

**A DECADE OF DEMOCRACY: COMPARING TRENDS IN SUPPORT FOR
DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AFRICA AND BRAZIL SINCE DEMOCRATIC
TRANSITION**

By:

Lucy Corkin

Thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of Master of Arts
at the University of Stellenbosch.




Supervisor: Professor Hennie Kotzé
Co-supervisor: Helen Macdonald

Department of Political Science
Stellenbosch University
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DECLARATION

I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this thesis is my own original work and that I have not in its entirety or in part previously submitted it at any university for a degree.

Signed.....



Date.....

ABSTRACT

Brazil and South Africa were both part of the global “third-wave” of democracy, the beginnings of their democratic transitions occurring in 1985 and 1994 respectively. Despite having been formerly subjected to decades of authoritarian rule, both countries experienced a modicum of democratic practice, however limited in franchise, under the previous regimes.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the levels of support for democracy in Brazil and South Africa since democratic transition. Two types of political support are identified as crucial for democratic sustainability: diffuse support, or support for democracy’s intrinsic principles, and specific support, support which is conditional on the positive evaluation of the regime institutions and incumbents. These two types of political support are conceptualized as encompassing five levels or objects of political support, according to the Norris model: the political community, regime principles, regime performance (diffuse support), regime institutions and political actors (specific support).

This study proposes that because vestiges of democratic norms and practices have been present within these countries’ political systems for some time, it is possible that they will manifest trends in support similar to much older, more established democracies. These global trends indicate that diffuse support for democracy is being maintained while specific support for democracy is waning.

A longitudinal quantitative study was conducted, using consecutive waves of World Values Survey to operationalize support for democracy in terms of the five abovementioned political objects and the results of South Africa and Brazil compared. These results show that both case studies could be interpreted as having fairly high levels of diffuse support and decreasing levels of specific support for democracy. It is however acknowledged that results are not conclusive and further research is required, especially with respect to how respondents conceptualize the term ‘democracy’.

OPSOMMING

Brasilië en Suid-Afrika was albei deel van die globale “derde golf” van demokrasie, met die aanvang van hulle oorgang na demokrasie onderskeidelik in 1985 en 1994. Ten spyte daarvan dat hierdie twee lande voormalig aan dekades van outoritêre gesag onderwerp is, het albei, hoewel beperk in stemreg, ’n mate van demokratiese praktyk onder ’n vorige bestel ervaar.

Die doel van hierdie studie is om die steunvlakke vir demokrasie in Brasilië en Suid-Afrika sedert hulle oorgang na demokrasie te ondersoek. Twee soorte politieke steun word geïdentifiseer as deurslaggewend vir demokratiese volhoubaarheid: verspreide steun – of steun vir die intrinsieke beginsels van demokrasie – en spesifieke steun – steun wat van die positiewe evaluering van die regime se instellings en ampsbekleders afhang. Hierdie twee soorte politieke steun word deur vyf konsepte voorgestel wat die vyf vlakke of voorwerpe van politieke steun volgens die Norris-model dek: die politieke gemeenskap, regimebeginsels, regimeprestasie (verspreide steun), regime-instellings en politieke akteurs (spesifieke steun).

Hierdie studie stel voor dat, aangesien spore van demokratiese norme en praktyke vir ’n geruime tyd binne hierdie lande se politieke stelsels teenwoordig was, dit moontlik is dat hulle steuntendense sal toon wat aan baie ouer, meer gevestigde demokrasieë soortgelyk is. Hierdie globale tendense toon dat verspreide steun vir demokrasie gehandhaaf word terwyl spesifieke steun vir demokrasie aan die kwyn is.


’n Longitudinale kwantitatiewe studie is onderneem wat van opeenvolgende siklusse van die “World Values Survey” gebruik maak om steun vir demokrasie in terme van die vyf bogenoemde politieke voorwerpe uit te beeld. Die resultate van Suid-Afrika en Brasilië is daarna vergelyk. Uit hierdie resultate sou afgelei kon word dat redelik hoë vlakke van verspreide steun en dalende vlakke van spesifieke steun vir demokrasie in beide gevalle voorkom. Daar word egter erken dat resultate nie beslissend is nie en dat verdere navorsing nodig is, in besonder met betrekking tot respondente se begrip van die term ‘demokrasie’.

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Thanks to my parents, Richard and Lynn Corkin, for all their boundless love, encouragement and weekly phone calls. There is very little to which I don't owe all to them.

Lastly, I thank God, for helping to me learn that perseverance is a virtue. With His will there is a way.

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to the memories of my grandmothers, Liz Corkin, the original exuberant and eccentric Irishwoman, and Dorothy Heslop, the perfect lady with the sharpest wit. They were dearly loved. I am lucky enough that part of both of them lives on in me.



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Chapter One : Introduction and Outline

1.1 Introduction

The third-wave¹ of democracy has swept the world (Huntington, 1996). Following the fall of the Berlin Wall in the East and several authoritarian or military regimes in the South, such as those of South Africa and Brazil, the argument for the “End of History” (Huntington, 1993:23; Dalton, 2002:235) seems to become ever more robust. The post-conflict institution of “free and fair” elections, the universally recognized symbol of political liberalization, is increasingly seen, not as a means to an end (i.e. the establishment of democracy), but simply as an end in itself. Without help in the consolidation of democratic political norms, however, this situation can be described as what Bratton (2002:14)² terms: “the *fallacy of electoralism*, namely the danger that a formal façade of multi-party contests will mask a persistent atmosphere of human rights violations”.

The misperceptions alluded to above are arguably symptomatic of the way that the West has come to see democracy. Consequently this is the way it is propagated to the masses of the world, particularly in developing countries. Inherent in this conception of democracy are two assumptions. The first is that democracy is assumed to be firmly established following the holding of national elections, and the second is that democracy promises “a better life for all”³.

The populations of many Third-world countries, engaged in struggles for political freedom, are thus often wrongly led by their liberators to believe that democracy and elections will be a panacea for all the social evils suffered under an oppressive regime

¹ As our study encompasses both an African country and a Latin American country, it must be noted that the “Third wave” in fact refers to African democratization, whereas the “Second-wave” took place in Latin America. Nevertheless, Brazil’s re-democratization in 1985 is also considered part of the third wave (Fuchs & Klingeman, 1995:3; Huntington, 1996).

² Bratton (2002:14) also suggests that there is a *fallacy of liberalisation*, implying that it is possible that many citizens of neo-democracies believe that, with the institution of freedom of speech, the battle has been won. This mirrors the misperception of many aid organisations that fail to realise that democratisation is an ongoing, long-term political process. See below for further discussion.

³ This is a slogan which the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa has used in all three national elections (1994, 1999, 2004) to great effect.

(Gasiorowski, 1997:266; Bresser Pereira, 1990:199; Przeworski, 1995:41). It is not explained that these are merely tools which will eventually enable the gradual improvement of socio-economic circumstances through the institution of a more accountable government (Marx, 1998:272). It is thus small wonder that public opinion in many newly democratic countries remains sceptical about such political transformation (Diamond *et al.*, 1999:41). Compounding the problem is that fact that a democratic government, unlike an authoritarian regime, needs the support of the people to maintain its legitimacy and is thus more susceptible to “populist demands and critiques” (Emmett, 2000:510). Political legitimacy is absolutely dependent on popular support⁴ (Bratton & Mattes, 2000b).

Inglehart (1990:17) also points out that a stable and thus effective democracy does not depend on democratic institutions alone. It requires a political culture conducive to democracy, implying the socialization of democracy. It is by definition almost impossible for fledgling democracies to have a deeply engrained democratic political culture⁵ (Bratton & Mattes, 2000b). Should a gulf open between state and society in a country with a history of political violence, which according to Emmett (2000:515) is not uncommon after elections, those who do not believe that they can rely on the government will resort to violence, believing it to be their only recourse (Emmett, 2000:511).

Indeed, quite apart from the masses’ understanding of democracy, political scientists themselves have not come far in reaching consensus regarding the definition of democracy. It seems that the more research that is done in this regard, the more complex the task becomes (Elgström, 2002:1; Parry & Moran, 1994a:10; Inoguchi *et al.*, 1998:1; Edwards, 1994:90; Cammack, 1994:176). The only points of agreement are that democracy is indeed a multidimensional concept (Norris, 1999a:1; Thomassen,

⁴ This idea will be developed in Chapter Two, the theoretical framework.

⁵ This study will examine two exceptions to this rule. Brazil, which has been under military rule since 1964, has always maintained a semblance of democratic practice, however deeply distorted (Lamounier, 1999:165). Similarly, it has been argued that South Africa never abandoned pluralist politics completely (Friedman, 1995:531). This line of argument will be incorporated into our main proposition, see below.

1995:349) and that it is a variable⁶ and a process. Democracies will vary with time along a continuum, rendering comparative studies eminently appropriate (Dalton, 1988:127).

Ironically, true democracy can never be achieved (Parry & Moran, 1994a:3; Wokler, 1994:21; Schmitter, 1998:23). It is merely a political ideal. Embarking upon the process of democratization thus introduces a great deal of uncertainty into the political equation. This is the case not least because regime change and democratic institutional reform, both inherently destabilizing processes, are part of the democratization process (Schmitter, 1998:29). This is known as the transitional phase; thus the Brazilian *abertura*⁷ and the South African dismantling of apartheid marked the beginning of democratic transition for both of these countries.

Unfortunately, very often the introduction of democratic norms and institutional transformation during the transition is not the end of the process. Indeed, Schmitter (1998:27) claims that the conditions which render the end of authoritarianism possible are not necessarily equally conducive to democracy's 'taking hold'. Przeworski (1995:2) alludes to the fact that the weakness of the authoritarian centre may give rise to separatist movements within multinational states, which include most developing countries. Furthermore, democratic transition is a very unstable period that cannot be endured indefinitely by the political elite or the masses⁸.

It is not, however, the democratic transition which gives politicians the biggest headache. It is what is known as the consolidation of democracy (Randall & Theobald, 1998:40). This is the case because without such consolidation a reversal of the entire democratic process commonly occurs (Broderick, 2000:1). Schmitter (1998:24-27) describes democratic consolidation as the firm establishment of a set of institutions that engenders

⁶ The Freedom House rankings can be used to attest this. See www.freedomhouse.org

⁷ "*Abertura*" literally "the opening" in Portuguese, is the term used to refer to the gradual process of reforms initiated by the Brazilian military government in 1974 under President Geisel in preparation for re-democratization.

⁸ A manifestation of this social unrest is the significantly increased crime levels observed during the time of democratic transition in both South Africa and Brazil (Landman, 2003).

trust and reassurance, allowing the uncertainties of democracy to be ‘normalized’⁹. Essentially the processes and principles of democracy must be accepted by both the politicians and the masses. Most importantly, it must be agreed that future conflict will be resolved within the framework set out by this set of institutions, which Linz & Stepan (1998:49-50) describe as “the only game in town”. Of course, there is no set point at which this state of consolidation is reached. Even mature democracies are required to adapt and change in order to survive (Fuchs & Klingeman, 1995:438). It is, however, generally accepted that the longer democratic norms exist, the longer they will persist¹⁰ (Schmitter, 1998:33).

Neo-democracies, or democracies which have only recently undergone transformation, are thus arguably much more vulnerable to regime retrogression than those which have prevailed for decades. As many countries party to “Third-wave democratization” find themselves in this precarious situation, it is argued that democracy in the developing world should be explored in more depth in order to understand their vulnerabilities. Two case studies have been selected whose democratic regimes are not more than 15 years old. The first is Brazil, whose democratic transition is recognised as beginning in 1985 (Sansone, 2003:25; Faro de Castro & Valladão de Carvalho, 2003:471). The second is South Africa, whose first democratic elections were held in 1994.

1.2 Two Comparable Countries: South Africa and Brazil

The choice of these two states for comparison¹¹ is appropriate firstly because remarkable similarities are discernable in their political histories. Both countries were under extremely oppressive authoritarian regimes for most of the 20th century. Following a term of military rule from 1889 to 1894 and the personal dictatorship of General Getulio Dornelles Vargas (1930-1954), which preceded ten years of inept civilian rule, a military coup once again placed Brazil under military control for over twenty years, from 1964

⁹ Laïdi (2002:76) describes this process as balancing the uncertainties inherent in procedural democracy with the certainties inherent in the institutionalization of democratic behaviour and norms.


¹⁰ Doh & McDonough’s (1999) case study of Korea supports this as, with the passage of time, the democratic regime garnered more support. Considering the nature of democracy, an increase in support for democracy is assumed to contribute to its continuation. Chapter Two will elaborate on this.

¹¹ The World Values Survey will be used to enable quantitative comparison. The methodology, both of the survey in question and its use in this study, will be described below.

until 1985 (Marx, 1998:169-172). South Africa, similarly, was governed by the infamous apartheid regime of the National Party from 1948 until the democratic elections of 1994. It is also widely recognized that both democratic transitions were elite pacts negotiated between the incumbent regime and organized opposition¹² (Schmitter, quoted in Friedman & De Villiers, 1996:12).

It is acknowledged that the political unrest characteristic of South Africa's history was not present in Brazil¹³. Nevertheless, the demographic similarities between these two countries and the socio-economic problems which they share continue to give their respective governments the most cause for concern. Competing with each other for the dubious honour of possessing the highest levels of inequality in the world¹⁴, socio-economic standing and class distinctions are similarly superimposed over racial categorization in both countries (Schmitter, quoted in Friedman & De Villiers, 1996:5). This is often due to deliberate state policies, although the nature of these policies has varied¹⁵.

Despite these considerable socio-economic obstacles, South Africa and Brazil remain the most influential states in their geographical areas. They are both considered regional



¹² Many deny that these transitions can be called pacts, considering the official inequality of status of the bargaining partners (Schmitter, quoted in Friedman & De Villiers, 1996:13). It is argued here that, while the opposition may not have possessed officially recognised status equivalent to that of the state government, it possessed enough legitimacy through the support of the population to warrant sufficient respect from the ruling regime for that regime to concede to negotiation (Gillespie, 1990:54; Friedman, 1996:48).

¹³ Indeed the former's comparatively bloodless political past is hailed as a national triumph, see Marx, 1998.

¹⁴ According to the World Development Report (2003), South Africa's Gini coefficient stood at 0.593 and Brazil's at 0.607. In the same report, it came to light that in the mid- to late 1990s in both Brazil and South Africa, 11.5 % of the population survived on \$1 a day or less. (See http://www.ssc.uwo.ca/economics/grad/626a-001/324_626inequalityoverheadsNov03.pdf)

¹⁵ South Africa legalized racism through apartheid and the imposition of the colour bar. The Brazilian government created a state ideology of non-racism, refusing to recognize race, despite the inherent prejudices suffered by blacks. As a result, the constructed social desirability to be white imposed the same barriers to social mobility for blacks in Brazil as it did in apartheid South Africa, as the Brazilian state afforded blacks no protection and led them to believe that they needed none. (For more in-depth discussion see Sansone, 2003). James and Lever (2001:29) dispute the fact that race and class lines converge so neatly in either country. While these cleavages have admittedly softened in the post-democratisation period, they are still considered to be a grave socio-economic problem.

hegemony because of their political importance and economic clout (*Business Day*, 10/03/04).

A second reason for the choice of the two countries in question is that both, in terms of democracy, have reached a turning point in their political progression. South Africa recently celebrated a decade of democracy. This is lauded as a significant achievement in view of its non-democratic legacy, as well as a poignant moment for reflection. In the same year, 2004, it held its third national democratic elections, signifying the African National Congress's (ANC) third consecutive term in power and President Mbeki's second and final term of office. This notwithstanding, and despite the ANC government's commendable efforts to address delivery of basic services to the most under-privileged sectors of South African society, the government has been criticised for its poor service delivery record (*Cape Times Business Report*, 2/03/04; *Mail & Guardian*, 17-23/10/03). Exploring the levels of support for democracy in South Africa after ten years of majority rule would thus be highly appropriate.

Brazil, on the other hand, while soon to celebrate 15 years of freedom from direct military rule, experienced a remarkable development in the national elections in 2003. Luíz Inácio ("Lula") da Silva of the Partido de Trabalhadores¹⁶ (PT) was voted in as president, marking the first ever election of a citizen of working-class background to such a prominent political position in Brazil. Despite the democratic transition, politics had remained the realm of the social elite in Brazil (*Mail & Guardian*, 9-15/01/04; Roett, 1999:18, McDonough, 1981). Given the neo-liberal nature of former president Fernando Henrique Cardoso's economic reforms, Lula's election has been seen by many as a public reaction to the jobless growth now experienced in Brazil and a call for state policy direction to change (*Mail & Guardian*, 2/03/2004). Although the absence of the required data¹⁷ prevents the study from encompassing the most recent developments in Brazilian

¹⁶ The Workers' or Labour Party.

¹⁷ While Brazil was incorporated into the 1990 and 1995 waves of the World Values Survey, to be used in secondary data analysis in this study, it was not included in the most recent (2001) wave, which means that analysis cannot extend beyond 1995.

politics, evidence of such dramatic developments suggests a need to examine events leading up to Lula's election.

A third reason for a comparative study, from a slightly different angle, is that Brazil and South Africa have for a number of years been fostering closer relations with each other. Both have as an integral part of their foreign policies the intention of increasing their international profiles. They have been heavily engaged in multilateral negotiations, most notably as intermediaries for North-South dialogue¹⁸ (*Business Day*, 15/12/03). The latest development in this regard has been the controversial alliance between Brazil, South Africa and India (IBSA¹⁹) (*Business Day*, 11/11/03). Comparison of two of these countries, in terms of democracy, is thus appropriate, considering the prominence their international profiles will accord them and the importance placed by the international community on democracy.

It is arguable that the incongruity of comparing two countries over disparate time periods, albeit using the same survey (World Values Survey) throughout, detracts from the quality of the comparison. This argument may be settled by two considerations. Firstly, although the time-spans are slightly different, the event marking the beginning of the respective periods to be compared is remarkably similar, as has been mentioned above, and the actual difference in years is not too great. Secondly, due to the oppressive nature of the previous regimes in both countries, these states were systemically ostracized globally (Cloete, 1990:29; Friedman & De Villiers, 1996:36; Roett, 1999:123; Hurrell, 1996²⁰). For this reason and the fact that both regimes were intensely growth orientated, both followed policies of import substitution to attain relative autarky (Friedman & De Villiers, 1996:263; Fredrickson, 2001:16-21). It can thus be argued that, while it is impossible to be completely immune to global phenomena, the relative de-linking that occurred prior to democratic transition lessened the impact any such phenomena might

¹⁸ An example here is the WTO Cancun rounds, Brazil's support and leadership of the developing countries and South Africa's rhetoric (*Business Day*, 31/03/04).

¹⁹ The IBSA partnership's anagram literally stands for **I**ndia, **B**razil and **S**outh **A**frica

²⁰ Hurrell (1996) in fact makes a strong case for the fact that Brazil experienced remarkably little foreign interference in her domestic politics, despite her geographic proximity to the United States of America.

have had²¹. In any event, the nature of the global system is to affect similarly those states grouped together collectively as “the developing world”²².

A further potential criticism of this study would question the claim that a “decade of democracy” is going to be analysed. South Africa has barely experienced ten years of democratic rule, ruling out the possibility of analysis of this period on the basis of the World Values Survey, as this survey has not to date covered ten years of South African democratic rule in its survey waves. On the other hand, Brazil, having undergone *abertura* in 1985, is well on its way to a second decade of democratic government. Several arguments are offered to qualify claims made by this study.

Despite the formal recognition of democratic transition in a given year, it is widely accepted that democracy is a process, and by virtue of this it is itself a variable (Kaase & Newton, 1995:127). With this as a point of departure, many South African analysts regard 1990 as the beginning of democratic transition, with the release of Nelson Mandela and many other prominent political prisoners in February of that year and the capitulation of the apartheid government that this act implied (Cloete, 1990:29; Schlemmer, 1991:2; Rhoodie, 1991:510). The spirit of the four years leading up to the 1994 elections was one of compromise and willingness to negotiate. The fact that bitter political enemies were able to come to an agreement on South Africa’s future over the negotiating table undermines the accusation that South African society was starkly polarised (Friedman, 1995:547). The attitudes of the South African mass public that were measured by the 1995 and 2001 World Value Survey waves have thus been influenced by the inevitability of impending universal franchise and majority democracy since 1990. Furthermore, following the 1994 elections for the government of national unity and the second of national elections in 1999, these survey waves (1995 and 2001) were neatly able to record two sets of attitudes towards democratic support which had had approximately one year of incubation each.

²¹ Whitehead (1996:408) also offers the interesting argument that ostracizing of a state leads to the perpetuation of the behaviour which led to the pariah status in the first place.

²² This was still certainly so in the build up to the collapse of the Soviet Union as both the USSR and USA wished to expand their ‘spheres of influence’. In latter days, however, foreign investors tend literally to treat emerging markets, regardless of geo-strategic position as a single bloc.

Brazil, in contradistinction, has arguably not experienced open democracy for as long as officially claimed, although this would not appear to be the case. Indeed, motions for democratic reform were initiated under President Ernesto Geisel in the mid-1970s (Lamounier, 1999:133). As in the South African case, the transition was essentially an elite pact, hammered out between two parties formed under new legislation: the Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro²³ (PMDB) under Ulysses Guimarães, and the Partido Democrático Social²⁴ (PDS), the party of the military government. Some commentators, such as Roett (1999), would thus argue that this was merely a continuation of the patrimonial politics so characteristic of Brazil. The death of Tancredo Neves of the PMDB, the president-elect on the eve of his inauguration, was nevertheless a terrible blow to the Brazilian democratic process and it very nearly unravelled completely²⁵. The fact that José Sarney, the government party's successful candidate for deputy-president elect, had to be sworn in subsequently as the chief executive officer, despite the fact that the deputy president is elected on a separated ticket, *and* had to switch party loyalty, did not sit well with either party. Neither trusted or respected him, and democratic reform was effectively halted (Martinez-Lara, 1996:51-52).

To further cast doubt on the authenticity of Brazil's democratic transition, which was supposed to have occurred as early as 1985, is the fact that universal franchise as it is recognised today was extended to the Brazilian population only in 1988/9, during the gubernatorial elections of that year²⁶. Whereas all literate people were obligated to vote, illiterates were for the first time given the option of doing so²⁷. According to Lamounier

²³ Previously Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (MDB).

²⁴ Previously Aliança Renovadora Nacional (ARENA).

²⁵ Neves's death would arguably have been tantamount to Nelson Mandela's death on the eve of the 1994 presidential inauguration. Martinez-Lara (1996:49) particularly emphasizes the importance not only of Neves's personal leadership and moderate stance for internal balance within the newly formed government, but also of the fact that he had concluded many secret conciliatory deals with prominent government party members to ease the transition, all of which were of course unknown and thus not honoured by his successor.

²⁶ Roett (1999:26) maintains that this move on the part of the still authoritarian government was not undertaken in good faith as no voter education was provided, thus the electoral process was flooded with millions of uninformed, easily influenced potential voters.

²⁷ Brazil was the last country in South America to remove the literacy prerequisite from voting franchise (Friedman & De Villiers, 1996:30).

(quoted in Friedman & De Villiers, 1996:31), only 22% of the Brazilian population was literate in 1985, thus seriously undermining the legitimacy of this “democratic” election. In an ironic comparison, a higher percentage of the South African population was able to vote during the era of P.W. Botha’s much scorned tri-cameral parliament system²⁸, instituted in 1983. From this it is concluded here that the first fully democratic presidential elections in Brazil were held in 1990, leading to the election of PMDB’s candidate Fernando Collor de Mello²⁹ as president. Thus, for the purposes of this study, Brazil has also arguably experienced little more than a decade of ‘true’ democracy.

1.3 Theoretical Background: An Introduction

It has been argued by many that the performance of the government of the day, especially in terms of the economy, influences support for the regime, regardless of its type (Ember *et al.*, 1997:110; Inglehart, 1990:253; Muller, 1997:133). This would perhaps be especially so in terms of developing countries. South Africa and Brazil both have high unemployment rates (30%-40% and 13%-29% respectively) (Landman, 2003:48) and at least roughly 40% the population of each country is considered to be living in absolute poverty (Friedman & De Villiers, 1996: 314, 328). This being the case, for the majority of the population material welfare is of primary importance and they are dependent on state welfare policies and policies of socio-economic amelioration. Thus views on the performance of the current government, if it is democratic, will influence perceptions of and support for democracy, just as failure by the democratic regime to provide materially for the masses will erode their confidence in democracy³⁰ (Muller, 1997:136; Broderick, 2000:21).

Yet it has been established that the above is too simplistic a view of support for democracy in any country, regardless of the need for socio-economic amelioration

²⁸ In 1984 in South Africa whites = 13%, coloureds= 9% and Asians= 3%, totalling 25% of the total population (Friedman, 1995:531).

²⁹ While many conclude that the subsequent impeachment of Collor de Mello points to Brazil’s democratic development in its ability to procedurally oust a prominent political figure, others cynically point out that Collor de Mello’s fate was the result of the fact that he didn’t “play by the rules”. For further discussion, see Roett (1999).

³⁰ This is especially relevant in terms of South Africa, according to Bratton and Mattes (2000b). The thesis will return to this point in order to compare the findings of this study to those of the Afrobarometer.

(Norris, 1999a). It has generally been established that democratic support is a multidimensional concept, manifested in terms of both diffuse and specific support spread among three levels of political association (Easton, 1965). This theory has subsequently been expanded to incorporate five levels (Norris, 1999a; Dalton, 2002), which will be explored and applied below. Briefly, although this latter theory has been applied more often to advanced Western democracies than to the newer democracies (Dalton, 1988, 2002), it is argued that the support for general principles upheld by a democratic regime ('democracy in principle'), known as 'diffuse support' differs from support for the democratic regime's institutions and incumbents ('democracy in practice') known as 'specific support'³¹ (Norris, 1999a:10-13; Doh & McDonough, 1999). Both are, however, important components of democratic support. As such, different aspects of political life in both case studies will have to be considered in order to explore and understand fully the nature of democratic support in each of the two case studies.

In terms of diffuse support for democracy and the enculturation of the abstract principles of democracy in each society, aspects such as political culture and national unity will have to be examined. Although the quality of investigation is limited to questions in the World Values Survey, many such studies have been conducted using this particular source of secondary data. Indeed, some question batteries were specifically structured to measure these concepts and successfully used in various studies³².

1.4 The Purpose of this Study and Possible Research Questions

The problem statement hinges on the assumption that support for democracy will contribute to the perpetuation of democratic norms and thus to democratic consolidation. While there is admittedly an ontological problem here, as many would argue that democratic consolidation itself leads to support for democracy, suggesting a circular relationship, it is sufficient for our study to be able to assume a positive relationship between support for democracy and democratic consolidation. Mass support, after all, is crucial to lend legitimacy to democratic actors, without which they must theoretically

³¹ For a more complete definition and conceptualization of these two critical terms, see Chapter Two.

³² See Kaase and Newton (1995), and Klingeman and Fuchs (1995).

step down. As Broderick (2000:17) states: "... political leaders may be vital in the transition stage, but it is ultimately the masses that determine consolidation"³³. The purpose of this study is therefore an investigation of the levels of support for democracy over the last decade in two developing countries which have recently experienced a democratic transition and are thus in the process of democratic consolidation, namely South Africa and Brazil.

With the political legacy and socio-economic consequences of both Brazil and South Africa in mind, there are various aspects that must be examined and several questions that must be posed in order to establish an appropriate research strategy for unpacking the nature of democratic support for South Africa and Brazil over the past decade.

The changing of the socio-economic and of the political environment of both countries is an important aspect to consider in a study of this nature. While the latter has changed dramatically, the former has arguably changed little at all, if it has not in fact worsened considerably (Landman, 2003). Inextricably linked to both is the issue of race relations and the history of racism in both countries. While racism is a delicate issue, often difficult to analyze in terms of quantitative data, its influence in the context of this study cannot be denied. This is above all because of the racialization of both countries' socio-economic strata and the resulting influence this phenomenon has on opinions about the government and institutional performance. While this study has not made race and race relations a primary focus, their implications will be suggested and explored through describing the historical context of this study. This will be especially relevant in terms of the demographics of democratic support.

Nevertheless, as has been suggested above, support for the government and confidence in the institutions of democratic government are based on perceptions of government success. In the case of new democracies, this is perhaps even more so, because the onus is on the new democratic regime to prove that democracy is beneficial, as democratic

³³ This is especially relevant in the case of South Africa and Brazil as both democratic transitions were elite negotiated pacts. (For further discussion see Broderick [2000]).

principles have neither yet proven their worth nor had enough time to be firmly embedded within the newly transformed political culture³⁴.

Following this, it will be important to compare perceptions of the ‘old’ versus the ‘new’ in terms of pre-and post-transitional regimes³⁵. Coupled with this is the need to consequently explore the mass public’s trust in both the government and the institutions of government which render its functioning democratic³⁶.

Pertinent to each of the aspects considered above is a set of research questions posed which will lead to propositions to be explored within the context of this study.

In terms of support for democracy itself:

- How has this changed in the past decade under study? What are the visible trends?
- How do the trends in diffuse support for democracy and specific support for democracy differ, and what are the implications and consequences of this?

As regards demographics³⁷, in terms of both case studies:

- What is the relationship between the level of education among respondents and support for democracy?
- What is the relationship between race and level of support for democracy?
- What is the relationship between income and support for democracy?
- How have the above trends changed over time?

³⁴ Doh & McDonough (1999) in their study of democratic support in the Republic of Korea found that democratic support increased gradually only as Koreans had favourable experiences with the new regime change.

³⁵ This has been an important aspect of the study of new democracies (Doh & McDonough, 1999; Broderick, 2000)

³⁶ Both these aspects relate to respective levels of democratic support, which will be explained in more detail in Chapter Two in the discussion of the theoretical framework used as a point of departure in this study.

³⁷ So-called social background variables (age, income, education and gender), these have been found to be associated with variations in political attitudes (Norris, 1999b:226). For a discussion on how they are seen to influence political values in part, see Bratton & Mattes (2003). See also further clarification in Chapter Three of this study.

Neither the data nor the statistical procedures necessary to establish conclusive evidence regarding causal relationships between these variables are present. For the purposes of this study it will be considered sufficient to establish the direction of the relationship (if any) and to provide possible explanations in terms of historical and political context. This will be an attempt to arrive at a basic understanding of these trends and will hopefully supply a springboard for further research in this direction.

From the proliferation of studies on support for democracy in Western publics (Dalton, 1988; Kaase & Newton, 1995; Fuchs & Klingeman, 1995; Inoguchi *et al*, 1998; Norris, 1999c) following the claims that democracy was facing a ‘crisis’ (Dalton, 1988; Huntington, 1993), it has been established that, while support for incumbent governments and specific leaders has waned, as a consequence of the rise of the so-called “critical citizen”, levels of diffuse support have remained fairly constant (Norris, 1999a; Inglehart, 1999:236)³⁸. Less certain, however, are the trends of democratic support in developing countries. To direct this study, a proposition has been formulated.

In terms of the two case studies one might be tempted to assume that because the democratic transitions are relatively recent, democratic norms have not yet permeated the national political culture. Nevertheless, following an examination of the political histories of these two countries, the contention here is that the opposite is in fact true³⁹. It is thus proposed that, despite their status as developing countries, both South Africa and Brazil will show the same trends as manifested by Western publics in terms of diffuse and specific support.

1.5 Research Design

Taking the similarities of their political legacies into account, a “most similar case”⁴⁰ approach has thus been used in comparing the two cases studies, South Africa and Brazil.

³⁸ See Chapter Two, theoretical framework.

³⁹ See Chapter Two, historical perspective.

⁴⁰ While this is logically the most appropriate choice of technique for this study, controversy surrounds this approach and it is acknowledged that the approach is not without its problems. Landman (2000:52) summarizes these succinctly. Furthermore, Hyden (2002a:139) emphasizes that a qualitative approach must be combined with statistical analysis for this technique to be correctly applied. This will be discussed further in Chapter Three.

This is an attempt to facilitate comparison and to eliminate the influence of several antecedent variables such as the nature of the previous regime, socio-economic inequalities and race relations. Edwards (1994) discusses the problems that arise in an attempt to investigate the phenomenon of democracy generally, i.e. cross-nationally. The “most similar case” method, while far from perfect, is the most widely used method to attempt to control as many external variables as possible in order to render cross-national comparison as valid as possible.

This study’s source of data is the World Values Survey, a large-scale co-operative project co-ordinated by Ronald Inglehart⁴¹. The South African survey was conducted by Markinor and the Brazilian survey by the Gallup Institute⁴². The field work for the respective waves used in this study was conducted in October 1991-January 1992 (n=1782) and in October 1995 (n=1149) in Brazil. It was conducted October 1995 (n=2935) and March-May 2001 in South Africa (n=3000). Probability sampling was used, in that all respondents of the age of 16 years and above theoretically had an equal chance of being selected to participate in the survey. The sample was stratified, meaning that respondents were drawn from constructed homogenous subsets of the population.

Two sets of the World Values Survey⁴³ will be used in each case to quantify the change through time of our identified independent variable, popular attitudes and political participation in terms of support for democracy. In the Brazilian case the 1990 and 1995 sets are used and in the South African case the 1995 and 2001 sets are used. The choice of sets is obvious in terms of the chronological relationship with the official beginnings of democratic transition in each case (1985 in terms of Brazil and 1994 in terms of South Africa). The sets are thus the next two surveys waves held immediately after these political watersheds.

⁴¹ The actual number of countries surveyed in each WVS wave has varied: 1990 (n=43), 1995 (n=39), 2001 (n=25).

⁴² Instituto Gallup de Opinião Publica (Sao Paulo).

⁴³ A more in-depth description of the World Values Survey will be given in Chapter Two under research design.

While there are many advantages to using this data source for secondary data analysis, several disadvantages are inherent in its use. Despite its use allowing access to a wealth of data on a national level, the fact that the questions were not designed with this specific study in mind at times poses methodological challenges in terms of operationalization. Necessary concessions to the sponsors of the survey, in terms of the questions included in the questionnaire, also dictate the scope of available indicators (Klingeman, 1999:35). Similarly, while the nature of the World Values Survey allows trends in support for the various levels of democracy to be examined longitudinally, the separate survey waves at times differ slightly. In this case, while the 1995 and 2000 waves are very similar, the 1990 wave differs markedly, increasing the limitations imposed on the study by the data source. Nevertheless, these problems are not insurmountable and merely call for more flexibility on the part of the researcher and encourage caution in terms of the conclusions drawn.

Support for democracy, the independent⁴⁴ variable under examination will be conceptualized and operationalized according to Easton's (1965) and Norris's (1999a) theoretical framework outlined briefly above⁴⁵. In some cases indexes have been constructed, as the variable measured is deemed composite in nature. The indicators will be computed in a principal components analysis to check for the validity of their use in measuring the concepts outlined above⁴⁶. Aside from measuring the frequency of these variables across both countries, the indicators will be cross-tabulated with demographic variables in an attempt to provide a description of democratic support in both countries. The results will be analysed and, in the light of the findings, suggestions for further research will be provided.

⁴⁴ As this study is not concerned with causal relationships, in the present context support for democracy will be considered an independent variable.

⁴⁵ This theoretical framework is described in more detail in Chapter Two.

⁴⁶ This will determine whether respondents do indeed distinguish between the various levels of democratic support in their response patterns. The value of this study is thus increased as cognitive differentiation between these levels, which shows that the public does distinguish the incumbents from the regime, bodes well for the sustainability of democracy. The masses will not thus blame democracy itself for the present authorities' shortcomings. This will be dealt with in more detail in Chapter Two.

1.6 Rationale: The Significance of this Study

The ubiquitous response to the above carefully laid out proposal is, of course, simply “Why?” What does it matter? In fact, there are several factors contributing the significance of this study.

As with any research on the developing world, the most obvious rationale for it is that it has not yet been done. While research on the development of Western democracies and inherent trends is prolific, there is a paucity of research on support for democracy as manifested in the developing world. It could be argued that this is due to democracy’s fairly recent development in these parts of the world, as well as to their often intransient nature, or merely to the Eurocentrism prevalent in social sciences for the better part of this century. Whatever the case may be, research in this regard remains important, especially so as democracy is only in the first stages of consolidation.

Choosing South Africa and Brazil as case studies in order to explore the development of democracy in the developing world allows the “most similar cases”⁴⁷ approach to be utilized. This means that more emphasis can be laid on exploring the trends in democratic support in developing countries, as the potential influence of many variables that occur in both case studies can be more or less eliminated. As mentioned above, both are high-middle-income countries displaying marked similarities demographically, socio-economically and geo-politically. Both countries are among those with the highest levels of inequality globally. They are both large states, geographically and in the context of regional politics, they were both under very oppressive and authoritarian regimes, and both have recently democratised through an elite pact.

Furthermore, South Africa and Brazil have come to extremely interesting junctures in their paths of democratic development, suggesting further advantages in the specific comparison of these two states as case studies.

⁴⁷ As mentioned previously, this technique is often used in comparative politics and involves selecting case studies with a large number of shared characteristics in order to control for the influence these may have on the proposed aspect of study. It is reasoned that, as each characteristic is present in both cases, any influence each may wield is ‘cancelled’ out (Babbie & Mouton, 1998:257).

Particularly timeously for this study, South Africa has recently (2004) celebrated 10 years of democracy. While the last couple of years are not covered by the WVS data, with the most recent wave used for South Africa being the one conducted in 2001, it seems fitting to assess support for democracy in South Africa in the spirit of reassessment and re-evaluation of ‘democracy in practice’ currently sweeping this country. Brazil, on the other hand, recently (2003) elected the first president in its history to come from a working-class background (Luiz Inacio da Silva). This is a dramatic departure from the patrimonial and elitist politics which remain a part of Brazil’s political dispensation, despite democratic transition (Roett, 1999:17). As in the South African case, the absence of data prevents statistical analysis of the years immediately preceding this event, but such a radical break with political precedent suggests a need to examine the years leading up to this change. Lula’s election was, incidentally, preceded by President Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s double term, which, according to Norris’s theorizing (1999:12), implies a decline in specific support on the part of the Brazilian voter and the manifestation of their right to “throw the rascals out”.

It is even more important to consider the contribution this study could make towards studying the actual consolidation of democracy in developing countries, perhaps possible only now because the ‘third-wave’ of democracy is such a recent phenomenon.

In many developing regions, especially Latin America, democracy’s regimes have already shown a decline in support (Norris, 1999a:18; *Latinbarometro*, 2001). On the assumption that it is the goal of democratic countries to consolidate⁴⁸ their democratic regimes, the tracking of democratic support and a descriptive analysis of its support base will open up research avenues for assessing the progress of democratic consolidation thus far. Should levels of democratic support prove to be low, this investigation raises questions about the political legitimacy of the current regime. It is thus important to

⁴⁸ As previously mentioned, it is considered impossible to make a country’s political system ‘fully democratic’ (Landman, 2003:58). Consolidation implies the institutionalization of democratic norms within the political structure (Parry & Moran, 1994a:3;11).

establish and explore the trends in political support of democratic countries in an attempt to understand possible consequences and their implications.

Furthermore, regardless of the length of time that a regime's democracy has been established, further studies of even the much-analysed Western democracies are now necessary, given the recent global trends in democratic consolidation. This only emphasises the importance of promoting research in developing countries, as what is known about them in terms of democratic regime trends is still so limited. Norris (1999a:7) has emphasised this:

“The twentieth century has therefore experienced periodic cycles of hope and fear about the state of popular support for democratic government. We need to re-examine this issue because understanding trends has important implications for explaining the causes of this phenomenon”.

1.7 Outline of the Study

Our point of departure has been set out above, introducing the study by way of a brief contextualisation and the variables we shall be principally concerned with. Chapter Two will expand on the theoretical frameworks used as a point of departure for this study, as well as drawing on prior research on support for democracy. The conceptualization of the most important concepts to be used in this study will also be dealt with. In order to fully understand the nature of both the state and society in our two case studies, further contextualisation is required. Chapter Two will therefore also provide a historical perspective, pointing out similarities between the two case studies. Chapter Three will operationalize the key variables identified in the previous chapter. This chapter will in addition explore the various research techniques available for a study of this nature, considering their advantages and limitations, and focusing on secondary data⁴⁹ analysis. It will also explain the use of the variables selected from the World Values Survey. A description of the World Values Survey series in question will also be provided and the

⁴⁹ Secondary data greatly simplify the procedure of acquiring raw data to use as the survey data have already captured and are ready to be analyzed. Its use is nevertheless limiting in that often the means for operationalizing and measuring the specific variables of one's own study are not included in the survey framework. This forces one to improvise using data that capture only an approximation of what was originally intended to be measured (Neuman, 2000:305). This will be explained further in Chapter Two.

methodology of this study explained. Chapter Four will present the data analysis of this study. As the World Values Survey is quantitative in nature, this chapter will contain graphic representations of the results found and descriptions of the processes used⁵⁰.

Chapter Five provides an analysis and interpretation of the data, exploring similarities as well as disparities, and placing these within a historical, political and socio-economic context. It also offers conclusions based on the analysis of the data and considers the implications of the findings. While an extension of the application of these conclusions to all democratic developing countries would be implausible, the similar position held by both South Africa and Brazil as regional hegemons within the so-called Third World suggests that the implications of the findings of this study could be far reaching. This is especially so in the context of the most recent political developments in both countries and their consequent impact on state policy and the role of the state in the eyes of the population. On the basis of the conclusions reached, avenues for further research will be suggested.

1.8 Conclusion

This study thus proposes to explore the progress of possible democratic consolidation in developing countries through the analysis of the case studies of South Africa and Brazil. These two countries have been carefully chosen for the inherent similarities between the two cases politically and socio-economically and for the similar time-frame during which they experienced democratic transition. What is intriguing is that their respective historical legacies suggest that, despite having been under authoritarian rule for many decades, vestiges of democratic norms and institutions remained a part of their political make-up.

In measuring and comparing the level of support for democracy in Brazil and South Africa, it is proposed that the presence of these democratic norms, however slight, may have sufficiently permeated the political culture of South Africa and Brazil to affect positively the levels of support for democracy. Thus, despite democracy having been

⁵⁰ These will include frequencies, cross-tabulations and index constructions.

established for barely a decade in South Africa and Brazil, it is suggested that levels of support for democracy in the two case studies may be remarkably similar to those of Western publics.

Any study proposing to use quantitative secondary data analysis requires a solid theoretical foundation as well as historical insight. These aspects are addressed in the following chapter.



Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework and Historical Perspective

2.1 Introduction

Following the outline of this study in Chapter One, this chapter provides, firstly, the theoretical basis from which the study proceeds. The key theoretical constructs, such as democracy, political culture, political support and the various levels of political objects of support¹, will be described and conceptualised. This is in order to explain the complex interrelationships between these conceptual constructs and how they fit into the research design of this study. Secondly, a brief political history of both the case studies will be provided in order to allow contextualization of the data which will be analysed in Chapter Four.

2.2 Theoretical Framework

The theoretical point of departure used in this study is that initially developed by Easton² (1965) and later expanded by Norris (1999a). Easton, in the spirit of behaviouralism, endeavoured to deconstruct the political system, and look at it as a scientific process consisting of inputs, outputs and feedback loops³. He described support for the political system as “the major summary variable in linking a system to its environment” (Easton, 1965:154). Easton identified two types of support, diffuse and specific, applicable to three object levels he attributed to the political system, namely the political community, the regime and the political authorities. Easton (1965:60) maintained that it was necessary for each object level to sustain a critical minimum level of support from the most significant and influential sectors of society⁴ in order to prevent the collapse of the current political system.

¹ These, according to the model used in this study, are the political community, regime principles, regime performance, regime institutions and political actors (Norris, 1999a; Easton, 1965).

² Easton (1965) has made many contributions towards explaining the political system. But he is not without his critics (Kaase & Newton, 1995; Klingeman & Fuchs, 1995). Nevertheless, his work on political support must be acknowledged as having pioneered research in this particular field.

