

The Particle ׀ and Conditionality in Biblical Hebrew Revisited: A Cognitive Linguistic Account


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Declaration

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Abstract

The present work is an investigation into both the semantics and functions of the particle ׀, and the conditional and non-conditional constructions in which it is found in Biblical Hebrew. A fresh examination of the particle and conditionality in Biblical Hebrew is warranted for two reasons. First, recent studies of conditionality based on a cognitive-functional based classification of conditionals have yielded fruitful results, indicating that the function of conditionals contributes to their interpretation. This study seeks to determine if this schema yields a more satisfying account of conditionality in Biblical Hebrew, as well as a better understanding of verb use in these constructions, than the results proffered heretofore. Secondly, advances in the cognitive linguistic sub-theories of Mental Space Theory and Construction Grammar have been utilized in the abovementioned cognitive-functional studies of conditionality. This study applies these to the Biblical Hebrew data in order to provide a more comprehensive explanation of the semantics of ׀ and meaning construction in the constructions in which it is used.

This study will, therefore, offer an analysis of the different classes of ׀-conditional and non-conditional constructions (such as ׀... questions, ׀ ׀ and so forth). The semantics of the particle and the role it has in each construction is considered. Furthermore, this study investigates whether the aforementioned cognitive-functional schema yields generalizations regarding verb use that were not obtainable under the traditional framework.

The study confirms that ׀ is the prototypical hypothetical marker in Biblical Hebrew and that it functions to build different types of mental spaces. Contextual factors can conspire to promote non-hypothetical construals. Schematic semantic components of the particle, grounded in its role in conditionals, are employed in non-conditional constructions in order to build alternative and background-scenario spaces utilized in contextual meaning-construction.

Included in the study is an examination of the patterns of verb use in ׀-conditionals. A complex of factors including discourse type and context, viewpoint of the speaker responsible for the conditional (narrator or character), epistemic stance, and the location of the eventuality vis-à-vis the speech event crucially influences verb choice. Predictable patterns emerge and are discussed.

Opsomming

In hierdie werk word ondersoek ingestel na die semantiek en funksies van die partikel ׀, sowel as die voorwaardelike en nievoorwaardelike konstruksies waarin dit in Bybelse Hebreeus voorkom. 'n Vars ondersoek van die partikel en voorwaardelikheid in Bybelse Hebreeus word om twee redes as geregverdig beskou. Eerstens, onlangse studies oor voorwaardelikheid wat op 'n kognitief-funksioneel gemotiveerde klassifikasie van voorwaardelike konstruksies gegrond is, het vrugbare resultate opgelewer. Die fokus van die studie is om te bepaal of hierdie skema 'n meer bevredigende verklaring van voorwaardelikheid, en 'n duideliker begrip van die werkwoordgebruik in hierdie konstruksies, in Bybelse Hebreeus bied as die resultate wat tot dusver behaal is. Tweedens, vooruitgang in die kognitief-linguistiese subteorieë van Dinkruimteorie en Konstruksiegrammatika word vir die voormelde kognitief-funksionele studie van voorwaardelikheid gebruik. In die studie word dit op die data vir Bybelse Hebreeus toegepas om 'n meer omvattende verduideliking van die semantiek van ׀ en betekeniskonstruksie, in die konstruksies waarin dit gebruik word, te gee.

Daar word 'n ontleding van die verskillende klasse voorwaardelike en nievoorwaardelike ׀-konstruksies (׀...-vrae, ׀ ׀ en so meer) in die studie gegee. Die semantiek van die partikel en die rol wat dit in elke konstruksie vertolk, word oorweeg. Verder ondersoek die studie die moontlikheid of die gemelde kognitief-funksionele skema veralgemenings oor werkwoordgebruik oplewer wat die tradisionele raamwerk nie kon bied nie.

Die studie bevestig dat ׀ die prototipiese hipotetiese merker in Bybelse Hebreeus is en dat dit gebruik word om verskillende soorte dinkruimtes te skep. Kontekstuele faktore kan meewerk om niehipotetiese vertolkings te bevorder. Skematiese semantiese komponente van die partikel, in sy ondersteunende rol in voorwaardelikes, word in nievoorwaardelike konstruksies gebruik om alternatiewe en agtergrondscenario-ruimtes daar te stel wat vir kontekstuele betekeniskonstruksie aangewend word.

Daar word ook ondersoek ingestel na die patrone van werkwoordgebruik in ׀-voorwaardelikes. 'n Kompleks faktore, waaronder diskoerstipe en -konteks, die gesigspunt van die spreker (verteller of karakter) wat vir die voorwaardelike konstruksie verantwoordelik is, die epistemiese stand, en die plek van die eventualiteit vis-à-vis die spraakgebeure, is van deurslaggewende belang by werkwoordkeuse. Voorspelbare patrone kom te voorskyn en word bespreek.

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Dedication

To Annie

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Abbreviations

1PS	1 Person Singular
AltQ	Alternative question
AltQvN	Alternative question and negative
BH	Biblical Hebrew
CL	Cognitive Linguistics
Exis	Existential
MST	Mental Space Theory
N	Noun
Neg	Negative
P	Protasis
~P	Not (opposite of/alternative to) the Protasis
Part	Participle
PolQ	Polar question
PP	Preposition
Pro	Pronoun
Pt	Particle
Q	Apodosis
~Q	Not (opposite of/alternative to) the Apodosis
Quest	Question word
qat	Qatal
SA	Speech-act (conditional)
Sub	Subject
yiQ	Yiqtol
ASV	American Standard Version
BDB	Brown, F., S. R. Driver and C. A. Briggs. [1906] 2008. <i>The Brown-Driver-Briggs Hebrew and English Lexicon: With an Appendix Containing the Biblical Aramaic</i> . Peabody: Hendrickson Publisher.
BHRG	Van der Merwe, C. H. J., J. A. Naudé and J. H. Kroeze. (1999, Forthcoming). <i>A Biblical Hebrew Reference Grammar</i> . Biblical Languages: Hebrew 3. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press.
BWS	Bible Word Study
CEB	Common English Bible
CEV	Contemporary English Version
DCH	Clines, D. J. A., ed. 1993. <i>The Dictionary of Classical Hebrew</i> , Vol 1. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press.
DHH	Dios Habla Hoy
ESV	English Standard Version
GKC	<i>Gesenius' Hebrew Grammar</i> (ed. E. Kautzsch, revised and trans. A.E.Cowley: Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1910)

HALOT	Koehler, L. and W. Baumgartner. 2000. <i>The Hebrew and Aramaic Lexicon of the Old Testament</i> . Revised by W. Baumgartner and J. J. Stamm. Translated and edited by M. E. J. Richardson, 5 Vols. Leiden, 1994-2000 combined in one electronic edition. Logos Library System.
HB	Hebrew Bible
HCSB	Holman Christian Standard Bible
IBHS	Waltke, B. and M. O’Conner. 1990. <i>An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax</i> . Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns.
JBLMS	Journal of Biblical Literature Monograph Series
JFA	João Ferreira de Alameida 1993
NASB	New American Standard Bible
NCV	New Century Version
NET	New English Translation
NIDOTTE	VanGemeren, W. A., ed. <i>New International Dictionary of Old Testament Theology and Exegesis</i> , Logos Bible Software, Electronic Edition. Grand Rapids: Zondervan.
NIV	New International Version
NKJ	New King James Version
NLT	New Living Translation
NRSV	New Revised Standard Version
NT	New Testament
NTLH	Nova Tradução na Linguagem de Hoje
NTV	Nueva Traducción Viviente
NVI	Nueva Versión Internacional
NVI-PT	Nova Versão Internacional
OT	Old Testament
OTS	<i>Oudtestamentische Studiën</i>
PDPT	Palabra de Dios para Todos
RV	Reina Valera 1960
RV95	Reina Valera 1995
SESB	Stuttgart Electronic Study Bible

Chapter 1: Introduction

This is a cognitivist study of ׀א, a Biblical Hebrew (BH) particle, and the constructions in which it was used. This study was prompted by my personal research of cognitive linguistics in general, and more specifically the cognitive linguistic sub-theories of Mental Space Theory (MST), a cognitivist theory of information processing proposed by Fauconnier ([1985] 1994; 1997), and Construction Grammar as elaborated by Goldberg (1995; 2006a, b).¹ Cognitive linguistics maintains that constructions (such as conditionals) “have particular formal grammatical patterns associated with them” (Evans and Green 2006: 13). Traditional studies of conditionals have used a truth-conditional, degree of hypotheticality schema for analyzing and categorizing conditionals. A cognitive linguistics based study by Sweetser (1990) built on work done by speech act theorists and pragmatics scholars on conditionals. She questioned the usefulness of the traditional paradigm and suggested a cognitive domain based description of conditionals that recognized the purposes for which speakers use them. This proposal was elaborated on in Dancygier (1998) and Dancygier and Sweetser (2005) where MST was fruitfully applied to a detailed analysis of conditionality and conditionals in English. These studies demonstrated clear correlations between different types of conditionals and particular grammatical details such as the verb form used therein.

Literature on the particle ׀א and the conditionals (and non-conditionals) in which it was used in Biblical Hebrew (BH) reveals that few form-function correlations have been determined using the traditional analytical framework based on degrees of hypotheticality. This lack of association was especially true of correlations regarding the verb forms used in different classes of conditionals.

In the traditional grammars, the particle ׀א is treated as though it is profoundly polysemous and is described as occurring in multiple, unrelated types of BH constructions. These constructions are typically described in the literature as conditionals (1-3), interrogatives (4), disjunctives (5), and relative clauses (׀א ׁד in example 6).

(1) Gen. 32:9 (Eng. 32:8)

וַיֹּאמֶר אֱם־יִבּוֹא עֲשׂוֹ אֶל־הַמַּחֲנֶה הָאֶחָד וְהִכָּהוּ
וְהָיָה הַמַּחֲנֶה הַנּוֹשֵׂאֹר לְפָלִיטָה:

He thought, If Esau meets the first camp and attacks it, at least one camp will be left to escape. (CEB)²

¹ See Chapter 3.4 for a discussion of Mental Space Theory and Construction Grammar.

² All citations are NRSV unless otherwise noted.

(2) Exod. 20:25

וְאִם-מִזְבֵּחַ אֲבָנִים תַּעֲשֶׂה-לִּי לֹא-תִבְנֶה אֶתְהֶן
גִּזִּית כִּי חֲרַבְךָ הַנֶּפֶת עָלֶיהָ וְתַחֲלִלָהּ:

But if you make for me an altar of stone, do not build it of hewn stones; for if you use a chisel upon it you profane it.

(3) 1 Sam. 20:8

וְעָשִׂיתָ חֶסֶד עַל-עַבְדְּךָ כִּי בְּבְרִית יְהוָה הִבָּאתָ
אֶת-עַבְדְּךָ עִמָּךְ וְאִם-יִשְׁכַּח עִוֹן הַמִּיתָנִי אֲתָהּ

Therefore deal kindly with your servant, for you have brought your servant into a sacred covenant with you. But if there is guilt in me, kill me yourself.

(4) 2 Sam. 19:36

בְּיָשָׁמַנִּים שָׁנָה אֲנִי הַיּוֹם הַאֲדַע | בֵּין-טוֹב לְרָע
אִם-יִטְעַם עַבְדְּךָ אֶת-אֲשֶׁר אֵכֵל וְאֶת-אֲשֶׁר
אֲשָׁתָה אִם-אֲשַׁמַּע עוֹד בְּקוֹל שָׂרִים וְשָׂרוֹת

Today I am eighty years old; can I discern what is pleasant and what is not? Can your servant taste what he eats or what he drinks? Can I still listen to the voice of singing men and singing women?

(5) Exod. 19:13

לֹא-תִגַּע בּוֹ יָד כִּי-סִקּוֹל יִסְקֹל אוֹ-יָרֵחַ יִיָּרֶה אִם-
בְּהֵמָה אִם-אִישׁ לֹא יִחִיָּה

No hand shall touch them, but they shall be stoned or shot with arrows; whether animal or human being, they shall not live.

(6) Isa. 30:17

אֶלֶף אָחָד מִפְּנֵי גַעְרַת אָחָד מִפְּנֵי גַעְרַת חִמְשָׁה
תִּנָּסוּ עַד אִם-נֹתְרֵתֶם כְּתֹרֵן עַל-רֹאשׁ הַהָר וְכִנֹּס
עַל-הַגְּבֻעָה:

A thousand shall flee at the threat of one, at the threat of five you shall flee, until you are left like a flagstaff on the top of a mountain, like a signal on a hill.

HALOT (2000: 40) classifies אִם as a deictic and lists the types of clauses in which it occurs as realizable and unrealizable conditionals, desiderative clauses, oaths, interrogatives, disjunctives and concessives and “collocations”. DCH (1993: 301-307) categorizes אִם as a conjunction and lists nine types of structures in which it is found: conditionals, oaths, where it additionally functions as an asseverative particle, interrogatives, disjunctives (meaning *or*), concessives, desideratives, relative clauses (in אִם עַד constructions) and in adversative/exceptive constructions (meaning *but, rather*). BDB ([1906] 2008: 49-50) also classifies אִם as a conjunction but takes a “joiner” approach to the various conditional type structures that

HALOT and Clines distinguish. This lexicon offers just two categories of conjunctive uses, namely as a hypothetical particle and an interrogative particle.

Traditional grammars such as Ewald (1891) and Gesenius-Kautzsch-Cowley (1910),³ and more modern ones such as Waltke and O' Connor (1990)⁴ and the Biblical Hebrew Reference Grammar (Van der Merwe, Naudé and Kroeze 1999)⁵ describe and classify the uses of ׀ in similar fashion to the lexicons.

The treatment of the particle in the lexicons and grammars leaves some questions unanswered. For one, how should ׀ be classified? The detailed agreement on the descriptive level in the grammars and lexicons regarding the diverse types of structures in which ׀ occurs conceals an uncertainty regarding the semantics of the particle: Is it a deictic as HALOT asserts, or is it a conjunction as BDB and DCH state? If a deictic, what does it specify? If a conjunction, is this actually its function in examples (5) and (6)? These questions have not been thoroughly explored.

Secondly, while the grammars and lexicons offer detailed description of the structures in which ׀ is found, they do not explain why this one particle could be used in such disparate constructions as conditionals, disjunctives and interrogatives. The grammars and lexicons classify ׀ as an interrogative since it occurs frequently in ׀ questions (92 times) and allegedly in a few non ׀ questions. Despite the fact that Biblical Hebrew had a robust repertoire of question words, there is no discussion in the literature that seeks to explain how, or why, a prototypical hypothetical particle could acquire the semantics of a question word. Similarly, although all the literature notes that ׀ occurs in disjunctive structures like those in (5), an analysis of the semantic component(s) of the particle that licensed this use has not been presented.

The grammars and lexicons correctly note that ׀ is primarily used in conditionals. Indeed, more than 900 of its 1,060 uses in the BH corpus are found in conditional constructions. Accordingly, the primary focus of an early study by Ferguson (1882) and a later analysis by Van Leeuwen (1973) was to describe both the types of conditionals in which ׀ occurs and the verb forms found in these conditionals.

Biblical Hebrew ׀ conditionals have historically been analyzed using a metric of “degree of hypotheticality” (real—capable of fulfillment; unreal—counterfactual) or “degree of

³ Henceforth GKC.

⁴ Henceforth IBHS.

⁵ Henceforth BHRG.

certainty” that has been employed for centuries in analyzing conditionals in Classical and Koine Greek⁶ and Latin.⁷ This schema has employed a four-fold system of hypotheticality exemplified in Ferguson (1882: 59).

Class 1 assumes the conditional to be real or actual.

Class 2 assumes the conditional to be probable.

Class 3 makes no assumption about the probability of fulfillment and is “indefinite”.

Class 4 assumes the condition is impossible or counterfactual.

Van Leeuwen’s (1973: 19) more recent claim that “conditional sentences can best be differentiated according to the degree of certainty expressed in the condition clause” demonstrates the enduring strength of this framework for the analysis of \square conditionals, despite its persistent inability to provide generalizations about real-world conditionals.⁸ This schema is on display in the early analyses of Driver (1874), Ferguson (1882: 59), GKC and in later works such as Van Leeuwen (1973), Spradlin (1991), Tjen (2010: 12) and contemporary grammars such as IBHS (1990: 636-638).

Because the protasis (P) clause is where degree of conditionality is expressed, the P clause is the focus of analysis for category determination and verb distribution in studies that employ the degree of hypotheticality/certainty categorization schema. This constrains the explanatory power of analyses based on this type of schema since the pragmatic function of a conditional is expressed in the main (Q) clause, not the P clause.

Comrie (1986: 93) notes that cross-linguistically, the degree of hypotheticality of conditionals is most commonly signaled by the tense, or time reference of the verb. Almost every study of English and other Indo-European language conditionals grounds its analyses on verbal cues, because in these languages an analysis that utilizes tense is productive and results in useful generalizations. Both Ferguson (1882: 59, 62) and Van Leeuwen (1973: 19, 23) have a strict tense-based understanding of the BH verb system. Based on this they concur that *yiqtol*s typically express Class 2 and 3 conditionals (unfulfilled) and *qatal*s are used for class 1 and 4 conditionals (fulfilled). Yet they cannot explain the many exceptions. As Ferguson (1882:

⁶ See Dana and Mantey (1955: 286-290); Robertson (1934: 1004-1027).

⁷ See Keller and Russell (2003: 93-95; 133-135).

⁸ Describing this system, Comrie (1986:88) observes that “most of these accounts...assume a neat...division with a clear-cut boundary between the...types.” He views hypotheticality as a continuum along which “different languages simply distinguish different degrees of hypotheticality” determined not by truth-conditional semantics but instead by the “subjective evaluation” of the speaker, hearer or reader. In his system, pragmatics, not truth values, contributes to interpretation of the degree of hypotheticality.

47) notes, “The Perfect [*qatal*] is, however, frequently found in the Protasis in cases where it is difficult at first sight to detect any reason for preferring it to the Imperfect [*yiqtol*].” Van Leeuwen (1973: 22) recognizes that both *yiqtols* and *qatals* are found in the conditionals used in legal texts, but he can’t explain why. This calls into serious question the analytical usefulness of the degree-of-hypotheticality framework for BH conditionals.

In the last thirty years, scholars of pragmatics and speech act theorists have identified conditional forms used to perform speech acts,⁹ initiating an analytical tradition alongside the traditional one. This recent programme presents problems for the philosophical-logical framework on which the above-noted classification system traditionally used to analyze BH conditionals is based.

For instance, there is agreement that \square occurs in prototypical *if-then* conditional constructions such as (1) and that in these contexts, it has a semantic value similar to that of English *if*. This type of conditional is amenable to a traditional truth-functional system traditionally used to analyze conditionals.¹⁰ However, for a logician, examples (2) and (3) would not be acceptable examples of “real” conditionals because they cannot be analyzed for their truth values since the apodosis in each is a directive and speak-acts are unanalyzable for truth values.¹¹ The lexicons and grammars do not distinguish between these “nonconditional uses of the conditional constructions” (Gauker 2005: 2) and “real” conditionals. GKC, for example, makes no distinction between these types of conditionals and lists example (2) alongside examples similar to (1) (GKC: §159r).

As I noted above, Sweetser (1990) proposed a framework elaborated on in Dancygier and Sweetser (2005) that rejects the traditional degree of hypotheticality analysis. They proposed instead that conditionals be classified according to the cognitive based domains their reasoning and function reflect, yielding predictive content conditionals, epistemic conditionals, generic conditionals and a variegated set of speech act conditionals such as conditional directives and questions.¹² This approach has been fruitfully applied to the study of conditionals in languages as diverse as Spanish,¹³ Serbian and Polish,¹⁴ and Chinese.¹⁵

⁹ See for example Akatsuka (1986); Fillenbaum (1975; 1986); Sweetser (1990); Van der Auwera (1986).

¹⁰ See Chapter 3.5.1 for discussion.

¹¹ Gauker (2005: 2) classifies these uses as “nonconditional uses of the conditional construction.”

¹² See Chapter 3.6 for a thorough explanation of this proposal.

¹³ See Schwenter (1999).

¹⁴ See Dancygier and Trnavac (2007).

¹⁵ See Xu (2015).

They assert that speech act conditionals (speech acts that are conditionally asserted) such as those in (7) are not used to deliberate about the degree of hypotheticality of the conditional P clause.

- (7) a. Conditional speech act directive: *If it rains tomorrow, cover the tennis court.*
 b. Conditional speech act promise: *If you graduate, you will get a new car.*
 c. Conditional speech act warning: *If you don't do your homework, you will not be allowed to take the car.*

Speakers use these speech act conditionals to give commands (7a), make promises (7b) and issue warnings (7c). The protasis is used to set the condition that must obtain for the command, promise or warning to be enacted. These common, ordinary types of conditionals are not used for speculating about what degree of certainty there might be that the protasis will be realized. Yet this has been the prime concern of and the metric employed for categorizing conditionals in every previous study of \square and all the conditional and non-conditional constructions in which it is used.

As will be demonstrated, speech act conditionals represent the overwhelming majority of conditionals in the BH corpus. Most studies of \square and \square conditionals were written before this conceptual framework was available for use. One of the purposes of this study is to apply Sweetser and Dancygier's framework to an analysis of \square conditionals and their verb forms in order to determine if generalizations exist which were not observable via the traditional framework.

Observations made in Van Leeuwen (1973) regarding verb form usage are representative of the issues this study seeks to investigate. Following in the tradition of Ferguson (1882), Van Leeuwen (1973: 19), Van Leeuwen uses four categories of certainty for classifying \square conditionals.¹⁶ In his category C¹⁷ he places conditionals which he interprets as exhibiting “the possibility of the realization of the condition – be it in the present or future – which is assumed by the speaker, though the actual realization is regarded as not quite certain” (Van Leeuwen 1973: 23).¹⁸ In this category he combines what I will classify as a conditional speech act directive in (8), which, since it is a directive is not considered to be a “real” conditional, and

¹⁶ These are presented in Chapter 2.4.3.

¹⁷ This is comparable to Ferguson's (1882) Class 2 conditional, noted above.

¹⁸ “Die Möglichkeit von der Verwirklichung der Bedingung—sei es in Gegenwart oder Zukunft—wird vom Redenden ohne weiteres angenommen, die tatsächliche Realisierung aber als nicht ganz sicher betrachtet.”

the generic predictive conditional in (9), which is considered to be a “real” conditional since it is amenable to truth-conditional analysis (Van Leeuwen 1973: 24).¹⁹

(8) 1 Sam. 20:8

וְעָשִׂיתָ חֶסֶד עַל־עַבְדְּךָ כִּי בִבְרִית יְהוָה הִבֵּאתָ
אֶת־עַבְדְּךָ עִמָּךְ וְאִם־יִשְׁכַּח עוֹן הַמִּיתָנִי אֶתָּה

Show loyalty to your servant, because you have brought your servant into a covenant of YHWH with you. But if there is guilt in me, kill me yourself. (My translation).

(9) Qoh. 11:3a

אִם־יִמְלְאוּ הָעַבִּים גְּשָׁם עַל־הָאָרֶץ יִרְיָקוּ

If clouds fill up, they will empty out rain on the earth. (CEB)

The degree of hypotheticality schema employed by Van Leeuwen constrains him to focus on explaining only P clause verb use. He merely notes that “the consequent clause can be formed in a variety of ways” (1973: 19) and does not seek to explain why both an imperative (הַמִּיתָנִי) and a non-jussive *yiqtol* (יִרְיָקוּ) are found in the Q clauses of conditionals which he classifies as an equivalent category of conditional.

This confusion is continued when Van Leeuwen classifies another conditional speech act directive seen in (10), not in Category C, but in category A, in which, “The condition is already conclusively completed or will in the future be represented as having been fulfilled”²⁰ (Van Leeuwen 1973: 19).

(10) Num. 22:20

וַיָּבֹא אֱלֹהִים | אֶל־בַּלְעָם לַיְלָה וַיֹּאמֶר לוֹ אִם־
לְקָרָא לָךְ בָּאוּ הָאֲנָשִׁים קוֹם לֵךְ אִתָּם

God came to Balaam at night and said to him, “If it is in order to summon you the men came, get up and go with them....” (My translation)

However, the *qatal* בָּאוּ in the P clause of this verse is not used to indicate YHWH’s reasoning in the epistemic domain regarding the certainty of the information in the P clause. Instead, it is used because the event is known to the narrator and reader to have occurred prior to the time of the speech. But more importantly, if the conditional was representing a degree of certainty regarding the information in the clause, it would not be about the *qatal* verb בָּאוּ, as Van Leeuwen states, but about לְקָרָא — whether they came to call Balaam or not. Their

¹⁹ See Chapter 3.6 for an explanation of these categories.

²⁰ “Die Bedingung ist in der Vergangenheit schon abschliessend erfüllt worden oder wird als in der Zukunft schon verwirklicht dargestellt.”

motivation for coming is the question under discussion, not their arrival in and of itself. However, the purpose of the conditional in (10) is to give a command, as the Q clause imperatives קום לך indicate. The P clause is used to provide the context in which the directive קום לך is to be interpreted and obeyed, not to reason about the degree of certainty of its fulfillment.²¹ Van Leeuwen's framework has prompted him to place two conditional speech act directives, each with Q clause imperatives and each of which have the same functional purpose in two separate categories of conditionals, indicating he does not consider the P clauses to be equally hypothetical. A central purpose of this study is to determine if a different metric based on pragmatic function yields a more adequate description of these conditionals.

The focus on “certainty” or degree of hypotheticality also leads Van Leeuwen to group content conditionals (characterized by alternative-based prediction in the real “content” domain),²² and speech act conditionals together. For example, Van Leeuwen considers the speech act conditional (a directive) found in (8) to belong to the same category as the predictive content conditional in (11).

(11) Deut. 5:25

<p>וַעֲתָה לָמָּה נָמוּת כִּי תֹאבְּלֵנוּ הָאֵשׁ הַגְּדֹלָה הַזֹּאת אִם-יִסְפָּקִים אֲנַחְנוּ לְשִׁמְעַ אֶת-קוֹל יְהוָה אֲלֵהִינוּ עוֹד וּמָתְנוּ:</p>	<p>So now why should we die? For this great fire will consume us; if we hear the voice of the Lord our God any longer, we shall die.</p>
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Additionally, as will be discussed, although generic conditionals²³ contrast with speech act conditionals on numerous levels, Van Leeuwen classifies the generic conditional in Prov. 9:12, shown in (12), in the same category A as (3), presumably because he construes the protasis as being “conclusively completed or will in the future be represented as having been fulfilled.”

(12) Prov. 9:12a

<p>אִם-חֲכִמָּתָ חֲכִמָּתָ לָךְ</p>	<p>If you are wise, you are wise for yourself.</p>
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He assigns both to the same category because he interprets the *qatal* forms found in the P clauses of both verses as indicating the writer's and speaker's attitude toward the condition.

²¹ The marked word order of the P clause אם יקרא לך באו emphasizes the concern of the speaker to communicate that the question under discussion is their motivation for coming.

²² An explanation for these categories is found in Chapter 3.6.

²³ Conditionals that state generic truths such as “If you heat water to 100 degrees, it boils.”

Significant pragmatic differences²⁴ between the two very different types of conditionals are ignored when they are grouped into a single category.

The above examples indicate that the “degree of certainty” or hypotheticality schema for conditionals has yielded few useful generalizations. In a language like English where degree of certainty is more explicitly indicated via modals (such as *may*, *might*, *will*) and verb forms, this metric offers more advantages. BH does not lexicalize modality as explicitly or extensively as English does,²⁵ and if the morphology (and intonation) did indicate degrees of certainty when BH was a spoken language, that information has been lost. BH verb phrases and forms provide little explicit information useful for determining levels of “certainty”. The level of frustration one encounters is evident in Cook’s (2012: 233) statement that “it is well-nigh impossible at this point in our knowledge to be able to predict whether a conditional apodosis might more likely feature an irrealis *qatal* or an irrealis *yaqtol* form.”

It is therefore now reasonable to argue that the degree of hypotheticality framework traditionally employed for analyzing BH conditionals has yielded few satisfying generalizations and its usefulness can be called into question. Reconsideration of the methodology is warranted because it seems to disallow generalities that might be obtainable if function (as opposed to degree of hypotheticality) were seen to contribute to interpretation.

To recap, the traditional grammars, lexicons and literature have adequately described the numerous constructions in which 𐤒𐤍 occurs. The lists of translation options they offer for 𐤒𐤍 suggest a position that the particle is profoundly polysemous, yet these sources do not explain why this is so, or propose how this apparent polysemy developed. The theoretical framework employed in existing studies of 𐤒𐤍 ’s use in conditionals has yielded few widely applicable generalizations. This appears to be a consequence of the traditional classification system itself. Determination of degree of hypotheticality of the subordinate P clause crucially depends on the reader’s construal of the writer’s intent conveyed especially via the verb forms of the P clause. Yet, if anything is true about our understanding of the BH verb system, it is that we don’t understand how or if it communicated modal categories similar to those used by most BH interpreters, whose cognitive interpretive categories are rooted in the modal categories of (principally) modern Indo-European languages.

The guiding hypothesis of this study is that a more unified and comprehensive account of (1) the semantics of the particle 𐤒𐤍 in its uses in conditional and non-conditional

²⁴ Generic conditionals are used to make predictions regarding classes of entities, states or events while conditional speech act directives are used to give commands (which are valid only if the condition is fulfilled).

²⁵ The infinitive absolute-*yaqtol* and infinitive absolute-*qatal* constructions are examples of lexicalized modality.

constructions and (2) the use and characteristics of BH conditionals is possible by means of the application of a cognitive-functional framework to the BH data. Dancygier (1998: 4) has stated “what is it that . . . various conditionals share over and above the notorious **if p, q?**” If we can identify a common function . . . it will then be possible to examine the ways in which interpretations are based on that common function, in combination with the meanings contributed by other formal elements (verb forms, clause order, etc.) and with contextual factors.” Dancygier and Sweetser (2005: 16) concur that “conditional constructions vary widely in function” and that “it would be economical and elegant to be able to attribute some of this functional diversity to a few specific parameters of interpretation.”

This study will, therefore, seek to apply a distinct conceptual framework, namely the cognitivist, functional framework (proposed in Sweetser (1990) and elaborated on in Dancygier (1998) and, especially, in Dancygier and Sweetser (2005)) to all uses of the particle ׀ in conditionals in the Hebrew Bible, in order to discover whether a more adequate description is obtainable of both ׀ and the constructions in which it is used.

This study will make extensive use of Mental Space Theory (MST), a cognitivist theory of information processing proposed by Fauconnier ([1985] 1994; 1997) and limited use of concepts from Construction Grammar as elaborated by Goldberg (1995; 2006a, b) in order to investigate: 1) why ׀ could be used in the diverse, above-noted types of conditional and non-conditional constructions and 2) the use of verb forms in ׀ conditionals classified according to the framework proposed by Sweetser.

Methodologically, verb form counts will be restricted to the first verb in the protasis and the first verb in the apodosis in any one conditional. This means that verbs use in second and even third clauses are not included in counts. When appropriate, remarks will be offered regarding these clauses. However the inclusion of these additional counts did not affect the findings of this study. Using a corpus-based approach, these measures will be applied to the Hebrew of the Hebrew Bible as found in the *Biblica Hebraica Stuttgartensia*, SESB 2.0.

This study seeks to make three main contributions to previous research. First, it will be argued that ׀ is not as polysemous as the literature suggests. Instead it will be argued that the hypotheticality is central to the semantics of the particle and consequently, ׀ is a mental space-builder.²⁶ This study will propose that specific characteristics of the particle’s space-

²⁶ See Chapter 3.4 for discussion of this concept.

building function in conditional constructions license its use in non-conditional constructions such as those in examples (4-6) above.

Secondly, it will be argued that principled generalizations regarding verb use in אם conditionals are obtainable when the cognitive-based categories proposed by Sweetser and Dancygier are applied to BH conditionals. Form will be shown to be related to the pragmatic function of the conditional. Finally, it will be argued that insights from Construction Grammar have more explanatory power than previous analyses when applied to constructions such as אם...ה and כי אם .

In order to do this, Chapter 2 will present an overview of the state of the literature pertaining to the particle אם and its use in conditional and non-conditional constructions in order to demonstrate: 1) that the taxonomic descriptions of the constructions in which אם occurs do not propose solutions to the polysemy these descriptions depict and 2) that the traditional model employed in the literature for classifying the conditionals has failed to provide principled classifications of the conditionals themselves, nor satisfying analyses and explanations of the verb forms used in these conditionals.

Chapter 3 will describe the theoretical frameworks employed in this study. It will provide an introduction to cognitive linguistics and its sub-theories of Mental Space Theory and Construction Grammar. The chapter will also define and describe the categories of conditionals proposed by Sweetser (1990) and Dancygier and Sweetser (2005). These categories will be used in Chapter 4 to categorize all אם conditionals in the BH corpus. This will be crucial to a principled analysis of verb forms and allow for discovery of correlations between the type and function of the conditionals, their interpretation, and the verb form used therein.

Chapters 4 and 5 will apply the theories presented in Chapter 3 to an analysis of אם and the constructions in which it was used. The discussion in Chapter 4 will examine אם 's use in BH conditionals, classify conditionals per the framework discussed in Chapter 3 and examine the verb forms found in these conditionals. Results of the analysis of verb forms in all אם conditionals will be presented and generalizations described. Specific concepts developed in MST that describe the function of particles (like אם conditionals) will be implemented. These will also be used to offer a more adequate explanation of the semantic components of אם that license its use in the non-conditionals examined in Chapter 5.

Chapter 5 will examine occurrences of אם in non-conditional constructions. The specific semantic components of אם that license its use in non-conditional constructions will be

described and correlations to its use in conditionals explained. In each chapter, examples will be taken from the entire Biblical Hebrew corpus.

In Chapter 6 a summary and conclusions will be presented. These will summarize the results of the study that applied Sweetser's categorization model. It will explain how the model offers a more adequate description of the semantics of ׀ and the constructions in which it is used than the traditional model. It will also indicate how the model permits generalizations about the use of verb forms in conditionals, generalizations not recoverable via the traditional categorization schema.

Chapter 2: Literature on the Lexeme ׀ and Biblical Hebrew Conditionals

2.0. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to review previous literature on the particle ׀ and its use in both conditionals and non-conditional structures in order to substantiate the hypotheses that (1) current inadequacies in the description of the semantics and function of ׀ are predominantly attributable to the theoretical frames employed in said descriptions and that (2) the development of cognitive linguistic approaches to information processing and the uses of conditionals hold the key to a more satisfying explanation for the variegated uses of ׀ in the Hebrew Bible.

This chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.1 will present a synopsis of the intellectual and linguistic trends that influenced and informed the research of Biblical Hebrew from the Middle Ages to the present in order to better understand how the analysis of ׀ was shaped by changing paradigms over time. Section 2.2 reviews the analyses offered in lexicons and dictionaries of Biblical Hebrew, while section 2.3 examines how traditional and modern grammars describe ׀ and the constructions in which it is used. Section 2.4 surveys the findings of monograph studies of the particle.

Via a survey of these previous studies, this chapter will demonstrate that, although descriptive analyses of ׀ are presented in the literature, many questions persist about the semantics of the particle that license its use in unrelated grammatical constructions. Additionally, the chapter will demonstrate that uncertainties persist regarding both the function of conditionals in BH and what motivated verb choice in conditionals.

2.1. Synopsis of the History of Linguistic Inquiry

Scientific inquiry in every era is shaped by the general intellectual trends of that period. “The definition of the object of study, or less formally, the basic beliefs about the nature of this object, constitute some of the most central philosophical elements of the scientific idea system” (Amsterdamska 1987: 220). The study of BH has not been immune to past or current philosophical currents; on the contrary the grammars reflect them in their analytical approaches to Biblical Hebrew. Since this study will be critiquing the standard grammars, lexicons and other works from a linguistic perspective, a brief overview of the dominant linguistic theories and trends that have informed researchers will provide a useful lens through which the various grammars can be understood.

Any starting point for an overview of BH studies will inevitably be disputed. Very early mention of certain linguistic aspects of Hebrew in the Talmudic period are noted by Khan (1999: 193), but he emphasizes that it “is important to notice, however, that the existence of these elements of grammatical thought should not lead us to define the general activity of the Masoretes of this period as ‘grammar’ . . . The use of grammatical categories was ancillary to [their] purpose.”

A convenient place to begin this discussion is in the Middle Ages. Waltke and O’Connor (1990: 31) propose the following periods during which the study of Hebrew took on a more systematic and grammatical sophistication:

1. Medieval Jewish Studies (11th to 16th centuries)
2. Christian Hebrew Studies (16th to mid-18th centuries)

In the early part of the period of Medieval Jewish Studies, Arabic grammars provided the vocabulary used by the early Jewish grammarians. David Kimḥi’s *Mikhol* is an example of work from this era, which saw increasingly sophisticated discussions of Hebrew morphology and syntax.

The dual influences of the Reformation and the Enlightenment stimulated scholarly Christian interest in the study of Hebrew. But as Christian interest grew, Jewish interest in Hebrew grammar waned. Based on David or Moses Kimhi’s work, Johann Reuchlin’s *Rudimenta linguae hebraicae* (1506) “established the study of Hebrew grammar in the Christian European world” (IBHS: 38). Reuchlin’s *Rudimenta* is notable for the strategy he employed in his approach to Hebrew because he compared it to Latin rather than Arabic. Waltke and O’Conner (1990: 40) conclude their survey of this time period with the observation that “the vast majority of Hebrew grammars did little to advance the scientific study of the language”. That said, it is important to realize that these grammatical studies must be situated in their historical milieu. Any pre-1900s linguistic studies are pre-modern-scientific era work. They do not contain “descriptions in terms of one or another explicit linguistic framework” (Van der Merwe 1991: 129) and as such they cannot be held to today’s standards since “the adequacy of the individual grammarian’s explanation depends on the adequacy of the theory” used (Van der Merwe 1991: 178). They were formative works and need to be appreciated as such.

Romanticism as a philosophical movement pervasively influenced European thought and scholarly inquiry from the late 1700s through the early-nineteenth century, and the study of language did not escape its influence. “Romanticism not only provided a general stimulus and legitimation to the study of comparative grammar, but by supplying the early linguists with

certain conceptual resources it shaped the manner in which they formulated problems and defined the goals of their research” (Amsterdamska 1987: 38). From the mid-18th century through the early 1900s, diachronic, developmental theories of languages drove the historical-comparative approach to Hebrew studies. Hebrew was initially compared to Arabic (a reflection of the early Jewish grammarians) and Aramaic, and later to Akkadian.

“The history and comparison of languages is the hallmark of nineteenth century linguistics. . . . This approach pervaded the century, and came to be viewed as the only ‘scientific’ approach to language” (Morpurgo-Davies 1992: 159). It was precisely during this period that Heinrich Ewald and Wilhelm Gesenius produced their seminal works. In Gesenius’ 1909 grammar, *Hebräische Grammatik* and all subsequent versions, the broader linguistic influence of the time is seen in Gesenius’ comment that the Semitic languages “stand to one another in much the same relation as those of the Germanic family” and in his comment that “the grammatical structure of the Semitic family of languages, as compared with that of other languages, especially the Indo-Germanic, exhibits numerous peculiarities.” (GKC §1k). This conceptualization of Hebrew and the historical-comparative paradigm for the study of Hebrew²⁷ is evident in other pre-Saussure grammars such as Driver (1874),²⁸ König, Brockelmann and Bergsträsser (IBHS: 42), and even in twentieth century works such as Joüon and Muraoka’s *A Grammar of Biblical Hebrew*.²⁹

Amsterdamska (1987: 39) points out that the “romantically inspired concept of language as an organism was combined with a belief in the value of the original and uncorrupted language” and that this understanding of language as an organism and of its history as a fall from perfection was translated into a methodological directive to study the history of morphological categories.” Additionally, the Romantic era concept that languages were somehow organic in nature resulted in them being “viewed as devolving entities, proceeding over the course of time and use from being grammatically intact and aesthetically pristine to becoming incomplete and corrupted” (Korchin 2008: 2). Gesenius (GKC [1909] 2006: §1m) reflects this belief in his comments on Hebrew, Aramaic and Arabic when he notes that:

The organic structure of a language is often considerably impaired even before it has developed a literature.... Thus the Aramaic dialects exhibit the earliest and greatest decay, next to them the Hebrew-Canaanitish. Arabic,

²⁷ See also BHRG (Forthcoming: 18-19).

²⁸ Though, it must be noted that Driver displayed a distinct reticence for using comparative and historical evidence to support his work (Driver 1998: xxx).

²⁹ See J-M (2006: §133b).

owing to the seclusion of the desert tribes was the longest to retain the original fullness and purity of the sounds.

The reference to “purity of sounds” reflects the historical-comparative school’s focus on phonological reconstruction.³⁰

In summary, Hebrew grammars and analytical works informed by the historical-comparative linguistics and imbued with a Romantic era view of language include: Ewald, GKC, König, Driver and Ferguson. Lingering effects are noted in J-M.

Ferdinand de Saussure’s work instigated what became a Kuhnian paradigm shift (Kuhn 1996) in linguistics, from the historical-comparative model to what eventually became known as Structuralism.³¹ As Korchin notes regarding the published notes of de Saussure’s lectures: “The *Cours de linguistique générale* revolutionized linguistics by shifting the object of study in language from essence to relation, and from substance to form” (Korchin 2008: 13). Programmatically, structuralism has several foci relevant to understanding the orientation of Hebrew grammars, lexicons and scholarly writings of much of the twentieth century. Talmy Givón (2011: 6) notes that “F. de Saussure (1915) elaborated the three central dogmas of structuralism:

•**arbitrariness:** The detachment of the visible signal from invisible mental—purposive—correlates.

•**idealization:** The reification of the underlying system--*langue*--as against the on-line behavior--*parole*.

•**segregation:** The detachment of synchrony (product) from diachrony (process).

The concept contained in Leonard Bloomfield’s (1933: 20) contention that “the only useful generalizations about language are inductive generalization” together with de Saussure’s structuralism led to a strong emphasis on the inductive description of synchronic language data, as opposed to its diachronic development (the focus of historical-comparative linguistic endeavor). As Kemmer comments, “the focus was on [syntactic] structure” (Kemmer 2011: 6) as opposed to function. The attention given to the descriptive study of synchronic data

³⁰ See Amsterdamska (1987: 53).

³¹ See Amsterdamska (1987: 232-233) for a nuanced study of de Saussure’s program. See also Korchin (2008: 4-20); Sampson (1980) for a brief overview of de Saussure’s program and structuralism; also see Givón (2011) for a broader outline reaching back to Aristotle.

coupled with the rising study of non-Indo-European languages led linguists to repudiate the idea of an ideal language and to see language as relative.

One significant result for Hebrew studies was that the language was no longer viewed as a special language of heaven, but as one displaying all the idiosyncrasies of any other language. At the same time, the emphasis on the arbitrariness and relativity of language meant that universals in language were not entertained as part of the program of study, isolating the study of Hebrew from typologically similar languages. However, as Van der Merwe (1987: 168) has pointed out,

The publications of De Saussure which appeared from 1878 to 1916 and are considered as the foundations of modern linguistics, initially had little influence on the description of Old Hebrew. Despite the fact that De Saussure had shown that in the description of language it is absolutely necessary to make a distinction between the diachronic and synchronic aspects of the language, Old Hebrew grammarians continued with their historical-comparative approach which ignored such a distinction.

In the 1960s several linguistic programs emerged, firmly situated within the broad outlines of structuralism and descriptive linguistics, that have had varying degrees of impact on the study of BH. The first was Noam Chomsky's transformational-generative program.³² Chomsky focused on an "idealized speaker-listener, in a completely homogeneous speech-community, who knows its language perfectly and is unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory limitation, distractions, shifts of attention and interest, and errors" (Chomsky 1965: 3). Chomsky's work has had a relatively minor impact on the study of BH, apart from the reaction and development of functionalism and cognitive oriented linguistics, which are currently providing new tools for the study of BH.

Secondly, in the late 1960s Simon Dik and Michael Halliday, influenced by the Prague School,³³ developed functional grammar "as an alternative to the abstract, formalized view of language" (BHRG Forthcoming: 21) characteristic of both Chomsky's programme and structuralism (Givón 2011: 9).³⁴ Whereas structuralism concentrated on the form or the structure of languages and is not concerned about the function of the forms, "functionalists agree that formal categories of language arise through use, developing in the individual and

³² See also Van der Merwe (2003: 15-17) and BHRG (Forthcoming: 20-21) for further discussion of Chomsky's influence on the study of BH and a summary of significant generative-based studies.

³³ See Bussmann (1996: 928-929) for a concise description of the distinctive premises of the Prague School.

³⁴ For a brief description of functional grammar see Bussmann (1996: 439-441). See Van der Merwe (2003: 17-20) for a succinct overview of functional grammar methodologies applied to the study of BH and an extensive bibliography of studies of BH. See also Buth (1987, 1992, 1999).

group to serve conventional functions, and evolving diachronically as use changes in the feedback loop of individual and community. All linguistic functions are situated in discourse and are semantic-pragmatic in their essential nature” (Kemmer 2011: 39).³⁵ Functionalism’s interest in the communicative function of language will be evident in the assumptions behind the cognitive linguistic-based categorization schema proposed by Sweetser and Dancygier used in this study.

Descriptive linguistics and structuralism’s influence on BH grammars is seen in the works of BHRG (Forthcoming), DCH (1993), Korchin (2008) and IBHS (1990).³⁶

A further project that has had a broader influence on the study of BH is that begun by Kenneth Pike, Robert Longacre and Joseph Grimes, amongst others. Their interest was, in many senses, diametrically opposed to Chomsky’s idealized speaker driven program; they were interested in language in use. Longacre’s (1994, 1995, 2003)³⁷ investigation of the grammar of discourse structures (or textlinguistics) in diverse languages, including Hebrew, has been instructive.³⁸ His work on Hebrew discourse and the use of the verbal system, *Joseph, A Story of Divine Providence: a Text Theoretical and Textlinguistic Analysis of Genesis 37 and 39-48* generated much discussion and served to broaden the scope of investigation of BH and forced the scholarly world to look at BH beyond the clause level. Longacre’s work in discourse represents a definite move toward functionalism.³⁹

Stephen Levinsohn (2000, 2006) built on Longacre’s work in BH, integrating typological research into his investigations, demonstrating how this can provide more satisfying understanding of certain phenomena in BH. Nevertheless, recent grammars such as IBHS still seem reluctant to integrate textlinguistic’s discoveries that discourse-level phenomena influence grammatical structures at the sentence and clausal levels.⁴⁰

In recent years, cognitive linguistic approaches to the study of language and cognition have begun to inform the study of Biblical Hebrew.⁴¹ These include studies in diverse areas such as

³⁵ See also Evans and Green (2006: 778).

³⁶ For further background see Van der Merwe (2003).

³⁷ Longacre (2003) is the second edition of the initial (1989) volume.

³⁸ See criticism of Longacre in Heimerdinger (1999: 52-100).

³⁹ For background on BH discourse studies, see Van der Merwe (1997a). For a discussion of Longacre’s study, see Van der Merwe (1997b).

⁴⁰ See Waltke and O’Connor’s (1990: 54-55).

⁴¹ See Van der Merwe (2003: 22-24) for suggestions regarding how this project might further the description and interpretation of Biblical Hebrew.

MST (including blending),⁴² metaphor,⁴³ lexical studies⁴⁴ and cognitive grammar.⁴⁵ The approaches utilized in this study will be introduced and described in Chapter 3.

2.2. Lexicons and Dictionaries

2.2.1. Brown-Driver-Briggs ([1906] 2008)

BDB classifies וְ as a conjunction. The presentation is divided into two major sections: 1) וְ as a hypothetical particle and 2) as an interrogative particle. The discussion of וְ as a hypothetical particle lists verb forms that occur in the protasis and apodosis. Under “special uses” (BDB 2008: 50) is listed repeated uses, oaths, wishes, as well as instances when it is interpreted as temporal *when*. Compounded uses, such as וְלִי וְלְךָ are also considered special uses. The second section asserts that וְ occurs in direct questions and oblique questions, which include disjunctives. These classifications reflect the distinct types of constructions in which וְ is found.

2.2.2. Clines (1993)

DCH classifies וְ as both a conjunction and a conditional particle. The presentation is organized in a strikingly similar way to Gesenius’ grammar: וְ with the perfect⁴⁶ in the protasis followed by all possible verbal combinations in the apodosis; וְ with imperfect⁴⁷ in the protasis followed by all possible verbal combinations in the apodosis, and so on. Along with the standard grammars he notes that וְ occurs in oaths and וְ questions. In addition to categorizing וְ as a conditional particle, Clines (1993: 305-306) asserts that it also functions as a disjunctive particle, a relative particle, a concessive particle, and adversative or exceptive particle.

Clines’ work is a dictionary and lexicographers are always confronted with the decision to join or split. Clines has chosen to split, hence the atomistic arrangement. DCH offers definitions of the particle and its classification, but does not explain its diverse uses.

2.2.3. Koehler and Baumgartner (2000)

HALOT is the only work to label וְ a deictic. Deictics are typically understood to reference a person, place, time or thing,⁴⁸ yet HALOT does not explain what וְ points to. The lexicon list

⁴² See Follingstad (2001); Vroon-van Vugt (2014); Howe and Green (2014).

⁴³ See Jindo (2010).

⁴⁴ See Van Wolde (2014).

⁴⁵ See Van Wolde (2009).

⁴⁶ The term *perfect* traditionally has been used to refer to the *qatal* form.

⁴⁷ Traditional term for the *yiqtol* form.

⁴⁸ See Bussmann (1996: 286).

the particle's uses in real and unreal conditionals, desiderative (wish) constructions, oaths, interrogatives and concessives. The authors also note that it occurs in combination with other forms such as ׀ִ ׀ִ, etc. The lexicon also includes a category of "imperfect prohibition," and offers Song 2:7 as the only example. HALOT provides a fairly comprehensive list of the categories of constructions in which ׀ִ is used. Like BDB and DCH, HALOT does not explain what motivates the particle's use in so many different structures.

2.3. Analyses of ׀ִ in Grammars

2.3.1 Gesenius (1909, 2006)

Gesenius' treatment of ׀ִ typifies the traditional approach to Hebrew. The grammar offers a useful description of ׀ִ,⁴⁹ which is mentioned in its occurrences in specific verbal constructions or clause types, yet no unified discussion of the particle itself is provided. Gesenius ([1909] 2006, §149a, b) initially classifies ׀ִ as a particle,⁵⁰ and later in §159 as a conditional particle. But he remarks in §149b that "no certain explanation of these particles has been given." Most references to ׀ִ occur in Chapter II Section II entitled "Special Kinds of Sentences." These include:

Sentences which express an Oath or Asseveration—§149

Interrogative Sentences—§150

Desiderative Sentences—§151

Conditional Sentences—§159

Concessive Clauses—§160

Temporal Clauses—§164

GKC does not provide a systematic, coherent analysis of ׀ִ that explains why the particle could be used in these varied clause types. The use of ׀ִ in these different constructions is not compared and contrasted. For example, ׀ִ conditionals typically form the basis for oaths, and the morphosyntax of these conditionals (and the pragmatic use to which they are put) is no different from that of non-oath BH conditionals. Although in oaths the apodosis containing the imprecation is usually omitted, probably due to common ANE-wide taboo reasons (Conklin

⁴⁹ The descriptivist framework treatment of conditionals typified by GKC is discussed in Chapter 3.5.1.2.

⁵⁰ Usage of the term "particle" varies, but generally speaking, the term is used to describe a word that may have one or all of the following characteristics as described in <http://www.sil.org/linguistics/GlossaryOfLinguisticTerms/hatIsAParticle.htm>: "it does not belong to one of the main classes of words, it is invariable in form, and typically has grammatical or pragmatic meaning." Gesenius' usage falls within this definition.

2011: 4), the syntax of the P clause and use of כִּי is consistent with its use in non-oath conditionals. Gesenius' atomistic treatment of clause types results in these generalities not being captured.

Gesenius' (GKC [1909] 2006: §159a) reliance on the degree of hypotheticality framework is evident in his statement that:

the great variety of construction in conditional sentences is owing to the fact that it frequently depends on the subjective judgment of the speaker, whether he wishes a condition to be regarded as capable of fulfillment (absolutely, or at least possibly), thus including those already fulfilled, or as incapable of fulfillment.

He goes on to state that “on this distinction depends the choice both of the conditional particle to be used, and especially . . . of the tense,” the use of which is “naturally determined according to the principles laid down” earlier in the book.

The “variety of construction” presumably refers to the different verb forms (*qatal*, *weqatal*, *yiqtol*, etc.) found in conditional constructions. The analysis of conditional “sentences” is organized, first by whether or not a conditional particle (כִּי or לִי) occurs, and then within these categories, by what verb form occurs in the protasis and apodosis. This results in the following categorization when the *qatal* and *yiqtol* occur in כִּי conditional sentences (GKC [1909] 2006: §159):

Table 2.1: GKC Categorization of Verb Forms in Conditionals

Protasis	Apodosis
Perfect	perfect, imperfect, jussive, perfect consecutive, imperfect consecutive, imperative, noun clause
Imperfect	perfect, imperfect, jussive (or optative), cohortative, perfect consecutive, imperfect consecutive, imperative, noun clause

This Linnaean style taxonomic categorization has little explanatory power in regards to the semantics or pragmatics of כִּי . All we are told is that if a *qatal* verb (perfect) occurs in an כִּי -conditional protasis, then any verb form but the cohortative may be used in the apodosis (Q clause); if a *yiqtol* verb (imperfect) occurs, then any verb form may be used. Gesenius also notes that כִּי occurs with noun clauses, cohortatives, infinitives and participles in conditional P clauses.

The defining characteristic of Gesenius' examination of כִּי is that there isn't one. Instead, there are discussions of different types of grammatical constructions, and if כִּי happens to occur in these, then its location (protasis/apodosis) and verbal syntactical elements are noted. This study will show that there is a principled reason why כִּי occurs in oaths, and in interrogative and conditional utterances.⁵¹

2.3.2. Ewald (1891)

Ewald includes a section on conditional constructions in his grammar, where he offers brief comments on כִּי , noting that it may be translated as conditional "if" (§355b.1) and as concessive "although" (§355b.1). He also remarks upon its use in habitual conditionals where he suggests that it be translated as "when(ever)" (§355b.1(1)). Ewald notes too that כִּי is typically used in oaths (§356a) and may co-occur in the כִּי יִבְרַח phrase which he defines as a "strong restrictive" (§356b). Like GKC and Ferguson, his chief concern is not the semantics of כִּי , but the verbal forms that occur in conditionals.

2.3.3. Watts (1964)

Among all the grammars surveyed in this dissertation, Watt's *Survey* offers the most realistic assessment of the issues associated with BH conditionals. He admits that "no sort of unanimity has existed among students of Hebrew concerning classification of conditional sentences" (Watts 1964: 133) and locates this lack of agreement to the "lack of unanimity of opinion as to the nature of perfects, imperfects and the conjunction *waw*" (Watts 1964: 133). He finds this "very disturbing" (Watts 1964: 142). It is important to note that Watts considers the source of the lack of unanimity regarding the classification of conditionals to a lack of consensus regarding the status of the verbal system, rather than the theoretical and analytical framework. He appears to say that if we understood the verbal system, we would understand how conditionals were used. This study asserts the opposite, namely that an understanding of how conditionals were used, may yield insight into the verb system.⁵²

Watts' definition of the problem influences his treatment of conditionality in that he attempts to deal with the translational dilemma posed by the lack of overt verbal modal morphology. Even though he maintains the traditional philosophical-logical four-class conditional classification, he struggles with epistemic distance—the way the writer encodes a character's evaluation of their own statements—and how to translate this adequately. No other grammars overtly recognize this issue. While Watt's presentation falls short for lack of

⁵¹ For oaths see Chapter 4.3.4; for interrogatives see Chapter 4.3.7 and Chapter 5.2. For conditionals see Chapter 4.

⁵² See Chapter 4.

theoretical tools, his *Survey* highlights the inadequacy of the traditional framework for understanding BH conditionals. He too offers no account of the use of the particle in diverse types of constructions.

2.3.4. Waltke & O'Connor (1990)

Waltke & O'Connor include two pages of discussion dedicated to conditional clauses (1990: 636–638). However, their most extensive discussion of conditional structures is found in their analysis of the *weqatal* construction. It is here that their most sweeping statement concerning the syntax of conditionals is found: “if the protasis of a conditional clause has a non-perfective form with a contingent-future sense..., the apodosis is introduced by *weqatalti*” (1990: 526). This is easily refuted by counterexamples in Genesis and Exodus: Gen. 30:31; 43:4; 44:23; Exod. 40:37. Conklin (2011: 33) notes several more counterexamples from 1 Sam. 6:9; 12:25; 20:7 and 20:21–22.

Waltke and O'Connor adopt Lambdin's definition of conditional constructions.⁵³ However, when classifying conditionals, they drop the term *hypothetical*, found in that definition, and instead classify conditionals as *real* and *irreal*. A conditional is real if it is either fulfilled in the past or capable of fulfillment in the future; an irreal condition is either contrary to fact or incapable of fulfillment. It should be noted that their schema is not different from the traditional one, it simply conflates the four categories into two, each of which are subdivided into two subcategories. They note, that a real condition is “usually introduced by ׀א” (1990: 636–638) but may be introduced by כִּי or אֲשֶׁר,⁵⁴ while irreal conditions are introduced by לֹא, לֹא־לִי or לֹא־לִי. This conclusion is challenged in my analysis of the content conditionals in Ps. 66:17–19, Jer. 23:22 and Ezek. 3:6 in Chapter 4.1. There are ׀א-headed counterfactual conditionals.

As Conklin (2011: 33) correctly notes, “One of the most comprehensive statements they [Waltke & O'Connor] offer on conditional-clause syntax also happens to be an erroneous statement: ‘If the protasis of a conditional clause has a non-perfective form with a contingent-

⁵³ Lambdin defines conditionals as follows: Any two clauses, the first of which states a real or hypothetical condition, and the second of which states a real or hypothetical consequence thereof.” (Lambdin 1971: 276).

⁵⁴ The status of אֲשֶׁר a conditional particle has been challenged by Revell (1991: 1288) and Tjen (2011: 15–16). Of the reputed examples, only three pose any difficulty: Lev 4:22; Num. 5:29 and Jos. 4:21. The use of אֲשֶׁר in Jos. 4:21 can be understood as a relative clause marker referencing the twelve אֲבָנִים mentioned in 4:20. In the case of Num. 5:29, all of the other זֹאת תּוֹרַת formulaic phrases in the legal materials (Lev. 6:2; 6:18; 11:46; 12:7; 13:59; 14:2; 14:32; 14:57; 15:32; Num. 6:21) are summary statements, like Num. 5:29. When אֲשֶׁר is used in these phrases (Lev. 14:32; 15:32; Num. 6:21) it clearly serves as a relative clause marker. I contend that this is the function אֲשֶׁר is serving in Num. 5:29 as well. Lev. 4:22 is challenging, but according conditional status to אֲשֶׁר based solely on this one verse is problematic. The lack of other clear examples makes this claim dubious.

future sense . . . the apodosis is introduced by [*weqatal*].” Conklin cites 1 Sam. 6:9; 12:25; 20:7, 21-22 as examples that contradict the assertion in IBHS.

אִם is given brief mention in the section on interrogatives (1990: 316) where it is labelled an interrogative particle. The authors indicate that אִם occurs in double or triple polar questions (1990: 684-685), but no further guidance is given as to why the particle can function as a conditional marker and an interrogative. In the section on oaths and wishes Waltke and O’Connor conclude that “the particles אִם and אֵל are involved in a number of these exclamations, not always in a comprehensible way” and that “it may be better to confess that the calculus of the particles is beyond our specification” (1990: 679). The authors recognize that the traditional treatment of אִם has not resulted in a satisfactory explanation of the particle’s use in such diverse constructions, but an analysis cannot be done in an introductory grammar.

The particle’s use is merely noted during discussion of different verb forms that occur in conditional constructions in sections dealing with non-perfective verbs (1990: 510), prefix conjugation verbs (1990: 526-535), cohortative forms (1990: 575) and infinitive absolutes (1990: 587).

Unlike many grammars, Waltke and O’Connor do comment on the interaction of אִם and אֵל in “more complex presentations of case law” (1990: 636-637, ex.6). Yet they do not explain why the sections of case law in which אִם and אֵל interact are more complex than those in which they don’t. (It could be argued that when they interact, the presentations are simplified, because they indicate, respectively, main topic-subtopic.)⁵⁵ Their above-noted decision to restrict the scope of their analysis to the sentence and clause level impacts their analysis at this point. This dissertation will argue in Chapter 4.3.2.4 that the use of אִם in these conditional constructions is a normal use, characteristic of case law.

In summary, Waltke and O’Connor essentially repeat the observations about אִם found in GKC and J-M, noting the diverse types of constructions in which it is used. Similarly, no attempt is made to explain the particle’s apparent polysemy. Their definition and classification of conditionals follows the traditional work done in earlier grammars.

⁵⁵ This is commented on by Milgrom (1991: 1444).

2.3.5. Joüon-Muraoka (1991, 2006)

Joüon-Muraoka (J-M)⁵⁶ also treat $\text{⌘}\text{⌘}$ atomistically within the descriptivist framework described in Chapter 3.5.1.2. Its use is noted, but not explored in the following types of constructions:

§161e	Disjunctive direct questions
§161f	Indirect questions
§163	Optative clauses (i. e. wishes)
§165	Curse and oath clauses
§166p	Temporal clauses
§167	Conditional clauses
§171	Concessive clauses
§175	Disjunctive clauses
§176d	The Waw of apodosis

The comments typically describe the word order of the clauses and verb form restrictions, as is found in GKC, Fergusson and Ewald. The discussion of conditional clauses makes a contribution to the understanding of these forms when J-M notes that “the conditional clause is closely related to the temporal clauses” (§167a). The presentation analyzes the conditional construction’s verb form use in the protasis based on situational time. According to his analysis, with the exception of *qatal* form used for future reference, any form can be used to reference any temporal situation:

Past: Protasis in *qatal* or *yiqtol*
 Future: Protasis in *yiqtol*
 Present: Protasis in *qatal* or *yiqtol*

No comments are made about participial use, nominal clauses, existentials or other forms. Their analysis of verb forms used in conditionals concludes that “there is nothing of particular importance to be noted. The tenses . . . are used in accordance with the usual rules, whether in a protasis or in an apodosis; so there are a great number of possible combinations” (§167g). This is reminiscent of much earlier, almost identical statements in GKC and Ferguson. GKC ([1909] 2006: §159a) state that “the use of the [tenses] is naturally determined according to general principles laid down earlier in the grammar.” Ferguson (1882: 59) states that “tenses are used, not arbitrarily, but in accordance with their nature, and always with the proper force.”⁵⁷ Apparently no form-function correlation between verb forms and the pragmatic

⁵⁶ This grammar was first published by Joüon in 1923. Muraoka revised and published translated editions in 1991, 2006 and 2011. This review is based on the 2006 version.

⁵⁷ See section 2.4.2 below for a review of Ferguson’s monograph.

function of BH conditionals were discernable. This issue is one that this study seeks to address through an application of Sweetser’s and Dancygier’s proposals to the BH data.

Although J-M label ׀ as a “conditional particle” (2006: §167c) it is not included in §102-105, which is entitled “Particles.” The reader is left with the understanding that ׀ is used in the above-mentioned variegated types of clauses, but no coherent linguistic explanation of the semantics and pragmatics of ׀ is offered, nor is there an attempt to explain what licensed its use in such variegated constructions.

2.3.6. Van der Merwe, Naudé and Kroeze (1999)

In its section on conjunctions, BHRG (1999: 295-296) offers some brief comments on the typical uses of ׀. The grammar classifies it as a subordinating conjunction when used in real conditionals and concessives; as a coordinating conjunction in disjunctive constructions such as polar questions, or as a modal word when it occurs in oaths. J-M (2006), when discussing curses and oaths also recognize its modal character when they term the oath formula an “optative formula” (§165a), and BHRG seems to be following this terminology. However, the classification of ׀ as a modal “word” is doubtful. It is clear that modality is involved in oaths and curses, but it is not clear that ׀ contributes the sense of modality in oaths and curses.

2.4. Monographs

2.4.1. Driver (1874)

Like Ferguson, Driver was mainly interested in describing the verbal syntax of conditional constructions; he was not interested in ׀ itself. He notes that it is the BH conditional particle, but no further attention is allotted to it. His initial presentation is somewhat perplexing because it is built around examples from English conditional sentences that serve to illustrate different types of Biblical Hebrew conditionals:

- If I see him, I will let him know.
- If I have seen him, I will let him know.
- If I had seen him I would have told him.
- If I had seen him I would (now) tell him.
- If I saw him (*now*, which I do not do), I would tell him

Driver details which verb forms occur in the protasis and apodosis of conditionals and lists the combinations that occur between the clauses, all similar to Ferguson and GKC.

2.4.2. Ferguson (1882)

This monograph is primarily a descriptive and taxonomic⁵⁸ study of the verbal forms that occur in conditional sentences, situated squarely within the historical-comparative paradigm. It is not an analysis of ׀. As was common in Hebrew studies of the time, the *Examination* presents lists, with examples, of every combination of verb forms found in the protasis and apodosis of conditionals. Naudé’s comment regarding early Hebrew grammarians that “they are essentially limited to compiling inventories of data and to making ad hoc attempts at classifying the collected data” (Naudé 1990: 116) is a most appropriate description of this work.

Ferguson defines conditional constructions as “a compound sentence in which the second clause is so limited by the first as to be necessarily dependent upon it, while it, in its turn, is equally necessary as explaining and completing the sense of the first clause” (Ferguson 1882: 1). His discussion of conditionals is atypical for his time in that he includes temporal, causal and concessive constructions in his discussion because he argues that Hebrew “uses the same particles indifferently to express any of these relations” (Ferguson 1882: 1). These “indifferently” used particles include ׀, ׀, ׀, and ׀, and ׀, amongst others.

Ferguson organizes his presentation in two parts: the first part is a taxonomic examination of the verbal forms in the P and Q clause of different syntactically and lexically defined conditional constructions. Ferguson understands the verb system to be tense-based. Similar to Gesenius, conditionals are examined first as to whether an introductory particle is present or not. Unlike Gesenius, Ferguson further subdivides the non-introductory particle conditionals by distinguishing those that are introduced by ׀, which he admits “differ little in theory from Class I” conditionals, i. e. those without an introductory particle (Ferguson 1882: 41). For each category, Ferguson offers a brief discussion of specific aspects of the syntax found in them. His discussion consists primarily in listing what the “favorite tenses” (Ferguson 1882: 46) in the protasis of conditional constructions were, and then noting what verb forms co-occur in the apodosis.

Although ׀ is the prototypical conditional marker in BH, Ferguson allocates little space to discussing ׀ conditionals specifically. He briefly notes which verb forms occur in ׀ conditionals, indicates that ׀ occurs in oaths and then spends more time addressing ׀. Ferguson (1882: 47) argues that ׀ may be used with a conditional meaning, but that it frequently loses this “conditional force,” and then is “strongly adversative.” At the same time,

⁵⁸ See Chapter 3.5.1.2 for a discussion of this the descriptivist programme.

he argues that the presence of אם in אם כִּי constructions “cannot be purposeless, and the particle, at some period at least of the history of the language, must have had a sensible value, though it is not necessary to suppose that the Hebrews were very conscious of any special force at the comparatively late period in which the books of the Old Testament were written” (Ferguson 1882: 47).

A number of Ferguson’s claims in the first section are suspect. I will only discuss one of these briefly. He asserts (1882: 46) that אם is a “conditional particle” that “may introduce any type of condition.” However, the examples he proposes in support, such as (1) can all be interpreted as offering an alternative choice.

(1) Exod. 21:35-36

$\text{וְכִי־יִגָּף שׁוֹר־אִישׁ אֶת־שׁוֹר רֵעֵהוּ וּמָתוּ וּמָכְרוּ}$
 $\text{אֶת־הַשׁוֹר הַחַי וְחָצְוּ אֶת־כֶּסֶףוֹ וְגַם אֶת־הַמֶּת}$
 יַחֲצִיּוּ:^{36} $\text{אִם נֹדַע כִּי שׁוֹר נִגָּח הוּא מִתְמָוֶל}$
 $\text{שְׁלֹשָׁם וְלֹא יִשְׁמְרֵנוּ בְּעֵלָיו שְׁלֹם יִשְׁלַם שׁוֹר}$
 $\text{תַּחַת הַשׁוֹר וְהַמֶּת יִהְיֶה־לּוֹ:}$

³⁵And if someone’s ox gores his neighbor’s ox and it dies, then they shall sell the live ox and split the money in half and they shall also divide the dead ox; ³⁶or (if) it is known that the ox is a habitual gorer and he did not watch over it, he must offer recompense, an ox for the ox, and the dead one will be his. (My translation)

When Exod. 21:35 is included in the context, it is clear that, while v. 36 is best interpreted as a conditional, the conditionality is determined by וְכִי , not by אם , in v.35. אם offers an alternate related situation for consideration.

In the second part of his paper, Ferguson (1882: 59) introduces his categorization schema for classifying conditionals.

Class 1 assumes the conditional to be real or actual.

Class 2 assumes the conditional to be probable.

Class 3 makes no assumption about the probability of fulfillment and is “indefinite”.

Class 4 assumes the condition is impossible or counterfactual.

As stated in Chapter 1, this schema does not differ from that used to classify Classical and Koine Greek and Latin conditionals. This is not surprising given his assessment that BH conditionality’s “underlying principles are the same as in Greek or English, but the niceties of expression and the exactness of grammar had been lost to the Hebrew language long before

it began to be preserved and fixed by being committed to writing” (1882: 76). This reflects the categories “capable/incapable of fulfillment” used in GKC ([1909] 2006: §159a).

The specification and description of these categories are important to note since every description and study of נִסְחָא and BH conditionals to date utilize these categories, minor variations in vocabulary notwithstanding.⁵⁹ Because the P clause is where the degree of conditionality is determined, the P clause is the focus of analysis for category determination and verb distribution in studies that employ this categorization schema.

Ferguson (1882: 59) presents his conclusion that in conditionals “tenses are used, not arbitrarily, but in accordance with their nature, and always with the proper force.” Ferguson explains what he means by this: if the action of the verb or future time reference is in focus, the “imperfect,” cohortative, jussive or imperative is used; if present time reference is in focus, the “perfect” (*qatal*) or the participle is used, and the “perfect” is also used when past time is in focus. (1882: 76). He argues that the imperfect (*yiqtol*) is the most frequently used verb form in conditional P clauses, yet the perfect may also be used in the P clause of all classes of conditionals.

2.4.3. Van Leeuwen (1973)

Van Leeuwen’s article is the most extensive treatment of נִסְחָא in the literature. The study opens with a brief discussion of cognates that occur in related languages of the ANE (Phoenician, Ugaritic and Aramaic) and speculates about its relationship to the Akkadian conditional particle *šumma*. Programmatically this study is situated firmly within the traditional descriptivist and structuralist paradigm that has characterized Biblical Hebrew linguistics for the last one hundred years.⁶⁰

No new theoretical framework for analyzing conditionals is introduced. As explained in Chapter 1, his analysis of conditional constructions is informed by the same framework operative in the 1880s work of GKC, Driver and Ferguson. Writing ninety years after Ferguson, the vocabulary and categories Van Leeuwen employs to discuss conditionals are virtually identical to Ferguson’s.

Category A: The condition is already conclusively completed or will in the future be represented as having been fulfilled.

⁵⁹ Vocabulary differences are discussed in Chapter 3.5.1.2.

⁶⁰ See Chapter 3.5.1.2 for a discussion of this the descriptivist programme.

Category B: The condition is represented by the speaker as not fulfilled because the opposite has already happened in the past.

Category C: The possibility of the realization of the condition—be it in the present or future—is assumed by the speaker, though the actual realization is regarded as not quite certain.

Category D: Not just the actual realization of the condition but also the possibility of realization is expressed as unrealistic or doubtful.

Although there are minor differences in the content of the categories, they vary little from how conditionals were conceptualized in the 1800s. Ferguson’s “real or actual” conditionals are equivalent to those described in Van Leeuwen’s Category A. Ferguson’s Class 2 conditionals that assume the conditional to be probable, and some from his Class 3 are similar to Van Leeuwen’s Category B and C conditionals. Van Leeuwen’s Category B conditionals are equivalent to Ferguson’s Class 4 counterfactuals. Like Ferguson, Van Leeuwen understands the BH verb system to be tense-based.

The limits that strict compositionality (a characteristic of modular structuralism) imposes on meaning construction is evident in Van Leeuwen’s comments regarding the meaning of the *qatal* form הִבִּיאֲתוּ in Gen. 43:9 and its *yiqtol* counterpart אֲבִיאֲנֹ in Gen. 44:32, where Judah quotes his own statement of Gen. 43:9.

(2) Gen. 43:9

אֲנֹכִי אֶעֱרָבְנֹ מִיָּדִי תִּבְקָשׁוּנֹ אִם־לֹא הִבִּיאֲתוּ
אֵלַיְךָ וְהִצַּגְתִּיו לְפָנֶיךָ וְחָטָאתִי לָךְ כָּל־הַיָּמִים:

“I myself will be surety for him; you can hold me accountable for him. If I do not bring him back to you and set him before you, then let me bear the blame forever.”

(3) Gen. 44:32

כִּי עֲבָדְךָ עָרַב אֶת־הַנְּעָר מֵעַם אָבִי לְאֹמֶר
אִם־לֹא אֲבִיאֲנֹ אֵלַיְךָ וְחָטָאתִי לְאָבִי כָּל־הַיָּמִים:

“For your servant became surety for the boy to my father, saying, ‘If I do not bring him back to you, then I will bear the blame in the sight of my father all my life.’”

Van Leeuwen (1973:21) comments:

So ist nicht einleuchtend zu machen, dass Judas Worte zu seinem Vater Jakob ... וחטאתי לך ... ואם לא הטאתי אלך (Gen. xliii 9) einen anderen Sinn haben als Judas Zitat seiner eigenen Worte im Hause Josephs (Gen. lxiv 32) wo אבאנו statt הביאתי steht). Die deutschen Übersetzungen haben denn auch in beiden Fällen: „wenn ich ihn dir nicht wiederbringe, so will ich mein Leben lang die Schuld ... tragen“).⁶¹

Because Van Leeuwen's objectivist position views word meaning as describing the real world, it is not possible for him to consider an explanation beyond the utterance itself. Hence Judah's use of a different verb form is baffling and unexplainable. In contrast, cognitive linguistics does not “seek a correspondence between utterances and a world (real or otherwise), but rather seeks to explore the ways in which meaning is motivated by human perceptual and conceptual capacities” (Janda 2015: 135). This means that “the same event of objective reality may be differently construed . . . even by the same speaker in different utterances, thus resulting in differences in linguistic expression such as aspect, syntax, case, etc.” (Janda 2015: 135). This study will seek to apply this view of meaning construction to the BH data.

Van Leeuwen (1973: 38-39) also discusses אִם's use in disjunctive constructions, double (polar) questions, temporal expressions, אִם כִּי and אִם עַד constructions. He asks a potentially interesting question regarding the diachronic source of אִם's semantics in double questions:

Man kann sich fragen, ob dieser Gebrauch von אִם in der Doppelfrage sich aus dem disjunktiven Bedingungssatz entwickelt hat, oder ob ein anderes אִם vorliegt, das dann dem arabischen, negative Alternativen einleitenden 'am < 'amā verwandt wäre. Der neuassyrische Gebrauch von šumma/u—šumma/u im Sinne von „ob . . . oder“ lässt vermuten, dass die erste Möglichkeit die wahrscheinlichere ist.⁶²

Yet, the question as to why אִם seems to be polysemous or whether we are faced with distinct lexical homonyms of the particle is not pursued. This question, left hanging by Van

⁶¹ So it does not clarify anything that Judah's words to his father Jacob ... וחטאתי לך ... ואם לא הטאתי אלך (Gen 43:9) have a different sense from Judah's quote of his own words in the house of Joseph (Gen 44:32) where we have אבאנו instead of הביאתי. Indeed, the German translations have in both cases: “If I do not bring him back to you ... then I will bear the guilt my life long.” (Translation by Barbara Cheeseman).

⁶² “One can ask oneself if this use of אִם in the double question has developed from the disjunctive conditional clause or if it is a different אִם that is present, which would then be related to Arabic 'am < 'amā introducing negative alternatives. The New Assyrian useage of šumma/u—šumma/u in the sense of “whether...or” leads one to assume that the first possibility is the more likely.” (Translation by Barbara Cheeseman).

Leeuwen (and every other work that mentions ׀, is one of the central issues to be investigated in this dissertation.

2.4.4. Gilmer (1975)

Gilmer's book investigates second person singular and plural conditional constructions (*If-You* formulations), principally in the casuistic legal sections of the Pentateuch,⁶³ and in wisdom literature and the prophetic books as well. His primary concerns are whether or not these form "a) a separate recognizable category of law, b) a conflation of other types of law, c) subdivisions of other types, or d) a combination of these possibilities" (Gilmer 1975: 113). He then seeks to place them in a literary stratum in order to discover the literary style and *Sitz im Leben* of these conditionals. In Gilmer's words, "the task of the *gattungsgeschichtliche* approach is to analyze the varied forms and determine their background and sociological function (Gilmer 1975: 1).

The morphosyntax of the conditional constructions is not addressed. Although Gilmer notes whether ׀ or ׀ is used in each example in the text, no attempt is made to explain their distribution beyond observations to the effect that ׀ occurs more often than ׀ in *if-you* formulations without imperatives. He attributes this, per BDB, to "im with the imperfect normally indicates present or future possibility" (Gilmer 1975: 78). Since this work pre-dates textlinguistic studies, no explanations at this level are found in the book.

Most importantly, Gilmer does not utilize the traditional degree of hypotheticality categories to classify the conditional *if-you* forms. Instead he asks: "what is happening in this speaking" and uses five different pragmatic-based categories: requests, agreements, threats and promises, counsels and directives (Gilmer 1975: 27). By doing so, he goes beyond previous discussions of conditionals in BH. However, he does not offer any linguistically based theoretical motivation for his choice of categories, nor does he explain his decision not to use the traditional categorization schema.

2.4.5. Revell (1991)

Much of Revell's article covers previously well-trod ground. He notes that conditionals may be introduced by ׀, ׀, ׀, ׀, or imperatives. Regarding ׀, he argues that the particle introduces "possibilities" that may contrast or "expand or reinforce" other preceding ׀-introduced sentences (Revell 1991: 1280). He discusses ׀'s use in representing alternatives, hypothetical conditionals, and the particle's use in the ׀ ׀ sequences that mark subordinate

⁶³ ׀ conditional directives in casuistic discourse are discussed in Chapter 4.3.3.4 of this study.

“incomplete” (Conklin 2011: 45, 76). This is contra Kitz (2014: 107)⁶⁶ who argues that the authenticating formula is “part of a conditional sentence” since it “actually constitutes the apodosis, the ‘then’ clause”. In his discussion of the status of authenticating formulas and elided elements, Conklin does not interact with the concept of implicature proposed by theories of communication such as Sperber and Wilson (1995), nor with the cognitive linguistic concept of cultural context-rich frames. Each of these concepts potentially offer principled explanations for the frequent elision of conditional Q clauses.

Conklin (2011: 60-75) has a helpful discussion of the use of the כִּי־אֵם in oaths. He concludes that in oaths, כִּי־אֵם must be understood as a sequence of two independent particles. His presentation is a useful contribution to the discussion of the non-constructive use of כִּי־אֵם .⁶⁷

2.4.8. Park (2013)

Park’s article offers a reanalysis of the oaths in the Lachish 3 “Letter of the Literate Soldier”. She argues that “the two אֵם clauses . . . should be seen as a pair of rhetorical questions” (Park 2013: 464). These אֵם clauses have traditionally been interpreted as protases of conditional clauses. Park asserts that her argument “relies on an already acknowledged use of אֵם in forming rhetorical questions in non-performative contexts” (Park 2013: 467). This accepted use, and Park’s conclusions, will be discussed in Chapter 5.2.5 where אֵם ’s status as an interrogative particle is challenged.

2.4.9. Kitz (2014)

Kitz⁶⁸ aims to offer a comprehensive study of the phenomena of cursing in the Ancient Near East, including Sumerian, Akkadian, Hebrew and Hittite curses. She argues that what have traditionally been termed oaths in BH are in fact curses because they call on a higher power to inflict mortal punishment on the speaker or object of the curse if obligation portion of the formula is not fulfilled. Mention is made here because of her discussion of BH curses (oaths). Kitz demonstrates that cursing in the ancient Near East formally distinguished between vows and curses, a distinction that will be maintained in this study. She also distinguishes between

⁶⁶ See discussion below.

