Contestations over urban space:

Exploring the discourse and dynamics between residents in Hermanus, Zwelihle and Dubai in a post-protest environment

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Declaration

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Abstract

This thesis analyses the question of what the discourse and dynamics between the residents of Hermanus, and those from Zwelihle and Dubai, reveal about contestations over urban space in a post-protest environment. In 2018 residents of Zwelihle, a semi-informal settlement outside of Hermanus, took part in protests over a piece of land (Schulphoek) in Hermanus originally earmarked for the development of low-cost housing, however after the municipality sold the land in 2010 to private property developers, no housing came to fruition. The protests ended in the occupation of Schulphoek and thus the creation of the informal settlement 'Dubai'. Thus, the expansion of informal settlements has led the residents of Hermanus to continuously partake in exclusionary discourse regarding the informal settlers in which the tensions between the middle- and upper-class residents and the urban poor are situated.

The research for this thesis was concerned with online interviews and critical discourse analysis. Here, the discourse analysis reveals how the politics of property and acts of rebellion frame the way residents relate to space, and when considering issues regarding development there is a clear distinction between development focused on 'aesthetics' versus 'necessity'. Moreover, the protests and land occupation provide an insight into how the urban poor lay a claim to the state and municipality through relations of 'obligation', in that the municipality and state are still indebted to the urban poor. Thus, this thesis argues that critical discourse analysis is crucial to understanding contestations over urban space, and that underlying all of this is contesting fears and aspirations motivated by poor municipal governance and lack of urban planning.

Opsomming

Hierdie tesis ontleed die vraag oor wat die diskoers en dinamika tussen die inwoners van Hermanus, en diegene uit Zwelihle en Dubai, openbaar oor die stryd oor stedelike ruimte in 'n post-protesomgewing. In 2018 het inwoners van Zwelihle, 'n semi-informele nedersetting buite Hermanus, deelgeneem aan protesoptogte oor 'n stuk grond in Hermanus wat oorspronklik bestem was vir die ontwikkeling van goedkoop behuising, maar nadat die munisipaliteit die grond in 2010 aan private eiendomsontwikkelaars verkoop het, het geen behuising tot stand gekom nie. Die protesoptogte het geëindig in die besetting van Schulphoek en dus met die skepping van die informele nedersetting 'Dubai'. Die uitbreiding van informele nedersettings het daartoe gelei dat die inwoners van Hermanus voortdurend deelgeneem het aan uitsluitingsdiskoers oor die informele setlaars waarin die spanning tussen die middel- en hoërklasbewoners en die stedelike armes geleë is.

Die navorsing vir hierdie proefskrif handel oor aanlynonderhoude en kritiese diskoersanalise. Hier openbaar die diskoersanalise hoe die eiendomspolitiek en rebelliedade die manier waarop inwoners met ruimte verband hou, omskryf, en as daar oor ontwikkelingsvraagstukke gekyk word, is daar 'n duidelike onderskeid tussen ontwikkeling wat fokus op 'estetika' versus 'noodsaaklikheid'. Boonop bied die protesoptredes en grondbesetting 'n insig in hoe die stedelike armes aanspraak maak op die staat en die munisipaliteit deur verhoudings van 'verpligting', omdat die munisipaliteit en die staat nogsteeds by die armes in die skuld staan. Hierdie tesis voer dus aan dat kritiese diskoersanalise van kardinale belang is om die stryd oor die stedelike ruimte te verstaan, en dat alles hieroor die stryd is met vrese en aspirasies wat gemotiveer word deur swak munisipale bestuur en gebrek aan stedelike beplanning.

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Contents

Introduction

In January of 2020, prior to the covid-19 pandemic and the government's subsequent lockdown regulations which restricted all forms of leisurely travel, I was privileged enough to spend a night in a holiday resort in Hermanus. This had been the first time I had visited Hermanus in almost two years: the municipality had been working on expanding the main road out of Hermanus from a single- to a double-lane, and my impatient spirit was incapable of handling the roadblocks, therefore I used a detour road around Hermanus any time I travelled in that direction. Thus, I had not seen Hermanus or the changes that took place after the 2018 protests until my visit in 2020. As we were driving to the resort, the image I had always known of Hermanus revealed a different picture, and somehow the idealistic coastal town looked like every other unequal suburban area throughout South Africa. Growing up, I always viewed Hermanus as a tiny Europe in South Africa – street markets, little alleyways covered in overgrown flowers and plants, seemingly undisturbed trees and mountains creating a cove for its residents, and the ocean as a backdrop to most residents' view. After the 2018 protests, however, this idealistic view and image of Hermanus was destroyed when the harsh living conditions of the town's urban poor was brought to the forefront.

Now, as one enters Hermanus from Cape Town on the R43, the stark contrast between some residents living in opulent (or even middle-class) homes versus others living in informal shacks built out of tin, corrugated iron, or scraps of metal, is readily obvious. Prior to the protests, the informal structures seemed hidden away and only noticeable if one truly tried to find them. However, by 2020 the sparse informal structures had accumulated and lined the ocean border. Previously, when driving down this road, the ocean seemed to form part of the large milkwood-forest of Schulphoek, however currently the accumulation of informal structures means the amalgamation of tin and ocean, where one seems to effortlessly flow into the other. The resort I stayed in was situated on the beach in Schulphoek and we had to drive through an informal settlement to reach it. Once we had booked in, I asked the receptionist about the creation and expansion of the informal settlements, and she replied by saying that after the 2018 protests it seemed as though the 'shacks' were doubling overnight. During our stay in Hermanus, I had asked various people how they were experiencing the increase and expansion of the informal settlements and most responded by blaming the settlements for an increase in crime and a decrease in property prices.

Hermanus has always been viewed as a predominantly white-inhabited coastal and retirement town and is one of the most popular tourist destinations in the Western Cape. The town is also popular amongst foreign property investors as it boasts scenic views, opulent houses, green golf courses and a 'village-type' lifestyle – if 'villagers' are affluent individuals who like to

partake in street markets. Locals define Hermanus as the predominantly white, middle- to upper-class suburbs of Eastcliff, Voëlklip, Westcliff and Northcliff. This incorporates the CBD and is bordered to the North by mountains and to the South by Walker Bay. The Swartdam Road to the West forms an infrastructural boundary between Hermanus and the black community of Zwelihle, with an industrial area providing some buffer. Schulphoek borders Zwelihle, and the new and informally developed 'Dubai' is situated here. Further West are the coloured suburbs of Mount Pleasant and Hawston, and the lower cost, white suburbs of Sandbaai, Onrus and Vermont. The addition of these suburbs provides what is generally referred to as Greater Hermanus. From the outside, Hermanus is viewed as an opulent, retirement town and all its residents are believed to be peaceful and content.

However, Hartford (2019) wrote about the social unrest and resulting violent protests that erupted in 2018 and described it as a shock to most Hermanus residents who were unaware and ignorant of the problems in the Zwelihle township. Given the proximity of Zwelihle to Hermanus this is surprising, but typical of the apathy of most white residents in matters that did not directly affect them. Few had ever ventured into Zwelihle. The area is perceived as too dangerous – very much a case of out of sight, out of mind. After the protests erupted, blame was placed squarely on the Zwelihle population with little regard for the circumstances that had triggered the unrest. The residents of Hermanus' anger were directed at the police's lack of ability to manage and control the protestors and subsequently several neighbourhood-watch groups sprang up.

Residents of Zwelihle explained that most of the time, protests are the only way in which anyone can invoke a response from the government and municipality. The contrast between the concerns of the prosperous white minority, as reflected in the municipality's *CBD Regeneration Framework* (2020), and those of the poverty-stricken black majority were worlds apart. On the one side discussion would centre on providing a clean environment on the cliff path, on the other ensuring adequate nutrition and shelter. This contrast is evident when one walks through Hermanus: in Westcliff Road, mansions stand as empty holiday homes are only occupied a few weeks of the year. Less than 500 meters away on Swartdam Road is the start of Zwelihle, where tiny, hastily erected shacks stand shoulder to shoulder, offering some shelter for a family of four. This glaringly obvious contrast of living conditions is a prime example of inequality in South Africa, and more so the politics of 'aesthetics' versus 'necessity' in Hermanus.

Thus, as much as my initial research was focused on questioning the residents of Hermanus' reaction to the expansion of informal settlements, I found that the real question should be focused on discerning what pre-empts the reactions. Clearly the residents of Hermanus find

the affluent, village aesthetic of their town – and the maintenance thereof – as cardinally important for their town's economic success. This would imply that their negative reactions towards the poor is a reaction based off fear for the destruction of this aesthetic. However, I began to wonder how this would translate in terms of space, i.e., how they relate to their space and what this relation reveals. Also then, how do the residents of Hermanus claim this superior status – one in which they imagine the right to decide who is and who is not a 'proper resident'? How, if at all, do the residents of Zwelihle and Dubai maintain a sense of 'belonging' if they are not always 'legal', land- or property-owning residents? These questions drive the research for this project. Given the context and the conflicts between these residents, this research project then argues that at the foundation of all lies two elements which control behaviours and reactions, and influence ideologies: fear and aspiration.

Situating the concepts

Throughout my research, one theme remained common amongst all Hermanus participants in their discussions of their space, others, and the municipality: the notion of 'aesthetics'. Eagleton (1990, p. 2) notes that the main reason why this notion of aesthetics is a recurring and dominant theme in contemporary thought of space and development "is no doubt in part because of the versatility of the concept". In other words, Eagleton explains that aesthetic takes its role of importance primarily because it incapsulates a vast array of other concepts, and more importantly that our understanding of aesthetic is founded upon the "construction of the dominant ideological forms of modern class-society" (Eagleton, 1990, p.2). This understanding of 'aesthetics' is of cardinal importance in the case of Hermanus where a confluence of interests exists – in terms of aspiring to uphold the town's aesthetic – between the residents of Hermanus and the Overstrand municipality who actively work at reinforcing the town's 'village aesthetic'.

Ghertner (2010, p. 207), following Foucault, theorises the notion of 'aesthetic governmentality' as a process or order through which the dominant aesthetic is implemented and maintained in towns, cities and suburbs to reconstruct the residents' "sense of self and place" whilst simultaneously encouraging the residents' identification with this aesthetic to justify any development which supposedly serves the "greater good". Naturally, this development is generally profit-driven, and within a neo-liberal, capitalist context, the profit-driven development in Hermanus is no different to development throughout the rest of South Africa. However, in the case of Greater Hermanus the reactions to development are greatly dependent on the residents' aspirations for their space which is founded on maintaining the town's 'village aesthetic' – an aesthetic which the expansion of informal settlements threatens.

A major part of this aesthetic is preserving a sense of purity in the suburban and town spaces. The notion of a pure town space presumes a space conceived of as impure, improper, and unsavoury. Maintaining purity in suburbs carries an ideology that dates the Apartheid era's Bantu Laws of forced segregation, and for many of the residents in Hermanus their aspiration for their town is to return to this supposedly 'idyllic past'. Apartheid might have been defeated, but the notion of maintaining a place's purity has not, and Shaw (2007, p. 129) notes that people tend to use these imaginaries as a method of escaping the "here and now, through denial or elision of pasts that have contributed to the current conditions, particularly with the expanding gap of inequity" prevalent through the presence and expansion of informal settlements.

Dubai and Zwelihle are viewed as 'Lego-landscapes' which symbolise disorder, chaos, poverty, and pollution. These areas and their subsequent 'image' of disorganization also ties to the idea of the residents of Hermanus and municipal members' aspirations of wanting to maintain a specific aesthetic as well as order in Hermanus. However, the aspirations of aesthetics here are in clear contrast to the residents of Dubai and Zwelihle's aspirations towards the 'necessities' for survival and, as Duncan and Duncan (2001, p. 410) note, showcases the all-encompassing inequality in South Africa. Various competing aesthetics are prevalent: aesthetics of use, where Dubai is only perceived as 'disorganised' and 'chaotic' by the residents of Hermanus for how the residents use their space; aesthetics of livelihoods, in that the way the way in which the urban poor conduct daily actions are viewed as 'disgusting' by the residents of Hermanus and this disgust is a form of justification for exclusionary discourse, whereas the residents of Dubai and Zwelihle's views of 'disgust towards the Hermanus residents can be seen as a form of 'embodied critique' (Tayob, 2019); and 'aesthetics' as tied to aspirations. Therefore, as much as the competing aesthetics between these residents acts as an index towards highlighting inequality in South Africa, I want to add on to these dimensions of affect by including notions of their aspirations.

Nicoli Nattrass and Jeremy Seekings' (2005) study on poverty and inequality in South Africa argues that due to underlying problems in public policy (or, the 'distributional regime', as they term it), the distribution of incomes is more unequal after Apartheid than it was during Apartheid. However, the notion of income inequality has shifted from race to class, with the rise of a prominent black elite, and the use of group-names such as 'working class' or 'upper-class' is merely a stratification of individuals based on their origin and activity (Nattrass and Seekings, 2005, p. 298; Tyler, 2015, p. 499; Pillay, 2018, p. 1). However, considering that this study was conducted in 2005, it is possible to argue that inequality has not changed as much as these scholars would have assumed. A rising black elite is prominent after the end of Apartheid, but inequality is still racialised. Posel's (2001, p. 68) argument of the perpetuation

of racial categories is pertinent for understanding its link to inequality, as she notes that racial categories were previously seen as signifiers of privilege or disadvantage but are now the locus for sites of redress. Therefore, the end of Apartheid was supposed to include the end of the racialisation of society, instead, South Africa has seen a return of racial consciousness, albeit for several reasons. This reiteration of racial signifiers is evident in the case of Hermanus; the town is mostly inhabited by White, middle- and upper-class individuals, apart from some Coloured, Black, and Indian individuals. Zwelihle, on the other hand, is widely known as a 'black' area, and the continuation of these signifiers implies that the legacies of apartheid remain powerful (Posel, 2001, p. 69).

In fact, many of the residents of Hermanus have emphasized the idea that they differ from the black Zwelihle residents, reiterating Nattrass and Seekings' (2005, p.308) discussion on the privileged 'insiders' and the unemployed, unskilled 'outsiders' created by the distributional regime. Residents in Hermanus have become so comfortable living in opulence that there seems to be an overall amnesia about the effects of Apartheid. The residents of Hermanus justify their callous responses to Zwelihle residents by claiming that Hermanus is 'changing' and refuse to see how this is no new occurrence. Poverty is still a critical issue within South Africa, and poverty implies an inability to purchase land or property (Ntsebeza, 2011, p. 295). Therefore, it seems as though poverty – specifically black poverty – as well as the legacy of Apartheid and colonialism seems irresolvable without questioning the politics of 'legality' with relation to land, especially when these politics define the difference between being a migrant or a non-migrant (Ntsebeza, 2011, p. 296). There seems to be an integral link between owning property and land and being viewed as a 'proper' citizen. During the Apartheid era, the control of land through dispossession of land rights were employed as a means of exploiting and subjugating black, coloured and Indian individuals, and as Tessa Marcus (1991, p. 25) notes, the power to control the lives of people becomes possible with the governing of property.

The way informal settlements are built, as well as where they were built during the Apartheid era, is designed to alienate residents of informal settlements. Informal settlements, like Zwelihle, were specifically built on the outskirts of towns to 'other' the individuals residing there (and to maintain the aesthetic within the town), and since they do not legally own their property or land, their sense of belonging and quality of life is obscured (Lalloo, 1999, p. 42). Individuals who do own land or property, such as the residents residing in the suburbs of Hermanus, have a sense of belonging and control over their own livelihoods, as well as a notion of 'deserving' to reside in the suburbs. On the other hand, there are other residents – such as those from Mount Pleasant and Hawston, who claim a sense of belonging purely for being the first settlement in Hermanus. Greenberg (2004, p. 27) was correct when he predicted that the townships formed during Apartheid would inevitably be reproduced post-Apartheid, and he

claimed that they would not be “segregated along racial lines, but in class terms”. Here, the notion of belonging seems to fall on a hierarchy scale which is mediated by property, indigeneity, and rebellion – in that specific order – and the only claim residents of informal structures have towards their sense of belonging is because of their revolutionary acts of land occupation.

Within these informal settlements, however, an infrastructure of relationships exists – as theorised by Simone (2004) – which is much more crucial than the relationships formed within middle- and upper-class areas. The residents of informal settlements are greatly dependent on these relationships for survival. Simone (2004:428) argues that the residents within a city use their place to survive and not as something they wish to belong to – instead it becomes a “launching pad” for better livelihoods. Hermanus is a coastal town, not a city, and as much as the residents of Zwelihle and Dubai use their space as the initiation towards a better means of survival, I argue that they simultaneously actively work at creating a sense of belonging. It is through the construction of informal settlements that residents create their own sense of belonging, as Claudia Gastrow (2015, p. 4) writes that when informal settlers “expand the edges of the city through home construction, they claim rights to urban belonging”.

Gastrow (2015, p.6) argues that the residents of informal settlements (Gastrow speaks here of slums) also use the construction of houses – and therefore the creation of belonging – to lay a claim to the ‘city’ and more so to the state. However, here I argue that the residents of Zwelihle and Dubai might use their homes and occupation of space to *negotiate* their space – much like Hermanus residents use their status as property owners to include and exclude others. But in terms of laying a claim to the state, following Steven Robins (2008), I argue that in South Africa the poor still mobilise and relate to the state – unlike in other neo-liberal societies where it is generally believed that the poor do not lay a claim to the state – such as in Anand’s (2017) discussion where the ‘invisible’ Muslims are incapable of laying a claim to the state and rather lay claims to ‘middle men’ to access basic services. However, in both Anand’s conception of the Muslim residents in Mumbai as well as in my discussion of the urban poor in Zwelihle and Dubai, the poor feel ‘invisible’, and in this case they make themselves visible through protests (therefore complicating the Foucauldian (1982) picture of state and subject) and thus lay a claim to the state.

The claim laid here, then, is one of obligation in that the poor hold fast to the historical imaginary of the state as indebted to them. David Graeber’s (2011) discussion on the money economy and debt is pertinent here; home owners in Hermanus are subscribing to the ideology of free-market fundamentalism in which they are no longer in ‘debt’ after they become home or land owners. For them, the act of ‘owing’ is a choice and they therefore deny the

relations of obligation which the poor are dependent on. Their understanding here is based on a relationship of 'equality', however, for the poor the relationship is based on hierarchy and, more importantly, obligation. After the end of Apartheid, the state promised to act as caretaker for the poor (in return for the poor's promise to uphold peace) and now the urban poor are still laying a claim to this obligation.

A contestation over urban space is thus prevalent in Hermanus, and it is greatly dependent on how people relate to space as well as the residents of Hermanus and the municipality's aspirations towards a desired aesthetic and fears that this aesthetic would be destroyed. Following Appadurai's (2013) discussion on aspirations, the capacity to aspire is a future-oriented state which is unevenly distributed amongst different classes of people. The upper- and middle-class – those who have had the opportunity to experiment with different aspirations – have a greater capacity to aspire in relation to the poor who have had no real opportunity to experiment with different wants and needs. Appadurai argues that for the poor to attain this capacity to aspire they need to 'strengthen' their communal bonds, and one way in which this is done is through mobilising and reclaiming their rights (during acts such as protests). The protests of 2018 were revolutionary for the residents of Zwelihle, and the subsequent occupation of *Schulphoek* and development of Dubai marked a new era in which the poor's capacity to aspire triumphed. However, the protests also revealed the poverty and inequality in Hermanus, and here I argue that just as aspirations are unevenly distributed, so are fears.

Fears amongst the residents of Hermanus – which are greatly influenced by members of the municipality and state – are concerned with an imagined 'imminent danger' that the black urban poor will, with the expansion of informal settlements, somehow cause their loss of property. Ironically, where the poor's capacity to aspire is reliant on their mobilization and organization, much of the imagined fears the residents of Hermanus face are produced through networks in which neighbourhood residents mobilize under the guise of 'protection' (neighbourhood watch groups) and share information regarding 'others' who enter into their space and supposedly 'threaten' it. Following Comaroff and Comaroff (2016) then, the sharing of mis-information in tight-knit groups is generally a cause for fear being instilled, whether the supposed threat is real or not. On the other hand, the residents of Dubai and Zwelihle's fears are closely tied with the means towards survival, and the real threat of eviction and worsening poverty conditions. Therefore, a contestation of fears and aspirations arise which seem to form the foundation on which the residents of Hermanus' negative reactions towards the poor, as well as the poor's rebellion and protesting are built.

Thus, this thesis will argue that an analysis of towns or areas such as Greater Hermanus – and, more importantly, an analysis of the dynamics and discourse between those who inhabit

it – is crucial for understanding issues surrounding development, belonging and space. Here it is important to situate the town in its specific neoliberal context, however it is also pertinent to consider the discourse of residents living within the areas as well as on the periphery, i.e., the discourse of suburban residents versus those from townships. I argue that a qualitative approach to analysing the discourse of residents in a post-protest environment is pertinent to understanding how they relate to their space, configure notions of belonging and perceive or understand issues regarding development.

The history, 1934-2020

In 1934, the first coloured fishing community was established at Mount Pleasant and this area subsequently remained a coloured community all throughout Apartheid. During this time, other areas surrounding Mount Pleasant were established and in 1950 the Group Areas Act of Apartheid stipulated spatial segregation which forced all black residents living in Die Mond to be relocated to lower Mount Pleasant, which borders on current day Zwelihle. In 1963, while Hermanus was declared a whites-only area, Zwelihle was established, and all black residents were rehomed to this area, leaving Mount Pleasant classified as a coloured-only area. By 1965 Hawston was created, and all coloured people who had not been living in Mount Pleasant since before the Group Areas Act came into effect were forcibly relocated to Hawston. Relocations continued until 1966, and the only beach available to 'non-whites' was Schulphoek.

The year 1994 marked the end of Apartheid and the onset of democracy, and subsequently all citizens of South African were seen as equal under the constitution. Black and coloured persons were allowed to move freely and had the same basic rights as white people. However, the communities of Hermanus, Zwelihle, Mount Pleasant and Hawston have remained "almost racially identical to their apartheid predecessors" (Hartford, 2019, p. 29). Just as during Apartheid, Hermanus remains a predominantly 'white' area, Hawston and Mount Pleasant are seen as 'coloured' areas and Zwelihle is known as a 'black' settlement. However, the population size of each area has changed, and this has attributed to the current overpopulation issues faced by the municipality. The population of white and coloured South Africans in Hermanus, Mount Pleasant and Hawston has decreased 8% from 2001 to 2016, whereas the population of black South Africans has increased from 27% (14 853) in 2001 to 43% (40 164) in 2016 (Overstrand Municipality, 2020a, p. 35). Notably, the greatest increase of black South Africans has been in Zwelihle[1], with Hermanus, Mount Pleasant and Hawston 'untouched'.

[1] The Integrated Development Framework of 2020 projected a 40% increase in population size in Zwelihle, but no proper census has been done in Zwelihle since 2017. With the creation and expansion of Dubai, it is possible that the increase of black population size has been exponential, but no record could be found of this.

With the increase of the black population to Zwelihle, overcrowding was a prominent struggle for the residents and the amount of backyard dwellers seemed to double overnight.

In 2010, the municipality, therefore, promised the urban poor residents that Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) housing would be developed on available space and marked Schulphoek as the site for development. However, in 2015 shock travelled through Zwelihle and Mount Pleasant as they heard about the municipality's decision to auction off areas of land in Schulphoek to private property developers. Prior to this, in 2010, Schulphoek was sold to private property developers Rabcav (a joint venture between Rabie Property and Cavcor Properties), and part of the deal was that almost four thousand houses, businesses and community centres be developed and handed over to the residents of Zwelihle and Mount Pleasant. After the sale of Schulphoek, some middle-income housing and holiday resorts were built, however, by 2015 it was evident that the supposed low-cost housing had never been included in the developers' initial plans. The sale of land in Schulphoek went ahead and Rabcav agreed to sell it to Cape Metropolitan Investment.

By 2018, residents of Zwelihle – referring mostly to the backyard dwellers of this area – had thus waited eight years for the development of the low-cost housing they were promised. The backyard residents marched to the municipality exclaiming their dismay towards high rental prices and demanded some information regarding the development of low-cost housing in Schulphoek. Coenie Groenewald was, at the time of this march, a municipal manager for the Overstrand Municipality and he explained that the residents of Zwelihle had been made aware of the housing developments, but the residents of Zwelihle strongly disagreed. In March of 2018, residents of Zwelihle attempted to occupy land in Schulphoek, but the private security company 'the Red Ants' were almost immediately deployed, and all illegal structures were destroyed. In addition, the protestors had also set fire to a mobile police station, a public library, and a school in Zwelihle. To still the unrest, the municipality had provided the protestors with an available piece of land in Schulphoek on which they could build some temporary homes while they waited for the housing development to ensue, and the municipality promised the delivery of basic services. Naturally, the development of RDP houses would take time to kick-off, but for the residents of Zwelihle who had been waiting for eight years, waiting any longer was not an option. "We were supposed to have our house in 2011," one participant explained, "so they can't say they haven't had time to plan the housing. That's a stupid excuse – those plans should've been done years ago!" (Gwadiso, 2020).

