


**Revising the Value Shift Hypothesis: South Africa's Value Dynamics
between 1991 and 2001.**

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Assignment in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the MPhil Degree in Political
Management at the University of Stellenbosch.



Study Leader: Prof. H. J. Kotzé

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Declaration

I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this assignment is my own original work and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it at any university for a degree.

Abstract

The World Values Survey has made a significant contribution to research in the field of values and value change, but a large amount of the research has been fashioned in a manner to tap values in industrialized and western states, rendering the theoretical models of explanation less than relevant for developing nations. This study aims to advance an understanding of value change within the South African context, particularly in light of the expansive political, social and economic changes to have transpired since 1990, whilst simultaneously addressing this issue of a lack of universal theory to understand value change.

Primary amongst the theoretical frameworks addressing this issue of value change has been Ronald Inglehart's theory of a shift towards increased post-materialism in economically viable democratic countries. By subjecting survey data regarding value priorities from the South African rounds of the 1991, 1995 and 2001 World Values Survey to statistical analysis, the hypothesis of a similar situation in South Africa will be tested. After evaluating whether South Africa concurs with the post-materialist shift hypothesis, a unique dimension, including pre-materialist values, will be utilized in an attempt to establish whether South Africa has undergone any value change. This dimension is employed in the analysis of the 1995 and 2001 South African data, and whilst the value shift hypothesis promulgated by Inglehart appears largely unconcurred, an overall trend away from pre-materialism towards increased mixed type value priorities, with an ever so slight increase in materialists, has become evident. Although South Africa's value configuration is displaying an increasing convergence towards more moderate value orientations, most of the dynamics of change are manifesting themselves amongst and across various population sub-groups.

South Africa's values are therefore undergoing relatively dramatic fluctuations, mainly reflected when the data are disaggregated for the various population sub-groups, the results indicating that longitudinal analysis along the pre-materialist/materialist continuum continues to be a more appropriate tool for tapping South Africa's underlying values. The consequences of these findings, for democratic consolidation, future political conflict, value change determinants and the appropriateness of this model for developing countries, will be assessed in detail. Consequently, by conducting these analyses, this research essay attempts to situate a global, but still largely Western theory, in a South African and developing world context. It thereby attempts to contribute towards filling a knowledge gap concerning the direction, degree and nature of the dynamics of value change.

Abstrak

Hoewel die Wêreld Waardestudie sedert 1981 'n noemenswaardige bydrae gemaak het tot navorsing rakende waardes en waardeverandering, was dit tot dusver hoofsaaklik gefokus op waardes van geïndustrialiseerde en westerse state. Dié fokus, het die studie grootliks van sy verklarende bruikbaarheid vir ontwikkelende lande ontnem. In hierdie opdrag sal daar gepoog word om die waardeveranderinge van Suid-Afrikaners, in die lig van die politieke- en ekonomiese omwenteling sedert 1990, te beskryf. Dit sal gedoen word tesame met die aanspreek van die kwessie rondom die gebrek aan 'n universele teorie waarmee waardeverandering verklaar kan word.

Ronald Inglehart se teorie, wat 'n skuif na post-materialistiese waardes in ekonomiese lewensvatbare state postuleer, was tot dusver die mees prominente teoretiese raamwerk wat waardeveranderinge beskryf het. Deur middel van die analise van die 1991, 1995 en 2001 data van die Suid-Afrikaanse rondte van die Wêreld Waardestudie, sal daar gepoog word om dié hipotese binne die plaaslike konteks te toets. Hierna sal 'n unieke dimensie, wat pre-materialistiese waardes insluit, gebruik word om vas te stel of Suid-Afrikaners enige verandering in hul waarde oriëntasies ondergaan het. Hierdie dimensie is by die 1995 en 2001 studies ingesluit, en hoewel die resultate nie heeltemal ooreenstem met Inglehart se hipotese nie, was daar 'n neiging weg van pre-materialisme in die rigting van meer gemengde waarde prioriteite, sowel as 'n baie klein toename in die aantal materialiste, merkbaar. Suid-Afrikaners blyk te beweeg in die rigting van meer gematigde waarde oriëntasies, en meeste van hierdie neigings manifesteer ditself binne en tussen die verskeie bevolkingsgroepe.

