


# **Africa's place in the International Football System – Why South Africa received the 2010 FIFA World Cup**

By

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Thesis presented in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of  
Master of Arts International Studies at the University of Stellenbosch



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March 2007

## Declaration

I, the undersigned. Mark-Marcel Müller.....hereby declare that the work contained in this thesis is my own original work and that I have not previously submitted it in its entirety or in part at any university for a degree

8 March 2007

Date

## Abstract

For millions of people around the globe, football is an important part of every-day life. Similarly, many African governments have found in international football competitions one of the few opportunities to be internationally represented. Furthermore, through successful participation of their respective national football sides, they internally seek to foster nationhood. In fact, football is an integral part of African self-esteem with regards to being recognised by the rest of the world. However, to succeed in international sports means to succeed in a politico-economic structure far from equality and general solidarity. This thesis goes about the question why South Africa received the FIFA 2010 World Cup. Thereby it will distinguish the position of the African continent within the international football system.

This mega sport event which takes place every four years receives global attention. For a nation to be chosen by the world football body FIFA to host this event elevates a nation to an equal participant in the international community. Particularly because hosting this event is widely demanded by governments, it was of immense significance that Africa, a continent with the stigma of being backward and 'underdeveloped', was named as a FIFA World Cup host for 2010. Thus, what this thesis needs to answer is how Africa overcame the stigma of backwardness. This regards the system of international football which is itself embedded within the general system of international social interaction. Thus, this thesis is to make clear the variables of the international football system in association with the overarching social system. A historical analysis will clarify the processes and actors as well as the driving motivations which led to the FIFA World Cup host decision in favour of the African continent.

The outcome of this study suggests that social interaction is driven by the interplay of two variables: normative principles and economic practices. The historical development of modern social behaviour from the 16<sup>th</sup> century until today's global capitalism surely reflects the interplay of these two traits. At the hand of the historical development of the international football system this thesis is going to outline this interplay – as a European form of behaviour that came to encapsulate all social relations on the globe particularly by the spread of the cultural practice of football. This study reaches the overall conclusion that the decision to let an African nation host the FIFA World Cup meant that economic practice and normative principles were brought into perceived congruence. At the specific moment in time the decision was made, FIFA diplomacy came to recapture its character of a body that acts 'fair' and 'for the good of the game'. However, this outcome came about by mediation between

clashing self-interests, with South Africa being able to finally succeed. Importantly, this appeasement was a success by the African continent as a whole only in symbolic terms. In economic terms, it was a South African achievement and, thus, the expression of South Africa's self-interest. Obviously, football is an important element in the submission and general acceptance of the dialectic value-system from which social orders and hierarchies are derived and by which they are maintained in our capitalist (and global) world-economy.

## Opsomming

Vir miljoene mense regoor die wêreld is sokker 'n belangrike deel van hulle alledaagse lewe. Terselfdertyd verleen suksesvolle deelname deur hulle nasionale spanne 'n geleentheid vir die vestiging van 'n gevoel van nasionale identiteit. Sokker is veral vir Afrika-state 'n integrale deel van hulle self-handhawing. Maar om suksesvol te wees in internasionale sport, vereis ook sukses in politieke en ekonomiese strukture wat nie gekenmerk word deur gelykheid en algemene solidariteit nie.

Hierdie tesis vra die vraag: hoekom het Suid-Afrika die reg verower om die 2010 FIFA Wêreldbeker aan te bied.? Die massiewe sport gebeurtenis wat elke vier jaar plaasvind geniet ongekeende wêreldwye belangstelling. Wanneer 'n staat deur die wêreld sokkerliggaam FIFA gekies word om 'n wereldebeker aan te bied, word daardie staat geag 'n gelyke deelnemer in die wêreldgemeenskap te wees. Gegewe die feit dat die Afrika-kontinent die stigma van 'agterlikheid' en 'onderontwikkeldheid' dra, is die aanbied van die 2010 wêreldbeker in Afrika van enorme belang.

Wat die tesis dus vra, is hoe het Afrika hierdie stigma van agterlikheid te bowe gekom veral in die lig van die feit dat die stelsel van internasionale sokker gewortel is in die groter stelsel van internasionale sosiale interaksie. Hierdie tesis verklaar die belangrikste faktore in die groter sosiale sisteem wat die rangorde van die internasionale sokkerstelsel bepaal. 'n Historiese ontleding verklaar die prosesse en akteurs asook die dryfkragte wat daartoe gelei het, dat die FIFA Wêreldbeker toegeken is aan 'n Afrika-gasheer staat.

Hierdie studie bevind dat sosiale interaksie gedryf word deur twee faktore, nl. normatiewe beginsels en ekonomiese gebruike. Die historiese ontwikkeling van moderne sosiale gedrag sedert die 16de eeu tot vandag se kapitalistiese stelsel weerspieël duidelik hierdie twee faktore.

Hierdie tesis verduidelik dat die twee faktore sentraal staan tot die historiese ontwikkeling van die internasionale sokker stelsel wat as 'n aanvanklike Europese spel 'n universele kulturele praktyk geword het.

Die studie kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat die besluit om 'n Afrika-staat as gasheer te kies, genoep is deur die persepsie dat die ekonomiese oorwegings en normatiewe beginsels waarop FIFA gebou is, weer-eens nader aan mekaar gebring moet word.

Die besluit is gebaseer op die veronderstelling dat FIFA sy karakter moet herbevestig as 'n instelling wat beide 'regverdig' en 'ter wille van die spel' optree. Hierdie uitkoms was egter 'n soort kompromie weens botsende belange waardeur Suid-Afrika eindelijk kon seevier.

Wat belangrik is, is dat hierdie bevrediging as 'n sort Afrika-wye sukses slegs in simboliese terme beskou kan word. In ekonomiese terme was dit 'n Suid-Afrikaanse prestasie en dus eindelik 'n manifestasie van Suid-Afrikaanse eie-belang. Uit die aard van die saak, is sokker 'n belangrike element in die toekenning en algemene aanvaarding van die dialektiese waarde-stelsel waardeur sosiale ordes en hierargieë ontstaan en in ons kapitalistiese (en globale) wêreld-ekonomie in stand gehou word.

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## List of abbreviations

### AFC

*Asian Football Confederation* – continental body of Africa’s national football association, representing Africa in the world football body FIFA

### AG

“Aktiengesellschaft” – German: Firm which’s capital is divided in stocks, also “Arbeitsgemeinschaft” – German: working group)

### ANC

*African National Congress* – today majority party in the South African Government, historically formed by different parties fighting against white oppression in South Africa

### ARD

*Arbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, First public broadcaster in Germany

### BBC

*British Broadcasting Corporation*, British public broadcaster

### CAF

*Confédération Africain de Football* (Confederation of African Football)

### CAS

*Court of Arbitration for Sport*, independent arbitration tribunal with headquarters in Lausanne (Switzerland) to resolve disputes within FIFA or between FIFA and other football bodies affiliated to FIFA

### CBD

*Confederação Brasileira de Desportos* – Brazilian Sports Federation)

### CBF

*Confederação Brasileira de Futebol* – Brazilian Football Confederation, equal to a national football association

### CDU

*Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands* – Germany’s conservative party, in the province of Bavaria “CSU”

### CEO

Chief Executive Officer, head of business operations respectively head of board of directors

### CONCACAF

*Confederation of North and Central American and Caribbean Association Football*

### CONMEBOL

*Confederación Sudamericana de Fútbol* – Confederation of South American Football

### DFB

*Der Deutsche Fußball-Bund* – German football association

### DM

*Deutsche Mark* – German currency until 31 December 2001 (change to Euro)

**EBU**

*European Broadcasting Union* – Union of 74 television and broadcasting bodies in 54 countries from Europe, North-Africa, the Near East, and some associates from Canada, Japan, Mexico, Brazil, India, Hong Kong, and the USA

**EC**

*European Cup* – football tournament which takes place every four years between the national sides of the football confederation UEFA

**EFA**

*Egyptian Football Association*

**EJC**

*European Court of Justice*

**FA**

*English Football Association* – founding organisation of the *Association Game* commonly known as football (sometimes as soccer), first national football association emblematic of all subsequent national football associations

**FC**

Football club (also F.C.)

**FECAFOOT**

*Fédération Camerounaise de Football* – Cameroon's football association

**FIFA**

*Fédération Internationale de Football Association* – global football body and control institution for the game of football and its organisation, organiser of the football World Cup

**FLN**

*Front de Libération National* – Algerian party, emerged out of the fight for Algeria's independence against French colonialism

**IFAB**

*English International Football Association Board* – authority concerned with rules of the football game under the global football body FIFA

**IMG**

*International Management Group* – global marketer of sports and entertainment

**ISL**

*International Sports and Leisure* – sports marketing firm and rights dealer

**GAA**

*Gaelic Athletic Association*

**GDP**

Gross Domestic Product – macroeconomic measurement for a country's economy

**GTZ**

*Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit* – German society for technical cooperation, globally operating firm of the German state to foster international cooperation and sustainable development

## **IOC**

*International Olympic Committee* – organiser of the international sports event “Olympic Games”, representatives of the IOC (138 by the end of 2005) represent the IOC in their country but are not representing their country in the IOC

## **Mitropacup**

*La Coupe de l'Europe Centrale* – European competitions for clubs and national sides from 1927 until “World War II” in the region of central-eastern Europe (around the Austria)

## **MNC**

Multi-National Corporation – firm with business activities across countries’ borders

## **NOC**

*National Olympic Committee* – representative of a territory recognised as independent by the IOC (see above) which can be a nation or another national-geographic entity (currently 203), coming together in the form of a continental *Association of National Olympic Committees* (ANOC) to organise and implement the movement of “Olympic Solidarity”

## **Nazi**

National-Socialism – totalitarian ideology and movement which led to the dictatorship by Adolf Hitler and his party NSDAP governing Germany from 1933 until 1945

## **NFA**

*Nigerian Football Association*

## **OAU**

*Organisation of African Unity* – Organisation by all African nation-states except Morocco, transformed into the African Union (AU) in 2001/2002

## **OFC**

*Oceania Football Confederation* – confederation in the global football body FIFA to represent football of the Oceania region

## **PSL**

*Professional Soccer League* – highest professional football league in South Africa

## **FASA**

*Football Association of South Africa* – South Africa’s national football association from 1955 until the end of Apartheid

## **SAONGA**

*South African Olympic and National Games Association*

## **SAFA**

*South African Football Association* – current name of South Africa’s national football association, also the name of the white-only football association in South Africa before 1955

## **SASA**

*South African Sports Association*

## **SASF**

*South African Soccer Federation* – multi-racial football association to oppose white-only football in South Africa during Apartheid

## **TDES**

*TITANIC – Das Endgültige Satiremagazin* – German satirical magazine (‘the final satirical magazine’)

**TWI**

*Trans World International* – media business subsidiary of the sports marketer *International Management Group* (IMG)

**UEFA**

Union of European Football Associations – confederation representing European football in the global football body FIFA

**Ufa**

*Universum Film AG* – today *UFA Film & TV Produktion GmbH*, German media company with a long tradition (since 1917), and subsidiary to the international media group *Bertelsmann*

**UN**

*United Nations* – since 1945 global organisation and recognised as subject of international law, rooted in the *League of Nations* which failed to uphold peace due to “World War II”

**WSA**

*World-Systems Analysis* – research methodology of the Modern World-Systems theory

**MWS**

*Modern World-Systems theory* – uni-disciplinary social science theory understanding contemporary social interaction to take place in a capitalist world-economy (or the Modern World-System) that emerged in the 16<sup>th</sup> century

**World Cup**

*FIFA World Cup* – the final tournament of the globally recognised world football championships of national football sides

**ZDF**

*Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen* – Germany’s second public broadcaster

## **CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS**

### **1.1. Introduction**

On 15 March 2001, the FIFA Executive Committee agreed to let the FIFA World Cup rotate between the continents and “that the rotation of the FIFA World Cup, due to begin in 2010, would start in Africa” (*FIFA.com*, 15.03.2001). On 7 July 2001, the Extraordinary FIFA Congress in Buenos Aires ratified this decision by the Executive Committee (*FIFA.com*, 07.07. 2001). The fact that since the first FIFA World Cup in 1930 it was never held in Africa before meant that an extraordinary change took place. This thesis seeks to understand why this phenomenon in the history of social interaction occurred. It was of global significance and reflected society’s worldwide interdependencies. Analysis of this change will help to understand that today people are living in a global political-economy. To back this claim, this thesis is going to analyse processes in the system of international football. It will find out that these processes are based on the interplay between normative principles and economic practices. By historically analysing the social phenomenon of a football World Cup to be hosted in Africa, this thesis will respect the complexity of this change in particular and international relations in general. It will take into account systemic processes on all levels including economy, politics, and culture and their effect on individuals, households, classes and other groupings, firms, and states.

The first chapter sets the theoretical scene for the analysis in the subsequent chapters. This means to understand what normative principles and economic practice mean in football and in turn what they mean in society at large. Asking why Africa received the 2010 FIFA World Cup, the analysis answers that FIFA sought to represent the capitalist system’s ‘universalism’ in order to legitimise its ‘universal’ football rule. Universalism refers to the historically evolved ideals to legitimise the modern world-system’s order – its processes and hierarchies. FIFA had the capacity to subordinate a sub-system, the international football system as a socio-cultural institution, to the capitalist world-system’s ‘universalism’. In fact, the capitalist world-economy imposes itself onto its principle institutions (households, classes and status-groups, firms, and states) also by help of football. Material reality is the outcome of economic practices. The outline of the Modern World-Systems theory will therefore serve as the analytical framework as well as the main ideas for conceptualising the international football system, its processes and actors, its motivations and legitimisations. As will become

clear in this thesis, the interplay of economic practice and normative principles is the root cause for changes in society.

The second chapter will provide an analysis of the roots of the cultural practice of football. The sport incorporated the modern world-system's universal value-system and was able to submit a sense of order and hierarchy (both national and international) to the general public. Elite classes of society, mainly managers of capitalist firms and state managers used the socialising capacity of football for their own intentions. The sense of order included Christian-based ideals of liberalism, meritocracy, and peace as well as competition, rivalry, and life for the sake of economic growth. Together with the capitalist world-economy's growth and spread towards a global arena, the football body FIFA came to enhance a sense of this spread and the functioning within. However, decisive for the acceptance to be a platform to display and enhance acceptance of the system and its enlarged geographic space, FIFA needed to incorporate areas outside Europe. In fact, without the so-called developing world, FIFA would not be able to claim and legitimise the 'universal' football rule.

The third chapter argues that FIFA had to take Africa into account as a host to the FIFA World Cup. There, this thesis will show that football was introduced by European powers to suppress Africans in Africa; but in contrast, Africans turned the cultural practice of football against their oppressors. The sport helped to support political consciousness and to realise that the 'universalism' of equal rights was far from practiced by European powers. But while football became an important cultural practice in Africa and a symbol for African self-esteem and emancipation, the new leaders rather came to reproduce the European-given order. Nevertheless, Africa became a central part in the capitalist system's and the football system's 'marketing-characters' as both an ideological and an economic resource. Increased African representation in the world football body FIFA and on international football fields veiled the inequality that was steadily reproduced in the economic reality of the world-system and particularly in that of international football. Still, especially the 'marketing-character' of FIFA had to ensure that its image of that football was organised fairly and equitably. In addition, Africa became an increasingly powerful constituent in FIFA as well as the organiser of a core mode of football production. And finally, South Africa rose to a major power both as an ideological symbol and a politico-economic force in FIFA. Therefore, FIFA had to take an African nation into account as a possible host for the World Cup in order to keep FIFA's 'universal rule'.

The fourth chapter will finally conclude that FIFA was forced to hand out the football World Cup to Africa. FIFA's 'marketing-character' and its claim of 'universal' football rule



was factually threatened. FIFA became more and more a business encounter instead of being the keeper of football's normative principles of fairness and equality. The most powerful constituents in FIFA, such as the European football confederation (UEFA), were focussed on their own interests. Far from a level playing field taking care of African interests, state and industry patronage became dominant in FIFA. This led to a boiling point in FIFA when the 2006 World Cup host decision was made. The FIFA statutes did not allow for any government interference in the decision-making processes of football. But in contrast, Germany's defeat of South Africa in the host decision rooted in the alliance of Germany with national industries and governments represented with members in the FIFA Executive Committee. In addition to national industry leaders, Germany outmanoeuvred South Africa's hopes in an outright bidding war. However, journalistic accounts have revealed information which threatened the unity of FIFA, its image, and the image of the dominant powers within FIFA. In fact, the media had developed into the main (if not only) control institution over activities in the FIFA body. The information deployed in the public discourse in newspapers concerning the decision-making processes in FIFA created a pressure moment which South Africa used for its own advantage. While upholding pressure via the public discourse and the threat of official investigations into corruption within FIFA, it became also clear that the conflicting parties would reconcile and reproduce FIFA's legitimacy as the universal football control institution.

At the same time as FIFA enhanced its legitimacy, also the capitalist world-economy enhanced its legitimacy in favour of the existing hierarchies in the world and to the advantage of the economically dominant powers. Most material profit remains with core nations such as those in Europe, by using peripheral representatives (or leaders) to impose core rule over the rest of the periphery. Nevertheless, the capitalist world-economy is not only driven by economic practices. The material reality remains in need to be legitimised by acceptance of the masses of society. In the end, perception of reality is manipulated for the sake of the well-being of those at the top-end of the capitalist world-economy. Nevertheless, as long as a liberal discourse is upheld by the media as an increasingly important democratic institution in international relations, conflict can be channelled into material peace. The capitalist world-economy – meaning the interplay of the political and the economic – thereby remains a 'naturally' evolving organism guiding processes within its boundaries towards its own enlargement and maintenance through imposing itself on possibly everyone and everything.

Coming to the framework for analysis, the main argument in this first chapter is that international relations are guided by two variables: the political and the economic. To support this thesis, the process that led to an African nation host the FIFA World Cup will be analysed hypothesising that this change in social relations was the perceived alignment of normative principles and economic practice. This first chapter will provide the theoretical framework: Modern World-Systems theory. In advance, the actual problem this thesis is going to investigate will be highlighted, as well as the aims of this thesis. Finally, the research question and the hypothesis of the analysis will be presented. In addition, before the framework and the concepts for the analysis will be outlined, a literature review will outline foregone academic thought on international football relations. Thereby, this thesis clarifies its contribution with new knowledge for theorising on international football relations and sport diplomacy.

## 1.2. Problem to be investigated

The general problem for theorising on international relations remains understanding changes in social interaction with the intention to foresee change (or those perceived as such). In order to help solve this problem, this thesis is going to investigate a specific change in international relations that took place in March 2001 which saw the decision to let an African nation host the 2010 FIFA World Cup. This will be approached by using a qualitative, interpretive methodology. The specific problem of this investigation is to understand this change with the intention to add knowledge to the academic process of theorising international relations. In particular, the world football body *Fédération Internationale de Football Association*, FIFA, decided to let an African nation host the FIFA World Cup. Since the first World Cup in 1930 the football tournament has never been held on the African continent before which makes the decision in favour of Africa an extraordinary change in international relations.

Still, the argument that this change was so extraordinary needs clarification. This implies, asking what football and FIFA means. Furthermore, what does football for Africa mean, and what does Africa mean in world football? And what were the processes which led to an African nation host the World Cup, what historic processes moved (who, why, and how) to this decision? To answer these questions, this thesis will analyse the decision starting from the origins of the football sport to the recent decision by FIFA to stage the 2010 World Cup in Africa.

### 1.3. Aims of the thesis

The main aim of this thesis is to understand the structures and processes of the international football system regarding its economy and its politics in FIFA diplomacy. This will shed light on what predominantly drives football development in the world today: On the one hand, football's normative principles (the political representation embodied in the football sport's ideals of fairness, equality, and universalism) and, on the other hand, the economic practices of the international football system (embodied in economic activities within international football). Thus, this thesis is going to highlight the reciprocal relationship of the two processes. In other words, changes in both political ideals and economic demands shaped changes in the structure of the international football system.

By outlining the interaction of the two mentioned processes at hand (normative principles and economic practice), this thesis will outline two compromising traits of human interaction and how they developed into social interdependences on a global scale. This requires to outlining the interplay of local, regional, and global sport processes, the main agents in international sport relations, and the structures of international football relations from the bottom (international division of labour) to the top (international diplomacy).

### 1.4. Research question and hypothesis

The research question of this paper is: Why did South Africa receive the FIFA World Cup for 2010? This question is posed with *why* instead of *how*, or *who* which emphasises the complexity behind that social occurrence. The hypothesis to answer this question is: FIFA was forced to hand out the World Cup to Africa in order to maintain the view that FIFA represents fairness and equality; which meant that the African World Cup embodied the perceived realignment of normative principles and economic practice. In particular, the thesis here is that social history is the process of the interplay of normative principles and economic practice guiding human individuals to live in a reality that is a political-economy. Finally, the capitalist world-economy as described by the Modern World-Systems theory is our contemporary reality or the world order we live in and are made to adhere to.

### 1.5. Literature review

Elias and Dunning (1971) and Dunning (1971) describe football development from medieval to modern football and detect a transformation of the meaning of sport. The cultural spread of the English Christian-liberalist values was enhanced by football. In fact, football developed into a global culture and shows religious traits (Elias & Dunning, 2003; Pfister, 2002). Much of the older research found, approaches football from a liberalist perspective. In that view, football is the peaceful outplay of conflict to implement and reproduce identities in the form of representational wars ('symbolic dialogue'), as a form of politics which expresses national and international unity and conflict at the same time (Ashworth, 1971; Lowe *et al.*, 1978; Shaw & Shaw, 1978). Still, some Marxist views on sport are also found which say that the reality of sports reflects the contrast to equality and fairness (Stone, 1971, Gruneau, 1983). Generally, sport is a utility by which ruling actors (states and economic leaders) seek to legitimise and uphold a current order, for example supremacy of one state over another. MacPherson *et al.* (1989: 102) go so far as to call sport a form of political propaganda. Politics, economy, and sport are inextricably intertwined where states (politics) seek to promote their own profile as well as protect investment (economy) in sport: "sport becomes a form of cultural capital that is traded along with other capital, such as technology, education, and information" (Nixon & Frey, 1996:276).

More contemporary authors take over a 'globalisation' perspective on football. However, these often combine realist and liberalist views. Nevertheless, these writings admit economic variables as a main motor for international sport and football relations. The state-centric view on international relations is left thereby, and firms (especially multi-national corporations) are emphasised. Still, the cultural aspect overall receives a prominent place in international football relations which neglects that the cultural issues are rooted in economic behaviour. It is said that football is two-faced in character: while it fosters nationalism, racism, and material inequality, the representational practices are dominated by normative principles of equality attached to strategically deployed symbols (Fanizadeh & Pinter, 2002; King, 2004). Nevertheless, power over football has recently shifted (yet not fully) from political to commercial patronage as well as towards 'globalisation' in terms of the interdependency of local, regional, and global structures (Ben-Porat & Ben-Porat, 2004). Football enhances international solidarity through the "de-nationalization of playing styles" or "creolization of fan cultures" (Horne & Manzenreiter, 2004:198). Furthermore, there are also approaches which are closer to a Marxist perspective. Yet, these views rather stay entrenched

in the core-periphery view on football relations, in accordance to dependency theory. Furthermore, a lack in conceptualisation on principle institutions in international football as part of an overarching political-economy has led to blurry simplifications; such as regarding the conceptual use of periphery, core, exploitation, or development (Alegi, 2004; Darby, 2000, 2002, 2006, Sudgen & Tomlinson, 2003:195). Yet, it is clear that “economic disparities between the First World and the Third World impact strongly upon the development of football in Africa and have a direct bearing on its political strength within FIFA”; football is a “symbol of economic and cultural imperialism” (Sudgen & Tomlinson, 2003:195; Darby, 2000:56). More specifically, neo-imperialist practices (particularly by Multi-national corporations (MNCs) backed by states) are legitimised by the linkage of international sport and nation-building whereby a sense of identity at the supra-national level is developed (Houlihan, 1994). And it becomes clear that exploitative structures of the international division of football labour help African football associations and governments “to obtain top international results” (Poli, 2006:289).

Apparently, football is an industrial system which summarises its presentation towards the creation of extraordinary surplus value in the form of the FIFA World Cup. Still, this football show called FIFA World Cup remains a hegemonic firm competing with other firms providing football, yet with the power to reproduce status and legitimisation of nation-states’ identities (Fanizadeh *et al.*, 2002; Spitaler & Wieselberg, 2002). The FIFA World Cup stands at the top-end of a global football industry wherein all actors behave according to economic interests and under commercial pressure to withstand monopolistic intentions (Hödl, 2002). Thereby, young football players of peripheral descent are drawn into an exploitative international division of labour (at times perverted in slave-owner relationships) (Giulianotti, 2002; Dabschek, 2006). In fact, states subordinate themselves to the flourishing of national football economies whereby governments legitimise their power through illogical public spending to host the FIFA World Cup and thereby accepting societal burden (Horne & Manzenreiter, 2004). Football has the power to veil discrepancies of rhetoric and reality as sportsmanship (‘for the good of the game’) is “surrounded by connotations of honor and ethical imperative” (Lowe *et al.*, 1978:x). This thesis will recapitulate that sports was “a lever for diplomacy; that sport was the number one weapon of the outside in its attempt to change apartheid” in South Africa (Lapchick, 1978:371). And this thesis will reframe the international football system as an industry wherein actors seek to accumulate capital and to create supremacy over other actors. To legitimise this, they represent themselves as bodies which reflect ‘universalism’ in the form of normative principles inherent in football as

fairness and equality. Therefore, this thesis will go beyond dependency theory and orthodox Marxist views by highlighting the Modern World-Systems theory as the appropriate framework for analysis into international football.

## 1.6. Framework for analysis

International relations display a system which is global in character and driven by both 'political' and 'economic' considerations. In fact, social interaction today is taking place in a global political-economy. Thus, what needs to be developed now is the understanding of what political and economic means in terms of the social reality of football as well as within the overarching global political-economy. The hypothesis here is that the African host decision was an alignment of the two. World-Systems analysis (from now WSA) seeks to incorporate a global political-economic perspective and will therefore be the theoretical basis for the analysis.

### 1.6.1. World-Systems analysis

The framework whereby this thesis chooses to analyse the international football system is Modern World-Systems theory (from now MWS). MWS is holistic in approach and we see ourselves as a unit of analysis. The main thesis of Modern World-Systems theory is that the currently overarching system is a world-economy and that this system is capitalistic. The historical systems within which humans live (or lived so far) are either a 'minisystem', a 'world-empire', or a 'world-economy'. The difference between these categories is found in the ways in which their economies are organised. In minisystems, the economy is organised by reciprocity "(a sort of direct give and take)". Economies of world-empires function "redistributive[ly] (in which goods went from the bottom of the social ladder to the top to be then returned in part to the bottom)". The world-economy is organised via a "market (in which exchange occurred in monetary forms in a public arena)" (below some examples of these will be given, yet emphasis here rests with the world-economy). Now, the system we live in today is a world-economy. Our world-economy has encountered the whole globe, meaning that all individuals on the globe today live within one world-economy. And finally, this (global) world-economy is the world-economy that has so far prevailed for the longest time, meaning since the 16<sup>th</sup> century (Wallerstein, 2004:16-17).



The reason why this world-economy prevailed for so long and how it managed to encompass all social behaviour around the globe is that it is capitalistic. Capitalist, in this case, means that the system “gives priority to the endless accumulation of capital” (Wallerstein, 2004:24). This is not so much an ideal or a necessity but rather a practice born of the dictates of the economic system bearing the material reality wherein which social life takes place. The unit of analysis is the whole system and all behaviour within is based on this economic intention of ‘endless accumulation of capital’. This is done through modes of production (or production processes) with the intention to create surplus value (or financial profit). The resources to do so are however scarce and therefore undergo a specific form of distribution. Distribution takes place on a market where goods are exchanged according to the principles of demand and supply. There, a good is sold in exchange for monetary value. In addition, goods are exchanged globally and, hence, there is a global market. However, there are also different markets within the global market with particular boundaries to the outside (meaning the rest of the global market). Furthermore, there are different actors which interact with each other defined as principle institutions of the world-economy: markets, competing firms, states competing with each other in an interstate-system, households, classes, and status groups (Wallerstein, 2004:24).

Modern World-Systems theory reduces social interaction to economic behaviour as the basis for all social interactions. In addition, all actors within the system are interdependent. Indeed, the processes within the system are very complex and, naturally, the reduction of social interaction to economic behaviour meets with many critics. Therefore, the following section will now highlight the criticism on MWS. And thereafter, the framework for analysis will be highlighted including a conceptualisation for the analysis in the subsequent chapters.

#### 1.6.2. Criticism on Modern World-Systems theory and overcoming it

This section will now look at the critiques on the structuralist approach taken by Modern World-Systems theory (from now MWS). They claim that MWS steps into a functionalist and determinist trap saying that MWS falls for a teleological fallacy by reasoning occurrences within the capitalist system to be determined by the systems structure and turn determining reality in favour of the system’s reproduction. By the end of this section the ‘structure-agency’ dilemma will be overcome, appreciating the structuralist (or functionalist or determinist) approach to reason occurrences in international football.

The critiques on Modern World-Systems theory (from now MWS) look at the perspective to explaining change which is exemplified in the discussion around the emergence of capitalism. The critics highlight that the transition from feudalism to capitalism in 16<sup>th</sup> century Europe is insufficiently explained by MWS. Favouring endogenous reasons for this change, the exogenous reasoning put forth by MWS is denied by the critics. On the one hand, endogenous reasoning sees “the roots of the transition ... in elements *internal* to the states, specifically in England.” On the other hand, ‘exogenous’ argumentation highlights *external* factors determining the transition, “particularly trade flows” aiming at accumulating surplus on the world-market (Wallerstein, 2004:14).

Wallerstein (2004:19-21) groups the criticism on Modern World-Systems theory (or world-systems analysis, from now WSA) into four different categories. Thereby, he refers to four different schools of thought: nomothetic positivists, orthodox Marxists, state autonomists, and cultural pluralists. First of all, they are all inclined to be against WSA due to its unidisciplinary approach. In fact, WSA criticises the partition of social science into different academic disciplines as intellectually illegitimate. WSA understands history of society as a single analytic frame in respect of the world’s complexity.

‘Nomothetic positivists’ criticise particularly the ‘grand narrative’ and that MWS bases on hypotheses which are not ‘rigorously’ tested. This critique claims that the propositions and thus the methodology of WSA are not disprovable (proving by negating) and therefore invalid. The nomothetic positivists want quantifiable data and say that WSA does not provide for this and has therefore no legitimacy to reduce complex situations to clearly defined and simple variables. However, as Wallerstein points out, WSA is narrative in character in order to understand the complexity of reality. And quantification as a methodological tool is surely used – where necessary.

The other three categories of critique are somewhat similar to each other as they all claim their own unit of analysis as the only true starting point from which to conduct social research. Whereas ‘orthodox Marxism’ wants a sole focus on the system’s modes of production relationships, the state-autonomists claim that particularly political life must not be reduced to being only determined by economic variables. In their view, the motivations that govern political decisions regarding behaviour of the state as well as behaviour between states (in an interstate-system) ‘are autonomous and respond to pressures other than behaviour in the market’. Finally, with the rise of the various ‘post’-concepts linked to cultural studies, as Wallerstein (2004:21) puts it, world-systems analysis has been attacked with arguments analogous to those used by the state-autonomists. Therein, WSA is said to create a



superstructure which subordinates the cultural sphere under economic behaviour without respecting “the central and autonomous reality of the cultural sphere” (Wallerstein, 2004:21). Thus, all of these three criticise the unit of analysis defending the centrality of their particular unit of analysis, respectively the mode of production (class-struggle), state (politics), and culture (individual value frame). The weakness of these critiques is that they contradict the necessity of researching society as a totality – thus within one single unit – in order to theorise on reality as a complex total.

Critique by ‘orthodox Marxists’ focuses on that Modern World-Systems theory says that ‘non-wage labour’ is very seldom. Yet, MWS does not say that such exchange (or non-wage labour) does not take place. It only says that wage-labour is the dominant form of labour in the system and non-wage labour is understood to cease in existence because it is limited in accumulating capital. The other particular critique by orthodox Marxism is that the discussion in MWS on the core-peripheral division of labour is ‘circulationist’ and neglects the ‘productionist base of surplus value’. And thereby, MWS is said to not give the class struggle between bourgeoisie (owners of capital) and proletariat (workers or direct producers) centrality in explaining change.

Before overcoming this critique here, the concept of a core-peripheral division of labour needs clarification. There are different ways of creating surplus value which means different modes of production. However, some modes of production become outmoded and are exchanged by innovative modes of production. The new mode of production is taken over because it can generate more surplus value. The reason therefore is that, through time, the old mode of production becomes known to more producers. In addition, the innovative (or core) mode of production is a quasi-monopoly enforced by a state, for example through a patent system. On the other side, the old (or peripheral) mode of production is rather free-market. More organisers of production start to supply a similar good which leads to a decrease in price (taken the condition that the demand for that good remains on the same level). On the search for greater financial profits the innovative (or core) form of production is taken over, which is generally more knowledge and capital intensive, i.e. it needs investment into knowledge (higher educated human resources for management or the production process) or new machinery (necessary to produce the new product or to substitute respectively increase effectiveness of workers in order to reduce costs). MWS generalises that the old mode of production is more labour intensive (like sewing cloths) and the innovative mode of production is more knowledge and capital intensive (like producing computer chips). In a nutshell, the new mode of production substitutes the old mode of production and the old mode

is shifted to other areas where labour is cheaper and does not have the education ready for the innovative mode of production. This shift produces two different areas called 'core zone' or 'core' (where the new production is processed) and 'peripheral zone' or 'periphery' (taking over the old mode of production). This represents a division of labour with an axis that sees core on the one side and periphery on the other side. Importantly, the concepts of core and periphery refer to the polarisation of modes of production and the *concentration* of these in particular zones. And only this concentration of either core or peripheral modes of production gives a zone or a state the definition to be either core or peripheral.

