ADOPTING "RESULTS-BASED MANAGEMENT POLICY INNOVATION: A TOOL FOR STRATEGY PLANNING AND EXECUTION": A CASE STUDY OF THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN SETTLEMENTS PROGRAMME

BY

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DECLARATION

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ABSTRACT

Transfer and adoption of western management concepts, structures and instruments often face cultural barriers and problems of misfit in developing countries. This study sought to establish the parameters and pre-conditions for results-based management (RBM) policy and management innovation transfer, taking UN-Habitat, the United Nations agency that has been mandated by the UN General Assembly to promote socially and environmentally sustainable towns and cities to provide adequate shelter for all, as a case study. The study utilised a cross-sectional design. The main field site was the coordinating programme office at the headquarters of UN-Habitat in Nairobi. Each of the three regional offices, including the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) country office located in Nairobi, was visited, however. The respondents were persons who had experience working with UN-Habitat while the key informants were those persons who had been key players in the design and implementation of the programme.

The study found that UN-Habitat is a highly complex, dynamic and image-conscious organisation. It appears to have many established habits, but at the same time is able to continually reflect, self-assess, and align itself with the external environment. UN-Habitat had many opportunities that were conducive to the successful transfer and adoption of the outlined RBM technology (Figure 2.3). These were the existence of in-house RBM expertise, UN-Habitat's Self-Assessment and Self-Aligning Management Practices, the existence of good communication channels and competent Programme Officers.

The RBM policy innovation transfer process at UN-Habitat had been incremental, and was partially successful, but remained largely incomplete. Some critical components, like systematic

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monitoring systems, had not been adequately transferred, while others, like results-oriented budgeting, were still in the early stages of the transfer process. Although RBM was appreciated by all at UN-Habitat, there were organisational cultures that hindered the acceptance of RBM. These cultures concerned governance, the reward system, and internal capacity, which may be summarised as staff not trusting management, which results in failure to speak out and also management's failure to read between the lines concerning why the staff close up. The study revealed that the transfer of RBM policy innovation faced several barriers related to a lack of compatibility and congruence with the organisation-wide systems and interests of individual programme officers.

From the findings, the study concludes that RBM policy innovation transfer comprises a continuous and conscious effort to systematically improve programme efficiency and effectiveness that will have no end. Technology designs and end user considerations should feature in discussions between developers and users before the commencement of the transfer process. The depth of RBM policy innovation transfer at UN-Habitat concerns the extent to which management is willing to go into the organisational culture to solve transfer problems. Change that occurs at the formal level rarely penetrates deep inside the organisation in such a way that would improve effectiveness or performance capacity. Findings of this study indicated that UN-Habitat had made multiple corrective changes in an effort to align the organisational culture with the mission.

It is recommended that, for successful RBM policy innovation transfer to occur, UN-Habitat has to stop being oversensitive to criticism. Successful transfer in an organisation should thus not be characterised by fear. RBM is about learning and adaptive management (Figure 2.3).

Sustained commitment by top management is required and strong leadership is necessary. Management should adopt a results framework that distinguishes more clearly between strategic planning and strategic execution.   RBM policy innovation has to be appreciated by both donors and recipients as a tool to help organisations succeed through learning and adopting programming accordingly, as opposed to being an accountability "policing and control" tool.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

Cap-Scan	Institutional Capacity Scan
CBAM	Concerns-based Adoption Model
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CPR	Committee of Permanent Representatives
DFID	Department of Foreign International Development
HIPC	Highly Indebted Poor Countries
IMDIS	Integrated Monitoring and Documentation Information System
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MfDR	Managing for Development Results
M & E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MTSIP	Medium-Term Strategic Institutional Plan
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OIOS	Office of Investigations and Oversight Services
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Programmes
RBM	Result Based Management
SMART	Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Realistic &Time bound
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
UN-Habitat	United Nations Habitat and Human Settlements Programme
UNHHSF	United Nations Habitat and Human Settlements Foundation
WFP	World Food Programme

WP   Work Plan

WUF 4   World Urban Forum 4

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DEFINITION OF TERMS AND CONCEPTS

Definition of key terminology relevant to the study

Accountability in development refers to the obligations of development recipients to act according to clearly defined responsibilities, roles and performance expectations, often with respect to the prudent use of resources. For public sector managers and policy makers, accountability is to taxpayers/citizens, as indicated by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (OECD, 2002a).

Aid donors/agencies or Western donor /agencies countries include member countries of the OECD and other countries like Japan, the Scandinavian countries, and UN bodies and multilateral organisations like The World Bank and the IMF that give money in the form of grants or loans to developing countries.

Developing countries are countries (mostly in Africa, Asia and Latin America) that receive international development assistance from Western countries. They rank lowest in the United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Index Ranking Report (UNDP, 2004).

Development programmes or interventions are instruments used for partner (donor and non-donor) support aimed to promote development. Examples could be policy advice, projects, or programmes (OECD, 2002a).

Results are those changes that are attributable to the breadth and depth of influence an organisation has through the use of resources. They are desirable or measurable changes in state (outputs, outcomes, impacts, negative or positive) that are derived from a development intervention (OECD, 2006b; Shand & OECD, 1994).

Results-based Management (RBM) refers to a team effort based on participatory management strategy designed to improve programme and management effectiveness, efficiency and accountability and focuses on achieving defined development results at output, outcomes and impact levels. The approach ensures that financial and human resources are strategically deployed to achieve the greatest human development impact (Goldstein, Skoufias, & Fiszbein, 2008; Menon, Karl, & Wignaraja, 2009).

Strategic planning comprises an organisation's process of defining its strategy, or direction, and making decisions on allocating its resources to pursue this strategy. In order to determine the direction of the organisation, it is necessary to understand its current position and the possible avenues through which it can pursue a particular course of action. Generally, strategic planning deals with at least one of three key questions (Armstrong, 1986; Mulcaster, 2008).

Strategy execution involves visualising the strategy, measuring the strategy, reporting progress, making decisions, identifying strategy projects, aligning strategy projects, managing projects, communicating strategy, aligning individual roles, and rewarding performance.

Strategy execution involves a process and the discipline of getting things done (Mulcaster, 2008; Larry & Ram, 2002). It is a discipline or "systematic way of exposing reality and acting on it." The authors explain that "the heart of execution lies in three core processes": people, strategy and operations. Strategy execution therefore encompasses the processes and descriptions that managers use to successfully drive business results. Strategy execution is about linking strategy to operations for competitive advantage (Mckeown, 2013).

Strategy is about shaping the future (Mckeown, 2013; Mulcaster, 2008). Strategy is something that people do, both as style of thinking, in "strategic planning", and the combination of actions

taken in "strategy execution" along with their consequences. Individuals, and groups, can increase their ability to think and act strategically, by finding the best route to desirable ends with available means.

Technologies, in this study, refer to ideas, concepts, structures, knowledge, practices and values.

Transfer of technologies refers to the cross-cultural, cross-border, and cross-organisational process whereby information, ideas, and practices move from one point or system to another (Clark & Geppert, 2002). (In the context of this study the movement is from Western developers to users in developing countries.)

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

The fast-changing global environment is forcing countries, companies and individuals to improve their competitiveness by acquiring new technical skills and investing in more advanced technologies and management skills. However, there are many factors inhibiting the adoption of new technologies and management skills, particularly in developing countries. Moreover, without adopting these, these countries will continue lagging in their development efforts. In an effort to improve accountability for the money that developing countries receive from developed countries and other organisations, developed countries introduced Result-based Management (RBM). RBM systems are government-wide reforms established by western development donor countries and multilateral agencies including Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as a response to a general public sense that development aid to developing countries was not working very well (Bamberger & Kirk, 2009; OECD, 2006b). RBM is both a management system and a performance reporting system which judges an operation by its outcomes or impacts as opposed to inputs or outputs (Bamberger & Kirk, 2009). The effect of the approach is to link budget planning with strategic policy planning, thus moving the institution from an internal management focus to an outward looking orientation, centred on achieving results (Carvalho, 2010).

The government-wide legislation in the OECD countries has driven and guided public sector reforms and multilateral organisations that benefit from these governments into conducting their

business in a results-oriented manner (OECD, 2006b). The policy requirement has subsequently been transferred to their funding beneficiaries, who are mostly non-profit organisations and governments in developing countries (OECD, 2006b). RBM specifically requires social organisations, governments, and communities supported by donor agencies to focus their work, plan strategically, and credibly demonstrate the difference that the organisations are making to human development (Menon et al., 2009). It also requires that public project and programme deliverables be measurable, observable, relevant, and verifiable, and is intended to enhance a culture of accountability, learning, and achieving results (Menon et al., 2009; OECD, 2006b). More specifically, donor agencies want to see more evidence that funded activities are producing longer-term human development benefits.

While RBM has been widely acclaimed and endorsed by development aid donors as a good management approach to the efficiency and effectiveness of non-profit sector programmes, literature (Nigel Holden, Cooper, & Carr, 1998; Dorota & Jankowicz, 2002) on transfer of management knowledge cautions that the process of transfer is complex. Further more, knowledge (like RBM) cannot be easily transferred across national, cultural, and institutional boundaries and implemented un- problematically within organisations without modifications (DFID, 2001b).

This study was motivated by the conviction that, while RBM seems conceptually appealing to end-user not-for-profit and developer donors alike, issues of development effectiveness and efficiency will remain a receding target, unless transfer problems are identified and addressed.

Theories on transfer of knowledge were not tested during the study, but they served as helpful frameworks for understanding the process of RBM transfer.

1.2   RBM AS A TOOL FOR PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT

According to the World Bank (2008a), one of the major challenges facing both developing countries and donor countries is the question of measuring and qualifying achievements of development interventions in terms of human development.   In spite of the billions of development dollars spent by donor agencies over the decades in developing countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe, economic and social growth expected from recipient countries has remained unrealised and elusive (Hulme, 2007; The World Bank, 2008b).

It has been noted that the majority of developing countries have maintained their largely poor status, and others have slid deeper into poverty, raising questions about the effectiveness of development programmes and projects in changing people's lives.   Internal and external customers of development assistance programmes are asking for better use of aid resources and evidence of the difference the resources are making in the lives of targeted beneficiaries (Menon et al., 2009; OECD, 2006b). They want to understand what is being achieved in relation to what is being spent.

There is a general sense that aid is not working very well, and that the prevailing "aid fatigue" (that is, the public's perception that aid programmes are failing to produce the desired development results) has resulted in declining budgets over the years. The effectiveness of the development agencies that have been carrying out economic growth through the Poverty

Reduction Strategy Programmes (PRSP) and the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiatives, have been rightly criticised for an implementation process that is very slow; and for paying too little attention to the final impact of their interventions (DFID, 2001; Menon et al., 2009).

While there was some progress in reducing income poverty, there was too little improvement in the performance of most of the non-income poverty indicators. This suggests that it is unlikely that the non-income Millennium Development Goal targets will be met by the end of 2015. Outcome indicators for growth, regional cooperation and integration, basic infrastructure, and governance showed satisfactory progress (Cummings & Worley, 2001).

According to government reports accessed by the Menon et al. (2009), there is growing public concern for national debt reduction as evidenced by the declining confidence in political leadership coupled with the globalisation of the economy through free trade and, consequently, increased competitiveness in the open market; these have all been important factors increasing pressure from the donor tax-paying public for demonstrating efficient and effective use of public resources. This new development has led to an increase in the number of evaluations to assess the effectiveness and impact of programmes in various organisational settings: in developing countries, including non-profit and for-profit organisations; local and government agencies; universities; and foundations (Nelson, 2012; OECD, 2002a; World Bank, 2010).

One core development concern has been the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) pledged by world leaders, whose overarching goal is to cut world poverty by half by

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2015, through improved organisational effectiveness or operational results (World Bank, 2005). According to the World Bank (2005) and UNDP (2004), achieving the MDGs (a commitment by the international community to an expanded vision of development, to one that vigorously promotes human development as the key to sustaining social and economic progress in all countries) by 2015, will require more focus on development outcomes (results) and less on inputs to effectively improve human development.

There has been emphasis on improving performance and ensuring that government activities achieve desired results and need to be supported by performance management systems (OECD, 2006b). Performance management, also referred to as results-based management (RBM), can be defined as a broad management strategy aimed at achieving important changes in the way government agencies operate, with improving performance (achieving better results) as the central orientation. Performance measurement is concerned more narrowly with the production or supply of performance information, and is focused on technical aspects of clarifying objectives, developing indicators, and collecting and analysing data on results. Performance management encompasses performance measurement, but is broader. It is equally concerned with generating management demand for performance information – that is, with its uses in programme, policy, and budget decision-making processes and with establishing organisational procedures, mechanisms and incentives that actively encourage its use (OECD, 2006b). In an effective performance management system, achieving results and continuous improvement based on performance information is central to the management process.

The 1990s saw a shift in the thinking and practice of development cooperation from aid flows being determined by national strategic considerations to a focus on the promotion of sustainable human development (Clinton, 2012). This shift also resulted in a steady decline in official development assistance and increasing pressure from the public in donor countries to demonstrate effectiveness of aid (UNDP, 2007). In response, some bilateral organisations (led by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the public sector in some donor countries (such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand) began to adopt a results-based management approach that was widely used in the private sector. To reverse the declining resource base, assure predictability of programme funding and demonstrate performance focus to the donors, UNDP also adopted results-based management (AfDB, 2013).

By promoting RBM, donors want to see more evidence that publicly funded organisational activities are producing longer-term benefits leading to the achievement of MDGs, and that they can describe and track these results (Menon et al., 2009; OECD, 2002b). RBM systems demand that development aid beneficiaries, like UN-Habitat, define clear and measurable goals, monitor and assess progress towards the achievement of these goals, use performance information to achieve better results and integrate lessons learnt, while reporting on performance (Menon et al., 2009).

The quest to better management for development results has led to the uniform adoption and use of RBM by multilateral organisations like the United Nations (UN), The World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), who receive their major contributions from OECD governments (OECD, 2006b). More recently, the Paris Declaration identified the five principles

of country ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results, and mutual accountability as the core of the global development agenda (The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action, 2005/2008: 3-8). This push towards results management has gained momentum and there is now a broad consensus regarding the importance of achieving measurable results (Ravishankar et al., 2009; Afdb, 2013).

Some aspects of RBM are, however, not dramatically new to the world of programme and project management. More than anything, RBM represents a shift of emphasis or paradigm in public sector management, beyond a traditional concern with operational aspects of programme and project management to an emphasis on longer-term human development results, which are outcomes and impacts (Morris, 2006). Positive changes in the lives of targeted people and communities is therefore expected (Carvalho, 2010). Thus, by specifically looking at what was achieved as compared to what was intended, aid-donors can be provided with a lens to examine whether they are on track to achieving development effectiveness.

In recent years, donor agencies have wanted to see organisational effectiveness hand in hand with improved development effectiveness for the results process to get fully aligned, which, at the moment, does not appear to be closely linked (Carvalho, 2010; OECD, 2006b). According to the RBM approach, improved management effectiveness and accountability requires involving key stakeholders in defining realistic expected results; assessing risk; monitoring progress toward the achievement of expected results; integrating lessons learnt into management decisions; and reporting on performance. It integrates the management of strategies, resources, activities, and information about performance (Menon et al., 2009).

The "results revolution" therefore came to the development sector in part as a result of "aid fatigue" (OECD, 2006b). By 2000, there was growing pressure for institutional reform and a rethinking of the traditional way of doing business (OECD, 2003). Evidently, if aid was to be effective, it was not going to be business as usual for the state and non-state actors in development. The results revolution was also fuelled by the development of powerful tools based on systematic analysis of logical cause and effect. Logical frameworks (logframes) were quickly accepted as valuable tools for improving planning, implementation, measuring and reporting results (Kusek & Rist, 2004).

The emergence of evidence-based policy making, evidence-based management and evidence-based decision making has gained prominence when accountability is required for monies given out for development projects. It involves generating management demand for performance information – for use in programme, policy, and budget decision-making processes, and for the establishment of organisational procedures, mechanisms and incentives that actively encourage the use of data (DFID, 2001). In an effective performance management system, achieving results and continuous improvement based on performance information is central to the management process (Menon et al., 2009). Strengthening the organisational performance management function, therefore, serves two key purposes:

(a)   Management improvement, which involves using performance information generated through performance measurement for management learning and decision-making processes to effect adjustments that improve programmes and projects based on feedback about results being achieved, and resource allocation; and

(b)   Performance reporting 'accountability' ensuring that organisations use performance information for accountability for results and managing for results.

Some of the governments that committed themselves to RBM are the United States of America (USA) through the 1993 United States Government Performance and Results Act; the United Kingdom (UK) through the 1995 White Paper on Better Accountability for the Tax Payers' Money; and Australia's Accruals-based Outcome and Output Budgeting. In Canada, the Office of the Auditor General and the Treasury Board Secretariat are the primary promoters of results reforms across federal government. Five bilateral organisations (USAID; the Department for International Development (DFID); AUSAID; the Danish International Development Agency – DANIDA; and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)) and two multilateral organisations (the UNDP and The World Bank) are leading in RBM experience (OECD, 2006b).

RBM has therefore been generally accepted as a coherent framework for strategic planning and management based on learning and accountability (OECD, 2006b). Firstly it is a management system and, secondly, a performance measurement and reporting system. It reflects the way in which an organisation applies processes and resources to achieve interventions targeted at commonly agreed results. RBM is a participatory and team-based approach to programme planning, monitoring and evaluation and focuses on achieving defined and measurable results and impact (UNDP, 2009). RBM requires that all stakeholders are involved in the design and the management of interventions. This involves participatory identification of unmet needs, defining of desired changes or results; and establishment and participation in performance measurement.

It is designed to improve programme delivery and strengthen management effectiveness, efficiency and accountability (AWID, 2013).

Governments require their international development agencies to demonstrate the purpose and value of all public funded activities. This has resulted in the introduction of RBM to bilateral organisations and recipients of their funding. With UN-Habitat (end-users) of bilateral funding, the introduction of RBM from Western countries (developers) was done to demonstrate results and value for money. However, the transfer of RBM from these Western developers to UN-Habitat was not negotiated. The RBM policy management innovation was made available or disseminated to the organisations through policy documents. Sustained funding to development programmes has since been pegged on how well recipients of such donor funds adopt and implement these blueprints from investors.

RBM suffers from what Rogers Everett (1995) calls "pro-innovation bias". The transfer model that was used assumed that potential end-users like UN-Habitat would be interested in RBM as a new and appropriate technology and would willingly accept it and use it without any capacity or contextual problems. The developers of RBM policy management innovation also assumed that, since it was conceptually appealing, it would self-sell. Thus implications for end-users did not seem to have been taken into consideration in the transfer model.

While RBM was expected to transfer successfully to end-users, further effort on the part of most developers has not been there. For instance, little, if anything, has been done by the RBM policy management innovation developers (Western donors) to educate the end-users (UN-Habitat or

UNDP) or to develop their capacity to design, to adopt, or adapt the new technology to context. Learning or any form of capacity development for designing, using and sustaining the system at UN-Habitat was not provided.

Development literature (OECD/DAC, 1999; World Bank, 2004; UNDP, 2001) cautions that, while some see merit in the RBM approach and view it as a navigating aid to assist organisations to achieve their intended results, many organisations that are now required to use the approach for project designs and progress reports, see RBM as an imposition motivated mostly by investor's accountability concerns. The Overseas Development Institute (ODI, 2003) also warns that attempts to just transplant mechanisms such ase RBM developed in OECD countries into very different institutional environments found in developing countries without contextualising them to different conditions, have rarely had a significant impact.

The transfer of RBM policy management innovation has been described as the new way of managing for development results by end users at UN-Habitat. To understand the phenomenon of transfer, the study was aligned to the literature on transfer and diffusion of technologies (Hall & Hord, 1987; Rogers Everett, 1995); transfer of management knowledge to developing countries; and private and public sector literature (OECD, 2006b) on RBM.

Rose (1993) asserts that many propositions that are true across space are not true across time. To say that a programme that works in one place could not work in another confuses a truth about the present with uncertainty about the future. He asserts that the fact that country Y does not have the programme in effect today indicates that there may be difficulties in its immediate

transference from country X (Rose, 1993). But this does not mean that a programme cannot be introduced there in the future. The farther ahead one looks, the greater the degree of uncertainty, and thus, the greater the possibility of applying lessons from elsewhere.

At a given moment, it is easy to document obstacles to adopting a policy management innovation based on experience elsewhere. A historicist argues against lesson-drawing on the assumption that present obstacles remain in place; the future is assumed to be determined by past events. In the short run, the political inertia of public agencies, employees, budgets, and laws makes programmes and policies "sticky" and difficult to alter. But every obstacle to change is sooner or later vulnerable to challenge (Rose, 1993). With time programmes become easier to transfer without any alteration in their intrinsic characteristics, as changes in policy environments remove obstacles.

While transfer theories were not tested during the study, they serve as a helpful framework for understanding the process. Transfer of RBM knowledge in this study includes not just the acceptance and appropriation of the new technical knowledge, but also new ways of thinking and understanding new discourses and, more deeply, the values, beliefs and assumptions upon which new practices were found.

Transfer theories emphasised factors that promote or undermine the transfer process from one point to another. They, for instance, emphasise that local values and cultures and management learning must always be taken into account for successful transfer of management knowledge (Lang & Steger, 2002; Mahoney & Chi, 2001). (Peng, 2001).

The correspondence in most available RBM literature by development donor agencies and multilateral organisations (Goldstein et al., 2008; OECD, 2006b) points to the fact that for RBM to be successfully transferred, the following six design and implementation aspects must be incorporated:

a) Expected results must be clearly defined and measurable;

b) Underlying assumptions and risks must be identified and monitored over time;

c) Performance indicators that will be used to measure progress towards results and to judge performance must be selected;

d) Performance monitoring systems must be developed to regularly collect performance information on actual results, to review, to analyse and to report performance (actual results vis-à-vis the targeted results);

e) In managing for development results, systems must integrate formative evaluations to performance measurement to provide complementary performance information not readily available from performance monitoring systems; and

f) Performance information is used not only for internal management accountability, learning and decision-making processes, but also for external performance reporting to stakeholders and partners.

According to OECD (2006b), the first three phases or processes generally relate to a results-oriented planning approach, sometimes referred to as strategic planning. The first five together are usually included in the concept of performance measurement. All six phases combined are essential to an effective RBM system - that is, integrating complementary information from both evaluations and performance measurement systems and ensuring use of this information are viewed as critical aspects of RBM.

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Bamberger and Kirk (2009), Loffler & Bovaird (2009), OECD (2006b), further indicate that, for RBM systems to be successfully transferred, they must be supported by a corporate culture characterised by the following good governance values:

- Accountability: Institutional mechanism for holding managers accountable for achieving results within the spheres of control;

- Empowerment: Managers with delegated authority to the management level are held accountable for results, and empowered with flexibility to make corrective adjustment and to shift resources to better performing activities;

- Transparency: Disclosure, reformed policies, procedures, roles and responsibilities to support the RBM system and an organisational culture (values, attitudes, behaviour of personnel) that supports the effective implementation of the RBM system;

- Results Focus: A focus on targeted client satisfaction with goods and services;

- Participation: Inclusiveness and partnership in all aspects of performance measurement and management processes, and shared interest and understanding of development objectives; and

- A developed support mechanism to help managers implement performance measurement and a management process that provides appropriate training and technical assistance needs to be established.

1.3   STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Billions of dollars are spent each year on development programmes like those of the UN-Habitat, in an effort to alleviate poverty and accelerate economic growth in developing countries (World

Bank, 2002), yet poverty does not seem to reduce. Most development donor agencies see successful transfer of RBM systems to development programmes as a plausible solution to problems of development inefficiency, ineffectiveness, and poor accountability to stakeholders (CIDA, 2010). The key question is how well the RBM systems are transferred to developing countries' developmental programmes and more so in a development organisation like UN-Habitat, and whether RBM has contributed to improvements in managing for development results and accountability, including its acceptability. Although there is a lot of literature on RBM in development work, a literature search indicated limited scholarly evidence of either successes or failures of the approach, especially in developing countries.

While RBM might be a useful performance management tool for the public and social sector organisations and in OECD countries, little is empirically known about its transfer (adoption) process to developental management sector of developing countries, its practicality, or its promises (Bamberger & Kirk, 2009; OECD, 2006b). Current management research literature cautions that the process of transfer of management knowledge is complex, and knowledge cannot be easily transferred across national, cultural, and institutional boundaries and implemented unproblematically within organisations without modifications (Holden, 1998; Nigel Holden et al., 1998). Current approaches to knowledge transfer are, however, based on a belief that there is a one best way in which certain aspects can be done, a belief that one world-wide approach to doing business is the key to both efficiency and effectiveness and that this can be transferred easily (Rogers Everett, 1995).

Transfer and adoption of western management concepts, structures, and instruments often face cultural barriers and problems of misfit, which can be characterised as technical and institutional inconsistencies. The other challenge is failure to consider the level of development and the economic structure of the recipient countries. For the transfer of management knowledge to be successful, enabler local values and cultures must also be taken into account (Dobosz & Jankowicz, 2002). The best way of doing things can be inappropriate due to fundamental differences between the values of different cultures, but if these can be taken into account and localised (Clark & Geppert, 2002), technology or policy transfer can be achieved. In comparison, in western countries, change takes place within a relatively stable framework of social and economic institutions, and managers of business organisations therefore operate within relatively known parameters (Clark & Soulsby, 2007; Clark & Soulsby, 2005), which is not the case within developing countries. The main questions to be answered are: What are the parameters that are prerequisites for RBM policy and management innovation transfer? What competencies and capacity are required to transfer and adopt a performance management tool like RBM in a development organisation in the public sector? Do recipient organisations or end users have the required competencies?

1.4   PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The purpose of this study was to look at the factors that determine the success or failure in the process of policy management innovation transfer using the RBM systems from developers in western countries to end-users in developing countries in the development management field.

Specifically, the objectives of the study were to:

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(i) Analyse the existing literature on the theoretical foundation (adoption of innovation transfer of management knowledge, and organizational culture) and how RBM has been used in measuring the performance of projects by different recipients supported by donors in the development management field,

(ii) Capture the experience, lessons learned and complexities of transferring and adopting policy management innovation from the developers in western countries to end users, UN-Habitat case for the development management field.

(iii) Identify the complexities and peculiarities associated with the transfer, especially in the context of development not-for-profit organisation, and

(iv) Provide recommendations for future technological innovation transfer between developed and developing countries that might enable the adoption of the new innovation in future in the development management field.

Specific research questions were formulated to pursue these objectives.

1.5   RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The following research questions were framed from the objectives of the study:

(i) Objective 1: Analyse the existing literature on the theoretical foundation (adoption of innovation transfer of management knowledge, and organizational culture) and how RBM has been used in planning and measuring the performance of projects by different recipients supported by donors in the development management field.

- What insights and knowledge exist in the literature on transfer of new policy management innovation like RBM in the development management field say?

- How has managing for development results been transferred to UN-Habitat at the headquarters and the three regional offices?

- How has RBM been applied to different components of development programmes at UN-Habitat?

Objective 2: Capture the experience, lessons learned and complexities of transferring and adopting the policy management innovation from the developers in western countries to end users, UN-Habitat a case for the development management field.

- What lessons were learned by UN-Habitat and UNDP from the transfer of RBM in the development management field?

- What potential lies in existing cultures of the UN-Habitat and UNDP for effective transfer of managing for development results?

- How has RBM transfer been received and accepted at UN-Habitat and UNDP as the receiving organisations?

Objective 3: Identify the complexities and peculiarities associated with the transfer, especially in a context of a development not-for-profit organisation in the development management field.

- What lessons have been learned at UN-Habitat and UNDP in managing for the development result's transfer process?

Objective 4: Provide recommendations for future technological transfer between the developed and developing countries that would enable the adoption of the new innovation in the development management field.

- What are the best ways of technological transfer for development purposes between the developed and developing (Donor and receiving) partners in the development management field?

- What is an effective RBM policy innovation transfer theory of change?

1.6 SIGNIFICANCE AND JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY

The study was set out to understand the adoption and transfer of a technology (RBM) that was directing the way the world was conducting development management in the non-government sector (donor perspective). This is because the non-government sector has away in which it influences technological transfer which sometimes also endup in the public sector. However, this study does not focus on public administration/public management perspective at all... The theoretical model for drivers of successful RBM policy innovation transfer (Figure 2.3) was developed, and gained insights that were absent in the theory of policy innovation technology transfer in the development management field, including on-site in-depth insight from field sites, which are often neglected in the policy innovation transfer process. This research study helped develop a theory of change for RBM policy innovation (Figure 8.1) in the development management field which was missing before. It further sought evidence-based insights gained on the peculiarities, practicality and problems associated with developmental technological transfer. It also adds to the general body of knowledge on the transfer of management knowledge, but more specifically in the development management organisation context. The information forms a database for future comparison and theory building. The new information could inform the way programmes in the development management field are designed and delivered, and this could, in the long run, have a positive effect on development progress for millions of poor people in the world targeted in such development programmes.

The study therefore extends frontiers of knowledge by documenting model requirements prerequisite for effective transfer and adoption of policy management innovation (RBM) from

western developers to end-user developing country programmes in the development management field. First, it seeks to understand the transfer of policy management innovation (RBM) that is directing the way in which the world is conducting social development business. Secondly, it is unique in that it examines the fit and consistency of the technology in a non-traditional not-for-profit organisation—a development-based international programme.

Any evidence-based insights gained on the peculiarities, practicality and problems associated with the transfer will in some way add to the general information available on transfer of management knowledge, but more specifically in a development organisation. The new information could inform the way human settlement development programmes are designed and delivered, and this could in the long run positively affect development progress for millions of the poor in the world targeted by such programmes.

For any new transfer of management policy innovation like RBM requires knowledge and insights on its adoption. Research data holds a promise by providing knowledge that creates a deeper understanding of the peculiarities and complexities associated with such transfer.

More importantly, it is hoped that the new knowledge will provide aid-donor agencies, multilateral organisations, private foundations and public sector organisations in developing countries with more realistic expectations of what RBM can do, and what it cannot do for development programmes. Such insights in an applied field can result in significant changes in the way development programmes are delivered and managed, hence contributing to better livelihoods for targeted communities.

The study is an important first step to understanding complexities involved in the transfer of management knowledge (RBM) from developer countries to end users in the social sectors of developing countries.   It is hoped that the greater the knowledge about the RBM transfer process, the more the development practice and theories will be improved, and ultimately the greater the advancement in human development. The study will also contribute significantly to add value to the body of knowledge on RBM policy innovation transfer.

Lastly, lessons learned about critical factors for successful RBM transfer to a human settlement-based end-user organisation might improve programme design, institutional context, and the implementation process, and generate some practical guidance for similar organisations seeking to operationalize RBM policy innovation.

1.7   ORGANISATION OF THE STUDY

The study has been divided into eight chapters. Chapter 1 which is the introduction sets out to provide the background to the study and the rational of RBM, as well as the potential contribution of the study to the body of knowledge on development management. Chapter 2 presents literature reviewed on adoption of innovation models, theories on management knowledge transfer, organisation culture, all providing the theoretical foundation to the research. The chapter also presents literature on RBM and supports the realisation of the objectives in analysing the existing literature on the use of how RBM policy innovation in development management in the non-government sector and by the different donor recipients in planning and measuring performance of projects. The literature review integrates sources from development

agencies with more academic writings thereby futher broadening understanding of the principles of RBM in the context of development aid from both these viewpoints to inform better development management. The chapter also presents a theoretical model for successful RBM policy innovation transfer. The methodology is presented in Chapter 3. The chapter describes how the study was conducted and what the study involved. The chapter defines the strategies employed in extending the frontiers of knowledge in the transfer of RBM policy innovation. Chapter 4 describes the study context in detail. Events cannot be fully understood outside of their context. Hence, the processes of RBM transfer to the UN-Habitat Programme could not be sufficiently understood independent of its wider context. The context describes the site, background history of the wider organisation, the vision and mission, mandate and geographical focus, governance structure, and important evolutionary changes in the recent past. The description of the context is not limited to the present, however, but straddles across changes in the last 10 years, and traces the effects of those changes in the existing UN-Habitat physical and material culture.

Chapters 5, 6 and 7 capture the findings, experiences and document lessons learned, including the enablers and potential in UN-Habitat's and UNDP's existing culture for effective transfer of managing for development results and how RBM transfer was received and accepted at UN-Habitat and UNDP. The chapters also capture the experience and complexities of transferring and adopting the RBM policy innovation from the developers in western countries to end users; UN-Habitat and UNDP. Chapter 5 looks at the good practices and enables for the transfer of RBM policy in the UN-Habitatat, including the ideology, political support and empowerment. Chapter 6 similarly examines the barriers in the transfer of RBM at the UN-habitat while

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Chapter 7 puts the preceiding chapters into context before presenting the steps of successful transfer of RBM.

Chapter 8 presents a summary of the findings, conclusions and recommendations, and proposes components for an effective and ideal RBM system. It also presents a theory of change for RBM as a further contribution to the academic and practical world. Finally relevant lessons for the successful transfer of RBM technology is offered in this chapter.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW FOR RESULTS-BASED MANAGEMENT

2.1   INTRODUCTION

Chapter 2 presents literature on RBM policy innovation adoption, diffusion of innovation models, concern-based adaptation model, explores the transfer of management knowledge, organization culture and human factors and Results-based Management (RBM). It presents the different contexts under which RBM has been applied and the challenges faced in implementing it. The chapter is divided into three parts: part one (sections 2.2 – 2.7) provides a theoretical foundation; It presents a framework for RBM policy innovation adoption, diffusion of innovation models, concern-based adaptation model, explores the transfer of management knowledge, organization culture and human factors. Part two (sections 2.8) contains the context of RBM technology transfer.   This culminates in a theoretical model for successful RBM policy innovation transfer (section 2.9) presented in part three. Part three introduces and describes the literature pertaining to RBM policy management innovation (section 2.9).

2.2   Adoption of Innovation

Rogers (2003) defined adoption as the decision to make full use of an innovation as the best course of action available. Rogers (2003) in his view claimed that if an innovation is perceived to be advantageous; is compatible with existing norms, beliefs, and past experiences; has a relatively low level of complexity; can be experimented with; and use of the innovation has observable results, including being able to see others using the innovation, then there will be an increased likelihood of adoption.

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Rogers (1995) views an innovation as an idea, practice or object that is perceived as new by an individual or other unit of adoption. However, Dobosz and Jankowicz (2002) and Mackenzie Owen and Van Halm (1989) argue that it is the adoption rather than the newness that is the essence of innovation. In Rogers' view, adoption is one of several stages in what he calls the innovation-development process. Of particular interest to this study are the events surrounding the transfer and adoption of RBM policy innovation. The following sections outline two adoption and implementation models that informed the study.

Many inconsistencies have been identified in transfer of management knowledge from Western countries and questions are being asked on the one hand whether these concepts really fit with the Eastern environment and, on the other hand, whether different Western "imports" with diverse origins are really consistent with one another. The different modes of adoption, especially those including a higher amount of power and pressure on actors, can create some severe problems if the local patterns of interaction are not taken into account (Nigel Holden et al., 1998).

Tiene (2004) and Hawkins (2002) both argued that to increase adoption of technology in developing countries, a focus must be placed on meeting the needs and addressing the limitations of the end user by demonstrating the advantages to adopting a given technology innovation. Tiene (2004) found that efforts to increase the adoption of technology in less developed countries often fail to improve innitiative efforts. Tiene noted that "one critical mistake is to be overly ambitious and overly optimistic about what technology can accomplish".

According to Dirksen & Ament (1996) innovations that have a clear, unambiguous advantage in either effectiveness or cost-effectiveness are more easily adopted and implemented (Marshall 1990; Meyer, Johnson, and Ethington 1997; and Rogers 1995). If potential users see no relative advantage in the innovation, they generally will not consider it further; in other words, relative advantage is a *sine qua non* for adoption (Rogers, 1995).

Denis et al. (2002); Fitzgerald et al. (2002) and Grimshaw et al. (2004) argue that relative advantage alone does not guarantee widespread adoption. Even so-called evidence-based innovations undergo a lengthy period of negotiation among potential adopters, in which their meaning is discussed, contested, and reframed. Such discourse can increase or decrease the innovation's perceived relative advantage (Ferlie et al. 2001).

Innovations that are compatible with the intended adopters' values, norms, and perceived needs are more readily adopted (Aubert & Hamel 2001; Denis et al. 2002; Ferlie et al. 2001; Foy et al. 2002; and Rogers 1995). Compatibility with organizational or professional norms, values, and ways of working is an additional determinant of successful assimilation (Denis et al. 2002; Fennell & Warnecke 1988; and Ferlie et al. 2001).

Innovations that are perceived by key players as simple to use are more easily adopted (Denis et al. 2002; Grilli and Lomas 1994; Marshall 1990; Meyer and Goes 1988; Meyer, Johnson, and Ethington 1997; and Rogers 1995). Perceived complexity can be reduced by practical experience and demonstration (Plsek, 2003). Plsek (2003) and Rogers (1995) further assert that if the innovation can be broken down into more manageable parts and adopted incrementally, it will be

more easily adopted. Innovations in an organizational setting that has few response barriers that must be overcome are more easily assimilated (Rogers, 1995). Interventions to reduce the number and extent of such response barriers improve the chances of successful adoption.

It is easier to adopt and assimilate innovations with which the intended users can experiment on a limited basis (Grilli and Lomas, 1994; Plsek, 2003; Rogers, 1995; and Yetton, Sharma & Southon 1999). Such experimentation can be encouraged by providing "trialability space" (Øvretveit et al. 2002; Plsek 2003 and Rogers 1995).

When the benefits of an innovation are visible to intended adopters, it will be adopted more easily (Denis et al. 2002; Grilli and Lomas 1994; Meyer and Goes 1988; and Øvretveit et al. 2002). Initiatives to make more visible the benefits of an innovation (e.g., through demonstrations) increase the likelihood of their assimilation.

According to Meyer, Johnson & Ethington (1997) and Rogers (1995) potential adopters can adapt, refine, or otherwise modify the innovation to suit their own needs, it will be adopted more easily. Reinvention is especially important to those innovations that arise spontaneously as "good ideas in practice" and spread through informal, decentralized, horizontal social networks (Rogers, 1995).

The adoption of an innovation by individuals in an organization is more likely if key individuals in their social networks are willing to support the innovation (Backer & Rogers 1998; Markham 1998; Meyer & Goes 1988; and Schon 1963). The different champion roles for organizational

innovations include (1) the organizational maverick, who gives the innovators autonomy from the organization's rules, procedures, and systems so they can establish creative solutions to existing problems; (2) the transformational leader, who harnesses support from other members of the organization; (3) the organizational buffer, who creates a loose monitoring system to ensure that innovators properly use the organization's resources while still allowing them to act creatively; and (4) the network facilitator, who develops cross-functional coalitions within the organization (Shane, 1995).

Pettigrew and McKee (1992) argue that receptive context for change incorporates a number of organizational features that have been independently associated with its ability to embrace new ideas and face the prospect of change. An organization with such a receptive context will be better able to assimilate innovations. In addition to an absorptive capacity for new knowledge, the components of receptive context include strong leadership, clear strategic vision, good managerial relations, visionary staff in pivotal positions, a climate conducive to experimentation and risk taking, and effective data capture systems (Anderson & West, 1998; Barnsley, Lemieux-Charles, & McKinney 1998; Dopson et al. 2002; Gosling, Westbrook, & Braithwaite 2003; Newton et al. 2003; Nystrom, Ramamurthy & Wilson 2002; Pettigrew & McKee 1992; and Van de Ven et al. 1999). Leadership may be especially helpful in encouraging organizational members to break out of the convergent thinking and routines that are the norm in large, well-established organizations (Van de Ven et al., 1999).

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2.3   Diffusion of Innovation Model

Studies of the diffusion model of innovation have revealed patterns in the process of adopting innovations. According to Rogers (1995), adopters of innovation fall into five categories ranked by the speed at which they adopt the innovations. He classifies the 2.5% of the population who are first to adopt as innovators. Early adopters are the next 13.5%. The early majority constitutes the following 34% of the population, while the late majority makes up the rest 34%. The last 16.5% of the population to adopt are called the laggards.

Figure 2.1: The diffusion of innovations according to Rogers
Source:Rogers (1995)

With successive groups of staff adopting the new technology (shown in blue), its acceptance/market share (yellow) will eventually reach the saturation level. In mathematics, the yellow curve is known as the logistic function. The curve is broken into sections of adopters.

These categories represent ideal types designed to facilitate empirical studies. Each of these types is thought to possess distinctive characteristics and values. For example, innovators' chief characteristic is venturesomeness. Each category of adapters has different kinds of social networks, with innovators being described as "cosmopolite" while laggards are "localite".

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Several other variables are used to characterise adopters. Rogers (1995) and Dobosz and Jankowicz (2002) identify five steps in the innovation-decision process: (a) obtaining knowledge about the innovation; (b) persuasion regarding the need for the innovation; (c) a decision support to reject or to adopt the innovation; (d) implementation; and (e) confirmation of the adoption decision based on further information about the innovation. Such further information may result in a reversal of the adoption decision. As indicated earlier, the innovation-decision process is not easily packaged in a linear stage model as suggested by Rogers (1995). In supporting the use of stages, he states that research strongly supports the presence of knowledge and decision stages but less strongly the presence of a persuasive stage.

Of particular interest in this study is the diffusion of innovations in situations where the adoption unit is a programme (UN-Habitat) in an organisation as opposed to an individual. To facilitate the study of innovation in organisations, Rogers (1995) and Dobosz and Jankowicz (2002) present a model that identifies innovation in organisations as a process. This process view is contrasted with the view of adoption as an event, which was characteristic of earlier "classical" diffusion research. Rogers' model divides the process into two broad phases called initiation and implementation, thus the decision to adopt acts as the boundary between the two phases. The first phase has two stages (agenda setting and matching) while the latter has three stages (redefining/restructuring, clarifying, and routinizing). Routinising is the final stage of the process. At this stage the innovation becomes part of the regular activities of the organisation. However, the innovation may fail to gain a following and ultimately be discontinued. The successful adoption (or failure) of Results-Based Management may be viewed from the

perspective of innovation diffusion, especially because such a perspective provides a broad framework with which to analyse the process and level of adoption by UN-Habitat.

2.4   Concern-based adoption model

Loucks-Horsley & Stiegelbauer (1991) and Hall & Hord (1987), (2001) emphasised the importance of the implementation process and points out that it may take several years to complete. This analysis centres on the adopter and indicates that adopters' innovation-related concerns change as their competency in using the innovation changes. During the initial stages of using an innovation, according to Hall and Hord (2001), these concerns are centred on the capabilities of the adopter to use the innovation and on the role he or she plays with respect to the innovation. In addition, adopters are concerned about the rewards of using the innovation. As their knowledge of innovation increases, adapters become more concerned about how to use the innovation. Finally, after they have developed some confidence from routine use of the innovation, their concerns shift to focus more on the impact of the innovation and on ways to improve or replace the innovation. Hall and Hord (2001) presented these ideas in the context of their Concerns-Based Adoption Model (CBAM).

The model, which was developed as a conceptual framework for guiding the process of adoption of innovations, principally in educational settings, is centred on the role of change facilitator who acts as a link between a resource system and the user system. This model views adoption as a process rather than an event. The change facilitator's role in the process is to assist others in ways relevant to their concerns so that they become more effective and skilled in using new programmes and procedures (Hall & Hord, 2001).

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According to Hall & Hord (2001), the change facilitator intervenes to help clients who constitute the user system (which includes both users and non-users of the innovation). He or she has access to a resource system that may include experts, libraries, administrators and colleagues in other institutions. Ultimately, it is intended that users will develop the ability to make use of the resource system without the intervention of the facilitator. In order to assist the change facilitator understand the users and hence decide how to apply the available resources, Hall and colleagues developed three independent diagnostic tools that are based on the concepts of stages of concern, levels of use, and innovation configuration.

Stages of Concern

The CBAM includes the following seven stages of concern:

Stage 0   Awareness: little concern or involvement with innovation

Stage 1   Information: Awareness of innovation, interest in learning more.

Stage 2   Personal: Uncertainties about demands of the innovation, one's adequacy to meet those demands, and one's role in the innovation.

Stage 3   Management: Concerns about tasks and processes of using the innovation, such as time demands, efficiency, organizing, managing and scheduling.