Therefore, even after the municipality had offered the residents of Zwelihle a "small strip of land" to build temporary homes, the residents of Zwelihle believe that history would repeat itself and that the municipality and private property developers would somehow find a way to

forego the promises they had made once again. This turned out to be true, as little to no basic services were delivered to backyard dwellers. Bobby Von During was at the time the Zwelihle community Trust Manager, and he explained that he feared the development of any form of housing in Schulphoek for the urban poor would be delayed by the bureaucracy in Hermanus, stating that he had received little to no confirmation that the municipality kept track of the backyard dwellers in need of homes (Redelmeir, 2018). Apart from this, Von During also raised concerns regarding the development of the land considering it was home to the world's twelfth largest milkwood forest. He claimed that any development on the land would require an environmental impact study, "which could take up to three years" (Redelmeir, 2018). Thus, after a small area had been earmarked for temporary development, the residents of Zwelihle decided "enough was enough. We weren't going to wait around any longer, so we took Schulphoek for ourselves" (Sehlabi, 2020) and as a result Dubai was created.

About three months after the initial protests had come to an end, a new movement gained ground, aimed at calling on the municipality and law enforcement officials to release a Zwelihle Renewal[2] leader, Gcobani Ndzongana, who had been arrested on the accusations of incitement and malicious damage to property. Gcobani had, allegedly, encouraged other community members to set fire to a fence erected by the municipality to separate the residents of Zwelihle from neighbouring white communities. The municipality, on the other hand, insisted that the fence was approved by the council during a budget review in 2018 to halt the illegal dumping of rubbish (Hlati, 2018). Regardless of the municipality and council's motivations for erecting the fence, for the residents of Zwelihle it resembled segregation and Apartheid laws all too well. After Gcobani's arrest, residents of Zwelihle marched to the municipality to allegedly hand themselves over as the true perpetrators, however, since the air was still thick with tension following the protests that took place three months prior, the police blocked all Zwelihle residents from entering Hermanus. Unfortunately, residents of Zwelihle were infuriated by their inability to help their community leader and retaliated against the police who had used rubber bullets and tear gas to keep them within Zwelihle. The police were joined by residents of Mount Pleasant who were enraged by the residents of Zwelihle's land occupation, stating that everyone had equal right to the land and through the process of land occupation, the Zwelihle residents stole that land from others.

In addition to the fence being burnt down, schools in Zwelihle were shut down with some in Mount Pleasant vandalized; the conveyor belt at a recycling plant had been set on fire and all forms of recycling in Hermanus and Kleinmond came to a standstill for a few months;

[2] Zwelihle Renewal is a social movement in Zwelihle aimed at advocating for improved living conditions, the enhancement of basic service delivery and the encouragement of transparent communication between municipality and Zwelihle residents.

businesses were forced to close due to staff not being able to/refusing to attend work and other municipal buildings were destroyed. Ultimately the damage caused by the protestors advocating for the release of their community leader amounted to an estimated forty million rand. Apart from the damage done to public infrastructure, four police officers (with one hospitalized) and over fifty residents from Zwelihle were injured (not all of whom were protestors). In addition to the injured protestors, a baby passed away from tear gas inhalation and a mother lost her unborn baby also due to teargas inhalation. Even though the protests, therefore, veered away from the original land protests, nearly all participants for this thesis exclaimed that it was "always about housing and service delivery and the promises they made us about land. But then they [the municipality] sent the police to fight their battles, and they turned us against the police" (Gwadiso, 2020). Another participant added onto this statement, by saying that they never intended to fight with the police – their fight had always been aimed at the municipality's lack of concern for the residents of Zwelihle (Hlathini, 2020).

The protests and tensions only started to ease after police Minister Bheki Cele went to speak to the aggrieved, and by the end of August in 2018, nearly five months after the initial protests kickstarted, Gcobani was released on bail and all protests came to a halt. On the same day, however, the Red Ants were deployed to demolish illegal structures built around Zwelihle by backyard dwellers. The structures were built out of a desperation for housing, Hlati (2018) reported, and they had existed for weeks before Gcobani was said to be released from custody. The dismantling of illegal structures only worsened the already fraught conditions, and the residents of Dubai refused to leave even after they were evicted. "Instead our numbers only grew in size," one participant explains, " […] they can try to force us to leave, but this land is now ours" (Mothupi, 2020).

By 2019, Rabcav and Cape Metropolitan Investment brought the eviction proceedings to court in an attempt to evict backyard dwellers from Zwelihle and residents of Dubai – "squatters who were occupying private land" (Gontsana, 2019) – from Schulphoek. The case had been postponed, however, when rumours started spreading that the municipality would buy back the land. Overstrand Municipality members vehemently denied this, stating that buying the land was not in their fiscus. However, by the end of September in 2019 the provincial government agreed to buy Schulphoek and make the municipality custodian of the land, whilst the province controls and plans the project. The new plan for the development of Schulphoek was based off the Conradie Better Living Model which pioneered in Pinehurst, Cape Town, and consisted of mixed-income housing. Half of the housing plans were focused on prioritising backyard dwellers, the elderly, child-led households, people with disabilities and those who have been on the waiting list the longest. Some of the 'priority houses' would also be set aside for younger individuals to rent. The other 50% would consist of open-market houses aimed at

pulling in middle- to high-income households. Some parts of Schulphoek were still owned by private property developers who aimed to develop additional business and real estate complexes.

The plans were aimed to take place by 2020, however, the leaders from Zwelihle and Dubai stressed their concerns over the fact that all residents of Dubai would have to be evicted and rehomed. With Hermanus already being a land-scarce region and many residents of Dubai not falling into the 'priority group' for housing in Schulphoek, the leaders from Zwelihle and Dubai claimed that thousands of their community members would, once again, be homeless. Therefore, before any development could take place the residents of Dubai refused to leave and stated that they had other plans for Schulphoek. Leaders from Zwelihle and Dubai told the Western Cape Minister of Human Settlements, Tertius Simmers, that they demand the area be "converted into serviced plots with electricity for people to build their own dwellings" (da Silva, 2020). Ironically, he and other municipal members responded to these requests by stating that the community must 'honour their promises and agreements', and yet the residents of Dubai had waited eight years for others to hold true to their promises. By the end of 2020, developers insisted the plans go ahead – with or without the eviction of the residents of Dubai – and they started putting up construction tape and signs throughout Schulphoek. "We will not go silent," Gwandiso (2020) explained, "we fought for this land, and they can try to take it from us, but we will fight for it still". Therefore, as much as the residents of Dubai use its existence to negotiate future development, the protests of 2018, the land occupation, and their continuous refusal to leave has ultimately been an attempt at reclaiming urban rights. The residents of Zwelihle and Dubai have felt 'unheard' and 'unnoticed' for over a decade and have exclaimed that the protests are an act of making themselves visible, therefore forcing the municipality and state to notice them.

The protests that ensued from 2018 broke the illusionary, idealistic identity held in Hermanus. Against the backdrop of this seemingly affluent town, the protests of 2018 and the subsequent land occupation and creation of Dubai revealed the indignity suffered by the urban poor and their harsh living conditions. In 2019, Hartford (2019) had written on the violence and the questions regarding urban land in Hermanus, Zwelihle and Mount Pleasant. His focus, however, was more on the question of land and how this influenced violence from the Zwelihle and Mount Pleasant communities. His writing did not take Dubai into account (Dubai was still in the process of expansion) and was more focused on how the residents of Zwelihle perceive residents from other communities (i.e., what would incite the violence?). For this thesis, then, I take the protests of 2018 into account, much like Hartford, but my focus is shifted away from the residents of Mount Pleasant and more towards the residents of Hermanus, Zwelihle and Dubai. I am not saying that the residents of Mount Pleasant (or Hawston) have not played a

role – instead, I know the residents of Mount Pleasant and Hawston are also attempting to lay a claim to Schulphoek and that their aspirations for housing are just as greatly affected by the creation of Dubai as are the development aspirations of private property developers.

However, as much as there has been written on the protests of 2018, very little has been written on the dynamics between the residents of Zwelihle and Dubai and the residents of Hermanus.

The dynamics

The aggrieved in Zwelihle and Dubai frame their grievances by claiming: the original sale of Schulphoek was unlawful; their living conditions are undignified; and their constitutional rights are being disregarded (thus blaming the municipality for their lack of intervention). Here, just as in most towns across South Africa, a need for housing and service delivery is overshadowing all other problems faced by the urban poor. Despite a growing housing budget and the South African government's construction of nearly three million RDP houses across South Africa from 2001, the housing backlog was estimated at 2.6 million by December 2019 (Thukwana, 2019). At the same time, however, the government also announced that it would restrict the construction of low-cost houses and rather increase the construction of self-serviced sites in which individuals would be given the opportunity to build their own homes. The local municipality of each area would then be responsible for offering basic services and infrastructure to these self-serviced plots. The residents of Dubai advocated for these sites in 2020, whilst expressing their concerns for the development of the Better Living Model.

Since the onset of the protests in 2018, there has also been a growing resentment amongst the urban poor against the characteristic 'whiteness' of Hermanus. Hermanus is greatly a retirement location and is mostly inhabited by the older white Afrikaner community. In essence, when one views the residents of Hermanus as belonging to an older, white generation, a major assumption regarding the residents of Hermanus is their supposed racially biased views of the black, urban poor. As much as this could be true – it is quite a difficult point to either prove or disprove – it seems that the residents of Hermanus' greatest grievances are framed around the 'destruction of their town's character ultimately caused by the expansion of informal settlements. According to these residents, Hermanus holds a character of opulence and wealth – even in the middle-class areas – and the expansion of informal settlements destroys this character. The planned development of the Better Living Model would ultimately benefit the character of Hermanus, whereas the development of self-serviced plots would not, because "even though it would still be on the periphery of Hermanus, it is still easily visible from the main road and entrance to Hermanus" (Kruger, 2020). This participant's claim

reiterates the notion of the importance of 'aesthetics' for both the municipality and residents of Hermanus.

The discourse of Hermanus residents surrounding the residents of Zwelihle and Dubai thus confers the idea that a confluence exists between race, aesthetics, economics, and property. The dynamics between the residents of Hermanus and those of Zwelihle and Dubai are therefore an essential aspect to consider when analysing the 'aftermath' of the 2018 protests. Generally, when authors consider an analysis of protests, what led to them or their aftermath, an 'on the ground' approach (ethnographic) is taken in which those who participated in protests (or were affected by them) can share their story. When questions surrounding space and development arise, however, it seems that more of a top-down approach is considered in which institutions, municipalities, policies, etc. are analysed and those who are most affected or impacted by the supposed development in question rarely can share their own experiences. For this thesis, I move away from this linear difference and instead consider merging these approaches to offer a clearer account. However, it is also important to situate Hermanus in its specific, neoliberal context because understanding the history and context of Hermanus (and of South Africa in general) could aid in building a framework in which the dynamics between the residents of Hermanus and those of Zwelihle and Dubai could be analysed.

Chapter one is focused on analysing the notion of '*moral development'*, or how the municipality and provincial government attempt to 'sell' the Better Living Model to the residents of Hermanus and Zwelihle. This chapter argues that the notion of 'moral development' is grounded on utilitarianist policies and development plans – plans and policies which decide the 'greater good', even if its 'good' only benefits the minority. This chapter, therefore, acts as an entry point for understanding the profit-driven means of all forms of development and planning in Hermanus. Here, competing moralities are prevalent where the 'moral development' is focused on upliftment on one side and on space on the other. Even though the Better Living Model is therefore marketed as one which could 'aid' in the growth of the poor whilst simultaneously maintaining the municipality's aspired village aesthetic, this development model is used as an excuse to gain back control over the urban poor and the space they currently inhabit. The development of the Better Living Model, according to the residents of Dubai, will ultimately diminish their chances at claiming their urban rights as many residents currently residing in Dubai do not form part of the 'priority list' for housing (thus they will once again be either homeless or backyard dwellers, just in a different location). The Better Living Model therefore echoes Ghertner's (2010) discussion on 'aesthetic governmentality'.

Here, a question of how people relate to their space arises, however before I venture into the politics of space, chapter two's focus is directed at the *'naming of places and people'* in which

the significance of each area's name is used as a foundation for understanding the residents' relation to space. Therefore, chapter two's discussion will focus on how a name such as 'the Village' for Hermanus holds within it the residents' aspirations towards keeping their town 'as is', and therefore ultimately how their negative reactions to the increase in informal settlements is a response to the fear that their town is 'changing for the worse'. Dubai, then, with its connotation to the luxurious middle Eastern city, was aptly named to connote the residents' aspirations towards a self-defined future with enhanced living conditions. Therefore, the fact that Zwelihle residents renamed Schulphoek, the 'land promised to them', as Dubai, unveils an interesting insight to the notion of their 'aspiration'. When the residents claimed this piece of land, albeit illegally, and protested their eviction, the actions which took place were not merely a sign of being 'unhappy' with the outcome of the situation and being removed of their rights to equitable redress. These individuals aspire towards a better means of survival and the protests and claiming of land which emerged are a direct result of their aspirations for change being hindered.

As the name of chapter two suggests, it will also consider the naming of people with a specific focus on the borna-amagoduka dynamic in Zwelihle, which refers to the families who have been living in Zwelihle since its initial construction (bornas) and the new 'inkomers' (amagodukas) who have no ties to the original families in Zwelihle. This dynamic resembles the insider-outsider dynamic prevalent during Apartheid, but also mirrors the insider-outsider dynamic in Hermanus. Apart from this, the relationships and subcultures formed in Zwelihle and Dubai become 'infrastructures of relationships' – as Simone (2004) discusses – meaning that the residents of Zwelihle and Dubai are dependent on these relationships to access their means of survival. The link here between the naming of places and the naming of people, then, rests upon the notion of infrastructure.

However, the insider-outsider dynamic in Zwelihle as well as in Hermanus in relation to Zwelihle residents is prevalent regardless of the relationships and subcultures formed. Here, the question of 'who belongs?' and 'how do individuals relate to space?' arises, therefore chapter three – '*space first, then structure'* – will focus on the politics of space and how space is negotiated in relation to a residents' sense of belonging. A common consensus amongst residents of Hermanus is that the residents of Zwelihle and Dubai 'chose to come here', and that they are to blame for their own living conditions. "If they don't like it here, they should go back to their homes in the Eastern Cape," one resident explained, "otherwise they should work hard and get a house in the suburbs like the rest of us" (van der Walt, 2020). Indeed, living in the 'suburbs' in Hermanus somehow connotes success and residents of Hermanus crudely express their concerns over the expansion of informal settlements into the suburban areas (Kruger, 2020). Of course, the consensus amongst Hermanus residents about 'deserving' to

live in the ‘suburbs’ encapsulates the notion of a neoliberal state, as neoliberalism, on the one hand, depicts impoverished individuals as equal to the rest of society - in the sense that they are able to escape poverty via the market. However, portraying the poor as ‘free agents’ also implies that they are “deficient and immoral individuals who do not take full responsibility for their own fate” (Feldman, 2019a, p. 342). It is also noteworthy to consider that the rule of the neoliberalist state is that of property owners.

I argue that the residents of Hermanus use their status as property and landowners – therefore, they use the structures within their space – to negotiate the inclusion and exclusion of ‘others’ into their space. I attribute this to a sense of belonging, which Hartford (2019) noted as a ‘hierarchy’ of belonging in Hermanus. Unlike Hartford, however, I argue that the hierarchy of belonging is not always attributed to socio-linguistic-cultural aspects, but that the hierarchy of belonging in Hermanus is mediated by property, indigeneity, and rebellion. At the top of the hierarchy, then, the residents of Hermanus who contribute the most to the town’s economy are also the ‘most deserving’ of belonging in Hermanus (according to their subjective opinions). In this sense, then, foreign nationals who purchase property or land in Hermanus (but have no socio-linguistic-cultural similarities to that of the rest of its residents) also obtain high spots on the hierarchy of belonging. The pejorative judgements or derogatory names attributed those who migrated to Zwelihle and Dubai are seldomly attributed to wealthier foreigners. Also, the wealthier black and coloured residents who live in the suburban areas of Hermanus are not included in the perceptions these residents have of the poor residents of Zwelihle and Dubai. Residents of Hermanus share a consensus that they ‘deserve’ to live in the town, purely because they own or rent property and/or land in Hermanus.

Here, a question of legality arises, where there seems to be a link between being a ‘proper’ resident of Hermanus and having bought property. However, when the now-residents of Zwelihle were forcibly relocated during the Apartheid era and confined to land on the outskirts of Hermanus, a life lived in harsh, impoverished conditions were inevitable (Burger, 2018). The residents of Mount Pleasant and Hawston, however, claim their sense of belonging through indigeneity. At the bottom of the belonging hierarchy, the residents of Dubai (the inkomers, poor foreign nationals, etc.) have little to no economic contributions to make towards the town’s economy. Rather, they use the threat of repeating the 2018 protests to negotiate their space, as well as the fact that the existence of Dubai – and their sheer refusal to be evicted – is hindering development. In this sense, the existence of Dubai is a point of negotiation in which the residents will comply with the developers’ and municipality’s commands for Schulphoek if their own aspirations and needs are met. Thus, the hierarchy of belonging is evidently mediated through property (residents of Hermanus), indigeneity (residents of Mount Pleasant) and rebellion (residents of Zwelihle and Dubai).

Chapter four, *'contesting or coinciding fears and aspirations?'*, will attempt to create the connection between the first three chapters by arguing that all reactions, behaviours, and perceptions discussed in these chapters are grounded on aspiration – as theorised by Appadurai (2013) – and fear in two distinct forms: real versus imagined. Here, a clear case of contesting fears and aspirations are found, and I argue that this results from the corrupt and ill-managed Overstrand Municipality. I will therefore attempt to situate the municipality as the main antagonist who, through corrupt sales of land; mismanagement of housing waiting lists and urban planning; failure to instil a sense of security amongst residents, and a lack of democratic public participation regarding development – whilst simultaneously attempting to control residents under the guise of development – has only aided in the fears of its residents and the destruction of their aspirations. This sentiment is highlighted by one participant who exclaimed: "the municipality's response to the 2018 protests is simply a case of too little, too late" (Combrink, 2020). The municipality clearly favour the interests of developers over the existing residents, however the municipality also holds fast to the fact that they are under-funded and therefore rely on private developers, for example, to generate their own revenue.

On Methodology

Through a grounded theory approach, my initial research for this thesis was focused on considering the history and context of Hermanus and South Africa in general, as well as the diverse population residing in Hermanus and the possible ideologies and structures which influence attitudes and beliefs. The purpose of this thesis was to emphasize the relevance of taking a qualitative approach to understanding the residents of Hermanus, Zwelihle and Dubai's behaviours and understandings of the expansion of informal settlements as well as 'life in a post-protest environment'. Therefore, I wanted to explore what these responses could unveil about the dynamics and structures of space, land, development, and inequality in South Africa. I initially wanted to take on an ethnographic approach when I started outlining my research proposal. However, with the pandemic and subsequent lockdown restrictions placing a barrier not only on travel, but also on in-person research, I was forced to move my research online. I started with purposive sampling by sampling participants from Facebook groups as both residents of Hermanus and those of Zwelihle have their own 'community' Facebook groups.

Facebook proved to be a very useful tool for finding participants; at first I scrolled through various messages and 'posts' on the group to find participants who were consistently vocal about the issues they faced post-protest. After I had contacted over thirty group members, nearly half of them accepted my request to participate in research. I interviewed my participants via online platforms such as Zoom, WhatsApp calls, and in some cases even

Facebook Messenger. Even though I was unable to partake in the everyday practices of these participants and discuss issues with a random passer-by on the street, I found that residents from each area were more than willing to share their grievances and issues (perhaps the use of online platforms enabled them even more so). Also, tensions in Hermanus and Zwelihle were still rife by the time I conducted my research, therefore memories of the events, their behaviours and emotions easily surfaced when questions were asked.

Therefore, my main method of analysis shifted from an ethnographic approach to critical discourse analysis, which is essentially the analysis of language in use (Brown and Yule, 1983, p. 1). As Saff (2001, p. 103) argues, through an analysis of discourse we are also "deconstructing language, highlighting the subtext, the subtleties, the hidden meanings of text, and the power relations and ideology that both form and are legitimized by these discursive practices". Critical discourse analysis is an interesting and important form of analysis which not only focuses on analysing written and spoken language, but also connects what is said or written to structures in a socio-political context (Fairclough, 1995, p. 13). Of course, critical discourse analysis as an analytical tool has been criticised for not being able to appropriately identify everything a researcher sets out to find and the researcher's own understanding of structures, institutions and ideologies might pose problems during the analysis stage. Following Fairclough's (1995) discussion of the three layers of critical discourse analysis, however, I attempted to stray away from analysing data through a 'narrow lens', so to speak. These 'layers' consisted of micro- (textual/linguistic analysis), meso- (analysis of production and consumption, i.e., who created the text and who is it intended for, which I specifically used when analysing social media content), and macro-level (intertextual analysis, where broader, social circumstances – such as the protests, expansion of informal settlements and planned development – which affected the spoken language was considered) interpretations of discourse (Fairclough, 1995).

At first, interviews focused predominantly on questions surrounding the 'influx of migration', and as much as this is the case – i.e., there is a definitive influx of in-migration of residents from neighbouring provinces, as well as an influx of migrants from neighbouring countries – this use of language limited and biased my research. I realised that by constantly calling the new residents of Zwelihle and Dubai 'migrants' instead of 'residents', my research was promoting the very issues I tried to unpack. Therefore, I changed my own way of speaking by asking questions surrounding the 'expansion of informal settlements' instead. This made quite a difference in how residents from Hermanus framed their answers, as their answers were no longer geared towards 'blaming migrants' for the issues within the town, but rather towards explaining their reactions to the events from the 2018 protests onwards. Still, I found it difficult to 'convince' the residents of Hermanus that those residing in Zwelihle and Dubai were,

indeed, residents. However, this did not pose any problems during interviews, instead, it opened new discussions on what it means to be a 'proper resident'.

Participants from Zwelihle and Dubai, on the other hand, were constantly referring to others residing in their areas as either 'bornas' (original families, those that have been living in Zwelihle since its creation in 1962/63), or 'amagodukas' (loosely translated to 'those that go home'). Amagodukas was also used interchangeably with 'inkomers', which connotes the residents who have no ties to the borna families. Prior to conducting interviews, I was completely unaware of this dynamic within Zwelihle and Dubai, and once I realised that my own use of language (specifically how I refer to residents from other areas) greatly impacted the way participants would speak to me, there was an immediate change in interview responses; although the responses themselves were not always 'positive', participants responded more easily.

The greatest struggle I encountered during the research process was finding reliable and current census data. The Western Cape provincial government has not collected census data since 2011, and the data published in 2017 was based off predictions following the 2011 census data. As much as the lack of reliable population statistics caused a barrier towards my own research, it also raised the question of how the municipality would be able to provide adequate data about housing lists and population size. One participant from Hermanus, who works closely with the residents of Zwelihle, explained that they conducted their own 'census' of Zwelihle residents by 2018 to provide the municipality with a truer picture of population size. Up until this informal census had taken place, the municipality's projections concerning the population size in Zwelihle were not indicative of the overcrowded conditions within Zwelihle. Considering this fact, attempting to find an estimate of the population size in Zwelihle, Dubai or Hermanus felt like an entire research project on its own and echoed the fears of individuals – such as the previous Zwelihle Trust Fund Manager, Bobby Von During – in which the prospective development (the Better Living Model) seems implausible without a genuine understanding of the population size and, therefore, who is truly in need of housing. Here, again, the notion of the poor as 'invisible' and not being seen by the state is evident and a prominent problem.

Whilst considering population size, I also feel it is pertinent to discuss why my research only considered residents of Zwelihle, Dubai and Hermanus when there are many other areas and suburbs which could also have been considered. For example, the residents of Mount Pleasant and Hawston – two areas mainly inhabited by coloured individuals – also broke out into their own protests in 2018 after the residents of Zwelihle occupied Schulphoek. In fact, the residents of Mount Pleasant were sometimes seen at the forefront of police barricades,

aiding the police and other security companies with keeping the residents of Zwelihle in Zwelihle. The residents of Mount Pleasant believe they have the greatest claim to any available land in Hermanus, seeing as though Mount Pleasant was the 'original' town. These residents also blame the expansion of Zwelihle for the subsequent loss of urban rights – by claiming land in Schulphoek, the residents of Mount Pleasant and Hawston believe that the residents of Zwelihle stole their chance at better living and housing conditions. However, as I explained earlier in my introduction, one of the main reasons for not considering the residents from other areas was to place an emphasis on the dynamics between the residents of Zwelihle, Dubai and those from Hermanus, whereas other authors have already discussed the dynamics between the residents of Zwelihle and Mount Pleasant. If my focus was purely on the dynamics between 'those living in informal settlements' versus 'those living in middle- and upper-class areas', it would have been wise to also include residents from other informal settlements surrounding Hermanus.

However, the protests of 2018 – as much as they had an impact on the residents of Mount Pleasant – greatly impacted the residents of Hermanus and through the mobilisation of individuals within Zwelihle, their capacity to aspire strengthened and the subsequent land occupation marked a revolutionary moment. The residents of Hermanus' perceptions of their own town and trust in police and municipality were also greatly impacted. This shift in dynamics would not have happened had the 2018 protests and land occupation not taken place, therefore I wanted to focus solely on these dynamics and changing perceptions. Also, whilst writing my initial research proposal I realised that it would be too great of a feat to consider all residents from all areas, and I did not have the time nor the space to take up such an extensive research project. Therefore, I had to ensure that my sample size would be suited to the questions I wished to answer, and I decided that these actors (read: various residents) would be the greatest contributors aiding my discussions of space, development, belonging and inequality.