⁶⁷ When the כִּי־אֵם sequence means more, or other, than the sum of its parts, i.e. its so called “exceptive” use, this study will refer to the sequence as a *construction* as defined by Goldberg (1995, 2006a, b). Its non-constructive use occurs when כִּי and אֵם each contribute compositional meaning, as Conklin argues it does in oaths. For a discussion of constructions see Chapter 3.3. For a discussion the constructive use of כִּי־אֵם in this study, see Chapter 5.6.

⁶⁸ See Russell (2015) and Sandowicz (2015) for reviews that consider strengths and shortcomings of the volume.

unconditional and conditional curses, the latter of which are a focus of this study; the former are not.

As noted above, Conklin and Kitz diverge in their understanding of the role of what Conklin calls the authenticating formula. Conklin places it outside the conditional and argues that the Q clause is evoked via implicature (though he does not use the terminology of implicature;⁶⁹ Kitz argues that the formula forms the Q clause of conditional curses, and that the formula such as כֹּה־יֵאָשֶׁה is “the malediction” (2014: 107). Their separate analyses of 1 Sam. 3:17b illustrate their differing positions:

(4) 1 Sam. 3:17b

כֹּה יַעֲשֶׂה־לְךָ אֱלֹהִים וְכֹה יוֹסִיף אִם־תִּכְחַד מִמְּנִי דְבָר מִכֹּל־הַדְּבָר אֲשֶׁר־דִּבֶּר אֵלַיךְ:

Conklin’s analysis (bolding in original): “**Thus will God do to you and thus will he add:** if you withhold (anything) from me. . . . [may you be cursed] (i.e., you must not withhold anything from me)” (Conklin 2011: 23).

Kitz’s analysis: “May God do thus to you and may he add to it, if you hide anything from me of all the things about which he spoke to you.

This debate will not be settled in this study. The classification of curses (oaths) as speech-act conditionals and analysis of verb forms is not dependent on a definitive solution.

2.5. Summary

The above grammars, lexicons and monographs have offered important and useful descriptions of the particle ׀. We have seen that they all agree that ׀ is principally used in conditional clauses, as were numerous other types of constructions. At the same time, we have seen that their focus on descriptive adequacy has left unanswered questions about the semantics of the particle ׀, i.e. what aspect(s) of the semantics of the particle licenses its use in non-conditional constructions. This study will propose possible answers.

Secondly, the majority of grammars and lexicons assert that ׀ is used only with real conditions or as opposed to with both real and unreal conditions.⁷⁰

⁶⁹ See Sperber and Wilson (1995).

⁷⁰ Works that do not discuss this issue, such as Kitz (2014) are not included in the table.

Table 2.2: Classification of Conditionals in BH Literature

Real	Real and Unreal
Ewald (1891: §355b.1, §358a.2)	GKC ([1909] 2006: §159m)
Joüon-Muraoka (2003: §167c)	Ferguson (1884: 46)
Watts (1964: 136)	Driver (1898: 183)
IBHS (1990: 636)	Tjen (2011: 12-14)
Revell (1991: 1278)	
DCH (1993: 301)	
Conklin (2011: 33)	
BHRG (Forthcoming: 295-296)	

These works have all been shown to be substantially descriptivist in nature and subscribe to the traditional philosophical and logical understandings of conditionality for interpreting and organizing their discussions of if conditionals. (The most recent works by Tjen and Conklin make mention of, but do not exploit, recent work on the pragmatics of conditionals.) This theoretical orientation, combined with their descriptivist presentations has not been conducive to a unified understanding of the particle that coherently explains, not just how if functions in traditionally understood hypothetical constructions (conditionals, concessive, oaths, desiderative), but how the use of if in these constructions is similar to the use of the particle in non-conditional constructions.

Thirdly, the surveyed works do not make clear what role BH verb forms might play in the interpretation of if conditionals. The above works have accurately catalogued which verb forms are found in conditional P clauses: *qatal*, *yiqtol*, participle, infinitive, nominal, jussive; and in Q clauses: *qatal*, *yiqtol*, *weqatal*, *wayyiqtol*, participle, imperative, nominal, cohortative, jussive. Yet few suggestions have been put forth regarding the contributions the verb forms make toward the interpretations of conditionals and those that have been offered are not very instructive.

For instance, GKC states that the perfect in P clauses is used to “express conditions . . . which have been completely fulfilled in the past or which will be completely fulfilled in the future” (GKC [1909] 2006: §159n) and the imperfect is used “to express what is possible in the present or future as well as what has continued or been repeated in the past” (GKC [1909] 2006: §159q). He offers no comment on what imperatives or other forms might contribute. J-M remark that “from the view of the tenses, there is nothing of particular importance to be noted. The tenses...are used in accordance with the usual rules...so there are a great number of possible combinations” (2006: §167g). The lack of consensus regarding how BH verbs should be interpreted greatly complicates understanding how and what they contribute to the

construction of meaning in BH conditionals. As a result, ׀א (or לִי) “takes all the weight in accounting for the semantics of the constructions” (Dancygier 1998: 14).

This traditional understanding of conditionals within a degree of hypotheticality framework has been challenged by works on conditionality in, mainly, Indo-European languages.⁷¹ This study will utilize frameworks proposed within these studies to determine if they might offer a more adequate and explanatory analysis. The following chapter will introduce and explain the theoretical frameworks used in this study.

⁷¹ Some of these include: Dancygier (1998); Dancygier and Sweetser (2005); Fauconnier ([1985] 1994; 1997); Fauconnier and Sweetser (1996); Fauconnier and Turner (2002); Langacker (2008); Sweetser (1990); Traugott, ter Meulen, Snitzer Reilly and Ferguson (1986); Van der Auwera (1986).

Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework

3.0 Introduction

It was demonstrated in Chapter 2 that the focus on descriptive adequacy in the literature on ׀ֿ has left unanswered questions pertaining to the semantics of the particle, specifically aspect(s) of the semantics of the particle that license its use in non-conditional constructions. It was also shown that the degree of hypotheticality/certainty framework employed to categorize and describe Biblical Hebrew conditionals was inadequate. Few insights into the purposes for which BH speakers used conditionals have been forthcoming from earlier studies, and the framework resulted in limited generalizations regarding verb forms found in ׀ֿ conditionals.

Conditionals in several Indo-European languages have been the object of recent cognitive linguistic based studies. These descriptions suggest a promising approach for a more coherent description of ׀ֿ and its use in both conditionals and non-conditionals. This approach will include a cognitivist understanding of semantics, a cognitive approach to language processing and meaning construction (Mental Space Theory) and concepts from Construction Grammar. In addition to these, the classification schema of conditionals developed in Sweetser (1990) and Sweetser and Dancygier (2005) offers tools that will be used to substantiate the hypothesis that a more satisfying description of ׀ֿ and verb usage use in both conditionals and non-conditionals can be offered within a cognitivist framework.

The purpose of this chapter is twofold. The first purpose is to introduce the assumptions of cognitive linguistics that are pertinent to the following analysis of ׀ֿ and the conditional and non-conditional constructions in which it is used. This will include describing the assumptions and practices of Mental Space Theory and Construction Grammar. The second purpose is to describe the framework within which conditionals will be analyzed in this study and present arguments as to why the traditional approach to their analysis is inadequate.

For these purposes, this chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.1 provides a brief introduction to the assumptions of cognitive linguistics, assumptions shared by Mental Space Theory and Construction Grammar. (These are sub-theories of cognitive linguistics that share its broader research concerns and orientation toward language.) Further discussion regarding the place and function of semantics within cognitive linguistics is offered in Section 3.2 where I will compare and contrast it with the semantic model found in BH grammars and lexicons in their discussions of ׀ֿ. Section 3.3 will define constructions and discuss their role in Cognitive Grammar in order to motivate their role in the semantic interpretation of certain structures

in which \Box is used. Section 3.4 will introduce Mental Space Theory and provide an overview of the motivation for the theory and how it has been elaborated in the study of conditionals. This will demonstrate why Mental Space Theory is especially suited to the study of conditionals. Section 3.5 provides an overview of the degree of hypotheticality categorization framework traditionally employed in the analysis of BH conditionals. In section 3.6 the categorization schema proposed by Sweetser (1990) and tested in Dancygier and Sweetser (2005) will be introduced and then contrasted with the degree of hypotheticality model. Section 3.7 will summarize the chapter.

3.1. Cognitive Linguistics

Cognitive linguists maintain that “the scientific study of language consists in seeking general principles governing all of language consistent with our overall knowledge about cognition and the brain” (Lakoff 1990: 45). Cognitive linguistics is concerned primarily with cognition and how language reflects cognition because language is understood as “indissociable from other facets of human cognition” (Langacker 1991a: 1).⁷² An embodied theory of language⁷³ such as the Neural Theory of Language (Feldman 2006) argues that the fact that we have bodies has consequences for cognition, including language, which is understood to be one aspect of cognition. A crucial consequence of the embodied theory of language is that reality is mediated through our bodily experience, and language reflects this mediation, most clearly seen in the metaphoric extensions of image-schemas.⁷⁴ How we conceptualize and use language—how we construe tense and aspect, deictics and mood—is shaped by the nature of our body and its interaction in the world and society.

Language is understood to be embodied, usage-based,⁷⁵ integrated and multimodal (Feldman 2006:9; Evans and Green 2006: 44-47; 641-699). This is programmatically opposed to an innatist, rationalist-based modular theory of language such as the generative model proposed by Chomsky, in which syntax is autonomous and minimalist, and semantics is purportedly fully compositional.⁷⁶ A usage-based theory of language understands that “becoming a fluent speaker involves a prodigious amount of actual learning, and tries to minimize the postulation of innate structures specific to language” (Langacker 1999: 91). The

⁷² For a concise overview of cognitive linguistics see Evans (2012) and Janda (2015).

⁷³ See Evans and Green (2006:44-47); Gibbs (2005) and Johnson ([1987] (2013)). For the Neural Theory of Language, see Feldman (2006). See also Barsalou (2009) and Niedenthal, et.al (2005) on cognitive simulation of language.

⁷⁴ See Evans and Green (2006: 176-190); Johnson ([1987] (2013)); Lakoff (1987; 1990); Lakoff and Johnson (1980).

⁷⁵ See Langacker (1999: 91-145) for a thorough discussion of cognitivist usage-based grammar. See also Johnson-Laird (1987).

⁷⁶ See Geeraerts and Cuyckens (2007b) for a comparative critique of the difference between the cognitivist orientation of Chomsky’s generative project and that of cognitive linguistics.

language skills that a person possesses and demonstrates are the “result of her accumulated experience with language across the totality of usage events in her life” (Tomasello 2000: 61).

The usage-based account is not restricted to the acquisition of lexical meaning but extends to the acquisition of grammar. This is because cognitive grammar rejects the separation of grammar and semantics and claims that they are “indissociable” (Langacker 1999: 1). The position that divides language into two parts, syntax and the lexicon, has maintained that “all regularity and productivity are in the syntax, with the lexicon serving as a repository of the arbitrary” (Tyler and Evans 2001: 725).⁷⁷ In contrast, “meaning is central to cognitive approaches to grammar” (Evans, Bergen and Zinken 2007b: 5) and any difference between lexical semantics and grammar “is clearly a matter of degree and any particular line of demarcation would be arbitrary” (Langacker 1999: 18).

In cognitive linguistics, the rules of language are termed *constructions*, and it is in constructions that the different aspects of a language are integrated—phonology, morphology, syntax, pragmatics and semantics.⁷⁸ Constructions are abstract schematic structures derived from either recurring utterances that have undergone embedding, or from categorizing relationships between schemas. Constructions may be units as small as morphemes and nouns, or they may be complex syntactic structures. This suggests that morphological elements, prepositions and particles, such as *of*, which have traditionally been considered semantically vacuous grammatical elements, have semantic content and contribute to the meaning of the utterance in the same way as nouns.

For instance, *of* has historically been considered “a meaningless syntactic element” (Langacker 1999: 74). In his analysis of *of*, Langacker notes that Hudson (1984) states that *of* is a “word ‘without any independent semantic structure’ and that it does ‘not contribute any distinct meaning of its own’, that it is ‘an empty word’” (Langacker, 1999: 74). He goes on to argue that *of* does have semantic content, albeit highly schematic content. The meaning of one category of uses of *of* is constituted in its profiling “a relationship between two entities such that one of them...constitutes an *inherent and restricted subpart* of the other” (original italics) (Langacker 1999: 74). Therefore, when we hear or use a phrase such as *the tip of my finger*, we understand *of* to be contributing this meaning.

One of the fundamental consequences of the usage-based view of language is that all constructions have phonological and semantic content; there are no linguistic elements that

⁷⁷ See also Aronoff (1994: 17).

⁷⁸ For more on Construction Grammar, see Goldberg (1995; 2006a, b); Kay and Fillmore (1999).

are merely syntactical. Cognitive grammar is constrained by the content requirement such that “the only units permissible within the grammar of a language are (1) phonological, semantic and symbolic units; (2) the relations that hold between them” (Evans and Green 2006: 502). Permissible units must be actual speech utterances used by speakers of the language or be schemas and categorizing relationships derived from these utterances via abstraction (Langacker 1999: 28; 2002: 18).


3.2. Cognitive Semantics

The traditional methodological practices of BH pedagogy, exegesis and linguistic inquiry found in commentaries, the major lexicons and BH grammars generally reflect “the kind of theory that has dominated theoretical discourse since at least the seventeenth century, in which the words, by contrast with the grammar, are treated as the seat of everything irregular” (Aronoff 1994: 17). As recently as 1995, Chomsky has maintained this stance, stating “I understand the lexicon in a rather traditional sense: as a list of ‘exceptions’, whatever does not follow from general principles” (Chomsky 1995: 235). It is typical of models within this framework to “represent different word senses as distinct lexical items. . . . Polysemous forms are simply represented as an arbitrary list of discrete words that happen to share the same phonological form” (Tyler and Evans 2001: 725). The consequences of this methodology is evident in the way traditional BH grammars have treated the meanings of BH verbal forms.

As a consequence of ascribing to this model, most traditional grammarians demonstrate an objectivist compositional view of meaning, in which “the meaning of the complex expression is wholly determined by regular compositional principles which derive its meaning from the compositional elements, the lexical items” (Langacker 1997a: 247). The central issue is to understand how the vague and ambiguous meanings of the constituents of an utterance contribute to the meaning of the entire utterance.

The predominant folk metaphor for understanding meaning under the compositional model is that words are containers which hold a distinct semantic meaning. This position can be seen in the format of most dictionaries. The metaphor can be illustrated with the following figure (Langacker 2008: 39) where the meaning of an expression is fully and wholly contained within the word:

Figure 3.1: Dictionary Semantics View



Under a model of compositionality, syntax, semantics and pragmatics are autonomous components. The standard view of meaning construction within the compositional framework is based on parsing (Coulson 2001: 31). The sentence is decomposed into two discrete components: syntactical and semantic, or word meaning. Interpretation requires accessing the lexicon for the correct entry of each word in a sentence, then by combining the syntactic structure and the semantic information about the constituents of the sentence, meaning is derived. Compositional models maintain “that each word has a discrete set of fixed meanings so that a given word makes approximately the same semantic contribution to each constituent in which it occurs” (Coulson 2001: 39) without referring to context. Furthermore, words and expressions are understood to refer directly to objects, events and actions in the real world or a possible world. Disambiguation of vague or ambiguous words via a pragmatic contextualization component is added after parsing occurs.

Cognitive linguistics rejects this modular notion while arguing for an integrated language-use based model of meaning. Fauconnier, argues that semantics is not in language, i. e. words and expressions, but in our brains. “Language does not carry meaning, but guides it” (Fauconnier [1985] 1994: xxii). Mark Turner comments:

Expressions do not mean; they are prompts for us to construct meanings by working with processes we already know. In no sense is the meaning of [an] . . . utterance “right there in the words.” When we understand an utterance, we in no sense are understanding “just what the words say”; the words themselves say nothing independent of the richly detailed knowledge and powerful cognitive processes we bring to bear (Mark Turner 1991: 206).

Philosophers and logicians also have long been interested in how language represents the world. (Traditionally, conditional constructions have been analyzed within the logical-philosophical framework.) They have assumed that to understand the meaning of an indicative expression⁷⁹ is to understand the kind of world in which it could be used to make a


⁷⁹ Expressions are understood to be distinct from utterances. Expressions are held to have meaning independent of context; an utterance of an expression has speaker-imposed contextual content. Here, an expression is similar to Evans’ definition of a sentence.

true claim about the world. Hence the main goal of semantics is to provide the truth conditions⁸⁰ for sentences by “accounting for the relationship between the meaning of a sentence and facts about the world that support the proposition expressed by the sentence” (Coulson 2001: 5). This led philosophers and linguists to understand the meaning of an expression as being compositional in nature. Their task was to develop ways of converting ambiguous utterances into unambiguous semantic representations using some form of predicate calculus. These representations are held to represent “meaning that is independent of any particular context in which it [the expression or utterance] might be uttered” (Coulson 2001: 8).⁸¹

The claim that meaning can be determined independent of context is rejected by cognitive linguistics. This rejection is grounded in the usage-based model of language taken by cognitive linguistics. Haiman (1980) has argued convincingly for the inadequacy of the dictionary view of semantics and the attempt to delineate a restricted set of semantic specifications that would represent the linguistics meaning of a word. He concludes that “the distinction between dictionaries and encyclopedias is not only one that is practically impossible to make, but one that is fundamentally misconceived. Dictionaries *are* encyclopedias” (Haiman 1980: 331).

Cognitive semantic understands meaning to be encyclopedic in nature.⁸² It views concepts as comprising a multifaceted network of interrelated meanings, built on the speaker’s use of the language, cultural experience, embodied sensory perceptions and experience. Some meanings in the network will be more salient or prototypical than others.⁸³ This might be illustrated via the following figure (Langacker 2008: 39):

Figure 3.2: Encyclopedic Semantics View



⁸⁰ Truth conditions of an indicative sentence (i.e. are those conditions under which it would be true or false. For example, the statement “I’m hungry” is true if the speaker is hungry at the time he said it; and false otherwise. The truth conditions of a construction are its contributions to the conditions under which a sentence would be true or false: any sentence “Henry is hungry” is true if the “Henry” it refers to is a person who is hungry, and false if it does not.

⁸¹ See Johnson ([1987] 2013) for a thorough discussion and critique of the objectivist logical-philosophical accounts of meaning construction.

⁸² See Haiman (1980) for a cogent argument in favor of the encyclopedic view of semantics. See also Evans (2006).

⁸³ On prototypicality, see Evans (2007); Geeraerts (2007); Lakoff (2007); Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (2007).

Evans and Green (2006: 210-212) note several crucial differences between the dictionary view of meaning and the encyclopedic view. First, the dictionary view maintains that “word meanings have a semantic “core.” This core meaning is the information contained in the definition of the word and is essential to the meaning of the expression. Non-core, peripheral elements of a word’s meaning, typically labeled “connotative meaning” is distinguished from the core “denotative” meaning. This distinction is evident in the denotative dictionary meaning of the word *bachelor*, a man who is not and has never been married. Cultural information relating to domestic habits of bachelors and their sexual habits is excluded from the core meaning of the word. Against this, cognitive semanticists argue that the decision as to which semantic components are core and which are not is arbitrary, since “words don’t have ‘meanings’ in and of themselves. Rather meaning is a function of the utterance in which the word is embedded . . . [and] words serve as points of access to larger-scale encyclopaedic knowledge structures” (Evans 2006: 493).

Secondly, the dictionary view of semantics maintains that words can be defined independently of the context in which they are used. Cognitive semantics posits that meaning is always context dependent and understood “in respect to **frames or domains** of experience” (Evans and Green 2006: 211, bolding in original text). The frames or domains⁸⁴ are the schematization of repeated context-dependent usage of the utterance. Since frames are context-dependent, they are also culture-dependent.

Note for example, how we assume that the definition of *dog* is straightforward. One definition for *dog* I found in an online English language dictionary can be summarized as:

(1) A domesticated carnivore of the family Canidae

This definition, however, privileges a Western European, North American cultural view of dogs by focusing on its domestication. Non-Western cultures might focus the definition on it as a source of food; in BH, *דָּוּג* is a wild pack animal that is to be avoided because it is both dangerous and is considered unclean. The frame associated with dog will vary significantly between cultures, and it is within the background of frames that word meanings are construed in individual utterances.

Coulson (2001: 11) offers a further example that illustrates how word meaning cannot be composed of discrete, fully determinate sets of specifications, but entails the knowledge of

⁸⁴ Frames will be used in as a cover term for a set of closely related concepts including scripts, schemas, idealized cognitive models and scenarios. Though each of these are structured somewhat differently, they all share a common feature of representing how cultural and background knowledge is structured.

routine cultural situations that are “required to recognize abstract commonalities between domains and an ability to conceptualize one domain in terms of another.” Consider how “ball” is interpreted in the following examples:

- (2) Shaq dribbled past his defender and dunked the ball easily.
- (3) Joe kicked the ball and smiled as it sailed through the uprights.
- (4) Sammy hit the ball right out of the park.

In (2) the ball is a medium-sized brown or orange, (generally) leather sphere that is filled with air; in (3) it is a brown leather ellipsoid, also filled with air that also has “laces” used for gripping it. In (4), the “ball” is a small white stitched-leather covered sphere, which has a yarn-wrapped rubber core. Coulson notes that each of the examples is understood to refer to a different game (basketball, American football and baseball respectively), and in each example the hearer understands “ball” differently, depending on the game in which it is used.

While all the different uses of “ball” can be incorporated in a single abstract meaning, this meaning does not help explain why any competent speaker or hearer will understand “ball” differently in each sentence, and will do so automatically. Coulson argues that knowing which “ball” is being referred to requires knowing what aspect of our vast (encyclopedic) knowledge about balls is to be selected and, just as importantly, what is to be ignored. The interdependence of meaning and contextual knowledge is fundamental to the way we construct meaning.

Knowing what aspect of encyclopedic knowledge to select and reject is facilitated, Fillmore proposes, by frames. He argues that words are defined vis-à-vis frames, which are systems of categories rooted in some motivating personal experiences, cultural practices and expectations and social institutions (Fillmore 1982: 111-137).⁸⁵ Coulson (2001: 19) notes that the “the real power of frames derives from the use of *default values*, that consist of the most typical and/or frequent filler for each slot.” To illustrate this, a brief mention of the phrase *I am buying a house* will imply features of the frame such as selling, transfer of money, transfer of property, mortgage, interest rate, broker, and so forth, none of which are mentioned explicitly in the sentence. These are all part of the frame of house buying. The claim, then, is that words do not map directly to objects and events in the real world (as the objectivist model asserts), instead they refer to slots and elements and references in frames which in turn may or may not refer to objects, actions and events in the real world.

⁸⁵ See also Coulson (2001: 18); Feldman (2006: 144-147).

In contemplating meaning construction, Evans (2006: 498) makes a useful distinction between a sentence, as defined by linguists, and an utterance. He argues that a sentence is “an idealization that has determinate properties, often stated in terms of grammatical structure. Because sentences are an idealization, they and their properties can be precisely defined.” Utterances, on the other hand, “represent specific and unique instances of language use. Once a sentence is given meaning, context and phonetic realisation, it becomes a (spoken) utterance” (Evans 2006: 499). Meaning, is a property of utterances, not sentences.

Commenting on the ubiquitous *The cat is on the mat* example, Langacker argues that a single utterance may have an innumerable variety of meanings depending on the contextual construal of the situation.

Consider *The cat is on the mat*. Prototypically it describes a situation where a mat is spread out on the ground and a cat is sitting or lying on it. Already there is indefinite variability, since the cat can be of any size, coloring, or subspecies; the mat is similarly variable; the cat can assume many different postures; and so on. But this is only the beginning. Possibly the mat is rolled up in a bundle and the cat is sitting or lying (etc.) on top of it. Maybe the operator of a slide show has just managed to project the image of a cat onto a mat being used for a makeshift screen. The sentence is appropriate in a mat factory where a worker has just finished decorating a mat with the outline of a feline. The possibilities are obviously endless.

Langacker concludes that the vast gulf between the many variegated possible construals of a simple utterance and the restricted set of abstract properties composing linguistic meaning offered by formal semantics leaves major aspects of human language ability unexplained. In order to explain how humans construct meaning, cognitive linguists have proposed that a word’s semantic value “resides in conventional paths of access (some well-trodden, some less so) to open-ended domains of knowledge” (Langacker 2008: 42). Exactly what a word will mean in a given utterance will depend on the speech event itself, coupled with the cultural, physical and social context of the utterance, and relevant domains of knowledge. Words and grammatical structures are prompts for constructing meaning via several different interpretive cognitive mechanisms, including constructions, frames and mental spaces, which draw on cultural, experiential and background knowledge.⁸⁶

⁸⁶ The findings of cognitive semantics poses serious challenges for the study of BH and demands a profound sense of humility from those studying the language and the meaning of the text. The dictionary view of semantics permits the exegete a deceptive degree of certainty regarding how well he understands the semantics of a word that cognitive semantics does not allow. If the semantics of BH words is inextricably tied into a three thousand year old network of cultural, physical, social and background knowledge as cognitive semantics claims, what is required to understand the BH text will take on an entirely new dimension.

In summary, traditional BH grammars have analyzed the text as examples of sentences comprised of words with discrete, packaged meanings rather than language utterances constructed “to express unique meanings about unique states of affairs and relationships, in unique ways” (Evans 2006: 497). In contrast, I will assume that language is intimately coupled to general cognitive processes that involve perception, reasoning and construal. Grammar is assumed to be symbolic and involves form-meaning pairings of semantic structure with phonological information. Polysemy is assumed to be the norm for lexical items. A modular or autonomous understanding of syntax is rejected. Instead, I am assuming that syntax is one part of a continuum involving the lexicon, morphology, syntax and discourse. Syntactic constructions (form-meaning pairings) are assumed to display semantic polysemy.

3.3. Constructions

The concept of constructions hold a central place in the theory of Cognitive Grammar.⁸⁷ The basic principle behind construction grammar “is that the basic form of a syntactic structure is a construction—a pairing of a complex grammatical structure with its meaning” (Croft 2007: 463). Goldberg extends this fundamental principle to non-syntactically complex structures. She defines a construction as “a form-meaning pair such that some aspect of the form and meaning is not strictly predicable⁸⁸ from the component parts or from other previously established constructions” (Goldberg 1995: 4). This means that not just grammatical constructions at the syntactic level are to be considered constructions characterized by form-meaning correspondences, but also phrases, morphemes and words. Fillmore, Kay and O’Connor’s seminal work claimed that “constructions may specify, not only syntactic, but also lexical, semantic, and pragmatic information” (1988: 501). Construction Grammar “denies the existence of any distinct morphological or syntactic constraints (or constructions)” (Goldberg: 1995: 5).

The discussion of constructions in this study will follow Goldberg’s (1995; 2006a) proposals. Goldberg’s (1995: 1) central thesis is that “constructions themselves carry meaning, independently of the words in the sentence.” She does not dismiss the notion that the individual elements of a clause or sentence carry semantic meaning, but she argues that “an

⁸⁷ Several related “flavors” of construction grammar have been elaborated. Janda (2015: 145-147) offers a brief overview. See Fillmore, Kay and O’Connor (1988), Goldberg (1995; 2006a; 2006b); Kay and Fillmore (1999) for presentations of construction Grammar frameworks, as well as Evans and Green (2006: 641-706) for a discussion of these works and others. See also Croft (2001; 2007) on Radical Construction Grammar. See also Mok, Bryant and Feldman (2004) for an analysis of English if conditional constructions using MST and Construction Grammar. For more on Construction Grammar, see also Boas (2010); Michaelis (2006, 2012).

⁸⁸ Goldberg (1995: 4) explains that by “predictable,” she means compositionally derivable.

entirely lexically-based, or bottom-up, approach fails to account for the full range” of language data (Goldberg 1995: 1). She proposes that a syntactic construction is identifiable as a distinct construction when “one or more of its properties are not strictly predictable from the properties of its component parts or from other constructions” (Goldberg 1995: 4). Goldberg (1995: 32) posits that constructions, like morphemes and words, will also be polysemous because they are all “the same basic data type.” This position that syntactic constructions themselves carry semantic meaning is a rejection of the objectivist, logical-philosophical position that sentence meaning can be derived exclusively from the combined semantics of the individual words in the sentence.

Constructions are increasingly understood to play a fundamental role in the construction of meaning. The current trend in lexical semantics is to shift the focus of meaning “from words as building blocks to usage events, in all their contextual details” such that in meaning-building, “constructions may have priority, in that the construction may ‘coerce’ the meanings of its constituents” (Cuyckens, Dirven and Taylor 2003: 21, 23).


The notion that semantic meaning is associated with syntactic constructions and that constructions themselves contribute compositional meaning apart from the lexical items in the construction (such as \square), and may even “coerce” meaning in lexical items raises methodological questions that have not been addressed in previous, modular-based studies of \square . As will be seen below, \square is used in polar questions, yes-no questions, disjunctives and various kinds of conditionals. Questions posed for an analysis of \square that posits constructions include: Do each of the structures in which \square is used qualify as a construction as defined by Goldberg? If so, what aspects of the meaning of each construction is contributed by the construction itself, and how much of the meaning is attributable to \square ?

3.4. Mental Space Theory

The majority of uses of \square occur in conditionals. My analysis of conditionals will be informed by Mental Space Theory, a branch of cognitive linguistics proposed in Fauconnier ([1985] 1994) and elaborated on in further writings.⁸⁹ It is used in this study because it helps to provide an insightful analysis of how \square functions in a unified and coherent manner in both conditionals and disjunctive \square questions in BH. Conditional and disjunctive structures are grammatically very distinct configurations and have very different communicative functions. When meaning is understood to reside in the word, as it historically has been understood in


⁸⁹ See also Dinsmore (1991); Fauconnier (1997; 2007); Fauconnier and Sweetser (1996); Fauconnier and Turner (2002); Turner (1996); Turner and Fauconnier (1995).

Additionally, unlike possible worlds, mental spaces are not stable nor static. They are “partial cognitive structures built up during discourse that keep track of entities and relations in different contexts” (Mok, Bryant and Feldman 2004: 2). Multiple mental spaces are continuously adjusted as a discourse develops and the users of language adjust to what is said and heard, or, as readers, process a text. They are evoked and discarded as needed in the course of communication. While possible worlds are philosophical constructs within which the meaning of certain grammatical forms such as hypotheticals and counterfactuals are to be interpreted, mental spaces are meant to reflect how our brains process the language of these and other constructions. The differences between the two models might be illustrated as follows, based on Fauconnier (1997: 36):



In the mental space framework, words do not refer directly to objects, events or actions in the real world, instead they prompt hearers and speakers to set up mental spaces which are filled by elements representing discourse participants or other elements, and simplified frames that elaborate the relationships between the elements.⁹² They are, as Coulson (2001: 21) explains “temporary containers for relevant information about a particular domain.” Because they are temporary, mental spaces are not fully elaborated, but are partial representations of a scenario and the events, actions, participants and objects in the scenario. A simple mental space for the sentence *Katie is Ann’s step-daughter* would look like the following:

Figure 3.3: Simple Mental Space



The circle represents the mental space set up to represent *Katie is Ann’s step-daughter*. It contains the elements *k* and *a* which represent *Katie* and *Ann*, the participants in the utterance.

⁹² See also Coulson and Oakley (2000: 176).

The attached box contains a representation of the conceptual structure of the space, and the elements are structured with a family frame. The linguistic cues prompt a hearer to set up the mental space, structured by a frame which provides access to a vast amount of cultural, social and background knowledge about families with step-children. The role of frames vis-à-vis mental spaces will not be focus in this study. Nevertheless, it should be understood that mental spaces are linked to frames and the information to which they provide access.⁹³ Schematic frame information required to understand the function of mental spaces will be provided as needed.

3.4.1. Construction of Spaces

As a discourse proceeds, the construction and connection of mental spaces is guided by numerous linguistic devices. Fauconnier (1997: 40-41) notes some of these which include space builders, grammatical and morphological markers such as tense and mood, cleft constructions and pragmatic information. The category of space builders⁹⁴ is variegated and includes adverbials, particles (like אם), prepositional phrases, subject-verb complexes amongst others. Examples from English for each include:

- (5) Adverbials: When I was ten...
- (6) Particles: If it rains,...
- (7) Prepositional phrases: in John's world..., at the library...
- (8) Subject-verb complexes: Max hopes..., Franklin said....
- (9) Hypotheticals: If it rains...

This study argues that אם is a BH space builder in both conditionals and non-conditional constructions, and hypothesizes that the particle's space-building characteristics displayed in conditionals motivated its use in non-conditionals.

Spaces have a 'parent space' or base space, usually called the "Reality" Space or Space R, which may or may not be explicitly specified via an expression; it may be part of background knowledge from the discourse. The base space is the initial starting space; it is a speaker's "reality". This "Reality" Space does not actually represent the actual state of affairs in the real world, which is why it is written in quotation marks. Instead it represents the speaker or

⁹³ For an introduction to frames see Cienki (2007); Evans and Green (2006: 222-229); Fillmore (2007).


⁹⁴ We propose that the particle אם (and אולי) is a space builder in BH. Other space builders in BH would probably include subject-verb complexes such as the different אמר verb speech introducers, adverbials such as באשר , prepositional markers such as ב , amongst others. It is, however, outside the scope of this study to pursue this question. See also Follingstad (2001) for an analysis of כי within a cognitive framework.

writer's "mental representation (cognitive construal)" of the real world (Buszard 2003: 48). Langacker (1991a: 498-503; 1991b: 318ff) argues that every utterance is grounded and in some manner and degree profiled. The "Reality" Space is always present in a speaker and hearer's mental representation of information and corresponds to Langacker's notion of grounding. Hence it is the speaker or narrator's construal of reality that is represented in the "Reality" Space.

The "Reality" Space is the parent of all daughter spaces. An example of how the above types of space builders set up spaces is illustrated in Figure 3.4 with the sentence taken from Fauconnier ([1985] 1994: 30), *In 1961 the president was a baby*. The phrase *in 1961* prompts the construction of a past space in which the information *the president was a baby* is valid (in the present he is 53 years old). The mental space structure would look like this:

Figure 3.4: Reality Space and Past Space


In 1961, the president was a baby.



The above figure illustrates what Dinsmore (1991) argues is one of the beneficial functions of mental spaces, namely that they partition information, which allows speakers and hearers to construe the information in relevant ways.


The network of spaces created in a discourse, either oral or written, narrative or poetry, is much more complex than in this simple example. A typical hierarchical network begins with an initial "Reality" Space shown below as Space R. New spaces, subordinate to Space R, are created from the types of linguistic markers and space builders noted above.

Figure 3.5: Hierarchy of spaces in a network



When mental spaces are constructed, cognitive links are set up between them that provide access between the spaces and the elements within different spaces. These links allow for an element in one space to be referred to by the element to which it is linked. Consider the following example of metonymy where a customer in a restaurant has ordered an omelet and later asks for orange juice to be added to her order. The waiter says, *The omelet wants orange juice too*. The cognitive link between the customer and her order is diagrammed as follows:

Figure 3.6: Metonymic Linking



The link enables the speaker to refer to the customer by describing her order. The omelet triggers reference to the customer (Cutrer 1994: 56-57). Cognitive links serve several important functions. They allow us to use a word from one cognitive domain to refer to an expression in another cognitive domain: an omelet (from the breakfast food domain) represents the customer who ordered it.

Cognitive links also connect an element from one mental space to its counterpart in another mental space. When information in an utterance is partitioned into multiple spaces, cognitive links allow access between spaces. This is formalized in the Access Principle (Fauconnier 1997: 41):


(10) Access Principle:

If two elements *a* and *b* are linked by a connector *F* (*b* – *F*(*a*)), then element *b* can be identified by naming, describing, or pointing to its counterpart *a*.

Coulson and Oakely (2000: 177) illustrate this with the sentence *When I was twelve, my parents took me to Italy*. In Figure 3.7, the utterance prompts the construction of two mental spaces: one for the present utterance, and a second for the event space when the speaker was twelve. *When* is a temporal space-builder. The fact that the speaker in the utterance space (BASE “Reality” space) and the person in the event space is one and the same person is represented by an identity connector (Fauconnier 1994: 12-15; 1997: 41). Partitioning the utterance into two mental spaces allows the hearer to understand that while the speaker may have been in Italy when she was twelve, she need not be at the time of the utterance. The identity connector allows the speaker to describe herself and what occurred to her at age twelve.

Figure 3.7: Identity Connectors

When I was twelve, my parents took me to Italy.



This example also illustrates the partitioning function of mental spaces. In this regard, Coulson and Oakely (2000: 177) note that “the virtue of mental spaces is that they allow the addressee to divide information at the referential level into concepts relevant to different aspects of the scenario.”

Mental space structures may also be built and filled as a result of pragmatic information, mapping from other domains, or as a result of inferencing or reasoning processes. So while linguistic information is crucially involved in the elaboration of mental spaces, it does not “completely determine meaning, but rather, [it] constrains the possible set of meanings” (Cutrer 1994: 21). Linguistic elements impose a set of constraints on and give the language decoder, or better, the language construer a set of partial and underdetermined instructions for the type of space construction which can be built. Because the language input underspecifies the space construction process, a given utterance may result in more than one possible space configuration (Cutrer 1994: 21).

3.4.2. Mental Space Approaches to Perspective in Narrative and Speech

In this section I will present MST approaches to issues raised by the narrative character of the BH texts. Unlike oral texts where there is a speaker and an addressee who share common knowledge, aural and visual fields and many other commonalities in space and time, in narrative there are often large gaps in time, space and culture between the writer, the text and the reader. This is clearly the situation with the BH corpus.

Despite these difference between oral and written narrative, the act of reading is still treated as a “communicative act which has an addresser and an addressee, even though the communicative intent is only through the text” (Dancygier 2012: 20). Dancygier (2012:21) observes that readers, without prompting, habitually speak of books “talking” to them and authors “speaking” to them, revealing that we “seem to rely on the default understanding of communication” when we read. In spite of the default communication paradigm being used as we read narrative, since the communicator in narrative is “hidden behind the text” (Dancygier 2012: 21) the concept of a narrator has been substituted for that of the teller of stories. Since the authors of the BH texts⁹⁵ are not accessible to readers, this study will use the term *narrator* when discussing the voice of the writer, and *reader* to represent the reader or hearer of the biblical text.⁹⁶ The discussion of the use of mental space in narrative and direct speech is based on Cutrer (1994), Buszard (2003), Dancygier (2012) and Vroon-van Vugt (2014).

⁹⁵ Since this is a study of the Hebrew of the Hebrew Bible as found in Biblia Hebraica Stuttgartensia SESB 2.0, further dissection of the text in search of the voice of editors and scribes would not fundamentally affect the analysis of דָּבָר 's semantics or its use in conditional and non-conditional constructions. Furthermore, space construction would not be fundamentally affected by a shift from a writer's voice to an editor's voice since BASE would shift to the editor's voice. For these reasons, this study will not pursue this question.


⁹⁶ The notions of narrator, implied narrator, implied reader and reader merit discussion, but are not germane to this project. See Banfield (1982), Cutrer (1994) and Genette (1980, 1988).

3.4.2.1. Narrative Domain

This study will partition spaces according to domains, which, following Buszard (contra Cutrer and Dancygier’s terminology) means “a partition of spaces, used to group spaces that constitute potentially alternate construals of reality” (Buszard 2003: 119). There may be multiple hierarchically organized mental spaces within a domain. The most pertinent domains are the “Reality” domain (discussed above 3.4.1), which is the domain of the narrator. This domain and the spaces found in it are not accessible to the reader. As noted above, *Reality* is inside quote marks to indicate that it does not directly represent facts in the real world, but the narrator’s perception of reality.

The narrative domain is populated by narrative spaces that are created as a reader processes the linguistic information of the narrative text during meaning construction. The spaces represent a reader’s construals of the meaning of the text. This domain is embedded within the “Reality” Space because the writing takes place in the writer’s “reality”. As in spoken discourse, various types of spaces will be created by linguistic cues—past and future spaces, and hypothetical spaces, amongst others. A hierarchy of spaces in these domains is illustrated in the following diagram.

Figure 3.8: “Reality” and Narrative Domains Display



Networks of spaces have certain features that reflect the process of meaning construction. At any given point in a narrative (or any type of discourse), one of the spaces in the network will be the BASE, one will be the V-POINT (VIEWPOINT) represented by the @ symbol, and one will be the FOCUS. Following Fauconnier ([1985] 1994) and especially Cutrer (1994), BASE represents the deictic center for the “conceptualizing self” or the “here and now” of the narrator’s reality (Buszard 2003: 38). In biblical narrative, BASE will normally match with the narrators “reality”.⁹⁷

BASE is also the default space for V-POINT, which “serves as the center of reference from which deictic relations typically...calculate” (Cutrer 1994: 72-73). Cutrer argues that V-POINT stands for a “bundle of deictic dimensions” including temporal, spatial, realis/irrealis,

⁹⁷ See Vroon-van-Vugt (2014:174).

personal (I vs. you) dimensions. FOCUS indicates the space that is most active and is currently being structured with information from text (Cutrer 1994: 72; Buszard 2003: 38-39).⁹⁸

Changes in V-POINT have been discussed by various researchers to discuss shifts from the narrator's "point of view" or "focalization" and that of a character's.⁹⁹ Genette introduced the concept of focalization to discuss the idea of perspective in narrative in order to differentiate between the voice of the narrator and that of alternate voices within a discourse, such as a character's. He proposed (1980: 189) that a text may be *externally focalized* when it is narrated from the perspective of the external author or narrator. External focalization hides the character's internal thoughts and only allows us to see what happens to the character. A text may also be *internally focalized*, when only what the character believes, thinks and perceives is expressed by the narrator. Genette (1980: 191) concedes that "the commitment to focalization is not necessarily steady over the whole length of a narrative." Indeed he states that internal focalization is rarely, if ever, applied in a "totally rigorous way" (1980: 192).

Since MST is intended to explain embeddings and restrictions on the validity of information, Sanders and Redeker use the theory to discuss the variation in focalization using the vocabulary of *perspective*. In their study of news texts, they define perspective as "the embedding of a subject's point of view in the narrator's discourse reality" (Sanders and Redeker 1996: 191). The embedding of the character's mental space within the narrator's domain or "reality" results in the restriction of "the validity of the presented information to a particular subject (person) in the discourse" (Sanders and Redeker 1996: 193). Since mental spaces are always tied to an embodied construer or cognizer (a speaker or hearer, a narrator or character), mental spaces always structure viewpoint (Dancygier and Sweetser 2012: Loc 12).

The importance of viewpoint (or perspective) is not limited to the determination of deictics in speech. Viewpoint is crucially involved in the construal of temporal and aspectual factors that control the choice of verb forms, and to the choice in English, Spanish and other Indo-European languages between *if* and *when*.

The symbol "@" (seen in the above display) was introduced by Cutrer (1994: 22, 110) to account for the location of the viewpoint of the narrator. When the narrator has a character speak, a quote formula verb prompts the construction of a character space (Buszard 2003: 145) within which the quote is elaborated. Cutrer (1994: 94, 404) shows that in direct speech the


⁹⁸ See also Fauconnier (1994: xl-xli); (1997: 49).

⁹⁹ See Fleishmann (1990) and Genette (1980, 1988).

BASE and, along with it, V-POINT shift by default to the character space,¹⁰⁰ reflected linguistically in the complete shift of the deictic center of the discourse to the space and time and pronominal deictics of the quoted speech,¹⁰¹ making direct speech a “mimetic device” that “shows a speech event instead of reporting it” (Redeker 1991: 342). In indirect quotes, V-POINT remains in the narrator’s base and, consequently so do tense and deictic indicators. This has been noted by Miller (1996: 73, 94) in Biblical Hebrew.

In the following simplified diagram which represents Genesis 1:1, the V-POINT resides in the narrator’s BASE, Space R. The temporal phrase בְּרֵאשִׁית prompts the construction of a temporal space in which the remaining information in the first clause is elaborated. This is the canonical, default structure for BH narrative.

Figure 3.9: Representation of V-POINT in BASE-- Gen. 1:1



In the display of direct speech in Figure 3.10 below, BASE and V-POINT shift from the narrator’s BASE space (Space N) to the character’s space. In the narrative domain, Pharaoh and Abraham are characters who populate the narrative space N. As needed, their counterparts are set up in spaces subordinate to Space N, as is seen in the Speech Space S, and in Space C in the Character Domain, being connected via the above-mentioned Access Principle. (Links not shown.)

The speech quote formula is in the narrative domain and is a space builder prompting the construction of a speech space which contains the speech verb itself (Cutrer 1994: 333) and an


¹⁰⁰ There is extensive discussion in the literature, both in mental space theory and narratology regarding the additional implications of the shift in BASE and V-POINT, including heightened vividness, epistemic distancing and so forth. See Cutrer (1994), Genette (1980), Fauconnier and Sweetser (1996), Fleischman (1990), Sanders and Redeker (1996) amongst others.

¹⁰¹ Miller (1996) has an extensive discussion of BH speech.

embedded content space, space C (for the speaking character). The speech space, Space C, represents the “reality” of the speaking character, pharaoh. What he says, the quote itself, is elaborated in Space C and its embedded spaces, which are not shown. The shifts that occur in deictic expressions in direct speech are evidence that BASE has shifted to the Space C.


Figure 3.10: Mental Space Diagram of Gen. 12:28

וַיֹּאמֶר מֶ־הָזֶאת עָשִׂיתָ לִּי לָמָּה לֹא־הִגַּדְתָּ לִּי כִּי אֶשְׁתַּדֵּךְ הוּא



In the above figures, the partially elaborated frames are displayed in boxes outside the circles that represent mental spaces. This display format is commonly used in the literature. It will be used in some displays, however a different format, also common in the literature, will be used in the discussion of כא conditionals. This format includes the information that is relevant to the discussion inside the figure that represents the mental space. This representation of the mental space will not be circular, but will be square or rectangular, in order to make the display of information easier. There are no theoretical differences implied by the shape of the mental space diagram. An example of what will be used follows:

Figure 3.11: Alternate Mental Space Diagram of Gen. 32:9



וַיֹּאמֶר אִם-יִבֹּא עֵשָׂו אֶל-הַמַּחֲנֶה הָאֶחָת וְהִכָּהוּ וְהָיָה הַמַּחֲנֶה הַנִּשְׁאָר לִפְלִיטָה
He thought/said, "If Esau comes to the one camp and attacks it, the remaining camp will escape." Gen. 32:9

3.5. Conditionals and their Interpretation

The goal of this study is to examine the ways in which the particle אם is used in Biblical Hebrew. Since אם has historically been considered the prototypical Biblical Hebrew conditional particle, it is necessary to discuss exactly what we mean when we talk about conditionality and conditionals. This is not as straightforward as the grammars and lexicons would lead one to believe.

Conditionals have been investigated and analyzed through the lenses of many different theoretical frameworks, each with distinct goals.¹⁰² Among the reasons why conditionals continue to challenge and perplex linguists is that “the semantic relation encoded by *if* is in

¹⁰² Conditionals and conditionality have been studied from many different perspectives from the time of Aristotle to the present. In this section I will give an overview of some of the more important ones. The most important volumes include Athanasiadou and Dirven *On Conditionals Again* (1997), *Journal of Pragmatics* number 7 (1983), Traugott, *et al. On conditionals* (1986). Conditionals have been studied in relationship to causality (Geiss and Zwicky (1971), pragmatics (Dancygier and Sweetser 2005; Haiman 1978; Sweetser 1990), topics (Haiman (1978), temporal reference (Comrie 1986), negotiations, threats, advice, warnings (Fillenbaum 1986: 179-195; Van der Auwera 1986: 206-207).

fact rather difficult to pinpoint with any precision” (Taylor 1997: 292). After centuries of study, this admission of uncertainty is surprising, but what exactly *if* contributes to the semantics of a conditional, and even how to define a conditional is still debated, not just for English *if*, but also for the equivalent construction’s conditional markers in other languages. Wierzbicka notes that most of the literature does not try to define what conditionals are, but what they do,

“they [conditionals] are not necessarily much clearer either. As I see it, the reason is that the concept of IF is one of those relatively simple and clear concepts which cannot be made clearer by decomposing them into simpler concepts” (Wierzbicka, 1997: 15).

She goes on to argue that it is fruitless to ask “What do conditionals mean?” as Johnson-Laird (1986: 73) does because

“the word conditional is a technical term, which can mean only what the scholars using it agree they want it to mean; and since the scholars who use this term do not seem to agree as to what they want it to mean, there is really little point in asking “what do conditionals mean?” (Wierzbicka 1997: 17).

Dancygier and Sweetser (2005: 9) concur when they say “it is no exaggeration to claim that we simply lack a linguistically useful definition of conditionality.” Wierzbicka (1997: 16) concludes that “the confusion which plagues the literature on conditionals is due . . . primarily to the fact that the authors try to define what can only be illustrated, not explained in words.” In other words, she argues that *if* is a semantic primitive which cannot be broken down into constituent components. Attempts to define conditionality have only led to a proliferation of definitions which use circular reasoning and imprecise language. An example of this circularity in the analysis of BH conditionals is seen in Van Leeuwen (1973: 16), “Ein Bedingungssatz bezeichnet einen Umstand (Bedingung) der notwendig ist für die Erfüllung der im Nachsatz benannten Handlung (Folge).”¹⁰³

Given this proclivity to circularity found in definitions of conditionality, this study of Biblical Hebrew ׀ will illustrate its object of investigation by way of examples, rather than by recourse to definitions. Rather than asking à la Johnson-Laird, “What do conditionals mean?”, the study will ask “How did the speakers and writers of Biblical Hebrew use ׀, and to what uses was it put?”

¹⁰³ “A conditional sentence expresses a circumstance (condition) which is necessary for the fulfillment of the action named in the consequent clause.” (Translation by Barbara Cheeseman.)

Because conditionals so clearly reflect the “characteristically human ability to reason about alternative situations” (Ferguson, Snitzer Reilly, Ter Meulen, Traugott 1986: 3),¹⁰⁴ they have historically been the purview of philosophers and logicians from Aristotle to the present. The descriptive categories used to describe \square conditionals in grammars and lexicons (real/unreal/hypothetical/irreal) reflect this tradition’s terminology and analysis. However, due to the failure of the logical and philosophical programme to deal with the wide range of conditionals that do not allow a material implication interpretation, linguists have explored numerous flavors of linguistic frameworks in an attempt to account for their variety. This chapter will present a brief and selective overview of several of the theoretical agendas that have been utilized to analyze conditionals. I will note which of these have had an influence on the analysis of \square constructions in BH. The linguistic theories utilized in this study will then be discussed and more thoroughly explained. Additionally, the terminology used by various traditions to describe the data of conditionals varies considerably. These differences will be presented and those used in this study will be described.

3.5.1. Interpretive Traditions

3.5.1.1. Logical-Philosophical Framework

Philosophers working within this model have defined conditionals as any sentence having the form *if P, (then) Q*. Examples include:

- (11) If there is a hurricane, the power will go out.
- (12) If there was a hurricane, the power would go out.
- (13) If there had been a hurricane, the power would have gone out.

Research by philosophers has mostly been limited to these types of the so-called ‘indicative’ conditionals because the semantics of the protasis are readily analyzable for their truth values and because “it is somehow assumed that the conditions for the truth of the conditional are those of material implication” (Inchaurrealde 2005: 7). Truth conditions are illustrated in the following truth table, where *P* is the protasis and *Q* is the apodosis.

¹⁰⁴ See also Dancygier (1998); Dancygier and Sweetser (2005); Johnson-Laird (1986).

Table 3.1: Truth Table

P	Q	$P \supset Q$
T	T	T
T	F	F
F	T	T
F	F	T

The problem regarding the analysis of conditional sentences in the philosophical-logical tradition is that material implication and truth conditions can only account for the so-called indicative conditionals. If counterfactuals are understood as material implication, there are whole classes of conditionals that are true from a logical standpoint, but unacceptable to speakers. This is because in material implication, conditionals are true whenever the consequent is true. Note the following sentence:

(14) If the activity on the moon is due to transformers arriving, the astronauts will find them.

Both speaker and logicians (see the truth table above) agree that if (15a) and (15b) are both true, then (14) is a true statement.

(15a) The activity on the moon is due to transformers arriving.

(15b) The astronauts will find them.

Note that in material implication, conditionals are true whenever Q is true and this implies that the existence of transformers and their arriving on the moon is irrelevant to the truth of the statement. Moreover, conditionals are true whenever the P is false. Consequently (14) is true whenever (15a) is false, regardless of whether the astronauts find the transformers. As far as material implication is concerned, the following is also acceptable:

(16) If white tea is blue, the astronauts will find the transformers.

Coulson (2001: 205) notes that “this discrepancy between truth and acceptability is particularly problematic for counterfactuals. . . . Because a counterfactual is by definition a conditional in which the antecedent is false, logically all counterfactuals are true statements.” However, for speakers of a language, whether or not a conditional statement is analyzable via truth conditions is irrelevant. In fact, truth values are irrelevant to the interpretation of most kinds of conditionals commonly used in everyday conversation, as the examples (17)-(21)

demonstrate. This is why linguists' (as opposed to philosophers and logicians) interest is not confined to those conditionals exhibiting material implication and analyzable for truth values. Examples of commonly used types of conditionals (i.e. natural language conditionals) that are unanalyzable in the logical-philosophical approach include:

- (17) If you need any help finding a tie, my name is José.
- (18) If you are thirsty, there is beer in the fridge.
- (19) If you are alone over Christmas, please come to our place for dinner.
- (20) If I had simply been more careful, I would have seen the train.
- (21) If you don't go to your room right now, I swear I will ground you!

Many ׀ conditionals are used in comparable ways to the examples above, and would be excluded from analysis under this framework. A few examples include:

(22) Exod. 1:16

אם־בן הוא והמתן If it is a boy, kill him.

(23) 2 Kgs. 2:1

וַיֹּאמֶר הַקְּשִׁית לְשֹׂאֵל אִם־תִּרְאֶה אֹתִי לְקַח
מֵאִתְּךָ יְהִי־לְךָ כֹּן He said, "What you ask is hard. If you
see me taken from you, it will be so for
you."

(24) Gen. 30:27

וַיֹּאמֶר אֱלֹהֵי לָבָן אִם־נָא מָצָאתִי חֵן בְּעֵינֶיךָ
נִחַשְׁתִּי וַיְבָרַכְנִי יְהוָה בְּגִלְגָּלֶיךָ: Laban said to him, "If I have found
favor in your eyes, I discovered
through divination that YHWH is
blessing me because of you."

Logicians and philosophers have responded to this critical deficiency by proposing context-sensitive possible worlds which "differ minimally from the actual world. This implies, first, that there are no differences between the actual world and the selected world except those that are required, implicitly or explicitly, by the antecedent," (Stalnaker 1968: 104).

Despite recourse to analyses in terms of possible worlds, this framework is still not able to account for many of the common, every-day use of conditionals that most speakers employ. The logical-philosophical framework is "widely recognized as less than adequate" for linguistic analysis (Ferguson, Snitzer Reilly, ter Meulen, Traugott 1986: 5). Dancygier and

Sweetser (2005: 8) agree, writing that in this framework “we are offered minimalist logical definitions of conditionality; but these do not seem helpful in examining natural language.” In the end, as Sweetser (1990: 4) notes, “truth-conditional semantics eliminates cognitive organization from the linguistic system.”

3.5.1.2. Descriptive Framework

The central task here is “the analysis and presentation of aspects of the grammatical structure of a particular language or language variety, used by a given speech community located in space and time. The prime purpose of the descriptive linguistic approach is to determine the range of forms and their meanings . . . within languages” (Ferguson, Snitzer Reilly, ter Meulen, Traugott 1986: 4-5). This is the most familiar framework to biblical scholars because it is the framework commonly found in Biblical Hebrew and Greek grammars and lexicons and monographs such as Van Leeuwen (1973).¹⁰⁵

As noted above, linguists are uneasy with and outright reject restricting the definition and study of conditionals to those that display material implication and are amenable to truth value semantic analyses.¹⁰⁶ Minimally, the majority of linguists tend to identify prototypical conditionals with *if-P, Q* clauses and their clear semantic equivalents, comparing these to a well-described metalanguage such as English (Ferguson, Snitzer Reilly, ter Meulen, Traugott 1986: 6).¹⁰⁷ Language specific syntactic, morphological, intonational¹⁰⁸ and lexical markers are also used to identify conditionals. Additionally, constructions that lack overt markers but are semantically equivalent to conditionals are included in the category. For example, the sentence *Go to the park, you're in trouble*, lacks any overt marker identifying it as a conditional. However it is commonly construed as a conditional because of the iconic causal relationship between the clauses. (Note that the intonational pattern also promotes this construal.)

The vocabulary employed within this framework to describe different perceived degrees of hypotheticality varies considerably and there is little agreement between authors; newer works seem to only augment the number of labels.¹⁰⁹ Terminological traditions include:

¹⁰⁵ See discussion in Chapter 2.4.3.

¹⁰⁶ See Dancygier (1998: 6); Dancygier and Sweetser (2005: 5); Ferguson, Snitzer Reilly, ter Meulen, Traugott (1986: 5); Podlesskaya (2001: 998).

¹⁰⁷ See also Comrie (1986: 78); Dancygier (1998: 11); Fauconnier (1994: 111); Fillenbaum (1986: 179); I-Wen Su (2005: 656); Van der Auwera (1986: 199) as representative examples.

¹⁰⁸ This is clearly not possible for BH, as it is no longer a spoken language. The use of the MT *ta'amim* as a gateway to the intonational prosody of spoken BH is, in my opinion, interesting, but since we have no access to speakers, conclusions will remain speculative.

¹⁰⁹ See Dancygier (1998). See also, for instance, Declerck and Reed (2001: 1) “it became clear to us...that more distinctions were required to describe the type of possible world (e.g. ‘open’, ‘counterfactual’)....”

irrealis/realis, hypothetical,¹¹⁰ consequential, open/closed, indicative/subjunctive, potential, impossible/possible, epistemic,¹¹¹ speech act,¹¹² content,¹¹³ factual, inferential, course of event,¹¹⁴ pragmatic,¹¹⁵ contrary-to-fact or counterfactual, generic/habitual, and even biscuit conditionals,¹¹⁶ to name a few. The labels most familiar to Hebrew studies include: real/unreal/hypothetical/irreal/fulfillable/unfulfillable.¹¹⁷

The analyses of כִּי in the literature are all situated squarely within the descriptive framework;¹¹⁸ description based on degree of hypotheticality is all that has been provided and the function of כִּי in conditionals and the other constructions in which the particle is used has not been a topic of discussion. Moreover, the descriptive categories for conditionals such as real/unreal/hypothetical, fulfillable/unfulfillable are themselves opaque and of little use when it comes to understanding the purposes for which they were used by the biblical writers.

A major theoretical concern with this classificatory system is that the difference between real, unreal and hypothetical is never defined with any precision. Whether it is possible to do so is highly questionable because by definition something that is hypothetical is not real. This has become so problematic that there is a move in the linguistic literature on conditionals away from classifying conditionals using hypotheticality terminology traditionally. In their major study of English conditionals Declerck and Reed (2001: 5) “decided to discard the term ‘hypothetical’ altogether, because it is used in too many different senses in the literature” in lieu of their own, more precise terminology.

Dancygier and Sweetser (2005) concur that the term is too vague and point out that all predictive content conditionals (typically categorized as real conditionals) are hypothetical in the sense that they “hypothesize a situation” (2005: 59). They also note that the term *irrealis* is equally imprecise and unhelpful because predictive conditionals are irrealis “in the sense that they do not portray situations as being a part of reality” (2005: 58). The protasis of some speech-act conditionals such as Exodus 1:16 $\text{וְהָיָה הַיּוֹנִים אֲתוֹ}$ could also be covered by the term *irrealis* since the infant boys it is portraying are not yet born, and hence not part of reality

¹¹⁰ See Haiman (1978) and Schiffrin (1992).

¹¹¹ See Sweetser (1990).

¹¹² *Ibid.*

¹¹³ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁴ See Athanasiadou and Dirven (1997b).

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁶ Named after a J.L. Austin example, “There are biscuits on the sideboard if you want some.” (DeRose and Grandy 1991: 405).

¹¹⁷ GKC (§159), IBHS (1990: 636–638), Van Leeuwen (1973).

¹¹⁸ The pertinent studies are reviewed in Chapter 2.

at the time of the utterance, yet few would be willing to classify this conditional as *irrealis*. So, the term *irrealis*, like *hypothetical*, does not make necessary distinctions that are crucial to differentiating between conditionals.¹¹⁹

As demonstrated, an additional problem with analyses that use “degree of certainty” or “hypotheticality” to categorize BH conditionals is that many conditionals are not used to speculate on the degree of possibility of fulfillment. For example, in speech-act conditionals,¹²⁰ conditionality is, in essence, co-opted for the performance of the speech acts. Since “degree of hypotheticality” does not motivate the use of many conditionals, this study questions the validity of the schema that uses this as the basis for classifying conditionals and will test the alternative classification system introduced below.

3.6. Analysis of Conditionals within a Cognitive Linguistics Framework

Fauconnier ([1985] 1994: 31, 109-142) proposed that a theory of mental spaces might provide a more insightful analysis of conditionals and counterfactual constructions than the traditional theories had delivered.¹²¹ MST has since been used effectively in the analysis of conditional constructions in a number of major languages such as English, Spanish,¹²² and French,¹²³ but never applied to an investigation of BH conditionals.

Dancygier and Sweetser (2005) offers the most comprehensive study of English conditionals in English within a cognitive framework. Their analysis of English conditionals examines different classes of conditionals proposed in Sweetser (1990: 113-144). The categories used within this study in the analysis of BH conditionals are based on her proposals.

Sweetser distinguishes three main types of conditionals distinguished by the type of mental space they construct: *content conditionals* (25), *speech-act conditionals* (26) and *epistemic conditionals* (27).

(25) If it rains tomorrow, the game will be cancelled.

¹¹⁹ Both Comrie (1986) and Dancygier and Sweetser (2005) also question the usefulness of the term *counterfactual* to describe certain types of conditionals, since by definition any conditional that refers to a future possibility is at the time of the utterance not factual, since future possibilities are just that – possibilities, and not facts. They may be expected to become facts, but they may never do so.

¹²⁰ See discussion below in Chapter 4.3.

¹²¹ See also Dinsmore (1991).

¹²² See Mejías-Bikandi (1996).

¹²³ See Cutrer (1994).

(26) If you're thirsty, there is beer in the fridge.

(27) If the clothes are on the line, they're home.

Content conditionals, illustrated by (25) are “*about* a possible state of affairs in the world” (Dancygier and Sweetser 2005: 16). The realization of the state of affairs in the P clause is a sufficient condition for the realization of the event or state of affairs in the Q clause. A distinguishing characteristic of content conditionals is that they are predictive (Dancygier 1998: 44-46; Dancygier and Sweetser 2005: 16) and characteristically involve causation (Comrie 1986: 80). The causation is iconic to the order of the clauses: the state of affairs in P are construed as causing or effecting the state of affairs in Q. In (25) the rain will cause the game to be cancelled. The predictive characteristic of content conditionals is located in the Q clause, and is not part of the *if*-clause. This can be seen in the above example where the speaker uses the assumption in the *if*-clause to make a prediction, but does not commit herself to stating whether it will rain or not.

It is frequently observed that *if* often promotes an interpretation of “if and only if” — where the P clause is taken as a necessary condition for Q. However, Comrie (1986: 78) argues persuasively that the “if and only if” reading is not part of the semantics of *if* itself, but a construal (or Gricean conversational implicature). In the above example, the “if and only if” reading is possible, but it is easy to imagine a context in which the game might be cancelled for other reasons. The discussion of BH content conditionals in Chapter 4.1 will demonstrate that these three features, prediction, causation and the *iff* construal also characterize BH content conditionals.

Generic conditionals form a class of conditionals related to content conditionals in that they “describe a predictive relationship between a state of affairs in P and the causally dependent state of affairs in Q” (Dancygier and Sweetser 2005: 95). The relationship is often construable with *when*. It has often been noted that *when* and *if* display a lot of overlap in English generic statements, such as (28) and (29):

(28) If water cools to 0 degrees, it freezes.

(29) When water cools to 0 degrees, it freezes.

The differences are subtle, but in (28) the freezing is conditioned by water reaching 0 degrees; causality is involved in the construal of the relationship between P and Q. In (29), on the other hand, the freezing is cotemporaneous with the temperature reaching 0 degrees, and causality is absent from the construal of these English examples because the use of *when* occurs only in sentences that assume that the state of affairs in the subordinate *when* clause

is the case. In other words, *when* asserts that freezing will occur at 0 degrees; *if* implies that there may exist instances when the situation is not the case.¹²⁴

The BH grammars and lexicons briefly mention that כִּי might be interpretable as *when* on rare occasions.¹²⁵ One of the issues that will be explored in the analysis of generic conditionals in chapter 4.2 is whether כִּי allows a temporal construal such as *when*, and if so, what local contextual factors might license this interpretation.

Speech-act conditionals were first proposed by Van der Auwera (1986) as a distinct category of conditionals. In example (26) above the “speech act represented in the apodosis is conditional on the fulfillment of the state describe in the protasis” (Sweetser 1990: 118). Stated differently, the P clause provides the context for the speech act to be performed. (26) might be paraphrased *If you are thirsty, then consider that I am informing you there is beer in the fridge*. It will be shown in Chapter 4.3 that speech-act conditionals are the most common conditionals in Biblical Hebrew, being used for a diverse set of speech acts.

The reasoning found in *epistemic conditionals* occurs in the epistemic domain. Though these conditionals may speak about states of affairs in the real world as seen in (27), they “follow the speaker’s reasoning processes” (Dancygier and Sweetser 2005: 17). The direction of the argument is opposite of that of content conditional in that the reasoning in epistemic conditional is typically from effect to cause. The hypothetical premise in P is the basis for the conclusion in Q. In (27), the speaker reasons, based most likely on experience, that the clothes hung on the line outside is sufficient condition for concluding that the family is home. This epistemic conditional may be glossed as *When you **know** clothes are on the line, you can **conclude** that the family is home*. Epistemic conditionals in BH are analyzed in Chapter 4.4.

As discussed above in section 3.3, questions posed for an analysis of כִּי that posits constructions will be relevant to the analysis of BH conditionals. Do the conditional structures in which כִּי is used qualify as a construction as defined by Goldberg? If so, what aspects of the meaning of each construction is contributed by the construction itself, and how much of the meaning is attributable to כִּי . What meaning is attributable to כִּי ?

¹²⁴ Dancygier (1998: 64). In German the close relationship between *if* and *when* is lexicalized in polysemous *wenn*.

¹²⁵ GKC (§164d): Gen. 36:9; 21:9; 36:4; Jdg. 6:3; Ps. 41:7; 94:18; Isa. 4:4, J-M (2003: §166p): Gen. 39:8; Deut. 19:8; Jdg. 6:3; 21:21; Ps. 94:18, IBHS (1990: 643–644): Jdg. 6:3, BDB (2008: 50): Gen. 21:9; 36:4; 38:9; Jdg. 6:3; Ps. 78:34 Isa. 4:4; 24:13; 28:25; Amos 7:2; Van Leeuwen (1973: 47–48).

In regards to the analysis of conditionals, we will ask, following Dancygier and Sweetser (2005:16),¹²⁶ whether “a few specific parameters of interpretation” can be discovered within the diverse types of uses of BH conditionals.

3.7. Summary

This chapter has presented an overview of the guiding assumptions of cognitive linguistics. These assumptions were demonstrated to differ significantly from the principles of Structuralism in that cognitive linguistics maintains that reality and language used to describe reality is a function of our human embodiment. Consequently, cognitive linguistics maintains that language is not innate or modular, as Chomsky argues, but is usage-based, integrated and multimodal. Constructions, the rules of language, are understood to integrate phonology, morphology, syntax, pragmatics and semantics. This assumption will inform our approach to lexically complex sequences such as אם כִּי and אם (אֲשֶׁר) עַד sequences whose meaning cannot be derived compositionally.

Cognitive linguistics was shown to maintain that word meaning reflects cognitive conceptual organization (such as semantic frames) and is encyclopedic in nature. This is a rejection of the objectivist semantics exemplified by truth-conditional approaches to meaning in which words are seen to represent the real-world. Cognitive semantics argues that meaning is mediated by our perception of the world and language represents a speaker’s construal of reality, not reality itself. Word and utterance meaning is understood to occur via accessing a vast corpus of encyclopedic knowledge. A strict compositional understanding of meaning construction is rejected.

An overview of Mental Space Theory principles relevant to this study were introduced. This theory seeks to model how meaning is partitioned and processed cognitively. Space builders such as אם prompt the construction of mental spaces that are partially structured by linguistic utterances. They are “partially structured” by linguistic input since utterances underdetermine meaning. Encyclopedic knowledge, context and general world knowledge contribute the meaning construction. Mental Space theory will be utilized to model how linguistic elements in אם conditional and non-conditional constructions are cognitively structured. Variations in how spaces are elaborated will reflect differences in meaning construction. Space diagrams clearly indicate the domains and domain shifts that occur in discourse and that are often determinative of verb choice.

¹²⁶ This was mentioned in Chapter 1, page 10.

Having laid out the models that will be used in this study, the remainder of the dissertation will be devoted to showing in detail how these will be used to account for both the semantics of \square and the range of constructions in which the particle is used.

Chapter 4 : A Study of Conditional ׀ Constructions

4.0. Introduction

In chapter 2 I discussed the limitations of current descriptions of ׀ and the constructions in which the particle is used, and I demonstrated that they can be attributed to the logic-based degree of hypotheticality framework that they used. Developments in cognitive linguistics have prompted a fresh look at conditionals across languages, and, in particular, at the way conditionals are used to accomplish particular goals speakers have. Chapter 3 introduced the most pertinent features of this linguistic paradigm, including insights from cognitive semantics, Mental Space Theory (MST) and Construction Grammar that have been useful for previous analyses and description of conditionals. Also in Chapter 3, the framework that will be employed to describe and categorize BH conditionals was described.

The goal of chapter 4 is to illustrate the value of this theoretical paradigm for the understanding of the semantics and interpretation of the particle ׀ and the Biblical Hebrew conditionals in which it is used. For these purposes I will use concepts from MST and Construction Grammar as points of departure in the analysis and will classify the conditionals according to the following domains, proposed by Sweetser (1990): content, generic, speech act and epistemic. Since it is hypothesized that some constructions might have become associated with particular categories of use, special attention will be paid to the formal features of each functional category. I will also investigate what differences in meaning, if any, might be indicated by the Q, P condition clause order.

In each section of this chapter, an analysis of one category of conditionals will be presented. This analysis will include: 1) a discussion of the salient and distinguishing characteristics of each type of conditional, 2) the distinctive attributes of their corresponding mental space configurations and finally, 3) an analysis of verb usage in each category of conditional. Linguistic elements and construal processes that are crucial to their interpretation will be presented. This chapter will, therefore, be organized as follows: In section 4.1 the analysis of content conditions will be presented. In section 4.2 generic and habitual conditionals will be analyzed. Section 4.3 will discuss the use of ׀ in speech-act conditionals on the basis of their pragmatics. Speech-act conditionals used to issue directives, warnings, promises and so forth will be analyzed and compared. Section 4.4 will examine epistemic conditionals, which rarely occur in Biblical Hebrew. Section 4.5 will look at postscript (Q, P order) ׀ conditionals and how they are translated. Section 4.6 will summarize the analysis of the use of ׀ in conditionals.

It is typical for studies such as this to consistently apply the analysis of a construction or topic to a single well-defined group of texts in each section of the entire study. It may appear that this is not done in this study because Section 4.1 discusses content conditionals within the categories of poetic and non-poetic literature, while Section 4.2 discusses generic conditionals as they occur in the entire corpus and Section 4.3's subsections define the discussion of speech-act directives within the textual parameters of casuistic and procedural literature vs. non-casuistic-non-procedural literature.

Each conditional in the entire corpus of the MT was examined. Then, in the course of the analysis, it became apparent that certain form-functional correspondences in conditionals were both restricted to and best explained in relation to their use in specific discourse or genre types. The analysis will attempt to demonstrate that correspondences exist between specific conditional forms and the discourse types and that the interpretation of the conditionals is contextually intertwined with the discourse type. In categories with few tokens, such as generic and habitual conditionals in Section 4.2, which occur only forty times in the MT, although discourse related correspondences do exist, it was easier to deal with the entire corpus in one section, rather than treat six tokens separately. The apparent inconsistency in corpus parameters in following sections is, therefore, data driven and done in an attempt to capture generalizations regarding the interpretation of the conditionals.

4.1. Content Conditionals in Biblical Hebrew

In this section, by way of orientation, I will first discuss the semantic features and functions that research has found to characterize content conditionals in non-Semitic languages. This discussion will provide a basis for determining whether content conditionals occur in BH and, if so, defining which features they share with non-BH content conditionals. Additionally, this section will seek to determine the role the particle כִּי has in the interpretation of content conditionals and the construction of hypothetical mental spaces. Verb use in the protases (P clause) and apodoses (Q clause) of content conditionals will be analyzed and presented in order to determine if generalizations can be captured that were not obtainable by previous studies.

In Chapter 3.6, content conditionals were introduced and characterized as being “*about* a possible state of affairs in the world” (Dancygier and Sweetser 2005: 16). Dancygier and Sweetser (2005: 20) go on to indicate that the term *content* does not refer to a particular mental space, as the terms “*epistemic* and *speech-act* refer to the spaces of the speaker’s current reasoning processes.” Content conditionals crucially involve causation (Comrie 1986: 80;

Fillmore 1990a: 148-149) which is iconic to the order of the clauses: the state of affairs in P are construed as causing or effecting the state of affairs in Q. Content conditionals are also characterized by being predictive, promoting an if and only if (*iff*) reading and prompting an alternate mental space (Comrie 1986: 78; Dancygier 1998: 44-46; Dancygier and Sweetser 2005: 16). In (1) it is predicted that hard rain will cause the golf tournament to be cancelled.

(1) If it rains hard tomorrow, the golf tournament will be cancelled.

Here the speaker sets up a mental space that is, to restate the above quote, “*about a possible state of affairs in the world,*” i.e. a hard rain tomorrow. The speaker then makes a prediction about this state of affairs (or content), namely that the golf tournament will be cancelled. The prediction is made within the original mental space indicating that the prediction holds exclusively within that mental space. No prediction is offered regarding what might happen if it does not rain hard. The hard rain is understood to cause the cancellation.

Dancygier and Sweetser (2005: 31) note that “one of the most important reasons for setting up mental spaces is to imagine alternatives.” Prediction imagines possible alternate futures, and much of daily life and conversation necessarily involves imagining alternate future scenarios because it is essential to decision-making. Predictions based on alternatives, Dancygier and Sweetser (2005: 32) argue, are much more valuable for decision-making than predictions involving a single option. The predictive characteristic of content conditionals is located in the Q clause, and not the P *if*-clause.¹²⁷ This can be seen in example (1) above. The speaker uses the assumption in the *if*-clause to make a prediction, but does not commit herself to stating whether it will rain hard or not. The Q clause contains the semantics of the prediction. Note, as Dancygier (1998: 47) demonstrates, that it is perfectly acceptable to say “*If it rains hard tomorrow and I predict it will, the golf tournament will be cancelled,*” but not “*If it rains hard tomorrow, the golf tournament will be cancelled and I predict it will.*” The latter is redundant, indicating that the semantics of the prediction are in the Q clause; the former is acceptable because prediction is not part of the P clause.

As note earlier (p. 68), the “if and only if” (*iff*) reading is not part of the semantics of *if* itself, but a construal (or Gricean conversational implicature). In example (1) above, the *iff* reading is possible, but it is easy to imagine a context in which the game might be cancelled for other reasons. Below we will see that BH content conditionals are typically predictive and that the alternative construal is often explicitly stated.

¹²⁷ See Dancygier (1998: 43-49).

Content conditionals occur 120 times¹²⁸ in the BH corpus: 62 times in the historical books; 24 times in Job and 17 instances in the Psalms, Proverbs and Song of Songs); 17 occurrences in the prophets. The database for this study includes 1,060 uses of ׀ in BH. ׀ content conditionals represent only 12% of all occurrences. This is interesting in that this type of conditional is the stereotypical representative of “real” conditionals in that their truth-conditions can be established.

Examples include:

(2) Gen. 32:8-9 (Eng. 32:7-8)

וַיִּירָא יַעֲקֹב מְאֹד וַיִּצְרַר לוֹ וַיִּחַץ אֶת־הָעָם אֲשֶׁר־
 אִתּוֹ וְאֶת־הָצֹאן וְאֶת־הַבָּקָר וְהַגְּמָלִים לְשְׁנֵי
 מַחֲנֹת: ⁹וַיֹּאמֶר אִם־יָבֹא עֵשָׂו אֶל־הַמַּחֲנֶה
 הָאֶחָד וְהַכְּהוּ וְהָיָה הַמַּחֲנֶה הַנִּשְׁאָר לְפָלִיטָה:

⁷Then Jacob was greatly afraid and distressed; and he divided the people that were with him, and the flocks and herds and camels, into two companies, ⁸thinking, “If Esau comes to the one company and destroys it, then the company that is left will escape.”

(3) Exod. 18:22-23

וַיִּשְׁפֹּטוּ אֶת־הָעָם בְּכָל־עֵת וְהָיָה כָּל־הַדָּבָר
 הַגָּדוֹל יָבִיאוּ אֵלָיִךָ וְכָל־הַדָּבָר הַקָּטָן וַיִּשְׁפֹּטוּ־הֵם
 וְהִקַּלְ מִעֲלֶיךָ וְנִשְׂאוּ אִתָּךְ: ²³אִם אֶת־הַדָּבָר הַזֶּה
 תַּעֲשֶׂה וְצִוְּךָ אֱלֹהִים וַיִּכְלַת עִמָּךְ וְגַם כָּל־הָעָם
 הַזֶּה עַל־מִקְמוֹ יָבֹא בְשָׁלוֹם:

²²They will judge the people all the time, and they will bring all the important cases to you, but all the small cases they will judge. And they will lighten the load from upon you and carry it with you. ²³If this is what you do, and God commands you to do it, then you will be able to stand it, and all these people will go to their home content. (My translation)

(4) Jdg. 6:37

הִנֵּה אֲנֹכִי מַצִּיג אֶת־גִּזְתְּ הַצֹּמֶר בַּגֶּרֶן אִם טֵל
 יְהִיָּה עַל־הַגִּזָּה לְבִדָּה וְעַל־כָּל־הָאָרֶץ חֹרֵב
 וַיִּדְעֹתִי כִּי־תוֹשִׁיעַ בְּיָדִי אֶת־יִשְׂרָאֵל כַּאֲשֶׁר
 דִּבַּרְתָּ:

Look, I am putting a wool fleece on the threshing floor. If there is dew only on the fleece and all the ground is dry, I will know that you will rescue Israel by my hand just as you said. (NET)

¹²⁸ Gen. 13:16; 18:21; 30:1; 31:8 (2x); 32:9; 34:15; 38:17; 42:19; 44:23, 32; Exod. 4:8; 18:23; 19:5; 40:37; Num. 5:27, 28; 21:9; 33:55; 36:4; Deut. 5:25; Josh. 22:23 (2x); Jdg. 6:3, 31, 37; 15:7; 16:7, 11, 13, 17; Ruth 3:13a; 1 Sam. 2:25; 19:11; 20:7; 23:23; 2 Sam. 15:25, 26, 33; 34; 18:3 (2x), 25; 1 Kgs. 12:7, 27; 2 Kgs. 2:10 (2x); 7:4 (4x); 1 Chron. 22:13; 28:9 (2x); 2 Chron. 10:7; 15:2 (2x); 30:9; Est. 4:14; 6:13; Neh. 3:35; Job 8:4, 5, 6, 18; 9:3, 15, 19 (2x), 20, 23, 27, 30; 10:14, 15; 11:13-15; 13:10; 14:7, 8; 16:6; 17:16; 21:6; 22:20, 23 (2x); 33:23; 34:14; Ps. 63:7; 66:18; 73:15; 90:10; 127:1 (2x); 139:8; Prov. 2:1, 3, 4-5; 3:24; 23:15, 18; 24:14; Song 8:7, 9 (2x); Isa. 7:9; 8:20; 53:10; Jer. 2:22; 5:2; 13:17; 14:18 (2x); 15:1; 23:22; 26:15; 31:36, 37; 33:20; Lam. 3:32; Ezek. 2:5; 3:6.