Now, to claim (as orthodox Marxists do) that MWS does not take into consideration the 'productionist base of surplus value' is obviously void. With regards to the critique of 'circularism' done by MWS, one must acknowledge that the product produced by the old mode of production may still be demanded in the market of the area with the new mode of production. Therefore, the produce made in the 'periphery' (defined by the mode of production) by means of the old (or peripheral) mode of production is transported to the 'core' (where innovative products are produced) for selling it on the market there. (In fact, this distinction might start within a city and then develop towards the distinction between continents, always referring to the concentration of peripheral or core modes of production.) The exchange value will then be transferred back to the peripheral area. However, production processes may also include both peripheral and core modes of production that form a value chain (see example in the following paragraph). In addition, peripheral areas might also demand products produced by core production processes (the innovative production). There we find circularism, yet not with regards to argumentation or methodology but with regards to empirical processes.

To exemplify this (in the words of the author of this thesis), the production of a car shall be split into two (extremely) simplified processes: generating steel and putting steel onto four wheels. Formerly, the core production included the generation of steel that is exploiting ore from the ground and process steel by heat. The innovation was to put that steel onto four wheels and the knowledge behind it was to know where to put the wheels (at the bottom and not on the top of the steel) which then created the innovative product: a car. Another area was found where steel could also be generated and labour was cheap because it did not have anything else to create income (surplus value for the household). However, the peripheral mode of production allows for less profit than the core mode of production. But in order to introduce a core mode of production capital investment is needed. Because the peripheral area remains with less profitable production processes it is almost impossible to establish a core

mode of production in the periphery. Finally, the workers in core modes of production have a more secure income (protection of a quasi-monopoly by the state) and receive higher salaries than those in peripheral modes of production. On the other side, peripheral modes of production in alliance with the state seek to export their products (mostly raw material) in order to gain a bigger share in surplus value. Workers of those peripheral production processes are therefore split between core and periphery. Solidarity beyond these boundaries of complexes is not likely due to this systemic or structural competition.

The critics of MWS look at internal factors rather than external factors to be decisive for change in terms of the origin (transition from feudalism to capitalism in 16<sup>th</sup> century Europe) as well as the central dynamics of the capitalist world-economy. This critique particularly concerns the interstate-system within the capitalist world-economy. To counter these critiques, Arrighi (2006) refers to two ‘non-debates’. The first non-debate is *The Skocpol-Brenner-Wallerstein non-debate* as Theda Skocpol (1977) and Robert Brenner (1976) were associated with the dominant critical stand-points in favour of endogenous reasoning. Wallerstein (2004) categorises Skocpol (as well as the prominent critique by Aristide Zolberg) as ‘state-autonomist’ and Brenner as ‘orthodox Marxist’. In the eyes of Skocpol, Wallerstein’s explanations suffer from a two-step reduction: “first, a reduction of socio-economic structure to determination by world market opportunities and technological production possibilities; and second, a reduction of state structures and policies to determination by dominant class interests” (1977:1078-1079). In her critique on the origins of the capitalist system (or the transition from feudalism to capitalism in late medieval and early modern Europe), Skocpol (1977:1083) actually cites Brenner’s interpretation of feudal agrarian class relations, who said:

[E]conomic backwardness ... can only be fully understood as the product of established structures of class relations (particularly “surplus extraction relations”), just as economic development can only be fully understood as the outcome of the emergence of new class relations more favourable to new organization of production, technical innovations, and increasing levels of productive investment. These new class relations were themselves the result of previous, relatively autonomous processes of class conflict (Brenner, 1976:36-37).

Brenner (1976:56) claims that the “peasant’s class” in late medieval Europe was able to institutionalise power in order to resist “seigneurial” (or landlords’) pressure. “As one historian of the Germany peasantry has stated, ‘without the strong development of communal life in (west) Germany, the peasant wars (of 1525) are unthinkable’” (Brenner, 1976:58). Internal

dynamics of negotiation between formations of power (peasants versus landlords) are here seen as the root cause for structural change. Yet, Brenner admits particular claims made by Wallerstein: First, the 16<sup>th</sup> century saw the full development of trade. However, this rather mirrored the dynamic which divided the organisation of production and direct producers from market-independent access to means of reproduction. The division which turned land and workforce into goods was not caused by exchange only (Brenner, 1983:99). Second, it is a fact that the rise in population in some countries called for more grain imports and better distribution of nutrition. The Baltic states or the Mediterranean region became exporters for Amsterdam. In turn, the growth of grain production for the world-market depended on different systems of work control in the particular regions. Brenner admits a feudal crisis in the landlords' production and income to have been a decisive threshold. But he emphasises that this was the result of changes in class relationships and class conflicts (Brenner, 1983:100-101). However, Brenner then steps into a trap when looking at interstate competition. Brenner admits a rise in grain exports to the core (e.g. from the Baltic regions to Amsterdam) as well as that the core created luxury goods for the feudal landlords in Eastern Europe. But is wrong what Brenner (1983:104) then says: industrial products only played a small role in the development of the work forces.

When looking at the structural development of the work forces, Brenner himself highlights 'feudal needs'. In comparable to the 14<sup>th</sup> century, the 17<sup>th</sup> reflected a feudal crisis which stemmed from the investment into extra-economic goods of luxury and warfare. To claim these goods being extra-economic is void. Still, he appears to be right in his analysis that the then non-capitalist European agriculture was not investing (or reinvesting) accumulated capital to enhance the mode of agrarian production. The rising competition and the military expenditure by feudal landlords met with the stagnating productivity by farmers. So what happened was that the landlords increased pressure on farmers without acknowledging that they could not produce more. Thus, Wallerstein's (1978) definition of the crisis as an "overproduction" was rather a crisis of an absolute lack of produce. The prices did not fall but rise (Brenner, 1983:106).

Obviously, the lack of capitalist managers in feudalism led to a competition over existing resources rather than a reorganisation of production towards innovative modes of production. In addition, the building up of capacities to counter increased military competition from outside firmly grounded on market-generated capital as well as industrial manufacture of state-of-the-art weaponry – both rather from the outside than from within states. Here we get to the point of Skocpol's and Brenner's critiques regarding the origin of different strengths of

states which were to become decisive for hierarchy as well as the unequal exchange between states in the interstate-system. In their view, MWS reasons teleologically in saying that this inequality occurred by chance (Brenner, 1983:96).

Here we get to the second *non-debate* described by Arrighi (2006): The *Wallerstein-Braudel non-debate*. In fact, WSA can appreciate a particular critique by Brenner (1983). Highlighting Sella (1977) Brenner (1983:90) sees two world-economies existing already before the capitalist system: the city-states of northern Italy and those of Flanders and Northern Germany. Furthermore, he identifies Northern Italy, the Rheinland, and Flanders as the core, France and the rest of Germany as the semi-periphery, and England, Sicily and the regions of the Black Sea the periphery. Furthermore, Brenner (1983:89) claims a division of labour and specialisation in modes of production to have already existed before the emergence of the capitalist system: England exported wool, France exported wine, Sicily and the Krim specialised on grain, Cyprus on sugar and cotton, and Northern Italy and Flanders on cloth. Individual trade beyond borders was eminent but not imperial (Brenner, 1983:89).

Fernand Braudel was able to combine his analyses on Mediterranean city-states with MWS's core-periphery analysis. Importantly, the capitalist world-economy was "not the first world-economy, but the first economy to survive as such for a long period and thrive, and it did this precisely by becoming fully capitalist." In addition to this, the concept of core-periphery must be understood as a "relational concept, not a pair of terms that ... have separate meanings" (Wallerstein, 2004:17):

[T]he answer lay in the degree to which particular processes were relatively monopolized or relatively free market. The relatively monopolized were far more profitable than those that were free market. This made the countries in which more core-like processes located wealthier. And given the unequal power of monopolized products vis-à-vis products with many producers in the market the ultimate result of exchange between core and peripheral products was a flow of surplus-value (meaning here a large part of the real profits from multiple local productions) to those states that had a large number of core-like processes (Wallerstein, 2004:18).

Therefore, Braudel called the capitalist system the "anti-market" and far from a free market. And finally, Braudel's concept of a structural time, *longue durée* (of the modern world-system), as well as his "insistence on the multiplicity of social times became essential to world-systems analysis" (Wallerstein, 2004:18). The structural time for the unit of analysis means that the capitalist world-system does not claim eternal truth but rather a certain life-span with a beginning, a life in which it 'develops', and an end (or "terminal transitions").



Still, the diverging level of states' strength needs to be clarified. Due to a lack of space, it can only be shortly defined what "by chance" actually means. The evolvement of innovative modes of production remains a precondition for the inter-state system to have occurred. And this move for innovation, in fact, rooted in an evolutionary human process which goes far back in time regarding the origin of humanity as well as migration of peoples. England's development of strength serves as a good example. Brenner (1976) shows England's internal transition from feudalism to capitalism, i.e. the move towards an internal division of labour between regions within England. Such an early level of capitalist economic structuring was, however, conditioned by the geographic position of England on an island. On the one hand, this enabled a rather autarkic societal development, e.g. less disturbances such as the pandemic religious wars on mainland Europe. On the other hand, this geographic position predestined the early advance of England as a naval power, in fact overtaking the United-Provinces in the capacity to allow for secure long-distance overseas trade. Now, specifically the securitisation of such long distance trade was defining the hierarchy within the interstate-system. Brenner explained, as pointed out above, internal feudalist production relations did not allow for increased accumulation of capital – but the world-market did.

Brenner points out that 'power is not a good' and that the control over work is an aspect of the relationships between classes (Brenner, 1983:97). However, power is a good in terms of supplying enforcement of one interest over another. Taxes on surplus created by innovative production processes are demanded by the state in return for security. Therefore, the different states had built huge bureaucracies in order to organise taxation (a part of the surplus created by households and firms). However, households and foremost firms were only willing to pay taxes if the state gave something in return, mainly infrastructure (e.g. education and a transport system, necessities to allow for the smooth running of production processes and selling products) and security (securing property within states and also securing transportation of goods to other markets, e.g. against pirates that targeted shipping lines in the practice of long-distance trade). This meant that the state guaranteed with a monopoly on exercising force. Thereby the state was able to uphold security of property – including life and creating rule of law to ensure the functioning of market exchange – internally and externally, with military force (for external business encounters by large firms seeking for resources to endlessly accumulate capital). Hence, dominant bureaucracies to allocate taxation (in order to provide with security guarantees and infrastructure) emerged at the end of the 15<sup>th</sup> century in the 'new monarchies' in England, France and Spain – just at the onset of the modern world-system. After the 30-years-war, most European powers (or states) came to an agreement to

settle their conflicts in the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. This institutionalised Renaissance diplomacy had developed on the Italian peninsula. The Peace regulated interstate relations with rules to set limits to, and allocate guarantees of 'relative autonomy' of individual states. These rules were later expanded in the form of international law. Importantly for the definition of states, was that each sought to centralise structures to subordinate regional power under state authority.

And they sought to ensure this by strengthening (really by creating) a civil and military bureaucracy. Most crucially, they sought to give themselves strength by securing some significant taxing powers with enough personnel actually to collect the taxes (Wallerstein, 2004:42).

Fernand Braudel (1984) emphasised the long-distance trade and high finance regarding Renaissance city-states of the Mediterranean (today mainly the area of northern Italy) and emphasised them as 'centres of gravity' and 'organising centres'. From 1350 until 1650 they were defeated in the 'intercapitalist competitive struggle' by the European world-economy. For Arrighi (2006:6-7) the focus is "on how a world-economy centred on city-states was transformed into a world-economy centred on territorial states and, in the process, expanded its tentacles to encompass the entire globe" (Arrighi, 2006:6-7). Importantly, despite domination and subordination the states came to meet up and agree on respecting each others existence – 'sovereignty'. What was necessary therefore was the agreement on specific norms, in fact, universal principles.

Obviously, there were different European world-economies as well as world-empires before the emergence of the capitalist world-economy (or modern world-system). The Italian city-states and their long-distance trade were mentioned. In addition, there were also 'longer' distance trade by the Hanseatic cities regarding North- and Baltic Seas, and also that of the Spanish Empire (later Habsburg and including the area of the Netherlands) which garnered wealth by overseas exploitation of resources. And also the emergence of the United Provinces (around Holland's trading power) as the first hegemon of the capitalist system after the 30-years war and the instalment of the interstate-system in the peace of Westphalia had a distinct back-up: What had always legitimised power (and does so today) was culture. It provided for the sense of subordination to rule and order. In most instances, religion was the dominant culture (or cultural practice). Concerning the Italian city-states, the Spanish Empire, or the Roman Empire of German nations, the Roman-Catholic Church was the legitimising force. Also the emergence of the capitalist world-economy stood in timely correlation with the emancipation of a counter religion to Catholicism, namely Protestantism. Religious wars

paved the way for a decisive belief-system: secularisation. This psychological transition from believing in a God-given order towards believing in a worldly hierarchy as a derivative of the struggle over endless accumulation of capital was the real transformation of the world-economy into a capitalist world-economy. Such formation of a normative value-system took place in the individuals' minds. Today, culture (including their normative principles) is found in the form of arts and fine arts (which used to be ruled by churches) and massively implemented in the minds of people through media of the entertainment industry such as literature, music, movies, or sports. In fact, the hegemonic culture today is found in the dominance of a consumer culture. In this sense, football is a cultural practice at the same time as it is a good to be consumed.

Which culture came to succeed was rooted in economic competition whereby the critique by 'cultural-pluralists' was overcome. Culture is the societal accumulation of individuals' reactions. These are derived from psychological processes wherein information penetrates the cognitive processes of individuals. What information penetrates minds, is rooted and guided by the economically (and thus politically) dominant elite. In order to understand an elite's supremacy, the concept of hegemony will clarify the power of a specific culture. Importantly, the states were to legitimise rule over people within a geographic area by internal cultural hegemony. And this brought about the 'nation-states' as nationhood where the sense of belonging and identity by which to legitimise monopoly on force over people then called 'nationals' or 'citizens'. Thus, the cultural sense of nation-hood rooted in the military struggle over securing resources and capitalist producers against other 'nation-states'. This shows the relational character of 'nation' as it is defined by being different from other 'nations'.

This nationalist character of ruling over people within particular boundaries derived from forcefully ensuring market exchange and access to resources including human resources (as workers as well as consumers). Now, a producer (and then seller of products) prefers a monopoly "for then they can create a relatively wide margin between the costs of production and the sales price, and thus realize high rates of profit" (seeking for an endless accumulation of capital). Real monopolies are rare because "one producer's monopolistic advantage is another producer's loss. The losers will of course struggle politically to remove the advantages of the winner" (Wallerstein, 2004:26). In the end, 'quasi-monopolies' and oligopolies (several producers with a combined monopoly on producing and selling a specific product) are created. A mode of production seeks securitisation of being the only one to produce and sell a specific product in order to increase surplus value. There are different ways



to achieve this, for example through patents (a exclusionist system enforced by the state) which reserves knowledge on a new mode of production (“invention”). Other examples are state imposed restrictions “on imports and exports (so-called protectionist measures), or subsidies and tax benefits as tools by a state to support modes of production and selling products (to enhance their monopolistic status). This reflects the respective search for endless accumulation of capital by the state through securing surplus value for capitalists.

Obviously, state and firm follow the same logic as both seek endless accumulation of capital through the reciprocal reinforcement of state power and business monopoly. However, firms are able to choose between different states according to which state can guarantee the utmost security or offer subsidies and other incentives to allow for more surpluses for the firm. Therefore, states compete in attracting firms to subordinate themselves to the power of the state. In contrast, in a world-empire capitalists could not choose between political powers and would be overridden by political interests. “Capitalists need a large market (hence minisystems are too narrow for them) but they also need a multiplicity of states, so that they can gain the advantages of working with states but also can circumvent states hostile to their interests in favor of states friendly to their interests. Only the existence of a multiplicity of states within the overall division of labor assures this possibility” (Wallerstein, 2004:24). Different rulers attempted to establish world-empires, like Charles V in the mid-17<sup>th</sup> century, Napoleon at the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, and Hitler in the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century. They failed in their attempts to create a structure with “a single political authority for the whole world-system” precisely because capitalists supported the multiplicity of states (or political authorities).

However, there were political powers (or states) which achieved hegemony or became temporary hegemons of the world-economy. This means that “for a certain period of time, they were able to establish the rules of the game in the interstate system, to dominate the world-economy (in production, commerce, and finance), to get their way politically with a minimal use of military force (which they however had in ample strength), and to formulate the cultural language with which one discussed the world” (Wallerstein, 2004:58). So far, three hegemonic powers have emerged: in the mid-17<sup>th</sup> century the United Provinces (today known as the Netherlands), in the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century the United Kingdom, and in the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century the United States. Central to this thesis is Wallerstein’s clarification of the ‘cultural’ that went along hegemonic rule within the capitalist world-economy:

Was there no place for ideas, values, science, art, religion, language, passion, and color?

Of course there was, for cultures are the ways in which people clothe their politico-

economic interests and drives in order to express them, hide them, extend them in space and time, and preserve their memory. ... How could there not be a cultural expression of hegemony? Core powers often dominate peripheral areas, imposing a sense of inferiority on people regarding their own culture; ... but cultures are precisely arenas where resistance to hegemony occurs, where appeals are made to the historical values of established 'civilizations' against the temporary superiorities of the market. This is true today and was no less true in the seventeenth century (Wallerstein, 1980:65).

This reduction of culture into a politico-economic variable is very important for the thesis presented here. In addition, the understanding of "development" also becomes clearer: On the one hand, it means to take over new or innovative forms of production. This shows a form of historic tradition wherein material processes – innovative (new) modes of production shift old modes of production (Time) to another area (Space) causing an axial division of labour. On the other hand, hegemonic cycles cause a "development" of culture whereby a tradition of norms evolves according to the value frame necessary for the capitalist system to function. These include, for example, voting rights, a minimum wage, or the abolishment of child labour and to emphasise on education. Wallerstein claims this normative tradition to have evolved into a geoculture understood today as "universalism". In the following section, this chapter will highlight more thoroughly what universalism means. In short, it is the value-system which rooted in Christian teachings and which evolved towards what is known today as 'liberalism'.

Finally, this section is to define hegemony regarding normative patterns within states as well as in the system as a whole. Although he returns to the state as the prime actor, Cox (1987) must still be highlighted in this regard, specifically his view on the historic bloc:

At any time, concentrations of forces tend to maintain the system's structure. Disturbances in any one part can be counteracted by mobilizing strength from other parts of the system. Yet change is possible and does happen. Change can occur at all levels – in production relations, in class relations, in the emergence of new historic blocs and of alternative forms of state, and in the structure of world order (Cox, 1987:8).

Cox's definition of historic bloc and hegemony refers to class relations within states. However, he misses out on the fact that it is a system-wide phenomenon. The liberal ideology served the system as a whole. The point made by Sklair (1997) and Robinson (2005) is that both states' and capitalist elites can be summoned into the transnational capitalist class (TCC). In order to understand the system as people driven rather than systemic and deterministic, Cox highlights the Gramscian sense of hegemony whereby "[t]he extraction of

surplus flows from the subordinate and weaker levels of production to the dominant and stronger” (Cox, 1987:5). This is to overcome the so-called structure-agency dilemma. Nevertheless, what Skocpol (1977: 1080) highlights as the “historically pre-existing institutional patterns, threats of rebellion from below, and geopolitical pressures and constraints” is a system-wide phenomenon. Global capitalism is a vulnerable social system that is in constant stress to “reproduce its hegemonic order globally” via “large numbers of local, national, international and global organisations” (Sklair, 1997:514-515). While Cox stresses the importance of the historic bloc, Sklair makes clear that block formation convenes “the *transnational corporation*, the characteristic institutional form of economic transnational practices, a still-evolving *transnational capitalist class* (TCC) in the political sphere, and the *culture-ideology of consumerism* in the culture-ideology sphere” (Sklair, 1997:520). Overcoming Cox’s (and Gramsci’s) state-centric view, Sklair (1997:521) makes clear that the four main fractions of the TCC today are the actual system maintainers: Transnational corporation (TNC) executives, globalizing bureaucrats, globalizing politicians and professionals, consumerist elites (merchants and media) – including institutions such as teachers or professors, profession in and ownership of media, and also think-tanks. Individuals are interchangeable between these fractions and key individuals are in fact found in more than one of these fractions at the same time. Looking at globalisation today, Robinson clarifies that “Globalisation is not a ‘national’ project but a class project without a national strategy, or rather, with a strategy that seeks to utilise the existing political infrastructure of the nation-state system” (Robinson, 2005:11). When taking the internal ideological hegemony to the international scale, it is the power by a particular state dominating the interstate-system, the hegemon, to enforce this ideology in the system as a whole, serving the system-wide elite, the transnational capitalist class.

Hegemonic powers (including their cultural impetus for the system) rise and thereafter fall (due to the competition between states) which Wallerstein calls cyclical rhythms of a world-economy (or hegemonic cycles). Thereby he refers to Kondratieff-waves which are about fifty to sixty years long and which include two system-wide macro-economic phases: expansion (A-phase) followed by stagnation or contraction (B-phase). In an A-phase the world-economy expands due to economic growth of ‘quasi-monopolistic leading industries’ (backed by political rule). The subsequent B-phase lowers the intensity of quasi-monopolies’ which thrive and the world-economy stagnates and contracts. The A-phase goes along the line of inventing a new mode of production and its flourishing due to its profitability as a monopoly or quasi-monopoly. In the B-phase, however, major production processes become

less profitable. Producers start to reduce costs by lowering wage levels or by relocating production to zones where labour is less costly (peripheralisation). “Meanwhile, there is increasing unemployment in core zones, and this affects global effective demand” which finally leads to a chaotic situation. States increasingly influence the market variables of demand and supply, unemployment leads to households’ diminution of consumption strength, and firms lose their consumer base. States become unable to provide for social guarantees and foster national identification to legitimise their power. The hegemon loses its military-economic strength and creates a power vacuum which other states seek to fill. Ultimately a major (world) war breaks out. The hierarchy in the interstate-system (balance of power) is redrawn as every single nation-state seeks to achieve hegemony (or fill the power vacuum left by the declined hegemon). In the history of the capitalist world-economy, this happened three times and therefore, MWS talks of three world wars.

The first was the 30-years-war after which the United provinces became hegemonic. The second was the Napoleonic wars (in aggregate) at the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century after which the United Kingdom emerged as hegemon. And the third was the aggregate of wars commonly known as the First and the Second World War at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century after which the USA became the hegemon. In addition, the end of a hegemonic cycle does not mean that history restarts from where the hegemonic cycle had begun or that the end of a B-phase means the beginning of the A-phase. The new A-phase is different from the previous A-phase meaning that the redrawing of the interstate-system’s hierarchy underwent the significant change from one hegemon to a new hegemon (another state). Now, in the eyes of MWS, there are many different cultures. Yet, there is one culture that normally dominates the system. During a hegemonic cycle, one state (the hegemon) was able to prominently infiltrate other cultures, either causing a mix or a full incorporation of the hegemonic culture and value system. Culture in terms of norms and values undergoes an evolution towards one common culture, ‘universalism’, which is dominant.

### 1.6.3 Conceptualisation of Universalism regarding football

“The complex relationships of the world-economy, the firms, the states, the households, and the trans-household institutions that link members of classes and status-groups are beset by two opposite – but symbiotic – ideological themes” (Wallerstein, 2004:38). This is the modern world-systems ‘universalism’ and it is essential for the capitalist system to function. According to Wallerstein (2004:38), it reflects the “priority to general rules applying equally



to all persons, and therefore the rejection of particularistic preferences in most spheres” such as racism or sexism, or the supremacy of one group of people over another. Wallerstein (2004:39) claims that “active institutional discrimination” is practiced on a day-to-day basis against particular identities whereby social rankings are produced (which happens everywhere on the globe). The examples Wallerstein (2004:39) puts forth are: “men over women, Whites over Blacks (or non-Whites), adults over children (or the aged), educated over less educated, heterosexuals over gays and lesbians, the bourgeois and professionals over workers, urbanities over rural dwellers.” We find rankings between ethnic groups and between religions. And nationalism defines a specific group as “true” nationals, for example, “adult White heterosexual males of particular ethnicities and religions” (Wallerstein, 2004:39).

In the world of sport, these distinctions are also reinforced, no less so than in global football. Hence, the decision to have an African state host the 2010 Cup sought to undo the perception of hierarchical divisions, especially between the formerly colonised African states and the European colonisers. In doing so, football could be more readily claimed to be ‘universal’. However, a holistic and historical analysis is necessary to illustrate how this came about. Only through a historical analysis for that phenomenon through the modern world-system framework can the decision to allow Africa to host the 2010 World Cup be understood.

This thesis argues that the FIFA decision to let an African nation host the FIFA World Cup, was driven by both economic practices and normative principles. These Normative principles refer to the norms that are represented in football sport: “fair play” (regarding behaviour during a football match) and “for the good of the game” (regarding the way football is organised in the confines of FIFA diplomacy). It is important to understand these concepts (or rather their marketing claims) within the historical legacy whereby these norms came to be accepted as good and legitimate. There were two preconditions: first, the emergence of Liberalism as the basis for the system’s geoculture as well as the emergence of the legitimising processes in modern society. And second, this universalism had to be incorporated and ‘lived’ in the cultural practice of football and its organisation. The sociologist, philosopher, and psycho-analyst, Erich Fromm (1979), provides a good understanding of what Wallerstein (2004) came to define as the evolution of a ‘geoculture’.

According to Fromm, the modern normative principles (the ‘religion of the industrial age’) were rooted in the Christianisation of peoples within the world-system. Christian based humanism emerged in the Renaissance and took over the (utopian) mysticism of writers of the 12<sup>th</sup> and 13<sup>th</sup> centuries. The norms included: all are equal before God (God-given order),

people must not be used as economic tools by others without being righteously awarded (meritocracy), and the state has the moral obligation to uphold Christian values of equality and justice (Fromm, 1979:135). The actual start of the industrial age's religion started with Martin Luther's religious protest (Protestantism versus Catholic Church). The Catholic Church preached 'universal' norms but its leaders did not adhere to these norms themselves. However, as Fromm (1979:139-141) puts it, this protest meant to ban the thought of 'unconditional love' (or motherly love) and paved the way for 'conditional love' (fatherly love or meritocracy); thus away from mercy, feeling, and nature towards justice, thinking, and intellect. Behind a 'Christian façade' a 'new secret religion' emerged and instead of Christianity's original values, 'it reduced humans to servants of the economy' (similar to what the famous sociologist Max Weber defined as protestant work ethic):

The religion of the industrial age is based on a new society-character which's core consisted of the following elements: Angst before mighty masculine authority and suppression there under, creating feelings of guilt in those who would not obey, dissolution of the linkages of human solidarity through the regency of self-interest and mutual antagonism. 'Holy' in the religion of the industrial age is work, property, profit and power although – in the borders of their general principles – they also fostered individualism and personal freedom. By transformation of Christianity into a patriarchal religion it was possible to dress the religion of industrial age with Christian terminology (Fromm, 1979:141).

In advance of industrialisation, humanist values of medieval times flourished again at the hand of the movement of Enlightenment in the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> century. This flourishing mounted in the outplay of tension between higher (oppressing) and lower (suppressed) classes of society at hand of the French Revolution. It displayed a political revolution taking place just like a religious revolution: like Islam or the Protestant revolt, it crossed borders and flooded countries and people and spread through preaching and propaganda (Fromm, 1979:139).

However, the movement for individual freedom represented in the French Revolution only lasted shortly. The French Revolution was led into a 'reign of terror' (in France) by the *ancien regime* and gave rise to the ideology of conservatism. As a form of a 'counter-revolution', conservatism preached 'acute caution' and meant that any kind of social change would have to take place within the confines of established institutions and guided by 'responsible people'. The main institution to restore and maintain the authority of the traditional institutions was the 'hierarchical, patriarchal family structure'. Yet, they sought to

limit education to the elites and believed that inequality between classes was God-given. This principle channelled (French) society towards the regime by Napoleon Bonaparte who

transposed its universalistic self-assurance and missionary zeal into French imperial expansion justified by revolutionary heritage. Politically, conservative ideology was on the rise everywhere after 1794, and presumably ensconced in power after Napoleon's defeat in 1815 in a Europe dominated by the Holy Alliance. Those who thought that any return to the ancient regime was both undesirable and impossible had to regroup and develop a counter-ideology. This counter-ideology came to be called liberalism (Wallerstein, 2004:61-62).

In fact, the French Revolution at the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century was, as Wallerstein (2004:60) puts it, "a turning-point in the cultural history of the modern world-system". Two fundamental changes emerged as the basis of the world-system's 'geoculture': "the normality of political change and the refashioning of the concept [of] sovereignty" (Wallerstein, 2004:60). Sovereignty was installed by the fact that people were called 'citizens' with inclusive universal rights. However, practice showed that 'citizenship' actually excluded many people and a debate started on the line between inclusion and exclusion. This debate took place

*"within the framework of a geoculture that proclaimed the inclusion of all as the definition of the good society. This political dilemma was fought out in three different arenas – the ideologies, the antisystemic movements, and the social sciences"* (Wallerstein, 2004:60).

According to Wallerstein, an ideology is more than a set of ideas or theories, and more than a moral commitment or a worldview. It is "a coherent strategy in the social arena from which one can draw quite specific political conclusions." This ideology is directly associated with the idea of 'normality of change' and that the responsibility for it rested with 'citizens', was adopted as the basic structural principles for political institutions.

As a result of the struggle between conservatism and liberalism our contemporary geoculture came to be born through the prevalence of liberal thinking: it was a transformation from humanist thought to "the only theoretical basis of practical knowledge, science" (Wallerstein, 2004:63). Replacing theology and philosophy (thus the transcendental reason for order) started the "path for material and technological progress and hence for moral progress" including specialisation on all levels (including scientific fields). In 1848, a "world revolution" or "social revolution" took place. Political parties were formed and fostered liberalist institutional conduct on conflict. In addition, suppressed classes and status-groups achieved more rights such as legalisation of trade unions, extension of suffrage, or the

beginnings of a welfare state. The French Revolution's punch-line of 'liberty, equality, and fraternity' became introduced as public policy. This created 'citizens' as members of a 'nation-state' (representing the constructed national as the dominant status-group) which sought for their protection enclosure into one 'nation' or 'nation-state'. Workers and peasants were to attend primary school in order to educate them of their 'national duties'. However, racism played an ever greater part in 'civilisation' practices by the state. Imperial conquests were renewed and in 1914 nationalism led to full subordination by all citizens to state rule forcing them into a major war (Wallerstein, 2004:63, 66-67).

Still, universalism is rather used to create a form of 'normalisation' by exclusion in terms of including a specific status-group (or identity). Hence, the norms of universalism are perceived differently regarding different spheres of life (or rather when applied to the different principle institutions). Regarding firms or schools, "it means for example the assigning of persons to positions on the basis of their training and capacities" (thus according to merit = meritocracy). Looking at households: for example, "marriage should be contracted for reasons of 'love' but not those of wealth or ethnicity". On the state level, it means for example universal suffrage and equality before the law. Universalism is a "positive norm" and has become "the official gospel of modernity" despite the fact that "negative norms" or "anti-universalism" are eminent in society (Wallerstein, 2004:38-40).

In football, this 'universalism' is represented in its rules, including normative principles of fairness and equality. In addition, the use of force (in terms of tackling an opponent) is sanctioned as a foul or even with the exclusion from the field. The establishment of 'Association Football' emerged just when liberalism (in terms of meritocracy and peaceful negotiation of interests and change) emerged as a political ideal. The establishment of association football achieved by agreement amongst representatives of the English elite including those from English ruled national-geographic zones such as Scotland, Wales, and Ireland. Despite the fact that it was a masculine focussed order, it implied the universal relevance of the rules of the football game beyond state borders, classes, religions, other status-groups, thus including all households.

The concept of fairness is *the* universal norm of contemporary social interaction. This is explicitly so when looking at John Rawls (2003) definition of political liberalism by conceptualising justice as fairness. The idea of fair social cooperation is derived from rational thinking and bases on the condition of mutual benefit. Modern society is to follow a constructivist approach in order to manifest fair conditions for social cooperation, the way



principles of justice are agreed on by representatives of free and equal citizens in a fair situation (Rawls, 2003:178).

It is important to realise that the conception of the person is part of a political and social conception of justice; i.e. it describes how citizens shall view themselves and one another in their political and social relations, ... as ... lifelong and unlimited cooperative members of a society (Rawls, 2003:495-496).

The fairness ideal in football is promoted by organisers of football and made (more or less) accessible to the general public. In fact, there is a reciprocal relationship between the system-wide universalism and the normative principles of football. This is particularly so regarding the incongruence of material and chance inequality on the one hand and its realignment to promoting fairness and equality on the other. This defines change in the reality of sport and sport diplomacy. The utopian ideals of the liberal ideology were transferred into the sport and were concerned with the “openness of the ranking system”. This openness or fair equality is “ideally only depending on performance” (meritocracy as a precondition for football on the playing field). In turn, this intends to guarantee “a degree of legitimacy of the system which is not existent to such an extent in the class system” (Lüschen, 1976:66-67).

To understand this implementation of norms in society through football, the concept of identification is essential. Central to modern social history is the notion of universalism as being either excluded or included.

The most important key to understand both the character-structure as well as the secret religion of today's society is the transformation which took place in the society-character between early capitalism and the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The authorial-constrained-hoarding character which started to establish itself in the 16<sup>th</sup> century and which predominated at least in the middle-class until the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century blended itself with the *marketing-character* or was ousted by it (Fromm, 1979:141).