³ For a fuller description, see Easton (1965).

⁴ This definition would seem to imply that only elite support is important, whereas it is mass opinion that is being measured in this study. Nevertheless, the legitimacy of the democratic regime depends on a majority of mass support (Kaase & Newton, 1995:60; Broderick, 2000:18). Consequently, in the case of democracy, it could be argued that mass support is critical in the case of democracy, thus warranting the investigation undertaken by this study.

As this study is limited to the exploration of democratic political systems, “political support” would seem to imply “democratic political support”⁵. Nevertheless, it is arguable that this distinction cannot be made so early in the analysis for a number of reasons outlined below, especially when examining political support in the context of this study.

2.1.1 Political Support

Firstly, in referring to “political support” Easton (1965) and Norris (1999a) are considering support for the actual political system and its norms in use in any given country, whereas *democratic* political support measures support for democracy *per se*. The problem arises in the event of the rise of several so-called democracies whose procedures do not conform to democratic norms. O’Donnell (1996:50) uses the term *particularism* to distinguish this distortion of the universally accepted democratic norms. Consequently, political support can arguably only be termed *democratic* political support once the regime has been classified as democratic. Essentially, it is arguably the masses’ conceptualization of democracy which will ascertain whether the regime is democratic or not, because should the regime be truly democratic, it is their support on which it depends for consolidation through legitimization (Diamond, 1994:48; Edwards, 1994:98; Bratton & Mattes, 2000b:1). This immediately raises methodological problems, as gauging the masses’ definition of democracy is a complex task, let alone trying to do so with secondary data which have not been specifically designed to address this delicate issue⁶ (Bratton & Mattes, 2000b; 2003).

It is, nevertheless, believed that despite the controversy surrounding the debate, the term democracy has at least entered into the vocabulary of Africans and is understood in terms

⁵ While this is perhaps implicit in Norris’s (1999) work, the distinction is not made as clearly in Easton (1965). It is recognised that Easton’s model could in some cases be applied to authoritarian systems (Easton, 1965:58).

⁶ The limitations of secondary data usage are discussed in detail in Chapter Three.

of “the standard liberal ideas of civil and political rights”⁷ (Bratton & Mattes, 2000b:4. See also Ake, 1996; Bratton & Mattes, 2000a:2). According to research done by the *Latinobarometro*, the same is true of South Americans⁸ (Lagos, 2000:167). This at least allows this study a measure of validity in the understanding that the comparison of the two countries’ support for democracy is not based on dramatically different definitions of the term.

It is the purpose of this study to measure support levels for democracy in the two stated case studies. In order to do so, it must be pointed out that the assumption has been made that these countries are in fact democratic. This could pose a problem, however, as although both have experienced recent democratic transitions and have constitutions based upon the tenets of democracy, the fact that they are indeed democracies does not necessarily follow. The literature does recognize that both South Africa and Brazil are democracies: what it disputes is that they are in fact consolidated democracies, which raises an entirely new debate (Schmitter, 1996b, 1998; Friedman, 1995:541; Hillard & Notshulwana, 2001; Linz & Stepan, 1996; Lowenthal, 1997:61; Giliomee & Schlemmer, 1998; Giliomee & Simkins, 1994). Be that as it may, while it is recognised that political support and democratic political support are not the same, both South Africa and Brazil are considered democracies (albeit unconsolidated democracies) here. Political support for their regimes thus implies democratic political support.

Before elaborating on the different types of political support as theoretically defined by Easton’s (1965) and Norris’s (1999a) model, it is first necessary to explore political support *per se* within the political system and the role it plays in this context.

⁷ According to research conducted by the *Afrobarometer*, Africans can at least recognise and identify a democratic country if not actually volunteer a meaningful definition of the term ‘democracy’ (Bratton & Mattes, 2000b:4; 2000a:2).

⁸ According to the 2001 *Latinobarometro*, however, 56% of Brazilians surveyed did not or could not supply a meaning for democracy, the highest rate of ‘don’t know’ responses in Latin America. While this is worrying, meanings volunteered through both open and closed questions included ‘freedom of expression’, ‘regular, clean and transparent elections’, ‘an economy that ensures a decent income’ and ‘equality and justice’ (Lagos, 2003). See also www.latinobarometro.org

This study proposes to use attitudinal measures⁹, through survey research, to gauge levels of political support for the political systems of both case studies, ostensibly democracies. While this study only purports to observe support through respondents' attitudes, others claim there is an established link between political attitudes and political support. Indeed, while manifested attitudes do not necessarily lead to political action, Kaase and Newton (1995:36) emphasize the importance of mass attitudes in terms of democracy. Dalton (1988:177) also points out that in Western publics recent trends show that social characteristics and agents of socialization¹⁰ are much less influential in terms of explaining voting patterns. It is in fact the attitude of the individual regarding certain issues which has become more important. This ties in with Inglehart's (1990) hypotheses regarding the cognitive mobilization of the mass publics leading to a weakening of traditional political ties (to social class and political parties) and growing scepticism about the state (Abramson & Inglehart, 1995). While it is evident that neither of the case studies falls under the title of "Western public", these emerging trends demonstrate the growing importance of attitudes within the political context.

Political attitudes, and consequently, political support are even more relevant when applied to the *democratic* system. According to Kaase & Newton (1995:60), trust, support, confidence and legitimacy are all closely related. This is especially so in terms of a democratic system, whereby the political support of the people is by definition mandatory for the legitimacy of the regime. Thus, without political support the incumbent regime loses the legal right to govern (Broderick, 2000:18; Dasgupta & Maskin, 1999:69; Saward, 1994:15; Kaase & Newton, 1995). Diamond's (1996:119) description of democracy as the process whereby citizens assert themselves (through voting) but submit to the government emphasizes the idea that these citizens support the political process they are buying into by participating in it¹¹.

⁹ See Chapter Three.

¹⁰ These include the church, the family etc. It must be noted that such elements as the church and family values still play a large socialization role in both South Africa and Brazil (Hurrell, 1996:153; Friedman, 1995:540.)

¹¹ It is here that the ability of the citizen to distinguish between the political incumbents (specific support) and the political system itself (diffuse support) becomes relevant, so that a lack of the former does not affect the latter in the medium to short term (Kaase & Newton, 1995:75). This will be discussed in more detail below.

Mass political support is therefore essential in theory to a democratic regime's legitimacy. Before clarifying the various types of political support that have been identified, however, it is necessary here to make some mention of what is known as political culture.

Diamond (1994:48) describes political culture as:

"...a people's predominant beliefs, attitudes, values, ideals, sentiments and evaluations about the political system of its country and the role of the self in that system."

This is taken from Almond and Verba's (1980:26) original definition of political culture:

"...as consisting of cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientations to political phenomena, distributed in national populations or subgroups...."

Thus, in order for political support for the regime to be garnered, it is logical that the political culture must support the same principles as those upheld by the regime (Przeworski, 1995:42). This is what Easton (1965:159) terms "covert support"¹². Broderick, 2000:58) describes political culture as comprised of "subjective orientation" (values and beliefs) and "objective phenomena" (behavioural patterns established through historical experience). Of course, in many countries, especially those which have experienced a transition from largely non-democratic regimes, such as South Africa and Brazil¹³, a political culture conducive to democracy does not often readily come into being and must be engineered or rooted through practice in a process of habituation (Hadenius, 2002:71). This is known also as institutionalization, as it involves the strengthening of democratic institutions within that country (O'Donnell, 1996:42-43). Hillard *et al.* (2001:151) emphasize the need for neo-democracies to develop a democratic political culture by reinforcing the fact that democracy is a way of life, not

¹² This is support in terms of attitudes, once again emphasizing the link between attitudes and political support.

¹³ It has already been suggested in this thesis that democratic political norms were not completely absent from the political cultures of Brazil and South Africa, but it must be acknowledged that their regimes before the democratic transition were authoritarian.

merely a set of political institutions¹⁴. South Africa, however, is a case in point that political culture “is not destiny” (Diamond *et al.*, 1995:21). Despite having emerged from an inflexible, intolerant political culture from the apartheid years as well as a legacy of violent protest, South Africa is developing a culture of concession and compromise, with the political elite having set the precedent in the 1994 pacted transition (Shaw, 2001:18-19, Higley & Gunther, 1992:24, Schmitter, quoted in Friedman & De Villiers, 1995:14).

It is contended here that, despite appearances, both South Africa and Brazil do possess a political culture to which democratic values are not alien. Throughout the period of authoritarian rule both retained some vestiges of democratic institutions, such as limited elections and qualified franchise¹⁵ (Lamounier, 1999:132-133; Martinez-Lara, 1996:15; Friedman, 1995:541).

The necessity of political culture lies in its ability to aid in consolidating a regime. In this case the development of a *democratic* political culture will lead to the further consolidation of a *democratic* regime¹⁶. To paraphrase Weffert (1994:44), one cannot have democracy without democratically minded people, and without them, one cannot have a consolidated democracy. Similarly: “...elections do not create a culture of democracy if there is no general will for reconciliation or for an emerging civic competence which transcends past enmities”¹⁷ (Inoguchi *et al.*, 1998:16). Thus the norms and values of the people must be able to support the political institutions in place.

¹⁴ Ake (1996:65) disputes the widely held Western view that democracy is incompatible with African political culture, thought to be authoritarian by nature. He contends that this perception confuses democratic institutions with democratic principles, the latter of which are implicit in traditional African political culture. Similarly, Diamond (1999:38) disputes the view that the Latin American political culture, held to be absolutist, elitist, hierarchical and authoritarian is not comparable with a democratic political culture. He suggests that it is often the political system which can create the political culture, thus allowing the possibility for a democratic political culture to arise through the new democratic regime.

¹⁵ Friedman 1995:567), for example, has suggested that the long process of negotiation and compromise completed by political elites during the transition set a precedent for future political behaviour.

¹⁶ Dahl (1997:34) maintains that political culture provides both cognitive and emotional support for the regime; see Dahl (1997).

¹⁷ This quote emphasizes the importance of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission in building a democratic political culture, an institution which offered amnesty to those willing to acknowledge crimes committed under apartheid.

What a consolidated democracy is and when a democracy reaches this stage in its political development are both, unsurprisingly, also contentious issues. For clarity's sake, O'Donnell's definition of a consolidated democracy will be adopted whereby a democracy is considered consolidated when the principles of democracy and the actual practices of the democratic regime are deemed similar (O'Donnell, 1996:47)¹⁸.

Schmitter (1996, 1998; Schmitter & Karl, 1996) has spent some time exploring the concept and nature of democratic consolidation, particularly in Latin America. He contends that to describe a democracy as consolidated is in fact a paradox as it is continuously evolving (Schmitter, 1998:23). He nevertheless describes the *process* of consolidation as the engendering of norms such as political trust and tolerance¹⁹, which allow the uncertainties inherent in democratic rule (such as election outcomes²⁰) to take place without violent conflict²¹ (Schmitter, 1998:25). Schmitter (1998:27, 1996a:77) maintains that democratic institutions²² are fundamental in normalizing the levels of uncertainty inherent in regime change through democratic processes, as they establish and maintain the rituals by which these political changes occur and minimize the unknowns. Nevertheless, the presence of institutions is not sufficient to ensure democracy, as in the case of Brazil, where he contends that minimal commitment to procedural democracy has failed to allow democracy to crystallize (Schmitter, 1996a:80). Indeed, Brazil's weak democratic institutionalization, through the abuse of democratic procedures by political actors, is considered by Diamond (1997) to be the primary reason for its remaining an unconsolidated democracy nearly two decades after democratic transition.

¹⁸ For other definitions of 'consolidated democracy' see also Diamond (1997); Schmitter (1998); Przeworski (1995).

¹⁹ This once again emphasizes the importance of political culture in supporting the political regime as trust and tolerance are both values deemed democratically important (Dahl, 1997:34).

²⁰ A rule of thumb, initially developed by Huntington, is that a democracy has become stabilized after two democratic handovers of power (Randall & Theobald, 1998:41). Brazil has achieved this, South Africa, however, has not, remaining under an ANC-dominated government and stirring fears that it will become a one-party state; see Giliomee & Simkins (eds) (1999).

²¹ This is supported by Diamond (1997) who contends that consolidated democracies are not characterized by the absence of conflict, but by the absence of conflict through illegal means.

²² There is a lively debate as to which specific institutional configurations actually best foster consolidated democracies (Lijphart, 1996; Linz, 1996a, 1996b; Hadenius, 1994; Elklit, 1994).

In light of the above, it is necessary to return to the discussion of political support and of the two types pertinent to this study in order to better understand how support for democracy in South Africa and Brazil will be measured.

Specific support is the more cognitively accessible concept, as it is simply the *quid pro quo* satisfaction of the public with the government following the fulfilment of very specific and immediate needs and demands (Easton, 1965:268). This is generally a narrow base of support and can, by definition, be conceived of as very short-term. The support generated is due to the manifestation of a specific policy and is directed at the incumbents of the regime, whose political term is theoretically limited²³.

Diffuse support is conceived of as support for the *zeitgeist*²⁴ of the political system and the processes by which the system actually functions, in our case democracy, as opposed to merely its output. As opposed to the “narrowness” of the concept of specific support, diffuse support is a broader, more abstract level of support. Easton (1965:269), in describing the functions of the political system, emphasises how diffuse and specific support are complementary in the following way. Government is generally entrusted with the distribution of scarce resources and it is logically impossible that the demands of every sector of society will be met. Capacity aside, many of these demands are in conflict with one another. Diffuse support, representing the public’s inherent acceptance of the political system’s procedures of government, fosters tolerance for the government despite the inability of the government to satisfy all needs²⁵. Diffuse support thus fosters sociotropic tendencies within society. Diffuse support can thus be seen as a “reservoir” of

²³ An example of this is perhaps what Tóka (1995:356) refers to as the “honeymoon period” experienced in most neo-democracies. The new democratic regime receives support for establishing democratic rule. This is short-lived, however, (2-3 years) and the government cannot rely on it to sustain support. South American *desencantado* (disenchantment) with democracy with the passing of time is an example of this effect wearing off.

²⁴ A German term for ‘spirit of the age’; in this context *zeitgeist* refers to the philosophy and founding principles of a concept, in this case democracy (Diamond, 1997).

²⁵ There is a perception that in terms of South Africa, apartheid both hindered and fostered the growth of diffuse support for democracy. Whereas rejecting the legitimacy of the tricameral parliament elections created validated fears that in some instances all representative institutions would be mistrusted, there has been an innate willingness to value democratic institutions which extends beyond the political elite (Friedman, 1995:541-543). This is a positive contribution to developing a democratic political culture.

support to sustain the political system when public demand is not being directly met²⁶ (Easton, 1965:249). Specific support, on the other hand, sustains both the political system and its source of diffuse support through the continuously necessary direct satisfaction of at least some demands, providing substantiation for this ultimate support for the regime and its principles (Easton, 1965:273). A critical loss of support, in terms of either of these two types, will place the political system under stress and could lead to its collapse, as mentioned above.


In order to further clarify the concepts of diffuse and specific support, it is necessary to identify the various levels of government to which they apply. Easton (1965) provided the initial framework of objects of political support by enumerating these as the political community, the regime and the authorities²⁷ (Easton, 1965:157).



²⁶ Establishing whether mass support for democracy still exists, despite deteriorating socio-economic inequalities in both South Africa and Brazil since their transitions, would thus shed some light on mass democratic commitment in these two countries. According to Przeworski (1995:57), diffuse support for democracy remains in neo-democracies despite a growing mistrust of politics and politicians. Whether this applies to South Africa and Brazil specifically remains to be seen.

²⁷ This model was later expanded by Norris (1999a).

Figure 1. The Concept Diagram of the Different Object Levels of Political Support



Source: Norris, P. (1999).

2.2.2 The Political Community

The political community (see Figure 1.) is described by Easton, drawing on definitions from Deutsch and Haas (quoted in Easton, 1965:177) as:

“...a group of persons bound together by a political division of labour. The existence of political system must included a plurality of relationships through which the individual members are linked to each other and through which the political objectives of the system are pursued, no matter how limited they might be”.

The political community is thus conceptualised as a willingness to participate in the collective solving of political problems and manifesting solidarity in terms of support for the political system. Norris (1999a:10) extends this further by incorporating what Easton (1965:185) terms the “social community”, thus including a fundamental attachment to the

nation served by the political system. This is a sense of identification and cohesion, a so-called “we-feeling”. This level of the political system is sustained by democratic support at its most abstract and intangible, thus comprising an aspect of diffuse support. It must be noted here that, especially regarding our two case studies, this dimension of the political system is particularly important considering the heterogeneous²⁸ nature of their populations, negating the existence of a “nation-state” in the European sense. Easton (1965:187) emphasizes this by commenting that it is possible for a political structure to bind a society together without this feeling of political community. He stresses, however, that should a sense of political community not eventually develop, the system will become vulnerable, especially during times of system stress. It may be argued that this became the case in apartheid South Africa.

2.2.3 Regime Principles

The second level of the political system, similarly sustained by diffuse support (see Figure 1), was identified by Easton as “the regime”. Easton (1965: 190-192) described this object of support as the constitutional order of the political society. It was a regularized method of ordering political relationships and stabilized the expectations of society as regards authority and the ability of the latter to process the demands of the former. The regime encompassed the values and accepted ideology of the political society, the procedures accepted as norms for political behaviour and the actual structure of authority used to implement policy decisions (Easton, 1965:193-194). Support for the regime on the part of the public denoted support for the “rules of the game”. In this case it would thus be support for the basic tenets of democracy as a political system and a consequent pledge to abide by and be ruled by them²⁹.

It was felt by later theorists that this level of the political system was too broad to be categorized as a single political object, especially as it was felt by some (Fuchs *et al.*, 1995:330) that Easton’s conceptualisation was unclear on several crucial points. The

²⁸ This is, however, perhaps more applicable to South Africa than to Brazil, as linguistic unity and a conscious unification policy implemented by political elites has removed the potential threat of ethnic conflict in Brazil (Nascimento & Nascimento, 2001:122).

²⁹ The active civil forces present in both countries prior to transition attest to the support present for democratic regime principles (Friedman, 1995; Whitehead, 1996).

political object of “the regime” has thus more recently been broken down and the various aspects of the regime divided into three separate levels of the political system. These are “regime principles”, “regime performance”, and “regime institutions” (Norris, 1999a:10).

“Regime principles” (see Figure 1) is the level of the political system representing exclusively the “rules of the game”. Support for this political object, diffuse in nature, denotes an acceptance and willingness on the part of the public to adhere to democracy as a set of principles. Easton hints at this level, suggesting that it is part of the ideology used to mobilize support and inspire legitimacy for the regime, but at the same time holding the government accountable to a certain mode of behaviour. It is, nevertheless, recognised that this is an ideal concept of regime behaviour, which governments rarely live up to (Easton, 1965:291; Parry and Moran; 1994a:3). Regime principles can thus also perhaps be seen as essentially a measurement of congruence with a citizen’s own beliefs and values.

A potential problem, considering that the regime principles in question are those of democracy, in our case is ascertaining what exactly about them is controversial and the subject of debate for such a long time (Elgström, 2002:1; Parry & Moran, 1994a:10; Inoguchi *et al.*, 1998:1; Edwards, 1998:90; Cammack, 1994:176; Norris, 1999a:11). Although usually modelled on the concept of Western liberal democracy, following Thomassen’s (1995) investigation of the public perceptions of the meaning of democracy in Western publics, it is evident that the generally accepted meaning of democracy can change. For this reason, what precisely is meant by “regime principles” in our case will become clearer after it has been operationalized in Chapter Three.

2.2.4 Regime Performance

Regime performance is the last object of democratic support subject to diffuse political support (see Figure 1). This is essentially an evaluation of the workings of the regime within the specific context of the country in question. It is also the evaluation of the perceived performance of democracy. In gauging support for regime performance, one is essentially measuring the level of support for democracy as applied to the governing of

the nation, which thus contributes to support for democracy as a political construct. Regime performance is crucial in terms of fostering support for democracy, especially in very young democracies:

“After all, it is very unlikely that citizens in neo-democracies would possess a reservoir of favourable affective dispositions arising from a lifetime of exposure to democratic norms...citizens fall back on performance-based judgements of what democracy actually does for them” (Bratton & Mattes, 2000a:1).

The above is especially relevant in this study, because it is indeed the purpose to find out whether trends in Brazil and South Africa mirror those of the mature Western democracies in levels of diffuse and specific support, or whether they maintain the patterns of new democracies, as described above.

2.2.5 Regime Institutions

“Regime institutions” is the first of two levels of political support to which specific support applies (see Figure 1). This is an evaluation of the role of the institutions and offices of the regime itself, as opposed to the office-holder, in governing the country. As these institutions are directly involved in the satisfaction of the public’s needs, it is easy to see why these are recipients of specific support. In terms of a democratic regime, such institutions consist of a parliament, independent judiciary and transparent multiparty elections, among others. They represent the democratic political culture of the country in question in that they have been established to aid in the democratic rule of the country. Listhaug and Wiberg (1995:299) emphasize the importance of the public’s ability to distinguish between the institutions of government and the incumbents themselves³⁰, although Norris (1999a:12) acknowledges the fact that it is frequently difficult to do so. In addition, the institutions considered to be under the jurisdiction of the government may vary according to the degree of state control over society and the legacy of the current and previous regimes. Both Listhaug and Wiberg (1995) and Fuchs and Klingeman (1995)

³⁰ The literature suggests that this is a problem in Brazil and South Africa (Lagos, 2001 ,2003; Bratton & Mattes, 2000a, 2000b). This will be further discussed below.

differentiate between “institutions of order”³¹ and other institutions generally considered as belonging to the private sphere, but it cannot necessarily be assumed immediately that these are free from state influence³². For this reason, it will later be discussed which institutions will comprise our research and the reasons for this.

2.2.6 Political Actors

The last level of the political system, termed by Easton (1965) as “the authorities” and by Norris (1999a) as “political actors” refers to the incumbents and politicians themselves, thus those held directly responsible for government actions within the context of representative government. As such, this level of the political system requires specific support (see Figure 1). Arguably, support for this level is also the most crucial as this level is the most high profile and cognitively accessible to the public, thus also the most open to criticism. Indeed, political actors are regarded as “where the buck stops” and diminishing support at this level can lead to a loss of support at other levels (Easton,1965:216). This is known as the “generalization process” (Fuchs *et al*,1995:327). A loss of support at the level of the political actor as an isolated phenomenon is not necessarily serious, as it is the purpose of elections to empower the public to be able to alternate the incumbent government (Dalton,1988:238). Nevertheless, continued long-term dissatisfaction with the authorities may cause this public dissatisfaction to spread to other levels of the political system, precipitating the destabilization of the system as a whole (Easton,1965:217). While Listhaug and Wiberg (1995:299) imply that a complete overhaul of the democratic political system is unlikely, as a viable alternative does not exist, the importance of declining specific support should not be underestimated, especially within neo-democracies, such as South Africa and Brazil, which have not yet reached consolidation.

³¹ These are institutions which are generally appointed to carry out the functions of the state, such as maintaining law and order: the police, the army, the legal system, etc.

³² The ability of both apartheid and the Brazilian military regime to permeate every level of society was infamous, an example being apartheid’s Immorality Act of 1950, banning inter-racial sexual relations, or the Brazilian clientelist relations with big business (Du Toit, 1995:300; Roett, 1999).

2.2.8 Democracy as a Concept

With the establishment of the theoretical framework to be used as our departure point and the conceptualisation of the various levels of the variable under study, that is, support for democracy, it would seem appropriate to conceptualise “democracy” itself. This is, however, more difficult than it would first seem.

The meaning of democracy, as mentioned above, has been seen to vary through time and across geographical distance. Thus, while both the Brazilians and the South Africans seem to recognise and hold a meaning for the term “democracy” (Lagos, 2003; Mattes, *et al.*, 2003), it is debatable as to whether the meaning they attribute to this concept is the same. Indeed, their conceptualization of democracy will more than likely vary according to their different experiences of democracy (Doh & McDonough, 1999).

In any event, this concept is arguably very subjective. As discussed above, no consensus has been reached in terms of an objective definition (Inoguchi *et al.*, 1998:1; Edwards, 1998:90; Cammack, 1994:176; Norris, 1999a:1; Thomassen, 1995; Parry & Moran, 1994a:10). Indeed, in terms of methodology, the fact that the concept “democracy” was not defined for respondents in the WVS, limits our knowledge of their understanding of the term. In a sense, we do not know what we are measuring. All things considered, however, due to the nature of this study, this should not prove too much of a problem. This is because this study is interested in *levels of support for democracy*, as opposed to democracy *per se*. Thus whether the regime embodies the views of democracy of the respective mass publics is of primary interest, instead of a universally accepted definition of the term³³.

³³ This implies that in this case, the masses’ understanding of the concept of democracy as applied to the political regime is more important than a universal definition that analysts conceptualise democracy with. Admittedly, should the masses collectively harbour a perception of democracy considered academically ‘wrong’, we are not measuring democracy *per se*, but rather what they believe to be democracy. Mattes *et al.* (2003:8) make the point that mass opinions are perhaps more valid than academic ‘ideal models’. They comment that the opinions of the ordinary South Africans about the state of the South African democracy (thus *Afrobarometer* data) may be more relevant than the opinions of foreign experts (referring to Freedom House ratings) as it is the South Africans themselves that must endure and/or provide support for the South African democratic regime.

2.3 Historical Perspective

In a study of a historical-comparative nature such as this, it is vitally important to place the data to be analysed within context. McAllister (1999:201) actually identifies “historical circumstance” as one of the most important factors affecting democratic (institutional) support. In addition, such a historical perspective has two further benefits. Firstly, the histories of the two case studies can be compared. Secondly, the basis for the primary proposition of this study, outlined above, will become clearer³⁴. In considering the historical events in both countries, it is plausible to suggest that despite the youth of the democratic regimes, trends in the support for democracy will follow those of the Western publics, namely that diffuse support will remain fairly constant, despite the decline of specific support (Klingeman & Fuchs, 1995; Kaase & Newton, 1995).

It will be suggested that despite the authoritarian nature of both the South African apartheid regime and Brazilian military rule, a semblance of democratic procedures remained, however distorted. This thus allowed democratic norms and values to permeate the consciousness of the national political communities, affording democracy the so-called “reservoir” of support needed during periods of potential instability (Easton, 1965:249; Norris, 1999a:11). The contention is thus that South Africa and Brazil have more in common with the older democracies of Western Europe in this regard than younger democracies such as those of Eastern Europe, whose democratic support is attributed to the so-called “honeymoon effect”³⁵.

Thus, a brief political history of both case studies will be outlined. Many argue that history stretching back to the colonial era has a bearing on each countries contemporary situation (Marx, 1998; Nascimento & Nascimento, 2001; Friedman, 1995). The political histories recounted here will thus give a brief description of national history since

³⁴ It was proposed in Chapter One that South Africa and Brazil do actually have a history of limited democratic norms inculcated into their respective political cultures. Thus, despite being new democracies, they follow the trends in democratic support manifested by Western publics.

³⁵ Tóka (1995), in his discussion of the emerging democracies in Eastern Europe, discusses this effect in detail, estimating it to last about 1 to 2 years (Tóka, 1995:357). New democracies seem to accord democratic principles the esteem usually only found in mature democracies. This is generally attributed to the fact that democracy initially compares favourably with the *ancien regime*, the novelty of democracy thus providing it with legitimacy as an alternative to the previous, unpopular regime.

independence, the authoritarian regimes of the respective case studies, events leading up to the respective transitions and the nature of the transitions themselves.

2.3.1 Brazil

Brazil achieved independence in 1822, when Emperor Dom Pedro I unilaterally declared independence from the mother country, Portugal, which was ruled by his father, Emperor Dom Joao VI (Marx, 1998:159). Ironically, despite the decades of brutal military rule which characterized its 20th-century history, Brazil prides herself on the peaceful and bloodless transition to independence and the image of a continuity³⁶ embedded in state authority figures which prevented the rise of political antagonists. Indeed, even with a military coup in 1889, deposing Dom Pedro I's son, Dom Pedro II, there was no change in the state bureaucracy. Power changed hands only symbolically as it remained in the hands of the elite (Roett, 1999:7).

Despite the large slave population and Brazil's dependence on primary commodity exports until the Great Wars of the 20th century, abolition in 1889 created barely a political ripple as the emancipated blacks were simply "abandoned to their fate"³⁷ at the lower echelons of Brazilian society (Marx, 1998:161). This reflects the confidence and complacency of the Brazilian political elite, especially when state power was decentralized up until 1930 (Marx, 1998:161). Indeed, it was only with the rise of Getulio Vargas that Brazil fell into the Latin American pattern of rule by military dictator.

Coming to power in 1930 as the "temporary president" of the Liberal Alliance party, Vargas consolidated power in the *Estado Novo* (New State) and promulgated a new constitution, which in 1934 which replaced that of 1891³⁸. Vargas ruled Brazil by dictate

³⁶ Przeworski (1995:50) refers to this as the characteristic 'continuismo' of Brazilian politics.

³⁷ Potential black mobilization was also emasculated by a national policy of 'racial democracy' which was perpetuated despite the frequent changes in regime throughout the 20th century. By emphasizing racial colour-blindness and a 'colour continuum' within society, the structural discrimination experienced by blacks was masked (Marx, 1998:280; Sansone, 2003:97; Nascimento & Nascimento, 2001: 122).

³⁸ Following Vargas's apparent relinquishing of political power in 1945, yet another constitution was promulgated in 1946 to replace that which had held sway for 12 years. Brazil has had 7 constitutions since independence in 1822. These were promulgated in 1824, 1891, 1934, 1946, 1967-9, 1988 (Martinez-Lara, 1996:8).

until 1945. Even he realised that his stranglehold on power would not be sustainable in a post-war situation. In an attempt to normalise political participation and foster a fledgling multiparty system, Vargas created two parties in 1945. These were the Social Democratic Party (PSD)³⁹ and the Workers' Party (PTB)⁴⁰ (Roett, 1999:39). He used the latter as a vehicle for re-election in 1950, serving a term as president until 1954, when he committed suicide rather than suffer the humiliation of removal from power by military coup (Roett, 1999:108).

It seems that Vargas's power had been rooted in his populist form of rule, as what followed was a string of ineffectual presidents,⁴¹ which did little to ameliorate an economic crisis rapidly spiralling out of control. Matters came to a head in 1964, when the military managed to achieve what had been prevented in 1961. The military assumed control of the national government.

It must be mentioned here that despite the military's frequent intervention in civilian politics, it had never been the intention of the armed forces to assume control of the state. The military had been recognised before this as the protectors of democracy and arbitrators in the struggle for political power (Roett, 1999:103; Fiechter, 1975:23; Martinez-Lara, 1996:13). With the assumption of the authority to rule, the military had set a precedent. Previously, power had always been handed back to civilians once the political situation had been normalized, as in the case of removing Vargas in 1954 (Roett, 1999:108). Military professionalism, which had until 1964 guided the military's dealing with politicians, was replaced by what Fiechter (1975:25) terms "structural militarism"⁴².

³⁹ Partido Social Democrático

⁴⁰ Partido Trabalhador Brasileiro

⁴¹ Roett (1999:37) uses Huntingdon's term "praetorian society" to describe the Brazilian political situation from 1946-1964. This refers to the low institutionalisation of, yet high participation in, political processes.

⁴² This term refers to the emerging belief that the military, because of their training at the institution known as the Superior War College (ESG), was eminently more suitable to rule Brazil and guide it on a path to economic modernization and democratic consolidation. The Superior War College's purpose was essentially to train the young military elite for entrance into political careers. All the military presidents were graduates of this institution (Roett, 1999:110).

Thus the intention of the military was originally to hold the state of Brazil in trusteeship until such time as it was deemed ready to be handed back to civilian rule once more. This mandate, subsequently extended to 1967, was issued in the preamble of the first of five “Institutional Acts” unilaterally decreed by the acting military president⁴³:

“...to provide the new government which will be sworn in with the indispensable means for the task of the economic, financial, political and moral reconstruction of Brazil, to enable it to grapple directly and immediately with the serious and urgent problems on which the restoration of internal order and the international prestige of the country depend.”
(quoted from Fiechter, 1975:37).

The PSD joined the National Democratic Union (UDN)⁴⁴ to form ARENA (National Renewal Alliance)⁴⁵, the official government party (Roett, 1999:45).

It initially seemed that the military was indeed making good on its promises of national restoration. For over a decade Brazil’s economy witnessed spectacular growth of 10% per annum, propelled by import-substitution policies and rapidly increased industrialization (Gillespie, 1990:64). This was not to last.

The growth experienced had huge social costs (Lamounier, 1999:153) reinforcing Fiechter’s (1975:37) assertion that the military succeeded only in modernizing Brazil’s economy, rather than rectifying inequalities and creating jobs from foreign direct investment as was originally intended⁴⁶. In addition to the weakening of the “capitalist dictatorship miracle” (McDonough, 1981:3), by 1969 inflation had reached 20% and would worsen in the coming years despite every attempt by the government to bring it under control (Fiechter, 1975:192). During the reign of the military, the successive

⁴³ The first of these was Castello Branco, appointed to this position on the approval of several military factions (Fichter, 1975:37)

⁴⁴ Uniao Democrática Nacional (the unofficial opposition before 1964).

⁴⁵ Aliança Renovadora Nacional.

⁴⁶ These were two of the goals of PAEG (Economic Plan of Action of the Government) in 1964-1966 under President Castello Branco.

passing of the “Institutional Acts”, one of which suspended most basic civil liberties, rendered the Constitution (of 1946) useless. It is estimated that nine thousand people “disappeared” at the hands of the military and three hundred had their political rights, such as they were, suspended. Forty of these were Congress members. The police were notorious for their brutality. Brazil was slowly becoming internationally ostracized (Roett, 1999:115).

It was in 1974, under President Ernesto Geisel, the fourth president of the military regime⁴⁷, that the government finally began the process of implementing much needed reforms (Martinez-Lara, 1996:27). As is characteristic of authoritarian reform, however, it was envisioned that the military would be in constant control of the *abertura*⁴⁸ process (Roett, 1999:127). Indeed, to prevent the regime change from being too dramatic, what became known as the “April package”⁴⁹ was issued. Despite the weak party structure and the virtually non-existent civil society, however, it was not possible to retain control of the process which had been set in motion (Martinez-Lara, 1996:29).

By 1978 new reforms had been imposed, revoking Institutional Act No. 5 and thus re-instating all civil liberties, including *habeus corpus* (Martinez-Lara, 1996:30). In 1979 an amnesty law allowed the official recognition of political parties other than the government party (ARENA) and the official opposition (MDB⁵⁰). Both of these parties renamed themselves as the PDS⁵¹ and PMDB⁵² respectively.

A massive campaign for direct presidential elections was launched in 1984, directed for the first time at the public at large. It was known as “Direitas-Ja”⁵³. Despite its failure to

⁴⁷ The Presidents of the military regime were General Humberto Castello Branco (1964-1966); General Arthur Costa e Silva (1966-1969); General Emilio Garrastazu Medici (1969-1973); Ernesto Geisel (1974-1978).

⁴⁸ Portuguese for ‘opening’; this term was coined to describe the process of political liberalisation which began in Brazil in 1974.

⁴⁹ This was a series of liberalizing reforms, intended to slow down the need for a political handover. It is an example of what Schmitter (1996:78) terms “dictablanda”, liberalization without democratisation.

⁵⁰ Movimento Democrático Brasileiro

⁵¹ Partido Democrático Social

⁵² Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro

⁵³ Translated literally, this means “Direct elections now”.

achieve this goal, its enormous popular support base succeeded in raising mass political awareness (Martinez-Lara, 1996:33).

When Tancredo Neves, the opposition's presidential candidate, was elected in 1985, it was widely recognised that his charismatic personality was required to reconcile the uneasy elite settlement of government handover and overcome Brazil's institutional weaknesses (Martinez-Lara, 1996:41). Indeed, although a skeletal democratic framework essentially remained in place, its institutions had effectively become obsolete, rendering the transition extremely vulnerable (Lamounier, 1999:137). His untimely death on the eve of his inauguration was almost the death knell for the transition, with José Sarney, the vice-president elect, hastily being sworn in in his stead, despite the unacceptability of this to both sides⁵⁴.

Democracy, however, did not atrophy completely. To symbolize a clean break with the past, despite the lack of unity⁵⁵ and weak party system, Brazil's fourth and current Constitution was drafted and eventually promulgated in 1988.

Severe economic problems, however, further hampered the democratic process. While it seems that the PMDB had found the solution in the Cruzado Plan of 1986⁵⁶, the situation only worsened with successive attempts. By 1990, under the Collor administration, the fifth austerity plan in as many years was being put into place, complete with yet another unit of currency, also the fifth such change (Roett, 1999:163). Admittedly, many of the aspirations represented by the economic plans were foiled by political power plays⁵⁷. Nevertheless, it was only in 1994, during the presidency of Itamar Franco, that the situation improved. Appointed as Finance Minister, Fernando Henrique Cardoso's "Plano

⁵⁴ As previously discussed, Sarney was a PDS candidate, thus his crossing the floor rendered him untrustworthy to both the PMDB and PDS. It is interesting that Ulysses Guimarães, president of the PMDB was not sworn in, perhaps illustrating the uniqueness of Neves in his ability to win PDS acceptance.

⁵⁵ Aside from the inherent conflict between PDS and PMDB, the PMDB, the largest political party since 1982, had sacrificed ideological coherence for strength in numbers. Lack of internal unity prevented both decisive action and hindered their ability to mobilize civil society's support (Martinez-Lara, 1996:48).

⁵⁶ The short-term success of this plan is reflected in the results of the 1986 gubernatorial and national elections (Roett, 1999:159).

⁵⁷ An example here is the Bresser Plan, implemented in the late eighties. For a comprehensive outline, see Roett, 1999.

Real” destroyed hyper-inflation and began to reduce inequalities marginally. So successful was he that he was promptly elected president in 1995 and the Constitution was changed so that he could serve another term from 1999 to 2003.

It must be mentioned here that Brazil’s democracy is still nowhere near what some consider to be consolidated democracies⁵⁸ (Cammack, 1994; Higley & Gunther, 1992:277). Despite severe economic pressure, huge socio-economic inequalities and the impeachment of a president less than a decade after transition, however, Brazil has weathered all these trials remarkably well and remains a democracy today (Hunter, 2003:158). Arguably, this is due to the nature of the transition, an elite pact⁵⁹. Despite Brazil’s weak party system, the elite settlement was concluded whereby the government party was beaten at its own game and accepted defeat (Landman, 2000:155). Lack of unity notwithstanding, the political elites were brought together to draw up the “rules of the game”. Interestingly, Higley & Gunther (1992:279), contend that there never was an elite settlement at all. They claim that the loss of Neves⁶⁰ and the fragmented nature of Brazilian party politics prevented any real conclusive or even inclusive agreement between elites, suggesting that this is the reason that Brazil’s democracy is not consolidated⁶¹ (Higley & Gunther, 1992:279). They contend that an elite pact is a social contract which guarantees security for certain elite groups, allowing the eventual consolidation of democracy (Higley and Gunther, 1992:33-34). Although it is perhaps true that Brazil’s democracy is not consolidated because of the reasons mentioned above, the fact that an agreement was reached in which not only was power transferred from the military (ARENA) to civilians (PMDB), but democratisation, however limited, occurred, which suggests an agreement of some sort.

⁵⁸ See Chapter Three for the definition and conceptualization of a consolidated democracy.

⁵⁹ As shall be seen, this pact was not concluded under as favourable conditions as those of South Africa. The partners were not equal, there was much procrastination by bureaucratic hard-liners and it is argued that the wrong set of institutions was picked for Brazil’s political context (Schmitter, quoted in Friedman & De Villiers, 1996:12-14).

⁶⁰ This in itself illustrates the importance of the personal characteristics of the elites (Higley & Gunther, 1992:279). This can be seen in the South African case in terms of Mandela’s and De Klerk’s key roles in negotiations.

⁶¹ Broderick (2000:15) also emphasizes the importance of elite agreement in pacts and settlements leading to democratic transition.

The election of Lula in 2003 sets a new precedent for Brazilian politics. As mentioned above, he is the only working-class president ever elected in Brazil, albeit on his fifth attempt⁶². Many believe Lula's ascendance to be a reflection of popular disillusionment with Cardoso's neo-liberal market reforms and the jobless growth it has produced (Hunter, 2003:154, Lagos, 2003:170). It remains to be seen whether President Lula will indeed succeed in addressing the dire socio-economic problems of Brazil.

2.3.2. South Africa

In terms of independence from a colonial power, South Africa is a much younger country than Brazil. Having formed the South African Union in 1910⁶³, South Africa was made a *de facto* sovereign state by the mid-1930s with the passing of the Statute of Westminster (1931) and the Status of the Union Act (1934) (Du Toit, 1995:296). Segregationist legislation was already firmly established by this stage⁶⁴. Indeed, several key pieces of legislation had been passed within the first few years of the formation of the Union. The most infamous of these are the Native Land Act⁶⁵ (1913) and the Native Urban Areas Act (1923)⁶⁶ (Marx, 1998:98).

It must be mentioned here that, despite the propensity of the South African government to distinguish primarily between whites and non-whites⁶⁷, within the white minority there

⁶² Lula has long been involved in politics, as a member of the Worker's Party (PT). His first presidential election campaign was against Fernando Collor de Mello in 1990.

⁶³ This was the consolidation of the four British colonial possessions into one political unit which was *de facto* self-governing (Du Toit, 1995:292). As a foretaste of things to come, no black representatives were invited to the National Convention in 1900 which led to the formation of the Union (Du Toit, 1995:295).

⁶⁴ The South African Native Affairs Commission, established in 1903 by Lord Milner, aided in this.

⁶⁵ This law restricted black ownership of land to 'reserves' especially laid aside for this purpose. These constituted 7% of South Africa's land area.

⁶⁶ This legislation introduced the notorious pass laws and regulated separate housing for blacks. These laws would be followed by the Pegging Act (1943); Asiatic Land and Indian Representative Act (1946); and the Group Areas Act (1950) (James & Lever, 2001:37).

⁶⁷ Coloureds were officially recognized as a racial category in 1904 (Marx, 1998:71). Nevertheless, all races which were not Caucasian (or could not pass as such) were eventually lumped together in 1955 and labelled 'non-whites'. Coloureds, despite having had qualified franchise in the Cape Colony for over 100 years, were struck off the common voter's role in 1956 (Giliomee, 1994:4). Along with other 'non-whites', they could elect three white representatives, in terms of the Representation of the Native Act (1936) (Du Toit, 1995:309, 298). In the early 1980s, to reinforce segregation and perhaps in an attempt to win over political support in the event of a democratic transition, coloureds and Indians were afforded special privileges (Steyn, 2001:93). Although this placed them marginally above blacks in socio-economic status, the racial balance of power remained the same (Friedman, 1995:531).

was by no means complete unity. Marx (1998:37-38) suggests that the British reneged on promised protection for the “native African” in favour of forming an alliance with the Afrikaner⁶⁸, considered the biggest threat to the colonial dominance of the former. Indeed, the segregationist Glen Grey Act of 1884 was apartheid’s forerunner. Furthermore, this created white solidarity in the face of a black majority.

By 1912 the organisation which later became known as the African National Congress (ANC)⁶⁹ had been formed and this movement petitioned the Crown directly in an attempt to alleviate the racial discrimination suffered by blacks, coloureds and Indians in South Africa. The ANC’s pleas, however, fell on deaf ears and their perceived failure led to a withdrawal of support in the wake of the Great Depression⁷⁰. In the 1940s however, a more militant group re-emerged with the formation of the ANC Youth League. The miner’s strike of 1946, however, seemed to highlight the *swart gevaar*⁷¹ in the minds of the white minority (Marais, 2001:12) and the National Party (NP), flagship of Afrikaaner nationalism, experienced a windfall election result in 1948. This party would rule unchallenged electorally, albeit by whites-only parties, for over four decades.

