Seeing ghosts:
The past in contemporary images of Afrikaner self-representation

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Declaration

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Abstract

Contemporary Afrikaner ethnic identity is subject to attempts at rehabilitation, which seek to fit Afrikaner whiteness to the post-apartheid milieu. This thesis investigates how popular visual culture, aimed particularly at the white Afrikaner consumer, provides transformative identity-positions by ingeniously re-imagining Afrikanerness. The potential of such images for identity- and memory-work is explored in relation to the various conditions (political, historical, economic or otherwise) that determine their social and psychological significance. The thesis particularly accounts for the manner in which the past is refigured (with varying degrees of criticality and self-reflexivity) in these consumer items and advertisements, and explores their deployment of discursive devices such as irony, hybridisation, nostalgia, and collective memory.

Opsomming

Die onsekerheid gekoppel aan hedendaagse Afrikaner etniese identiteit is onderhewig aan betekenisvolle diskursiewe strategieë daarop gemik om witheid te rehabiliteer, en dus aan te pas tot die post-apartheid milieu. Hierdie tesis ondersoek die herskeppende potensiaal van visuele kultuur om die konstruksie van verbeeldingryke Afrikaner identiteite te bevorder. Die verskeie omstandighede (polities, histories, ekonomies of andersins) wat ‘n impak het op die sosiale en sielkundige onderhandeling van identiteit en kollektiewe herinnering word deurgaans bespreek. Die tesis ondersoek finaal die manier waarop die verlede herroep word in kontemporêre beelde en verbruikersgoedere wat fikseer op Afrikaner etniese identiteit (met uiteenlopende vlakke van self-refleksiwiteit en -kritiek), en is geïnteresseerd in die manier waarop hierdie verskynsels aansluit by die diskursiewe werklikheid van ironie, hibridisering, nostalgie en kollektiewe herinnering.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

This study explores a contemporary trend in popular culture aimed at the Afrikaner market, in which selected elements of Afrikaner ethnicity and history are ingeniously recovered, re-appropriated and commercialised. I need to clarify at the outset that I employ the term Afrikaner to refer to white, Afrikaans-speaking South Africans. This study specifically targets Afrikaner consumers belonging to the middle to upper-classes, who are, for the most part, visually and historically literate. Cultural forms of expression aimed at a less refined Afrikaner market are considered for comparative purposes only, and in considerably less detail – the ‘conventional’ conceptions of Afrikanerness they engender are also already subject to significant academic attention.¹ The complex, postmodern representational strategies that propel the re-appropriation of Afrikanerness in contemporary visual and material culture (and pique my interest) are ultimately characteristic of media discourses which appeal specifically to a sophisticated audience.

Since I form part of this niche, my interest in decoding such discursive devices also emerges from a desire to critically explore my own position in post-apartheid South Africa. The racial profile of my target demographic (which, in a country in which class and race has always been closely imbricated, is inextricable from class privilege) therefore necessitates a mindfulness of the manner in which such consumers imagine their ‘selves’ through the lens of specific discourses. The economic and cultural benefits that such individuals inherited from white rule (of which very few have been forfeited in post-apartheid South Africa), means that their contemporary re-negotiation of Afrikaner identity is largely symbolic rather than material. Regarding the commodities and images I discuss, whiteness therefore functions as a category from which to narcissistically imagine new visions of Afrikanerness, which (as I discuss later) often manifest in a self-congratulatory, arrogant fashion that maintains a charged, hierarchical relationship with blackness.

¹See, Baines, 2013; Grundlingh, 2008; Lewis, 2008; Van der Waal & Robins, 2011.
I follow Michel Foucault’s (2002) understanding of discourse to position such phenomena as conducive to Afrikaner identity-work in post-apartheid South Africa. In this understanding, discourses are comprised of a number of related “statements … that belong to a single system of formation”, which (at a given time and in a specific social context) produce and grant access to a variety of forms of knowledge (Foucault, 2002:107). Yet, discourses are also characterised by their specificity and exclusivity, and therefore place particular power-laden limitations on what is taken as authentic knowledge, and to whom such knowledges are available (Foucault, 2002). Any comprehensive analysis of discourse must necessarily identify the institutionalised powers, as well as socio-political climates, that guide the emergence of culturally disseminated images or texts (Foucault, 2002).

The way I plot the coordinates of Afrikaner identity therefore operates under the rubric of social constructionism, which suggests that instead of being inherent or a priori, “our identities and ourselves as persons come to be produced by socially and culturally available discourses” (Burr, 1995:140). In this regard, the singular context of post-apartheid South Africa becomes extremely important to this study: since our social and discursive worlds operate reciprocally, any prominent shift, transformation or instability experienced at the level of material reality will have a significant impact on the shapes that discourses assume. The ‘products’ of such shifts, which become discernible in visual culture, for example, ultimately constitute the objects that form part of this study’s repertoire.

Throughout this exploration, major emphases are placed on the conditions (social, political, psychological, and economic) that are central to the manner in which Afrikaners narcissistically navigate their ‘image’ in relation to ethnicity, nationalism, history, memory, consumerism, popular culture, the media, and globalisation. The specific personas, historical junctures and symbols of Afrikanerdum that haunt contemporary visual and commodity culture, as well as the strategic forms they assume, are therefore subject to questions that speculate on the forces that make such practices possible, culturally significant and commercially viable.
I am specifically interested in exploring discourses that assuage, negotiate and appropriate the more ‘disruptive conditions’ precipitated by the establishment of the post-apartheid state. Indeed, a number of studies suggest that a significant constituency of Afrikaners are facing a crisis of selfhood, and desperately navigate the post-apartheid realm in search of semblances of ethnic cohesiveness in the midst of stigmatising discourses that link their identities to apartheid.2

Thus, nowhere is the need to transform or adapt more pressing, or discernible, than in the identity-work of some Afrikaners, whose capacity to imagine their ‘selves’ (previously rationalised by the state and Afrikaner nationalism) is now contingent on conditions that do not necessarily prioritise Afrikaner whiteness. I do not assume, however, that this is true for all Afrikaners or that a single, unified Afrikaner identity exists, but (given existing research on the sense of calamity experienced by some) I intend to speculate on the possible affective bonds between particular cultural forms and the consumers that they target. Accordingly, I focus predominantly on a variety of cultural products, events, and texts that act as vehicles for the dissemination of discourses that possibly become internalised by Afrikaners who attempt to fit their self-representations to the post-apartheid landscape.

The main thrust of my research departs from the understanding that negotiations of Afrikaner identity are at their most prolific in consumer culture, which, to some degree, remedies the loss of sovereign nationalism as the primary signifier of Afrikanerness (Blaser, 2012; Van der Waal & Robins, 2011). Since consumer culture has the potential for conferring a sense of distinction onto social subjects, the momentous role that the deployment of monetary capital plays in the acquisition of cultural capital (and, therefore, symbolic power) is also explored (Bourdieu, 2010). The relatively stable economic position of the Afrikaner middle-class in post-apartheid South Africa is reiterated throughout this study in order to argue that while some post-apartheid conditions have supposedly relegated the Afrikaners to an inferior position, others (such as their class status) allow for an uninhibited mobility (Davies, 2012).

The neo-liberal sphere offers Afrikaners multiple ways of representing and imagining themselves, which allow for identity-constructs that creatively engage Afrikanerness via appropriation and assimilation, while eschewing selected, ‘incompatible’ Afrikaner values (Giliomee, 2009:664). Afrikaner identity has therefore apparently transformed to become more inclusive and liberal (with varying levels of self-reflexivity, as I will argue) in order to maintain a sense of distinctiveness without compromising its legitimate integration into the ethos of post-apartheid South Africa. Yet, instead of suggesting that ‘consuming for difference’ is central to the identity-work of Afrikaners only, I argue that such processes are symptomatic of the immersive experiences of globalisation on a larger scale. At their core, such practices are underscored by a distinct paradox: it is exactly the shrinking proximity between geographically and ideologically disparate cultures that threaten and facilitate (or necessitate) differentiation (Kros, 2004). Thus, by incorporating the styles and idioms of various cultures, or cultural movements, into an Afrikaner vernacular, such processes of identity-work simultaneously guard against ‘inauthenticity’ and promote a sense of modernisation and cosmopolitanism.

I also question whether Afrikanerness itself is subject to such integrative processes: since (especially young) consumers are prone to the near compulsive acquisition of new modes of fashionable self-expression (Featherstone, 1991; Jameson, 1991), specific aesthetics marked by Afrikanerness arguably achieve ‘commodity candidacy’ the moment they become esteemed as ‘cool’ or ‘hip’ (Appadurai, 1986:15). Throughout this study, which largely focuses on the centrality of aesthetics to postmodern identity-work, I therefore place major emphasis on the notion of “active attribution” [or the] twin evocation of both affect and agency – or, emotion and politics” (Hutcheon, 1998:5). Instead of assuming that a single image or commodity will generally elicit the same degree of pleasure (or vexation) from every consumer, I adopt a ‘multiperspectival’ approach in order to speculate on the possible positions that variously raced or classed individuals assume in relation to such cultural forms (Kellner, 1995).

This, of course, also includes acknowledging the diverse economic and discursive (or linguistic) communities that different social subjects are socialised into. Such
affiliations alternately inhibit and lend intelligibility to the discourses that emerge via interactions between consumers and the material and visual realms in which they are immersed.

This approach is valuable for departing from the notion that the assertion of Afrikaner identity in post-apartheid South Africa is necessarily inflected by a self-defensive whiteness, and tones of martyrdom. I posit that particular features of traditional Afrikanerness are routinely usurped into the “frantic economic urgency of producing fresh waves of ever more novel-seeming goods” in late-capitalist societies (Jameson, 1993:316): the implication of this process is that Afrikaner identity, history, and symbolism become imbued with an aesthetic levity that largely rejects trauma and indignation for the sake of marketability, cultural sophistication, personal individuation and amusement. I do not, however, suggest that Afrikanerness is rendered apolitical by such processes of commodification, but rather that its politics are contingent on a contemporary cultural ethos in which no single ethnicity, history or collective memory is exempt from the manner in which social subjects seek to aestheticize ‘everyday life’ (Featherstone, 1991).

The plural, occasionally conflicting, and potentially progressive or regressive strategies employed by contemporary Afrikaners in their attempts towards self-definition are not mutually exclusive: these expressions access their signifying power from the same visual genealogy and historical repository of Afrikaner ethnicity, but reimagine and repeat the past via diverse aesthetic programmes and narrative structures. The study focuses on this type of dis/continuity because it is interested in the manner in which particular representations (and social subjects) esteem specific aspects of Afrikanerness, and jettison others. The choices made regarding which events, archetypes or symbols reappear therefore form part of the study’s inquiry into the conditional nature of discourse (Foucault, 2002), and draws attention to the divergent social and psychological values that are attributed to such imaginings by various consumers and cultural brokers.
I do not, however, attempt to provide a complete overview of the development of ‘Afrikaner’ as an identity category or visual trope: rather I hark back to specific, significant historical moments or periods that exemplify the constantly changing status of Afrikanerness. Hence, a selective historical trajectory of the Afrikaner imaginary and its inextricability from the visual realm is offered by Chapter 2, which (necessarily very briefly) traces the discursive and material development of the Afrikaners. This approach ultimately offers some insight regarding the manner in which the vernacular of the Afrikaner imaginary is contingent on the narratives legitimated at each subsequent stage of the Afrikaners’ history.

The central role of visual culture and narration in the development of Afrikaner ethnic identity is, firstly, positioned as having its origins in the early twentieth century – a tumultuous period of colonisation, war, depression, and abject poverty (Du Toit, 2001): the conflict between the Afrikaners and British imperialists, which culminated in the South African war, is therefore subject to major emphasis, because such events (and the economic, psychological traumas left in their wake) are indispensable for arguing that pathos still circulates as central to some discourses on Afrikanerness (Grundlingh, 2004a:367). The deification of Afrikanerdom during the 1930s and 1940s, which operated via the incessant reiteration of mythologised events such as the Great Trek and the South African war, is discussed as promoting a powerful, emotional bond amongst Afrikaners. Such narratives (which had notions of the superiority of whiteness and tenacity of the Afrikaners at their core (Freschi, 2011:9)) entered the imaginary via nationalist art, popular culture, spectacular re-enactments and print media – prominent examples of which are included in the study.

After briefly revisiting the conditions pertinent to the establishment of apartheid and Afrikaner hegemony in 1948, I focus on the manner in which proto-nationalist institutions provided Afrikaners with an unprecedented economic mobility and linguistic authority secured by the state via ethnic nepotism. Such practices of ideological nation building are conceived of as assuaging the major problem of Afrikaner poverty, while inverting the historically substandard status of the Afrikaans language (Vestergaard, 2001:26; Wasserman, 2009:64). The rise
of a wealthier, consumerist and complacent Afrikaner bourgeoisie (somewhat indifferent to ethnic cohesiveness and the myths exalted in the past) in the 1960s and 1970s, however, steers the study towards positing a significantly transformed Afrikaner imaginary.

At this time, the past no longer represented an archetypal, essential vision of Afrikanerness for the growing elite, but was relegated to the position of the archaic, since it had become incompatible with the Afrikaner middle-class’ aspirations towards modernity and cosmopolitanism (Blaser, 2012). The abstract aesthetics that dominated nationalist art during this time are, for example, taken as indicative of the psychological and social shifts towards a globalised, sophisticated neo-Afrikaner ethnicity (Freschi, 2011), which sought recognition from the international community. Yet, such liaisons were constantly undermined by the human rights violations perpetrated by the apartheid regime, which provided bases for a number of social and economic embargoes (Booth, 2003).

South Africa’s pariah status is discussed as having compounded the internal strife between Afrikaners on the right, and their more prosperous counterparts on the left, who (together with a number of anti-apartheid figures and movements, such as Voëlvry) to some degree precipitated the undoing of apartheid and Afrikaner nationalism (Blaser, 2012; Giliomee, 2009; Grundlingh, 2004b). The chapter finally deals with the sea-change brought about by South Africa’s democratisation, and I focus specifically on the manner in which the emergence of powerful Afro-nationalist discourses supposedly relegate Afrikaners to positions of political inferiority and psychological precarity in the post-apartheid realm. No longer buttressed by the state, the Afrikaners are conceived of as desperately attempting to maintain some relevant sense of identity and community in a milieu apparently intolerant of their history, language, and other claims to ethnicity. As I have mentioned earlier, the consumerist tones of the culture industry (especially the festival circuit) is therefore positioned in this chapter as operating to significantly recuperate lost
power by claiming a legitimate space for Afrikaners via the mobilisation of white capital (Haupt, 2006).

Chapter 3 hones in on the discursive machinations of a number of print advertisements obtained from two high-brow Afrikaans lifestyle magazines, DEKAT and Insig, from 1994 to 2009. I selected these publications precisely because they form part of an extremely limited number of Afrikaans lifestyle magazines that are geared towards the elite consumer that I focus on. I also purposely omitted Afrikaans magazines that are too specialist in focus, and thus hone in exclusively on, for instance, travel, sport or the home. Although Huisgenoot is the magazine with the highest circulation in South Africa (Media 24 – Huisgenoot, 2013:sp), the banality of this Afrikaans weekly has been conceived of as indicative of the overwhelming tawdriness that defines tabloid magazines on a global scale (Viljoen & Viljoen, 2005:106). Huisgenoot therefore ostensibly offers less than DEKAT or Insig in terms of sophisticated, postmodern conceptions of Afrikaner ethnicity and Afrikaans. Huisgenoot is also no longer an exclusive register of Afrikaner culture because it is published together with its ‘sister magazines’: an English counterpart, You, and Drum, a consumer magazine for black readers (Media 24 – Huisgenoot, 2013:sp). Huisgenoot is also subject to a number of existing studies that highlight the historical relevance of the magazine for plotting the development of Afrikaner identity and the nationalist movement (see, Froneman, 2004; Viljoen & Viljoen, 2005; Viljoen, 2006), which I touch on in selected sections of this study. My main points of discussions are, however, more contemporaneous.

The presumed existence of some Afrikaners’ ‘need to adapt’ to the ‘new’ South Africa, ultimately provides the rationale for focusing on issues of the magazines published during the critical (and socially challenging) first fifteen years after South Africa’s democratisation. In turn, the advertisements that I analyse were selected based on their potential to promote a neo-Afrikanerness acclimatised to the post-apartheid landscape. I specifically argue that these images allow for the momentary recurrence of symbols of Afrikanerdom by concealing their ethnocentric politics via duplicity, humour and in-group knowledges (which only...
particular readers are conditioned to). Some of these images are, however, also
inflected by the conditional assimilation of racial Others into Afrikaner ethnic
identity – a process that I critique as marked by white narcissism. Hence, I
employ particular theoretical approaches to explore the complexities of these
discourses. They mainly comprise in-depth engagement with the manner in
which irony, as a postmodern device, is ideologically dextrous at manipulating
historical knowledge and disarming political bias (Hutcheon, 1995), while
selected critical theories provide insights regarding the precarity (and
mutability) of both ‘settel’ and ‘colonised’ identities in the postcolonial state
(Bhabha, 1998; Ingram, 1999; Kitzinger & Wilkinson, 1996; Lawson, 2004;
Lazarus, 2011). The advertisements and objects discussed in the study (including
the commodity items focused on in Chapter 4) ultimately possess a certain
degree of discursive ingenuity, thereby significantly restricting the number of
phenomena I finally identified as engaging Afrikanerdom in a self-reflexive
manner.\(^3\) Advertisements that appear in *DEKAT* and *Insig*, but do not
strategically engage or attempt to reconstitute Afrikaner identity or history, for
example, do not form part of my data set. The methodological route I followed in
selecting the advertisements is discussed in more detail in section 3.2.

Again, it is useful to acknowledge that the Afrikaners targeted by these
publications are not representative of an entire constituency: rather, I am
interested in speculating on the cultural and psychological practices that are
apparently characteristic of some upwardly-mobile, relatively liberal and urbane
Afrikaners prone to sophisticated conceptions of identity. This chapter therefore
reiterates the continued importance of ‘culture’ in legitimating Afrikanerness in
the ‘new’ South Africa, but appends this notion to include critiques of the racial
tokenism at the core of balancing minority (Afrikaner) and majority interests
(Wasserman & Botma, 2008). It is exactly the imaginary quality of such

\(^3\)Although I acknowledge that identity-based discrepancies possibly exist between the producers
and anticipated consumers of these images and commodities, I nevertheless argue that these
phenomena have the potential to become internalised as self-representations (and subsequently
performed) by the Afrikaner market that I have identified. Thus, instead of denying the agency
of each individual consumer, I argue that some Afrikaners engage particular discourses from a
psychologically and socially anxious position in the post-apartheid state, which selected
Afrikaner-centred texts assuage via reconstituted, aspirational (albeit often problematic)
identity positions.
discourses of inclusion (which have very little basis in material reality) that
guides the study towards the realms of magazine culture and advertising, which
are significantly characterised by artifice and an unrelenting commercial agenda
(Dyer, 1982; Wasserman & Botma, 2008:3).

The editorial vernaculars of DEKAT and Insig are briefly discussed, and
(together with their dependence on advertising revenue) positioned as
strategically acquiescent to the ruling ethos of the post-apartheid state, thereby
reasserting the conditional appearance of particular discursive formations
(Foucault, 2002). The next section contextualises these representations in the
characteristically contentious climate of post-apartheid advertising discourse
(Bertelsen, 1998; Herbst, 2005). Inter alia, I consider the qualities of irreverence,
ingenioussness and irony that seem to have become staples of cutting-edge
Afrikaans advertising in the post-apartheid period (Slimjan, 2005). Such images
ultimately provide fertile ground for arguments pertaining to the formative
relationship between postmodern texts and their readers.

Chapter 4 situates the commodification of Afrikanerness (which appears to have
grown exponentially in the post-apartheid period) in the ethos of late capitalism,
which attributes a central place to aesthetics in the global economy
(Featherstone, 1991; Jameson, 1991). The emancipatory potential of having
access to a seemingly infinite number of styles from which to construct and
transform one’s identity is, however, often qualified by arguments pertaining to
the loss of individuality, or ethnic distinction. Yet, I find accord with the notion
that the impact and reach of cultural imperialism is routinely overstated, since
contemporary social subjects do not passively accept the archetypes of popular
culture, but appropriate them to fit their own strategic ways of being (Jackson,
1999). Therefore, the chapter firstly considers the historical and social conditions
pertinent to the Afrikaners’ initiation into the global economy, mass
consumerism and the ‘aestheticization of everyday life’ (Featherstone, 1991:66). I
specifically focus on the complex relationship between a waning Afrikaner
nationalism, the economic boom associated with middle-class Afrikaners in the
1960s and 1970s, and globalisation, in order to posit the origins of a materialistic
Afrikaner ethnicity, which persists contemporarily (albeit with different political and affective motivations at its basis) (Grundlingh, 2008).

What piques my interest in particular, is the manner in which the commercial appeal of markers of Afrikaner ethnicity vacillates significantly across time. Thus, what was deemed out-dated by urbane Afrikaners in the late twentieth century, has apparently been regenerated in the aestheticized consumption practices of the young. The visual and material culture associated with lower-class Afrikaner identity, previously a source of cultural embarrassment, for example, now circulates in the self-expression of a number of young Afrikaners who employ such aesthetics in a dual manner: they give access to the superior sensibilities central to hipsterism (which hinge on idiosyncratic or discerning modes of consumption (Greif, 2010a)), but also augment such knowledges via an ethnically-specific vocabulary, which is intelligible mainly to the Afrikaner consumer.

By organising themselves into so-called ‘tribes’, premised on the collective consumption of particular goods in order to become visible, and visibly ‘cool’, to others (Maffesoli & Foulkes, 1988:144), such youths possibly negotiate the loss of a coherent ethnicity by forging new affective and aesthetic connections. A number of commodity items, images and immersive experiences, which are illustrative of such processes, are discussed in the chapter. I ultimately speculate on the (economic and social) limitations and potentials of the notion of a ‘hip Afrikanerness’ available for appropriation by racial or ethnic Others who also seek a sense of distinction via consumer culture.

The final section of the chapter utilises postmodern accounts of history, which assert the discursive nature of historiography and the undeniable subjectivity of historical knowledge (Jenkins, 2003a). A significant number of commercially viable markers of Afrikaner ethnicity feature historical personas or events, and their newfound symbolic value has been subject to a number of critical readings regarding the pervasiveness of nostalgia in the contemporary Afrikaner imaginary. Although I find accord with the notion that the nostalgic attitudes prominent amongst some Afrikaners (which find expression in popular Afrikaans
music, for example (Van der Waal & Robins, 2011)) are the result of the gradual demotion of Afrikaner history in post-apartheid South Africa, I do not agree that such imaginings are necessarily always intransigent.

The view of contemporary Afrikaner nostalgia as manifesting dissatisfaction with the state, is not representative of the diverse spectres of Afrikanerdom that haunt selected commodity items, such as the t-shirts discussed in this section of the chapter. If a postmodern view of history suggests that the past has been democratised, thus allowing for a melange of narratives and interpretations to emerge, then a one-dimensional view of Afrikaner nostalgia is not admissible. I therefore make a case for nostalgic imaginings of Afrikanerdom that are decidedly self-reflexive and progressive (Boym, 2001:49-50). Instead of attempting to reify the past (together with irrecoverable positions of power), some of the discourses I deal with engage Afrikaner heritage with an acute sense of its capacity for appropriation, aestheticization, and commodification.

For an understanding of postmodern discursive strategies, I followed Linda Hutcheon in particular, while Michel Foucault’s thoughts on the circuits of discourse guided my interpretations of contemporary phenomena of ‘resurgence’. I consulted selected texts by Arjun Appadurai, Mike Featherstone, Mark Greif, Fredric Jameson and Michel Maffesoli for expositions on the machinations of commodification, and the integration of aesthetics into processes of postmodern identity-work and the establishment of ‘tribes’. Regarding the affective, discursive power of nostalgia, I looked towards Svetlana Boym. I also engaged Keith Jenkins’ seminal work on the mutability of historical knowledge, and the creative potential of postmodern historiographies. Regarding post-apartheid South Africa (and Afrikaner heritage) in particular, I followed Annie Coombes’ account of the manner in which material and visual culture is constantly renegotiated amidst fluctuating claims to the nation-state.

Pierre Bourdieu’s view of the relationship between class, consumerism and social distinction proved indispensable to charting the deployment of Afrikaner capital to assert ethnic identity. Rebecca Davies also provided excellent discussions of the continuing economic vitality of the Afrikaner middle-class in the post-1994
period. Hermann Giliomee’s insights regarding the complex, often controversial, historical development of the Afrikaners constituted a major part of my contextual research. In this regard, Albert Grundlingh also contributed significantly to this study. Thomas Blaser and Melissa Steyn’s claims to the ‘identity crisis’ at the core of Afrikaner whiteness, offered a vantage point for addressing the tendency towards rehabilitation and legitimisation in Afrikaner social discourse. Furthermore, Kees van der Waal and Herman Wasserman provided crucial expositions on the status of the Afrikaans language, media and culture industry in post-apartheid South Africa. Finally, I found accord with Adam Haupt’s discussions of the imbalances that permeate processes of racial and ethnic appropriation, and hybridisation, in South African popular culture.

Yet, to date, no in-depth, critical research (to my knowledge) has been conducted on the visual manifestations of the current Afrikaner imaginary, especially in relation to commodification and an ethos of irony and hipness in Western popular culture. My study therefore departs from and supplements existing approaches to cultural revivals of Afrikanerdom by explicitly focusing on their discursive mechanisms in visual media and the market. Moreover, these discourses are also conceived of as operating within a matrix of power relations, which guides the study towards questioning whom such constructs appeal to, privilege, or exclude.
Chapter 2

A visual genealogy of the Afrikaner imaginary

This chapter traces the historical and discursive development of Afrikaner ethnic identity, including its trajectory toward parity with national identity, and finally tries to account for the anomie associated with Afrikaner selfhood in post-apartheid South Africa. I explicitly position the cultural construction of Afrikanerness as contingent on the politically motivated memorialisation and representation of particular historical junctures, such as the Great Trek and South African war. Identity construction is thus conceived of in a Lacanian sense, as forged in relation to significant and endlessly repeated images, which form part of the psyche and constitute the so-called ‘imaginary’ (Olivier, 2006:490). I therefore explore the Afrikaner imaginary as constituted by representations or narratives that are central to a process of identification by which specific iconic images are “assimilated into people’s sense of self” (Kros, 2004:600).

The existence of a relatively coherent Afrikaner imaginary, however, does not suggest that a monolithic Afrikaner identity exists now or ever existed, but rather that this coherence confirms that it is “easier to [imagine] a limited community than a limitless one” (Greenfeld, 2001:259). In order to demonstrate and account for the complexity of the category ‘Afrikaner’, this chapter firstly provides an overview of the ethnic origins of the Afrikaners, and the manner in which nationalist principles conflate ethnicity and nationality (Greenfeld, 4).

Although the Lacanian concept of the Imaginary will not be substantially explored in this thesis, seeing that it is a psychoanalytic theory that pertains mainly to individual subject-formation, there are many precedents for the use of Jacques Lacan’s concept of the Imaginary to explain collective or national identities: notably Anderson (1983), Bhabha (1990) and Fanon (1970). The Imaginary is a central concept in psychoanalytic theory and is “one of the three registers to which Lacan relegated all subjective experience, the other two being the Symbolic and the Real. It is founded on the constituting role of the image in regard to the ego. One of Lacan’s first papers, ‘The mirror stage’, demonstrates how the Imaginary engenders a variety of dual relationships between the ego and its counterpart, identifications which invariably result in misrecognitions of reality, erotic or aggressive reactions, and other subjective impasses” (Warshawsky, 2006:sp). The primary value of the concept of the Imaginary for this study, lies in its emphasis on the visual in the development of an Imago, according to which subjects (or, in this case, the Afrikaner collective) shape their identities. The Ego-ideal is, per definition, narcissistic.
2001:256). I frequently allude to the Afrikaans language throughout this chapter (and the next), since Afrikaans was conceived of by nationalist ideology as the primary force in “developing a distinctive nationality”, and is arguably still the “main symbol of [Afrikaner] identity” (Giliomee, 2009:365).

The defection of a number of disenfranchised Afrikaners from the British-governed Cape Colony via the Great Trek, as well as the poverty and trauma experienced by many Afrikaners in the aftermath of the South African war are discussed as of significant propagandistic value to later attempts at unification and economic reformation by the nationalist movement (Giliomee, 2009:144, 161, 166, 315). Selected examples of visual and material culture from the early twentieth century, comprising photography, film, print media, nationalist monuments and art, as well as the re-enactment of key historical events, are then explored as constituting the bourgeoning ‘imagewor(l)d’ of the Afrikaners, which visualised the mythical ascension of a sovereign volk or nation (Du Toit, 2001). The internal fissures that have troubled the promotion of a unified Afrikaner community are also explored. Class differences, as well as disparate political agendas must be accounted for, since they reveal not only the constructedness, but also the precariousness of a unified Afrikaner ethnicity (Greenfeld, 2001:262).

The next section of the chapter focuses on the fragmentation of Afrikaner identifications as manifest by dissenting cultural movements in Afrikaans literature and music from the 1960s onwards. The subversive performances of musicians associated with the Voëlvry (Free Bird) movement, which assailed Afrikaner hegemony in the 1980s, for example, is contextualised within the broader frame of the apartheid regime's respective support and rejection of conservative and liberal politics, which, to some extent, divided Afrikaners along those lines (Giliomee, 2009:554-556; Grundlingh, 2004b).

The waning importance of ethnic solidarity and traditional Afrikanerness is also discussed as being compounded by the rapidly growing wealth of the Afrikaner middle-classes during the 1960s and 1970s, which propelled a desire to modernise by acquiring monetary and cultural capital while abandoning
fixations on archaic, mythical notions of Afrikaner ethnicity (Davies, 2009:106; Freschi, 2011:22-23). I also explore the visualisation of the Afrikaners’ aspirations toward modernity, cosmopolitanism and worldliness as manifest in the nationalist art of the time, which tended toward a global aesthetic of abstraction (in contrast with the history painting of the 1930s and 1940s) (Freschi, 2011).

I maintain that the imagined ethnic cohesion of the Afrikaners, vehemently promoted by Afrikaner nationalist discourses during most of the twentieth century, has become unsustainable following South Africa’s democratisation. The final section of the chapter therefore follows the widespread contention that the erosion of social, cultural and political nepotism accompanying the abolition of apartheid, has precipitated a dilemma for Afrikaners regarding their place and status in South Africa, and necessitates strategies of identity construction that attempt to rehabilitate and/or legitimate Afrikanerness (Blaser, 2012; De Vries, 2012; Giliomee, 2009; Walker, 2005). Contemporary Afrikaners are therefore often conceived of as either rejecting their ethnic lineage in order to liberate themselves from ‘a whiteness disgraced’, or desperately attempting to de-stigmatise their identities and maintain ethnic separateness under the rubric of South Africa’s multicultural ethos (Steyn, 2004a).

This chapter posits that the Afrikaner culture industry, which is inextricably linked to the promotion and consumption of the Afrikaans language, exists as one of the few remaining spaces where a sense of ethnic ‘communitas’ can be established amongst Afrikaners (Van der Waal, 2011:67). Inter alia, I argue that the purported non-racialism of contemporary Afrikaans-language festivals such as the *Klein Karoo Nasionale Kunstefees (KKNK)* and others, can be critiqued as a superficial attempt at inclusivity and reconciliation, since access to the symbolic power that these ethnic enclaves offer is limited and ultimately mobilise Afrikaner capital in economic and cultural terms (Kitshoff, 2004; Van der Waal, 2008).
2.1 Afrikaner ethnicity in historical context

While I do not provide a comprehensive history of the emergence of the Afrikaner as a distinctive ethnic and national entity, a brief outline of key moments in this trajectory is essential for any nuanced consideration of contemporary Afrikaner identity, particularly since current and past cultural practices frequently allude to this history. Ethnic groups have the potential to “become elevated to nations through politicisation and staking claims to the state” and the constructed synonymy of Afrikaner identity and South African identity during the years of National Party rule must be understood as a process that has its origins in colonial ideology and culminated in the apartheid regime (Blaser & Van der Westhuizen, 2012:381).

Ethnic identity, however, should not be conceived of as conducive to national identity, since the inverse is arguably the case: ethnicity refers to a variety of distinctive, ascriptive categories, such as race, religion, language, culture and ancestry, which are ‘rendered intelligible’ by national principles (Greenfeld, 2001:256, 257). Nationalism, therefore, is a ‘cultural system’ (Greenfeld, 2001:255), which, in the case of the Afrikaners and other ethnic nationalisms, “excludes those not born into [a specific ethnic group] from participation in the life of the nation” (Motyl, 2001:151). Nationalism is also the discursive force responsible for organising the ‘raw materials’ of ethnicity in such a way that, “when perceived as culturally significant, they are magnified – often to the point of being turned into a cultural rift that cannot be bridged” (Greenfeld, 2001:256).

The ‘raw materials’, or ethnic origins, of the Afrikaners comprise a number of key social and cultural characteristics, as well as historical events and developments, later exploited by the machinations of Afrikaner nationalism in order to construct ethnic solidarity (Greenfeld, 2001:256; Marx, 2002:105, 106). During the eighteenth century, the nascent ethnic identity of the Afrikaners was defined by their European ancestry, rural existence and farming abilities, Christian values, and the Dutch language (Giliomee, 2009:1, 21). From these bases emerged “two other self-concepts … one of being white, the other of being Afrikaners”, which was inextricably linked with the Afrikaans language (Giliomee, 2009:50, 53).
From a postcolonial perspective, the establishment and maintenance of an ‘essentialist ethnicity’ based on racial purity (Steyn, 2004a:149), involved the disavowal of the genealogy of so-called mixed-race ethnic groups whose origins can be traced to “liaisons between Europeans, slaves and [indigenous people such as the] Khoikhoi” (Giliomee, 2009:40). Moreover, it also meant denying the historical creole status of Afrikaans, which developed from a dialect of Dutch initially spoken by slaves and servants during the early years after colonisation (Giliomee, 2009:53; Van der Waal, 2011:68). The strict policing of racial boundaries in order to curb fears of miscegenation and preserve the exclusive association of whiteness with citizenship and the right to own land was, however, compromised by the abolition of slavery in the British-ruled Cape Colony in the early nineteenth century (Giliomee, 2009:94). This signalled the advent of two formative events in the construction of Afrikaner ethnic identity: the Great Trek (1838) and the South African war (fought against British imperial forces from1899 to 1902) (Grundlingh, 1999:22; Motyl, 2001:5).