Suid-Afrikaanse waardes ondergaan dus, in relatiewe terme, dramatiese veranderinge, wat veral na vore kom wanneer data vir die onderskeie bevolking sub-groepe afsonderlik geanaliseer word. Die resultate bevestig dat longitudinale analise in terme van 'n pre-materialistiese/materialistiese kontinuum steeds die beste metode is om waardeverandering binne die Suid-Afrikaanse konteks te meet. Die implikasies van hierdie bevindinge vir demokratiese konsolidasie, toekomstige politieke konflik, waardeveranderinge, en die toepaslikheid van die model op ontwikkelende lande, sal in detail bespreek word. Hierdie studie poog gevolglik om 'n universele, maar hoofsaaklik steeds Westerse, teorie in 'n Suid-Afrikaanse en ontwikkelende staat perspektief te plaas. Daar word gehoop dat sodanige studie sal bydra om bestaande tekortkominge rakende die rigting, graad, en aard, van waardeveranderinge aan te spreek.

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Chapter 1: Introduction and Outline of the Study

"It is clear that change in the operational sphere- in the whole range of social, cultural, demographic, economic, and technological factors that comprise the way of life in that society- has enormous repercussions for values- providing tremendous opportunities for the enhancement of some of our traditional ideals and aspirations, and great threats to the realization of others."

Nicholas Rescher (1969: 118)

Since 1994 South Africa has been characterized by intense restructuring in the political, social, cultural and economic sphere, and this monumental transformation has had a multifarious impact on South African society. Much of this impact and the resultant changes have been assessed in recent academic and political debate. One facet of society, no doubt dramatically influenced by these changes, are the value priorities of the South African population, yet there has been little extensive and systematic research to assess the direction, magnitude and nature of these changing dynamics.

Although not an ideal tool, social surveys have proven pivotal in accessing this still largely untested territory of perceptions and values. The World Values Survey (WVS), now conducted in over 50 countries, has proven invaluable for research in this field of mass public attitudes and values. Although conducted in South Africa since 1981, certain changes have occurred in the structure and the sampling procedure that have meant that only data from the 1995 and 2001 survey can be utilized in this research essay.¹

The 1991 South African World Values Survey was conducted in October and November of that year- on the very eve of nationwide transition. Both the European Economic Commission and the United States Congress had imposed formal sanctions since 1988. President Botha had resigned on the 14th of August 1989 and had been succeeded by F. W. De Klerk. On the 11th of February 1990 Nelson Mandela was released from Victor Verster Prison after serving 27 years. Despite widespread violence, particularly in Kwa-Zulu Natal, change appeared imminent with the inception of the Convention for Democratic Southern Africa (CODESA) at the World Trade Centre at Johannesburg. The October 1995 WVS, although conducted in the post-Apartheid era, took place a mere 18 months after the first democratic elections. Most South Africans were still trying to internalize the expansive changes to have occurred within the country over the last five years. Although many of the broad political changes had been

¹ The 1981 and 1991 questionnaire did not contain the six pre-materialist items, regarding which issues should be prioritized by government over the next ten years.

enacted, many South Africans were still awaiting the implications of these on the broader socio-economic environment. Uncertainty for the future loomed.

Since then much has changed. A relatively peaceful transition has occurred and South Africa has held its second democratic elections in June 1999. The euphoria of the first elections has subsided. Economically and socially a certain degree of consolidation has occurred and much of the uncertainty has dissipated. A completely different political milieu has been entered into with the African National Congress having replaced the National Party in government. It is thus necessary to determine South Africa's value structure in this new environment. The different context against which the 2001 World Values Survey was conducted will no doubt be reflected in the results of the survey. The past decade has, without a doubt, been marked by exceptionally expansive change, change that will have left its mark on South Africa's value priorities.