The NP immediately began consolidating the racial domination which had taken root within South African political culture. With reference to the passing of the Population Registration Act (1950), Freidman (1995:534) does not exaggerate when he states that race, in South Africa, was the primary social and economic divide, determining everything from one’s property rights and residential area, to education and access to state facilities⁷². Furthermore, the Mixed Marriages Act (1949) and the Immorality Act

⁶⁸ ‘Afrikaner’ is that name of South Africans of primarily Dutch origin whose ancestors settled in what is now South Africa prior to its becoming a British colony in the early nineteenth century. Historically there was animosity between the Afrikaners and British settlers following the First and Second Boer Wars. (For a more detailed discussions on the repercussions of these events, see Marx, 1998).

⁶⁹ This organization, formerly the South African National Native Congress, was made up of the members of the tiny black elite that had arisen despite South African society’s heavy racial prejudice. Most had been educated at mission stations (Friedman, 1995:537). It was renamed the African National Congress in 1923.


⁷⁰ This organisation’s support base had been elitist; members had in fact been at pains to distinguish themselves from the uncivilized masses in the eyes of the South African government (Sisk, 1995:61).

⁷¹ Afrikaans for literally “black danger”, this was a propagandist term used in apartheid days to emphasize the danger of black minority rule for whites from which apartheid supposedly protected society.

⁷² This is the primary reason that race is included as a social background variable in the South African section of this study.

ensured that there would be no further racial miscegenation (Sisk, 1995:8). The ANC, aided by the newly formed ANC Women's League, launched the Defiance Campaign in 1952. Nevertheless, failure to achieve results led to support petering out by 1953. The tragedy of the Sharpeville massacre⁷³ in 1960 gave the NP government the excuse they needed to declare a state of emergency and ban both the ANC and other "non-white" political organisations (Du Toit, 1995:25).

The apartheid state extended its definition of separate development by establishing several "homelands" or "bantustans", each one roughly corresponding to supposedly traditional lands of an ethnic group such as the Zulus, the Tswanas, the Xhosas, etc. Together these "homelands", the boundaries of which were originally laid out in the Land Act of 1936⁷⁴, comprised approximately 14% of South Africa's total surface area and they were technically supposed to be the home of 80% of the population (Hanf, 1981:145, 286). The homelands were offered independence from South Africa, as an alternative to white rule, but should they accept it, as the Transkei did in 1976, citizens of the homeland lost their South African citizenship. Thus, as was intended, migrant workers would become foreign labourers in South Africa, devoid of any political rights at all⁷⁵ (Schrire, 1994:127).



Apartheid thus was effectively a project of social engineering which enabled a white Afrikaans minority to sculpt a sense of nationality and nationhood. The centralist state apparatus was also used as an "ethnic patronage network" (Friedman, 1995:541) in order to resolve the "poor white" question by privileging whites to the detriment of other ethnic groups. Unofficially, the Afrikaans community was given free reign in the political arena, while the English consolidated their control over the private sector up until the 1970s (Marx, 1998:97; Giliomee & Simkins, 1999:8). While ostensibly not the most ardent supporters of apartheid *per se*, big business had a readily exploitable unskilled labour

⁷³ Police opened fire on unarmed rioting township residents in Sharpeville, killing 12 by shooting them in the back as they fled.

⁷⁴ The bantustans officially came into being with the Promotion of the Bantu Self-government Act (1959).

⁷⁵ The legislation involved was the known as the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act (1970).

force as a result of the socio-political division of labour⁷⁶ (Friedman, 1995:541; Marx, 1998:38).

After the most prominent leaders of the ANC were exiled, their ties with the South African Communist Party (SACP⁷⁷) strengthened (Friedman, 1995:537, Marais, 2001). This was perhaps not only due to the geo-strategic pledge of the Soviet Union to support “freedom fighters,” but also because of the appeal at the time of the ideological tendencies of socialism. It was felt by some within the ANC that its emphasis on non-racialism and acceptance as members of all those willing to oppose apartheid, regardless of ethnicity, damaged black solidarity. The Pan-African Congress (PAC) under the leadership of Robert Sobukwe broke away in 1959 to become the hard-liners of the left. By the 1970s “Black Consciousness” had emerged in South Africa, although its appeal was essentially only to the black elite. From it arose the Azanian People’s Organisation (AZAPO)⁷⁸.

While the Soweto Uprising of 1976 ultimately led to the granting of union rights to black workers⁷⁹ in 1978 (Sisk, 1995:61; Friedman, 1995:538), the apartheid government was disinclined to negotiate with the ANC, despite the anti-apartheid struggle having escalated into a “virtual civil war” (Friedman & De Villiers, 1996:146). There were some who maintained that the regime had softened even before this apparent concession to black labour, which in turn had led Albert Hertzog⁸⁰ to form the *Herstigigte Nasionale Party*⁸¹ in 1968.

⁷⁶ As in the case of Brazil, it would only be when this was form of political economy was no longer economically viable that big business would come to advocate democracy (Gillespie,1990:50; Shaw,2001:4).

⁷⁷ Formed in 1923, the SACP’s (then the CPSA) power increased with the banning of the ANC. They are credited with helping to finance ANC guerrilla fighters’ training in Moscow and Cuba (Lodge, 1999:131).

⁷⁸ Steve Biko, a prominent activist in the ‘Black Consciousness’ movement became this organisation’s martyr when he died in police custody in 1977.

⁷⁹ This relates to the apartheid government consenting to blacks legally being able to form unions. Cosatu, the Congress of South African Trade Unions, formed in 1985, became the third member of what became known as the tripartite alliance between the latter, the ANC and the SACP (Shaw, 2001:3).

⁸⁰ Son of the former prime minister James Barry Hertzog (1924-1939).

⁸¹ Renewed National Party

It was obvious that when attempted reforms were implemented, such as Prime Minister PW Botha's "tricameral" parliament, allowing controlled representation of the Indian and Coloured minorities, that it was too little too late (Slabbert, 1990:82; Friedman, 1995:538). The United Democratic Front (UDF), an umbrella organisation for civil society movements, although affirming political independence (Lodge, 1999:83), was very much behind the ANC. The Anglican Church had also condemned racial segregation (Friedman, 1995:540). The ANC, in planning to make South Africa "ungovernable" by 1985, had in essence succeeded, as states of emergency were declared in 1985 and 1986 to be maintained indefinitely (Cloete, 1990:43).

Thus, by the mid-1980s it was realised that some sort of political compromise to break the deadlock between the ANC and the NP was inevitable⁸². Indeed, the NP had been conducting secret negotiations with Nelson Mandela⁸³ since as early as 1982 (Shaw, 2002:7). His release, along with many other political prisoners, and the unbanning of the ANC in February 1990 marked the beginning of public rapprochement between the two political opponents, the NP and the ANC (Rhoadie, 1991:510; Schlemmer, 1991:2; Cloete, 1990:29).

The period between 1990 and 1993 can best be described as a protracted series of negotiations between the aspiring political elites and the crumbling incumbent regime, which ultimately culminated in an elite pact. Conventions such as the Congress for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) of 1991 and 1993⁸⁴ and the Multi-party Negotiation Process (MPNP) of 1993 were held. Through these, an Interim Constitution, promulgated

⁸² While external influences are not the focus of this study, Shaw (2002:7) mentions several such factors, such as the end of the Cold War, sanctions, the precedent set by the Namibian negotiated pact, among others, which precipitated the NP's decision to negotiate. It can be argued that neglecting to discuss these factors leaves several holes in the study's line of argument. Nevertheless, it is argued here that these factors, on a broader, more global scale, influenced both the Brazilian and the South African transitions in a similar way. For example, Reagan's foreign policy encouraging democratisation was present during both transitions (Broderick, 2000:14) and thus logically had a similar influence on regime change from authoritarianism to democracy in both cases.

⁸³ Nelson Mandela had been incarcerated on Robben Island as a political prisoner since 1963 following his being found guilty of terrorist acts. He was acting president of the ANC because Oliver Tambo, the *de jure* president, was in exile.

⁸⁴ The first set of these talks collapsed in 1991, although a 'Declaration of Principles' was issued, and a second set, CODESA II, was established in 1993 to continue the process.

in 1993, was hammered out, describing the processes through which the proposed Government of National Unity was to be elected (Shaw, 2002:12-15).

So it was that the first South African multi-party elections with universal franchise took place in 1994. Cynics contend that rather than putting faith in the uncertainty of a truly democratic outcome, it was an elite pact to the very end. All the key players achieved a political goal to mollify them and curb any animosity, leaving nothing of Schmitter's (1998) "uncertainties of democracy". The ANC won a two-thirds majority barring one vote, thus stopping just short of the power to unilaterally change the Constitution, the NP won enough seats to warrant a deputy-president being chosen from their party and the IFP (Inkatha Freedom Party⁸⁵) won regional control of the Kwa-Zulu Natal province, their political stronghold. Nevertheless, the important role of political elites in smoothing the transition process and thus preventing the possibility of grassroots clashes is recognised by political analysts (Hadenius, 2000:73). It must be conceded that whatever "back-room bargaining" (Friedman & de Villiers, 1996:50) may have taken place, the South African transition in 1994 was truly remarkable considering the pessimistic prognoses of some. It was the effective mediation of a political transition⁸⁶ which, acted out at grassroots level, would more than likely have culminated in a blood bath (Landman, 2000:73).

In 1996 the Government of National Unity⁸⁷ promulgated the final National Constitution which would replace the interim document. It was understood that such concessions to appease minority and essentially white concerns, such as the guarantee of a cabinet seat

⁸⁵ Initially a cultural movement, "Inkatha" became a political party in the early nineties under Mangosuthu Buthelezi. A controversial personage in South African political history, Buthelezi is said to have collaborated with the apartheid government as a bantustan tribal ruler in the 1980s in opposing the ANC and fomenting so-called "black on black" violent (Marx, 1998:206). Relations between the ANC and the IFP have thus sometimes been strained, especially as the IFP is predominantly Zulu by definition, whereas the ANC, despite their policy of non-racialism, garners most of its support from South African Xhosa speakers. Matters came to a head in 1994, when the IFP walked out of talks leading up to the 1994 elections, only to announce their re-entry into the elections just days before the polling stations were to open (Friedman, 1995:545).

⁸⁶ The precedent which this pact, essentially between the NP and the ANC, set in terms of compromise and reconciliation has already been commented on. It served to foster unity within the nation starting from the top (Landman, 2000:74).

⁸⁷ This was the government which was elected in the 1994 elections, whose primary tasks were the formulation of the official Constitution and overseeing the political transition.

to any party winning a 5% threshold in Parliament, would be waived in the 1999 elections (Hadenius, 2000:77).

It was recognised that a major goal for the newly elected government would be the social and economic upliftment of those previously disadvantaged under the apartheid system, in essence the majority of the population. To this effect, the Reconstruction and Development Programme⁸⁸ (RDP) was launched, with the twin goals of simultaneously alleviating poverty and reconstructing the economy, under strain from the *ancien regime's*⁸⁹ considerable debt (Lodge, 1999:27). This programme was interpreted to mean “different things to different people” (Marais, 2001:238). Whereas the political left saw this as beginning to redress the past, the private sector saw the RDP as a promise by the state not to oppose privatisation. The cost of this programme was not reflected in increased state expenditure as many state subsidies were withdrawn to cover its costs (Lodge, 1999:30-31). Despite marked improvement in the provision of basic services, the ambiguity of the programme’s mandate limited its impact and it was withdrawn in 1996 amid much controversy, later replaced by GEAR (the Growth, Employment and Redistribution programme).

It is here that the tripartite alliance⁹⁰ began to weaken, as the perception was that the ANC had succumbed to the temptations of international capital and big business. This is especially true because GEAR, a document much more neo-liberally orientated in its framework, was presented as a *fait accompli* to the ANC National Executive and its allies. Consultation with the SACP or Cosatu was thus pointedly neglected, as was becoming more and more the case⁹¹ (Lodge, 1999:5-7). While the influence of the SACP had waned with the crumbling of the USSR in 1989, Cosatu had perhaps arguably been

⁸⁸ Under the directorship of Aziz Pahad.

⁸⁹ Originally used in the context of the French Revolution in 1789 to refer to the absolutist monarchy of King Louis XVI, *ancien regime* is French for ‘previous regime’.

⁹⁰ This was a political alliance between ANC, SACP and Cosatu (The Congress of South African Trade Unions).

⁹¹ Indeed, Marais (2001:95) suggests that the Reconstruction and Development Programme was propagated before the 1994 elections to win Cosatu’s backing of the ANC, then subtly changed following the elections. To be sure, the final document was radically different from the initial drafts.

mollified by the formation of NEDLAC⁹² in 1994. The ANC remained firmly in the driving seat, however. In addition, civil society, while having flourished during the apartheid era, suffered a severe blow when the UDF's successor, the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO) lost 70% of its leadership to regional and national governments following the 1994 elections⁹³ (Lodge, 1999:83). Despite SANCO allowing those who had become parliamentarians and local councillors to retain their positions at SANCO, in 1997 it was felt that this organisation experienced severe marginalisation and had lost much of the influence it had previously exercised over the ANC (Lodge, 1999:84).

South Africa has nevertheless emerged from two more consecutive national elections, held in 1999 and 2004, without mishap and is considered by some to be well on its way to furthering democratic consolidation, having successfully completed democratic transition (Friedman, 1995; Lodge, 1999; Shaw, 2002; Hyden, 2000b:14). Mandela stepped down following the completion of his presidential term in 1999 in favour of his successor, Thabo Mbeki. Despite the ANC's having won well over a two-thirds majority in the most recent national election, Mbeki has promised not to seek a third term through a unilateral constitutional amendment⁹⁴. Marring this picture of possible democratic consolidation, however, is the fact that despite President Mbeki's promises, South Africa is seen by both analysts and political opponents alike as a *de facto* one-party dominant state and it seems that it will remain so for the foreseeable future (Giliomee & Simkins, 1999:1; *Mail & Guardian* 21/6/04). Exacerbating the situation is the view held by some that, because of their historical affiliations, the majority of black South Africans will support the ANC whether their situations improve or not, threatening to alienate the other racial minorities (Giliomee & Simkins, 1999:25;41). There are thus many political obstacles, both real and perceived, yet to be overcome before South African democracy can be regarded as convincingly consolidated.

⁹² The National Economic Development and Labour Council was instituted to foster dialogue between the state, the private sector and labour organizations, specifically about labour policies; see www.nedlac.org.za.

⁹³ Due to the policy of maintaining political neutrality, SANCO members who wished to participate in the public sector had to resign from their positions held at SANCO. This held until 1997.

⁹⁴ A constitutional amendment requires a two-thirds majority, followed by a further 75% vote in favour of the motion in the National Assembly. Furthermore, six out of the nine provinces in the National Council of Provinces must also be in favour of the motion (Shaw, 2001:20).

On the economic front South Africa was recognised by Morgan & Stanley as one of the top five most promising emerging markets (Shaw, 2002:7). Although apartheid's ostracism was a contributing factor, the new regime's refusal to borrow money to service debt has led to low levels of international debt and South Africa is recognised as harbouring few of the characteristically African impediments to progress and stability that are present elsewhere on the continent (Shaw, 2002:68; Chege, 1996:351; Ake, 1996:70).

Politically, the Mbeki administration has done much for South Africa. Although not a charismatic leader like his predecessor, President Mbeki is an astute political manager and negotiator, supported by the business sector (Lodge, 1999:117). He has also endeavoured to put South Africa on the map through his 1997 "I am an African" speech and his propagation of the "African Renaissance" (Lodge, 1999:98). Nevertheless, he has often been surrounded by controversy, following his "quiet diplomacy" approach towards Zimbabwe and his stance on HIV/AIDS (*Cape Times*, 27/04/04). The backlash at media criticism of the government is also worrying. The fact that South Africa could be described as a "*de facto* one-party dominant state" is also a point of concern, as Shaw (2002:30) points to the fact that multiparty politics are "the heart-beat of democracy". Thus prospects for South Africa's further consolidation of democracy, while promising, are by no means completely assured.

2.4 Comparing Historical Legacies

From the cursory political insights provided above, it is evident that while there are many aspects of South Africa and Brazil's historical legacies which bear little resemblance, there are several rather important parallels. The most striking of these, as well as the most radical differences, will be elaborated on below.

Firstly, it is evident that both the *ancien regimes* and the nature of the democratic transitions themselves share many characteristics. In both cases the pre-democratic government was authoritarian, yet it began introducing gradual reforms and negotiating

with the political opposition. This was approximately ten years before history recognised these respective countries' democratizations after their first democratic elections (Shaw, 2002:7; Martinez-Lara, 1996:27). The self-imposed nature of these reforms is emphasized in this study as the international influences of both of these transitions, while not ignored, have not been focused on⁹⁵. It has been argued that internal pressures for democratic transition are by far the most important prerequisite for such change (Hurrell, 1996). Consequently, it must be recognized that the timing of South Africa's transition was affected by several external factors, despite or perhaps because of its political isolation (Shaw, 2002:7). These are the ANC's international support network and the end of the Cold War. Brazil, while unusually insulated from world affairs (Hurrell, 1996:146) also experienced external pressure. The argument maintaining that a comparison over a disparate time-frame is thus valid as many of these pressures on the two countries were the same⁹⁶.

Regarding the nature of the transitions specifically, they were both elite pacts⁹⁷. Consequently, it could be argued that this provided for too much continuity from the old forms of government. It is true that the military kept a strong finger in the political pie after *abertura* through the Sarney presidency; and the NP arguably retained far more influence than it would have retained through strict proportional representation⁹⁸ (Hurrell, 1996:161; Friedman, 1995:559; Hadenius, 2002:77). Nevertheless, it could be countered that it is this very continuity which has saved both democracies from political retrogression, so often seen in developing countries, as it cushioned the inevitable

⁹⁵ The rationale for this is presented by the arguments in Chapter One.

⁹⁶ These include the USA's continued foreign policy advocating democracy, the upholding of human rights (both regimes were violators in this respect) and the continued sanctions and ostracism experienced by both regimes due to their non-conformity to global norms (Broderick, 2000:14; Whitehead, 1996:154; Shaw, 2001:6) For a detailed examination of Brazil's external influences to democratic transition, see Hurrell (1996). Shaw (2001) albeit less thoroughly, describes the international factors contributing to the South African transition. See also Geldenhuys, 1984.

⁹⁷ While Higley & Gunther's (1992:279) argument that there was never an elite pact in Brazil is acknowledged, it is argued here that the fact that political power remained with the political elite (Roett, 1999:95), although it changed hands in terms of political parties, constitutes a kind of elite pact.

⁹⁸ The provisos guaranteeing minority representation in the first democratic term of administration have been mentioned, among those effectively allowing the NP a deputy president. These subsequently fell away in the term beginning in 1999.

institutional shock inherent in regime change⁹⁹ (Schmitter, 1996b:25; Przeworski, 1995:50; Hadenius, 2002:67). Weffert (1994:31) emphasizes the importance of good leaders in the early transitional phases. In both cases studies, it was the political elites who took the initiative.

Something must also be said about the remarkably similar socio-economic profile shared by South Africa and Brazil¹⁰⁰. In both cases the decades of authoritarian rule exacerbated what had already been very unequal societies (O’Connell & Birdsall, 2001; Nascimento & Nascimento, 2001:128). The reason for this is two-fold.

In the first instance, racism was used as a weapon against the masses. A legacy of slavery and colonialism dictated that, as a general rule, blacks were more impoverished than whites. In South Africa this situation was reinforced by a deliberate accumulation of legislation ensuring that the welfare of the white population was subsidized by the neglect of the black majority¹⁰¹ (Ramphela, 2001:65). In Brazil, following the higher rate of miscegenation historically, the phenomenon of racism was much more subtle¹⁰², despite achieving the same effect as apartheid (Sansone, 2003:152). It was related more to the darkness of one’s skin¹⁰³ (on a colour continuum) than the ethnic categorization it implied. Nevertheless, in Brazil the prerequisite of literacy to vote excluded most blacks from political franchise, as had been the intention, especially as little effort was made on the part of the government to improve the socio-economic circumstances of the mostly black poor (O’Donnell & Birdsall, 2001:291). In addition, the false ideology of a “racial

⁹⁹ While perhaps not so evident in the Brazilian case, in South Africa the ANC’s primary mandate was to bring democracy to South Africa, leaving them ill-prepared to actually assume government authority. Aside from allowing “sharing of blame”, retaining parliamentarians from the *ancien regime* initially provided much needed administrative experience (Friedman, 1995).

¹⁰⁰ See chapter one.

¹⁰¹ A direct example of this is a comparison of government subsidies per schoolchild according to race and age group; see O’Donnell & Birdsall, 2001.

¹⁰² It is noteworthy that the principles of eugenics were incorporated into the 1934 Constitution under Vargas, despite his populist image as a “champion of the working-class”, who would have been predominantly darker skinned (Nascimento & Guimarães, 2001:514).

¹⁰³ Sansone (2003) found that his interviewees collectively used more than 36 terms to describe the different colours of their complexion, as many have negative or positive connotations. In an attempt to promote racial democracy however, the military state census omitted racial categorization (Marx, 1998:177).

democracy”, simultaneously ignored structural inequalities and prevented political mobilization or solidarity on the basis of race¹⁰⁴ (Guimarães,2001).

Secondly, in both cases, the disenfranchisement of the poor, generally the black masses, consequently released the government of any obligations of social accountability, as they did not form part of the electorate. This left the governments in South Africa and Brazil free to pursue clientelistic relations with the richer, whiter sectors of society, thus further widening the gap between the “haves” and the “have-nots” (Friedman, 1995:541; McDonough, 1981). The subsequent state of the population, in terms of socio-economic inequalities, has had important consequences for levels of support for democracy in both South Africa and Brazil.

Firstly, with the institution of a universal franchise, the government had, literally overnight, become accountable to an electorate, approximately 80%¹⁰⁵ of whom has been effectively ignored by the government for several decades and the majority lacked the provision of basic needs as a result of past discrimination. This presents a serious challenge to the current administrations. Not only was the state apparatus previously not equipped to deal with this demand, political actors face the potential loss of substantial specific support should these demands not be met. The respective administrations have also lost the complete autonomy to enact the necessary economic restructuring for long-term benefits as the inevitable job losses will evoke public protest.

In addition, the waning legitimacy of both South Africa’s and Brazil’s authoritarian regimes also affected citizens’ relations toward the state. In the former case years of protest through boycotting had instilled a culture of non-payment (Friedman, 1995:543) in certain sectors of the population, further depriving the state of much needed revenue and further weakening political legitimacy. In the latter case the recent phenomenon of political apathy, most evident among black youths, can be directly attributable to the

¹⁰⁴ To this day political campaigning on the basis of race, even in the most black areas of Brazil, have come to nothing as it is considered a taboo subject (Guimarães, 2001:170).

¹⁰⁵ In 1994 the percentage of non-whites in South Africa was approximately 76% (Friedman, 1995:531) and in Brazil in 1988 the percentage of non-literates was 78% (Lamounier, quoted in Friedman & De Villiers, 1996:31)

feeling of powerlessness and frustration engendered through decades of authoritarian rule (Sansone, 2003:104; Guimarães, 2001:170).

Despite all these factors, the contention here is that both South Africa and Brazil will demonstrate similar trends to those that characterize mature democracies with deeply embedded democratic cultural norms. This is due to the very important fact that in both cases some semblance of democratic practice, however limited, was maintained throughout authoritarian rule. It is proposed that this sustained practice fostered a democratic political culture even through the years of the previous oppressive regime. Consequently, it is proposed that diffuse support for democracy, may have developed, providing the reservoir of support for democratic principles needed to sustain a democratic regime in times of crisis.

In Brazil this is ostensibly due to the fact that it was always the intention of the military government to return to civilian democratic rule “once the country was ready”¹⁰⁶ (Fiechter, 1975:37; Roett, 1999:50). Presidential and gubernatorial elections were held regularly and official opposition existed throughout the twenty years of military rule, despite the frequent manipulations of the system on the part of the government and temporary suspensions of certain rights and institutions (Lamounier, 1999:132-133; Martinez-Lara, 1996:15).

In the case of South Africa during the apartheid years, the situation was much the same as that described above. Despite police brutality¹⁰⁷, regular elections were held, with all the institutions of democracy maintained in place, including parliamentary opposition, provided the political participants were white. By the same token, the black elite were fighting for the institutionalization of democracy, so naturally democratic theory was well-known and propagated by them (Friedman, 1995:541).

¹⁰⁶ It is thus ironic that Castello Branco, the first military president, projected that having a mandate of only two years (later extended) would be sufficient to bring Brazil back to political order (Fiechter, 1975:44).

¹⁰⁷ This was present in both authoritarian regimes and it is contended that this situation prevails in Brazil to this day (Landman, 2003:31).

Consequently, it is possible that the necessary permeation of democratic norms into the democratic political culture to ensure diffuse democratic support was already in place¹⁰⁸. While specific support gained through satisfactory regime performance is of course necessary, many argue that it is diffuse support that is the most fundamental to democracy's survival as this cushions the regime in the event of performance failure (Bratton & Mattes, 2000b). Diffuse support is thus especially necessary in developing countries, where the authorities are faced with the twin challenges of both political and economic liberalization as they are re-integrated into the global economy.

2.6 Conclusion

Democracy, despite the universal acknowledgement of its importance, remains a difficult concept to define, much less quantify, owing to the numerous ways in which it is conceptualised and the many variations of democratic regimes found throughout the world. Support for democracy, as has been discovered, is even more perplexing to conceptualise, as it arguably revolves around a common understanding of what democracy is.

It has been argued here that, while there is no certainty that Brazilians and South Africans define democracy in exactly the same way, they have a similar general understanding of it. Thus, in measuring political support for their democratic regimes, we are measuring support for democracy in their countries and allowing a certain measure of comparison.

The theoretical model chosen on which to base this study acknowledges the layered meaning of political support. It attempts to measure both diffuse support, support for democracy itself, and specific support, i.e. support for the more immediate actions of the democratic regime. This is done by attempting to measure support for the five layers of political objects identified above as the political community, regime principles, regime performance, regime institutions and political actors.

¹⁰⁸ Furthermore, at least in the case of sub-Saharan Africa, there is no correlation between poverty and a reduced appreciation of democratic norms (*Afrobarometer* Briefing Paper No. 4, 2003). This seems to contradict the belief that a certain level of economic development is necessary for sustainable democracy (Linz & Stepan, 1996). While this cannot be said to reflect Brazilian or indeed uniquely South African trends, it is a useful finding to bear in mind.

In addition, the unique politico-historical context of the two case studies has been explored in order to provide both an elaboration of their comparability and a setting for the data analysis to follow. For both new democratic regimes, knowledge of support levels for democracy will be essential in gauging its legitimacy among the masses, which is required by these regimes for sustainability, and progress in democratic consolidation.

With the theoretical point of departure clarified, and the specific historical contexts of each case study explored, the focus of the study has been solidly conceptualized. It remains to accord each element of the framework an instrument of measurement. The following chapter will thus operationalize the key conceptual elements in this study.



3.1 Introduction

Following the conceptualization of the key constructs: political support, political objects of support and democracy, as well as their contextualisation, it is necessary to consider the methodological aspect of the research. Firstly, the World Values Survey¹, the chosen measurement instrument and source of data, will be briefly described. This will be followed by a discussion of the methodological techniques to be used, focusing specifically on their appropriateness in this case as well as on disadvantages to take note of. Lastly, the operationalization of this study's primary variables will be explained.

3.2 The World Values Survey as a source of Secondary Aggregate Data²

The chosen measurement instrument, as mentioned above, is the World Values Survey, a source of secondary data. The term secondary data refers to data which have already been analysed and are being used in a study other than the one for which they were originally collected (Jackson, 1995:3). They thus provide an opportunity to rework and re-interpret the data from a different angle (Moser & Kalton, 1977:43). It is therefore possible to discover relationships between variables across countries that were not originally anticipated (Dale *et al.*, 1988:54). The secondary data used in this study, the World Values Survey (WVS), are thus aggregate data because the data collected have been categorized by country, according to the countries that participated in the survey (Landman, 2000:72).

Although the survey was not specifically designed to explore the level of support for democracy in South Africa and Brazil *per se*, it is well suited to this purpose. Especially in terms of cross-national comparative research, as is the case here, secondary data is often the only source of relevant quantitative information, as few independent researchers

¹WVS is a source of secondary data. The implications of this for the study as well as the appropriateness of this type of data for a study such as this will be addressed below. In places data have been supplemented by the Brazilian Centre of Public Opinion Studies (CESOP) survey data. This is also elaborated on below.

² Information on the World Values Survey was obtained at www.worldvaluessurvey.com ; wvs.isr.umich.edu/index.shtml

can afford to undertake a project of such magnitude as WVS single-handedly (Dale *et al.*, 1988:26). This is especially true of a longitudinal study such as this thesis, which requires several waves of the survey³, implying further expense. In addition, this study is also able to benefit from the expertise of those who created the survey, as well as save on the time and money needed to complete it (Dale *et al.*, 1988:44; Babbie & Mouton, 1998:265).

There are, however, several disadvantages to the use of secondary data. Although the data are quantitative, this does not prevent them from being influenced by the values and preferences of the primary researchers (Weisberg & Bowen, 1977:82). Often the focus of the survey is not appropriate for what the secondary researcher wishes to investigate, leading to problems of validity⁴. Similarly, even should the survey purport to measure what the secondary researcher requires, the latter has to rely on the primary researchers' operationalization, which may not always be an accurate measurement (Landman, 2000:21). Especially in view of the cross-national nature of this study, the problem is compounded by the fact that the concept which needs to be measured may be interpreted or translated differently from, in the case of this study, English into Portuguese, in the case of Brazil, and into the ten other official languages of South Africa, let alone taking into account the cultural differences which may inhibit direct translation (Mokrycki, 1979:94-95; Dogan & Kazancigil, 1994:24). A particular disadvantage of the use of secondary data encountered in this study was that, whereas it was suitable as a measurement instrument for some aspects, in others it could not be used at all. In this case, another survey was used to substitute missing data or poor indicators, as explained below. Nevertheless, the World Values Survey, for all that it may not be perfectly suited to this study, is the most appropriate source of data for this study as it facilitates the direct cross-national comparison of South Africa and Brazil, using the same instrument. As such, its origins should be explored.

The World Values Survey (WVS) developed out of surveys initially carried out by the European Value Systems Study Group (EVSSG). The first wave, in 1981, was conducted

³ WVS is generally conducted approximately every five years.

⁴ This has been the case in several instances in this study; see Chapter Four.

in primarily Western developed countries, but the project drew such interest that it was expanded to eventually include the mass publics of 45 different countries over a broad socio-economic spectrum. Subsequent waves were carried out in 1990 and 1995, when the number of participating countries increased to sixty-five. The most recent survey wave was completed in 2001. It is to date the largest cross-national exploration of social change and value shifts and, according to Babbie & Mouton (2001:265), the most widely analysed⁵.

The survey was designed and carried out by an international network of social scientists, under the guidance of a steering committee based at the University of Michigan and headed by political scientist and sociologist Ronald Inglehart. The surveys in each country were predominantly locally funded⁶ and organised, essentially allowing relative freedom from a central controlling body or sponsor⁷. Organisers, in return for their assistance in carrying out the World Values Survey project, receive free access to the data collected in all the other countries, as well as their own⁸.

Covering a wide range of topics, among them family life, work, politics and religion, the survey was initially constructed in order to investigate the suspected change in mass value systems of belief⁹. The most recent two waves, however, have shifted their focus somewhat to investigating the development of democratic political culture in developing countries¹⁰.

⁵ Publications based on the WVS used in this study include Klingeman & Fuchs (1995); Kaas & Newton (1995) and Abramson & Inglehart (1998).

⁶ Exceptions include India, China and Nigeria, for which American-based funding was sourced in order to carry out the surveys.

⁷ It must be pointed out that, while some consider this an advantage, independent researchers lack a system of standardization and this detracts from the ultimate comparability of results, especially in a project of this size.

⁸ A moratorium is placed on the data for three years for other researchers. This could be seen as a disadvantage for researchers using the data in secondary analysis, therefore, as it renders the data slightly out of date.

⁹ See Inglehart (1990, 1998).

¹⁰ Aside from the fact that both South Africa and Brazil are participants in the survey, this is another reason why this particular survey is so appropriate for use in this study, especially as WVS allows longitudinal research. Nevertheless, as will be noticed and acknowledged, changes in the survey's design, while increasing the validity of the data's use, also creates some methodological problems.

Both stratified random sampling and quota sampling were used to select the sample groups from the cross-national universe¹¹. The population included all adults over the age of 18 years¹². Respondents were surveyed by means of face-to-face interviews. The data have been weighted to correct any bias that non-responses¹³ or the over-sampling of a certain group may create.

The Brazilian version of the survey was conducted by the Gallup Institute based in Sao Paulo. The 1990 (n=1782) and 1995 (n=1149) survey waves¹⁴ were conducted in October 1991 to January 1992 and Fall¹⁵ 1997 respectively. The South African survey sets¹⁶ were conducted by Markinor Research Company, based in Randburg. The 1995 (n=2935) and 2001 (n=3000) were conducted in October to November, 1995 and March to May 2001 respectively.

3.3 Filling in the Gaps: CESOP¹⁷ data

As mentioned above, secondary data can be restrictive because they are not specifically formulated around the operationalization of one's own research problem. This is the case with the 1990 Brazil questionnaire. Whereas the 1995 and 2001 survey waves show a good deal of continuity, the topic areas covered by the 1990 and 1995 survey waves differ markedly.

In addition, questions which may have been utilised in this study's operationalization were excluded from the Brazilian version for unknown reasons. This is beyond the control of the current study. As such, in an attempt to supplement the WVS data where

¹¹ Unfortunately the specific sampling techniques for each individual country are not known, although it is noted that they do differ. Häder & Gabler (2003:123) note that, whereas random sampling may not be universally accepted as appropriate for cross-national surveys, quota sampling lacks sufficient theoretical backing. They contend that the latter is in fact inappropriate as, especially cross-nationally, the variable used to stratify the population may bias the data. It is in fact acknowledged that the populations of India, China and Nigeria, as well as the illiterate and rural populations globally, were under-sampled.

¹² This is officially the age range of the respondents, although it has been discovered that in the case of both Brazil and South Africa, respondents were aged 16 years and older.

¹³ Non-bias response is a random error whereby a large number of respondents answering 'don't know' to a question may distort results (Häder & Gabler, 2003:124).

¹⁴ The primary investigator was Carlos Eduardo Meirelles Matheus in both instances.

¹⁵ It is uncertain as to whether this refers to the Northern or Southern hemisphere.

¹⁶ Investigators included Johann Mouton, Anneke Greyling, Robert Mattes & Mari Harris.

¹⁷ Centro de Estudos de Opinião Publica

they do not fill this study's requirements surveys from the *Centro de Estudos de Opinião Pública* (CESOP) have been used¹⁸.

CESOP is an academic organisation affiliated with and based at the University of Campinas¹⁹ (UNICAMP), Brazil. It is an interdisciplinary institution, which professes to specialize in the structure, collection and organisation of survey data, particularly on public opinion. CESOP provides consultation services in the development of research projects as well as training programmes for public opinion methodology and quantitative analysis²⁰.

Two of the CESOP surveys have of necessity been employed to supplement the WVS data: one taken in January 1990²¹ (just prior to Collor's inauguration) and one in December 1990²². Both are Public Opinion Surveys, with a universe comprising Brazilian voters and Brazilian citizens of 16 and 17 years of age. For both surveys, N=3650.

3.4 Design and Methodology

This study, according to the nature of its research problem, is to engage in comparative research. In choosing to use the World Values Survey as an instrument of measurement, this study assumes a decidedly quantitative nature and it consequently uses a positivist approach. This notwithstanding, the importance of the data's context and historical precedent in a study such as this ensures that the study is also influenced by qualitative research²³. Indeed, it is recognised that cross-national comparative research is very

¹⁸ This is specifically for the 1990 Brazil 'regime performance' and 'political actor' operationalization; see below.

¹⁹ Information on CESOP is available at: www.unicamp.br/cesop.html

²⁰ As all the CESOP surveys that were used were conducted in Portuguese, the researcher's ability to understand and speak Portuguese was very useful in translating both the survey item questions and their response sets.

²¹ Used to provide data to analyse for 1990 Brazil 'regime performance'.

²² Used to provide data to analyse for 1990 Brazil 'political actors'.

²³ It is generally recognised that comparative research is best served by borrowing from both the quantitative and qualitative approaches (Ragin, 1994:130).

successful in combining the two approaches²⁴ as qualitative data provides more depth to the study's essentially quantitative findings (Dale *et al*, 1988:2,41). As such, all of these approaches, the comparative, qualitative and quantitative, will be discussed and contrasted.

3.4.1 The Comparative Approach

The comparative approach, such as it is to be used here, focuses on the differences across cases in that it explores the diversity in similar cases with the same outcome (Ragin, 1994:106). It attempts to establish and understand whether certain generalizations hold across particular countries (Dogan & Kazancgil, 1994:15). Here the possible differences between South Africa's and Brazil's levels of democratic support following democratic transition, under broadly similar circumstances, is to be investigated²⁵.

This implies the use of the most similar systems design (MSSD). MSSD is most appropriate when analysing relatively few case studies, as in this study, as it allows the controlling of several variables in an attempt narrow down possible explanations for the phenomenon to be explained²⁶ (Landman, 2000:53). While this study does not use control variables statistically, the marked similarities between Brazil and South Africa, in some respects, allows the similar context of these countries to either explain parallels in the research results or be ruled out as mitigating factors. MSSD avoids focusing exclusively on statistical and quantitative data, ensuring that context and historical influence are accorded the proper amount of emphasis and significance, essentially combining aspects of qualitative and quantitative data (Landman, 2003:200, Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998:13). The level of conceptual abstraction is also lower as the case studies

²⁴ This is known as the pragmatic approach. Although many contend that qualitative and quantitative approaches are in fact incompatible, many researchers successfully combine the two. For further in depth discussion, see Tashakkori, A. & C. Teddlie (1998).

²⁵ It is also the aim of comparative research to advance theory within a specific analytical framework (Ragin, 1994:108). Here, the description of levels of democratic support in the case studies, within the theoretical framework of political support theory, will perhaps provide avenues for further research in this regard.

²⁶ While this study is primarily descriptive in nature, the controlling of as many variables as possible still aids in narrowing down the focus of the research.

are more specific (Landman, 2003:27). Nevertheless, this approach has been criticized for several reasons.

Especially when comparing developing countries, as is the case here, the quality of data is at times limited, which means the researcher may have to compromise the quality of statistics (Dogan & Kazancigil, 1994:41). In addition, due to the necessary limitations on the number of case studies which can be examined, in this case two, general inferences the researcher is able to make are necessarily limited. Similarly, due to the conscious choice involved in selecting case studies, researchers may be tempted to select only those which will prove their hypothesis²⁷ (Landman, 2000:201). As this study is not concerned with hypotheses, nor necessarily with making generalized inferences, however, these limitations are not as applicable in this case.

There are several advantages and disadvantages implicit in the use of both quantitative and qualitative approaches to cross-national studies. These will both be discussed, leading to a substantiation of the use of the methods chosen for this study.

3.4.2 Quantitative and Qualitative Research: Positivism versus Idealism

Tashakkori & Teddlie (1998:11) emphasize that qualitative and quantitative approaches can happily co-exist within a single study and indeed many researchers combine these two to enrich their research²⁸. It is necessary to examine them in order to distinguish the differences and how their use will benefit this study.

Quantitative research is nomothetic in that it favours the creation of generalizing laws following the analysis of data (Babbie & Mouton, 1998:272). Research takes place within a carefully controlled environment and relies upon the formulation of hypotheses to be disproved within the context of the research (Hammersly, 1993:15). Quantitative researchers are often accused of “obsessions to control” (Babbie & Mouton, 1998:49) and

²⁷ This is known as selection bias (Landman, 2003:42). It is not, however applicable, as the nature of this study is exploratory and part of the research problem involved the specific selection of case studies South Africa and Brazil.

²⁸ This is often called the ‘mixed methods’ or pragmatic approach (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998:11).

the reduction of the study to pure mechanics (Dasgupta & Maskin, 1999:81). This is largely because quantitative researchers derive their methods from positivism, an approach to social science whereby the research is handled like that of the natural sciences: the formulation of general laws, the identification of variables, etc. (Bunge, 1999:19). According to positivists, research can only be based on the reality of observable, objective facts and so value judgements are disregarded (Hammersley, 1993:5-6). This study incorporates aspects of the positivist approach, because it uses qualitative data in the form of WVS survey statistics. It does depart from this paradigm, however, in that certain value judgements are inherent in the interpretation of the data.²⁹

While the “hypothetico-deductive strategy” (Babbie & Mouton, 1998:273) has no appeal for some researchers, who maintain that descriptions and concepts remain thin and lack context (Ragin, 1994:81), this approach has some definite advantages. Quantitative research, by virtue of the fact that it uses statistics to make inferences, can supposedly remain value neutral³⁰ (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998:7). It is also appropriate for this specific study because the research employs aggregate data (Landman, 2000:18). Of course, this aspect of the quantitative approach leads to a host of limitations in the study. Those specific to this study will be discussed below³¹.

Qualitative research, especially in terms of cross-national comparison, can make an important contribution towards enriching the study. Indeed, comparative research, in terms of epistemology, is often considered to be half-way between qualitative and quantitative research, benefiting from both approaches (Ragin, 1994:130). As this study is concerned with only two cases, the qualitative nature of the study can be extended³² (Landman, 2000:18). Investigations into both South Africa’s and Brazil’s political

²⁹ See Chapter Five.

³⁰ Admittedly, this claim is problematic because no statistics can be regarded as completely objective. In addition, many might perhaps argue that objectivity in the context of social research is not desirable.

³¹ They have to do with the problems of validity and reliability, as well as restriction of the research in terms of analytical framework (Ragin, 1994:140-142). They will be discussed with specific reference to survey and secondary aggregate data studies, as is the case here.

³² Due to the intensity and ‘rich’ description inherent in qualitative data, as well as the intensity of the methodology, usually fieldwork, usually very few cases are incorporated into a single study (Babbie & Mouton, 1998:271).

histories and development have been made, both to inform the data results and provide a context for the data analysis. The complexities of comparative research mean that the researcher and the theoretical background employed will influence the study, confirming that it is value-bound, as qualitative research maintains³³.

Qualitative research places the emphasis on contextualization and rich description, thus drawing nuances and subtleties from the collected data (Ragin, 1994:137). Although this study will not go so far as to attempt an “emic”³⁴ interpretation of the study, recognition of the role that culture has to play in terms of interpreting the data stems from the appreciation of the qualitative approach (Landman, 2000:204). Dasgupta and Maskin (1999:81-82) summarise the contrast between the principle concerns of qualitative and quantitative research most succinctly in terms of this kind of study:

“The case-by case approach to such questions has enjoyed a long tradition, but it is often so case specific that it is difficult to draw a general picture from the studies. An alternative is to conduct statistical analyses of cross-country data, but the limitations of statistical analysis are often noted by social scientists, many of whom find them mechanical, bloodless, and lacking in the kind of insights that only macro-historical studies can offer. There is something in this, but it is also good to recognise their strength. Statistical analyses should be seen as complements to the cases studies of nations and regions. Their strength lies in that we avoid getting enmeshed in historical details, which can mesmerize us into thinking that whatever has happened to the case has a certain inevitability about it”.

³³ Just as quantitative research stems from the positivist paradigm, the qualitative approach is informed by an idealist perspective. Briefly, the latter maintains that reality has multiple truths and the observer cannot be separate and independent from the observed. All interpretations are thus value-laden. Similarly, because of the unique context of each study, qualitative researchers deny that the formulation of generalized laws, such as those found in the natural sciences, is possible (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998:10).