Lastly, I also purposefully decided to forego most discussions (apart from a short discussion in chapter 2) on xenophobia within Zwelihle and Dubai; not because I intended to hide this reality from the reader, but purely due to the same reason I did not include residents from other areas: a lack of space and time. Xenophobia in Zwelihle and Dubai, much like any other area across South Africa, is a constant. This is partly due to the notion amongst residents that foreign nationals are 'stealing' their employment opportunities. Residents from Hermanus explained that foreign nationals are much more readily accepted by white and coloured communities because they "are here to work, so they work hard, and they don't do drugs or crime. They'll work for next to nothing and the work will be good" (van der Walt, 2020).

Therefore, white and coloured residents perceive foreign nationals to be more trustworthy than black South Africans, and thus prefer to employ foreign nationals over locals. Zwelihle residents did express their sentiments towards foreign nationals as 'neutral', however, when protests over service delivery and housing break out, foreign nationals seem to be the first targets when lootings begin (Hartford, 2019, p. 34). Xenophobia, then, could be considered an important theme when discussing the dynamics at play between residents from different areas, however, much has already been written on xenophobic incidents in Zwelihle. For this thesis, I decided to therefore forego this discussion purely due to a lack of space to give it justice, however, I do believe that a discussion on xenophobia could also aid in understanding issues surrounding development, space, and belonging. Thus, I intend to extend this research project in the future to include more residents from different areas – possibly even extending my research to other towns across South Africa – and therefore also include an entire discussion dedicated to the aspect of xenophobia.

For now, this thesis will argue that an in-depth discursive analysis of the residents of Hermanus, Zwelihle and Dubai's discussions, emotions, and behaviours in a 'post-protest' environment is pertinent to understanding residents' configuration and experiences of the contestations over urban space. Following this analysis of discourse, this thesis will highlight elements which influence these experiences and behaviours, such as the contesting values of 'aesthetic versus necessity', how people relate to their space and configure a sense of belonging, how residents lay a claim to the state and negotiate their space, and what their fears and aspirations reveal. Underlying all of this, I argue, is the municipality's lack of proper governance, corrupt actions and mismanagement of programs and urban space.

1

Moral Development

Introduction

Discourse surrounding development is complex, multifaceted and far-ranging. Adams (2020, p. 7) provides a rudimentary definition, by stating that development "can be taken to mean the production of social change that allows people to achieve their human potential". However, it is also used as a political tool with which politicians, officials and developers can 'herd' people in a specific direction (Adams, 2020, p.7). Moreover, the term 'development' holds within it great power, and the understanding of alternative futures (in which redress and economic redistribution seem attainable) is severely diminished by both the fact that its conceptualisation justifies those in authoritative positions' intervention in people's lives as well as by the notion of 'modernity' that lies behind it (Crush, 1995; Escobar, 2004).

Understanding development as partly an 'intervention into the lives of the poor' implies that development is also geared towards aiding the poor's growth away from poverty. However, the question here is concerned with what happens when the 'interventional development' does not coincide with that which the poor needs. In the case of Hermanus, the protests of 2018 erupted out of a built-up, shared frustration amongst residents of Zwelihle who had continuously voiced their needs for housing and (geographic) space. As a result, the residents of Zwelihle occupied Schulphoek and created Dubai, after which the municipality and provincial government proposed plans to build the 'Better Living Model': a development model which would expand the Hermanus CBD into Schulphoek and create mixed-income housing opportunities.

With this development, municipal officials, developers, and policy makers have attempted to uphold the 'Village aesthetic' throughout Hermanus – an aesthetic constantly boasting with vibrant and lively street markets and pedestrian walkways throughout the CBD and along the coastline. It is this 'Village aesthetic' to which the residents of Hermanus ascribe their sense of place, and therefore echoes Ghertner's (2010) discussion on aesthetic governmentality, in which the government or municipality implement and maintain the dominant aesthetic within an area to recreate the residents' "sense of self and place". In doing so, the residents are encouraged to identify with this aesthetic and those implementing it can justify any resulting development as 'serving the greater good'.

At the time of writing this thesis, the development of the Better Living Model has been halted due to residents of Dubai (the informal settlement in Schulphoek) refusing to comply with the municipal officials' conditions for development to ensue. The residents of Hermanus are supporting this development plan, as municipal officials are advertising it as the only way to help the residents of Dubai, Zwelihle and Hermanus – thus the development which could help all. In this instance, the notion of 'help' becomes idealized; the officials who decided on this development are transformed into the hero of the story – they are merely trying to help those in 'need'. However, 'help' is not as innocent as it may seem, regardless of the ideas underpinning 'help' which are rooted in an idyllic past. The interpretation of help in present society is based on a reciprocal relationship, where help is no longer suggested to be from a purely sympathetic, caring perspective (Gronemeyer, 1992, p. 55). If one is helped, it is not only because they are in need, but because there is something to be gained from helping them.

The development of Schulphoek into an extension of Hermanus CBD is therefore only considered a viable and acceptable form of development because it benefits the affluent members of the town, the municipality, and will ultimately uphold the 'aesthetic' of Hermanus. The poor residents of Dubai, those who this development is strategically and supposedly 'aimed' at, have no say in this development and – as we will see later – when they attempt to participate or offer suggestions it is to no avail. Their 'needs' are decided for them by experts based on scientific principles (Illich, 1992). Therefore, when development is decided based on their professionally dictated needs, it is seldomly founded on the needs of the people. Nonetheless, regardless of the development decided for the people and whether it truly helps them, those who stand against it are seen as obstructions on the road to a better future.

"Our town will never get anywhere if [the residents of Zwelihle and Dubai] continue like this," a resident of Hermanus explained. "I don't care if they want to live like that, but they must do it somewhere else or at least allow the municipality to help them" (Meyer, 2020). Meyer and I were discussing the growth and expansion of Zwelihle and Dubai when he made these remarks. He vocalised his disdain towards the residents of Zwelihle and Dubai for ruining the 'image' of Hermanus, stating that their behaviour resembled that of an animal who is "refusing to let us help them. We can help them become decent human beings" (Meyer, 2020). Another participant shared a similar opinion, stating that these residents should "go back to the bushes. They don't want to develop forward – they've made it very clear with how they live and mistreat the environment" (Groenewald, 2020).

These degrading responses were a continuous theme throughout my interviews with residents of Hermanus and are, unfortunately, racial tropes commonly used in South Africa. The poor

are viewed as primordial beings who have no concept of what they need to 'be better' or move forward in life. Development, in its Western form, is seen as the sole 'cure' for the 'backwardness' of the poor. Moreover, the urban poor in Dubai and Zwelihle are currently restricting the development of the Better Living Model and therefore also limiting the maintenance and enhancement of the municipality's aspiring aesthetic for Hermanus. The Better Living Model is therefore 'advertised' as the necessary development which would 'benefit all', in that it would maintain the village aesthetic (and remove the tin shacks out of Schulphoek) but would also, supposedly, benefit the poor in 'aiding their needs'.

Here, development and policies geared towards development are centred around utilitarianism, which I argue is then advertised as 'moral development'. Even though utilitarianism dictates that 'the greater good' should be maximised, development is generally profit-driven (therefore the 'greater good' in this sense could also be 'that which is good for the already affluent'). The market economy has created new moral problems, in which morality has been adjusted to accommodate a specific type of economy. Prior to the market economy, people used to exchange goods through borrowing and credit. However, as Graeber (2011) notes, the market economy caused a switch – the idea of 'borrowing' or being in debt garnered a bad reputation and the usage of money became morally justifiable. The market economy, in return, is therefore built upon and geared towards generating a profit. Profit-driven development, then, becomes 'moral development' as the morality of development is adjusted to accommodate the profit-driven ethos of the market economy.

Therefore, this chapter will argue that the development which is declared 'moral' and acceptable by the municipal officials and policy makers is guided on utilitarian principles, however, this approach can be viewed critically: utilitarianism is not only flawed due to the way it is created, but also due to the assumption it is both premised with and emphasizes. A utilitarian approach to development dictates that the aim of development should be to ensure the 'greatest amount of happiness', however, in the case of Hermanus, Zwelihle and Dubai, this is not focused on the poor – which constitute most of the population. It is instead focused on the affluent members of society who can partake in market activities and who will ultimately benefit the most from development. This approach also postulates the notion that the 'greatest amount of happiness' is achievable only if the greatest number of needs are fulfilled by one specific type of development, therefore it assumes that all needs are equal. This assumption is highly problematic in an unequal society, specifically in the case of Hermanus where the needs of the rich are not equivalent to the needs of the poor, but also elsewhere in South Africa where development policies are founded on the same assumption and principles.

Aesthetic development

The use of the word ‘development’ is generally either used descriptively, i.e., when we describe the process in which environments, economies and societies change, and ‘normatively’ in the sense that we describe or estimate what *ought* to happen (Goulet, 1995, p. 27). The notion of development is, therefore, understood as that which describes a ‘change towards the better’, but it is also inexplicably synonymous with ‘economic growth’ (Adams, 2020; Esteva, 1992; Sachs, 1992). Hermanus, Zwelihle and Dubai form part of the Overstrand Municipality, however, since Hermanus is regarded as the municipality’s largest town, Overstrand Municipality policies and strategic frameworks are geared mostly (but not entirely) towards developing and expanding the area of Hermanus. This town is considered one of the greatest sources of income for the Overstrand area as it is largely a tourist attraction, but also a superior source of income in terms of property development, real estate, and agriculture. It is no great surprise that all policies geared towards the development of Hermanus and attempts at enhancing its socio-economic stability are mainly focused on developing these aspects. The towns within the Overstrand depend greatly on tourist activities, as 15.9% of the households within the Overstrand region fall into the no-income bracket. In Hermanus, if Zwelihle and Dubai are considered, more than 30% of households are classified as no-income households. Therefore, a great number of the residents residing in this area are unable to partake in most market activities, hence the reliance on tourists.

Policies specifically aimed at Hermanus, such as the Hermanus CBD regeneration framework (2015, p. 34), is aimed at developing the town whilst simultaneously maintaining an image of the 'Village Life' in an attempt to boost the local economy and maintain the average tourist’s interests. Thus, the development of the town is focused largely on "...protecting the historic village character and relationship to the natural environment of the coast" (Hermanus CBD regeneration framework, 2015, p.37). Indeed, this 'historic village character' is intricately linked to the heritage resources of the town, such as the "...architecture, structures and settlement pattern of the CBD itself. Its history is also represented in intangible cultural and social memories and practice" (Hermanus CBD regeneration framework, 2015, P.38). Therefore, the historic ‘village character’ is the aesthetic which municipal officials and developers wish to maintain during all processes of development.

Another priority for the Overstrand municipality is protecting and maintaining a sustainable natural environment which is a key element for their proposed aesthetic. After the creation of Dubai in Schulphoek, this priority reached a peak as most of the area’s milkwood forest had been destroyed in the land grab process. This milkwood forest was the 12th largest in the world, and after they had occupied the land, the area was left unrevivable. In fact, this is one

of the main reasons why the developers allegedly backed out of their original plans and promises to develop housing for the poor in Schulphoek; they were unsure of whether the development of housing in this area would be sustainable. Nonetheless, the residents of Zwelihle and Dubai are labelled as the main cause of environmental destruction. Here, I will not attempt to evaluate the validity of this accusation, rather this discourse surrounding the urban poor – following Anand (2017, p. 56) – is aimed at emphasising their exclusion, thereby demonising the urban poor and illegitimating their claims to Schulphoek.

In the same breath, the residents of Dubai are claiming a process of 'double standards' by stating that the Better Living Model will do just as much damage to Schulphoek than any other type of development. One participant from Hermanus exclaimed that the municipality should, instead of focusing on unsustainable land and the further destruction thereof, focus on the 'real issues' which have a direct, negative impact on the environment. "Instead of trying to help [the residents of Dubai] [the municipality] should focus on the real issues" (Parker, 2020), he explained while referring to an incident in Onrus, just outside of Hermanus CBD. In this incident, a sewerage pipeline had a blockage and as a result had leaked into the river. Members of the neighbourhood next to the river started noticing a 'smell of decay' and contacted the municipality to fix it, but to no avail. Parker started campaigns to raise awareness and contacted the municipality numerous times. He received no response for almost four months. They did, however, respond once Parker shared images of the river on social media. He explained: "it seems like only when you threaten the municipality publicly, or threaten their image at least, that they 'find the time' to respond to you" (Parker, 2020). Perhaps the poor share a similar idea with that of middle- and upper-class residents: to garner a response from the municipality and to ensure their needs are met, the municipality needs to be 'threatened' publicly. Therefore, much like the residents of Zwelihle's use of protests, Parker aptly noted that the municipality only tends to react when the 'image' of Hermanus – and therefore the aesthetic they attempt to uphold – is threatened.

(Not) Protesting development

The protests of 2018 were not a spontaneous occurrence. Rather, these protests were the result of two decades' worth of growing fatigue amongst the residents of Zwelihle. The protests ultimately led to a 'lockdown' of the town, where business owners were forced to close shop for the duration of the protests, not only due to the (sometimes) violent nature of the protests, but also because majority of the people working for Hermanus residents live in Zwelihle. One participant from Zwelihle stated that they knew Hermanus would 'struggle' to conduct business without the residents of Zwelihle, claiming:

> They cannot continue without us showing up to work. We decided to stay home to show them that they also need us. But they can't keep treating us like children – that was important for them to know – we have needs too, and if they want us to work for them, they need to give us what they promised us (Sehlabi, 2020).

The residents of Hermanus, however, considered these events as similar to that of a toddler throwing a 'temper tantrum', albeit a frightening one. Majority of the participants from Hermanus agreed that they were oblivious to the hardships and frustration the residents of Zwelihle had to deal with on a regular basis. The residents of Hermanus imply that this 'oblivious state' is purely an innocent reaction to the absence of their involvement with the people of Zwelihle. Of course, this might be true; the residents of Hermanus have no real desire nor reason to be confronted by the troubles of their neighbours, unless it impacts them directly. Nevertheless, when the protests erupted the residents of Hermanus who participated in this research assumed the protestors were demanding more services without deserving them. One participant's sentiments towards the first day of the protests highlights this general assumption:

> It didn't look like a cry for help. It looked like every other protest in South Africa [...] we give them everything and they never say thank you – they just want more free handouts. Free houses, higher paying jobs – for what? They really showed everyone how truly uncultured they are with the protests […] they're sitting around all day waiting to be spoon fed by people who actually work for a living, and then they go and burn down a library which could have helped them educate themselves and get better jobs (Meyer, 2020).

Concepts such as 'children' and 'underdeveloped' have formed an integral part of racial discourse from the onset of colonialism, implying the 'backwardness' of the urban poor. Regardless of the concept experts choose as an umbrella term for the poor, all these concepts share a similar notion: to create one homogenous society, the 'backward' must be aided in developing forward. This depiction of the 'poor' as children and 'uncultured' is a common assumption amongst experts and middle- and upper-class individuals. They view the poor as 'underdeveloped' children with no autonomy over their own interests or 'needs'. Only those in higher positions of knowledge and power (experts) can help the 'poor' on their behalf. However, as much as the idea holds that only experts have the scientific knowledge to decide, implement, control and review programs which will 'help' the poor, these programs are all aimed at economic development, and the enhancement of the municipality's desired 'image', instead of focused on fighting poverty at its core (Rahnema, 1992).

One of the major needs which the Overstrand municipality tends to focus on is creating more employment opportunities, which, when successful, seems like a fair approach at eradicating poverty. However, in most cases programs aimed at maximising the poor's chance at

employment opportunities are, once again, aimed more at maintaining a certain type of 'image' of heroism for the municipality or provincial government instead of truly alleviating poverty. A prime example of this in Hermanus was prevalent in a situation in 2011, where the residents of Zwelihle were given the opportunity to partake in an Entrepreneurial course conducted by Stellenbosch University Business School in partnership with Siege.

One participant, Swanepoel (2020), spoke about how she became involved with the residents of Zwelihle through this programme. Even though every member who took part in it received a 'certificate of completion', Swanepoel noted that once the programme had finished, nothing came of it. The Mayor of Hermanus had promised to build premises which could increase entrepreneurial opportunities, and by 2018 Swanepoel sent a formal enquiry to the municipality, asking whether the promises would ever be fulfilled. The Municipal councillor in charge of entrepreneurial programs such as this responded to her enquiries by saying it is 'unnecessary', "and he told me that 'as soon as you start giving [the poor] stuff then they want more stuff. We do enough for entrepreneurs' and that's all he had to say about it" (Swanepoel, 2020). Here is a case where 'training' is provided to enhance the municipality's image of 'providing opportunities for the poor', but training without infrastructure is just as good as no training at all.

The councillor's sentiments towards the poor echoes those of Meyer's. There seems to be a mutual form of sympathy fatigue amongst residents of Hermanus and municipal officials. This emotional state, or 'reaction' towards the poor is part of what Feldman (2019) considers a foundation for the definition of neo-liberalism. According to Feldman (2019, p. 342) the two types of reactions towards the poor are either that (1) the poor is in dire need of charity and welfare (or educational and training programs) to 'develop' forward as they do not take responsibility for their own fate, and (2) the poor should be seen as free agents who can easily enter and compete within the market by themselves, and by doing so, 'escape' their impoverished lifestyles. However, the growing sympathy fatigue amongst Hermanus residents and officials is a result of the failure of this neo-liberal approach, as one participant noted:

> [the municipality] see us as just wanting and wanting [more from them], but we do not want them to come and tell us how to live our lives, we want them to listen to us. If they listen to us, just once, we won't have to keep knocking on their doors asking for them [to do so] (Sehlabi, 2020).

This sympathy fatigue is ultimately what gave momentum to the 2018 protests, as the residents of Zwelihle decided to amplify their voices through an organized protest. The residents of Zwelihle who partook in the research for this thesis explained that their frustrations towards Hermanus residents and municipal officials turning a blind eye to them had grown too intense. As mentioned, major theories surrounding development postulate that the 'poor' are

children without agency in need of a parental figure who decides their needs for them and helps them move forward. Post-development scholars also view development and development policies as 'forced' upon these individuals, 'destroying diversity' and 'removing cultural ties' (Sachs, 1992). However authors such as Vokes (2018, p. 17) argues that scholars make a mistake by assuming that the poor cannot participate in development, stating that development is no longer 'outside' of most societies and 'forced' upon them, rather it should be accepted that development is integrated in the poor's everyday activities and that they have the agency to decide their own needs.

In fact, the residents of Zwelihle and Dubai showcased their agency through the 2018 protests. They did not exclaim a wish for an end to development, in fact, they welcome transparent development and the fulfilling of promises such as housing and employment opportunities. However, they are not 'victims' of these development ideals. Sally Matthews (2017) critiqued development and post-development theorists who believe that those who accept development with its Western connotations merely do so as they suffer from internalising colonisation, therefore insinuating a state of 'colonised mindsets'. It is, in fact, quite possible for people to accept contemporary forms of development whilst maintaining their cultural ties.

This is evident in the case of Zwelihle and Dubai. The residents did not fight for proper housing or employment opportunities because they wish to be 'Western', in fact, all the participants who took part in the research for this thesis agreed that aspects such as housing and the opportunity to fair and equal employment formed part of their rights as citizens of South Africa. They had no intention of forgoing their cultural or religious backgrounds (as will be discussed later) by accepting development – even if it is generally accepted that the process of development is deeply embedded in the process of homogenization. The protests of 2018 and the resulting land grab symbolised a victory for residents of Zwelihle, as one participant exclaimed:

> we fought the police. We fought for what is ours and we won; we have our land. Now [the municipal officials] must listen to us […] there are things that we need, and we have now shown them what will happen if they do not listen! (Mothupi, 2020).

Control under the guise of development

The residents of Hermanus believe that if developing the town to a more 'aesthetically' pleasing area for tourists is on top of the development agenda, areas such as informal settlements (like Zwelihle and Dubai) engulfed in a sea of tin houses, would surely be on the 'this needs to be sorted out' agenda. Therefore, the housing policy – i.e., the policy geared at

providing houses for all residents which would fit the town's 'aesthetic' would seem to be a top priority. However, the municipality constantly reiterates their reliance on the province and 'outside' sources of funding to go through with their 'plans' for housing (Overstrand Municipality, 2020). Of course, the provincial government did eventually buy Schulphoek from private property developers, however, we should not forego the fact that housing was first and foremost the municipality's responsibility and that they are responsible for the original sale of Schulphoek.

Now, the municipality and provincial government's plans entail creating 'Government Assisted Rental Housing' (GARH) (Government Assisted Rental Housing, 2019, p. 7) as well as implementing the 'Better Living Model' in Schulphoek which is based on the 'Conradie Better Living Model' in Pinehurst, Cape Town. In some cases, however, they would have to negotiate with current residents residing in houses on pieces of land (or 'Restructuring Zones') they wish to develop to fulfil their plans. These residents will have to be rehomed and the houses (or informal houses, such as 'tin shacks') will be demolished to build smaller, 'affordable' houses. However, apart from the mountain of issues correlated to the notion of 'rehoming' residents and its ties to the Bantu Laws of Apartheid, GARH is only aimed at residents who already receive an income of between R 1500 to R 15 000, which would be (33%) of residents. Zwelihle and Dubai are mostly inhabited by individuals who fall into the no-income bracket, which means that the GARH is not aimed towards most of the population within these areas. Of course, the way the GARH is constructed and planned makes sense in a Capitalist, neo-liberal era where taxpayers and those who can take part in the economy (therefore those who earn a salary) are deemed to be higher on the priority list. Even if neo-liberal ideology states that everyone within society is 'equal' in the sense that they are all free agents who can enter and compete in the market, a 'rental housing scheme' is a development strategy in which experts can control and mobilise the poor through a set of 'conditions' to which they must comply.

Along with the fact that some residents will have to be rehomed, the previous Western Cape Premier Helen Zille, who front lined the proposal for the 'Better Living Model', also exclaimed that the development would only be able to take place if the residents of Dubai promised to no longer build 'shacks' (informal houses). She explained that development can only take place on 'unoccupied pieces of land' (Steyn and da Silva, 2019). Development is therefore ultimately a guise for the municipal officials and policy makers under which they can manage others (Escobar, 1992, p. 239). By promising development in Schulphoek which could "ultimately enhance the livelihoods of residents" (Steyn and da Silva, 2019), and stating that the development will only happen if the residents comply with the municipality and developer's

rules, the developers and officials attempt to control the residents of Dubai under the guise of 'development towards the better'.

The residents of Zwelihle and Dubai have, outside of formal protests, approached developers and other stakeholders with their own suggestions on developing Dubai and Zwelihle. In fact, when speaking to participants from Zwelihle and Dubai, each participant had a story to share on how some of the community's ideas and contributions towards developing their areas were shrugged away. One example provided by various participants is that of a meeting where residents of Dubai had proposed developing an area specifically catered for the religious practice of slaughtering and offering animals, "and every white person in the room was disgusted" (Swanepoel, 2020). 'Disgust' is an emotive response to what is perceived of 'others' – that which does not coincide with the hegemonic understanding of 'acceptable' – and Sara Ahmed (2013, p. 83) writes that disgust "is mediated by ideas that are already implicated in the very impression we make of others and the way those impressions surface as bodies". Disgust as an emotive response is based on – and reinforces – the Hermanus residents' perceptions of these residents; 'disgust' becomes a foundation on which the residents' 'otherness' is amplified, and any action then taken towards them is defined as a justifiable response.

Like Ahmed's (2013) analysis, disgust, in the context of this thesis, is used as a form of justification for the controlling and marginalization of the people of Zwelihle and Dubai. Although this reaction was a result of the residents' request to build an area for slaughtering animals, it was not an isolated occurrence. Several of the participants from Zwelihle and Dubai shared their embarrassment and anger towards municipal officials and residents of Hermanus who called their everyday actions and ways of navigating through life 'disgusting'. These methods and actions concerned aspects such as washing their clothes in the street, letting their dogs and children roam freely and 'play in the dirt', littering, butchering animals in public streets at markets and publicly displaying their intoxication (whether it be drugs or alcohol). One resident of Zwelihle explained that she regularly feels as though:

> [the residents of Hermanus] look down on us […] everything we do is disgusting to them, but they don't understand our ways [of doing things]. I think the fact that they keep their dogs inside their homes and feed them until they look like soccer balls is also disgusting, but they don't care what I think (Sehlabi, 2020).

Disgust therefore typically embodies control, but only when the disgust is aimed at the marginalised members of society. In the case of the residents of Zwelihle, then, following Tayob (2019), disgust transforms into 'embodied critique' rather than an act of control or marginalisation. However, when outside developers shared their 'disgust' towards the

development suggestions brought forth by the residents of Dubai, their emotions were enough to deny the residents a religious slaughtering site. Disgust therefore implies a hierarchy – those who are deemed 'experts' or 'better off' in society claim to have a firmer grasp of what is 'acceptable' and therefore not 'disgusting' – and this emotive response is used as a form of political control to force people into a hegemonic society whilst simultaneously maintaining their desired aesthetic. Municipal officials and other 'experts' use this form of control when planning and deciding on development which they wish to enforce on the rest of society. The concept of planning – and development – is therefore not only a problem when it fails, but also when it succeeds (Escobar, 1992, p. 250). Following Foucault (1982), then, development and planning in this case is used as a mechanism of power and control which ultimately shapes and creates individuals and influences their behaviour. When 'experts' of Western influence 'plan' successfully, they set the terms for how everyone should live; they create subjects out of poor people by teaching them 'how to behave' to succeed in the contemporary society.

