NOT JUSTICE, BUT CARE? AN ANALYSIS OF CONTEMPORARY ETHICAL THEORIES IN LIGHT OF THE LOVE COMMANDMENT

by

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Declaration

By submitting this dissertation electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained therein is my own, original work, that I am the owner of the copyright thereof (unless to the extent explicitly otherwise stated) and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for obtaining any qualification.

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Abstract

Since the late 1970's an important conversation concerning the ethics of care became more prominent. One of the most prominent and influential key figures of this ethical theory was Carol Gilligan who, during the 1980’s, developed the ethics of care as a response to the theory of the ethics of justice that was developed by her friend and colleague, Lawrence Kohlberg. The ethics of care was developed into an influential theory that changed the perception of moral development and it is for this reason that the work and development of the ethics of care by Carol Gilligan is of crucial importance in this dissertation.

The ethics of care should, however, not be considered to be a moral theory that is restricted to the private sphere. It has also influenced the development of ethical-political theories that have an impact on the public sphere and how people live within public spaces. Joan Tronto, one of many prominent figures and experts on the ethics of care, develops the ethics of care further into a moral theory that has the potential to change the way democracy functions if people are willing to take their ethical responsibilities of care seriously along with their ethical responsibility of justice.

In this dissertation one of the crucial questions to ask is whether the Christian tradition can learn something from the moral traditions that have already been developed, especially when it comes to the debate concerning the ethics of care and the ethics of justice. The proposed point of connection, based on the mutual basis of love, is Frits de Lange’s understanding of the Love Commandment, which will also serve as the hermeneutical lens of this dissertation. This dissertation does not attempt to critically- or theologically evaluate the work of the chosen key figures, but rather attempts to determine whether the Love Commandment, as the cornerstone of the Christian tradition and the hermeneutical lens of this dissertation, can be a valuable means to unify the ethics of care and the ethics of justice in order to create a society that seeks both justice and care as equal and necessary moral theories.
Opsomming

Sedert die laat 1970's het daar 'n belangrike gesprek ontwikkel oor die etiek van sorgsaamheid (the ethics of care). Een van die mees prominente figure van hierdie etiese teorie was Carol Gilligan wat gedurende die 1980's die etiek van sorgsaamheid ontwikkel as 'n reaksie op die etiek van geregtigheid soos dit uiteengesit is deur haar kollega en goeie vriend, Lawrence Kohlberg. Die etiek van sorgsaamheid het ontwikkel tot 'n etiese teorie wat die manier waarop morele ontwikkeling gesien is verander het, en daarom is Carol Gilligan se werk van wesenlike belang vir die verstaan van die etiek van sorgsaamheid in hierdie proefskrif.

Hierdie etiek van sorgsaamheid is egter nie beperk tot die privaat sfeer nie, maar het ook 'n invloed gehad op die ontwikkeling van eties-politiese teorieë wat die publieke ruimtes en hoe 'n mens binne hierdie publieke ruimtes funksioneer, beïnvloed. Joan Tronto, een van vele prominente figure en kenners wanneer dit kom by die etiek van sorgsaamheid, ontwikkel dan die etiek van sorgsaamheid verder tot so 'n mate dat dit die funksionering van 'n demokratiese samelewing kan verander indien etiese verantwoordelikhede van sorg, saam met die etiek van geregtigheid, ernstig opgeneem sou word.

In hierdie proefskrif is 'n wesenlike vraag of die Christelike geloofstradisies iets kan leer van die morele tradisies wat reeds ontwikkel is, veral as dit kom by die debat oor geregtigheid en sorgsaamheid. Die voorgestelde aanknopingspunt, gebaseer op die gemeenskaplike basis van liefde, is Frits de Lange se verstaan van die Liefdesgebod, wat dan ook dien as die hermeneutiese lens van hierdie proefskrif. Hierdie proefskrif poog nie om te dien as 'n krities-teologiese evaluering van die werk van die gekose kernfigure nie, maar poog eerder om vas te stel of die Liefdesgebod, as die hoeksteen van die Christelike geloof en die hermeneutiese lens van hierdie proefskrif, van waarde kan wees om die teologiese verstaan van die etiek van geregtigheid en die teologiese verstaan van die etiek van sorgsaamheid nader aan mekaar te bring ten einde 'n gemeenskap te vestig wat beide geregtigheid en sorg as gelykaardige en noodsaaklike morele teorieë ag.
Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to my grandparents, Donald George Prinsloo and Baby Prinsloo, both of whom passed away unexpectedly while I was completing my PhD dissertation. May their souls rest in peace with our Lord.

*Sola Gratia!*
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Chapter 1
Introduction

In 1992, Steve de Gruchy wrote his doctoral dissertation at the University of the Western Cape on Reinhold Niebuhr, who wrote about justice in great detail. He called this dissertation Not Liberation, but Justice. An Analysis of Reinhold Niebuhr’s Understanding of Human Destiny in the Light of the Doctrine of Atonement. As a young theologian and freedom fighter in Apartheid South Africa, De Gruchy committed himself, among other things, to the issue of justice. His call for justice in South Africa was a bold and significant one, because the majority of freedom fighters during the struggle years of Apartheid, including influential leaders like Allan Boesak and Archbishop Desmond Tutu, were calling for liberation from the oppressive system of Apartheid. For De Gruchy, the call for liberation as a basis for his political understanding of ethics was not enough. Liberation was important, but there needed to be something else in the “New South Africa” (De Gruchy 1992:6). It was in this context that he felt the focus needed to shift away from the struggle for only liberation to justice. His interest and thinking about justice was greatly influenced by Reinhold Niebuhr and it was his thinking about Niebuhr’s understanding of justice that laid the foundation for his own political thinking and ethics. Niebuhr’s understanding of justice was a justice that was firmly based in love.

In his doctoral dissertation, De Gruchy explained that the dialectic relationship between love and justice has to be understood in order to fully understand Niebuhr’s ethics (De Gruchy 1992:250). Niebuhr was convinced that the ethical challenge of the cross was based in love. He analysed the connection between love and justice, and explained how “Christians are challenged by the cross of

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1 Where there are references to “Niebuhr” it will always be in reference to Reinhold Niebuhr, unless clearly stated otherwise. Similarly, any reference to De Gruchy will always be in reference to Steve de Gruchy, unless clearly stated otherwise.
Christ to live a life of love” (De Gruchy 1992:249). When justice, therefore, is lived in a rightful and responsible way, it can be seen as love.

De Gruchy (1992:253) explained that Niebuhr considered perfect love, as embodied by Christ’s sacrifice on the cross, not only as the fountain of justice, but also as justice’s greatest critic by saying that “…love is both the fulfilment and the negation of all achievement of justice in history” (De Gruchy 1992:253). Because justice springs forth out of the cross of Christ, it is impossible not to tend to the responsibilities of justice in this world. Justice, from a Christian theological perspective, is therefore non-negotiable and plays a continuously important role in contemporary society.

For Niebuhr, faith, hope, and love formed the basis for the continuing battle for justice and equality in this world. There cannot, however, be one universal and rational standard by which justice is measured, because the human being will always be biased and prejudiced. He also reasoned that sacrificial love, the agape love, love as it is portrayed through Jesus Christ on the cross, completes the incomplete mutual love known as eros love. This sacrificial love is the fundamental requirement for social existence and can, therefore, be used as a norm when it comes to justice. Justice as incomplete love strives for equality that is ever increasingly inclusive and constantly creates space for people to live together in harmony. The justice De Gruchy was calling for as opposed to mere liberation, was therefore a justice firmly based in love.

While South Africa was still in a political transition period, and the call had just come from De Gruchy to move from the liberation struggle to a focus on justice, the Unites States had already embraced the call for justice after their own struggle during the Civil War. By the time that De Gruchy had finalised his dissertation in 1992, the American feminist, ethicist, psychologist, and at the time, Professor at Harvard University, Carol Gilligan, was well known in both feminist and in ethical

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2 Carol Gilligan is currently a Professor at New York University after serving at Harvard University for more than thirty years. She is also a visiting Professor at the University of Cambridge.
circles for writing extensively on the ethics of care\textsuperscript{3} as a moral theory that she had developed in response to the ethics of justice. In the same way that De Gruchy had called for a shift in focus from liberation to justice in South Africa, Gilligan also called for a shift, but the shift she called for would be one that would recognise the ethics of care as a contemporary ethical theory that is just as important as the ethics of justice. For her, this was the next important step to take to give voice to those who had been silenced for too long.

For Gilligan, one of the most pressing matters that would be addressed by the ethics of care was gender. She writes about various perspectives and approaches that men and women display when it comes to ethical issues. She is further also

\textsuperscript{3} My personal journey and interest in the ethics of care dates back to when I was very young. I have always had a particular interest and love towards the elderly. The times I spent with the elderly developed with my belief that all people should be treated just and equally. It has always been important for me to make time to spend quality time with the elderly, even if it was only to listen to their stories and their experiences of life. Despite the fact that it has never been possible for me to tend to all the practical needs of elderly people, it has always been important to me to tend to their emotional needs, where possible. During my final year of my ministerial studies, I did my practical year at the Dutch Reformed Church in Hartenbos, where I had ample opportunity to spend time with the elderly, also those who were already living in some form of retirement home. It was especially during these times that I realised that care is more than simply meeting the financial or practical needs of people, but that it also meant tending to the emotional needs and recognition of other people’s inherent dignity. In the process I was always very aware of the care and love I received in return.

The creation of more just society was not only a prominent theme throughout my classes as a student at the Faculty of Theology at Stellenbosch University, but also in various lectures and conferences that I attended. It has, however, always been very difficult to imagine the just societies while living in a context that displays constant carelessness and unequal treatment of people based on race, class, gender, age, or sexuality. By constantly thinking on and the rethinking of the Love Commandment and the concept of being created in the Image of God, I found new ways of finding hope for a world that displays both care and justice through a command to love God and love others as oneself. It was during a lecture on 6 August 2012 by Frits de Lange on the Love Commandment and the elderly at the Faculty of Theology in Stellenbosch, to which I had to act as respondent, that I irrevocably committed myself to studying the ethics of care during my doctoral studies.

As a result of the fact that the ethics of care developed as a response to the ethics of justice, I also prepared myself to reading extensively on the ethics of justice. A socially justifiable society is, after all, fundamentally based on the principles of solidarity and equality that appreciate and understand human rights and human dignity. Wolterstorff, for instance, believes that justice and dignity go together, and by linking justice to love, further believes that there are times that love exceeds justice. The ethics of care and the ethics of justice are still, however, two distinctive approaches to morality, despite the fact that both have arguments for the promotion of better societies. It is precisely the relevance of both discourses that made me think about whether there ought to be a choice between the discourses or whether it is possible to reconcile them.
known for her critique of the work of Lawrence Kohlberg, who was her friend and colleague at the time, but also an influential American psychologist at Harvard University. Out of this critique, she developed her own theory as an alternative to Kohlberg’s theory of moral development, which in turn was based on a theory of cognitive development by Jean Piaget, the Swiss developmental psychologist and philosopher.

Gilligan criticised Kohlberg’s work on moral development of the human being by showing that Kohlberg’s research was based on research conducted primarily on male participants. She also believed that the results for the moral development of men and women would be more balanced in its outcome had their education be more controlled. Furthermore, Gilligan argued that the scale that Kohlberg used to measure moral development was not an objective scale, despite the fact that some other scholars of the time believed this to be the case. She then criticised the fact that Kolberg’s research was solely based on justice and abstract responsibilities, while the focus was obviously more focused towards the morality of male participants. She contended that Kohlberg’s model for moral development was an insufficient model as a result of the fact that it left out half of the population of the world by focusing only on studies based on male participants’ experience.

Gilligan believes that there is a strong possibility that men and women may display different perspectives on moral development and consequently developed a feminist perspective on moral development. She bases this belief in the evidence of multiple case studies with people of varying ages that showed that women may have the tendency to focus more on empathy and compassion. This perspective, however, does not mean that all women display a tendency towards empathy and compassion, but rather that the research with women displayed an alternative way of developing to that of Kohlberg’s research. She heard a distinctive different voice that seems to have been silenced by patriarchy. In her best efforts, she tried to create a space for the silenced voice to be heard. In order to do this, however, the silenced voice should resist the injustices brought about by patriarchy. According to Gilligan, women are not inferior to men, but indeed different to men. Some
women may focus more on people and relationship, while some men may tend to experience relationships differently than women. She therefore develops the ethics of care as an alternative approach to the ethics of justice. Gilligan, along with other liberal theorists, believes that formal rights for equality are not sufficient for equal care and respect for all people. Her book, *In a Different Voice*, published in 1982, is often called “the little book that started a revolution” and played a vital role in the understanding of the connection between human moral development and gender.

She later developed her theory towards resisting injustice in a book called *Joining the Resistance* (2011). In this book, Gilligan listens to the voices of young girls going into adolescence, the stage in which they tend to lose their own true relational voices in order to maintain some form of relationship. Some adolescent girls, however, managed to resist the notion of disconnecting from their true voices. In joining these young girls during her studies with adolescent girls, she makes an effort to support these girls in order for them to develop a more honest version of who they truly are. At the heart of her argument is the belief that love holds the key to unlocking a truly democratic society. The resistance that Gilligan thus describes is one that refuses to give in to patriarchal structures in order to live in a truly democratic society. This resistance and the need to live in honest relationships are firmly secured within the ethics of care. Gilligan aims to promote the equality of girls and women as citizens. Once this happens, the relational orientation will be accepted and promoted within a democratic society.

Shortly after Gilligan’s revolutionary book, *In a Different Voice*, was published in 1982, more people decided to join her in arguing for the ethics of care as an equal moral theory to the ethics of justice. Joan Tronto, currently a Political Scientist, ethicist, and Professor at the University of Minnesota in the United States, started writing about the ethics of care and its potential within politics. She expanded on Gilligan’s understanding of the ethics of care and developed it further as a political theory in her influential book, *Moral Boundaries*, published in 1993. Her argument was that if the ethics of care was to be adopted as an influential theory, the
boundaries of morality would have to shift in order to accommodate it. The book also challenged the idea that any work connected to care ought to be done by women. She argued that if the perception of women as primary care-givers were to be challenged, it would have a tremendous impact on politics. She displayed how society is being negatively affected by the undervaluation of care and how the powerful and privileged people are being kept in power by underestimating the importance of care. She used a carefully worked out theory to argue for political change in which hierarchical structures and patriarchy are overthrown. Her definition of care helped her to identify four stages of care that form a critical part of any conversation regarding both care and politics. Her argument for a feminist ethics of care is helpful to address political issues, especially with regard to citizenship. Care is something that affects everyone, whether they need care themselves or provide care to others. Her view of the feminist ethics of care helps to ensure that everybody within society take up their care responsibilities in order to bring about political change. With regard to both ethics and politics, she succeeded in proving the importance of care in every society.

In her 2013 book, *Caring democracy*, Tronto tries to reframe democracy from the perspective of care. The argument is that everyone, as citizens of a democracy, has a responsibility towards care. If everyone accepts their responsibility, and participate in the allocation of care responsibilities, some fundamental values and commitments will be addressed. These responsibilities and the allocation thereof should be taken seriously on various levels of society. Race, gender, social class, and economic structures ought not to be overlooked. Care is fundamentally part of every human being’s life and if this is to be taken seriously, issues regarding the economy and politics would need to be addressed. As it stands in the public realm of the United States of America, care is not being considered as a fundamental part of human life in the political sphere. This, of course, is also, if not more, accurate in the context of South Africa. Therefore, the issues that Tronto address are vitally important in and for a South African context. Tronto is very critical of a neoliberal society and argues that it creates a society that promotes ‘privileged
irresponsibility’ wherein some people are given passes out of caring. Tronto calls for these passes to be revoked in order for a democracy to transform into a caring democracy. She further argues that the needs of people ought to be addressed before seeking a financial success. She is deeply aware of the existing division between the public sphere and the private sphere, and makes a case for care to be included as a public concern in order to strive for true freedom, equality, and justice for all citizens.

More recently, Frits de Lange, a Professor at the Protestant Theological University in Groningen and extraordinary Professor at Stellenbosch University, chose to further develop the ethics of care from a theological perspective. His theological perspective on the ethics of care is seated within a specific focus in the field of gerontology and the good life of the elderly. He brings the ethics of care into conversation with the Love Commandment in his latest book, *Loving Later Life* (2015), in order to argue for both the equal treatment and flourishing lives of the elderly. His arguments, however, are not restricted to care for the elderly or even to Christians for that matter. The combination of theology and care, as developed out of the Love Commandment, has an important and useful contribution to make towards ethical issues that are currently being discussed globally. It further seeks to create space for both the ethics of care and the ethics of justice as valuable and important moral theories. This gives rise to a discussion of justice and how it is understood.

When it comes to justice, it is interesting to see that both Steve De Gruchy and Reinhold Niebuhr argued for love as the basis from which justice ought to develop. It is the relationship between God’s love and the individual life of a human being in terms of justice that stimulates the thought pattern of Niebuhr, who seeks to address the connection between justice and love in theology. What Niebuhr seemed to do very well, was to use his theological theories in practical examples of dealing with people’s problems. By thinking practically, his thought on love and justice has an important role to play in contemporary society. Someone who shares Niebuhr’s understanding of the connection between justice and love is
Nicholas Wolterstorff, an Emeritus Professor of Philosophical Theology at Yale University in the United States of America. In his book, *Justice in Love* (2011), Wolterstorff claims that two terms that seem contradictory in Western Culture, justice and love, are, in fact, deeply connected to each other and actually completely compatible. The notion that they do not belong together shows something of the wrongful understanding of both ideas. The command to love others and to do justice within Christianity can be combined in an effort to love others justly. Wolterstorff further considers the possibility that care may have the potential to combine human flourishing and justice through love. His ability to talk about the connection involving justice, care, and love in order to live a good life will be discussed as part of this dissertation.

When it comes to ethical theories and moral formation, there are numerous theories that are helpful. For this dissertation, however, the focus will primarily be on the ethics of care as a theory that developed as an alternative theory to the ethics of justice. The ethics of justice, also sometimes referred to as the morality of justice, can be understood as an ethics wherein moral choices are being made from a perspective of rights or according to the choice that will cause the least sorrow or damage in a situation. Wolterstorff, among others, argues that it has its basis in already set rules and regulations that are found in every society. While some people may find this moral theory appealing, others may have a different approach in mind. The ethics of care is a theory that developed as a response to the ethics of justice and can be regarded as a normative ethical theory. This theory

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4 While the work of Steve de Gruchy, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Nicolas Wolterstorff will play important roles in the understanding of certain ideas concerning justice and love at different stages of this dissertation, they should not be considered to be primary key figures along with Carol Gilligan, Joan Tronto, and Frits de Lange.

5 Louise Kretzschmar (2009:26), a Professor of Theological Ethics from the University of South Africa and a member of the Baptist Convention of South Africa, explains that moral formation entails the formation of the moral character of a person in order to live a morally responsible life and to “be a moral agent” (Kretzschmar 2009:26). This means that moral formation is not merely something that seeks to address ethical matter in an intellectual way, but also seeks to incorporate “critical reflection and analyses” (Kretzschmar 2009:26) in the process of developing moral character – Kretzschmar (2009:26) calls this “an ethics of being” (Kretzschmar 2009:26).
finds its origins in the later part of the twentieth century with scholars like, among others, Gilligan and Tronto, who developed it into the theory it is today. This theory focuses on a more relational approach when it comes to moral formation. In essence, it maintains that people are interrelational beings and therefore have the ability and responsibility to tend to the needs of others. This theory thus places an emphasis on connectedness, needs, and relationships in the process of moral formation.

These two theories are often regarded as being conflicting moral theories, this despite the fact that scholars like Gilligan and Tronto have argued that it should not be viewed as conflicting moral theories. With the help of some influential scholarly experts, it will be argued that these two theories may be able to work in unison when it comes to moral formation. In fact, it is important that they are seen as two distinctive theories, working together in order to achieve a responsible and good moral outcome. There are enough similarities between the two theories to demand and promote more just and caring structures in every society. On the one hand, it is important to engage critically with the ethics of care in order to determine when justice is needed. On the other hand, it is also necessary to approach justice with a more concrete focus on the relational aspect of human existence. The ethics of care should pay special attention to the marginalised and the oppressed when it comes to structures of power, while the ethics of justice should pay special attention to the needs of people in order to establish a habit of care and respect for others.

It will further be argued that both these moral theories, when they are in dialogue with the Christian faith, have the ability to create more accepting and just societies, especially in a context like South Africa where the majority of citizens identify with the Christian faith. With both the ethics of care and the ethics of justice, love is an important element. With the Love Commandment being the cornerstone on which the Christian faith is built, it will be argued, with the help of well-known scholars, that the ethics of care and the ethics of justice are equally important ethical theories in contemporary society. It will also be argued that, from a theological
point of view, both the ethics of care and the ethics of justice, firmly based in the Love Commandment, ought to be regarded as complementary ethical theories and while both theories are based in the mutual love of the Love Commandment, there is no reason for a choice to be made between these two theories. The main question of this dissertation, therefore, will be whether the Love Commandment (as hermeneutical lens) can help to provide more clarity on this matter from a Christian theological perspective.

The research question that arises is therefore:

- Are there criteria from within the Love Commandment that compel a choice between the ethics of care and the ethics of justice or should they be regarded as complementary ethical theories?

It can be argued, from both the perspective of Reinold Niebuhr in Steve De Gruchy’s dissertation and Wolterstorff’s writings, that justice should be situated within love. Similarly, both Gilligan and De Lange argue for care from a perspective of love. By looking at the Love Commandment as the cornerstone of Protestant Christian theology as it is set out by De Lange, it will be used as a hermeneutical lens to look at both the ethics of care and the ethics of justice. This hermeneutical lens will be used to look particularly at the work and findings of two scholars who are not theologians (Gilligan and Tronto) and the work and findings of one theologian (De Lange). It is important to note that while there will be mention of two contemporary ethical theories throughout this dissertation, the focus will be more on the ethics of care as an ethical theory that developed as a response to the ethics of justice.

If it is true that the ethics of justice and the ethics of care ought to work together, then mutual respect that embraces inclusivity and equality can be created, despite the fact that justice and care represent different approaches to morality. This can only happen when there exists genuine mutual interaction between the theories, interaction that embraces the validity and worth of both theories. The connection between care and justice does not imply that one theory be taken up within the
other, but rather one in which the two distinctive theories work together to enrich and transform the other.

Three primary figures have been identified\(^6\) to be of assistance while doing research and reflecting on these contemporary ethical theories and the influence that the Love Commandment has on them. These scholars are Carol Gilligan, one of the most influential thinkers and one of the founders of the ethics of care, Joan Tronto, a political scientist and expert in the ethics of care and politics, and Frits de Lange, one of the leading theologians in the field of the ethics of care and the Love Commandment. Their voices will be the three prominent voices throughout this dissertation.

The research methodology that will be used in this dissertation is a literature study. The ethics of care as a contemporary ethical theory\(^7\) developed during the 1980’s in psychological circles in the United States of America and spread to other disciplines, like political science, education, and medical science, among others. More recently, the ethics of care has also been reflected on in theological circles. The aim of the research methodology will therefore be to analyse the work and research of key figures in at least three of these disciplines. The first section will aim to show the development of the contemporary theory of the ethics of care as a response to the ethics of justice in the academic discipline of psychology. This will build up to a further development of the theory and understanding of care in the academic discipline of political science and how this contemporary ethical theory can influence a democracy. The last section will aim to reflect on the ethics

\(^6\) It is important to note that there are a multitude of scholars who have written about the debate between the ethics of care, the ethics of justice, and the relationship between them. The key figures that have been identified for this dissertation have been chosen for a number of reasons, some of which will be elaborated on in later footnotes.

\(^7\) Kretzschmar’s (2009:35) understanding of what an ethical theory is may be very helpful at this stage. She writes that ethical theory refers to “the various ways of understanding the realities of life and the need for an ethical approach to life in all its dimensions. Ethical theories are ways of understanding what is right and good in life and many different ethical theories (or voices) can be identified” (Kretzschmar 2009:35). The ethics of care can, therefore, be considered as merely one of the contemporary approaches to help with the understanding of the realities in life.
of care, as developed in the disciplines of psychology and political science, from a theological point of view while continually using the Love Commandment as a hermeneutical lens.

The research methodology that was chosen will therefore seek to give detailed accounts of carefully selected works of the three key figure that were identified. These selected works will provide a comprehensive explanation of the historical development of the ethics of care as a feminist moral theory, more information on substantive findings of empirical studies, critique on the polarisation of the ethics of care and the ethics of justice, a detailed account of how care can influence the political sphere, as well as a theological reflection on the ethics of care. The purpose of bringing these selected works together is to show that the ethics of care and the ethics of justice, through the lens of the Love Commandment, are complementary theories. Seeing as this is a literature study, it is important to introduce some primary sources that will be crucial during this literature study. Some sources may have been mentioned already, but will again be discussed briefly as prominent sources.

Carol Gilligan’s prominence as one of the most influential thinkers in the field of the ethics of care gives her a voice that cannot be excluded in any discussion of the ethics of care. Her understanding of the ethics of care will therefore be seen at various stages throughout this dissertation. Her book, *In a Different Voice* (1982), will be of assistance when a detailed description of the development the ethics of care is given. In this book she criticised theories that are considered to be universal, even though they were based in exclusively male perspectives and experiences. By pointing this out, she attempted to create a space for the voices of those who have been silenced by these patriarchal standards to be heard in their own unique way. This resulted in a new way of thinking in the moral sphere. In *Mapping the Moral Domain* (1988), Gilligan and her colleagues attempted to show exactly how influential this new way of thinking (that was developed in *In a Different Voice*) was by compiling essays in book form. In identifying the voices of care and justice, they showed how people approach morality in different ways,
whether in terms of connection, dependence, and relationship, or autonomy, individuality, and independence. By mapping the moral domain by means of various moral dilemmas and experiences, they presented the implication of the exclusion and inclusion of the silenced voices in society. In 2011, Gilligan published another book titled *Joining the Resistance*, wherein she speaks about how the development of the ethics of care can assist in creating a more democratic society wherein both men and women are freed from patriarchy in order to be who they truly are. In joining young girls in the battle of resisting patriarchal pressures, Gilligan leads the way in arguing for a society wherein people are more open to relational approaches in the political sphere.

Joan Tronto, as a leading figure in Political Science and the ethics of care has managed to produce insightful sources on the ethics of care’s ability to transform a democratic society. Her book, *Moral Boundaries* (1993), made a compelling argument for a political revolution from the perspective of the ethics of care. She did this by arguing that, in the first place, the historical idea that care is associated with women is one that is historically and empirically erroneous, and also reckless when it comes to political decision-making. She showed how care has been undervalued and disregarded in order to uphold the structures of power and privilege. By claiming that care stands central within human life, she called for the moral boundaries to be shifted in order to create more caring societies.

In *Caring Democracy* (2013), Tronto expand on the ideas she developed in *Moral Boundaries*. She claims that democracy, as it is currently reflected in the United States of America, is staring a care deficit in the eyes because of the amount of care needs that keep on rising. The political involvement when it comes to care, however, is not enough to meet the care demands. Therefore, she argues for a complete shift in the way democracy is practised in order to include the crucial values and commitments to care. She also addresses the issue of the allocation of care and care responsibilities with great earnest. If care, which is at the centre of all human life, is included in politics, it would be possible to move towards the establishment of a caring democracy that in the first place addresses the needs of
people before seeking economic gain. In an effort to investigate whether theological ethics can learn something from Gilligan and Tronto’s understanding of the ethics of care, a theological interpretation of the ethics of care will be discussed. The point of contact that will be used is the Love Commandment.

As a theological companion, the work of Frits de Lange will serve as an enriching and valuable addition to the discussion. Not only because of his knowledge and passion about the ethics of care, but also because of his connection to the Faculty of Theology at Stellenbosch University. His book, *Loving Later Life* (2015), serves as a crucial resource for a theological reflection on the ethics of care where he uses the Love Commandment to argue for an ethics of aging. This book, even though it focuses on the elderly, is helpful for any theory of love and the ethics of care because of the way it presents the understanding of the triadic relationship between God, the self, and the other. His careful reading and interpretation of the Love Commandment as a theology of love forms the basis of his argument for the ethics of care. He connects his understanding of care to the Biblical narrative of the Good Samaritan in order to reflect on what care ought to be and also what it ought not to be. If it is to be argued that a theological ethics of care and a theological ethics of justice should work together in unison, it will be necessary to reflects upon a theological understanding of the ethics of justice.

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8 It is of crucial importance to note that this dissertation seeks to address the question of whether theology can learn something from the work of Carol Gilligan (as a Professor, scholar, and expert of Psychology) and Joan Tronto (as a Professor, scholar, and expert in the field of Political Science) when it comes to the ethics of care. This does not, however, mean that it is not possible to reflect or critique these and other disciplines from a theological point of view, but rather that it is not the primary purpose of this dissertation to do so.

9 It is important to note that there is a close working relationship between the Protestant Theological Seminary in Groningen and the Faculty of Theology at Stellenbosch University. Both institutions share theological research interests and attempt to collaborate when it comes to annual public lectures. Frits de Lange, in particular, has a very close relationship with the faculty and was appointed as an extraordinary professor at the department of Systematic Theology and Ecclesiology. His theological knowledge, including his understanding and knowledge about the ethics of care, has greatly enriched the theological depth of the Faculty of Theology at Stellenbosch University. His contextualised theology has also helped South Africans to reflect on their own understanding of theology within an African context.
De Lange’s primary focus is on the ethics of care and therefore a suitable conversation partner for a theological reflection on the ethics of justice is needed, even though this conversation partner will not serve as one of the three key figures that have been identified. Where De Lange’s work is not sufficient to discuss a theological reflection on the ethics of justice, the work of Nicholas Wolterstorff will be used, also because De Lange draws on his work to enrich his own argumentation. Wolterstorff’s book, *Justice in Love* (2011), will be important when it comes to theology and the understanding of justice as a moral theory seated within love. He argues that loving the other is exemplified by the just treatment of the other, as well as the promotion of worth of the other. His argument about justice and love forms a crucial part of the understanding of justice as placed within love.

Gilligan, Tronto, and De Lange, each in their own unique way, contribute to the arguments regarding the ethics of justice and the ethics of care, and the relationship between them. Some of these sources speak about the influence of love in both the theories of justice and care, which will help with the eventual argument. More sources will be added to discussion as it develops, but the main discussion partners will be Gilligan in chapter two, Tronto in chapter three, and De Lange in chapter four.

This dissertation can lead to further research in the field of the ethics of care, the ethics of justice, and how these theories can lead to further political change, especially in a South African context where relationships are regarded as a vital part of what it means to be human and an African, and where justice is still a crucially important matter. It may also serve as the basis from which to investigate the connection between the ethics of care and equality. The hope is that the focal points in this dissertation will inspire new ways of thinking about relationship, care, and justice, whether it be in the church, in smaller communities, or in the larger general society. A further attempt will be made to show that the ethics of care and the ethics of justice are not in conflict with each other when it comes to moral formation and that the mutual element of love is the driving force for both theories in order to create new a more caring democracy. Care, as it will be argued, has
the ability to bring positive attributes to the conversation of equality and dignity of all people in a democratic society.

An outline of the structure of this dissertation will provide a framework for the basic argument. Chapter one serves as the general introduction to what can be expected while also providing a research question. This should be seen as merely introductory remarks which will be elaborated on in the chapters that will follow.

Chapter two will mostly draw on the research of the American, Carol Gilligan, who can be regarded as one of the founding figures of the ethics of care. Chapter two is titled “From the Ethics of Care to Resisting Injustice”, and will be divided into three sections. The first section is a crucial part of this chapter, because it will deal with the development of the ethics of care as a moral theory as a response to the ethics of justice. The development of the theory will be seen to develop as an independent theory as an alternative approach to the ethics of justice, while at the same time calling for the two orientations to work in unison. It will have a strong focus on relationships and the understanding of the self in relationship. It will further show how the ethics of care, as a normative ethical theory, has an enormous impact on the human understanding of the moral domain. The second section will therefore look at how this development affects certain sectors of morality, especially with regard to gender, race, and social class. In several of her research studies on the ethics of care and morality, Gilligan has shown how there is an inclination toward resisting the injustices brought about by patriarchy. Moving onward from the way in which the ethics of care influences morality, Gilligan then investigates the ethics of care from the perspective of the resistance to the injustices caused by a patriarchal voice towards a relational voice that is promoted by the ethics of care. In listening to the voices of girls and women who resist these

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10 This is one of the primary reasons why Carol Gilligan, with her vast knowledge on the ethics of care, has been chosen to be a conversation partner in this dissertation. When I was introduced to the ethics of care, her work was the first academic work on the ethics of care that I was introduced to. The importance of her work and her development of the ethics of care is highly influential and therefore plays a crucial role in this dissertation.
injustices, she argues for a feminist ethics of care that can lead to a more inclusive and just society. The third section can be seen as a further development of Gilligan’s political thinking when it comes to the ethics of care.

Chapter three is titled “From Resisting Injustice to a Caring Democracy”. This chapter picks up the political nuances at the end of the second chapter and is also divided into three sections, with Joan Tronto, as an American Political Scientist and specialist in the ethics of care, being the most prominent voice\(^\text{11}\). The first section deals with the moral boundaries that need shifting in order for the ethics of care to be a transformative moral theory. The first moral boundary is the boundary between morality and politics, the second boundary is called the moral point of view boundary, and the third boundary is the boundary between the private and the public life. When these three boundaries are shifted, not only the ethics of care, but also women’s understanding of morality will be more acceptable in the moral domain. The second section follows with the shifting of boundaries with care. In this section the focus is completely on care and the way it should and should not be seen. It also includes a wide variety of issues concerning care and how it should be interpreted. It builds the character of a type of care that can have a tremendous effect on the political sphere within a democratic setting. This leads to the third section of chapter three, which will discuss care and its political aspects in an effort to establish a more caring democracy. It will show that care can have an impact on politics and will argue for a more responsible approach to the allocation of responsibility in order to create a caring democracy where the needs of people are addressed before anything else.

\(^{11}\) Joan Tronto was chosen to be a conversation partner in this dissertation for various reasons, some of which I will mention here; the ending of Chapter Two ends with a slightly more political tone with Carol Gilligan making some interesting and relevant political statements, and the political potential that comes with the ethics of care. After doing research on the political component of the ethics of care and speaking to Frits de Lange about the ethics of care and the political element of the ethics of care, he introduced me to the work of Joan Tronto. With democracy, the conversations concerning the relevance of democracy, what it ought to look like in a contemporary context, and a challenging global and local political context, Joan Tronto and her expertise when it comes to the ethics of care and politics, especially what a caring democracy ought to look like, brings an enriching and valuable contribution to this dissertation.
Chapter four will focus on a theology of love as the basis for care and justice. This chapter will be divided into six sections, with Frits de Lange being the primary theological companion. The first section will see the De Lange’s understanding of the Love Commandment, as the cornerstone of the Christian tradition, being analysed as the command to love God, the self, and the other in a triadic relationship. It will further address different kinds of love and how to determine whether love that is shown is good love. The second section will see the theology of love, as portrayed in the love commandment, in conversation with the ethics of care in order to create a theological ethics of care that supports and promotes the resistance of injustice. The third section will have a closer look at how the theology of love comes into conversation with justice.

In search of an all-inclusive perspective on a theological ethics of care that has multiple components in an effort to create a better society, the fourth section will consider a third component based in love, namely compassion. The fifth section of chapter four will aim to examine whether love, by means of the Love Commandment, may be the mutual element that is needed for care and justice to work together in order to create a society that is more caring and just, as opposed to providing criteria that enforces a choice between the ethics of care and the ethics of justice. The sixth section will be an attempt to argue that (South) Africans may be able to benefit and learn something from the theological ethics of care and theological ethics of justice as developed by De Lange, especially considering that South Africans are not only very relational beings, but also largely identify with the Christian religion.

The fifth and final chapter will see some concluding remarks being made about the research question and the suggested relationship between the theological ethics of care and the theological ethics of justice.
Chapter 2
From the Ethics of Care to Resisting Injustice

During the early 1970’s Carol Gilligan, currently a professor at New York University and influential psychologist and feminist, started questioning prominent and dominant ethical theories of the time, especially in the context of the United States of America. It was during this time that the *Roe versus Wade* case was a prominent and well-known case that led to the United States Supreme Court legalising abortions (Gilligan 1993:x). In the wake of these controversies, in 1982, Gilligan wrote a book called *In a Different Voice*, which changed the way morality was viewed. Gilligan (1993:x) explained how men, women, and children, and the relationship between them became a focal point of discussions about relationships, an idea which had been neglected for a long time. It was the first time that American women had the right to speak for themselves and to make decisions for themselves about themselves. Gilligan (1993:x) described how American women could have a deciding voice in the complex matter of the responsibility and relationship when it came to moral matters of life and death. This gave some women an opportunity to finally have their voices heard.

Likewise, Gilligan (1993:x) noted that some women had an internal battle when it came to accepting that they were now allowed to speak when they had, for so many years, been taught that they were not allowed to speak. This “internal voice”, as Gilligan (1993:x) called it, was one that silenced women because of their fear that they would be considered selfish if they were to speak out, for they felt that it would be considered inappropriate or dangerous to have their opinions or thoughts heard (Gilligan 1993:x). Gilligan (1993:x) explained how women, during personal interviews, which were guaranteed to be kept confidential, voiced what they really felt and managed to voice their fears of speaking out about

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12 Gilligan’s work and research is primarily representative of the North American context unless it is explicitly stated otherwise.
certain situations because feared that others would condemn, hurt, or even ignore them if they were ever to raise their opinion. What tended to happen then was that women would simply not speak at all, in spite of the fact that they now had a right to make certain decisions.

Gilligan (1993:x) remembered how women, when they finally had the courage to say something, would always speak or act for others. She often picked up the voices of men through the voices of women (Gilligan 1993:x). She mentioned how Virginia Woolf\(^\text{13}\) realised that if she wanted to hear the real feminine voice, she would have to somehow silence the false feminine voices that were imprinted on the minds of women (Gilligan 1993:x). It was this real feminine voice that intrigued Gilligan (1993:x) and inspired her to seek and to listen closer to the real but silenced voices. She quickly realised that women, within that context, would selflessly silence their own voices in order to sustain certain relationships and that a space needed to be created where their relationships would not be in harm’s way if they chose to speak out (Gilligan 1993:x). Gilligan also said that the way in which women tended to keep their real voices hidden was a way in which the patriarchal, male-voiced society was being kept intact (1993:xi). By listening to women and their distinctive voices, Gilligan (1993:xi) heard a difference voice and realised this different voice would be able to change psychology, history, the human story, and the narrator of it. The continuous presence of the different voice would eventually develop into the widely influential intellectual movement, which has become known as the ethics of care.

2.1 Searching for a Different Voice

Gilligan’s understanding and eventual development of the ethics of care began with her attempt to find and strengthen a different voice. Gilligan (1982:1), while listening to people talking about morality and about themselves, distinguished between two different ways of speaking about moral problems and two modes of

\(^{13}\) Virginia Woolf was an English writer, feminist, and modernist during the twentieth century in England. She committed suicide in 1941.
describing the relationship between the other\textsuperscript{14} and self. The purpose of Gilligan’s psychological study was to observe a relational approach of women in a study in which a sample of women was given a situation of moral conflict and choice (Gilligan 1982:1). Their judgments and actions were then observed. As an expert in the field of identity and moral development, she felt that women’s voices sounded dissimilar to the usual, expected voices within the study, and that they showed recurring problems with interpretation of women’s development (Gilligan 1982:1).

In her book, \textit{In a Different Voice}, Gilligan suggested different modes of thinking about relationships, distinguishing between the male and the female modes of thinking. She felt that “the representation of human development, noted in the psychological literature, has generally been seen to signify a problem in women’s development” (Gilligan 1982:2). She explained that her research on a different voice need not necessarily be characterised by gender.\textsuperscript{15} It is more important to realise that there is a distinct difference between two modes of thought, and to focus on the problem of interpretation, than to distinguish between generalised views of the sexes. As a result of the social context in which factors like social status and power come into play, it tends to force these different voices into the generalised experiences of men and women (Gilligan 1982:2). Gilligan made it clear that her interests lie with the interaction between experience and thought, and in the different voices and dialogues that arise when listening to others and the self through stories being told (Gilligan 1982:2).

\textsuperscript{14} Mary C Grey (1995:24), who taught feminist theology at the University of Nijmegen and, at the time of writing was a Professor of Contemporary Theology at La Sainte Union College in Southampton, while referring to women’s position in society as “insider-outsider” (1995:24), especially in a European context pre-1989, explains that women have often been depicted as “the Other” (Grey 1995:24), or more crudely stated “the despised other” (Grey 1995:24) who is often merely tolerated as “the other” in society.

\textsuperscript{15} This notion has been misread or misunderstood by a lot of people who still try to enforce gender differences upon the ethics of care. The question whether care is gendered shall be considered and discussed at a later stage.
Gilligan (1982:2), in her book *In a Different Voice* (1982), focused mainly on three different studies that led her to making some assumptions about her research. The first assumption she made when speaking to people is that the way in which people speak about their lives is of great significance (Gilligan 1982:2). Secondly, she valued the language that people used (Gilligan 1982:2). Thirdly, it was important for Gilligan (1982:2) to be attentive about the connections people made, for she believed that it revealed something about the world which they perceive. The studies that she performed where all done with the same goal in mind: She wanted to understand something about people’s ideas of themselves and morality, and about their experiences when it came to conflict and the choices they had to make (Gilligan 1982:2). In order to do this, she constructed three studies, the “college student study” (Gilligan 1982:2), the “abortion study” (Gilligan 1982:2), and the “rights and responsibility study” (Gilligan 1982:2), each with the same sets of questions being given to the various participants. The so-called ‘college student study’ was aimed at finding out more about identity and moral development during the early adult years (Gilligan 1982:2). This study attempted to use the view of self and the way in thinking about morality to relate to the experience of moral conflict and the making decisions about life (Gilligan 1982:2). The second study, called the ‘abortion decision study’ looked into the connection between experience and thought, and the role of conflict in development (Gilligan 1982:3). These two studies and their results about the different modes of thinking when it comes to morality and their relation to different views of self were then explored in more detail in the third study called the ‘rights and responsibilities study’ (Gilligan 1982:2).

Throughout this book, Gilligan shared some of the case studies she encountered, all in an attempt to develop a clearer representation of women’s development within the broader field of human development (Gilligan 1982:3). Feeling that an entire group (females) was left out of the construction of a moral theory, Gilligan made it her goal to expand the understanding of human development by using that which was missing from its developmental theory (Gilligan 1982:4).
2.1.1 Woman's Place in Man's Life Cycle

Gilligan (1982:6) noted that differences between men and women in social sciences had become ever more prominent, but only after an attempt was made to get rid of discrimination in order for justice and equality to prevail. Once this started happening, it became clear how habituated it had become for people to see life from the perspective of men and only men. She noted that various spheres of life, including that of psychology, were influenced by the everyday patriarchal social context16 (Gilligan 1982:6). This meant that the male-centred life and the perspective of men had become the norm for any human study, regardless of its eventual application to both men and women. By doing this, Gilligan (1982:6) felt that “they have tried to fashion women out of a masculine cloth” (Gilligan 1982:6). This notion went back to as far as 1905, when Freud developed a theory on psychosexual development based on the experience of a male child (Gilligan 1982:6). He then tried to apply his masculine conceptions on females, but found a developmental difference (Gilligan 1982:6-7). This meant that Freud initially saw the different perspective, but did not embark on a mission to establish and elaborate on the different perspective. Instead of trying to determine why women were presenting differently on his developmental theory, he chose to see this difference in women’s development as being flawed.

According to Freud, men had a well-developed sense of what was considered to be morally right and wrong, while women simply didn’t have this sense (Tong 1993:81). Tong (1993:81) explained how Gilligan perceived Freud as condemning women twice; first, based on the fact that he believed women showed a considerably lesser sense of justice than men, and second, based on the fact that he believed that women’s judgments are influenced by unwanted

16 Beverly Wildung Harrison (1985:3), who was a Professor of Christian Social Ethics at Union Theological Seminary in New York, when writing about patriarchal structures in theology, argues that some of the patriarchal processions in Christianity find their origins within the concept of the Trinitarian god “with its threefold, exclusively male manifestation” (Harrison 1985:3) that is “expressive of the male homosexual fixation that underlies the dominant spirituality of our culture, whether in ecclesiastical or an academic expression” (Harrison 1985:3).
feelings and emotions (Tong 1993:81). Gilligan (1982) considered the perspectives and developmental theories of various psychologists and scholars, including people like Chodorow, Piaget, Lever, and Erikson. Each of them tried to explain why and how boys and girls develop differently from each other. In conversation with these and other people, it became clear that there had always been a lack of theory for women's development. When she started the process of keenly observing different case studies, theories and contexts, she found that the patriarchal society had judged women on the basis of masculine principles all along. Tong (1993:81) explained that when these scholars considered women to be morally inferior to men, Gilligan suggested that women's moral development be understood as 'different', and not inferior. She further believed that men and women experience relationships differently; where men's identity seems to be intertwined with issues of separation and individualism, women's identity is threatened by notions of separation and individualism (Gilligan 1982:8).

Gilligan (1982:9) drew upon the work of Janet Lever, who conducted studies about children in peer groups while they were playing. The results of Lever's study, according to Gilligan (1982:10-11), was that boys learn independence and organisational skills necessary for the coordination of activities of large and diverse groups of people. They also learn to be competitive – “to play with their enemies and to compete with their friends – all in accordance with the rules of the game” (Gilligan 1982:10-11). All of this happens in preparation for boys to be able to turn into successful, autonomous, individualistic men who are able to compete in public life. Girls, again, were inclined to play in smaller and more familiar groups, sometimes even only sticking to their familiar friends only, in more private and secluded places (Gilligan 1982:11). In contrast to boys, girls seemed to be less competitive and more cooperative. This led to the conclusion that girls generally tend to be more sensitive and empathetic, supported by Mead’s theory, which alleged that girl's development tended to focus on the difference of the other from the self (Gilligan 1982:11). While observing these kids, it seemed that for boys, the games were all about the rules, while for the girls it seemed to be
more about relationship, sometimes even at the expense of the game itself (Gilligan 1982:11).

Gilligan (1982:11) continued by explaining problems in psychosocial development theories of Freud and Erikson, and showed that there may have been a problem in the understanding of female adolescence for theorists of human development. She argued that, once again, Erikson in particular, was only looking at the male child and leaving out all possibilities which come with the female counterpart (Gilligan 1982:12). Gilligan (1982:12) further said that the identities of men were more important than intimacy as a result of their human cycle of attachment and separation, while identity and intimacy were closely connected when it comes to women. Women’s identities are formed by having relationships, and women only get to know their own identities when they are in relationships with others (Gilligan 1982:12). She explained that Erikson, like many others, believed that the male identity is artificial in relation to the world, while the female identity only comes to its full right when it is in a relationship of intimacy with others (Gilligan 1982:13).

Gilligan (1982:14) believed it to be difficult to speak about the difference in approach without thinking that the one is a better or a worse approach, given that people tend to think hierarchical when they are faced with different options. This notion was further complicated by the fact that the scale of measurement that is used is generally based on the masculine approach as the standard of measurement. Masculine behaviour is thus seen as the so-called ‘norm’, whereas feminine behaviour is seen as the deviation from the norm and therefore, there must be something ‘wrong’ with feminine behaviour. According to Tong (1993:82) these “misunderstandings” (Tong 1993:82). and “mistranslations” (Tong 1993:82) in measurements led to women and their morality being terribly distorted (Tong 1993:82). Gilligan (1982:14) then looked into various theories about success and achievement and how it is portrayed between the sexes. In reality, women tended to respond differently in situations of competitive achievement than men.
McClelland\textsuperscript{17} divided the concept of achievement motivation into two logical components when it came to men (Gilligan 1982:14): A motive to approach success (“hope success”), and a motive to avoid failure (“fear failure”). According to Horner\textsuperscript{18}, women appeared to have a problem with competitive achievement (Gilligan 1982:14). She consequently developed a third category, known as the unlikely motivation to avoid success (“fear success”) (Gilligan 1982:14). The anxiety to be successful, however, seemed to be present only when women’s achievement was directly competitive or at the expense of another person’s failure (Gilligan 1982:15).

Virginia Woolf\textsuperscript{19} believed that even something like values would be different for women than it would be for men and that the masculine values would always be preferred and accepted (Gilligan 1982:16). It is for this reason that women sometimes question and change their own judgment to the opinions of others. Gilligan (1982:16) highlighted an important point of criticism found in Woolf’s theory about values when she said that women’s submissiveness is not only caused by their social subordination, but also by the substance of their moral concern. In other words, their moral concern is influenced by their sensitivity toward others, the way in which they consider the needs of others, and in their acceptance of responsibility to tend to these needs (Gilligan 1982:16). Women go beyond the point of only considering their own wants and needs, they actively tend to the wants and needs of others:

\textit{Women’s moral weakness \ldots is thus inseparable from women’s moral strength, an overriding concern with relationships and responsibilities. The}

\textsuperscript{17} McClelland, D.C., 1975, \textit{Power: The Inner Experience}. New York: Irvington. McClelland was an American Psychologist who developed the Achievement Motivation Theory. He was a Professor at Harvard University.


\textsuperscript{19} Wolf, V., 1929, \textit{A Room of One’s Own}. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World
reluctance to judge may itself be indicative of the care and concern for others that infuse the psychology of women’s development and are responsible for what is generally seen as problematic in its nature. Thus women not only define themselves in the context of human relationship but also judge themselves in terms of their ability to care (Gilligan 1982:16-17).

Gilligan (1982:17) noted the woman’s place within the man’s life cycle had always been restricted to the private sphere of life where they were seen as the ones who are responsible for the caretaking, the ones who are in charge of nurturing of the family, and to ones who should be there to be a helper when they are needed. In the process of being all the above mentioned, men have tended to assume, devalue and maybe even come to expect this from women (Gilligan 1982:17). When it comes to womanhood and adulthood, studies had shown that qualities deemed necessary for adulthood were unwanted attributes of the feminine self (Gilligan 1982:17). Attributes like autonomous thinking, clear decision-making, and responsibility were all associated with men and did not fit with feminine attributes, for these stereotypical attributes caused a division of love and work, and therefore only pertained to the masculine portrayals in society (Gilligan 1982:17).

Gilligan (1982:17), however, felt that from a different perspective, this stereotype would show an imbalance in the conception of adulthood, because it would favour the individual self over the connection with the other. It leaned more to an autonomous and individualistic life in the public sphere of life than toward the interdependence of love and care (Gilligan 1982:17), considered to be part of the private sphere of life. She stated that men only tend to realise the importance of relationships, intimacy, and care when they reach mid-life, whereas women know this from the beginning (Gilligan 1982:17). The development of these relational

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20 Studies regarding sex-roles and stereotyping as reported by Broverman, Vogel, Clarkson, and Rosenkrantz (Gilligan 1982:17)
elements present among women had been neglected by psychologists and scholars, because for years it had been seen as something that was instinctive or intuitive for women (Gilligan, 1982:17). Nel Noddings, an American feminist who specialises in education, philosophy, and the ethics of care, who was a professor at Stanford University in the United States of America, still argued that the relational element is inherent, intuitive, or natural for women, despite the fact that this notion had been challenged. Noddings (1984:31) believed that women or mothers care naturally. She used the argument that women feel or know when their infants need them, or when something is wrong, and therefore have the inherent ability to be naturally caring (Noddings 1984:31). For Noddings, caring is thus an intuitive or instinctive trait.

Gilligan (1982:18) noted that the criticism that Freud claims against women’s sense of justice, where it is seen as “compromised in its refusal of blind impartiality” (Gilligan 1982:18), is also seen in the works of Piaget and her colleague of later years, Lawrence Kohlberg.\(^{21}\) She criticised Kohlberg’s work on Piaget’s theories, saying he focused his research based on studies of male participants only and did not even consider the perspective of girls. Kohlberg’s six stages for moral development of moral judgment are based on the study of boys alone and exclude girls. When he measured people on this scale, girls tend to be seen as lacking judgment and moral perspective. Women’s tendency to be more caring and sensitive to the needs of others marked them as deficient in moral development (Gilligan 1982:18).

Tong (1993:83) explained that Gilligan, however, questioned Kohlberg’s methodology and claimed that his scale may be accurate for a male account of moral development rather than a human account of moral development. She then called for a mode of thinking that is contextual and narrative, rather than solely formal and abstract (Gilligan 1982:19). This call led her, for the first time, to

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\(^{21}\) Lawrence Kohlberg was an American psychologist who was famous for his creation of the Stages of Moral Development. He was a friend and Colleague of Carol Gilligan, despite the fact that she criticised his work on Moral Development. Kohlberg committed suicide in 1987.
distinguish between the discourses of justice and care where the activity of care paired moral development with the understanding of responsibility and relationships, as opposed to the concept of morality as justice which is typically paired with the understanding of rights and rules (Gilligan 1982:19). If this were to be considered in the deconstruction of a moral problem, women would not have been perceived as failing Kohlberg’s system.

Gilligan (1982:19) explained that the morality of rights, unlike the morality of responsibility, placed more emphases on separation and individuality, as opposed to connection and relationship. To illustrate this point, she compared the opinion of a male (from Kohlberg’s study) person and female (from her own study) person on morality. The male identified morality with justice, fairness, and rights, whereas the woman identified morality in terms of relationship and responsibility (Gilligan 1982:20-21). The results of this case-study led her to believe that the morality of justice and non-interference may appear frightening to women in its potential justification of meaninglessness and detachment (Gilligan 1982:22). For Gilligan (1982:22), women’s psychology and judgments provide a definite alternative conception of maturity, which calls for a more contextual mode of judgment and a different moral understanding. Women bring a new way of thinking and a different set of priorities to the understanding of the self and morality. In short, Gilligan developed the idea that a woman’s place in a man’s life cycle is to protect the recognition of the continuing importance of attachment in the human cycle while the developmental traits of men are celebrated in separation, autonomy, individuation, and natural rights (Gilligan 1982:23).

2.1.2 Images of Relationship

Gilligan (1982:24) believed that Freud, in all his studies, had failed to trace in women the development of relationship, morality, and a clear sense of self. As a result of the fact that Freud was unable to do so, he set women, their relationships, and their sexual lives, apart as “a dark continent” for psychology (Gilligan 1982:24). “To Freud … women’s relationships seemed increasingly
mysterious, difficult to discern, and hard to describe” (Gilligan 1982:24). For Gilligan (1982:25), the inclusion of women in relationship studies was of utmost importance, for the imagery of relationships shape the narrative of human development and women’s contribution have the ability to change that imagery. She explained this importance by suggesting a new line of interpretation based on the imagery of a girl’s thought as an alternative in order to consider differences in the understanding of relationships without scaling these differences from better to worse (Gilligan 1982:25).

Gilligan (1982:25) studied the responses of two eleven-year-old (female and male) participants of the *rights and responsibility study* in order to gain a better understanding of moral judgment and the interpretation of women’s development. The moral dilemma that they were asked to resolve was one used by Kohlberg to measure moral development in adolescence (Gilligan 1982:25). In this dilemma, a man named Heinz has to make a decision on whether he should steal medication, which is overpriced to the extent that he cannot afford to buy it, in order to save the life of his critically ill wife.

The boy, Jake, was very clear from the beginning that Heinz should steal the drug, for a life is more valuable than property. Tong (1993:83) explained that he prioritised life above that of property in a logical manner in order to justify his
choice, thereby presenting a perfectly Kohlbergian\textsuperscript{22} answer. He also took the law into account and recognised its place within the social order of life, but also acknowledged the fact that the law is man-made and fallible by times (Gilligan 1982:26). He set up this dilemma like he would a math problem by equating the problem and working toward a solution (Gilligan 1982:26). By doing this, he reckoned that other people, like a judge, would also have considered stealing the medication as the right thing to do (Gilligan 1982:27).

In contrast to the boy, the girl, Amy, responded in a different way. By doing so, she failed to answer in a Kohlbergian way (Tong 1993:83). At first, her approach may have seemed to be evasive and unsure. She, at no point, tried to equate the value of life to the value of money, like Jake did (Tong 1993:83). She said that she doesn’t think that Heinz should steal the medication, as there may be other ways to get the medication than stealing it (Gilligan 1982:28). Tong (1993:83) elaborated that in the process of thinking of this dilemma, she did not consider property of law, but rather the effect that it would have on the relationship between Heinz and his wife if he was to be caught (Tong 1993:83). She insisted that if they talked to the chemist, he would give them the medication, because the most important thing would be to save a life (Gilligan 1982:28). Gilligan (1982:28) saw this interpretation of the value of life in the context of relationships. She saw a world comprised of human relationships rather than individualism. It is a world

\textsuperscript{22}Tronto (1993:65-66), whose work will be discussed in more detail at a later stage, gave examples of what typical Kohlbergian answers would look like during the a conventional, post-conventional, and a stage six response. During the conventional stages, an answer would be something like: “Friendship is based on trust. If you can’t trust a person, there’s little grounds to deal with him. You should try to be as reliable as possible, because people remember you by this. You’re more respected if you can be depended upon” (Tronto 1993:65). A typical answer of the post-conventional account would be something like: “I think human relationships in general are based on trust, on believing in other individuals. If you have no way of believing in someone else, you can’t deal with anyone else and it becomes every man for himself. Everything you do in a day’s time is related to somebody else and if you can’t deal on a fair basis, you have chaos” (Tronto 1993:65-66). A response to the Heinz dilemma of someone in stage six looked like this: “It is wrong legally, but right morally. Systems of law are valid only insofar as they reflect the sort of moral law all rational people can accept. One must consider the personal justice involves, which is the root of the social contract. The ground of creating a society is individual justice, the right of every person to an equal consideration of his claims in every situation, not just those which can be codifies in law. Personal justice means, ‘Treat each person as an end, not a means’” (Tronto 1993:66).
where human connectedness is more important than a set of rules. For the girl, it is not a question of “should Heinz steal the drug?”, but rather “should Heinz steal the drug?” (Gilligan 1982:31).

Gilligan (1982:32) came to the conclusion that both children recognised the need for agreement, but got to that point in different ways – the boy with logic and law, and the girl with relationship and communication. Tong (1993:83) explained that she contrasted the differing ways in which the children came to their conclusion in a way which affirms Amy’s way of doing, instead of opposing it with the way Jake reached his conclusion. When she used the information about the boy and the girl to measure it on Kohlberg’s scale for moral development, it becomes clear that there were no stages present to measure the girl’s maturity, which led her to appear a full stage lower in maturity than the boy (1982:31).

Kohlberg’s scale was, thus, according to Gilligan (1982:31), faulty as a result of the fact that it does not have what is necessary to measure the approach chosen by Amy. Gilligan (1982:35) highlighted that the Amy’s world was a world of relationships and truths where she was aware of the needs and wants apart from her own and that she felt a sense of responsibility toward other people. She believed that if the girl’s perspective were to be seen in this light, that it would become clear that it is a method that is far from being naïve or cognitively immature (Gilligan 1982:35). It was at this point that the discourse of the ethics of care was set up as an alternative to the boy’s logic of justice, known as the discourse of the ethics of justice23. The boy displayed the logic of justification, while the girl made use of an equally refined understanding in the nature of choice (Gilligan 1982:32).

23 It is important to note that at no point throughout this dissertation is the ethics of justice considered to be a lesser theory than the ethics of care. The development of the ethics of care as an additional theory to the ethics of justice is not based on the fact that the ethics of justice is not a valid theory, but rather because there was a silenced, relational voice that was not included in the ethics of justice. The additional theory is, therefore, meant to work in unison with the ethics of justice in order to create inclusive societies that are just and caring. The last-mentioned is partly what this dissertation will set out to do.
Gilligan (1982) went into some detail about the interviews with the two children. By doing this, she repeatedly pointed out the difference in approach. Every time she did this, it was clear that the boy used the approach where justice, logic and rights were prominent. In contrast, the girl’s responses tended to show her concern for relationships, the feeling of all the parties involved, and her own relation to the world. While she placed herself in relation to the world, the boy placed the world in relation to himself “as it defines his character, his position, and the quality of his life” (Gilligan, 1982:35). It became apparent that the children respond differently when it comes to the responsibility to others and responsibility toward the self.

Where the boy felt that the self was the most important thing when it came to decision-making, the girl felt the need to look at everybody involved in a particular situation in order to decide what the best outcome will be. The boy, from a premise of separation, wanted to limit his interaction with other people and he was able to do so by sticking to rules that made the larger society a better place. The ethic of justice thus clings to rules in all situations, while the ethics of care is affected by contextual variations in character and circumstances. For the girl, responsibility toward others is important and signifies response, rather than a limitation of action (Gilligan 1982:38). For Gilligan (1982:38), the greatest difference between the children’s responses was the imagery they used. The boy’s imagery, she said, came across as more violent and aggressive, as he saw the world as a dangerous place (Gilligan 1982:38). The girl saw the world as a place of love and care, and a place where you “may even love people much more than you love yourself” (Gilligan 1982:38).

Gilligan (1982:39) explained that the themes of separation and connection were central to a study she conducted on the images of violence. Violent imagery seemed to be present in men’s stories about intimacy, while women’s stories about competitive success seemed to contain violent imagery (Gilligan 1982:40). It appeared as though men and women may experience attachment and separation in different ways and that men and women may perceive danger that
the other sex is unable to see - “men in connection, women in separation” (Gilligan 1982:42). This may even be connected to Freud’s theory of the different experiences of boys and girls when it comes to separation. Once again, the male perspective was accepted as the norm when it came to aggression, leaving the absence of aggression in women as problematic (Gilligan 1982:43).

When it comes to relationships, women tended to change the rules in order to include and preserve relationships, whereas men would rather abide by the rules at the cost of relationships which may be easily replaceable (Gilligan 1982:44). Gilligan (1982:45) elaborated on Freud’s theories on why men prefer separation, tracing it back to infants and the study of the ego and the id. It is because of separation anxiety, the “infantile helplessness” (Gilligan 1982:46) and “limitless narcissism” (Gilligan 1982:46), that men tend to cling to rules (Gilligan 1982:46). The disappointment of the separation, fuelled by the anger, forced the male self to protect himself by the rules. Thus, it looked like men needed rules because of separation anxiety. Women, on the other hand, demonstrated love from a feeling of connection, or the bond between the other and the self (Gilligan 1982:47).

From these studies, it appeared that the ethics of care may have something to do with connectedness, whereas the ethics of justice is more influenced by separation. Gilligan (1982:48) noted that women more often than not did not fit into the picture of Freud’s idea of a relationship, because women did not base their relationships on separation or aggression, but rather on connection and the other as a foundation.

Gilligan (1982:48) turned to the work of Jean Baker Miller24 about dominance and subordination, and stated that Miller called for a new language within a psychological framework where the description of care and connectedness was not the language of inequality and oppression, but rather a new language seen as originating in women’s experience of relationships (Gilligan 1982:49). For so

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24 Miller, J.B., 1976, *Toward a Psychology of Women*. Boston: Beacon Press. Jean Baker Miller was a psychiatrist, psychoanalyst, feminist, and social activist. She was a Professor of Psychiatry at Boston University School of Medicine and a Faculty Member of Harvard Medical School.
many years, psychological studies have been focused on male dominance. In doing so, it somehow neglected to find the right language to use when it comes to the experiences of women. This problem was further complicated by the fact that women, when asked about their experiences, would never really share their own true experiences, but would rather say what they thought would be the right way in which to talk about their experience according to what society deemed right. Gilligan (1982:49) explained that this issue becomes central during the youthful years of women's development. It is during these years, when women's thoughts are developing, that they start to doubt their own voice and sense of self, and rather cling to what is expected of them to think and do (Gilligan 1982:49). This causes problems when it comes to women's perceptions of themselves and their willingness to take up responsibility in order to stand up and share their own true experiences, and not those which are expected of them.

Gilligan (1982:51) further found that female students participating in the college student study had a difficult time to describe themselves to themselves. They were inclined to define themselves in terms of who they should be according to general society, or in the perception of other people, rather than defining themselves according to their own wants, needs, and desires. Their identities are thus not primarily based on their own perceptions of themselves, but on those of others. As they continue to answer questions being posed to them, it became clear that the way they were looking at themselves became more direct as opposed to how other people had perceived them to be (Gilligan 1982:52). Gilligan (1982:52) picked up that the moral question similarly shifted from “what is right” (Gilligan 1982:52) to “what is right for me” (Gilligan 1982:52). It happened, however, that as soon as these women heard their own voices, they tended to draw back to their previous opinions (Gilligan 1982:52). These women found it extremely difficult to define themselves and their relationships, because the world around them had enforced other definitions of who they were upon them, and had decided what their relationships ought to look like. Gilligan (1982:53) noted that it was hard for these girls to explain their sense of self, because they encountered
a problem with vocabulary when they were trying to convey a new understanding of themselves and their relationships. Claire, one of the students in the college student study, confirmed this when she said:

   I’m trying to tell you two things. I’m trying to be myself alone, apart from other, apart from their definitions of me, and yet at the same time I’m doing just the opposite, trying to be with or relate to – whatever the terminology is – I don’t think they are mutually exclusive (Gilligan 1983:53).

During Gilligan’s research with female students, it became obvious that the ideal of care is an activity of relationship in that it sees a need and responds to it (Gilligan 1982:62). By doing this, she believed that a network of relationship is started to take care of the world so that everybody will be able to be taken care of (Gilligan 1982:62). It is this relational approach that has caused some difficulty for psychologists, because the experiences of women have for so long been neglected, that it is like stepping into unknown territory (Gilligan 1982:62). All the theories about women’s experiences have been written from the interpretation and understanding of what women should experience, thereby not considering what women are truly experiencing. In most psychological theories about relationships, a hierarchy has been formed, a hierarchy where being at the top means being alone, or separated from others (Gilligan 1982:62). It requires others to be kept at arm’s length and not allowing people to come too close, but also to not be so disconnected that isolation eventually sets in (Gilligan 1982:62). It is a hierarchy that is by all means one filled with fear; fear of being too close and being too far at the same time (Gilligan 1982:62). By taking women’s true experiences in terms of relationships into consideration, it becomes easier to understand women’s experiences, and also breaks down the hierarchical view of relationships which was previously present (Gilligan 1982:62). By taking women’s experiences into consideration the other’s experiences of what women should be is rejected, and women are allowed to have their own experiences.
2.1.3 Concepts of Self and Morality

Gilligan (1982) introduced some case studies in which she attempted to analyse the concepts of self and morality. She did this by asking students what morality meant to them and why people should be moral or live moral lives. She discovered that the students who were being questioned had a genuine concern about hurting other people, as it is one of the major themes in the responses of the mainly female students (Gilligan 1982:65). She explained that the common thread that ran through their responses was the desire not to harm other people, and the hope that a moral conflict would be solved in a manner in which no one will be hurt (Gilligan 1982:65). What she understood from their answers was that a moral person was someone who would always be willing to help others because of their good nature, that it is a matter of “meeting one’s obligations and responsibilities to others, if possible without sacrificing oneself” (Gilligan 1982:66). One of the students noted that the limits of judgment would, however, be tested when helping others meant that it comes at the cost of hurting the self (Gilligan 1982:66).

Gilligan (1982:66) also found a restraint in several college women to take a stand on controversial issues. They tended to keep themselves from making decisions on moral issues, because they did not want to denounce other people or their beliefs (Gilligan 1982:66). She felt that these women showed signs of vulnerability, and that this prevented them from taking a stand (Gilligan 1982:66). This reluctance within them to exercise judgment in moral situations did not, however, imply that women are unable to exercise sound judgment, but rather that they were uncertain whether they have a right to make certain moral judgments (Gilligan 1982:66). Gilligan (1982:67) explained this by saying that women sometimes tend to feel dependent on their husbands for guidance, support, and protection when they feel that the patriarchal society is being oppressive.
Another issue with regard to making a moral decision seems to be the choice within the matter. Where there are choices, a decision has to be made. When a decision is made, responsibility lies with the person who made the decision (Gilligan 1982:67). To some extent, women sometimes perceive themselves as having no choice in a moral matter, on mere grounds that they are women within a patriarchal society. Gilligan (1982:67) found that these women were “childlike in the vulnerability of dependence” and that they were inclined to live in constant fear of being abandoned, causing them to give in to submissive behaviour in order to receive goodness, love, and care (Gilligan 1982:67). When some of these women eventually make decisions, the question may be asked whether they are doing it to please people or whether they are doing it because it is the right thing to do. Women should have the freedom to make decisions based on what is right according to their own moral compass, and not on grounds of what is expected of them by other people. For centuries, women have been required to be reliant on men when it comes to decision-making, even though they may have differing opinions at times (Gilligan 1982:68).

Men have, more often than not, been seen as the so-called thinkers, the ones who are just and honourable. Women, on the other hand, have often been seen (stereotypically) as beings filled with feelings and emotions who can, traditionally, not be associated with justice, rights or good judgment. This caused a separation between public and private, with justice and rights considered to be part of the public sphere, leaving feelings and emotions to be considered private matters (Gilligan 1982:69). In doing so, men are considered pioneers of public life, giving order to social structures. Women are then automatically restricted to the private and domesticated life, the life of the family, secluded from anything considered public (Gilligan 1982:69). Traditionally, women have been perceived as out of place if they give voice to their own opinions and thoughts. On the developmental scales, the masculine role has thus been accepted as the more developed and more important role than the feminine role, concluding that men must therefore be more developed or mature than women.
Gilligan (1982:69) called upon the research of Norma Haan25 and Constance Holstein26 on college students, which indicated that the moral judgments of women are to some extent more influenced by their feelings of empathy and compassion than those of men, and that their judgments may also be influenced by whether the given dilemmas at the given moment were real as opposed to hypothetical dilemmas (Gilligan 1982:69). The real concern here, however, should not be the impact of the feeling of empathy and compassion. Gilligan’s greater concern in this instance was that the categories by which development of both men and women were being measured, was derived from research originally only conducted on men (Gilligan 1982:69). By doing this, the standards of development can, in actual fact, only be relevant to men, because women were completely excluded from the research conducted. If mature women are to be measured on this masculine scale, it would mean that they would almost inevitably score very low and their moral development would be comparable with that of children when, in fact, this is not necessarily the case (Gilligan 1982:70). If the measuring of moral development were to be conducted according to gender, it would be suggested that a different scale for the measurement of moral development in women be made available. This scale should, as in the case with the masculine scale, include specifications based on certain feminine qualities (Gilligan 1982:70).

In order to find a place where women could speak freely and truly about their own experiences, Gilligan turned to abortion studies. When it comes to birth control and abortion, Gilligan (1982:70) felt that it was the one place where women were in control and where they could make decisions based on their own opinions, their own bodies, and their own sexuality. These are matters over which they have complete control, where they are not bound to the thoughts and experiences


of men. This was the one place where they could find independence from the
binds of a patriarchal society and its expectations of women. Gilligan (1982:70),
however, appropriately pointed out that even though society publically proclaimed
that women had the right to make these decisions for themselves, they were still
faced with a private conflict within themselves concerning the choices they now
had to face, because with it they would also have to face moral decisions
concerning goodness and self-sacrifice (Gilligan 1982:70).

The care and concern for others with which women function tend to cause internal
problems when it comes to morality and the self. It forces the woman to make a
choice between inflicting possible harm to the self or to the other. Gilligan
(1982:71) called this dilemma “the conflict between compassion and autonomy,
between virtue and power” (Gilligan 1982:71). It is the natural instinct for the
feminine voice to attempt to resolve moral issues without harming either the self
or the other. The consideration of abortion forced women into such dilemmas,
because the decision about the abortion ultimately resided with the woman. The
woman has no choice but to make a decision which will affect both herself and
other people involved, thus forcing her to make a critical moral decision on her
own, and accepting responsibility for it (Gilligan 1982:71). It puts her in a position
to make a choice between the responsibility of care for herself or for the other
and ultimately becomes a matter of choice and responsibility (Gilligan 1982:71).

During her abortion studies, Gilligan (1982) asked participating women to resolve
three hypothetical moral dilemmas according to Kohlberg’s work on moral
development and moral judgment. Kohlberg’s research on moral development
can be seen as an extension and continuation of Piaget's work on children’s
moral judgment (Gilligan 1982:72). Kohlberg elaborated on Piaget's theory and
created a model for moral development in adolescence (Gilligan 1982:72). This
model housed three levels of morality known as the pre-conventional, the
conventional, and post-conventional (Gilligan 1982:73). These three views
reflected on the human being’s moral understanding and growth from an
individualistic point of view to societal point of view and from there eventually
maturing into the universally accepted point of view (Gilligan 1982:73). Kohlberg’s model for the measuring of moral development can be further divided into six stages. The first two stages are seen as part of the pre-conventional view, the third- and the fourth stage form part of the conventional point of view and stages five and six form the post-conventional view. These six stages of moral development are formed into an “invariant sequence, each successive stage representing a more adequate construction of the moral problem, which in turn provides the basis for its more just resolution” (Gilligan 1977:483). At the highest level, a person reaches the peak of moral development and can be regarded as a person who is able to reason independently from external factors brought about by psychological or historical constraints (Gilligan 1977:483).

Tong (1993:82) explained the different stages. Stage one is the “punishment and obedience orientation” (Tong 1993:82), where the child does what he or she is told to do in order to avoid punishment (Tong 1993:82). Stage two is the “instrumental relativist orientation” (Tong 1993:82), where the child does anything to support his or her own needs and occasionally tend to the needs of others (Tong 1993:82). These two stages, as part of the pre-conventional view, consist of a very self-centred starting point. Both of these stages aim to firstly please the self before even considering the moral constructs of the other.

Stage three is the “interpersonal concordance orientation” (Tong 1993:82), where the adolescent starts to base decisions on the popular and dominant values, behaviours and principles of the day, because he or she seeks approval from other people such as friends or family (Tong 1993:82). Stage four is the “law and order orientation” (Tong 1993:82), where the adolescent begins to act on responsibilities that are placed upon him or her in order to be seen as a morally

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good person, as opposed to a troublemaker or shameful person (Tong 1993:82). These two stages, as part of the conventional view, shift the focus from the individual to a more societal and communal view. The adolescent in these two stages of moral development is aware that there are certain norms and values within society that must be upheld in order to maintain order within society, and thus acts accordingly.