³⁴ An anthropological term, “emic” relates to attempting to understand and interpret the world from the “insider’s” point of view, thus one who is actually being studied. This is in contrast with “etic” studies, generally quantitative, which attempt to interpret facts objectively, from the “outsider’s” point of view (Babbie & Mouton, 1998:53).

3.4.3 Measuring Attitudes

Considering the nature of this study, which is essentially a measurement of attitudes, the operationalization of which is an attitudinal survey, something must be said concerning the measurement of attitudes³⁵.

Weisberg and Bowen (1977:6-7) contend that the measurement of attitudes is important in terms of understanding social phenomena and processes. Similarly, attitudes are instrumental in informing policy decisions. They are thus an integral part of the study of support for democracy, as this implies the measurement of a kind of attitude toward a (political) object. It is recognised that attitude measurement cannot be said to be directly related to behaviour as intent does not necessarily lead to action (Weisberg & Bowen, 1977:83). This is a very important consideration when interpreting data from the World Values Survey. What is equally important, however, is what Oppenheim (1992:175) considers the ‘action tendency component’ of the attitude³⁶. Mannheim (1975:23) describes this as the conative part of an attitude. It is what links the attitude to behaviour, although it is not part of the behaviour or reaction itself, but it is the thought process which precedes the behaviour³⁷.

Although there is no proof that attitudes are either a product of logical reasoning, or measurable on a linear continuum, they are treated as such to facilitate their measurement (Oppenheim, 1992:175). This is achieved through attitude scaling. Attitudes are generally measured on two dimensions: content and direction (what is thought about the topic

³⁵ Oppenheim (1992:177) describes attitude as more ‘superficial’ than value – the value implying a sustained attitude towards a stimulus. In this survey, ‘attitude’ is used interchangeably with ‘value’ as in the context of the World Values Survey attitude measurement is considered a manifestation of the value orientation (Abramson & Inglehart, 1995:2).

³⁶ Oppenheim (1992:175) conceptualizes attitude as comprising three parts: beliefs (cognitive component); feelings (emotional component); intent (action tendency component). He furthermore maintains that an affirmative answer to an attitude statement, such as is found in a survey questionnaire, implies a ‘state of readiness’ (Oppenheim, 1992:174). This has been similarly conceptualized by Mannheim (1975) as the cognitive component, the affective component and the conative component respectively.

³⁷ Mannheim (1975:23) acknowledges that there is a debate surrounding this conceptualization as to whether conation is a basic component of an attitude, or whether it is a part of an ‘attitude cluster’ which describes various feelings of an individual towards a certain object. See Mannheim (1975).

under discussion) and intensity (how strongly this is felt) (Oppenheim, 1992:176; Manheim, 1975:15).

The most prominent technique used in the World Values Survey in terms of attitude scaling is known as the Likert scale. This involves constructing a question whereby there is an attitude statement³⁸ and a continuum of responses from which the respondent must make a selection³⁹. All the World Values Surveys also include an implicit ‘don’t know’ category, although this is not advertised, so as to minimise non-response bias.⁴⁰ The Likert scale is favoured because it allows a greater range of opinion to be gauged and has a proven high reliability (Oppenheim, 1992:200).

Despite this, there are several problems unique to attitude measurement which must be considered here. Weisberg and Bowen (1977:81) categorize them as issues arising either due to the often superficial nature of public opinion, or poor attitude survey construction. The former comes into play when researchers try to question respondents on issues considered important by the researchers, but not so by the respondents (Weisberg & Bowen, 1977:82). Answers can then be invalid, as they are not really meaningful, or simply ‘non-answers’, leading to non-response bias, mentioned above. In addition, the more abstract the topic under consideration, the more problematic extracting opinions and attitudes from the respondent becomes (Weisberg & Bowen, 1977:85).

An additional problem, discussed at length by Johnson and Van de Vijver (2003) is social desirability bias. They investigate whether this form of survey bias is a social response style or an actual personality characteristic of some respondents. Interestingly, social desirability bias, the tendency to modify one’s surveyed views in order to appear more socially acceptable, is a universally recognised concept (Johnson & Van de Vijver,

³⁸ According to Oppenheim (1992:174), this is a statement expressing a “point of view, belief, preference or judgement” with which the respondent must be able to disagree.

³⁹ An example of this taken from WVS 1995 (q21@4): “*one of my main goals in life has been to make my parents proud*” (attitude statement) ; “*strongly agree/agree/disagree/agree strongly*” (Likert scale) This is a variation of the more common 5-point scale, which includes a neutral category. Here the choice encourages the respondent to take a side.

⁴⁰ Non-response bias occurs when the percentage of ‘don’t knows’ distorts the overall picture presented by the other attitude category percentages.

2003:199), which is good news in terms of cross-national studies. Of relevance to our study, however, is the fact that it corresponds to the Latin American cultural norm of “*simpatia*”, as well as the fact that social desirability bias is a greater factor in heterogeneous societies⁴¹.

These factors of course come into play during the physical measurement of attitudes. As mentioned, the chosen instrument of attitude measurement is the World Values Survey. Consequently, the aspects of survey research will be discussed.

3.4.4 Survey Research

Survey research, such as the WVS, uses sampling methods in an attempt to collect reliable and valid data from a representative portion (sample) of what is usually a large universe. As such, survey research, in the form of the WVS, is ideal for the purposes of this study as the universe is the populations of two countries, whose opinions it seeks to compare (Moser & Galton, 1977:43). Both of the countries in question have been surveyed by the WVS with every attempt to represent the entire population in the sample surveyed. The study has further benefited from the survey by virtue of its being secondary data and a respected instrument formulated by the collective expertise of many senior researchers, increasing its reliability (Babbie & Mouton, 1998:265).

Survey research is not however, without its limitations. Although deemed the most suitable technique in the case of this study, especially as the focus is attitude measurement, survey research has been criticized for its difficulty in dealing with social life, particularly with its inability to measure social action, due to its overly positivist approach (Dale *et al*, 1988:2,37). In terms of technical problems, sampling error, especially from a large universe, is common⁴² (Braun, 2003:137). In addition, secondary

⁴¹South Africa and Brazil are both heterogeneous societies. Social desirability bias is also prevalent among lower income and historically disadvantaged groups (Johnson & van de Vijver, 2003:198). Apart from the sociological implications of this, it must be remembered that the vast majority of both South Africa's and Brazil's populations are socio-economically disadvantaged. Thus the potential for social desirability bias to distort data in this study is considerable.

⁴² In terms of the WVS, not only is it acknowledged that several countries were under-sampled in terms of rural areas, but two different kinds of sampling techniques were used during measurement, causing the comparability of the national data sets to be questioned.

survey research sometimes lacks validity as it was not specifically constructed for that study (Babbie & Mouton, 1998:265). Braun & Mohler (2003:110) also refer to the lowest common denominator effect, whereby lost data, with no chance of later researchers recovering it, forces the entire study to be simplified.

It is also important to consider the technique used to conduct the interview. The World Values Survey utilized ‘face-to-face’ interviews⁴³, involving an interviewer asking the respondent the survey questions in person and noting the answers.

This technique is very advantageous should the respondent sample group have a low literacy rate as is more likely to be the case in developing countries, surveyed here. The interviewer can also probe if it is deemed that a particular survey question has not been sufficiently answered, leading to more complete data collection (Moser & Galton, 1977:271; Brenner, 1982:133). In addition, in contrast with self-administered surveys, the interviewer can omit the “don’t know” category as a response option, encouraging respondents to think about an answer instead of merely opting for “don’t know”, thus lowering the ‘non-response’ percentage (Babbie & Mouton, 1998:250, Moser & Galton, 1977:272). There are various disadvantages to this technique, however. Although it usually achieves a high response rate, face-to-face interviews are the most expensive form of survey data collection (Babbie & Mouton, 1998:262). It is also time-consuming as the interviewer generally has to build up a rapport with the respondents in order to gain their trust⁴⁴ and thus enable the interviewer to probe for answers if the respondent seems reticent in answering (De Lamater, 1982:33).

The danger of social desirability bias is also greater in the context of face-to-face interviews, as respondents sometimes defer to their perceived opinions of the interviewer in terms of their gender, ethnic group or apparent social background. This is known as interviewer bias (Johnson & Van de Vijver, 2003:207). For this reason it is necessary to


⁴³ Other commonly used techniques are self-administered surveys (usually sent by post) and telephonic interviews.

⁴⁴ This is especially important as many respondents are fearful that information provided will later be used against them. This was indeed the case during the apartheid era, despite the fact that this violates the principle of confidentiality inherent in social research ethics (Babbie & Mouton, 1998:250).

pay careful attention to ensuring that respondents are interviewed by interviewers sharing the same characteristics, as this will limit the potential distortion of responses by this kind of bias (De Lamater, 1982:20).

As mentioned previously, the data collected by means of the responses given by those interviewed will be cross-tabulated with several demographic variables, called “social background variables” by Norris (1999b:226). Braun and Mohler (2003:101) explain that such variables are useful in that they are inherently independent and can be used to explore dependent trends in the data used for the study. Thus information can be explained or described according to the subsets of these independent variables (Braun & Mohler, 2003:102). This is especially relevant because the type of survey used in this study targets attitudinal information, and the social background variables such as age, education, income and marital status are known to influence certain opinions⁴⁵.

Thus, having considered the instrument, namely the World Values Survey, and the theoretical substantiation for its use in this study, it remains to be seen how the data contained in the survey will be applied to the specific problem at hand through operationalization.



3.5 Operationalization of Key Concepts

While the World Values Survey has been selected for its eminent suitability for this study, as discussed above, it must be noted that the operationalization of the concepts used has been limited in two ways. Firstly, as the survey was composed without this specific study in mind, the questions used to measure the identified variables are not always ideal. The reader should bear the limitations of secondary data, discussed above, in mind when considering the nature of operationalization. Secondly, within the different survey waves, while the basic spheres of inquiry have remained the same, the wording of questions has often changed. This may be due to an adjusted focus in terms of the survey due to research interests or sponsors' requirements. Whatever the case may be, where this

⁴⁵ For example, age affects opinions of the individual according to their life cycle and cohort experience. For a more in-depth discussion on these phenomena as well as generational displacement theories, see Inglehart, R. (1990). See also Chapter Four.

occurs with questions pertinent to this study, the best attempts have been made to use questions deemed to measure the same concept, although the questions themselves may differ slightly.

3.5.1 Political Community

The conceptualization of political community used in this study encompasses both the acceptance of political co-operation within the designated community and a social communal feeling of belonging to this community (Norris, 1999a:10; Easton, 1965:177).

Easton (1965:321) predicts the collapse of the political community in the event of internal separatist movements. Should this occur, it would mean that sub-regional or ethnic and linguistic ties are deemed by the members of the community to be more important than identification with the political community as a whole. Separatist movements have plagued African attempts in particular at democratization, following the imposition of incongruous of colonial borders as they did not correspond to the habitats of traditional ethnic and linguistic communities (Ake, 1996:65). This has consequently proved a huge problem for the creation of a national identity⁴⁶. It is thus to be expected that African countries would have a very low support of political community, claiming loyalty instead to ethnic or cultural groups. This would seem even more likely in South Africa, due to the legacy of separate development and the exclusivity of South African citizenship⁴⁷. In Brazil, in contrast, support for the political community could be expected to be rather high as ethnic differences are, officially at least, not acknowledged (Marx, 1998:176). In addition, Portuguese is the universal mother-tongue.

Thus to measure the respondent's identification with the political community on a national level, the following question was asked: "*To which of these geographical groups would you say you belonged to first of all?*"⁴⁸. Evidently the most desirable response in

⁴⁶ The notion of national identity has, ironically, been used by many African leaders as a legitimate reason to create a centralist, one-party state "in order to consolidate national unity" (Ake, 1996:65).

⁴⁷ Blacks especially were encouraged to claim independence for their artificially created 'homelands' so that their South African citizenship could be revoked (Schrire, 1994:127).

⁴⁸ This is question 320 in the 1990 survey, q80 in the 1995 survey and q215 in the 2001 survey. The response set included: a) locality of town where you live; b) province or region of the town where you live;

terms of a feeling of national political community would be identification with the country of the respondent. Identification below this level indicates regionalism and above this level indicates a poor acknowledgement of political community.

Easton (1965:290-291) also speaks of a regime's "operating values" and the regime's use of an ideology to help legitimate it. Another word for this is nationalism or patriotism. Although it could be considered the darker side of the political community – consider, for instance, that apartheid was the consequence of Afrikaner nationalism⁴⁹ and National Socialism was the consequence of German nationalism in the 1930's (Marx, 1998:23) – it has had a very unifying effect⁵⁰ in the case of Brazil (Marx, 1998:252). National pride is thus a recognized measure of political community (Norris, 1999a:16). As such the following question was also incorporated into the operationalization of the latter concept: *"How proud are you to be South African/Brazilian?"*⁵¹. Evidently, the more national pride felt, the stronger the sense of political community.

In relation to the above question, with the similar intention of measuring patriotism, the following question is also asked: *"Of course we hope that there will not be another war, but should it come to that, would you be willing to fight for your country?"*⁵².

A 'yes' response is expected to show a strong sense of patriotism, emphasizing a sense of belonging to the political community.

c) [South Africa/Brazil] as a whole; d) Africa/Latin America as a whole; e) The world as a whole; f) don't know.

⁴⁹ It must be acknowledged that nationalism (especially Afrikaners') was very exclusive, whereas the concept of political community is inclusive in character. It is for this very reason that the former is considered to be negative whereas the latter is positive. What these concepts have in common, however, is the sense of belonging and 'oneness' they bestow on a nation. It must be recognised that this of pride and community awareness can thus have had consequences (Afrikaner nationalism circa 1940's) or good (South African patriotism circa 1994).

⁵⁰ It must nevertheless be acknowledged that the ideology of 'racial democracy' imposed by the Brazilian state was instrumental in creating the structural inequalities between blacks and whites in Brazil (Guimarães, 2001:68).


⁵¹ This was q322 in the 1990 survey, q82 in the 1995 survey and q216 in the 2001 survey. The response set included: a) very proud; b) quite proud; c) not very proud; d) not at all proud; e) I am not a South African/Brazilian; e) don't know.

⁵² This was q263 in the 1990 survey; q43 in the 1995 survey; q126 in the 2001 survey. The response set included a) yes; b) no; c) don't know.

3.5.2 Regime Principles

Regime principles, generally held to be the principles of democracy in the case of a democratic regime⁵³, pose a methodological problem in terms of measurement. Democracy's principles and those which should receive priority are contested (Thomassen, 1995; Schmitter & Karl, 1996). It is logical, however, that public attitudes which support a democratic system above all other forms of government will support the principles of a democratic regime⁵⁴. Furthermore, according to Bratton (2002:9), *confirmed* democrats will reject other forms of non-democratic government. Bearing the above in mind, the following question was thus used to operationalize this aspect of regime principle support: *"I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing the country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing the country?"*

- *Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections*
- *Having experts, not the government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country*
- *Having the army rule*
- *Having a democratic system"*⁵⁵



While acceptance of a democratic system is imperative, only the rejection of the other two non-democratic political systems would indicate complete support of democratic regime principles.

⁵³ It is assumed that the principles adopted by a democratic regime would be those ascribed to democracy. This is supported by Dahl's (1997:34) emphasis on the need for a democratic political culture (born of democratic principles) to support and sustain a democratic regime.


⁵⁴ It could be argued that support may stem from a substantive support, i.e. that those who support democracy do not do so for principle's sake, but for the material needs satisfied by the democratic regime (Bratton & Mattes, 2000a; 2003). Nevertheless, according to Schmitter & Karl (1996), there is no evidence that democracies will necessarily increase service delivery. Thus support for democratic principles is necessary for sustained support of a democratic regime (Plattner, 1996:44; Whitehead, 1996:395; Przeworski, 1995:42)

⁵⁵ This set of questions was only available in the 1995 (q55@1-4) and 2001 (q164-q167) survey waves. The response set, as indicated, was a choice between 'very good', 'good', 'bad', 'very bad' and 'don't know'.

3.5.2.1 Index Construction for Consolidated Support for Democracy

An index was constructed to measure the percentage of respondents who not only supported democracy as a form of government, but who also rejected all other forms of non-democratic rule. In order to do this all the items were recoded to account for “don’t know” and refused answers, or missing responses were recognized as ‘system missing’. Furthermore, the item relating to ‘*having a democratic system*’ was recoded in reverse so that the response direction of all the items was the same.

A reliability analysis rendered an Alpha score of between 0.4270 and 0.6196⁵⁶. It is recognized that this range is not suitable for a reliable index, but the low reliability may be explained. On reverse recoding ‘*having a democratic system*’, it was assumed that this item was diametrically opposed to the other items and would thus be reflected as such in the response items. The low Alpha score may suggest that respondents do not necessarily see support of another form of regime as completely opposed to support for democracy. It is interesting to note that the Alpha score strengthens from 1995 to 2001 in South Africa. This may suggest that the idea that these forms of government are indeed in opposition to support for democracy is being crystallized in the minds of the respondents.



This notwithstanding, it was concluded that unfortunately, while solidly based theoretically, this index could not be rationalized statistically because its Alpha scores for the three different survey waves indicated a weak statistical relationship between the items, ranging from 0.4270 to 0.6196, as seen above. Furthermore, although explanations are offered, they cannot adequately account for the low Alpha scores. This being the case, it was considered more appropriate to use only the last item, measuring the opinions on ‘*having a democratic system*’ to be used as a simple frequency.

It also stands to reason that democratic regime principles will be supported if they are congruent with those held by society as norms and values (Broderick, 2002:19). Support

⁵⁶ Brazil 1995, Alpha=0.4270; South Africa 1995, Alpha= 0.5716; South Africa 2001, Alpha=0.6196. This index is not available for Brazil 1990.

for the regime principles will rest on the public's evaluation of these in society in terms of compatibility with reality. This is especially so in new democracies (Doh & McDonough, 1999:5). The following questions were thus used to measure levels of support for regime principles: *"I'm going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic political system. Could you please tell me if you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree"*⁵⁷.

- *In a democracy, the economic system runs badly*
- *Democracies are indecisive and have too much squabbling*
- *Democracies aren't good at maintaining order*
- *Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government"*⁵⁸.

Disagreement with the first three statements and agreement with the last will be taken as confirmation of support for democratic regime principles.

3.5.2.2 Index Construction for Support for Regime Principles

In order to measure support for regime principles, in this case the purported principles of the democratic regimes of South Africa and Brazil, an index was constructed with the above-mentioned items. In order to do this, as above, all the items were recoded to account for "don't know" and refused answers, or missing responses were recognized as 'system missing'. Furthermore, the item *'democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government'* was recoded in reverse so that the response direction for all the items was the same. The Alpha scores ranged from 0.5821 to 0.7394 depending on the data set⁵⁹. Here again however, these scores were judged to be too low to warrant the use of the index. Instead, the last item was used on its own *"democracy may have*

⁵⁷ This set of questions was only available in the 1995 (q58@1-4) and 2001 (q169-q172) survey waves. The response set, as indicated was a choice between 'strongly agree', 'agree', 'disagree', 'strongly disagree' and 'don't know'. While it admittedly not absolutely clear whether the response is due to personal experience or merely an opinion of democracy as an abstract term, methodologically it does not make a difference to the operationalization of regime principles.

⁵⁸ This statement measures the so-called "Winstonian hypothesis". It encompasses the argument that support for the democratic system will only be seriously threatened when there is a viable alternative system in existence which is accepted by the people (Dasgupta & Maskin, 1999:71).

⁵⁹ Brazil 1995, Alpha=0.5821; South Africa 1995, Alpha=0.7394; South Africa 2001, Alpha=0.7130. This index was not available for Brazil 1990.

problems but it's better than any other form of government” as a frequency to provide another measure of support for regime principles.

Whereas neither of these batteries was available in the 1990 survey, the methodologically most compatible questions were those which measured support for such democratic norms as individual freedoms and government transparency. Thus for the 1990 wave, the following questions were used to measure support for regime principles: *“I am going to read out some statements about the government and the economy. For each one, could you tell me how much you agree or disagree?”*

- *Our government should be made much more open to the public*
- *We are more likely to have a healthy economy if the government allows more freedom for individuals to do as they wish”⁶⁰.*

3.5.2.3 Index Construction for Support for Regime Principles for Brazil 1990

These two items were recoded to eliminate ‘don’t knows’, refused and missing answers and combined in an index. This remains the most problematic section of the operationalization, in that these questions are a poor substitute for those used in the other surveys to operationalize regime principles. This will also be seen to be the case empirically, as the Alpha score of these items is only 0.3412. Nevertheless, they remain the only possible items to be used.

In addition, the position of the respondents remains ambiguous regardless of their answer. Affirmative responses could demonstrate support for democratic values, yet show a lack of support for government principles. Similarly, negative responses might not necessarily mean lack of support for the democratic norms of transparency and individual freedoms, but denote satisfaction with the way the regime protects these values. Although it is acknowledged that this measure must be interpreted with care, affirmative answers will be taken to denote a support of democratic values, but possibly a lack of satisfaction with the embodiment of these norms by the regime.

⁶⁰ These are q336 and q337 respectively in the 1990 wave. The response set is as follows: ‘agree completely’, ‘agree some what’, ‘neither agree nor disagree’, ‘disagree somewhat’, ‘disagree completely’, ‘don’t know’.

3.5.3 Regime Performance

As mentioned above, regime performance and regime principles are closely related in the minds of the public. As Broderick (2002:23) points out :

[new democracies have] *no track record of long-term effectiveness to carry the regimes through periods of crisis. Thus it is reasonable to assume that ...the regime itself will be held responsible for economic performance. In other words the performance of the economy will influence citizens' evaluations of the political system in its entirety as well as the incumbent government.*

Thus democracy itself may be judged by citizens on the performance of a democratic regime in terms of how well it seems to work for their country in question (Doh & McDonough, 1999). Confidence in the regime would indicate approval of its performance. This would in turn indicate support for this political object.

Comparison in terms of what kinds of results were achieved by the previous regime is also important for ascertaining public support of democracy. Tóka (1995:357) refers to a “honeymoon period” of approximately one or two years whereby the novelty of the regime, following its replacement of the old ‘bad’ regime, lends it legitimacy. Nevertheless, to sustain such support, the regime must display a satisfactory performance. Mattes *et al.* (2003:24-26) found a nostalgia for apartheid stemming from the fading memories of the quality of life then and a perceived failure on the present regime’s part to deliver. While Easton (1965:271) points out that it is often the case that governments are judged on results predetermined by predecessors and make decisions which will affect their successors, it is public perception of regime performance regardless that will inform public opinion and evaluation of the regime’s performance. The following questions were thus selected to enable the measuring of opinions regarding the current regime: “*People have different views about the system for governing the country. Where on this scale*⁶¹*would you put the political system:*

⁶¹ 1=very bad; 10= very good.


- *as it was [in apartheid times/before abertura]?*
- *as it is today?*
- *as you expect it will be ten years from now?”*⁶²

The first question allows comparison with the performance of the non-democratic regime and the third implies the potential of the current regime to affect the political future, tying in with Easton's observation, mentioned above.

Once again, the 1990 Brazil data set did not include these items. In order to supplement the World Values Survey, therefore, the following item, taken from a CESOP⁶³ data file was used to measure support for regime performance in Brazil in 1990:

*In a general way, how would you say you feel about the future of Brazil?*⁶⁴

This question was chosen because it most closely resembles one of the items used in the operationalization. It is also more appropriate, because President Collor, the first president elected through universal franchise, had only recently been elected president at this stage, thus preventing any evaluation of regime performance based on sustained actions.



3.5.4 Regime Institutions

Regime institutions form part of what is known as “procedural democracy”, i.e. the procedures for electing representatives and for delegating power. This is opposed to “substantial democracy”, which is concerned with policy issues such as economic redistribution⁶⁵ (Randall & Theobald, 1998:41).

⁶² This set of questions was only available in the 1995 (54@1-3) and 2001 (q163, X3, X4).

⁶³ *Centro des Estudos de Opinião Publica.*

⁶⁴ This was question P1 in a survey conducted by CESOP in January 1990. The response categories were as follows: a) very optimistic, b) optimistic, c) neutral, d) pessimistic, e) very pessimistic

⁶⁵ Some doubt has been expressed as to whether citizens of developing countries can distinguish between the institutions and the political leaders themselves, thus the office (procedural) and the office-holder (substantive). It is indeed feared, as mentioned above, that poor policy decisions on the part of political actors will not only cause the incumbents to lose support and thus legitimacy, but jeopardise the actual democratic political system itself; this due to the inability of citizens in neo-democracies to distinguish between these two levels of government (Broderick, 2002:23). Nevertheless, it has been proved in several

This is significant in that the institutions which form part of any democratic system, and the institutional choices made by the creators of the system, profoundly affect the nature of that democratic system (Linz, 1996; Horowitz, 1996; Lipset, 1996⁶⁶). Thus is it once again emphasized that there are different types of democracy, whose frameworks necessarily differ cross-nationally according to cultural and historical precedent (Norris, 1999b:220). What is even more interesting is that according to several analysts, (Norris, 1999b:234; Hadenius, 1994; Linz, 1996; Lijphart, 1996), these institutional arrangements themselves have an impact on the levels of political support.

South Africa and Brazil both have hybridized versions of the presidential/parliamentary systems, and a proportional representation electoral system. While it is evident that their political systems cannot be identical, they would fall roughly within the same category in terms of institutional configuration, rendering comparison slightly more valid in terms of comparing levels of political support (Lijphart, 1996).

3.5.4.1 Index Construction for Support for Regime Institutions

In order to operationalize support for regime institutions, the following question was utilized: *“I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence, not very much confidence⁶⁷ at all?”*

The items listed in the survey questionnaire were run through a factor analysis to determine which clustered together (see Appendix 2). From this a battery was constructed of the following items:

cases that this fear, at least in the case of Africans, is unfounded (Broderick, 2002; Bratton, 2002; Bratton & Mattes, 2000a).

⁶⁶ The debate, entered into by these three authors, revolves around whether parliamentarianism or presidential democracies are preferable. While Linz (1996) argues that presidential systems encourage the abuse of power by a strong executive, Horowitz counters that this is a generalization and applies mostly only to Latin America (1996). Lipset (1996) emphasizes the influence of culture and historical precedent, suggesting that political culture’s fluidity causes analysts to focus on institutions as a source of democratic instability.

⁶⁷ Again, the use of secondary data limits this study’s operationalization. It is assumed here that a respondent who has a high level of confidence in a certain institution will support it (Kotze, 2001:33).

- *The armed forces*⁶⁸
- *The Police*
- *The National Government*
- *Parliament*
- *The Civil Service*
- *The Legal System*
- *The President*⁶⁹

Some qualification is in order here. Although some of the above elements are more obviously institutions of democracy, there are several others that, while statistically clustering with the above, are not necessarily so. Their inclusion is due to their historical roles in government, the importance of these backed up by their strong factor loadings.

In view of the heavy involvement of the armed forces in Brazil, not only as the *poder moderador*⁷⁰ (Linz, 1996b:127) before 1964, but because they effectively ruled the country by military dictate for twenty years, there is a strong argument to include it in the battery. Similarly, the police force in both South Africa and Brazil played an active role in subduing political dissidence during the rule of the *ancien regimes* and promoted the emergence of a culture of violence (Landman, 2003:17). It is highly likely that the respective populations will thus still associate them with the government, therefore meriting inclusion in the institutional battery.

The items were recoded to eliminate 'don't knows', refused and missing responses and combined into an index, with the Alpha score ranging from 0.8593-0.7665⁷¹. The

⁶⁸ In the 2001 wave in South Africa, the index does not include 'the armed forces' because its factor loading was considered too weak (0.496).

⁶⁹ In the 1990 wave the items 'national government' and 'president' are not available, so the 1990 version of the battery will omit these two items. Similarly, the 1995 WVS does not include 'the president'. The items forming this battery are taken from a set of questions in each set: q272-q285 (1990); q53@1-16 (1995); q17-q162,X1-2 (2001).

⁷⁰ Literally translated 'moderating power'.

⁷¹ Brazil 1990, Alpha=0.7665; Brazil 1995, Alpha=0.8048; South Africa 1995, Alpha=0.8090, South Africa, Alpha=0.8593.

responses were recoded into three categories comprising ‘strong support’, ‘medium support’ and ‘weak support’,⁷².

3.5.5 Political Actors

As the narrowest concept in terms of the political object levels, political actors are no less important in terms of sustaining political legitimacy. Indeed, especially in neo-democracies which have little experience with democratic norms, the political actors are often held directly accountable for regime performance⁷³. Consequently, consistently poor ratings of the political actors will eventually lead to a decline in legitimacy of the regime itself (Dalton, 1988:171). Contributing to this, therefore, is the fact that, despite being the elected representatives of the ‘people’, political elites sometimes hold very different views to their constituencies⁷⁴ (Dalton, 1998:207). Indeed, even if one was to consider the Schumpeterian definition of democracy, that democracy is “not fundamentally about representation, it is about selling a product – government output – in exchange for votes” (Shapiro & Hacker-Cordón, 2000:4), legitimacy depends on the delivery of said government output.

Bearing the above in mind, in order to operationalize support for the government incumbents, the following questions were used:

“How satisfied are you with the way the people now in national government are handling the country’s affairs?”⁷⁵

“How much do you trust the government in Brasilia/Pretoria to do what is right?”⁷⁶

⁷² For the 1995 and 2001 waves, ‘strong support’ = values 6-11; medium support = values 12-18; ‘weak support’ = values 19-24. For the 1990 wave, ‘strong support’ = values 5-9; ‘medium support’ = values 10-15; ‘weak support’ = values 16-20. See Appendix 2.

⁷³ As discussed above, in the case of democratic transition through elite pact, political elites are seen to have an even bigger influence over political events.

⁷⁴ The irony is that this is in spite of the fact that “commitment to popular rule” is what sets democracies apart from other political systems (Dalton, 1988:206).

⁷⁵ This is q60 in the 1995 wave and q174 in the 2001 wave. It has been substituted for the previous question as it did not occur in either of the 1995 or 2001 surveys. The response set read as follows: a) very satisfied; b) fairly satisfied; c) fairly dissatisfied; d) very dissatisfied; e) don’t know.

⁷⁶ Although ‘what is right’ is conceptually very vague, the operationalization rests on the rational assumption that should the government do what is considered right by the respondent, regardless of what this is, the respondent supports the government. This is q289 in the 1990 data set, the only set in which this

Unfortunately the latter question, while very suitable to measure support for political actors, was not included in the Brazilian survey wave, although it is part of the 1990 WVS survey questionnaire. To supplement the data, a question from a CESOP questionnaire, polled in December 1990, was used. It read:

*In your opinion, do you think Collor is making a(n): i) excellent ii) good iii) average iv) bad v) terrible government?*⁷⁷

Especially because the president is a powerful and influential figure within the context of both Brazilian and South African politics, both symbolically and as an institution, it would have been instructive to be able to compare levels of support for the president as a political actor. Unfortunately, this item was only included in the 2001 WVS wave⁷⁸, rendering it useless in terms of enabling a time-scale comparison between South Africa and Brazil.

3.6 Conclusion

The theory behind the methodology of this study is particularly important, because it informs both the researcher and the reader how and why the data are interpreted as they are. It also provides key insights into the formulation of the operationalization of this study.

Due to the nature of this study, the comparative approach is being followed, allowing various elements of both quantitative and qualitative research paradigms to be utilized, despite statistical analysis being the central focus of the study. Indeed, although survey data have been operationalized for this study, the need to understand the context of the data in both countries has necessitated aspects of interpretation which are, strictly speaking, part of the qualitative discipline.


question was available. The response set reads: a) almost always; b) most of the time; 3) only some of the time; d) almost never.

⁷⁷ This was question P10 of the questionnaire. The response set was: i) excellent ii) good iii) average iv) bad v) terrible.

⁷⁸ Confidence in the president is available in the CESOP questionnaires of January and December, allowing comparison during 1990 in Brazil, but this does not enable comparison of confidence in the president between the two case studies.

In terms of the operationalization itself, it must be remembered that, even should the measurement instrument be specifically designed for a study, it is impossible to create an instrument which is 100% valid. This is especially so with attitudinal measurements, which are open to at least a modicum of interpretation on the respondents' part. As it is, the survey used in this study provides secondary data, and has proved problematic in several areas in terms of the operationalization of the various levels of objects of political support, as seen above. These challenges have been addressed by making the best use of the collected data. A supplementary data set from a reputable source has also been introduced in order to 'fill in the gaps', where necessary, which would otherwise be present in the data analysis. It is important to interpret the results with care, however, as the errors inherent in the measurement must be borne in mind.

Now that the key concepts to be used in this study have been operationalized, the data may be analysed using these instruments. This will be undertaken in the following chapter.



Chapter Four: Statistical Data Analysis and Description of Results

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter the results of data analysis, according to the operationalization described in the previous chapter, will be graphically presented and described. Several problems with the original data arose during the actual analysis process, as mentioned in Chapter Three. A discussion of these problems and their potential solutions, where appropriate¹, will follow. Following on from this discussion, conclusions will be drawn on the validity and reliability of these findings.

4.2 Independent and Dependent Variables

The previous chapter discussed at length both the conceptualisation and the operationalization of the five political objects, the support levels of each of which are to be used as the dependent variables. These political objects are the political community, regime principles, regime performance, regime institutions and political actors. The theoretical background rationalizing their use was also provided.

The reasons for using the four independent variables selected for this study – age, ethnicity, income and education – will also be discussed. Norris (1999a:11) identifies these four variables as ‘social background variables’ and maintains that these four particular variables have been found to have a marked influence on social science phenomena. Whether this is true of developing countries *per se* is debatable, but in the context of this study, each variable’s use has an individual rationale.

Age, especially in the context of a longitudinal study, is arguably very important as a determining factor. Abramson and Inglehart (1995:4) maintain that an individual’s values reflect experiences in the pre-adult years. The gradual increase in financial security over the decades since World War II, for example, has led generations to become less preoccupied with the need to accumulate material wealth and consequently less spend-

¹ In terms of random errors accumulated during data capturing, there is often little one can do as the data source is secondary and the means to recover and correct errors are often beyond the scope of the current researcher.

thrift. This is called the generational replacement theory (Inglehart, 1990:135). Following from this, it is perhaps not so far-fetched to believe that successive generations after democratic transition will perhaps more easily adopt democratic values as part of a long-term socialization effect (Inglehart, 1990:79-82). In addition, this cultural socialization is said to be crucial in the stabilization of democratic institutions (Inglehart, 1990:33). Age is thus potentially a very influential factor in a longitudinal survey measuring support for democracy².

Income and education are similarly important, but for different reasons. Inglehart (1990; 1998; Abramson & Inglehart, 1995) related increasing income and education in the Western democracies in successive generations to a shift in values which seemed to promote an increase in diffuse support, but a decrease in specific support in Western publics. This would not be applicable to our two case studies, considering the marked inequalities in standards of living found in both. In Brazil, however, these two variables may have an indirect effect on support for democracy. In that country the biggest social cleavage is class as there is no formal racial segregation (Marx, 1998:174, Guimarães, 2001:166). Considering both the patriarchal power structure inherent within the Brazilian democracy, protecting the ruling class, and the fact that a lack of formal education is used as a class barrier, both education and income, or lack thereof, are projected to have profound impact on the way a respondent would evaluate the various levels of political support (McDonough, 1981:18; Roett, 1999).

Interestingly, education and income are likely to have a similar such effect in South Africa, although in the opposite direction. This is because wealth in both income and higher education has been concentrated in a specific racial minority through apartheid (O'Connell & Birdsall, 2001:285; James & Lever, 2001:41; powell, 2001:386). Thus, indirectly, South Africa's democratization and the removal of former privileges for whites may well bias those who hold the majority of the wealth in income and education, essentially whites, against democracy in South Africa.

²While it is recognised that such a shift in values as propounded by Inglehart will not be observable in a study spanning such a short time period as this one, it is important to be aware of the broader context of this age variable.

It can also be seen from the above that ethnicity has a large part to play in any such analysis in South Africa at least³, and may well do so until apartheid's legacy has been uprooted (Friedman, 1995; powell, 1995:374; Ramphela, 1995:65). Consequently, all four selected independent variables have an important bearing on this study.

4.3 Challenges in the Data Analysis Process

In terms of the Brazilian data set, it quickly came to light that using race/ethnicity as a social background variable would be problematic. This is the case for several reasons. Firstly, due to the state socialization policy involving propagating a 'racial democracy', race was not acknowledged as a social characteristic, and was omitted from the state census during the military regime⁴. 'Colour' is conceptualized as a continuum, rather than in terms of separate categories. (Marx, 1998:67; 177). The legacy of slavery has led a darker skin to be supposedly indicative of a lower social class/standing (Nascimento & Nascimento, 2001). Thus, should any form of colour description be required, respondents are likely to describe themselves as lighter skinned than they might be perceived by an observer in order to avoid discrimination based on class (Sansone, 2003:44). This explains why, although Brazil is acknowledged as having a 'black majority' (Nascimento & Nadcimento, 2001:120; Marx, 1998:8), 72.8% of Brazilians classified themselves as white in the 1995 WVS⁵, thus choosing the more socially desirable response. The vagueness of Brazilian ethnic coding is emphasized even more strongly when compared to circumstances in South Africa, where the legacy of apartheid has enforced rigid ethnic self-awareness (Friedman & De Villiers, 1995:220). As such, analysis in terms of ethnicity has not been used in the Brazilian case, because the coding categories used in the survey are inaccurate, being inapplicable to the Brazilian context and thus deemed invalid for this study. For the record, although the danger of generalization is noted, state

³ For reasons discussed below, the ethnicity variable was deemed inappropriate for use in the Brazilian context.

⁴ This has diminished the use of race as a demographic characteristic in Brazilian social research, as was intended. It is assumed here that the reason the Brazilian survey wave of 1990 did not survey the ethnic group of the respondents was that legislation of the previous regime discouraged use of this category.

⁵ The ethnicity variable is not even available on the 1990 WVS, probably due to state restrictions as mentioned above.

social policy and prejudice seem to dictate that the lower the education and the lower the income, the darker the Brazilian respondent's skin will be⁶.

The ethnic group variable in South Africa, however, in contrast with Brazil, has great importance in terms of historical precedent⁷ and explanatory value in this study. This notwithstanding, the use of the terms white, black, coloured and Indian as ethnic categories does not imply agreement on the researcher's part with the use of these terms.

In terms of the social background variables themselves, recoding was required in most cases. Additional challenges arose following the discovery of several inconsistencies in the coding of the social background variables.

It must be noted that, whereas the convention is to survey respondents 18 years and older, in both the South African and Brazilian cases, respondents 16 years and older were included. In the Brazilian sets, where this variable was used, age groups had been coded differently in that, whereas the oldest group in 1990 is 51+ years, in 1995 it is 65+ years. This does not pose a serious challenge to data interpretation, especially as this sector of the population is relatively small, but has been duly noted. In terms of education, it must be pointed out that the schooling systems are not identical in the two countries, although the levels of primary, secondary and tertiary education exist. As such, educational levels have been grouped into the following categories in an attempt to better facilitate comparison: no schooling⁸, at least some primary education⁹, at least some high school¹⁰, at least some tertiary education¹¹.

⁶ This has been argued eloquently by many scholars, despite Brazil's seeming 'racial democracy'. See Sanson, 2003; Hamilton *et al.*, 2001; Friedman & De Villiers, 1995.

⁷ This is perhaps especially so because this is roughly the classification system used by the apartheid government in enforcing the Population Registration Act.

⁸ This refers to no formal education on the part of the respondent, but does not necessarily mean that the respondent is illiterate.

⁹ In the South African case, primary education refers to Grades 0-7, ideally with the student beginning at 7 years of age and finishing at 13. In Brazil the case is similar, in that there are 8 *série* (Grades).

¹⁰ In the South African case this refers to Grades 8-12, with the student ideally finishing at age 18. In the final year a senior certificate is written called matriculation. In Brazil high school consists of three years (*primeiro, segundo and terceiro ano*), after which the student writes *vestibular*, similar in function to the matriculation certificate in that it is necessary for university entrance.

¹¹ This refers to any further study beyond the completion of matriculation or *vestibular*.

4.4 Data Analysis

Following an explanation of the shortcomings and problems encountered in the data, it is now necessary to turn to the analysis of the data itself. As the time periods are not the same, but comparable in terms of the political history of each country as motivated earlier, the data have been analysed by giving an overview of general levels of support comparing the two countries, then comparing the progress of each country individually.

It must be remembered that in the case of this study, there are 5 dependent variables, namely the five levels of political support discussed in Chapter Two, and the four independent variables, namely the four social background variables selected for use in this study: age, education, income and ethnicity¹². As such, a large number of permutations were investigated in this study. Space does not permit the intensive examination of each one. Nevertheless, the most important relationships will be discussed. All cross-tabulations are found in Appendix 1.

As the principal focus of this study is the level of support for democracy, the data will be analysed and presented in terms of each level of the Norris model: political community, regime principles, regime performance, regime institutions and political actors.




4.4.1 Political Community

It is unfortunate that the three measures used to indicate the level of support for political community were incompatible with respect to index construction. Nevertheless, an examination of these variables individually will still enable the formation of a general idea of the perception of the political community as a political object. The trends over the entire sample will firstly be examined, followed by their inspection in terms of the various social background variables.

¹² See recoding problems discussed above.

4.4.1.1 National Pride¹³

As can be seen from the total sample, levels of ‘pride to be Brazilian’ (Figure 2), are much lower than the corresponding levels of pride to be South African (Figure 3). It could be argued that South African respondents in 1995 were still euphoric over the successful, relatively bloodless democratic transition in 1994, demonstrating Tóka’s (1995:356) previously mentioned ‘honeymoon period’. In addition, South Africa winning the World Cup Rugby in May of that year may also have inflated national pride in that period as the 1995 wave was taken only 5 months later. Nevertheless, relatively high levels of national pride are sustained in 2001, despite a slight shift from ‘very proud’ to ‘quite proud’. Indeed, although the ‘very proud’ drops by nearly 7%, this is still 10% higher than 1995 levels in Brazil, and while those ‘not at all proud’ in South Africa triples, this is also still less than 1995 Brazilian levels. It must be pointed out, however, that in Brazil those who are ‘very proud’ are not as numerous as in South Africa, between 1990 and 1995, those who were ‘not at all proud’ reduced to less than a third of the original percentage, from 6.4% to 1.9%.



¹³ The question item used to measure national pride was worded: “How proud are you to be South African/Brazilian?”. Response set: very proud/quite proud/not very proud/not at all proud. This item was q322 (1990); q82 (1995); q216 (2001).

4.4.1.1.1 National Pride: Brazil 1990-1995 (see Appendix I, pp. i and v)

In terms of the social background variables, several interesting relationships emerge. In Brazil, in terms of age, it seems that the more aged respondents consistently displayed higher levels of national pride. The most notable increase occurs when the respondents reach the 65+ year age category, increasing from the previous age category by nearly 14% to 81.3% in 1990 and rising by 7.4% to 74.4% in 1995. With regards to education, it seems that in 1990 those with the less schooling are prouder to be Brazilian. Indeed, concerning the 'very proud' category, there is a huge dip between those with primary school and some high school (68.3% and 48.2% respectively). It is thus perhaps significant that, in Brazil, the military state policies to ensure the universal and subsidized enrolment of all children at a primary school level since 1965 have been largely successful (O'Connell & Birdsall, 2001:290). Those who study further, however, must have the money to be able to afford it¹⁴. It seems thus that the great divide between the very poor and the richer Brazilian respondents in terms of pride to be Brazilian is evident in the difference between 'at least some primary school' and 'at least some high school'. In 1995 this trend is not so obvious¹⁵, although those who are 'very proud' with 'at least some primary school' increase by almost 12% to 69.6% from those with 'no schooling' and remains at least 7% higher than any other education category. It is interesting to note, however, that with increases in level of education, the percentage which is 'not at all proud' decreases.