Stage 4   Consequences: Concerns about impact of innovation on students regarding relevance, performance, competencies, and changes needed to increase outcomes.

Stage 5   Collaboration: Concerns about coordination and cooperation with others in using innovation.

Stage 6   Refocusing: Concerns about more universal benefits of innovation and possibilities of improving or replacing the innovation.

From observation in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Hall and Hord (2001) noted differences in how innovations are used. They subsequently identified eight levels of use. These concerned

observable behaviour, unlike stages of concern, which are inferred from information supplied by the subjects. Though no direct correspondence between stages of concern and levels of use is claimed, they are thought to be related.

In addition to levels of use and stages of concern, Hall and Hord (2001) developed a way to describe an innovation using the concept of innovation configuration. After many studies involving the use of curriculum innovations, they noted that, though several people may be using the same instructional module, the operational form of these modules differed between faculties and campuses. This led to the development of innovation configurations as a means to define and describe innovations in use. The three stages of concern, levels of use, and innovation configurations are regarded by Hall and colleagues as tools that the change facilitator uses to increase his or her understanding of users and hence improve the effectiveness of their facilitative interventions.

This study uses both the Diffusion of Innovation Model and the CBAM model to understand and obtain insights about the complex process (successes and barriers) of adopting the RBM by UN-Habitat, with a focus on considerations made during implementation and perceptions of users and stakeholders. It is hoped that the greater knowledge about the implementation process will help other social programmes in similar contexts. Both positive and negative outcomes are possible when an organisation chooses to adopt a particular innovation. Rogers states that this area needs further research because of the biased positive attitude that is associated with innovation. Rogers lists three categories for consequences: desirable vs undesirable, direct vs indirect, and anticipated vs unanticipated.

2.5   TRANSFER OF MANAGEMENT KNOWLEDGE

Many inconsistencies have been identified in the transfer of management knowledge from Western to other contexts, and unanswered questions exist, on the one hand, whether these concepts really fit with non-Western environments and, on the other hand, whether different Western "imports" from diverse origins are really consistent with one another. The different modes of adoption, especially those including a higher amount of power and pressure on actors, can create problems if the local patterns of interaction are not taken into account (Holden *et al*., 1998; Puffer *et al*., 1996).

Knowledge transfer refers to the cross-cultural, cross-border and cross-organizational processes where by information ideas and practices move between two different business systems. Knowledge transfer does not just include the appropriation of new technical knowledge, but also new ways of thinking and understanding new discourses, and more deeply, the values, beliefs and assumptions upon which new practices are found (Lang & Steger, 2002).

Knowledge transfer as discussed in the literature is seen as a one-dimensional process taking place when a concept travels from one location to another (Jankowicz, 2000). As Jankowicz (2000) pointed out, knowledge itself is not an object, or indeed a process, that has existence in a particular location. Knowledge transfer makes use of bi-directional processes, including discussions and exchange by both parties involved. He argues that it makes sense to consider this phenomenon in terms of knowledge creation rather than transfer, and to speak, as some have, of the resulting knowledge transfer as diffusion, which denotes an abstract process.

Management systems should be context sensitive. No single system will be appropriate for every organisation. This is because organisations differ greatly in the scope of activities they perform within different settings. Different solutions for performance measurement problems exist in different agencies. Evidence suggests that customised management systems are critical for success (Casey, 2007). Experience in OECD countries suggests that selecting an appropriate approach for implementing management systems is also very important. Basic approaches to implementing performance management must be selected according to the needs and situations of each country (OECD, 2006a).

The concepts of 'lesson drawing' (Rose, 1993) and 'policy transfer' (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996, 2000) have become increasingly influential ways of studying public policy, especially in the UK. They form an important part of the theoretical basis of the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) Future Governance Programme, a major initiative costing around £3.5m and encompassing 30 projects (ESRC, 2000). The programme aims to draw lessons from policy initiatives and practices in different jurisdictions by looking at the potential for innovation by cross-national learning; examines how policies work when they are adopted as the result of international treaties and obligations; and identifies processes and mechanisms of policy learning and transfer and how they work. Individual projects explore a range of issues and are not all similarly committed to 'lesson drawing' and 'policy transfer'. However, most use the terms 'lessons', 'learning', 'transfer', 'transferring' in their titles and refer to these concepts in their project summaries (ESRC, 2000).

Lang and Steger (2002), like Geppert and Merkens (1999), Good Practices: Institutional Development (2005) observed that, in reviewing literature on management transfer in developing countries, it becomes obvious that authors of empirical studies as well as of normative writing, explicitly or implicitly, start from a strong and common basic assumption: That more or less well-tested institutions, structures, concepts, instruments, and practices need to be transferred from the west to ensure a successful transformational process. This critical assumption is hardly challenged and does not ask for degrees of adaptation or for modification that take into account, for example, the different cultural backgrounds of the various developing countries.

It is assumed that developing nations have to acquire western procedures, and practices and managers and, by the same token, are believed to have little choice but to copy and adopt imported market economy practices wholesale as "best practice" in order to survive (Geppert & Merkens, 1999; Eric, 2012). Geppert & Merkens (1999) and Eric (2012) argued that the implication is that knowledge transfer and learning constitute a one-way process, with the Western sources acting as the "senders" and "teachers" and the East as the "recipients" and "learners." But Czarniawska-Joerges (1994) cautions that western management principles might not constitute reliable foundations for theorising knowledge transfer and management in transforming societies.

Situations of transfer of management knowledge have sometimes led to marginal modifications of the concepts and to the re-combination of old and new, for example, the inclusion of cultural factors that are considered responsible for the blockade of the well-experienced, practices (Weick, 2001). In other cases, the receiving countries and actors are simply blamed for not

having understood the "greatness" of the concepts transferred or how they should work (Gilbert, 1998).

According to Lang and Steger (2002), management knowledge transfer is grounded in the cultural bias of Western modernity. According to this approach, management transfer can be understood as a process of re-institutionalisation whereby management concepts, structures, and instruments as institutionalised practices are transferred, not because of their higher efficiency, but because of the legitimacy they provide and their perceived and expected success. Management transfer is seen as a means of supporting the process of adaptation to Western "normality".

Peng (2001) argues that Western structures and practice are considered a universal, superior norm, which should be followed by the reforming societies and organisations, a position that is questionable. Lang and Steger (2002) noted that similar patterns and problems of transfer have been observed in management knowledge transfer between developed nations. And many times, failure serves as a reminder that one has to take into account the different cultures while transferring structures and concepts.

For the transfer of knowledge to be successful, local values and culture must be taken into account (Dorota & Jankowicz, 2002). They suggest that "one best way" is inappropriate due to fundamental differences between the values of different cultures, but that, if these can be taken into account, localised "best ways" can be achieved. Sadly, this traditional practice of know-how transfer from West to East is often justified and legitimised.

2.5.1   Management Learning

Management learning refers to those internal organisational processes of knowledge organisation whereby managers in the organisation concerned assimilate new values, ideas, systems, and techniques and thereby, in their changed practices, produce new organisational patterns and processes (Clark & Geppert, 2002).

Rose (1993) and Lang and Steger (2002) stressed that there comes a time in a programme's life when dissatisfaction disrupts routine. Dissatisfaction can be signalled in many ways. Instead of offering support for a program, beneficiaries and their pressure groups can demand more or different services (Rose, 1993). The media can publicise complaints; political opponents are always ready to stir up discontent; and public opinion polls can register an increase in dissatisfaction. He further states that dissatisfaction stimulates policymakers to search for a solution, that is, actions that will reduce the gap between what is expected from a programme and what government is doing. The voices of the society represent the environment in which the organisation operates and often demand societal transformation.

According to Clark and Geppert (2000), the environment of organisations in transforming societies is, to a very high degree, complex, dynamic, and uncertain, including in many cases a threat to survival. Changing political government systems increase the complexity and dynamism of the environment, and that leaves both organisation and managers in a state of uncertainty and ambiguity (Clark & Soulsby, 1999).

There has been a great expectation concerning the introduction and implementation of Western institutions and structures on the part of state and regional governments, the European Union,

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The World Bank, and others. Unfortunately, most organisations in developing countries are highly dependent on resources provided by these institutions (Norgaard, 2000). These organisations have learned how to incorporate expected structures at the surface and how to develop and carry out ceremonial and symbolic activities signifying conformity to funder's ideologies. These patterns of action may be useful (if not necessary) for survival under changing environmental and funding conditions.

The extent, intensity, and speed of the adoption process will depend on the situation of the country and the forms and ownership structures of the enterprises. These adoption processes are often supported by the state providing additional resources and developing certain professional standards. The practice of transformation shows a strong presence of active attempts to influence and manipulate actors, often trying to change the rules of the game or to develop new rules and laws in their favour (Brouthers & Bamossy, 1997).

The transfer and adoption of Western management concepts can lead to East-West inconsistency problems, as the Western concepts and instruments may not fit the local national and organisational culture (Clark & Geppert, 2002). Inconsistency can also come about as different Western concepts, structures, and instruments may not be consistent with one another with respect to their different origins. And lastly, Western management concepts can lead to process inconsistency problems as the mode of introduction of Western concepts structures and instruments may not fit into local hierarchy structures and values. Most often, inconsistency problems have been described as cultural issues, which could be solved with cultural sensitivity, training and learning (Edwards & Lawrence, 2000). Problems of adoption could also be

considered to be conflicts between different institutional pressures and the need to organise efficiently and maintain the process of production (Holden, 1997).

According to Dörrenbächer*et al*. (2000), transfer of management knowledge can be assumed to lead to a learning process at the management level and, furthermore, to hybridisation, that is, a development of "new" (mixed, adapted) structures, institutions, and practices (Breu, 2000). Poate (1997) concludes that current research about management knowledge transfer to developing countries reveals serious shortcomings, and transfer of knowledge can no longer be considered a simple adoption of well-proved "best practices", but rather as a dynamic process of learning, re-interpreting, evaluating, and remodelling and recombining with existing concepts, structures, and instruments to create new practices—a process he thinks is highly influenced by the situative power relations between the actors, as well as by their continuing cultural backgrounds.

2.5.2   Organisation learning and resistance to change

Dobosz and Jankowicz (2002) argue that learning is both institutional and individual, and the ensuing corporate changes are seen as the prerequisite for the success and survival of organisations irrespective of their size and sector. The challenge for most organisations is to recognise and react to perceived environmental challenges or enact changes and responses. Change is the outcome of learning.

According to Huber (1991) and Tippins & Sohi (2003) organizational learning represents a firm's efforts to harness the intellectual and social capital of individuals in order to realize the firm's potential for innovation. It has been broadly agreed that organizational learning consists of four

components: knowledge acquisition, knowledge distribution, shared interpretation, and development of organizational memory have adopted Huber's conceptualization of organizational learning and demonstrated that the four learning components are positively related to innovation (Jiménez-Jiménez & Sanz-Valle, 2011). Specifically, knowledge acquisition identified acquires internally and externally-generated knowledge that is critical to a firm's operations. Knowledge acquisition plays a pivotal role in renewing the firm's knowledge base and skills that are necessary to initiate innovations.

Senge (1990); Senge et al., (1994) and Tushman & Nadler (1986) have asserted relationships between leadership and organizational learning. Traditional leadership has been characterized as highly individualistic and a systematic and as making the learning of organizational teams difficult; however, transformational leadership is focused on active promotion of employees' participation in collective decisions and activities (Adair, 1990; Bass, 1991). Transformational leaders should be able to build teams and provide them with direction, energy, and support for processes of change and organizational learning (Blackler & McDonald, 2000; McDonough, 2000; Nadler & Tushman, 1990).

More specifically, transformational leadership fuels organizational learning by promoting intellectual stimulation, inspirational motivation, and self-confidence among organization members (Coad & Berry, 1998). A capability for transformational leadership has been even described as one of the most important means of developing learning organizations (Maani & Benton, 1999; Slater & Narver, 1995; Snell, 2001).

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2.6   ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE

An organisation needs to change its culture in order to adopt the RBM. The reason is that each organisation over time has developed its own culture which does not change easily, since it took time to develop. According to Schein (2000), culture is "how things are done around here". The culture of an organisation is its unique configuration of customary and traditional ways of thinking and of doing things that is shared to a greater or lesser degree by all its members, and that new members must learn and at least partially accept in order to be accepted into the organisation. It includes values and beliefs that inform practice and behaviour; rules that guide people's choices; and how they behave.

Organisational culture is the collective programming that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another. Culture in a sense covers a wide range of behaviour; it incorporates attitudes, customs and habits of managerial behaviour; the objectives of the concern; ways of doing business; beliefs; and the less conscious conventions and taboos (Minkov, 1991; Schein, 2000). It is a set of understandings or meanings shared by a group of people, and meanings are passed on to new group members. Culture is not only deep, but also wide and complex. It is dynamic and fluid and never static. Some aspects of the culture are visible and tangible and others are intangible and unconscious.

Every organisation, regardless of its size and complexity, has a political structure and culture that greatly impacts its behaviour. Cultural issues are not clean but are intricately wired to political, social, historical and, especially, personal contexts (Senge, 1990; Kotter, 1997). Organisational culture and structure are, indeed, often the major reason why organisations experience

difficulties, or become dysfunctional. Introducing RBM to any organisation will thus involve teaching the organisation to change and understand the measurability thereof.

According to Schein (2000), to say something cultural is to say:

- It must be shared by a significant number of people or members of a social group,

- It is shared in behavior enacted,

- It is physically possessed,

- Or internally thought,

- It has the potential of being passed to a new group, and

- It exists with some permanency.

Culture is not values hoped for, but values lived. A distinction has to be drawn between the beliefs and values espoused and those that the employees actually use on a day-to-day basis to guide their work and activities (Hofstede, 1991; 1997). Formal documentation (such as publicity material and annual reports and accounts) and speeches present a particular view of culture. This espoused culture refers to a desired state vision of the organization, that is, what the organization should be. In any organization, culture in practice is its actual culture as experienced by employees (Senge, 1990).

According to Senge (1990), culture drives an organisation and its actions. It is somewhat like the operating system of the organisation. It reflects a group's effort to cope and learn. Organisational culture can be summed up as the total sum of assumptions, beliefs, practices, and values its staff share, and it is expressed through what is done, how it is done, and who is doing it. Values are generally connected with moral and ethical codes and determine what a person, or

people, think ought to be done. For instance, do members act openly, honestly, and with integrity if they embrace these values? Beliefs, on the other hand, concerns what people believe is true or not true—the theories in use or basic assumptions that influence thinking and action.

Failure in any change process can therefore be avoided by maximising profitability and cultural congruence. Changes that embrace or acknowledge aspects of prevailing culture while incorporating newly adopted knowledge are often better than revolutionary change. For a new culture to take root, the existing culture has to be fully analysed for compatibility (Schein, 2000).

Within an organisational culture, staff learning is through the positive and negative feedback they receive about their actions, repeating what gains positive feedback and giving up behaviour that gets negative feedback. The relationship between learning and culture is interdependent (Schein, 2000). Culture will be influenced by the rate and content of what an organisation learns. The influence of politics and culture are important inhibitors of learning. Any organisational politics will often counteract and neutralise positive learning. Negative culture can retard learning, inadvertently paralyse some individuals, promote and protect competency traps, and hence undermine any superior change that an organisation might want to institute (Kotter, 1997). Resistance is, indeed, culturally-based. But while cultural change is a long-term and complicated process, behaviour that protects and preserves the negative culture must be monitored and managed for greater performance to be realised (Senge, 1990; Kotter, 1997).

The way things are handled by management—new norms, values, working procedure—reveal important underlying assumptions which are engrained in culture. For example, informal messages are sent by the way situations are handled.

2.7   THE ROLE OF HUMAN FACTORS IN POLICY MANAGEMENT INNOVATION TRANSFER

A results-based culture must permeate all levels of the organisation and be consistent throughout each type of activity (OECD, 2002a). Key is the development of results-focused objectives ("Managing for Outcomes: Output Plans and Guidance for Departments," 2002) within the organisation and fostering a culture of measurement and learning   While experience suggests that appropriate leadership providing appropriate signals and incentives can successfully change this culture, any reform processes in the organisation have to be consistent with these leadership signals (OECD, 2002a).

There is strong evidence to suggest that senior-level leadership is necessary for successful implementation (OECD, 2006a). It is critical that senior management, from top to middle managers, fully support and actively participate in the implementation of results-based management (UNDP, 2009; UNEG, 2009). Their level of commitment sets the tone for the entire organisation (Clinton, 2012).

Stakeholder Participation and ownership:
In all cases, governments attribute successful implementation to full participation of staff at all levels (McKenzie, 2010; OECD, 2001). A sense of ownership and commitment is developed by involving managers and staff in the process of developing the strategic plans and performance

measures (McKenzie, 2010), and people are less likely to criticise something they have developed themselves and are more motivated to work together to accomplish common objectives (USGAO, 1995).

Among leaders of results-based management, training is listed as an essential ingredient for reform (OECD, 2001; USGAO, 1995).   A major hurdle in implementing results-based management is the relative lack of experience and expertise (Hatry, 1997a, 1997b; UNIFEM, 2008). Successful implementation is dependent on managers and staff having the necessary knowledge, skills, and abilities to develop and use the performance measurement system (Casey, 2007). Training in the development and use of performance measures builds the skills needed for results-based management in organisations that have historically been preoccupied with inputs (Qizilbash, 2006) Training not only assists in the acquisition of skills, but also in changing the organisational culture (Jackson & Philip, 2005).

Employees need to know why performance measurement is being undertaken, what their role is in the new system, and how performance information fits into the decision-making process (McKenzie, 2010; OECD, 2001). They need to know that the performance measurement system will provide essential information to improve management within the public sector and that it will help monitor progress made towards the achievement of expected results. A lack of clear expectations about possible uses for performance data presents perhaps the most difficult challenge (Binnendijk, 2001). In many cases, the sorts of measures that might effectively guide internal decision-making may provide data that managers would not want made public for resource allocation decisions (IEG, 2011; UNDP, 2009). In order to overcome the above

scenarios, the donors came up with ways in which the though appropriate to transfer innovations hence the introduction of Results Based Mangement (RBM).

2.8   RESULTS-BASED MANAGEMENT (RBM)

Governments and organizations all over the world are grappling with internal and external demands and pressures for improvements and reforms in public sector management. They are facing a variety of unique accountability challenges towards their stakeholders as they try to answer the "so what" question in regards to the human development results and impacts of their actions (Kusek & Rist, 2004; World Bank, 2004).

Whereas many international donor organisations like the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG), the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG), the OECD, the United Nations Development Programme have written about RBM (MUNDIAL, 2011; UNEG, 2005a; IEG, 2011a), there is little scholarly 'academic' literature on RBM.   However, some leading scholars have tried to study the outcome of using RBM, especially in measuring the impact of donor funds on the livelihood of the beneficiaries of grants and loans (Madhekeni, 2012).

The concept of RBM is believed to have begun with Peter Drucker as Management by Objectives (MBO) and Program Performance Budgeting System (PPBS) in the 1960s and evolved into the use of a logical framework for the public sector in the 1970s (Rassapan, 2005: 2). Management by results (MBR) is a process in which employers and employees agree on what they have to achieve while working for the organisation. An employee's performance is related to the extent to which objectives are met. At the start of the performance management cycle the

employee and the supervisors agree on what should be achieved (Odiorne, 1965). The term "management by objectives" was first popularised by (Drucker, 1954). While performance-based budgeting is the practice of developing budgets based on the relationship between programme funding levels and expected results from that programme, the performance-based budgeting process is a tool that programme administrators can use to manage more cost-efficient and effective budgeting (Young, 2003). And a logical framework is a means to define (or present) a logic as a signature in a higher-order type theory in such a way that provability of a formula in the original logic reduces to a type of inhabitation problem in the framework type theory (Jacobs, 2001: 598). To describe a logical framework, one must provide the following:

- A characterisation of the class of object-logics to be represented;

- An appropriate meta-language;

- A characterisation of the mechanism by which object-logics are represented (Young, 2003).

This is summarised by: *'Framework = Language + Representation'*

According to Hulme (2007), results-based management is a

> …strategy aimed at achieving important changes in the way government agencies operate with improving performance as the central orientation where the key component is the process of objectively measuring how well an agency is meeting its stated goals or objectives.

RBM is a sub-field of a wider and more theorised body of work, were management seeks to understand how the public sector could be made more effective (Minogue, Polidano, & Hulme, 1998) as cited by Hulme (2007). With RBM, human development posits that human beings are both the ends as well as the means of development, which contradicts many economists and

policymakers who want to rely purely on per capita economic growth, and emphasises the multidimensionality of human wellbeing (Qizilbash, 2006).

Based on the knowledge of RBM, governments and organisations all over the world are grappling with internal and external demands and pressures for improvement and reform in public sector management. They are facing a variety of unique challenges of accountability towards their stakeholders as they try to answer the "so what?" question regarding human development results and impacts of their actions (MUNDIAL, 2011; UNEG, 2005a; IEG 2011a).

Donor agencies broadly agree on the definition, purposes, and key features of RBM systems as follows:

> Results based management provides a coherent framework for strategic planning and management based on learning and accountability in a decentralized environment. It is first a management system and second, a performance reporting system (World Bank, 2004) in Binnendijk, 2001, and in Nelson, 2010.

It can therefore be concluded that introducing a results-oriented approach aims at improving management effectiveness and accountability by defining realistic expected results, monitoring progress toward the achievement of expected results, integrating lessons learned into management decisions and reporting on performance (Committee, 2002; Menon et al., 2009). As the pressure to do more with less is mounting, governments and NGOs are facing increasing calls for reform from internal and external stakeholders, for example to deliver tangible results in a fair, accountable, equitable, efficient, and timely manner (Löffler & Bovaird, 2009).With diminishing resources, these organisations are experiencing budgetary constraints which force them to make difficult choices and trade-offs in deciding on the best use of limited resources.

There is recognition of the need to build and sustain results-based management systems to demonstrate performance.

2.8.1   RBM Approaches, models and how they differ in context and implementation

RBM is a management strategy aimed at achieving important changes in the way organisations operate, with improving performance in terms of results as the central orientation (OECD, 2002). RBM provides the management framework and tools for strategic planning, risk management, performance monitoring, and evaluation. Its primary purpose is to improve efficiency and effectiveness through organisational learning and, secondly, to fulfil accountability obligations through performance reporting (Menon et al., 2009). Key to its success is the involvement of stakeholders throughout the management lifecycle in defining realistic expected results, assessing risk, monitoring progress, reporting on performance and integrating the lessons learned into management decisions.

RBM is significantly different from its precursor, MBO, which suffered from a confusion of terminology. Take for example the term "objective" which has the following synonyms: aim, goal, intent, purpose and target, not to mention the use of the phrases general and specific objectives. The roles and relationships among these terms within the MBO approach was never really clear (Menon et al., 2009), with the exception of the hierarchy of objectives that was popularized through the use of the Logical Framework Analysis, i.e., inputs, outputs, purpose and goal (OECD, 2001). While one can argue the semantic nuances between a well-written objective and a well-written result statement, the significant differences lie in how RBM terms are defined in relationship to one another.

RBM terminology borrows heavily from systems theory and reflects the central role of causality, while taking into account the temporal dimension. The following selection of key RBM terms as defined by the OECD (2001) clearly illustrates these concepts:

Inputs include financial, human, and material resources used for the development intervention.

Activity refers to actions taken or work performed through which inputs, such as funds, technical assistance and other types of resources are mobilised to produce specific outputs. A related term to activities is development intervention.

Outputs are the products, capital goods and services which result from a development intervention.

Outcomes are the likely or achieved short-term and medium-term effects of an intervention's outputs.

Impacts are positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.

Successful implementation of RBM is dependent on the organisation's ability to create a management culture that is focused on results. It requires more than the adoption of new administrative and operational systems (Dobosz & Jankowicz, 2002). An emphasis on outcomes first and foremost requires a results-oriented management culture that will support and encourage the use of the new management approaches.

Performance-Based Budgeting: Historically, Performance-based Budgeting (PBB) is described as linking performance levels directly to the budgeting process and allocating resources among competing programmes based on cost-effectiveness measures (DFID, 2001). It was believed that integrating performance information into budgetary decision-making and management practices would create incentives for improvement. According to Young (2003), performance measurement in and of itself is not a strong incentive for improvement unless it is connected to budgetary decision-making. Many refer to the PBB approach as "managing by results" which leads to the misconception that PBB is synonymous with RBM (Young, 2003).

Continuous Evaluation: The essence of evaluation is to determine the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of activities in the light of their objectives as systematically and objectively as possible. Continuous evaluation implies having different formative evaluations. One of the popular misconceptions is that RBM and continuous evaluation, also known as performance measurement, are synonymous. It is true that the continuous process of collecting and analysing data to compare current performance with what was expected is an important component of the RBM approach. However, RBM is a much broader management strategy that incorporates aspects of strategic planning, risk management, monitoring, evaluation and even auditing. This popular misconception has led to some people to believe that RBM is designed to increase compliance and control in decentralised management environments (OECD, 2008).

Performance Reporting: This is a detailed statement that measures the results of some activity in terms of its success within a specific time frame. Performance reporting is not the main purpose

of RBM, just a secondary by-product of good RBM. In government, performance reporting requirements are sometimes the only point of leverage that central agencies have over ministries and departments (Wener, 2006).

Compliance and Controls: Compliance and control entail the use of a performance measurement system as instrument by which senior management ensures compliance and exercise control over front-line managers under the guise of accountability (Werner, 2013).

With Government services becoming increasingly decentralised with privatisation, organisations have resorted to outsourcing and alternative service delivery (UNDP, 2004). The often advanced argument is that there must be increased accountability with delegated decision-making authority, not just for the stewardship of funds, but also for the achievement of results. When this rationale is applied to the individual, we observe a number of distortions in how RBM is implemented. In many cases, individual performance appraisals or incentives are linked to the achievement of short- and medium-term outcomes through the performance measurement system. This becomes problematic because the performance measurement system becomes the instrument by which senior management ensures compliance and exercises control over front-line managers under the guise of accountability.

2.8.2 RBM in the Context of Managing for Development Results

In the Accra Agenda for Action, Managing for Development Results (MfDR) (Menon et al., 2009) and (Rogers, 2008) commitments provide that:

> (a) Developing countries will strengthen the quality of policy design, implementation and assessment by improving information systems, including, as appropriate, disaggregating data by sex, region and socioeconomic status;

(b) Developing countries and donors will work to develop cost-effective results management instruments to assess the impact of development policies and adjust them as necessary;

(c) Donors will align their monitoring with country information systems; they will support and invest in strengthening national statistical capacity and information systems, including those for managing aid; and

(d) All partners will strengthen incentives to improve aid effectiveness by systematically reviewing and addressing legal or administrative impediments to implementing international commitments on aid effectiveness. Donors will pay more attention to delegating sufficient authority to country offices and to changing organizational and staff incentives to promote behaviour in line with aid effectiveness principles.

In RBM, as in MfDR, 'results' are understood to go beyond management (systems, scorecards, metrics, reporting) and should be dynamic and transformative (Menon et al., 2009) so that results inform decision-making and lead to continuous improvement and the achievement of envisaged changes in outcomes.

The effect of the RBM approach is to link strategic policy planning and budget planning to goal achievement, thus moving the institution from internal management focus to an outward looking orientation, centred on achieving results (Bamberger & Kirk, 2009; Loffler & Bovaird, 2009). Private sector and public sector literature review highlighted several factors promoting implementation conditions of RBM.

2.8.3   RBM in Strategy Planning

Results-Based Programme Planning ensures that the sum of interventions is sufficient to achieve the expected result (UNICEF, 2003). RBM has been one of the most used tools by organisations in the planning phase for their strategic frameworks, programmes and projects (OECD, 2001). A number of tools are used in the planning phase; these include: results matrix, monitoring and

evaluation plan, and risk mitigation strategy (UNEG, 2005a). It is during the planning phase that all the initiatives or activities, programme logic and contextual factors of programme "theory of change" elements that are required to effect a desired development change are defined (UNDP, 2009).

A theory of change is a strategy for change. It explains all the major elements that need to be in place in order that developmental change may occur. The key elements in the theory of change are stated by Rogers (2008) is not about what the organisation must do, but what all partners and non-partners must do to make real change happen. It is not about projects, but all the different types of interventions necessary for change to happen. The Act Knowledge and Aspen Institute Roundtable on Community Change (2003) suggested that the theory of change is about

> …building coherent logical models so as to be explicit about: What change is desired; what needs to take place for the desired changes to occur? What risks there are to that change ever coming into being and how they can be mitigated?; Why is the system of monitoring necessary to capture relevant data on whether change is emerging as planned; and, How and when relevant stakeholders will be able to decide if the initiative was a success or not?

A successful project, programme or policy needs both a strong design and strong implementation (Rogers, 2008). One of these two components on its own is not sufficient to ensure success. A well-crafted theory of change can help on both accounts, by clearly articulating where the initiative intends to go and, secondly, by matching monitoring data against the theory so as to tell whether the initiative is going in the right direction or not. It can, therefore, be concluded that, to use RBM, the organisation should adopt it right from the planning stage and answer the

following five questions when thinking through the logic of a programme, or its theory of change: (Mulcaster, 2008; UNDG, 2011).

What are the *concern* or concerns of most affected citizens and other stakeholders? To sort out this issue, we need questions such as: Is there a problem? How do we define the problem? What are the extent and the causes of the problem?

- What is the *outcome* or solution sought? In other words, what would success look like? Can success be defined? How can it be measured? When will success be achieved? What definitions of success are most relevant? Can we articulate casual model/theory of change for how to state success?

- What are known or likely *risks* which will stop the programme being successfully implemented? Have key risks that threaten success at each stage of the theory of change been identified? Are there mitigating ways to address these risks in case they are identified? Is the performance measurement system sufficiently nimble and sensitive for picking up data that show the effort is going off track? Can key *assumptions* be tested and measured with information readily available to determine what is, or is not, working?

- Can new programme *logic* and knowledge gained from implementing programme interventions be fed back regularly as necessary into the programme to revise the design and implementation plan?

One example where information gained from strategy execution is regularly fed into strategy planning to inform existing and new programme logic is at where the Government of Uganda has committed itself to effective public service delivery in support of its poverty-reduction

priorities. The recognition of service delivery effectiveness as an imperative of national development management is strong evidence of commitment to results, which has also been evident in several of the public management priorities and activities in Uganda (Mulcaster, 2008).

2.8.4   RBM in strategy execution (monitoring)

Monitoring is an important task in the life of a programme or project and is a continuous process of regular systematic assessment based on participation, reflection, feedback, data collection, analysis of actual performance and regular reporting. Monitoring tells us where we are in relation to where we want to be; it helps us remain on track by gathering data and evidence, identifying issues and analysing documents and reports (Menon et al., 2009; O'Sullivan, 2004). Monitoring is for accountability purposes in order to communicate results to stakeholders and adjust the implementation to better meet expected results and informs decision-making (Binnendijk, 2001; UNEG, 2005).

People more often easily confuse RBM and Monitoring. RBM is a Management strategy or approach by which an organisation ensures that its processes, products and services contribute to the achievement of clearly stated results (UNDP, 2009). RBM goes beyond output monitoring of the past to stress outcome monitoring (World Bank, 2003a). Outcome monitoring refers to tracking the outputs and measures their contributions to outcomes by assessing the change from baseline conditions (Obadan, 2005). Obadan (2005) and DBSA (2000) suggested that the results matrix, the monitoring and evaluation plan, provide the most important monitoring tools by outlining expected results, indicators, baselines and targets against which to monitor 'change'.

The results matrix helps to stay focused on the expected achievements of the programme or project. The results matrix can be used in a number of ways. First, it serves as the centrepiece of a programme or project proposal, summarising in a nutshell what the programme or project hopes to achieve. Second, the results matrix serves as the reference point for management during team meetings. It can act as a guide for reporting on progress and helps in making management decisions based on performance information. Third, the results matrix is an aid for monitoring and evaluation, providing parameters for what results to measure and to account for with useful targets, baselines and sources of information (Mansuri & Rao, 2012; Menon et al., 2009). The monitoring and evaluation plan gives precise information on methods, frequency and responsibilities with regard to expected results and indicators (Mansuri & Rao, 2012; Menon et al., 2009). Monitoring thus provides the opportunity to:

- Review assumptions made during the planning process to ensure they still hold true;

- Track progress in the achievement of results;

- Decide whether the original strategies are still appropriate and should be continued or modified; and

- Make necessary adjustments to resources, both human and/or financial. An important element of monitoring effectively is ensuring that data systems are developed and collect information on a regular basis. Data may come from a combination of national systems and the programme or project specifically. Baseline data is normally collected at the beginning of a programme to show where the programmer project stands before the intervention.

Furthermore, in line with the above DBSA (2000) contentions, the point here is that performance measurement, including establishing baseline values and setting targets, has become increasingly important in Africa because of stagnant and negative economic growth rates; concerns related to governance; and doubts about the efficacy of development assistance (DBSA, 2000).

Monitoring supports learning from experience, expands the existing knowledge base and helps to make programmes even more effective. Monitoring and evaluation of organisations, projects and programmes plays an essential role in this process. RBM has a number of advantages and benefits, because it gives an organisation insight into the effectiveness and efficiency of its activities, projects and programmes. An organisation can use these results to adjust its activities (Kusek & Rist, 2004).

2.8.5   RBM in strategy execution (evaluation)

While monitoring essentially is a management function and internal to the implementation of a programme or project, evaluation is independent and usually external, RBM needs external validation of results reported in order to be credible. However, according to Kusek and Rist (2004), monitoring and evaluation should begin with a 'readiness assessment'. The United Nations Evaluation Group (2009) has defined an evaluation as "An assessment, as systematic and impartial as possible, of an activity, project, program, strategy, policy, topic, theme, sector, operational area, institutional performance". It focuses on expected and achieved accomplishments, examining the results chain, processes, and contextual factors of causality in order to understand achievements or the lack thereof. It aims at determining the relevance, impact, effectiveness and sustainability of the interventions and contributions of the organisations to development results. An evaluation should provide evidence-based information that is credible, reliable and useful, enabling the timely incorporation of findings, recommendations and lessons into the decision-making processes of the organisations of the UN system and its members (Pawson, 2001; Nutley, Davies & Walter, 2003; UNEG, 2005b).

Evaluations have three key functions

(1) Utilisation, as an input to provide decision makers with knowledge and evidence about performance and good practices;

(2) Accountability to donors, funders, political authorities, stakeholders and the general public; and

(3) Contribution to institutional policymaking, development effectiveness and organisational effectiveness (UNEG, 2009; OECD, 2001).

Over time, the accountability function has expanded from donors and government primarily to other stakeholders and beneficiaries of development interventions. This means that evaluations should be useful to all parties, not only the hiring organisation. Evaluations should also help to improve development effectiveness and provide critical inputs for managing for results (Nutley, Davies & Walter, 2003; McKenzie, 2010).

The usefulness of evaluations, therefore, depends largely on the extent to which the information they provide is aligned with the questions asked by their potential users. For most organisations, those users include operational staff, management, governments or private sector clients, and the development community. Hence the organisation, in its evaluation, should examine the relevance of evaluation for programme and project operations, institutional strategies, knowledge generation, and accountability for results (IEG, 2012).

It can therefore be concluded that the goals of evaluation are to learn from experience, to provide an objective basis for assessing the results of organisations' work, and to provide accountability in the achievement of its objectives. It also improves organisation work by identifying and disseminating the lessons learned from experience and by framing recommendations drawn from evaluation findings, all fed back to the strategy planning process, thus improving interventions (IEG, 2012). Thus evaluation utilisation and use of performance measurement information completes results-based management or the performance management cycle.

2.8.6   RBM in strategy execution (utilization of evaluations)

Integrating complementary information from both evaluation and performance measurement systems and ensuring management's use of this information are viewed as critical aspects of results-based management (OECD, 2000). In most organisations, there is a modest feedback loop between evaluation production and programme and project operations and learning. There are notable examples of the influence of evaluation on development practice, including project assessment, decisions to design future programmes; raising the profile of certain types of interventions; informing policy dialogue and institutional strategies; and building local RBM capabilities (Walter, 2003). Such examples indicate that evaluation, overall, is regarded as a valuable tool to increase development effectiveness through better evidence. But in some instances, even when evaluations have been relevant and of good quality, they appear to have had limited use and influence (IEG, 2012; UNDP, 2009), for varying reasons: poor timeliness, failure to engage programme and project teams and decision makers, or lack of dissemination.

Countries have adopted the use of evidence from evaluations to justify their high levels of expenditure on education, health and social welfare over other national public sectors (Nutley, Davies & Walter, 2003). Evaluation must satisfy a need. "What is involved is a complex mixture of institutional preconditions, political culture, exposure to intellectual traditions, as well as sectoral concerns dominating the political discussion" (Davies & Walter, 2003).

With increasing demand for accountability for results by bilateral organisations, stakeholders, government oversight institutions, political oversight, citizens and donors (Ravishankar*et al*., 2009), there are signs of improvement, such as dedicated support for results dissemination as

well as closer collaboration with operations and clients in the design of on-going evaluations by organisations. Lack of demand is rooted in the absence of a strong evaluation culture (Schacter, 2000), which stems from the fact that performance measurement has been viewed as fault finding and identification of non-performance and/or non-achievement of planned results as opposed to being viewed as a tool for performance improvements and learning.

According to Kusek and Rist (2004), a credible answer to the "so what" question is that results-based management seeks to address the accountability concerns of stakeholders, to give public sector managers information on progress towards achieving the stated targets and goals, and to provide substantial evidence as the basis for any necessary mid-course corrections in policies, programs or projects.

2.8.7   Challenges to implementing RBM policy innovation as a tool for strategy planning and strategy execution

In implementing RBM, resistance and momentum in the implementation are critical aspects that need to be anticipated. Readiness assessment and timing is an important factor to consider during implementation of RBM (World Bank, 2004). Morris, (2006) and Roger (2008) also cautions that there are risks associated with taking both too long or too little time to implement results-based management. A too hurried implementation will only exacerbate fears, but there also are risks associated with a slow implementation process. It is important, therefore, to keep the momentum going at a balanced pace (Kusek & Risk, 2004).

Ensuring that performance indicators and measurement practices are linked to strategic objectives or expected results is important to successful performance management (OECD,

2002a). In this way, performance measurement is integrated within strategic planning (UNDP, 2009). Therefore knowledge about strategy planning and execution is increased, and the strategy is more likely to be realised (UNDG, 2009). Managers also need to take a corporate-level view and not make the mistake of aggregating functions or lines of business (UNDG, 2009).

There is a cost associated with implementation, and organisations do not necessarily have the capacity to adopt a new system (Rogers, 2008). If organisations are expected to design and use performance measurement systems, those requesting the information need to recognise that these organisations need the resources to do so (World Bank, 2008b, 2009). Experience in the US suggests that commitment of resources—including the time of top-level management devoted to designing and implementing feasible performance measurement systems—is a key indication of top leadership support. Such support minimises the risk (Rogers, 2008; World Bank, 2010).

The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) suggest that performance management be located at the programme level and that this will assist in ensuring buy-in from line managers (IFAD, 2009; UNEG, 2005b). However, according to experience in the Australian Public Service Western Australia ("Managing for Outcomes: Output Plans and Guidance for Departments," 2002), central monitoring and evaluation units within organisations should take responsibility for the process. It is argued that these units can provide the necessary technical and analytical expertise needed for successful implementation (UNEG, 2005b). If performance monitoring is to be part of an overall initiative, in particular a shift from a traditional direct type of control to a more flexible, strategic, and distant type of control, then the need for firm central leadership seems clear (Mayne, 2007a).

Conducting pilot projects presents a good opportunity for organisations to test new systems (AWID, 2013). Pilot projects have facilitated implementation by easing the organisations into reforms. They represent an opportunity to work out problems with some or all of the components of the new system while it is being used on a small scale.

One of the biggest risk factors that threaten successful implementation of results-based management is over-complexity (Casey, 2007). Over-complexity of a performance measurement system will lead to implementation problems and will simply frustrate stakeholders. The easier it is to use and apply, the more likely it is that stakeholders will adopt and embrace the new approach. One way to keep it simple is to limit the number of indicators. Multiple cases have suggested that indicators should be kept down in number; three indicators which are solid measures of outcomes are better than 10 which do not measure anything relevant (AWID, 2009, 2013).

Using the logic chart has proved to be very helpful in the development and identification of expected results, indicators, and risks (OECD, 2006a). It facilitates the task of conceptualising projects/programmes in terms of inputs, outputs, and outcomes. It also helps verify the logical consequences of the cause-and-effect linkages and, hence, the level of attribution. This is a useful tool particularly for stakeholders who are not familiar with results-based management, because it illustrates how RBM works (UNDP, 2004). A further advantage that proponents still claim for the logframe is that the identification of risks helps to structure the uncontrollable factors separating outcomes from output (Ravallion, 2009).

Morris (2006) believes that RBM focuses attention on achieving outcomes; establishes goals and objectives; permits managers to identify and take action to correct weaknesses; and supports a development agenda that is shifting towards greater accountability for aid lending. But implementing RBM requires a combination of institutional capacity and political will. For performance information to be useful, it must be valid and reliable. The information will simply not be accepted or used if it is biased or inaccurate (Khandker, Koolwal, & Samad, 2010). Even a perceived possibility that the information could be falsified can impair the usefulness of the system (IFAD, 2009; UNEG, 2005b). To ensure that the information is credible, there needs to be some form of independent checking or auditing. The means of verification must be communicated. It has been found that simply describing the chosen method within annual reports provides assurance to readers that the information is credible (Mayne, 2007a).

It is difficult to judge whether results are improving if one has no reference point against which to compare. In this sense, baselines and targets are critical for defining accountability. In the absence of specific and measurable standards of performance against which measured performance can be compared, there is no basis for accountability (UNDG, 2009). Benchmarking against similar programmes is another method used for setting targets. Evidence from the private sector suggests that benchmarking against competitors is a useful practice (Hulme, 2007; Hulme, 2007) also notes that indicators and targets should be set in the context of what is understood to be best practices through reference to the experience of other agencies undertaking the same or similar tasks.

The use and hence credibility of performance information is essential for effective implementation of development interventions. The performance information collected has to be useful (OECD, 2002a; UNEG, 2009). It has to illustrate that it is worth the cost incurred to collect the data. As data usage increases and produces real benefits, individuals will gain more confidence in the data (World Bank, 2008a, 2008b).

Managers will be less likely to commit to achieving results if they do not have the flexibility needed to manage their programmes efficiently and effectively (OECD, 2006a). The idea of having fewer rules and controls is an attractive incentive in support of results-based management (OECD, 2006a). The use of other types of incentives needs to be carefully considered. For example, pay for performance has been used in some jurisdictions (OECD, 2006a), but not always with positive results (OECD, 2002a). Incentives can be counterproductive when the perception is that good performance is rewarded and poor performance is penalised with budget cuts and staff reductions, rather than seen as an opportunity to learn.

Information regarding progress towards achieving objectives should be reported and communicated to all stakeholders. As stated earlier, results-based management should be implemented using a participatory approach. Stakeholders involved in the process will want to be kept informed of the progress. This vital flow of information should be maintained (Gore, 1999). Managers and staff need performance information frequently in order to make adjustments to programmes and to later assess the effectiveness of those adjustments. The most successful organisations have kept in constant communication with their staff at all levels (Meier, 1998).

Development literature (OECD, 2006a; UNDP, 2009; World Bank, 2008b) cautions that, while some see merit in the RBM approach and view it as a navigating aid to assist organisations achieve their intended results, many organisations that are now required to use the approach for project designs and progress reports find RBM an imposition motivated mostly by investor's concerns about accountability. The Overseas Development Institute (ODI) (ODI, 2003) also warns that attempts to transplant mechanisms like RBM developed in OECD countries into the very different institutional environments found in developing countries have rarely had a significant impact due to a myriad of factors such as organisational setup and human factors including results and information culture.

2.8.8   Concluding remarks on RBM in planning, monitoring and evaluation

As all management systems for planning, monitoring and evaluation become more results based, it is expected that the process of implementation will lead to greater learning, adjustment and decision-making. This continual process of feedback and adjustment seeks to make programmes and projects more responsive to the environment within which they operate. Organisations need to ensure that they have adequate mechanisms for flexibility, revision, adjustment and learning (UNDP, 2009).