Marketing-character means that the single individual experiences itself as a good and its own value not as a utility but as an exchange-value. The human being becomes a good on the ‘personality-market’. The evaluation is the same as on a regular market. The difference is that personalities are supplied in return for an exchange-value. Success is dependent on how well an individual can sell himself on the market, if he ‘wins’, how ‘attractive’ his package is, if he is ‘happy’, ‘solid’, ‘aggressive’, ‘reliable’, and ‘ambitious’, depending from which milieu he comes, which club he is member of, and if he knows the ‘right’ people. The deployment of these traits depends on which profession or economic task one seeks to occupy. ‘The highest

priority of the marketing-character is total adaptation in order to be unconditionally attractive on the personality-market. ... He steadily changes according to the principle: "I am the way how you want me to be." ... [The intention thereof is] to function according to the logic of the "megamachine" [or the capitalist world-economy or the modern world-system]' (Fromm, 1979:142). Now, this thesis sees that this 'marketing-character' refers not only to individuals but also to social institutions such as football as a whole and FIFA (as the world governing body of football) in particular. And there lies an inherent ambiguity: while football serves to identify with a specific identification (city or nation), FIFA seeks to transcend that narrow identification towards universal norms like fair play and chance-equality, which is adaptable to all modern forms of sport such as presented in the realm of the Olympic Games.

[O]ne should think of the raving nationalism with which many people follow the Olympic Games which presumably serve peace. The popularity of the Olympics is itself an expression of Western heathendom. It is a celebration to the honour of the heathen hero: the victor, the strongest, the one who can best carry through, wherein spectatorship is ready to oversee the dirty blend of business and publicity which now marks today's version of the Greek Olympic Games (Fromm, 1979:138).

According to Fromm (1979), it is human nature for individuals to want to feel as 'one' with others and to avoid the feeling of isolation. This means the search for unity with nature, but foremost with other people, e.g. mother, idol, tribe, nation, class, religion, and organisation. They want to participate in a feeling of 'us' or 'we' and are scared of being 'outsiders' through a 'symbolic solidarity'. However, this is not real solidarity because it is conditional and rather self-focussed (Fromm, 1979:104). Happiness in this case is not really 'shared happiness' but a 'taken' or 'consumed' happiness (Fromm, 1979:113). In football, this happiness is reproduced by identification with a specific team (wishing to defeat an opposition) as well as by the excitement produced by the openness of the match (insecurity of victory).

In the case of the FIFA World Cup, Fromm's 'marketing-character' refers to the intention of the national side to be identified with a 'nation'. At the same time, 'marketing-character' refers to the image of FIFA as the main organising body to inclusively transpose universal norms into equal competitiveness for all participants to ensure that victory is based on sporting merit. And such meritocracy is the main trait of FIFA's 'marketing-character' of fairness which refers both to the football field and the diplomatic field. Thus, FIFA diplomacy seeks to create the view of openness and chance equality for all members. And, in fact, the

decision to let Africa host the 2010 FIFA World Cup sought to present this justice in terms of fairness embodied in FIFA. Therefore, the symbol of the host decision is identified as that of Africa having developed into a 'highest-performance-athlete' in the international community in general. However, the hard facts of economic reality show that it was rather South Africa and not Africa as a whole that managed to become perceived as such a top-performer.

What skews equality in the reality of social interaction (including the football system) is that the system gives priority to 'endless accumulation of capital'. And this defines the economic practice found in the football sport. To achieve capital accumulation in sport is equal to victory in terms of the performances' material preconditions. In international football, this means the historic-economic givens for performances on the football field as well as for achievements in FIFA diplomacy. Crucial for universalism or geoculture with regards to football and its diplomacy is identification. According to Fromm (1979:37), identification is mostly used mistakenly for describing imitation or subordination. To the author of this thesis, identification rather refers to the spiritual incorporation of a specific feeling that is produced by understanding the self as part of a bigger group or a bigger order. This creates a meaning for the individual life and acceptance of order in terms of the individual's place in time and space.

Football represents an ongoing tradition embodied in the overarching regulator over this cultural practice, FIFA. The Modern World-System became truly global through economic-military expansion. This enabled FIFA to represent a common 'global' tradition – by inhibiting the history of a common cultural practice. And only if FIFA represents the common tradition according to meritocracy in respect of contemporary standards of fairness and equality can it legitimise its universal football rule. Hence, the football tradition embodied by FIFA is perceived as something 'good' as it stands in line with the modern world-system's 'universal' norms.

According to Fromm (1979:37), people's main objective regarding their free-time today is consumption. In fact, the formula of modern consumers' identification is "I am what I have and what I consume." Similarly, consuming the 'good' football tradition means that consumers identify the self as part of that 'good' and global tradition. Because this football tradition is presumed to be going on forever, the self is transcended into a greater order through identification. Therefore, afterlife was transformed into a more graspable and real-life function of the self. This process of transcendence is facilitated either as an active player or organiser to be remembered 'forever' in the annals of the sport tradition, or as the fan who

enables a team's victory as the so-called '13<sup>th</sup> team member'. What is consumed through football is in fact a sense of eternity or the sense of the self as an eternal being. Football becomes a transcendental experience of life as a common (and today global) reference point. The memorisation through active participation (actively playing or actively cheering) is what Wallerstein (2004) refers to as a celebration whereby a sense of the self in space and time is created.

Yet, inequality is produced within FIFA. And given the popularity of football, it legitimises the capitalist interstate-system. While the individual perceives a possibility to understand the self within and across time and space, football fosters the liberalist maintenance of the modern world-system. The football competition enhances affiliation and provides with reference points for identification, especially national identity. International matches in general (such as clubs of different nationalities or continental championships like the African Cup of Nations) and the FIFA World Cup in particular create possibilities for 'peaceful' rivalry between 'nations' by peoples' identification with 'national sides' (football teams). It enhances peace at the same time as it reproduces national rivalry. The interstate-system receives a tool by which to peacefully achieve recognition and legitimisation. By the congruence of normative principles displayed in football and the 'universal' norms of general society (both nationally and internationally) universalism becomes accessible to those who are otherwise not willing to, not having the time to, or not being able to identify the capitalist 'universalism' as 'good' through costly (time and effort) philosophic reflection.

Finally, universalism is important because it is believed to ensure a better functioning of production processes. It fosters the selection of 'the best' professionals by competence and merit. Therefore, football transports universalism which "tends to be the operative principle most strongly for what we could call the cadres of the world-system – neither those who are at the very top in terms of power and wealth, nor those who provide the large majority of the world's workers and ordinary people in all fields of work and all across the world" (Wallerstein, 2004:40). It is

... rather an in-between group of people who have leadership or supervisory roles in various institutions. It is a norm that spells out the optimal recruitment mode for such technical, professional, and scientific personnel. This in-between group may be larger or smaller according to a country's location in the world-system and the local political situation. The stronger the country's economic position, the larger the group. Whenever universalism loses its hold even among the cadres in particular parts of the world-system, however, observers tend to see dysfunction, and quite immediately there emerge

political pressures (both within the country and from the rest of the world) to restore some degree of universalistic criteria (Wallerstein, 2004:40).

And such restoration of international belief in universalism as the appropriate pool of norms everybody on the globe should adhere to, was displayed by FIFA's host decision in favour of Africa. In this restoration, communication processes and their massive spread, thus media, are of utmost importance in addition to that the media need to consist of the 'cadres of the world-system'.

#### 1.6.4. Football within the framework of Modern World-Systems theory

The mode of production this thesis looks at is the production and supply of football entertainment. It is a very complex industry. Different modes of production are found therein. The first complex regards the value of a competitive football player which is in turn the direct producers of (or workers in) a football match. The second complex regards the organisation of the game. They are intertwined as well as inextricably linked with the dynamics of the capitalist system as a whole. Points of identification, ideological and monetary values are generated by football making it play an increasingly relevant role in society. In the following, this section is going to reduce the football system to core aspects. It bears an obviously functionalist connotation. Yet, it is intended to make clear what football means with regards to the dynamics of the modern world-system outlined above.

The first complex regarding the production of competitive football players entails peripheral-like and core-like production processes. (To remember, peripheral production processes were formerly core production processes.) Peripheralisation means that a core-production process (innovative and quasi-monopolised) was transferred from one group of people to another group of people which took over this formerly innovative mode of production and made it more 'free-market', that is many produce and supply the good (formerly core-product). In the eyes of the author of this thesis, to define periphery and core regarding the production and supply of football players, is to distinguish between levels of utilisation or competitive levels of a football player. The first stage of peripheral production creates players which are: healthy (skilled and physically capable in terms of strength and endurance) and self-disciplined (subordination to the team's success and willing to give their 'best'). The second stage of peripheral production creates players with match experience up to national and semi-international competition levels. Finally, the core production of players refers to match experience on the level of the best internationally existing footballers under

enormous psychological pressure (not only give the best but to succeed against an opposing football player in decisive split-seconds).

The actors in the football system which produce and supply (create) players on these three levels are households, football academies, players' agents, football clubs, and national football associations. These actors handle football players like capital assets and seek to increase the value of these capital assets via the ladder of the three mentioned production processes – reflective of training levels. Exploitation means to extract a football player from one of the production processes and to process this player further to create surplus value. It represents a speculative system where the organiser of the mode of production invests in the player production with the expectation to sell the player further (or expecting reiterative value by the investment in the player). Yet, the values created differ from actor to actor (or organiser of production). Households focus on the first stage of the peripheral mode of production, yet supporting (or investing in) the player with the expectation to later partake in the core-mode of production. Football academies and peripheral clubs look at the first and the second stage of production. Core football clubs, national associations, and players' agents are concerned with all modes of production, yet concentrating to achieve and maintain the core mode of production.

The basic principle which all actors follow is financial income (accumulation of capital surplus value). Even the intention to earn honour, respect, and reputation means to climb in social status which, in turn, intends to, or automatically generates, accumulation of material wealth. This reflects what Fromm (1979) describes as the 'marketing-character' by which ideological (or perceptual) values are created. These ideological values are surplus-value which clothe the creation of material surplus-value. Representational practices in football display this juxtaposition of ideological and material (or financial) values and define power in terms of the football system.

The main actors in the representational practices of football concern a national level and an international level. The national and the international level are inextricably linked to one another. And on both levels, political (or ideological) values are produced which clothe the creation of financial values. To understand decision-making processes in FIFA, one must define the actors and processes regarding the interplay of the 'national' and the 'international' of the football system which then defines the football system (or international football system). The dominating actors in the football system are states (or rather nation-states). States regulate the national football industry by bureaucracy and monopoly of force and protect this industry in enabling a functioning market and protecting this industry's interest



(of accumulating capital) from the outside. The protection from the outside takes the form of supporting interests of a respective national football association in international football diplomacy. The state seeks to protect all different national industries (the capitalists) and the national football association is the particular representative of the national football industry (i.e. the football-complex within a country's geographic borders). Both follow the same logic of regulating and enhancing the national football industry towards the well-being of the state and through that of the national football industry. Important however, is the marketing-character of power in international football diplomacy. The achievement of interests in the liberal negotiation of interests needs to be legitimised through communicating (or skewing the perception) of that those interests are congruent with 'universal' norms (meritocracy and equality). In football diplomacy these norms refer to the balance between normative principles of fairness and equal distribution of bargaining power according to merit. Crucial to this balance is the communication of the meanings of equality, fairness, and merit.

Merit in FIFA diplomacy means to be an actor that adheres to FIFA's marketing-ideal of acting 'for the good of the game'. Good for FIFA means to increase FIFA's popularity which is actually referring to the economic practice of attracting as many spectators to the World Cup in order for FIFA to create surplus value. This implies financial value as well as ideological value because mass interest in FIFA legitimises its claim as the universal football control institution. This monopoly ensures that it has a marketing platform to generate surplus value (capital through sponsorship and media broadcasting rights). In turn, this enhances FIFA's value for nation-states (international recognition and nation-building within states) and the order of the interstate-system as a whole (normative value-system (universalism) of the capitalist world-economy).

Thus, both FIFA and the nation-state which seeks recognition through the FIFA World Cup are in need of an exciting tournament. Yet, FIFA needs to enhance the openness of the match results in order to keep the tournament exciting (equality of competitive level between national sides) while states (or the national associations) seek to skew this openness by deploying a football team that is likely to win. In order to do so, football players are needed which are produced by core modes of production. Yet, there is a polarisation of core and peripheral modes of creating football players, i.e. between zones with a concentration of either core or peripheral modes to create football players.

The success of a national football industry depends on the general macro-economic level of a state. Only if there is a strong consumer base can a football-media-industry complex emerge as its processes follow market (value exchange) principles of demand and supply. The

media is crucial since football is a communicative production process where the excitement of a match needs to be communicated directly or indirectly. The crudest (or say peripheral) form of football communication is when spectators pay an entrance fee to attend a football match. Then the meanings of a football competition (identification and excitement) are transmitted directly. However, the meanings of football can also be transmitted indirectly via the media. In turn, this media transmission itself is a business encounter and the organisers of the modes of media production seek to create surplus value. As the author of this thesis sees it, while newspapers and radio are peripheral modes of production, television and internet are core (or innovative) modes of production. This distinction is due to the fact that television and internet need a higher standard of knowledge necessary to produce these media transmission for consumption.

Media transmit the meanings of football, create the 'reality' of football and, in turn, make football a utility to identify with as well as enhance football's status as an exciting form of entertainment. A football match always takes place within a framework of time and space. Time refers to the historical (past and future) meaning of a football match and space refers to the geographic relevance for an individual to identify with the competing football teams. For example, the meaning of a match between two clubs in Germany can take place within the national league (inter-city competition within Germany's boundaries) towards an outcome in the future (the end of the season). Therefore, the media help to memorise and recall the 'league-rankings' as well as expectations of the match in respect of past events or the strategy deployed by the coach of a team.

Firms and geographic (political) entities such as nations attach themselves to the meanings created in football and hope to receive positive recognition. This is done by attaching symbols or names to specific teams (or players). Those who carry these symbols during a match are normally chosen if they are victorious. The reason is that a winner normally receives greater publicity. In addition, labels and brands seek to symbolically transfer the identification with a victorious team (or player) to the labels and brands. The intention is to create specific reactions in those people who watch a football match. A brand seeks consumption of its product while a state seeks for subordination to, or acceptance of, the state's rule and order (legitimisation and nationhood).

However, the filtering system for getting the best players (for club-teams or national sides) takes place on the level of national leagues and international club competitions (such as the UEFA Champions League where the best teams of European national leagues compete against each other). Teams seek to achieve victory in order to receive sponsorship by firms in



return for carrying the firms' symbols. The 'armament race' between the clubs to skew the competition to their advantage represents the clubs' intention to achieve victory at the highest level in order to create surplus value. The highest competition levels are necessary for getting most media attention which in turn enhances the interest by sponsoring brands to display their symbols. Yet, these brands only do so because the spectators equal potential buyers (or consumers) of the brands' products. If media transmission of a football match does not reach a potentially strong consumer base, firms will not support teams or finance the sport's media transmission by buying advertising space.

There are examples of such an industry complex in peripheral zones, yet the surplus value created in core zones (by all actors within the football complex) is by far larger. Different systemic pressures exist which explains why football players from a peripheral zone aim to play in a core zone. First, there are a few football players in the core zone, the stars, which generate enormous amounts of financial surplus. Second, a peripheral zone has not many (if at all) opportunities ready for households to create financial surplus. This makes investment in education increasingly senseless, and if done so investment takes much time to return surplus value whereas the household's need to produce for a livelihood is in immediate demand. Third, a nation-state in a peripheral zone welcomes the export of players to core zones because it enhances the possibility for positive recognition of the state in international football. In turn, this enhances the process of nation-building and the maintenance of a government's rule as well as subordination to the existing social order and hierarchy. Fourth, households, clubs, football academies, national associations, and the state fall for the 'comparative advantage' of exporting football talents to core zones. The accumulation of capital by other means and on markets within the state is comparatively lower to the surplus which can be generated by exporting football talents. Finally, the peripheral resource pool of players seems endless as its growth is fostered by the extraordinary attractiveness for poor children to play professional football in core zones at the same as there are not many other job-opportunities in the periphery. Thus, it is both a 'sell-out' of players at the same time as it is demanded by households and individuals. However, the capital produced by this players drain is enormous for core football industries. In comparison, the capital that returns to peripheral zones in this relationship is by far smaller.

Obviously, there is no football 'development' in peripheral football zones possible if it is not politically, economically, and gradually implemented in addition to the creation of a financially capable consumer base that could provide with the money to allow for core-like (football-media-industry complex based) football production processes and for football talents

to earn a living in the respective state of a peripheral football zone. In addition, a ruling by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in 1995 declared that European citizens do not fall under football regulations regarding the limit of foreign players playing in a match for European clubs. This allowed for greater player migration from Africa to Europe and to economic advantage of European clubs. The ruling helped European clubs' financially because they then had greater access to football players, both from within the EU as well as from outside the EU such as from Africa. Africa is a major exporter of raw football material in terms of young football talents while most profits are made and stay in Europe – also by Africa's state-enforced 'underdevelopment'.

Crucial for understanding the FIFA decision to let an African nation host the FIFA World Cup is the concept of a 'semi-periphery'. Although it was presented as if Africa won the right to host 2010, the prime if not exclusive beneficiary is South Africa, a semi-peripheral and arguably 'least Africa' of all states on the continent. A semi-peripheral zone (or state) entails an increasing concentration of core modes of production next to the yet dominating peripheral modes of production. In football terms this means that football players are not merely produced for export to a core zone but to offer players a job as a professional footballer within the state of origin – in exchange for a sufficient amount of income (if he is willing to stay in the country). This displays a fully developed (core-like) football industry embodying a football-media-industry complex despite the lesser degree of financial surplus created in comparison to a core zone. Africa inhibits such core-like football industries, yet only a few such exist as in Egypt, Ivory Coast, Morocco, and South Africa.

It was from this semi-peripheral zone that the challenges to FIFA's supposed 'universalism' emerged. African states, especially South Africa and Morocco, lamented that they were being treated unfair. This rhetoric was prominently utilised by South Africa as well as the FIFA Presidency. However, this threatened FIFA's 'marketing-character' of being the keeper of the football sport's normative principles of fairness and equality. Moreover, it threatened the dominant stakeholders in FIFA to not adhere to the capitalist system's 'universalism' (thus the liberalist value-system). Obviously, the whole issue around the 2006 host decision was a discussion on merit and reward. The interests of two states were in conflict and drew system-wide attention. According to Chase-Dunn (1982:25) "[s]emi-peripheral states and core states contending for hegemony utilize protectionism and mercantilist monopoly to protect and expand their access to world surplus value." Germany and South Africa both wanted to host the 2006 FIFA World Cup but Germany succeeded under much negative publicity. The German alliance of state and industry was said to have

bought votes via strategic deployment of military and foremost economic incentives for Asian states represented in the FIFA Executive Committee deciding on the World Cup host.

South Africa was however deploying much symbolic value for FIFA. South Africa's President Thabo Mbeki highlighted that South Africa was the only true representative of Africa. He further claimed that Africa was treated 'like an unimportant appendage' in the international community (Fanizadeh & Pinter, 2002:257). Thereby, he accused Germany, the European football industry, and FIFA as a whole of exploiting the African continent for European economic profit by actively keeping Africa 'underdeveloped' and disregarding Africa's merits for football and FIFA. Importantly, the prominence of South Africa as the only symbol to represent Africa in FIFA overruled another African contender in the bid to host the 2006 World Cup, Morocco. In fact, South Africa had come to overrule the African continent for its own economic advantage in exchange for core-support and in favour of a Eurocentric world order.

On the grounds of FIFA diplomacy states tested their strength: South Africa succeeded against Morocco within Africa but lost against Germany (from Europe). In the view of Wallerstein (1979:355), a strong state-machinery is "a partially autonomous entity in the sense that it has a margin of action available to it wherein it reflects the compromises of multiple interests." The high interest by states to host the FIFA World Cup as a core mode of production is that it offers many expected values to the host nation: job-creation, foreign capital investment, and enhancing the tourism sector. Most important are however the politico-economic values of enhancing the national football industry and of nation-building (in terms of increasing social order and government affiliation). The 2006 host decision made clear that South Africa was fighting strongly to receive these values. However, German industry (football, media, and sponsorship) had invested much in FIFA and was by merit surely legitimised to be awarded the World Cup.

Finally, the public discourse played a decisive role in the FIFA host decision in favour of Africa. And here the concept of Fromm's (1979) 'marketing-character' is very important in the sense that FIFA's image of serving the world-system's liberalist value-system, 'universalism', was threatened. While South Africa sought to undermine FIFA's image and called for investigations into the decision-making processes of FIFA, the public discourse revealed much negative information on all stakeholders in FIFA (states, national associations, and individuals). Therefore, the public discourse was an important pressure moment which supported South Africa's wish to host the World Cup. In addition, South Africa's politico-economic history served the view that if it was awarded with a World Cup, FIFA would

symbolically uphold football's normative principles of fairness and equality (in turn the modern world-system's universalism regarding the system's legitimisation of order through liberalism and meritocracy). To host the World Cup, South Africa transmitted the perception that it was capable of doing so, that it could veil African dependency on Europe, and that it was willing and able to shatter FIFA's 'clean' image. FIFA, on the other hand, constantly seeks to enhance its 'marketing-character' and thereby to receive backing by the strongest states of the capitalist world-economy. Yet the "priority remains always the endless accumulation of capital, and this is best achieved by an ever-shifting set of political and cultural dominances within which capitalist firms manoeuvre, obtaining their support from the states but seeking to escape their dominance" (Wallerstein, 2004:59). FIFA, however, is a firm that intrinsically represents the capitalist interstate-system. The complex of FIFA, media, states, and capitalists displays a mutually beneficial relationship regarding ideological and economic values – but only as long as internal unity in FIFA prevails – and economic practices and inequalities are veiled by the claim towards 'universalism' in sporting practice.

So what does Africa mean? What is Africa's position in the capitalist world economy respectively the international football system? Bale and Cronin (2003:5-6) look at sport in connection to postcolonialism and say that sport in postcolonial Africa equals resistance with an imminent crisis of representation. Cox (1987:230) highlights the neomercantilist states in the Third World where state power meant repressive coercive power to the inside and the dependent development (or underdevelopment) on the outside. "Development is a more complex, normative, and teleological concept, implying changes in the structures of production and the distribution of the product. The initiative of the state envisages both growth and development. ... The initiative-taking state extracts rents when it authorizes foreigners to undertake such operations, and in addition it undertakes certain forms of production directly through an expanded nationalized sector. These become more important sources of state revenue than general taxation, and the state comes to control a very large part of the surplus product and of total domestic resources available for investment (Cox, 1987:231-232). "The neomercantilist developmentalist state seeks to increase its bargaining power vis-à-vis foreign capital without breaking with foreign economic dependency (Cox, 1987:232). Providing those states a position in the global system gave, in return, support and legitimacy back to the system. Similarly, providing lower classes with welfare (or the prospect of such) and an institutional position in the political system within states (such as acknowledgement of labour unions) sought for legitimisation from within the states. However, "[t]he merger of nationalism and welfare was in the first instance an initiative from

above, a preemptive stroke by state managers aware of the disruptive potential of the social forces generated by urbanization and industrialism” (Cox, 1987:157). Henceforth, Africa will be treated in this thesis as, first, a peripheral zone with numerous neomercantilist state elites bargaining for economic importance to the outside and political legitimacy to the inside. A few of these states – most prominently South Africa – have the tendency to being semi-peripheral zones. Second, Africa will be treated in this thesis as a symbol. This symbol’s value rests on the fact the global system’s ‘universalist’ norms are merely supported by core states dominating African states which in turn equals repression and exploitation of the lower classes by the capitalist managers (Europe imposed and enforced by African elites). That South Africa won the bid to host the 2010 World Cup mirrored its status as a kind of European ‘sub-imperialist’. South Africa was able to achieve the status of representing the formerly suppressed continent as a whole while working towards the interest of the transnational capitalist class (that includes South Africa’s managerial class) and, thus, enhancing the reproduction of the capitalist world economy.

### 1.7. Summary

This first chapter outlined the theoretical framework of this thesis as the basis for the analysis. Asking why Africa received the 2010 FIFA World Cup, the analysis answers that FIFA sought to represent the capitalist system’s ‘universalism’ in order legitimise its ‘universal’ football rule. Universalism refers to the historically evolved ideals to legitimise the modern world-system. Thus, universal rule refers to FIFA’s capacity to subordinate a sub-system, the international football system as a socio-cultural institution, to the capitalist world-system’s ‘universalism’. In fact, the capitalist world-economy imposes itself onto its principle institutions (households, classes and status-groups, firms, and states) also by help of football organisations as cultural institutions. While the economic practice of endless accumulation of capital prevails as the underlying motivation, normative principles serve to legitimise economic practices. When economic practices lead to disadvantages for particular institutions in society, a change in normative ideals occurs. Thus, it is the interplay of economic practices and normative principles that are responsible for changes in society. And such change in terms of a globally significant social phenomenon took place when Africa received the FIFA World Cup. The following analysis will therefore outline the historical processes that finally led to this social phenomenon.

## **CHAPTER TWO: FROM AN ENGLISH TO A GLOBAL GAME**

### **2.1. Introduction**

The main argument of this chapter is that the *Fédération Internationale de Football Association* (FIFA) needed the developing world in order to legitimise its claim to be the global football body. Therefore, this chapter will first show how football came to incorporate normative principles and highlight football's capacity as an educational tool used by elites of the capitalist world-economy to create a sense of world order for the single individual's mindset. In addition, the development of football into an economic venture will be highlighted and the connection between industrialisation and the sport. Furthermore, the spread of football is going to be outlined showing how the game became an expression of British cultural hegemony in the world. At the same time, football emancipated different social groups and provided a means to express their identity within the capitalist society. Furthermore, different European powers sought to exert power over the cultural practice of football specifically due to football's capacity to create mass interest and national identification. Thereby, the interconnectedness of economic practice and normative principles will be outlined in terms of a spiral between ideological value and material value (capital). Finally, the rise of the world football body FIFA is outlined in terms of a mutually beneficial relationship between dominant powers of the interstate-system as well as the capitalist normative value-system. By incorporation of organised football from outside Europe, FIFA was able to create a sense of an expanded Eurocentric world order and to legitimise its claim as the sole and universal football institution.

### **2.2. The beginnings of football**

Football became a social institution inhibiting norms of physical behaviour as well as organisational behaviour. Therefore, this section will first highlight how the game's rules came about. It was a reciprocal development between norms of behaviour found in general society and the imposition of norms wished for by the capitalist elite. These elites recognised football's potential to implement their normative principles which were regarded as a means to enhance the functioning of the capitalist system. The first generations of English public school graduates were responsible for the diffusion of football and its rules into society at large, first in England and then the rest of the world. In addition, this section is going to



explain the effects of industrialisation and urbanisation on the meaning of football. On the one hand, football became a form of expressing increased political strength by the working class and resistance against social hierarchies in general. The sport became a means to articulate workers' resistance to bourgeois exploitation as well as a tool by which to express and achieve greater social mobility for the lower classes. And therefore, football served to articulate the lower classes' newly won freedom. On the other hand, the sport helped to maintain the capitalist order as it provided an orderly free-time activity. Furthermore, this first section of the second chapter will show how the football sport helped to implement norms of behaviour in the people's mindset in order for the system to work in addition to the sense that capitalist economic practices were 'good'.

Finally, this section will highlight the diffusion of economic practice into the football sport. The competition principle of 'achieving victory' led to professional football. In order to achieve victory as well as attract spectators, football clubs needed to motivate the best players to play for their teams. Due to the immense public interest that followed, political and commercial values were soon attached to the sport. This, in turn, increased popularisation of football. The amateur and gentleman attitude which the noble class attached to football were removed as football became a sphere of working life. However, this increased football's attractiveness and installed mass affiliation to the sport. Thereby it turned into one important means by which to impose elite-made identities on all households. Industrialisation and trade enhanced technological advancement regarding transportation and communication which enhanced football's capacity to create an understanding of local, regional, and national boundaries at the same time as it fostered international liberalism and peace.

### 2.2.1. From medieval times to the Renaissance

Different cultures display different types of football in their own history, like in the Caucasus area, in China and Japan, or North- and Latin America (Koch, 1895:40; Armstrong & Guilianotti, 1999:3; Gerhardt, 2006). The games played a rather ceremonial role in society and did not show traits of competition. First accounts of a football-like sport in Europe can be found in ancient Greece and Rome: respectively *Episkyros* and *Harpastum*. However, physical harm was a frequent occurrence (Gerhardt, 2006). In the 12<sup>th</sup> century, first accounts of football-like games were documented in France ('Soule') and in England. Documented official statements revealed that leaders tried to forbid the game. In England the games were

often prohibited by the state due to their “wild and riotous” nature and outplay of “deviant behaviour” (Elias & Dunning, 1971:117).

Yet, already then the game had normative socialising effects. Besides having fun (like children playing with a ball), they also represented a societal ritual. Accounts from England describe the creation of a sense of village identity as it was “the expression of intimate unity and solidarity and [allowed for] ... equally intimate and intense hostility, without giving the slightest impression that the participants themselves saw anything contradictory or incompatible in these fluctuations.” The games were used to outplay tensions within villages or as a means by which to “pay off old scores” between rivalling groups (e.g. bachelors versus married men) or towns (Elias & Dunning, 1971:121-123).

In 1555, the football-like game ‘Calcio’ played in city-states of Renaissance Italy was documented. During the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> century, strong men played Calcio in the city-states of Florence and Venice. Despite its violent nature, the game was less rough and more regulated than those games found in England during that time (Gerhardt, 2006). Also in 1555, Oxford in England is said to have reported about ‘Pila pedalis’. And Cambridge reported about a ‘play at football’ in 1579. But the 16<sup>th</sup> century did not have the modern fairness-ideal. The European games mentioned were very robust and rather ‘uncivilised’.

### 2.2.2. Utilisation of football for education and socialisation

Dr. Thomas Arnold, headmaster of the school in Rugby, wrote an influential book about the positive effects sport had on students in boarding schools. According to Dunning (1971:132) students of the English public schools took over the simple football games and adapted them to their forms of social organisation and authority. The games were controlled within the hierarchy of older and younger boys, the ‘prefect-fagging’ system. In the rough football game younger boys (the fags) were able to reach certain status of honour and respect; but most of the times youngsters beaten up and injured by the older ones (the prefects). The games only followed loose regulation and differed from school to school. Still, they became an important leisure activity, point of socialisation, and expression of order.

School reforms were introduced which left students with less self-rule. Authorities came to use football for “communication and understanding between boys and masters”. Furthermore, team sports came to foster desirable character traits, like loyalty, co-operation, subordination of individual aims to a common aim, competition within rules, “quick decisions, physical and moral courage, leadership ability and so on.” Rules were written down



affording self-control by players. In addition, pupils of public schools had noble and increasingly bourgeois backgrounds. With the change of society towards industrialisation and trade, upper-class households (parents) supported the reforms that took place in schools. The utilisation of football for educational ends was taken as a suiting preparation for the households' offspring. In fact, elite households seemed to have been fostering football as a possibility to enhance the households' capacity to succeed in surplus creation on the capitalist market. Football moved to the centre of the state's school education guiding the sport towards a more "civilised" form which later diffused into society at large (Dunning, 1971:132, 140-142).

Eton became the 'model-making centre' for football while the schools of Rugby and Cheltenham offered a rivalling model which was rougher. According to Gerhardt (2006) students of Cambridge University wrote down the first football rules in 1846. Former students established the first football and rugby clubs which subsequently became the basis for nationwide organisations from 1850 to 1890. In 1857 the first football club of the world was found, *Sheffield Wednesday F.C.* Importantly, the development of the railway system allowed for matches between teams from different regions of the country. Common rules were necessary in order to play against teams from different regions.

Interestingly, the rules of the game also increased football's attractiveness. In contrast to rugby, football was less violent, and a wider range of people (young and old) could play the game (Koch, 1983:12-13). Violent behaviour became sanctioned as 'foul play', like tackling or picking up the ball. Furthermore, the rules called for skilful handling of the ball as well as team play (passing the ball):

Skill at football was beginning to be regarded as a desirable accomplishment in the young gentlemen. Under these conditions, it became increasingly possible for individual players and for teams to gain a national rather than simply a local reputation at the game. ... In addition, the more effective national unification which was now becoming possible enabled class, regional and other group rivalries to be extended, symbolically, to a test of strength and skill on the football field (Dunning, 1971:146-147).

Finally, printed media developed great interest in reporting about football which fostered the game and its values. Due to that attractiveness, football became a means to establish forms of identity. The foundation of the Football Association in London of 1863 paved the way for modern football and the centralisation of a game that spread to the rest of the world. From 1866 until 1888 the main relevant rules were developed which transformed football into the game as we know it today. Football became a social institution with a single stringent

development of a common tradition. The foundation of the *Football Association* was the beginning of one ‘universal’ football community.

### 2.2.3. Industrialisation and universalism

Industrialisation and urbanisation made football a mass phenomenon in England. Agrarian reforms, technological advancement in food production, and disease control led to a massive increase in population from 1750 to 1820. In turn, this caused food shortages which was followed by massive emigration to urban and industrial centres as well as overseas (imperial) dominions (Kinder & Hilgemann, 1985:31, 43). Technological advancement led to greater effectiveness and the emerging ‘global’ value chain led to increased profits (transporting slaves to America, importing cotton to Britain, textile production, and global marketing). This created the basis for capitalist industrialisation. Transport technology led to increased industrialisation in England, followed by Belgium, Holland, Switzerland and France (around 1825), Germany (around 1850), and Sweden (around 1880). The transport revolution around 1840 was started by the development of the steam-ship in 1807 and the locomotive in 1814. The first railway line in England connected Stockton and Darlington and until 1848 the railway system already counted 5.000 miles (Kinder & Hilgemann, 1985:43).