1.1. The Socio-economic Context

Before the results of the 1990, 1995 and 2001 WVS can be compared, it is crucial that the differing backdrops against which the two surveys were conducted be examined. This measurement and comparison of the two socio-economic settings is imperative to establish a context in which to analyze the changes in South Africa's value dimension. Constructing an all-inclusive analysis of South Africa's level of economic and social change over the last decade is a near impossible task. It is, however, paramount that such a context be constructed, and therefore a framework of indicators of the most pervasive external changes has been selected. Facets of socio-economic and political change to be addressed include purely economic indicators, economic development indicators, infrastructure and service delivery, changes in physical security and lastly the fluctuations in public perceptions.

1.1.1. Economic Indicators

Economic growth rates over the last ten years have revealed a slight overall improvement, marred only by slight fluctuations. The average growth rates have been calculated at 1.5% for the period between 1985 and 1990 and 0% between 1990 and 1994 (Whiteford, 1996:115). 1995 signified a dramatic increase in economic growth, calculated at 3,3% (*Business Day*, 15 February 1996). Growth rates subsequently plunged to 1.9% in 1999, only to rise again to 3.1% in 2000. These rather dismal growth rates only serve to compound the problem of a relatively low GDP per capita. A comparison of United National Development Programme Human Development Reports between 1994 and 2000, in fact reveals a deterioration in real

GDP per capita from \$4 291 in 1994 to \$3 056 in 2000.² Conversely, the South African Reserve Bank has calculated Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita as follows, changing from R13 786 in 1994 to R14 249 in 1997 and finally to R14 013 in 1999.³ Although this does represent an increase in net income, the change has been marginal.

Besides looking at aggregate income and production figures, the most pivotal changes within South Africa's production structure also have to be considered. The importance of the agricultural and mining sectors has decreased substantially, their respective contribution decreasing from 11.0% and 9.4% in 1990 to 4% and 6% of the GDP in 2001. The manufacturing, communication, transport, financial and business sectors have increased during recent years and the tourist industry is also expanding and its contribution towards the South African economy is expected to further increase in future (South Africa Yearbook, 2000/01).

This shift away from mining and agriculturally dominated production has had serious ramifications for employment levels, calculated by the total number of people employed as a percentage of the entire population of a working age and capacity. The result has been an increase in high-skilled job creation and job losses amongst low-skilled workers. This restructuring, leading to a scarcity of employment opportunities for less skilled workers, has reinforced the problems of inequality and poverty within the country. Statistics for the pre-1994 period are not always reliable or accurate, but data procured by the Central Statistical Service (CSS) claim unemployment rates of 11%, 8% and 6% for Africans, Coloureds and Indians respectively for 1990.⁴ According to a working paper published in 1990 by the Centre for Community Organisation, Research and Development (CORD), official unemployment figures were in the region of 1 million, whilst unofficial estimates were nearer 5 or 6 million (*The Star*, 11 March 1990). Unemployment remains rife, with *The Mail & Guardian* reporting half a million job losses since 1994 (20 April 2000). According to Idasa's Budget Information Service, 36% of the potential workforce is unemployed in 2001 (*The Mail & Guardian*, 23 March 2001), whilst the Central Statistical Services reported a similar unemployment rate of 36,2% in 1999. Unemployment rates over the last 5 years have changed quite drastically, ranging from 31,5% in 1994 to 29,2% in 1995, and an upsurge to 35,6% and 37,4% unemployment levels in 1996 and 1997 respectively. 1998 figures are given at 37,5% to drop

² The calculation method was not stipulated, and one can only speculate that changes in exchange rate could have affected these calculations.

³ SARB, South African National Accounts 1946-1998, June 1999 and SARB, Quarterly Bulletin, March 2000.

⁴ CSS, *Current Population Survey: Development Regions, provinces and self-governing territories*, Statistical News Releases. 26 February 1990.

slightly to 36,2% in 1999.⁵ The latest unemployment figure for 2001, supplied by Statistics South Africa, after adjustment for certain factors, is 22.5% (*The Cape Argus*, 28 March 2001), a figure that was attained by utilizing an alternative calculation method, which only includes the active job seekers, whilst the other statistics provided previously utilized an expanded definition of unemployment. Although unemployment statistics can yield remarkably different results (depending largely upon the definition of an unemployed person), escalating unemployment appears to have become one of the biggest problems facing the country.