The Great Trek refers to the colonisation of the interior of South Africa by a significant number of Afrikaners (known as the voortrekkers) who migrated from the Cape Colony to escape British governance and establish the independent republics of the Orange Free-State and the Transvaal, a process marked by violent conflicts with indigenous communities (Giliomee, 2009: 175; Grundlingh, 2001: 95, 96). Since their earliest dissemination, discourses surrounding the Great Trek have romanticised the tenacity and dignity of the Afrikaners, who were represented as martyrs who had embarked on a treacherous journey to claim African soil as their own (Giliomee, 2009: 161). The South African war had similarly “assumed a central place in Afrikaner historical consciousness” by reinforcing notions of the Afrikaners (who were defeated by the British) as a harshly afflicted people (Grundlingh, 2004a: 359, 370). Reminders of the ‘scorched earth’ policy (a war tactic implemented by the British, which literally incinerated the Boer republics) and the atrocious conditions of British concentration camps where thousands of Afrikaner women and children died, have therefore become a common theme in reflections on the war in the Afrikaner imaginary (Grundlingh, 2004a; Stanley, 2008).
Narratives of suffering and perseverance have been instrumental in establishing the Afrikaners as a noble but subaltern volk or nation, whose initial challenge was to disavow their European origins, and create a sense of an indigenised white ethnicity that sought equity with but distinction from British colonists (De Vries, 2012:52; Duffy, 2006:89; Freschi, 2011; Giliomee, 2009:359, Steyn, 2004a:147-148). The formation of the Union in 1910 was a significant ideological move towards entrenching preferential political and social treatment for white South Africans, while the fragile coalition between Boer and Brit enabled the construction of a common black Other in need of surveillance and control (Giliomee, 2009). Yet, the years of union also marks the demoralisation of many Afrikaners burdened by drought and poverty; a dire situation which necessitated the construction of a unified Afrikaner culture by Afrikaner ideologues who sought to employ ethnic cohesiveness as a catalyst for mobilising political force.

2.2 Making history ‘work’: the Afrikaner imaginary and visual culture in the early twentieth century

As mentioned in the introduction, this study follows a constructionist approach to national identity, which suggests that a variety of narrative structures constitute ‘the nation’ through symbolisation, instead of it being a-priori (Anderson, 1983; Bhabha, 1990; Hall, 1992; Mookherjee, 2011:4; Vestergaard, 2001:23). At the core of the Afrikaners’ self-concept was the view of South Africa as their sole ‘national home’ (Giliomee, 2009:356), a physical and psychological space “paid for in sweat and blood” (Freschi, 2011:9). This perceived right to govern is located in a ‘racialised’ form of Christianity based on a mythical notion that God himself had promised South Africa to the Afrikaners (Steyn, 2001:28-29). The Day of the Covenant, which is celebrated as the Day of Reconciliation in post-apartheid South Africa, for example, marks the anniversary of the Battle of Blood River (16 December 1838) during which the voortrekkers defeated the Zulu despite being significantly outnumbered – a victory that obtained mythic status.
as cementing the relationship between God and His volk (the Afrikaners) (Giliomee, 2009:165). 5

It is especially significant to bear in mind that the process of inviting citizens to identify with such representations, and “enact’ [them] as a theme in their own lives” (Hofmeyr, 1988:523), is lent gravity by the authoritative voice of history, which professes objectivity and fixes the origins of the nation “in the mists of, not ‘real’, but ‘mythic’ time” (Hall, 1992:294-295). Such practices of myth-making were achieved via the over-articulation and obsessive repetition of selected events, symbols or personas that glorified Afrikaner nationalism (Van Robbroeck, 2008:128). Cultural broker Gustav Preller, for example, was influential in positioning the Great Trek as “the key myth of Afrikaner nationalism, thanks largely to [his film, De Voortrekkers (1916) –] an interpretation that has been widely received as the dominant one” (Hofmeyr 1988:522).

The film, however, is but a single example of the mass commodification of the Great Trek and the “emergence of an Afrikaans and nationalist ‘imagewor(l)d’ in the 1910s and 1920s, decades during which numbers of entrepreneurs, politicians and members of a range of cultural and philanthropic organisations participated in the construction of a racially and ethnically circumscribed ‘Afrikaner’ identity” (Du Toit, 2001:81). Yet, along with the celebratory tone of such representations, a note of martyrdom that transmuted past tragedies into collective, ‘national’ mourning also rang out, especially in narratives that revisited the South African war (Grundlingh, 1999:22; Stanley, 2008:37): the account of Afrikaners as a persecuted people is not only a popular discourse, but a ‘powerful one’ (Grundlingh, 2004a:367), because “pain is a medium through which the nation establishes ownership in individuals, and reminds and

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5The Voortrekker Monument, “a giant square granite structure” overlooking Pretoria (the administrative capital of apartheid-era South Africa) was completed in 1949 and pays homage to the heroism of the voortrekkers (Grundlingh, 2001:95). It has also been instrumental in “serving the foundational myth of exclusive Afrikaner power” (Grundlingh, 2001:96). To represent their divine favour, “the monument was designed so that each year on December 16 [the anniversary of the Battle of Blood River and the Afrikaners’ covenant with God], a shaft of light shines through an aperture onto a marble memorial block inscribed with the words ‘We for thee South Africa’ in Afrikaans” (Grundlingh, 2001:98-99).
guarantees an individual of his or her belonging and witness to a moral community” (Mookherjee, 2011:7).

Such discourses therefore accessed affective power from revisiting historical injustices that the Afrikaner volk had endured and survived, and their subsequent dissemination helped to foster a sense of ethnic cohesion based on the imperative to unite as a precaution to future dangers (Grundlingh, 2004a:367). It is, however, important to re-emphasise that such practices were notably manifest in the visual realm, and strategically so (Du Toit, 2001:111). During the South African war, photographs of concentration camp victims, including the iconic image of Lizzie van Zyl, an Afrikaner girl who died in a Bloemfontein camp (Fig. 1) (Stanley, 2008: 9, 12), were disseminated in order to enforce the propagandist notion that, “though it was not the case in fact ... the British had embarked on a deliberate policy of genocide” (Grundlingh, 1999:22). By obscuring the originally intended function of a photograph, its meaning ultimately becomes dependent on the political agendas of those responsible for its dissemination (Sontag, 2004:9): private funerary portraits were, for example, circulated in order to demonise the British, although “their [intended] purpose, evidently, was to console the family of the deceased” (Godby, 2006:34, 37).

The affective power of such images in promoting outrage and political mobilisation lie in the ‘rhetorical value’ of the photographic medium itself, since “the first response they elicit is, of course, to side with those they represent and condemn those responsible for the conditions they depict” (Godby, 2006:35, 47).

In the post-war period, with the rise of popular media such as the Afrikaans family magazine, Die Huisgenoot6 (founded in 1916), the potential of visual culture to promote ethnic cohesion persisted (Du Toit, 2001:80).  

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6Die Huisgenoot formed part of the catalogue of the proto-nationalist publishing house, Nasionale Pers (later Naspers) (Giliomee, 2009:375). The editorial content of the magazine promoted Afrikaans and ethnic solidarity, and mythologised Afrikaner history, but was not primarily political in orientation and also featured lifestyle and general interest articles (Giliomee, 2009:375). By the early 1930s, Die Huisgenoot had reached an unprecedented number of Afrikaner families, and “[i]ts success in stimulating a consciousness of history almost certainly prepared the ground for the hugely successful 1938 centenary celebrations of the Great Trek” (Giliomee, 2009:375). Contemporarily, Die Huisgenoot holds the distinction of being the magazine with the highest circulation in South Africa, but has largely abandoned its fixations on Afrikaner ethnicity in favour of a consumerist ethos (Viljoen & Viljoen, 2005).
The need to fortify ethnic identity was also particularly significant during this time, since the war had left a great number of Afrikaners impoverished, humiliated and demoralised, thereby destabilising Afrikaner homogeneity by creating internal divisions, predominantly along class-lines (Giliomee, 2009:329). Efforts at assuaging the scourge of Afrikaner poverty persisted until the 1940s (Giliomee, 2009:315), since the economic and emotional blows of the war were amplified by the “Depression of the ... 1930s ... late Afrikaner urbanisation” and having to compete with black South Africans in the job market (Davies, 2009:24).

In its complementary relationship with the nationalist agenda, Die Huisgenoot, for example, circulated a discourse that “warned against class division amongst Afrikaners [because it mitigated political power and] would erode the difference between black and white”, thereby threatening the revered ‘purity’ and uniformity of Afrikaner ethnicity (Du Toit, 2001:95; 101-102). Photographs of the poor were published by the magazine in an attempt to facilitate volksliefdadigheid, a form of ethnic welfare, which could arguably moderate the class-based fissures that inhibited the construction of an exclusive, integrated...
Afrikaner community (Du Toit, 2001:81, 95). Part of the rationale for engaging in such projects, was to refute popular representations of Afrikaners as uncouth in British propaganda, which compounded their already compromised self-esteem (Swart, 1998:742).

Most of the subjects of the photographs published in Die Huisgenoot were elderly Afrikaners who personally experienced the hardships of the Great Trek and the South African war. The photographic remnants of these ancestral figures thus formed part of the preoccupation of nationalist discourses with constructing a shared heritage or volksgeskiedenis that must be preserved, esteemed and memorialised in all of its various guises (Du Toit, 2001:90). The notion of heritage must be understood as being employed by nationalist forces to imbue specific historical junctures with affect, thereby creating powerful collective memories (Stanley, 2008:4). Such ‘memories’ finally imprinted on the Afrikaner imaginary the notion that the Afrikaners had earned their freedom and that this freedom can “be understood as the freedom to exercise racial hegemony”, which later became manifest in the policies of the apartheid regime (Steyn, 2004a:32).

One could argue that the role of collective memory in serving the ideological impetus of nationalism was made potently manifest via visual and material culture (Hofmeyr, 1988:529). It is, in fact, through visualisation that the nation-state eases its anxieties regarding the fragmentation of its members, because “the aesthetics of nations [are] linked to the personal experience of a peculiar emotion, one’s feeling for these aesthetic artefacts, as well as the social, political socializations of these feelings” (Mookherjee, 2011:5). National vernaculars are therefore not only ubiquitous, but also uniform. Whether taught at school, eternalised by the Voortrekker Monument or filmed, the heroic, martyred narrative of the Great Trek is consistent exactly because repetition allows it to

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7 Photographs of the South African landscape, especially rural scenes, were also published by the magazine, thereby contributing to the “the elaboration of ... a discourse that associated grond (land) with [the] Afrikaner that was already articulated in poetry and prose” (Du Toit, 2001:84). The colonial notion of ownership (and ‘spiritual’ quality) of the land that existed in the Afrikaner ethnic imaginary, would remain a mainstay of Afrikaner culture, appearing quite prominently in the work of revered nationalist painter, Jakob Hendrik Pierneef (Freschi, 2011).
become crystalized (Van Robbroeck, 2008:128), and consequently experienced affectively through ‘vicarious spectacle’ (McClintock, 1997:101).

Afrikaner nation-building in the early twentieth century therefore centred on constructing a popularised reverence for Afrikanerdom, which legitimated the Afrikaner volk (Freschi, 2011:13), whose “imagination of the South African state would creak with the ox-wagons of the Afrikaner pioneers, thunder with the massed rifles of Blood River, and echo with the cries of the falling impi” (Shepherd, 2002:144). The centenary celebrations of the Great Trek in 1938, for example, centred on a re-enactment of the original trek (with several ox-wagons travelling from Cape Town towards the South African interior), thereby reinvigorating the past and giving access to the Afrikaner imaginary via “cultural and political theatre” (Grundlingh, 2001:98):

frenetic crowds dressed in period Voortrekker garb welcomed the procession [of ox-wagons] as it approached the towns and cities. Streets were renamed after Voortrekker heroes. Men and women were moved to tears by the spectacle. Young people were married and couples christened their babies in the shade of the wagons. Although this ‘second trek’ had been carefully orchestrated by Afrikaner cultural entrepreneurs, even they were impressed by the tumultuous response to the event (Grundlingh, 2001:98).

The construction of ethnic identity therefore depends greatly on appealing to collective memory, or memories that become significant to individuals who have not necessarily lived through the events that they ‘experience’ in and through the social imaginary (Grundlingh & Huigen, 2008:2-3). Such herinneringsplekke (places of memory/remembrance) (Grundlingh & Huigen, 2008), include but transcend physical spaces such as monuments, and transmute the past into ‘representational forms’ that encourage “agreement between official political myths and popular memories or understandings of ‘the past’” (Stanley, 2008:21, 28). In its most extreme guise of ideological streamlining, the memory of the South African war, for example, came to justify the apartheid regime as reparation for the humiliation and trauma inflicted on the Afrikaners by the British – “in 1948 they had regained what they had lost in 1902” (Grundlingh, 2004a:370).
By the 1930s and 1940s, when the Afrikaners found themselves in dire economic circumstances and a resulting low morale, the ‘imagewor(l)d’ (Du Toit, 2001:81) that had been established earlier proliferated (largely as a result of the centenary celebrations of the Great Trek) in order to reinvigorate ethnic pride (Van Robbroeck, 2008). The canon of nationalist art produced during this time, for example, constructed an epic Afrikaner history and focused specifically on the irrefutable ownership of and “powerful … identification with the land”, thus naturalising what would eventually become the apartheid regime’s strict segregation of racial communities across geographical and ideological divides (Freschi, 2011:9, 11). The fresco by Le Roux Smith Le Roux (Fig. 2), for example, resonates with the right to imprint identity onto the South African landscape and thereby designate racialised zones, which, in the Afrikaner imaginary, was a prerogative earned through the suffering and admirable resilience of their ancestors, and events such as the Great Trek (Freschi, 2009:544).

Fig. 2. Le Roux Smith Le Roux, *Great Trek*, 1940. Egg tempera on plaster, dimensions unknown. Old Mutual building (currently Mutual Heights), Cape Town. (Freschi, 2009:544).
One must also bear in mind that in the creation of myths, selective forgetting is equally as important as selective remembering (Bhabha, 1990:311; Stanley, 2008:37; Swart, 2004:856). The veneration of the landscape paintings of nationalist personage Jakob Hendrik Pierneef finds its roots in their representation of the South African countryside as inhabited by the “spirit of the Afrikaner” (Peffer, 2005:47). Yet, they simultaneously efface the violent, oppressive colonial practices that had historically removed those who originally occupied the areas depicted (Peffer, 2005:47). The Pierneef painting, *Rustenburgkloof* (Fig. 3), for example, forms part of 32 panels produced for the Johannesburg Station in 1929 (Nel, 1990:142): viewed through a postcolonial lens, the station panels represent a “Utopian fantasy of what the South African landscape never actually was ... they performed a symbolic rubbing-out of the history of the land” (Peffer, 2005:49).

![Fig. 3. Jakob Hendrik Pierneef, *Rustenburgkloof*, 1932. Oil on canvas on board, 141 x 126cm. Transnet Heritage Foundation. (Nel, 1990:201; Peffer, 2005:49).](image-url)
Making history ‘work’ for the state also meant collapsing the assumed distance between fine art, popular culture and the media, thereby creating not only seamlessness through iteration, but also greater accessibility. During the early twentieth century, *Die Huisgenoot* was, for example, “largely positioned within the so-called ‘high’ or idealist culture” of the nationalists (Viljoen & Viljoen, 2005:91). Pierneef, in fact, produced numerous artworks for print media, such as the cover of the commemorative issue of *Die Huisgenoot* (Fig. 4), which was published in December 1938 as part of the centenary celebrations of the Great Trek (Nel, 1990:170). During this time, Pierneef’s equally celebrated contemporary, Willem Hermanus Coetzer, was responsible for creating Great Trek commemorative postage stamps, thereby mass producing the memory of the nation’s noble origins (Freschi, 2011:11). The celebrations also mobilised the remembrance of “the heroism and suffering of the [South African] war [which resulted in the publication of a] spate of popular books on the war … along with numerous articles in popular magazines and newspapers” (Giliomee, 2009:432).

**Fig. 4.** Jakob Hendrik Pierneef, cover illustration for *Die Huisgenoot, commemorative issue: The Great Trek* (detail), 1938. (Nel, 1990:172).
The triumph of the National Party during the elections of 1948 decisively recovered the Afrikaners’ social self-confidence, and a powerful ethnic politics could finally be mobilised. The defeat of the United Party (which was considered partial to the advancement of English-speaking whites) signalled that the Afrikaners had finally become the dominant white grouping in South Africa (Giliomee, 2009:490). After establishing their hegemony, the National Party deployed a number of social, legislative and economic apparatuses in the post-1948 period that secured the privilege and power of the Afrikaners. Certainly, the most incendiary of these strategies was the implementation of apartheid, which “rested on several bases: political apartheid restricting all power to whites, the enforced separation of existing communities, segregated education [and] influx control that restricted African movement into cities” (Giliomee, 2009:500). The nationalists also “constructed a scheme with both materialist and ethnic appeal to raise an ethnic mobilisation capable of improving and securing the economic position of [Afrikaners through] racial protectionism which offered welfare, subsidies and job reservation” (Davies, 2009:19).

Indeed, even the formative years of Afrikaner nationalism were characterised by attempts to curb the poverty that plagued the Afrikaner community (Davies, 2009:24). A decade before the institutionalisation of apartheid, the centenary celebrations of the Great Trek, for example, “paralleled the economic journey of Afrikanerdom from a debilitating depression”, partly precipitated by the South African war, and “gave powerful expression to the longing for a more prosperous future” (Grundlingh, 2001:98). At its peak, Afrikaner nationalism therefore extended across a number of proto-nationalist organisations, especially financiers such as Sanlam and Santam, that advanced Afrikaner capital and created economic imbalances that cut across racial lines and would persist long after apartheid had ended (Vestergaard, 2001:20).

Moreover, the media, culture industry and education system were instrumental in cementing the nationalist agenda of promoting Afrikaans and its related

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8Sanlam and Santam, ‘insurance giants’ founded in 1918, shared an affinity with the National Party since their inception (Giliomee, 2009:387). In fact, although their correspondence was in Afrikaans and English, the “companies marketed themselves as ‘genuine Afrikaner people’s institutions’”, and especially targeted wealthy Afrikaner farmers (Giliomee, 2009:387).
forms of cultural expression to the point of standardisation (Giliomee, 2009:377; Wasserman & Botma, 2008; Wasserman, 2009). One could, in fact, argue that vying for Afrikaans to have “parity of esteem with English” was the main thrust of Afrikaner nationalism, and as “Afrikaans and Afrikaner culture gained more social and symbolic capital [it was] transferred into cultural and economic capital in the field of cultural production” (Botma, 2008:52). The publishing giant, Naspers (formerly Nasionale Pers) played a pivotal role in establishing Afrikaans as an official language and published the widely consumed Afrikaans newspaper, *Die Burger*, often conceived of as the mouthpiece of the National Party (Botma, 2008: 52; Duffy, 2006:90; Wasserman, 2009:64). The power of print media and its propagation of linguistic biases therefore cannot be overstated, since the “convergence of capitalism and print technology [creates] unified fields of exchange and communication [that imagine a consolidated] community, which in its basic morphology [sets] the stage for the modern nation” (Anderson, 1983:44, 46).

Afrikaans was positioned by nationalist apparatuses, such as prescribed schooling and a ubiquitous media presence, as a ‘unitary phenomenon’ essential for political mobilisation, but this required that a fixity be given to the language by overruling the “continuum of language interactions in multilingual” Afrikaans-speaking communities (Van der Waal, 2008:55, 56). Suppressing the many varieties of Afrikaans that were spoken in South Africa created a discourse of standardised Afrikaans as “supposedly the language of white people”, thus cementing a direct correlation between Afrikaans and national identity (Van der Waal, 2008:62). These processes of institutionalisation also denied the Creole origins of the language by relegating non-white variants of Afrikaans to the substandard sphere of the colloquial, thereby entrenching the ideology of white superiority (Van der Waal, 2011:68).

The press and public broadcaster also played a pivotal role in naturalising apartheid logic (manifest in ethnically-specific, exclusive media), and provided the opportunity to hierarchically organise media products in order to grant Afrikaans the most airtime and, therefore, general exposure (Marlin-Curiel, 2001:155; Wasserman & Botma, 2008:5; Wasserman, 2009:65). Such discursive
manipulations provided the white variant of Afrikaans with a constructed ‘linguistic authority’ (Mookherjee, 2011:1) that, together with the media and popular culture, enabled the nationalist movement to materialise its ‘collectivity’ (Vestergaard, 2001:23). Thus, signifiers such as the national flag, the national anthem, Afrikaans literature, nationalist art and memorial sites “were found to fill empty signifieds and imbue them with meaning, a meaning that is ... constructed [via metonymy] in order to hide the politics behind ‘nation as natural’” (Koundoura, 1998:74). The brief historical trajectory sketched above emphasises the ‘holy period’ of Afrikanerdom (Motyl, 2001:3), and provides some insights regarding the manner in which the early visual and material culture of the Afrikaners was ideologically aligned with Afrikaner nationalism in an attempt to foster a powerful sense of ethnocentrism (Bizumic & Duckitt, 2008:438).

Imagining a homogeneous Afrikaner community, however, proved unsustainable. In the following section, I explore the unravelling of Afrikaner nationalism with reference to two specific periods of transformation that would irrevocably alter the Afrikaners’ carefully constructed world. I first examine how the dominant mode of Afrikaner nationalism discussed above became irreconcilable with the bourgeois ideals of an emerging cosmopolitan Afrikaner in the mid to late twentieth century, resulting in growing dissatisfaction and, to a certain degree, political apathy (Blaser, 2012; Grundlingh, 2001). The Afrikaner’s apparent desire to modernise is also briefly discussed as reflected in the nationalist art of the time, which engaged an internationally recognisable aesthetic vocabulary of abstraction, and abandoned the provincial slant of earlier nationalist art and visual culture (Freschi, 2011).

The second and final blow was far larger in scope and centres on the sea-change brought about by the shift from gross racial prejudice to a post-apartheid milieu in which the Afrikaners, a small, white minority that had controlled an entire state, lost not only power, but also a sense of belonging and self (Blaser, 2004; De Vries, 2012). Selected discursive and material spaces where Afrikaner culture is asserted in post-apartheid South Africa are also critiqued as realms that attempt
to mitigate such feelings of ‘homelessness’ by recuperating collective, exclusive constructions of Afrikaner ethnic identity.

2.3 Afrikaner ethnic identity and discourses of modernisation and dissidence

This section explores the current state of affairs in which Afrikaners are often thought of as disempowered, emasculated, traumatised and insecure – a ‘crisis’ of identity (Blaser, 2012; De Vries, 2012; Giliomee, 2009; Walker, 2005). This milieu has been precipitated not only by the loss of political power, but also competing, ‘disruptive’ discourses of a new national affirmative action, African nationalism and South Africa’s liberal constitution that empowers not only black individuals, but also women and queer citizens (Krog, 2010:11; Walker, 2005:226-227). Yet, to provide a comprehensive understanding of the decline of Afrikaner nationalism, one must first make a “case for an [initial] unravelling from within, from the realm of ideas and sentiments, how [Afrikaners] saw themselves within the world around them, and how this affected their thoughts, feelings, identifications and actions” [my emphasis] (Blaser, 2012:3).

One could argue that Afrikaner ethnicity is, in fact, historically characterised by ‘internal dissent’ (Davies, 2009:106). The 1960s saw the emergence of a subversive literary movement referred to as the ‘Sestigers’. This “Generation of the Sixties, embraced secularization, modernity, racial tolerance and sexual freedom” and the expressions of its members therefore provided cutting critiques of the apartheid regime and the compartmental nature of Afrikanerness (Giliomee, 2009:554-556). Similarly, the 1980s were witness to the musical

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9The main proponents of the Sestigers-movement, which (amongst others) included prominent literary figures such as the writers, André P. Brink and Etienne Leroux, and the poets, Breyten Breytenbach and Ingrid Jonker, also mobilised against apartheid censorship, which sought to curb the sexual frankness and political critique that characterised much of their writing (Viljoen, 2012). Moreover, their personal lives were also reprimanded: Breytenbach’s wife, a Vietnamese woman, was, for example, refused a South African visa, because she was considered ‘non-white’ by the apartheid government (which had already expressed its distaste at Breytenbach’s interracial marriage) (Giliomee, 2009; Viljoen, 2012). Yet, what perhaps vexed nationalists most, was the fact that the works produced by the Sestigers did not engage the dominant political and literary discourses that revered Afrikaner history and the ‘unbreakable spirit’ of the Afrikaner – instead, they sought to provide alternative histories and identity-positions that did not fit nationalist conceptions of a hegemonic, stable Afrikanerness (Viljoen, 2012).
movement, Voëlvry, whose members’ lyrics and performances “satirized the state, Afrikaans political leaders, the South African Defence Force [which imposed a militarised, heteronormative Afrikaner masculinity] the apartheid system, and white middle-class values” (Grundlingh, 2004b:485, 497).

Despite the significance of such movements in shaping the ‘modern’ Afrikaner, I am particularly interested in the momentous growth of the South African economy in the 1960s and 1970s, which significantly shifted the class status of Afrikaners. With the power of the state and the Broederbond behind them, Afrikaners had become masters of industry (especially agriculture), and were largely urbanised and overwhelmingly bourgeois (Davies, 2009:106; Giliomee, 2009:543; Grundlingh, 2001:99). These developments, however, lent precariousness to Afrikaner nationalism, since the complacency of a privileged middle-class existence apparently undermined political incentives, especially the crucial project of maintaining a white-owned state, while an ‘emotional’ ethnic bond seemed increasingly unnecessary (Blaser, 2012:3, 6):

The generation of Afrikaners that had come to maturity in the 1960s and 1970s thus had an awareness of themselves and their place in the world that was profoundly different from that which had informed [previous generations]. The bitter history of the concentration camps and the ravages of the South African [war] that had fuelled Afrikaner nationalism [in the early twentieth century], while not receding in

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10 In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Voëlvry-musicians also gave expression to their dissidence by performing and socialising in Yeoville, a neighbourhood in Johannesburg that was “one of the first urban spaces in apartheid South Africa” where segregation laws were being steadily challenged via racial intermixing (Suriano & Lewis, 2015:1). Moreover, the musicians’ disregard for racial segregation was deemed especially transgressive, given that most were white and Afrikaans-speaking, and asserted themselves as such (Grundlingh, 2004b). In 1989, Voëlvry toured the country and their “explicit anti-apartheid message unleashed an enthusiasm that was succinctly described as ‘Boer Beatlemania’”, especially amongst young, liberal Afrikaners desperate for identity-positions and politics that could counter and undermine the oppressive patriarchy that was at the core of Afrikaner nationalism and the apartheid regime (Grundlingh, 2004b:485).

11 The Afrikaner Broederbond (Brotherhood) was founded in 1918, and is a right-wing secret society that played an instrumental role in establishing Afrikaner power before and during apartheid (Giliomee, 2009:400-401). The Broederbond restricted its membership to male, conservative Afrikaners, and attracted prominent politicians, academics, entrepreneurs and church leaders (Freschi, 2009:526). The Broederbond sought to secure the political, economic, moral and cultural well-being of Afrikaners via an unwavering loyalty to the National Party, the establishment of co-operative financial institutions that could assuage Afrikaner poverty, and a cultural wing, the Federatie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge (Federation of Afrikaans Cultural Associations, or FAK), that ensured the continued public use and legitimacy of Afrikaans (Freschi, 2009:526; Giliomee, 2009:401, 544).
ideological significance, were no longer part of the living memory of the economically active population (Freschi, 2011:22-23).

The nationalist vision of unwavering ethnic cohesion was undermined by so-called verligte (enlightened) Afrikaners, who apparently valued sophistication and personal wealth above the needs of the nation-state and were pitted against the right, who viewed themselves as “the custodians of the ‘soul’ of Afrikanerdom” and “argued vociferously for ... ‘pure’ nationalism and hegemonic apartheid” (Grundlingh, 2001:100). On the left, the imperative to maintain a consolidated political front by devotion to traditional conceptions of Afrikaner nationalism seemed outmoded, since white rule (and the benefits associated with it) was already firmly in place (Blaser, 2012:6; Freschi, 2011:21).

The apartheid government was also criticised for inhibiting the acquisition of monetary and cultural capital from translocal interactions, because of boycotts from the international community and state censorship (Blaser, 2012:1-2; Coombes, 2003:23). The United States, for example, significantly valued its economic and political relationships with South Africa, which became an ally against the spread of communism during the Cold War (Giliomee, 2009:572), and offered access to the “important Cape sea route ... reserves of rare minerals [and] the South African market” (Thomson, 2008:2). Yet, the liaisons between South Africa, the United States and other foreign investors were strained (and in some cases completely terminated) by the continuing human rights violations.

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12 Afrikaners such as Beyers Naudé and Braam Fischer, however, assailed the apartheid government via radical political activism, thus illustrating that dissidence on the left was not necessarily mobilised by capitalist endeavours only (Giliomee, 2009:533). In 1963, Naudé (a minister of the Dutch Reformed Church) “became director of the Christian Institute, an ecumenical body founded to co-ordinate opposition within the existing South African churches to apartheid” (Giliomee, 2009:529). During this time he was also expelled from the Broederbond (Giliomee, 2009:421, 529). In 1965, Fischer was sentenced to life imprisonment for leading “a joint African National Congress-SA Communist plan” to overthrow the apartheid government (Giliomee, 2009:533).

13 During Angola’s fraught disengagement from Portuguese domination in the late 1970s, the military assistance offered to leftist Angolan movements by Cuba and the Soviet Union prompted the United States to ask “South Africa to provide training for the anti-Marxist movements in Angola ... and ... offered financial assistance to this end” (Giliomee, 2009:572). However, once the United Nations decried South Africa’s involvement in Angola, the United States risked being viewed as a cohort to apartheid, and subsequently withdrew their support (Giliomee, 2009:573).
perpetrated by the apartheid government and its pernicious racist policies (Thomson, 2008).

The 1970s and 1980s were therefore marked by international action against South Africa, which involved “an embargo on the sale of military hardware, financial sanctions, refusing visas to South African officials and nationals, and boycotts of produce and products” (Booth, 2003:477). South Africa’s pariah status was further compounded by increasing pressure from the United Nations and other anti-apartheid movements that called for the abolishment of racial segregation and a significant reformation of the South African government: this, for example, included granting Namibia (previously South West Africa, which had been annexed by South Africa and subjected to apartheid legislation) independence; withdrawing South Africa’s military presence from neighbouring African states that sought their own liberation from colonial domination; and instituting a democratic vote that would grant black and white South Africans civil equity (Giliomee, 2009).

Simultaneously, at a domestic level, South Africa was plagued by “guerrilla attacks, civil disobedience campaigns, strikes ... marches and rallies, and boycotts of apartheid institutions, goods and services” (Booth, 2003:477). The End Conscription Campaign (ECC), together with cultural movements such as Voëlvry, for example, vehemently opposed the compulsory 2-year conscription for white men who were deployed to South Africa’s borders to moderate expanding African socialist movements in Namibia, Angola and Zimbabwe (previously Rhodesia) (Grundlingh, 2004b). Yet, most white South Africans supported the conflict, fearing that black consciousness movements elsewhere in Africa would provide “bases for South Africa’s own guerrilla movements, the African National Congress and the Pan African Congress” (Giliomee, 2009:571, 572). As a result, the South African government also had to temper an overwhelming sense of paranoia amongst many of its white constituents, who were anxious about the possibility of the “nationalization of land and industries ... and the flight of whites” (Giliomee, 2009:571).
A significant number of (liberal and conservative) Afrikaners therefore became disillusioned with apartheid and the National Party, which failed to establish a compelling sense of national security, had become an international scapegoat for racial hatred, and restricted global, modernising influences. Before the introduction of television in 1976\(^{14}\), for example, the South African government was responsible for “the incessant broadcasting of nationalistic programming on state-sponsored media [which] warned against the dangers of non-Afrikaans movies, books, and music” (Marlin-Curiel, 2001:155). Furthermore, “travel, cosmopolitanism and other experiences outside [the confines of Afrikaner ethnicity] were vehemently discouraged and construed by the state as threats” (Marlin-Curiel, 2001:155).

A paradigmatic shift had thus occurred and the introversion of the Afrikaner receded in favour of an “assertive and self-conscious modernity” (Freschi, 2011:24) and “styles of consumption prevalent among the middle classes elsewhere in the West” (Grundlingh, 2004b:490). This development is symptomatic of the manner in which globalisation and the rise of neo-liberalism have decentred seemingly stable identities, thereby fracturing previously consolidated social categories (such as Afrikaner ethnicity) into a multiplicity of identifications by privileging individual, consumerist choices above collective choices (Blaser, 2012:2; Hall, 1992:278, 279, 284).

One of the sites where the changing face of Afrikaner nationalism appears to be most evident is in the art produced during this shift toward international recognition and congruence. In fact, the canon of painting had shifted significantly, and instead of reiterating the “backward-looking, blood-and-soil imagery” of earlier nationalist art, it now adopted an aesthetic that was reconcilable “with the aspirations of a modern nation state” and global trends toward abstraction in visual art (Freschi, 2011:15). The proliferation of state sponsored buildings that coincided with the urban sprawl brought about by the economic boom of the 1960s and 1970s, propelled the institutionalisation of

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\(^{14}\)The introduction of television was vehemently opposed by the National Party in South Africa in the 1950s and 1960s, because of the belief that the nationalist project of “‘separate development’ from the rest of the world [which was] determined by internal rather than external politics” would be compromised by the ‘integrative effects’ of television (Evans, 2014:27).
modern Afrikaner nationalist art (Freschi, 2011:13). Erik Laubscher's abstract vision (Fig. 5), for example, illustrates that although “the landscape was firmly established as a canonical trope [in Afrikaner nationalist art] at some point in the 1960s it became conflated with a new imaginary of the Afrikaner – no longer a hick out of step with the world, but urban, sophisticated and firmly in control of his destiny” (Freschi, 2011:24).

![Fig. 5. Erik Laubscher, Landscape, 1967. Acrylic on canvas, 105 x 120cm. (Freschi, 2011:22).](image)

Another example of this shifting social, economic and political climate in South Africa is the changing focus of nationalist narratives on the revered Afrikaner writer, Eugène Marais (Swart, 2004). In the 1930s, during which the nationalist movement fixated on establishing a clearly defined and distinct ethnic identity, Marais was often portrayed as a ‘national treasure’ whose poetry evoked the unique spirit of the Afrikaner (Swart, 2004:855). During the 1960s, however, his science writing and status as an expert on animal behaviour was foregrounded, since it was more compatible with the Afrikaners’ ascent to worldliness and
international recognition, with representations of Marais comfortably consolidating the “authentic bushveld Afrikaner with being a genius” (Swart, 2004:861). Ultimately, these cultural forms of expression became emblematic of the emphasis placed on progress and a promising future, instead of a tumultuous history, in the social and psychological landscapes of the Afrikaner imaginary in the latter half of the twentieth century (Freschi, 2011:21).