However, commercial pressure led to increased exploitation of workers which resulted in workers’ solidarity. With the spread of workers consciousness (following the ideas of Karl Marx) socialist movements emerged all over Europe. In England, workers received the right to organise themselves in 1824 and formed trade unions (likewise in 1864 in France and 1869 in Germany). Increased power by workers led to more free-time but also fear by the ruling classes’ which demanded social discipline; and football came to serve well in this function. According to Müller (2002:63-65) football’s mass interest rooted in urbanisation and industrialisation as it became a utility for elites to compensate for societal disharmonies. The trade unions were able to gain a work-free Saturday which was, in fact, the start of the free-time society. Football was a dominant activity to fill this free-time and became a regular event in English society. Regularity of the sport made football to be perceived like religious holidays serving to create a sense of order. For individuals of an industrial society ‘the games fill the sense’s vacuum of their everyday-life’ (Herzog, 2002:17).

As mentioned, greater reach and dispersed football teams made common rules necessary. On 26 October 1863, the English Football Association (FA) was established. Former pupils of English elite schools, especially those from Eton, Harrow, and Winchester, as well as

Oxbridge students and representatives of different clubs met in a tavern in England. They drew up 14 rules which constituted the 'Association Game' for the first time. The rules were the normative principles of physical behaviour as well as liberal internationalism by respect of identities. Representatives from Scotland, Wales, and Ireland also took part in this establishment. The creation of the association also meant football's distinction from other forms of football, especially rugby. Rugby favoured using hands as well as more violence (tackling) during the game which led to the Rugby Football Union in 1871. These developments were consistent with the public school rivalry found in the 1840s.

During the 1870s sport remained a middle and upper class enjoyment. But with increasing leisure time, the number of workers playing football increased. Especially the lead by Christian priests from public schools fostered sports in the general public as a

means of moral and physical salvation, ... activities which would help the denizens of slums to become strong and physically healthy and to develop traits of character which would enable them to improve their miserable lot. ... Indeed, many of the new, working-class clubs founded after 1870 – some of them the ancestors of present-day professional teams – were founded by Muscular Christian and Christian Socialist priests in association with church or chapel (Dunning, 1971:147).

Thus, industrialisation, urbanisation, and the subsequent increase of workers' power enhanced football's spread and popularity. Thereby Christian based liberal values were transmitted to the general public. Workers achieved more leisure-time and football became a valuable asset to employ workers' senses either through active play or watching the game. With increased demand to consume football, the organisational side of the game developed and the amateur and gentleman principles became drawn into a sphere of work. Football underwent a transition from playing for the sake of playing towards playing for the sake of winning.

#### 2.2.4. Amateurism versus professionalism

In 1879, Great Britain saw the introduction of economic practices into football. That these economic practices stood in contrast to football's normative principles made elites refuse professional football. A small club from Lancashire, Darwen, reached two times a draw against the *Old Etonians* which were seen as unbeatable. Two players of Darwen's team were the first professional players ever: the Scots, John Love and Fergus Suter (Gerhardt, 2006). Mangan (2006) highlights the involvement of educational institutions other than the Public Schools or Oxbridge as decisive for the further development of football. Leading figures in

the then successful football club *Wolverhampton Wanderers* were teachers and pupils from teacher training schools, as well as elementary schools. This club was also one of the founding clubs of the English Football League in 1888. In fact, football became transformed from an elite amateur sport to an economic professional system. Given the fact that football created the possibility of upward social mobility for people of lower classes, increased the number of professional players. In 1885, the Football Association (FA) was forced to permit professional football (Gerhardt, 2006).

In fact, the FA had to do so in order to maintain control over the game. Only by accepting professional football it could maintain equal conditions for competing teams, claim universal rule, and maintain football interest. The royal classes withdrew from active football playing around 1888 because it became a work sphere (Eggers, 2002:68). The number of competitions and teams increased also in England's rural areas. By the 1890s the FA counted about 270 clubs in about 40 sub-divisions. However, winning became ever more important in order to enhance identification with teams and, in turn, affiliation to certain regions or groups. Some clubs were independent, yet, most represented counties and were sponsored by the ruling earls.

In 1895, the German football pioneer Konrad Koch criticised the development of professional football. His accounts highlighted a thorny problem in professional football. People who played the game once a week were not able to compete fairly anymore against professionals who played football everyday and could thereby increase their football skills. Economic practices stood in crass contrast to football's normative principles of fairness and chance equality of opportunity to win. Still, Koch pointed out that in cricket such developments helped the flowering of the sport. Although professionalism diminished the possibility of fair competition for amateurs, it did lead to a higher quality football and, in turn, attractiveness for spectators.

[B]y the late nineteenth century, the game had established itself as the dominant sport among the urban working classes [in England]. Clubs had been formed that reflected a strong sense of local and civic pride; two-team rivalries were profitably situated in the major conurbations; the office-holders at clubs converted their 'leisure associations' into genuine businesses, complete with share-holdings and boards of directors. Inevitably, with the inception of the Football leagues in Scotland, England and Wales, association football turned professional (Armstrong & Giulianotti, 1999:3).

In addition to its normative principles, football's capacity to make financial profit was also a precondition for the development of the game. Interestingly, the first professional players

were from Scotland, England's periphery at that time. The increased ability to travel was the root cause for adherence to football's competition principles beyond localities, regions, and nations. Football was used to articulate regional group identities, such as classes or religion and also greater political-geographical identities such as 'nations' or an interstate-system.

### 2.3. Spread of football

This second section of chapter two will connect the spread of football to British military-economic hegemony. It led to an increased number of British people living on Europe's mainland and overseas. They brought their love for the game with them and founded the first clubs outside the British islands. Although the game was not welcomed by many in the beginning, it was able to develop into the favourite sport all over Europe. In addition, British success with regards to capitalist industrialisation was an example which leaders of other nations came to follow. Football's educational value was taken over in schools throughout Europe and also the demographic developments of industrialisation and urbanisation made football a welcomed means to create and uphold order in society at large. Furthermore, ruling elites everywhere in Europe used football to enhance social hierarchies in mutual benefit with football organisers' intention to create surplus value. The first professional tournaments and international matches took place everywhere in Europe. Thus, both normative as well as economic practices spread from England to neighbouring countries and all over Europe and football became a prominent platform.

#### 2.3.1. British cultural hegemony

The foundation of 'Association Football' in 1863 officially incorporated Scotland, Wales and Ireland into England's football realm. The biggest number of football players was found in England and its neighbouring countries, Scotland and Ireland. While only a few hundred people played football around 1850, forty to fifty years later there were hundreds of thousands playing it (Koch, 1983:5). England's closest neighbours were naturally the first countries which enjoyed the early spread of football, like Sweden. Football was brought to Scandinavia through the "recreation of sailors and workers" (Armstrong & Guilianott, 1999:4-6.). The game spread further onto mainland Europe, with the spread of British people. In Germany around 1880, the number of English workers, merchants, and students increased the establishment of football as a social institution (Prosser, 2002:271).

However, the first forms of resistance also occurred like Ireland's creation of an own sports association (Gaelic Athletic Association, GAA). Although 'Association Football' was a cultural good from England, it was used for the formation of Irish national identity. It can therefore be understood as an ambiguous form of resistance to English hegemony. Germany also showed this development. Hopf (1983) points to the nationalist character of the opinions of Konrad Koch, Germany's football pioneer, and his references to "Turnvater Jahn" (Friedrich Ludwig Jahn). In the mid 19<sup>th</sup> century Jahn implemented a movement for more outside activity and gymnastics for the German youth. It sought to enhance German nationalism and was directed against the French oppressor. In this connection, many Germans are said to have rejected the Olympic movement as too French. Apparently, the football pioneer Koch revealed a tendency to foster German nationalism and to step up against English hegemony by means of football (Koch, 1983). The main difference between *Turnen* and English sports was that the former was there to increase general physical abilities of German citizens as well as national affiliation. In contrast, English sports brought with them specialisation, rationalisation, bureaucratisation, records, internationalism, competition and performance principles (Eggers, 2002:70). However, the early attempts by Koch to implement football and rugby as school sport in Braunschweig faced less opposition than in the rest of Germany. One reason was that the royals were situated there and in neighbouring Hannover; was close to the British crown, and England's traditions (Hopf, 1983:50). In fact, the first football club playing according to the rules of the English Football Association was found in Hannover in 1878 (Elias, 2003:233).

According to Binz (2006:14), with the steady spread of football and the foundation of pupil-football-clubs, travelling became an important way of spreading the sport's attractiveness. An increase of exchange occurred between Swiss clubs and the newly found South-German football association of 1897. For example, the *Karlsruhe Kickers* who once played in Basel two matches on one day in 1895 – against the *Old Boys* in the morning and the *Football-Club Basel* in the evening. Since 1890 German football became a public spectator event apart from sport activities in schools and universities. Football found ever more supporters in upper-classes and in the group of higher-level employees. In addition, the Olympic movement and the first modern Olympic Games in 1896 were generally rejected in Germany as too French (Eggers, 2002:71). Germany's historically based hostility against anything French welcomed football as the lesser of two evils. Many football clubs were found and there are still clubs existing today which emerged during that time. Since 1900 the German football association (DFB) acted as organiser and ruling body for football and



respective events in Germany. By then, some games counted already over a thousand spectators (Prosser, 2002:271).

Binz (2006) regards sportive interaction to have fostered travelling and enlarged the general sense of space. Already concerning the *Turn*-Movement school excursions took on the lead in this regard in the second half of 18<sup>th</sup> century Germany. The German football pioneer Konrad Koch valued the philosophy of competition highly especially because it included travelling (Binz, 2006:10). The development of a supra-regional sport press during the 1880s enhanced the integrative factor of football for a nation and helped to imagine broader geographic and political spaces. The development of increased mobility and club contacts specifically fostered the geographical sense of nationhood. The foundation of the German football association DFB came to institutionalise this nationalist understanding (Binz, 2006:14).

Looking at the collapsing Austrian-Hungarian Empire, the English were specifically responsible for the development of football there. In 1894, English entrepreneurs, representatives, and engineers met in the tavern “Zur schönen Aussicht” in order to hold the founding assembly of the *First Vienna Footballclub*. They chose to take over the colours blue and yellow from the banking-house Rothschild. Already the following day the first competitor was born when the *Vienna Cricket and Football Club* handed in its statutes at Vienna’s city council. On 15 November 1894, the first football match took place which was won by the *Vienna-Cricketers* with 4:0 (*Der Standard*, 2002).

From there, Austria became the centre for football in ‘middle-Europe’ – a vaguely defined region surrounding Austria-Hungary. Similar to England, developments with regards to breaking class divisions through football took place in Austria (such as in the rest of Europe). At the beginning, football was a sport solely for the upper- and middle-classes. Industrial magnates were members of the *First Vienna Footballclub* and workers were not admitted to play. Popularity was not the intended goal and the entrance fees were doubled in order to stop the spectator rush. Nevertheless, in 1896 already seven clubs existed in Vienna and professionalism in football emerged quickly drawing ever more spectators.

English people played the dominant role in football’s development in Europe. For example Switzerland’s football, like that in Germany and Austria, profited from an increasing amount of English people living there. But also in the Netherlands and in Italy the first clubs were established in 1879/80 and 1890 respectively. A first match between a French and an English team took place in 1892 in Paris under the British embassy’s patronage. And soon, first national associations were found, for example, in Switzerland in 1895, Germany in 1900,



and six years later in Portugal. In 1901, already 25 clubs existed in the Netherlands – ten years later the number of clubs grew to 130. Further following the example of the English Football Association, the national associations of Denmark and the Netherlands were established in 1889. Yet, looking at the chronology of the creation of national associations, including non-European countries, it became apparent that the first national associations were formed where English hegemonic influence was stronger, like New Zealand in 1891, Argentina in 1893, and Chile in 1895, as well as Uruguay in 1900 and Paraguay in 1906. Further European examples only followed after the first non-European nations created their football associations, like Switzerland and Belgium in 1895, Italy in 1898, Germany in 1900, 1901 Hungary, 1902 Norway, 1904 Sweden, a year later Spain, and Finland in 1907.

Although these establishments were caused by an immense increase in the number of football affiliates, only increased communication infrastructure enabled a nation-wide football industry as well as international matches. This made far-reaching mass media possible, and ensured the clubs' legitimacy as the official national football associations. By the year 1908 football became an Olympic discipline (Elias, 2003:233). According to Randl (2002:182) industrialisation, urbanisation, and the subsequent achievement by workers of more leisure time, more football affiliates were created which, in turn, served as a reason for football to become an Olympic discipline. And since being an Olympic discipline, football became increasingly interesting with regards to commercial and political intentions. Internationalism of the game made it a welcomed instrument to display national identities. And together with the rise of nationalist ideologies, the growth of football spectatorship fostered the capitalisation of football at the same time.

### 2.3.2. Football and mass media

Mass media was the decisive element for the popularisation of football. According to Binz (2006:14) the development of a supra-regional sport press during the 1880s enhanced the integrative factor of football for the German nation. Increased mobility and club contacts specifically fostered the geographical sense of nationhood. The foundation of the German football association, DFB, came to institutionalise this nationalist principle culturally. The increased ability to utilise football for economic and ideological ends had much to do with image-creation through the mutually beneficial relationship between media, sport, state, and the corporate world.

For the first DFB finals in 1920 fans were brought to Frankfurt (from Nürnberg and Fürth) with specially provided trains. There, companies came to investigate football as a new market for economic purposes. It was realised that people were hungry for sport stars. Specific post-stamps were already made by then and also pictures were collected by football fans, as well as pins, posters and other print products. Soon, breweries and the cigarette-industry started to use the new heroes as advertisement platforms with the aim of distinguishing one brand from another. In addition, the media reported about huge sums of money paid to individuals. Naturally, the football association wished to profit for their own good, too.

In a report from 1937, the immense increase and diversity in Germany's sport press showed the parallel development of sport journalism and sport. However, writing styles tended to over-decorate the events. Already in 1920, some media accounts were criticised by more serious football papers as being responsible for riots that occurred at football events. At that time, football was the most favourite part of the newspaper read by 12 to 16-year old children. The German cultural magazine "Der Querschnitt" announced in 1932 that sport is the world-religion of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Although this statement had an ironic touch to it, reality made it relatively true. In the 1920s there existed a differentiated sport press and the media was responsible for the first phase of commercialisation of sport. The elements of today's football, like spectators, media, star-cult, and professionalism already existed by then (Eggers, 2002:67, 85-86).

According to von Berg (2002:197) the first football match that was documented on film was the English first division match *Blackburn Rovers* against *West Bromwich Albion* in 1898. In 1920 the first slow-motion films were made in England (Eggers, 2002:90). In Germany, the first football motion-pictures were distributed during the 1920s and 1930s. However, they were rather educational movies intending to create an understanding of the game (Prosser, 2002:273). Still, football documentation by motion-picture was by then not used for mass consumption. Weekly news in cinemas included football reports, but most football filming intended to educate trainers and players. Nevertheless, from 1918 to 1933 the number of cuts mounted up to 49, including the finals of the German championships and matches by the national side (Eggers, 2002:88). Still, moving pictures were qualitatively not ready for massive media use and television had to await the development of the necessary technology. Before that, radio broadcasting became the first medium which enabled people to attend matches live without being physically at a venue. 1923/24 saw the start of live media in Germany with ten radio broadcasters which were partly privately owned. A first international

side match, between Germany and Holland, received live radio transmission. And although the quality of transmission is said to have been relatively low, on 13 June 1926 an estimated 400.000 people listened to the German finals in Frankfurt (Eggers, 2002:87).

Yet, live-broadcasting also had its negative implications and first disharmonies occurred due to the increased number of radio presentations. While radio broadcasting increased the popularisation of football, the DFB came to go along football clubs' argument about the decrease of spectator numbers in the stadiums. This led to a decrease of radio reports: Only the final of the German championships and a few games of the national side were allowed to be transmitted on radio. In 1928/29 only the final of the German championships were broadcast and radio-reports about two additional games were allowed. In England, similar developments took place. There, radio broadcasting of matches was prohibited in 1931/32 because of a decrease in stadium ticket sales. Authorities in Austria allowed broadcasting only sometimes and Sweden discussed a general ban. In Germany, however, radio broadcasts of events with national awareness was not seen to harm spectator numbers, like the German finals and national side matches. Also, radio broadcasting continued to be perceived as a good vehicle to advertise football in the general public (Eggers, 2002:87-88). And most importantly, nation-building through football via media served not only the business of sport and media, but especially the nation's leadership.

### 2.3.3. The link between football, industry, and politics

Stadium construction was a complementary industry to sport's development towards a predominant cultural activity. Sport's capacity to create mass-gatherings and a sense of national identification led to a stadium for the 1912 Olympics in Stockholm. For the 1916 Olympic Games the *Deutsches Stadion* was built Berlin. The Games did not take place due to World War I, yet the stadium could already host 27.000 spectators. According to Randl (2002:182), Stadium construction and nationalist ideologies went hand in hand: 'For the first time a stadium was built with the intention to create a possibility for national identification with the reutilisation of historicising symbolism.' Nazi-Germany came to practice this to an unprecedented extent. For example, the Stadium *Rote Erde* ('red earth') was built with sandstone which was prominently found in the region for where the Stadium was planned in order to highlight 'monumentality and affiliation to the home country.' The Stadium for the 1936 Olympic Games in Berlin was built on the ground of the old stadium and mainly used for football matches after the Games. Planned at first as a construction of steel and concrete,

Adolf Hitler wished to cover the stadium with natural stone in order for it to be perceived as more powerful and monumental (Randl, 2002:182-183).

In addition to that, the development of broadcasting technology played an important role to enhance ideological as well as economic values. According to Burk (2002:234) the 1936 Olympics in Berlin was the first major event which was to be broadcast live on television. As Eggers (2002:91) highlights, exactly those modern conditions which drive football today were in place very early: the global role of commerce, media, and star-players. The political role of football regarded stadium building to create historical symbols. In turn, their construction created jobs which enhanced affiliation to political leadership, especially by the construction industry and urban workers. And also another complementary industry had emerged – sports goods. In 1890, football manufacturers sold about 2.000 balls throughout Germany (Koch, 1983). The third chapter will highlight how this sports goods industry increasingly influenced football diplomacy in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. First, however, was the institutionalisation of economic and political forces on an international level towards the ‘universal’ football body named FIFA.

## 2.4. FIFA

Above, the scene was set for this thesis to now look at the development of the world football body FIFA. This leads towards the final understanding of FIFA as the ‘universal’ football body which this second chapter provides. So far, this thesis made clear that at the onset of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, football became a reference point for the world to be perceived as truly global. This section will further clarify the obstacles for FIFA’s development towards the ‘universal’ football body, such as succeeding competing football organisations (Olympic football tournament and the *Mitropacup*). Finally, this section will highlight the connection of FIFA’s ‘universal’ character with military-political preconditions. While major wars erupted at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, sport evolved into a major tool to provide for regional and national identification during peace.

Still, international football matches needed an overarching institution for common rules. The internationally organised football game started in Great Britain and was international in character already then (Armstrong & Guilianotti, 1999:3). Accordingly, the *Fédération Internationale de Football Association*, FIFA, became the pre-eminent global football organisation and essentially determined the rules for the game. FIFA intended from its start to invent the football World Cup: On the one hand a production process to create financial

profit, on the other hand, to realise FIFA's claim to be the sole global football body. The interconnectedness between FIFA, football, media, the corporate world, and states, moved FIFA to the top of the international football system within which all individuals (households) and groups (states, firms, and other groups of economic and political identity) came to seek influence. This search for influence meant that specifically the World Cup became a resource whose economic and political values were distributed between the mentioned stakeholders.

Nevertheless, FIFA still had to establish encompassing control over football. Separatist football organisations had to be dissolved or incorporated into FIFA. The (Anglo-French-American) capitalist world-economy prevailed as the globally dominating system after the third world war (according to Modern-World Systems theory the major wars commonly known as World War I and II). And with it, FIFA prevailed as the global football body. Amid this military and politico-economic world domination of the capitalist world-economy, FIFA became able to exemplify its global rule and legitimise this claim against any football separatism. However, FIFA needed the support by all national football organisations in the world. Thereby, those countries which came to be known as the developing world were crucial to the perception that FIFA was the universal football institution. Finally, the diplomatic processes within FIFA were directly connected to the well-being of the modern world-system's interstate system. FIFA became a dominant player within the capitalist world-economy. And by drawing specifically overseas (outside Europe) football dominions under its supervision, FIFA expanded its 'universal' football rule and legitimised its claim as the global control institution over football. However, universal meant the well-being of the major European powers within the framework of the capitalist world-economy.

#### 2.4.1. The beginnings of FIFA as the universal football body

The *Fédération Internationale de Football Association*, FIFA, was created on 21 May 1904. It aimed at producing common football rules binding for all so that international matches could take place. FIFA was initiated by the French engineer and newspaper editor, Robert Guérin. From the start, FIFA showed its roots in the interplay of sport and media. Guérin proposed to the English FA to establish an international football federation, but the suggestion was rejected and only cooperation in fields of mutual interest was offered. Guérin "recalled, in the 1920s: 'Tiring of the struggle and recognizing that the Englishmen, true to tradition, wanted to wait and watch, I undertook to invite the delegates from various nations myself'" (Tomlinson, 2000:55). FIFA's foundation in Paris in 1904 included football

representatives from France, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain (without an association by then but represented by the club Madrid FC), Sweden, and Switzerland. On the same day the German football association declared its membership via telegraph (Gerhardt, 2006). Although the English FA did not take part, FIFA took over the rules laid out by the English International Football Association Board (IFAB). Still today, IFAB which was installed in 1886 remains the authority concerned with the rules of the game (*FIFA.com*, 2006). The acronym FIFA stands for *Fédération Internationale de Football Association* and means that FIFA is the international federation of ‘Association Football’.

On 14 April 1905, the Executive Committee of the English FA joined FIFA recognising the other national associations in FIFA. That the English FA teamed up with FIFA “was FIFA’s first big success, thanks to Baron Edouard de Laveleve. With great personal efforts, the President of the *Union Belge des Sociétés de Sports Athlétiques* dissipated the last misgivings and doubts of the English” (*FIFA.com*, 2006). (The factor of individual effort in FIFA diplomacy had shown its importance from the start and was often officially honoured.) Thereafter, England took over the lead in FIFA. When Daniel Burley Woolfall became FIFA President in 1906, first steps were taken in the direction of FIFA teaming up with the International FA Board. Yet, FIFA began to take part in IFAB meetings only from 1913 onwards which again shows English supremacy in the creation of football rules. Daniel Burley Woolfall summarised the English FA’s position after meeting other football nations in 1905 in Switzerland:

[I]t is important to the FA and other European Associations that a properly constituted Federation should be established and the Football Association should use its influence to regulate football on the Continent as a pure sport and give all Continental Associations the full benefit of the many years experience of the FA (Tomlinson, 2000:57).

With ‘pure’, Woolfall obviously referred to football’s normative principles clarifying that the English elite represented English football internationally. However, the economic interests became stronger also in FIFA.

Until the second FIFA Congress in June 1905 in Berlin, associations from Germany, Austria, Italy and Hungary were officially incorporated; Scotland, Wales and Ireland followed England’s example. In 1909, FIFA became more global in character with the membership of South Africa. Yet, according to Apraku and Hesselmann (1998:16), the South African association was not African but under English rule. After the British won the Boer-war (1899-1902) the Boers received self-administration in South Africa and Dutch became the official



language (1923 saw a switch to Afrikaans) (Kinder & Hilgemann, 1985:103). Only in 1923, did the first independent African football association joined in: the football association of Egypt, EFA, which was formed in 1921.

#### 2.4.2. FIFA versus the Olympic football tournament

FIFA intended to create an independent international tournament under its own supervision. The plans for a first tournament in Switzerland in 1906 failed. So the first international tournaments were organised within the realm of the Olympic Games – first in London, 1908, and then in 1912 in Stockholm which were won by England. Information diverges with regards to who actually organised the first Olympic tournaments. Some sources name FIFA as the responsible organiser in 1912. Some say the Olympic Games in 1908 and 1912 were supervised by the English FA. As FIFA committed itself to the rules of IFAB and that FIFA only began to take part in IFAB meetings in 1913, it can be assumed that it was rather the English FA which was responsible for organising the Olympic tournament. However,

[t]he new virtually unknown sport was regarded suspiciously at the Olympics and was considered as a show and not a competition. In connection with the Olympic Games, the problem of professional players also arose – a thorny problem which would be pursued in decades to follow (*FIFA.com*, 2006).

In addition, World War I interrupted the development of FIFA. Nevertheless, relations between the FIFA affiliates were not broken, and some international matches took place on neutral territory. On 1 March 1921 the French Jules Rimet became the third President of FIFA (*FIFA.com*, 2006). This shift of power away from the English FA paved the way for FIFA's focus to accept and promote professional rather than amateur football. Ultimately, this led to the withdrawal of the English FA in 1928. The Olympic football tournament in 1924 received very positive resonance which led to FIFA's intensification to plan for an own Championship. Furthermore, differences arose between FIFA and the Olympic Committee with regards to the amateur status of the players. The British were against professionalism and Stanley Rous, who later became FIFA President, reminisced in a 1985 BBC interview:

We used to look upon it as a sport, as a recreation, ... we had little regard of points and league position and cup competitions. We used to play friendly matches mostly. There was always such a sporting attitude and the winners always clapped the others off the field and so on. That's all changed of course (Tomlinson, 2000:59).



Thus, the major powers in FIFA were in conflict with the English football elite. England wanted to keep international football on an amateur basis following higher values such as self-discipline, equality, and fairness. However, French initiation of FIFA sought to accept professional football in order to bring about the best possible football in an international tournament and to provide for a spectator friendly show. And amid these internal problems, FIFA experienced an external problem: the establishment of a strong separatist football organisation around the region of the former Austrian-Hungarian Empire, the *Mitropacup*.

#### 2.4.3. FIFA versus the *Mitropacup*

After football was introduced to 'middle-Europe', it quickly developed enormous support in the big cities such as Budapest, Prague, and Vienna. Shortly after the turn of century, the Austrian-Hungarian Empire's two parts, Austria and Hungary, staged football matches between each other. In fact, football became a mirror for the national differences as well as ethno-nationalist sentiments. The match terminology deployed in the media (such as comparing matches with 'battles') increased tension between teams and spectators. However, these tensions were decreased at the same time by the ritual of the football competition (Marschik, 2000).

In 1897, John Gramlick senior, co-founder of the *Vienna Cricket and Football-Club*, installed the *Challenge-Cup*. It lasted until 1911 and all football clubs of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire could take part in that tournament. With the start of the First World War, these international playing contacts came to an end. But during the interwar-years, football quickly developed into a mass culture in and around Austria (Marschik, 2000). The sport served the nations which were defeated in World War I as a way of achieving international recognition: profits for the clubs, social mobility for players, and professional entertainment for spectators. The newly established countries such as Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia also came to use football to create a sense of nationhood. Austria's football association permitted professional football, followed by Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, due to a lack of financial resources only a few clubs were able to commit to the financial efforts necessary for international matches and victorious match results. Football clubs started to use every income possible in order to undertake extensive foreign tours.

The *Mitropacup* (officially *La Coupe de l'Europe Centrale*), was found on 17 June 1927 in Venice, Italy, on the initiative of the Austrian association leader Hugo Meisl. *Mitropa* referred to 'middle-Europe', an area which was only vaguely defined. Before World War II it

was the most important tournament in Europe and was the predecessor of the European Cup (national sides) and the UEFA Champions League (clubs). Its establishment occurred after different professional football leagues were installed: 1924 in Austria, a year later in Hungary, and Czechoslovakia another year later. The intention was to manifest the area's dominance in football and help the professional clubs economically. According to Marschnik (2000), the *Mitropacup* was based on a private agreement and meant an active confession to 'middle-Europe'. The clubs which came to tour Europe, North-Africa, and the Near-East were seen as representatives of the "Donaufußball" ('Danube-football').

The first *Mitropacup* started on 14 August 1927 between the national league and cup champions, of Austria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. In 1936, the cup counted already 20 different clubs, including Switzerland. And in 1937 Rumanian teams also took part. The matches were specifically rough and openly fostered nationalist sentiments. Like national team games, the international club matches were equally seen as nationalist confrontations and became football highlights with up to 100.000 spectators. Like today, football stars (like the Austrian Matthias Sindelar and the Italian Giuseppe Meazza) were public focal points. The *Mitropacup* became extremely political. At that time, Yugoslavian football was dominated by Croatia. Through the affiliation to *Mitropa* and, in turn, support by Austria, Croatia intended to roll back the growing power of the Serbian association. Furthermore, fascist Italy sought better political contact to 'middle-Europe' via *Mitropacup* affiliation. International exchange of players increased as well as 'middle-European' football's international reputation. However, the relationships were actually very competitive and hostile:

No national side season and no Mitropacup-competition ended without the occurrence of riots on the field as well as between spectators. Often the existence of the Mitropacup was threatened: 'What a real Mitropacup-match is, has to be played to its end at the embassy', Friedrich Torberg noted (Marschnik, 2000).

In the beginning, Germany was not admitted to the *Mitropacup*. But with the rise of National-Socialism in Germany the cup slowly lost its status as well as members, and thereby Germany came to dissolve the *Mitropacup*. In 1938 Austria was annexed by Germany and in 1939 only eight teams took part in the competition. Due to the outbreak of World War II the cup was stopped. Despite low public interest, matches still took place between teams of the "Ostmark" (the way Austria was called during Nazi-Germany), of the "Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren" (the part of Czechoslovakia that diplomatically fell under Nazi-rule), and

German friendly Hungary. Thereby, Nazi-Germany sought greater affiliation from its neighbours as well as legitimatisation of its rule. However, with the defeat of Germany in the Second World War, also the *Mitropacup* ceased to exist and FIFA became the global organisation for football.

#### 2.4.4. The FIFA World Cup

In 1928, the English FA left FIFA and four years later, FIFA decided not to organise the Olympic football tournament due to differences regarding amateur and professional football. Thereafter, the FIFA statutes recognised the Olympic tournament as the world championships for amateur football (*FIFA.com*, 2006). On 28 May 1928, the FIFA Congress decided to stage a world championship for professional football. Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden submitted their candidature to host the first World Cup. But soon it became clear that the winner of the 1924 and 1928 Olympic tournaments, Uruguay, should become host. Besides Uruguay's sporting success there were several other aspects in favour of Uruguay to host the World Cup. First, it celebrated its 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary of independence in 1930. Second, Uruguay's football association took over all the costs, concerning for example the travel and accommodation of the participants. In addition, any possible profit would be shared with FIFA while Uruguay obliged to take over deficits if they occurred. It was financially the best that could have happened to FIFA which still suffered from World War I (*FIFA.com*, 2006).

Although FIFA grew in the number of its members, only a few European teams entered the competition in Uruguay: France, Belgium, Yugoslavia, and Romania. The reason was that the clubs did not want to let their best players be away for two months due to a long sea journey. The first World Cup commenced on 18 July 1930 in Montevideo and it was a sporting and financial success. Yet, problems remained with regards to the attendance of players and accessibility for spectators, specifically Europeans. The 1932 FIFA Congress in Stockholm decided in favour of Italy to host the 2<sup>nd</sup> World Championships. For that World Cup "[q]ualifying matches had to be played in order to arrive at the 16 finalists. Right from the start, the Cup system applied and so, the national teams from Brazil and Argentina already had to return home after their first defeat" (*FIFA.com*, 2006). Italy won the final against Czechoslovakia. Importantly, this final became the start of the link between the FIFA World Cup and live-broadcasting. In 1934, for "the first time ever, the World Cup Final was being transmitted on the radio" (*FIFA.com*, 2006). Interestingly, Italy's hosting of the World Cup

stood in timely correlation with Italy's involvement in the separatist football organisation *Mitropa*.

#### 2.4.5. FIFA's universal power and military preconditions

FIFA sought for universal football regency and to centralise international football. FIFA showed an uncompromising path when, for example, closely after the English FA joined, FIFA forbid its members to play against an improvised English club without FIFA authorisation (*FIFA.com*, 2006). Still, national sides and the respective football stars that attended the 1934 FIFA World Cup in Italy were also taking part in the *Mitropacup* which still existed at that time. And already in the first World Cup, Yugoslavia and Romania were also affiliated to the *Mitropacup*. Competition between FIFA and the *Mitropacup* was apparent. However, while the *Mitropacup* remained entrenched in a regional perspective and even excluded Germany, FIFA already involved a greater number of states and, importantly, states from outside the European continent.

The combination of French initiative and English dominance in FIFA cohered with general developments in international relations. From 1904 until 1914, the German Reich stood close to the Austrian-Hungarian Empire while France and England were allied in the *Entente Cordiale* in 1904. And after the Morocco crisis in 1905/06 where Germany protested against France's peaceful penetration of Morocco Berlin was isolated further. This strengthened the British-French Entente reflected by the militaries' general-staff consultations between Britain, France, and Belgium (Kinder & Hilgemann, 1985:83).

Belgium played an important role in FIFA in the beginning. And also militarily, Belgium stood close to England and France particularly because of the German war strategy for 1914 to 1917. The *Schlieffen-Plan* established by a German general in 1905/06 included the quick take over of Belgium. When the *Schlieffen-Plan* became public in 1906, Belgium sought closer links to England. In addition, Belgium's colonial practice became influenced by England's public discourse. At that time, the Belgian Congo was the private property of the Belgian crown. Increased British critique about abominations against indigenous Africans led to a return to state rule by Belgium over Belgian-Congo in 1908 (Kinder & Hilgemann, 1985:85, 125).