(5) Ps. 66:17-19¹²⁹

אֶלְיוֹ פִּי־קָרָאתִי וְרוּמָם תַּחַת לְשׁוֹנֵי: ¹⁸אֶזְנוֹן אִם־
 רָאִיתִי בְלִבִּי לֹא יִשְׁמַע אֲדֹנָי: ¹⁹אֲכֹן שָׁמַע
 אֱלֹהִים הִקְשִׁיב בְּקוֹל תַּפְלְתִּי:

¹⁷I cried aloud to him, and he was extolled with my tongue. ¹⁸If I had cherished iniquity in my heart, the Lord would not have listened. ¹⁹But truly God has listened; he has given heed to the words of my prayer.

Each of these conditionals set up two alternative mental-space structures as can be seen in Figure 4.1, a display of Gen. 32:9. Each alternative represents possible futures of the BASE space, an אִם future and an alternative future. Each of these alternative structures has two mental spaces: the אִם mental space, and the extension (EXT) space, which is embedded in the אִם space. It is embedded because the prediction can hold only within the first space, i.e. (iff).

Figure 4.1: Mental Space Diagram of Gen. 32:9, example (2)



וַיֹּאמֶר אִם־יָבֹא עֵשָׂו אֶל־הַמַּחֲנֶה הָאֶחָת וְהִכָּהוּ וְהָיָה הַמַּחֲנֶה הַנִּשְׁאָר לִפְלִיטָה:
 He thought/said, “If Esau comes to the one camp and attacks it, the remaining camp will escape.” Gen. 32:9.

¹²⁹ Many would classify this as a counterfactual and ignore the fact that the conditional refers to past correlation between clauses, correlation that involves causality and predictiveness. See discussion below on the limits of this vocabulary and the alternative concept of epistemic distance.


In this example, as a space-builder, ׀ prompts the reader to construct hypothetical mental spaces seen on the left side of Figure 4.1. In one space, ׀ prompts the construction of a hypothetical mental space which is partially structured by the linguistic information in the P clause: ׀ִבּוֹא עֵשָׂו אֶל־הַמַּחֲנֶה הָאֶחָת וְהָכֹהֶוּ. Still on the left side, the Q clause prompts the construction of the extension (EXT/FUTURE) mental space, structured by the information in the Q clause: וְהָיָה הַמַּחֲנֶה הַנִּשְׁאָר לְפָלִיטָה. Due to the strength of the *iff* construal deriving from the P-Q causal correlation, alternate ~P, ~Q mental spaces structures are also set up (on the right side). The alternative structure has two spaces, a ~P space in which Esau attacks a united camp and the second ~Q mental space (embedded in the ~P space) in which everyone dies. BASE¹³⁰ is Jacob's present for the construction of the mental spaces. It is from the BASE that he imagines these potential futures, makes predictions based on them and then acts based on his assessment of his predictions.

The correspondence between prediction and causation should be noted. Dancygier and Sweetser (2005: 33) observe that “the essence of conditional predictiveness is the correlation which allows conditional prediction of one event based on the knowledge about the other....So conditional prediction normally invites a reader to imagine what models of the world would lead the speaker to believe in the correlation underlying that prediction.” We readers of this text have been informed that Jacob divided his family into two groups and put a river between them. The narrator asks us to understand that his actions are causally related to the prediction that one group will be able to escape if Esau attacks.

The properties discussed in Gen. 32:9 are representative of all BH content conditionals. Predictiveness, the *iff* interpretation that promotes alternativity and the construal of causality are found in all BH content conditionals. These features are also seen in Figure 4.2.

¹³⁰ For a discussion of BASE, see chapter 3.4.1.

Figure 4.2: Mental Space Diagram of Jdg. 6:37, example (4)



אם טל יהיה על-הגִּזָּה לְבִדָּה וְעַל-כָּל-הָאָרֶץ חָרֵב וַיִּדְעֹתַי כִּי-תוֹשִׁיעַ בְּיָדִי אֶת־
:יִשְׂרָאֵל כַּאֲשֶׁר דִּבַּרְתָּ: “If there is dew only on the fleece and all the
ground is dry, I will know that you will rescue Israel by my hand
just as you said.” Jdg. 6:37

In this example, as a space-builder, אם prompts the reader to construct hypothetical mental spaces seen on the left side of Figure 4.2. In one space, אם prompts the construction of a hypothetical mental space which is partially structured by the linguistic information in the P clause: חָרֵב וְעַל-כָּל-הָאָרֶץ לְבִדָּה וְיִהְיֶה עַל-הַגִּזָּה טֵל. Still on the left side, the Q clause prompts the construction of the extension (EXT/FUTURE) mental space, structured by the information in the Q clause: וַיִּדְעֹתַי כִּי-תוֹשִׁיעַ בְּיָדִי אֶת־יִשְׂרָאֵל כַּאֲשֶׁר דִּבַּרְתָּ. Due to strength of the *iff* construal deriving from the P-Q causal correlation, alternate ~P, ~Q mental spaces structures are also set up (on the right side). The alternative structure has two spaces, one in which the fleece is wet and the second (embedded in the first) in which Gideon knows that God will not give him victory. BASE is Gideon's present for the construction of the mental spaces. It is from the BASE that he imagines these potential futures.

I have categorized (4) as a content conditional despite the fact that it appears to involve the type of reasoning that characterizes epistemic conditionals, in which P is the basis for the conclusion in Q. As described above, content conditionals reason from cause to effect. At first

glance, the use of יָדַעַתִּי, a verb of cognition, appears to provide evidence that this is an epistemic conditional. However, the mental state of knowing is the actual content of the utterance. The conditional would be an epistemic conditional if it read *If there is dew only on the fleece and all the ground is dry, you will rescue Israel by my hand just as you said*. But Gideon is not stating that he will conclude that God will rescue Israel, but stating that he will know that God will rescue Israel. He is predicting that the presence of dew will cause him to know something. This is an example of instances where “anything . . . in the speaker’s thought processes . . . can become the explicit content of what is being said” (Dancygier and Sweetser 2005: 21).

Examples (2) and (4) demonstrate that BH content conditionals share numerous features with content conditionals in other languages. First, they are predictive, i.e. there is a “correlation” between the P and Q clauses which “allows conditional prediction of one event based on the knowledge about the other” (Dancygier and Sweetser 2005:33). In Figure 4.2 the BASE is structured with semantic frames related to Gideon’s worldview. In that worldview, YHWH can and does manipulate the natural world, so leaving the fleece wet and the ground dry, is not excluded from consideration. On the basis of this, Gideon sets up a conditional prediction—if the fleece is wet and the ground dry, he predicts that YHWH will give victory. Because of Gideon’s knowledge about the how the world works, he assumes that P causes Q, hence a causal correlation is brought into the prediction.

Secondly, the construal of causality promotes an *iff* interpretation since it is understood that only within the background scenario, *If there is dew only on the fleece*, will Gideon know that YHWH will give victory. (While other explanations are possible, the prediction is local to the background conditional P clause and no other backgrounds.) It is on the basis of the *iff* construal that the alternative $\sim P$, $\sim Q$ mental spaces are created. If the prediction is true exclusively under P’s conditions, then if P does not hold, neither will Q. Alternate reasoning in predictive content conditionals make them very useful in everyday life, as can be seen in the BH examples. They allow Gideon to decide whether to go into battle or not; in (2), the alternative reasoning motivates Jacob’s decision to divide his clan into two groups.

In Chapter 3.6.1, some of the limits of the hypotheticality/irrealis/certainty vocabulary traditionally used to refer to conditionals was discussed. Example (5), Ps. 66:17-19, illustrates this issue. Traditionally, the conditional in (5) would be considered a counterfactual since it entertains an eventuality that did not occur. Dancygier and Sweetser (2005: 59) note that “we might say that all predictive conditionals (and perhaps others) are *hypothetical*,¹³¹ in the sense

¹³¹ Italics in original.

that they hypothesize a situation and base a prediction on it. But this term is used variously to refer to all predictive conditionals and to negative-stance ones in particular.” Cross-linguistically, content conditionals are used with differing epistemic stances in order to represent how the speaker or writer feels about the situation being portrayed.

The conditionals in (2-5), which are repeated here for ease of reference, reveal how the categorization schema adopted in this study yields generalizations that are both distinct and preferable to the traditional framework.

(2) Gen. 32:8-9 (Eng. 32:7-8)

וַיִּירָא יַעֲקֹב מְאֹד וַיִּצְרַח לֵאמֹר אֶת־הָעָם אֲשֶׁר־
 אִתִּי וְאֶת־הַצֹּאן וְאֶת־הַבְּקָר וְהַגְּמָלִים לִשְׁנֵי
 מַחֲנֵוֹת: ⁹וַיֹּאמֶר אִם־יָבֹא עֵשָׂו אֶל־הַמַּחֲנֶה
 הָאֶחָד וְהַכֹּהֵן וְהָיָה הַמַּחֲנֶה הַנּוֹשָׂא לִפְלִיטָה:

⁷Then Jacob was greatly afraid and distressed; and he divided the people that were with him, and the flocks and herds and camels, into two companies, ⁸thinking, “If Esau comes to the one company and destroys it, then the company that is left will escape.”

(3) Exod. 18:22-23

וַיִּשְׁפֹּטוּ אֶת־הָעָם בְּכָל־עֵת וְהָיָה כָּל־הַדָּבָר
 הַגָּדוֹל יָבִיאוּ אֵלָיִךָ וְכָל־הַדָּבָר הַקָּטָן יִשְׁפֹּטוּ־הֶם
 וְהַקָּל מִמֵּלֶיךָ וְנִשְׂאוּ אִתָּךְ: ²³אִם אֶת־הַדָּבָר הַזֶּה
 תַּעֲשֶׂה וְצִוְּךָ אֱלֹהִים וַיְכַלֶּת עִמָּךְ וְגַם כָּל־הָעָם
 הַזֶּה עַל־מִקְמוֹ יָבֹא בְּשָׁלוֹם:

²²They will judge the people all the time, and they will bring all the important cases to you, but all the small cases they will judge. And they will lighten the load from upon you and carry it with you. ²³If this is what you do, and God commands you to do it, then you will be able to stand it, and all these people will go to their home content. (My translation)

(4) Jdg. 6:37

הִנֵּה אֲנֹכִי מִצִּיג אֶת־גִּזְתַּת הַצֹּמֶר בַּגֶּרֶן אִם טֹלֵ
 יְהִיָּה עַל־הַגִּזָּה לְבִדָּה וְעַל־כָּל־הָאָרֶץ חֹרֵב
 וַיִּדְעֹתִי כִּי־תוֹשִׁיעַ בְּיָדִי אֶת־יִשְׂרָאֵל כַּאֲשֶׁר
 דִּבַּרְתָּ:

Look, I am putting a wool fleece on the threshing floor. If there is dew only on the fleece and all the ground is dry, I will know that you will rescue Israel by my hand just as you said. (NET)

(5) Ps. 66:17-19¹³²

אֶלְיוֹ פִּי־קָרָאתִי וְרוּמָם תַּחַת לְשׁוֹנֵי: אֶזְנֵן אִם־
 רָאִיתִי בְלִבִּי לֹא יִשְׁמָעוּ אֲדֹנָי: אֶזְנֵן שָׁמַע
 אֱלֹהִים הֶקְשִׁיב בְּקוֹל תַּפְלִתִּי:

¹⁷I cried aloud to him, and he was extolled with my tongue. ¹⁸If I had cherished iniquity in my heart, the Lord would not have listened. ¹⁹But truly God has listened; he has given heed to the words of my prayer.

Conditionals with differing attitudes toward the P clause can readily be found in one pragmatic category, reflecting how conditionals are actually used in BH. All the conditionals in (2-5) are content conditionals, yet the epistemic stance¹³³ taken toward them differs. The stance taken toward examples (2-4) is neutral, while the stance in (5) taken by the writer of Psalm 66:17-19 toward the conditional in the P clause in v.18 is decidedly negative.

But should (5) be considered a true counterfactual and if so, does this entail that it is not a content conditional? As noted by Sweetser and Dancygier (2005: 64), “context is a strong contributing factor” of true counterfactuality. By sandwiching the conditional between two statements of God’s positive attitude toward him (vv. 17, 19), the conditional is used to confirm YHWH’s positive response to his prayer. The strong negative אֶזְנֵן and the assertion לֹא־הִשְׁמָעוּ in vs. 20 rejects the instantiation of the Q clause prediction that God didn’t listen to him. If the result is invalid, the condition in the P clause must be invalid. This supports a conclusion that this is a true counterfactual conditional.¹³⁴ The semantics of counterfactuality appear to be strongly determined by context. An additional factor contributing to this strongly negative epistemic stance is the use of the *qatal* verb (רָאִיתִי).¹³⁵ Further discussion of the use of the *qatal* to promote negative epistemic stance is found in section 4.1.1.3.

¹³² Van Leeuwen recognizes that Ps. 66:18 is a counterfactual, but believes that אִם was used “because he [the writer]...did not want to emphasize the unreal aspect of the condition over its hypothetical aspect.” (Translation by Margaret Cheeseman.) “...weil er nicht so sehr den irrealen als wohl den hypothetischen Aspekt der Bedingung betonen wollte.”

¹³³ Fillmore (1990a, b) proposed that epistemic stance is crucially involved in all conditional reasoning. It refers to the speaker’s or writer’s attitude, or stance, toward the proposition in the P clause. A speaker can have a neutral, positive or negative attitude toward the proposition. A speaker who distances herself from the proposition displays negative epistemic stance, often indicated via verb forms. The concept of epistemic stance may appear, on the surface, to correlate with the concept “degree of hypotheticality” that has traditionally been the basis for categorizing conditionals. However, the theoretical motivations for each concept are fundamentally different.

¹³⁴ HALOT (1994-2000: 524) notes that אִם can be used in counterfactual (“unreal”) utterances.

¹³⁵ The question of whether the *qatal* is complicit in promoting of the negative stance is an important one and will be considered below. However, our inability to query speakers of BH severely constrains any conclusions on this matter.

Although (5) is a counterfactual, this does not mean that the causality and prediction that characterize content conditionals is not present. Both are evident in the conditional. In the P clause, frame-based knowledge informs the reader that sin causes YHWH to withdraw and that causes him to not listen. Within the hypothetical mental space structured by the P clause, the writer predicts Q—YHWH will not listen. Because of these factors, I classify it as a content conditional. The assertions in v.19, 20 are overt indications that the alternative construal exists and is in fact substantiated.

It has been mentioned that predictive content conditionals promote alternative construals because the causal correlation between P/Q is so strong that it prompts the setting up of an alternative mental space where $\sim P$, $\sim Q$ holds. This raises a question regarding $\square\aleph$'s role in this construal. In English, *if* does not make a semantic contribution to the construal of alternativity.¹³⁶ However, unlike $\square\aleph$, *if* is not used in non-conditional constructions in which alternativity is central. In BH, $\square\aleph$ is used in alternative $\square\aleph, \dots \square$ constructions such as polar questions (Job 4:17; Ps. 77:10) and alternative questions (Exod. 17:7; Jdg. 20:28). The lexicons do not however directly indicate that alternativity is part of the semantics of the particle.¹³⁷ At this point, we will note that in BH predictive conditionals, as in other languages, the setting up of the alternative mental spaces is the result of the causality between the P and Q clauses and not attributable to the semantics of $\square\aleph$. Conclusions will be deferred until the summary in Chapter 6 after the presentation of $\square\aleph$'s use in other constructions in which alternativity plays a role.

In order to discuss questions pertaining to verb use in content conditionals, the discourse context in which they occur must be considered. A now well-established mental space approach to tense and tense-aspect has been developed¹³⁸ that this study will draw on to model conditional verb phenomena in discourse. If we consider Gen. 32:9 in examples (2, Figure 4.1), the conditional occurs, as do most content conditionals, in direct speech that is situated in the broader narrative.

¹³⁶ See Dancygier and Sweetser (2005: 42).


¹³⁷ BDB (2008: 50); BHRG (1999: 296); HALOT (1994-2000: 60); IBHS (1990: 316, 684); J-M (§161e, §175). See also Revell (1991).

¹³⁸ See Buszard (2003); Cutrer (1994); Fauconnier ([1985] 1994: 33).

Figure 4.3: Mental Space Diagram of Gen. 32:8-9 (Eng. 32:7-8)

וַיִּירָא יַעֲקֹב מְאֹד וַיִּצְרַר לוֹ וַיַּחַץ אֶת־הָעָם אֲשֶׁר־
 אִתּוֹ וְאֶת־הָצֹאן וְאֶת־הַבְּקָר וְהַגְּמָלִים לְשְׁנֵי
 מַחֲנֹת: וַיֹּאמֶר אִם־יָבֹא עֵשָׂו אֶל־הַמַּחֲנֶה
 הָאֶחָד וְהִכּוּהוּ וְהָיָה הַמַּחֲנֶה הַנִּשְׁאָר לְפָלִיטָה:

⁷Then Jacob was greatly afraid and distressed; and he divided the people that were with him, and the flocks and herds and camels, into two companies, ⁸thinking, “If Esau comes to the one company and destroys it, then the company that is left will escape.”



In Figure 4.3, BASE and V-POINT are in the narrator’s “Reality” space. Because of this, the mental space configuration locates the information in 32:8 in the narrative domain. (This information is noted in the frame box to the right of the first space circle in the narrative domain.) As the narrative moves to 32:9, the narrator then shifts responsibility for the content of the speech to Jacob, the speaking character. This shift of responsibility is indicated via the speech verb וַיֹּאמֶר , which prompts the construction of a speech space in the narrative domain. Since the speech (construed as Jacob’s thoughts) is represented as Jacob’s direct speech, the content of the speech (the conditional construction) opens a space in the character domain. BASE and V-POINT, noted by @ symbol, move from the narrators “reality” Space R to the hypothetical Space H in the character domain when the protasis is structured in this space. The apodosis is then elaborated in Space H1.

The diagram also incorporates information regarding the construal of TIME relations between the eventualities (וְיָבוֹא in the P clause and $\text{וְהָיָה לְפָלִיטָה}$ in the Q clause) and the information regarding them that the mental spaces organize. For example, in Figure 4.3 the possible eventuality considered in Space H is construed as occurring after that in Space N, and the prediction in Space H1 would take place after Space H. They are therefore both FUTURE with regards to the spaces in which they are embedded.

The above discussion proposed that content conditionals in BH follow the prototypical cross-linguistic iconic P, Q order. The background P clause is typically headed by כִּי , which prompts the construction of a hypothetical mental space.¹³⁹ The main Q clause is structured within the P clause space. In these spaces the linguistic information in the conditional utterance is structured. Since linguistic information underdetermines meaning, the spaces are further elaborated via incorporation of contextual and frame-based encyclopedic knowledge. Predictive conditionals were shown to prompt, via inference, the construction of alternative spaces in which $\sim P$, $\sim Q$ was considered. The following discussion examines viewpoint and verb distribution and construal in כִּי content conditionals in order to determine what, if any, generalizations regarding verb usage might be identified.

4.1.1. Content Conditional P Clauses

One of the most striking characteristics of prior analyses of BH כִּי conditionals is the conclusion that no generalization can be stated regarding verb forms beyond noting that they are used according to their nature.¹⁴⁰ This mirrors the lengthy historic attempt to understand

¹³⁹ See discussion of examples (12) and (13) below where contextual factors can suppress hypotheticality and promote a temporal construal.

¹⁴⁰ See GKC (§159a); J-M (§167g).

the semantics and use of BH verbs. Recently Andrason (2010a; 2011a, b, c; 2012a, b) has applied the work of Hopper and Traugott (1993) and Bybee, Perkins and Pagliuca (1994) on grammaticalization to the Biblical Hebrew verbal “situation”. Grammaticalization studies have focused on explaining the synchronic semantic complexity of grammatical constructions by examining the diachronic history of a given form.¹⁴¹ Andrason argues that BH verbs and

their aspectual, taxis, temporal, modal, textual and pragmatic readings and implications....which from the synchronic perspective is a disordered and heterogeneous mixture of supposedly random and unrelated functions can be viewed as a prototypical homogeneous diachronic trajectory and thus, as a manifestation of a single linguistic input. This signifies that the synchronically based taxonomy of uses of a gram may be ordered into a linear representation which matches one of the universal paths. Consequently, the synchronic state of the language is pictured as a regular diachronic progression.

He argues that the traditional synchronic analysis of the BH verb system’s semantic complexity will always result in an incomplete representation of the facts, which instead call for a more nuanced and variegated semantically polysemous “boxes-without-sides” understanding. He posits that:

First, the semantic potential of a gram corresponds to an amalgam of meanings which mirror various stages on a given path—the synchronic grams are portions of certain paths. Second, the idea of “invariant meanings” and of a clear-cut borderline between conventional and contextual interpretations is rejected. And third, the binary contrast is illusory and does not reflect the real state of affairs (Andrason 2011c: 382).

And consequently that,

First, the semantic potential of a gram should be presented as an amalgam of various meanings which match different consecutive stages on a path. Second, all such meaning-stages are to be treated as equally important. On the other hand, certain meanings may be more frequent (core) while others can appear as uncommon (peripheral)—this situation, as already mentioned, reflects the progression on the path. Third, the idea of a binary opposition between grams must be abandoned (Andrason 2011c: 382).

I concur with Andrason’s analysis, and will discuss verb use in ׀ִנְּ conditionals and other ׀ִנְּ constructions from the position that BH verb forms allowed for variegated construals by

¹⁴¹ Andrason (2010:19); Hopper and Traugott (1993: 6).

speakers of the language and that they cannot be understood through the the binary lens of structuralism.

The position that no generalization can be stated regarding verb form usage in conditionals beyond stating that they are used “in accordance with the usual rules” (J-M §167g) will be shown to be inexact. It is postulated that the conclusions of earlier studies of $\square\aleph$ are in part attributable to the logical-philosophical “degree of certainty or hypotheticality” framework employed in the analyses. Because different pragmatic types of conditionals were lumped together in single categories, the schema itself obscured clear symmetries in verb usage in the P clause of content conditionals in narrative. The results of my analysis of content conditionals demonstrate that in narrative, the narrator chose *yiqtol* verbs in the P clause to describe events that were realized subsequent to a specific reference point, namely the speech event; *qatal* forms were typically used in content conditional P clauses to refer to events the narrator or speaker construed as occurring prior to the speech event. Verb use in poetry and wisdom literature will be discussed below.

In my analysis, the determination and description of viewpoint (indicated in mental space diagrams as V-POINT) is crucial. Additionally, Fillmore’s (1990b: 121) differentiation between *time* as a semantic notion and *tense* as a grammatical notion also offers productive possibilities. More recently, Tonhauser has argued along similar lines as Fillmore, though she does not distinguish the vocabulary of *time* vs. *tense* as he does:

Since both the utterance time and the topic time are contextually given, it follows that the semantic TENSE relation is contextually given, too, and a universal semantic relation. The TENSE relation does not depend on whether a language is tensed or tenseless. TENSE, but not tense markers are a linguistic universal. (Tonhauser 2006: 64).

Following Fillmore, I will represent the semantic notion of time as PAST, PRESENT and FUTURE. However, I am not thereby taking a position in regards to whether or not BH verbs mark tense, nor is this notation intended to make claims about the aspectual semantics of the verb either.

A cognitive approach to the construal of TIME (and tense and aspect) differs markedly from an objectivist component approach. The traditional, and for the most part, current objectivist approach to the study of meaning in Biblical Hebrew views meaning construction as the pairing of words with the world. The speaker and hearer, narrator and reader – the cognizers, i.e. speakers, writers, hearers and readers, are excluded from consideration in the construal of meaning. Cognitive linguistics, on the other hand, views language, including the language

of literary narratives¹⁴² such as we find in the Hebrew Bible, and meaning construction as intimately involving the active participation and construal of speakers and hearers, writers and readers. This means that the encoding of tense, aspect and mood (TAM) in BH did and does not occur by matching relationships between time in the physical world and grammatical elements of the language. Rather, the encoding of tense, aspect and mood is the result of unconscious mental simulations of events and states by the narrator, and encoding reflects both the narrator's construal of the temporal elements of the events and states as tense and aspect, and that narrator's epistemic attitude toward those events as mood.¹⁴³

Secondly, the traditional analysis of TAM in BH views language processing as linear (compositional) and modular in nature. The traditional analysis of TAM in BH views tense, aspect and mood as being located in the verbal forms of the language, rather than in the mind of the speaker or narrator—the construer or cognizer. The modular view of language has promoted the historic “either-or” pendulum swings in opinions over whether BH is an aspectual language, a tense language or some combination of both. The cognitivist view taken in this work is that language processing is neither linear nor modular, but instead involves the simultaneous processing of multiple aspects of meaning construction.¹⁴⁴

The cognitivist model proposes that when someone utters a sentence, the hearer does not attend to the elements in the utterance separately, one after another, but instead concurrently considers tense, aspect and modal elements in their interpretation of the utterance and construes the meaning using all three parameters both unconsciously and simultaneously. The implications for the analysis of TAM in BH \square conditional constructions can be summarized as follows:

Tense, aspect, modality, and evidentiality are not each processed in isolation. In the simulation process, we access a bundle of tense, aspect, modality . . . simultaneously. As we unconsciously decompose the internal structure of the focal event, we anchor its temporal configuration to a metaphoric time line in such a way that we can relate it to our deictic center and assert our stance towards the focal information in conveying because we, as cognizers, include information of subjectivity in what we convey (Kwon 2012: 16).

In regards to the reference point from which TIME is construed by the narrator and reader, in narrative and poetry the default BASE and V-POINT is always the narrator's, and thus TIME

¹⁴² See Dancygier (2012) for a discussion of language and literary narrative from a cognitivist approach.

¹⁴³ See Feldman (2006) for more on mental simulations of events. See also Kwon (2012) for a recent cognitivist study of tense, aspect, mood and evidentiality in Korean.

¹⁴⁴ See Barsalou (2009; 2010); Feldman (2006); Kwon (2012); Narayanan (1997a, b); Niedenthal, et. al. (2005) for discussion of the concept of the neural theory of language and mental simulation of language.

is initially determined relative to the location of BASE and V-POINT. Unless stated otherwise, the reference point for narrative TIME is determined by the narrator's V-POINT (Cutrer 1994: 22, 73). However, in direct speech, where the narrator allows a character to speak and to take responsibility for the speech, BASE and V-POINT move to the character domain and spaces built in that domain. Hence in direct speech, the reference point for TIME, PAST, PRESENT or FUTURE, is construed via the character's BASE and V-POINT. The location of BASE and V-POINT are thus crucial.

In the following sections, content conditional verb use and distribution will be examined. My analysis has determined that verb use in content conditionals is remarkably consistent throughout the BH corpus. However, there exists quantifiable differences in the use of content conditionals between the primarily poetic books of Job, Psalms, Proverbs and Song of Songs,¹⁴⁵ and the remainder of the corpus. The discussion will, therefore, be organized around these broad categories. I will first discuss P clause and then the Q clause verb use in non-poetic books, i. e. the historical books and prophets,¹⁴⁶ and then present my analysis of verb use in the poetic literature. The discussion focuses primarily on the use of the *yiqtol*, *qatal* and *weqatal* forms because these comprise the overwhelming majority of uses. Other forms such as verbless clauses, existential particles, and participles are discussed in section 4.1.1.5.

4.1.1.1. P Clause *Yiqtol* Verbs in Non-Poetic Literature

Content conditional P clauses headed by ׀ occur seventy nine times in the historical writings and the prophets.¹⁴⁷ Verb forms are used as follows:¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁵ Content conditionals are not used in Qohelet.

¹⁴⁶ Poetry is clearly found in the prophetic writings. However the purposes to which it is put is distinct from that found in Job, Psalms, Proverbs, Qohelet and Song of Songs.

¹⁴⁷ Gen. 13:16; 31:8 (2x); 32:9; 34:15; 38:17; 44:23, 32; Exod. 4:8; 18:23; 19:5; 40:37; Num. 33:55; 36:4; Deut. 5:25; Jdg. 6:37; 15:7a; 16:7, 11, 13; Ruth 3:13a; 1 Sam. 2:25; 20:7a; 2 Sam. 15:25, 26, 34; 18:3 (2x); 1 Kgs. 12:7, 27; 2 Kgs. 2:10a; 7:4 (2x); 1 Chron. 22:13; 28:9 (2x); 2 Chron. 10:7; 15:2 (2x); 30:9; Est. 4:14a; Neh. 3:35; Isa. 7:9; 8:20; 53:10; Jer. 2:22; 5:2; 13:17; 15:1; 31:36, 37; 33:20; Ezek. 2:5.

¹⁴⁸ The 16 content conditionals in the prophets represent 13% of all content conditionals and 20% of the tokens in this section. If these were separated out, *yiqtol*s would represent 62% of total uses and *qatal*s 21%. On participial use is found.

Table 4.1: Content Conditional P Clause Verb Forms in Non-Poetic Literature

<i>Yiqtol</i> ¹⁴⁹	<i>Qatal</i> ¹⁵⁰	Verbless	יש, אין ¹⁵²	InfC ¹⁵³	Participle
53 (67%)	13 (16%)	4 (5%)	4 (5%)	2 (2%)	1 (%)

In every instance but two (example 9, 10), *yiqtol* verbs in the P clause of ׀ content conditionals refer to situations that are located post-speech, i.e. FUTURE TIME. This is illustrated in examples (6-8). With the exception of (10), every content conditional in which *yiqtol* verbs are used in P clauses is found in direct speech or what is represented as direct speech.

(6) 2 Sam. 15:25

וַיֹּאמֶר הַמֶּלֶךְ לְצָדוֹק הַשֵּׁב אֶת-אֲרוֹן הָאֱלֹהִים
הָעִיר אִם-אֶמְצָא חַן בְּעֵינֵי יְהוָה וְהִשְׁבֵּנִי וְהִרְאֵנִי
אֶתוֹ וְאֶת-נְוֵהוּ:

Then the king said to Zadok, “Carry the ark of God back into the city. If I find favor in the eyes of the Lord, he will bring me back and let me see both it and the place where it stays.”

(7) 1 Kgs. 12:7

וַיֹּדְבֹרְ אֵלָיו לֵאמֹר אִם-הִיִּים תְּהִיֶה-עֲבָד לָעַם
הַזֶּה וְעַבְדֵתֶם וְעַנִּיתֶם וְדַבַּרְתֶּם אֵלֵיהֶם דְּבָרִים
טוֹבִים וְהָיוּ לָךְ עֲבָדִים כָּל-הַיָּמִים:

They answered him, “If you will be a servant to this people today and serve them, and speak good words to them when you answer them, then they will be your servants forever.”

(8) Jer. 38:17

וַיֹּאמֶר יִרְמְיָהוּ אֶל-צְדַקְיָהוּ כֹה-אָמַר יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵי
צְבָאוֹת אֱלֹהֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל אִם-יֵצֵא תֵצֵא אֶל-שָׂרֵי
מֶלֶךְ-בָּבֶל וְחִיתָה נַפְשְׁךָ וְהָעִיר הַזֹּאת לֹא תִשְׂרָף
בְּאֵשׁ וְחִיתָה אַתָּה וּבֵיתְךָ:

Then Jeremiah said to Zedekiah, “Thus says the LORD, the God of hosts, the God of Israel, If you will only surrender to the officials of the king of Babylon, then your life shall be spared, and this city shall not be burned with fire, and you and your house shall live.”

¹⁴⁹ Gen. 13:16; 31:8; 31:8 (2x); 32:9; 34:15; 38:17; 44:23, 32; Exod. 4:8; 18:23; 19:5; 40:37; Num. 33:55; 36:4; Deut. 5:25; Jdg. 6:37; Ruth 3:13a; 15:7a; 16:7, 11, 13; 1 Sam. 2:25; 20:7a; 2 Sam. 15:25, 26, 34; 18:3 (2x); 1 Kgs. 12:7, 27; 2 Kgs. 2:10a; 7:4 (2x); 1 Chron. 22:13; 28:9 (2x); 2 Chron. 10:7; 15:2 (2x); 30:9; Est. 4:14a; Neh. 3:35; Isa. 7:9; 8:20; 53:10; Jer. 2:22; 5:2 (Note textual issue.); 13:17; 15:1; 31:36, 37; 33:20; Ezek. 2:5.

¹⁵⁰ Num. 5:27, 28; 21:9; Jdg. 6:3; 16:17; 2 Sam. 15:33; 2 Kgs. 7:4 (2x); Jer. 14:18 (2x); 23:22; Lam. 3:32; Ezek. 3:6.

¹⁵¹ Gen. 42:19; Jdg. 6:31b; 2 Sam. 18:25; Est. 6:13.

¹⁵² Gen. 30:1; 1 Sam. 19:11; 23:23; 2 Kgs. 2:10b.

¹⁵³ Josh. 22:23 (2x).

¹⁵⁴ Jer. 26:15.

Two instances are anomalous. These are found in Genesis 31:8 and Exod. 40:37, shown in (9) and (10). The *yiqtol*s in (9) are used in embedded direct speech, but they refer to a PAST situation that occurs prior to BASE/V-POINT, which is located in the character domain.

(9) Gen. 31:8

אָס־כֶּה יֹאמֶר נִקְדִּים יְהִי שְׂכָרְךָ וְיִלְדוּ כָּל־הֶצֶאן
נִקְדִּים וְאָס־כֶּה יֹאמֶר עֲקָדִים יְהִי שְׂכָרְךָ וְיִלְדוּ
כָּל־הֶצֶאן עֲקָדִים:

“When thus he would say, ‘The speckled will be your wages,’ then all the flock bore speckled; and when he would say, ‘The striped will be your wages,’ then all the flock bore striped.” (My translation)

This passage occurs in a speech Jacob made to his wives that “represents his sobered reflections on the happenings of the last several years” (Hamilton 1995: 288). Jacob’s speech is a reflection about past, completed events. In (9) the conditionals support his assertion that although Laban cheated him, YHWH did not allow Jacob to be harmed. The formula כֶּה יֹאמֶר occurs only four times in BH, each in embedded direct speech: twice here in Gen. 31:8 and in 1 Sam. 20:7 and 2 Sam. 15:28. Interestingly, the latter two instances are also in conditional constructions. 1 Sam. 20:7 is a content conditional; 2 Sam. 15:28 is a speech act directive. Unlike the two occurrences in Gen. 31:8, the eventualities referenced in 1 Sam. 20:7 and 2 Sam. 15:28 clearly reference post-speech FUTURE eventualities, which is the TIME that this study finds that *yiqtol*s typically reference.

In direct speech, whether embedded or not, V-POINT rests in the speaking Character’s domain and hence deictic references such as tense, aspect, modality are centered there.¹⁵⁵ Since in content conditionals *yiqtol* verbs typically profile post-speech FUTURE time, the use of the *yiqtol*s here is anomalous since they profile Laban’s speech events that occurred prior to Jacob’s speech. The interpretive challenge posed by the *yiqtol*s is evidenced in that none of the traditional grammars, nor Miller (1996) discuss these uses. It is possible that the narrator chose the *yiqtol* to indicate that Laban repeated his claims on several or numerous occasions. GKC (§107b-e), J-M (§113e) note past habitual uses of the *yiqtol* and Andrason (2010) has provided a principled explanation for the inclusion of past habitual meaning in the polysemous *yiqtol* gram. Fleishman (1995: 522) has argued that habituais or iteratives are “the

¹⁵⁵ See Miller (1996: 230).

aspect of generic, non-referring expressions.”¹⁵⁶ This characterization describes Jacob’s use of the *yiqtol* here.

The epistemic stance taken toward the speech event determines whether אם prompts construction of a hypothetical space or temporal space.¹⁵⁷ In English both *when* and *if* similarly “mark clauses whose function is to build a background space within which the main clause holds” (Dancygier and Sweetser 2005: 45). They differ in that *if* establishes a relationship of causal contingency, while *when* designates cotemporality with some aspect of the situation with a time specified in the main clause. When contextual factors promote a positive epistemic stance toward the content of the אם clause, a temporal interpretation is promoted. Supporting contextual factors are present in (9).

The eventualities to which Jacob refers seemed to occur subsequent to Jacob’s initial wage proposal in Gen. 30:25-42. Commentators (Hamilton 1995: 288; Mathews 2005: 513); Reyburn and Fry 1998: 710) consider the אם constructions as representing actual events and not utterances used to engage in reasoning about a hypothetical situation. Reyburn and Fry (1998: 710) state “If does not indicate in this context a situation that may or may not have happened. It probably refers to Laban’s having said the words.” They suggest that translating it “First he said....”

I propose that these contextual factors promote a positive (as opposed to neutral) epistemic stance toward the אם construction such that אם prompts the reader/hearer to construct a temporal mental space and not a hypothetical one. Consequently the P clause should be translated temporally as in (9).

Like the *yiqtol*s in (9), the P clause *yiqtol* in (10) also presents the PAST eventuality as iterative, one that occurred many times in the desert experience. BASE/V-POINT are in the narrator domain. As can be seen in the example, the conditional occurs in the context of a temporal clause situated prior to the narrator’s BASE, $\text{וּבַהֲעֵלוֹת הָעֵגֹן מֵעַל הַמִּשְׁכָּן יִסְעוּ בְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל}$. As discussed immediately above, temporal *when/whenever* clauses like v. 36a indicate a positive epistemic stance toward an event in which the reader assumes that the event did in fact occur. This stance in v. 36 promotes the iterative construal of the *yiqtol*s in v. 37 and licenses a *when/whenever* construal of the אם construction in v. 37 too.

¹⁵⁶ Cover (2010: 43) adds that generic and habitual or iterative expressions are also characterized by a lack of specificity. In other words, they do not profile a specific eventuality, but instead profile its expected, generic qualities or its repetitive nature.

¹⁵⁷ See Dancygier and Sweetser (2005: 45-49) for a comparison of the semantics of *when* and *if*.

(10) Exod. 40:36-37

וְבַהֲעָלוֹת הָעֲנָן מֵעַל הַמִּשְׁכָּן יִסְעוּ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל
 בְּכֹל מַסְעֵיהֶם: וְאִם-לֹא יֵעָלֶה הָעֲנָן וְלֹא יִסְעוּ
 עַד-יוֹם הָעֲלֹתוֹ:

³⁶Whenever the cloud was taken up from the tabernacle, the Israelites would set out on each stage of their journey; ³⁷but when the cloud was not taken up, then they did not set out until the day that it was taken up.

This study proposes that each lexical item in the phrase וְאִם-לֹא, (i. e. וְ, אִם, and לֹא) contributes compositionally to the meaning of the utterance. The וְ signals the reader that the conditional is continuing the immediately preceding argument and should be interpreted within that context. אִם contributes space building and (typically) hypotheticality, which in this verse is suppressed by the context's overt temporal semantics. לֹא contributes semantics of alternativity and signals the reader that the utterance is the alternative to a preceding assertion. A negative cannot be understood without a positive alternative and negative particles such as לֹא always profile an alternative.¹⁵⁸

The P clause eventualities in fifty-two of the fifty-four uses of these conditionals referenced post-speech FUTURE events. The *yiqtol* is the preferred verb form for construing FUTURE eventualities. In two instances, (9) and (10), *yiqtol*s referenced PAST habitual eventualities. *Qatal* verbs are used when the narrator construed pre-speech PAST eventualities or wanted to indicate epistemic distance from the predictions in the conditionals. Counterfactual interpretations are licensed via inference from context and *qatal* verb forms. It is not available via strict compositionality. See the following section 4.1.1.2 for discussion of this use of *qatals*.

4.1.1.2. P Clause *Qatal* Verbs in Non-Poetic Literature

In non-poetical books, *qatal* verbs are used thirteen times in אִם content conditional P clauses.¹⁵⁹ Eleven of these occur in direct speech.¹⁶⁰ Two instances are not in direct speech,¹⁶¹ so BASE and V-POINT for these are in the narrator's BASE. In five passages (Num. 5:27, 28; 21:9; Jdg. 6:3; Jer. 14:18 (2x); Lam. 3:32) whether BASE and V-POINT are in the narrator's space or the character's space, *qatal* verbs are clearly used to refer to situations that occur prior to BASE/V-POINT and are PAST TIME. However, P clause *qatals* that do not reference PAST TIME

¹⁵⁸ See Dancygier (2012) on negation and alternativity.

¹⁵⁹ Num. 5:27, 28; 21:9; Jdg. 6:3; 16:17; 2 Sam. 15:33; 2 Kgs. 7:4 (2x); Jer. 14:18 (2x); 23:22; Lam. 3:32; Ezek. 3:6.

¹⁶⁰ Num. 5:27, 28; Jdg. 16:17; 2 Sam. 15:33; 2 Kgs. 7:4 (2x); Jer. 14:18 (2x); 23:22; Lam. 3:32; Ezek. 3:6. The uses in Num. 5:27, 28 are, strictly speaking in a procedural text, but they occur inside a quote frame, and because of that will be considered to be used in direct speech.

¹⁶¹ Num. 21:9; Jdg. 6:3.

occur in six content conditionals and pose a more serious interpretational challenge. These include: Jdg. 16:17; 2 Sam. 15:33; 2 Kgs. 7:4a (2x); Jer. 23:22; Ezek. 3:6. I will first discuss those which do reference PAST TIME, followed by those that do not.

The speech in (11), in which the *qatal* is used to profile PAST TIME, is represented as direct speech of Moses. BASE/V-POINT, therefore, will be in the character domain.

(11) Num. 5:27

וְהִשְׁקָהּ אֶת־הַמַּיִם וְהִיְתָה אִם־נִטְמָאָה וְתִמְעַל
מִעַל בְּאִשְׁהָ וּבָאוּ בָּהּ הַמַּיִם הַמְאָרְרִים לְמַרְיָם
וְצִבְתָּהּ בְּטִנָּה וְנִפְלְהָ יִרְכָּה וְהִיְתָה הָאִשָּׁה לְאֵלָה
בְּקִרְבַּ עַמָּהּ:

When he has made her drink the water, then, if she has defiled herself and has been unfaithful to her husband, the water that brings the curse shall enter into her and cause bitter pain, and her womb shall discharge, her uterus drop, and the woman shall become an execration among her people.

My analysis argues that a *qatal* is used in the protasis of Num. 5:27 (and 5:28) because the (suspected) situation of the woman having defiled herself due to unfaithfulness occurs prior to the speech event and to the ritual itself. Therefore, TIME is PAST and *qatal* is preferred for PAST construals.¹⁶²

The conditional in (12) is not in direct speech, so BASE/V-POINT are in the narrator's space. This is another instance where contextual factors prompt temporal space-building by אִם. These factors include the mention in Jdg. 6:1 that Israel was under Midianite rule for seven years. The reader will understand the subsequently mentioned events as transpiring during those seven years. Since planting was done, at the least, on a yearly basis, this background knowledge promotes a habitual interpretation of זָרַע. The use of וְהִיְתָה, which marks habituality construed from the narrator's V-POINT, reinforces this interpretation. The conditional in Num. 21:9 is similar, and also occurs after וְהִיְתָה.

(12) Jdg. 6:3

וְהִיְתָה אִם־זָרַע יִשְׂרָאֵל וְעָלָה מִדְּיָן וְעַמְלֵק וּבְנֵי־
קְדָם וְעָלוּ עָלֵיוּ:

For whenever the Israelites put in seed, the Midianites and the Amalekites and the people of the east would come up against them.

¹⁶² Andrason and Van der Merwe (2015) present arguments that in Genesis discursive material the *qatal* can typically be interpreted as a present perfect. A perfect construal of the *qatal* in (14) is preferred as indicated in the NRSV, presumably because the initial impurity is viewed as sticking to the woman creating ongoing defilement at the moment of speech.

The background to Jer. 14:18, example (13) appears to be a military defeat and subsequent famine. The two conditionals in (13) are set in a lament section, Jer. 14:17-15:4, that constitutes a definable unit.¹⁶³

(13) Jer. 14:18

אִם-יֵצְאֵתִי הַשֶּׁדָּה וְהִנֵּה תַלְיֵי-חֶרֶב וְאִם בָּאתִי
הַעִיר וְהִנֵּה תַחֲלוּאֵי רֶעִב כִּי-גַם-נִבְיָא גַם-כֹּהֵן
סָחְרוּ אֶל-אָרֶץ וְלֹא יָדְעוּ:

When I went out into the field, look—those killed by the sword! And when I entered the city, look—those sick with famine! For both prophet and the priest do business throughout the land, and they lack knowledge. (My translation)

The following analysis assumes that the lament is set post-famine and describes eventualities that occur prior to the expression of the lament. This assumption crucially affects my conclusion that the writer of Jer. 14:18 utilized the past and perfective semantic components available in *qatal* forms so that the reader would understand that the eventualities *יֵצְאֵתִי* and *בָּאתִי* actually did occur. Since this enables a PAST TIME construal, these *אם* clauses could be interpreted as *when* clauses.¹⁶⁴

However, as mentioned earlier, P clause *qatals* that do not reference PAST TIME occur in six content conditionals.¹⁶⁵ In (14), the speaker, Samson, is predicting the consequences of having his head completely shaved: If his head is shaved, he would lose his strength.

(14) Jdg. 16:17

וַיַּגִּדְלָהּ אֶת-כָּל-לְבוּ וַיֹּאמֶר לָהּ מוֹרָה לֹא-עָלָה
עַל-רֹאשִׁי כִּי-נִזְוֵיר אֱלֹהִים אֲנִי מִבֶּטֶן אִמִּי אֶם-
גִּלַּחְתִּי וְסָר מִמֶּנִּי כֹחִי וְחַלְיִתִּי וְהִיִּיתִי כְּכֹל-
הָאָדָם:

So he told her his whole secret, and said to her, “A razor has never come upon my head; for I have been a nazirite to God from my mother’s womb. If my head were shaved, then my strength would leave me; I would become weak, and be like anyone else.”

¹⁶³ See Thompson (1980: 385) for discussion.

¹⁶⁴ Note that the temporal *when* construal is not reflected in English or most Spanish translations. Dios Habla Hoy translates with positive epistemic stance, but does not include *cuando* (*when*): *Salgo al campo...entro en la ciudad* (*I go out to the field...I go into the city*). See discussion of epistemic stances that license *when* construals in section 4.2.3.

¹⁶⁵ Jdg. 16:17; 2 Sam. 15:33; 2 Kgs. 7:4 (2x); Jer. 23:22; Ezek. 3:6.

The *qatal* represents the event of head-shaving as completed. Since Samson's head was not shaved at speech time, we know that the eventuality portrayed by יִתְּחַלֵּץ in the P clause is a future possibility; Samson is simply considering this scenario. The question then is, since in narrative the *qatal* is typically used in direct speech to refer to eventualities that occur prior to speech time, why is it used here to refer to a possible future eventuality? I suggest that two semantic components are salient in this context: First, the perfective aspect component of the *qatal*'s semantics is profiled,¹⁶⁶ so יִתְּחַלֵּץ is portrayed as a bounded event—if the shaving of his hair occurs and is completed, he will lose his strength. Secondly, and more importantly, the *qatal* is used to promote negative epistemic stance toward the eventuality of being shaved.¹⁶⁷ In other words, the *qatal* indicates that Samson does not believe his hair will be shaved off; he is distancing himself from the idea.

Hendel (1996: 176) notes that “one occasionally finds the Pf. [perfect] used in real conditions to express a related value in the axis of real: unreal, that of the real but extremely dubious or remote.” It is common cross-linguistically for verb forms that typically have past meanings to be used for epistemic distancing, as in the English *If John came, I would be surprised*. It is well documented cross-linguistically that verb forms typically used for PAST TIME (and the various types of past tense in tense languages) seem “to most frequently occur simply as a means of making a proposition one degree more hypothetical in meaning than it otherwise would be” (James 1982: 385).¹⁶⁸ Binnick too notes that “because of its ability to distance, to detach the event from the speech-act situation, the past may be used for irrealities: the hypothetical is expressed in many languages through the use of the past tense” (Binnick 1991: 390). I am suggesting that in BH content ׀ conditionals, *qatal* verbs could be used to promote the implicature that possible futures contemplated by the *qatals* were being dismissed.¹⁶⁹

In summary, the *qatal* is not used in (14) to prompt a PAST construal. It instead promotes a distanced perfective construal of the conditional. The use of the *qatal* to promote negative epistemic stance is also the preferred understanding of the P-clause *qatal* conditionals in the first conditional in 2 Sam 15:33 (15) and in 2 Kgs. 7:4a (16).

¹⁶⁶ If the verbal grams (*qatal*, *yiqtol*, etc.) could be conceived of, metaphorically, as a multifaceted entity (where, it may be possible to apply Langacker's (1987: 271-274) concept of *active zones* to verbal construal operations. Langacker (1987: 271) defines an active zone as “those facets of an entity capable of interacting directly with a given domain or relation.”

¹⁶⁷ For the use of the *qatal* to indicate “mood” see GKC (2007: §106p); J-M (§163c, §167k); IBHS (1990: 493-494).

¹⁶⁸ See also Fleischman (1989).

¹⁶⁹ See also the FUTURE reference use of a P clause *qatal* in the speech-act conditional in Gen. 43:9 where distancing may also be involved.

The content conditional in (15) is the first of a pair of conditionals in which the second, in verse 34, entertains an alternative to the first.

(15) 2 Sam. 15:33-34

וַיֹּאמֶר לוֹ דָּוִד אִם עֲבַרְתָּ אִתִּי וְהִיָּת עָלַי
לְמִשָּׂא: ³⁴וְאִם-הָעִיר תָּשׁוּב...וְהִפְרַתָּה לִּי אֶת
עֲצַת אַחִיתֹפֶל:

³³David said to him, “If you go on with me, you will be a burden to me. ³⁴But if you return to the city...then you will defeat for me the counsel of Ahithophel.”

A *qatal* is used in the P clause of the first conditional in v.33. BASE and V-POINT are in the character domain where David, the speaking character, discusses with Hushai where he (Hushai) should continue with him (David) in his exile or return to Jerusalem to spy for him. I propose that as in (14), the *qatal* is used to indicate negative epistemic stance—David does not want Hushai to continue with him into exile. This conclusion is reinforced when David proposes an alternative, replacement scenario in the second alternative conditional in verse 34. This P clause provides the context in which David’s real interest lies – obtaining information on court activities. Here the *yiqtol* is used to profile FUTURE TIME because the eventuality תָּשׁוּב would occur post-speech.

The two uses of the *qatal* in v. 4 of (16) are the most challenging to explain. The reasoning that is occurring in this passage is complex. Reference can be made to the mental space configuration in Figure 4.4 below.

(16) 2 Kgs. 7:3-4

וַאֲרַבְעָה אַנְשִׁים הָיוּ מִצָּרְעִים פֶּתַח הַשָּׁעַר
וַיֹּאמְרוּ אִישׁ אֶל-רֵעֵהוּ מָה אֲנַחְנוּ יְשֻׁבִים פֹּה
עַד-מָתָנוּ: ⁴אִם-אֶמְרֵנוּ נָבוֹא הָעִיר וְהָרַעַב בָּעִיר
וּמָתָנוּ שָׁם וְאִם-יִשְׁבְּנוּ פֹה וּמָתָנוּ וְעָתָה לָּכֹו
וְנִפְלֵה אֶל-מַחֲנֵה אֲרָם אִם-יַחַיֵּנוּ נַחֲיֵה וְאִם-
יָמִיתָנוּ וּמָתָנוּ:

³Now there were four leprous men outside the city gate, who said to one another, “Why should we sit here until we die? ⁴If we say, ‘Let us enter the city,’ the famine is in the city, and we shall die there; but if we sit here, we shall also die. Therefore, let us desert to the Aramean camp; if they spare our lives, we shall live; and if they kill us, we shall but die.”

In 7:3, BASE and V-POINT, initially in the narrative domain, switch to the character domain for the direct speech. The verb forms are therefore determined by the character’s construal of the eventualities, not the narrator’s. The context in which these four conditionals are used and character viewpoint are crucial to explaining why *qatals* are used in the P clauses of the

first pair of conditionals, and *yiqtol*s in the P clauses of the second pair. Before arguing for this, it is important to note that the first two *qatal* conditionals form one unit and the second two *yiqtol* conditionals form a second unit. This is indicated by the use of ׀ instead of ׀.¹⁷⁰ ׀ is typically used in the second (or third) conditional in a series of ׀ conditionals. The ׀ in ׀ functions to alert the reader to use the available linguistic and contextual clues to search for the most relevant interclausal or intersentential semantic relationship. But ׀ itself doesn't specify that relationship. In this case, the relationship between the first and following conditionals is that of alternative, topically related conditionals. ׀ alone is not indicating the semantics of alternativity. Here in 1 Kgs. 7:3, 4 ׀ effectively groups the second and fourth conditionals with their preceding ׀ construction, creating two sets of two conditionals. Both possibilities in the first set were rejected and not acted on; the situations in the second were accepted and one of these situations "became" the future.

The first two *qatal* conditionals follow the rhetorical question in 7:3, מָה אֲנַחֲנוּ יֹשְׁבֵימָה עַד- , "Why should we sit here until we die?" and are used to explore possible alternative futures that arise from that question. Prominent among the implicatures that follow from the question is: "We shouldn't just sit here; it is foolish to do so." The *qatal* conditionals explore the reasoning behind why they believe it is foolish to do this. The first conditional ׀-אֲמַרְנוּ ׀ אֲם-נָבֹא הָעִיר וְהָרֶעֶב בָּעִיר וּמָתָנוּ שָׁם can be paraphrased ׀-אֲם-נָבֹא הָעִיר וְהָרֶעֶב בָּעִיר וּמָתָנוּ שָׁם; the quote formula serves to increase the epistemic distance the speaker takes toward going into the city, and ׀ explains why they would die if they went into the city. The speaker's epistemic stance toward going into Jerusalem is definitely negative—who wants an assured death? The epistemic stance toward continuing to sit there is also decidedly negative. No reason for the conclusion that they would die is given, but little familiarity with war and famine is needed to deduce multiple reasons.

I propose that *qatals* are used by the speaker to indicate his negative epistemic stance, (already established by the rhetorical question) toward the proposition in the P clause, as it is in Jdg. 16:17 and 2 Sam. 15:33. Effectively, the *qatals* inform the reader that the speaker rejects these alternatives. The fact that the speaker in 7:4 used *yiqtol*s in the pair of conditionals that the lepers did act on strengthens this claim. *Yiqtol*s are used to promote neutral or positive epistemic stance. It is important to note that the *yiqtol* gram is not solely responsible for the construal of epistemic stance, but works in tandem with the context to promote the construal. One would imagine that intonation may well have contributed too.

¹⁷⁰ See below for discussion of the use of ׀ to signal an additional related, coordinate or supporting argument.


Above, we hypothesized that the *qatal* verbs were used by the speaker to indicate his negative epistemic stance regarding entering Jerusalem. As the discourse proceeds, this contextual information becomes part of the speaker's BASE, and crucially becomes part of the reader's contextual knowledge in the reader's BASE and consequently plays a central role in the interpretation of the *qatals* in the P clauses. As contextual information is added to the reader's BASE, this knowledge is promptly used in the construal of immediately following information. This proposal requires some discussion of the status of contextual information in the base space.

Referring to the BASE space, Cutrer (1994: 53) states that “in the canonical case, the Base space is speaker reality” and as such is the space where encyclopedic background knowledge about semantic frames employed in construal is located. Kwon (2012: 138) has argued that “presupposition has so far been naively assumed to be undifferentiated from the rest of our shared knowledge in the Base space; however, I claim that we must specify and represent this type of backgrounded information independently even though it is part of the Base space.” He further elaborates, arguing that “it is the space that includes any implicit information that [speakers/hearers/readers] need for accessing the newly updated information in any mental spaces” (Kwon 2012: 138).

More recently, building on work by Sanders, et. al. (2009) where an enriched BASE was proposed, Ferrari and Sweetser (2012) have offered an analysis that illustrates how meaning migrates from spaces back to the BASE during language processing. This migrated meaning is then available as contextual knowledge. In 2 Kgs. 7:3-4, newly obtained information, such as the negative epistemic stance displayed in the rhetorical questions, that readers need for the construal of subsequent information will be in the BASE space. This includes information needed for construal of the epistemic stance the speaker takes toward the focal events in conditional constructions.

The following mental space diagram of 2 Kgs. 7:4 makes explicit the role contextual knowledge has in interpretation by shading the BASE for the conditional (Space H) light blue to indicate that the BASE has been updated by the negative epistemic stance in the rhetorical question.

Figure 4.4: Mental Space Diagram of 2 Kgs. 7:3-4, example (16)



It is important to note that I am not suggesting that every use of *qatal* in content conditional P clauses is intended to promote this implicature, simply that it is available for construal when supporting contextual factors are present. In 2 Kgs. 7:3-4, the question promotes and supports the negative construal.

(17) is a further example where context and the *qatal* together promote negative epistemic stance toward the P clause of a content conditional.

(17) Jer. 23:21-22

לֹא־שָׁלַחְתִּי אֶת־הַנְּבִיאִים וְהֵם רָצוּ לֹא־דַבְּרֹתַי²¹
 אֲלֵיהֶם וְהֵם נִבְּאוּ: וְאִם־עָמְדוּ בְּסוּדֵי וַיִּשְׁמְעוּ
 דְּבָרֵי אֶת־עַמִּי וַיִּשְׁבוּ מִדְּרָכָם הָרַע וּמִרַע
 מַעַלְלֵיהֶם:

²¹I did not send the prophets, yet they ran; I did not speak to them, yet they prophesied. ²²But if they had stood in my council, then they would have proclaimed my words to my people, and they would have turned them from their evil way, and from the evil of their doings.¹⁷¹


¹⁷¹ The verb וַיִּשְׁמְעוּ in v. 22 is repeated from Jer. 23:18 and is possibly a *wayiqtol*. However, *wayiqtol*s are rare in BH. BHRG (Forthcoming: 199) comments “Besides linking clauses, this construction has no semantic function in

Jer. 23:22 occurs in what is represented as the direct speech of YHWH to the prophet Jeremiah. The topic of the passage in which (17) is found is a denunciation of the reassuring message of prophets in Jerusalem, who represent themselves as speaking for YHWH. First-person singular pronouns and verbs in the preceding context of chapter 22 refer to YHWH as the speaker and establish the deictic center in the character domain. The situations referred to in 23:16-17 are presented as occurring prior to the speech event, or possibly, when participles are used, habitually and overlapping speech time.

The rhetorical question in verse 18 asserts that none of the prophets referenced in verses 16-17 have ever *וַיִּרְא וַיִּשְׁמַע אֶת־דְּבָרָיו*. As in (16), a question is used by the writer to introduce a new topic for discussion. Whether the *qatal* *עָמַד* is construed as referencing TIME anterior to speech time or perfective aspect, the resulting interpretation is the same: no prophets in YHWH's *סוּד*. As discussed above, this contextual fact is part of the speaker's base, and crucially becomes part of the reader's contextual knowledge in her BASE and plays a central role in the interpretation of the *qatal* in the P clause of 23:22. As contextual information is added to the reader's BASE, this knowledge is promptly used in the construal of immediately following information. The updated contextual information in the BASE is indicated via the blue shading in Space H.

itself." However, see (Baden 2008: 152)) who argues that in BH narrative this form explicitly connotes purpose or result. He states that it is "so uncommon and does not fit into the standard verbal system, it must be associated with a specific meaning or usage." He counts only eleven actual uses from Genesis through 2 Kings versus a morphological search in the SESB database in Logos which lists hundreds of instances. None of Baden's are conditionals. Those listed in SESB that occur in conditionals are all in Q clauses. Due to the total lack of clarity on determination of the status of most of these forms, I have counted them as uses of *yiqtol*s.

Figure 4.5: Mental Space Diagram of Jer. 23:21-22, example (17)



When the reader arrives at Jer. 23:22, the contextual information from verse 18 is still cognitively active, so she already knows that none of what the prophets have said and are saying is the result of being in YHWH's counsel. The conditional repeats almost verbatim the rhetorical question in verse 18 and is used to consider a hypothetical scenario in the past that might have occurred if the prophets had stood in YHWH's inner council. The *qatal* in the conditional promotes an anterior perfective construal, and conspires with the context to promote strong negative epistemic distance.

Since the conditional makes a prediction based on a counterfactual premise (e. g. the prophets never did stand in YHWH's presence) the conditional is a true counterfactual, like (5) above. Note that here, and in (5), counterfactuality is not strictly compositional, because it is not a conventional meaning of the lexical forms in the conditional. Instead it is prompted via inference from those forms in their context. As stated above, Figure 4.5 captures how context is updated and available to hearer/readers as utterances are processed so that it is available for inference. The use of the *qatal* promotes this inference. As noted by J-M (§167f), לו nor לולא were required by Biblical Hebrew speakers to construe counterfactuality in content

conditionals, contrary to IBHS (1990: 636-638).¹⁷² Contextually prompted inference plus P clause *qatals* were sufficient. This same cognitive information processing explains the use of the *qatal* in the P clause in Ezek. 3:6.

Finally, the proposal that the *qatal* was used to promote negative epistemic stance is buoyed by comparing examples (9) and (16). Only the relevant portion of each example is repeated here. Based on chapter 30:31-43 of the Genesis narrative, the reader knows that the topic was discussed. The narrator uses the *yiqtol* in (9) to promote the speaking character's positive epistemic stance toward the eventualities, to convey that they are facts. As (16) indicates, *qatals* were used to indicate negative stance.

(9) Gen. 31:8

אִם-כֹּה יֹאמֵר נִקְדִּים יִהְיֶה שְׂכָרְךָ וְיִלְדוּ כָל-הַצֹּאן
נִקְדִּים וְאִם-כֹּה יֹאמֵר עֲקָדִים יִהְיֶה שְׂכָרְךָ וְיִלְדוּ
כָל-הַצֹּאן עֲקָדִים:

“When thus he would say, ‘The speckled will be your wages,’ then all the flock bore speckled; and when he would say, ‘The striped will be your wages,’ then all the flock bore striped.” (My translation)

(16) 2 Kgs. 7:4

אִם-אָמַרְנוּ נִבְזֹא הָעִיר וְהָרָעַב בָּעִיר וּמָתָנוּ שָׁם
וְאִם-יֹשְׁבָנוּ פֹה וּמָתָנוּ

If we say, ‘Let us enter the city,’ the famine is in the city, and we shall die there; but if we sit here, we shall also die.

This section has argued that in different contexts, the *qatal* gram can express different values, including PAST TIME (simple past, present perfect), perfective aspect and, when contextually driven, a distanced epistemic stance. This polysemy is challenging to explain within an objectivist, dictionary-driven semantic framework characteristic of much of traditional Biblical Hebrew inquiry. Within a cognitive semantic paradigm, polysemy is the norm and is expected since meaning does not consist of form-real world pairings, but is instead a reflection of construal and user-based prototype effects and patterns of connectivity.

4.1.1.3. P Clause *Yiqtol* Verbs in Poetic Literature

In this section I will present an analysis of content conditional verb usage in the poetic books of Job, Psalms, Proverbs, Qohelet and Song of Songs. The results will be compared with

¹⁷² IBHS states that irreal conditionals are “usually” introduced by these particles. It does not, however, recognize that אִם conditionals can be counterfactuals or, in their terminology, irreal.

their usage in non-poetic literature. Content conditionals are used forty-three times in these books. In the P clauses verb use is as follows:

Table 4.2: Content Conditional P Clause Verb Forms in Poetic Literature

<i>Yiqtol</i> ¹⁷³	<i>Qatal</i> ¹⁷⁴	Verbless	שׁוּ ¹⁷⁶	Participle ¹⁷⁷
21 (51%)	14 (34%)	4 (10%)	2 (5%)	1 (2%)

Verb distribution in these poetic books differs significantly from the use in non-poetic literature. In non-poetic literature *yiqtol*s are used in 67% of content conditional P clauses; in poetic literature, 51% of the time. Correspondingly, *qatals*, discussed below, are used in 16% of non-poetic content conditionals versus 34% of content conditionals in poetic literature.¹⁷⁸ Verbless and existential clauses are discussed in section 4.1.1.5.

In Psalms and Proverbs each content conditional BASE and V-POINT is in the narrator's domain since none are in discourse explicitly attributed to a non-narrator participant.¹⁷⁹ In the three instances in Song of Songs—8:7, 9 (2x)—BASE and V-POINT are in the character domain because the conditionals are in speech attributed to a character. In Job every ׀ content conditional is found in the dialogues.¹⁸⁰ Therefore BASE and V-POINT are in the character domain in the speaking character's space. The deictic center is in the character space and verb forms should therefore be determined from the character space's V-POINT, not the narrator's. The mental space configurations for these conditionals are similar to the Figures 4.1 and 4.2.

Content conditionals are used in Job in significantly higher numbers than in the other poetic books. There are a total of 110 conditionals in Job, 24 of which are content conditionals. In the other four books combined (Psalms, Proverbs, Qohelet and Song) only 104 conditionals

¹⁷³ Job 8:5, 18; 9:3, 20, 23; 13:10; 14:7, 8-9; 16:6; 17:16; 22:23 (2x); 34:14; Ps. 127:1 (2x); 139:8; Prov. 2:1, 2, 4-5; 3:24; Song 8:7. On Job 17:16, Clines (1998: 375) notes that “Revocalizing MT נָחַח “rest” (cf. rv) to נָחַח “we shall descend,” as is quite universally done.”

¹⁷⁴ Job 8:4; 9:15, 30; 20:14, 15; 11:13-15; 21:6; 22:20; Ps. 63:7; 66:18; 73:15; Prov. 23:15.

¹⁷⁵ Job 8:6; Ps. 90:10; Song 8:9 (2x).

¹⁷⁶ Job 33:23-25; Prov. 23:18.

¹⁷⁷ Job 36:7-10.

¹⁷⁸ 64% of the *qatals* are in Job alone.

¹⁷⁹ Psalms such as Psalms 126 and 139 are attributed to Solomon and David respectively. This study determined Character, Narrator domain based on who the text states the narrator or writer was, not on the basis of a contemporary text-critical-based reader's understanding.

¹⁸⁰ Job 8:4, 5, 6, 18; 9:3, 15, 19 (2x), 20, 23, 27, 30; 10:14, 15; 11:13; 13:10; 14:7, 8; 16:6; 17:16; 22:23 (2x); 33:23; 34:14. On 9:27 Clines (1998: 219) notes “The inf אַמְרֵי אַם after אַם is unparalleled, and usually emended to אַמְרֵי אַם. G. R. Driver, “Problems in the Hebrew Text of Job,” *VTS* 3 (1955) 72–93.”

are used, and of those 17 are content conditionals. This distribution is not surprising. First, conditionals are most frequently found in direct speech, and Job consists almost entirely of dialogues of represented speech. Secondly, the characters' purpose in speaking is to persuade Job to abandon his opinions regarding his situation and to adopt their positions. Persuasion typically involves energetic reasoning, which in turn incorporates alternative reasoning and scenario building. Conditionals, and content conditionals in particular, are common in this type of reasoning. Note the intense reasoning occurring in the string of nine conditionals in Job 9:15-30, where we find "Job debating the wisdom or possibility of legal disputation with God."¹⁸¹ Six of these conditionals are content conditionals. In (18) five overt ׀ conditionals are used and vs. 20b is, via implicature interpreted as a second conditional under the scope of the verse-initial ׀. I classify the conditionals in vss. 15, 20a, b as content conditionals. Sequential conditional clauses may not be common in everyday conversation, but in extended legal dialogue or argumentative presentations where one party is seeking to challenge and change another party's position, such as is found in Job, they are not uncommon. They should not be considered extraordinary use of language.¹⁸²

(18) Job 9:15-20

15 אֲשֶׁר אִם-צִדְקָתִי לֹא אֶעֱנֶה לְמִשְׁפָּטֵי אֶתְחַנֵּן;
 16 אִם-קָרָאתִי וַיַּעֲנֵנִי לֹא-אֶאֱמִין כִּי-יֵאָזֵן קוֹלִי;
 17 אֲשֶׁר-בִּשְׁעָרָה יִשׁוּפְנִי וְהִרְבָּה פְּצָעֵי חַנּוּם:
 18 לֹא-יִתְּנֵנִי הַשֶּׁב רֹחִי כִּי יִשְׁבַּעֲנִי מִמַּרְרִים:
 19 אִם-לִלְכֹחַ אֶמְיֵץ הַגָּה וְאִם-לְמִשְׁפָּט מִי יוֹעִידֵנִי;
 20 אִם-אֶצְדֵּק פִּי יִרְשִׁיעֵנִי תָם-אָנִי וַיִּעַקְשֵׁנִי:

¹⁵Though [If] I am innocent, I cannot answer him; I must appeal for mercy to my accuser. ¹⁶If I summoned him and he answered me, I do not believe that he would listen to my voice. ¹⁷For he crushes me with a tempest, and multiplies my wounds without cause; ¹⁸he will not let me get my breath, but fills me with bitterness. ¹⁹If it is a contest of strength, he is the strong one! If it is a matter of justice, who can summon him? ²⁰Though [If] I am innocent, my own mouth would condemn me; though [if] I am blameless, he would prove me perverse.

In Job, most *yiqtol*s are used to reference eventualities that are post-speech FUTURE TIME. Five *yiqtol*s (Job 9:23; 11:13; 13:10; 14:7, 8-9) may be construable as referencing generic eventualities. The reasoning about content domain eventualities in these conditionals

¹⁸¹ Clines (1998: 225).

¹⁸² See Clines' (1998: 224) comment: "Related to the language of controversy are the "if" clauses of this speech. "If" clauses belong to the formulation of law, and also, as here, to the contemplation of legal steps to be taken. ...creating a marked impression of the experimentation of the speaker's thoughts."

involves causality and prediction. Generic and content conditionals are closely related since both are predictive and involve causality. If these are generic conditionals, then the *yiqtol*s should be translated to indicate their generic status.¹⁸³

(19) Job 14:7

כִּי יִשׁ לְעֵץ תִּקְוָה אִם־יִכָּרֵת וְעוֹד יִחְלִיף וְיִנְקֹתוּ
לֹא תִחְדָּל:

“For there is hope for a tree—if it is cut down, again it will sprout, and its shoots will not fail. (My translation)

In the Psalms, Proverbs and Song, all but two *yiqtol*s (Ps. 127:1a, b) clearly reference FUTURE TIME eventualities. Like the five possible generic construals in Job mentioned above, the two conditionals in (20) could be construed as generic conditionals.

(20) Ps. 127:1

אִם־יְהוָה לֹא־יִבְנֶה בַּיִת שָׂא | עֲמָלוֹ בּוֹנֵי בּוֹ
אִם־יְהוָה לֹא־יִשְׁמַר־עִיר שָׂא | שָׁקֵד שׁוֹמְרֵ:

If YHWH does not builds the house, the builders have labored in vain on it. If YHWH does not guard a city, the guards have kept watch in vain. (My translation)

4.1.1.4. P Clause *Qatal* Verbs in Poetic Literature

Translation decisions in English translations reflect the analytical challenge in understanding the use of *qatals* in the אִם conditional P clauses in Job, Psalms and Proverbs and Qohelet—some uses are given a temporal (Ps. 63:7; 94:18; Job 21:6 NIV,¹⁸⁴ NRSV, ESV, CEB, NET, Tanach), others a concessive construal (Job 9:15 NIV, NRSV, ESV, CEB, NET, Tanach). Even though the אִם-*qatal* sequence is used in P clauses in Job 9:15 and 9:16 (a speech-act conditional), only 9:16 is translated as a conditional. These content conditionals with P-clause *qatals* appear to fall within two categories. The first category is characterized by internal state verbs and the second category by non-internal state verbs.¹⁸⁵

The internal state verbs and the six passages where they are found include אִמְרָתִי Ps. 73:15; 94:18; זִכְרָתִי Job 21:6; חָכַם Prov. 23:15; Ps. 63:7; רָאִיתִי Ps. 66:18.

¹⁸³ See section 4.2 below for analysis of generic conditionals.

¹⁸⁴ NIV ignores אִם in Ps. 63:7.

¹⁸⁵ Eve Sweetser (p. c.: May 2014) with gratitude for pointing this out to me. Internal-state verbs are verbs that refer to cognitive states that are typically unavailable for evaluation by others. They include verbs of perception (see, look, listen), cognition (think, say-in BH; remember), knowledge (know), desire).

Prototypically אָמַרְתִּי describes actual physical speaking, however the verb is often used figuratively to indicate the process of thinking.¹⁸⁶ For example, the NRSV translation of Ps. 94:18 is *when I thought...*, rather than *If/when I said....* In Gen. 32:9 וַיֹּאמֶר is translated *thought, thinking* in almost every major English translation.¹⁸⁷ רָאָה is also used metaphorically to represent a character's inner perception and understanding.¹⁸⁸ The KNOWING is SEEING metaphor is common cross-linguistically¹⁸⁹ and is productive in BH as well.

I propose that in אָם conditional P clauses, *qatals* are preferred for verbs that describe a character's inner state when PAST TIME interpretations are promoted. Kiparsky (2004: 280) suggests that verbs of perception, cognition and emotion are “quasi-resultative” in Finnish in that they profile a bounded event where a change of state is difficult to define. Since resultative is not a grammatically productive category in BH, we might say that these uses of the *qatal* are “quasi-perfective”. They profile a process which in the utterance is considered bounded for the sake of the interpretation, but is unbounded in the world outside the speech event. For example, the process profiled by וְזָכַרְתִּי in (21) is construed as bounded, but living humans cannot cease thinking. In (23) the hearer/reader can imagine the process profiled by רָאִיתִי as bounded, i. e. perfective, for the purposes of the narrator, but in reality, the narrator continued “seeing” after the profiled event.

This may explain the use of the *qatals* in (21) and (22). They can also promote negative epistemic stance as is also evident in (23) and (24) where either simple past or perfect interpretations are reasonable. Passages that are best construed as PAST TIME due to contextual factors in both the preceding and following contexts include Ps. 66:18; 73:15; 94:18.

(21) Job 21:6

וְאִם-זָכַרְתִּי וְנִבְהַלְתִּי וְאָחַז בְּשָׂרִי פִלְצוֹת:

When I think of it I am dismayed, and shuddering seizes my flesh.

(22) Prov. 23:15

בְּנֵי אִם-חָכִים לִבְךָ יִשְׂמַח לִבִּי גַם-אֲנִי:

My child, if your heart is wise, my heart too will be glad.

¹⁸⁶ See BDB (2008: 56); HALOT (1994-2000: 66); Lund (1997: §6); Miller (1996: 290-96). Miller refers to this use as internal speech.

¹⁸⁷ CEB, ESV, KJV, NASB, NET, NCV, NIV, NKJV, NLT, NRSV.

¹⁸⁸ See BDB (2008: 907); Lund (1997: §1.c).

¹⁸⁹ See Dancygier and Sweetser (2014: 3-4; 26-28); Johnson ([1987] 2013: loc. 2605, 2636). Use of upper-case letters to refer to the domains is conventional practice in cognitive linguistics studies of metaphor and other figurative language.

(23) Ps. 66:18

אִן אִם־רָאִיתִי בְּלִבִּי לֹא יִשְׁמַע אֱדֹנָי:

If I saw/had seen iniquity in my heart, the Lord would not have listened. (My translation)¹⁹⁰

(24) Ps. 73:15

אִם־אָמַרְתִּי אֶסְפְּרָה כְּמוֹ הַנְּהַ דֹּר בְּנֵי בְּגָדָי:

If I said/had said, “I will talk on in this manner,” Look, I would have betrayed your children. (My translation)

The remaining אִם conditional P clause *qatal* verbs are not internal state verbs. The *qatal* in (25) clearly refers to an eventuality prior to the speech event since if Job’s children sinned, they would have done so before they died, and the speech which refers to their possible sinning occurs after the recorded death of Job’s children in Job 1:19.

(25) Job 8:4

אִם־בְּנֵיךָ חָטְאוּ־לוֹ וַיִּשְׁלַחֵם בְּיַד־פְּשָׁעָם:

If your children sinned against him, he delivered them into the power of their transgression.

The *qatals* in the remaining six conditionals in Job 9:15, 30; 10:14, 15, 11:13-15 and Prov. 24:14 are the most challenging interpretively.

(26) Job 9:30-31

אִם־הִתְרַחַצְתִּי בְּמֹ־שֶׁלֶג וְהִזְפֹּתִי בְּבָר כַּפֵּי:
אִז בְּשַׁחַת תִּטְבַּלְנִי וְתַעֲבוּנִי שְׁלֹמוֹתַי:³¹

³⁰If I wash myself with snow, purify my hands with soap, ³¹then you’ll hurl me into a slimy pit so that my clothes detest me. (CEB)

¹⁹⁰ Commentators disagree on the interpretation of this אִם clause. Hossfeld and Zenger (2005: 144-147) translated it as a temporal *when* clause and the *qatal* as profiling simple past/perfective. Tate (1990: 145-146) translate it as an *if*-less conditional (i. e. do not translate אִם overtly) expressing epistemic distance as I have. I suggest that *yiqtol* יִשְׁמַע in the Q clause is used since, from the perspective of the writer/narrator, this eventuality occurs after the eventuality in the P clause.

(27) Job 10:14-15¹⁹¹

אִם־חָטָאתִי וְשִׁמְרַתְנִי וְיַמְעוֹנִי לֹא תִנְקֶנִי:¹⁴
אִם־רָשָׁעְתִּי אֶלְלִי לִי וְצַדִּיקְתִּי לֹא־אֶשָּׂא רֹאשִׁי¹⁵
שָׁבַע קָלוֹן וּרְאָה עֵנָי:

¹⁴If I sin, you watch me, and do not acquit me of my iniquity. ¹⁵If I am wicked, woe to me! If I am righteous, I cannot lift up my head, for I am filled with disgrace and look upon my affliction.

I tentatively suggest that the *qatal*s in (26) and (27) are best understood as perfective uses of the gram.¹⁹² For the following reasons, I must emphasize the tentative nature of this suggestion because, as we have seen,¹⁹³ ׀ can license a temporal reading, Job 10:14 could be construed as saying *When I sin/have sinned*. The reader's understanding of the broader context of Job and more specifically the portrayal of Job's stance regarding his sin-status crucially informs the construal.

4.1.1.5. Other P Clause Forms

The presentation of my analysis of the remaining P clause forms, verbless clauses, syntactic ellipsis, ׀, ׀, and participles does not categorize them within text types because the few instances of use of each are too small to be statistically significant. In the P clauses of the remaining predictive content conditionals, the following forms are used:

- Verbless clauses (ten times)¹⁹⁴
- Syntactic Ellipsis (three times)¹⁹⁵
- ׀ (three times)¹⁹⁶
- ׀ (three times)¹⁹⁷
- Participle (two times)¹⁹⁸

4.1.1.5.1. Verbless Clauses

The ten verbless clauses represent 8% of instances in ׀ content conditionals.¹⁹⁹ They are evenly divided between narrative and poetic literature. None are used in content conditionals in the prophets. Content conditionals are used in verbless constructions in which one clause

¹⁹¹ Although the Hebrew in Job 9:15 and 10:14-15 is almost identical in structure (*qatal...׀*), most English translations interpret 9:15 as a concessive and 10:14-15 as *if*-conditionals, revealing the profound challenges posed by interpretation of a dead language, and the inescapable role of the interpreter's construal.

¹⁹² I also classify as perfective the *qatal* use in Job 10:14; 11:13-15; Prov. 24:14.

¹⁹³ See above section 4.1.1.2 and below section 4.2.3.

¹⁹⁴ Gen. 42:19; Jdg. 6:31b; 2 Sam. 18:25; 2 Kgs. 1:10, 12; Est. 6:13; Job 8:6; Ps. 90:10; Song 8:9 (2x).

¹⁹⁵ Gen. 18:21; Josh. 22:23 (2x).

¹⁹⁶ 1 Sam. 23:23; Job 33:23-25; Prov. 23:18.

¹⁹⁷ Gen. 30:1; 1 Sam. 19:11; 2 Kgs. 2:10b.

¹⁹⁸ Job 36:7-10; Jer. 26:15.

¹⁹⁹ See Miller (1999) for the most recent study of BH verbless clauses and for bibliographic information.

(Gen. 42:19; Jdg. 6:31b; Est. 6:13; Job 8:6; Ps. 90:10) or both (2 Sam. 18:25) are verbless. These conditionals all occur in direct speech. Verbless אם clauses are used to reason about the identity or status of the subject (or topic). The topic TIME of the eventualities in the P clauses overlap with the speech time, i.e. they refer to PRESENT TIME. BASE and V-POINT are in the Character Domain. As seen in (28) the verbless אם P clause sets up the background condition within which the Q clause is to be interpreted.

(28) Jdg. 6:31b

אם-אלהים הוא ירב לו כי נתן את-מזבחו:

“If he is a god, let him argue for himself, because it was his altar that was torn down.” (CEB)

(29) is an אם conditional used mid-sentence in a verbless clause to consider an alternate to the first proposed scenario. The conditional makes a prediction that if a person is strong, then they may live eighty years.