The 'Better Living Model' complies with what experts deem to be 'acceptable' development, and as mentioned earlier, the developers and council members in control of this plan have clearly set out their terms for the residents of Dubai: they must forgo their 'disgusting' practices and halt the construction of their 'tin shacks' if they wish to have a better future. Of course, the developers and council members merely note their desire to 'help' these residents. This contemporary idea of 'help' is correlated to offering people the possibility of escaping their 'backwardness' and to aid them in following the path towards the hegemonic societal culture. However, help becomes a reciprocal relationship; one is only helped if there is something to be gained from helping them. This is true for the 'Better Living Model' where developers and council members only suggested and planned for this type of development as it would increase their economic stability and provide middle- and upper-class residents more housing and business opportunities, whilst simultaneously maintaining their desired aesthetic.

Complexities of development

At the time of writing this thesis, tensions are rising once again in the Zwelihle and Dubai neighbourhoods as they fear the municipality's lack of engagement with the communities will result in a repeat of the 2018 protests. As briefly mentioned, the previous Western Cape Premier, Helen Zille, proposed a draft for the 'Better Living Model' in 2019 which was based on the 'Conradie Better Living Model' development plan in Pinehurst, Cape Town. This plan was focused on creating a mixed-income housing development in Schulphoek as well as building a

> high-density, high-rise, residentially-led development; commercial and retail business opportunities; a safe and secure environment; active streets; well-designed recreational spaces; new schools; integration of different communities and income groups; and government and public services brough closer to citizens (Steyn and da Silva, 2019).

This proposed development also requires the residents of Dubai to halt their constructions of informal houses, which did not bode well for them. For these residents, the land which they fought for is rightfully theirs – they do not wish to have outside developers decide which development is best suited for Dubai. As one participant stated:

> It would be like going to war over a country, winning the war and the land of the country, and then having other people tell you what you're allowed to do with it. No! Nonsense! This is our land. They must listen to our plans! (Sehlabi, 2020).

The residents of Dubai are concerned about the development of mixed income living as well, claiming that they fear a process of gentrification is on the rise and that the land of Schulphoek should not be given to middle-class residents. However, according to various participants, their fears and concerns are not being heard due to a lack of opportunities to partake in public participation. For example, one resident explained that during the Covid-19 pandemic in which the 'Better Living Model' development started to gain shape, the residents of Dubai felt isolated from the municipality's supposed community meetings due to a lack of access (Mothupi, 2020).

The meeting was planned to take place in Hawston, where municipal leaders made WiFi networks available so residents from Zwelihle could join. Residents of Zwelihle and Dubai expressed their dismay towards these arrangements, explaining that Hawston was nearly eleven kilometers away from Zwelihle and although some could use public transport to attend the meeting no public transport was available after, which suggested that almost everyone would have to walk home after the meeting adjourned (Land Party SA, 2020). Apart from this, the residents also explained that even though they are grateful for the "free WiFi", many residents do not own the technology needed to connect to the networks (i.e., smartphones, laptops, etc.) and that it would be much easier for the residents of Zwelihle and Dubai to simply walk to the municipality – which would take roughly 45 minutes. The residents explained that they believed the municipality planned this meeting to receive 'clean audits', stating that

> this is a typical DA [local municipality] modus operandi, particularly when it comes to property […] this meeting will be checked off as public participation has been done […] and they will move on swiftly with their plans (Land Party SA, 2020).

Therefore, the tactics used by the municipality in this sense are nothing short of the 'disaster capitalism' strategy outlined by Naomi Klein (2020). Klein explains that this strategy is often

employed when a crisis arises and the government or, in the case of Hermanus, the local municipality impose and implement their own agenda or plans while suspending some (or all) democratic norms under the auspices of 'saving the economy and the people'.

> The municipality knew we weren't going to be able to make it [to the meeting], but they don't care because now they can say they gave us a chance to participate and after that they'll go ahead with what was decided in that meeting, even if the people from Zwelihle didn't really get to say their say (Hlathini, 2020).

Along with the minimal public participation opportunities, Swanepoel (2020) explained that there is a general lack of proper representation amongst the stakeholders deciding on the development.

> […] there are 56 people [stakeholders], of the 56 people – and the exact numbers might be wrong – of those 56 people, I think 15 are black, and of those 15, 8 are living in Zwelihle. And these are the people that are deciding on what happens there (Swanepoel, 2020).

When proposing the development draft for the Better Living Model, Helen Zille explained that:

> We need all the input we can get from all interested and affected parties so that we know that we are on the right track. It is, however, impossible to please everyone and therefore we as leaders will have to take ownership of the project and drive it forward (Steyn and da Silva, 2019).

These examples reiterate the notion that the 'experts' who decide the needs *for* the poor are not truly taking the poor into account – the poor hardly have the ability or chance to represent themselves and voice their own needs. The municipality has, however, allegedly formed a massive base of support from the middle- and upper-class Hermanus residents as well as the municipal stakeholders with regards to the implementation of the 'Better Living Model' but has yet to finalize discussions with the residents of Dubai.

It seems that majority of the residents of Hermanus have agreed to support the municipality and developers in their endeavours to develop Schulphoek into another extension of the 'Village'. In fact, most residents have agreed that developing Hermanus (and therefore expanding it to Schulphoek) is essential for ensuring economic stability. One participant noted that he agreed with the development of Schulphoek into an extension of Hermanus with businesses, low- to middle-income housing and schools if the long-term effects would result in greater financial stability. He did, however, exclaim that he will always be a bit nostalgic for how things were. "When I was a kid, I could run around this town at eight o'clock at night without a care in the world. As long as Hermanus is developing, those days are long gone" (River, 2020). This participant views Hermanus as turning into a "mini-Cape Town, and you won't see a little five-year-old playing around by himself at eight o'clock at night. They've made

Hermanus dangerous" (River, 2020). Here, however, the participant did not necessarily refer to the development of Hermanus into a 'city', but rather the intrusion of the poor, which creates a sense of imminent danger.

Parker, stated that "This town was never meant to be developed, that's why there's no train station" (Parker, 2020). Technically, there is a train station in Hermanus, but it has never been used – no tracks were laid to Hermanus as one of the original developers of the town did not want Hermanus to become as polluted as others. Although, his example still highlights a major argument majority of the residents of Hermanus have regarding the image of the town – the Village must stay a Village – as the aesthetic of 'the Village' symbolises the "Hermanus we always knew and loved" (Parker, 2020). With this shared sentiment, residents of Hermanus are, ironically, divided over the development in Schulphoek. Some residents believe that Hermanus should stay a Village, and it can do so only if Schulphoek is 'transformed' into sharing the same aesthetic. Other residents believe that this development is unnecessary, however, they do still want the residents of Dubai to 'leave' to regain and maintain their village aesthetic. Therefore, as much as there are competing aspirations towards the development of Schulphoek, one aspiration all residents of Hermanus agree upon is that only when the current residents of Dubai (and, therefore, Dubai itself) are removed will they be able to maintain their aesthetic. The poor's needs, according to the municipality, are generally centred around housing – even though not all would be able to attain housing with the proposed development plans. Thus, the municipality advertises the development of the Better Living Model as the only 'acceptable' model of development – the development which would suit all.

Moral development

Defining and understanding morality is often considered a hazardous task – what seems 'moral' for one individual might seem entirely 'immoral' for another. In terms of development and defining what is deemed 'moral', policy makers have attempted to take on an approach which could suit all – a utilitarian approach – but in doing so have also created a flaw in their reasoning, as we shall see later. When Thompson (1971) wrote about *The Moral Economy of the English Crowd*, he wrote how morality is considered as what 'ought' to happen. Development policies are therefore based on this principle, where morality is concerned with what obligations the state, government, policy makers or developers have and ought to obey. This could refer to protecting and sustaining the environment; ensuring housing for all; building, fixing, and maintaining infrastructure; and aiding in the creation of employment opportunities, to name a few. These, amongst others, are all aspects which has been deemed pertinent to an individual's survival, but 'moral' development could also concern aspects which

are only deemed necessary by experts and not necessarily by the people who are affected by the development. As stated in the previous section, providing the people of Dubai with an area in which they could continue their religious slaughtering was not deemed ‘necessary’ or viewed as ‘acceptable’ development, as it threatened the maintenance of the municipality’s desired ‘aesthetic’ as well as the enhancement of the market economy’s moral code.

Nonetheless, development policies therefore concern what has been outlined as 'moral development', that is, what 'ought to be done'. The decision here does not always lie in public participation, and when it does, public requests are not always accepted – especially if the suggestions fall outside of the desired aesthetic, as is evident in the case of Zwelihle and Dubai. ‘The Better Living Model’ which, at the time of writing this thesis, is gaining momentum, and is advertised as development which would benefit everyone, even if it the residents of Dubai refuse to accept it. Here, moralities seem to be competing in the sense that one side of the moral coin is focused on the supposed upliftment of the poor, whereas the other is focused on the space and lives of the middle- and upper-class residents.

The municipal members and developers have grown weary of attempting to negotiate with the residents of Dubai over the Schulphoek land and have instead focused on gathering the support of the residents of Hermanus. The use of the term ‘moral’ development is ultimately a strategic process used to draw emotional support from the residents of Hermanus; when residents of Hermanus hear that the developers and council members want to partake in ‘moral’ development (that which ought to be done for the sake of everyone to live better) they will most certainly rather stand behind it instead of going against it. Likewise, when middle- and upper-class residents or municipal members respond to a form of development as ‘disgusting’, the sense of unity and the ultimate hegemony amongst the respondents validates the decision taken against those who suggested the ‘disgusting’ development.

By refusing to accept the supposedly ‘moral development’ model, the residents of Zwelihle and Dubai are viewed as selfish individuals. “I don’t understand why they can’t just move their shacks,” one resident notes, when speaking of the current unrest amongst Dubai residents due to the threat of ‘The Better Living Model’, saying that

> they are going to get other houses, so why are they fighting it? I don’t know what they want anymore, but they need to understand that [The Better Living Model development] is going to happen, and it’s going to be better for everyone [in this town] (Groenewald, 2020)

Therefore, by denying this type of development and continuously occupying the land, the impoverished residents of Dubai are supposedly denying both themselves and the residents of Hermanus a chance at a superior future (Groenewald, 2020). Indeed, utilitarian policies based on the moralities and ethics of Western development are structured around the

supposed needs of the people, which are decided by experts, and by complying with development these needs will be fulfilled. An economy based on needs ultimately leads to a 'manageable' society. If needs are decided, managed, controlled, and reviewed by experts, society dodges the possibility of moving towards intolerable levels of polarization if the economy is based on 'wants' instead. The 'needy' man can be controlled scientifically and is therefore reduced "to a mere profile of his needs" (Illich, 1992, p. 98).

It is exactly in this instance, where all individuals of society are condensed to a mere characteristic of needs, that a utilitarian approach to development seems fit as an option. In its most classical form, the utilitarian approach seeks to create "the greatest overall balance of happiness over unhappiness" (Rachels and Rachels, 2015, p. 111). When the utilitarian approach is considered as the foundation for a development strategy, all individuals affected by development are supposedly viewed as equal; no person's 'happiness' is more important than another. Policy makers therefore consider development as 'what will bring the greatest amount of happiness for everyone?' As much as this method of policy creation is, in every way, superior to the methods used, for example, during the Apartheid era where the happiness of white people was considered first and above all, it still attempts to postulate that every individual's needs are equal. If a development strategy can offer the highest levels of content for all individuals, then all individuals will benefit from the same type of development.

Yet I have attempted to argue that this is not necessarily true. Naturally, there is a vast amount of critique surrounding the notion of utilitarianism (see Rachels and Rachels, 2015, pp. 111–125) and it is not unfounded. However, the greatest flaw in this method of development planning is the lack of acknowledging that everyone's needs are not equal; policy makers attempt to enforce homogeneity through the concept of 'needs' and apply their vision of development as an 'answer' to fulfilling these needs. With the 'Better Living Model', the 'needs' which are catered for are not that of the poor, but that of the income-earning individual who can 'afford' to live in the newly built houses (or 'apartments') and partake in activities to boost the town's economy. The needs of the poor are disregarded when it is deemed 'disgusting' and not fit for the image of the town. Still, development aimed at the 'greater good' is considered moral development and the middle- and upper-class residents of Hermanus are supporting it, purely because they will benefit from it the most.

Thus, in the case of Zwelihle and Dubai the greatest flaw with a utilitarian approach to development is stating that the development is 'for the greater good' and asserting that everyone has equal needs. 'One type of moral development for all' reinforces the idea that a homogenous society exists, when, in fact, society is extremely unequal. The development strategies and policies in Hermanus are an illusionary attempt at buttressing their desired

aesthetic and the needs of the residents of Zwelihle and Dubai – needs geared towards proper housing, service delivery, space, religious slaughtering sights, etc. – are gaslighted to fulfil these goals. In the end, only the residents of Hermanus who currently have better living conditions will fully benefit from the 'moral development' plans, even if it is advertised as targeted to help the poor. The residents of Zwelihle and Dubai are not blind to the deception of the 'Better Living Model', however, just as they were not blind to the lack of promises fulfilled by the municipality prior to 2018. Just as the emotive response of disgust correlates to a sense of unity, power and control, the notion of 'moral development' provides the developers, policy makers and municipal and other officials an 'ethical' foundation to build and garner support. Once the 'moral development' has been decided as the 'greater good' based on the needs prescribed to the people, officials have an ethical obligation to fulfil it. However, the needs prescribed *to* the residents of Dubai and Zwelihle do not necessarily take the residents into account, and the utilitarian approach to development diminishes their heterogeneity.

Conclusion

Our view of development and the people it affects needs to shift towards understanding that people are agents in all spheres – they do not wish to receive 'other forms of service delivery', but a more democratic and transparent form of the policies and processes which are currently in place. Contrary to the popular belief amongst the residents of Hermanus, the residents of Zwelihle and Dubai are not *refusing* development. Instead, they welcome transparency and development towards equal living standards. The residents of Zwelihle and Dubai have set their own terms and vocalised their own needs, however, their attempt at showcasing their agency over deciding and realising their own needs have been met with reactions of 'disgust'.

The municipal officials, property developers and other stakeholders' emotive response of 'disgust' has acted as a strategy for control and marginalisation; they claim that their promise of providing the residents of Zwelihle and Dubai with a better future (or better living conditions) will not realise unless the residents comply with the only 'acceptable' development model. The protests of 2018 as well as the refusal to comply with the 'rules' laid out by the municipality for the 'Better Living Model' to take shape have all been part of a reactionary process to decades of 'silence' from the municipality and a feeling of being 'unseen'. However, it is not simply that these residents *feel* unheard and unseen – they claim that the municipality willingly leaves them 'in the dark' and refuses to provide them with the necessary resources to participate in community and municipal meetings, as we saw with the discussion on the lack of representation in share-holder meetings as well as the lack of proper public participation opportunities.

I have argued that the use of utilitarian policies as a foundation for 'moral development' holds within it the assumption that all individuals have equal needs (and it therefore downplays the inequality within society), but the needs ascribed to individuals seldomly mirror their *true* needs: housing for all (instead of the few, as is implied with the development of the Better Living Model), space, slaughtering sites, etc. Of course, the complexities of development come in to play here, and the utilitarian approach then questions which areas of development will bring about the 'greatest good', i.e., which needs should be met to ensure the greatest amount of content amongst all residents. In the case of Hermanus, the needs of the minority – the middle- and upper-class residents – trump the needs of the majority (the residents of Zwelihle and Dubai).

The true needs of the poor, the needs which are not being 'heard', are directly linked to their aspirations and desires. On the other hand, the municipality's use of development as a controlling measure to enhance and maintain their desired 'village aesthetic' also provides some context with regards to their aspirations for Hermanus. One way in which the poor have attempted to emphasize their desires is through a process I have mentioned quite a few times but not yet elaborated on – the occupation of land, or more specifically, the renaming of the Schulphoek area into Dubai after occupying it. However, if we discuss the significance of the name *Dubai* for the poor, then the significance and use of the nickname 'the Village' for Hermanus could arguably also hold within it the aspirations and desires of the middle- and upper-class residents, and the municipality. Therefore, the next chapter will delve into the significance of the naming of places and people as an elaboration of this discussion on the complexities of development and needs assessment.

2

The Naming of Places and People

Introduction

Zwelihle is not an informal settlement, as its creation dates to the Apartheid era when Hermanus was declared a whites-only town and all black people residing in Hermanus, Hawston or Mount Pleasant (of which the latter two were declared coloured areas) were forcibly relocated to Zwelihle. Black people were confined to this space and the only beach they had access to was part of Schulphoek – a large milkwood forest bordering on Zwelihle and Sandbaai (just outside of Hermanus town central). Over the years, however, long-term residents of Zwelihle started renting out space on their property to in-migrants and Zwelihle began to expand exponentially. The protests of 2018 were therefore aimed at calling on the state to deliver on their promises of public housing, and with this the subsequent occupation of Schulphoek ended in the creation of Dubai.

The previous chapter analysed this situation as an index for competing moralities. On the one hand, the Better Living Model allegedly focuses on upliftment and 'helping' the residents of Zwelihle and Dubai by building more houses, while the process of expanding the Hermanus town centre into the area of Schulphoek will simultaneously help the town's economy. On the other hand, this idea of 'moral development' competes with the realities of space and people. The residents of Dubai feel they have fought for their land, and they want to decide the development for Schulphoek. They fear the Better Living Model will not only lead to gentrification, but also increase a negative sense of forced isolation – one like that which they experienced throughout the Apartheid era – as it will also entail the displacement and rehoming of many of the current Dubai residents.

Their isolated experience is in no way like the sense of isolation described by residents and holidaymakers of Hermanus – the latter's discussion on isolation is an idealistic one, a chosen way of living apart from other towns and, specifically, the residents of Zwelihle and Dubai. I was intrigued by this notion of 'chosen isolation' and, at first, reluctantly attributed it to the everlasting effects of the Apartheid Bantu Laws. As much as this turned out to be true, the residents of Hermanus also attribute their sense of isolation to their sensory experiences and, more importantly, to the 'Village' aesthetic of Hermanus. This nickname holds great value for the residents of Hermanus – not only historically, but also as an indicator of their aspirations for wanting to maintain things 'as is'.

The same cannot be said for the residents of Zwelihle and Dubai. The area of Schulphoek holds great historical significance, but the residents of Dubai aptly renamed their informal settlement to showcase their aspirations for the future. Therefore, the residents of Dubai aspire towards change instead of aspiring to maintain things 'as is'. Here, another competing relationship ensues between these diverse groups of residents: the residents of Hermanus want their town to remain a village and are reluctant to allow the 'backyard dwellers' and 'squatters' of Zwelihle and Dubai to change that. The residents of Dubai, however, are fighting towards a changed future – one surrounded with promise and improvement. Then again, when interviewing participants from Zwelihle, I noticed that some participants had differing views on whether they wanted to side with either keeping Zwelihle as is or wanting to fight towards a changed future. The difference in opinions here rested greatly on whether the residents were 'bornas' or 'amagodukas'.

Bornas refer to families who can trace their ancestry back to the original development of Zwelihle, whereas amagodukas directly translates to 'those that go home'. They are usually individuals who only live in Zwelihle for seasonal work and then return home to their families living in other cities. The term 'amagodukas' is also used interchangeably with 'inkomers' (incomers) referring to newer families or individuals who moved to Zwelihle and have no ties with the bornas. Inkomers can be either South African citizens or foreigners. Here, an insider-outsider dynamic persists, and although this dynamic was eroded during the onset of the protests in 2018, once the area of Schulphoek was taken and transformed into Dubai tensions between the bornas and the inkomers restarted. Moreover, a politics of housing and infrastructure of relationships is prevalent within this dynamic. Bornas seldomly wish for Zwelihle to change, as they generally have 'better' living standards than their inkomer neighbours. Borna families tend to be employed and have houses in the older parts of Zwelihle and rent out extra space on their property to inkomers for the construction of their informal tin houses.

Apart from this, before the 2018 protests development was underway in Mandela Square in Zwelihle to renovate houses situated directly in a flood plain. The residents who resided in these houses were relocated temporarily, however, after the protests took place, the development was halted, and some residents are still waiting to return. Therefore, some bornas still hold negative perceptions of the inkomers for taking away their chance at improved living conditions. Inkomers, on the other hand, led the protests in 2018 and are now most leaders fighting towards a changed future. Here, a politics of housing and infrastructure is prevalent and arises between the homeowners (bornas) and the shack-dwellers (inkomers).

Amongst these contesting relationships and competing aspirations, there is no doubt that the politics and question of space is a recurring theme. However, before I move on to a discussion on the dynamics of space, I wish to situate the significance of the naming of places and people as a foundation for understanding the competing aspirations in relation to space. Therefore, this chapter will focus on an elaborated discussion of the significance attributed to the names of places and people in Hermanus, Zwelihle and Dubai to provide a framework in which the politics of space can be better understood.

The Naming of Places

Hermanus, the 'Village' and Zwelihle, 'a beautiful place'

Hermanus' identity as a simple 'fishing village' is almost overshadowed by its history of attracting a wealthy, white bracket of society. The town was first dubbed Hermanuspietersfontein in 1830 and in 1904, when the town was declared a municipality, the name was shortened to Hermanus (Burman, 1989). It was during this period of becoming a municipality that the development within the town started attracting more upper-class white holiday makers. Participants have noted that it is the 'village character' which added to the popularity of this town, however one participant from Hermanus admitted "suggesting that Hermanus is still a mere fisherman's village is quite a bit of a joke" (Heslop, 2020). Instead, the actual fishing community revolved more around the areas of Mount Pleasant and Hawston since Mount Pleasant was the first existing area – primarily inhabited by fisherman – and especially after the forced removals of coloured people from Hermanus and their relocation to these areas. Hermanus was only given the nickname 'the Village' due to its character pertaining to its street-markets, supposed sense of 'village' community relations, as well as the idea that Mount Pleasant and Hawston (the fisherman towns) form part of the 'Greater Hermanus' (the name attributed to the area in which Hermanus, and its surrounding suburbs, are included).

In the technical sense, Hermanus is in no way a 'village'. A 'village' usually refers to a group of houses or small buildings situated in a rural area and signifies isolation from the surrounding areas. In chapter one, I briefly mentioned that the original developers of Hermanus never built a train station to keep the pollution – which was prominent in other towns with train stations – out of Hermanus. The lack of access in and out of Hermanus clearly added to the town's isolation. Of course, over the years and with the development of automobiles, the task of entering and leaving Hermanus is no longer solely dependent on the use of a train, therefore Hermanus is not necessarily 'isolated' from other towns. One participant exclaimed that even though this is true – especially since Hermanus is situated off one of the main roads in Cape

Town – while living and going on holiday in Hermanus "you really feel as if you're in a different country […] it always felt as though we are in our own little bubble and all the other parts of South Africa were hundreds of kilometers away" (Combrink, 2020). Therefore, the isolation attributed to this coastal town is not one of a forced and unwanted separation from other towns, but rather a form of chosen isolation – isolation in the idealistic sense – connoting largely to the colonialist dream of recreating Europe in Africa.

Most of the participants for this thesis attributed the feeling of isolation to sensory aspects; the mountain which seems to form a 'cove' around Hermanus, the vibrant and lively street-markets, the natural environment which is always easily in reach and the quiet of the town during its 'off-seasons' (the few times during the year when the town is not overcrowded with tourists). These sensory aspects are not only central to the residents of Hermanus' adoration of the town, but also to the alleged sense of community and 'togetherness' formed on the streets of Hermanus. Therefore, the residents of Hermanus attribute its nickname 'the Village' not only to the history and 'image' of the town, but also to the community created from choosing to 'isolate' from other areas.

When I asked participants from Hermanus whether they would consider Zwelihle a part of this 'Village', one participant noted that Zwelihle has the wrong name. Zwelihle was created in 1963 when the Bantu Laws of Apartheid declared Hermanus a 'white-only' area. Prior to this, black people had already been living amongst the coloured residents of Mount Pleasant and Hawston, but the Bantu Laws forced the removal of the black residents from these areas and thus develop a new formal settlement (Zwelihle) on the border of Mount Pleasant. The name Zwelihle translates to 'A Beautiful Place', and the participant who mentioned that Zwelihle was named incorrectly further explained that "Zwelihle should actually have been called something that translates to '*bordering* on a beautiful place'" (Parker, 2020, emphasis added). Some residents of Zwelihle have, in a sense, agreed with this explanation of their area's name, stating that "we see the difference in houses but even if we try to make our houses more like theirs [the residents of Hermanus] it will never be possible" (Sehlabi, 2020).

Anthropologist Filipe de Boeck (2011) notes that the urban poor have a tendency to idealize specific aesthetic ideologies commonly resulting from urban planning which affects them the most. The 'disorganised' informal settlements are regarded as something in dire need of order, and even the name 'informal settlements' or 'townships' is, as Gastrow (2015, p. 2) argues, formed in relation to its imagined other: the 'suburb', 'town' or the 'city', which all connote order and material infrastructure. Other residents have noted that despite the appearance of Zwelihle – that of "poverty and chaos" – there is a community spirit which is apparently lacking in Hermanus, as one Zwelihle resident notes: "People help each other, children play together

in the streets and strangers are welcomed by a friendly wave. In Hermanus, you would be lucky if strangers greeted you with a smile" (Hlathini, 2020). Here, then, as much as the residents of Hermanus boast with their infrastructure in the technical sense, the residents of Zwelihle hold fast to the notion of an 'infrastructure of relationships' which is built out of a dependency on each other for survival (Simone, 2004, p. 413). Regardless, the residents of Hermanus argue that there is a strong sense of community amongst its residents, however in this sense it is greatly attributed to their chosen, idealistic 'isolation' from other towns and, more importantly, their chosen isolation from Zwelihle.