From 1890 until 1914, Germany sought for world power status. However, World War I interrupted Germany's imperial intentions and also dissolved the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. On 8 January 1918, US-President Wilson announced his plan which paved the way for the

*League of Nations*. His proposition included the recognition of independence movements by the different ethnic groups in the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. New nation-states emerged such as Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and the division of Austria and Hungary. The Monarchies in Germany and Austria were shattered and republican movements became dominant in Europe (Kinder & Hilgemann, 1985:131). Although the *League of Nations* was not able to uphold worldwide peace for a longer time, it was, nevertheless, the start of the global community shown in the later established *United Nations*.

The established powers in the *League of Nations* were also leading the cultural practice of football into the global institution, FIFA. Yet, FIFA needed the affiliation by football associations from outside Europe in order to represent a broader geographic representation. South America's football already enjoyed a well developed football infrastructure. The confederation CONMEBOL was already established in 1916 and organised annual championships between CONMEBOL nations apart from FIFA. Nevertheless, the football establishments in South America were originally introduced by Europeans and especially the British. Despite FIFA's prohibition to form separate football federations, CONMEBOL was admitted to FIFA as a kind of independent football union. In addition, FIFA even strengthened CONMEBOL by handing out the first World Cup to a South American country. CONMEBOL's subordination was returned with the favour to host the FIFA World Cup whereby South America could increase recognition by Europe as a more equal partner. On the other side, that the FIFA World Cup took place outside Europe materialised global ambit of the new body FIFA and gave FIFA the representational legitimisation as the sole universal football body. Thereafter, FIFA received a great influx of new members. Until 1954, FIFA already counted 79 members.

## 2.5. Summary

FIFA achieved universal football hegemony. The reason was, first, that FIFA incorporated the world-system's universal value-system. This included transmitting a sense of international order and hierarchy to the general public and enabled the peaceful outplay of national rivalry. In turn, this helped states' enhancement of national identification within a geographically enlarged 'world'. And also complementary industries within nations were enhanced through football and the World Cup helped governments' celebration of nationhood. Second, FIFA was able to break English football elite's resistance and focussed on professional football. Thereby, FIFA ensured the creation of exciting tournaments. Third,

FIFA was able to gain control over all football in Europe by the dissolution of a separatist and economically strong football organisation. And fourth, the incorporation of overseas football dominions, the perceived 'developing world', ensured FIFA's status as the universal football institution by displaying an enlarged capitalist world-economy.



## **CHAPTER THREE: FROM EUROPEAN IMPERIALISM TO AFRICAN EMANCIPATION**

### **3.1. Introduction**

Regarding the quest to understand why Africa received the 2010 FIFA World Cup, this chapter will now define Africa's position within the international football system. This chapter argues that FIFA had to take an African nation into account as a possible host for the FIFA World Cup. To make this clear, this chapter will look at the origins of African football as well as football's meaning in African society. Furthermore, this chapter will highlight Africa's first steps towards emancipation in the international football system and FIFA diplomacy. European colonialism left newly independent African states to seek international emancipation through subordination to dependency on Europe. In addition to that, the need to enhance African nation-hood led to an influx of many African states into FIFA. This created immense power for the Africa-block within FIFA. In turn, African members symbolically enhanced FIFA's universal football power.

However, the economic reality of the international football system reflects neo-imperialist practices by the North. Due to the immense utilisation of African football talent by the European (core) football industry, FIFA needed to realign to norms of equality and fairness in its diplomatic conduct. Particularly newly democratised South Africa, proved to be able to organise (or host) the FIFA World Cup. Furthermore, the increased political power in FIFA as well as its symbolic value made Africa a strong interest group willing to change the inequalities of the international football system. Thus, FIFA had to take cognizance of the need for an African nation to host the FIFA World Cup as a diplomatic incentive.

### **3.2. Rise of football in African culture**

This first section of this chapter will show how important football became for African societies. The sport was brought to Africa through European imperialism. The sport's instalment deepened European power in Africa during the colonial era due to the colonisers' intention to use football as a tool to subordinate Africans to the Eurocentric order and exploiting Africa. However, the sport became a ground on which a new African identity was fostered and resistance against European rule emerged, which made football an important reference point for African identity. In addition, international representation through football

gave newly independent states' elites the opportunity to enhance nationhood and international recognition. Africa's struggle emerged as a struggle for emancipation within the European implemented capitalist world-economy. This chapter will therefore highlight now how football served as a tool to implement both European normative principles and economic practice in Africa and again for their reproduction by new African elites.

Cox (1987:390) points out that "Third World workers may not have acquired the degree of self-consciousness, organizational capacity and ideological maturity necessary to become the basis of a counterhegemonic bloc." However, African nations came to embrace what Cox conceptualises as nationalist-socialism. In addition, Gramsci's analysis on populism – defined as 'caesarism' – can be applied to African nations: "the assemblage of factions in a cartel state, each maneuvering for influence within the state apparatus, seeking control over strategic instruments of state (military forces, police, intelligence, development bank, regional power position, etc.), and cultivating clienteles and support bases in society" (Cox, 1987:238). Football served well in the submission of European values brought by imperialist-encounters of European capitalism. Thereafter, football served well in the creation of nationhood – in terms of the instalment and legitimacy of the new African elites – which in turn reproduced the capitalist system.

### 3.2.1. European imperialism and colonialism

European imperialism brought football to Africa. Soldiers and merchants were the first to play the game on the African continent and established the first clubs. Thereafter, businessmen, and colonial administrators furthered the game's development in Africa, yet keeping it a white leisure activity. Sport organisations served to keep the link between the European powers and their satellites. Nevertheless, Africans started to play football. On the one hand, football was obviously a fun activity. On the other hand, football came to be institutionalised as a prominent tool to transform African society according to the liking of the European oppressors. In general, colonial administration and increasingly Christian missionaries fostered African football in order to implement humanist values and forms of behaviour in the presumed 'uncivilised' subjects. The exact nature of football development was different from colony to colony and from coloniser to coloniser. Yet overall football development followed similar paths all over Africa.

Belgian colonialism was said to have been extremely hostile regarding the treatment of indigenous Africans. There, football was used in the training of African soldiers in Belgian

Congo (later Zaïre) in order to suppress fellow Africans. In terms of French colonial rule in northern and western parts of Africa, the aim was to transform the ‘uncivilised’ subjects into French citizens as part of the greater France. In order to reach France’s colonial doctrine of assimilation, it was seen as a necessity to convert the ‘undistinguished colonial subject into a civilised *evolué*’ (Wachter, 2002:122). Likewise, British administration in central, western, and southern African regions had the same intention. British recruitment procedures for colonial administration favoured to employ those with an Oxbridge education which had also a sports profile and specifically football experience. In the 1930s, nine out of ten officials in the Gold Coast counted some sport successes (Wachter, 2002:121). Nevertheless, British administration was said to have been less hostile compared to French and Belgian rule and offered greater freedom for African self-control (Darby, 2002:17). In addition, English direct control focussed rather on rugby and cricket which created a greater chance for African participation in football.

### 3.2.2. Internal African resistance

Industrialisation developments in Africa showed similarities to the beginnings of football in industrialising Europe. In South Africa, the discovery of gold and diamonds led to the increased utilisation of Africans as mine-workers. In addition, a cow-plague led to an immense migration by indigenous Africans to the urban centres. Football was utilised by the European elite to control the workers’ leisure activities. Generally, European rule feared social unrest due to the decreasing living conditions for African workers as well as the concentration of ever more Africans in the urban centres everywhere on the continent. In Nigeria, football was mainly concentrated in the city of Lagos where British colonial administrators and merchants founded the Nigerian Football Association (NFA) in 1931 (Wachter, 2002:125). However, the European educated Africans, the generation of the new African elite, came to use football against white rule and to their own political intentions. Directly after 1945, Nigeria was dominated by strikes of railway workers and miners and African political consciousness grew. In North-Africa, football organisation moved earlier into the hands of Africans. In Egypt, indigenous Africans started independent football development in 1907 (Apraku and Hesselmann, 1998:12). Different levels of African self-organisation caused later developments of inequality between African nations.

In contrast to the European colonisers’ intention to use football as a means to implement subordination to colonial rule, the sport became an important ground on which Africans

started to organise resistance. Nevertheless, resistance reproduced the capitalist order brought from Europe, especially so because the new African elites were European educated. However, the new African elites communicated the ambiguity of white rule. Instead of humanist football principles of fairness, equality, and non-violence, the white oppressors violently exploited Africa and presumed and enhanced African inequality and dependency. In South Africa, increased urbanisation during the 1920s and 1930s made football develop into a popular past-time activity of black males in Durban and the Witwatersrand (the Johannesburg region). However, white authorities did not give indigenous Africans adequate sport facilities and political leaders such as Albert Luthuli got involved in resisting inequality in football. Trade unionists and ANC (African National Congress) members came to foster 'race-conscious populism':

football played the role of 'asserting changing black masculine identities' as players could affirm and express themselves rather than succumb to extreme racism and oppression, and thus African men were able to negotiate their identities (Bolsman, 2006:294).

In addition, a black press established itself which spread resentment against subordination to white rule. In South Africa, the Communist Party achieved greater influence over the political activities of workers in Durban during the depression of the 1930s. Charismatic leaders emerged, like Johannes Nkosi or Zulu Phungula, who threatened political stability.

French and Belgian colonies underwent similar developments. Cultural unifications and specifically football clubs became non-prohibitive structures for Africans where they could articulate opinions and self-organisation. Therefore, football began to function as an arena for anti-colonial dissidence in Belgian Congo:

An organisational infrastructure for African run football began to emerge during the 1920s and many of the locally formed football teams came to represent a focal point for the indigenous communities and one of the few arenas in which to criticize their colonial rulers and voice concerns about worsening socio-economic conditions brought about by the economic recession of the 1920s and early 1930s (Wachter, 2002:124).

African football organisation started in Brazzaville in 1931 most of which were closely connected to African pro-nationalist movements. After World War II, football became a vehicle for African nationalism in Zaire which led to the creation of a national side in 1957, three years before independence.

In Nigeria, Nnamdi Azikiwe who later became President, came to play an important role in the anti-colonial movement. He used football to exemplify the problem of Africans'

unequal status. Azikiwe's pan-African newspaper *West African Pilot* strongly criticised state institutions (like the railway, the marine, and the post and telegraphy authorities) which wasted money on football. Clubs like the white-led *Railway FC* could regularly buy off the best players from *ZAC* or *Muslim Eleven FC* by offering non-manual jobs. The clubs ran by Nigerians had no access to the pool of talented players generated by missionary schools because the white football association prohibited pupils to play club football. Azikiwe's newspaper accused the British football establishment of acting against the sport principle of equality. Thus, the sport ethos which used to be a symbol for European civilisation and superiority was returned by nationalists and freedom-fighters. It illustrated the decadence of the colonialists and their inability as rulers. Therefore, the fight over football was congruent with the anti-colonial struggle on the streets and at work (Wachter, 2002:125).

### 3.2.3. International African resistance

The new African elites took over the European made politico-geographic entities. They sought international recognition as nation-states and to establish political and economic relationships via international football contacts. In addition, due to the mix of ethnicities within these state-boundaries, governments prominently used football politically to create a sense of nation-hood. The first African President of Ghana (Gold Coast during colonisation) was one of the first to recognise the potential of football for the integration of ethnically fragmented nations. Kwame Nkrumah is said to have started a real football revolution after Ghana's independence in 1957. In 1959, he founded Ghana's national side, the *Black Stars*, which sought to represent his philosophic and political ideals also on the international football field. The resources that went into football produced one of the best football teams on the continent and Ghana's victories at the Africa-Cup in 1963 and 1965. The team photo of the successful Black Stars with Kwame Nkrumah in their middle found its way into most of Ghana's households (Wachter, 2002:126). Similarly, in Zambia more than seventy tribes were forced into one state. After independence in 1964, the then President Kenneth Kaunda "planned to use the popular sport of football as a means of binding the young nation together" (Broere & Van der Drift, 1997:68).

However, what became decisive for Africa's international representation through football were highly qualified football players. The Algerian liberation movements' search for international recognition exemplified the dependency on Europe's football industry in this regard. Since the establishment of France's professional league in 1932, North-African

football migrants were central actors. In 1938 already 147 Africans, most of which came from the Maghreb, were playing in the two top-leagues. Apparently, France's imperial practice was to make sense of a greater France (including its colonies) also by using football players from its colonies as part of the French national side. Since 1956, Algerian clubs took part in the French Cup competitions. However, two years later, eight professional footballers of Algerian origin left their French clubs in order to participate in the team of Algeria's independence movement in Tunis. An official communiqué by the Algerian *Front de Libération National* (FLN) praised the players as patriots who more than anyone else vowed for their country's independence. They were described as giving the example for Algeria's youth for courage, righteousness, and unselfishness. Although the rebellious team was directly banned by FIFA, it toured as ambassadors for the FLN through many parts of the world until the end of the independence war in 1962. Furthermore, football qualities became a positive factor for individual political aspirations: the first President of independent Algeria, Ahmed Ben Bella, briefly played for the professional team Olympique Marseille in 1941. Still, some of the members in the independence-team were representing the Algerian revolution only for a short time. They returned to France after Algeria's independence (Wachter, 2002:126-127).

### 3.2.4. International institutionalisation of African football

In 1956, Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan, and South Africa founded the *Confédération Africain de Football* (Confederation of African Football), CAF. They were the only politically independent countries at that time. Egypt was playing the leading role for CAF as the first African country which had attended a FIFA World Cup, in 1934, manifesting its interest in FIFA. Furthermore, Egypt's government and National Olympic Committee took over first financial aspects for CAF. The rich club *Al Ahly* (meaning national) gave to Egypt's football association (EFA) parts of its premises and EFA gave a bit of this space to CAF. Later, Egypt's National Olympic Committee presented CAF with 2.000 British Pounds with which CAF bought land directly neighbouring Egypt's football association to build its own headquarters. The decisive administrative positions were first occupied by Egyptians like the Presidency and the General-Secretary. According to Apraku and Hesselmann (1998:17) the closeness of CAF to North-Africa is a major criticism by Sub-Saharan nations. Nevertheless, CAF, like any other football organisation, aimed at organising independent championships. In 1957, the first African Cup of Nations tournament was held in Sudan and installed as Africa's competition for national sides every two years.



In addition to the formation of diplomatic co-operation within African football, also Africa's power within FIFA slightly increased. When the colonial powers started to withdraw from their African dominions, Kistner and Weinreich (1998:26) claim that FIFA, just like the United Nations, offered African nations an area of worldwide acknowledgment 'where they could finally show their own flag'. According to Armstrong & Giulianotti (1999:4) "the game soon became a vehicle for the cultural pride and ethnic solidarity of the indigenous peoples". And FIFA (2004) proudly highlights that "[a]mong the first steps taken by newly independent nations was their affiliation to FIFA. So, the number of members grew steadily." This development was later to become decisive for the shift of power in FIFA from Europe to South America. With the increased number of African members in the FIFA Congress – about the same as Europe – Africa became a powerful faction regarding the Presidential elections.

### 3.3. Rise of Africa in FIFA

Africa's power within FIFA started quantitatively and developed qualitatively. This was rooted in the great number of African members in the FIFA Congress. There, the FIFA President is elected and therefore Africa became an important ally for established football powers. This led to an increase in African representation in the FIFA Executive Committee as well as in the FIFA World Cup. However, this had to await the rise of the Brazilian João Havelange. His campaigning for the FIFA Presidency included many promises to African FIFA members which then resulted in greater qualitative power for Africa. Still, to fulfil his promises, Havelange had to open up FIFA for capital and transformed FIFA into a business venture. Economic interests and opaque business practices came to guide FIFA's conduct. Nevertheless, in addition to diplomatic promises, decisive for Havelange's succession of the English Stanley Rous as President was also the issue of apartheid South Africa. The great international discourse against apartheid led to the ban of South Africa in many diplomatic spheres. And also with regards to FIFA, the promise by Havelange to ban the apartheid football association was an important promise for African members to vote for him. Thereby, the black South African elite achieved great support which was later to be developed further into South African hegemony on the African continent also in football terms.

### 3.3.1. Demise of English power

Africa's struggle for equality in the world body has to be seen as a rise of the so-called developing world as a whole in FIFA. This was led foremost by South America which showed a longer history of political independence and experience in football organisation. Still, at the beginning of FIFA's existence and with Jules Rimet still in power "FIFA was so Eurocentric that no need was seen for any separate European organization. Rimet's concept of the world football family was deeply rooted in an entrenched colonialism" (Tomlinson, 2000:58). But South America became a football super-power opposing European dominance on both sportive as well as diplomatic fields. Specifically Brazil managed to become a major football power after it hosted the World Cup in 1950. It also won the World Cup in 1958 and 1962 and until today, Brazil remains the most successful national side in the history of the FIFA World Cup. In addition, a general discussion around the discrimination of FIFA's developing constituent emerged.

The English FIFA Presidents secured the demand of their nation to host the World Cup in 1966. Inequality for peripheral nations remained, especially due to the Eurocentric worldview by the FIFA President Stanley Rous:

A modernizer compared to Rimet, Rous remained nevertheless trapped in an anachronistic set of values. ... Rous could be both innovative and traditional, adventurous yet crabably cautious; modern yet steeped in traditional values. With World Cup finals looking increasingly lucrative, and emerging Third World nations wanting more representation in the world game, Rous appeared ever more old-worldly (Tomlinson, 2000:60).

Rous's attitude reflecting English supremacy in the world became his weakness. According to Tomlinson (2000:60), even Europe saw Rous as too English. Regarding the 1966 World Cup, discussions went so far as saying that he manipulated the tournament in favour of England, leading to the success of 'his team' in the final match. The pressure on Stanley Rous rose, especially from the side of the developing world. Officials started to call for changes within FIFA, especially regarding FIFA's attitude. "To raise the 'moral and the athletic level of the World Cup', [the coach of the Swiss national team, Dr A.] Foni proposed a more representative participation" referring also to the increasingly important continents Africa and Asia (Tomlinson, 2000:60). For the 1966 World Cup, Africa and Asia together were only admitted with one team. FIFA's normative claims of fairness and equality were suffering from not representing the football associations equally. Before 1970, CAF had to share a

tournament place with the Asian confederation AFC which had to be played out between the best teams of the two confederations. The obvious discrimination made resistance grow against European dominance in FIFA. Kwame Nkrumah, then Ghana's President, initiated the CAF campaign to boycott the 1966 final World Cup tournament in England. The CAF executive committee declared Africa's World Cup representation as 'outrageously unfair' and informed FIFA in 1964 to withdraw all national associations from the qualification. The Asian confederation followed this boycott. FIFA reacted with a sanctioning of 5000 Swiss Francs, but renounced from this in the face of the World Cup qualification for 1970 (Wachter, 2002:117, 127).

CAF officials, most notably Ydnekatchew Tessema, the confederation's President at the time, increasingly gave voice to their frustrations and indignation and Africa's relationship with Rous's FIFA grew steadily fractious. Beyond the broader concerns over inequality and lack of opportunity within world football, the status of South Africa within the world body between the late 1950s and early 1970s came to represent a central dynamic around which African acrimony towards FIFA revolved (Darby, 2006:4-5).

And with the rise of Brazil as a major power in FIFA, the European power base was soon to be stopped. In fact, the head of Brazil's football association, João Havelange, turned the face of FIFA by 180 degrees.

### 3.3.2. Havelange, the new FIFA President from Brazil

To understand the transformation of FIFA starting in the mid-1970s, the role of the new President João Havelange has to be highlighted. He had an extraordinary career and came to preside over FIFA for 24 years. Born in 1916 as a son of a Belgian industrialist and arms trader he "learned the rudiments of business administration" and gained business experience very early in his life. He also performed sports on an elite level and represented Brazil in the Olympic Games in Berlin in 1936 as swimmer and in Helsinki in 1953 as part of the water polo team. Already after the 1936 Olympics he extensively travelled Nazi-Germany and saw business opportunities in the transport industry.

In his own words, the post-war years were for him ones of opportunity for fighting government interference in the market. ... By the mid-1950s Havelange had established a power base in national business networks. ... Later he played an important role in the

modernisation process of Brazil and had built a business empire in the transport and financial industries (Tomlinson, 2000:61).

Havelange had an elite European background and rather represented Brazil's high industry and European oligarchy in the developing world. "[H]e played junior football with Fluminense, the amateur sporting club for Brazil's elite. To belong to this club it was necessary to belong to a family of means – which meant being white." This club had the nickname 'face-powder club' because "a famous mixed race player, Carlos Alberto, sought to pass himself off as white by powdering his face in the locker rooms" (Tomlinson, 2000:61). Havelange found his base from which to start with his personal business encounter in the Brazilian Sports Federation (CBD) and gained authority over Brazil's major sports. Havelange once explained:

'I brought with me the entrepreneurial skills, the business skills from my own company to the federation,' he says. 'There were just [sports] coaches, but I brought in specialist doctors, administrators for the federation to give it a wider basis. This is what made the difference and why we [Brazil] won the World Cup in 1958, 1962 and 1970' (Tomlinson, 2000:61).

Havelange saw that he could promote Brazil's image internationally but also "his own global profile" by strengthening Brazil's football through commercialisation of the national league and cup. These experiences paved the way for FIFA's global expansion during his regency.

Furthermore, Havelange anticipated Africa's increasing strength in the FIFA Congress, in contrast to Stanley Rous, and utilised this when he applied for FIFA Presidency. Havelange's campaign for the 1974 FIFA President elections included a brochure in which he listed all kinds of high-level posts, awards and order memberships. Importantly however, he emphasised his Brazilian origin. Like for example South Africa, Brazil is a microcosm reflecting the whole range of the globe's societal aspects. In addition, he presented himself in 86 countries together with Brazil's football icon Pelé (Kistner & Weinreich, 1998:25). Pelé was the first global and black football superstar and supportive of Africa's football. Finally, Havelange was said to be a man with the aura of power and that he was even frightening to some people (Tomlinson, 2000). Such character traits became useful to exert power and create loyalties, to establish commercial contacts and bind functionaries to his person.

### 3.3.3. South Africa's role in the 1974 Presidential elections

South Africa played an important role in the outcome of the 1974 FIFA Presidential election. In fact, the 1974 election reflected the rise of South Africa's black elite by support of the international community as well as by South America's struggle for power in FIFA. Together with rising African consciousness, the formerly suppressed groups increased power through football and within FIFA. As outlined above, African football fostered a new pan-African identity by the establishment of the African football confederation CAF – including its emancipation against white rule. A year after CAF was found, the confederation banned apartheid South Africa. However, in 1952 (four years in advance of CAF's foundation) FIFA had already welcomed South Africa with open arms. But in opposition to the white football association (FASA), African, Indian, and Coloured football affiliates founded the South African Soccer Federation (SASF) in September 1952. It became the largest in the country and reflected multi-racial cooperation. SASF started to lobby at FIFA for recognition as the only legitimate representative for South African football in 1954. Apparently, SASF was the football representative for over eighty percent of South Africa's population (Darby, 2006:6).

[A] FIFA Emergency Committee meeting, convened on 8 May 1955 concluded that SAFA did not control all football activity in South Africa and as such did not conform to the International Federation's statutory definition of a 'real' national association (Darby, 2006:7).

Also SAFA responded by changing its name into FASA (Football Association of South Africa) and to renounce from racial exclusivity. The 1956 FIFA Congress in Lisbon accepted the new FASA although South Africa's internal politics made FASA to further adhere to apartheid policy. Apartheid's segregation ran counter to FIFA principles which became a major advantage for South Africa's multi-racial lobby. Already SASF's efforts at FIFA in 1954 officially accused SAFA (then FASA) to disregard FIFA's anti-discrimination principle (Bolsman, 2006:297). In the meantime, further anti-racist movements occurred also in other South African sports like table-tennis, rugby, cricket and weightlifting all of which struggled for recognition in international federations. A significant step was the establishment of SASA, the South African Sports Association, in October 1958. It lobbied during the 1960s primarily at the International Olympic Committee (IOC) which also had a non-racist constitution. This helped the struggle concerning football as football accounted for most of the Olympic organisation's members including several high officials in the executive committee (Dabry, 2006:8).

However, FIFA President Stanley Rous lobbied in favour of FASA in order to keep football and politics separated. International pressure was seen by white South Africa as political interference in the country's internal affairs. Rous headed the commission installed by the 1962 FIFA Congress in Chile to investigate allegations of racism and incoherence with the FIFA constitution in South Africa. Yet, for the 1964 FIFA Congress in Tokyo, the football association of the United Arab Emirates proposed the complete expulsion of FASA which was changed to suspension. Furthermore, the International Olympic Committee expelled the South African Olympic and National Games Association, SAONGA, from the Tokyo Olympics in 1964. This made SAONGA send a multi-racial Olympic team to the following Games in Mexico and the IOC to lift the expulsion in 1968. But because the team only included one black athlete, over forty nations boycotted the games, mainly from Africa, Asia, the Americas, and the Eastern bloc countries (Darby, 2006:15).

The white FASA tried to get around FIFA sanctions by the help of Rous and invited selected amateur teams from England, Brazil, and West-Germany to attend a 'multi-racial' sports festival in South Africa in 1973. But after it was revealed that South Africa would not let a racially mixed team play, the guests withdrew from their visit. According to Darby (2006:20), in the case of England and West-Germany the respective ministries of foreign affairs were mainly responsible for the withdrawal. In the case of Brazil, João Havelange as President of Brazil's football association saw the withdrawal through. Nevertheless, despite ongoing pressure Rous was re-elected as FIFA President in 1970 (Darby, 2006:18-19).

However, as Darby (2006:21-22) points out, Africa had realised its increased amount of power within FIFA due to its growing number of Congress members. And thus, João Havelange made South Africa a leading campaign issue for the 1974 FIFA President elections.

Rous' biggest mistake was to ignore developments in Africa. To him Havelange did not seem to be a serious opponent. So he refused to give in to the efforts by the Africans to boycott the white Apartheid-Regime in South Africa. ... Rous saw football as a political-free zone ... His pseudo-neutral attitude offered Havelange an easy game (Kistner & Weinreich, 1998:26)

Stanley Rous remained reluctant to ban apartheid South Africa from FIFA. In contrast, Havelange clearly spoke against South Africa's apartheid regime and was thereby able to win African votes in the FIFA Congress. "The contradictions surrounding Rous were to be cleverly exploited by Havelange". He won the presidential elections in 1974 in Frankfurt, Germany (Tomlinson, 1999:60-61). Havelange saw it through to ban South Africa's white



football association FASA from FIFA in 1976; and until the end of apartheid (Apraku and Hesselmann, 1998:18; Darby, 2006:21-22). Before South Africa's transition to democracy, the country remained a pariah in sport and lost important ground for international recognition and internal self-esteem. The membership in CAF and FIFA had a comparable symbolic value like membership in the OAU or the UN (Wachter, 2002:125).

### 3.3.4. Havelange's Promises

In addition to the apartheid issue Havelange's election as FIFA President was rooted in promises concerning increased power for the developing football constituents in FIFA. He introduced measures such as the enlargement of the FIFA Executive and the FIFA World Cup. However, this paved the way for FIFA's transformation into a multi-national business venture with an increased focus on economic interests. In order to keep his promises, Havelange needed to attract immense amounts of capital and to make the FIFA World Cup an extraordinary valuable asset in both political and economic terms. Havelange became an extremely controversial figure. His way of handling FIFA business took place behind the scenes and accusations of corruption and bribery increased during his regency. Already after the 1974 elections Havelange's conduct of diplomacy was criticised; especially by the defeated Stanley Rous. Rous specifically criticised Havelange's election campaign and the "appeals he'd made to countries". These included

[t]he increase in the number of World Cup final teams, from 16 to 24; the creation of a junior, under-20 World Championship; the construction of new FIFA headquarters; the provision of materials to needy national associations; help in stadium development and improvement; more courses for professionals; medical and technical help; and the introduction of an inter-continental club championship. Rous was no match for this manifesto, and Havelange won the presidency on the second ballot (Tomlinson, 2000:62-63).

But with Havelange on top, FIFA developed into a highly profitable venture. FIFA highlights Havelange as the one that helped the development of football in the world in general:

From the moment the South American Confederation, the Confederación Sudamericana de Fútbol, presented his candidature for the FIFA Presidency in 1970, he had looked for solutions to the major problems of world football. When Dr. João Havelange was elected at the 39th Congress in 1974, he was ready to consider football not only as a competition, but also to try and find new ways and means to worldwide

technical development and to prepare new generations for this. ... In no time, Havelange transformed an administration-oriented institution into a dynamic enterprise brimming with new ideas and the will to see them through (*FIFA.com*, 2006).

Technological advancement in television broadcasting was the major impetus for FIFA's further development. The FIFA World Cup had to conform to this development if it was to secure future income through television. And in fact, the World Cup's value chain had to create an economically effective and attractive event. As FIFA states, "[t]he TV transmission of the World Cup also considerably contributed towards the worldwide expansion" (*FIFA.com*, 2006). FIFA had to ensure excitement through attractive football because only thereby could the FIFA World Cup generate global attention which, in turn, made sponsors willing to pay extraordinary amounts of money. And only this global attractiveness led to the enormous income made possible by the sales of marketing and television rights. The FIFA World Cup developed into a globally lucrative business as well as ideological asset. However, the increased representation of the so-called developing football nations in FIFA needed financial back-up and legitimisation on the football field.

### 3.3.5. Northern Capital for Havelange's FIFA

Havelange came to draw immense amounts of capital into FIFA. Two important conditions were decisive for this, television and advertising. Neal (1975:206-207) refers to the 'utility of the media' still with newspapers in mind. Spitaler and Wieselberg highlight Maguire's (1999:144-146) concept of the 'media-sport-complex', which has to be understood as 'the interplay and growing together of three main sporting actors: sport organisations, media/marketing organisations, and trans- and multinational ventures' (2002:183). Burk (2002:237) refers to this complex as the "trias" of football, television and advertising industry which started to dominate football. Looking at Germany, the public television broadcasters, ARD and ZDF, did not even broadcast some games because of the increased utilisation of football to market brands. But the FIFA World Cup set new standards and enormous interest in the matches made the world oblige to FIFA's economic status. During the 1970 World Cup in Mexico, broadcasters' advertising restrictions could not be upheld. Brand placement around the field could not be avoided and brands became globally recognised, for example, the German brands *Kaufhof* (a chain-store) and *Jägermeister* (a spirit).

Looking at the German football league, sponsorship presented on the kits worn by football players was permitted in 1974. Burk (2002:236) names this era as the transformation from amateurism to “Vollprofitum” (‘full-professionalism’). Salaries of players and transfer payments rose and football became a lucrative business. The clubs developed into business ventures with turn-over surpassing the million-barrier in German Marks. In Germany, the fees to obtain the broadcasting rights of the league increased from 0.13 million in 1966/67 to 2.3 million German Marks in 1969/70. The enthronisation of the businessman Havelange as the head of FIFA made the football body realise its own value regarding its main asset, the World Cup.

In 1974, the 10<sup>th</sup> World Cup was still more of a competition between Europe and South America, with nine teams and four teams respectively. The confederations CONCACAF (North-and Central America and the Caribbean,) AFC (Asian confederation), and CAF could only send one team each. But for the 1982 World Cup in Spain, the number of competitors for the final round was increased to 24 teams and for the 1998 World Cup in France even up to 32 teams (the number of participants today). Africa and Asia profited most by being able to send more teams attending the final tournament. However, this immense increase in participants meant extraordinary logistical and managerial advancements and, thus, meant an enormous capital investment. “In no time, Havelange transformed an administration-oriented institution into a dynamic enterprise brimming with new ideas and the will to see them through” (*FIFA.com*, 2006). Havelange searched for corporate partners and the first he found was Horst Dassler, head of *Adidas* and son to Adi Dassler who invented the sports goods brand. At least since the 1970 World Cup in Mexico, FIFA and *Adidas* were closely linked to each other. Almost all teams were playing with *Adidas* football shoes (Wulzinger, 2006:97).

Havelange met Dassler during the 1974 election campaign. Although Dassler was campaigning for Stanley Rous, Havelange came to respect Dassler’s political skills. Havelange claimed that Dassler approached him because of his love for the game and the vision to develop it further (Kistner & Weinreich, 1998:44-45). Together they flew to Atlanta in Dassler’s private jet to visit the headquarters of the beverage brand *Coca-Cola*. Dassler found a partner in Patrick Nally of the *West-Nally-Agency* who invited the boss of *Coca-Cola*, Al Killeen, to a football match in Rio de Janeiro. ‘That has woken him up. Killeen could hardly believe that in this [Maracana] stadium 110.000 Brazilians followed even the warm-up screaming.’ In 1976 Coca-Cola gave 360.000 Dollars to FIFA. A year later the first Youth-World Cup took place in Tunisia which has since then been the *FIFA/Coca-Cola-Cup*. For the

1978 World Cup in Argentina, Coca-Cola already invested eight million Dollars (Kistner & Weinreich, 1998:46-47).

In 1978, Havelange sold the usage of FIFA symbols, signs, and mascots to the German marketing agency *Sport-Billy* for the period up to 1990. This contract is said to have been given because Robert Deyhle of *Sport-Billy* agreed privately with Havelange to build the new FIFA headquarters. The rights to sell advertising space around the field at the 1978 World Cup in Argentina were given to a company formed by Dassler and Nally. In addition, Dassler wanted the dissolution of the *Sport-Billy* contract and to take over the marketing rights. In the run up to the 1982 World Cup in Spain, Havelange manoeuvred statements against the *Sport-Billy* contract. He constructed the view that the FIFA General-Secretary at that time, Käser, was responsible for the unfair set-up of the marketing contract with *Sport-Billy*, hinting to the deal of building the new FIFA headquarters. Käser seemed to have been the only one who tried to step up against Havelange – and had to leave FIFA (Kistner & Weinreich, 1998:47).