Stage five is the “social contract legalistic orientation” (Tong 1993:82). During this stage, the adult adopts a moral point of view that allows for any decisions to be made, as long as it is to the greatest good of everybody involved (Tong 1993:82). This moral point of view is thus utilitarian in nature (Tong 1993:82). Stage six is the “universal ethical principle orientation” (Tong 1993:82). During this stage, the adult’s rationality is dominated by the ultimate good (Tong 1993:82), they reach moral maturity and is no longer influenced by the self, the other, or the law (Tong 1993:82). This stage is characterised by prominent universal influences of justice, maturity, and respect for all people and their dignity (Tong 1993:82). These last two stages form part of the post-conventional view according to Kohlberg’s model for moral development. It is seen as the ultimate stages to be reached by humans in their moral development.

The question begs to be asked how accurate this model truly is. Tong (1993:82) rightly pointed out that there are at least three immediate questions that ought to be asked when it comes to Kohlberg’s model for moral development: (1) is this model universal (Tong 1993:82)? (2) Is it invariant or unchangeable (does A always precede B, B always precede C, and so on) (Tong 1993:82)? And (3) is this a hierarchical model (is B more adequate than A, C more adequate than B, and so on) (Tong 1993:82)?

According to Kohlberg’s studies, women hardly ever ascend past stage three of Kohlberg’s model for moral development, whereas men tend to reach stage five, and even stage six, on a regular basis (Tong 1993:82). If this model is accurate, then it implies that women are morally less developed than men, and therefore
men may be superior with regard to moral formation. This places men in a hierarchical position over women. This view can still be considered as one of the main justifications for patriarchy.

Gilligan, however, disagrees with Kohlberg’s model for moral development, as she feels that Kohlberg left out half of the human population by focusing his research solely on men. She criticised his work on moral development of human beings by pointing out that his research did not include female participants, but despite this fact, he still used this model to measure both men and women. This model may have been more applicable to both men and women if women had the same education, opportunities, and skills as men. Kohlberg’s model can thus be in no way objective, even though some scholars believe it to be objective. Gilligan (1982:73) picked up on the fact that women’s interpretation of a moral problem differed from those of men, because women interpret and deconstruct moral problems in terms of care and responsibility in relationships, rather than individualistic rights and rules, and “the formal logic of fairness that informs the justice approach” (Gilligan 1982:73). Gilligan (1982:73) then claimed that women had a different moral voice and a different moral language than men, and therefore could not be measured on a model based on male attributes for moral development.

Gilligan (1982:74) proceeded to develop her own model for the moral development in women as an alternative model to Kohlberg’s model.28 Both of the models represent two distinctive injunctions of morality whereby one strives to not treat the other in an unjust manner, while the other strives not to turn away from the other when they have needs (Gilligan & Attanucci 1988:225). Like Kohlberg’s model, Gilligan’s model also consists of three views of morality known

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28 Friedman (1987:192) explained that even Kohlberg later admitted that Gilligan’s work challenged him to take the “notions of care, relationships, and responsibility” (Friedman 1987:192) and the importance thereof into consideration. He also had to rethink the way these concepts interacted with his emphasis on moral reasoning based on rights and justice (Friedman 1987:193). He, however, regarded the morality of care “as pertaining to special relationships among particular persons, in contrast to the universalistic relationships handled by justice reasoning” (Friedman 1987:193).
as pre-conventional, conventional, and post conventional, but her model only has three different stages as opposed to the six stages of Kohlberg’s model. The first stage is characterised by an overemphasis on the self (Tong 1993:85). This stage forms part of the pre-conventional stage. During this stage moral formation will be influenced by what is best for the self within a moral dilemma. Gilligan (1982:74) explained that this stage is where judgment is criticised as being “selfish” (Gilligan 1982:74). When the person becomes aware of this selfishness, it leads them to think about their responsibility toward the other(s) involved, thereby reaching stage two (Gilligan 1982:74).

Stage two automatically implies the conventional view. This stage is characteristically one with an “overemphasis on others” (Tong 1993:85). During this stage, what is good is seen as “caring for others” (Gilligan 1982:74). This means that the selfishness of stage one is now replaced with an overemphasis on the necessities, desires and wishes of the other. The problem with this stage is that the self is completely excluded from the equation. Gilligan (1982:74) noted that this caused problems within relationships, which eventually led to imbalances. In theory, this imbalance should eventually lead to the third stage.

Stage three forms part of the post-conventional view. This stage is where there is “a proper emphasis on self in relation to other (Tong 1993:85). It is believed that women who reach moral maturity will eventually base most of their moral decisions according to this stage (Tong 1993:87). Care becomes the focus within this perspective, but not just care for the other. This includes care for everybody involved, in other words, caring for oneself in relation to others. This care seeks the best for everybody involved without causing harm to anybody: “Care becomes the self-chosen principle of a judgment that remains psychological in its concern with relationships and response, but becomes universal in its condemnation of the exploitation and hurt” (Gilligan 1982:74). This stage thus balances out the selfishness of stage one with the other-directedness of stage two in order to find equilibrium for all people involved.
According to Gilligan’s abortion studies, women can move from one stage to another from time to time. It is thus not a hierarchical model where the one stage follows chronologically on the other. Within one moral decision, women can move through all of these stages. The ideal is that mature moral decisions are being made when a woman reaches stage three. Gilligan (1982:74) suggests that it is during this stage that human relationships becomes central and that the self and the other are seen as interdependent on one another. In keeping with this view, the self and the activity of care both enriches the other and the self (Gilligan, 1982:74).

The abortion study is a good example of how women can move between the different stages at different times with moral decision-making. Gilligan (1982:74) elucidated that the decision to have an abortion would initially be focused on the self. The reason for this would be that the issue at this stage is rational and concerns the basic survival of the woman (Gilligan, 1982:75). The woman would thus be in stage one according to Gilligan’s model for moral decision-making. During this stage of the decision, the woman may feel alone and vulnerable, and therefore may feel the need to focus on taking care of herself before thinking of anybody else concerned (Gilligan 1992:75). When making this decision, it is hard for the woman to distinguish between should and would, and the voice of the other can only have an effect on the outcome of decisions after it has already been made (Gilligan 1982:75). Gilligan (1982:75) explained that women tend to isolate themselves from others during this stage because they feel that relationships may cause disappointment and this disconnection would leave them feeling powerless.

After the initial focus on the self within making a decision, there will usually come a point where a shift is made from the first stage unto the second stage. This shift in mind-set usually occurs when the woman first becomes aware of her own selfishness and the responsibility that is now placed upon her, as opposed to the self-interest which has determined her judgments up until this point (Gilligan 1982:76). The woman would at this point be forced to think of the unborn child.
Even though the baby may seem as a possible answer to her initial loneliness, and a solution to issues with regard to dependence and independence, the woman is also faced with the responsibility that goes with giving birth to the child or having an abortion (Gilligan 1982:76). If the woman decides to have the child, certain parental responsibilities will be placed upon her, including taking care of the child and protecting the child (Gilligan 1982:76).

Gilligan (1982:76) rightly pointed out that is it necessary for the woman to care for herself in order to care responsibly for the other. Moving from stage one to stage two, thus, created a need for the woman to connect with others and to form part of the larger society (Tong 1993:76). The woman in this stage will uphold her decision based on societal values and her being part of the society (Gilligan 1982:79). Tong (1993:76) explained that a woman in stage two is constantly faced with balancing that which is good with self-sacrifice, and suppressing her own needs in order to conform to the thoughts, ideas, and wants of other people. In extreme cases, the woman will see any decision wherein she is benefitting, or adhering to her own needs, as selfish (Tong 1993:86). What used to be the woman’s desire to survive is now overpowered by a need to do what is good in the eyes of others in order to be accepted by others (Gilligan 1982:79). The conventional feminine voice is clearly heard in this stage with the woman defining and proclaiming her worth in terms of her caring and protection of others, a voice prominent within stereotypical views of what it means to be a woman (Gilligan 1982:79).

Gilligan (1982:80) articulated that it was also during this stage of development that hurting people becomes an issue. It happens every so often that there exists no option better than the other, when the responsibilities involved are conflicting, situations where someone’s needs will not be tended to, and then the onus is on the woman to make a difficult decision as to who will have to suffer the consequences (Gilligan 1982:80). Somewhere during the process of focussing solely on the needs and wants of other, the lack of proper relationships becomes evident. The woman will then realise that her own needs are being suppressed.
at cost to herself in order to please other people. According to Gilligan (1982:82), this was reminiscent of stage three of Kohlberg’s stages of moral development, where the need for approval is the driving force behind the wish to fulfil the needs of others. The woman then gets caught between the passivity of dependence and her own role of caring for others, and thereby gets stuck with regard to both action and thought (Gilligan 1982:82). What follows is the realisation that the self can only be neglected for so long before the longing for both mutual relationship, and the need to be responsible for the self, arises. Gilligan called this transition “a shift in concern from goodness to truth” (1982:82). She found that women in her abortion study had struggled to equate whether it would be considered selfish or responsible, moral or immoral to take their own needs into consideration (Gilligan 1982:82). The cause of a problem in a lot of the cases was that women started doubting their own worth during the process of moral formation, and when this happened, women tended to fall back into the idea that their decisions were selfish (Gilligan 1982:87). Gilligan (1988:87) noted that when morality disappeared, the only thing that counted was surviving, no matter how self-centred or dissolute it may have been. Women consequently reach a point where they escape from the bonds of stage two and push through to stage three in order to avoid becoming aggrieved, or mad, or a truly unpleasant person (Tong 1993:86). In realising that responsible care is both a necessity for the self and the other, the woman can change over to the third stage in the process of moral formation.

Tong (1993:87) noted that decision-making in stage three can be very complex. In the case of the deciding whether to abort, for example, the woman in stage three would have to make a decision based on what is best for herself, the unborn fetus, as well as anyone likely to be affected by her decision (Tong 1993:87). Stage three deals with finding a balance between the wants and the needs of the self, but also of others who are affected. Gilligan (1982:85) called the act of being responsible to others the notion to be “good”, and the act of being responsible to the self the notion to be “honest” and “real”. Women in stage three want to make
the right and responsible decision in order to be a “good” person in the eyes of other people, but they also want to be true and “honest” with themselves (Gilligan 1982:85). Tong (1993:87) thus concluded that women reach moral maturity when they stop compromising on their own needs in order to please other people, and “simultaneously recognising the falseness of this polarity and the truth of her and others’ interconnectedness” (Tong 1993:87). In this stage, it is all about finding a moral balance between the self and the other in order to include both in the process of care (Gilligan 1982:90). Gilligan (1982:85) explained that, at first, it may seem odd or self-centred to be inclined to tend to the needs of the self, but that it is, in actual fact, only fair to do so. In fact, it is necessary to care for the self in order to extend any form of good care to anyone else. In this final stage care becomes what it ought to be in that it becomes the ethic of choice and leads to the acceptance of the responsibilities that go with that choice (Gilligan 1982:90).

Gilligan (1982:94) noted that once the focus shifted to be inclusive of both the needs of the self and the other, the tension which existed between selflessness and responsibility seemed to fade away. In realising that a failure to care for the self would undoubtedly mean the failure to care for the other, this stage creates a responsible way of thinking about the moral problem. Although the moral problem will not be solved by this understanding, the moral problem can be constructed in such a manner that is orientated towards being caring for all the parties involved (Gilligan 1982:94).29 Responsibility for the care orientation, Gilligan (1982:95) believed, is something that includes the self just as much as the other people involved.

Gilligan (1982:100) consequently distinguished between women and men according to her findings, where women tended to show an inclination to lean toward a care orientation that included a sensitivity to responsibility, while men

29 An example of this was discussed in great detail by Gilligan (1982:94) where a woman in the abortion study had to make a decision as to whether she would abort or not for a second time. After battling to make the right decision, she made a mind shift within herself to realise that she has a responsibility towards herself too (Gilligan 1982:94).
tended to show an inclination towards a justice orientation that included a particular sensitivity toward rights. It became clear that a lot of women opted not to judge other people for their choices as a result of the fact that they could not possibly fully grasp the circumstances that caused a person to act in a certain way. This is confirmed by one if the participants who explained that it would be hard for her to judge other people, because she believed that everybody’s existence is different from the other, and that what she may consider to be right or wrong may not necessarily be right or wrong for another person (Gilligan 1982:102).

Gilligan (1982:102) believed that women who withheld judgment often did so in an effort not to hurt people. The very nature of care is not to hurt someone. This is, however, complicated by the fact that moral dilemmas unfortunately involve pain (Gilligan 1982:103). Gilligan (1982:103) picked up on the fact that women, who spoke directly about morality, always tended to show a particular sensitivity to the abuse and hurt of people. In concluding remarks about the abortion study, Gilligan (1982:105) had shown that women perceive moral dilemmas as an issue regarding contradictory responsibilities. She further suggested that there are three distinctive perspectives representing differing views of the self in relation to the other (Gilligan 1982:105). These three stages can be identified as the pre-conventional, conventional, and post-conventional stages.

This first stage in women’s moral judgment involves the focus on the self and the issue of survival (Gilligan 1982:105). The second stage, the conventional stage, goes into a primary focus of the other in an attempt to portray goodness (Gilligan 1982:105). The last stage, identified as the post-conventional phase, sees the focus shift to caring for both the self and the other in order to resolve conflicts within moral dilemmas (Gilligan 1982:105). The different stages, therefore, move from a concern for survival, to the being good to other, and from being good to others to truth (Gilligan 1982:109). The abortion study helped Gilligan (1982:105) to identify in women’s moral thinking the voice of care and responsibility, and the
necessity for a care orientation to be added into the moral domain, in order to give voice to the often silenced differing voice.\textsuperscript{30}

In considering women’s rights and judgments in \textit{In a Different Voice}, Gilligan (1982) pointed out some of the discrepancies that women face in society as a result of the fact that their moral orientation is often not considered as valid when it comes to moral choices, and how women seemed to constantly face a battle between selfishness and responsibility because of it. She succeeded to show, through a variety of responses from various participants, that women voiced a different voice, a voice that resonated with that of responsibility, interdependence, and care. It was an approach that was relational and concerned with the wellbeing of the self and the other. This additional approach to morality is one that considers everything that is involved and essential to the issue and only after that makes a choice and accepts responsibility for that choice (Gilligan 1982:147): “In the end, morality is a matter of care” (Gilligan 1982:147). The morality of the different voice is one that is infused with interdependence and seeks to care in a responsive manner for both the self and the other in an attempt to maintain a connection (Gilligan 1982:149).

This morality has the relationships between human beings at the heart of its understanding (Gilligan 1982:149). Gilligan (1982:149) stated that when women’s rights are changed, that their judgment necessarily changes too, which would in turn empower women to embody the notion that caring, not only for themselves, but for others as well, is moral. The consequences of the different voice in morality led to issues being noticed in the public domain, including the feeling of women of being excluded (Gilligan 1982:149). Gilligan (1982:149) explained that women had begun to see their responsibility in social relationships as a source of strength in the moral domain. With the focus being placed on the rights of

\textsuperscript{30} Gilligan (1982:106-127) used the fourth chapter in \textit{In a Different Voice} to show how a crisis can lead to a person’s growth or their despair. She used two examples of girls who participated in her abortion study. By highlighting their crisis, she was able to show the growth and transition the girls had made in the ethics of care (Gilligan 1982:109).
women, it became clear that there was an additional approach when moral problems were being deliberated upon which often led to a more tolerable and more flexible outcome (Gilligan 1982:149).

Gilligan (1982:151) recalled that during all the phases of human development in life, attachment and separation are evident; during the adolescent phase of development, these factors may appear in the form of intimacy and identity, and when adulthood is reached, it can be seen in work and in love relations. Men in society are depicted as the ones who will most likely lean toward the separation orientation in life. Gilligan (1982:156) believed that women showed an infusion of both separation and connection during their developmental stages, but that women were essentially being devalued as a result of the fact that that society places an incredible emphasis on separation. She therefore endeavoured to include the relational orientation as part of women' moral development (Gilligan 1982:156). While Tong (1993:87) argued that Gilligan’s way of speaking about morality cannot be seen as an account of human moral development, it is clear that this was never Gilligan’s intention to suppose that a relational approach is an account of human moral development. Gilligan (1982:156) clearly stated that her intentions were to restore to human development the missing voice of the women who were not involved in previous studies about the conceptions of self and morality. She did this by focussing on the differences she had seen between the male and female respondents in order to find a more inclusive view of development (Gilligan 1982:156). It may be more responsible to argue that Gilligan’s addition to that of Kohlberg’s view on human development31, would be a more inclusive account of human moral development, for it included both men and women, and both the approaches to morality. The way that women often felt that they had to compromise who they truly are in order to make the right decision, helped Gilligan (1982:157) to realise that there was dysfunctionality in the general

31 Kohlberg in his research, did not include females in doing his research about morality, but still continued to call it an account of human moral development, rather than an account of men’s moral development (Tong 1993:87).
view of what morality was constituted to be and led to further complications regarding development. Gilligan’s studies repeatedly showed that women, when they were asked about their identity, identified themselves in terms of relationship, care, and responsibility instead of listing the success that they have achieved on academic or professional levels of their lives (Gilligan 1982:159). In contrast to what she had heard from women, Gilligan (1982:160) noted that men identified themselves in a more distinctive and sharp-edged manner that, even though references where made to relationships, never included any particular relationships or people, but included a definite set of words like “intelligent”, “logical”, “imaginative”, “honest”, “arrogant”, and “cocky”, all words that were considered to be part of separation language. She explained that men often found their identity solidified in power and separation through their experience of work, leaving them to be disconnected from other people (Gilligan 1982:163). The experience of intimacy, however, is a crucial one in that it has the ability to reconnect the disconnected self to others (Gilligan 1982:163). For Gilligan (1982:163-164), relationships had the ability to undo the isolation and give men the opportunity to experience the transformative powers of intimacy to accommodate both adult love and work. Maturity is reached when identity and intimacy are developed to such an extent that the two differing moralities are perceived to be complementary approaches to morality (Gilligan 1982:165).

Gilligan (1982:167) explained that the two differing perspectives became noticeable when people realised that there were differing ways to approach a moral problem. In recognising that there are differing approaches to morality, it is crucial to listen to the new voice in morality, and to include the new voice that had been silenced by the one-sided approach to morality that was considered to be the norm. In doing this, the voices of the once silenced women and their development will be tended to. Gilligan (1982:169) quoted Miller, who called for a new exploration and investigation into women’s development and the relational approach that was so often perceived in these studies. She argued that research ought to be done to include attachment and care within relationships, instead of
devaluing and displacing it as non-essential (Gilligan 1982:170). Separating the self from others was no longer to be seen as the ideal and only way of successful moral development. It was in women’s depiction of interdependent relationship that an additional way of moral development was discovered, one that changed the perception that autonomy and individuality were the true markers for development to include caring relationships (Gilligan 1982:170). Gilligan succeeded in her attempt to include women in developmental studies without merely regarding them as less morally developed. In fact, she succeeded in pointing out an additional approach to moral development and moral understanding. This additional moral approach was rooted in relationship and interdependence, and regarded care as more important than achievement (Gilligan 1982:171).

Gilligan (192:173) pointed out that the voices of women had for centuries been silenced, but that, in her studies, she heard a different voice, a voice that ought to be listened to in a different way as a result of the fact that it is rooted in the ethics of care that connects relationships with responsibility. It was in their resistance to separation that Gilligan came to see the ethics of care. When Gilligan (1982:174) distinguished between the ethics of care and the ethics of justice, she explained that the ethics of justice finds it starting point at equality, whereas the ethics of care is based on the principle of non-violence in an attempt to exclude any form of harm. Both these perspectives are relevant perspectives based on the fact that both inequality and attachment are part of the universal experience of human beings\(^{32}\) (Gilligan & Attanucci 1988a:225). Both perspectives of morality form a vital part human existence at some point in life (Gilligan & Attanucci 1988a:225). Both the perspectives of justice and care are

\(^{32}\) Gilligan & Attanucci (1988:225) clarified this with an example: “All children are born into a situation of inequality and no child survives in the absence of some kind of adult attachment”.

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vitaly important due to the fact that all human beings are vulnerable beings who are bound to be affected by abandonment and oppression (Gilligan & Attanucci 1988a:225). The tension ensues when detachment, which is seen as the highest level of moral development in justice, is regarded as a moral problem for care (Gilligan & Attanucci 1988a:232). In the same way, the focus on the needs and context of particular needs of a person, which is a mature understanding in the care perspective, is considered to be problematic for the justice perspective (Gilligan & Attanucci 1988a:233).

When justice becomes the only measure of morality, a large number of people will be dismissed in their moral thinking. It is therefore vital that both the perspectives be included in moral thinking in order for both perspectives to be accommodated. Gilligan and Attanucci (1988a:235) argued that an awareness of two distinct moral orientations “highlight the issue of interpretation”. Different people reach a moral conclusion in different ways. Justice and care ought not to be seen as polar opposites or even mirror images of each other, in the same way that men and women are not polar opposites when it comes to morality (Gilligan & Attanucci 1988b:452). They are, however, different, but that does not

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33 Held (1995:128) confirmed this by saying that there are numerous arguments among feminist scholars that justice and care, with their different values and characteristics, differing interpretations of moral formation, and their moral concerns are infinitely important in moral discussions. She acknowledged that there are those who disagree with this sentiments, but confirms that numerous others agree with her on this point (Held 1995:128).

34 Gilligan & Attanucci (1988:232), after doing empirical research with men and women, have found that both men and women display justice and care in their thinking when it comes to moral dilemmas in real life. What tends to happen, however, is that people tend to focus on either justice or care in their approach to moral dilemmas (Gilligan & Attanucci 1988:232). They have found that despite the fact that both genders have the ability to reason with both the justice and care orientation, the justice orientation is often found in male moral thinking, while the care orientation is often found in female moral thinking (Gilligan & Attanucci 1988:232).

35 Gilligan (1987:19) explained justice and care to be like the ambiguous drawing, often seen in psychology, of the young women who is simultaneously an old women, or the image that can be a vase of different faces. She explains that the image can initially only be seen as one of the two images, but after it becomes clear that there are two images, a person will be able to see both, but may be more inclined to see the one than the other. In the same way there are different ways of approaching morality. Justice and care, therefore, are not polar opposites, but rather two ways of approaching the same moral problem.
mean that they are in constant conflict. Care ought not to be seen as unjust, or justice as uncaring (Gilligan & Attanucci 1988b:452). The different voice merely calls for the recognition that there is another way of thinking about morality and the self (Gilligan & Attanucci 1988b:455). It understands moral development not only in terms of the separation of the self from morality, but that there are also people who regard themselves as people who are inseparably part of social structures and relationships, thereby influencing their understanding of morality (Gilligan & Attanucci 1988b:455). There should therefore be distinguished between the two perspectives, but it should not to be seen as two conflicting perspectives. In distinguishing between these two perspectives, Gilligan essentially called for the whole moral domain, and every aspect thereof, to be re-evaluated in order to include the additional approach of the ethics of care; a call that would have tremendous ramifications for morality and everything it entails.

2.2 Morality and a Different Voice

Shortly after Carol Gilligan had written *In a Different Voice* in 1982, a lot of questions arose concerning ideas and themes that were addressed in the book. People were suddenly curious about the justice-care debate, about the differing voices, and about the gender differences in development. Gilligan, therefore, set out to publish a book called *Mapping the Moral Domain* (1988) that is concerned with the variety of differences found within the moral sphere of life. It is a collection of essays written by Gilligan and her colleagues, who used *In a Different Voice* (1982) as the basis of their argument. Gilligan (1988:i), in the preface of *Mapping the Moral Domain* (1988), recalled an occasion where a woman had sent her a letter to tell of an incident where boys and girls had been asked to write essays on how to improve their city. According to this woman’s story, boys and girls had written completely different ideas on what improvement meant for them; where

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36 Botes (2000:1074) echoes this belief, also in a medical context. She argues that both “the fair and equitable treatment of all people (from the ethics of justice) and the holistic, contextual and need-centred nature of such treatment (from the ethics of care), ought to be retained in the integrated application of the ethics of justice and the ethics of care” (Botes 2000:1074).
the boys wrote about urban renewal by means of the construction of new parks, building, and restoration of existing buildings and streets, the girls perspective on improvement included ideas on strengthening relations between people by means of responding to needs and helping people where it was needed (Gilligan 1988:i). Gilligan (1988:i) described these differences that were picked up as “anecdotal” (Gilligan 1988:i) or “naturalistic” (Gilligan 1988:i), and said that they posed some questions that were left to be answered. These questions were concerned with the interpretations of the difference, or what to make of these different notions that were suddenly being noted (Gilligan 1988:i). She further wondered why it was that the same words could have differing meanings to different people, and which interpretation was to be considered the ‘right’ one (Gilligan 1988:i). As a result of this, it was needed to further explore the concepts of “self”, ‘relationship’, ‘morality’, and ‘development’ (Gilligan 1988:ii). It was also necessary to look at the two moral theories that were originally addressed in In a Different Voice, known as the ethics of justice and the ethics of care, as a result of the fact that there were suddenly two voices being heard when people spoke about moral problems (Gilligan 1988:ii).

Mapping the Moral Domain (1988) was, therefore, an attempt to address these various concepts that needed exploring as a result of the important questions that were suddenly being asked after the appearance of In a Different Voice (1982). The collection of essays found in Mapping the Moral Domain (1988) was categorised in one of two parts of the book. The essays that make up the first part attempted to determine the different voices of justice and care in an effort to outline new boundaries or coordinates for a new theoretical framework (Gilligan 1988:iii). Essentially, part one attempted to look at justice and care as the differing ways of men and women when it comes to human development, moral reasoning, and moral emotions (Gilligan 1988:iv). The collection of essays in the second part of the book dealt with how the new approach of the different voices of justice and care can help the understanding of development in adolescence and adulthood (Gilligan 1988:iv). Gilligan (1988:v) explained that, ultimately, Mapping the Moral
Domain (1988) was an attempt to conclude whether this contribution of women’s thinking, within various contexts, was indeed a different voice with regards to the understanding of relationship and the experience of the self, thereby changing the moral domain and the mapping thereof. If this statement was to be considered accurate, the concepts of self, relationship, and the connection between them would have had to be looked at in more detail in order for a new framework of moral theory to be created, one which not only considered justice to be a valid moral theory, but also care. Mapping the Moral Domain (1988) had this very notion as a focal point. The idea of this section is, therefore, to look at how the concept of morality was influenced and changed after Gilligan wrote In a Different Voice (1982), thereby reflecting on the ground-breaking work that Gilligan has done.

2.2.1 New Images of Self in Relationship

The first notion that needed to be looked at was how the work of Gilligan about the ethics of care influenced the way people perceived themselves. After her book had appeared, a new idea of the perception of the self was portrayed. It was a self that was no longer bound to the individualistic, autonomous, independent realms, but a self that was exposed to relationships, a self that was concerned with the livelihood of the other, it was a self in relationship, and therefore needed to be looked at from this new perspective. Tronto (1991:376), whose work will be discussed in greater detail later, saw Gilligan’s idea of “self in relationship” as a new paradigm in moral development. Gilligan (1988:3) explained something of the overwhelming dichotomy that was suddenly in need of being investigated by

37 Gilligan addressed this in short by saying: “The inclusion of this voice changes the map of the moral domain. Listening to girls and women, we have come to listen differently to boys and men. And we have come to think differently about human nature and the human condition, and in turn, about psychology and education, disciplines devoted to understanding and improving human life” (Gilligan 1988:v).

38 This, by no means, implies that Gilligan was the first person ever to write about relationality, but that her work was viewed as a fresh perspective with new possibilities for the self, relationality, and a relational voice that demanded to be heard in a context where autonomy seemed to be the more dominant approach between the two approaches.
using the example of Aeneas who was torn between the two images of himself that he was suddenly facing; one where he is at the same time both separated and connected to others by being caught up in a relationship. Gilligan (1988:4) noted that the two images of self that were recognised by Aeneas were in actual fact two ways of looking at responsibility that were completely conflicting. She elaborated on what she meant when she spoke of the two meanings of responsibility by stating that the one has to do with commitment to obligations whilst the other has to do with responsiveness within relationships (Gilligan 1988:4). She also stressed the importance of morality in the concept of self in relationship by saying that moral judgments mirror the social understanding and value of self-evaluation (Gilligan 1988:4).

Tronto (1991:377) reiterated the importance of the alternative approach to morality as a result of the fact that it brought with it an alternative approach to the morality of responsibility, which enriches the self in relationship. Throughout her work on morality, Gilligan (1988:4) chose to distinguish between two moral predispositions when it comes to human morality, the one being a predisposition toward justice and the other being a predisposition toward care. She further explained that there is a recurrence of two narratives in morality in the human experience that can be traced back to the relationship between the parent and the child, which has to do with the experience of inequality and of attachment (Gilligan 1988:5). Tronto (1991:377) identified these two narratives as Gilligan’s way of having moved toward the idea that the ethics of justice and the ethics of care are the two foundational moralities that already appear during the early stages of human development due to the fact that all children experience inequality and attachment. Lyons (1988:21) explained that she also found, in her

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39 Gilligan (1988:3) told the story of Aeneas, as part of book 6 of the Aeneid, who had travelled to the underworld in order to find his father, but in the process stumbled upon the dead Dido, a previous lover whom he had left. In his encounter with Dido, he is suddenly faced by being simultaneously connected and detached – he was connected to her, but had to let her go, because he had responsibilities which asked of him to be detached (Gilligan 1988:3). In the process he recognises something of both his separation and connection with other.
own research, that people had two contrasting views on what morality entails; one where morality is dominated by reason and a reliance on what is known to be right and wrong, and another where morality is essentially centred around the notion of being sensitive in an attempt not to offend or negatively affect other people. She, therefore, also pointed out that morality had two distinctive ways of being approached (Lyons 1988:21).

Gilligan (1988:6) noted that individualism, which had been the normative ideal of morality before a relational ethics of care was introduced, had been defined by autonomy, which, in turn, led to a particular emphasis being placed on detachment. Gilligan (1988:6) purposely attempted to create a tension between this individuation and interconnectedness in order to prove a point concerning morality and the self. What she did, was to use the connection between detachment and dispassion in order to reveal the problem that she was intending to solve by using a love story once forgotten to shine a light upon the self in relationship (Gilligan 1988:6). She claimed that it is not entirely denied that the early childhood engagement with others is observed, but said that this capacity had been underrepresented, partly as a result of the fact that it is part of what she calls a “still image of relationship” when it comes to the concept of self (Gilligan 1988:6). She further stated that although psychologists, at that point, had often placed the self in the context of relationships, it was still being defined in terms of

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40 Nona Plessner Lyons was a lecturer on Education at Harvard Graduate School of Education in Cambridge Massachusetts.

41 Lyons (1988:23) drew on the work of Iris Murdoch who echoed something of this notion of Gilligan in believing that love is one of the central parts of human life and morality.

42 Gilligan (1988:7) drew upon the work of well-known scholars like George Herbert Mead and his work on the self known through other’s reflection, Cooley’s work on the “looking-glass self”, and Erikson’s focus on the discovery of the self through other’s recognition. She also drew upon the fascination with the process of “mirroring” in psychological circles (Gilligan 1988:7). She used these perspectives in order to show the relational context of in the formation of identities which had been portrayed in the past (Gilligan 1988:7). Gilligan (1988:7) explained that even though these perceptions of relationship, it was rather an image of the “lifelessness in this portrayal of relationships”. “… the language of relationships is drained of motion and, thus, becomes lifeless” (Gilligan 1988:7).
separation and detachment (Gilligan 1988:7). Interestingly, when the self was defined according to the experience of women, it was seen to be a failure of a definition of the self (Gilligan 1988:7). This differing, “failed” attempt at defining the self was a self through the experience of connection and interaction as opposed to merely a lifeless reflection of the self (Gilligan 1988:7). Gilligan (1988:7) saw how differing views and definitions of the self led to differing views on moral issues, which in turn again led to differing views on what it means to be responsible.

It was clear that both the justice approach to morality and the care approach to morality were possible ways of looking at responsibility. In asking various participants in a study what responsibility meant to them, Gilligan (1988:7) distinguished between the two distinctive approaches. For the one participant, responsibility was a contractual obligation and a commitment of sticking to what had been promised, while responsibility to another participant was to create awareness of the other and acting in a way that would be in the best interest of all the parties involved (Gilligan 1988:7).\(^43\) These differing voices helped Gilligan (1988:8) to clearly distinguish between two categories within morality and the self. She explained how there were definitely two reliable voices in all of her tests, one voice speaking in terms of connection, relatedness, interconnectedness, not wanting to hurt people, caring for others, and responding to their needs, while the other voice spoke in terms of rights, individuality, rules, justice, and reciprocity (Gilligan 1988:8). The voice of justice and the voice of care had differing ways of perceiving morality, each with their own set of principles. Gilligan (1998:8) consequently explained that the principles of justice and autonomy held that the

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\(^43\) Interestingly enough, both of these perspectives were the experience of young women (Gilligan 1988:8). This is an important contribution in the gender debate around the ethics of care, for not all women are care orientated, while, similarly, not all boys are justice orientated when it comes to morality. It was never Gilligan’s intention to create a gender division, but rather to distinguish and recognise two distinctive approaches to morality. She explains that one voice would be predominant, and even though it was never specific to a gender, it was related to gender, which said something about the differences perceived in moral orientation and the differing ways in which the self was seen in relationship (Gilligan 1988:8).
individual should be separate and detached from other and when if they were to be in relationship, that it would be some kind of contractual agreement of sorts, and in a lot of cases it would be hierarchical. The principles connected to care and relationship, viewed the self in relation to other as interconnected, interrelated, and relational, and further perceived relationships as being a network concerned with attention and the appropriate response (Gilligan 1988:8). For Gilligan (1988:8), this meant that the world was being seen, lived, and defined according to two distinctive moral voices. She used the example of the ambiguous figure, which, at the same time, can be perceived as both a vase or as two faces, to explain the perception of the two view on morality and the self (Gilligan 1998:8). Just like the one image gives way to the other in the case of the vase and the faces, the same way the one image of the self can temporarily give way to the other (Gilligan 1988:9).

Gilligan (1988:9) analysed the depiction of love in modern psychology and the work of various scholars in an attempt to look at the self in relation. She drew upon the work of Ian Suttie, who felt that science was at a “particular disadvantage in dealing with the topic of human ‘attachments’” and that love had always been overlooked as an illusion or shoved to the side as a distraction (Gilligan 1988:9). Suttie therefore made it his mission to include love within his

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44 Ruddick (1987:240) explained that the two distinctive moral voices are, at its core, “identified, not by gender, but by cognitive modality, moral theme, and a conception of self” (Ruddick 1987:240).

45 An example that helped to understand this is one where a boy and a girl who are playing together wants to play different games; the girl wants to play next-door neighbours and the boy wants to play pirates (Gilligan 1988:9). By realising that they cannot play both games at the same time, a compromise is made and they play next-door neighbour with the one neighbour being a pirate (Gilligan 1988:9). By doing this, Gilligan (1988:9) noted that they chose the inclusive solution and transformed both games; the neighbour games was enriched by having a next-door neighbour who is a pirate, and the pirate game had been transformed by placing the pirate within a neighbourhood. In the process, both identities and the equality of both parties are protected in an inclusive manner through experiencing relationship (Gilligan 1988:9). In finding solutions to a problem, there can be a variety of approaches, and each of those involve a differing way of seeing the self in relationship, each of which shows differing ways of connecting to the other (Gilligan 1988:9).

46 Ian Suttie was a twentieth century British Psychologist. He wrote the book *The Origins of Love and Hate* which was published a shortly after his death in 1935. He was, at times, very critical of Freud’s work.
workings in psychology, for he believed love to be a “state of active, harmonious interplay” and something that from its origins represented the responding nature in relationships as opposed to the solitude and seclusion, and the utter distress that is experienced with it at infancy (Gilligan 1988:10). This importance brought to the fore by Suttie was later absorbed and embraced by John Bowlby in his observation of children and their dealing with loss that opened for him a way of observing relationship (Gilligan 1988:10). Gilligan (1988:10) explained that she saw how children grieved the loss of loved ones and thereby noticed an aptitude to love that was previously unfamiliar, an aptitude that led to the understanding of human development to be altered in order for it to include children’s capacity to love.

By looking at how care was given and how it was received, Bowlby picked up on a connectedness that had previously gone unseen and thereby neglected, and challenged psychologists on their eagerness to place great value on the importance and necessity of separation and individuality by describing it as the norm for healthy development in children (Gilligan 1988:10). His main concern, therefore, was the sustenance of the aptitude for love amidst the harsh reality of detachment and separation when loss and grievance is experienced (Gilligan 1988:10). For Bowlby, the distressing separation and detachment that was experienced during loss, was the breaking apart of a relationship (Gilligan 1988:10). Rather than seeing separation and detachment as the norm, Bowlby saw the process of mourning as a traumatic separation or a hole which had to be

47 John Bowlby was a British Psychoanalyst in the mid- to late twentieth century. He has made contributions to the study of childhood development and is known for his work in attachment theory.

48 Bowlby, Gilligan (1988:10) explained, used the method of the “magnification of pathology” to show what had previously been hidden, thereby showing when loss was exposed and experienced, the underlying tones of connection was brought to the fore.

49 Bowlby built this notion upon the Freud’s idea that the psyche was fractured during neurotic symptom formation (Gilligan 1988:10).
fixed (Gilligan 1988:10). This new language of relationship, as it was defined by Bowlby, helped Gilligan in her definition of an image of self in relationship. It helped her to grasp the notion of humans who are constantly engaging in interplay with one another, constantly seeking for attachment and care in order to sustain human bonds which had been formed (Gilligan 1988:11).

The view in civilisation of detaching from the other to become independent is one that was, according to Freud, also prevalent during adolescence when an adolescent had to detach from their parent in a painful manner in order to become independent (Gilligan 1988:13). Freud viewed this as one of the most noteworthy and also one of the most essential transitions that a pubescent person will ever go through, as a result of the fact that it marked the detachment of an old generation and the beginning of a new generation that brings with it progress in civilisation (Gilligan 1988:13). It is upon this theory that the importance of detachment during puberty rests. Gilligan (1988:13) explained that the problems adolescents face during the course of their development was automatically considered to be caused by their struggle with separation. Freud believed that everyone eventually passes through this phase where they have to detach and separate from their parent’s authority, but that some, however, cannot seem to detach themselves, thereby living under the authority of their parents for the rest of their lives (Gilligan 1988:13). This failure to separate from the authority of the parents was, as a result, seen as a failure in development and according to Freud, this mostly happened to female adolescents (Gilligan 1988:13).

Gilligan (1988:13), however, believed that there was an alternative reason as to why girls tended not to detach themselves as frequently as boys. She believed that the resistance that was seen in girls to detach had to do with the ethical

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50 Gilligan (1988:10-11) gave an interesting account of Freud’s idea of a failure to detach during the process of mourning; He believed that the person living with depression would, rather than work through the reality of the loss of the irrecoverable object, rebel against reality by convincing themselves that the irretrievable object cannot, in fact, be gone. The person with depression would then, rather than detaching themselves from the other, choose to become the other and detach from themselves (Gilligan 1988:11).
dilemma that was being concealed by a normative account of development that tended to exclude the development of girls (Gilligan 1988:13). What may have been the problem for girls in disconnecting was that they experienced an ethical dilemma in finding an “inclusive solution to the problem of conflicting loyalties” (Gilligan 1988:13). In other words, girls tended to have a more difficult route to detach, because they had developed a loyalty in their relationship with their parents and found it to be an ethical dilemma to break that loyalty merely because society expects it of them. Therefore, instead of having problems detaching, girls may have actively resisted detachment in an attempt to be loyal. Gilligan (1988:14) saw this as another way of defining the self in relationship that would have the potential to lead to a different view of progress within civilisation.

Gilligan (1988:14) pointed out that attachment, in the way it was perceived in society, was automatically connected to inequality, whereas development was connected to separation. The consequence of this was that story of love was perceived in a manner that made it a story of power and authority (Gilligan 1988:14). Gilligan’s mission was to change this by “remapping the development across two dimensions of relationship” and thereby eradicating the notion that tied attachment or connection with others in a relational manner with inequality (Gilligan 1988:14). She explained the two lines as the one where development happens from childhood and attachment, which develops to an eventual detachment during adolescence or another line, where development similarly starts off with childhood and attachment, but in this case, the adolescent does not detach or disconnect from relationships, but grows in the capacity to love and live relationally (Gilligan 1988:14). For Gilligan (1988:14), the idea of a two-fold dimension helped to prevent issues concerning oppression and separation, for it made space for both options to be included with the parameters of development. The problem that she encountered, however, was that there was an uncertainty and an ethical problem concerning the two-fold meaning of the word “dependence”, which needed to be addressed (Gilligan 1988:14).
Dependence, according to Gilligan (1988:14), was to be understood in terms of connectedness, but could at the same time both lead to individuality or to segregation. She claimed that it would be problematic to merely oppose dependence to independence, because that would mean that any uncertainty regarding relationship would be illuminated, thereby leaving independence as the norm for power and success, while attachment or relationship is left to be regarded as a hindrance to progress and growth of an individualistic, autonomous person (Gilligan 1988:14). When they were asked the question of what dependence meant to them, adolescent girls responded with expressions like “to be there”, “to help”, “to talk to”, and “to listen” (Gilligan 1988:15).

Gilligan (1988:15) analysed this as being a way of placing dependence in line with being able to understand a certain situation, to be able to comfort each other, or to give love. What was notable was that the “dependence” that was being described was in no way the dependence that is sometimes perceived in a negative away. This dependence showed something of a relational character as opposed to merely being attached like some kind of parasite to its host. Gilligan (1988:15) explained that this idea of dependence showed something of “the human capacity to move others and to be moved by them”. It meant being more than just being a burden, or helpless, or unable to take care of the self (Gilligan, 1988:15). For Gilligan (1988:15), this form of dependence showed something of the recognition of the other, of the interconnectedness between humans, and the ability to take care of each other in such a way that it empowers not only the self, but also the other without the one oppressing the other. She further highlighted that to care as an activity in this form, had taken up its rightful place within the moral domain by showing interest in the needs and wants of others without ignoring them (Gilligan 1988:15).

Gilligan (1988:15) argued that as soon as it becomes clear that a person is more than just reliable, but loveable, it changes something within the self to become more willing to care for others, thereby interpreting dependence as more than
merely the inability to individualise the self to the autonomous, but rather draws the self into a position to become more loving.

Gilligan (1988:15) claimed that the identity of the new image of the self, where the self is perceived in terms of relationship, is formed by having discourse with others rather than simply mirroring, thereby forming an ability to speak and developing personal views and beliefs by interacting with the other. A problem that often led to the inability to develop this identity properly is always present in the silencing of relational voices. Gilligan (1988:17) mentioned how silence and being silenced often pointed to the moral dimension of listening, especially the battle for women to be heard and their struggle to successfully beat the enforced silencing. Although silence can sometimes be perceived as a way of protecting integrity in a situation of carelessness, Gilligan (1988:17) noted the importance of being willing to speak up, even if it meant disagreeing, in order to maintain relationships and also to be able to distinguish between good and bad relationships.51

The resistance to separate in the girls who were part of her study, helped Gilligan (1988:18) to realise that they were challenging a longstanding norm that being human was associated with being a male, while being caring meant sacrificing the self. This opened the door for love to join the side of the alternative approach to being autonomous and helped to form a morality where it is possible for the self to be an individual and still maintain a relationship with the other (Gilligan 1988:18). Gilligan (1988:18) concluded by saying that when it comes to the moral domain, it should be considered that there are thus two possible ways in which to define what is believed to be the self; one where the self detaches from the other, and one that stays attached and in relation with the other. What was once

51 Gilligan (1988:17) explained how one adolescent girl expressed the need to be able to more easily disagree with her mother in order to better their relationship and further expressing the need to interact with others instead of becoming what the imagine her to be. By expressing this need, she simultaneously recognised that there was a possibility of becoming what people expect of her to become, and then realised that if she resisted it would leave her feeling empty in her connection with other people, thereby rendering attachment impossible (Gilligan 1988:17).
perceived as a failure in development, a failure of detaching, has now become and additional perspective to moral development. For Gilligan (1988:18), the “new image of self in relationship opens the way to a new understanding of morality and love”.52

Realising that Gilligan had recognised two differing moral orientations, justice and care53, Lyons set out to test these findings by using a systematic-empirical study (1988:23). She explained that she wanted to investigate the developmental patterns of a morality of care as a result of the fact that Kohlberg had neglected to develop a scheme that included a relational approach wherein relationships are central to the concept of morality (Lyons 1988:24). In analysing the data received during this study, Lyons (1988:24) managed to confirm and elaborate on some of Gilligan’s ideas. Some of the results indicated that when men and women of the tested groups faced a situation of moral conflict in real life, they responded by calling upon both the justice approach and the care approach, but that they would mainly focus on one of the two approaches (Lyons 1988:39).54 Lyons (1988:40) stressed the importance that the justice and rights approach to morality is not the only approach and that people use both the justice and care approaches when they are trying to solve moral conflicts, with one being more leading than the other. She also said that it cannot be confirmed that men will

52 Lyons (1988:22) mentioned that Iris Murdoch, British novelist and philosopher, believed that two issues should be addressed when it comes to the images of the self; one being that the self should not be limited to the rational or individualistic approach, and the other being that the concept of love ought to be regarded as something which is central with regards to people and morality. By suggesting as much, she reject the notion by Kant that the image of the self can only be pure if it is rational (Lyons 1988:22).

53 Carol Gilligan and Jane Attanucci (1988:74) used the work of Lyons to define and to show the difference between a morality of justice and a morality of care in terms of relationship; the morality of justice was defined as the relationship between detached individuals based on their obligation or their duty to be in relationship whereas the morality of care was defined as the relationship between connected individuals due based on a response to the other.

54 Lyons (1988:39) explained that the data showed that the choices between justice and care can be related to gender, but is not necessarily defined by gender or constricted to gender. This means that both genders are able to think in terms of justice and care, but that when a decision has to be made, the individual will probably lean towards one approach more than they will to the other.
always use the justice approach and women will always use the care approach because of the fact that both men and women made use of both of these approaches (Lyons 1988:40). When the participants were asked how they would define themselves to themselves, the majority of women defined themselves in terms of connectedness, while the majority of men defined themselves in terms of separateness (Lyons 1988:41). There were, at the same time, men and women who defined themselves both in terms of connectedness and separateness, and then there were those who used no relational component whatsoever (Lyons 1988:41).55

The implications of the results of the data gathered were important for a variety of reasons. It meant that the self in relationship was not regarded as a failure in human development, as would have been the case if Kohlberg’s scale was still the norm. It also meant that the self in relationship was not merely a stage someone goes through or phase on a scale, but it is an actual orientation regarding moral decision-making (Lyons 1988:42). Lyons (1988:42) further noted that the self in connection was also not limited to a gender, for it was present in both male and female participants, even though it was more prominent with women during testing. The testing had clearly shown the two differing perspectives when it comes to morality. She asked that social and cognitive developmental theories be reconsidered (Lyons 1988:43). Lyons (1988:43) stressed the importance of the way in which people approach conflicts within relationships due to the change in the way people spoke about morality, for it became clear that people had different ways of dealing with moral problems rather than simply dealing with it from a justice and rights perspective. It was also important to change the approach in psychological settings so that the

55 63% of women defined themselves in terms of connectedness; 12% of women defined themselves in terms of separateness; 6% of women defines themselves as equally connected and separate; 19% of women used no relational component at all (Lyons 1988:41). 0% of men defined themselves in terms of connectedness; 79% of men defined themselves in terms of separateness; 7% of men defined themselves equal in terms of connectedness and separateness; 14% of men used no relational compound in their definition (Lyons 1988:41).
counselling and research not only happened from the justice perspective, but also from a relational perspective (Lyons 1988:43). Lyons (1988:43) called this the “move from a psychology of the individual to a psychology of relationships”. It is, thus, clear that this new image of the self in relationship had clear implications when it comes to morality and the way of dealing with moral issues.

After Gilligan identified two moral orientations and Lyons explained the implications of the two orientations with data received from a systematic-empirical study, Kay Johnston, set out to investigate whether men and women are able to comprehend and use both moral orientations (Johnston 1988:50).56 Johnston (1988:50) aimed to investigate whether a person would be able to approach a moral situation from both moral orientations if they were given a chance, even though they may have spontaneously chosen one of the two moral orientations at first. She did this by doing a study with adolescents and their response to moral dilemmas in fables (Johnston 1988:50).57 Johnston (1988:52) asked the participants in the study two questions; the first question was, “What is the problem?”, and the second question was, “How would you solve it?” The interviewer would then ask varying contextual question and made suggestions in order to see whether participants would stick to their original answer as the best possible answer (Johnston 1988:52). She explained that there were two solutions to each question where the one was seen as the “spontaneous” answer, and the other was seen as the “best” answer (Johnston 1988:52). The spontaneous answer was the one that was initially given by the participant, whereas the best

56 Kay Johnston, at the time of writing this article, was an assistant professor of Education at Colgate University in Hamilton, New York, and also a research associate at Harvard Graduate School of Education in Massachusetts.

57 Johnston (1988:51) presented three reasons why she used fables instead of real life moral dilemmas; It, firstly, offered a constant, unchangeable context to all of the participants, thereby levelling the playing field; It, secondly, helped the participants not to feel the pressure of a real life dilemma, thereby given them the freedom and confidence to freely participate in an open discussion; It, thirdly, asked of the participant to both identify the moral problem and then asked the participant to solve the moral problem.
answer was the solution to the problem that the participant eventually deemed the best possible solution to the problem (Johnston, 1988:52).

After doing extensive testing and documenting the relevant data with regard to the two moral orientations identified by Gilligan and Kohlberg respectively, Johnston (1988:60) found that age was not necessarily connected to the moral orientation that was chosen to be the best, but that gender was somehow connected to the choice that was made by adolescents. She further noted that it was possible for boys and girls, who were at least eleven years of age, to switch between the two moral orientations when they were asked whether it was possible to solve the moral issue in any other way, thereby showing that at this age they already had the ability to distinguish between the rights and regulations orientation and the care orientation (Johnston 1988:60). For Johnston (1988:60), this meant that they not only had the ability to distinguish between the orientations, but also the ability to choose a favoured orientation over and above the other. Johnston (1988:61) found it interesting that even though boys and girls had the ability to recognise both orientations, boys would more often stick to the rights orientation, while girls had no problem to fluctuate between the two orientations. This confirmed Gilligan’s concern and criticism about Kohlberg’s work that did not include results from both boys and girls, consequently only reflecting one moral orientation (Johnston 1988:61). Johnston (1988:61), like Gilligan, therefore believed that if girls were to have been included in the original studies, a more completed and well-rounded view of morality would have been presented.

The implications of Johnston’s (1988) further studies on Gilligan’s notion of two moral orientations were of great importance. Whereas there used to be only one hierarchical way of solving moral problems as suggested by Kohlberg, Johnston (1988:66), with her data gathered in the fable studies, clearly confirmed Gilligan’s

58 The majority of girls choose both the rights- and the care orientation more frequently, while boys tended to stick to the rights orientation on a more frequent basis, thereby indicating that girls tended to use the rights orientation more often than the boys chose the care orientation (Johnston 1988:61).
notion of two moral orientations. She also suggested that the moral orientation that is chosen at first during problem-solving may be linked to gender (Johnston, 1988:67). Instead of suggesting that men and women are bound to certain ways of thinking in moral situations according to their gender, Johnston (1988:68) stressed that she would rather suggest that it be considered two separate moral orientations used by both men and women, building on Gilligan's theory that both men and women have the ability to connect and separate. This also enriched the new image of the self in that the self was no longer merely rated and judged according to the justice perspective and showed that all humans are capable of embodying both the justice and care orientation. Johnston (1988:68), in her study, came to the conclusion that there is, as Gilligan suggested, indeed a gender difference when it comes to moral reasoning. She further succeeded in pointing out that both girls and boys can use both moral orientations and argued that the care orientation ought to be studied and developed in greater detail (Johnston 1988:69). She stressed the fact that it would be impossible to speak adequately about morality if one of these two moral orientations were to be omitted (Johnston 1988:69), thereby confirming the importance of the inclusion of the ethics of care in the moral domain.

Gilligan and Attanucci (1988:82), in their study of the two moral orientations, confirmed that adolescents and adults also had the ability to use both the justice and care perspective when they had to solve real-life moral dilemmas, although they tended to choose one orientation above the other, like the children in

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59 It is important to take the gender roles that were expected of males and females during that period of time into consideration. Someone like Joan Tronto (1987) and other scholars may argue that gender roles are only obvious due to the fact that the patriarchal society has forced women into thinking and acting in a certain way. The role of gender and morality, and whether it is a biological fact or social construct to choose a certain moral orientation, should never overshadow the true importance in the matter: the fact that there is more than one normative, generally accepted approach when it comes to moral problem-solving.

60 Joan Tronto is one of many scholars who set out to develop the care orientation in more detail within her own academic context of political science. Other academic disciplines where the care orientation has been further developed include education, health care, psychology, and theology, among others.
Johnston’s (1988) studies. While Kohlberg suggested that women are more often than not unable to reach mature moral thinking according to his scale of moral development, Gilligan and Attanucci (1988:82) found that both moral orientations were valid in moral thinking and would be present in mature moral thinking. The reason why women scored lower on Kohlberg’s justice oriented scale was because the care perspective did not coincide with detachment (Attanucci & Gilligan 1988:82), thereby restricting care orientated people to a lower rank on the scale of moral development. Gilligan and Attanucci (1988:82) explained that when the care perspective was applied to the justice orientated model for moral development, it complicated the interpretation and led to odd results; it was for this very reason that Piaget decided to only study men, for it illuminated the chance of having to interpret difficult and irregular results (Attanucci & Gilligan 1988:82-83).

Attanucci and Gilligan (1988:83) witnessed the way in which women voiced their concerns about moral issues in a caring manner, how it impacted the moral domain, and the way moral judgments of men and women were interpreted. They also noted the importance of studying the moral approaches of people who tended to use both the justice and care orientations in equal amounts (Attanucci & Gilligan 1988:83). In general, the care perspective seemed to have changed the moral domain to such an extent that people needed to find a new way in which to define themselves and their identities. For Gilligan and Attanucci (1988:84), it was important that the self be defined and understood according to the preferred moral orientation. No longer were people to be measured exclusively according to the justice orientation. The impact of identifying a second moral orientation had an immense influence on how people would henceforth measure

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61 Jane Attanucci, at the time of writing this article, was a college professor in education at Harvard Graduate School of Education in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

62 Gilligan and Attanucci (1988:84) explained that the preference of an orientation may influence a person’s identity or the ways in which they tend to define themselves, particularly when their thoughts and ways of tending to moral problems move into the “post-conventional” way of thinking.
their moral development and moral approach. This also meant that people could develop an alternative moral approach to the approach they would usually apply in a moral situation (Attanucci & Gilligan 1988:84). Gilligan and Attanucci (1988:85) therefore explained that the acceptance of care as a moral orientation in the moral domain would be the responsible thing to do, for if one of the two orientations were to be left unattended to, the imbalance in orientation would lead to errors being made when it comes to moral insights.\(^{63}\)

When Gilligan and Wiggins (1988:114) investigated the origins of morality within early childhood relationships, they identified two dimensions of relationships; the one dimension was that of inequality, while the other is that of attachment or connectedness through love.\(^{64}\) Children who experienced inequality did so as soon as they realised that their adult parents, or older people in general, were bigger than they are and that these people had far more skills and aptitudes than they did (Gilligan & Wiggins 1988:114). Gilligan and Wiggins (1988:114) noted that children in these situations felt powerless and vulnerable and that these feelings were attached to them being defenceless and dependent on the people in the position of power. As a result of this feeling of inequality and powerlessness, children attempt to grow into adults who are equal and independent, and therefore more focused on justice during the process of development (Gilligan & Wiggins 1988:114).

At the same time, however, children also experience attachment and an awareness of the self in relationship with other people (Gilligan & Wiggins 1988:114). Children have the capability of living in relationships with the people who are around them and are subsequently influenced by these people and influence the people in return (Gilligan & Wiggins 1988:114). Gilligan and Wiggins

\(^{63}\) Gilligan and Wiggins (1988:114) drew upon the work of Piaget to state that “apart from our relationships with other people... there would be no moral necessity”, thereby claiming that any moral judgment is built upon a relational foundation.

\(^{64}\) Grant Wiggins, at the time of writing this article, was the director of research at the Coalition of Essential Schools at Brown University in Providence, Rhode Island.
(1988:114) explained how children are capable of showing love to the people in their lives, that they yearn to be with them, and how they are saddened when people leave. Children are able to care for people in the same way that they are able to recognise when other people are caring or hurting others (Gilligan & Wiggins 1988:114-115). Just like the feelings of inequality have an effect on the development of children, so too the feelings of being connected and in relationship have an effect on the development of children and how they ought to act towards other people (Gilligan & Wiggins 1988:115). The difference, however, is that the moral effects of the self in relationship in morality have often gone unnoticed in parts of Western history because of the fact that connectedness and relationships had often not been viewed as an important part of childhood development as opposed to the great appreciation and encouragement children receive to become individualistic and detached (Gilligan & Wiggins 1988:115).

In identifying both feelings of inequality and attachment in children, Gilligan and Wiggins (1988:115) found a dual basis for moral development with inequality linked to the justice orientation and attachment linked to the care orientation. Children have the ability to identify at a very young age that there are moral guidelines in life and consequently understand that the justice orientation will protect them in matters where an unequal opportunity arises, and that the care orientation will protect them in a situation where separation or detachment is threatening (Gilligan & Wiggins 1988:115). Gilligan and Wiggins (1988:115) claimed that children, in their moral development, will be guided by the moral rules of not being treated in an unequal manner and not turning away when

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65 This does not, however, mean that it has never been considered in history, but that it didn’t seem to have a big impact on childhood development as had individualism. It is also important to note that this view is for the most part based on the Western and American view of morality, and not taking the African context, with a more relational orientation, into consideration. An African view would challenge these notions.

66 Gilligan and Wiggins (1988:115) noted that children, especially children in the United States, would call for the justice orientation in their exclamation “It is not fair”, or “You have no right”, while they would call for the care orientation in their exclamation “I do not care”, or “I do not love you anymore”.

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another person is in need of assistance.\textsuperscript{67} They explained that there is often an ethical uncertainty that may come with the realisation that there is more than one moral orientation (Gilligan & Wiggins 1988:117). A child may, for instance, be torn between the idea of fairness while writing a test, or whether to help another child who is struggling to write the test, or a person may be torn between being loyal to their own group and relationships within that group, and their loyalty to the great society and its values of freedom and equality for all (Gilligan & Wiggins 1988:117).\textsuperscript{68}

It was further important for Gilligan and Wiggins (1988:119) that their findings be tested in various contexts where the socio-economic, educational, and cultural circumstances were different and where the moral problems would be different to that of the first world North American context in which they were working. They emphasised that the two moral perspectives clearly showed that the moral domain could not go unchanged (Gilligan & Wiggins 1988:119) and that the new self in relationship was no longer to be measured solely on Kohlberg's scale of moral development. They also mentioned that it is important to realise that the detachment, which is ranked of high value in the justice orientation and indicate moral maturity, can at the same time be a threat to the moral framework of care that highly values connectedness with others (Gilligan & Wiggins 1988:120). When it came to the self in relation to the other, they suggested a more unsolidified perception of the self in relation, one that is connected to “the growth

\textsuperscript{67} When it comes to gender and moral orientations, Gilligan and Wiggins (1988:116) again stressed the importance of not implying that one gender is more morally mature than the other or that the orientation that is chosen is determined by the biology of the person. It merely points to the fact that there is more than one moral orientation when it comes to morality (Gilligan & Wiggins 1988:116). They did, however, confirm that biological sex, the psychology connected to gender, and the norms and values that are expected of typical males and females in society, would have an influence on the outcome of moral development (Gilligan & Wiggins 1988:116).

\textsuperscript{68} A contextual example of this may be that of a South African who struggles to find a balance between being loyal to a certain culture and its rituals while at the same time trying to seek justice, inclusion, liberty, and freedom for all people in the country. There may, at times, be ethical grey areas which make it hard to be loyal to tradition and culture, and to be loyal and fair to the great dream of a united South Africa.
of the affective imagination, namely, the ability to enter into and understand through taking on and experiencing the feelings of others” (Gilligan & Wiggins 1988:120). They further decided to connect their understanding of care with the emotions of love and sorrow as moral compasses (Gilligan & Wiggins 1988:119). "Love is tied to the activities of relationship and premised, like attachment, on the responsiveness of human connection, the ability to of people to engage with one another in such a way that the needs and feelings of the other come to be experienced and taken on as part of the self" (Gilligan & Wiggins 1988:120). They further emphasised the importance of feelings or emotions in both the orientations. They noted that feelings of shame and guilt, for instance, showed something of not meeting the standards of justice, while feelings of love and sorrow showed something of connection with other people (Gilligan, Wiggins 1988:121). Gilligan and Wiggins (1988:121) argued that these different emotions serve as moral experiences and as a warning when moral boundaries are breached, and also warned that these feelings ought to be interpreted in a context-sensitive manner.

69 They explained that moral outrage was not only a possibility due to oppression and inequality, but also as a result of “abandonment or loss of attachment or the failure of others to respond” (Gilligan & Wiggins 1988:120).

70 From a theological point of view, the Love Commandment with its triadic view on relationship between God, the self, and the other, echoes what Gilligan and Wiggins said. A theological ethics of care (that will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4) as a feminist moral theology also regards relationships a key to human life. Harrison (1985:15) wrote that “as a feminist moral theology celebrates the power of our human praxis as an intrinsic aspect of the work of God’s love, as it celebrates the reality that our moral-selves we body-selves who touch and see and hear each other into life, recognizes sensuality as fundamental to the work and power of love, so above all else a feminist moral theology insist that relationality is at the heart of all things” (Harrison 1985:15).

71 In the individual person these feelings may get slightly entangled where the inability to show love, for instance, may lead that person to feel guilty; or shame, guilt, and sorrow may, for instance, be entangled in a situation where inequality and oppression is present (Gilligan & Wiggins 1988:121).

72 Gilligan and Wiggins (1988:121-122) distinguish between compassion in the sense of sympathy and compassion in the sense of co-feeling.
Gilligan and Wiggins (1988:123) explained that the shift in how the self is perceived in relation to the other noticeably changes the moral questions that are being asked. The questions were no longer limited to that of inequality, but suddenly addressed issues of inclusion and exclusion, and how the self is to live in relationship with the other in order not to focus on separating the self or to ignore the need of the other (Gilligan & Wiggins 1988:123). The norm for the self in relation to the other used to be a subject-object distinction, but included the risk of objectification in the process (Gilligan & Wiggins 1988:124). It runs the risk of becoming a situation wherein the self may become egocentric and remove themselves from any form of connectedness, thereby living in “egocentric ignorance” (Gilligan & Wiggins 1988:124). It is therefore necessary to include both orientations in the moral domain in order to grasp the full spectrum of the human ability to experience both moral orientations: The ability to see relationship in two ways or to tell a story from two different angles underlies what may well be among the most searing experiences of moral dilemma, creating an irreducible sense of ethical ambiguity and also perhaps a temptation to eliminate one version or one perspective and, thus, make the incongruity disappear (Gilligan & Wiggins 1988:128).

When they spoke about the implications of the two moral obligations, Gilligan and Wiggins (1988:128) concluded that justice and care as separate moral orientations tended to point out some concerns about the opposing orientation. They explained that from a justice perspective, care would often be considered a matter of obligation or duty and not a necessarily a sincere matter, while from a care perspective, the self and the other ought to be considered when it comes to justice (Gilligan & Wiggins 1988:128). It would, however, be considered irresponsible to place these orientations as opposites, thereby trying to show that caring is unjust or that justice is uncaring, for it “misses the reorganization of relationship that occurs with the shift in perspective” (Gilligan & Wiggins 1988:128). It would also be unfair to regard care as merely “a ‘personal’ aspect of morality conceived as justice” (Gilligan & Wiggins 1988:129).
For Gilligan and Wiggins (1988:129), if care were to be excluded as a proper moral orientation within morality, development will focus solely on equality, which would lead to moral respect confusing separation with objectivity, thereby claiming that relationships are merely aiding heteronomous moral standards (Gilligan & Wiggins 1988:129). They therefore called for a new image of self in relationship as a possible way of viewing morality as being able to house both the view of attachment and of equality as relevant and important during moral development (Gilligan & Wiggins 1988:129; 135).

2.2.2 The Implications of a New Moral Domain

It is clear from the previous sections that Carol Gilligan’s work in her book *In a Different Voice* (1982) had tremendous repercussions for the moral domain. It was no longer dominated by only a justice perspective, but had to make space for the inclusion of an additional approach, the care perspective, when it came to morality. This led to certain flags being raised about the self and how the self was to be understood. Gilligan and other scholars suggested that a new image of the self in relationship ought to be considered within the boundaries of morality. This enriched the understanding of morality and led to the inclusion of women who were previously left out of the moral equation and who were regarded as being less morally developed than men.

Gilligan (1988:xvii) argued that the two distinctive voices of morality implied different approaches to morality, moral problems, and how it can be addressed. The inclusion of this additional approach to morality, therefore, did not arise without any implications. It meant that a lot of moral areas that had previously been seen through the lens of only the justice perspective, now had to be studied taking both moral orientations into consideration. The next section, therefore, seeks to address how the new moral domain may influence different sectors of general society. Some of these that will be discussed will show the implications for the moral domain in terms of age, class, and gender-specific roles in careers.
2.2.2.1 Morality and Low Socioeconomic Status

Bardige\textsuperscript{73}, Ward\textsuperscript{74}, Gilligan, Taylor\textsuperscript{75}, and Cohen\textsuperscript{76} (1988:159) noted that one of the oversights in the empirical studies included that most of the research involved mostly white, middle- and upper-middle class participants. Similar to the case of women being left out of the studies done by Kohlberg, the studies on morality would not be considered valid if it could not be applied to all people and could have left some important contributions out of consideration (Bardige et al 1988:159). This led them to consider the effect of growing up in a different social context, for they believed that a person’s moral development could be affected in differing ways depending on whether said person grew up in a poor, middle-class, or well-off neighbourhood (Bardige et al 1988:159).

They set out to investigate the finding of adolescents of varying ages in low-income areas in an effort to gather information on how these adolescents think about morality, moral decision-making, justice, and indifference (Bardige et al 1988:160). They wanted to know whether both the justice and care orientations would be present in the participants’ thinking by means of directly speaking about certain laws, rules, and values, or referring to the needs of other, relationships with other people, and concern for the upkeep of relationships (Bardige et al 1988:160). They were also keen to see whether the language that the participants would use may contribute in a new way to the concept of the justice and care orientations and whether the participants would approach a moral situation in the same way that privileged participants would (Bardige et al 1988:160-161). They

\textsuperscript{73} Betty Bardige, at the time of writing this article, was the vice-president of Learning Ways, an educational software firm.

\textsuperscript{74} Jane Victoria Ward, at the time of writing this article, was a professor of education and Human Services at Simmons College in Boston, Massachusetts.

\textsuperscript{75} Jill McLean Taylor, at the time of writing this article, was a doctoral candidate at Harvard Graduate School of Education in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

\textsuperscript{76} Gina Cohen, at the time of writing this article, was a law student at the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
also aimed to determine whether there would be a gender difference in the participant’s moral thinking, as was the case with the more privileged participants (Bardige et al 1988:161).

The results of the study showed that almost every participant had had experiences that included being treated unfairly (Bardige et al 1988:163). It also showed that morality had an enormous impact on the identity of the participants in that they constantly faced concerns regarding their self-image and the way in which they perceive themselves (Bardige et al 1988:163). When it came to the moral language that was used, it was noted that it was a language that knew when it was required to overrule the generally accepted rules within society (Bardige et al 1988:167). The participants showed an ability to use both the language of rights and the language of care at the same time (Bardige et al 1988:168). In these studies, it showed that the participants battled the same moral conflicts that privileged participants did in that they also faced situations of pressure by their friends into doing something wrong when they knew that it was clearly wrong to do it (Bardige et al 1988:169). They also faced situations where their loyalty was tested in situations where they were confronted with having to choose between individuals they cared for and larger groups of friends (Bardige et al 1988:169). Bardige et al (1988:169) noted that these participants, like the privileged participants in similar studies, also showed the ability to think in terms of both justice and care. These participants, like the privileged participants, lived

77 The example that was used by Bardige et al (1988:167) was that of a girl, who was told not to leave her house, who needed to make a decision as to whether she had to take bandages to a neighbour who had cut herself badly and needed bandages desperately. For the girl it was a moral issue whether to stay home, as she had been told, or to help the neighbour who had cut herself and was in need of help (Bardige et al 1988:167). The moral language that was clearly recognisable was that of a necessity in that the girl used words like “had to”, “need”, and “absolutely necessary” during her discussion (Bardige et al 1988:167). This would have been considered a heteronomous morality according to Piaget and similarly would have scored the girl very low on Kohlberg’s scale of moral development for they would have regarded the girl’s decision as an inability to do what is right by staying home like she was told to do (Bardige et al 1988:168). The girl, however, believed that she did what is right by going to the neighbour and giving her bandages when she needed it and it is this firm belief that led Birdage et al (1988:168) to also notice a rights orientation to morality. In this way the girl shows both a language of rights and a language of care (Bardige et al 1988:168).
according to moral standards, whether it is justice or care oriented (Bardige et al 1988:170). They did, however, have a hard time to stick to their moral standards when they were faced with situations where injustice, violence, and uncaring situations were happening (Bardige et al 1988:170). When it came to the different orientations and gender, the studies revealed the same results as it did during the studies with the more privileged participants (Bardige et al 1988:170). For almost all of the male participants, the orientation tended to lean towards the justice orientation, while almost all of the female participants’ dilemmas somehow involved loyalty that leaned more toward the care orientation (Bardige et al 1988:170). During the study it was found that the female participants would speak about dilemmas that stretched over an extended period of time, as opposed to a dilemma that was a once-off occasion only (Bardige et al 1988:171).

Interestingly, the female participants tended to stay connected to the dilemma, not letting it go for any reason, while the male participants tended to want to leave a problematic situation as soon as possible (Bardige et al 1988:171). Bardige et al (1988:172) concluded that the participants of the lower-income neighbourhoods showed an appreciation for morality, whether it is used in the way of the justice orientation, the care orientation, or a combination of the justice and care orientations. They, once again, stressed the importance of the care orientation being a part of morality and moral concepts by saying that a lot of developmental traits would have been considered less developed or problematic had it been measured solely according to the justice orientation (Bardige et al 1988:172). They noted that these participants naturally shared the same moral language as their privileged counterparts, even though some participants used

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78 This is an example of what Carol Gilligan (1988) would describe as an exit-voice dilemma. The exit option would refer to the attempt to escape from a given situation in order to avoid dealing with the problem or wanting to get away from, for instance, conflict within the family (Gilligan 1988:143). The exit option, according to Gilligan (1988:143), may leave a person feeling freer to speak and more accepting of possible alternative perspectives. The voice option would refer to the loyalty found in relationship where, for example, an adolescent would attempt to integrate incorporate both the new image of the self and the experience of being part of a relationship (Gilligan 1988:143). Gilligan (1988:143) explained that in order for the voice option to develop, the continuation of loyalty over a period of time is needed.
the language of necessity more often than others, leading to an enriched view of the care perspective (Bardige et al 1988:172). For Bardige et al (1988:172), one of the most important implications that was noted during this study, was that there was a connection between moral development and social class, thereby also pointing out that context plays an important role in moral development. It should, however, be pointed out that it does not necessarily mean that low-income people do not develop as well as their more privileged counterparts, but rather asks that moral development be interpreted with the context in mind (Bardige et al, 1988:173). The next section will deal with the question of the development of morality in areas that are prone to violence and how people think about morality and violence.

2.2.2.2 Morality and Conceptions of Violence

The question that this section will address is how people who are exposed to acts of violence will respond in moral situations and whether both the care and justice orientations can be identified in the participants’ moral thinking. Ward (1988:175) noted that violence, being one of the unfortunate realities of life, has everything to do with the way in which morality is perceived. In her view, it was pointless to address any issues regarding morality without addressing the issue of violence and violent behaviour (Ward 1988:175). She further noted that it was necessary to look at the gender roles when it comes to violence in society (Ward 1988:175). Ward (1988:177) attempted to investigate the morality of participants who lived in areas that were prone to violent occurrences. She was interested in what the participants were thinking about the violence they encountered in their lives and their immediate surroundings, and how it affected the way they thought about morality (Ward 1988:177).

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According to her statistics, Ward (1988:175) claimed that more often than not, men were both the primary victims and the primary perpetrators when it came to violence, while women were increasingly becoming the victims of violence, not only indirectly when they lose their male family members due to violence, but also directly when they are direct victims of violence. The number of violent encounters by women has, however, increased dramatically (Ward 1988:176).
For Ward (1988:177), it was problematic that people living in areas of violence were often considered to be poorly educated and not as skilled as others in society. They were often considered to have a lesser sense of moral reasoning and often perceived as members of society who were not as socially developed as others (Ward 1988:177). This led to their opinions about morality being undervalued and usually not considered (Ward 1988:177). Consequently, Ward (1988:177) made an effort to address this issue by conducting a study wherein the participants shared their experiences of their lives while living in a violent society. She worked with a group of adolescent participants from schools in areas that were known to be exposed to acts of violence (Ward 1988:178). They were asked to take part in a course that asked of them to wrestle with moral issues that were applicable to their context and timeframe such as Apartheid in South Africa, environmental issues, issues concerning race and racism, the Holocaust, and violence in the region of Central America (Ward 1988:178). The purpose of this was partly that the participants may ask some critical questions about themselves and about the world in which they lived where social and moral guidelines were being obscured by violence and even to inspire some of the participants to be a positive influence in their community (Ward 1988:178). Just like the justice and care orientations were previously helpful in addressing differing approaches to moral thinking in certain situations, so this study focused on the two different moral orientations when it came to violence (Ward 1988:179).