(29) Ps. 90:10

ימי-שנותינו בהם שבעים שנה ואם בגבורת |
שמונים שנה...

The days of our life are seventy years, if with strength, eighty years.... (My translation)

4.1.1.5.2. Ellipsis, שׁ and אין

Ellipsis is typically described as the omission of one or more “necessary” elements in a grammatical construction.²⁰⁰ It is used here to describe any of the “anaphoric processes that involve ‘omission’ of a syntactic constituent under identity with an antecedent in the adjoining discourse”.²⁰¹ The use of ellipsis is common in normal everyday language and follows the Gricean maxim to restrict communication to no more than is necessary to be informative,²⁰² and the similar Relevance Theory principle that speakers will typically be efficient in their communication—they will say no more than they believe necessary to communicate their intentions.²⁰³ In reality, there is no “omission” of information.

²⁰⁰ See Crystal (2008: 166); Quirk, et. al. (1985: 884). See van Leeuwen (1973: 30-34) for his comments on ellipsis in conditionals.

²⁰¹ See Lobeck (1995); Romero and Soria (2006: 24).

²⁰² See Cruse (2003: 368). As Carston (2002: 150-153) points out, syntactic ellipsis such as is found in Gen. 18:21 and Josh. 22:2 should not be confused with what she terms “subsential utterances” that do not involve anaphoric processes that depend on linguistic reconstruction.

²⁰³ See Sperber and Wilson (1995: 46-50).

Ellipsis occurs in Gen. 18:21 and twice in Josh. 22:2 in content conditionals. This represents a mere 2.4% of these conditionals. In (30) the ה-question is omitted in the וְאִם-לֹא P clause of the conditional:

(30) Gen. 18:21

אֲרִדָּה־נָּא וְאֶרְאֶה הַכְּצַעְקוֹתָהּ הַבָּאָה אֵלַי עָשׂוּ
בְּלֵה וְאִם־לֹא אֶדְעָה:

I must go down and see whether they have done altogether according to the outcry that has come to me; and if not, I will know.”

If it were included, the P clause might read, וְאִם־לֹא עָשׂוּ כְּצַעְקוֹתָהּ הַבָּאָה אֵלַי, where the elided information is in italics. The eventuality with the P clause references is PAST, while the *yiqtol* in the Q clause refers to an eventuality that is post-speech or FUTURE because the V-POINT is tied to the speaking character.

The two P clauses in (31) below also display ellipsis of some of the syntactic constituents from the immediately preceding context.

(31) Josh. 22:22-23²⁰⁴

אֵלֹהִים אֵלֹהִים | יְהוָה אֵל | אֵלֹהִים | יְהוָה הוּא יָדַע
וְיִשְׂרָאֵל הוּא יָדַע אִם־בְּמִרְדּוֹ וְאִם־בְּמַעַל בְּיְהוָה
אֶל־תּוֹשִׁיעֵנו הַיּוֹם הַזֶּה: ²³לְבָנוֹת לָנוּ מִזְבֵּחַ
לְשׂוּב מֵאַחֲרֵי יְהוָה וְאִם־לְהַעֲלוֹת עֹלֹת
וּמִנְחָה וְאִם־לַעֲשׂוֹת עֹלֹת זִבְחֵי שְׁלָמִים יְהוָה הוּא
יִבְקֹשׁ:

²²“El, God YHWH! El, God YHWH! He knows; and let Israel itself know! If it was in rebellion or in breach of faith in YHWH, do not spare us today ²³for building an altar to turn away from following the Lord; if we did so to offer burnt offerings or grain offerings or if it was to do peace offerings on it, YHWH himself will take vengeance. (My translation)

The conditionals in 22:23 continue the conditional reasoning begun in 22:22. There are coordinate P clauses and one Q clause. The use of וְאִם (rather than אִם) is commonly employed to alert the reader that the conditional reasoning is ongoing. Here it indicates that the conditionals in v. 23 are related to the first conditional in 22:22. The syntactic component that is omitted in the P clause of the two conditionals in 22:23 is supplied in my translation above by *did so*. The ellipsis is of the material from 22:23a—יְהוָה מֵאַחֲרֵי יְהוָה—

²⁰⁴ My analysis attempts to deal with the MT reading. Numerous English translation (NIV, CEB, NASB, NKJV, NET, NLT) follow the LXX and Syriac; some follow the MT (ESV, NRSV, HCSB).

Numerous versions (NRSV, NIV, NLT) translate the verb in the Q clause as a jussive, and the Westminster Morphology supports this. If this analysis is correct, then the conditional would be a Speech-Act conditional, and not a content conditional. However, I propose that בִּקֵּשׁ is not a jussive, but a simple *yiqtol* with FUTURE reference that insists that YHWH himself will seek vengeance. The reasoning reflects the biblical belief that YHWH himself will avenge apostasy. The NET Bible translation, *...the LORD himself will punish us* is, I submit, more accurate.

וַיִּ ²⁰⁵ is found in content conditional P clauses in 1 Sam. 23:23; Job 33:23²⁰⁶ and Prov. 23:18. It is most commonly classified as an existential particle or adverb.²⁰⁷ J-M (§154k) note that וַיִּ is often used to “ascertain or confirm something about which someone is uncertain,” an observation that accurately describes its use in these conditionals. The semantics of וַיִּ in these passages require a PRESENT TIME construal for the P clause. However, a *yiqtol* (32) or *weqatal* (33) is used in the Q clauses when the eventuality in the Q clause is construed as being in FUTURE TIME relative to that of the P clause.

(32) Prov. 23:18²⁰⁸

בִּי אִם-יֵשׁ אַחֲרַיִת וְתִקְוֶתְךָ לֹא תִכָּרֵת:

For if there is a future, your hope will not be cut off. (My translation)

(33) 1 Sam. 23:23

וּרְאוּ וּדְעוּ מִכֹּל הַמְחֻבְּאִים אֲשֶׁר יִתְחַבֵּא שָׁם
וּשְׁבַתְּם אֵלַי אֶל-נִבְזֹן וְהִלַּכְתִּי אִתְּכֶם וְהָיָה אִם-
יִשְׁנֶנּוּ בְּאֶרֶץ וַחֲפִשְׁתִּי אֹתוֹ בְּכֹל אֶלְפֵי יְהוּדָה:

“Look around and learn all the hiding places where he lurks, and come back to me with sure information. Then I will go with you; and if he is in the land, I will search him out among all the thousands of Judah.”

The three P clauses with אִן , Gen. 30:1; 1 Sam. 19:11 and 2 Kgs. 2:10b, all occur in direct speech.²⁰⁹ The eventuality referred to in (34) is to be construed as PRESENT TIME, concurrent with speech time. The examples in (35) and (36) are alternatives to the immediately preceding

²⁰⁵ On the semantics and use of וַיִּ see BHRG (Forthcoming: 463-464); GKC (§141k); J-M (§154k-l).

²⁰⁶ The verb in the Q clause of Job 33:23 is in 33:25, but see Clines' (2006: 735-740) discussion on the difficulties faced by this form.

²⁰⁷ See BHRG (1999: 321); GKC (§100o, p); IBHS (1990: 182-183) and J-M (§154k).

²⁰⁸ Commentators acknowledge that the text of this verse creates interpretational and translational challenges. See the discussions in Murphy (1998: 173-174) who considers “the repetition of אִם בִּי following 17b disturbing.” He follows J-M (§174c) and translates *surely*. See also the extended discussion and proposals in Heim (2013: 551-556). Heim argues for a causal reading of בִּי and considers this a case of ellipsis from v. 17. He translates *For if [so], then there is a future, and your hope will not be cut off*.

²⁰⁹ On the semantics and use of אִן see BHRG (Forthcoming: 441-442); GKC (§152i-q); J-M (§154k-l; §160j).

information. The אין clause in (35) appears to involve syntactic ellipsis of $\text{הַבְּהִלֵּי בְּנִים}$. The אין Q clause participle מִתָּה focuses attention on the disastrous consequence that will result if she continues childless and not on locating that eventuality in time. (36) appears to involve syntactic ellipsis of $\text{לְקַח מֵאִתִּי לְקָח מֵאִתִּי}$ and also refers to the FUTURE TIME eventuality in the first conditional. I say that אין “appears” to involve syntactic ellipsis of the finite verbal phrases in (35) and (36) because אין cannot directly negate finite verbs.²¹⁰ Consequently, in the specific cases of the passages in (35) and (36), J-M (§160j) argues that it is not the finite clauses which are elided, but rather a participle, presumably recovered via implicature. In (35) they state that the elided elements in $\text{אין ואם בְּנִים וְהָבִיא לִי בְּנִים}$ consists of “(= אֵינְךָ נֹתֵן =). Following J-M, the elided element in (36) might then be רָאָה . An alternative suggestion is that in (35) the elided element is simply בְּנִים . In the absence of live speakers uncertainty is certain.

(34) 1 Sam. 19:11

וַיִּשְׁלַח שְׂאוּל מְלָאכִים אֶל־בֵּית דָּוִד לְשָׂמוֹר
וְלִהְיוֹתוּ בַבֶּקֶר וַתִּגְדַּל לְדָוִד מִכָּל אֲשֶׁתּוֹ לֵאמֹר
אִם־אֵינְךָ מִמְּלֹט אֶת־נַפְשְׁךָ הַלַּיְלָה מִחַר אֲתָה
מוֹמֵת:

Saul sent messengers to David’s house to keep watch over him, planning to kill him in the morning. David’s wife Michal told him, “If you do not save your life tonight, tomorrow you will be killed.”

(35) Gen. 30:1

וַתִּרְאֵהוּ רָחֵל כִּי לֹא יֵלְדָה לְיַעֲקֹב וַתִּקְנֶה רָחֵל
בְּאֶחָתָהּ וַתֹּאמֶר אֶל־יַעֲקֹב הַבְּהִלֵּי בְּנִים וְאִם־
אֵין מִתֵּה אֲנִי:

When Rachel saw that she was not giving birth to children for Jacob, she envied her sister; and she said to Jacob, “Give me children, and if not, I will die!” (My translation)

(36) 2 Kgs. 2:10

וַיֹּאמֶר הַקְּשִׁיתָ לְשֹׂאֵל אִם־תִּרְאֶה אֹתִי לְקַח
מֵאִתִּי יְהִי־לְךָ כֵּן וְאִם־אֵין לֹא יִהְיֶה:

He responded, “You have asked a hard thing; yet, if you see me as I am being taken from you, it will be granted you; if not, it will not.”

Because there are so few examples of predictive content conditionals in the BH corpus with ellipses, יש and אין , generalizations are problematic.

²¹⁰ Van der Merwe (p. c.: August 2016)

4.1.1.5.3. Participles

Participles are used twice in content ׀-conditional P clauses.²¹¹

(37) Job 36:7-9

לֹא־יִגְרַע מִצְדִּיק עֵינָיו וְאֶת־מַלְכִים לִכְסֹּא
וַיִּשְׂבֵּם לְנֶצַח וַיִּגְבְּהוּ: ⁸וְאִם־אֲסוּרִים בְּזִקִּים
יִלְכְּדוּן בְּחַבְלֵי־עָנִי: ⁹וַיִּגְדֹּל לָהֶם פְּעָלָם וַיַּפְשְׁעֵיהֶם
כִּי יתְגַבְּרוּ:

⁷He does not withdraw his eyes from the righteous, but with kings on the throne he sets them forever, and they are exalted. ⁸And if they are bound in fetters and caught in the cords of affliction, ⁹then he declares to them their work and their transgressions that they are behaving arrogantly.

(38) Jer. 26:15

אָדָּא יָדַעַתְדָּעוּ כִּי אִם־מִמָּתִים אַתֶּם אֶתִּי כִּי־יָדָם
נָקִי אַתֶּם נִתְנִים עֲלֵיכֶם וְאֶל־הָעִיר הַזֹּאת וְאֶל־
יִשְׁבֵיהָ כִּי בְּאִמַת שְׁלַחְנִי יְהוָה עֲלֵיכֶם לְדַבֵּר
בְּאָזְנֵיכֶם אֵת כָּל־הַדְּבָרִים הָאֵלֶּה:

Only know for certain that if you put me to death, you will be bringing innocent blood upon yourselves and upon this city and its inhabitants, for in truth the LORD sent me to you to speak all these words in your ears.”

The participle in (37) is found in a passage describing how God acts in the world. Temporal movement is absent from the passage since it focuses on the characteristics of God’s activity. In Job 36:7 the speaker considers how God deals with ruling kings—he encourages their reign. The ׀ conditional introduces the alternative scenario in which kings are held captive, and discusses how God deals with them. The use of the *Qal* passive participle promotes a stative construal that is both atemporal and descriptive of the king’s situation.

In (38) Jeremiah uses the conditional to warn of possible consequences that would follow if he were killed. The use of the active participle מִמָּתִים allows for a near-future construal, but focuses the reader’s attention on the consequences of killing him. Note however that the contextual information makes it plain that this would be a future event—someone talking about his own death is still alive!

In summary, the paucity of participles in content conditional P clauses (only 27 times in all ׀-conditional clauses, principally in speech-act conditionals) again means that this generalization has limited predictive power.

²¹¹ A participle is also used in the conditional with ׀ in 2 Kgs. 2:10.

4.1.1.6. Summary of Content Conditional P Clauses

One of the primary goals of this section was to apply the cognitive-based functional categorization schema proposed by Sweetser (1990) to BH $\square\aleph$ content conditionals in order to evaluate whether generalizations might be captured that the logic-based schema used in previous studies failed to discover. Concepts from Mental Space Theory were implemented to demonstrate how $\square\aleph$'s space-building function prompted the construction of mental spaces within which the linguistic information was partially structured and enriched via frame semantics and general world knowledge. Content conditional P clauses all participate in building background mental spaces against which the main Q clause is used to make a prediction.

Table 4.3: Verb Use in All Content Conditional P Clauses

<i>Yiqtol</i> ²¹²	<i>Qatal</i> ²¹³	Verbless ²¹⁴	\aleph, ψ ²¹⁵	Ellipsis ²¹⁶	Participle ²¹⁷
74 (61%)	27 (22%)	10 (8%)	6 (5%)	3 (3%)	2 (2%)

The distribution of verb forms indicates a clear preference for forms that are conducive to future-oriented predictions. The *yiqtol* is the decidedly preferred form and was demonstrated to be used almost exclusively in direct speech or what is presented as direct speech. They primarily profile eventualities that are located post-speech, i.e. FUTURE TIME. When FUTURE TIME was not profiled by *yiqtol*s in non-poetical literature, context promoted a habitual eventuality with a temporal *when* construal in (9) and (10). *Yiqtol*s were used in 67% of P clauses in non-poetic literature and 51% of the uses in poetic literature. In poetic literature, all but seven *yiqtol*s clearly profile post-speech, FUTURE TIME eventualities. Those that do not seem to promote a more habitual construal and are borderline content or generic conditionals. These demonstrate that my analysis, like that of every reader, involves dynamic, context-driven construal, reflecting Langacker's assertion that "the linguistic meaning of a word [or verbal gram]...is not a distinct and self-contained entity, divorced from other knowledge and

²¹² Gen. 13:16; 31:8 (2x); 32:9; 34:15; 38:17; 44:23, 32; Exod. 4:8; 18:23; 19:5; 40:37; Num. 33:55; 36:4; Deut. 5:25; Jdg. 6:37; 15:7a; 16:7, 11, 13; Ruth 3:13a; 1 Sam. 2:25; 20:7a; 2 Sam. 15:25, 26, 34; 18:3 (2x); 1 Kgs. 12:7, 27; 2 Kgs. 2:10; 7:4 (2x); 1 Chron. 22:13; 28:9 (2x); 2 Chron. 10:7; 15:2 (2x); 30:9; Est. 4:14a; Neh. 3:35; Job 8:5, 18; 9:3, 20, 23; 13:10; 14:7, 8; 16:6; 17:16; 22:23 (2x); 34:14; Ps. 127:1 (2x); 139:8; Prov. 2:1, 3, 4-5; 3:24; Song 8:7; Isa. 7:9; 8:20; 53:10; Jer. 2:22; 5:2; 13:17; 15:1; 31:36, 37; 33:20; Ezek. 2:5.

²¹³ Num. 5:27, 28; 21:9; Jdg. 6:3; 16:17; 2 Sam. 15:33; 2 Kgs. 7:4 (2x); Job 8:4; 9:15, 30; 10:14, 15; 11:13; 21:6; 22:20; Ps. 63:7; 66:18; 73:15; Prov. 23:15; 24:14; Isa. 28:25; Jer. 14:18 (2x); 23:22; Lam. 3:32; Ezek. 3:6.

²¹⁴ Gen. 42:19; Jdg. 6:31b; 2 Sam. 18:25; 2 Kgs. 1:10, 12; Est. 6:13; Job 8:6; Ps. 90:10; Song 8:9 (2x).

²¹⁵ ψ -- 1 Sam. 23:23; Job 33:23; Prov. 23:18. \aleph -- Gen. 30:1; 1 Sam. 19:11; 2 Kgs. 2:10b.

²¹⁶ Gen. 18:21; Josh. 22:23 (2x).

²¹⁷ Job 36:7-10; Jer. 26:15.

cognitive abilities—instead it recruits and exploits them” (Langacker 2008: 458, brackets my addition).

In P clauses *qatals* are used at half the rate in non-poetic literature (16%) versus poetic literature (34%). In non-poetic literature the conditionals primarily occur in direct speech and profile PAST TIME eventualities that occur prior to speech time or negative epistemic stance. This contrasts with the use of *yiqtol*s when a positive epistemic stance is taken. The uses in poetic literature demonstrated that *qatals* can be used with internal-state verbs to profile “quasi-perfective” eventualities; in other contexts *qatals* are used to promote perfective construals.

םֹּנֵן content conditionals were used primarily in direct speech to engage in reasoning about alternative scenarios. The use of a single P, Q content conditional is typical, however content conditionals can be used serially, occurring twice in Gen. 31:8; 2 Sam 18:3; 1 Chron. 28:9; 2 Chron. 15:2; Jer. 14:18; Song 8:9; Job 10:14-15; 14:7-8; Ps. 127:1. םֹּנֵן content conditionals occur three consecutive times in Josh. 22:23-24; Job 8:4-6 and four times in 2 Kgs. 7:4.

In addition to serial occurrences of םֹּנֵן content conditionals, a single םֹּנֵן can have scope over a second, coordinate P clause: P, P, Q.²¹⁸ In (39), each of the three serial םֹּנֵן-P clauses has scope over a second, coordinate P clause. In Prov. 2:1 םֹּנֵן has scope over וּמְצוֹתַי וּתְקַח אִמְרֵי and תִּצְפֹּן אֶת־דָּ. The Q clause is in 2:5.

(39) Prov. 2:1-5

בְּנִי אִם־תִּקַּח אִמְרֵי וּמְצוֹתַי תִּצְפֹּן אֶת־דָּ:¹
 לְהִקְשִׁיב לְחִכְמָהּ אֲזַנְךָ תִּטֶּה לְבָבְךָ לְתַבּוּנָה:²
 כִּי אִם לְבִינָה תִקְרָא לְתַבּוּנָה תִתֵּן קוֹלְךָ:³
 אִם־תִּבְקֶשְׁנָה כַּכֶּסֶף וְכַמְטֹמוֹנִים תַּחְפֹּשְׁנָה:⁴
 אֲזִי תִבִּין יִרְאֵת יְהוָה וְדַעַת אֱלֹהִים תִּמְצָא:⁵

¹My child, if you accept my words and treasure up my commandments within you, ²making your ear attentive to wisdom and inclining your heart to understanding; ³if you indeed cry out for insight, and raise your voice for understanding; ⁴if you seek it like silver, and search for it as for hidden treasures—⁵then you will understand the fear of the LORD and find the knowledge of God.

²¹⁸ These also occur in Gen. 32:9; Exod. 4:8; 18:23; 19:5; Num. 5:27; 21:9; 2 Chron. 10:7; Job 8:5; 9:30; 14:8; Jer. 2:22; 31:37. In Num. 21:9, most English translations (CEB, ESV, HCSB, KJV, NKJV, NASB) construe וְהָבִיט as the first of two coordinate Q clauses. NIV construes it as a coordinate P clause.

4.1.2. Content Conditional Q clauses

The purpose of this section is to examine content conditional Q clauses. Information regarding use in direct speech or narrative will not be discussed in this section, as this type of general information provided in the sections on P clauses applies equally to Q clauses in the same passages. The Q clause (or apodosis) is the main clause in a conditional construction. The mental space in which the Q clause is (partially) elaborated is a daughter space of the P space, where the protasis is structured. As noted above, the semantics of prediction in content conditionals are located in the Q clause and the Q clause is understood to be “caused” by the P clause. Content conditional Q clauses are predictions that are valid if the P clause background condition is met.

4.1.2.1. Content Conditional Q clauses in Non-Poetic Literature

The verb use indicated in Table 4.4 indicates that *yiqtol*s and *weqatal*s are used with comparable frequency and together are overwhelmingly preferred over every other form and were the preferred grams for content conditionals.

Table 4.4: Content Conditional Q Clause Verbs in Non-Poetic Literature²¹⁹

<i>Weqatal</i> ²²⁰	<i>Yiqtol</i> ²²¹	Verbless	Participle	יָשׁ ²²⁴	Ellipsis	<i>Qatal</i> ²²⁶
33 (42%)	31 (39%)	4 (5%)	3 (4%)	2 (2%)	2 (2%)	1 (1%)

Commenting on *yiqtol*s (e. g. 40), Andrason (2010: 7) notes that “in the future time context, the construction denotes any prospective event.” In discourse, he states that the *weqatal* gram (e. g. 41) “frequently introduces real conditional apodoses providing consecutive (logical

²¹⁹ If the content conditionals in the prophets were separated out, *yiqtol*s would account for 56% of the grams in content conditionals in the prophets; verbless clauses 20% and *weqatal*s would represent 13% of the tokens. One participle and one instance of יָשׁ is attested.

²²⁰ Gen. 31:8 (2x); 32:9; 34:15; 44:32; Exod. 4:8; 18:23; 19:5; Num. 5:27, 28; 21:9; 33:55; 36:4; Deut. 5:25; Jdg. 6:3, 37; 16:7, 11, 17; 1 Sam. 2:25; 23:23; 2 Sam. 15:25, 33, 34; 1 Kgs. 12:7, 27; 2 Kgs. 7:4 (3x); 2 Chron. 10:7; Neh. 3:35; Lam. 3:32; Ezek. 2:5.

²²¹ Gen. 13:16; 18:21; 42:19; 44:23; Exod. 40:37; Josh. 22:23b; Jdg. 6:31; Ruth 3:13a; 2 Sam. 15:26; 18:3 (2x); 2:10 (2x); 7:4c; 1 Chron. 22:13; 28:9 (2x); 2 Chron. 15:2 (2x); 30:9; Est. 4:14a; 6:13; Isa. 7:9; 53:10; Jer. 5:2; 13:17; 23:22; 31:36, 37; 33:20; Ezek. 3:6.

²²² 1 Sam. 20:7a; 2 Sam. 18:25; Jer. 14:18 (2x).

²²³ Gen. 30:1; 1 Sam. 19:11; Jer. 2:22.

²²⁴ Isa. 8:20; Jer. 15:1. On Isa. 8:20, see Oswalt (1986: 230n9) where he observes that “The Hebrew of this sentence presents numerous problems. Lit. ‘If they will not say as this word, which there is not to him it dawn.’ The present translation is justified in that pronoun disagreement (they-him) is not uncommon in the Hebrew prophets and that ³šer can function as kî.”

²²⁵ Gen. 38:17; Jdg. 16:13.

²²⁶ Jdg. 15:7a. This text is universally acknowledged as challenging and its classification is doubtful.

and/or temporal) meaning” (Andrason 2011a: 9). Since the Q clause is a prediction that holds within P, most Q clause eventualities will be logically and/or temporally subsequent to the P clause event, the semantics of the *yiqtol* and *weqatal* make them the default grams for conditional apodoses.

(40) Gen. 13:16

וְשִׁמְתִי אֶת־זַרְעֲךָ כַּעֲפַר הָאָרֶץ אֲשֶׁר | אִם־יִוָּכַל
אִישׁ לִמְנוֹת אֶת־עֲפַר הָאָרֶץ גַּם־זַרְעֲךָ יִמְנָה:

I will make your offspring like the dust of the earth; so that if one can count the dust of the earth, your offspring also can be counted.

(41) 2 Sam. 15:25

וַיֹּאמֶר הַמֶּלֶךְ לְצָדוֹק...אִם־אֶמְצָא חַן בְּעֵינֵי יְהוָה
וְהִשְׁבֵּנִי וְהִרְאֵנִי אֹתוֹ וְאֶת־נְוֵהוּ:

Then the king said to Zadok, ...If I find favor in the eyes of the Lord, he will bring me back and let me see both it and the place where it stays.

Only four verbless content conditional Q clauses (42) occur and are construable as predictive based on the אם-conditional construction’s iconic clausal order’s contextual effects. No verbless clause eventualities are construable as occurring pre-speech. Participle (43) use in content conditional Q clauses is limited to three instances. They describe the speakers own viewpoint of a state of affairs that is cotemporaneous with the speech event. Although the verbal gram is not future oriented, the conditionals are nevertheless predictive conditionals. Dancygier and Sweetser (2005: 91) argue that the “predictive conditional relationship emerges from the larger construction,” and not the verb form.

(42) 1 Sam. 20:7a

אִם־כֵּה יֹאמֶר טוֹב שְׁלוֹם לְעַבְדְּךָ

“If he says, ‘Good!’, [there will be] shalom for your servant.” (My translation)

(43) Gen. 30:1 (repeated from example 35)

וַתֵּרָא רָחֵל כִּי לֹא יִלְדָה לְיַעֲקֹב וַתִּקְנֶא רָחֵל
בְּאָחֶתָהּ וַתֹּאמֶר אֶל־יַעֲקֹב הִבְהֵלִי בָנִים וְאִם־
אֵין מִתָּה אָנֹכִי:

When Rachel saw that she bore Jacob no children, she envied her sister; and she said to Jacob, “Give me children, or I shall die!”

In אין Q clauses (44), the predictive relationship is also construed from the larger conditional construction. Implicature and context are crucially involved in construing the

conditional relationship in conditionals that lack the Q clause via ellipsis. In (45), the bracketed Q clause is not in the Hebrew text, but is easily recoverable from the context.

(44) Jer. 15:1

וַיֹּאמֶר יְהוָה אֵלַי אִם-יַעֲמֹד מֹשֶׁה וְשָׁמוּאֵל לְפָנָי
אֲזַן נַפְשִׁי אֶל-הָעָם הַזֶּה

Then the Lord said to me: Though Moses and Samuel stood before me, yet my heart would not turn toward this people.

(45) Jdg. 16:13

וַתֹּאמֶר דְּלִילָה אֶל-שָׁמְשׁוֹן עַד-הֵנָּה הִתְלַתְּ בִּי
וַתְּדַבֵּר אֵלַי כְּזָבִים הַגִּידָה לִּי בְּמָה תִּאָּסֵר וַיֹּאמֶר
אֵלֶיהָ אִם-תִּתְּאֲרָגִי אֶת-שֵׁבַע מַחְלָפוֹת רֵאשֵׁי עַם-
הַמְּסֻכָּת:

Then Delilah said to Samson, “Until now you have mocked me and told me lies; tell me how you could be bound.” He said to her, “If you weave the seven locks of my head with the web and make it tight with the pin, [then I shall become weak, and be like anyone else.”] (Brackets added)

The use of the *weqatal* in conditional Q clauses has been noted abundantly in the literature (GKC: §112ff, §159; J-M: §119, §167c, and especially §176d-o; IBHS 1990: 519-542; BHRG 1999: 170-171).²²⁷ Additionally, the historical development of the *weqatal* is argued to be a successor of PS **qatal(a)* and rooted in conditional Q clauses.²²⁸

The *weqatal* and *yiqtol* are typically in complementary distribution in Q clauses: *weqatal* is used in clause-initial position; *yiqtol* forms in non-clause initial position. However, this is not as strict a pattern in content conditionals as might be expected. In eight instances in non-poetic literature *yiqtols* occur clause initial (46) in Gen. 18:21; 1 Kgs. 12:7; 2 Kgs 7:4c; 1 Chron. 28:9 (2x); 2 Chron. 15:2 (2x); Isa. 53:10; in poetic literature, they occur five times clause initial in Job 22:23a; 34:14a; Prov. 23:15; Song 8:9 (2x). More typically *yiqtols* are used when elements²²⁹ are fronted for pragmatic effects in both non-poetic literature²³⁰ and poetic literature.²³¹ Q clauses with *yiqtols* offer more pragmatic effects.

²²⁷ See Andrason (2011a; 2012a) for a useful review of the literature on the *weqatal* and for an analysis of the development of the form using his “panchronic” analysis, one based on grammaticalization studies of Hopper and Traugott (1993) and Bybee, Perkins and Pagliuca (1994).

²²⁸ See IBHS (1990: 519-595) and Andrason (2012a) for a discussion of the historical development of the *weqatal*.

²²⁹ These include אַז, גַּם, כִּי. Sentence constituents such as infinitive absolutes, direct objects, prepositional phrases and nouns also appear before *yiqtols*. I do not include אֵל-negation of the verb or clause (אֵל-*yiqtol*...) under the rubric of fronting effects. This occurs thirteen times.

²³⁰ Gen. 13:16; 1 Chron. 22:13; Isa. 7:9; Jer. 31:36-37.

²³¹ Job 8:6; 9:3, 20, 30-31; 10:14; 13:31; 14:7, 8; 34:14b Ps. 63:7; 73:15; 127:1 (2x); Prov. 2:5.

(46) Gen. 18:21 (Repeated from example 30)

אֲרִדָּה־נָא וְאֶרְאֶה הַבְּעֵקֶתָהּ הַבָּאָה אֵלַי עָשׂוּן
כִּלְאֵה וְאִם־לֹא אֶדְעָה:

“I must go down and see whether they have done altogether according to the outcry that has come to me; and if not, I will know.”

These tokens of clause initial *yiqtol*s are not sufficient in number to provide for a defensible hypothesis that would explain why they are used clause-initially instead of *weqatals*. By way of illustration, note that in (47) the verb חיה is used in both the protasis and apodosis, with the *yiqtol* form in the Q clause. However, in (48), which immediately follows (47) in the same verse, the same verb (מות) is likewise used in both the P and Q clauses, but a *weqatal* is used in the Q clause instead of a *yiqtol*. This exemplifies why, without being able to query a live speaker, one can only arrive at the tentative conclusion that *yiqtol* and *weqatal* are near-synonyms.²³²

(47) 2 Kgs. 7:4c

אִם־יִחְיֶינוּ נִחְיֶה... ...if they spare our lives, we shall live...

(48) 2 Kgs. 7:4d

וְאִם־יִמִּיתֵנוּ וּמָתָנוּ... ...and if they kill us, we will die.

To summarize, content conditional Q clauses in non-poetic literature are where conditioned predictions are made. The data indicates that *yiqtol* and *weqatals* are the (overwhelmingly) preferred verbal grams to do this. Verbless clauses and participles are construable as predictive from the entire אם-conditional construction’s iconic clausal order’s contextual effects. Participles, unlike verbless clauses, describe the speaker’s viewpoint of a state of affairs that is cotemporaneous with the speech event. Although they make non-predictive statements they are still predictive conditionals because predictiveness is construable from the conditional construction as a whole. Coordinate Q clauses are permitted, occurring six times in non-poetic literature.²³³

4.1.2.2. Content Conditional Q clauses in Poetic Literature

Content conditionals occur forty-one times in the poetic books of Job, the Psalms, Proverbs and Song—half the number as occur in non-poetic literature. They are not used in Qohelet. We find a significant difference in Q clause verb use between non-poetic and poetic literature.

²³² Also noted by Van Leeuwen (1973: 24) in comments on these specific conditionals.

²³³ Gen. 44:23; 2 Kgs. 1:10, 12; Isa. 53:10; Jer. 13:17, 23:22.

In non-poetic literature the use of the *yiqtol* and *weqatal* was virtually identical, and the *qatal* was used only one time and that in a difficult text. As shown in Table 4.5, in poetic literature content conditional Q clauses, the *yiqtol* is still, overwhelmingly, the preferred gram for making predictions. *Weqatals* also facilitate the same construal. In contrast to the situation in non-poetic literature, *weqatals* occur much less frequently, on par with *qatals*.²³⁴

Table 4.5: Content Conditional Q Clause Verb Forms in Poetic Literature²³⁵

<i>Yiqtol</i> ²³⁶	<i>Qatal</i> ²³⁷	<i>Weqatal</i> ²³⁸	Verbless ²³⁹	שׁי ²⁴⁰	<i>Qal Passive</i> ²⁴¹	<i>Wayyiqtol</i> ²⁴²
21 (51%)	5 (12%)	5 (12%)	3 (7%)	1 (2%)	1 (2%)	1 (2%)

The use of the *qatals* is decidedly difficult to explain, apart from the instance in (49), which is another example of a true ׀ counterfactual.²⁴³ As in examples (5) and (17) the *qatal* gram promotes a strong negative epistemic stance.²⁴⁴

(49) Ps. 73:15

אִם־אָמַרְתִּי אֶסְפְּרָה כִּמוֹ הַנְּהָה דֹּר בְּנֵיךָ בְּגִדְתִּי:

If I had said, “I will talk on in this way,” I would have been untrue to the circle of your children.

An explanation for the other uses of the *qatal* in (50) remains tentative: the *qatal* may possibly promote epistemic distance, but this is uncertain.

²³⁴ If the poetic sections of the Prophets were included in the poetic literature, *yiqtols* predominate followed by verbless and *weqatal* forms. No *qatals* are recorded in Q clauses in the Prophets. Results are not materially different.

²³⁵ Percentages do not add up to 100%, and the total number does not match the number of total conditionals because several coordinate P clauses have only one Q clause (e. g. Prov. 2:1-5).

²³⁶ Job 8:6; 9:3, 15, 20, 23, 30; 10:15, 13-15; 14:7, 8-9, 16:6, 22:23a; 34:14; Ps. 63:7; 66:18; Prov. 2:4; 3:24; 23:15, 18; Song 8:9 (2x).

²³⁷ Job 9:28; 22:20; Ps. 73:15; 121:1 (2x).

²³⁸ Job 8:4, 18; 10:14; 21:6; 22:23b.

²³⁹ Job 17:16; Ps. 90:10; 139:8.

²⁴⁰ Prov. 24:14.

²⁴¹ Job 22:25a.

²⁴² Job 8:4.

²⁴³ See Ps. 66:18 (example 5) and Jer. 23:22 (example 17) above.

²⁴⁴ Van Leeuwen (1973: 23) states, in regard to the use of ׀ with this counterfactual, “Wahrscheinlich hat der Verfasser aber absichtlich ׀ gewählt, weil er nicht so sehr den irrealen als wohl den hypothetischen Aspekt der Bedingung betonen wollte.” His conclusion illustrates the constraints of modularism and truth-functional compositionality that locates all the meaning of counterfactuality in the particles וְ and לֹא־וְ, and rejects the role of the semantics of the larger construction and of construal in meaning construction.

(50) Job 9:27-28²⁴⁵

אִם־אֶמְרֵי אֶשְׁכַּחַהּ שִׁיחִי אֶעֱזֹבָה פָּנַי וְאֶבְלִיגָה:²⁷
 יִגְרָתִי כָּל־עֲצָבֹתַי יִדְעֵתִי כִּי־לֹא תִנְקֵנִי:²⁸

²⁷If I were to say, 'I will forget my complaint; I will change my sad face and be happy,' ²⁸I would become afraid of all my suffering, for I know you will not hold me innocent. (My translation)

The Q clause *qatal* in (51), like the P clause *qatal*, appears to reference a PAST TIME relative to the speech event. The conditional is elaborated in the character domain of the צַדִּיקִים and נָקִי who are quoted.

(51) Job 22:19-20

יִרְאוּ צַדִּיקִים וַיִּשְׂמְחוּ וְנָקִי יִלְעַג־לָמוֹ:¹⁹
 אִם־לֹא נִכְתָּד קִימָנוּ וַיִּתְּרֵם אֶכְלָה אֵשׁ:²⁰

¹⁹The righteous see it and are glad; the innocent laugh them to scorn, ²⁰saying, 'Surely our adversaries are cut off, and what they left, the fire has consumed.'

This passage is challenging for several reasons. First, אִם־לֹא is used only seven times as the head of content conditional P clauses (Gen. 44:23, 32; Exod. 4:8; 40:37; Num. 5:28; 33:55; Job 20:22 and Isa. 7:9; 8:20; Jer. 13:17). Isa. 8:20 and Job. 20:22 are not amenable to the compositional *If...not* reading that is agreeable in the remaining five passages. Translations choose one of two incompatible and unrelated options: in Isa. 8:20 English translations opt for an asseverative reading, *surely*;²⁴⁶ in Job 20:22 translations opt for either *surely* or a rhetorical question. This study finds no support for either choice, but I have no clear counter-proposals.²⁴⁷

In (52) the interpreter's construal of the perspective of the writer of the Psalm seems to crucially determine the construal of the verbs. I interpret the P clauses as either a generic description of the writer's view of reality or as a future condition, *If [going forward] YHWH does not....* and the Q clauses as a prediction about past eventualities made within the Q space.

²⁴⁵ The MT has an infinitive construct אֶמְרֵי after אִם. Hartley (1988: 178) comments "An infinitive construct after 'im is most unusual. Therefore, it seems best to read the perfect form 'amarû, 'I said'." See also GKC (§159o). Clines (1998: 219) observes that the inf אמרי after אם is unparalleled, and usually emended to אמרתי. My comments are based on emended אמרתי.

²⁴⁶ The Hebrew of this verse is problematic. See Oswalt's (1986: 230n9) comments.

²⁴⁷ See Clines (2006: 561) for brief comments.

(52) Ps. 127:1 (Repeated from example 20)

אִם־יִבְנֶה | לֹא־יִבְנֶה בַּיִת שׁוּא | עֲמָלָיו בּוֹנִיּוֹ בּוֹ
אִם־יִשְׁמְרֵה | לֹא־יִשְׁמְרֵה עִיר שׁוּא | שָׁקֵד שׁוֹמְרֵה:

If YHWH does not build the house, the builders have labored in vain on it. If YHWH does not guard a city, the guards have kept watch in vain. (My translation)

The lone *wayyiqtol* in content conditional Q clauses is found in (53). BHRG (Forthcoming: 196) comments that in poetry the *wayyiqtol* will refer to an “actual present,” and in proverbial literature have a gnomic value. Although Job is poetic, these uses do not apply in this instance, likely because the conditional occurs in dialogue and is reasoning about past events. The simplest explanation is that it indicates temporal succession and, taking into account a worldview that sees sin and punishment as logically connected, logical consequence.

(53) Job 8:4

אִם־בְּנֵיךָ חָטְאוּ־לֹוֹ | וַיִּשְׁלַחֵם בְּיַד־פְּשָׁעָם:

If your children sinned against him, he delivered them into the power of their transgression.

The predominant use of the *yiqtol* in content conditional Q clauses in poetic literature indicates a preference for grams that facilitate predictiveness, congruent with its use in non-poetic literature content conditional Q clauses. However, overall verb use in the poetic literature is markedly different in that the *weqatal* gram is not used with the same frequency as the *yiqtol* (as it is in non-poetic Q clauses), and the *weqatal* and *qatal* are used with the same frequency. In non-poetic literature, the *qatal* is used only once, and that in a difficult passage. (49) confirms what was seen in examples (5) and (17), that *qatals* are preferred in true counterfactual conditionals.

4.1.2.3. Content Conditional Q clauses Summary

Content conditionals are predictive and the Q clause is where the prediction is made. This examination of Q clauses in content conditionals indicates that verbal grams that facilitate the construal of this prediction are preferred. Typically predictions involve a temporal reference subsequent to (i.e. FUTURE) the background in the protasis. This explains why *yiqtol*s and *weqatal*s are preferred in content conditional Q clauses, as is seen in Table 4.6. What has not been noted in previous literature is that the *yiqtol* is used with greater frequency than the *weqatal* in the Q clause of what are commonly referred to as “real conditionals”. As will be demonstrated below in sections 4.3.2.3 and 4.3.2.4, *weqatal*s are the preferred Q clause verb

form *only* in procedural and casuistic discourse. In predictive, content conditionals (and generic conditionals, see section 4.2 below) the *yiqtol* is the preferred Q clause verb form.

Table 4.6: Verb Use in All Content Conditional Q Clauses

<i>Yiqtol</i> ²⁴⁸	<i>Weqatal</i> ²⁴⁹	Verbless ²⁵⁰	<i>Qatal</i> ²⁵¹	Part ²⁵²	יָשׁוּב, יָשׁוּב ²⁵³	Ellipsis ²⁵⁴
52 (43%)	38 (32%)	7 (6%)	6 (5%)	3 (3%)	3 (3%)	2 (2%)

<i>Qal Passive</i> ²⁵⁵
1 (1%)

When other verbal grams are used, predictiveness is still operative, but the conditional construction's iconic P, Q order facilitates it. This is the case when participles are used, since they describe the speakers own viewpoint of a state of affairs that is cotemporaneous with the speech event. Verbless Q clauses also derive their predictive semantics via construal from the larger conditional construction. Coordinate Q clauses occur nine times in the poetic literature.²⁵⁶

4.1.3. Semantic Contribution of ׀ in Content Conditionals

׀ has traditionally been considered the prototypical conditional or hypothetical particle in Biblical Hebrew. In lexicons *if* is the first sense listed for the particle. Yet the actual semantic contribution of the particle in conditional constructions has not been discussed. Though rare, ׀-less content conditionals do occur in BH. Lexicons and some studies give examples²⁵⁷ which

²⁴⁸ Gen. 13:16; 18:21; 42:19; 44:23; Exod. 40:37; Josh. 22:23b; Jdg. 6:31; Ruth 3:13a; 2 Sam. 15:26; 18:3 (2x); 2 Kgs. 1:10, 12; 2:10 (2x); 7:4c; 1 Chron. 22:13; 28:9 (2x); 2 Chron. 15:2 (2x); 30:9; Est. 4:14a; 6:13; Job 8:6; 9:3, 15, 20, 23, 30; 10:15, 13-15; 14:7, 8-9; 16:6, 22:23a; 34:14; Ps. 63:7; 66:18; Prov. 2:4; 3:24; 23:15, 18; Song 8:9 (2x); Isa. 7:9; 53:10; Jer. 5:2; 13:17; 23:22; 31:36, 37; 33:20; Ezek. 3:6.

²⁴⁹ Gen. 31:8 (2x); 32:9; 34:15; 44:32; Exod. 4:8; 18:23; 19:5; Num. 5:27, 28; 21:9; 33:55; 36:4; Deut. 5:25; Jdg. 6:3, 37; 16:7, 11, 17; 1 Sam. 2:25; 23:23; 2 Sam. 15:25, 33, 34; 1 Kgs. 12:7, 27; 2 Kgs. 7:4 (3x); 2 Chron. 10:7; Neh. 3:35; Job 8:4, 18; 10:14; 21:6; 22:23b; Lam. 3:32; Ezek. 2:5.

²⁵⁰ 1 Sam. 20:7a; 2 Sam. 18:25; Jer. 14:18 (2x); Job 17:16; Ps. 90:10; 139:8.

²⁵¹ Jdg. 15:7a; 2 Chron. 18:27; Job 9:27; 22:20; Ps. 73:15; 121:1 (2x).

²⁵² Gen. 30:1; 1 Sam. 19:11; Jer. 2:22.

²⁵³ Prov. 24:14; Isa. 8:20; Jer. 15:1.

²⁵⁴ Gen. 38:17; Jdg. 16:13.

²⁵⁵ Job 22:25a.

²⁵⁶ Job 8:6; 9:30; 11:13-15 (3x); 14:7, 8-9; 33:23-15, 14; Prov. 2:5; 24:14.

²⁵⁷ See GKC (§159.2b-f); J-M (§167a, b); Van Leeuwen (1973: 17). However, a close examination of the examples offered in these resources reveal that, while many of the citations can be construed as possible conditionals, most are tenuous construals at best and find little support from translations. Other examples cited such as 2 Chron. 7:14; Job 10:16; Ps. 139:8b, 9 and Prov. 3:24; are second (and third) topically related ׀-less conditionals, but it should be noted that they follow an initial ׀ conditional as in 139:8a.

seems to indicate they believe that the semantics of conditionality might not be linked (exclusively) to אם (or other particles). My hypothesis is that the syntax of אם-less conditionals and their interpretation will offer insight to the particle's contribution to conditional interpretation.²⁵⁸

In the following examples אם is not available to promote a conditional construal. When the conditional is only one part of a verse it is bolded; if it is the entire verse, it is not.

(54) Gen. 42:38

וַיֹּאמֶר לֹא-יֵרֵד בְּנֵי עִמְכֶם כִּי-אָחִיו מֵת וְהוּא
לְבַדּוֹ נִשְׁאַר וּקְרָאָהוּ אֶסּוֹן בְּדַרְדָּרָא אֲשֶׁר תִּלְכוּ-בָּהּ
וְהוֹרַדְתֶּם אֶת-שֵׁיבְתֵי בִגְדוֹן שְׂאֹלָה:

But he said, “My son shall not go down with you, for his brother is dead, and he alone is left. If harm should come to him on the journey that you are to make, you would bring down my gray hairs with sorrow to Sheol.”

(55) Gen. 44:22

וַנֹּאמֶר אֶל-אֲדֹנָי לֹא-יִוָּכַל הַנְּעַר לַעֲזֹב אֶת-אָבִיו
וְעִזָּב אֶת-אָבִיו וּמָת:

We said to my lord, ‘The boy cannot leave his father, for if he should leave his father, his father would die.’

(56) Gen. 44:29

וְלִקְחֶתֶם גַּם-אֶת-זֶה מֵעַם פְּנֵי וּקְרָהוּ אֶסּוֹן
וְהוֹרַדְתֶּם אֶת-שֵׁיבְתֵי בְרַעְיָה שְׂאֹלָה:

If you take this one also from me, and harm comes to him, you will bring down my gray hairs in sorrow to Sheol.’

(57) Num. 14:15

וְהַמַּתָּה אֶת-הָעָם הַזֶּה כְּאִישׁ אֶחָד וְאָמְרוּ הַגּוֹיִם
אֲשֶׁר-שָׁמְעוּ אֶת-שְׂמִיעַד לֵאמֹר:

If you kill this people all at one time, then the nations who have heard about you will say,

(58) Josh. 22:17-18


¹⁷הַמְעַט-לָנוּ אֶת-עֵזְוֹן פְּעֹזֵר אֲשֶׁר לֹא-הִטְהַרְנוּ
מִמֶּנּוּ עַד הַיּוֹם הַזֶּה וַיְהִי הַנֶּגֶף בְּעֵדֶת יְהוָה:
¹⁸וְאַתֶּם תִּשְׁבּוּ הַיּוֹם מֵאַחֲרֵי יְהוָה וְהָיָה אַתֶּם
תִּמְרְדוּ הַיּוֹם בְּיְהוָה וּמָחָר אֶל-כָּל-עַדְתַּי יִשְׂרָאֵל
יִקְצֹף:

¹⁷Have we not had enough of the sin at Peor from which even yet we have not cleansed ourselves, and for which a plague came upon the congregation of the LORD, ¹⁸that you must turn away today from following the LORD! If you rebel against the LORD today, he will be angry with the whole congregation of Israel tomorrow.

²⁵⁸ Examples include, but are not limited to: Gen. 44:29; Exod. 20:25b; 21:31, 36; 33:5; Lev. 13:5, 6, 8, 10, 20; 14:2, 33; 25:49; Num. 5:6-7, 14, 20; 10:32; 11:22; 12:14; 14:15 36:3; Deut. 21:11; 25:8; Jdg. 6:13; Ruth 2:9; 1 Sam. 2:16; 20:12, 13; 25:29; 2 Kgs. 5:13; 7:2, 19; 2 Chron. 6:18; 7:14; Neh. 1:8, 9a; Job 9:24a; 10:16; 15:15b; 16:6b; 19:4; 22:21, 23b-25; Ps. 139:8b; 9-10, 18; Prov. 1:23; 3:24. Jer. 3:1; 7:6.

A mental-spaces approach offers a suggestive explanation for why certain ׀-less constructions can convey conditional meaning, especially in contexts where alternative-based prediction is provided by the context or the semantics of the lexemes, as in each of the above examples. The mental space configuration of each is the same as that for ׀ predictive conditionals seen in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. The configuration for (56) would be as follows:

Figure 4.6: Mental Space Diagram of Gen. 44:29



ולקחתם גם את זה מעם פני וקרהו אסון והורדתם את שִׁבְתִּי בְרָעָה שְׂאֵלָה:
 [our father said], 'If you take this one also from me, and harm comes to him, you
 will bring down my gray hairs in sorrow to Sheol.' Gen. 44:29

In four of the five P clauses *weqatals* are used to set up the background to the prediction and seem to be used to promote construal of the P clause as a FUTURE eventuality. The only *yiqtol* in these examples occurs after a וְהִיא introduction in (58). Like the *weqatals*, it too provides for a FUTURE interpretation. The use of the *weqatal* in these P clauses is striking because they never occur in content ׀-conditional P-clauses.²⁵⁹ The reason they don't is

²⁵⁹ וְהִיא occurs in Num. 5:27; 21:9; Jdg. 6:3 and 1 Sam. 23:23. Although this ostensibly appears to be a *weqatal*-headed ׀ clause, the disjunctive *revia* in Num. 21:9 the *tifha* in Jdg. 6:3, and the *pashta* (or *qadma*) *ta'amim* in 1 Sam. 23:23 indicate that it was not considered head of the ׀ clause. In Num. 5:27 (note the textual variant וְהִיא in the Samaritan Pentateuch) we do find a conjunctive *munah* followed by a *meteg* on וְהִיא, however construal of וְהִיא as syntactic head of the P clause is unlikely. Rather, it serves a procedural function, instructing the reader/hearer that the following conditional (or temporally construed ׀ clauses, Num. 21:9; Jdg. 6:3) is to be

being built up as a background to another” (Dancygier and Sweetser 2005: 239). As Dancygier and Sweetser point out, this restricts the information structure of the construction. Its presence makes the conditional construal the most accessible. (Only rarely is this overridden by contextual factors, such as occurs in the few instances where \square constructions are construable as temporal *when* clauses.)²⁶¹ Because of this, even conditionals with Q, P sequences, provide no interpretational challenges when \square is present. However, this reversal of clause order in \square -less conditionals is not amenable to conditional interpretation in BH.

4.1.4. Summary of Content Conditionals

One of the objectives of this section was to investigate the role and semantics of the particle \square in content conditionals, one class of several cognitively motivated, functional classes of conditionals proposed in Sweetser (1990). Since this schema classifies conditionals in a distinctly different manner than previous studies, another objective was to determine whether new generalizations might emerge regarding the use of the conditionals and verb use in them.

In BH content conditionals the particle \square itself prompts the construction of hypothetical mental spaces within which the P and Q clauses are partially elaborated. The semantics of the particle inform the reader/hearer that a hypothetical scenario will be considered. Like *if*, \square attaches to a specific clause to “mark that clause as the one being built up as a background to another” (Dancygier and Sweetser 2005: 239). The semantics of hypotheticality can only be overridden by multiple contextual factors allowing temporal *when* construals. These contextual factors typically involve eventualities that were habitual in PAST TIME relative to the narrator or character domain. The difference between the semantics of *if* and *when* was shown to be one of epistemic stance. A positive epistemic stance prompts a temporal construal and a neutral or negative epistemic stance results in a conditional interpretation. Space construction is adjusted resulting in temporal spaces rather than hypothetical spaces.

While conditionality can be construed in the absence of \square , its absence makes construal of \square -less conditionals more costly because \square contributes compositionally to the interpretation of hypotheticality. The fact that there are relatively very few \square -less conditionals in the BH corpus relative to the number of \square conditionals suggests this. At the same time, the presence of \square -less conditionals indicates both the crucial role that context and construal play in interpretation and that “linguistic cues represent only part of the raw material used in meaning making” (Halverson 2013: 48).

²⁶¹ The “border” between *if* and *when* is “blurry” in many languages. Note the case of German *wenn*.

Predictive content conditionals are typically used in dialogic exchanges in direct speech. They permit a wide variety of verb form combinations. However, the use of particular forms is not random; on the contrary, in P clauses *yiqtol*s are preferred when the referenced eventuality is post speech-event, FUTURE. P clause *qatal*s are typically used to refer to eventualities that are pre-speech or PAST.

In Q clauses, *yiqtol*s are found more frequently than *weqatal*s, which are in complementary distribution with *yiqtol*s. Since content conditionals are predictive and are most often used to consider possible alternate futures, and since the preferred verb forms for discussing the future is the *yiqtol*²⁶² or *weqatal*,²⁶³ these are the most frequently used forms in content conditionals.

When a *qatal* is used to reference an event that is obviously not PAST, negative epistemic stance is the salient semantic component being promoted. It is also preferred for inner state verbs when a PAST TIME or perfective aspect or atemporal imperfective interpretations are promoted. The *qatal* is the most commonly used form for encoding pastness,²⁶⁴ and in content conditionals it is typically used to reference pre-speech eventualities.

Content conditionals in BH, as in many languages, discuss alternative-based predictions, and because of this an *iff* implicature is available for all BH content conditionals. In many instances in BH the alternative is overtly stated, as Num. 5:28 (see example (11) above). When the alternative is not overtly stated, it is, nevertheless, an active construal. An alternative mental space is constructed for the alterative implicature. In the alternative mental space ~P holds and therefore ~Q also holds.

The following section will present an analysis of generic conditionals, another category of conditionals that makes predictions and therefore promotes the construction of an alternative mental space.

4.2. Generic (and Habitual) Conditionals in Biblical Hebrew

The purpose of this section is to present the analysis of generic conditionals, a category of conditionals proposed by Sweetser (1990) and elaborated on in Dancygier and Sweetser (2005). This category has not hitherto been recognized in the literature on Biblical Hebrew conditionals. Indeed, little has been written about generics in Biblical Hebrew until relatively

²⁶² BHRG (1999: 146); Driver (1874: 2); IBHS (1990: 511-513) J-M (§113a, b).

²⁶³ Andrason (2011a: 9-13); IBHS (1990: 521); J-M (§119c); Joosten (2002: 68); Lambdin (1971: 108).

²⁶⁴ BHRG (1999: 144); Driver (1874: 8-9); IBHS (1990: 485, 592); J-M (§112c). *Pastness* includes simple past, perfective past, perfect and pluperfect interpretations.

recently.²⁶⁵ Lexicons and grammars offer scant help in understanding the linguistics of generics in Biblical Hebrew. In their discussions of the verb system, the lexicons and grammars employ traditional terminology to make passing reference to habituals²⁶⁶ or gnomics,²⁶⁷ but they never define the category generic or habitual.²⁶⁸ “Generic,” the most common term used by linguists to cover both generic and habitual expressions, is rarely used. Although habituals²⁶⁹ are differentiated from “gnomics” (generics) in Biblical Hebrew lexicons and grammars, current linguistic research “points to the artificiality of any sharp distinction between generics and habituals” and “the similarities and relationships between [habituals and generics] argue for a unified analysis” (Langacker 1997b: 194). Krifka, et al. (1995: 3) concur that habituals statements should not be distinguished from generics.

My analysis of generic conditionals will include what might otherwise be classified as habitual conditionals.²⁷⁰ The purpose of this section is to contribute to the discussion of generics in conditionals. In order to do this, my first goal is to determine if the category of generic conditionals was a valid category in the language. In this section, I will first present the features and functions that characterize generic conditionals and offer evidence for the validity of the category in BH, I will describe how and why generic conditionals were used and compare their use to content conditionals. A second goal is to determine whether generalizations regarding verb use in generic conditionals are obtainable and whether their use in these conditionals differs from that found in content conditionals. This section will also continue to seek to verify if the conclusions reached in the previous section regarding ׀ are valid in the light of the analysis of its use in generic conditionals.

Only two generic conditionals occur in the MT from Genesis through 2 Chronicles, and four occur in the prophets. Because of this the textual divisions used in the above discussion of content conditionals (non-poetical, poetical) are of limited value in the analysis of generic

²⁶⁵ See Rogland’s (2003) study of the *qatal*. His conclusions, influenced Cook’s (2005) study of habituals in Proverbs. See below on their views regarding the *qatal*. See especially Andrason (2012c) for a typological and cognitivist reanalysis of the so-called “gnomic” *qatal*.

²⁶⁶ BHRG (1999: 147); GKC (§107d-g); IBHS (1990: 559, 691); J-M (§113c1, §113e1); Lambdin (1971: 39, 100).

²⁶⁷ BHRG (1999: 146); Driver (1874: 13); IBHS (1990: 488, 559); J-M (§112d).

²⁶⁸ The exception is IBHS (1990: 691) who provide definitions in the glossary.

²⁶⁹ Generics are distinguished from habituals in that habituals represent “customary, hence repeatable” eventualities (Langacker 1997b: 191). Dahl (1995) and Langacker argue that habituals are a subset of generics. See Comrie (1976: 27) for his definition of habituals and a brief discussion. See Krifka et al. (1995) for a thorough introduction to genericity from a formal semantics point of view. See also Carlson and Pelletier (1995) for other topics on generics. Langacker (1997b) presents an analysis within the framework of cognitive linguistics. See Ter Meulen (1986) for a discussion of generics and conditionality.

²⁷⁰ Habituals need to be distinguished from repetitive and iterative utterances. See Langacker (1997b) for a discussion of the differences.

conditionals. Therefore the above-employed divisions will not be used in the following discussion.

4.2.1. Linguistic Characterization of Generics and Generic Conditionals

Generic statements “ascribe a general property to all members of a class” (Langacker 1997b: 191) and “make a statement about idealized tendencies, properties characteristic of, though not universally applicable to, a certain class of individuals or events” (Cover 2010: 46). Krifka et al. (1995: 16) emphasize that “kind-referring NPs” and “characterizing sentences” are basic properties of generics. (59) is a generic statement about all members of the class *cat*, a “kind-referring NP”. (60) and (61) illustrate the fact that generics can include kind-referring NPs and be characterizing sentences at the same time. (59) and (60) show that English permits present or past (61) verb forms.

(59) Cats have fur.

(60) Flycatchers eat insects.

(61) In prehistoric times, carnivorous dinosaurs ran down their prey.

The reference to “characteristics” and “tendencies” is what distinguishes generics from non-generic expressions that refer to particular events and individuals. It is important to recognize that while some generics can be construed to refer to particular events or individuals (especially in out-of-context examples, in normal every-day language use) context will typically disambiguate between the two. For example, out of context, *The flycatcher eats insects* could be a particular or a generic statement. If parents point out a single flycatcher to their child and say *The flycatcher eats insects*, it is not a generic statement because the activity of a specific flycatcher is under consideration. If a child asks what flycatchers eat and the parent replies *The flycatcher eats insects*, it is a generic utterance because it discusses the class flycatcher.

Like content conditionals, generic conditionals such as *If you heat water to 100 degrees, it boils* are predictive, and because of that prompt an alternative mental space (see Figure 4.1.). Generic conditionals are conditioned generic statements, hence the defining characteristics of generic statements apply to generic conditionals. Generic conditionals differ from content conditionals in that content conditionals make predictions about specific entities and events while generic conditionals, like generic statements, make predictions regarding all members of a certain class or events. Because pronouns such as *they* can refer to a complete set of a class, or specific subsets of a class of people, they are characteristically found in generic

statements and hence in generic conditionals as well (Dancygier and Sweetser 2005: 96). The above characterization of generics and generic conditionals was used in my analysis of BH conditionals.

These cross-linguistic characteristics of generic statements were found to be typical of Biblical Hebrew generic statements. For example, in (62) the narrator's comment characterizes all the people (אַנְשֵׁי) of Sodom, not one in particular. Similarly in (63) Jeremiah makes an observation about a general trait about all (כָּלָם) of "them". In (64) a class of people, the רְשָׁעִים, are commented on. Accordingly, in BH, third person plural nouns, pronominals and verb forms typify generic statements.

(62) Gen. 13:13

וְאֲנָשֵׁי סֹדֹם רָעִים וְחַטָּאִים לַיהוָה מְאֹד:

...the people of Sodom were wicked,
great sinners against the LORD.

(63) Jer. 6:28

כָּלָם סָרִי סוֹרְרִים הַלְבִי רַכִּיל נְחֹשֶׁת וּבְרֹזֶל כָּלָם
מִשְׁחִיתִים הֵמָּה:

They are all stubbornly rebellious,
going about with slanders; they are
bronze and iron, all of them act
corruptly.

(64) Ps. 1:5

עַל-כֵּן | לֹא-יִקְמוּ רְשָׁעִים בְּמִשְׁפָּט וְחַטָּאִים
בְּעֵדֶת צְדִיקִים:

Therefore the wicked will not stand in
the judgment, nor sinners in the
congregation of the righteous.

However, singular nouns that represent a class of persons or things are also frequent in generic statements as seen in the following examples. They are especially common in sapiential literature.

(65) Ps. 37:32

צוּפָה רָשָׁע לְצַדִּיק וּמְבַקֵּשׁ לְהַמִּיתוֹ:

The wicked watch for the righteous,
and seek to kill them.

(66) Qoh. 4:5²⁷¹

הַכֹּסֵל חִבְקָ אֶת-יָדוֹ וְאָכַל אֶת-בְּשָׂרוֹ:

The fool folds his hand and eats his
own flesh. (ESV)

²⁷¹ The NRSV has translated the Hebrew singular noun + definite article הַכֹּסֵל as a plural noun *fools* in English because the plural English noun more clearly refers to a complete set of the class *fool*.

4.2.2. Generic Conditionals in Biblical Hebrew

The above observations regarding Biblical Hebrew generic statements also hold for BH generic conditionals, which occur 40 times in the corpus.²⁷² The majority of these occur in sapiential literature (67-70).²⁷³ In (68) a singular verb, בָּא, references the plural class of אוֹיְבֵי in v. 6. In (71) the singular subject noun אִישׁ represents the class “people”.

(67) Job 36:8-9

וְאִם־אֲסוּרִים בְּזִקִּים יִלְכְּדוּן בְּחַבְלֵי־טְנִי: וַיִּגִּד
לָהֶם פְּעֻלָּם וּפְשָׁעֵיהֶם כִּי יתְגַבְּרוּ:

⁸And if they are bound in fetters and caught in the cords of affliction, ⁹then he declares to them their work and their transgressions, that they are behaving arrogantly.

(68) Ps. 41:6-7

אוֹיְבֵי יֹאמְרוּ רַע לִי מִתִּי יָמוּת וְאֶבֶד שְׁמוֹ:
וְאִם־בָּא לְרֵאוֹת | שְׂוֹא יִדְבֹר לְבֹ

⁶My enemies speak evil about me asking, “When will he die and his name be forgotten?” ⁷If they come to visit, they have only worthless things to say. (My translation)

(69) Prov. 9:12

אִם־חֲכִמָּתָ חֲכִמָּתָ לָךְ וְלִצְתָּ לְבַדְּךָ תִּשָּׂא:

If you are wise, it is to your benefit; if you are cynical, you will bear it all alone. (CEV)

(70) Qoh. 4:10a

כִּי אִם־יִפְּלוּ הָאֶחָד יִקֶּים אֶת־הַבְּרִי

For if they fall, one will lift up the other.

They are also found in predominantly narrative literature (71) and in the prophets (72), where contextual factors (וְהִיָּה), the metaphoric comparison and genericity promote a temporal *when* construal.

(71) 1 Sam. 2:25a

אִם־יִחַטָּא אִישׁ לְאִישׁ וּפָלְלוּ אֵלֵהֶם

If one person sins against another, someone can intercede for the sinner with the Lord.

²⁷² Gen. 38:9; 1 Sam. 2:25a; Job 20:6, 12; 27:14, 16; 36:8, 11, 12; 37:13 (3x); Ps. 7:13; 41:7; 50:18; 59:16; 68:14; 78:34; 94:18; 138:7; Prov. 3:34; 4:16 (2x); 9:12 (2x); 19:19; 27:22; Qoh. 4:10, 11, 12; 8:17; 10:10, 11; 11:3 (3x); Isa. 28:25; Jer. 49:9 (2x); Mic. 5:7.

²⁷³ Thirty four (85%) of generic conditionals occur in poetic literature. Six of the forty (15%) generic conditionals (occurring in 5 passages) occur in non-poetic literature. No observable differences could be observed in the generic conditionals in the two groups of literature. As a result, they are analyzed together.

(72) Micah 5:7


וְהָיָה שְׂאֵרֵי יַעֲקֹב בְּגוֹיִם בְּקֶרֶב עַמִּים רַבִּים
 כְּאַרְיֵה בְּבֵהֲמֹת יַעַר כְּכִפְיֵר בְּעֵדְרֵי צֹאן אֲשֶׁר
 אִם עָבַר וְרָמַס וְטָרַף וְאַיִן מַצִּיל:

And among the nations the remnant of Jacob, surrounded by many peoples, shall be like a lion among the animals of the forest, like a young lion among the flocks of sheep, which, when [if] it goes through, treads down and tears in pieces, with no one to deliver.

אם's use in generic conditionals corresponds with its use in content conditionals: it prompts the construction of a hypothetical space P in which the linguistic information in the P clause is elaborated. The P clause information is the background from which the "causally dependent state of affairs" (Dancygier and Sweetser 2005: 95) in the Q clause is predicted. If P obtains, then the generic situation in Q will be predictable. Instead of making predictions about specific eventualities, characterizing predictions are made about states of affairs. Since generic conditionals are predictive, their mental space configuration is similar to that of content conditionals seen in Figure 4.1 above. However, the P space is a hypothetical generic space rather than a hypothetical future space, as is noted in the display in Figure 4.7 below.²⁷⁴ The diagram notation is borrowed from Dancygier and Sweetser (2005: 97).

²⁷⁴ Dancygier and Sweetser (2005: 96) note that in English "*when* parallels *if* in the construction of generic dependency clauses". This is due to the nature of generic statements: since P generally and predictably causes Q, if the speaker construes the eventualities as being cotermporal or wishes to accentuate that the predictability of the causal relationship *when* is often an acceptable variant of *if*. Langacker (1991a: 263-266) proposes a "structured world model" to account for "events [that] are direct manifestations of the world's structure—they are in some sense regular and predictable, and thus expected to occur whenever the appropriate preconditions are satisfied" (1991:264). What a culture considers to be a "direct manifestation of the world's structure" will vary greatly between an animistic culture and one in which scientific positivism is the prevailing interpretive model. Generic (and habitual) statements and conditionals reflect a speaker's construal of the structured world model.

Figure 4.7: Generic Conditional Space Configuration



:אם־לֹא יִשׁוּב חַרְבּוֹ יִלְטֹשׁ קֶשֶׁתוֹ דָּרְדַר וַיִּכּוֹנֶנֶה: *If a person does not repent, [God] sharpens his sword and prepares to shoot his bow. Ps. 7:13.*

4.2.3. Verbs Usage in Generic Conditionals

Dahl (1995: 419) states that “the tendency for generics to go with imperfective aspect is fairly strong, but it is not without its exceptions.”²⁷⁵ The Biblical Hebrew situation is reflective of this statement.²⁷⁶ Cook (2005: 124) noted that *yiqtol*s are the preferred form in regular generic statements in Proverbs. Although *yiqtol*s are the preferred verb form in Biblical Hebrew generic conditionals, *qatal*s, verbless clauses and a participle also occur in P clauses.

Three recent studies have examined verb use in non-conditional BH generics. These discussions are applicable to an analysis of verbs in generic conditionals. Rogland (2003: 40, 46) argued against the traditional interpretation and translation of the so-called “gnomic” *qatal* and proposed that in proverbial statements the *qatal* should be translated as a past tense in order to express its prototypical past semantics. Cook (2005) supports Rogland’s interpretation of the *qatal* in proverbial generics and joins him in arguing for a past interpretation of *qatal*s in Proverbs. Andrason (2012c) however, rejects their analyses. He proposes that principles of grammaticalization and the cognitive linguistic understanding of

²⁷⁵ See also Cover (2010: 46) and Langacker (1991a: 280).

²⁷⁶ This is well documented in the literature on BH. See Andrason (2010); BHRG (Forthcoming: 167).

polysemy, based on a usage-based theory of grammar, can explain the atemporal use of the gram in proverbial statements. He proposes that the gnomic use of the *qatal* is explained via development along the anterior path:

Given that, on the one hand, inclusive, frequentative, and experiential perfects (as far as inferences are concerned) as well as anti-perfects (which correspond to negative perfect uses) naturally generate a sub-development designated by us as a “gnomic branch”, yielding gnomic uses, and given that, on the other hand, the examples of the BH gnomic *qatal* are regularly found in contexts of inclusive, frequentative, experiential (also iterative experiential perfect), and anti-perfect values, the gnomic sense of the gram can be explained – i.e. linked, both conceptually and diachronically – by employing the “gnomic branch” linkage. In this manner, the chaining, which originates in the aforementioned perfect values, justifies the possibility of using the category with a gnomic force (Andrason 2013: 46).

Contra Rogland (2003) and Cook (2005), Andrason concludes (2013: 50) that in English translations of proverbial literature, *qatals* are best translated using the simple present or, in intransitive or stative constructions, resultative forms. This study agrees with Andrason’s understanding of the polysemous nature of the *qatal* and his hypothesis that this polysemy can be understood as the result of motivated shifts in language use along diachronic grammaticalization paths.²⁷⁷ His analysis of the gnomic *qatal* will be appropriated to explain the use of the gram in generic conditionals.

4.2.3.1. Verbs Usage in Generic Conditional P Clauses

Table 4.7 shows verb use in P clauses. The use of the *yiqtol* gram to profile habitual eventualities is well documented in the literature and the preference for it extends to generic conditional P clauses as seen in (70) and (71) above.

Table 4.7: Generic Conditional P Clause Verb Forms

<i>Yiqtol</i> ²⁷⁸	<i>Qatal</i> ²⁷⁹	Verbless ²⁸⁰	Participle ²⁸¹	Ellipsis ²⁸²
25 (62%)	11 (27%)	3 (7%)	1	1

²⁷⁷ On grammaticalization see Bybee et. al. (1994) and Hopper and Traugott (1993).

²⁷⁸ 1 Sam. 2:25a; Job 20:6, 12; 27:14, 16; 36:8, 11, 12; Ps. 7:13; 59:16; 68:14; 138:7; Prov. 3:34; 4:16 (2x); 19:19; 27:22; Qoh. 4:10, 11, 12; 8:17; 10:11; 11:3 (3x).

²⁷⁹ Gen. 38:9; Ps. 41:7; 50:18; 78:34; 94:18; Prov. 9:12 (2x); Qoh. 10:10; Isa. 28:25; Jer. 49:9a; Mic. 5:7.

²⁸⁰ Job 37:13 (3x).

²⁸¹ Job 36:8.

²⁸² Jer. 49:9b.

Qatals are used in non-aphoristic generic conditional P clauses that discuss habitual events (Gen. 38:9; Ps. 41:7; 50:18; 94:18; Jer. 49:9a, b;²⁸³ Mic. 5:7). In these, repeated actions are viewed as so habitual that generic conditions can be entertained. The habitual eventualities evidence the generic semantics of the *qatal* described by Andrason (2012c: 34) as resulting from the semantics of a resultative proper formation being extended when “the acquired (due to a prior action) state can be expanded to larger periods of time, resultative proper grams may indicate not only current resulting conditions but also permanent ones. Such permanent states...can thus be employed to express invariant truths.” These uses are susceptible to temporal construals.

The ׀ clauses in Gen. 38:9; Ps. 41:7; 50:18; 94:18 and Mic. 5:7 are translated as temporal *when* or *whenever*²⁸⁴ in every English translation except Young’s Literal Translation. Even translations that purport to be literal translations (KJV, ESV, NASB) render the ׀ clause in (73) temporally. Spanish translations of this passage choose *cuando* “when” or *cada vez que* “each time that, whenever,” which promote a habitual repetition or strict habitual interpretation respectively.²⁸⁵

(73) Gen. 38:9

וַיֵּדַע אֹנָן כִּי לֹא לוֹ יִהְיֶה הַזָּרַע וְהָיָה אִם-בָּא
אֶל-אִשְׁתּוֹ אֶחָיו וְשָׁחַת אֶרְצָהּ לְבִלְתִּי נַתּוֹזְרַע
לְאֶחָיו:

But Onan knew that the offspring would not be his; so whenever he lay with his brother’s wife, he spilled his semen on the ground to keep from producing offspring for his brother. (NIV)

Since ׀’s semantics are highly schematic and the particle does not mean *when* or *whenever*, what features of the verse convince translators to choose a temporal reading in spite of the fact that ׀ is typically interpreted conditionally? First, it is important to remember that a conditional reading of *if* indicates neutral epistemic stance: the narrator would be understood to be uncommitted to the assertion Onan אֶחָיו אֶל-אִשְׁתּוֹ אֶחָיו בָּא. On the other hand, a *when* interpretation would mean that the narrator was positively committed to the assertion and believed that Onan definitely had sexual relations with his brother’s wife. With this in mind,

²⁸³ Jer. 49:9b is included since the elided element is the *qatal* verb in 49:9a.

²⁸⁴ The difference between English *when* and *whenever* is located in the frequency of the eventuality being described. *When* is used to describe events that are unique or whose temporal location in time is known, i.e. non-habitual events. *Whenever* is used with habitual eventualities indicating that the co-occurring event in the second clause occurs every time the eventuality in the *whenever* clause holds. For instance in the utterance *Whenever I get in the bath, the phone rings*, the phone rings each time I get in the bath. *When* is not amenable to habitual utterances.

²⁸⁵ See DHH, NTV; PDPT; RV95.

Gen. 38:8 and 9a tell the reader that Onan is not a willing partner in the plan to provide a child to his deceased brother's wife so that the child will inherit his dead brother's share and carry on his family. This would have effectively reduced Onan's inheritance. Gen. 38:8-9a would have instantly prompted the hearers and readers general background knowledge regarding these issues. Onan is reluctant, but goes through the motions.

Secondly, general background knowledge informs the reader/hearer that sexual relations are necessary to produce a child, so Onan had to go to his brother's wife. This is the way the world works. Since readers know the world works this way, *when* is the most relevant construal since it indicates positive epistemic stance. *If* would have indicated the narrator's neutral stance regarding the proposition that Onan did not go to his brother's wife. But we know from v. 10 that he did because it states that God viewed what he did as evil. The context combined with general background knowledge encourage the reader to take a positive epistemic stance toward the phrase $\text{אֶל־אִשְׁתּוֹ אָחִיו}$ and this prompts the construction of a temporal mental space instead of a hypothetical space. As discussed above, the *qatal* $\text{אָ$ poses no syntactic-semantic incompatibility issues. The mental space configuration is nested in the Narrator domain. Since the action is viewed as occurring prior to narration, PAST TIME construal is expected and *qatal* is the unmarked form for this construal.

The interpretation of the אִם clause in (74) is not as easily agreed upon as the one in (73). English translations are equally divided and it is instructive to examine why. The reason does not relate to the meaning of אִם per se, but rather to the absence of sufficient contextual clues to provide a clear basis for choosing a conditional or temporal interpretation.

(74) Ps. 41:7

וְאִם־בָּא לְרֵאוֹתַי | שֹׁנְאֵי יְדִבְרֵי לְבִי יִקְבְּצֵן־אֶזְנוֹ לִי
יֵצֵא לְחוּץ יְדַבֵּר:

And when they come to see me, they
utter empty words, while their hearts
gather mischief; when they go out,
they tell it abroad.

This verse falls in the lament section of the psalm,²⁸⁶ written from the viewpoint of a sick person. In the immediate context, vv. 6-10, the sick narrator describes his enemies' actions and asks God for protection. In v.6 the narrator states that his enemies wish he would die. בָּא is one of only two *qatal* verbs in this section,²⁸⁷ the rest are *yiqtol*s and participles. I believe that there are two principle reasons the translations are divided between conditional and temporal readings. First, translators lack sufficient background knowledge concerning whether or not

²⁸⁶ See Craigie and Tate (2004: 319-321).

²⁸⁷ The other is הִגְדִּיל in v. 10.

enemies would typically visit a (sick) person. Generally they do not; but this uncertainty motivates a neutral or negative conditional construal. However, the use of kind-referring NPs such as the plural *אוֹיְבֵי* (v. 6), and *כָּל-שֹׁנְאָי* (v. 8), in addition to *yiqtol*s and participles in the surrounding context seem to indicate habitual characterizing sentences. These motivate a temporal construal. I believe that translations which choose a conditional reading did so because *אם* prototypically occurs in conditional constructions and in doing so they ignore the linguistic factors that identify this as a habitual generic expression, which favors a temporal construal. A habitual construal motivated by the linguistic cues leads the reader to interpret the *qatal* as PAST TIME vis-à-vis BASE and V-POINT in the Narrator's space.

The *אם* clause in (75) is interpreted as a generic/habitual *when* clause in most English translations (CEB, HCSB, KJV, NASB, NET, NIV, NKJV, NLT, NRSV).

(75) Ps. 50:18

<p>אִם-רָאִיתָ גֹּבַב וַתִּרְצַץ עִמּוֹ וְעַם מִנְאֻפִּים חִלְקָדָּ:</p>	<p>When you see a thief, you join with him; you throw in your lot with adulterers. (NIV)</p>
--	--

Amos Hakham (1990: רצג)²⁸⁸ concurs that the *אם* clause should be construed as a temporal since he rephrases it as “בְּאֲשֶׁר אֶתָּה רוֹצֵה גֹבַב, אֶתָּה נֹלֵה אֱלֹהֵי.”²⁸⁹ Note that every *qatal* (and *wayyiqtol*) clause in 50:16-19a is also translated as a generic statement in the above-noted English translations. As Dancygier and Sweetser (2005: 97) put it, “Genericity thus further blurs the distinction between the contextualized interpretations of the positive epistemic stance involved in *when*-clauses and the neutral one which characterizes *if*-clauses.” Present tense forms are used to translate the *qatals* in these verses because generics are most commonly expressed with present tense forms in English.²⁹⁰ (Note however that generic pasts are readily found in English and these verses could accurately be translated using the English simple past: *When you saw a thief you made friends with him and you kept company with adulterers.*)

Dancygier and Sweetser (2005: 96, 98) observe that in English “*when* parallels *if* in the construction of generic dependency statements....There are contextual reasons for the choice of *when*, *whenever* and *if*, but the reasons have less to do with the event being described than with the viewpoint taken towards the event.”²⁹¹ Dancygier and Sweetser use the word “choice”

²⁸⁸ Page numbers are per Hebrew numbering system. This is page 253, but it appears as indicated above.

²⁸⁹ My translation: When(ever) you see a thief, you accompany him.

²⁹⁰ As noted by Andrason (2012c: 49-50).

²⁹¹ Contextual prompts that contribute to a temporal construal will include the use of *וְהָיָה* in Gen. 38:9 and Mic. 5:7.

to describe viewpoint because it involves a construal choice on the part of the hearer/reader. There are no overt time words that compositionally contribute temporal meaning. Hence it is via implicature and construal.

It needs to be clear that simply because generic/habitual כִּי clauses can be interpreted temporally (as I proposed above in 4.1.1.3. in the discussion of *qatals* in narrative that occur in content conditionals) this does not mean that כִּי means *when*. כִּי is a hypothetical particle that instructs the hearer/reader to construct a mental space (typically a hypothetical space) in which a new scenario is to be considered. In a usage-based grammar, speakers will choose the most relevant interpretation based on frequency of use and compositional meaning of the construction. I propose that since כִּי was used most frequently in conditional constructions in Biblical Hebrew, hypothetical spaces were the most relevant space of choice when the particle occurred as head of a clause. This choice would be confirmed as the rest of the linguistic information in the construction was processed. If (or when!) the hearer/reader encountered kind-referring NPs and/or characterizing clauses with habitual implicatures, she could immediately replace the hypothetical mental space with a temporal generic space as she processed the information. In normal every-day situations hearers and readers continuously, effortlessly and almost instantaneously adjust their interpretations of meaning as linguistic information is processed.

Qatals are also used in aphoristic generic conditional P clauses that profile some characteristic of a participant (Prov. 9:12a, b; Qoh. 10:10). Prov. 9:12a, example (69), repeated below as (76), exemplifies what Andrason (2012c: 35) labels a “gnomic state,” and comments that “due to the stative component in the meaning, and because of a typically intransitive and especially de-transitive effect, resultative proper constructions give rise to gnomic states and situations, and not to dynamic activities.

The *qatals* in (76) and (77) are used to describe resultative states. The choice of the *qatals* תִּכְרַחֵם in (76) and קָהָה in (77) can be explained when the narrator’s viewpoint and construal as well as the lexical semantics (or *aktionsart*) of the verbs are considered.

