Now showing items 1-3 of 3
How not to be a metaethical naturalist - Jesse Prinz on the emotional construction of morals
(Taylor & Francis, 2014-07)
Jesse Prinz develops a naturalistic metaethical theory with which he purports to sidestep ‘Hume's law’ by demonstrating how, on his theory, in describing what our moral beliefs commit us to we can determine what our moral ...
Peculiarities in mind ; or, on the absence of Darwin
(Philosophical Society of Southern Africa, 2011)
A key failing in contemporary philosophy of mind is the lack of attention paid to evolutionary theory in its research projects. Notably, where evolution is incorporated into the study of mind, the work being done is often ...
Harm: The counterfactual comparative account, the omission and pre-emption problems, and well-being
(Taylor & Francis, 2018-03)
The concept of “harm” is ubiquitous in moral theorising, and yet remains poorly defined. Bradley suggests that the counterfactual comparative account of harm is the most plausible account currently available, but also ...