Ward (1988:182) shared an experience of two participants, one man and one woman, who shared an almost identical story of being a witness to a violent occurrence where a gun ended up being fired among a group of individuals. The group of individuals involved was known to the male participant, but not to the female participant (Ward 1988:182). When they were asked why this event took place and whether they knew who was to blame, there were two differing moral judgements that came to the fore (Ward 1988:182-183). Interestingly enough, the male participant showed clear signs of the care orientation being used in his moral reasoning, while the woman showed clear signs of using the justice
orientation in her reasoning (Ward 1988:183). While both of them judged the violent event in itself as a wrongful deed, the male participant was concerned with the wellbeing of the person who fired the gun, the people who may have tried to mediate the situation, and of the children who may have been in the area (Ward 1988:183). Even though the female participant mentioned the immediate danger of the onlookers, her concern focused on issues of justice by stating that the people involved were adults and that they should have been able to tell the difference between what is right and what is wrong (Ward 1988:183). Ward (1988:184) recognised both the care orientation and the justice orientation among these participants’ moral reasoning and stressed the importance of allowing them to reason in differing ways in order to develop a sustaining moral sense that will help them to think responsibly when they are faced with moral dilemmas. She regarded both the justice and the care approach as valid moral orientations for educators to build upon in an effort to help students to think responsibly and morally reflective in life (Ward 1988:184).

In her findings during the course of the study, Ward (1988:184) noted that a lot of the violent events that took place were caused by a human relationship that had gone wrong. Some participants chose to share experiences where they encountered violence psychologically, but most of the participants chose to share stories of violence that involved physical violence (Ward 1988:184). These experiences of violence occurred in neighbourhoods, family homes, schools, and violence referred to in the media (Ward 1988:184). When it came to the participants who showed a moral orientation leaning toward justice with regards to morality and violence, Ward (1988:185) noted three things; first, participants often tried to justify their actions as getting back at someone or retaliating for what they had done to them. Second, violence often occurred as a result of someone being undeservedly experiencing punishment for something that they did not do (Ward 1988:185). Third, violence often broke out in situations where people did
something that was wrong according to accepted behaviour (Ward 1988:186). The participants who showed a moral orientation leaning toward care often mentioned how violence caused others to feel hurt, pain, or suffering and that they felt that it was morally wrong to have these people go through this type of experience (Ward 1988:188). The participants who showed care logic often struggled more to accept the violence and often showed a greater unease with violence than those who held a justice oriented morality (Ward 1988:188). Most of the participants who shared in the care orientation held the belief that violence could have been prevented if people only spoke to each other about what was bothering them (Ward 1988:189). They were also able to grasp that the effects of violence often stretch further than only the people directly involved (Ward 1988:188).

An interesting occurrence was when some of the participants showed both the justice and the care orientation equally in their moral reason concerning violence (Ward 1988:191). Ward (1988:191) explained that although previous works had indicated this to be possible, these participants showed that it was possible to hold both the orientations concurrently in their experiences of violence. She believed that this confirmation enriched the nature of morality and violence, which would have been incompletely described had both orientations not been considered simultaneously (Ward 1988:191). Ward (1988:196) introduced another possible option in the integrated moral orientation. This, she claimed, was different to the case of participants merely showing an ability to use both the

80 Ward (1988:187) noted that when it came to retributive justice, a lot of teens felt that it ought to be justifiable. She called it “the eye-for-an-eye philosophy” (Ward 1988:187) and it was a perspective shared by many of the participants (Ward 1988:187).

81 Ward (1988:191) explained that in order to qualify to be both justice and care oriented, the participant had to show signs of both orientations in combination and had to clearly articulate both the care and justice concerns that she had set out in advance.

82 Examples of this is seen where a care perspective is firmly held, but in the an effort to protect the self or another, violence is justified, even though it is against the nature of care to enforce hurt upon another person (Ward 1988:193). This option is therefore only implemented when all other options have been exhausted and there is no other option left (Ward 1988:193).
justice and care orientations for it involved “integrally interwoven themes of justice and care” (Ward 1988:194). This was ultimately considered to be a more complex moral orientation (Ward 1988:194). This complex interwoven perspective of morality in the context of violence would, for instance, set limits for violence when it may have been justifiable for a variety of reasons (Ward 1988:194). If justice and care were interwoven or limitations for violence were set in order to justify a certain amount of violence, the perspective was considered to part of the integrated moral orientation (Ward 1988:194).

Ward (1988:196) noted that a justice orientation was more often than not chosen when the violent event took place within a neighbourhood. Unlike the cases of violence at home or at school, the people involved in the violent events in neighbourhoods were often unknown or vaguely familiar to the participant, which may have caused the participant to speak in terms of the justice orientation as a result of the lack of relationship (Ward 1988:196). In the same way that the justice orientation was almost always chosen with the occurrence of neighbourhood violence, so the care orientation was predominantly chosen when it came to violent events in the family (Ward 1988:197-198). This was not limited to any specific ethnic or racial group, but happened across all boundaries (Ward 1988:198).

Regardless of the moral orientation that was eventually displayed, it

83 An example given by Ward (1988:194) was that of a participant who noted that crime was picking up in the area. He mentioned how old ladies were being robbed after leaving the bank and considered this to be wrong (Ward 1988:194). He imagined what it would be like for him if that old lady happened to be his grandmother and mentioned that he would do anything to in his ability to help her (Ward 1988:194). He said that it is important to care for family and that respect has to be shown for other people, because that is what is expected of good citizens (Ward 1988:194). Ward (1988:195) explained that this participant’s moral outrage stemmed from his connection that he felt for his own family. Even though this was happening to strangers, he was able to imagine what it would have been like if that person had been someone whom he had cared for (Ward 1988:195). Out of his care for those in need is interwoven his justice orientation arose; due to the fact that he respected other people, he wanted to do what was considered to be right (Ward 1988:195).

84 One of the aspects that was missing from this study which I would have liked to know more about, is whether the orientations were gendered at all. From the overall study it seemed like the orientation was not necessarily chosen based on the gender of the person, but by the violent event itself and whether people were known to the people involved in the violent event.
was always clear that all of the participants had a strong moral outcry against acts of violence that they perceived (Ward 1988:197). Ward (1988:200) concluded that this study had provided enough information to confirm that these participants, who lived in violent areas, had a definite ability to show both the justice and the care orientations when it comes to morality, which provided an investigative peculiarity that had not been analysed before this study.\footnote{In a later article written by Ward (1995) she called for a concrete inclusion of the morality of care in a culture-specific study. She argued that, in an African-American context, an awareness needed to be created that “aggression against others is aggression against the self” (Ward 1995:175). She believed that a solution to violence in African-American communities can be addressed by reconnecting the adolescents with the values and traditions that have previously helped black communities to stand unified and in solidarity against injustice (Ward 1995:175). She further argued that their sense of justice should be built on their ability to care for one another (Ward 1995:186).} Ward’s study on violence not only developed new categories in terms of the combination of the justice and care orientations, but also suggested that the care orientation could envision violent situations and accordingly help with the prevention of violence (Gilligan 1988:iv). In the previous two sections, the morality and moral interpretation of people with a lower socio-economic status and people exposed to violent-prone areas were discussed. On the other end of the spectrum is the question of moral orientation and people with higher social status. In the next section, the moral orientation of people classified as people with high social status will be discussed. An example of someone with high social status who faces constant moral formation is a medical practitioner.

2.2.2.3 Morality and Physicians

The thing that makes the practice of medicine different to that of other care orientated professions is the fact that it has a higher social status (Gilligan & Pollak 1988:245). It is, however, important to note that the practice of medicine is a combination of scientific knowledge, a particular set of skills, and the practice of taking care of the need of someone (Gilligan & Pollak 1988:254). Gilligan and
Pollak (1988:245) pointed out that a medical practitioner has to constantly find a balance between becoming overly involved in caring to the extent where it influences their judgment, and being so professional and caught up in the scientific knowledge that it creates a remoteness between the practitioner and the patient. They explained that even though there were ethical codes to adhere to as a medical practitioner, the same could not be said for the dangers of isolation between medical practitioners and patients (Gilligan & Pollak 1988:245). The fact that danger and intimacy have been associated with each other has been an occurrence that was found when dealing with men and their fantasies (Gilligan & Pollak 1988:245).

Gilligan and Pollak (1988:246) explained that the danger of intimacy was quite often linked to men’s fears of being caught in an overwhelming and restricting relationship or by the fear of being shamed by being rejected or double-crossed (Gilligan & Pollak 1988:246). For women, the opposite ran true, where isolation and the lack of relations were linked to danger (Gilligan & Pollak 1988:246). They noted that what was considered to be safe and dangerous was associated with connection and separation, which in turn had an influence on the fear of success that people experienced (Gilligan & Pollak 1988:246). This image is further distorted by the notion that power and success stand up and against relational connections (Gilligan & Pollak 1988:246). It was also pointed out that men and women have different perceptions of what power, success, and achievement constitute; for men, power was most often associated with dominance and aggression, while women tended to associate power with the ability to build and sustain lasting relationships (Gilligan & Pollak 1988:246).

The study done by Gilligan and Pollak (1988:247) set out to investigate whether men and women in the medical profession regarded power and success as something that was opposed to intimacy and nurturance, or whether intimacy and

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86 Susan Pollock, at the time of writing this article, was an associate psychologist at Mount Auburn Hospital in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
nurturance contributed to power and success. The participants in the study were shown four pictures suggesting success or relationship (Gilligan & Pollak 1988:248). The students were then asked to make up creative stories about each of the pictures (Gilligan & Pollak 1988:248). Gilligan and Pollak (1988:247) explained that they used imagery of violence as a representation of fear. The results of the study showed that men more often wrote stories about violence than women tended to (Gilligan & Pollak 1988:249). According to their analysis, men who wrote about violence in their stories connected danger to closeness, while the women who wrote imagery of violence connected it to separation (Gilligan & Pollak 1988:250-251). For Gilligan and Pollak (1988:251), this meant that the medical students who took part in this study considered and understood relationships to be one of two ways; safe or dangerous.

The results further suggested that these differing views could be ascribed to gender, wherein males, predominantly, but not always, considered relationships to be dangerous as opposed to most of the females, but not all of the females, who considered relationships to be safe (Gilligan & Pollak 1988:251). This suggested that there was a need for the view on relationships to be changed, especially in terms of human and psychological development (Gilligan & Pollak 1988:251). Gilligan and Pollak (1988:251) explained that intimacy could, therefore, at the same time, be considered to be a danger and a contributor to psychological wellbeing. For medical practitioners, however, both of these considerations of relationships and intimacy are heightened when they are, for instance, at the same time at risk of getting an infection while working with dangerous illnesses as opposed to the danger of being isolated by “the structure of medical training and practice” (Gilligan & Pollak 1988:251). The fear of being intimate and the fear of being isolated is consequently continuously in tension with each other (Gilligan & Pollak 1988:252).

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87 Gilligan and Pollak (1988:252) stressed the fact that even though the statistics revealed that the differences are best displayed in terms of gender, it ought not to be regarded as gender specific.
After collecting and analysing the data gathered from their study, Gilligan and Pollak (1988:261-262) established that the inclusion of women to the field of psychological theory had forced morality to be revaluated and reconsidered as a result of the fact that women often aligned success with connection. They further believed that the fact that more women were entering the medical field, forced the medical educators to rethink the content and approaches that they were teaching, especially in areas where the practice and training human connection were increasingly lacking in substance (Gilligan & Pollak 1988:262). Women and the inclusion of their approach wherein they linked success with relationship, had the ability to help narrow the gap between caring for patients and being scientifically successful, and showed the ability to contribute to the advancement of medical training (Gilligan & Pollak 1988:262). It was for this reason that Gilligan and Pollak (1988:262) requested that women’s voices, perspectives, and perception be heard and encouraged.

They concluded by saying: “Since humanism in medicine depends on joining the heroism of cure with the vulnerability of care, reshaping the image of the physician to include women constitute a powerful force for change” (Gilligan & Pollak 1988:262). This section dealt with medical practitioners and the way in which they care for their patients. It was, thus, not only a section that dealt with people with higher social status and how they interpret moral formation, but also a section that dealt with how to morally care for other. It was, therefore, not impossible to think of a moral orientation that has to do with care. The concern, then, is whether there is room for a care orientation within a context where rules and principles are prominent. One of the ways to investigate how a care orientation functions within such a context is to look at a legal context wherein moral formation is based purely on rules and regulations that have been previously established.
2.2.2.4 Morality and Female Lawyers

One of the areas that directly concerns morality is that of the legal system. This is also one of the areas that is particularly affected by the new moral domain with the additional approach being suggested. Dana Jack\textsuperscript{88} and Rand Jack\textsuperscript{89} (1988:263), in their study on female lawyers, found that there was a rapid influx of women into the legal profession. The study that Jack and Jack (1988:263) aimed to investigate whether a person’s moral orientation had an influence on their legal profession, whether women brought their own moral approach into their legal profession (which may lead to it being in conflict with the legal system), and what the approach may be when a person in the legal profession has a differing way of thinking to the legal system. Their study, therefore, was a study on moral choice in a conflicting situations when it comes to practising law (Jack & Jack 1988:263).

The participants in the study were asked about their view on morality and justice, their view of the self, and how they feel their work as legal practitioner may have affected their relationships (Jack & Jack 1988:264). They were also to describe moral issues they have had while practising law, and were asked to react to hypothetical moral issues that were given to them in order to see if they had an inclination towards the care or the justice orientation in their own moral decision-making (Jack & Jack 1988:264).

Jack and Jack (1988:264) explained that lawyers, unlike people in professions who make an impact on the way people live, often likened their profession to the playing of a game in that the one who used the provided rules in the best manner would ultimately win the game. They then continued to explain that Piaget, in his study of children, found that boys tended to struggle through the rules of the game

\textsuperscript{88} Dana Jack, at the time of writing this article, was a lecturer at Fairhaven College /Western Washington University in Bellingham, Washington and a part-time private psychotherapist.

\textsuperscript{89} Rand Jack, at the time of writing this article, was a professor at Fairhaven College /Western Washington University in Bellingham, Washington.
to find a solution when there was an argument over the rules, while girls tended
to end the game or alternatively start over in order to avoid the conflict (Jack &
Jack 1988:264). Where boys were often found to play games in a competitive
manner where a clear winner and loser was present, girls tended to show a more
indirect kind of competition where winners were often rotated rather than
accepting one clear winner (Jack & Jack 1988:264-265).

Jack and Jack (1988:265) noted that culture has an impact on the differing gender
roles that are often ascribed to children from a very young age. The majority of
boys are culturally prepared to envision themselves in terms of rules, detachment,
separation, individuality, and being emotionally unmoved, while girls are prepared
to be attentive to the feelings of other people, co-operative, involved, and
generally accepting of what is expected of them (Jack & Jack 1988:266). The
important thing to keep in mind is that cultural preparations like these, more often
than not, led to women being viewed as the lesser one of the two genders,
thereby assigning the male point of view as the normative approach of what it
means to be successful when it ought to function as merely a description (Jack &

Similar to the way boys and girls play, women who want to practice law are told
that any feminine ideas of practising are not accepted in the practice of law, and
that they therefore have to adhere to the male rules (Jack & Jack 1988:266). In
order to participate in this “game”, it is necessary to detach emotionally and to
maintain a personal distance (Jack & Jack 1988:266). The consequence of this
is that women often have to eliminate their own traits and learn to be the same
way as her male counterpart in the way they talk, walk, dress, and act (Jack &
Jack 1988:266). What is generally associated with culturally prepared feminine

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90 This, of course, led to Piaget stating that boys, in their endurance to struggle their way through the
rules, had a much better legal sense than girls had, and that girls were consequently less developed than
boys (Jack & Jack 1988:264).

91 This is not a given in every situation, and includes exceptions (Jack & Jack 1988:266).
traits is considered to be insufficient and mindless when it comes to expectations regarding professionalism (Jack & Jack 1988:267). Jack and Jack (1988:167) said that this placed women in a place where they had to choose between themselves and who they are, and who they are supposed to be in their profession. Jack and Jack (1988:267) quoted Strachen, who stated that women ought to become more serious, committed, and competent in their work if they want to become a lawyer and that they should then convince each judge and opposing counsel that they are able to do a proper job. Women who want to be part of the male-dominated profession of law, therefore, need to play by the rules determined by men, and have to work harder and longer in order to be considered an equal (Jack & Jack 1988:267).

If a woman in a legal profession, thus, had any relational inclination whatsoever, she would put herself at risk of being perceived as someone who is not professional (Jack & Jack 1988:267). The rules that women have to adhere to, are not only rules pertaining to the field of law, but also some behavioural rules and attitudes (Jack & Jack 1988:268). This often led women to feel uncomfortable in their work environment and their profession (Jack & Jack 1988:268). Jack and Jack (1988:268) identified this dilemma as: “forsake the law, or forsake the self” (Jack & Jack 1988:268). This meant that women and men who had an inclination that was more in line with the care orientation felt excluded and even alienated at times (Jack & Jack 1988:268). For Jack and Jack, it was important to see whether it would be possible to secure both the role of relationship and that of rules in order to be “caring advocates” (1988:269).

In their study, Jack and Jack (1988:269) found that a lot of women had to give up a lot of themselves in order to be what was expected of them, thereby continuously tearing themselves apart in order to adhere to the justice and rules of the legal realm, and the care and relationship they found to be true to their

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92 A fund known as the Rockefeller Foundation grant has been set up for a Gender and Professional Socialization study in order to address the issue of women and legal education and profession (Jack & Jack 1988:269).
morality. They admitted that one of their biggest challenges was that they were not sure what they ought to do with their care orientation when they chose to enter the legal playing field (Jack & Jack 1988:270). In most cases, women would either keep their caring self to as little as possible and try to take on the persona of a “real” lawyer, or they would attempt to include their care orientation while they take on the persona of a “real” lawyer (Jack & Jack 1988:270).

Jack and Jack (1988:207) then set out to investigate these two differing approaches to care in the law profession. The first approach was one that saw the care orientation, and thereby the self, being denied in order to adopt the role of the male lawyer who sticks to the legal system, and the rules and procedures attached to it (Jack & Jack 1988:270). In order to adhere to the standards of the legal profession, culturally motivated feminine characteristics had to be moved to the side and denied at all costs (Jack & Jack 1988:271).

A woman shared how she became so professional that it dominated her whole life (Jack & Jack 1988:271). She denied herself to be who she really was, even outside of her profession (Jack & Jack 1988:271). She also denied herself the right to be able to live happily within relationships, which was evident when she took responsibility for her marriage ending up in a divorce (Jack & Jack 1988:272). The decision to repress her relational self was encouraged and supported in her professional life with the idea that independence and autonomy, success, power, and happiness would follow if she only adopted the masculine traits she needed to embody to be a successful lawyer (Jack & Jack 1988:272). This mind-set led her to believe that a marriage and kids would stop her from
being a successful lawyer; something that would make it same as though she was “settling for less” (Jack & Jack 1988:273).\footnote{An example of the inequality based on gender is found in the example given by Jack and Jack (1988:273) of a lawyer who feels she cannot be a professional and a mother who has to take maternity leave: “How would you feel if you had a partner who was going to take this extended leave of absence to have children or who was working part days because of their obligation for children or would have to cancel appointments because their child was sick? I don’t have a wife to take care of those things. Those guys go down with their little brown bag and have lunch in the lunchroom. I don’t have a wife to pack my lunch in the morning. I mean, they have this servant. I don’t have that and it would be very difficult to maintain the level that I’m maintaining with children” (Jack & Jack 1988:273).}

The balance between the private sphere and the public sphere comes into play and makes it difficult for women to be who they really want to be. According to many Western traditions, men have always had their private matters taken care of by their wives (Jack & Jack 1988:273), essentially making them slaves to their husbands. Women became the servants of the husband in order for their husbands to complete their powerful jobs in the public sphere (Jack & Jack 1988:273). When a woman entered into the public sphere, there was no one to take care of the private sphere. The woman in the study who denied relationship to herself and in the process opted not to have children, comforted herself by telling herself that one day, when she is old, she may be able to look back and convince herself that she had helped someone instead of having a potential relationship with her own children (Jack & Jack 1988:273). This woman saw her future self somewhere alone in a retirement home with her only connection being that of her contribution as a lawyer (Jack & Jack 1988:273). “To flourish … [She] subordinates relationship to achievement, love to work, femininity to professionalism” (Jack & Jack 1988:273).\footnote{In an interesting turn of events this woman was interviewed after a year and a half and found to have taken time to reconnect with her personal life and to give attention to relationships (Jack and Jack 1988:274). As she began to explore the relational side of herself, she discovered aspects of herself that she had previously lost and called these aspects human needs as opposed to the needs of females (Jack & Jack 1988:175).}

Jack and Jack (1988:176) noted that society only allowed for people to choose between two perspectives when they reach adulthood; one being achievement...
and the other one being relationship, not leaving space to incorporate both. The way in which this problem was dealt with was to split the responsibilities within a marriage into two parts where men stepped out into the public world in order to accomplish success, while leaving women to deal with the private domain of caring for the children and the household and building social relationships (Jack & Jack 1988:275). They explained that the genders were separated to such an extent that they were denied the right to share in the rewards and in the benefits that came with each other's world (Jack & Jack 1988:275).

During more recent times, however, this started to change and roles started to change in society with women and men crossing the boundaries of the public sphere and the private sphere (Jack & Jack 1988:275). The result, however, was that women were still being undervalued, while men neglected to take up responsibility where they needed to, which meant that women not only had to be competitive in their profession, but also had to pick up the responsibility of being domesticated and caring (Jack & Jack 1988:275). In the best possible outcome, the private sphere and the public sphere finds a balance between the interdependent and the continuous, but this is more often than not the case and women end up being overworked, undervalued, and underappreciated (Jack & Jack 1988:275). It is therefore an undeniable struggle to find a solution that adheres to both the relational and independent character that comes with being a female lawyer who chooses to emulate the model of the male lawyer.

The other option, instead of emulating the model of the male lawyer, was to split the self in two in order to incorporate the caring orientation, while putting up the face of the model of the male lawyer. In this way, the person would actually splits themselves in two, with one part being the lawyer and the other part being the caring and nurturing self (Jack & Jack 1988:277). Jack and Jack (1988:277) explained that what happens in this case is that the one persona will be seen at work, while the other persona will come out once the person is at home. In this way, the person can adhere to the differing self in each setting according to what is needed and expected (Jack & Jack 1988:277). In dividing the self in this way,
the person ought to have sufficient chances to develop both the work self and the

They further stated that in most of the cases they dealt with throughout the study,
the splitting of the self into two personas seemed to be quite prevalent (Jack &
Jack 1988:277). This, Jack and Jack (1988:277) explained, seemed to be
harmless at first, but at second glance, it became clear that the oppression of the
morality that was adopted may have led to issues with keeping the self mentally
healthy, because it can be extremely stressful and often not implemented well.
All of this can cause the divided self to be conflicted and self-critical to the point
where it becomes harmful (Jack & Jack 1988:277). If the person were to choose
to stay true to the caring self, the danger of being hurt may be bigger and the
expected professionalism may be more difficult to sustain (Jack & Jack

On the other side of the spectrum is the analytical thinking that is required in the
legal profession that asks of a person to be objective, sceptical, and very
impersonal at all times in order to construct a fair verdict (Jack & Jack 1988:279).
Taking this into consideration, it becomes obvious that it can put stress and
conflicting ideas on the table for someone who is naturally more inclined to lean
towards the care orientation. One of the women in this study explained that she
had to make sure that she maintained relationships outside of her legal profession
because of the fact that she found her own growth (as a person) in the
relationships she had with people, while she only found her growth as a lawyer
when she withdrew her “emotional, intuitive self” (Jack & Jack 1988:280).

It was clear from these studies that the women had a difficult time to be true to
who they were as people and who they were expected to be in their law practice.
It also became clear that these women had the need to be able to express
themselves in their profession without having to change who they are. Jack and
Jack (1988:281) expressed their concern about the problem in the system, and
called upon lawyers to address this problem in such a manner to include both the “fairness of justice and the responsibility of caring” (Jack & Jack 1988:281).

There were also women who showed a strong orientation toward care and this presented another way to take on the role of a lawyer (Jack & Jack 1988:281). This was completely different to the other approaches in that this approach did not call for the oppression of the caring self or the dividing of the self into two parts; instead, these women opted to take on the generally accepted perception of a lawyer and changed it to accommodate their true, caring self (Jack & Jack 1988:281). These women refused to be shaped according to the male orientated view of what it takes to be a lawyer and opted to find a way to integrate their care orientation into their legal profession in spite of the general view that these feminine traits would not suffice in a legal profession (Jack & Jack 1988:281).

By integrating the care orientation into their work, these women changed what it meant to be responsible as a lawyer (Jack & Jack 1988:281). Jack and Jack (1988:281), however, pointed out that this meant that a new set of dangers would come with this approach. They elaborated by saying that this would open the door for clients to abuse the caring lawyer with burdens and their problems which will eventually take its toll (Jack & Jack 1988:281). The other problem they pointed out was that even though they may have changed what it means to be a lawyer for themselves, there would still exist a particular perception of what it means to be a lawyer (Jack & Jack 1988:281). This meant that these participants, however brave they were to incorporate their caring selves into their jobs, may be perceived as unprofessional and maybe even inapt (Jack & Jack 1988:281).

One of the participants explained that she had started a practice where she incorporated her caring self and allowed other employees to do the same (Jack & Jack 1988:282). She decided that she would limit the type of cases that she would take on to the ones that she would feel comfortable doing and the ones that fell within her set of values (Jack and Jack 1988:282). She felt that the integrity of her practice protected her from taking on cases that would have asked
of her to set aside her own set of moral values and beliefs (Jack & Jack 1988:282). One of the things that still caused some anxiety was the fact that she was unable to prevent bad things from happening to her clients and that she was unable to tend to all of their needs (Jack & Jack 1988:282). While it was clear that all lawyers suffered a certain amount of stress because of the fact that they had to tend to deadlines, meetings, and the pressures of certain cases, a lot of care orientated lawyers had to carry the extra burden of not being able to tend to the human needs of the clients they represented (Jack & Jack 1988:282). It is as a result of this emotional susceptibility that it became a norm to set certain boundaries, which included being separated and uninvolved in cases (Jack & Jack 1988:282).

Jack and Jack (1988:283) consequently suggested that people who choose to reshape their caring roles into their professional work environment, ought to reshape their view of what is meant by responsibility and care. With care comes the responsibility not only to address and balance the needs of other people, but also the needs of the self. It was therefore suggested that a boundary be placed around the personal responsibility when it comes to other people, for this limiting of responsibility would allow the person to care without constant pressure and stress about the client (Jack & Jack 1988:284). The lawyer would then be able to express their concern and care for the need of the client without having to take it as their personal problem to solve (Jack & Jack 1988:284). The lawyers, thus, have to include themselves in the care they incorporate into their lives in order to be able to care for others (Jack & Jack 1988:284-285). This method, therefore, permit lawyers to bring their care orientation into their legal profession, but not without limiting the reach of care (Jack & Jack 1988:285).

Jack and Jack (1988:286) concluded that the care orientation is of tremendous value wherever human relations are involved and felt that the legal system is a definite area where it could be implemented successfully if it is done right. They confirmed that most of the women they interviewed, who were orientated towards care, expressed the frustration of not being able to be themselves in the system
in the way it is presented to them (Jack & Jack 1988:287). They also affirmed that all three ways in which women dealt with this frustration could be valid methods in dealing with the unease, but that not one of the three options came without possible risks (Jack & Jack 1988:287). They therefore called for the legal system to address the issue of excluding people who are inclined to lean towards the care orientation, while sharing their belief that the legal system would be greatly enriched if it made space for care orientated people to be themselves in their profession (Jack & Jack 1988:287-288).

After reflecting on the impact that some of the implications of the new moral domain would have for some the sectors of life, it becomes apparent that the impact of adding the care orientation to morality is far more influential than what it may have looked like at first. The new moral domain clearly pointed out that there has been a lack in moral understanding to some extent and that people have often had to live as lesser or restricted people because of it. It also showed that people talk differently about morality and the self. Instead of looking at how women would fit into standards that were created by measuring men, the new moral domain included women and their views of the self and morality (Gilligan, Ward, & Taylor 1988:289). In all of the studies, it was apparent that there were two clearly distinguishable approaches when speaking about the self and morality (Gilligan, Ward, & Taylor 1988:289). Gilligan, Ward and Taylor (1988:289), when speaking of the voices that they had heard in their studies, described the one voice as being one that was well-known in educational systems and psychology and another voice, which sounded “different” (Gilligan, Ward and Taylor 1988:289). It is this different voice that led to a new moral domain being considered. It is this different voice, often silenced by patriarchy, which brings with it the hope of the inclusion of people who think differently when it comes to moral development.

This study showed that girls often resisted detachment and that it is not a bad thing, but just a different way of living. By listening to both the voices of justice and care, this work showed that noticing the differences leads to the inclusion of
differing solutions to various moral issues (Gilligan, Ward, & Taylor 1988:291). By including the care orientation, another approach to solving difficult moral issues is suggested, and more often than not, it will be a non-violent approach. This new approach and new image of the moral domain, as suggested by Gilligan, is greatly enriching, influential and encouraging, and ought to be considered as a valid approach to morality in the daily lives of all people. It is, however, true that people who tend to show an inclination towards the care orientation are often silenced by patriarchal structures. Gilligan, therefore, decided to journey with girls at the age where they seemed to succumb to pressures of different social and patriarchal structures, in order to support them in their efforts to resist social injustices that are forced upon them. The next section will, thus, deal with the resistance in girls who are expected to give up their true self to become what a patriarchal society expects of them.

2.3 Resisting Injustice

In several of her books, like *Making Connections* (1990), *Women, Girls, and Psychology: Reframing Resistance* (1991), *Meeting at the Crossroads* (1992), and *Between Voice and Silence* (1995), Gilligan succeeded in showing that there were girls in her empirical studies who tended to resist the stereotypical femininity that was enforced upon them by a patriarchal society. There was a resistance present in the moral development of the participants in her study that simply refused to conform to patriarchal ideas of what it meant to be moral, or successful, or a good person. Gilligan had set out to show that making connections and building relationships in no way devalues or weakens a person. In the book, *Making Connections* (1990), Gilligan and some of her colleagues made a definite choice to study the relational approach that they had come to know in several of their empirical studies. They made a special effort to listen to voices that had previously not been heard, often due to the fact that these voices had been silenced in the name of autonomy, individuality, and reason. As a result of the silencing of the female voice, the point of view of women were often left out of developmental studies.
In an effort to right this wrong and to gain a better understanding of a relational approach to development, Gilligan and her colleagues looked at the conceptions of separation and connection in these adolescent girls and the impact it had on their moral development. Gilligan (1990:4) wrote that girls, at the age where they enter adolescence, experience a critical time in their development because it is a time where they have to enter into a Western civilisation where success is measured in terms of power and independence, and where being a human was being measured in terms of being a man. In the process, these girls, who tended to lean toward a relational approach, were seen as weak, immature, and too dependent. In the past, women had to learn to adapt and had to force themselves to become what was expected of their male counterparts in order to be considered good enough to comply with Western standards. Their voices, who they truly were and what they truly felt, had to be silenced in order to succumb to the rules and regulations of the patriarchal society.

Gilligan (1990:4) shared an experience that confirmed this when she explained how a college graduate student, when asked a question about solving moral questions, answered: “Would you like to know what I think or would you like to know what I really think?” (Gilligan 1990:4). Responding in this way meant that this student had her own thoughts and opinions, but had learned that she had to think in a certain way about certain things. For Gilligan (1990:4), the resistance and reluctance to submit to these ways were clearly seen in the early years of development and that they only learned what they were supposed to say during adolescents. Gilligan (1990:5) was fascinated by the fact that in their adolescent development, rather than resisting the loss of their innocence, girls resisted their loss of their own knowledge. Brown and Gilligan (1992:1) later called this stage

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95 Gilligan (1990:4) explained that girls consistently showed a learned response during and after adolescence, a time in which they were faced directly with the harsh realities of what is expected of them in a Western society.
in girls' development, on the edge of adolescence, a “crossroads intersection” (Brown & Gilligan 1992:1). They called it so because of the fact that it marks a point in which a person is facing an intersection in development where psychological health and cultural renewal cross their path (Brown & Gilligan 1992:1). This means that a choice has to be made as to which road to choose; the road of resisting the cultural regeneration or the road of psychological health.

The different voice that had such a tremendous impact on the moral domain was a voice that clearly needed more exploration and investigation. The more empirical studies were conducted, the more intriguing information was gathered about this differing voice and the additional, relational approach to morality. The downside to this differing voice was that it objected to a lot of rules and regulations that were in place to support a patriarchal society, leading to this voice being silenced whenever it entered general society. Women, Brown and Gilligan (1992:2) argued, had to give up their relational voice, their own voice, the voice of the self, in order to maintain any form of relationship.

It was the uneasiness with this very notion that led Gilligan and her colleagues to embark on a journey to include the suppressed voices of women in the moral domain. Brown and Gilligan (1992:2) explained that they only discovered the relational crisis that women were experiencing when they started to trace women’s development back to girls’ adolescence and early childhood, and then compared it to the development of boys. What followed was the unlocking of a mystery in girls’ development (Brown & Gilligan 1992:2). Brown and Gilligan (1992:2) warned that girls’ adolescence is a time when girls are faced with incredible difficulties marked by factors like losing the sense of their own true self,

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96As an example, Gilligan (1992:1) recalled the story of the murder at a crossroad where Oedipus killed his father, Laius, in a fight over power and who held the most power between them. She explained that this had come to be known as a symbol of conflict in a patriarchal society where power is always important (Gilligan 1992:1). She continued to explain the psychological reasoning for the murder of Oedipus’s father by saying that it was rooted in the separation of Oedipus by his parents during the early stages of his childhood when he was given to the shepherds which, consequently, let to Oedipus being stripped of any relational attributes (Gilligan 1992:2).
their resistance to depression, and their own unique character. By studying girls, who had been excluded from developmental studies by people like Kohlberg, it they had had the opportunity to listen to girls and their own experiences. These studies led to the discovery that connection and the relational approach are, without a doubt, necessary for the understanding of development and the way in which women function (Brown & Gilligan, 1992:3). Brown and Gilligan (1992:3) also mentioned how they regularly heard the voices of girls who showed immense bravery and courage because they were actively resisting the fact that it was expected of them to lose their own relational voice and to adopt a voice enforced upon them by a patriarchal society.

Gilligan (1991:9) recounted an occasion where a girl in an advanced stage of adolescence gathered how all of her relationships seemed to have changed from stable and secure friendships to unstable, short-term friendships. This relational disconnect seemed to have happened as she entered adolescence at the age of about eleven (Gilligan 1991:9). This disconnect had left her feeling alone, and out of touch with others and the world (Gilligan 1991:9). Adolescence is typically associated with a time of disconnection, which means that people who have a general inclination to lean toward relationships may feel oppressed, or even confused during their adolescent development years because they have a hard time to disconnect from themselves, their thoughts and emotions, their own true voice and feeling, and their connection with others (Brown & Gilligan 1992:4).

Brown and Gilligan (1992:4) shared how they often saw the confusion and struggle to disconnect in their studies with girls in their frequent use of the words
“I don’t know”\textsuperscript{97} (Brown & Gilligan 1992:4) in their responses to questions they were asked. The struggle between resisting the change and losing their own voice often had a profound influence on how they perceived themselves, their feelings about themselves, and the way they built their relationships with other people (Brown & Gilligan 1992:4). Brown and Gilligan (1992:4) mentioned that their studies with girls had led them to understand something of girls’ voices getting lost in the developmental phase of adolescence and that they also saw girls’ resistance when it comes to simply accepting the loss of their voices. Their research had a great impact on the understanding of the development of women and showed something of the impact of society and various cultures on the development of women (Brown & Gilligan 1992:4).

They showed that even though the girls in their study showed clear evidence of their ability to become independent, differentiated, autonomous, and that they can differentiate between societal and cultural groups, this developmental pattern also showed signs of the loss of their own voices, the inability to believe in their own point of view, and the distrust in their own feelings and emotions (Brown & Gilligan 1992:6). For Brown and Gilligan (1992:6), this meant that even though girls moved from childhood through adolescence, at the same time they were experiencing a developmental crisis that forced them to move away from their

\textsuperscript{97} Gilligan (1991:8) explained that the phrase “I don’t know” indicated something of dissociation – it often hid the fact that girls knew the answer they had wanted to answer, but didn’t feel confident enough to answer what they believed to be the appropriate answer. This phrase is, therefore, used to hide the knowledge that they feel may have dangerous implications, while a repeated use of the phrase “you know” helps them to test the parameters in which they are allowed to express what they know and still be connected to other people (Gilligan 1991:11). Essentially, girls are frightened to speak their minds in fear of losing relationships and would rather make use of the expression “I don’t know” to cover what they actually do know or use the phrase “you know” to see whether it would be safe to express their knowledge without compromising their relationships. The “I don’t know” becomes the covering of what is known, it becomes the voice that tells a person to ignore what they do know (Gilligan 2011:64).
own relational self. The aim of the research with girls was to offer them assistance in establishing, supporting and strengthening their own voices, their own resistance, their own courage and their unique relational approach (Gilligan 1991:15), and to create a space for girls to be in relationships in order to create a society that is more caring and just (Brown & Gilligan 1992:6).

Gilligan, Rogers, and Tolman (1991:1) made it clear from the beginning that the research being done about the understanding of the resistance to detach, often found by girls in their adolescent years, was not only important for their healthy development, but also for resistance as a strategy in the political realm of society. It had become clear that girls played a big part in the understanding of this resistance and a better understanding of resistance was gathered when girls were supported in the challenge to “know what they know and speak about their thoughts and feelings” (Gilligan, Rogers, & Tolman 1991:1). A struggle emerged for a lot of these girls when their knowledge, what they really felt or knew, seemed like it would hurt the feelings of others, or that it may disrupt relationships they were in (Gilligan, Rogers, & Tolman 1991:2). The reframing of resistance meant that resistance ought to have been understood in a different way in order to give it strength and courage to resist at the right time (Gilligan, Rogers, & Tolman 1991:2).

Gilligan (1991:16) described how girls, on a daily basis, gather information from the world around them, and that they knew exactly what they believed to be true for themselves, but that they tended to mask their own feelings and thoughts. She picked up on girls’ extraordinary ability to tune themselves into the world of relationships and their ability to connect to other people (Gilligan 1991:17). For Gilligan (1991:17), it was remarkable how girls, at the young ages of seven or

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98 Gilligan (1991:13) pointed out “that girls at adolescence experience a kind of psychic constraint or narrowing and suffer from a range of depressive symptoms, dissociative processes, and “as if” phenomena” (Gilligan 1991:13). Girls are considered to be more optimistic than boys up to puberty after which girls tend to show more signs of depressions and vulnerability (Gilligan 1991:13). Gilligan (1991:13) quotes Block in the saying that this vulnerability is caused by something that happens after puberty.
eight, had the ability to tell people exactly how they felt, or when they felt that somebody violated a relationship in some way, and how they were generally able to be aware of what was going on in relationships. Gilligan (1991:19) explained that when girls start to pick up what is being said in conversations in the world, they tend to lose their own voices and their relational knowledge gets silenced. This leads to girls suppressing their ability to point out when relationships are dishonoured (Gilligan 1991:19).

One of the girls in Lyn Mikel Brown’s study, at age sixteen, wrote a letter to Brown explaining how the voice that is inside of her had been silenced, how it felt as though her voice had been buried inside of her, and how she wished that she could have been in honest relationships with other people (Gilligan 1991:19). In hearing what other people were saying about what it meant to be a perfect girl and what it meant to be someone who is loved and liked by all people, she lost her own voice (Gilligan 1991:19). The purpose of the reframing of the resistance was to help girls to be guided past the stage in their adolescence where they lose their voices or where their voices are often silenced by outside perceptions, to a place where they would be able to speak their truth, their knowledge, and their thoughts.

In their attentiveness to relationships and their ability to tune in to what is going on around them, girls around the age of eleven often become particularly aware of their fathers as part of the world in which they live and often uncover what is not explicitly said within culture, and the humanness of men and their vulnerability (Gilligan 1991:21). Gilligan (1991:21) described something of the “embodied

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99 Gilligan (1991:17) explained how Lyn Mikel Brown experienced these girls as incredibly honest in and about relationships. She also noted the willingness of these younger girls to voice their painful experiences in relationships (Gilligan 1991:18).

100 Examples of these violations include “not being listened to, being ignored, being left out, being insulted, being criticized, being spoken about meanly, being humiliated or made fun of, being whispered about, being talked about behind one’s back, being betrayed by a friend, or being physically overpowered or hurt” (Gilligan 1991:19).
courage” (Gilligan 1991:21) that is often found with these girls in their willingness to speak the truth relating to their own beliefs and know to be true with all of their heart. This is, however, contrasted by the image of courage generally found with the image of men as someone who is without fear and does not show any signs of vulnerability (Gilligan 1991:21). In noticing the difference in the definition of courage between themselves and what their fathers portray, girls around the age of eleven tend to lose their unique embodied courage that allows them to speak their mind with all of their heart. The loss of their unique voice is further exemplified in the various ways girls tend to experience being told to cover up their body, feelings, relationships, knowing, their voices, and their desires, for all of these things are being labelled as bad (Gilligan 1991:22-23).

When she spoke about development, Gilligan (1991:23) theorised that boys and girls go through the same experience in psychological development, but at different stages; the crisis that girls experience during adolescence with separating the self from others, is the same crisis that boys experience during childhood. This relational crisis is one that calls the self to move away from relationships (Gilligan 1991:23). Gilligan (1991:23) explained that, in psychological development, it is confusing and unnatural to remove the self from relationships. The separation ought to be resisted and an alternative solution ought to be found (Gilligan 1991:23). This suggestion is supported when considering that Freud, when speaking about the Oedipus complex as a significant time of change in the early childhood of a boy’s life, suggested the same thing (Gilligan 1991:23-24).

The big difference between the experience of girls and boys, however, is that girls have a different relationship with social culture and that they are in a completely different frame of mind during adolescents than boys during their early childhood (Gilligan 1991:24). In their adolescent years, girls have experienced far more relationships than boys have had during their early childhood years, which make it considerably harder for girls to give up relationships during that age (Gilligan 1991:24). Gilligan (1991:24) therefore believed that this stage during a girl’s
development is incredibly transformational. She also stated that the relational crisis that both boys and girls experience is one that is discernible in the clear struggle they encounter in order to stay in relationship (Gilligan 1991:24). She called this struggle a “healthy resistance to disconnections which are psychologically wounding” (Gilligan 1991:24). This resistance has at its core the opposition to separation and disconnection from relationships that force these children to take on another idealisation101 (Gilligan 1991:24). When these images of “perfection” are imposed on the children during their developmental years, their initial response seems to be that of resistance to detachment because that they desire to be in the relationships that they know (Gilligan 1991:24). When their connection and relationships are threatened, these children are exposed to a struggle of a political nature (Gilligan 1991:24). It is exactly at this stage that these children need to be supported in their resistance in order to prevent becoming who they are not at heart.

2.3.1 The Resistance in Girls and Women

Brown and Gilligan (1992:216), in their study with women and girls102, picked up that girls at the age of adolescence spoke of a crossroads that was all too familiar to women in the sense that they recognised their own struggle with giving up

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101 The examples given are that of young boys who are expected to take on and embrace the image of a hero, or superhero in order to become the kind of man that they are supposed to become, or the expectation that girls will turn into the perfect women who is pure, good, and likeable in everybody’s eyes (Gilligan 1991:24).

102 The study with women and girls at Laurel School for Girls in Cleveland, Ohio, was an attempt to teach girls to resist the disconnection with their knowledge and feelings in order to be true to who they really are and what they really know and feel to be true. This study, true to the ethics of care, ran over a long period of time in order to help not only the girls, but also the women in the study, to appreciate their own thoughts and feelings.
relationship in order to stay in “relationships”. According to Brown and Gilligan (1992:216), when this happens in a patriarchal society and in a culture where the voices of men are the leading ones, the development that girls go through can be considered undeniably distressing. They further found that at adolescence girls felt that they were at risk of losing friendships or relationships if they were to speak the truth about what they were really feeling or thinking, and that they would be left feeling alone and without power (Brown & Gilligan 1992:217). Brown and Gilligan (1992:217) noted how girls, over years of studying them, tended to lose their outspoken and often courageous voice, and grew increasingly hesitant to speak the truth about what they were really thinking and feeling in fear of being called “stupid” (Brown & Gilligan 1992:217), “selfish” (Brown & Gilligan 1992:217), “rude” (Brown & Gilligan 1992:217), or “mean” (Brown & Gilligan 1992:217). What tended to happen then was that girls, who seemed to be very courageous and honest in their resistance to detachment at eight- to eleven years, grew to be less certain of what they really knew and believed (Brown & Gilligan 1992:217).

This led to girls trying to disconnect the self or the psyche from what their bodies were feeling, essentially giving up their own voices, to adopt the popular voice so that the others they were in relationship with would not know what they were really feeling and thinking, thereby taking themselves out of real relationships to become what others want them to be, or trying to become the image of the perfect person they are expected to be (Brown & Gilligan 1992:217-218). What used to be girls’ relational strength turns into girls’ ignoring what they really believe in. It is this very strength that, during adolescent years, then turns into a political liability (Brown & Gilligan 1992:218). Brown and Gilligan (1992:218) explained

103 To give up relationship in order to stay in “relationships” means that the relationship with the true self is given up in order to become an image of what will be acceptable for others so that others will still stay in relationship with the changed self. This, however, causes an inner struggle, because what is said and what is really felt in terms of thoughts and emotions, are not the same thing. Time and again, during empirical studies, this altered voice was heard at the age when girls reached adolescence, something that was seen as “girls enacting and narrating dissociation” (Brown & Gilligan 1992:216).
that in studying these girls, the lies about relationship in a patriarchal culture were exposed through girls’ relational knowledge, lies that they called “subtle untruth and various forms of violation and violence that cover over or lead women’s disappearance in both the public world of history and culture and the private world of intimacy and love” (Brown & Gilligan 1992:218).

It was found that often, in the lives of young girls, it is the adult women in their lives who are responsible for the silencing of their voices in telling them to behave like “good little girls” (Brown & Gilligan 1992:221). They found that girls had to be given the space to act on their own knowledge and feelings, even if it meant allowing differences and rambunctiousness to see the light of day (Brown & Gilligan 1992:221). The dean at Laurel School for Girls wrote of her experience of letting girls act on their knowledge and feelings, and explained that it would only be possible for these girls to speak in their own voice when the adult women in the study didn’t constantly expect goodness and control from them (Brown & Gilligan 1992:221). This meant that the girls had to be left alone to be honest and candid in their conversation.

The dean further explained that they had faith in the possibility of being “intelligently disruptive without destroying anything except the myth about the high level of female cooperativeness”\(^{104}\) (Brown & Gilligan 1992:221). Even though disagreements happened out in the open and sometimes led to a feeling of uneasiness, girls were finding their own voices and were encouraged in their own strengths (Brown & Gilligan 1992:222). In creating a space for girls to resist disconnection, Brown and Gilligan (1992:224) saw girls’ small voices growing into

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\(^{104}\) “Claudia Boatright, a most courteous and also scrupulously organized teacher, found herself permitting a loud personal argument in her classroom and was astonished to be thanked by the two girls for not interrupting them when it reached its natural conclusion. In another class, Claudia actively resisted her impulse to close off an emotionally tense conflict over a heated political question. She had come to see confronting conflict openly with strong feelings in public as essential to young women’s education” (Brown & Gilligan 1992:222).
powerful voices that knew what they wanted to say and didn't give in to the pressures from outside that expected of them to say something else.

Brown and Gilligan (1992:224) saw how “women began to speak in public and to act on the basis of what they knew through experience – to trust their own experiences and the experiences of girls and other women” (Brown & Gilligan 1992:224). In creating this space, these girls and women, addressed the psychological suffering that women had to endure in the process of losing their voices, but at the same time also created a space for women to become who they really are, to express what they really knew and felt, and to show their strong, courageous voices (Brown & Gilligan 1992:232). Brown and Gilligan (1992:232) found that, in their listening to the resisting voices of girls at the edge of adolescence and experiencing their own and other women’s responses to these girls, they began to see infinite possibilities, not only for women’s development, but also for the role that women ought to play in the course of political transformation. “If women and girls together resist giving up relationship for the sake of ‘relationships,’ then this meeting holds the potential for societal and cultural change” (Brown & Gilligan 1992:232).

### 2.3.2 A Resisting Relational Voice and a Patriarchal Voice

After identifying a definite differing voice while working with female participants in a variety of projects and studies, Gilligan set out to calculate the change in the conception of the human world. For Gilligan (1995:120), it was important to listen to women and their voices in their own terms, rather than listening to their voices in light of a theoretical framework that already existed. By doing this, the relational voice that was heard with women caused the paradigm to shift (Gilligan 1995:120). Gilligan (1995:120) explained: “Men’s disconnection from women, formerly construed as the separation of the self from relationships, and women’s dissociation from parts of themselves, formerly interpreted as women’s
selflessness in relationships, now appeared to be problematic” (1995:120). Gilligan (1995:121) noted that the dominant and only voice in psychology, politics, law, and ethics, had been a voice that was characterised by separation and disconnection. It was individualistic, autonomous, a separate self, and for the most part someone with natural rights (Gilligan 1995:121). With this image of voice being the dominant one, it was nearly impossible to hear a relational voice unless it was specifically looked for (Gilligan 1995:121). When the relational voices of women were heard, it was considered to be “unnatural, unhealthy or unreal” (Gilligan 1995:121).

After Gilligan’s research saw the light of day, it created new opportunities that were greatly needed on political, personal, theoretical, and psychological levels (Gilligan 1995:121). Gilligan (1995:121) explained that a paradigm shift was important, because the only paradigm at that stage was a patriarchal paradigm that was built upon the definite separation from women, while it was still regarded as the psychology for both women and men. The theories that were developed within this paradigm, whether psychological or political, were built upon the reasoning that separation was crucial in the development of the self causing a patriarchal system to seem completely natural, unavoidable, maybe even essential and respectable (Gilligan 1995:121-122).

Gilligan (1995:122), then, made an important distinction between a feminine ethic of care and a feminist ethic of care. The feminine ethic of care, Gilligan (1995:122) said, is an ethic of care that is a relational approach situated within a patriarchal society where everything political and psychological is still only considered to be successful within a framework of separation and detachment, a world in which autonomy and freedom is only part of a justice orientation. This ethic of care is marked by selflessness and self-sacrifice wherein relationships are in definite

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105 Held (2014:110) explains Gilligan’s understanding of “the separation of the self from relationships and the splitting of thought from emotion” (Held 2014:110) as an experience of “injury or responses to trauma” (Held 2014:110). This leads to the suppression of a person’s own voice by the pressures enforced by patriarchal structures (Held 2014:110).
opposition to self-development (Gilligan 1995:122). The feminist ethic of care, however, has its starting point in connection and attachment that is seen as fundamentally important within human life (Gilligan 1995:122). The premise of the feminist ethic of care is that the lives of human beings are interconnected in a variety of ways and it regards the idea of the self separated from others as problematic\(^\text{106}\) (Gilligan 1995:122).

Gilligan (1995:122) believed that if psychology were to be reframed in order to include connection, the view of humanity would forever be changed and that politics, ethics, and the legal system would be considerably enriched. From this point of view, it became clear that the world of disconnection and separation, a world where the public and private spheres of life are completely separated, can only be successful if there is someone to take care of the relational needs in the world, the world often limited to the private sphere (Gilligan 1995:122). This “labour of care” (Gilligan 1995:122) had, in the past, been left to women, or quite often, “the poorly paid labour of women” (Gilligan 1995:122), who are not regarded as equal and free human beings in a patriarchal society (Gilligan 1995:122).

Gilligan explained that “women living in patriarchal families, societies, and culture are bound internally and externally by obligations of care without complaint, on pain of becoming a bad woman: unfeminine, ungenerous, uncaring” (1995:122). She found that women could only be freed from these restrictions after they were exposed to a process of regaining their voices that had been silenced by the structures of patriarchy (Gilligan 1995:122). Gilligan (1995:122-123) argued that relational approaches that are caught in a patriarchal society meant that women

\(^{106}\) This resonates with a morality that is often found in the African context where relationship and community is regarded as vital and separation of disregard for the community is seen as deeply problematic. More will be said about this relational African approach to morality at the end of the fourth chapter.
were giving up on relationship in order to have “relationships”. The difference between a feminine ethic of care and a feminist ethic of care, therefore, is that a feminist ethic of care suggests and supports the resistance to the silencing of a voice (Gilligan 1995:123).

Gilligan (1995:123) described the patriarchal voice as a society that depends on the disconnection from and separation of women that leads to women often feeling like they do not know what they really know, or that they do not feel what they really feel, or that they do not think what they really are thinking. She said that this kind of dissociation filters through the memories and experiences of women, which leads them to feel like their cultural history and their entire reality is unsubstantiated (Gilligan 1995:123-124). In finding freedom to make their voices heard, the women of the 1970’s made it known that they had been left out from a great part history and psychology, and further found to what extent their bodies, relationships, and themselves had been lost to dissociations (Gilligan 1995:124).

Gilligan (1995:124) reported how women consequently found it problematic that they were regarded as the ones who ought to care when care was regarded as an “ethic of selflessness and self-sacrifice in relationships” (Gilligan 1995:124). They had realised that being selfless and sacrificing themselves at all odds meant that they were losing out psychologically and politically (Gilligan 1995:124). Women now regarded themselves to be human, and demanded that their relational orientations be considered as important on the public and political agendas (Gilligan 1995:124). “In this way, women reframed women’s problems as human concerns” (Gilligan 1995:125). Gilligan (1995:125), thus, regarded the

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107 Gilligan (1995:124) explained this as a kind of selflessness where the voice of the self is lost in relationships.

108 These relational orientations included “relationships with children, family relationships, relationships with the environment, relationships with the future as developed through education and health care, and above all, the problem of violence in domestic as well as national and international relationships” (Gilligan 1995:124-125).
hearing of the difference between a relational voice and a patriarchal voice as the recognition or acknowledgment of a voice of separation, which has seemed normal, and as one that is both psychologically and politically destructive. She believed that a relational voice in psychology and politics calls for both justice and care to be understood within a relational framework\textsuperscript{109} (Gilligan 1995:125).

Like Freud and Breuer, Gilligan (1995:125) believed that a relational approach is so effective and powerful that if it were to be taken seriously in the public, it could lead to a democratic society in which people can live and speak in complete freedom. For Gilligan (1995:125), not only are the voices of women, but also the voices of men freed in the process of adopting a relational approach to psychology, the political realm, the justice system, ethical theories, and philosophy to such an extent that the patriarchal system disintegrates\textsuperscript{110}.

\subsection*{2.3.3 A Feminist Ethic of Care to Resist Injustice?}

In her book, \textit{Joining the Resistance} (2011), Gilligan (2011:7) recalls how she used to associate the word patriarchy with anthropology, studies of tribalism, and feminism to the extent that it meant that women despised men. It was only later

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{109} The call for the ethics of care to be included in the political sphere will be further discussed and developed in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 will see a theological argument for a similar stance, especially from the perspective of the Love Commandment that serves as the basis for both orientations.
\item \textsuperscript{110} Denise Ackermann, a prominent feminist theologian in South Africa, when writing about freedom, distinguishes between differing understandings of freedom. For her, to be free means that a person should be “free from” (Ackermann 2014:140) that which binds a person, but also “free for” (Ackermann 2014:140) the other. She writes: “To be free is not simply the absence of interference, a freedom from, but it is, in fact, a freedom for – freedom for attaining worthy goals, freedom for goodness, freedom to cross barriers and connect with “the other”, freedom to be what we were created to be, that is fully and truly human” (Ackermann 2014:141). She continues to explain that freedom only makes sense to her when it is understood as concept of relationship (Ackermann 2014:148). “Yes, I am free to be myself. I have agency to determine the internal norms that govern my actions, but my freedom is mediated by and depends on how I relate to others... By “others” I mean first of all God (and my relationship with God), and then other people (and my relationship with them).” (Ackermann 2014:148).
\end{itemize}
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Denise Ackermann was Professor of Christianity and Society at the University of the Western Cape, South Africa, until her retirement in 2000. She is currently an Extraordinary Professor at the Faculty of Theology at the University of Stellenbosch.
in life that she had learned that patriarchy had to do with privilege and power (Gilligan 2011:8). In working with girls, and hearing them say that their voices are being buried deep inside of themselves and having seen girls resist the silencing of their voices, even at the cost of conflict, Gilligan (2011:8) realised that she was asking herself what girls were resisting against. In coming to this realisation, she decided to listen to physical voices and started hearing the voices as a metaphor for the self (Gilligan 2011:9). In working with girls in her empirical studies, Gilligan had heard a resisting voice that would inspire change and bring hope for a truly democratic society. She recalls how the voices of some of the girls and women she had worked with taught her that what was needed for love and what was needed for citizenship in a flourishing democracy was the same thing: voice, the natural need to live a relational life, and the ability to resist deceitful authority (Gilligan 2011:12). For Gilligan (2011:13), it is unthinkable that an authentic ethic of care could exist if the injustices brought forth by patriarchy were not resisted.

When she speaks about culture, Gilligan (2011:15) notes that it is a way of speaking and understanding things in such a way that it becomes unnoticed in the everyday life of people. She explains that it is only when there is a change in cultural that the routines of everyday culture are noticed (Gilligan 2011:16). In writing her book In a Different Voice (1982), Gilligan tried to shift the paradigms that were so set in culture, paradigms that depicted men as human beings and portrayed women as being different (Gilligan 2011:16). Her concern was great when she noticed that it was not a problem for either men or women that women were being excluded from studies regarding human development, thus leading to the understanding that men, their autonomy and their rationality, were the

\[\text{\footnote{Harrison (1985:5) writes that misogyny can only be resisted when “women’s concrete power is manifest, when we women live and act as full and adequate persons in our own right” (Harrison 1985:5). If a society want to reflect something of a true democracy, then it will be crucial for women to claim their own voice and to stand up for their own rights to live as full and flourishing human beings in a democratic society. Harrison (1985:7) further explains that the biggest threat to the cause of resisting injustices caused by patriarchy, is that the anger of women will be turned inward, causing women to appear as though they are victims as opposed to women “who have struggled for the gift of life against incredible odds” (Harrison 1985:7). Anger should rather be focused on oppressive structures such as patriarchy.}}\]
measure for humanity and its development (Gilligan 2011:16). Women were silenced “in the name of goodness” (Gilligan 2011:17), for it was ‘a good woman’ who paid attention to the needs and want of others and made an effort to respond to them (Gilligan 2011:17). Gilligan (2011:17) believes that the ethics of care is currently more relevant and necessary than ever before based on the fact that despite knowing that people in the world are interdependent and that autonomy is surrealistic, inequality is still a fierce reality (Gilligan 2011:17). This inequality comes to the fore in a variety of ways, including during discussions on race and gender.

Gilligan (2011:18) explains that it is impossible for her to speak on issues of gender without speaking about patriarchy, which is the enforcer of gender problems, for patriarchy112 is “an order of living based upon gender: where being a man means not being a woman and also being on top” (Gilligan 2011:18). For all intents and purposes, patriarchy is nothing other than a system in which men dominate over women (Gilligan 2011:19). Gilligan (2011:19) explains that care, in a patriarchal society, becomes a “feminine ethic” (Gilligan, 2011:19) and not a widespread concern. When caring is gendered and force women to become primary care-givers, they are forced to become selfless (Gilligan, 2011:19). What Gilligan (2011:22) set out to do, was to create a democratic framework wherein care was considered to be a human ethic. Care, therefore, ought to be regarded as a feminist ethics113 and not a feminine ethic (Gilligan 2014:101). Feminism that is guided by the ethics of care can be one of the most powerful and radical

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112 Gilligan (2011:19) explains that a patriarchal family, religion, or culture believes that authority is carried over from generation to generation from the father and that male qualities are of higher standard than that of females.

113 Robinson (1997:119) believed that feminist ethics “clarifies the moral legitimacy and necessity of the kinds of social, political and personal changes that feminism demand in order to end male domination, or perhaps to end domination generally” (Robinson 1997:119).
theories in the history of human liberation movements\textsuperscript{114} (Gilligan 2014:101). In order to do this, it is necessary to promote a feminist ethic of care wherein the voices of reason and emotion are connected, where the mind is not separated from the body, where the self is relational\textsuperscript{115}, and where men are considered equal to women, all in an effort to resist the general acceptance of patriarchy\textsuperscript{116} (Gilligan 2011:22). Gilligan (2011:22) stresses the importance of not merely having a democracy for the sake of equality, but also recognising that different voices form an essential part of a democracy.

The concept of care and the practice of care, Gilligan (2011:23) believes, is not to be considered a gendered\textsuperscript{117} concept insofar as it becomes an issue for women only, but should rather be seen as a concern of human beings\textsuperscript{118}. In saying this, she calls for the conversation of the care versus justice debate not to be recognised by its gendered nature for the fear that people will be caught in its obstinacy and never get to the importance of the conversation about how justice

\textsuperscript{114} Gilligan (2014:101) argues that if feminism can be released from the binary of gender and hierarchy, then it is not an issue of women, or an ongoing battle between women and men, but rather a movement that seeks to free democracy from patriarchy.

\textsuperscript{115} Similar to a feminist ethics of care, Harrison (1985:15) argued that central to a feminist moral theology, is relationships. She wrote about a feminist moral theology saying: “As a feminist moral theology celebrates the power of our human praxis as an intrinsic aspect of the work of God’s love, as it celebrates the reality that our moral selves as body-selves who touch and see and hear each other into life, recognizing sensuality as fundamental to the work and power of love, so above all else a feminist moral theology insists that relationality is at the heart of all things” (Harrison 1985:15).

\textsuperscript{116} Susan Frank Parsons (2002:212), the founding member of the Society of St Catherine of Siena and Feminism and Christian Ethics scholar, reiterates the fact that feminist ethics has a great appreciation for relationships. She explains that it is “within ties of biological kinship and communal association the human person is born, nurtures, and fulfilled” (Parsons 2002:212). She continues to explain that feminists have decided to call these relationships “care” (Parsons 2002:212) that seeks the flourishing of all people (Parsons 2002:212).

\textsuperscript{117} Ruddick (1987:238) explained that the justice and reasoning too should not be considered to be exclusively ascribed to males. Rationality is not something that is found only in males, and it most certainly does not imply that “women cannot and should not be rational” (Ruddick 1987:238).

\textsuperscript{118} Joan Tronto echoes this when she calls for the passes that men get out of caring to be revoked. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.
and care, and rights and responsibility, can be mutually rewarding (Gilligan 2011:23). Fairness and rights, generally associated with men in the justice orientation, has to do with the rules and principles in life (Gilligan 2011:23). Therefore, if women are regarded as people, and all people have rights, then women are entitled to rights (Gilligan 2011:23). Care is at its core a relation ethic that is based on the fact that all humans are interdependent, yet not selfless (Gilligan 2011:23). If justice is seen as an approach that has reason, mind, and the self at its core, and care is seen as an approach that has emotion, body, and relationship at its core, then it is clear to see how, in a patriarchal society, justice and care are divided into masculine and feminine, where justice becomes the dominant approach over care119 (Gilligan 2011:23-24).

Gilligan (2011:24) consequently argues that when morality becomes gendered, the image of what is means to be a man becomes equivalent to that of carelessness, while the image of what it means to be a woman becomes that of someone who is willing to give up right in order to stay in relationships and to keep peace at bay. Splitting men and women to fit into these categories, is to systematically distort and twist the nature of what it means to be a man or a woman (Gilligan & Richards 2009:193). When this happens, an argument ensues over which gender is better than the other (Gilligan & Richards 2009:193). For Gilligan (2011:24), the belief that men do not care and that justice is not important for women is nothing but ridiculous. She therefore argues that the different voice should rather be understood in terms of theme and not in terms of gender (Gilligan 2011:24).

Gilligan (2011:25) believes that it is only in a culture of patriarchy that the different voice of the ethics of care sounds as though it is feminine and that if it is understood "within its own right and on its own terms, it is a human voice" (Gilligan 2011:25). She argues that the voice of the ethics of care can serve as a voice

119 Gilligan and Richards (2009:193) explain that “mind, reason, self, and culture were considered masculine and were elevated above body, emotion, relationship, and nature, seen as feminine and like women at once idealized and devalued” (Gilligan & Richards 2009:193).
that guides human beings in a careful manner in a human world that often seems to highlight the cost of carelessness (Gilligan 2014:103).

Gilligan (2011:26) elucidates that children who are being led into patriarchy are being forced into gender roles that are driven by “shaming and exclusion” (Gilligan 2011:26). If boys do not act like the stereotypical image of a “real boy” (Gilligan 2011:27), or a girl does not act like the stereotypical image of what it means to be a “good girl” (Gilligan 2011:27), then they are shamed, or sometimes even beaten, or excluded, or mocked and judged by other kids, adding the stresses and struggles of psychological development (Gilligan 2011:27). In a patriarchal society, the notion of separating the self from relational situations, the control of the mind over the body, and the heightened sense of reason over emotion, marks the excellence of development and maturity, a theory that Freud, Erikson, Piaget, and Kohlberg, among others, firmly believed in (Gilligan 2011:28). This is not only oppressive and traumatising for girls, but also for boys who often lose their sense of their true self in name of becoming a “man”.

In working with boys and their fathers in some of her studies, Gilligan (2011:29-30) recalls how fathers fear that their boys would lose a sense of self in the process of becoming what is expected of boys, and eventually men. The fathers speak of a relational sensitivity that they see in their boys that they hope will not give way to individuality and autonomy (Gilligan 2011:30). In essence, these fathers are calling for the same resistance in their sons during early childhood as the resistance that is called for in girls during their adolescent years.

When it comes to resisting the patriarchy and creating a space for true democracy, a democracy free of gendered paradigms, it is important to change

\[12^{122}\] Gilligan (2011:27) noted that it often happens that boys between the ages of five and seven, “the age when boys who cross gender boundaries are called girls or gay or sissies or mama’s boys” (Gilligan 2011:27), show signs of learning disorders and speech problems, problems with paying attention, and behavioural problems. She further noted that boys tend to be more inclined to depression than girls up until the age of adolescence, the time when it becomes more difficult to adhere to the norms of being a stereotypical “good girl” or be classified as a “bad girl” which ultimately leads to exclusion or inclusion in social situations (Gilligan 2011:27).
the image of the self away from being aggressive, competitive, and overly self-interested (Gilligan 2011:32). The act of losing compassion, empathy, and cooperation need to be resisted at all cost for it creates a space were people have the ability to love and live together in a democratic setting (Gilligan 2011:32). Gilligan (2011:32) further argues that women’s voices are essential in freeing democracy from the clutches of patriarchy, not because women are fundamentally different or even the same as men, but because “there is an inherent tension between … human nature and the structures of patriarchy, leading the healthy psyche to resist an initiation that mandates a loss of voice and a sacrifice of relationship” (Gilligan 2011:33). Gilligan (2011:37) believes that the loss of voice and the sacrifice of relationships is not only damaging to the psychological health of people, but also when it comes to democracy. As with girls, boys also compromise their feeling, emotions, and relationship in order to adhere to the rules of what it means to be masculine (Gilligan 2011:38).

Gilligan (2011:38) states that boys in early childhood have the same emotional capacity to read into the relational sphere of the world, even when those emotions are not clear to see\textsuperscript{121}. She explains that children at the age of four or five learn how things are in life, but when they reach adolescence, they get taught “how things are said to be: how we talk about things, what is the right way to speak and to be” (Gilligan 2011:38). As a result of the fact that girls are only exposed to the change in who they ought to be at adolescence, unlike boys who experience it at childhood, girls can more easily speak against it (Gilligan 2011:38-39). Even though it is easier for girls to resist these injustices enforced upon them at adolescence than it is for boys at adolescence, it is still a struggle for girls due to the fact that their honesty may cause them some trouble (Gilligan 2011:39). The resistance to these psychological losses in girls is, however, very important

\textsuperscript{121} Gilligan (2011:38) recalls how a five-year-old boy asked his mother why she was smiling when she is sad, showing that boys in early childhood have the same ability as girls to read emotional reactions in the world.
because it eventually matures into a political resistance when the truth is spoken (Gilligan 2011:39). In this sense, the contribution of women to call patriarchy on its injustice is immeasurable. Gilligan (2011:39) further explains that if the resistance of girls does not reach the right channels, it would again be silenced or it may turn into psychological resistance that prevents them from knowing what they actually do know. In writing her book *In a Different Voice* (1982), Gilligan found herself asking the question: “If women’s voices differ from the voice of psychological and moral theory, is the problem in women or in theory?” (2011:41). Her answer to this question is that it is both in theory and in women that there is a problem; in the theory insofar it needs to hear the additional approach heard through the different voice and in women as far as resisting the patriarchal gender codes enforced upon them, forcing their voices to be silenced (Gilligan 2011:41). She recalls how the frame, that at that stage existed as the human experience, had shifted and changed the moment women’s voices were brought into the conversation (Gilligan 2011:41).

Women’s lives have increasingly changed since their voices were being heard, also as a result of the fact that the rights of women were seen as human rights, thereby paying more attention the fact that women are human (Gilligan 2011:48). Gilligan (2011:104) describes the paradigm shift that had taken place, following research that had included the voices of women, as a new paradigm where women were no longer regarded as merely emotional beings without any rationality, and as people having relationships, but not a self. Even men were no

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122 Taylor, Gilligan, & Sullivan (1995:26) identified at least two forms of political resistance; it can be covert or overt. This first form of political resistance would, for instance, be a girl who keeps her feelings and her knowledge inside herself, while publically complying with social conventions of what is expected of her (Taylor, Gilligan, & Sullivan 1995:26). The alternative would be a girl who, for instance, speaks out about the relationships in her life that feels fake and will speak and act against social convention enforced upon her which forces her to separate from others (Taylor, Gilligan, & Sullivan 1995:26).

123 In an important act of bringing the voices of women into conversation and changing the conversation to include their experiences, the path also opened up for men to speak about their experiences of being violated, and in the process saw the exposure of sexual abuse by priests come to the fore (Gilligan 2011:41).
longer only considered to be exclusively rational being without having a trace of emotion or regarded to be merely autonomous (Gilligan 2011:104). The paradigm shift had brought with it the release of the voices of both women and men, voices that had previously been silenced and misunderstood (Gilligan & Richards 2009:193). Therefore, in the freeing of the voices of women, the relational nature of all human beings was set free (Gilligan 2011:104).

In her research, Gilligan (2011:42) had found that the enemy of patriarchy, the one thing that breaks all hierarchies and crosses all boundaries and the one thing that questions the way things are in life, is love. She quotes Patricia Papperman, who wrote: “There is nothing exceptional about vulnerable people” (Gilligan 2001:42-43) and in doing so states that vulnerability is no longer to be understood as a feminine characteristic, but rather as a human characteristic (Gilligan 2011:43). Gilligan (2011:43), therefore, calls for the different voice, the relational voice, the voice of love, to be included as an equal to justice in the moral framework in order for democracy to be freed from patriarchy. What has to be kept in mind is that the different voice, the voice of resistance, is an honest

124 From a theological point of view, this is definitely a point of connection – love, more specifically the Love Commandment, is the cornerstone of Christian theology. If a theological ethics of care wants to be a relevant moral theory, it needs to understand the crucial importance of love as a basis for its existence. Harrison (1985:11) explained the importance of this when she wrote: “I believe that an adequate moral theology must call the tradition of Christian ethics to accountability for minimizing the deep power of human action in the work of or the denial of love. Because we do not understand love as the power to act-each-other-into-well-being... The fateful choice is ours, either to set the power of God’s love in the world or to deprive each other of the very basis of personhood and community” (Harrison 1985:11).

Love resists all kinds of hierarchy. Love resists the patriarchal structures that claim that some people ought to be regarded as better than others, or be regarded as more important than others. Love places all people on equal standing before God – God did not send His son to the world to empower and save only men, or the privileged, or those that hold high status in society, but rather sent Jesus as assurance than the whole world is loved (John 3:16; Gal 3:28). Harrison (1985:12) argued that the world has become a place “on the verge of self-destruction and death because society as a whole has so deeply neglected the most basic of all the works of love – the work of human communication, of caring and nurturance, of tending the personal bonds of community. This work has been seen as women’s work and discounted as too mundane and undramatic, too distracting from the serious business of the world” (Harrison 1985:12).

125 Grey (1995:32) wrote that ”[V]ulnerability is not a weakness...but an openness to the other, a cultivation of that space...to nurture compassionate empathy so that it can become the basis of another ethic...to resist violence“.
voice (Gilligan 2011:63). Given the fact that the resisting voice is an honest voice, it does not always represent a pleasant voice to other people (Gilligan 2011:63).

Quite often, this voice can cause disruptions in communities, in schools, among friends, or in families and because of this, girls often cover this voice (Gilligan 2011:63). Regardless of the fact that it causes disruption, it is important to pay attention to this voice, for it is an honest voice within relationships. Hrdy, Gilligan (2011:64) says, describes the complicated situation girls find themselves in by noting that they are capable of reading situations and emotions, but live in a society that constantly tells them they cannot. They are also capable of being in relationship and desire connection with people, but find themselves in a society that tells them that separation and independence are the ultimate features of success. Girls further find themselves with a desire to work cooperatively, but simultaneously find themselves in a society that calls for competitiveness in order to succeed.

Gilligan (2011:67) explains that the hierarchy that is found within structures of patriarchy relies on dissociation so that relationship will not inhibit its progress. A democratic society, however, is built on the parallel structures of mutual understanding (Gilligan 2011:67). This mutual understanding, the empathy, the ability to cooperate, and the capability of reading emotions and situation, poses a threat to the hierarchical structures of patriarchy that seeks to eradicate this by oppressing it (Gilligan 2011:67). Girls are thereby forced into deciding whether they want their voices to be heard or having relationships with others (Gilligan 2011:76). By resisting this oppression, it is possible to establish and maintain democracy. This resistance, however, causes girls to be described as “having a problem with separation” (Gilligan 2011:76), which happens to be the truth because they do not want to separate themselves from their voice and relationships (Gilligan 2011:76). For Gilligan (2011:76-77), it is crucial to find the

126 Harrison (1985:12) wrote: “We are not most godlike in our human power when we take the view from the top, the view of rulers, or of empires, or the view of patriarchs”.

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roots of the gender issues and hierarchies that are prominent in patriarchy in order to eradicate them so that freedom and love can reign free\textsuperscript{127}.