Negotiations of temporality are, in fact, indispensable to “national invention [since history provides] a theatrical stage for the collective acting out” of national identity (McClintock, 1997:103). The burgeoning nation-state maintains a charged, often contradictory relationship with its past, since progress seemingly depends on a simultaneous recognition and disavowal of lapsed time:

Though they seem to invoke an origin in a historical past, with which they continue to correspond, actually [modernising national identities] are about questions of using the resources of history, language and culture in the process of becoming rather than being ... How we have been represented and how that bears on how we might represent ourselves [my emphasis] (Hall, 1996:4).

One could argue that aspirational national identities therefore revisit “images [and narratives] of archaic time to identify what is [by contrast,] historically new about enlightened, national progress” (McClintock, 1997:92). 15 From the 1960s and 1970s onwards, kudos could therefore be obtained from performing Afrikanerness through liberalism, consumerism and cosmopolitanism: such practices suggested cultural superiority to verkrampte or conservative Afrikaners who valued tradition and myth not as constructs to be surmounted, but as sanctified essences of ethnic identity (Bhabha, 1990:295; Freschi, 2011:21; Giliomee, 2009:549). The modern nation, as a discursive construct, exists in a ‘double-time’, since “[b]eing obliged to forget becomes the basis for remembering the nation, peopling it anew, imagining the possibility of other contending and

15Given the racial prejudice that permeated apartheid logic, one must acknowledge that the notion of progress is ultimately also articulated in a colonial vernacular of white superiority, which (through authoritative discourses such as anthropological study) position the black Other as “always the same, unchanging [and] uniform” (Said, 1978:98). One could argue that the modernity of Afrikaners “sought to distance itself from the perceived slowness [or ‘timelessness’] of its others. It needed this temporality to achieve domination” by creating a discursive divide between white civilisation and black primitivity (McRobbie, 2005:103-104).

Koos Kombuis, Johannes Kerkorrel and other musicians associated with the Voëlvry movement “rejected a certain form of Afrikaner identity [they deemed obsolete and stifled, but] at the core of what they represented was a broader formulation” of that very construct, which they employed as a claim to distinction that individuated them from the broader anti-apartheid struggle (Grundlingh, 2004b:495). They sought to “make Afrikaans part of a wider world through rock and roll”, which can be aligned with other liberal Afrikaners’ tendencies toward globalisation and modernisation during this time (Grundlingh, 2004b:495). They, however, had a keen awareness of the fact that the success of their political message depended on “connecting … a usable past with ongoing contemporary life [because] potential critical impact is heightened as the familiar is recognizable, but in a defamiliarized shape” (Grundlingh, 2004b: 498-499).

Bitterkomix, “a series of satirical underground” comic books (first published in 1992) is, for example, considered a landmark in the ideological project of stripping symbols of Afrikanerdom of their power by reducing their mythical status to ironic, often pornographic, ‘kitsch’ (Barnard, 2004:719, 725). Similarly, musicians associated with the Voëlvry movement parodied the nineteenth-century meeting of slain Afrikaner hero, Piet Retief, and the Zulu king, Dingane, who ordered the execution of Retief and other voortrekker men (Angove, 1992:40).16 Their cabaret, Piekniek by Dingaan (Picnic at Dingane’s), trivialised the legacy of Retief’s martyred status by lending a sense of the absurd to nationalist fixations on symbolically charged personas and events (Angove, 1992:40).17

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16 Retief had attempted to negotiate the settlement of the voortrekkers in Kwazulu-Natal, but upon arriving at Dingane’s homestead on 6 February 1838, Retief and his men were persuaded to lay down their arms, “whereupon the Zulu king’s men seized all the unarmed trekkers and their servants and clubbed … them to death one by one” (Giliomee, 2009:164-165).

17 The cabaret can, in fact, be viewed as an extension of the musicians’ other discursive attacks on Afrikanerdom, which manifested not only in their lyrics, but also in the naming of their
The Voëlvry members’ subversive use of traditional symbols from their own Afrikaner heritage is indicative of the manner in which nationalism is subject to a “necessary slippage and loss of the possibility of an ‘absolute return’ to that originary version of the nation in which the nation is, of course, so invested” (Mookherjee, 2011:7):

A particular popular song in this respect was “Ossewa” (Ox-wagon) [(1989), which transformed the emblematic ox-wagon of the Great Trek of 1838 into a] modified modern car with a V6 engine and a tape deck blaring Elvis Presley music … Symbolically the oxwagon is now being put to a different use. Where the oxwagon was usually associated with closed, inward-looking worldviews (often referred to as the laager mentality), the new revamped oxwagon was to lead Afrikaners out of their political and cultural impasse into a brighter future. But even though it was now billed as a “funky” oxwagon, the refrain of the song – “sweet, sweet ossewa” – was a constant reminder of the enduring familiarity and almost endearing reliance of the symbol (Grundlingh, 2004b:499-500).

The Afrikaners’ disillusionment with apartheid therefore “happened gradually and unevenly” – some “started to evince some embarrassment at aspects of ethnic exclusivity redolent of an earlier era” (Grundlingh, 2001:100), while others found it consoling to look towards the past in nostalgic pursuit of honourable Afrikaner role-models and historical narratives unspoilt by apartheid (Grundlingh, 2004b:499).

2.4 Losing power/losing oneself: Afrikaner ethnicity in ‘crisis’

In 1990, President F.W. de Klerk (leader of the now defunct National Party) “announced the lifting of the ban on the [African National Congress (ANC)] and other revolutionary organizations” that sought to obliterate white supremacy in South Africa (Giliomee, 2009:429). The central argument that had propelled De Klerk’s decision was that “whites as a shrinking proportion of the population would get a much better deal before their backs were against the wall” (Giliomee, 2009:631). Furthermore, this momentous gesture coincided with the release of Nelson Mandela (a prominent ANC-leader) from prison, and the decision to put a

collective as Die Gereformeerde Blues Band (The Reformed Blues Band) – an ironic appropriation of the Dutch Reformed Church (one of the main ideological pillars of Afrikaner nationalism and apartheid) (Angove, 1992; Grundlingh, 2004b).
“proportional vote electoral system” into action, which effected “the acceleration of the disintegration of Afrikaner nationalism” (Giliomee, 2009:630, 633). Indeed, by the time the political and social spheres in South Africa had adopted a democratic ethos, following the electoral victory of the ANC and Mandela’s presidency in 1994, Afrikaner nationalism was a ‘spent force’ – its gradual decline had seemingly culminated in its total collapse (Blaser, 2012:1).

Simultaneously, the link between Afrikaner identity and the state, “which sustained a delicate balance of ethnic, racial and class forces [was] irretrievably broken” (Davies, 2009:2). This, however, does not suggest that attitudes of superiority among selected Afrikaners did not persist, but the discourses and institutions that had buttressed such positions no longer exerted the same power, and have made way for new, reparative structures (Du Pisani, 2001:172).

Whereas the apartheid state sanctioned the economic advancement of white South Africans, the new dispensation instated policies of employment equity and black economic empowerment (BEE), which relegated especially white men to a disadvantaged position by favouring black individuals, women and disabled South Africans (De Vries, 2012:9).\(^\text{18}\)

The Dutch Reformed Church, once a beacon of Afrikanerdom, no longer holds an unwavering congregation and has failed to remain a consolidating force amongst Afrikaners (De Vries, 2012:327; Giliomee, 2009:660). Regarding political discourses, “many [Afrikaners feel disempowered and] claim they no longer have a legitimate space from which to enter the national conversation and that their voices are not heard” (Scott, 2012:746-747). The post-apartheid milieu has not only occasioned a loss of autonomy by eroding the tenets between Afrikanerness and a sovereign national identity, but Afrikaners may also experience a sense of irrelevance and persecution, since they are excluded from the realms of history-

\(^{18}\)Although employment equity is perceived by many whites as “a form of reverse discrimination and a policy of vengeance” that engenders fears of redundancy (De Beer, Rothmann and Pienaar, 2015:5), the social reality is that economic mobility in South Africa remains dominated by white males: “[s]ignificantly, despite 15 years of predominantly race-based affirmative action, the Commission for Employment Equity pessimistically reports that the percentage of ‘Whites’ in top management has remained static at 73%, with ‘White’ men constituting almost 60% of these positions” (Erasmus, 2014:2).
and meaning-making and are suffering various ‘attacks’ on their ethnic identities (Steyn, 2001:159-160).

The cover for *The Best of Bitterkomix Vol. 1* (Fig. 6), for example, features a despairing “Afrikaner martyr figure [with] his body covered in patriotic tattoos, standing in his stained underpants in a graveyard of dead volk heroes”¹⁹, thereby satirising the notion that the collapse of Afrikaner patriarchy has led to the demoralisation of the Afrikaners (Mason, 2006:7). In view of this, it becomes significant to distinguish amongst the “dimensions on which threats may vary” (Korf & Malan, 2002:152): it appears that *material* threats (such as BEE policies) are less pressing than so-called *symbolic* threats, which invalidate ethnic markers and call the ‘character’ of Afrikanerness into question. Although it had formed part of the history curriculum at school-level during apartheid, the revered narratives of the Battle of Blood River and the Great Trek (indispensable to the formative years of Afrikaner nationalism) now barely feature in grassroots South African historiography (De Vries, 2012:58; Hofmeyr, 1988:522; Swart, 2004:849; Van Robbroeck, 2008:128).

The Voortrekker Monument, previously sanctified as an “apparently stable signifier of monolithic nationalist associations” (Coombes, 2003:25), has been subjected to iconoclasm,²⁰ and while its original meaning had been one of Afrikaner glory, it now acquired contradictory meanings: the symbolic power of the monolith had shifted so tremendously that, in a post-apartheid world, it could very well be interpreted as representing what black people have had to overcome – *their* triumph (Coombes, 2003: 12, 23, 44-45; Grundlingh, 2001:104; Vestergaard, 2001:23). The volatile status of the Afrikaans language in the new South Africa has also caused major concern for many Afrikaners who still view the language as the prime “symbol of their sense of place and community” (Giliomee, 2009:664).

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¹⁹ The ‘graves’ of the apartheid-era presidents, H.F. Verwoerd and D.F. Malan, are, for example, discernible.
²⁰ Consider, for example, that in the year following South Africa’s first democratic elections (1995), the Afrikaans pornographic magazine, *Loslyf*, featured the Voortrekker Monument as the backdrop to an erotic pictorial featuring a young Afrikaner woman, Dina, who is a far cry from the dignified, Christian nationalist sentiments that the monument had originally been imbued with (Coombes, 2003:44-45).
While there was no need for Afrikaners to concern themselves with the sustainability of Afrikaans before and during apartheid (when the state ensured the hegemony of the language) contemporary discourses of African nationalism exercise increasing pressure on institutions such as universities and schools to adopt a parallel medium of instruction (Giliomee, 2009:658). Also, the presence of Afrikaans “in the state television service … had dropped precipitously from the pre-1994 situation when it alternated with English on one channel in prime time to less than ten per cent of the channel” (Giliomee, 2009:659). Indeed, Afrikaans has been relegated to one of the South Africa’s eleven official languages, whereas it had been historically and discursively positioned as a
“unitary language for a state [which provided] a basis for political mobilisation” (Van der Waal, 2008:56).

Ultimately, in a “general delegitimization of Afrikaner history”, the national anthem and flag, and even the Afrikaans names of streets, public buildings and towns, for example, have mostly been supplanted to become integrated with the new political and social climate (Vestergaard, 2001:22-24). This begs the question (seemingly at the base of Afrikaner anxiety in post-apartheid South Africa) whether one disappears along with one’s disappearing symbols (Verwey & Quayle, 2012:556). Inversely, having their ethnic identity put into stark relief has its own repercussions for Afrikaners in maintaining a healthy self-image.

The postcolonial critique of whiteness, in fact, often highlights the tendency of this construct as operating in a sphere of racial neutrality, normativity or obscurity – it has, through discursive and material colonisation, created Others in opposition to itself, while maintaining a sheer synonymy with humanity (Scott, 2012; Steyn, 2001; Steyn 2004; Straker, 2004). In post-apartheid South Africa, however, the “Western center is tipped” (Steyn, 2001:150) and whiteness has not only lost its power, but the “previously unseen [is] being made forcibly visible” (Steyn, 2004a:150). As the atrocities of racial segregation become publicly aired, by, for example, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), “Afrikaners [are constantly reminded] that they cannot escape that the apartheid system was put in place in their name” (Steyn, 2004a:150) and that there is “very little on which to pin self-respect now that the previously voiceless are telling their stories” (Steyn, 2001:160).

One could argue that the “ideal of whiteness itself – as expressed in the values of liberty, equality, fraternity, and justice – has been betrayed” and, as the beneficiaries of apartheid, Afrikaners experience feelings of disgrace, guilt, trauma and marginalisation in post-apartheid South Africa (Straker, 2004:409). In fact, “perhaps nothing in the democratic era has stung white South Africans as deeply as the government’s re-racialisation of the public sphere [which has signalled the] steady emergence of racial typecasting”, especially the equation of
whiteness and racism (Ballantine, 2004:122). An unsustainably utopian ethos of race-blindness and peaceful multiculturalism, which characterised the euphoric period directly following democratisation, would (under Thabo Mbeki’s presidency) soon turn to powerful discourses of Afro-nationalism that reinstated binaries of black and white; the oppressed and the oppressor; the impoverished and the wealthy (Ballantine, 2004:108; Blaser, 2004: 179; Giliomee, 2009:662).

It would appear that in reaction to being ‘exposed’, Afrikaners have realised that their “social imaginary [must transform] as a new moral order emerges” (Blaser, 2012:9), and they consequently employ various strategies of identity-work to ‘rehabilitate’ their social and psychological selves (Steyn, 2004a:150). The abolition of apartheid presents a distinctly postmodern moment that has lent a “high degree of self-consciousness [to] Afrikaners” (Vestergaard, 2001:34), who now employ “the energy previously allocated to enforcing modernist whiteness ... in creative energy, choosing more varied options of personal and social redefinition” (Steyn, 2001:151, 161). Following democratisation “[t]here [is] a tendency to couple [or substitute] an Afrikaans identity with other identities ... people [become] Afrikaners and South Africans, Afrikaners and Africans, Afrikaners and Afrikaanses, an awkward term used to designate all Afrikaans-speakers regardless of colour” (Giliomee, 2009:664). The South African photographer, Roelof Petrus van Wyk, for example, states that his collection of photographs of young Afrikaners (entitled Jong Afrikaner) (Fig. 7) illustrates that a “[m]odern Afrikaner is someone who is in touch with the present place and time; who is engaged with living in Africa, and open to experiencing other cultures without fear of losing their own” (Van Wyk cited in Barnardt, 2013:5).

\[21\] It is significant to take into consideration that English-speaking white South Africans were also beneficiaries of the apartheid regime, but “can adopt a more equivocal position in relation to the policy that they supported in increasing numbers throughout the ... years”, since their identities are evidently not as inextricably enmeshed with Afrikaner nationalist ideology (Steyn, 2004a:150). The anxiety created by a disturbingly new post-apartheid world is also perhaps far greater for Afrikaners, because English whiteness “has an international ideological center which gives the ‘we/us’ a stable continuity [while] Afrikaners are contending with a profound existential crisis, grappling with the question ‘Who are we?’” (Steyn, 2004a:153).

\[22\] Van Wyk’s photographs have, however, been critiqued as lacking the self-reflexivity that he claims they possess. The aesthetics of the photographs (which have been likened to fashion photography) are antithetical to the ethnographic gaze that the photographer intends to subversively turn on the white subject: the photographs ultimately appear as manifest ethnic
Contemporary Afrikanerness therefore does not resist absorbing or disavowing particular inflections of identity, but navigates amongst forces of denial, assimilation, integration and segregation (De Vries, 2012:391). Instead of being always-already ethnically categorised, “[p]erforming the self becomes a choice” for Afrikaners, not an unequivocal, essentialist role that they are born into (Blaser, 2012:13). There are a multiplicity of strategies employed by Afrikaners to create new, “self-respecting subject positions” (Steyn, 2004a:146): they constitute competing ways of being an Afrikaner in post-apartheid South Africa, and it is important for the purposes of this study to explore selected constructs in order to further motivate that a unified or singular Afrikaner identity does not and never has existed beyond the cultural imaginary.

In order to acclimatise to the ‘hostile’ social and political environment that the victory of the ANC had precipitated, some argue that “the bulk of Afrikanerdom narcissism, and therefore reiterate the perceived superiority of Afrikanerness that they attempt to destabilise (Marais, 2012; Van der Watt, 2014).
is fleeing from the past” and choose to disentangle from their ethnic heritage in order to counter the stigma associated with being an Afrikaner (Grundlingh, 2001:102). This phenomenon is partly motivated by the resentful notion that contemporary Afrikaners, who have come of age after apartheid, are paying the moral debt they did not create – considering that amnesia is etymologically derived from amnesty, they apparently yearn to forget that forgiveness must be obtained (Van Robbroeck, 2008:133).

For example, Hunter Kennedy (lyricist and guitarist of the Afrikaans punk-band Fokofpolisiekar (Fuck-Off Police Car)) states that the song, Brand Suid-Afrika (Burn South Africa) (2007) articulates his desire to be unapologetically Afrikaans by means of emancipation from ‘the sins of our fathers’: “Let’s leave all the rubbish behind; let’s, like the proverbial phoenix, rise from our own ashes; let’s burn down the whole past” (De Vries, 2012:260). Expressions of disenchantment, betrayal and anger permeate much of Fokofpolisiekar’s vernacular and, owing to the band’s popularity amongst Afrikaner youth, one can conceive of “a harsh awakening” for present-day Afrikaners who are “encountering [disgraceful] histories that flatly contradict” the versions that they were socialised into (Marlin-Curiel, 2001:153).

Their performances are propelled by violent nihilism, substance abuse, sacrilege and sexual provocation, which can be viewed as discursive attacks on their formative years in prosaic, middle-class, Afrikaans suburbs in Cape Town (spaces seemingly permeated by a particularly oppressive Calvinism) (Kennedy, Van Coke, Myburgh, Krog & Marais, 2010). Their dissidence is therefore akin to members of the Voëlvry movement (discussed earlier), of which “at least three ... were sons of ministers of religion [while] others had a strict religious upbringing” (Grundlingh, 2004b: 487). Moreover, the music video that accompanies Brand Suid-Afrika (2007) features a laager of old-fashioned cars (in fact, reimagined ox-wagons) that surround the band as they perform, thereby satirising the insulation that had characterised so much of their ethnic heritage, while the

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23The original excerpt appears in Afrikaans, and reads: “Laat ons asseblief tog al die gemors agterlaat; laat ons soos die spreekwoordelike feniks uit ons eie as opstaan; laat ons die hele verlede verbrand”.

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image of two stereotypical, burly boere (farmers) kissing aims to affront the institutionalised heterosexuality of traditional Afrikaner masculinity.

Instead of Afrikanerness being that which subsumes other identifications, in some instances it is assigned a secondary position to other traits (such as social class) and is deflected, which is indicative of the notion that the “thick’ ethnic identity … of the previous generation … [often] fails to be transmitted” to contemporary Afrikaners (Blaser, 2012:14). Historically, this has been evidenced by prominent and powerful Afrikaner businesses, such as Volkskas-bank and the publisher Naspers, who have “shed [their] ethnic character” in order not to alienate stakeholders and consumers that cut across “language and racial lines” (Giliomee, 2009:659). Numerous Afrikaners, “mostly belonging to the upper income categories”, have also defected from the language group and educate their children in English (Giliomee, 2009:663).

The dislocation of Afrikaner nationalism has, amongst selected individuals with an Afrikaner heritage, resulted in the performance of so-called “sanitized versions of Afrikaner identity” (Verwey & Quayle, 2012:573):

In doing so they [jettison] the aspects of [stereotypical] Afrikaner identity, which [threaten] to tie them to the accountable past. These [include] die taal (the language), the Voortrekkers or brandy-drinking Boers in long socks and short pants. Since these images would anchor their own identities as Afrikaners in the past, they would also increase the accountability of present-day Afrikaners for the sins of their predecessors and these [traits are] therefore discarded as identity-liabilities in post-apartheid South Africa (Verwey & Quayle, 2012:573).

Disengaging from their heritage, however, is experienced by another faction of Afrikaners as damaging to their sense of identity, belonging and community. More discerning modes of identification, which consider “what to salvage from the past [and] what to let go of” (Steyn, 2001:161) exist, and also attempt to temper the stigma of Afrikanerness, but via selective remembering and oblivion instead of rejection or the cultural ‘cringe’. The sentiment that there is “much more to [the Afrikaner’s] history than forty years of apartheid” has manifested in the appreciation of elements of Afrikanerdom that are conceived of as
commendable and that have the symbolic potential to liberate Afrikanerness from its vilified form (Grundlingh, 2004b:499).

Such modalities are concerned with “the discursive bridging across the ‘guilty generation of the fathers’ to the ‘heroic generation’ of the great-grandfathers” (Van der Waal & Robins, 2011:776). In what is referred to as the ‘nostalgic turn’, selected Afrikaners are yearning “for a return to the ... ethnic pride associated with” early Afrikaner nationalism and strategically relate to mythic events such as the Great Trek and South African war (Van der Waal & Robins, 2011:774): since selected nationalist narratives are chronologically and ideologically distanced from apartheid, this proximity projects a degree of ‘innocence’ onto contemporary Afrikaner ethnic identity. Therefore, they attempt to neutralise the blows inflicted on the Afrikaner imaginary by postcolonial discourses propagated by, for example, the TRC. However, what has presented a more “psychologically challenging endeavour” is “finding pleasure in memories that are part of a system from which” it is important to dissociate in order to become an integrated citizen of the Rainbow Nation (Marlin-Curiel, 2001:154).

There are Afrikaners who are “reluctant to condemn the pleasant memories of their youth [and the] memories of the poems, stories, and music they experienced as children are happy ones”, despite occurring against the backdrop of apartheid, which represents the undesirable, but inextricable part of their ethnic origins (Marlin-Curiel, 2001:154). In view of this, many Afrikaners seek self-expression and social cohesion through the culture industry, which legitimises the appreciation of Afrikaner culture by operating within the new South Africa’s ethos of multiculturalism (Blaser, 2012:16; Giliomee, 2009:662; Van der Waal & Robins, 2011; Wasserman, 2009:63). It appears that “stronger ethnic identification [amongst Afrikaners in the post-apartheid landscape] is associated with active involvement in cultural ... activities that involve mostly in-group members, suggesting cultural politics could perhaps represent the base of a new Afrikaans grouping” (Davies, 2009:72).

This is made manifest through the avid promotion of Afrikaans and its related forms of cultural expression, most prominently at popular, commercially
successful festivals such as *Woordfees* in Stellenbosch, *Aardklop* in Potchefstroom and the *Klein Karoo Nasionale Kunstefees (KKNK)* in Oudtshoorn. Such events have become extremely important for Afrikaners in maintaining visibility and legitimacy in the face of ‘homogenising pressures’ that threaten to erode their ‘uniqueness’ (Davies, 2009:133). As mentioned earlier, the paradigmatic shift of the locus of Afrikaner ethnic identity from politics to culture has been propelled by the postcolonial scrutiny placed on whiteness in the new South Africa: such critiques have extricated race from ethnic identity (which hitherto had been indistinguishable from one another and therefore powerful through acquiescence) and made its racist underpinnings visible (Blaser, 2012:16; Steyn, 2004a:149). In contemporary constructs of Afrikanerness “[c]ulture, including language, is used as a proxy for race and the defence and maintenance of one’s language and culture as exclusionary practices is justified as multiculturalism” [my emphasis] (Blaser, 2012:16).

The *KKNK* is, for example, discursively marketed as “racially inclusive [and seemingly does not] shy away from difference, provided that it [is] celebrated within the broader context of a democratic state” (Giliomee, 2009:662). By honing in on Afrikaans (of which the majority of speakers are not white) and effacing the inflections of race and class that exist amongst speakers of the language, the festival attempts to “purchase legitimacy for the continued prominence of Afrikaner culture” in South Africa. (Haupt, 2006:18). The following chapter agrees with the critique that the post-apartheid preoccupation with Afrikaans and its cultural forms is an attempt to “reinscribe the Afrikaner mythology ... so that the ground gained through the apartheid era of systematic Afrikaner advancement is not [totally] lost in the new social order” (Steyn, 2004a:150).

The chapter therefore reveals the manner in which selected forms of visual culture, as constitutive of the Afrikaner imaginary in the post-apartheid period, are permeated by discourses that are propelled by ‘old momentums’, such as Afrikaner capital, as well as new aspirations toward hybridity or Africanness (De Vries, 2012:173). In other words, “[f]ar from redrawing the boundaries as they integrate into the ‘rainbow nation’, these strategies produce a ghettoized
Afrikaner identity” that ultimately harks back to the ethnic ‘separateness’ of early Afrikanerdom (Verwey & Quayle, 2012:560).
Chapter 3
Ironies, Others and Afrikaners: an exploration of selected print advertisements from \textit{DEKAT} and \textit{Insig} (1994 – 2009)

As discussed in the previous chapter, Afrikanerness has been historically and discursively shaped by attempts at autonomy via the assertion of a distinct ethnic character. Contemporarily, such practices have been “revamped and re-applied in post-apartheid South-Africa in strategies aimed at rehabilitating” Afrikanerness (Blaser & Van der Westhuizen, 2012:383). Yet, instead of conceiving of ‘identity closure’ as characteristic of post-apartheid Afrikaner ethnicity alone, this phenomenon “must be understood in a global context, occasioned by the global homogenization of culture” (Kros, 2004:588, 593). The resurgence of Afrikaner ethnicity can therefore be positioned in relation to “the general retreat to the ‘smaller units’ of society” in an anxious, global milieu, but the notion that such forms of ‘clustering’ are also “disguises for covert social dynamics” necessitates cultural critique (Kros, 2004:593).

A number of critical studies on the present state of Afrikaner identity have emerged, and trace the strategies employed by contemporary Afrikaners to “spring them from their alleged post-apartheid malaise” (Blaser & Van der Westhuizen, 2012:384-385). The authors mostly draw on discursive psychology to uncover the attitudes of selected Afrikaners concerning their identities and sense of belonging in post-apartheid South Africa, and variously employ formal and informal interviews, as well as analyses of readers’ letters submitted to particular Afrikaans print media.\textsuperscript{24} Many reveal that contemporary Afrikaners fixate on “ethnic issues such as [culture, identity] language and minority group rights” (Steyn, 2004:b:83), but also selectively depart from “the [insularity] that [traditional] Afrikanerhood was constructed from.”\textsuperscript{25} – these developments are

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{24}See, De Vries, 2012; Korf & Malan, 2002; Kotze, Coetzee, Elliker & Eberle, 2015; Lewis, 2008; Steyn, 2001; Steyn, 2004b; Verwey & Quayle, 2012; Vestergaard, 2001.
\item\textsuperscript{25}With the exception of Megan Lewis’ discussion (2008), which includes the analysis of a single advertisement for the \textit{KKNK}, most of these critical views do not focus explicitly on the manner in which particular discourses surrounding post-apartheid Afrikaner identity appear in popular visual culture.
\end{itemize}
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discussed in the first section of the chapter (Blaser & Van der Westhuizen, 2012:385).

I, however, predominantly focus on manifestations of a new imaginary fit to reinvigorate the social esteem of Afrikaners in post-apartheid visual culture via discursive devices such as hybridisation and irony. I do this by discussing a number of print advertisements obtained from two contemporary Afrikaans lifestyle magazines (DEKAT and Insig) from 1994 to 2009. I have isolated advertisements that fixate on Afrikaner ethnicity and its modalities, such as the Afrikaans language, since they are arguably illustrative of the discursive strategies mentioned above. This chapter also provides some insights into the machinations of advertising discourse in general, as well as an overview of the vernacular of South African advertising after democratisation. I choose to focus predominantly on advertising images, because the Fine Arts mostly follow a tradition of avant-garde art practice which tends to adopt critical deconstructive approaches toward notions of national belonging, ethnicity and race. These practices draw on critical discourses in Fine Art (propelled by significant post-apartheid exhibitions such as Democracy X (2005)) in which “visual culture is not reductively promoted as a reassuring link between peoples or as a mindless celebration of plurality and multiculturalism” (Van Robbroeck, 2004:45).

This study rather uncovers the complex (often unconscious) modalities – economic, psychological, social and political – that govern the emergence of postmodern conceptions of Afrikanerness that seemingly possess commercial appeal. Given the high-brow bracket that these publications occupy, I find accord with the following: “Afrikaner elites balance a strong material position and distinctive cultural legacy [that enables them to] capitalise on the liberalisation of the domestic economy and [therefore satisfy the narcissistic need to] reposition themselves [as sophisticated and modern] in the new dispensation” (Blaser & Van der Westhuizen, 2012:384).

Yet, instead of conceiving of a monolithic Afrikaner identity (or presuming that such aspirations are representative of an entire ethnic collective), I am speculating on the degree to which existing discourses on ‘new’ Afrikanerness are
visualised in the publicity realms of these particular publications. My study therefore creates an understanding of the conditions that guide the reciprocal relationship between the data (the advertisements) and the Afrikaner ethnic imaginary and identity politics, the post-apartheid state and instability of whiteness, as well as consumerism, or the commodification of the Afrikaans culture industry (Botma, 2008; Foucault, 2002:74, 115; Wasserman & Botma, 2008: 6-7).

3.1 The media, and the depoliticisation of Afrikaans

The crucial role that the Afrikaans media fulfil in ensuring that “the mobilization of Afrikaner capital could still take place ... within the new ‘common sense’ of multiculturalism” cannot be neglected, because this incentive is also conducive to the media’s own economic aspirations (Wasserman, 2009:62-63). Agents of the major publishing house, Naspers (previously aligned with Afrikaner nationalism), for example, apparently possessed an acute understanding that the market value of their media products would suffer if they did not undertake the “stiff challenge to change historic perceptions and cultivate new interests, without losing valuable vested interests” (Wasserman & Botma, 2008:11-12). For Afrikaans media, adapting to a post-apartheid climate has involved a precarious “negotiation between [the] material power [of white audiences] on the one hand, and [their] new-found identity as a cultural minority on the other” (Wasserman & Botma, 2008:5).

The period of major social and political change following democratisation had sensitised Afrikaners to perceptions of loss and marginalisation, which include “the loss of symbolic power”, since the Afrikaans language had become less prominent across national, public media (Wasserman, 2009:64). As a result, reactionary forces have emerged to temper such ‘attacks’, and include “an insistence on minority rights” via selected cultural institutions (Wasserman, 2009:68). Some, such as the Pro-Afrikaanse Aksiegroep (Pro-Afrikaans Action Group) (PRAAG), tend toward rightist extremism and have, for example, “launched a boycott of the multi-national dairy group Parmalat to force it to return Afrikaans wording to its product labels” (Geertsema, 2006:108).
Additionally, “the privatization of culture and language … through the establishment … of pay-television … services” (such as the kykNET) and online forums for Afrikaans-language interests (such as Litnet) apparently satisfy the need for a consolidated Afrikaner community, if only virtually (Wasserman, 2009:65).

This section of the chapter is concerned primarily with the intricacies of a third strategy: the attempted depoliticisation of Afrikaans by selected media and cultural institutions who divorce the language from its “link to Afrikaner nationalism and … stigmatized symbolic capital” in order to become assimilated and therefore legitimated by the discourse of multiculturalism (Botma, 2008:55). Nowhere has this been more evident than in the sponsorship, organisation and “comprehensive promotional and marketing campaigns and editorial coverage” of the Afrikaans culture industry and specifically the festival circuit, which has grown exponentially in South Africa in the post-1994 period (Botma, 2008:44):

Currently there is a wish to include [black] Afrikaans speakers in the Afrikaans-speaking fold in an attempt to strengthen the position of the Afrikaans language [and negate the triad of Afrikaans, whiteness and racism]. This attempt can be regarded as an example of [constructing a ‘community’] around the newly emerged identity of so-called Afrikaans-sprekers (Afrikaans speakers) in order to strengthen the claims for a larger public space for Afrikaans (Van der Waal, 2008:64-65).

Such claims to race-blindness, however, when “considered against … the persistent correlation, on the whole, of class and race” in South Africa simply “makes good business sense” (Wasserman, 2009:74-75). In the wake of the apartheid state’s hegemony, Afrikaans has withdrawn from the “public media sphere to a private sphere premised on consumption” and targets those who “have the economic power to literally make [consumer culture] speak their language” (Kitshoff, 2004:68) – a gambit that has been “interpreted by many as

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26I employ the term ‘black’ to refer to all Afrikaans-speakers (and not exclusively ‘Africans’) who stand in binary opposition to normative Afrikanerness. ‘Black’ and ‘blackness’ are preferred throughout the study, since they are more charged than, for example, ‘people of colour’ or ‘coloured’ and therefore more adequately reflect the discursive strife between differently raced individuals.
an attempt to guarantee cultural power for Afrikaans-speaking whites” (Van der Waal, 2008:65).

Operating under the rubric of ‘Afrikaans’, allows the culture industry (including the textual matrix of popular visual culture in which it manifests) to disguise that it acts as “an emotional anchor and reaffirmation of solidarity” for Afrikanders (Kitshoff, 2004:70), thereby reiterating the “symbolic power that has historically been concentrated around the White part of the [Afrikaans-speaking] community” (Wasserman, 2009:73). By focusing on commonalities, such non-racial discourses ultimately “construct a potentially false, or at least superficial, narrative of belonging” (Scott, 2012:749, 750). In fact, the manner in which Afrikaans culture attempts to assimilate ‘participants’ beyond the peripheries of ethnic whiteness could be conceived of as an example of what is referred to as ‘strategic essentialism’:

[‘Strategic essentialism’ articulates the] need for temporary solidarity for purposes of social action in specific cases … [Social minorities employ this form of cultural amalgamation] as a short-term strategy in their search for recognition and social influence … [They therefore] use … an ethnic identity to affirm minority-group status, but only as a context-specific strategy … and not as a long term political solution (Van der Waal, 2008:55).

From a critical perspective, this strategy could “reinforce [and eventually authorise] the factionalism from the past” (Marlin-Curiel, 2001:164) by producing a “ghettoized Afrikaner identity” that asserts itself in clusters of cultural expression, such as the festival circuit (Verwey & Quayle, 2012:560). Whereas the National Arts Festival in Grahamstown, for example, strives to appeal to the ‘general’ festivalgoer by “down-playing its Englishness”, Afrikaans festivals in South Africa appear to place major emphasis on the fact that they offer a ‘distinct cultural experience’ (Giliomee, 2009:356, 369, 662). It can hence be argued that the places and spaces where Afrikanerness manifests provide the longed for ‘home’ for Afrikanders experiencing feelings of anomie and disconnection in the post-apartheid state (Grundlingh, 2004a:371; Steyn,

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27The development of the theory surrounding ‘strategic essentialism’ can be attributed to the seminal postcolonial, feminist critiques of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1987), although my study does not necessarily engage Spivak at this level.
2001:161). Furthermore, the perceived homogeneity of such experiences provides not only comfort, but also power – the command of selected spaces within a larger, possibly ‘hostile’, socio-political milieu could facilitate the partial recovery of lost control (Kitshoff, 2004:77).