RBM emphasises efficiency and effectiveness and business systems and processes inform on what, how, when and where. When business processes are aligned to programmes, they strengthen the likelihood that results will be achieved and facilitate improved staff performance (World Bank, 2008b). Considerable progress has been made with several established standard

operating procedures and business processes, including delegation of authority and corresponding accountability frameworks. RBM stresses learning to inform decision-making, planning and improvement.

With the major emphasis on evidence and visible change, the RBM is a powerful instrument that can be used to improve the way in which organisations and governments achieve results. Just as governments need financial, human resource and accountability systems, governments also need good performance feedback systems (Hauge, 2001). As described by Khan (2001), results-based management is an exercise to assess the performance of an institution or a programme or a project, on the basis of impacts and benefits that it is expected to produce. Unlike the traditional monitoring and evaluation, which simply measure and report on the status of results, the RBM measures and reports results to produce better results. In other words, it is a proactive tool to improve decision making and drive interventions and actions towards clearly defined goals (Kahn, 2001).

The International Program for Development Evaluation Training (IPDET, 2007:3) suggests that there are growing pressures in developing countries, particularly in Africa, to improve the performance of their public sectors. One strategy to address this need is to design and construct results-based management systems. These strategies track the results produced, or not produced, by governments and other entities. Kusek and Rist (2004) suggest that what gets measured gets managed. The power of measuring results is that,

If you do not measure results, you cannot tell success from failure;

If you cannot see success, you cannot learn from it and you cannot reward it, you are probably rewarding failure;

If you cannot recognize failure, you cannot correct it;

If you can demonstrate results, you can win public support (World Bank, 2010).

2.9 RBM POLICY INNOVATION GOOD PRACTICES CONCEPTUAL MODEL

This section presents the RBM policy innovation conceptual framework and factors 'enablers' model for successful RBM transfer. The transfer of technologies framework captured the processes for the transfer of RBM policy innovation from developers to end-users at UN-Habitat. To understand the phenomenon of transfer, the study was aligned to literature on the transfer and diffusion of technologies (Hall & Hord, 1987; Mackenzie Owen & Van Halm, 1989; Rogers, 1995); transfer of management knowledge to developing countries; and private and public sector literature (OECD, 2001) on results-based management. Transfer of RBM policy innovation in this study includes not just the acceptance and appropriation of the new technical knowledge, but also new ways of thinking and understanding new discourses and, more deeply, the values, beliefs, and assumptions on which new practices are found.

Transfer theories emphasise factors that promote or undermine the transfer process from one point to another. They, for instance, emphasise that local values and cultures and management learning must always be taken into account for successful transfer of management knowledge (Hofstede*et al.*, 1997; Lang & Steger, 2002; Peng, 2000).

A convergence in most available RBM literature by development donor agencies and multilateral organisations (OECD, 2001; World Bank, 2004; UN, 2001) points to the fact that for RBM

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policy innovation to successfully transfer, the following six design and implementation aspects must be incorporated into the intervention theory of change:

(a) Expected results must be clearly defined and must be measurable;

(b) Assumptions and risks must be identified and monitored over time;

(c) Performance indicators that will be used to measure progress towards results and to judge performance must be selected;

(d) Performance monitoring systems must be developed to regularly collect performance information on actual results, to review, to analyse and to report performance (actual results vis-à-vis the targeted results);

(e) The RBM system must integrate formative evaluations to provide complementary performance information not readily available from performance monitoring systems; and that

(f) Performance information is used not only for internal management accountability, learning and decision making processes, but also for external performance reporting to stakeholders and partners (OECD, 2001).

According to OECD/DAC (2002), the first three phases or processes generally relate to a results-oriented planning approach, sometimes referred to as strategic planning. The first five together are usually included in the concept of performance measurement. All six phases combined are essential to an effective RBM policy innovation system. That is integrating complementary information from both evaluations and performance measurement systems and ensuring use of this information are viewed as critical aspects of RBM. The six steps are diagrammatically represented below.

RBM (Performance Management)

Performance Measurement

Strategic Planning

1. Identifying clear and measurable objectives

2. Selecting indicators

3. Setting explicit targets

4. Developing performance monitoring systems

5. Reviewing, analysing and reporting actual

6. Using evaluation findings to generate lessons and increase the understanding of strengths, weaknesses and comparative advantages

7. Using performance information for internal management accountability, learning, resource allocation decisions including human resources management, and reporting to stakeholders and partners

Figure 2.2: Holistic RBM Policy Innovation
Source: (Adopted from OECD: 2001)

RBM Policy Innovation Enablers and Barriers Model

Transfer theories emphasized factors that promote or undermine the transfer process from one point to another. They, for instance, emphasize that local values and cultures and management learning must always be taken into account for successful transfer of management knowledge (Hofstede, 1997; Lang & Steger, 2002; Peng, 2000). According to Hall and Hord (2001), during the initial stages of using an innovation, these concerns are centred on the capabilities of the adopter to use the innovation and on the role he or she plays with respect to the innovation. This analysis centres on the adopter and indicates that adopters' innovation-related concerns change as their competencies in using the innovation changes. In addition, adopters are concerned about the rewards of using the innovation. Successful implementation is also dependent on managers and staff having the necessary knowledge, skills, and abilities to develop and use the

performance measurement system (Casey, 2007). It is critical that senior management, from top to middle managers, fully support and actively participate in the implementation of results-based management (UNDP, 2009; UNEG, 2009). Their level of commitment sets the tone for the entire organisation (Clinton, 2012). By involving managers and staff in the process of developing the strategic plans and performance measures, a sense of ownership and commitment is developed (McKenzie, 2010). Dobosz and Jankowicz (2002) argue that learning is both institutional and individual, and ensuing corporate changes are seen as the prerequisite for the success and survival of organisations irrespective of their size and sector. Results-based management should be implemented using a participatory approach. Stakeholders involved in the process will want to be kept informed of the progress. This vital flow of information should be maintained (Gore, 1999).

Therefore for RBM policy innovation system to transfer successfully, it must be supported by a corporate culture characterised by the listed enablers, (a- β) below, and avoiding their absence 'barriers': This is further demonstrated in Figure 2.3 that shows enablers that contribute to successful adoption of RBM policy innovation in implementing organisations. Inappropriate realisation and implementation of any of these enablers result in this variable/enabler becoming a barrier to successful RBM adoption. Therefore, when any of the variables below are realised, it becomes an enabler to successful RBM policy transfer, and when inappropriately realised, they become barriers to RBM transfer (Source: Researcher original work). The RBM enablers therefore are:

(a) Ideological commonalities between the RBM's components and principles, and organisations' Espoused values and governance practices

(b) Donor Pressure

(c) Emerging political support from senior leadership including resource allocation for RBM implementation

(d) Existence of good communication channels

(e) Results focus: A focus on targeted client satisfaction with goods and services

(f) Lessons of experience from pilot programmes

(g) Governance values

(h) Existence of in-house RBM expertise and internal institutional capacity

(i) Empowerment and accountability: Institutional mechanism for holding managers accountable for achieving results within the spheres of control and managers with delegated authority to the management level are held accountable for results, and empowered with flexibility to make corrective adjustment and to shift resources to better performing activities

(j) Participatory and team-based management: Inclusiveness and partnership in all aspects of performance measurement and management process, and shared interest and understanding of development objectives

(k) Learning organisation

(l) The reward system

(m) β

(n) Six RBM policy innovation adoption steps

(Source: Researcher's original work)

The enablers can thus be summarised as:

Successful RBM innovation adoption enables = f (a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, I, j, k, l, m)

Where:

- Successful RBM policy innovation adoption = dependent variable

- Independent variables 'enablers/drivers' are: a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, I, j, k, l, β

  - β = other variables that might have been omitted from the enablers model and hence resulting in under identification of the model.

- The six RBM policy innovation adoption steps

Thus RBM poicy innovation adoption = f (Six RBM policy innovation adoption steps) + f(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, β)

RBM Policy Innovation
Strategic Planning

Performance Monitoring & Reporting

Evaluation & Using Performance Information

Steps for holistic RBM transfer

Performance Measurement

Strategic Planning
1. Clearly defining expected results in a measurable manner
2. Identifying and monitoring risks over time
3. Identifying or selecting performance indicators that will be used to measure progress towards results and to judge performance

Performance Monitoring & Reporting
4. Developing performance monitoring systems to regularly collect performance information on actual results, review, analyse and report performance

Evaluation & use of Performance Information
5. Integrating formative evaluations to provide complementary performance not readily available from performance monitoring systems

6. Use of performance information for learning, management improvement, 'decision-making processes', and internal management accountability

RBM Policy Innovation Results

Learning

Performance Improvements

Accountability

RBM Enablers/Drivers

(a) Donor Pressure
(b) Ideological Commonalities between the RBM Components and Principles, and the organization's Espoused Values and Governance Practices
© Results focus: A focus on targeted client satisfaction with goods and services;
(m) β

(d) Empowerment and accountability
(e) Reward system
(f) Learning Organization
(m) β

(g) Existence of good communication channels
(h) Lessons learned from pilot programmes
(i) Existence of in-house RBM expertise and internal institutional capacity
(j) Participatory and team-based management
(k) Governance values
(l) Political Support from Senior Leadership including resource allocation for RBM
(m) β

Figure 2.3: RBM Policy Innovation Adoption Model
Source: Researcher's original work

Figure 2.3 comprises of: strategic planning, performance measurement, evaluations, performance information use, enablers and barriers.

The six stages of RBM policy innovation transfer from Figure 2.3 (discussed in Chapter Seven) are therefore presented / expressed as follows:

- Strategic planning (SP) = Well-defined results, Risk Management, Results focused indicators (1, 2 & 3)

- Performance monitoring and reporting (PMR) = performance monitoring systems (4)

- Performance measurement (PM) =

  Well-defined results, Risk Management, Results focused indicators & performance monitoring systems (1, 2, 3 & 4)

- Thus PM = f (SP, PMR)

- Evaluation and use of performance information (EUI) = formative evaluations and performance information for learning, management improvement, decision-making processes (5 & 6). The use of performance information for management decision-making requires that it becomes integrated into key management systems and processes of the organization; such as in strategic planning, policy formulation, program or project management, financial and budget management, and human resource management.

- Performance management = f (SP, PM, EUI)

- Therefore, performance management (PMM) = f (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6)

- Thus: PM = PMM – EUI

- PMM = f (Learning, performance improvement, accountability)

- PMM = f (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) = f (Learning, performance improvement, accountability)

- For SP to be effectively executed it has to be supported by enablers (a, b, c, m); PMR requires enablers (d, e, f, m) for its successful implementation and performance measurement will be successful if enablers (g, h, I, j, k, l, m) are present.

The three chapters of the research finding are represented in the model (Figure 2.3) by the enablers (a, b, c,......,l, m) - are discussed in chapter five, barriers (which are the reverse/converse of enablers) are presented in chapter six and chapter seven discusses the six stages for RBM policy innovation transfer [PMM = f (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6)].

In the model, performance measurement [(PM) = 1, 2, 3, 4] is concerned more narrowly with the production or supply of performance information, and is focused on technical aspects of (1) Clearly defining expected results in a measurable manner; (2) Identifying and monitoring risks over time; (3) Identifying or selecting performance indicators that will be used to measure progress towards results and to judge performance; and (4) Developing performance monitoring systems to regularly collect performance information on actual results, review, analyze and report performance. Performance management [(PMM) = f (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) + f (a, b, c,......, l, m)] encompasses performance measurement, but is broader. It is equally concerned with generating management demand for performance information [(EUI) = 5, 6] - that is, with its uses in programme, policy, and budget decision-making processes and with establishing organizational procedures, mechanisms and incentives that actively encourage its use. In an effective performance management system, achieving results and continuous improvement based on performance information is central to the management process.

Performance management [(PMM) = f (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6)], also referred to as results based management, can thus be defined as a broad management strategy aimed at achieving important changes in the way government agencies operate, with improving performance (achieving better results) as the central orientation. Thus the organisational performance management system (Learning, Performance Improvements and Accountability) = f (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) + f (a, b, c, l, m).

The enablers (a, b, c, l, m) in figure 2.3 above illustrate factors for successful adoption of RBM policy innovation (presented in Chapter Five). However, (Chapter Six) discusses the absence of these factors as as barriers to successful RBM adoption. Chapter Eight thus presnts the RBM theory of change derived from the theoretical model (Figure 2.3) and also presented as enablers (discussed in Chapter Five), barriers (discussed in Chapter Six) and RBM adoption steps (discussed in Chapter Seven).

- Focusing on results: This involves focusing on identifying beneficiary needs inform of expected results. Consulting with and being responsive to project/programme beneficiaries or clients concerning their preferences and satisfaction with goods and services provided.

- Empowering managers: Delegating authority to the management level being held accountable for results, thus empowering them with flexibility to make corrective adjustments and to shift resources from poorer to better performing activities.

- Holding managers accountable: Instituting new mechanisms for holding agency managers and staff accountable for achieving results within their sphere of control.

- Participation and partnership: Including partners (e.g., from implementing agencies, partner country organisations, other donor agencies) that have a shared interest in

achieving a development objective in all aspects of performance measurement and management processes. Facilitating putting partners from developing countries "in the driver's seat", for example by building capacity for performance monitoring and evaluation.

- Leadership of recipient organisations reforming policy and procedure: Officially instituting changes in the way the donor agency conducts its business operations by issuing new policies and procedural guidelines on results based management.

- Developing supportive mechanisms by developing in-house expertise and institutional capacity: Assisting managers to effectively implement performance measurement and management processes, by providing appropriate training and technical assistance; establishing new performance information databases; developing guidebooks and best practices series.

- Governance values: Changing organisational culture: Facilitating changes in the agency's culture − i.e., the values, attitudes, and behaviours of its personnel − required for effectively implementing results-based management. For example, instilling a commitment to honest and open performance reporting; reorientation away from inputs and processes towards results achievement; encouraging a learning culture grounded in evaluation (Source: Researcher original work).

Thus the adoption RBM elements with the right enablers in place, namely; strategic planning processes, performance monitoring, evaluations and use of performance information creates organisations that manage for results. The organisations learn from what they do, apply adoptive management principles and will be accountable to all their stakeholders. However, the above model of enablers may be 'under-identified' or 'over-identified' and hence enabling factors will

need to be adopted in relation to a given context. The application of this model should thus be context sensitive and consider other variables that might not have been included in this model.

2.10   SUMMARY

The chapter analysed the existing literature on how RBM has been used by the different donor recipients on planning and measuring performance of projects and what the literature on transfer of new policy management innovation like RBM says. This section summarises the relationship and types of three relevant literature sources; Results-Based-Management; the transfer of knowledge and policy management innovation; and organisational learning and culture. The chapter also summarised RBM's central role in strategic planning and management based on learning, adopting and accountability in a decentralised environment. It is first a management system and second, a performance reporting system (World Bank, 1997, in Nelson, 2010) and hence a coherent framework for strategy planning and strategy execution.

The literature review revealed that successful transfer of policy management innovation like RBM and its implementation is dependent on the organisation's ability to create a management culture that is focused on results. Jankowicz (1996) said that it requires more than the adoption of new administrative and operational systems. Adopting RBM requires an organisation to change its culture, and understand the context in terms of barriers and opportunities that support it. The literature guided the study in answering the research questions.

Most of the literature cited on RBM is from development organisations, development partners and its application in programming. However, limited literature was available from the academic point of view, which looks at the merits and demerits of RBM policy management

innovation transfers.   The research methodology will describe the approaches to extending frontiers of knowledge on the transfer of RBM policy innovation to UN-Habitat headquarters and the three regional offices, and how it was applied to different components of development programmes at UN-Habitat. It also describes the approaches to capturing key challenges and barriers encountered in the transfer and adoption of RBM

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

3.1   INTRODUCTION

This chapter describes the methodology used in the study. The discussion of the methodology is divided into two parts. The first part describes the underlying research design. This covers the reasons for choosing particular design strategies, how the design minimised some of the limitations that have been associated with it, and how field sites were selected. The second part summarises the way data was collected and analysed.

The study started with two data collection methods (document review and observation), and proceeded to conducting key informant interviews as the situation warranted. This, therefore, involved spending time doing the initial data analysis while data collection was still in progress and this process was aimed at enhancing the validity of study findings through triangulation. The researcher analysed the data through interpretation and the constant comparative method, and constantly reflected on the meaning of the data (what was heard and observed) and the direction in which the research was going; constantly comparing themes and looking for data that confirmed the interpretations.

The above process adopted two strategies recommended by Robson (2002), of thinking through data collection. The first strategy was to keep a record using standard forms to summarise data collection events from interviews and observations (see Appendices A and B for contact summary sheets and document summary forms). The forms were pre-designed for recording

specific details about people, events, and situations and on what else the researcher focused attention during the next contact. The document summary form records brief summaries of documents that the researcher examined, noting the type of document, its uses, a summary of its contents, and ideas about other documents that had to be obtained and studied. The completed forms revealed missing information and thus indicated where further data collection was needed. They also suggested promising directions for subsequent stages of data collection and analysis. This form was not a substitute for the researcher's field notes. The contact summary sheet (see Appendix A) is brief and primarily focuses on what was learnt and further guided subsequent data collection activities, while the field notes are comprehensive and descriptive.

3.2   RESEARCH DESIGN

According to Creswell (2007) and Yin (1994:19), a research design is a "blueprint" of the research. It is the "action-plan for getting from here to there" where "here" is the question to be answered and "there" is the conclusions or "answers" to these questions. Yin (1994) states that action plan should guide the researcher in the process of collecting, analysing, and interpreting data. A research design, he explains, is the logic that links the data to be collected and the conclusions to be made to the initial questions of the study.

A cross-sectional case study design was chosen for this study because of the nature of the research problem and the questions being asked. The types of research questions to be answered in this study were the deciding factors of the research design (Creswell, 2007; Yin, 1994:13; Robson, 2002). The reason for this was to provide for a deep understanding of (a) how policy management innovation with the RBM transfer process occurred in its dynamic social context;

(b) why it worked or why it was not working; (c) the study subjects; and (d) the contextual conditions believed to be relevant to the phenomenon under study.

3.2.1   Justification for the use of a case study

A case study design was that a case study strategy is a comprehensive research strategy that "investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context were not clearly evident" (Creswell, 2007; Robson, 2002; Yin, 1994:13). According to Creswell (2007), case studies are aimed at complex relationships between interventions and various factors in social systems without focusing on specific relationships between isolated variables. Cases are conceptualised as examples of a broader phenomenon, and the significance of the case can be seen in terms of the light it sheds on the phenomenon. Case studies describe organisations and the behaviour of people as they occur and provide a deeper understanding of what is actually going on. They allow us to learn through the experience of other organisations so that we can avoid the uncertainty of working by trial and error. The real business of case studies is particularisation, not generalisation, so the first criterion for a case study should be to maximise what one can learn. Case studies help us to get to know it well, not how it is different from others, but what it is and what it does (Creswell, 2007; Stake, 1995).

The case study design was suitable for this study because:

      (a) the focus of the study was to answer "how" and "why" questions on the transfer of RBM policy innovation;

      (b) the behaviour of those involved in the study could not be manipulated;

      (c) of the need to cover contextual conditions because they were relevant to   the phenomenon under study; and

(d)   The boundaries between the phenomenon and context were not clear.

A case study was, therefore, chosen because the adoption of RBM policy innovation by UN-Habitat could not be considered without the context; the UN-Habitat physical and material image; evolutionary changes at UN-Habitat; and the organisational infrastructure setting. It is in these settings that the adoption took place. It would have been impossible for the researcher to gain a true picture of the adoption of RBM policy innovation by UN-Habitat without considering the context within which it occurred (Yin, 2003; Grinstead, 2009). Merriam (1998) emphasises this notion when she argues that innovative programmes and practices are often the focus of descriptive case studies. She stresses that insights gleaned from cases can be unique and can reveal information about the phenomenon, knowledge, and understanding we would otherwise not have access to, which could be used to influence policy, practice, and future research. The information forms a database for future comparison and theory building.

3.2.2   Field Site Selection

The UN-Habitat headquarters are located in Nairobi to strategically cope with the increasing needs for inter-programme coordination, a global perspective and representational duties. The UN-Habitat is primarily concerned with promoting socially and environmentally sustainable towns and cities with the goal of providing adequate shelter for all (UN-Habitat, 2011). The main study field site was thus the coordinating programme office located at the headquarters offices at UN-Habitat, Nairobi, Kenya. However, all three regional offices were purposively selected, including that of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) located in Nairobi, for comparative purposes and further illumination of the findings from the main field site. The

three sites outside the main field site are distinctly different regarding their mandate. The regional field sites, the Regional (ROAAS) based in Nairobi, Kenya; the Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific (ROAP) based in Fukuoka, Japan; and the Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean (ROLAC) based in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Each of these offices is in charge of several countries and offices were all purposively selected because of implementing the UN-Habitat programmes.

Information-rich cases are those from which one can learn a great deal about issues of central importance to the purpose of the research (Creswell, 2007). The study, therefore, looked for interesting patterns across the great variation of data, and in this way was able to increase the scope and range of data exposed, as well as the likelihood that the full array of multiple realities was uncovered. The selection was refined during the piloting of the tools.

3.2.3   Selection of respondents

The selection of the study respondents was guided by the fact that the selected staff had experience working with the organisation and perceptions that gave them special value as data sources. Key informants were people who had been key players in the designing and implementing of the organisation's programme, including the old and new staff in the organisation. The key informants provided in-depth explanations including providing materials that contained information relevant to the study.

3.2.4   Pretesting of instruments

Prior to beginning the field work, the instruments to be used were pretested to establish whether they presented a good flow; were able to capture the data required to meet the objectives of the

study; and cross check the reliability (Grinstead, 2009). Face validity of the instruments was achieved using peers and anything they did not understand was changed. The pilot testing was done on a small sample of staff that became part of the study population. Useful comments were incorporated into the final tools.

3.2.5   Simplifying the plans to collect data

Data collection tends to be one of the most expensive and time-consuming items in a research study. Consequently, any efforts to reduce costs or time inevitably involve simplifying plans for data collection (Grinstead, 2009). This involved three main approaches:

- Identification of what information was really required for the research and elimination of information that was not essential in answering the key research questions driving this study.

- Reviewing data collection instruments to eliminate unnecessary information. Data collection instruments tend to grow in length as different people suggest additional items that would be "interesting" to include, even though not directly related to the purpose of the study.

- Streamlining the process of data collection to reduce costs and time. These included the following: simplifying the study design, e.g. looking for reliable secondary data; reducing the sample size; reducing the costs of data collection, input, and analysis (e.g. use of self-administered questionnaires, using direct observation instead of surveys, using focus groups and community fora instead of household surveys).

3.3 DATA COLLECTION METHODS

Four main methods were used in the data collection, namely interviews, review of secondary documents, observations and assessment of UN-Habitat capacities for RBM policy innovation using CAPScan tool. Table 3.1 below summarises the methods used for data collection; who was interviewed (UN-Habitat and UNDP) senior staff; the key documents reviewed; and what was observed.

Table 3.1: Data collection techniques

Research questions	Interviews (who will be interviewed)	Document review (which)	Observation (what)
Question 1: How has RBM been transferred at the programme	Only Senior staff at headquarters and field sites selected	Strategic plan, annual work plans, Quarterly/annual, & financial reports, evaluations, field visit reports, minutes of project, travel schedules, agreements with donors & partners and general project communication between and among staff.	Staff (behaviour at formal settings and field staff)
Question 2: What potential exists in receiving culture for effective transfer of RBM?	Purpose-fully selected Staff	Corporate strategies and reports. Strategic plans, financial reports, annual reports, internal correspondence and memos from management to staff. Public speeches from management, appraisal documents, Board of Trustees minutes.	Behaviour at formal and informal settings, space and surroundings, objects of importance, events. Activities and interactions, physical settings and participants. Rites and rituals of the organisation.
Question 3: What barriers, if any, does receiving culture present to RBM's transfer process?	Purposefully selected Staff—old and recent employees.	Strategic plans, financial reports, annual reports, internal correspondence and memos from management to staff. Public speeches from management, appraisal documents, committee of permanent representative minutes.	Events, behaviour at social and formal /informal settings, space and surroundings, objects of importance

The study involved observing what was going on; interviewing respondents either face to face or by telephone; and examining documents that are part of the context. Respondents were asked why they did the things they did; said the things they said (verbally or in reports); and meanings of their various actions and words. Triangulation or multiple sources of information (review of

UN-Habitat document, interviews with staff at headquarters and field sites, observation of the unspoken practices, and assessment of capacities for RBM at UN-Habitat) was sought and used because no single source of information could provide a comprehensive perspective (Mckenzie, 2010).

3.3.1   Document Review

In terms of collecting readily available data, documents were the most unobtrusive and immediately available sources, especially those that were particularly relevant, valid, and reliable (Grinstead, 2009). However, note that there was indication of central record keeping of RBM-related documents or general programme/project management files and reports. A protocol to record information about each document or material and key categories sought in the source of information was designed (see Appendix B). The material was divided into primary (information directly from those people being studied) and secondary (second-hand accounts of the people or situation) material. The document reviewed revealed information about the programme practices and trends over time in managing for results and the culture of UN-Habitat.

In reviewing the documents, the researcher aimed to find out whether there were any important messages between the lines, by looking for biases, what audience the document was written for, and with what objective. Documentary evidence reflected communication among other parties attempting to achieve some objective.   The documentary evidence obtained, however, was triangulated with information obtained from interviews with staff. In identifying conditions and assumptions when the documents were authored, the researcher conducted interviews with staff; corroborated documentary evidence; and interpreted the contents of such evidence. Document analysis was triangulated with information gathered through interviews. The document review

also provided what the programme achieved and this was corroborated with practices observed and also with what programme staff members said they did. Table 3.2 below outlines the key documents that were selected and reviewed to best answer the questions of the study. The table also outlines what was reviewed in the documents. Validation and triangulation of document data was done through in-depth interviews.

Table 3.2: Document Reviews

Question	Rationale
What was reviewed?	Sample key planning and implementation documents (2008-2013) that explained the adoption process of RBM and documents that spoke to how the programme was like previous to the adoption of RBM (2007). Other sample documents were those that showed the organisation's culture –internal communication for management, policy guidelines, Committee of Permanent Representatives (CPR), Governing Council, corporate Medium-Term Strategic and Institutional Plan (MTSIP) for 2007-2013, strategy papers, biennium strategic plans and programmes of work, and annual plans and reports, travel calendar and UN-Habitat evaluations, corporate history, procedures, regulations, reward system, strategy, mission, values and organisational change process documents.
Why?	By going through the documents, the researcher wanted to better understand what UN-Habitat HQ does – the practices, prior to RBM implementation and after, and the organisations' culture relationship between policy and practice, lived values and espoused values. In addition, the researcher was able to verify some interview data.
When and for how long?	The larger part of the document review was undertaken at the beginning of the study (January - June 2013), before any in-depth interviews. It overlapped with most of the early intense observation period. Document review was continuous until the end of the 5th month when the researcher terminated the research to continue analysing and reporting.

3.3.2   Interviews

Semi-structured, open-ended in-depth interviews were the main basis of the study, as a design that does not set limits to the process of unveiling the distinct meanings of words and actions of participants. Interviews were an essential source of case study evidence because case studies are about human affairs (Creswell, 2007). When questions emerged or changed in the course of interviewing, the researcher added them to the protocol (Appendix A). The main reason for using open-ended interviews for the study was because they are suitable for probing deeply in search of opinions, perceptions, knowledge, and attitudes towards various issues, and serve also

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as a validity check regarding responses and information that could be obtained from observations and documents. Questions were open ended for general themes and issues and more focused for specific issues. The opportunity to learn about what the researcher could not see and to explore alternative explanations of what was seen was the special strength of interviewing in this study (Glesne, 1999).

In-depth interviews were conducted in a conversational manner guided by a set of questions in the interview protocol. The human affairs in the programme were reported and interpreted through the eyes of specific interviewees, and the purposely-selected, well-informed respondents provided important insights into the situation. Table 3.3 outlines the key informants selected for in-depth interviews, why they were selected and the timing of interviews, which was important in providing timely information for corroboration with that gathered using other data collection techniques.

Table 3.3: Summary of the Interviews

Question	Rationale
Who was interviewed?	Purposefully-selected senior staff in Nairobi and at the selected field sites, Chairperson Committee of Permanent Representatives Incumbent Executive Director Regional Director, and five staff members—field site 1 Deputy Executive director Senior Programme Officers in charge of strategic planning, quality assurance, monitoring and evaluation, and three staff members– Field Site 2 Former Executive Director Senior Programme Officers and three staff members – Field Site 3 Programme Manager Four international staff – service between 3-4 years Four newly recruited staff – service less than 1 year
Why?	Because they were best placed to answer the research questions, given that they are directly involved in the designing and planning of the programme and are directing the implementation process and hence the use of RBM. Others who were interviewed were those best placed to talk about RBM and the culture at the organisation.
When? **For how long (months/year)?**	After preliminary observations and some extensive document review Just how many sessions were required depended on the availability and fluency of the respondent and the researcher's probing skills. All interviews were conducted in between observations and document reviews, but follow-ups on very particular items of importance, were undertaken throughout the period of study in a bid to gain more understanding, and clarification.

3.3.3   Observations

Although observation as a data-gathering technique has been criticised as highly subjective and unreliable due to the selective nature of human perception, in terms of collecting data, it still has an advantage in covering events in real time and in the context of these events (Creswell, 2007; Yin, 1994). Many things that seemed ordinary to people in the organisation explained difficult problems and behaviour and gave the researcher important clues about the norms and values that are central to shaping behaviour in this arena. Observation helped the researcher to identify the informal rules that people at UN-Habitat and UNDP follow to guide and make decisions (Creswell, 2007).

Planning and mental preparation were important for the researcher to be able to observe well and pay attention to norms and values that were central to shaping behaviour. The specifics to be observed were guided by the purpose of the study and the research questions. During the research period, the researcher was physically located at the UN-Habitat HQ offices in Nairobi and engaged in observation to become familiar with and to understand the dynamics of the purposively-selected study participants. The study did not adopt observation as its primary data collection method; rather the researcher followed McKenzie (2009) and Glesne's (1999) suggestion, that in qualitative research, the experience of learning as an observer often preceded interviewing, and this was a basis for informing some issues in the study questions.

Observation helped the researcher to study behaviour in formal and informal settings; space and surroundings; objects of importance; and events (Creswell, 2007). The activities and interactions, physical settings and participants, rites and rituals of the organisation were also observed. Observing is about sensing and getting an opportunity for a first-hand account of the phenomenon as it happens as opposed to relying on other people's perspectives and interpretations (Merriam, 1998). Given that nobody can observe everything, the researcher focused the observation on behaviour, events, persons, and the physical context (Table 3.4). He observed routine things that may have led to understanding the context. He observed things like dynamics among staff that participants often miss or point out in interviews, and also observed with the idea to triangulate emerging findings from interviews and document analysis. What was learnt through the observation provided the researcher with knowledge of context, specific

incidents, behaviour, and so on, and these were used as reference points for subsequent interviews.

Table 3.4: Observation Chart

Question	Rationale
Who was observed?	HQ staff—general interactions at formal and informal settings, body language.
What was observed?	Normal daily activities, physical setting, conversations, subtle factors, events like coffee meetings, seminars in Nairobi, annual planning and review meetings, Management meetings, coffee breaks, lunch breaks, cocktails, Concept Paper writing for donor funding, training session.
Why?	By observing these things the researcher could become familiar with the surroundings, participants and the organisational vocabulary. Most importantly, the researcher better understood the context/culture of the UN-Habitat and this helped in framing meaningful interview questions.
When and for how long (months, year/s)?	Researcher observed more keenly and intensively in the beginning, but general observation ran throughout the length of the study period.

3.3.4   RBM Institutional Capacity Scan (CAP-Scan) at UN-Habitat

a) Introduction: The CAP-Scan is an analytical   framework and participatory process. As a self-assessment tool, CAP-Scan is conducted on the basis of the five managing for development results (MfDR) pillars: Leadership; Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E); Accountability and Partnerships; Planning and Budgeting; and Statistical Capacity, by determining the level of development of its capacities on a scale of four major stages: Awareness, Experimentation, Transition, and Sustainable Implementation (CAP-Scan Secretariat, 2009),

b) Purpose of the Institutional Capacity Scan: The research study involved assessment of UN-Habitat capacity to work within Results-Based Management (RBM), using the Institutional Capacity Scan methodology (CAP-Scan Secretariat, 2009) to identify its strengths and weaknesses and improve achievement of results.

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*c) Components of the Institutional Capacity Scan (CAP-Scan):*The methodology implemented included orientation of staff on RBM concepts and principles, and on key elements of the Institutional CAP-Scan Measurement Framework adapted for the following five main RBM pillars: Planning and Budgeting, Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E), Leadership and Accountability, and Information Systems and Statistics (Cap-Scan Secretariat, 2009).

d) Components of the Cap-Scan as adapted for the purpose of this study: The Planning and Budgeting (P&B) pillar incorporates all components necessary to ensure that the institution's coordination of planning and budgeting process is in line with RBM objectives. The assessment is based on the following elements: (1) budget consistency with MTSIP priorities; (2) budget preparation based on objectives and results; (3) sub-programme coordination; (4) presence of a results management framework; (5) supporting funding sources link programming to the budget, and 6. participation of cities in the budgeting process.

The Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) pillar was key in determining whether the institution's current M & E systems facilitate or hinder RBM. This entailed assessing the following components: (1) Results-based monitoring is in place; (2) Capacity for monitoring and evaluation in the organisation exists; (3) Information system and decision-making support tools are utilised; (4) Reporting on results occurs; (5) The use of programme and project monitoring and evaluation information for decision-making; (6) A system for measuring client satisfaction in place; and 7. an independent evaluation unit exists in UN-Habitat.

The Information Systems and Statistics (IS&S) pillar provides the structure in ensuring that sound statistical information systems exist, are used for decision making, and are disseminated

throughout the institution. To do so, the following criteria were assessed: (1) presence of a framework for the management of statistical activities; (2) data management and disaggregation capacity; (3) data quality assessment; and (4) capacity for analysis and modelling.

The Leadership and Accountability (L&A) pillar includes the key elements which demonstrate the institution's commitment from the top down to RBM objectives. It is an important element in RBM that could be considered the foundation upon which the other pillars stand for the implementation. To assess the solidity of the pillar, the following elements are considered: (1) integration of RBM; (2) commitment to RBM; (3) clarity and articulation of development assistance and orientation; (4) responsibility, delegation and accountability for senior UN-Habitat staff;   (5) management changes; (6) responsibility and commitment to achieve results; (7) UN-Habitat results orientation; and (8) programme implementation for mainstreaming RBM.

Table 3.5: Components Scored by RBM Pillars for the Capacity Assessment

			RBM Pillars	
	1. Planning & Budgeting	2. Monitoring & Evaluation	3. Information Systems and Statistical Capacity	4. Leadership & Accountability
Components by Pillar	1.1. Budget consistency with UN-Habitat's MTSIP priorities	2.1. UN-Habitat's MTSIP results-based monitoring	3.1. Framework for the management of statistical activities	4.1. Commitment
	1.2. Budget preparation based on objectives and results	2.2. Capacity for monitoring and evaluation of UN-Habitat's operations	3.2. Data management: aggregation and disaggregation	4.2. Clarity and articulation of development assistance orientations
	1.3. Intra- sub programmes coordination	2.3. Information system and decision-support tools	3.3. Extent of data	4.3. Responsibility, delegation and accountability at the level of senior officials of UN-Habitat
	1.4. Sub programmes coordination	2.4. UN-Habitat performance geared to development results	3.4. Data quality assessment	4.4. Change in Management
	1.5 Results management framework	2.5 Reporting on results	3.5 Capacity for analysis and modelling	4.5. Responsibility and commitment to achieve results in UN-Habitat
	1.6 Supporting funding sources link programming to results	2.6 Use project implementation (and monitoring) data for institutional decision-making process	3.6 Performance Measurement	4.6.. UN-Habitat staff results-orientation and programme for mainstreaming RBM
	1.7 Participation of cities in budget planning	2.7 Use of project evaluation data for institutional decision-making process		4.7. Integration of the RBM
	1.8. Budget consistency with UN-Habitat's medium-term plan (3-5 years)	2.8. System for measuring client city/community satisfaction		
		2.9 Independent evaluation of UN-Habitat activities		
		2.10 Coordination with partners (executing agencies)		

Source: (CAP-Scan Secretariat, 2009)

The participants were divided into groups of approximately five people from their own sub-programmes to participate in the exercise. Participants came from a mix of senior level,

technical, and managerial positions. At least one participant from each group was responsible for noting down the capacity scores and justification for these. Before the exercise, the Cap-Scan tool was designed and tailored to the UN-Habitat context. The main purpose of the adaptation phase was to clarify wording issues and ensure that the different criteria of the RBM levels were properly captured for the current UN-Habitat change process.

e) *Training of Participants and Scope of the Assessment*

All participants received a brief overview on RBM concepts and the Institutional Cap-Scan methodology to ensure effective implementation of the group discussion exercise during the assessment. The assessment targeted all sub-programmes and managers, including directors.

Seven groups scored their capacity and the extent to which they have put RBM-related practices and structures in place based on the Institutional Cap-Scan measurement framework. Each group determined where it fell within the following criteria:

- Lack of knowledge and absence of procedures: There is an absence of knowledge regarding the UN RBM approach (every UN agency develops its own strategy for implementing RBM);

- Awareness level: recognizing the need to implement RBM in the institution, with no concrete action conducted to date;

- Exploration stage: taking actions but in the context of limited means to effectively implement a given strategy;

- Transition stage: advancing with the effective use of RBM practices; and

- Full implementation or consolidation process of RBM practices: in other words performance oriented projects and policies consolidated for a period longer than three years.

The overall institutional score was obtained through averaging the scores of the seven groups, rather than through an agreement by all groups on an institutional score. The groups presented the results to their colleagues for further validation as they were generated during the self-assessment. For the definitions of the CAP-Scan stages, (see Appendix E).

3.4   Data Management and Analysis

Data analysis is inevitably inextricably linked to the method of collection, not least because they are derived from the same theoretical concepts and are aimed at meeting the same research objectives. Creswell (2007) referred to this as "Analysis is a matter of giving meaning to first impressions as well as final compilations". Analysis means essentially taking something apart. In this case, it was necessary to have a reasonable measure of overlap between the case study analysis and data gathering so that each informed the other. The whole process of data analysis is what Creswell (2007) referred to as the "explanation building" case study analysis, or what Glaser and Strauss (1967) called the constant comparative method of data analysis. This relates to the way new data were constantly compared with old data; the way case analysis went through several iterations; and the way emerging themes were constantly compared with theoretical propositions.

The strategy (finish-to-start approach) that the study adopted involved thinking about the way to present data at the end of the research. The relative emphasis was to be given to thick

description and to analysis and interpretation of constructs and themes, patterns, and a comparison of emerging data with existing theories. This makes the researcher record events at an adequate level of detail, including an abundance of quotations. In this way, the researcher was able to anticipate which data were collected and in what depth.

The case study description involved analysing the organisation's culture from the perspectives of key informants to see how it promoted or undermined the transfer process of RBM; clearly describing the analysis of the transfer process of RBM at the UN-Habitat from the theoretical concepts described earlier; and looking at the three field sites to further gain some understanding of how the transfer was rolling out; and compiling multiple databases prior to collecting the data. Handwritten notes were typed, formatted, and made into computer files, hard copy documents were scanned and turned into files, resulting in a database.

The researcher, in addition, developed a category label and definition for each type of phenomenon that was analysed. A category is a construct that refers to a certain type of phenomenon mentioned in the database; a construct observed from the phenomenon (Yin, 1994). Consideration was given to whether the categories could be analysed further into subtypes (e.g., very useful, useful, and not useful). File folders and 3x5 card files that identified issues, field sites, and persons were used in the process of sorting out information. Each category or theme was supported by numerous incidents, quotes, and so on. Categorisation cascades to sub-categories and assumes many levels. This level of coding was important; hence, there was a need to include details such as when the incident took place or the characteristics of the person

interviewed and the comments and thoughts at the time. In this way, the researcher was able to avoid loss of detail that could occur with the passage of time.

The researcher organised field notes into observational notes (what was seen, heard, felt, etc.); methodology notes (methods regarding how to collect the data); theoretical notes (hunches, hypothesis, critiques of what was done, thinking, seeing); and personal notes (reflections, feeling, statements about the research, the people talked to, the doubts, the anxieties, the pleasures).

One way in which this analysis was done was through the use of codes to categorise and sort the data into look-alike groups. "Codes are tags or labels for assigning units of meaning to descriptive or inferential information compiled during a study" (Creswell, 2007). Codes attempt to characterise and make understandable the meaning of the data and answer why data are grouped together in a particular way. These codes were used to sort and organise the volume of data collected during the study.

Utilising the research questions, the components and principles of RBM, related literature, and the researcher's conceptual framework of transfer of technologies/knowledge, a starter list of codes which "forces the analyst to tie research questions or directly to the data" (Mayne, 2007) were created. The pilot interviews were coded using this starter list of codes. The codes were then re-examined, and categories that were too broad, too abstract, or just did not work were either revised or discarded.

Transcription of interviews was on-going throughout the seven-month field process. Taped interviews were transcribed, read, re-read, and coded. Comments to self-suggesting interpretations, links between data, and issues for further checking were written in the margins of the transcribed interviews. These comments were coded. Document summary forms and contact summary sheets were coded. A separate notebook/memo was kept to record the researcher's thoughts, feelings, hunches, doubts, insights, and peculiar incidents "throughout the data collection, data reduction, data displays conclusion drawings, conclusion testing and final reporting" (Robson, 2002), and these memos were coded.

Throughout the process of data analysis, the codes were periodically re-examined to determine whether or not they still worked. Categories of material that were too broad were divided into sub-categories. Codes that did not work were dropped. The researcher kept notes on RBM, transfer of technologies, and adoption and diffusion of innovation literatures as reading material specifically to stimulate questions, data gathering, and theoretical sensitivity in the course of the data collection and analysis process, and to help explain why the findings support or differ from existing literature. In addition, the researcher kept a diary to help in reflection and to ensure that important aspects of the early thinking about the research were not forgotten, an aspect that was crucial to the readers' understanding of the case. The self-conscious notes in the diary were intended to show readers the development of thinking with all the setbacks and dead ends. This was to ensure that the reasoning remained transparent to self as well as to others. Diary keeping also improved time management and provided ideas for the future direction of the work.

The data analysis process consisted of three concurrent flows of activity: (a) data reduction; (b) data display; and (c) conclusion drawing/verification. In data reduction, the researcher selected, focused, and simplified raw data. Data reduction involves making decisions about which data chunks provide the initial focus, and data display involves organising and assembling information that permits conclusions to be drawn (Mayne, 2007). The researcher, in the end, decided what things meant and noted regularities, patterns, and configurations. Finally, conclusions were tested for plausibility and validity by having key informants read the draft report.

Russ-Eft (1999) warns that the methods that a researcher chooses for analysis should be able to provide meaningful information to listeners and readers. The researcher, therefore, used interpretational analysis and reflective analysis because it is best suited for case studies. Even though the data were coded into categories that summarised it during the data collection, the study still generated a great many pages of observational notes, interview transcripts, and documents obtained from the field setting.

As a final check on category systems, Mckensie (2010) recommends that the inter-ratter reliability should be determined. While the discovery of themes is important in qualitative research, the discovery of constructs can be a significant outcome of a case study (Creswell, 2007).

3.5   QUALITY CONTROL

Being able to trust research results is especially important to professionals in applied fields in which practitioners intervene in people's lives (Ravallion, 2009; Merriam, 1998). Every

researcher wants to contribute results that are believable and trustworthy. Reliability concerns the accuracy of the information; whether it matches reality; the extent to which the same research findings can be repeated; and, if repeated, whether it can yield the same results. This poses a problem in qualitative studies because human behaviour is dynamic and not static, and reliability is based on an assumption that there is a single reality (Mayne, 2007).

However, to ensure reliability, the researcher created trust through being sensitive, maintaining confidentiality, being non-judgmental, friendly, and inoffensive when relating to the research participants, and that made respondents talk more openly, personally, and deeply about issues. To further increase the quality and credibility of data the researcher used three strategies: (a) Member checking– confirmation by the respondents that the information the researcher had was correct; (b) Multiple methods, convergence or corroborative evidence (triangulation) to increase the reliability and precision of the information gathered; and (c) According to Yin (1994), the validity of a study is strengthened if the researcher presents a strong chain of evidence that is clear –meaningful links between research questions, raw data, and findings. Validity was further strengthened by the participatory manner in which the researcher collected data at the field sites. Data were member-checked during individual reviews, and peers commented on findings as they emerged.

