Doctoral Degrees (Philosophy)
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Browsing Doctoral Degrees (Philosophy) by browse.metadata.advisor "Cilliers, P."
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- ItemAbortion, sentience and moral standing : a neurophilosophical appraisal(Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2002-12) Van Bogaert, Louis-Jacques; Cilliers, P.; Stellenbosch University. Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences. Dept. of Philosophy.ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Moral theories on abortion are often regarded as mutually exclusive. On the one hand, pro-life advocates maintain that abortion is always morally wrong, for life is sacred from its very beginning. On the other hand, the extreme liberal view advocated by the absolute pro-ehoieers claims that the unborn is not a person and has no moral standing. On this view there is no conflict of rights; women have the right to dispose of their body as they wish. Therefore, killing a non-person is always permissible. In between the two extreme views, some moral philosophers argue that a 'pre-sentient' embryo or fetus cannot be harmed because it lacks the ability to feel pain or pleasure, for it is 'sentience' that endows a living entity (human and non-human) with moral considerability. Therefore, abortion of a pre-sentient embryo or fetus is permissible. Neurophilosophy rests a philosophical conclusion on neurological premises. In other words, to be tenable sentientism - the claim that sentience endows an entity with moral standing - needs robust neurobiological evidence. The question is, then: What is the basic neuroanatomical and neurophysiological apparatus required to be sentient? The answer to that question requires a fair understanding of the evolution, anatomy and function of the brain. The exploration thereof shows quite convincingly that the advocates of sentientism do not provide convincing arguments to root their theory in neurobiological facts. Their claims rest rather on emotions and on behaviours that look like a reaction to pain. The other shortcoming of sentientism is that it fails to distinguish pain from suffering, and that as a utilitarian moral theory it considers only the alleged pain of the aborted sentient fetus and disregards the pregnant woman's pain and suffering. And, finally, sentientism leaves out of our moral consideration living and non-living entities that deserve moral respect. The main thrust of the dissertation is that the argument of sentience as its advocates present it has no neurophilosophical grounds. Therefore, the argument from sentience is not a convincing argument in favour or against abortion.