Although an inclusive vision of Afrikaans is discursively promoted in popular culture, the deep historical divisions between white and black Afrikaans-speakers undermine the notion of a streamlined social category: as discussed, such discrepancies exist predominantly on an economic level, but one must also bear in mind that individual Afrikaans-speakers, who possess various, competing inflections of identity, cannot necessarily “join the plight of the Afrikaner around which [Afrikaans culture] seems to pivot” (Kitshoff, 2004:79). The desire to part with apartheid era associations, while becoming more Africanised, cosmopolitan and integrated into the Rainbow Nation, reflects the concern of Afrikaners desperate to transform their whiteness. Moreover, one can anticipate that a significant number of black Afrikaans-speakers have defected from the language, given its associations with discourses of white supremacy (Webb, 2010:111-112).

Speculating on the social significance that Afrikaans still engenders for some black speakers therefore depends on considering the “cultural formations born from appropriation, dispossession and translation in the colonial encounter” (Bosch, 2008:187). Although most channels for the communicative and creative deployment of Afrikaans primarily give precedence to white producers and consumers (Webb, 2010:111), the existence of a nuanced and commercially viable black Afrikaans culture cannot be denied. The stratification of race-based speech communities inevitably produces distinct cultural artefacts in material reality; forms of expression that elicit a sense of ethnic pride or distinction beyond the Afrikaans ‘mainstream’. It is, for example, exactly the idiosyncrasies of ‘substandard’ Afrikaans that accounts for the contemporary popularity of hybridised musical idioms emerging from black Afrikaans-speaking communities (Haupt, 2001:173): through popular “identification with an African American hip-hop culture [black Afrikaans-speaking] youth … articulate a blackness that links up with global understandings of blackness based on oppression and
discrimination” (Bosch, 2008:188), but “employ codes ... that are specific to everyday black South African experiences ... through their use of *gamtaal*”, a black dialect of Afrikaans (Haupt, 2001:173). Discourses that invite black speakers to identify with mainstream Afrikaans, and its institutions, are therefore imbued with arrogance, given the fact that black Afrikaans-speakers possess their own “detailed bodies of knowledge, specific cultural practices, memories, rituals and modes of being” (Erasmus, 2001:21).

By giving primacy to language as the defining feature of the Afrikaner, the Afrikaans culture industry arguably conceals the heterogeneity of Afrikaans-speakers, and it is therefore necessary to analyse “the divisions and variations which the secondary variables [such as race and class] bring into the [category] defined by the main variable” (Bourdieu, 2010:97). I speculate that the relatively stable monetary status of Afrikaners predisposes them to the consumption of Afrikaans culture, which facilitates the “transmutation of things into distinct and distinctive signs” that give access to *cultural* capital (Bourdieu, 2010:170, 199, 225). These acts of consumption ultimately mobilise the resurgence of “an Afrikaner ethno-nationalism ... in which a defensive and exclusivist ethnicity is [possibly] rediscovered” (Blaser & Van der Westhuizen, 2012:385, 386).

The specific habitus or realm in which Afrikaans culture is discursively and materially produced and consumed therefore operates as a system in which the power derived from the symbolic capital of ‘distinction’ is disproportionately available to variously raced or classed individuals, despite the fact that they are seamlessly represented as and invited to consume Afrikaans (Bourdieu, 2010:118, 166-167). 28 Since traditional Afrikanerness is enmeshed with stigmatised notions of an oppressive nation-state, exclusive whiteness and political conservatism, particular representations of this neo-Afrikaner ethnicity are strategically reimagined to align themselves with the ruling ethos of multiculturalism: thus, such discourses embrace a politically correct,

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28 The habitus is structured by (and simultaneously structures) the relationship between the “pertinent characteristics of economic and social condition ... and the distinctive features associated with the corresponding position in the universe of life-styles” and ‘taste’ (Bourdieu, 2010:166). The habitus thus allows for “social identity [to be] defined and asserted through difference” via consumption; the consumption of “sign systems that are socially qualified” as, for example, ‘Afrikaans’ (Bourdieu, 2010:167, 168).
superficially inclusive discourse in order to “yield a profit in ... legitimacy, the profit par excellence, which consists in the fact of feeling justified in being (what one is), being what it is right to be” (Bourdieu, 2010:225).

This study therefore concerns itself with critical questions about the Afrikaans culture industry or habitus, and its presence in visual culture, “as an area of production with its own logic, and about the conditions of possibility of the appropriation of those goods and services” (Noble & Watkins, 2003:523). The discourses that permeate Afrikaans culture and are reflective of these needs, ultimately limit the degree to which black Afrikaans-speakers can foster an affinity toward commodified forms of the language. My exploration of advertisements therefore follows the critique that a multiracial, egalitarian Afrikaner community exists only in the phantasmatic sphere of visual media, such as glossy magazines (Marlin-Curiel, 2001: 164).

3.2 DEKAT and Insig: methodological and theoretical considerations

Insig was founded by Naspers in 1987 “for the purpose of creating an opinion magazine” that would continue the intellectual discourses propelled by the defunct Afrikaans literary magazine, Tydskrif vir die Letterkunde (Magazine for Literature) (End of era as Insig closes, 2007:sp). Although the publication garnered commercial and critical success its final issue appeared in June 2007: the highly competitive sphere of magazine publishing, as well as the steady emergence of savvy digital media, had proved too aggressive for Insig to survive, despite later editorial efforts to shed the publication’s ‘bookish’ vernacular in favour of a consumerist slant and greater focus on lifestyle (Wasserman, 2009:71).

DEKAT has been in circulation since 1985, has been independently published by African Sky Media since 2002 (the magazine had previously formed part of the catalogue of Penta Publikasies) and “changed from a quarterly publication to a bi-monthly glossy lifestyle magazine in 2007” (DEKAT adverteer, 2013: sp). The

29The relative absence of multiculturalism in the material realm, for example, manifests at popular Afrikaans festivals such as the Klein Karoo Nasionale Kunstefees (KKNK), which represents black and white Afrikaans-speakers in its publicity material, but remains dominated by upwardly-mobile, white festivalgoers (cf. section 3.5) (Haupt, 2006).
magazine focuses on a variety of topics, including “art, books, film, photography, finance, travel, food and wine, beauty, trends, architecture and design as well as current affairs and controversial issues” (*DEKAT* adverteer, 2013: sp). *DEKAT* primarily attracts a white audience and has dedicated a third of its total print run of 30 000 copies to an English issue since 2006 (*DEKAT* adverteer, 2013: sp).

The rationale for specifically focusing on *DEKAT* and *Insig* in this thesis is partly based on the notion that

consumer magazines render meaningful, *without always putting into action*, a shared repertoire of middle-class, everyday experiences, lifestyle options, and social practices. They are, then, documents or sources of data which represent *aspired to*, not necessarily *given* states of affairs, and it is their ‘evocative power’ ... and the power of the cultural commodities and beliefs they recommend ... through which they provide valid ways for people to imagine as plausible alternative realities which may be structurally opposed to their existing reality (Laden, 2003:194).

Yet, instead of endowing visual media with a hypnotic power that renders the consumer defenceless to their allure, I focus “on the text in relation to the subject” and her social world (Huisman, 2005:285). Such an approach moves “back and forth, in recursive cycles, from ... microlevel analysis [magazine discourse] to the macroanalysis” of the broader social and political climate in which the text is produced and received (Mautnet, 2008:44). Visual culture is therefore intimately connected with shifting political, social or economic developments (Edwards, 2003:135). For the purposes of this study, the Afrikaans magazines selected for analysis are also conceived of as texts that “very much reflect [a specific] social mainstream” or discourse (Mautnet, 2008:32): I speculate that the comparatively liberal and intellectual (or high-brow) niche to

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30 However, *DEKAT* remains one of the few lifestyle magazines published in Afrikaans that caters to the urbane Afrikaner consumer that is the subject of this study. Accordingly, I have intentionally excluded the English issues of *DEKAT* from the sample of publications selected for analysis, because it is not conducive to the study’s speculation on the degree to which some Afrikaners are engaged in discourses and representations of Afrikaans culture via specific first-language cultural commodities. Furthermore, analyses of *DEKAT-TV* (a lifestyle-oriented television series aired on the privatised Afrikaans channel, kykNet) could possibly offer similarly valuable insights, but have been excluded for the sake of scope, and because my focus is on print media in particular.
which these publications belong provides a more habitable discursive realm for the negotiation of the precarious state of Afrikaans and Afrikaner identity in the tumultuous period following South Africa’s democratisation.

Magazines are not only cultural artefacts, but also cultural texts or so-called “meta-commodities, that is, commodities in themselves and vehicles for the dissemination of a range of other cultural commodities [and] new praxes of social, cultural and behavioural norms for their target readership” (Laden, 2003:194). Selected media studies corroborate that the editorial and advertising spaces of glossy magazines do not operate in isolation, but are “mutually dependent, mutually defining and overlapping” (Benwell, 2003:24) and “a clear division between the two [and other discursive structures] in terms of their ideological goals is not always possible” (Huisman, 2005:295). This can be attributed to the ‘commercial logic’ at the centre of mass culture, which structures consumer media in relation to the “search for lucrative audiences” (Wasserman & Botma, 2008:3): since advertisers provide magazines with a significant part of their revenue, they are likely to place major “pressure on [publications to propagate] editorial material aimed at market segments to which [they] want to appeal” (Huisman, 2005:295).

In order to effectively explore the machinations of publicity images that appear in lifestyle magazines, one must therefore take heed of the notion that they form part of a particular “discursive constellation” and must consequently be “studied in relation to [discourses] that are contemporary with … or related” to them (Foucault, 2002:74). The data was collected by perusing “a small but relevant and homogenous corpus” in order to locate images that manifest the ‘synergy’ between Afrikaans lifestyle magazines, their stakeholders, advertisers and consumers (Mautnet, 2008:35), whose inflections of identity “construct the object world, which in turn constructs and determines subjectivity” (Iqani, 2012:32).

As a relatively new, but theoretically rich discipline that has emerged from the broader realm of cultural studies, visual studies offers “little in the way of
distinct methodology” (Banks, 2007:8).\(^{31}\) Yet, it can be argued that visual studies is traditionally partial to qualitative approaches, of which purposive sampling is generally characteristic (Kenney, 2009). I therefore selected images on the “basis of how conceptually interesting they are” (Rose, 2007:79), while it is exactly the “quality and the judicious and knowledgeable choices” (Weber, 2008:50) of these specific images (instead of a mass sample) that determine the integrity and persuasiveness of the overall research design (Rose, 2007; Weintraub, 2009). With this study, I initially identified over 110 Afrikaans advertisements\(^{32}\), unequally distributed throughout approximately 70 issues of *DEKAT* and 90 issues of *Insig* for a period of 15 years, and finally reduced the data to a purposive sample of 30 advertisements, divided and limited once more according to the specific discourses they appear to propagate. Gillian Rose, for example, argues that it is the “feeling you have enough material to persuasively explore its intriguing aspects” that brings the process of purposive sampling to an end (2007:150). Rose further motivates that “you may quite legitimately select from all possible sources those [images] that seem particularly interesting to you [as] long as you have located some intriguingly complex texts [or discourses that are] convincingly productive” (2007:170).

I accordingly identified particular discursive strategies that appear to characterise selected print advertisements published during and after South Africa’s momentous social and political transformation. They appear to fixate on the status of Afrikaner identity in the post-apartheid state and comprise mainly ironic representation and the assimilation of racial Others, but are inflected by discourses centred on the sustainability and versatility of Afrikaans, as well as the consumerist relationship between Afrikaans culture and its benefactors. The contextual framework provided by the previous chapter regarding the fluctuations of Afrikaner ethnic identity, as well as the role of visual culture in

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\(^{31}\) See, for example, prominent visual studies such as Goldman, 1992, and Williamson, 1978: according to Rose, “neither [authors] suggest they had a rigorous sampling procedure, as a content analyst would; nor do they either say how they chose which of these many adverts to discuss in detail as examples in their books” (2007:79).

\(^{32}\) These advertisements appear alongside English advertisements, which do not discursively align themselves with notions of *Afrikaans* as a language, *Afrikaner* as an ethnic identity, or historical and stereotypical conceptions of *Afrikanerdom* – they are therefore purposely excluded from the corpus of data.
making its troubled trajectory manifest, is therefore indispensable to the study, since it acknowledges “the fundamental dialectic” of power that exists between our representational and social worlds (Mautnet, 2008:44). My analyses therefore focus on the manner in which commodified Afrikanerness projects a sense of ethnic identity onto selected consumers who possess the required economic and cultural capital to facilitate this process of assimilation (Bourdieu, 2010:119, 485). Moreover, as I mentioned in the introduction, analysing the discursive complexity of these advertisements lends itself to the application of selected critical postcolonial theories (Bhabha, 1998; Ingram, 1999; Kitzinger & Wilkinson, 1996; Lawson, 2004; Lazarus, 2011), and an acute awareness of the role that postmodern devices (especially irony) play in creating nuanced advertising discourses (Hutcheon, 1995).

3.3 Advertising discourse in post-apartheid visual culture

The study of advertising images of Afrikaner ethnicity in the post-1994 context “raises questions about the ways in which [ethnic identity] is imagined and constructed in visual terms” (Freschi, 2011:24). Indeed, one could argue that this is significant because a global ethos of overproduction and consumption constantly facilitates the exponential growth of visual culture (Baudrillard, 1988:180), and demands the study of “postmodern life from the point of view of the consumer” as well as the producer (Mirzoeff, 1999:3-4). In South Africa, “visual and material culture dramatized the tensions involved in [establishing a post-apartheid state] while at the same time [endeavouring to contribute] to the process of transformation itself” (Coombes, 2003:1), with varying levels of critical reflexivity. The realm of advertising, for example, is specifically “best seen as a concentrated, readily accessible, and highly influential instance of a general shift” (Bertelsen, 1998:223).

Selected publicity images that appeared during this transitional period targeted black consumers by detaching the “[s]ignifiers of choice, freedom, change [and reconciliation used in the ANC’s electoral campaign] from their place in a discourse of collaborative struggle with its critique of [inequality] to promote a discourse of individualism” through the consumption of banal commodities: an
advertisement for the dairy supplier Bonnita, in fact, reduces apartheid to an ‘unfortunate mistake’ by appealing to their mark8et not to ‘cry over spilt milk’ (Bertelsen, 1998:226, 227, 235). The ‘rainbowism’ that abounded in South African popular visual culture after the establishment of a democratic state in 1994, persisted well into the 2000s, “where celebrations of the national body as one, big happy family [continued as] unconvincing kitsch and obscene sentiment” (Van Robbroeck, 2004:45).

An advertisement for the city of Pretoria, for example, appeared in print and on television in 1995 and attempted to “symbolically disarticulate [Pretoria’s] historically conservative image and repressive mission, by rearticulating [it] as the locus of non-racial democracy and national unity, multiculturalism, and economic growth” (Shepperson & Tomaselli, 1997:25); at the height of the television version’s absurdity, the animated statue of Paul Kruger, which presides over Church Square in the city’s urban centre, jovially mingles with several other statues, including the Zulu king, Shaka, Queen Victoria and Mohandas Ghandi. Kruger’s gregarious nature, however, completely disregards his status as a “notoriously xenophobic … icon of [nascent Afrikaner nationalism, who propelled the establishment of the Afrikaner republics of the Transvaal and Orange Free-State in] the nineteenth century [and who still remains a] hero of the contemporary white right wing” (Shepperson & Tomaselli, 1997:25).

Likewise, marketing strategies for the South African Breweries (SAB), which during apartheid had hinged on a ‘beer division’ or oppositional representations of black and white beer consumers, “began to promote multiracial nationalism directly … only when South Africa entered a period of ‘transitional nationalism’ in the mid-1990s” (Mager, 2005:165, 189). The strategic use of images of streamlined camaraderie between South African beer drinkers with various

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33Pretoria is the administrative capital of South Africa, and therefore inescapably associated with the apartheid regime. The text that accompanies the print advertisement, in fact, makes the multicultural aspirations of the city explicit by lending stereotypical characteristics of black ethnicity to a city often conceived of as the nerve centre of apartheid’s white hegemony: Daar’s ritse restaurante, teaters, nagklubs en flieks. Daar’s sjebeens, waar Mamelodi jazz jou voete laat jeuk. Daar’s rap, reggae, rock. / There are restaurants, theatres, nightclubs and movies. There are shebeens [taverns] where Mamelodi jazz makes you move your feet. There’s rap, reggae, rock.
ethnic identities, discursively and materially connected to sporting events, such as rugby or football matches, are therefore “simply extending the [original discourse of] masculinity, heritage [and] nationalism ... into another new configuration”, thereby circumventing the contentiousness of interracial interactions in the South African context (Mager, 2005:189).

Such advertisements are symptomatic of a post-1994 climate, and the strategic machinations of advertising in general, in which “well-secured discourses are systematically being dismantled, and their terms rearticulated to those of new social and political projects” (Bertelsen, 1998:228):

[Advertisements] are parasitic (ads have no unique discourse of their own, they are intensely intertextual and completely dependent on other discourses) [and] opportunistic (ads habitually seize upon whatever powerful idiom happens to be situationally available to promote their products) (Bertelsen, 1998:226-227).

Advertising therefore “projects the goals and values that are consistent with the consumer economy”, and ultimately sell concepts that transcend the materiality of goods – they sell “commodities in terms of what they can do for relationships” (Dyer, 1982:77, 116-117). In supposedly fulfilling a reconciliatory function, the publicity images discussed in this chapter attempt to “erase or at least obscure [Afrikaans’] historical links with Afrikaner nationalism” (Wasserman, 2009:62) and apartheid via the “institutions and agents of consumer culture who are admirably equipped for the task” (Bertelsen, 1998:222-223).

The late 1990s signalled a renaissance for Afrikaans advertising, which had steadily garnered international recognition, rendered English copywriting comparatively stale, and necessitated the establishment of Afrikaans-centred accolades such as the Pendoring-awards (‘Afrikaanse reklame sprankel’, 2004:7; Browne, 1997:50; KKNK-veldtog beeld sy ‘renaissance’ uit, 2006:35; Slimjan, 2005). Afrikaans advertisements produced from the 1990s onwards are characteristically daring, “self-reflective [and] self-critical”; even cutting-edge (Herbst, 2005:33). These representations can be conceived of as products of the “new energies unleashed by a transmogrified Afrikaans liberated from its
immediate association with political oppression and reconceived … full of subversive nuance” (Barnard, 2004:720).34

Following the downfall of Afrikaner nationalism, Afrikaans no longer occupies a hegemonic (or sanctified) position in South African media and politics, is therefore less surveyed and apparently affords industry professionals more creative freedom (Slimjan, 2005:26). In a similar vein, there is a sense that contemporary Afrikaners have been liberated from Afrikaner patriarchy and its zealous promotion of moral, obedient Afrikanerness (Barnard, 2004; Du Pisanie, 2001; Heilige koeie? Watwou!, 2005:28). Others conceive of this irreverence as a continuation of the “investment in, and attachment to, the rural nostalgia of [Afrikanerdom], as well as a defilement of [its] various signifiers”, which provide substantial materials for postmodern conceptions of Afrikaner identity (Truscott, 2011:96).

Such historically subversive moments found expression in a characteristically fraught political sphere – the tentative, intermediate space between the old regime and democratisation. As discussed in Chapter 2, previous manifestations of irony in Afrikaner culture of the 1980s and 1990s served to oppose Afrikaner nationalism (Angove, 1992; Barnard, 2004). Contemporary forms of ironised Afrikanerness, however, apparently do not endeavour to dismantle a hegemonic force; in fact, such a force no longer exists. The advertisements discussed in my study therefore navigate “South Africa’s newness [which involves] a radical testing out of old and new codes, of the lines between the permissible and the taboo, between old resentments and new freedoms, between old traumas and new pleasures” (Barnard, 2004:748).

Ultimately, the “post-apartheid period demonstrates, perhaps more than any other historical juncture, that the role played by discourse, and how it is related to materialities, deserves attention in order to understand the ebb and flow of

34The critical dimension of sophisticated Afrikaans publicity has also been conceived of as antithetical to “all those highly improbable beer-advertisements that show black and white yuppies constantly drinking to one another’s health, and calling each other ‘brother’”. / “n Mens dink hier aan al daardie hoogs ongelooiewaardige bieradvertenties waar swart en wit jappies die heelyd glasies klink en mekaar ‘brother’ noem” (Slimjan, 2005:26). Also compare the critique of SAB’s advertising campaigns (which seemingly efface ethnic diversity and conflict) discussed earlier (Mager, 2005).
the formation” and negotiation of *identity* (Blaser and Van der Westhuizen, 2012:383). The functions of irony that characterise the representations selected for this study therefore propagate the larger ideological project of rehabilitating, redefining and defending Afrikanerness, which has been delegitimised because of its complicity with apartheid (Blaser, 2012:9; Blaser & Van der Westhuizen, 2012:386; Hutcheon, 1995:50, 51-52, 54; Steyn, 2004a:150).

My rationale for tracing the changing status of Afrikanerness in post-apartheid visual culture via publicity images is therefore partly based on the notion that the discourse of advertising arguably “induces a selective amnesia, as readers are required to recognize the aspirational power of the [rhetoric] while abandoning its context and history” (Bertelsen, 1998:235-236). This, however, does not imply that I intend to either overestimate or underplay the discursive power of advertising: “far from [operating within] a concealing, mystifying realm where ideology holds everyone in chains” or dupes them (Herbst, 2005:34), advertisements condition consumers to the “co-ordinates of popular understanding” through inter-subjective exchanges that are inflected by the social, political or cultural positions that their readers occupy (Bertelsen, 1998:240).

I therefore speculate on the extent to which post-apartheid advertisements that focus on Afrikaans culture possibly satisfy yearnings for belonging, community, identity and pride amongst Afrikaners who engage with them from a personal, anxious context in which “[a]ny notion of essential or historically guaranteed orientation … is thrown into doubt” (Bertelsen, 1998:240). Regarding the strategic placement of advertisements by marketing forces, this study is partial to ‘psychographic’ variables: the “internal perceptions of the [target] audience … in terms of their needs, aspirations, attitudes [and] motivations”, because this “approach [theorises] that a consumer will want [a commodity or ‘idea’] that confirms or enables their own sense of identity” (Huisman, 2005:298).

Advertisements therefore do not arbitrarily impose meaning, but “operate by linking [the] formless desire [that individuals already possess] to specific [commodities], and the key to this linkage is *identification* – the process by which
one identifies with something to take on some of its qualities” (Herbst, 2005:15). The urgent “desire to reinvent what it means to be white, Afrikaans South Africans” in the post-apartheid epoch that I have selected (Haupt, 2006:17-18), guides the study by taking heed of the notion that although “[s]ome expressions can be read and understood cross-culturally, ... to fully understand the function and meaning of affective displays [one needs] to refer to a particular context or social situation within a culture” (Dyer, 1982:97).

Although the Afrikaner psyche had suffered major blows regarding feelings of powerlessness in the new South Africa, the state of Afrikaner capital and the class status that it affords (‘demographic’ variables) has remained relatively stable: “Afrikaner constituencies, most notably an increasingly globalised middle class and capital elites, are flourishing”, partly because of the resilience of the economic advances made during the apartheid era in spite of contemporary shifts toward black economic empowerment (Davies, 2007:353). In turn, this economic power has been employed to assert ethnic, Afrikaner identity “through desires for cultural commodities rather than nationalist political traditions ... generated through imagery [that provide] a form of instant identification that [does] not require commitments beyond ... consumption” (Van der Waal & Robins, 2011:765). Whether manifest as commodities, events, ideas or experiences, culture has to some degree become a proxy for political authority in South Africa regarding particular constituents of the Afrikaner ‘community’ (Davies, 2009:133; De Vries, 2012:162, 172; Giliomee, 2009:662; Hauptfleisch, 2006:186; Kitshoff, 2004).

3.4 Playing devil’s advocate: an analysis of irony as a discursive strategy

For some, in the most elementary sense, ironic expression is a means of ‘getting away with it’ (Dyer, 1982: 159-160; Hutcheon, 1995:30). Since irony “happens’ ... in the space between (and including) the said and the unsaid” it creates the impression that one is not committed to any particular polemic, but it is a gambit – an “attempt to render oneself invulnerable” or exempt from scrutiny via

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35 The broad parameters of this approach, however, simultaneously assumes that “one can always have resistant readers [who view advertisements as commodities in themselves, which] can be appreciated as art [or] a story external to [their] own subjectivity” (Huisman, 2005:298).
oblique speech (Hutcheon, 1995:50). Irony is therefore critiqued as only feigning indifference, since it “can and does function in the service of a wide range of political positions, [simultaneously] legitimating and undercutting a wide variety of interests” (Hutcheon, 1995: 10). Advertising discourse, already permeated by artifice, can therefore be viewed as a habitable realm for ironic expression, since it already affords a degree of creative license (the realm of publicity, for example, shows little regard for political correctness and conventional linguistic rules) (Dyer, 1982:159-160).

The advertisements for the radio station, radiosondergrense (Radio Without Borders; or, RSG) (1997) (Fig. 8 and 9), illustrate the manner in which select representations in post-apartheid visual culture are geared toward severing Afrikaans (and Afrikaner identity) from its perceived conservatism, which has become “incompatible with [the] ‘liberal norms’” of contemporary South Africa (Vestergaard, 2001:22). At a denotative level, the advertisements show two outmoded consumer products, which were household names in Afrikaner communities: Brooklax, a laxative, and McChrystal’s Snuff, which are transmogrified into portable FM-radios via the addition of antennae. A closer reading, however, reveals that in conjunction with the texts that accompany them, these images pathologise an archaic form of Afrikaneriness: various traits stereotypically associated with nationalist Afrikaner ethnicity, such as provinciality and separatist politics (tonnelvisie; (ver)kramperigheid; laager-itis), and moral superiority (opgeblasenheid; prekerige styfheid) 36, are ironically represented as afflictions that Afrikaners must recover from in order to become assimilated by the new South Africa.

Fig. 8. RSG, Aanbevel vir doeltreffende verligting van radiostyfheid (Recommended for the relief of radio-discomfort). Colour magazine advertisement. (DEKAT, Mar. 1997:93; Insig, Sept. 1997:4).

The advertisements also parody the radio station itself, which (in comparison with the liberal outlook of the magazine’s readers) is historically associated with pastoral, ‘backward’ Afrikanerness: in 1938, following demand for coverage of the centenary celebration and re-enactment of the Great Trek (arguably the most significant mythological narrative of Afrikaner nationalism), the so-called B-programme (later RSG, and counterpart of the English-language A-programme) was established to broadcast exclusively in Afrikaans via a short-wave service that would reach the farmlands where many Afrikaners lived (Wigston, 2007:9).

It is “not so much that irony creates [discursive] communities or in-groups; instead … discursive communities make irony [intelligible] in the first place”, because of selected forms of knowledge shared by that particular collective (Hutcheon, 1995:18). I am positing that Afrikaners possess a specific ironic
sensibility that is coupled with an “[e]thnic humor ... strategically mobilized in the construction of an Afrikaner ‘national culture’” (Swart, 2009:890, 892). The political project of homogenising Afrikaners included establishing ‘a sense of humour’ as a defining trait of Afrikanerness by disseminating the following discourses via culture-brokers, academics and the press (Swart, 2009:901-902): Afrikaans is especially vivacious and therefore ‘naturally’ adept at wit and parody; and humour is “an organic Afrikaner trait, a biological essence coupled to historical experience[s]” such as the South African war, which lends pathos and melancholy to the Afrikaner’s mirth (Swart, 2009:901-902).

Fig. 9. RSG, Aanbeveel vir ‘n 24-uur oop kanaal (Recommended for a 24-hour open channel). Colour magazine advertisement. (DEKAT, June 1997:113; Insig, Aug.1997:4).37

The visual examples that I have identified as manifest irony, therefore possess a dimension of humour that seemingly entrenches their existing discursive specificity. Yet, irony and humour do not necessarily always operate as a dyad, but for the purposes of my analysis both function to “reinforce already existing connections within a community” (Hutcheon, 1995:26), allow “social norms to be flouted momentarily” (Swart, 2009: 899), and depend on shared knowledges for their efficacy. Evidently, one can infer that owing to their exclusivity, irony and humour also create hierarchical structures: “those who use it, those who ‘get’ it and, at the bottom, those who do not” (Hutcheon, 1995:17-18). Ironies therefore also possess an evaluative, affective edge, which accounts for “the range of emotional response (from anger to delight) and the various degrees of motivation and proximity (from distanced detachment to passionate engagement)” that permeate the politics of their interpretation and production (Hutcheon, 1995:14-15).

My critique therefore specifically considers the “possible [and therefore restricted] positions of desire in relation to discourse”, and posits a particular reader or consumer whose psychological, political and social interests these ironies serve (Foucault, 2002:76). Thus,

> divisions [between individuals who collectively consume specific cultural or linguistic forms] are themselves set in a hierarchy; groups mobilized on the basis of a secondary criterion ... are likely to be bound together less permanently and less deeply than those mobilized on the basis of the fundamental determinants of their condition [which include] institutionalized channels for expressing and defending their interests (Bourdieu, 2010:101).

Afrikaans and the cultural forms that surround it developed concurrently with Afrikaner nationalism, and whiteness therefore does not occupy a secondary position in relation to Afrikaans, but is constructed as synonymous and therefore on an equal footing (Van der Waal, 2008:62). I do not, however, want to suggest that black Afrikaans-speakers lack the faculties to ‘read’ the peculiar vernacular

*vision, congestion as a result of laager-itis. Cause: Afrikaans-radio that attempts to rock around the ox-wagon. Recommended dosage: 24-hour exposure to the new radiosondergrense. Side-effects include relief from cultural stuffiness; open eyes (for appreciating others); an open-minded Afrikaans. Never again will Afrikaans-radio lead you by the nose. Listen to radiosondergrense. We’re delightfully fresh, open and smartarsed.*
employed by these advertisements. Rather, I am concerned with the manner in which the ‘said’ (or, rather, ‘unsaid’) bestows symbolic power onto a selected group or collective *within* particular discursive communities (Hutcheon, 1995:97). As I have stated earlier, irony is an extremely suspect discursive mode, because its functions are ambiguously positive and negative regarding their potential for subversion: what appears as oppositionality necessarily involves the possibility of slippage toward complicity (Hutcheon, 1995:30; Truscott, 2011:98). I therefore follow the assertion that the affective range of ironic representation, in its production and reception, hinges on a fraught negotiation between cool detachment and ruthlessness, and legitimate empathy (Hutcheon, 1995:37, 40, 41). Ultimately, the ‘pathologies’ associated with Afrikanerness, together with the *desire* to part with them, is evidently not equally shared by each individual reader of these images.

In the context of my study, playing devil’s advocate entails that the discursive structure of selected visual representations of Afrikaner ethnicity “sits on the fence between a need (often ironic) to recall the past of [a particular] lived cultural environment and a desire (often ironized too) to change its present” (Hutcheon, 2002:12). By illustrating the various strategies (such as irony) by which Afrikanerness is discursively revived in order to acclimatise to Afro-nationalism and the post-apartheid state, my analyses maintain that the “production of ethnicity through negotiation, compromising and [incessant re-representation] is always to some degree political” (Alsheh & Elliker, 2015:6).

Instead of sustaining “the idea of a single break suddenly, at a given moment, dividing all discursive formations”, my analysis

questions [discursive tropes] as to their mode of existence, what it means to them to have come into existence, to have left traces, and perhaps to remain there, awaiting the moment when they might be of use once more; what it means to them to have appeared where and when they did – they and no others (Foucault, 2002:123, 193).

*Haas Das se Nuuskas (Haas Das’ Newscast)*, the first program broadcasted on public television in South Africa in 1976, is considered a mainstay of Afrikaner popular culture, and its beloved main characters, *Haas Das* and *Piet Muis*, are
nothing less than iconic (Van der Walt & Sevenhuysen, 2005). The reappearance of these personas in the 2002 advertisement for the KKNK (Fig. 10) engages ironic discourse not only at the level of anachronism (the last episode of *Haas Das* aired in 1980, and the advertisement presumably targets middle-aged readers who share an affinity with the program established in their youth), but also regarding the characters’ apparent modernisation: originally marked by a playful, even dandy, sophistication, their authority has been substituted with an urban aesthetic associated with hip-hop – a contemporary (now globalised, but originally African-American) youth culture centred on “DJ-ing, graffiti, break dancing, and emceeing (rhyming)” (Ralph, 2009:142).

I am deliberately employing this advertisement to illustrate that a discursive construct, which in this case is iconographic, always forms part of a particular genealogy and therefore accesses “antecedent elements in relation to which it is structured [and] which it is able to reorganize and redistribute according to new relations” [my emphasis] (Foucault, 2002:139, 140). Discursive forms therefore assume the power to return via material culture, such as the media, and particular institutions or stakeholders – all of which are likely to change along with, for example, political shifts.

It is essential for *Haas Das* to appear ‘like never before’ (Fig. 10), since the liberal, post-apartheid climate in which this advertisement is produced and viewed is not particularly tolerant of what could be construed as nostalgia for Afrikaner nationalism: “[a]lthough Afrikanerdom predates apartheid, apartheid was the inductorium of Afrikaner identity; apartheid legislation, the cauldron in which it was forged”; and the cultural forms associated with it (even a children’s program like *Haas Das*) are not exempt from the taint of its oppressive politics (Truscott, 2011:93). Ironic discourses that fixate on Afrikaner ethnicity are therefore contingent on a particular ‘institutional field’, or socio-political climate, that characterises the historical moment at which they appear, but it is not my objective to define them as discursively disparate (Foucault, 2002:174).
Instead, I align my study with the notion that a discursive formation emerges from a unique, regenerative body of knowledge that is asymmetrically acquired and appropriated by select individuals: it is “a form of dispersion in time, a mode of succession, of stability, and of reactivation, a speed of deployment or rotation ... that belongs to it alone” (Foucault, 2002:144, 145, 146). In fact,

[b]ecause the appropriation of [such idiosyncrasies] presupposes dispositions and competences which are not distributed universally [they] are subject to exclusive appropriation, material or symbolic, and, functioning as cultural capital (objectified or internalised) they [become distinct, and distinguishing] (Bourdieu, 2010:225).\(^{38}\)

\(^{38}\)As a sociologist, Bourdieu often critiqued Foucault and other philosophers because of what he perceived as their disregard for empirical research (and the social sciences in general). Indeed, “[a]lthough [Foucault] wrote thousands of very innovative pages on power, he never wrote about power as a social reality in action” (Callewaert, 2006:81, 90-91). For the purposes of my study, however, I am following the contention that Bourdieu and Foucault’s strands of thought
One must always consider the power relations that define such statements (or images), because “the property of discourse – in the sense of the right to speak, ability to understand … and the capacity to [deploy it in, for example, identity construction] – is in fact confined … to a particular group of individuals” (Foucault, 2002:75-76). Viewing these advertisements as part of a reparative process that defines post-apartheid Afrikaner identity politics, therefore involves acknowledging that the ironist and interpreter presumably share an ‘intimacy’ with that which is being ironised (Hutcheon, 1995:30, 40).