Another leading challenge facing South Africa is its gross income inequality. According to a recent publication by leading Economists Whiteford and Van Seventer, redistribution from white to black South Africans has increased since 1991, but has not done much to change the overall gross income inequality, as most of the benefits of this redistribution have been reaped by the wealthiest portion of Blacks, Indians and Coloureds (Slabber, 2000:28). In 1995 most of the income inequality tended to be between racial groups, but today the intra-racial inequality is becoming an ever more prevalent problem. The total income gap for the population as a whole is widening and a recent report ranked South Africa as the country with the most skewed income distribution, second only to Brazil (*Mail and Guardian*, 28 July 2000).

A positive trend was, however, revealed in South Africa's strong commitment to lower inflation and reducing the fiscal deficit and public debt. Since 1995 South Africa has also embarked upon a process of liberalization of its financial and trade markets and a wave of privatization of state assets has begun. In 1995 the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), with its emphasis on growth through reconstruction was still in place. By 1996 it had been replaced with the Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) macro-economic strategy, with a greater emphasis on GDP growth, increased job creation, lower inflation, increased non-gold exports, increased inflows of foreign investment and a rise in domestic savings (Adelzadeh, 1999:3).

1.1.2. Economic Development Indicators

Although financial indicators are important, economic development levels should not be ignored. Seen in a global context, South Africa, with a real GDP per capita of R14 013 (*Quarterly Bulletin*, March 2000), is classified an upper middle-income country, but does not always reflect this in its standard of living. To facilitate a comparison of standard of living and quality of life, the Human Development Index (HDI) will be employed. It is a construct

⁵ CSS, *October Household Surveys*, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999.

first used by the UND in 1990 and comprises three indicators: life expectancy at birth, level of education,⁶ and standard of living⁷ (Woolard and Barberton, 1998:14).

Even in 1995, South Africa did not always fare well in comparison with other countries of similar income levels. South Africa's life expectancy was 64 and the adult illiteracy rate was 18 out of 1000 (World Development Report 1996, World Bank, Washington DC). In 1995 South Africa was ranked 86th, with an HDI value of 0,677 and was accorded a medium human development level (CSS Statistical Release P0015, 8 May 1995). Since then South Africa appears to have fared worse. In 2000 it was ranked 103rd, with an HDI value of 0.628. A recent report by the University of South Africa's (Unisa) Bureau of Market Research reveals that although South Africa's Human Development Index has weakened since 1995, the biggest problem is the discrepancy between the provinces. Whilst the Western Cape's HDI is estimated at 0.73, the Northern Province has one of 0.57, one on par with the likes of Zimbabwe (*Business Day*, 01 March 2001).

This apparent regression in terms of human development may, at least partially, be the result of the extreme poverty of many South Africans. A Human Poverty Index (HPI) has been constructed to measure poverty in a more holistic sense, thus not only denoting household income. The HPI comprises a measure of deprivation in longevity (i.e. the percentage of people not expected to live longer than 40 years of age), deprivation in living standards and deprivation in knowledge, measured as the percentage of illiterate adults. Deprivation of living standards is assessed on the grounds of the percentage of underweight children, the percentage of people without access to safe water and lastly to health services (Human Development Report, 2000). In 2000 South Africa's HPI was estimated at 20,2%, indicating that almost a fifth of the population is afflicted with serious poverty, although this does represent an improvement on the 17,46% of 1996. Again the difference between provinces is highly pronounced. Even in 1996 the Western Cape had an HPI of 9,68%, whilst Gauteng had one of 10, 45% and the Eastern Cape and the Northern Province faring worst with 23,34% and 28,34% respectively (Human Development Report, 2000).