Case studies like this one cannot be generalised, so we cannot talk of external validity or reliability in the context of replicating the study in another context. Dooley (2002) suggests, however, that relating findings back to the literature also helps to establish external validity, which the researcher ensured in the research questions.

3.6   REPORTING THE CASE STUDY

A case study represents a unique case. In reporting, the researcher compressed and linked data together in a narrative that conveyed the meaning derived from studying the phenomenon (Merriam, 1998). Caution was exercised in trying to faithfully report reality as it was heard in the voices and interpretations of the informants. The case report is descriptive and is based on experiences lived by UN-Habitat HQ staff in field sites, including experiences of UNDP staff based in Nairobi. The reporting represents the context, participation, and reality of the situation. Context was included as an important aspect of the study because practitioners would be interested in knowing whether the research setting sufficiently resembles their own situation to warrant adopting the same practice.

Starting with a brief overview of findings, each finding is supported by quotes from interviews, field notes, and reference to documentary evidence. A combination of reflective and analytic reporting is used. The researcher drew conclusions because leaving it for others could lead to misinterpretation, especially by readers who are not able to make connections implied in the study. However, the case report still leaves room to stimulate the reader to think beyond the particular bits of information. Because cases reflect real life situations, the case report tries to represent good and bad practices, failures as well as successes. There were no attempts to change facts to expose how a situation should have been handled.

3.7   CONFIDENTIALITY

It was not possible completely to protect the identity of the participants in this case study, and that could have led to speculation, accusations, and denials, especially regarding contentious

data. However, efforts were made to conceal the identities of respondents, especially regarding sensitive evidence. Participants were informed that they have the right to refuse to answer the research questions.

The researcher made every effort to be truly sensitive to the variety of individual and institutional interests that were at stake in the kind of information that was presented. The researcher avoided offending questions or issues to ensure that respondent's dignity was fully protected in the course of the research. The approval letter for subjects was a written agreement concerning the promise of non-violation to them. All participants were assigned a number and these number codes were used throughout the study to protect the identity of the participants. A written consent letter was prepared (See Appendix F).

3.8 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

This case study was limited in several ways. First, by mainly using the qualitative paradigm, some aspects may require quantification, which was not the case. Qualitative data collection methods as the primary framework for data gathering and analysing can sometimes be subjective. As in Royse (2004), research methods in social work, positions quantitative research as "legitimate" research and qualitative research as "popular". Second, "natural" alliance exists between practice and qualitative research methods and data, and qualitative markers of validity and reliability are as rigorous as those employed in quantitative research. There should be no one research methodology assuming the status of "truth"— indeed, these approaches are all about a challenge to the notion that there is a "truth" to be "discovered" or a "true path" to follow in creating, constructing, or uncovering knowledge. Other people's views are filtered through the

researcher's worldview, values, and perspectives, which are coloured by the researcher's experience in development programmes and the use of RBM policy innovation.

The other limitation is the use of case studies which are usually few but from which conclusions are made (Mayne, 2007). Case studies usually may not be easily replicable, thus the difficulty in designing the survey tool. Case studies have been faulted for their lack of rigor in the collection and the analysis of empirical material, and that lack of rigor is linked to researcher bias and others involved in the case, hence raising the question of ethics, trustworthiness, validity, generalisation, and basic data integrity (Yin, 1994). Deliberate efforts were made to apply methods like data triangulation and detailed verifiable processes to avoid such possible errors in the current research.

Since the researcher was aware of the limitations, ways to mitigate these were used, like addressing the issues related to bias, accuracy, and being as honest as is humanly possible in all phases of research (Creswell, 2007). These are discussed in the report, including the inbuilt controls to manage bias, accuracy and validity of data.

3.9   SUMMARY

Case study research comprises more than simply conducting research on a single organisation/individual or situation. This approach has the potential to deal with simple though complex situations. It enabled the researcher to answer "how" and "why" type questions, while taking into consideration how the phenomenon of 'RBM policy innovation' adoption is influenced by the context within which it is situated. For research on the transfer and adoption

of RBM policy innovation at UN-Habitat, a case study provided an excellent opportunity to gain tremendous insight into a case. It enabled the researcher to gather data from a variety of sources and to converge the data to illuminate the case. The research proposition was based on the literature found on the topic of RBM policy innovation.

A case study design was chosen for the study because of the nature of the research problem and the questions being asked. What the researcher wants to know and the types of research questions to be answered in a study are the deciding factor of a research design (Yin, 1994; Merriam, 1998).

The qualitative case study design provided tools for the researcher to study complex phenomena within the particular contexts. The study's purpose and objectives guided writing the research questions, developing propositions, determining the "case" under study, binding the case and a discussion of data sources and triangulation. The unit of analysis "case" is defined by Miles and Huberman (1994:25) as, "a phenomenon of some sort occurring in a bounded context. This research study, the case, in effect, is my unit of analysis.

CHAPTER 4

RBM AT THE UN-HABITAT

4.1   INTRODUCTION

This chapter describes the context of the study in detail. This helps to place UN-Habitat in the wider context of the organisation, where the infrastructure necessary for RBM transfer lies. Examining the UN-Habitat context – the role; the site; background history of the wider organisation; the vision and mission; mandate and geographical focus; governance structure; and important evolutionary changes in the last few years – provides an attempt to explain the complexities and peculiarities associated with the transfer of RBM policy innovation, especially in a context of a development not-for-profit organisation. Understanding the programme focus helps to understand how RBM was applied to different components of development programmes at UN-Habitat. Studying the context in terms of geographical focus supports complexities and peculiarities associated with transferring RBM policy innovation and how it was received and institutionalised between UN-Habitat headquarters and the study's field sites.

4.2   UN-HABITAT BACKGROUND HISTORY AND THE CHANGING FACE

On 1 January 1975, the UN General Assembly established the United Nations Habitat and Human Settlements Foundation (UNHHSF), the first official UN body dedicated to promoting urbanisation in developing countries as an international public good (IPG) to address issues of urbanisation by assisting national programmes relating to human settlements through the provision of capital and technical assistance, particularly in developing countries (UN-Habitat, 2011a).

On 1 January 2002, the UN-Habitat mandate was strengthened and its status elevated to a fully-fledged programme in the United Nations system, giving birth to UN-Habitat, the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (General Assembly Resolution A/56/206). Key recommendations and fine tuning of the agenda were now underway, along with new strategies for achieving the urban development and shelter goals and targets for the next 15 years.

The revitalisation placed UN-Habitat squarely in the middle of the UN's development agenda for poverty reduction (General Assembly Resolution A/56/206), with a more streamlined and effective structure and staff, and a more relevant and focused set of programmes and priorities. It is through this structure and mandate that UN-Habitat contributes to the overall objective of the United Nations system aimed at addressing "humankind's greatest challenges on the planet - to reduce poverty and to promote sustainable development (General Assembly Resolution A/56/206). Today, its partners range from governments and local authorities to a wide range of international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society groups (CSGs) (General Assembly Resolution A/56/206).

Starting with an annual budget of $4 million, UN-Habitat had grown into a $100 million annual budget organisation by 2012 (UN-Habitat, 2011b). The United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) is the United Nations agency for Human Settlements mandated by the General Assembly to promote socially and environmentally sustainable towns and cities with the goal of providing adequate shelter for all (General Assembly resolutions, S-25/2). UN-Habitat

helps the urban poor by transforming cities into safer, healthier, greener places with better opportunities where everyone can live in dignity (General Assembly resolutions, S-25/2).

UN-Habitat's mission is to promote the development of socially and environmentally sustainable human settlements and the achievement of adequate shelter for all (General Assembly **r**esolution A/56/206, 2002). UN-Habitat's vision is to see sustainable urbanisation in cities and regions that provides all citizens with adequate shelter, basic services, security, and employment opportunities, regardless of age, sex, and social strata (General Assembly **r**esolution A/56/206, 2002). This vision, derived from the Millennium Development Goals, requires systemic reform to improve access to land and housing for all.

The UN-Habitat strategy supports national and local governments and Habitat Agenda partners to put in place better land and housing policies. The agency is focusing on three outcomes: supporting enabling land and housing reforms; increasing security of tenure; and promoting slum improvement and slum prevention policies (General Assembly resolutions, S-25/2).

In order to realise its vision and mission, UN-Habitat made a radical departure from standard practices in the UN Secretariat by developing a six-year Strategic Plan, 2008-2013, and adopting RBM as its management approach for achieving better development results. The development of the strategic framework and work programme documents is pivotal to and sets the foundation for implementation of RBM in the agency as they define the programme of work for the concerned

biennium. These documents are mandatory and are prepared according to regulations and rules articulated in the UN Secretary General's bulletin ('ST/SGB/2000/8').

To spearhead the implementation of the strategic plan, UN-Habitat established four change-management task forces, namely Results-based Management and Knowledge Management (RBM & KM); Resource Mobilization and Allocation; Human Resources and Administration; and Enhanced Normative and Operational Framework (ENOF). The RBM & Knowledge Management (KM) task force was responsible for implementing RBM-related activities (UN-Habitat, 2009). Institutionalisation of results-based management in UN-Habitat encompassed introducing a results-oriented approach aimed at improving management effectiveness and accountability by defining realistic expected results, monitoring progress towards the achievement of expected results, integrating lessons learned into management decisions and reporting on performance. UN-Habitat introduced RBM at its headquarters and at its three regional offices. The regional offices include the Regional Office for Arab and Africa States, the Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean; and the Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific (UN-Habitat, 2012).

4.3   UN-HABITAT GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE

The UN-Habitat Secretariat is the executive organ of UN-Habitat in charge of coordinating the programme (Governing Council Resolution, 32/162). It designs, implements, manages and monitors UN-Habitat's urban initiatives and human settlements development projects, and provides the Governing Council with strategic recommendations and direction. It is also mandated to carry out research activities and to facilitate the exchange of information,

knowledge and best practices on questions of urbanisation such as global trends, effective approaches and new technologies (Governing Council Resolution, 32/162).

The UN-Habitat Secretariat headquartered in Nairobi, Kenya services the Governing Council and acts as the focal point for all human settlement matters within the United Nations system. Under the direction of the Executive Director (Figure 4.1), it is entrusted with the responsibilities set out in both Resolution 32/162 and in paragraph 228 of the Habitat Agenda.

The UN-Habitat Secretariat is structured according to:

- offices that carry out management and support tasks,

- thematic organisational units, or branches, that handle a specific urban theme, and

- regional offices that deliver the UN-Habitat work programme at regional and country levels.

Thus (Figure 4.1) presents the UN-Habitat Secretariat organisation structure, headed by the Executive Director.

Figure 4.1: UN-Habitat Organogram
Source: UN-Habitat, 2010-2013 Programme of Work and Budget

The work of the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UH-Habitat) is guided through the General Assembly by three main policy bodies of the United Nations, namely the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC); the Governing Council of UN-Habitat; and the Committee of Permanent Representatives (CPR) (General Assembly Resolution A/RES/56/206). The governance structure is headed by the Chair selected from permanent member countries with a rotational tenure of two years, with the agency's Executive Director participating as an ex-officio member of the Committee. The members 'Ambassadors' are appointed by respective member

countries to represent their governments and regions. Members serve for a period of two years (General Assembly Resolution A/RES/56/206).

The Office of Programme Management coordinates financial management and control, resource management and administration, business processes, and quality assurance functions comprising results-based management and programme planning, monitoring and reporting. It is responsible for financial management and control; human resource management and administration; business guidelines and processes; and administrative services for HQ, regional and field offices, among other areas (Governing Council Resolution, 32/162).

According to the United Nation Charter, the Committee of Permanent Representatives (CPR) are responsible for guiding the development of the programme's long-range plans; approving the annual programme of work and budget; monitoring progress towards the agency's objectives; ensuring financial integrity and accountability; providing oversight of investments and the disposal of major assets; approving personnel policies affecting the organisation staff; defending the organisation's image; the legal implications of activities; and the performance of the Committee as a whole and that of its individual members (General Assembly Resolution A/RES/56/206).

The day-to-day management of the organisation is vested with the Executive Director, who is as-sisted by a Senior Management Team comprising the Deputy Executive Director, the Division Directors, and Chief of Staff. UN-Habitat's professional staff were selected through a highly

competitive international search; the agency had a worldwide staff of 500 from 40 nationalities by the year 2005 (General Assembly Resolution A/RES/56/206).

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In addition to the diversity of their funding base, UN-Habitat benefits greatly from a diversity of staff. Staff are based in 23 countries throughout the tropics and work in collaboration with others in many more regions. According to categorisation in an internal report by the Cultural Change Committee (2009), UN-Habitat's staff members at the Headquarters and regional offices comprise 40 female and 30 male support staff, and 60 female and 70 male professional staff. More than half of the senior professional talent is drawn from the South and from the very countries in which UN-Habitat works and the aim is to achieve an impact on slum dwellers. Staff membership is composed of more than 30 different nationalities, and UN-Habitat enjoys a well-balanced profile of experience, and educational and professional backgrounds ranging from pre-graduates who were just starting out to staff with more than 20 years of experience in the international urbanisation and economics (UN-Habitat, 2012).

4.4   UN-HABITAT GEOGRAPHICAL FOCUS

UN-Habitat has three main regional offices, as well as liaison and information offices in New York, Brussels, Geneva, Moscow, Beijing, Chennai (India), Amman and Budapest. The Regional and Technical Cooperation Division oversees the work of the:

a) Regional Office for Africa and the Arab States (ROAAS) based in Nairobi, Kenya

b) Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific (ROAP) based in Fukuoka, Japan,

c) Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean (ROLAC) based in the Brazilian city of Rio de Janeiro.

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Currently, 34 countries across Africa and the Caribbean and Pacific States (ACP) participate in the programme (UN-Habitat, 2011b).

Participating countries in Africa include: Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, and the Republic of the Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Uganda, Benin, Lesotho, Rwanda, Botswana, Togo and Namibia (UN-Habitat, 2012). The participating Caribbean countries include: Antigua and Barbuda, Haiti, St. Lucia, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, while those from the pacific region are Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands.

4.5   UN-HABITAT'S MATERIAL CULTURE

The UN-Habitat headquarters in Nairobi is a symbol of good taste, opulence, and status. It is located in a lush and plush neighbourhood of Gigiri and, in the words of one director, *"Nairobi is a beautiful and great location for all of us—you can't be in a better location."*

A drive up a stunning terrain of well-manicured grounds and lush assortments of flower gardens brings you to the UN's sprawling office complex. Tarmac driveways and brick-paved pathways direct employees and visitors around the complex grounds, where well-tended indigenous and exotic trees are a natural habitat to monkeys and rare birds. An uncommon display of rare palm trees accents the entrance to the main buildings.

On one side of the complex, a cascading car park displays staff members' red-numbered UN car number plates that are part of the benefit package for professional staff at UN-Habitat and other UN bodies housed at the complex, as well as buses that transport national staff to and from their residences. The red UN plates are an official government symbol for United Nations status, like UN-Habitat. As with all other aspects of UN-Habitat work, the trademark suggests attention to detail.

The office complex at UN-Habitat, which consists of what they call the north and south office blocks, holds approximately 150 employees (UN-Habitat, 2011b), creating what one would call an "urban park." Offices in each block face each other in a rectangle-like design, forming a spectacular quad in the middle, a design that seems to have been created with collaborative work in mind.

All UN-Habitat staff members, both professional and support staff, occupy individualised, soundproof, windowed offices, complete with nameplates on the doors. Modern facilities include laptop computers and modern computer furniture, book-shelves, telephones, printers, with informal seating and carpeting as extras for senior management. This office arrangement allows for personal décor, total privacy, and independence at work. In the words of one Program Officer, "The system trusts you will do a commendable job without constant supervision." Behaviour around the offices is quiet and controlled. The pin-drop silence around the campus gives it an ambience of high professionalism.

Under the lower offices, a medium-sized modern library and documentation centre keeps and preserves many of UN-Habitat's publications and wider important but related literature. Urban management books and journals, development books, and many best-seller management books are among the many resources found in the library.

The office complex includes approximately 100 avant-garde offices, at least 10 meeting rooms complete with ultra-modern facilities, and a state-of-the-art amphitheatre lecture room that can accommodate 100 people. All of this remains available to teams, staff, and partner organisations. One of the largest and seemingly most useful facilities is the 500 plus capacity, stained glass-ornamented conference room managed by the United Nations Office in Nairobi, which is complete with speakerphones, effect lighting, and a 10 by 10 foot remote-controlled screen that is used for most large meetings, including annual Planning and Review meetings.

But that is not all—other conveniences around the office complex include coffee shops located in each office block, a commercial printing press, and a private banking facility. Cold and hot drinking water dispensers are conveniently placed in office blocks and conference rooms. Contemporary toilets complete with Eastern showers and shower/bathrooms are located in convenient areas of the buildings.

Highly polished terracotta floors lined with potted plants bring the outside inside. Gallery-size pictures that depict UN-Habitat's work, agency logos, and mission statements decorate the hallways and define its long-term vision in terms of who they are, what they do, how they do it, why they do it, whom they want to serve, and where they want to be.

Modern communication satellite dishes managed by the United Nations Office in Nairobi facilitate direct world dials and high-speed internet connections, linking UN-Habitat to the rest of the world. Uniformed guards, cleaners, and grounds men keep the complex safe, clean, and well-manicured. A polite, pleasant and courteous staff is present to serve the public.

However, the three field sites visited did not have an equal measure of outward glamour and elegance like the headquarter office in Nairobi. The field offices each had one meeting room with modern facilities that could accommodate 50 people and is available to teams and partner organisations. This meeting room is used for most large meetings, including annual planning and review meetings. Field offices are smaller and in most cases are shared with other international organisations like the United Environmental Programme (UNEP) field offices and the UNDP. The surroundings lack the spruced-up look, the attention to detail, and the environmental sensitivity of the Nairobi headquarter complex. Other conveniences around the field offices include cold and hot drinking water dispensers which are conveniently placed in offices and conference rooms.

None of the three field sites visited had a library or documentation centre that keeps and preserves UN-Habitat publications and other important literature, but the researcher found these kept in lockable cabins located in the offices of technical staff. Most of the reference material like urban management books and journals, development books, and many best-seller management books are only accessible through the UN-Habitat HQ E-Library.

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Other conveniences found at field site offices include kitchens where staff made coffee, computers and printers. Banking facilities are located in the central business districts.

In most respects, an air of professionalism was evident in the Africa and Arab States regional office in Nairobi, Kenya and in the Asia Pacific office in Fukuoka, Japan, while the Latin America and the Caribbean office based in the Brazilian city of Rio de Janeiro seems to reflect some difference. For instance, beyond things appearing oddly casual inside most offices, the behaviour was also somewhat casual compared to the Nairobi HQs; the researcher on one occasion observed young staff members freely enjoying football on television in the Boardroom during working hours, behaviour that was in total contrast to the seriousness and professionalism displayed at the UN-Habitat HQ in Nairobi.

4.6   UN-HABITAT'S MATCH WITH THE PHYSICAL IMAGE

To match its physical image, UN-Habitat solicits internationally for the best professionals in the field of urbanisation who are either posted to headquarters in Nairobi or to field sites. To retain them, they "pay better than most" in similar organisations, take care of their family's health, housing, schooling, home leaves, and, until two years ago, provided the security of renewable two-year tenure contracts. As an incentive to accept work in field sites, the international professionals are paid a field maintenance allowance. What is more, one requires no appointment to see middle-level managers or senior management; UN-Habitat maintains an open door policy at both the headquarters and in field sites. The informality is extended to the way people address each other. For instance, while nearly all the professional staff and senior managers at

headquarters are PhD holders, academic titles (Dr or Prof.) are hardly ever used, as everyone is on a first name basis.

Everything at UN-Habitat appears to be done with two things in mind: excellence and superior image. The Committee of Permanent Representatives, which is the governing body, creates and protects UN-Habitat's image (General Assembly Resolution, S-25/2), and is ultimately responsible for its integrity, delivery of development results, and the promotion of good governance values, at the headquarters and in field sites.

UN-Habitat describes itself in its publications as world renowned for its urbanisation contribution in the fields of slum upgrading. Starting with its highly accomplished Committee of Permanent Representatives members, its professional staff are equally widely published in top peer-reviewed journals. The professional staffs at field sites publish in top peer-reviewed journals in collaboration with their counterparts at UN-Habitat HQ (UN-Habitat, 2011b).

According to its own publications, UN-Habitat has distinguished itself as world-class in urbanisation for over 20 years (UN-Habitat, 2011b). International peer-reviewed journals publish UN-Habitat contributions to the world's slum problems. In return, investors, mostly governments, foundations, and international development agencies, invest an average of $100 million annually in support of UN-Habitat's work. One newly recruited staff member at headquarters, overwhelmed by his brief experience in the organisation, summarised what most other staff said of UN-Habitat:

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> It is a great place, friendly, warm people, beautiful environment, good salary packages, and professionally very exciting and challenging.

Although staff at headquarters enjoyed their working environment, some staff at field offices felt it was better to be stationed away from headquarters. One staff member at the UN-Habitat field site visited had this to say:

> I prefer working here compared to headquarters with bosses all over the place-, everywhere you pass you find a Director. In addition, field offices are not busy compared to working at the headquarters. I could not get time to study while I was based at HQ, and I thank God now I have the time to study while working at the same time.

4.7   PROGRAMME FOCUS

Seven major thematic areas that correspond directly to its Mission Goals define UN-Habitat's operational structure (Dialogues at the UN Economic and Social Council, 2008:224-227). These include Urban Legislation; Land and Governance; Urban Planning and Design; Urban Economy; Urban Basic Services; Housing and Slum Upgrading; Risk Reduction and Rehabilitation; and Research and Capacity Development (Governing Council Resolutions 24/1, 2013)

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The **Urban Legislation, Land and Governance** (Governing Council Resolutions 20/6, 2012) focus area supports improving access to land; adopting enabling legislation, and putting in place effective decentralised governance that foster equitable sustainable urban development, including urban safety at city, regional and national authority levels (Governing Council Resolutions 24/1, 2013).

The **Urban Planning and Design** focus area supports improving policies, plans and designs for more compact, better integrated and connected cities that foster equitable sustainable urban development and are resilient to climate change, at city, regional and national levels (Governing Council Resolutions 24/1, 2013).

The **Urban Economy** programme focuses on improving urban strategies and policies supportive of city-wide economic development, creation of decent jobs, and enhanced municipal financing (Governing Council Resolutions 24/1).

The **Urban Basic Services** focus area supports increasing equitable access to urban basic services and improving the standard of living of the urban poor (UN-Habitat, 2013a:12).

The **Housing and Slum Upgrading** focus area supports increasing access to adequate housing and improving the standard of living in existing slums and communities at the local and national levels (UN-Habitat, 2013a:14).

The **Risk Reduction and Rehabilitation** focus area supports increasing the resilience of cities to the impact of natural and human-made crises in an equitable manner, and undertakes rehabilitation in ways that advance sustainable urban development (UN-Habitat, 2013a:16).

The **Research and Capacity Development** focus area of UN-Habitat is responsible for the preparation of the Global Report on Human Settlements (GRHS), a UN General Assembly mandated report published every two years that provides one of the most authoritative reviews of urban trends, conditions and policies (Governing Council Resolutions 24/1).

4.8   RECENT EVOLUTIONARY CHANGES AT UN-HABITAT

UN-Habitat, like many development organisations, has evolved through several changes from 2001 to 2013. Prior to the evolutionary changes, power and accountability were concentrated at

headquarters and the approval bureaucracy slowed down implementation of activities; there was a general lack of accountability for resources and results and this affected the UN-Habitat donor base who eventually demanded RBM adoption; UN-Habitat operated in only 20 countries and there was a growing demand for more urbanisation initiatives; the Integrated Monitoring and Documentation Information System (IMDIS), the UN-Habitat performance measurement system only monitored and reported at output level. The performance measurement system did not address the "so what" questions in which donors and other stakeholders were interested. Programme stakeholders are interested in seeing development changes and not outputs. The evaluation unit was more involved with conducting meta-analysis of performance reports instead of evaluating the effectiveness of programmes and strategies and there was a limited results culture at UN-Habitat. Capacity for RBM was also limited in the organisation. UN-Habitat practised resource-based budgeting as opposed to results-based budgeting. It was thus important for UN-Habitat to go through evolutionary changes (UN-Habitat, 2010).

In the words of the Executive Director,

> It was important for UN-Habitat to go through these evolutionary changes to meet the urbanisation and human settlement challenges of today. The UN-Habitat of ten years ago cannot stand today's demands; we can no longer afford to do business as usual. The organisation has to expand geographically and its programs, we had to become efficient and cost sensitive and improve the way we manage and deliver our programs.

a) **Decentralisation***:* In the new structure, power and accountability were decentralised from the headquarters to the regions. This meant that Regional Directors had power and responsibility with regard to planning, monitoring and budgeting and were answerable to the Director Projects instead of Office of Management, as they had previously done. This move was meant to, among other things, ease some historic management tensions that were said to have existed between

headquarter and the regions. In the seemingly exaggerated words of one Programme Officer, "There have been many 'bloody battles' between the regions and headquarters."

Yet, the autonomy of the regions seemed threatening to some at headquarters, who saw the regions as having "too much power" (UN-Habitat, 2011b).

Although RBM is appreciated by all at UN-Habitat, there are organisational cultures which hinder the acceptance of RBM. These cultures are about governance, the reward system and internal capacity that may be summarised as staff not trusting management, which results in failure to open up and management's failure to read between the lines to discover what causes the staff to close up. The conflict between local and international staff and the issue of academic qualifications are some of the barriers. These personal perceptions of the organisation; the informal power structures; inter- and intra-group relationships; perceptions of trust, openness, and risk-taking behaviour resulted in 'blood wars' among staff; and the relationship between managers and employees. The transfer process did not enjoy formal backing of top leadership, nor did it enjoy full peer support (UN-Habitat, 2010).

In all the discussions that took place during this study at all levels of the organisation, there was one overarching issue that was raised: the lack of transparency, responsiveness and accountability in the making and implementation of organisational policy and, above all, in the allocation and use of UN-Habitat resources, both human and financial, between headquarters and regions. The way different issues are handled by management creates new norms, values, and working procedures for the whole organisation and reveals important underlying assumptions. This has led to the inefficient use of limited resources, the diminished ability to achieve both

work programmes and the Medium-Term Strategic and Institutional Plan (MTSIP) results and the lowering of staff morale, especially at regional offices. The principal recommendation in this regard was to decentralise resource allocation and management of limited resources (UN-Habitat, 2011).

b) **Cost saving measures:** Projects and housed partners have been charged for services provided through UN-Habitat and for office space as part of cost recovery measures and in keeping with the RBM principle of "doing more with less". The fundamental rationale for using team-based approaches in management also, among other things, concerned cost-effectiveness. Significant improvement in productivity was expected with the use of teams at UN-Habitat. They compensated for some of the effects of down-sizing. These teams include the RBM and knowledge management team spearheading institutionalisation of RBM policy innovation; the Resource Mobilisation and Allocation; the Enhanced Normative and Operational Framework (ENOF); and the Human Resources and Administration teams (UN-Habitat, 2011b).

c) **Expansion***:* By 2011, UN-Habitat expansion had reached Spain (UN-Habitat Annual Report, 2012); a new office was established in Barcelona, Spain, which also happened to be the home town of the new Executive Director (UN-Habitat, 2010).

d) **Results-based reforms***:* Following a 2005 Office of Investigations and Oversight Services (OIOS) evaluation of UN-Habitat's organisational effectiveness, which found that UN-Habitat focused on activities, and money spent on "delivery" was used to measure performance at the organisation; learning was limited and the measurement effort was to satisfy the organisation's

accountability function and data were not used for performance improvements, the Governing Council called on the UN-Habitat Executive Director to develop a six-year Medium-Term Strategic and Institutional Plan (MTSIP) for the period 2008 to 2013. The MTSIP was approved in April 2007 (GC Resolution 21/2), which further directed the Executive Director to refine this new strategy, make it more results-based and ensure that the traditional work programme and budget became fully aligned to it.

In June 2007, the Executive Director established four inter-divisional Task Forces to initiate the implementation of the MTSIP. The Task Forces were developed around specific objectives designed to address identified institutional constraints inhibiting achievement of MTSIP results: (i) the Enhanced Normative and Operational Framework; (ii) Results-based Management and Knowledge Management; (iii) Resource Mobilization and Allocation; and (iv) Human Resources Management and Administration (UN-Habitat, 2008).

An action plan was developed to provide guidance to the Task Forces during MTSIP implementation, and particularly with regard to the refinement process. It included critical information regarding priorities; verifiable indicators and targets; linkages and dependencies; phasing and sequencing; and preliminary cost estimates. Twelve "quick-wins" which included Strengthening the Programme Review Committee (PRC); a Resource Mobilisation Unit established by March 2008; delegation of authority at division and regional level; a Branding and fund-raising strategy launched at the World Urban Forum 4; proposals for intra-divisional restructuring by June 2008; improved engagement of UN-Habitat staff by Quarter 1 of 2008; a participatory work programme and budget preparation; institutionalisation of performance

monitoring, evaluation and reporting; the launch of the RBM project and several more "must-does" were developed to further promote strategic and institutional reforms during the first two years of the Action Plan (UN-Habitat, 2008).

By June 2009, the strategic dimension of the refinement process was largely completed with the formulation of results frameworks, SMART results and corresponding performance indicators, and policy papers for each of the four new MTSIP focus areas. The Executive Director had this to say;

> *Staff are empowered to achieve planned results, institution aligned to deliver MTSIP Results, RBM principles are applied, and financial resources are used to achieve MTSIP results.*

While several actions aimed at addressing institutional issues were undertaken during the first two years of the Action Plan, critical reforms identified by the Office of Investigations and Oversight Services (OIOS) and in later assessments remained incomplete. The MTSIP Roadmap was conceived for picking up where the Action Plan left off, but with the specific purpose of pursuing institutional reforms necessary to deliver newly refined SMART results. According to one UN-Habitat document, "The MTSIP was built from, and contributes to the evolution of regional strategies, which were in turn defined by global priorities and targets for socially and environmentally sustainable human settlements development and the achievement of adequate shelter for all" (UN-Habitat, 2011b).

4.8.1 RBM policy Innovation at UN-Habitat

Results-based Management (RBM) was not entirely new to UN-Habitat, but it was not implemented in a systematic and consistent manner before 2008. As an agency of the UN Secretariat, UN-Habitat started implementing results-based budgeting (RBB), for the biennium

2000-2001. This included an integrated planning, management and measurement cycle guided by the Regulations and Rules Governing Program Planning, the Program Aspects of the Budget, the Monitoring of Implementation and the Methods of Evaluation (ST/SGB/2000/8, General Assembly resolution 55/231). The General Assembly (GA) requested that RBB be implemented 'gradually and incrementally'.

UN-Habitat adopted RBM as the management approach in response to recommendations from the General Assembly (A/55/231; A/61/805); the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness; and the Accra Agenda for Action for enhancing the practice of RBM by development partners. Like other agencies of the UN Secretariat, UN-Habitat had been implementing results-based budgeting along the lines prescribed in the Regulations and Rules Governing Programme Planning, the Programme Aspects of the Budget, the Monitoring of Implementation and the Methods of Evaluation (ST/SGB/200/8). The focus was largely on selecting activities and costing them as "budgeting and programming aspects", without paying due attention to results, and the essential changes in culture, administrative, financial and human resource systems that are critical RBM elements.

UN-Habitat adopted RBM as the management approach for achieving institutional and development results in the Medium-Term Strategic and Institutional Plan (MTSIP) following its approval by the Governing Council (GC) in April 2007. An MTSIP Action Plan developed in 2007 to guide implementation of the MTSIP outlined four objectives, each with 'quick wins' and 'must dos' to be implemented during the kick start phase (2008) and two subsequent implementation phases, namely the roll-out phase (2009-2010) and up-scaling phase (2011-

2013). The Action Plan articulated the deliverables for the period 2008-2009 and an MTSIP Roadmap that picked up from where the Action Plan left off outlined the deliverables for the remaining years, 2010-2013, and aligned the delivery periods to the biennial planning cycles including excellence in management, a hybrid management structure for a results-based organisation, and commitment by UN-Habitat leadership to institutional reform *(ST/SGB/2000/8, General Assembly resolution 55/231;* UN-Habitat, 2011b)*.

Achieving excellence in management expected accomplishments largely meant that senior managers provide excellence in leadership (GC/23/2, 2010). The job of reform and creating the institutional conditions that promote a results-based culture falls to excellence in management. Important institutional actions that underlie the push towards true organisational reform driven by excellence in management include:

- Alignment of MTSIP with work programme and budget;

- Identification of capacity building requirements for RBM transfer;

- Integrating RBM into staff performance appraisal; and

- Strengthening the capacity of the evaluation unit and systematically incorporating results into reporting systems, and strengthening the monitoring and evaluation framework for learning, accountability and reporting (UN-Habitat, 2011b).

The existing task force structure that was created as part of the MTSIP action plan with a specific mandate to ensure the implementation of quick-wins and a range of must-dos ran its course as most of them were achieved, including refinement of the MTSIP (UN-Habitat, 2011b). In aligning the institution for delivering MTSIP results, RBM was introduced to support

implementation of the MTSIP as an enterprise that ensures high-level transparency and accountability in the management of human and financial resources; enhancing results-based planning, budgeting, monitoring, and evaluation; and reporting (OECD, 2003). In undertaking the necessary institutional reforms defined in the roadmap to deliver the refined MTSIP appointed a "champion" Senior Programme Officer in charge of RBM to provide stronger, more strategic and accountable leadership of the reform process. The changes and reforms at UN-habitat include: decentralisation; expansion to new regions; cost saving measures; and results-based reforms. However, the Senior Programme Officer in charge of RBM had this to say:

> UN-Habitat is moving in the right direction; my only concern is that the organization is implementing multiple changes or too many reforms in a short period of time. This might lead to transformation fatigue which may contribute to limited transformation.

These changes were geared towards making UN-Habitat a result-oriented organisation that learns from its intervention-providing management with evidence on which to base decision making and at the same time be accountable to its stakeholders, especially donors. The changes were meant to focus the organisational thinking on results and not just on outputs. The adoption of RBM was also expected to increase organisational efficiency and the donor base, in addition to building staff capacity to manage for results and to also be accountable for resources and results (UN-Habitat, 2011b).

4.8.2   Consequence of introducing RBM at UN-Habitat

These multiple changes in structure and management affected the UN-Habitat RBM transfer process in one critical way: the newly mandated Office of Management meant having less direct management involvement with those who worked under it (UN-Habitat Organisation Structure, Unit Roles and Responsibilities, 2011), with the office now focusing more on strategic issues. The Office of Management (OM) provides administrative and programme support, and is

structured in two units: Finance, Quality Assurance, Information and Support (FQAIS), and Resources Management (RM). Through these two units, the Office of Management coordinates and controls the agency's finances, resources, and administration, as well as its business processes, quality assurance, monitoring, and reporting. The OM embedded staff in all organisational units who were directly supervised by those units and not by the Office of Management (UN-Habitat, 2011b).

The OM also works closely with the United Nations Office at Nairobi (UNON) on issues of financial management and control, human resource management and administration, business guidelines and processes, and project and administrative services for regional and field offices. The overall objective of the programme support component is to strengthen organisational accountability, financial resources, and systems management for the effective delivery of services.

The OM ensures the efficient and transparent allocation of the human and financial resources of the organisation and other assets to meet its operational priorities. It also promotes transparent financial management, effective reporting, and strong financial accountability and governance, in compliance with the UN's financial and administrative rules and regulations (ST/SGB/200/8; UN-Habitat, 2013a).

The Project Office ensures the overall coordination of the UN-Habitat project portfolio. Its objectives are to strengthen project development and management processes and to ensure efficient and effective implementation of UN-Habitat projects. The Project Office oversees the whole project management cycle, from project strategy, resources, formulation, and approval to implementation and monitoring. In order to guarantee operational efficiency and to optimise workflow, the regional offices managed by regional directors and the thematic organisational units (branches) are decentralised thematic areas and are supported by the Office of Management with policies and guidelines (UN-Habitat, 2011b).

Staff who were previously appraised by the Office of Management leaders were going to be evaluated "by their primary supervisors and colleagues [to] whom they were responsible for deliverables under particular projects" (UN-Habitat, 2013b). Planning and budgeting was decentralised; this included decision making about the four thematic areas. The complexity, dynamism, and uncertainty in the organisation's internal environment definitely posed a threat to different aspects of the transfer and survival of the RBM system.

4.9   SUMMARY

UN-Habitat is a highly complex, dynamic, image-conscious, political, and unpredictable organisation. UN-Habitat seems to have many established habits, but at the same time is able to continually reflect, self-assess, and align itself with the external environment.

UN-Habitat's physical and material culture describes the potential that lies in the existing culture in UN-Habitat and the UNDP for effective transfer of RBM policy innovation. The description of the context was, not limited to the period during which data were collected for the study,

however, but straddled across changes from the time of the organisation's founding, and traced the effects of those changes to the existing UN-Habitat culture.

The formal components of UN-Habitat represent that part that can be seen and informal components are those that lie beneath, unseen, unknown and undetected, yet clearly recognisable as organisational elements. These consist of personal perceptions of the organisation; the informal power structures; inter- and intra-group relationships; perceptions of trust, openness, and risk-taking behaviour; and the relationship between managers and employees. The way different issues are handled by management creates new norms, values, and working procedures for the whole organisation and reveals important underlying assumptions. The study's wider context was not meant to serve merely as a descriptive background to the case study; it also represented, on its own, an analysis of the organisation's receiving culture.

CHAPTER 5

GOOD PRACTICES/ ENABLERS FOR TRANSFER OF RBM POLICY INNOVATION IN UN-HABITAT

5.1   INTRODUCTION

RBM is a management strategy aimed at improving the way organisations operate by improving performance in terms of results as the core objective. It provides a management framework and tools for strategic planning, risk management, performance monitoring and evaluation, with the primary objective of improving efficiency and effectiveness through organisational learning and fulfilment of accountability obligations through performance reporting.

This chapter presents the findings and analysis of the enabler 'drivers' for RBM policy innovation transfer developed and presented in Figure 2.3: A theoretical model for successful RBM Policy innovation transfer. The theoretical model presents the enabler 'drivers' that support successful transfer of different steps of the holistic RBM policy innovation discussed in this chapter. In terms of expert human capital it looks at inter-relationships with regard to communication channels and ideological commonalities as well as institutional capacity. Other enablers that were studied were UN-Habitat as a learning organisation and donor pressure. Expert human capital with good communication channels with ideal ideological commonalities as well as on-going learning at UN-Habitat and pressure from donors will enable the transfer of RBM policy in UN-Habitat. For RBM policy innovation transfer to succeed, the following are requisite enablers:

(a) Ideological commonalities between RBM components and principles, and an organisation's espoused values and governance practices

(b) Donor pressure

(c) Emerging political support from senior leadership, including resource allocation for RBM implementation

(d) Existence of good communication channels

(e) Results focus: A focus on targeted client satisfaction with goods and services

(f) Lessons of experience from pilot programmes

(g) Existence of in-house RBM expertise and internal institutional capacity

(h) Empowerment and accountability: Institutional mechanism for holding managers accountable for achieving results within the spheres of control, and managers with delegated authority to the management level held accountable for results and empowered with flexibility to make corrective adjustments and to shift resources to better performing activities

(i) Participatory and team-based management: Inclusiveness and partnership in all aspects of performance measurement and management process, and shared interest and understanding of development objectives

(j) Learning organisation

5.2   ENABLERS FOR RBM POLICY TRANSFER

In exploring the potential for transfer, it is worth noting that the fact that UN-Habitat was able to retain some of the best human settlement experts in the world and to attract a constant flow of funds (more than $150 million annually) from diverse world agencies and governments (UN-

Habitat, 2011b). This testifies to the fact that the organisation was creating recognisable public goods and services that were of value to stakeholders. Correspondingly, it was also clear from evidence that most employees considered UN-Habitat a great place to work at in many ways, and that, for most, it was "a better place to work" than where they previously worked. Professionally, people were described as "good to work with", and most urban experts enjoyed a high "degree of freedom" and "greater liberty" than in their previous employment. One urban expert summarised the perceptions of most when he said:

> At UN-Habitat you have greater freedom to apply knowledge than in most places, and people are particularly motivated by the work they do. There is tremendous latitude—and irrespective of your field in human settlements management, there is room for you at UN-Habitat, and you get to move beyond the box. Generally people do not want to leave UN-Habitat.

Some factors, practices and characteristics at UN-Habitat that held substantial potential for the RBM transfer process included:

5.2.1   Ideological Commonalities between the RBM Components and Principles, and UN-Habitat's Espoused Values and Governance Practices

Many components of RBM policy innovation were not entirely new to UN-Habitat, and the potential for transfer lay in the fact that, ideologically, RBM says nothing radically different from the UN-Habitat aspiration to manage the transformation of human settlements effectively and efficiently and for lives to escape poverty. RBM is likewise vested in efficiency and effectiveness of the transformation of the status and conditions of poor urban dwellers. It was evident from the many changes instituted at UN-Habitat that improved efficiency and effectiveness was of as much concern as it was for RBM (UN-Habitat, 2011b).

The UN-Habitat inclinations towards "doing more with less", as evidenced by cost cutting measures and the creation of teams, and their "focus on results", as stipulated by planning and reporting guidelines from the office of programmes and Budgets at the UN headquarters in New York (ST/SGB/200/8), did not contradict RBM policy innovation but rather affirmed it. Obvious examples of the UN-Habitat concern for efficiency could be seen in decisions to outsource transport services for support staff, photocopying; sharing of office space and information technologies with other UN agencies located at the UN complex in Nairobi, Kenya; cutting down on functions that did not add value; and in the reduction of staff contracts to results-based contracts, all of which were cost-saving measures intended to enhance efficiency (UN-Habitat, 2013a).

5.2.2   Donor Pressure as tool for successful RBM transfer

RBM policy innovation transfer at UN-Habitat experienced a high degree of power and pressure from donors (transfer developers). The potential for RBM policy innovation transfer lay with UN-Habitat's compliance with the requirements instituted by development partners, especially the Department of Foreign International Development (DFID), one of its major donors, regarding the use of the tool for managing and tracking performance.

DFID was urging UN-Habitat to focus its work; plan strategically; and credibly demonstrate the difference that it was making in the lives of the targeted populations (UN-Habitat, 2011b). DFID and other development donors also required that UN-Habitat's project and programme deliverables be measurable, observable, relevant, and verifiable, and wanted to see more evidence that funded activities were producing longer-term benefits.

More and more donors investing in UN-Habitat had roundly said that publications were good, "but they were not enough", as the Executive Director put it. RBM assisted in better describing and tracking of the results of programmes; assessing progress towards the achievement of goals; integrating lessons learned; and reporting performance (UN-Habitat, 2011b). The demand for results ran across the three field study sites; however, in Fukuoka, CIDA, the leading donor, had pressurised for the institutionalisation of RBM in the planning and reporting of its programmes and projects.

5.2.3   Emerging Political Support from Senior Leadership

RBM literature suggests that senior management is central in successful transfer. Without the support of senior management, there is no impetus for change. It is critical that they participate and actively support both the creation and implementation of the approach. Moreover, their involvement must be clear, consistent, and visible, and they must help overcome resistance. The literature also suggests that the leadership role should be shared, in cascading downwards for depth and sustainability (UN-Habitat, 2011a).

A review of documents and interviews revealed that the prevailing thought at senior management level at UN-Habitat (Deputy Executive Director's office) showed a shift towards a results focus, although it was not necessarily referred to as RBM (UN-Habitat, 2012). Guidelines from the Deputy Executive Director's office to programme officers and section heads asked for more explicit development results and performance measures that would be easily tracked for progress (UN-Habitat, 2011). They asked for reports that were analytical and that indicated why plans

succeeded or why they failed, as well as reasons for variance in planned outputs. In the words of a member of CPR: "Getting funds is not an employee's key deliverable; the money aspect is their added value. People must deliver on development results."