When it comes to resistance, Gilligan (2011:109) believes that the ability of humans to love and the ability to live with wholeness rest upon each individual’s ability to resist the gender roles of patriarchy that is enforced upon them. In order to resist injustice, it is crucial to be able to identify resistance. This resistance is important, because the basis of a fair and just society and political change is based upon a psychological transformation that can only come from resistance\textsuperscript{128} (Gilligan 2011:122). Gilligan (2011:151) believes that when it comes to education, girls should learn how to give voice to their disagreements within a public space. She believes that education is at the heart of social change, especially because of the fact that it is nonviolent (Gilligan 2011:153). If women could succeed in resisting psychologically, it is within them to resist politically (Gilligan 2011:154).

Gilligan (2011:128) suggests that there are five psychological truths about resistance: The first truth is that that which is unsaid or unspoken, due to the fact that it is not in relationship, shows a tendency to lose perspective and to be dominant in the psychic sphere of life (Gilligan 2011:128). The second truth is that loss is characterised by idealisation, fury, and incredible sadness (Gilligan 2011:128-129). The third truth is that that which has been suppressed or dissociated, that which was at first known and then unknown, has a tendency to come back time and again (Gilligan 2011:129). The fourth truth is that “the logic of psyche is an associative logic … as well as a formal logic of classification and control” (Gilligan 2011:129). The fifth truth is that the answers to questions are

\textsuperscript{127} Gilligan (2011:76-77) calls for the patriarchal gender binaries and hierarchical structures to be recognised as a hate crime against humans.

\textsuperscript{128} An example of resistance found in women is seen in the resistance of women against the reign of Nazi’s. Their resistance was marked by the subtle ways in which they hid documents under babies, how they hid information from officers by seducing them, and manipulating them instead of confronting them (Gilligan 2011:124). They did not, however, openly oppose the Nazi reign and did what was expected of them, like to vote the Nazi’s into power (Gilligan 2011:124).
typically learned and that the questions that are asked shapes a person’s knowledge (Gilligan 2011:129). Gilligan uses the work of American Psychoanalyst, Teresa Bernardez, to explain that resistance is born from a place where anger has turned into bitterness or where hatred turns back into anger when a person becomes aware of an injustice that they have suffered (2011:154). She explains that this anger has to do with “self-love and [an] awareness of responsibility for making choices” (Gilligan 2011:154-155).

Gilligan (2011:157-158) notes that girls, when they voice their honest opinions against people who are in power, seem to find themselves in conflict with those people, but that if they were to silence their honest voice, they would be in conflict with themselves. She explains that girls have the ability to see it from both perspectives and that it shows something of their ability to understand relationship and how to stay in relationship with both themselves and with other people (Gilligan 2011:158). Gilligan (2011:158) believes that it is important for girls entering adolescence to stay in relationship with women in order for them to be supported in their resistance to losing their voices, but also notes that it is an extremely difficult task for women to create a space for girls to learn traditions, but also allow for them to hear, see, and experience the world in their own way. In the process of supporting girls in their resistance, girls teach women to enquire about their own silence and receive the opportunity to hear their own honest voices that had been silenced (Gilligan 2011:160). Gilligan (2011:162) further describes how, while listening to girls and their questions, girls had inquiries about

129 Harrison (1985:14) wrote about anger and how it can sometimes be regarded as a form of care. She wrote: “Anger is not the opposite of love. It is better understood as a feeling-signal that all is not well in our relation to other persons or groups or to the world around us, Anger is a mode of connectedness to others and it is always a vivid form of caring” (Harrison 1985:14). She continued to say that anger can be seen as a form of resistance within the self about the quality of morality in certain social relationships (Harrison 1985:14). For her, realising and recognising this anger, is to “understand the power of anger in the work of love” (Harrison 1985:14). It is within this anger that change is needed in order to restore a relationship (Harrison 1985:15).

130 More will be said about self-love and the importance thereof when reflecting on a theological ethics of care in the fourth chapter of this dissertation.
relationships. She is convinced if girls’ curiosity and questioning continue, they will be able to find the connection between what is personal and what is political (Gilligan 2011:162). Once the healthy resistance becomes political, it will be easier to create a better world to live in (Gilligan 2011:163).

When speaking about humanity and what it means to be human, Gilligan (2011:164) points out that it is important to ask the right questions. She holds that when it comes to humanity, the question should not be how to gain the capacity to care, but rather how the capacity to care was lost (Gilligan 2011:164-165). She says that “it is in the absence of care or the failure to care that calls for explanation” (Gilligan 2011:165). In linking a feminist ethic of care to politics, Gilligan (2011:177) explains that a feminist ethic of care is essential in order to free democracy from patriarchy. She explains that a feminist ethic of care is rooted in the need to put the future generation first, to think of their wellbeing first (Gilligan 2011:177). A feminist ethic of care considers everything that makes a person human as important and warns a person when their humanity is being breached (Gilligan 2011:177). It is thus important for this feminist ethic of care to free democracy from patriarchy, for it is patriarchy that keeps on forming a divide between men and women, eventually isolating them from each other as human beings (Gilligan 2011:178).

What is needed from a feminist ethic of care is resistance. A resistance to psychoanalysis that forces women to believe that they do not know what they know, and do not feel what they feel, and resistance as a political resistance in a sense that it does not fear to speak the truth to power (Gilligan & Richards 2009:194). Patriarchy has the ability to convince men and women alike that human nature is false and thereby claims that any resistance to this patriarchal structure is immoral and wrong (Gilligan & Richards 2009:197). Gilligan and Richards (2009:193) consequently fault the lens of patriarchy with which human development has been looked at for far too long and calls for a resistance in order to shift the paradigm to be liberated to live a relational life.
The resisting voice of a feminist ethic of care, therefore, has the ability to transform a patriarchal society to a democratic society. Gilligan and Richards (2009:240) explains that a constitutional democracy is marked by its ability to create a space for different voices to be accepted upon equal grounds. They warn that the freedom and the respect for equality when it comes to voice within society is something that goes against the grain of patriarchy and its understanding of authority (Gilligan & Richards 2009:240). Even more than that, patriarchy finds it stability in the silencing of certain voices, especially those voices that are resisting it or those who are trying to dislodge its basis (Gilligan & Richards 2009:240). The resisting of patriarchy and what it stands for is, thus, at the same time, both a democratic act and a process of democratising (Gilligan & Richards 2009:240-241).

Gilligan and Richards (2009:241) believe that resistance against patriarchal structure is psychologically possible and alluring because of the fact that it has the ability to break through silence through its ability to see, know, and speak about the concept of love. They quote Auden in saying: “We must love one another or die” (Gilligan & Richards 2009:241). Examples of resistance succeeding against patriarchal structures can be found in the Civil Rights Movement against a racist America (Gilligan & Richards 2009:241), the women who embarked on a mission to resist patriarchal structures in claiming their voices during the time of second wave feminism (Gilligan & Richards 2009:241), and men and women who took part in the Gay Rights Movement in order to resist the restrictive conceptions of what it meant to be a woman or a man so that equal rights for love would be permitted (Gilligan & Richards 2009:242). According to Gilligan and Richards (2009:242), the driving force behind the resistance in these movements of resistance, was the different voice that had had enough of patriarchal structures impeding the freedom of a voice “in experience, in the body

\[131\] An example of a democratic act and the process of democratising, may be, for instance, the liberation movements of the 1960’s where people demanded their right to have their voices heard on equal basis (Gilligan & Richards 2009:241).
and in relationship” (Gilligan & Richards 2009:242). What was also interesting was that in most cases of resistance movements in the past, women played a leading role, along with men that had realised that their resistance of patriarchy was needed (Gilligan & Richards 2009:242).

Gilligan and Richards (2009:243) note that it is deceptive to think that it is possible to merely resist one injustice enforced by patriarchy without resisting other injustices. At the heart of a democracy lies the equal exposure of all injustices so that all human beings can have their voice equally heard. At the heart of patriarchy lies “a systematic distortion of men’s and women’s nature in the service of maintaining a patriarchal order” (Gilligan & Richards 2009:265). The tautness between patriarchy and democracy lies in the struggle between the violence of patriarchy and the voice of democracy (Gilligan & Richards 2009:265). By listening to the voice, the desire to love and the desire for democracy are brought to the fore (Gilligan & Richards 2009:265).

It becomes clear that boys at childhood and girls during their adolescent years have a natural inclination to resist their initiation into a patriarchal society that stops them from knowing what they know and feeling what they feel (Gilligan & Richards 2009:266). This resistance brings forth a paradigm shift in the way resistance is perceived; no longer is resistance to detach seen as a flaw in development, but rather as “a resistance to losing grounds of … ethical and emotional intelligence” (Gilligan & Richards 2009:266). Human beings are “responsive, relational beings, born with a voice and with the desire to live in relationship, along with the capacity to spot false authority. Within ourselves, we have the requisites both to love and for citizenship in a democratic society” (Gilligan 2014:90). At the heart of this resistance, therefore, lies the courage of a feminist ethic of care that is willing to speak the truth to power in order for a flourishing democracy to see the light of day.

In this chapter, the development of Carol Gilligan’s understanding of the ethics of care as a contemporary moral theory, especially in the academic discipline of
psychology, was discussed in great detail. This was important, because the validity and argument of an entire theory rests upon the sound and credible development to this theory. This section paid special attention to various empirical studies and their results in order to show that the care orientation was a consistent and important addition to morality that needed to be taken seriously. The development of the ethics of care a contemporary moral theory eventually led to a discussion on the influence and implications of the ethics of care on the moral domain and a call for the moral domain to be adapted in order to include a care orientation in moral formation. In order to include the care orientation, it is vital to resist the patriarchal structures that do not allow for the care-orientation to be included in the moral domain.

This, in turn, led to a study where Gilligan assists girls in their endeavour to resist the injustices brought about by patriarchal structures in order to be their relational selves. In the process of resisting injustice, the importance of a feminist ethics of care was discussed in order to free true democracy from patriarchy. If democracy is to be freed from patriarchy, then it is important to spend some time reflecting on the political potential of the ethics of care. The next chapter will therefore build on this idea by looking at politics and how the ethics of care can contribute to securing a true democracy. One of the leading voices when it comes to politics and the ethics of care is Political scientist, Joan Tronto. She will be the key figure in the next chapter.
Chapter 3
From Resisting Injustice to Caring Democracy

In 1993, well after Gilligan had written extensively on the ethics of care and how it had influenced the moral domain, Joan Tronto, a professor of Political Science at City University of New York\textsuperscript{132} and specialist in the field of the ethics of care, like Gilligan during the 1980’s, wrote a book on morality. Her book, \textit{Moral Boundaries} (1993), made a political argument to support the ethics of care and became increasingly influential. She argued that care is not a gendered concept, but that it is universal in its nature and that it is far more political than generally accepted. In order for a care ethic to be adopted, the moral domain needed to adapt. Similar to Steve De Gruchy’s concern that the call for liberation was insufficient in the context of Apartheid South Africa and that justice was also needed for transformation and change to happen, Tronto felt that the moral theories, on which the existing theories of change were built, were not adequate for transformation to happen efficiently in her own context (Tronto 1993:x). Consequently, she called for a way of living that included caring for each other on a daily basis as a principle of human existence (Tronto 1993:x).

The metaphor that Tronto used to talk about morality was boundaries. For her, boundaries could help to provide a better understanding of what she meant when she spoke about morality and the way in which it had to be transformed. Tronto (1993:x) explained that she used the metaphor of boundaries when speaking about morality for primarily two reasons; the first reason being that boundaries allowed for people to understand something of inclusion and exclusion, while the second reason tried to find out whether there may be an alternative to the most prominent understanding of morality. She believed that whatever morality encompassed, it should provide people with a way of living in which all people are respected and dealt with in a just manner (Tronto 1993:x). According to Tronto (1993:x), the only way to do this was to honour

\textsuperscript{132} The work and research in this section is based in a North American context, unless it is explicitly stated otherwise.
the way in which people cared for themselves, others, and for the world. She therefore believed that humans would only be able to flourish when a “liberal, democratic, pluralistic society” (Tronto 1993:x) was created (Tronto 1993:x). By arguing for a liberal and democratic society that embraces care, Tronto (1993:xi) believed that even conventional liberal thought would be transformed.

3.1 Morality and Boundaries

Morality of men and women within the twenty-first century context of the United States of America is no easier to understand, or even deconstruct, than it was in the twentieth century, not to mention centuries before then. For great parts of history, women’s morality has been somewhat questionable. Morality, up until recently, had often been measured according to male standards. It was not until recently that women’s morality became a more prominent issue within the wider society. Tronto (1993:1) explained that women, during the twentieth century in the United States of America, had started encouraging the idea that women are more moral than men, and by doing so, tried to progress the political standing of women within the social sphere. In a sudden outburst of liberation movements by women, light was shed on the issue of gender and morality.

From the late twentieth century onwards, claims were being made by the female suffragist movement that “if women voted there would be no more war” (Tronto 1993:1), and in 1992 the United States of America tried to shift attention to this issue by declaring 1992 to be the “year of the woman” (Tronto 1993:1). For some people, an attempt to advocate for equal rights for men and women became an opportunity to claim that politics would be more morally acceptable if women were involved in political decisions (Tronto 1993:1). Tronto (1993:1) therefore claimed that when it came to women’s morality, it showed clear signs that it had the ability to be a powerful source in calling for political change.

Tronto (1993:1) noted that there was not a set, universal definition for what was meant when speaking about “women’s morality” but that it consisted of different concepts, which were combined into a collection that makes up the term. These concepts included “values placed on caring and nurturance, the importance of mother’s love, a
stress on the value of sustaining human relationships, [and] the overriding value of peace” (Tronto 1993:1). She argued that it was not clear what it was that made a woman more morally sensitive than men; whether it was derived by simply being a female, or from the idea that a woman was a mother or a potential mother, or whether it was driven by a woman’s place within a society and the cultural role which she fulfilled, in other words, whether it may have been that women were regarded as more moral than men because women were not necessarily as actively involved within the public or political sphere (Tronto 1993:1). Even though there has been multiple attempts to promote gender equality in an effort to give men and women the same opportunities in all walks of life, the struggle for equality is one that still needs a lot of attention globally. Even the plans and movements for women’s morality of more than a century have not been sufficient in considering them to be successful (Tronto 1993:1). This can be seen in political, economic, and cultural structures from around the world.

In a more recent address on 23 September 2014 at the UN, Women Goodwill Ambassador, Emma Watson, delivered a speech on gender equality as part of the #heforshe campaign¹³³, wherein she stated that no one country in the world has managed to successfully implement gender equality. Gender inequality, especially the unequal treatment of women, is still a major problem that needs to be addressed. Feminism and feminists seeks to eradicate these problems of inequality, but often get no further than alienating themselves in the process of seeking equality. There are multiple challenges facing feminism and feminists when it comes to changing political, social, and economic structures that treat men and women as equals. Tronto (1993:12) argued that the concept of “woman” was already so suspect, that any other theory that relates to women and their existence was automatically also considered to be suspect. This meant that feminists and feminism were already experiencing a great disadvantage by mere fact of being women or representing women, thereby negatively

¹³³ The #heforshe campaign is a solidarity movement for gender equality. It strives to mobilise boys and men to be advocates for change when it comes to human rights, which includes equality for both men and women. A “heforshe” believes that gender equality is a human rights issue that affects all of humanity.
influencing any form of change. One of the greatest challenges feminists and feminism seemed to face, was to include women of all walks of life within its theories and structures.

Tronto (1993:12) noted that the women who were referred to within most feminist theories usually only represented some women; most often women who wanted to establish their own position of power or independence within a society. This was seen in various twentieth century Western societies where women who were privileged had moved on to greater places, but, that the experiences of women of colour or other relegated women were constantly being overlooked or moved to the side (Tronto 1993:12). These women who experienced a feeling of being left out of feminist theory ultimately rejected the theory as a whole or questioned whether it was possible at all to have theory that would be able to empower all women (Tronto 1993:12). It happened quite often that women who wrote on feminism and feminist theories found themselves in a place where they were already in a position of comparative power based on the fact that they found themselves in the academic realms, or, at the very least, the world of publishing where they had a platform to work from (Tronto 1993:18). These women were actually more liberated than the women or women’s rights they were writing about. This meant that there was an indictment of partial privilege when addressing feminism and feminist theories (Tronto 1993:18).

Tronto (1993:2) noted that the attempts and strategies that had been made to share power, however good their intentions may have been, had not been very effective and had, at times, actually been very costly. Not only has it been ineffective and costly, but the image of “women being more moral than men” (Tronto 1993:2) had not been an image everybody could relate to (Tronto 1993:2). The image of morality when it comes to women had often led to the feeling of exclusion among, for example, women of colour, women who immigrated from elsewhere, women who were not economically stable, or women who were gay (Tronto 1993:2). The methods used to empower women, and the strategies used to raise awareness about women’s morality failed if it happened at the cost of the exclusion of other women. It was further not the idea to devalue, degrade, or oppress men under any circumstances, or to elevate women to
a position of power above men. The importance of women's morality lies within the recognition that women's morality is in no way less valuable than that of men and that it has an important contribution in both the public and private spheres of life.

In an attempt to offer a model of a good society, Tronto (1993:3) used the same feminist strategies with regard to women's morality, but attempted to do so without missing the point about equality leading to the attempts being declared null and void. For her, the good values found in caring and nurturance and the importance of human relationships were crucial essentials when it came to living a good life\textsuperscript{134} (Tronto 1993:2). Some of these values included “attentiveness, responsibility, nurturance, compassion, and the meeting of the needs of others” (Tronto 1993:3). These were values that had traditionally been associated with women, and had for the most part been kept to the private sector (Tronto 1933:3). She, however, argued for a radical transformation in the way boundaries of morality were seen, and called for a shift in the structures in terms of power and privilege within society in order for these values of a good society to be taken seriously (Tronto 1993:3). Consequently, she suggested that the notion of “women’s morality” (Tronto 1993:3) be replaced by the ethics of care, which included all the values that were previously perceived as values associated with women (Tronto 1993:3).

\textsuperscript{134} Kretzschmar (2009:14) explains that ‘a good life’ within the context of Christian ethics includes living a life that is a “full, holy and meaningful life” (Kretzschmar 2009:14). She writes: “In short, ‘a good life’ is a moral life” (Kretzschmar 2009:14). She does not regard Christian ethics as something that restricts a person to a moral life that is “a joyless, cold or barren life” (Kretzschmar 2009:14), but instead regards morality as something that contributes to a life that is “abundant, meaningful and constructive” (Kretzschmar 2009:14). She connects her understanding of Christian ethics and ‘a good life’ to her interpretation of Scripture.

In the first place, she connects it to John 10:9-10 in the Bible that speaks about an abundant life through Jesus Christ (Kretzschmar 2009:14). In the second place, she connects it to Deuteronomy 30:19-20 which she regards as a passage that “confronts the issue of what constitutes a good life” (Kretzschmar 2009:15) and provides an opportunity to make a choice to live a moral life (Kretzschmar 2009:15). In order to live a good life, a person needs to seek a relationship with God in order to fully know and love God, and to keep God’s commandments (Kretzschmar 2009:15). Kretzschmar (2009:15) concludes by saying that the moral life (a good life), from a Christian point of view, “is a life lived in God’s presence and according to God’s will. Sometimes, the moral life will also demand, as it did of Jesus, sacrifice and suffering (Matt 5:9-12; 1 Pet 1:6 and 3:13-18)” (Kretzschmar 2009:15).
Tronto (1993:3) believed that morality ought to have been taken more seriously and that the way in which to do this was to understand morality within a political context. She criticised feminists for disregarding the political context within moral arguments, and thereby failed to influence the thoughts and ideas of the philosophers and political theorists within the Western society (Tronto 1993:3). What she thus aimed to do was to change the focus of philosophical and political theorists by bringing care into the equation, and thereby shifting the focus of theories to these characteristics of human life (Tronto 1993:4). Tronto (1993:4) showed a particular sensitivity to the notion of context when she spoke about changing the approach of women's morality. In order to use moral theories responsibly, it was of utmost importance to take any context into account. Tronto (1993:4) noted how moral arguments had the ability to be convincing within moral arguments based on certain moral influences in any given context. What may be morally and culturally acceptable in, for example, a third world African country, may be frowned upon in a first world, developed country.

Tronto (1993:4) believed that even the moral theories that claim to be universal needed to "establish the basis for this claim". It was, therefore, particularly important to be sensitive when it comes to the context of moral theories. For Tronto, context was not simply about given facts; therefore she gave a clear and meaningful explanation of what she meant when she spoke about context. She also stressed the importance of recognising the political context and inherent power structures within moral theories and moral situations (Tronto 1993:5). She added that political realities seriously influenced the perceptions of both the political actors and the public citizens concerning women’s morality (Tronto 1993:6). By calling for a political context for women’s morality, women entered into the public and political realm, thereby reaching a far bigger crowd than from the outside of this context. Tronto (1993:6) said that it would only be possible to shape the boundaries of morality once it was clear that moral arguments happened within a political context. In every social context there are certain social values that constitute whether moral arguments are accepted or rejected. These ideas, according to Tronto (1993:6), function as boundaries in an attempt to exclude
some moral ideas from even being considered. She, consequently, argued for three of these moral boundaries.\footnote{This does not imply that there only exist three boundaries, but rather highlights three important boundaries that are relevant for Tronto’s argument at that stage}

### 3.1.1 Tronto’s recognition of three Moral Boundaries

Throughout life, boundaries function as borders for what or who should be included or excluded in different ideas, situations, places, or societies. They can, at different points in time, be considered to be valuable or oppressive. Boundaries are often crossed or stretched in order to accommodate change, yet they are never completely eradicated. Boundaries, according to Tronto (1993:11), are formed by humans and therefore they are in no way natural. The fact that boundaries are created and determined by humans means that they can also be changed or expanded by humans. Boundaries are thus not permanent fixtures wherein some ideas, situations, people, or places are included and others are excluded. When she wrote about boundaries, Tronto (1993:11) was particularly interested in exploring why women were often excluded when talking about moral boundaries and in the process asked two very important questions: “Who is included and who is excluded by drawing moral boundaries?” (Tronto 1993:11) and “What are the moral consequences of this set of moral boundaries?” (Tronto 1993:11).

#### 3.1.1.1 The Boundary between Morality and Politics

Tronto (1993:6) started off by saying that it was extremely difficult to describe the boundaries between morality and politics, “… because both of the notions of morality and politics are ‘essentially contestable’ ideas” (Tronto 1993:6). In order to understand this boundary better, it was important to have a basic understanding of what Tronto meant when she was speaking of morality and what she meant when she is speaking of politics. She based her understanding of morality on the language of Dorothy Emmet\footnote{More can be read about essentially contestable ideas, and also Emmet’s language with regards to morality in: Emmet, D., 1979. *The Moral Prism*. New York: St. Martin’s Press}, referring to “considerations as to what one thinks is important to do and in

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\footnote{This does not imply that there only exist three boundaries, but rather highlights three important boundaries that are relevant for Tronto’s argument at that stage}

\footnote{More can be read about essentially contestable ideas, and also Emmet’s language with regards to morality in: Emmet, D., 1979. *The Moral Prism*. New York: St. Martin’s Press}
what ways; how to conduct one’s relations with other people; being aware and prepared to be critical of one’s own approvals or disapprovals” (Tronto 1993:6). When it came to politics, Tronto (1993:6) described it as something that “is usually conceived in Western thought as the realm in which resources are allocated, public order is maintained, and disputes about how these activities should occur are resolved” (Tronto 1993:6). These understandings, however, may seem like they cannot be connected at all, as though there is nothing that links the two concepts with one another. Tronto (1993:6) went so far as to say that it appeared as though politics and morality are very different aspects of human life, but affirms that they are, contrary to belief, deeply connected to each other within Western life. She based this claim on Aristotle’s thoughts on political association, in which he claimed that societies had created the capacity to live ethically and morally, due to the fact that he believed it would be “almost impossible that good men could exist in a bad polis” (Tronto 1993:7). Aristotle, thus, showed that morality and politics were, against all odds, deeply connected. This would mean that it is, in actual fact, very important to take morality into consideration when dealing with political matters.

Tronto (1993:7) explained that the notion of relationship between morality and politics, and the idea that political life may influence moral perspectives, may not be as foreign as was first believed. It was merely seen in a different way than it was a couple of centuries ago. She suggested that in modern times it is seen in one of two ways (Tronto 1993:7): The first premise regards morality as the primary starting point, or what she calls the “morality first view” (Tronto 1993:7). “After moral views are fixed, right-thinking individuals should suggest to the state how political life should conform to these moral principles” (Tronto 1993:7). People who consider themselves to be liberal political thinkers, would probably consider this view as the better option. Tronto (1993:7) explained that the “Aristotelian relationship between the primacy [sic] of political life to direct ethical practices is reversed” (Tronto 1993:7). In other words,

137It is important to remember that both of these understandings are also set from the point of view of a Western thinker, and therefore has a context of its own to take into consideration. This may not be a general and universally accepted understanding of either politics or morality.
these thinkers will make a decision on what is morally right, and then try to influence political life and political spheres with what they believe to be the better moral point of view. The second possible way of viewing morality and politics would be to view politics as a starting point, or what Tronto calls “politics first view” (1993:7). “In this view, moral values should only be introduced into politics in accordance with the requirements of [these] political concerns” (Tronto 1993:7). This perspective is one which is most probably well known in a lot of contexts. It holds the belief, according to Tronto (1993:8), that as long as “moral principles explain to us how we should treat others morally, such principles may be irrelevant, and at least subsidiary, to the central concerns of politics, which involve the struggle for power and the control for resources, territory, etc.” (Tronto 1993:8).

Where struggles such as these for power and resources are concerned, it can be difficult to make morally good decisions. Tronto (1993:8) explained that ethical questions will, and can, only be asked once struggles for power have been resolved or when it is beneficial to politics to behave in a moral manner. By looking at both of these points of view, it becomes clear that it will be a challenge for women’s morality to make a difference within society, whether it is a social or political change. At this stage, the “morality first” does not allow for women to approach a very male dominated political system. Tronto (1993:8) also noted that even if women’s morality were to somehow reach the political playground, that there was no way in which to be sure that politics would not corrupt this moral perspective, or even worse, that they would even pay any attention to any of the moral argumentation. The politics first perspective will not be any easier to get into in order to give a voice to women’s morality. It is a perspective that begs for political favour before even considering what the moral implications may be. Tronto (1993:8) said that from the start, just by looking at what the perspective was called, it was obvious that the moral argumentation would take the backseat. In both of these points of view, morality and politics were actually separated along the way, unlike the Aristotelian perspective where the questions of power (political view) and the question with regard to what is right and wrong (moral point of view), were deeply intertwined with each other (Tronto 1993:8).
The problem with viewing morality and politics as separate entities is that politics may never be influenced, or even more than that, it may never be based on morality. This means that politics may never be practiced according to what is right or wrong, but will rather spiral down into endless battles over power, control, and resources. If morality and politics are separated into different spheres, it will be very difficult, if not nearly impossible, for moral argument to have any effect on politics and political power whatsoever (Tronto 1993:8). Tronto (1993:9) continued to say that for Aristotle, both the political realm and the moral realm were influenced by the same set of values, and that those values were actively in pursuit of a good life. It was, therefore, important to change the modern thought when it came to morality and politics in order to strive for a good life. For Tronto (1993:9), it is possible to escape from the separate realities of morality and politics that is so prominent in modern times. She believed that care would be able to serve as a basis for both moral value and political achievement in order to create a good society (Tronto 1993:9). Care, therefore, functions as the link between morality and politics. In doing so, both morality and politics will receive equal attention, thereby bringing a moral voice to political strategies.

3.1.1.2 The “moral point of view” Boundary

Tronto (1993:9) described this boundary as one which makes moral decisions or moral judgments from “a point of view that is distant and disinterested” (Tronto 1993:9). She explained that this theory includes everything that is expected of a moral theory (Tronto 1993:9). It may also include the accepting of other people’s ideas and understanding of what morality is without forming an idea based on contributing rational theories and experiences of what morality may be. She explained that many people, since the eighteenth century, believed that moral theory ought to be what Immanuel Kant described it to be, which is that a moral theory should develop the “requirement of reason” (Tronto 1993:9), and not function according to the “concrete circumstances of any given society” (Tronto 1993:9). By seeing moral theory this way, Kant excluded anything that was not seen to be part of reason. It therefore also excluded feelings, emotions, habits, traditions, and local customs as a result of the
fact that morality was regarded as something which is beyond these notions and only forms part of reason (Tronto 1993:9).

Tronto (1993:9-10) noted that the typical moral person, according to Kant’s theory of morality, would probably be someone who may be perceived as autonomous and detached, and someone who would surrender personal gain in order for justice to prevail in a given moral situation. In the case of the Heinz dilemma, this person would be someone who said that Heinz should steal the drug in order to save the life of his wife. It would be someone who, like in the case of 11 year old Jake, equates that someone’s life is worth more than material goods. Such a person may be perceived as very individualistic and rational.

Tronto (1993:10) claimed that if Kant’s theory alone were to be the one that acts as the starting point of moral argumentation, any account of morality which was affected by emotions, daily life, or political situations would seem “corrupted by non-rational and idiosyncratic incursions” (Tronto 1993:10). Women are, more often than not, perceived as emotional beings, or at the very least, more emotional than men. If this is regarded as the general perception, then women’s morality would almost immediately be pushed down in the hierarchy as less important (Tronto 1993:10). Tronto (1993:10), therefore, argued that even if morality was accepted into politics, women’s morality would still not make the cut. It is at this point where the ethics of care can and will influence or transform the way in which this boundary is perceived (Tronto 1993:10).

3.1.1.3 The Boundary between Public and Private Life

The third boundary is one that also contributed to women’s morality being side-lined, especially with regard to politics. Tronto (1993:10) explained that various feminist scholars had recognised the fact that there existed a separation between the public and private life in most Western societies. Historically, women were generally restricted to the workings of the private life because it represented the domestic side of life. This included taking care of the household by cooking and cleaning, raising the children, hospitality, and any other chores related to domesticity. The public life,
however, had been perceived as the men’s playground. The public life was one that was driven by success, money, independence, individuality, and rationality. For a very long time within Western thought, the separation of public and private life also meant the separation of men and women when it comes to responsibilities in life. Even though civilisation has slowly started to show signs of change, this is still a prominent sight within plenty of Western societies. Tronto (1993:10) argued that women’s opinions, perspectives, and unique moral perspectives were limited and restricted to the boundaries of the private life, because women were themselves often side-lined to the private sector. While this was the case, women would be prevented to contribute to the greater society beyond their private circle of friends and family.

For Tronto (1993:10), these three boundaries excluded women from the successfully and effectively arguing for women’s morality. What she did not do, however, was to call for the total destruction of these boundaries, because she believed that it would have created havoc and in the process may have done harm to feminism, freedom, and modern day political life (Tronto 1993:10). Instead, she suggested that people take these boundaries into account when attempting to use women’s morality to affect political change in a positive manner (Tronto 1993:10-11). It would have been ineffective for activists of women’s morality to try to break down these boundaries. Instead, these activists ought to change, challenge, and expand these boundaries from within. In this way, Tronto (1993:11) argued, women may at least have the possibility of being participants in public life as opposed to being restricted to private life.

3.1.2 Feminist Theory and Moral Boundaries?

In trying to explain what exactly feminist theory ought to do, Tronto (1993:11) admitted that what may at first seem easy and rather obvious to describe, turns out to be a little bit more complicated. She went even further and described the formulations and goals of feminist theory as “virtually impossible” (Tronto 1993:11) to formulate. She explained that the first challenge in talking about feminist theory is the category known as “woman” and as a result of this category being called suspect, the reality of “women”
is immediately coined as suspect too (Tronto 1993:12). This leads to feminist theory being regarded as suspect, which in turn prohibits the theory from having any political impact (Tronto 1993:12). There are generally two reasons why “women” may be regarded as suspect; first, due to the fact that some critics have noted that the term “women” merely suggest some women and not all women, and second, because the “perennial philosophical problem of the relationship between names and objects that they name” (Tronto 1993:12) had returned (Tronto 1993:12).

Tronto (1993:13) believed that moral boundaries play an important role in shaping theories. She further believed that moral situations form when there are imbalances when it comes to power (Tronto 1993:13). When it comes to feminist theory as a moral theory, it is important to consider various relationships, both close relationships and distant relationships, and the context of the circumstances (Tronto 1993:14). When this is done, power imbalances can be addressed. Tronto (1993:15) stated that a feminist theory is born from the desire to bring an end to the marginalisation of women within societies. This feminist theory ought to make a case for the powerless in calling for a redistribution in the power rankings (Tronto 1993:15). This can be done in one of two ways; it can either claim that all people are equal and therefore deserve to be together in the centre of power, or it can argue that the difference of the people it represents will have a valuable contribution to offer to those who are at the centre of power\(^{138}\) (Tronto 1993:15).

Tronto (1993:19), in speaking of partial privilege and the ways in which to build an inclusive feminist theory, explained the importance of the ethics of care due to the fact that caring’s commencement is from a point of necessity that needs attention. Caring

\(^{138}\) Tronto (1993:15) explained that the method of using the “sameness/difference debate” as a base for a theory is not because of a lack of intelligence to move past this debate, but rather because it is necessary to use the argument of sameness or difference if an argument is made from the margins towards the centre of the power. For modern-day feminists, this “difference dilemma” (Tronto 1993:13) is problematic, for it ignores the differences among women themselves. What tends to happen then, is that the opinion of a “white, professional, heterosexual woman” (Tronto 1993:13) is considered to be the general opinion of all women, essentially ignoring the opinions of women of differing “race, ethnic groups, religious backgrounds, sexual orientations, and class background” (Tronto 1993:14). Partial privilege is therefore a very big problem in that it does not include women of all orientations, races, and backgrounds.
requires a person to consider the morality of the other person and to embrace their perspective in order to help them establish change (Tronto 1993:19). If boundaries exist, as Tronto (1993:20) said, in order to maintain positions of the powerful people in society, then the ethics of care seeks to move these boundaries by starting at the margins with the people who seek to be included. By arguing for the ethics of care, Tronto (1993:21) tried to rethink humanity in terms of interdependence and argued that care’s political capabilities would help to establish a more democratic and pluralistic society. Care has the potential to cause a shift in already established paradigms in an attempt shift moral boundaries that bind people and to move it to a place where society is considered to be more caring and just (Tronto 1993:21).

3.1.3 The Containment of Women and the Engenderment of Morality

Tronto (1993:52) mentioned how the Scottish Enlightenment’s thinkers had depended upon a variety of moral sentiments in order to create a society with individuals that held virtue to a high value, but that these same thinkers neglected to do the same when it came to the “same parallel distinctions between men and women and reason and feelings” (Tronto 1993:52). She explained that in the time before the eighteenth century, hardly anybody spoke about women’s ability to reason, or their capacity to feel (Tronto 1993:52). Interestingly enough, the ability to feel has not always been reserved for women; in countries where people spoke English during the eighteenth century, emotions and sentiments were characteristics that were an important part of what it meant to be a man living a virtuous lifestyle (Tronto 1993:52). Women during the eighteenth century, Tronto (1993:52) argued, seemed to be a problem for the thinkers of the day.

The eighteenth century was a time when households started to change from what it had traditionally been, which made the role of the woman complicated to understand. The household was no longer a place where the primary economic production happened and with this came the reasoning that women ought to be given a chance at getting an education and to maybe even contribute to the broader English society (Tronto 1993:52). Women had suddenly been seen as worthy of the chance to
“exercise their rationality” (Tronto 1993:53). Tronto (1993:53) explained that women, in the time before they had the chance to be educated and when economic production happened mainly from the household, were measured according to their usefulness to men and their usefulness when it came do domestic duties\(^\text{139}\). Women had seen a change in attitudes when it came to their “proper place in public spaces” (Tronto 1993:53). Women were no longer confined to the boundaries of the private sphere and began to embrace their opportunities to claim their space in the public (Tronto 1993:53). Tronto (1993:54) elucidated that the fact that women were seen as being more active out in public spaces meant that the sexuality of women became more public, and with it becoming more public, it became more problematic\(^\text{140}\).

Jean Jacques Rousseau, for instance, was concerned with women’s ability to control men with their sexuality and called for women to be kept out of public space in order for men to be able to make sound judgments (Tronto 1993:54). Tronto (1993:54) explained that in calling for the separation of women from public as a result of their sexuality, it became possible to develop strategies to contain women in a variety of ways. The only way it was possible to contain these women, was to demand that they be held to the private sphere of the household (Tronto 1993:54). Soon thereafter, moral sentiment was attached to the image of women in order to bind them to the boundaries of the household (Tronto 1993:55).

Women were suddenly responsible to take care of the empathetic, compassionate, and humane side of life, and before they knew it, “sentiment found its home at home” (Tronto 1993:55). This led to the view that women and men ought to occupy differing realms of society, where women and their sentiment were considered to be best

\[^{139}\text{Tronto (1993:53) quoted Bishop Frances Fenelon who had written: “I should be willing, however, to teach Latin only to girls of sound judgment and modest behaviour, who would know how to value such an acquirement justly, would abstain from foolish curiosity, would conceal what they had learned, and seek only improvement therefrom” (Tronto 1993:53).}\]

\[^{140}\text{The problems caused by women’s sexuality and the fear of women’s sexuality that came with it, can be seen in writings of people like Jean Jacques Rousseau who found the sexuality of women to be distracting (Tronto 1993:54). Tronto (1993:54) quoted him saying: “A man is a man some of the time, but a woman is a woman all of the time” (Tronto 1993:54) and showing his distraction and women’s ability to control men.}\]
valued in the household, while men make do with the public realm of life (Tronto 1993:55). Consequently, women were bound to feelings and emotions, while men were bound to reason (Tronto 1993:55). Tronto (1993:56) pointed to the importance of realising that the fact that women were associated with feeling and emotions was not a result of biological facts or due to an obligatory change in social structures, but merely because of the occurrence of historical progression. She, consequently, warned against the idea that all women be associated with emotion or that all men be associated with reason, or that reason is the finest form of moral living (Tronto 1993:56). It is, however, a fact that women, in the past, have been excluded from moral discussions as a result of their association with a “parochial and context-bound, moral sentiments perspective” (Tronto 1993:56).

Tronto (1993:57) believed that the history of moral theory during the eighteenth century left humanity with some important lessons. Firstly, it became clear that moral theory could in no way be considered as a separate entity from social or historical circumstances (Tronto 1993:57). Secondly, it was shown that relational characteristics such as a sense of community, or attachment to other people may actually have been considered to be male dominated characteristics during the eighteenth century, and that it was therefore not a “biological, or psychological, or cultural connection” (Tronto 1993:57) that connected women with these sentiments in the first place (Tronto 1993:57). The third lesson learnt is that it was only during the eighteenth century that relational characteristics were openly and generally associated with women, characteristics and responsibility initially forced upon them to keep them contained to the private sphere of life (Tronto 1993:57).

What was learnt from the eighteenth century Scottish philosophers is that the relational approach to morality was something that could be worked with. Tronto (1993:58) noted that, when speaking of the ethics of care, there may be some resemblances to Scottish thought, but that the ethics of care will address some important questions that were discounted by Scottish thought, like the question of “otherness” (Tronto 1993:58). She argued that the otherness of people will only be dealt with sufficiently once a care ethic is added in order to challenge the boundaries of moral theory (Tronto 1993:59).
3.1.4 Morality and Gender

Tronto (1993:61), in discussing whether women and men have a differing sense of morality, noted that contemporary theories of moral development made it seem as though the people who have more power in society are those who have a better sense of morality. This, in turn, leads to a division in the perception of morality where it is the privileged people who find themselves with more power than those who are considered less privileged (Tronto 1993:61). Tronto (1993:61) consequently argued that if moral development continued to be studied without taking the political context thereof into consideration, the view that the privileged are more moral would continue to be the leading one of the day. Due to the fact that powerful people’s views are considered to be morally privileged, any group of outsiders who tried to challenge their view would be at a disadvantage (Tronto 1993:61). Women who may think in a different way about morality are eventually excluded from the important conversations about morality (Tronto 1993:62).

It is not a strange or unknown perception that the view of morality in the past has been, for the most part, gendered. Tronto (1993:62) explained that, especially in the history of Western society, men and women have been portrayed as holding differing moral capabilities. She described how thinkers like Aristotle, Hegel, or Freud considered women to be incapable of thinking morally and thereby argued that men have a greater sense of morality than women, while others, during the late nineteenth and twentieth century, have argued that women have a better sense of morality than men (Tronto 1993:62). The conversation about morality has, therefore, always been a gendered conversation (Tronto 1993:62). Tronto (1993:62) believed that morality has always been influenced by context and history, even when it has been called a universal morality. This can be seen in a moral theory such as that of Lawrence Kohlberg, who claimed that his theory was universal, but in fact favoured the privileged within society (Tronto 1993:63).

Tronto (1993:68), even after defending Kohlberg and his model for moral development from critics who do not interpret his work in the right way, eventually admitted that his
work, despite his intentions, is hierarchical\textsuperscript{141} and that it distinguished a “moral elite from the rest” (Tronto 1993:68). She explained that Kohlberg’s theory of human development assumed that the self can become anyone in a moral situation, thereby saying that the self can become “the generalised other” (Tronto 1993:70). Becoming part of the generalised other, immediately points to the fact that there is a “non-generalised other” (Tronto 1993:70) whose circumstances in the process of development had been overlooked (Tronto 1993:70).

Tronto (1993:70) quoted Simone de Beauvoir, who wrote that it is impossible for one group to consider itself as “the One” (Tronto 1993:70) without having to set themselves up against “the Other” (Tronto 1993:70). She consequently argued that Kohlberg, in his hierarchical view of moral development, could not resolve the issues regarding otherness (Tronto 1993:71). For her, Kohlberg’s theory of moral development only included the view from those who were privileged and in power through the process of development as opposed to those who have had a hard time who are told to get past their bad experiences in order to become successful (Tronto 1993:73). She explained that the view that is created by Kohlberg’s model for moral development made it look like “those who tell their story about racism, sexism, ethnocentrism, and so forth, are misunderstood or derided for their inability to get beyond these sticking point” (Tronto 1993:73). The image that is carried over is one that sees “the other” as being less significant because they have a hard time to get over the hurt that they have experienced due to the process of moral development of other (Tronto 1993:74). The conclusion is, thus, that Kohlberg stages is inevitably hierarchical, not only because of the obvious hierarchy in stages, but also in the fact that for someone to climb the ladder of moral development to the top, some other people have to pay the price of

\textsuperscript{141} Kohlberg’s defence to the claim that his theory is hierarchical, according to Tronto (1993:69) was that his theory was not merely descriptive, but also prescriptive of the best way to reach moral maturity, and that his theory showed social inequalities within society that never gave the people of the working-class, people of colour, or a lot of women, an equal opportunity to develop their sense of morality like others who had that opportunity.
not being able to progress in their own moral development (Tronto 1993:75). In doing so, an elitist class is created.

When Gilligan criticised the work of Kohlberg in researching the morality of women, she heard a distinctly different voice, a difference which, to date, has had an enormous influence in circles of moral theory (Tronto 1993:77). Tronto (1993:78) explained that although Gilligan criticised some of Kohlberg’s work, she did not discredit all of it. Gilligan’s biggest concern, however, was that Kohlberg’s model for moral development only included the morality of justice and therefore could not be accepted as a complete model for moral development (Tronto 1993:78). Gilligan, Tronto (1993:78) said, believed that human relationship was left out of the moral account. With a relational approach to morality, the problem is not driven by the conflict of rights, but rather by conflicting responsibilities (Tronto 1993:78). The differing approach of care was therefore relational, contextual, and responsible. The differences in approach were consequently labelled as the ethics of justice, which concerns rights, and the ethics of care, which concerns relationship (Tronto 1993:78).

Tronto (1993:79) suggested that Gilligan’s ethic of care differed from Kohlberg’s ethic of justice in three essential ways: The first was that the ethics of care was built around relationship and responsibility as opposed to the rights and rules found in Kohlberg’s ethic of justice (Tronto 1993:79). The second was that the morality of the ethics of care was not tied to something “formal and abstract” (Tronto 1993:79), but rather to concrete circumstances (Tronto 1993:79). The third difference was that the morality of the ethics of care is built around the centrality of the “activity of care”\(^\text{142}\) (Tronto 1993:79), as opposed to principles that were predetermined (Tronto 1993:79). This ethics of care was gendered insofar as it was first heard in the listening to the voices of women that were initially excluded from the study of morality. The ethic of justice viewed the ideal of the self in the framework of morality as separated, while the ethics of care saw the self as ideally being connected with or in relationship with others within

\(^{142}\) The activity of care includes the experiences and moral problems that people face every day in their lives (Tronto 1993:79).
the framework of morality (Tronto 1993:79). The study of morality, consequently, is
gendered insofar as men usually relate themselves as being individualised or
objective, while women are more often considered to be connected to others (Tronto
1993:790). Tronto (1993:79) further pointed out that when men express themselves in
moral situations it will, more often than not, be a justice perspective, whereas women
may use either a justice or a care approach depending on the situation. Gilligan,
therefore, felt that morality cannot be considered to be a complete model with merely
the morality of justice being the only perspective and this called for both an ethic justice
and the ethics of care to be considered when speaking about the entirety of morality
(Tronto 1993:80). Morality, therefore, ought to be considered as consisting of both the
ethics of care and the ethics of justice143.

Tronto (1993:82) said that although Gilligan’s study of the different voice was initially
heard when she did her research while working with women, it should not be
considered as gendered. She specifically referred to Ward’s work in Boston
neighbourhoods that showed that both male and female participants have the capacity
to reason within the parameters of the ethics of care (Tronto 1993:82-83). She also
referred to Carol B. Stack, among others, who found that some of her participants
chose to use a combination of both the justice and care approach when they were
faced with a moral dilemma (Tronto 1993:83). Her conclusion was, thus, that the
different voice that was initially heard in studies with women is not necessarily a
gendered voice, but rather another way of thinking or reasoning (Tronto 1993:83).
However, if this is the case, the question still remains as to why the issue of gender
keeps on appearing in conversations about the ethics of care (Tronto 1993:91), even
after Gilligan did not intend for it to be a gendered conversation. Tronto (1993:91)
argued that this kept on happening because of a gendered morality maintains the
boundaries when it comes to privilege, power, gender, race, and class, among others.

143 Gilligan (1991:xviii) wrote: “Since all relationships can be characterized both in terms of equality and in terms
of attachment or connection, all relationships – public and private – can be seen in two ways and spoken of in
two sets of terms. By adopting one or another moral voice or standpoint, people can highlight problems that are
associated with different kinds of vulnerability – to oppression or to abandonment – and focus attention on
different types of concern”.
She believed that the only way to break this image was to shift the boundaries that were created to keep this conversation gendered in a contemporary moral life (Tronto 1993:91).

### 3.1.5 Shifting Boundaries

Tronto (1993:92) argued that moral boundaries are difficult concepts to grasp because people do not necessarily pay attention to the moral boundaries that are in place, but also due to the fact that it keeps the privileged and the powerful in their positions of privilege and power. In order to shift moral boundaries, it would be essential to recognise that there are moral boundaries in place and that they favour the privileged and powerful. Tronto (1993:92) again explained that the first boundary that needs to be addressed is the boundary that exists between morality and politics. She argued that it is apparent that in Western thought politics are to be considered outside of the boundaries of morality (Tronto 1993:92). When there is a division between the world of politics and the world of virtue, the danger exists that power will be without a much needed moral base (Tronto 1993:93). Tronto (1993:93) consequently argued that the boundary that is situated between politics and morality keeps people from realising that morality carries with it a certain amount of power and privilege. When this happens, a theory of moral development, like that of Kohlberg, exerts the notion that the people who are the most successful are the people who are the most moral and that those people who are not as successful are people who are not as moral (Tronto 1993:93). This becomes dangerous, because it allows for people to justify their positions of power and privilege above other (Tronto 1993:93). In expanding why this ideology is dangerous,

Tronto (1993:93-94) pointed out that these kinds of moralities not only uphold the powerful and the privileged, but also refuse to acknowledge the problem. She therefore called for the boundaries that uphold Kohlberg’s excluding theory of moral development to be shifted in order to include an inclusive ethic of care, thereby shifting the view away from the centrality of the powerful and the privileged (Tronto 1993:94). Tronto (1993:94) explained that the only way it would be possible for the boundary to
shift would be to make use of a moral theory that moves away from the centrality of the powerful and argues for an inclusive vision, also for those who are considered to be outsiders.

Kohlberg’s response to the ethics of care developed by Gilligan, however, was to ascribe it to the private sphere and in doing so pointed out the inequalities when it comes to the private and public arena (Tronto 1993:96). This perception of the ethics of care is not a strange and should be expanded to include a more extended part of society like family, communities, and general society (Tronto 1993:96). In order to view the ethics of care and the ethics of justice as being equal moral theories, the boundary that exists between the private sphere and the public sphere needs to be shifted (Tronto 1993:96). Tronto (1993:96-97), in conclusion, argued for an intersection between politics and moral theory, and placed a particular emphasis on the notion that caring, as a human activity, has the ability to transform morality and the way it is understood. The notion of caring, and what exactly is meant by it, is not something to be taken lightly, but ought to be further reflected upon if the ethics of care is to be understood as an inclusive moral theory. The next section will, therefore, deal with the shifting of the boundaries of care in order for care to make a meaningful contribution to politics.

3.2 Shifting the Boundaries with Care

Tronto (1993:97) argued that a high value must be placed on care in order for the values of care to transform the values of society. In describing the moral process of care, the political importance of care will become ever clearer. It is, therefore, vital to see care for what it truly is; a central part of human life (Tronto 1993:101). By discussing the concept of care as a central part of human life, care can be seen as the basis upon which the shifting of boundaries can be built (Tronto 1993:101). This section will therefore describe a concept of care that places care where it ought to be; at the centre of human life. The care that will be spoken of in this section is a care that seeks to integrate “practical, moral, and political aspects about the place of care in society” (Tronto 1993:102).
Denise Ackermann (2006:233) describes how everything in this world is interconnected and interdependent. Care is something that everybody on earth has experienced at some point during their life as a direct result of this interdependence and interconnectedness. From the day a person is born they are in constant need of care. It is one of those things that no one can live without. It is also one of the most underappreciated things in life. It is has become an expectation without appreciation. It has become devalued by the same people who have been cared for in their own life and expect to be cared for in the future. Care has also become gendered in the sense that patriarchy has portrayed women as the best carers. Care, however, should not be perceived as something that is restricted to women, childcare, frail care, or care for the elderly. Care has the possibility to transform many, if not all, facets of life, including the moral and political realms.

Tronto says care is something that “expresses an action or a disposition, a reaching out to something” (Tronto 2013:x). Badgett and Folbre (1999:312) tried to define care by using various definitions from a dictionary, but concluded that care should be seen and understood in more specific ways than just attributing it to something that has to do with feeling. They therefore, like many other scholars, chose to understand care in terms of responsibility (Badgett & Folbre 1999:312). They further believed that it is important to distinguish between ‘care services’, which can be seen as a type of work, and ‘care motives’, which are inherent or undeniable to the worker (Badgett & Folbre 1999:312). Tronto (2013:22) draws on the work of Kari Waerness, who identifies three kinds of caring: Spontaneous care, necessary care, and personal service.

144 Parsons (2002: 213) argues that it is “not only the heart, but the whole body of society” (Parsons 2002:213) that should manifest care. The responsibility of caring is therefore not restricted to certain people only, but is rather the shared responsibility of the entire society. Everybody needs to take up their responsibility when it comes to caring.

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Spontaneous care is care which happens as an act in which a previous, ongoing relationship is not a prerequisite, but in which a person performs an act of caring without expecting any form of a relationship to continue in the future (Tronto 2013:22). Necessary care is the kind of care which is impossible for a person to provide for themselves and therefore find themselves in need of some kind of assistance with regard to care (Tronto 2013:22). Personal service is the kind of care that could be taken care of personally, but is provided by someone else who is providing the care instead (Tronto 2013:22), quite often as a paid service, but not exclusively a paid service.

Tronto (1993:101) argued that the world could be viewed in a completely different way if care is to be placed in the centre of human life. If this were to happen, then theories of morality and politics have to be adapted in order to work from a perspective of care (Tronto 1993:101). This would mean that the way things have been done and understood for centuries must be reconsidered and rethought, because the “current moral and political theories work to preserve inequalities of power and privilege, and to degrade ‘others’ who are currently doing the caring work” (Tronto 1993:101). Care, in the holistic sense, has the ability to enforce major changes in societies, but for this to happen, a better understanding is needed of exactly what is meant by care. Tronto (1993:102) said that care, at the core, has to do with some kind of engagement.

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146 Tronto (2013:22) equates spontaneous care, for instance, to the care provided by the Good Samaritan in the story found in the Bible (Luke 10:25-37). By this she means that care is provided to someone without there being a constant and continuous relationship between the self and the other (Tronto 2013:22). After the care is provided, nothing, not even a relationship between the self and the other, is expected in return (Tronto 2013:22).

147 An example of necessary care would be the care provided to patients from doctors, but is not exclusively reserved for well-skilled or trained individuals – it can also be a baby’s nappy being changed, for instance (Tronto 2013:22).

148 Babysitters or au pairs would be an example of this kind of care, for a person may be able to take care of their own child, but prefers, at some point, to appoint someone to provide their service of caring. Waerness’s example is that a husband may expect of his wife to clean up their house as a personal service to him (Tronto 2013:22). Tronto (2013:22) asks that the difference between ‘service’ and ‘care’ is noted, where service is commanded by a person in a position of power.
Care, according to Tronto (2013:x), articulates something of relationship. She said that this can be seen by the use of the negative phrase: “I don’t care” (Tronto 1993:102). It has, however, often been used incorrectly when people intended to express that they have no interest in something. Tronto (1993:102) explained that there is a difference between a person who shows care and a person who shows interest in something. Care is about more than simply taking an interest in something or someone. Care is a reaction or engagement toward something or someone. Care pronounces an act or character of reaching out to something (Tronto 2013:x). Care asks for personal engagement between the provider and the receiver (Badgett & Folbre 1999:312). Tronto (2013:140) stresses the importance of recognising that care is relational in order to care well, and believes that no judgments on caring can be made if it is from a singular perspective.

Tronto (1993:102) highlighted two additional aspects that she felt care carried with it: The first is that care is something that seems to reach out to others as opposed to the self, something she refers to as being neither “self-referring”, nor “self-absorbing”. The second aspect she highlighted is that care tacitly advocates for action (Tronto 1993:102). To care, for Tronto (1993:103), involves more than simply a passing awareness, interest, or fancy, but it is instead the acceptance by a person of some form of someone else’s burden. Therefore, you cannot say that you care about world hunger, or poverty, or the oppression of people, and then not do anything about

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149 It is important to note that this phrase has, in recent years, been used in a very loose way and people have not always used the word “care” correctly when saying it. It has especially been picked up by younger generations as a way of shielding, or sometimes even hiding, their emotions from others.

150 Tronto (1993:102) says that to say that “we care about hunger” means more than just taking an interest in it. Care, therefore, implies actions and engagement.

151 Malan and Cilliers (2004:15) echo this belief in saying that care and its social vocabulary should not be underestimated. “It should not be understood as merely emotions or ‘nice warm feelings’, but as a move away from seeing problems of justice as maths problems with human beings in them, a move away from calculation towards “inherent” sensitivity to the complexity of society and the relationships between people within it” (Malan & Cilliers 2004:15).
Virginia Held (2006:9) holds a similar view when she says that care consist of both value and practice. In this way, care is not only restricted to mundane theories and speculations, but seeks to improve a situation or attempts to fulfil the need where it arises. Tronto (1993:103) furthered this notion by giving a definition of care constructed by a colleague, Berenice Fisher, and herself, which has been at the heart of her understanding of care ever since:

*On the most general level, we suggest that caring be viewed as a species activity that includes everything that we do to maintain, continue, and repair our ‘world’ so that we can live in it as well as possible. That world include our bodies, our selves, and our environment, all of which we seek to interweave in a complex, life-sustaining web.*

Tronto (1993) then continued to explain some features of this definition of care: The first feature is that caring is not something that is restricted to human interaction with other, thereby saying that caring can also include objects, the environment, or other people (Tronto 1993:103). The second feature is that they do not believe that caring is dyadic or individualistic, as it happens quite often that care is seen in terms of one person caring for one other person, like in the relationship between a mother and a child (Tronto 1993:103). Tronto (1993:103) criticised this dyadic idea by saying that

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153 Engster (2005) draws on the work of Schwarzenbach for another definition of care. He says that Schwarzenbach connects care with “reproductive labor, meaning not the biological processes associated with reproduction (sexual activity, pregnancy, childbirth), but rather “all those rational activities (thinking about particular others and their needs, caring for them, cooking their meals, etc.) which go toward reproducing a particular set of relationships between persons over time – in the best case... relations of philia”” (Engster 2005:51). Personally, I regard Tronto’s definition as a more concrete and inclusive definition.

154 Tronto (1998:16) told how she and Fisher, in their quest to find the nature of care, could not find a good and systematic definition of care, because it had so many different meanings and therefore decided to construct their own definition.

this view of care automatically causes most contemporary authors to dismiss the possibility of care being functional within social and political structures. She is convinced of the fact that care can be found within the household, on the market, and in bureaucratic organisations (Tronto 1998:16). The third feature is the belief that care is for the most part defined by culture and will therefore be perceived differently within every culture (Tronto 1993:103). The fourth feature of this definition is that caring is ongoing (Tronto 1993:103). By saying that they believed that care can be characterised by a single activity or by an ongoing process (Tronto 1993:103). It is because of this that caring, for Tronto (1993:103), was not simply a rational concern, or a character trait, but rather a concern of life and living. According to Tronto (1993:103), care is not only practice, but also disposition.

It becomes clear, from this definition of care, that care reaches farther than initially expected. Tronto (1993:104) argued that if care was to be understood in this way, it would infiltrate and influence a lot of human activity. She also made it clear that not all human activity can be seen as being care and explained this best by using the Aristotelian idea of nested ends: Care can be something pleasurable and sometimes it is possible that creative activities can be undertaken with an end towards caring, but care can only be truly recognised when a practice is aimed at maintaining, continuing, or repairing the world (Tronto 1993:104). One of the ways to see whether a practice is care is to understand what care does not consist of. If there existed a definition of what care is, then there can also be a reasonable argument of what care is not.

Tronto (1993:104) listed activities that do not necessarily constitute care as follows: the pursuit of pleasure, creative activity, production, destruction, to play, to fulfil a

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156 “Care”, Tronto (1998:16) said, “is not restricted to the traditional realm of mother’s work, to welfare agencies, or to hired domestic servants but is found in all of these realms. Indeed, concerns about care permeate our daily lives, the institutions in the modern marketplace, the corridors of government. Because we tend to follow the traditional division of the world into public and private spheres and to think of caring as an aspect of private life, care is usually associated with activities of the household. As a result, caring is greatly undervalued in our culture”.
desire, to market a new product, or to create a work of art. She also highlighted the fact that not all care ought to be considered good care (2013:24). More than that, care has the ability to be perceived as something that is simultaneously good and bad; it can be bad, but may have had a good purpose in mind, and this can sometimes lead to care being conceptualised in order to justify certain judgments within the world (Tronto 2013:24).

This argument is further complicated by the view that some activities can simultaneously be considered to be partly aimed at care and partly aimed at another end (Tronto 1993:104). Tronto (1993:104) used protection as an example of this. She argued that protection may at first seem that it is aimed at the maintaining and continuation of the world, but at the same time, protection sometimes comes at the cost of destruction, which is difficult to call part of care (Tronto 1993:104). She further reasoned that some protective acts from the police can be considered to be care, while others are not (Tronto 1993:104). The problem with protection is that even though it means that someone is assuming the burden of others in the same way that is seen in care, the relationship seen within the concept of protection is vastly different from the relationship between a person or group, and others, when it comes to care (Tronto 1993:104-105).

Protection, unlike care, is not necessarily continuous (Tronto 1993:105). Caring, according to Tronto (1993:105), seemed to involve the consideration of the needs and concerns of others as the basis for ongoing

157 By saying that this list of activities is not caring, Tronto (1993) did not exclude the possibility of it being part of a bigger scheme of caring or contributing to care at the end, but that these activities by itself is not care, for care, according to Tronto (1993:103), is ongoing and something that is not simply done once and then seen as completed.

158 The example given is that of colonialism according to Uma Narayan’s (1995) perspective of the British colonialism in India (Tronto 2013:24). Tronto (2013:24) explains Narayan’s point of view that the colonialists “did not attempt to justify itself to the imperialists population by claiming to be a system of the exploitation of others’ goods, property, and labor” (Tronto 2013:24). Colonialism, instead, came from a discourse of care, wherein the citizens would be civilised, and Christianised as a result of the influence of the British, Western world, with their Christian ideas and ideals (Tronto 2013:24). This shows something of the dichotomy which may also be experienced within certain forms of care.

159 Protection can, in a patriarchal society, also be used as a pass from caring and will be discussed at a later stage when gender and caring is discussed.
engagement, thus taking the needs of the other as a starting point for what must be done.\textsuperscript{160} In order to give a more tangible account of the different dimensions present in care, Tronto (1993:105) initially presented four phases of caring for further analysis for a better understanding of care.\textsuperscript{161} She later added a possible fifth phase of caring.

3.2.1 Phases of Caring

Tronto (1993:106) believed that care consists of four analytically separate, yet interconnected phases. These phases point to the four different dimensions within caring and serve as a means in which to show how the understanding of care can function differently at different phases. The four different phases are ‘caring about’, ‘taking care of’, ‘care-giving’, and ‘care-receiving’ (Tronto 1993:106). Tronto (1998:17) believed that by identifying these four phases of care it would be possible to have a more compound picture of what it may mean to care well for something, someone, or a group of people, even though it is hardly ever possible for care to happen in a perfect way. She explained that the process of caring is further complicated by conflict and power relations (Tronto 1998:17).

3.2.1.1 Caring About\textsuperscript{162}

This dimension, most importantly, has to do with the recognition of a need for care (Tronto 1993:106). It encompasses an awareness of and attentiveness to needs that need to be taken care of (Tronto 1998:16). This means that a need is noted, evaluated, and assessed in order to better understand what the core problem is that needs to be

\textsuperscript{160} The question of who ‘the other’ is, is a complex question within secular society. From a religious, Christian perspective, ‘the other’ can, theoretically, be understood as ‘thy neighbour’ or anybody other than the self.

\textsuperscript{161} The Four Phases of Caring were identified by both Joan Tronto and Berenice Fisher as part of “Toward a Feminist Theory of Care” in E. Abel & M. Nelson. (eds), 1991. Circles of Care: Work and Identity in Women’s Lives. New York: State University of New York Press.

\textsuperscript{162} This is different than caring for. Tronto (2013), in her later work Caring Democracy, also introduces the notion of ‘caring with’ which will be discussed as a possible fifth phase of caring.
addressed (Tronto 1993:106). Tronto (1993:106) explained that ‘caring about’\textsuperscript{163} will often involve assuming the position of the person or group in need in order to better understand their position. She then used the example of the needs of people who suffer with difficulty when it comes to mobility as a result of AIDS, and then asked questions like “how will they be able to eat? Or to shop” (Tronto 1993:106)? For Tronto (1993:106) ‘caring about’ has always been both culturally and individually shaped. Every person will respond to different cultural and societal needs in their own way, whether it is to an individual or to a group. Some people may recognise the need of children who have terrible conditions at a local school and can then go to the school to find out exactly what their needs are in order to make the conditions at the school better. Tronto (1993:106) argued that caring need not only be interpreted and understood in individualistic terms, but has the ability to have an impact on a wider society and on political level. In short, this ‘caring about’, according to Tronto (2013:22), constitutes someone or some group of people who identify or recognise needs that are not met. This leads to the second phase of caring.

3.2.1.2 Taking Care of

After recognising the need of the other, the next step in caring is ‘taking care of’. Tronto, (2001:63) explains that it is not enough to simply acknowledge that there is an existing problem. This, thus, automatically implies that responsibility needs to be accepted for the needs that have been identified, followed by a plan as to how to respond (Tronto 1993:106). ‘Taking care of’ involves taking responsibility and putting structures of support in place in order for said structures to function according to plan. Tronto (1998:16) also referred to ‘taking care of’ as ‘caring for’\textsuperscript{164}, explaining that it is

\textsuperscript{163} Glenn (2000:86) describes caring about as a phase that “engages both thought and feeling, including awareness and attentiveness, concern about and feeling of responsibility for meeting another’s care” (Glenn 2000:86).

\textsuperscript{164} Glenn (2000:86) says that caring for can be understood in terms of “the varied activities of providing for the needs or well-being of another person. These activities include physical care (e.g., bathing, feeding), emotional care (e.g., reassuring, sympathetic listening), and direct services (e.g., driving a person to the doctor, running errands)” (Glenn 2000:86-87).
the phase in which somebody decides to take responsibility for a need that has been recognised. She used the AIDS crisis as an example of how people have responded by organising service-providing agencies such as Gay Men’s Health Crisis, Project Open Hand, and the Shanti project (Tronto 1993:106). She then not only stressed the importance of simply setting up support structures, but also that reliable sources should be put in place, that volunteers must be coordinated, and that funds should be obtained, all in an effort to sustain the project (Tronto 1993:107). Where needs are identified, someone or some group needs to take responsibility in order for these needs to be met (Tronto 2013:22). After responsibility has been accepted by someone or some group, the third phase of caring should be the logical next step.

3.2.1.3 Care-giving

The third phase in the caring process is the care-giving phase. This is where the actual work of caring needs to happen (Tronto 2013:22). According to Tronto (1993:107), care-giving involves the direct meeting of needs for care. Care-giving is not merely expressing care vocally. ‘Care-giving’ is where the actual, material needs are met (Tronto 1998:17). She believes that caring needs a certain set of skills or basic knowledge about how to care (Tronto 2001:63). She stressed the importance of the fact that, even though it may not be clear to everybody, competence forms part of the moral dimension when it comes to care-giving (Tronto 1998:17). For Tronto (1993:107), care-giving involved physically doing work. It also meant that the care giver would in most situations come in contact with the objects of care (Tronto 1993:107). A good example of care-giving would be the people who volunteered their time, energy, and even their own health to take care of people in the most recent outbreaks of Ebola in Western Africa. These people got actively involved, using the resources and knowledge available to them, giving care to people with a deadly virus, whether it was helping with the provision of appropriate meals, setting up quarantined camps and hospitals, nursing people to health, or helping in an effort to find a cure.

Tronto (1993:107) pointed out that it would be possible for people to perceive the giving of money to such projects as care-giving, but that this, in fact, only enables
another person to do the necessary giving of care. She explained that giving money in these situations is a form of ‘taking care of’ rather than ‘care-giving’ and that it is important to understand the difference between the two, because money itself is not what solves the problem, but serves as a means of getting resources in order to satisfy needs (Tronto 1993:107). Donating money in such circumstances is not necessarily a bad thing, but sometimes it has the ability to undervalue care-giving within societies (Tronto 1993:107). After this hands-on approach to care-giving, there should be a reaction to the care given. This happens during the fourth phase of caring.

3.2.1.4 Care-receiving

This is the fourth and originally the final phase of caring according to Tronto (1993). This phase recognises that the object receiving care will respond in some way to the care that is being received (Tronto 1993:107). Tronto articulates that it does not matter whether the needs were fully met or not, whether care was implemented in a successful way or not, but when care was provided within a certain situation, there will always be a response, for the responsiveness to care serves as a requirement in order for an act to be called care (2001:63). Examples of these responses could be that the tuned piano sounds good again, or that the person who had been ill, feels better, or that children who were starving, are healthier and looking better after being fed properly (Tronto 1993:107). Tronto (1993:108) explained that ‘care receiving’ is a very important part of the caring process, because it is the only way in which to gauge whether the caring needs have actually been met in some way; to determine whether adequate care has been provided to those who are in need of care (Tronto 1993:108). When the response comes from the thing, person, or group who received the care, it is a sign that the process of caring has come full circle (Tronto 1998:17).

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165 Tronto (1993:107) explains that if money is given to a homeless person himself or herself on the street, that person still has to convert the money into whatever it is they need in order to fulfil their need. In this situation, the person would not be able to live off of money itself, but has to convert that money into, for instance, food or shelter. The person giving the money is thus not giving care, but merely recognises a need and takes care of it by giving money in order for someone else (the homeless person himself or herself) to satisfy their need.
### 3.2.1.5 Caring with

In her book *Caring Democracy* (2013), Tronto speaks of ‘caring with’, which may be seen as a possible fifth phase of caring. She uses this phase in a more particular setting, usually when she speaks of democratic caring. ‘Caring with’, as she explains, is the understanding that the needs that require caring and the ways in which they are addressed, need to be unfailing in their loyalty to the values and norms found within democratic commitments to justice, equality, and freedom for all (Tronto 2013:23). Michalinos Zembylas*, Vivienne Bozalek, and Tammy Shefer* (2014:6) explain that the moral qualities of solidarity and trust are essential in the process of ‘caring with’. The idea of ‘caring with’ is one that was inspired by the notion of caring for citizens and to care for democracy as a citizen in a democracy (Tronto 2013:x). She warns, however, that ‘caring with’ is not something that is done out of self-interest, and that is does not involve personal judgment (Tronto 2013:xii). It is something that has the collective interests of everybody in the long run at heart. ‘Caring with’ is not reserved for an elect few, but involves everybody, in spite of fears of disagreements or differing ideas (Tronto 2013:xii). It is about finding common ground and common values and caring with each other for the task at hand.

After she described the original four phases of caring, Tronto (1993:108) continued her explanation of care by pointing towards some crucial aspects to keep in mind regarding good care. She explained that care may be best thought of as a practice and noted that the notion of a practice tends to be complex (Tronto 1993:108). By

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167 Bozalek is on the directorate of Teaching and Learning at the University of the Western Cape, South Africa.

168 Shefer is part of the Women and Gender Studies Program at the University of the Western Cape, South Africa.

169 Sara Ruddick insisted that care should be understood as a practice as a form of practical rationality (Tronto 1993:108). Nel Noddings (1984:25), however, does not share the same opinion and preferred to call care essentially “non-rational” in her book, *Caring: A Feminine Approach*. When faced with the choices between the two, Tronto chose Ruddick’s approach with care as practical rationality, thereby rejecting Noddings’s perspective.
calling care a practice, Tronto (1993:108) tried to present it as an alternative to the perception that care is a principle or an emotion. Care, in this regard, should be understood as a practice that involves both thought and action as interrelated and being pointed towards some end (Tronto 1993:108).

After she classified care as a practice, Tronto (1993:109) made it clear that even though care can be viewed as a well-integrated process, it does not mean that conflict will always be avoided, in fact, she claimed that care involves conflict. She said that even though the four phases of care may seem to be interconnected without any problems, the reality is that there may be conflict within each individual phase (Tronto 1993:109). What needs to be remembered is that the people who are performing the act of caring are not exempt from having their own thoughts, ideas, or biases with regard to how things should be done. Conflict quite often happens when personalities, beliefs, or understandings differ. Where people are involved, it is impossible to insure a process without conflict.

Another possible cause of conflict is one that quite often occurs within bureaucracies is where the person who determines the strategies, structures, and schemes for the meeting of needs is far away from the actual care-giving and care receiving, which means that it is possible that needs are not being met in the best possible way (Tronto 1993:109). Conflict can also occur when the need for care from others comes in conflict with the need for care from the self, or when a person has a number of persons to take care of whose needs are in conflict with each other (Tronto 1993:110). It becomes the responsibility of the care-giver to balance the needs of the people involved to give the best possible care available (Tronto 1993:109). This is further complicated when the care receiver wants to dictate or instruct the care-giver as to the way in which the care should be provided (Tronto 1993:109). Caring well for someone is, thus, not always easy. When conflict arises, the care giver must take responsibility in order to resolve the conflict as soon as possible. One of the best things to do in a

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170 This echoes something of what Gilligan experienced during her empirical studies with adolescent girls who also encountered conflict. To Gilligan, this was a sign of resistance to injustice.
conflict situation, is to listen to the people involved, analyse the situation, obtain a mediator if it is required, followed by an attempt to rectify the problem.

In order to care well for people, it is important to keep in mind that care can, at the same time, be both particular and universal (Tronto 1993:109). Tronto (1993:109) explained that the construct of adequate care varies from culture to culture, and that it may vary among different groups within a society as distinguished by affinity group, class, caste, gender, and so forth. Even though care is different from culture to culture, care is at the same time a universal aspect of life (Tronto 1993:110). Tronto (1993:110) clarified this when she said that all human beings are in need of care and needs to be cared for at various stages of their life, but that the degree of care may vary not only because of culturally constructed differences, but also on a biological level where babies, the infirm, and the sick are not able to care for themselves, but must be taken care of. Care can thus be seen as universal as a result of the fact that everyone requires someone to care for them in life in order to survive.

Tronto (1993:110) also noted that good care requires certain resources in order to be successful. These resources, however, may not always be readily available as needed. Tronto (1993:110) mentioned that the resources needed for adequate care are usually scarcer than what those who are caring would like it to be and that the determination of the placement of available resources to particular caring needs had been one of the biggest political questions in the past. The question of resources is further complicated by the existence of conflict within care, cultural diversity and the scarcity of resources or materials to provide adequate care to those who need it (Tronto 1993:110).

The final aspect that Tronto provided as an aspect for caring well was to see care as a standard where caring as a concept provides a standard by which caring adequacies can be measured (1993:110). She explained that the adequacy of care, for a start, can be judged by considering how well the process of caring is integrated (Tronto

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171 Resources will generally be needed in cases where care is seen as a practice, where care involves needs being met by resources like books, or clothes, or food, or medicine, for instance.
One way of noticing a possible problem within the caring process, can be the absence of integrity (Tronto 1993:110). Factors like conflict, limited resources, divisions within the caring process, and the ideal of an integrated process of care, according to Tronto (1993:110), is something that will rarely be met. Even though that may be the case, Tronto (1993:110) explained that the ideal may be able to serve as an analytical mirror in which to measure whether the care provided is, in fact, up to standard.

In the discussion of care thus far, care has been portrayed as more than a caring act. It has been argued that care play a central part of every human life and that there is a certain way in which to provide adequate care. It is important to see how this broader understanding of care can have an effect on the daily lives and activities of people. The next section will, therefore, deal with the understanding of said concept of care in the context of human life.