1.1.3. Infrastructure and Service Delivery

Although the depth of poverty amongst the poorest appears to have increased since 1995, some significant advances in the provision of basic services may have improved the quality of life of a substantial sector of society. The Budget Review released by the Department of Finance in February 1999 claimed that over 3 million South Africans had received access to

⁶ Determined by a combination of adult literacy and school enrolment rates.

⁷ Indicated by real GDP per capita.

safe drinking water. Since then the government has stipulated that every household with a joint income of less than R800 per month will receive 6 kl of free water every month (*Financial Mail*, 9 February 2000). Recent developments have, however, underscored this seemingly exemplary performance. The outbreak of cholera in Kwazulu-Natal and surrounding areas in August 2000, and the incapacity of provincial and local government to control the epidemic have proven disastrous, already having claimed 85 lives and infected 37 204 people by February 2001 (*Financial Mail*, 9 February 2001). This disease, which can only proliferate in the absence of clean water and hygienic sanitation facilities, has created awareness of the approximately 12 million South Africans that do not have access to clean water and that 21 million do not have access to hygienic sanitation (*Financial Mail*, 19 January 2000).

The provision of electricity appears to have improved, as in 1993 it was asserted that only 67.1% of urban houses and 10.1% of rural households had electricity,⁸ whilst in 1997 already the figures had increased to 82% of urban houses and 32% of rural houses having electricity.⁹ Despite a new municipal initiative introduced in some provinces, which strives to supply some houses with 20-kilowatt hours of free electricity a month (*The Cape Argus*, 31 March 2001), many houses are still in dire need. According to housing Minister Mthembu-Mahanyele, between 4,5 and 5 million citizens having been provided with housing since 1994. Between 1994 and the end of 2000, 1 129 612 new houses and 370 000 council houses had been delivered to the people (*The Mail & Guardian*, 23 February 2001). This does not however meet the need for housing, and in June 1999 the housing backlog stood at 3 million, leaving many without adequate shelter (Idasa e-politics Newsletter, Issue 19. July 2000).

When seen against the background of needs and promises, the picture of land reform is not as satisfactory. A *Quality of Life Report* asserts that land reform has not met the promises made in 1994, namely that 25,6 million landless people will be given 30% of South Africa's agricultural land by 1999. Instead only approximately 0,6 % of the land has been transferred to 400 000 citizens (*The Mail & Guardian*, 21 January 1999). Thus it would appear that only very little of the demand for land has been met since 1995, and consequently the need remains great.

Segregationist Apartheid policy caused a great many problems in the South African Education System, the most blatant being the vast discrepancy between the previously White

⁸ Central Statistical Service (CSS) October Household Survey 1994. PO317. March 1995.

⁹ "National Electricity Regulator" in *Lighting up South Africa: Progress Report on Electrification*. (1997)

on the one hand, and the Black, Coloured and Indian education systems on the other. In 1994 it was calculated that approximately 10 million people had no education whatsoever. The disaggregated statistics reveal that of these 86% were American, 7% were Coloured, 2% Indian and 5% White.¹⁰ Further it has been asserted that overall pass rates have dropped from 58% in 1994 to 47% in 1997 ("Education: Achieving...", 2000:40). Other aggregate statistics, however, appear to yield some favorable results, with school enrolment rates showing an increase of 21% between 1991 and 1998 ("Education: Achieving...", 2000:41). In 1995 the adult literacy rate was 81,8% contributing to an Education Index (EI) of 0.6518, whereas the 2000 Human Development Report utilizes 1998 statistics and estimates the adult literacy rate to be 84,6%, with gross enrollment rates at 95%, resulting in an EI of 0.88.¹¹ Advances made in tertiary education, however, appear limited in the light of warnings of a drop in enrollment rates for tertiary institutions since 1995,¹² as well as a reported fact that only 18,4% of candidates who registered for university endorsement in 1999 passed at that level.¹³ So it would seem that despite the advances in education in some sectors, education in South Africa still leaves much to be desired.