(76) Prov. 9:12

אם-חכמתָ חכמתָ לךָ וְלֹא-פָנִים לְבַדְךָ תִּשָּׂא:

If you are wise, you are wise for yourself; if you scoff, you alone will bear it.

(77) Qoh. 10:10a

אם-קִהָה הַבְּרִזָּל וְהוּא לֹא-פָנִים קִלְקֵל וְחִילִים יִגְבֵּר

If an ax is dull and one doesn't sharpen it first, then one must exert more force. (CEB)

The diachronic path that led to *qatals* being available for use in proverbial sayings has been noted above. Availability of the *qatal* alone may not explain why it was used in these instances. Verbs profile a process²⁹² and the narrator's choice of verbs חִכְמָה in Prov. 9:12 and קִהָה and קִלְקֵל in Qoh. 10:10 necessarily involved his perspective and the vantage point²⁹³ from which he viewed these processes. The narrator's perspective and the vantage point from which he chooses to view the verbal process is a matter of construal. Langacker asserts that even “the choice between a perfective or imperfective construal is not necessarily determined by anything inherent in the scene described. It often depends on general or contextual knowledge, or it may simply be a matter of how the speaker decides to portray the situation” (Langacker 2008: 151). Traditional analyses of the BH verbal systems that locate all the “meaning” in the verbal gram itself preclude a role for construal or the narrator's viewpoint. As a result, deviations from strict deterministic rules of verbal usage are problematic, often labeled “special uses,” as noted regarding the gnomic *qatal* in Andrason's (2012c) study. Although *yiqtol*s were apparently the preferred form for generic conditionals, there apparently was nothing that prohibited a BH speaker from using a *qatal* if the speaker (or narrator) believed it better suited his description of the situation.

The semantics of חִכְמָה and קִהָה contribute to the choice of *qatals* in (76) and (77). Both verbs involve a process that proceeds from state A to a resulting state B: חִכְמָה from not wise to being wise (which is why definitions of חִכְמָה state that it means “become wise”),²⁹⁴ and קִהָה a process from the state of being sharp to dull. They highlight the end of the verbal process, focusing on the final resultant state. Figure 4.8 from Langacker (2008: 121) illustrates this process. In the figure, the successive circles represent the change in state of the trajector (tr)²⁹⁵ over the

²⁹² Langacker (1987: 199; 2008: 112).


²⁹³ Ibid. (73, 75-76). For more on perspective or viewpoint, see Dancygier and Sweetser (2012); Kwon (2012).

²⁹⁴ See HALOT (1994-2000: 314); NIDOTTE (1997: 130).

²⁹⁵ A trajectory in Langacker's cognitive grammar is the profiled element, or “primary focus” of a clause and is typically the subject (Langacker 1991a: 23). In Langacker (2008: 70) he terms it as “the entity construed as being located, evaluated or described.”

course of the verbal process, which occurs over time (t) represented by the arrow line below the circles. The dashed box inside the circle represents the change the participant is undergoing. The bold circle and box represent the new state with the participant (p) in that state.

Figure 4.8: Stative (Intransitive) Process



The *qatal* in the second conditional in Prov. 9:12, קָטַל , was most certainly used to take advantage of the semantics of genericity noted by Andrason. Scoffing is interpreted as a characteristic of the person.

In generic conditional Q clauses, *yiqtol*s are overwhelmingly preferred as seen in the following table.

Table 4.8: Generic Conditional Q Clause Verb Forms

<i>Yiqtol</i> ²⁹⁶	<i>Weqatal</i> ²⁹⁷	<i>Wayyiqtol</i> ²⁹⁸	<i>Qatal</i> ²⁹⁹	קָטַל ³⁰⁰	Verbless ³⁰¹	Participle ³⁰²
25 (63%)	3 (8%)	3 (8%)	2 (5%)	2 (5%)	1	1

*Yiqtol*s are the preferred verb form in generic conditional Q clauses. As noted above, generic conditionals are, like content conditionals predictive and the iconic P, Q clause order promotes semantics of causation, as it does in content conditionals. *Yiqtol*s, *weqatals* and *wayyiqtol*s are conducive to promoting these construals. The use of *wayyiqtol*s in non-narrative text is uncommon,³⁰³ but it is very infrequent in conditionals. The grammars characterize the

²⁹⁶ Job 20:6; 27:16; 36:11, 12; 37:13c; Ps. 7:13; 41:7; 94:18; 138:7; Prov. 3:34; 4:16a; 19:19; 27:22; Qoh. 4:10, 12; 8:17; 10:10; 11:3 (3x); Jer. 49:9a.

²⁹⁷ 1 Sam. 2:25a; Qoh. 4:11; Isa. 28:25.

²⁹⁸ Job 36:8-9; Ps. 50:18; 59:16. On Job 36:8-9 Clines (2006: 812) notes that in the apodosis in v.9 several commentators read קָטַל and the New American Bible read קָטַל “in order to avoid waw consec, since the continuing thought is of an ongoing or repeated action.”

²⁹⁹ Prov. 9:12; Jer. 49:9b.

³⁰⁰ Qoh. 10:11; Mic. 5:7.

³⁰¹ Job 27:14.

³⁰² Ps. 68:14. See Hossfeld and Zenger (2005: 158-169) for a discussion of the complex textual and interpretational issues in this passage.

³⁰³ Cook (2012: 298) states that “it is indeed native to prose narrative” and that it is a “rarity in poetry”. See Cook (2012: 298-304) for a fuller discussion.

wayyiqtol as indicating temporal³⁰⁴ or logical³⁰⁵ succession. I hypothesize that the semantic feature of succession, or consequence, licensed its use in conditionals.

4.2.4. Summary of Generic Conditional Usage

Having analyzed and presented the instances of generic conditionals in the BH corpus, the following results can be presented. First, the general linguistic characteristics of generic statements are descriptively applicable to BH generic conditionals, which follows since generic conditionals are conditioned generics. Specifically, the topics that generic conditionals make predictions regarding are the characteristics and tendencies of the subject of the conditional.

Secondly, it was demonstrated that the verbs used in BH generic conditionals also reflect the cross-linguistic preference that generic statements have for verbs with imperfective aspect values: *yiqtol*s are clearly preferred in both the P and Q clauses and the characterizing (gnomic) use of the *qatal* is consonant with the analysis presented by Andrason (2012c) of the gram's use in non-conditional generics. It was hypothesized that the semantics of contingent causality located in the iconic P, Q clause order is entangled with the rare use of the *wayyiqtol* in non-narrative generic conditional Q clauses. The semantic value of succession, recognized to be a primary semantic component of the *wayyiqtol*, licenses its use in these conditionals.

Finally, \square 's use in generic conditionals corresponds to its use in content conditionals. It prompts construction of a hypothetical mental space within which a generic P clause and Q clause are elaborated. The semantics of hypotheticality connected to \square maintain unless, as shown above, contextual factors common to generics promote a positive epistemic stance toward the situation in the P clause, in which case *when* or *whenever* is construable. Like content conditionals, generic conditionals were shown to be predictive. As a result the alternative reasoning characteristic of content conditionals is evident in generic conditionality. Consequently mental spaces are constructed in which the $\sim P$, $\sim Q$ alternative is considered.

4.3. Speech-Act Conditionals

4.3.1. Introduction to Speech-Act Conditionals

Speech-act (SA) conditionals are “cases where the *if*-clause appears to conditionally modify, not the contents of the main clause, but the speech-act which the main clause carries

³⁰⁴ BHRG (Forthcoming: 192-196); GKC (§111a, t); IBHS (1990: 547-548).

³⁰⁵ J-M (§118h).

out” (Dancygier and Sweetser 2005: 113). Imagine parents telling a babysitter, *If Madeleine gives you any trouble, feed her*. The directive is to be understood to be asserted and valid only *If Madeleine gives you any trouble*; if Madeleine poses no trouble, the directive is not invoked. This section will examine the use of ׀ in these constructions.

SA conditionals are the most common type of ׀ conditional in Biblical Hebrew. They occur over seven hundred fifty times in variegated sorts of speech-acts such as oaths, curses, promises, warnings, questions and directives. The purpose of this section is as follows: First, to examine the use of ׀ in these constructions to determine if its use is consonant with or differs from its use in content and generic conditionals. The mental spaces prompted by the particle will be compared to these cognitive constructs in content and generic conditionals. Secondly, to explore the types of speech acts that BH licensed for conditional use. Thirdly, as in previous sections, I will examine verb use in the different types of speech-act conditionals. The type of discourse in which they are situated will be shown to be relevant.

In order to do this, I will first present a brief overview of how speech-acts have been analyzed and discuss how conditional SAs are treated within a cognitive theory of mental spaces. Following this, SA conditionals in Biblical Hebrew and their uses will be examined by category in order to elicit valid generalizations from the data which will then be compared. Initially, an analysis of SA directives will be presented and the different types of genre (procedural, casuistic, narrative) in which they occur will be considered in sections 4.3.3.2 through 4.3.3.4. Then, oaths, vows and curses will be examined in section 4.3.4. Promises and threats (section 4.3.5), petitions (4.3.6) and speech-act questions (4.3.7) will likewise be analyzed. In conclusion, a summary will be offered in 4.3.8, in which I will point out how SA conditional mental space structures and verbal use differ from the constructions in both content and generic conditionals, and how different types of SA conditionals differ one from the other. The relevance of the discourse type in which, especially, directives are used will be indicated.

4.3.2. A Terminological Orientation

Every discussion of speech-acts must start with J. L. Austin’s (1962) seminal work *How to Do Things with Words*, which to a “philosophically inspired tradition of semantic analysis preoccupied with questions of truth and logical inference...brought the revelation that making assertions is not the sole purpose of natural-language” speech (Langacker 1991a: 494). Austin argued that an utterance may be used for many diverse classes of speech-acts besides assertions: giving a promise, asking a question, issuing an order, take an oath, make a curse,

and so on. That utterances are used for many different types of purposes is widely accepted today, despite the fact that the way an utterance represents a speech-act, i.e. its illocutionary force, is still far from settled.³⁰⁶ This issue is, however, beyond the scope of this study.³⁰⁷ Speech-acts include examples such as:

- (78) a. **Directives:** Don't open the window!
 b. **Promises:** (I promise) I will give you the book tomorrow.
 c. **Warnings:** If you break the contract, (I warn you) I will take you to court.
 d. **Questions:** Are you going to wash the car?
 e. **Request:** Please hand me the saw.

There are numerous classification systems that have been offered for categorizing speech-acts. The differences primarily reflect terminological preferences. The initial categories proposed by Austin were few in number; later work contained more categories, often many more.³⁰⁸ Different terminology describing the same speech-acts is encountered. For example Austin's *behabitives* correspond roughly to Searle's *expressives*, which correspond to Bach and Harnish's *acknowledgments*. For the purposes of this study, the relevant categories in which \square conditional speech-acts are found include: directives,³⁰⁹ promises, warnings, questions,³¹⁰ petitions, and curses (or oaths³¹¹).

³⁰⁶ Langacker (1991a: 494).

³⁰⁷ For more on speech-acts see Bach and Harnish (1979); Langacker (1991a: 494-506); Searle (1965; 1969).

³⁰⁸ For example Bach and Harnish (1979: 41) vs. Searle (1969).

³⁰⁹ This study will use the terms imperative, cohortative and jussive to distinguish the verbal forms, but the term *directive* will be used refer to all three forms; I will not use the term *volitives*. Directives in Semitic studies have traditionally been termed *volitives*. In Classical and Semitic studies, this term typically refers to the imperative, cohortative and jussive verbal forms. However, outside of Classical studies and Semitic studies, in the world of linguistics, the term is rarely found. It does not even appear in Crystal (2008), *A Dictionary of Linguistics and Phonetics*, where *command*, *desiderative* and *directive* are found. In linguistics, cohortatives and jussives are usually classified as imperatives unless a language distinguishes forms as BH does. However, some writers such as Palmer ([1986] 2001: 111) argue that maintaining the terminological distinction is helpful. For more on the three command forms in BH, see BHRG (1999: 71-72); Dellaire (2014); GKC (§108-§110); IBHS (1990: 564-65); J-M (§114). See Warren (1998) for a study of modality and speech-acts in the Psalms. For a more recent discussion on BH modality see Cook (2012: 237-244). On command forms, see Dalaire (2014) and Oakes (2010).

³¹⁰ Conditional speech-act questions and \square ... \square questions are distinct constructions analyzed separately. See Chapter 5.2.2-5.2.4 for analyses of \square ... \square questions.

³¹¹ Recent work by Kitz (2014) has demonstrated that the expressions which have traditionally been called oaths such as Gen. 26:29 are better understood as curses. This study will use the term *curses* to refer to these constructions.

4.3.3. Speech-Act Conditionals³¹²

Since Van der Auwera (1986), linguists have acknowledged that conditional speech-acts exist. He argued (1986: 199) that utterances such as those in (79) are not about a conditional relation between P and Q. Rather P is presented as conditioning the speech-act in Q. In spite of the fact that these types of *if*-conditionals are representative of common every-day language use, these conditionals had never been considered by philosophers and logicians because they are not amenable to truth-conditional analysis.

- (79) a. If you go to the store, (please) buy me some beer.
 b. If I may say so, I think that's a crazy idea.
 c. If you don't mind my asking, why did you marry her?

In SA conditionals, the enactment of the eventuality in the apodosis “is conditional on the fulfillment of the state described in the protasis (the state in the protasis *enables* or *causes* the following speech-act)” (Sweetser 1990: 118). Thus, (79a) purports to issue a directive (or request, if *please* is used) in the case that the person goes to the store; (79b) purports to state an opinion *if* permission is granted to do so; and (79c) purports to ask a question *if* it isn't perceived as being rude. In all of these, the apodosis is asserted and it is contextualized by the protasis.³¹³ Sweetser (1990: 121) notes that “all speech-act conditionals have in common the fact that they are appropriately paraphrased by ‘If [the protasis], then let us consider that I perform this speech-act (i.e. the one represented in the apodosis).’”


In contrast to content and generic conditionals, SA conditionals are not predictive; there is no predictive relationship between the P and Q clauses. “The performative status almost prohibits such a predictive relationship, since (however hedged), ... a speech-act performed is performed” (Dancygier and Sweetser 2005: 113). Because a predictive relationship doesn't exist, alternative scenarios are likewise excluded in SA conditionals. SA conditionals also differ from content and generic conditionals in that they are not used for conditional reasoning. Content and generic conditionals are used to consider actions, events and situations under alternate, possible scenarios. Speech-act conditionals, in contrast, are used to achieve an end. Epistemic reflection about the world and alternative scenarios is not their purpose.

³¹² Initially Van der Auwera (1986) asked if there was a difference between speech-acts about conditionals and conditional speech-acts. More recently scholars have used the terms *speech-act conditionals* and *conditional speech-acts* interchangeably, I will therefore use both terms interchangeably. See Sweetser (1990: 142-144) for a critique of Van der Auwera's distinctions. Declerck and Reed (2001) prefer the term *rhetorical conditional*.

³¹³ Dancygier and Sweetser (2005: 113).

In conditional speech-acts אם has the same function it does in content and generic conditionals—it prompts the construction of a hypothetical mental space in which the utterance is partially structured. The mental space configuration for speech-act conditionals is as follows:

Figure 4.9: Mental Space Configuration for Speech-Act Conditionals



:אם-נָא מְצָאתִי חֵן בְּעֵינֶיךָ אֶל-נְאֻם תְּעַבְרָה מֵעַל עַבְדְּךָ: “My lord, if I find favor with you, do not pass by your servant.” Gen. 18:3.

In Biblical Hebrew, אם constructions are used to condition directives, curses, promises, questions, warnings, wishes and petitions. These will be discussed in the following sections.³¹⁴

4.3.3.1. Speech-Act Directives

אם -conditional speech-act directives in BH are directives that are conditioned by an אם clause. They are found in narrative, poetry, in the prophets, extensively in the casuistic law codes, and in procedural texts (such as those in Leviticus)³¹⁵ as well. Methodologically, I first classified and analyzed conditional directives across the entire corpus. During the course of this analysis, it became obvious that significant functional and related formal grammatical

³¹⁴ Panther and Thornburg (1998, 2003a, b), Thornburg and Panther (1997) propose an analysis of speech-acts in terms of metonymic inference and mapping. Their discussions include conditional speech-acts constructions. A thorough discussion of their proposals is beyond the scope of this study, but references will be included when needed. Athanasiadou and Dirven (1996: 626) refer to SA-directives as *instructional conditionals*.

³¹⁵ I classify the prescriptions regarding sacrifices and offerings in Leviticus as procedural discourse. See Dallaire (2014: 91) and Longacre (1994: 52; 1995: 23).

distinctions occur between those conditionals that are found in casuistic and procedural discourse and those that occur outside these types of discourse. Hence the discourse related section divisions are derived from the analysis, not decided upon a priori. Consequently, these discourse-related distinctions are maintained in the structure of this subsection.

This section will, therefore, be structured as follows: first, because conditional directives utilize typical BH directive forms, a brief description of BH directives will be given in section 4.3.3.1.1. Secondly, section 4.3.3.2 will discuss conditional directives found outside of casuistic and procedural discourse. Following that, the conditional directives used in procedural literature will be examined in section 4.3.3.3, after which those used in casuistic texts will be assessed in section 4.3.3.4. The findings are summarized in section 4.3.3.5.

4.3.3.1.1. Directives in Biblical Hebrew

Directives in BH can be implemented using a variety of constructions and verbal grams.³¹⁶ These typically include the imperative, the jussive and the cohortative forms.³¹⁷ The imperative is not used for negative directives. Instead the negative **אַל** is used with the second-person jussive or, to express an absolute prohibition; the negative **לֹא** is used with the *yiqtol* second-person verb forms. These are in complementary distribution with the imperative. The use of these forms in conditional directives corresponds to their normal non-conditional use.

The imperative is the second-person (singular or plural) directive form.

(80) Exod. 14:26

וַיֹּאמֶר יְהוָה אֶל-מֹשֶׁה נָטֵה אֶת-יָדְךָ עַל-הַיָּם	Then the LORD said to Moses, “Stretch out your hand over the sea...”
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The jussive form is used for positive and negative directives as in the following examples.

(81) Gen. 1:3

וַיֹּאמֶר אֱלֹהִים יְהִי אוֹר	Then God said, “Let there be light”
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³¹⁶ The morphology and diachronic development of the imperative, jussive, *yiqtol* and cohortative are beyond the scope of this study, as is the synchronic relationship between the jussive and the *yiqtol*. Since the *yiqtol*s and jussive forms are identical for most verbs, context must have guided the hearer’s and reader’s interpretation. For contemporary interpreters, construal based on a much more tenuous basis plays a non-trivial role in the classification of the form. As Cook (2014: 184) stated, “statistics only serve as a tally of the interpreter’s subjective and often predetermined semantic interpretation of the forms...” For this reason, my statistics combine *yiqtol*s and jussives. See Dallaire (2014: 91-107) on the jussive; pp. 107-121 on the cohortative, pp. 121-129, 140 on the *yiqtol* and pp. 141-150 on the *weqatal* in commands. See also Joosten (2012: 11, 314).

³¹⁷ Cook (2012) and Joosten (2012). Dallaire (2014) especially offers a thorough study of directive forms in BH. See also Oakes (2010) for an analysis of the verbal and social context of imperative-imperative verses imperative-*weqatal* sequences.

(82) Gen. 15:1

הָיָה דְבַר־יְהוָה אֶל־אַבְרָם בַּמַּחֲזָה לֵאמֹר אֶל־
תִּירָא אַבְרָם...

...the word of the LORD came to Abram
in a vision, “Do not be afraid, Abram,...

The cohortative is found in the first-person singular and plural. In English, it is typically translated *Let us and Let me*. It is used with אֶל for first-person negative directives.

(83) Jer. 18:18d

וְאֵלֵינוּ קְשִׁיבָה אֶל־כָּל־דְּבָרָיו: ...

...let us not heed any of his words...

The *yiqtol* was used for both positive (84-85) and negative directives (86).

(84) Ps. 51:9

תְּחַטְּאֵנִי בַאֲזֹב וְאֶטְהַר תְּכַבֵּסְנִי וּמִשְׁלֵג אֲלֵבִין:

Purge me with hyssop, and I shall be
clean; wash me, and I shall be whiter
than snow.

(85) Lev. 2:7

וְאִם־מִנְחַת מִרְחֶשֶׁת קִרְבַּנְךָ סֶלֶת בְּשֶׁמֶן תַּעֲשֶׂה:

If your offering is grain prepared in a
pan, it shall be made of choice flour in
oil.

(86) 2 Kgs. 2:16d

וַיֹּאמֶר לֹא תִשְׁלְחוּ

He said “Do not send them.” (My
translation)

In traditional truth-conditional semantics where words are seen as containers for meaning, the semantics for both the descriptive and performative usages have been understood to reside in the *yiqtol* gram.³¹⁸ Andrason (2010) seeks to explain how the gram acquired these semantics. Yet the question remains, how is the correct interpretation invoked? Langacker (2008: 470-475) argues that speech-acts are based on widely accepted cultural models that are “invoked as cognitive domains...and function as the meanings” of verbs in speech-acts. The linguistic contents of an actual utterance, he argues, is “just one of several levels of organization that figure in its [the utterance’s] full conceptual import” (2008: 471). The actual contextual scenario in which the utterance occurs plays a significant and crucial role in the assignment of meaning. For example, *I’ll play tomorrow* may be interpreted as nothing more

³¹⁸ See Andrason (2010); BHRG (1999: 149); Cohen (2013: 185); Driver (1874: 41, 48); GKC (§107m-o); IBHS (1990: 509-510); J-M (§113m).

than a statement about the future. However, when it is embedded in what Langacker calls the “promise scenario,” it is interpreted as a promise.

The application of Langacker’s scenario-based element of meaning formation is applicable to cases such as (85). In isolation the *yiqtol* gram of הַעֲשֵׂה can be argued to be semantically ambiguous. Nevertheless, words are not used in isolation and in Lev. 2:7 and similar speech-act passages, the linguistic context (מִן construction) and the procedural directive scenario in which הַעֲשֵׂה unambiguously occurs promote a directive construal. In context it was rarely ambiguous.

Deference and politeness are crucially involved on many linguistic levels in most communicative events. The social situation and status of the Biblical Hebrew speaker and hearer appears to have played a role in a speaker/writer’s verb choice in directives.³¹⁹ There is general agreement, for instance that the particle נָא is often found in situations that appear to require deference on the part of the speaker.³²⁰

4.3.3.2 Non-Casuistic, Non-Procedural Speech-Act Directives

Conditional speech-act directives occur 117 times in non-casuistic, non-procedural discourse in the Biblical Hebrew corpus.³²¹ 101 of the directives are found in direct speech. In these directives, the mental spaces are in the Character domain and V-POINT is determined by the character. The remaining 16³²² are found principally in Proverbs and Ecclesiastes, which are characterized by didactic discourse in which the mental spaces are constructed in the Narrator domain. Directives are always construed to be fulfilled post-speech, or in the case of didactic material, post-writing. For this reason the Q clause directive always refers to a FUTURE eventuality. In the P clause any construal is possible.

³¹⁹ On how social distinctions may have influenced the use of command forms see Dallaire (2014: 18-24; 71-72); Joosten (2012: 327-29) and Oakes (2010). See discussion below in section 4.3.6.

³²⁰ On politeness strategies and the particle נָא see Shulman (1999).

³²¹ Gen. 15:5; 20:7; 23:8, 13; 24:49 (2x); 31:50 (2x); 43:11; 47:6, 16, 29; 50:4; Exod. 1:16 (2x); 4:9; 13:13; 19:13(2x); 20:25; 32:32b; 33:13, 15; 34:9; Num. 5:19 (2x); 11:15 (2x); 22:20; 32:29, 30; Deut. 19:8; Josh. 17:15; 22:19, 22 (2x); 24:15; Jdg. 4:20; 6:31b; 7:10; 9:15 (2x), 16 (3x) (all broken off), 19 (repeats 9:16a, b, c), 20; 13:16b; 14:13; 21:21; 1 Sam. 3:9; 6:3; 7:3; 20:6, 7b, 8, 21, 22; 21:10; 2 Sam. 10:11a; 11:20; 14:32; 1 Kgs. 18:21 (2x); 20:18 (2x); 2 Kgs. 1:2; 9:15; 10:6; 4:4 (2x); 1 Chron. 13:2; 19:12a; Job 11:14; 19:5; 31:5; 33:5, 32, 33; 34:16; 38:4, 18; Ps. 81:9-10; 95:7-8; 139:24; Prov. 1:10, 11; 3:30; 6:1-3; 23:1-2; 25:21 (2x); 30:32 (2x); Song 1:8; 7:13; Qoh. 5:7; 10:4; 11:8; Lam. 1:12; Isa. 21:12; Jer. 2:28; 14:7; 27:18 (2x); 30:6; 40:4 (2x); 42:13; Ezek. 2:7; 3:11; 20:39; 43:11; Hos. 4:15; Hab. 2:3; Zech. 11:12 (2x); Mal. 3:10.

³²² Prov. 1:10, 11; 3:30; 6:1-3; 23:1-2; 25:21 (2x); 30:32 (2x); Song 1:8; 7:13; Qoh. 5:7; 10:4; 11:8; Lam. 1:12; Hos. 4:15; Mal. 3:10.

4.3.3.2.1 Observations on the Protasis

The P clause in non-casuistic and non-procedural conditional directives is the םֶ- conditional clause. Verb distribution in the P clauses follows.

Table 4.9: Non-Procedural, Non-Casuistic P Clause Verb Forms

<i>Yiqtol</i> ³²³	Verbless ³²⁴	<i>Qatal</i> ³²⁵	Participle ³²⁶	אֵין ³²⁷	יֵשׁ ³²⁸
40 (34%)	28 (24%)	25 (21%)	8 (7%)	7 (6%)	7 (6%)

Thirty-two of the *yiqtol*s occur in direct speech.³²⁹ BASE and V-POINT are, therefore, in the Character domain and all temporal and spatial deictics will be grounded in this domain. The remaining eight tokens are in Proverbs and Qohelet³³⁰ (for which BASE and V-POINT are in the Narrator Domain), and Song of Solomon where they are in the Character Domain. Twenty eight of the thirty-two P clauses with *yiqtol*s that occur in direct speech reference FUTURE TIME eventualities as is seen in the following example:

(87) Exod. 4:9

וְהָיָה אִם-לֹא יֵאֱמִינוּ גַם לְשְׁנֵי הָאֵלֹהִים
וְלֹא יִשְׁמְעוּן לְקוֹלִי וְלִקְוֹתַי מִמִּיַּם הַיָּאֵר וְשָׁפְכֹתָ
הַיְבֵשָׁה וְהָיוּ הַמַּיִם אֲשֶׁר תִּקַּח מִן-הַיָּאֵר וְהָיוּ
לְדָם בַּיַּבֶּשֶׁת:

If they will not believe even these two signs or heed you, you shall take some water from the Nile and pour it on the dry ground.

(88) is an apparent exception because, although it is possible to construe וְיִשְׁעִיעוּךָ as *if they will save you*, a modal construal seems preferable since the main question is, which god is able

³²³ Gen. 15:5; 31:50 (2x); Exod. 4:9; 13:13; 20:25; Num. 32:29, 30; Deut. 19:8-9; Jdg. 4:20; 13:16b; 14:13; 21:21; Ruth 4:4 (2x); 1 Sam. 3:9; 14:9, 10; 20:6, 7b, 21, 22; 21:10; 2 Sam. 11:20; 2 Kgs. 1:2; 1 Chron. 19:12a; Job 19:5; 33:5; Ps. 81:9; 95:7; Prov. 1:10, 11; Song 1:8; Qoh. 5:7; 10:4; 11:8; Isa. 21:12; Jer. 2:28; Ezek. 2:7; 3:11; Hab. 2:3; Mal. 3:10.

³²⁴ היה clauses are not counted as verbless. Gen. 23:13; 24:49b; 43:11; Exod. 1:16 (2x); 19:13 (2x); Josh. 17:15; 22:19, 22 (2x); 24:15a; Jdg. 6:31b; 1 Kgs. 18:21 (2x); 2 Kgs. 10:6; Est. 1:19; 3:9; 5:4; 1 Chron. 13:2 (the first of two coordinate P clauses is verbless; the second is not); Job 11:14; 34:16; Ps. 139:24; Prov. 23:1-2; 25:21 (2x); Jer. 27:18a; 40:4 (2x); Zech. 11:12 (2x).

³²⁵ Gen. 47:6, 16, 29; 50:4; Exod. 33:13; 34:9; Num. 5:19 (2x); 11:15b; Jdg. 9:16 (3x), 19; 1 Kgs. 20:18 (2x); Job 31:5; 38:4, 18; Prov. 3:30; 6:1; 30:32 (2x); Song 7:13; Jer. 14:7; Ezek. 43:11.

³²⁶ Num. 11:15a; Jdg. 7:10; 9:15a; 1 Sam. 6:3; 7:3; Jer. 30:6; 42:13; Hos. 4:15.

³²⁷ Gen. 20:7; Exod. 32:32b; 33:15; Jdg. 9:15b, 20; Job 33:33; Ezek. 20:39.

³²⁸ Gen. 23:8; 24:49a; 1 Sam. 20:8; 2 Kgs. 9:15; Job 33:32; Lam. 1:12; Jer. 27:18b.

³²⁹ Gen. 15:5; 31:50 (2x); Exod. 4:9; 13:13; 20:25; Num. 32:29, 30; Deut. 19:8-9; Jdg. 4:20; 13:16b; 14:13; 21:21; Ruth 4:4 (2x); 1 Sam. 3:9; 20:7b, 21, 22; 21:10; 2 Sam. 11:20; 2 Kgs. 1:2; 1 Chron. 19:12a; Job 19:5; 33:5; Isa. 21:12; Jer. 2:28; Ezek. 2:7; 3:11; Hab. 2:3; Mal. 3:10.

³³⁰ Prov. 1:10, 11; Song 1:8; Qoh. 5:7; 10:4; 11:8.

to save. However, this eventuality, if realized, would still be post-speech, hence FUTURE TIME, so it is not a real exception.

(88) Jer. 2:28

וְאֵיִה אֱלֹהֵיךָ אֲשֶׁר עָשִׂיתָ לָּךְ יְקוֹמוּ אִם-יוֹשִׁיעוּךָ
בְּעֵת רָעָתְךָ

Where then are the gods you made for yourselves? Let them come if they can save you when you are in trouble!

The remaining P-clause *yiqtol*s promote an imperfective construal, although as in (89) realization of the directive is still post-speech, FUTURE TIME.

(89) Prov. 1:10

בְּנֵי אִם-יִפְתּוּךָ חַטָּאִים אֶל-תִּבָּא:

My son, if sinners entice you, do not give in to them.

(90) Qoh. 5:7

אִם-עָשָׂק רָשׁ וְגִזְלַת מִשְׁפָּט וְצָדֵק תִּרְאֶה בְּמִדְיָנָה
אֶל-תִּתְתַּמָּה עַל-הַחֲפִץ...
...עַל-הַחֲפִץ...

If you see the poor oppressed in a district, and justice and rights denied, do not be surprised at such things...
(NIV)

Qatals promote construals of the eventualities they describe as happening before the speech event (PAST TIME) in the twenty four direct speech occurrences.³³¹ Present perfect construals are included in this count as can be seen in (91) and (92). The two occurrences of *qatals* in non-direct speech are found in Proverbs 3:30; and 6:1 in lessons for the “son”. The lessons can be understood as an imaginary conversation or speech in which the *qatals* can be construed as PAST TIME vis-à-vis “speech” time.

(91) Gen. 47:6b

וְאִם-יִדְעַת וְיִשְׁבֹּב אֲנִשִּׁי-חֵיל וְשִׁמְתֶם שָׂרֵי
מִקְנֵה עַל-אֲשֶׁר-לִי:

“... And if you [already] know of any among them with special ability, put them in charge of my own livestock.”

(92) Jdg. 9:19

וְאִם-בְּאֵמֶת וּבְתָמִים עָשִׂיתֶם עִם-יְרֻבְבָעַל וְעִם-
בֵּיתוֹ הַיּוֹם הַזֶּה שָׂמְחוּ בְּאַבִּימֶלֶךְ וְיִשְׂמַח גַּם-הוּא
בְּכֶם:

If then you have acted honorably and in good faith toward Jerub-Baal and his family today, may Abimelech be your joy, and may you be his, too!
(NIV)

³³¹ I analyze Prov. 30:32 (2x) and Song 7:13 as direct speech since they are presented this way in the text.

(93) Prov. 6:1-3

¹בְּנֵי אִם־עֲרַבְתָּ לְרֵעִי תִקְרַעַתְּ לְזָר כְּפִידִי: ²נִגְזַשְׁתָּ
בְּאִמְרֵי־פִידִי לְלַכְדֹתָ בְּאִמְרֵי־פִידִי: ³עֲשֵׂה זֹאת
אֲפֹאֵא | בְּנֵי וְהִנָּצַל כִּי בָאתָ בְּכַף־רֵעִי לְךָ הִתְרַפַּס
וְרָהַב רֵעִי:

¹My son, if you guarantee a loan for your neighbor or shake hands in agreement with a stranger, ²you will be trapped by your words; you will be caught by your words. ³Do this, my son, to get out of it, for you have come under the control of your neighbor. (CEB)

Verbless P clauses in conditional directives exhibit the same semantic characteristics as those used in content conditionals, described above in section 4.1.1.6.1. However, they are used in 24% of the P clause of these directives compared to 8% of content conditional P clauses and 7% of generic conditional P clauses. Many such as (94) and (95) refer to an atemporal state of affairs. Although the P clauses refer to a state of affairs, the eventuality is construed as occurring post-speech. Temporal location is not being profiled. Instead the situation itself is profiled.

(94) Exod. 1:16

וַיֹּאמֶר בְּיַלְדֵיכֶן אֶת־הֶעֱבָרִיּוֹת וּרְאִיתֶן עַל־
הָאֲבָנִים אִם־בֵּן הוּא וְהַמַּתֵּן אֹתוֹ וְאִם־בַּת הִיא
וְחִיָּה:

“When you act as midwives to the Hebrew women, and see them on the birthstool, if it is a boy, kill him; but if it is a girl, she shall live.”

(95) Prov. 25:21

אִם־רֵעִיב שָׁנְאֵךְ הֶאֱכִלְהוּ לֶחֶם וְאִם־צָמָא הִשְׁקֵהוּ
מֵיִם:

If your enemies are hungry, give them bread to eat; and if they are thirsty, give them water to drink.

Other verbless clauses are cases of syntactic ellipsis. In (96) information regarding building an altar is elided. (This information might be something similar to *אֶת הַמִּזְבֵּחַ*.)

(96) Josh. 22:22 (Included in example 31)

אֵל | אֱלֹהִים | יְהוָה אֵל | אֱלֹהִים | יְהוָה הוּא יָדַע
וְיִשְׂרָאֵל הוּא יָדַע אִם־בְּמַרְדָּ וְאִם־בְּמַעַל בְּיְהוָה
אֶל־תּוֹשִׁיעֵנו הַיּוֹם הַזֶּה:

“El, God YHWH! El, God YHWH! He knows; and let Israel itself know! If it was in rebellion or in breach of faith in YHWH, do not spare us today.” (My translation)

Verbless P clauses combine imperative and *yiqtol*/jussive Q clauses in twenty two of the tokens. They combine with *weqatal* Q clauses only two times and those in (94) alone. This verse

is the only case where a conditional directive with a verbless P clause is used in which someone powerful is giving the directive.

אין and יש are generally conceived of as two sides of one coin: יש indicates the positive existential status of an object as in (97); אין's (98) core semantics is existential negation. Conditional directives make use of these semantic qualities when no syntactic ellipsis occurs:

(97) Jer. 27:18

וְאִם-נְבִיאִים הֵם וְאִם-יֵשׁ דְּבַר-יְהוָה אִתְּם יִפְגְּעוּ-
נָא בַיהוָה צְבָאוֹת...

If indeed they are prophets, and if the word of the LORD is with them, then let them intercede with the LORD of hosts...

(98) Exod. 33:14-15

וַיֹּאמֶר פְּנֵי יְלֹכוּ וְהִנַּחְתִּי לָךְ:¹⁵ וַיֹּאמֶר אֵלָיו
אִם-אֵין פְּנֵיךָ הֵלְכִים אֶל-תַּעֲלֵנוּ מִזֶּה:

¹⁴He said, "My presence will go with you, and I will give you rest." ¹⁵And he said to him, "If your presence will not go, do not carry us up from here.

Both אין and יש can also be used in order to avoid saying something explicitly. Instead of repeating information from the preceding context, these existential particles facilitate saying as little as necessary. These are examples of syntactic ellipsis. However, in non-procedural, non-casuistic conditional directives, יש is used only one time, (99), where the information "you want me to be king" is elided.

(99) 2 Kgs. 9:15b

... וַיֹּאמֶר יְהוּא אִם-יֵשׁ נַפְשְׁכֶם אֶל-יַעֲזָא פְּלִיט
מִזֶּה-עִיר לְלַכֵּת לְגֵיד בְּיִזְרְעֵאל:

... So Jehu said, "If this is your wish, then let no one slip out of the city to go and tell the news in Jezreel."

אין is used four of seven times (Exod. 32:32b; Jdg. 9:15b, 20; Job 33:33) in constructions in which there is syntactic ellipsis. Each of these occurs in the second conditional in pairs of consecutive conditionals. Existential negation is profiled in these uses, but these also exhibit syntactic ellipsis of information from the first of the pair of conditionals, seen in (100).³³² This compares with one use in 2 Kgs. 2:10 of syntactic ellipsis in the second of paired content conditionals.

³³² Regarding the issue of syntactic ellipsis and the existential particles, see discussion about examples (35) and (36).

(100) Jdg. 9:15

וַיֹּאמֶר הַאֲטָד׃ אֶל־הָעֵצִים אִם בְּאֵמֶת אַתֶּם
 מְשֻׁחִים אֵתִי לְמֶלֶךְ עָלֵיכֶם בְּאוֹ חֶסֶד בְּצִלִּי וְאִם־
 אֵין תֵּצֵא אֵשׁ מִן־הָאֲטָד וְתֹאכַל אֶת־אֲרֹנֵי
 הַלְבָּנוֹן׃

“And the bramble said to the trees, ‘If in good faith you are anointing me king over you, then come and take refuge in my shade; but if not, let fire come out of the bramble and devour the cedars of Lebanon.’”

Participles occur seven times in P clauses of conditional directives. The construals profile three separate aspects of the semantics of BH participles. One use is to profile the event as occurring during speech time as is seen in (101) where יָרָא could be translated *are afraid*.³³³

(101) Jdg. 7:10

וְאִם־יָרָא אַתָּה לְרִדֹת רִד אַתָּה וּפְרָה נַעֲרָךְ אֶל־
 הַמַּחֲנֶה׃

“But if you fear to attack, go down to the camp with your servant Purah...”

In (102), the use of the participle excludes profiling of temporality in order to focus on the eventuality itself.³³⁴

(102) 1 Sam. 6:3a

וַיֹּאמְרוּ אֲס־מְשֻׁלְחִים אֶת־אֲרֹן אֱלֹהֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל
 אֶל־תְּשַׁלְּחוּ אֹתוֹ רִיקִם...

They said, “If you send away the ark of the God of Israel, do not send it empty...”

4.3.3.2.2. Observations on the Apodosis

The directive in the main (Q) clause is expressed conditionally. In other words, the directive is understood to be valid only if the condition in the P clause maintains. The mental space Figure 4.9 captures this by nesting the Q clause under the P clause. In (94), repeated here, the condition to kill a baby is valid only under the condition that the child is a boy; if it is a girl, the child is not to be killed, but allowed to live.

³³³ Jdg. 9:15a; 1 Sam. 7:3 are also instances of this use. יָרָא could be an adjective (see HALOT: 43), however every other listed adjectival use is in the context of a person fearing a person or thing. The use is vague.

³³⁴ Num. 11:15a; Jer. 30:6 and Hos. 4:15 are also instances of this use.

(94) Exod. 1:16

וַיֹּאמֶר בְּיַלְדֵיכֶן אֶת־הַעֲבָרֹת וְרֵאיתֶן עַל־
הָאֲבָנִים אֲסֻבֶּן הוּא וְהַמִּתֵּן אִתּוֹ וְאִם־בַּת הִיא
וְחִיָּה:

“When you act as midwives to the Hebrew women, and see them on the birthstool, if it is a boy, kill him; but if it is a girl, she shall live.”

Conditional SA directives are prototypically characterized by the use of the imperative to express the directive in the Q clause, as seen in Table 1.10.

Table 4.10: Non-Procedural, Non-Casuistic Q Clause Verb Forms

Imperative ³³⁵	Yiqtol/Jussive ³³⁶	Weqatal ³³⁷	Verbless ³³⁸
63 (53%)	25 (21%)	20 (17%)	4 (3%)

Since conditional directives are valid only if the P clause conditions are met, the imperative לך in (103) is binding only if David says “Look the arrows are beyond you.” We know that because in verse 21 (104) he has previously said that if “The arrows are on this side of you, come....”. Under a different condition, another directive is mandated.

(103) 1 Sam. 20:22

וְאִם־כֵּן אָמַר לְעֵלַם הַנֶּה הַחֲצִיצִים מִמֶּנִּי וְהִלָּאָה
לְךָ כִּי שָׁלַחְךָ יְהוָה:

But if I say to the young man, ‘Look, the arrows are beyond you,’ then go; for the Lord has sent you away.

(104) 1 Sam. 20:21

וְהִנֵּה אֲשַׁלַּח אֶת־הַנְּעָר לְךָ מֵצֵא אֶת־הַחֲצִיצִים
אִם־אָמַר אָמַר לְנֶעַר הַנֶּה הַחֲצִיצִים מִמֶּנִּי וְהִנֵּה
קָחְנוּ וּבָאָה כִּי־שָׁלוֹם לְךָ וְאִין דָּבָר חִי־יְהוָה:

No look, I will send the boy out and tell him, ‘Go, find the arrows.’ If I explicitly say to the boy, ‘Look, the arrows are on this side of you, get them,’ then you are to come, for, as YHWH lives, it will be safe for you and there won’t be any danger. (My translation)

³³⁵ Gen. 15:5; 20:7; 23:8, 13; 24:49 (2x); 31:50b; 43:11; 47:16, 29; 50:4; Exod. 32:32b; 33:13; Num. 5:19b; 11:15a; 22:20; Josh. 17:15; 22:19; 24:15a; Jdg. 7:10; 9:15a, 19, 20; Ruth 4:4 (2x); 1 Sam. 7:3; 20:7b, 8, 21, 22; 21:10; 1 Kgs. 18:21 (2x); 20:18 (2x); 2 Kgs. 1:2; 10:6; Job 11:14; 19:5; 33:5, 32, 33; 34:16; 38:4, 18; Ps. 139:24; Prov. 1:11; 6:1; 25:21 (2x); Song 1:8; Lam. 1:12; Isa. 21:12; Jer. 14:7; 30:6; 40:4 (2x); Ezek. 20:39; 43:11; Hab. 2:3; Zech. 11:12 (2x); Mal. 3:10.

³³⁶ Exod. 20:25; 33:15; 34:9; Num. 11:15b; Josh. 22:22b; Jdg. 6:31b; 9:15b; 13:16b; 1 Sam. 6:3; 2 Kgs. 9:15; Est. 1:19; 3:9; 5:4; 1 Chron. 13:2; Job 31:5; Prov. 1:10, 11; 3:30; 23:1-2; Song 7:13; Qoh. 5:7; 10:4. 11:8; Jer. 2:28; 27:18b; Hos. 4:15.

³³⁷ Gen. 47:6; Exod. 1:16 (2x); 4:9; 13:13; Num. 32:29, 30; Deut. 19:8; Jdg. 4:20; 14:13; 21:21; 1 Sam. 3:9; 20:6; 2 Sam. 11:20; 1 Chron. 19:12a; Ezek. 2:7 (2x); 3:11 (2x).

³³⁸ Gen. 31:50a; Num. 5:19a; Prov. 30:32b.

Note that Dallaire (2014: 91) states that in conditional directives “the imperative is asyndetic, without a *waw*.” וְבִאֵה in (104) is an exception, the only one I have found. Dallaire (2014: 91) also states that “imperatives are usually found in main clauses, but in a few cases, the imperative introduces the apodosis of a conditional clause”. She correctly observes that imperatives are typically found in main clauses; she is mistaken that the apodosis of a conditional is not the main clause. The apodosis is the main clause of a conditional construction. She is also mistaken that they occur “in a few cases”. They occur 63 times in conditional directives.

Jussives and *yiqtols* are used twenty-five times in conditional SA directive Q clauses. In (105) Jehu has just been anointed king of the northern kingdom of Israel by Elisha, while Joram is still the official king. Jehu talks to the army officers (2 Kgs. 9:11-13) who acknowledge his anointing as king. What he commands the officers is in 9:15b. The P clause אִם-יֵשׁ נִפְשְׁכֶם אֶל-יֵצֵא פְּלִיט sets the condition for the prohibitive: אֶל-יֵצֵא פְּלִיט מִן-הָעִיר לְלֶכֶת לְגִיד בְּיִזְרְעֵאל:

(105) 2 Kgs. 9:15b (Repeated from example 99)

... וַיֹּאמֶר יְהוּא אִם-יֵשׁ נִפְשְׁכֶם אֶל-יֵצֵא פְּלִיט מִן-הָעִיר לְלֶכֶת לְגִיד בְּיִזְרְעֵאל:	... So Jehu said, “If this is your wish, then let no one slip out of the city to go and tell the news in Jezreel.”
--	--

With one exception (106), prohibitive conditional directives in BH conditionals in non-procedural and non-casuistic literature are jussive + אַל constructions. Here the prohibition relates to a cultic issue, which may explain why אַל was used.³³⁹

(106) Exod. 20:25

וְאִם-מִזְבֵּחַ אֲבָנִים תַּעֲשֶׂה-לִּי לֹא-תִבְנֶה אֶתְהָן גִּזִּית...	But if you make for me an altar of stone, do not build it of hewn stones...
--	--

With the exception of Qoh. 11:8, every *yiqtol* verb in positive conditional directive Q clauses occurs in first position in the clause as in (107).³⁴⁰ This is the case whether the text is classified Classical Biblical Hebrew or Late Biblical Hebrew.

³³⁹ See BHRG (1999: 151); Dallaire (2014: 76). אַל + *yiqtol* was preferred for negative directives that are absolute prohibitions.

³⁴⁰ Exod. 34:9; Jdg. 9:15b; 13:16b; Job 31:5; Jer. 27:18b.

(107) Jer. 27:18

וְאִם־נְבִיאִים הֵם וְאִם־יֵשׁ דְּבַר־יְהוָה אִתְּם יִפְגְּעוּ־
נָא בְּיְהוָה צְבָאוֹת לְבִלְתִּי־בָאוּ הַכְּלִים | הַנּוֹתְרִים
בְּבֵית־יְהוָה...
בְּבֵית־יְהוָה...

If indeed they are prophets, and if the word of the Lord is with them, then let them intercede with the Lord of hosts, that the vessels left in the house of the Lord.

It is unusual for the *yiqtol* to occur in first position because *weqatals* and *yiqtols* are typically in complementary distribution, with *weqatals* generally occur in clause-initial position; *yiqtols* in secondary slots. In Exod. 34:9; Job 31:5 and Jer. 18b the speaker is in a socially lower position vis-à-vis the addressee, as in (107). In clause-initial position the *yiqtol* gram appears to attenuate the directive. In Exod. 34:9 and Jer. 27:18b, the deference morpheme אָנֹכִי is used with the gram.

The two uses where the speaker is not in an obviously lower social position are both in Judges, examples (108) and (109). In Abimelech's parable of the trees seeking a king to rule over them in (108, repeated from example 100), the bramble replies with two conditional directives. In the second directive (Jdg. 9:15b) the *yiqtol* is in clause-initial position. We may assume that the bramble was understood to occupy the socially lower position. Although it is speculation, it could be that since the bramble was asked to be king, the writer may have used the *yiqtol* to emphasize the lower social position of the bramble and indicate unwarranted haughtiness.

(108) Jdg. 9:15 (repeated from example 100)

וַיֹּאמֶר הַאֲטוּד אֶל־הָעֵצִים אִם בְּאֵמֶת אֲתֶם
מִשְׁחִים אֶתִּי לְמֶלֶךְ עֲלֵיכֶם בָּאוּ חֶסֶוּ בְּצִלִּי וְאִם־
אֵין תֵּצֵא אֵשׁ מִן־הָאֲטוּד וְתֹאכַל אֶת־אֲרוֹנִי
הַלְבָּנוֹן:

And the bramble said to the trees, 'If in good faith you are anointing me king over you, then come and take refuge in my shade; but if not, let fire come out of the bramble and devour the cedars of Lebanon.

The second instance where the speaker is not in an obviously lower social position is in Jdg.13:16b where the angel of the Lord tells Manoah עֲלֶה לִיהוָה תַעֲלֶנָּה. The angel appears to have a higher social status than Manoah, but the conditional indicates that Manoah had the right to “detain” him, so this may be reversing our assumed hierarchies of power and explain this use of the *yiqtol*.³⁴¹

³⁴¹ Thanks to Dr. Christo van der Merwe (p. c.: August 2014) for pointing out the angel says that Manoah might detain him.

(109) Jdg. 13:16

וַיֹּאמֶר מַלְאָךְ יְהוָה אֶל־מְנוּחַ אִם־תִּעְצָרְנִי לֹא־
אֲכַל בְּלֶחְמֶךָ וְאִם־תַּעֲשֶׂה עֲלַי לַיהוָה תַּעֲלֶנָּה

The angel of the Lord said to Manoah, “If you detain me, I will not eat your food; but if you want to prepare a burnt offering, then offer it to the Lord.”

There is a question regarding the status of *yiqtols* in directives that are not morphologically marked as jussives, such as אִם־תִּעְצָר in (108)—are they *yiqtols* or are they jussives?³⁴² Joosten (2012: 314-315) observes that there is a clear “lack of morphological clarity” between them. He argues, however, that in directives they are in complementary distribution: jussives are clause initial and *yiqtols* are not. By this metric, the position-initial prefix forms in the above section are jussives, not *yiqtols*. However, he also notes *yiqtols* do occur, albeit rarely, in clause-initial positions (2012: 315) and that “the distinction between volitive forms and YIQTOL is slowly eroding” in Late Biblical Hebrew. Given that Biblical Hebrew is a dead language, it is impossible to be certain what form the writer or editor had in mind when he penned the forms.

Weqatals occur fifteen times as the only directive verb in the conditional directive Q clauses. In (110) וְאָמְרָת expresses the directive.

(110) 1 Sam. 3:9a

וַיֹּאמֶר עֲלֵי לְשִׁמוּאֵל לֵךְ שֹׁכֵב וְהָיָה אִם־יִקְרָא
אֵלָיִךְ וְאָמְרָת דְּבַר יְהוָה כִּי שָׁמַע עַבְדְּךָ...

Therefore Eli said to Samuel, “Go, lie down; and if he calls you, you shall say, ‘Speak, LORD, for your servant is listening.’ ”

These fifteen tokens occur after any verbal P-clause forms: *yiqtols*, *qatals*, participles, וְיִשׁ, אֵין and verbless P-clauses.³⁴³ The *weqatals* in this group of directives are used by participants who have higher social status and power than the addressee.³⁴⁴ In one instance, Jdg. 14:13a, below in (111), the narrator has Samson use a *weqatal* in a conditional directive when speaking to Philistines, even though he is outnumbered by them and in their territory. This could be intentional on the part of the narrator and reflects his ideological stance.

³⁴² See also Job 31:5; Qoh. 11:8; Jer. 27:18; Hos. 4:15 amongst others.

³⁴³ In five other instances they follow imperatives (Gen. 47:29; Josh. 17:15; Jdg. 7:10; 9:19) or a *yiqtol* (Prov. 21:1-2), but in these they are not the primary directive.

³⁴⁴ According to Longacre (1989: 123, 127-32) *weqatal* directives which follow imperatives in hortatory discourse are mitigated directives. Dallaire (2014: 145) disagrees with Longacre and asserts that they are unmitigated directives. Of interest here is that the *weqatals* follow not just P clause imperatives, but other P clause verbal forms. Further study is needed to clarify this question.

(111) Jdg. 14:13a

וְאִם-לֹא תוּכְלוּ לְהַגִּיד לִי וּנְתַתֶּם אֵתֶם לִי
שְׁלֹשִׁים סְדֵינִים...

But if you cannot explain it to me,
then you shall give me thirty linen
garments and thirty festal garments.”

4.3.3.2.3. Summary of ׀-conditional Directives in Non-Procedural, Non-Casuistic Discourse

׀’s use in conditional directives is consistent with its use in content and generic conditionals. The particle prompts the reader/hearer to construct hypothetical mental spaces in which the P clause is elaborated. The P clause is used to contextualize the speech-act. If the condition in the P clause is not fulfilled, the speech-act is not effective. Directives are always understood to be realized post-speech, therefore, they are always construed to occur after the condition is met, whether the condition is situated in the past, present or future. *Yiqtol* verbs, verbless clauses and *qatals* are the most used verbs in the P clause of conditional directives.

In the Q clause where the directive is expressed, imperative verbs predominate, followed by the *yiqtol*/jussive form and then *weqatals*. The *weqatals* are used by participants who have higher social status and power than the addressee, while *yiqtols* are used by participants whose social status is either lower or characterized as lower than the addressee. The clear preference for the imperative gram in conditionals used in non-procedural and non-casuistic literature is important, because as will be demonstrated in the following sections, the imperative is rarely used in those discourse-types. This suggests that discourse genre is implicated in the speaker and hearer’s ability to construe the non-imperative forms in procedural and casuistic discourse as imperatives and, conversely, their difficulty in doing so outside of these genres.

4.3.3.3. Speech-act Directives in Procedural Discourse

It was my original intention to discuss the analysis of all conditional speech-act directives collectively in their entirety. However, as noted above, upon analysis, it became evident that discourse type may have been a contextual participant in the meaning construction of SA-directives for BH speakers. Discourse studies (textlinguistics) have provided a description of procedural discourse and argued that the genre displays distinctive characteristics that merit recognition. Longacre characterized procedural text as +temporal succession, -agent orientation (Longacre 1996: 9). By -agent orientation, Longacre meant that the eventuality “may be implemented by any qualified agent” (Longacre 1995: 23). According to Larson its purpose is to “instruct” and “teach how to do” (Larson 1978: 147) and she noted that the agent is typically “an indefinite someone” (1978: 127). These descriptions aptly characterize Biblical

Hebrew procedural discourse. For example, in Lev. 1:2 the agent is an indefinite **אָדָם בִּי־יִקְרִיב**; in Lev. 2:1, it is simply ... **נִפְּשׁ בִּי**. In other words, generic or characterizing terminology is employed.

Procedural discourse is also characterized by “a series of steps leading to a goal and that it centers on events that are contingent on one another, rather than focusing on the performer of the events.”³⁴⁵ Note too that Levinsohn states that “the sentences that present the main steps typically have imperfective aspect.... When no discontinuity is signaled [in the discourse]..., a distinctive verb is often used (e.g. ..., the *wqtl* form in Hebrew) (Levinsohn 2011b: 14). These observations accurately describe the sacrificial instructions and processes for purification in Leviticus and describe conditional directive verb forms in Leviticus.

Conditional speech-act directives in procedural discourse occur seventy four times.³⁴⁶ Sections of Leviticus begin with the directive **דִּבֶּר אֶל־בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְאָמַרְתָּ אֲלֵהֶם**, or a slight variation on this. Chapter 19 of Numbers also begins with the same formula, **דִּבֶּר אֶל־בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל**. None of the conditional directives occur in dialogic exchanges.

As in the above conditional directives, the P clause contextualizes the Q clause directive. **אִם** has the same hypothetical space-building function as noted above. In the procedural text under consideration here **אִם** interacts with **כִּי** to mark subcases while **כִּי** marks the main topic in the procedure in 72% of occurrences. This can be seen in (112) below where in Lev 1:2 **כִּי** introduces the main topic of an animal offering from the herd or flock; in v. 3 **אִם** indicates that the condition that follows is subtopic, namely a herd animal sacrifice.³⁴⁷ The second subtopic, flock animal sacrifices, is introduced by an additional **אִם** conditional directive protasis in Lev. 2:10.

³⁴⁵ <http://www-01.sil.org/linguistics/glossaryoflinguisticterms/WhatIsAProceduralDiscourse.htm>; see also Dixon (1987).

³⁴⁶ Exod. 12:4; 29:34; Lev. 1:3, 10, 14; 2:5,7,14; 3:1 (2x), 6, 7, 12; 4:3, 13, 27, 32; 5:7, 11, 17; 6:21; 7:12, 16, 18; 12:5, 8; 13:4, 7, 12, 21, 22, 23, 26, 27, 28, 35, 37, 41, 53, 56, 57; 14:21, 43, 48; 15:23, 24, 28; Lev. 27:4, 5, 6, 7 (2x), 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 (2x), 22, 27 (2x), 31, 33; Num. 15:24, 27; 19:12; Deut. 20:11, 12.

³⁴⁷ This has been noted by Bandstra (1982: 126); Milgrom (1991: 144); Van Leeuwen (1973: 15-48, esp. 18-19).

(112) Lev. 1:2-3

דִּבֶּר אֶל־בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְאָמַרְתָּ אֲלֵהֶם אָדָם כִּי־
 יִקְרִיב מִכֶּם קֶרְבָּן לַיהוָה מִן־הַבְּהֵמָה מִן־הַבְּקָר
 וּמִן־הַצֹּאן תִּקְרִיבוּ אֶת־קֶרְבַּנְכֶם:³ אִם־עֹלָה
 קֶרְבָּנוֹ מִן־הַבְּקָר זָכָר תִּקְרִיבוּ...³

²Speak to the people of Israel and say to them: When a person among you presents an offering to YHWH, you must present the offering from among the domesticated livestock, from the herd or from the flock. ³If the offering is a burnt offering from the herd, he must present a male that is flawless... (My translation)

This distribution of אִם clauses vis-à-vis כִּי requires that we ask where the semantics of subtopic identification are located. Are the semantics associated with אִם or with כִּי? Or should the semantics of topic-subtopic be attributed to the discourse grammar? A further option, offered by Construction Grammar, is to recognize the אִם...כִּי sequence as a construction and attribute the semantics of topic-subtopic to the construction itself. Since this phenomena is restricted to the procedural and casuistic texts, I posit that further study would confirm the status of a אִם...כִּי construction that specifies topic-subtopic identification as part of its semantics. Subtopic identification, I submit is not part of the semantics of אִם or כִּי, but of the proposed construction. Further study is required to confirm this.

A striking difference between the conditional speech-act directives in the previous section and those in procedural text is in the distribution of P clause verb forms. In non-procedural conditional directives, predicates in the P clause are fairly evenly distributed between *yiqtol*s (32%), verbless clauses (24%) and *qatal*s (23%). In contrast, in procedural P clauses, *yiqtol*s are overwhelmingly preferred, followed by verbless clauses:

Table 4.11: Procedural Discourse P Clause Verb Forms

<i>Yiqtol</i> ³⁴⁸	Verbless ³⁴⁹	<i>Qatal</i> ³⁵⁰	Participle ³⁵¹
46 (62%)	20 (27%)	6 (8%)	2 (3%)

³⁴⁸ Exod. 12:4; 29:34; Lev. 2:14; 4:3, 13, 27, 32; 5:7, 11, 17, 12; 7:18; 12:5, 8; 13:7, 12, 21, 22, 23, 26, 27, 28, 35, 41, 53, 57; 14:43, 48; 15:24; 27:9, 10, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20a, 22, 27b, 31, 33; Num. 15:27; 19:12; Deut. 20:11, 12.

³⁴⁹ Lev. 1:3, 10, 14; 2:5, 7; 3:1a, 6, 12; 7:16; 13:4; 14:21; 15:23; 27:4, 5, 6, 7 (2x), 8, 11, 27a.

³⁵⁰ Lev. 6:21; 13:37, 56; 15:28; 27:20b; Num. 15:24.

³⁵¹ Lev. 3:1b, 7.

This distribution supports Levinsohn's (2011b: 14) observation above that in procedural discourse "the main steps typically have imperfective aspect" and in turn reinforces the argument that imperfectivity is a central semantic value of the *yiqtol* gram.

Note that in (113), although the offerings under discussion are temporally situated post-speech via implicature, the location in time is not profiled in the P clause.

(113) Lev. 2:14

וְאִם־תִּקְרִיב מִנְחַת בְּבוּרִים לַיהוָה אֲבִיב קִלְוִי
בְּאֵשׁ גֵּרֶשׁ כְּרֵמֶל תִּקְרִיב אֶת מִנְחַת בְּבוּרֶיךָ:

If you bring a grain offering of first fruits to the LORD, you shall bring as the grain offering of your first fruits coarse new grain from fresh ears, parched with fire.

Eight of the twenty occurrences of the verbless P clauses occur in Lev. 1-3 and another eight occur in Lev. 27 alone. The main topic of Leviticus 27 is consecrated peoples and objects.³⁵² The chapter has a tripartite division; the first two of which are clearly marked by the conditional-*אם...כי* construction which is followed by multiple *אם*s, each of which mark new subtopics. This and the conditional-*אם...כי* construction followed by *אם* can be seen in (114).

(114) Lev. 27:14-16

¹⁴וְאִישׁ כִּי־יִקְדֹשׁ אֶת־בֵּיתוֹ קֹדֶשׁ לַיהוָה וְהִעֲרִיכוּ
הַכֹּהֵן בֵּין טוֹב וּבֵין רָע כַּאֲשֶׁר יַעֲרִיךְ אֹתוֹ הַכֹּהֵן
בֵּן יְקוּם: ¹⁵וְאִם־הִמְקִדִישׁ יִגָּאֵל אֶת־בֵּיתוֹ וְיִסַּף
חֲמִישִׁית בְּסוּף־עֲרֻכָּתוֹ עָלָיו וְהָיָה לוֹ: ¹⁶וְאִם
מִשְׁדֵּה אַחֲזָתוֹ יִקְדִישׁ אִישׁ לַיהוָה וְהָיָה עֲרֻכָּתוֹ
לְפִי זֶרְעוֹ זֶרַע חֶמֶר שְׁעָרִים בַּחֲמִשִּׁים שֶׁקֶל בְּסוּף:

¹⁴“If a man dedicates his house as something holy to the Lord, the priest will judge its quality as good or bad. Whatever value the priest then sets, so it will remain. ¹⁵If the man who dedicates his house redeems it, he must add a fifth to its value, and the house will again become his. ¹⁶If a man dedicates to the Lord part of his family land, its value is to be set according to the amount of seed required for it— fifty shekels of silver to a homer of barley seed.” (NIV)

The six *qatal*s do not permit a unified explanation. In (115) the event is an explicit contrast to the situation in the immediately preceding verses. The *qatal* gram in the P clause of v. 37a could profile a resultant state indicating that the skin condition has stopped spreading. A perfective or present perfect sense is also possible. Either of these are also possible in the

³⁵² See Milgrom (2001: 2367).

coordinate P clause v. 37b. Meaning-making is so profoundly dependent on the vantage point assumed by the narrator and the reader/hearer that certainty is elusive.

(115) Lev. 13:35-37

וְאִם־פִּשְׁהַיִּפְשָׁה הַנֶּתֶק בְּעוֹר אַחֲרֵי טְהָרְתּוֹ:³⁵
 וְרָאָהּ הַכֹּהֵן וְהִנֵּה פִּשְׁהַיִּפְשָׁה הַנֶּתֶק בְּעוֹר לֹא־יִבְקֹר³⁶
 הַכֹּהֵן לְשַׁעַר הַצָּהָב טָמֵא הוּא:³⁷ וְאִם־בְּעֵינָיו
 עָמַד הַנֶּתֶק וְשַׁעַר שְׁחָר צִמְחָבוּ נִרְפָּא הַנֶּתֶק
 טָהוֹר הוּא וְטִהְרֹה הַכֹּהֵן:

³⁵But if the itch definitely spreads in the skin after he was pronounced clean, ³⁶the priest shall examine him. If the itch has spread in the skin, the priest need not seek for the yellow hair; he is unclean. ³⁷But if in his eyes the itch has checked, and black hair has grown in it, the itch is healed, he is clean; and the priest shall pronounce him clean.

The *qatals* in (116) and (117) are passive forms and the only *qatals* used in *yiqtol*-rich contexts. The use of the pual *qatal* in (116b) occurs immediately after a non-conditional directive in which a pual *yiqtol* is used. In (117), the אֶם -conditional in v. 24 resumes and restates the כִּי conditional in v. 22 that is broken off and lacking a Q clause. In v. 22, the verbs are *yiqtols*, yet when the conditional is resumed in v. 24, a *qatal* is used to restate the intention of the *yiqtols*. I do not have an explanation for the switching observed in these two instances, but, as in (115) it may be a question of the vantage point and perspective of the narrator.

(116) Lev. 6:21

וּכְלִי־חֵרֶשׁ אֲשֶׁר תְּבַשְׁלֶבּוּ יִשְׁבֵּר וְאִם־בְּכֵלִי
 נִחְשֶׁת בְּשִׁלָּה וּמָרַק וְשִׁטַּף בַּמַּיִם:

Any clay vessel it is boiled in must be broken, and if in a bronze vessel it was boiled, then that vessel must be scrubbed and rinsed in water. (My translation)

(117) Num. 15:22-24

וְכִי תִשְׁגּוּ וְלֹא תַעֲשׂוּ אֵת כָּל־הַמִּצְוֹת הָאֵלֶּה²²
 אֲשֶׁר־דִּבֶּר יְהוָה אֶל־מֹשֶׁה:²³ אֵת כָּל־אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה
 יְהוָה אֲלֵיכֶם בְּיַד־מֹשֶׁה מִן־הַיּוֹם אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה יְהוָה
 וְהִלָּאָה לְדֹרֹתֵיכֶם:²⁴ וְהָיָה אִם מַעֲיַנִּי הָעֲדָה
 נִשְׁתָּה לְשִׁגְגָה וְעָשׂוּ כָל־הָעֲדָה פֶּר בֶּזֶבֶקָר
 אֶחָד לְעֹלָה

²²But if you unintentionally fail to observe all these commandments that the Lord has spoken to Moses—
²³everything that the Lord has commanded you by Moses, from the day the Lord gave commandment and thereafter, throughout your generations—
²⁴then if it was done unintentionally without the knowledge of the congregation, the whole congregation shall offer one young bull for a burnt offering.

In Q clauses, *weqatals* are the most common verb form used to express conditional SA-directives in procedural discourse. I concur with Cook (2002: 306) that “in procedural discourse *weqatal* has a contingent-deontic use, expressing directive modality in conditional constructions.”

Table 4.12: Procedural Discourse Q Clause Verb Forms

<i>Weqatal</i> ³⁵³	<i>Yiqtol</i> ³⁵⁴	Verbless ³⁵⁵	<i>Qatal</i> ³⁵⁶
50 (68%)	17 (24%)	3 (4%)	1 (2%)

This represents a clear contrast to verb use in the Q clause of non-procedural, non-casuistic directives. In those conditional directives, imperatives are the preferred form and are used in 53% of those conditional directives. *Weqatals* are permitted, but are used in only 15 of 112 apodoses (13%). However, in procedural discourse *weqatals* are preferred and they are in complementary distribution with the *x-yiqtol* construction.³⁵⁷ This supports Cook’s claim that “what is distinctive about *weqatal* in procedural discourse, as compared to predictive, is that *weqatal* has a combined conditional-deontic (directive) meaning..., as found in other conditional law codes” (Cook 2002: 305). This does not, however explain why *yiqtol*s, the verbless grams and the single *qatal* would have been understood as directives. I hypothesize that the discourse type participated in the interpretation of these conditionals as directives. The purpose of the procedural discourse in which these conditionals occur is to instruct the hearer how to construct something that they understand they must construct. The hearer knows this and my proposal is that this contextual knowledge participated in meaning construction.

I hypothesize that the construal of the Q clause *weqatals* and *yiqtol*s as directives was aided by the frame-based encyclopedic knowledge BH readers and hearers had regarding procedural discourse. Fillmore (1982: 117) argued that “knowing that a text is, say, an obituary, a proposal of marriage a business contract, or a folktale, provides knowledge about how to interpret particular passages in it, how to expect the text to develop, and how to know when it is finished. It is frequently the case that such expectations combine with the actual material of the text to lead to the text’s correct interpretation.” The frames relating to

³⁵³ Exod. 12:4; 29:34; Lev. 1:14; 3:7, 12; 4:3, 13, 27; 5:7, 11, 17; 6:21; 7:12; 12:5, 8; 13:4, 7, 12, 21, 22, 23, 26, 27, 28, 35, 53, 56; 14:21, 43; 15:24; 15:28, 27:4, 5, 6, 8, 11, 13, 15, 16, 18, 19, 22, 27 (2x), 33; Num. 15:24, 27; Deut. 20:11, 12.

³⁵⁴ Lev. 1:3, 10; 2:5, 7, 14; 3:6; 4:32; 7:16, 18; 13:57; 15:23; 27:9, 10, 17, 20b, 31; Num. 19:12. All except Lev. 15:23 are *x-yiqtol*.

³⁵⁵ Lev. 13:41; 27:7 (2x).

³⁵⁶ Lev. 13:27.

³⁵⁷ All except Lev. 15:23 are *x-yiqtol*.

procedural discourse would contain information that the purpose of the discourse is to direct the hearer/reader exactly how to perform the procedure.

Since in procedural discourse, imperatives are never used, we can conclude that imperatives could not be used in BH procedural discourse. I concur with Dallaire (2014: 145) that *weqatals* are not mitigated directive forms. Yet the distributional differences indicate that the semantics of the grams were not equivalent. Imperative use seems to have been restricted to directives directed at a specific individual or individuals (animate or inanimate), not, as Longacre termed it “any qualified agent”.³⁵⁸

The choice of imperative versus *yiqtol* or *weqatal* may have involved the concept of boundedness that is central to the distinction between count and mass nouns.³⁵⁹ Langacker notes that “conceiving of something as being bounded does not depend on being able to impose a precise line of demarcation in a specific place. Boundaries are often “fuzzy”.... In the last analysis, bounding that “counts” for linguistic purposes is always conceptually construed.” (2008: 138). Imperatives may have been used with what were construed as count noun objects, and *yiqtols* and *weqatals* with what was construed as mass noun objects. Langacker further notes that the conceptual processes that result in the distinction between count and mass nouns is also evident in the perfective/imperfective verbal distinction: perfectives reflect the boundedness of count nouns and imperfectives view time as homogeneous as mass nouns view objects homogeneously. It is accepted that imperfectivity is a semantic component of *yiqtols* and *weqatals*. These forms are preferred over imperatives in conditional directives used in procedural and casuistic discourse when directives are issued to all Israelites (mass noun) and not specific (count noun) people. Further study is needed to confirm if the *yiqtol* and *weqatal* directives are preferred for objects construed as mass nouns and imperatives for objects construed as count nouns.

Another explanation that correlates with Langacker’s observations for the marked preference for P clause *yiqtols* involves genericity. It may not be coincidental that the *yiqtol* is overwhelming preferred in both generic conditional P clauses (62%) and SA conditional P clauses in procedural directives (62%).³⁶⁰ As noted above, the subject (or agentive) nouns in procedural P clauses are typically generic, characterizing nouns, as they are in generic

³⁵⁸ Guverich (2010) has argued that in Russian conditionals, a specific participant’s viewpoint is explicitly emphasized via the choice of imperative verbs and deemphasized via non-imperative verbs. Little research into the role viewpoint plays in Hebrew verb choice has been done. It may prove fruitful, but is outside the scope of this study.

³⁵⁹ See Langacker (1991a: 18-22; 25-31; 1991b: 69-74; 98-100; 2008: 128-155).

³⁶⁰ See Table 4.7.

conditionals. As Cover (2010: 46) noted, generics “make a statement about idealized tendencies, properties characteristic of, though not universally applicable to, a certain class of individuals or events.” This description also describes directives in BH procedural discourse. While these directives do not “make a statement” about a “class of individuals or events,” they do characterize how a class of individuals (שְׂנֵי, אֲדָמָה) must perform a class of events. The *yiqtol* is preferred for generic characterizing-type eventualities. Further research, outside the scope of this study, is needed to determine if the distinction is text-type based as Longacre argues, or if profiling restrictions in the grams themselves result in the distributional restrictions.

A further distinctive of the conditional directives in procedural discourse is the high percentage use of אֲדָמָה instead of אֲדָמָה. Below, comments will address the corpus-wide use of אֲדָמָה, but it should be noted that the form occurs sixty two times in seventy two procedural discourse conditional directives or in 86% of occurrences.³⁶¹ I propose that in procedural discourse אֲדָמָה instructs the reader/hearer to understand that the אֲדָמָה...יִבְּנֶה construction that specifies topic-subtopic is still valid and that the אֲדָמָה conditional directive that follows is topically nested under the preceding יִבְּנֶה.

4.3.3.4. Speech-Act Directives in Casuistic Discourse

Albrecht Alt noted the distinction between casuistic and apodictic law in the Pentateuch. He observed that case law is formulated “If someone does x, then y” and “is invariably introduced by an objective conditional clause beginning ‘If . . .’ . Throughout, all those who are concerned in the case under discussion are spoken of in the third-person—the person who commits the act and his adversary, and also the judge and God himself” (Alt 1968: 113ff). Wenham (1971) provided a helpful description of the conditional directives in the case law of Exodus 21-22 and includes a detailed analysis of the syntax of the P and Q clauses. He further notes the significance of the אֲדָמָה...יִבְּנֶה construction in conditionals in casuistic literature and its

³⁶¹ On interclausal or intersentential יִ see GKC (§154); IBHS (1990: 647-654); J-M (§166-176) and Steiner (2000). The traditional analysis of the particle generally notes its “roles” (IBHS: 648) and categorizes its meanings based on the semantics (construal) of the clauses in which it is used: disjunctive *waw*, temporal *waw*, exegetical *waw*, apodictic *waw* and so forth. These classifications encourage the notion that the semantics of the particle include all these meanings. I believe this to be mistaken. Instead, I hypothesize that יִ functions as a procedural particle with very schematic semantic content. It instructs the reader to use the available linguistic and contextual clues to search for the most relevant interclausal or intersentential semantic relationship. But it doesn’t *specify* that relationship itself. There is no “temporal *waw*” or “disjunctive *waw*”; there is one procedural particle, the semantics of which instructs hearers and readers to search for the most relevant relationship. Since language is learned in context, these semantic relationships would have been learned via repetition and miscommunication would have been minimal, especially in spoken language.

implications for paragraph divisions in translations.³⁶² He does not, however, compare these conditional directives to those in procedural discourse.

The כִּי...אִם construction's function (and semantics) in casuistic discourse is identical to its function in procedural discourse, namely to signal the reader to interpret the כִּי clause situation as the main topic or case and the following אִם conditionals as subcases. All but eight³⁶³ of the 59 אִם SA-directives in casuistic discourse are used in a כִּי...אִם construction. A different strategy is used in all these eight instances to set the topic under discussion. The topic for Exod. 22:24, 25, example (119) is set in v.21 (example 118):

(118) Exod. 22:21

כִּלְאֵל־מִנֶּה וְיִתּוֹם לֹא תַעֲנוּן:

You shall not abuse any widow or orphan.

(119) Exod. 22:24-25 (Eng. 22:25, 26)

אִם־כִּסְּפִי | תִּלְוֶה אֶת־עַמִּי אֶת־הָעֲנִי עִמָּךְ לֹא־
תִּהְיֶה לּוֹ כְּנֹשֶׁה לֹא־תִשְׁיָמוֹן עָלָיו גִּשְׁדִּי: ²⁵אִם־
חָבֵל תִּחַבֵּל שְׁלֵמַת רֵעֶךָ עַד־בָּא הַשֶּׁמֶשׁ תְּשִׁיבֵנוּ
לוֹ:

²⁵If you lend money to my people, to the poor among you, you shall not deal with them as a creditor; you shall not exact interest from them. ²⁶If you take your neighbor's cloak in pawn, you shall restore it before the sun goes down;

In (120) the topic is set in the first half of the verse; in (121) it is set in Num. 30:10.

(120) Exod. 34:20

וּפְטוֹר חֲמוֹר תִּפְדֶּה בְּשֵׂה וְאִם־לֹא תִפְדֶּה וְעִרְפָּתוֹ
כֹּל בְּכוֹר בְּנֵיךָ תִפְדֶּה וְלֹא־יֵרָאוּ פָנֶי רִיקָם:

The firstborn of a donkey you shall redeem with a lamb, or if you will not redeem it you shall break its neck. All the firstborn of your sons you shall redeem.

³⁶² Wenham (1971: 101).

³⁶³ Exod. 22:24, 25; 34:20; Num. 30:11, 13, 15, 16; Deut. 22:2.

(121) Num. 30:10-12 (Eng. 30:9-11)

וְגִדְרָא אֶלְמָנָה וְגִרוּשָׁה כָּל אֲשֶׁר-אָסְרָה עַל-
 נַפְשָׁהּ יְקוּם עָלֶיהָ: ¹¹וְאִם-בֵּית אִישָׁה נִדְרָה אוֹ-
 אָסְרָה אָסֵר עַל-נַפְשָׁהּ בְּשִׁבְעָהּ: ²¹וְשָׁמַע אִישָׁהּ
 וְהִחְרֹשׁ לָהּ לֹא הֵנִיא אֶתְּהָ וְקָמוּ כָּל-נִדְרֶיהָ וְכָל-
 אָסֵר אֲשֶׁר-אָסְרָה עַל-נַפְשָׁהּ יְקוּם:

⁹Every solemn promise of a widow or a divorced woman who makes a binding obligation for herself will stand. ¹⁰If a woman makes a solemn promise in her husband's household or makes a binding obligation for herself with a solemn pledge, ¹¹and her husband hears, keeps silent, and doesn't express disapproval to her—then all her solemn promises will stand and all her binding obligations for herself will stand. (CEB)

In these few verses the, the *אם...כי* construction strategy is not used and topics are set without the use of *כי*. Language users employ all the resources of a language for communication so we should not be surprised to find multiple strategies for topic-setting.

Conditional SA directives occur fifty-nine times in the case law in Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers and Deuteronomy.³⁶⁴ Verbs are distributed as follows:

Table 4.13: Casuistic Text P Clause Verb Forms

<i>Yiqtol</i> ³⁶⁵	Verbless ³⁶⁶	<i>Qatal</i> ³⁶⁷	אֵין ³⁶⁸
35 (59%)	11 (19%)	11 (19%)	2 (3%)

Table 4.14: Casuistic Text Q Clause Verb Forms

<i>Weqatal</i> ³⁶⁹	<i>Yiqtol</i> ³⁷⁰	Verbless (אֵין 2x) ³⁷¹	Participle ³⁷²	<i>Qatal</i> ³⁷³
29 (49%)	22 (37%)	3 (5%)	3 (5%)	1 (1%)

³⁶⁴ Exod. 21:3 (2x), 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 19, 21, 23, 27, 29, 30, 32; 22:1, 22:2 (2x), 3, 6, 7a, 11, 12, 14 (2x), 16, 24, 25; 34:20; Lev. 25:28, 30, 51, 52, 54; Num. 5:8; 27:9, 10; 27:11; 30:6, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 16; 35:16, 17, 20, 22, 26; Deut. 21:14; 22:2, 20, 25; 24:1, 12; 25:2, 7.

³⁶⁵ Exod. 21:3a, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 19, 21, 23, 27, 30, 32; 22:1, 3, 6b, 7a, 11, 12, 16, 24, 25; 34:20; Lev. 25:30, 54; Num. 30:7, 9, 13, 15, 16; 35:20, 26; Deut. 22:2, 25; 24:1; 25:7.

³⁶⁶ Exod. 21:3b, 8, 29; 14 (2x); Lev. 25:51; Num. 27:9, 10, 11; Deut. 22:2; 24:12; 25:2.

³⁶⁷ Exod. 22:2a, 7b, 10; Lev. 25:28, 52; Num. 30:6, 11; 35:16, 17, 22; Deut. 22:20.

³⁶⁸ Exod. 22:2b; Num. 5:8.

³⁶⁹ Exod. 21:3b, 5, 8, 11, 19, 23, 30; 22:2b, 22:7a, 10; 34:20; Lev. 25:28, 30, 54; Num. 27:9, 10, 11; 30:7, 9, 11, 15, 16; 35:22; Deut. 22:2, 20, 25; 24:1; 25:2; 25:7.