### 3.2.2 Care in Context

One of the mistakes people tend to make, is quite often to assume that care is limited to children, the elderly, the sick, or the infirm. Care, however, is more connected to the daily lives of people than some are inclined to admit. Care, therefore, also has a bigger influence on the outcome of people’s lives than initially thought. After she explicated the concept of care, Tronto (1993:111) continued by considering the very concept of care within daily undertakings. For her, it was not about seeing care as a systematic dimension of life, but rather investigating as to why care, which appears to be a central part of human life, is disregarded and side-lined within society (Tronto 1993:111). The theory that arose was that care, within the culture of the time, contains a great ideological advantage for those who are successful in keeping it out of picture, for if care is noticed and accepted as pervasive and central to human life, those who are in positions of power and privilege would no longer be able to ignore and reduce the importance of care and the activities and responsibilities which accompanies it (Tronto 1993:111).
Tronto (1993:111) reasoned that by calling attention to care, questions may be asked about the adequacy of care within the wider society, thereby influencing thinking of the moral and political life. By saying this, however, she did not imply that some people in power were, and still are, deliberately obscuring care in order to avoid the responsibilities which come with it, for this would have been too simplistic in both the way the powerful are perceived, and in terms of her view of how ideologies function (Tronto 1993:111). For Tronto (1993:111), the connection between fragmented views of care and the distribution of power was better explained in terms of a variety of complex ideas about individualism, autonomy and the “self-made man”. She explained that it would be difficult for said “self-made” individuals to agree to the fact that care has played an important role in their personal success and that such an admission would undermine the legitimacy of inequitable distribution of available power, resources, and privileges of which they were probably great beneficiaries (Tronto 1993:111).

Tronto (1993:111) viewed care as being devalued and contained within the social order. Care and what it is supposed to achieve, is discussed, but is hardly ever considered in a systematic form, which in turn causes the critical perspective on culture to be lost (Tronto 1993:12). Care, according to what Tronto (1998:19) believed, ought to be something that happens within an environment where everybody within that environment participate in caring – an environment in which both the care-givers, care-receivers, and other responsible people involved, communicate about what the best option would be to satisfy the needs at hand. Even though some changes have occurred in recent years, the role and perception of care is not nearly what it should to be, and more attention should be given to the role of care within every aspect of

\footnote{Tronto deliberately chose the term “man” to be able to refer to a feministic perspective in a footnote, especially with regard to the understanding of feminism and individualism. Tronto elaborated on this view in a footnote on page 205.}

\footnote{It is important to keep in mind that not all people in power are or were ever in denial about the role of care in their success. In recent times the role and importance of care for both men and women are becoming more prevalent, but it is still in the early phases and a lot still needs to be done in order for a more equal and caring society to be established.}
human life. If care then takes its proper place in society, however, questions about “who cares for whom?” and the legitimacy of current arrangements will become central political and moral questions (Tronto 1993:112).

Tronto (1993:112) continued to explain how the understanding of care is quite often fragmented in numerous significant ways. Firstly, she noted that the caring processes were incompletely integrated and that differing kinds of care were assigned different weights in society (Tronto 1993:112). Her second concern was that care was described and discussed as though it was only about inconsequential concerns (Tronto 1993:112). Care, according to Tronto (1993:112), was associated with the private sector, it represented the emotional, and the needy, and therefore it was perceived as a sign of weakness; all of these “negative” attributes have made it extremely difficult for care to infiltrate the social, moral, and political spheres of life (Tronto 1993:112).

### 3.2.3 Care as Work

Back in 1982, when Gilligan wrote *In a Different Voice*, it became more evident that there was an alternative voice to the autonomous, individual, and non-relational voice that seemed to have dominated the daily lives of successful people. Tronto (1993:112) explained that at first it seemed that women were the only ones able and willing to care, and for this reason Gilligan’s interpretation became powerful; her work gave a voice to something which was not taken seriously for a long time. Tronto (1993:112) noted that it was not only gender that determined who would care and how caring would take place, but also race and class. She elaborated on this by saying that caring would quite often be left in the hands of the least well off members of a society, and therefore became work (Tronto 1993:113). For members of society who were financially well-off, it became easier to use their positions of superiority to pass the caring work off to those who needed a job and were therefore willing to take up the

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174 I refer to these attributes as “negative”, because it is the way it has been perceived. I do not, however, believe that they are necessarily negative in themselves, but that (patriarchal) society has caused these attributes to be considered as “non-manly” and therefore they tend to be unacceptable within the public spheres of life.
responsibility of caring as a means of work (Tronto 1993:113). Care, within the history of Western civilisation, had always been considered to be the work of slaves, servants, and women (Tronto 1993:113). Caring had, therefore, always been associated with someone who was less respected than the powerful and the successful people. It would, thus, have been unthinkable, maybe even shameful, for a man, let alone a successful man, to take any responsibility when it came to caring. The largest tasks of caring throughout history, the nurturing of and attention to children, and the concern and care for the elderly and the infirm, have generally been considered to be the responsibility of women (Tronto 1993:113). Tronto (1993:113) continued by saying that in caste societies, the lowest castes were often the ones who were reserved for the cleaning up after bodily functions. Even in the industrial societies that are prevalent in modern times, these tasks still seem to be disproportionately carried out by those considered to be part of the lower class in society; the women, the lower working classes, and quite often in the West, by people of colour (Tronto 1993:113). She noted that the people who were doing the caring work and caring activities were often devalued, underpaid, and disproportionately occupied by people who were relatively powerless within society (Tronto 1993:113). 175 Her conclusion was, thus, that a vicious circle evolved over time; care was devalued while the people who were doing the caring work, were devalued (Tronto 1993:114).

Tronto (1993:114) believed that the framework for care that she suggested allowed people to notice something extraordinary about the relationship that exists between race, class, gender, and care. She noted that when she took all of these things into consideration, care’s place within society was a lot more complex than she had initially thought it would be (Tronto 1993:114). She elaborated on this by suggesting that the gender, race, and class dimension to care is more subtle than a first glance allowed and that in reality, caring about, and taking care of, quite often become the duties of the powerful (Tronto 1993:114). Care-giving and care receiving, on the other hand,

175 Tronto (1993:113-114) backed up these statements by providing statistics of various jobs held by a variety of people based on race, class and gender within the United States of America.
are generally left to the less powerful within society (Tronto 1993:114). Taking care of, according to Tronto (1993:115), in this instance, was more associated with public roles, and in that context, had more to do with men, than with women. It happens at times that, by working at his job, a man is considered to be taking care of his family (Tronto 1993:115). By associating “taking care of” with masculinity, “caring about” also becomes gendered, race-related, and classed; men and people who enjoy greater privilege take care of by caring about public and broader issues, while women and people of colour have very little to take care of in that they care about private and local affairs (Tronto 1993:115). This creates a divide in society between men and women, different races, and different social standings. Whenever this happens, it leads to a scenario where the question is often asked which one is better, and when this question is answered, it gives the impression that one is greater than the other, thereby causing inequality to transpire. It also constructs the view that some forms of caring are greater or more important than others.

It is important to remember that care is about the meeting of needs (Tronto 1993:116). In order to better understand how these needs can be met, it is crucial to try to construct an idea of what it means to be needy, or to define what is meant when referring to these needs. Care can be understood in a variety of ways in different contexts and cultures. The difference in what is understood as needs can, for example, be seen in the need for food or clean water by a starving child in a third world country, or the need for help from a domestic worker, because there is no time for doing laundry and cleaning the house in a busy schedule. Both are needs, but they differ greatly in terms of economic differences and livelihood. Tronto (1993:116) elucidated that some needs not only speak to the economic inconsistencies within cultures, but also the variance in value of different people’s needs. Caring, she said, does not function in an egalitarian manner, for the distribution of caring work and those who are cared for are still being forced to maintain the patterns of subordination, because they are considered less important than those who have the financial means to pay people to

176 By looking at care this way, Tronto’s four phases of caring are split up into two groups in what she classifies as the “more abstract” and the “more concrete” (Tronto 1993:206).
care on their behalf (Tronto 1993:116). Tronto (1993:117) concluded by saying that care is devalued as work in society and therefore easily reduced to a lesser place within a value system.\(^{177}\)

Care is not only devalued as work within society, but also devalued in terms of its linking with private lives, emotions, and the penurious (Tronto 1993:117). It has become clear through the work of Gilligan that society has the perception that those who are successful are individualistic, autonomous, independent, rational, intellectual, and in most cases, men. Gilligan has, however, been successful in questioning whether this is the only valid perception by doing extensive research with both male and female participants and thereby establishing that what (patriarchal) society wants people to believe about emotions and care, and what reality proves to be, are worlds apart. Society tends to treat accomplishment, rationality, and autonomy as the only worthy qualities, thereby devaluing care, because it represents the opposite of those qualities (Tronto 1993:117). Care, whether it be work or in any other dimension of life, is therefore often considered to be a sign of weakness among powerful people.

One of the reasons for the devaluation of care within Western thought and Western society today, is that it is every so often seen as a private matter. Care, according to Tronto, is something which is seen within society as something that is supposed to be provided in the household, and that it only enters the public or market life once the private household is unable to provide sufficient care (Tronto 1993:119). Tronto (1993:119) used mothers as an example, saying that, ideologically, they are the ones responsible for taking care of the children and that the use of day-care facilities are merely reserved as a back-up option when a mother's options have run out. She then drew upon the work of Susan Faludi, who reported that despite the conventional understanding that single women are unhappy, the burden of being married made married women even more depressed and unhealthy than their single counterparts.

\(^{177}\) The importance of care as work and the value thereof within society may be better grasped when society is imagined without it. The true value of good care can only be understood in the absence thereof. Attention should be paid to the importance of care in various dimensions in life, and whether certain accomplishments would have been possible at all without care playing an important role in said success.
(Tronto 1993:119). For Tronto (1993:119), this made sense, because being married automatically suggested that women have to take up the role of taking care of the household, and that they have to take care of their husbands without any thought or attention given to their own needs. Women who have jobs in the public sector where care is required and have the responsibility of taking care of the household are often unfavourably affected by their situation (Tronto 1993:119). Putting all the caring responsibilities on women and expecting them to do all the caring without being cared for themselves, harms the already weakened perception that care is a burden. Tronto (1993:120) suggested that the constant need to privatise care and the privatisation of the challenges women face as care givers support the perception that care is actually not a social concern, but one of idiosyncratic individuals.

The view of care as characteristics of weakness is further weakened by the power structures attached to caring by society. Care receivers, as Tronto (1993:120) explained, are often perceived as relatively helpless; for someone to admit that they require help means that they are in need. Tronto (1993:120) explained that successful people, as perceived by the general, patriarchal society, are people who are autonomous, independent adults, and therefore are not people who require help or care from other people. This way of thinking, thus, leads to the perception that people who are in need of care or some form of help, are less successful, less driven, and less worthy than their autonomous, independent counterparts. Another reason why people tend to overlook routine forms of care as care, is because they then need to admit that they are themselves in need of something, thereby presumably allowing themselves to be perceived as less autonomous, and less capable of doing things they should be able to do (Tronto 1993:120). This, Tronto (1993:120) felt, led to the social construct that people who receive care should be pitied, thereby not recognising needs

178 Susan Faludi is an American humanist, journalist and author. She studies at Harvard University in the United States of America.

179 Kittay (2005:443) shares this belief by saying that care people, whether they need or provide care, are reliant on both political and social organisations to support them.
of people as needs, and creating a breach between the needs of what Tronto (1993:120) called “truly needy” and other people who suppose they have no needs.  

Care, and the perceptions contributed to it, are further debilitated by what Tronto (1993:120) called “privileged irresponsibility”. What she meant when she first referred to this term is the privilege of those who are privileged enough to be able to ignore or disregard certain adversities that are bestowed upon them (Tronto 1993:121). Zembylas et al (2014:8) explain Tronto’s understanding of privileged irresponsibility as a system that allows for people who are in a superior position to remain oblivious about their contribution to the maintaining of a hierarchical system. It is at this point that Tronto (1993:121) recalled what it meant to “take care of” a problem according to the phases of care as she previously described it. She explained that there must be a moment in which there is a recognition of a problem, thereby accusing privileged people of being irresponsible because of their ignorance when it comes to noticing or recognising the needs of others (Tronto 1993:121). In a society of people with ample financial means, it becomes rather easy to side-step basic human needs and the recognition of care due to the fact that it becomes so easy to lob money at the situation, thereby shying away from the responsibility of taking care within the situation.

The people who are actually responsible, thus pay someone to do the caring work on their behalf and in this way manage to avoid taking responsibility and “taking care of” a problem or a need themselves. Tronto (1993:121) noted that this caused a problem when care-receivers felt aggrieved and felt the need to complain, because it would mean that they could not communicate a particular problem to those who provided the care, because they did not consider it to be their responsibility anymore. In this way,

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180 Tronto (1993:120) used the example of disabled people within the disabled rights movement who have had struggles in the past to get able-bodied people to recognise them as people who are equal to them with regard to worth, dignity, and respect.

181 Privilege may in some instances be best understood as secure financial welfare. It may, therefore, be interpreted that because of the fact that the privileged have secure financial means, they have the ability to take care of their needs by means of money. Privilege can, however, also refer to having means other people do not necessarily have access to or possession of.
people who are in a position of privilege also seem to be in a position of power because they get to decide when and how they intend to tend to or avoid certain responsibilities.\textsuperscript{182} Tronto (1993:121) explained that people who are privileged do not need to take responsibility, either for themselves and their own privilege or the absence of privilege when it comes to other people. This creates a problem where no one is taking responsibility, leading to what is now known as privileged irresponsibility. When this system is not challenged, the people in the privileged position justify their being in a position of power by arguing that everybody around them is benefitting from their position (Zembylas et al 2014:8).\textsuperscript{183} Privileged irresponsibility is further complicated by the fact that it is hardly ever directly visible (Tronto 2013:104). It is something that hovers in the background, seen as part of everyday life, or accepted as part of traditions being passed down from one generation to another. Tronto (2013:104) stresses the importance of taking responsibility and consciously making the decision to challenge the system when privileged irresponsibility does eventually come to the fore.

3.2.4 Is Care Gendered and Why Does it Matter?

A lot has been said, written, and believed about the role of gender when it comes to care. This, more often than not, leads people to ask the question whether care may be gendered. The short answer to this question would be both “yes” and “no”. This short and straightforward answer, however, does not satisfy the question completely. The mere fact that this question exists says something about the history, development, 

\textsuperscript{182} Tronto (1993:121) used the example of racism where some people would, for instance, enjoy “white skin privilege” where they would benefit from a certain system because of the colour of their skin. They also do not recognise that they are privileged because of their skin colour (Tronto 1993:121). They may not feel the need to take responsibility in the fight against racism, because they are not affected by racial bias or discrimination, and they may not think that they are themselves being prejudiced (Tronto 1993:121).

\textsuperscript{183} Zembylas et al (2014:8) explains that an example of this would be wives not saying anything, because they are benefitting from their husbands being the sole breadwinner, or domestic workers not challenging these ideas, because they have a paying job. In countries like South Africa where unemployment is an enormous problem, people, especially women, sometimes tend not to challenge the system due to fear of losing their job. This is sometimes further complicated by cultural beliefs wherein a woman has no authority to question the decisions made by a man, however bad they may be. Men are the leaders and women have to accept whatever they receive graciously, without questioning the position of the man.
and perception of care. In the early stages of the development of the ethics of care, Carol Gilligan started asking certain questions about the different roles men and women tend to ascribe to when it comes to morality and moral situations. Her research, at first, seemed to differentiate between the way boys and girls, and eventually, men and women, perceive moral situations and morality.

When Lawrence Kohlberg started his research on moral development, he unknowingly opened the door to the conversation about gender and moral development. This conversation about the role of gender was started when Gilligan first challenged Kohlberg’s work on moral development. She was disturbed by the early findings that suggested that girls were generally ranked lower on the scale of moral development than boys (Tronto 1987:647). She challenged Kohlberg’s work by claiming that it could not possibly be expected to be universal when his research and work was based solely on the outcome of studies based primarily on the experiences of boys.

For Kohlberg, moral actions and decisions were based on fairness and justice (Woods 1996:376). This, however, was not the only option according to Gilligan and her research. While doing research with women, Gilligan felt like the theories of moral development of people like Piaget and Kohlberg, were too masculine. Gilligan (1995:121) described how, at the time she was writing In a Different Voice, the dominant voice that shaped the standard of the day within psychology, political theory, law, and ethics, were all set by masculine standards. The standard by which everyone were to be measured by, were based on a male voice. This voice, according to Gilligan (1995:121), was keyed to separation in that it was an individual, autonomous voice that acted alone, was the possessor of natural rights, and in general an autonomous moral voice. When women’s moral development was then measured or judged according to these masculine scales, they fell short compared to men (Woods 1996:377). As an alternative, Gilligan suggested a morality based on responsibility and relationship, that which she had seen as the “different voice” while working with various women. Instead of using language of justice and fairness, the women in Gilligan’s studies tended to use language of responsibility and care when it came to moral actions and decision-making.
For Woods (1996:377), these two perspectives had been the centre of dispute on this topic since the early 1980’s. It is important to keep in mind that Gilligan never denied the validity of the justice perspective, but merely suggested that it is not the only perspective when it came to moral development. Yet the perception still remain in many circles that there is not space for both moral orientations and that a choice had to be made between the two. Schwickert and Miller (2005:166) explain that Gilligan not only claimed to have proven the validity and use of these two gender moralities, but also managed to assert the ethical validity of both of these moralities. Crandall, Tsang, Goldman, and Pennington, (1999:190) elaborated on this by saying that Gilligan predicted different moral approaches because of the different development paths men and women experience within the boundaries of society. By differentiating between the justice perspective and the care perspective, it was never Gilligan’s intention to separate them or judge one as better than the other. In fact, Gilligan believed that even though the concept of care was a different moral construct than the moral construct of justice, a complete view of moral development needed to include both the care construct and the justice construct (Crandall et al. 1999:189).

Nel Nodding\textsuperscript{184}, in her book \textit{Caring} (1984), perceived women to be genetically engineered to be caring, as opposed to men who are genetically engineered to be just and righteous. She used the story of Abraham and Isaac, where Abraham is willing to sacrifice his son in obedience to God. She used Kierkegaard’s\textsuperscript{185} interpretations of the supra-ethical action of Abraham to explain that he, being a man, was willing to sacrifice his son and that it would have been justified based on the fact that he answers to God, the absolute (Noddings 1984:43). His action, Nodding (1984:43) said, was justified and derived from his absolute duty toward God. She explained that this, however,

\textsuperscript{184} Nel Noddings is an American feminist author, and also a Lee Jacks Professor of education, Emerita, at Stanford University. She has written a lot about care, the ethics of care, and the impact and influence it has on education.

\textsuperscript{185} Kierkegaard, according to Noddings (1984:43), believed that “the ethical is...the universal, and the individual directly obedient to God is superior to the universal” (Noddings 1984:43). She quoted him as saying: “In the story of Abraham we find such a paradox. His relation to Isaac, ethically expressed, is this, that the father should love the son. This ethical relation is reduced to a relative position in contrast with the absolute relation to God.” (Noddings 1984:43).
Natural caring, according to Noddings (2002:2), is a form of caring that has no prerequisite or necessity for an ethical effort in order for it to be motivated. She believed that women do not love because it is required of them to love, but rather loves naturally because their natural relatedness gives birth to love (Noddings 1984:43). The love referred here is therefore natural caring, and it is this natural caring that leads women to ethical behaviour (Nodding 1984:43). What happened when Abraham was willing to sacrifice his son was therefore, in the eyes of Noddings, not only ethically unjustified, but also a violation of the supra-ethical of caring (Noddings 1984:43). In short, for Noddings, women are more ethically responsible in their moral decision-making, based on the fact that they possess the ability to care naturally.

Noddings (1984:46), in her firm belief that women are naturally caring, felt that it would be possible to build a new sort of world based on this natural caring that is all too familiar to women. She believed that a world where women tend to be seen as people with a lack of experience, and are thereby held to an inferior stage in moral development, is utter nonsense, and then suggested, to the contrary, a more ethical and powerful society where the voice and opinions of naturally caring women are heard (Noddings 1984:46). One of the greatest points of critique against the work of Noddings, however, is the fact that she based her whole argument on the use of mothering as the model for female moral agency. One of the critics of Nodding’s view

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186 Noddings (1984:31) believed that women or mothers care naturally. She used the argument that women feel or know when their infants need them, or when something is wrong, and therefore have the inherent ability to be naturally caring (Noddings 1984:31).

187 Noddings believed that men and women are able to care and therefore should be caring – that is, people who are able to do the right thing and choose to do the right thing because they are driven by the overwhelming feelings of love, affection, compassion, sympathy, and empathy (Tong 1993:112). Tong (1993:112) also mentioned that Noddings, in her book Women and Evil (1989), wrote that women are better able to resist evil than men, because of their natural mothering instinct to care. For Nodding, women’s understanding of evil is concrete, while the understanding of evil for men is rather abstract (Tong 1993:113). This does not mean that men are unable to care well. She was, however, convinced that for men to become completely moral beings, they should learn how to care, for they are able to learn how to care (Tong 1993:111).
on care, is Joan Tronto. Tronto (2013:151) explains that even though the image of care portrayed by a mother lovingly holding her child in her arms is one that soothes the imagination, she believes that it is a distorted image of care. She says that such a thing, which she calls “Robinson Crusoe” (Tronto 2013:151) care, where one person cares for the other and thereby ends the situation, does not exist (Tronto 2013:151). Tronto (2013:152) also believes that the notion that only mothers care for their children contribute to the misconception about the nature of care.\textsuperscript{188} She said that if care was to be exclusively connected to the ‘naturalness’ of the caring done by a woman, that it would be either a case of instinct or of deeply social or cultural behaviour, thereby excluding care from the realm of moral choice (Tronto 1993:123).

Back in 1987, shortly after Gilligan wrote \textit{In a Different Voice}, Tronto shared her opinion about gender differences when it comes to a theory of care. She was adamant in highlighting the fact that Gilligan never intended to differentiate between genders in her research, but rather meant to distinguish between two modes of thinking when it came to moral development and morality. She did this in a time when people tended to mistakenly assume that Gilligan meant that women had a different, and maybe even a lesser, morality than men. This despite the fact that Gilligan (1982:2) clearly stated right at the start of her book that the different voice is not to be characterised by gender, but rather by theme. She even went so far as to explain that the distinction being made between the voices of male and female, were for the purpose of highlighting the contrast between the two modes of thought, rather than for representing male and female perspectives (Gilligan 1982:2).

During a small, informal meeting with Gilligan in Stellenbosch in 2014, when she was asked about why she chose to focus on the two modes of thinking rather than gender, her answer was straightforward and clear that it would not be true to generalise by

\textsuperscript{188} Tronto (2013:152) explains that while children get taught by teachers, they are not exclusively taught by teachers, and nor do they do so dyadically. Care rarely happens between only two people (Tronto, 2013:153); most of the time people contribute without being credited for doing care work. The importance of realising this must be noted, for when care is “triangulated”, it presents opportunities to break the hierarchy of power (Tronto 2013:153).
saying that all men are a certain way and all women are a certain way, for this would not only be untruthful, it also automatically forces the impression that the one must be better than the other. This, in turn, leads to the formation of a hierarchy, something which the ethics of care, as a moral theory striving for equality, seeks to eradicate.\footnote{During March of 2013 Gilligan visited Stellenbosch University as a STIAS Fellow and delivered a paper on “Moral Injury and the Ethic of Care: Reframing the Conversation about Differences”. During her time spent in Stellenbosch, I had the privilege of inviting her to a small and informal study group consisting of mainly students in Systematic Theology at the Faculty of Theology of Stellenbosch University. During this visit, we heard first-hand about her research, latest works, and her experience in the field of the Ethics of Care. We also had ample opportunity to ask questions which she answered in great detail.}

Tronto (1987:645) supported Gilligan’s perspective when she made an important point in saying that Gilligan’s point is a subtle one. She explained that Gilligan, on the one hand, wanted to say that her argument has no further claim on the moral domain apart from the fact that it must include both justice and care (Tronto 1987:645). On the other hand, she said that Gilligan picked up that the focus on care was primarily branded as a female phenomenon in the advantaged populations that have been studied (Tronto 1987:645). She continued to explain that the perception that Gilligan’s work was based solely on women’s morality is a cultural phenomenon, rather than what Gilligan had intended for it to be (Tronto 1987:646), which is her concern with the alternative voice that she had identified and its impact on morality and ethics.

Tronto (1987:646) believed that the equation of “care” with “female” is a questionable one based on the lack of evidence regarding the connection between gender difference and different moral perspectives. She argued that it would be dangerous, especially for feminists, to hold this view to be true in a social context in which men are considered to be normal, for it may imply the inferiority of that which is considered to distinctly female (Tronto 1987:646). Her argument was that if feminists, like Noddings for instance, were to see the ethics of care as a category characterised by gender, then their struggle would not be one where they are thinking critically about philosophical problems and promises, but rather one where they become stuck in trying to defend women’s morality (Tronto 1987:646). If Gilligan did not intend for her research to be interpreted as gendered, it is necessary to consider why it is so often
perceived as a gendered ideology. Tronto (1987:649) noted that Gilligan’s work hinted at the explanation of the origins of care when she described women in the abortion study they were conducting. She wrote:

> What begins to emerge is a sense of vulnerability that impedes these women from taking a stand, what George Eliot regards as the girl’s "susceptibility" to adverse judgment of others, which stems from her lack of power and consequent inability to do something in the world... The women’s reluctance to judge stems ... from their uncertainty about their right to make moral statements or, perhaps, the price for them that such judgment seems to entail ... When women feel excluded from direct participation in society, they see themselves as subject to a consensus or judgment made and enforced by the men on whose protection and support they depend and by whose names they are known ... The conflict between self and other thus constitutes the central moral problem for women ... The conflict between compassion and autonomy, between virtue and power (Tronto 1987:649).

For Tronto (1987), the argument that care is gendered has been an issue of social society more than a biological or psychological issue. Badgett and Folbre (1999:312) also shared in this view, believing that gender norms leading the understanding of what acceptable concepts of ‘familial altruism and individual self-interest’ are, are socially constructed. The essence of what Tronto (1987:649) understood from Gilligan’s work, was that women’s different approach to morality may merely be a different moral expression as a result of their subordinate or tentative social position. It is not so much a psychological or developmental blemish that caused women to express themselves in a certain way, but rather the constant pressures from a

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190 Gilligan in "In a Different Voice: Women's Conceptions of Self and of Morality" (pp 486, 487, and 490).
patriarchal society enforcing certain ways of saying, being, and thinking upon them.\textsuperscript{191} Tronto (1987:652) argued that the present society still believes that “man” stands for human and that the norm for everything is equated with the masculine or male perspective. Anything that deviates from this patriarchal and masculine point of view is thus subordinate or considered to be inferior. Gender difference, according to Tronto (1987:652), is therefore a concept that deviates from what society perceives to be normal. It is, however, essential to break down this stereotypical acceptance of gender difference within society in an attempt to build up an equal society where men and women enjoy equal rights on all levels. It is therefore crucial for the alternative perspective of Gilligan to be seen as exactly that, an alternative.

Tronto (1987:655) noted that thinkers who tend to advocate women’s morality as a necessary corrective to Kohlberg’s moral development, rather than an alternative, have made it relatively easy for critics to dismiss women’s morality as secondary or irrelevant to broader moral and political concerns. In order for care and the moral theories concerning care to have an actual impact on modern day society, it is of great importance that it is not seen as the only way to be successful, but rather an alternative way to improve the morality of the whole of society. To limit Gilligan’s work to women’s morality, is to address only half of society, thereby limiting the endless possibilities that come with this theory. Tronto (1987:656) helped with the understanding that care and its place within the ethics of care must be understood within the context of moral theory, rather than a gender-based psychological theory.

Tronto (2013:67) explains that there will be no hope for society to rethink responsibility or become more caring or more democratic while masculinity continues to be constructed around the popular notions such as “tough guys don’t care” (Tronto 2013:67) or to “man-up” (Tronto 2013:67) during challenging times. She goes as far

\textsuperscript{191} Fisher and Tronto (1991:36) explained that the modern industrialised society divided the world into two parts: one where the man is perceived as in individual, autonomous, rational being over and against the depending, caring woman. In this world, the men are seen as the ones who go out into the public sphere and get involved in matters which pertains to laws, rights, paid labour, and formal encounters, while women stay in the private sphere, unseen and unheard, continuing their wifely duties of cooking, cleaning, caring for the family, and performing various forms of unpaid labour and tending to personal relations (Fisher & Tronto 1990:36).
as to say that not only is care considered to be gendered in contemporary society, it is also marked by race/ethnicity and class (Tronto 2013:68). She further notes how, despite valiant efforts to break this view, care is still persistently being viewed through a gendered lens across time and place (Tronto 2013:68). Care is seen to be the work of a female (Tronto 2013:68). It is at this point that she differs considerably from Noddings in that she believes that the essentialist claim should not be made that just because a woman gave birth, she must be a care giver or that she will naturally be a better care giver (Tronto 2013:68).

Tronto (2013:71) argues that the problem with traditional biological arguments for natural caring is that they tend not to admit how humans frequently alter with the so-called “natural” process, like for instance, in the case of surrogates, or the feeding of children in ways other than breastfeeding the “natural” way. For Tronto (2013:71), there is no reason why the “natural” mother “naturally” cares, for mothers sometimes even kill their infants. She makes a point of saying that not all women care, or should care well (Tronto 2013:68). She further emphasises the fact that if women were to be seen as the only ones capable of caring, it would mean that men are being denied the capability to care (Tronto 2013:68). By saying this, she automatically acknowledges and accepts the fact that men are indeed capable of caring. She notes that current societal constructs regarding femininity and masculinity tend to permit men to avoid taking up, or even thinking about, responsibilities regarding care tasks which would generally be assigned to women (Tronto 2013:68). She explains that the definitions of what it means to be masculine, is to be given what she calls, a “pass” out of thinking about “girl things”, which tend to include caring responsibilities that are so easily perceived as the sole responsibility of women (Tronto 2013:68).

Tronto (2013:72) believes that the gendered roles we perceive in society are due to the unquestioned attitudes and social patterns which is being reinforced upon people. The argument that care becomes gendered because of cultural practices such as patriarchy is supported by scholars such as Carol Gilligan and David Richardson, who openly and actively speak against the nullifying effect that patriarchy has on democracy and society (Tronto 2013:72). Badgett and Folbre (1999:316) explain that
even though experimental studies have disproved the notion that men and women have differing levels of altruism, the forms in which it is expressed are still overwhelmingly gendered. Tronto (2013:72) says that it takes but a stroll through a toy store to see the gender stereotyping enforced upon boys and girls, with metallic-coloured toys for the boys and pink and pastel-coloured toys for the girls. This is merely one way that girls and women are being portrayed as “more caring” than boys or men (Tronto 2013:72). She further believes that this pattern of gender stereotyping is so deeply entrenched that it seems to be universal and timeless (Tronto 2013:72).

Tronto sketches four different “passes” that men tend to get in order to escape their responsibility when it comes to caring or to show that they do not care, due to beliefs in society like “tough guys don’t care”. She calls these passes the protection pass, the production pass, the bootstrap pass, and the charity pass (Tronto 2013). These passes are often used as justification for men not to care or to evade their responsibility when it comes to care. Tronto (2013), however, explains how these passes cannot be used for these purposes. The first two passes, she argues, are essential for living well, and for living in a democratic society, but not required for living well (Tronto 2013:70). Tronto (2013:70) believes that democratic societies would be possible if protection and production were brought back into balance with care.

The first pass, called the protection pass, has to do with the protection of the body from its enemies, whether external and internal (Tronto 2013:72). Tronto (2013:72) says that protection can be seen as an element of care insofar as it prevents, and tries to alleviate, harm. She believes the policing and the police powers that are seen in the modern times, are a significant form of what she calls “non-caring care” (Tronto 2013:73). Modern policing, according to Tronto (2013:74), has become militarised and masculinised, a notion which has been widely received and supported by the public, as opposed to the kind of care work it used to be. She explains how it becomes increasingly necessary for the meaning of military to be redefined in terms of the

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192 An example of this would be how men will likely be willing to carry the laundry basket, while women will likely be the ones to fold the laundry; or that men will most likely be more willing to go to war than women, while women are more likely to help within the community or families (Badgett & Folbre 1999:316).
masculine, because of the influx of women within a system that was once perceived as a masculine domain (Tronto 2013:74). The term “warrior”, she says, is being used in an effort to re-masculinise the duties of soldiers in order to distance themselves from the military functions of care work (Tronto 2013:75). She further explains that protection is seen as a form of public care provided by citizens for citizens wherein both the recipients of care and the providers of care are marked by masculinity (Tronto 2013:75).

Zembylas et al. (2014:8) understand this pass to be the old-fashioned view that men are the protectors of women. By marking this masculine protection as public, it once again forces women to be bound up within the limited boundaries of the private sphere. Tronto (2013:75) says that the recipients of this “feminine” care, which is found in the private sphere, are usually people who are perceived to be dependant, in other words, children, people who are disabled, people who are sick or infirm, or the elderly. She notes that as soon as people seem to become dependent or are in need of care, they become feminised, and are thereby seen by society as unable to make independent, autonomous decisions (Tronto 2013:75). This happens, as she previously explained, because people tend to think in terms of the traditional view that the world is either private or public, with care being restricted to the private sphere and therefore restricted to the household and its duties (Tronto 2001:62).

Tronto (2013:76) believes that protection as a form of care has a dark side to it. She draws on the work of Judith Stiehm to point out that when protectors are in a position in which they cannot protect, they may sometimes try to justify other forms of bad treatment based on their need to protect someone, and in a lot of cases, the victims are the people whom they originally vowed to protect (Tronto 2013:76).

193 This kind of violence, or any violence for that matter, poses a great threat to the ideal of democratic caring, and is in its multiplicity the antithesis of care (Tronto 2013:76). She continues by stating that it often happens that violence is found in places where care is expected to be found, or that violence and care are entangled (Tronto 2013:76). However, she

193 Judith Stiehm is a Professor of Political Science at Florida International University.
is convinced that the ethics of care has long been considered to be an ethic strongly connected to nonviolence (Tronto 2013:76). The ethics of care, therefore, not only strives for equality among genders, but also for a nonviolent society. She makes an important claim in saying that it would be erroneous to excuse men from their caring responsibilities on the grounds of a ‘protection pass’, especially because issues like domestic violence are so prevalent in households (Tronto 2013:77). Tronto (2013:79) acknowledges that protection can be seen as a kind of care, but says that people tend to be rather hesitant to discuss protection as part of care, because when protection is hidden as a caring dimension, the people in charge of protecting others grant themselves a ‘protection pass’ in order to evade their responsibilities with regard to others, “feminised” forms of caring. She continues to explain that it is these boundaries between care and protection which, at the end of the day, keep the gendered order of men over women in place (Tronto 2013:79).

The second pass Tronto (2013) speaks of, is called the ‘production pass’. This pass is probably one of the oldest and most used passes when it comes to care. It basically entails the notion that men work hard and provide a pay check, while women are at home taking care of their domestic duties. In this way, a man cares by producing monetary support in order for the woman to stay at home and take care of all the duties that needs their attention. Badgett and Folbre (1999:316) highlight the fact that women are not only expected to do general housework, but it is also expected of them to ‘take care’. In the same way the man produces the finances, the woman fulfils her ‘domesticity’ in order for the man to continue to build a stable career (Tronto 2013:80). The word ‘domesticity’, according to Tronto (2013:80), was first coined by John Williams (2000) to magnify the great separation that exists between the private household and the public life.194 Badgett and Folbre (1999:316) explained that men generally gain a great advantage when they encourage women’s caring trends, as do women who encourage the caring propensities of men. Society, however, has always unequally favoured men in their in their quest for more power, whether it be cultural,

194 Joan Williams is a legal scholar, is a Distinguished Professor of Law, and Founding Director at the Centre for Work Life Law.
or economic (Badgett & Folbre 1999:316). They called this “socially imposed altruism” (Badgett & Folbre 1999:316), or “gender-biased system of coercive socialization” (Badgett & Folbre 1999:316), or “discriminatory obligation” (Badgett & Folbre 1999:316) the result of the growth of exceedingly gendered standards of familial obligations (Badgett & Folbre 1999:316).

Tronto (2013:80) argues that the idea of ‘breadwinner’, the man of the house, and ‘caregiver’, the submissive wife, still persist within the cultural thinking in society and a lot of public policies of the day. She further says that even though a lot of modern households do not look the same as they historically did, men who provide in material goods somehow earn a ‘production pass’ that enables them to escape their caring duties, which are found within all households (Tronto 2013:82). Even though some women are now included within the workforce and also contribute and provide material goods for their family, they are still wedged into accepting sole responsibility for not only the unpaid housework, but also the care work (Tronto 2013:82). It is, thus, not only unfair, but unacceptable that men still receive a ‘production pass’ out of household-based care responsibilities.

The third pass that men get, is called the ‘bootstrap pass’. This pass is generally found on the marketplace and is driven by self-interest and personal gain. Zembylas et al (2014:7) note that this pass justifies a lack of responsibility by claiming only responsibility for the self or kin. This pass, according to Tronto (2013:118), further resorts within a system where it is accepted that everyone allocates scarce resources to the benefit of their own interest and presumes that everyone else is permitted to do the same. It is, therefore, a pass that implies that self-care or the wellbeing of the self is guaranteed, and claims a pass out of caring for anybody else is claimed. Tronto (2013:82) explains that an obvious problem with this pass is that not every human being is capable of accessing these scarce resources. The playing field is, thus, not level for everybody. This pass particularly negatively affects the elderly, the infirm, children, some people with disabilities, and the frail elderly (Tronto 2013:82), and in the case of a country like South Africa, the poor. Caring, as Tronto (2013:120) states, asks of citizens to think further and more broadly about varying kinds of responsibility,
for this helps them not to fall back on the notion of ‘each one for themselves’. By not only focusing on personal bootstraps, the way of seeing and knowing others are broadened (Tronto 2013:120). Tronto (2013:120) explains that caring, thus, asks responsible people to consider various forms of responsibilities, thereby suggesting that people look wider than only their own context, for they cannot make judgments of responsible caring if they do not understand where they come from, and to whom and what they are related to, leading them back into the trap of only caring for themselves, thereby enforcing the bootstrap pass of only looking after themselves.

The fourth and last pass that Tronto (2013) speaks about is the ‘charity pass’. This pass alludes to when money gets donated to a charity of someone’s choosing, thereby fulfilling the duties ascribed to caring. Tronto (2013:120) warns that this often happens out of self-interest and that wants and interests are often met, or the driving force behind decisions as to which charity to donate to, but that necessities are overlooked in the process. It would be irresponsible to assume that responsibilities with regard to caring will be met just because charities exist in society (Tronto 2013:121). All of this does not suggest that charities are at all a bad idea and should be avoided; it simply means that contributing to a charity is by no means a valid pass out of the responsibilities of caring. Donating to a charity can never be seen as a replacement for actual caring. One of the other concerns to consider when it comes to this pass, is that people who donate to these charities often do so without any physical presence. Tronto (2013:121) rightly notes that this pass lacks an important aspect of caring, that is, time. She explains that no greater effectiveness can be achieved within an intimate care situation than spending time as part of the caring activity (Tronto 2013:121).

When dealing with the question whether men have the ability to care, Tronto (2013:68) undoubtedly says yes. She explains that men care for themselves, their property, and other people (Tronto 2013:68). She says that men both give and receive care; they give care on a more regular basis to their children, spouses, friends, and parents, and they receive care when they are boys, elderly, or infirm, and care to keep themselves alive every day (Tronto 2013:68). This means that care is not as gendered as it is believed to be. Care, even though it is perceived that way, is not limited to the
capabilities of a woman. Men are, undoubtedly, able to both perform acts of caring, as well as receive care. Yet, as Tronto (2013:68) explains, the image that men do not care, or at the very least, that they are incapable of caring well, keeps persisting in society today. This image is further motivated by the belief throughout society that women are simply better at caring, and by the fact that women are more closely associated with care than men (Tronto 2013:68). Gilligan (2011:19) explains that care is perceived as something good women do, and that people who care, are therefore doing women’s work. It is, however, important to keep in mind that all women are not necessarily better at caring, even though they are more closely associated with care. The belief that that women are good at caring while men are not, Tronto (2013:68) says, is what R.W. Connell (2005) calls “hegemonic masculinity”.

Held (1987:121) believed that if men came to share fully and equitably in the care of all persons, such as children, the elderly and the old, that the moral values that arise for women within the context of caring may also arise fully for men. If everyone, men and women equally, accepted their responsibility to care, care’s power to change a society into a more caring society would be unavoidable.

### 3.2.5 The Promise of Care: Care’s Power

Over the past thirty years, various theories regarding care have been prominent within the realm of ethics and morality. This relatively young and developing theory has changed the way in which a lot of people perceive ethics, morality, gender roles, and everyone’s role in taking responsibility. It is becoming more evident that care may have been underwritten, underestimated, and devalued for far quite some time. Already in 1993, Tronto (1993:122) noted that patterns of delineation of power and powerlessness began to appear when the organisation of care was to be critically examined within society. For Tronto (1993:122), care appeared to be only an issue of the less powerful and the less important within society, while it is actually, ironically, the power of care that makes it so contained. She further argued that care is actually

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195 Hegemonic Masculinity, according to R.W. Connell (2005:77), can be defined as: “the configuration of gender practice which embodies the current accepted answer to the problem of the legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) the dominant position of men and the subordination of women”.

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arrayed by the powerful in order for it to both demonstrate and preserve their power (Tronto 1993:122). The power of care is, thus, to some extent recognised, but outsourced to the less powerful in order for the people in power to have more time and space to do the things they deem to be more important at that point in time.  

Simultaneously, Tronto (1993:122) argued that care is not only powerful within the realm of the powerful, but also within the realm of the weak, and therein care must also account for its place and the ways in which it is powerful within society. Care and the power of care are, therefore, important when it comes to both the powerful and the less powerful. Care becomes one of the powers of the weak (Tronto 1993:122). The difference between these power structures and their view on care, however, becomes apparent in the management, the claiming of responsibility, and the eventual “taking care of”.

By viewing care as a power of the weak, the importance of the role of care givers becomes more prominent, for without these care givers and their particular skills and willingness to accept responsibility for certain needs of others, some essential support in life would be lacking. Tronto (1993:122) pointed out that without care, infants, for instance, would not have the ability to grow into adults and thus concluded that a kind of resentment of care has often led to the unacknowledged importance of care. According to Tronto (1993:123), the power of care was, however, not limited to the unacknowledged importance of care. She argued that if object-relations psychologists and their theories were to be taken seriously, then care’s power cannot be seen as anything other than formidable (Tronto 1993:123). She continued to explain that object-relations psychologists have theorised that the primary bonds between child and primary care-taker have such an immense influence on the child and that it is so

196 It often happens that the powerful outsource their responsibility with regards to care to the less powerful within society. Sometimes the responsibility is so great that the less powerful person does not have time, energy, or the financial means to take up the full responsibility of their own personal needs and responsibilities when it comes to care. It happens every so often that the responsibility of care of the powerful comes at the expense of the responsibility of care of the less powerful. It is thus of great importance to find a way to balance the importance of the power of care among all people.
formative in their lives, it would impact the way in which children approach, behave, and interact with other people for the rest of their lives (Tronto 1993:123).

Tronto (1993:123) elaborated that the rage felt by children at a very young age over their powerlessness over their care-givers, may be one of the main reasons why care-givers are sometimes perceived as “the other”, or treated with condescension. She then continued to explain how this “otherness” contributes to the inability of people to recognise the importance of care. She explained that, on the one hand, people’s high regard for and striving to be autonomous causes them to see any form of dependency as a great weakness (Tronto 1993:123). People who are in need of care then become objects in the eyes of the autonomous people within society (Tronto 1993:123). On the other hand, Tronto (1993:123) felt that people who are powerful are unwilling to admit that they are dependent on those people who care for them when they are in need of care. The pride and the position of the autonomous, powerful people do not help care to regain its rightful place of importance within society.

This position of care is, according to Tronto (1993:124), further dragged down by subtle mechanisms of dismissal through existing structures like sexism and racism. In order to restore the rightful recognition of care within society, structures like racism and sexism also need to be addressed with great concern. Tronto (1993:124) saw care as a complex cultural construction, but also as the work of care. A big part of her research revolved around the fact that she believed that if social and political institutions were perceived from the view of this fragile and marginalised concept, it would be possible to see how social structure influence values and practices on a daily basis (Tronto 1993:124). She firmly believed that if the vocabulary of care were to be used in social and political institutions, it would play a vital role in the transformation of social and political thinking, especially when it comes to the treatment of “others” (Tronto 1993:124). “Care can only be useful … when we change the context in which

197 Tronto (1993:123) noted that feminist theorists in particular draw upon the work of object-relations psychologists and their theories to describe different developmental differences between boys and girls. Carol Gilligan, for instance, would be one of the feminists who would have taken these theories into consideration during her research on the different developmental stages of boys and girls.
we think about care” (Tronto 1993:124). This means that care has a lot of potential in a society where care is much needed, but not correctly applied, and sometimes even neglected. Care has the potential to transform the way social and political structures are operated, but only if the true value and power of care is brought to the fore. Care, however, does not come without some risks and dangers. If care was to be taken seriously, then the dangers of care should be pointed out in order to avoid them.

3.2.6 The Dangers of Care

Care, however good intentions may be, is not without flaws. Care can also happen in a bad way. It has, without a doubt, some dangers attached to it, especially when it is done in a hierarchical manner. Tronto (1995:145) regarded power relations as highly intertwined with care interactions. This should be taken into account at all times. In an ideal set-up, one of the characteristics of good care within the ethics of care would be that it considers all human parties involved as equals. Whenever this balance is disturbed, care runs the risk of becoming bad care. Despite this characteristic of care, care is hardly ever an activity that portrays a relationship of equality (Tronto 1993:145). Tronto (1993:170) identified two dangers that may occur within the boundaries of the ethics of care. These dangers are known as paternalism or maternalism, and parochialism, and are caused by the inherent nature of care, especially when it pertains to the political realm (Tronto 1993:170). Both of these dangers can be considered to be harmful distortions when it comes to responsibilities that people accept in order to meet particular needs (Tronto 2013:63).

Paternalism or maternalism\(^{198}\) can be understood as the notion of care-givers claiming too much responsibility upon themselves (Tronto 2013:63), because they may consider themselves to be more adequately equipped to assess and tend to the needs

\(^{198}\) Uma Nayaran (1995) described how care, as a moral discourse, can become susceptible to being abused by ideologies in contexts where power is abused. She explained how care was abused during colonialism to justify colonial power in the context of India (Nayaran 1995).
of care receivers than the care receivers themselves (Tronto 1993:170).\textsuperscript{199} The initial idea may be born from a place of sincere caring, but goes wrong when the person who claims responsibility begins to enforce self-importance when it comes to addressing the need (Tronto 1993:107). Tronto (1993:170) stated that care receivers affected by paternalism or maternalism are often either infants, or infantilised by the person who assumes control. The urge to define the needs of others instead of having them define their needs themselves can, thus, cause an imbalance with regard to the distribution of power, thereby violating the ethics of care which were originally intended. Particular awareness and attention should thus be given in order to avoid paternalism or maternalism from negatively affecting care.

The second disturbing danger often found in the realm of care, is parochialism. This can be understood as the notion of setting the parameters of accepted responsibility too narrowly (Tronto 2013:63).\textsuperscript{200} Tronto (1993:171) believed that parochialism can too easily allow people to reason that everyone should take care of their own personal needs and leave others to attend to their needs on their own. This becomes a serious problem as a result of the fact that not everybody has the same amount of resources to draw upon and are therefore then left with their needs that are completely untouched.\textsuperscript{201} Care, according to Tronto (1995:145), should never be seen as something that is completely private or parochial, for care is not limited to that realm, but spreads wider into the realms of institutions, different societies, and sometimes it even reaches international spheres.

\textsuperscript{199} An example of maternalism would be a mother assessing and deciding on behalf of her child what their need is based on her belief that her ‘maternal instinct’ knows better what the needs of her child are than what the child is claiming it to be.

\textsuperscript{200} Tronto’s (1993:171) example of parochialism is to ask why it is important to care about hungry children in Somalia when there are unfed children locally. It is true that the local needs should be taken care of, it does not, however, mean that it is not important to care about the needs of all other unfed children.

\textsuperscript{201} On a large scale, an example of this would be one where each country only tends to its own needs. Poorer countries or developing countries that have not yet established an adequate amount of resources would then be left out to dry without any assistance.
Tronto (1993:171) made a bold statement in saying that the only effective way of resisting these two dangers from seeping into the realm of care would be to insist that care be somehow connected to the theory of justice and to be “relentlessly democratic in its disposition” (Tronto 1993:171). When it comes to the connection of justice and care, Tronto (2013:62) explains: “Our ... responsibility to other citizens, which is how we may define justice, is that we must ensure that, in our democracy, no one goes without care”. She acknowledges that both care and justice ought to be taken into consideration in order for a caring society to prevail. One of the strengths of care and the ethics of care is the fact that there is already and inherent awareness built into care, which prompts everybody involved to be aware of the dangers of power imbalances. If the ethics of care is to be considered a mature moral theory, then it will do whatever it takes to protect the dignity and equality of all partakers involved.

3.2.7 The Ethics of Care

One of the first and most important things to realise about the ethics of care is that it is a distinct moral theory and should not be seen as part of or included within another already established moral theory, such as the moral theory of Immanuel Kant, or utilitarianism, or the virtue ethics (Held 2006:3-4). Held (2004:143), in fact, argues that the ethics of care poses challenges to various dominant ethical theories. Tronto (2008:212), on reviewing Held’s book, believes that Held (2006) successfully showed why the ethics of care can never be understood in terms of “deontology, utilitarianism,

202 Gilligan has criticised some of the more traditional moral theories such as the Kantian or utilitarian theories as being negligent in respecting “the personal point of view” (Adler 1987:205).

203 Tong (1998:132), after studying the justice-care debate, suggested that she was able to resolve this debate once and for all by suggesting a new ethics known as “a feminist virtue ethics of care” (Tong, 1998:132). This new ethics that she suggested grew from the conviction that care ethics was merely a species of virtue ethics (Tong 1998:132).

204 Held (2006) goes into an extensive explanation as to why the ethics of care should not be seen or considered to be part of virtue ethics. She explains that she understands why some people may find similarities between the two ethical theories, especially because both of the theories embody certain values and practices (Held 2006:19). She notes that one of the most important differences of the ethics of care is that it envisions that caring should happen in a postpatriarchal society (Held 2006:19). She further believes that caring is a virtue, but the ethics of care should not be understood as merely a form of virtue ethics (Held 2006:19).
or virtue ethics” (Tronto 2008:212). It is therefore important to realise that the ethics of care is not subservient or inferior to any other moral theory, but a theory that is self-sufficient and impartial in its own right. Tronto (1993:125) stated that it is unclear what exactly is meant by the term ‘ethics of care’. Pettersen (2012:366) shares the view that it is complicated to define care and exactly what it entails. She explains that some scholars have actually reached the point where they question whether it is possible and worthwhile to define care at all (Pettersen 2012:366). She still believes, however, that it is necessary to explore the different practices and features of the ethics of care (Pettersen 2012:366). By stating that care is not something which should be exclusively tied to ‘naturalness’, Tronto (1993:123) believed that care has a definite purpose.

At this point is may be a helpful contribution to reflect on the meta-ethical understanding of Tronto’s understanding of an ethic of care — She explained that in 1993, one of the aspects that was discussed in the debate around the ethics of care, was that the ethics of care was a moral practice and therefore relied on a different meta-ethical theory and because of this, it would be impossible for an ethic of care to be compatible “with universal moral reasoning” (Tronto 1993:147). It was therefore argued that care, which is based on some form of Aristotelian metaethic, and justice, which is based on either a deontological or a utilitarian metaethic, do not share the same vision and that it would be “philosophically unsophisticated” (Tronto 1993:148). She, consequently, dismissed the debate about care and justice relatively soon and labelled these discussions as “not fruitful” (Tronto 1993:148), because it “prevents us from paying attention to the substantive concerns raised by an ethic of care while we spend time analysing the appropriateness of epistemological positions. Often philosophers start and stop at the metaethical level in considering disputes such as the value of care and justice. Not only is this seeming dispute between justice and care not best resolved at this level, it cannot be resolved at this level at all” (Tronto 1993:148). By saying this, Tronto (1993:151) was not trying to convince anyone to “abandon previous moral commitments”, but rather explained that the moral order that was emerging required “that we recognize that humans are not only autonomous and equal, but that they are also beings who require care” (Tronto 1993:151-152).

Tronto (1993:153) argued that the real problem “is not that care cannot be expressed as a universal imperative: one should care. It would be possible to describe care in terms of universalistic moral principles... But care is distorted if we separate the principles of care – that care is necessary – from the particular practices of care in a given situation” (Tronto 1993:153). To merely making a moral ideal of caring available will not lead to a world that suddenly cares more; for Tronto (1993:152) these moral ideals need to be translated into practice. Care cannot be restricted to mere good intent, but has to translate into practical expressions of caring. Tronto (1993:152) explained that the “philosophical terms within which we may discuss the adequacy of metaethics cannot provide grounds for its resolution. The difficulty that moral philosophers have had with grounding metaethics in the twentieth century stands as evidence of this difficulty. To use familiar language: In times of transition, the problem of the relationship between theory and practice becomes more profound. As smart as our philosophers are, they have not been able to prescribe a moral theory that solves contemporary moral problems” (Tronto 1993:152). For Tronto (1993:153) the change that was needed would not be found in epistemology, but rather “in changing assumptions about the world” (Tronto 1993:153). In other words, there was a need for a new type of theory that was both political and social (Tronto 1993:153).

Pettersen is Professor of Philosophy at the Faculty of Humanities at the University of Oslo in Norway.
role to play when it comes to the moral sphere of life. She further emphasised the fact that the ethics of care can only be properly and fully understood when it is placed within the full context of the moral and political life, for it is only when it is placed within given contexts that care is able to change them (Tronto 1993:125-126).

Gilligan (1982:19) explained her understanding of the ethics of care as follows: "(The) conception of morality as concerned with the activity of care (that) centers moral development around the understanding of responsibility and relationships, just as the conception of morality as fairness ties moral development to the understanding of rights and rules" (Gilligan 1982:19). Tronto (1987:648) highlighted three features in Gilligan’s definition that distinguish it from the alternative moral theory of justice. Firstly, she underlined that it is a moral theory about responsibility and relationship instead of rights and regulations (Tronto 1987:648). Secondly, she highlighted that this moral theory is contextual in the sense that is takes concrete circumstance into account as opposed to being very formal and abstract (Tronto 1987:648). Thirdly, she noticed that Gilligan saw this moral theory as an ‘activity of care’ rather than a pre-set group of universal principles, making it more personal and human-centred (Tronto 1987:648). It was clear from the work of Tronto (1993) that she could especially agree with the third feature of Gilligan’s definition. She agreed with Gilligan that the ethics of care is to be understood as a practice instead of a set of principles or rules. The practice of the ethics of care, however, is a complex practice which necessitates certain ethical elements (Tronto 1993:127).

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207 Tronto (1993:126) elaborated on this by saying that “as a result [of this], care’s moral qualities will take a more ambiguous form than a list of carefully designed moral precepts” (Tronto 1993:127). Due to the complexity of the practice of an ethic of care, there exists a need for “specific moral qualities” (Tronto 1993:127). She explained this by writing that “it poses a different range of moral dilemmas than does the current moral thinking. It involves both particular acts of caring and a general “habit of mind” to care that should inform all aspects of a practitioner’s moral life” (Tronto 1993:127). The aspects that she then regards as crucial ethical elements of an ethic of care are attentiveness, responsibility, competence, and responsiveness (Tronto 1993:127). This is to be distinguished from the four elements of care, namely caring about, taking care of, care-giving, and care-receiving.
3.2.7.1 The Practice of the Ethics of Care

As a moral theory, the ethics of care has everything to do with what it means to be a good person and what it takes to be a good person. Tronto (1993:126) believed that it is compulsory for a morally good person to be attempting to meet the caring needs of people in their life\footnote{Held (2004:145) echoes this belief in saying that care is concerned with the meeting of the needs of people who are dependent on others. Care as the practice of the ethics of care, thus, involves care-giving and different standards to measure the care that is provided by the caregiver (Held 2004:145).}. This notion is not restricted to individuals. Even a society that perceives itself to be a moral society is one that strives to offer sufficient and quality care to its citizens and their surroundings (Tronto 1993:126).\footnote{Tronto (1993:126) did mention that a society that provides sufficient care is not, however, automatically a moral society, for care is not to be seen as a complete and total account of morality. She stressed the fact that it does not override the moral precepts that a person should not lie, or break their word, or harm other people (Tronto 1993:126).} Tronto (1995:142) argued that the four phases of caring that she and Fisher (1991) had identified, came with affiliated ethical virtues: ‘Caring about’ comes with attentiveness; ‘taking care of’ comes with responsibility; ‘care-giving’ comes with competence; and ‘care-receiving’ comes with responsiveness (Tronto 1995:142). These four values, Sevenhuijisen (2003:184) argues, form the heart of the ethics of care as a moral theory, and thereby the heart of care as a social practice.\footnote{Selma Sevenhuijisen is a Professor in the Ethics and Politics of Care at Utrecht University, in the Netherlands, and also a visiting Professor at the University of the Western Cape.} She believes that this approach helps to balance the imbalanced romanticised idea that care is private and something ascribed to the symbols and norms contributed to stereotypical female activities (Sevenhuijisen 2003:185). She understands care to be a social process and part of the daily routine of human beings, and therefore a human practice that requires a set of moral orientations in order to make decisions about the interpretations and fulfilment of needs that may arise (Sevenhuijisen 2000:12). In this sense, the ethics of care brings to mind the human capabilities approach, which was developed by Sen and Nussbaum (1993), stating that all communal activities should be focused in a manner that it allows for the ideal “development of human capacities and human flourishing” (Sevenhuijisen 2000:12).
In essence, the practice of the ethics of care incorporates a set of moral values and orientations to tend to the needs that arise on a daily basis in order for people to flourish.

In order for care to be considered good, it should integrate the four phases of caring, each with its own ethical quality in order to fulfil the moral elements within ethics of care (Tronto 1993:136). Tronto (1998:18) believed that by thinking of care in terms of morality and ethics, can better the situation in which people find themselves. Even though she knew that perfection is impossible, she was convinced that people’s circumstances can improve, and that good caring would make it possible for people to live in a better world (Tronto 1998:18).

3.2.7.2 Features of the Ethics of Care

For Held (2006:9), the ethics of care consists of both value and practice. The ethics of care as a moral theory has grown so much that it is not a theory solely applicable to the private spheres of life such as the family or friends, but has since grown to be relevant and applicable in the public spheres of life such as politics, health care, elderly care, and many other societal relations (Held 2006:9). In order to distinguish the ethics of care as a self-sufficient moral theory, Held (2006:10) identifies at least five features of care that makes it discernible from other moral theories:

Firstly, she recognises that the ethics of care understands human beings to be interrelated and dependent upon each other and therefore has its central focus on the meeting of the needs of the people whom responsibility is taken for (Held 2006:10). She explains that human flourishing and progress fundamentally depend on the ethics of care of the people who are in need of care and that the ethics of care does not hesitate to stress the importance of the responsibility to meet the needs identified (Held 2006:10). Due to the fact that all human beings are at some point in their life in need of care, it is obvious that the ethics of care, thus, has an incredibly important role.

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211 Frits de Lange from the Protestant Theological University in Groningen has written extensively on the ethics of care and aging. He will be properly introduced in Chapter four.
to play in everyday life. Held (2006:10) makes an important claim in saying that human life is the central concern of the ethics of care and that all other values with regard to the ethics of care are built around the centrality of human life.

The second feature that Held (2006) recognises is the fact that the ethics of care does not discard of emotion like some other moral theories may do, even though it asks for responsible recognition of emotions (2006:10). The ethics of care has always considered emotions as inherently part of human beings and does not deny its place within human life. It rather seeks for its value. Emotions are unavoidable in life and should be regarded as important factors when it comes to moral formation. Nussbaum (2006:10) explains that emotions can be regarded as something which either improves or impedes moral thinking. She further believes that humans can condition themselves to manage the amount of emotion they want to allow themselves during the process of moral decision-making (Nussbaum 2008).

Held (2006:10) indicates how even an emotion like anger, which is often perceived as a bad emotion, is vital in order for people to realise that a situation is playing out unjustly or maliciously. Held (2006:10), like Nussbaum (2008), believes that people should be

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212 Held (2006:10) explains: "...in contrast with some dominant rationalist approaches, such emotions as sympathy, empathy, sensitivity, and responsiveness are seen as the kind of moral emotions that need to be cultivated not only to help in the implementation of the dictates of reason but to better ascertain what morality recommends."

213 Martha Craven Nussbaum is an American philosopher, and Professor of Law and Ethics at the University of Chicago. She has, in the past, taught at Harvard University and Brown University. She is the writer of numerous academic books and articles including The Fragility of Goodness (1986), Sex and Social Justice (1998), The Sleep Reason (2002), Hiding from Humanity: Shame, Disgust, and the Law (2004), and Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership (2006).

214 Nussbaum (2008) explains the importance of emotions in decision-making: "An emotion such as grief is not simply a mindless surge of painful affect: it involves a way of seeing an object, an appraisal of that object as important, and the belief that the object is lost. Fear involves the belief that bad events are impending, and that one is not fully in control of warding them off." In this way, emotions can help the process of moral-decision-making by means of a controlled action.

215 I hold the belief that anger, as an emotion, is not a bad thing. The real problem in a situation of anger is how people tend to react when they are angry. In this way I am in agreement with Nussbaum that people can be conditioned to control their emotions in a moral decision-making process in order to apply a positive outcome to the emotion of, for instance, anger.
educated to make controlled and informed decisions when it comes to all emotions, especially in their raw state. Moral decisions that rely solely on right, reason, and regulations are considered to be incomplete, according to Held (2006:10). Due to the fact that emotions have the ability to be injudicious if they are not controlled, it is important to follow the ethics of care rather than just care itself (Held 2006:10).

The third feature that distinguishes the ethics of care from other theories is that it does not agree with other prominent moral theories that reasoning within a moral problem should be as abstract and intangible as possible in order for it not to be affected by biases or uncertainty (Held 2006:10). Held (2006:10) explains that the ethics of care tends to rather respect the claims of others involved and sees itself as sceptical about the dependence on abstract, universalistic rules and regulations often found in other dominant ethical theories. The ethics of care basically insists on hearing all sides to the moral problem in order to make a sound moral decision\(^{216}\). The importance of the voices of the persons in a caring relationship is equally significant. Held (2006:12) states that people in these relationships care for themselves and for others and are neither egoistic, nor altruistic in a situation upon which they do not agree. She believes that the ethics of care, in its more developed forms, has the ability to transform societies completely and radically, especially if successfully implemented in social and political realms (Held 2006:12).

A fourth feature Held (2006) identifies, is challenging the old ideas concerning the public and the private realms in society (Held, 2006:12). The private sphere of life has been reserved for family life and has exclusively been associated with women. Held (2006:12) says that the social, political, economic, and cultural society have been constructed in such a way as to negatively affect both women and children, who are often left dependent on men. She further explains that the public life have generally been associated with morality, while the private life, which concerns close relations of

\(^{216}\) This is an example of the kind of conflicts that may occur between the ethics of care, and theories like the ethics of justice.
family and friends, has been completely ignored when it comes to morality (Held 2006:13).

The fifth characteristic of the ethics of care is the belief that people are relational rather than autonomous, individualistic, and independent as various other dominant moral theories may suggest (Held 2006:13). When it comes to epistemology and morality, the ethics of care considers people to be interdependent and relational (Held 2006:13). Held (2006:13-14) believes this starts with every child who, from the start, is considered to be dependant and continues to be so in various stages throughout life. The ethics of care appreciates the relational aspect of human life, which is absolutely unavoidable. It does not believe that a person can only be considered successful if that person is autonomous, independent, and individualistic. Held (2006:14) believes that the ethics of care inspires people to become more focused on their relationships with others and helps them to be more caring in the process. She further believes that a lot of responsibilities that people accept are not responsibilities that were forced upon them, but came about through relationship established along the way (Held 2006:14). In this way, the ethics of care encourages people to take responsibility in certain situations where other dominant ethical theories, with a more individualistic approach, may have suggested that the situation play itself out without anyone taking responsibility (Held 2006:15).

Care and the ethics of care as a moral theory have changed the way in which morality is seen. By unpacking some ideas regarding care and the ethics of care, it became clear that it has been greatly underrated. Care is more than simply taking care of children, the elderly, the sick, or infirm. Care and the ethics of care deserve their rightful place within society, especially bearing in mind their particular focus on relationships and responsibility. Held (2006:168) believes that caring relations, not individual actions, demonstrate the various values found in caring. It has further become evident that care should not be bound and restricted to the private sphere of life as it has been in the past. It is also obvious that care ought not to be seen as a practice restricted to females or the feminine realm. Men are perfectly capable of
caring and should take up their responsibilities when it comes to caring. Hall\(^{217}\), Du Toit\(^{218}\) and Louw\(^{219}\) (2013:31) recognise that the ethics of care is a respected additional approach to the ethics of justice, or any other prominent moral theories. They warn, however, against the gross misuse and abuse of care and ethics of care in order to oppress women in both the public and the private spheres of life (Hall et al. 2013:31).\(^{220}\) Even though a lot of practices claim to be gender neutral, they are, in actual fact, either oppressive toward women, or empowering to men. The ethics of care should seek to eradicate this kind of imbalances, by firstly recognising that these imbalances are still very prominent within society (Hall et al. 2013:31). By recognising this imbalance, the first phase of caring can begin. “Care”, Tong (1998:150) said, “is worth ‘rescuing’ from the patriarchal structures that would misuse or abuse it”. Fox (1998:138) highlighted Bowden saying that the ethics of care holds the promise to be gender-sensitive as a moral theory.

As a moral theory, the ethics of care has a functional and important role to play as a result of its particular emphasis on value and practice. The ethics of care not only identifies needs, but also calls for responsibility to be accepted in order for the identified needs to be met. It takes into consideration the particular context of each situation and strives to be continually involved in the caring process, even after initial needs may have been met. Due to the fact that care is a central concern for human life, Tronto (1993:180) called for a wider application of the ethics of care. She stressed the importance of the need for the ethics of care within political and societal institutions (Tronto 1993:180). Held (2006:168) believes that the ethics of care and its caring

\(^{217}\) David Hall is associated with the department of Obstetrics and Gynaecology at Stellenbosch University, South Africa

\(^{218}\) Louise du Toit is a Professor at the department of Philosophy at Stellenbosch University, South Africa

\(^{219}\) Daniel Louw was a Professor and Dean at the Faculty of Theology at Stellenbosch University, South Africa

\(^{220}\) The example they use of the misuse or abuse of care within a South African context is how women constitute the overwhelming majority of carers when in a country riddled with large numbers of people infected with HIV/AIDS (Hall et al 2013:31). These women often work without being paid, compensated, or supported in any way, quite often at their own expense or the expense of their families (Hall et al 2013:31).
relations has the possibility to impact the global world to such an extent that it may in actual fact contribute to peace among global citizens. Tronto (1993:175) also argued that care, understood as a political concept, can be the foundation on which political change is established. It can further help in offering a political strategy in order to create a more caring and just society. Tronto (1993:175) claimed that care has the ability to shift the terms of a political debate. Tronto’s (1993:175) understanding of care as a political concept included that it is anti-capitalistic, based on the fact that, as its social goal, it seeks to address the needs of people first before seeking capital gains. Care as a political concept, furthermore, seeks to include women and those who have been excluded in the past (Tronto 1993:175). Tronto (1993:175), consequently, believed that this was reason enough to further explore the possibility of care and politics.

3.3 Care and Politics

Care and politics, at first, seem to be opposites that do not belong together, but contrary to popular belief, Tronto (1999:114) claimed that since Gilligan knew that there is more than one way to think about moral life, it became possible to rethink and transform both the moral life and the functioning of political structures through the ethics of care. After all, nearly all theories about morality at some level seem to address issues in the social sphere and the political sphere221 (Tronto 1987:661). Care has a more radical way in which it approaches issues on a moral and political level (Tronto 1995:142). Tronto (1998:16) argued that care ought not to be regarded as something that only takes place in the way it is portrayed through a nurturing mother, or institutions of care, or people who are paid to do the care work. She thought that this view was portrayed in such a manner because of the split that existed between the public sphere and the private sphere, with care usually restricted to the private sphere (Tronto 1998:16). Tronto (1993:158) further believed that care is something

221 Crysdale (1994:25) argued that if the ethics of care as a moral theory strives to be “liberating and innovative” (Crydale 1994:25), it must, at some level be grounded in a political and social setting. The ethics of care must be in constant conversation with rights, modern liberalism, and the boundaries that come with care in order to become a moral theory that is not politically naïve (Crysdale 1994:25).
that people take for granted as an essential part of human life. For her, care played a vital role making ethical decisions and moral judgments (Tronto 1993:158). She explained that the fact that care is overlooked as an important ethical approach meant that those who care and the work they do is devalued in society (Tronto 1993:158). She, therefore, argued that the only way to get people to recognise the value of care and the people who do the caring is to address it in a political context (Tronto 1993:158).

Tronto (1993:158) explained that the moral boundary that keeps the devaluation of care in place need to be shifted and that the only way in which this would happen would be if it was shifted by some form of political involvement. She mentioned the importance of not breaking down the structures that are already in place for moral life, but rather that the parameters of these moral boundaries be shifted to include the ethics of care (Tronto 1993:158). She further also stressed the fact that care as an ethical theory can only function as a political theory when it is set within a democratic context (Tronto 1993:159). Tronto argued against the notion of a “morality first” approach when it comes to care, stating that it would be a mistake to merely posit care as a moral value that lends some guidance to politics. She stated that by using care as merely a virtue, care would not be taken seriously within the public realms and that it would not be able to realistically address problems that caring will come to know in the world (Tronto 1993:161). Tronto (1993:161) consequently argued that the care that she believed in was a kind of care that can be incorporated into a political world and that ought to be understood as a concept of morality and a political concept in itself. The practice of care, therefore, is not merely a moral concept, but also a political idea that makes it easier for care to be understood in terms of political terms (Tronto 1993:161).

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222 Tronto (1993:158-160) considered the “morality first” approach of caring, which regards care to be merely a value, as damaging to caring practices and names Charlotte Perkins Gilman and Nel Noddings as culprits whose work seem to be unsatisfying insofar as it offers a view of “morality first” when it comes to caring. Tronto (1993:160) criticised the work of Noddings due the fact that Noddings had been unwilling to recognise any form of institutional care or structural care. She considered Noddings’ work as ignorant in some ways (Tronto 1993:160).
Tronto (1993:162) believed that if care were to be drawn into the political realm as a moral theory, the view of human beings would be changed considerably. Humans would no longer be considered to be completely autonomous beings, but rather as people who are interdependent (Tronto 1993:162). This would not only lead to a different perception of the self, but also a completely different understanding of the self in relationship (Tronto 1993:162). She based this argument on the fact that care is an essential part of life and therefore has a considerable impact on how humans live in relation to others (Tronto 1993:162). The mere fact that human beings are reliant on care means that they can by no means be considered completely independent\(^{223}\), but rather live as interdependent beings among each other (Tronto 1993:162). Just like all human beings need to rely on others to occasionally care for them, others may also call on them for some assistance or care (Tronto 1993:162).

The argument that everybody is at some point in need of assistance or care and therefore dependent on others to care for them, has not been one that has been recognised by political and moral theories, due to the fact that most theories distinguish between a model independence and a model of dependence (Tronto, 1993:162). This often leads to a sharp distinction between the powerful, independent, rational man in the public sphere, as opposed to the dependent and emotional woman, who is subjected to the private sphere. Tronto (1993:163) explained that the reason why dependence is not considered to be a natural part of human life is because political theorists tend to depict it as something that is harmful to the character of humans. The depiction of dependence they portray, is one where to be dependent means not to be independent, not being able to make sound judgments, and being placed under the responsibility of other people (Tronto 1993:163). She noted, however, that viewing dependence in this way, means that political theorists are ignoring the fact that people cannot choose whether they are dependent or not as a

\(^{223}\) By dependence, Tronto (1993:162) did not imply constant dependence, but rather that all humans are dependent at some point and can only eventually become independent after a considerable time of being dependent on others. She further believed that in some way all people are dependent upon others in some way or another throughout their lives, and therefore cannot claim a fully independent existence (Tronto 1993:162).
result of the fact that all people are born into a state of dependence (Tronto 1993:163). She stated that to be dependent ought not to frighten people into thinking that dependence is a permanent state (Tronto 1993:163). She merely argued for an acknowledgement that all people are dependent at certain points throughout life and that a certain aspect of care, in fact, can perhaps even be regarded as working towards creating a form of independence (Tronto 1993:163). Tronto (1993:163) acknowledged that to be too dependent can create problems because of the fact that it paralyses citizens and prevents them from becoming active citizens in society. This, however, does not by any means disqualify care from a democracy or the values that it believes in (Tronto 1993:163). In fact, Tronto (1993:163) believed that a democratic society would be the perfect context for care to help people to defeat their sense of complete dependence upon other people. She consequently called for a shift in the perspective that dependency acts as a threat to autonomy, a perspective that tends to blind people to be able to deal with a problem (Tronto 1993:163). Instead of blindly staring at the problem, a relational care perspective can help to deal with solving the problem (Tronto 1993:163).