Havelange came to redeem his promise to increase the number of participating sides from 16 to 24 at the 1982 World Cup in Spain. Therefore he paid to Spain 36 Million Swiss Francs which Dassler was able to raise together with *Coca-Cola* and other companies. In turn, the *Sport-Billy* contract was cancelled and Dassler received the marketing rights. Dassler is also said to have paid Havelange one Million German Marks on the side for the contract (Kistner & Weinreich, 1998:50-52). Wulzinger (2006:97) highlights that Horst Dassler was the actual inventor of FIFA's 'sponsor-pool'. In the 1980s Dassler took over the marketing for FIFA and before the 1986 World Cup, an *Adidas*-sub-firm transferred 45 million Swiss Francs to FIFA. In turn, Dassler made 200 million Francs by selling to twelve brands the right to call themselves official FIFA sponsors.

The greater possibility for African representation in the World Cup surely made FIFA look more democratic. However, the internal decision-making processes increasingly changed into business-like non-transparency. The growth of FIFA which enabled greater African representation in the World Cup mainly based on the economic interests by Havelange and Horst Dassler (and other brands). But thereby,

sport politics slowly became a lawless room. What are rules against golden credit cards? Dassler's intention was clear: Over FIFA he wanted to get a grip on the national associations in order to equip their athletes with Adidas-articles and thereby making them his worldwide advertisers. The potential for sport political power which could be generated over FIFA and later also over the IOC was attracting him' (Kistner & Weinreich, 1998:44-45).

Horst Dassler himself once said: 'The sport must be attentive that the economy does not dominate it, that [sport] results are not manipulated. Marketing rights do not pose any threat.' Kistner and Weinreich (1998:45) further highlight Lord Denis Howell, former British minister of sport, who conducted investigations in international sport politics. He came to declare that the multinational *Adidas*-group is uniquely entangled with the organisation of world sport.

Therefore, firms and other commercial interest groups (one of the principle elements in the Modern World-Systems theory) imposed ever more power over FIFA, rolling back normative principles. This was also driven by household interests (another principle element in the capitalist world economy) when looking at individual sport functionaries. In addition, FIFA tried to prohibit state involvement in football (the state is normally the strongest principle element of the capitalist system) to secure its hegemony. Finally, the people in power are costly for their respective organisations. Havelange's expenses on FIFA's budget almost bankrupted FIFA if there had not been donors like *Coca-Cola* or *Adidas* additionally paying for the extravagant life of the President at the beginning. And once started, such a system reproduces itself. The individuals involved cling together to either maintain or increase their status and privileges. Kistner & Weinreich quote the sociologist Gunter Gebauer who points out:

The structures are impressive, beneath governmental structures, but internationally organised. Often everything relies on agreements by mouth, not at all on contracts. The people know each other, they harmonise, they think similarly, they drink together, and they discover soul relations and found brotherhoods which they hold on to. Together they plot what possibilities they have got. There, complicated networks stay in the hands of a few for decades. Others are rarely able to get in, there is not much to achieve by democratic means. The structures are mafia-like, everything looks like it. But I don't say they are all crooks (Kistner & Weinreich, 1998:56).

In fact, the household element became an important factor during the time Horst Dassler sought to maintain and increase power in international sports. To exemplify how Dassler's conduct in international sports diplomacy functioned can be explained by taking the example of how his marketing firm ISL received the marketing rights of the Olympic Games in 1985. Kistner and Weinreich cite former ISL employee Jean-Claude Schupp who explained:

The decisive person in this connection was Abidjan Louis Guirandou, [National Olympic Committee] NOC President of Côte d'Ivoire' – nominally number two after the Dassler-Havelange-friend Samaranch [IOC President]. 'Without expecting favours any

time before, we invited him to Landersheim [headquarters of *Adidas* France] and Paris for heaving meals together about ten times within two weeks. That was the Africa-politics of Horst Dassler, which paid out, without him telling the people what they should do (Kistner & Weinreich, 1998:72-73).

In fact, Dassler is said to have produced a data base on more or less all important sport functionaries, including their body sizes to send them fitting sports wear, their general preferences and what they dislike, and even their preferences regarding prostitutes (Kistner & Weinreich, 1998:72-73). Therefore, not only clubs, brands, or FIFA increasingly followed economic interests, but also very much so the households represented by individuals within the football system on lowest (players) and on highest diplomatic levels (functionaries). This chapter will now turn to the lower levels of the football system. Therein, it will be highlighted what opportunities increased commercialism created regarding Africa's role. A division of labour was established which represented neo-imperial practices by exploitation of young African football talent.

### 3.4. Increased African representation in international football

To justify the increase of African football sides to take part in the FIFA World Cup, Havelange had to look for measures to levelling football skills in order to provide for an exciting tournament. He introduced football development schemes for the developing world: "He was ready to consider football not only as a competition, but also to try and find new ways and means to worldwide technical development and to prepare new generations for this" (*FIFA.com*, 2006). At the beginning of his presidency, Havelange made clear how he saw the World Cup and what he expected of Africa to legitimise increased representation. He is quoted as saying in 1979:

The World Cup is a tournament under professionals, the first goal is a financial one. The audience wants to see teams with a high technical standard. If we admit national teams with average or even low levels the audience will not come, resulting in financial loss. So television would have no interest in broadcasting the games. Without television the big companies would not be interested in advertising with football. But exactly in this field we have to fight for a place. That is why it should not be condemned that Europe is represented by so many countries in the final tournament. The football on this continent is a very good example on all levels. Africa must profit from European experience. It must learn from its methods (Apraku & Hesselmann, 1998:55).



In fact, Havelange highlighted in this quote that the FIFA World Cup had to be an attractive competition, which could only be achieved by competitive equality between the participants. In fact, only if the outcome of a match is unknown in the beginning, can it create excitement and attract spectatorship. Neal (1975:206-207) describes this as the 'effect of the league-ranking' and Lüschen (1976:66-68) referred to this as 'the openness of the ranking system' which is 'ideally only depending on performance'. Only thereby, football serves as a representational tool for transmitting the capitalist order to general society and as an attractive means for the interstate-system as an ideological investment. And only then could a football World Cup be identified as embodying normative principles of fairness and equality. Africa's increased representation in the FIFA World Cup enhanced this view with regards to FIFA; however, only because African football subordinated itself to economic interests and reproduced dependency.

An exploitative system of extracting human resources (young football talents) from Africa emerged. Despite the comparative advantage of African states (both economic and representational), the following analysis will clarify Africa's inequality in international football and, thus, serve to understand the incongruence of normative principles and economic reality in international football caused by economic interests. Nevertheless, the democratisation of South Africa and its development of a football industry created the opportunity to realign football's normative principles and economic practice. In addition to Africa's increased diplomatic strength in and symbolic value for FIFA, this chapter argues, FIFA finally had to take Africa into account as a host to the FIFA World Cup to realise its universal claims.

### 3.4.1 African football success

African football underwent a dramatic representational transformation in the recent past. This transformation concerned the way Africa was viewed internationally. Africa's value for the international football system changed from a rather ideological to a competitive system. This means that African players were used to enhance the sense of football as international, as something global and fair. Dark skin colour made the football fields factually more 'colourful' and therefore helped to present football as modern and diverse. The earliest example was Arthur Wharton from the then Gold Coast (today Ghana) who was playing in England already in 1886. Although living in England as the son of an Afro-European missionary family, it was hard for him to find another job than football player in Victorian

England due to his skin colour. In 1938 the Moroccan Larbi Ben Barek was the first African in France. His person was attributed with 'Black Pearl', a 'marketing-character' that prevailed for a long time with Africans playing football in Europe on whichever level.

According to Broere and Van der Drift (1997:17) the first time when European public came into closer touch with African football was when a team from Ghana (then Gold Coast) toured England and Ireland in 1951. However, the team was seen rather as a 'circus attraction' by the public, especially because some players did not wear shoes. Also when a bigger flow of African footballers to Europe started in the 1960s, African football teams often remained mystified. Mainly France and Portugal, but also England started to use their colonial connections to incorporate African players into European teams. Until the nineties, African football remained stigmatised with being backward and exotic, particularly through how media reported about African football. At the 1990 World Cup in Italy, media highlighted the blend of football with African rituals and witchcraft or so-called dark magic. Roger Milla, Cameroon's football legend, explained his irritation surrounding European media attention from the FIFA World Cup 1982 in Spain until the 1990 World Cup in Italy:

There was a rumour then that we had a medicine man as a coach, continually performed voodoo, and ate monkey meat. We were not taken seriously and instead portrayed as a circus attraction (Broere & Van der Drift, 1997:26).

However, Milla was specifically important for Cameroon's football to be positively recognised due to his dances at the corner flag after he shot a goal. In fact, this factor of show value was an important element for Africa's status within the international football system.

Wachter (2002:131) emphasises that African teams and the legions in European leagues were used to take over the role as producers of multi-cultural surplus value, at least since the globalisation of the football market in the 1990s. The head of the board of the German club *1.FC Kaiserslautern* considered the employment of Nigeria's national team player Taribo West as increasing the fun-factor for spectators: 'We are entertainers and have to offer something to the fans week for week.' West's funny hairstyles were positively adding to this (Wachter, 2002:131). Similarly, Brazilian football players were subscribed with the stereotypical expectation of the South American intuitive and technical football abilities, which were said to be missing in Europe. The main reason for employment is, however, that they are instrumentally well functioning athletes who can play on all positions and on a technical level which surpasses European players on the same price level (Giulianotti, 2002:171).

In fact, the same accounts for African talents who are increasingly penetrating the core football job markets. And thereby, quality of African national sides is enhanced. Already during the 1982 World Cup, Cameroon was taken seriously due to a larger number of professionals from France (Broere & Van der Drift, 1997:18). At the 1990 World Cup, Roger Milla was the main success factor for Cameroon; he played for the French club St. Denis at that time. Cameroon reached the quarter final and only lost narrowly against England. Nigeria's national side won Olympic gold in 1996; the team included several players from professional European clubs. Many members of African national sides are now professionals playing in European leagues. Of the 115 players in the cadres of African national sides at the 2006 World Cup, 88 were employed by European clubs in the foregone season, over 76%. Only 22 came from African clubs, about 19%. Also very important was the fact that African national sides included football superstars playing in some of the best European clubs. At the 2006 World Cup, Ghana presented Samuel Kuffour (*AS Rom*, Italy) and Michael Essien (*FC Chelsea*, England). The Ivory Coast had a team with most players from top European clubs such as *Arsenal London* (England) or *Hamburger SV* (Germany). The Ivory Coast also presented one of the top superstars, Didier Drogba from *FC Chelsea* (England). Even the small country Togo came with the football star Emmanuel Adebayor who played for *Arsenal London* (England) in the foregone season. And Togo further had an interesting addition with the youngster Assimiou Toure, who was football raised in Germany's top-club *Bayer Leverkusen* and already played for Germany's youth national-side. The African players at the 2006 World Cup were spread over ten different European clubs including all important national football markets of UEFA. Thereby, the footballers surely embodied competitive and star-value. In fact, the television reports in Germany changed away from creating interest in the event by highlighting Africans as exotics and backward but rather as football powers respected as highly skilled opponents to the established football nations. In German media, comments mostly emphasised the employment in European clubs and the players' competitiveness in the best leagues of the world.

### 3.4.2. Neo-colonialism

There remains a problem regarding the organisational side of African national sides. The dependency on European organisational experience (in accordance to the division of labour) is clear. At the 2006 World Cup, only Angola was coached by an Angolan. The others were coached by Europeans: Togo had a German Coach, both Tunisia and Ivory Coast a French,

and Ghana had a coach from Serbia and Montenegro (*FIFA.com*, 2006). In fact, success by African national sides was often rooted in European organisation. For example, Nigeria's football strength was rooted in the input by Yugoslavian coaches during the 1960s and 1970s. Another example, the national side of Kenya was coached by the German Eckhard Krautzun who organised training matches in Europe in the 1970s. Thereafter, the team was able to achieve successes against other African teams.

German development aid emphasises football development for African nations. The German Society for technical cooperation GTZ sends coaches to Africa. In comparison to their African counterparts, they are well paid by Germany. Yet, these coaches are not the best coaches available because otherwise they would manage a team in Europe (Apraku & Hesselmann, 1998:40-42). In addition, this football development aid is a critical issue. Regarding the commitment by the GTZ in Nigeria, Apraku & Hesselmann (1998:31) point out Nigeria's lucrative natural resources in correlation to the German ministry for foreign affairs paying a lot of money for coaches there; and the authors raise the issue that football development rather aims at enhancing good relationships with the African governments.

Another problem for African coaches is that they often earn disrespect from the African stars playing in Europe. The professionals coming back to their home countries to train for the national sides are hardly impressed by African coaches. This is mostly due to the immense difference in salary and less European professional experience by the coaches in comparison to the players (Apraku & Hesselmann, 1998). This further enhances 'Europe's colonial project' to remain in place and that Europeans remain on the organisational side further fuelling the drain of the best players to Europe. Poli (2006:289) says that Ghanaian players account for the highest number of African footballers in Romania. The Ghanaian national side used to be managed by Petre Gavrila from Romania. After his time as a coach he became a player agent and established the 'Euro-African' training centre in Romania. A further example is the Ivorian player Kolo Touré who is said to have been transferred to the English club *Arsenal London* because *Arsenal* coach Arsène Wenger had a personal link to Jean-Marc Guillou "who owns the football academy in which Kolo Touré has been trained. Besides, it was not a coincidence if the Frenchman Guillou chose the Ivory Coast, a former French colony, to realize his project" (Poli, 2006:289). And here we reach the crucial point at which African football is incorporated into the division of labour of the European football industry.

### 3.4.3. Comparative advantage

Capitalisation of African football talent has become a very lucrative business. The structure reflects ongoing African dependency on the North and neo-imperial forms of exploiting African resources. Especially those clubs which cannot afford high salaries prefer African players. Yet, the intention is rather to sell those players further to clubs on higher levels instead of using them for the clubs' sportive success: "Africans are very often sought after because of their reiterative commercial value" (Poli, 2006:289). This strategy of speculative investment is also fostered by the increasing gap between rich and poorer clubs especially within Europe. Hödl (2002:28) refers to the approach by European tops-clubs as a double-strategy called investment in 'stones and bones' ("Steine und Beine", i.e. referring to capital assets such as a stadium as well as human resources).

Today, most Africans are found especially in lower divisions and in less advanced European leagues. Dividing UEFA's leagues into five levels of competition, Latin Americans are mostly found in the top level with a decreasing number down to the lowest competition level. On the other hand, there are more Africans in the last four competition levels, than in the first (14% in the first, 21% in the second, 26% in the third, and 18% and 18% in the fourth and fifth). Data suggests that Africans are geographically dispersed and over-represented in the less well-off leagues in Europe, such as those in Eastern Europe (Poli, 2006:285). In Romanian leagues, 53 percent of foreign players were from Africa. In Malta Africans accounted for 53 percent, in Belgium for 43, Switzerland 34 and in Albania for 33 percent. They are indeed cheap labour often without any chance to reach higher professional levels. Many football migrants do not make it in Europe, often becoming illegal immigrants and are misused by clubs, players' agents, and scouts.

It is especially the unbearable economic state in which many African households find themselves which creates the demographic pressure of youngsters towards Europe's football industry. In addition, for many African clubs, the only substantial income is derived from selling players to Italy, Belgium, Turkey, or to Arabian countries. And even the national sides find comparative advantage in selling young talent to better-off states rather than to create a functioning football league. The Nigerian football association's export limitation is that the transfer sum must reach at least 150.000 Dollars for every player that leaves the country. However, the player exodus is surely not stopped thereby due to the mentioned 'reiterative value' of young African football talent (Wachter, 2002:129). The manager of the club Türkiyemspor (in a provincial league in Germany) described a transfer process as follows: A

Nigerian scout offers a youngster to the club. This player is first transferred to a club in the Netherlands due to lower visa restrictions than in Germany. From there he is brought over to Germany easier because the players have already entered the EU legally. Claiming that the small club cannot hold the talent for too long because the top-clubs are always on the search for new talents, the manager knows that “then we will gain from the transfer. *Türkiyemspor* thereby profits from the African” (Apraku & Hesselmann, 1998:217). To give an example of a prominent club in Germany, Apraku and Hesselmann (1998:204) cite a report of the magazine *Spiegel* which points out the financial calculation by the manager of the club *Bayer Leverkusen*, Reiner Calmund. He wanted to buy the teenagers Sebastian Barnes and Daniel Addo after they won the Under-17 World Cup in 1991 with Ghana. ‘*Bayer* will pay about 600.000 Mark for the transfer, language teacher, accommodation, food, salary and return ticket until the two will play with the pros in three years. Then, Calmund hopes, the players will long be worth several times the investment.’

The export structure has taken on an institutionalised character in the fact that European clubs go into cooperation, buy, or establish themselves as clubs or football academies in Africa. These ‘transnational networks’, as Poli (2006:289) calls them, are widespread. *Auxerre* works together with the *Salif Keita Football Centre* in Bamako, *Feyenoord Rotterdam* runs the *Feyenoord Fetteh Football Academy* in Ghana, *AS Monaco* stands in close relationship to football schools in Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, and Senegal. Thereby, the clubs have direct access to young African talents. Another possibility is shown by *Ajax Amsterdam* which is the main owner of *Ajax Cape Town* in South Africa and *Obuasi Goldfields* in Ghana. Likewise, *Manchester United* took over *Fortune FC* of South Africa’s second league. The calculation by African academy owners sees that they have a rather small investment to do: football education of 6 years costs about 5000 dollars per player. As long as the academy can sell one or two players on the global market every year, it can expect a high profit margin. In Mali, for example, there are about 20 of those academies (Hödl, 2002:31).

#### 3.4.4. Problems in African national associations

According to Apraku and Hesselmann (1998:61) football development aid by the North implicates an absolute precondition. Africa needs development on all levels and football is rather helping the nations’ representation instead of education and building up important economic sectors. It disregards the fact that Africa lacks a broad middle-class on which a sound democratic development can be grounded which, in turn, would enable a national



football industry In addition, the elites' efforts in football are soaked with corruption and misuse of power. Often national side managers are quickly fired if there are no immediate successes, specifically due to impatience by governments, like the past cases in Zaire, Burkina Faso, Mozambique, or Egypt show. The Dutch coach Ruud Krol said "[t]hat's the way it goes in Africa. They don't know what patience is here. There has to be immediate success. No? Sack the trainer! In practice a contract here lasts 90 minutes'" (Broere & Van der Drift, 1997:65). The experiences by the Dutch coach Clemens Westerhof in Nigeria shows that football is government responsibility in Africa. In 1989, he wished to create a successful team which was however costly and Westerhof understood that neither the Sports Commission nor the Football Association had the resources therefore. He highlighted his relationship to Admiral Augustus Aikhomu, at that time the proxy of Nigeria's President Babangida: "Whenever I had a problem ... I talked to Aikhomu and within five or ten minutes we talked everything through. He then said: 'Okay, okay, okay – but I want to see results.'" (Apraku & Hesselmann, 1998:139).

Since the 1990s there is a constant conflict about salaries and bonuses surrounding the national sides. The African public often interprets this as betrayal of the nation by the players and as a negative cause of 'Europeanization'. Yet in fact, this reflects the emancipation of football work forces against corrupt administrators. 'None of the modern stars wants to end up like the generation around Roger Milla: utmost popular and loved, but poor' (Wachter, 2002:129). Also Broere and Van der Drift (1997:61) emphasise the mediocre quality of African football managers who damage success through self-enrichment highlighting a scandal surrounding the Cameroon national side at the 1994 FIFA World Cup in the USA. The association Fecofoot spent more money 'for the joyrides of the bigwigs than it was putting into the bonus kitty for the players.' Goalkeeper Joseph Antoine Bell left 'in anger because he discovered that the players were not being given their financial dues whereas the officials were lining their pockets' (Broere & Van der Drift, 1997:61-62). This makes continuity in African football a rare occurrence which is very important. In Namibia, for example, the German coach Peter Überjahn undertook a long-term development with the Under-14 national. The goal was to qualify for the African Cup of Nations in 2000, a goal which was then reached already in 1998 (Apraku & Hesselmann, 1998:95).

### 3.4.5. Differences within Africa

African football focuses on European consumer strength. African football is one of the few products which can find demand from international television stations and sponsors. The alliance of CAF and the French sport marketer *Groupe Jean-Claude Darmon* exemplifies this. European consumption remains essential for African football development (Wachter, 2002:129). Yet, despite the general dependency on the European football industry, the position of Africa in the international football system differs from nation to nation. Poli's (2006) study shows that most African players in European leagues came from Cameroon, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Morocco, and Senegal. Their distribution reveals certain correlations to general economic terminations. Many Nigerians were found in lower football divisions which showed that they tend to play in Europe at all costs. Cameroonian player migration is rather comparable to that of Nigerians, while Senegalese, Ivorian, and Ghanaian footballers are more concentrated at an intermediary level.

In contrast, Moroccans are concentrated in the higher divisions. In addition, the average age of Moroccan football migrants was lower in comparison to the other African countries. Poli (2006:288-289) explains that Moroccan professional clubs, in contrast to the vast majority of Sub-Saharan ones, offer better salaries to the best players, which discourages them to leave a Moroccan club at a very young age. This makes Moroccan players more expensive. European clubs buy them later, after the players gained more experience, "rather than to suppose on a hypothetical future progression, as is very often the case of players coming from Sub-Saharan countries". This shows two correlations: The first between GDP per capita of the football migrants' home countries and the level of competition they are playing in. The second one, between the GDP per capita and the average age of African players in Europe, is even stronger "which indicates that the migration is directly linked to the economic situation of the country of departure. The poorer a state is, the younger are the players going abroad seeking better living conditions" (Poli, 2006:287-288).

Thus, the poor economic state of African households fuels the exploitative and Eurocentric division of football labour. Furthermore, the poor economic state of African households reflects the low consumer strength in African and makes the development of a functioning leagues system almost impossible. And without football enthusiasm by the government football in Africa cannot develop. In Ghana, this was evident in the decay of stadiums: four people died when the railing of a tribune in Accra broke in 1989. And also the national side, the *Black-Stars*, neither qualified for the World Cup nor the African Cup of

Nations at the time government focussed on economic development instead of representation through the national side.

Because of both economic and sportive reasons the important footballers of Ghana see no future in their home country anymore. Until 1997, the Ghanaian journalist Sam Okaitey estimated in his magazine *Ghana Sports News*, about 200 pro-footballers changed to European clubs (Apraku & Hesselmann, 1998:116).

In addition, if a household decides on creating value through football, it rather aims at having a player anywhere in Europe due to the financial returns that can be expected.

The club *Coton Sport Garoua* won Cameroon's championships four times since 1997 and is one of the best managed clubs in Cameroon. However, it pays its players less than 400 Euros per month (Poli, 2006:283). The African clubs' budgets are extremely low despite improved management. The clubs *ASEC Mimos*a in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, has sponsorship contracts which are several times higher than that of Ghana's *Kotoko*. With the help of the European top-club *AS Monaco*, *ASEC* invested into an own football academy for young talents since 1993. *ASEC*'s professional structures made the clubs win the 1998 African Champions-League. The top-clubs in countries like Cameroon, Ghana, or Nigeria only have budgets which are comparable to those in Germany's third league. Still, there are better-off exceptions such as in Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, and South Africa (Wachter, 2002:129-130).

The tendency that football power is concentrated in a few nations as well as in a few clubs is a general feature everywhere on the world. Analysing inequalities within Europe:

In contrast to the general opinion that everything is possible in football, financial potency and sport successes go hand in hand and enhance each other: financially strong clubs have a pool of players which, yet, does not guarantee sport successes, but make them probable; sport successes in turn enhance the financial situation by increased spectator numbers and TV- and merchandising income etc (Hödl, 2002:17-18).

In Africa, especially South Africa concentrates football strength due to its general economic level in comparison to the rest of Africa. Only a neo-liberal approach allows for greater capital accumulation according to market opportunities also in football. This leads to concentration development between African nations as well as within African nations. The football association SAFA alone has an annual budget of about 20 million Euros. Prime income is the association's equipment contract with *Adidas* of about 3 million Euros annually (Wachter, 2002:130). The big clubs, such as the *Orlando Pirates* and *Kaizer Chiefs* from Soweto, pay fixed monthly salaries of 6.600 Euros to their players. Thereby, the clubs are able to keep their talents. Actually, half of the self-declared football fans in South Africa are

affiliated to the *Kaizer Chiefs*. With an average of 29.000 spectators at every match, the *Kaizer Chiefs* count amongst the leagues' highest amount of visitors. The turn over including sponsorship, ticket sales, merchandising, and membership fees amounted to 7.3 million Euros in 1999. In 2001, the media and entertainment company *Primedia* bought itself into the club in order to penetrate the increasingly important football market (Wachter, 2002:131).

Therefore, South Africa displays a higher position in the international division of football labour. For example, South African interests in players from Zaire undermined the team's concentration during its preparation for the match against Gabon in the 1996 African Cup of Nations. Some functionaries of Zaire confronted players with possible contracts from South Africa. South Africa proves to have climbed the ladder towards an organiser in the football industry away from the supplier of cheap human resources. Due to a stronger consumer base, South Africa has become an experienced organiser in the sport entertainment sector. More than ten million South African television consumers watched the 1998 World Cup match between South Africa's *Bafana Bafana* against France.

In conclusion, South Africa embodies both ideological as well as economic value. The process of democratisation and reconciliation after the end of apartheid made South Africa *the* symbol in forgiving the misdeeds by Europe on the African continent. And this reflects subordination to the Eurocentric capitalist system. South Africa's subordination to European business order fostered the perception that Africa both deserved to host a World Cup and especially enabled it to do so. For example, the *First National Bank Stadium* was opened in 1989 before the end of apartheid. Yet it is important for South Africa's stance of host-ability. The stadium represents the highest quality and is positioned between Johannesburg and Soweto. It can host almost 85.000 spectators and is planned to increase its capacity to 112.000 which is sufficient to host the World Cup final in 2010 (Wachter, 2002:131). And finally, South Africa successfully hosted the 1998 African Cup of nations. Surely, with democratised South Africa, FIFA had to take an African nation into account as a host to the World Cup. In addition to that, South Africa could serve FIFA as a symbol for African emancipation in general by the hand of FIFA enhancing FIFA's 'marketing-character' being fair and equal.

### 3.5. Summary

This chapter argues that FIFA had to take Africa into account as a host to the FIFA World Cup. First, this was rooted in the fact that football became a dominant cultural practice and very important for Africans' self-esteem. Football in Africa was a symbol both for the

oppression by Europe as well as African resistance against it. However, second, the new African elites subordinated the newly independent states to the Eurocentric world order. In addition, Africa became a central part in the capitalist system's and football system's 'marketing-characters' as a resource to create ideological value. Third, Africa was still able to reach material diplomatic importance through quantitative membership in FIFA. This, in turn, led to its increased qualitative power with regards to increased representation in the FIFA Executive Committee as well as in the FIFA World Cup. Fourth, with the Brazilian businessman Havelange as FIFA President the world football body was transformed into a business venture recognising African football as a potent resource for the football industry as well as for the representation of FIFA to the outside. And African nations did abide by the dependency on European football industry in order to enhance the FIFA World Cup's excitement by delivering competitive football sides. However, sixth, African talent was exported to Europe reproduced dependency on Europe at the same time as it enhanced Africa's representation in international football. Yet, the exploitative system of players' export in addition to the fact that most profits made thereby, mostly serves Europe, sheds a negative light on football as being unfair and reproducing inequality of, and oppression over Africa. In addition, different African nations, foremost democratised South Africa, had established a functioning football industry with a tendency towards core modes of production. In order to diminish the view of the football system to reproduce European imperialism, an African World Cup host would surely help to secure FIFA's 'marketing-character'. Finally, South Africa was a symbol for Africa's rise in the world. In addition, it reflects increased economic capability as well as diplomatic strength in FIFA. This resulted in the fact that FIFA had to take an African nation into account as a possible host to the FIFA World Cup.

## **CHAPTER FOUR: AFRICAN EMANCIPATION IN FIFA DIPLOMACY**

### **4.1. Introduction**

The argument of this last chapter is that FIFA was forced to let an African nation host the World Cup. This was needed for FIFA to remain being viewed as the keeper of football's normative principles of fairness and equality because the diplomatic and the economic reality for Africa proved differently. This fourth chapter will therefore look at the political discourse that occurred around the host decision for the 2006 World Cup. This will create an understanding of how the political processes in and around FIFA moved the world football body to decide in favour of Africa as host to the 2010 World Cup. By looking at the diplomatic preconditions advancing the host decision for the 2006 World Cup this chapter sets the final scene of the diplomatic constellations towards the African host decision. Therein, FIFA's and its main stakeholders proved to focus on self-interested economic practices which was criticised by liberal journalists. In turn, it inhibited much negative information against the 'marketing-character' of FIFA's main stakeholders. In addition, the power-bloc formation behind the two main FIFA powers Brazil and Germany will become clear as the preset for the 2006 host decision.

The 2006 host decision made Germany the host for the 2006 World Cup leaving South Africa with an extremely close defeat, many unfulfilled expectations, and anger. However, while South Africa had convinced FIFA and the rest of the world of its capability to host the World Cup, the 2006 host decision also created an immense pressure moment for FIFA and its main stakeholders. Three factors were instrumental in this regard. Firstly, two power blocks emerged which impacted on the 2006 host decision: Europe and Asia (with regards to Germany and the Asian members in the FIFA Executive) on the one hand and, on the other hand, South America and Africa (with regards to the FIFA Presidency and South Africa). In addition, FIFA was much more focused on economic interests than normative principles of fairness. Secondly, the 2006 World Cup host decision mounted to an outright bidding war. FIFA's 'universal' marketing-character received a dent through that investigative journalism which revealed the economic practices by leading individuals in FIFA. And thirdly, threatening to disclose information on non-adherence to the FIFA statutes, South Africa called for official investigations into FIFA decision-making processes. Therefore, the public discourse in newspapers in Germany and South Africa backed South Africa's call with additional information. FIFA's and its main stakeholders' 'marketing-image' was close to



being shattered. Thus, FIFA was forced to adopt a rotation principle between the continents for hosting the World Cup and to start with it in Africa in 2010.

#### 4.2. Diplomatic preconditions

In advance of the 2006 host decision there were three decisions which made a deep impact on the host decision for the 2006 World Cup. The first and second issues were the voting blocs that occurred behind Germany and South Africa during the 2006 host elections. On the one hand, the European (UEFA) and the Asian (AFC) football confederations and, on the other hand, the alliance of South Africa with the powerful apparatus of Havelange and his successor on the FIFA throne Joseph Blatter. The third issue concerned FIFA's emphasis on economic interest and its struggle against state involvement in FIFA business. The description of the diplomatic preconditions clarifies the non-transparent activities within FIFA's decision-making processes. And this non-transparency became publicly discussed in advance and after the 2006 World Cup host decision. This created pressure on FIFA and posed a threat to the "marketing-character" (or normative image) of FIFA and its main stakeholders. The normative principles of fairness and equality are sought to be upheld especially by the media as a particular important form of exercising power in international relations.

##### 4.2.1. The 2002 World Cup co-hosting decision

Two power blocs were decisive around the 2002 FIFA World Cup clash: FIFA President João Havelange (or South America and the successor to Havelange, Joseph Blatter) on the one side and UEFA on the other. The conflicts between them concerned the host-decision itself, and the free tournament place which a host nation receives for the final World Cup tournament. Havelange was against a co-hosting decision and wanted Japan to be the sole host for the 2002 World Cup. In opposition to this, UEFA backed South Korea's bid campaign. In advance of the host-decision (due in May 1996), Japan and South Korea fought fierce battles at highest political levels and spent more than 80 Million Dollars on their campaigns. Japan was backed by Havelange and South Korea by UEFA. UEFA headed by Lennart Johansson, feared unofficial influence by Havelange and prevented the decision the night before the vote. 14 of the then 21 ExCom members signed a proposal in favour of a co-hosting of Japan and South Korea to which Havelange had to agree (Berliner Zeitung, 05.07.2000).

The political son of Havelange in FIFA, General-Secretary Joseph Blatter, succeeded Havelange as FIFA President and again a problem regarding the co-hosting of Japan and South Korea emerged. The faction behind Blatter did not want to grant two free tournament places to the Asian confederation and aimed against South Korea. UEFA-submitted a proposal in which it offered to share its 14<sup>th</sup> tournament place, i.e. UEFA offered a decisive match between the last European qualifier and one from Asia to fill the UEFA's 14<sup>th</sup> tournament place. In view of the 2006 World Cup host-decision, UEFA and AFC (the Asian football confederation) became close allies. AFC General-Secretary, Peter Velappan, stated after the 2006 host-decision in favour of Germany that Asia had "returned a favour to UEFA" (Griffiths, 2000:186-187).

#### 4.2.2. Johansson versus Blatter

The two power blocs in FIFA – the Havelange-Blatter family on the one side and Europe on the other – recognised Africa's decisive role for the 1998 FIFA Presidential elections. Griffiths (2000:91) refers to this as "a feud between Lennart Johansson, head of UEFA, and Joseph Blatter". In his first Vision paper in 1995, UEFA-President Johansson proposed a rotation for the FIFA Presidency between the confederations. A paper called Vision II then included to equip African associations with more money to enable them to take part in the World Cup qualification. Finally, Johansson and CAF President Issa Hayatou signed a deal wherein UEFA supported African football financially, technically, and with equipment (Kistner & Weinreich, 1998:178). However, Havelange also extensively rallied for African support, similar to his election campaign for the 1974 FIFA President elections: first for himself and then for his protégé, the then General-Secretary, Joseph Blatter. Havelange emphasised that it was he who increased the number African participants in the World Cup from one to five. Furthermore, similar to 1974, South Africa became a focal point for Havelange's strategy. He announced to favour a 2006 World Cup to be staged in South Africa and sought to win Nelson Mandela as an ally in Africa (Kistner & Weinreich, 1998:179). Havelange won the strongest African nation in CAF and FIFA, South Africa, and paved the way for Joseph Blatter's victory.