³⁷⁰ Exod. 21:3a, 4, 9, 10, 21, 27, 29, 32; 22:3, 6b, 11, 12, 14a, 16, 24, 25; Lev. 25:51, 52; Num. 30:6, 13; 35:20; Deut. 24:12.

³⁷¹ Exod. 22:1, 2a; Num. 35:26.

³⁷² Num. 5:8; 35:16; 35:17.

³⁷³ Exod. 22:14b.

*Yiqtol*s are clearly the favored form in P clauses; in the Q clauses *weqatals* and *yiqtol*s are overwhelmingly preferred. All of the 26 ׀ conditional SA-directives in Exodus 21 and 22 follow the opening line in Exodus 21:1 which sets the Base and V-POINT in the Character domain. In similar fashion, in Num. 30:1 and Lev. 25:1, the narrator again sets the directives in what appears to be the direct speech of YHWH. They appear in text presented as direct speech, the words of YHWH, as seen in (122):

(122) Num. 30:2 (Eng. 30:1)

וַיִּדְבֹר מֹשֶׁה אֶל־רְאֹשֵׁי הַמִּטּוֹת לִבְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל
לֵאמֹר זֶה הַדְּבָר אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה יְהוָה:

Then Moses said to the heads of the tribes of the Israelites: This is what the Lord has commanded:

The eventualities discussed in the casuistic directives are set post-speech in FUTURE TIME. As was shown in section 4.1.1.1., *yiqtol*s are preferred in P clauses when the eventualities under discussion in direct speech are post-speech. So, it is difficult to determine why *qatals* are used 11 times in P clauses. In (123), note that *יְהַדְפֵנוּ*, the *yiqtol* of הָדַף “to push, thrust away,” is used in the P clause in the conditional in Num. 35:20. But in the coordinate conditional clause in v. 21, *qatal* הִכָּהוּ is used. The difference in verbal *aktionsart* could tentatively be offered as an explanation, but this seems implausible because in (124), the alternative conditional to (123), הִדְפּוּ, the *qatal* of הָדַף is found. Both follow a prepositional phrase. Without additional data, an explanation for what motivated this switching of forms remains uncertain.

(123) Num. 35:20-21

וְאִם־בְּשִׂנְאָה יְהַדְפֵנוּ אֶוְהַשְׁלִיךְ עָלָיו בְּצַדִּיָּה
וַיִּמָּת: ²¹אִו בְּאִיבָה הִכָּהוּ בִידּוֹ וַיִּמָּת מוֹת־יוֹמָת
הַמִּכָּה רֹצֵחַ הוּא גֹאֵל הַדָּם יָמִית אֶת־הָרֹצֵחַ
בְּפָגְעוֹ־בּוֹ:

²⁰Likewise, if someone pushes another from hatred, or hurls something at another, lying in wait, and death ensues, ²¹or in enmity strikes another with the hand, and death ensues, then the one who struck the blow shall be put to death; that person is a murderer; the avenger of blood shall put the murderer to death, when they meet.

(124) Num. 35:22

וְאִם־בְּפֶתַע בְּלֹא־אִיבָה הִדְפּוּ אֶוְהַשְׁלִיךְ עָלָיו
כָּל־כְּלִי בְלֹא צַדִּיָּה:

But if someone pushes another suddenly without enmity, or hurls any object without lying in wait...

Nevertheless, an explanation for the use of *qatals* in these casuistic conditional directives is suggested when the nature of these directives is considered. Casuistic conditional directives

are atypical directives in that both the P and Q clause subjects are always impersonal (אַלְמָנָה, נִעֵר, עֶבֶד עֲבָרִי) and thus neither about specific individuals or directed to specific individuals for execution of the directive. In this they share many similarities with generic conditionals: the noun phrases are “kind-referring NPs” (Krifka et al. 1995: 16) in what I propose should be considered as characterizing conditionals.³⁷⁴ If this is correct, then the analysis offered by Andrason (2012c) of the gnomic *qatal* would apply to the grams use in casuistic conditional directives such as (123) as well.

In Q clauses, *weqatals* and the *x-yiqtol* construction are the preferred verb form in casuistic text SA-directives, as they are in procedural discourse.

Predictive content conditionals (see section 4.1.1 above) are characterized by prompting the construction of alternative mental spaces. When someone says *If thunderstorms move in, the airport will be closed*, the alternative space (where thunderstorms do not move in and the airport stays open) is “assumed to be cognitively present as a contrast to the one overtly mentioned” (Dancygier and Sweetser 2014: 149). Because of this content conditionals are usually not overtly negated.

In contrast, as shown above (Figure 4.9), conditional directives do not prompt alternative space construction. We find instead that the alternative is expressed in a second conditional directive in which the conditional P clause is negated and the Q clause directive to this alternate condition is adjusted. In (125) the conditional directive is expressed in verse 6 and the negated directive in verse 7:

(125) Exod. 22:6-7 (Eng. 22:7-8)

כִּי־יִתֵּן אִישׁ אֶל־רֵעֵהוּ בְּסֵף אוֹ־כֶּלִים לְשֹׁמֵר וְגָנַב
 מִבַּיִת הָאִישׁ אִם־יִמָּצָא הַגָּנֵב יִשְׁלַם שְׁנַיִם:
 אִם־לֹא יִמָּצָא הַגָּנֵב וְנִקְרַב בְּעַל־הַבַּיִת אֶל־
 הָאֱלֹהִים אִם־לֹא שְׁלַח יָדוֹ בְּמִלְאֲכַת רֵעֵהוּ:

⁷When someone delivers to a neighbor money or goods for safekeeping, and they are stolen from the neighbor’s house, then the thief, if caught, shall pay double. ⁸If the thief is not caught, the owner of the house shall be brought before God, to determine whether or not the owner had laid hands on the neighbor’s goods.

³⁷⁴ See section 4.2 above for discussion of the characteristics of generics and generic conditionals.

All conditional directives in Biblical Hebrew express alternatives in this manner, not just those in the casuistic texts. In (126) note the positive conditional directive in Zech. 11:12a and the alternate negative in 12b.

(126) Zech. 11:12

וְאָמַר אֲלֵיהֶם אִם־טוֹב בְּעֵינֵיכֶם הָבוּ שְׂכָרִי וְאִם־
לֹא | תְּדַלּוּ וַיִּשְׁקְלוּ אֶת־שְׂכָרִי שְׁלֹשִׁים כֶּסֶף:

I then said to them, “If it seems right to you, give me my wages; but if not, keep them.”

In summary, in casuistic text ׀-conditional SA-directives, ׀ functions to prompt the hearer/reader to construct hypothetical mental spaces. Since alternatives are not part of the semantics of conditional SA-directives, alternative conditional directives have to be expressed directly, not via mental spaces constructed via implicature. 86% of the conditional directives occur in the ׀...׀י constructions. In P clauses *yiqtol*s are heavily preferred, while in Q clauses the *weqatal* is favored. I have hypothesized that, because these conditionals share characterizing features with generic conditionals that the *qatals* in these conditional directives are examples of the characterizing gnomic *qatal* per Andrason’s analysis. Frame-based encyclopedic knowledge regarding casuistic discourse—its structure and purpose helped lead the readers to construe these grams as directives.

4.3.3.5. Comparison and Summary of Conditional SA-Directives

׀’s function in conditional SA-directives is consistent with its function in content and generic conditionals. In its position at the head of a conditional P clause, it is used to signal the hearer/listener that a conditional construction follows. The particle prompts the construction of hypothetical mental spaces in which the linguistic information in the conditional is processed concurrently with background and general world knowledge.

Conditional SA-directives differ from content and generic conditionals in their purpose: they are used to issue directives, not to make predictions. Because of this they are not predictive and do not prompt the construction of a second set of mental spaces in which the alternative to the condition could be considered.

The verb forms that characterize conditional directives in non-procedural, non-casuistic discourse differ significantly from those found in procedural and casuistic discourse. As can be seen below in Table 4.15, in P clauses, *yiqtol*s, *qatals* and verbless constructions are used with essentially the same frequency in non-procedural, non-casuistic discourse. In procedural and casuistic literature however, *yiqtol*s are clearly preferred. In Q clauses, imperatives are used 53% of the time in non-procedural, non-casuistic text, but never once in procedural and

casuistic discourse conditional Q clauses. *Weqatals* and *yiqtol*s are the preferred verb forms in these types of texts. Tables 4.15 and 4.16 summarize the main P and Q clause verb-use percentages for conditional directives.

Table 4.15: SA-Directive P Clause Verb Forms

	Non-P, non-C ³⁷⁵	Procedural	Casuistic
<i>Yiqtol</i>	32%	62%	59%
Verbless	26%	27%	22%
<i>Qatal</i>	23%	8%	17%

Table 4.16: SA-Directive Q Clause Verb Forms

	Non-P, non-C	Procedural	Casuistic
Imperative	53%	0%	0%
<i>Weqatal</i>	17%	68%	50%
<i>Yiqtol</i> /Jussive	21%	24%	39%

The most interesting and obvious contrast is how the use of the imperative is determined by discourse type.³⁷⁶

Only the conditional directives in procedural and casuistic texts are used in the כִּי...אִם construction. I propose that this syntactic sequence meets the conditions of Goldberg's (1995, 2006a, b) definition of a construction, and that this construction contributes semantic meaning to the component parts of the construction. Its meaning consists in instructing the reader/hearer to interpret the sequence and its parts as a unit composed of topic and subtopics. כִּי clause alone do not carry this meaning, nor does אִם . The combination as a construction adds this meaning. A single כִּי...אִם construction is minimally composed of one topic-setting כִּי clause and one אִם conditional. But the כִּי clause may be followed by many אִם conditionals, as seen in (127).

³⁷⁵ Indicates non-procedural, non-casuistic discourse.

³⁷⁶ See Dallaire (2014: 88-89) for a summary of imperatival use in Biblical Hebrew.

(127) Exod. 21:2-6

כִּי תִקְנֶה עֶבֶד עִבְרִי שֵׁשׁ שָׁנִים יַעֲבֹד וּבְשִׁבְעַת
 יֵצֵא לְחֻפְשֵׁי חָנָם: ³אִם-בְּגִפּוֹ יָבֵא בְּגִפּוֹ יֵצֵא אִם-
 בְּעַל אִשָּׁה הוּא וַיִּצְאָה אִשְׁתּוֹ עִמּוֹ: ⁴אִם-אֲדָנָיו
 יִתְּנֶהָ אִשָּׁה וַיִּלְדֶּה-לּוֹ בָנִים אוֹ בָנוֹת הָאִשָּׁה
 וַיִּלְדֶּיהָ תִהְיֶה לְאֲדֹנָיָהּ וְהוּא יֵצֵא בְּגִפּוֹ: ⁵וְאִם-
 אָמַר יֵאמֹר הָעֶבֶד אֶהְבֵּתִי אֶת-אֲדֹנָי אֶת-אִשְׁתִּי
 וְאֶת-בְּנָי לֹא אֵצֵא חֻפְשִׁי: ⁶וְהִגִּישׁוּ אֲדָנָיו אֶל-
 הָאֱלֹהִים וְהִגִּישׁוּ אֶל-הַדָּלֶת אוֹ אֶל-הַמְּזוּזָה וַרְצַע
 אֲדָנָיו אֶת-אָזְנוֹ בַּמַּרְצֵעַ וַעֲבָדוּ לְעַלְמֵם:

²When you buy a male Hebrew slave, he shall serve six years, but in the seventh he shall go out a free person, without debt. ³If he comes in single, he shall go out single; if he comes in married, then his wife shall go out with him. ⁴If his master gives him a wife and she bears him sons or daughters, the wife and her children shall be her master's and he shall go out alone. ⁵But if the slave declares, "I love my master, my wife, and my children; I will not go out a free person," ⁶then his master shall bring him before God. He shall be brought to the door or the doorpost; and his master shall pierce his ear with an awl; and he shall serve him for life.

4.3.4. אִם Speech-Act Oaths, Vows and Curses

The speech-act classification of אִם-conditional constructions such as (128) has been inconsistent at best in the literature.

(128) 1 Sam. 26:19a

וַעֲתָה יִשְׁמַע-נָא אֲדֹנָי הַמֶּלֶךְ אֶת דְּבָרַי עֲבָדוֹ אִם-
 יְהוָה הִסִּיתָךְ בִּי יָרַח מִנְתָּהּ וְאִם בְּנֵי הָאָדָם
 אָרוּרִים הֵם לִפְנֵי יְהוָה

So let my lord the king now listen to the words of his servant. If the LORD has incited you against me, may he take delight in an offering. But if men have instigated this, may they be cursed before the LORD! (NET)

Pre (and many post)-Austin and Searle lexicons and grammars offer little comment on the status of these constructions as speech-acts. They simply label them oaths.³⁷⁷ Kitz (2014: 25) notes that Austin (1962: 160) classifies oaths and curses as behabitives, i.e. reactions to another person's behavior, but doesn't explore this further. Bach and Harnish (1979: 49ff) label oaths

³⁷⁷ For more on oaths/curses see: Bandstra (1982: 142-146); GKC (§149); Hankore (2013); IBHS (1990: 678-680); J-M (§165); Lehmann (1969); Naudé (2013a, b); Stadel (2013); Van Leeuwen (1973: 34-38). See especially Conklin (2011) and Ziegler (2008) for a good presentation of varied oath formulas in Biblical Hebrew. Conklin offers a thorough listing of the verbal and syntactic structures found in the oath formulas. Kitz's (2014) study is one of the more thorough works to date on ANE oaths and curses. See review in Chapter 2.4.9.

and vows as commissives. In the end, whether they are labeled as behabitives or commissives, they are clearly recognized as speech-acts by linguists.

Additional terminological issues have also surrounded the discussion of these conditional forms. They have generally been labeled *oaths*, but the terms *vows* and *curses* are also employed. Although J-M (§165) discuss both oaths and curses in the same section, they argue they should be distinguished based on syntax. IBHS lumps oaths with wishes (a categorization with which Kitz concurs).³⁷⁸ Adopting the traditional label “oath” for these constructions, Conklin notes some of the pragmatic and semantic complexity of these constructions:

“An oath may involve an assertion.... It may also involve a promise of something in the future. But an oath is more than a mere assertion or mere promise. It also includes a statement of sincerity or earnestness: the person who swears an oath is committed to certain consequences or sanctions” (Conklin 2011: 2).

These “consequences or sanctions” are spelled out in the curse that accompanies the oath in which the oath-taker petitions the deity to inflict some form of harm on him or another party if the conditions of the oath are not met. An example is seen in (129) when Saul swears with a curse that the guilty party מות ימות, even if it happens to be Jonathan:

(129) 1 Sam. 14:39

כִּי חַי־יְהוָה הַמּוֹשִׁיעַ אֶת־יִשְׂרָאֵל כִּי אִם־יִשָּׁנוּ
בְּיוֹנָתָן בֶּן־יָכִי מוֹת יָמוּת

“For as the Lord lives who saves Israel,
even if it is in my son Jonathan, he shall
surely die!”

One reason for this confusion regarding oaths is, as Kitz (2014: 25) remarks, “the lack of modern terms that properly reflect the intended meaning behind many ancient expressions” combined with the “the modern propensity to deemphasize the role of the divine realm in oaths and, subsequently, eliminate all indications that a divinely enforced curse is involved.” Cartledge and Kitz describe the differences between vows (נדר) and oaths: A vow is a reciprocal negotiation or “bargain” with the deity to obtain a benefit for the vow-taker and do not include curses (Kitz 2014: 33, 60); the latter always involves a curse directed at oneself or second or third party. Cartledge (1992: 12) notes that “one may swear [an oath] to another person, but may vow only to God.”³⁷⁹

³⁷⁸ She states “since they express the desire of the speaker...they are principally wishes” Kitz (2014: 64).

³⁷⁹ See Naudé (2013b) for further discussion of Biblical Hebrew vows.

4.3.4.1. The Status of Q clause Ellipsis in Conditional Oaths

It is impossible, Kitz observes, “for an oath to exist without a curse. Thus an oath is really nothing more than a form of conditional cursing” (2014: 38). Because of this, oaths are most commonly analyzed as “statements introduced with ׀ that are to be regarded as conditional sentences” and, van Leeuwen states, sentences “in which the consequent clause is generally missing” (van Leeuwen 1973: 34). For this reason he discusses the use of ׀ in oaths as examples of ellipsis. Conklin (2011: 31) calls them “incomplete conditional sentences,” as does Naudé (2013b: 978). Ellipsis occurs in 119 conditional oaths, 82% of all instances. Examples (130) and (131) demonstrate the ellipsis common in BH conditional oaths. They can be compared with the conditional oath in example (129) above that does not elide the Q clause.

(130) Gen. 42:15

...הַי פֶּרַעַה אִם־תִּצָּאוּ מִזֶּה כִּי אִם־בָּבוֹא אֲחִיכֶם
הַקָּטָן הַזֶּה:

“...as Pharaoh lives, you shall not leave this place unless your youngest brother comes here!

(131) Ps. 95:11

אֲשֶׁר־נִשְׁבַּעְתִּי בְאַפִּי אִם־יָבֹאוּ אֶל־מְנוּחָתִי:

Therefore in my anger I swore, “They shall not enter my rest.”

The complete conditional oath for (131) would presumably be similar to ,אִם־יָבֹאוּ אֶל־מְנוּחָהּ, or something similar that invokes a curse.

While it is true that many conditional oaths are “incomplete” syntactically because they lack the Q (consequent) clause, they are most definitely not communicatively incomplete. Ellipsis is common in everyday language and reflects the Gricean maxim to give as much information as is needed and no more. It is used when a speaker or narrator is certain that the truncated information will not result in a lack of relevance and meaning. Therefore, curses and oaths involving ellipsis should not be considered incomplete. The most probable explanation for the frequent ellipsis of the Q curse clause is language taboo, as Conklin (2011: 4) notes.

In all conditional oaths and vows, ׀ functions as it does in other conditional constructions: it notifies the hearer or reader that a hypothetical scenario will be considered and it prompts the construction of hypothetical mental spaces in which the information will be elaborated. The Q clause mental space in linguistically complete oaths (those that have an overt Q clause) is structured by the linguistic information provided. When the Q clause is not uttered, there is no overt linguistic information available to elaborate a mental space. Since

conditional curses were commonly used throughout the ANE,³⁸⁰ we must assume that the set phrases such as *חַי־יְהוָה* and *וְכֵן יִסְיֵף אֱלֹהִים יַעֲשֶׂה-לְךָ* prompted the semantic frames and domain information associated with curses. Hearers and readers used this background information to schematically elaborate the implied Q clause.

There are 151 *אֶם*-conditional oaths in the BH corpus³⁸¹ and 5 conditional vows.³⁸² Outside of the Psalms, every use is in direct speech. BASE and V-POINT are therefore in the Character Domain. This is expected since oaths and vows are speech-acts that reference post-speech, hypothetical FUTURE eventualities. In the Psalms, the BASE and V-POINT is always either in the Narrator Domain or the Character Domain. When in the Character Domain the oath is in text that is represented as speech, as the following example:

(132) Ps. 89:36

אַחַת נִשְׁבַּעְתִּי בְקֹדֶשׁי אֶם-לִדְוֹד אֶבְזֹב:	“Once and for all I have sworn by my holiness; I will not lie to David.”
---	--

The quote frame that precedes this verse is in 89:19. The Q-clause which would contain the curse is omitted. Although the *qatal* oath-frame verb *נִשְׁבַּעְתִּי* situates the oath as completed or PAST, the P clause verb is *yiqtol*. A perfect *have sworn* construal of *נִשְׁבַּעְתִּי* portrays the effects of the PAST (relative to speech time) oath as current at time of speaking. This permits the FUTURE TIME oriented *yiqtol*. I propose that this shift from *qatal* to *yiqtol* is the result of a shift, not just in V-POINT, but also in what Cutrer designates “a FACT/PREDICTION status in speech domain spaces.” The *qatal* is used to promote a FACT construal relevant at speech time. The mental space configuration which results follows:


³⁸⁰ See Kitz (2014).

³⁸¹ Gen. 14:23 (2x); 21:23; 24:38; 26:29; 31:52 (2x); 42:15, 16, 37; 43:9; Exod. 22:7b; 10; Num. 14:23, 28, 30, 35; 32:11; Deut. 1:35; 32:41; Josh. 14:9; 22:24; Jdg. 11:10; 1 Sam. 3:14, 17; 14:39, 45; 17:55; 19:6; 20:9; 24:7, 22 (2x); 25:22, 34; 26:10, 19b; 28:10; 30:15 (2x); 2 Sam. 3:35; 11:11; 14:11, 19; 15:21a; 19:8, 14; 20:20 (2x); 1 Kgs. 1:51; 2:8; 17:1, 12; 18:10a; 20:10, 23, 25; 2 Kgs. 2:2, 4, 6; 3:14 (2x); 4:30; 5:16, 20; 6:31; 9:26; Neh. 13:25 (2x); Job 1:11; 2:5; 6:28; 17:2; 27:4 (2x), 5; 31:7-8; 9-10; 16, 19, 20, 29, 31, 33, 36, 38, 39; Ps. 7:4 (2x); 7:5; 44:21; 89:36; 95:11; 131:2, 132:3 (2x), 4; 137:5, 6 (2x); Qoh. 2:7; 3:5; 5:8; Isa. 5:9; 8:20; 14:24; 22:14; 62:8 (2x); Jer. 15:11 (2x); 22:6, 24; 38:16 (2x); 42:5, 6 (2x); 44:26; 49:20 (2x); 50:45 (2x); 51:14; Ezek. 5:11; 14:16 (2x), 20 (2x); 16:48; 17:16, 19; 18:3; 20:3, 31, 33; 33:11, 27; 34:8-10; 35:6; 36:5, 7; 38:19; Amos 8:7; Mal. 2:2 (2x); 3:10.

³⁸² Gen. 28:20; Num. 21:2; Jdg. 11:30; 1 Sam. 1:11; 2 Sam. 15:8.

Figure 4.10: Mental Space Configuration of Ps. 89:20b, 36.

...ותאמר... אחת נשבטתי בקדשי אם-לדוד אכזב:



The diagram represents the flow of linguistic information from the speech verb ותאמר that opens a series of spaces in the Character Domain where God's speech in 89:20c onward is represented as direct speech.³⁸³ In 89:36 the speech verb נשבטתי does several things. First, it prompts the construction of embedded direct speech, the actual oath. The *qatal* form indicates that the eventuality is a FACT, relevant at speech time. In the oath, אם prompts the construction of a hypothetical space in which the P clause is elaborated by the linguistic information אם-לדוד אכזב.

³⁸³ The space configuration from vv.20c-35 is not included for two reasons: First, including it would make the diagram too long and secondly, it would obscure the issue under discussion, the oath.

The diagram also seeks to display how the entire conditional oath construction was properly interpreted as an oath with a Q clause. Universally, conditional space builders like *if*, *si* (in Spanish), *se* (in Portuguese) and ׀ typically prompt the construction of two spaces, one for the P clause and a second for the Q clause. This has been demonstrated in diagrams of content conditionals and other ׀ conditionals discussed in this study. Therefore it is reasonable to assume that BH hearers and readers expected Q clauses. Cartledge (1992: 15) proposes that *if* functions as the “reminder” that a curse is invoked when the curse is not enunciated in the Q clause. However, since ׀ does not prompt curse constructions in other conditionals, Cartledge’s proposal is improbable, and inadvisable since it would require enriching ׀’s semantics in an ad hoc manner.

In the Figure 4.10, the space in which נִשְׁבַּעְתִּי is elaborated is colored in order to indicate that the rich frame information associated with swearing an oath is prompted by נִשְׁבַּעְתִּי and becomes available to the hearer/reader as soon as נִשְׁבַּעְתִּי is uttered or read. Frame information includes the fact that oaths are conditionals. Conditional constructions have Q clauses and in oaths, the curse is in the Q clause. If the Q clause is not expressed linguistically, as here, both the culturally supplied frame information and the ׀-conditional construction information instruct the hearer or reader to construct a space for the unexpressed Q clause and fill it schematically. The Access Principle (see Chapter 3.4.1, example (10)) would guide the hearer to identify the speaker of the oath with the curse and YHWH as the one called on to implement the curse. In this verse, YHWH is both and the same.

The traditional stance regarding the meaning of ׀ and ׀־לֹ oath clauses in oaths is that ׀ introduces a negative statement and ׀־לֹ oath clauses express a positive statement. This understanding is stated by van Leeuwen (1973:37):³⁸⁴

Die...Schwurpartikeln *'im*, „gewiss nicht“, und *'im lo*, „gewiss“, aus den Bedingungssätzen wird zwar von den meisten Gelehrten befürwortet, hat aber auch ihre Gegner gefunden. Vor allem hat man es öfters als schwer empfunden die implizierten Selbstverwünschungen im Munde YHWH’s denken zu müssen, wie es z.B. in Deut. i 35 der Fall wäre. Wenn man aber erwägt, dass das Bewusstsein vom eigentlichen Sinn der Schwurformel frühzeitig verloren ging, so dass *'im* einfach die Bedeutung „wahrlich nicht“ und *'im lo* „wahrlich“ ausdrückte, wird dieses Bedenken hinfällig.³⁸⁵

³⁸⁴ See also GKC (§149b); Gogel (1998: 225, 286); J-M (§165); Naudé (2013a: 806).

³⁸⁵ “The idea ... that the oath particle *'im*, has the meaning “certainly not”, and *'im lo* “certainly” is indeed supported by most academics, but does have its opponents. Above all it has often been hard to think out what the implied self-cursing must be in the mouth of YHWH, as would be the case e.g. in Deut. 1:35. When one considers, however, that the awareness of the actual meaning of the cursing formula was lost early on, resulting

The proposed proscription against enunciating the actual curse would be part of this frame so that when the curse was not enunciated, the ׀ and ׀-׀ clauses would still be interpreted conventionally. ׀ clauses would be interpreted as they typically were in conditional clauses: *If I...; ׀-׀* clauses would be interpreted *If I do not... No recourse to “special” usage would be required in the lexicon.³⁹⁰ Whether or not the linguistics of ׀-conditional oaths in which ellipsis of the Q clause occurs should be reflected in translation is a question of the *skopos*³⁹¹ and translation’s brief, and is not a linguistic issue proper.*

The verb frequency in the P and Q clauses in oaths occur as follows:

Table 4.17: Conditional Oath P Clause Verb Forms

<i>Yiqtol</i> ³⁹²	<i>Qatal</i> ³⁹³	Ellipsis ³⁹⁴	<i>Weqatal</i> ³⁹⁵	׀ ³⁹⁶
111 (74%)	28 (19%)	6 (4%)	2	1

Traugott 2012a). However, the use of ׀ and ׀-׀ in curse/oath forms is stable throughout the MT. ׀ and ׀-׀’s use in curse formulas in what is considered Early Biblical Hebrew is identical to its use in texts considered to contain Classical and Late Biblical Hebrew. If context-induced reinterpretation of the particle in this context did occur, it occurred before the current text was fixed, because there are no traces of shift evident in the MT. Further research is required to verify if this shift did occur.

³⁹⁰ Research into negation by linguists and psychologists (Horn 1985: 143-44, 152; Horn 1989) has recognized that negation, such as that found in ׀-׀ clauses, automatically evokes the corresponding positive mental scenario, and sets up an alternative mental space in which the positive alternative is considered (Dancygier (2012) and Sweetser (2006)). Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 29) noted that *There is no milk in the fridge* makes sense only in a context where the positive presence of milk is cognitively available. This suggests an explanation for why the lexicons and translations argue that negative ׀-׀ clauses *mean* the positive alternative.

³⁹¹ See Nord (1997).

³⁹² Gen. 14:23b; 21:23; 26:29; 28:20; 31:52 (2x); 42:15; Num. 14:23, 28, 30, 35; 21:2; 32:11; Deut. 1:35; Josh. 14:9; Jdg. 11:10, 30; 1 Sam. 1:11; 3:14, 17; 14:45; 19:6; 20:9; 24:7, 22 (2x); 25:22; 26:10; 28:10; 30:15 (2x); 2 Sam. 3:35; 11:11; 14:11; 15:8, 21a; 19:8, 14; 20:20 (2x); 1 Kgs. 1:51; 2:8; 17:1; 20:10, 23, 25; 2 Kgs. 2:2, 4, 6; 3:14 (2x); 4:30; 5:16; 6:31; Neh. 13:25 (2x); 1 Chron. 4:10; Job 1:11; 2:5; 6:28; 27:4 (2x), 5; 31:7-8, 16, 19, 29, 36, 38; Ps. 89:36; 95:11; 132:3 (2x); 132:4; 137:5, 6 (2x); Song 2:7; 3:5; 5:8; Isa. 5:9; 8:20; 22:14; 62:8 (2x); Jer. 22:6, 24; 38:16 (2x); 42:5; 44:26; 49:20 (2x); 50:45 (2x); Ezek. 5:11; 14:16b, 20b; 17:16; 18:3; 20:3, 31, 33; 33:11, 27; 36:7; 38:19; Amos 8:7; Mal. 2:2 (2x); 3:10.

³⁹³ Exod. 22:7b, 10; Deut. 32:41; Josh. 22:24; 1 Sam. 17:55; 25:34; 2 Kgs. 5:20; 9:26; Job 31:7-8, 9-10, 20, 21, 31, 33, 39; Ps. 7:4a, 5; 44:21; 31:2; Isa. 14:24; Jer. 15:11 (2x); 51:14; Ezek. 16:48; 33:27; 35:6; 36:5.

³⁹⁴ Gen. 14:23a; 42:16; 1 Sam. 26:19b; Job 17:2; Jer. 42:6 (2x).

³⁹⁵ Ezek. 17:19; 34:8-10.

³⁹⁶ Ps. 7:4b.

Table 4.18: Conditional Oath Q Clause Verb Forms³⁹⁷

<i>Yiqtol</i> ³⁹⁸	<i>Weqatal</i> ³⁹⁹	אֵין ⁴⁰⁰	<i>Qatal</i> ⁴⁰¹	Participle ⁴⁰²
17 (63%)	7 (26%)	1 (4%)	1 (4%)	1 (4%)

There is a clear preference for *yiqtol*s in both P and in the Q clause (when it is expressed). In content conditionals, I demonstrated that *yiqtol*s are the preferred verb form for referencing post-speech eventualities in direct speech conditionals. Every conditional oath that occurs in narrative, Job and the prophets is in direct speech. In the Psalms, most conditional oaths are in a participant's direct speech, such as in (132) above. The five that are not in direct speech⁴⁰³ are in the Narrator Domain, written from BASE of the narrator/writer. This results in all deictic references being parallel to those in direct speech. This preference is maintained in אֵין-conditional curses as can be seen in (133) where the *yiqtol* references a post-speech eventuality.

(133) Ezek. 20:3

בְּנֵי־אָדָם דַּבֵּר אֶת־זַקְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְאָמַרְתָּ אֲלֵהֶם כֹּה
אָמַר אֲדֹנָי יְהוִה הַלְדֹרֵשׁ אֶתִּי אַתֶּם בְּאֵים חֵי־אֲנִי
אִם־אֲדַרְשׁ לָכֶם נָאִם אֲדֹנָי יְהוִה:

“Son of man, speak to the elders of Israel, and tell them: ‘This is what the sovereign Lord says: Are you coming to seek me? As surely as I live, I will not allow you to seek me, declares the sovereign Lord. (NIV)

This preference is so strong that with the exception of the oaths found in Job 31, every P clause *yiqtol* references a FUTURE TIME eventuality. The exceptions occur in the final speech in Job 31:7, 16, 19, 20, 9, 36 and 38. Clines (2006: 978) comments that the “distinctive form in this speech is the oath of purification, sometimes called an “oath of clearance,” which “would have been spoken after the failure of pre-trial arbitration.” If his understanding of the form is correct, then it follows that the oath curses would refer to events prior to the speech since the purpose would have been to declare oneself innocent of charges. Accordingly past or present perfect verb forms are used in all English, Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch and German

³⁹⁷ The paucity of verbs reflects Q-clause ellipsis. Q-clauses occur 27 times. The percentages for the verbs are based on this figure and excludes the apocopated Q clauses, which occur 199 times or 82% of all Q clauses.

³⁹⁸ 1 Sam. 3:17; 14:39; 2 Sam. 19:14; 1 Kgs. 20:10; Job 31:7-8, 9-10, 21, 38, 39; Ps. 7:5; 44:21; 37:5, 6b; Jer. 22:24; 42:6 (2x); Ezek. 35:6.

³⁹⁹ Gen. 28:20; Num. 21:2; Jdg. 11:30; 1 Sam. 1:11; 2 Sam. 15:8; 19:8; 1 Chron. 4:10.

⁴⁰⁰ 1 Sam. 8:20.

⁴⁰¹ Isa. 14:24.

⁴⁰² 1 Sam. 26:19b.

⁴⁰³ Ps. 7:4 (2x), 5; 137:5-6.

translations. The *yiqtol* forms are interspersed among *qatal* forms. The current state of understanding of BH offers no explanation for why these *yiqtol* forms were chosen and how they were construed differently than the surrounding *qatal* forms.

Most of the P clause *qatal* forms,⁴⁰⁴ reference pre-speech eventualities and thus locate the action in PAST TIME, as in (134).⁴⁰⁵

(134) Josh. 22:24

וְאִם-לֹא מִדְּאָגָהּ מִדְּבָר עָשִׂינוּ אֶת-זֹאת לְאֹמֶר
מִחֹר יֹאמְרוּ בְּנֵיכֶם לְבָנֵינוּ לְאֹמֶר מִה-לָּכֶם וְלִיהוָה
אֱלֹהֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל:

“If we did not do this because we were worried that in the future your descendents would say to ours, ‘What part do you have with YHWH, God of Israel?,’ [may we be cursed].” (My translation).

The *qatal* verb עָשִׂינוּ refers to the building of an altar in Josh. 22:10, which occurred prior to the speech event, hence PAST. The actual curse is apocopated.

The *qatal* grams in (135) appear to be used primarily to promote epistemic doubt or distance via the PAST time frame semantics of the *qatal*:

(135) Ps. 7:4-6 (Eng. 3-5)

יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵי אִם-עָשִׂיתִי זֹאת אִם-יִשְׁעוּל בְּכַפֵּי
אִם-גָּמַלְתִּי שׂוֹלְמֵי רָע וְאֶחְלָצָה צוֹרְרֵי רִיקָם:
כִּי-רָדַף אוֹיְבִי נִפְשִׁי וַיִּשָּׂג וַיִּרְמָס לְאַרְצָ חַיִּי וַכְּבוֹדִי
לְעַפְר יִשְׁבֶּן סֵלָה:

³O LORD my God, if I have done this, if there is wrong in my hands, ⁴if I have repaid my ally with harm or plundered my foe without cause, ⁵then let the enemy pursue and overtake me, trample my life to the ground, and lay my soul in the dust.

As was seen in other direct speech narrative conditionals, *qatals* primarily promote a pre-speech, PAST TIME construal. This is the unmarked construal. But, the *qatal* gram is also used for epistemic distancing to cast doubt on the assertion, as was discussed regarding the conditionals in 2 Kgs. 7:4, example (16) above.

⁴⁰⁴ Exod. 22:7b, 10; Deut. 32:41; 1 Sam. 17:55; 25:34; 2 Kgs. 5:20; 9:26; Job 31:7-8, 9-10, 20, 21, 31, 33, 39; Ps. 7:4a, 5; 44:21; 31:2; Isa. 14:24; Jer. 15:11 (2x); 51:14; Ezek. 16:48; 33:27; 35:6; 36:5. The text of Jer. 15:11 has manuscript issues. Commentaries are deeply divided about multiple questions in this verse. See Thompson (1980: 391-393) for a discussion of the issues.

⁴⁰⁵ These include Exod. 22:7b, 10; Josh. 22:24; 2 Kgs. 9:26; Job 31:7-8, 9-10, 20, 21, 31, 33, 39; 44:21; 131:2; Isa. 14:24; Ezek. 16:48; 36:5. Some such as Job 31:20, 21 may profile perfectivity, which is typically associated with a past time frame.

Only 27 Q clauses of conditional curses in oaths are explicit.⁴⁰⁶ In these, BH shows a strong preference for the *yiqtol*, followed by the *weqatal*. Together they are used in 89% of these clauses.

The five conditional vows⁴⁰⁷ in the corpus include Gen. 28:20; Num. 21:2; Jdg. 11:30; 1 Sam. 1:11; 2 Sam. 15:8. As noted above, vows are distinguished from oaths in that they are always directed toward the deity and never involve a curse. They share conditionality with curses. *Yiqtols* are used in the P clauses of all 5 vows. In 4 of the 5, infinitive absolute-*yiqtol* sequences occur. It is generally maintained that the infinitive absolute-*yiqtol* sequence indicated a strong commitment to the assertion of the verb.⁴⁰⁸ Since vows are negotiations, we would expect the person making the vow to attempt to convince YHWH of his commitment to fulfill his end of the deal. The infinitive absolute-*yiqtol* sequence met this need.

In summary, in all conditional oaths and vows, $\square\aleph$ functions as it does in all conditional constructions to alert the hearer or reader that a hypothetical scenario will be considered and prompt the construction of hypothetical mental spaces in which the information will be elaborated. The *yiqtol* is the preferred verb form in both P and Q clauses. When *qatals* occur in P clauses, they typically reference pre-speech eventualities or evoke epistemic distance.

4.3.5. $\square\aleph$ Speech-Act Promises and Threats

Austin and Searle classify promises and threats (or warnings) as different categories of speech-acts; Bach and Harnish do also. I will, however, discuss conditional promises and threats together because of how the BH writers used them. Austin classified promises as commissives because they “commit the speaker to a certain course of action” (1962: 157-158). Searle notes that “the essential feature of a promise is that it is a “pledge” or “obligation” to do something for someone (1969: 58-60; 71). In contrast, Austin classifies warnings (or threats) in the same category, behabitives, as he does curses. Searle however discusses them alongside promises because a threat is a commitment or pledge to do something. The crucial distinction being that a promise is a “pledge to do something for you, not to you. A threat is a pledge to do something to you, not for you” (Searle 1969: 58).

⁴⁰⁶ Gen. 28:20; Num. 21:2; Jdg. 11:30; 1 Sam. 1:11; 3:17; 14:39; 26:19b; 2 Sam. 15:8; 19:8, 14; 1 Kgs. 20:10; 1 Job 31:7-8, 31:9-10, 31:21, 38, 39; Ps. 7:5; 44:21; 37:5, 6b; Isa. 8:20; 14:24; Jer. 22:24; 42:6 (2x); Ezek. 35:6; 1 Chron. 4:10.

⁴⁰⁷ See Cartledge (1992) for a thorough discussion of BH and ANE vows.

⁴⁰⁸ BHRG (1999: §20.2); GKC (§113); J-M (§123d); IBHS (1990: 581-582); Lambdin (1971: 158). See also Cartledge (1992: 144-147) on the use of the infinitive absolute-*yiqtol* in vows. This construction may reflect a case of intersubjectification processes, defined by Traugott (2012b: 9) as “the development of markers that encode the Speaker’s (or Writer’s) attention to the cognitive stances and social identities of the Addressee.”

Conditional promises occur in BH 87 times;⁴⁰⁹ conditional threats occur 61 times⁴¹⁰ and are paired with and follow conditional promises 30 times.⁴¹¹ Examples of conditional promises include:

(136) Isa. 58:9b-10

...אִם־תִּסְרֹם מִתּוֹכָךְ מוֹטֶה שְׁלַח אֶצְבְּע וְדַבֵּר־
אָנוּ: ¹⁰וְתִפֵּק לָרֵעִב נִפְשֶׁךָ וְנִפְשׁ נַעֲנֶה תִשְׁבְּעֵם
וְזָרַח בְּחֹשֶׁךְ אוֹרְךָ וְאֶפְלֹתֶךָ כַּצֹּהָרִים:

⁹...If you remove the yoke from among you, the pointing of the finger, the speaking of evil, ¹⁰if you offer your food to the hungry and satisfy the needs of the afflicted, then your light shall rise in the darkness and your gloom be like the noonday.

(137) Josh. 2:14

וַיֹּאמְרוּ לָהּ הָאֲנָשִׁים נַפְשֵׁנוּ תַחְתִּיכֶם לְמוֹת אִם
לֹא תִגִּידוּ אֶת־דְּבָרֵנוּ זֶה וְהָיָה בְּתַת־יְהוָה לָנוּ
אֶת־הָאָרֶץ וְעָשִׂינוּ עִמָּךְ חֶסֶד וְאֶמֶת:

The men said to her, “Our life for yours! If you do not tell this business of ours, then we will deal kindly and faithfully with you when the Lord gives us the land.”

In (138) a threat follows the promise. The promise is conditioned on obeying YHWH; the threat is based on the condition of refusing to obey and rebelling against YHWH:

⁴⁰⁹ Gen. 13:9 (2x); 18:26, 28, 30; 24:8, 41; 34:15; 43:4, 5; 44:26; Exod. 15:26; Lev. 26:3-4; Num. 12:6; 20:19; 22:34; 32:20a, 20b-22; Deut. 11:13-14, 22; 15:4-5; 28:1; 30:4; Josh. 2:14, 19; Jdg. 4:8 (2x); 11:9; 14:12, 13; Ruth 3:13b; 1 Sam. 11:3; 12:14; 17:9a; 21:5b; 2 Sam. 10:11b; 1 Kgs. 1:52a; 2:4; 3:14; 6:12; 8:25; 9:4; 11:38; 21:2, 6; 2 Kgs. 18:23; 21:8; 1 Chron. 12:18; 19:12b; 28:7; 2 Chron. 6:16; 7:13b-14, 17-18; 20:9; 30:9; 33:8; Neh. 1:9; Job 34:32; Ps. 132:12; Prov. 4:12; Isa. 1:18 (2x), 19; 4:4-5?; 36:8; 58:9-10, 13-14; Jer. 2:22; 4:1 (2x); 5:1 (2x); 7:5 (2x); 12:16; 15:19 (2x); 17:24; 22:4; 38:17; 42:6 (2x), 10; Nah. 1:12; 3:12; Zech. 3:7 (2x); 6:15. Additional examples may include Num. 22:18; 24:13; Jdg. 13:16b; 1 Kgs. 13:8; Job 30:24. Dallaire (2014: 112) discusses examples such as these and others including Gen. 13:9; 43:4 as examples of *declarations*. A promise is a declaration of intent, so the difference, if any is minimal. Their use as speech-acts would not change.

⁴¹⁰ Gen. 34:15; Exod. 7:27; 8:17; 9:2; 10:4; 22:22 (2x); Lev. 5:1; 17:16; 19:7; 20:4-5; 26:14, 15 (2x), 18, 21, 23, 27; Num. 32:23; Deut. 8:19; 11:28; 28:15, 58; 30:17; Josh. 2:20; 7:12; 23:12; 1 Sam. 2:16; 12:15, 25; 17:9b; 2 Sam. 17:13; 1 Kgs. 1:52b; 9:6; 20:39; 2 Chron. 7:19; Job 13:10; Ps. 89:31; 89:32; Isa. 1:20; 10:22; 12:17; 13:17; 17:27; 22:5; 23:38; 26:4; 37:10; 38:18, 21; 42:13, 15; Hos. 9:12; Amos 6:9; 9:2 (2x), 3 (2x), 4; Ob. 4 (2x); 5 9 (2x); Zech. 14:18.

⁴¹¹ Gen. 34:17; Exod. 7:27; Lev. 17:16; 19:7; 20:4-5; 26:14; Num. 32:23; Deut. 8:19; 11:28; 28:15; 30:17; Josh. 2:20; 1 Sam. 2:16; 12:15, 25; 17:9b; 2 Sam. 17:13; 1 Kgs. 1:52b; 9:6; 2 Chron. 7:19; Isa. 1:20; Jer. 12:17; 13:17; 17:27; 22:5; 23:38; 38:18, 21; 42:13; Zech. 14:18.

(138) Isa. 1:19-20

19 אִם-תֵּאָבֹדוּ וְשִׁמְעֵתֶם טוֹב הָאָרֶץ תֹּאכְלוּ: 20 וְאִם-
תִּמְאָנֻ וְיִמְרִיתֶם חֶרֶב תֹּאכְלוּ כִּי פִי יְהוָה דִּבֶּר:

¹⁹If you are willing and obedient, you shall eat the good of the land; ²⁰but if you refuse and rebel, you shall be devoured by the sword; for the mouth of the LORD has spoken.

In (139) YHWH promises blessing, וְנִבְנוּ בְּתוֹךְ עַמִּי if foreigners learn his ways, but if they do not, in 12:17, he threatens them with destruction:

(139) Jer. 12:16-17

16 וְהָיָה אִם-לָמַד יִלְמְדוּ אֶת-דְּרָכַי עַמִּי לְהִשָּׁבַע
בְּשֵׁמִי חַי-יְהוָה כַּאֲשֶׁר לָמְדוּ אֶת-עַמִּי לְהִשָּׁבַע
בְּבַעַל וְנִבְנוּ בְּתוֹךְ עַמִּי: 17 וְאִם לֹא יִשְׁמְעוּ
וְנִתְשָׁתִי אֶת-הַגּוֹי הַהוּא נְתוּשׁ וְאֶבֶד נְאֻם-יְהוָה:

¹⁶“And then, if they will [indeed] learn the ways of my people, to swear by my name, “As the Lord lives,” as they taught my people to swear by Baal, then they shall be built up in the midst of my people. ¹⁷But if any nation will not listen, then I will completely uproot it and destroy it,” says the Lord.

The verbs used in conditional promises and threats pattern as follows:

Table 4.19: Conditional Promises P Clause Verb Forms

<i>Yiqtol</i> ⁴¹²	Verbless ⁴¹³	<i>Qatal</i> ⁴¹⁴	Ellipsis ⁴¹⁵	Participle ⁴¹⁶	שׁ, אִין ⁴¹⁷
71 (82%)	7 (8%)	3 (4%)	2	2	2

⁴¹² Gen. 18:26, 28, 30; 24:8, 41; 34:15; Exod. 15:26; Lev. 26:3-4; Num. 12:6; 20:19; 22:34; 32:20 (2x); ; Deut. 11:13-14, 22; 15:4-5; 28:1; 30:4; Josh. 2:14, 19; Jdg. 4:8 (2x); 14:12, 13; Ruth 3:13b; 1 Sam. 12:14; 17:9a; 2 Sam. 10:11b; 1 Kgs. 1:52a; 2:4; 3:14; 6:12; 8:25; 9:4; 11:38; 2Kgs. 18:23; 21:8; 1 Chron. 19:12b; 28:7; 2 Chron. 6:16; 7:13b-14, 7:17-18; 20:9; 30:9; 33:8; Ps. 132:12; Prov. 4:12; Isa. 1:18 (2x), 19; 36:8; 58:9-10, 13-14; Jer. 2:22; 4:1 (2x); 5:1a; 7:5 (2x); 12:16; 15:19 (2x); 17:24; 22:4; 38:17; 42:10; Nah. 3:12; Zech. 3:7 (2x); 6:15.

⁴¹³ Gen. 44:26; Num. 22:34; 1 Sam. 11:3; 1 Kgs. 21:2, 6; Jer. 42:6a; Nah. 1:12.

⁴¹⁴ 1 Chron. 12:18; Job 34:32; Isa. 4:4.

⁴¹⁵ Gen. 13:9 (2x).

⁴¹⁶ Jdg. 11:9; Neh. 1:9.

⁴¹⁷ Gen. 43:4, 5.

Table 4.20: Conditional Promises Q Clause Verb Forms

<i>Yiqtol</i> ⁴¹⁸	<i>Weqatal</i> ⁴¹⁹	<i>Wayyiqtol</i> ⁴²⁰	<i>Qatal</i> ⁴²¹	Verbless	Ellipsis
39 (44%)	38 (44%)	2	1	1	1

Table 4.21: Conditional Threats P Clause Verb Forms

<i>Yiqtol</i> ⁴²²	Participle ⁴²³	<i>Qatal</i> ⁴²⁴	Ellipsis	יָסַח
54 (88%)	5 (8%)	1	1	1

Table 4.22: Conditional Threats Q Clause Verb Forms

<i>Weqatal</i> ⁴²⁵	<i>Yiqtol</i> ⁴²⁶	Participle ⁴²⁷	<i>Qatal</i> ⁴²⁸	Verbless ⁴²⁹
26 (43%)	21 (34%)	4 (6%)	3 (5%)	2

In both conditional promises and threat P clauses *yiqtols* are overwhelmingly preferred. Promises and threats always involve something that will be done for or to someone after the speech-act. Saying *I will give you a gift yesterday* or *I will kill you last week* is nonsensical. *Yiqtols* are the preferred gram for construing post-speech eventualities in $\square\aleph$ conditionals.

Consequently, the parsimonious use of *qatals* in the P clause of both conditional promises and threats is not surprising. As has been demonstrated above, in $\square\aleph$ conditionals occurring

⁴¹⁸ Gen. 13:9 (2x); 18:28, 30; 43:4, 5; Exod. 15:26; Num. 12:6; 22:34; Deut. 15:4-5; 30:4; Jdg. 4:8b; 11:9; 1 Kgs. 1:52a; 2:4; 8:25; 21:2, 6; 2 Kgs. 21:8; 1 Chron. 12:18; 2 Chron. 6:16; 7:13b-14; 20:9; 30:9; 33:8; Neh. 1:9; Job 34:32; Ps. 132:12; Prov. 4:12; Isa. 1:18 (2x), 19; 36:8; 58:13-14; Jer. 15:19 (2x); 42:6a; Zech. 3:7b.

⁴¹⁹ Gen. 18:26; 24:8, 41; 34:15; 44:26; Lev. 26:3-4; Num. 20:19; 32:20b-22; Deut. 11:13-14, 22; 28:1; Josh. 2:14; Jdg. 4:8a; 14:12, 13; Ruth 3:13b; 1 Sam. 11:3; 17:9a; 2 Sam. 10:11b; 1 Kgs. 3:14; 6:12; 9:4; 11:38; 1 Chron. 19:12b; 28:7; 2 Chron. 7:17-18; Isa. 4:4-5; 58:9-10; Jer. 4:1b; 7:5 (2x); 12:16; 17:24; 22:4; 38:17; 42:10; Nah. 3:12; Zech. 6:15.

⁴²⁰ 2 Kgs. 18:23; Jer. 5:1b.

⁴²¹ Num. 32:17; Nah. 1:12.

⁴²² Gen. 34:17; Exod. 22:22 (2x); Lev. 5:1; 17:16; 19:7; 20:4-5; 26:14, 15 (2x); 26:18, 21, 23, 27; Num. 32:17, 23; Deut. 8:19; 11:28; 28:15, 58; 30:17; Josh. 2:20; 7:12; 23:12; 1 Sam. 12:15, 25; 17:9b; 2 Sam. 17:13; 1 Kgs. 1:52b; 9:6; 20:39; 2 Chron. 7:19; Job 13:10; Ps. 89:31, 32; Isa. 1:20; 10:22; Jer. 12:17; 13:17; 17:27; 22:5; 23:38; 26:4; 38:18; 42:15; Hos. 9:12; Amos 6:9; 9:2 (2x), 3 (2x), 4; Ob. 4 (2x); Zech. 14:18.

⁴²³ Exod. 7:27; 9:2; 10:4; Jer. 38:21; 42:13.

⁴²⁴ Jer. 37:10.

⁴²⁵ Gen. 34:17; Lev. 5:1; 17:16; 20:4-5; 26:18, 21, 23, 27; Deut. 28:15, 58; Josh. 2:20; 1 Sam. 12:15; 17:9b; 2 Sam. 17:13; 1 Kgs. 1:52b; 9:6; 20:39; 2 Chron. 7:19; Ps. 89:32; Jer. 12:17; 17:27; 26:4; 38:18; 42:15; Hos. 9:12; Amos 6:9.

⁴²⁶ Exod. 22:22b; Lev. 26:15b; Deut. 8:19; 30:17; Josh. 7:12; 23:12; 1 Sam. 12:25; Job 13:10; Isa. 1:20; 10:22; Jer. 13:17; 22:5; 37:10; Amos 9:2 (2x); 3 (2x), 4; Ob. 4 (2x); Zech. 14:18.

⁴²⁷ Exod. 7:27; 8:17; 9:2; 10:4.

⁴²⁸ Num. 32:23; 1 Sam. 2:16; Jer. 23:38.

⁴²⁹ Lev. 19:7; Jer. 38:21.

in direct speech, *qatal*s are typically used to refer to pre-speech PAST TIME eventualities.⁴³⁰ In conditionals promises and threats, they are used twice (140) and (141) to reference real-world PAST events and once (142) to an epistemically distanced PAST.⁴³¹ The *qatal*s in (140) and (141) occur in speech and reference pre-speech eventualities. PAST eventualities impacting speech time are construable as perfects, seen in the translation in (140) and (141). BASE and V-POINT are in the Character domain so all temporal deictics are determined from within that domain:

(140) 1 Chron. 12:18a

וַיֵּצֵא דָוִד לִפְגִּיָּהֶם וַיֵּטֵן וַיֹּאמֶר לָהֶם אִם-לִשְׁלוֹם
בְּאַתֶּם אֵלַי לְעִזְרָנִי יְהִי־הָ לִי עֲלֵיכֶם לִבָּב לְיַחַד...

David went out to meet them and said to them, “If you have come to me in friendship, to help me, then my heart will be knit to you;...”

(141) Job 34:32

בְּלַעַדִּי אֶחְזֶה אֶתְּהָ הֲרֵנִי אִם-עָוֹל פָּעַלְתִּי לֹא
אֶסִּיף:

“teach me what I do not see; if I have done iniquity, I will do it no more?”

In (140), after the Benjaminites arrive at David’s fortress, he speaks with them and בְּאַתֶּם references their prior arrival. In Job 34 Elihu addresses Job and his friends. His theme is Job’s rebelliousness against God. Clines observes that “Elihu will allow Job some dignity: he does not have to denigrate himself before God, but simply to concede that he has been “misled, misguided, beguiled”.⁴³² *Qatal* פָּעַלְתִּי is used to refer to sins committed by Job prior to his affliction.

I propose that the *qatal* in (142) is used to create epistemic distance⁴³³ and thus allow the addressee to infer that the speaker doubts that the eventuality will occur. This is similar to the uses of *qatal* forms in Jer. 23:22 (example (17)) and Ezek. 3:6 (see above 4.1.1.2).

⁴³⁰ See section 4.1.1.2 above.

⁴³¹ See discussion following example (16).

⁴³² Clines (2006: 783).

⁴³³ See Fleishman (1989, 1990); Dancygier and Sweetser (2005, 2012) for discussions of past verb forms and epistemic distance.

(142) Jer. 37:9-10

9 כֹּה־אָמַר יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵי־יִשְׂרָאֵל נִפְשֵׁתִיכֶם לֵאמֹר הֲלֹךְ
 יֵלְכוּ מֵעַלְיָנוּ הַכַּשְׂדִּים כִּי־לֹא יֵלְכוּ: ¹⁰כִּי אִם־
 הִבִּיתֶם כָּל־חַיִּל בְּשָׂדֵי־הַנְּלַחֲמִים אִתְּכֶם וְנִשְׂאָרוֹ
 בָּם אֲנָשִׁים מְדַקְרִים אִישׁ בְּאֶהְלוֹ יָקוּמוּ וְשָׂרְפוּ
 אֶת־הָעִיר הַזֹּאת בָּאֵשׁ:

⁹Thus says the Lord: Do not deceive yourselves, saying, “The Chaldeans will surely go away from us,” for they will not go away. ¹⁰For even if you defeated the whole army of Chaldeans who are fighting against you, and there remained of them only wounded men in their tents, they would rise up and burn this city with fire.

It should be noted that most translations in English⁴³⁴ and Spanish⁴³⁵ translate this use of the ׀-conditional construction as concessive *even if* or *even though* or *aunque* in Spanish. I posit that this concessive interpretation of the construction is what Croft and Cruse (2004: 98) call a “contextualized interpretation.” Although BH did not lexicalize an equivalent to the *even if/though/although* construction, as English and many other Indo-European languages do,⁴³⁶ a context-motivated construal cannot be ruled out. Concessive conditionals use hypothetical reasoning and invoke scalar interpretations. They make a prediction that denies “the validity of these [alternative] scenarios” (Dancygier and Sweetser: 2005: 158) and assert that only one of possibilities that could be entertained is true. The concessive construal is available *in translation* with ׀ conditionals because the particle prompts the construction of hypothetical mental spaces in which conditional constructions are typically elaborated, and if the hearer/reader is able to construe multiple (scalar) scenarios based on the context, a concessive interpretation is invoked. Although a concessive reading of the ׀-conditional in (142) appears to be contextually motivated by the warning in verse 9, a non-concessive conditional reading is also acceptable. It is important to note that whenever concessive conditionals appear in translation, they reflect the translator’s contextually motivate construal of the ׀ construction.

The use of the *qatal* in (143) is an analytical challenge. It occurs in a coordinate P clause where the second verb is a *yiqtol*.

⁴³⁴ See CEB, CEV, ESV, NASB; NCV, NET, NIV, NLT, NRSV.

⁴³⁵ DHH, LBJ76, NTV, PDPT, RV, RV95.

⁴³⁶ See Dancygier and Sweetser (2005: 155-168); Declerck and Reed (2001: 461-471) and König (1986) for more on concessives. On scalar implicature see (Fauconnier 1975a, b).

(143) Isa. 4:3-5

וְהָיָה | הַנִּשְׁאַר בְּצִיּוֹן וְהַנּוֹתָר בִּירוּשָׁלַם קְדוֹשׁ
 יֵאמָר לוֹ כָּל-הַכֹּתוּב לַחַיִּים בִּירוּשָׁלַם: ⁴אִם | רָחַץ
 אֲדֹנָי אֶת צִנְיָת בְּנוֹת-צִיּוֹן וְאֶת-דְּמֵי יְרוּשָׁלַם יְדִיחַ
 מִקְרָבָהּ בְּרוּחַ מְשַׁפֵּט וּבְרוּחַ בָּעֵר: ⁵וּבְרָא יְהוָה
 עַל-כָּל-מְכוֹן הַר-צִיּוֹן וְעַל-מִקְרָאָהּ עָנָן | יוֹמָם
 וְעֶשֶׂן וְנֹגֵה אֵשׁ לְהִבָּה לַיְלָה כִּי עַל-כָּל-כְּבוֹד
 חֲפָה:

³Whoever is left in Zion and remains in Jerusalem will be called holy, everyone who has been recorded for life in Jerusalem, ⁴when the Lord has washed away the filth of the daughters of Zion and cleansed the bloodstains of Jerusalem from its midst by a spirit of judgment and by a spirit of burning. ⁵Then the Lord will create over the whole site of Mount Zion and over its places of assembly a cloud by day and smoke and the shining of a flaming fire by night. Indeed over all the glory there will be a canopy.

Before discussing the verbal situation, the contribution that ׀ makes to the interpretation of the passage will be examined. Every translation in English chooses to translate the ׀ clause in (143) as temporal *when* or *once*. None translates it as a conditional. I have shown that this interpretation is licensed when a positive epistemic stance taken by the text toward the eventualities from Isa. 4:2 onward. See the discussion above, example (73). We have also seen that in conditional constructions (where ׀ stands at the head of the P clause), the particle marks the P clause as the background in which the Q clause is understood to be valid. In content and generic conditionals, which can license *when* interpretations, the P clause is typically assumed to be causally related to the Q clause. I suggest that the reason ׀ is used here is to indicate that the eventualities רָחַץ and יְדִיחַ are background causal factors required for those in verse 5 to be realized.

Several contextual considerations are critical in the temporal construal of רָחַץ *qatal*. First, in verse 4:2, the temporal setting is determined by בְּיוֹם הַהוּא, which promotes a FUTURE, post-speech temporal reference interpretation. This temporal setting is reaffirmed in 4:3 by the use of וְהָיָה, which also promotes a FUTURE, post-speech temporal construal, as does יֵאמָר. In this context of futurity the *qatal* רָחַץ is used.⁴³⁷ Oswalt (1986) translates the verb as future perfect *will have washed*, while Blenkinsopp (2000) and Wildberger (1991) choose the present perfect *has washed*. None of these discuss the verb form shifts noted here or between *qatal* רָחַץ and the following *yiqtol* יְדִיחַ. I propose that the *qatal* is used here to profile the end point of the eventuality. This strengthens the semantics of contingency and causality contributed by

⁴³⁷ Note that LXX translates רָחַץ with a future indicative ἐκαλυψεῖ.

ⲙⲛ that the washing and cleansing must be terminated before the (re)creation in verse 5 can begin. The present and future perfect translations that Oswalt, Blenkinsopp and Wildberger’s translator chose reflect the best attempts to capture the semantics of contingency. The exegetical and translation process BH scholars often engage in is noted by Gibbs, Jr. and Colston (2012: 137): “Scholars can stand back and consciously link particular types of [verbal] meaning with specific types of cognitive processes, but they do so “after the fact” of understanding. People typically create “good enough” interpretations...without having to consciously decide beforehand how to go about understanding the meaning.”

As previously indicated, conditional threats are paired with conditional promises 30 times.⁴³⁸ They present alternate situations for the addressee’s consideration in order to encourage obedience to the promise’s condition. If the condition stipulated by the P clause is not fulfilled, then the threat becomes a possibility. Conditional threat P clauses that are paired with conditional promises are headed by ⲙⲛⲓ in 25 of 30 instances.⁴³⁹ Of the remaining that do not, Deut. 8:19; 28:15 are headed by ⲙⲛ ⲓⲛⲓⲛⲓ. Note that in 1 Kgs. 9:6, there is a textual issue with ⲙⲛ; the LXX, Syriac and Vulgate all add ⲙⲛⲓ.

As noted above in section 4.1.1.2 in the discussion of example (16), the semantics of ⲓ are very schematic. The fact that most discussions of the conjunction do little more than offer a taxonomy of the diverse syntactic environments in which it occurs, and offer few proposals regarding its semantics reveals that assigning a precise meaning within traditional semantic categories is challenging. The conjunction’s semantics are clearly very schematic. It is likely that ⲓ does nothing more than instruct the reader/hearer to construe meaning based on the contextual semantic and/or thematic relationship between the preceding and following clauses or sentences. I propose that this is how it functions with ⲙⲛ in the above-noted conditional promise-threat pairs—it instructs the reader to seek a semantic relationship between the second conditional, the threat, and the conditional promise. This relationship of contrast requires little cognitive effort.

The uses of ⲙⲛⲓ which do not occur in conditional promise-threat pairs include: Lev. 26:18, 21, 23, 27; Amos 9:2b, 3a, 3b, 4; Ob. 4b. In these instances the construction also serves to alert

⁴³⁸ Gen. 34:17; Exod. 7:27; Lev. 17:16; 19:7; 20:4-5; 26:14; Num. 32:23; Deut. 8:19; 11:28; 28:15; 30:17; Josh. 2:20; 1 Sam. 2:16; 12:15, 25; 17:9b; 2 Sam. 17:13; 1 Kgs. 1:52b; 9:6; 2 Chron. 7:19; Isa. 1:20; Jer. 12:17; 13:17; 17:27; 22:5; 23:38; 38:18, 21; 42:13; Zech. 14:18.

⁴³⁹ Gen. 34:17; Exod. 7:27; Lev. 17:16; 19:7; 20:4-5; 26:14; Num. 32:23; 30:17; Josh. 2:20; 1 Sam. 2:16; 12:15, 25; 17:9b; 2 Sam. 17:13; 1 Kgs. 1:52b; 2 Chron. 7:19; Isa. 1:20; Jer. 12:17; 13:17; 17:27; 22:5; 23:38; 38:18, 21; Zech. 14:18.

the reader that the ׀ conditional threat should be considered in relationship to the preceding information.

(144) Lev. 26:17-18

וְנִתַּתִּי פְנֵי בְּכֶם וְנִגְפְתֶם לְפָנַי אֲיִבֵיכֶם וְרָדוּ
 בְּכֶם שְׂנְאֵיכֶם וְנִסְתֶם וְאִין־רָדוּ אֶתְכֶם: ׀
 וְאִם־עַד־אֶלֶּה לֹא תִשְׁמְעוּ לִי וְיִסְפְתִי לְיִסְרָה
 אֶתְכֶם שִׁבְעַ עַל־חַטֹּאתֵיכֶם:

¹⁷“I will set my face against you, and you shall be struck down by your enemies; your foes shall rule over you, and you shall flee though no one pursues you. ¹⁸And if in spite of this you will not obey me, I will continue to punish you sevenfold for your sins.”

In Lev. 26:18, 21, 23 and 27 relationship construal is also promoted by the use of two other strategies. First, anaphoric deictic phrases such as עַד־אֶלֶּה (26:18), בְּאֶלֶּה (26:23), בְּזֹאת (26:27) contribute to establishing the relationship that the ׀ in ׀ initiates. Secondly, negative לֹא (26:18, 23, 27) promotes an alternate construal and an alternate is by definition linked to its alternative. In contrast, 26:21, promotes an additive “that and even more” interpretation by the use of ׀.

In summary, the use of ׀ in conditional promises and threats is consistent with its use in content, generic and other speech-act conditionals. It functions to inform the hearer/reader that a hypothetical scenario will be considered and to prompt the construction of hypothetical mental spaces in which the information will be elaborated. BH speech-act promises and threats discuss post-speech eventualities and thus exhibit the previously demonstrated preference for *yiqtol* verbs in the P clause and *weqatals* followed by *yiqtol*s in the Q clause. The situation to which the eventualities refer constrain the choice of verb form. It is not random. Conditional concessives were shown to be contextually interpreted and available for construal because of ׀’s semantics of hypotheticality. The ׀ construction (as opposed to simply ׀) occurs in the majority of conditional threats in promise-threat pairs because ׀ contributes instructions to the reader/hearer to seek a semantic and pragmatic association between the promise and the threat.

4.3.6. ׀ Speech-Act Petitions (Requests)

Biblical Hebrew speech-act petitions occur twenty-eight times.⁴⁴⁰ Two phrases predominate in the P clause of petitions: אִם־נָא מְצִאתִי חֵן בְּעֵינֶיךָ and אִם־עַל־הַמֶּלֶךְ טוֹב. They are used by speakers who have distinctly lower social status than the addressee in order to display

⁴⁴⁰ Gen. 18:3; 24:42; 30:27; 33:10; Num. 32:5; Jdg. 6:17; 1 Sam. 20:14; 20:29; 26:19a; 27:5; 2 Kgs. 1:10; 2 Kgs. 1:12; Est. 1:19; 3:9; 5:4, 8 (2x); 7:3 (2x); 8:5 (2x); 9:13; Neh. 2:5 (2x), 7; 1 Chron. 19:12a; 2 Chron. 6:22, 24.

deference.⁴⁴¹ The use of a conditional to introduce a petition appears to reinforce the pragmatics of deference. It allows the addressee who is being petitioned a face-saving reason for declining the request because the petition is conditioned. These forms can be observed in the following examples:

(145) Num. 32:5

וַיֹּאמְרוּ אִם-מָצְאוּנוּ חֵן בְּעֵינֶיךָ יִתֵּן אֶת-הָאָרֶץ
הַזֹּאת לְעַבְדֶיךָ לְאֶחְזָהּ אֶל־תַּעֲבֹרְנוּ אֶת-הַיַּרְדֵּן:

They said, “If we have found favor in your sight, let this land be given to your servants for a possession; do not make us cross the Jordan.”

(146) Est. 7:3

וַתַּעַן אֶסְתֵּר הַמַּלְכָּה וַתֹּאמֶר אִם-מָצְאוּתִי חֵן
בְּעֵינֶיךָ הַמֶּלֶךְ וְאִם-עַל-הַמֶּלֶךְ טוֹב תִּנְתֶּנּוּ-לִי נַפְשִׁי
בְּשִׂאלֹתַי וְעַמִּי בְּבִקְשָׁתִי:

Then Queen Esther answered, “If I have won your favor, O king, and if it pleases the king, let my life be given me—that is my petition—and the lives of my people—that is my request.

In her study of “volitives”, Dallaire (2014: 105) noted that the jussive can express a desire, wish, directive, suggestion, request and several types of requests. In this category of SA petitions, what the *yiqtol* or jussive⁴⁴² expresses is a matter of construal. Because of this, some of these examples could be construed as polite commands. (147) is an example of this. In this passage the *חֵן בְּעֵינֶיךָ* formula is not used because someone with higher social status, Joab, is petitioning his soldiers, who are under his command. Note the *אִם* SA promise that follows the request in verse 11b:

(147) 2 Sam. 10:11

וַיֹּאמֶר אִם-תִּחַזְקוּ אָרָם מִמֶּנִּי וְהִיָּתָה לִּי לִישׁוּעָה
וְאִם-בָּנֵי עַמּוֹן יִחַזְקוּ מִמֶּךָ וְהִלַּכְתִּי לְהוֹשִׁיעַ לָךְ:

He said, “If the Arameans are too strong for me, then you shall help me; but if the Ammonites are too strong for you, then I will come and help you.

The other SA conditionals we have analyzed demonstrate that there was an unambiguous preference for *yiqtol* forms in the P clause and *weqatal* and *yiqtols* in the Q clause. In contrast, we find that in SA conditional petitions, verbless clauses and *qatals* are preferred in the P

⁴⁴¹ See Dallaire (2014: 53–58) for a recent discussion of the function of *אִם* and a survey of relevant literature. On politeness formulas and strategies see Bridge (2010); Shulman (1999); Warren-Rothlin (2007).

⁴⁴² Jussive forms proper are used just three times in the Q clauses of 1 Sam. 26:19a; 2 Kgs. 1:10, 12. The remaining are *yiqtols*.

clause. In Q clauses, the preference for *weqatals* and *yiqtols* is maintained, as seen in the following tables.

Table 4.23: Conditional Petition P Clause Verb Forms

Verbless ⁴⁴³	<i>Qatal</i> ⁴⁴⁴	<i>Yiqtol</i> ⁴⁴⁵	ִּשֿׁ ⁴⁴⁶
12 (41%)	11 (38%)	5 (17%)	1 (3%)

Table 4.24: Conditional Petition Q Clause Verb Forms

<i>Yiqtol/Jussive</i> ⁴⁴⁷	<i>Weqatal</i> ⁴⁴⁸	Cohortative ⁴⁴⁹	<i>Qatal</i> ⁴⁵⁰	Verbless ⁴⁵¹
18 (62%)	4 (14%)	1 (3%)	1 (3%)	1 (3%)

Every petition, logically, occurs in speech. BASE and V-POINT are in the Character Domain. Verbal deictics represent the character's viewpoint. *Qatals* are used because the speaker is appealing to the addressee to assess his or her pre-speech (PAST) behavior to decide if they merit future ׀. If their previous behavior was found to merit ׀, they then are understood to be requesting a favor. Since every petition occurs in direct speech, BASE and V-POINT are located in the Character Domain and the semantics of the *qatal* locate the eventuality prior to the speech where the speech verb ׀ִאִמְרָה is elaborated. The use of the *qatal* may have functioned to promote deference by distancing the speaker from the appearance of presuming he or she did find favor.

The verbless constructions promote a present construal.⁴⁵²

⁴⁴³ 1 Sam. 20:14; 2 Kgs. 1:10, 12 Est. 1:19; 3:9; 5:4, 8 (2x); 7:3b; 8:5a; 9:13; Neh. 2:5a, 7.

⁴⁴⁴ Gen. 18:3; 30:27; 33:10; Num. 32:5; Jdg. 6:17; 1 Sam. 20:29; 26:19a; 27:5; Est. 5:8a; 7:3a; 8:5b.

⁴⁴⁵ 2 Sam. 10:11a; Neh. 2:5b; 1 Chron. 19:12a; 2 Chron. 6:22, 24.

⁴⁴⁶ Gen. 24:42.

⁴⁴⁷ Gen. 18:3; Num. 32:5; 1 Sam. 20:14, 29; 26:19a; 27:5; 2 Kgs. 1:10, 12; Est. 1:19; 3:9; 5:4, 8b; 7:3b; 8:5b; 9:13; Neh. 2:5b, 7; 2 Chron. 6:22, 24.

⁴⁴⁸ Gen. 33:10; Jdg. 6:17; 2 Sam. 10:11a; 1 Chron. 19:12a.

⁴⁴⁹ 1 Sam. 20:29.

⁴⁵⁰ Gen. 30:27.

⁴⁵¹ Gen. 24:42

⁴⁵² Due to textual issues 1 Sam. 20:14 poses interpretive challenges resulting in diverse opinions about the syntax and interpretation of the passage. Omanson and Ellington (2001: 435) remark that "This verse is difficult to understand in Hebrew, as the RSV note suggests. Osty states in a footnote that the text of verses 14–16 is in very bad condition. Many translations follow the Septuagint or simply reconstruct the probable sense of the text." See also Tsumura (2007: 509).

(148) 2 Kgs. 1:10a

וַיַּעֲנֵה אֱלֹהֵיוּ וַיְדַבֵּר אֶל־שָׂר הַחֲמִשִּׁים וְאִם־אֵישׁ
אֱלֹהִים אָנֹכִי תֵרַד אֵשׁ מִן־הַשָּׁמַיִם...

But Elijah answered the captain of fifty,
“If I am a man of God, let fire come
down from heaven...

(149) Neh. 2:7

וְאָמַרְתִּי לַמֶּלֶךְ אֶם־עַל־הַמֶּלֶךְ טוֹב אֲגִיד לְיָדְיָ
עַל־פְּחֻזוֹת עֲבָר הַנְּהָר אֲשֶׁר יַעֲבִירוּנִי עַד אֲשֶׁר־
אָבֹא אֶל־יְהוּדָה:

Then I said to the king, “If it pleases
the king, let letters be given me to the
governors of the province Beyond the
River, that they may grant me passage
until I arrive in Judah.

The existential *yiqtol* construction, (מְצַלִּיחַ דְּרָכִי) אִם־יִשְׁדָּךְ־נָא in (150) is unique in the BH corpus. The distinctive feature is *na* following *yiqtol*. Although unique, I do not believe this example should be viewed as odd or special since *na* is commonly used in requests by socially lower speakers, as is the case here where a request is made of YHWH. Language is flexible, and textually infrequent, seemingly idiosyncratic constructions are readily understandable in context if the “pieces” can be fit together by the hearer/reader in a relevant manner. Indeed, this conditional request itself is evidence of the flexibility of language. The P clause has an embedded *aspa* clause followed by a description of the imagined scenario, after which the Q clause request *huwa ha'aspa aspa-rahkiy yehwa l'bo'adani* is given.

(150) Gen. 24:42-43

וְאָבָא הַיּוֹם אֶל־הַעַיִן וְאָמַר יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵי אָדָנִי
אֲבָרְהָם אִם־יִשְׁדָּךְ־נָא מְצַלִּיחַ דְּרָכִי אֲשֶׁר אָנֹכִי
הַלֹּךְ עָלֶיהָ: ⁴³הִנֵּה אָנֹכִי נֹצֵב עַל־עַיִן הַמַּיִם וְהִיא
הַעֲלָמָה הַיְצֵאָת לְשָׂאֵב וְאָמַרְתִּי אֵלֶיהָ הַשְׁקִינִי־
נָא מִעֵט־מַיִם מִכַּדָּךְ: ⁴⁴וְאָמְרָה אֵלַי גַּם־אֶתֶּנָּה
שְׂתֵה וְגַם לְגַמְלֵיךְ אֲשָׂאֵב הוּא הָאִשָּׁה אֲשֶׁר־
הִכִּיחַ יְהוָה לְבוֹן־אָדָנִי:

⁴²“I arrived at the spring today, and I
said, ‘YHWH, God of my master
Abraham, if it would please you to
make my trip, the one I am on,
successful, [here’s my petition]: ⁴³See,
I’m standing by the spring and when
the young woman comes out to draw
water and I say to her, ‘Please give me a
little drink of water from your jar,’
⁴⁴and she responds to me saying,
‘Drink, and I will also draw water for
your camels,’ may she be the woman
YHWH has selected for my master’s
son.” (My translation)

Yiqtol/jussives are the preferred verb form in conditional SA-Petition Q clauses. Jussive forms proper occur three times (1 Sam. 29:19a; 2 Kgs. 1:10, 12). All other *yiqtol* forms are construable as jussives. However, categorizing them as jussives is an interpretation. The

boundary between a petition and polite directive is impossible to decide in any principled manner. The use of *yiqtol*s in a conditional BH petition could simply have been the accepted construction for conditional petitions.

Two cognitive approaches offer a potentially satisfying explanation for why these passages could so readily be interpreted as requests, without having to resort to calling them “special”. First, construction grammar’s claim that constructions are semantically rich offers a non-traditional foundation for rejecting the claim that the *yiqtol*s are to be interpreted as jussives. Under strict compositionality, the semantics of Q-clause *yiqtol*s in P clause אִם (אָן) מְצַאֲתִי הֵן בְּעֵינַיִךְ conditionals such as (145) and (146) would demand that the Q clause be construed as a directive. But, this form is only used by lower social status speakers, and general knowledge of ANE social relationships typically disallows interpretation of the *yiqtol* as a directive. I suggest that the construction became a conventionalized petition form in which the directive semantics of the Q-clause *yiqtol* were canceled by the construction. P clause אִם (אָן) מְצַאֲתִי הֵן בְּעֵינַיִךְ + *yiqtol*-headed Q clause is a BH construction which means PETITION. This would eliminate any interpretational ambiguity on the part of the addressee as to whether the speaker was petitioning or issuing a directive to him or her. The construction appears to be so well established in BH that its intent must have been unmistakable. Polite directives could easily be made in BH without any confusion, as was seen above in section 4.3.3.1 on SA Directives. The conditional אִם (אָן) מְצַאֲתִי הֵן בְּעֵינַיִךְ construction avoided any ambiguity as to the interpretation of the verb forms.

This approach is supported by the work of Panther and Thornburg⁴⁵³ who argue that the seemingly effortless ability of people to interpret speech-acts as such is facilitated by scenario-based metonymic conceptual relationships. They argue that metonymy functions, not just at the word level, but at the level of concepts and conceptual relationships. They contend that “conceptual relationships such as *part-whole*, *cause-effect*, *ability-action* have metonymic and indexical function and facilitate the inferential work of conversational interactants” (Panther and Thornburg 1998: 755). I hypothesize that the אִם (אָן) מְצַאֲתִי הֵן בְּעֵינַיִךְ construction functioned metonymically to a request scenario.

In (151), the speaker does not use the אִם (אָן) מְצַאֲתִי הֵן בְּעֵינַיִךְ construction to petition God. However, since this is a prayer, it is clearly a request. The request appeals to a factor other than the petitioner’s finding grace before YHWH. This is potentially an additional example of Panther and Thornburg’s argument for how metonymic reasoning functions to facilitate the

⁴⁵³ See Panther and Thornburg (1998); Thornburg and Panther (2003a; 2003b).

interpretation of speech-acts. Note that **וְאִם** is used in the second conditional to indicate the topical relationship with the first conditional:

(151) 2 Chron. 6:22-25

22 אִם־יַחַטָּא אִישׁ לְרֵעֵהוּ וַנִּשְׁאֲבוּ אֱלֹהִים לְהִאָּלְתוֹ
 וּבָא אֱלֹהִים לְפָנָי מִזְבֵּחַךְ בַּבַּיִת הַזֶּה: 23 וְאִתָּהּ
 תִּשְׁמַע מִן־הַשָּׁמַיִם וְעָשִׂיתָ וְשִׁפְטָתָּ אֶת־עַבְדֶּיךָ
 לְהָשִׁיב לְרִשְׁעָם לְתֵת דַּרְכּוֹ בְּרָאשׁוֹ וּלְהַצְדִּיק צְדִיק
 לְתֵת לוֹ כְּצַדִּיקוֹ: 24 וְאִם־יִנְגַּף עַמְּךָ יִשְׂרָאֵל
 לְפָנָי אוֹיֵב כִּי יַחַטְאוּ־לָךְ וְשָׁבוּ וְהוֹדוּ אֶת־שְׁמֶךָ
 וְהִתְפַּלְּלוּ וְהִתְחַנְּנוּ לְפָנֶיךָ בַּבַּיִת הַזֶּה: 25 וְאִתָּהּ
 תִּשְׁמַע מִן־הַשָּׁמַיִם וְסָלַחְתָּ לַחַטָּאת עַמְּךָ יִשְׂרָאֵל
 וְהָשִׁיבוּתָם אֶל־הָאָדָמָה אֲשֶׁר־נָתַתָּה לָהֶם
 וּלְאַבְתֵּיהֶם:

22“When a man wrongs his neighbor and is required to take an oath and he comes and swears the oath before your altar in this temple, 23then [you yourself] must hear from heaven and act. Judge between your servants, repaying the guilty by bringing down on his own head what he has done. Declare the innocent not guilty and so establish his innocence.