Although discursive formations are inflected by non-discursive practices or events, regarding the ways in which they appear, they do not irrevocably change the object of discourse: the discursive realms of the ‘new’ South Africa are therefore witness to “elements that reappear after [or during] a period of desuetude, oblivion, or even invalidation” (Foucault, 2002:179, 191-192). While the ‘alternative Afrikaners’ of the 1980s, for example, fought to destabilise Afrikaner nationalism via satire, selected post-apartheid forms of discursive negotiation attempt to assuage the stigmatisation of Afrikanerness.

In order to “buy time … to be permitted and even listened to, even if not understood” (Hutcheon, 1995:30), because of the exclusive knowledges belonging to specific discursive communities, *Haas Das* ultimately manifests as an ‘ironic double’ (Truscott, 2011:101); recognisable, but rendered innocent. Considering the precarious psychological state of Afrikaners in post-apartheid South Africa, one could argue that the return of recognisable markers of their culture illustrates that “while it is clear enough that apartheid as an ideal is dead, what, precisely, it is about this ideal and the life that it enabled that was loved and has been lost is unavowable” (Truscott, 2011:93).

The contemporary presence of the image of the ‘new’ *Haas Das* exemplifies that the significance of such retroaction lies in its ability to reinscribe the past, reactivate it, relocate it [and] resignify it [while] it commits our understanding of the regarding the acquisition of material and discursive power in the social realm are “self-sustaining … but parallel” (Callewaert, 2006:76).
past, and our reinterpretation of the future, to an ethics of ‘survival’
that allows us to work through the present (Bhabha, 1998:35).

The contemporary mobilisation of a distinctly political Afrikaner ethnicity is
therefore discernibly manifest in the cultural realm (Kriel, 2010). The fervent
promotion of Afrikaans, for example, can be attributed to the fact that a
“weakening institutionalised position” of the language simultaneously mitigates
the “power of its speakers” (Kriel, 2006:48), because economic, cultural and
political capital are not only interchangeable, but also inflected by one another
(Bourdieu, 2010:170, 199, 225). In the advertisement for the Pendoring-awards
(2009) (Fig. 11), the pre-eminent Afrikaans newscaster, Riaan Cruywagen (who
also provided the voice for Haas Das), is represented as a mere waiter, indignant
and humiliated. His downfall is anchored by the main copy, Moenie die taal
afskeep nie (Don’t neglect the language), as well as the remainder of the text,
Ondersteun goeie Afrikaanse reklame en keer dat ons mooiste taal sy glans verloor
(Support outstanding Afrikaans publicity and help us preserve our most beautiful
language). The irony, therefore, is not limited to Cruywagen’s dislocation, but
simultaneously hinges on a process of symbolisation and projection by which his
effigy becomes the signifier of an apparent fear of a socio-cultural dystopia
precipitated by a moribund Afrikaans.

Evidently, this resonates with the manner in which public discourses
surrounding the diminished status of Afrikaans in the new South Africa,
especially those propagated by traditionally Afrikaans-medium universities,
often allude to the threat of the language’s extinction (Van der Waal, 2011:69).
Cruywagen’s demotion (and the subservience associated with waiting on tables)
also gives expression to fears of powerlessness and being assigned an inferior
social status, which are at the anxious core of Afrikaner identity in post-
apartheid South Africa. One can therefore infer that the advertisement’s plight
extends to the commercial value of Afrikaans, because “the conversion rate
between one sort of capital and another is fought over at all times” (Bourdieu,
2010:243). The potential loss of ‘linguistic capital’ consequently also threatens
the economic capital of Afrikaners (already compromised by black economic
empowerment), which the culture industry secures via a myriad consumer media and experiences that hone in on Afrikaans as a definitive marker (Kriel, 2006:62).

Fig. 11. Pendoring-awards, Moenie die taal afskeep nie (Don’t neglect the language). Colour magazine advertisement. *(DEKAT*, July/Aug. 2009:45).

In fact, the majority of the Pendoring-advertisements sampled from *DEKAT* and *Insig* explicitly encourage advertising in Afrikaans as a means to obtain direct access to a wealthy demographic – Afrikaners who still benefit from the asymmetrical distribution of capital mechanised by apartheid and Afrikaner nationalism (Blaser, 2012:7-8; Davies, 2007:353; Huisman, 2005:298; Wasserman, 2009:70). I have selected two advertisements from this repertoire for illustrative purposes. The first, from the September-issue of *DEKAT* (2008;
not shown), is emblazoned with a photograph of the Afrikaans pop-singer, Patricia Lewis, reclining on an opulent chaise lounge, carving *biltong* with a golden dagger, while the main copy, *Praat die taal, dit betaal (Speak the language – it pays)*, enforces the advertisement’s intended message: selling to Afrikaners in Afrikaans means taking full advantage of their economic power (and apparent preference to consume in and through their mother tongue).

The second advertisement (1999) (Fig. 12) employs the symbolic currency of *boerewors* to envisage a collective Afrikaner psyche, or ‘brain’. The advertisement also calls for a mode of material and discursive production (*Dink ’n bietjie / Think a little;* or, perhaps, *Think like an Afrikaner*) that will maximise the appeal of commodities by engaging particular psychological and social desires, which, evidently, is characteristic of advertising discourse in general (Herbst, 2005; Dyer, 1982).

By presupposing an Afrikaans-centred economic mobility, the vernacular of the advertisement therefore aligns itself with the often reiterated notion that Afrikaners increasingly assert their identities, sense of belonging and ethnic pride through acts of (cultural) consumption in an ‘alien’ post-apartheid world (Blaser, 2012:16; Giliomee, 2009:662; Van der Waal & Robins, 2011; Wasserman, 2009:63). Yet, the advertisement strategically effaces the racially-inflected economic discrepancies of its supposed audience via an essentialist conception of ‘Afrikaans-speakers’: it not only appears in publications with a predominant white readership, but the monetary power that it alludes to is primarily the forte

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39 *Biltong* is dried, seasoned meat and is considered a “traditional boere food which was brought to the Cape by the Dutch and which became part of the staple food of the Voortrekkers” (Kotzé, 2013:72). This advertisement is therefore again illustrative of the manner in which ironic discourse fulfils a reparative function in post-apartheid visual culture, because “when biltong is associated with Afrikaners, the association is [usually] negative in nature, because it ... becomes one of the defining features of the stereotypical Afrikaner male, the one with the boep [beer-belly] ... holding a piece of biltong in the one hand and a [brandy-and-Cola] in the other” (Kotzé, 2013:72).

40 *Boerewors* is a spicy sausage that, like biltong, is considered an integral part of the “archaic Afrikaner culture” that this advertisement apparently recognises for its kitsch appeal, and ironises (Kitshoff, 2004:79).

41 The blurb reads: *Die Afrikaanssprekende lot is die groep met die grootste besteebare inkomste in Suid-Afrika. As jy in hulle oorvloed wil deel moet jy slim speel. Nou toe. Praat mooi. Op die manier wat hulle beste verstaan. In oorspronklike Afrikaans. / Afrikaans-speakers have the most expendable income in South Africa. If you want to cash in on their wealth, you have to be clever. Come on, talk to them in the way they understand best – in authentic Afrikaans.*
of Afrikaner capital, while the psychological aspirations toward a consumer-driven neo-ethnicity is a reactionary force mobilised by Afrikaners reeling from the loss of political power (Marlin-Curiel, 2001:162; Van der Waal, 2008:64-65). The advertisement is also indicative of the manner in which the tenacity of modern capitalism extends to the constant modification of its discourses of consumerism, since

[a] transformation of the conditions of existence and of the corresponding dispositions will tend to induce, directly or indirectly, a transformation of the field of production [and therefore representation], by favouring the success, within the struggle constituting the field, of the producers best able to produce the needs corresponding to the new dispositions (Bourdieu, 2010:228).

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**Fig. 12.** Pendoring-awards, Dink ‘n bietjie (Think a little). Colour magazine advertisement. *(DEKAT, July 1999:13; Insig, June 1999:63).*
The anxiety elicited by the concern that the imagined ethnic solidarity of Afrikaners will disappear in the wake of Afrikaans is therefore tempered by accessing an entire repository of potential symbols (such as *Haas Das* and Cruywagen) that can be excavated, recycled and politicised for the enduring affective and aesthetic responses they elicit from particular discursive and ethnic communities (Bennett & Bhabha, 1998:38-39; Mookerjee, 2011:5). To secure the survival of Afrikaner ethnicity and the commercial value of Afrikaans, selected signifiers of Afrikaner culture are therefore “displaced by an anxious space of iteration [and modification] in which an authorized speech emerges as the only hope for the recuperation of discourse threatened by a perpetual slippage and loss” (Pinney, 2011:193-194). At one level, as I have discussed, this is achieved through the self-protective machinations of irony, which construct varying levels of ‘indifference’ that belie the presence of invested affection (Kriel, 2006:48). For the purposes of my study, ironic representation can also be viewed as embracing the tendency towards hybridisation in contemporary South African cultural politics (which vehemently promote multiculturalism) (Haupt, 2006:16-17).

### 3.5 Hybridity and assimilating others (with ironic inflections)

The advertisement for the *ATKV (Afrikaanse Taal- en Kultuurvereniging)*

42 (2001) (Fig. 13) is indicative of the marriage between irony and a second discursive form, which departs from the existential crisis discussed earlier, and is articulated by claims to multiculturalism and inclusivity. This paradigmatic shift has been propelled by two related strands of thought surrounding Afrikaans in the post-apartheid milieu: the realisation that Afrikaans is primarily spoken by blacks, and the supposition that selected Afrikaans-speakers, across the racial divide, are likely to be apathetic regarding the ‘status’ of Afrikaans (Van der Waal, 2011:69).

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42The *ATKV* “was formed in … 1930 in response to railway workers’ request for a special organization. By 1936, the organization had more than eleven thousand members and forty-six branches. With enthusiasm it embarked on a campaign for Afrikaans as a medium of communication on the railways. It was the *ATKV* that would organize the highly successful ox wagon trek as part of the 1938 centenary celebrations of the Great Trek” (Giliomee, 2009:402). Contemporarily, the *ATKV* is still a major cultural force that endeavours to guarantee the continuing legitimacy of Afrikaans in South Africa.
Fig. 13. ATKV, *Ons bedien nie slegs Blanc de Blanc nie* (We do not only serve Blanc de Blanc). Colour magazine advertisement. (*Insig*, Mar. 2001:63).

Since irony teeters on the edge between the “stated [and] the unstated” (Hutcheon, 1995:37), claiming that the ATKV no longer exclusively serves *Blanc de Blanc* (a *white* wine, and therefore a palpable signifier of whiteness43) ultimately confers the liberal ideals of egalitarianism onto the advertiser and the reader, but simultaneously circumvents dealing critically with the institution’s racially divided past.44 The advertisement is therefore an attempt at reparation: by the 1940s, Afrikaners had positioned their variant of Afrikaans as formal and legitimate (while black variants were considered merely colloquial) – a process mobilised by Afrikaner nationalism and its agents, including broadcasting services, the education system and cultural institutions such as the ATKV (Webb, 2010:109). The advertisement nonetheless serves the interests of white Afrikaans-speakers and their cultural institutions, since its discursive form centres on the perceived aspirations toward hybridity or “becoming ‘white Africans’” as a means of accessing citizenship in the liberal, pluralistic atmosphere of the post-apartheid state (Ballantine, 2004:112).

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43During apartheid, ‘blank’ was favoured as an ethnic marker, because it “carries historical connotations of racial purity, the sanctity of ‘whiteness’ and the weight of publicly legislated racism that the English ‘white’ (and the Afrikaans ‘wit’) do not convey” (Du Toit, 2001:78).

44The blurb reads: *Die ATKV is lankal nie meer oop slegs vir dié af dáái nie. Dis die plek vir almal wat Afrikaans smáák! / The ATKV no longer only welcomes some. It’s the place for everyone who loves Afrikaans!*
My critique is therefore concerned with the manner in which the Afrikaner ethnic imaginary conditionally incorporates blackness, not necessarily as a move toward reconciliation, but as a guarantee for its own adequacy via tokenism. In other words,

the redefinitions of claims to race and ethnicity [are subject to] a deeper unease, a fear that the engine of social transformation is no longer the aspiration to a democratic common culture. We have entered an anxious age of identity, in which the attempt to memorialise lost time and to reclaim lost territories creates a culture of disparate ‘interest groups’ or social movements. Here affiliation may be antagonistic and ambivalent; solidarity may be only situational and strategic: commonality is often negotiated through the ‘contingency’ of social interests and political claims [my emphasis] (Bhabha, 1998:35).

I have to contend that I engage Bhabha (1998), and postcolonial theory in general, with a “very precise inflection” regarding the discursive structure of the objects that I analyse (Lawson, 2004:152). I follow the critique that if postcolonial theory is “driven by an engagement with the power that remains in … discourse [it] cannot, then, cease at those historic moments of independence” and remain ahistorical (Lawson, 2004:154), but must “register the necessary distinctions between qualitatively different moments, epochs and determinate universes of meaning” (Lazarus, 2011:15). The contemporaneity and specificity of this study therefore necessitates a postcolonial vision accountable “to the realities of the contemporary world system”, especially regarding the “specific regimes of accumulation, expropriation and exploitation in the form of … commodification”, which is, of course, significantly mobilised by the machinations of advertising discourse (Lazarus, 2011:4, 10). Moreover, I conceive of the reader of these images as a so-called ‘post-coloniser’ (Ingram, 1999) or ‘settler subject’ (Lawson, 2004) who, in the postcolonial situation, occupies a ‘precarious positionality’ that (especially in terms of power) is decidedly different from the experiences of the post-colonised subject (Ingram, 1999).

Indeed, by focusing on the identity politics of some contemporary Afrikaners, I attend “more comprehensively to the different ways in which imperialism interpellated the full range of its subjects so that [I] can explore the particular investitures of power, both material and discursive, that postcolonial readings
unmask and unravel” (Lawson, 2004:153-154). I therefore aim to illustrate the manner in which ‘post-colonisers’ attempt to remedy the loss of a precolonial state (and simultaneously deny that they are implicated in this loss) by attempting to “write themselves into origin, to become indigenous” via the self-serving, often uncritical discursive practices of hybridisation that underscore the advertisements discussed in this section (Ingram, 1999:82-83). The ‘subalterinity’ or precarity of the white subject in the context of this study, which is supposedly remedied by ‘consuming’ racial Others and their idioms, is ultimately subject to the notion that the Afrikaner might still believe himself or herself to be at a cultural disadvantage; which is to say that, in the eyes of the settler, the native and the settler have an uneven relationship to this ‘lost origin’ for though neither can recover it, the native, unlike the settler, may still bear the historical trace of its presence – even if only as absence (Ingram, 1999:85).

The following ATKV-advertisement (2003) (Fig. 14) is indicative of the manner in which particular institutions are “very prone to the use of uncritical essentialist understandings current in a given [discourse, such as Afrikaner identity politics] of which they are the mouthpiece” (Van der Waal, 2008:53). Considering that I am engaging this discourse at a textual level, it is significant to note that “[p]aradox exists at the very core of commercial communication, since to the extent that an advertisement is deemed to display the verisimilitude of real-life, it [often] does so by the skilful use of an invented” persona (Stern, 1994:387). As a purveyor of the tolerant, inclusive vision of contemporary Afrikaans and the culture that surrounds it, this advertisement therefore strategically (and conditionally) assimilates the black Other, but does not endow her with agency: instead, the agendas of the institution representing her are projected onto her ‘voice’, thereby reaffirming them (Kitzinger & Wilkinson, 1996:14).

The presence of the black woman in this advertisement is therefore instrumental in maintaining the hegemony of the Afrikaners via the “refusal to acknowledge the differences of those in relation to whom [they] occupy positions of privilege [which is] expressed ... in the liberal insistence on ‘colour-blindness’” (Kitzinger
On the contrary, the woman’s blackness is exactly that which is accentuated and *constructed* along with her speaking-position, since representation “imposes a law of truth [onto the subject] which [she] must recognize and which others have to recognize in” her (Foucault, 1982:781, 786-787).

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**Fig. 14.** ATKV, *Wit mense dink nie* … *(White people don’t think …).* Colour magazine advertisement. *(Insig, Mar. 2003:65).*

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45The blurb reads: *Snaaks, né! Nou die dag nog was dit “ek hier, jy daar”. Kleur het bepaal wáár. En jy is maar altyd so bietjie opsy geskuif … al het jou tong die regte taal gepraat! Maar nou begin ‘n mens sien wit mense dink nie meer so strak oor kleur nie. Die ATKV allermins. Kultuur is immers bevorderend vir kleurblindheid. En hoe meer ons kleurblind word, hoe meer sien ons die regte dinge in mekaar raak. Toe ek die ATKV-advertensie gesien het wat sé “Ons bedien nie slegs Blanc de Blanc nie”, het ek gereken dit is nogal “daring”. Dit het my laat aansluit. En nog nooit het ek gevoel ek word opsy geskuif nie. Wonderlik, né? / Funny, isn’t it? Not too long ago, it was “me here, you there”. Colour determined where. And you’ve always been pushed aside a little bit, even though you spoke the right language! But now one can see that white people don’t think in black and white anymore. At least not the ATKV. Culture is, after all, conducive to colour-blindness. And the blinder we get, the more we get to see the good in one another. When I saw the ATKV-advertensie that said “We not only serve Blanc de Blanc”, I thought it was rather daring. It made me join. And I’ve never felt like I’m being marginalised. Wonderful, isn’t it?*
One must firstly consider that within this dynamic, the woman is anonymous and reduced to the immediate marker of her racial Otherness, which is commodified and appropriated, and distracts the reader from the “absence of [her] identity” (for which her blackness has become a proxy) (Cook, 2001:181). Secondly, the position from which the reader is addressed is akin to the project of rehabilitating and hybridising Afrikaans and Afrikanerness, which the ATKV apparently aims to facilitate, thereby indicating the discursive congruence between institutions and their textual personae (Cook, 2001; Stern, 1994). Moreover, the manner in which the previous advertisement (Fig. 13) is praised (the blurb of the latest advertisement reads, *When I saw the ATKV-advertisement that said “We do not only serve Blanc de Blanc”, I thought it was rather daring. It made me join*) is symptomatic of the manner in which all texts are strategically structured in relation to particular inter-texts that belong to a common discursive formation, thereby stressing the supposed authority of their communicative practices (Foucault, 1982:781; Foucault, 2002:74; Frow, 1990:45, 46; Kitzinger & Wilkinson, 1996:14).

The “relations of production and signification” (Foucault, 1982:778), which reduces the woman to her blackness, is therefore an “important form of the ‘control’ exerted by dominant or hegemonic groups over Others [which extends to the realm of representation in which] Others are not accorded expert status on their own lives or on that of the dominant group” (Kitzinger & Wilkinson, 1996:9). Given South Africa’s colonial past, and its culmination in apartheid, this image is also illustrative of the “idea [that] the [discourse of the] Afrikaner

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46Accordingly, “[w]hat is relevant to textual interpretation is not, in itself, the identification of a particular intertextual source but the more general discursive structure (genre, discursive formation, ideology) to which it belongs”, which, for the purposes of my analysis, has been identified as the political project of maintaining the cultural power of Afrikaners via the provisional acceptance of Otherness and the supposed sense of liberalism that it affords (Frow, 1990:46).

47I am aware that representing “Others in ways which reinforce the power and purported superiority of those with control over the processes of representation” includes visions of gender and sexual identity as markers of Otherness, but they are not critically explored here for the sake of scope (Kitzinger & Wilkinson, 1996:6). Moreover, although I will not expound on the colonial origins (and complete theoretical trajectory) of the Other, I am aligning myself with postcolonial and feminist critiques that position Othering as necessary for the process by which the Self is discursively constructed via binary opposition to that which is considered ‘different’ or inferior (Kitzinger & Wilkinson, 1996).
as the most responsible of cultural custodians to whom all South African cultures should be entrusted has travelled right through to the twenty-first century” (Kros, 2004:597). The advertisement therefore articulates not only the tenacity of discourse, but also that the process of reanimation is contingent on the constantly shifting positions of power and knowledge, or the “interplay of the rules that make possible the appearance of [particular discourses] during a given period of time” (Foucault, 2002:36).

Since the post-apartheid realm is not discursively or materially conducive to sheer racism, the combination of this socio-political climate with a delegitimised Afrikanerness means that the knowledges imagined around the concept of blackness (in relation to whiteness) have necessarily mutated to hinge on consolidation, instead of isolation (Ehlers, 2008; Ingram, 1999; Lawson, 2004). The power of self-definition previously located in the supposed superiority of Afrikanerness as opposed to primitive blackness, now resides in claims to racial tolerance, as exemplified by the advertisement’s statement that ‘white people don’t think in black and white anymore’. Ultimately,

[Instead of reading [representations] of Others as transparent texts which more or less adequately reveal information about [their Otherness], such texts [should] be inverted and read as being ‘about’ their authors – that is, as reflecting and revealing the strategies by which those with the power of representation construct themselves (Kitzinger & Wilkinson, 1996:10).

The liberalism at the centre of post-apartheid ideology thus places increasing pressure on Afrikaner culture to define itself in ways that allow for the inclusion of Otherness (Kauffmann, 2000:1096). Such aspirations toward inclusivity often involve the negotiation of ethnic identity via representations that collapse the difference between individuals who occupy various and class- and race-based dispositions (Illouz, 2007; Ingram, 1999; Lawson, 2004). The following ATKV-advertisement (2007) (Fig. 15) thus illustrates the manner in which selected manifestations of the Afrikaner ethnic imaginary aim to repeal the “symbolic inequality between those who possess many ethnic traits and those who possess (or subscribe to) fewer”, which has been precipitated by the “ethnic drive towards differentiation” [my emphasis] (Kauffmann, 2000: 1095).
The folktale of Racheltjie de Beer, an heroic young girl who supposedly died protecting her brother from freezing to death and whose martyred status has occupied a central place in Afrikaner nationalist mythology, is discursively employed by this advertisement to suggest its contemporary ‘accessibility’ (Kros, 2004: 590). The affective response that this legend elicits, together with the capacity to identify with its heroine, is therefore propagated as being universal in appeal, and not the exclusive symbolic property of Afrikaners (as evidenced by the advertisement’s black persona, Sophie Rapolai). Since the subjects of cultural or discursive ‘communities’ also access feelings of unity from their shared appreciation of particular cultural artefacts (Mookherjee, 2011:4), the acquisition of such knowledges is therefore constructed in the advertisement to “accommodate a measure of liberalism” for its target readership (Kauffmann, 2000:1099).

Fig. 15. ATKV. “Racheltjie de Beer is my held ook”. Sophie Rapolai, kinderoppasser (“Racheltjie de Beer is my hero too”. Sophie Rapolai, child-minder). Colour magazine advertisement. (Insig, June/July. 2007:17).
By moderating selected, originally policed, ethnic boundaries, these images are symptomatic of the manner in which discourses surrounding post-apartheid Afrikaner ethnicity position “symbolic appropriation ... as a kind of mystical participation in a common good of which each person has a share ... unlike material appropriation”, which involves ‘legitimate’ exclusion (Bourdieu, 2010: 224-225). Yet, the discursive inclusion of black Others in the Afrikaner ethnic imaginary is contradictory to the racial segregation and class-based inequalities at Afrikaans festivals such as the KKNK (Haupt, 2006: 25): here, black subjects are likely to appear as performers and staff, rather than participants (except at selected, peripheral events beyond the festival’s main circuit) (Hauptfleisch, 2006: 187, 195; Kitshoff, 2004; Lewis, 2008; Van der Waal, 2011: 67). In 2008, for example, the KKNK’s promotional material was emblazoned with the slogan “There’s Afrikaans in all of us’ [which supposedly] marks a desire for an inclusive festival”, but could simultaneously be interpreted as a defensive act to counter critiques of the continuing white bias of this cultural enclave (Lewis, 2008: 659).

My critique aligns itself with the contention that a genuinely democratised cultural sphere is possible only when it “encourages dialogue, rather than representation, and ... is truly an Afrikaans rather than an Afrikaner construct”, which acknowledges the various class- and race-based dispositions that either impede or facilitate consumption and, therefore, participation [my emphasis] (Marlin-Curiel, 2001: 164). In other words,

’sincerity’ (which is one of the preconditions of symbolic efficacy) is only possible – and real – in the case of perfect immediate harmony between the expectations inscribed in the position occupied ... and the dispositions of the occupant; it is the privilege of those who, guided by

Furthermore, the print advertisements promoting the 2008 festival featured black “male bodies whose limbs and torsos [were] inscribed with, and formed out of, Afrikaans words. While the intent might have been to include all Afrikaans speakers, the images read as a troubling colonial cartography, and the ads invite a series of questions: For whom, or at whom, was this slogan imagined? Whose Afrikaans (culture) is being inscribed onto whom? And how is the Afrikaans language being imagined and embodied by white and [black] Afrikaners?” (Lewis, 2008: 659). I am, however, aware that particular theatrical productions at the KKNK are “consciously self-reflexive” regarding Afrikanerness and possibly “radically undermine the status quo” via subversion, but such performative acts do not form part of this study’s main enquiry (Lewis, 2013:3, 4).
their ‘sense of place’, have found their natural site in the field of [cultural consumption and] production (Bourdieu, 2010:237).

Ultimately, although the advertisements discussed in this section of the chapter endeavour to foster discourses of ‘communitas’, they neglect to acknowledge that the sense of “belonging around ‘being Afrikaans’” varies according to one’s background, racial identity, economic mobility, political position and ethnic affiliation (Van der Waal, 2011:67). As I have illustrated, such discrepancies are variables in the drive toward establishing a postmodern, post-apartheid Afrikaner identity via selected accoutrements of ‘modern Afrikaans culture’, which are consumed less for material value than for the affective and psychological sentiments with which they are imbued.

Multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism are not uniformly desirable, but depend on one’s position in relation to South Africa’s socio-political climate and associated feelings of marginalisation, alienation, and longing (Ingram, 1999; Lawson, 2004). The connections that these discursive structures attempt to foster with the post-apartheid realm are therefore “at best mythical, tentative and confused, and at worst self-serving”, given that they operate in the service of a hegemonic Afrikanerness and therefore attempt to salvage (at least some) of the power and ethnic stability compromised by South Africa’s democratisation (Ballantine, 2004:112).
Chapter 4

Consumerism, globalisation and the Afrikaner imaginary in late capitalism

‘Culture’ is traditionally understood as an ethnically-specific organising principle, but its definitions have been appended to include the contemporary significance of globalisation and mass media (Lash & Lury, 2007:2-3). I therefore agree with the notion that ‘culture’ can also be conceived of as, firstly, a mode of “production of works for reproduction and mass consumption” and, secondly, as a commodity in and of itself (Bernstein, 1991:3). This paradigmatic shift has been precipitated by the advent of consumer culture, which articulates the “cultural dimension of the [global] economy” (Featherstone, 1991:84), or the manner in which aesthetics have become deeply embedded in capitalist processes and attach particular symbolic values to commodities. As the most prominent feature of consumer culture, the pervasiveness of images in contemporary societies is therefore largely responsible for turning theorists’ attention to film, advertising, art, design, fashion and a number of other aestheticized forms that are characteristic of ‘late’ or ‘multinational’ capitalism (Jameson, 1991).

In order to satisfy consumers’ yearnings for ‘new’ or ‘fresh’ commodities and experiences in an already image-saturated, globalised cultural sphere, visual culture (and the making of styles) continues to grow exponentially; at such a rate that most late capitalist societies “are now a field of stylistic and discursive heterogeneity without a norm” (Jameson, 1993:320). It is often reiterated that contemporary societies are subject to a postmodern condition in which ‘culture’ is fractured into a multiplicity of practices and meanings that allow for endless

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49Earlier forms of capitalism involved competition between an assortment of smaller industries over the modalities of labour, production and consumption, but late capitalist societies are dominated by a limited number of monopolies created by “corporations [which] merge and form ever larger global centres of economic power that have the potential to rival nation-states in their influences over ... the terms on which social life is lived in the broadest sense” (Capitalism, 2000:[sp]). Contemporary critical theorists, such as Fredric Jameson (1991), are therefore concerned with the manner in which the ubiquity of mass media, information technology and visual culture (and their consumption) has become the ‘logic’ of (post)modern, globalised societies and therefore the most popular referential realm in terms of identity-creation. It is important to bear in mind that this overwhelming appetite for novelty and distinction has also mobilised the production of personalised or peculiar commodities in limited numbers, which appeal to the supposedly more discerning, individualistic consumer (Barker, 2003).
creativity and an infinite number of combinations across history, genre, style and medium. Broadly speaking, two camps have emerged that respectively celebrate and abhor such contemporary cultural phenomena (Agger, 2006:67; Featherstone, 1991:68). Some place major emphases on the potential for this abundance of cultural forms to manifest previously unseen or oppressed knowledges and identities via self-reflexive, politicised practices (Giroux, 1993; Hutcheon, 2002). Others are critical of the manner in which over-production strips cultural forms of their meaning, thereby creating spheres in which the rapid turn-over of commodity-signs has produced nothing but a parade of vapid images (Baudrillard, 1988; Jameson, 1991).

Such competing views are apparently also guided by the objects from which they predominantly draw their insights. The progressiveness of pastiche, historical detotalisation and multiplicity, and parody are, for example, often propagated as being characteristic of avant-garde artistic practice, in both visual art and the literary novel. Considering this, one can infer that these areas of creative critical enquiry, informed by critical theory, become closely imbricated as black, queer, and a variety of Other voices emerge from such texts and their interpretations (Barker, 2003:214; Fuery & Mansfield, 2000). Popular culture, however, interests those who tend to highlight the superficiality of consumer culture, and the manner in which its perceived lack of originality and emotional currency is compromised for by sheer quantity and spectacle (Barker, 2003:213). Such critiques often include views of globalisation as a levelling force that eradicates ethnic and local particularities, since the ease with which images, ideas and trends are appropriated across national boundaries (via popular culture) is ultimately a homogenising force; a form of cultural imperialism (Featherstone, 1995:87).

Yet, this claim is prone to reductionism, since the effects of globalisation are “geographically uneven and socially differentiated” (Jackson, 1999:95), and resisted, negotiated and assimilated in ways that are contingent on the specific social contexts in which they manifest. It is worth reiterating that the re-emergence of ethnic enclaves that supposedly assuage the ‘flattening out’ (Jackson, 1999:95) of distinct socio-cultural groups is characteristic of
contemporary culture in general, and are reactionary forces set to curb the threat of total assimilation (Kros, 2004:593). I deal specifically with the relationship between consumerism and Afrikanerness in a globalised milieu, and therefore adopt a ‘multiperspectival’ cultural critique (Kellner, 1995), which accounts for the emergence of ‘ contests’ between the local and the global, the Self and the Other. The relationship of some contemporary Afrikaners to commodity culture is therefore subject to their minority status, which is exceptional in the sense that their identity-positions have fluctuated significantly across time, especially regarding their access to and deployment of power.

I am concerned with the manner in which the vitality of Afrikaner capital ensures, firstly, access to symbolic capital attached to specific commodities and, secondly, the creative, selective engagement with what could be considered global trends, such as hipsterism and similar fixations on style. The manner in which economic power is conducive to symbolic power is therefore at the core of this exploration, which speculates on the degree to which a sense of ethnic Afrikanerness is reinforced, destabilised or fetishised via a selection of contemporary commodities, which range from t-shirts to tea sets. The many possible affective positions that guide the consumption and production of these artefacts are also discussed in relation to whether they can be considered individualistic and purely narcissistic, or political (although these categories are not mutually exclusive). The first section of this chapter, however, briefly revisits the unprecedented rise of the Afrikaner middle-class in the 1960s as exemplary of the “need for Afrikaner identity to be re-negotiated in a different material context” (Grundlingh, 2008:152-153), which has continued under the auspices of late capitalism and the ‘consumerist turn’ (Wasserman, 2009:62-63).

4.1 Material realities and consumerist fantasies: upwardly-mobile Afrikaners in the 1960s, and contemporary youth culture

I revisit the 1960s to plot the consumerist tendencies of upwardly-mobile Afrikaners because this period signals the advent of an economically powerful Afrikaner middle-class. I discussed the ensuing political strife and selective abandonment of what were considered passé ethnic markers of Afrikanerness in
the second chapter, but this section provides a more comprehensive trajectory of the changing face of the “culture ... of materialism [and] individualism” amongst Afrikaners (Davies, 2012:398). Since cultural production and consumption (as well as related attempts at identity formation via the appropriation of cultural commodities) are likely to change along with material realities, the discourse of consumerism must necessarily change along with it. The contemporary reassertion of Afrikaner ethnicity (via the festival circuit, Afrikaans-centred media and other ‘ethnic’ commodities) is evidently a sentiment that is markedly different from the aspirations of the ‘modern’ Afrikaners of the 1960s, who sought sophistication and worldliness exactly by consuming beyond the ethnic fold.

Prior to the momentous rise of an Afrikaner bourgeoisie during South Africa’s economic boom in the 1960s, an ethos of volkskapitalisme (the advancement of Afrikaner capital via ethnic nepotism in terms of employment, patronage and welfare) ensured seamlessness between the economic and ideological aspirations of early Afrikaner nationalism (Van der Westhuizen, 2002:52). Thus, Afrikaners were encouraged to be frugal not only because of the continuing repercussions of the Depression of the 1930s, but also because nationalist sentiment hierarchically positioned the collective economic and moral well-being of the volk above individual development (Grundlingh, 2008:146). Diminishing the class-based inequalities that divided Afrikaners was therefore construed as essential to maintaining a unified ethnic body with unparalleled political authority.

Yet, by the late twentieth century, Afrikaner capital had steadily become part of the globalised economy and followed neo-liberal tendencies, which almost completely severed the bond between the National Party and the economic successes of increasingly wealthy Afrikaners (Davies, 2012:397). The economic divide between differently classed Afrikaners was of major concern to some, who viewed “individualistic materialism and consumerism” as antithetical to ethnic solidarity and political unity (Davies, 2012:401), and detrimental to the Afrikaners’ moral fibre (Grundlingh, 2008:152). Yet, increased secularism and a steady decline in the reverence for Afrikanerdrom meant that by the time the
Afrikaner middle-class had been established, very few institutionalised efforts at curbing the economic divide remained (Davies, 2012).