In a similar fashion the provision of health care appears to have made many advances, whilst simultaneously deteriorating in other ways. The introduction of more immunization programmes and free maternity care to mothers and children under the age of 7 has made a positive impact, with the infant mortality rate dropping from 51 deaths per 1000 births in 1994 to 40.2 per 1000 births in 1996 (*The Mail & Guardian*, 23 May 2000). The impact of HIV/AIDS on an already burdened health care system cannot be undermined. According to the "National HIV and Syphilis Sero-Prevalence Survey of Women Attending Public Antenatal Clinics in South Africa," considered one of the most accurate measures of HIV infection rates in the country, an estimated 4,7 million South Africans are HIV positive. This translates to one out of every nine citizens having been infected by the end of 2000 (*The Cape Times*, 21 March 2001),¹⁴ implying an ever-escalating burden on the health care system.

¹⁰ Central Statistical Service (CSS) October Household Survey 1994. PO317. March 1995.

¹¹ Human Development Reports 1995 and 2000.

¹² Statement issued by the Council for Higher Education in April 2000, and quoted in *The Mail & Guardian*, 7 April 2000.

¹³ Department of Education 2000, reported in "Education: Achieving Equality" in *Indicator South Africa June 2000*.

¹⁴ This method of calculating Aids statistics is not however completely faultless as it does exclude some high-risk categories, such as gay men.

1.1.4. Physical Security

Although certain threats to physical security, such as political violence, have diminished spectacularly over the last decade, other risks, such as Aids, have become an increasingly real threat for many South Africans. Political fatalities, now one of the shrinking threats, had experienced a drastic increase from 661 deaths in 1987 to 1149 in 1988, 1403 in 1989 and 951 in the first three months of 1990 alone, reaching a peak with just short of 2 500 deaths in 1994. This steadily decreased from then to approximately 1000 in 1995, to just fewer than 500 in 1997 to under 90 in 2000 (South Africa Survey 2000: 235).

Although the accuracy of crime statistics is constantly under debate,¹⁵ crime appears to be one of the escalating threats to South Africans. Due to the fact that before 1994 there were 11 police forces- the South African Police and ten homeland police forces, and all recorded criminal activities in varying ways, (with differing degrees of precision and according to diverse criteria) accurate all encompassing information for the pre-1994 period is not available, but relying on the small extent of reliable data for the period (such as murder statistics) reveal that there seems to have been a general increase in crime, which began already around 1985 (Shaw and Gastrow, 2001:259). Information supplied by the South African Police Services Crime Information Analysis Centre reveal that murder decreased by 11,2% between 1994 and 1999, whilst reported cases of rape increased by 20,8%. Motor vehicle theft decreased by 0,8%, whilst common assault and common robbery both increased by 14,8% and a whopping 121,5% respectively.¹⁶ Shaw and Gastrow (2001: 243) also remark on the excessive increase in what they term *violent property crimes* during the time in question. Organized crime networks also appear to present an ever ballooning threat to South Africa, and the Western Cape in particular.

Overall crime trends however do not highlight the fact that some South Africans are in fact under greater threat from crime than others. Although the media often portrays whites as the primary victims of crime, particularly when it comes to white farmers, Shaw and Gastrow (2001: 243) regard this to be untrue, claiming instead that Africans are at greatest risk¹⁷, and

¹⁵ Many South Africans feel crime statistics do not reflect the true nature of the situation and also believed that they have simultaneously become a highly politicized issue and a political tool (Shaw and Gastrow, 2001: 237).

¹⁶ *The Incidence of Serious Crime*, January to December 1999. Semester Report 1/2000. The moratorium placed on the release of more crime statistics last year, on the grounds of police statistics being unreliable and inaccurate, creates the possibility of these statistics also proving less than reliable. Other knowledgeable sources, such as Ms. Louw, head of the Crime and Justice Program of the Institute of Security Studies, do not deem the statistics so unreliable as to warrant the placing of the moratorium (*Mail and Guardian*, 6 April 2001).

¹⁷ Claims based on findings of the *National Victims of Crime Survey*, Statistics South Africa, Secretariat for Safety and Security, Pretoria, 1998.

that “in the vast majority of crimes of violence the victims are African and poor”. Somewhat ironically, crime appears to be perceived as a bigger problem for Whites, Coloureds and Indians than black people (Rule, 1999:25; Shaw and Gastrow, 2001:236).