In formal meetings and in documents, the Executive Director reminded programme officers and Section Heads of the need for performance measurement and the possibility of adopting some aspects of RBM. Guidelines from the senior leadership team were meant to guide global programming, and hence the three field study sites were expected to oblige. Top management support was yet another potential for successful RBM policy innovation transfer.

Argyris (1999) indicated that leaders transmit the culture of an organisation. Leadership does set the trends in the organisation and what they reward gets done or reinforced. The actions of management, therefore, have symbolic meanings, and they send messages to the rest of the organisation. A performance measurement specialist at UNDP had this to say:

> Leadership support for results-based management reforms has played an important role in this organization. Strong advocacy from senior managers has supported institutionalized results-based management systems broadly and effectively within the agency. Leaders have been sending strong messages of support for results based management to their staff by giving speeches, sending out agency-wide notices, participating in results-based management-oriented workshops, providing adequate budgetary support, etc.

One UN-Habitat section head was reported as a manager who managed with tough empathy, 'that is, caring intensely about employees and the work they do, yet tough on the bottom line', and was said to pay attention to subordinate's concerns. Staff said the leader focused on building emotional bonds while building relationships and healing rifts. This was confirmed by many programme officers at UN-Habitat HQ and, in the words of one of them, "We get together—

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chat—celebrate birthdays go out for dinners and dancing— X really tries to keep us together and motivated."

5.2.4   Existence of Good Communication Channels as tool for successful RBM transfer

Johnson*et al.* (1997) noted that communication is a key element in any transfer process, and the use and acceptance of technology will not happen without proper communication strategies. RBM is an iterative tool that depends on good communication and feedback loops. Intended learning will not occur if knowledge is not communicated in a timely manner. UN-Habitat's potential for RBM transfer lay in its various communication channels, which would support the diffusion to its global partners, field sites, national, and regional offices. Moreover, there were journals, newsletters, and web-field sites, communities of practice, books, and education and training programmes. Other existing institutionalised communication channels included bi-annual planning and review meetings, CPR meetings, annual reports, and quarterly reports. Further, UN-Habitat had invested heavily in information technology, which connected it not to its global offices only, but also to other stakeholders and partners (UN-Habitat, 2012).

These well-established channels of communication offered huge potential for a successful RBM transfer. For instance, with communication, it was easy to clarify RBM concepts and plans globally; to clarify why performance was being measured; what performance information fitted decision-making; what kinds of data were expected from the field; and so on, and it would be easy to receive timely feedback. UN-Habitat's good communication network, if used efficiently, has great potential for assisting RBM policy innovation transfer. Fundamentally, all three field sites were connected to the Nairobi-Kenya HQ office and had dependable means of communication to allow successful RBM policy innovation transfer.

5.2.5   A results focus as a tool for successful transfer of RBM

Many components of RBM, especially the strategic and budget planning process, were not new to UN-Habitat. For example, engaging partners to increase chances of results; identifying and clarifying the specific development problems UN-Habitat sought to affect; developing hypotheses about how to address the problems; defining results that reflect the hypotheses; organising teams to manage for results; articulating alternative approaches; developing activities that achieve the intended results; determining how well to access progress; and obtaining the approval to fund the plan, were already in practice, albeit not as systematically as required by an RBM system. The Regulations and Rules Governing Programme Planning, the Programme Aspects of the Budget, the Monitoring of Implementation and the Methods of Evaluation (ST/SGB/200/8) which govern UN-Habitat's planning processes states that stakeholders must always be engaged in all the organisation's strategic planning to increase chances of achieving results by jointly identifying and clarifying the development problems; agreeing on results to be achieved; developing a hypothesis about how to address problems; and articulating alternative approaches.

Likewise, in implementing the planned activities, UN-Habitat conducted most activities with partner institutions (governments, UN agencies, international organisations, local non-governmental bodies, and local governments at municipalities), and they constantly engaged partners for results, including joint monitoring and tracking output quality and timeliness.

RBM policy innovation transfer at UN-Habitat, in this case, would just be a combination of old and new and a shift of emphasis to outputs and outcomes in the results chain, as opposed to their

previous emphasis on activities and outputs. The use of the results frameworks, for instance to display programme logic, had been in use at UN-Habitat. What RBM was offering was an improvement of the framework to a Performance Management Framework (PMF) whose strength lay in its ability to graphically represent not only the cause-and-effect relationships between activities, reach, and developmental results, but also more details at output, outcome, and impact levels including establishing a robust intervention theory of change. Extra details in PMF included systematically identifying performance indicators; means of verifying the indicators, sources and frequency of data collection; responsibilities and accountabilities for data collection; and, finally, risks and assumptions involved in realising the results.

5.2.6   Lessons of Experience from Pilot Programmes as tool for successful RBM transfer

Literature suggests that conducting pilot projects presents a good opportunity for organisations to test new management systems. Pilot projects present an opportunity to identify and to work out some problems and to try out some of the RBM components. It further suggests that pilot projects must emulate the scenario of full implementation; must last long enough to test most of the new systems, including data collection; and must involve a representative group of participants (Creswell, 2007; Robson, 2002).

The Africa regional office had more than three years of RBM experience, and the UN-Habitat HQ had about four years of piloting. This combined experience and lessons learned presented an incredible window of opportunity for easier RBM policy innovation transfer to the rest of UN-Habitat.

5.2.7 Existence of in-house RBM expertise and internal institutional capacity as tool for successful RBM transfer

a) In-house RBM expert

The potential for RBM policy innovation transfer was high at UN-Habitat, with the enthusiasm and interest of a recognised in-house expert and champion in the section head for strategic planning and quality assurance. RBM literature indicates that implementing the approach can be very challenging, especially to those who have no in-house expertise. An in-house technical expert provides guidance, mentors, and facilitates regarding every aspect of development and use of performance measurement systems, including collection of data and analysis. The fact that one UN-Habitat section head had respect and recognition as an RBM resource from top leadership proved very important for the transfer. In the words of the Executive Director:

> The ground was prepared to receive RBM . . . . We linked the Medium-Term Institutional Strategic Plan to RBM, which we did successfully. This was done even before I joined the organization,. . . the UN-Habitat HQ section head is an expert and is helping us.
>
> The one other section head at UN-Habitat is also of great assistance, having used RBM for many years while working with UNDP, was involved in a task force that developed guidelines for UN-Habitat's performance measurement. There were a few other program officers who were interested in RBM and performance measurement system; this was a huge potential for successful RBM transfer.

With regard to the field sites, those in Kenya, though somewhat interested in RBM, did not have in-house experts or champions. However, the Fukuoko office seemed to have benefited from a training programme provided by one of its main donors and a section head of RBM from UN-Habitat HQ.

The existence of in-house expertise to support implementation of RBM policy innovation proved critical in the adoption of the RBM policy innovation technology. Mentoring for RBM by one

UN-Habitat section head in particular had set the climate and seriousness for RBM by communicating enthusiasm, confidence, and optimism, which seemed to inspire staff to manage for results. One programme officer had the following to say of one of the section heads: "X is easy-going and supportive, but he does not joke when it comes to delivering of results: you either show results or you quit."

b) Internal institutional capacity as tool for successful RBM transfer
For successful transfer of RBM policy innovation, organisations need to have adequate capacity in RBM. The study assessed RBM capacity at UN-Habitat using CAP-Scan (see section 3.3.4), and considered the four RBM pillars, namely planning, monitoring and evaluation, and use of performance information which were reviewed; and assessing adoption and application of the RBM tool in the organisation. In order to understand the level of RBM policy innovation adoption and application within the institution, each pillar was assessed and given a score ranging between 0 and 4. The closer the number was to 4, the higher the RBM level of adoption and application. With an average score of 2.2 on a 4-point scale, UN-Habitat has clearly been implementing results-oriented approaches for quite some time. There is a need to follow a consistent institution-wide approach so as to increase its effectiveness and improve performance. Figures 5.1 to 5.5 present an overview of the ranking of UN-Habitat adoption and application of RBM in the four pillars. The findings indicated that UN-Habitat as an institution has the knowledge and methodology that is required for RBM successful transfer. It is observable that most pieces of the puzzle are on the table, except for the one related to the role and commitment of top managers, which at this moment remains the missing piece.

Figure 5.1: Results RBM capacity in UN-Habitat

Based on the results presented in Figure 5.1, UN-Habitat is in the transition phase of its RBM capacity and implementation of RBM-related strategies, with an average score of 2.2 on a 4-point scale, as detailed in Figure 5.1 above. All pillars, except for the one focusing on Monitoring and Evaluation, are in the transition phase. UN-Habitat scored the least in the "monitoring and evaluation" RBM pillar with an average capacity score of 1.9, which places it in the exploration phase.

Figure 5.2: UN-Habitat Score in Planning and Budgeting

Planning and Budgeting scored 2.0, as seen in Figure 5.2. The budgeting process must consider the results established by UN-Habitat in the Medium-Term Strategic and Institutional Plan (MTSIP). One of the major challenges to implement joint results or Programme-Based Budgeting (RBB) is to link planning with the budget. A programme-based budget is a strong support in advancing the transfer of RBM policy innovation. The advantage of the programme classification is that it allows monitoring and evaluation of strategic programmes in the MTSIP. This facilitates the achievement of expected results. It is easier to analyse results if both instruments have the same programme structure.

It is clear that a programme consists of organised and integrated activities, services, processes and/or projects that implement the strategies designed to achieve the objectives and goals of an

organisation. In the RBM system, the entire budget should be programme-structured, including current spending (wages and salaries).

Figure 5.3: UN-Habitat score in Monitoring and Evaluation
Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) scored 1.9, demonstrating that this is still at the infancy stage and appears to be the weakest pillar compared with the other pillars that were studied. Monitoring and evaluation is at the core of RBM, since it focuses on the decision-making process. Its adoption requires training, practice, and leadership. Training includes how to use information to implement evidence-based decision making; practice is necessary to avoid making decisions that are not evidence based, and leadership is required because, if evidence-based decision making is not demonstrated by the heads of the institution and the heads of sections, it will not be part of decision making. The respondent's average for this pillar was 1.9, with a standard deviation of 65%. The lowest scoring M&E pillar reported 0.7 for the

information system and decision support tools, and the highest scores were reported in the three subcomponents of UN-Habitat's MTSIP results-based monitoring (2.3), Reporting on Results (2.5), and Use of project implementation (and monitoring) data for the institutional decision-making process (2.6). UN-Habitat in addition works with IMDIS (Integrated Monitoring and Documentation Information System) which is used by all UN Secretariat agencies, and several staff members pointed out that this system exists for results-based reporting. Nevertheless, with such a high standard deviation, the key question to be raised is whether monitoring of projects is implemented in an adhoc manner or whether most projects follow a rigorous M&E protocol.

Figure 5.4: UN-Habitat score in Information Systems and Statistics Capacity
As shown in Figure 5.4, **Information Systems and Statistics Capacity scored 2.3.** One of the key pillars of the RBM framework is reliance on solid information systems and statistics capacity and to be able to incorporate confident baseline and robust input data into the forecast model. All these are key components of an RBM performance measurement system. Without good

information and indicators, the likelihood to show failure or success is limited. All the dimensions averaged 2.3, which by definition indicate that all data are available for some priority sectors and data are available for almost the entire institutional planning. However the levels of quality and usability are still low.

Figure 5.5: UN-Habitat score in Leadership and Accountability

Figure 5.5 show that **Leadership and Accountability scored 2.6.**There is enough empirical evidence to prove that the possibility to succeed in RBM is limited without leadership and accountability. Leadership skills are required to make adoption and implementation sustainable in the long run and to remain consistent across the institution, the evidence, and the performance-driven decision-making process. Leadership entails the following concepts: commitment, responsibility and accountability to partners. Since UN-Habitat, as well as most of the UN Development Group's institutions, are donor dependent, RBM policy innovation in many cases

is donor driven with the result that the level of transparency and accountability is very high with donors. A UN-Habitat section head had this to say:

> UN-Habitat should move beyond collecting data for reporting to donors only and also give high priority to address the disconnect between its various results-focused data collection, reporting and monitoring tools in order to foster the availability of reliable data that can be used by the organization, including its evaluation function. A strategy to strengthen feedback links between the three results-based management pillars of planning, monitoring and evaluation to ensure effective learning, performance improvement, management decision-making and policy should be strengthened as at the moment it is very weak.

c) Competent Programme Officers as tool for successful RBM transfer

UN-Habitat recruited internationally and had a huge pool of first-class programme officers with superior qualifications and vast experience in urbanisation, economic planning and research methods, which was a huge advantage for RBM policy innovation transfer as a management tool. The high quality of programme officers was evident in all field sites as a result of UN-Habitat's rigorous recruitment processes, with most of the programme officers holding Master's and Doctoral degrees. In the words of one former UN-Habitat division director: "UN-Habitat's technologies are now being used in some developed countries, which are a rare example of South-North transfer of technology."

Arguably, if programme officers at UN-Habitat were persuaded and saw value and reward in the use of RBM policy innovation, there seemed to be potential that the same professional competency they embrace could be exhibited in their use of the tool. In the words of a Senior UN-Habitat Programme Officer in charge of RBM: "While it is apparent that most program officers are aware of RBM, that is, they had heard about it, most seemed to lack enough details to fully appreciate it."

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There seemed to be many unanswered questions about value added and individual involvement in using the approach, and questions about required time demands, relevance, competencies, and needed changes. There were a few who seemed to be at the stage of showing interest, who desired to know more about what RBM was, how it was applied, and the potential benefits and effects. Others seemed to be at the evaluative stage, mentally weighing it against existing practices to determine the added value of the approach, with UN-Habitat HQ and Africa region piloting only incrementally based on its appreciation of previous smaller applications. A Senior Programme Officer at UN-Habitat at one of the sites that were visited said: "Much of the resistance seems to come from misunderstandings and an inability to see the value added from RBM."

However, despite the above setback, Programme Officers at UN-Habitat presented another potential for transfer in that, while research methods used in RBM to monitor and evaluate programme progress on indicators posed the greatest challenge to most development organisations trying to adopt the management approach, they already had superior research skills and vast experience. Issues of data reliability and credibility, which are critical in RBM for information to be useful in programme decision-making, were often undermined by lack of skill in research methods. UN-Habitat would have an obvious advantage in this area, being a distinguished organisation with a pool of programme officers with vast research and planning experience. Moreover, with the more recent external by donors and internal emphasis on results by UN-Habitat's management, it was likely that both management and other section heads would be looking for a tool that would create coherence in the mix of responsibilities across regions and

globally. Further, UN-Habitat was more likely to accept RBM as a tool that drives the organisation to systematically manage in ways that explicitly define expected results in all processes and relationships, and that made its seemingly fragmented projects and programme results more coherent as well. In any case, structural, strategic, and cultural changes at UN-Habitat—instituted to improve coherence, alignment, and ultimately improve organisational effectiveness and efficiency—needed a tool that could monitor and measure progress.

There was also a high likelihood that programme officers would commit themselves to RBM policy innovation if they saw the benefits and were supported by a good reward system, and if management took a serious lead and asked for results; committed funds to training and education; and developed systems that would support the process and the programme officers. A team of committed Programme Officers would easily localise the tool, and would have the ability to discern the aspects of RBM that were congruent with UN-Habitat's culture and those that needed modification.

5.2.8   Empowerment and accountability at UN-Habitat as tool for successful RBM transfer

RBM advocates for the institutional mechanism for holding managers accountable for achieving results within their spheres of control. Accountability at UN-Habitat, for instance, means that programmes have the responsibility of influencing the outcomes or results being sought while recognising that achievement of outcomes and impacts requires joint action on the parts of many actors, including government, National Urban Authorities and municipalities, the private sector, communities, and donors. RBM obliges individuals to demonstrate what outcome results have been accomplished. An accountability culture is one that causes individuals to report specifically

on the extent an outcome is being or has been accomplished, or on accounting for significant and valuable achievements that have contributed to the success of the overall outcome, hence, demonstrating that probability of success is important enough to justify expending organisational resources.

Consistent with the RBM values, findings indicated that UN-Habitat had decentralised power and responsibility to those nearest the front-lines. It had empowered Regional Directors and delegated authority to make them accountable for programme results (UN-Habitat, 2012). In addition, it empowered them with the flexibility to make corrective adjustments and to shift resources to better performing activities. This was an RBM value that UN-Habitat fully embraced and practised at all three field sites that were visited.

In keeping with the RBM principle of accountability, documents like work plans and interviews at UN-Habitat revealed that staff had defined the roles and responsibilities and the results to be delivered by each individual. Findings further indicated that, although team-based management was encouraged at UN-Habitat, individual performance was critical to the section's overall performance. Accountability for outcomes in an RBM system is not an individual's responsibility, but a shared responsibility among partners. An individual's output or even a cluster of outputs will often not guarantee the achievement of an outcome, since the contribution of a wider group of partners is usually essential. Effective partnerships occur where there is a clear understanding of the contribution of each individual to agreed outcomes.

Through performance contracts designed by UN-Habitat management, staff were given performance specifications that made them understand the results that they were expected to produce and the standards they were expected to meet. The performance contracts were based on staff's knowledge and the skills required to achieve the expected results. The section heads ensured that there were sufficient resources (budget, equipment, and staff) and through frequent appraisal meetings ensured that staff knew when they were realising important results and when their work was not adding value.

At UN-Habitat HQ those interviewed said there was a high sense of openness and transparency, and contentious issues were openly discussed. Respondents said that there were no surprises even when it came to performance appraisals. One particular section head was especially popular for his down-to-earth approach to management and was described by one of the staff in the following manner: "XX is down to earth and tries to come to our level—he not only hears the words, but feels the emotions behind the words."

The UN-Habitat section heads were said by most respondents to manage staff fears, expectations, and conflicts in a win-win manner. One example given was when there were issues of budget cuts that threatened people's jobs: "All scenarios and possibilities were explored and discussed in the open, and because of this, the staff understood the situation from the section head's perspective."

The empathy shown by one of the UN-Habitat section heads seemed to pay off well in terms of staff commitment. A programme Officer said: "Such comforting clarity reduces negative politics and the anxiety staff often felt about careers, and encouraged a focus on results."

Most interviewed staff seemed to have a covenant with their work, and this was evident in their broader sense of handling responsibilities and their ability to persevere even in the face of "frustrations and setbacks". A Programme Officer expressed this in, "not just to be able to perform well in tasks, but to ensure what it takes to stay on when the wider organisation decides to separate the wheat from the chaff."

Such mutual loyalty and dependency seemed to have created a fear-free environment and transfer of some RBM-enhanced performance. A Programme Officer had this to say, "People envy UN-Habitat staff." UN-Habitat was perceived by most national staff as one of the "best places to work" because "the managers cared for their staff."

5.2.9   Participatory and team-based management as tool for successful RBM transfer

In an RBM system, stakeholder participation is important in that it expands the information base needed for programme/project design and planning. Identifying, defining, and measuring results/risks hinges on the collection of comprehensive information. Bringing together project/programme stakeholder's helps to ensure that the information and knowledge held by stakeholders are identified, coordinated and used to fine-tune and inform programming. Observations and document reviews showed that team-based management and participatory methods at UN-Habitat were evident in project teams, thematic teams, and the many team-building activities that took place, for instance, annual planning and review meetings and communities of practice.

Externally, UN-Habitat boasted more than 100 synergetic partnerships and alliances across the world and it internally was constantly looking at new ways of eliciting more participation and

feedback across field sites and regions (UN-Habitat, 2011b). Although these practices were not as systematic as would be required in an RBM process, they still were not incongruent with RBM, and this was another window of opportunity for successful RBM policy innovation transfer.

The essence of participation in RBM is that those involved, that is, the stakeholders, define expected results and develop indicators to show progress, and to have the indicators accepted by all. When there is mutual acceptance and ownership, there is a higher likelihood that there will be a commitment to moving towards the desired results and less criticism of and resistance to the RBM process. A full understanding of factors that might affect the realisation of outcomes becomes very crucial. A document review of the Executive Director's opening remarks revealed evidence of stakeholder participation in the 2014-2018 strategic planning process; where he had this to say,

> I am pleased to welcome members of the Committee of Permanent Representatives, the Mayors, and Government Urban Planners to contribute to UN-Habitat's work for the period 2014 – 2048. Your voices will be very important in defining the impact of UN-Habitat activities on urban poor.

According to RBM policy innovation, accountability is applicable at all levels, from the top down. The executive heads and the heads of major organisational units are therefore the first to be held accountable for the results that they are expected to deliver:

Evidence from document reviews (UN-Habitat, 2011a) and interviews with staff strongly suggested that accountability focuses almost exclusively at the level of the Executive Director. A senior Programme Officer at UN-Habitat HQ had this to say:

> Program staff do perceive that they are accountable for delivery of project outputs, but nobody is identified as accountable for ensuring that projects and programs are managed to maximize their

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contributions to achievement of the outcome which is the key aspect expected in the results based management system.

Full participation to foster support for implementation of RBM is a key ingredient in the transfer process, and the subculture at UN-Habitat HQ attained the greatest hope for transfer of the policy innovation. Data indicated that there was a high level of involvement in programme planning and implementation at UN-Habitat HQ (UN-Habitat MTSIP, 2008-2013). Inclusion and participation of key stakeholders is critical in defining expected results in a RBM system. The Chairman of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (CPR) stated: "We told UN-Habitat management, for the 2014 - 2018 strategic plan, we want to see full participation of member countries through the CPR."

5.2.10 UN-Habitat as a learning organisation as tool for successful RBM transfer

RBM involves continuous learning about what works, what does not work, and why, and spending more time on high leverage, value-adding work. UN-Habitat is a learning organisation, and this was evident from the strategic plans and the many changes continually instituted. Change occurred as a result of learning that some things were not working well. The Deputy Executive Director explained: "As an organization, UN-Habitat is continuously learning and transforming itself in response to internal and external realities. This kind of learning is expanding individual and organizational horizons and was empowering."

Further, assessing and learning took place formally during the annual planning and review meetings and took place when working with partners to transform inputs into outputs, and as the organisation assessed whether the outputs were enough to achieve stated objectives. Reporting

on progress on performance and conducting formative and summative evaluations were all avenues of learning.

This study showed that a lot of research is conducted at UN-Habitat, which gives it a competitive advantage, as another form of learning; every year more than 50 articles containing lessons and best practices were published in renowned world, peer-reviewed journals. While publishing was a valued output by stakeholders, RBM would go a step further with the question "so what?" "So what if you published in the best journals? How was that getting you closer to your mission? Are you measuring? What are you measuring? Where is the evidence?" Value for money and measurable results would be the purpose for learning, according to the RBM system.

While learning at UN-Habitat did not seem systematic, with outcomes of learning defined in advance as required by the RBM system, the practice was in tandem with RBM's principle of learning as you go along. Learning in RBM aims at better management for enterprise success and so was the learning that is occurring at UN-Habitat.

UN-Habitat's supported learning was evident in their investment in communication technology, which enhanced learning globally across regions and partners. The support that management gave to communities of practice also provided evidence of a high level of commitment to learning. Learning at UN-Habitat was, therefore, consistent with RBM values and principles.

There was evidence across the three field sites that were visited that learning occurred, but, as in the case of the Headquarters, it was not occurring in any organised or systematic manner. There

was sharing of lessons of experience between headquarters and field sites. In sharing knowledge with the regions, the senior human settlement officers in the African region, UN-Habitat section heads, and a Programme Officer in the Programme & Budget Department at UN Headquarters in the New York office were cited in one site as exemplary.

Transparency as UN-Habitat's core value is a key RBM value and principle. People using RBM are empowered out of necessity; there is tremendous power in measuring performance. People are required and permitted to think, use common sense or good judgment, and make decisions that are transparent. The good governance value of openness and transparency, which are key RBM values, were also two of UN-Habitat's core values. Transparency in an RBM process means data-based or evidence-based decision-making with regard to budget use and other resources, management of people, and number of people to be targeted by the programme. Decisions must be supported by data as evidence.

While acknowledging that values are ideals that organisations aspire to attain and often are receding targets, there was evidence that UN-Habitat had some commitment to transparency. For example, one notable occasion where management showed exemplary transparency was during the Strategic Planning meeting in which the Executive Director guided the decision-making process in the allocation of Department of Foreign International Development (DFID) funds. This kind of budget transparency was unprecedented and was applauded by most. While the budget allocation decisions were not made on strict RBM principles, where data as evidence of results or plans guided allocation, there were indications from reviewed documents as well as and management remarks that it was the preferred future direction. In the evaluative words of the

Executive Director, "This is the first time we have had an open and transparent negotiation process. There was an open and transparent evaluation of our budgets, and people were making their cases."

One Programme Officer spoke for most of the others when he said, "I must say I really liked the transparent way that the budget has been discussed this time, I wish we had this method of open decision making earlier in our programs and in UN-Habitat."

Another notable case of transparency was the process of restructuring. A series of documents showed detailed communication from the office of the Executive Director, specifying the process, roles, and responsibilities and inviting comments and suggestions. Another example was in the recruitment processes of the Directors. Openness, rigorous procedures, and highly transparent processes characterised the exercise.

UN-Habitat's on-going reforms in appraisal systems; guidelines on grievances; non-discriminatory policies; zero tolerance of financial misappropriation; and harassment policies, if adhered to, were all meant to enhance transparency in decision-making. Hence, the potential for RBM transfer would be high, given that it would only add value. Transparency was not an easily observable behaviour at the field sites, given the short time the Section Heads spent there.

UN-Habitat's Self-Assessment and Self-Aligning Management Practices: RBM is an iterative tool that relies heavily on feedback from monitoring and evaluation for programme learning, decision-making and redesign for improved effectiveness and efficiency. RBM literature further

suggests that the starting point for any improvement is to realise that a current position was unsatisfactory and something better and achievable existed.

Evidence from documents, especially those originating from the senior leadership team (Executive Director, Deputy Executive Director, Section Heads and Regional Directors); observations, bi-annual review documents, reports of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (CPR) and donor programme review meetings; and interviews with programme officers indicated that UN-Habitat had a strong self-assessment and self-alignment culture. Interview evidence revealed a high level of self-awareness, especially of things that did not work, and why they did not work. IMDIS data and some of the documents furthermore showed the specific proposed solutions identified in team discussions. With all the on-going changes in the organisation there was also overwhelming evidence that UN-Habitat continuously adopted new practices that were intended to improve its performance and, in so doing, continually strived to transform itself, hence aligning itself externally and internally. In the words of the Executive Director: "We have to adjust the way we do business while responding to the external environment. We are trying to maintain funding, while at the same time looking at improvements."

This inclination to reflect, consider, analyse, and self-critique by UN-Habitat was congruent with RBM values and principles and this provided good ground for successful transfer. The self-assessment and self-alignment of internal and external realities running through the organisation was evident, for instance, when the Chairperson of the UN-Habitat's CPR commented on the restructuring process with:

The funding climate was changing fast with more organizations competing for less and less resources. Staff salaries at UN-Habitat started to get affected. UN-Habitat realized if it did not change it was going to perish. Business as usual was over—we had to change or we die.

On the same subject of restructuring, the CPR's chairperson went on and explained the situation in the following words:

For a long time UN-Habitat used to be the best. We had a lot of donors, good program officers, and were the only game in town. Then, all of a sudden, we found out we were no longer the best, and even, not the only game in town. Of course that was threatening. We realized that answers to yesterday's questions were not going to solve today's problems. The new challenges called for new and entrepreneurial approaches. UN-Habitat had to reinvent itself.

In a different forum, the Executive Director echoed the words of the Chairperson to the CPR when he said: "The world is changing. UN-Habitat has to adapt to an extremely versatile external environment. The ability to adapt to these changes will be crucial to our future survival."

This kind of external and internal assessment and self-alignment was evident in many of the changes UN-Habitat had instituted. From changes in top management, to programmatic realignment, to recruiting, to mentoring, to outsourcing, all were open admissions that what was in place was not working well and management was open to better ways of doing things. For instance, regarding the restructuring of the Research and Development Divisions, the Chairperson of the UN-Habitat CPR explained:

The organization felt it was living a contradiction by separating research and developments. To create a continuum and harmony, research had to marry development—a liaison that has not been fully accepted by some at UN-Habitat and by some partners outside.

This inclination towards self-assessment and concern for things that eroded efficiency and effectiveness was further evident during interviews, as programme officers criticised what they

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perceived as declining research quality; lack of knowledge management systems; poor communication; inadequate involvement in decision making by management and so on. This ability to reflect and critically and objectively look at things with the intent of righting them was in full congruence with the RBM principle of questioning value for money and results that were of value to the organisation and stakeholders.

5.3   POTENTIAL FOR RBM TRANSFER AT UNDP

The adoption and implementation of results-based management has been a challenge to many donor-fund recipients and development partners. The World Bank 2006 annual report on evaluation of operations reviewed progress with managing for results. The report found that the World Bank and other partners, UNICEF, the World Food Programme, and the United Nations Development Programme instituted policies and procedures to manage better for results. These policies translated into improved practices at the operational level, but managers and operational staff in these organisations were still struggling to link goals to operations. Performance indicators were often inadequate and many staff were unclear about how to use performance information in their day-to-day work and the culture acted as a disincentive to managing for results. These findings resonate with the challenges faced by the UNDP referred to by the UNDP management in all interviews.

The findings from this research indicate that the UNDP Strategic Plan, 2008-2011, took RBM policy innovation a step further by providing an instrument that: (a) clearly articulated UNDP priorities, objectives, targets and performance indicators; (b) created a solid basis for internal resource allocation; and (c) set a stronger platform for comprehensive results management. This

simplified framework sharpened the UNDP focus, clarified areas of comparative advantage, and facilitated the measurement of and reporting on results. For each focus area, the UNDP spelled out its key results areas and outcomes with a view to further strengthening alignment.

A further general lesson that emerged was the importance of stressing management over measurement. The fundamental goal of results-based management is to improve development effectiveness, which requires helping managers to manage better. In comparing RBM systems, the distinction is sometimes made between managing by results and managing for results. The former is principally oriented towards accountability and external reporting; the latter focuses on a cycle of planning, periodic performance and organisational learning. In implementing RBM, the UNDP made a deliberate decision to emphasise management and learning. RBM has to aim explicitly aim at changing the way the organisation is managed, fostering a strategic orientation and a culture of performance. Improved external reporting was approached as very important, but a secondary benefit.

The UNDP country resident representative commented:

> Strategic results frameworks have assisted our managers to judge whether the overall results of UNDP assistance meet the goals, principles and standards set out in the mission statement and business plans as well as in operational and thematic policies. As such, have improved UNDP's substantive accountability to national stakeholders and the Executive Board and, for the first time, laid the basis for a funding strategy to support approved programs based on results that are clearly identified and monitored.

Findings indicated that tools and systems for RBM policy innovation evolved without a comprehensive design, creating a five-year period of rolling innovation, redesign and change.

The documents (UNDP Country Programme Document, 2010-2014) showed a shift towards a results focus, although it was not necessarily referred to as RBM. The strategic objectives have been developed to help focus the programme, whilst also improving communication with external stakeholders. Alignment of programmes to strategic goals was promoted by a shift in the results focus from outputs to outcomes. In parallel, the balanced scorecard was a response to change the culture of the organisation and report against a broad range of physical and financial indicators of operational change. Developments in reporting were led by the Results Oriented Annual Reports (ROAR), but monitoring lagged behind in terms of policy and tools to help monitor progress towards country outcomes. Adjustment of programmes was expected to take place mainly through annual and country programme cycles. Links to learning were supposed to occur through the shift from project to programme outcome evaluations and interactions with the practice areas and networks. An accountability framework was developed with provisions for individual, managerial and true organisational accountability.

Strategic plans should articulate the programme's theory of change clearly. Findings indicated that UNDP results frameworks did not convincingly link results directly with the achievement of specified goals. The UNDP country resident representative explained:

> One of our challenges in improving the strength of practice is the quality and evaluability [sic] of planning and programming frameworks upon which RBM relies. The outcome evaluations we have conducted highlighted the lack of clearly defined and measurable objectives supported by appropriate indicators, and data streams have restrained the accurate assessment of results for program and project learning and accountability. I think the planning horizon in UNDP may be too short to be able to meaningfully assess progress with outcomes. Whereas outcomes may easily take 5-10 years to materialize, most programs are designed for a 2- 4 year duration, intentionally being kept within the timeframe of the Country Program Document (CPD). Our challenge has been to identify methodologies, standards and indicators that meaningfully capture

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performance and attribution within the timeframe of the operational horizon. Sometimes the link between our projects and programs is weak due to political and donor pressure – we're forced to implement projects that don't contribute to the realization of program results.

The findings from the UNDP results matrices revealed that there is fairly good identification of risks and assumptions; targets and timelines are set; outputs are linked to those accountable; and indicators are properly identified. The outcomes were specific so that there was a suitable practical indicator to show whether the outcome had been achieved or not, all of which are critical elements for a RBM system.

The deputy resident representative operations lamented:

> Organization's resources are supposed to be well aligned with its long-term objectives. At present, ensuring coherence and compatibility between budgeting and programming decisions (for example, any budget cuts should correspond to specific and identified program cuts) is difficult since programming and budgeting planning cycles are separate.

There is evidence that, even when opportunity existed to allocate funds (i.e. within thematic trust funds) and core resources on the basis of priorities and results, this has not been done. At the Kenya country office, interviews with senior management and the review of documents suggest that there was no systematic tool for doing this.

In performance measurement, harmonising donor performance information requirements with the organisational performance monitoring and reporting systems is critical. Evidence from reviewed records indicates some harmonisation around (driven by) other donor systems (i.e. the DFID-funded Elections project).

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Findings indicated that interaction between the UNDP and the Government of Kenya and non-government actors in performance measurement was found to be limited; yet the UNDP's RBM initial core principle is national ownership, which supports the RBM principle of stakeholder participation. With few exceptions, the UNDP's activities were found to be focused solely on its own programmes, despite often managing and supporting RBM-related initiatives.

RBM literature (OECD, 2001) identifies three primary uses of performance information, namely learning, management improvement and accountability for results. In terms of the UNDP and its primary partners' own use, the Country Resident Representative commented on the use of evaluations by saying:

> The majority of evaluations conducted have enabled senior management to determine and respond to aspects of quality of the delivery, strengths and weaknesses, potential gaps and identified future needs. The Kenya country office is using the findings of the evaluations for strategic and programmatic adjustment and development. These include the drafting of new strategic results frameworks and country program documents, and in one case for the complete reassessment of work arrangements, approach, staff needs and advocacy in the area attended by the evaluation. The wide scope of outcome evaluation, beyond the traditional sectoral boundaries, has in other cases identified the lack of cross-fertilization of knowledge and ideas within UNDP and beyond.

The findings identify five main uses: first, internal CO [country office] operational planning and management (to feed into staff meetings, retreats, performance assessment); second, corporate reporting (e.g. strategic results frameworks, ad hoc headquarters requests for information); third, partner/counterpart liaison, consultations and decision-making (e.g. steering committee meetings); fourth, resource mobilisation (project briefs, proposals, 'success stories'); and fifth, as substantive contributions in participation in Government/donor consultation groupings and UN

inter agency working groups. Less evidence was found on dissemination of lessons learned for global and cross-national learning.

In most of the cases, information derived from the monitoring function was found to be confined to a small cadre of operational staff within the arrangement of implementing agency, the UNDP and government, who serviced the input and activity tracking functions. The notion of participation in this context often hinged only upon the involvement of these 'internal' stakeholders, and thus relates, even unintentionally, largely to the control function of projects. However, where regular feedback mechanisms were found, where steering committees and tripartite reviews are systematically practised and located within broader programmatic structures, the information generated was found to be of wider operational and strategic relevance."

The value of the RBM "results chain" is that it makes explicit the underlying assumption of all development programming, i.e. that no project or programme should be undertaken if a reasonable case cannot be made at the outset that it will contribute to development outcomes, *and* no on-going project or programme should continue to operate as initially designed if it becomes clear during implementation that it is unlikely to produce development outcomes.

Because development organisations and partners are acting more in concert, development results most likely will not be attributable directly to any one development organisation or partner, but the UNDP can show how its projects and programmes have contributed to the overall results. The deputy resident representative for programmes had this to say:

What is important is that lasting development results be achieved, not that they be attributed directly to the intervention of any particular organization. This type of reporting would reinforce UNDP's move to focus more on development results, and would improve learning and performance improvements for the effective use of donor funds.

RBM policy innovation encourages a shift in programming towards "contribution" as opposed to focusing on "attributing" results (OECD, 2003). What is important is that development results have been achieved but not who achieved, and that results are achieved through the collective effort of different stakeholders.

5.4   SUMMARY

Findings from the previous discussion have demonstrated the relevance and significance of the theoretical model (Figure 2.3) for any successful RBM policy innovation transfer. The analysis and discussion of the variable 'enablers' of the theoretical model showed that UN-Habitat had many opportunities that were conducive to the successful transfer and adoption of RBM policy innovation technology. First, the existence of in-house RBM expertise; UN-Habitat's Self-Assessment and Self-Aligning Management Practices; the existence of Good Communication Channels and Competent Programme officers the Ideological Commonalities of the RBM Components and Principles and UN-Habitat's Espoused Values and Governance Practices; and participatory and team-based management were precursors to the successful implementation of RBM innovation technology at the UN-Habitat offices. In addition, UN-Habitat being a learning organization strengthens the innovativeness of adaptation of the RBM policy innovation. Furthermore, it was found that RBM was able to promote transparency, hence empowering the accountability process. Donor pressure also helped UN-Habitat to adapt to the RBM policy innovation technology, even if it was to receive resistance, as human beings always resist

change. The result was emerging political support from senior leadership and internal institutional capacity.

CHAPTER 6

BARRIERS TO SUCCESSFUL TRANSFER OF RBM IN UN-HABITAT

6.1   INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the identified barriers in the successful transfer of RBM policy innovation. The chapter therefore presents RBM policy innovation variables/factors (Figure 2.3) not appropriately realised and hence becoming barriers to successful RBM policy innovation transfer. Any enabler not realised or inappropriately realised becomes a barrier to successful transfer of RBM policy innovation. Barriers can be seen or unseen impediments that cause difficulties in the process of transfer.   Transfer of any technology is not just technical, but is also social and political. As a result, transfer and adoption of western management concepts, structures, and instruments often face cultural barriers and problems of misfit, which can be characterised as technical and institutional inconsistencies (Dorota & Jankowicz, 2002).

The chapter presents inappropriately realised enablers (hence barriers) for RBM policy innovation transfer as developed and presented in (Figure 2.3): A theoretical model for successful RBM Policy Innovation Transfer. When these enablers are inappropriately realised, they become barriers to RBM policy innovation transfer and this chapter presents those inappropriately realised enablers as "barriers". The identified barriers include inappropriate realisation of governance values; a counterproductive reward system and internal capacity; ineffective roll-out of participatory management; and inappropriate in-house RBM expertise. RBM systems are sustained by the organisational culture characterised by good governance reflecting itself in transparent, participatory and inclusive decision making and a poor reward

system. Other barriers relate to how management gives rewards for work done and the extent of knowledge and skills in using the performance measurement system. The chapter also presents other variable barriers not identified in the theoretical model (represented by "β" in model 2.3) as a result of model under-identification. These additional barriers that affected successful transfer of RBM policy innovation at UN-Habitat include: inability to actively promote impartiality; inequality and inappropriate politics of change; and inappropriate RBM policy innovation supporting systems and structures.

6.2   BARRIERS TO TRANSFER OF RBM TECHNOLOGY

Current management research literature cautions that the process of transfer of management knowledge is complex, and that knowledge cannot be transferred easily across national, cultural, and institutional boundaries and implemented unproblematically within organisations (Jackson, 2005). Organisations are not always rational machine-like entities. Rather, organisations often are irrational, hypocritical, uncoordinated, and highly political miniature societies (Brown, 1998). Only when the irrational, ambiguous, and unpredictable nature of the organisation is understood, can one introduce change. The transfer-receiving culture or user environment is often the primary determining factor for whether a transferred technology sustains or fails.

In stark contrast to the huge potential and good intentions that existed at UN-Habitat, the prevailing informal culture, as described by most of the respondents at the time of the study, seemed largely negative. Some RBM policy innovation success variables/factors in the model (Figure 2.3) were inappropriately realised: Governance values were inappropriately realised and was a significant variable in the RBM transfer process and hence an "inappropriate realization of Governance Values as barrier to successful transfer of RBM"; In-house RBM expertise and

internal institutional capacity also hindered successful transfer of RBM and hence were "Inappropriate in-house RBM expertise and internal institutional capacity as tool for successful RBM transfer"; Participatory and team-based management was also lacking at UN-Habitat and hence "ineffective roll-out of participatory and team-based management"; and the reward system was not well thought through, and thus "Counterproductive reward system as barriers to successful transfer of RBM".

The researcher categorised the data on the informal practices in four broad categories of barriers to successful transfer of RBM policy innovation, namely;

   (a) Inappropriate realisation of Governance Values as barrier to successful transfer of RBM

   (b) Inappropriate in-house RBM expertise and internal institutional capacity as tool for successful RBM transfer

   (c) Ineffective roll-out of participatory and team-based management

   (d) Counter-productive reward system as barriers to successful transfer of RBM

6.2.1   Inappropriate realisation of Governance Values as a barrier

Good governance issues relate to transparency in decision making, which involves following rules and regulations and giving enough information about decisions. It also includes being participatory and inclusive in decision making (Argyris, 1999), being accountable for decisions and finances (Watts, Flanagan& Little, 2005), and actively promoting impartiality and equity (Ölund Wingqvist & Slunge, 2013), with views of the minority being taken into account in decision making.

According to the OECD (2001), RBM systems are sustained by an organisational culture that is characterised by good governance structures. Culture is "how things are done around any particular place" (Schein, 2000).It includes values and beliefs that inform practice and behaviour—rules that guide people's choices and how they behave. Culture drives an organisation and its actions. It is a little like the operating system of the computer. It is deep, and wide and complex; and dynamic and fluid (Spencer-Oatey, 2012). Some aspects of the culture are visible and tangible, and others are intangible and unconscious. This study bracketed off organisational action and management attention as often being the strongest indicators of culture. Schein (2000) asserts that the way different issues are handled by management creates new norms, values, and working procedures, and reveals important underlying assumptions. Informal messages, for example, are sent to staff members by the way senior management handles situations.

Most respondents indicated that there was a high level of frustration among staff members as a result of the lack of common practices in doing things and inconsistencies in following the policies and procedures that have been put in place. This sometimes led to frustration among the workers. One respondent who had served UN-Habitat for more than 12 years remarked:

> If you come from the US or Europe or the World Bank, you come with your own culture on how to do things. There is no on-boarding or orientation to the policies or guidelines on many things. Good or bad practices are largely personal decisions—there is no orientation to the culture and the way of doing business at UN-Habitat.

Good governance refers to the effective, honest, equitable, and accountable exercise of power in a transparent fashion by organisations and institutions. A professional administrative cadre and recognition of the limits of an organisation's actions are important elements of good governance. Good governance refers mainly to the fashion in which we exercise power, but it also includes

the adoption of sound management policies which promote growth with equity and which places appropriate limits on expenditure. Barriers to transfer touched on three key good governance practices, namely following of rules and regulations. Giving enough information about decisions that are made; and active promotion of impartiality and equity.

a)   Non-observation of rules and regulations

An organisation's culture is defined by its practices. Every organisation, regardless of its size and complexity, has a political structure and culture that greatly impacts its behaviour (Schein, 2000; Hofstede, 1997). Cultural issues are not clean, but are intricately wired to political, social, historical and especially to personal contexts. Organisational culture and structure are, indeed, often the major reason why organisations experience difficulties or become dysfunctional (Schein, 2000).

According to OECD (2001) RBM literature, policies and procedures govern organisational behaviour, thus providing a means for norming practices. Management systems are put in place to save time on supervision and giving directions through memos or meetings, and that allows individuals to be more proactive regarding critical matters. People know what is expected of them at different times and for different things. Process requirements are made clear with written guidelines, and most importantly, there is someone to monitor and enforce standards.

However, according to the perceptions of respondents, rules and regulations laid down at UN-Habitat were not always adhered to strictly in decision-making, and hence undermined the full development of transparency as a key value in good governance. Remarks from most respondents portrayed policies at UN-Habitat as "amorphous," and that although procedures and

policies existed on paper, incidents of ethical lapses and un-procedural practices sometimes went unnoticed and without consequences from management. One respondent who had been with the organisation for more than 20 years explained:

> Policies are ambiguous, and there is ambiguity in most things. There are inconsistencies in practice and some things are just not in writing anywhere. There are no guidelines to help you make decisions as simple as taking your car on a trip. People have learned how to go around strict UN guidelines on employment for short-term and long-term positions and it is a disaster–it is just a big joke. Existing rules are not followed by anybody and if you try to follow, you find out everybody else out there is laughing at you.