The entrepreneurial spirit and fervent pursuit of social clout that was characteristic of many constituents of the recently liberated Afrikaner middle-class, however, cannot be attributed solely to a general, global propensity towards increased consumption and creative identity-work (Featherstone, 1991:65). What apparently sets Afrikaners apart is their notable and drastic shift from a “predominantly rural society, ill equipped for the challenges of the modern economy, into a predominantly bourgeois class” (Van der Westhuizen, 2002:63). An inheritance of discourses that portrayed Afrikaners as simple, ascetic and conservative, considered virtuous by the nationalist agenda, could therefore be challenged in an exceptionally aggressive manner by means of an unprecedented economic mobility. As their sense of responsibility towards ethnic solidarity waned, upwardly-mobile Afrikaners thus constructed phantasmal visions of their identities via consumer culture. Luxury cars, bespoke homes, esteemed social connections, and international travel, amongst other “interwoven markers of materialism and status”, thus contributed towards an “emerging culture of demonstrative display of the new tokens of prosperity” (Grundlingh, 2008:149).

The political transition in South Africa (which culminated in the electoral victory of the ANC in 1994) was therefore met with “relative acquiescence” by a considerable section of the Afrikaner middle-class, who possessed the economic stability and social confidence to prosper in this new milieu (Grundlingh, 2008:159). Yet, the stigmatisation of Afrikanerness and related feelings of persecution and dislocation have emerged in the post-apartheid period as traumas that have irrevocably altered the Afrikaners’ psyche (Steyn, 2004a). It is exactly the discursive negotiation of Afrikaner identity in a ‘rehabilitative mode’ that is at the core of this exploration, which speculates on the degree to which upwardly-mobile Afrikaners contemporarily look towards consumer culture and the neo-liberal sphere for new claims to ethnicity (Blaser & Van der Westhuizen, 2012:388).
The consumer mentality established in the 1960s therefore persists, since the faculties to consume are imparted to individuals by the specific socio-economic and cultural contexts in which they are socialised (Bourdieu, 2010:257; Grundlingh, 2008:158; Venkatesh, 1995:27, 29). The drive to consume is therefore unequivocally discursive and constructed, implying that “[e]very desire that we have is a product of our cultural environment, and all culture is, in an important sense, artificial” (Heath, 2001:6). Consumerist attitudes are, however, complex and mutable, and although they are still articulated with Afrikaner capital at their bases, they strategically align themselves with contemporary conditions. In the post-apartheid climate, for example, the Afrikaner imaginary apparently harks back to and consumes ethnic myths and personas, but does so in an impertinent fashion: this apparently indicates a discursive moment that revisits ‘outmoded’ markers of Afrikaner ethnicity, but not without being inflected by the experimental and potentially subversive consumer practices that characterise late-capitalist societies.

Contemporary consumer culture must therefore necessarily strike a “balance between reflecting a global culture pertinent to the younger sector [of the Afrikaner] middle-class [and] the traditional values that define people’s roots and cultural interests” (Kuper, 2013:17). This strategy exploits the legacy of Afrikaner capital, which facilitates the mobility of many young Afrikaners into the upper-middle and upper classes – economically privileged positions that engender a certain level of cultural capital and consumer savvy (Bourdieu, 2010:257; Grundlingh, 2008; Kuper, 2013). The significance of engaging with the practices and styles of the young cannot be overestimated in discourses surrounding consumerism and identity-construction, since youth culture aligns itself most explicitly with the obsessive, fast-paced dissemination of commodities and styles in an image-saturated age (Slater, 1997:163).

I am positing that the exchanges between consumer culture and Afrikaner youth identity are therefore significantly more tangible in the post-apartheid landscape, given that asserting “particularity [tends] to become sharpened and more well defined” in anxious or precarious conditions (Featherstone, 1995:110). In contemporary South Africa, young Afrikaners have to navigate between a
racial past that they are irrevocably implicated in, and the desire to reimagine and hence represent themselves as ‘rehabilitated’. Despite responding to an increasingly globalised, commodified culture by consuming its fashion and music, Afrikaner youths in the 1960s “showed no [committed] dissident inclinations” that were comparable with their American and British counterparts (Grundlingh, 2008:156). This can be attributed to the fact that the newfound economic mobility of Afrikaners burgeoned against the backdrop of the apartheid regime “which promised a secure future as far as Afrikaners were concerned” and therefore did not necessitate a “need to question the system or the underlying issues and values” (Grundlingh, 2004b:488).

By comparison, contemporary “young Afrikaners are well aware that they cannot count on the largesse of the state” (Blaser, 2004:184): they create fluid, hybridised and unconventional Afrikaner identities from a combination of global trends, a discursive repository of Afrikaner myth and history, and the ethnic markers of Others (Vestergaard, 2001). The freedom to creatively engage their identities is, of course, contingent on the democratised sphere in which their aspirations are protected by a liberal constitution that is markedly different from the institutional rigidity that impacted on the formative years of earlier generations of Afrikaners (Grundlingh, 2008:156). It appears that in post-apartheid South Africa, Afrikaner youths “refuse to fix” their identities (Vestergaard, 2001:36), and their “assemblage eschews the predictability of ‘traditional’ ethnic markers” (Blaser, 2004:184).

The relationship between consumer culture and youth culture is therefore best understood in terms of young people’s supposed propensity towards non-conformity. Yet, instead of conceiving of this relationship as one of insidious co-optation (which is arguably the popular interpretation), one must view consumerism and revolt as forces that are compatible and reciprocal (Heath, 2001:12-13). In fact, the countercultural propagation of liberalism and self-

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50 There have been notable exceptions, such as the antiauthoritarian attitudes expressed by the Sestigers (Giliomee, 2009) – but for the most part, “a conformist youth culture flourished” (cf. section 2.3) (Grundlingh, 2004b:488). In fact, “it took about twenty years after oppositional youth movements in the West for roughly comparable developments amongst Afrikaner youth [such as the Voëlvry-movement] to gain some traction” (Grundlingh, 2004b:484).
expression (which have their origins in the social tensions of the 1960s) were
equally expressed by the agents of consumer culture who experienced their
creativity as being stifled by a particularly conformist corporate world (Frank,
1997). The subsequent diversification of mass media and advertising amidst the
major socio-political shifts of the mid-twentieth century (especially in the United
States) therefore not only created new spaces for experimentation, but
simultaneously satisfied consumers’ longing for novel conceptions of selfhood
(Featherstone, 1991: 65).

Far from being a homogenising force that promotes conformity in order to
maintain its centrality in social life, consumer culture caters to the contemporary
fascination with constructing and transforming identity, and creating difference.
Accordingly, one could argue that the “central figure in modern consumerism …
is the ‘hip consumer’ … the one who attempts to express his or her individuality
through consumer choice” (Frank 1997:5), thus mobilising the ever-escalating
production of new, diverse commodities (Heath, 2001:2). Moreover, consumer
culture explicitly promotes an aspirational sense of youthful rebellion, and
therefore manifests as a “showplace of transgression and inversion of values, of
humiliated patriarchs and shocked puritans” (Frank, 1997:5).

One cannot ignore that the contemporary ubiquity of popular culture and
globalised, mass commodification offer competing notions of the self, which could
compound the “profound confusion [that] exists about what it means to be an
Afrikaner in the twenty-first century” (Blaser, 2004:184). In the section that
follows, and with specific foci on reaffirmations of Afrikaner ethnic identity via
selected commodities, I speculate on the capacity of postmodern Afrikanerness to
selectively resist and seize upon global trends. This exploration also questions
the affective range of such negotiations, and whether they can be conceived of as
political or, inversely, completely devoid of any invested meaning beyond
aesthetic appeal or social status. In fact, the centrality of blatant self-promotion
in many young lives (especially via social networking websites such as
Facebook), raises important questions about the possible motivations for
reasserting one’s Afrikanerness. In view of this, I am particularly interested in
the apparent oscillation between a psychological need for a cohesive, renewed
sense of self, and the drive to simply “maximize ... the range of sensations and experiences available” to an insatiable appetite for novelty and distinction (Featherstone, 1991:91).

4.2 Neo-tribalism, everyday aesthetics, and hip Afrikanerness

In the light-hearted e-book, *New urban tribes of South Africa* (2012), fashionista Dion Chang categorises post-apartheid society by identifying a number of so-called ‘tribes’ that share particular expressions of style, cultural interests and patterns of consumption. My interest is piqued by whom Chang refers to as the ‘Afrikaner Artistes’, and specifically the

The Liberal Millennial subtribe, in their 20s and 30s [who] are free-spirited, but want to clear their Afrikaner culture of its apartheid-era associations. They look back to the ‘pure’ Voortrekker era, growing bushy beards and full moustaches, and collect ox-wagon memorabilia. They are Afrikaner culture’s answer to the hipster, carrying Moleskin notebooks and taking up retro hobbies, such as knitting their own clothing (The rainbow nation: from black pinks to diamond chips, 2012:[sp]).

Chang does not necessarily engage the more sophisticated discourses of neo-tribalism, but does offer a contingent understanding thereof: that the contemporary relationship between consumerism and self-reflexivity marks a return to the classical anthropological idea of individuals being organised into distinct tribes that place major emphases on ‘indifferentiation’, or their collective spirit (Maffesoli & Foulkes, 1988). The emergence of neo-tribes has gained momentum specifically because some of the most pressing anxieties in late-capitalist, consumer societies have resulted from the “disaggregation of sociality and the resulting confusion this creates for the increasingly isolated individual faced with contradictory advice” from an innumerable number of sources (Lury, 2011:204). The globalisation of media and popular culture therefore induces a peculiar kind of vertigo in contemporary social subjects, since they are “surrounded not so much by other human beings, as they were in all previous ages” (Baudrillard, 1998:25), but by images and commodities (Best, 2009:261). Globalised, transcultural societies therefore supposedly do not offer the surety or comfort constructed in bounded enclaves via limited performances of the self,
which are subject to, for example, tradition, inheritance or rites of passage (Maffesoli & Foulkes, 1988).

Neo-tribalism (or the reassertion and mobilisation of ethnic or local particularities) is therefore best understood as an attempt to assuage the thrust of globalisation. Yet, instead of conceiving of neo-tribal autonomy, I follow the contention that globalisation is far too great a force to operate completely outside of. Instead, much of the resistance offered by neo-tribes manifests in the emergence of “various forms of hybridization ... in which meanings of externally originating [trends] are reworked, syncretized and blended with existing cultural traditions and forms of life” (Featherstone, 1995:116-117). Neo-tribalism indeed departs from classical conceptions of tribal behaviour regarding the ease with which contemporary ‘members’ are able to routinely abandon, and simultaneously commit, to various tribes (Davis, 2013:120). Neo-tribes are therefore organic in structure and lack any defined boundaries, which allows for the appropriation of a multitude of encounters, images, trends or commodities, regardless of whether they are of local or global origin (Arnould & Thompson, 2005; Maffesoli & Foulkes, 1988).

This section is specifically concerned with exploring the nuanced discursive and material realms of the contemporary Afrikaner imaginary, which apparently aims to maintain a sense of ethnic distinctiveness even as it usurps the accoutrements of globalised trends such as hipsterism. The stigmatisation experienced by many young Afrikaners in post-apartheid South Africa is possibly tempered by the integration “into a variety of scenes and situations whose relevance [or symbolic power] exists only because they are played out by many” (Maffesoli & Foulkes, 1988:144). Yet, the allure of globalised styles and other modes of expression, such as music, demeanour, body modification and visual art, are not exclusively characteristic of Afrikaner youths. It is important to acknowledge that many young black South Africans merge their ethnic identities with the predominantly African-American subculture of hip-hop. This is evidenced by the prevalence of localised isiXhosa and Afrikaans rap-music (especially in urban centres such as Cape Town) that carries its own social, context-specific messages (Pritchard, 2009; Haupt, 2012). In fact, the appeal of
hip-hop has grown significantly: a number of local hip-hop clothing brands, speciality music stores, graffiti artists, glossy magazines, and television shows have emerged, thereby firmly establishing a consumerist, aestheticized neo-tribe of South African ‘hip-hop heads’ (Pritchard, 2009).

There are, however, a number of important points to consider regarding one’s access to particular subcultures or neo-tribes. Firstly, I am not suggesting that hip-hop and hipsterism are necessarily appropriated respectively by black youths and white youths, since such an assumption ignores the modes of overlapping and interchanging that define neo-tribalism (Maffesoli & Foulkes, 1988:148). In the United States, for example, “70 to 75 percent of the people who purchase or own hip-hop music are white” (Ralph, 2009:146). Similarly, some young, white South Africans have “started to identify with the modish new musical idioms produced and consumed by black South African youths” (Ballantine, 2004:111) – especially kwaito, and the vernacular rap of black, Afrikaans-speaking hip-hop collectives (Ballantine, 2004; Marlin-Curiel, 2001). This, in turn, leads to a second pivotal observation: while neo-tribes are fluid and routinely acquire and forfeit members, they are nonetheless restrained by the market, which allows entry only to those who can afford to “sport the insignia of tribal alliance” (Lury, 2011:202).

The majority of black youths in post-apartheid South Africa have restricted access to specialised consumption practices, since their agency is inhibited by their racial identities, which relegate them to the lower economic classes – a material reality inherited from the apartheid era (Haupt, 2012:7). Frequent allusions to a burgeoning black middle-class simply builds on a “facile celebratory and self-congratulatory rainbow-rhetoric of diversity”, which continues to ignore the growing economic divides between the impoverished black majority, and upwardly-mobile South Africans in general (Erlmann, 2012:ix). The importance of reiterating the complexities (and ubiquity) of South

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51*Kwaito* is a specific genre of music that emerged in the impoverished townships of Soweto in the mid-1990s, and manifests as an eclectic mix of various musical styles, including “bubblegum, rap, reggae, ragga, rhythm and blues, as well as European and American house-music” (Peterson cited in Haupt, 2012:185).

52Also compare the hybrid whiteness of the Afrikaans hip-hop collective, *Die Antwoord*, later briefly discussed in this section.
Africa’s race-class matrix cannot be underestimated in discussions surrounding neo-tribalism (and especially hipsterism). This is because hipsterism has emerged from the consumption practices of particular young people who consume specific, highly-stylised commodities, and possess the faculties to do so (Arnould & Thompson, 2005; Lury, 2011).

I discuss these features as manifest in the following ways: hipsterism is defined by possessing forms of knowledge that only the initiated have access to; shares a contentious relationship with whiteness (Greif, 2010a); and is founded upon the theatricality of style, which “allows us to grasp the interplay of affects” (Maffesoli, 2007:83) that are at the core of so-called community aesthetics (Maffesoli, 2003). Given that every consumerist act is based on a judgment of taste, the significance of the conditions or predispositions that foster such discretions should not be neglected (Bourdieu, 2010). In their latest guise, hipsters access their claims to authenticity, superiority and ‘coolness’ from a particular brand of ‘a priorism’\(^{53}\): the defining feature of contemporary hipsterism essentially hinges on “knowing about exclusive things before anyone else”, and a disdain of anything considered ‘mainstream’ (Greif, 2010a:3). It is therefore a sensibility that attributes equal weight to ‘knowingness’, and the aptitude for recognising which commodities are \textit{worth} knowing and consuming (and which are passé).

The rise of contemporary hipsters, as well as their consumerist fixations, can be attributed to “a variety of social conditions [that] had metastasized to create a de facto new life stage suspended between adolescence and adulthood with its own features, dubbed ‘emerging adulthood’” (Davis, 2013:117). The decentering forces of consumer culture (which create an infinite maelstrom of identity-positions that are at once potentially transformative and disruptive) have been

\(^{53}\text{Claims to ‘a priorism’ have, in fact, defined hipsterism since its inception. The hipster first emerged as a black subcultural figure in the United States in the 1940s, and employed hip slang as an exclusive form of knowledge – a ‘password language’ to negotiate and perhaps even subvert the oppressive power of racist discourses (Greif, 2010a:3). By the 1950s, amidst the United States’ fraught racial politics, hipsterism became associated with white dissidents who co-opted the vernacular of hip blackness in order to disengage themselves from whiteness and thereby assert their symbolic superiority via creolisation (which included an appreciation of jazz music) (Greif, 2010a).}
compounded by the particular manner in which contemporary young people mature. The “age period … of identity explorations, feeling ‘in-between’, instability [and] self-focus” has been significantly prolonged, as increasing numbers of young people pursue tertiary and post-graduate education in order to compete in the knowledge economy (Tanner & Arnett, 2009:39). Moreover, the average age at which middle-class young people pursue long-term relationships and careers, and have children, is significantly higher than it had been for previous generations, whose trajectory from adolescence to domesticity was arguably more linear (Tanner & Arnett, 2009).

Yet, ‘emerging adulthood’ and the propensity towards hip consumerism are significantly more common amongst the middle-classes in developed countries – it cannot be said to manifest equally visibly across national, economic, and racial or ethnic boundaries (Greif, 2010a; Tanner & Arnett, 2009; Wampole, 2012). The meandering fashion in which some youths habitually gravitate towards and disaffiliate themselves from specific styles as they “stroll through … postmodern urban spaces” is therefore a type of capriciousness that only a select few can afford (Featherstone, 1991:65). One of the major criticisms of hipsterism, in fact, hinges on the notion that the ‘alternativity’ that many of its members adhere to belies (yet ironically puts on display) their membership to the dominant classes; a social position that facilitates the cultural exploitation of other class- and race-based positions (Greif, 2010a).

The emergence of hipsterism in the United States is discussed in some detail here in order to contextualise Afrikaner hipsterism at two levels. Firstly, the American equivalent of hipsterism provides some insight regarding the manner in which hip consumerism operates in a class-race matrix; a notion indispensable to my study regarding the significance of fashion and style to the assertion of ethnic identity. Secondly, a comparison of American and Afrikaner hipsterisms illustrate that their shared (but divergent) fixations on lower-class aesthetics are symptomatic of the manner in which the global is selectively incorporated into the local. Thus, depending on the social context, signifiers similar in form are indefinitely ‘emptied out and refilled’ with idiosyncratic meanings by producers
or consumers seeking different claims to ethnic specificity and cultural sophistication (Baudrillard, 1988).

In fact, the most salient appearance of hipsterism in the West “manifested not as a subculture, but like an ethnicity” (Greif, 2010b:41): from the late 1990s onwards, major American cities such as New York, San Francisco and Seattle witnessed a particular ‘clannishness’ amongst some white, middle-class youths who were “claiming … microneighborhoods from other, older migrants”, thereby creating new, exclusive enclaves (Greif, 2010a:4). Gentrification aside, what was especially peculiar about this newly emerged tribe was that they “wore what they were in economic and structural terms” (Greif, 2010a:4). Their penchant for ‘trucker hats’ (promotional peaked caps traditionally offered to rural workers by their contractors), ‘wife-beaters’ (white undershirts, worn alone), cheap beer, kitsch or outmoded decor, moustaches, and a general fascination with Americana all apparently fetishised the demeanour and style of lower-middle-class whites, or so-called ‘white trash’ (Greif, 2010a; Wampole, 2012).

Moreover, deliberately displaying signifiers of suburban, ‘gaudy’ whiteness in privileged, cosmopolitan urban milieus ultimately arm such youths in a dual manner. Firstly, this conspicuous appropriation of ‘white trash’ carries an ironic inflection that signifies the hipster’s intellectual sophistication and the competitive ability to recognise and appropriate emerging trends ‘instinctively’ (Greif, 2010a; Hutcheon, 1995). Secondly, the self-defensive mechanisations of irony apparently render these self-aware absurdities beyond reproach, since hipsterism “pre-emptively acknowledges its own failure to accomplish anything meaningful … it has already conquered itself” via its openly flaunted ‘insincerity’ (Wampole, 2012:1).

The manner in which superior ‘tastes’ are culturally constructed (by, for example, higher education, familial capital, and contact with particular cultural forms) is obscured by the ‘a priorism’ that hipsters claim to inherently possess: in fact, the “true basis of difference found in the area of consumption … is the opposition between the tastes of luxury (or freedom) and the tastes of necessity” (Bourdieu, 2010:173). The social stratum from which hipsters emerge, therefore
offers a greater degree of liberalism regarding mastery over their performative identities. Inversely, the features that they emulate are the actual ‘detritus’ that lower-class whites are bound to consume given the manner in which they too are conditioned to particular occupations, aesthetics and leisure activities. Their ironic sensibilities are therefore contingent on the particular forms of socialisation that they have undergone. Yet, one cannot neglect that “irony works in [an] intersubjective way … invoking or even establishing community or consensus … shared knowledge, beliefs, values, and communicative strategies” (Hutcheon, 1995:91). In that sense, hipsterism can be regarded as an ‘in-joke’.

Considering that such ironies manifest aesthetically via the accoutrements of ‘white trash’ and ultimately become embodied (Mookerjee, 2011), I posit that this form of expression is emblematic of “the degradation of being into having [as well as the eventual slippage of] having into appearing” (Debord, 2001:142). Investigating hipsters means being partial to their aesthetics (Maffesoli, 2003), since the irredeemably consumerist milieu in which they form collectives is predominantly characterised by iconic signifiers that become intelligible via resemblance (Debord, 2001; Featherstone, 1991). Faced with globalisation and the increasing difficulties of establishing a sense of ‘individuality’, appearances have become tantamount to the “recognition of oneself by oneself and by others, and finally, of others by oneself” (Maffesoli & Foulkes, 1988:150). Surrendering to indifferentiation therefore requires that each individual member of a neo-tribe draws symbolic power from a collective, ‘imaginal body’ (Maffesoli, 2007:86) that allows a “group to imagine and feel things together” (Appadurai, 1996:8).54

Rather than fixate on a number of diverse (or akin) social subjects, this approach suggests that one should focus on the shared aesthetic forms that, firstly, foster perceptual connections, and, secondly, facilitate the enlargement of one’s self (Featherstone, 1991:66-67). The rationale for this mode of thinking, as I have mentioned, is propelled by the notion that neo-tribal projects are markedly symptomatic of late-capitalist societies, which value commodities not for their

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54 This is analogous to Benedict Anderson’s thesis (1983): Anderson posits that a sense of national belonging is contingent on the mass dissemination (and reception) of visual print media that collapse the material and discursive distances that separate the members of a nation, thereby allowing them to imagine themselves as belonging to a coherent whole.
utilitarian qualities, but for their potential to *signify* (Bernstein, 1991): contemporary identities are without a constitutive centre (Jameson, 1991), and (as if by centrifugal force) become necessarily defined and recognisable via myriad ‘visible criteria’ that have their origins in the broader realm of consumer culture (Baudrillard, 1998:49). The erosion of the hierarchical distinction between low culture and high culture (avant-garde art was previously revered as aesthetically and intellectually superior to the spectacle of mass-produced artefacts), has therefore facilitated the so-called ‘aestheticization of everyday life’ (Featherstone, 1991). Therefore, even the most banal commodities have the capacity to become meaningful extensions of one’s identity (Jameson, 1993).

The drive towards constructing distinct, alluring self-images, and vying for their recognition by a wider audience, therefore pertains to the notion that modern consumers are at once the subjects and objects of a scrutinising gaze. Indeed, at the core of hipsters’ claims to superior forms of knowledge and aesthetic expression lies the “habits of hatred and accusation” whereby ‘hipster’ itself (as a marker of charlatanism) becomes a “potent insult among all people identifiable as hipsters themselves” (Greif, 2010c:3). In turn, the social fear of being unmasked as an ersatz-trendsetter is apparently tempered by the sense of validity that is accessed from one’s belonging to a specific tribe or sub-tribe (Maffesoli & Foulkes, 1988). Nowhere is this as evident as in the “desire to remain in a bounded locality or return to some notion of ‘home’”, which supposedly provides a sense of autonomy amidst the inescapable forces of globalisation (Featherstone, 1995:103). Manifest hipsterism amongst contemporary young Afrikaners is therefore contingent on the notion that the “work of the imagination … is neither entirely emancipatory nor entirely disciplined but is a space of contestation in which individuals and groups seek to annex the global into their own” performances of identity (Appadurai, 1996:4).

In general, the thesis of so-called cultural imperialism is flawed considering that “in-group social status … is achieved not through adherence to monolithic consumption norms but through displays of localized cultural capital” (Arnould & Thompson, 2005:874). The ease with which images and trends reach geographically and culturally disparate communities via globalisation has not
resulted in widespread homogeny: in fact, the appeal, relevance or meaning of various aesthetic forms constantly transmute according to the specific values of each locale in which they manifest (Jackson, 1999:97). It is therefore more accurate to refer to various hipsterisms, which cannot be organised hierarchically, since their affective range and discursive particularities are subject to the manner in which their respective members are culturally interpellated.

The mutability of commodification is perhaps best exemplified by performances of Afrikaner hipness that apparently fetishize outmoded, lower-class Afrikanerness (Pretorius, 2013): although this phenomenon is comparable with American hipsterism’s fixations on ‘white trash’, it has emerged as a self-determining, localised cultural trope referred to as zef, and therefore cannot simply be reduced to its ‘foreign’ antecedents. Zef is etymologically derived from Ford Zephyr, an old-fashioned car stereotypically associated with working-class Afrikaners in the late twentieth century (Grundlingh, 2008:150). In contemporary, colloquial Afrikaans, zef is traditionally employed to describe anything (or anyone) considered vulgar. Thus, zef was not deemed a “reputable appellation until [popular musicians such as] Jack Parow transformed it into a ‘cool’ disposition” (Du Preez, 2011:106). The following advertisement (Fig.16), which features Parow, illustrates the manner in which zef has become fully integrated into South African popular visual culture, manifest via kitsch, excess, and a general sense of dereliction (perhaps best represented by the empty swimming pool in this advertisement). Parow and his contemporaries (most

55Parow performs a “unique Afrikaans style of rap” and is considered one of the main personages of the zef ‘movement’ (Du Preez, 2011:115). Parow’s zef-ness emerges not only from his music, but also from his absurd personal style, which resists association with the more conservative ideals of ‘respectable’ Afrikaner masculinity (Pretorius, 2013:224).

56The blurb reads: Skeppende hoof, ek’s kief soos warm kole. Check die beeldjies op my tafel, van dorings tot vole. / Lead creative, I’m cool as hot coals. Check out the awards on my desk, from feathers to thorns. Thorns refer to Pendoring-awards, while feathers allude to the Loeries – prestigious South African advertising awards named after an indigenous bird. The advertisement therefore explicitly promotes one’s proficiency in Afrikaans (especially one’s ability to use it creatively) as a commendable quality via the final part of the copy, which reads, Skep in die taal en bewys jou cool / Create in the language and prove your cool. This discourse is, of course, also contingent on the notion that post-apartheid Afrikaans advertisements are considered ground-breaking, and consistently garner local and international recognition from audiences and industry professionals (cf. section 3.3).
notably *Die Antwoord* have been subject to a number of significant studies, which explore *zef* in relation to the carnivalesque, and critique its strategies of hybridisation as exploitative and essentially operating from a privileged position of middle-class whiteness (see Du Preez, 2011; Haupt, 2013; Scott, 2012).

![Fig. 16. Pendoring-awards advertisement featuring Jack Parow, 2010. (Woelag, 2010).](image)

Although I selectively engage with these discourses, this study approaches *zef* from a different angle. I am particularly interested in the manner in which *zef* signifiers enter a “commodity situation in which [their] exchangeability [become their] socially relevant feature” (Appadurai, 1986:13). This raises questions about the nature of their value and the circuits of knowledge they produce or give access to, as well as the particular conditions that mobilise their commodification. In order to fully grasp contemporary commodification, some

57 *Die Antwoord (The Answer)* is a quintessentially *zef* hip-hop collective comprised of Ninja and Yo-landi Vi$$er (Du Preez, 2011). Ninja and Vi$$er constantly negotiate their whiteness via highly-aestheticized music videos and performances, and body modification: Ninja, for example, uses “tattoos and body art synonymous with a Cape Coloured gangster identity to reinscribe an alternative narrative of identity on his white skin” (Scott, 2012:755).
significant qualities about (post)modern ‘things’ need to be observed. Firstly, as I have mentioned, commodities are not restricted by \textit{materiality}, but transcend their utilitarian qualities and enter the realm of the discursive or imaginary. The ‘abstract exchange value’ that defines commodities means that images, concepts, social identities, historical phenomena, and entire paradigms of style or demeanour have become marketable and ultimately exchangeable (Featherstone, 1991:67). Closely related to this is the notion that there is no simple, linear trajectory that particular objects or ideas follow from their origination to their inevitable commodification. Instead, they “spin out of the control of their makers [bearers, original sites or contexts, and] change through transposition and translation, transformation and transmogrification” (Lash & Lury, 2007:5).

Commodification (or, as I have established, the processes by which selected ‘things’ become imbued with symbolic exchange values) is therefore equally subject to temporal and spatial dimensions: it is at a specific time or “phase in their careers and in a particular context” that events, personas or stylistic forms “meet the requirements of commodity candidacy” (Appadurai, 1986:16). As with all discursive structures, commodity-signs do not appear arbitrarily, but become perceptible because of the interplay of a variety of social conditions that call upon their materialisation (Foucault, 2002). I am therefore positing that the commodification of \textit{zef} can be attributed to a number of cultural influences, socio-political ruptures and new identity-based aspirations. In the most general sense, the emergence of \textit{zef} aesthetics is arguably indicative of the manner in which global imports, such as white hipsterism, enter local imaginaries via fashion, which “is the cultural medium in which objects” move in late-capitalist societies (Appadurai, 1986:46). Yet, trends are regulated by each cultural matrix in which they manifest and ultimately negate hierarchical distinctions between various hipsterisms, since localised interpretations and representations carry their own symbolic weight (Featherstone, 1995).

Therefore, objects that are similar in \textit{form} do not necessarily \textit{signify} in unison. This can be attributed to the fact that geographically and culturally disparate subjects are socialised into a “specific ‘register’ of consumption [characterised by] semiotic virtuosity [and] specialized knowledge [which become] prerequisites for
the ‘appropriate’ consumption” of particular commodity-signs (Appadurai, 1986:38). Thus, at an aesthetic level one can draw a number of comparisons between American hipsterism, and the specific brand of ‘coolness’ that hip Afrikanerness exhibits, but the systems of knowledge that make these objects intelligible remain distinct. Consider, for example, that the moustache sported by Parow (Fig. 16) engages a discourse that does not simply reiterate early American hipsterism’s fascination with facial hair, and the ‘seedy’ appeal of old-fashioned pornography that it ironically appropriates (Greif, 2010a). Zef certainly values irony as well, but its “assemblage of recycled and ridiculed apartheid-era artifacts” situates Parow’s performativity in a specific context, thereby providing the zef moustache with a discursive career of its own (Brock & Truscott, 2012:325).

In the 1980s, a key member of the Voëlvry-movement, Bernoldus Niemand, satirised the city of Pretoria in the song, Snor City, which ridiculed the Calvinist hetero-masculinity that was apparently manifest via the moustaches (or snorre) of many Afrikaners living in the capital (Van Niekerk, 2008). Yet, in the politically fraught period before apartheid collapsed (when the song was disseminated) staunch nationalism was more likely to appeal to working-class Afrikaners whose faith in the nation-state proved less wavering than that of their conceited, middle-class counterparts. The snor has therefore been usurped by zef as part of its fascination with debased whiteness, and contemporarily circulates the Afrikaner imaginary not as a symbol of ethnic insularity and nationalist dogma, but as a signifier of ironic Afrikaner hipness.

The graphic design studio, Doktrine (Doctrine) (headed by M.J. du Preez), for example, attempts to dislodge Pretoria from its perceived conservatism exactly by making the snor an integral part of their logo design for an informal sports-club based in the city (Fig. 17). At a strategic level, this aesthetic is indicative of the “more constructive or ‘appropriative’ function of irony [which targets] the system itself, of which [that being ironised and perhaps even the ironist] was also a part” (Hutcheon, 1995:17). Thus, the symbolic power accessed from the image (as a surface for the projection of specialised knowledge, and by its rehabilitative potential) is generated via commodification. It is indeed the fashionability of the
*snor* that allows for it to legitimately signify in a different context without exhausting its ‘biography’ (Appadurai, 1986:17).

![Image](image.png)

**Fig. 17.** *Doktrine*, Logo design for *Die Pretoria Sport Snor Wolwe Sport Klub vir Sport (The Pretoria Sport Moustache-wolves Sports-club for Sport)*, 2011. (*I love Pretoria*, 2011).

The localised, even ethnic, knowledges that have transformed the *snor* into a popular accoutrement are indicative of the manner in which the “diversion of commodities from their customary paths brings in the new” (Appadurai, 1986:29). The *zef snor* therefore departs from the American symbolism of ‘white trash’ in order to attain idiosyncrasy without having to sacrifice the discursive lineage that situates it within a globalised sense of ‘coolness’ based on abject whiteness. Yet, as a palpable signifier of lower-class, *Afrikanerness*, the *snor* engages a specific “language of commodity resistance” in the post-apartheid realm (Appadurai, 1986:30). It fulfils a reparative, self-defensive function whereby its (re)emergence in the Afrikaner imaginary supposedly satisfies the need for fresh, reconcilable performances of Afrikaner identity. In other words, what was problematic about Afrikanerdom to the apartheid regime [the ‘poor white problem’] becomes a salvageable element of Afrikanerdom in post-apartheid South Africa; it is, at least partially, compatible with the post-apartheid nation ... Afrikaner self-parody has offered Afrikaners a way of being authentic post-apartheid South Africans by
turning against the past and the past as it lives on in the present (Truscott, 2011:97).

The ironic tone that underscores *zef* and its manifestations in consumer culture therefore simultaneously “affirms and negates the knowledge of castrated whiteness or powerlessness in the same moment”, since commodification supposedly suspends disbelief (Straker, 2004:412, 413-414). As a fetish, the *zef* operates in a discursively convoluted manner, since its absurdity (and the self-reflexive faculties that its consumers and exhibitors possess) is exactly what provides it with an ‘ironic afterlife’ (Brock & Truscott, 2012:325). The sense of loss that some Afrikaners experience in post-apartheid South Africa regarding their “affective ambivalence over traditional Afrikanerdom” (Truscott, 2011:94), is therefore apparently placated by the commercial viability of *zef*, especially regarding the knowledges required to comprehend its ironies or discursive particularities.