Africa's national associations became torn into two camps: One was caught behind the idea of a FIFA World Cup to be staged in Africa (meaning South Africa) promised by Blatter. The other camp, under CAF leadership, was fond of the idea of a FIFA President from Africa to succeed UEFA's candidate, Johansson. Griffiths (2000:91) says that CAF granted all

African votes to Johansson. But South Africa backed Blatter in order to become World Cup host. The South African association and two FIFA ExCom members rallied for him: Jack Warner, head of the association of Trinidad and Tobago and President of CONCACAF, and Morawi Makudi, head of the football association of Thailand. Blatter won 22 of the 46 votes from Africa although CAF had promised them to UEFA President Johansson (Griffiths, 2000:91).

Speculations occurred accusing Blatter of bribery. The *Rheinische Post Online* writes about a report by the British paper *Daily Mail* noting that Blatter bought his votes for 100.000 Dollars. The Vice-President of the Somali football association, Mohiadin Hassan Ali, admitted that he received 100.000 Dollars to vote for Blatter instead of Johansson. Mohamed Bin Hamman, the FIFA ExCom member from Qatar was said to have given the money. The President of the Somali football association, Fara Addo, confirmed this. Also Vice-President of CAF at that time, Addo told the British journalist Andrew Jennings about a telephone call from a Somali ambassador in the Near-East. He was told that a friend of the ambassador offered 100.000 Dollars for Addo's vote, half of which would be transferred in the form of money and the other half in the form of sports equipment. Jennings further claimed that the election campaign by Blatter was sponsored by the associations from Saudi-Arabia and Qatar with a total of five million dollars (*RP ONLINE*, 2002). Blatter countered that these accusations, four years after the election, were targeting his person strategically as 'part of a defamation and destabilisation campaign' (*Tagesspiegel Online*, 2002). Nevertheless, the bribe accusations were further fuelled by the information that envelopes with money were given to several representatives of member associations, especially to Africans (Ide, 2005).

Anyhow, African unity was broken by Blatter's alliance with South Africa. Despite the bribe accusation, South Africa was a strategic partner to Blatter. His promise to give the World Cup to South Africa was a major factor which led to the fierce battle around the 2006 host-decision and the subsequent decision regarding the 2010 World Cup. The struggle by the leadership of the African confederation CAF to keep Africa behind one voice was specifically undermined by South Africa's hegemonic intentions.

#### 4.2.3. Television rights

The FIFA Congress on 4 July 1996 accepted to give the confederations of Africa and Asia an additional Executive Committee member, and the first one to Oceania. In addition, on that Congress Havelange promised an amount of one million Dollars to each of the then 198

national member associations. The money should be taken from the income generated by the television rights deal for the 2006 and 2002 World Cup. According to Kistner and Weinreich (1998:132) this was originally an idea by UEFA President Johansson in his first Vision-Paper. Anyhow, FIFA was under commercial pressure: In 1995, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) sold the television rights for the Olympic Games 2000 to 2008 for almost five billion Dollars. In competition, the rights for the 1990, 1994, and 1998 FIFA World Cup were sold for only 340 million Swiss Francs, one of the greatest miscalculations in the history of sport. The closest competitor with regards to football, the UEFA Champions League, also reached much better terms than FIFA: the sum of 340 million Swiss Francs which FIFA garnered for three World Cups was reached by the Champions League already in one season. (Kistner & Weinreich, 1998:115). In June 1996, the *European Broadcasting Union* (EBU) declared its willingness to change the payment agreement for the television rights of the 1998 World Cup; although the conditions were agreed on already ten years earlier. However, EBU demanded security to buy the television rights for the 2002 and 2006 World Cup. Apparently, FIFA had already disregarded the contract with EBU and the 1998 World Cup because it raised the number of teams from 24 to 32 without asking EBU. FIFA insisted on the rise of a fee for EBU from 135 to 200 million Swiss Francs (Kistner & Weinreich, 1998:128).

Regarding the television rights for the 2002 and 2006 World Cup, FIFA anyway favoured the rights dealer *International Sports and Leisure* (ISL) formed by Horst Dassler, the late *Adidas* companion of Havelange. In fact, granting the rights to ISL would have helped ISL out of a crisis as the IOC had fired ISL as the official marketer of the Olympic Games. In addition, ISL President at that time, Jean-Marie Weber, was friend of FIFA-President Havelange. The FIFA decision on 3 July 1996 regarding the television rights (for 2002 and 2006 World Cup without the broadcasting rights for the USA) again displayed the FIFA leadership's non-transparency and undemocratic conduct (Kistner & Weinreich, 1998:119-121).

The first in the race for the bid was *Sporis-Holding* as partner of ISL and the *TaurusFilm GmbH*, a company of the *Kirch Group* founded by the German media-mogul Leo Kirch from Munich. The next was *Trans World International* (TWI), daughter of the *International Management Group* (IMG) which started its bid together with the *Bertelsmann*-child *Ufa* in August 1995. The third was the *European Broadcasting Union* (EBU) representing the European Public Broadcasters and, therefore, the interests of the European states. While *TWI/IMG* was booted out already by manoeuvres and misinformation from the side of the then FIFA General-Secretary Joseph Blatter, the bid became a final contest

between ISL/Sporis(Kirch) and the EBU. The EBU offered 2.2 billion Swiss Francs to take over the TV-production and costs (by the experienced Public Broadcasters). ISL/Sporis(Kirch) intended to leave the production and its costs with the organiser of the World Cup, but also offered 600 million Swiss Francs more than the EBU (in total 1.3 billion for 2002 and 1.5 billion for the 2006 World Cup) (Kistner & Weinreich, 1998:120-122).

The FIFA ExCom decided in favour of the bid by *Kirch Media* and ISL with 9:6 votes and three abstentions. Only 19 of the then 21 ExCom members were present when the multi-billion deal was decided. Interestingly, the German representative, Gerhard Mayer-Vorfelder, was not present. At that time, he was Vice-President of the German football association (DFB), Finance Minister in the German province Baden-Württemberg, and a member of Germany's conservative party CDU. Leo Kirch, head of the *Kirch Group*, had close connections to politicians of that party. However, the then DFB President Egidius Braun favoured a FIFA deal with the public broadcaster. By not attending the decisive FIFA meeting, Mayer-Vorfelder avoided to vote against the EBU and his DFB President on the one side, as well as against his conservative party friend Kirch on the other side. After the decision, Mayer-Vorfelder claimed he did not know that the deal was to be decided on during that very meeting. But in contrast, FIFA's General-Secretary at that time, Joseph Blatter, claimed to have informed Mayer-Vorfelder about this (Kistner & Weinreich, 1998:132-133).

Speculations grew: Havelange broke any resistance against the deal with Kirch through dividing the UEFA fraction. According to Kistner and Weinreich (1998:133), the main element therefore was the ExCom delegate from Russia, Wjatscheslaw Koloskow, who aimed at a lucrative deal with the sports brand *Nike*. Havelange's son-in-law and head of the Brazilian football association (CBF), Ricardo Teixeira, concluded a contract between *Nike* and CBF in December 1996 for ten years; the most expensive sponsorship deal until then including 400 million Dollars split into 20 million Dollars annually as well as 200 million in the form of equipment and a new administration- and sports-centre in Rio de Janeiro (Kistner and Weinreich, 1998:219). The FIFA ExCom member from Russia also concluded a lucrative deal with *Nike* for the Russian football association – only four months after FIFA's television rights decision. Until the year 2000, ten Russian teams, such as the national sides for men, youth, and women, as well as six clubs of Russia's top league came to be equipped by *Nike* (Kistner and Weinreich, 1998:133-134).

Furthermore, the television rights deal met with resistance at the highest political levels. DFB President Egidius Braun wanted Europe's public broadcasters (EBU) to receive the TV-rights while Germany's representative in the FIFA ExCom, Gerhard Mayer-Vorfelder,

avoided to vote. Prominent German sports and political representatives saw the accessibility for the general public to watch the German national team in the World Cup threatened. The reason was that the *Kirch-Group* fostered its plans to install Pay-TV in Germany. In February 1997, the German public broadcasters commission highlighted a list to be decided on by the European Union. This listed sport events free to watch on public television and Egidius Braun sought to add the FIFA World Cup to that list (Kistner & Weinreich, 1998:162-163). In 1998, Joseph Blatter emphasised, however, that the TV-rights contract was surely subordinate to national and international laws. In addition, Blatter claimed that FIFA did not sell its rights, but only the usage of the rights to Kirch. Thus, the governments of the German provinces (responsible for media law-making in Germany) put World Cup football on the EU's recommended list of generally accessible sports events (Kistner & Weinreich, 1998:172-173).

The struggle between the two major power blocks within FIFA reached into highest legislative levels of core states. Despite a few individuals, Germany's national association clearly represented the German nation-states and European market interests. The media posed an enormous threat to all actors' credibility, accountability, and image due to much negative information it was able to profile. When looking at the 2006 host decision, the media is to be understood as the dominant actor to foster transparency and liberal ideals.

#### 4.3. The two opposing blocs of votes

The German alliance of national side, state, and industry brought the 2006 World Cup to Africa. Nevertheless, South Africa was a tough opponent in the bid. And after its defeat, South Africa threatened to open FIFA's non-transparent business and damage FIFA's 'marketing-character' of being the guardian of football's normative principles of fairness and equality. Despite their speculative nature, information regarding the decision-making processes revealed that the nation-states remained the most important actor in international relations seeking to secure national capitalists' interests. However, government involvement in the decision-making processes of football was normally sanctioned by FIFA with a ban. For example, the Guinean football association was suspended from FIFA in 2001. This followed what Blatter accused as "government interference" in the affairs of Guinea's football association. Blatter further said that "[i]t's absolutely stupid. They (Guinea) don't want to understand that Fifa and CAF have no other alternative" (BBC Sport Online, 08.07.2001). However, those under pressure regarding South Africa's threat were the most powerful nations in FIFA (and Guinea was not). Economic interests were much more important to



FIFA and its decision-makers. Nevertheless, the liberalist pressure led to a momentum where FIFA had to symbolically realign to normative principles, institute a rotation for the World Cup between the continents, and start with that in Africa in 2010. Still, this section will highlight the efforts by Germany and its subordination to the national association's interest which, in turn, sought for the German state's subordination to FIFA.

#### 4.3.1. German formation behind the World Cup bid

The German national association's organising committee was contractually bound to the rule of the FIFA Organisation Committee for the World Cup (Ehlers, 2005:54). The bid had to prepare and present all issues as if the World Cup was to be staged. The stadiums had to be built and further construction planned according to FIFA rules within a convincing time frame. Preparation of tournament details included the FIFA-Confederations Cup, a tournament between the best national sides of the confederations which took place in Germany one year before the actual World Cup. Ticketing, pricing, and distribution had to be planned. In addition, infrastructural demands by FIFA for the mega-event had to be obliged to, including the selection of the personnel. Public relations infrastructure had to be established: press-statements, press-conferences, the media-centre, and regional press centres at the match locations which implied accreditation for, and selection of, media representatives. A website with a regular newsletter in four different languages had to be installed. Side-events needed preparation, such as the draw of the teams for the qualification groups and the eight World Cup tournament groups. Accommodation for the national teams had to be ensured regarding distance to the host cities, training facilities for all weather situations, and recreation facilities.

The government guarantees included uncomplicated immigration procedures and work permits for players, functionaries, medicinal, and other technical personnel of the national sides. Yet, really important and costly was security which had to be planned together with FIFA and in coordination with other countries; concerning safety of spectators and tourists against, pick-pocket thieves, and especially hooligans and terrorists. The *Schengen declaration* of the European Union was paused during and in advance of the World Cup to better control travellers. Team accommodations and airports, railway stations, main streets, and public places in the host cities were put under thorough investigation (Ehlers, 2005:61). Government also had to provide for the smooth running of banking and cross-border money traffic, telecommunication, and customs. And in addition to the cooperation with the national

association concerning radio and television broadcasting infrastructure, the government was also responsible for national anthems and flags at all World Cup matches and events according to diplomatic protocol. Tax regulations were especially complex. FIFA did not need to pay taxes in the host nation but could do so in Switzerland – where its headquarters are – especially for income from broadcasting and marketing. FIFA as a whole, FIFA officials and guests, referees and their assistances, and the FIFA Congress members were freed from taxation on income generated in connection with the FIFA World Cup (Ehlers, 2005:62).

Finally, Beckenbauer and Radmann extensively travelled for the bid campaign. Six months before the decision on 6 July 2000 they visited Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Japan, Paraguay, USA, Tunisia, Malta, Thailand, and many more. The German state supported them by all means. Embassies prepared functions to present the image-campaign and provided for individual talks. Government provided with its international infrastructure, gave Beckenbauer and Radmann advisory help regarding the respective nations' cultures, and established necessary contacts to top-level decision-makers of sports, politics, and the corporate world (Ehlers, 2005:63).

On the other side, there was Germany's corporate world which extensively helped the campaign. The official budget of the German bid amounted to 16 million German Marks (DM) (about 8.5 million Euros in today's terms). This money was derived from the official sponsor-pool for the German bid: *Adidas* as the long-term partner of the DFB and FIFA, *Mercedes Benz* the German car-brand of *Daimler-Chrysler*, the pharmaceuticals and chemicals producer *Bayer AG* (also owning one of the German top-clubs), Airways company *Lufthansa*, sports-insurer *Albingia* (part of *AXA* insurances), and the *Dresdner Bank* (the financial institution frequented by the DFB for a long time) (Ehlers, 2005:64). Part of the money went into an image-campaign by the advertising agency *DMB&B* which included German celebrities such as German's Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, super-model Claudia Schiffer, the TV-presenter Thomas Gottschalk, and former Tennis number-one Boris Becker (Ehlers, 2005:53).

Franz Beckenbauer was the German football representative and ensured an optimal presentation of the eight years long campaign since 1998. The 1200 pages long bid document surely impressed FIFA (*Berliner Zeitung*, 05.07.2000). Full commitment to FIFA and football was statistically proven: "All political parties stand behind the German candidature, all important German sports associations, over 90% of the German population, as polls gave as a result" (Steudel & Scherer, *Die Welt*, 05.07.2000). Beckenbauer and Radmann included German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder into the bid preparations:

When Blatter visited Gerhard Schröder in October 1999 in his Villa in Dahlem, Radmann already prepared and handed over the entire documents about Blatter, ‘Schröder was prepared up to the point’ (he knew about all ideas and projects of Blatter, the most mighty football functionary of the world) (Steudel and Scherer, *Die Welt*, 05.07.2000).

Germany’s World Cup bid displayed Chase-Dunn’s (1982:27) world-systemic claims: “state managers” took over the interest of one industry segment (football) to “effectively pursue a policy of national development and upward mobility in the world-system” creating “convergence of political interests among the dominant economic groups within a nation.”

#### 4.3.2. German hegemony in UEFA

The host of the final World Cup tournament is decided in the FIFA Executive Committee where the confederations are represented. For a national association it is of utmost importance to get its own confederation behind its bid. UEFA had two strong competitors in the race: both Germany and England have a long football tradition, vast football affiliation by the public and the corporate world, and many loyal sport functionaries in international sports and general diplomacy. Their technical standards regarding infrastructure, security, and organisational experience were high. However, the view occurred that England’s bid was never meant seriously. Furthermore, *The Berliner Zeitung* (05.07.2000) pointed to riots during the 2000 European Cup by English hooligans. On the other side, “Germany was able to successfully stop their worst rioters from travelling there” (Steudel & Scherer, *Die Welt*, 05.07.2000).

FIFA’s technical report rated England behind South Africa due to a lack of hotel guarantees. This caused turmoil from the side of English interests. Stenger (*Frankfurter Rundschau*, 03.07.2000) highlighted what former British minister of sports Tony Banks – whom Toni Blair made special government advisor for the World Cup bid – told the Times: ‘The only European bid which could get enough back-up from other parts of the world is England.... It is an insult for English football. It is clear now that the UEFA-machinery works in favour of Germany and that of the FIFA-apparatus for South Africa’. And regarding the ranking in the FIFA report: ‘If Fifa really believes in that, then it will believe that Elvis Presley is still alive and lives on the Moon. It is no objective report but rather the proof of political vexation.’ Jack Warner, FIFA ExCom member for CONCACAF and affiliated to FIFA President Blatter advised the English to withdraw their bid. Nevertheless, it was obvious

that Tony Banks was working for the British government rather than for England's association. In an interview with Riegler in the *Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung* (05.07.2005), Fedor Radmann reacted saying: 'We have got zero point zero trouble with England. The behaviour was surprising, but I think we have reacted very elegantly and reserved the critique.'

In fact, UEFA diplomacy enhanced the presumption that the German and the English national associations were working together. 'It occurred negatively that England broke a Gentlemen's Agreement. Germany gave its votes to England for the EC [European Cup] 1996 and expected in return that England would not bid for the WC 2006' (*Berliner Zeitung*, 05.07.2000). The then President of the German football association (DFB), Egidius Braun, played a decisive role in UEFA's backing for the German bid. As DFB-President from 1992 until 2001 he greatly influenced politics within UEFA where he held posts as Vice-President and as treasurer, and he was a good friend of UEFA-President Lennart Johansson. In turn, Johansson was one of the FIFA Vice-Presidents, lead the UEFA faction within the FIFA ExCom, and headed the FIFA organising committee for the 2006 World Cup. Actually, the English FIFA ExCom member voted for England only in the first round of the 2006 host elections; thereafter he supported Germany (Ehlers, 2005:52-53).

Nevertheless, there were some weak elements within the UEFA faction in the FIFA ExCom. Stenger (*Frankfurter Rundschau*, 06.07.2000) highlighted two: The Italian Antonio Matarrese was not re-elected into the UEFA Executive at the European Congress the week before the host decision. The second was the Spaniard Angel Maria Villar, 'whose country surprisingly lost the host bid for the European Championships 2004 against Portugal.' Both threatened UEFA solidarity (Stenger, *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 06.07.2000). Concerning Matarrese, Kistner (*Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, 15.07.2000) wrote that Matarrese was slightly in favour of South Africa after he was ousted as UEFA Vice-President. But 'some days before the WC-vote he was quickly brought home into the UEFA government by the smart creation of a new advisor post'. In fact, Kistner called the DFB-President at that time the 'chief-whisperer of Uefa-President Lennart Johansson'. And after Johansson was booted out by some Europeans during the 1998 FIFA President elections, he was able 'to hold the herd together' in 2000.

#### 4.3.3. South Africa and CAF's division

South Africa was able to bring the African confederation CAF behind its bid. Nigeria retreated very early from its bid which increased the chances for South Africa (*Berliner Zeitung*, 05.07.2000). A short glance at Nigeria clarifies a dividing line within CAF. Nigeria was dominated by a Muslim majority. However, what surely counted more was that Nigeria was a Sub-Saharan state. And within Africa that made it more likely to support South Africa rather than an Arab country. According to the *Berliner Zeitung* (06.07.2000), South Africa was also able to persuade Ghana and Egypt to renounce their interest to host the World Cup. The only African candidate that remained in the race until the end beside South Africa, was the Arab country Morocco.

Morocco became a major opponent of South Africa due to backing by Arab FIFA ExCom members. According to Veiel (*Frankfurter Rundschau*, 04.07.2000) Morocco's football enthusiasm was huge and its citizens were crazy about the game with many young football talents. Also many professionals were playing in European leagues. Morocco had two huge stadiums with capacities for 80000 and 60000 people and planned investments of over 500 million Euros for additional stadium construction. Improved infrastructure (it built up its street network from 60km to 400km in eight years only) and long commitments to FIFA were important arguments for Morocco's bid. It highlighted its role as African representative attending the World Cup in 1970, reaching the round of the best sixteen teams in 1986, and qualifying regularly (1994 and 1998). Finally, Morocco bid for the third time and pledged about 4 billion South African Rand to upgrade sports facilities and infrastructure in a five-year economic plan if the bid was successful (Urquhart, *The Cape Times*, 06.07.2000:9). Veiel (*Frankfurter Rundschau*, 04.07.2000) also highlighted Morocco's hope that its geographic position close to Europe would be a positive factor. However regarding CAF, this apparently had a negative impact. Because Morocco is so close to Europe, the African rhetoric was not as strong as South Africa's. Still, both South Africa and Morocco used this representational tool and highlighted that hosting the FIFA World Cup would help ease most of the problems an African country is dealing with today:

Like South Africa, Morocco's head of the WC organisation committee also sees the opportunity to host a WC as the 'dream of a continent' and 'the project of a whole nation made reality'... Again, the argument of job creation is held high, in a country where 'half of the people are poor and are not able to read and write' (Veiel, *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 04.07.2000).

Urquhardt (*The Cape Times*, 06.07.2000:9) commented that “South Africa’s theme – hear Africa’s call – was a noble one, but Morocco sang the same tune with sufficient verve to make others sit up and take notice.” Yet, in an interview with the South African bid official Irvin Khoza, Craig and Legge indicate in a question:

We have met all the requirements, we stand on the moral high ground. Brazil, England and Germany have been hosts and Morocco is not ready. How can we [South Africa] fail? (Craig & Legge, *The Sunday Independent*, 02.07.2000)

The South African bid never mentioned Morocco and kept on selling its campaign as to ‘fulfil an African dream’, as South Africa’s Sports Minister Balfour said. Bid committee member Khoza clarified that South Africa was ‘the power factor in Africa’. The bid CEO Jordaan promised to ‘make Fifa proud’ and further claimed that ‘not only our nation but also 400 million people on our continent ask for this World Cup.’ In fact, South Africa tried to

create moral pressure to bring the WC to Nelson Mandela’s country. The tournament was stylised to be the symbol for the world to care about Africa. One generously overlooked that another African state, Morocco, was in the race. For ‘Black Africa’ [i.e. Sub-Saharan Africa] this is almost a European country (Konrad Mrusek, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 07.07.2000:3).

Nevertheless, South Africa’s bid promised to foster football development in Africa and announced to establish a trust “with a minimum of R14 million generated from the 2006 tournament” to be used for development programmes by CAF (Urquhart, *The Cape Times*, 06.07.2000:9). In addition, South Africa was the only market with an interesting business potential for FIFA. As the bid CEO, Danny Jordaan, highlighted:

Football [in South Africa] has been isolated for many years. There is a big gap, in commercial terms, between rugby and cricket and soccer: One of the things we can do to address that is hosting major events like the World Cup to accelerate the process of commercial advancement (Craig & Legge, *Saturday Star*, 01.07.2000:12).

This implicated that a World Cup would also foster football affiliations amongst the wealthy white elite in South Africa.

Finally, a diplomatic alliance between FIFA President Blatter and South Africa existed since the 1998 FIFA President elections (see above). Morocco only received backing by Arabian FIFA ExCom members. In fact, Brazil became the most prominent partner of the South African bid, in line with Blatter’s support who was put onto the FIFA throne by the Brazilian João Havelange. In turn, Havelange was the father in law of the President of Brazil’s football association (CBF) Ricardo Teixeira.



#### 4.3.4. South Africa's deal with Brazil

According to Griffiths (2000:128), a voting deal was concluded between South Africa and Brazil at the end of June 2000. Teixeira visited South Africa and confirmed an accord between CAF and CONMEBOL. The deal included the withdrawal of Brazil's bid and the support for South Africa in return that CAF would back a bid by Brazil to host the 2010 World Cup. Already in May 2000, Winterfeld (*Die Welt*, 27.05.2000) wrote that Brazil had 'stopped its efforts' to host the World Cup 2006. On the one hand, Brazil sought to concentrate on the bid by Rio de Janeiro for the Olympic Games. On the other hand, the bid received strong opposition within its own ranks. The reason was that Brazil's Minister of Sport, the football icon Pél  , publicly announced that in the face of the more urgent social problems of his country all bid efforts were 'money thrown away'.

The Brazilian-South Africa alliance was officially announced on 3 July 2000. Teixeira, president of Brazil's football association (CBF) and FIFA ExCom member, proclaimed:

We do not in South America agree that the 2006 tournament should be staged in Europe, because it has just taken place in France. Germany and England should not be in the vote. We have always said we would support South Africa if it came to a vote (Griffiths, 2000:136).

However, the deal gave Germany the possibility to present its own bid in a better light. Riegler (*Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung*, 05.07.2005) highlighted Germany's bid committee member Fedor Radmann saying "[w]e will not be irritated by that. We were surprised, of course, about the sudden retreat by Brazil, more I do not want to comment on that. But this is not at all a pre-decision." Also the main representative of Germany's bid, Franz Beckenbauer, utilised Brazil's move and talked about 'horse-trading' and rule offences and that Germany "stuck to all rules of the game so far which was sometimes disadvantageous, ... we will keep sticking to them" (*Berliner Zeitung*, 05.07.2000). Griffiths (2000:136) accused Beckenbauer of showmanship. And Stenger (*Frankfurter Rundschau*, 06.07.2000) described how well Beckenbauer acted in a press conference:

With smile reflecting pain Beckenbauer says at the end of the seven-years-race: 'In the beginning, every month something new happened. Later the scenario changed first weekly and then daily. Now information changes every hour, and there is lots of wrong information.' ... It is a disturbing fire which is already part of the good tone with regards to sport political events of this level (Stenger, *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 06.07.2000).

Apparently, the bid campaign for the 2006 World Cup host decision was not only a backstage diplomatic battle but even more a public relations battle. The democratic control of FIFA was outsourced to the public discourse and media investigations. FIFA as a whole and the different interest groups within were checked on their adherence to football's normative principles of fairness and equality and, in turn, transparent democratic conduct. The perception of the economic reality often relied on speculations and the public relations efforts by interest groups in FIFA sought to skew reality to their advantage. In fact, the actors tried to hide that they focussed on economic interests rather than normative principles.

#### 4.4. The public discourse as a moment of pressure

This section will approach the public discourse surrounding the 2006 host decision. This looks at the targeted use of information that came to be a pressure point of strategic value to secure an African World Cup. The showcasing of the bid provided a picture of FIFA as a fair diplomatic ground with equal chances for all. It also distracted from information concerning the decision-making process and the quest to find out what really happened behind the scenes. Nevertheless, the latter became increasingly important especially because South Africa came to call for an investigation into the decision-making process. This would have broken up FIFA and its stakeholders' non-transparent business practices as well as shattered the image of the international football community as a unified football family following principles of fairness and equality. Yet, both sides' public relations also sought to let the opponent look as not legitimate to receive the World Cup. The FIFA technical report on the bidding nations rated Germany best and one place above South Africa. Although this could not ensure Germany to win the bid, it was clear that a defeat of Germany would have made the decision political rather than technical. As Germany's head of the bid Franz Beckenbauer said:

Fifa said that we have set new measures. ... The question is, what is weighing more? The topical, the subject related or the sport political, the 'Zuschieben' [i.e. a secret trade] of votes? (Von Berries Bossmann, *Die Welt*, 05.07.2000)

On the other side, according to the *Sunday Independent*, South Africa "met all the requirements" and was "on a moral high ground". To the question how South Africa could then fail, South Africa's bid committee member Irvin Khoza answered:

[It] can only be a political decision. On merit, facilities and business benefits, we have got it all. It can only be a political decision with reasons beyond our control (Craig & Legge, *Sunday Independent*, 02.07.2000: 22).

This third part will highlight now, how political the 2006 World Cup actually became, especially after the decision was made. The public relations dispute wherein South Africa achieved a great moment of pressure on FIFA and its main stakeholders finally forced FIFA to give the World Cup to Africa.

#### 4.4.1. Negative views on FIFA and South Africa's anger

The *Berliner Zeitung* (07.07.2000) expected the South African Football Association to push for an inspection. It underlined this by referring to the South African International Olympic Committee (IOC) member Sam Ramsamy and claiming that it could happen that South Africa's 'disappointment changes into anger'. The paper fuelled the perception of misconduct in FIFA, referring to the late Horst Dassler, the former head of *Adidas*. There 'were barely any elections in the Seventies and Eighties from Olympic Games, to important World Championships or elections of functionaries which were not according to the wish of Dassler.'

Dassler once overshadowed the world of sport with an extensive and often disreputable net of relationships. Fedor Radmann, who now as the so-called WC-coordinator is always on the side of Beckenbauer, and the German IOC-member Thomas Bach, who is very involved in the WC bid, once counted themselves as the close intimates of Dassler (*Berliner Zeitung*, 07.07.2000).

Two days earlier, the *Berliner Zeitung* (05.07.2000) claimed that host decisions for the FIFA World Cup and the Olympic Games were traditionally becoming increasingly corrupt. The report highlighted Olympic host decisions where functionaries still faced trails of accusations relating to corruption and bribery.

Kistner (*Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, 06.07.2000) wrote a very critical report on FIFA. He effectively accused all stakeholders of corruption. His main focus rested with Jack Warner, the head of the confederation CONCACAF and how he rose from a teacher to a millionaire through his FIFA post and his help for Havelange since 1994. Havelange, in turn, was highlighted with regards to a bribe-list which was found in a raid on illegal gambling in 1994 in Rio de Janeiro. Furthermore, Kistner outlined the fact that Pél , the football superstar and sports minister in Brazil, accused Teixeira, the head of Brazil's football association and Havelange's son-in-law, to have tried to bribe him regarding a 1994 FIFA World Cup television rights deal. And also Irvin Khoza, the South African bid committee member, received heavy accusations by Kistner. Khoza was described as a leading cause for the fact

that South Africa's football association as well as South Africa's Professional Soccer League (PSL) were very close to anarchy and soaked with corruption.

But also Germany's success was put under heavy pressure. Stenger (*Frankfurter Rundschau*, 06.07.2000) went so far to highlight allegations regarding the FIFA President Joseph Blatter. These allegations referred to the fact that the World Cup 2002 in Asia was not very lucrative for FIFA. Therefore, Stenger wrote that Blatter was actually in favour of a European host – in contrast to his rhetoric of being in favour of Africa.

At the same time, the South African newspapers highlighted South African anger and the willingness to investigate the decision-making process of the 2006 host decision. One major point was that South Africa's idol, Nelson Mandela was made to look ridiculous during the last phase of the bid. In 1998, Nelson Mandela awarded the FIFA-President with the highest order possible for a foreigner in South Africa called 'Order of Good Hope' (*Berliner Zeitung*, 06.07.2000). But when it came to the 2006 host decision, FIFA left the symbol for Africa's struggle for emancipation aside and powerless. According to Kistner (*Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, 15.07.2000) Franz Beckenbauer won the Asian confederation. And Mrusek (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 07.07.2000:3) wrote that Franz Beckenbauer's invitations of football functionaries to play golf in Kitzbühel, Austria, meant more than the diplomacy of Nelson Mandela. What was so shattering for Mandela's standing was that he seemed to have had no idea of what was really going on shortly before the bid. Nelson Mandela focussed on diplomatic influence via telephone calls. But Germany's unstoppable drive regarding the Asian FIFA ExComs could not even be broken by the South African idol Nelson Mandela.

Shortly before the elections he unsuccessfully phoned the Emir of Qatar, the King of Thailand, the King of Belgium (in order to influence the Belgian FIFA-Executive-member D'Hooghe) and the pitiful Charles Dempsey who only became shakier. Only the Germans remained cool during the bid-finish. Franz and Fedor at the hotel pool, Chancellor Schröder at lunch in Berlin where he was even said to have searched for betting partners. Where this relaxedness came from remains a mystery (Kistner, *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, 15.07.2000).

Mandela was expected to attend the final presentation, but he probably knew that the bid was lost and refrained from appearing in Zurich. Still, in an interview with the radio station *SAfm* he claimed: 'So far we could be assured of having twelve votes. So I sat down at the phone and won two more countries for us' (r.z., *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 05.07.2000).

South African newspapers accused Europe of global apartheid and reminded Germany of its past. The *Mail & Guardian* (07.-13.07.2000:24) wrote about “a disgrace, a discredit to Europe and very, very bad news for the game of football.” *Mail & Guardian* reporters and Sapa (*Mail & Guardian*, 07.-13.07.2000:4) cited the mayor of Durban, Obed Mlab, talking of ‘international racism’.

Can Europe see beyond its own nose? We fear not. Can Germany conceive of interests more important than its own greedy aggrandizement? It seems not. Is the rich North able to grasp the paradox that, by sharing things around a little, it may enrich not merely the rest of the world but, also, itself? Evidently not (*Mail & Guardian*, 07.-13.07.2000:24). The *Mail & Guardian* further highlighted Germany’s ‘most unfortunate past’ and that it was ‘bereft of generosity and redolent with racism.’ Personifying the German fault the newspapers openly accused Chancellor Gerhard Schröder of not sticking to his words, in fact, claiming him and the German football authorities to be liars (*Mail & Guardian*, 07.-13.07.2000:24).

Finally, to exemplify how negative the host-decision was for the relationship between South Africa and Europe, the *Mail & Guardian* emphasised how important football was for the citizens of South Africa and how important a decision in favour of South Africa was also for the whole of Africa and also for millions around the world. Great disappointment ‘by millions of South Africa’ stemmed from the great expectations and ‘widespread confidence’ that were created by the North (*Mail & Guardian*, 07.-13.07.2000:24). Now, most of these reports were of course preceded by information concerning the decision-making process. This information, in turn, legitimised the accusations and the anger.

#### 4.4.2. The Asian ExCom members

For Germany, DFB President Egidius Braun was concerned to align UEFA whereas the heads of the German bid Franz Beckenbauer and Fedor H. Radman were responsible to handle the rest of the FIFA ExCom (Kistner, *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, 15.07.2000). The strategy was mainly to win the Asian representatives (AFC) and one from Oceania. According to Ehlers (2005:53), one prominent promise to the Asians was that if Germany got to host the 2006 World Cup, AFC would receive a fifth place in the final tournament of the World Cup. However, they could only see through half a starting place, i.e. an Asian national side had to play a qualification match against a team from the Oceania confederation. Other offers to Asia were appearances of the German top-club Bayern München and the German national side in Asia. The preparation tour of the German national team in December 2004 took place in Asia

with matches against Japan, South Korea, and Thailand – national associations represented in the FIFA ExCom in 2000. Radman is quoted saying:

We were said to have unruly created advantages for us in other countries, for example through friendly games with Bayern or the national side, in order to positively influence decision-makers. But this is normal international practice (Ehlers, 2005:54).