Another respondent with nearly 25 years' experience at UN-Habitat shared similar sentiments: "People are never sure of management thought or direction. There is no consistency in systems, things are started and forgotten halfway when new priorities emerge."

Although a document review revealed many written organisational policies and procedures at the UN-Habitat, the perceived lack of transparency seemed to emanate from lack of consistency and adherence. This seemed to create an erosion of trust in management, which, in turn, seemed to promote gossip, speculation, insecurity, and politics, which wasted people's time.

Management literature (Jackson, 2005) state that management's clarity of rules and policies help reduce the anxiety people feel about their careers. But in situations where management sends out mixed signals about rewards, promotion, career paths, and criteria for termination, there inevitably is a lot of gossip, game-playing, and unproductive expenditure of energy. In the words of one Programme Officer:

> Staffs [sic] are not using much of their time and energy on work related things, but on politics and seeking opportunities elsewhere. Especially during this time of restructuring, commitment is actually very low.

Some respondents indicated that the state of "chaos" and "ambiguity" that was perceived to exist at UN-Habitat was sustained because it served some individuals. In the words of a UN-Habitat Programme Officer: "Being without systems and ambiguity serves some people well; it gives them power, so they will resist any change."

While most respondents consistently cited lack of following guidelines on decision-making and "ambiguity", none cited financial misappropriation. On the contrary, most respondents cited the "zero tolerance to financial mismanagement" policy as one of UN-Habitat's most adhered to governance practices. In the words of one respondent from the Senior Management Team: "We can't tolerate financial mismanagement—we just cannot survive a financial scandal."

This assertion was supported by the existence of a number of qualified finance staff who ensured financial accountability and limited audit vulnerability. Documents revealed the use of UN Office of Oversight and Inspection, and PricewaterhouseCoopers, an internationally reputable audit firm, as the preferred firm for audited financial reports at UN-Habitat.

However, without consistently and strictly following most procedures as laid down, management was seen as not precisely transparent and open but as arbitrary in decision-making, both in the management of people and in financial decisions. The frequently cited non-adherence to existing procedures and absence of cultural orientation (to define the organisations spoken and unspoken Do's and Don'ts clearly) at UN-Habitat seemed to have made organisational life capricious for some.

b)   Not giving enough information:

Although UN-Habitat has cutting-edge communication systems, including internal newsletters and a website, responses suggested that many aspects of communication remained a big challenge. Issues around delayed information, relevance, and openness remained. A respondent who had been with the organisation for nearly 20 years summarised what several respondents had said:

> There are no records; no reference files; no order and no systems for tracking information gathered on urbanization issues or financial commitment. You can't track anything. With digital files-information is individual-to-individual. If you are out of the loop, you do not know anything. Nobody knows what is going on; there is no single system that informs everybody.

Another respondent complained: "Management is always reactive; they lack crucial and timely information—the organization is always in one form of crisis or another."

During the time of the study, many examples were given of instances where management exhibited "a lot of unnecessary secrecy" about issues that could easily have been discussed in the open, and instances where decisions were made without communicating them to those affected. This was seen to have caused a breakdown of trust in management. One respondent put it this way: "Management is not open, it's not transparent; I wouldn't say they lie but there is a lot of withholding of information . . . that causes speculations and mistrust."

Further, there were complaints of too many "unnecessary" e-mails. In the words of one Programme Officer:

> There is e-mail fatigue at UN-Habitat. Programme Officers have too many e-mails, sometimes, hundreds of them, and titles are often misleading and discouraging. People do not have time to read everything…. There should be a sign indicating if sender wants reply, because people are often tired and can't read everything. Posting jobs should not even be done on e-mails.

The channel of communication seemed to be cumbersome; when there is communication, the individual spends a lot of time reading and filtering out what concerns him or her, which may be

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seen as positive in one respect, but fatiguing to others who must implement activities rather than spend time reading and sorting email. One Senior Programme Officer commented: "There is too much unnecessary communication by e-mail, which takes a lot of manager's time. On average I have about 400 unopened e-mails."

Others that cited poor governance practices that stood in the way of transparency were "habitual delay in decision-making by management on important matters" as well as "procrastination", which was said to cause "a lot of unnecessary tensions". One respondent described management's decision-making process in the following manner:

> Top leadership has reflective decision-making methods –and cannot be called very decisive. That indecisiveness is what slows down things around here—decisions take a long time—a simple issue has to be looked at from 50 perspectives before a decision is made.

One Programme Officer described UN-Habitat's management communication style as, "Very bad, very slow, and not productive at all." Others felt that management "does not listen". Other respondents indicated that, although there was communication from management, it was often "after the fact".

However, not all of those interviewed shared the negative sentiments. One Senior Programme Officer who had been with the organisation for nearly 15 years said: "Management means well, but they are poor communicators. They make many silly mistakes and often don't give timely feedback on critical issues."

Meanwhile, the management indicated that they felt equally frustrated that often when they solicited feedback from staff on important issues, the "response was quite poor". An admission

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from some respondents indicated that messages from management many times are deleted without being read, and that some staff would not respond when leadership asked for opinions, whether verbally or by e-mail. One respondent felt that top leadership was often misunderstood and explained it in the following manner:

> The Executive Director listens a lot, but doesn't tell you what to do with your good ideas. He expects you to take them and run with them, but most people do not understand this and they just sit and wait for his feedback.

These sentiments seem to frustrate management who have tried as hard as possible to be open but seem not to be understood by junior staff. This was echoed by a member of senior management who argued that: "Leadership is always open to discussion. If you make a good case, they will eventually turn around—but definitely they are not pushovers."

All in all, senior management admitted that there were problems with communication. They said that they had tried repeatedly to address them, but they seemed to persist. One of the directors explained that "The formal information flow seems to be a challenge. But it is not that we do not try, we just don't seem to get it right."

At the time of this study, management was still testing new methods of improving communication. One member of senior management confirmed this when he said: "There are issues of poor staff feedback. We are now trying to get opinions using blind questionnaires since people are afraid of being open. We also have introduced a suggestion box."

6.2.2 Inappropriate in-house expertise and internal institutional capacity as barriers to successful transfer of RBM

RBM literature indicates that successful implementation is dependent on managers and staff having the necessary knowledge, skills, and attitude to develop and use the performance

measurement system. The lesson had been to provide training for nearly all those involved in RBM policy innovation transfer. Training was also suggested as crucial in changing the organisational culture.

Because of lack of appreciation of RBM, most programme officers seemed to regard RBM as synonymous with inflexible and time-frozen Logical Frameworks matrices. Such misconceptions about the RBM concept seemed to limit their appreciation of the approach and resulted in negative perceptions. While an RBM culture could have been cultivated by training, UN-Habitat indicated that it did not have the curriculum to tailor capacity building, which was another barrier. The RBM Senior Programme Officer has this to say; "The organization still has no RBM training curriculum, the trainings are adhoc and demand driven. I have budgeted for a consultant to help us develop RBM curriculum".

Furthermore, there seemed to be little RBM experience and expertise in other similar organisations, which meant that there were no best practices or lessons learned to guide UN-Habitat, especially in the development of RBM systems and urbanisation indicators.

Successful RBM implementation requires clear, consistent and visible support and active involvement of senior leadership as critical ingredients (World Bank, 2004). Without the leadership's support, there would be no impetus for change. Yet, one of the reasons the leadership gave for the need to adopt RBM was compliance, not merit in the approach.

"If we don't do it, donors will catch up with us sooner or later", explained the Executive Director. On the basis of his rationale, the researcher concluded that the use of RBM was largely

based more on compliance with demands of one of the major donors, not yet a conversion, and therefore the changes that were incorporated risked being just superficial with little depth. It seemed that reasons for adopting RBM policy innovation were not yet motivating enough for programme officers to develop enduring ways of thinking. At the time of the study it moreover seemed that RBM was quite incongruent with the interests of most individual programme officers. According to RBM literature (OECD, 2001), however, it was strengthening values like transparency, accountability, participation and teamwork, learning, diversity, and a focus on results that helped anchor RBM in an organisation.

OECD (2001) literature considers training and education as key ingredients for successful transfer of RBM innovation. Among leaders of results-based management, training is listed as an essential ingredient for reform (OECD, 2001). A major hurdle in implementing results-based management is the relative lack of experience and expertise (UNDP, 2009; Mascarenhas, 1996).

6.2.3   Ineffective participatory and team-based management as a barrier

Participation in an RBM process concerns the active involvement of people in decisions that affect them. The objective of participation is to improve the quality of decisions and to ensure that the decisions have the support that is needed to succeed. One of UN-Habitat's espoused values was teamwork. Teamwork and participation at UN-Habitat represents a belief that sections and regions are more effective when they work collaboratively than when they work in isolation. Participation is encouraged in bi-annual joint planning, which also ensures that plans are vetted with those who have a stake or interest in them, and it ensures ownership and support for actions.

Teams at UN-Habitat were used for many different purposes. Some had specific long-term tasks and others were short term, with full-time members and part-time members. Use of teams was supposed to ensure better decisions, more effective processes, and commitment to defined results. Some good examples of these were the programming teams, and management taskforces.

While participation systems seemed to be in place, including websites, e-mail and newsletters, most respondents indicated that they were excluded from decision-making on important issues: "Attempts to be consultative by management are perceived as not genuine but a way of rubber stamping changes, and wanting to appear democratic."

While acknowledging that the use of teams was supposed to ensure better decisions; more effective processes; and commitment to defined results, the restructuring exercise that was taking place was cited as one example where most staff felt excluded by management. Some members of senior management were said to have often "made up minds" by the time they consulted staff. One key respondent echoed what many had said in the following remark: "We would have liked to see a sense of transparency and inclusiveness by top leadership and not directives."

This statement is contrary to what was reviewed in the documents on the restructuring process that revealed comprehensive details of the change process, including requests from the Executive Director's office to staff for feedback on the process.

Team approaches cut across the three field sites that the researcher visited; the levels of staff involvement varied, however, and in some field sites like Fukuoka where there were no regular staff meetings, participation was cited as being particularly low. A Senior Programme Officer at the Fukuoka field site had this to say;

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> …we know RBM needs a team effort to succeed but our projects are funded by different donors and are fragmented. It is difficult to bring staff together to plan as different donors expect different outputs from the projects they fund. Staff are also busy and don't have time for meetings.

A document review further revealed that city Mayors from member states, Ministers of Planning, and the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) were invited to participate in the strategic planning process. Despite stakeholder participation in the development of the 2014-2018 strategic plans, it was not possible to ascertain whether people that participated understood the responsibility and accountability that went with the participation. Participation was not viewed as inclusive by a majority at UN-Habitat, as indicated in this remark by one programme officer: "Despite the appearance of participation and consultations, sometimes decisions are already made and many proposals are written without our input."

UN-Habitat section heads confirmed this and explained that projects were designed without a participatory approach in some cases, especially when there were "unrealistic deadlines" from donors to be met for submitting funding proposals or concept papers for funding considerations. During such times, it was explained, it would be impractical to use participatory approaches given that they are very time-consuming, labour intensive in nature, while at the same time having to meet the deadlines.

Another reason for making decisions that were not participatory was that, while donors talked a lot about RBM and participatory methods, the cost of the process was never factored into the project and programme designs. The extent and depth of the participation across each

programme / project and each step of RBM was difficult to determine from documents, given that projects and documents were "highly fragmented," as confirmed by findings.

6.2.4   Counterproductive reward system as barrier to successful transfer of RBM

According to management literature (Argyris, 1999), leaders transmit the culture of an organisation. What leadership does sets the trends in the organisation and what they reward gets done or re-enforced. The actions of management, therefore, have symbolic meanings, and they send informal messages to the rest of the organisation. As a rule, what is done is always more important than what is said. Management actions, hence, are very telling, revealing and indicative, and much organisational behaviour is created by what management rewards or punishes.

Research findings in this study portrayed UN-Habitat management as living some major contradictions and inconsistencies in some of its practices, and the behaviour seemed to undermine rather than promote the desired organisational results. Most of what has been cited as undesirable behaviour at UN-Habitat could be traced back to the formal or informal reward and punishment systems. In some instances, UN-Habitat seemed to unconsciously drive the behaviour of the organisation by formally and informally rewarding or sanctioning some wrong things. For instance, while the change theory and strategy statements showed the organisation as promoting human development and environmentally sound urban-management practices, the reward system was portrayed as mostly favouring and promoting the creation of urban knowledge. Consequences for failure to publish were immediate and obvious; individual appraisals and professional advancement at UN-Habitat were largely based on the number of individual publications.

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Furthermore, there seemed to be disharmony between individual interests and organisational objectives at UN-Habitat as well. In the words of a member of senior management: "At UN-Habitat, program officers do what they want, when they want and with whom they want. It is time Program Officers stopped working for them and started working for UN-Habitat."

Consequences for not showing evidence of progress towards the intended outcomes of projects and programmes were rare, and one respondent echoed what others had said when he made the following remark:

> We are a human settlements organization and not inclined to development. If RBM is going to take the time I should be using for reducing slums, I will not use it. I am evaluated on number of slum houses upgraded. There must be a system that recognizes and rewards human development results for RBM to institutionalize, and right now there is none.

The literature that was reviewed, though not exhaustive, suggested that the reward system at UN-Habitat was partly driven by donors and the CPR, who hoped for human development results and a visible contribution towards the Millennium Development Goals, yet seemed to reward good and prompt reports. These reward systems seemed to cause UN-Habitat to appear to care about the wrong things, instead of caring for actions that guaranteed the attainment of development results.

a)   Rewarding the best team members instead of the team

Team building was promoted in the organisation as a necessary ingredient for RBM's success, as well as one of UN-Habitat's core values. But while teamwork does not imply suspending the notion of individual responsibility, the formal system appeared to reward individual effort and the best team members, as opposed to rewarding both team and individual effort. Hence, evidence portrayed some people as still thinking of themselves as individuals working on their

planned outputs, rather than as people working together to accomplish desired outcomes. Full performance benefits of operating as teams appeared somewhat undermined as a result of such oversights. Existing management systems seemed to unconsciously undermine the quality of urbanisation by having top urban specialists spend most of their quality time on management issues, as evident in the following: "We have our best urban experts running around writing proposals, fundraising, and writing donor reports, and not doing urbanization."

Furthermore, by informally making management a less rewarded task than the work of urban specialists, the system unconsciously sanctioned and promoted bad management practices that findings suggested generated low morale, which is a performance-undermining factor. While RBM and development were people-centred, emphasising the role of people as both means and end in the development process requiring high people-skills for the accomplishment of social change, most urban experts indicated that they detested managing people, with their primary interest being urban planning and design.

b) Rewarding avoidance of criticism.
UN-Habitat strives to be a learning organisation. Learning is important for transformational change and is a key component of successful RBM. In learning, and to develop sustainable solutions, there must be freedom to challenge the status quo and to question decisions; hence, people must go outside the box to create new ideas. According to research (Worley, 2001) learning organisational cultures promote openness, creativity, freedom to try new things, risking failure, and learning from mistakes to change and improve themselves and the organisation.

While there was sufficient evidence that UN-Habitat had a practice of learning, most programme officers seemed inhibited in observed meetings, especially when it came to giving contradictory opinion or feedback to senior management or colleagues. Management was said to verbally encourage openness while implicitly encouraging what one programme officer called "maintaining civility or political correctness" and another termed "a dignified silence". Observed evidence from planning meetings showed that some highly contested issues were often discussed outside meeting rooms in small groups, mostly during coffee breaks, but many of them never made their way back to the plenary. Management was said to demand and reward what was referred to as "conspicuous loyalty", and was said to be sensitive to criticism. In the words of one programme officer, "Professionalism and excellence alone cannot guarantee you a job at UN-Habitat. People are very sensitive here and loyalty to the system is what really matters."

While the "hard to match" salary packages and benefits at UN-Habitat were meant to keep and attract the internationally best in the field, documents reviewed, although not exhaustive, suggested that there was also an implicit expectation of hard work, professionalism, and loyalty to the organisation. But they cited over sensitivity to criticism, constructive or otherwise, unconsciously inhibited learning, creativity, and innovation, which are factors that stood in the way of learning as is required in a successful RBM system. Evidence from findings suggested that, instead of learning, repressing criticism and negative feedback seemed to have created staff that was deferential in front of management but angry, unmotivated, and bitter behind the scenes.

When the researcher asked respondents what exactly the commonly cited "loyalty" that was implicitly demanded by UN-Habitat meant, Focus Group respondents – Senior Programme

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Officers and Programme Officers – gave varying responses, such as: "respecting and not challenging the pecking order", "keeping one's head down", "keeping invisible on hot issues and being non-controversial", "not criticizing or questioning management decisions", "being agreeable and appreciative in regard to status quo", "working diligently and keeping timid with your superiors", "being blind to injustices and remaining mute when the scales of justice are unfairly tilted against you", "keeping politically correct company", and "an ability to endure unjustified pain with a dignified silence", amongst others. One bitter respondent had the following to say: "Of course, we cannot give our all and our best to an organization that demeans and dehumanizes us into robots without emotions."

RBM literature (OECD/DAC, 2001) indicates that successful transfer is dependent on the organisation's ability to create a culture that is focused on learning. Both the transfer of technology and RBM literature indicate that the informal factors in an organisation are more determinants of transfers than the formal ones, and while the formal is important, no change will be permanent without support from the informal.

6.3   UNDER-IDENTIFIED BARRIERS/ENABLERS IN THE THEORETICAL MODEL FOR SUCCESSFUL RBM POLICY INNOVATION TRANSFER

The theoretical model for successful RBM policy innovation transfer (Figure 2.3) includes unidentified variables "β = other variables that might have been omitted from the barriers/enablers model and hence resulting in under-identification of the model". Other variables not identified "β" either are the result of model under-identification or are context specific. The findings and analysis in the identified additional barriers that affects successful transfer of RBM policy innovation at UN-Habitat. However, the study did not establish

significant levels of their contribution to successful RBM policy innovation transfer and hence the barriers kept under "β". These barriers are: inability to actively promote impartiality and inequality; inappropriate politics of change as a barrier; and inappropriate RBM policy innovation-supporting systems and structures.

6.3.1   Inability to actively promote impartiality and Equity

Diversity was one of UN-Habitat's espoused values and was supported by policies like "zero tolerance to racism", "equal opportunity employer", "non-discrimination HIV/AIDS policy", and a "grievance procedure" policy. The good governance practice of valuing diversity is closely related to the value of participation and inclusiveness. Valuing diversity reflects a belief that there is more than one way to look at the world and that work will improve if we consciously seek to take into account the diversity of views, experience, skills, capabilities, and beliefs of those affected. Diversity is about creating synergy and the benefits of bringing together people of different backgrounds and skills to accomplish the mission. In an RBM system, valuing diversity is demonstrated by respecting team members or individual inputs, regardless of ethnicity, nationality, sex, and organisational status.

While UN-Habitat seemed to have a good record externally and among CPR members on racial and professional diversity among programme officers and staff, respondents and management admitted to several serious "inequity issues", "an existing culture of fear and intimidation", and "power distance between national staff and international staff". Some respondents cited concerns such as gender equity, segregation, and exclusion. But while some indicated that they thought segregation, in particular, was a "racial thing and others felt it was about academic

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credentials,("here at UN-Habitat, you are nobody without a PhD"), there yet were those who strongly felt it was "a power thing". In the words of one respondent:

> Segregation at UN-Habitat is not about national staff versus international staff. It might even look like it is racial, but it is actually not. Segregation here is a power thing—and power here, is predominantly male and white. Those who have power try to exclude those without it.

UN-Habitat was further portrayed as two organisations in one. National staff members came through as a category with particularly "high social interests," and "need for inclusion", which management did not seem to care much about, while the professional international staff's concerns were mostly about "academic freedom and professional advancement, and individual space".

One senior human settlements officer, in explaining partiality at UN-Habitat, summarised what most respondents had said with the following remark: "At UN-Habitat, some people are allowed to do certain things and some are not—you therefore have to figure out for yourself whether you are among those who can do forbidden things with impunity, or not."

Consequences for similar irregular behaviour were said to be inconsistent and subjective, and in the words of one respondent:

> Although there are incidents where people are punished for non-adherence to rules in the staff manual, this is very subjective, and it depends on a lot of factors. Grievance procedures exist, but do not work because there is inconsistency in application—everything around here is so subjective. Judgment is often not neutral.

The organisation was depicted as unequal, with most respondents describing situations where rules and procedures were applied selectively and inequitably. Some staff members were described as "protected" and others as leadership's "blue-eyed-boys". Some respondents indicated that most of their opinions often were not taken into consideration.

The researcher, however, noted that any attempt by management to be fair and inclusive was viewed by many with cynicism. A good example of extreme cynicism was a remark by a key respondent regarding management's involvement of national staff in donor cocktail events, which went as follows: "That management invited local staff to a social event, a cocktail organized for donors during the donor consultations was just a public relations stunt staged to impress international visitors."

Senior management seemed aware of this cynicism among staff, as indicated by a remark by a member of the senior management: "There is suspicion that what management says and does is for show and that deep inside we don't care. Staffs feel that management action is largely ceremonial."

To further illustrate some existing inequities, some respondents cited situations where staff did work for "several people" and yet were not rewarded accordingly. Other incidents involved "undeserving" people who were promoted, and the hard workers were left out. Regarding this, management was implicitly aware of it and was already trying to address the situation by eliciting the services of an international management consultant to look at "staff development". They openly admitted that "there are a lot of inequities", but hoped to have in place what they called a "one staff concept," which allowed career progression for staff.

Some respondents cited some good governance practices that were already in place, though, and that were intended to close the equity gap, such as the "open-door-policy", but indicated that they were slowly losing their meaning. One respondent had the following to say:

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What you see is not always what you get at UN-Habitat; they say it is an open door policy and that people can call each other by their first names, but reality is far from it—we actually have a lot of social distance here and calling each other by first names has not closed that distance— doors remain closed even when they are physically open.

6.3.2   Inappropriate politics of change as a barrier to transfer of RBM

UN-Habitat appears to be a highly complex, unpredictable, and highly political place. This question explored UN-Habitat's culture for possible barriers that would undermine the transfer of RBM. The researcher tried to understand how things were done formally and informally at UN-Habitat and, in addition, tried to observe whether the culture at the headquarters office in Nairobi-Kenya was reflected in the three field sites that were studied.

RBM policy innovation transfer depends on change being accepted and supported, not simply complied with. Findings indicated that low acceptance and lack of support of RBM by the wider system was based on prejudices and stereotypes rather than factual information. People did not fully appreciate RBM and did not fully understand it.

For transfer to have a higher chance of success, it should begin with changing people's attitudes by making them understand the concepts, language, benefits, and demands of the process. Rogers (2008) warns that new knowledge unless it becomes part of the person's life, is useful only for the performance of mechanical tasks rather than for creative problem solving, which is the real purpose of learning.

6.3.3   Inappropriate RBM policy innovation supporting systems and structures

In analysing the supporting environment for RBM, the study focused on culture, or how things are done at UN-Habitat, and structure, or how work is done. An organisation is only as effective as its processes, and every work is a process. Superior performance in an RBM system lies in the way work is done and why it is done the way it is done. Staff at each level should have a "clear line of sight" to desired results. They should understand each of the other levels, how they relate to one another, and where they individually contribute on the "line of sight" towards desired results. People have to understand why they are doing the things they are doing. One pessimistic respondent from one of the field sites had the following to say about the adoption of RBM: "RBM will be conceived but will soon be a stillbirth. There are no systems to sustain it—I have been trained in many things, which I do not use. RBM will only add to the pile."

While many aspects of RBM seemed evident in UN-Habitat's strategic plans, the reality was that only the two section heads and the Programme officer were conversant enough with the RBM terminology and application of the results chain and performance measures. Most of the lower level staff (below officer level or below P2) respondents (70%) did not have understanding of RBM despite having attended RBM training, and were not aware of the available support tools like RBM literature, RBM Senior Programme officer and focal persons in the organisation. Most of the interviewed staff confessed that they did not "know enough" of RBM to comment authoritatively about the process and confessed to have "attended trainings on RBM but have not practised".

Given the adhoc manner in which documents were archived at UN-Habitat HQ, and the informal manner in which the transfer process of the RBM system seemed to have been carried out, it was

difficult to trace all the project/programme processes. For instance, when the researcher requested to see monitoring reports from the regions, only two narrative reports on activities carried out and completed within the quarter could be located. In explaining the situation, one UN-Habitat section head indicated that they found it rather unrealistic for the researcher to expect to locate files for programmes spanning 120 countries in all regions: "UN-Habitat work is undertaken in 120 countries. How could you expect to find all the documentation in my office?" But there was a repeated remark from most respondents from UN-Habitat HQ and field sites indicating that "Everything [projects] at UN-Habitat is very fragmented."

At two of the sites, there seemed to be confusion and disharmony in terminology, which was indicative of limited understanding of the results concepts and principles, which could have been attributed to the fact that all programme staff members were not RBM trained. As one of the UN-Habitat HQ section heads lamented:

> Too much time is used arguing about terminologies in RBM. What is important is for people to understand the concept and principles and not vocabulary. Only then will people appreciate the RBM approach as a useful tool for managing their program and projects.

Johnson *et al*. (1997) observed that, for innovations to be transferred successfully, both knowledge and the technology being transferred must be conceptually adapted. It was evident that there were too many tasks to be accomplished in very little time. Later the UN-Habitat section head remarked to the researcher: "People have too many things, tasks, and meetings and the quality is lost in process. We sometimes end up giving quick and dirty jobs."

Further, reports and other programme-related documents at UN-Habitat HQ depicted disharmony between the use of RBM language and vocabulary. This was partly explained by the fact that

donor agencies did not have commonly accepted definitions and terminologies for RBM processes, which the researcher believed to be true, and partly could have been explained by the fact that the staff lacked RBM proficiency.

Organizations' use of inconsistent definitions for their programme's measures could hamper decision makers' use of data collected from those measures in planning, comparing performance, and reporting on performance achieved (IFAD, 2009; Casey, 2007; USGAO, 1997). A standard set of definitions is said to help minimise misunderstandings and will foster consistency throughout the organisation (OECD/DAC, 2001).

6.4   DISCUSSION AND SYNTHESIS REGARDING THE BARRIERS

UN-Habitat has many good intentions, highly competent staff, and good systems, but the potential for RBM policy innovation transfer and sustainability lies in programme officer' voluntary acceptance of the policy innovation technology and higher adherence to existing systems. There have been multiple corrective measures addressing perceived problems at UN-Habitat. However, the new interventions should be viewed from a systems perspective—where all things are interconnected, and a dysfunction in one area affecting the whole, with piecemeal and isolated improvement processes risking failure. This will require a change in the corporate culture and for existing management systems to get aligned to support the policy innovation technology. Since some of RBM's systems are already in place, there will be no radical and revolutionary change processes, but rather building on what is in place, and that, in itself, offers huge potential for a successful policy innovation technology grafting process.

The fact that most responses indicated that there was no participatory and team-based management with the leadership often taking authoritarian action on important issues; issuing "directives"; and trying to standalone meant that this type of culture in the UN-Habitat is a barrier to the smooth and quick adoption of all the components of RBM. They were said to often not share in crucial decision-making, were not open and transparent, and instead dominated the process of decision-making. This contradiction of expectations seemed to have eroded staff trust in leadership and created many incidents of overt and strained compliance in the view of management, alongside resentment and secret non-compliance. One angry programme officer put it this way:

> As program officers we do not want to be told what to do. If UN-Habitat wants people to instruct, they should not go for experts; they should go for technicians. Experts are employed to think and not to take orders and directives.

Some remarks at one bi-annual planning meeting (Bi-annual planning meeting report, 2012) indicated that it was possible that consultations were not as inclusive as intended, as evidenced from the following remark from the field sites:

> Focus areas are not strictly headquarters issues. Can we be told what criteria were used to come up with these focus areas? Can we in future have guidelines to ensure transparency?—and can we have a transparent and participatory process of choosing focus area teams. The way things are being done is not inclusive at all.

In spite of evidence collected by the researcher during management and planning meetings and reviewed documents denoting a courteous and solicitous approach to decision-making by leadership, most respondents felt differently. One programme officer summarised what most had said with the following remarks:

> Decision-making here is very top down—and by the CPR. This includes policy, allocation of funds, priorities, and direction—and there is desire for a more participatory approach.—The

> Executive Director talks a lot about the need to be participatory, but is rarely seen to be participatory in practice—often he gets into the micromanagement of things.

Another overly cited incident that was meant to signify poor governance practices involved the laying-off of some staff. There was a general sense among most respondents that the process was not done in a sensitive manner, and as one particularly dissatisfied programme officer put it, "You cannot carry out an exercise of that nature without the involvement of the program officers the staffs have been serving. In future let us recruit for UN-Habitat and not for individuals." When management was asked about such comments, the Deputy Executive Director responded that there were lessons to be learnt from this particular restructuring process, and they would be documented to avoid a repeat of similar mistakes in future. However, they reaffirmed that, "the decisions were right, but it is in the implementation we went wrong." They were committed to introducing and managing the change process in ways that minimise the pain of those affected.

Management, in responding to issues of poor communication, expressed frustration that their efforts to be participatory were sometimes discouraged by staff non-response and indicated that messages often went without response for weeks. When they finally got a response, the feedback sometimes was "not a quality one." As summarised by one top manager;

> Silence on contentious issues especially during meetings is a red flag at UN-Habitat. It often does not mean content or consent, but is often an indication of repressed opposing views. Management is however, unable or unwilling to read this signal.

There was frustration that management sometimes asked for feedback on too many things within a very short time, without considering the fact that meaningful feedback often took time. Further, some said it is hard to respond to urgent messages when "priorities at UN-Habitat change by the hour". When the researcher asked why some programme officers did not participate in

discussions but seemed reserved, self-conscious, and inhibited during the bi-annual planning meetings, some of the responses went like this:

> Most people were quiet in meetings because they are insecure. They don't want to rock the boat especially when they are not good performers. When you are a good performer and your results were visible, fear does not come into play. It is when you do minimums and know you are easily dispensable that you fear to speak out.

Another comment that captures what many respondents felt went like this:

> There is a lot of game playing in most face-to-face meetings. There is a lot of competition and self-alignment among staff. Some of the discussions at the planning meetings are meant to impress the Executive Director. Some people are always positioning themselves and looking for favours.

However, another Director, one of the senior management members, had a different view:

> People do not want to waste time in meetings contradicting top leadership—whose mind is already made [up] about most things anyway. Why engage in an intellectual debate while you know that any of the recommendations and largely the whole planning exercise has no seriousness? People do not want to prolong debates, they want the planning meetings to get done and they can move on and do other things.

Regarding the national staff's appearance of apprehension, one respondent summarised the situation in the following manner:

> There is a lot of fear and apathy here. You witness this in meetings especially when management asks whether there are questions and we all keep quiet—while inside we are seething with anger and have a million questions we would like answered. But again, one dares not.

One key respondent had the following to say about the feeling of uncertainty that prevailed among staff during the period of the study:

> Uncertainty at UN-Habitat as far as professional staffs are concerned is not really about funding; it is about leadership. You do not know whether tomorrow the finger points at you and your job is gone. But if leadership was rallying behind the organisation, it would win people's confidence—but right now; most people are suspicious about management. Secondly, people want to feel they are in a quality ship, the captain is confident, and the crew is with them. But when the captain is forever looking worried, sweating, constantly looking through the manuals,

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that does not inspire passenger's confidence. People at UN-Habitat are busy looking for jobs elsewhere.

On this, management had a different view, and had the following to say:

> The problem with most people at UN-Habitat is that even if they can see the boat is overheating, smoking, and about to blow up, very few are willing to alert the captain. They would prefer to see the boat blow up and the captain to look bad. Unfortunately, they don't seem to realise that when the boat sinks, it will sink with all of us in it.

6.5   SUMMARY

Although RBM is appreciated by all at UN-habitat, the study showed that there are organisational cultures that hinder the acceptance of RBM. These rotated around three issues, namely governance, the reward system and internal capacity.   The active promotion of impartiality and equity plus the politics of change all seemed to be barriers to RBM transfer. These can be summarised as staff not trusting management, which results in failure to open up, and management failure to read between the lines about what makes the staff close up. The conflict between local and international staff and the issue of academic qualifications for those who seem not to have PhDs are some of the barriers. The PhD holders want to advance professionally while others want to ensure that work is done. There also seemed to be a culture of fear, especially around when you notice something, open up and lose your job as the next thing. Lastly, the study found out that management is doing everything possible to balance the power dynamics by wanting to recruit a consultant to sort out the differences.

CHAPTER 7

ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT OF FINDINGS

7.1   INTRODUCTION

Chapter 5 presented enabling conditions for transfer of RBM policy innovation in UN-Habitat. These concerned expert human capital; good communication channels; ideal ideological commonalities; and the on-going learning and donor pressure. Chapter 6 looked at the barriers to successful transfer of policy innovation. These involved inappropriate governance values and internal institutional capacity; suspicious participatory and team-based management; and a counterproductive reward system. Chapter 7 now presents the six steps of RBM policy innovation transfer. This is followed by a discussion and summary of the chapter.

The theoretical model for successful RBM policy innovation transfer (Figure 2.3) presented steps for successful RBM transfer and enablers and/or barriers to RBM transfer. This chapter however, also looks at and provides an analysis and assessment of the findings from UN-Habitat offices based on the six steps for successful transfer of the RBM policy innovation technology.   In addition, it provides possible ways (recommendations) for future technological policy innovation transfer between the developed and developing countries. In examining the findings, the study investigated the extent to which UN-Habitat had cast off or modified previous ideas, practices and ways of thinking and adopted RBM systems. The study further looked at the extent to which the old management style was combining with the new RBM style.

The case study sought to extend the frontiers of knowledge on the complexities, practicalities, and peculiarities related to the transfer of RBM policy innovation from western developers, to a

non-profit international human settlements and development organisation located in a developing country. Transfer in this study does not just include the appropriation of new technical knowledge, but also new ways of thinking about and understanding new discourses, and, more profoundly, the values, beliefs, and assumptions on which the new practices were found and adopted (Clark &Geppert, 2002).

In structuring the answer to the question, the study examined how RBM implementation is aligned with the six key steps in OECD/DAC (2001) literature that define the RBM system, UN-Habitat's infrastructure, and observed practices in the visited field sites. A synthesis of the findings was carried out with reflection on adoption and diffusion literature (Rogers, 2008), and transfer literature (Johnson*et al.,* 1997). A detailed discussion is presented in section 7.3.

7.2   THE SIX STEPS FOR SUCCESSFUL RBM POLICY INNOVATION TRANSFER

The six key steps that define the RBM system, as defined in the OECD (2001) literature, are:

(a) Clearly defining expected results in a measurable manner;

(b) Identifying and monitoring risks over time;

(c) Identifying or selecting performance indicators that will be used to measure progress towards results and to judge performance;

(d) Developing performance monitoring systems to regularly collect performance information on actual results, to review, to analyse and to report performance (actual results vis-à-vis the targeted results);

(e) Integrating formative evaluations to provide complementary performance not readily available from performance monitoring systems;

(f) Use of performance information for learning, management improvements also called decision-making processes, and internal management accountability including external performance reporting to stakeholders and partners.

The first three steps or processes generally relate to a results-oriented planning approach and are sometimes referred to as strategic planning. The first five steps or processes together are usually included in the concept of performance measurement, while a combination of all six steps is referred to as performance management and is essential to effective transfer of an RBM system. Integrating complementary information from both evaluations and performance measurement systems and ensuring use of this information is viewed as critical aspects of Results-Based Management (RBM). The detailed explanation and findings under each of these steps is presented here.

7.2.1   Step One: Defining Expected Results in a Measurable Manner

Defining results in a measurable manner is a central part in an RBM process, and according to RBM literature, the better defined the expected results in a plan, the better the monitoring and the better designed the interventions and linkages. This is the stage where intervention theory of change is established.

The study examined and reviewed the Medium Term Strategic Institutional Plans (MTSIP) *(UN-Habitat MTSIP, 2008 – 2013; MTSP, 2014 -2018),* which is based on six-year forward planning

schedules, and the bi-annual work programmes and budgets, and findings indicated that UN-Habitat HQ had made considerable efforts to explicitly define expected results. For instance, short-term, medium-term, and long-term results and milestones to be realised within the planning period had been clearly identified. Indicators to measure progress and targets to be realised had been developed as well, and the activities that were to produce the outputs had been clearly outlined.

The strategy planning tools of the United Nations Secretariat of which UN-Habitat is part, are MTSIP; bi-annual strategic frameworks; work programmes; and budget, with the associated templates and the format predetermined. The United Nations Secretariat system was somewhat different from the RBM system, and this made it particularly difficult to locate some aspects of RBM in this "rolling" Medium-Term Strategic Institutional Plans (MTSIP) (2008-2013, 2014-2018). The MTSIP was/is always developed two years before its implementation to allow time for its approval processes. How each plan evolved to the next was easy to trace, and was helpful to the researcher *(UN-Habitat MTSIP, 2008-2013, 2014-2018).* For example, objectives, outputs, and indicators were the same in each document, and while some documents had information on key aspects like risk analysis, there was no evidence of risk monitoring. The documents were well written and it was easy to access the information in both soft and hard form from the UN-Habitat offices. *(UN-Habitat MTSIP, 2008-2013, 2014-2018).* In the same way, the planning horizons specified time frames for different levels of results in the strategic document, which was a critical element, given RBM's emphasis on efficiency and accountability for results (ST/SGB/200/8; *UN-Office of Planning and Budgeting, 2012).*

The UN-Habitat Programme had well developed results framework matrixes. The results framework is a favourite tool used by developers of RBM policy innovation and is used for conceptualising a project's expected results/objectives and the strategies that would be used to attain these results/objectives. Using the logic chart and results maps proved to be very helpful in the development and identification of expected results, indicators, and risks (OECD/DAC, 2001). It also facilitated the task of conceptualising projects/programmes in terms of inputs, outputs, and outcomes. It helped verify the logical consequences of cause-and-effect linkages and, hence, the theory of change and level of attribution (Casey, 2007; Plantz*et al.,* 1997). This is a particularly useful tool for stakeholders that are not familiar with results-based management because it illustrates how RBM works. A further advantage that proponents still claimed for the results framework is that the identification of risks helped to structure the uncontrollable factors separating outcomes from output.

The frameworks (Bi-annual programme of Work results framework, 2012-2013, MTSIP results framework 2008-2013, 2014-2017) at UN-Habitat specifically showed the activities that were to produce the desired outputs and how the outputs would contribute to delivering the desired outcomes, and indicators at output and outcome levels had been selected. However, the relationship between strategy planning and execution was not always well articulated. One of the observed contradictions of the results framework was that different projects were not linked to various expected outcomes – "expected accomplishments". However, strategy planning at UN-Habitat is commendable, though it still needs to articulate and establish the relationship between strategy planning, which takes place at programme level, and strategy execution that involves the

planning, implementation, management of different projects to realise programme results, including establishment of partnership arrangements.

One of the UN-Habitat heads of section had this to say:

> Staff at the organisation do not understand their roles and contribution to the MTSIP, they understand the results they have agreed with their particular donors. This lack of understanding is not helpful to the establishment of RBM. The processes of planning in UN-Habitat are too donor-driven, especially regarding the constant insistence on the use of results frameworks to display expected results without explaining to staff their roles and contributions to the bigger picture and focusing on real change that the projects and programmes were expected to cause and selection of projects to implement was driven by donor and not based on needs.

A Lake Victoria water and sanitation project engineer had this to say:

> I am not sure my project is part of this HQ MTSIP…….. What is important for me is to meet donor targets and provide numbers they want to share with their governments. Donors want their numbers; they don't care about MTSIP and have nothing to do with HQ. They come here to talk to me.

Individuals who interviewed most were probably thought that RBM began and ended with the results frameworks and the plans were never executed with the same rigor that was applied in developing them. In the words of one of the UN-Habitat section heads:

> I think there is a fundamental error donors thinking that if you have a results framework you have results. While under pressure from their capitals or wherever, and they think if they don't push recipients to get the numbers, they will not sell the project. Most programme actions cannot be explained in simple RBM results framework linear terms. There is a lot of thought process and intuition, which cannot be explained and put in a results framework.

The fact that the results framework was not always seen by most as a "living document" but a fixed document, created a lot of concern. As one programme officer pointed out: "Why can't donors who insist on results frameworks see that projects cannot stay fixed for a six-year planning horizon when the environment continues to change?"

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Some of the more experienced UN-Habitat HQ staff members felt that they often had rich intuitions about complex processes and systems that could not fit into the RBM logic of explanation.

One Senior Programme Officer had this to say: "obvious pre-decided solutions", especially for a research and human settlement programme, could sometimes cause more harm than good by restraining staff to having to explain their ideas in "simple linear cause and effect language" of the RBM logic.

7.2.2   Step Two: Identifying and Monitoring Assumptions and Risks over Time

In the design of an RBM system, risks and assumptions on which the theory of change is based have to be stipulated (UN-Office of Planning and Budgeting, 2012), as well as the economic, social, cultural, physical, and other contexts in which the programme functions (OECD, 2003). A plan for risk monitoring and mitigation is critical, especially for risks that might prevent outputs producing outcomes.

Findings indicate that, although UN-Habitat might have had knowledge of the critical assumptions and risks of the programme, they were not systematically tracked or reported. In the words of one of the regional directors:

> Donors are interested in value for money – they want to see results but are not interested in listening to issues related to issues and risks. We have learned to deal with issues and risks internally while demonstrating value for money and this has helped take care of donor needs.

7.2.3   Step Three: Identifying/ Selecting Performance Indicators to Measure Progress towards Results

In an RBM process**,** programme/project must identify and select performance indicators to measure progress towards results and to judge performance. From the available documents and interviews with the staff at UN-Habitat, it was discovered that UN-Habitat had very well-developed performance standards and measures (Bi-annual programme of Work results framework, 2012-2013; MTSIP results framework 2008 – 2013, 2014-2017). These were evidence from the reviewed plans that showed well-stipulated results over planned periods and targets to be achieved progressively each year (UN-Habitat, 2011b).

Use of baseline data as a basis to set targets: The indicator targets in an RBM system have to be based on baseline data (where are we now?) and would have to be very specific (how much change within what period of time?). Findings indicated that most performance information contained in available reports was without context or clear baseline information, and that could lead to incorrect conclusions about programme success or failure, more so, in the case of an external evaluator. In addition, there was little indication of the existence of a systematic approach to performance tracking, receiving of feedback, or lesson learning/experience. Worse still, there were no guidelines for setting targets. The relationship between project and programme targets was never clear.

Performance standards and targets: According to OECD RBM literature, performance indicators are qualitative or quantitative measures of resource use; the extent of reach; and developmental results achieved, and were used to monitor programme/project performance**.** The indicator targets specify what to measure along a scale or according to a dimension in order to

gauge progress. The relative importance of indicator types, however, is likely to change over the period of the project's life cycle, with more emphasis on input and process indicators at first, then shifting to output and outcome (purpose level) and (impact-level) indicators later as the project matures.

At the outcomes level, the information collected on performance indicators is analysed and used for management decision-making to keep the programme and associated projects on track and moving toward the achievement of the programme's purpose *(UN-Habitat, 2011a).* Information collected on the indicators constituted evidence regarding programme/project success or failure at termination. In an RBM process, emphasis is on measuring the achievement of developmental results as opposed to the use of resources "implementation monitoring".

UN-Habitat HQ plans, for instance, showed a greater focus on process or implementation indicator targets than transformational indicator results (UN-Habitat, 2012). They showed identified output and desired outcomes at process level (means) but did not indicate outcomes related to the human development results (end) as required by an RBM process. However, there seemed to be a realisation that human development results would not be attained in the two years of the bi-annual planning horizons as this requires between five and ten years. It was not possible to verify from document and interviews at what point they would develop and to trace human development indicators. As one critique of UN-Habitat HQ indicated: "We tend to focus more on the number of housing units. However, the Slum Upgrading section head is the one who has a people focus and tends to question the effect of organizational work on targeted beneficiaries' lives."