Thus the drop in national pride in those with more than primary education seems to suggest that the wealthier¹⁶ are less 'proud to be Brazilian'. This is partially corroborated by the fact in 1990 67.5% of the working class are 'very proud' as opposed to only 55% of those with 'higher incomes' in 1990. The same trend is manifested in 1995, where

¹⁴ Very few poorer families keep their children in school after the primary level. Not only is the quality of education at state high schools very poor, but it is thus logically believed by parents that it would be more productive to bring them home to work (O'Connell & Birdsall, 2001:297).

¹⁵ This may be due to the limited improvement in providing good secondary education for poorer Brazilians (O'Connell & Birdsall, 2001:290), thus softening the distinction slightly between the very rich and the very poor in terms of education.

¹⁶ The wealthier in Brazil are mostly those with better education as formal education is used as a social barrier in Brazil (McDonough, 1981:18).

66.9% of those with 'working-class incomes' are 'very proud', whereas only 53.3% of the higher income group are 'very proud'.

4.4.1.1.2 National Pride: South Africa 1995-2001 (see Appendix 1, pp. xii and xxi)

In South Africa in 1995, age-wise, there do not seem to be any marked trends, although it is noted that in 2001 the 55-64 age group drops more than 8% lower than the other categories' range of approximately 72%-78% to 64.9% in the 'very proud' category¹⁷. Along ethnic divisions, the ethnic groups previously discriminated against under apartheid are much prouder to be South African. Blacks are the most proud (85.8%), with whites trailing at 62.6% in 1995¹⁸. This is to be expected. The ANC, the first non-racial South African party to come to power, had done so through peaceful means, signalling the end of racial discrimination and, by implication, a better life for those previously discriminated against under apartheid (Ramphela, 2001:76). Although whites are still relatively proud, their apprehension about their future as a previously privileged minority had perhaps dampened their enthusiasm, as well as a lingering sense of guilt over apartheid (Steyn, 2001:97-100). While the percentages of those who are 'very proud' drop in 2001, blacks and coloureds are still in the seventies (78.1% and 72.1% respectively), whereas the whites and the Indians, historically more privileged races¹⁹, have dropped to 48.6% and 52.2% respectively.

In terms of income and education, the legacy of apartheid is clearly illustrated in the almost perfect parallel between the low levels of these two variables and ethnic divisions²⁰. In 1995 pride to be South African drops nearly 20% (66.4% as opposed to ranging from 84.9-82.6%) as the respondents acquire some tertiary education, which

¹⁷ This age group also had the lowest percentage of 'very proud' in 1995, perhaps as they are the older part of the work force, on the brink of retirement and fear the political upheaval and consequent job insecurity the democratic transition may cause.

¹⁸ This is still higher than the national Brazilian percentage of those 'very proud' in 1990 and 1995.

¹⁹ While it is true that Indians were classified as 'non-white' under the apartheid regime and thus obligated to carry passes, they were still higher up on the racial hierarchy than either coloureds or blacks, being conceded more privileges. This was intended to foment resentment and discourage any possible alliance between blacks, coloureds and Indians, thus using the latter as a racial buffer (Steyn, 2001:93).

²⁰ Whites correspond roughly to higher income, Indians to 'middle income', coloureds to 'lower income' and blacks to 'working-class income' - in the perceived racial hierarchy of the apartheid era. James & Lever (2001:29) dispute the fact that race and wealth really coincide so neatly, but it must be remembered that their article was published 6 years after the data for 1995 were collected.

corroborates the fact that whites were concentrated in the higher education facilities (O'Connell & Birdsall, 2001:285). Income mirrors this as in 1995 30% more of those respondents with working-class income are 'very proud' than those with a higher income (86% as opposed to 56.2%). While not so marked in 2001²¹, a similar trend is visible and significant in terms of both education and income. This is probably due to the fact that in South Africa race is almost an antecedent variable as it continues in some measure to define income and educational level due to the legacy of apartheid (Friedman, 1995:534; Alexander, 2001:475; Zoninsein, 2001:363). Only further longitudinal survey research will be able to determine whether and when income and education will become fully independent from race.

Thus it seems here that in both South Africa and Brazil, it is the poorer, less educated respondents who have the highest levels of national pride, ironically suggesting that it is those who have, according to the respective circumstances, benefited the least from the previous regime have the most national pride.²² This may be because they are the most susceptible to populist propaganda in Brazil, following a history of populism, whereas in South Africa, following the new democratic dispensation, they now have the most to gain as the South African Bill of Rights commits the government to addressing the provision of basic needs as far as services such as water, sanitation and electricity are concerned (Marais, 2001:125).

4.4.1.2 Geographic Identification²³

With regards to identifying with the country as a geo-political unit, neither country has a population majority which does so, although South African national identification is again stronger (see Figures 4 and 5). In both countries regional and continental identification is fairly poor, although it does increase slightly in later years. The latter is


²¹ This is possibly due to concerted attempts by the government to address such racial inequalities.

²² In the case of South Africa, blacks are historically poorer as a result of apartheid's discriminatory policies (Sisk, 1995), whereas the poorer classes in Brazil were less subsidized than the richer classes (Roett, 1999; McDonough, 1981).

²³ The question item used for geographic identification was worded: "To which of these geographical groups would you say you belong first of all?" Response set: locality or town where you live/province or region of country where you live/South Africa (Brazil) as a whole/Africa(South America)/The world as a whole. These were q320 (1990); q80 (1995); q214 (2001).

probably due to the fact that Brazil has a different colonial history to the rest of South America²⁴, whereas South Africa's Eurocentrism during apartheid as well as the country's global ostracism prevented her from identifying strongly with either Africa or the world (Steyn, 2001:85). Interestingly, an increasing number of Brazilian respondents seem to identify themselves as 'world citizens' as opposed to nationals.

4.4.1.2.1 Geographic Identification: Brazil 1990-1995 (see Appendix 1, pp. i and vi)




In terms of the social background variables it is the poorer income groups which identify more strongly with their town, possibly due to a rural mentality or a lack of political education (Bresser-Pereira, 1990:206). Predictably, it is also the higher income groups which are more likely to classify themselves as 'world citizens', most likely because of the growing phenomenon of the 'global village' and their more likely participation in international trade and affairs. Interestingly, in 1990 in Brazil the poorer income groups seem to identify more with the nation geographically only marginally, with the working-class and lower income groups at 31.2% and 31.9% respectively against the middle and high income groups at 27.6% and 30% respectively. By 1995 this has changed. National identification increases gradually with income until it drops from 37.5% (middle income) to 16.7% (higher income). Whereas no trend was discernable in terms of education in Brazil 1990, by 1995 those with some tertiary education displayed the highest levels of

²⁴ She was colonized by Portugal, as discussed, whereas the other South American countries were colonized by Spain. Brazil is consequently the only South American country to speak Portuguese, whereas the others have Spanish as their national language.

national identification (30.1%), which drops steadily as education levels decrease. In terms of age, the older the respondent, the more likely national identification was chosen, up until before the oldest age group, after which national identification drops from 35.9% to 30.6% in 1990 and 38% to 25.6% in 1995.

4.4.1.2.2 Geographic Identification: South Africa 1995-2001 (see Appendix 1, pp. xiii and xxii)



In the South African case, as in that of Brazil, ‘world citizens’ are also more likely to come from the higher income group and stronger identification with one’s town from the lower or working-class income. In 1995 the lower income class identified most strongly on a geographically national level (50.1%). In terms of education, an increase in this variable seemed to increase national identification, rising from 31.1% (no schooling) to 47.8% (at least some high school), although dropping slightly to 42% (some tertiary education). These trends are fairly consistent in 2001. In terms of ethnicity, Indians identified most with South Africa as a country in 1995 (56.1%), although the inter-ethnic differences are relatively small on this issue. In terms of age, little remarkable emerges except that in 1995, the 45-54 year age group had the strongest national identification (47.3%), but it is almost the weakest in 2001 (36.1%).

To compare, it seems that in South Africa and Brazil, the seemingly contradictory trends of higher education yet lower income in terms of those respondents with the stronger


national identification seem to point to a stronger national geographic identification. While it is true that these trends are only slight, it is curious as in both countries, by implication, income and education have a fairly direct relationship. It is possible that the higher income group's pre-occupation with their global context may skew the relationship in this case.

4.4.1.3 Willingness to fight for their country²⁵

The last indicator used to measure levels of support for the political community, willingness to fight in a war for one's country, yields some interesting results. Brazil produced curious results indeed. In contradistinction to South Africa, whose percentages of respondents willing to fight remained fairly constant at just under 60%, in Brazil an almost two-thirds majority admitted that they would *not* be willing to fight (64%, see Figure 6). Nevertheless, by 1995 this trend has radically reversed with 71.8% stating they would be willing to fight for their country. It is unlikely that this is due to a single factor, but it is worth noting that this survey was conducted shortly after Cardoso's election as president in 1995, following the successful economic turn-around he achieved for the Brazilian economy in terms of hyper-inflation (Hunter, 2003:154). This is something that would have been experienced positively by all Brazilians, particularly the poor, whom inflation often hits the hardest. It is possible that such a tangible improvement in the economy, following the solution of a chronic problem, prompted the flood of patriotic devotion which is suggested by the percentages in Figure 6.


²⁵ The question item used for 'willingness to fight for their country' was worded: "Of course, we all hope that there will not be another war, but if it were to come to that, would you be willing to fight for your country?" Responses set: yes/no. These were q263 (1990); q43 (1995); q126 (2001).

Figure 6: Brazilian willingness to fight for their country in a war (1990-1995)



In South Africa in 1995 a majority does express a willingness to fight for their country. (59.4%, see Figure 7), but it is arguably not very high. This is possibly due to South Africa's expensive involvement in the Angolan war, terminated only several years before 1995, or perhaps mistrust of the armed forces and enforced conscription under the apartheid state. This drops slightly to 58.3% five years later in 2001. An interesting observation is that a fairly large proportion (13.7 % in 1995 and 14.4% in 2001) stated that they did not know. This suggests that there is a fair amount of uncertainty in terms of the hypothetical situation of being called to war.

Figure 7: South African willingness to fight for their country in a war (1995-2001)



4.4.1.3.1 Willingness to Fight for their Country: Brazil 1990-1995 (see Appendix I, pp. ii and vii)

On examination of the trends inherent in the social background variables, it is interesting that in Brazil, willingness to fight a war for one's country increases with education, with 54.8% of those with 'some tertiary education' willing to fight as opposed to 40% of those with 'no schooling' and 32.8% of those with 'some primary education' in 1990. This is completely reversed in 1995, with 94.7% of those with 'no schooling' willing to fight, against 65.3% of those with 'some tertiary education', perhaps reinforcing the idea of the unskilled labourers' gratitude that hyper-inflation is now under control and no longer eating away at their meagre disposable incomes. In terms of the relationship between willingness to fight for one's country and income in 1990, the trends here remain mysterious as willingness increases with income until the higher income group where it drops sharply by over 10% (39.8% to 28.6%). In 1995 'willingness to fight' decreases steadily with income, from 74.9% (working-class income) to 63.3% (higher income).

4.4.1.3.2 Willingness to Fight for their Country: South Africa 1995-2001 (see Appendix I, pp. xiv and xxii)


In South Africa in 1995 initial trends mirror those of Brazil in 1990, i.e. that willingness to fight in a war increases with education. By 2001 increased education still uniformly increases willingness to fight. With regards to ethnicity, blacks are least likely to fight, although the percentage of willingness to fight is still 58.6% in 1995. This does seem to corroborate the previous trend, as it is generally accepted that whites were better educated due to apartheid's legacy of discriminatory education subsidisation²⁶. Interestingly, by 2001 willingness to fight is much the same among ethnic groups except among Indians, whose willingness is only 44.8% compared to a range of 57.5% (whites) to 56.1% (coloureds), whereas they had been the most willing to fight in 1995 (74.5%). The younger the respondent, the more likely to express willingness to fight in 1995 and this trend continues to 2001²⁷.

²⁶ In 1994 spending on education was 5 times greater for whites than it was for blacks (O'Connell & Birdsall, 2001:285).

²⁷ This is unlikely to be a nationally specific trend, however.

Due to the erratic nature of the Brazilian trends, a comparison may not be as useful as it has been in the previous items for the political community, pointing once again to the problem with only two points of reference in a longitudinal study.

Thus analysis of support for the political community in South Africa and Brazil has led to mixed results. It is clear that South African respondents identify with their nationality much more proudly and are slightly more likely to recognize a national affiliation as opposed to other levels of geographic groupings. Nevertheless, Brazilian respondents are, in theory²⁸, much more likely to go to war for their country, perhaps not having experienced the toll of protracted warfare such as South Africa's forays into Angola or enforced conscription²⁹. While it is tempting to gauge South Africa's support for the political community as stronger than Brazil's, it must be remembered that a clear majority is 'very proud' to be Brazilian, albeit not as large as in South Africa's case. In addition, it cannot be determined what the significance of each of these evaluations is in relation to each other and whether each measure is of equal importance in terms of support for the political community. It is perhaps more prudent to examine the other political objects and their levels of support before attempting to reach any conclusions.





4.4.2 Regime Principles

While every attempt has been made to measure the same concepts in terms of regime principles, it must be remembered that it was the Brazilian 1990 survey which necessitated the construction of a different index to those used in the 1995 and 2001 waves. This must be borne in mind during the interpretation of the data in this section. It will also consequently be more difficult to render a precise comparison between Brazilian and South African support for this political object. The two countries will thus be discussed separately in this section and only afterwards be compared broadly.

²⁸ As mentioned in Chapter Three, surveys can only effectively measure attitudes and are not reliable indicators of future behaviour (Weisberg & Bowen, 1977:83). In this case, for instance, while 71.8% of Brazilians in 1995 stated that they would be willing to go to war in a hypothetical situation, whether this would translate to 71.8% of Brazilians indeed enlisting should a state of war be declared is both uncertain and debatable.

²⁹ Enforced conscription for all white males (and extended in principle to coloured and Indian men in 1977) was met with increasing resistance from the mid-1980s onwards (CIIR, 1989; Guimarães, 1998).

4.4.2.1 Regime Principles: Brazil 1990-1995³⁰ (see Appendix 1, pp. iii and vii)



While the data rendered for Brazil in 1990 (see Figure 8) do seem very promising in terms of contributing a solid support base for the broad principles which should be held up by a democratic regime, the difficulty of constructing an index to measure support for this political object³¹ and the consequent implications must be borne in mind. It does seem, however, that Brazilian respondents are very supportive of an open transparent government, as well as more freedom for the individual. It is perhaps important to remember that this survey was taken around the time of Collor's impeachment, prompting an overwhelming response to the need for a transparent government following the corruption scandal which led to the chief executive officer's being removed from office.

As regards trends within the social background variables, in 1990 it seems that the lower the income, the more strongly supportive the respondent was of the regime principles. It

³⁰ The two items used to construct the index for Brazil 1990 'regime principles' were responses to statements q336 and q337 respectively: "Our government should be made much more open to the public" and "We are more likely to have healthy economy if the government allows more freedom for individuals to do as they wish". Response set: agree completely/agree somewhat/neither agree nor disagree/disagree somewhat/disagree completely. 'Regime principles' for 1995 and 2001 were measured using responses to the statements "having a democratic political system"; q55@4 (1995); q167 (2001). Response set: very good/fairly good/fairly bad/very bad; and "Democracy may have its problems but it's better than any other form of government"; q58@4 (1995); q172 (2001); response set : strongly agree/agree/disagree/strongly disagree.

³¹ See Chapter Three and Appendix 2.


can be seen that 84.4% of working class income respondents are 'strongly supportive' as opposed to 'higher incomes' at 57.9%. A cynic would suggest that this is probably due to the fact that Brazil's patrimonial state functioning often ensured that wealth removed a large number of restrictions ordinary citizens are subjected to, providing structural protection for the elites (McDonough, 1981:3). A lack of transparency facilitated many of the clientelist backroom deals which characterised Brazil's earlier political system (McDonough, 1981:110-121). The above trend is also supported by the fact that the less education a respondent had, the more likely they were to be supportive of the regime principles, elites being more likely to have a higher education³². To illustrate the dramatic differences, 95.0% of those with 'no schooling' demonstrated support, as opposed to 71.9% of those with 'some tertiary education' that did so.

The data rendered for 1995 (Figure 9) compared with the 1990 data (Figure 8) could have interesting implications. While support for regime principles in 1990 was measured by actual characteristics of a liberal democracy, support for regime principles is measured by assessment of the actual system of democracy in 1995. This could be interpreted as indicating that, while Brazilians hold the basic tenets of democracy in high regard, what they recognise as a democratic system of government does not command such support, which may reflect on the performance of democracy in Brazil. This notwithstanding, if those who believe 'having a democratic system' is 'very good' and 'fairly good' are combined, it can be seen that a large majority (85%) still regard democratic systems fairly highly.

An examination of the data's relationship to social background variables seems to contradict the 1990 findings. It seems that as income increases, so does the likelihood of the respondent having a favourable opinion of the democratic system; the percentage of those who believe the democratic system to be 'very good' rises steadily with income from 23.7% (working-class income) to 38.9% (higher income).

³² By implication, the more educated respondents were also wealthier. Formal education was one of ways in which class barriers were imposed in Brazil, preventing social mobility (McDonough, 1981:18).

While it is indeed possible that the lack of continuity is due to problems with measurement as mentioned above, it is possible that the poorer sectors of society are disillusioned with democracy as it has failed to improve living standards significantly³³ (*Mail & Guardian*, 9-15/01/04; Hunter, 2003). The wealthier sectors still enjoy considerable influence in the government and thus find democracy agreeable (Roett, 1999). In terms of education, it seems that there is a slight tendency for those who are more educated to have a more positive opinion of the democratic system; the combined percentages of those who rate the democratic system as ‘very good’ and ‘fairly good’ rise from 76.2% (‘no schooling’) to 88.1% (‘at least some tertiary education’). This may be because the latter consider the procedural theory behind democratic rule, whereas those with less education may rate democracy in terms of performance³⁴.



A further attempt to measure support for the democratic system or at least acceptance of it is to measure agreement with the Winstonian³⁵ hypothesis. This will be especially relevant in Brazil’s case because, whereas the apartheid state in South Africa was never truly legitimate, the Brazilian military regime, while never accorded legitimacy through official popular mandate, was considered by many respondents in Brazil to have been an

³³ The election of Luiz Inacio “Lula” to the presidency in 2002 is seen by many as an attempt by the Brazilian population to place redistribution onto the government’s agenda. Lula is the Worker’s Party (PT) candidate and the first working-class president to be elected in Brazil’s history (Hunter, 2003).



³⁴ This may point to a fault in the measuring instrument, as the researcher does not know how the respondent conceptualised ‘democratic system’.

³⁵ This hypothesis takes its name from Winston Churchill who is said to have declared: “democracy is the worst form of rule except for all the other ones before it” (Huntington, 1996:10).

effective regime³⁶. It is nevertheless encouraging that a majority have ‘strong agreement’ that democracy is better than any other form of government (50.1%, see Figure 10). Combined with those who ‘agree’, this totals 83.4%, which is almost 10% higher than South Africa.

In terms of social background variables, it seems that as income increases, so does the strength of opinion that democracy is the best political system despite its faults. This is only slightly so, however, as the combined categories of ‘strongly agree’ and ‘agree’ differ between the working-class income group and the higher income group by less than 2%. It is perhaps significant, however, that whereas those of the working-class income group who ‘strongly agree’ are 46.4%, those of the higher income group with this opinion are 65.0%. Similarly, in terms of education, it seems that the more educated the respondent, the more likely to ‘strongly agree’ that democracy is a better political system, as only 22.2% of those with ‘no schooling’ strongly agree compared to 56.3% of those with ‘some tertiary education’, and those strongly disagreeing 16.7% and 6.0% respectively of those with ‘no schooling’ and ‘some tertiary education’. This is consistent with results from the previous graph.

4.4.2.2 Regime Principles : South Africa 1995-2001 *(see Appendix, pp. xiv and xxiii)*



³⁶ Considering the severity of the authoritarian military regime, it is surprising that as much as 35.6% thought army rule to be a fairly good form of government according to 1995 WVS data. Public opinion was in essence divided on this matter, 45.4% considering it to be a good form of government and 54.6% considering it to be a bad form.

The South African democratic regime, in both measures of support for regime principles, does not seem to have as broad a support base as Brazil, although support is still fairly strong. It can be seen that 46.4% of South African respondents showed a high level of support for the democratic system, dropping minimally in 2001 (see Figure 12). In terms of supporting democracy as opposed to any other form of rule, this support base is also relatively well grounded as the 'strongly agree' and 'agree' categories combined made up 72.4% in 1995 this was maintained at 73.6% in 2001 (see Figure 11).

In terms of social background variables and 'having a democratic system', the younger respondents seem to be slightly more in favour, 52.1% of 16-24-year-olds calling it 'very good' as opposed to 44.2% of 65+ respondents. Interestingly, this trend is reversed in 2001, where only 34.4% of 16-24-year-olds as opposed to 57.2% of 65+ respondents considered 'having a democracy' as 'very good'. This must not be over-emphasized, however, because if one combined the 'very good' and 'good' categories, the younger group is larger, 87.7% as opposed to 83.8%. Black respondents are by far the most supportive of democracy, 51.0% pronouncing democracy 'very good', which is at least 15% higher than any other ethnic group in 1995. By 2001 black respondent support has dropped slightly to 46.9%, whereas both white and Indian respondent support strengthened, those with 'very good' responses rising between 6% and 9% to 37.6% and 45.0% respectively.

In terms of income in 1995, curiously, strong support ('very good') for democracy weakens from 47.4% at the working-class income group as income increases until the higher income group, where it increases quite substantially by 13% to 51.0%. Those who think that democracy is 'very bad' corroborate this trend, reaching a high of 8.6% at the middle-income group. By 2001 this has changed somewhat, as opinions seem to polarize. Those with higher percentages of 'very good' also have higher percentages of 'very bad' opinions (and thus lower percentages of the more moderate response categories) especially the higher income group³⁷. In terms of education in 1995, it does seem that the

³⁷ The lower income group now has the lowest percentage of 'very good' responses 41.5%, but the lowest percentage of 'very bad' responses too (1.0%). The working-class income group and the higher income

higher the level of the respondents' education, the more likely they are to rate having a democratic system as 'very good'; 43.7% of those with 'no schooling' doing so as opposed to 52.4% of those with 'at least some tertiary education'. By 2001 it seems that strong enthusiasm for having a democratic system still increases as education rises, but dips 9% at the higher income group to 36.8%.

As regards democracy above all other forms of government (see Figure 11), blacks still have the largest percentage of strong support (42.1%, almost double any other group's) and whites, the lowest (19.6%) in 1995. It is possible that the other ethnic groups fear the so-called 'tyranny of the majority' as ethnic minorities. By 2001, however, these opinions have become less polarized, with blacks and Indians the most 'strongly supportive' of democracy over any other system (34.6% and 34.1% respectively) and whites and coloureds not far behind, in comparison to 1995 at 22.3% and 21.5% respectively. This bodes well, as universal acceptance of the political 'rules of the game' is conducive to effective conflict resolution³⁸.

In terms of income and democracy as the better form of political system in 1995, the working-class income group displays the highest level of 'strong agreement' (39.0%), decreasing as income increases to 27.5% (higher income group). This trend becomes less marked in 2001, however, as opinions homogenise between income groups. It becomes the trend that strong support for consolidated democracy increases as income declines. On examining the influence of education in 1995, it is interesting to note that, while the percentage of those who 'strongly agree' that democracy is the better political system remains fairly constant as education increases, so does the percentage of those who 'agree', rising from 25.9% ('no schooling') to 45.8% ('some tertiary education'). By 2001 this has changed, so that agreement that democracy is the better political system increases uniformly until 'some tertiary education'. At this category 'strongly agree' and

group, while having 'very good' percentages of 47.4% and 43.7% respectively, also have 'very bad' percentages of 4.3% and 5.0% respectively.

³⁸ This refers to democracy being not absence of conflict, but absence of illegal conflict mechanisms. Democracy is thus seen as a legitimate process through which consensus can be reached through conflict management and mediation (Schmitter & Karl, 1996:50).

‘agree’ drop 10% each to 24.9% and 34.3% respectively. Age does not show any significant trends.

To ignore for a moment the data results of 1990, it would seem that education increases the chance of a favourable opinion of democracy in both South Africa and Brazil. This may be due to an increased understanding of democracy’s theoretical basis³⁹, but in the case of Brazil, it could be because the way that democracy functions is very beneficial to the elite. This indeed seems to be the case, as in 1995 the wealthier and more educated the Brazilian respondents, the more likely they were to be in favour of democracy in principle. In South Africa, it seems that it is the groups at the extreme ends of the education and income continuum which are the most supportive of democracy. This may be explained by the expectations that the democratic transition was meant to fulfil with respect to the prevailing inequalities. The wealthier, more educated South African respondents, still pre-dominantly the historically privileged ethnic groups, seem at once to support democracy and yet remain wary of it as they are invariably minorities in a “majority rules” situation.

Overall, in terms of regime principles, it seems that Brazilian respondents provide a slightly stronger base of diffuse support for this political object. What is significant, however, is that in the final wave in South Africa those who believe democracy to be ‘very good’ outnumber those who only believe it to be ‘fairly good’ (43.2% to 37.9%), whereas in Brazil this is not so (27% to 57.9% respectively). This perhaps due to the fact that many still regard the army as having been effective rulers⁴⁰, despite the oppression and especially because there was not much confidence in the most recent president, Itamar Franco, who had assumed office by default as vice-president following Collor’s impeachment (Martinez-Lara, 1996:174). Brazilian respondents are nevertheless much more supportive of democracy over other systems, despite its faults (83.4% as opposed to 73.6%), suggesting that democracy is still preferable to rule by the military. Thus it seems that, in this context, although South African respondents may have a slightly

³⁹ To corroborate this, the ‘don’t know’ rates drop as education increases among the items referring to democracy.

⁴⁰ In 1995 fully 45.4% of the Brazilian respondents thought army rule was fairly good to very good.

greater sense of pride and national identification, the Brazilian support base for regime principles is wider.

4.4.3 Regime Performance⁴¹

As previously mentioned, in some cases problems in the data capturing of the World Values Survey in the country sets used meant that crucial variables required for analysis were missing in certain instances in the Brazil 1990 wave. In order to supplement the data required for the study therefore, several variables were acquired from CESOP⁴², the Centre for Public Opinion Studies, based in Sao Paulo, Brazil. It is recognised that this does compromise the comparability of the data and results must thus be interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, use of variables⁴³ from another data set is intended to provide a rough idea of public opinion where the original instrument is unable to do so. As a consequence of the different variables used, Brazil and South Africa will again be compared separately in terms of evaluation of regime performance. General impressions in terms of comparison will be noted following the individual analyses.

4.4.3.1 Regime Performance: Brazil 1990-1995 (see Appendix 1, pp. iii and ix)

Broadly speaking in terms of Brazilian respondents, it is encouraging to note that almost twice as many people felt 'optimistic' or 'very optimistic' as 'pessimistic' or 'very pessimistic' (43.8% as opposed to 22%) about Brazil's future in 1990 (see Figure 13). It seems that opinions are very favourably disposed towards the future of the regime.


In terms of social background variables, it seems that the most optimistic are the youngest (16-25 years) and oldest (51+ years) age cohorts, 8% and 8.3% respectively

⁴¹ The items used for 1995 and 2001 'regime performance' were: "Where on this scale would you put the political system: as it was [in apartheid times/before *abertura*]?" q 54@1 (1995); q163 (2001) as it is today? q54@3 (1995); qX3 (2001) as you expect it will be ten years from now?" q54@2(1995); qX4 (2001). Response set scale, 1-10; 1=very bad; 10=very good.

⁴² Centro de Estudos de Opinião Publica

⁴³ The data used in this case to provide a point of departure for support for regime performance in Brazil 1990 were taken from a survey conducted by CESOP in January 1990. The question reads: "*Generally, how would you say you feel in relation to the future of Brazil? a) very optimistic, b) optimistic, c) neutral, d) pessimistic, e) very pessimistic?*" This question was chosen because it most closely resembles one of the items used in the operationalization. It is also appropriate, because President Collor had only recently been elected president at this stage, thus preventing any evaluation of regime performance based on sustained actions.

stating they were ‘very optimistic’, as opposed to the other age cohorts who ranged from 4.7% to 5% in this category. If one combines the ‘very optimistic’ and ‘optimistic’ categories, however, optimism seems to increase with age. This is corroborated by the fact that the youngest age category also displays the highest percentage of those feeling ‘pessimistic’ (16.7%) and within 0.2% of the highest percentage of ‘very pessimistic’ (7.9%). This prompts the suggestion that younger Brazilians are more polarised in their views and less settled in their political opinions perhaps. In terms of schooling, there are no spectacular differences discernable between the various levels of schooling, although opinions seem slightly more favourable towards the regime’s future among those with less education⁴⁴.



Although it is unfortunately not possible to compare perceptions of the previous and present regimes between 1990 and 1995, it is possible to compare roughly the perceptions of the future regime⁴⁵ between these two time frames (see Figure 13 and Figure 14). It is

⁴⁴ While the percentage of those who have ‘no schooling’ and are ‘very optimistic’ about Brazil’s future is slightly more than those with ‘some tertiary education’ of the same opinion (6.3% to 4.8%), combined with the respective percentages which are ‘optimistic’, this difference is negligible (42.1% versus 44.4% respectively). It is only when combining those who are ‘pessimistic’ and ‘very pessimistic’ that one can notice a slight difference: 12.5% (‘no schooling’) versus 23.6% (‘some tertiary education’).

⁴⁵ Strictly speaking, the question used for this item measures anticipation for the future regime as the survey was taken on the eve of Collor’s inauguration, thus the new administration could not yet be judged on current performance.

clear that, whereas more Brazilian respondents were optimistic than pessimistic in 1990 (42.8% as opposed to 22%), in 1995 this picture has changed somewhat⁴⁶.

In terms of the future regime in 1995, however, one can see that 10 years after democratic transition Brazilian respondents are still optimistic about the future of the government. This optimism is fairly evenly distributed across the board in terms of age⁴⁷. Interestingly, although those with 'no schooling' are the happiest with the present and previous regimes, in terms of the future regime, they are the most pessimistic. In a reversal of previous trends, it seems that as the respondent's level of education increases, so does their optimism for the future⁴⁸.


It is curious that, whereas there had been a strong link between education and income previously, these variables display quite different trends in terms of perspectives on the political future of Brazil. This can be seen by examining the trends in income. Interestingly, the working-class respondents are very polarized as they are the most pessimistic in terms of the future regime (at 21.1%), but they are also the most optimistic (25.7%). As regards the other income groups, there is a slow decline in the percentage of those who predict the future regime to be 'very good', with higher income at 16.7%. Interestingly however, as regards those who think the future regime will be 'very bad', the percentage declines with increase in income until the higher income group, where it jumps from 8.5% (middle income) to 20% (higher income).

⁴⁶ The figures of 42.8% and 22% are achieved by collapsing the 'very optimistic' and 'optimistic' categories and the 'very pessimistic' and 'pessimistic' categories respectively (see Figure 13). Combining 'very good' and 'fairly good', and 'very bad' and 'fairly bad' for anticipation of the future regime in 1995, percentages of 54.2% and 35.9% respectively are reached, demonstrating a shift in opinion. While it is acknowledged that the discrepancy may be attributed to the fact that the WVS had no neutral response category, and those who are optimistic are more numerous than those who are pessimistic, the change is significant enough to take note of.

⁴⁷ Of those who predict the future regime to be 'very good' and 'fairly good', all age groups range between 60% and 49.3%. It is interesting to note that the two most optimistic groups are the oldest, 65-70 years (60.0%) and the youngest, 16-24 years (59.7%).

⁴⁸ This is illustrated in that of those with 'no schooling', 50% rate the future regime 'very bad' whereas after a steady decline through the education groups, only 14.2% of those with at least some tertiary education do so. In addition, only 12.5% of those with 'no schooling' predict the future regime to be 'very good', whereas the other education groups all range between 22% and 27.9% in this category.

Although they cannot be compared with 1990 data, evaluations of the present and past regimes can be compared with projections for the future regime in 1995 (see Figure 14).



Encouragingly, it can be seen that Brazilian respondents contemplate the political future with optimism relative to their evaluation of the present regime. What is troubling is that in 1995 the former military regime rates better than the current democratic regime⁴⁹.

On examining evaluations of the previous regime in terms of age, what is interesting is that, although the percentage of those who consider the regime to be 'very bad' increases slightly with age, it dips substantially from group 55-64 years to 65-70+ years (from 27.8% to 18.9%). This is especially remarkable as it is this group that is most supportive of the 1995 present democratic regime (see below), yet they were least opposed to the military regime. This can perhaps be explained by noting that this group had lower expectations of democracy, seeming to retain a fairly good opinion of the former military regime.


In terms of education, a marked divide is noticeable. Those with 'no schooling' and 'at least some primary school' who rated the previous regime 'very good', made up 22.2%

⁴⁹ Although only a slight difference, the fact that those who rate the previous regime 'very good' and 'fairly good' make up 33.4% as opposed to the present regime's 28.2% is worrying.

and 20.1% respectively. Only 9.6% and 7.0% of those with at least 'some high school' and at least 'some tertiary education' respectively considered the previous regime to be 'very good'. This can perhaps be explained by the fact that Brazilian regimes have always been populist, appealing to the masses⁵⁰, whereas it is those with higher education who would have noticed the fundamental injustices of authoritarian rule.

On examining trends within the social background variables in terms of evaluation of the present regime in 1995, it is interesting to note that, although no respondent with a higher income rated the government as 'very good', those who considered it 'fairly good' were more than the 'fairly good' and 'very good' categories combined among the other income groups.

Regarding education, those with 'no schooling' are the most supportive, 36.8% rating the present regime as 'very good', which is more than triple the percentage of any other education group. It is possible that this is due to hyper-inflation having been brought under control by the Minister of Finance, Cardoso. Those with no education are probably rural workers, whose incomes to buy such basic commodities as paraffin and foodstuffs are eaten away by inflation.



On examining support within age groups, what is most noticeable is that the percentage of those who think that the government is 'very good' increases very slightly with age, but between 55-64 years and 65-70 years it jumps from 9.4% to 32.4%. While it must be remembered that this is probably because the sample size of this group is smaller, as mentioned before, it could be argued that respondents of this age can more reliably compare the present regime's previous attempts at democracy. That the 65-70 year age group was the most supportive of the previous regime, however (see above), suggests that this group is pleasantly surprised at the democratic regime's performance, having endorsed military rule in the past.

⁵⁰ Bresser-Pereira (1990:206) describes the typical Brazilian voter as having a poor political education and a lack of information, mistrusting elites but favouring 'popular' candidates. These are vestiges of the populist nature of Brazilian government.

4.4.3.2 Regime Performance: South Africa 1995-2001 (see Appendix 1, pp. xvi and xxv)

On examining regime evaluation in South Africa in 1995 (see Figure 15), it is evident that the new democratic dispensation is much more popular among respondents than the apartheid regime (only 10.4% as opposed to 56.3% considering it ‘very bad’), and South African respondents were very optimistic about the future, 47.2% predicting it will be ‘very good’.

In terms of social background variables, there are predictably stark polarities noticeable between those who benefited from apartheid and those who did not. For example, in terms of ethnicity in 1995 only 16.6% of whites considered apartheid ‘very bad’, whereas between 66.1% (blacks) and 47% (coloureds) of the other ethnic groups considered it to be so. These percentages perhaps again reflect the racial hierarchy inherent in apartheid laws. Similarly, whereas 47.8% of whites considered apartheid ‘fairly good’ or ‘very good’, these two categories never made up more than 16.2% (Indians) of any other racial category.

In 1995 there is a definite trend whereby, as education increases, so does the likelihood of a more positive evaluation of apartheid⁵¹. What is interesting in examining trends in terms of income is that it would be expected that there would be a clear trend of an increase in income denoting an increase in support for apartheid. It seems, however, that those with a higher income are less supportive than the middle-income group (35.2% consider apartheid ‘very bad’, as opposed to 23% respectively). In terms of age, it seems to be the youngest (60.8%) and the oldest (66.3%) age categories that have the highest percentage of those rating apartheid as ‘very bad’.

In terms of evaluating the present regime in 1995, whites are by far the most pessimistic⁵², although in terms of considering it ‘very bad’, they are closely followed by

⁵¹ Only 37.9% of those with ‘some tertiary education’ considered apartheid ‘very bad’, as opposed to 68.6% of those with ‘no schooling’. This could arguably be called circular reasoning, as whites, who supported apartheid, were afforded better educational subsidies, thus increasing the likelihood that they would be in favour of a system that benefited them.

⁵² Of whites, 76.9% consider the present regime either ‘very bad’ or ‘fairly bad’.

coloureds⁵³ (26.7% compared to 24.6% respectively). Perhaps an illustration of the continued inequalities across racial lines present in 1995, the general trend is that the poorer the respondent, the more supportive of the present regime, although the higher income group is slightly more supportive than the middle income group⁵⁴. This may be attributed to the small repatriated black elite and newly appointed, high-salaried public officials who support the governing party. In terms of education, there is a clear trend that the more educated the respondents, the less likely they are to support the present regime⁵⁵, again pointing to apartheid's legacy of inequality affecting the present regime. In 1995 it seems that the younger respondents are more likely to be positive about the present regime. The percentage of those rating the regime as 'very bad' doubles from 6.1% (16-24 years) to 13.1% (45-54 years) and the 'very good' respondents halving in percentage from 17.4% (16-24 years) to 8.8% (55-64 years).

On considering the future, the pessimism of whites is again evident, although they seem slightly more optimistic about the future than the present⁵⁶. Blacks are again the most positive, and the coloureds and Indians of a similar opinion, although this time the coloureds are slightly more optimistic than the latter group about the future, 38.2% as opposed to 32.7% predicting the future regime to be 'very good'. As regards income groups, the same trend of support for the present regime is evident in terms of support for the future incumbents. On examining trends within the age categories, it becomes clear that the younger respondents are definitely more positive⁵⁷.


⁵³ It is possible that they feel vulnerable politically, as a minority, because although they were victims of apartheid, coloureds were traditional supporters of the NP, following the latter's belated attempt to diversify its support base in 1984 (Giliomee, 1994:11). That the same is true of the Indian population is reflected in the fact that the percentages of those who collectively consider the regime 'very bad' and 'fairly bad' are 63.5% (coloureds) and 62.2% (Indians).

⁵⁴ Of the higher income group 17.2% as opposed to the middle-income group's 22.7% consider the present regime 'very bad' whereas, collectively, 33.1% of the higher income group consider it to be 'very good' or 'fairly good' in comparison to the middle-income group's 27.6%.

⁵⁵ This is most dramatically illustrated in that, whereas 29.8% of those with 'no schooling' evaluate the present regime as 'very good', this percentage decreases with education until support drops to 3.4% among those with 'at least some tertiary education'.

⁵⁶ Notably, whereas 0.9% considered the current regime to be 'very good', 6.3% project the future regime to be 'very good'.

⁵⁷ As this trend extends into 2001 (although there is not enough data yet available to support this), it is possible that this suggests the applicability of Inglehart's (1998) generational displacement thesis in terms of democratic values.



In comparing 1995 results (Figure 15) to 2001 (Figure 16), it would seem that the optimism for the future has tempered somewhat; those who think the future regime will be 'very good' dropping from 47.2% in 1995 (Figure 14) to 22.9% in 2000 (Figure 15). Indeed, while opinions on apartheid have changed minimally in five years, the outlook on the present and future regimes has become somewhat more pessimistic.

On examining patterns in terms of social background variables, several patterns are evident. Blacks still have the highest percentage in considering the previous regime 'very bad', although this has dropped slightly from 66.1% in 1995 to 60.4% in 2001. Similarly, whereas 47% of coloureds considered it 'very bad' in 1995, by 2001 this has dropped to 33.5%. Indians display the highest level of nostalgia as the percentage of those considering apartheid 'very bad' drops from 54.3% to 28.8%, suggesting that they are the unhappiest with the current regime performance. Interestingly, slightly more whites consider apartheid to be 'very bad'⁵⁸.

⁵⁸ The percentage considering apartheid 'very bad' rises from 16.6% to 18.5%. It is, however, arguable that this increase is negligible. What is more interesting is that the white percentage considering the apartheid regime 'very good' has dropped from 12.1% to 8.1%, whereas coloureds and Indians considering apartheid to be 'very good' have increased slightly (4.5% to 6.8% and 3.2% to 12.8% respectively).


In 2001 support for the previous regime continues to increase with education, the most noticeable differences occurring between those with 'no schooling' and those with 'at least some primary school' and again with those who have 'some tertiary education'⁵⁹.

In terms of income, generally, it seems that time has softened perceptions of apartheid as, although support for this regime was not high, the percentages for those who considered it to be 'very bad' have diminished. An exception to this is the middle-income group, whose perceptions of apartheid have worsened considerably, the percentage considering it 'very bad' climbing from 23% in 1995 to 45.6% in 2001. A possible explanation is that some South African respondents who were relatively poor have since the democratic transition been able to increase their income to that of a middle-level income. Thus they attribute their previous poverty to apartheid discrimination and continue to hold bad memories of their experiences under that regime.


On evaluating the present regime, there is a clear trend demonstrating that as respondent income increases, so support for the present regime declines⁶⁰. This is probably due to the redistributive measures introduced by the ANC-led government to address the income inequalities in South Africa. Support for the present regime has, however, declined absolutely among all income groups, perhaps due to dissatisfaction with service delivery (Lodge, 2000:33-34; Schlemmer, 1994a:99). Bearing in mind that there seems to be a relationship between democratization and a strong middle class (Rivero *et al.*, 2003:6), the fact that only 26.4% of the middle consider the present regime 'fairly good' or 'very good' may be a cause for concern. Within the context of South Africa, however, rampant inequalities ensure that the middle class is not in the majority, although it is increasing (11.9% in 2003), perhaps reducing the severity of this situation (Rivero *et al.*, 2003:23).

⁵⁹ The percentage of those who consider the previous regime to be 'very bad' drops from 74.1% ('no schooling') to 53.8% ('at least some primary education') and again to 34.6% ('at least some tertiary education').

⁶⁰ While 8.9% of the working-class income group consider the present regime 'very bad', 25.8% of the higher income group hold the same opinion. Similarly, whereas 56.8% of the working-class income group consider the present regime either 'fairly good' or 'very good', only 16.1% of the higher-income group hold the same opinion.



On examining trends in 2001 among ethnic groups, white pessimism is again evident as the group which has the highest percentage (29.5%) considering the present regime 'very bad'. This is closely followed by the Indian population (24.4%). Racially, trends in terms of present regime support have changed little in five years, although Indians are slightly more pessimistic than coloureds⁶¹, whereas the reverse was true in 1995. In terms of education, the same trend apparent in 1995 is present.



On projecting into the future of the South African regime, all respondents are more positive and supportive, although those with little or no education continue to be more so than others⁶².

Optimism for the future continues to decrease fairly rapidly as income increases⁶³. There are some interesting developments in terms of support amongst the ethnic groups. Among whites, there is a slight moderation in views on the future regime⁶⁴. Among black people,

⁶¹ 78.6% of Indians consider the present regime to be 'very bad' or 'fairly bad' as opposed to 61.5% of coloureds.

⁶² This is reflected in the fact that of those with 'no education', 1% project the regime to be 'very bad' as opposed to 20.8% of those who have 'some tertiary education'.

⁶³ Of those who project the future regime to be 'very good', the percentage of the working-class income group is 39.4% dropping to 5.3% amongst the higher income group. This suggests a link with ethnicity.