The need for autonomy and individuality as an ideal forces society into two parts; the private sphere and the public sphere. Tronto (1993:165) explained that the split between the private and public\textsuperscript{224} life negatively affects the lives of women and some aspects of caring. The ethics of care with a political influence may help to eradicate the split that is created between the public and private spheres of life (Tronto 1993:165). She clarified that the split between private and public is further supported by the notion of work ethic, which has at its core the belief that a person gets rewarded for the work that is being done, but at the same time excludes the amount of care work, often unpaid, being done in order to uphold a functioning society (Tronto 1993:165). With this split comes the idea that people who work within the public sphere have more worth than people in the private sphere. From this point of view, being part of the public sphere equates to being autonomous, and being autonomous equates to being more

\textsuperscript{224} Sullivan-Dunbar (2009:40) argues that the industrialisation and commercialisation that occurred in society led to care being barred to the private sphere in life.
worthy (Tronto 1993:166). Tronto (1993:166), consequently, argued that the “moral boundaries that surround a world constituted by the work ethic cannot recognise the importance of care” (Tronto 1993:166). One of the factors that denies care a valuable place within society is the constant debate between justice and care. Tronto (1993:166) said that care would never be regarded as important as it should be while the theory exists that a care orientation is a threat to a justice orientation. The idea was never that a care orientation replace the justice orientation; in fact, Tronto (1993:166-167) stressed the point that ample scholars argued that a justice approach and a care approach be considered mutual and equal moral allies. Tronto (1993:167) explicitly said that a theory of justice is considered to be incomplete without the notion of care. If the moral boundary regarding the false dichotomy between justice and care shifted, it would become clear that care is not threat to justice, thereby moving a boundary that excludes the private from the public sphere. Once this boundary is shifted, the truth about human beings and their interdependence can be embraced and the justice and care orientations can be regarded as mutually supportive as opposed to its very prominent unfriendliness (Tronto 1993:167). Tronto (2008:216) reiterates the fact that Gilligan, when speaking about morality in 1988, argued that there can only be two ways of speaking about morality due to the fact that it gives direction to the differing ways in which people live morally; either as someone focused on “autonomy, fairness, and equality (justice)” (Tronto 2008:2016), or as someone focused on “connection with others” (Tronto 2008:216).

3.3.1 Caring Politics?

If care was to be considered an equal moral approach to that of justice, and if care was to be taken seriously as a moral approach, it would have the ability to transform society and the politics being practiced in society. The ethics of care, Tronto (1995:143) believes, has an inherent important value and that is that “proper care for others is good, and that humans in society should strive to enhance the quality of care

225 It is important to note that the key figures that were chosen for this dissertation are not the only ones who wrote on the ethics of care, the ethics of justice, and the relationship or connection between them. The key figures of this dissertation were chosen for various reasons mentioned earlier in this dissertation.
in their world" (Tronto 1995:143). Tronto (1993:167), however, noticed early on that care is not something that is usually associated with politics and that it is not really considered to be an influential factor in the social or political realms of life. Despite these harsh judgments, she believed that care, when it is properly practiced, has the ability to greatly influence the way democratic citizenship is perceived (Tronto 1993:167). If people become better at mutually practising care for one another, caring would become something that is more acceptable in society and society would become better moral and democratic citizens (Tronto 1993:167).

Tronto (1993:167-168) believed that some of the qualities that come with caring practices like attentiveness, responsibility, competence, and responsiveness, could add considerable value to the way in which people live as democratic citizens. Her reasoning behind this, was that these qualities would focus attention to the needs of people within a society (Tronto 1993:168), thereby adhering to the requirements of a democratic society. In focusing attention on the needs of people, the responsibility is shifted to the people to install and uphold values and policies. She explained that the ethics of care asks that the needs of people be constantly revaluated in everyday life so that political positions and practices can adapt to the needs of the people (Tronto 1995:144). At the heart of her reasoning, rests Tronto’s (1993:168) belief that “a society that took caring seriously would engage in a discussion of the issues of public life from a vision not of autonomous, equal, rational actors each pursuing separate ends, but from a vision of interdependent actors, each of whom needs and provides care in a variety of ways and each of whom has other interests and pursuits that exist outside the realm of care” (Tronto 1993:168).

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226 Glenn (2000:88) argues that three elements are needed to make care a central concern of citizenship: The first is to establish care to be a central “right of citizens” (Glenn 2000:88), the second is to establish “care-giving as a public social responsibility” (Glenn 2000:88), and the third is to give care-givers the necessary recognition that is due to them “for carrying out a public social responsibility” (Glenn 2000:88). She argues that these three elements are interrelated (Glenn 2000:88).

227 Interestingly, this vision that Tronto believes in, does not call for the split between the private and public spheres to be obliterated, it rather asks that care be valued in both the private and public spheres in order for the gap to close naturally as a result of caring practices (Tronto 1993:168).
Tronto (1993:169) explained that for this vision to be successful, care patterns as they have been known in history, as an activity of a family taking care of children and providing in the basic essentials, need to be changed. She regarded this view of care as a dangerous way of caring if it were to be brought into the public realm as a result of the fact that a familial view of public life would bring with it the same negative familial attributes such as an hierarchical order or partiality, which are considered to be an abhorrence of what a democratic and liberal society believes in (Tronto 1993:169). The care that is referred to here as a political ideal, is a care that does not shy away from the fact that conflict may occur when it comes to deciding on the division of caring responsibilities, or that some inequalities be ignored (Tronto 1993:169).

This care and its values ought to be regarded as an addition to the “commitments to other liberal values (such as a commitment to people’s rights, to due process, to obeying laws and following agreed-upon political procedures)” (Tronto 1993:169) in order to transform people into more considerate and attentive democratic citizens (Tronto 1993:169). This care and the values that it believes in therefore contribute to the formation of a democratic society with democratic politics (Tronto 1993:169-170). In the process of including caring values to political life, democratic citizens should, however, beware of becoming paternalistic or maternalistic in responding to the needs of others (Tronto 1993:170). The other danger of care that should be avoided at all costs is that of parochialism in which some personal caring relationships become more important than others (Tronto 1993:170). Tronto’s (1993:171) only solution to both these dangers that come with care as a political ideal, is to insist that the theory of the ethics of care be indisputably linked to the ethics of justice and that it be uncompromisingly focused on being democratic in its approach.

Tronto (2013:7) further notes that there are some assumptions about care and politics that need to be addressed. One of the first assumptions regarding care is that there are people who have the ability to care “naturally” and that the responsibilities of care in society would be better off in the hands of those who have the natural ability to
care\textsuperscript{228} (Tronto 2013:7). This most often leads to care being cast off onto women (Tronto 2013:7). Regarding care as a naturally feminine trait makes it nearly impossible to change this idea and means that men who show any signs of caring are considered to be feminine (Tronto 2013:7). A further consequence of regarding some people as “naturally caring” than others, is that when people perform care work as a professional they get paid less, because they are considered to be doing something that matters to them (Tronto 2013:8). Tronto (2013:8), however, argues that the notion that care is something that happens naturally for some as opposed to others is quite often a cultivated idea that is enforced upon some people, especially women. She, therefore, considers it to be an ideological idea as opposed to being true (Tronto 2013:8).

The second assumption, Tronto (2013:8) says, is the opposite view of care as being more natural for some than for others. She explains that this assumption is that care is something that ought to be regarded as a service that is provided and therefore incorporated into the market forces (Tronto 2013:8). The argument holds that if someone needs care, they can hire somebody at a certain cost to provide a care service to them (Tronto 2013:8). The biggest concern about this idea, however, is that it tends to privatise care again, thereby removing it from the public sphere (Tronto 2013:8). Even though there are currently a lot of occasions where care is being provided as part of the market forces, care should not only be considered from this point of view (Tronto 2013:8). One of the reasons why this is a bad idea, is that the market would then be able to determine prices of care and that may cause some problems for people who cannot afford to pay the price required for care (Tronto 2013:8).

The third assumption is one that believes that care can continue as it currently functions (Tronto 2013:8). This means that it is reliant on public policy and that it makes use of the globalised care market to adjust “public provisions and private costs” (Tronto

\textsuperscript{228} Tronto (2013:7) explains that this idea dates back to the time of Aristotle. He considered these people to be “natural slaves” (Tronto 2013:7) who are to be of assistance to other people (Tronto 2013:7).
and also to rely on the globalising world to bring new ideas of caring labour to the market (Tronto 2013:9). Tronto argues that the problem with this approach “is that it ignores the injustices, unfairness, inequality, and lack of freedom in both current and proposed future arrangements” (2013:9). When these assumptions are taken into account, it becomes obvious that care has the potential to be misunderstood. If care were to be understood as one of these assumptions, it could have dire consequences for women, the markets, and current structures of care. When care and the way care happens in society are distorted, it can harm a democratic society. It is therefore important that care and caring responsibilities be implemented in an accountable way that serves everyone equally.

### 3.3.2 Politics Changed by Care?

Tronto (1993:175) regarded one of care’s strengths as the ability to change politics by means of offering politics a policy for organisation. She believed that care has the ability to create a repositioning in terms of how political debates and political discussions take place. She warned that care ought not to be considered the new version of an old model of socialism, but at the same time confirmed that care could be regarded as anti-capitalistic because of the fact that it seeks to pay specific attention to the needs of people as opposed to seeking ways in which to make a profit as its highest priority (Tronto 1993:175). More than simply bringing about change when it comes to political debates and discussion, care can be used to actually implement this change, especially with regard to women and those who are generally excluded from the political sphere (Tronto 1993:175).

Tronto (1993:177) explained that care’s significance rested upon the notion that it has the ability to gather “the powers of the weak” (Tronto 1993:177), and also to persuade the people with a lot of power to capitulate some of the power that they have. Care has the ability to alter the kind of discussion that takes place in public to such an extent that the most powerful in society will not have the usual easy access to many of the resources (Tronto 1993:177). Tronto (1993:177) therefore believed that the ethics of care, if it is implemented in a political society, would have an insightful effect on the
way citizens are portrayed and will seek to empower some of the groups who are so often politically excluded. The way in which care will transform society in politics is merely speculative and it cannot be pinpointed exactly how it will influence citizens due to the fact that the conception of morality that is currently being valued does not allow for the ethics of care to politically inform the lives of people in a democratic society (Tronto 1993:178). It is therefore necessary to move the moral boundaries that prevent care from being seen as a vital and central part of human life (Tronto 1993:178). It is by excluding care from central political and social moral values that those who are powerful, can make claims on people who are less powerful to take responsibility for caring for them, thereby maintaining their power and their privilege over other people (Tronto 1993:179). Tronto (1993:180) consequently argued that “care is not a parochial concern of women, a type of secondary moral question, or the work of the less well off in society. Care is a central concern of human life” (Tronto 1993:180). It is therefore important that a space be created for care within social and political institutions in order for the importance and centrality of care in human life to be displayed (Tronto 1993:180).

In her 2013 book, *Caring Democracy: Markets, Equality, Justice*, Tronto (2013:ix) notes that not much has changed with regard to care in the twenty years that passed since she wrote her previous book, *Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for the ethics of care*. This, however, does not mean that the ethics of care is not a valid moral theory or that it does not have the ability to transform a society into a more acceptable society. Tronto (2013:ix) goes so far as to say that nothing in societies will change for the better unless societies take seriously the centrality of care and people’s responsibility to care within their political structures and their democratic societies.

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229 Tronto (2013:xv) writes about human beings and their caring needs, caring abilities, and the importance thereof for politics: “Human beings begin and end their lives depending upon others for care; in between those times we never cease being engaged in relationships of care with others, and we never cease needing and providing care for ourselves. As our independence in caring grows greater, we need to rethink how we parse out our time, energy, work, and resources to make certain that we, as well as those around us, are well cared for. We cannot rethink these question in isolation, we can only do so collectively. And in doing so, we will change how we see ourselves in the world and what should guide our most fundamental political choices” (Tronto 2013:xv).
Consequently, she argues for a political system that has the needs and concerns of its citizens at heart (Tronto 2013:ix). She explains the role of the citizen in a democratic society as a person who cares about the citizens within a democracy, and people who care about the democracy itself (Tronto 2013:x). She calls this kind of caring “caring with” (Tronto 2013:x). The task of changing politics and changing a democracy with the ethics of care, however, is not an easy thing to do (Tronto 2013:x). This is further complicated by people’s obsession with possessions and wealth. People tend to overlook care as an important and central part of human life in their journey to autonomy, success, and wealth. Tronto (2013:xi) believes that politics have wrongfully been argued to be part of economics and calls for politics to be seen as something that is much closer to care. She describes care as something that is needed by politics in a democratic society (Tronto 2013:xi).

When citizens care within a democracy, they should be supported in their caring endeavours (Tronto 2013:xi). Tronto (2013:xi) believes that in order for politics to change, citizens need to realise that they are tasked with the responsibility of caring for their democracy, despite the fact that it is not an easy task. When citizens start to “care with” each other, they will start to develop some form of trust among each other, even though that does not mean that they will always get along or that they will not get along with each other at all times (Tronto 2013:xi). The extreme importance of caring for a democracy cannot be more explicit; if citizens in a democracy do not find themselves caring about issues regarding justice, or about their part in keeping political leaders in line with the rules, or their role in the upkeep of the law itself, then that democracy will sooner rather than later cease to be a true democracy (Tronto 2013:xiv).

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230 Tronto (2013:xi) describes this “caring with” as something that is concerned with the future well-being of the self and others. She says that caring with requires of citizens to “care enough about caring... to accept the political burden of caring for the future” (Tronto 2013:xi). This future that she talks about is not merely the future of economics, but also entails something of caring for a variety of values that concerns the freedom, the equality, and the justice of all citizens (Tronto 2013:xi).
3.3.3 Care and the Private Sphere?

Care has, at some points in history, been regarded as something that should be restricted to the private sphere of life. Caring and anything related to relationships was not seen as something that would occur in the public sphere. In keeping care restricted to the private sphere, it became the sole responsibility of predominantly women, often women who were considered to have lower social status. While care happened in the private sphere, politics was something that happened in the public sphere, generally accepted to be associated with men. Tronto (2013:1) explains that most societies had some kind of structure in place to keep the split between the private and the public spheres intact. She further explains that it would be negligent to regard the home, restricted to the private sphere, as a place where care and comfort resides, for not all homes are a place of care and comfort (Tronto 2013:1).

Care should therefore not be regarded as something that happens within the boundaries of the household. Tronto (2013:2) described how care, in the last century, has been revolutionised to such an extent that it is no longer perceived as something that has to do with only nurturance, but that is has grown into a profession, thereby growing further away from the private sphere. It seems that parents claim to spend a greater amount of time with their children than before, but Tronto (2013:2) notes that they do not use that time to take care of chores that need

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231 Aristotle was one of the famous philosophers who made a clear distinction between “polis” (Tronto 2013:1) and “oikos” (Tronto 2013:1), thereby stressing the difference between that which happens in the public sphere and that which happens in the private sphere (Tronto 2013:1).

232 This notion is strongly supported by Kittay (2011:56) who argues for a public ethics of care based on her belief that all human beings are dependent beings. “It is the obligation and responsibility of the larger society to enable and support relations of dependency work that takes place in the more intimate settings, for that is the point and purpose of social organization – or at least a major one” (Kittay 2011:56).

233 Some of these care professions include schools where children are taught, hospitals and hospices that take care of the sick and terminally ill, nursing homes for the elderly, care facilities that help care for people with disabilities, funeral homes that take care of funeral arrangements and admin, and plenty more facilities (Tronto 2013:2). It also includes services like cleaning, preparing food several times of day, taking care of bodies, and taking care of garbage (Tronto 2013:2). Tronto (2013:2) explains that these kinds of jobs are usually left in the hand of women and people of colour who also seem to be paid less and consequently have the status of someone with a lower economic income.
to be done or taking care of the bodily needs of the children. She says that those tasks that are less fun and unenjoyable are left to other people, thereby further indicating how care work has moved away from the private realm considered to be the household (Tronto 2013:2). The household that used to be considered the hub of caring and comfort can no longer be perceived that way. Not only has care expanded to realms outside the household, but the public sphere has also managed to infiltrate the household. Tronto (2013:3) points out that homes in recent times, have become investments and thereby become a strategic economic move and no longer just a place to go to in order to seek comfort and safety. In the midst of turmoil, war, social insecurity, and injustice, care is nowhere to be found. The home merely becomes a place where people go to hide from the harsh realities they face outside the home (Tronto 2013:6). Home becomes a place where people go to their own families and where “caring with” (Tronto 2013:6) is something that is hardly ever seen outside out the home (Tronto 2013:6). Tronto (2013:6) then criticizes a book entitled Starting at Home, written by Nel Noddings, who seems to suggest that a starting point for care is at home, which is not necessarily the case anymore. She suggests that when care is considered to be no longer visible in the private realm of the household, then some form of a revolution needs to take place in order to reinstate care (Tronto 2013:6).

Due to the fact that care is not limited to the private sphere, this revolution should not only be limited to the household, but should also be instated in political, cultural, and social structures and institutions. Tronto (2013:7) believes that the best way to rethink democratic politics, would be for democratic politics to centralise the “assigning of responsibilities for care” and to help prepare citizens to be responsible as best as they can be (Tronto 2013:7). She is further convinced that if care were to become a concern of the political sphere, the quality of care would improve tremendously and citizens will experience a proper democratic life (Tronto 2013:10). Tronto believes that care has

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234 Tronto (2013:5) described how president George Bush created the Department of Homeland Security and how hardly anybody opposed the term “homeland” (Tronto 2013:5) which has its most recent origins in the South African Apartheid system referring to certain regions that was assigned for “indigenous people” (Tronto 2013:5).
the ability to transform democratic life in the best way possible (Tronto 2013:11). In order for care to embody its transformative ability, it is necessary to give a more specific account of how care can transform a democratic society. Tronto (2013:11) explains that in order to understand care more democratically and to think of democracy in a more caring way, it is important to think of what exactly it means to be responsible.

Tronto (2013:18) clarifies that the notion that care and democracy are not concepts that blend together, is a consequence of the split between the private and the public spheres. When Western thinkers think about care, it mostly happens in the context of the private sphere where politics are absent and the general concept of care involves dependency (Tronto 2013:18). She argues that care and caring responsibilities ought not to be viewed in terms of the public/private split within a democratic society as a result of the fact that a democracy seeks for equality for all and due to the fact that the way in which care is understood, has changed considerably (Tronto 2013:18).

The argument that Tronto (2013:18) is trying to make, is that care is no longer only reserved for the private sphere, but that it also has a rightful place within society; care can function as something that is very close and personal, but can also be of great value in public practices. Her main reasoning for arguing for care’s place in the public is because of her conviction that a democratic society cannot function as a truly democratic society without the conception of care to maintain it (Tronto 2013:18). She believes that “the care deficit will only be solved when caring becomes more democratic, and the democracy deficit will only be solved when democracy becomes

235 Sandra Sullivan-Dunbar (2009:42) explains that a care deficit refers to “the very large numbers of children, frail elderly, permanently or temporarily disabled, and sick persons, both in the United States and globally, who require intensive care, or are getting care from care-givers who are themselves exploited through poverty-level wages, poor working conditions, and social invisibility” (Sullivan-Dunbar 2009:42). She argues that the care-deficit is a result of “demographic and technological factors” (Sullivan-Dunbar 2009:42) and the fact that care is being marginalised in society (Sullivan-Dunbar 2009:42).
more caring" (Tronto 2013:18). She has warned, however, that when politics is “built upon relationships” (Tronto 1991:96), it may lead it to becoming privatised (Tronto 1991:96). This should be prevented at all costs. The amount of caring work taking place in both the private and the public sector is tremendously underrated. What tends to happen, is that a lot of caring being done is not always acknowledged as caring work, leading to care being underrated. Tronto (2013:27) says that it would be inconceivable to imagine a political life without care if all the different types of care were to be acknowledged as a central part of human life like it should be.

3.3.4 A Feminist Democratic Ethic of Care

When it comes to politics, Tronto (2013) has a definite view of how it should function within a democratic society. Her main focus with regard to politics and care is that care should happen in a democratic way and that care should be the central focus of all democratic practices (Tronto 2013:29). This is the central idea of her work on politics and care. She built this theory based on findings of a feminist ethic of care (Tronto 2013:29). She explains that a feminist ethic of care finds its commencement in the visualising of care practices and the aim of these practices is an attempt to help everybody in society to live as well as possible by creating a society that becomes as democratic as humanly possible (Tronto 2013:30). This, for her, is the heart of what

236 Duffy (2005:67) explains: “Amid stories of substandard day care centers, unhealthy conditions in nursing homes, and shortages of qualified nursing personnel in hospitals, there is mounting concern about the quantity and quality of care available for children and the elderly as well as those who are ill or disabled. Feminist scholars have been among those making connection between these social problems and the low wages and poor working conditions of day care providers, health aides, and other workers who provide care for pay in labor market. Especially concerning to feminists is the concentration of women, particularly women of color, in these low-wage jobs”.

237 Sullivan-Dunbar (2009:42) echoes Tronto’s reasoning in saying that caregiving to those who are dependent become privatised and not the concern of a “service to society” (Sullivan-Dunbar 2009:42), thereby arguing that society neglects its role and responsibility to provide sufficient support to, for instance, parents who have to do the care work on their own.

238 Held (2006:20) also argues for a feminist ethic of care. She emphasises that the ethics of care cannot be understood in terms of gender where it all comes back to a responsibility of women. She therefore insists on the ethics of care that is definitely a feminist ethic in order to include both men and women and ultimately makes it easier for both men and women to embrace (Held 2006:20).
“caring with” (Tronto 2013:30) means. Tronto (1998:19) has always believed that any caring should happen in a space where everyone has some input as to how to resolve caring needs. She calls for democratic political structures to be adapted in order for all the citizens of the democracy to participate in taking care of the care responsibilities (Tronto 2013:30). Tronto (2013:30) argues that, due to the fact that care practices have largely been excluded from politics because of the assumption that it is gendered, a correction needs to be made about the gendered, racial, and classist approach that have been clung to in the past. The way in which to eradicate the gendered, racial, and classist approach of the past would be to use lenses of the feminist theories which have the ability to point out the wrongful approach (Tronto 2013:30). Tronto (2013:30) explains that a “feminist ethic of care” (Tronto 2013:30) takes on a different angle to general understanding of what is meant by human nature. The fact that the ethics of care regards human beings as relational beings is one of the greatest differences to be noted (Tronto 2013:30).

Another difference that is characteristic of a feminist ethic of care, is that it does not shy away from the fact that human beings are “vulnerable and fragile” (Tronto 2013:31). All human beings are, at different times in their lives, dependent upon the care given by someone else and are also providers of care throughout their lives (Tronto 2013:31). “People are both givers and receivers of care all the time” (Tronto 2013:31). Vulnerability and fragility, however, are often perceived as threats to a democracy and to the autonomous lifestyle that is supposed to uphold a democracy.

239 De Lange (2011c:493) makes this point indirectly within the context of elderly care when he says that it is not only the responsibility of adult children to take care of their elderly parent. It is also the responsibility of the broader society and the community to help with caring duties (De Lange, 2011c:493).

240 It often happens that vulnerability and fragility are regarded as hindrances and weaknesses. It is, however, a natural part of human life and something that affects all people. Tronto (2013:31) explains that people are especially vulnerable and fragile when they are at a younger age, when they get older, or when they fall ill. According to her, all human life ought to be regarded as fragile (Tronto 2013:31).

241 Sullivan-Dunbar (2009:39) echoes Tronto’s reasoning in saying that it should be accepted as a concrete reality that all human beings are dependent beings who rely on each other to tend to their needs. She further explains that dependence is often wrongly seen as something that makes a person unequal to others (Sullivan-Dunbar 2009:39).
Tronto (2013:31) believes that a feminist democratic ethic of care ought to help to illuminate the perception that dependency\textsuperscript{242} is a threat to democracy and that it should have the ability to find a balance between autonomy and dependence. She therefore argues that a true feminist democratic ethic of care has the ability to create a space for the differences found in autonomy and dependency (Tronto 2013:32).

When it comes to politics, a feminist democratic ethic of care has the ability to point out when institutions manage to impose responsibility for all of the caring duties, whether it is joyous or more draining for some people, while other people seem to evade this responsibility (Tronto 2013:33). Tronto (2013:33) refers to this as “passes” (Tronto 2013:33) that people are given in order to avoid having to take up caring responsibilities or leaving it to other people to take care of it. If a feminist democratic ethic of care is at work to create a more caring democracy, then it is important that the field be level to everybody. Tronto (2013:33) describes a caring democracy as a democracy that cares about real equality for all people and the “reducing of power differentials as much as possible, in order to create the conditions for a meaningful democratic discussion of the nature of responsibility in society” (Tronto 2013:33). What distinguishes a feminist democratic ethic of care as a theory from other contemporary democratic theories, is that it genuinely seeks to give an equal voice to all people.

When it comes to ethics, a feminist democratic ethic of care seeks to approach the boundary that exists between the ethical and political realms with the necessary insight (Tronto 2013:34). Tronto (2013:34), like many other feminist scholars, challenges the notion that a set of moral principles need to be created first in order for a political structure to be built around it. The reason they tend to challenge this is because this order creates a space for care and other moral and ethical qualities to be devalued by society (Tronto 2013:34). Tronto (2013:34) explains that in a society where care and

\textsuperscript{242} Sullivan-Dunbar (2009:41) stresses the importance of tending to the needs of dependency by society. She argues that the equality of some in society is achieved at the expense of marginalised others, who often take care of needs on behalf of those who neglect to take care, if the call to address the needs of people are not adhered to (Sullivan-Dunbar 2009:41). She further explains that the basic needs of people cannot be adhered to if the conversation is not taken to the “complex and interdependent market structures” (Sullivan-Dunbar 2009:48).
its ethical qualities are already undervalued, any further devaluation can lead to care being virtually insignificant. The theorists who believe that the ethics of care can be of great value therefore began to vouch for the importance of values that spring forth from care and the needs of democratic citizens in society (Tronto 2013:34). Some of the ethical qualities that Tronto and Fischer (2013:34-35) identify include attentiveness, responsibility, competence, and responsiveness.

These ethical qualities are merely examples of some of the qualities that spring forth from care and care ethics. Tronto (2013:35) points out that there may be plenty more ethical qualities that may be just as valid as the qualities they identified from the care ethics. While she recognises the importance of these various qualities of the ethics of care, she is also cautious not to overstress the importance of these qualities (Tronto 2013:36). She says that some people regard the ethics of care as merely part of some kind of virtue ethics and also acknowledges that there are similarities between the ethics of care and virtue ethics, but she has one vital objection to the ethics of care being regarded as part of a virtue ethic and that is that the ethics of care, unlike virtue ethics, is relational (Tronto 2013:36), in other words, virtue ethics, instead of

243 These qualities were discussed in more detail earlier in this dissertation.

244 Some of the examples that Tronto (2013:35) lists include that of Margaret Walker and her writings on the “importance of hope” (Tronto 2013:35) and the work of Sara Ruddick on “maternal thinking” (Tronto 2013:35) and “cheerfulness” (Tronto 2013:35). She also refers to Selma Sevenhuijsen and the set of qualities that she added in order for a democratic society to include more care (Tronto 2013:35). These qualities include “making care a priority, so that one has a commitment to handle the moral complexities of ‘dependency, vulnerability and otherness’ in order to make life livable [sic] and worth living” (Tronto 2013:35).

Sevenhuijsen, according to Tronto (2013:35), also feels that care asks for “plurality, communication, trust and respect” (Tronto 2013:35). Tronto (2013:35) believes that these qualities that were identified by Selma Sevenhuijsen help to point out the importance of these qualities if people are to take “collective responsibility” (Tronto 2013:35) for needs in society. They would further make it possible for people to think of themselves as citizens as “both receivers and givers of care” (Tronto 2013:35) and contribute to people regarding the nature of care as something that is truly important in society (Tronto 2013:35).

245 Virginia Held is another person who clearly objects to the ethics of care being regarded as part of virtue ethics. Apart from the ethics of care’s relational difference from virtue ethics, Held (2006:19) argues that a feminist ethic of care, unlike other forms of virtue ethics, is very aware of patriarchal structures in society and seeks to be practiced in what Held (2006:19) calls a “postpatriarchal society” (Held 2006:19). She stresses the fact that although care can be considered to be a virtue, the ethics of care cannot be merely accepted to be part of some kind of virtue ethics (Held 2006:19).
focussing on relationships, places more emphasis on the development of the character and morality of the individual\textsuperscript{246}. She explains that all of the qualities of virtue ethics, as important as they are, lack the importance of taking the needs and relations of people into consideration as a starting point for addressing moral issues (Tronto 2013:36). One of her biggest concerns with regard to the ethics of care as merely another form of virtue ethics is that it places the focus and attention on the virtuous individual of the care giver, instead of focusing on the needs of others through relations\textsuperscript{247} (Tronto 2013:36). When this happens there is an immediate imbalance in focus, which may lead to an imbalance between the person who is providing the care and the person who is receiving the care (Tronto 2013:36). When regarding care as only a subject-related disposition instead of seeing both the subject and object as important, care cannot be regarded as the ethics of care (Tronto 2013:48). Tronto (2013:48) believes that a subject-related disposition can contribute to the importance of the ethics of care, but cannot be regarded as sufficient in itself.

She further explains that the ethics of care as a theory cannot be regarded as a whole, functioning theory unless it includes a relational aspect of human beings, some way of understanding and contributing to politics, and a conclusive understanding of ethics (Tronto 2013:36). Without these three elements, the ethics of care is not a true ethic of care. The overwhelming difference that separates a feminist ethic of care, then, from other ethical and political theories, such as virtue, is that it is relational (Tronto 2013:36). This means that any ethical decision that is made is made from a relational perspective. Tronto explains that from this perspective: “[T]he world consists not of individuals who are the starting point for intellectual reflection, but of humans who are

\begin{itemize}
\item This view can be criticised based on the notion that virtue is something that can only be practically carried out through relationship, regardless of whether it happens in the private sphere or in the public sphere.
\item Held (2006:19) also objects to this notion, saying that a virtue ethic tends to place more focus on the “states of character of individuals” (Held 2006:19), while the ethics of care moves being the self to a self in relation to others, thereby giving relations within an ethic of caring primary status above that of the individual greatness (Held 2006:19). She criticises those who consider the ethics of care to be part of virtue ethics by saying that the ethics of care focuses on more than simply the “motive or attitude or virtue” (Held 2006:20) of an individual person.
\end{itemize}
always in relation with other” (2013:36). A feminist democratic ethic of care, therefore, calls into consideration not only the individual’s motive and outcome, but a holistic perspective of human beings in relation to others.

3.3.5 Democratic Caring and Responsibility

If caring and the ethics of care have any role to play in a political system, it is inevitable that the responsibilities concerning this care have to be addressed. In order for a society to become a society that is caring, it will be necessary for people to accept responsibility for the needs that arise within the community. For this to happen, people in society will have to put in some extra effort and show astonishing commitment to engage with people in their communities about their needs on a daily basis (Tronto 2013:46). Tronto (2013:46) emphasises the fact that a community can only be fully caring and fully democratic when its understanding of justice includes a vision of sharing in both the times of joy and the times of sorrow and need. A society that has the ability to balance out justice and care amidst joys and sorrows, is a society that succeeds in helping its citizens to experience as much freedom as possible (Tronto 2013:46).

Another aspect of this vision to become a realising is for citizens to realise that they have a responsibility to care with other people for a better society (Tronto 2013:46). Tronto (2013:46) argues that sometimes people are so deeply influenced by the boundaries that they have set for themselves, whether it is social habits or certain practices or general ideas about politics, that responsibilities get divided, which in turn causes a democratic caring society to collapse. These boundaries, Tronto (2013:47) believes, can cause people to resist their responsibilities, which in turn can lead to the restriction of human flourishing. This becomes a dangerous playing field where politics is driven “in terms of action (who does what), rather than distribution (who gets what)” (Tronto 2013:47).

When speaking about the responsibility that every human being has toward caring, Tronto (2013:49) reiterates the fact that to take responsibility to care “is not (only?) natural and innate” (Tronto 2013:49) but that any human being has the ability to adjust
to become more caring. She explains that if people had no needs, that it would not be necessary to have politics and people would most probably not have made an effort to meet one another (Tronto 2013:49). This does not mean that politics is all about meeting the needs of people, but rather that politics “involves meeting needs in a way that permits the pursuit of other goals as well, and because it involves making decisions about who does what for whom” (Tronto 2013:49). Tronto (2013:49) further believes that the fact that she considers a focus on responsibility to be central in the discussion about democratic caring and politics, does not mean that she regards the other phases of caring as any less important than the phase of responsibility. In fact, she believes that the phases before and after the phases of apportioning responsibility are equally important (Tronto 2013:50). It just so often happens that the phase of responsibility is neglected and needs to be highlighted, also because it has political implications.

Tronto (2013:50) says that there are at least three ways of talking about responsibility: Firstly, it is tied to an obligation or a sense of duty wherein responsibility springs forth from a perspective of rights, which in turn leads to the concept of rights and responsibilities that is so often connected to each other. Secondly, responsibility is associated with ethics and is then linked to “something that are accountable or attributable” (Tronto 2013:50). The third context of responsibility finds itself in politics (Tronto 2013:50). She explains that the word responsibility comes from the stem “response” (Tronto 2013:50) or “responsible” (Tronto 2013:15). She believes that responsibility, at its core, is relational in its nature and that it is something that “dynamic rather than fixed” (Tronto 2013:50). When she speaks about the importance and role

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248 Engler (2005:59) believes that everyone has a duty to care for others based on the fact that all human beings are dependent at some point in their life, and not necessarily due to the fact that people are vulnerable to others. “It is our dependency on others rather than their vulnerability to us that grounds our obligation to care for them” (Engler 2005:59).

249 Tronto (2013:50) notes that the word responsibility is a relatively young word. “An exemplary use occurred in the Federalist Papers, in Paper No.63, defending the longer terms of the Senate, probably written by Alexander Hamilton: “Responsibility in order to be reasonable must be limited to objects within the power of the responsible party”” (Tronto 2013:50).
of responsibility, she points out four limits that the assignment of responsibility encounters along the way (Tronto 2013:50).

Firstly, it aims not only to assign certain responsibilities to certain people, groups, or institutions, but also to free some people from having to take on the same responsibilities, but this does not always happen (Tronto 2013:50). Secondly, it aims to ascribe responsibility only to the people, groups, or institutions that are capable of carrying out the responsibility and properly equipped to do so (Tronto 2013:50). This, sadly, is a crucial limit in the assignment of responsibility, which is neglected far more than it ought to be. Thirdly, it is important to realise that the allocation of responsibility is “diffuse” (Tronto 2013:50) in the sense that the word itself does not provide any indication as to who ought to take responsibility and whether responsibilities have been taken care of in the best way possible (Tronto 2013:50). Fourthly, because responsibility takes on both the shape of a social and political demeanour, this may cause some difficulty and uncertainty when it comes to the assignment of responsibility (Tronto 2013:50). This leads to confusion for people, groups, and institutions who have a problem determining when their responsibility should commence or when it should conclude (Tronto 2013:50). One of the ways to address the issue of the limitations when it comes to the assignment of responsibilities is to assume an ethic of responsibility that “tries to put people and responsibilities in the right places with respect to each other” (Tronto 2013:54). Tronto (2013:55) argues that this ethics of responsibility could be well housed in a feminist democratic ethic of care, because it already has a functional base in order to apply engage with an ethic of responsibility. She explains that the ethics of care has the ability to direct attention to “certain aspects of life in order to determine responsibilities” (Tronto 2013:55).

If a democratic politics of care that aims to restore the notion of responsibility wants to be successful in its endeavours, there are certain aspects that need to be looked at. Tronto (2013:57) mentions two critical conditions that need to be addressed if this is to work. Firstly, she explains that more effort should be allocated into determining who the participants will be when it comes to decisions that need to be made (Tronto 2013:57). The people involved in decision-making can have a tremendous influence
on the result of that which they are deciding on. It is therefore crucial that the right people are identified for decisions that are being made. Tronto (2013:58) notes that exclusion can be extremely dangerous when it comes to responsibility and decision-making and says that it can have a considerate influence on the eventual outcome of political processes. If politics claim to be truly democratic, then it needs to include all people in order to guarantee a truly democratic result (Tronto 2013:58). One of the key dangers to look out for in a democracy, is the occurrence where the most powerful have the ability to work exclusion among the less powerful (Tronto 2013:58). The other important factor to keep in mind, is that no-one should be given a pass on their responsibilities (Tronto 2013:58). Tronto (2013:58) explains that people who are excused from their responsibilities cause a system to be unbalanced and some people to have power over others; she calls this “privileged irresponsibility” (Tronto 2013:58).

The second critical condition that needs to be addressed, is what the people who were chosen to make the decisions will decide when they meet to discuss the allocation of responsibility (Tronto 2013:59). Tronto (2013:59) notes that the eventual outcome of their discussions and allocations will not be an easy job as a result of the fact that all the people who were chosen to make the decisions have their own history and context that comes with them that shapes the way they think and influences the way in which they will come to a conclusion. This will be further complicated by the fact that there is also a “power differential” (Tronto 2013:59) among these people (Tronto 2013:59). This power differential should be managed in order to prevent authority and relational matters from turning into moral conflicts that led to unfair treatment of some people.

Tronto (2013:60) theorises that when people become aware of their own interconnectedness with other people they will be more responsible themselves. Even though this would be the case in an ideal world, people are somehow still evading their responsibilities in a variety of ways. Tronto (2013:60) notes that general ignorance and the creation of “an institutional structure that deliberately diffuses and obscures lines of authority” (Tronto 2013:60) are two examples of how people attempt to elude their responsibilities. If a democratic politics of care is serious about its motives and goals, then it should make responsibility one of its most important focal points. Without
competent and inclusive structures in place, a democratic politics of care will have an imbalance with dire consequences. Tronto (2013:61) believes that a truly democratic care has the ability to coup an ideological construction that constantly tries to escape problems with regard to political responsibility. A neoliberal economy that constantly seeks to encourage an individual responsibility as the best and only way to understand responsibility is one that promotes privileged irresponsibility among people who ought to have accepted their responsibilities in society (Tronto 2013:61). Tronto (2013:61) says this neoliberal perspective leads to a place where people are left to their own devices when it comes to things like care where people are told their responsibilities are their own, that they are on their own, and that it is “tough luck” (Tronto 2013:61) if they cannot provide for themselves.

If the neoliberalist view is currently the dominant view of the day with its individualistic perspective of responsibility, the ethics of care, with its relational approach, may have a way to enrich the view of responsibility in a democratic society. Tronto (2013:61) explains that it not always easy to determine exactly what care is to different people, groups, or institutions. It is also not always possible to determine exactly who is responsible for the particular needs that arise (Tronto 2013:61). She mentions that a way of determining the needs of people and who should accept responsibility for them, is to distinguish between the “basic needs” (Tronto 2013:61) and the “other needs” (Tronto 2013:61) that arise, and that society would then have a responsibility to help people with basic needs (Tronto 2013:16). Once again, this line is not a clear line, for basic needs vary from person to person and from context to context. Tronto (2013:62) suggests that the focus should be shifted to what the concern of the public discourse about care ought to be. That would simplify the focus to the four phases of care, which in turn would show that the public role of caring should be to assign care responsibilities to various people, groups, or institutions (Tronto 2013:62).

250 Lawson (2007:3) believes that the ethics of care has what it takes to challenge the principles of neoliberalism displayed as “individualism, egalitarianism, universalism, and a society organized exclusively around principles of efficiency, competition, and a “right” price for everything” (Lawson 2007:3). According to the understanding of neoliberalism, care is something that happens in the private sphere of homes with families (Lawson 2007:3).
help people to understand something about their role and responsibility towards the caring of other people. This would further address the issue of people who have been able to elude their caring responsibilities. Tronto (2013:62) stresses the fact that a democratic society should commit to equally addressing both care-giving and care-receiving for all people. She says that this also requires that people accept their responsibility when it comes to caring for children, the elderly, and the infirm or disabled people among us (Tronto 2013:62). She further stresses the fact that every person’s political responsibility to other people as citizens,\(^{251}\) is to accept responsibility to make sure that every citizen in a democratic country has access to care (Tronto 2013:62). In this way, justice is right beside caring responsibilities in society. Tronto (2013:62) believes that this is what the appropriate role of a government ought to be if it claims to be a democratic state.

While accepting responsibility for the needs of others is crucial in an understanding of the true nature of a democracy, it is also vitally important to steer clear of parochialism and paternalism when tending to the needs of others. Tronto (2013:63) mentions that paternalists accept too much authority in the distribution of responsibility, especially when it comes to the portion allocated to themselves, while parochialists tend to “set the boundaries of … responsibility too narrowly” (Tronto 2013:63). In other words, paternalists, as people who provide care, tend to accept that they know better than the care receiver about what the care receiver’s needs entail, while parochialists develop a sense of particularity when it comes to the people whom they prefer to be care-receivers of their care-giving (Tronto 2010:161). Tronto (2010:161) reasons that great effort is put into preventing “purpose, power, and particularity” (Tronto 2010:161) from getting out of hand. It is vital that a wide enough range of people’s voices are included when decisions regarding moral principles are made in order to include the view of as many people as possible (Tronto 2013:63). Tronto (2013:63) emphasises the fact that a democratic society has to be as inclusive as it is humanly possible. While she admits this, she notes that some people may be denied of the fact that they are citizens

\(^{251}\) For Tronto (2013:62) the definition of justice is a political responsibility of every person to other citizens.
because “they will always be vulnerable” (Tronto 2007:39). Even though she believes that it is possible to speak of responsibility, she believes that a feminist democratic ethic of care has the ability to turn theoretical responsibility into real practices (Tronto 2013:64). She further believes that the idea that a society influenced by neoliberalism has been divided into forcing people into only looking into their own needs and not the needs of others need to be challenged (Tronto 2013:64). By doing this, some voids that have formed due to injustice, will provide an enriched form of justice through caring responsibilities, and not simply justice as it is currently understood as something that is an answer to the disregarding of rights (Tronto 2013:64). Tronto (2013:64) therefore believes that justice can be greatly enriched by working with the ethics of care because of the fact that the ethics of care can answer some questions regarding responsibility that have been left unanswered by an account of justice that is too narrow.

3.3.6 Democratic Caring

The ultimate argument that Tronto (2013:139) wants to formulate, is that a democratic society can only fully function as a democratic society with greater freedom, equality, and justice when a feminist ethic of democratic caring brings both the focus of the care giver and the care receiver into consideration. The democratic values of freedom, equality, and justice will reach a point of saturation at a certain level if its focus does not include the care giver and care receiver (Tronto 2013:139). If this does not happen, it becomes impossible to see problems concerning care as problems concerning justice, something that happens far too often due to the fact that care is not seen as a vital part of life while individualism reigns supreme (Tronto 2013:139). Care, Tronto (2013:139) argues, is not just something that has to do with the everyday practices of caring, but also involves operational ideas and thinking of various people, groups, and institutions about how to incorporate people and institutions in meeting the caring needs of people from all walks of life. She reiterates that no form of care exists that is not relational and that it would be impossible to determine whether a caring task has been performed properly if it was not relational (Tronto 2013:140).
Democratic caring seeks to include as many people of different walks of life as possible. It seeks inclusivity and wants the perspective of more than just the people with power. Tronto consequently claims “that democratic politics should center upon assigning responsibilities for care, and for ensuring that democratic citizens are as capable as possible of participating in this assignment of responsibilities for care” (2013:140). Therefore, democratic societies cannot be left to be ruled by the most powerful, the biggest institutions, or certain families or certain structures, but should seek to include every democratic citizen to care with each other (Tronto 2013:140). Tronto (2013:140) explains that this “caring with” is something that ought to be regarded as a political concern and should therefore be taken care of by means of a political system. What Tronto (2013:141) argues for, is not that all citizens should bear the same amount of care burdens, for that would be impossible and would deny people their own freedom, but rather that they share “the duty to reflect upon the nature of care responsibilities” (Tronto 2013:141) be shared among all citizens in order to find the best way to distribute the care responsibilities among competent people, groups, and institutions for freedom, equality, and justice to rule the day (Tronto 2013:141). To be inclusive of all people is, however, not an easy task, especially in societies with a great variety of cultures, languages, traditions, and social practices. Tronto (2013:142) notes that majority groups tend to overlook the “difficulties and struggles” (Tronto 2013:142) of other people.

She further argues that if care is to be taken seriously in a democratic society, it would cause an upset in the present-day understanding of a democracy. This would happen due to the fact that care has for the most part been restricted to the private sphere of life where women, people of the working class, and certain racial groups and certain ethnic groups have predominantly taken the responsibility of it (Tronto 2013:143). Bringing care into the public sphere of democratic life would mean that inclusivity in term of race, gender, and class would have to be reconsidered and reconstructed in order to create a more inclusive space (Tronto 2013:143). The process of inclusion is further complicated by the continuous uprisings of the neoliberalist movement and its
Tronto (2013:143) explains that neoliberalism has become at the same time a necessity for the economy when it comes to the modern understanding of capitalism and a way of fostering exclusion on a political level. There are basically two roads for a democratic country to follow. The one is on the current path, which seems to be that of neoliberalism. The other is that of democratic caring. Tronto (2013:144) points out some of the perils of neoliberalism stating that it relies on personal responsibility. She explains that personal responsibility “as a description of moral and economic life” (Tronto 2013:144) cannot be regarded as a true reflection of human life in general (Tronto 2013:144). She further says that it hardly ever happens that people really have complete independence and personal responsibility without any help, because most people do depend on some form of work, system, or engagement with people of some sorts to continue with their life (Tronto 2013:144). Tronto also mentions that personal responsibility forces public care into a precarious service of care (2013:144).

Neoliberalism does not prohibit public provisions for care, but somehow leads to the notion that private care is more sought after than public provisions of care as a result of the fact that public provisions of care are detrimental to the persons who require it (Tronto 2013:144). Neoliberalism leads people who require public provisions of care to feel like they are not able to be personally responsible for themselves, and must therefore be incompetent (Tronto 2013:144-145). Tronto (2013:145) believes that neoliberalism is a system that operates in such a way that it becomes increasingly difficult to be inclusive in all spheres of society. Neoliberalism forces people into groups of those who are more dependent and less dependent on the government to provide assistance. The system also harbours parochialism (Tronto 2013:145). Tronto (2013:145) explains how people are constantly being left to their own devices and that this causes strain on the economy and causes the gaps between the rich and the poor.

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252 Neoliberalism, Tronto (2013:143) explains, developed during the 1980’s while the world saw movements like the civil rights movement making enormous leeway and the second wave feminism become exceedingly successful. These movements called for greater inclusion for those who had been excluded for far too long (Tronto 2013:143).
to widen even more where “the rich grow richer and the poor stay poorer” (Tronto 2013:145). What tends to happen in these situations, is that the dignity of some people is denied. According to Tronto (2013:145), worth is then connected to social stance, where people who have less are considered to have less worth. When human dignity and human worth are measured by how well off someone is, there is something fundamentally wrong with a system. Such a system should then be revaluated in order to broaden its central values.

Tronto (2013:145) suggests that there is an alternative option to neoliberalism through the acceptance of the credibility and significance of the ethics of care. The caring alternative will ask for a revaluation of central values. It will promote a relational approach. It will also ask that caring responsibilities be examined in order to make necessary changes with regard to the distribution of responsibility for certain tasks (Tronto 2013:145). People who seemed to have gotten passes out of their caring responsibilities, will have to accept more caring responsibilities when it comes to care (Tronto 2013:145). According to Tronto (2013:145-146), there will most definitely be resistance and it will not be welcomed by everyone and some may even claim that not everyone has the ability to care, also because caring is not always easy or without frustration. She also argues that caring is not always difficult and frustrating, but that it can be a joyous occasion where something is effectively accomplished (Tronto 2013:146). “And to become more caring is to become more attentive and more capable of making judgments about responsibility” (Tronto 2013:146). She explains the importance of putting moral structures in place in order to prevent paternalism and parochialism to develop in caring structures because this would respectively impede on freedom and equality (Tronto 2013:146). A change in mind-set will be key to

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253 Tronto (2013:145) speaks of a vicious cycle that comes into being which continually excludes people. She says: “The vicious circle spins more tightly: those “others” become “irresponsible” by their economic failure, and citizens become more angry, distrustful, and resentful. Politics becomes increasingly punitive. The cycle repeats. Citizens become increasingly resentful and unhappy about public life. A future lies ahead in which those who can afford it will live inside gated communities and organize their lives so that they never need to meet the people who live elsewhere. At that point, the capacity to trust those “others” becomes more remote. Democratic citizens may come to have only the equal power to loath and fear those who are not like them” (Tronto 2013:145).
accepting the ethics of care into a democratic society because of the fact that the focus will be on the needs of the citizens and not on a capitalistic notion that money needs to be made (Tronto 2013:146). This does not mean that an economy is not important, but that the importance of monetary gain should not happen at the expense of the needs of people. Tronto (2013:146) believes that even though it is hard for people to change the way they think, it is still a choice that is real, and that it has more to offer than the false promise that comes with neoliberalism.

There are, however, considerable challenges in bringing about change. Nevertheless, if a democracy wants to be serious about its citizens, then it must take the needs of its citizens seriously. A democratic ethics of care is therefore appropriate for the challenges that face government and citizens, whether it is in the United States of America, or South Africa. Tronto (2013:146) says that the first step in the process is for all humans to realise and admit that they are vulnerable human beings and in need of care at various times and phases of their lives. When people come to the realisation that they constantly have needs themselves, then they may develop a sensitivity towards others who similarly have constant needs that have to be met (Tronto 2013:146). One of the greatest contributions that care theorists have made, Tronto (2007:39) argues, was to place emphasis on the fact that all human beings are vulnerable beings (Tronto 2007:39). She explains that to be vulnerable has never meant that a person is not inept of developing in a certain way (Tronto 2007:39). “Caring with” Tronto (2013:146) explains, asks not only of caring practices, but also of institutions of democratic caring to be renovated, and renewed into practices and institutions to rethink the distribution of responsibilities when it comes to care.

Tronto (2013:149) then also identifies three concerns about democratic caring. The first is that care cannot be democratic as a result of the fact that caring often happens between people who are considered to be unequal (Tronto 2013:149). Tronto (2013:150-151) addresses this by saying that if all people were prepared to view themselves as people who also receive care, the view of the self as a recipient of care will be stabilised. There is clearly a stigma of care-receivers being regarded as
unequal to others that ought to be challenged in order to do away with the inequality\textsuperscript{254}. Along with people realising that they are care-receivers themselves, care receivers ought not to be seen as “others” (Tronto 2013:151). Tronto (2013:151) believes that if care-receivers are no longer seen as others and all people realise that they

\textsuperscript{254} Denise Ackermann (2006:230) suggests a feminist theology of praxis as a possible method of opposing stigma, especially in the context of faith communities. She identifies five different points of praxis in which to oppose stigma (Ackermann 2006).

The first one is through a feminist praxis of storytelling where a space is created for people to tell their stories in order for people to better understand them (Ackermann 2006:230-231). She believes that storytelling is a crucial part of what it means to be human and that it help people to relate to one another (Ackermann 2006:231). Telling their story also helps the person who is telling the story to make sense of their own understanding of what is happening to them.

The second is a praxis of gender analysis and considers the role gender plays in stigma (Ackermann 2006:232). In a patriarchal society with patriarchal norms and ideas around caring, this praxis plays an important role in opposing stigma.

The third is the praxis of mutual relationship (Ackermann 2006:233). Ackermann (2006:233) explains that relationship is a vital part of any feminist theology, ethics, and theories. In a care context, this praxis would also be the main focal point in determining how relationships are affected by stigma and how it can be opposed. Ackermann (2006:234) stressed the fact that all human beings are relational beings and that everyone is interrelated with others. The focus on relationships will help to pinpoint inequality in relationships, the economy, and in politics (Ackermann 2006:234). Due to the fact that care is often gendered, this praxis can help to oppose stigma by pointing toward “mutuality and interrelatedness” (Ackermann 2006:235).

The fourth praxis is the Body of Christ Praxis (Ackermann 2006:235). In combatting stigma, this praxis helps to point out that even though people are different, they still form part of the on Body of Christ. In the context of stigma and HIV/AIDS, Ackermann (2006:236) says that the church today is the body of Christ with HIV/AIDS. This means that when one is affected, everybody is affected. The same could be said within a care context – the church today is the body of Christ without care. In order to change this, it is important to recognise and acknowledge that the fact the humans are relational, vulnerable, and dependent on one another. Every part of the body of Christ has a worthy role to play (Ackermann 2006:236).

The fifth and last praxis is the embodied praxis (Ackermann 2006:237). Ackermann (2013:237) stresses the importance of the body and the “embodied nature” (Ackermann 2006:237) in this praxis. She explains that human bodies are not simply just the skin over the flesh and the bones of people, but that the body also houses the totality of the people, including their thoughts, emotions, experiences, whether it be good or bad, and the needs and requirements in order to survive (Ackermann 2006:237). The church, according to Ackermann (2006:237) ought to include the embodiment of people in its teachings, for this may help to teach people about each other’s all-inclusive humanity.

This feminist theology of praxis can also help with the opposing of care stigma by teaching people about their own embodiment and teaching them that all people’s bodies at some point require care and that all people have the ability to help others by accepting responsibility for various caring practices.
themselves are vulnerable care-receivers at various points in their life, judgements will not be as severe and people will show more signs of empathy.

The second problem that may arise from democratic caring as a "large-scale democratic project" (Tronto 2013:151) involves the fact that care may happen in dyadic or binary relations that may lose their intimacy if enforced into this large-scale democratic project (Tronto 2013:151). Tronto (2013:151), however, criticises this view as a misunderstanding of what she means when she speaks about democratic caring. When she speaks about democratic caring, she refers to the importance of the organisation of care responsibilities and not about the actual care work itself (Tronto 2013:151). She is, however, cautious in cases where people assume that care is always dyadic (Tronto 2013:151). Tronto (2013:151) criticises Nel Noddings by saying that she is one of the people who insist that care is a dyad that happens between a person receiving care and a person providing care and that no care has occurred if the receiver of the care did not acknowledge that care had been received.

Tronto (2013:151) says what is problematic about such an image of care is that it is a distortion of what care really is, which leaves people to imagine care, as something that is restricted to a baby being cared for by a mother. She argues that there exists "no such thing as "Robinson Crusoe" care in which one person cares for other, and that is the end of the situation" (Tronto 2013:151-152). Care-receivers quite often try to respond to the care they have received (Tronto 2013:152). Tronto (2013:152) therefore criticises the dyadic image that has been formed of care and believes that such a view of care is inaccurate and unacceptable. It hardly ever happens that care only happens between only two people without any support from anyone else. She further stresses the importance of dismantling the idea that mothers are the only ones who care for their children and says that it is hindering the true nature of what it means to care (Tronto 2013:152). The hierarchical structures that exist within dyadic understandings of care are dangerous and should be broken down by any means possible (Tronto 2013:153). If caring is restricted to a dyadic understanding of care, it will never be able to move beyond the boundaries of the private sphere of life.
The third and last concern that is identified and addressed by Tronto (2013:149) is one that suggests that focusing on care, will lead to the promotion of the human rights of people. Tronto (2013:153) starts by saying that people who receive care are people who have needs that have to be addressed. At the same time, these people also have human rights (Tronto 2013:153). She explains that the concern with democratic caring is that it can, at certain times, cause rivalry between different needs, instead of all of the most important needs being addressed by society (Tronto 2013:153). This, however, is not something that should ever happen in society. No needs should ever be measured against each other to determine which one ought to be addressed first (Tronto 2013:153). Tronto (2013:153) argues that human rights become very important at this stage. She identifies three rights of every human being: Firstly, that every person is entitled to “adequate care throughout their lives” (Tronto 2013:153); secondly, that every person has the “right to care” (Tronto 2013:153); in other words, to participate in caring relationships that contribute to lives becoming more meaningful (Tronto 2013:153-154); and lastly, that every person has a right to partake in the process of insuring that the first two rights are carried out (Tronto 2013:154).

Tronto (2013:154) appeals for care to be understood in terms of an ongoing process that assures that is always available to citizens and is impossible to deny those who need it. At the same time, care should not only be seen as the responsibility of the state, but also as something for which everybody is responsible with support and assistance from the state. This is what Tronto (2013:154) means when she refers to “caring with”; it becomes something in which citizens are constantly involved in, in order to provide care services (Tronto 2013:154). In a democratic society it is vital that not only the voices of the privileged and powerful are heard, but all voices (Tronto 2013:155). Tronto (2013:155) admits that some of the processes regarding democratic caring may seem idealistic, but reiterates the fact that she believes that even just starting with the conversion to democratic caring can have numerous advantages. For this to happen, it is crucial that “a set of ideas about how democracy and care fit together” (Tronto 2013:155) need to be adapted in order for democratic care to become a reality (Tronto 2013:155). She argues that “democratic caring is not only
better because it is more democratic, it is better because it provides better care” (Tronto 2013:155). It is only within the framework of a truly democratic society that the ethics of care can function as an additional approach to morality (Tronto 2013:155). Tronto (2013:154) further believes that a democracy that cares, houses good care for its citizens and when that happens, a democracy will flourish. “By this account, democracy is the best political regime because it is the kind of political arrangement that best permits humans to care for one another, for other animals and things in the world, and for the world itself” (Tronto 2013:155-156).

3.3.7 Moving towards a Caring Democracy

It is obvious that it will not be easy to implement democratic caring, but it will be possible when some shifts come in the understanding of what is meant by democracy. The main shift that needs to happen, is to move the focus away from a society that is driven by economic success to a society that is concerned with meeting the needs of its citizens. The argument thus far was that the ethics of care has the ability to shift this focus. In order to create a world where care becomes a central issue requires that there be a focus on politics, particularity and plurality, and purposiveness (Tronto 2010:162). Tronto (2013:169) insists that the key to the re-imagination of what a democracy means, lies in the “ongoing practices and institutions in which all citizens are engaged” (Tronto 2013:169). This means that everybody will have to take their care responsibility seriously and that no one will be exempt from accepting responsibility (Tronto 2013:169). After making sure that no one gets a pass out of their responsibilities, it is of vital importance to have all people of all walks of life come together in order to decide about the “renegotiation of caring responsibilities” (Tronto 2013:170). This means that decisions will have to be made about what exactly it is that citizens will have to do in order to maintain a caring democracy.

Tronto (2013:179) suggests that a starting point for citizens would be to endorse the act of caring; in other words, citizens will have to promote that care and caring has the ability to change society for the good of all people. It would also help if care workers themselves were better supported, better educated, and better trained to do their care
work (Tronto 2013:179). To build a caring democracy, it is crucial that people show a genuine concern for the wellbeing of others. This can be done by becoming more knowledgeable about the circumstances of other people, becoming more open to act when injustices arise against them, and doing all of this without causing permanent harm to the self (Tronto 2013:180).

In becoming a more caring democracy, Tronto (2010:163) says that there are at least seven warning signs that people need to look out for in order to care well. The first warning sign is that there should never be a perception that only misfortunate people are in need of care (Tronto 2010:163). Tronto (2010:163) explains that those who are in need become marginalised when the image of success is portrayed as an “autonomous career man” (Tronto 2010:163). It is important to realise that all people need care at various stages of their life (Tronto 2010:163).

The second warning sign is when institutions accept that needs do not have to be discussed because they are a given (Tronto 2010:163). Tronto (2010:163) says that the determination of what needs are and who exactly have needs, is one of the biggest political struggles of care that needs to be addressed. It should not simply be accepted that every need is the same for every person or situation. Needs are complex and differ in all circumstances.

The third warning sign is when care is handled as though it is a commodity instead of a process (Tronto 2010:164). Tronto (2010:164) argues that the commodification of care within a Marxist context leads to people being alienated. When care merely becomes a service that can be bought instead of a process, it becomes dangerous grounds to walk upon (Tronto 2010:164). Tronto (2010:164) criticises the model of people being regarded as consumers, especially in a care context, as this leads to the denial of the right that people have to make decisions for themselves when it comes to their own needs.

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255 Tronto (2003:123) explains that “processes of commodification are at work in providing humans with food, with products for their bodily needs and with ‘time-saving’ devices that will help mothers, spouses, dutiful daughters of ageing parents and so on” (Tronto 2003:123).
The fourth warning sign is when people who are receiving care are excluded from making certain decisions as a result of the fact that they are not experts in the field (Tronto 2010:165). It often happens that people who receive care are seen as being inept because they depend on other people to provide them with care (Tronto 2010:165). These care receivers should not be seen as resistant or obstructive simply because they may have their own opinion (Tronto 2010:165).

The fifth warning is when the provision of care is diminished to be seen as care-giving, instead of regarding it as a process that needs to understand needs in order to assign the necessary responsibilities to various people (Tronto 2010:165).

The sixth warning sign in an institution is when providers of care experience the requirements of the institution as a burden rather than something that can provide them with more skills in their caring. Requirements for care should never become an unnecessary obstacle in the way of caring.

The seventh warning sign that care work is not being done properly, is when care work becomes something that divides according to the race, class, or gender of people (Tronto 2010:166). Tronto (2010:166) says that it is unacceptable that people are still ascribed certain care positions according to their social status in society, even more so that care, in this day and age, is regarded as something with “secondary status in society” (Tronto 2010:166). These seven warning signs reflect the fact that “purpose, power, and plurality” (Tronto, 2010:166) can lead to care becoming impersonal and commodified if caring practices are not managed properly.

Tronto (2013:181) maintains that citizens need to be open to revaluate their caring responsibilities on a regular basis in order to determine whether needs are being met in the process. As the government and citizens start to work together in an attempt to meet the needs of citizens, the ever widening gap between the government and its citizens will become smaller until it almost does not exist anymore (Tronto 2013:181). Tronto (2013:181) believes that when this happens “citizens will become, as Aristotle once described them, those who rule and are ruled in turn” (Tronto 2013:181). Tronto (1995:148) has been open about the fact that care will never be able to tend to all the
needs that arise in societies, and that the theory in practice is not necessarily perfect, but that a society that chooses to adopt the ethics of care would be one where the violence, hatred, and general unhappiness will be less prevalent than what current societies depict. By arguing for care to be taken seriously in a society, Tronto (2013:181) hopes to argue for a more democratic society in which citizens’ needs are truly addressed. For her, economic gain is not the ultimate contributing factor to the happiness and flourishing of human beings (Tronto 2013:181). To cling to such a claim, would be to deny the irrefutably relational nature that every human being is born into (Tronto 2013:181). Tronto (2013:182) firmly believes that a commitment to taking care and care responsibilities seriously, can turn the world into a better place. If caring for others and responsible distribution of care responsibilities are addressed, caring for others and for sustainable resources can be a reality (Tronto 2013:182). She argues that if this were to happen, trust would be restored, and equality and freedom will be a reality for all (Tronto 2013:182). In that sense, justice and care will have a very important role to play as ethical discourses in the moral domain. It will be a democracy in which justice is known through the “constant care for the common good” (Tronto 2013:182).

In this chapter, the development of the ethics of care was further developed into an ethical theory that has the capability of bringing about political change in a democratic society. Tronto’s identification of the moral boundaries helped to identify crucial issues within society and how it is possible for the ethics of care as a moral theory to shift boundaries that tend to limit a good life for every human being, regardless of race, class, or gender. This chapter also discussed the various phases of caring and the importance of the acceptance of care responsibilities. It was stressed that nobody should be given passes out of their care responsibilities, regardless of who they are and what they do. When every person accepts their care responsibility, care has the power to transform society into a truly democratic society.

This chapter further provided more clarity on the practice and features of the ethics of care. It was argued that the ethics of care is a theory that seeks to bring the voices of those formerly excluded from the political and public realm into the political realm. It
was also argued that a democratic society can only become more caring when the needs of all citizens are placed before pursuing capital gains. In order to do this, justice and care, as two distinctive ethical theories, need to work together in order to create a better society for all citizens.

One of the important questions of this dissertation still remains: what can a theology, as an academic discipline, learn from these contemporary ethical contributions as it was set out in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3? The next chapter will attempt to argue that a theological ethics of care, developed out of the ethics of care and based in the Love Commandment, can play a vital role in the theological understanding and theological interpretation of the ethics of justice and the ethics of care as two contemporary ethical theories working in unison.
Chapter 4
The Love Commandment as Basis for Care and Justice?

In chapter two, the origins and development of the ethics of care as a response to the ethics of justice were discussed. Gilligan developed this ethics further into an ethics that had a great impact on the way a lot of people view morality today. The ethics of care, as a relational theory, grew into a theory that empowered especially women to resist the injustices brought about by a patriarchal society. The relational nature of the ethics of care calls for both justice and care orientations to be included within a relational framework in order to transform the way psychology, politics, the justice system, ethical theories, and philosophy are understood.

Chapter three saw Tronto’s account of the development of this theory into a theory that could, if responsibilities of care were taken seriously, change the way a democratic society function to be more caring and just. In this chapter, the aim is to look at the possibility of developing a theological ethics of care that works in unison with a theological ethics of justice, as opposed to being regarded as being polar opposites. In order to do this, the aim is to determine whether theology, the ethics of care, and the ethics of justice can come into conversation with each other through the mutual element of love, more specifically the Love Commandment.

In her research, Gilligan had found that the enemy of patriarchy, the one thing that breaks all hierarchies and crosses all boundaries and the one thing that questions the way things are in life, is love. She therefore calls for the different voice, the relational voice, the voice of love, to be included as an equal to justice in the moral framework in order for democracy to be freed from patriarchy. This chapter will see an analysis of Frits de Lange’s interpretation of the Love Commandment, as the cornerstone of the Christian tradition, to see if it can be of assistance in bringing theology into conversation with the ethics of care and the ethics of justice.
Frits de Lange, a professor from the Protestant Theological University in Groningen in the Netherlands and an Extraordinary Professor at Stellenbosch University in South Africa, will be a key figure throughout this chapter. He is a well-known theologian who writes extensively on the ethics of care and theology, especially within the context of gerontology. His work is, however, not limited to gerontology and can be used in different contexts. His knowledge of a theological interpretation and theological application of the ethics of care is relevant in both the contexts of social society and religious traditions. His understanding of the Love Commandment and the narrative of the Good Samaritan in his interpretation of the ethics of care and theology is useful and enriching. Firstly, however, it will be motivated why it is important to reflect theologically on ethics, more specifically, the ethics of care.

Frits de Lange (2015b:1), believes that there are numerous reasons why a theological approach to the ethics of care can be helpful. Even though the theological approach

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256 The work and research of Frits de Lange, the key figure in this chapter, is based in a European context unless it is explicitly stated otherwise. The last section of this chapter will attempt to determine whether an African context can learn from the experience of a North American, European, and Western perspective about the ethics of care.

257 De Lange (2009:205) seeks to answer the question of what care for the elderly would mean “in a world in which there seems to be no common moral ground for treating the weak and marginalized in a humane and just manner” (De Lange 2009:205).

258 De Lange has a long history with the narrative of the Good Samaritan. He regards it as a crucial Biblical narrative when it comes to the interpretation of, among others, the ethics of care, thereby making it a crucial narrative for this dissertation. He has used it in multiple academic articles and books that he has written (see De Lange 2011a, 2011b, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015a, 2015b in the bibliography).

259 Kretzschmar (2009:21), when writing about the relationship between theological ethics and other academic disciplines, explains that “[E]thics is best pursued in an interdisciplinary manner” (Kretzschmar 2009:21). This means that ethics informs itself by drawing on various disciplines, whether it be theological or other disciplines in academia (Kretzschmar 2009:21). Kretzschmar (2009:21) further argues that it is essential “for theologians to interact with other intellectuals and for Christians generally to interact with all aspects of life” (Kretzschmar 2009:21). For her it is important that the life of Christians be “presented in an honest, self critical and open manner” (Kretzschmar 2009:24). She argues that theological ethics should not be isolated from other disciplines, because these disciplines “inform and challenge our ethical analyses, norms and values, character, relationships and actions” (Kretzschmar 2009:26). The aim of this dissertation is to bring the academic disciplines of psychology, political science, and theology, and their approaches to the ethics of care, into one collective conversation about the ethics of care that developed as a contemporary feminist moral theory in response to the ethics of justice.
he argues for has a focus on the elderly, it can be of assistance in various other ways too. He argues that a theological ethics attempts to bring moral traditions into conversations with religious traditions\(^{260}\) and that this has an impact on the public sphere (De Lange 2015b:10). He further believes that Christian ethics is not restricted to the Christian audience, but that it can contribute to the general moral sphere in public. For him, theology adds something extra to the understanding of morality that moral philosophy does not offer (De Lange 2015b:10). Theology has the ability to speak to the spirit and the soul through various biblical narratives (De Lange 2015b:10). Theology also offers “existential and pastoral dimensions”\(^{261}\) (De Lange 2015b:10) with abundant examples of communal practices that humans relate to both “reflectively and existentially” (De Lange 2015b:10). This dichotomy of humanity is reflected in philosophy, in the arts, and in religion\(^{262}\) (De Lange 2015b:10). “Theology, also, is one of the few disciplines, not afraid for using the language of love” (De Lange 2015c:473).

Wolfgang Huber\(^{263}\) (2015:160), during his inaugural lecture as an Honorary Professor in the Faculty of Theology at Stellenbosch University, echoes this belief by saying that “[N]o other ethical approach – religious or secular, theological or philosophical – is prohibited to use the Ten Commandments, the command to love God, your neighbour

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\(^{260}\) As a theological ethicist, this is the aim for this dissertation. By writing this dissertation, the attempt is to bring the moral traditions that have been discussed in the first two chapters into a conversation with a (Christian) religious tradition of love, which has been a pinnacle point of the Christian religious tradition.

\(^{261}\) In writing about Christian ethics, Kretzschmar (2009:19) explains that a person who is moral, from a Christian perspective, “is not simply someone who can discuss moral issues and theories intellectually, but someone who has received God’s love and truly loves God, self and others (Matt 22:37-40) - indeed all of creation” (Kretzschmar 2009:19).

\(^{262}\) De Lange (2015b:10) explains that theology is something that “deals with human drama depicted in narratives, and it touches the spirit, going deep into the soul” (De Lange 2015b:10).

\(^{263}\) Wolfgang Huber is a retired German Theologian and Ethicist. He was a Professor of Systematic Theology in Heidelberg. He is the Chairperson of the Stiftung Garnisonkirche Potsdam and the Dean of the Domstift Brandenburg. His is also an Honorary Professor at Stellenbosch University. He was also the bishop of the Evangelical Church of Berlin-Brandenburg-Silesian Upper Lusatia and the Chairperson of the Council of the Evangelical Church in Germany.
and yourself or the Golden Rule and to test their productivity for today’s ethical challenges” (Huber 2015:160). De Lange (2015b:11) further argues that religion creates a space for “practices of lament and thanksgiving, grief and compassion” (De Lange 2015b:11). He also notes that theology has the unique ability to incorporate in it the “language of love, emotions, social relationships, and self-esteem” (De Lange 2015b:11). It is built upon biblical stories “where dramatic life stories fuel reflection much more than abstract ideas or concepts do” (De Lange 2015b:11).

One of the main reasons why theological ethics is important is that it takes the spiritual needs of people into consideration (De Lange 2015b:11). Various liberation theologies have addressed issues concerning “victims of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination” (De Lange 2015b:11). The work of theology in ethics, therefore, takes the need for liberation for those who are oppressed in society very seriously (De Lange 2015b:11). This is evident in liberation theologies such as black liberation theology, Latin American liberation theology, and feminist theology, to name merely some examples. Caring, within a theological context, whether it be about the elderly, the poor, the oppressed, or any other social group, “is not only a matter of spiritual care but also of social justice” (De Lange 2015b:11).

Nico Koopman’s interpretation of Jurgen Moltmann’s argument in support of “particularistic liberation theologies” (Koopman, 2004:191), can be of further assistance when arguing in favour of a theological discussion on the ethics of care as

264 The Golden Rule is virtually known in every religious and secular tradition in throughout the world: Do to others as you want other to do to you. In his book The Golden Rule (1996), Wattles investigates the historical contexts of the Golden Rule and how it is implemented in various cultures. He also compares it to similar rules given by Confucius, Plato, Aristotle, and classical Jewish literature.

265 The Role of compassion plays a very important role in De Lange’s understanding of the ethics of care and will be discussed extensively at a later stage.

266 Nico Koopman is a South African theologian and ethicist who is currently also the vice-rector: Social Impact, Transformation and Personnel at Stellenbosch University. He was also the dean at the Faculty of Theology at Stellenbosch University before being appointed as the vice-rector.

267 Jurgen Moltmann is a German theologian of reformed theology. He is an Emeritus Professor of Systematic Theology at the University of Tübingen in Germany.
a particularistic liberation theology. He explains that such a theology needs to be separate from “the dominant traditional male theology” (Koopman, 2004:191) and that it should develop in its own unique way with its own unique characteristics in order to address specific issues without being disturbed (Koopman, 2004:191). He also draws on the work of Mercy Oduyoye who believes that particularistic theologies can be viewed as being “sectarian in terms of their credenda (creeds and ideologies) and agenda (concrete tasks and action that flow from the credenda)” (Koopman, 2004:191), but that they eventually add to the conversation about some form of theological anthropology, in other words, to the “search for a wholesome and meaningful way of being human as well as in the elaboration of what human being is all about” (Koopman, 2004:191). A theological understanding of the ethics of care as a particularistic theology can therefore be a crucial conversation partner based on the fact that it seeks to make a meaningful contribution to what it means to be a human being.

Caring, yes, about the elderly, but also about all human beings, is always a matter concerned about social justice (De Lange 2015b:11). De Lange (2015b:11) explains that ethics focuses on practical problems as a “reflection on the good life” (De Lange 2015b:11) and seeks to answer the questions: “What is the good thing to do?” (De Lange 2015b:11), “what does it mean to live a good life” (De Lange 2015b:12), and “how should I live?” (De Lange 2015b:12). Theological ethics ought to address all three of these questions and not merely one of them (De Lange 2015b:12). Theology can therefore be greatly enriched by being in conversation with other moral traditions.

Mercy Oduyoye is a famous African women Theologian from Ghana. She is also a Methodist Theologian. She is also the director of the Institute of African Women in Religion and Culture at Trinity Theological Seminary. She is also the founder of the Circle for Concerned African Women Theologians and has visited Stellenbosch and South Africa on numerous occasions.

Kretzschmar, Bentley & Van Niekerk (2009:4) argue that a good life for Christians constitute a life that is lived “in accordance with what God desires for them, namely a moral life of love, integrity and generosity” (Kretzschmar, Bentley & Van Niekerk, 2004:4).
De Lange (2015b:14-26) considers five different moral philosophies. The first four, he argues, will not address the three above-mentioned questions thoroughly, while the fifth, he suggests, may be of assistance. The first perspective is the Kantian perspective on ethics. De Lange (2015b:14) says this theory has strong affinities with theories regarding political liberalism. People in this perspective are considered to be citizens who are autonomous “with personal life plans, who negotiate mutual rights and obligations in a rational, equal, and fair dialogue” (De Lange 2015b:14) and adapt themselves accordingly (De Lange 2015b:14). He identifies four crucial words that are associated with this perspective: autonomy, responsibility, beneficence, and distributive justice (De Lange 2015b:14). This perspective leads to a vast distinction between the public sphere and private sphere. In the case of ageing, then, the personal experience connected to ageing is on that is consequently perceived as a private matter (De Lange 2015b:14). This perspective, however, can lead to discrimination and simultaneously disregards any form of social reality (De Lange 2015b:14). Something like ageing, for instance, is a social matter (De Lange 2015b:14). This perspective on ethics is limited to “liberal proceduralism” (De Lange 2015b:14) that runs the risk of discrimination.