24“When your people Israel have been defeated by an enemy because they have sinned against you and when they turn back and confess your name, praying and making supplication before you in this temple, 25then hear from heaven and forgive the sin of your people Israel and bring them back to the land you gave to them and their fathers. (NIV. Bracketed information my addition)

In summary, in BH conditional speech-act petitions, **אִם** functions to prompt the reader or hearer to construct a hypothetical mental space that functioned as the background for the petition. These speech-act petitions typically employ the conditional **אִם־נָא מִצְּאֵתִי חֵן בְּעֵינֶיךָ** construction. In the Late BH books, a second conditional construction **אִם־עַל־הַמֶּלֶךְ טוֹב** was available when addressing royalty. Its use reinforced and augmented deference. Since they were politeness formulas, they allowed the addressee some room to maneuver. Precisely because these politeness forms had such high social value and were so culturally engrained, I posit that they became so idiomatic they no longer had any genuine conditional value. In contrast to all other speech-act conditionals, the preferred verb form in P clauses was the *qatal*, in the **אִם־נָא מִצְּאֵתִי חֵן בְּעֵינֶיךָ** phrase, which seemed to serve both a social-status-driven epistemic distancing function and to locate the eventuality pre-speech. When this phrase is not used, the unmarked choice, *yiqtol* is found (1 Chron. 19:12a; 2 Chron. 6:22-24; Neh. 2:5b). The preference for *yiqtols* and *weqatals* in Q clauses holds and in the absence of additional data, no motivation for why the four *weqatals* were used instead of *yiqtols* is discernable.

4.3.7. ׀ Conditional Speech-Act Questions

Conditional questions are characterized by an ׀-conditional P clause normally followed by the Q clause in which a question is posed. (The Q, P order occurs twice in Deut. 32:30 and Est.4:14b). They occur 22 times in the BH corpus.⁴⁵⁴ The question in the Q clause is typically a rhetorical question such as that seen in (152). However, (153) does not appear to be a rhetorical question, because after posing the question, Esther goes to inquire of YHWH the reason for her situation. However, a rhetorical construal is also possible, after which she goes to YHWH for certainty.

The question in the Q clause can be posed using the following interrogatives: מִי (152), לָמָּה (153), מָה (154), אֵיךָ (155), אֵיכָה (156), הֵי (157).

(152) 1 Sam. 2:25b

וְאִם לַיהוָה יַחֲטָא אִישׁ מִי יִתְפַּלֵּל-לוֹ

“if someone sins against the LORD, who can make intercession?”

(153) Gen. 25:22a

וַיִּתְרַצְצוּ הַבָּנִים בְּקַרְבָּהּ וַתֹּאמֶר אִם-כֵּן לָמָּה זֶה
אֲנֹכִי וַתֵּלֶךְ לְדַרְשׁ אֶת-יְהוָה:

The children struggled together within her; and she said, “If it is to be this way, why is this [happening to] me?” So she went to ask YHWH. (My translation)

(154) Song 5:8

הַשְּׁבַעְתִּי אֶתְכֶם בְּנוֹת יְרוּשָׁלַם אִם-תִּמְצְאוּ אֶת-
דוֹדִי מִה־תִּגִּידוּ לוֹ שְׁחֹלַת אֶהְבֶּה אָנֹכִי:

O daughters of Jerusalem, I charge you— if you find my lover, what will you tell him? Tell him I am faint with love. (NIV)

(155) Mal. 1:6a

בֶּן יִכְבֹּד אָב וְעֶבֶד אֲדוֹנָיו וְאִם-אָב אָנִי אֵיךָ כְבוֹדִי

A son honors his father, and servants their master. If then I am a father, where is the honor due me?

(156) Deut. 32:30

אֵיכָה יִרְדֹּף אֶחָד אֶלֶף וּשְׁנַיִם יִנְיִסוּ רַבָּבָה אִם-לֹא
כִּי-צוּרֵם מָכְרוּם וַיהוָה הִסְגִּירָם:

How could one have routed a thousand, and two put many to flight, if it was not that the Rock had sold them, that YHWH had given them up? (My translation)

⁴⁵⁴ Gen. 25:22; 27:46; Deut. 32:30; 1 Sam. 2:25b; Est. 4:14b; Job 9:24; 11:10; 14:14; 17:13-15; 24:25; 31:13-14; 35:6, 7; Ps. 130:3; Prov. 22:27; Song 5:8; Ezek. 21:18; Hag. 2:13; Mal. 1:6 (2x).

(157) Hag. 2:13a

וַיֹּאמֶר חַזְקִי אִם־יִגַּע טְמֵא־נַפֶּשׁ בְּכָל־אֵלֶּה הֲיִטְמָא

Then Haggai said, “If one who is unclean by contact with a dead body touches any of these, does it become unclean?”

The discussion of how conditionals with questions should be analyzed was initiated by Van der Auwera (1986). He distinguished between “conditional questions” such as *If you don’t think it impertinent, when did you wander in this morning?* and “questions about conditionals”, typified by his example, *If you inherit, will you invest?* Conditional questions “are not about any conditional relation between *if p, then q*, but represent *p* as a condition for a speech-act about *q*” (Van der Auwera 1986: 199). In other words, “the performance of the speech-act represented in the apodosis is conditional on the fulfillment of the state described in the protasis (the state in the protasis *enables* or *causes* the following speech-act)” (Sweetser 1990: 118). Conditional questions are regularly politeness devices,⁴⁵⁵ so in high social-deference cultures such as were found in the ANE and ancient Israel, it is noteworthy that no SA conditional questions in BH are used for purposes of politeness or deference.⁴⁵⁶

Unlike conditional questions, “questions about conditionals,” inquire about “there being (or not being) a causal or enablement relation between the proposition of *p* and that of *q*” (Dancygier 1998: 124). However, Dancygier (1998: *ibid*) has noted that numerous types of conditioned questions, such as the types of questions we see in (152)-(157), do not ask a question about there being a relationship between the P clause and the question in the Q clause. Instead, the P clause condition seems to provide contextually known or given “background conditions” against which the question can felicitously be posed (Dancygier 1998: 125). This observation was made regarding non-rhetorical conditioned questions, but its validity to conditional rhetorical questions is even more pertinent because rhetorical questions are typically redundant questions (Rohde 2006: 146) in that they “are designed to elicit an answer that must be either (A) obvious to both speaker and addressee, (B) uniform in not requiring any updates to discourse participant commitments or beliefs, or (C) sufficiently similar between the two” (Oakley and Tobin 2014: 87). Given background conditions provide speakers and characters the opportunity “to synchronize discourse participants’ commitments, confirming their shared beliefs about the world” (Rohde 2006: 135)⁴⁵⁷ via blending of the speaker and addressee’s mental spaces. I will refer the BH questions discussed

⁴⁵⁵ See Dancygier (1998: 124); Van der Auwera (1986: 199).

⁴⁵⁶ See the above section 4.3.6 for how deferential or polite requests were made in BH.

⁴⁵⁷ This is noted in Moshavi (2009).

in this section as *conditioned questions* in order to distinguish them from Van der Auwera's categories. Since they are conditioned questions, they should be understood to contain the implicature seen here from example (155), *If I am a father, (consider I rhetorically ask,) where is the honor due me?*

The standard analyses of rhetorical questions have asserted that they are “disguised assertions” that require a yes, no or null answer (Oakley and Tobin 2014: 86).⁴⁵⁸ However, Rohde (2006: 135) demonstrates that they often elicit a wider range of responses to include positive/negative, null/non-null, and single/multiple answers. For instance, her example, *Who always shows up late to class?* requires a non-null answer or multiple answers. Oakley and Tobin (2014: 96) argue that rhetorical questions fit Goldberg's (1995, 2006a) definition of constructions as form-meaning pairings whose meaning is not strictly compositional but means more than the sum of its parts. They state that “they have a conventional pragmatic content of PROPOSING A JUDGMENT and INVITING AN AGREEMENT.” Their study of rhetorical questions in a United States Supreme Court opinion finds that, as in BH, they are frequently combined with conditionals demonstrating what Goldberg (1995, 2006a, b) argued, that constructions are typically used in combination with other constructions with the purpose of finding common ground between speaker and addressee (Oakley and Tobin: 2014: 96).

The answers to conditioned rhetorical questions in BH display the variegated responses that Rohde proposed for non-conditioned questions. Example (157) above is an example of a requiring a positive answer and (152) is an example of a non-null answer.⁴⁵⁹ Multiple answers are possible for the question in (155).⁴⁶⁰ A negative answer is required for (158).⁴⁶¹

(158) Job 14:14

אִם-יָמוּת נָבֵר הַיְחִיָּה

If people die, will they live (again)?
(CEB)

⁴⁵⁸ See also Biezma and Rawlins (2012); Hiz (1978); Koshik (2005) and Moshavi (2009).

⁴⁵⁹ Non-null answers are also required for Job 17:13-15; 31:13-14; Song 5:8.

⁴⁶⁰ Multiple answers can be offered for Gen 25:22 (if interpreted rhetorically); Job 35:6; Prov. 22:27; Ezek. 21:18; Mal. 1:6a, b.

⁴⁶¹ Negative answers are also required for: Gen. 27:46; Deut. 32:30; 1 Sam. 2:25b; Est. 4:14b; Job 9:24; 24:25; 35:7; Ps. 130:3.

Verb use in conditional SA questions is distributed as follows:

Table 4.25: Conditional Question P Clause Verb Forms

<i>Yiqtol</i> ⁴⁶²	<i>Qatal</i> ⁴⁶³	Verbless ⁴⁶⁴	Ellipsis ⁴⁶⁵	Participle ⁴⁶⁶	יָסֵב ⁴⁶⁷
8 (36%)	5 (23%)	3 (14%)	3 (14%)	2 (9%)	1 (4%)

Table 4.26: Conditional Question Q Clause Verb Forms

<i>Yiqtol</i> ⁴⁶⁸	Verbless ⁴⁶⁹	Ellipsis ⁴⁷⁰	Participle ⁴⁷¹
15 (68%)	5 (23%)	1 (4%)	1 (4%)

All the uses occur in direct speech or in poetry and represent the speaker/narrator's V-POINT.⁴⁷² The use of verbs in conditional questions is consistent with their use in all other speech-act conditionals: all the *qatals* reference pre-speech PAST TIME eventualities as do the eventualities in the questions. *Qatals* are also used in non-conditional BH questions.⁴⁷³ All occur in the conditional P clause; none in the actual questions in the Q clause. However the majority of questions that use the above-noted questions words found in conditional questions appear to be future or present oriented.

In summary, all conditioned questions in BH are rhetorical questions (with the possible exception of example 153). I have hypothesized that the יָסֵב-conditional P clause serves to provide the given, background context within which the rhetorical question is conditionally uttered. It has been shown that Rohde's (2006) proposal that rhetorical questions can merit responses other than a negative answer applies to BH rhetorical questions.

⁴⁶² 1 Sam. 2:25b; Job 11:10; 14:14; 17:13-15; 31:13-14; Ps. 130:3; Song 5:8; Hag. 2:13.

⁴⁶³ Deut. 32:30; Est. 4:14b; Job 7:4; 35:6, 7.

⁴⁶⁴ Job 9:19b; Mal. 1:6 (2x).

⁴⁶⁵ Gen. 25:22; Job 9:24b; 24:25.

⁴⁶⁶ Gen. 27:46; Ezek. 21:18.

⁴⁶⁷ Prov. 22:27.

⁴⁶⁸ Deut. 32:30; 1 Sam. 2:25b; Job 7:4; 9:19; 11:10; 14:14; 24:25; 31:13-15; 35:6, 7; Ps. 130:3; Prov. 22:27; Song 5:8; Ezek. 21:18; Hag. 2:13.

⁴⁶⁹ Gen. 25:22; 27:46; Job 17:13-15; Mal. 1:6 (2x).

⁴⁷⁰ Job 9:24b.

⁴⁷¹ Est. 4:14b.

⁴⁷² See the poetry of Deut. 32:30 and Ps. 130:3.

⁴⁷³ See, for example, Jdg. 20:3; 1 Sam. 26:14; Lam. 1:1.

4.3.8. Summary of Speech-Act Conditionals

Speech-act conditionals are used to perform a wide range of speech-acts in Biblical Hebrew. In speech-act conditionals, the particle אם is used to prompt the construction of hypothetical mental spaces within which the speech-act is performed. Speech-acts in the Q clause are performed contingent on the actualization of the state expressed in the P clause. This state enables or causes the speech-act. Conditional SAs in BH are used to condition directives, oaths, vows, promises, threats, requests and questions.

Speech-acts, by definition, occur in speech. Consequently the V-POINT and BASE are in the Character domain and all deictic information, including verbal deictics, is presented as construed by the speaker. Conditional speech-acts are typically used to enact post-speech FUTURE TIME actions—directives, promises and so forth are all future oriented. It is not surprising, then, that *yiqtol*s are the overwhelmingly preferred choice for P-clause verbs in every category of speech-acts, since in speech they are the preferred verb of choice for construing FUTURE eventualities. It was shown, however, that the verb forms that characterize conditional directives in non-procedural, non-casuistic discourse differ significantly from those found in procedural and casuistic discourse. In P clauses, *yiqtol*s, *qatal*s and verbless constructions are used with essentially the same frequency in non-procedural, non-casuistic discourse.

I have hypothesized that in speech-act petitions the conditional P clauses, $\text{אם-נָא מְצַאֲתִי חַן}$ בְּעֵינַיִךְ and $\text{אם-עַל-הַמְלִיךְ טוֹב}$ are constructions whose pragmatic meaning is PETITION. They functioned metonymically to a request scenario.

In the Q clause, the *weqatal* and *yiqtol*/jussive forms account for 78% of all Q clause verbs, establishing a clear preference for these forms in the Q clause of SA-conditionals. However, in procedural and casuistic literature Q clauses, imperatives are used 53% of the time in non-procedural, non-casuistic text, but never once in procedural and casuistic discourse conditional Q clauses where *weqatal*s and *yiqtol*s are the preferred verb forms in these types of texts.

A summary of all verb use in these forms follows:

Table 4.27: Summary of Speech-Act Conditional P-Clause Verb Distribution

<i>Yiqtol</i>	<i>Qatal</i>	Verbless	אין, שׁ	Participle	Ellipsis
373	90	81	22	19	14

Table 4.28: Summary of Speech-Act Conditional Q-Clause Verb Distribution

<i>Weqatal</i>	<i>Yiqtol/Jussive</i>	Imperative	Verbless	<i>Qatal</i>	Participle	Ellipsis
174	174	63	17	8	9	2

יָנִי	<i>Wayyiqtol</i>	Cohortative
3	2	1

4.4. Epistemic Conditionals

As noted in section 3.6, epistemic conditionals are characterized by taking place in the epistemic domain. This means that though they may speak about states of affairs in the real world (the clothes on the line, home—see (159 below)), they “follow the speaker’s reasoning processes” (Dancygier and Sweetser 2005: 17) and usually argue from effect to cause, something people do constantly. This can be seen in example (159):

(159) If the clothes are on the line, they’re home.

The hypothetical premise in P is the basis for the conclusion in Q. The speaker’s experientially-grounded reasoning informs her that the clothes hung on the line outside is sufficient condition for concluding that the family is home. This epistemic conditional may be glossed as “When you *know* clothes are on the line, you can *conclude* that the family is home.” The reasoning process is the opposite of that used in content conditionals where we reason from cause to effect.

Epistemic conditionals are not typically used to promote alternatives. Dancygier and Sweetser note that “the *if* clause...is primarily there to lay out the reasoning processes of the speaker and make them accessible, within that single mental space, rather than to engage in a comparison between alternative spaces” (2005: 118).

Epistemic conditionals occur, but are rare in BH, occurring a mere seven times.⁴⁷⁴ In the following examples, the conditionals reveal the speaker’s reasoning. In Num. 16:29 the speaker is reasoning from effect to cause: if natural death occurs, then it is proof YHWH has

⁴⁷⁴ Gen. 47:18; Num. 16:29, 30; 1 Sam. 6:9 (2x); 1 Kgs. 1:27; 22:28. Note that GKC (§150 f), BDB (2008: 50) and most major language translations (English, Spanish, French, German and Portuguese), following GKC, render 1 Kgs. 1:27 as a question, contra the LXX. GKC argues that this is an example of a polar question in which the η -question has been lost. There is, however, no textual evidence to support such a conclusion. The η construction makes sense interpreted as a conditional and there is no reason to translate it as a question. The MT and LXX can be translated “If this situation has been brought about by my lord the king, then you did not let your servant know who will sit on the throne of my lord the king after him”.

not sent Moses. The context is the rebellion of Korah and his followers and Moses has stated that YHWH will affirm his choice of Moses as leader. The proof will be God's punishment of Korah, his family and followers. In the conditional Moses states that if this doesn't occur and they die a natural death, then he concludes God hasn't chosen him. The conclusion in the Q clause is supported by the P-clause premise.

(160) Num. 16:29

אִם-כָּמוֹת כָּל-הָאָדָם יִמָּתוּן אֱלֹהִים וּפָקַדְתָּ כָּל-
הָאָדָם יִפָּקַד עֲלֵיהֶם לֹא יְהוֹה שְׁלֹחֲנִי:

If these people die a natural death, or if a natural fate comes on them, then the Lord has not sent me.

(161) Gen. 47:18b


... לֹא-נִכְחַד מֵאֲדָנִי כִּי אִם-תֵּם הַכֶּסֶף וּמִקְנֵה
הַבְּהֵמָה אֶל-אֲדָנִי לֹא נִשְׂאָר לִפְנֵי אֲדָנִי בְּלִתִּי
אִם-גִּוְיָתָנוּ וְאֲדָמָתָנוּ:

We cannot hide from our Lord that if our silver is finished, and our herds and cattle are our Lords, then we have nothing left before my Lord [to exchange] except our bodies and our land. (My translation)⁴⁷⁵

In (161) speakers use the protasis content, which is already contextually known, to explain their behavior. It provides the basis for their reasoning. The protasis provides the background for asserting the apodosis. This type of conditional does not involve setting up alternative mental spaces in which the background is not true. Because of this a single space is evoked that provides the background for the reasoning. Figure 4.11 shows the mental space configuration of (160).

⁴⁷⁵ This verse poses multiple linguistic and, therefore, exegetical and translational challenges. Hamilton (1995: 617) notes the multiple issues posed by כִּי and אִם בְּלִתִּי. Most English translations ignore the three particles, resulting in translations with no obvious conditionals. Matthews' (2005: 856) translation recognizes the particles as I do. He interprets כִּי as a subordinating conjunction (translated as *that*). He differs in that he translates the first אִם clause *since*, instead of *if*.

Figure 4.11: Mental Space Configuration of Epistemic Conditionals



אִם-כָּמוֹת כָּל־הָאָדָם יִמְתּוּן אֱלֹה וּפְקֻדַת כָּל־הָאָדָם יִפְקֹד עֲלֵיהֶם לֹא יְהוּה שְׁלַחְנִי:
*If these people die a natural death, or if a natural fate comes on them, then
 the Lord has not sent me. Num. 16:29.*

The seven epistemic conditionals occur in direct speech. Verb use is, therefore, determined in the Character Domain and verb choice is constrained by the character's view of the eventuality and its relationship to speech time. In the P clauses, *yiqtol*s are used to reference post-speech FUTURE TIME and *qatal*s reference eventualities that are construed as occurring pre-speech PAST TIME.

Table 4.29: Epistemic Conditional P Clause Verb Forms

<i>Yiqtol</i> ⁴⁷⁶	<i>Qatal</i> ⁴⁷⁷	Ellipsis ⁴⁷⁸
4 (57%)	2 (29%)	1 (14%)

⁴⁷⁶ Num. 16:29; 1 Sam. 6:9a; 1 Kgs. 22:28.

⁴⁷⁷ Gen. 47:18; 1 Kgs. 1:27.

⁴⁷⁸ 1 Sam. 6:9b.

Table 4.30: Epistemic Conditional Q Clause Verb Forms

<i>Qatal</i> ⁴⁷⁹	<i>Weqatal</i> ⁴⁸⁰
5 (71%)	2 (29%)

What is significant is that *qatals* are the preferred form for epistemic conditional Q clauses, regardless of whether a *yiqtol* or *qatal* is used in the P clause. This may be due to the reasoning process from effect to cause.

4.5. Other Conditionals

4.5.1. Post-Script (Q, P) Conditionals

P, Q clause order is the default clause order in BH $\square\aleph$ conditionals, as it is cross-linguistically. Although uncommon in BH, Q, P constructions were permitted, as they are in many languages. In BH they occur thirty-nine times.⁴⁸¹ Since they occur so infrequently, the pragmatics that motivated their use in the biblical text is difficult to determine. Issues such of information structure and space building constraints are also difficult to determine. Given that the overwhelming majority of BH conditionals reflect the iconic P, Q order, it seems it was intuitively natural in Biblical Hebrew for the clause containing the causal information (P clause) should precede the effect clause (Q clause), and that the space-builder $\square\aleph$ clause would precede the contents that elaborate the space. We don't have enough information to determine how the reversal of the iconic clause order might have effected meaning construction.

It has also been shown that in languages such as English, Q, P conditionals intonation may clearly indicate whether or not the Q clause is being asserted or not.⁴⁸² While this information is irretrievable for BH, it may not be insignificant that *'atnah* or *zaqef* mark the clause boundary between every Q, P clause except for the transition between the clauses in Prov. 4:16a, b. If these pauses imitate aspects of original language use, what meaning they indicated, and if different pauses specified different information is unknown. The following example illustrates the characteristic pauses:

⁴⁷⁹ Gen. 47:18; Num. 16:29; 1 Sam. 6:9a; 1 Kgs. 1:27; 22:28.

⁴⁸⁰ Num. 16:30; 1 Sam. 6:9b.

⁴⁸¹ Gen. 15:5; 18:28, 30; 42:37; 47:16; Deut. 32:30; Josh. 2:19; 7:12; 1 Sam. 3:17; 21:5b; 2 Kgs. 1:2; 18:23; Est. 4:14b; Ezra 2:59 (repeated in Neh. 7:61); 1 Chron. 22:13; 28:7; 2 Chron. 30:9; Job 13:10; 38:4, 18; Ps. 139:24; Prov. 3:30; 4:16 (2x); 23:2; Eccl. 5:11 (2x); Song 7:13; Isa. 24:13 (note LXX); 36:8; Jer. 2:28; 5:1 (2x); 30:6; Ezek. 2:7; 3:11; Zech. 6:15; Mal. 3:10. Since Ezra 2:59 is repeated verbatim in Neh. 7:61, there are actually 38 different tokens.

⁴⁸² See Dancygier and Sweetser (2005: 174ff) for a discussion.

(162) Job 13:10

הוֹכַח יוֹכִיחַ אֶתְכֶם אִם־בִּסְתֵר פָּנִים תִּשְׁאֹן:

He will surely rebuke you, if in secret
you show partiality.

Of the thirty-nine Q, P conditionals, thirty-one are found in speech-act conditionals such as (162).⁴⁸³ The remaining eight include two generic conditionals (Prov. 4:16a, b) and six background scenario-specifying uses of אִם.⁴⁸⁴ Dancygier and Sweetser (2005: 175-177) note that in English Q, P conditionals are most commonly found in speech-act and metalinguistic conditionals, an observation confirmed (regarding SA conditionals) by the BH data.

In most instance, the P clause in Q, P conditionals serves the same function as it does in conditionals with the iconic P, Q order—it provides the background, the mental space, within which the Q clause is to be interpreted. For instance, in (162) the warning that YHWH will rebuke is a prediction that holds when and if partiality is displayed. The P clause provides the context in which Q holds, just as it typically does in SA conditionals with the P, Q clause order.

Nine of the P clauses occur as the direct object complement of imperative verbs of sight (Ps. 139:24a; Qoh. 7:13; Jer. 30:6), inquiry (2 Kgs. 1:2; Jer. 5:1(2x); Mal. 3:10) or speech (Job 38:4, 18). In (163) the P clause functions to explain the intent or purpose of the Q clause directive. Without the P clause, the directive is meaningless. The speaker uses the P clause to explain or specify the purpose of the directive and what type of information the addressee is to obtain, or in those cases involving verbs of sight, what the person commanded to “see” is to look at. Yet the same imperative verbs occur in the typical P, Q conditional clause order as examples (165) and (166) illustrate. Further study into whether this is related to information structure concerns regarding topic and focus is merited.⁴⁸⁵

(163) 1 Kgs. 1:2

... וַיֹּאמֶר אֱלֹהִים לְכוּ דַרְשׁוּ בַּבַּעַל זְבוּב אֱלֹהֵי
עֶקְרוֹן אִם־אֶחְיֶה מִחֲלֵי זֶה:...so he sent messengers, telling them,
“Go, inquire of Baal-zebub, the god of
Ekron, whether I shall recover from
this injury.”

⁴⁸³ Gen. 15:5; 18:28, 30; 42:37; 47:16; Deut. 32:30; Josh. 2:19; 7:12; 1 Sam. 3:17; 2 Kgs. 1:2; 18:23; Est. 4:14b; 1 Chron. 22:13; 28:7; 2 Chron. 30:9; Job 13:10; 38:4, 18; Ps. 139:24; Prov. 3:30; 23:2; Song 7:13; Isa. 36:8; Jer. 2:28; 5:1(2x); 30:6; Ezek. 2:7; 3:11; Zech. 5:15; Mal. 3:10.

⁴⁸⁴ 1 Sam. 21:5b; Ezra 2:59; Neh. 7:61; Qoh. 5:11a, b; Isa. 24:13. For the scenario-specifying use of the particle, see Chapter 5.2.6.

⁴⁸⁵ See Lambrecht (1994) and Erteschik-Shir (2007) for a thorough introduction to information structure. See Floor (2004), Heimerdinger (1999); Van der Merwe and Wendland (2010) and Westbury (2014) for studies utilizing Lambrecht’s proposals to analyze Biblical Hebrew word order and information structure. See also Van der Merwe (2000) for a review of Heimerdinger (1999).

(164) Job 38:4

איפה היית בִּיסְדֵי־אָרֶץ הַגָּד אִם־יָדַעְתָּ בִּינָה:

Where were you when I laid the foundation of the earth? Tell me, if you have understanding.

(165) Gen. 24:49a

וְעַתָּה אִם־יִשְׁלַחְמֶךָ עֲשִׂים חֶסֶד וְאֶמֶת אֶת־אֲדֹנָי
הַגִּידוּ לִי

Now then, if you will deal loyally and truly with my master, tell me.

(166) Gen. 31:50

אִם־תִּעַנֶּנָּה אֶת־בָּנֹתַי וְאִם־תִּקַּח נָשִׁים עַל־בָּנֹתַי
אִין אִישׁ עִמָּנוּ רְאָה אֱלֹהִים עַד בֵּינִי וּבֵינֶךָ:

If you ill-treat my daughters, or if you take wives in addition to my daughters, though no one else is with us, remember that God is witness between you and me.”

4.5.1.1. Post-Script אִם P Clauses Translated *Unless*

The אִם clause in several Q, P conditional passages (Deut. 32:30; Josh. 7:12; Prov. 4:16(2x)) is translated *unless* in the NRSV, NET, ESV, NLT, NKJV, NASB and TNIV. (NIV translates with *if* in each of these passages).

(167) Deut. 32:30 (repeated from example 156)

איִכָּה יִרְדֹּף אֶחָד אֶלֶף וּשְׁנַיִם יָנִסוּ רַבָּבָה אִם־לֹא
בִּי־צוּרָם מִכָּרָם וַיהוָה הִסְגִּירָם:

How could one have routed a thousand, and two put a myriad to flight, unless their Rock had sold them, the LORD had given them up?

These translations are not unexpected because as Dancygier and Sweetser (2005: 183-184) have noted, in English *unless* “is quite clearly conditional in meaning.” Consequently, in English, *unless* also prompts the construction of hypothetical mental spaces. However, unlike *if*, the semantics of *unless* are exceptive or exclusionary; it allows no other options to be entertained other than the current one under discussion. This will be reflected in the space building. Additionally, unlike *if*, *unless* commonly follows the main clause, so *unless* is a good translation when Q, P אִם conditionals occur in a context where an exceptive construal is promoted.⁴⁸⁶ But, the above-noted אִם clauses are translated with conditional *unless* precisely

⁴⁸⁶ See Traugott (1997) for an overview of the diachronic cline of *unless* and its conditional status in contemporary English; Dancygier (1998: 167-178); Dancygier and Sweetser (2005: 183-187) for a detailed discussion of English

because the clauses occur in contexts that meet the semantic requirements for *unless* via implicature, not because the semantic components of English *unless* are semantic components of BH ׀ or vice versa. Unlike *unless*, ׀ is not exceptive and ׀ P clauses typically precede Q clauses.

4.5.1.2. Post-Script ׀ P Clause Translated *Since*

In (168), several English versions (NIV, NCV, Holman, NAS95, NLT) translate the ׀ P clause in the Q, P conditional with *since* instead of *if*.

(168) Gen. 47:16

וַיֹּאמֶר יוֹסֵף הֲבֵנוּ מִקְנֵיכֶם וְאֶתְנֶה לָכֶם בְּמִקְנֵיכֶם
אִם-אָפֶס כֶּסֶף:

“Then bring your livestock,” said Joseph. “I will sell you food in exchange for your livestock, since your money is gone.” (NIV)

English *since* “presupposes the validity of the *since*-clause in the speaker’s reality space (BASE) and expresses an explicit causal relationship” (Dancygier & Sweetser 2005: 182) between the P and Q clauses. In Gen. 47:14–15 the narrator tells us that Joseph had collected all the people’s money and that he was informed by them that their money was gone. This general world knowledge formed part of the speaker’s (Joseph’s) reality space and thus via implicature permits the translators of the English versions to assume the explicit causal relationship between the people’s lack of money in the P clause and the offer to sell food in exchange for livestock in the Q clause. The semantics of ׀ itself do not motivate the *since* translation. It seems to be a contextual implicature, of the causal relationships characteristic of conditionals. Consequently *since* is a good and valid translation, not of ׀, but of the causal relationship.

To summarize the Q, P clause order ׀ conditionals, there seems to be no difference in meaning between Q, P clause order conditionals and their P, Q counterparts in BH. The pragmatic motivation behind the choice of Q, P clause order over the default P, Q order is not obvious. It may be that Q, P order would occur, as in English and other languages, when a speaker (or writer) was in the process of stating an assertion (a Q clause) and immediately realized they wanted to condition it and added a conditional P clause as a postscript. Language is not neat. It has been noted that speakers of any language may “build conditional spaces opportunistically...” and “need not necessarily recapitulate a full conditional statement of the

unless and *if*. The above remarks pertain only to English translation of ׀ clauses and extended discussion of the English semantics of the words is outside the scope of this study.

space structures...but simply fill in the parts...they wish to add (Dancygier and Sweetser 2005: 265). Conditioning an assertion can be done for various pragmatic purposes which the English translations *unless* and *since* attempt to capture. In Q, P ׀-conditional constructions ׀ identifies the conditional P clause as the contextual background scenario for a prediction or speech-act in the Q clause and prompts the construction of a hypothetical mental space.

4.5.1.3. Postscript ׀ Construction

The ׀ sequence, occurs five times in the BH corpus⁴⁸⁷ (two of which are parallel passages). It is a distinct Q, P conditional construction that inherits its structure from the ׀-conditional constructions. Mental Space Theory provides a convenient way to model some of the differences between this class of construction and central, prototypical ׀ conditionals. The phrase is translated *if only* in most English translations,⁴⁸⁸ is problematic for reasons that will be demonstrated below.

(169) Deut. 15:4-5

4 אָפֶס כִּי לֹא יִהְיֶה־בְּךָ אֲבִיּוֹן כִּי־בִרְךָ יְבָרְכֶךָ
יְהוָה בְּאַרְצְךָ אֲשֶׁר יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ נָתַן־לְךָ נַחֲלָה
לְרִשְׁתָּהּ: 5 רַק אִם־שָׁמוּעַ תִּשְׁמַע בְּקוֹל יְהוָה
אֱלֹהֶיךָ לְשָׁמֵר לַעֲשׂוֹת אֶת־כָּל־הַמִּצְוֹת הַזֹּאת
אֲשֶׁר אֲנִי מְצַוֶּךָ הַיּוֹם:

⁴because there will not be poor people among you, because YHWH will richly bless you in the land which YHWH your God is giving you to possess as an inheritance, ⁵only if you listen attentively to the words of YHWH your God so that you do all these commands which I am commanding you. (My translation.)

(170) 1 Kgs. 8:25

וַעֲתָה יְהוָה | אֱלֹהֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל שְׁמֵר לְעַבְדְּךָ
דָּוִד אָבִי אֶת אֲשֶׁר דִּבַּרְתָּ לּוֹ לֵאמֹר לֹא־
יִכָּרֵת לְךָ אִישׁ מִלְּפָנַי יֹשֵׁב עַל־כִּסֵּא יִשְׂרָאֵל
רַק אִם־יִשְׁמְרוּ בְּנֵיךָ אֶת־דַּרְכֶּם לְלַכֵּת לְפָנַי
כַּאֲשֶׁר הִלַּכְתָּ לְפָנַי:

“Now YHWH, God of Israel, keep for your servant David, my father, the promises you spoke to him when you said: ‘No man of yours who sits on the throne of Israel will be cut off from before me, only if your sons guard their paths to walk before me as you walked before me.’”
(My translation.)

⁴⁸⁷ Deut. 15:5; 1 Kgs. 8:25; 2 Kgs. 21:7-8; 2 Chron. 6:16; 2 Chron. 33:8. With minor differences, 2 Chron. 6:16; 33:8 are parallel to 1 Kgs. 8:25 and 2 Kgs. 21:8 respectively.

⁴⁸⁸ ׀ is translated as follows in 2 Kgs. 21:8: The NIV, RSV, NRSV, ASV, ESV, NASB95 and Holman Christian Standard Bible translate it “if only”. The New Living Translation and Good News Translation invert the clause order and simply translate ׀; ׀ is left untranslated. Only the KJV and NKJV translate it *only if*. This is typical of the way it is translated in Deut. 15:5; 1 Kgs. 8:25; 2 Chron. 6:16; 33:8.

(171) 2 Kgs. 21:7-8

וַיִּשֶׂם אֶת־פֶּסֶל הָאֲשֵׁרָה אֲשֶׁר עָשָׂה בְּבַיִת
 אֲשֶׁר אָמַר יְהוָה אֶל־דָּוִד וְאֶל־שְׁלֹמֹה בְּנֹו
 בְּבַיִת הַזֶּה וּבִירוּשָׁלַם אֲשֶׁר בַּחֲרָתִי מִכָּל
 שְׁבֵטֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל אֲשִׁים אֶת־שְׁמִי לְעוֹלָם: ⁸וְלֹא
 אֶסְיֵף לְהַנְדִּיב רַגְלֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל מִזֶּה־הָאָדָמָה אֲשֶׁר
 נָתַתִּי לְאֲבוֹתָם רַק אִם־יִשְׁמְרוּ לְעֲשׂוֹת כְּכָל
 אֲשֶׁר צִוִּיתִים וּלְכָל־הַתּוֹרָה אֲשֶׁר־צִוָּה אֶתָּם
 עֲבָדֵי מֹשֶׁה:

⁷He put an idol of asherah made in the house regarding which YHWH said to David and to his son Solomon: “In this house and in Jerusalem, which I have chosen from all the tribes in Israel, I will put my name forever. ⁸And I will not again cause the feet of Israel to wander here and there away from the land I gave to their fathers, only if they guard and do according to all which I commanded them and do all the law which Moses my servant commanded them.” (My translation.)

Some initial observations are in order. First, the אם רק sequence differs from central אם conditionals in one very obvious respect—the P clause containing אם follows the Q clause, so that the order is Q, P. This is one of several similarities between אם רק -conditionals and *only if* constructions in English, which ordinarily display a Q, P order.⁴⁸⁹ Secondly, it appears that, as in English, both רק and אם contribute compositionally to the interpretation of the construction.⁴⁹⁰ Consequently, to understand how the אם רק sequence differs from central אם conditionals, the first relevant factor to consider is the semantics of רק and then the combinatorial semantics of the two.


According to the BHRG (1999: 317), רק is “primarily a focus particle” when governing a constituent, and a “conjunctive adverb” when governing a sentence. They indicate that its primary function is one of limiting, either someone or something in the preceding context, or the implications of the preceding context. Waltke and O’Connor classify it as a “restrictive adverb”. Levinsohn, has argued that the semantics of רק are more complex than is indicated in the grammars. He observes (2011: 89) that “when רק governs a non-initial constituent, it both limits and counters something stated or implied in the context.” We propose that this limiting and countering effect is equivalent to setting a sufficiency condition on the Q clause space that precedes P and which serves as its context, as is noted by the grammars and Levinsohn. In summary, רק has scope over (or governs) the entire אם -conditional clause and limits and counters the Q clause.

⁴⁸⁹ See Dancygier (1998: 183); Dancygier and Sweetser (1997: 124).

⁴⁹⁰ McCawley (1981: 51) points out regarding the compositionality of *only if* in English that, “expressions such as *only if* . . . appear to be immediately intelligible to anyone who knows the words of which they are composed (i.e., they are in no sense idioms)”.

All of the examples above demonstrate that \square -conditional P is the defining feature of the *only* space. For instance, (169) means, roughly, that “the only circumstance under which YHWH will bless them in the land is if they heed and obey all the commands,” and (170) proposes that men from the line of David will reign only in the case of their living before YHWH as David did. Figure 4.12 indicates that P is the uniquely sufficient space.

Figure 4.12: Mental Space Configuration of **אם רק** Conditionals



וַיִּשֶׂם אֶת־פֶּסֶל הָאָשֶׁרָה אֲשֶׁר עָשָׂה בְּבַיִת אֲשֶׁר אָמַר יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵי דָוִד וְאֶל־שְׁלֹמֹה בְּנוֹ
 וְלֹא בְּבַיִת הַזֶּה וּבִירוּשָׁלַם אֲשֶׁר בְּחָרְתִּי מִכָּל שְׁבֵטֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל אֲשִׁים אֶת־שְׁמִי לְעוֹלָם:
 אֲסִיף לְהִגִּיד רַגְלֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל מִן־הָאֲדָמָה אֲשֶׁר נָתַתִּי לְאַבְוֹתָם רַק אִם־יִשְׁמְרוּ לַעֲשׂוֹת כְּכֹל
 אֲשֶׁר צִוִּיתִים וּלְכַל־הַתּוֹרָה אֲשֶׁר־צִוָּה אֶתֶם עַבְדֵי מֹשֶׁה:

⁷He put an idol of asherah made in the house regarding which YHWH said to David and to his son Solomon: “In this house and in Jerusalem, which I have chosen from all the tribes in Israel, I will put my name forever. ⁸And I will not again cause the feet of Israel to wander here and there away from the land I gave to their fathers, only if they guard and do according to all which I commanded them and do all the law which Moses my servant commanded them.” (My translation.) 2 Kgs. 21:7-8.

Because רק has scope over the אם -clause, like English *only* in *only if* phrases, רק seems to be asserting that there is only one condition under which Q is valid, and, via implicature, that all other possible scenarios are denied.⁴⁹¹ (171) appears to be asserting that the only scenario in which YHWH will refrain from causing Israel to wander here and there away from the land is one in which they obey all His commands. Via implicature any scenario under which they do not obey will yield the possibility of exile.

As was noted above, BHRG, Waltke and O' Connor and Levinsohn agree that the semantic contribution of רק crucially includes limitation. Levinsohn argues that the relevant semantic information רק brings to the floor is that of contrast. It has been pointed out by Dancygier and Sweetser (2005: 206) that predictive אם conditionals in English comittantly carry an *iff* implicature (just as they do in BH), and because of this "there is no need for them to assert it explicitly by saying *only*, unless the speaker needs to contrast the unique space where Q holds with other contenders which are on the floor." The above noted examples indicate this is also the case for BH as well where in (171), for example, partial obedience is ruled out by רק .

It is also important to note that scalability is present in the interpretation of אם רק -conditionals. They do not deny there are other alternatives to obeying all the commands, but assert that the condition in the P clause is the only one in which the apodosis is valid. In (171) the Israelites could choose to obey none of the commands or certain selective commands, but the only acceptable choice is לֵל . This scalability is modeled in Figure 4.12.

At first glance, it might seem that the scalability reading contradicts the contrastivity and exclusivity readings of the אם רק construction. However, the scalability reading in the BH examples above apply only to spaces with values lower than P. If the P space is not exclusively fulfilled, then Q does not hold. Exclusivity is derived from these scalar effects invoked by רק and results in the אם רק space being the uniquely sufficient space that fulfills the conditions. All others are excluded. James (1986: 476-479); Van der Auwera (1997: 169-190) and Dancygier and Sweetser (1997: 125; 2005: 205, 207) have also observed that this is a characteristic of *only if* conditionals in English.

The אם רק conditional P and Q clauses in each of the passages under discussion occur in quoted speech. The remaining passages from 1, 2 Kings and 2 Chronicles are embedded quotes that are presented as taking the original speaker's perspective. Hence the events in the P, Q

⁴⁹¹ Dancygier and Sweetser (2005: 205); Horn (1969).

clauses are viewed as occurring subsequent to the speech event. These factors all promote a FUTURE TIME construal for the *yiqtol*s.

It was noted at the beginning of this section that most English Bibles invert the אם רק construction order and (mis)translate it *if only*. I suggest this is a mistranslation because, although *if only* is “composed of the same two lexemes as *only if*, it is quite different in meaning, not just in scope, but also in the degree of compositionality.”⁴⁹² This is not the place for an extended discussion of the linguistics of English *if only*, so a brief summary based on Dancygier and Sweetser (2005: 212) will suffice. The main part of their discussion which I will note refers to the following sentence taken from *The Beach* by Alex Garland, p. 281.

(172) If only I could have frozen him I'd have circled him like a statue in a museum, taking my time, noting his posture and listing the items he carried.

Dancygier and Sweetser observe that in uttering sentences like (172) the speaker is committing to three separate aspects of interpretation: (1) A conditional relationship between P and Q (“freezing” the man would let the speaker get a good look at him). (2) because it is impossible to “freeze” someone, (172) expresses a negative epistemic stance towards P as evidenced by the distanced verb forms. And (3), the speaker preference for the P, Q space is evident.

Crucially, the core semantic components of limitation, contrast and exclusivity are not asserted at any level in *if only* constructions, nor is scalability. Just as important, due to the negative epistemic stance, *if only* sequences have much in common with negative-stance conditionals such as *If I could get that job, I'd buy a new house*, a similarity not shared by *only if* conditionals. In fact, *if only* constructions share many features with the verbs *wish*, *believe* and *hope*.⁴⁹³ Note that an acceptable substitute for (172) is:

(173) I wish I could have frozen him, then I'd have circled him like a statue in a museum, taking my time, noting his posture and listing the items he carried.

In contrast, *only if*-conditionals do not express wishes. Consequently, because of these fundamental differences between *only if*-conditionals and *if only*, the use of the latter in English translations of the above passages demands of the reader additional processing effort to arrive at the correct interpretation. Note example (174), the NIV translation of example (169) above:

⁴⁹² Dancygier and Sweetser (2005: 211).

⁴⁹³ Dancygier and Sweetser (2005: 212).

(174) “in the land the Lord your God is giving you to possess as your inheritance, he will richly bless you, ⁵if only you fully obey the Lord your God and are careful to follow all these commands I am giving you today.

Upon reading this, the reader must cancel the first relevant interpretation of *if only you fully obey the Lord your God and are careful to follow all these commands I am giving you today*, which would be a wish, then seek for another interpretation which does make sense, the *only if* interpretation. The reason I believe most English translations have used *if only* is because they desire to maintain the Hebrew clause order and *only if* would result in awkward-sounding English. But the result is a translation that conceals the core semantic components of the קִי אִם construction from the reader.

A better strategy is suggested by some of the New Living Translation of (169), where the core information of the Q clause is repeated:

(175) ...for the Lord your God will greatly bless you in the land he is giving you as a special possession. ⁵You will receive this blessing if you are careful to obey all the commands of the Lord your God that I am giving you today.

This however still omits *only*, which, since אִם קִי is compositional, is required in order to provide the crucial semantic components of limitation, contrast and exclusivity. If the repetition of the core information from the Q clause is maintained, including *only if* yields a very satisfactory translation: *You will receive this blessing only if you are careful to obey....* This strategy produces felicitous results in the remaining passages.

4.6. Summary of אִם Conditionals

The goal of this chapter was to demonstrate the value of a cognitivist approach for analyzing both the semantics and role of אִם in אִם -conditional constructions. The analyses also sought to investigate whether the cognitive domain based classification system proposed by Sweetser (1990) would yield a more satisfying understanding of the types of אִם conditionals that occur in Biblical Hebrew than that offered by the “degree of hypotheticality” categories employed in earlier studies of BH conditionals. Finally, the analysis sought to determine if the cognitive-domain based categories of conditionals had observable functional purposes and whether any correlation existed between verb use and the function of the conditional.

In regards to the semantics and role of אִם in אִם -conditional constructions, this chapter affirms the traditional view that hypotheticality is the core semantic component of אִם , and

that an *if* translation of the particle is fully warranted when it occurs as the head of a conditional construction. As will be demonstrated in the following chapter, this schematic, prototypical hypothetical meaning is invoked when, and only when, the particle occurs as the head of a conditional construction,⁴⁹⁴ either the iconic P, Q order or the Q, P order. When ׀ does not occur as head of a construction, the semantics of hypotheticality are suppressed.

The chapter also established that ׀ functions as a mental space builder and that the spaces it builds when it is the head of a construction are hypothetical spaces. We demonstrated that ׀ marks the P space as background to the Q space. This background-marking function is a schematic semantic component of the particle and has functions in non-conditional constructions that will be explored in the following chapter.

In this chapter, it was also demonstrated that the cognitive-functional domain-based categories proposed by Sweetser provide a more coherent analysis of BH conditionals than previous analyses have offered. The majority of uses of ׀ in Biblical Hebrew are in conditional constructions. Therefore, when ׀ headed a P clause, the particle would first prompt the construction of hypothetical mental spaces. If the expectation of hypotheticality was contradicted when the entire utterance was completed, the expectation would be amended. This allowed for ׀-temporal spaces to be constructed when certain contextual factors conspire to promote a temporal construal. These factors typically involve eventualities that were habitual in PAST TIME relative to the narrator or character domain. The difference between the semantics of *if* and *when* was shown to be one of epistemic stance. A positive epistemic stance prompts a temporal construal and a neutral or negative epistemic stance results in a conditional interpretation. Space construction is adjusted resulting in temporal spaces rather than hypothetical spaces. Temporal construal of ׀-conditionals is confined to content domain and generic conditionals.

Traditional degree of hypotheticality-based analyses of BH conditionality failed to uncover interesting generalizations regarding the purposes for which BH speakers used conditionals. Because of this I presented an analyses of BH conditionals based on cognitive-functional, domain-based categories. Content conditionals are used primarily in direct speech and were shown to be used to reason and make conditioned predictions regarding possible future alternative scenarios. The iconic P, Q clause order is complicit in invoking causality, *iff* reasoning and alternative reasoning via alternate mental spaces. When the alternative is not overtly stated, it is, nevertheless, an active construal. An alternative mental space is

⁴⁹⁴ As noted earlier, constructions are here defined following Goldberg (1995, 2006a, b).

constructed for the alterative implicature. In the alternative mental space $\sim P$ holds and therefore $\sim Q$ also holds. Alternative mental spaces are not invoked in speech-act conditionals or epistemic conditionals.

Generic conditionals were also shown to be predictive and invoke alternate reasoning. They differ from content conditionals in that they typically discuss a general property of all members of a class and characterize a behavior or class. In contrast, content conditionals are typically non-characterizing and discuss specific members and eventualities. It was demonstrated that the verbs used in generic conditionals also reflect the cross-linguistic preference that generic statements have for verbs with imperfect aspect values: *yiqtol*s are clearly preferred in both the P and Q clauses and the characterizing (gnomic) use of the *qatal* is consonant with the analysis presented by Andrason (2012c) of the gram's use in non-conditional generics. It was hypothesized that the semantics of contingent causality located in the iconic P, Q clause order is entangled with the rare use of the *wayyiqtol* in non-narrative generic conditional Q clauses. The semantic value of succession, widely recognized to be a primary semantic component of the *wayyiqtol*, licenses its use in these conditionals.

Speech-act conditionals were shown to be the most commonly used type of conditional in the BH corpus. These conditionals set up an אם clause that conditionally contextualizes the speech act in the main Q clause, not the content of the main clause. Speech-act directives comprise the largest subcategory of speech-act אם conditionals. Directives are always understood to be realized post-speech, therefore, they are always construed to occur after the condition is met, whether the condition is situated in the past, present or future. I have hypothesized that in speech-act petitions the conditional P clauses, $\text{אם-נָא מְצַאֲתִי הֵן בְּעֵינַיִךְ}$ and $\text{אם-עַל-הַמֶּלֶךְ טוֹב}$ are constructions whose pragmatic meaning is PETITION. They functioned metonymically to a request scenario.

Conditional promises and threats occur in pairs in approximately 30% of uses of these conditionals. The אם־וְ construction (as opposed to simply אם) occurs in the majority of conditional threats in promise-threat pairs and it was hypothesized that וְ contributes instructions to the reader/hearer to seek a semantic and pragmatic association between the promise and the threat. Conditional concessives were shown to be contextually interpreted and available for construal because of אם 's semantics of hypotheticality.

Epistemic conditionals are rarely used in the Biblical Hebrew corpus. They were used for reasoning from effect to cause. Q, P and אם קִי constructions are subcategories of the prototypical and iconic P, Q conditional construction. אם קִי constructions are a subcategory

of the Q, P construction. Both inherit structure from the P, Q construction. Neither construction is common in the BH corpus. אם קי constructions are used to exclude from consideration all scenarios except the one presented in the אם clause.

This chapter has also demonstrated that categorizing BH conditionals based on cognitive-functional domains yielded clear generalizations regarding verb use in conditionals. Prior analyses of BH verb usage in conditionals used traditional categorization schemas based on degrees of hypotheticality. These schemas hindered discovery of and obscured clear patterns of verb use in these conditionals.⁴⁹⁵ *Yiqtol*s, *qatal*s and *weqatal*s are the most commonly used verb form in BH conditionals. *Yiqtol*s are typically preferred when the speaker references an eventuality that he or she construes as occurring post-speech in FUTURE TIME. *Qatal*s are preferred to reference eventualities that are construed as occurring prior to speech or PAST TIME. *Weqatal*s typically occur at the head of Q clauses and are, with few exceptions, in complementary distribution with *yiqtol*s in this position and promote construal of post-speech in FUTURE TIME reference. Participles occur only twenty-seven times in BH conditional P clauses and twenty-one times in Q clauses. Their use appears to promote an atemporal construal that focuses the reader/hearer's attention on the action of the eventuality itself. However, the paucity of participles again means that this generalization has limited predictive power.

This chapter has demonstrated that verb choice in speech-act conditional directives is determined to a significant degree by the type of discourse in which the conditional is used. In procedural and casuistic texts *yiqtol*s are used almost twice as frequently in the P clause as in the P clauses found in speech-act conditional directives in non-procedural and non-casuistic texts. Additionally, imperatives are never used in procedural and casuistic text speech-act directive Q clauses. In these types of discourse the *weqatal* is found in 68% of procedural text Q clauses and 50% of uses in casuistic texts. In contrast, in Q clauses of non-procedural, non-casuistic text, imperatives are used 53% of the time, while the *weqatal* in only 17% of uses.

⁴⁹⁵ There are exceptional uses that break the analysis I propose, but every language has “residue” that is unexplainable and no analysis accounts for every instance of use. This is especially true with a language like Biblical Hebrew that is no longer spoken. The question is one of degree of explanatory power.

Chapter 5: Non-Conditional ׀ Constructions

5.0. Introduction

This chapter will examine the uses of ׀ in non-conditional constructions. These include wishes (5.1), the ׀,...׀ alternate question construction (5.2), ׀ (אָשֶׁר) ׀ sequences (5.3), ׀ בְּלִי אָ (5.4), the ׀(׀)...׀ configuration which is translated *whether...or* (5.5), the ׀ כִּי construction (5.6) and finally, the phrase ׀ אָ לֹא (5.7). Previous studies of ׀ suggest that the particle used in conditional constructions may be explained via a separate etymology than the etymology of the particle used in non-conditional constructions (Eitan 1934; Van Leeuwen 1973: 38-48). Contra this dual-etymology theory, I hypothesize that schematic components of ׀'s semantics, demonstrably operative in the particle's use in conditional constructions, motivated and enabled its use in non-conditional constructions. Pursuant to this, questions that will be addressed include: What is the function of ׀ in these constructions? Are ׀'s semantics of hypotheticality, active and profiled in ׀-conditionals, expressed in these non-conditional constructions? Is the position of ׀ in these constructions indicative of its role and semantic contribution? Mental space theory will be employed to explain the cognitive structure of several of the above-mentioned constructions and concepts from Construction Grammar will help to explain the semantics of other of the constructions.

5.1. Putative ׀ Conditional Speech-Act Wishes

This section will examine the putative monoclausal ׀ wish construction found in 1 Chron. 4:10, Ps. 81:9, 95:7 and Ps. 139:19.⁴⁹⁶ Wishes in BH are typically expressed using several different constructions other than this ׀ construction, including ׀ ׀ or לֹא אָ׀.⁴⁹⁷ Constructions involving these will not be examined in this study. The status of 1 Chron. 4:10, Ps. 81:9, 95:7 and Ps. 139:19 as wishes is based on their being so classified in GKC (§151c), J-M (§162c) and BDB (2008: 50). Given that these are the only examples offered of this construction⁴⁹⁸ in the entire BH corpus, the status of the category and these tokens should be questioned. I will first argue that Ps. 81:9 and Ps. 95:7 are best explained within the conditional categories discussed in Chapter 4. The remaining two examples are discussed separately.

⁴⁹⁶ See BDB (2008: 50); GKC (§151c); IBHS (1990: 680) and J-M (§162c).

⁴⁹⁷ See GKC (§151; §167a); IBHS (1990: 680-681) and J-M (§105f; §163d; §176f).

⁴⁹⁸ BDB (2008: 50) lists Job 34:16 as a further example, but this is clearly a conditional speech-act command. No translation follows BDB.

(1) Ps. 81:9-10 (Eng. 81:8-9)

שִׁמְעַ עַמִּי וְאֶעֱיֵדָה בְּךָ יִשְׂרָאֵל אִם־תִּשְׁמַע־לִי:⁹
 לֹא־יִהְיֶה בְּךָ אֱלֹהִים זָר וְלֹא תִשְׁתַּחֲוֶה לְאֵל נָכַר¹⁰

⁸“Hear, O my people, and I will warn you— if you would but listen to me, O Israel! ⁹You shall have no foreign god among you; you shall not bow down to an alien god. (NIV).

(2) Ps. 95:7-8

כִּי הוּא אֱלֹהֵינוּ וְאֶנְחֵנוּ עִם מְרֵעִיתוֹ וְצִאֵן יָדוֹ⁷
 הַיּוֹם אִם־בְּקִלּוֹ תִשְׁמָעוּ:⁸ אֶל־תִּקְשׁוּ לְבַבְכֶם
 כַּמְרִיבָה בַּיּוֹם מִסָּה בַּמִּדְבָּר:

⁷for he is our God and we are the people of his pasture, the flock under his care. Today, if you hear his voice, ⁸do not harden your hearts as you did at Meribah, as you did that day at Massah in the desert. (NIV).

Under the traditional analyses the אִם clauses are understood to be syntactically isolated from the following clauses and are not analyzed as P clauses followed by apodoses. The Masoretic פסוקים סוף at the end of Ps. 81:9 and 95:7 support this hypothesis. However, the translational inconsistencies reveal the challenges and uncertainties posed by the classification of these אִם clauses as monoclausal wishes.

Note how the NIV makes different translation choices regarding the אִם constructions in (1) and (2). The syntactical differences in the אִם clauses are minimal, and the difference in the identical verb שמע is one of number. Even though the clauses that follow the אִם clauses are construed as commands in the translation of both passages, the NIV translates the אִם clause in (1) as a monoclausal wish followed by free-standing commands and the one in (2) as the protasis of an אִם-conditional speech-act directive. The translation of (1) honours the סוף פסוק, but ignores it in (2). There appears to be no motivation for these contradictory translation decisions apart from adherence to tradition in the former and ignoring it in the latter.

I propose that the NIV (and LXX-NETS, Holman, NKJV, ESV, NASB) have correctly analyzed the אִם clause in (2) as the P clause of a typical BH conditional speech-act command, but have misanalysed and mistranslated the אִם construction in (1). The אִם clauses in both Psalms should be analyzed and translated similarly. I propose that Psalm 81:9 should be translated: *Israel, if you listen to/obey me, ⁹you shall have no foreign god among you; you shall not bow down to an alien god.* In conclusion and contra GKC, J-M and BDB, I do not consider (1) and (2) to be monoclausal wishes. Instead, I classify them as biclausal (P, Q) אִם conditional speech-act directives in which אִם prompts the construction of the hypothetical P clause mental space.

Ps. 139:19 and 1 Chron. 4:10 are analytically challenging.

(3) Ps. 139:19

אִם-תִּקְטֹל אֱלֹהִים | רָשָׁע וְאֲנֹשֵׁי דָמִים סוּרוּ מִנִּי:

If only you would slay the wicked, O God! Away from me, you bloodthirsty men!

(4) 1 Chron. 4:10

וַיִּקְרָא יַעֲבֵז לֵאלֹהֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל לֵאמֹר אִם-בְּרָךְ
תִּבְרַכְנִי וְהִרְבִּיתָ אֶת-גְּבוּלֵי וְהִיָּתָה יְדִךְ עִמִּי
וְעָשִׂיתָ מִרְעָה לְבִלְתִּי עָצְבִי וַיָּבֵא אֱלֹהִים אֶת
אֲשֶׁר-שָׂאָל:

Jabez called out to the God of Israel, “If only you would greatly bless me and expand my territory! May your hand be with me! Keep me from harm so I might not endure pain!” (NET)

Both represent אִם speech-act requests, as שָׂאָל at the end of (4) indicates, but neither is amenable to the above analysis as full P, Q conditionals. If these are monoclausal speech-act wishes, then some questions need to be answered regarding the construction. First, is it a conditional construction or is it a non-conditional אִם construction? Secondly, since three other constructions were available in BH to express wishes, what motivated this use of אִם for wishes?

As to the first question, Waltke and O’ Connor (1990: 680) seem to classify (3) and (4) as conditional constructions since they remark “wishes may be expressed...in protases lacking apodoses, introduced by אִם.” J-M (2003: §176f) also appear to believe these are true conditionals *sans* the Q clause since they claim there is a missing “Waw of apodosis” in (4). GKC (2006 [1909]: §167a) concurs that the Q clause in (4) is concealed or suppressed. When Van Leeuwen (1973: 33-34) discusses these examples, he speaks of them as pleas and appears to classify them as conditionals since he submits that the Q clause is suppressed and are therefore examples of ellipsis of the Q clause.

Contra this analysis, there are no examples of אִם wish constructions in BH with explicit Q clauses. The above examples are the only אִם constructions interpreted as wishes and both lack Q clauses. The opinion that the Q clause is missing is based on lack of evidence and possibly based on expectations derived from how typical Indo-European language conditional wishes operate. English and Spanish, for example, readily allow conditional wishes such as *If only he would come tonight, I could explain everything to him*. But, the BH corpus seems to indicate that BH did not allow the Q clause.⁴⁹⁹ We can well imagine numerous possible consequents for

⁴⁹⁹ Some instances of אִם רק are translated *if only* in English. In Chapter 4.5.1.3. I demonstrate that this translation is incorrect and that the construction should be translated *only if*.

each of the wishes in examples (1)-(4), yet being able to imagine them doesn't mean the Q clauses were omitted or "suppressed". Since full conditionals do not seem to have been used to express wishes, there is little ground to support the hypothesis that these are conditional constructions.


Although examples (3) and (4) are not conditional constructions, they nevertheless share certain properties with conditionals. One can express wishes about the future or past. The use of the *yiqtol* appears to indicate that both (3) and (4) are future-oriented wishes. What characterizes both is that as Fillmore (1990a: 154) noted, wishes indicate "the speaker's positive interest in the state of affairs," yet still promote a negative epistemic stance.⁵⁰⁰ In other words, the speaker is emotionally engaged, yet because she is uncertain that the wish will be fulfilled, she does not commit to it. The parameter of "positive interest in the state of affairs" is clear in both passages.

This leads to the second question, if this construction does express a wish and is not a conditional, what motivated this use of $\square\aleph$ to express wishes? I hypothesize that $\square\aleph$ is used to express wishes because it shares the semantics of hypotheticality with $\imath\aleph$, a particle that expresses even greater epistemic distance than does $\square\aleph$. Perhaps it was used because the narrator sought to convey the semantics of positive interest coupled with less epistemic doubt than $\imath\aleph$ would allow. In the absence of native speakers to question, it is impossible to be certain.

Following Dancygier and Sweetser, I believe the mental space configuration of these constructions should be represented as in Figure 5.1. It reports the speaker's wish, "but does not allow the reader/hearer to speculate about the specific consequences of the wish being fulfilled" (Dancygier and Sweetser (2005: 219)). $\square\aleph$ does prompt the construction of a wish space. Yet the clause in this construction is not a P clause in the same sense that conditional P clauses set up mental spaces for background information for the contemplation of some Q clause. If a Q clause could be proposed, it would only be via implicature and would follow below the dash line.

⁵⁰⁰ Dancygier and Sweetser contend that Fillmore's concept of "positive interest" is too temporally oriented toward the future, and should be reconsidered. They propose the non-temporally oriented category *positive emotional stance* (2005: 214-215).

Figure 5.1: Mental Space Configuration for Monoclausal ׀ִשׁ Wish Construction



...את־גְּבוּלֵי...
 “If only you would greatly
 bless me and expand my territory!” (NET) 1 Chron. 4:10.

The contribution that ׀ִשׁ makes to the compositional meaning of the wish construction can be evaluated by deleting ׀ִשׁ from the above examples (1-2) repeated here where [] indicate where ׀ִשׁ is in the actual text.

(5) Ps. 139:19 [] תִּקְטַל אֱלֹהִים | רָשָׁע וְאֲנֹשִׁי דָמִים סוּרוּ מִנִּי:

(6) 1 Chron. 4:10 [] בָּרַךְ תְּבָרַכְנִי וְהִרְבִּיתָ אֶת־גְּבוּלַי... וַיִּקְרָא יַעֲבֵץ לְאֱלֹהֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל לֵאמֹר

As noted above, ׀ִשׁ wish constructions appear to require *yiqtol* verbs (two examples are clearly not sufficient to establish claims). I hypothesize that the *yiqtol* contributes a FUTURE TIME construal to the construction when ׀ִשׁ is present. However, when ׀ִשׁ is absent, it appears from parallel examples in prayers where *yiqtol* שָׁמַע is used, such as in (7) that the *yiqtol*s would be construed as mitigated (polite) commands (mitigated because YHWH is being commanded) or requests. All versions translate them accordingly as seen in (7).

(7) 1 Kgs. 8:30, 32

וְשָׁמַעְתָּ אֶל-תַּחֲנֻנַּת עַבְדְּךָ וְעַמְּךָ יִשְׂרָאֵל אֲשֶׁר
 יִתְפַּלְלוּ אֶל-הַמָּקוֹם הַזֶּה וְאַתָּה תִּשְׁמָע אֶל-מְקוֹם
 שְׁבִתְךָ אֶל-הַשָּׁמַיִם וְשָׁמַעְתָּ וְסָלַחְתָּ:

וְאַתָּה | תִּשְׁמָע הַשָּׁמַיִם וְעָשִׂיתָ וְשִׁפְטָתָ אֶת-
 עַבְדֶּיךָ לְהַרְשִׁיעַ רָשָׁע לְתַת דַּרְכּוֹ בְּרֹאשׁוֹ
 וּלְהַצְדִּיק צַדִּיק לְתַת לוֹ כְּצַדִּיקוֹ:

³⁰Hear the supplication of your servant and of your people Israel when they pray toward this place. You yourself must hear from heaven, your dwelling place, and when you hear, forgive.

³²then you yourself must hear from heaven and act. Judge between your servants, condemning the guilty and bringing down on his own head what he has done. Declare the innocent not guilty, and so establish his innocence. (My translation).

Following the translation decisions displayed in (7), (1) would read *Hear, O my people, while I admonish you; O Israel listen to me!*

In summary, the monoclausal ׀ construction used to express future wishes two times in BH is not a conditional construction in which the Q clause is omitted, unexpressed or suppressed as suggested by the grammars and lexicons. This study suggests that ׀'s semantics of hypotheticality enables a negative epistemic stance toward the proposition and explains why ׀ was useful in this construction. As noted above, wishes involve both positive interest in the state of affairs under discussion and at the same time indicate that the speaker lacks confidence that the state of affairs will be realized. This lack of confidence is the negative epistemic stance. The *yiqtol* gram contributes FUTURE orientation to the interpretation.

5.2. ׀ in Non-Conditional Interrogatives

It is well documented that ׀ occurs in non-conditional interrogatives in BH. These questions are non-wh questions, generally characterized by a question headed by the interrogative morpheme הַ (twice by מַה) followed by a ׀ (or, rarely, וְאִם) clause construed as a second or disjunctive question. ׀ clauses occur twice following מַה questions in Job 6:11-12 paralleling exactly its use in הַ-questions.

The following are examples of these interrogatives.⁵⁰¹

(8) Job 4:17⁵⁰²

הַאֲנוֹשׁ מֵאַלֹּהִים יִצְדֵּק אִם מְעַשֵּׂהוּ יִטְהַר־גִּבֹּר:

Is mortal man more righteous than God or man purer than his Maker? (My translation.

(9) Exod. 17:7

וַיִּקְרָא שְׁמֵם הַמָּקוֹם מַסָּה וּמְרִיבָה עַל־רִיבֵי בְנֵי
יִשְׂרָאֵל וְעַל נִסְתָּתָם אֶת־יְהוָה לְאֹמֶר הֲיֵשׁ יְהוָה
בְּקִרְבָּנוּ אִם־אֵין:

He called the place Massah and Meribah because of the Israelites quarreling and because they tested YHWH, saying “Is YHWH among us, or not?”

As will be discussed below, linguists generally distinguish alternate questions (AltQs) and polar questions (PolQs).⁵⁰³ This is often not the case in BH lexicons and grammars where the distinction is underrepresented. GKC (§150g, h), for instance, distinguishes just two categories of אִם, ... הֲ questions: disjunctive questions (§150g) and double questions (§150h), but does not define the difference between them. Presumably, disjunctive questions are AltQs and by double questions GKC is indicating PolQs. J-M (§161e) distinguishes the category “disjunctive questions,” but makes a comment that “a disjunctive question is sometimes a mere stylistic feature, used in cases of synonymous parallelism.” J-M apparently finds synonymy in the fact that both are questions and the topics of the two questions often display semantic parallelism.

A further concern is that in the traditional lexicons and grammars, the meaning (and function) assigned to אִם in אִם, ... הֲ questions is vague and ill-defined. For instance, BDB (2008: 50) lists the particle as an interrogative particle, as does DCH (1993: 304-305). HALOT (1994-2000: 60-61), states “in disjunctive questions אִם, ... הֲ are you ... or...?”. This seems to indicate they assign the meaning *or* to the particle when it occurs in these questions, but they do not overtly state that אִם means *or*. Similarly, GKC (§150i) claims that in disjunctive questions אִם may mean *or*, or at the least be translated *or*. IBHS (1990: 316) avers that אִם is an interrogative

⁵⁰¹ Constructions such as (8) will be considered polar questions. Polar questions are commonly referred to as yes-no questions. I follow the general linguistic literature in referring to them as polar questions. Constructions such as (9) will be considered alternative questions. As discussed below, BDB (2008: 50); BHRG (1999: 296); DCH (1993: 304-305); GKC (§150c, f-i); IBHS (1990: 316, 684); J-M (§161d). IBHS (1990: 684) conflates alternate questions and polar questions into one category.

⁵⁰² As example (10) below illustrates, *or* typically joins the two polar questions. In poetry, *or* is often dropped for stylistic reasons. When dropped in translations as in (10), it should be inferred.

⁵⁰³ In English and many other languages part of the characterization of AltQs verses PolQs crucially involves a difference in intonation; each has its own characteristic intonational pattern. This is not recoverable for BH so we assume, but cannot know how intonation differentiated the two types of questions.

particle. In spite of this unity of opinion, none of the literature offers a principled explanation for how the hypothetical particle assumed the semantics of an interrogative.⁵⁰⁴

In this section, I have several goals. First, I will address the descriptive underrepresentation of \square questions in the BH literature in order to establish the status of these questions. This will be done by applying general linguistic research of disjunctive type questions to the BH data. Secondly, I investigate whether claims that \square is an interrogative or disjunctive particle (with the meaning *or*) in \square questions is valid, or alternately, whether certain components of \square 's semantics that have been proposed in Chapter 4 of this study might instead license its use in \square questions. As in the previous chapter, the theory of Mental Spaces and that of Construction Grammar will be employed in the analysis with the goal of providing a more coherent understanding of \square 's semantics.

In order to accomplish these goals, I will first discuss the status of BH of \square questions by presenting a brief review of how alternate questions and polar questions have been understood in the general linguistic literature. Based on this review, I will then offer a classification of \square questions and subsequently suggest an analysis of \square 's use in these questions that allows a coherent understanding of the particle's semantics.

5.2.1. Linguistics of Polar Questions and Alternative Questions

Traditionally, in a logical-philosophical framework of linguistic description such as Montague grammar, PolQs are derived from AltQs.⁵⁰⁵ A cognitive usage-based approach however, posits that the individual constructions are learned by language users and stored directly through repeated usage and one is not considered to be derived from the other.

Examples of typical English alternative questions include:

- (10) a. Do you want coffee or tea?
 b. Are you coming or going?
 c. Did you give the car keys to John or to Mary?

⁵⁰⁴ It should be noted that the use of particles whose semantics include hypotheticality (like \square) in alternate question and polar question constructions is not unknown typologically. Haiman (1978: 570-572; 1986: 215) notes the similarity between If P, Q conditionals and question-statement forms such as *Is the traffic bad? It will take forever to get to dinner*. Dancygier and Sweetser (2005: 263) observe that this similarity may reflect the fact that "conditional reasoning structure is more basic than any specific syntactic form such as question-statement." This type of conditional reasoning may be found in Jdg. 6:31; 9:2, but further discussion is outside the scope of this study.

⁵⁰⁵ See Karttunen (1978) for an analysis of AltQs and PolQs within the framework of Montague grammar.

Stereotypical polar questions include:

- (11) a. Do you want tea?
 b. Are you leaving?
 c. Did you give the car keys to John?

Bollinger (1978: 87) addressed the issue of whether polar questions are a subset of alternate questions and demonstrated that this “notion...will not work.” He pointed out how alternative questions are not interchangeable with the PolQs in the following request scenarios:

- (12) a. Will you marry me? PolQ
 b. Will you marry me or not? AltQ

- (13) (train conductor to passenger)
 a. May I see your ticket? PolQ
 b. May I see your ticket or not? AltQ

Biezma (2009) and Biezma and Rawlins (2012) have provided further arguments in support of Bolinger and establish why they are not interchangeable in English. They contend that AltQs typically function to offer “an *unbiased choice* between the alternatives offered by the disjunction” (Biezma and Rawlins 2012: 2). The normal response is to choose one of the alternatives. Van Rooy and Safárová (2003: 13) propose that AltQs indicate that the speaker “has no bias with respect to one or the other alternative being either more probable or more useful for her conversational goals.” This sharply differentiates them from most questions, including polar questions, which offer only one alternative.

In everyday discourse, the conversational goals of the speaker are crucially involved in the type of question that the speaker chooses (van Rooy and Safárová 2003: 10). When a speaker has no preference as to the answer, but wishes to limit the responses available to the addressee, AltQs are typically chosen; if the speaker prefers a positive answer, PolQs are more often chosen. Answers to polar questions such as (11a) include *yes* and *no*, where *yes* indicates an answer that affirms the content of the question. If, however, the addressee of the question answers *no*, they may acceptably counter with something like *but I would like coffee*, or *but I would like water*. Responses such as these are not compatible with the AltQs in (10) because “the function of an ALTQ is to present alternatives that the answerer should choose between” (Biezma and Rawlins 2012: 18). Polar questions do not limit the addressee in this way.

Alternate questions also include what are referred to as AltQvNs⁵⁰⁶ such as:

- (14) a. Do you want coffee or not?
 b. Are you coming or not?
 c. Did you give the car keys to John or not?

Since they are AltQs, they are used in the same way to offer an exhaustive list to the addressee. There is, though, a pragmatic difference—they have a “cornering effect” (Biezma 2009: 1) and “do not leave the addressee any room to maneuver” (Biezma 2009: 16). They are, effectively, the last move in dialogical discourse.

Bolinger (1978:90) has noted that rhetorical polar questions such as the following are not amenable to the alternate questions in (14):

- (15) a. Are you crazy?
 b. Do you think I’m going to risk my reputation for that?
 (16) a. *Are you crazy or not?
 b. *Do you think I’m going to risk my reputation for that or not?

He concludes that only PolQs are acceptable for rhetorical questions⁵⁰⁷ and AltQvNs are unsatisfactory because of their above-noted uses. When someone asks a polar rhetorical question, the speaker acts as though she has received (and may in fact has received) “some information (linguistic or otherwise) ... that was very unexpected” (van Rooy and Safárová 2003: 12) and seeks to “clarify” the information (Biezma 2009: 17). For example, when a friend told us her fifty-two year old sister wanted to get pregnant, the response was *Is she crazy?* The polar question allows for further clarification and discussion. Since AltQvNs (like all AltQs) present the alternatives as unbiased, they are not as useful for clarifying information.

In summary, polar questions are not a subset of alternative questions. They are used for different communicative purposes and are not interchangeable. As we look at the $\square\aleph, \dots \aleph$ sequences in BH, several questions will be examined. First, what kinds of questions use the $\square\aleph, \dots \aleph$ construction and why. Secondly, how do these differ, and finally, why is it that $\square\aleph$ can be used in the $\square\aleph, \dots \aleph$ question construction?

⁵⁰⁶ Read as “AltQs or Negatives”.

⁵⁰⁷ See Chapter 4.3.7 for a discussion of rhetorical questions and their uses. There is a vast amount of linguistic literature on rhetorical questions. Some selected references include: Hiz (1978); Koshic (2005); Oakley and Tobin (2014); Rohde (2006). See Brueggemann (1973); Moshavi (2009, 2011, 2013a, 2013b) for studies on Biblical Hebrew rhetorical questions.

5.2.2. ׀,... ׀ Questions

׀ is associated with ninety-six ׀ questions in BH.⁵⁰⁸ It is well established that ׀ itself is a question word,⁵⁰⁹ typically used to mark “disjunctive” questions. This analysis demonstrates that ׀,... ׀ questions are used to ask multiple polar questions and alternative questions as defined above. As will be seen, in BH these two types of questions are different, not just pragmatically, but syntactically as well. It will also seek to answer the following questions: What is ׀’s role in these sequences of alternate and polar questions and why is ׀ used in these constructions?

׀ questions are distributed between AltQs and PolQs as follows:

Alternative questions: 21⁵¹⁰

Polar questions: 75⁵¹¹

5.2.3. ׀ in Alternative Questions

Both AltQs and the subset of AltQvNs occur in Biblical Hebrew with AltQ being the more frequent construction. The interrogative particle ׀ is the question particle in every AltQ in which ׀ occurs, with the exception of the above-mentioned AltQs headed by ׀ in Job 6:11-12. Typical examples of AltQs include:

(17) Jdg. 20:28

וּפִינְחָס בֶּן־אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן־אֶהֱרֹן עֹמֵד לְפָנָיו בְּיָמִים
הֵהָם לֵאמֹר הַאֲזַסְף עוֹד לְצֹאת לַמִּלְחָמָה עִם־
בְּנֵי־בְנֵימִן אֲחֵי אִם־אֶחְדָּל

And Phinehas son of Eleazar, son of Aaron, ministered before it in those days), saying, “Shall we go out once more to battle against our kinsfolk the Benjaminites, or shall we desist?”

⁵⁰⁸ GKC (§150f) asserts that the use of ׀ as a question marker in 1 Kgs. 1:27; Isa. 29:16; Job 6:12; 39:13 is “really due to the suppression of the first member of a double question,” i.e. ׀. Since ׀ does not occur in the MT in these verses, they will not be considered as instances of ׀ in ׀-questions. See Hawley (2015) for a recent discussion of ׀-questions.

⁵⁰⁹ See BDB (2008: 209); GKC (§150a); HALOT (1994-2000: 236); J-M (§161).

⁵¹⁰ Gen. 24:21; 27:21; 37:32; Exod. 16:4; 17:7; Num. 11:23; 13:18, 19 (2x), 20 (2x); Deut. 8:2; Josh. 5:13; Jdg. 2:22; 20:28; 2 Sam. 24:13; 1 Kgs. 22:6, 15; 2 Kgs. 20:8 (see apparatus); 2 Chron. 18:5, 14. AltQvNs in this list include: Gen. 24:21; 27:21; 37:32; Exod. 16:4; 17:17; Num. 11:23; Deut. 8:2 and Jdg. 2:22.

⁵¹¹ Gen. 4:7 (2x); 17:17; 37:8; Num. 11:12, 22; Jdg. 6:31; 9:2; 11:25; 2 Sam. 19:36; Job 4:17; 6:5, 6, 11-12 (2x), 13, 30; 7:12; 8:3; 10:4, 5; 11:2, 7; 13:8, 9; 22:3; 34:17; 38:33; 39:9, 10; 39:27; 40:8-9, 27; Ps. 77:10; 78:20; 88:11; 94:9; Prov. 6:28; Qoh. 11:6; Isa. 10:9, 15; 27:7; 40:28; 49:24; 50:2; 66:8, 9; Jer. 2:14, 31; 3:5; 5:9, 22, 29; 8:4, 19, 22; 9:8; 14:19, 22; 18:14; 31:20; 49:1; Ezek. 15:3; 22:14; Joel 1:2; 4:4; Amos 3:3, 4, 6 (2x); 6:2, 12; Mic. 2:7; 4:9; Hab. 3:8.

(18) 2 Sam. 24:13

וַיֵּבֶאֱגַד אֱלֹהֵי דָוִד וַיִּגְדֹּל וַיֹּאמֶר לוֹ הֲתָבוֹא לְךָ
שָׁבַע שָׁנִים | רָעַב | בְּאַרְצְךָ אִם־שְׁלֹשָׁה חֳדָשִׁים
נִסָּף לִפְנֵי־צָרֶיךָ וְהוּא רֹדְפֶךָ וְאִם־הִיּוֹת שְׁלֹשַׁת
יָמִים דָּבָר בְּאַרְצְךָ עֲתָה דַע וּרְאֵה מִה־אָשִׁיב
שְׁלָחִי דְבָר:

So Gad went to David and said to him, “Shall there come upon you three years of famine in your land? Or three months of fleeing from your enemies while they pursue you? Or three days of plague in your land? Now then, think it over and decide how I should answer the one who sent me.”

(19) 1 Kgs. 22:6

וַיִּקְבֹּץ מֶלֶךְ־יִשְׂרָאֵל אֶת־הַנְּבִיאִים כְּאַרְבַּע מֵאוֹת
אִישׁ וַיֹּאמֶר אֲלֵהֶם הֲאֵלֶיךָ עַל־רָמֹת גִּלְעָד
לְמַלְחָמָה אִם־אֶחְזָקֶל

So the king of Israel brought together the prophets—about four hundred men—and asked them, “Shall I go to war against Ramoth Gilead, or shall I refrain?” (NIV)

AltQvNs are a subcategory of AltQs whose second question scenario is typically אִם־לֹא (20), though אִם־אֵינִי occurs also (e. g. example (21)). They differ from AltQs in that, as seen in (17)–(19), AltQs are real questions, posed by a speaker seeking information from an addressee; AltQvNs describe questions a participant is seeking to determine for themselves.⁵¹² They may occur in quotes, but are the object complements of verbs of knowledge (ראה, ידע, נכר),⁵¹³ testing (נסה) and touch (מוש).⁵¹⁴

(20) Gen. 24:21

וְהָאִישׁ מִשְׁתַּאֲה לָהּ מִחֲרִישׁ לְדַעַת הַהֲצִלִּיחַ
יְהוָה דְּרָכּוֹ אִם־לֹא:

The man gazed at her in silence to learn whether the LORD had made his journey successful or not.