Even if the residents of Hermanus' adoration for the 'village' and the use of this nickname is closely related to their sensory experiences and sense of community, the name cannot be removed from its history. Hermanus, much like any other town or city across South Africa, was developed during the colonial period. Many of the town's buildings, such as the Hermanus museum, still boast with the colonial architecture (or Cape Dutch architecture) of the 17th century, and the spatial (and racial) separation still mimics that of the Apartheid forced removals. The history of this town is crucial when one considers the values and aspirations residents still hold for its character, as well as why some residents still deem themselves 'isolated' from Zwelihle. Remaining isolated, i.e., having the history of forced separation constantly repeating, is of cardinal importance for the residents of Hermanus to uphold the character of Hermanus.

One of the participants for this thesis spoke on this issue, stating that "[the residents of Hermanus] think we're living in a colony and actually we're living in South Africa, and they need to embrace that" (Swanepoel, 2020). This notion of living in a colonial bubble is largely attributed to the colonial architecture and 'sensory experiences' the residents of Hermanus adore. Swanepoel explained that this view of the village being isolated from Zwelihle contributed greatly to the onset of the protests in 2018, and still contributes to the ongoing tension within the town. "Of course, there's an obvious separation between [Hermanus] and [Zwelihle]," one resident exclaimed,

> you would have to be blind not to see it […] and you can't blame us for wanting to keep the separation. We have put so much sweat and tears into maintaining our little town, and when the [residents of Zwelihle] started bordering on our doorstep, the town didn't feel like ours anymore (Meyer, 2020).

The participant was referring to the expansion of Zwelihle and Dubai along the borders of Hermanus and Sandbaai, as well as the 'daily migration' of Zwelihle residents into Hermanus for work. Therefore, the residents of Hermanus not only refer to their town as an 'isolated

village', but they also do not want to share this village with the residents of Zwelihle. It would not be possible to make the claim that the residents of Hermanus do not want to share their village with *anyone*, seeing as though they rely greatly on tourists and the constant influx of new property owners. They view the residents of Zwelihle as detrimental to the 'image' and character of Hermanus, stating that they do not want Hermanus to end up looking like Zwelihle (i.e., with broken down houses, polluted streets and informal businesses open on every corner) (Combrink, 2020; Meyer, 2020; Parker, 2020; van Kerwel, 2020). As stated in chapter one, the residents of Hermanus do not mind the development of the Better Living Model as it would purely result in an expansion of the Hermanus town centre into Schulphoek, however they do have some reservations over the mixed-income housing arrangements.

One resident noted that they "…moved to Hermanus in 2000 and the people from Zwelihle were living outside of it – as they always have been – I see no reason why they should be allowed to live amongst us" (van Kerwel, 2020). This participant was, once again, implying that the tragic history of South Africa and the forced separation laws should remain intact to withhold the character of Hermanus, making a somewhat disturbing comparison when he said, "by keeping the black people out of Hermanus, you get to keep Hermanus the way it is" (van Kerwel, 2020). For this resident, as well as many others, it seems that black people are synonymous with ideas of 'poverty' and 'chaos'. In this sense, then, there is a clear perception of Hermanus residents that race, property, and order are intertwined, and the only way to maintain 'order' is through removing that which is causing the 'disorder': the black, urban poor.

Therefore, the residents of Hermanus not only choose this form of 'idealistic isolation' from other towns, but also a sense of forced separation from the residents of Zwelihle to maintain the 'village' aesthetic as well as its affluent status. Thus, the significance the residents of Hermanus hold to the nickname 'the village' would only be possible with the constant repetition of history – the forced separation of Hermanus residents from the residents of Zwelihle. However, the residents of Zwelihle and Dubai, the informal settlement created in Schulphoek, not only hold the same notion for the area of Schulphoek – i.e., the significance of its history – but also the importance of the area for their future-oriented aspirations, as this next section will examine.

Dubai

The significance of Dubai, and more importantly Schulphoek, is deeply tied to the fact that the black, urban poor were confined to this space during the Apartheid's Bantu Laws of forced segregation. "There's no way you can compare that type of significance," one Dubai resident explains, "so much of [black people's] struggle and history is part of the soil I stand on" (Ndaba, 2020). Some of the residents currently residing in Dubai explained that they had never felt

welcome in Hermanus, regardless of whether they were long-term residents of Zwelihle or had recently moved to the area. According to these residents, it was pertinent to create a space for themselves where they were not considered mere 'backyard dwellers', but a place to call home which could develop into something greater. The residents residing in Dubai are mostly inkomers, as will be discussed later, and the historical significance of Schulphoek is tied to the bornas of Zwelihle rather than the inkomers. Therefore, this area does not necessarily hold a historical significance for the residents of Dubai – instead, it holds a future-orientated significance.

I was immediately intrigued by the name 'Dubai' when I first read about it in 2019. The name is taken from the middle Eastern city and symbolises the notion of promise and futurity. Michael Jackson (1998:175) argues that the name of a place is an indicator for the place's story, and it reminds those who reside within this place of the routes taken to get there and the history attached to the landscape. This is true for Hermanus, or 'the village' as I have discussed, however in terms of Dubai the place name is not only a reminder of the residents' story and history that led them here, but also a beacon for their aspiration. It symbolises a future of prosperity, enhanced living conditions, and success – a future in complete contrast to the harsh realities they currently face. The residents of Dubai believe they hold a 'claim' to this land, stating that they fought a war to win it and that they should be able to decide what to do with it, not outside property developers. Das and Copeman (2015, pp. 6–7) writes that the act of naming and fixing an identity to something or somewhere implies a position of power. State-sanctioned renaming of areas or structures can be viewed as an act where the state exercises its sovereignty by providing a 'gift' to deprived or marginalised communities. However, when individuals create and name their own settlement, such as in the case of Dubai, the power dynamic is shifted and is no longer dependent on state-sanctioned 'gifts' to provide the marginalised community with a promise for future.

When I asked other residents from Hermanus what they thought the name 'Dubai' meant for its residents, most participants refused to call it Dubai. "It's Schulphoek," one participant exclaimed aggressively, "you don't just take a piece of land illegally and then decide you're going to give it a name and now everyone must accept it. It's Schulphoek" (van Kerwel, 2020). Another participant stated that the name 'Dubai' and the refusal of its residents to call it anything else has become an act of rebellion, especially considering that other residents and municipal leaders refuse to call it as such (Ndaba, 2020). The Overberg municipality and some residents of Hermanus view Dubai as a barrier barricading their way towards 'greater' development as well as the main contributor towards a supposed drop in property prices and tourist activities (although there is no evidence of this).

Their refusal for calling Dubai by its name – the name chosen by those who created it – is, in a sense, an attempt at hindering the normalisation of the settlement as well as the denial of their aspirations to be co-residents. The normalisation of the settlement, or at least of its name, will obstruct the morality of the development plans. Once it is universally regarded as Dubai and not merely as 'the land in Schulphoek that was illegally taken', developers will no longer be able to say they are pursuing development on a piece of land, but that they must destroy Dubai – the home of a few thousand people – to build something that will benefit the affluent members of Hermanus more. Therefore, the refusal of calling Dubai by its name is also the denial of its existence, at least, its existence as a 'real place' and not an informal, illegal settlement.

The greatest concern for the residents of Dubai is attributed to the reality that once outside developers step foot in Dubai the residents' aspirations for their space will not be considered. In chapter one I examined the example where residents were explaining to developers about their need for an area to partake in religious animal slaughtering ceremonies, and the developers' refusal as they deemed it 'disgusting'. I will not go in to this again in this chapter, but with this example and what I have thus far tried to explain throughout this chapter, I want to point to a reoccurring theme that presented itself throughout almost all of the interviews for this thesis: a contestation between keeping things as is (as we have seen in the case of Hermanus) and aspiring towards a changed future (as is the case with Dubai). In both circumstances, the differing aspirations are understandable given the areas and its residents' histories and what is viewed as important for maintaining a specific character or, ultimately, for breaking away from it.

Zwelihle, on the other hand, is bordering somewhere in the middle (both physically and metaphorically) in that the residents of Zwelihle differ on whether they want to maintain what is already there versus wanting to change it for a different future. This difference in opinion rests greatly on whether the residents are 'bornas' or amagodukas (or 'inkomers'), thus also relating to where they live in Hermanus. Before 2018, the tensions between the bornas and the inkomers were characterised by an insider-outsider dynamic. However, during the protests this dynamic had eroded and changed into a somewhat unified one – long enough for the creation of Dubai. I say somewhat, because after the protests had settled and Dubai had formed into a home for many residents, the tensions between the bornas and the inkomers started to peak again, as will be discussed in the next section, and contesting relationships between residents ensue.

The Naming of People

Bornas and Amagodukas

Zwelihle is a predominantly amaXhosa community. The residents of Zwelihle form part of an insider-outsider dynamic which rests greatly on the difference between the 'bornas' and the 'amagodukas' (Hartford, 2019). Bornas refer to the people of Zwelihe who have either lived in the area since its establishment or are part of an ancestral line of the 'first' families. Generally, bornas live in older parts of Zwelihle in houses which, although not close to the lifestyle the affluent members of Hermanus enjoy, is more comfortable than those forced to live in informal settlements. With the increase in in-migration to Zwelihle, bornas started to convert any available space on their property for the construction of informal tin houses to accommodate the amagodukas and receive a small monthly 'rent' income.

Vanessa (2020) explains that the notion and significance of 'bornas' is

> very real in all communities [i.e., Marikana, Zwelihle and Dubai] … even if you came here when you were three years old, you're not a 'borna'. The 'bornas' tend to be older families that have houses… their ancestry can be traced all the way back to the first people who lived in Zwelihle and they're more wealthy than other residents of Zwelihle.

Amagodukas, or 'inkomers' (incomers) connotes the 'newcomers' and non-permanent residents. Amagodukas translates to 'those that go home' and is typically used to describe the non-permanent residents of Zwelihle who stay in Hermanus for a short period to work. "Zwelihle is empty during the day and during December," one participant explained. "most inkomers mission to Hermanus every day to work… in December most of them go home to their families" (Ndaba, 2020). Apart from these 'seasonal residents', the term inkomers also connotes the new generation of Zwelihle, or families who have no ancestry dating back to the establishment of Zwelihle. Amongst these families, the notion of inkomers is biasedly divided amongst those from Mthatha, Elliotdale and Mganduli of the Eastern Cape against the Xhosa people who come from North of Mthatha (Hartford, 2019, p. 29). The division between these families is more of a generalisation rather than a rule but is also prevalent in terms of their cultural status, where the Xhosa people are awarded with greater acceptance.

The residents of Zwelihle attribute a higher level of value, or status, to the borna families than the inkomers. The insider-outsider dynamic in Zwelihle is also a remaining feature of the Bantu Laws of Apartheid, in which individuals were only granted the title of 'resident' if they had lived in the area for more than fifteen years without breaking any pass laws; had worked in the area for more than ten years under one employer or; if they were married to a permanent resident or had a direct relationship to the resident (such as children) (Kok *et al.*, 2003). Similarly, the 'cultural statuses' attributed to bornas can be awarded to inkomers, provided they meet one of the previous criteria. One participant from Hermanus, who works at a clinic in Zwelihle,

mentioned that she noticed this dynamic in Zwelihle when an inkomer from the Eastern Cape married a borna. Bornas are not only held to a higher cultural and social standard by the community, but they are also key when it comes to 'keeping the peace' within the community.

> Culturally, [there is] quite an important issue around whether someone is a long-term resident of Zwelihle…[the borna] who got married to [the man from the Eastern Cape] has a high level of importance in terms of leadership, and when they got married he was kind of automatically trusted by the community… the same way the community trusts her (Heslop, 2020).

The protests of 2018 were, in fact, largely not due to grievances shared by the bornas of Zwelihle. Bornas, as I have noted, live in more 'comfortable areas' of Zwelihle – or, at least, their lifestyles are more 'comfortable' as they are generally already employed and live in the houses built with the creation of Zwelihle. It was rather a group of inkomer women who approached the municipality with a letter indicating their dismay for having to pay such high rent whilst living as backyard dwellers. The municipality failed to respond, and their grievances started reaching the outer corners of Zwelihle where other inkomers decided to stand up and speak out alongside them. Their questions surrounding the municipality's failure to deliver adequate housing (as had been promised) as well as fulfil basic service delivery duties fell on deaf ears. New leaders started emerging throughout Zwelihle – inkomers – and they created a social movement dubbed 'Zwelihle Renewal' to mark their transition and fight towards a renewed Zwelihle.

The new leaders of Zwelihle, except for one, are all inkomers and proved themselves to be of great use in uniting and 'keeping the peace' in Zwelihle – a characteristic previously only attributed to the bornas of Zwelihle. These new leaders symbolised an ideological shift for the people of Zwelihle. Most of the inkomers are part of younger generations, and the new leaders utilised their youth and understanding of the South African dispensation – which has, according to them, been the greatest cause for the continuous struggle of Zwelihle – to fight an "ideological battle against an immoral municipality" (Hlathini, 2020). Hartford (2019, p.29) also noted this shift, stating:

> Where older leaders might have been more passive and prone to dialogue in their engagements with the municipality, the new guard in the young people of Zwelihle Renewal are uncompromising, educated and angry (Hartford, 2019, p. 29).

The new leaders of Zwelihle are therefore somewhat idolised by other inkomers, as well as some bornas, for kickstarting a fight that should have occurred a long time ago. Various participants alluded to the fact that any difference between bornas and inkomers were eroded during the protests, and for this period the unification of Zwelihle made the renewal of Zwelihle seem possible.

However, in the previous section I wrote that this ultimate unification only lasted during the protests and for a short while afterwards. Since the establishment of Dubai, majority of the long-term inkomers – i.e., residents of Zwelihle who have been living in Zwelihle for a long period but are still regarded as 'inkomers' – relocated to Dubai. With the lack of service delivery and constant 'pestering' of outside developers for Dubai to be demolished, a shift in dynamics between bornas and inkomers are once again prevalent. Here, a politics of housing arises between the bornas as homeowners and the inkomers as shack-dwellers, much like the politics of housing which arises between the residents of Hermanus and the 'illegal squatters' of Dubai, which will be discussed in chapter 3. The new leaders of Zwelihle, consisting mostly of inkomers, are still 'inkomers' in a sense, however they are more secure compared to other inkomers, as they generally have houses and are employed. Differences in infrastructure – with reference to housing and fixed incomes – is therefore a key feature regarding the politics of housing, and a major cause for the growing unrest between the bornas and inkomers.

Two participants I interviewed for this thesis form part of borna families, and they expressed that the overall dismay towards the majority of the inkomers rests greatly on the fact that they are causing 'unnecessary trouble' within the community:

> Now that they have Dubai they are just causing trouble for us [in Zwelihle]…I understand that they are not being treated well by the municipality, but now they are stealing power lines and fighting with [the families in Zwelihle] who no longer want to protest (Gwadiso, 2020).

However, both participants also form part of an older generation and other participants have explained that the older individuals in Zwelihle have grown content with the ill-treatment of the municipality. One participant explains:

> We know the bornas don't always agree with what is happening, but they are set in their ways. A change is coming and if they don't want to stand with us, they will stay behind. We will take care of our own, but they must not stand in the way of this change (Hlathini, 2020).

Another reason for the growing dismay against the inkomers is that some residents of Zwelihle – who lived in Mandela Square – were temporarily relocated before 2018 for the development of better housing. Their original houses in Mandela Square were situated in a flood plain and development was underway to reconstruct the area. However, with the onset of the protests in 2018 development came to a standstill and some residents are still waiting for the development to complete. These residents blame the inkomers for kickstarting the protests that not only made Zwelihle a warzone, but also hindered the development of adequate and upgraded housing. Again, here a politics of housing arises where the residents who had lost their promised housing place the blame squarely on the inkomers, which reinstates the notion

that politics surrounding infrastructure – whether in relation to relationships or housing – is key to understanding the dynamics between the residents.

Therefore, as much as there is a contestation between the residents of Hermanus and the residents of Dubai with wanting to keep things as is versus wanting to change the things for a better future respectively, the residents of Zwelihle can seldomly be found somewhere in the middle. Although majority of the newer inkomers have, over time, relocated to Dubai (and other surrounding smaller settlements) there still exists an insider-outsider dynamic within Zwelihle between the bornas and the inkomers. This dynamic is not only the result of a long history of oppressive forces and the indoctrination of becoming a 'proper resident', but also due to the distinction between those living in Zwelihle who do not want the change inkomers are demanding. Bornas, having had their place in Zwelihle for many decades, stood their ground alongside inkomers in their fight towards a future in which their urban rights for housing are more accessible.

Conclusion

The residents of Hermanus also, just as this holidaymaker, believe that the 'backyard dwellers' of Zwelihle and the informal settlers of Dubai and Marikana are flooding into the streets of Hermanus, and the residents of Hermanus want their 'space' back. Not only do they want to keep things as is, but in a way, they want to regress to the 'good old days' in which the residents of Hermanus were 'cut off' or isolated from the residents of Zwelihle. In a similar notion, the bornas of Zwelihle want their space back to the way it was before the inkomers 'caused trouble', where they lived comfortably amongst themselves in their borna community. The residents of Dubai, however, as well as all other inkomers, want to change the present in hopes for a better future. Their aspirations are future-oriented, as is evident with renaming their settlement to 'Dubai', which is in contestation to the aspirations of the residents of Hermanus who want their town to remain a 'Village' and connotes their desired aesthetics for their town. The residents of Hermanus fear the increase in 'backyard dwellers' and 'squatters' will diminish their town's aesthetic, and the intrusion of these informal settlers into the space of Hermanus is forcing a change which the residents of Dubai aspire towards, but the residents of Hermanus wish to stray away from.

This chapter has thus attempted to highlight the significance of not only the names of places, but also the names of people, to showcase the contesting aspirations found when analysing the names in relation to each other. With this, I have attempted to allude to the importance and politics of *space* in terms of aspiration, as well as how these contesting aspirations are founded on the notion of space. In addition, this chapter has also showcased how the names

of places and peoples' significance is deeply embedded in how people relate to their space and, therefore, the people within it. This level of significance is in no way objective and relies entirely on the sensory experiences of the residents residing in the areas, as well as the history attached to the names of the places and people. Without their relation to the history and space in which they are found – and thus how the residents relate to these histories and spaces – the various significances would have no meaning.

Therefore, the next chapter will delve into the politics of space with a specific focus on Hermanus, Zwelihle and Dubai, and how the notion of isolation as a characteristic for Hermanus influences the challenges residents of Zwelihle and Dubai are faced with, but more so a focus will be placed on how people relate to their space and the power dynamics this unhinges. Furthermore, a question of 'who belongs' consistently arises when unpacking a discussion in relation to the politics of space, and this question will then also form part of the next chapter.

3

Space first, then structure.

Introduction

My previous discussions on 'aesthetic governmentality' have attempted to situate the residents of Hermanus' sense of self and place as deeply embedded in the 'aesthetics' of their town. This is what Lawrence-Zuniga (2014, p. 826) describes as a process through which "aesthetic normativity [is linked] to intersubjective knowledge". Therefore, as much as the previous chapter was aimed at providing a framework for understanding the significance attributed to the names of various areas – Hermanus, Zwelihle and Dubai – the following chapter is aimed at understanding the dynamics of space within these areas and how people relate to space. Following Foucault (1982), I argue that an analysis of space is ultimately an analysis of power, one in which inequality and the power to exclude shines predominantly in Hermanus. Even though economic inequality and a failure in the development of low-cost housing is a superior driving factor for the increase in informal settlers and informal settlements, the history of the injustices of colonialism and apartheid add on to the burgeoning effects of inequality and the need to claim land (Gibson, 2008, p. 703). It is true that the need for housing and intense inequality led the inkomers of Zwelihle to kickstart the protests and lay claim to their right to housing in Schulphoek.

Now, Schulphoek is known – primarily amongst those who inhabit it – as Dubai, and thousands of individuals have not only laid claim to this space, but also actively worked to make it a home. Historically, individuals who illegally occupy a piece of land or a building are known as 'squatters', and this term carries derogatory and negative connotations. The residents of Hermanus view squatters as deviant, dirty individuals who fail to promote or maintain the 'character' of Hermanus (or 'the Village'). With these ascribed pathologies, the residents of Hermanus hold the belief that Hermanus is a clean and safe place – characteristics which the residents of Dubai threaten. Here, the residents of Hermanus lay a claim to maintaining the aesthetic of their town – one which is somewhat founded on the notion of 'purity'. However, apart from the perceptions of Hermanus residents towards the backyard dwellers of Zwelihle or the informal settlers of Dubai, the residents of Hermanus' greatest concern is the notion that these individuals are moving into their space. The residents of Hermanus' response to the expansion of informal settlements (and, therefore, the increase in illegal settlers) is grounded upon the idea that race, property, and economy are inseparable and the discourse, aesthetics, and sensory aspects of Hermanus residents all speak to the confluence of these.

The Apartheid Bantu Laws of forced segregation – where the forced removal of residents and informal settlers were implemented under the auspices of 'urban renewal' – is still prominent and easily spotted when one drives through the suburban cities of South Africa. In Cape Town, it is almost impossible to enter or leave a suburban area without noting the vast array of tin shacks bordering on both the suburb and the main road. Hermanus is not exempt from this reality, however, the original spatial structuring of the town – where most middle-class houses were built closer to the main road – works as a blanket to somewhat 'hide' the informal settlement in the background, as if it were part of a completely different area. With the land grab of Schulphoek and the creation of Dubai, it has become increasingly more difficult to 'hide' the informal settlements stretching towards the ocean. Residents of Hermanus have explained that this is damaging the 'image' and 'character' of Hermanus, but to evict these residents would require a legal justification (rather than an aesthetic one, such as in Lawrence-Zuniga's (2014) *Bungalows and Mansions: White Suburbs, Immigrant Aspirations and Aesthetic Governmentality*).

The Overstrand Municipality have tried to justify their attempts at evicting informal settlers from Dubai and destroying their tin houses by claiming the need to use the space for the Better Living Model. With Schulphoek being sold to private property developers, various stakeholders have bought pieces of land in and around Schulphoek for the construction of businesses or residential complexes. More importantly, majority of the development planned to take place is reserved for the Northern part of Schulphoek – the area currently known as Dubai – and the supposed mixed-income housing development will be built in the Southern parts. To continue with these developments, the informal settlers need to be removed from Dubai. However, while the municipality has been fighting to remove the residents of Dubai, the residents have been working at creating their own space – one in which they feel they belong.

Claudia Gastrow (2015, p. 4) notes that "the antipathy of planners" regarding areas such as informal settlements "has particular local discourses attached to it that are important in understanding what is at stake" when aspiring to evict the residents and demolish the settlements. The pathologies ascribed to the residents within informal settlements are generally also ascribed to the settlements themselves – i.e., crime, disease, disorder, poverty, etc. – but Gastrow (2015, p.4) argues that to rightfully analyse and understand the meaning of the settlements to those who inhabit it and how they relate to their space, we must not stop our analysis at these pathologies. Rather, we must understand that areas such as Dubai and Zwelihle – and Hermanus for that matter – hold within them the narratives and imaginaries of all those who inhabit them. Through an in-depth analysis of the discourse and behaviours of the residents within these areas, we can build a greater picture of how the residents relate to their space, which relations they claim, and how they construct their sense of belonging.

The notion of belonging in these areas is pertinent for this chapter's discussion on space because I argue that individuals lay a claim to their space based on where they fall on the hierarchy of belonging. This hierarchy of belonging in Hermanus was first noted by Hartford (2019) and I attempt to add on to this discussion by claiming that a residents' position on the hierarchy of belonging scale influences their ability to lay claim to their space (or others), and after they had laid claim to their space, they use structures to negotiate their space. Hermanus residents own land and/or property, and this fact puts them higher on the belonging hierarchy scale because they aid in the town's economic growth.

In addition to the hierarchy of belonging, another aspect which speaks to hierarchy is, according to David Graeber (2011, p. 53), the notion of 'obligation' in relation to debt, despite it being grounded in the morality of equal exchange. Following Graeber's (2011) approach of relationality and politics of obligation, I argue that the urban poor are claiming a relation of obligation from the municipality – 'they owe them something' – and more often than not it is turning the urban poor against the 'whiteness' of the town. This historical imagination of the municipality and state as indebted to the urban poor is not the same for the residents of Hermanus who live in their confined societies. These residents – being land or property owners – believe their transaction is complete (and there have no obligation to debt). In sum, the residents of Zwelihle and Dubai are making a claim to a relation of obligation, whereas the residents of Hermanus are denying it.

Therefore, this chapter aims to analyse the dynamics and relations of space in Hermanus, Zwelihle and Dubai whilst also placing an emphasis on how people relate to their space and how relations are claimed. This chapter will conclude with arguing that for both the residents of Hermanus and Dubai, the significance of these areas is attributed to the space first, and the structure which is developed onto the space is used as a site for negotiation, sub-culture formation and claiming relations.