⁶⁴ From 1995 to 2001, although those who project the future regime to be 'very good' have dropped from 6.3% to 3.8%, those who project the future regime to be 'very bad' have also dropped from 35% to 26.7%.

however, optimism for the future has dropped significantly, as those projecting the future regime to be 'very good' have dropped from 58.7% to 40.5%. Whereas coloured support for the future regime has dropped only marginally, however, Indian support has dropped even more significantly than that of black South African respondents⁶⁵.

In terms of overall impressions, it seems that both Brazilian and South African respondents are increasingly optimistic about the future of their country in terms of regime performance⁶⁶. What is interesting, but perhaps worrying, is that whereas South Africans overall remain convinced about the evils of apartheid⁶⁷, Brazilians in 1995 seem to rate the former military regime as better than their current democratic system of government. This does not bode well for the continued legitimacy of the democratic regime, although it is encouraging to note that Brazilians remain optimistic about the future. An examination of specific support, support for regime institutions and political actors, will perhaps clarify the picture.



⁶⁵ Coloureds are more likely to consider the future regime to be 'fairly good' (38.2%) in 2001 than 'very good' as in 1995 (38.2%), but the percentage of Indians projecting the future regime to be 'very good' has dropped dramatically from 32.7% to 8.9%.

⁶⁶ This is especially so because those with higher levels of education and income are the least supportive, suggesting that the elite, very influential in the Brazilian political arena (O'Donnell, 1996:100) are least disenchanted with democracy.

⁶⁷ It must be acknowledged that this is possibly due in part to the fact that black South Africans form an overwhelming majority of the population and, considering that they were the group most discriminated against during apartheid, do sway opinion, masking dissatisfaction among other groups. Opinions among ethnic groups, as has been seen, are not really that unanimous.

4.4.4 Regime Institutions⁶⁸

At this level of political support, it is possible to compare South Africa and Brazil using the same variables; thus an overall general impression can be given initially, followed by a country by country analysis.


It is clear that within both countries support for the regime institutions seems relatively stable over the period of time examined. Encouragingly, both countries display a high level of medium support or neutral support, at least suggesting that the institutions are largely tolerated, if not emphatically supported. What puts Brazil at a disadvantage in comparison to South Africa is that whereas in Brazil approximately 14% of respondents have strong support and approximately 30% weak support, the opposite is true of South Africa, suggesting that the latter has a much more secure support base.

4.4.4.1 Regime Institutions: Brazil 1990-1995 (See Appendix 1, pp. iv and x)

It is evident here (see Figure 17) that levels of support for the Brazilian regime institutions have remained fairly stable, with only a very slight shift to higher levels of support in 1995. It is also notable that whereas 'strong support' does not constitute a large percentage, a clear majority at least has medium support, in essence suggesting approval of at least the institutions of the democratic regime.

⁶⁸ The question item used to construct the index reads: "I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence, not very much confidence at all?" The armed forces; The legal system; The police; Parliament; Civil Service; The government in Brasilia/Pretoria; The president. Response set: a great deal /quite a lot/not very much/none at all. The 1990 (q273;q275; q277-280) data set only contained the first 5 items, and the 1995 (q53@2-3; q53@6-11) data set did not include the last item. The 2001 data set (q148; q151-q156;X1;X2) included all of them. Responses were recoded such that (1990); 'strong support' =6-11, 'medium support' = 12-18, 'weak support' = 19-24 (1995) and (2001). From this it can be deduced that strong support comprises responses of mostly 'a great deal of confidence' or 'quite a lot of confidence' responses; medium support comprises mostly 'quite a lot of confidence' and 'not very much confidence' responses and weak support comprises responses of mostly 'not very much confidence' and 'no confidence at all'. (See Appendix 2 for more in depth discussion).

Figure 17: Brazilian Support for Regime Institutions Index (1990-1995)



In 1990, in terms of income, it seems that the lower the Brazilian respondents' income, the more likely they are to demonstrate strong support for regime institutions⁶⁹. It seems that the higher income group is equally divided between medium support and weak support (50% in both categories), the middle and lower income groups also displaying high levels of weak support, 39.4% and 35.7% respectively, suggesting that weak support increases with increased income. By 1995 several changes have occurred. It is still true that the lower the income, the more likely the respondent to show 'strong support',⁷⁰. What is interesting, however, is that this trend ceases to hold for the higher income group. From no 'strong support' at all in 1990, 12.8% show 'strong support' in 1995. Nevertheless, 51.3% of this group still display low support for regime institutions. In 1995 results confirm the regularized trend that the wealthier the respondents, the more likely they are to have 'low support' for the regime institutions⁷¹.

In terms of education in 1990 there are very definite trends demonstrating that the less education the respondents have, the more likely they are to demonstrate 'strong support', and the more education the respondents have, the more likely they are to demonstrate

⁶⁹ Of working-class income Brazilians, 20.5 % demonstrated high support. This declines steadily until the higher income group, 0% of which demonstrate strong support.

⁷⁰ Of the working-class income group, 19.9% show 'strong support', at least 7% higher than any other group.

⁷¹ It can be seen in 1995 that 25.9% of working-class income respondents show 'weak support'. This figure increases steadily to 51.3% in the higher income group.

‘weak support’⁷². Five years later, in 1995, levels of support among the different levels of education have begun to homogenise⁷³. In 1995, whereas those with ‘no schooling’ and ‘at least some primary school’ display similar levels of strong support (25% and 22.7% respectively) as do the other two groups (14.6% and 12.0% in ascending order of educational level), a visible cleavage exists between them of at least 8.1%.

In terms of age in 1990, once again it seems that the older respondents (55+ years) show more political support, not only showing the highest percentage of ‘strong support’ (26.3%) but also the lowest percentage of weak support (21.2%). In 1995 this trend continues, with the oldest age group (65-70 years) demonstrating 35.6% strong support, almost 15% higher than any other age group. In all groups, however, the majority (55.5% to 60.4%⁷⁴) demonstrate medium support, suggesting a stable and fairly secure support base for the regimes institutions.

4.4.4.2 Regime Institutions: South Africa 1995-2001 (*see Appendix 1, pp. xix and xxvii*)

Levels of support among South African respondents also seem relatively stable in the period under study, although a slight shift to weaker levels of support is discernable (see Figure 18). As in the case with Brazil, a clear majority has at least medium support for the regime institutions, which is encouraging in terms of support for democracy. Also important to note, however, is that, whereas in Brazil the percentage of ‘strong support’ is less than half that of ‘weak support’, in South Africa this situation is reversed, suggesting an overall stronger support base for the South African regime’s institutions.


On examining trends within ethnic groups in 1995, white pessimism is again clear, this group showing the highest percentage of weak support (25.1%) and the lowest percentage of strong support (8.7%). In 2001 this support drops lower as a mere 2.0% retain strong

⁷² Of those with ‘no schooling’, 43.2% show ‘strong support’. This declines as education level rises until 3.1% of those with at least some tertiary education show ‘strong support’. Also, of those with ‘at least some tertiary education’, 62.5% show ‘weak support’ as opposed to those with ‘no schooling’, 18.9% of which show weak support.

⁷³ ‘Strong support’ figures have a smaller range, 25.0% (‘no schooling’) to 12.0% (‘at least some tertiary education’) and ‘weak support’ figures do not vary by more than 2.2%.

⁷⁴ Percentages of medium support increase with age until the 65-70 years age group, where the percentage decline slightly by approximately 5% (60.3% to 55.6%).

support for regime institutions, whereas weak support increases substantially to 48.1%. On the opposite side of the spectrum, understandably, are blacks with 6.2% and 46.0% in the respective categories in 1995. These percentages do not change significantly in 2001. The majority of Indians show moderate support in 1995, as 69.9% are medium supporters, whereas coloureds have slightly more negative views, demonstrating a higher percentage of weak support (20.2% as opposed to 8.1%) than Indians. By 2001 Indians' support has dropped noticeably, weak support more than trebling to 29.8% at the expense of strong and medium support. Coloured support, on the other hand, shifts less significantly. In terms of age, whereas it seems in 1995 that the younger the respondents, the more likely they are to be supportive of the regime's institutions, strong support decreasing almost uniformly from 43.5% (16-24 years) to 30.6% (65+ years); by 2001 strong support peaks at the 45-54 year age category (41.5%), declining in both directions from this point.



As regards education in 1995, strong support peaks with those who have 'primary school' (45.8%), declining to 16.1% with those with 'some tertiary education'. This is explainable in the light of the poor institutional support shown by whites and their higher education in 1995 as a legacy of apartheid discrimination. Most of those with 'some tertiary education' are medium supporters (66.0%). Although they have the highest percentage of weak support⁷⁵ (17.9%), this in itself shows that low support in 1995 for regime institution was not high enough to cause concern. These trends have not altered

⁷⁵ The percentage of weak support increases steadily as the level of education rises.

drastically by 2001. Those with 'primary school' increased 'strong support' to 55.8%, although 'strong support' has otherwise dropped several percent across the board. Indeed, it seems that support has lowered generally, as 'weak support' has increased, those with tertiary education remaining the least supportive with a 'weak support' percentage of 18.2%. A majority in each category (ranging from 69.5% to 45.5%), except those with 'some primary school' (37.4%) being mostly 'strong' supporters, however, does retain 'medium support', demonstrating that the drop in institutional support does not threaten to lead to destabilization.

On looking at income in 1995, there is clear evidence that generally the poorer the respondents, the more likely they are to support the regime's institutions. Of the working-class income group, 44.6% demonstrated strong support. This figure dwindles gradually with an increase in income to 9.9% with the higher income group. Similarly, of the working-class income group, 7.6% show weak support, which increases with higher income until 22.0% in the higher income group. What is interesting to note, however, is that medium support also increases with an increase in income, providing reassurance that the higher income group does not completely oppose the regime's institutions. By 2001 very little has changed. Trends concerning strong and weak support have remained the same, except that the actual percentages have dropped. In the case of 'strong support', the higher income group decreases threefold from 9.9% to 2.9%. Also with regards to weak support, the middle and higher income group show 23.6% and 46.3% (the latter more than doubling from 1995), suggesting that support has dropped at increasingly higher rates as income increases.

It is evident here that South African respondents' support for regime institutions is stronger than that of Brazilian respondents. Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to hypothesize as to why this might be, several suggestions, which will be developed in the following chapter, can be offered. From Brazil's side, the clear regard that the majority of the Brazilian respondents have for the former military regime, especially in comparison to the current democratic dispensation, is reflected in their lack of enthusiasm

for the current regime's institutions⁷⁶. In addition, as South African opinion is swayed by the strength of black South African respondent opinion, so Brazil is swayed by that of the working-class citizen, essentially also poor, black and marginalised⁷⁷. The fact that the government has until very recently attempted to address their situation may have much to do with the low confidence in institutions, especially as it is reported that the police and courts are still especially discriminatory against poorer, darker-skinned Brazilians (Sansone, 2003:152; Nascimento & Nascimento, 2001:120; Friedman & De Villiers, 1995:509). The slight shift towards more favourable levels of support is encouraging, however, suggesting perhaps that these problems are being addressed. In terms of South Africa, the very fact that the majority of the (poorer, previously disadvantaged) population are now treated equally according to the nature of democratic institutions explains their higher support. Perhaps the reason that their support is not in fact stronger is that South African respondents are disappointed with government service delivery⁷⁸. This may also relate to opinions held about the political actors, the leaders of the democratic regimes, themselves.

4.4.5 Political Actors



In terms of both South American and African politics, the political actors themselves, especially such high-ranking officials as the president, have always played a large role in the political arena. This can be related to the populism considered characteristic of South American politics, and the central role of the so-called 'big or strong man' in African politics (Bresser Pereira, 1990:206; Bratton & Mattes, 2003:17).

⁷⁶In contrast, the army, albeit it is considered as an institution of the current regime, has always been fairly autonomous from civilian control (Roett, 1999:20). Despite its brutal rule for 20 years, the army has the confidence of 45.4% ('a great deal' and 'quite a lot of confidence' combined) of the population in 1995.

⁷⁷This is evident in the high inequalities in Brazil (Gini co-efficient= 0.63 in 1991); the correlation between poverty and darker skin was discussed in Chapters Two and Three.

⁷⁸Bratton & Mattes (2000:9) discovered that South Africans, especially in comparison with the rest of Africa, have a very materialistic or substantive interpretation of democracy, in that their support for democracy was contingent on how much the democratic regime could raise their standard of living or redress the inequalities generated by the apartheid government. This may explain why, in some cases, specific support levels are not very high. Intrinsic support for democracy, on the other hand, is support for democracy as a set of principles, essentially diffuse support.

While the operationalization of the ‘political actors’ could not focus specifically on support for the President as this item was not present in all the survey waves⁷⁹, it must be emphasized how important a figure he is considered to be in both countries.



4.4.5.1 Political Actors : Brazil 1990-1995⁸⁰ (see Appendix 1, pp. v and xi)

Due to constraints within the data, it is again not possible to compare directly data results from 1990 with those from 1995⁸¹. The data used to supplement this study must again be interpreted with caution in terms of linking them to patterns inherent in the 1995 data.

In terms of political actor evaluation at the national level⁸² in 1990, it can be seen (Figure 19) that, although those who regard them as excellent are a relatively small percentage (7.6%), those who are positive are the larger in number than those who are purely negative in their evaluation (29.6% as opposed to 23.4%).

⁷⁹ ‘The president’ occurs as an item on the regime institution index in 2001 wave only.

⁸⁰ The question item used in the 1995 (q60) and 2001 (q174) waves was worded: “How satisfied are you with the way the people now in national government are handling the countries affairs? Would you say that you were very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied?”

⁸¹ The variable necessary for the measurement of the level of support for political actor was not recorded, despite its presence on the questionnaire. To supplement this study therefore, the missing data were replaced by part of a study conducted by CESOP (Centro de Estudos de Opinião Pública) in Brazil in December 1990. The question read : “In your opinion, is President Fernando Collor making a(n) : a) excellent, b) good, c) average, d) bad, e) terrible government?” The response categories were collapsed and recoded as seen in Figure 19.

⁸² Considering the survey question items used to operationalize this level of political support, the assumption is made that both Brazilian and South African respondents will evaluate political actors at a national level.

In terms of age, it seems that, although there is no general trend, those who are over fifty years seem to be much more approving of Collor's government⁸³. It is possible that this is due to the fact that they experienced the ineffective democratic regime between Vargas's and the military's dictatorships (1946-1964) leading them to see the current democratic dispensation in a comparatively favourable light.

In terms of education levels, although again no clear trends are exhibited, it seems that those with 'no schooling' are more supportive of the government⁸⁴. Those with 'at least some primary' and 'at least some high school' are increasingly less optimistic, although those with 'at least some tertiary education' do not follow the pattern, seeming to hold more moderate views⁸⁵. As it is probable that those with 'at least some primary' and 'high school' are urban workers⁸⁶, it is possible that they come into more conflict with the government through wage disputes, thus dampening their enthusiasm for the regime⁸⁷.

In 1995 there are clear tendencies demonstrating that the older the respondents, the more likely they are to show satisfaction with the incumbents⁸⁸. Predictably, those with less education also seem to show more support for their contemporary political actors. Interestingly, while the trends are consistent, the biggest percentage differentials occur between those with 'no schooling' and those with 'at least some primary school', suggesting division in terms of strength of opinion⁸⁹. In terms of income, several rather

⁸³ Of those of the age of 51+ years, 9.2% rate the regime as excellent, whereas no other age group does so above 7.4%. Similarly, those who rate it 'good' make up 29%, whereas no other age group does so above 23%.

⁸⁴ Those with 'no schooling' who rate the present incumbents as 'excellent' or 'good' make up 45.5%, almost double any other educational group.

⁸⁵ Although possessing the lowest percentage that considers the government 'excellent' (4.6%), they also have the lowest percentage, after those with 'no schooling', in rating the present incumbents as 'terrible' (12.8%).

⁸⁶ This is as opposed to rural workers, who is it expected will consist mostly of those with 'no schooling'.

⁸⁷ This follows from what Roett (1999) describes as Brazil's patriarchal society, thus benefiting the wealthier Brazilians at the expense of the poorer, perhaps also explaining the slightly more favourable views of those with 'some tertiary education'. In addition, it is possible that the urban workers supported Lula, from the Worker's Party (PT), who was Collor's opposition in the presidential elections of 1990.

⁸⁸ Incumbent satisfaction rises steadily with each age cohort. The 'very satisfied' increase from 8.4% (16-25 years) to 21.1% (65-70 years). The 'fairly satisfied' rise from 42.7% (16-25 years) to 60.5% (65-70 years).

⁸⁹ Whereas percentages of those who are 'fairly satisfied' decrease from 66.7% ('no schooling') to 43.6% ('at least some primary school'), other education groups differed from the latter by no more than 0.3%. In

interesting observations can be made. In comparing the combined percentages of 'very satisfied' and 'satisfied', with 'very dissatisfied' and 'dissatisfied', there is not a large difference in opinion between income groups. Nevertheless, whereas those with higher income show the highest percentage of those 'very satisfied' (16.7%), the middle income group has the highest percentage of those 'fairly satisfied', i.e. 52.8%, almost 10% higher than any other group. This suggests that the higher income group are slightly more enthusiastic supporters, while the middle class are the most reluctant supporters. Bearing the above in mind, it is curious that the higher income group also show the highest percentage of those 'very dissatisfied', i.e. 33.3%, also almost 10% higher than any other group. This can perhaps be explained by the fact that, as higher income respondents in patrimonial Brazilian society, they are more likely to wield political influence and, consequently, have more at stake financially in the political game. The polarized nature of opinion among those of the higher income group is probably due to the difference in political preferences; those who support the incumbents are obviously supporters of Collor and those dissatisfied support an opposition party.


4.4.5.2 Political Actors: South Africa 1995-2001 (see Appendix 1, pp. xix and xxviii)

Here again the levels of support for the South African incumbents over the period of study seem to remain relatively stable. Satisfaction with and support for South African political actors in fact increases slightly, the only instance of an increase in specific support experienced in either country⁹⁰. A majority remain at least 'fairly satisfied' with their political leaders, which is encouraging in terms of support for the democratic regime.

addition, whereas those who were 'very dissatisfied' rise from 11.1% (no schooling) to 19.4% ('at least some primary school'); other percentages differed by no more than 5%.

⁹⁰ This is seen if one combines the 'very satisfied' with the 'fairly satisfied': 50.2% in 1995 and 52.3% in 2001.

Figure 21: South African Support for Political Actors (1995-2001)



Results in terms of ethnic groups are fairly predictable in 1995 in that black South African respondents are the most supportive of their political leaders, whereas the whites are least so. This is understandable as blacks, the most oppressed group under apartheid, are showing support for the political leaders who brought that regime to an end. The more conservative whites, on the other hand, may be mourning the loss of their past privileges that the new regime has brought about. Comparing relatively with coloureds, however, whites do not compare as unfavourably in terms of support as perhaps might be expected⁹¹. Less encouraging is the fact that whites are more numerous than any other ethnic group in not being satisfied at all with the government, suggesting sustained racial cleavages⁹². By 2001 opinion polarities between black and white respondents in South Africa seem to have widened⁹³. Meanwhile, whereas coloured support remained the same since 1995, Indian support has weakened⁹⁴. Those Indians who are ‘very dissatisfied’ with the government are 35.9%, which is almost as much as whites (36.2%).

⁹¹ ‘Very satisfied’ and ‘fairly satisfied’ blacks together make up 56.0% of their total, whereas whites with the same opinions total only 32.3%. This is not that much less than the coloured total of 35.8%, whereas Indians total 40.0%.

⁹² Of whites, 27.0% are very dissatisfied, nearly 10% higher than any other ethnic group.

⁹³ Of blacks, those ‘very satisfied’ and ‘fairly satisfied’ together make up 60.6%, but whites of the same opinion are only 26.2%. This differential has thus increased by 10.7% in 5 years.

⁹⁴ The percentage of coloureds who are ‘very satisfied’ and ‘fairly satisfied’ has decreased marginally from 35.8% to 34.9%. Indians with these views, on the other hand, have decreased from 40% to 34%.

In terms of education in 1995, it is again evident that, generally speaking, the less education the respondents have, the more likely they are to support the government⁹⁵. This pattern continues with little variation into 2001.

On examining income in 1995, a similar trend to that of the above variable emerges⁹⁶, unsurprisingly, given South Africa's known social demographics. The poorer the respondents, the more likely they are to support the incumbent government. What is interesting is that the working-class and lower income groups share similar percentage breakdowns as do the middle and higher income groups, suggesting an ideological separation between the lower and upper economic classes. Regarding age, there is a definite trend in 1995, which suggests that the younger the respondents, the more likely they are to support the political actors of the regime. This changes in 2001, with the older respondents indicating that they have become both more satisfied and more dissatisfied, suggesting that the older the respondents, the more polarized their view⁹⁷.

In taking an overall view, it seems that, whereas neither South African nor Brazilian respondents' evaluation dynamics have changed drastically, there is a slight shift towards less satisfaction with the incumbents discernable⁹⁸. In the case of both countries, the poorer and less educated the respondents, the more likely they are to support the incumbents. While admittedly it is perhaps the poorer, less educated respondents who are more susceptible to social desirability bias, taken at face value, it is encouraging that the poorer, less educated respondents, who represent the majority in both countries, show the

⁹⁵ Of those with 'no schooling', 10.7% are very satisfied, as compared to the 1.8% of those with 'at least some tertiary education'. In addition, while only 9% of those with 'no schooling' are 'very dissatisfied', 18.9% of those with 'at least some tertiary education' are.

⁹⁶ Whereas 11.5% of the working-class income group are 'very satisfied' with the political leaders, this percentage declines as income increases until the percentage for higher income is 1.2%. Similarly, whereas 8.1% of the working-class income group are 'very dissatisfied', this is true of as much as 21% of the higher income group.

⁹⁷ In 1995, those 'very satisfied' decreases with age from 12.1% (16-24 years) to 4.0% (65+ years) and the 'very dissatisfied' respondent percentage increases from 9.3% to 16.0% respectively. In 2001, this trend changes where those 'very satisfied' increases with age from 7.1% (16-24 years) to 19.1% (65+ years) and but those who are very dissatisfied also increases from 13.0% to 20.6% respectively.


⁹⁸ In both the South African and the Brazilian cases, both the areas of 'fairly satisfied' and 'very dissatisfied' have increased, suggesting a shift in those who were 'very satisfied' and only 'fairly dissatisfied' to these two categories.

highest level of support for their political actors. The onus is on these actors to maintain this support by executing efficient service delivery.

4.5 Conclusion

After examining the levels of support pertinent to each political object in both South Africa and Brazil, it would seem that overall South African respondents hold a slightly higher level of support for their democratic political system.

This does seem to be in keeping with the research of others, who have noticed the worrying decline in support for democracy in South America (Lagos, 2001; Lagos 2003)⁹⁹. In South Africa, however, a decline in support is noticeable at each level, barring a slight increase of support for political actors. While it is natural to assume a normalization of unusually high levels of support following democratic transition, support for democracy should increase with the successful perpetuation of a democratic regime (Doh & McDonough, 1999). Indeed, Bratton and Mattes's studies (2001, 2003) of democracy in Africa compare South Africa rather unfavourably to Africa in terms of an understanding and support of democracy, particularly in what they call 'intrinsic' (diffuse) support.



Indeed, in terms of the data analysed in this study, while South African respondents may seem to show a slightly better sense of political community and higher support for present and future regime performance, Brazilian respondents are much stronger in their support for democratic regime principles. This having been said, South African respondents show higher support for their regime institutions and arguably higher support for their political actors. Thus, comparatively speaking, South African respondents seem to indicate much more encouraging results in terms of the future of this country's democracy.

⁹⁹ See also research conducted by the *Latinobarometro*, available: www.latinobarometro.org

In the next chapter these issues will be discussed in more detail in order to present a clearer picture of the findings of this data analysis and speculate on their possible consequences.



Chapter Five: Conclusions and Recommendations

5.1 Introduction

Following the analysis of data in Chapter Four, it is the purpose of this chapter to expand on the cursory interpretation initiated in the previous chapter, placing the results within a broader socio-political context. Both the initial propositions and the broader significance of this study, outlined in Chapter One, will be revisited in order to evaluate the results of the data analysis. In addition, recommendations for further research, which could stem from this essentially descriptive and exploratory study, will be suggested.

The original research proposition put forward by this study was to describe and analyze comparatively the level of support for democracy in South Africa and Brazil over the decade since democratic transformation. It was proposed that the levels of diffuse and specific support would manifest similar trends to those found in the Western consolidated democracies because of the long-established undercurrent of democratic institutionalization in these two countries, despite decades of authoritarian rule. If Brazil and South Africa seem to be following the paths of more mature democracies, this will have very interesting implications for their democratic consolidation. Similarly, this study may broaden our knowledge about the deepening of third-wave developing democracies in general and their prospects for sustainability.


5.2 Following in the footsteps of Western Europe?

As stated above, an initial proposition put forward in this study was that, despite the historically recent establishment of both the South African and the Brazilian democracies, their historical precedent of several decades of at least a weak pseudo-democracy¹ may have instilled both an appreciation of, and a respect for, democratic principles and institutions, essentially creating that ‘reservoir’ of democratic political support so

¹ During both the apartheid era and the Brazilian military regime, elements of democracies were retained (Lamounier, 1999:132-133; Martinez-Lara, 1996:15; Friedman, 1995:541. See also Chapters One and Two). In essence, the former was a democracy with limited franchise, and the latter an attempt by the military to act as custodians of democracy until such time as Brazil was ‘ready’ to be governed democratically.

necessary for the consolidation of democracy (Easton, 1965:249; Bratton & Mattes, 2003:23).

That the future of the democratic political system depends on the establishment of a strong level of diffuse support for democracy is demonstrated in the case of the Western democracies. These states, which have the oldest and most consolidated democratic regimes, have experienced steadily declining levels of specific support, i.e. confidence in both their political actors and democratic institutions. The levels of diffuse support, i.e. commitment to the principles of democracy itself, however, have either been maintained or have experienced a slight increase. This implies that, while the politicians (and perhaps the institutions) are themselves not trusted, belief in the system by which they are selected and replaced is preventing the collapse of the system in its entirety² (Easton, 1965:158). This illustrates the important function of diffuse support in acting as a buffer between the political system and the stress placed upon it by rising demands and a limited capacity on the part of the regime to process these demands (Easton, 1965:64). The legitimacy of the system, sustained by diffuse support, i.e. the fundamental acceptance on the part of citizens of the democratic process, prevents its collapse when it fails to provide the immediate satisfaction of demands (Easton, 1965:269).



Brazil and South Africa have experienced mixed results in terms of support for the various political objects under study. Observations concerning both levels of support, i.e. diffuse and specific, will be assessed as well as their possible implications, bearing in mind Western publics' political support trends.

5.3 Trends in Diffuse and Specific Support in South Africa and Brazil

South Africa and Brazil are possibly emulating the Western democracies in terms of trends in democratic political support. It is necessary to take a more in-depth look at what is in fact happening at levels of diffuse and specific support in Brazil and South Africa.

² These phenomena are described by Inglehart (1990, 1998) as a symptom of what he has called the shift from materialism to post-materialism, a gradual generational change in core values.

Following this, several aspects of their political environments will be discussed in order to provide a context for the results of the study.

5.3.1 Diffuse Support: Political Community

In terms of pride in their countries especially, both South Africa and Brazil demonstrate very high levels. This is interesting in the latter case, as opinions about the country's system of government and institutions do not seem to be a source of fierce pride³, but is perhaps once again attributable to populism and specific policies of state ideological propagation in the early twentieth century. As regards geographic identification, South African respondents have a relatively stronger national awareness than their Brazilian counterparts, with most of the latter respondents identifying with their town, rather than their country⁴. This is not, however, unusual, as it must be taken into account that Brazil is a much larger country than South Africa with a population of about four times the size at the time of the surveys⁵. It is highly probable that many rural communities, relatively isolated from the centres of political power in Brazil, would associate more strongly with their immediate community than with a national identity, especially as political education among the rural poor is notoriously poor (Bresser-Pereira, 1990:106; Sansone, 2003:153, Lamounier, 1999:166). This is perhaps a practical example of how, as Dogan & Kazancigil (1994:52) claim, the size of a country can indirectly affect its democratic workings. Owing to the fact that Brazil is a large country with many pockets of rural communities, extensive programmes of voter and political education, and ensuring access to them, would be costly, assuming there is the political will to do so.

³ The debate as to whether the presidential or parliamentary system is more conducive to democracy is still fierce, as has been previously mentioned (see Linz, 1996a, 1996b; Horowitz, 1996; Lipset, 1996). Interestingly, despite the protracted debate as to which system the Brazilian constitution should adopt, parliamentarian or presidential, in CESOP's January 1990 survey polled that double the percentage of respondents which favoured a parliamentarian system, favoured a presidential system (33.1% as opposed to 17.1%), but the don't know response rate was 43.3%. This perhaps illustrates the elitist nature of the Brazilian democracy, in that it seems that a large percentage of Brazilians are not concerned with or have no opinion on such fundamental procedural questions.

⁴ Identification with one's town was the second highest category in terms of percentage in South Africa, and can also be attributed to its high percentage of rural populations.

⁵ In 2001 Brazil's population was 166 million and South Africa's was 43 million according to Nationmaster (see www.nationmaster.com)

In terms of willingness to fight for one's country, both countries have a majority willing to do so. Whereas South Africa's percentage is fairly stable from 1995 to 2001, in the case of Brazil, the rapid turn-around from 1990 to 1995 of the data results suggests that this is due at least in part to a short-term phenomenon and should perhaps be interpreted with care when trying to predict long-term phenomena.

The indicators of the level of support for political community are fairly strong all told. It must be acknowledged these indicators cannot claim to represent long-term trends. Nevertheless, this is a good basis from which to attempt political consolidation and should the governments succeed in the challenging task of addressing the skewed resource distribution present in both countries, it is highly probable that a sense of national identification will become more widespread amongst the more rural communities.

5.3.2 Diffuse Support: Regime Principles

Regime principles are perhaps one of the more important aspects of diffuse support, as this level attempts to measure directly mass support for the principles by which the current regime ostensibly governs. In the case of Brazil and South Africa, following their respective democratic transitions, this would thus seem to measure support for the principles of democracy (as opposed to another political system) as these are the regime's purported principles.

Were this undoubtedly the case, South Africa and Brazil would fare very well in the process of democratic consolidation as it seems that there is high support for democracy as a system among the respondents of both these countries. What is perhaps a cause for concern is that this support may not extend to the political elites of these countries, particularly Brazil, due to the delegative and elitist nature of her democracy (Huntington, 1996:12; O'Donnell, 1996:95; McDonough, 1981). This implies that chances of consolidating her democracy would be, as some fear, rather slim (Schmitter, 1996a:80, Lagos, 2001, 2003).

There are, however, two important considerations to bear in mind when considering mass evaluations of the regime principles of these two countries. In terms of Brazil, it could be argued that unadulterated democracy has never been practised in living memory⁶. The years between Vargas and the military regime (1946-1964) were characterized by a democracy so weak and inefficient that the military set a precedent by stepping in and assuming political rule rather than merely handing power back to civilian politicians after restoring order, as had been the norm (Fiechter, 1975:23). During the military rule, while a semblance of democracy was maintained, the government was obviously never truly democratic. Even now doubts have been expressed as to whether the current form of Brazilian democracy⁷, characterized by corporatism and patriarchy (Roett, 1999:10; Lamounier, 1999:186; Bressser-Pereira, 1990:197; Friedman & De Villiers, 1996:16), will ever lead to a consolidated democracy. Nevertheless, although arguably never having experienced what some would call a true functioning democracy⁸, it seems that Brazilians are aware of the principles to which these previous pseudo-democracies or ‘custodians of democracy’ aspired, or claimed to aspire. Furthermore: according to Przeworski (199:57):

Survey data indicate that new democracies often show a syndrome consisting of the mistrust of politics and politicians, sentiments of personal inefficacy, low confidence in democratic institutions and dissatisfaction with the performance of the actual democratic institutions. Yet curiously, the belief in democracy as the best form of government does not bear an obvious relation to these attitudes.

⁶ It is, however, interesting to note that the older the respondents, the more likely in almost all cases that their evaluation will be more favourable towards the regime. This may point to the current regime being most positively assessed by those who actually experienced the former military regime. It must be remembered that, as Brazil has a young population, those over 65 years are not a large number and consequently their positive evaluation is hidden in overall percentages.

⁷ It is hoped that the election of Lula, of the Worker’s Party, will perhaps continue to address the pressing socio-economic concerns (Faro de Castro & Valladão de Carvalho, 2003:482). His term, however, falls outside of this study’s time frame.

⁸ It is for this reason that there was some hesitation in Chapter One to speak freely about ‘democratic political support’, because it was not certain that the *de jure* democracies examined here were functioning *de facto* democracies as experienced by all citizens.

This does seem to be the case in Brazil, especially as support for regime principles remains strong, although support for neither the present regime's performance nor institutions (see below) is extremely high. Indeed, the fact that levels of specific support remain weak is perhaps suggestive of the fact that Brazilians could subscribe to what are generally considered to be the basic principles of democracy and recognize that, at present, neither their institutions nor their incumbents embody these. This brings one again to the problem of defining democracy. Although the data can gauge what mass attitudes in Brazil and South Africa towards democracy are, there is no way of ascertaining, through the use of the data at hand, what this conception of democracy is⁹. Interpreted as above, however, it is possible to suggest that, although what Brazilians perceive to be a democracy in terms of a definition has not been captured by data, they seem to understand what a liberal democracy entails and, while possessing the constitutional framework, do not yet have democratic practices institutionalized within their system.

In South Africa, although support for both 'having a democratic system' and 'democracy as the best political system despite its faults' is slightly lower than in Brazil, in both cases it is still quite high and increased slightly from 1995 to 2001. Even among whites, the ethnic group which generally expressed the weakest levels of support for almost all political objects, over two thirds support having a democratic system and agree that democracy, despite its faults, is the best political system.

Although what South Africans actually mean by 'democracy' cannot be gauged through the data used for this study, studies by Bratton and Mattes (2000b; see also Bratton, 2002; Mattes *et al.*, 2000) undertook to discover what Africans understood by the political concept of democracy. Using data from the *Afrobarometer*¹⁰ to survey a selection of African countries, it was found that despite South Africa being one of the more wealthy

⁹ Thus it remains unknown whether these conceptions are similar at all, or how they compare to the conventional, so-called Western conception of democracy. Considering that democracy depends on the vote of the ordinary citizen, this remains a problem and future studies would benefit from further, more intensive research in this regard.

¹⁰ The *Afrobarometer* is an independent, non-partisan research project which conducts surveys in Africa to gauge the socio-economic and political climate of these countries. (See www.afrobarometer.org)

countries surveyed, mass perceptions of democracy tended heavily towards an instrumental¹¹ approach (Bratton & Mattes, 2000b:5). This implies that South Africans are more interested in what the democratic system can provide them in terms of an improved standard of living rather than in the democratic principles themselves. It must be remembered, however, that in South Africa (as in Brazil) the severe inequalities and the large number of those living below the poverty line were a consequence of discriminatory political policies. It is not difficult to see how some may perceive it to be the new regime's responsibility to directly address the negative consequences of its predecessor's policies¹² (Bratton, 2002:6). It also stands to reason that those without economic difficulties and thus not susceptible to 'the politics of the belly' – still mostly whites in 1995 because of historical precedent – would depend the most on intrinsic democratic principles and procedures to protect them as an ethnic minority (Bratton & Mattes, 2000b:5). The fact that whites paradoxically seem to be the least enthusiastic about democracy, according to this study's data, is probably because the most basic tenet of democratic practice, majority rule, is perceived to work decidedly against them as a minority in the new South Africa¹³.

5.3.3 Diffuse Support: Regime Performance

Regime performance evaluation seems to demonstrate the curious trend in the Brazilian case that, although contemporary circumstances may not have been very favourably perceived, Brazilians remain optimistic about the future under a democratic regime. This, if nothing else, perhaps explains why this country's democratic constitution has survived so many political 'hiccups' in the past (Hunter, 2003:154).

In 1990, for instance, Brazilians' general prognosis for the future under Collor, bearing in mind that he was the first directly elected national president for over forty years, was


¹¹ Bratton & Mattes (2000) distinguish between intrinsic and instrumental attitudes towards democracy, which basically corresponds to support for democracy for the sake of democratic principles and support for democracy in practice as it benefits the citizen respectively.

¹² It is not surprising therefore that Bratton & Mattes (2000b:5) found that, whereas blacks stress the importance of 'equality of outcome', whites stress the importance of equality of opportunity.

¹³ In fact it is interesting to note that Bratton (2002:7) found that where non-opposition to authoritarian forms of rule occurred in South Africa, it was "significantly concentrated among whites". This further suggests the trepidation they feel as an ethnic minority in a majority-rule democracy.

relatively favourable. He was impeached two years later and his deputy, Itamar Franco, was sworn in. This notwithstanding, in 1995, although an evaluation of the present regime was not particularly positive, especially in comparison to the evaluation of the former military regime, Brazilians were again fairly convinced that the future would improve politically. One perspective would be to say that this demonstrates a considerable 'reservoir of support' (Easton, 1965:249) in terms of support for the current political system, especially as they seem to have the mechanisms in place to 'throw the rascals out', even before the end of their term, if necessary¹⁴.

In terms of South Africa, the same optimism for the future is evident, although this does decrease rather alarmingly between 1995 and 2001, with the evaluation of the present regime performance also worsening slightly. As has been mentioned above, only two points of reference cannot determine whether this gradual drop in favourable evaluation will be a long-term trend. Should it turn out to be so, this would indeed be worrying in terms of South Africa's ability to sustain a democracy¹⁵. On the other hand, this in effect may be slightly counteracted by an increased support for regime principles as seen above. In addition, if this is merely a stabilization of levels of support for regime performance following the democratic transition, then there is little cause for concern.¹⁶



Thus, in terms of all three indicators of support for the political community¹⁷, both South African and Brazilian respondents showed fairly healthy support. Similarly, in spite of the methodological problems with the Brazilian data¹⁸, both Brazil and South Africa also showed strong levels of support for the democratic system in principle. It was only on appraising regime performance that respondent enthusiasm began to flag slightly and

¹⁴ This, of course, refers to Collor's impeachment. The view has been expressed, however, that Collor was impeached because he was considered too volatile and seemed intent on upsetting the political status quo. For a more in-depth discussion, see Roett (1999).

¹⁵ Considering that South African perceptions of democracy are so closely linked with service delivery, regime performance is especially important. Should it decrease below a critical level, this would have more influence than is ideal on South Africa's ability to sustain democracy.

¹⁶ Here again, the fact that additional longitudinal research in this regard is necessary is acknowledged.

¹⁷ These are pride to be South African/Brazilian; geographic identification on a national level and willingness to fight in a war for South Africa/Brazil.

¹⁸ It could almost be argued that, considering that similar results were achieved despite having used different questions from different surveys, the high level of support for regime principles found in Brazilian respondents shows a high level of external validity.

show marked declines within the time period of the assessment, suggesting that support for ‘democracy in practice’ is not as strong as that for ‘democracy in principle’¹⁹. Nevertheless, diffuse support seems to have fairly stable support base, especially as both South Africans and Brazilians remained very positive about the future government, relative to the contemporary one²⁰.

5.3.4 Specific Support: Regime Institutions

The debate as to the relative importance of diffuse and specific support has not been resolved. Bratton and Mattes (2000b:1; see also Norris, 1999a:1-2) contend that diffuse support is much more necessary for the successful consolidation of a democratic regime. It must be remembered, however, that failing the establishment of a deeply ingrained political culture supporting democratic principles, as is the case in many new democracies, democracy will be judged by the regime’s actions perceived to be carried out ostensibly according to democratic principles. It can be seen in the case of South Africa and Brazil that, whereas diffuse support is strong in terms of support for the political community and regime principles, it is possible that a lack of specific support may begin to erode diffuse support. Low levels of support for regime performance are already suggestive of this. This places the emphasis on specific support and consequently support for the regime institutions and political actors.

In terms of institutions, support for democracy seems to be more favourable in South Africa, but with only approximately 28% of respondents showing strong support in this country, this is not highly encouraging and neither case study seems to have a particularly high support base for regime institutions²¹. Indeed, a large majority of both South Africans and Brazilians demonstrate medium (essentially ambivalent) support and strong institutional support seems to be dropping slightly in both countries. There are several


¹⁹ For a thorough conceptualization of these two terms, see Doh & McDonough, 1999.

²⁰ See Chapter Four.

²¹ *Latinobarometro* identifies low confidence in democratic institutions as a key problem in Latin America’s low support for democracy. Brazil still fares badly compared to her regional neighbours however, only 23% showing support for the national congress/parliament in a range of 9% (Ecuador) to 46% (Uruguay) in 2001. (See www.latinobarometro.org). Similarly, Bratton & Mattes (2000b:11) found that: “*Apart from in South Africa* [emphasis added], trust in governmental institutions is...rather robust [in Africa].”

reasons that may be suggested as to why South Africans seem more trusting of their political institutions, however.

Following the end of apartheid, the institutions essentially comprising the state have striven to become both more inclusive and transparent, and, following democratic transition, South Africa experienced a complete institutional overhaul. This process was smoothed by a coalition government of national unity and an interim constitution comprising “The 34 principles of good governance” serving a symbolic as well as practical value in terms of generating trust on the part of ordinary South Africans for the new political institutions (Shaw, 2001:20; Sisk, 1995:14;41-47; Marx, 1998:213; Friedman & De Villiers, 1996:139). Provision was thus made for an interim institutional framework not only to begin the process of democratic institutionalization²², but to lubricate the democratic transition and the institutional make-over that this entailed. In addition to the ratification of the final Constitution of 1996, other institutions such as the Constitutional Court, the Ombudsman and a Bill of Rights were created to protect human rights and guarantee equality. Institutions were thus put in place to protect citizens and to eliminate the feelings of uncertainty which not only the transition itself, but the very nature of democratic governance, implies (Schmitter & Karl, 1996:56).



Brazil, in contrast, suffered from a great many teething problems following her democratic transition. After an overwhelming victory in the 1985 elections, the PMDB experienced a common problem within large, moderate political parties: ideological disunity²³. Its members held such diverse positions on so many issues of policy that, following the death of Tancredo Neves and the political victory over ARENA, there was little to unite them. On many occasions that the PMDB should have been able to sway the decision-making in the drafting of the new Constitution. It failed to do so, reaching an

²² It should be pointed out here that institutionalization, according to O'Donnell (1996:97), is a “regularized pattern of interaction which is known and practiced”, emphasizing the close relationship of institutions with political culture.

²³ McDonough (1981: 110) has gone so far as to suggest that Brazilian political elites are completely devoid of ideology, save fending off mass rule, thus reducing Brazilian politics to a series of power plays among elite sectors. According to Roett (1999:10), this has not changed despite the democratic transition.

impasse²⁴. Consequently, there was often a deadlock on certain crucial decisions and the end result was a constitutional document that few were satisfied with. This situation was worsened by the fact that many aspects were influenced by the personal ambitions of politicians (Roett, 1999:165; McDonough, 1981:33). Thus, the drafting of the final Constitution was long and tortuous, dominated by power plays within the context of a weak party system (Martinez-Lara, 1996:88, 97). The weakness of democratic institutionalization in Brazil has also long been identified as one of this country's major stumbling blocks on the road to democratic consolidation²⁵ (Martinez-Lara, 1996: 88; Huntington, 1996:9; Hurrell, 1996:165; Schmitter & Karl, 1996:83). It is thus hardly improbable that to the many Brazilians for whom the government has done little to improve the standard of living, governmental institutions are seen as the playthings of the political elite.

Thus, while both countries ostensibly underwent a complete institutional overhaul, it seems that South Africans see a cleaner break with the past than their Brazilian counterparts. It must be remembered that ten years is scarcely time enough for the institutions of democracy to adequately instil democratic norms and practices within the government of a country in full, and that procedural democracy does not mean functional democracy, not least due to the possibility of corruption. Nevertheless, to further explore the attitudes of both Brazilians and South Africans in terms of specific democracy, it is necessary to examine their opinions of their political actors.