Nevertheless, the Asian votes were won by other means than mere football cooperation. Speculations arose regarding the influence of Asian ExCom members by government and high-industry.

German government interference referred to a weapon delivery contract to Saudi Arabia. The FIFA representative from Saudi Arabia, one of the four Asians, was Abdullah Al-Dabal who was also a member of the Saudi royal family. On 28 June 2000, eight days before the 2006 host decision,

the *Bundessicherheitsrat* [Federal Security Council] – at that time consisting of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, Defence Minister Rudolf Scharping, Minister of Economics Werner Müller, Foreign Affairs Minister Joschka Fischer and Minister for Development-Aid Heidemarie Wiecezorek-Zeul – approved with a majority of three to two votes the delivery of 1200 bazookas to Saudi Arabia (Ehlers, 2005:63).

Ehlers (2005:63) follows newspaper allegations saying that this was no coincidence. At the same meeting of the Security Council, it became clear that weapons exports into crisis regions are not common in Germany. A weapon delivery to Taiwan and a delivery of military computer-software to the NATO-partner Turkey were refused, respectively delayed.

Speculations on high-industry interference first regarded Germany's campaign budget of 16 million German Marks (DM) raised by a German sponsor-pool. According to Ehlers (2005:64), the overall sponsorship was probably much higher. The then still financially liquid Leo Kirch, the one who bought the television rights for the 2002 and 2006 World Cup in 1996, involved himself. Naturally, his interest was that the final tournament in 2006 should take place in his home-country Germany, especially because the 2002 World Cup in Asia was not very lucrative for him. The official description of Kirch's involvement was a 'contribution' on the 'operative level'. Apparently, the official budget for England's bid was 120 million DM and thus nine times higher than Germany's.

[T]he advantage of private financial involvement alone was immense: One was neither to be held accountable to politics nor to tax-paying citizens. No public control of the finances, no bureaucracy with control over charges and receipts, the Deutschland AG paid 'generously but discretely' (Ehlers, 2005:65).



In addition, several German high-industry companies were said to have influenced Asian votes by strategic investments and announcements of such in the national markets represented in the FIFA ExCom.

The first target was South Korea, represented in the FIFA ExCom by Chung Jong-Moon, son to and junior-chief of the car-brand *Hyundai*. On 26 June 2000, a few weeks before the 2006 host decision, *Daimler-Chrysler* signed a cooperation contract with *Hyundai* concerning the truck sector. About 800 million German Marks (DM) were to be invested in *Hyundai* (more than 400 million Euros in today's terms). Towards the end of June 2000, the German chemicals producer *Bayer AG* targeted South Korea and bought the South Korean plastics-producer *Sewon Enterprises* which had a market share of 40 percent in South Korea. In addition, *Bayer* announced to build a new plant in South Korea to produce pesticides. Together with Germany's second largest chemicals producer *BASF*, *Bayer* announced an investment of 800 million DM until 2003 (Ehlers, 2005:65-66).

The second target was Thailand, represented in the FIFA ExCom by the General-Secretary of Thailand's football association, Morawi Makudi. He had close links to *Daimler-Chrysler* and traded *Mercedes*-cars in Bangkok (although, he claimed that it was his wife's business). Anyhow, also *Bayer AG* made a move regarding Thailand. At the beginning of July 2000, *Bayer* announced to increase the scale production in the polycarbonate-plant in Thailand threefold and proclaimed to invest six billion DM in Asia regarding production of plastics, colours, and other chemical products. And another actor came into play: the German electronics and chip producer *Siemens*. Shortly before the host-decision, Arthit Ourairat, Technology Minister of Thailand at that time, proclaimed that *Siemens* would invest 2.5 billion DM Thailand and cover the private investment for a project half public half private to build chip-production. Yet, after the host decision, *Siemens'* subsidiary *Infineon Technologies* denied this information. Finally, as a Moslem, the ExCom member Makudi was part of a minority in Thailand. His posts in the Thai football association as well as in FIFA was rooted in the backing by Arabic functionaries (Ehlers, 2005:66). Now, the Arabic functionary from Saudi Arabia was already highlighted above.

The other representative from an Arab country was Mohamed Bin-Hammam. In a German newspaper, his role was only shortly mentioned. During a stay in London, Hammam told the British Prime Minister that he had already promised his vote to the German Chancellor, after the Prime Minister asked for his vote (Kistner, *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, 15.07.2000). However, Bin-Hammam was said to have been on Joseph Blatter's side, meaning South Africa, specifically regarding the 1998 FIFA President elections (see above).

Now, in South African newspapers, the Qatar representative was not at all mentioned. However, in the view of this paper, he became a decisive pressure tool, as the information surrounding him clearly showed government interference which was normally sanctioned by a ban from FIFA. In the book by Griffiths (2000), Jordaan had the opportunity to tell his side of the story regarding the Arabian ExCom members. On 20 April 2000, ExCom member Al-Dabal from Saudi Arabian made Danny Jordaan feel reassured of support from the Arab world. Al-Dabal was expected to support South Africa after supporting Morocco in the first election round to avoid humiliating effects for Morocco from the side of CAF. And CAF understood that Al-Dabal would then support South Africa in the subsequent rounds. But Al-Dabal voted for Germany saying that there was no agreement with CAF and that he had to stick with his Asian confederation (Griffiths, 2000:148). And Bin-Hammam's vote was factually promised to South Africa already one year before the host decision: On 8 June 1999 it was officially announced that Qatar had always supported South Africa and that only if South Africa did not comply with the FIFA requirements would Qatar give its vote to Germany. In the FIFA technical report South Africa was declared as 'very well qualified' (Griffiths, 2000:134). South Africa's bid CEO Jordaan regarded Bin-Hammam as 'a friend' serving together with him on the FIFA Media and TV Advisory Committee (Griffiths, 2000:127-128). However, on 1 May 2000 Bin-Hammam told Jordaan that Morocco was lobbying with the Emir of Qatar and emphasised the importance "to ask the South African government to campaign for their bid at the highest political level. 'This is very important,' he said". And on 3 July 2000, Jordaan detected Beckenbauer and Radmann talking to Bin-Hammam at Zurich airport. "After a short hello", the Germans quickly left and Bin-Hammam explained to Jordaan that he cannot uphold his promise to vote for South Africa. (Griffiths, 2000:134). What the deal was between Germany and Qatar was not revealed but obviously government interfered in the decision. Finally, Jordaan accused the German bid member Radmann to have approached him and asked for a deal on a sideline with South Africa. Jordaan described that Radmann asked him 'if there is a way for a solution' (2000:136).

Jordaan's information in Griffith's book (2000) was not included in the newspaper discourse. Nevertheless, shortly before the FIFA decision to take over a rotation system for the World Cup and start off in Africa, the book was highlighted as very helpful to understand what happened in the decision-making process of the 2006 World Cup bid. The *Financial Mail* (Laurence, *Financial Mail*, 05.01.2001:14) published a book review highlighting a follow-up campaign to host the 2010 World Cup. Laurence explained that "[a]s a man who served as editor of the 2004 Olympic bid document as media consultant to the 2006 bid,

Griffiths is qualified to offer advice” (Laurence, *Financial Mail*, 05.01.2001:14). Thus, instead of letting all anger out regarding prominent stakeholders in FIFA such as Germany or Arab representatives, the anger was channelled into underlying pressure by South Africa. And finally, the anger was also directed onto another FIFA ExCom member: Charles Dempsey from New Zealand representing the confederation Oceania. He was the one that abstained from his vote and thereby created the vote constellation which led to South Africa’s defeat.

#### 4.4.3. The Dempsey Case

Charles Dempsey, the FIFA ExCom member representing the confederation Oceania (OFC) abstained from voting in the 2006 host decision. Thereby, he created the outcome of 12 to 11 in favour of Germany. If he had cast his vote in favour of South Africa as it was expected, Blatter would have had to use his casting vote. And following his ongoing rhetoric, Blatter would have then had to decide in favour of South Africa. In May 2000, the Oceania Football Confederation’s congress decided for Dempsey to vote in favour of South Africa. The representatives did not want to re-elect him as President because he did not want to commit to this decision. “His daughter, Josephine King, a powerful force behind her father, and general secretary of the confederation, lashed out at the members for embarrassing her father in front of Blatter and reminded some of them that they had not yet paid their membership fees” (Bezuidenhout *et al.*, *Sunday Times*, 09.07.2000:5). Yet the minutes of that Congress clearly stated that if England fell out of the race “then South Africa would be given OFC’s vote in the remaining ballots” (Griffiths, 2000:128-129). And even the day before the host decision, in a private meeting, the Oceania Executive allowed Dempsey to back England in the first round but emphasised to back South Africa in subsequent voting rounds. However, the following morning shortly before the vote Dempsey announced in a meeting with the Oceania Executives to vote for England and ‘nobody else’.

After the host decision, speculations arose why Dempsey abstained from his vote. South African newspapers claimed that he had always been in favour of Germany. Bezuidenhout *et al.* (*Sunday Times*, 09.07.2000:5) highlighted a meeting between Dempsey and UEFA as well as German delegates the night before the vote.

[T]he Germans clinched the cup hours before the final vote took place. It was also where Dempsey sat at the cosy jiggle wood-panelled bar drinking his favourite tippie of Guinness with his old friend Lennart Johansson, the boss of the European confederation UEFA who wanted him to vote for Germany. ... [Dempsey] sat in the bar of the Dolder

Grand Hotel, surrounded by his key allies Per Ravn Omdal of Norway, Joseph Mifsud of Malta and Miche D'Hooghe of Belgium. The glasses were filled with scotch and clinked, the pianist played, and Johansson – singing, smiling broadly and banging the table in accompaniment – led the choruses. As he left the bar, Johansson stopped briefly. 'I know who the winner is,' he said. 'It is a country like England' (Bezuidenhout *et al.*, *Sunday Times*, 09.07.2000:5).

In Germany, however, Dempsey was counted with the German bloc longer before that. Von Berries Bossmann (*Die Welt*, 05.07.2000) outlined that the FIFA President normally abstains from his vote. In fact, only three of the four Asian votes were seen on Germany's side in addition to Dempsey. Mrusek (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 07.07.200:3) and Stenger (*Frankfurter Rundschau*, 06.07.2000) highlighted that Franz Beckenbauer won these votes because he played golf with the ExCom members, several times with Dempsey. And he invited football functionaries to Kitzbühel (an upper-class health and skiing resort in Austria).

Nevertheless, Dempsey's abstention was a prominent argument for a South African appeal to investigate the host decision. The reason was that his abstention led to speculations concerning bribes and even death threats. The Scottish representative in the FIFA ExCom commented:

'From the early morning onwards enormous pressure was put on him from all parties. ... He has already asked for help from his lawyer in order to keep his integrity.' ... The Scot emphasised that during this WC-decision 'there was only great pressure but no corruption. ... We are not the IOC' (*Berliner Zeitung*, 07.07.2000).

Dempsey repeated that he was put under "'intolerable pressure' from various sources" producing a facsimile from his lawyer advising him to abstain from his vote (Griffiths, 2000:149). Nevertheless, already five days before the decision, Charles Dempsey approached Beckenbauer complaining about the pressure. The German is said to have answered: "Don't worry ... This is only a football vote. It's really not a matter of life and death" (Griffiths, 2000:137). Thus, the heavy speculations around Dempsey legitimised South Africa's call for investigations into the decision-making processes of the 2006 World Cup host decision. And with concrete information on government interference regarding German incentives to Arabian countries, Germany was almost revealed to have broken with the FIFA Statutes. Still, it was not proven but threatened Germany's and FIFA's 'marketing-character'. In the end, as it will be shown below, all negative information was channelled towards accepting the outcome and again subordinating South Africa under FIFA. The manipulative use of

communication upheld pressure at the same time as it revealed South Africa's closeness to becoming host to the FIFA World Cup.

#### 4.5. Towards the rotation system and the African World Cup

In 2002, two years after the 2006 host decision, FIFA proclaimed to adapt a rotation system and to start with it in Africa with the 2010 World Cup. This meant that the FIFA World Cup which took place every four years was to rotate equally between the continents. It was South Africa that achieved this success. South Africa highlighted the ongoing imperialist attitude by Europe and claimed that the 2006 host decision was influenced by other spheres than that of football administration. After South Africa lost the bid, President Thabo Mbeki called for the emancipation of Africa and accused Europe of 'globalisation of Apartheid':

The (South) African bid highlighted again and again the input of its star-players for the development of the prospering football-economy in Europe and that it is time to integrate Africa into this globalised economy ... as an equal participant (Wachter, 2002:131-132).

However, by hosting the World Cup, only South Africa (and not all of Africa) would profit from the economic expectations for its football economy and other macro-economic variables. Nevertheless, South Africa was able to submit its status as the only African representative in addition to its capability of hosting the World Cup.

When the 2006 host decision was announced in Zurich, representatives from both sides expressed their feelings: Former German national side players embraced each other and fell into the arms of Germany's Interior Minister Schily whereas boos by the closely defeated South Africa mounted to torn transparencies in the front rows which the Germans held (Mrusek, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 05.07.2000). South African representatives showed their outrage which exemplified the great expectations that were produced in them during the bid. South Africa came to threaten FIFA and its main stakeholders by calling for investigations into the host decision thereby potentially shattering FIFA's 'marketing-character'. Obviously, government interfered in the decision which normally led FIFA to ban respective constituencies. To settle a dispute would have gone through different institutions. Article 59,1 of the FIFA Statutes said, "FIFA shall create an option for recourse to the Court of Arbitration for Sport [CAS], an independent arbitration tribunal with headquarters in Lausanne (Switzerland), to resolve any disputes between FIFA, the Confederations, Members

... [etc.].” However, South Africa still wanted the World Cup and to subordinate itself to FIFA rule.

Kistner and Weinreich (1998:225) give an example of how information deployed in the public discourse was used to create pressure on interest groups. When the sports brand *Nike* sought to entering the European football market, the marketer *Nike Sports Entertainment* (NSE) recognised *Adidas*. Yet, NSE-President Ian Campbell placed a statement in the business newspaper financial times saying: ‘We want to do clean business. But we are not interested in backroom deals with Swiss number accounts, the way it is often done over here’. This was a short but very tough hint to having threatening inside knowledge of *Adidas* and FIFA business – and that this knowledge would also be used if necessary. Regarding the 2006 host decision, exactly such deployment of threatening information took place. This helped South Africa to pressurise FIFA. Yet, the public discourse submitted at the same time that, in the case of an African World Cup, South Africa was willing to subordination itself to FIFA’s institutional power. In fact, negative information became played down by the football officials towards reconciliation. The FIFA World Cup as well as the prospect and wish to host it was valued too high, even by South Africa. It was very interesting how the opposing parties were able to manipulate the public discourse in favour to their respective ‘marketing-characters’.

#### 4.5.1. FIFA’s official version regarding bribery speculations

After the 2006 host decision, Beckenbauer repeated his surprise about the outcome (BBC Sport Online, 06.07.2000). All speculations about German bribery, corruption, and even death threats were played down and channelled towards a hoax letter from a German satirical magazine. At around 11pm the night before the host decision, Martin Sonneborn, chief editor of the German satirical magazine *TITANIC*, faxed a letter to seven members of the FIFA ExCom including the representatives from South Korea, Trinidad and Tobago, Brazil, Saudi-Arabia, Botswana, USA, and New Zealand – Charles Dempsey. Sonneborn phoned the Zurich Dolder Grand Hotel’s reception claiming an extremely important message to be brought to the FIFA Executives. The facsimile emphasised his own and Beckenbauer’s wish for the World Cup signed with mister ‘Martin Hansen, Secretary TDES’; the acronym standing for “*TITANIC* – das endgültige Satiremagazin” (‘the final satirical magazine’). The fax was pushed underneath the doors of the FIFA representatives hotel rooms, proposing ‘a small gift’ in return for the vote. Around 12pm, Sonneborn sent another fax to Chuck Blazer (USA) clarifying the ‘small gift’ as a ‘fine basket with specialties from the black forest,



including some really good sausages, ham and – hold on to your seat – a wonderful KuKuClock! And a beer mug, too! Do we leave you any choice???' (*TITANIC*, 2006).

The British television broadcaster Channel4 was the first to make it a big story, and the British BBC quickly followed with own reports. The evening after the decision, Channel4 confronted PR-officials of the German delegation in Zurich with the fax. The following day, the *London Evening Star* published parts of the fax and in the morning two German journalists and an English television team confronted the German bid committee with the letter. FIFA General-Secretary Michel Zen-Ruffinen and German bid coordinator Fedor Radmann thought about asking the police for an investigation. But some hours later, FIFA's PR-Officer announced that the letter was a stupid joke by the German satirical magazine *TITANIC* (*Berliner Zeitung*, 07.07.2000). *TITANIC* admitted responsibility to the German press agency (*dpa*) and thereafter, all important television, radio, newspaper, and press agency journalists from around the world visited *TITANIC*'s editor rooms. In one of Germany's most important news magazines of the public broadcasters, ARD's *Tagesthemen*, the anchor-woman said that *TITANIC* brought the World Cup to Germany (*TITANIC*, 2006).

The hoax letter became the official version for any negative speculations against Germany and FIFA. Together with the German association DFB, FIFA highlighted the hoax letters by *TITANIC* as 'established facts behind certain incidents' (*FIFA.com*, 08.07.2000). The public discourse was manipulated to play down all reports about unruly background activities by the bid campaigners. And the Oceania representative Dempsey saw a chance in calming sentiments against his person by telling the news agency *Reuters* that after all the pressure, the hoax letter gave him the final blow to abstain from his vote (*TITANIC*, 2006).

#### 4.5.2. South Africa's anger at Dempsey

South Africa came to focus on Dempsey as the guilty man who caused South Africa's defeat. In fact, FIFA President Blatter offered Dempsey as a scapegoat for South African anger. After Germany won the 2006 host bid, "Blatter said he would answer in the cause of FIFA transparency, and announced: 'The president of the Oceania Football Confederation abstained, Charlie Dempsey.' Again, a volley of boos and hissing reverberated through the conference hall" (Griffiths, 2000:154). Blatter also highlighted his ongoing support for South African (thus Africa) and that South Africa's defeat was not his fault: "Before the meeting was officially opened I said to the executive committee: 'Make history! Take the World Cup to Africa!' ... Eleven followed me, 12 did not" (*FIFA.com*, 06.07.2000). Finally, a private

meeting shortly before the vote was highlighted where Blatter told Dempsey that he was “79 years old and that the time was to give up his crown. His announcement that he was going to vote for England because ‘his roots lay there’ was not acceptable, Blatter told him” (Bezuidenhout *et al.*, *Sunday Times*, 09.07.2000:5). South African newspapers highlighted that Dempsey was working in favour of UEFA President Lennart Johansson: “Both Dempsey and Johansson had a reason to get back at Blatter” (Bezuidenhout *et al.*, *Sunday Times*, 09.07.2000:5). Furthermore, the administrative position by Dempsey’s daughter was questioned referring to rumours saying that she worked for UEFA. South African bid committee president Irvin Khoza accused Dempsey of “betraying the South African people. ‘I do not see how a man can vote in the first two rounds and then not vote in the third and final round. Fifa should investigate this,’ he said” (*Mail & Guardian reporters and Sapa, Mail & Guardian*, 07.-13.07.2000:4). Dempsey was described “as arrogant, who has fought many a battle with Australian soccer chiefs, and who has ruled soccer in the Pacific with an iron fist was expecting the world to believe he had become a cowed victim of voting machinations.” Finally, different personalities from the Oceania region were quoted highlighting anger against the person Dempsey shifting anger away from Oceania. (Bezuidenhout *et al.*, *Sunday Times*, 09.07.2000:5).

On 7 July 2000, FIFA denied that one of the FIFA officials received death threats in the run-up to the 2006 host decision. Dempsey’s complaints were only referring to “unbearable personal pressure” and any reports claiming differently, “including comments by its [FIFA’s] own director of communications Keith Cooper, were inaccurate.” Bezuidenhout *et al.* (*Sunday Times*, 09.07.2000:5) cited Dempsey saying: ‘I was scared standing there at 5am with this letter in my hand ... On the last evening before the vote, my night’s sleep was interrupted by five phone calls, I did not make any calls as I feared my phone might have been bugged. I had death threats. I was also phoned by Nelson Mandela at 6.30am. I never thought the World Cup was so important to so many people.’ However, Bezuidenhout *et al.* (*Sunday Times*, 09.07.2000:5) highlighted that few believed Dempsey and quoted Jack Warner, the representative for CONCACAF and Trinidad and Tobago: ‘Dempsey made it all up. He lost his nerve and he concocted the whole thing in his head. I am livid, Football does not deserve a man like Charlie Dempsey’ (Bezuidenhout *et al.*, *Sunday Times*, 09.07.2000:5).

South Africa’s *Mail & Guardian* also emphasised public opinion and made clear that FIFA could lose all credibility as well as its foothold in an increasingly important football market. Several people ‘from the street’ were quoted declaring their disappointment and that the decision was betrayal against “not only South Africa, but the whole African continent”.

The South African Radio 702 presenter, Gareth Cliff, referred to Dempsey as “that bastard New Zealander” from that nation of “sheep-shaggers” and called upon South African criminals to kill Dempsey if the “Kiwi” had backed out because of South Africa’s crime rate (*Mail & Guardian reporters and Sapa, Mail & Guardian*, 07.-13.07.2000:4). On 1 October 2000, Dempsey stepped down from his administrative posts and claimed: “My family has been harassed and I’m not prepared to let that continue. ... Annie (his wife) and I are going on holiday. She has stood up to it well, but it is not fair to let it continue. The pressure had been too much for me. My family is more important than football” (*BBC Sport Online*, 2006).

Nevertheless, despite the defeat in the 2006 host decision, the rotation principle was a great chance for an African World Cup to follow in 2010. While it was necessary to uphold pressure on FIFA South Africa made clear its willingness to accept the outcome. This was achieved focussing on Dempsey as the main cause for the defeat. And finally, South Africa’s President Thabo Mbeki highlighted to move forward to the 2010 World Cup and said shortly after the 2006 host decision: “next time we will win” (*BBC Sport Online*, 07.07.2000).

#### 4.5.3. Towards the 2010 World Cup in Africa

For the bid campaign of South Africa the logic before the 2006 host-decision was already following the sense of a rotation: The 1994 World Cup in the USA, in 1998 in Europe (France), 2002 for the first time in Asia, and thus 2006 in Africa as South America waited for 2010. In fact, many in the football world discussed a rotation for a long time (*Berliner Zeitung*, 06.07.2000). South Africa’s bid-CEO Danny Jordaan emphasised:

It’s almost as if the World Cup is held on a home and away basis at the moment with every second competition going to Europe. We must break that pattern. The World Cup should be awarded more equally among continents. The tournament is about the future of football. If an African country is given a chance, it will have a greater market share. Only that will ensure that football becomes a truly global sport (Craig & Legge, *Saturday Star*, 01.07.2000:12).

This was consistent with FIFA President Blatter who highlighted a week before the 2006 host-decision that the candidates “have gone about their campaigns with vigour and imagination, promoting their bids with insistent persuasiveness and sometimes locking horns directly with one another.” He further emphasised “look at a system of pre-elimination ... Linked to this is also the concept of rotation among the continents, an idea that continues to merit serious attention. As the organisation of the World Cup becomes an increasingly

desirable prospect, it will be essential to ensure that the entire selection process is conducted fairly and democratically” (*FIFA.com*, 29.06.2000). But Germany stepped in and won the bid by deploying its economic strength.

Yet, after the emotional 2006 host-decision, voices in favour of rotation grew louder. A day after the decision, UEFA President Johansson called for the rotation system and backed an African nation for the 2010 World Cup. Apparently, he started the idea of a rotation principle including also the FIFA-Presidency. Johansson was cited saying:

The experience of the campaign to host 2006 has confirmed my belief in the need for a rotation system to be introduced for future competitions. ... We must act now to take away the unnecessary tension and division caused by the current system. If we can move forward on this basis I would strongly favour European support for an African candidate for the 2010 competition (*BBC Sport Online*, 2000).

At the FIFA ExCom meeting on 3 August 2000, CAF officially asked FIFA to discuss the establishment of a rotation system. (*FIFA.com*, 10.07.2000). On 3 August 2000, the FIFA ExCom announced the rotation plans starting with 2010 and that the “Committee ... unanimously backed Blatter’s suggestion ... [and that] the initiative taken by the defeated South African Football Association to take the matter to arbitration was inappropriate, and not supported by the African Football Confederation (CAF)” (*FIFA.com*, 03.08.2000). The FIFA Strategic Study Committee was to elaborate the details of a rotation as a basic principle. Two days later, the 52<sup>nd</sup> Ordinary Fifa Congress in Zurich ratified this decision and the technical development of the idea followed. On 15 March 2001, the FIFA ExCom “agreed – to details that are yet to be determined – that the rotation of the FIFA World Cup, due to begin in 2010, would start in Africa” (*FIFA.com*, 15.03.2001). On 7 July 2001, the Extraordinary FIFA Congress in Buenos Aires ratified the decision by the FIFA ExCom taken in March (*FIFA.com*, 07.07. 2001).

The World Cup had become so attractive that the bid turned into a diplomatic war. FIFA’s principles of transparency, fairness, and non-discrimination of any kind were undermined due to this increased competition around the scarce resource, the FIFA World Cup. The 2006 host decision shattered relationships between Africa and Asia within FIFA. Still, FIFA-President Blatter said to the representatives of the 203 national member associations at the FIFA Congress in August 2000 that “we have unity in the family of football.” FIFA leadership sought to reunify the so-called football family. However, the rotation rather shifted the conflict potential of the host decision away from the main body into

the confederations. *BBC Sport Online* commented on the rotation system to start with the 2010 World Cup in Africa:

The Fifa announcement will trigger an all-out bidding war amongst African countries with a burning ambition to stage the World Cup finals, namely South Africa and Morocco (*BBC Sport Online*, 08.07.2001).

In the end, South Africa was announced as host to the 2010 World Cup. Morocco was defeated despite much back-up by the Arabian ExCom members from the Asian confederation. However, South Africa received much support from UEFA and especially Germany. The Germans Fedor Radmann and Franz Beckenbauer were close allies to South Africa's bid: "It's never a bad thing to learn how you were beaten – especially if those lessons prevent you from being beaten again" (McCallum, *Star*, 14.05.2004:1).

Soccer legend Franz Beckenbauer, roped in to help with the SA bid and the man behind Germany's successful 2006 bid, was even more blunt. 'Yes, yes, it [the presentation] was excellent. You saw the presentation? It was all good-hearted, but it was not enough. Sports politics, you know?' (Donaldson, *Sunday Times*, 16.05. 2004: 2).

Three Nobel Peace Prize winners appeared in Zurich for the announcement of the 2010 World Cup host: Nelson Mandela, F.W. de Klerk, and Archbishop Desmond Tutu (Donaldson, *Sunday Times*, 16.05. 2004:2). The symbolism around FIFA recreated the world body's universal claims backing the order of the capitalist world-economy.

#### 4.6. Summary

This chapter made clear that FIFA became forced to hand out the football World Cup to Africa. This was due to the fact that it was threatened in its 'marketing-character' to be the 'universal' football control institution. First, FIFA itself, at hand of the dominant powers within, followed economic intentions rather than normative principles and handled the peripheral constituency Africa as an unimportant appendage, as South Africa's President Thabo Mbeki was said to have defined it. Second, this behaviour of FIFA found a prominent boiling point in the 2006 World Cup which exemplified that national football associations, national industry leaders, and the nation-state were to be understood as one unit competing against other 'national' units. Third, FIFA was threatened by revealing that its 'universal' norms, posited in the FIFA Statutes, were not adhered to by the leaders in FIFA. The 'suppressed' peripheral constituent unit, South Africa, as a national unit seeking for economic (and in turn ideological) hegemony, did not want to oblige to this suppression of its 'national'

interests. Therefore, fourth, the public discourse came to help South African interests by calling on universal principles of the capitalist world-economy. However, these national interests were veiled by the perception that this interest was of general peripheral interest. But while the peripheral interest remained with the creation of ideological values (African self-esteem), only South Africa managed to bring about material interests for its own 'nationals' or 'citizens'. In fact, the FIFA decision in favour of letting the World Cup rotate between the continents shifted this conflict potential away from the main body and the dominant constituents to the peripheral constituents. In turn, the world-systemic order regarding the hierarchy in the interstate-system as well as the capitalist intention of 'endless accumulation of capital' regained legitimisation by veiling economic practices with 'universal' normative principles of a global, liberal meritocracy. Importantly, what was shown in this last chapter was that the two opposing fractions regarding the bid to host the 2006 bid (in favour versus against the 2006 World Cup to be hosted in South Africa) was not a battle between the good or the bad guys. Rather, it was a battle over appearing either good or bad. Nevertheless, in world-systems terms the African World Cup is to be understood as more conform to its 'universal' norms. The public discourse made clear that the discussions around these norms were building up the decisive momentum for FIFA to take over the rotation system in advantage of the African continent. The sporting principles of fair-play and following rules and justice were taken up by the agents of public opinion to counter the focus by the organisers of football on profit, efficiency, and doing-anything-one-can to win (even cheating). In this sense, the bid for the 2006 World Cup functioned as the decisive moment to let FIFA change its conduct in favour of the rotation system. That this bid and the immense struggle occurred rooted in the foregone formation of the two power-blocs within FIFA. Yet, the bid concerning the 2010 World Cup would still need a closer investigation whereby to proof by a more detailed investigation how Africa reflects a structural discrimination of the Arab countries on the African continent.



## **CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION**

A major change took place in international relations: the world football body changed its bid procedures and symbolically admitted Africa as an equal partner by giving the World Cup to the continent. This was necessary to uphold the 'universal' football order. Without the normative change in host regulations, the conflict around a bid mounted to an outright bidding war wherein core constituents were able to reproduce their superiority. However, the principle of a 'marketing-character' made sure that those in power oblige to public pressure to uphold the capitalist system's 'universal' liberalism. Nevertheless, the success by one peripheral nation (or rather semi-peripheral) against a core nation is always achieved on the back of the rest of the periphery. Symbolically, Africa received the World Cup in order to re-cast the hierarchy of the world order of football as a level playing field.

However, most of African football players remain cheap raw material for the European football industry. While South Africa was not able to impose its hegemony against a core nation, it did so towards the of the African continent. Obviously, the capitalist world-economy further rises to global legitimacy as the only possible order. However, most material profit will remain with core nations such as in Europe which is done through peripheral representatives (or leaders) to impose core rule over the rest of the periphery. Nevertheless, it has become obvious that the capitalist world-economy is not only a material undertaking but very much concerned with the manipulation of communication. As long as the liberal discourse is upheld by the media as an ever more important democratic institution in international relations, conflict can be channelled into material peace. Nevertheless, the capitalist world-economy as a naturally evolving organism will 'automatically' guide processes within its boundaries towards its own enlargement and maintenance. Surely, social reality is based on the interplay between the political and the economic, respectively 'universal' ideals and economic practice.

Finally, this thesis wants to put forth several aspects which the author deems necessary for further academic investigation. Firstly, WSA needs to be enhanced by drawing on processes of social psychology. This regards the meaning of an 'eternal' football history as a transcendental yet graspable sense-creator for the self. In addition, investigations into the values football offers to athletes and especially spectators will help to understand social occurrences of our time. This regards, for example, the massive wave of emigration from Africa to the North (in football as well as in general). It is surely true that poorest living conditions for many Africans leave them no other choice than to seek a better life in Europe.

Still, researching the information that is passed on to Africans will presumably reveal that football is a major factor for the creation of the belief that an African can achieve a better life only by going to Europe. The ability by a few Africans to achieve a massive income in Europe (by playing football) makes them idols worth following. Thus, a comparative investigation is needed on the value-system that football produces, regarding core and peripheral nations, as well as elite, lower-class, and children perspectives.

A further point of interest will be the investigation into the future of China as the widely presumed hegemon to follow the USA. This regards cultural aspects and the question whether China is able to transform capitalist society's culture the way Britain did through football or the USA did through the movie-industry in Hollywood. Two years ago, Juan Figer, the most successful players' agent from South America with much (and criticised) power in the international football system, claimed: 'The Chinese football will explode in about two years' (Goos, 2006:113). China did not resist capitalist culture, yet it seems that China might well enhance the capitalist system's 'value-system'.

Finally, the effect of football on individuals' value-systems should be tested. This concerns the fact that football, and thus its values, stand in economic competition to other spheres of the entertainment industries. First, the spread of football's values (its rules and the organisational conduct) is constrained by other sports. For example, professional sports on highest levels in the USA, such as American Football, or in Cricket are much stricter on physical discipline on the field. There, an umpire is able to overrule referees, at times by use of a television replay. In Europe, 'TV-umpire' for football is widely discussed but also heavily opposed so far. Second, the entertainment industries other than sports, such as movies and music, also submit values. The question is in how far the values of the globally operating entertainment industries oppose or support each other.

Obviously, football stands in competition with other forms of consumer oriented entertainment, regarding both economic and ideological aspects. Thus, there is still much knowledge to be gained from academic research into football. Theorisation in social sciences on contemporary issues in our 'global society' will be enhanced by academic sport research. Nevertheless, such academic research must also understand itself as an important element in the shaping of the capitalist world-economy's value-system. And therefore it is obliged to put much effort in a correct understanding of our capitalist system as a process that slowly undergoes different transformations which are rooted in psychological aspects.

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