Perceptions across spatial boundaries

When driving towards Hermanus on the R43 from Cape Town, the ocean sits quietly on one's right-hand side. Where the waves end, the tin shacks start and form part of a larger ocean spilling into the rest of Hermanus and the surrounding suburbs (known as Greater Hermanus). In chapter two I discussed the residents of Hermanus' aspirations towards keeping their town 'as is' (or, as always has been) and how this aspiration is supposedly threatened by the increase of backyard dwellers and 'informal settlers' in and around Hermanus. The increase in backyard dwellers initially started because of the original residents of Zwelihle (the bornas) renting out available space on their properties to 'inkomers'. Even though backyard dwellers

are technically not always legal residents, they differ from the informal settlers living in areas such as Dubai, in that they inhabit semi-permanent dwellings. The term 'squatters' or 'squatting' usually refers to individuals who illegally occupy a piece of land (or a building) as a residence for a long period of time (more than one year), however, considering the derogatory connotations associated with these terms, for the purpose of this chapter I instead use the term 'informal settlers' (except in cases where the term is used by participants). According to various residents of Hermanus who participated in the research for this thesis, informal settlers and backyard dwellers are a threat to the 'image' or character of Hermanus, and they are blamed for an alleged decrease in property investment, an increase in crime and for "chasing the tourists away" (Combrink, 2020).

There is no doubt that the residents of Dubai have dramatically increased in population size since the land grab of Schulphoek in 2018. Informal settlers, however, can shed a bright light on the persisting inequalities in South Africa. A lack of basic services and poor governance forces individuals to turn to squatting as a coping mechanism, however the act of squatting also resituates our understanding of the home as "a site of cooperation, emancipation and self-organization" (Ward, 2002, p. 101). The residents of Hermanus view informal settlers as deviants and some might argue that this is a justifiable perception, seeing as though the act of 'squatting' refers to the illegal occupation of land. For the residents of Dubai, however, squatting is an entry point towards a better means of survival (greater access to employment opportunities) as well as the beginning of a path towards the creation of subcultures and relationships.

The subcultures and relationships created within spaces where informal settlers reside are much more crucial than the relationships created within suburbs. Although the residents of Hermanus attribute some of the 'village' characteristics of their town to the sense of community and the relationships formed between the community members, every resident of Hermanus can retreat to their private space and isolate from their neighbours. The residents of Dubai share very public lifestyles with other informal settlers, and the relationships formed between these residents are a result of this sharing of space. Therefore, the residents of Dubai are in a sense *forced* to relate to each other as they do not have the 'luxury' of isolating themselves as Hermanus residents do.

Dubai was not created due to a need for the formation of new relationships, instead the latter was a result of the former. In other words, the residents of Dubai's need for housing also demanded a relationship of support between residents. Schulphoek was occupied and transformed into Dubai due to a housing crisis, and as Vasudevan (2017, p. 8) writes, housing has become an "instrument of profit-making transforming today's cities into sites of intense

displacement and inequality, exploitation and poverty". This is true for Hermanus, of course, as it is true for almost any town or city throughout South Africa. The residents of Dubai are under constant threat of eviction for (1) occupying land illegally and (2) to make way for the Better Living Model development plan.

The efforts of the municipality to remove the residents of Dubai are justified through exclaiming their need to uphold the promised development plans, maintain the village aesthetic and to protect the rights of property investors and private property owners. These 'justifications' are "used as a 'tool' or 'weapon' to perpetuate domination, accentuate inequality and support a system that is increasingly unsustainable" (Vasudevan, 2017, p. 8). The residents of Hermanus, on the other hand, hold their own assumptions of the residents of Zwelihle and Dubai. For the more affluent members of society, the terms 'squatters' and 'backyard-dwellers' automatically carry a negative connotation. The terms symbolise an in-migration of 'others', overcrowded spaces, filth, pollution and disease (Combrink, 2020; Groenewald, 2020; Meyer, 2020; Parker, 2020; River, 2020). For this to be true, however, there needs to be an existing space which is clean, safe, and hygienic, thus implying the idea that their aspired aesthetics for Hermanus is founded upon a notion of 'purity'.

The residents of Hermanus therefore – by making claims such as these – imply an idealised space which will become polluted through the growth of the informal settlements (such as Dubai) or the expansion of Zwelihle. To maintain and justify the exclusion of Dubai residents, the residents of Hermanus idealize the beauty of their space whilst vilifying the space of Zwelihle and Dubai, thus reinforcing a sense of chosen isolation. The suburban residents of Hermanus therefore tend to ascribe pathologies to the residents of Dubai, and therefore justify their exclusion based on these ascribed pathologies. Following Foucault, a discourse of space is ultimately a discourse of power. To control a space means to control who enters or leaves it, and therefore the control of a space implies the power to exclude. Here, we arrive at a question of who belongs, and although I will not attempt to find a sole answer for this question (doing so would require its own thesis), I do wish to analyse the relations between 'belonging' and 'space' in Hermanus, Zwelihle and Dubai.

Making a Space versus Owning a Space

Belonging, or the desire to belong, is not a fixed condition. "People can simultaneously belong to different groups and places, so belonging is never a coherent or autonomous experience, but a complex, multiple and often fragmented relationship" (Lahdesmaki *et al.*, 2016, p.237). Intrinsically, therefore, belonging is not fixed to a territory, which implies that the sense and need for belonging is something we negotiate throughout our lives. It is with this understanding

of belonging that I analysed the discourse of residents of Dubai, Zwelihle and Hermanus. Through the everyday negotiations of belonging our focus on this concept shifts to its micro-definitions, rather than formal definitions, such as citizenship. These micro-definitions refer to the materialities of belonging – the places, people or material objects to which the residents ascribe their sense of belonging (Lahdesmaki *et al.*, 2016).

In this instance, then, the residents can also create their own sense of belonging through the creation of something to belong to. In the case of the residents of Dubai, the entire process of protesting, land occupation and creation of Dubai shifted their idea of belonging from something pre-existing to something they created for themselves. It is also through this process of creating a space to which they belong that the residents of Dubai vehemently attempt to deny any outside developers into their space for fear of changing it. Naturally, fears of gentrification are rife amongst the residents of Dubai, but they also fear the new development would not fulfil all their needs (such as the discussion in chapter one concerning the site for slaughtering rituals). In addition, the notion of belonging then also emphasizes the social aspects of coexisting – cohabiting a space with other individuals or relating to others in a certain cultural and historical context. Therefore, the notion of belonging is person-centred, but does not necessarily imply a private feeling – instead, it includes emotions and external relations (May, 2011:3) and "it is also a political aspect and points to the norms, restrictions and regulations that enable or hinder belonging" (Lahdesmaki *et al.*, 2016).

In Simone's (2004, p. 407) essay on *People as Infrastructure*, he extends the general understanding of infrastructure (in its developmental sense, i.e., pipes, highways, etc.) to address the notion of infrastructures of relationships, stating:

> […] a specific economy of perception and collaborative practice is constituted through the capacity of individual actors to circulate across and become familiar with a broad range of spatial, residential, economic, and transactional positions.

Here, and specifically with the sense of belonging embodied by the residents of Dubai, this aspect of people as infrastructure is pertinent in relation to 'material infrastructure' where the residents are provided with a structure which could support them better than if they were not organised into a group.

When talking to participants for this thesis, the question of 'who belongs?' received a vast array of contested and fragmented answers. For the residents of Hermanus, a person's status of belonging seemed cemented once they had contributed to the town in some positive way – economically or socially – and maintained the ethos of being a 'proper resident'. A proper resident, in their terms, was someone who helped to maintain the aesthetic of Hermanus through their daily movements and social interactions. In this sense, the original residents of

Zwelihle are still seen as proper residents in that they had been contributing to the growth and maintenance of Hermanus since Zwelihle's construction. Inkomers, on the other hand, especially settlers, are not seen as proper residents. "They're not here to help us or help our town," one participant notes, "they want a free place to live and they don't care how badly they affect the rest of Hermanus" (Parker, 2020). For the residents of Dubai, however, the notion of belonging is something which they create for themselves. It is evident that majority of the residents of Hermanus want the informal settlers to be removed and relocated – they do not believe the residents of Dubai belong in Hermanus. The residents of Dubai are aware of this sentiment towards them, but while the residents of Hermanus and municipal members fight to have them evicted and removed, the residents of Dubai are continuously building a new space to which they attach a sense of belonging – be it through physical acts of constructing houses, or through the formation of social relationships between community members.

However, as Hartford (2019) discussed, a hierarchy of belonging exists in this area and he attributes it to socio-cultural-linguistic aspects. I argue that the hierarchy of belonging is instead mediated by property, indigeneity, and rebellion. The residents of Hermanus are at the top of the hierarchy scale, not because of their historical claim to Hermanus but because of their contributions to the town. When we base the hierarchy of belonging in Hermanus on the material aspects of its residents as more important than their history – i.e., 'who was there first' – the residents of Hermanus' claims to belonging are based off their property and land ownership, and in a capitalist, profit-driven environment those who can contribute to the economy of a town are regarded as more deserving of a status of belonging. This includes the residents of Hermanus who rent their property – and therefore do not own any property or land – for the fact that they have the means to afford the excruciatingly high real estate prices in Hermanus. This would, therefore, still imply that they have the means to contribute exponentially to the economy of the town. Lower, but not yet at the bottom, lay the residents of Mount Pleasant and Hawston.

Throughout this thesis, I have not yet discussed the 'coloured' areas of Hermanus (specifically Mount Pleasant and Hawston) and in the introduction to this thesis I explained that the reason for this is to only focus on the tensions between the residents of Zwelihle, Dubai, and Hermanus. Apart from this, other authors (such as Hartford, 2019) have already discussed and analysed the relationship between the residents of Mount Pleasant and those from Zwelihle. Therefore, for this thesis, I attempted to stray away from this discussion and focus on other dynamics concerning the residents of Hermanus' sentiments and reactions to the residents of Zwelihle and Dubai – especially the dynamics post-protests. However, I do feel it is pertinent here, with a discussion on belonging, to address the residents of Mount Pleasant's claim to land in Schulphoek.

So far, I have discussed the significance Schulphoek holds for the residents of Zwelihle, however, with the Apartheid Bantu laws and forced segregation, the coloured residents of Mount Pleasant and Hawston were also confined to this space and to the Schulphoek beach. Therefore, this area also holds great historical significance for these residents, but more so because these residents believe they are the original 'settlers' (Kleintjie, 2020). Of course, I do not mean to imply the same type of 'settling' we attribute to colonials, instead I am noting the fact that Hermanus originated as a fishing town and that the first fishing community came from Mount Pleasant. Residents of Mount Pleasant and Hawston do not, however, enjoy the living conditions that the residents of Hermanus do. However, majority of the residents residing in Mount Pleasant and Hawston are far better off than those residing in informal settlements across the Hermanus region. Still, the residents of Mount Pleasant's belief that the land in Schulphoek belongs to them more than to the black residents of Zwelihle is the reason why they took part in their own protests in 2018. These residents did not share the grievances of their neighbours in Zwelihle, rather their protests were based off the frustration they experienced because the residents of Zwelihle "stole the land" (Kruger, 2020). Therefore, where the residents of Hermanus lay a claim to 'belonging' based on property or land ownership, the residents of Mount Pleasant ground their sense of belonging on claims of indigeneity.

Below the residents of Mount Pleasant – on the belonging hierarchy scale – lay the residents of Zwelihle who claim their sense of belonging purely due to historical reasons (much like the residents of Mount Pleasant), however the residents of Mount Pleasant hold steadfast to their argument that Hermanus would not have existed had it not been for the coloured fishing communities which emanated from their areas and because of their ancestors. During Apartheid, some laws in the Western Cape preferred the improvement and positive focus on coloured people over that of black people, which contributes to the coloured communities' sense of belonging in Hermanus over that of the Zwelihle residents. At the very bottom of the hierarchy lies the residents of Dubai, many of whom come from neighbouring provinces and countries and have absolutely no claim to belonging in the historical sense, and even less claim to belonging in the sense of material or economic contribution.

Indeed, for the residents of Hermanus, Zwelihle and Dubai, the sense of belonging can be attributed to one aspect which embodies the materiality of belonging - space.

> The spatiality of belonging is, therefore, closely intertwined with temporality, materiality, and embodiment: space functions as a concrete frame connecting various other dimensions, aspects, and relationalities of belonging (Lahdesmaki *et al.*, 2016, p. 236-237).

Here, I want to add on to Hartford's (2019) discussion on the hierarchy of belonging by stating that the residents from each area use their sense of belonging to negotiate their claim to space, as is evident in the case of the residents of Mount Pleasant. However, the residents of Mount Pleasant's attempts at laying a claim to space in Schulphoek were fraught, and ultimately the protestors from Zwelihle won the space. The residents of Hermanus, however, being at the top of the hierarchy, claim their space for the same reason they are situated at the top of the belonging hierarchy: they can contribute towards the town's economy. With the residents of Dubai being on the bottom of the belonging hierarchy, their claims to space seem unjustified, however they are grounded on the fact that the occupation of Schulphoek is an attempt at claiming their urban rights. In addition, Dubai's existence is causing a halt to the development of the Better Living Model, therefore the residents use their newly constructed settlement to negotiate space and they also use the threat of repeating the 2018 protests to maintain their space.

As I discussed in chapter two, Dubai can be viewed as a site of rebellion, one in which the constant threats and pressures to 'leave' are only strengthening the residents' reasons to stay. Following Lefebvre (1976), Harvey (2013, p.2) agrees that those who inhabit an urban space should be those who have the right to shape and change it and argues that this is a collective right since "this transformation inevitably depends upon the exercise of a collective power to reshape the process of urbanisation". In Zwelihle, residents started an activist group in 2015 called 'Zwelihle Renewal', indicating their aspirations towards a 'renewed' space. However, their beliefs are that to renew their space, they must renew and increase the strength of their community. Therefore, just as in Dubai, the residents of Zwelihle's sense of belonging is deeply integrated with the creation and improvement of their space, and this is then used to negotiate their space. One participant noted that the improvement of their community relies greatly on "building a bigger community […] the more there are of us, the louder our voices and then no one can say they can't hear us" (Sehlabi, 2020). Therefore, the hierarchy of belonging can be summed up as thus (and in this order): the hierarchy of belonging is mediated by claims to property, indigeneity, and rebellion.

With the constant improvement and subsequent expansion of Zwelihle and Dubai the notion of 'running out of space' was a recurring concern for Hermanus residents. On the one hand, they feared the rapid urbanisation and overpopulation of Hermanus would lead to the destruction of natural resources, and on the other hand they feared the overpopulation of Dubai and Zwelihle would eventually force the residents of Hermanus out of Hermanus. However, these negative pressures are much more severe when urban planning is done poorly and urban governance is ineffectual (Tacoli, McGranahan and Satterthwaite, 2015, p. 11). The fears of environmental destruction and the resulting water and resource shortages is

not solely to blame on the increase of the growth of informal settlement, but also the lack of planning in policies and poor governance.

Poor governance and planning not only increases the risks of environmental devastation, but when the municipality or government showcases a negative response towards the urban poor problems such as overcrowding/overpopulation are inevitable. Ironically, this thesis' participants from Dubai have fervently stated that the constant lack of service delivery, ill-treatment from Hermanus residents and municipal members and continuous threat of eviction has, instead of forcing them out, encouraged them to continue developing Dubai and build stronger community relationships. This, in turn, strengthens the residents' capacity to make themselves 'visible'.

Relations claimed, relations denied

Regardless of the urban poor's attempts at showcasing their visibility, it seems evident that the residents of Hermanus still *choose* to ignore their plights. Penfold (2012, p. 994) argues that South Africa's idealistic reach for an inclusive utopia has become more of a "dystopian struggle where the past has remained very much present and many new social problems have arisen". The residents of Hermanus claimed that their sense of 'ignorance' to the struggles faced by their town's neighbours is a result of seldomly entering their space and experiencing their harsh realities. This is true and valid to a certain extent, however, instead I argue that this is a sense of wilful ignorance. In most cases, the residents of Hermanus who have never entered Zwelihle, or Dubai have done so out of choice. Their wilful ignorance is most evident through their sense and act of chosen isolation.

The residents of Hermanus hold an a priori assumption about the morality of their community members, or fellow residents. They assume that if the residents of Hermanus were to enter Zwelihle and Dubai and spend time in this space, they would try to help the residents of these areas. Their logic follows as such: if the residents of Hermanus were more aware of the harsh realities the residents of Zwelihle and Dubai face, they would help more, but because they are not aware they do not help. This tautological reasoning assumes the virtuousness of the Hermanus residents and follows Mueller's (2017) analysis of student reports in which she examined the perpetuation of colour-blindness. Instead of colour-blindness, however, here we have a case of perpetuating ignorance where, as Mueller (2017, p. 230) suggests, the tautological reasoning and virtuousness assumptions "enshrines the entire ideological apparatus that makes whites' material domination possible".

One resident of Zwelihle explained that

> it's as if there's this invisible curtain [between Hermanus and Zwelihle] and we can open it and see through it to look at [the residents of Hermanus] but they keep the curtain closed and refuse to look at us (Sehlabi, 2020).

The invisible curtain metaphor referred to by this participant carries a direct connotation to the notion of 'wilful ignorance' – the residents of Hermanus choose to keep the curtain closed. Even if the residents of Hermanus can turn a blind eye to the harsh realities faced by the residents of Zwelihle and Dubai, they can still see the spaces these residents reside in when they drive or move around areas of Hermanus. And that used to be part of the problem – residents would be able to drive past, quickly, and arrive at their homes and destinations, with Zwelihle and Dubai remaining nothing more than a far, distant memory on the peripheries of Hermanus.

However, with the expansion of Zwelihle and Dubai many informal settlers and backyard dwellers have built their homes next door to the affluent individuals of Hermanus. The informal settlers are no longer a distant reality on the periphery of Hermanus – something that could remain out of sight (and, therefore, out of mind), instead they are starting to share a space with the residents of Hermanus and (according to Hermanus residents) wreaking aesthetic havoc on the town. Even in situations where the residents of Zwelihle or informal settlements are not encroaching on the 'doorsteps' of the residents of Hermanus, it has become increasingly difficult to keep them out of sight. One resident of Hermanus who had been living in the area for over thirty years explained that he used to have a view of Schulphoek's milkwood forest seamlessly blending into the ocean behind it. "But now," he explains, "all I see is tin houses and pollution. It's a fucking eyesore, that's what it is, and the municipality is not trying hard enough to get rid of it" (van der Walt, 2020).

An informal settlement, such as Dubai, situated on the urban periphery of Hermanus reflects hardening relations of inequality in post-apartheid South Africa. It is much easier to remain wilfully ignorant when individuals are not forced to face the harsh realities of their neighbours daily. However, forced integration and 'mixed-income living' is not necessarily the answer either. The Better Living Model aims to transform Schulphoek into a mixed income living landscape and although the benefits of this seem glaringly obvious (poverty alleviation, reduced spatial segregation, gentrification etc.) the problems attached to this developmental plan are far from simple. Lefebvre (1976) argues that in order for capitalism to thrive, space needs to be transformed into something which capitalism can add value to. In the case of Dubai, the Schulphoek space is being transformed through the eviction of informal settlers and the demolition of their public, non-profitable informal houses to make way for privately-owned properties that can be bought, sold, rented out – i.e., profitable houses.

In 2020, the municipality planned the eviction of the remaining residents of Dubai to continue with the development of the Better Living Model, but the plans were halted due to the coronavirus pandemic and the South African government's lockdown response. No informal settlers were allowed to be evicted during lockdown, and by September 2020 the Overstrand Municipality received a court order halting them from removing the informal settlers even after the lockdown restrictions had eased. The municipality appealed the court order and although not much has been reported on this case, by 2021 the municipality proceeded with outlining areas of Schulphoek with barrier tape and warning signs indicating the start of the Better Living Model development process. Just as in other parts of South Africa (see Greenberg, 2004, p. 11), the clearing of land (or the removal of informal settlers) is used to allow technocratic 'efficient' use of land, however the residents who are forced to leave the area are not moved to better circumstances.

Just as in other parts of South Africa (see Penfold 998), the municipality relies on the Red Ants (a private security company) to take on the eviction process instead of public or police authorities. This is a clear-cut case where the liberalization and privatization of markets has complicated national reconstruction, as it nurtures the conditions in which inequality is perpetuated rather than eradicated. In addition, the regulation of private security companies is exceedingly difficult and various residents from Zwelihle and Dubai have reported the Red Ants for using force, firing at them with rubber bullets and, in some cases, even live ammunition. Regardless, in Dubai the Red Ants are employed to evict the informal settlers, and these removals persist only to satisfy private landowners. Here, a link between rights and markets persists and is a clear consequence of neoliberal ideology in which market fundamentalism undermines the freedom of the people to prioritise the freeing of the economy (Makhulu, 2012, p.553).

Fear and Aspiration

The character and image of Hermanus is the town's greatest resource and asset – it is what drives private property owners and tourists to the town. The village aesthetic is of cardinal importance to all Hermanus residents, municipal members, and developers. As much as the village aesthetic is founded upon the notion of 'openness' – i.e., public street markets, constant intermingling of community members, etc. – the residents of Hermanus can retreat to their private lifestyles once they no longer wish to engage with the rest of the public. In the same breath, they show a sense of disgust towards the public form of living prevalent in Zwelihle and Dubai. "They can stay behind the walls of their gated complexes," Swanepoel (2020) explains, "but they must acknowledge that they're living in Africa, and this is how it is in Africa.

We slaughter sheep, we believe in Muti, we let our dogs feed themselves and run around the streets […]".

Swanepoel believes that the lack of cultural understanding is informed by a lack of shared space and argues that South Africa's history of forced separation plays a major role. In addition, she explains that the urban poor have always been accustomed to entering the affluent members of society's space, whereas middle – and upper-class residents choose not to enter the urban poor's space, therefore correlating to my earlier discussion on wilful ignorance. On the other hand, the residents of Hermanus also feel a sense of urgency to retreat to their private living conditions with informal settlements spreading into the suburban spaces. "They're getting closer," one participant explained, "and it's only a matter of time until they flood the whole of Hermanus" (Hollier, 2021). Many authors have claimed that this process wherein the urban poor move into affluent or suburban areas is the greatest cause for the prevalence of 'white flight' after the end of Apartheid (Wilson, 1983; Frey, 2004; Crowder and South, 2008). In Hermanus, the urban poor are still mostly present on the peripheries, even if their expansion has started to reach areas closer to town.

The notion of urban poor 'chasing' white, affluent individuals of society out of a town is another reason why the municipality aims to evict informal settlers and keep the urban poor on the peripheries. Hollier (2020) explained how she and her partner sold one of their properties situated in a residential complex opposite a holiday resort in Hermanus – a property they invested in for retirement. In 2018, amidst the ongoing housing crisis, the intensification of the protests as well as the development of Mandela Square in Zwelihle (as discussed in chapter two), the municipality informed them that a temporary informal settlement would be developed on the vacant land next to the complex. "We decided to sell the property before word got out," Hollier (2020) explained. "If we hadn't, we would never have been able to sell it. No one wants to live next-door to a squatter camp".

In Sandbaai (a neighbourhood/suburban area outside of Hermanus town centre), plans have been put together to develop a new technical school, but the development has been put to a halt after residents from Sandbaai expressed their 'fears'. Their greatest concern is the notion that a school would enable residents from Zwelihle and Dubai's access to the Sandbaai suburban area. When I asked a participant from Sandbaai whether they would prefer the school be built in Zwelihle, the participant responded saying: "no, because it would be too unsafe for kids from Hermanus to travel to Zwelihle every day for school" (Groenewald, 2020). Here, a contestation of space and an aesthetic geared towards 'purity' is once again prevalent, where the suburban residents do not want their area 'infiltrated' by the urban poor, but also refuse to have their own offspring enter the urban poor's space. There is a clear confluence

here between race, property and economy, and the residents of Hermanus' discourse concerning the residents of Zwelihle and Dubai as well as they're aspired 'aesthetics' for Hermanus showcases this convergence.

The residents of Hermanus have no adverse reactions to black or coloured middle- and upper-class residents residing in or moving to Hermanus, because they are seen as 'proper' or fitting to the image of Hermanus – i.e., property owners automatically fall on top of the belonging hierarchy. Hermanus is widely known not only as a vibrant and lively tourist destination, but also a retirement town and a residence for more affluent members of South Africa. The urban poor are therefore not viewed as people who would aid towards the growth of the town or the maintaining of its image – they are not considered residents who belong to Hermanus. Therefore, as Saff (2001, p. 91) argues, exclusionary discourse should always be taken on a case-to-case basis and that

> the context of these struggles is always mediated through the self-interest that is engendered by the unequal division of space (and hence of resources) that is inherent within the capitalist land market.

When we visualise space as part of a capitalist land market, it becomes easier to understand how the competition for access and control over space and its resources creates conflict within society and therefore creates a system in which insiders (those with access to the space and its resources) have the power to exclude or deny the outsiders (those living on the periphery) (Saff, 2001, p. 102). This, Saff (2001, p.102) argues, could provide us with a possible reason as to why racial motives are not always the only driving factors towards spatial exclusion, which is evident in Hermanus where residents do not fear those who have the means to live amongst them. The residents of Hermanus' perception of black middle- and upper-class residents therefore confers Lim and Telles' (1988) discussion on the notion that 'money whitens'. The residents' disdain is rather aimed at the urban poor, specifically the residents of Dubai and the backyard dwellers of Zwelihle, who are taking over their access to space and natural resources in Schulphoek. The same explanation could be granted for the municipality in that they have made a large capital investment in Schulphoek – along with various other stakeholders and private property developers – and currently the residents of Dubai are causing a hinderance to the fulfilment of their development plans. Therefore, it becomes somewhat more understandable that the 'insiders' (the residents of Hermanus, the municipality and the various stakeholders) want to protect their resources by any means necessary, even if it means forcible evictions and the destruction of Dubai.