5.3.5 Specific Support: Political Actors

In terms of political actors, the other indicator of specific support levels, support was not especially high either, although a scant majority in both countries did show support for

²⁴ The new Brazilian Constitution was not drawn up a specially appointed Constitutional Congress, despite a strong lobby for it. The process was long and drawn out, taking more than three years to produce the final document, which is still criticized for its lack of specificity and blamed for Brazil's lack of consolidated democratic institutionalization (Martinez-Lara, 1996:88).

²⁵ In addition, as has already been mentioned, there is a strong bias on the part of the Brazilian police and legal courts to treat darker-skinned Brazilians more harshly in comparison to their lighter-skinned counterparts (Nascimento & Nascimento, 2001:120; Przeworski, 1995:35). This manifestation of discrimination would do little to instil mass trust in state institutions, especially as police brutality is on the rise (Landman, 2003:31). South Africa is also recognized as having a greater commitment to addressing equalities (Frederickson, 2001:24).

political actors in Brazil in 1995 and in South Africa from 1995 to 2001²⁶. Support for political actors is thus stronger than that for regime institutions.

It has been established that potential long-term trends cannot be isolated with only two points of reference. Interpretation of results in terms of political actors should be conducted with even more caution, however, by virtue of the fact that it will rarely be the same actor who is evaluated, especially as the incumbent's terms coincide almost exactly with the survey waves, allowing opinions to be polled around the same time of consecutive incumbent terms in the case of both South Africa and Brazil²⁷.

In terms of developing democracies, political actors are arguably very influential in mass support for democracy as they are the physical manifestations of an intangible system²⁸. Simply put, the buck stops with them. In addition, the presidencies of both South Africa and Brazil are very influential offices. In Brazil, this is quite understandable, given that Brazilian voters must choose specifically from candidates. Aside from the party system in Brazil being exceptionally weak and fragmented (Martinez-Lara, 1996:57,62; Diamond, 1996:xxv; Hurrell, 1996:165), political parties are generally only used as a vehicle for a candidate's election, alliances often having been switched to facilitate this. In addition, populism having left its mark on Brazilian political culture, it seems that a president's public relations are just as important as government policy formulation in order to garner political support, as has been seen in the case of countless Brazilian leaders' careers (Roett, 1999:39; Faro de Castro & Valladão de Carvalho, 2003:469; Fiechter, 1975:123).

²⁶ The timing of these surveys must, however, not be disregarded when assessing this particular indicator as the actors change every 4 (Brazil) to 5 (South Africa) years. The 1990 results bear testimony to the lack of confidence in Collor as a leader, especially as confidence in Collor's government had dropped 32.3%, from 59.9% to 27.6% between January and December of his first year in office, according to comparative data from CESOP. In 1995, on the other hand, under Cardoso, support for the incumbents was up to 57.3% and in South Africa, support for the political actors has risen 4.1% from 1995 to 2001.


²⁷ The 1990 survey, collected in 1991-1992 in Brazil, coincided with the swearing in of Itamar Franco following President Collor de Mello's impeachment in 1992. Fernando Henrique Cardoso was elected in 1995, coinciding with the 1995 survey wave, although the Brazilian data were collected in 1997. In the South African case, the 1995 survey was conducted barely 18 months after President Mandela's inauguration, and the 2001 survey wave nearly two years after President Mbeki's election in 1999.

²⁸ This would be especially so in the context of Brazil, with its legacy of populism, and South Africa, whose present incumbents, in the African tradition of personality cults and charismatic rulers, carry the additional aura of independence leaders (Bratton & Mattes, 2000b:5; McDonough, 1981:58-59).

In South Africa, while the electoral system is based on a closed party list system, since 1994 the president, as leader of the majority party in Parliament²⁹, has always, for good or ill, been influential over policy³⁰. As in Brazil, it is the President who controls the appointments of the cabinet ministers (Martinez-Lara, 1996:141; Giliomee & Schlemmer, 1994:72) and thus most of the appointments of the high-profile political actors on whose performance it is assumed that Brazilian and South African respondents would have based their opinions.

For this reason it is a pity that confidence in the President is not directly comparable due to shortcomings of the WVS data³¹. Nevertheless, the following is evident.

Support for political actors had increased quite substantially between 1990 and 1995, although it must be remembered that President Collor was forced to resign following the instigation of impeachment procedures against him on charges of corruption³² less than a year after the Brazilian 1990 WVS survey was taken. What is interesting is how quickly mass confidence in him and especially his government dropped³³, particularly when he was so favoured at the beginning of his term in comparison to Sarney, his predecessor³⁴. What is interesting is that Collor, despite being the leader of the government, did not



²⁹ On his inauguration, the president relinquishes membership of Parliament, but towing the party line ensures that the president retains a reasonable amount of influence.

³⁰ An example of this is President Mbeki's ill-advised stand over HIV/AIDS, of which South Africa has one of the highest infection rates in the world. His insistence that the HIV virus did not cause the epidemic had huge repercussions on the capacity to treat the pandemic in South Africa, as well as the country's global reputation (*Mail & Guardian*, 09/04/2004).

³¹ The ability to poll confidence in the president was only available in the 2001 survey wave and thus it has no comparative value.

³² These were brought against him by the Brazilian lower house. Even before this, however, he was an unpopular president – among the political elite for trying unilaterally to fast-track economic liberalization, and among the masses for failing to control hyper-inflation (Faro de Castro & Valladão de Carvalho, 2003:478).

³³ This is according to comparison of a survey measuring confidence in Collor as president, which shows a drop from 68.3% to 58.3%. Interestingly, this is better than confidence in the government, which dropped 32.3%, from 59.9% to 27.6% in the same period.

³⁴ In January 1990 confidence in Sarney was only 14.4%, whereas confidence in Collor was 68.3% in a survey conducted by CESOP.

seem to be associated with other government officials in the respondents' view³⁵, and thus the government did not lose as much confidence.

Cardoso, on the other hand, was a vastly more successful president, not least because he managed to eradicate hyper-inflation. So successful was he that the Constitution was amended so that he could serve another term as president, which he did from 1999 to 2003. Interestingly, this ostensible difference in these political actors is not reflected in the measured support of respondents, although results at this level in Brazil have been compromised in terms of comparability³⁶. Although only 29.6% of Brazilian respondents have a positive response to political actors in 1990, as opposed to 57.3% in 1995, the latter had no 'neutral' category whereas the neutral category ("average") of the former made up 45.1%, calling what seems to be such large disparity into question.

It is interesting to note in terms of South African political actors that satisfaction with and support for them increases slightly in the period under study. But it seems that, this notwithstanding, South Africans have a similar opinion of their political actors to the Brazilians. They are moderately supportive and, while a fair percentage is not that enthusiastic about political actor performance, enough are to prevent too pessimistic a picture being painted for the political future. This is especially when one considers that Nelson Mandela, a national hero, stepped down in 1999 to allow his successor as head of the ANC, Thabo Mbeki, to assume the presidency. At the time this caused much consternation about the political future of South Africa, among whites especially, due to Mbeki's reputation as rather a dark horse (*Mail & Guardian*, 09/04/2004). The fact that support for the political leaders has increased slightly is encouraging³⁷.

The fact that in both South Africa and Brazil just under half the respondents have expressed dissatisfaction with the government is troubling in one sense. It also shows,

³⁵ This is statistically backed as a factor analysis of confidences levels in politicians, political parties, state governors, municipal prefects and Collor showed that the latter loaded only weakly (0.362) into the single factor compared to the other components. The survey used was conducted by CESOP in December 1990.

³⁶ This is because a different measuring instrument and sample was used, as well as the fact that the 1990 survey included a 'neutral' response category.

³⁷ It was nevertheless noted that the difference between white and black support for the incumbents has increased, and the overall increase in political actor support is probably due to the increase in black support.

however, that respondents are willing to express their discontent with the government, and this in turn illustrates an implicit trust that their political attitudes will not endanger them, as had been the case during both the previous regimes (Fiechter, 1975:146; Marx, 1998:196). Another possibility to consider, however, is that social desirability bias may have a strong influence on respondents in their efforts to seem discerning by criticizing the government. In the case of Brazil, this is especially in terms of the Latin American tendency of *simpatia*³⁸ (Johnson & Van de Vijver, 2003:198).

It can thus be seen that in both South Africa and Brazil levels of diffuse support remain fairly high, considering what has been observed as relatively low levels of specific support. This would suggest that South Africa and Brazil are indeed showing similar trends to those present in Western democracies.

5.4 Mitigating Factors: The Current Global Context and Political Legacies

Thus, although specific support may not be very high, diffuse support is healthy, thus prompting relatively favourable comparison with trends in specific and diffuse support in the Western consolidated democracies. There are several factors present, however, to warn against hasty conclusions that South Africa and Brazil may share the necessary trends in diffuse and specific support to warrant classification with other, more mature democracies.

The first, and perhaps the most important to consider, is the global context in which these democratic consolidations must take place. Both South Africa and Brazil, due to their circumstantial isolation, have had to simultaneously undergo both political and economic transformation³⁹. Both of the new democratic regimes were burdened with significant

³⁸ See Chapter Three.

³⁹Przeworski (quoted in Bratton & Mattes, 2000b:3) maintains that it is not possible to undergo both economic and democratic transformation simultaneously, as the necessary economic reforms will come up against strong popular opposition. It is an interesting point to consider that it was perhaps the intention of the previous regime in Brazil, according to their initial mandate, to instigate the economic transformation first, in preparation for the eventual democratic transformation envisaged. This did unfortunately not occur and both were simultaneously attempted with *abertura*, begun in the late 1970s (Friedman & De Villiers, 1996:262).

public debt and soaring inflation⁴⁰, significantly restricting the new governments' room to manoeuvre. It is true that the Mandela administration was successful in reducing both foreign debt and inflation (Shaw, 2001:73) and that Finance Minister Cardoso under the Franco administration crushed hyper-inflation (Roett, 1999:164), ultimately benefiting the poorer citizens. Nevertheless, the prioritization of these issues over much needed social service improvement and redress of inequalities is liable to weaken the support of the masses, who want to know what democracy can do for them in concrete terms.

Indeed, although both Brazil and South Africa are ranked as middle-income countries and considered as regional hegemons, this masks the fact that both Brazil and South Africa have large percentages of the population below the poverty line as a consequence of severe inequalities⁴¹. Research suggests that sections of the population that are concerned with basic needs will evaluate democracy through the performance of the democratic regime (Bratton & Mattes, 2000:5, Broderick, 2000). This suggests that they do not cognitively differentiate between specific and diffuse support for democracy⁴². Consequently, should the government fail to deliver sufficiently, both specific and diffuse support will decrease, throwing the baby out with the bath water, so to speak. Indeed, the fact that support for regime performance was the weakest of the three indicators of diffuse support could be interpreted as a warning that democracy's performance and delivery are dangerously weak. Considering that South Africa and Brazil have some of the highest rates of inequality in the world, it is very possible that the government, however hard they may try, will not satisfy the urgent need for mass service delivery. Consequently, as has been seen, both diffuse and specific support will decline.

What is interesting is that those who do show high support are concentrated in the echelons of society with low incomes and minimal basic education, thus seeming to contradict the above explanation. On closer examination, however, it can be seen that this

⁴⁰ In the case of Brazil, this was hyper-inflation (Faro de Castro & Valladão de Carvalho, 2003:471).

⁴¹ According to Nascimento & Nascimento (2001:106), in 1995 43% of Brazil's population was below the poverty line, whereas, according to Nation-master, (available: www.nationmaster.com), in 2000 50% of South Africa's population was under the poverty line. These figures are cited because they are chronologically relevant to time points measured in the study.

⁴² The ability of respondents to differentiate between diffuse and specific support warrants further research (see below).

is not necessarily so. In the case of South Africa, all those who were previously discriminated against under apartheid were very supportive of the new regime in 1995, as it afforded them equal political rights for the first time⁴³ – blacks exceptionally so, as under the democratic principle of majority rule they have enormous political power. In a mere six years, while most levels of support for the various political objects are still relatively high, a marked decline is noticeable. In the case of the Indian, coloured, and white minorities, there has been a severe decline in most levels of support. These groups possibly fear the ‘tyranny of the majority’⁴⁴.

In terms of Brazil, the relatively declining levels of support in terms of regime performance, regime institutions and possibly political actors, are corroborated by acknowledged declines in support for democracy across the South American continent (Lagos, 2001;2003).

It has also been observed at many of the levels in Brazil that the poorest and most uneducated respondents, as in South Africa, are those that support the government and the regime most fervently. While this may seem to be a contradiction of the above explanation, it must be remembered that political and voter education is almost non-existent in Brazil (Bresser-Pereira, 1990:206). This was initially a deliberate government policy in order to ensure that the newly enfranchised masses would not upset the political balance of power in 1988 (Roett, 1999:26). As such, these people are possibly more susceptible to the populist claims and campaign promises of politicians⁴⁵. It can be noticed, however, that the lower and middle classes and those with relatively more education are often the most unsupportive of the regime and government. This is possibly because they are dissatisfied with the government and have not been swayed by

⁴³ While it is true that coloured people were on a separate voter’s role until 1952, this is the first time that all South Africans were given the same rights politically (Giliomee, 1994:4).

⁴⁴ This fear was realised in the 2004 elections, when the ANC receive 70% of the vote, technically giving them the right to unilaterally change the Constitution.

⁴⁵ It must be also remembered that, while Vargas was a ruthless dictator, he was much loved by the working class, whom he claimed to represent and hold dear. Vargas started the Worker’s Party in 1945 and used this as a vehicle for re-election in 1950 (Roett, 1999:39, see Chapter Two). General Castello Branco, on the other hand, who genuinely attempted to prepare Brazil for civilian democratic rule within a 3-year mandate, was very unpopular, because he did not put on a public face and woo mass popularity (Fiechter, 1975:41). Thus popularity cannot always be equated with an effective executive.

misleading propaganda and are more critical of the government in terms of the Brazilian democracy's performance measured against its principles⁴⁶. The richer respondents, on the other hand, while previously heavily protected by the patriarchal structure of the state (McDonough, 1981:18; Roett, 1999:22) may resent the *novo sindicalismo*⁴⁷ and interest politics that are slowly developing and mobilizing, the top-down corporatist privileges previously afforded to big business (Faro de Castro & Valladao de Carvalho, 2003:472).

In essence, while it is true that the results of this study's analysis could point towards South Africa and Brazil following in the footsteps of more mature democracies in terms of trends in democratic support, the socio-political circumstances of these two case studies differ in several ways from those of the Western democracies, as has been shown above. In addition, as has been pointed out, there are also several alternative explanations for the observed trends. Consequently, these results should be interpreted with care.

5.5 Future Political Development

Following the above analysis of the levels of diffuse and specific support in Brazil and South Africa, several questions regarding the implications for future political development in both case studies arise. How have the results manifested in the analysis tied in with the most recent political development in both case studies? What are the implications for further democratic consolidation? What are the implications of both South Africa and Brazil's political future for the regions over which they hold hegemonic influence? It may be possible to suggest the beginnings of answers to these questions. Suggestions will be made in terms of the data analyzed⁴⁸.

⁴⁶ Those Brazilian respondents with higher education were more supportive of 'having a democratic system' (see Chapter Four).

⁴⁷ 'New unionism'. This movement developed as a social force in the build-up to democratic transition. It was a kind of grassroots activism that was strongly supported by church-based communities which challenged the traditionally top-down organisation of labour movements in the Brazilian corporatist environment. Lula da Silva was heavily involved in its activities and it became important in the mobilisation of pro-democratic forces in the 1970s (Faro de Castro & Valladao de Carvalho, 2003:472).

⁴⁸ The above questions will be touched upon by an elaboration of the interpretation of the data in an attempt to place the research within its historico-political context. It must be acknowledged, however, that it is beyond the capacity of this study to provide conclusive answers to the above questions. They warrant further and more in-depth research which could draw from this study as a starting point.

In terms of consolidation of democracy, it does not seem that South Africa or Brazil is experiencing complete retrogression in terms of support for democracy. What remains to be seen is whether they are going to move any closer towards democratic consolidation⁴⁹.

With regard to Brazil, many believe after the third wave of democratic transition that it is endemic to South American countries that they are doomed to remain only partially consolidated (Schmitter, quoted in Friedman & De Villiers, 1996:16; Lagos, 2001, 2003). The fact that many countries in Latin America have been democracies for several decades without managing to deepen their democracy is called upon as evidence. It is speculated that this is due to certain characteristics of what has been classified by some, according to Schmitter (1998), as 'Latin American political culture'. It is undoubtedly true that what vestiges of democratic political institutions and practices remained during the previous regime in Brazil were corrupted and often manipulated to benefit the rich and powerful (Roett, 1999:16; O'Connell & Birdsall, 2001:290). Attributing a lack of political consolidation to a weakly ingrained democratic political culture is, however, making an assumption in a chicken and egg situation. The fact is, however, that Brazil's democracy, however tenuous it may seem, has survived the death of the first democratically elected presidential candidate, years of soaring inflation and the impeachment of a president (Hunter, 2003:155; Lagos, 2003:163). No popular revolution or military coup d'état has occurred, despite the country having a history of military interference. In addition, although admittedly several levels of political object support remain low, support for regime principles remains high.

As a member of the African continent, South Africa, on the other hand, has been held up as a shining example of a working democracy for the region, especially as the potential volatility during political transition due to severe ethnic tensions was diffused. Admittedly, South Africa's path to democratic transition was much smoother than Brazil's. This is in part perhaps because, unlike in Brazil, tragedies such as the equivalent

⁴⁹ It would, of course, be fallacious only to take into consideration the attitudes and opinions of the masses collected at a few points in time as an indicator of the consolidation of democracy.

of Tancredo Neve's death, did not occur⁵⁰. South Africa's transition cannot, however, solely be attributed to happy circumstance. It was achieved by effective institutional design and forward planning, as well as the political will on both sides of the negotiation table to make the transition work. It has been and will only continue to be maintained by the continued efforts of all concerned.

5.6 Recommendations for Further Research

Although this study has made an attempt to broaden our knowledge of democratic consolidation in developing countries by looking at levels of support for democracy, many questions have been raised during this research. There are several aspects which this study has touched upon, but which would greatly benefit from further research.

In looking at the attitudes of South Africans and Brazilians over ten years, it must be acknowledged that the examination of data with only two points of chronological reference is not sufficient to suggest trends in democratic political support in, in this case, either South Africa or Brazil (Weisberg & Bowen, 1977:86; Bratton & Mattes, 2003:8). This will be the task of researchers who have at their disposal World Values Surveys covering more years than have as yet been surveyed. With only two points of reference it is difficult to distinguish between the beginning of a long-term attitudinal trend and the short-term period effects of singular events⁵¹. In addition, given that the democratic transition and what amounts to a complete systemic political overhaul have occurred only recently⁵², it will possibly be some time before political opinions and attitudes stabilize.

⁵⁰ It must be mentioned here that Chris Hani, a popular anti-apartheid activist, was assassinated in 1993, shortly before the first South African democratic elections. He was the Secretary-General of the SACP at the time of his death and his murder was calculated to derail negotiations between the NP and the ANC (Lodge, 1999). While such a derailment was avoided due to the diplomatic skill of the South African political actors, the only tragedy comparable to Neve's death in Brazil would arguably have been Mandela's death on the eve of his inauguration.

⁵¹ This is apparent, for example, in the fluctuating results of Brazilian respondents' 'willingness to fight' (see Chapter Four). According to Inglehart (1990:79-82), among others, there are short-term periodic cycles in attitudes and there are attitude shifts over the *long durée*.

⁵² This is reference to the democratic transitions which occurred in Brazil and South Africa in 1985 and 1994 respectively.

Democratization and democratic consolidation have been recognized as a process (Parry & Moran, 1994a:1-3; Schmitter, 1998:23). As such, an attempt to provide conclusive findings on the state of regime consolidation in two such newly democratized states as South Africa and Brazil is at best presumptuous. Rather, this study should be perceived as the initiation of an ongoing project of monitoring their democratic progress. This in turn implies that further waves of the World Values Survey should be utilized to observe emerging trends in both diffuse and specific support. The tracking of statistically reliable long-term trends in democratic consolidation will be possible only once data have been collected over several more decades. These trends can be continually compared to those of the Western publics and the interplay of socio-demographic variables observed. Such questions as, for example, whether Inglehart's (1990, 1998) generational displacement theory⁵³ applies to developing countries in terms of the transmission of democratic values and the possible deepening of a democratic political culture with democratic consolidation can be tested. In addition, to complement the assessment of mass attitudes, it would be very beneficial to be able to compare the attitudes of elites regarding democratic political support⁵⁴. This is especially so, considering the substantial role that political elites specifically have played in democratic transition and continue to play in both South Africa's and Brazil's political arenas (Friedman, 1995:547; Giliomee & Simkins, 1999:67-68; McDonough, 1981:130; Roett, 1999:1). Ascertaining whether elites in both these countries are consolidating a democratic political culture within their ranks will be instrumental in assessing chances for democratic consolidation.

Furthermore, this study has picked up on a significant weakness in terms of measuring support for democracy. While it may be possible to assess the strength of support for democracy (as attempted here), it is more difficult for a researcher to determine what the

⁵³ This refers to Inglehart's theory that the environment present at the pre-adolescent stage of each generation gradually prompts a generational change in values following the changing nature of the environment (Inglehart, 1990:77).

⁵⁴ As yet, there exists little quantitative data on elite values and beliefs. While South Africa is part of the African Opinion Leaders' Survey, headed by Hennie Kotzé at the Centre for International and Comparative Politics at Stellenbosch University, conducted almost annually since 1991, there is no known Latin American equivalent.

respondent actually means by the concept ‘democracy’⁵⁵. This has implications not only for comparative research but also in terms of the validity of the study itself. It is recommended that further research with regards to actually determining the meaning of democracy be conducted at a mass and an elite level. Following from this, it will be easier to assess whether respondents can distinguish between intrinsic democratic support (‘democracy in principle’) and instrumental democratic support⁵⁶ (‘democracy in practice’) (Bratton & Mattes, 2000b; Doh & McDonough, 1999). This will provide further insight into both democratic support and democratic consolidation.

Lastly, another avenue of research involves an attempt to explain the results of this essentially descriptive study. Although possible reasons for emerging patterns have been suggested, these have been based solely on an interpretation of each case study’s historico-political context and have no statistical grounding. It seems that in many cases demographic variables cannot conclusively explain attitudinal phenomena here, suggesting the need to explore other possible causal variables. It is only once several of these issues are addressed that a more concrete understanding of South Africa and Brazil’s potential for democratic consolidation will be realized.

5.7 Conclusion

Despite a hesitation to make sweeping statements, it would seem from the trends in diffuse and specific support that South Africa and Brazil do indeed retain high levels of diffuse support despite low levels of specific support, allowing tentative comparison with the democratic paths of Western democracies.

South Africa and Brazil, however, have only begun the process of consolidating their democracies. Having both only inaugurated truly democratically elected presidents in the 1990s, a decade is too short a space of time in which to assess progress in this regard conclusively.

⁵⁵ Questions which do attempt to gauge the respondent’s understanding of democracy are present both in the *Afrobarometer* (see Bratton & Mattes, 2000b) and *Latinobarometro* (see Lagos, 2000; 2003) but have not yet been utilized for cross-continental comparative research.

⁵⁶ Again, this has been attempted by Bratton & Mattes (2000b), but theirs is not a longitudinal study, nor does this type of research extend to other developing regions.

What is evident as well is that, despite high levels of support for political community and regime principles, support for regime performance is declining. This suggests that the ‘reservoir’ of diffuse support is potentially being eroded by the sustained weak levels of support for regime institutions and political actors. These democracies, while tenacious, especially in Brazil’s case, are perhaps not robust enough to weather successively low levels of specific support indefinitely.

It is agreed that democratic political norms need to be institutionalized and absorbed into the national political culture in order to further democratic consolidation. In terms of respondents at the *mass* level in both Brazil and South Africa, support for democracy as a system is high. What is necessary to gauge, as mentioned above, is support for democracy at an elite level⁵⁷. Elite political will was instrumental in beginning the democratic transition process and, although mass support for democracy is imperative to sustain the system’s legitimacy, political elite support and reinforcement are required as well. By virtue of Brazil’s ‘delegative’ model of democracy (Schmitter, 1996) and South Africa’s closed party list system, there is arguably a certain ‘distancing’ of the elites from the masses following election. Elites must be willing to submit themselves to the rule of law, rather than holding themselves above it.

This is especially the case now in both the case of Brazil and South Africa. In Brazil Lula of the PT has recently been elected as Brazilian president, marking a significant break with past leaders in terms of both his socio-economic background and his ideological leanings⁵⁸. Many believe he was elected because the Brazilian masses are feeling the pinch of Cardoso’s neo-liberal policies. Interpreted within the context of this study, therefore, the observed decline in support for regime performance and institutions has led to a dramatic upheaval within the Brazilian political elite. In terms of South Africa, having recently re-elected the ANC and thus President Mbeki, several questions pertaining to the future of competitive democracy also are hanging in the balance. Having

⁵⁷ Huntington (1996:9) identifies a weakness of democratic values in political elites as a contributing factor to a reversal of the democratic transition.

⁵⁸ Lula is the first working-class president to be elected in Brazil.

achieved more than a two-thirds' majority, the ANC can legally change the Constitution and Mbeki could thus seek a third term. This could have been safely predicted following the indicators inherent in high levels of support for the regime's political future, institutions and especially political actors. Voices have been raised about the safety of democracy with the beginnings of a one-party dominant state seeming to emerge. Whether the ANC abuses its position of power and whether the Lula administration can address the incredible inequalities in Brazil where those before have either ignored them or failed, will only be seen in time. Whether they do so or not will undoubtedly influence the strength of both the South African and the Brazilian democracies.

Although this study has only introduced the beginning of South Africa and Brazil's process of democratic consolidation, it is significant in that it has broadened horizons regarding knowledge of developing democracies. It must be recognized that, while the particular characteristics of these two case studies are what originally prompted choosing them, aspects of this study may not be completely inapplicable to other studies of developing democracies. In terms of Brazil and South Africa specifically, this study is significant because it has shed light on the state of democratic support in these two countries, as was its purpose, as well as providing a starting point for the continued analysis of their path towards further democratic consolidation.

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
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Appendix 1: Cross-tabulations of Social Demographic Variables¹

Brazil 1990

4.4.1.1.1 Political Community: Pride to be Brazilian (see chapter four, p.92)

AGE						
	16-24 years	25-34 years	35-44 years	45-54 years	55+ years	Total
Very proud	54.2%	51.7%	62.5%	67.9%	81.3%	64%
Quite proud	26.8%	32.1%	23.2%	19.9%	11.4%	22.2%
Not very proud	10.3%	8.3%	8.1%	6.1%	2.8%	7.2%
Not at all proud	8.7%	7.9%	6.2%	6.1%	4.5%	6.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

EDUCATION					
	no schooling	primary school	some high school	completed high school, possible tertiary education	Total
Very proud	73.7%	68.3%	48.2%	50%	65.1%
Quite proud	14.5%	20.9%	28.9%	21.9%	21.8%
Not very proud	3.9%	5.3%	14.5%	9.4%	6.7%
Not at all proud	7.9%	5.5%	8.3%	18.8%	6.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

INCOME					
	working-class income	lower income	middle income	higher income	Total
Very proud	67.5%	62.7%	46.9%	55%	64.5%
Quite proud	20.4%	25.3%	27.3%	25%	22.2%
Not very proud	6.1%	4.8%	14.8%	15%	6.5%
Not at all proud	6.1%	7.2%	10.9%	5.0%	6.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

4.4.1.2.1 Political Community: Geographical Groups (see Chapter four, p.95)

AGE						
	16-24 years	25-34 years	35-44 years	45-54 years	55+ years	Total
town	38.3%	33.9%	38.8%	33.1%	36.5%	36.7%
region	12.8%	10.7%	9.0%	10.6%	12.4%	11.2%
country	26.0%	31.8%	31.1%	35.9%	30.6%	30.5%
S. America	1.9%	2.9%	1.9%	0.4%	1.3%	1.7%

¹ All cross-tabulations have a large chi-square and significance to the level of 0.000 unless stated.

World	21.1%	20.7%	19.2%	20.0%	19.2%	20.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

EDUCATION					
	no schooling	primary school	some high school	completed high school, possible tertiary education	Total
town	48.5%	37.9%	33.0%	18.8%	37.2%
region	5.9%	11.5%	13.0%	9.4%	11.4%
country	20.6%	31.5%	27.0%	34.4%	30.4%
S. America		1.6%	2.6%	9.4%	1.8%
World	25.0%	17.5%	24.3%	28.1%	19.2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Explains 99% of the variance, chi-square=32.257

INCOME					
	working-class income	lower income	middle income	higher income	Total
town	37.4%	33.8%	36.2%	20.0%	36.2%
region	11.1%	11.3%	11.0%	5.0%	11.0%
country	31.2%	31.9%	27.6%	30.0%	31.1%
S. America	1.8%	1.4%	1.6%	5.0%	1.7%
World	18.5	21.6%	23.6%	40.0%	20.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

4.4.1.3.1 Political Community: Willingness to Fight for one's Country (see chapter four , p. 98).

AGE						
	16-24 years	25-34 years	35-44 years	45-54 years	55+ years	Total
yes	39.3%	42.4%	37.0%	34.1%	28.8%	36.0%
no	60.7%	57.6%	63.0%	65.9%	71.2%	64.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

EDUCATION					
	no schooling	primary school	some high school	completed high school, possible tertiary education	Total
yes	40.0%	32.8%	46.4%	54.8%	35.7%
no	60.0%	67.2%	53.6%	45.2%	64.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

INCOME					
	working-class income	lower income	middle income	higher income	Total
yes	33.8%	40.0%	39.8%	28.6%	35.7%
no	66.2%	60.0%	60.2%	71.4%	64.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

4.4.2.1 Regime Principles: Support for Regime Principles (see chapter four, p. 101)

AGE						
	16-24 years	25-34 years	35-44 years	45-54 years	55+ years	Total
very supportive	81.6%	80.5%	87.3%	84.9%	85.1%	84.1%
fairly supportive	7.7%	7.9%	2.9%	5.4%	2.2%	5.0%
neutral	9.8%	10.8%	9.5%	8.8%	10.1%	9.8%
fairly unsupportive		0.4%	0.2%	0.4%	0.5%	0.3%
very unsupportive	0.9%	0.4%		0.4%	2.2%	0.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

EDUCATION					
	no schooling	primary school	some high school	completed high school, possible tertiary education	Total
very supportive	95.0%	85.4%	82.4%	71.9%	85.0%
fairly supportive		4.9%	6.6%	12.5%	5.1%
neutral	3.3%	9.0%	9.3%	15.6%	9.0%
fairly unsupportive		0.1%	0.9%		0.2%
very unsupportive	1.7%	0.5%	0.9%		0.6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Explains only 38% of the variance, chi-square=20.293

INCOME					
	working-class income	lower income	middle income	higher income	Total
very supportive	84.4%	85.7%	80.3%	57.9%	84.1%
fairly supportive	4.8%	5.6%	8.7%		5.3%
neutral	9.9%	7.5%	10.2%	42.1%	9.7%
fairly unsupportive	0.2%	0.5%			0.3%
very unsupportive	0.7%	0.7%	0.8%		0.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

4.4.3.1 Regime Performance: Feelings in Terms of the Future of Brazil (CESOP)(see chapter four, p. 108)

AGE						
	16-25 years	26-30 years	31-40 years	41-50 years	51+ years	Total
Very optimistic	8.0%	5.0%	4.8%	4.7%	8.3%	6.4%
optimistic	35.1%	35.4%	37.5%	41.3%	39.3%	3.7%

neutral	23.8%	29.2%	21.8%	21.2%	17.2%	22.5%
pessimistic	16.7%	16.0%	16.4%	14.8%	12.1%	15.4%
Very pessimistic	7.9%	5.5%	8.1%	5.8%	4.5%	6.6%
Don't know	8.4%	9.0%	11.5%	12.2%	18.5%	11.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

EDUCATION					
	no schooling	at least some primary school	at least some high school	some tertiary education	Total
Very optimistic	6.3%	6.3%	7.4%	4.8%	6.4%
optimistic	35.8%	36.9%	39.7%	39.6%	37.4%
neutral	15.7%	22.2%	27%	28.4%	22.5%
pessimistic	8.6%	16.5%	17.1%	16.4%	15.4%
Very pessimistic	3.9%	7.4%	6.4%	7.2%	6.6%
Don't know	29.6%	10.7%	2.5%	3.6%	11.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

The income variable was not available for cross-tabulation

4.4.4.1 Regime Institutions: Index of Institutional Support (see chapter four, p. 119)

AGE						
	16-24 years	25-34 years	35-44 years	45-54 years	55+ years	Total
strong support	10.6%	12.1%	12.4%	13.8%	26.3%	15.2%
medium support	58.1%	55.8%	53.3%	51.8%	52.4%	54.4%
weak support	31.3%	32.1%	34.3%	34.4%	21.2%	30.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

EDUCATION					
	no schooling	primary school	some high school	completed high school, possible tertiary education	Total
strong support	43.2%	16.3%	4.8%	3.1%	15.6%
medium support	37.8%	55.7%	57.1%	34.4%	54.6%
weak support	18.9%	28.0%	38.1%	62.5%	29.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

INCOME					
	working-class income	lower income	middle income	higher income	Total
strong	20.5%	7.0%	3.9%		15.5%

support					
medium support	52.7%	57.3%	56.7%	50.0%	54.1%
weak support	26.8%	35.7%	39.4%	50.0%	30.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

4.4.5.1 Political Actors: Opinion on Collor's government (CESOP)(see chapter four, p. 125)

AGE						
	16-25 years	26-30 years	31-40 years	41-50 years	51+ years	Total
excellent	7.4%	7.2%	6.9%	7.2%	9.2%	7.6%
good	18.5%	22.7%	20.8%	21.0%	29.0%	22.0%
average	49.3%	42.1%	43.9%	46.8%	41.1%	45.1%
bad	9.1%	9.2%	9.6%	8.4%	7.6%	8.8%
terrible	15.4%	17.6%	16.2%	14.4%	9.6%	14.6%
don't know	0.3%	1.2%	2.6%	2.3%	3.4%	1.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

EDUCATION					
	no schooling	at least some primary school	at least some high school	at least some tertiary education	Total
excellent	9.0%	8.3%	5.0%	4.6%	7.6%
good	36.5%	19.5%	18.3%	22.8%	22.0%
average	32.5%	46.7%	50.1%	44.7%	45.1%
bad	7.3%	8.4%	9.8%	14.2%	8.8%
terrible	8.6%	15.8%	16.2%	12.8%	14.6%
don't know	6.1%	1.3%	0.6%	0.9%	1.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

The income variable was not available for cross-tabulation

Brazil 1995

4.4.1.1.1 Political Community: Pride to be Brazilian (see chapter four, p. 92.)

AGE							
	16-24 years	25-34 years	35-44 years	45-54 years	55-64 years	65+ years	Total
Very proud	63.4%	62.9%	63.3%	67.3%	67.0%	74.4%	64.5%
Quite proud	17.6%	17.6%	22.5%	18.2%	22.7%	20.5%	19.2%
Not very proud	17.6%	17.6%	12.1%	11.5%	9.3%	2.6%	14.3%
Not at all proud	1.5%	1.8%	2.1%	3.0%	1.0%	2.6%	1.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

EDUCATION					
	no schooling	primary school	some high school	completed high school, possible tertiary education	Total
Very proud	57.9%	69.6%	62.9%	62.3%	64.5%
Quite proud	26.3%	15.8%	20.4%	20.6%	19.2%
Not very proud	10.5%	11.3%	15.1%	16.0%	14.3%
Not at all proud	5.3%	3.3%	1.6%	1.1%	1.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Explains 69% of the variance, chi-square=19.702

INCOME					
	working-class income	lower income	middle income	higher income	Total
Very proud	66.9%	63.3%	58.3%	53.3%	65.0%
Quite proud	17.8%	17.5%	29.2%	30.0%	18.8%
Not very proud	13.2%	17.5%	11.1%	16.7%	14.3%
Not at all proud	2.2%	1.7%	1.4%		1.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

4.4.1.2.1 Political Community: Geographical Groups (see chapter four, p. 95.)

AGE							
	16-24 years	25-34 years	35-44 years	45-54 years	55-64 years	65+ years	Total
town	29.8%	35.3%	26.7%	29.9%	28.0%	38.5%	30.9%
region	13.5%	10.6%	11.9%	11.0%	13.0%	5.1%	11.6%
country	22.9%	26.7%	32.6%	30.5%	38.0%	25.6%	28.5%
S. America	1.8%	2.4%	1.7%	3.0%	1.0%	5.1%	2.2%
World	32.0%	24.9%	27.1%	25.6%	20.0%	25.6%	26.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

EDUCATION					
	no schooling	primary school	some high school	completed high school, possible tertiary education	Total
town	22.2%	34.9%	32.5%	27.9%	30.9%
region		14.3%	10.6%	10.8%	11.6%
country	16.7%	26.3%	28.9%	30.1%	28.5%
S. America		1.5%	3.7%	2.0%	2.2%

World	61.1%	23.0%	24.4%	29.0%	26.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Explains 99% of the variance, chi-square = 33.269

INCOME					
	working-class income	lower income	middle income	higher income	Total
town	32.6%	31.2%	16.7%	20.0%	30.8%
region	12.1%	12.8%	8.3%	10.0%	12.0%
country	27.6%	29.9%	37.5%	16.7%	28.6%
S. America	2.2%	2.7%		6.7%	2.3%
World	25.6%	23.5%	37.5%	46.7%	26.4%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

4.4.1.3.1 Political Community: Willingness to Fight for one's Country (see chapter four, p. 98)

AGE							
	16-24 years	25-34 years	35-44 years	45-54 years	55-64 years	65+ years	Total
yes	70.1%	67.2%	73.4%	77.7%	71.3%	89.5%	71.8%
no	29.9%	32.8%	26.6%	22.3%	28.7%	10.5%	28.2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

EDUCATION					
	no schooling	primary school	some high school	completed high school, possible tertiary education	Total
yes	94.7%	79.9%	73.1%	65.3%	71.8%
no	5.3%	20.1%	26.9%	34.7%	28.2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

INCOME					
	working-class income	lower income	middle income	higher income	Total
yes	74.9%	68.2%	60.0%	63.3%	71.8%
no	25.1%	31.8%	40.0%	36.7%	28.2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

4.4.2.1 Regime Principles: Having a democratic system (see chapter four, p. 101.)

AGE							
	16-24 years	25-34 years	35-44 years	45-54 years	55-64 years	65+ years	Total
very good	25.0%	27.2%	28.0%	27.6%	28.0%	31.8%	27.1%
fairly good	59.0%	57.7%	57.3%	60.0%	56.8%	47.7%	57.9%
fairly bad	11.5%	9.1%	10.0%	8.6%	8.5%	11.4%	9.8%
very bad	4.5%	6.0%	4.7%	3.8%	6.8%	9.1%	5.2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

EDUCATION					
	no schooling	at least	at least	completed	Total

		primary school	some high school	high school, possible tertiary education	
very good	33.3%	19.7%	28.3%	30.7%	27.1%
fairly good	42.9%	60.1%	56.9%	57.4%	57.9%
fairly bad	23.8%	13.8%	9.0%	7.6%	9.9%
very bad		6.4%	5.8%	4.2%	5.1%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

INCOME					
	working- class income	lower income	middle income	higher income	Total
very good	23.7%	29.5%	41.5%	38.9%	26.9%
fairly good	59.6%	57.0%	45.7%	55.6%	57.8%
fairly bad	11.0%	9.1%	7.4%	2.8%	10.0%
very bad	5.7%	4.4%	5.3%	2.8%	5.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Regime Principles: 'Winstonian Hypothesis': Democracy is better than other forms of government despite its problems (see chapter four, p. 101)

AGE							
	16-24 years	25-34 years	35-44 years	45-54 years	55-64 years	65+ years	Total
strongly agree	42.4%	46.2%	52.3%	63.7%	58.8%	50.0%	50.1%
agree	41.2%	36.4%	28.2%	21.1%	30.7%	36.4%	33.2%
disagree	8.2%	9.1%	9.7%	6.4%	3.5%	6.8%	8.1%
strongly disagree	8.2%	8.4%	9.7%	8.8%	7.0%	6.8%	8.5%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

EDUCATION					
	no schooling	at least primary school	at least some high school	completed high school, possible tertiary education	Total
strongly agree	22.2%	48.7%	40.1%	56.3%	50.2%
agree	55.6%	34.2%	39.7%	29.2%	33.2%
disagree	5.6%	6.5%	9.1%	8.5%	8.0%
strongly disagree	16.7%	10.6%	11.0%	6.0%	8.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

INCOME					
	working- class income	lower income	middle income	higher income	Total
strongly agree	46.4%	53.6%	63.8%	65.0%	50.1%
agree	35.7%	32.8%	19.1%	20.0%	33.3%
disagree	7.7%	7.3%	12.8%	7.5%	7.9%

strongly disagree	10.2%	6.3%	4.3%	7.5%	8.6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

4.4.3.1 Regime Performance: Evaluation of the Previous Regime (see chapter four, p. 108)

AGE							
	16-24 years	25-34 years	35-44 years	45-54 years	55-64 years	65+ years	Total
very bad	20.7%	28.5%	29.2%	22.7%	27.8%	18.9%	25.5%
fairly bad	48.9%	42.7%	38.5%	33.1%	38.9%	24.3%	41.1%
fairly good	20.4%	20.9%	20.8%	26.6%	17.8%	37.8%	21.9%
very good	10.0%	7.9%	11.5%	17.5%	15.6%	18.9%	11.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

EDUCATION					
	no schooling	at least primary school	at least some high school	completed high school, possible tertiary education	Total
very bad	22.2%	26.5%	25.1%	25.2%	25.5%
fairly bad	33.3%	32.0%	40.2%	47.1%	41.1%
fairly good	22.2%	21.4%	25.1%	20.7%	21.9%
very good	22.2%	20.1%	9.6%	7.0%	11.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

INCOME					
	working-class income	lower income	middle income	higher income	Total
very bad	23.7%	29.3%	31.9%	28.6%	25.9%
fairly bad	41.1%	41.8%	36.1%	42.9%	41.0%
fairly good	21.9%	19.5%	27.8%	25.0%	21.7%
very good	13.3%	9.4%	4.2%	3.6%	11.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Regime Performance: Evaluation of the Present Regime (see chapter four, p. 108)

AGE							
	16-24 years	25-34 years	35-44 years	45-54 years	55-64 years	65+ years	Total
very bad	30.1%	34.2%	31.8%	32.1%	28.1%	16.2%	31.3%
fairly bad	42.6%	41.8%	40.8%	38.4%	40.6%	18.9%	40.5%
fairly good	22.8%	19.1%	19.7%	21.4%	21.9%	32.4%	21.1%
very good	4.4%	4.9%	7.7%	8.2%	9.4%	32.4%	7.1%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

EDUCATION					
	no schooling	at least primary school	at least some high school	completed high school, possible tertiary education	Total

very bad	15.8%	33.9%	33.1%	29.5%	31.3%
fairly bad	10.5%	35.1%	44.1%	43.0%	40.5%
fairly good	36.8%	19.1%	20.4%	22.1%	21.1%
very good	36.8%	11.9%	2.4%	5.4%	7.1%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

INCOME					
	working-class income	lower income	middle income	higher income	Total
very bad	30.7%	32.3%	30.6%	33.3%	31.2%
fairly bad	39.7%	42.8%	44.4%	30.0%	40.6%
fairly good	20.4%	20.9%	20.8%	36.7%	21.0%
very good	9.3%	4.0%	4.2%		7.2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Regime Performance: Evaluation of the Future Regime (see chapter four, pg. 108)

AGE							
	16-24 years	25-34 years	35-44 years	45-54 years	55-64 years	65+ years	Total
very bad	16.7%	14.8%	23.1%	22.0%	18.3%	16.7%	18.4%
fairly bad	23.6%	32.2%	25.8%	28.7%	25.6%	23.3%	27.5%
fairly good	34.5%	28.3%	28.1%	25.3%	35.4%	26.7%	29.9%
very good	25.2%	24.7%	23.1%	24.0%	20.7%	33.3%	24.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

EDUCATION					
	no schooling	at least primary school	at least some high school	completed high school, possible tertiary education	Total
very bad	50.0%	24.9%	18.1%	14.2%	18.4%
fairly bad	12.5%	27.9%	27.3%	27.5%	27.5%
fairly good	25.0%	19.2%	32.6%	34.9%	29.9%
very good	12.5%	27.9%	22.0%	23.4%	24.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

INCOME					
	working-class income	lower income	middle income	higher income	Total
very bad	21.1%	14.5%	8.5%	20.0%	18.4%
fairly bad	27.1%	28.3%	28.2%	20.0%	27.3%
fairly good	26.0%	33.7%	45.1%	43.3%	30.0%
very good	25.7%	23.6%	18.3%	16.7%	24.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Regime Institutions: Index of Institutional Support (see chapter four, p. 119.)