The predispositions required to effectively engage *zef* discourse are central to the emergence of what I have posited as a specific form of Afrikaner hipness, which (like other hipsterisms) draws symbolic power from ‘in-group’ knowledges (Greif, 2010a), and a ‘high-brow aestheticism’ (Appadurai, 1986:54). Instead of being exclusively characteristic of artists and the cognoscenti, the process of creative self-imagining, of “turning life into a work of art” (Featherstone, 1991:66-67), has been democratised and forms part of the “quotidian mental work of ordinary people in many societies” (Appadurai, 1996:5). Therefore, ‘modern’ individuals are simultaneously *impelled* and *compelled* to engage global consumer cultures and their sheer visuality (Appadurai, 1996): the resources available to imagining one’s self continue to grow exponentially in the information age, thereby creating numerous textual and spatial sites from which seductive styles or aesthetic attitudes can be adopted. Yet, these spaces and places of narcissistic self-expression also produce power struggles over the “proclamation of the superiority” of particular lifestyles, aesthetic inclinations or knowledges (Featherstone, 1991:77). One need only consider the endemic popularity of social media, such as Facebook, to contend that postmodern subjects replicate
themselves indefinitely via virtual personae, and endorse their identities at every turn in order to assert their authenticity, which has become an “accumulated social achievement” (Barker, 2003:393).\(^\text{58}\)

The advertisement for the *Pendoring*-awards (Fig. 18), for example, features a presumably *zef* individual, marked as such by his situation in a derelict neighbourhood, and a car that possibly completes the stereotypical Afrikaner working-class “trinity of ‘one-litre brandy, two-litre Coke and three-litre Ford’” (Grundlingh, 2008:150). What is however perplexing about the image is that its *zef* persona sports a ‘wife-beater’ – an accoutrement of the so-called ‘white hipster’ whose origins are far removed from the South African milieu imagined by this advertisement (Greif, 2010a).

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\(^{58}\)Facebook, an online platform that allows its users to create an online profile, connect with others and share personal photographs, views and preferences, is visited by approximately 750 million people a week (Davenport, Bergman, Bergman & Fearrington, 2014). Moreover, Facebook apparently provides an “easy way for narcissists to engage in the exhibitionistic, attention-seeking, and self-promoting behaviors that assist them in maintaining their inflated self-views”, which gain validity only by being constantly acknowledged or assumed by others (Davenport et al, 2014:214).
Therefore, given that all “hipsters play at being the inventors or first adopters of novelties” (Greif, 2010c:3), the ‘wife beater’ is at risk of appearing too derivative in this context. Yet, the vernacular of the advertisement ultimately proves its superiority by marking the image with a colloquial Afrikaans expression (help-my-sterk-lyk-hempie or, literally translated, ‘help-me-to-look-strong-shirt’), which limits the intelligibility of the image by a wider audience, consequently asserting its exclusivity and subsequent hipness. This ironic Afrikaans ‘in-joke’ is underscored by the underdeveloped physique of the protagonist. Moreover, the Autumn 2005 edition of DEKAT (which positions itself as the preeminent lifestyle magazine of the Afrikaner-sophisticate) dedicated itself entirely to elaborating on the qualities of so-called Boerekitsch, which refers to outmoded aesthetics of Afrikanerdom. These include, but are not limited to, crocheted tablecloths and decorative plates or ashtrays produced during the centenary celebrations of the Great Trek in 1938.

One of the articles featured in this special edition, for example, states that Afrikaner-yuppies are apparently prone to “experimenting with fashionable décor-trends such as feng shui, but perfect their style with a classic piece of Boerkitsch unashamedly displayed in a prominent place. It says: ‘even with my perfect yoga-physique, I am still a boer’” (Van der Vyver, 2005:34).59 Certainly, this confirms that the “meaningful appropriation of things by consumers is ... simply an aspect of the intrinsically cultural nature of consumption” (Slater, 1997:171). It also testifies to the fact that commodities are attributed value only when they are considered constructive to the particular lifestyles or identity-positions demanded by their consumers. Such reflections on the specific ways in which particular commodities ‘aestheticize everyday life’ (Featherstone, 1991), however, also reveal that two major types of knowledge permeate consumer culture (which appear to have reached their full capacity in contemporary negotiations of hipness).

59 This excerpt was originally published in Afrikaans, and reads: “Daar is niks so lekker vir n jappie … as om rond te speel met supersliek dekorgiere soos feng shui … en dan as die laaste kersie op die koek die monumentale stukkie Boerekitsch … wat pryk op n prominente plek, skaamtelooos, uitdagend. Dit se: ‘met my perfekte jogalyf, is ek nog altyd Boer’” (Van der Vyver, 2005:34).
There is, firstly, the knowledge “(technical, social, aesthetic and so forth) that goes into the production of the commodity”, while “knowledge about commodities is itself [also] increasingly commoditized” (Appadurai, 1986:42). This has resulted in a “traffic in criteria” (Appadurai, 1986:54), evidenced, for example, by hipsterism’s compulsive acquisition of cultural savoir-faire (Davis, 2013). One cannot claim that aesthetics have achieved the status of currency in late-capitalist societies (McRobbie, 2005) without acknowledging that “the need for instruction in how to use and experience” commodities is also satisfied by the ‘culture industry’ (Featherstone, 1991:76). Instead of conceiving of the social demand for particular commodities as the product of “individual whims and needs” (Appadurai, 1986:32), one must consider the “symbolic work of producing needs” as creating ‘constituted tastes’ that meet the ideals that specific consumers aspire to (Bourdieu, 2010:228, 345).

Professionals working in industries such as advertising, design, magazine journalism and television production therefore continue to act as so-called ‘cultural intermediaries’ who exude a “certain amount of cultural authority as shapers of taste and the inculcators of new consumerist dispositions” (Nixon & Du Gay, 2002:497). I therefore intentionally discuss visual and textual examples that find their origins in a selection of these industries. Those who are at the forefront of identifying and disseminating hip sentiments therefore “provide a [specific] milieu for new, late-capitalist commerce” in which certain individuals are guided in their endeavours to attain ‘coolness’, or social distinction (Greif, 2010a:2, 7). The highly aestheticized commodities that emerge from “forms of production that centre on small batch production, [handicraft

60Bourdieu is credited with coining the term ‘cultural intermediaries’ in his seminal sociological text, *Distinction: a social critique of the judgment of taste* (2010[1984]), but is critiqued for qualifying the term with the word ‘new’: in Britain, for example, “occupations such as broadcasting and advertising, alongside journalism, expanded markedly in the first half of the twentieth century and, in the case of advertising, decline in terms of the number of people employed from a high point of the 1960s. In no sense, then, are these occupations particularly new and nor are they necessarily expanding” (Nixon & Du Gay, 2002:497). Moreover, since the early twentieth century, prominent cultural ‘brokers’ (such as the filmmaker Gustav Preller) have been instrumental in creating and disseminating the collectively experienced myths and aesthetics that defined the early Afrikaner imaginary (cf. section 2.2) (Hofmeyr, 1988; Du Toit, 2001). I therefore prefer to use the term ‘cultural intermediaries’ without allusions to the ‘newness’ originally proposed by Bourdieu.
skills] customization and niche marketing” (Barker, 2003:210), which are revered by hipsters for their bespoke, authentic qualities, consequently [become] charged with the legitimizing, reinforcing capacity which [commodification] always possesses, especially when [it is aligned with] a prestigious group so that it functions as an authority that authorises and reinforces dispositions by giving them a collectively recognized expression [my emphasis] (Bourdieu, 2010:228).

However, such modes of production do not coerce consumers into passive acceptance of the legitimacy of particular commodities. Instead, I suggest that cultural intermediaries have the potential to give expression to specific unconscious, perhaps amorphous, desires that emerge from the cultural and socio-political realms in which identity is constructed and performed (Bourdieu, 2010; Herbst, 2005). The constant competition over proving one’s ‘coolness’, which is apparently rife in contemporary youth cultures such as hipsterism, is therefore a marked expression of the manner in which individuals are generally socialised into a “system of class conditions [and] differences” by the commodified spheres that surround them (Bourdieu, 2010:166-167). For some Afrikaners, the untenable situation created by the disavowal of their ethnic identity is apparently redressed by cultural products that strategically fit Afrikanerness to the post-apartheid climate.

Reflecting on The Most Amazing Tea Set Ever (Fig. 19), designer Leanie van der Vyver, for example, states,

I have always been intrigued by the symbolic tension represented by the Voortrekker Monument in Pretoria. I can relate to the Voortrekkers’ strength and determination to be free, but their warped ideals were the cause of many of South Africa’s problems. With this tea set I wanted to give [t]he Voortrekker Monument a post-apartheid make over, where all South Africans are celebrated equally (Just our cuppa tea, 2012/2013:22).

Van der Vyver therefore fashioned an alternate teapot from which a Zulu warrior (instead of a voortrekker woman) triumphantly emerges (Fig. 20) – a supposed eulogy for the black lives claimed by the Battle of Blood River. At one level, Van der Vyver perhaps overestimates her design’s reparative powers. Yet, the many affective positions that result from the various readings of the tea set.
are indeterminable, since “knowledge about [commodities tend] to become partial, contradictory, and differentiated” along their course from production to consumption (Appadurai, 1986:56). Whether the tea set succeeds in fulfilling a reconciliatory function ultimately depends on the specific context in which it is received, and the dispositions of its intended (and unintended) audiences.

Fig. 19. Leanie van der Vyver, *The Most Amazing Tea Set Ever*, 2013. (Cargo Collective, 2013).

Fig. 20. Leanie van der Vyver, *The Most Amazing Tea Set Ever* (detail), 2013. (Cargo Collective, 2013).
In fact, discourses centred on aesthetics have significantly shifted their attention from the “creative activity of the lone artist or craftsman to the social conditions that are reproduced in art and craft production” (Gell, 1986:136). I therefore speculate that Afrikanerdom is contemporarily renegotiated via selected consumerist and aesthetic practices that are apparently aligned with the desire of some Afrikaners to efface or at least obscure the stigma of apartheid-era whiteness. This is achieved in commodity culture via beautification and claims to hipness, which buttress one another and are mobilised by cultural intermediaries, such as Van der Vyver, and their creative output or projects. The cultural currency of Afrikanerdom in contemporary South African youth culture is, for example, evidenced by the popularity of Park Acoustics – a monthly live music-festival that, after a number of initial events at the Pretoria National Botanical Garden in 2010, moved to the Voortrekker Monument Nature Reserve in 2011.

I posit that there exists a cultural synonymy between particular signifiers of Afrikanerdom and ‘coolness’, which becomes discernible at Park Acoustics: despite being presided over by the Voortrekker Monument (the preeminent signifier of an obsolete Afrikaner ethnicity), the event creates a platform for “consumer practices in the ... domains that are most relevant to – and expressive of – young people’s identities”, namely fashion, music and ‘alternative’ commodities (Michael, 2013:2). Park Acoustics, for example, features indie-bands that operate independently of major record labels and have small but dedicated followings; DJs at the forefront of contemporary electronic music; stalls selling vintage clothing, bespoke jewellery, sunglasses, and craft beer; and promotional posters that are aestheticized to function as works of art in their own right (Fig. 21).

In response to the official nomination of Cape Town as the World Design Capital in 2014, Pretoria-based architect, Pieter Mathews, conceived of the Cool Capital Biennale, an “un-curated, DIY, guerilla [sic] biennale” that included a variety of aesthetic interventions in the urban landscape of South Africa’s administrative capital (Johnston, 2014:[sp]). According to the biennale’s official website, the aim of the project is to introduce “the public to a wealth of art, architecture, urban-
and graphic design, as well as sculpture creations” that permeate the city, which is not often regarded as particularly cosmopolitan, exciting or culturally prolific (Cool Capital Biennale, 2014:[sp]). Although there are no allusions to Afrikanerdom in the biennale’s mission statement, I propose that the aesthetic and cultural renegotiation of Pretoria also implicitly subverts (or at least contests) the conservatism and ennui that is arguably projected onto its white, Afrikaans-speaking citizens.

Fig. 21. Park Acoustics promotional poster, 2014. (Park Acoustics, 2015).

At the core of this speculation is that the biennale, to some degree, perpetuates the notion that signifiers of “monolithic nationalist associations can be undercut by the necessarily hybridizing effects of different acts of translation” (Coombes, 2003:25): by illuminating the Voortrekker Monument in pink (Fig. 22), the agents involved in the biennale are, perhaps unintentionally, engaging a tradition of symbolic attacks on and alternative ‘readings’ of the monument.
These, for example, include former South African minister, Tokyo Sexwale’s Afro-nationalist interpretations of the monument’s decorative programme, and journalist Barry Range’s controversial suggestion on national radio (which was later subject to litigation) that the monument is superfluous in post-apartheid South Africa and should be painted pink and transformed into a gay nightclub (Coombes, 2003). The symbolic work involved in reimagining Pretoria as ‘cool’ therefore “reveal[s] the generation and deployment of strategies to rehabilitate an ethnic whiteness in distress” (Blaser & Van der Westhuizen, 2012:385). Such strategies, which have been discussed throughout this study, function as significant counterbalances to the psychological and social challenges faced by some Afrikaners in the post-apartheid milieu.

Fig. 22. The Voortrekker Monument lighted in pink during the Cool Capital Biennale, 2014. (Stehle, 2014:[sp]).

Of course, other subjects could be moved by the city’s gentrification at a formal level only. Others may view their participation in the biennale as an act of reclaiming their own positions of belonging, as black South Africans, in a space
haunted by the spectres of apartheid. This means taking heed of “affect as an entire, vital, and modulating field of myriad becomings across human” identities and aesthetic forms (Gregg & Seigworth, 2010:6). In turn, this lends probability to the notion that some Afrikaners may access symbolic, rehabilitative powers from the biennale, because it esteems their ethnic heritage as commercially ‘cool’.

Those who trade in symbolic value are also responsible for conditioning consumers to the “ever-shifting rules” of such ‘cool’ sensibilities (Appadurai, 1986:32), since commodities progress rapidly from novelty to obsolescence in late-capitalist socio-economics (Appadurai, 1986; Heath, 2001; Michael, 2013). The ‘white trash’ aesthetic that defined early hipsterism in the United States has, for example, lost almost all of its momentum. In fact, “it began to seem that a ‘green’ hipster had succeeded the white” (Greif, 2010a:5). Suddenly, hipness turned its attention to a peculiar ‘primitivism’, which commodified notions of sustainable living and fixated on motifs from ‘the wilderness’: trashy moustaches gave way to bushy beards and “hunting jackets in red-and-black check” replaced worn-out ‘wife-beaters’, while some of the most popular hipster-bands (the aptly named Fleet Foxes, Animal Collective and Band of Horses) conjured “rural redoubts … on wild beaches and in forests” (Greif, 2010a:5).

The frivolousness that underscores the constantly changing landscape of hip aesthetics is, however, not an arbitrary phenomenon: it is symptomatic of the ‘kind of impermanence’ that is apparent in most contemporary societies (Maffesoli, 2007:85). Selected examples include the demise of the nuclear family, the erasure and subsequent reanimation of local particularities, the ethereality of commodities, and sexual promiscuity (Maffesoli, 2007:85). Perhaps more than anything, postmodern societies are apathetic towards the modernist fixations on a ‘projected future’ and instead thrive on a “desire for living in the present” (Maffesoli, 2007:85, 139): in turn, the present becomes increasingly defined by a series of moments or events that come to pass, but possess at least some cultural validity during their fleeting appearance (Jameson, 1991).

Such shifts in aesthetic sensibility and imagination, articulate, firstly, the importance of cultural intermediaries in facilitating the navigation of emerging
trends that give access to new criteria for hip self-expression. Secondly, the subsequent globalisation of the products of “trend-spotting [and] cool-hunting” (Greif, 2010a), draws attention to the “conditions of collective reading, criticism, and pleasure”, which negotiate the appropriateness of recognisable commodities in culturally specific locales (Appadurai, 1996:8). The beards ubiquitously sported by ‘green’ hipsters are therefore not exempt from the polysemic readings that characterise postmodern signs, which routinely acquire new meanings via knowledges that are ‘perspectival in character’ (Barker, 2003:20): such negotiations supposedly ‘free’ the hip beard from its American associations with archetypal figures such as the lumberjack and the recluse (Greif, 2010a).

Given the penchant of Afrikaner hipsters for engaging archaic Afrikanerdom, their beards (Fig. 23) may additionally point towards a voortrekker-masculinity more self-reflexive and knowingly ironic than the machismo exhibited by fervent nationalists in anticipation of the centenary celebrations in 1938 (who are perhaps also subject to the hipster’s ironic gaze) (Du Pisani, 2004; The rainbow nation …, 2012). As I have discussed with reference to the zef moustache, displaying the beard arguably re-negotiates the coordinates of hipsterism in order to assert not only a sense of localism, but also an entire repository of culture-specific knowledges. The Afrikanerness of the image (Fig. 23) is further entrenched by the Afrikaans proverb which emblazons the featured sweater (Wie A sé moet B sé / Who says A, must say B too: an individual who endeavours to do something must follow through).

It is useful at this stage to briefly return to the notion of the so-called discursive community (Hutcheon, 1995), which comprises members who are culturally interpellated to comprehend the various nuances of the specific visual and textual signs that circulate their cultural frames of reference. In view of this, the intelligibility of proverbs is (based on their poetic structure) perhaps even more contingent on “referring [and] remembering” than most other colloquial expressions, and ultimately “depend on [their] recognition as proverbs in order to work” [my emphasis] (Becker, 1996:144, 145). The ‘a priorism’ that marks this image and other forms of hip representation is, however, occasionally moderated
in order to facilitate “open communication with a diverse range of people” (Michael, 2013:9).

Consider, for example, that a selection of these proverbs have been rendered more widely intelligible by English translations in the t-shirt’s advertisement, indicating that non-Afrikaans buyers are anticipated (Fig. 24). Also, Far and Wide’s design-team (Kristian van Tonder and Nicole Jean Hustler) states that their intent is to invigorate traditional Afrikaans proverbs via an aestheticized product “that is in line with the modern day fashion market [but that is] not solely aimed at the Afrikaans market but rather at any person that relates to [its] meaning” (Between 10 and 5: the creative showcase, 2012:[sp]). As aesthetic communities, the legitimacy of any individual hip tribe is therefore as self-determined as the many other “ways of being and appearing” (Maffesoli, 2007:84), and routinely integrate themselves into a “variety of scenes and situations” that are not their ‘own’ (Maffesoli, 1988:144).

Yet the question remains whether ‘democratising’ the consumer profile of Afrikaans commodities and experiences empowers black youths (and underprivileged South Africans in general) to access hipness via appropriation of
the Afrikaner Other. What is essentially problematic about such notions of inclusivity is that “the ability to commodify other cultures is not evenly distributed in society” and those with fewer economic and cultural resources are “more likely to be on the receiving end of ... processes” of commodification (Jackson, 1999:99).

Fig. 24. Far and Wide, ‘n Versameling idiome; Jakkals trou met wolf se vrou (A collection of proverbs; Fox marries Wolf’s wife), 2012. Online advertisement. (Between 10 and 5: the creative showcase, 2012).

It is significant to note that the examples of ‘cool’ Afrikanerness that I discuss, manifest in cultural matrices (including online and print media, as well as the advertising industry), which are dominated by and serve the interests of an “arguably still largely white, or at least affluent black ... elite market” (Wasserman & De Beer, 2005:39). Moreover, the unequal distribution of information technology amongst South Africans differently inflected by race and class “hinders [many audiences from participating] effectively in society through the use of the many tools the Internet presents” (Oyedemi, 2012:312), including platforms for the negotiation of identity and self-representation.
Given their white, middle-class predispositions, performers such as *Die Antwoord* are, “far better resourced than the subjects on whom they have based their work” – black individuals whose realities of gang-violence and poverty are exploited and disseminated in local and global media (especially online video-repositories such as Youtube) in which they have very little stake (Haupt, 2012:120). As is often reiterated in critical, postcolonial theory, one must take heed of the notion that the act of representation and being represented respectively engender positions of control and subjugation (Kitzinger & Wilkinson, 1996). Secondly, it is too easily taken for granted that it is “acceptable for whites to explore blackness as long as their ultimate agenda is appropriation” (hooks, 2001:432). The advertisement for the Pendoring-awards (Fig. 25), which echoes the image I discussed earlier (Fig. 18), engages blackness at such a facile level: the presence of the ‘Cape Coloured gangster’, and the use of a colloquial expression associated with black Afrikaans-speakers to caption the advertisement, can be critiqued as reinscribing the “black experience … within a ‘cool’ narrative of white supremacy”, which nevertheless strips the black subject of agency (hooks, 2001:432).

The strategic refusal to identify with stigmatised conceptions of white supremacy, which, for example, manifests discernibly in the abject representations of *zef*, is therefore aided by the conditional inclusion of the “more exciting, more intense, and more threatening” characteristics of blackness, which are conceived of as being able to “disrupt and subvert the will to dominate” (hooks, 2001:428). Thus, suggesting that class (or, at least, the representation of a *specific* social class) could foster commonality between blackness and whiteness effaces the disparities of power that inflect these racialised positions, and make possible the imagining of flexible, potentially liberating identities. While Afrikaner hipness holds the potential for exploring whiteness in novel ways that are compatible with the post-apartheid milieu, the discourse of blackness that is employed to legitimate such forms of identity-work lock dispossessed black

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61 *Wie’t jou met ‘n nat Argus geslat?* / *Who hit you with a wet Argus?:* a mocking gesture suggesting that one’s many tattoos resulted from being slapped with a wet newspaper, which in this case is the Cape Argus, a daily publication distributed in Cape Town.
subjects into stereotypical cultural tropes that “frustrate their attempts to represent themselves on their own terms” (Haupt, 2012:140).

4.3 Spectres of Afrikanerdom in contemporary commodity culture: history, memory, and imagining the self

This section focuses on the unprecedented manner in which fixations on the past, historiography and memory are also decidedly symptomatic of late capitalist societies, and have become commercially viable. Contemporary, consumerist societies are characterised by a sense of historical discontinuity precipitated by the collapse of discernible distinctions between the past and the present. The complexity of the postmodern is perhaps best exemplified by the tendency towards the appropriation and subsequent amalgamation of a variety of styles from distinct, historically disparate eras in the realms of popular culture, avant-garde art practice, architectural design and fashion (Jameson, 1991). Far from
being ahistorical, late capitalist milieus are defined by a multitude of parallel temporalities that routinely conjure the past in the present (Verwoert, 2012). A number of key considerations of the postmodern condition, in fact, allude to death, haunting and artifice in their analyses (Baudrillard, 1988; Baudrillard, 1998; Jameson, 1991; Nora, 2012; Verwoert, 2012), but diverge on the topic of whether the powerful and abundant presence of the past (or many pasts) liberates or perplexes social subjects. Selected detractors (Baudrillard, 1988; Jameson, 1991) view the dizzying rate at which contemporary commodity culture articulates the past via compound images as creating difficulties for social subjects regarding their understandings of where they are situated on the continuum of time (Fuery & Mansfield, 2000). Through a modernist lens, the notion of progress (apparently necessary to centre the subject) has ultimately been compromised by the degradation of traditional linear understandings of history (Duvall, 2002; Malpas, 2005).

On the contrary, and especially at the level of critical postmodern practice, the emphasis has been on the emancipatory potential of asserting counter-narratives of the past, which have been excluded from hegemonic, Eurocentric histories (Hutcheon, 1988; Hutcheon, 2002). I am, however, particularly interested in speculating on the manner in which everyday consumers, instead of being merely acquiescent, have become conditioned to the disproportionate number of historical representations that haunt late capitalism. Given the realisation that “dead speech has … manifest effects on the lives of the living”, consumers effectively employ particular strategies to engage such spectres (Verwoert, 2012:152). I am therefore partial to the notion of ‘presentism’, which contends that historical reiterations facilitate perspectives on contemporary life, and mobilise creative, self-confident imaginings of identity and belonging rather than simply reinstating the past and its politics or performances of the self (Baines, 2013; Milton, 2014; Nora, 2012).

This section therefore deals with the transformative power that selected postmodern aesthetics lend to contemporary Afrikaners via the reincarnation of particular historical moments and personas of Afrikanerdom. Yet, asserting the
significance of the ‘everyday’ historiographies that characterise so much of the commodified realm appears facile in the absence of an exploration of the structural changes that have necessitated such reactionary practices. I will consider the proliferation and democratisation of history as part of a general shift in historical consciousness at social and institutional levels: the ‘textual turn’ and related affirmations of the mutability of history (Bundy, 2007:79) provide a basis for this discussion. I then focus on post-apartheid South Africa in particular, and explore the changing state of institutionalised history and memorialisation. Inter alia, I explore how the nation is narrated by dominant, Afro-nationalist forces, which are selectively countered by ancillary, ethnocentric historical visions.

In a postmodern vernacular, the traditional values of historical truth, objectivity and universality are deemed illusory, given the revelation that one accesses the past exclusively via discursive structures that are inflected by a range of subjective positions that guide their partiality (Hutcheon, 1988; Jenkins, 2003a). This implies that the intangibility of the past is subject to an innumerable number of attempts at creating, disseminating and interpreting historical knowledge, while the texts that result from such processes invite infinite readings (Jenkins, 2003a). In their production and consumption, histories are never engaged with for their own sake, but because the knowledges they engender serve political ends (Jenkins, 2003b). The principles that govern the emergence of all discursive formations therefore become powerful analytical tools for theorising the continually shifting limitations and potentials of historical knowledge. Such fluctuations are therefore contingent on an ‘episteme’, or the “present state of knowledge”, which at a given time and in a particular context determine the “enunciative possibilities and impossibilities” of historical representation (Foucault, 2002:5, 145).

As an episteme of sorts, the condition of postmodernity has apparently split the past “into multiple versions and narrative types … generated by the needs and desires of particular” groups or individuals whose various modes of remembering characterise the current state of historiography (Malpas, 2005:98). This development has impacted significantly on professional historians (Bundy, 2007),
who, having to contend with the “opening up of history” (Jenkins, 2003a:19), find their authoritative status as custodians of the past undermined by a “proliferation of particularist histories and memories” (Baines, 2006:174). The postmodern era is therefore witness to an unprecedented prevalence of interest in so-called post-national histories, which centre on the construction of personal archives and genealogical ‘discoveries’ (Baines, 2007). The rise of the antiquarian, “a new kind of ‘freelance’ historian” (Guffey, 2006:26), is also contingent on the relative ease with which knowledge can be obtained, stored, digitised and distributed in the technologically-advanced, information-saturated age of late capitalism (Jenkins, 2003a:16).

Contemporary history is, however, still subject to a set of social determinations that attribute different levels of cultural significance to different visions of the past. What has changed is the principles that govern their legitimacy, which vary from one socio-political context to another. Power relations therefore cannot be extricated from the knowledge economy, and “the system of its functioning” still enforces a particular hierarchy (Foucault, 2002:144). Given the momentous rise of cultural tourism, it appears that presently “there can be little doubt that history produced in the realm of public culture rather than the academy largely determines how the past is remembered by society at large” (Baines, 2007:173). This provides some basis for proposing that the Afrikaners’ loss of state power has simultaneously occasioned a loss of control over which versions of historical knowledge become institutionalised and officially memorialised. In turn, this has provoked the growing importance of commodity culture in preserving selected remnants of Afrikanerdom.

Public culture in post-apartheid South Africa has been subject to a significant number of practices of displacement and reparation, which have been “formative for the ways different constituencies … produce themselves as part of the new nation” (Coombes, 2003:5-6). The recent activist movement to get the statue of Cecil John Rhodes removed from the University of Cape Town (UCT) is testament to the manner in which personas and narratives deemed incompatible with the post-apartheid milieu are dismantled at material and discursive levels, because of the enduring symbolic violence they exert as part of their complicity.
with colonisation and apartheid. Yet, attempts to fit narratives of the nation to the ethos of post-apartheid South Africa do not exclusively engage the so-called ‘African Renaissance’, or “a triumphalist narrative of resistance” that asserts African hegemony (Baines, 2007:176).

At the risk of appearing to be reductive, one could argue that two other major “discursive projects … to narrate the nation” have emerged in the post-apartheid period, which have been touched on throughout this study (Bundy, 2007:80): the promotion of a Rainbow Nation, or multicultural, non-racial society, and (arguably as a result of this ‘rainbowism’) the proliferation of “a variety of claims to ethnic particularism” (Bundy, 2007:83). I have already emphasised the manner in which selected forms of Afrikaner identity-work employ the minority status of Afrikaans in order to reclaim a sense of ethnic distinction, whether in terms of the culture industry and festival circuit, or hipsterism and the deployment of superior knowledge. As an extension of these explorations, I now focus specifically on practices in Afrikaner commodity culture related to the construction of ‘counter-memories’ (Baines, 2007:169), which employ the “past as a kind of communal, mythic response to current controversies, issues and challenges” (Milton, 2014:325).

Considering that collective memory is inextricably tied up with history (Nora, 2012; Whitehead, 2009), the suppression or exclusion of marginal versions of the past from dominant historical discourses possibly creates difficulties for Afrikaners who seek a sense of belonging or identity via memory-work (Milton, 2014:326). Hegemonic or ‘public’ memory is therefore contingent on particular forces, notably “political resources and state power”, which prescribe “what should be remembered (as well as how it should be remembered) and what should be forgotten” (Baines, 2007:169). As discussed, the decentralisation of

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62During the late nineteenth century, Rhodes (a prominent British colonist, politician and entrepreneur) was at the forefront of expanding British rule “over the prime areas [of Southern Africa] not yet under white control” (Giliomee, 2009:241). In “what is now Zimbabwe, Zambia and South Africa, [Rhodes] looted the region’s wealth [and displaced numerous indigenous peoples] in his attempts … to spread the ‘superior’ Anglo-Saxon culture” (Editorial: razing symbols isn’t real change, 2015:[sp]). On 9 April 2015, Rhodes’ statue was removed following a number of rallies mobilised by the ‘Rhodes Must Fall’ movement, whose members (including university staff and students) view the “fall of ‘Rhodes’ [as] symbolic for the inevitable fall of white supremacy and privilege” at UCT (Rhodes Must Fall, 2015).
selected Afrikaner histories (as well as the histories of English-speaking whites) in post-apartheid South Africa has impacted on and irrevocably transformed a number of heritage sites and the names of public streets and buildings. Moreover, school textbooks no longer prioritise Afrikaner history, but offer multiperspectival, ethnically-diverse narratives of the past at grassroots level (Bundy, 2007; Vestergaard, 2001).

Being immersed in the largely state-sanctioned public culture of post-1994 South Africa means that some Afrikaners have to contend with a “lack of continuity between the symbols and narratives of Afrikaner ethnic pride into which they had been socialised and their actual experiences and perceptions of Afrikaner marginalisation” (Van der Waal & Robins, 2011:775). Contemporary Afrikaners are apparently subject to specific forms of ‘memory loss' that negatively impact on their social self-confidence, which is dependent on a sense of security and camaraderie partly accessed from a collectively remembered past. As I have mentioned, this ‘cultural amnesia’ can be conceived of as being induced by the state, regarding the manner in which the memories of Afrikanerdom disappear together with the evisceration of particular knowledges by transformative practices at material and symbolic levels.

Another interpretation, however, is that this cultural amnesia is a wilful forgetfulness, occasioned by the psychological struggle that some Afrikaners face regarding their complicity with the human rights violations perpetrated by the apartheid regime. This predicament is perhaps best understood as resulting from some Afrikaners’ realisation that whiteness has failed to “live up to its own democratic and humanitarian ideals” (Straker, 2004:409). Ultimately, what some Afrikaners may experience as their continuing pariah status has mobilised the constructed remembrance of “a sanitised history where conflict and distress are absent” (Jenkins, 2003a:22). Yet, at the same time, some Afrikaners have strategically embraced victimhood as central to their identities, a process which can be viewed as reiterating “the international trend whereby minorities prefer to remember their collective suffering rather than take pride in their achievements” (Baines, 2013:252).
The most striking example of this identity politics is illustrated by the popularity of Bok van Blerk’s song, *De la Rey*, which sold an impressive 180 000 copies of the album that it is featured on in the first six months after its release in South Africa in 2006 (Van der Waal & Robins, 2011). The song and its accompanying music video (2007), which has over 700 000 views on YouTube, reify the bravery and leadership of the *boer* general, Koos de la Rey, and invoke the persecution of the Afrikaner *volk* during the South African war. Both the song and music video have been subject to a significant number of critiques regarding the emphases on ‘affliction’ in contemporary narratives of Afrikanerness. These discourses appear to fixate on whether the song is a “right-wing [call] for Afrikaners to assert themselves politically”, or merely an example of the “cynical commercial exploitation of nostalgia given circumstances in which the commodification of Afrikaner identity had become lucrative” (Van der Waal, 2011:764).

Regardless of whether the *De la Rey* phenomenon is at risk of mobilising radical political action or simply satisfies a yearning for ethnic camaraderie and commiseration, the most significant factor that defines the relationship between *De la Rey* and its listeners (or viewers) is *affect*. Indeed, the *De la Rey* music video manipulates its viewers, firstly, via an introductory text providing details of the scourge of the South African war, thereby ‘authenticating’ the visual spectacle that follows (Haupt, 2012). Such claims to verisimilitude encourage “emotional identification and affective communication between audiences and the narrated story” (Stanley, 2008:21). In a similar vein, the music video also exploits a number of stereotypical, but no less emotive, tropes of warfare that already circulate in the Afrikaner imaginary: most prominently, these include dichotomous representations of gender that attribute the custodianship of women and ‘the land’ (as well as the ache of witnessing the violent conquest of both) to masculinity, while feminine subjects are fixed in the role of the “suffering, stoic, and self-sacrificing” *volksmoeder* (the mother of the nation), who is the repository of the Afrikaners’ “moral and spiritual mission” (McClintock, 1997:104-105).

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The apparent internalisation of De la Rey’s affective powers amongst some Afrikaners is therefore illustrative of the notion that particular “individuals and groups in civil society … refuse to forget” narratives that are marginalised in ‘official’ or state-sanctioned historiographies (Baines, 2007:169). Memory is therefore indeed recoverable, but depends, firstly, on a certain degree of “commemorative vigilance” (Nora, 2012:61) and, secondly, recognisable discourses that render the past visible (Jenkins, 2003b:70). While it is true that a sense of ethnic cohesiveness can be maintained or restored by reflecting on a shared past (Halbwachs, 2012:48), one cannot posit that there is “such a thing as spontaneous memory” (Nora, 2012:61). Collective memories are therefore jarred into action via discourses, whether mobilised by interaction with members of one’s in-group (communicative memory), or the figurative phenomena that become repositories for fading, or lost, memories (cultural memory) (Coombes, 2003; Milton, 2014; Whitehead, 2009).

It is, in fact, exactly the limitations of communicative memory that have necessitated the mass proliferation of cultural memory: since communicative or living memory (which is approximately 80 to 100 years old) is evidently fragile and ephemeral, (post)modern memory, it seems, is decidedly “archival [and] relies entirely on the specificity of the trace, the materiality of the vestige, the concreteness of the recording, the visibility of the image” (Nora, 2012:62). Moreover, the aestheticized state of collective memory, together with the indispensable role that memory plays in self-realisation, reinforces the

64 During the heyday of the De la Rey phenomenon, live performances and recordings of the song were met by audiences “known to clutch balled fists to their chests and sing the rousing chorus with great gusto [suggesting] that the song is able to touch a raw nerve in the Afrikaner psyche while also prompting a momentary uplift of the spirit”, and a sense of ethnic ‘togetherness’ (Baines, 2013:225).