Furthermore, the Executive Director had this to say: "We realised we could not achieve meaningful results within the bi-annual planning frameworks. Meaningful results can only be achieved during the MTSIP planning horizon. Bi-annual work programmes and budgets are, therefore, milestones to realizing MTSIP results".

Because of the fact that UN-Habitat HQ was not a new program, process results of previous years, with time, could be expected to yield human development results based on cause and effect relations (OECD, 2003), but that had to be tracked. In explaining the situation, one UN-Habitat section head said, "We have no standards for measuring quality, and it is really difficult to develop appropriate measurable outcome and impact indicators for human settlements programmes."

Human settlement programming is still a new field with no established measures, especially at outcome and impact levels (UN-Habitat, 2012) and this has posed a challenge to UN-Habitat's ability to measure its contribution to development results.

There also seemed to be some conflict between what UN-Habitat section heads understood as good management practices that would help them better realise desired results and what the donor agencies wanted to see. The UN-Habitat Section Head admitted that there was a lot at UN-Habitat HQ that was "donor driven," and that seemed to put a limit to what they could do or put in their plans and what they could not do. In an RBM system, selected activities should have the greatest potential to achieve desired outputs, which should also have the greatest potential to

contribute to the realisation of desired outcomes and these outcomes should have the greatest potential to contribute to realising desired impact. This cause-and-effect relationship, or the "if-then", would be difficult to realise if activities are donor driven.

It should, therefore, be noted that transfers, like RBM policy innovation, often were long-term processes, as opposed to events, and measures of transfers range from short-term, to medium-term, to long-term. For instance, in an RBM system, it takes a long time to have a results-oriented organisation, develop indicators, and align these indicators to management systems; it may take up to 10 years before planned development impacts are realised.

7.2.4   Step Four: Developing Performance Monitoring Systems to Collect Performance Information on Actual Results, Review, Analyse and Report Performance

At the heart of the RBM approach is performance measurement (OECD, 2001). Findings, however, indicated that, although UN-Habitat had solid technical skills in data collection and analysis, it seemed to be making less than optimum use of these with regard to monitoring. There was continuous "giving" of information and technologies to city municipalities and partners, but there were no systems that actively and systematically sought their feedback on the consequences of the actions. Existing RBM components seemed weak and informal, especially in collecting data around indicators that show progress on desired outcomes.

Although the UN-Habitat HQ office was a coordinating office and not an implementing office, it was responsible for the implementation of the UN-Habitat global strategy, including monitoring of the processes and results. RBM literature suggests that, when performance measurement is undertaken on a continuous basis during implementation, it empowers managers and

stakeholders with "real-time" information about the use of resources, the extent of reach, and the achievement of developmental results.

Findings, however, identified Integrated Monitoring and Documentation Information System (IMDIS) as the main monitoring tool (UN-Habitat, 2010); all project staff self-reported their project performance in this system. One of the draw-backs of the IMDIS system was lack of data validation (UN-Habitat, 2011a). Other informal monitoring systems existed. For instance, there were indications that periodic participatory project reviews were conducted with stakeholders; the project review committee (PRC) meetings provided project quality assurance at entry (UN-Habitat, 2010) – it ensured that projects that were developed contributed to at least one of the MTSIP expected results, had measurable indicators with baselines and targets, and this seemed to serve as one of the monitoring tools ((UN-Habitat, 2011b). Documentary evidence indicated that the planning and evaluation sections routinely trained section heads on RBM. Periodic reports to the Committee of Permanent Representatives (CPR) and donors also served as another way of monitoring progress, but there was little indication that the performance information collected was around indicators of risks; there was no evidence of risk analysis and mitigation. One Human Settlement Officer had this to say:

"Human settlements programming has no major risks to be monitored, and that is where I have problems with RBM assuming everything has risks."

Annual planning and review meetings, in addition, served as both monitoring and evaluation tools for the MTSIP.

a) Credible performance information

For performance information to be useful, it must be valid and reliable. The information will simply not be accepted or used if it is biased or inaccurate (IFAD, 2009; IEG, 2012b). Even the perceived possibility that the information could be falsified can impair the usefulness of the system (IEG, 2012a). For RBM to fulfil its continuous performance measurement function, two types of information are collected. With the first type, performance information is collected around the indicators developed during the planning and design of the programme/project. With the second type, risk information is collected by using the risk indicators. The performance information is analysed in the context of risk information. All stakeholders, including the beneficiaries, where feasible, should review the project/programme at least once a year and should draw conclusions about its performance. For this reason, it is crucial that the information collected is accurate and reliable. Without good performance information, the organisation cannot learn effectively.

Indications were that was greater focus at UN-Habitat on implementation monitoring rather than performance monitoring, that is, execution or compliance questions about whether projects/programmes have done what they said they would do in their plans. While this is important, it did not say much about the success or failure of a project, programme, or policy, however. In an RBM system, even when all activities are completed within given timeframes, it does not necessarily mean that the desired outcome has been achieved. Activities are necessary—just not sufficient. RBM asks what transformational changes have resulted in the lives of the target group as a result of UN-Habitat's intervention or actions. It is about answering the question, "So what?" So what if activities have taken place? So what if outputs have been generated? So what if the outputs have been counted? What are the consequences of UN-Habitat

actions? Are the actions of Programme Officers at UN-Habitat making a difference in the lives of urban dwellers, especially those living in slums? How do we know? Can we prove the causality? Is the change measurable and observable? In explaining the IMDIS inability to answer the so what question, the Deputy Executive Director said:

> It is difficult to know whether our programmes are having impacts on the lives of the beneficiaries. Every quarter we are told of the number of people trained, number of low cost housing units constructed, but no one has ever talked about how UN-Habitat has changed the lives of urban poor. I hope with the organization adopting RBM the measurement people will now tell us [what] impact our interventions are making.

RBM consequently goes beyond the traditional task monitoring, and demands that transformational results be monitored alongside the implementation process. In an RBM system, annual planning and review meetings are about progress in implementation and, more importantly, about results achievement. The key question to ask is whether the proposed theory of change is working, that is, whether activities are producing planned outputs progressively and whether outputs are causing outcomes and whether the planning assumptions are still holding. If they are not, why and what lessons could be learnt from the experience? If you are succeeding, can you rule out any rival explanations to the success? Do programme officers have persuasive evidence that A has caused B beyond any reasonable doubt?

b) Data-driven systems' requirement for adequate resources
UN-Habitat seemed to have very limited resources for implementing the RBM system. The UN-Habitat Planning Unit responsible for implementation of RBM had an annual budget of $460,000 constituting 0.05% (UN-Habitat, 2012). A performance measurement unit budget should always constitute 3-5% of organisational budget (UNDP, 2010; OECD, 2003). Literature warns that there is a cost associated with implementation, and organisations do not necessarily have the capacity to adopt a new system (Grinstead, 2009). The cost of data collection also has to be

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properly factored into planning and budgeting, otherwise, the planning gets disconnected from the context under which it is operating. Financial allocation is one of the key indicators of top leadership support. A peer review of the UN-Habitat monitoring and evaluation function (2011) revealed that less than 5% of the projects were evaluated. The Senior Programme Officer in charge of RBM at UN-Habitat explained: "We don't carry out many studies because it is costly given our limited budget, especially data collection. A few studies we have conducted cost on average $150,000 and over 70% of study money goes on data collection."

Data indicated huge gaps between monitoring, available human and financial resources, and time, which seemed to undermine the monitoring process. For instance, time-wise, records showed that one of the UN-Habitat Slum Upgrading section heads, spent on average between 50 and 70 days per year on work-related travel, and an equal number of days writing proposals and donor project reports; attending management committee meetings; and participating in various other committees and task forces not to mention time spent on issues delegated for action or opinion by senior management. A review of supervision reports by UN-Habitat 2012 Slum Upgrading Section heads indicated that six days were spent in monitoring projects. In explaining the situation, one programme officer said: "[Programme] officers were already overworked. Activities listed in our plans would realistically take 18 months, but they have been scheduled to be accomplished in 12 months."

Another programme officer, in explaining how they had to overstretch themselves to meet objectives, said: "People put in an average of 70 hours a week. "The section head at UN-Habitat indicated that they were already overworked. In his words:

> People have too many tasks to accomplish and there are too many meetings. Reports are hurriedly done to meet deadlines and quality in the process is always lost. We often end up giving 'quick and dirty jobs'. There is limited staffing and limited funds for all these grandiose plans we were trying to implement. Management has told us to do more with less.

As a report by the UN-Habitat programme officer indicated, "one of the problems we have is tailoring reports each time, since the reporting formats are not the same as our internal operating system"

In the words of a section head,

> There is too much travel and no support for most things. . . . you do your own fundraising, monitoring, reporting. . . . Quality doesn't seem to be important at UN-Habitat anymore. There is too much going on at any one time—you can't get quality things done".

RBM comprises a systematic approach to doing things, and that requires constant monitoring and reflection on the balance between results, resources, and reach. However, findings indicated that staff and section heads had little time to reflect, consider, examine, analyse, contemplate, or critique situations as they implemented programmes. Section heads were often overwhelmed and bombarded with competing priorities and had very limited support.

7.2.5   Step Five: Integrating Formative Evaluations to Provide Complementary Performance not Readily Available from Performance Monitoring Systems

Performance information alone does not provide the complete performance picture (IEG, 2011a; Poate, 1997). Evaluations complete the performance picture by providing the depth of analysis needed to explain why targets are not met or why they are exceeded. They also provide the information managers need to improve operations. Identifying and communicating the reasons that programmes do not perform or perform at expected levels also clearly is the province of programme evaluation (UNEG, 2010; Poate, 1997).

When the researcher asked for evaluation reports, the data showed that 5% of the programme components and projects were evaluated, and 98% of the evaluations conducted were either requested by the committee of permanent representatives (CPR) or the donors (UN-Habitat, 2011a). This complemented the informal monitoring, and there was evidence to show that feedback from these particular evaluations was fed into UN-Habitat programme redesign and management decision-making. From interviews with staff respondents and document reviews, reports on other programme-specific formative evaluations that could have been undertaken, were not available to the researcher. However, there was no systematic conduct of programme, outcomes, and thematic evaluations that would inform organisation strategy.

7.2.6 Step Six: Use of Performance Information for Internal Management, Accountability, Learning and Decision-making Processes

Learning from performance information and feedback is critical in an RBM system. The collected performance information has to be useful (OECD, 2002). It has to illustrate that it is worth the cost incurred to collect the data (Itell, 1998). As data usage increases and produces real benefits, the more confidence individuals will have in the data (IEG, 2011a; Gibson &Boisvert, 1997). In most instances at UN-Habitat, however, it was not possible to ascertain whether programme implementation and budgetary decisions were data-driven, or were of a personal nature or influenced by other factors and not based on evidence. Some programme decisions, UN-Habitat section heads admitted, were not based on learning but were donor-driven. One section head said, "Here at UN-Habitat, donors fund projects which are of interest to their countries and are often not based on needs of our beneficiaries."

Knowledge sharing and learning was encouraged through training whereby experts in different technical areas were always invited to give presentations during lunch hours – the "brown bag lunch hour" – once a week and staff were encouraged to ask questions, and a website existed at UN-Habitat on which different articles and presentations were posted solely for this purpose. Communities of practice, for example the RBM and knowledge management, slum upgrading, water and sanitation at UN-Habitat, brought together like-minded internal and external experts for learning and sharing of best practices.

Notable was that UN-Habitat had tried to build staff capacity on RBM through its website. Information that staff could access was posted, but in the absence of a formal arrangement for rewarding newly acquired knowledge, or an expectation to demonstrate RBM understanding on the job, the researcher was doubtful that staff would become motivated to use time and effort in that direction.

RBM literature (IFAD, 2009) tells us that the effectiveness of the RBM approach depends on the extent to which good performance and risk information are collected, used by managers, and then monitored again through a series of performance information feedback loops. Performance information is used to make adjustments in programmes/projects in three key ways: where results were being achieved, actions can be taken to strengthen them; where progress is difficult, different approaches can be tried or activities added; and where outputs from activities were considered to be obsolete, they should be abandoned. Performance information can also be used to examine strategic trade-offs between resource use, extent of reach, and the achievement of developmental results. This process of data analysis and examination of trade-offs enhances

organisational learning. A controversial scene between one UN-Habitat section head and the top management that was witnessed by the researcher at UN-Habitat's Strategic Planning meeting illustrated best the extent of pressures UN-Habitat staff had to sometimes face in the course of their work. The revealing emotional response by the Programme Officer to the top management's request to have more done went like this:

> I think you have to consider trade-offs when you give us all these things to do. We need guidance from you on priorities. Sorry I am getting emotional here—but I have the donor briefing papers to write, I have proposals, and the budget to prepare and now the performance framework—how much am I supposed to take as a section head?

Learning, reviewing, and adjusting performance measurement systems. To ensure continued success, the performance measurement system must be monitored and improved continuously. This will translate into a responsive system that reflects the changing environment in which it operates (Casey, 2007; Poate, 1997; Plantz, Greenway & Hendricks, 1997). The system should not be static. It should reflect changes in the organisation and changes to programmes. This corresponds to the two management functions of continuous performance measurement and iterative implementation: the collecting of performance information and the management decisions based on the analysis of this information. In iterative management, implementation decisions are based on the lessons learned which are then re-assessed. Based on the performance information collected, corrective action has to be taken to adjust the programme/project. From the behavioural perspective "what gets measured and reported gets managed and shapes organisational behaviours".

7.3   DISCUSSION OF THE SYNTHESIS

The transfer process in this study comes from developers and users of the policy innovation technology. This study tried to trace the extent of RBM transfer to UN-Habitat, following the steps and enablers presented in the theoretical model for successful RBM policy innovation transfer (Figure 2.3) and by literature on adoption and diffusion. A cursory look at the field sites did not show much in terms of varying practices, but attitudes differed significantly.

First, findings regarding this question indicated that UN-Habitat is operating in a highly complex, dynamic, and internally political environment. However, varying degrees of transfer have successfully been accomplished, and perhaps much more than the study was able to get from the limited number of available documents. Many RBM components were not entirely new to UN-Habitat programming. More than anything else, RBM at UN-Habitat HQ, and as a concept, largely represented a shift from a focus on inputs and outputs to a focus on outcomes and long-term development results in which changes in the lives of people and communities could be expected. There has been a significant shift at UN-Habitat from focusing on inputs to focusing on measuring the effectives or results of interventions (UN-Habitat, 2012)

Secondly, the transfer seemed a complex process, requiring attention to many factors. Rogers (2008) says time is a major factor for real transformations to take place. Installing new management systems at UN-Habitat means changing some of the existing ones, and getting strong enough support and prolonged attention for new ones to take root and sustain—a process that seemed more political than technical. The transfer processes seemed to demand inestimable amounts of time, finance, skills, and knowledge that were not obvious in the theory. Adjusting

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the transfer components for compatibility with a human settlement-based organisation posed a great challenge, as the process of urbanisation and human settlements could not be confined to the time-bound requirements of planning within an RBM system.

Further, when attempting to innovate, as in human settlements and in creating social change, it seemed difficult to predict how long something would take, and how much it would cost (it probably will take longer and cost more than planned). Hence, it was necessary for leaders and donors to prepare to accept serious departures from plans. If donors and organisational leaders were to reward innovations and creativity, they could not measure performance according to strictly planned activities and outputs. Creativity and innovation will often take programmes and organisations out of the "box" as they explore new and better ways of doing things. Creativity and innovation are some of the drawbacks of RBM, which emphasises learning and performance improvements, yet donors are keen on accountability for results, which instead discourages innovations and learning.

These findings were consistent with Lang and Steger's (2000) assertion that transfer of knowledge can no longer be considered as a simple adoption of well-proved "best practices" but must rather be considered a dynamic process of learning, re-interpreting, evaluation, remodelling, and recombining with existing concepts, structures, and instruments to create new practices.

Thirdly, some of the challenges that faced section heads at UN-Habitat headquarters (HQ) seemed to largely emanate from the fact that projects were fragmented, and programmes

sprawled across 120 different countries in Africa, South East Asia, South Asia, and Latin America. There existed no formal systems to support RBM; human, time, and financial resources were limited and, in addition, the diversity of projects was very wide. UN-Habitat's programme officer's further contention involved their multiple donors (as many as 25), whose project reporting procedures, formats, and timeframes varied widely; CPR members that had to be briefed quarterly through a Programme of Work and Budget (POWB); and an MTSIP that was a requirement of the Governing Council, all situations processes that were very time consuming and left little time for a systematic RBM transfer process. Interferences and the irrational demands from policy innovation developers derailed the transfer process.

There also seemed to be variations in terms of how things were managed at UN-Habitat HQ and across field-sites, and this seemed to have undermined the speed of the transfer process. UN-Habitat projects furthermore were implemented by different partners, all of varying capacities, and linkages with partners seemed weak, hence affecting accountability. UN-Habitat HQ seemed to also face the problems of standard indicators that could be aggregated across all its projects as well as capacity to monitor all its programme indicators.

Fourthly, findings indicated that RBM at UN-Habitat was based largely on one individual's inclination and enthusiasm, and lack of common understanding undermined the institutionalisation process. RBM at UN-Habitat was a personal passion and inclination on the part of one of the section heads, without any formal support from the organisation-wide systems. There was a strong indication that much of what was installed would collapse if the UN-Habitat section head in charge of RBM left the organisation. In the end, the RBM technology in the whole of UN-Habitat was equated with him. Transfer literature (Schein, 2000) warns that, for

new ideas and behaviours to transfer and normalise, they must be supported by management action (reward systems, hiring, firing, knowledge, and information management systems, etc.) and words.

In addition, the transfer process seemed like a secondary task amid other pressing priorities. UN-Habitat section heads expressed their feelings of frustration with the bombardment of donor, CPR, and UN Secretariat reporting requirements; fundraising proposals, meetings; and fundraising and monitoring travel, all without adequate support, which left little time to manage the RBM process. As one of the UN-Habitat section heads put it:

> We can't concentrate on our work, there is too much demand on our time by things that don't contribute directly to the results we are accountable for . . . the reporting demands from CPR, UN Secretariat and donors are in particular overwhelming and burdensome.

A review of documents revealed the UN-Habitat programme officer's further contention about their multiple donors (as many as 25), whose project reporting procedures, formats, and timeframes varied widely; a CPR that had to be briefed quarterly through a Programme of Work and Budget (POWB) reviews; and an MTSIP that was a requirement of the Governing Council, all situation processes that were very time consuming. UN-Habitat's section heads indicated that both the CPR and the UN Secretariat reporting requirements could not be used to report to donors, as they did not meet donor expectations about reporting on outcomes and impacts. UN-Habitat had on many occasions appealed to the UN Secretariat's management to bring the issue of harmonising planning and reporting formats to the attention of the CPR and donors, which would help with operating efficiently, and to suggest an RBM format for planning and reporting.

In all, UN-Habitat HQ had been incrementally implementing RBM for nearly 10 years. The installation did not seem like a planned change. Staff assessments, preparedness for use, and acceptance of the policy innovation technology was not done formally. Readiness assessment and timing is an important factor to consider during implementation (World Bank, 2004). Given that RBM policy innovation is about people and what they know, the lack of knowledge was a huge impediment to the greater use and full acceptance of the tool. Since the staff did not yet fully understand how different RBM concepts work, they had not fully appreciated its full potential. According to Jackson (2005), users of a policy have to first be made aware formally of the innovation to want to know more about it. This had not happened at UN-Habitat, as one of the section heads explained: "Most donors do not give capacity building money to implementing organisations. It would be hard to get money for RBM training."

Real transformations at UN-Habitat will take time, but some positive changes seemed to be happening within the senior level management at the time of this study, and one of the UN-Habitat directors applauded them in the remark: "Our new Deputy Executive Director's progressing reforms in our planning, budgeting, implementation, monitoring and reporting frameworks, and the initiatives by the CPR to ensure greater impact and efficiency, as well as reduced burden, is most welcome."

UN-Habitat, like the UNDP, moved to introduce a results-based management approach. The research study identified a number of areas where greater progress could have been made, but even under perfect conditions it would have been unlikely that both UN-Habitat and the UNDP could have fully institutionalised a results-based management approach within six and eight

years respectively. Subsequent conclusions and recommendations therefore focus on the key challenges for UN-Habitat and UNDP. The challenges faced by UN-Habitat included a weak culture of results; fear of change among staff; and inadequate internal capacities to adopt and manage RBM policy innovation.

a) UN-Habitat and UNDP have a weak culture of results.

Adopting results-based management was a logical continuation of the management reforms that occurred in the 1990s and a response to pressure to improve performance across the United Nations as a whole. Significant progress has been made on a number of fronts in both organisations, sensitising staff to results and creating the tools to enable a fast and efficient flow of information. Managing for results has proved harder to achieve. In particular, the strong emphasis on resource mobilisation and delivery; a culture that does not support risk taking; systems that do not provide adequate information at the country programme level; a lack of clear lines of accountability; and a lack of a staff incentive structures all work against building a strong culture of results.

b) The corporatist approach has only had a limited effect on development effectiveness at the country level.

The UNDP adopted a systems approach to stimulate managing for results, which meant that change was to be driven by the implementation of centrally designed and prescribed systems. These were developed primarily to enable aggregate reporting of UNDP performance to the Executive Board while at the same time creating a clearer focus for the programme. In practice, the corporate goals and service lines set by headquarters proved too numerous, with very permissive definitions. This led to country offices manipulating their programmes to fit into corporate service lines; diverted attention away from country needs; and made reporting to the Executive Board more about process than substance. There is little evidence that this approach

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has significantly affected the shape of country-level programmes, but there is significant evidence that it has imposed unnecessary transaction costs at the country level. A notable omission is the lack of oversight systems that focus on tracking whether programmes use results to adjust resources such as people, money and partnerships in order to improve future results.

c) Results-based management has been misinterpreted as not supporting the decentralized way in which UN-Habitat works.

UN-Habitat works in a strongly decentralised way, yet the results frameworks in the MTSIP were not geared to country processes. Emerging new systems following the reform of country programmes including the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) have the potential to create objectives for United Nations organisations that are aligned with national plans and are responsive to country needs. Decentralisation has been accompanied by delegation of authority over the country programme. Under current procedures, country programmes are not scrutinised for development potential by regional management, an abdication of responsibility.

As a result, evaluation and auditing are the only means for checking that country programmes are contributing to corporate goals. The 'top-down' approach has inadvertently fuelled concerns that having corporate goals is a means of imposing upon programmes at the country level. The role of results-based management is not to constrain the ways in which programmes are negotiated at the country level, but to provide a framework, so that the organisation works within its mandates and ensures that resources are aligned with achieving results. Once programmes are agreed upon at the country level, results-based management should provide standards for dialogue about how to set realistic outcomes; select objective indicators that demonstrate progress towards development objectives; and jointly monitor progress.

7.3.1 RBM in building a results-based culture

There are strong perceptions within the UNDP that financial administration and management systems have improved. There is little evidence, however, that these systems have led to an increased focus on managing for outcomes. There are also concerns that systems have become too complex and time-consuming. Results systems have been designed mainly to meet the demand for reporting to the Executive Board, rather than to manage outcomes. Yet the UNDP has not developed a system for reporting on its contribution towards development results. This reflects a number of issues. The corporate-level results frameworks have never included high-level goals with substantive measurable and agreed-upon indicators against which to assess pro goal-level reporting by UNDP and contrasts starkly with the objectivity of reporting against the Millennium Development Goals. The UNDP has developed a reporting system that aggregates whether or not results will be delivered when expected. This approach has limitations: the country programme outcomes against which the UNDP is expected to deliver are poorly defined; the logic linking outputs delivered by the UNDP with achievement of the outcomes is often not explained and this reporting system therefore fails to report on UNDP performance relative to what it is accountable for.

Regarding the UNDP, the drive was visible, but consistent senior-level support was needed for results-based management. Relationships stand out as the most critical: the country resident representative ensured that the programme was always held accountable for development results.

7.3.2   RBM conceptuality complexity and user friendliness

Findings indicate that adoption/transfer of RBM is complex and requires time and attention to many factors. Part of the resistance to transfer can be closely linked to its tendency to complicate rather than simplify management processes. For instance, although complied with, RBM is obviously seen as a burden to an already overloaded system. According to Jackson (2005) and Hall and Hord (1987), the more the concerns end-users have concerning a technology, the lesser the degree of acceptance.

In an RBM transfer process, for instance, if there is no buy-in and there is too little time, the proposed changes will end up as adornments lacking depth and coherence. People might comply with new systems, but the systems will not change people's mental modes. Successful RBM transfer, therefore, calls for fundamental change that goes beyond fine-tuning the status quo; it requires change in the way organisation staff perceive, think, and behave at work. It is about changing assumptions, philosophies, and the values of the organisation. Successful transfer of RBM, for instance, will depend on the ability of individual programme officers and support staff to voluntarily think in a results-oriented manner without the coercion of management systems. Until changes in a transfer process sink down deeply into the culture of an organisation, which can take a long time, new approaches like RBM remain fragile and subject to regression. The notion that "good" or promising technologies would sell themselves needs to be re-examined.

7.3.3   The technology and how to understand and address the social aspects

In keeping with earlier studies on transfer (Jackson, 2005; Johnson *et al.,* 1997), findings from this study indicated that the informal part of the receiving culture is the key determinant of the successful transfer of any technology. Social factors had to be considered together with technical

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aspects for a successful transfer. Practices, values, and beliefs of people were the biggest barriers to the transfer process, as opposed to difficulties resulting from the technology. A bad culture took the focus away from important things. And according to Schein (2000), real change only occurs when the informal organisation and all its behaviours and practices are radically altered. Fundamentally, change that occurs at the formal level rarely penetrates deep inside the organisation in such a way as to improve effectiveness or performance capacity.

The UN-Habitat HQ seemed to have been positioned in an unfavourable culture, and the transfer faced extra challenges because the dominant human settlement-based culture was too strong. The study showed that perceptions about development and RBM in particular were largely negative, and although some policies and procedures that would support the transfer existed, they were flouted with "impunity". Most barriers to the transfer manifested themselves in informal components of the organisation.

The study further supports Jackson (2005) view that changes is bound to fail if managers focus on the technical aspects of change only and fail to see the organisation as a community of humans. They say that technology does not stand alone but is political, social, economic, and cultural, and these could be barriers in a successful transfer and adoption process. For a new transfer culture to take root, the existing culture has to be fully analysed for compatibility. The technical aspects will not be effective if the social aspects are not understood and addressed. Likewise, change that embraced or acknowledged aspects of a prevailing culture while incorporating newly adopted knowledge is often better embraced than revolutionary change.

7.3.4   Institutionalizing RBM transfer and the role of senior management

The importance of leadership to drive results-based management forward has been noted by several study respondents. A good example of effective leadership was the role of senior management at UN-Habitat in appointing a section head responsible for RBM in the organisation, together with a strong personal commitment supported by a single and consistent message on resource mobilisation that was communicated to both internal and external audiences; development of systems to track, measure and report managers' success in mobilising resources; and a clearly perceived link between successful resource mobilisation and advancement within the organisation.

Findings from this study furthermore indicated that individual inclinations and enthusiasm about the transfer of a technology is not enough to institutionalise it. Literature dealing with transfer (Hall &Hord, 2001) warns that, for new ideas and behaviours to transfer and normalise, they must be supported by management actions (reward systems, hiring, firing, knowledge and information management systems, etc.) and words. The literature further suggests that the measures by which performance is evaluated are primary shapers of employees' values and beliefs. To take but one example, people would believe that RBM is important when it is rewarded. The results of this study showed that, regardless of the UN-Habitat section head's enthusiasm in communicating optimism and clarity in the transfer of RBM in a way that inspired others, the process did not enjoy the support of senior management, nor did it have the support of organisation-wide systems. Senior management was taking too long to warm up to the idea, and there were strong indications that, if the UN-Habitat section head left the organisation, much of what was installed would collapse. In the end, RBM was equated with section head but was seen

as a burden by most. Senior management must lead the change towards institutionalisation of RBM.

7.3.5 Complexity, Dynamism, and Uncertainty in an Organisation is a Threat to the Transfer and Survival of Technology

Organisations are complex and transitional; how they are today can be very different in six months. The findings indicated that there multiple changes were taking place simultaneously that affected the transfer process at UN-Habitat HQ. Restructuring resulted in changes in roles and that meant management had less direct involvement and control over those who worked under them, and their power to influence RBM was undermined by the fact that they no longer conducted individual performance appraisals. Staff cut-backs increased the uncertainty of staff, and changing political systems increased the complexity and dynamism of the environment. All these changes affected different aspects of the transfer process, and there was no guarantee that what had been transferred was sustainable unless UN-Habitat would be stable for a considerable period of time.

7.4 SUMMARY

This chapter has presented peculiarities and complexities with regard to the transfer of RBM policy innovation. The synthesis of the findings first discussed the six steps presented in the theoretical model (Figure 2.3) which are prerequisite for the effective adoption of RBM. These are summarised in the model as: defining expected results in a measurable manner; identification of the monitoring risks; selecting the performance indicators; developing performance monitoring systems for collecting performance information, reviewing, analysing and reporting performance; integrating additional formative evaluations to provide complementary

performance; use of performance information for learning, management improvement in 'decision-making processes', and internal management accountability including   external performance reporting to stakeholders and partners. RBM value addition is therefore summarised as:

 (i) RBM is important, useful and necessary ... There is a strong sense among staff and management responsible for multilateral institutional support that RBM provides a valuable framework for planning, managing and describing their work. In particular, it is seen as providing a firm basis for:

- Seeing and understanding the "big picture" within which individual programmes fit;

- Prioritising tasks and organising a work programme;

- Identifying and managing programme risks;

- Explaining why UN-Habitat and the UNDP are involved in development work and what can be accomplished by such work.

In brief, the general concepts and broad principles of RBM are appreciated by programme staff. They welcome the opportunity it provides, within the annual cycle of programme activity, to step back and take stock of their work; to reflect on the "fit" of what they are doing with higher-level objectives; to evaluate policy and operational strategies; and to learn lessons relevant to future work.

(ii) ... but it must be better adapted to development work.

While appreciating RBM's value as a management tool, many staff feel that it provides an inadequate framework for *reporting* on what they do. A programme officer had this to say: "RBM's narrow focus on change, causality and attribution, all in the context of annual reporting,

is a touch with the reality of multilateralism drive and with UNDP's donor dependency in particular".

"The last thing we'd want," said one officer "would be for people to stop focusing on things that are important to us but that can't be measured."

Said another, "You start to think twice about getting involved in doing things that you feel are worth doing, but where you know it will be difficult to measure results. The attitude becomes 'can't measure: shouldn't do'". Such concerns are well founded. There is a substantial body of research literature concerning the unintended, harmful effects on an organisation resulting from performance measurement that is out of tune with the things that the organisation values. The American Economic Review(May, 1997)concluded that the goal of bringing market-like incentives to government or private bureaucracies has much rhetorical appeal, especially in an era of tight budgets.

(iii) Perverse effects of performance measurement

A cautionary note to multilateral practitioners about the unintended negative effects of an RBM policy innovation framework that is poorly adapted to the reality of the work of an organisation like UN-Habitat's came from one officer: "You start to think twice about getting involved in doing things that you feel are worth doing, but where you know it will be difficult to measure results. The attitude becomes 'can't measure: shouldn't do'".

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(iv) Not "whether", but "how"

There is strong acceptance within UN-Habitat and the UNDP in Kenya of the importance of focusing on results and accountability. The concerns regarding RBM are not about *whether* managing for results is important, or *whether* accountability is important. Instead, there is concern about finding ways to discuss results and be accountable that are well adapted to the organisation's work. The UN-Habitat and UNDP Kenya case is interesting because it is based on explicit acceptance of fundamental problems related to measuring results and attributing them to their work. It is a pragmatic option that focuses on the level of results that UN-Habitat and UNDP *can* measure and control (and therefore take responsibility for).

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<div align="center">**CHAPTER 8**</div>

SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1   INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the understanding that has been gained from this study. The chapter synthesises the case study against the backdrop of an organisation-wide cultural context and draws extensively on the theoretical concepts of the transfer and adoption of technologies, diffusion of innovations, and RBM literature described in Chapter 2. The chapter begins with a summary of the main findings that emerged from answers to the research questions and then goes on to compare emerging conclusions with existing research on the transfer of knowledge. The chapter's final section considers suggestions for practice, policy and further research.

8.1.1   THE PROBLEM STATEMENT

One of the gaps this study wanted to look at is the how the Billions of dollars are spent each year on development programmes but no considerable progress being achieved. From the study it was discovered that most development donor agencies had though that successful transfer of RBM systems to development programmes was the plausible solution to problems of development inefficiency, ineffectiveness, and poor accountability to stakeholders. However, the study has showed that the failure to adopt RBM innovations more effectively was as a result of failure to study the situation in the receiving economies, the non-anticipation of barriers to adoptions RBM not having piloted out the methodology before roling it out to the recipient organizations remained the greatest hurdles in the implementation of RBM as observed in Chapter 6.

8.1.2   PURPOSE OF THE STUDY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Chapter 2 was able to address the specific objective 1 as it reviewed and analysed the existing literature on how RBM has been used in planning and measuring the performance of projects by different recipients supported by international donors. The study looked at factors that determine success that is Chapter 5 specific objective 2; or failures in the transfer of RBM that is Chapter 6 specific objective 3; while chapter 7 looked at the process of policy management innovation transfer using RBM systems from developers in western countries to end-users in developing countries.   The UN-Habitat programme was used as the case study in answering the study objectives explained in chapter 4. Chapter 8 addresses the specific objective 4 that is it provides recommendations for the best way on how to use RBM; brings in the candidate proposed theory of change as a contribution to academic and practical knowledge.

8.2   OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTERS AND SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The summary of findings has been presented chapter by chapter and each chapter represents a different objective/ research question in the study. Chapter 2 analysed the existing literature on how RBM has been used by the different recipients of donor funds on planning and measuring performance of the projects and on transfer of new policy management innovation like RBM. Literature that was review revealed that successful transfer of policy management innovation like RBM and its implementation is dependent on the organisation's ability to create a management culture that is focused on results. Jankowicz (2000) argues that it requires more than the adoption of new administrative and operational systems. Adopting RBM policy innovation requires an organisation to change its culture, and understand the context in terms of barriers and enablers or opportunities that support it. The literature guided the study in answering the research questions. Chapter 2 presents a model of enablers for successful transfer of RBM policy innovation. The

enablers that are a prerequisite for successful RBM transfer include the following: Ideological Commonalities between the RBM Components and Principles, and an organisation's Espoused Values and Governance Practices; Donor Pressure; Emerging Political Support from Senior Leadership, including resource allocation; Existence of good communication channels; A results focus which includes a focus on targeted client satisfaction with goods and services; Lessons of experience from pilot programmes; Governance values; Existence of in-house RBM expertise and internal institutional capacity; Empowerment and accountability which includes institutional mechanisms for holding managers accountable for achieving results within the spheres of control and Managers with delegated authority to the management level are held accountable for results, and empowered with flexibility to make corrective adjustments and to shift resources to better performing activities; Participatory and team-based management; Inclusiveness and partnership in all aspects of performance measurement and management process, and shared interest and understanding of development objectives; Creation of a learning organisation; and An effective reward system.

Chapter 3 presented the methodology used in the study. A case study approach has the potential to deal with simple to complex situations. It helped to answer "how" and "why" type questions, while taking into consideration how a phenomenon, 'RBM policy innovation' adoption, is influenced by the context within which it is situated. It enabled the gathering of data from a variety of sources and converging the data to illuminate the case. The study design chosen for this study was influenced by the nature of the research problem and the questions being asked. What the researcher wanted to know and the types of research questions to be answered in a study are the deciding factors in a research design.

The limitations of this research study were those associated with case studies. Usually case studies may not be easily replicable, thus the difficulty in designing the survey tool. Case studies have been faulted for their lack of rigor in the collection and the analysis of empirical material, and because lack of rigor is linked to researcher bias and others involved in the case, hence raising the question of ethics, trustworthiness, validity, generalisation, and basic data integrity. This case study was limited in several ways. First, by mainly using the qualitative paradigm, some aspects may have required quantification, which was not the case. There should be no one research methodology assuming the status of "truth"— indeed, these approaches are all about a challenge to the notion that there is a "truth" to be "discovered" or a "true path" to follow in creating, constructing, or uncovering knowledge.

Deliberate efforts were made to apply methods like data triangulation and detailed verifiable processes to avoid such possible errors.

Chapter 4 reveals that UN-Habitat is a highly complex, dynamic, image-conscious, political, and unpredictable organisation. UN-Habitat appears to have many established habits, but at the same time is able to continually reflect, self-assess, and align itself with the external environment. UN-Habitat's formal components represent that part that can be seen and informal components are those that lie beneath, unseen, unknown, undetected, yet clearly recognisable as organisational elements. These consist of personal perceptions of the organisation; the informal power structures; inter- and intra-group relationships; perceptions of trust, openness, and risk-taking behaviour; and the relationship between managers and employees. The way different issues are handled by management creates new norms, values, and working procedures for the whole

organisation and reveals important underlying assumptions. Informal messages are sent to staff members by the way senior management handles situations.

Prior to the evolutionary changes, power and accountability were concentrated at headquarters and the bureaucratic approval system slowed down the implementation of activities; there was a general lack of accountability for resources and results and this affected the UN-Habitat donor base who eventually demanded the adoption of RBM; UN- Habitat operated in only 20 countries and there was a growing demand for more urbanisation of initiatives; IMDIS, the UN-Habitat performance measurement system, only monitored and reported at output level. This performance measurement system did not address the "so what" questions in which donors and other stakeholders are interested, while stakeholders in programmes are interested in seeing development changes and not outputs. The evaluation unit was more involved with conducting meta-analysis for performance reports instead of evaluating the effectiveness of programmes and strategies. There was a limited results culture at UN-Habitat. Capacity for RBM was also limited at the organisation. UN-Habitat practised resource-based budgeting as opposed to results-based budgeting. It was thus important for UN-Habitat to undergo evolutionary changes. The introduction of MTSIP and hence RBM moved the organisation to a results orientation and communication channels were equally defined.

Chapter 5 reveals that the UN-Habitat programme had many advantages that were conducive to the successful transfer and adoption of the RBM technology. These were the existence of in-house RBM expertise, UN-Habitat's Self-Assessment and Self-Aligning Management Practices, the existence of good communication channels and competent programme officers, the

ideological commonalities between RBM's Components and Principles and UN-Habitat's Espoused Values and Governance Practices, and the participatory and team-based management were precursor to the successful implementation of RBM technology at the UN-habitat offices. In addition, UN-Habitat being a learning organisation strengthens the innovativeness of the adaptation of RBM policy innovation. Furthermore it was found that RBM was able to promote transparency, hence empowering the accountability process. Donor pressure also helped UN-Habitat to adapt to the RBM technology, even if it was to receive resistance. The result was emerging political support from senior leadership and internal institutional capacity.

The RBM policy innovation transfer process at UN-Habitat had been incremental, and was partially successful, but remained largely incomplete. Some critical components like systematic monitoring systems had not been transferred, and others, like results-oriented budgeting, were still in the early stages of the transfer process. Although RBM is appreciated by all in the UN-Habitat programme, there are organisational cultures which hinder the acceptance of RBM. These cultures are about governance, the reward system, and internal capacity, which may be summarised as staff not trusting management, which results in failure to speak out, as well as management's failure to read between the lines to discover what prevents the staff speaking out.

Chapter 6 showed that, although RBM is appreciated by all in the UN-Habitat programme, some organisational cultures hinder the acceptance of RBM, These rotate around governance, a reward system and internal capacity which may be summarised as staff not trusting management, which results into failure to open up, and management's failure to read through the lines on what makes the staff close. As indicated in the enablers and barriers model in Figure 2.3, the governance

values, reward system, in-house capacities, conflict between local and international staff and the issue of academic qualification were some of the barriers that hindered successful transfer of RBM policy innovation at UN-Habitat.

The study revealed that the transfer of RBM policy innovation faced several barriers related to a lack of compatibility and congruence with the organisation-wide systems and individual programme officer's interests. It came across strongly that UN-Habitat, being but a piece of the larger organisation, needed support from the wider system for RBM to be successfully installed and sustained. It was evident that the transfer process did not enjoy formal back-up of top leadership, nor did it enjoy full peer support. In addition, the transfer process appeared to be a more complex and difficult task than it seemed in theory, especially in an organisation that already seemed overloaded and resource constrained, and RBM was perceived as a tool that complicated rather than simplified the complex situation. The preparations for use and acceptance were not obviously planned for, and the transfer seemed adhoc. Organisation-wide social factors seemed to have had a huge effect on the transfer process. The organisation's complexity, dynamism, and state of uncertainty seemed to pose a threat to the adoption and survival of the transferred technology. Acceptance of the technology, which included perceived profitability and congruence of the RBM policy innovation, was low. According to Rogers (2008), acceptance has to precede the technical installation phase for a successful transfer process, and that had not happened at UN-Habitat.

Chapter 7 presented the peculiarities and complexities in the transfer process of RBM. The six steps which are pre-requite for the effective adoption of the RBM can be summarised as:

defining expected results in a measurable manner; identifying the monitoring risks; selecting the performance indicators; developing performance monitoring systems for collecting performance information, reviewing, analysing and reporting performance; integrating additional formative evaluations to provide complementary performance information; use of performance information for learning, management improvements in 'decision making processes'; and internal management accountability including external performance reporting to stakeholders and partners. These six steps were discussed in light of the RBM policy innovation enabler's model. The chapter exhaustively presented a better understanding of the peculiarities and complexities of the transfer of RBM.

8.3   FINDINGS AND KEY CONTRIBUTIONS

8.3.1 The theoretical model

The study presents a theoretical model for drivers/ 'enablers' of successful RBM policy innovation transfer (Figure 2.3) that reflects the multi-faceted and complicated nature of technology transfer that has been absent in earlier RBM transfer attempts and may account for some of the failures., The study identified that, for a RBM policy innovation system to transfer successfully, it must be supported by a corporate culture characterised by the following enablers:

  (a) Ideological commonalities between the RBM's components and principles, and the organisation's espoused values and governance practices

  (b) Donor pressure

  (c) Emerging political support from senior leadership including resource allocation for RBM implementation

  (d) Existence of good communication channels

  (e) Results focus targeted on client satisfaction with goods and services

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(f) Lessons from experience with pilot programmes

(g) Governance values

(h) Existence of in-house RBM expertise and internal institutional capacity

(i) Institutional mechanism for holding managers accountable for achieving results within their spheres of control and managers with delegated authority being held accountable for results, and empowered with flexibility to make corrective adjustments and to shift resources to better performing activities

(j) Inclusiveness and partnership in all aspects of performance measurement and the management process, and shared interest and understanding of development objectives

(k) A learning organisation

(l) The reward system

Functionally, this can be presented as

RBM = f (Six RBM policy innovation adoption steps) + f(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, β)

Where a, b, c, …,l, m are as stated above, and β being the error term or un-defined variables.

8.3.2. RBM theory of change

The research developed a theory of change also called the development hypothesis for RBM policy innovation strategy (**section 8.5.3**). The developed theory explains all the major variables and things that need to be in place for achieving improved performance and demonstrable results for a desired change to occur. It clearly spells out what organisation has need to do to make real change happen, and showing the different types of interventions necessary for change to happen; implementation of the six RBM policy innovation adoptions steps; agreement on what success will look like; identified success factors/enablers' (in Figure 2.3) for successful RBM policy

innovation transfer are considered during the policy adoption process; key stakeholders are involved and own the system; there is continuous measurement of performance and effectiveness of the RBM system to enhance learning and continuous feedback to improve policy implementation and is functioning "M&E of the M&E function", performance information is utilised; assumptions and risks to the success of the policy are identified, monitored and mitigated and RBM sustainability elements are identified.

8.3.3 Additional contributions to knowledge

The study also found that for RBM to be appreciated by both donors and recipients as a tool to help organisations succeed, as opposed to a "policing and control" tool, it has to have greater buy-in and usefulness. There has to be a balance between RBM policy innovation accountability and learning functions. The way RBM is used at the moment is prone to abuse through the manipulation of data. As organisations try to please donors of aid, important lessons of failure that could benefit others are avoided in the reporting process. Short-term objectives are given more emphasis and priority (results that lend themselves to quantification are often preferred) and performance measurement (managing by results) takes precedence over issues of performance management (managing for results). RBM can only make a major contribution to the effectiveness of institutional capacity and development if accountability, risk, and credit are shared by both end users and developers. Accountability, a key RBM value, should be lived by both developers and end users of transfer.