However, this sense of 'validating' a resident's worthiness of residing in a specific area based on their economic value holds an underlying assumption about the significance of living in the

'suburbs'. Without delving into an entire conceptual discussion on suburban areas, I argue that the residents of Hermanus view their suburban neighbourhoods as an end-goal – something which signifies success and growth. This contrasts with the residents of Dubai who view their space and neighbourhood as a starting point towards a better future. For both groups of residents, however, space comes first, and structure is used to negotiate new relations and exercise power. In the case of Dubai, the residents took over Schulphoek – a space that symbolised their aspirations towards a better future – and the creation of Dubai (building tin houses) not only marked a rebellious movement in which they constantly aim to reclaim their urban rights, but their creation now stands as that with which they negotiate their future. Various participants from Dubai have expressed their intent on rebuilding their informal houses, regardless of how many times they are evicted, until the municipality offers them a chance to express their needs and aspirations for the development of Dubai (i.e., until they are offered the opportunity to decide what becomes of their space).

Hermanus, on the other hand, acts as a status symbol for the residents residing in its space. The structures built in and around Hermanus therefore become a part of the residents' identity and sense of self and place. Through the constant complaints from the residents of Hermanus (regarding the ever-expanding informal settlements into their space) and their supposed aspirations towards keeping the town 'as is', the municipality has the 'moral backing' to continue with profit-driven development regardless of the impact on the residents of Dubai. In addition, the development also continues regardless of relationality – the residents of Zwelihle and Dubai are claiming a relation to Hermanus and to the state and their claims are inadvertently being denied through the process of development.

Conclusion

The realities of space in Hermanus are relevant across South Africa. After Apartheid, the newly elected government's rush to move towards an idealistic utopia failed to successfully create a path for the inclusion of 'outsiders' or 'those living on the outskirts', such as backyard dwellers and informal settlers. The Overstrand municipality (much like many others) has not responded well to the new freedoms of movement in public spaces. This has resulted in a continuation of spatial segregation and exclusionary discourse, especially where the residents of Hermanus believe the town's character or 'image' is threatened.

The expansion and growth of both Zwelihle and Dubai are therefore seen as an issue needing to be fixed – for the residents of Dubai, however, the act of 'squatting' is ultimately an act of claiming urban rights. Through the fight for basic requisites of life – land, shelter, access to

potable water, employment and services – informal settlers constantly negotiate their relationship with the state and the relationship between these needs (Makhulu, 2010, p. 552).

> In this sense, informal settlements define a moral space in which practices of the everyday constitute the a priori in terms of the political […] the a priori refers to a pre-disposition to resisting power in which the joy is always bound up with the (revolutionary) terror (Makhulu, 2010, p. 559).

However, what stands out most about informal settlements such as Dubai is the act of self-determination showcased by the individuals who create and inhabit these spaces. The area of Schulphoek was not ready for habitation, in fact, property developers considered the area bedrock and shared their concerns towards possible development (other concerns were about the sustainability of development). The skills and determination of the Dubai residents to turn this space into a home have transformed these barren spaces into spaces of aspiration – aspirations towards a self-determined future.

The expansion of Dubai and Zwelihle holds a mirror to the mounting inequality in South Africa, and this is correlated to the municipality's poor governance (of in-migration, the urban poor and housing backlogs) and both the municipality's as well as the residents of Hermanus' negative reactions towards the urban poor. Gastrow (2015, p. 7) makes an important conclusion in *Thinking Futures Through the Slum* when she writes that in order to develop the city we cannot disregard or ignore the negative connotations of the 'slum'. In fact, she argues that it is pertinent to analyse and look at the slum and city as one formation,

> in which political subjectivities are crafted in relation to histories, materials, aesthetics, and experiences that constantly negotiate the notion of slum as negation and slum as affirmation of belonging—that we will move closer to an architecture and urbanism that embraces the majority (Gastrow, 2015, p. 7).

Similarly, in the case of Dubai, the exclusionary discourse municipal members and residents of Hermanus use against the residents residing in Dubai (as well as the area itself) will provide no benefit whatsoever towards changing the circumstances of the residents in Dubai. Throughout this thesis I have spoken of Hermanus, Zwelihle and Dubai as if they each belonged to different spaces. Geographically, of course, this is valid, but it is only when we consider these different areas as part of the same space that we will be able to develop policies towards a more inclusive future.

The use of terms such as squatters and backyard dwellers carry their own negative connotations, as I have attempted to showcase throughout this chapter. However, for the residents of Hermanus, the greatest issue with 'squatters' and 'backyard dwellers' is that they will not be able to attribute to – or maintain – the character or 'image' of Hermanus. It is thus important to understand that through the act of giving derogatory names to the urban poor,

their exclusion from urban and suburban spaces seem justified. Even when residents of Hermanus were weary of calling the residents of Dubai or Zwelihle ‘squatters’ or ‘back yard dwellers’, the terms usually chosen were ‘the protestors’ or ‘them/they’. These terms still create an exclusionary mindset wherein the ‘we’ is separated from the ‘them’ through spatial boundaries, and the residents of Dubai and Zwelihle are not accepted into the Hermanus space.

The residents of Hermanus’ perceptions of the poor embody the notion that economics, race and property are merged into an affectual relationship. The claims made by Hermanus residents are concerned with property, and currently the residents of Zwelihle and Dubai are inadvertently causing the access to these claims to be severely limited. Therefore, the residents of Hermanus share the view that removal of Dubai and Zwelihle residents is essential for their claims to come to fruition. The municipality, on the other hand, have only showcased their profit-driven justification for removing the residents of Dubai. This capitalist, neo-liberal mentality towards profit-driven development of space and privatisation of markets leads to the perpetuation of inequality, rather than its eradication.

This chapter has thus attempted to showcase that the hierarchy of belonging might be a fictitious notion, but residents from different areas use this sense of belonging to lay a claim to their space. For each group of residents, space is first and foremost the most important and structure is used to negotiate space. In addition, it is also pertinent to understand how people relate to space, what relations they claim and how these relations are denied or accepted. The next chapter will therefore continue with this discussion on relations and aesthetics, as well as the effects of poor governance and the urban poor’s (also, in some cases, the residents of Hermanus’) retaliation against a supposed failing municipality. Throughout each chapter until now, I have attempted to hint at two factors which drive development, the importance of aesthetics, retaliation (or rebellion) and relationality (or laying a ‘claim’): fear and aspiration. Therefore, the next chapter will consider these themes to provide a narrative on how fear and aspiration can be viewed as the driving factors which influence the dynamics and discourse between the residents.

4

Contesting fears and aspirations

Introduction

The notion of ‘aspirations’ or ‘aspiring towards something’ is not an individual state of mind of feeling, rather, aspirations are formed in the interactions of social life. With this, Arjun Appadurai (2013, p. 187) argues that different groups of people from different social realities have differing aspirations, however the capacity to aspire is unevenly distributed. Those who are ‘better off’ in society have a greater capacity to aspire than do the urban poor, Appadurai writes, because they have had the opportunities to explore the realms of the “good life” (that which most people aspire towards). Therefore,

> the more privileged in any society simply have used the map of its norms to explore the future more frequently and more realistically, and to share this knowledge with one another more routinely than their poorer and weaker neighbors (Appadurai, 2013, p. 188).

However, here Appadurai argues not that the poor have no capacity to want or aspire, instead the fact that they are impoverished already implies the existence of circumstances in which their aspirations are diminished. Therefore, Appadurai argues that to change the lives of the poor means to strengthen their capacity to aspire, and the case of the 2018 protests in Hermanus is a prime example of this: the residents of Zwelihle’s mobilization and organization around a structured protest leading to the occupation of Schulphoek strengthened their aspirational capacities.

Fear, on the other hand, is a naturally occurring reaction to a threat, be it real or imagined. Just as aspirations, however, an unequal distribution of fears is persistent amongst individuals from different classes. Here, there is a difference between ‘imagined’ fears that are produced and ‘natural’ fears. Various leaders and individuals can use tactics to produce fears for various reasons – whether it be to promote a certain political agenda or ideology, or to cause a disruption in the everyday order of society. An example of this is something I came across recently, where a group called ‘Suidlanders’ – which is run and managed by old, Afrikaans farmers and ex-military – instil the imminent fear amongst Afrikaans individuals that they must always be prepared and have an ‘evacuation plan’, should the black South Africans decide to wage a war on all Afrikaners. Similarly, the residents of Hermanus’ greatest fear is the intrusion of black, urban poor individuals into their space and the supposedly subsequent loss of property. This is a typical discourse amongst white Afrikaners and is also prevalent in other discussions on the ‘Swart Gevaar’ (Black threat) and the historic tale of ‘die nag van die lang messe’ (the night of long knives). All these fears are produced and imagined – neither of them

carries any solid evidence – and form part of racist ideology amongst white Afrikaners symbolizing the 'imminent black threat'.

In contrast, natural fears are fears tied to reality, or at least are concerned with realistic fears regarding an inability to survive, i.e., being incapable to obtain nutrition or shelter. In addition, I argue that fear is tied deeply to the notion of aspirations in that individuals sometimes act out of fear of not achieving or attaining their aspirations. When residents from Zwelihle, Dubai and Hermanus fear their goals for reaching their aspirations are diminished, they act out of fear by threatening either municipal members or, in the case of Zwelihle and Dubai, both municipal members and Hermanus residents. But the fear of not achieving aspirations – just like it can be a foundation for threats from those 'on the ground' – can also be felt from the 'top', in other words municipal members also implement strategies and policies to achieve their own aspirations and still their fears, such as implementing the Better Living Model in Schulphoek.

Of course, Schulphoek now belongs to the residents of Dubai, and is therefore also used as an entry point for the residents to mark their aspirations and voice their fears. Prior to the 2018 protests, therefore, the residents of Zwelihle mobilized and organized themselves to take something that had originally been promised to them, therefore reiterating Appadurai's notion of how a strengthened urban poor community can ultimately have the same capacity to aspire as their suburban and wealthier neighbours. The residents of Dubai use their informal settlement to negotiate their space and use the threat of repeating the 2018 protests to keep their space and claim their urban rights. In Zwelihle, Dubai and Hermanus then, how people relate to space and which relations they claim are pertinent for understanding the dynamics between the residents. Following Graeber (2011, p. 47), the residents of Zwelihle and Dubai – the urban poor – make a claim to the state founded on a discourse of obligation, i.e., reiterating the state and municipality's obligation towards helping them. The residents of Hermanus – the property and landowners who can retreat to their confined space – on the other hand, view their obligations as 'completed'.

These residents aspire towards keeping their town 'as is' and ultimately also use the fact that they are land and property owners to negotiate their space and execute decisions on who does and who does not belong in it. When the growth and expansion of informal settlements reaches the suburban borders of Hermanus, the residents act out of fear by either moving out of Hermanus or by organizing their neighbourhoods and creating security watch groups to keep those who supposedly 'do not belong' out of their neighbourhoods. In the same breath, the residents of Hermanus' use of their titles as land and property owners is managed in a coercive manner, where they use the looming threat of 'fleeing' to instil a fear in the municipality. Therefore, some of the municipality's greatest fears and challenges are, in fact:

the absence of middle – to high-income property and landowners, the ever-expanding Dubai and the resulting halt of development in Schulphoek, an increase in tension between the residents from areas outside of Hermanus and those within, and a repeat of the 2018 protests.

The Overstrand municipality residing over Hermanus (among other towns) was unofficially accused of corruption and maladministration prior to the 2018 protests (although, the residents of Zwelihle, Dubai, Mount Pleasant and Hawston still reiterate these accusations). These accusations regard the sale of Schulphoek (as well as irregularities in housing waiting lists) and dismissing the poor's needs for land and housing, whilst rather siding with private property developers. In 2018, members of the municipality publicly denied these accusations and repeated the previous Western Cape Premier Helen Zille's arguments surrounding the complications of land and housing provision:

> municipalities are hamstrung by the national fiscus and, with a small tax base and high rates of in-migration to the Western Cape, they do not have the resources to provide housing that can meet the growing demand (Hartford, 2019, p. 26).

Therefore, the municipality justifies selling large pieces of land in a highly popular town such as Hermanus – land which was promised as a site for the construction of housing for the poor – by arguing that it is one of the quickest ways to increase budget funding. This can be attributed to municipalities existing under neo-liberal law, in that they are severely underfunded and forced to generate their own revenue through 'outsourcing' to private property developers.

Yet the municipality also uses the fact that issues such as housing and land shortage have been outsourced as a method to sidestep their accountability, and the urban poor are calling on the municipality to uphold their accountability (Kadirbeyoğlu and Sümer, 2012). However, as much as the municipality is supposedly 'at fault', according to the urban poor, we must not forego the affluent members of Hermanus' role in the ever-increasing grievances amongst the urban poor. Also included in this category of 'affluent members' of Hermanus are the holiday-goers who own property in this coastal town. The contrast between the properties in Hermanus' suburbs and the living conditions of Zwelihle, Dubai, Mount Pleasant, and Hawston, etc. is glaring and, quite frankly, depressing. Therefore, even though the wealthy residents of Hermanus are not being accused in the same way the municipality is, I have attempted to argue throughout the previous chapters that they have played a role in the increasingly tense dynamics between them and the residents of Zwelihle and Dubai.

However, as much as the residents of Hermanus have played a role in the residents of Zwelihle and Dubai's grievances, the residents of Zwelihle and Dubai are causing grievances for the residents of Hermanus, and at the base of all this tension and grievance-building is the municipality's lack of proper governance and mismanagement of housing lists and other

programmes. When programmes, plans and policies are developed to settle the unrest, it is done in a manner like the 'oil spot' strategy of late-Apartheid in which specific programmes and incentives were deployed to areas where rebellions were imminent. The programmes, plans and policies in Hermanus aimed at 'helping' the poor are therefore not done out of a genuine attempt at alleviating poverty and aiding in the urban poor's growth, but rather to still the fear that the 2018 protests might repeat.

This chapter will therefore consider everything this thesis has discussed thus far, as well as expand on areas I have not yet discussed, to show that not only are the fears and aspirations of all residents within Greater Hermanus competing, but also their fears are encouraged due to a lack of proper governance and a mismanagement of programmes and incentives. Ultimately, the residents are left to fend for themselves and take care of each other, and even though the municipality has in some ways aided in the growth of the town, its residents are far from content.

Flight and/or fight response

Property in Hermanus is some of the most expensive in all Western Cape, which attributes to the fact that Hermanus is regarded as a 'wealthy white town'. With real estate being almost unattainable to low-income families (unless provided to them by the state or municipality), backyard dwellings and illegal occupation of land are a few of the only ways in which low- to no-income families and individuals can manage to live in these urban areas. In addition, the real estate market is considered one of the biggest contributors to the town's economy as well as the element to which residents of Hermanus connote their sense of belonging.

Hermanus real estate has, over the years, managed to not be affected by other property market slumps which is a testament to the popularity of this town and the demand for housing developments as well as land in a land-scarce region. After the 2018 protests, however, property prices dropped detrimentally to a 30% decline in sales by 2019 (de Stadler, 2021). Ironically, most of the residents residing in Hermanus' suburban areas have attempted to justify their aspirations towards evicting the 'informal settlers' around Hermanus by arguing that the increase in informal settlers leads to crime, environmental damage and a decrease in property prices. Even when the residents of Hermanus and municipal members were unable to successfully evict the informal settlers, they maintained their idealistic isolation and separation from the informal settlers. I say this is ironic because the Municipality and Hermanus residents' acts of isolating and ignoring the informal settlers, residents of Dubai and backyard dwellers, aided in the outburst of the protests in 2018, after which the subsequent slump in the housing market took place. Therefore, it was, in fact, not the increase in in-

migration of informal settlers which led to a decrease in property prices, but the protests. Thus, the protestors removed the supposed 'invisible curtain' and limited the continuation of 'wilful ignorance' by frightening property owners and making poverty – and themselves – visible.

Nonetheless, it is important to note that there is, indeed, an increase in in-migration to the town. However, this in-migration ranges from no-income to high-income individuals and families. Although, middle- to high-income families only migrate to the town once they have secured a piece of land or a property in which they can reside, whereas low-income to no-income individuals and families tend to migrate to the town and only sort out living arrangements after the fact. These living arrangements would generally be backyard dwellings or the construction of tin shacks on available pieces of land (either in other formal settlements or bordering them). So, when the in-migration of low- to no-income families also increase, so too does the expansion of informal settlements. The presence of informal settlers was not as much of a threat and fear for the residents of Hermanus prior to 2018, however the protests resulted in a rapid expansion of informal settlements and thus influence the residents of Hermanus' flight response.

Apart from the consensus amongst Hermanus residents, private property developers and potential property investors that informal settlements are 'eyesores' (thus destroying their aspired aesthetics for the town) and damage the character of Hermanus, one participant noted that the growth of informal settlements – especially when they start to border on the suburban areas – immediately instils a sense of fear amongst residents. "As soon as shacks start piling up next to an estate," Hollier (2021) said as she explained why they sold their potential retirement home, "you see it as a warning […] you no longer feel safe to live there because crime seems imminent". Similarly, another participant was in the process of moving out of Hermanus by the time I interviewed him for this thesis. He explained that he saw "no future for white people in Hermanus. One day the shacks will take over […] this beautiful town will look like the Cape Flats and all interventions from the municipality will be a case of too little, too late" (Combrink, 2020). Here, we see how fears are produced, imagined, and exaggerated amongst the more affluent members of society.

On the other hand, residents from Zwelihle and Dubai look at the suburban houses as something to aspire towards, therefore reinforcing their need to fight for their urban rights to land and housing. Here, a contestation exists between those who supposedly 'belong the most' and their privileged position of having the opportunity to flee an area once they no longer feel safe or embody a sense of belonging, and those who 'belong the least' who have no choice but to fight for their right to stay. Underlying both situations is a sense of fear and aspiration, in that the residents of Hermanus aspire towards living in more aesthetically

pleasing and 'suitable' areas (i.e., areas which confer with their economic status) and that they fear the growth of informal settlements will cause them harm and destroy their aspirations. The residents of Zwelihle and Dubai's aspirations towards a better means of survival and claiming their urban rights is almost over-clouded by a fear of being evicted, rehomed, and displaced, therefore also destroying their aspirations. Thus, unlike the imagined and exaggerated fears of the residents of Hermanus, the fears prevalent amongst the residents of Zwelihle and Dubai are 'natural' in that they embody realistic fears concerned with survival.

The fears of an aspired 'moral development'

I have discussed the notion of 'aesthetic governmentality' (Ghertner, 2010) by pointing towards the municipality's methods of maintaining and strengthening the 'Village aesthetic' in Hermanus. The municipality reinforces this aesthetic through policies and during meetings with Hermanus residents in which they vehemently state the importance of maintaining this aesthetic for the town's survival. In this instance, there exists a confluence of interests where Hermanus residents are led to believe that the existence of their town is reliant on this aesthetic, and that the expansion of informal settlements is causing a barrier for the continuation of this aesthetic. Therefore, one of the residents of Hermanus' greatest fears is the notion that the urban poor and the expansion of informal settlements will destroy the character of Hermanus. In this case, majority of the residents of Hermanus agree that the development of the Better Living Model (and subsequently the removal of the informal settlement, Dubai) is the only way towards 'fixing' the 'issue' of informal settlers in Hermanus. However, a major reason for the municipality's dire need to continue with this plan is the fact that majority of Schulphoek land is owned by private property developers (even after the province bought the land back) and the plan involved the expansion of Hermanus' business section. With the existence of areas such as Dubai, the municipality has no way of ensuring profits off Schulphoek.

To tip the scales in their favour, the municipality has dubbed the Better Living Model as 'moral development' or 'development that is good for all', when in fact this development is more beneficial for the already wealthy. E.P. Thompson (1992, p. 144) expressed this type of morality – a morality we see all too often in capitalist and neo-liberal societies such as Hermanus – as the problematic part of the market economy argument of Adam Smith. The existence of a market economy in which almost everything has been commodified (especially land, as is the case in Hermanus) has led to leaders, policy makers and developers to adopt a type of morality which accommodates the economy, instead of accommodating the people.

When this morality is attributed to development, 'moral development' becomes profit-driven development.

However, here I want to add that although I fully agree this morality is not based off any moral values and rather economic values, I argue that this morality is also driven by fear. As we will discuss later, fear is a major reason why some of the residents of Hermanus help the residents of Zwelihle and Dubai. In terms of development, the municipality fears the flight response of Hermanus residents already prevalent with the increase of in-migration and the expansion of informal settlements. By using urban municipal land to further develop areas and neighbourhoods for middle- to high-income individuals and families not only ensures an increase in revenue, but also gives the residents of Hermanus (as well as prospective residents) a reason (and place) to stay. This, in turn, also motivates and justifies the evictions of the residents of Dubai.

On the other hand, however, the Better Living Model is also planned as a response to fear that the protests of 2018 repeat themselves – with the development of RDP and low- to no-income housing, municipal members hope to still the unrest amongst the landless people. Thus, the so-called moral development planned to take place in Schulphoek is not only formed by a profit-driven economy, but also from fears related to a decrease in property prices and a repetition of the 2018 protests. The affluent members of Hermanus, then, use the threat of 'fleeing' to inadvertently negotiate their space and influence development in Hermanus. In the same breath, the residents of Dubai, Zwelihle and other areas around Hermanus occupied by low – to no-income persons use the threat of 'repeating 2018' to negotiate their own terms and aspirations for claiming urban rights and land.

Protesting, crime and helplessness

When middle- to high-income individuals buy private property on municipal urban land (such as Schulphoek) which is home to thousands of informal settlers (even if they are informal settlers) the informal settlers are forced to relocate for the development to ensue (and the informal settlers seldomly have a choice in their relocation, echoing colonial and apartheid processes). This is a clear-cut example of the repetition of past dispossessions. In Hermanus, the wealthy residents who want to claim land hire private eviction companies (such as the Red Ants) to do the job for them. In other cases, residents of Hermanus have no reason to want to evict informal settlers – they are not infringing on the Hermanus residents' private property – but are still deemed to be a 'threat' to their space, and in these situations the residents of suburban areas mobilise and call on neighbourhood watch groups.

The neighbourhood watch groups in Hermanus are extremely popular and almost all participants for this thesis shared their appreciation and adoration for them. Kirk and Laub (2010, p. 446) define neighbourhoods as "spatial constructions that are defined ecologically, with reference to a geographic area", and state that majority of residents within a neighbourhood perceive their neighbourhood territorially. In this territorial sense, neighbourhood watch groups act as a form of social cohesion between residents of a suburban area. Jacobs (2016, p. 119), in her only discussion of analysing neighbourhoods as 'necessary', posits the notion of neighbourhoods as something which establishes mechanisms of social control and emphasizes the idea that spatial boundaries articulate a way in which we can understand social boundaries. Here, residents of a neighbourhood can negotiate determinations of 'inclusion' based on adherence to spatial norms. In a sense, then, Simone's (2004) discussion on the role of people as infrastructure in terms of surveillance and monitoring of behaviours also correlates to Jacob's discussion on the role of neighbourhoods in *maintaining* behaviours. Thus, perhaps here we can extend Simone's discussion by claiming that people are not solely infrastructures of relationships, but that they also form infrastructures of surveillance.

The watch groups are managed and maintained over WhatsApp in which residents of the neighbourhood share articles, information and offer advice. "When we see someone sketchy lurking around our houses, we share it on the group and make everyone aware so they can be vigilant" (van der Walt, 2020). This participant's explanation of the role of the WhatsApp group and the sharing of information implies an act of 'caring' amongst neighbourhood residents – an attempt at protecting each other. In this sense, a neighbourhood watch group acts as an informal organisation of people who take care of others, and echoes Heidegger's (1971, p. 349) notion of a neighbour as a 'near dweller', someone who protects and preserves their dwelling.

Therefore, the main role of these groups is to "keep the deviants out of our neighbourhoods" (Meyer (2020) explains. The term 'deviants' here is used to loosely describe black and coloured individuals from surrounding areas, mostly referring to the urban poor. Here, the policing of these individuals is usually done under the pretence of 'neighbourhood safety'. Suburbs or areas that are predominantly inhabited by either white or coloured individuals tend to foster environments in which race-based perceptions are founded on stereotypes (such as all black people are criminals) and, therefore, the "criminality or honourability of an individual or group can be determined by their skin colour" (Hartford, 2019, p.33). Therefore, the residents of Hermanus – through laying a claim to their space because of owning property – hold to the notion that they have the power to include or exclude others from their space.

The residents of Hermanus' suburbs therefore hold a high level of adoration for their neighbourhood watch groups, because they function as an organization who act upon the residents' beliefs and wishes. Their beliefs, in this sense, confers to a racial legality of crime in which the urban poor are automatically described a pathology of criminality and, therefore, when one resident shares a photo of a black individual strolling through a suburban area the neighbourhood watch group acts 'accordingly': Generally, one or two persons from the watch group will patrol the area in which the individual was seen and maintain high levels of surveillance 'just in case'. Apart from the neighbourhood watch groups, participants also explained that almost everyone in their neighbourhood has installed CCTV cameras on the outside of their homes to keep an everyday eye on the streets. One of these participants explained that "you can't trust anyone walking down your street anymore, especially if they come from a shack. If something were to happen […] at least we have them on camera" (Groenewald, 2020).