(21) Exod. 17:7 (repeated from example 9)

וַיִּקְרָא שֵׁם הַמָּקוֹם מַסָּה וּמְרִיבָה עַל־רִיב | בְּנֵי
יִשְׂרָאֵל וְעַל נִסְתָּם אֶת־יְהוָה לֵאמֹר הֲיֵשׁ יְהוָה
בְּקִרְבָּנוּ אִם־אֵין:

He called the place Massah and Meribah, because the Israelites quarreled and tested the LORD, saying, “Is the LORD among us or not?”

In summary, the אִם clause of AltQs minimally requires the speaker or writer to specify an alternative to the topical component of the הַ question. Principles of relevance guide the under-specification of all other components of the question. Since AltQvNs by definition

⁵¹² Van der Merwe (p. c.: August 2016).

⁵¹³ Although ראה is technically a verb of perception, its use is a metaphorical extension of knowledge. To see is to know.

⁵¹⁴ Gen. 24:21; 27:21; 37:32; Exod. 16:4; Deut. 8:2; Jdg. 2:22.

provide “not” as the only alternative to the הָ question, אֵלֶּם-לֹא and (once) אֵלֶּם-אֵינָן are the only permissible alternatives. Crucially, every multiple AltQ and every AltQvN is headed by a הָ question. The אֵלֶּם clause is always the second question; none occur where a אֵלֶּם clause heads the first question. At this point, we will only remark that the אֵלֶּם prompts the second (or third) question. The implications of this will be discussed in full after the analysis of polar questions.

5.2.4. אֵלֶּם,...הָ Polar Questions

The most frequent category of questions in which אֵלֶּם is used is PolQs.⁵¹⁵ אֵלֶּם clauses always occur as the second (or third) question in a sequence of PolQs, in which the first PolQ is, with the exception of the two מה questions, always a הָ-question. I will call the אֵלֶּם,...הָ pairs of PolQs “sequential PolQs,” and note that not just one, but at least two אֵלֶּם-headed polar questions may follow the initial הָ-PolQ, as seen in (24).⁵¹⁶ Typical examples include:

(22) Gen. 17:17

וַיִּפֹּל אַבְרָהָם עַל-פָּנָיו וַיִּצְחַק וַיֹּאמֶר בְּלִבּוֹ הֲלֵבֶן
מֵאָה-שָׁנָה יוֹלֵד וְאִם-שָׂרָה הִבְתִּי-תִשְׁעִים שָׁנָה
תֵּלֵד:

And Abraham fell on his face and laughed. Then he said to himself, “Can a son be born to a one hundred year old man? And can Sarah who is ninety bear a child?” (My translation)

(23) Jdg. 6:31a

וַיֹּאמֶר יוֹאָשׁ לְכָל־אֲשֶׁר-עָמְדוּ עָלָיו הָאֲתָם |
תִּרְיִבּוּן לְבַעַל אִם-אֲתָם תּוֹשִׁיעוּן אוֹתוֹ

But Joash said to all who stood against him, “Will you contend for Baal? Or will you save him? (ESV)

(24) Isa. 10:8-9

כִּי יֹאמֶר הֲלֵא שָׂרֵי יַחֲדוּ מְלָכִים: הֲלֵא⁸
כְּכַרְכַּמִּישׁ כְּלָנוּ אִם-לֵא כְּאַרְפַּד חַמַּת אִם-לֵא
כְּדַמָּשְׁק שַׁמְרוֹן:

⁸For he says: “Are not my commanders all kings? ⁹Is not Calno like Carchemish? Is not Hamath like Arpad? Is not Samaria like Damascus?”

The examples demonstrate that the אֵלֶּם-headed questions are both topically related to the הָ polar question and syntactically similar. The topical verbs or nouns in the הָ polar question address the question under discussion and the subsequent אֵלֶּם-headed questions continue to address it. As a result, sequential pairs are not just in the same semantic domain, but are often synonyms.⁵¹⁷ In (22) both questions address the issue of whether someone can be fertile at an

⁵¹⁵ An analysis of rhetorical questions is beyond the scope of this study. See Moshavi (2009) on the argument structure of certain rhetorical questions in BH; see also Held (1969) and de Regt (1996).

⁵¹⁶ 2 Sam. 24:13; Isa. 10:9.

⁵¹⁷ This is presumably what J-M (§161e) meant when he called these synonymous.

advanced age. In (23) both questions express scorn that Baal needs protection, and both questions in (24), the הָ question and the two אם questions that follow discuss the same topic.

PolQs display not just semantic parallelism, but also syntactic parallelism. This contrasts with AltQs. The parallelism extends not just to the order of constituents but to the verb forms.

(25) Gen. 37:8

הַמֶּלֶךְ	תִּמְלֹךְ	עָלֵינוּ	אִם־תִּמְשֹׁל	בָּנוּ
InfAb-Quest	PP	PP	InfAb-Pt	PP

“Are you indeed to reign over us? Are you indeed to have dominion over us?”

(26) Isa. 10:15

הִתְפָּאֵר	הַגֵּרֶזֶן	עַל	הַחֹצֵב	בּוֹ	אִם־יִתְגַדֵּל	הַמְשׁוֹר	עַל־מְנִיפּוֹ
yiQ-Quest	PP	Part	PP	Part	PP	Sub-N	Part-PP

Shall the ax vaunt itself over the one who wields it, or the saw magnify itself against the one who handles it?

(27) Isa. 40:28

הֲלוֹא	יָדַעְתָּ	אִם־לֹא	שָׁמַעְתָּ
Neg-Quest	qat	Neg-Pt	qat

Have you not known? Have you not heard?

This parallelism is the default for אם,...הָ polar questions.

Elements of the second question that are easily derivable via implicature may be elided⁵¹⁸ as in the following examples.

(28) Jer. 2:31b

הַמְדַבֵּר	הַיִּיְתִי	לְיִשְׂרָאֵל	אִם	אֶרֶץ	מְאֻפְלֵיהָ
N-Quest	qat	N	Pt	N	N

Have I been a wilderness to Israel, or a land of thick darkness?

Here a verbless stative clause is used in parallel with stative הַיִּיְתִי. In (29) the pronoun is elided in the אם clause:

(29) Job 7:12

אִם־תִּנְיִן	הֲיָם־אֲנִי
N-Pt	1PSPro-N-Quest

Am I the Sea, or the Dragon?

⁵¹⁸ See comments in Chapter 4.1.1.5.2 regarding the status of underrepresented elements.

The mental space configuration of $\square\aleph, \dots \eta$ questions is presented below in Figure 5.2, but suffice it to say at this point that it differs markedly from the space configuration for conditionals given in Chapter 4. In conditionals $\square\aleph$ functions as the space builder of a hypothetical space in which the P clause is elaborated. The Q clause is nested under and thus interpreted within the P clause space. In $\square\aleph, \dots \eta$ questions, η is the space-builder of a question space and the $\square\aleph$ clause is nested in the η space.

To summarize, polar questions are the most frequent category of $\square\aleph, \dots \eta$ questions. PolQs are always headed by a η question. The $\square\aleph$ clauses are always the second and third questions. No PolQs occur where a $\square\aleph$ clause heads the first question. Unlike AltQs, PolQs are characterized by both semantic and syntactic parallelism in both narrative discourse and poetic texts. Elided elements are easily recovered via implicature.

Significantly, in every $\square\aleph, \dots \eta$ polar question, both the η -PolQ and the following $\square\aleph$ question are rhetorical questions.⁵¹⁹ None seeks to elicit information from the addressee. Rather they are used to make assertions and or influence the hearer's conceptualization of the question under discussion or move the hearer to commit to some action. In contrast, as can be seen in examples (17)-(19) above, AltQs pose real questions that do seek to elicit information from the addressee.

In both AltQs (examples 17-19) and PolQs (examples 22-24) the $\square\aleph$ question occurs as the second (17-19; 22-23) or third (24) question in a series of these questions. Each is headed by a η -question. $\square\aleph$ never occurs as head of a first question. I am proposing that the $\square\aleph, \dots \eta$ sequence in Biblical Hebrew is a construction (per Goldberg's definition) whose mental space configuration, and hence the cognitive processing of AltQs and PolQs, is distinct from the space configuration and processing of conditionals. This is due to the fact that in these questions η is the space-builder of a question space, so $\square\aleph$ does not build a question space in AltQs, AltQvNs or PolQs. Instead the $\square\aleph$ clause is nested in, and consequently interpreted, within the scope of the η space. This calls into question the classification of $\square\aleph$ as a question word that independently builds question spaces. In the following section this issue will be examined further.

⁵¹⁹ The questions in Jer. 8:19 may be real questions. If so, it would be the only non-rhetorical PolQ sequence.

5.2.5. The Status of ׀ as an Interrogative Particle (and Question Space Builder)

The questions asked at the beginning of this section were: What is ׀'s role in these sequences of alternate and polar questions? Why is ׀ amenable to this role? The traditional answer, noted above in 5.2,⁵²⁰ is that ׀ is an interrogative particle. However, as demonstrated above, in both AltQs (examples 17-19) and PolQs (examples 22-24) the ׀-headed question occurs as the second (17-19; 22-23) or third (24) question in a series of these questions. Each is headed by a ׀-question. ׀ never occurs as head of the first of multiple questions. Interestingly, although Clines (1993: 304-305) states that ׀ is an interrogative, in (Clines: 1998: 374) he suggests that the use of ׀ as a question word is rare at best, "if not actually unattested".) This section will confirm that Clines' latter suspicion is valid.

It is crucial to note that ׀ always occurs as the head of the second scenario in a pair of PolQs, AltQs and AltQvNs. It never occurs independently as the head (or interrogative marker) of a polar question. Example (30), taken from Gen. 17:17 (example (22) above) would be an ill-formed question and unacceptable in BH. There are no examples of questions with this syntax in the entire corpus:

(30) אִם־לִבְּנֵי מֵאָה־שָׁנָה יוֹלֵד* (30)

However, the lexicons offer a number of examples to support their proposal that ׀ is a question word. The examples include GKC (§150f): 1 Kgs. 1:27; Isa. 29:16; Job 6:12; 39:13; J-M (§161d) suggests that Jer. 48:27;⁵²¹ Ps. 131:2; Job 17:2 should be added to this list. I postulate that most of these are only apparent counterexamples and the following discussion will support this claim.

To address GKC's examples, Job 6:12 can be easily resolved. As has been noted above, the ׀-clauses in this verse are preceded by מַה questions and form a אִם,...מַה construction built by analogy from the אִם,...׀ construction.

The translation of (31) in different English versions reveals almost total lack of consensus regarding ׀'s role in the passage.

⁵²⁰ See BDB (2008: 50); DCH (1993: 304-305); IBHS (1990: 316).

⁵²¹ BDB offers Jer. 48:27a, b as examples of the interrogative use of ׀.

(31) Job 39:12-13

12 הֲתֵאֱמִין בּוֹ בִּי-יָשׁוּב זֶרְעֶךָ וְגִרְנֶךָ יֵאָסֵף:
 13 בְּנִפְרֵי-רִנְגָיִם נִעְלָסָה אִם-אֶבְרָה חֲסִידָה וְנֹצָה:

12“Do you have faith in it that it will return, and bring your grain to your threshing floor? 13The ostrich’s wings flap wildly, though its pinions lack plumage.”

Most translations ignore אִם’s role.⁵²² Hartley (1988: 509), appealing to GKC (§150f), argues for a “missing” הֲ in the first clause of v.13. Clines (2015: 1074) too appeals to GKC (§150f) and argues that the text should be amended stating that “v 13b is pretty clearly the second half of a double question, and v 13a may well be understood as its first half.”

Another consideration that bolsters interpreting the אִם clause as the second question of a אִם,...הֲ construction in this passage is the occurrence of the preceding הֲ clauses in 39:11, 12, which license the interrogative interpretation in v.13. Admittedly there are no other examples of a אִם,...הֲ sequence in the Hebrew text where a אִם is separated from הֲ by two clauses, however no other remotely satisfying explanation has been proposed apart from amending the text.

(32), on the other hand, can be readily construed as a speech-act conditional and should be read as follows:

(32) 1 Kgs. 1:27

אִם מֵאֵת אֲדֹנָי הַמֶּלֶךְ נִהְיָה הַדָּבָר הַזֶּה וְלֹא
 הוֹדַעְתָּ אֶת-עַבְדִּיךָ מִי יֵשֵׁב עַל-כִּסֵּא אֲדֹנָי-הַמֶּלֶךְ
 אַחֲרָיו:

If this situation has been orchestrated by my master the king, you didn’t make it known to your servant who should sit on the throne of my master the king after him.” (My translation)

Following GKC, the NRSV translates with a question: “Has this thing been brought about by my lord the king and you have not let your servants know who should sit on the throne of my lord the king after him?” ESV, NASB, NET, NIV, NKJV, NLT also follow GKC and translate the אִם construction as a question.

⁵²² English: CEB, ESV, HCSB, NASB, NIV, NKJV, NRSV. Spanish: DHH, PDPT, RV95.

The ׀ clause in (33) has also been interpreted as a question by all major translations.

(33) Isa. 29:16

הַפְּכֹכִים אִם-כְּחֶמֶר הַיֵּצֵר יִחְשָׁב כִּי-יֹאמֶר מַעֲשֵׂה
לַעֲשֹׂהוּ לֹא עֲשָׂנִי וַיֵּצֵר אֹמֵר לְיוֹצְרוֹ לֹא הִבִּין:

Your thinking is backwards—It is as if you think the potter is just like the clay he uses. Or as if the thing that is made can say about its maker, “He did not make me”; or the object fashioned can say of its designer, “He has no ability”? (My translation)

Several solutions have been offered for this unusual use of the particle. GKC (§150f) argues that this is “due to the suppression of the first member of a double question,” i.e. the הַ clause. This, however, is the same argument offered for the use of ׀ in (32), which I have shown to be doubtful. Since ׀ is typically used to propose hypothetical scenarios, I suggest that it is doing the same here—the particle is first and foremost instructing the reader to consider the subsequent clauses as hypothetical examples of how the hearer/readers הַפְּכֹכִים, “turn things upside down”. These examples consist of everything that follows ׀—a potter being regarded as clay turns the established order on its head, as does the creature regarding the creator as one having no understanding.⁵²³

The same hypothetical scenario-proposing use of the particle is seen in an example from J-M (§161d) in (34) where the particle specifies an alternative scenario to the eventualities presented in verse 1. It does not function as an interrogative as J-M suggests. Omitting the introduction, Psalm 131:1, 2 reads as follows:

(34) Ps. 131:1b-2⁵²⁴

יְהוָה לֹא-גָבַהּ לִבִּי וְלֹא-רָמוּ עֵינַי וְלֹא-
הִלַּכְתִּי בְגִדְלוֹת וּבְנִפְלְאוֹת מִמְּנִי: ²אִם-לֹא
שׁוֹיִתִּי וְדוֹמַמְתִּי נִפְשִׁי כְּגִמְלָה עָלַי אִמוּ כְּגִמְלָה

¹YHWH, my heart is not arrogant, nor my eyes too full of conceit. I do not involve myself in important matters, nor with concerns that are too wonderful for me. ²Instead, for example, I have calmed and quieted my soul such that I am like a child who has just finished nursing with its mother--my soul in me is like that nursed child. (My translation)

⁵²³ My hypothesis is supported by Blenkinsopp (2008: 406) whose translation of v. 16, *You have things the wrong way round! As if the potter were no different from the clay, or as if what is made were to say of its maker...*, treats the ׀ clauses as examples of the hearers' incorrect thinking. See likewise Watts (2005: 455-456) who translates v. 16, *O your perversity! As if the potter be regarded like clay! As if the thing made should say to its maker...*

⁵²⁴ Textual issues in v. 2b, d have led to numerous divergent interpretations and translations throughout the history of translation. See Hossfeld and Zenger (2005) for a detailed account of the issues.

The NRSV and NIV translation of ׀ with *but*, or better yet, the *instead* of the NLT accurately captures that ׀ is indicating that the eventualities in v. 2 are alternate or contrastive to those in v. 1. J-M's suggestion that this is an interrogative use of ׀ is unnecessary.

J-M (§161d) also proposes that the two occurrences of ׀ in (35) are examples of an interrogative use of the particle. On the contrary, they are examples of sequential PolQs related to the second ׀ clause in verse 5:

(35) Amos 3:5b-6

<p>הִיעֲלֶה־פֶּחַ מִן־הָאֲדָמָה וְלִכּוּד לֹא יִלְכּוּד: ׀־יִתְקַע שׁוֹפָר בְּעִיר וְעַם לֹא יִחָרְדוּ ׀־ תִּהְיֶה רָעָה בְּעִיר וַיְהִי לֹא עֲשָׂה:</p>	<p>Will a trap spring up from the ground when it has taken nothing? ‘If a ram’s horn is blown in a city, won’t people tremble? If disaster falls on a city, is it the LORD who has done it? (CEB)</p>
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The ׀,...׀ sequence here displays the typical characteristics of BH ׀,...׀ polar question sequences:⁵²⁵ the topic of the ׀ clause (events have causes) is continued in the ׀ clauses. ׀ alerts the reader that a different scenario will be presented and the ׀ clause is construed as a question under the scope of the ׀ clause. The CEB translates the post-׀ ׀ constructions as polar questions with hypothetical conditional *if*P clauses. The hypothetical nature of the polar question scenarios licenses this interpretation. But it is crucial to recognize that the ׀ clauses fall under ׀’s scope. J-M’s suggestion that these ׀ clauses are examples of an interrogative use of the particle fails to acknowledge the ׀,...׀ sequence and unnecessarily complicates the lexicon.

The final two independent interrogative uses of ׀ proposed by J-M (§161d) are Job 17:2 and 30:24, 25. The translational history of Job 17:2 reveals the analytical challenges particles pose. J-M’s suggestion is similar to the translational strategy of the King James versions which all translate the ׀־׀ clause as a question.⁵²⁶ However, more recent translations choose either an intensifier “surely, certainly”⁵²⁷ or ignore it completely.⁵²⁸ There is however no basis here for interpreting ׀ as an intensifier.

Young’s Literal Translation offers what it promises—a literal translation—and actually deals with the ׀־׀ clause seriously.

⁵²⁵ See also Isa. 10:8, 9.

⁵²⁶ The 1611 and subsequent versions.

⁵²⁷ See ASV, ESV, God’s Word Translation, HCSB, NASB, NET, NIV, NRSV, RSV.

⁵²⁸ New Living Bible, NCT, Good News Bible.

(36) Job 17:1-2

1רוחִי חִבְּלָה יָמִי נִזְעָבוּ קְבָרִים לִי: 2אִם־לֹא
הַתְּלִים עִמָּדִי וְבַהֲמִרוֹתָם תִּלְוַן עֵינָי:

¹“My spirit hath been destroyed, My days extinguished—graves are for me.
²If not—mockeries are with me. And in their provocations mine eye lodgeth.

This rendering construes the אִם־לֹא clause as a predictive content conditional. It has Job stating that if he does not die, he will endure being mocked. This solution is consonant with the semantics of the particle. The one issue that mitigates against this interpretation is that the *ta'amim* on הַתְּלִים אִם־לֹא call for a conjunctive reading rather than the disjunctive reading *If not—mockeries are with me*. However, the disjunctive rendering makes better sense of the אִם־לֹא phrase and yields a reading compatible with אִם's core semantics of hypotheticality. In summary, I propose for consideration that in Job 17:2 אִם does not function as an interrogative particle, nor as an intensifier per more recent translations, but rather as the head of a predictive content conditional P clause.

(37) is the final use of אִם that J-M classifies as an interrogative.

(37) Job 30:24-25

24אֵךְ לֹא־בָעִי יִשְׁלַח־יָד אִם־צָפִידוֹ לְהִן שׁוֹעַ:
25אִם־לֹא בְּכִיתִי לְקִשָּׁה־יּוֹם עָגְמָה נַפְשִׁי
לְאֶבְיוֹן:

²⁴“Surely one does not turn against the needy, when in disaster they cry for help. ²⁵Did I not weep for those whose day was hard? Was not my soul grieved for the poor?”

The אִם־לֹא conditional in v. 25 poses serious exegetical challenges in an interpretationally challenging context. Most English translations translate the אִם־לֹא construction as a rhetorical question, as reflected in the NRSV translation above. In contrast, CEB translates it as a conditional protasis with no apodosis: *if I didn't weep for those who have a difficult day or my soul grieve for the needy;....* Clines (2006: 957) comments that v. 24 “is one of the most unintelligible verses in the book.” Regarding the context, which includes v. 25, he states “when the sense of the individual words is so vague or uncertain, it becomes all the more necessary to ask what is suitable to the context. The next verse [i.e. v. 25] has Job speaking of his care for the needy as the bitter backdrop to his present afflictions, and it would make sense to see v 24 also as portraying his generosity.” Given the linguistic and, resulting interpretational challenges of this passage, Clines' observation that context should drive the interpretation is crucial.

Of the 128 occurrences of אִם-לֹא, only this passage and Jer. 48:27, discussed below, have traditionally been translated as rhetorical questions. Every other use is given a conditional interpretation.⁵²⁹ This argues for a conditional interpretation, contra the rhetorical question position. A conditional interpretation would possibly read: *If I did not weep for those whose day was hard, grieved was my soul for the poor.* The viability of this interpretation is challenged by the fact that this would be the only speech-act conditional with a אִם-לֹא – *qatal* P clause followed by a *qatal*-headed Q clause in the BH corpus. The CEB’s translation decision to treat this as an incomplete conditional may be the most honest exegetical interpretation. It acknowledges that the semantics of אִם-לֹא clauses are clearly hypothetical in the overwhelming majority of instances, and it rejects what seems to be an ad hoc rhetorical exegesis. Finally, treating it as an incomplete conditional admits the difficulties of the text.

The second, putative interrogative use of אִם-לֹא is noted in BDB, which lists the two uses of אִם in Jer. 48:27 as examples of the interrogative use of the particle. Verse 26 consists of an accusation and judgement against the inhabitants of Moab, while verse 27 offers the supporting reasons for the judgement. Virtually all English, Spanish and Portuguese versions translate the אִם-clauses as accusatory rhetorical questions.⁵³⁰ In order to provide context, verse 26 is also shown.

(38) Jer. 48:26-27

הַשְּׂכִירָהוּ כִּי עַל־יְהוָה הִגְדִּיל וְסַפֵּק מוֹאָב
בְּקִיאָו וְהָיָה לְשִׁחַק גַּם־הוּא: אִם | לֹא
הַשִּׁחַק הָיָה לְךָ יִשְׂרָאֵל אִם־בְּגַנְבִים נִמְצְאָה
כִּי־מַדִּי דְבַרְיֶךָ בּוֹ תִתְנַדְּד:

²⁶“Make him drunk, for he has defied the LORD. Let Moab wallow in his vomit; let him be an object of ridicule. ²⁷For wasn’t Israel the object of your derision? He was caught among thieves, that you shake your head in scorn whenever you speak of him?”
(My translation)

These uses of אִם are challenging on several levels: First, it is syntactically challenging because the most relevant construal of אִם-headed constructions are as conditional constructions, but these are monoclausal uses and no readily relevant Q clause offers itself for interpretation. Secondly, the *ta’amim* indicate a disjunction, which is atypical for question words. However, a solution may be postulated based on the particle’s typical role in prompting background

⁵²⁹ I include in this the uses in oaths that are translated *surely*, and postscript uses translated as conditional *unless*. For the use of conditionals in oaths, see discussion in Chapter 4.3.4.

⁵³⁰ English translations: ESV, HCSB, KJV, NASB, NET, NIV, NKJV, NLT. Spanish translations: DHH, NVI, PDPT, RV60, RV95. Portuguese translations: NTLH, JFA, NVI-PT.

information mental spaces. This proposal does not require imputing an *ad hoc* interrogative function to the ׀ clause.

Thematically, vss. 26 and 27 are linked by the repetition of שחק in both verses. Verse 27 explains that Moab will be ridiculed because (or in the same way that) the Moabites ridiculed Israel. I suggest that syntactically, in v. 27, the ׀ in ׀א׀ instructs the reader that a relevant logical connection exists between verse 26 and 27, and the repetition of שחק establishes the thematic connection. I hypothesize that the construal of the first ׀ clause ׀א׀ ׀לוא השחק היה ׀א׀ as an interrogative is motivated by ׀לוא, not ׀א׀. The use of the negativizer in constructions that lack an interrogative word but are construed as questions has precedent in Exod. 8:22; 1 Sam. 20:9; Jer. 49:9a and Jon. 4:11.⁵³¹

(39) Exod. 8:22

וַיֹּאמֶר מֹשֶׁה לֹא נָכוֹן לַעֲשׂוֹת כֵּן בְּי תוֹעֲבֹת
מִצְרַיִם נִזְבַּח לַיהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ הֵן נִזְבַּח אֶת־
תוֹעֲבֹת מִצְרַיִם לַעֲיִנֵיהֶם וְלֹא יִסְקֻלְנוּ:

But Moses said, “It would not be right to do so; for the sacrifices that we offer to the Lord our God are offensive to the Egyptians. If we offer in the sight of the Egyptians sacrifices that are offensive to them, *will they not stone us?*”

Although it is an argument from silence, I suggest that when ׀לוא was used in this way, question intonation may have identified the construction as an interrogative.

׀א׀’s role in (38) is an extension of the particle’s space-building function. In conditionals, ׀א׀ typically prompts the construction of a mental space for the P clause in which background information is elaborated. The main Q clause interpretation is restricted to the P clause context. Because ׀א׀ prototypically constructs mental spaces that contain background information I suggest that in (38) ׀א׀ is doing just this—prompting construction of mental spaces and the information elaborated therein is to be construed as background information. This information is the setting or background reason for why Moab will be punished as described in 48:26. The ׀א׀-clauses in Jer. 48:27 provide supporting arguments for YHWH’s judgement against Moab enunciated in v.26. I label this use of ׀א׀ *background-specifying*. Its function is similar to that of ׀א׀ clauses in speech-act conditionals, where the ׀א׀-headed P clause provides the setting for the speech act. This use of ׀א׀ does not complicate the lexicon because it is grounded in ׀א׀’s prototypical function in building conditional background-information-containing P spaces.

⁵³¹ See HALOT (1994–2000: 511). In Exod. 8:22 and 1. Sam. 20:9 ׀לוא is used; in Jer. 49:9a, Jon. 4:11 ׀א׀ is used.

In a recent article focusing on several speech-act uses of ׀א in the Lachish 3 ostrakon,⁵³² Park (2013: 463, 467) argues that “the polar use of ׀א is derived from its use in forming rhetorical questions” and that “polar ׀א in oaths forms an interrogative sentence that functions as a rhetorical question.” She focuses her discussion on oaths involving כה יעשה and הויהוה constructions, contending that in these constructions the ׀א-clause is not the protasis of a conditional with an elided Q clause, but instead a rhetorical question. To support her argument Park (2000: 464) appeals to Gesenius who, she states, “suggested two possible explanations for the polar use of ׀א in oaths.” His first explanation was that ׀א might originally have been an interrogative particle: just as הלא yields a positive meaning, so does לא ׀א. Gesenius, she concludes “did see the possibility of a relationship between the use of ׀א in the formulation of questions and the polar meaning of ׀א in oaths although he did not use the term ‘rhetorical question’” (Park 2013: 467).

Park sets forth three arguments to support her claim:

“First, there is no syntactic relationship between the כה יעשה clause (“Thus may God do and more...”) and the ׀א clause, and the absence of syntactic connection between them undermines traditional analyses in which the ׀א clause is treated as a conditional protasis. Second, there is no formal difference between ordinary rhetorical questions formed with ׀א and polar ׀א clauses in oaths, except for the addition of an oath formula. Third, rhetorical questions formed with ׀א can serve as the content of an oath (Cant 8,4), just like the rhetorical questions formed with מה in Cant 2,7 (=3,5).” (Park 2013: 476).

A significant issue that Park does not address in her reassignment of the function of ׀א clauses in oaths is the purpose for oaths (or curses) in the biblical world. As Brichto (1963: 24, 27) and Kitz (2014: 38) point out, every oath involves a curse. Brichto has pointed out that in (40), אלה, is clearly used as a synonym of שבואה, reflecting this conceptualization of how the world functions.

⁵³² See Schniedewind (2000) for background on the ostrakon.

(40) Gen 26:28-31

28 וַיֹּאמְרוּ רְאֵוּ רָאִינוּ כִּי־הִנֵּה יְהוָה אִתְּךָ
 וְנֹאמַר תְּהִי גַּא אֱלֹהֵי בֵּינוּתֵינוּ וּבֵינֵינוּ
 וְנִכְרַתְתָּה בְרִית עִמָּדָ: 29 אִם־תַּעֲשֶׂה עִמָּנוּ רָעָה
 כַּאֲשֶׁר לֹא נִגַּעְנוּךָ וְכַאֲשֶׁר עָשִׂינוּ עִמָּךָ רָק־
 טוֹב וְנִשְׁלַחְךָ בְּשָׁלוֹם אֶתְּהָ עֲתָה בְּרוּךְ יְהוָה:
 30 וַיַּעַשׂ לָהֶם מִשְׁתֶּה וַיֹּאכְלוּ וַיִּשְׁתּוּ: 31 וַיִּשְׁכְּמוּ
 בַבֹּקֶר וַיִּשְׁבְּעוּ אִישׁ לְאַחִיו וַיִּשְׁלַחֵם יִצְחָק
 וַיִּלְכוּ מֵאֵתוֹ בְּשָׁלוֹם:

28 They said, “We see plainly that the Lord has been with you; so we say, let there be a curse between you and us, and let us make a covenant with you: 29 If you do us harm, (just as we have not touched you and have done to you nothing but good and have sent you away in peace), [may you be cursed]. You are now the blessed of the Lord.” 30 So he made them a feast, and they ate and drank. 31 In the morning they rose early and exchanged oaths; and Isaac set them on their way, and they departed from him in peace. (My translation.)

As suggested in Chapter 4.3.4.1, reversing of the polarity אִם and לֹא is a translational decision that may be located in an unwillingness to include the implicit curse in the translation. Since Park recognizes that כֹּה יַעֲשֶׂה and כִּי־יִהְיֶה constructions are oath “formulae”, she understands that these are oaths. If they are oaths, then based on the widespread, pervasive cross-linguistic and cross-cultural evidence from related languages and cultures, they must include an implicit curse. I hypothesize that evidence of it is reflected in the אִם-conditional P clause. Elision of the curse explains the lack of syntactic relationship between the oath/curse authenticators and the אִם clause. Syntactic disruption is common in everyday speech and rarely results in miscommunication. If the BH כֹּה יַעֲשֶׂה and כִּי־יִהְיֶה constructions were idiomatic phrases, miscommunication due to syntactic disruption would have posed even less of a communication issue.

Park’s argument stands or falls on her assumption that אִם’s use in oaths as a rhetorical question particle is related to its use as a question marker in polar questions. I demonstrated above that in polar questions אִם does not function as question word. Instead, it functions under the scope of הֲ to open a new mental space. The information following אִם is construed as a question, not because אִם is a question word, but because the אִם space is embedded in the הֲ question space. As was shown above, אִם is never the head of any PolQ or AltQ. Since Park bases her claim that אִם is functioning in oaths as a question word is based on the particle’s use in PolQs, her argument is weakened.

Park appeals to Isa. 29:16,⁵³³ as an example of אָן 's use in rhetorical questions. See the discussion of this challenging passage after example (33) above. There and following I hypothesized that in the few passages where אָן has been interpreted (and translated) as a rhetorical question marker, the particle is instead prompting a mental space in which background or setting information is elaborated. This information informs assertions in the immediate context.

Park's third argument, "rhetorical questions formed with אָן can serve as the content of an oath (Cant 8,4), just like the rhetorical questions formed with מָה in Cant 2,7 (=3,5)" (Park 2013: 476), is dependent on her second argument that אָן is a question word.⁵³⁴ Park's arguments (and those reflected in the commentaries in footnote 533) reflect a modular view of grammar and disallows conceptual frame-based knowledge available in the CURSE/OATH frame. It is well established that curses and oaths were used extensively in ANE cultures. Upon reading $\text{הַשְּׁבִעָה־יְהוָה}$ the CURSE/OATH frame would provide instantaneous access to a rich set of knowledge about curses, including the language employed in curses and how that language was employed. I have proposed that those frames were linked to conditionals when they were used in curse formulas.

In summary, the lexicons (BDB, GDC and J-M) classify a small number of uses of אָן as interrogatives. GKC proposes that an initial וְ clause may be missing in some of the passages, but these וְ clauses would have to be reconstructed *ad hoc*. A closer analysis of the putative examples proposed in the lexicons and by Park demonstrates that each use can also be understood as instances of other undisputed categories of אָן . Because the particle never occurs independently to mark questions, I conclude that אָן is not an interrogative and should not be classified as such. I have also demonstrated that the putative examples offered in the lexicons fit into אָן 's mental (setting/background) space-building function.

If אָן is not an interrogative marker, it raises a number of questions that will be addressed below. First, what property of אָן 's semantics promotes its use in the second of a pair of PolQs and AltQs? Secondly, if אָן is not an interrogative marker, then what allows the אָן clause to be construed as a question, either real or rhetorical? Finally, if אָן is not marking the clause as a question, what is its function?

⁵³³ See discussion above where the exegetical challenges of the passage are discussed.

⁵³⁴ Song 2:7; 3:5; 5:8 and 8:4 are virtually identical. Noegel and Rendsburg (2009: 114-116) argue that אָן and מָה are negativizers here. Exum (2005: 248) concurs but argues that construing the מָה phrase as a rhetorical question is also a viable interpretation. Keel (1994) translates each passage as an oath, but does not comment on the role of either lexeme.


5.2.6. Scenario-Specifying use of ׀

If ׀ were an interrogative particle as BDB (2008: 50) and DCH (1993: 304-305)⁵³⁵ claim, we would expect it to be used frequently in contexts independent of other interrogatives like ׀ and ׀. However, as demonstrated above, it is never found independently. Yet there has never been any confusion about interpreting the ׀-clauses that follow ׀ questions (or the two associated with ׀ questions) as interrogative. This seems to indicate clearly that the construal of the ׀ clause as a question is promoted by the ׀ clause itself.

My hypothesis is that ׀,...׀ question sequences are not derived from an underlying form via transformations, as has historically been posited for AltQs and PolQs.⁵³⁶ Nor should they be understood to be “built” by aggregating the ׀ clause and the ׀ clause to form ׀,...׀ sequences. A cognitive grammar posits a usage-based approach in which the inventory of linguistic units in the language reflects the experience speakers have of actual language use. This approach assumes constructions in which phonological, syntactic, semantic and pragmatic information are linked to the construction, instead of residing in separate modules. A “constructional model does not assume ‘words and rules’ but instead assumes ‘ready-made’ grammatical constructions, some of which are highly detailed” and others more generalized or schematic (Evans and Green 2006: 660). I propose that the ׀,...׀ construction is one such “ready-made” grammatical constructions in the BH lexicon.

The mental space configuration of AltQs does not differ significantly from the proposed PolQ configuration. In AltQs the ׀ clause is also interpreted as a question under the scope of the ׀ clause. This means that the mental space prompted by ׀ is still nested inside the ׀ Q(uestion) space as is seen in the following diagram:

Figure 5.2: ׀,...׀ Question Mental Space Configuration



⁵³⁵ While Clines argues in DCH (1993) that ׀ has an interrogative use, Clines (1998) argues that it doesn't.

⁵³⁶ See especially Bolinger (1978) and Goddard (2002: 5).

If ׀ is not functioning as an interrogative particle in ׀... sequences, what is its role, if any, in meaning construction in the ׀... construction? I hypothesize that ׀ is used because of its function in alternative scenario-building. Above we demonstrated this function of ׀ in Jer. 48:27 where the particle prompts the reader/hearer to build a mental space where a new background or setting scenario is to be considered. In the ׀... construction, ׀ is building mental spaces for the second and third questions. The ׀-clauses in sequential ׀... sequences, are construed as questions because they are under the scope of the question words ׀ and ׀. The mental space that is built by ׀ is nested inside the question space these words build. Being nested inside the question space is what licenses the ׀ clause to be construed as a question. The ׀-clauses are interpreted as AltQs or PolQs because ׀ typically prompts these types of questions.⁵³⁷

5.3. ׀ (אָשָׁר) עַד Sequences

׀ is used in ׀-headed prepositional phrases seven times. In Gen. 24:19, 33; Ruth 2:21 and Isa. 30:17 it immediately follows the preposition, seen in (41)-(42). Three times, in Gen. 28:15; Num. 32:17 and Isa. 6:11 it follows ׀ אָשָׁר,⁵³⁸ seen in (43) and (44). ׀'s function is the same in both constructions.

(41) Gen 24:19

וַתִּכַּל לְהַשְׁקֵתוֹ וַתֹּאמֶר גַּם לְגַמְלֵיךָ אֲשַׁבֵּב עַד
אִם-כָּלוּ לְשִׁתָּת:

When she had finished giving him a drink, she said, “I will draw for your camels also, until they have finished drinking.”

⁵³⁷ In Rabbinic Hebrew and Modern Hebrew ׀ is a commonly used as an interrogative. It occurs twice in BH, in Num. 17:28 and Job 6:13. I consider the particle's use in these two occurrences to be instances of scenario-specifying, however, the paucity of occurrences means that this can only be hypothesized. The same is true of suggestions that it is clearly an interrogative in BH. A grammaticalization process of the ׀... construction, described as context-induced reanalysis (Hopper and Traugott (2003: 39-70) could possibly explain ׀'s incorporation into the ׀ construction. It should be noted that ׀ itself is not considered a question word in Modern Hebrew. Further examination of the question is beyond this study, but the question merits attention. See Perez Fernandez (1999: 192) on ׀ in Rabbinic Hebrew.

⁵³⁸ In ׀ עַד phrases Holmstedt (2002: 76) argues that ׀ is modifying a “covert [temporal] head”. He suggests the phrase be translated “until the time when....” But see Park (2015) for a rebuttal of Holmstedt. She analyzes ׀ as a “light noun” and argues it is always the head of its clause. Regarding עַד, see IBHS (1990: 215-16).

(42) Ruth 2:21

וַתֹּאמֶר רוּת הַמוֹאֲבִיָּה גַם | כִּי־אָמַר אֵלַי עַם־
הַנְּעָרִים אֲשֶׁר־לִי תִדְבְּקוּן עַד אִם־כִּלּוּ אֶת
כָּל־הַקֶּצֶיר אֲשֶׁר־לִי:

Then Ruth the Moabite said, “He even said to me, ‘Stay close by my servants, until they have finished all my harvest.’”

(43) Gen 28:15

וְהִנֵּה אֲנִכִּי עִמָּךְ וְשָׁמַרְתִּיךָ בְּכָל אֲשֶׁר־תֵּלֵךְ
וְהִשְׁבַּתִּיךָ אֶל־הָאָדָמָה הַזֹּאת כִּי לֹא אֶעֱזָבְךָ
עַד אֲשֶׁר אִם־עָשִׂיתִי אֶת אֲשֶׁר־דִּבַּרְתִּי לָךְ:

Look, realize that I am with you and will keep you wherever you go, and will bring you back to this land; for I will not leave you until I have done what I have promised you.”

(44) Isa. 6:11

וְאָמַר עַד־מַתִּי אֲדַגֵּי וַיֹּאמֶר עַד אֲשֶׁר אִם־
שָׂאוּ עָרִים מֵאֵין יוֹשְׁבִים וּבָתִּים מֵאֵין אָדָם
וְהָאָדָמָה תִּשָּׂאָה שְׁמָמָה:

Then I said, “How long, O Lord?” And he said: “Until cities lie waste without inhabitant, and houses without people, and the land is utterly desolate.

אם’s function in these constructions presents an analytical challenge, demonstrated by the fact that its presence in these passages is typically ignored in translations. The translations reflect the difficulty in discerning how אם combines compositionally with the semantics of the (אֲשֶׁר) עַד phrases. Based on the translations, there would appear to be no difference in meaning between the עַד-headed prepositional phrases with אם and those without the particle.

What is clear is that the mental space configurations will be distinct because אם is a space building particle. עַד-headed prepositional phrases without אם occupy one temporal mental space. The אם space in (41) and (42) would be embedded inside the עַד space. Three levels of embedding would be present in עַד אֲשֶׁר אם sequences. Multiple embedding requires the hearer/reader to expend more effort to process the information. But as Sanders (2014: 275) points out, “readers are used to complex and subjective space building to such an extent that processing these embeddings...comes natural to them. I suspect that this increase in embedding is related the narrator’s desire to blend his viewpoint with that of the character, a topic beyond the scope of this study.

Given that there are only four examples in the entire corpus, any proposal is tenuous. I suggest two possibilities: First, אם could be used to prompt a space in which the narrator or character’s perspective of doubt (epistemic distance) on the statement in which the phrase is found. This use is grounded in אם’s core semantics of hypotheticality. (אֲשֶׁר) עַד-headed prepositional phrases without אם state the speaker’s perspective; אם indicates the narrator’s

perspective of doubt. In (41) the reader knows that thirsty camels can drink an enormous amount of water. When Rebekah offers to draw water $\text{עַד אִם־כָּלוּ לְשָׁתוֹת}$, the use of אִם opens a mental space in which her or the narrator's doubt of her ability to accomplish the task is entertained. However, further research into perspectivization strategies in BH is needed to confirm this proposal. Secondly, אִם could be used to indicate the setting or background within which the preceding comment is to be understood, as it is in above noted instances.

5.4. Analysis of אִם בְּלִתִּי Sequences

אִם 's function in the אִם בְּלִתִּי phrase is more amenable to analysis than it is in אִם (אֲשֶׁר) sequences. אִם occurs four times following בְּלִתִּי .⁵³⁹ In (45) and (46) things—the speaker's body and land, and Gideon's sword—are excluded from the preceding generalization. I will call this the *noun- אִם בְּלִתִּי sequence*. However in (48) eventualities are excluded by בְּלִתִּי . I will call this the *verb- אִם בְּלִתִּי sequence*. This difference appears to be crucial. In (45) and (46) when things (i.e. nouns) are profiled, אִם is not amenable to a conditional interpretation. But when eventualities are profiled as in (48), I propose that אִם should be construed as the head of a conditional construction. Given the paucity of examples, certainty is impossible.

(45) Gen. 47:18b

לֹא נִשְׂאָר לִפְנֵי אֲדֹנָי בְּלִתִּי אִם־גּוֹיֹתֵינוּ
וְאֲדָמָתֵנוּ:

There is nothing left in the sight of my lord but our bodies and our lands.

(46) Jdg. 7:14a

וַיַּעַן רֵעֵהוּ וַיֹּאמֶר אֵין זֹאת בְּלִתִּי אִם־חֶרֶב
גְּדָעוֹן בֶּן־יוֹאָשׁ אִישׁ יִשְׂרָאֵל

And his comrade answered, "This is no other than the sword of Gideon son of Joash, a man of Israel.

In (45) and (46) it is unclear what אִם contributes compositionally to the interpretation of the בְּלִתִּי phrases. אִם is clearly not required to follow בְּלִתִּי since, as seen in (47) בְּלִתִּי occurs more often immediately preceding its complement, e.g. Gen. 18:12, 26; Num. 11:6; Deut. 3:3; Isa. 10:4.

⁵³⁹ בְּלִתִּי indicates that the thing, state or eventuality following the particle is an exception to the preceding assertion. See BHRG (1999: 317); J-M (§160mVII); Naudé (2013: 803).

(47) Num. 11:6

וְעֵתָהּ נִפְשָׁנוּ יִבְשָׁה אֵין כֹּל בְּלִתֵּי אֶל־הַמָּן
עֵינֵינוּ:

“But now our strength is dried up, and there is nothing at all but this manna to look at.”

One possible explanation is that אֵין is contributing a weak sense of hypotheticality to the assertions. An adjusted translation of Gen. 47:18b would read *There is nothing in the sight of my lord except possibly our bodies and our lands*. Jdg. 7:14 would be understood as saying *This is nothing except possibly the sword of Gideon...* However, I suggest that hypotheticality should be ruled out because in both instances the speaker seems to be making a strong assertion of fact or belief.

Scenario identification is a second possibility, yielding *There is nothing left in the sight of my lord except, consider this, our bodies and our land*, and *This is nothing except, consider this, the sword of Gideon...* This proposal seems preferable, but the fact that בְּלִתֵּי occurs more often without אֵין, as in (47), than with it indicates that אֵין is not required to uniquely identify the complement.

The two אֵין בְּלִתֵּי sequences in (48) have verbal complements.

(48) Amos 3:3-4

³הֲיִלְכוּ שְׁנַיִם יַחְדָּו בְּלִתֵּי אֵין-נוֹעָדוֹ: ⁴הֲיִשָּׂאג
אֲרִיָּה בַּיַעַר וְטָרַף אֵין לוֹ הַיַּתֵּן כְּפִיר קוֹלוֹ
מִמְעַנְתּוֹ בְּלִתֵּי אֵין-לֶכֶד:

³Do two walk together?--Only if they have agreed to do so? ⁴Does a lion roar in the forest, when it has no prey? Does a young lion growl from its den? - Only if it has caught prey! (My translation)

Initially, the אֵין בְּלִתֵּי sequence in these two verses appears to occur in a אֵין...הַ construction. However the questions are not PolQs or AltQs, so neither is a אֵין...הַ construction. Instead they are conditional speech-act questions in which the P clause follows the Q clause question. In Amos 3:3, אֵין נוֹעָדוֹ is a conditional P clause that sets the condition and background in which the הַ question is to be interpreted. The P clause in Amos 3:4 is אֵין-לֶכֶד. אֵין בְּלִתֵּי instructs the hearer or reader to understand that the answer to the הַ question is *No* in any space but P.⁵⁴⁰

The semantics of the אֵין בְּלִתֵּי sequence appear to be similar to those found in the English *only if* construction, which is used to assert “the *exclusivity* of the P-defined space as a setting

⁵⁴⁰ If a speaker of BH were alive, I would ask whether אֵין לֶכֶד יַחְדָּו, שְׁנַיִם לֹא נוֹעָדוֹ, אֵין לֹא would be an acceptable substitute for Amos 3:3.

for Q” (Dancygier and Sweetser 1996: 205, italics in original). In English, *only if* conditionals tell the reader that among acceptable spaces, the *only if* space is the only acceptable one; *only* precedes and has scopal dominance over the *if*-clause.⁵⁴¹ In BH בְּלִתִּי אֵם is understood to indicate that what follows the particle is an exception to the assertion that precedes it. However, in (48) the אֵם בְּלִתִּי אֵם construction seems to indicate that the information in the following P clause is the exclusive space in which the preceding Q clause rhetorical question will hold. In (48), אֵם בְּלִתִּי אֵם is not indicating that the situation of a lion catching prey and guarding it in its lair is the only time that the lion does not roar. On the contrary, the writer is stating that lions roar in their lair exclusively when they have taken down prey and have it in their lair. All other spaces are excluded. This attribute of אֵם בְּלִתִּי אֵם is similar to the semantics and space-building characteristics of אֵם רַק, which also builds exclusive spaces.

Van der Merwe (p.c.: August 2016) has proposed that אֵם בְּלִתִּי אֵם is best understood as a construction analogous to אֵם כִּי and that, like the אֵם כִּי construction, the אֵם בְּלִתִּי אֵם construction indicates “exhaustive exclusion.” He proposes that אֵם amplifies אֵם בְּלִתִּי אֵם’s semantics of exclusion. This suggestion accounts for each of the four uses of the construction. This proposal essentially states that in אֵם בְּלִתִּי אֵם and אֵם כִּי, itself is contributing the meaning “exhaustive.” Although it can be argued that the semantics of alternativity are a schematic aspect of the semantics of אֵם, being based on the fact that hypothetical scenarios which the particle prototypically prompts are alternatives to “reality,” I have not found evidence to support the proposal that it ever involves the meaning “exhaustive”. As noted in Chapter 3.3, Goldberg (1994: 4) defines constructions as a “form-meaning pair such that some aspect of the form and meaning is not strictly predictable.” Since neither כִּי, אֵם בְּלִתִּי אֵם or אֵם appear to have recognized semantic components indicating exhaustive exclusion, I believe it is better to attribute this to the constructions themselves. This proposal does raise certain questions which demand further research, such as if the semantics of the אֵם בְּלִתִּי אֵם construction are analogous to the אֵם כִּי אֵם construction, why would speakers of the language need the אֵם בְּלִתִּי אֵם construction? Questions regarding dialect, compositional dating, and so forth would be involved in the issue.

The interpretation of the verb-אֵם בְּלִתִּי אֵם sequence I am proposing is the opposite of the typical interpretation of אֵם בְּלִתִּי אֵם itself: אֵם בְּלִתִּי אֵם alone indicates that what follows the particle is excluded from the preceding assertion, i.e. what precedes doesn’t apply to what follows the particle. I am proposing that the verb-אֵם בְּלִתִּי אֵם sequence indicates that the preceding Q clause applies (holds) exclusively in the following P clause.

⁵⁴¹ See Dancygier and Sweetser (2005: 206) for a mental space diagram of English *only if* spaces.

In summary, I hypothesize that the **אם בְּלִתִּי** construction indicates exhaustive exclusion. It prompts the construction of mental spaces that identify the **אם בְּלִתִּי** as the unique space for consideration. This appears to be similar to the meaning and space-building of **אם רק**. The verb-**אם-בְּלִתִּי** sequence is part of a conditional construction. **אם** prompts the construction of a hypothetical mental space in which the P clause of a speech-act conditional is elaborated as the unique space, to the exclusion of all others, in which the Q clause is valid.

5.5. **אם(ו)...אם Sequences**⁵⁴²

אם(ו)...אם sequences occur eight times.⁵⁴³ In each instance the narrator uses the information in the **אם**-clauses to disambiguate and clarify a concept in the preceding discourse. I postulate that this function is similar to that of the P clause in the Q, P conditionals which Declerck and Reed label “postscript conditionals”.⁵⁴⁴ Dancygier and Sweetser call them “trail-offs” and note that these often specify “the spaces in which the preceding discourse holds.”⁵⁴⁵ In (49), referencing the final two uses of **אם**, the options **אם-זָכָר** **אם-נְקֵבָה** clarify, or provide the background information the hearer/reader needs to understand exactly what is meant by the class of animals, **הַבְּקָר**.⁵⁴⁶

(49) Lev. 3:1

וְאִם-זָבַח שְׁלָמִים קָרְבָּנוֹ אִם מִן-הַבְּקָר הוּא
מִקָּרִיב אִם-זָכָר אִם-נְקֵבָה תָּמִים יִקְרִיבֵנוּ
לִפְנֵי יְהוָה:

If the offering is a sacrifice of well-being, if you offer an animal of the herd, whether male or female, you shall offer one without blemish before the Lord.

(50) Qoh. 12:14

כִּי אֶת-כָּל-מַעֲשֵׂה הָאֱלֹהִים יָבֵא בְּמִשְׁפָּט עַל
כָּל-נֶעְלָם אִם-טוֹב וְאִם-רָע:

For God will bring every deed into judgment, including every secret thing, whether good or evil.

⁵⁴² This section does not address coordinate conditional P clauses, listed in BDB ([1906] 2008: §1b, p. 50), in which each P clause is headed by **אם**, e. g. Exod. 19:13 (a conditional speech-act command); Qoh. 11:3.

⁵⁴³ Lev. 3:1; 27:26; Deut. 18:3; Josh. 24:14; 2 Sam. 15:21; Ruth 3:10; Prov. 20:11; Qoh. 12:14.

⁵⁴⁴ See Declerck and Reed’s (2002: 367-368) very brief discussion.

⁵⁴⁵ See Dancygier and Sweetser (2005: 263-266).

⁵⁴⁶ Milgrom (1991: 204) states that it was necessary to clarify that animals of both sexes were acceptable because “all other animal sacrifices were fixed regarding their sex.”

In (50) the specifications *וְאִם-טוֹב* and *וְאִם-רַע* clarify what aspect of the general class of *מַעֲשֵׂה* is examined in the judgement. Another example is found in Ezra 2:59 and Neh. 7:16, which, except for minor spelling variations, are identical. Here only one mental space is specified.

(51) Ezra 2:59; Neh. 7:16

וְאֵלֶּה הָעֹלָיִם מִתֵּל מְלַח תֵּל חֶרְשָׁא כְּרוּב אֲדָן
אִמֶּר וְלֹא יָכֹלוּ לְהַגִּיד בֵּית-אֲבוֹתָם וְזִרְעָם אִם
מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל הֵם:

The following were those who came up from Tel-melah, Tel-harsha, Cherub, Addan, and Immer, though they could not prove their families or their descent, whether they belonged to Israel.

אִם prompts the construction of a mental space in which the reader is provided with the background information required for knowing why it was important to verify which *בֵּית-אֲבוֹתָם* the people belonged to--were they Israelites or not? I analyze the *אִם* clauses in Isa. 24:13; 29:16 and Jer. 48:27 similarly. In Jer. 48:27 (see discussion above, example (38)) the *אִם* opens a space in which background to the charge *וְהָיָה לְשֹׂחֵק גַּם-הוּא* is understood.

Although the P clause in (52) is not a postscript/trail-off conditional, the *אִם*-headed P clause is used to create a mental space that provides the background and context in which the following question can be understood. Without this space, the question is meaningless. Amos 7:2 is a similar example in which *אִם* opens a space in which speech is contextualized.

(52) Job 7:3-4a

כִּי בָן הַנְּחִלָּתִי לִי יָרְחֵי-שָׁוְא וְלַיְלֹת עָמָל מִנּוּ-לִי:³
וְאִם-שָׁכַבְתִּי וְאִם-רָמַתִּי מִתִּי אֶקּוּם וּמִדֶּד-עָרַב...⁴

³so I am allotted months of emptiness, and nights of misery are apportioned to me. ⁴When I lie down I say, 'When shall I rise?'

In summary, I have proposed that the *אִם(ן)...* sequences analyzed by BDB and others to mean *whether...or* promote the construction of mental spaces in which the preceding discourse holds and in which information crucial for the understanding and contextualizing of the preceding discourse is specified. In most cases the *אִם* clauses denote the specific members of a general class or set, apparently to avoid misunderstanding on the part of the reader. The particle *אִם* prompts the construction of these spaces which share with conditional P spaces the marking of crucial background information.

5.6. The ׀ Construction

This section will discuss the ׀ construction. I will not discuss instances of sequential non-constructive uses of ׀ + ׀, where ׀ is clearly conditional, e. g. Deut. 11:22; Josh. 23:12. The literature on the so-called exceptive ׀, seen in (53) is extensive. See below for some of the more important references.⁵⁴⁷ All of these analyses, with the exception of van Leeuwen (1973), are found in studies of the particle ׀, so they have made just passing reference to ׀. Within the boundaries of this study, the relevant question concerns the role of ׀ in the construction and the semantic contribution, if any, the particle makes to the meaning of the construction.

(53) Dan. 10:21

אָבֵל אֲנִיד לְךָ אֶת־הַרְשׁוּם בְּכֶתֶב אֱמֶת וְאִין
אֶחָד מִתַּחְזֵק עִמִּי עַל־אַלֶּה כִּי אִם־מִיכָאֵל
שׂרָכָם:

But I am to tell you what is inscribed in
the book of truth. There is no one with
me who contends against these princes
except Michael, your prince.

Regarding this construction, Ferguson (1882: 49) states that “the presence of ׀ cannot be purposeless, and the particle, at some period at least of the history of the language, must have had a sensible value, though it is not necessary to suppose that the Hebrews were very conscious of any special force at the comparatively late period in which the books of the Old Testament were written.” Van Leeuwen (1973: 47) and Schoors (1981: 252) view ׀’s presence in this construction as purely pleonastic—reinforcing existing adversative-exceptive semantics of ׀. In other words, ׀ intensifies the adversative semantics of ׀.⁵⁴⁸

These analyses maintain that each lexical item contributes semantically to the meaning of the construction. In contrast, the analysis proposed here is that ׀ ׀ is an integrated construction whose semantics are defined separately from the semantics of ׀ and ׀. Since semantic information is attached to the construction itself, at the stage in Biblical Hebrew that we encounter the construction, the semantics of ׀ may not have made any compositional contribution to the construction. At some point in time, each particle may have provided some of the semantics of the construction, but its meaning in the Hebrew of the MT does not appear to be dependent on their semantics.

⁵⁴⁷ See especially Bandstra (1982: 154-157) and Follingstad (2001: 563-566) who focus on ׀, and Van Leeuwen (1973: 42-47) whose main interest is ׀. See also BHRG (1999: 303); Brockelmann (1956: 168); GKC (§163a-d); IBHS (1990: 671-673); J-M (§164c, §172c, §173b) and Schoors (1986: 252). See Follingstad for a complete list of all instances of ׀.

⁵⁴⁸ See Bandstra (1982: 155-156) for arguments to the contrary.

I will propose that the semantics of alternativity which hypothetical particles exhibit could offer a justifiable explanation for ׀'s inclusion in the construction. Hypothetical scenarios are, by definition, alternate realities, so it is possible this was ׀'s contribution to the formation of the construction at an early stage. The suggestion by van der Merwe, discussed above in 5.4, that ׀ contributes the semantics of exhaustive exclusivity to both this and the ׀-בְּלִתִּי construction is also suggestive.

5.7. The ׀ִלּוֹא Construction

This section will examine the phrase ׀ִלּוֹא ׀, which occurs four times in Biblical Hebrew in Gen. 4:7; 1 Sam. 15:17; 2 Kgs. 20:19 and Isa. 28:25. I propose that ׀ִלּוֹא ׀ is not a construction because as a unit, ׀ִלּוֹא ׀ does not make a semantic contribution to the discourse that is distinct from the semantics of the parts. There is disagreement among grammarians regarding the status of ׀ִלּוֹא as a marker of asseveration and/or rhetorical questions, leading to the proposal in Sivan and Schniedewind of separate etymologies for the two meanings.⁵⁴⁹ Based on syntactic analogies, Moshavi (2007a) proposes that in these cases ׀ִלּוֹא should be analyzed as clausal adverb with scope over the following clause, or in the case of biclausal conditionals, the following construction. It functions, she argues (Moshavi: 2007b), as a presentational discourse marker to indicate that what follows provides justification for a preceding or following argument. The use of ׀ִלּוֹא ׀ in these passages can be construed to support her proposal. She does not include the challenging Gen. 4:7a passage in her discussion. In the following examples, I use *look* to translate ׀ִלּוֹא's semantics of justification.

(54) Gen 4:7a

׀ִלּוֹא ׀ִמִּי־תִיטִיב שְׂאֵת וְאִם לֹא תִיטִיב לְפֶתַח
חַטָּאת רֹבֵץ...

Look, if you do the right thing, won't you be accepted? But if you don't do the right thing, sin will be waiting at the door ready to strike! (CEB)

(55) 1 Sam. 15:17a

וַיֹּאמֶר שְׂמוּאֵל ׀ִלּוֹא ׀ִמִּי־קָטַן אַתָּה בְּעֵינָיִךְ
רֹאשׁ שְׁבֵטֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל אַתָּה

Samuel said, "Look, even if you were insignificant in your own eyes, you are head of the tribes of Israel. (My translation)

⁵⁴⁹ See BHRG (1999: 322); GKC (§150e). J-M (§161c) remarks that the phrase is used to indicate exclamations. See also Brongers (1981); IBHS (1990: 684n48); Sivan and Schniedewind (1993).

(56) Isa. 28:23-25

הָאֲזִינוּ וְשָׁמְעוּ קוֹלִי הַקְּשִׁיבוּ וְשָׁמְעוּ אִמְרָתִי:
 הַכֹּל הַיּוֹם יַחְרֹשׁ הַחֹרֶשׁ לְזָרַע יִפְתַּח וַיִּשְׁדַּד
 אֲדַמְתּוּ: ²⁵הֲלוֹא אִם־שָׂנְה פְּנִיָּה וְהִפְיֵץ קֶצֶחַ
 וּכְמֵן יִזְרַק וְשֵׁם חֹטָה שׁוֹרָה וְשַׁעֲרָה נִסְמָן
 וּבִסְמַת גְּבֻלָתוֹ:

²³Listen, and hear my voice; Pay attention, and hear my speech. ²⁴ Do those who plow for sowing plow every single day? Do they continually open and harrow their ground? ²⁵Look, when they have leveled its surface, they then scatter dill, sow cumin, and plant wheat in rows and barley in its proper place, and spelt as the border. (My translation, based on NRSV)

I am not convinced that in (54) הָלוֹא functions to indicate that the conditional clause is used to justify a surrounding assertion or argument, because there isn't one. I construe it as a rhetorical question that affirms the truth of the predictive conditional that follows. I do agree that (55)⁵⁵⁰ and (56) are amenable to Moshavi's proposal.

In (57) Hezekiah can be seen using הָלוֹא to justify his own actions in the previous sentence.

(57) 2 Kgs. 20:19

וַיֹּאמֶר חֲזָקִיָּהוּ אֶל־יְשַׁעְיָהוּ טוֹב דְּבַר־יְהוָה
 אֲשֶׁר דִּבַּרְתָּ וַיֹּאמֶר הָלוֹא אִם־שָׁלוֹם וַאֲמַת
 יִהְיֶה בְיָמַי:

Then Hezekiah said to Isaiah, "The word of the Lord that you have spoken is good." For he thought, "Why not, if there will be peace and security in my days?"

The אִם clause is a postscript/trail-off conditional P clause that specifies the space in which הָלוֹא holds. In conclusion, הָלוֹא אִם is not a construction that makes a semantic contribution to the meaning of the discourse. Both הָלוֹא and אִם each contribute compositionally to the contextual meaning.

5.8. Summary

In this chapter I have investigated the use of אִם in monoclausal wishes, the אִם,...הָ construction used for AltQ, AltQvNs and PolQs, אִם (אֲשֶׁר) עַד sequences, אִם(ו)...אִם sequences the אִם כִּי construction and הָלוֹא אִם. The purpose of the inquiry was to answer the questions: Are these actual constructions, the meanings of which are greater than the semantics of the parts, or is the meaning simply the sum of the semantics of each lexeme? Are אִם's semantics of hypotheticality, active and profiled in אִם-conditionals, also expressed in

⁵⁵⁰ A concessive reading is also possible. In either, the אִם clause provides background information for the assertion in the Q clause.

these constructions? What is the function of םא in these constructions? Is the position of םא in these constructions in any way determinative of its role and semantic contribution?

Regarding םא's role in monoclausal wishes, which occur only two times, I proposed that in BH this expression does not have an underlying biclausal conditional form in which the Q clause is omitted, unexpressed or suppressed, but is instead monoclausal. I also proposed that םא's core semantic component, hypotheticality, enables a negative epistemic stance toward the proposition and likely licensed םא's use in this construction.

It was demonstrated that the םא,...ן sequence should be considered a construction that indicates to the hearer two (or more) alternative questions. In this construction ן has scope over the entire construction and builds a question space. םא does not build a question space. Because ן has scope over the entire construction, the information elaborated in the space prompted by םא is also construed as a question. םא's function is to build a mental space that is nested inside the ן space, in which a second question is elaborated (see Fig. 5.2). Since hypothetical mental spaces prompted by םא are by definition alternate conceptualizations of reality, the spaces prompted by םא under ן's scope are interpreted as alternates to the ן question. It was proposed that םא's semantics of hypotheticality are suppressed because the םא space(s) are under the scope of ן.

The classification of םא as a question word that independently builds question spaces was challenged by demonstrating that most cases can plausibly be accommodated under existing conditional categories. In other instances, it was shown that the particle was used, not as a question word, but to build mental spaces in which contextual background information was elaborated. It was concluded that םא is not an interrogative particle and proposed that its status as such should be abandoned.

In םא (אָשָׁר) עַד sequences it is difficult to discern how םא combines compositionally with the semantics of the (אָשָׁר) עַד phrases. From our position today, it is difficult to detect what difference the particle makes when it is present versus when it is absent. עַד-headed prepositional phrases without םא occupy one temporal mental space. When םא is used, the mental space configurations will be distinct since the םא space would be embedded inside the עַד space. Three levels of embedding would be present in םא אָשָׁר עַד sequences. This increase in embedding may have been related the narrator's desire to blend his viewpoint with that of the character.

The analysis of םא בְּלִתִּי sequences differentiated between the noun-םא-בְּלִתִּי sequence and the verb-םא-בְּלִתִּי sequence. In both sequences scalar effects similar to those elicited by םא רַק

seem to be involved. אם בלתי אם does not seem to deny that alternatives might exist, but it insists that the אם בלתי אם space is the only acceptable space. In the verb- אם-בלתי אם sequence conditionals, the P space is the only (exclusive) acceptable space in which Q is valid.

An analysis of the אם(ו)...אם sequences demonstrated that in this context the particle prompts construction of mental spaces in which background information, crucial for the understanding and contextualizing of the preceding discourse is specified. The semantics of alternativity that merit the translation *or* are derivable via implicature from both the semantics of the alternatives themselves (e. g. נָקְבָה, וְזָכַר) and אם 's central function as a builder of mental spaces in which alternative scenarios are considered.

The analysis proposed here is that אם כי is an integrated construction whose semantics of exception are defined separately from the semantics of כי and אם . אם does not contribute compositionally to the construction. At some point in time, each particle may have contributed to the semantics of the construction, but the meaning of the construction in the Hebrew of the MT does not appear to be dependent on their semantics.

The analysis of אם הלווא concluded that the phrase is not a construction. Instead הלווא and אם each contribute compositionally. Following Moshavi (2007a, b), in the passages where this phrase is found, הלווא functions as a clausal adverbial, possibly of justification. אם heads conditional clauses over which הלווא has scope.

Several general patterns have emerged from this examination of אם 's function in, and contributions to, each of the forms analyzed in this chapter. They have been demonstrated to be entirely consistent with the results of the analysis of אם 's role in conditional constructions in Chapter 4. First, אם functions as a mental space builder in each of the above forms. With the exceptions of the אם clauses in the אם הלווא phrase and the verb- אם-בלתי אם sequence, none of the אם constructions are conditionals. This means that the mental spaces that אם prompts in these constructions are not the hypothetical spaces that the particle prototypically builds.

Secondly, the spaces that אם builds in these constructions share two features that are typical of the conditional P clause space: First, the space indicates an alternate scenario to that which currently holds. This can be clearly observed in the אם,...ו construction, in the monoclausal wish form, and example (34). Secondly, non-conditional אם spaces are similar to conditional P clause spaces in that they build background spaces for their immediate context as was demonstrated for passages such as (39), which have been classified as an interrogative. These are spaces in which contextual background required by the reader to draw appropriate conclusions about assertions in surrounding spaces is elaborated.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

My interest in a reevaluation of ׀'s semantics, BH conditionals and the status of the particle's use in non-conditional constructions was prompted by the explanatory power of recent studies of the conditionals of numerous, principally, Indo-European languages. These studies were carried out under a cognitive-functional based research programme into conditionals, initiated by Sweetser and Dancygier. Previous research on ׀ and its use in Biblical Hebrew conditionals utilized a degree of hypotheticality metric for categorizing conditionals. When principled generalizations regarding verb use in the conditionals in each category were sought, the results were disappointingly random. Furthermore, this categorization schema could not provide insight into the purposes for which the different categories of conditionals were used. Nor could it provide explanations for why ׀ could be used in conditionals and several distinct types of non-conditional constructions. Consequently, lexicons and grammars tend to offer little more than taxonomic lists of the types of constructions in which the particle is used, without any explanation for what motivated the diverse uses.

Hence the aim of this thesis was to reassess from a cognitive linguistics standpoint the semantics and function of the particle ׀ and the conditional and non-conditional constructions in which it is found in the Hebrew Bible, in order to test whether a cognitivist approach to language would further our understanding of the particle. Pursuant to this, the general hypothesis of this study, as stated in Chapter 1, was stated as follows:

A more unified and comprehensive account of (1) the semantics of the particle ׀ in its uses in conditional and non-conditional constructions and (2) the use and characteristics of BH conditionals is possible by means of the application of a cognitive-functional framework to the BH data. This study sought to test this hypothesis via the application of a cognitive-functional framework (proposed in Sweetser (1990) and elaborated on in Dancygier (1998) and, especially, in Dancygier and Sweetser (2005)) to all uses of the particle ׀ in the entire BH corpus, in order to discover whether a more adequate description is obtainable of both ׀ and the constructions in which it is used.

The study made use of Mental Space Theory (MST), a cognitivist theory of information processing proposed by Fauconnier ([1985] 1994; 1997), and limited use of concepts from Construction Grammar as elaborated by Goldberg (1995; 2006a, b) in order to investigate: 1) why ׀ could be used in the diverse, types of conditional and non-conditional constructions

and 2) the use of verb forms in $\text{׀}\text{ׁ}$ conditionals classified according to the framework proposed by Sweetser.

Although this study has not answered every question regarding conditionality in BH or every question regarding the precise semantic components of $\text{׀}\text{ׁ}$ that license its use in non-conditional constructions, the aforesaid hypothesis was nonetheless confirmed by the description of $\text{׀}\text{ׁ}$ -conditional constructions in chapter 4 and the analysis in chapter 5 of the non-conditional constructions in which the particle is used. Furthermore, we have provided evidence to support the hypothesis that $\text{׀}\text{ׁ}$ is not an interrogative particle by demonstrating that its use in interrogatives is licensed by the schematic scenario-specifying semantics of the particle used in its function as a hypothetical space builder.

The implementation of the aforementioned hypothesis necessitated the description of the following concepts in Chapter 3:

1. Mental Space Theory, which provided a principled means of analyzing the different kinds of mental spaces Biblical Hebrew conditionals build and of displaying how these conditionals are cognitively structured. Mental Space Theory also allowed for a formal display of Domain, and Viewpoint, which specifies the domain location (narrator or character) of Viewpoint that is controlling temporal and spacial construal of eventualities under discussion. The unique mental space configurations of the different classes of conditionals proposed by Sweetser and employed in this study reinforced arguments for the validity of their status.
2. The cognitive domain-based categories (content, generic, speech-act and epistemic) that the study used to classify BH $\text{׀}\text{ׁ}$ -conditionals was described. Conditionals in each of these categories employ reasoning pertinent to their domain and hence represent different types of reasoning. This study hypothesized that the different types of reasoning employed by the different types of conditionals would also be reflected in systematic differences in verb choice between categories of conditionals.
3. Andrason's proposals, that as a result of their usage-driven diachronic paths, BH verbal grams offer the cognizer a broad heterogeneous range of temporal, aspectual, modal and discourse values from which to choose when portraying an eventuality, were utilized when analyzing verb use in conditionals. The narrator could, therefore, use *qatals*, which are preferred for various types of PAST (simple past, present or past perfect, etc.) temporal and perfective aspectual values, to promote a distanced epistemic stance. The concept of epistemic distance offers a more principled means of

addressing the notion of gradations of hypotheticality, the notion on which earlier studies of BH conditionals classified conditionals.

4. Basic concepts of the cognitive linguistic sub-theory of Cognitive Grammar were introduced in order to motivate a reanalysis of several BH constructions whose constructional meaning has been unexplainable using traditional compositional semantics.

These theoretical tools were then applied to the analysis of conditionals found in the entire Biblical Hebrew corpus. Because a primary concern of the study was to investigate conditionality and processes involved in the interpretation of BH conditionals, when discourse and genre types were understood to be involved in meaning construction, the categories were employed to frame the discussion. It was not when discourse type or genre was not understood to be implicated in interpretation.

In Chapter 4 it was demonstrated that \square is a space-building particle whose prototypical function is to build hypothetical mental spaces. Compositionally the particle contributes the semantics of hypotheticality to conditional constructions. Prototypical BH conditionals are bi-clausal and follow the universal P, Q clause order. Q, P order is permitted, though it is relatively rare, occurring only 37 times. This order does not, however, constitute a “special” use of conditionals.

The study has demonstrated that the categorization of conditionals into the cognitive-functional content, generic, speech-act and epistemic domain-based sets has more explanatory power and descriptive validity than previous analyses based on a degree of hypotheticality framework. The generalizations and conclusions derived from applying this framework to the BH data include:

1. Different types of conditionals reflect distinctive types of reasoning. Content conditionals reason from cause to effect about eventualities in the content (real-world) domain, as do generic conditionals. Generic conditionals, however, discuss classes of things and types of events, rather than specific occurrences. Epistemic conditionals, in contrast to content conditionals, were shown to reason from effect to cause. Speech-act conditionals do neither of these. Instead they are used to condition a variety of speech acts in order to accomplish a speaker’s predetermined goal. Speech-act conditionals are the most commonly used conditionals in BH. These general characteristics of conditional reasoning are not particular to BH conditionals, but are shared cross-linguistically.

2. General characteristics of BH conditionals have emerged from the study including:
- a. *Prediction*. Content conditionals are used to make predictions in order to consider possible consequences of alternate scenarios. Generic conditionals make predictions regarding classes of things and events. Conditional prediction was shown to be implicated in the structuring of alternative mental spaces. Content and generic conditionals promote not just reasoning regarding the P and Q clause, but also regarding the alternative $\sim P$ and $\sim Q$ spaces.
 - b. *Space-building* is properly a function of the particle אם itself. When אם is the head of a bi-clausal conditional construction it typically prompts the construction of hypothetical mental spaces. The linguistic information of an utterance enriched by frame-based information partially elaborates spaces. אם -less conditionals also structure hypothetical mental spaces; however, their infrequent use in the BH corpus indicates that they were cognitively costly.
 - c. *Types of mental spaces*. The types of spaces that אם builds are not uniformly the same. As mentioned, predictive conditionals promote the structuring of alternative mental spaces. In contrast, speech-act and epistemic conditionals do not structure alternative spaces, and neither do אם -headed monoclausal wish constructions. Scalar reasoning such as that invoked by אם רק prompts construction of multiple spaces, only one of which is the uniquely acceptable space. אם may also prompt construction of non-hypothetical spaces in which background scenario information is structured. Additionally, in the case of the אם...ה construction, it prompts the construction of an embedded space in which a second question is entertained.
 - d. *Construal*. The role of contextually motivated construal grounded in general world knowledge was shown to crucially determine the temporal interpretation of אם -headed biclausal constructions that would typically receive a conditional interpretation. Lexemes that prompt temporal mental spaces apparently don't allow "regressive" epistemic stance shifts, from positive to neutral or negative. This would explain why כאשר or the preposition -ב is never used to profile conditionality in place of אם .
 - e. *Encyclopedic background knowledge and frames*. Frames play a significant role in reader/hearer construal. It has been proposed that readers and hearers access frame-based encyclopedic background knowledge regarding the how to interpret texts such as procedural and casuistic discourse. Construal of the non-imperative verbal grams is guided by such frame-based knowledge.

- f. *Epistemic stance.* $\square\aleph$ prototypically requires either neutral or negative epistemic stance. However, this can be overridden when constructions headed by the particle are temporally construed, as noted in (d). It was demonstrated that the *qatal* verb form was used in contexts in which *yiqtol*s would typically be used in order to promote negative epistemic stance.
3. Nuanced generalizations regarding verb usage in $\square\aleph$ -conditionals can be formulated. Because BH is no longer spoken, conclusions are more tentative than in spoken languages, and irregularities remain difficult to explain because testing is not an option. The generalizations include:
 - a. In conditionals occurring in dialogic discourse, verb usage is typically determined by the cognizer's (speaker or narrator) construal of the location of the eventuality vis-à-vis the speech event. The Mental Space concepts of BASE and V-POINT attempt to formalize this. In predictive content and generic conditional P clauses, which typically reference post-speech FUTURE TIME eventualities, *yiqtol*s are overwhelmingly preferred; *qatal*s are preferred to reference those that are construed as occurring in the PAST TIME, or pre-speech.
 - b. *Qatal*s can be used to promote negative epistemic stance. This use explains numerous anomalous uses of the gram.
 - c. Verb choice in speech-act conditional directives is, to a significant degree, determined by discourse type. *Yiqtol*s are used almost twice as frequently in conditional P clauses of procedural and casuistic texts than in the P clauses of speech-act conditional directives found in non-procedural and non-casuistic texts. Additionally, imperatives are never used in Q clauses of procedural and casuistic text speech-act directives. In these types of discourse, the *weqatal* is used in 68% of procedural text Q clauses and 50% of uses in casuistic texts. In contrast, in Q clauses of non-procedural, non-casuistic text, imperatives are used 53% of the time, while the *weqatal* in only 17% of uses.

In Chapter 5 the analysis of $\square\aleph$'s semantics was continued. The uses explored in this chapter expose more schematic aspects of the semantics of the particle. The following proposals were suggested:

1. $\square\aleph$ is not a question word. This conclusion was reached after demonstrating that when the particle occurs in polar questions (PolQs) and alternative questions (AltQs and AltQvNs), it is under the scope of the interrogative word \square , which heads these questions. $\square\aleph$ functions in these types of questions to prompt construction of a second or third

- mental space in which additional alternative scenarios are considered. These mental spaces are embedded in the question space built by הָ.
2. When ׀ is not the head of a construction (as it is in conditionals) its semantics of hypotheticality are suppressed and other functions such as space-building are profiled for use.
 3. ׀'s background scenario-building function is invoked to explain its use in several non-conditional constructions such as בְּלִתִּי ׀, and ׀ עַד (אֲשֶׁר) ׀. A group of occurrences of ׀, often classified as interrogative uses of the particle in the lexicons, were shown to be instances of the particle's background-scenario space-building function.
 4. The semantics of alternativity, intrinsic to the definition of hypotheticality, is profiled in ׀(י)...׀ sequences that are typically translated *whether...or*. ׀(י)...׀ is similar to postscript conditionals in that it is used to clarify the intended meaning of some aspect of the utterance in order to avoid misunderstanding on the part of the reader/hearer.
 5. The study discussed the suggestion that the particle's use in the בְּלִתִּי ׀ construction (and ׀ כִּי) may contribute the semantics of exhaustive exclusivity. However, it was concluded that, since neither כִּי, בְּלִתִּי or ׀ appear to have recognized semantic components indicating exhaustive exclusion, I believe it is better to attribute this to the constructions themselves. If, however, future research determines this is the case, then my following suggestion that the semantics of the construction ׀ כִּי are not decomposable is not viable.

Finally, I have suggested that the ׀-headed bi-clausal conditional construction, ׀,...הָ questions and exceptive כִּי ׀, as well as הֲוֹן בְּעֵינַיִךְ מִצָּאֲתִי הֲוֹן בְּעֵינַיִךְ and ׀-עַל-הַמְּלֶךְ טוֹב should be considered constructions as defined by Goldberg (1995; 2006a, b). The latter two mean PETITION. The meaning of certain other phrases such as ׀ קִי is strictly compositional in nature.

Several avenues for further research present themselves. As stated immediately above, although the present study argued for a constructional interpretation of כִּי ׀, ׀-עַל-הַמְּלֶךְ טוֹב and הֲוֹן בְּעֵינַיִךְ מִצָּאֲתִי הֲוֹן בְּעֵינַיִךְ, the theory and practices of Construction Grammar have yet to be applied to Biblical Hebrew in any significant manner. Since most research into Biblical Hebrew has been carried out within a modularist and often strictly compositionalist framework, Construction Grammar offers intriguing possibilities.

Another area of further research concerns the application of a cognitive-functional framework to an analysis of counterfactual conditionals to determine what, if any, role verb

forms play in epistemic distancing, or if the particles לֹ and לֹא־לִ contribute to the distancing or if both contribute to the counterfactual interpretation.

Lastly, constraints on space prohibited me from exploring the role of viewpoint and perspective in verb choice in conditionals. There is a definite sense of frustration in exegetes evoked by the switch between *yiqtol* and *qatal* forms in otherwise identical utterances by the same character referring to the same situation in Gen. 43:37; 43:9 and 44:32. More research is needed on issues of subjectivity and intersubjectivity to determine if and to what degree, and how, the narrator's viewpoint and perspective influence verb choice.

Finally, in the past thirty years I have had the privilege of working with several minority languages. Learning and analyzing a living language is at times maddeningly frustrating. Since there is always something new to learn, it is a never-ending task. And since it is a living language, an offhand comment overheard in a marketplace can spur new insights into some feature of the language that had hitherto been intractable. In a living language intonation is there for the analysis, the content of semantic frames can be explored and the how and why of the language's metaphors can be examined by talking with the speakers of the language. In living languages we can attain a fair degree of confidence in our analysis.

This study has led to the realization that regardless of how challenging I thought it was to analyze and learn a living language, it is trivial compared to working on a dead language spoken thousands of years ago in a culture that has disappeared, which we attempt to reconstruct from archeological research and our own culturally-based reading of ancient documents. No matter how much I think I know about Biblical Hebrew, the elephant in the room is named *Overconfidence*. What I think I know is really nothing more than educated guesses. And they will always be educated guesses because we don't have access to speakers. This uncertainty means that the language used above such as "I have demonstrated" and the use of the word "conclusions" should properly be understood in terms of "proposals" and "tentative conclusions." They will *always* be open to reconsideration and improvement.

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