AGE							
	16-24 years	25-34 years	35-44 years	45-54 years	55-64 years	65+ years	Total
strong support	15.4%	13.4%	12.8%	16.8%	23.0%	35.6%	15.8%

medium support	55.5%	58.2%	58.2%	60.4%	60.3%	55.6%	57.9%
weak support	29.1%	28.4%	28.9%	22.8%	16.7%	8.9%	26.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

EDUCATION					
	no schooling	primary school	some high school	completed high school, possible tertiary education	Total
strong support	25.0%	22.7%	14.6%	12.0%	15.8%
medium support	50.0%	54.5%	56.3%	60.8%	57.9%
weak support	25.0%	22.7%	29.1%	27.2%	26.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Explains 97% of the variance, chi-square= 19.702

INCOME					
	working-class income	lower income	middle income	higher income	Total
strong support	19.9%	8.1%	7.4%	12.8%	15.6%
medium support	54.2%	64.6%	71.6%	35.9%	57.7%
weak support	25.9%	27.3%	21.1%	51.3%	26.6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

4.4.5.1 Political Actors: Satisfaction with Incumbents (see chapter four, p. 125)

AGE							
	16-24 years	25-34 years	35-44 years	45-54 years	55-64 years	65+ years	Total
very satisfied	8.4%	12.5%	13.6%	19.4%	20.6%	21.1%	13.7%
fairly satisfied	42.7%	41.8%	42.8%	47.3%	41.2%	60.5%	43.6%
fairly dissatisfied	23.4%	22.0%	19.1%	15.2%	16.5%	15.8%	20.0%
very dissatisfied	25.5%	23.8%	24.6%	18.2%	21.6%	2.6%	22.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

EDUCATION					
	no schooling	at least primary school	at least some high school	completed high school, possible tertiary education	Total
very satisfied	16.7%	17.6%	9.8%	13.1%	13.7%

fairly satisfied	66.7%	43.6%	43.9%	42.6%	43.6%
fairly dissatisfied	5.6%	19.4%	22.4%	19.9%	20.0%
very dissatisfied	11.1%	19.4%	24.0%	24.4%	22.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Explains 85% of the variance, chi-square=20.518

INCOME					
	working-class income	lower income	middle income	higher income	Total
very satisfied	14.3%	13.5%	8.3%	16.7%	13.7%
fairly satisfied	43.6%	41.4%	52.8%	40.0%	43.5%
fairly dissatisfied	19.8%	20.9%	19.4%	10.0%	19.8%
very dissatisfied	22.4%	24.2%	19.4%	33.3%	23.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

South Africa 1995

4.4.1.1.2 Political Community: Pride to be South African (see chapter four, p. 93)

AGE							
	16-24 years	25-34 years	35-44 years	45-54 years	55-64 years	65+ years	Total
Very proud	83.4%	83.4%	83.7%	79.2%	77.7%	83.5%	82.1%
Quite proud	12.2%	11.1%	13.8%	16.5%	15.0%	10.1%	13.1%
Not very proud	4.0%	2.6%	1.4%	3.3%	4.9%	5.5%	3.5%
Not at all proud		0.7%	0.3%	0.8%	0.3%	0.3%	0.4%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

ETHNICITY					
	Black	White	Coloured	Indian	Total
Very proud	85.8%	62.6%	83.2%	81.8%	81.8%
Quite proud	9.9%	29.8%	15.7%	14.9%	13.6%
Not very proud	3.4%	3.3%	0.8%	3.3%	3.2%
Not at all proud	0.3%	1.4%	0.4%		0.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

EDUCATION					
	no schooling	primary school	some high school	completed high school, possible	Total

				tertiary education	
Very proud	84.9%	82.6%	84.0%	66.4%	81.8%
Quite proud	10.0%	12.6%	12.6%	24.9%	13.6%
Not very proud	3.6%	3.3%	2.5%	5.5%	3.2%
Not at all proud	0.6%	0.5%	0.3%	0.9%	0.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

INCOME					
	working- class income	lower income	middle income	higher income	Total
Very proud	86.0%	80.7%	74.7%	56.2%	82.7%
Quite proud	10.3%	16.1%	18.9%	36.1%	13.3%
Not very proud	2.6%	2.8%	3.5%	1.2%	2.6%
Not at all proud	0.3%	0.1%	1.9%	1.2%	0.4%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

4.4.1.2.2 Political Community: Geographical Groups (see chapter four, p. 96)

AGE							
	16-24 years	25-34 years	35-44 years	45-54 years	55-64 years	65+ years	Total
town	26.8%	32.2%	36.0%	28.3%	27.8%	35.8%	30.6%
region	17.9%	12.7%	12.8%	14.0%	20.5%	14.5%	15.5%
country	42.9%	46.3%	44.6%	47.3%	42.3%	41.4%	44.3%
Africa	6.6%	4.0%	3.0%	3.5%	3.6%	2.4%	4.2%
World	5.0%	4.9%	3.1%	6.9%	3.0%	5.9%	4.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

ETHNICITY					
	Black	White	Coloured	Indian	Total
town	31.7%	37.3%	30.5%	27.0%	32.4%
region	16.1%	10.5%	11.0%	8.2%	14.6%
country	42.4%	41.8%	50.5%	56.1%	43.3%
Africa	4.9%	1.8%	1.7%	2.5%	4.1%
World	3.7%	8.4%	6.3%	5.9%	4.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

EDUCATION					
	no schooling	primary school	some high school	completed high school, possible tertiary education	Total
town	49.4%	31.2%	28.6%	34.9%	32.4%
region	10.3%	18.9%	14.1%	8.9%	14.6%
country	31.1%	41.3%	47.8%	42.0%	43.3%
Africa	2.9%	3.8%	4.7%	3.3%	4.1%

World	1.9%	4.1%	4.6%	10.5%	4.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

INCOME					
	working-class income	lower income	middle income	higher income	Total
town	32.6%	29.3%	37.9%	34.4%	32.6%
region	17.0%	11.2%	9.4%	9.4%	15.0%
country	41.1%	50.1%	43.9%	38.9%	42.8%
Africa	4.6%	4.0%	3.3%	2.2%	4.3%
World	3.6%	5.2%	5.2%	15.1%	4.6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

4.4.1.3.2 Political Community: Willingness to Fight for one's Country (see chapter four,p. 99)

AGE							
	16-24 years	25-34 years	35-44 years	45-54 years	55-64 years	65+ years	Total
yes	70.6%	60.8%	63.7%	58.5%	57.5%	56.1%	62.6%
no	18.3%	26.3%	19.6%	26.9%	27.9%	28.5%	23.5%
don't know	11.2%	13.0%	16.7%	14.5%	14.5%	15.4%	13.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

ETHNICITY					
	Black	White	Coloured	Indian	Total
yes	58.6%	59.7%	61.4%	74.5%	59.4%
no	26.5%	31.7%	23.4%	20.6%	26.9%
don't know	14.9%	8.5%	15.2%	4.9%	13.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

EDUCATION					
	no schooling	primary school	some high school	completed high school, possible tertiary education	Total
yes	49.7%	51.8%	65.4%	64.5%	59.4%
no	32.7%	30.8%	22.7%	28.6%	26.9%
don't know	17.5%	17.5%	11.9%	6.7%	13.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

INCOME					
	working-class income	lower income	middle income	higher income	Total
yes	57.9%	68.1%	67.0%	58.9%	60.4%
no	27.3%	21.9%	24.7%	31.6%	26.4%
don't know	14.8%	10.1%	8.3%	9.5%	13.2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

4.4.2.2 Regime Principles: Support for having a democratic political system (see chapter four,p. 104.)

AGE					
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	16-24 years	25-34 years	35-44 years	45-54 years	55-64 years	65+ years	Total
very good	52.1%	51.8%	43.0%	49.3%	42.9%	44.2%	49.3%
fairly good	31.9%	31.3%	34.5%	31.0%	35.8%	35.9%	31.0%
fairly bad	3.8%	4.5%	6.9%	1.9%	4.1%	3.2%	1.9%
very bad	1.2%	2.0%	2.0%	4.3%	2.3%	1.7%	4.3%
don't know	11.0%	10.5%	13.6%	13.5%	14.9%	15.0%	13.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

ETHNICITY					
	Black	White	Coloured	Indian	Total
very good	51.0%	31.4%	36.3%	37.2%	46.4%
fairly good	29.1%	39.9%	34.3%	36.4%	31.5%
fairly bad	3.1%	12.7%	3.2%	5.1%	4.7%
very bad	1.8%	8.4%	3.0%	2.0%	2.9%
don't know	14.9%	7.6%	23.1%	19.3%	14.6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

EDUCATION					
	no schooling	at least primary school	at least some high school	completed high school, possible tertiary education	Total
very good	43.7%	44.6%	46.8%	52.4%	46.4%
fairly good	29.3%	32.1%	31.5%	31.9%	31.5%
fairly bad	2.8%	3.1%	5.7%	6.5%	4.7%
very bad	2.4%	1.7%	3.5%	4.3%	2.9%
don't know	21.9%	18.5%	12.6%	4.9%	14.6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

INCOME					
	working- class income	lower income	middle income	higher income	Total
very good	47.4%	42.8%	38.0%	51.0%	46.1%
fairly good	30.4%	36.4%	35.1%	36.6%	32.1%
fairly bad	3.6%	5.3%	13.3%	6.8%	4.8%
very bad	1.7%	5.2%	8.6%	2.5%	2.9%
don't know	16.9%	10.3%	5.0%	3.1%	14.2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Regime Principles: 'Winstonian Hypothesis': Democracy as the best system despite its problems (see chapter four, p. 104)

AGE							
	16-24 years	25-34 years	35-44 years	45-54 years	55-64 years	65+ years	Total
strongly agree	45.3%	37.6%	30.7%	40.3%	34.2%	32.8%	38.0%
agree	34.9%	35.7%	42.2%	36.4%	38.8%	36.5%	37.2%
disagree	5.6%	7.4%	8.7%	6.3%	5.7%	7.7%	6.8%
strongly disagree	1.4%	2.2%	1.4%	0.9%	0.7%	1.9%	1.4%

don't know	12.8%	17.1%	17.0%	16.2%	20.7%	21.1%	16.6%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

ETHNICITY					
	Black	White	Coloured	Indian	Total
strongly agree	42.1%	19.6%	21.4%	22.3%	36.3%
agree	32.0%	49.1%	42.6%	45.7%	35.9%
disagree	4.7%	16.3%	9.1%	8.5%	7.0%
strongly disagree	0.9%	5.3%	1.4%	2.1%	1.6%
don't know	20.3%	0.1%	25.5%	21.3%	19.1%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

EDUCATION					
	no schooling	at least primary school	at least some high school	completed high school, possible tertiary education	Total
strongly agree	36.8%	36.4%	36.7%	33.8%	36.3%
agree	25.9%	32.5%	38.2%	45.8%	35.9%
disagree	4.2%	4.8%	8.5%	9.7%	7.0%
strongly disagree		0.8%	1.9%	4.8%	1.6%
don't know	33.2%	25.5%	14.8%	6.0%	19.1%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

INCOME					
	working-class income	lower income	middle income	higher income	Total
strongly agree	39.0%	33.2%	27.1%	27.5%	36.5%
agree	32.3%	44.1%	44.6%	46.2%	36.0%
disagree	4.5%	9.0%	15.6%	16.3%	6.7%
strongly disagree	1.2%	2.4%	4.4%	4.0%	1.8%
don't know	22.9%	11.3%	8.3%	6.0%	18.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

4.4.3.2 Regime Performance: Evaluation of the Previous Regime (see chapter four, p. 113.)

AGE							
	16-24 years	25-34 years	35-44 years	45-54 years	55-64 years	65+ years	Total
very bad	60.8%	54.5%	53.8%	55.8%	59.5%	66.3%	58.1%
fairly bad	25.0%	26.5%	28.2%	26.8%	24.2%	18.8%	25.4%
fairly good	10.2%	14.0%	12.5%	13.3%	12.7%	9.3%	12.0%
very good	4.0%	4.9%	5.5%	4.1%	3.7%	5.6%	4.6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

ETHNICITY

	Black	White	Coloured	Indian	Total
very bad	66.1%	16.6%	47.0%	54.3%	56.3%
fairly bad	21.9%	35.7%	37.1%	29.6%	25.6%
fairly good	8.5%	35.7%	11.4%	13.0%	13.2%
very good	3.5%	12.1%	4.5%	3.2%	4.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

EDUCATION					
	no schooling	at least primary school	at least some high school	completed high school, possible tertiary education	Total
very bad	68.6%	66.2%	51.4%	37.9%	56.3%
fairly bad	20.7%	24.3%	25.6%	33.7%	25.65
fairly good	6.2%	5.9%	17.2%	22.7%	13.2%
very good	4.5%	3.6%	5.7%	5.6%	4.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

INCOME					
	working-class income	lower income	middle income	higher income	Total
very bad	64.0%	52.5%	23.0%	35.2%	57.3%
fairly bad	23.9%	24.1%	28.7%	34.4%	24.8%
fairly good	8.5%	15.6%	35.9%	23.6%	12.7%
very good	3.6%	7.8%	12.5%	6.8%	5.2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Regime Performance: Evaluation of the Present Regime (see chapter four.p. 113)

AGE							
	16-24 years	25-34 years	35-44 years	45-54 years	55-64 years	65+ years	Total
very bad	6.1%	9.7%	7.9%	13.1%	9.3%	9.3%	8.9%
fairly bad	31.9%	34.3%	35.7%	35.5%	42.5%	42.2%	35.9%
fairly good	44.6%	39.7%	39.4%	37.4%	39.3%	34.55	40.0%
very good	17.4%	16.3%	17.0%	14.0%	8.8%	14.0%	15.2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

ETHNICITY					
	Black	White	Coloured	Indian	Total
very bad	4.9%	26.7%	24.6%	19.2%	10.4%
fairly bad	32.6%	50.2%	38.9%	43.0%	36.2%
fairly good	43.3%	22.2%	25.4%	29.4%	38.1%
very good	19.1%	0.9%	11.1%	8.4%	15.2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

EDUCATION					
	no schooling	at least primary school	at least some high school	completed high school, possible tertiary	Total

				education	
very bad	7.0%	8.7%	11.1%	15.7%	10.4%
fairly bad	34.3%	33.65	35.9%	46.8%	36.2%
fairly good	28.9%	41.2%	39.1%	34.2%	38.1%
very good	29.8%	16.5%	13.9%	3.4%	15.2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

INCOME					
	working-class income	lower income	middle income	higher income	Total
very bad	7.2%	14.7%	22.7%	17.2%	10.3%
fairly bad	32.0%	39.1%	49.8%	49.7%	35.5%
fairly good	42.8%	35.1%	23.7%	28.8%	39.2%
very good	180%	11.2%	3.9%	4.3%	15.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Regime Performance: Evaluation of the Future Regime (see chapter four,p. 113)

AGE							
	16-24 years	25-34 years	35-44 years	45-54 years	55-64 years	65+ years	Total
very bad	6.6%	8.5%	8.4%	9.8%	11.0%	9.1%	8.6%
fairly bad	14.0%	13.95	13.1%	18.0%	15.9%	14.8%	14.8%
fairly good	24.9%	28.8%	25.9%	27.8%	26.2%	32.1%	27.1%
very good	54.5%	48.8%	52.6%	44.5%	46.8%	44.0%	49.6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

ETHNICITY					
	Black	White	Coloured	Indian	Total
very bad	3.8%	35.0%	10.2%	21.1%	10.3%
fairly bad	11.3%	31.0%	22.0%	18.1%	15.7%
fairly good	26.2%	27.7%	29.5%	28.0%	26.8%
very good	58.7%	6.3%	38.2%	32.7%	47.2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

EDUCATION					
	no schooling	at least primary school	at least some high school	completed high school, possible tertiary education	Total
very bad	4.0%	4.0%	12.5%	21.5%	10.3%
fairly bad	12.4%	12.9%	16.6%	21.8%	15.7%
fairly good	21.1%	29.8%	24.8%	32.4%	26.8%
very good	62.5%	53.2%	46.2%	24.3%	47.2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

INCOME					
	working-class income	lower income	middle income	higher income	Total
very bad	5.1%	13.9%	29.0%	22.5%	9.7%
fairly bad	12.0%	15.0%	28.8%	25.6%	14.8%
fairly good	25.5%	25.9%	24.5%	37.3%	26.2%

very good	57.4%	45.2%	17.6%	14.5%	49.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

4.4.4.2 Regime Institutions: Index of Institutional Support (see chapter four,p. 121)

AGE							
	16-24 years	25-34 years	35-44 years	45-54 years	55-64 years	65+ years	Total
strong support	43.5%	37.6%	34.8%	34.8%	32.5%	30.6%	36.9%
medium support	49.8%	54.2%	52.5%	52.1%	56.6%	60.0%	53.3%
weak support	6.7%	8.2%	12.8%	13.1%	10.9%	9.5%	9.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

ETHNICITY					
	Black	White	Coloured	Indian	Total
strong support	46.0%	8.7%	18.7%	22.0%	36.4%
medium support	47.8%	66.3%	61.1%	69.9%	52.8%
weak support	6.2%	25.1%	20.2%	8.1%	10.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

EDUCATION					
	no schooling	primary school	some high school	completed high school, possible tertiary education	Total
strong support	42.2%	45.8%	35.1%	16.1%	36.4%
medium support	49.7%	47.1%	53.3%	66.0%	52.8%
weak support	7.9%	7.1%	11.6%	17.9%	10.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

INCOME					
	working-class income	lower income	middle income	higher income	Total
strong support	44.6%	29.3%	13.9%	9.9%	36.9%
medium support	47.8%	56.4%	66.0%	68.1%	52.3%
weak support	7.6%	14.3%	20.1%	22.0%	10.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

4.4.5.2 Political Actors: Satisfaction with Incumbents (see Chapter four,p. 127)

AGE							
	16-24 years	25-34 years	35-44 years	45-54 years	55-64 years	65+ years	Total
very satisfied	12.1%	11.4%	11.6%	8.9%	8.3%	4.0%	10.0%
fairly satisfied	43.3%	43.0%	40.4%	40.4%	39.6%	37.4%	41.2%
fairly dissatisfied	31.35	32.1%	32.9%	32.4%	35.6%	35.0%	32.9%
Very dissatisfied	9.3%	10.2%	9.7%	12.8%	12.5%	16.0%	11.2%
don't know	4.0%	3.3%	5.4%	5.5%	3.8%	7.7%	4.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

ETHNICITY					
	Black	White	Coloured	Indian	Total
very satisfied	12.1%	1.2%	4.9%	6.2%	9.6%
fairly satisfied	43.9%	31.1%	30.9%	33.8%	40.6%
fairly dissatisfied	30.1%	38.9%	43.1%	41.4%	32.9%
Very dissatisfied	8.3%	27.0%	15.9%	15.4%	12.1%
don't know	5.6%	1.4%	5.1%	3.1%	4.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

EDUCATION					
	no schooling	at least primary school	at least some high school	completed high school, possible tertiary education	Total
very satisfied	10.7%	9.4%	11.3%	1.8%	9.6%
fairly satisfied	46.1%	40.3%	39.9%	38.8%	40.6%
fairly dissatisfied	25.9%	33.4%	32.6%	39.4%	32.9%
Very dissatisfied	9.0%	9.1%	13.2%	18.9%	12.1%
don't know	21.9%	18.5%	12.5%	4.9%	14.6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

INCOME					
	working- class income	lower income	middle income	higher income	Total
very satisfied	11.5%	8.1%	3.0%	1.2%	9.7%
fairly satisfied	42.5%	39.9%	33.5%	33.0%	40.9%
fairly dissatisfied	31.8%	31.9%	41.2%	42.6%	33.1%
Very dissatisfied	8.1%	18.9%	21.6%	21.0%	11.7%

don't know	6.1%	1.2%	0.6%	2.2%	4.6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

South Africa 2001

4.4.1.1.2 Political Community: Pride to be South African (see chapter four, p. 93)

AGE							
	16-24 years	25-34 years	35-44 years	45-54 years	55-64 years	65+ years	Total
Very proud	78.4%	71.7%	78.6%	72.2%	64.9%	76.5%	74.6%
Quite proud	17.5%	19.6%	17.8%	22.7%	31.9%	19.1%	19.9%
Not very proud	3.8%	3.6%	1.5%	4.1%	2.1%	4.4%	3.2%
Not at all proud	0.3%	4.9%	0.3%	1.0%	1.1%		1.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

ETHNICITY					
	Black	White	Coloured	Indian	Total
Very proud	78.1%	48.6%	72.1%	52.2%	65.7%
Quite proud	18.3%	38.7%	22.6%	40.1%	27.3%
Not very proud	2.8%	9.0%	4.4%	6.0%	5.3%
Not at all proud	0.6%	1.6%	0.4%	1.7%	1.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

EDUCATION					
	no schooling	primary school	some high school	completed high school, possible tertiary education	Total
Very proud	70.5%	70.7%	67.0%	54.3%	65.9%
Quite proud	25.9%	24.7%	26.1%	35.3%	27.2%
Not very proud	2.7%	4.4%	5.2%	6.9%	5.2%
Not at all proud	0.9%	0.2%	1.1%	1.3%	0.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

INCOME					
	working-class income	lower income	middle income	higher income	Total
Very proud	72.2%	72.5%	56.5%	52.5%	67.2%
Quite proud	23.7%	22.75	32.6%	36.9%	26.6%
Not very proud	3.3%	3.7%	8.4%	7.6%	4.7%

Not at all proud	0.7%	0.7%	2.1%	1.4%	0.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

4.4.1.2.2 Political Community: Geographical Groups (see chapter four, p. 96)

AGE							
	16-24 years	25-34 years	35-44 years	45-54 years	55-64 years	65+ years	Total
town	28.7%	29.1%	30.1%	36.1%	20.4%	29.6%	29.6%
region	6.7%	13.8%	16.3%	14.9%	22.6%	11.8%	13.3%
country	40.9%	48.4%	34.0%	36.1%	45.2%	48.5%	41.7%
Africa	9.6%	2.3%	11.4%	2.6%	3.2%	2.9%	6.1%
World	12.9%	5.9%	6.0%	7.7%	6.5%	4.4%	7.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

ETHNICITY					
	Black	White	Coloured	Indian	Total
town	27.5%	38.6%	38.5%	24.1%	32.3%
region	15.1%	8.6%	8.4%	11.7%	11.7%
country	43.7%	39.6%	41.1%	55.5%	43.2%
Africa	7.2%	2.7%	4.2%	3.0%	4.9%
World	3.8%	8.6%	7.6%	5.4%	6.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

EDUCATION					
	no schooling	primary school	some high school	completed high school, possible tertiary education	Total
town	25.9%	31.1%	32.4%	35.3%	32.4%
region	23.2%	14.7%	10.9%	8.7%	11.8%
country	33.0%	41.9%	44.5%	42.6%	43.3%
Africa	0.9%	6.7%	4.9%	3.9%	4.9%
World	4.5%	3.7%	5.9%	8.4%	5.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

INCOME					
	working-class income	lower income	middle income	higher income	Total
town	30.3%	30.7%	35.8%	31.8%	31.3%
region	15.7%	11.5%	7.4%	10.1%	12.3%
country	41.3%	46.7%	43.9%	43.8%	43.9%
Africa	5.4%	5.9%	3.5%	3.9%	5.1%
World	3.8%	4.4%	7.4%	9.2%	5.3%
don't know					
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

4.4.1.3.2 Political Community: Willingness to Fight for one's Country (see chapter four, p. 99)

AGE						
	16-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65+

	years	years	years	years	years	years	
yes	62.3%	59.0%	60.8%	61.3%	45.2%	30.9%	58.3%
no	28.4%	25.9%	20.8%	25.3%	39.8%	51.5%	27.3%
don't know	9.4%	15.1%	18.4%	13.4%	15.1%	17.6%	14.4%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

ETHNICITY					
	Black	White	Coloured	Indian	Total
yes	56.3%	57.5%	56.1%	44.8%	55.5%
no	26.7%	29.1%	34.7%	37.8%	29.9%
don't know	17.0%	13.3%	9.2%	17.4%	14.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

EDUCATION					
	no schooling	primary school	some high school	completed high school, possible tertiary education	Total
yes	41.1%	47.9%	58.4%	56.5%	55.4%
no	43.8%	34.6%	27.4%	30.3%	29.8%
don't know	15.2%	17.5%	14.2%	13.2%	14.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

INCOME					
	working-class income	lower income	middle income	higher income	Total
yes	52.9%	56.9%	54.7%	61.3%	56.0%
no	30.3%	28.8%	31.9%	26.5%	29.3%
don't know	16.8%	14.3%	13.3%	12.2%	14.7%
Total					

4.4.2.2 Regime Principles: Having a democratic system (see chapter four, p. 108)

AGE							
	16-24 years	25-34 years	35-44 years	45-54 years	55-64 years	65+ years	Total
very good	34.4%	48.7%	42.0%	53.9%	46.6%	57.2%	44.5%
fairly good	53.3%	34.5%	36.8%	35.8%	28.2%	26.6%	39.3%
fairly bad	3.6%	6.0%	10.2%	4.0%	10.1%	3.1%	6.1%
very bad	2.2%	3.1%	4.2%	2.3%	3.4%	1.1%	3.0%
don't know	6.5%	7.7%	6.9%	4.0%	11.7%	11.9%	7.2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

ETHNICITY					
	Black	White	Coloured	Indian	Total
very good	46.9%	37.6%	36.5%	45.0%	44.5%
fairly good	39.9%	32.9%	43.3%	39.6%	39.3%
fairly bad	4.5%	14.9%	6.3%	5.7%	6.1%
very bad	2.6%	6.3%	0.8%	2.5%	3.0%

don't know	6.1%	8.2%	13.1%	7.1%	7.2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

EDUCATION					
	no schooling	at least primary school	at least some high school	completed high school, possible tertiary education	Total
very good	39.3%	47.6%	45.7%	36.8%	44.4%
fairly good	41.6%	34.9%	36.0%	56.9%	39.4%
fairly bad	3.5%	5.7%	7.2%	2.8%	6.1%
very bad	1.2%	4.6%	2.9%	1.7%	2.9%
don't know	14.3%	7.2%	8.2%	1.8%	7.2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

INCOME					
	working-class income	lower income	middle income	higher income	Total
very good	47.4%	41.5%	46.3%	43.7%	44.5%
fairly good	32.3%	48.5%	40.9%	32.6%	39.8%
fairly bad	4.0%	5.6%	5.4%	15.6%	5.9%
very bad	4.3%	1.0%	2.7%	5.0%	2.9%
don't know	12.05	3.4%	4.6%	3.2%	7.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Regime Principles: Winstonian Hypothesis: Democracy is the best political system despite its problems (see chapter four, p. 108)

AGE							
	16-24 years	25-34 years	35-44 years	45-54 years	55-64 years	65+ years	Total
strongly agree	24.6%	34.0%	38.4%	28.1%	29.2%	34.7%	31.5%
agree	40.0%	40.3%	46.6%	45.6%	36.0%	43.4%	42.1%
disagree	25.4%	17.3%	6.3%	10.3%	12.9%	6.3%	15.4%
strongly disagree	0.7%	3.0%	1.2%	3.6%	7.2%	1.0%	2.3%
don't know	9.2%	5.4%	7.5%	12.5%	14.7%	14.7%	8.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

ETHNICITY					
	Black	White	Coloured	Indian	Total
strongly agree	34.6%	22.3%	21.5%	34.1%	31.5%
agree	40.8%	47.3%	46.6%	34.5%	42.1%
disagree	14.5%	16.1%	20.4%	17.0%	15.4%
strongly disagree	2.3%	2.8%	0.8%	4.6%	2.3%
don't know	7.8%	11.5%	10.7%	9.8%	8.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

EDUCATION

	no schooling	at least primary school	at least some high school	completed high school, possible tertiary education	Total
strongly agree	23.2%	31.0%	33.6%	24.9%	31.4%
agree	42.4%	45.5%	43.3%	34.3%	42.2%
disagree	10.6%	8.8%	12.8%	33.3%	15.4%
strongly disagree	1.9%	1.9%	2.4%	2.5%	2.3%
don't know	21.9%	12.8%	7.9%	5.0%	8.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

INCOME					
	working- class income	lower income	middle income	higher income	Total
strongly agree	35.0%	29.7%	32.4%	33.4%	32.4%
agree	40.6%	40.5%	41.9%	40.5%	40.7%
disagree	10.7%	21.0%	16.1%	17.1%	16.1%
strongly disagree	2.6%	2.1%	1.4%	2.7%	2.3%
don't know	11.1%	6.6%	8.3%	6.3%	8.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

4.4.3.2 Regime Performance: Evaluation of the Previous Regime (see chapter four, p. 113)

AGE							
	16-24 years	25-34 years	35-44 years	45-54 years	55-64 years	65+ years	Total
very bad	53.2%	53.1%	49.7%	58.2%	52.1%	47.8%	52.7%
fairly bad	24.8%	26.2%	31.5%	26.8%	28.7%	25.4%	27.3%
fairly good	16.6%	16.0%	12.7%	12.4%	14.9%	17.9%	14.9%
very good	5.4%	4.7%	6.1%	2.6%	4.3%	9.0%	5.1%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

ETHNICITY					
	Black	White	Coloured	Indian	Total
very bad	60.4%	18.5%	33.5%	28.8%	50.7%
fairly bad	22.9%	31.1%	43.2%	26.3%	26.3%
fairly good	13.1%	42.3%	16.6%	32.2%	18.1%
very good	3.6%	8.1%	6.8%	12.8%	4.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

EDUCATION					
	no schooling	at least primary school	at least some high school	completed high school, possible tertiary education	Total
very bad	74.1%	53.8%	53.2%	34.6%	50.7%

fairly bad	14.3%	29.6%	27.3%	20.3%	26.3%
fairly good	8.0%	11.2%	15.0%	39.2%	18.1%
very good	3.6%	5.4%	4.5%	5.9%	4.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

INCOME					
	working-class income	lower income	middle income	higher income	Total
very bad	57.7%	51.4%	45.6%	24.9%	50.7%
fairly bad	31.2%	19.3%	23.4%	32.3%	26.3%
fairly good	7.9%	24.2%	20.3%	38.0%	18.1%
very good	3.2%	5.2%	10.7%	4.9%	4.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Regime Performance: Evaluation of the Present Regime (see chapter four, p. 113)

AGE							
	16-24 years	25-34 years	35-44 years	45-54 years	55-64 years	65+ years	Total
very bad	28.2%	12.6%	12.1%	12.3%	17.4%	11.5%	16.6%
fairly bad	29.9%	34.6%	43.2%	36.8%	43.1%	46.9%	36.6%
fairly good	33.7%	31.8%	34.2%	28.9%	34.2%	20.7%	32.1%
very good	8.2%	21.0%	10.5%	22.0%	5.3%	20.9%	14.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

ETHNICITY					
	Black	White	Coloured	Indian	Total
very bad	7.1%	29.5%	19.1%	24.4%	17.6%
fairly bad	33.6%	57.6%	42.4%	54.2%	44.4%
fairly good	43.0%	12.6%	30.8%	15.7%	29.1%
very good	16.3%	0.2%	7.7%	5.7%	9.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

EDUCATION					
	no schooling	at least primary school	at least some high school	completed high school, possible tertiary education	Total
very bad	6.3%	12.9%	18.9%	20.7%	17.6%
fairly bad	33.3%	34.6%	45.8%	52.0%	44.1%
fairly good	36.0%	40.0%	26.8%	24.3%	29.3%
very good	24.3%	12.5%	8.5%	3.0%	9.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

INCOME					
	working-class income	lower income	middle income	higher income	Total
very bad	8.9%	18.7%	23.6%	25.8%	16.9%
fairly bad	34.3%	42.3%	50.0%	58.1%	43.0%
fairly good	41.3%	29.7%	22.5%	15.4%	30.6%
very good	15.5%	9.4%	3.9%	0.7%	9.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Regime Performance: Evaluation of the Future Regime (see chapter four,p. 113)

AGE							
	16-24 years	25-34 years	35-44 years	45-54 years	55-64 years	65+ years	Total
very bad	10.0%	14.1%	9.4%	10.9%	8.0%	19.0%	11.5%
fairly bad	36.1%	18.7%	30.7%	21.6%	31.6%	33.1%	27.4%
fairly good	24.6%	33.1%	29.6%	30.0%	45.4%	25.4%	30.2%
very good	29.4%	34.1%	30.4%	37.5%	15.0%	22.4%	30.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

ETHNICITY					
	Black	White	Coloured	Indian	Total
very bad	5.4%	26.7%	12.0%	29.1%	15.4%
fairly bad	18.6%	43.6%	28.7%	37.2%	29.8%
fairly good	35.6%	25.9%	38.2%	24.8%	31.9%
very good	40.5%	3.8%	21.1%	8.9%	22.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

EDUCATION					
	no schooling	at least primary school	at least some high school	completed high school, possible tertiary education	Total
very bad	1.0%	8.5%	16.8%	20.8%	15.4%
fairly bad	20.4%	23.6%	30.3%	36.2%	29.7%
fairly good	26.5%	35.9%	31.1%	31.9%	32.0%
very good	52.0%	32.0%	21.7%	11.2%	23.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

INCOME					
	working- class income	lower income	middle income	higher income	Total
very bad	6.9%	14.9%	19.1%	24.0%	14.2%
fairly bad	18.5%	28.9%	35.6%	42.2%	28.3%
fairly good	35.2%	32.9%	33.5%	28.5%	33.0%
very good	39.4%	23.2%	11.9%	5.3%	24.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

4.4.4.2 Regime Institutions: Index of Institutional Support (see chapter four,p. 121)

AGE							
	16-24 years	25-34 years	35-44 years	45-54 years	55-64 years	65+ years	Total
strong support	29.9%	29.3%	37.2%	41.5%	40.9%	37.3%	33.5%
medium support	60.2%	48.8%	50.9%	43.9%	43.1%	45.7%	51.2%
weak support	10.0%	22.0%	11.9%	14.6%	16.0%	17.0%	15.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

ETHNICITY					
	Black	White	Coloured	Indian	Total
strong support	42.7%	2.0%	16.6%	16.5%	33.5%
medium support	50.1%	49.9%	59.3%	53.7%	51.2%
weak support	7.1%	48.1%	24.0%	29.8%	15.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

EDUCATION					
	no schooling	primary school	some high school	completed high school, possible tertiary education	Total
strong support	48.7%	55.8%	33.4%	12.2%	33.6%
medium support	45.5%	37.4%	49.7%	69.5%	51.1%
weak support	5.8%	6.9%	17.0%	18.2%	15.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

INCOME					
	working-class income	lower income	middle income	higher income	Total
strong support	47.7%	32.3%	27.1%	2.9%	
medium support	41.2%	60.5%	46.6%	50.8%	
weak support	11.1%	7.2%	26.3%	46.3%	
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

4.4.5.2 Political Actors: Satisfaction with Incumbents (see chapter four, p. 127)

AGE							
	16-24 years	25-34 years	35-44 years	45-54 years	55-64 years	65+ years	Total
very satisfied	7.1%	4.6%	10.3%	14.4%	10.1%	19.1%	8.6%
fairly satisfied	34.7%	51.4%	44.1%	47.4%	48.0%	23.6%	43.7%
fairly dissatisfied	39.7%	25.9%	27.3%	14.4%	21.5%	22.9%	27.9%
Very dissatisfied	13.0%	14.8%	15.3%	16.7%	16.0%	20.6%	15.0%
don't know	5.5%	3.2%	3.1%	6.9%	4.4%	13.8%	4.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

ETHNICITY					
	Black	White	Coloured	Indian	Total

very satisfied	10.1%	2.9%	6.1%	8.8%	8.6%
fairly satisfied	50.5%	23.3%	28.8%	25.2%	43.7%
fairly dissatisfied	24.3%	33.7%	45.8%	27.0%	27.9%
Very dissatisfied	10.2%	36.2%	13.8%	35.9%	15.0%
don't know	4.9%	4.0%	5.6%	3.2%	4.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

EDUCATION					
	no schooling	at least primary school	at least some high school	completed high school, possible tertiary education	Total
very satisfied	10.4%	12.4%	8.7%	4.6%	8.7%
fairly satisfied	40.2%	51.6%	45.5%	29.5%	43.8%
fairly dissatisfied	13.7%	21.0%	25.1%	48.8%	27.9%
Very dissatisfied	8.7%	8.9%	16.5%	15.4%	14.8%
don't know	27.1%	6.0%	4.2%	1.8%	4.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

INCOME					
	working-class income	lower income	middle income	higher income	Total
very satisfied	11.9%	8.1%	2.6%	6.6%	9.1%
fairly satisfied	48.6%	42.2%	39.9%	28.5%	43.3%
fairly dissatisfied	22.7%	33.1%	28.7%	29.0%	28.2%
very dissatisfied	10.1%	12.5%	27.9%	32.9%	14.6%
don't know	6.7%	4.2%	0.9%	3.1%	4.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Construction

“I’m going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing the country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing the country?..”

- *Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections*
- *Having the army rule*
- *Having a democratic system*

Consolidated Support for Democracy Index: Alpha²=	.4270	(Brazil 1995)
	.5716	(South Africa 1995)
	.6196	(South Africa 2001)

1995: v55@1-4

2001: v164-167

“I’m going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic political system. Could you please tell me if you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree..”

- *In a democracy, the economic system runs badly*
- *Democracies are indecisive and have too much squabbling*
- *Democracies aren’t good at maintaining order*
- *Democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other form of government*

Due to the low Alpha scores of the indexes constructed above, it was deemed more appropriate to use to single items to measure support for regime principles for the 1995 and 2001 waves. These are:

- *Having a democratic system*
(1995=q55@4; 2001=q167)
- *Democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other form of government*
(1995=q58@4; 2001=q172)

² The low Alpha of this index against suggests that it is not statistically a good instrument of measurement. It could be interpreted to mean that respondents do not necessarily see support of an alternative form of government as diametrically opposed to support for democracy. This could be a fault of the survey question wording, or merely a trend in respondent conceptualization. The strengthening of the Alpha between 1995 and 2001 could suggest that respondents are perhaps crystallizing the perception that these forms of government are in fact opposed to support for democracy.

Regime Performance: (Brazil 1990) CESOP (January)

P1

In a general way, how would you say you feel about the future of Brazil?

Regime Performance (Brazil 1995 & South Africa 1995,2001) WVS

1995: v54@1-3

2001: v162,X3,X4

Where on this scale would you put the political system:

- *as it was [in apartheid times/before abertura]?*
- *as it is today?*
- *as you expect it will be ten years from now?"*

Regime Institutions (Brazil 1990,1995 & South Africa 1995,2001) WVS

Support for Institutions Index: Alpha= .7665 (Brazil 1990)
.8048 (Brazil 1995)
.8090 (South Africa 1995)
.8593 (South Africa 2001)

1990: v273,v275, v278-v280

"I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence, not very much confidence at all?"³

- *The armed forces*
- *The legal system*
- *The police*
- *Parliament*
- *Civil Service*

All variables were recoded whereby all values 1-4 were copied and all others classified as 'system missing'.

³ In all the surveys where the items 'trade/labour unions' and 'political parties' were available, these items also loaded in the same factor as the items used for the regime institutions index. They have been excluded, however, for the following reasons. 'Trade/labour unions', while having had a close relationship with the government in South Africa since 1994 (Lodge,1999), are not a democratic regime institution. Similarly, while it may be argued that 'political parties' are such an institution, the question was considered too ambiguous to be used. (Are the respondents for the system of multi-party politics, political parties in general, or a specific political party?)

Strong support = 5-9 recoded as 1
Medium Support = 10-15 recoded as 2
Weak Support= 16-20 recoded as 3


1995: v53@2-3, v53@7-11

“I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence, not very much confidence at all?”⁴

- *The armed forces*
- *The legal system*
- *The police*
- *The government in Brasilia/Pretoria*
- *Parliament*
- *Civil Service*

All variables were recoded whereby all values 1-4 were copied and all others classified as ‘system missing’.

Strong support = 6-11 recoded as 1
Medium Support = 12- 18 recoded as 2
Weak Support= 19-24 recoded as 3



2001: v148, v151-v156, X1,X2

“I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence, not very much confidence at all?”

- *The police*
- *The government in Brasilia/Pretoria*
- *Parliament*
- *Civil Service*
- *The legal system*
- *The president*

All variables⁵ were recoded whereby all values 1-4 were copied and all others classified as ‘system missing’.

⁴ The indexes differ slightly from wave to wave as some of the items were not available in the earlier waves, but were included in the index as they became part of the survey questionnaire.

Strong support = 6-11 recoded as 1
 Medium Support = 12- 18 recoded as 2
 Weak Support= 19-24 recoded as 3

Factor analyses of the Items used for Regime Institutions

All items necessarily loaded onto one factor. The factor loadings of the principle component analysis for each wave are displayed below.

Brazil 1990

Component matrix	
Questionnaire Item	Component 1
Confidence in the Armed Forces	0.626
Confidence in the Legal System	0.778
Confidence in the Police	0.782
Confidence in Parliament	0.787
Confidence in the Civil Service	0.668

51.940% of variance explained

Brazil 1995

Component matrix	
Questionnaire Item	Component 1
Confidence in the Armed Forces	0.604
Confidence in the Legal System	0.732
Confidence in the Police	0.766
Confidence in Parliament	0.760
Confidence in the Civil Service	0.624
Confidence in the National Government	0.774

50.924% of variance explained

South Africa 1995

Component matrix	
Questionnaire Item	Component 1
Confidence in the Armed Forces	0.670
Confidence in the Legal System	0.739
Confidence in the Police	0.634
Confidence in Parliament	0.804
Confidence in the Civil Service	0.748
Confidence in the National Government	0.771

⁵ 'The army' was excluded from the 2001 battery because its factor loading was too weak (0.496)

53.262% of variance explained

South Africa 2001

Component matrix	
Questionnaire Item	Component 1
Confidence in the Legal System	0.801
Confidence in the Police	0.654
Confidence in Parliament	0.840
Confidence in the Civil Service	0.659
Confidence in the National Government	0.810
Confidence in the President	0.789

53.309% variance explained

Political Actors: (Brazil 1990) CESOP (December)

P10

In your opinion, do you think Collor is making a(n): i) excellent ii) good iii) average iv) bad v) terrible government?

Political Actors (Brazil 1995 & South Africa 1995,2001) WVS

1995: v60

2001: v174



“How satisfied are you with the way the people now in national government are handling the country’s affairs?”