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Difference, disability and discrimination : a philosophical critique of selective abortion

dc.contributor.advisorVan Niekerk, Anton A.
dc.contributor.authorHall, Susanen_ZA
dc.contributor.otherUniversity of Stellenbosch. Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences. Dept. of Philosophy.
dc.date.accessioned2008-06-17T10:04:53Zen_ZA
dc.date.accessioned2010-06-01T09:06:32Z
dc.date.available2008-06-17T10:04:53Zen_ZA
dc.date.available2010-06-01T09:06:32Z
dc.date.issued2008-03en_ZA
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/3110
dc.descriptionThesis (MA (Philosophy))--University of Stellenbosch, 2008.
dc.description.abstractThe practice of abortion continues to provoke controversy and disagreement. However, within the context of this wider debate, a greater level of consensus appears to have been reached as to the moral acceptability of the practice of prenatal screening, and selective abortion following the detection of foetal abnormality. This study seeks to interrogate whether justifications of this practice lend credence to the moral permissibility of selective abortion. In particular, it considers whether justifications for this practice amount to, or perpetuate, discrimination on the basis of the characteristic of disability, as selective abortion entails choosing against a particular foetus because of its characteristics. This study poses this question in two contexts – where the moral permissibility of selective abortion is regarded as an exception to the general moral impermissibility of abortion, and where selective abortion is regarded as one distinct justification within the context of the general moral permissibility of abortion. This study attempts to show that while justifications of selective abortion are directly discriminatory in the former case, they are not necessarily discriminatory in the latter case. This latter conclusion, however, recommends maintaining vigilance against the possibility that such justifications could rely upon or perpetuate prejudice, or restrict reproductive autonomy. These conclusions are considered within the South African context; in particular, with regard to their application to the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act of 1996.en_ZA
dc.language.isoenen_ZA
dc.publisherStellenbosch : University of Stellenbosch
dc.subjectSelective abortionen_ZA
dc.subjectDisabilityen_ZA
dc.subjectDiscriminationen_ZA
dc.subjectBioethicsen_ZA
dc.subjectSouth Africa. Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1996en
dc.subjectAbortion -- Moral and ethical aspects -- South Africaen
dc.subjectAbortion -- Government policy -- South Africaen
dc.subjectPrenatal diagnosisen
dc.subjectFetus -- Abnormalitiesen
dc.subjectDissertations -- Philosophyen
dc.subjectTheses -- Philosophyen
dc.titleDifference, disability and discrimination : a philosophical critique of selective abortionen_ZA
dc.typeThesisen_ZA
dc.rights.holderUniversity of Stellenbosch


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