The second perspective is the utilitarian perspective on ethics. This perspective is not too hesitant to state what a good life entails (De Lange 2015b:14). It regards a good life to be one that is “experientially satisfying” (De Lange 2015b:15). A life that is a good life is one which causes a person to feel good and lacks any evidence of suffering (De Lange, 2015b:15). De Lange’s (2015b:15) main concern with this perspective is that it is easily corruptible. He explains that it is possible for a person to be corrupted to feel happy, while they are actually not happy (De Lange 2015b:15). He clarifies: “I think I desire one thing, but I am actually longing for something else” (De Lange 2015b:15). He argues that life is not merely a group of experiences, but that human beings need more than that; “they also need truth and respect” (De Lange 2015b:15). An experience ought not to cover the true experience that a person is feeling. If something is wrong, it should be addressed responsibly (De Lange, 2015b:15).
This third perspective, the eudaemonist perspective, is slightly more pleasing to De Lange (2015b:15), but not quite yet the right perspective. This perspective has as its goal a life that is lived well (De Lange 2015b:15). He explains that only life that is lived well can be considered to be a “happy life” (De Lange 2015b:15). The good life is, thus, understood as a life that can be intentionally controlled as an activity and is therefore not simply an experience (De Lange 2015b:15). For a life to be considered as happy, it must have flourishing as its ultimate goal (De Lange 2015b:16). This perspective is one that is in accordance with the “morality of authenticity and self-realization” (De Lange 2015b:16).

De Lange’s (2015b:17) concern with this perspective, however, is that its focus on human flourishing as the ultimate goal of life is not inclusive of, for instance, frail elderly care, or for that matter, anyone who does not flourish. Although it may be based in human nature, De Lange (2015b:18) argues that it does not include the entire lifespan of a human being. For De Lange (2015b:17) the focus on flourishing seemed to be “counterintuitive”, especially in the context of gerontology (De Lange 2015b:18), because not all lives are reminiscent of flourishing, but rather often seem to be reminiscent of “progressive losses (of health, relationships, mobility, status, etc.)” (De Lange 2015b:18). The eudemonic approach to ethics, according to De Lange (2015b:18), is restricted to a timeline that is better suited to younger ages, but does not address the issues concerning the oldest members of society (De Lange 2015b:18).

The other objection (De Lange 2015b:19) has to a eudaemonist approach, is that it is “future-orientated” (De Lange 2015b:19). This means that it, once again, excludes people, especially the elderly who may be more focused on reminiscing about the past, their memories, and the stories of that shaped their lives than being concerned about future troubles and how to provide for their old day270 (De Lange 2015b:19). He further feels that a eudaemonist perspective tends to be an approach that is individualistic in

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270 This does not mean that people who are old are not concerned about their future or that they do not have goals and things they want to accomplish in the shorter term (De Lange 2015b:19).
its nature (De Lange, 2015b:20). He does not, however, imply with this that a eudaemonist perspective is egocentric or that it does not have the ability to compassionately care about the needs of others in a very compassionate way (De Lange 2015b:20). He simply means that the wellbeing of the life of the self is considered to be central within this approach (De Lange 2015b:20).

Virtue ethics, De Lange (2015b:17) argues, is at the same time both an ethic in itself and a variation on the eudaemonist perspective. The good life, according to this perspective, is a life that takes part in “social practices and exercising the excellencies they require” (De Lange 2015b:17). De Lange (2015b:17) explains that virtue ethics, as a developmental theory, seems to focus on issues like “learning and education” (De Lange 2015b:17). This theory, however, like the eudaemonist perspective, is also based on the principles of human flourishing.

All four of these ethical approaches offer different understandings of what a good life entails, but De Lange (2015b:20) notes that there is one distinct mutual element that is also part of them and that is that they are “agent-orientated” (De Lange 2015b:20). It neglects the relational aspect of ethics. Other people are merely there as a component that takes part in life, but as “coconstituents” (De Lange 2015b:20). De Lange (2015b:23) explains that an ethical theory is needed that will reflect something of the importance of relationships and vulnerability (De Lange 2015b:23). He, thus, opts for the ethics of care with a relational orientation.

De Lange (2015b:23), similarly to the content in Chapter 3, claims that there are several key features that help with the identification of the ethics of care. The major features the he identifies as important are, however, slightly different to the features of the ethics of care that was identified in Chapter 3. The first feature that he identifies is that the ethics of care places an emphases on the importance of dependence of all human beings (De Lange 2015b:23). He explains that other moral theories, especially those “built on the image of the independent, autonomous, rational individual” (De Lange 2015b:23) often neglect to recognise the reality of the dependence of all people (De lange 2015b:23). The second feature of the ethics of care, according to De Lange
(2015b:23) is that it appreciates emotion instead of neglecting, ignoring, or completely rejecting it as part of human life. He feels that it is necessary that emotions like “sympathy, empathy, sensitivity, and responsiveness” (De Lange 2015b:23) be refined in order to establish exactly what it is that morality endorses (De Lange 2015b:23). The third feature that he identifies, is the rejection by the ethics of care that “moral reasoning needs abstraction and impartiality” (De Lange 2015b:23). He explains that the ethics of care has a great appreciation for the opinion of others “with whom we share actual relationships” (De Lange 2015b:23).

Echoing Tronto’s concern, the fourth feature of the ethics of care that De Lange (2015b:23) deems to be a major feature, is the view regarding the separation of the private and public spheres. He argues that the ethics of care questions the validity of the traditional view of care whereby care is restricted to “the private sphere of the household and carried out mainly by women” (De Lange 2015b:23), while justice is regarded as “something that belongs to the male-dominated public sphere” (De Lange 2015b:23-24). This is a great concern for De Lange (2015b:24), because when they clash, the private care always gives way to the public justice. Justice should never prevail at the expense of true care.

The fifth and final feature of the ethics of care identified by De Lange (2015b:24) is “its concept of persons” (De Lange 2015b:24). De Lange (2015b:24) explains that the ethics of care “works, morally and epistemologically, with a conception of persons as relational and interdependent, contrary to the self-sufficient individual of liberal political theory” (De Lange 2015b:24), thereby confirming what both Gilligan and Tronto regarded as a vital part of the ethics of care271. He says that “relationships are a constitutive part” (De Lange 2015b:24) of people’s identities (De Lange 2015b:24). De Lange (2015b:24) believes, like Gilligan and Tronto, that “the ethics of care’s concept

271 De Lange (2015b:24) writes about the centrality of care in human life: “We start out as children dependent on those who provide us with care, and we remain interdependent in thoroughly fundamental ways throughout our lives. That we can think and act as if we were independent depends on a network of social relationships making it possible for us to do so... Not only does the liberal individualist conception of the person foster a false picture of society and people in it, it is also, from the perspective of the ethics of care, impoverished as an ideal”.
of “care” is not limited to the practices of institutional health care, but offers a comprehensive perspective on the human condition” (De Lange 2015b:24). He, similar to Held in Chapter 3, argues that this ‘care’ is, at the same time, value and practice272 (De Lange 2015b:24).

According to De Lange (2015b:25) there are “striking affinities and similarities” (De Lange 2015b:25) between the ethics of care and a theological ethics in general. Similar to the ethics of care, theological ethics recognised the great importance of relationships between human beings (De Lange 2015b:25). He writes: “Those (agapist) variants that center on the New Testament commands to love also acknowledge the moral importance of emotion (compassion) and concern for the particularity of the other” (De Lange 2015b:25). Theological ethics also recognises that dependency is part of human life (De Lange 2015b:25). De Lange (2015b:25) argues that many theologians, including Friedrich Schleiermacher, said that the start of religion is “the feeling of absolute dependence273” (De Lange 2015b:25).

Theology, like De Lange mentioned, has the unique ability to combine “language of love, emotions, social relationships, and self-esteem” (De Lange 2015b:11). Huber (2015:161) adds that as human beings created in the image of God, two crucial elements are combined: “I see my own life as a divine gift entrusted to me, while I also understand the other’s life as sacred because it is created in God’s image, like my own” (Huber 2015:161). The life of a person therefore ought to be understood in terms of a relationship of responsibility wherein a person is responsible for the impact of their decisions on their own life and the lives of others as a sign of this life given by God as

272 De Lange (2015b:24) explains that to care about other people and taking care of them in the process is “the most natural thing for people to do” (De Lange 2015b:24). To care and to be cared for is therefore something that gives value to the lives of people (De Lange 2015b:24).

273 This dependence, more often than not, refers to the dependence of human beings from God (De Lange 2015b:250). De Lange (2015b:25) says that “the image of self-sufficient, autonomous human was unthinkable as a moral ideal throughout Christian theology; rather, it is precisely the image of sin: “It is not good that the man should be alone; I will make him a helper as his partner” (Gen. 2:18, NRSV). Part of the good creation is that humans are created as selves-in-relationship” (De Lange 2015b:25). This, from a theological point of view, becomes the base argument for human beings and their relational orientation.
a gift (Huber 2015:161). From an ethical point of view, the ethics of care succeeds in combining these features. From a theological point of view, the Love Commandment succeeds in combining them. Before reflecting on the Love Commandment’s possible connection to the ethics of care, it is necessary to reflect on the Love Commandment. Due to the fact that De Lange was chosen as a key figure in this dissertation, especially in for the theological reflection of the ethics of care, his treatment and interpretation of the Love Commandment will be discussed in the next section.

4.1 The Love Commandment as a Way of Living?

According to De Lange (2015b:26), the Love Commandment is part of the Christian religious heritage, even though he is convinced that it is not in any view limited to the Christian tradition. For him, the command to love is a “good ethics for the public sphere” (De Lange 2015b:26). Michael Welker274 (2001:127) argues that life without love would be inconceivable and that there is no way that any relationship could last if love was not the basis of it. It is fundamentally part of any human life. It is the cornerstone of the Christian tradition. De Lange (2015b:27) draws on the work of various influential philosophers and theologians who, along with himself, argue that love as understood within the Christian tradition, the agape form love, is at the centre of what is known as Christian ethics.

One of the central imperatives in a theological ethics, that has been as the heart of the Christian religious tradition and that can, therefore, help with a theological interpretation of the ethics of care and the ethics of justice is the Love Commandment. De Lange (2015b:29), when reflecting upon the Love Commandment, chooses to do so with the focus falling squarely on the “agapistic interpretation of the command to love” (De Lange 2015b:29). He then continues to apply this agapistic interpretation to gerontology and care (De Lange 2015b:29). He explains that when he works with the Love Commandment, he does not do so from the perspective of theological doctrine,

274 Michael Welker is a German Theologian and Professor of Systematic Theology at the University of Heidelberg in Germany. Some of his research themes include Christology, doctrine of creation, anthropology, and eschatology.
but rather as “an intellectual tradition fuelled by biblical narratives in which the thankful affirmation of life as given (the love of God), the acceptance of self in its particularity (self-love), and the benevolent response to the act of trust of the other (love of the neighbor) are closely intertwined” (De Lange 2015b:29). From this perspective, it also becomes clear that the Love Commandment, even though it may find its origins in a religious background, is not limited to the audience of sacred religious space. It is something that can be useful to anybody inside or outside the Christian faith. In discussing the Love Commandment, De Lange (2015b:29) offers it as follows:

“You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind. This is the great and first commandment.275 And a second is like it [DEUTERA DE HOMOIA AUTÈ]. You shall love your neighbor as yourself [AGAPESEIS TON PLÈSION HOOS SEAUTON]. On these two commandments depend all the law and the prophets. (Matt. 22, 38-40; cf. Mark. 12:28-34; Luke 10: 25-37)” (De Lange 2015b:29).

De Lange (2011a:86) explains that the Love Commandment may have had its origins in the Golden Rule, which says: “Treat others as you would want them to treat you” (Cf. Matt. 7:12; Luk. 6:31). There is, however, an important difference. The Golden Rule seems to have been understood in terms of “an ethic of calculated reciprocity”276 (De Lange 2015b:37) in which a person would only do the minimum that it sufficient according to their own satisfaction, while the Love Commandment goes a step further in order to promote an ethic of selfless compassion wherein a person cares for the other based on said person’s needs and not according to their own accord (De Lange 2011a:86).

275Cf. Deut. 6,5

276 This reciprocity clause, according to Wolterstorff (2011a:123), can be divided into two parts. Firstly, it can refer to the equal repayment of the act of kindness that has been incurred or secondly, it can refer to the equal repayment of the foul that has been experienced (Wolterstorff, 2011a:123). This ethic of calculated reciprocity therefore, wants all debt to be balanced out so that no debt has occurred without it being paid back. The ethic of selfless compassion, however, contributes to the wellbeing of other without calculating debt and without expecting anything to be paid back in return. Wolterstorff (2011a:124) argues that Jesus’ approach, therefore, completely disregards the negative part of evil being repaid with the same amount of evil incurred. Jesus only concentrates on the positive side that shows goodwill to others, and does so without expecting any favours in return (Wolterstorff 2011a:124).
The Love Commandment’s ethic is one that requires a person not to keep count of their love. A person who lives this kind of love does not expect anything in return, but instead loves the other compassionately and selflessly. De Lange (2015b:38) argues that the Love Commandment, instead of asking a person to love the other “as much as” (De Lange 2015b:38) the self, rather asks a person to love the other “in the same way” (De Lange 2015b:38) as loving the self.

The Love Commandment can be divided into two parts. The first part is a command that requires of human beings to love God with all of their heart, soul, and mind. The second part that follows directly after that is the command that humans love their neighbour as they would love themselves. With the combination of these two parts into one command, De Lange (2015b:29) argues that the relationship that exists between God, the self, and others are indissolubly intertwined with one another.

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277 This statement has been contested in the past by a number of scholars, but is not the primal focus of this dissertation. Therefore the various interpretations thereof will not be discussed.

278 Welker (2001:131) writes: “The love between the Father and the Son is a love that does not just mean ‘abstract reciprocity,’ in which human beings can only somehow ‘mystically’ gain participation. Rather, it is a love connected with the making known of the Father or his name (Johan 17:26), or with the revelation of the Son and his dwelling among his witnesses (John 14:21ff.). The love God loves with and wants to be loved with is thus revealed to human beings, and God is revealed in this love. In this love, God’s identity and power are made known. In the same way the Creator entrusts Jesus Christ with divine power via the love relation, human beings are also to become familiar with God and gain participation in God’s power through love”.

279 Murphy and Ellis (1996:194) wrote that the nature of God is essentially kenotic through the death of Jesus Christ on the cross. They argued that this has implications for human beings who should respond to the kenotic nature of God by living in kenosis themselves as human beings made in the image of God (Murphy & Ellis 1996:194). This concept of kenosis is a contested idea, especially with regards to the conversation about self-love. It will, however, not be vastly discussed in this dissertation.

280 Ackermann (2014:166) connects the love commandment to freedom and says that one part of being free is to be ‘free for’ others. She writes: “to be ‘free for’ is to be free to love my neighbour as myself. Away with the contorted, self-serving images of love! The balm of healthy love of self is the joyful acceptance that we are valued and loved by God. We see our neighbours as persons loved by God – able to love themselves and to love us. Being free for love of others is a merry-go-round of loving relationships, expressed by sharing with and caring for one another” (Ackermann 2014:166).

281 Marais (2015a:718) uses Ackermann’s understanding of relationality that reflects the same idea. She says that “relationality is both a need and a priority...which leads us to our ‘created nature’... and “finds its source in our understanding of the God as God in relation” (Marais 2015a:718). This relationality is the foundation of an
He explains that this expression of love is one that goes in three directions and then connects it to the former Yale Professor Nicholas Wolterstorff’s explanation of what love does; that it seeks to promote a person’s flourishing and seeks to treat someone in a way that affirms their dignity (De Lange 2015b:29). This can be seen in the love and concern that God has for the creation (De Lange 2015b:29).

De Lange (2012) believes that the aim of God’s creation is that this love is something that should be shared among humans, their God, and themselves. When interpreting the Love Commandment, De Lange (2012) says that it can easily be interpreted as something that is an exclusively Christian commandment. He believes that this can happen because the first part of the commandment cannot simply be pushed to the side in order to secularise the commandment – it is ultimately “the great and first commandment” (De Lange 2015b:29). According to him, the love of God has understanding of “transformative anthropology” (Marais 2015a:718) whereby the humanity of all people is affirmed in full (Marais 2015a:718).

Nicholas Wolterstorff is an American Philosopher and the writer of various philosophical and theological books. He was a Noah Porter Professor of Philosophical Theology at Yale University in the United States of America and is currently an Adjunct Professor in both the Philosophy and Religious Studies Departments. In his lifetime he has acted as a visiting Professor at many Universities across the world, including Harvard University, Princeton University, Oxford University, the University of Notre Dame, the University of Texas, the University of Michigan, Temple University, the Free University of Amsterdam, and the University of Virginia.

Welker (2001:135) argues that the kenotic love that God displays “gives to creation an unconditional share in itself and in that power of new life – which it is – time and again directs us towards God and a fuller revelation. The power of God’s kenotic love, revealed in Christ’s love and bestowed on creatures by the working of the Holy Spirit, draws human lives into the creative love that makes them bearers of God’s presence and the incarnation of the new creation” (Welker, 2001:135-136).

This can lead to a discussion about kenosis that will not be further discussed in this dissertation, but is something that ought to be noted. George Ellis (2001:107) writes that kenosis is a central theme in various phases of human life, whether it be personal or group orientated, “in learning and art” (Ellis 2001:107) or “in properly understood ethics and social action” (Ellis 2001:107). He argues that this can be seen as something that is “fully coherent with the concept of a kenotic creator God” (Ellis 2001:108). He defines kenosis as “a joyous, kind, and loving attitude that is willing to give up selfish desires and to make sacrifices on behalf of others for the common good and the glory of God, doing this in a generous and creative way, avoiding the pitfall of pride, and guided and inspired by the love of God and the gift of Christ” (Ellis 2001:108). Ellis (2001:109) further argues that the goal of kenosis ought to be “theosis, or covenant with God” (Ellis 2001:109). Ellis (2001:109) builds on this statement by saying that the lives of people ought to be focused on the welfare of other people and the welfare of the world while it brings praise to God at the same time. This should be done because “God loves humanity and his creation” (Ellis 2001:109). This would mean that self-sacrifice that happens “on behalf of the domination of others” (Ellis 2001:109), cannot be regarded as a form of kenosis (Ellis 2001:109).
“ontological primacy” (De Lange 2015b:29). He, however, disagrees with a reading that is limited to only Christians and pleads for a reading that is inclusive and also accessible for those who are not Christians (De Lange 2015b:29). He argues that when Jesus Christ uttered the Love Commandment that he did not only do so for a specific group of people, but rather as an “ethics for everyone” (De Lange 2015b:29). This means that there is no pre-condition of religion for this commandment to be effective, based on the fact that the phenomenology will be sufficient to apply to all people (De Lange 2015b:29).

People who do not share the theological content of the commandment can still share in the essence of the commandment by reading the first part as: “Love life as it is given to you” (De Lange 2015b:30). This does not mean, however, that the first part of the command to love God can be reduced to phenomenology, because it is first and foremost part of Christian ethics (De Lange 2015b:31). In terms of phenomenology, however, it is possible to understand it as “the appropriate response to the gift of life” (De Lange 2015b:31). He argues that when somebody loves their life and loves to live their life, they are in essence loving God who serves as the source from which all love comes from (De Lange 2015b:30). De Lange (2012) finds a connection with the ethics of care in his understanding of love that can be accepted as a “moral anthropology” (De Lange 2012) and says that the ethics of care develops the same kind of moral anthropology (De Lange 2012). The love of God is more than simply the love of humans; it is the love that all love comes from (De Lange 2015b:30). The second part of the love commandment, therefore, “relates to the first as a fish relates to the water” (De Lange 2015b:30).

De Lange (2015b:38), when he speaks about the second part of the Love Commandment, explains that the conjunction “as” has not gone without contention in the translation and interpretation of this text. He says that some, like Emanuel Levinas, chose to translate the Love Commandment in terms of the virtual denial of self-love thereby saying: ‘Love your neighbour, it is yourself’ (De Lange 2015b:38). This means that the self-love is determined by how much love is given unto the other. Others, like Immanuel Kant, choose to exploit self-love to say: ‘Love your neighbour just as much
as you love yourself” (De Lange 2015b:38). He suggests, however, that the Love Commandment be read as “Love your neighbor as another self. Love yourself as another neighbor” (De Lange 2015b:38). He therefore believes that self-love plays an important role in the Love Commandment wherein the self becomes both a “model and a mirror” (De Lange 2012) as a guideline to love others (De Lange 2012).

The command of the Love Commandment runs from God into human beings. God cares for humans, therefore humans ought to care for themselves (De Lange 2015b:39). De Lange (2015b:40) quotes Augustine in saying: “We love ourselves and others “in God”” (De Lange 2015b:40). To love the self is crucially important. In fact, says De Lange (2015b:81), “it is not only justified, but, in our reading of the love imperative, a divine command: we must love ourselves” (De Lange 2015b:81). He goes as far as to say that loving the self in the same way as God loves the self forms part of religious worship (De Lange 2015b:81). He explains that there is a difference between self-love and self-indulgence, wherein the last-mentioned develops out of “narcissistic egoism” (De Lange 2015b:31-32) and the first-mentioned out of the worth that humans have for God (De Lange 2015b:32). He believes that self-love is not only something that is morally allowed, but that it is a requirement in Christianity. De Lange (2015b:39) mentions four characteristics of love, whether it be for the self or for the other, it does not matter. The first characteristic of love for a person is that it is a “disinterested concern for the well-being or flourishing of the beloved person” (De Lange 2015b:39). This means that love does not have any bad intentions. It is something that seeks the wellbeing of all people (De Lange 2013:39). The second

285 Grey (1995:28) is critical of any notion that expects or even idealises the “self-denying basis of human love” (Grey 1995:28) or the “encouragement of the sacrifice of the self” (Grey 1995:28) or even the “subtle denigrating of pleasure and the extolling of pain” (Grey 1995:28) as a means to become more holy.

286 The flourishing of people is an idea that is not the same for everybody. Nadia Marais, a lecturer at the department of Systematic Theology and Ecclesiology at the Faculty of Theology of Stellenbosch University, recently wrote her doctoral dissertation wherein she discusses the three dominant discourses and three dominant differences of the understanding of human flourishing. Her dissertation is titled Imagining Human Flourishing? A Critical Analysis of Contemporary Soteriological Discourses (2015b).
feature of love for a person is that it is an inescapably personal concern (De Lange 2013:40). This means that love for the self or another is not conditional, but seeks to accept a person as they are (De Lange 2015b:40). The third feature of love for a person is that the person who loves the other identifies themselves with the other (De Lange 2015b:40). The experience of the other is adopted by the self, whether it is good or bad (De Lange 2015b:40). The last feature is that love has restrictions when it comes to the will (De Lange 2015b:40). A person cannot simply decide what they want to love or who they love or similarly what they do not want to love or who they do not want to love (De Lange 2015b:40). Some things are not within the instantaneous control of the mind (De Lange 2015b:40).

Trust and goodness form a very important part of the commandment. De Lange (2015b:32) notes that this love requires a philosophy that is built upon trust. It asks of people to trust others first, instead of taking on the Hobbesian philosophy in which a person should not trust others until there is a reason to trust them (De Lange 2015b:32). He uses Annette Baier’s definition of trust as “the reliance on another’s goodwill” (De Lange 2015b:33). He further explains Baier’s reasoning by saying that the most striking question in ethics is not whether or not the other ought to be trusted, but rather whether the trust for the other that is already present in the subconscious is sensible or not (De Lange 2015b:33). De Lange (2015b:34) writes that human beings have the expectation of others to guard their life if they entrusted it to someone else. At the centre of trust is the notion of goodness (De Lange 2015b:34). The reasoning is, thus, that ethical normativity is fundamentally ontological and not deontological or teleological, for the person who betrays the other’s trust, becomes guilty themselves (De Lange 2015b:34).

De Lange (2015b:34) continues by explaining that when someone puts their trust in someone else, it becomes a one-sided deal where it does not require of the other to respond in a certain way. The only thing to do is to trust in the other person (De Lange 2015b:34).

287 Annette Baier was a feminist philosopher from New Zealand. She was a professor of Philosophy at University of Pittsburgh. She died in 2012.
2015b:34). He states that “life and all that it contains has been given to us ... there is nothing in our life to justify our making a counterdemand upon another person; in view of the fact that we possess nothing which we have not received, we cannot make counterdemands” (De Lange 2015b:34). The idea is that as a person receives something, they affirm that they have received it (De Lange 2015b:34). In the same way, as God is loved by people and people love themselves, so they should also love their neighbour (De Lange 2015b:34). De Lange (2015b:35) explains this by saying that the life received is a life that is driven by love. When a person receives the goodness that is life, they show affirmation by living that life well, and in turn share the affirming life with the other (De Lange 2015b:35). He reasons that the ethical relationship that exists between God, the self, and the other is not a contractual business where something is provided in return for something else that is equal to it, but that it is instead responsive to what has been received, in other words a sharing with the other in the same amount that it has been received (De Lange 2015b:35). The amount of self-love that has been received through God’s love is shared in the same amount unto the other.

Love for the self becomes something that serves as a model for how to love other people (De Lange 2012). It is, however, merely a model. De Lange (2012) states that the other receives priority in the command to love. The good of the self ought not to be the reason for loving the other; instead, the need of the other should be addressed as an end in itself (De Lange 2012). There should not be any sign of self-interest or exploitation when it comes to loving the other, in other words, the self should not love

288 De Lange (2015b:109) writes: “In the ethics of love, love for the other has moral priority. Though we cannot love the other without loving ourselves, self-love functions as a stepping-stone toward the main concern: seeking to promote the neighbor’s good for her sake. Love aims at the other’s well-being, best understood as her enjoyment of the best for her as person” (De Lange 2015b:109). He explains that love for the other is, however, not an unconditional sacrifice of the self for the other, but rather a “communion of the self and the other, a relationship of giving and receiving” (De Lange 2015b:109).

289 When it comes to a model or metaphor of God’s love, Vanhoozer (2001:16) writes that there is “no one metaphor” (Vanhoozer 2001:16) that can completely grasp God’s love. There exist numerous examples of how God has shown his love in relationship with the world and human beings, but there is not a concrete or specific model that is able to combine the full value of God’s love.
another in order to gain anything in return. The biblical narrative of the Good Samaritan as an example may clarify this.

The narrative of the Good Samaritan displays something of the “fundamental relatoriality of dignity” (De Lange 2013:20). It is a narrative of care that is contradictory to the individualistic views that is often found in the works of Stoics such as Kant and Habermas (De Lange 2013:20). The reasoning is, thus, a move away from the self toward the other. The Samaritan did not help the man on the ground in order to contribute to his own well-being, he helped the man because he was a victim and needed help (De Lange 2015b:41). De Lange (2013:20) explains that the care that the Samaritan provides to the victim is not provided on account of “his own altruistic or heroic moral characteristics, but because, taken up in the flow of the relationship of care, he cannot do otherwise” (De Lange 2013:20-21). Just like the Samaritan did not seek his own wellbeing in helping the man on the ground, the need of the other should not be addressed for selfish gain. This does not mean, however, that the self is not important; on the contrary, the Love Commandment requires that the self and the other are loved in equal measure (De Lange 2015b:41). The measure by which the self is loved, should guide the self in loving others. At the same time, the self ought to be loved as a human being created in God's image and one who is loved by God.

Sullivan-Dunbar (2009:40) also argues that the narrative of the Good Samaritan can be of great assistance in the understanding of Christian love and how it calls for inclusivity and care of all human beings. She believes that the interpretation of this narrative lends itself to the notion that people ought not to be excluded from the “circle of concern” (Sullivan-Dunbar 2009:40), even if a person happened to be an enemy or a stranger.

De Lange has written extensively on the theme of Individualism. In his book Individualisme. Een Partijdig Onderzoek naar Een Omstreden Denkwijze (1989), he wrote on, among other things, individualism in the (post)modern society. In 1993, he wrote Ieder Voor Zich? Individualisering, Ethiek en Christelijk Geloof, a book that seeks to address the theme of individualism, what it entails, what it means for individuals, how it is seen within the Christian tradition, and what its impact is on the Christian church and the general society. In one of his more recent works, De Lange (2007:275) calls for a shift in the human reality whereby “liberal individuality” (De Lange 2007:175), that seems to have become the norm in society, be replaced with a “more communitarian orientated, relational anthropology” (De Lange 2007:275).

This is a definite point of contact with regards to the work of Gilligan, who also stresses the importance of taking care of the self and not merely selflessly loving or caring for the other.
De Lange (2015b:41) says that if there is not self-love and caring for the worth that is inherent in the self, there will not be true neighbourly love. De Lange (2013:21) furthermore argues with Ricoeur that “the other is as myself and I am as the other in the fragility we share” (De Lange 2013:21). There exists a mutual need for each other, especially in times of sorrow, abandonment, loneliness, and death (De Lange 2013:21). Caring for someone else, De Lange (2013:24) writes, is something that asserts the self-esteem of a person for it recognises that a person has the inherent freedom to care for the other (De Lange 2013:24). He then quotes Ricoeur: “This exchange authorizes to say that I cannot estimate myself without estimating the other as myself” (De Lange 2013:24). De Lange (2015a), during a public lecture on compassion, explained that in order for a person to be moved to a place of compassion for others, “entails that one is willing to run the risk of being changed into another person by participating in someone else’s distress” (De Lange 2015a). When a person cares for another in an unplanned manner, there is an immediate affirmation of the dignity of the person who is cared for, but also of the person who is caring for that person (De Lange 2013:24).

The outcome of one person caring for another is impossible to determine (De Lange 2012). In the same way, the outcome of one person loving another is impossible to determine. This is also due to the fact that there is not one standard way to love

293 Paul Ricoeur was a twentieth century French Philosopher at the Divinity School at the University of Chicago. He wrote on, among other things, phenomenological hermeneutics. He died in 2005.

294 More can be read about this in: Ricoeur, P., 1995. Oneself as Another. Chicago: University of Chicago Press

295 This conference was a joint conference in at Stellenbosch University in South Africa and the Protestant Theological University in the Netherlands. The theme of the conference was: Compassion? Global Ethics, Human Dignity and the Compassionate God. It was held from 6-8 March 2015 at the Faculty of Theology in Stellenbosch, South Africa.

296 De Lange (2015a) explains that when a person is moved with compassion, they are forever changed. Even if that person refuses act to on their feeling of compassion, they will be forever altered by their feeling of compassion (De Lange 2015a).

297 This echoes the notion of Tronto that it would be impossible to determine whether a caring task was done properly if it was not relational.
another. Love can be portrayed in various forms, whether it be through attachment, attraction, or compassion (De Lange 2015b:47-48). De Lange (2015b:49) argues that even when all of these emotions of love are removed, love can still happen out of a sense of duty\(^\text{298}\). He says that love guides people to be decisive about what to care about and helps people to give complete control to love when it comes to others (De Lange 2015b:52). “By investing ourselves in others, love frees us from ourselves. Love de-centers ourselves” (De Lange 2015b:52). In the same way, compassion de-centers the self. This de-centering, along with dispossession of the self, forms a vital part of having compassion for others (De Lange 2015a).

De Lange (2011a:85) writes that neighbourly love is not something that is completely foreign to humans, but that it is, in fact, intrinsically interwoven into a human’s existence and experiences. The notion that neighbourly love is intrinsically interwoven in a human’s existence and experience is not a strange one. In a book made up of a compilations of influential academic articles called *Altruism and Altruistic Love* (2002), a vast amount of scholars write about altruism, its origins, definitions, practical implications, biological evolution, science, and how it should be understood within the context of religion. It seeks to address the “place of the other in moral experience, especially when the other is in need” (Post, Underwood, Schloss & Hurlbut 2002:3). In altruism\(^\text{299}\), the self no longer only thinks about the worth of the self and no longer only recognise the worth of the other to the extent that it benefit of the self (Post et al 2002:3). In this book, altruistic love is closely related to the notion of care, “which is love in response to the other in need” (Post et al 2002:4). “Care is the form love takes

\(^{298}\) In the same way that De Lange speaks of love out of a sense of duty, Noddings speaks of care out of duty. Noddings, as Bergman (2004:152) explains, acknowledges that there is a moral obligation to care when “natural caring is not enough” (Bergman 2004:152). Bergman (2004:152) quotes Noddings: “Why ... do we recognize an obligation to care? ... In the ethics of care we accept our obligation because we value the relatedness of natural caring... When we care, we must employ reasoning to decide what to do and how best to do it... But reason is not what motivates us. It is feeling with and for the other that motivates us in natural caring. In ethical caring, this feeling is subdued, and so it must be augmented by a feeling for our own ethical selves”.

\(^{299}\) Grey (1995:28) is very critical when it comes to altruism. She wrote: “What is being criticised is the idealising of the sacrifice of the self, the subtle denigrating of pleasure and the extolling of pain as the right way to holiness. There are appalling connections to be made here with the reality and the history of Europe’s wars.” (Grey 1995:28).
when it is attentive to the other in need. Love implies benevolence, care, compassion, and action” (Post et al 2002:4).

When the Love Commandment therefore asks of a person to love their neighbour, it is not an entirely strange or unknown request (De Lange 2011a:85). At the very core, human beings are fashioned upon love and this love is made known through the various relationships through which people relate to one another (De Lange 2011a:85). The Love Commandment is visible in relationships between a husband and his wife, or teachers and their pupils, or care-givers and their patients, or employers and their workers, all in their own unique way, seeking the good of the other (De Lange 2011a:85). This command is therefore already fundamentally part of the way people live throughout their lives and the people they meet.

De Lange (2011a:86) further explains that the key to the transformation of this command is that love not only be restricted to everyone with whom a person has in their own life; it has to go even further. The challenge that is found in this commandment is that it asks of a person to tend to any neighbour that is in need of help, even if that neighbour happened to be an enemy (De Lange 2011a:86). The Love Commandment asks of a person to love their neighbour in spite of whom that neighbour is. It does not have any other specifications as to who and what their neighbour is supposed to be. There is also not any specific instructions as to whom

300 Kittay (2005:444) argues that “caring is a practice that affects both the person receiving the care and those providing it” (Kittay 2005:444) while “the ethics of caregiving pertain to carer and care recipient alike, and caring brings into being (or rests on) a relationship that has crucial cultural and ethical meanings” (Kittay 2005:444).

301 Karl Rahner, who was a German Jesuit priest and a Catholic theologian, wrote in his book The Love of Jesus and the Love of Neighbor (1983) about what exactly neighbourly love entails. He writes: “There is no love for God that is not, in itself, already a love for neighbor; and love for God only comes to its own identity through its fulfillment in a love for neighbor. Only one who loves his or her neighbor can know who God actually is. And only one who ultimately loves God (whether he or she is reflexively aware of this or not is another matter) can manage unconditionally to abandon himself or herself to another person, and make that person the means of his or her own self-assertion” (Rahner 1983:71).

302 Outka (1972:44) wrote that “If one loves God one is not free to decide whether to love the neighbor or not. Love in God thus implies conformity in loving what He does” (Outka, 1972:44). To love God is thus to love the neighbour and to love the neighbour is to love God.
should be excluded when considering the neighbour. In essence, the neighbour is anybody who may need caring assistance and goodwill, regardless of whether that person would be able to repay the provider of care or goodwill (De Lange 2015b:36). The love of the Love Commandment should therefore be extended to anybody who is able to receive such love, in spite of whom they are.

The biblical narrative about the Good Samaritan may again be of assistance to clarify this. De Lange (2010:53) writes that the victim that is attacked and left for dead on the ground was not helped by his own peers in the form of a priest and a Levite, both of whom were considered to be temple worshippers. Instead, he was helped by a Samaritan, who was usually not trusted by his peers, even someone who would generally be regarded as an enemy (De Lange 2010:53). This Samaritan could have passed by, like the priest and the Levite, but he was so moved by the compassion that he felt for the wounded man on the ground, that he could not stop himself from tending to his needs (De Lange 2013:21). The Samaritan’s incapability to ignore the wounded man brings to the fore the ethical ideal of caring (De Lange 2013:21). De Lange (2015:41) explains that true neighbourly love is a love that may require, at times, for a person to give up some of their own good in order for other’s flourishing, but for this “presupposes an authentic selfhood, an I that loves itself as a Thou” (De Lange 2015b:41).

De Lange (2015b:42) warns, however, that if the command to love is interpreted in this way, it may not be in accord with the “radical altruistic interpretation of care” (De Lange 2015b:42). Love is then often perceived as the unconditional attitude wherein the other always comes first, often at the expense of the self (De Lange 2015b:42). He says that this is known as “solaltrism (only-other)” (De Lange 2015b:42) in ethical circles and that it maintains that the other is the most important person, even if it is at the expense of the self. This leads to the self being completely disregarded and is often seen in

303 This can almost be seen as a form of masochism (in the general understanding of the term) where the self enjoys being humiliated or harmed. Klapwijk (1973) wrote a dissertation on Social Masochism and Christian Ethics that looks at Christianity as a form of masochism. Klapwijk (1973:1) wrote: “Evident is ook in de christelijke boodschap en de christelijke beloovende een eigenaardige opvatting van de verhouding lijden-vreugde. Het kruis
situations where women are taking care of others (De Lange 2015b:42). The person who loves their neighbour, should not do so without loving themselves too. It is vitally important that the person who cares also takes care of themselves (De Lange 2015b:42). They have an obligation to do so, not only because they are worthy in the eyes of God, but also because they cannot provide sufficient care if they are not cared for themselves (De Lange 2015b:42).

De Lange (2015b:42) therefore stresses the importance of “human connectedness and interdependence” as a starting point in moral ontology, as is the case with the ethics of care, wherein the good of the self is intrinsically interwoven with the “flourishing of the other” (De Lange 2015b:42). De Lange (2015b:42) is consequently convinced that “radical altruism is not compatible with agape ethics” (De Lange 2015b:42). The love of the Love Commandment is a love that should exist in a “triadic communion” (De Lange 2015b:42) wherein the self, the other, and God are in a relationship where all the participants give and receive (De Lange 2015b:42). “Christian love is a communal event” (De Lange 2015b:42).

An *agape* ethic is, therefore, an ethic that seeks to protect and develop communities among people (De Lange 2015b:43). This *agape* ethic insists on the development and restoration of community, even when people seem to demolish it (De Lange 2015b:43). Augustine, De Lange (2015b:43) says, believed that the love for the self is

is daarvan het op christelijk erf algemeen erkende en aanvaarde symbol: het teken van het diepste lijden èn van de optimale overwinningvreugde, dé zaligheid”. Masochism in this sense and in the context of care can therefore be the selfless act of caring so much for the other that the self is harmed in the process.

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304 Koopman (2004:198) opts for the use of the word “dependence” rather than using the term “interdependence”, especially when it comes to feminism and feminist theology. He argues that “interdependence” may “inhibit a positive view of the notion of dependence since it subtly carries the idea of independence with regards to many, or even most aspects and dependence with regard to a few other aspects” (Koopman 2004:198). He argues that it may be valuable to place an emphasis on dependence, for it may have a more liberating effect of the thinking of especially men, who have spent their lives hearing how they ought to be independent (Koopman 2004:198).

305 Marais (2015:721) writes: “Love is how I relate to God, others, myself and the world in which I live. Love is to risk trust and commitment. Love means creating space for another in which she can flourish, while at the same time she does this for me. This is love that is mutual – my desire for the well-being of the other is related to his desire for my well-being. Her fulfilment is my fulfilment”.
a pure love that seeks the good of the self from within the triadic communion with God and the other without being selfish or self-absorbed. De Lange (2007:289), writing on the other and the self as understood by Kierkegaard, says: “Grounded in God… we have a ‘double existence’. In our finiteness we experience the eternity; in our engaging with the Other, we discover our Selves” (De Lange 2007:289). He continues to explain that every human being has a choice as to how he or she wants to live their life. He then concludes by saying that everyone has “one basic choice” to make: “The choice whether you want to invest your finite self in the concrete life with the Other and others – or not” (De Lange 2007:293).

Christians in this triadic relationship also do not seek to harm themselves (De Lange 2015b:43). Augustine distinguished between three different understandings of self-love306; the first meaning is that self-love is “natural and morally neutral” (De Lange 2015b:43). This means that it is a love of the self that egoistically has the protection and flourishing of the self in mind (De Lange 2015b:43). The second meaning of self-love is one that is considered to be “morally wrong” (De Lange 2015b:43); in other words, it is a self-love driven by the need to be independent, self-assertive, and the “pride of sin” (De Lange 2015b:43). It is a self-love that goes against God (De Lange 2015b:43). The last way to understand self-love is in terms of the triadic communion with God and the other (De Lange 2015b:43).

This understanding of self-love, according to De Lange (2015b:43), can be defended on religious and moral grounds. He argues that the other has a moral priority when it comes to Christian love, but that both the self and the other stands equally under the

306 Hannah Arendt, who was a German-born American political theorist, wrote in her book Love and Saint Augustine (1996) about Augustine’s understanding of self-love. She explained his understanding of self-love as follows: “To love God means to love oneself well, and the criterion is not God but the self, namely the self who will be eternal” (Arendt 1996:30). She then quotes Augustine: “He who knows how to love himself, loves God; but he who does not love God, even though he loves himself as nature binds him, is better said to hate himself since he acts in a way to be his own adversary” (Arendt 1996:30). She explained that “the love of God is the love of the self that will be (the immoral self) and the hatred of the self that is (the mortal self)” (Arendt 1996:30). Arendt (1996:42) explained that the order in which the self ought to love the self and to love the neighbour is beside each other, in other words, it ought to be equal in the triadic relationship between God, the self and the other. “He occupies this place because he is like myself” (Arendt 1996:42).
grace of God, who lives in communion with people (De Lange 2015b:44). De Lange (2015b:44) quotes Kierkegaard: “… if Christian neighbor love is primarily giving, it is secondarily yet essentially receiving … Love is, or at least it should be, contagious; it is a willingness to affirm others in their growth and well-being and then a willingness to accept gratefully the response which such love calls for. Love brings the other out of egocentricity and transforms him or her into a loving being” (De Lange 2015b:44).

When love is viewed as a triadic relationship between God, the self, and the other, it becomes clear that the Love Commandment can be of assistance in determining the way in which people have to live their lives. Love, as part of a triadic communion with God, the self, and the other paves a way to a more just society in which people care for one another. Love, however, is a broad term which includes a different kinds of love which asks to be more closely reflected upon.

4.1.1 Different Kinds of Love

Love, De Lange (2015b:46) argues, has a complex structure. He says that the ethical problem is not found in human beings’ inability to love, but rather in their ability to love “too much and in the wrong ways” (De Lange 2015b:46). This love, consequently, needs to be trained and developed in order to be directed toward that which is good for the self and for the other (De Lange 2015b:47). De Lange (2015b:47), then, introduces four different kinds of love; “Love as attachment” (De Lange 2015b:47), “love as attraction” (De Lange 2015b:48), “love as compassion” (De Lange 2015b:48), and “love out of duty” (De Lange 2015b:49).

307"To love too much in the wrong ways” is what Augustine defined as sin (De Lange 2015b:46).

308The first three kinds of love were originally identified by Robert C Roberts, while De Lange (2015b:49) added the fourth kind of love. Nygren distinguished between two kinds of love: agape and eros. He also wrote a book with the title: Agape and Eros which was a Christian study of the two different kinds of love. Nygren believed that agape is “spontaneous, unmotivated, indifferent to value, creative, and an initiator of fellowship with everyone, even our enemies” (Simon 1997:79) while eros is “desire, egocentric love, for which man occupies the dominant position as both starting-point and goal… Even in its loftiest form eros retains the egocentric trait” (Nygren 1953:235-236).
The first kind of love has to do with attachment and is generally seen in the form of the love that parents display toward their children, for instance (De Lange 2015b:47). This attachment ought to develop and grow stronger and it is fundamentally something that seeks for the good of someone (De Lange 2015b:48). With this attachment comes an inevitable amount of emotions, which includes both positive and negative emotions\(^{309}\) (De Lange 2015b:48).

The second kind of love has to do with erotic love between people, in which attraction stand central (De Lange 2015b:48). De Lange (2015b:48) explains that the emotions of this kind of love include satisfaction, pleasure, and hopefulness. It is a kind of love that wants the good for someone because they are thought of in terms of being objects of love (De Lange 2015b:48).

The third kind of love, love as compassion, can also be understood in terms of notions like thankfulness, generosity, grace, fondness, or sympathy (De Lange 2015b:48). “Compassion is concern extended to someone who is in distress or suffering some significant deficiency” (De Lange 2015b:48). It is concerned with the wellbeing of others and what happens to them (De Lange 2015b:49). The benevolence felt in love as compassion is not restricted to individuals who are known to a person, but stretches further, like in the case of the Good Samaritan\(^{310}\), to any individual who is in need of assistance (2015b:49).

The fourth and last kind of love that is identified is love out of duty and is a love that is not necessarily a love that has anything to do with an emotion (De Lange 2015b:49).

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\(^{309}\)De Lange (2015b:48) uses the example of a negative emotion in saying that parents may become angry, or disappointed, or scared about their children. At the same time they may also be proud, or delighted by their children (De Lange 2015b:48). These are some of the emotions that may be present in love as attachment.

\(^{310}\)Sullivan-Dunbar (2009:54-55) strikingly explains that the narrative of the Good Samaritan acts as a reminder that all people are equally entitled to “the compassionate, perceptive, responsive, and extravagant care” (Sullivan-Dunbar 2009:54) that is needed in order to survive. When someone posits such care into the other, the other becomes the equal that they inherently are (Sullivan-Dunbar 2009:55). She says that the parable further creates an awareness that all are deserving of such care (Sullivan-Dunbar 2009:55). “We may say that in Christian terms, we are all “some mother’s child,” but the parent whose extravagant love demands we provide care is God” (Sullivan-Dunbar 2009:55).
De Lange (2015b:49) explains that this is the only kind of love that was acceptable as true Christian love for both Kierkegaard and Kant. While the other three kinds of love all have the ability to be motivated by favouritism, this love is the one that goes beyond favouritism to what is expected of a person in the love commandment – to love all people in the world, including strangers and enemies, without favouring some or averting others (De Lange 2015b:49). This kind of love is a love of “unconditional obedience” (De Lange 2015b:49).

De Lange (2015b:49) mentions that he agrees with Wolterstorff that all of these kinds of love should be welcomed and accepted as long as it is concerned with the wellbeing and the good of every human being. He explains that emotions should never get in the way of making the best decision for the other and that love as duty should always be kept in mind as a back-up plan for when emotions interfere in promoting the good for others (De Lange 2015b:50). In cases where a person’s love happens to be restricted to only those who are within the realm of their own comfort, the love commandment becomes a true command to love the other out of a sense of duty, in spite of the fact that there is no other motivation to love them (De Lange 2015b:50).

De Lange (2015b:50) argues that self-love can again be of assistance to a person in order for them to love another: “We are to love the other out of duty, just as we are to love ourselves out of duty” (De Lange 2015b:50). Thereby also implicating that the self ought to care for the self, even when the self has lost a natural disposition to care for the self (De Lange 2015b:50). It is from this position that the self ought to love the other.

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311 Søren Kierkegaard wrote a very influential book on love that was originally published in 1847 as *Works of Love*. Kierkegaard saw love as being a central concept in human life. It not only binds people to one another, but also binds people with God. He made it clear that his writings in this book were “Christian reflections; therefore they are not about love, but about the works of love” (Kierkegaard 2009:xxvii). For Kierkegaard there existed mainly two forms of love: Love and erotic love (Pattison 2009:xi). These two kinds of love were roughly seen as “the love that Christians were commanded to practice... and the spontaneous love that lovers, parents, children, and friends feel for each other” (Pattison 2009:xi). This way of reading and understanding of Kierkegaard’s work was also echoed by the Swedish Theologian Anders Nygren who also distinguished between two main forms of love known as *agape* and *eros* (Pattison, 2009:xi). Kierkegaard believed that the command to love or “Christian love” (Pattison, 2009:xii) gives “security and constancy” (Pattison, 2009:xii) to *eros* love that is a more spontaneous love. “Commanded love is there to support and nurture what is best in such natural love, not to uproot or destroy it” (Pattison, 2009:xiii). For Kierkegaard, Christian love, the command to love, was the duty of every person and assisted every person in their spontaneous love for others.
other out of duty. De Lange reasons that “love overtakes and overrules” (2015b:52) all people, whether it be out of a sense of duty or out of attachment, or attraction, or compassion.

Love does not, however, go against the will of people, “on the contrary, the constraint operates from within our own will itself” (De Lange 2015:52). De Lange (2015:52) clarifies this by saying that people may have to decide how they will attempt to love the other in the best possible way, but that all people are free from the deciding who they ought to love, because it is already clear that all people should be loved (De Lange 2015b:52). In light of this discussion, it becomes clear that different kinds of love exist; sometimes love happens because of attraction. Sometimes it happens because of attachment. Sometimes a person is driven to love another person because they are inherently moved by compassion to do so. If love does not occur through any of these methods, a person has a duty to love another, because they love themselves and God. One of the challenges of these different kinds of love, however, is to determine how a person knows that that which they do out of love is good love and not something that is done from an egoistic or paternalistic position.

### 4.1.2 When can Love be seen as Good Love?

When a person loves themselves or someone else, it is important to consider whether the love is good love or not. De Lange (2015b:52), in an attempt to address this challenge, starts off by distinguishing between an autonomous or individualistic approach to love, and a caring relationship approach to love. When it comes to an ethic that is individualistic in its approach, the decision about what is good is left to the self to decide (De Lange 2015b:52). When others come into this relationship, each person’s understanding of the good is inherent in their own autonomy (De Lange 2015b:52). De Lange (2015b:52) argues that this approach can work, but only in situations where everybody lives as an “independent citizen” (De Lange 2015b:52).

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Another ethical approach is an approach based on a caring relationship wherein everyone seeks to find similarities in another person’s understanding of what the good entails and then strives to respect and promote it (De Lange 2015b:53). It is impossible to ignore the mutual understanding of what is good when people are in a caring relationship (De Lange 2015b:53). De Lange (2015b:53) therefore argues that the way in which the good is interpreted is decided based on the ethics that a person believes in. He, too, warns against paternalism in any relationship (De Lange 2015b:53). He explains that if a person chooses to isolate themselves, but is forced into an active lifestyle, that they will become a victim of paternalism (De Lange 2015b:53). There are, however, cases, De Lange (2015b:55) claims, where paternalism sometimes becomes unavoidable. Sometimes a person may have lost the ability to love themselves and may wish bad things on themselves, because they despise themselves (De Lange 2015b:54-55). It is at this point where an autonomous approach is insufficient and a care approach needs to be supported (De Lange 2015b:55). De Lange (2015b:55) argues that the love commandment urges a person from the perspective of self-love to address issues like these. He says that when all motive has failed to love the self, there is still a duty to love the self and that this duty, to some extent, can sometimes justify paternalism (De Lange 2015b:55). There is no way in which someone can ever be forced into loving themselves, but the love for the other refuses to give up on looking for alternative ways, doing so with patience, kindness, and the necessary sensitivity in order to guide someone into discovering love toward themselves (De Lange 2015b:55). It is, however, crucial to make sure whether a situation calls for paternalism or whether it may be a case of the self projecting certain fears or reading some form of self-destruction into a situation where it is not at all the case. A genuine concern for the other, thorough reflection, and great sensitivity is needed before a person chooses a paternalistic approach as a form of loving the other.

313 Simon (1997:74) wrote that the love for the neighbour “involves seeing someone as having a destiny even when there is little overt evidence that this is so” (Simon 1997:74).
De Lange (2015b:55-56) reasons that the only way to determine what the good is for another person is to be in a mutual relationship with them, so that both the person receiving the care and the person providing the care’s understanding of good can be protected. When he is faced with the decision to choose between an individual, autonomous approach with regard to the good, or a relationship of care approach to the good, De Lange (2015b:58) chooses to combine the two approaches. He calls for the respect of autonomy within care relationships wherein the other’s love for life can be promoted (De Lange 2015b:58). He believes that the people who provide care should also be able to adjust according to the demands and requests voiced by the person receiving the care (De Lange 2015b:58). A relationship of care approach is therefore a process and not simply a momentary occasion that passes by when the initial need has been taken care of.

De Lange (2015b:58-59) again affirms his belief that “the command to love does not contain an altruistic selfless ethics” (De Lange 2015b:59), but at the same time creates space for autonomy in relationships of love. He says that there is ultimately not a specific way in which to determine what exactly the good is and that it essentially involves a lot of guesswork and speculation (De Lange 2015b:59). This should, however, always be done with the necessary sensitivity and wisdom. It should not simply be something which is decided upon based on the easiest approach or the most convenient approach to the one caring. It should always be a process of careful reflection and attentive listening between the people involved to seek the best in every situation. At the end of the day, “to know what makes up one’s flourishing is – theologically speaking – an eschatological notion” (De Lange 2015b:59).

It is, however, not possible to wait forever, and therefore people are left to make the best decision as they see fit (De Lange 2015b:59). Consequently, De Lange (2015b:59) believes that a love ethic is not governed by principles of autonomy or paternalism, but that there is a constant movement and adjustment that seeks to understand exactly what the good is in every situation.
In this section the Love Commandment, the different kinds of love, and the challenges of love have been discussed. The following section will aim to determine whether the ethics of care, based in the command to love as seen in the Love Commandment, can contribute to the development of a theological ethics of care.

4.2 The Theology of Love Meeting Care

In the second chapter of this dissertation, the focus was primarily on the development of the ethics of care as a response to the ethics of justice. This was done by showing a detailed account of the development from one of the leading scholars in the field of the ethics of care, Carol Gilligan. Gilligan’s focus on feminist ethics succeeded in bringing focus to a relational approach to morality when, especially in her own context, the view on morality seemed to be predominantly focused on autonomy and individuality within a patriarchal system. By listening to the voices of women during numerous empirical studies, Gilligan heard a different voices that was often silenced by the voice of autonomy and individuality. She refused to accept that the “different voice” should be regarded as less moral because of its relational approach as opposed to the autonomous and individualistic voice often present in the ethics of justice.

By developing the ethics of care as an ethical theory equal to that of the ethics of justice, Gilligan placed an emphasis on relationality and love. It is at especially this point, that a theological ethics of care finds a point of contact with the ethics of care. Gilligan, in developing the ethics of care as a relational theory that regards love as a central concept for its existence, laid the basis for a mutual conversation between the ethics of care and a theological ethics of care. It was the way in which people showed their ability to love that Gilligan realised their potential to care. It is from this very point...

314 Mary C Grey (1995:26) is also critical of an “individualistic notion of the self” (Grey 1995:26) that has become the norm of what it means to be human in the context of Europe. She calls individualism that is excessive “the Logos myth of false consciousness” (Grey 1995:26-27) and explains that this excessive individualism can be dangerous in both private and public spheres (Grey 1995:27).

315 Grey (1995:27) explains that feminist theology, instead of separating the self from the other, tries to focus on relationality, the connections between people, and the reality of vulnerability that is shared among people. It is within these relationships that people experience and develop their own “personhood” (Grey 1995:27).
foundation that a theological ethics of care is introduced by De Lange who argues that the Love Commandment can serve as the source of a theological understanding of the ethics of care.

De Lange (2014:158) explains that there is a healthy connection between the ethics of care and a theology of love. A theology of love can be as seen as part of the agapistic tradition (De Lange 2014:158). The theology of love, therefore, has to do with the triadic communion of God, the self, and the other found in the Love Commandment. From this position, he starts to develop a theological ethics of care that seeks to combine the ethics of care and the theology of love316 (De Lange 2014:158). This theology would have its beginning and its end in care, with care based in love being the centre of this theology (De Lange 2014:158). When he speaks of the ethics of care, he claims that it should be seen as something that is more than simply an applied ethics of care generally thought of as something that has to do with health care (De Lange 2014:158). This kind of ethics is something that has the potential to be far greater than the boundaries that is sometimes ascribed to it.

The ethics of care is, therefore, a completely new way of “doing ethics” (De Lange 2014:158) wherein it displays itself as a “fundamental understanding of human life and of living together” (De Lange 2014:158). De Lange (2014:158) joins the voices of people like Carol Gilligan and Joan Tronto, amongst others, when he argues that the ethics of care begs for the understanding that care is the most important part of human life (De Lange 2014:158). Every person is born in need of care and need care throughout their lives at different times. Without care, nobody would be able to mature as human beings. No one is born autonomous and independent. Care is furthermore needed throughout life and influences life in a dramatic fashion, even when it comes to politics, as Tronto has argued. Care is therefore, as Gilligan, Tronto, and now De Lange, have argued, central to human life. Martin Heidegger, De Lange (2014:158) says, regarded care as something that is an “existential” (De Lange 2014:158) part of

316 The ethics of care and its connection with love is not a strange phenomenon at all – Gilligan has stated numerous times that the ethics of care and love are complementary elements. Gilligan’s belief that the ethics of care and love are complementary have been mentioned multiple times in this dissertation.
what it means to be a human being. He then fittingly quotes Leonardo Boff\textsuperscript{317}: “We do not have care. We are care” (De Lange 2014:158).

According to him, a theological ethics of care rooted in a theology of love could therefore learn from the ethics of care that was developed by scholars like Gilligan and Tronto in recent decades (De Lange 2014:159). De Lange (2014:159) stresses again, along with other scholars of the ethics of care, that the ethics of care’s understanding of care is not something that it restricted to within the boundaries of the health care sector. It goes further than that. It is about the entire wellbeing of human being. It is care that makes humans human\textsuperscript{318}, argues De Lange (2014:159), not things like work or rationality. This does not, however, mean that there is no place for care in work or rationality. In fact, Joan Tronto (2013:84) argues that a work ethic on its own, for instance, is not enough and care should be incorporated into the work environment in order to address a work ethics that is “deeply gendered” (Tronto 2013:84). By recognising the importance and centrality of care to human beings’ lives therefore plays an important role in various spheres of life.

De Lange (2014:159) also understands care to be something that is both a way of being and a way of acting. This is usually followed by the acceptance of responsibility\textsuperscript{319} in order to get the process of caring started (De Lange 2014:159). When he argues for an acceptance of responsibility, he echoes what is crucially important to scholars like Gilligan and Tronto who have both shown, in their own thinking, the importance of accepting care responsibilities in various spheres of life. The process of creating a society that it both caring and just can only start once people

\textsuperscript{317} Leonardo Boff is a Brazilian theologian who specialises in the field of Liberation Theology. He is also concerned with theology and ecology. He is an emeritus Professor at Rio de Janeiro State University.

\textsuperscript{318} De Lange (2014:159) argues for an understanding of \textit{cura ego sum} – I care, therefore I am. Even more personal, he argues, “because every human being is a mother’s child: I am being cared for, therefore I am.” (De Lange 2014:159).

\textsuperscript{319} Kretzschmar (2009:31), in writing about the formation of moral communities, stresses the importance of responsibility. She says that “the word ‘responsibility’ implies our ‘response-ability’, our willingness to respond to others” (Kretzschmar 2009:31). She regards this as a characteristic that is true to the character of Jesus and serves as a commitment that a person makes to adhere to their promises (Kretzschmar 2009:31).
recognise that they have a responsibility to care and then accept that responsibility and incorporate it into their lifestyle, thinking, and acting.

In seeking to develop a theological ethics of care, De Lange (2014:159) again uses the work of Boff, who regards care as something that is ever-present in the lives of humans and who believes that people will never end their caring towards others. Boff’s understanding of care, whether it is based in the ethics of care or the theology of care, is as follows: “To care is at the very root of the human being; it is there before anyone does anything. And if someone does do anything it is always accompanied by, and permeated with, a caring attitude” (De Lange 2014:159).

De Lange (2014:158) believes that theology can be enriched by a view that starts with the understanding of care being the centre of “human life in relationship with God” (De Lange 2014:158), especially when it comes to God’s relation to the world (De Lange 2014:158). Care, in a theological context, is even greater than the understanding of being central to human life, as initially suggested by both Gilligan and Tronto. Care surpasses the boundaries of humanity when it is understood within a theological context. It becomes something which also includes a relationship with the divine God of love who can be regarded as the source from which all care comes from. With the help of the Heidelberg Catechism, De Lange (2015:159) encounters a God that has a caring nature and a God that is in a caring relationship of reciprocated care.

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320 Boff continues to ask: “What kind of image of the human being do we project when we discover the human being as a being-in-the-world-with-others always in relation, building his habitat, occupied with things, concerned with people, willing to suffer with and be happy with those to whom he feels united and whom he loves? The most adequate answer to this question will be: the human being is a being that takes care; moreover, his essence is found in caring. To have an attitude of care towards all he plans and does is the essential characteristic of the human being” (De Lange 2014:160).

321 The Heidelberg Catechism is one of the three forms of unity in the Dutch Reformed faith orientation. It is a confessional document that consists of various questions and answers which helps with the teachings of Dutch Reformed Christian doctrine. The document was written in 1563 in Heidelberg, Germany. Frits de Lange delivered his paper on the Heidelberg Catechism and a theological ethics of care at the 450 year celebration of the document, at Stellenbosch University in South Africa in 2013. It was published in 2014 in a theological journal called Acta Theologica.
4.2.1 Moving Closer to a Theological Ethics of Care that Resists Injustice?

It has been shown through Gilligan’s studies with women that equality is an important issue that needs to be addressed in a society that is still being dominated by patriarchal structures. From a psychological point of view, Gilligan (2011:33) explains that “there is an inherent tension between…human nature and the structures of patriarchy, leading the healthy psyche to resist an initiation that mandates a loss of voice and a sacrifice of relationship” (Gilligan 2011:33). Gilligan, in developing the ethics of care, therefore encouraged especially girls and women to use their ‘different voice’ to stand up to patriarchal structures. In this way, they would be able to resist the injustices brought about by patriarchy. She further explained that love is crucial when it comes to resisting injustice, especially in a democratic society. She writes that “[P]atriarchy is antithetical to democracy, but it is also in tension with love” (Gilligan 2013:44). For her, therefore, love plays a crucial part in the ethics of care, especially considering that love actively resists injustice.

In chapter three it was shown how Tronto built on the ethics of care that Gilligan had developed. She placed further emphasis on the political power of the ethics of care. If the care responsibilities, which the ethics of care call for, were to be accepted by every citizen, it would be possible to create not only a more caring democracy, but also a democracy that is more just. Care, as was shown by Tronto, should not be something that is gendered. Care is not something that should be restricted to the private sphere where it often becomes the sole responsibility of women. Class and race should also not have an influence on whose responsibility it is to care. The ethics of care calls for everybody to take up their care responsibilities. Everybody has the capability to care, because everybody are themselves dependent human beings at various stages of life. Tronto’s appeal when it comes to the ethics of care and caring responsibilities are clear: Nobody should get a pass out of caring and everybody should accept their care responsibilities, whether it be at home, at work, or in the greater society. It is further important to remember that no one should have to choose between rationality and emotion, or care and justice. These two orientations can and should function together.
to resist the injustices brought about by a patriarchal society and to create truly
democratic societies.

De Lange (2014:161) uses the Heidelberg Catechism to assist him in searching for
theology of care that resists injustice. He notes that the Heidelberg Catechism speaks
of caring in various ways, even though it may be limited\(^{322}\) (De Lange 2014:161). He
distinguishes between at least three such occasions: The first is where God is
regarded as a “mothering” God who cares (De Lange 2014:161). The second is where
it describes humans as “having care as their essence and divine vocation” (De Lange
2014:161), and lastly, where it describes the relationship between humans and God
starts off by discussing the relationship that exists between God and humans in the
framework of a theological ethics of care. He argues that a theological ethics of care,
as in the case with the ethics of care suggested by scholars such as Gilligan and
Tronto, regards humans as intrinsically relational (De Lange 2014:161).

In the same way that Gilligan often experienced care to be portrayed as being
underappreciated in a context where autonomy and individuality reigns supreme, De
Lange (2014:161) explains that the relational view of care in a theological context is
countered by the view of the Enlightenment wherein autonomy and individuality was
sought after at the expense of relationships (De Lange 2014:161). He draws on
Noddings, who says that people are not naturally alone, but rather naturally in relation
with other who provides sustenance and direction\(^{323}\). He goes further by criticising
Eberhard Busch’s\(^{324}\) notion that the heart of the Heidelberg Catechism is anthropology

\(^{322}\)De Lange (2014:161) believes that the Heidelberg Catechism is reserved in its inclusion of care, because it is
unable to provide a full account of the relationship between God and humans (De Lange 2014:161).

\(^{323}\)Noddings (1984:51) wrote: “When I am alone, either because I have detached myself or because circumstance
have wrenched me free, I seek first and most naturally to re-establish my relatedness. My very individuality is
defined in a set of relations. This is my basic reality”.

\(^{324}\)Eberhard Busch is a German Theologian who worked closely with Karl Barth. He is an Emeritus Professor of
Reformed Theology at the University of Göttingen. He wrote a book on the Heidelberg Catechism with the title
*Drawn to Freedom. Christian Faith Today in Conversation with the Heidelberg Catechism* that was published in
2010.
and instead suggests that the main concern of the Heidelberg Catechism is relationality (De Lange 2014:162). From the beginning, human beings are seen as those belonging to Jesus Christ, but not as a possession, but rather as children who belong to a parent or a “beloved to his or her lover” (De Lange 2014:162). De Lange (2014:162), therefore, argues that the Heidelberg Catechism supports a “relational ontology” (De Lange 2014:162).

A relationship of care is one that is a constant process that presents itself as being open and dynamic (De Lange 2014:162). It is a relationship that seeks to promote the good of the other325 (De Lange 2014:162). At the same time, a relationship of care is also one that has to endure both adversity and elation (De Lange 2014:162). This is also how the relationship between God and his people is portrayed (De Lange 2014:162). De Lange (2014:162) explains that salvation, as depicted in the majesty of God, has as its goal that human beings and God can live in a mutually loving relationship. He reasons that the ultimate goal of salvation is therefore to dwell “together in freedom and mutuality of Lover and Beloved” (De Lange 2014:162). God cares for humans, and even though he cares for all of his children, he still has an intimate relationship with everyone personally (De Lange 2014:162). He is a father to everyone, but also a father to every specific human being (De Lange 2014:162). A person, as an individual, is cared for by God and is special to God (De Lange 2014:162).

Like in the case with the ethics of care as it was developed by Gilligan, the Heidelberg Catechism also places an emphasis on emotions in the relationship between humans and God (De Lange 2014:162-163). It also recognises the needs and finite nature of a human body, similar to the way in which the ethics of care does (De Lange 2014:163). The human body is, therefore, acknowledged as one that is in need of care

325 Kretzschmar (2009:38), in writing about ethical action, argues that if people who regard themselves as Christians really loved their neighbours, they would be willing to join in the “resistance of individuals and communities to crime, corruption, graft, incompetence and indifference asserting, in their place, righteousness, fairness, honesty, competence, and compassionate engagement” (Kretzschmar 2009:38). By becoming more Christ-like in life, will help to bring about a good life for all people (Kretzschmar 2009:38).
De Lange (2014:163) thus argues that a theological ethics of care ought to be one that regards itself as “down to earth” (De Lange 2014:163). De Lange (2014:163) also argues that God takes care of all the needs of his children, not only their salvation. The Heidelberg Catechism helps to develop a theological ethics of care in its recognition that human beings have constant needs, whether it is nourishment, housing, health, or affection, similar to the ethics of care (De Lange 2014:163). Tronto is a leading voice when it comes to understanding the ethics of care in this way, as was seen in her assertion that care and care responsibilities be accepted and incorporated into every aspect of human life, whether it be private or public, in order to create a society that is both more caring and more just.

In the ethics of care, the notion of dependency is often talked about. The interpretation of dependency plays an important role in the eventual understanding of the ethics of care. Dependency, as was discussed in the previous chapters by both Gilligan and Tronto, is not something that is regarded as a burden or encumbrance within the framework of the ethics of care. In fact, the ethics of care calls for human beings to recognise and accept their dependence as part of their humanity. All humans are born into dependence and will be dependent on people at various stages of their lives. Koopman (2004:195), in writing about a theological understanding of dependence and vulnerability echoes this idea. He believes that it is crucial for people to realise that as human beings they need each other and God in order to live (Koopman 2004:195). People are relational beings from the very start of their existence. To be a human being, according to Koopman (2004:195), is therefore “to live in relationships of dependence” (Koopman 2004:195).

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326 Eva Feder Kittay (1999:19) explains that all human beings are “some mother’s child” (Kittay 1999:19), thereby implicating that every human being is at some point dependent on another. This idea of being “some mother’s child”, however, is not restricted to a mother per se, but rather refers to someone who is responsible for taking care of the needs of a person in order to survive. Kittay (1999:42) also speaks of a notion called “deprived dependency” whereby the caregiver is burdened by their caring responsibilities to such an extent that it becomes nearly impossible to function in the political or economic spheres of life in order to tend to their own basic needs. She therefore shows something of the moral and the practical demands that come with the dependency (Kittay 1999:49).
Dependence is, therefore, not something that should be denied, but rather embraced as something that is part of what makes a person a human being. It is not something that can be resisted and it is not something that anybody should be ashamed off. The Heidelberg Catechism also accentuates the importance of dependence, especially in a relationship between God and human beings (De Lange 2014:163). De Lange (2014:163) explains that human flourishing, in fact, is dependent on the care that is provided to human beings. When people express that God is their redeemer, they indirectly acknowledge their dependence upon God for justification (De Lange 2014:163). From a Christian point of view, De Lange (2015c:476) explains that “finiteness, dependency, neediness, and the search for meaning are not interpreted as tragic characteristics of the human condition only, but they [sic] embedded within the hopeful story of God’s creation and salvation” (De Lange 2015c:476).

De Lange (2014:163) argues that the relationship that exists between God and human beings can be considered a hierarchical one with God being the one who “redeems and preserves his children” (De Lange 2014:163). The children of God, however, are not merely beings who receive this redemption passively, but rather become human beings with freedom to live as such (De Lange 2014:163). The relationship between God and his children starts off like any other relationship as a relationship between child and their father, wherein the father provides the care and the child receives the care (De Lange 2014:164). God’s justification through Jesus is, therefore, one of the greatest signs of how God cares for his children (De Lange 2014:164). De Lange (2014:164) says that this caring act can be seen as a “sacrifice out of love” (De Lange 2014:164). He argues that the Heidelberg Catechism’s emphases on justice may, thus, be a crucial part of the relationship of care between human being and God (De Lange 2014:164). When justice is included and part of the structure of care, it can never be seen as standing in opposition to care (De Lange 2014:164). From a theological point of view, care and justice ought not to be perceived as polar opposites. In fact, care and justice are both equally important when it comes to relationship between God and human beings.
De Lange (2014:164) quotes the Heidelberg Catechism: “God is indeed merciful, but He is likewise just”. Care is, however, often still regarded as less important. Care that is seen as being inclined towards an emotional perspective that “refuses impartiality” (De Lange 2014:164), from a perspective of justice in terms of rationality, becomes a “spoilsport” (De Lange 2014:164). De Lange (2014:164) argues that care is regarded as an odd component from the perspective of a modern understanding of justice. What tends to happen then is that care and justice stand in opposition to one another and accordingly create a split between the rational and emotional elements and the private and the public spheres (De Lange 2014:164). When a decision has to be made about which one is better, justice is always chosen (De Lange 2014:164).

De Lange (2014:164) quotes Juliana Claassens: “Care” is a nice mother, who only can say to her rebellious children: “Just wait until father gets home”. Justice, from this perspective, becomes the one who brings back the order (De Lange 2014:164). The ethics of care, however, chooses to make care a priority while justice is included as part of the caring process (De Lange 2014:164). This understanding of the ethics of care working together with the ethics of justice is echoed by various other scholars, also in the field of theology. Huber (2015:163) agrees with this sentiment when he argues that “both justice and care for others are elementary determinants of human existence” (Huber 2015:163). The distribution of moral theories should also be careful not to become gendered in a process where justice becomes a male oriented theory and care a female oriented theory. In the ethics of care, this way of distributing moral theories is abandoned (Huber 2015:164). Huber (2015:164) explains that justice, in a care framework, is oriented towards “the generalized other” (Huber 2015:164) while

327 The aim of this dissertation is to question this very idea – is there something in the Love Commandment, regarded as the base for both care and justice, which requires a choice to be made between justice and care?

328 This argument was also made in the second chapter of this dissertation through the work of Tronto. She warns that this is one of the dangers of regarding care and justice as contradictory theories. She suggests that the gap between the private and the public spheres will only be narrowed once justice and care are not seen as contradictory theories, but rather complementary theories.

329 Juliana Claassens is a Professor of Old Testament at Stellenbosch University in South Africa. She specialises in the fields of human dignity and the Old Testament.
care shifts its focus to “the concrete other” (Huber 2015:164). He continues to say that both of these have to do with humans and it would thus be customary to see signs of both justice and care in all people (Huber 2015:164).

De Lange (2014:164) asks that the portrayal of care as something sentimental be set aside and believes that discipline and punishment are fundamentally part of care. He acknowledges the fact that care can be a painful process too (De Lange 2014:165). This is confirmed by the Heidelberg Catechism as seen through God’s mercy as it is perceived in justice or when God’s justice is expressed in mercy (De Lange 2014:165). De Lange (2014:165), when he uses the Heidelberg Catechism as a frame of reference, says that all humans, “created in the image of God” (De Lange 2014:165), embody care within them. With an inbuilt capacity to care, all people have to take care of their needs (De Lange 2014:165). Yet, care is often perceived as something that should be restricted to the private sphere. When this happens, care becomes a gendered concept and the primary concern of women, as Tronto has argued in the previous chapter. When this happen, an injustice is not only done to women who often have to work a so-called “second shift” (Tronto 2013:82), but also to care itself that is not being taken serious in society. By restricting care to a gendered private sphere, its full potential is denied, thereby causing an injustice to those who may be in need of care.