For successful RBM transfer to occur, recipient organisations have to stop being oversensitive to criticism and must recognise that being off balance can provide a moment for learning. Fear must be removed from the organisation for successful transfer of any new methodology being

introduced in an organisation. However, there are real political limitations to being open and democratic, as required by a RBM system, but there are lessons to be learned from failure in all organisations. Failure is simply a shortfall, evidence of a gap between vision and reality. Failure is an opportunity for learning about strategies that did not work as expected and not about unworthiness and powerlessness. A mistake is an event the full benefit of which should be turned into advantage. To be a learning organisation, it is necessary to be open to formal and informal feedback. In addition, for any transfer process at a democratic organisation, when people express doubts, reservations, and sometimes outright opposition to a new direction, senior management must make time, seek to listen and take the concerns of resisters and doubters seriously. It must learn to respect those it wishes it could silence. Dissent has to be seen as a source of new ideas and break through. Being alert to differences is absolutely vital.

The depth of RBM policy innovation transfer at an organisation is the extent to which management is willing to go into the organisational culture to solve transfer problems. For any technology to transfer and take root, the existing organisational culture has to be fully analysed for compatibility. If culture guides how employees think, act, and feel, then it affects the way people perceive change. Findings in this study indicated that UN-Habitat had made multiple corrective changes in an effort to align the organisational culture with the mission. But while that is important, making changes and not changing the thinking that produced the problem in the first place can be counterproductive; it only increases stress and the burden of management to maintain coherence and direction. To permanently address perceived problems, the root causes of the problems must be identified or sought and resolved. When we focus on symptoms where the stress is greatest, we repair symptoms.

RBM policy innovation is never entirely new to recipient organisations like UN-Habitat, but it is not always implemented in a systematic and consistent manner. The adoption of such a policy innovation should therefore start with assessment of the existing performance management information systems in recipient organisations.

The analysis of the organisation's culture is important for successful policy innovation adoption. It is always important to recognise that, in recipient organisations like UN-Habitat, formal components represent that part that can be seen and informal components are those that lie beneath and are unseen, unknown, undetected, yet clearly recognisable as organisational elements. These consist of personal perceptions of the organisation; the informal power structures; inter- and intra-group relationships; perceptions of trust, openness, and risk-taking behaviour; and the relationship between managers and employees. Often the way different issues are handled by management creates new norms, values, and working procedures for the whole organisation and reveals important underlying assumptions.

Successful transfer of policy management innovation like RBM and its implementation is dependent on the organisation's ability to create a management culture that is focused on results. Adopting RBM policy innovation requires an organisation to change its culture, understand the context in terms of drivers/'enablers', barriers and opportunities that support it. As Jankowicz (1998) said, adoption of policy innovation technologies requires more than the adoption of new administrative and operational systems but includes understanding of management culture focused on results.

There is a need to establish an institutional mechanism that ensures empowerment and accountability by holding managers accountable for achieving results within their spheres of control. Accountability means that programmes have the responsibility of influencing outcomes or results being sought, while recognising that the achievement of outcomes and impacts requires joint action on the part of many actors, including government, national stakeholders, the private sector, communities, and donors. RBM policy innovation obliges individuals to demonstrate what outcome results have been accomplished. An accountability culture should cause individuals to report specifically on the extent that an outcome is being or has been accomplished or on accounting for significant and valuable achievements that have contributed to the success of the overall outcome. Hence, demonstrating that probability of success is important enough to justify expending organisational resources.

8.4   CONCLUSION

The perfect RBM policy innovation transfer does not exist. RBM policy innovation transfer will always be a continuous and conscious effort to systematically improve programme efficiency and effectiveness that will have no end. Technology designs and end user considerations should be discussed between developers and users before the commencement of the transfer process. Formal rational approaches like RBM that prescribe what should be done at various stages and do not sufficiently explain how to carry out the various planning stages error, principally owing to the presumption that RBM is a mechanistic planning and implementation procedure that can be carried out without structured methods.

Organisations undergoing change processes like UN-Habitat have to be aware of the fact that sheer number of innovations does not assure success. If there is too little time, the changes end up as superficial adornments lacking depth and coherence. According to Hall and Hord (2001), new insights fail to get put into practice because they conflict deeply with deeply held internal perspectives, and that limits staff. People might comply with new systems but the systems will not change people's mental models. The success of RBM depends on the ability of individuals to voluntarily think in a results-oriented manner without the coercion of management systems.

In a transfer process, proximity to the situation does sometimes hinder thinking. Sometimes, leverage is not obvious to most people in the system, especially amid pressures and cross-currents of real life situations. It is hard to see the structures underlying actions, especially when the organisation has become accustomed to the "illogic" of doing things. Insiders by themselves are often incapable of re-engineering themselves as they often have vested interests, and it would be too much to expect that they will overcome their cognitive and institutional biases by themselves and embrace radically new ways of doing things. Insiders must work with outside experts, otherwise they risk recreating what already exists, with perhaps only a little improvement.

RBM policy innovation transfer is a collective effort involving everyone in the organisation, and the leadership role should be shared vertically and horizontally so that the process might have the depth and sustainability necessary to ensure survival in case of leadership turnover. Nobody, even a change facilitator like the section head at UN-Habitat, has all the answers to questions

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about a successful transfer process. The common assumption by organisational members that the leader or management must have the answers or that people at the top should know more, or at least would know if they were competent, is wrong. This mentality weakens individuals and organisations, and at some level absolves them from responsibility in the transfer process. It predisposes staff members to cynicism when events reveal that the top did not have all the answers.

The experience of UN-Habitat and the UNDP with introducing RBM policy innovation is similar to that of other organisations. UN-Habitat, like the UNDP, moved to introduce RBM approach. The findings from the research strongly suggest that the experience of UN-Habitat and the UNDP did not diverge significantly from that of many other public-sector organisations. The challenges faced by UN-Habitat included a weak culture of results; from the analysis of the enablers and barriers to successful RBM policy innovation transfer, it was evident that

    i.   The corporatist approach had only a limited effect on development effectiveness at the country levels

    ii.   RBM was misinterpreted as not supporting the decentralised way in which UN-Habitat works

    iii.   RBM was not helping to build a results-based culture

    iv.   RBM was conceptually appealing, but complex and not user friendly

    v.   The technology transfer was not effective if the social aspects were not understood and addressed

    vi.   Institutionalised RBM Transfer will only happen if supported by senior management and management systems

vii.   Complexity, dynamism, and uncertainty in an organisation's environment can become a threat to the transfer and survival of a transferred technology

All in all, results from this study indicated that RBM transfer or application at UN-Habitat HQ, and at large, is complex, expensive, and demanding, and it is critical to consider the scope and intensity of tasks before a transfer. The construction of a successful RBM system is a serious organisational undertaking and will not happen overnight. Findings also revealed the relevance and importance of the receiving culture in a transfer process, and showed that no matter how well designed new processes were, they were not going to work and be sustained if the UN-Habitat's culture did not change.

8.5. RECOMMENDATIONS

Several recommendations can be made from the findings of this study. It is difficult, however, to offer general prescriptions to UN-Habitat HQ or senior management for several reasons. One, what a leader or manager ought to do is a function of the specific context that has to be faced and, in addition, following a prescription might substitute the manager's best judgment, which may be more valuable in a given situation. Two, these recommendations are based on both facts and opinions of respondents. However, in-depth understanding that has been gained from this case study's enabler model can, with care, be used to offer a number of insights for managerial action.

8. 5.1 Implications for developers of technology (Aid/Western Donors Countries)

If RBM policy innovation is going to transfer successfully, it should not be made so complex as to overload the users' management system; otherwise too much time will be spent managing the

system and not enough time to use feedback data to achieve desired results. It must be a user-friendly and a relevant tool for those using it. Findings from this study indicate that most end users and potential users view it as a complex, unfriendly, and burdensome tool.

Aid donor agencies, as the developers of RBM policy innovation, should have adequate knowledge about and expertise in the transfer and diffusion of technologies and cross-cultural issues, among other management knowledge that is required to guide a successful transfer process from one point to another. Findings from this study seem to indicate a lack of appreciation of the difficulties and complexities involved in the transfer of RBM to a different context, and that, in some cases, has created artificial transfers as users compete to keep the programme and project resources running.

When transferring RBM policy innovation, aid donor agencies should examine the contextual realities of the organisation, and user considerations should be taken into account. The political, economic, and weather ambiguity and uncertainty that is prevalent in developing countries does create serious challenges for RBM. Programme time schedules which often become unrealistic and donor driven, with pressures to meet disbursement targets. With such turbulent environments as found in developing countries, where implementing organisations have very little control, results rarely happen as planned in the RBM linear systems. Hence, things have to be adjusted to field realities. Assumptions on both sides must be examined and discussed openly to examine the truth in them—and the likelihood that they will continue holding true.

Donors must ensure that their internal businesses, that is, practices and procedures, do not impede on the RBM policy innovation transfer effort of recipient organisations. Indications from this study are that effectiveness and efficiency are often sacrificed as RBM end users strive to meet donor demands of disbursements and reporting. Incentives are often for prompt reporting – "accountability for results" – and not for learning and results – "management improvements". Other cited interferences include delayed disbursements; cancellation of financial commitments; unsolicited technical support; and donor/ supply-driven projects, all which take time away from project preparation and better monitoring to improve results.

Further, aid-donors agencies must establish institutional arrangements in support of the greater transfer of RBM policy innovation by designating staff to oversee and support. Staff from the same agency sometimes gave conflicting and sometimes contradictory messages, and this confused the users of RBM. There should be ways of sharing lessons with recipients in similar fields. Measuring effectiveness is not easy given the institutional and environmental constraints of some of the recipient organisations.

RBM policy innovation is a donor-driven technology. In this study there is little evidence to suggest that end users, although trying to comply, had technical and financial support from donors to support them in unlearning their old habits and to help them embrace the new way of doing things. The skills, knowledge, and attitude of end-users (human settlement officers) should have been addressed for compatibility. Developers should evaluate users for financial and human resources available and whether they were sufficient to sustain these technologies as well as the existing infrastructure. Further, developers should help the end users to address the barriers. The

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private sector invests heavily in the training of its personnel to deliver results; donors should invest in capacity-building for end users, either at the individual or the organisational level.

RBM policy innovation has to be appreciated by both donors and recipients as a tool to help organisations succeed as opposed to a "policing and control" tool, for it to have greater buy-in and usefulness. The way RBM is used at the moment is prone to abuse through manipulation of data. As organisations try to please aid donors, important lessons of failure that could benefit others are avoided in the reporting process. Short-term objectives are given more emphasis and priority (results that lend themselves to quantification were preferred). Performance measurement (managing by results) takes precedence over issues of performance management (managing for results). The cost of data collection is never properly calculated and is not well thought out in most instances. RBM becomes disconnected from the context it is operating under. RBM can only make a major contribution to the effectiveness of institutional capacity and development if accountability, risk, and credit are shared by both end users and developers. Accountability, a key RBM value, should be lived by both developers and end users of transfer.

Time is wasted in organisations on arguments about RBM terminologies, which often vary from one donor to another. Harmonisation of language and concepts among donors would go a long way in making RBM a more user-friendly technology.

8.5.2   Recommendations for UN-Habitat

While there can never be a recipe for transfer or a step-by-step manual for technologies like RBM to transfer successfully and to be sustained, implementing programmes or organisations might want to consider ensuring that the following enablers are present: Ideological

commonalities between RBM's Components and Principles, and the organisation's Espoused Values and Governance Practices; Donor pressure; Emerging political support from senior leadership – allocation of resources; Existence of good communication channels; Results focus: A focus on targeted client satisfaction with goods and services; Lessons from experience with pilot programmes; Existence of in-house RBM expertise and internal institutional capacity; Empowerment and accountability; Institutional mechanism for holding managers accountable for achieving results within the spheres of control and Managers with delegated authority to the management level being held accountable for results, and empowered with flexibility to make corrective adjustment and to shift resources to better performing activities; Participatory and team-based management: Inclusiveness and partnership in all aspects of performance measurement and management process, and shared interest and understanding of development objectives; and being a learning organisation.

Strengthening leadership and direction: The overarching recommendation addresses the need to capitalise on what has been achieved to date and establish a stronger culture of results. The success of this is not dependent upon tools and systems, but leadership and direction. Sustained commitment by top management – the executive director – is required. Strong leadership is necessary. Attention to the following issues is also needed: a shift in the accountability framework from process and compliance to results; outspoken commitment by senior management, especially the directors; a change in dialogue throughout the organisation that prioritises management for development results and addresses how this will be balanced against competing demands such as resource mobilisation; time and space for staff to give feedback on

and learn from experiences; a shift in organisational practices to take risks and manage for outcomes rather than outputs; and improved capacity to measure results.

Global goals, local solutions—sharpening the role of the strategic results framework:
Management should adopt a results framework that distinguishes more clearly between corporate goals and country programme outcomes. For the seven UN-Habitat focus areas, objectives should be based on the key results areas, with indicators of substantive development change comparable to those used for the Millennium Development Goals. The corporate key results areas contain the basis of what could be measurable goal-level objectives, for example: promoting inclusive growth; promoting gender equality; fostering inclusive participation (in governance); and empowering the poor, women and youth. This approach will take time. The executive director and UN-Habitat should start with those key result areas where internationally agreed-upon indicators already exist.

The current practice of setting corporate outcome-level objectives and indicators within the strategic plan should end. Instead, outcome objectives and indicators should be set at the country programme level, where they should be linked to the United Nations Development Assistance Framework outcome objectives in the context of agreed-upon national development objectives. Comparable outcome objectives should be set within the regional and global programmes.

The change suggested above would reinforce the decentralised nature of UN-Habitat activities and build on United Nations reforms. The change would have to be supported by a shift in the oversight roles of HQ, senior management and the Committee of Permanent Representatives away from compliance with procedures towards ensuring that country programmes implement

robust, results-based management approaches and are designed to contribute to the UN-Habitat focus areas.

Support managing for outcomes at country offices:
Managing for outcomes means that managers learn from results and empirical evidence and use that evidence to adjust either the projects under their control or the composition of the portfolio of projects to maximise the contribution of the organisation to that outcome. Implementing such an approach requires that UN-Habitat consider the wider environment at the country level when defining outcomes. There is a need for improved guidance on how to balance demands on the results-based management system to meet internal UN-Habitat needs with those imposed by the wider environment within which UN-Habitat operates at the programmatic level. This includes dealing with three core issues raised in this report, namely;

- Ownership of results at the country level;

- The implications of harmonising other partners' results-based management approaches and systems; and

- UN-Habitat accountability for managing for results.

Regional and country offices want to be effective and need support in several ways to manage for results:

- A streamlining of systems, aiming for a more user-friendly integrated approach with better prioritisation and introduction of new requirements across the organisation

- Improved practical tools and guidelines to plan how projects will contribute to programme outcomes and to improve the specification of indicators

- A large-scale capacity-development programme to improve staff knowledge and skills

- Improved design of programmes based on proven models of intervention that can be tailored to regional and country circumstances, managed, monitored and evaluated

- Introduction of quality assurance to examine UN-Habitat programmes and assess evaluability, expand the use of outcome evaluation plans geared to joint evaluations with government and development partners

- Revision of the results-oriented annual report to improve the evidence-base and structure of the report

There is a need to expand investment and use performance information at country and regional level. Improving regional and country programmes requires attention to detail and development of sound objectives and indicators. A quality assurance process is recommended as an ex ante way of scrutinising country programmes. This needs to be supported by independent reviews of processes and compliance, along the lines of the current enhanced audits.

The structure of results proposed here places more responsibility on regions and country offices to develop programmes that respond to regional and country needs and contribute towards global goals. It also frees them from having to fit into centrally determined focus areas. The test, therefore, is whether the programmes that are developed contribute to the goals of UN-Habitat. This will require a stronger evaluation function that addresses both learning and accountability.

8.5.3   Recommended RBM theory of change for UN-Habitat

The theory of change for results-based management was derived from literature on the adoption of results-based management systems, the theoretical model on successful RBM policy innovation transfer (Figure 2.3) and research findings (chapters 5, 6 & 7) . It identifies a causal

process with the key six RBM steps and success factors/'enablers' for successful RBM policy innovation transfer. The theory of change operationalizes the theoretical model for successful RBM policy innovation transfer (Figure 2.3). This theory of change provides the structure for enquiries and will go a long way in contributing to the body of knowledge on RBM policy innovation transfer. It combines the six RBM steps; including continuous measurement of performance and effectiveness of the results-based management system; learning and continuous feedback to improve implementation and policy; identification, monitoring and mitigation of assumptions and risks and enables for successful RBM policy innovation transfer and is presented diagrammatically (Figure 8.1).

The hypothesis for RBM theory of change

The theoretical model for RBM policy innovation transfer (Figure 2.3) in chapter two presented the six steps for RBM policy innovation transfer and enablers/barriers, which are discussed as findings in chapters 5, 6 & 7. From these research findings, the hypothesis for the RBM policy innovation transfer can therefore be stated as follows:

IF the causal processes presented by the key six RBM adoptions steps is applied, success factors/enablers' for successful RBM policy innovation transfer are considered during the policy adoption process, key stakeholders are involved and own the system, there is continuous measurement of performance and effectiveness of the results-based management system to enhance learning and continuous feedback to improve policy implementation and is functioning "M&E of the M&E function", performance information is utilised, assumptions and risks to the success of the policy are identified, monitored and mitigated, RBM sustainability elements are integrated into the design *THEN* organisational management learning, management

improvement and accountability will be enhanced and hence there will be organizational performance improvements and development effectiveness.

Managing for results

Clarify program strategic goals

RBM policy innovation adoption steps
1. Clearly defining RBM expected results in a measurable manner
2. Identifying and monitoring risks over time
3. Identifying or selecting performance indicators that will be used to measure progress towards results and to judge performance
4. Developing performance monitoring systems to regularly collect performance information on actual results, review, analyze and report performance
5. Integrating formative evaluations to provide complementary performance not readily available from performance monitoring systems
6. Use of performance information for learning, management improvement, 'decision-making processes', and internal management accountability

Plan specific results to provide performance information to support achievement of program strategic goals

M&E of the M&E function / (Performance measurement function)

Strategic planning

Monitoring (Implementation & Performance)

Evaluations

Communication strategy & enhancement of information use

Align resources (staff, money & partnerships)

Timely information informing decision making processes

Knowledge interpretation

Decision makers respond

1. Identify what RBM policy innovation success looks like, including establishing ways of measuring RBM policy innovation success
2. Feedback knowledge to re-design or improve implementation and policy decision-making

1. Identify key assumptions and risks to the theory of change that threaten the success of the RBM policy innovation
2. Develop a risk monitoring and mitigation system
3. Develop policy innovation sustainability elements and strategy
4. Develop RBM policy innovation implementation plan, including an execution timeline

Management Learning

Management Improvements

Accountability

Improved Performance: organizational & development effectiveness

Enablers
(a) Donor Pressure
(b) Ideological Commonalities between the RBM Components and Principles, and the organization's Espoused Values and Governance Practices © Results focus: A focus on targeted client satisfaction with goods and services;
(m) β

(d) Empowerment and accountability
(e) Reward system
(f) Learning Organization
(m) β

(g) Existence of good communication channels; (h) Lessons learned from pilot programmes
(i) Existence of in-house RBM expertise and internal institutional capacity
(j) Participatory and team-based management; (k) Governance values
(l) Political Support from Senior Leadership including resource allocation for RBM; (m) β

Figure 8.1: The theory of change for results-based management policy

Source: Researcher's original work

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The first four steps in the RBM theory of change (Figure 8.1) are concerned with the policy innovation strategic planning processes (discussed in Chapter Seven). This theory of change steps are operationalized by addressing the five questions below which need to be answered when thinking through its logic and design. These questions aim to support policy innovation planners and are:

- What is the performance management concern or concerns most affecting the organization and other stakeholders?

- What is the outcome or solution sought? In other words, what would success look like?

- What are known or likely risks which will stop the successful transfer of policy innovation?

- Can key assumptions be tested and measured with information readily available to determine what is, or is not, working?

- Can new policy innovation logic and knowledge, gained from implementing RBM, be regularly fed back into the policy innovation to revise the design and implementation plan as necessary?

Agree on desired outcome or solution: Define what success looks like. Success is essentially the end point in the theory of change. The variables to consider in addressing this issue of success, and what it would look like, include: Having all the definitions of success on the table; Defining ways of measuring success; Agreeing on when success will be achieved; Agreeing on definitions of success that are most relevant; and articulate

the causal model/the theory of change on how to get to that state of success.

It is thus important to understand what success would look like; agree that it is what stakeholders want to see. The organization should establish ways of measuring success; articulate the causal model theory of how we will get to that state of success; and think through when success will be achieved.

Identify and manage risks to success: There are many factors or risks that can cause success not to happen. Some might be anticipated and we can plan for these; others will not "unanticipated consequences of social change": The theory of change requires that UN-Habitat or any other organization wishing to adopt the RBM policy innovation identify key risks at each stage of the theory of change that threaten its success; Decide on how to mitigate these risks should they emerge, and ensure the performance measurement system is sufficiently nimble and sensitive to picking up data that show the effort is going off track - unanticipated risks are emerging.

Test key assumptions with valid information: As indicated in the RBM theory of change (Figure 8.1) and discussed in Chapter Seven, assumptions in this case are all those components of the theory of change which are presumed to hold true, to hold constant, or to hold together for the change to eventually occur. Each assumption should be stated explicitly and then examined as to whether it is likely or highly problematic, whether there is research to support it or not, and whether all

the key factors, which will facilitate or hinder progress towards the desired change, have been identified within the cumulative total of all assumptions.

A theory of change (Figure 8.1) needs to be continually tested to see if the logic behind it continues to hold during policy innovation implementation. To do this, one must ask key questions during design and implementation and when the policy innovation is being evaluated.

The value of regularly monitoring and evaluating an RBM system "M&E of the M&E": The theory of change (Figure 8.1) suggests frequent mid-course corrections as RBM system is being designed and implemented will lead to additional lessons from experience. Unsurprising, the objective of regularly monitoring and evaluating the system is to find out what is working, what is not, and why. This is called monitoring and evaluation of the monitoring and evaluation function – "the M&E of the M&E function". Such monitoring and evaluation provide the opportunity to review both the demand and the supply sides of the equation, and to clarify the extent of actual utilization of RBM information, as well as the particular ways in which it is being used.

Feedback knowledge during implementation to redesign or improve implementation: Testing key assumptions of the theory of change will produce a continuous flow of information which will support better management of the RBM policy innovation, and provide a basis for revising (if necessary) the original

design. The key considerations to ensure that knowledge acquired during implementation is used to improve the chances that the RBM policy innovation theory of change will be successful include:

- Existence of a monitoring system that allows continual feedback to decision makers,

- Appointment of a champion or individual whose job is to assess progress towards RBM policy innovation implementation. This can be a powerful senior official who is able to lead the push to institutionalize RBM policy innovation; to persuade colleagues about its priority; and, to devote significant resources to create an RBM policy innovation system. A champion needs to have some understanding of RBM policy innovation, in terms of tools and methods, and an appreciation of its potential usefulness for the organization,

- Establishment of fora for discussing implementation results with stakeholder, and

- Ensuring there are opportunities to adjust the theoretical model, hence revising the theory of change.

Utilization is the measure of success of an RBM policy innovation system: The objective of RBM policy innovation systems is never to produce large volumes of performance information, or a large number of high-quality evaluations per se - this would reflect a supply-driven approach to an RBM policy innovation system. The RBM policy innovation objective is

therefore to create demand for and utilization of performance information to support organization and development effectiveness. Utilization of performance information is therefore the measure of success of an RBM policy innovation system.

Sustainability

An RBM policy innovation system should be regarded as a long-term effort, as opposed to an episodic effort for a short period or for the duration of a specific project, program, or policy. Thus sustainability elements and strategy need to be developed. Sustaining an **RBM policy innovation system in** organizations recognizes the long-term process involved in ensuring utility (for without utility, there is no logic for having such a system).Sustainability and use of performance management systems (**RBM policy innovation**) are interdependent. Systems that are not used will not be sustainable. The issue of use has to be addressed first. It is the prerequisite to **RBM policy innovation system** sustainability.

Enablers in the RBM theory of change (Figure 8.1)

Some of the enables that are a prerequisite and constitute part of the RBM policy innovation theory of change include:

Accountability: No part of the organization should be exempt from accountability to stakeholders. Donors can play a key role in encouraging transparency and accountability, and can even help with providing resources for data collection.

Capacity: Sound technical skills in data collection and analysis are necessary for the system's sustainability. Managerial skills in strategic goal setting and organizational development are also needed. Data collection and retrieval systems must be up and running—and modernized. The organization will need to commit continuing financial resources to the upkeep and management of **RBM policy innovation** systems. Institutional experience and memory are also helpful in the long-term sustainability of these systems.

Incentives: Incentives need to be introduced to encourage use of performance information. This means that success needs to be acknowledged and rewarded, and problems need to be addressed, and organizational learning is valued

Demand: Demand should not be episodic or haphazard for RBM system to be used and sustained. Structured requirements for reporting results, including legislation and regulations can help lead to sustained, consistent demand for such systems.

Clear Roles and Responsibilities: Clear roles and responsibilities and formal organizational and political lines of authority must be established. The organization and people who will be in charge of collecting, analyzing, and reporting performance information must be clearly defined.

Trustworthy and Credible Information: The **RBM policy innovation** system must be able to produce results information that brings both good and bad news. Performance information should be transparent and made available to all key stakeholders. Debatable issues should be

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backed up by trustworthy and credible information, and not by personal opinions and presumptions.

Other enablers include: Ideological commonalities between the RBM components and principles, and an organisation's espoused values and governance practices; Donor pressure; Emerging political support from senior leadership, including resource allocation; Existence of good communication channels; Lessons of experience from pilot programmes; Governance values; Participatory and team-based management; Creation of a learning organisation; and An effective reward system (Figure 2.3).

Conclusion

This theory of change (Figure 8.1) has addressed the issue of why it is important to focus on building coherent logical models so as to be explicit about: (i) what change is anticipated; (ii) what risks there are to that change ever coming into being; (iii) why a system of monitoring and evaluation is necessary to capture relevant data on whether the change is emerging as planned; and, iv) how and when relevant stakeholders will be able to decide if the initiative was a success or not. A successful RBM policy innovation needs both a strong design and strong implementation.

8.5.4   Recommendations for further research

Researchers should consider the need for more in-depth studies on the process of RBM policy innovation transfer to development organisations operating in post-conflict countries. Transfer of

technology as an applied field might best be studied through the qualitative method, which will tease out and grasp hidden details and non-obvious data missed by standard statistical approaches.

More studies should be conducted on organisations at different stages of RBM policy innovation transfer to gain further insight into factors influencing transfer in different settings. Varying contexts create different results, and people wanting to implement RBM would best benefit from case studies.

Future research should include cases of negative RBM policy innovation transfer experiences to prevent public sector organisations and technology developers from repeating mistakes. There should also be studies of the transfer of knowledge from the developing countries to developed countries and from developing countries to developing countries at different stages of development. In addition, there should be studies on the transfer and return of knowledge and experiences from South-south transfers.

Western management literature is ethnocentric. Further research is suggested in the area of processes of organisational change, and to look at transfer from these four perspectives: transfer of best practices; transfer of negative Western experiences to prevent Eastern partners from making the same mistakes (Dallago, 1999); transfer of management knowledge between developing countries at different stages of development, in spite of traditional rivalries (Fine,1999); and, lastly, the transfer and return of transfer of knowledge and experience from the East to the West (Thelen & Turner, 1998).

Lastly, this study lacked the perspectives of the developers of RBM policy innovation (donor government agencies). Future research could be undertaken on developers instead of users to find out more about their assumptions and experiences with transfers.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: PARTICIPANT INTERVIEW GUIDE

Participant's code ___

I am a graduate from the School of Public Management and Planning, University of Stellenbosch. I am interested in learning more about the transfer of technologies and in particular about the implementation of RBM at the organisation.   I would like to understand the process, context and complexities of implementing RBM.   Any information that you provide at this interview will be treated responsibly and confidentiality will be respected.   I would like your permission to record the interview so that we can concentrate on the discussion.   However, feel free to let me know if there is anything you do not want me to record or report.   Anyone of you of course has the right to not answer any questions and you can terminate the interview at any time.   Thank you.

During this interview I will be looking to see how the six components of RBM have installed at organisation, further, I will try to find to what extent factors identified by literature as important to successful implementation have been considered.

Expected results must be clearly defined and must be measurable.

Assumptions and risks must be identified and monitored overtime.

Performance indicators that will be used to measure progress towards results and to judge performance must be selected.

Performance monitoring systems must be developed to regularly collect performance information on actual results, to review, to analyse and to report performance (actual results vis-à-vis the targeted results).

RBM system must integrate formative evaluations to provide complementary performance monitoring systems.

Using performance information for internal management and accountability, learning and decision-making processes, and also for external performance reporting to stakeholders and partners.

Factors identified by literature as important for successful implementation.

Organisational Factors

A customised results-based management regime

Taking time and maintaining momentum

Linking performance measures to the policy or strategic framework

Aligning management system to support implementation

Providing adequate human resources

Location of stewardship over performance management process

Pilot project

Human Factors

Developing a performance management culture

A practical understanding of accountability

Senior management leadership and involvement

Full participation by all

Training and education critical

Use of expertise to support implementation

Communicating purpose of measurement system

Developing of Performance Measures

Use of manageable numbers of indicators

Clearly defining key terms and concept

Use of logical charts

Aligning performance measure with accountability and decision making authority

Credible performance information

Performance standards and targets

Use of baseline data to set standards

Use of Performance Information

Demonstrable use of performance information

Use of evaluations and performance measurements

Incentives towards use of RBM

Performance reporting for decision-making

Learning, review and adjustment of performance

Since many of these aspects overlap, I will ask you several questions related to the process, and you can fill me in with as much detail as you would like.   Please respond as objectively as possible.   I may occasionally ask you to illustrate what you are saying with an example.

Before we start, I would like to request you to read and sign the human subject research form.   If you would like a copy of the signed copy for your records, I will be happy to make a copy for you.

Thanks, can we begin right now?

I will start with general questions.

Demographic:

Position

Academic Background

Interview Questions:

How long have you been working with organisation?

Check for (Ice-breaker, history)

Tell me how it is to work for an international programme/organisation like this one and how different it is from other places you have worked before.   Illustrate with examples.

Check for (Perspectives that reveal personal experience and cultural aspects)

What do you know about Results-Based-Management/MfDR and how did you know about it?

Check for (Depth of knowledge on concept, training)

Help me understand the RBM process as you understand it and walk me through the implementation process as applied in the organisation?

Check for (RBM components)

How and when was RBM introduced to the organisation?   How did you feel about the change?

Check for (Acceptance level)

Help me understand how the decision to adopt RBM was made and why?   Who was involved and why?

Check for (process of buy-in)

Tell about some of the preparation and support that you receive to help you use RBM.

Check for (training, incentives, management support)

Tell me about the process or steps the organisation takes in policy making? Who is involved and at what stage?   Illustrate with an example.

Check for (RBM process involvement, management involvement)

What factors are salient to RBM implementation and why?

Check for (lessons of experience)

Tell me about being a Technical staff here.   Walk me through a typical day here.

Check for (workload, culture/habits, interactions, RBM activities, teamwork)

What choices do you routinely make? Illustrate with an example.

Check for (Organisation cultural issues)

What are the rules and what happens when they are violated? Illustrate with example Check for (Organisational cultural issues)

What gets rewarded and what gets punished and why? Illustrate with example.

Check for (RBM innovations, management attention, and culture)

What have you learned about implementing RBM and about working at the organisation?

Check for (lessons: complexities, practicalities, factors of success)

Describe the culture at the organisation. What would you tell someone coming to work at the organisation when you help them fit within the programme and advance in their career?

Check for (Organisational culture)

Tell me some interesting things about RBM. What are some of the challenges or obstacles that you have encountered and how the obstacles have been overcome.

Check for (Implementation process: complexities, practicalities)

Is there anything that you would like to add that has come to mind and I did not ask?

Check for (Other insights)

Thank you for your time

APPENDIX B: PARTICIPANT INTERVIEW GUIDE

ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE

Participant's Code………….

Scholarly literature indicates that – Management attention is often the strongest indicator of culture.   The way things are handled creates new norms, values, working procedures and reveals important underlying assumptions.   Informal messages are sent by the way these situations are handled.   (This questionnaire was administered to staff that had been at organisation from 4 to 24 years and those less than one year in the organisation).

Qs. What 10 words would you use to describe your organisation to an outsider?

Qs. What is management most concerned about–or what is emphasised around here?

What does management pay attention to?

What does management measure, and control on a regular basis?

Qs. Who gets noticed? What is noticed consistently and commented upon by management?

Qs. What kinds of questions does management frequently ask at meetings?

Qs.   What is most frequently asked at meetings?   Is it important for staff and management to agree on issues? How is this demonstrated?

Qs. Who is rewarded? Rewards happen in what manner?

What is rewarded – socially and in performance appraisals? Risk taking? Creativity? Innovation? Sycophancy? What criteria are used?

How is a good employee measured? Criteria

Qs. Who gets promoted? What are the criteria?

Qs. What behaviour is punished? What will get you into trouble here? What are the criteria? How do you get the feedback? Punishment is often in what forms?

Are there consequences for management?

(Do answers depend on who you ask?)

Qs. What are some of the issues/ that preoccupy – controversial – most talked about by people

Qs. Are there emotional issues at the organisation – Issues that cause emotional reactions?

Qs. Around here, who fits in—or what kinds of people fit in and who does not? What is the criterion?

Who gets pushed out or isolated? What is the criterion? Character/Skills/Knowledge values

Qs. Who is envied around here? Who is the hero and model for behaviour that is acceptable? Why? Who is hated? What's the criterion? How is this shown?

Qs. How is the flow of decision making? Inclusive? Bottom up, top bottom? Who makes decisions? Based on best available data? Boardroom, golf course, hallway.

Qs. Who is invited to the "grown-ups table"? What are the criteria by which leaders recruit? Character/skills/knowledge/values

Who sets the standards for quality of work, behaviour etc.?

How is the appreciation shown? Smiles, comments, gestures of kindness

What criteria by which budget allocated? Political? Objective –informed by emerging programme intelligence – best available data? What are the spending practices?

Qs. Organisation's strategic direction? Is it objective? Political, donor driven? What are the criteria used?

Qs. How are agreements – written, verbal (gentlemen's agreements)

Where does it happen? Boardroom, golf course, hallway-

Qs. What happens when you openly express disagreement or challenge your superior?

Qs. How are conflicts resolved?

Qs. How does management react to critical incidents and organisational crisis? (Crisis is important in cultural creation – and what is defined as a crisis by a leader).

Qs. Who matters around here –Who does the organisation pay most attention to? Criteria? Who does not matter?

Qs. What are some of the non-negotiable and timeless core values at the organisation? What are organisation's values or standards? How is conformity ensured or enforced?

Qs. Does management encourage/discourage feedback? How does it do this?

Qs. What spoken or unspoken rules guide people's decisions and choices at the organisation?

Qs. How is organisational loyalty shown around here?   And to whom?

Qs. Who is treated with dignity and respect and who is not? (Equality?)

Qs. Who jokes with whom – (teasing backslapping, etc)? Criteria

Qs. Who is direct with whom? Who uses hints, when making criticism or giving feedback?

Qs.   What happens when one displays negative or offending behaviour? Insulting, fighting criticism.

Qs.   What kinds of information does management share? Who is information shared with? What doesn't it share? Why?

Qs. What are some of the unspoken and killer assumptions in this place? Criteria for unspoken?

How is change perceived around here? Is change frequent and rapid or is status quo protected? Recent changes?

Qs. Who is considered higher in status, treated with respect and viewed as distant – most people will not laugh with them with some backslapping happening?

Qs. Who gets hired around here? (Adding new member is very telling, who is likely to be selected in an interview? Who does not get selected? Conservative, revolutionary – male female?)

Qs. How does management communicate? (Transfer of thought) Verbal, written email – the writing is on the wall – when? What messages are in the ED's or management pronouncements, speeches, proclamations or remarks? (Consistency with behaviour and practice?)

Qs. How is information shared? Grapevine, memos, reading the times or faces?

Qs. How are delays handled and infidelity to plans?

Qs. What constitutes results or performance around here?

How is it measured?

Who measures?

Rituals

Who greets who? Who associates with whom? What happens if lines are crossed?

What symbols carry a particular meaning here? Words gestures, pictures, and physical objects, might tell me who is who here, or say I am in trouble? Etc. memos, e.g., when I dressed in a suit everyone understood I had a meeting outside the office most likely a government office. Jogon-dress hairstyle, etc.

Qs. Who drives the culture around here – the cultural gate-keepers? Socialisation, leader transmitted- charisma? Acting by doing?

What is regularly reviewed around here? What are the objectives for these reviews?

Who is powerful around here – mover shaker? What is the criterion for power?

Who is feared around here? Why?

Where is the fun around here?

What is great or excellent?

Where is the pain?

Qs. Is there a culture of trust among the various staff?

– trust is achieved through open communication between individuals and groups. Trust is enhanced where there is a history of "making decisions in a way that reflects clear and sensitive understanding of culture in the organisation – that encourage "buy-in".

Who are the managers?

What is your organisation's management style?

Tell me things you like and things you have not liked about this management style.

What assumptions do the managers make? Or operate under?

What do the managers need to manage effectively?

Managerial Issues

Qs. What are the expectations of staff from the management? What are these expectations based on? Are the expectations met?

If no – why? What do people feel? How have they addressed this issue?

How do people relate with managers around here?

How is performance assessed?

What is valued?

What is punished?

Qs. Attitude towards work

What demotivates staff around here? What motivates them?

Qs. Where does manager derive most satisfaction?

What is difference between national staff and international staff?

How is the relationship?

APPENDIX C: SAMPLE DOCUMENT REVIEW GUIDE

PROTOCOL

DOCUMENT REVIEW GUIDE

The questions in this protocol serve as my reminders and they keep me on track as data collection proceeds. The protocol reminds me of what the case is about and what question I am trying to answer in collecting the data evidence. I will particularly be examining the documents identified as critical to RBM'S successful transfer and components of RBM will guide my thinking process as I review the documents

For who was the document authorized?

Research question to be answered:

To what extent has RBM transferred in the organisation's programme? What has changed, how and why?

Analytical look through the documents identify variety and frequency of messages any important messages between lines/biases

Look into RBM and transfer of management literature for guidance and insights

What have been the practices and trends?

Evidence will be supported by quotes from documents or references to documentary evidence.

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ORGANISATION'S STRATEGIC PLAN (one before RBM and one AFTER RBM)

Are there differences between the plans before RBM and after? What were the conditions and assumptions when the document was authorized?

Who is the audience for the plan? What is the objective that the plan is supposed to achieve?

Does the most recent plan show knowledge and understanding of the approach?

Has the new plan adopted an RBM approach?

Involvement of stakeholders in the planning process,

Identifying expected specific, measurable results with time- frames and systematic sub – strategies of achieving them?

Identifying risks and assumptions and ways of monitoring and mitigating them,

Identifying progress indicators

Are there strategies for tracking and monitoring progress?

Are there guidelines about the approach reporting will take, the frequency and expected contents?

Is RBM explicitly mentioned in the plans as a policy that will guide the planning implementation and reporting of the programme?

Who participated in developing the strategic plan?

What is the programme's structure and are accountability lines?

(My comments – thoughts and questions to pursue through interviews? What needs to be validated through interviews and observations)

Annual work plans & progress reports (2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, & 2011)

What were the conditions and assumptions when the document was authored?

Who is the author and who is the audience for the plan? What is the objective that the plan is supposed to achieve?

Do annual plans reflect fidelity to strategy plans and are they RBM compliant?

What is the nature of the contents in the annual reports?

Is the process controlled (Time frames)

What are sources of the information in the plan?

In what form is progress reported? Is it fact – based evidence of progress or what?

APPENDIX D: SAMPLE OBSERVATION GUIDE

OBSERVATION PROTOCOL

I will observe to have the content, which is a part of the phenomena under investigation. I will focus on behaviour, events, persons and physical context. I will, for instance find out whether actions correspond with words. Some of the things I will see and hear will become nuggets in which to construct some of the questions. Observation will ideally continue throughout the period of data collection

Activities and interactions

What is going on? When do people come to work, what time do they leave?

Is there a definable sequence of activities?

How do people interact with activities and with one another?

How are people and activities connected or interrelated? Either from my point of view or participant point of view.

What norms or rules structure the activities and interrelations? When did the activity begin?

How long does it last? Is it typical or unusual?

Physical settings

What is the physical environment like/attributes?

What is the context? What kinds of behaviour is the setting designed for?

How is space allocated? What objects, resources technologies are in the setting?

What are the relevant characteristics of the participant?

Conversation

What is the content of conversation in these settings? Who speaks to whom? Who listens? (Quotes of conversations, paraphrases and summaries of the conversations to be captured, silences are be noted and other non-verbal behaviour that adds to the exchange

Subtle factors

What are the informal and unplanned activities?

What are the symbolic and connotative meanings of words?

What do you infer from non-verbal communication such as dress and physical space, unobtrusive measures such physical clues. What does not happen that ought to happen?

My own behaviour

What is my role? Observer or observer participant?

What do I say or do?

What thought am I having about what is going on (observer comments)?

How do you feel being in environment?

APPENDIX E: DEFINITION OF CAPACITY BUILDING STAGES

The assessment is scored based on the following five main stages:

Capacity-Building Stages				
Lack of knowledge (Absence of procedures)	Awareness (Early stage)	Exploration / Experimentation (Want to learn more)	Transition (Advance stage)	Full Implementation (Consolidated process)
There is a lack of knowledge among UN-Habitat of RBM; there is absence of knowledge about what is UN's RBM approach, hence every UN executing agency and subprogram develop its own RBM approach.	Inadequate management capacities are recognized as an obstacle to achieving development results. UN-Habitat is aware of, but not clearly committed to, RBM. Project Officers acknowledge the need to do better and wish to operate in accordance with the principles of	UN-Habitat begins to commit to shifting to good management practices and explores various approaches. In this stage, Program Officers gather ideas from various sources and try out new methods. Experimentation may take the form of pilot projects and may involve studies and working groups. One problem at this stage is lack of homogeneity,	UN-Habitat has committed itself to RBM and embarks on transition from the previous to the new methods. Individuals begin to adopt the new practices, perceiving the old methods as ineffectual in handling day-to-day problems. This stage may be characterized by difficult decisions. For instance,	RBM is mainstreamed into Administration practices as a cross-cutting approach. The main administrative processes (formulation of institutional strategies and preparation of the budget) conform to the new practices. Indicators are used to monitor UN-Habitat action and regular reviews lead to realignment on institutional priorities.

	good management. This stage often involves a sense of frustration and dissatisfaction with UN-Habitat performance. Awareness of appropriate management practices and a sense of urgency for change encourage the adoption of different methods and lead to the next stage.	and various tools are chosen on the basis of personal preference. Moreover, launching multiple initiatives at the same time may result in pursuing none thoroughly. Many program officers acknowledge that RBM is beneficial, provided that the approach is fully pursued. Their number and resolve lead to the next stage.	conversion to a results-oriented framework implies dropping the earlier indicators and measuring methods. Determining priorities and managing change at the human level are further significant issues. The spread of the new approach on a large scale in the Administration leads to the next stage.	Managers and staff implicated in the change are trained and prepared to own the new management tools, which are regularly reviewed in the light of experience. Resource allocations ensure the sustainability of the new methods, whose effect on the services provided by UN-Habitat becomes evident.

APPENDIX F: AUTHORIZATION LETTER

Dear Participant,

I am a student from the School of Public Leadership, University of Stellenbosch. I am conducting a study about transfer of technologies and I am in particular interested in the transfer process of Results Based Management in this organisation.

You have been purposefully selected to participate in the study as one of the knowledgeable people who might deepen my understanding about the transfer process and the organisational culture which receives and nurtures the technology. This will involve me asking you some questions, however, your participation is voluntary and you are free to disengage from the study at will and for any reason.

Any information given will be treated responsibly, and what you consider privileged information will be protected. Please feel free to ask any question in regard to the study by contacting me or my academic Advisor through the address below.

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