65 The music video (as well as photographs of afflicted, elderly Afrikaners published in Die Huisgenoot during the early twentieth century (cf. section 2.2)) is also subject to the notion of ‘postmemory’; or, that “the ‘generation after’ [can relate to the] cultural trauma of those who came before … not by recall but by imaginative investment” (Hirsch, 2012:5). Yet, as a theoretical approach, postmemory focuses almost exclusively on the perpetuity of traumatic memories, such as the ghostly remnants of the Holocaust (Hirsch, 2012; Sturken, 1999), and I prefer not to employ the term going forward, given that I conceive of all memory as always already visually inclined.
undeniable *visuality* of the imaginary, which I have asserted throughout this study.

While I recognise that “the act of making and objects themselves can become an insurance against forgetting and thus against the loss of personhood” (Coombes, 2003:9), I purposely depart from the ubiquitous discourses of victimhood and indignation that are the focus of a number of cultural expressions of Afrikaner ethnic identity, as well as the critiques that surround them. I am not denying the existence of forms of Afrikaner memorialisation that have “no place for irony as a corrective mechanism” (Van der Waal & Robins, 2011:773), or that “soothe white anxiety because [they anchor themselves] in a lost and glorious past” (Lewis, 2013:10). What needs to be considered, however, is that nostalgia is not uniform across the spectrum of artefacts that contemporarily reflect on the history of the Afrikaners (Bissell, 2005); nor is every nostalgic mode intent on providing a “potentially threatening undercurrent to the social order” (Baines, 2007:169).

The sombre tones of the *De la Rey* music video can indeed be read as reinscribing “a standardised narrative about the history of the Afrikaners and their present predicament” (Van der Waal & Robins, 2011:769). The *De la Rey* phenomenon therefore symbolically collapses the distance between past and present forms of oppression (respectively antagonised by British imperialism and Afro-nationalism), thereby asserting the continued persecution of the Afrikaners in a ‘failed’, hostile nation-state. Selected Afrikaners, for example, ascribe their contemporary vulnerability to affirmative action and perceptions of ‘reverse-racism’ (as well as hate-crimes perpetrated against South African whites), which are propagated as threats that require the mobilisation of an ethnic bloc in order to assuage them (De Vries, 2012; Lewis, 2013). The *De la Rey* phenomenon is therefore arguably illustrative of the manner in which the past can be “politically manipulated through newly recreated practices of national commemoration with the aim of reestablishing social cohesion, a sense of security and an obedient relationship to authority” (Boym, 2001:42). Yet,

> identifying all forms of political ethnicity with nationalism forces one to assume that all political ethnicities [or ethnic minorities] are necessarily subversive, i.e. ultimately working to undermine the
sovereignty of the state, whenever and as long as it is not their nation-state. This is however evidently false, given the multiplicity of political ethnicities currently prospering under the sovereignty of various liberal democracies without questioning, let alone challenging, their legitimacy (Alsheh & Elliker, 2015:3).

While it is impossible to separate historiography and memory-making from their politics (Jenkins, 2003a), one cannot assume that a single narrative of Afrikaner ‘selfhood’ is employed in post-apartheid South Africa, or that such conceptions are necessarily embattled by ‘nationalist’ forces. As discussed, there has been a discernible tendency towards hybridisation and modernisation in contemporary Afrikaner identity politics, which creatively engage and endlessly transform the ‘self’ via the myriad distinctions offered by the neo-liberal sphere. Particular forms of nostalgic imagining therefore appear to be more “complicitous with ... the economic order” than any specifically subversive form of resistance (Duvall, 2002:17). The manner in which specific pasts are longed for, and resurrected in the present as paradigms of some lost ideal, has indeed become “thoroughly entwined with the consumer-entertainment complex” (Reynolds, 2011:xxix).

Contemporary advertising discourses routinely reconstruct bygone times in order to affect mass audiences (Meyers, 2009), while nostalgia has become increasingly characteristic of the aesthetics of commodity production (Harris, 2000): in fact, consumer societies are in the “midst of a ‘retro-revolution’ in which ... revivals of old brands and their images” (Brown, 2003:19) are in high demand and have apparently reached the point of ubiquity (Boym, 2001). The marketing of nostalgia is, however, not a catalyst for the contemporary propensity towards cravings for the past. Instead, the inverse appears to be true – it is the “anthropologically rooted longing for time ... that creates a market for time-enhancing objects and experiences” (Leone, 2014:8). Nostalgia does not reside in objects and images, but is actively produced by consumers who engage such aesthetics as a means of navigating the disorienting (and often euphoric) spaces of globalisation and mass commodification (Hutcheon, 1998). Dealing with nostalgia therefore simultaneously involves acknowledging the various acts of attribution that necessitate contemporary reflections on the past, which satisfy particular psychological or social needs in the present (Milton, 2014).
Nostalgia maintains a contentious and often contradictory relationship with postmodernity and consumer culture. Some commodified histories, such as the De la Rey phenomenon, provide a distinctly modernist sense of continuity longed for by particular ‘displaced’ social subjects traumatised by the sweeping forces of globalisation and postcolonialism (Featherstone, 1995). Such forms of nostalgia, which can be conceived of as restorative, are therefore predominantly driven by anxiety (Walder, 2009), and depend on aesthetic programmes that provide “total reconstructions of … the past” for their symbolic power (Boym, 2001:41). It is exactly the ‘authenticity’ and solemnity with which the past is invoked in the present that creates a mirage of dead time, which may be recognised as illusory but is no less effective in connecting the individual nostalgic with “wider, collective pasts of family, society, and history” (Walder, 2009:936).

Restorative nostalgia is, however, qualified by reflective nostalgia, which dwells on the past in an irreverent, flexible and selective manner (Boym, 2001). Reflective nostalgia concentrates on ‘representative samples’ (Nora, 2012:65-66), and has very little interest in the seamless reiteration of monolithic events such as the South African war. Therefore, it is important to bear in mind that

the uncanny quality of an encounter with [the dead] after all lies precisely in the fact that, in the relationship between a spectre and the one who invokes it, who controls whom will always remain dangerously ambiguous and the subject of practical struggle (Verwoert, 2012:153).

Thus, although restorative and reflective nostalgia may overlap and re-present the same historical juncture, the resulting narratives presented by each form are characteristically different (Boym, 2001). Reflective nostalgia rejects the notion that the past can be held up to the present as a mirror which reflects “identical copies of ourselves”, and therefore seeks “not our origins but a way of figuring out what we are from what we are no longer” (Nora, 2012:65-66). By means of parody, irony and humour, reflective nostalgia therefore illustrates that “longing and critical thinking” are not oppositional forces (Boym, 2001:49-50), but coexist in the imaginary. Instead of attempting to excavate and restore the past, reflective nostalgia, like other postmodern practices, is suspicious of “narrative mastery ... and master narratives” (Hutcheon, 2002:61). Thus, this mode
indiscriminately combines historical ‘facts’ with myth, popular culture and fantasy in order to imagine new relationships to the past, as well as functional ways of ‘being’ in the present (and beyond). To illustrate the machinations of reflective nostalgia in the Afrikaner imaginary, I later analyse a number of t-shirts that form part of the catalogue of Valhalla Tees (2015) – a niche, online store specialising in clothing, posters and décor, featuring parodic representations of prominent personas and events from Afrikaner history, aimed at consumers between the ages of 25 and 35 (Du Plooy, 2013).

In a sense, reflective nostalgia is prospective, buoyant and creative, unlike nostalgic visions such as the *De la Rey* phenomenon, which conflate past and present injustices, and anticipate future betrayals. Instead of focusing on collective memories that mobilise around “shared experiences of discrimination … in order to obtain redress for real (or imagined) wrongs” (Baines, 2013:252), I view some nostalgic expressions as symbolic acts that attempt to resolve social predicaments in the ‘aesthetic realm’ (Jameson, 1981:76, 79). This, however, does not suggest that reflective nostalgia is apolitical, but rather that its politics are (in a characteristically postmodern fashion) concerned with negotiating identity via stylised commodities that apparently encourage radical subjectivities, and even progressive interpersonal or intercultural relationships (Jenkins, 2003b).

Some, however, maintain that irony and parody are irreconcilable with nostalgia (Hutcheon, 1998), since the latter is always prelapsarian or intent on

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66 Owing to the fact that I am predominantly interested in speculating on the possible affective, social and psychological positions that the t-shirts afford their wearers, I am not intent on providing a textual reading of the Valhalla Tees website as a whole. Moreover, I am not suggesting that all the commodity-images featured on the website necessarily operate via reflective nostalgia, although the majority of discourses they engender are inflected by a playful, ironic attitude. Given a broader scope, some of the website’s features could, however, additionally motivate that particular contemporary forms of asserting Afrikanerness are distinctly post-national and integrative: the website’s use of *jongheer* (young man) and *jonkvrouw* (young woman) to designate gender-specific items of clothing are peculiar, since they hark back to the Afrikaners’ Dutch heritage, a fact that was often abandoned in nationalist discourses seeking to establish the Afrikaners as an autonomous, homogenous, and legitimately South African ethnic group (Giliomee, 2009). Conversely, the website’s emphasis on the European origins of the Afrikaners could be construed as exemplary of the manner in which the past is often sanitised by conveniently circumventing stigmatised narratives, such as apartheid. Yet, one cannot neglect that Valhalla Tees endeavours to remain commercially viable, and therefore evidently deals with historical subjects that can be transformed into aesthetically appealing, humorous accoutrements (without, as I argue, necessarily backsliding into essentialist, reified representations of Afrikanerness).
“reinstating the ideal” (Hutcheon 1998:4). Yet, while I find accord with the notion that restorative nostalgia often denies its nostalgic nature in order to protect its claims to ‘the truth’, reflective nostalgia (like irony and parody) is self-aware: it “dwells on the ambivalences of human longing and belonging ... does not shy away from contradictions”, and calls truth into doubt (Boym, 2001:xviii). Thus, instead of maintaining a typology of progressive (ironic) and regressive (nostalgic) postmodernisms, I suggest that in certain cases (and especially depending on the object being investigated) the qualities of seemingly contradictory postmodern forms can operate alongside one another, and foster various affective and political positions.

The KKNK-advertisement featuring Haas Das (Fig. 10) (cf. section 3.4), for example, is at once nostalgic and ironic. Given the medium (advertising) from which this particular discourse emerges, I concluded that the image may appeal to Afrikaners seeking absolution and functional ways of maintaining white privilege, and separateness, in post-apartheid South Africa. Yet, considering that the agenda of all advertisements is to connect intelligibly to an abstract concept (thereby selling an idea that circulates in discursive realms beyond the materiality of the image), the analysis of commodity items such as t-shirts (which sell themselves) requires a different approach. The medium therefore not only “shapes and controls the scale of human association and action”, but all media are “fixed charges on our personal energies [and] configure the awareness and experience of each one of us” (McLuhan, 2001:9, 23). More so than any discursive form that depends on abstraction, commodity items such as t-shirts (which are worn on the body, and indeed become embodied) expressly articulate the notion that individuals consume as a “means of defining the self socially” (McLuhan & Gordon, 2003:163).

Although advertisements also fulfil a social function (as regards the internalisation of their aspirational tones), items of clothing (and other concrete commodity items) appear to possess a more “active’ or agential dimension” (Conkey, 2006:361). Print advertisements are embedded in editorialised spaces that provide, at least some, discursive coherence. Commodity items, however, are always in transit (Appadurai, 1986), and thus abandon the virtual and material
spaces (such as online stores or shopping malls) that may provide them with some context, and tangential means for consumers to ‘read’ and comprehend their codes. The limitations placed on the ‘expressive possibilities’ of items of clothing (Conkey, 2006:367-368), necessitates the prioritisation of their aesthetic dimension, which not only seduces the consumer, but also ensures the confidence with which the item can be worn in everyday performances of the self (Schneider, 2006).

The appeal of the commodity is not only contingent on its capacity to be perceived as beautiful, but also depends on its spirituality or ‘aura’ (Brown, 2003; Schneider, 2006): its sovereignty and originality, the unique ‘feeling’ of distinction that it holds for particular consumers (which, of course, is comparable with the acquisition of hipness, discussed in section 4.2). The idea of the ‘aura’ (or, at least, the loss of such an appellation) was first alluded to in critiques of modernity and industrialisation, especially regarding the newfound ease with which works of art could be infinitely reproduced: ‘great’ works of art become degraded, even soulless, the moment they are rendered banal, appearing on postcards sold on every street corner (Benjamin, 2001).

Those who had optimistically believed in the emancipatory potential of the democratisation of art in the Modern age, perhaps could not have anticipated that contemporary consumer culture would seize upon processes of mass production and foster a marked sense of ennui and alienation in late capitalist societies (Baudrillard, 1988). The proliferation of bespoke consumer items in the neo-liberal sphere is therefore not merely symptomatic of late capitalism, but also reactionary: the carefully constructed aesthetics of specialised (predominantly nostalgic) artefacts thus seek to “restore the ‘aura’ of the handmade to our commodities and combat our estrangement from a world packaged in plastic” (Harris, 2000:xxi-xxii). Regarding clothing, such processes “convey a kind of spiritual power not unlike the auspicious motifs woven into [pre-industrial] traditional textiles (which for their part now circulate as disembodied images advertising ‘cultural’ tourism)” (Scheider, 2006:214).
As a vantage point for discussing the prominence of reflective nostalgia in the Afrikaner imaginary, I consider the design for *De la Rey Leeutemmers (De La Rey Lion Tamers)* (Fig. 26 and 27) as markedly different from other commodified memories of the South African war. Nostalgia suggests an ache of “temporal distance and displacement” (Boym, 2001:44) and is evidently saturated with affect, which (in its restorative mode) is often conceived of as somewhat defeatist; a futile attempt at recovering the irrecoverable (Hutcheon, 1998). The design for *De la Rey Leeutemmers*, however, suggests that instead of always taking itself ‘dead seriously’ (Boym, 2001:49-50), nostalgia also engages the notion that “the articulation between emotion and consumption … is to be found in the … ‘imagination’, understood as the socially situated deployment of cultural fantasies” (Illouz, 2007:379).

Essentially, in this context, the presence of De la Rey’s ghost fails to ‘restore’ anything: instead of relying on historical ‘truth’ or following a coherent narrative, the details surrounding De la Rey’s biography are fractured and reorganised in a defamiliarised fashion. The most evident example of this is the fact that *De la Rey Leeutemmers* (as opposed to De la Rey himself) had never actually existed, and consequently cannot be longed for. Here, nostalgia does not reconstruct “emblems and rituals of home and homeland in an attempt to conquer and spatialize time [but] cherishes shattered fragments of memory and *temporalizes*” the commodity [my emphasis] (Boym, 2001:49). Historical data such as De la Rey’s date of birth (1847), as well as his status as ‘The lion of the West-Transvaal’ (Baines, 2013), are therefore “randomly plucked out of the flow of history” (Nora, 2012:61) and returned to it in new, parodic forms that fit the ‘birth of a legend’ to the advent of a purely imaginative company of intrepid lion tamers.

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67 T-shirts emblazoned with slogans such as *Praat Afrikaans of hou jou bek (Speak Afrikaans or shut up)* and *100% Boeremeisie (100% Afrikaner girl)* are also antithetical to the commodities discussed in this section of the chapter. According to the founder of Valhalla Tees, Pieter Venter, his designs are purposely detached from such inferentially racist, hostile and essentialist discourses (Du Plooy, 2013). I similarly anticipate a more discerning, liberal, hip consumer who derides the more gaudy variety of ‘Afrikaner’-commodities, which are often considered poorly designed and cheaply made, as well as self-defensive and regressive in tone (thus perpetuating the discourse of victimhood popular amongst the right-wing) (Baines, 2013).
The irreverence with which De la Rey is engaged exemplifies the manner in which particular postmodern forms, such as retro, seek to “know the past ... sensually, not through knowledge but through [an] atmosphere [or aesthetic] that simultaneously sensualizes and de-intellectualizes history” (Harris, 2000:24-25, 26). Yet, a theoretical divide also exists between nostalgia and retro, which, like irony, is at times conceived of as structurally antithetical to nostalgia, because it seizes upon history in a cannibalistic, unsentimental manner, and characteristically fixates on the recent past while ignoring ‘remote lore’ (Guffey, 2006:10-11, 20). Again, I find this rigorous dualism problematic, since De la Rey Leeutemmers is at once nostalgic (at a reflective level, at least), and indicative of the manner in which the past (even the archaic) can be recycled and aestheticized to charm contemporary consumers (Reynolds, 2011).

The historical acumen of reflective nostalgia recognises the impossibility of an absolute return to the past, while maintaining “some connection to the loss of collective frameworks or memory” (Boym, 2001:55). It therefore operates by means of a “seriousness that [deliberately] fails” in order to produce pleasure (without being necessarily patronising or cynical) (Sontag, 1990:283). Indeed, at
the level of its aesthetics, *De la Rey Leeutemmers* hints at the simultaneous functioning of two (apparently incompatible) discursive formations.

![Image](image-url)

**Fig. 27.** Valhalla Tees, *De la Rey Leeutemmers (De la Rey Lion Tamers)* (detail), 2015. (Valhalla Tees, 2015).

The first is, of course, nostalgic, and sets its gaze on De la Rey in a self-reflexive manner, thereby illustrating that any “designated ‘content’ can be emptied out (and re-filled or forgotten) by an equally contingent and thus never rigid/fixed re-designation – *ad infinitum*” (Jenkins, 2003b:35-36). Additionally, a second semiotic system becomes discernible regarding the manner in which the image of the lion (Fig. 27) signifies not only De la Rey’s heroic status (and the imaginary lion tamers his legendary personage ‘inspires’), but also a retro sensibility; indeed, retro *par excellence* – Art Deco (Guffey, 2006).

The aesthetic conventions that characterised ‘popular Modernism’ in Europe and the United States between the two world wars (Guffey, 2006:68) – a repertoire of “lavish ornamentation [and a] standard iconography” of fauna and flora, Egyptology, tribalism, hard-edged geometrics, and sleek machine-age sophistications (Duncan, 1988:7) – re-emerged in the imaginary of a number of retro enthusiasts in the 1960s, who only then started to refer to this particular
style as Art Deco (Guffey, 2006). The revival of Art Deco can be conceived of as one of the most prominent examples of the “unusual phenomenon of a historical vision shaped largely by non-historians” (Guffey, 2006:86). From “the gangster pinstripe suits” sported by the fashion-conscious, to the “[h]ard-edged and metallic” typefaces that dominated glossy magazines and advertisements, Art Deco assumed “both economic and cultural significance” (Guffey, 2006:86, 91).

A number of similarities can thus be drawn between the image of the lion featured on the t-shirt, and the “bas-relief appearance” and streamlined, partially abstracted features of the immensely popular animal sculptures and hood ornaments (or automobile mascots) produced as part of the Art Deco movement (Fig. 28) (Duncan, 1988:131).

![Fig. 28. Casimir Brau, *Leaping-lion mascot/hood ornament*, 1920. Heavy chromed bronze, 21cm (long). (Miller, 2005:183).](image)

In a typically postmodern fashion (regarding the bric-a-brac manner in which many temporalities and aesthetics potentially meet in a single discourse), the t-shirt’s design is decidedly ambiguous, since it is unclear whether it is Art Deco that is being quoted, or the retro-tradition of appropriating Art Deco. Yet, I am not particularly interested in speculating on the intent of the discourse, but
rather its potential for affecting consumers: as discussed, Art Deco possesses significant cultural gravity (as evidenced by its momentous revival in the 1960s) and therefore arguably lends an ‘aura’ of beauty (Scheider, 2006), sophistication and cultural savoir-faire to an otherwise ordinary commodity item.

Furthermore, the presence of Art Deco perhaps also attributes a sense of contemporaneity to the impossibly distant notion of De la Rey and the South African war, thus illustrating that pre-modern historical junctures are also subject to the transformative powers of retro. On the contrary, both the nostalgic and retro discourses engendered by *De la Rey Leeutemmers* may appear seductive to contemporary consumers based on the fact that they barter with historicity itself: thus, “[t]ime may enhance what seems simply dogged or lacking in fantasy now because we are too close to it, because it resembles too closely our own everyday fantasies, the fantastic nature of which we don’t perceive. We are better able to enjoy a fantasy when it is not our own” (Sontag, 1990:285).

The following images (Fig. 29 and 30) similarly engage Afrikaner history at a parodic level, but (given their endeavour to Africanise Afrikanerdom) also invite some comparison with the *ATKV*-advertisement discussed earlier (Fig. 15; cf. section 3.5). The advertisement’s attempt at reconciling blackness and Afrikanerness under the rubric of ‘rainbowism’ exacts a kind of symbolic violence by discursively appending the folktale of Racheltjie de Beer to blackness, represented by the fictitious Sophie Rapolai. Her persona accordingly engenders the “mimetic quality of the fictive discourse devised to represent” the *ATKV*s agenda (Stern, 1994:388), which hinges on legitimating the continuance of claims to Afrikaner ethnicity and white cultural hegemony in the post-apartheid context. The t-shirt’s design, however, does not impose order and continuity on the past, but engages a decidedly colloquial or marginal historical vision in the midst of more traditional Afrikaner historiographies. The *boer*-leader and military strategist, Andries Pretorius is, for example, described by Hermann Giliomee (in his seminal text on the history of the Afrikaners) as a “[t]all, robust man with an impressive bearing [whose] self-confidence … shaded into arrogance” (2009:165).
Yet, by asserting that Pretorius was apparently also referred to as *ngalonkulu* (‘muscular arms’) by the Zulu (Valhalla Tees, 2015), the discourse constructed by the t-shirt negotiates the conventional narration of the Afrikaners’ past in an idiosyncratic manner. Considering that no measure of historical inventiveness...
can operate completely outside of the “already-written” (Brink, 1998:22), Pretorius’ purported hyper-masculinity and pompousness are therefore employed to humorously connect to male vanity (and ‘the cult of the physique’) in a manner that does not completely surmount Pretorius’ legend, but fits it to the commercial and social spaces in which Valhalla Tees operates.

The design for *Oom Paul: die fluitende man/Mamelodi* (*Uncle Paul: the whistling man/Mamelodi*) (Fig. 31 and 32) similarly abandons the conventional historiography of Paul Kruger as the major founder of the *boer* republic of Transvaal (over which he would eventually preside as president) during the late 1800s (Giliomee, 2009): instead, the t-shirt is preoccupied with illuminating the relatively unknown fact that Kruger was colloquially referred to as *mamelodi* (‘the whistling man’) by some indigenous black people because of his ability to imitate birdcalls (Du Plooy, 2013; Joubert, 2012). Moreover, the Africanisation of Kruger and Pretorius displaces the “potency of ... the paternalistic ideology of whites-only rule” (Peffer, 2005:45).

These images ultimately refute the notion of the Afrikaners’ sole entitlement to South African soil, and (instead of discursively erasing the presence of black indigenous populations) suggest a coeval relationship between black and white South Africans based on familiarity, perhaps even affection. The Battle of Blood River (during which Pretorius lead the Afrikaners to a glorious victory against the Zulu in 1838 (Giliomee, 2009)) and Kruger’s staunch republicanism are ultimately foregone in favour of discourses that have garnered significantly less consideration in academic, as well as social, histories. Whereas the *ATKV*-advertisement (Fig. 15) subjected blackness to Afrikaner mythology, thereby promoting a facile notion of inclusivity, the t-shirts articulate that “[t]o look instead at the Others looking at ‘us’ is to relativize and problematize ‘our’ own

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68The township Mamelodi (in the east of South Africa’s capital, Pretoria) is also named after Kruger (Joubert, 2012).

69Certainly, in its production and consumption, this discourse also engages the so-called ‘self-indigenising settler identity’ (Lawson, 2004) discussed earlier (cf. section 3.5). Thus, in the “act of inscribing indigenous culture in their texts, these white settlers are attempting to write themselves into origin, to become indigenous” (Ingram, 1999:82-83), but simultaneously speak “of and against [their] own oppressiveness” without backsliding into self-aggrandisement (Lawson, 2004:158).
perspective: it can be uncomfortable, unsettling or painful [even delightful], but it is an essential beginning if the process of Othering is to be interrupted” (Kitzinger & Wilkinson, 1996:17).

Fig. 31. Valhalla tees, Oom Paul: die fluitende man/Mamelodi (Uncle Paul: the whistling man/Mamelodi), 2015. (Valhalla Tees, 2015).

Fig. 32. Valhalla Tees, Oom Paul: die fluitende man/Mamelodi (Uncle Paul: the whistling man/Mamelodi) (detail), 2015. (Valhalla Tees, 2015).
Although black youth ostensibly do not fit Valhalla Tees’ target market, one could argue that Zulu-speakers in particular may draw some symbolic power from comprehending the *Pretorius* t-shirt’s ironic stance, which may remain obscure to those not socialised into similar discursive communities (Hutcheon, 1995). Far from being liberal and self-reflexive merely because it inverts an existing power structure, the t-shirt holds affective, psychologically potent and socially constructive potential for its (black and white) consumers because it does not set itself up as a ‘correction’ of silence or of other versions of history; but through the processes of intertextuality set in motion by its presentation it initiates (or resumes) strategies of interrogation which prompt the [consumer] to assume a new (moral) responsibility for his/her own narrative, as well as the narrative we habitually call the world (Brink, 1998:28).
Chapter 5

Conclusion

To say that one discursive formation is substituted for another is not to say that a whole world of absolutely new objects, enunciations, concepts, and theoretical choices emerges fully armed and fully organised in a text that will place that world once and for all; it is to say that a general transformation of relations has occurred, but that it does not necessarily alter all the elements; it is to say that statements are governed by new rules of formation, it is not to say that all objects or concepts, all enunciations or all theoretical choices disappear. On the contrary, one can, on the basis of these new rules, describe and analyse phenomena of continuity, return, and repetition (Foucault, 2002:191).

Foucault’s account of the complexities of discourse is profoundly demonstrated in this research on the re-imagination of Afrikaner identity in contemporary consumer culture and advertising. Each particular juncture in the Afrikaners’ history has produced discourses that are legitimated (and, in turn, serve to legitimate Afrikanerness) in power-laden social climates that guide their emergence. My interest in the cultural phenomena explored in this thesis is therefore grounded in an awareness of the capacity of visual culture and commodification to “show what (in a particular social context at a specific historical moment) it means for something to mean something” (Verwoert, 2012:149).

In Chapter 2, I traced the volatility and constructedness of Afrikaner ethnic identity with reference to a number of significant historical junctures that have been formative in establishing a vivid Afrikaner imaginary. I supported my claim that national belonging and ethnicity are inseparable from the imaginary by focusing on the affective power of representations of mythologised events such as the Great Trek and South African war. By visualising, and consequently popularising, Afrikanerdom, nationalist apparatuses ultimately provided the Afrikaners with a discursive realm from which to draw a coherent sense of identity, which is powerful exactly because it is perceived as being collectively shared. Yet, I also suggested that this sense of homogeneity was illusory, since the Afrikaners never constituted an entirely consolidated community.
As social, economic and political disparities amongst Afrikaners mounted and became increasingly discernable in the mid to late twentieth century, Afrikaner nationalism and the apartheid regime faced major threats to their hegemony. The modernisation and newfound monetary power of a significant constituency of Afrikaners (which, as I discussed, also irrevocably changed the vernacular of the imaginary) ultimately proved detrimental to the continuation of an emotionally and politically bounded ethnic enclave. I concluded that the various strategies employed by contemporary Afrikaners to assuage the loss of political power, moral superiority, and social privilege in the post-apartheid milieu are also illustrative of the complex, nuanced relationships they continue to maintain with their history and ethnic lineage.

I suggested that while some contemporary Afrikaners have abandoned their ethnic heritage in order to circumvent the stigma of Afrikanerness, others are actively involved in transforming their identity-positions in order to recuperate their damaged psyches, and compromised social positions. I reiterated that such assertions of Afrikaner ethnicity often emphasise the minority status of the Afrikaners in order to facilitate the integration of expressions of Afrikanerness into the ethos of post-apartheid multiculturalism. Moreover, I argued that some Afrikaners’ claims to ethnic particularity ultimately compromise for the loss of state power, which had previously secured the continued legitimacy of Afrikanerness and the Afrikaans language. I finally critiqued the manner in which discourses of a ‘rehabilitated’ Afrikanerness, which integrate into the new dispensation via the culture industry, often exploit claims to liberalism and race-blindness in order to mobilise the symbolic and economic power of Afrikaners.

I subsequently discussed an assortment of commodities and images (in Chapters 3 and 4), in order to speculate on the possible psychological and social benefits particular consumers obtain when consuming cultural commodities that target post-apartheid Afrikanerness. Far from assuming that contemporary representations of Afrikanerness target a homogenous constituency of social subjects, I posited that the affective, symbolic power accessed from such artefacts are contingent on individual aspirations and modes of self-imagining. Given the
fractured state of Afrikaner ethnic identity, it appears that perceptions of precarity and persecution, as well as the desire for transformation and integration, markedly characterise selected spaces of post-apartheid visual culture. Ultimately, the connections between Afrikaners and the commodities or images they consume, give expression to processes of identity-work variously inflected by, for example, narcissism, nostalgia, hipness, and an awareness (or, alternately, a superficial understanding) of the continuing complexity of race-relations in South Africa.

In Chapter 3, I identified the publicity realms of DEKAT and Insig as exemplary of the tendency towards reparation in discourses that fixate on Afrikanerness in the post-1994 period. I argued that the advertisements discussed in this chapter, meet the psychological and social needs of the magazines’ readers by using irony to overwrite the ‘taint’ of traditional Afrikaner ethnic identity. By means of humour and self-parody, these images effectively recover the Afrikaners’ past in order to mitigate the anxieties of the present, but do so in terms of strategies that supposedly render their re-emergence beyond reproach. Several of the advertisements I discussed also articulate the perceived seamlessness of linguistic, cultural, and economic capital in the Afrikaner imaginary. Indeed, I argued that these advertisements discursively position the well-being of Afrikaner ethnic identity as contingent on the combined symbolic and material value of all three constructs. Moreover, I critiqued some of the advertisements’ claims to multiracialism as expediently deployed to reinvigorate (and Africanise) Afrikanerness, instead of broadening the ethnic fold to legitimately include black Afrikaans-speakers.

In Chapter 4, I deliberated on the manner in which particular images and commodity items navigate amongst global trends and localised knowledges in order to lend commercial appeal to Afrikaner ethnic identity, and Afrikaner history. I argued that the emergence of Afrikaner hipsterism has, to a certain degree, secured the continued legitimacy of Afrikaner ethnicity in a dual manner. Firstly, Afrikaner hipsterism’s reverence for zef lends a sense of cosmopolitanism to Afrikanerness, since the aesthetic appeal of abject whiteness emerges from an internationally recognised centre. Secondly, hip Afrikanerness
simultaneously amplifies its ‘coolness’, or cultural superiority, exactly by differentiating itself from its global counterparts via specialised in-group knowledges. I suggested that such forms of localised hipness are conducive to advancing the self-esteem of particular young Afrikaners, who experience their identity-positions in post-apartheid South Africa as tentative and estranged.

Yet, despite attempts at broadening the consumer profile of hip Afrikanerness, I was reluctant to propose that such endeavours have a marked effect on reconciling black and white youths, since the deployment of economic power remains racially circumscribed in contemporary South Africa. Finally, I accounted for the manner in which Afrikaner history is also subject to commodification, and consequently forms part of a global cultural economy fixated on recapitulating (and capitalising on) the past. My main concern was to argue against the presupposition that all contemporary nostalgic reflections on Afrikanerdom necessarily attempt to reinstate a lost ethnic Utopia, or rearticulate the perceived subaltern status of the Afrikaners. I concluded that particular nostalgic commodities, which revisit selected personas from the Afrikaners’ history, imaginatively engage the postmodern view of the mutability of the past and collective memory. As a result, such commodities offer functional, self-reflexive ways of asserting Afrikanerness, without essentially lapsing towards inferential racism and defeatism.

Considering these successive historical renegotiations, despite the emancipatory potential of many of the representations that I have discussed, it is not viable to suggest a definitive reading of Afrikaner ethnic identity, since this construct continues to be in constant production. A far more fruitful way of thinking would be to state that, beyond the scope of this thesis, Afrikaners are bound to continue negotiating their identities in a social world irrevocably subject to change. The nature of future calls for the renewal of Afrikaner ethnic identity is indeterminable, but it is certain that impending social ruptures will act as catalysts for new discursive modes of identity-work.

The capriciousness of consumer culture must be considered, since a variety of symbols, iconographies and historical junctures routinely acquire and forfeit
their potential for commodification as a result of the “increasing speed of fashion cycles” (Michael, 2013:3-4). As a trend, the appeal of Afrikaner hipsterism is, for example, unlikely to continue indefinitely: in a “cultural economy organised around bipolar rhythms of surge and slowdown” (Reynolds, 2011:197), the brand of ethnic Afrikanerness (which is currently imbued with ‘hipness’) will ultimately become subject to obsolescence. The current commodification of Afrikanerdom is therefore marked by transience, because such practices cannot anticipate the imminent social and psychological needs of young Afrikaners subject to ever-shifting global trends, local particularities and tribal affiliations.

The ongoing negotiation of Afrikaner ethnic identity is based not only on the fleeting nature of fashion (and its fluctuating potential for self-realisation and -reparation), but also the persistent instability and flux of politics, culture and race-relations in post-apartheid South Africa. Established, historically Afrikaans institutions are, for example, still subject to major scrutiny regarding their past complicity with apartheid, and are routinely troubled by perceptions of structural inequalities, which are seen as perpetuated in current practices.\(^\text{70}\) In the wake of Afrikaner nationalism and apartheid, I argue that Afrikanerness is provided an ‘afterlife’ via numerous strategies that have become characteristic of the ways in which Afrikaners position themselves (and are discursively positioned) in post-apartheid South Africa. Now, more than two decades after South Africa’s democratisation, disunity continues to embattle the Afrikaners, thereby rendering the need to actively negotiate Afrikaner ethnic identity more pressing than ever.

\(^{70}\)Stellenbosch University (which was once a bastion of Afrikaner nationalism) currently faces allegations of institutional racism and enforcing an exclusionary language policy (Van der Spuy, 2015). The Open Stellenbosch-movement is a collective comprised of “students and staff working to purge the oppressive remnants of apartheid in pursuit of a truly African university” (Open Stellenbosch, 2015). Affiliated to the ‘Rhodes Must Fall’ movement (discussed earlier, cf. section 4.3), this movement’s greatest grievance concerns the exclusive use of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in selected courses offered by the university.
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