International law in the interpretation of sections 25 and 26 of the Constitution

Date
2010-12
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Stellenbosch : University of Stellenbosch
Abstract
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The protection of human rights is one of the main aims of international law. Since the Second World War, the United Nations and various other international organs have recognised the protection of human rights in various treaties. These treaties protect citizen.s rights against possible infringement on the side of the state. South Africa was isolated from the development that occurred in international human rights law due to the system of apartheid. When South Africa became a democracy in 1994, international law had to be made part of South African law so that South Africa could once again take its place in the international community. Therefore, the Constitution of 1996 contains various sections that deal with international law and its place within the South African legal system. In particular, section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution places an obligation on courts, tribunals and forums to consider international law in interpreting the bill of rights. With regard to section 39(1)(b), this thesis questions whether the Constitutional Court fulfils its obligation when interpreting the right to property and housing in sections 25 and 26 of the Constitution respectively. Through a discussion of Constitutional Court cases on the right to property, it is discovered that the Court does not optimally use the international law sources that are available. The Court does not reflect on the status of international law sources and confuses international law with foreign law. Therefore, the sources relating to the right to property in international and regional international law are outlined. On the basis of the available sources in international law that relate to the right to property, it is argued that there is no justification for the Court not considering the relevant international law sources. With regard to the right of access to adequate housing in section 26 of the Constitution and the case law relating to the right, the Constitutional Court is more willing to consult international law to aid its interpretation of the right. This is partly attributable to fact that the right to adequate housing is a well developed right in international law. As a result, the Court refers to a wide range of international law sources when interpreting the right of access to adequate housing. However, the Court does not indicate the status of the various international law sources it uses to interpret the right to adequate housing. Therefore, it is argued that in the instances where there are relevant international law sources available to aid the interpretation of the rights to property and adequate housing, they should be considered. In the event that the Constitutional Court uses international law sources, their status within South African law and their relevance to the rights in question should be made clear. As a result, a method for the use of international law as a guide to interpretation is proposed.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die beskerming van menseregte is van groot belang in internasionale reg. Na afloop van die Tweede Wêreldoorlog het verskeie internasionale agente, met die Verenigde Nasies in die voorgrond, menseregte begin erken in verskeie internasionale konvensies. Omdat Suid-Afrika die apartheidstelsel toegepas het, was die Suid-Afrikaanse reg geïsoleerd van die ontwikkeling rakende die beskerming van menseregte in internasionale reg. Met die koms van demokrasie was Suid-Afrika genoodsaak om internasionale reg deel te maak van Suid-Afrikaanse reg om te verseker dat Suid-Afrika weer die internasionale gemeenskap kon betree. Gevolglik bevat die Grondwet van 1996 verskeie artikels wat met internasionale reg handel. In besonder plaas artikel 39(1)(b) 'n verpligting op howe, tribunale en ander forums om internasionale reg te gebruik wanneer enige reg in die handves van menseregte geïnterpreteer moet word. In hierdie tesis word daar besin oor die vraag of die Grondwetlike Hof die verpligting in terme van artikel 39(1)(b) nakom wanneer die regte tot eiendom en toegang tot geskikte behuising in artikels 25 en 26 onderskeidelik geïnterpreteer word. Na 'n bespreking van die grondwetlike sake wat verband hou met die reg tot eiendom, word die gevolgtrekking gemaak dat die Grondwetlike Hof nie die verpligting in terme van artikel 39(1)(b) konsekwent nakom nie. Die Hof verwys nie na relevante internasionale of streeks- internasionale reg nie. Verder verwar die Hof internasionale reg met buitelandse reg. In die gevalle waar die Hof wel gebruik maak van internasionale reg, word die status van dié reg in die Suid-Afrikaanse regstelsel nie duidelik uiteengesit nie. Na aanleiding van die grondwetlike sake wat verband hou met die reg van toegang tot geskikte behuising, is dit duidelik dat die Grondwetlike Hof meer gewillig is om internasionale reg in ag te neem. 'n Moontlike rede hiervoor is die feit dat die reg tot behuising goed ontwikkel is in internasionale reg. Gevolglik maak die Grondwetlike Hof geredelik van internasionale reg gebruik om artikel 26 van die Grondwet te interpreteer. Nietemin, die status van die internasionale reg bronne wat die Hof wel gebruik word nie uiteengesit nie. Daarom word daar aangevoer dat indien daar internasionale reg beskikbaar is wat relevant is tot die geskil, behoort die Grondwetlike Hof sulke reg in ag te neem. Indien die Hof wel internasionale reg gebruik om die regte tot eiendom en toegang tot geskikte behuising te interpreteer, moet die status van die bronne uiteengesit word. Daarom word daar ook in die tesis 'n voorstel voorgelê hoe howe te werk moet gaan indien internasionale reg bronne geraadpleeg word.
Description
Thesis (LLM (Public Law))--University of Stellenbosch, 2011.
Bibliography
Keywords
Bill of Rights, Theses -- Law, Dissertations -- Law
Citation