Difference, disability and discrimination : a philosophical critique of selective abortion

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dc.contributor.advisor Van Niekerk, Anton A.
dc.contributor.author Hall, Susan en_ZA
dc.contributor.other University of Stellenbosch. Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences. Dept. of Philosophy.
dc.date.accessioned 2008-06-17T10:04:53Z en_ZA
dc.date.accessioned 2010-06-01T09:06:32Z
dc.date.available 2008-06-17T10:04:53Z en_ZA
dc.date.available 2010-06-01T09:06:32Z
dc.date.issued 2008-03 en_ZA
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/3110
dc.description Thesis (MA (Philosophy))--University of Stellenbosch, 2008.
dc.description.abstract The practice of abortion continues to provoke controversy and disagreement. However, within the context of this wider debate, a greater level of consensus appears to have been reached as to the moral acceptability of the practice of prenatal screening, and selective abortion following the detection of foetal abnormality. This study seeks to interrogate whether justifications of this practice lend credence to the moral permissibility of selective abortion. In particular, it considers whether justifications for this practice amount to, or perpetuate, discrimination on the basis of the characteristic of disability, as selective abortion entails choosing against a particular foetus because of its characteristics. This study poses this question in two contexts – where the moral permissibility of selective abortion is regarded as an exception to the general moral impermissibility of abortion, and where selective abortion is regarded as one distinct justification within the context of the general moral permissibility of abortion. This study attempts to show that while justifications of selective abortion are directly discriminatory in the former case, they are not necessarily discriminatory in the latter case. This latter conclusion, however, recommends maintaining vigilance against the possibility that such justifications could rely upon or perpetuate prejudice, or restrict reproductive autonomy. These conclusions are considered within the South African context; in particular, with regard to their application to the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act of 1996. en_ZA
dc.language.iso en en_ZA
dc.publisher Stellenbosch : University of Stellenbosch
dc.subject Selective abortion en_ZA
dc.subject Disability en_ZA
dc.subject Discrimination en_ZA
dc.subject Bioethics en_ZA
dc.subject South Africa. Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1996 en
dc.subject Abortion -- Moral and ethical aspects -- South Africa en
dc.subject Abortion -- Government policy -- South Africa en
dc.subject Prenatal diagnosis en
dc.subject Fetus -- Abnormalities en
dc.subject Dissertations -- Philosophy en
dc.subject Theses -- Philosophy en
dc.title Difference, disability and discrimination : a philosophical critique of selective abortion en_ZA
dc.type Thesis en_ZA
dc.rights.holder University of Stellenbosch
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