There is a consensus between residents from this neighbourhood that they are left to protect themselves and their neighbours – they form the infrastructures of surveillance out of a need to maintain their isolation and out of fear of the 'imminent danger' of black urban poor. Here, an ultimate lack of trust and faith in the police is prevalent and thus the need for informal organizations such as neighbourhood watch groups. These informal security organizations are therefore created out of a collective fear of the urban poor, and an aspiration towards a safer neighbourhood space. However, these fears are once again referring to produced and imagined fears. Comaroff and Comaroff (2016) noted this social reproduction of fear, where information circulated in 'tight-knit' groups – such as WhatsApp neighbourhood watch groups – instils and produces an imagined fear amongst those who receive it, and therefore perpetuates ideologies of exclusion of 'others'. These produced fears, however, only intensified after the onset of the 2018 protests.

The 2018 protests were largely focused on land (and, therefore, housing) and Hartford (2019, p. 38) argues that what makes land protests different than other protests is that land is "tangible, formative and symbolic". Also, unlike service delivery or political protests, disputes over land tend to draw in groups who inhabit more secure and privileged positions (even if these positions are still relatively weak to the most affluent members of society). During the 2018 protests, residents from Mount Pleasant and Hawston were upset about the fact that residents from Zwelihle occupied Schulphoek. The residents from Mount Pleasant and Hawston believed they were the ones more deserving of 'free' space, or more housing opportunities. Therefore, even though the protests were initiated by the residents of Zwelihle – those considered the urban poor – the residents from Mount Pleasant aided the police (and sometimes took part in vigilante behaviour) to halt the protests and land occupation. Here, we

can argue, land protests are vastly different from political and service delivery protests because land protests involve “a contestation of different urban interests over the same land, thus intensifying conflict” (Hartford, 2019, p. 39).

When speaking to participants from Zwelihle and Dubai about the protests, they noted how their view of ‘violent’ protests differed greatly from what the media, police and private security companies were reporting. According to my participants, protests only turn violent once the police or armed security forces start to use force – either through shooting rubber bullets, using water cannons or teargas. The media (sites such as the Village News, News 24, etc.) on the other hand, reported that the protestors initiated the protests with violent behaviours which forced the police and private security companies to protect the rest of Hermanus. Following a Durkheimian functionalist perspective, violence, and protesting as a form of crime, are considered that which ruptures the conscience collective, – the supposed ‘natural order’ of society – fosters chaos and is subsequently regarded as something needed to be punished. Not only police, therefore, were attempting to ‘contain’ the protests (and punish the criminals), as one participant recalls seeing private security companies, neighbourhood watch groups, and Mount Pleasant residents as well, saying: “There was this cloud of teargas hanging over Zwelihle and it felt like a war zone” (Swanepoel, 2020). In this sense, those who fought against the protestors claim that their fears of the protests spreading into the suburbs drove their actions, and in some way the violence they used to curb the protests is morally grounded.

When discussing colonial rule, Fanon (1967) argued that it was sustained by violence and repression and therefore only the colonisers understood its language of violence. Therefore, only when those who had been colonised, dehumanised, and marginalised use violence can they recreate themselves in an anti-colonial way and can society be restructured. Fanon called this use of violence ‘cathartic’, but repeatedly expressed the fact that even though land and power will be reclaimed, violence would not be able to gently aid the creation of new political identities. However, with this view, we can analyse the protestors as temporal agents and examine the struggles and temporal contexts instead of purely judging the act of violence. The fear they instilled (through the protests) in municipal members and other residents was not only the result of built-up frustration and hardening conditions, but also an act aimed at helping them move closer to their aspirations – the greatest of all being their aspiration towards better living conditions.

More (2011, p. 180) argues that “the importance of the land question […] is the fundamental issue of discourse about human rights precisely because it must always be related to the primary human right, namely, the right to life”. Similarly, Fanon (1967:44) argues that land is an indispensable value which gives life to humans (and, more importantly, the colonised and

marginalised groups of society from whom land has been taken). Thus, if anyone denies another access to land, they are inadvertently denying them access to life (More, 2011). In addition, land is also the primary form of capital and increases an individual's chances for attaining other aspirations and desires. The residents of Zwelihle and Dubai agree with this sentiment, and although the proposed Better Living Model has included low-cost housing for the urban poor, the housing is limited and "the waiting list is long. We have been waiting for more than ten years, we're done waiting" (Hlathini, 2020). Greyling and Oldfield (2015, p. 1103) explain that the politics of housing, and more importantly, waiting for housing is "paradoxical: citizens are marked as legitimate wards of the state," however whilst waiting for housing, living is reliant on subversion, "an agency that is sometimes visible in mobilization and protest". In this sense, residents of Dubai argue that the 2018 protests and the occupying of Schulphoek was ultimately their only way of ensuring their chance at having a place to build a home. "We all feel like the municipality failed us. They promised us housing, but we had to take care of it ourselves, and now that we're here they're all of a sudden making new plans and promises again" (Gwadiso, 2020).

The municipality envisages 'proper' residents who would come to conclusions over housing and development plans through formal consultations, however the residents of Zwelihle and Dubai are the same people who, during Apartheid as well as in post-Apartheid South Africa, have been marginalised. The continuation of poverty in these communities as well as the hardening inequality throughout South Africa puts these residents in a position where they believe "to fight for what we want is the only way we'll ever get it" (Sehlabi, 2020). When these residents then partake in protest actions to share their grievances, the protests are disregarded as their attempt to raise their voices and regain their urban rights and rather seen as acts of criminal and destructive behaviour. Therefore, similar to Watson's (2003) conclusion in her analysis of Crossroads in South Africa, the political rationalities and subjectivities that exist in areas such as Zwelihle and Dubai are vastly different from the political and social rationalities (and expectations) that exist amongst wealthier members of society.

E.P. Thompson (1971) notes how, instead of viewing 'riots' (or, in this case, protests) as spontaneous and irrational events, protestors demonstrate high levels of organization. One of the ways in which the residents of Zwelihle organized themselves prior to (and during) the protests of 2018 was through a Facebook group named 'Zwelihle Renewal', which ultimately strengthened their community's capacity to aspire (Appadurai, 2013). This group was originally created for residents of Zwelihle as a community platform for positive change and naming this group 'Zwelihle renewal' – literally implying the renewal of Zwelihle – is a form of expression for an aspiration towards change.

Zwelihle residents might not have the same type of watch groups as their suburban neighbours, but this group acted as a catalyst for expressing needs within the community in a time where they felt their needs fell on death ears. The residents of Zwelihle exclaimed that they had attempted to consult with the municipality, but to no avail. The protests of 2018 were thus their own form of 'communicating' their grievances, and following Thompson (1971, p.94), concerned a particular 'moral economy' – that which *should* be done or given to them. The right to housing is a basic, constitutional right in South Africa, and the residents of Zwelihle believe that when this is not respected, they have the right to take the land that was promised to them. In short, protests draw on new and traditional fears and aspirations, as well as demands for equality and redress, even if the demands are in contradiction to the moral assumptions of the municipality or state.

In addition, Steven Robins (2008) makes an interesting claim about the significance of the state and protestors' actions and aspirations towards claiming rights from the state. Much like in other societies, such as in Anand's (2017) analysis of Mumbai, the urban poor feel invisible to the state, therefore contrasting Foucault's (1982) conceptualisation of the state as something which forces the visibility of its subjects to keep them under surveillance. Anand (2017, p.87) explained that the urban poor mobilise and lay a claim to the 'middleman' (plumbers, for example) to acquire access to water. In the case of Zwelihle and Dubai, however, the urban poor mobilise through protests to make themselves visible and lay a claim to the state and municipality to fulfil their obligations towards providing adequate shelter and care. The post-Apartheid era marked a shift in which the state declared their promises and desires to build a 'better life for all' in exchange for the residents of South Africa's promise of peace. In this instance, and following Graeber (2011, p. 50), the urban poor especially feel a sense of relation to the state where the state's role as 'caretaker' seems prominent, albeit imagined. The urban poor thus share the consensus that the state has an obligation of taking care of them and it is this obligation and relation to the state which the urban poor claim and call upon through protesting.

With these various discussions and examples of violence, crime and protesting, I want to point here that even though these protests were concerned with land, the situation was a political crisis. By the time politicians attempted to intervene, emotions were soaring, and little could be done or said to calm the tensions on the ground. This failure of resolving issues regarding land and housing has not only mobilised communities but has also consequently led to the proliferation of land activist groups. The creation of neighbourhood watch groups – as well as the fact that suburban residents seem to trust them more than the police – also implies the notion that residents assume they must take care of themselves and each other without the aid of the municipality to survive. I argue that this belief can be linked to neo-liberal policies,

in which a reliance on welfare is a major aspect, along with the privatisation of markets and the commodification of resources. One participant echoed this statement by saying that

> The municipality are doing some things. They made some roads bigger and in Zwelihle they are rebuilding some houses that usually got flooded during the winter rains. But it's not enough. People don't trust the municipality to look after us anymore – everything seems to be a money game for them these days and if there's no money involved for them, it takes them years to do it (Heslop, 2020).

This participant's sentiments towards the municipality seems to be a general one, and while conducting my research it became evident that the municipality plays the role of antagonist in majority of my participants' stories – not only those from Zwelihle and Dubai, but from Greater Hermanus in general as well. So far, I have attempted to highlight the differing fears and aspirations for the residents from each area – i.e., Hermanus, Zwelihle and Dubai – however, it seems evident to me that the fears and aspirations are only increased due to a lack of poor governance from the municipality, themselves holding their own fears and aspirations for the town.

Programmes for the people, by the people

There is a constant debate and struggle for the residents of Hermanus who are obligated to pay a monthly stipend towards the maintenance and basic service delivery for the informal settlements and informal housing in and around Hermanus. Gronemeyer (1992, p. 65–66) makes a distinction between help as an "act of restoration" and help as a "transformative intervention". The characteristic underlying these distinctions are based on whether the person receiving help is in need, or is deemed as needy, where the former refers to a person in control of their need and help would then be a restorative act which aids them in reapproaching normality. On the other hand, help as a 'transformative intervention' only occurs when a person or group of people is judged as 'needy' by a different person, institution, official, etc. Help becomes an obligation, not a selfless act of care. Therefore, the stipend 'rule' in Hermanus is therefore seen as a 'transformative intervention', one that is obligatory for the residents of Hermanus and not a form of 'choosing to help'.

One resident from Hermanus shared his grievances towards this 'rule' and said it was on ongoing issue amongst other residents to accept it. "I don't see why I should be paying for them to live here when they can just go back to where they came from and have someone else take care of them" van der Walt (2020) explained. This stipend is obligatory and if the residents refuse to pay it, they are 'blacklisted' from buying electricity (most residents have

pre-paid electricity meters) and are incapable of loading electricity until their stipends are up to date. Van der Walt (2020) went on to explain that “property in Hermanus is ridiculously expensive. It takes a toll on your pocket if you have to take care of your own home and someone else’s illegal home”.

This is not the only situation in which the residents of Hermanus have felt *forced* to take on that which the municipality is obligated to deliver, as some residents of Hermanus kickstarted a food programme in 2019 aimed at delivering food packages to the urban poor in Zwelihle and Hermanus’ informal settlements. Those who pioneered this programme had done so out of a desire to help those in need and alleviate hunger problems in the impoverished communities. Heslop (2020) explained that herself and other restaurant owners kickstarted the feeding scheme by collecting data from impoverished areas to determine the need for such a programme. Once they had presented the data to the municipality, the municipality replied saying they had allocated roughly 4.4 million rand to the feeding scheme. However, after a month of running the food programme, all the municipality’s efforts came to a standstill, and they offered no explanation to the urban poor communities. After this, Heslop and the other members of the programme managed to collect three million rand from locals to continue the feeding scheme. After running the program for more than eleven months, the funds started to run dry and they planned on developing a community vegetable garden in Zwelihle, Dubai and other areas. Heslop attempted to contact the municipality once more wanting to present them with the data they collected whilst managing, running, and maintaining the programme. “The municipality is just disappointing,” she explained with a frustrated tone,

> it’s been almost two months, and no one has been willing to listen to me. Now, I have to tell a whole community our food packs are going to stop because the municipality has not come to the party (Heslop, 2020).

Here, Heslop (2020) explained to me that majority of the Hermanus residents who helped to donate towards the food programme did so not due to a desire to help those who need it, but rather “because they don’t want 2018 repeating itself”. In this sense, the residents of Hermanus’ sentiments mirrors that of Illich (1992, p. 96) when he explained that welfare is not a cultural hammock, but rather a risk prevention strategy and an obligation of the state. The lack of proper local governance and mismanagement of urban areas led to the outbursts of the 2018 protests and, subsequently, the need for programmes such as this. However, three years after the protests occurred the municipality has had very little impact on providing the residents of Zwelihle and Dubai with any sense of security, and the residents of Hermanus agree – to an extent – that to maintain their own aspirations for their space and Hermanus, they must help themselves.

However, even during neo-liberal policies and the general assumption in Hermanus and its surrounds that due to a lack of proper municipal leadership people must take care of themselves and each other to survive, people still mobilise and need the state. This is a foundational feature of democracy and post-Apartheid South Africa. Even in the context of the 2018 protests and the resulting existence of Dubai, as well as the way Hermanus residents negotiate space, people are still making a claim from the state. However, after the 2018 protests and the residents of Hermanus' burgeoning fear that the protests would come back to life, landowners in Hermanus are providing the poor with food and donations not because of an ethics of obligation or a desire to help, but to 'keep the peace'. However, this relates back to the municipality's lack of efficient governance and mismanagement of welfare schemes. The residents of Hermanus would not have been left with the responsibility to 'maintain the peace' had programmes such as the municipality's feeding scheme not fallen through the cracks.

In chapter one I discussed the role of the developmental state in providing 'growth', redistribution, and redress. With this ideology of development, as Greenberg (2004, p. 5) notes, material improvements are also pertinent, even though the material improvements are "provided in such a way that they support the modernization and reorganization of the national capitalist economy". In this sense, the issue of land is central to the notion of development with material improvements. In South Africa the state acts as intermediary between the market, and those who wish to enter it, by providing some assistance in entering the market. With land, the market is based off a willing seller, willing buyer dynamic, and this is partly due to the post-Apartheid attempts at ensuring those who were previously excluded from owning land can do so. Moreover, this dynamic also exists due to the refusal of state to decommodify land. However, as is evident in the case of Zwelihle and Dubai, where poverty is rife and municipal governance and assistance is weak, the urban poor (aspirational landowners) have little-to-no chance of attaining their aspirations without taking it through the process of land occupations. In a similar breath, the residents of Hermanus deploy watch groups and initiate food programmes to maintain their aspirations and still their fears.

Regardless of the development models the municipality plan to initiate to diminish their own fears of the wealthier residents fleeing the town and the inability to manage and control urban space, thus also destroying their aspirations towards maintaining the village aesthetic, the glaringly evident lack of proper governance is causing an unrest amongst all Greater Hermanus' residents. Should the municipality be unable to successfully plan and implement policies in which their responsibilities to the urban poor are equalized to that of the wealthier residents of Hermanus, the tensions and perceptions between the residents of Hermanus and those of Zwelihle and Dubai will remain. Some might find it as a case of 'too little, too late', but

should the municipality continue this train there will be no reason why history will not repeat itself.

Conclusion

South Africa's dark and gloomy history of Apartheid has, no doubt, caused the atrocious conditions of inequality still prevalent in South Africa. In addition to this, it is also important to note that the local municipalities in Cape Town are regarded as some of the best in South Africa in terms of management in organization. The Eastern Cape has had its fair share of mismanagement, and improper and poor governance. There, living conditions are increasingly volatile which encourages the residents to leave and migrate to the Western Cape – which is partially due to the Western Cape's reputation as offering better living conditions. The same can be said for harsh conditions in other countries in Africa, where individuals aspire towards a better living standard and thus flee to South Africa. With Hermanus being one of the most popular tourist destinations, the streets are filled with visitors almost all year round. There is no question as to why the urban poor would choose this town as a site for migration aimed at locating a better means of survival.

Considering this, it would not help any of the current residents of Hermanus, Zwelihle, Dubai, Mount Pleasant, or any other surrounding area to continuously dwell on the past and not look at the improper and poor governance in the contemporary. I do not mean to say we should disregard South Africa's past and deny the role it has played, instead I agree that we should take it into consideration when viewing the current situation in Hermanus. However, it was, in fact, the current municipality's mismanagement of urban space and housing lists and outright corrupt actions that led to the protests of 2018 and the current growing tension in Hermanus. Even though this exceedingly affected the residents of Zwelihle, the residents of Hermanus share their sentiments towards the municipality. The residents of Hermanus' lack of faith and trust in the municipality and police have forced them to take on the notion that they must take care of themselves, and this is a similar sentiment amongst the residents of Zwelihle and Dubai. The residents of Hermanus have mobilised and created groups such as the neighbourhood watch group to protect each other and have reluctantly aided in welfare programmes aimed at stilling the tension in Zwelihle and Dubai and hindering another round of protests.

Regardless,

Therefore, this chapter has attempted to situate the narrative on the corrupt and mismanaged actions of the municipality and state as centred on the fears and aspirations of the residents

of Hermanus, Zwelihle and Dubai. In doing so, this chapter has also attempted to emphasise the relationality and claims of obligation the residents of Dubai and Zwelihle claim from the state and municipality, as well as how the residents of Hermanus attempt to deny these claims but are nevertheless forced to 'take care' of the urban poor in instances where the municipality has failed them greatly. Still, the residents of Hermanus' greatest fear is encroachment and a subsequent loss of property – with property being that which they lay a claim to. Their fears are centred around an 'imminent danger' of black, urban poor 'taking their space' and this fear is often emphasised by municipal members as the greatest issue which could result in a destruction of the town. In addition, the municipality's lack of intervention and inability to provide the residents of Hermanus with a sense of security only aids this imagined fear. On the other hand, the residents of Dubai and Zwelihle's greatest fears are not 'imagined' or 'produced' and are rather centred around not being able to achieve their aspirations – a better means towards survival. Here, again, the municipality is solely to blame for their ill-managed housing waiting lists, corrupt actions (such as the 'under-the-table' sale of Schulphoek), mismanagement of programs aimed to help the poor, and lack of urban planning resulting in overcrowded spaces and inefficient service delivery. It is evident that even though the grievances on the ground are proliferated by growing tensions between the residents of Hermanus and those of Zwelihle and Dubai, the municipality's actions (or lack thereof) have only added fuel to the fire. From the onset of 2010 when the first sale of land in Schulphoek went through, there has been no doubt that the municipality's actions towards the residents of Greater Hermanus have been nothing short of corrupt.

Conclusion

Strategies and interventions focused on delivering adequate housing and land to the urban poor are thus only valuable, I argue, when the discourse of those who are most affected by it are taken into consideration. Without doing so, any impact of policies and interventions on the spatial equity in South Africa will be minimal. Thus, poor governance and the resulting inability to provide opportunities to proper public participation will only add to the burgeoning urban land crisis. Although some policies and plans have been adjusted to aid in the alleviation of this crisis, without protests focused on calling on the state to fulfil their obligations to the poor the poor will forever go unheard. Thus, the aspirations of those who partake in protests over land, and the discourse of the more affluent members of society in relation to the protestors are key to understanding contestations over urban space and what is needed to resolve them.

By analysing the discourse of, and dynamics between the residents of Hermanus, and those of Zwelihle and Dubai in a post-protest environment, this thesis has shown that questions regarding how residents navigate and experience development; how they relate to space and the contestations over urban space; and how they configure a sense of belonging are all deeply connected to their fears and aspirations. The Hermanus municipality have attempted to push the idea that the Better Living Model in Schulphoek should be consider 'moral development'. Utilitarian policies are concerned with the 'greater good', implying that all needs are equal, which in the case of Hermanus' ever-growing inequality gap, fails to consider the specific material needs of the poor. The implementation and development of the Better Living Model is mainly focused on maintaining the aesthetic and order in Hermanus and this aspiration of Hermanus residents and the municipality connotes the significance of the Hermanus nickname, 'the Village'. The residents of Hermanus use their status as property owners to negotiate their space, but then also to deny any relations of 'obligation' to the state, implying that their 'obligations' ended once they become property- and/or landowners. However, due to the municipality's corruption, failure of urban planning and mismanagement of housing lists and welfare programs, the residents of Hermanus are *forced* to take on initiatives to help the urban poor.

For residents of the informal settlement Dubai, the space is also an aspirational towards an improved future, and throughout Dubai and Zwelihle the relationships formed with other residents (as well as the tensions between the bornas and inkomers) is significant for our understanding of infrastructure and infrastructure of relationships. In addition, the residents of Zwelihle and Dubai use the aspect of protests to make themselves visible to the state and lay a claim to the state's indebtedness to them with regards to delivering the necessities for survival, such as adequate housing and proper service delivery.

Questions of belonging and rationality also form a major part of the residents' discourse in their discussions on contestations over urban space. The belonging hierarchy in Hermanus is mediated through property (Hermanus residents), indigeneity (residents of Mount Pleasant) and rebellion (residents of Zwelihle and Dubai), and residents use their status on the belonging hierarchy scale to lay a claim to their space, whereafter structures in their space are used to negotiate their space. Here, the residents of Hermanus' discourse concerning the residents of Zwelihle and Dubai confirm the confluence of race, economic value (class), and property as an index for 'who does and does not belong in their space'. The residents of Zwelihle and Dubai, on the other hand, use their occupation of Dubai and the threat of repeating the 2018 protests as a method for negotiating space. Fear and aspirations, I argued, therefore form the foundation of this discourse, but even more so the qualities of affect with specific regards to the competing aesthetics prevalent in this area.

Here, a contestation is evident between the 'real' and the 'imagined' fears of the residents from different areas, where the fears of the urban poor in Zwelihle and Dubai are centred around notions of 'finding a means for survival' and the fears of the middle- and upper-class residents in Hermanus are produced, concerning aspects such as the 'imminent threat of black people' moving into their space. The aspirations of the affluent are concerned with maintaining their town's aesthetic – one which the urban poor threatens – whereas the urban poor only strengthened their capacity to aspire towards better living conditions through mobilizing and organizing protests. Therefore, the critical analysis of discourse in this study is crucial for understanding these dynamics and elements in a post-protest environment such as Hermanus. This thesis has thus used discourse analysis to discuss the above-mentioned themes, as well as aid to the current knowledge of the dynamics between residents in this area by continuing with a study 'post-protest', whereas other studies (such as Hartford, 2019) ended when the protests did.

The protests are of great significance here because this research would never have happened – or, at least, I would not have found it necessary – if not for the protests of 2018. Amongst all the themes and connections this thesis made between what residents said and what it reveals about their aspirations, no narrative has yet proven to hold as much of a relationship to aspirations as protests. Here I specifically refer to protests concerning land – which South Africa has seen a dramatic increase of in the past decade – and these protests show the urban poor's ability to mobilise and call on the state to claim their urban rights.

Through these protests, the urban poor show their aspirations towards equal housing opportunities and better livelihoods – promises that were made to them with the end of Apartheid. Urban housing and the politics of property are major issues in South Africa and are

also key to post-Apartheid discourse. The discourse of Zwelihle and Dubai residents in this thesis points to their conceptualisation of protests over land as a 'battle' and the only way in which they could force a reaction out of the municipality and state. Indeed, the municipality and state's promises to deliver housing to the urban poor in Zwelihle never came to fruition, and only after the protests erupted did the municipality and province 'jump in' to find a resolution to the urban housing crisis. When the urban poor remain quiet in their settlements on the outskirts of suburbs, towns, or cities, their aspirations are not heard by others and thus grow quiet.

With the protests, the residents of Zwelihle and Dubai voiced their aspirations (and fears) towards claiming their urban rights and in doing so also initiated a broader discussion on class dynamics – i.e., how the affluent talk about, react and behave to the poor. Moreover, the land protests also make poverty visible in areas where the urban poor are still tucked away on the periphery. Therefore, the protests not only showcased the urban poor's aspirations, but also how their aspirations are often overlooked, and rather fragile strategies are implemented to keep them 'content' for the time being.

It has been 27 years since the end of Apartheid and its legacies are still prevalent, and the strategies aimed at contenting the urban poor are in no way feasible long-term solutions. Although this is greatly a result of poor governance, land protests and land occupation prove to be a way in which the urban poor can mobilise and claim urban rights in ways they were unable to under Apartheid law. Therefore, amongst everything this thesis has discussed and emphasised, the most significant of all are the aspirations underlying protests over land.

On the other hand, the discourse of Hermanus residents with regards to the urban poor have also showcased that an analysis of the dynamics between middle- and upper-class residents and the poor no longer necessarily need to solely revolve around an analysis of 'race and class'. On the contrary, I have argued that the residents of Hermanus' discourse speak to the confluence of race, class, and property. For future research concerned with the dynamics of individuals with regards to contestations over urban space, I suggest that this merger of elements be taken into consideration instead of purely laying a claim to discourse as grounded upon issues regarding race and/or class.

This thesis did not, however, go into a complete discussion on other elements I also consider crucial to the dynamics between the residents, i.e., xenophobia, questions and issues regarding sustainability and ecology, questions regarding heritage claims and the inclusion of discourse of residents from other areas. Therefore, continuing with research focused on the discourse of the residents in relation to space, development and belonging in a post-protest environment – specifically as in the case of Hermanus – could also consider these elements

to mediate a broader understanding of how people relate to their space and to contestations over urban space.

[41890 words]

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