Echoing the appeals of Gilligan and Tronto, De Lange (2014:165) explains that as people who engage socially with others, all people also have a responsibility to care about others and to tend to their needs (De Lange 2014:165). From a theological point of view, the Heidelberg Catechism guides people not into a principle of harm, but also chooses to lead people into neighbourly love wherein the relationships of the citizens take priority (De Lange 2014:165). To live the Love Commandment in relationship with others, asks of a person to show generous amounts of “patience, peace, meekness, mercy, and kindness” (De Lange 2014:165). It expects a person to make an honest attempt to avoid harming others and to seek good for their enemies (De Lange 2014:165). The Heidelberg Catechism, De Lange (2014:165) believes, argues for a “public ethos of mutual care” (De Lange 2014:165). Important to note here is that there
is the Heidelberg Catechism does not restrict this care to either a private sector or to something that is gendered. This appeal to care is aimed at all human beings, in spite of who they are.

For a theological ethics of care, De Lange (2014:169) suggests Joan Tronto’s four ethical elements of care to describe the forces at work when it comes to care. Three of them, attentiveness, responsibility, and competence, he notes, have to do with the person providing the care, while the fourth, responsiveness, has to do with the person receiving the care (De Lange 2014:169). He, again, stresses the fact that care is not something that springs forth from individuality, but that it is always a relational process (De Lange 2014:169). The care process cannot continue or be considered to be complete without the responsiveness of the one who receives the care (De Lange 2014:169-170). De Lange (2014:170) believes that even when people reject the care of God, “God’s care still counts as care” (De Lange 2014:170). It may not have played out the way it was intended, but it still counts. The response of a person, even if it is not the preferred response, is necessary to know whether the care process has come full circle, or whether it needs to address the issue again. Recognition, or a response from the person who receives care, is thus, vital to the process (De Lange 2014:170).

De Lange (2014:170) quotes Noddings in saying that care is something that always happens between “two parties: the one-caring and the cared-for” and that the care process can only be considered as complete when both these parties are satisfied (De Lange 2014:170). “Even without our thankful response, God remains the “ethical here.” But his care project would have failed” (De Lange 2014:170). De Lange (2014:170) challenges a theological ethics of care to be brave enough to challenge “the insights and implications of its paradigm” (De Lange 2014:170). Maturity is the ultimate goal of any relationship of care; in other words, the person who is cared for is

330De Lange (2014:170) explains that the Heidelberg Catechism does not go this far in its understanding of the relationship between God and human beings. He says: “It keeps considering us as children fed by our heavenly Father; we’ll never become his intimate friends or free and easy lovers. Though there is a mystic tone in the HC, the distance between the Lover and Beloved is kept. As the caring relationship develops, it stays characterized by hierarchy and asymmetry” (De Lange 2014:170).
no longer dependent on their basic needs, but rather acts as a person who is in a relationship of mutual, well-adjusted interdependency (De Lange 2014:170). At the point where a person is no longer dependent on the other for basic needs, a care relationship can turn into a relationship wherein both parties seek the good of the other (De Lange 2014:171).

De Lange (2014:171) explains that “altruism and self sacrifice” (De Lange 2014:171) is only one step in a care relationship and that symmetry, and not hierarchy and asymmetry, becomes the eventual telos of a caring relationship (De Lange 2014:171). Any good relationship of care moves from a place of “mothering to mutuality and to maturity” (De Lange 2014:171). De Lange (2014:171) suggests that this also applies to the relationship of care between God and human beings. Theologically, he says, this may mean that God not only cares about humans, but that humans, while caring about others and themselves, may also care for and care about God (De Lange 2014:171). De Lange (2014:171) acknowledges that even though the Heidelberg Catechism does not even come close to this line of thinking, it does help in providing essential components to developing a theological ethics of care. It succeeds in portraying human beings, as created in the image of God, as creatures that are in a caring relationship with God (De Lange 2014:171).

These creatures, created in the image of God, are driven to care not only for themselves, but also for the creation and for others (De Lange 2014:171). One of the

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331 Ellis (2001:110) explains that he prefers to make use of the word kenosis instead of the more widely used term altruism, because altruism does not capture the full meaning like the word kenosis.

332 I am, at times, hesitant to use the term “mothering” in reference to care for the simple reason that it may feed into the stereotype that only women or only mothers can care. It further gives men a “pass”, as Tronto explained, out of caring. Though it is true that mothers can be caring, they are not the only ones who care. In the same way not all mothers care. This does not mean that they are excused from caring, or that they do not have the ability to care. At the end of the day, everybody has to take up their responsibility of care, even if that means that they love or care for others out of nothing else than duty.

333 De Lange (2014:171) explains that this notion is something that is completely foreign to the Heidelberg Catechism and that it may be categorised under “impossible, even blasphemous thoughts” (De Lange 2014:171) from within the context of the Heidelberg Catechism.
best ways in which to love the other as a neighbour would be to treat them justly (Wolterstorff 2011:85). A theological ethics of care that will be suggested is fundamentally based on love and strives for both a more caring and just society. On this grounds, a theological ethics of care is a theory that seeks to work in unison with an ethics of justice that is fundamentally based on love. Due to the fact that the ethics of care developed as a response to the ethics of justice, it is imperative to consider an understanding of justice, more specifically for this dissertation, an understanding of justice based in love. As a result of the fact that De Lange does not focus extensively on a theory of justice, but rather refers to Wolterstorff in this regard, Wolterstorff (2011) will be a helpful theologian in the discussion of a theory of justice based in love.

4.3 The Theology of Love meeting Justice

One of the most influential moral theories in a modern Western society today must be a theory about justice. The ethics of justice is a moral theory concerned with making moral decisions based on rights, rules, and principles. Botes (2000:1072) identifies some of the attributes of justice as fairness, equality, verifiable and reliable making of decisions based on rules and principles that can be considered to be universal, autonomous thinking, objectivity, impartiality, and rationality. Its attributes differ from that of the ethics of care that includes care, involvement, empathy,

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334 Harrison (2004:16) justice is more than merely “a juridical notion” (Harrison 2004:16) or “a regulative ideal” (Harrison 2004:16), or even “the first virtue of social institutions” (Harrison 2004:16). Justice, according to her, is rather a central image in theology, “a metaphor of right relationship, which shapes the telos of a good community and serves as the animating passion of the moral life” (Harrison 2004:16). She further argues that theological images of justice help to provide “intimations, imaginative envisagements of what constitutes the good of the society” (Harrison 2004:17).

335 Annatjie Botes is a Professor at the Department of Nursing at the University of Johannesburg, formerly known as the Rand Afrikaans University in Johannesburg.
relationships, need-centeredness, and communicative rationality (Botes 2000:1072). Despite the differences between the ethics of justice and the ethics of care, both Gilligan and Tronto, in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 respectively, never denies the importance or the relevance of the ethics of justice. In fact, both of them regard the ethics of justice to be a relevant and crucially important ethical theory, but ask that that it not be regarded as an ethical theory that is regarded as the polar opposite of the ethics of care whereby a choice has to be made between the two theories. Despite their efforts in their own academic disciplines to express this concern, the perception still exist that a choice has to be made between the two contemporary ethical theories. From a theological perspective, the ethics of justice based in love can be helpful to nullify this perception.

Jenny Wright (2012:321) writes that the Niebuhr’s understanding of justice “is closely connected to the impossible possibility offered by the ideal of love, with love being both the fulfilment and the negation of law” (Wright 2012:322). She says that justice can be regarded as “an approximation of love, setting down rules aimed at preventing people from taking advantage of each other” (Wright 2012:322).

In the discussion of a theological ethics of justice based in love, the work of Wolterstorff can be helpful and enlightening. Wolterstorff, as a companion in this conversation, can be helpful and enlightening. Wolterstorff337, as a companion in this conversation,

336 Speaking on justice, Grey (2001:49) explains that her feminist theology sees God not only as a just God, but also as a relational God. She writes: “This refers to God as the source of right and just relation, because to be God means to be the source of all just relating” (Grey 2001:49). Justice and relationality is therefore deeply connected and should not be separated from one another, but rather work together as two parts of a puzzle coming together. Grey (2001:51) speaks of the “relational power” (Grey 2001:51) of God and explains that it forms “part of feminist theology’s re-imagining of God’s power as alternative to the patriarchal power of the ‘God of power and may’. I have tried to see this as the power of sensitivity, of compassion, of empathy, of affiliation and bonding” (Grey 2001:51).

337 Wolterstorff is not one of the key figures in this dissertation, although his work and contribution plays an important role. I make use of the work of Nicholas Wolterstorff for two reasons: The first reason I make use of his work is because he focusses in more detail on the understanding of justice where De Lange’s focus rests primarily on care. Wolterstorff, therefore, assists me in creating a more rounded understanding of justice in relation to love and ultimately to care. The second reason I make use of his work, is because De Lange himself, in many of his own works, draws on Wolterstorff for assistance. His work is key when it comes to answering the research question of this dissertation. It is precisely his explanation of justice based in love (like other theologians have argued too), that helps in showing that justice and care, both based in love, ought to be regarded as complementary contemporary ethical theories as opposed to being polar opposite ethical theories.
succeeds in demonstrating that love and justice are two concepts that are perfectly compatible. In fact, not only are these two concepts compatible, but love can be viewed as the base from which all justice stem. It is therefore a relationship that ought to be regarded as a harmonious relationship instead of a contradictory relationship. Love and justice greatly complement each other. Wolterstorff (2011:83), when he speaks about love as it is spoken of in the Love Commandment, like De Lange, also contests the idea that the other should be loved as the self. He also understands it to mean that the neighbour ought to be loved as well as the self (Wolterstorff 2011:83). He argues that the other be treated “as our moral counterparts” (Wolterstorff 2011:83).

In addition to looking at the Love Commandment in the New Testament, he takes the command to love all the way back to the Old Testament, where Moses commands the Israelites to love their neighbours as themselves (Wolterstorff 2011:83). He also looks at the texts that precedes this command and explains that to love others could include reproving their ways when they have done wrong (Wolterstorff 2011:83). He goes further to explain that “various ways of treating the neighbor justly are … examples of loving one’s neighbor” (Wolterstorff 2011:83). This means that the just treatment of others should not be considered to be contradictory to loving them (Wolterstorff 2011:83). In fact, Wolterstorff (2011:83) believes that treating others in a just manner is a clear example of what it means to love them, or even a good way of loving them. “Love is not justice-indifferent benevolence” (Wolterstorff 2011:83). Wolterstorff, thus, argues that justice is an example of love and not in conflict with love, a supplement thereof, or a restriction to it.

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338 Harrison (2004:26) writes: “Love in the pursuit of justice is effectual acting upon the longing to make right relation. And doing so does make for justice”.

339 Wolterstorff (2011:84) writes that Moses did not regard love and justice as contradictory terms either. He criticises any attempt to do that. “He does not say that we are to love the neighbor and pay no attention to what justice requires” (Wolterstorff 2011:84). “He does not say that we are to love the neighbor so long as doing so does not abet or perpetrate injustice” (Wolterstorff 2011:84). “Nor does he say that we are to love the neighbor in addition to treating him justly” (Wolterstorff 2011:84).
When it comes to justice, Wolterstorff (2011:93) is careful not to limit the notion of justice as only an ethic that "seeks to promote the good in someone’s life as an end in itself" (Wolterstorff 2011:93) and to think of this as love. He suggests that “there is something else that love seeks as an end in itself” (Wolterstorff 2011:93). Love for the other strives for the just treatment of the other by the self and others, and that the other’s rights be honoured and they be treated in accordance with their worth (Wolterstorff 2011:93). Wolterstorff (2011:93) therefore argues that the agape love, as part of an ethical structure, is a love that strives to promote both the flourishing and the worth of someone. The understanding of this love is one “seeking to secure for someone the good of being treated as befits her worth” (Wolterstorff 2011:93) as “an example of love for her” (Wolterstorff 2011:93). This is, according to Wolterstorff (2011:93) the kind of love that Jesus and Moses spoke about in their command to love. It is, thus, not limited to the seeking of only the good for someone as an end in itself, but also the promotion of their worth, also as an end in itself. The second part of the Love Commandment asks the self to love their neighbour as they love themselves. The part of the love to the other has been addressed, but the part on self-love still needs to be addressed.

When it comes to self-love, Wolterstorff (2011:94-95), like De Lange, is critical of those who argue against any form self-love. His understanding of self-love is based in his understanding of rights and worth. He argues that “not to be treated with due respect for one’s worth is to be wronged, deprived of that which one has a right, treated unjustly” (Wolterstorff 2011:96). He adds to this that the lack of acknowledgment of

340 For Wolterstorff the idea of rights is central to the concept of justice. In his book Justice. Rights and Wrongs (2008), Wolterstorff combines justice with moral philosophy and Christian ethics in order to develop an important theory of rights and of justice grounded in rights. He explains that he thinks of justice as something that is “constituted of rights: a society is just insofar as its members enjoy the goods to which they have a right” (Wolterstorff 2008:xii). Right, to him is “ultimately grounded in what respect for the worth of persons and human beings requires” (Wolterstorff 2008:xii). Wolterstorff’s account of right is, therefore, not merely an idea or a theory of justice.

341 Wolterstorff (2011:94) writes: “Many, both within and without the Christian tradition, believe that Christian scripture teaches the illegitimacy of self-love. And of those who do not take Christian scripture as authoritative, some have their own reasons that holding self-love is wrong”.

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someone being wronged is also a denial of their dignity (Wolterstorff 2011:96). If a person is thus indifferent to their own worth being wronged by not being respected, then they are also wronging themselves (Wolterstorff 2011:96). The failure to point out the injustice of being wronged and to promote the “moral reformation of the wrongdoer” (Wolterstorff 2011:96) can often be regarded as a failure to love someone (Wolterstorff 2011:96). It is therefore crucial that a person not only love others, but also themselves (Wolterstorff 2011:96).

A person should therefore also seek to promote the good of the self and the worth of the self as an end to its means. At the same time, however, a person should, of course, be careful not to become egoistic or self-indulged. From the biblical text that commands love, Wolterstorff (2011:97) states that Jesus and Moses both already accepted self-love to be part of the Love Commandment. His argument is that if Jesus and Moses had thought of self-love as something that is illegitimate, they would have commanded that the neighbour be loved instead of the self (Wolterstorff 2011:97). The legitimacy of self-love is therefore a prerequisite (Wolterstorff 2011:97). What this love entail, whether it be the love for the other or the love for the self, still needs to be addressed.

4.3.1 Love as Care in Justice?

Justice, up to this point, has been regarded as being securely seated within *agape* love. It has been argued that love is the promotion of the flourishing of the other and the self, and the promotion of the worth of the other and the self. The second part of the command to love, therefore, is a command for the other and the self. The question remains, however, what exactly this love as the promotion of the flourishing and the worth of the self and the other means. Wolterstorff (2011:101) sets out to find whether there is a term as an additional term to ‘love’ that promotes both worth and the flourishing of people. It is his conviction that such a word indeed exists: care. The love as care that he speaks of is, however, not the ethics of care that is taken up into an approach of justice (Wolterstorff 2011:103). His understanding of love as care rather developed from studying literature on *agapism* and finding it to provide an insufficient
account of what justice is within the framework of love (Wolterstorff 2011:104). The point that he makes is an important one for the final conclusion of this chapter and overall dissertation.

Care, Wolterstorff (2011:101) believes, has the ability to form a combination between the promotion of someone’s flourishing and the promotion of their just treatment. He, like Gilligan, Tronto, and De Lange, immediately warns of the danger of paternalism wherein a person experiences injustice (2011:101). In such cases where a person is wronged in the process of care, care would have fallen short of its purpose (Wolterstorff 2011:102). Wolterstorff (2011:102) calls this “malformed care” (Wolterstorff 2011:102), because care that seeks to promote the good and the worth of someone does not wrong a person in the process. He further argues that care that wrongs anyone, not just the person receiving the care, can be regarded as a malformed practice of care (Wolterstorff 2011:102). The love that is seen as care that seeks to enhance and promote the good and the worth of someone else, also includes the enhancement and promotion of the good and worth of the self (Wolterstorff 2011:104). Love as care, according to Wolterstorff (2011:105), includes everything that is needed in order for justice to prevail. Love as self-love and the love for the other is an example of love as care (Wolterstorff 2011:105).

When it comes to God’s love as care for humans, Wolterstorff (2011:107) argues that it would be undeniably true that God’s love is presented as care. Numerous biblical texts use familial language when it comes to God; God is spoken of a caring parent, both in terms of being a father and a mother, while human beings are regarded as

342 Some examples include: God described as a mother (Hos 11:3-4); God described as a mother bear (Hos 13:8); God described as a mother eagle (Deut 32:11-12); God who gives birth (Deut 32:18); God as a comforting mother (Isaiah 66:13); God as a mother hen (Matt 23:37; Luke 13:34); Jesus as the bridegroom (Rev 19:7); God as Father (Matt 6:26; John 3:16); Jesus as son (John 3:16); God as merciful father (Luke 6:35-36); God the loving father (John 16:27).

343 I find the classification of a caring God as both father and mother very helpful. It helps to break down the stereotype that caring is limited to care provided by women or of women as being primary care-givers. With God being regarded as a parent, both in terms of mother and father, it creates an image of both genders being able to care.
God’s children (Wolterstorff 2011:107-108). Wolterstorff (2011:108) explains that Jesus told his followers to address God as ‘Father’ in their prayer. God’s love is also portrayed as being caring, as seen in the Gospel of John where Jesus says that “God so loved the world that he gave his only Son” (Wolterstorff 2011:108). God’s love for the world is, therefore, also God caring for the world (Wolterstorff 2011:108). Wolterstorff (2011:108) further explains that the care he has in mind is a care that includes that every person be treated justly. If someone is, thus, treated unjustly in the process of care, it is a malformed version of care (Wolterstorff 2011:108). He therefore believes that God, as God caring for his people, seeks that everyone be treated in a just way (Wolterstorff 2011:108).

Wolterstorff (2011:108) argues that the justification that humans receive from God is completely impartial, thereby suggesting that the generosity that God displays is a just generosity. Therefore, God not is not only “concerned that we treat each other justly; God’s care about us is itself just” (Wolterstorff 2011:108). The kind of love that care portrays is a love that includes the love that God has for human beings, the love that people have for themselves, and the love for others. Thus far the conversation about care has been about treating the self and the other in a specific way. By this standard, the conversation about justice has a tendency to become very individualistic; not only in arguing how a person needs to treat others, but also in arguing how a person has to treat themselves. The concept of individuality is something that is often connected to an understanding of justice. The next section will seek to reflect upon this in more detail.

4.3.2 Correcting the Impression of Individualism in Justice

In an effort to correct the impression that the conversation about justice thus far has been very individualistic, this section will deal with a broadened view of the

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344 Wolterstorff (2011:109) makes an important point in arguing that love as care is not the only kind of love that God as for humans, or humans have for themselves, others, or God. “God’s love for us is not only love as care, but also, love as eros, attraction-love. So too, the love that we should have for God and that is appropriate to have for self and neighbor is not only love as care but love as eros. Where there is worth, it is appropriate to be drawn to it, attracted” (Wolterstorff 2011:109).
conversation about love as care in justice. Wolterstorff (2011:134) argues that the conversation of love as care has had an individualistic cast insofar the conversation by merely focusing on individuals that provide and receive care. Consequently, he argues for the broadening of this view (Wolterstorff 2011:134). Justice should not be limited in its contribution by the impression that it is always individualistic. He explains that if the flourishing of a person is sought, then it is also necessary to seek for the flourishing of their wider social community, whether it be their “families, clans, neighborhoods, cities, churches, synagogues, clubs, groups, peoples, states, agencies, institutions, enterprises, [or] organizations” (Wolterstorff 2011:134). If the worth and flourishing of a social entity is wronged, it may lead to an individual’s flourishing being wronged (Wolterstorff 2011:134). The flourishing of all human beings, according to Wolterstorff (2011:134), is intertwined in the flourishing of their social context. Care for the other, consequently, will have a tremendous impact on the social and political spheres (Wolterstorff 2011:134). The argument is, thus, that if a person cares about another person, they also care about their social and political

345 The degree of human flourishing, according to Wolterstorff (2011:185), “is determined by the worth of states and events in one’s life along with the worth of actions and activities one performs” (Wolterstorff 201:135).

346 Jenny Wright, in her doctoral dissertation, writes about the importance of justice and the concept of community as understood by Niebuhr. She says that community is a central concern of what it means to be human (2011:128) and that it “is only in relationship to other people that we can realize ourselves. Thus love and fraternity are necessities on our lives because we are social beings and being a part of a community is an essential part of our nature. But the relationships within the community and between communities is corrupted by sin, which ultimately leads to injustice” (Wright 2011:128-129). She argues that justice comes from reason “and a reasonable and rational society will be critical of injustice. But justice can never be separated from the political, and power will always play against power” (Wright 2011:132).

347 Wright (2011:212) argues that the church is a community where justice can be developed on several levels. She writes: “it can foster a safe space for individuals to be given a voice to speak out and be heard about injustices; it can offer ideas and ideals about how society can become more just (on local and global levels); and it can teach individuals to live in such a way that they live with care and concern for other people in the community and in society, teaching them to think responsibly and ethically about social, political and economic occurrences” (Wright 2011:212).

348 Wolterstorff (2011:134) draws on Jeremiah 29:4-7 for his reasoning, “seek the welfare (shalom) of the city”, and also “pray to the Lord on its behalf, for in its welfare you will find your welfare”.
welfare (Wolterstorff 2011:134), as was the arguments of Gilligan and, even more so, Tronto.

To Wolterstorff (2011:137), the worth of a social entity and how it flourishes is determined by the impact it makes on the flourishing of humans. He explains that a social entity can only be regarded as a good social entity insofar as it enhances the flourishing of human beings (Wolterstorff 2011:137). Therefore, the care for the good of the social entity wherein the other resides should be included in the care responsibilities. The good of the social entity should not, however, be sought as an end in itself (Wolterstorff 2011:137). Wolterstorff (2011:137) argues that it happens too often that people end up only serving social entities that do not contribute to the flourishing of human beings. Social entities are then served in order to receive wealth and glamour for themselves, without contributing to the flourishing and justice people are due (Wolterstorff 2011:137). The idea is, therefore, to do what is needed to ensure that social entities contribute to the flourishing and justice of human beings (Wolterstorff 2011:137). Making sure that social entities are not wronging or inhibiting flourishing of other is to care for others and to make sure that justice prevails in the process.

Thus far, it has been argued that the Love Commandment can be a basis from which a theological ethics of care can function. Justice, as has been reflected upon, can also be regarded as based in love. Apart from care and justice, there may be a third element that can be regarded as an enriching addition to this dissertation. In the next section will elaborate on the third component known as compassion.

4.4 The Theology of Love meeting Compassion?

While closely examining justice and care, a possible third element was discovered in addition to a theological ethics of care and a theological ethics of justice. This element is Christian compassion. It is compassion that sees the humbled person exalted and is portrayed in biblical narratives like the Good Samaritan. De Lange’s study on compassion is a thought-provoking interpretation that may be an enriching addition to a theological ethics of care and a theological ethics of justice. His argument is
fundamentally based in the Love Commandment and shows love has yet another element to offer. This element is compassion\textsuperscript{349}. Compassion is unwaveringly based in love\textsuperscript{350}. This love\textsuperscript{351} is, however, not something that comes from human beings, but is rather given freely from God, who is the very base of love Himself who stirs the human ability to love (Marais 2015a:720). If the Love Commandment serves as the hermeneutical lens to reflect theologically upon the relationship between justice and care, it offers something an additional aspect which has not been considered in the work of either Gilligan or Tronto. It is, however, not limited to within the boundaries of theology.

Compassion is unique insofar as it cannot be institutionalised. It is something that does not have its origins in rationality, but is considered a primal instinct that removes the self from the centre of a compassionate act. At the heart of this compassion is not, as De Lange (2015a) states, “a straightforward appeal to neighbor love”. It is completely different from that. Instead it is something that bears the typical signs of a virtuous person through “an individual moral capacity” (De Lange 2015a). Even though compassion may at times be seen as an element found in the theological ethics of care, it is something that is completely distinctive from care insofar as it does not include a rational decision, but is rather something that happens to a person. A person who shows compassion opens themselves to “the risk of being altered by the joy or suffering of others” (De Lange 2015a). Compassion is, therefore, different from a theological ethics of care and a theological ethics of justice.

De Lange (2015b:126) argues that the Love Commandment, which requires a person to promote the good of both the known other and unknown other, cannot be properly

\textsuperscript{349}Compassion, at its core, is concerned with the dignity and the worth of all human beings and consequently functions as a “practical expression of love” (Marais 2015a:720). It is impossible to separate love and compassion from each other (Marais 2015a:720).

\textsuperscript{350}Compassion, according to Post et al (2002:4), is “the form love takes in response to suffering; it is a readiness to enter into the other’s suffering”.

\textsuperscript{351}In the same way that compassion is based in love, love has the ability to express itself in compassion (De Lange 2015b:110). De Lange (2015b:110) writes that compassion can be regarded as “a caring concern for someone in a situation of distress, out of spontaneous gratuitousness” (De Lange 2015b:110).
carried out if it is not done from a place of compassion. He understands compassion literally as “suffering together” (De Lange 2015b:126). In speaking about the elderly, he explains that they experience love when people around them identify and share in their suffering (De Lange 2015b:126). De Lange (2015b:128) explains that compassion is more than simply an emotion. It is therefore not merely the identifying or the sharing of the suffering of the other. It is even more than that. Compassion, especially during an experience of hardship, “creates a “we” (De Lange 201b:128) that precedes the “I”” (De Lange 2015b:128). He says that compassion is that which binds people together in “primordial commonality” (De Lange 2015b:128), long before the self becomes individually responsible for the other’s hardship (De Lange 2015b:128).

Compassion is not an activity that is decided on by an individual, but precedes an individual’s ability to decide whether they will care (De Lange 2015b:128). He describes compassion, therefore, as “an elementary, prereflective kind of attention to the other” (De Lange 2015b:128). The pity that is felt during compassion is something that exists before it registers in the mind of a person (De Lange 2015b:129). The work of Emmanuel Housset guides De Lange (2015b:129): “The other’s distress appeals to us unconditionally: the act of pity is experienced as an obligation, even before we make any decision to think, act, or have pity. This means we are not the masters of our compassion. Ethics, therefore, does not start with an isolate, thinking person making moral decisions but with this primordial sharing of one another’s suffering”. Compassion, thus, cannot be controlled by the human being (De Lange 2015b:129).

This influences the way that ethics is understood. Ethics, consequently, do not begin the moment a person thinks rationally about morality, but rather at the primordial commonality of sharing in another person’s hardship (De Lange 2015b:129). The point that De Lange (2015a) makes is that compassion is an activity that “deconstructs the ‘ethical subject’ as the center of moral agency” (De Lange 2015a). He asks for “strong

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352 De Lange (2015b:128) quotes Jean Jacques Rousseau: “It is this compassion ... that hurries us without reflection to the relief of those who are in distress: it is this which in a state of nature supplies the place of laws, morals and virtues” (De Lange 2015b:128).
compassion” (De Lange 2015b:129) to be separated from “weak compassion” (De Lange 2015b:129), followed by the rejection and exclusion of weak compassion (De Lange 2015b:129). He explains how Augustine was one of the first philosophers to base their ethics on compassion (De Lange 2015b:129).

Augustine looked at the reactions of people in theatres and saw how they wallowed in their weeping, how they seemed to relish their own pity (De Lange 2015b:129). This was an example of what Augustine regarded as “malivola benevolentia” (De Lange 2015b:129), or “malevolent compassion” (De Lange 2015b:129). This malevolent compassion is an example of weak compassion that enjoys the sorrow. Strong compassion does not, however, show any signs of enjoyment in the hardships or suffering of others, but rather wants for it to end (De Lange 2015b:129). A person who displays true, strong compassion, is one who steps into the suffering with the person who is experiencing it in order to help to end it (De Lange 2015b:129). De Lange (2015a) explains that someone who displays this genuine, strong compassion is someone who is prepared to “run the risk of being changed into another person by participating in someone else’s distress” (De Lange 2015a). The other person’s distress influences the self so much, that it is impossible to stay unchanged by it (De Lange 2015a).

De Lange says that Ricoeur rightly defined compassion as “a struggling-with, an accompanying” (2015b:129) of someone, and not as a “moaning-with, as pity, commiseration, figures of regret” (De Lange 2015b:129). Compassion is not something that becomes an aversion of someone else’s suffering, or something that becomes part of a person’s “terror management strategy” (De Lange 2015b:129). De Lange (2015b:129) uses the story of Judge Clamence, described in his novel, The Fall, by Albert Camus as an example of weak compassion that is “patronizing and humiliating” (De Lange 2015b:129-130). He (2015b:129-130) quotes Camus who wrote: “I enjoyed that part of my nature which reacted so appropriately to the widow and orphan that eventually, through exercise, it came to dominate my whole life. For instance, I loved to help blind people cross streets. From as far away as I could see a cane hesitating on the edge of a sidewalk, I would rush forward, sometimes only a
second ahead of another charitable hand already outstretched, snatch the blind
person from any solicitude but mine, and lead him gently but firmly along the crosswalk
among the traffic obstacles toward the refuge of the other sidewalk, where we would
separate with a mutual emotion. In the same way, I always enjoyed giving directions
in the street, obliging with a light, lending a hand to heavy pushcarts, pushing a
stranded car, buying a paper from the Salvation Army lass or flowers from the old
peddler, though I knew she stole them from the Montparnasse cemetery.

I also liked—and this is harder to say—I liked to give alms. A very Christian friend of
mine admitted that one’s initial feeling on seeing a beggar approach one’s house is
unpleasant. Well, with me it was worse: I used to exult… If I had the luck, certain
mornings, to give up my seat in the bus or subway to someone who obviously
deserved it, to pick up some object an old lady had dropped and return it to her with a
smile I knew well, or merely to forfeit my taxi to someone in a greater hurry than I, it
was a red-letter day.”

The judge’s joy is based on the fact that the suffering is not his own and that he does
not have to share in that suffering (De Lange 2015b:130). He is, however, changed
when he is in a situation where a woman is about to jump from a bridge, because in
that moment he is faced with genuine, strong compassion, even though he does not
try to intervene in the situation (De Lange 2015b:130). De Lange (2015a) explains that
this event had, in that moment of compassion, forever altered the judge’s life, despite
the fact that he did not intervene. He says that there is “an element of de-centering
and disposition” (De Lange 2015b:130) by which a person is affected by the distress of the other353. It is having “sorrow for and with the other”354 (De Lange 2015a).

When it comes to compassion, a person mirrors the “experience of being physically invaded by the other’s suffering” (De Lange 2015a) without having the ability to distinguish the exact feelings of the self and the other (De Lange 2015a). When the times comes for that a person has to make the decision whether to stay and act or to flee, “the ‘we’ of common suffering transforms itself into a responsible I taking care of a unique, irreplaceable Thou355” (De Lange 2015a). Compassion is, thus, not something that can be described as an emotion that effects a person after the rationalising the sorrows of other. It is rather something that grows from the primal, virtuous goodness that is embedded in a person. This may be further clarified by an example of a Biblical narrative that has already been introduced, the narrative of the Good Samaritan.

De Lange (2015b:130-131) says that this narrative has, for a great part of history, been an influential part of the guidelines when it comes to Christian ethics (De Lange 2015b:131). He explains that the Samaritan is seen as the epitome of what it mean to be a neighbour to the other in his selfless act of interrupting his own expedition in order to care for the man who fell victim to crime (De Lange 2015b:131). De Lange is curious about just how strong this “Christian compassion” (2015b:131) really is. He clarifies by

352 De Lange (2015b:130) quotes Rousseau: “Compassion is an ecstatic event, not an individual attitude. In our most inner sentiment of pitiful love, we cannot stay with ourselves but are turned inside out, sharing the weal and woe of the other. We are no longer enclosed in our own inner aversion to the physical presence of the other”.

354 Grey (2001:59), when writing about God and compassion as opposed to the limited ability of human compassion, says that “God weeps with our pain” (Grey 2001:59). She explains that this weeping image of God is born from having the experience that God is present in suffering and sharing in the suffering while being there (God 2001:59). This compassion is best known in the passion of Christ. “But because God is God, it means that suffering is not all that God does. God’s compassion being poured out ceaselessly is a source of strength” (Grey 2001:59). This compassion of God and having the knowledge that God is there in suffering, is compassion that creates “endurance and courage” (Grey 2001:59).

355 De Lange (2015a) reasons that suffering is something that binds people together in their “primordial commonality” (De Lange 2015a), and at the same time also places a focus on the individual whose presence cannot be replaced.
saying that the general image of the Samaritan is usually one that represents the Samaritan as a person who is kneeling over the helpless victim in the ditch (De Lange 2015b:131). This usually signifies the mercy of God (De Lange 2015b:131). He argues that some ethicists are weary of a Christian compassion that easily becomes patronising when the relationship of God as the care giver and human beings as the receivers of care is portrayed as an asymmetrical relationship (De Lange 2015b:131). There is concern for the autonomy of the victim displayed in Christian charity (De Lange 2015b:131).

De Lange (2015b:131) therefore calls for an awareness of the fact that “Christian compassion and the Christian narrative are closely related” (De Lange 2015b:131). Together with the degradation, there exists an exaltation through the lens of the Christian narrative (De Lange 2015b:131). He clarifies this by saying that the “actual human being Jesus, in whom God incarnates himself, partakes of the position and the power of God as the risen one” (De Lange 2011b:65). Through the compassion that God displays, those who are humble become exalted (De Lange 2011b:65). The inner objective of compassionate acts is to restore the humanity, autonomy, and dignity of the person who receives care356 (De Lange 2015b:131). The image of the victim in the narrative of the Good Samaritan is, thus, not one of a person left for dead next to the road, but rather someone whose dignity is recognised by being tended to and taken to an inn to be taken care of (De Lange 2015b:131).

De Lange (2011b:66) uses paintings to further elucidate on the relationship of care and autonomy. He uses three different paintings of the narrative of the Good Samaritan to emphasise the different perspectives of the relationship of care and autonomy. The first painting is the painting of Giordano Luca Giordano (1685) and it shows something of the asymmetrical movement of care (De Lange 2011b:66). The Samaritan is hovering over the victim’s body with a look of dismay painted across his face.

356 O’Connell (2009:120) quotes Johann Baptist Metz: “Compassion sends us to the front lines of social and conflicts in today’s world. For perceiving and articulating other’s suffering is the unconditional prerequisite of any future politics of peace, of every new form of social solidarity in the face of the widening gap between rich and poor, and of every promising interchange between different cultural and religious worlds”.

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face while he looks at the pale, white body of a man whose face is hidden from the viewer (De Lange 2011b:67). This painting shifts the focus to the Samaritan who is looking over the body of the faceless man whose dignity is nowhere to be found (De Lange 2011b:67).

The second painting is the painting of Jacopo Bassano (approximately 1570), who shifts the focus of the painting to mutual dignity (De Lange 2011b:67). The picture that is portrayed is one that sees the victim’s body being lifted by the Samaritan, who is bending himself down in a moment of compassion underneath the victim in an effort to try and raise him (De Lange 2011b:67). This, however, is also not pleasing to De Lange, who says that “the bending down in compassion is not an end in itself either, not a servile self-debasement out of subservience, but is aimed at ‘resurrection’” (De Lange 2011b:67). He says that the aim is for the human being to live upright (De Lange 2011b:67).

De Lange (2011b:67) then finds a third painting, painted by Vincent van Gogh (1853-1890), which represents a portrayal of the Good Samaritan that he finds pleasing. He calls it a classical painting because it also portrays both the Levite and the priest who are walking past the victim (De Lange 2011b:67). What makes this painting more exceptional than the other two, however, is that it lacks any evidence of an ethics that is moving downwards from above (De Lange 2011b:67). The Samaritan is painted as a normal man, “with his sleeves rolled up and wearing plain slippers on his feet” (De Lange 2011b:67). There is nothing extraordinary when it comes to the mule (De Lange 2011b:67). This painting illustrates “a horizontal care of one person for another” (De Lange 2011b:67) instead of the ethics of charity from a middle class man and proprietor (De Lange 2011b:67).

De Lange (2011b:68) explains that the Christian narrative is seen as straining the ethos. He argues that when one person is moved by compassion to act on the need of another, it is not only “aristocracy (the person helping from above)” (De Lange 2011b:68), but so too a “democracy (the person that helps as an equal)” (De Lange 2011b:68) that becomes lop-sided (De Lange 2011b:68). He explains that the
emphasis in the painting is on exertion whereby there is a great amount of strain on the upright Samaritan, who is trying to help the dependent man onto his mule (De Lange 2011b:68). The only goal that the Samaritan has in mind is “to lift the victim upright again” (De Lange 2011b:68).

According to De Lange (2015b:132), Van Gogh succeeded in portraying an exalted person in the humbled person. He therefore repeats his earlier observation that “strong compassion entails the risk of de-centering and dispossessing” (De Lange 2015b:132). He believes that when “the humiliation of the compassionate person” (De Lange 2015b:132) is aimed at the “exaltation of the sufferer” (De Lange 2015b:132), a true understanding of Christian compassion is displayed (De Lange 2015b:132). The Love Commandment, as the Theology of Love, therefore displays and suggests another element that is not seen as a theological ethics of care itself, even though it is present in it, or a theological ethics of justice, but an addition to it. This element is one that requires a person to open themselves up to compassion and thereby run the risk of being forever altered by compassion in times of joy and sorrow.

4.5 Love as Care, Justice, and Compassion?

So far in this chapter, it has been argued that theology can be in a meaningful conversation with ethics. It has also been argued that the Love Commandment as a hermeneutical lens, in its various forms, can provide guidance to living a good life, provided that it is good love. This kind of love, as the theology of love, is the basis for the development of a theological ethics of care to be built upon. A theological ethics of care that is based on love, has care as its central focus, whether it be care for the self or care for the other. It is a care that is received as a sign of love from God and in

357 Grey (2001:60) quotes Heyward: “The root meaning of passion or suffering – passio – is to bear, to withstand, to hold up. We are called, collectively, to bear up God in the world. To withstand/’stand with’ is to be in solidarity with God, to go with God in our comings and goings. This vocation involves pain...but not only pain. To be passionate lovers of human beings, the earth, and other creatures; to love passionately the God who is Godself the resource of this love, is to participate in an inspired and mindbogglingly delightful way of moving collectively in history” (Grey 2001:60).
a similar way that God loves and cares for the self, the self ought to display care and love unto others\textsuperscript{358}.

It has also been argued that it is possible to develop a theological ethics of justice that is similarly based on the Love Commandment as a hermeneutical lens. In its essence it not only seeks to promote the good in a person’s life, but also the worth of people. It has been argued that a theological ethics of justice also includes the flourishing and worth of both the self and the other. In promoting the flourishing and worth of the self and the other, there is also an inherent care about what happens in the wider social sphere of life. Justice seeks to promote a better society because the self and the other live in and form part of a wider community. By resisting the injustices in society, the worth and flourishing of all people can be protected.

Based on the Love Commandment, it became clear that a theological ethics of justice asked for a concern about true care. Likewise, it was also evident in the development of a theological ethics of care, also based in the Love Commandment, that true justice is a concern. The love of God, the self, and the other was further apparent in both a theological ethics of care and a theological ethics of justice. Based on the fact that both discourses have the Love Commandment as the foundation which it is built upon and its concern with the flourishing and worth of all human beings, it is proposed that these two theories, as distinctive theories, work in unison\textsuperscript{359}, as complementary theories, to create not only better lives for all human beings, but also a better society in which injustices are resisted. Let it be clear that it is not proposed that one theory be taken up within another theory, but that these two theories as distinctive theories, each with their own characteristics and goals, work together in order to address morality. Where one theory falls short, the other can contribute. When justice falls short

\textsuperscript{358} Marais (2015a:718) echoes this notion in saying: “...since God’s (covenant) relationship with us is characterised as being loving and just – involving ‘unconditional love’, ‘ongoing presence’, ‘justice’, ‘peace’ and ‘wholeness’ – we too are called to practice loving and just relationships”.

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in promoting a relational approach\textsuperscript{360}, care can serve as a helpful measure to promote relationality.

Malan and Cilliers (2004:14) argue exactly this point when they say that “Gilligan’s plea for an ethics of care also highlights many problems with rights. They are abstract and do not necessarily change institutional contexts, and there is a gap between \textit{de iure} rights and \textit{de facto} injustice” (Malan & Cilliers 2004:14). The ethics of care is therefore sensitive and open to the “context and consequences” (Malan & Cilliers 2004:14) instead of focused and fixated on “abstract rights” (Malan & Cilliers 2004:14). Where care falls short in an understanding of rights and rules, justice can complement it\textsuperscript{361}. Harding (1987:297) explained that Carol Gilligan, from the beginning noted that care and justice as two moral orientations ought not to be regarded as polar opposites, but rather as complementary orientations for different approaches. Justice with its rights orientation, she explains, should not be considered to be uncaring, and care should not be regarded as unjust (Harding 1987:297). Even though Gilligan herself said that these two theories should not be regarded as polar opposites, there continually exist a divide within society that ought to be addressed until these theories exist as complementary orientations that should work together towards until there is both justice and care in society.

The focus of this dissertation is therefore also primarily focused on the ethics of care, because it is the theory that is more often than not compromised when society compels that a choice be made between the ethics of care and the ethics of justice. As was mentioned before, when people are faced to make a choice between the ethics of care and the ethics of justice, the ethics of justice is chosen at the expense of the ethics of care. It is therefore vitally important to focus on the importance of the equal status of

\textsuperscript{360} Kittay (2011:51) explains that justice, for instance, does not address the issue of dependence and therefore would be greatly supplanted and complemented by the ethics of care that addresses this issue head-on.

\textsuperscript{361} Justice should provide sufficient support to a more caring society. This can, for instance be done by giving attention to care in situations where “care is the appropriate response to a condition” or “when other forms of support should be put in place... [in] determining just and caring ways to deal with longterm care issues” (Kittay 2005:448).
both theories. Not only is it necessary to plea for its equal status, but even more so, a call for the ethics of justice and the ethics of care to work together in unison when it comes to morality. The two approaches, as Gilligan (1987:20) also suggested, simply “calls attention to the fact that all human relationships, public and private, can be characterized both in terms of equality and in terms of attachment, and that both inequality and detachment constitute grounds for moral concern” (Gilligan 1987:20).

When it comes to general society, Wolfgang Huber helps to articulate this better. Huber (2015:163) criticises the split that exists between justice and care and believes that this divide ought to be challenged, also from a theological point of view. He argues that justice, which has been a dominant ethical theory of reason when it comes to morality, needs to have a complement that pays attention to the emotions and empathy that form a central part of human life (Huber 2015:163). He says that “the willingness to pursue justice depends on an emotional base; but this emotion cannot be restricted to our relatives or others with whom we live together” (Huber 2015:163).

It is at this point that the Love Commandment, from a theological point of view, binds the two theories together as two theories working in unison. It is this love that calls people to move beyond their comfort zones to reach out to other that are beyond personal boundaries. Huber (2015:163) argues that justice on its own is not enough to resist injustice brought about in society. Justice needs the perspective provided by care to “recognise injustices if we look at the social reality with “the view from below” with the eyes of the powerless, from the perspective of those who suffer under hunger and poverty” (Huber 2015:163). He is convinced that justice becomes damaged, as both a personal approach and an institutionalised virtue, if the oppressed in society are not pointed out by care (Huber 2015:163).

362 This notion, once again, echoes what both Gilligan and Tronto suggested in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 of this dissertation. The idea that justice and care are contradictory theories was rejected by both Gilligan and Tronto. They also argued that justice and care need to work together in order to serve the moral domain justly and in a caring manner in order for justice and equality to prevail in a caring democracy. For some reason, however, there seem to be a continuous divide between these two theories.
Huber (2015:163) further calls for the gender orientations connected to justice and care by a patriarchal society to be done away with and consequently argues that both care and justice can be allocated as moral orientations of men and women, because both justice and care are “elementary determinants to human existence” (Huber 2015:163). As a result of the fact that both elements are human elements, it would not be strange to find both of these elements in men and women (Huber 2015:164), a notion that echoes that of both Gilligan and Tronto in the previous chapters. It is, thus, important not to separate the body from the spirit, or the emotion from reason, or the self from relations with the other (Huber 2015:164).

Huber (2015:164) argues that the capacity to care for the other can be traced back to the early development of human beings. This would imply that the command to love the other as the self can be understood as something that is inherent in all human beings (Huber 2015:164). If the understanding of the Love Commandment has been inherent in the primal existence of human beings, there should be no reason to deny or refute something that is naturally part of all human beings in a search for justice. Instead, it should become a complement in the search for true justice. Huber (2015:164) explains that that which is inherent in human beings ought not to be unlearnt as a result of the individualistic “overvaluation of competitive economic behaviour” (Huber 2015:164). Human beings are at their very core people who live in relationship with others. Huber (2015:164) argues that it is at exactly this point that theological ethics contribute to the understanding of natural sciences. This means that there ought to be a shift away from any dominant approach that regards a person as “homo oeconomicus, the economic human, interested only in his or her own advantage” (Huber 2015:164) to an approach that promotes “homo communicativus, the communicative human, interested in the relations with others and being aware of

363 Wentzel van Huyssteen (2011:458), who was a Professor at Princeton Theological Seminary in the United States of America and who writes vastly on theology and science, mirrors this in a study of the evolutionary approach to the understanding of the roots of morality. He argues that human beings have a “deeply embodied sense of empathy” (Van Huyssteen 2011:485) that can be traced back to the biological roots of humans. He argues that from “an evolutionary perspective” (Van Huyssteen 2011:458) empathy can be regarded as a basic moral sense in human beings (Van Huyssteen 2011:458).
one’s own self-transcendence” (Huber 2015:164). The argument of this dissertation is, therefore, that a theological ethics of justice, based in love, should create space to work in unison with a theological ethics of care that is also based in love. Christian ethics is, after all, like Huber also argues, concerned with a perception wherein human beings are understood to be “relational and communicative” (Huber 2015:164).

It has further been argued that there is a third element, which is also based on love, called compassion. Although compassion is something that is found in the way a person cares for the other, compassion is unique in the sense that it is something that cannot rationally or emotionally be decided on, but rather overcomes a person when they open themselves up to be influenced by it. When a person opens themselves up to the possibility of being overcome by compassion, they run the risk of being forever changed by sharing in the joys and the sorrows of others.

Compassion, however, is not care itself, or justice for that matter. When a person is spontaneously overcome by compassion, they can choose whether they want to act in a caring and just way, or walk away without doing anything at all. The argument is, still, that whatever the person decides to do in a moment of compassion, they will be affected in some way. If compassion, strong compassion that seeks the end of sorrow and hardship for other, is also based in love, it is something that can assist in assuring that justice and care prevail.

It is, therefore, proposed that compassion, as based in the Love Commandment, be regarded as a helpful and enriching contributor to the distinctive and unified theories of justice and care in the search for a more caring, just, and compassionate society. If justice and care provide assistance to the rational and relational realities of human existence, compassion provides a naturally spontaneous reality that assists both justice and care in moral situations. Compassion, as neither rational nor relational, adds another vital characteristic to human behaviour that seeks the wellbeing and worth of all human beings by exalting those who are humbled as equals. Together, care, justice, and compassion form the core of the Love Commandment, which strives
for all human beings to be treated equally and in a worthy manner in order for them to truly flourish.

4.6 The Theological Ethics of Care in an African context?

In chapter two and chapter three of this dissertation, the main contributors to the conversation regarding the ethics of care, Carol Gilligan and Joan Tronto, both pleaded for the relational approach of the ethics of care to be recognised as an equal moral approach to the ethics of justice. Both of these scholars argue that the ethics of justice and the ethics of care should work together in order to create a society that is more caring and just. In this chapter it has been argued, through the work of predominantly Frits de Lange, that a theological ethics of care based in the Love Commandment also appeals for the relational approach to morality to take its place as an equal moral theory working in unison with the ethics of justice.

One of the most important things to note about all three of these scholars, apart from the fact that all of them have done extensive research on the ethics of care, is their context. Gilligan and Tronto are both from the United States of America, while De Lange is from the Netherlands. The context from which they address the ethics of care would, therefore, not only be a first world perspective, but also predominantly Western. While the ethics of care as a relational approach to morality may be considered as ground-breaking or different to the usual individualistic or autonomous approach to morality for some people in a first world Western context, the reception of this dissertation and the content regarding the theological ethics of care may not be an entirely foreign notion to grasp within an African context. Relationality and religion, in fact, are central to African thinking and African morality\textsuperscript{364}. An ethics of care that works in unison with an ethics of justice, both based in love, may be a moral approach that

\textsuperscript{364} Louise Kretzschmar, a professor of theological ethics at the University of South Africa and a member of the Baptist Convention in South Africa, and André van Niekerk, a minister of the Dutch Reformed Church in South Africa and part-time lecturer at the University of South Africa, note that there has been an ongoing debate on whether African ethics is primarily influenced by religion or whether it is primarily built upon a more humanistic approach that is “based on human social needs and fellowship” (Kretzschmar & Van Niekerk 2009:61). According to them, it is possible that African ethics may be a combination of “the full range between these two poles” (Kretzschmar & Van Niekerk 2009:61).
may be more acceptable in an African context where justice, relationality, and religion are highly important and relevant matters, as opposed to moral approaches that tend to be focused solely on autonomy and individuality. Morality and moral thinking in an African context is therefore different to the contexts of Gilligan, Tronto, and De Lange.

Neville Richardson\textsuperscript{365} (2009:43), while writing about morality and communality in Africa, acknowledges that morality in an African context cannot necessarily be spoken of as one “unified morality over such a large and diverse area” (Richardson 2009:43), especially considering that there are different views on ethics when it comes to certain matters concerning morality\textsuperscript{366}. This does not, however, mean that it is impossible to find some common factors that provide a more unified perspective of morality in the African context. In fact, Richardson (2009:43) quotes Kasenene who says: “It would be misleading to overlook such cultural differences, but it would, however, be equally wrong not to recognise the common values and, at times, uniformity that exists within diversity, south of the Sahara. There is a common Africanness, which must not be lost sight of” (Richardson 2009:43). It is, therefore, possible and important to look at certain unified characteristics of morality within an African context, more specifically a Sub-Saharan perspective of morality. Richardson (2009:44) argues for at least five features that are often identified within an African morality: “holism, vitalism, communality, ancestors, and ubuntu”\textsuperscript{367} (Richardson 2009:44). At least four of these five features can be directly or indirectly linked to the centrality of relationships and/or religion within African morality.

\textsuperscript{365} Neville Richardson, at the time of writing this, was the dean of students at the Seth Mokitimi Seminary in Pietermaritzburg in South Africa. He is also connected to the University of KwaZulu-Natal as a senior research associate.

\textsuperscript{366} Richardson (2009:43) lists issues like abortion, homosexuality, and the death penalty as some of the moral issues that cannot claim a unified moral understanding from a Christian perspective in Africa.

\textsuperscript{367} Kretzschmar and Van Niekerk (2009:62) argue that these features are an African ethics’ strengths and that they serve as a crucial “critique of the individualism, secularism and dualism of several forms of Western moral philosophy” (Kretzschmar & Van Niekerk 2009:62).
Holism, Richardson (2009:44) argues, is a concept that may be a foreign concept from a Western perspective, because Western thought tends to be “dualistic and tend to look instinctively for pairs – above and below, human and divine, physical and spiritual, sacred and profane, before and after, inner and outer, thesis and antithesis” (Richardson 2009:44). African thinking, however, does not resemble the same preference for dualism. In fact, African thinking is traditionally holistic, meaning that objects are perceived “as a whole, rather than as their constituent parts” (Richardson 2009:44). Richardson (2009:44) notes that this holism stresses the fact that people are dependent on each other and on their environment, thereby appreciating the unique “symbiotic relationship” (Richardson 2009:44) that exist between them. Balance and harmony are crucially important in these relationships. There is further also not a distinction between secular thinking and religious thinking, for the one is intrinsically interwoven in the other (Richardson 2009:45). When it comes to African morality, then, there is also not a distinction between secular and religious. Everything that is done, is done so “for the good of all” (Richardson 2009:45).

Individuality, which is often seen as the ideal in Western thought, is something that is often completely foreign in a traditional African context. Richardson (2009:45) explains that when a religious blessing occurs, it is never something that happens to an individual on his or her own, but that it is rather something that happens to the community. He further notes that the holistic view is in actual fact a reflection of the biblical view of God’s interaction with the Israelites as a whole, rather than as individuals in the Old Testament, or the view of Paul in the New Testament that salvation through Christ is not restricted to certain individuals, but to all of humanity (Richardson 2009:45). Morality within an African context is, therefore, something that is inseparable from the good of the entire community (Richardson 2009:45). While this idea may seem foreign to some Western thinkers, it is crucially important to comprehend something of the African understanding of morality.

Communality is another feature that lies at the heart of African morality. It is well-known that a sense of community is something that is important within an African
context. Thaddeus Metz\textsuperscript{368} (2012:26) explains that ideas such as community and communitarian elements are not completely foreign to Western philosophy, but that it is not as prominent or dominant as it is in African philosophy. Richardson (2009:47) also argues that communality is a central idea when it comes to African ethics. He notes that there exists a “fascinating dialectic relationship between particular communities and their stories” (Richardson 2009:48). Storytelling form an important part of African morality in that certain traditions and morals are carried over from one generation to another. By sharing the morals and traditions through stories, a sense of belonging as part of a community is created, something that is often not found in modernised urban contexts filled with entertainment instead of stories (Richardson 2009:48).

Richardson (2009:48) stresses that a sense of identity and morality in the African context comes from a “sense of communality” (Richardson 2009:48). He writes: “It is from my community that I understand who I am and also what I should and should not do” (Richardson 2009:48). Mercy Amba Oduyoye (2001:26), a well-known African feminist theologian from Ghana who specialises in women’s theology and who is the founder of the Circle of Concerned African Women Theologians, echoes this notion when she says that “the ‘communal’ ideology” (Oduyoye 2001:26) is “a cardinal cultural trait” (Oduyoye 2001:26). From her point of view, an understanding of the human self in the context of African anthropology is completely dependent on that person’s “life-in-community” (Oduyoye 2001:26).

This sense of community and communality\textsuperscript{369} is something which is more often than not contrasted by a Western view where a lot of emphasis is placed on the individuality and autonomy of the individual (Richardson 2009:49). Unlike in Western thought influenced by philosophers like Descartes and Kant, morality in Africa is not focused

\textsuperscript{368} Thaddeus Metz is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Johannesburg who has published about 200 scholarly articles about value theory, and moral, political, and legal philosophy.

\textsuperscript{369} Richardson (2009:49) quotes John Mbiti: “Whatever happens to the individual happens to the whole group, and what happens to the whole group happens to the individual. The individual can only say: ‘I am because we are; and since we are, therefore I am’. This is a cardinal point in the African view of man [sic]”.

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on the individual (Richardson 2009:49). This does not, however, mean that African life and African thought does not include a sense of morality or that ethics is non-existent in Africa (Richardson 2009:49), but rather that it looks different to the Westernised concept of ethics.

Richardson (2009:49) writes that African ethics, like any other ethical theory, can be deontological or teleological in its approach. What distinguishes African ethics, however, is that when it is deontological “it is determined by the obligation and duty laid on an individual by the family or clan in terms of its rules or moral stories, not just by the individual’s moral sense” (Richardson 2009:49). When it is teleological, the determining factor is whatever the best option for the entire group instead of merely the individual would be (Richardson 2009:49). Richardson (2009:50) further argues that African ethics, due to its communal approach to morality, is often regarded as a “shame ethics” (Richardson 2009:50) as opposed to its Western counterpart that is often regarded as a “guilt ethic” (Richardson 2009:50). This means that those who live according to African ethics would probably regard “any wrong they may do in terms of how it is regarded by their community” (Richardson 2009:50), thereby feeling a sense of shame as opposed to those who focus on that the wrong that they may do as something that is the cause of their own wrongdoing and thereby experience a sense of guilt (Richardson 2009:50).

Another feature of African morality that reflects something of relationality is seen in the relationship between African people and their ancestors. Richardson (2009:50) explains that this is one of the features that is particularly difficult to comprehend for Western thinkers. Ancestry refers to the belief that the relationship of the community is not only restricted to those people who are alive (Richardson 2009:50), but also to

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370 Richardson (2009:49) explains that the ethical theory in Western thoughts that comes the closest to this kind of thinking is Utilitarianism where the greatest happiness is sought for the greatest amount of people. The greatest number of people in this case would be any unspecified group of people while, in African morality, the group of people would be the community of the individual involved (Richardson 2009:50).

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those who have passed on beyond present life\textsuperscript{371}. The people who have died are, therefore, regarded as active members of the community and contribute to the community in terms of the protection and prosperity of the community (Richardson 2009:50). Richardson (2009:50) explains that ancestors tend to be people who have known members of the community during their lifetime, but are not limited only to those who have been personally known to members of the community.

According to Richardson (2009:51), Western thinkers should not be too quick to dismiss ancestry as something that is fictitious, because certain churches still believe in the sainthood of people. Similar to ancestors, saints\textsuperscript{372} are people who have lived a holy life and “are held in special regards by those currently living, who are engaged in worship by the living and who are believed to have a possible positive influence on the affairs of the present” (Richardson 2009:51). One of the differences between saints and ancestors is that saints are less personal than ancestors (Richardson 2009:51). Saints are not necessarily part of a familial bloodline, but can be an unfamiliar person who was canonised by a person with the necessary religious authority to do so (Richardson 2009:51).

Richardson (2009:51) further notes that ancestors are regarded as present among community members as “the living dead” (Richardson 2009:51) even though they cannot be seen, while saints, due to the dualistic Westernised thinking, exist in a separate realm. The relationship between community members and ancestors is often regarded as a relationship wherein community members worship their ancestors (Richardson 2009:51). Richardson (2009:51) warns against this common misunderstanding and explains that members of the community honour and communicate with ancestors, but do not worship them.

\textsuperscript{371} Richardson (2009:50) writes: “In African tradition, the individual’s community looks both forward and backward beyond the confines of those who are currently alive. It encompasses those still in their mothers’ wombs, yet to be born, as well as ‘the living dead’”.

\textsuperscript{372} In September 2016, the world-famous Mother Teresa, a Catholic nun and missionary who devoted her life to charity work in India, was declared a saint in the Vatican City by Pope Francis of the Roman Catholic Church. This declaration was warmly welcomed and celebrated by people all over the world.
In an attempt to explain the relevance and importance of ancestry to morality, Richardson (2009:51) writes that it would be “very Western” (Richardson 2009:51) to assume that morality is restricted to a mere department of a mere segment of life, because the importance of ancestry to morality forms part of the holistic view that African morality forms part of. The relationship between ancestors and members of the community are, therefore, part of a holistic view of African morality wherein everything in life, whether it be relationships, well-being, or prosperity of the entire community, is intrinsically entwined with an African morality (Richardson 2009:51).

The last feature of African morality that has a direct connection to relationality in an African context, is commonly known as Ubuntu. Ubuntu is very closely related to communality, but goes even further than being a mere community\footnote{Emeritus Archbishop Desmond Tutu is a well-known, prominent, and influential religious and political figure in South Africa. He used to be the Archbishop of the Anglican Church in South Africa until his retirement. He was also a fierce political activist and freedom fighter during the Apartheid years in South Africa.}. Richardson (2009:52) quotes Emeritus Archbishop Desmond Tutu\footnote{Ackermann (2014:171) explains that Ubuntu can be regarded as an authentic African concept, “the name of which is derived from African languages in our country” (Ackermann 2014:171). She quotes Tutu when she writes: “A person with Ubuntu is open and available to others, affirming others, does not feel threatened that others are able and good, for he or she has a proper self-assurance that comes from knowing that he or she belongs in a greater whole and is diminished when others are humiliated or diminished, when others are tortured or oppressed” (Ackermann 2014:171).} who says that Ubuntu can be a very difficult concept to explain with a language that the Western world understands. Ubuntu encompasses more than communality. It is a way of living. It is a lifestyle that includes generosity, hospitality, care, and compassion (Richardson 2009:52). When Desmond Tutu describes Ubuntu he say that: “My humanity is caught up, is inextricably bound up in yours” (Richardson 2009:52) and that “a person is a person through other people” (Richardson 2009:52). For Oduyoye (2001:26) this means that what is considered to be personal, is in fact at the very same time communal. She explains that this has been carried down tradition through the belief that “I am, because we are” (Oduyoye 2001:26). Instead of saying “I think, therefore I am” (Richardson 2009:52) Tutu argues that Ubuntu in the African context rather...
believes that “I am human because I belong, participate, I share” (Richardson 2009:52), thereby resonating with what Oduyoye understands Ubuntu to be.

This Ubuntu not only includes care and compassion, but also a deep-seated sense of justice. If injustice is done unto an individual, it affects the whole community. Tutu writes: “[W]hat dehumanizes you inexorably dehumanizes me” (Richardson 2009:52). As a moral philosophy in an African context, Ubuntu has become a strong driving force against injustice, oppression, carelessness, and dehumanisation. Richardson (2009:52) further explains that those who are often the most vulnerable in society, whether it be the elderly or those affected by a mental or physical disability, are cared for within the community and its members.

Ubuntu, while in theory may sound like an unwavering moral philosophy, still has its own challenges. In the South African context, Ubuntu has been widely taught and accepted among community members, but have often become the practical responsibility of the women in communities. Koopman (2004:198) asks the question whether Ubuntu is really fulfilling its purpose if it “did not bring about the liberation of African women” (Koopman 2004:198)? When he asks this question, he basically echoes what Gilligan and Tronto calls for within the ethics of care and that is that all people, men and women alike, take up their care responsibilities within society. By doing so, Koopman (2004:198) believes that women and men alike will be re-humanised in order to have better relationships in their communities and societies. If Ubuntu, therefore, has a deeply entwined relational orientation, it is vital that the

African ethics as a whole, and not only its prominent features like Ubuntu, has its own challenges and weaknesses. Kretzschmar and Van Niekerk (2009:62) write that African ethics in contemporary society are challenged by “issues such as urbanisation, modernism, consumerism, globalisation, African womanist ethics and postmodernism” (Kretzschmar & Van Niekerk 2009:62).

Another example of Ubuntu failing in its practise is one given by Ackermann (2014:147) who explains that her “understanding of ubuntu is shattered” (Ackermann 2014:141) by things like the South Africa’s leaders’ indifference when it comes to the cry for help by Zimbabwean refugees. She, however, believes that it is not an entirely failed moral philosophy due to the fair amount of generosity that she has perceived by those who do not have a lot themselves, yet seem to share generously. Kretzschmar and Van Niekerk (2009:62) identified the lack of practical implementation of ubuntu as a feature of an African ethics as a possible contributing factor to social issues like “poverty, corruption, exploitation and xenophobia... on the continent” (Kretzschmar & Van Niekerk 2009:62).
relationality and the practical responsibilities that come with it not become the one-sided responsibility of only women. It is at this point that a contemporary moral theory like the ethics of care, as argued by Gilligan and Tronto, can be enriching within an African context and its democratic countries. The relationality and insistence on accepting responsibility by Gilligan and Tronto could speak to the heart of what matters for an African morality.

By discussing four features that are vital when it comes to African thinking and African morality, it becomes clear that there is a great appreciation for both religion and relationality among each other. Unlike the Western contexts of Gilligan, Tronto, and De Lange, individuality is not a sign of great achievement and independence. The lifestyle, moral thinking, and essence of being a human being is rather deeply rooted in the living in community with other people. A relational approach to morality, would thus not be a strange or foreign notion in a context that is already embracing it. Along with relationality, another concern within the context of modern day South Africa is the constant outcry for justice during and after Apartheid.

There is a continuous public outcry against the injustices of the past, but also as a result of the past. Justice is still a very relevant and needed discourse in Africa, and

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377 Prof Dirkie Smit (Forthcoming), an ordained minister of the Uniting Reformed Church in Southern Africa and a Systematic Theologian at the Faculty of Theology at Stellenbosch University who is internationally well known for his writings on Reformed, Ecumenical, and Public Theology, explains that “the popular and influential theologian and activist Allan Boesak” (Smit Forthcoming) is an example of a South African who has often appealed for justice within the public sphere of society during the Apartheid years. He goes on to say that even in Boesak’s most recent work, he still regards justice as a crucial discourse, not only within South Africa, but globally (Smit forthcoming). Boesak is merely one example of an endless list of political and church leaders who have called for justice within a South African (and global) context. The importance of justice and just societies are therefore still very important and relevant in South Africa today.

378 One of the more recent examples of a very public outcry against the injustices of the past can be seen in the recent #feesmustfall campaigns at university campuses all over South Africa whereby students are calling for free, quality, and decolonised education for all students in South Africa. Further public outrcies against injustice can be seen in the call for land ownership and land distribution, better living conditions, more job opportunities, and better health care, to mention only a few examples.
more specifically, in a South African democracy today. Religion still plays a very big role in an African context and in the lives of African people, and therefore also influence the way they think about justice. According to Pali Lehohla (2013:12), the Statistician-General of Statistics South Africa, only 5.6% of South Africans do not identify with any specific religion. Of the 94.4% of the South African population who do identify with a particular religion or religious organisation, 85.6% identify themselves with the Christian religion (Lehohla 2013:12).

The practical implications of a theological ethics of care working in unison with a theological ethics of justice consequently has the ability to create a new prophetic voice in an African context where relationality, justice, and religion are already crucially important parts of people’s lives and political undertakings. In fact, a relational approach such as the theological ethics of care to work in unison with a theological ethics of justice is crucial additional ethical theory considering the extreme importance of relationality in an African context. The relational theological ethics of care can therefore be an important addition to an already relevant, prominent, and important theological ethics of justice in Africa and South Africa.

The combination of a relational theological ethics of care, along with the constant call for justice in an African context, may be a refreshing way to address social, societal, political, and theological issues. In a time when everybody seems to be calling for justice, especially in a South African democracy after Apartheid, maybe a call for an theological ethics of justice working in unison with a theological ethics of care, both fundamentally based in the Love Commandment, could finally provide a step forward in building democratic societies that flourish because they are both caring and just. What can be learnt from the work of the Western thinkers such as Gilligan, Tronto, and De Lange, is that the ethics of care is a crucial addition to the ethics of justice in

379 The South African democracy at present is merely 22 years old and still in its developmental stage. This means that there are still a multitude of issues to be dealt with, especially considering the oppressive past of the country. The outcry for justice is still alive in the country after Apartheid. People are constantly seeking better lives. A conversation around the ethics of care and the ethics of justice (especially as portrayed by scholars like Gilligan, Tronto, and De Lange) would therefore be an enriching experience to draw upon in a young and developing South African democracy.
terms of resisting injustices, breaking down patriarchal structures of the past, and creating more caring and just democracies. These two contemporary ethical theories can be further enriched when a compassion, based in love, is included in as a contributing aspect.

South Africa and other African democracies can learn from the research and findings of Gilligan, Tronto, and De Lange when they call for a shift away from justice alone as a prominent contemporary ethical theory. In the same way De Gruchy felt that, in the context of the time in South Africa, the call for liberation was not enough and that justice was needed as an alternative approach, it may be time to consider calling for something more than justice in contemporary South Africa and its young and developing democracy. The suggested logical next step in South Africa and Africa, who value relationality, communality, compassion, and who has a burning passion for justice, would be to also look beyond the mere call for justice to a place where a theological ethics of justice can work in unison with a theological ethics of care and compassion in an attempt to create more caring, compassionate, and just democratic societies.

This chapter aimed to engage, from a Christian theological perspective, with the ethics of care that was developed in Chapter 2 (by mainly Gilligan) and Chapter 3 (by mainly Tronto). The hermeneutical lens that was used was the Love Commandment and Frits de Lange’s interpretation and understanding thereof. The theological ethics of care, based in love, was understood as a moral approach that has the potential of resisting injustices brought about by a patriarchal society. A theological ethics of care that is fundamentally based on love strives for both a more caring and just society. This necessitated a closer look at the ethics of justice, also firmly based in the Love Commandment. This lead to the conclusion that justice and care, both based in the Love Commandment, not only had the potential to work together as contemporary ethical theories, but that it is crucial that these two theories work together in order to create truly democratic societies is just and caring.
Apart from justice and care, a third element, also based in the Love Commandment, was suggested as an important contributor to the two contemporary ethical theories of justice and care in the search for a more caring, just, and compassionate society. The last section of this chapter reflected on the possible reception of a theological ethics of care in the context of (South) Africa where relationality and religion are regarded as central to an understanding of African morality. It was concluded that South Africa, and other African democracies, can learn from the research and findings of Gilligan, Tronto, and De Lange regarding a theological ethics of care when they call for a shift away from justice alone as a prominent contemporary ethical theory. In the next chapter concluding remarks will be made about the entire dissertation and the research question will be answered.
Chapter 5
Conclusion

The first chapter of this dissertation served as an introduction to some key figures, different concepts, and some primary resources. In the second chapter of this study, the development of the ethics of care by Carol Gilligan as a moral theory that developed as a response to the ethics of justice was discussed. It sketches the ethics of care as a relational theory, an alternative theory to the ethics of justice that is often considered to be a moral theory holding a view of individuals as autonomous, and based on rules and principles. The ethics of care seeks to give voice to people who are seen to be silenced by patriarchal structure in society. Gilligan first heard this different voice in studies she conducted with women. Although the studies were initially done with women, it became clear that the different, relational voice was not restricted to a female voice. This, however, meant that it was necessary to reevaluate the concept of the self in relation to others.

The ethics of care, as developed by Gilligan, developed into a moral theory that had an enormous impact on the moral sphere of life. This became evident through studies that were conducted with people in different social classes, genders, ages, and races. In order to include the voices of these people, it becomes imperative that the moral domain changes in order to accommodate these different voices. In working with younger girls, Gilligan saw signs of resistance to the patriarchal notion that girls have to give up relationships in order to have relationships. By joining in the resistance of these young girls, Gilligan aims to create a space for girls to be who they really are. In the process of doing so, she calls for a feminist ethics of care, with a relational nature, to be included as a self-standing moral theory to free democracy from patriarchy. In order to resist injustices brought about by patriarchy in society, it is vital that the ethics of care and the ethics of justice work in unison.

The third chapter explained how Joan Tronto builds on the ethics of care that was developed by Gilligan. In a manner similar to Gilligan, Tronto explains that the horizons
of morality need to be adapted in order for a relational approach to be included as an ethical theory. She identified at least three moral boundaries that need to be shifted; the boundary between morality and politics, the moral point of view boundary, and the boundary between public life and private life. Consequently, she argued that a feminist theory is needed in order for these boundaries to be shifted. The feminist theory she suggested is the ethics of care. She developed her own definitions of care and its different phases. By regarding care as the centre of human life, she pleads for every person to accept their care responsibilities. If care is to change the political sphere, then all passes out of caring need to be revoked. This understanding of care is further developed into a theory that has the potential to influence politics in order to create a more caring democracy. As is the case with Gilligan, she also calls for a feminist ethics of care in order to break down patriarchal structures. In discussing the importance of responsibility and care, it becomes clear that everyone has a responsibility to care for the other. If every person were to take up their care responsibility, it would be possible to create a more caring democracy.

The fourth chapter aimed to reflect on the ethics of care and what a theological ethics of care can learn from an engagement with the ethics of care and its relation to the ethics of justice. In doing so, it was argued that the Love Commandment, as a hermeneutical lens, functions as a motivation to bringing the ethics of care and the ethics of justice closer to each other instead of requiring them to be separate theories altogether. With the help of the work of Frits de Lange, the Love Commandment, as an important basis for a theological ethics of care to be built upon, was closely examined. By arguing for a theological ethics of care, it became clear that it can contribute to the relational reality that forms part of every human being. This relationship springs forth from the triadic relationship between God, the self, and the other.

It was further argued that justice, as a theological concept, can also be understood as being based in love, more specifically the Love Commandment. By arguing that both care and justice is based in love, love can be regarded as the key to bringing care and justice closer to each other. It was further argued that there is a third element, based
in love, that goes beyond a person’s ability to reason whether to act caring or justly, called compassion. By opening the self up to compassion, a person can be overcome by the joys and sorrows of others. This compassion drives a person to either respond in a caring and just way, or to walk away. Either way, a person is forever changed by the event of compassion. In the concluding remarks of the fourth chapter it was argued that love, as a theological concept, is the main idea that binds care, justice, and compassion together in an attempt to create a better society wherein all people can flourish as equals with equal worth, beings created in the image of God.

The last section of chapter four was an attempt to contextualise the reception of a theological ethics of care (working in unison with justice and compassion) in a South African and general African context. It was found that the theological ethics of care as an additional contemporary ethical theory may be the responsible next step of progress in a South African and African context who already regard justice as a crucially important matter. Seeing as the African context, unlike its Western counterparts like the United States and the Netherlands, is generally inclined to be more relational, communal, religious, and compassionate in its orientation, the belief is that the ethics of care would be well suited and well-received in an African context.

In an attempt to conclude this dissertation, the research question will be addressed:

- Are there criteria from within the Love Commandment that compel a choice between the ethics of care and the ethics of justice or should they be regarded as complementary ethical theories?

From a theological ethical point of view it is suggested that there is no reason for a decision to be made between the ethics of care and the ethics of justice. The Love Commandment as the cornerstone of the Christian tradition, as has been claimed, is the basis of both a theological ethics of care and a theological ethics of justice. It has, consequently, been argued that the Love Commandment rather functions as a reconciliatory base for both discourses. In fact, it can be argued that it is imperative that both of these theories work in unison in order to create a society that takes both
justice and care as fundamental necessities for any good society in which the value, worth, and flourishing of all people are considered to be of great importance.

In addition to being the foundation on which care and justice is built upon, it has been argued that the Love Commandment also opens the possibility for compassion to come into conversation with care and justice. Compassion brings with it its own unique characteristics which proves to be an enriching and valuable addition to the ethics of care and the ethics of justice. By arguing for love as the base of care, justice, and compassion, it is believed that the love of the Love Commandment as the hermeneutical lens of this dissertation, in fact, proposes and promotes a more just, caring, and compassionate society and does not ask for a decision to be made between the contemporary ethical theories, but rather calls for it to work together as complementary contemporary ethical theories.
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