The legitimacy of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights after the withdrawal of Rwanda, Tanzania, Benin, and Côte d’Ivoire from Article 34(6) of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights

Date
2023-12
Journal Title
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Publisher
Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University
Abstract
ENGLISH ABSTRACT : The African continent is plagued by systemic human rights violations. These violations are often perpetrated by states against marginalised communities such as ethnic, sexual and gender minorities. Victims of human rights violations must, as a principle of international law, exhaust domestic remedies before they approach international human rights courts. However, access to justice and to an appropriate remedy under domestic law is far from the norm for African victims of human rights violations. As such, it is vitally important that Africa has a strong regional human rights system. With the adoption of the African Charter on human and Peoples’ Rights and the establishment of the African Commission of Human and Peoples’ Rights (“African Commission”) and the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (“African Court”), victims have been empowered to seek redress at a regional level. However, the African Commission is not empowered to deliver binding judgments, and the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“Court Protocol”) does not afford individuals an automatic right to directly petition the African Court. Individuals may only petition the African Court directly on condition that the respondent state has made an optional declaration in terms of Article 34(6) of the Court Protocol. States have never petitioned the African Court and the African Commission has only done so on three occasions. As such, the African Court relies on the petitions of individuals to receive new applications and develop its jurisprudence. The inclusion of Article 34(6) has, thus, raised debates amongst the Justices of the African Court and academics alike, with some arguing that its inclusion poses a risk to the African Court’s legitimacy as a human rights protector. In 2016, Rwanda withdrew its optional declaration under Article 34(6), followed by Tanzania, Benin and Côte d’Ivoire, limiting potential applications to the African Court even further. This thesis assesses the legitimacy of the African Court after these withdrawals. Theoretical considerations of state sovereignty, the right of access to regional justice and the principle of complementarity underpins the research. Furthermore, the theoretical framework developed by Madsen et al. with regard to state resistance to international courts is applied to further analyse the withdrawals. Ultimately, this thesis seeks to provide an evaluation of the contemporary legitimacy of the African Court insofar as it relates to its ability to adequately fulfil its human rights protective mandate.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING : Afrika word geteister deur sistemiese menseregteskendings. Hierdie oortredings word dikwels deur state gepleeg teen gemarginaliseerde gemeenskappe soos etniese, seksuele en geslagsminderhede. Slagoffers van menseregteskendings moet, as 'n beginsel van internasionale reg, binnelandse remedies uitput voordat hulle internasionale menseregtehowe nader. Toegang tot geregtigheid en tot 'n gepaste remedie ingevolge binnelandse wetgewing is egter ver van die norm vir slagoffers van menseregteskendings in Afrika. As gevolg hiervan is dit uiters belangrik dat Afrika 'n sterk streeksmenseregtestelsel het. Met die aanvaarding van die “African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the establishment of the African Commission of Human and Peoples’ Rights” (“African Commission”) en die “African Court on Human and Peoples Rights” (“African Court”), is slagoffers bemagtig is om regstelling op streeksvlak te soek. Die “African Commission” is egter nie bemagtig om bindende uitsprake te lewer nie, en die “Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights” (“Court Protocol”) bied individue nie ’n outomatiese reg om direk die “African Court” te nader nie. Individue kan slegs direk die ‘African Court” nader op voorwaarde dat die respondent staat 'n opsionele verklaring ingevolge artikel 34(6) van die “Court Protocol” gemaak het. State het nog nooit die “African Court” versoek nie en die “African Commission” het dit net by drie geleenthede gedoen. Dus maak die “African Court” staat op die petisies van individue om nuwe aansoeke te ontvang en sy regspraak te ontwikkel. Die insluiting van Artikel 34(6) het dus debatte onder die regters van die “African Court” en akademici ontlok, met sommige wat aanvoer dat die insluiting daarvan 'n risiko inhou vir die “African Court” se legitimiteit as 'n menseregtebeskermer. In 2016 het Rwanda sy opsionele verklaring ingevolge artikel 34(6) teruggetrek, gevolg deur Tanzanië, Benin en Ivoorkus, wat potensiële aansoeke by die “African Court” selfs verder beperk. Hierdie tesis beoordeel die legitimiteit van die “African Court” na hierdie onttrekkings. Teoretiese oorwegings van staatsoewereiniteit, die reg op toegang tot streeksgeregtigheid en die beginsel van komplementariteit onderlê die navorsing. Verder is die teoretiese raamwerk ontwikkel deur Madsen et al., ten opsigte van staatsweerstand teen internasionale howe, aangewend om die onttrekkings verder te ontleed. Uiteindelik poog hierdie tesis om 'n evaluering van die hedendaagse legitimiteit van die “African Court” te verskaf in soverre dit verband hou met sy vermoë om sy menseregtebeskermingsmandaat voldoende na te kom.
Description
Thesis (LLM)--Stellenbosch University, 2023.
Keywords
Legitimacy, State Sovereignty, Access to Justice
Citation