As already mentioned, the amplified prevalence of HIV/Aids has had a dramatic impact on the population, and according to the *National HIV and Syphilis Sero-Prevalence Survey of Women Attending Public Antenatal Clinics in South Africa*, considered one of the most accurate measures of HIV infection rates in the country, an estimated 4,7 million South Africans are HIV positive. This translates to one out of every nine citizens having been infected by the end of 2000 (*The Cape Times*, 21 March 2001).¹⁸ Whilst the increase of the virus has been dramatic, with only 0.7% of the population being infected in 1990, compared to 10.4% in 1995 and 22.8% in 1998, the estimate of 1 500 new HIV infections every day appears more daunting still.¹⁹ It is further projected that by 2002 approximately 250 000 South Africans will die of Aids annually, increasing to 500 000 by 2008.²⁰ Without going into the debate surrounding the new AIDS report released by the Medical Research Council (MRC) in September 2001, the statistics regarding the impact of HIV/AIDS on mortality in South Africa will be included in table 1, in order to further highlight the dire situation in the country. Of course solutions are constantly being sought, but the obstacles to dealing with this epidemic are too numerous and complex to be discussed here, - what does however remain paramount is that drastic intervention is imperative.²¹

Table 1: The Impact of HIV/AIDS on Adult Mortality in South Africa

<i>Year (starting in July)</i>	<i>Percentage of deaths due to AIDS</i>
1995	9%
1996	14%
1997	19%
1998	26%
1999	33%
2000	40%

Source: The Impact of HIV/AIDS on Adult Mortality in South Africa (2001:33)

¹⁸ This method of calculating Aids statistics is not however completely faultless as it does exclude some high-risk categories, such as gay men.

¹⁹ South Africa Yearbook 2000/2001.

²⁰ Health Systems Trust, *South African Health Review*, 1999, p305.

²¹ For a discussion of the obstacles to dealing with HIV/Aids in South Africa see Van Der Vliet (2001) and Adler (2000)

It would thus appear that a mixed bag of changes have occurred since 1990. In general service provision appears to have made some improvement with more people having access to basic survival needs, which have, however, by no means sufficiently been met. Particularly in the light of the recent upsurge of Aids, compounding the already existing impact of increasing poverty, much still needs to be done. Unemployment and income inequality have increased in spite of escalating stability in the formal economic indicators, such as inflation and national debt. In terms of the delivery of social and physical infrastructure and services, the progress made since the 1994 elections, at the time of the 1995 WVS, was still relatively slow.²² In a similar vein the situation of physical security, in terms of crime and political unrest, also reveal simultaneously pleasing and distressing results.

1.1.5. Public Perceptions

The construction of a detailed background on social and economic changes is, however, incomplete without an appraisal of public perceptions at the time the three surveys were conducted. Even though economic and social welfare may be measurable, quality of life measurements present a more holistic impression of general satisfaction. For this reason public satisfaction, as a meaningful measurement of quality of life, should not be undermined in the light of more quantitative and objective analyses. In 1988 82% of Whites, as opposed to 32% of Africans, felt an overall satisfaction with their life, with Indians and Coloureds in between at 77% respectively. By September 1995 satisfaction with life amongst Blacks had increased only marginally to 39%, whilst the life satisfaction of the other three groups- Whites, Indians and Coloureds, decreased in the 1995 poll to 60, 63 and 66% respectively. In 2000 47% of Africans were satisfied- indicating an 8% increase, whilst 58% of Coloureds, 65% of Indians and 81% of Whites were satisfied with life (Moller, 1989, 1995, 2000).²³ Although satisfaction with life ran very high during the May 1994 poll (80% of Blacks, 78% of Coloureds, 71% of Indians and 78% of Whites), this can largely be attributed to 'election euphoria' (Moller, 1995:27).

In three independent polls, conducted between February and September 1995, to determine whether South Africans had perceived an improvement in service and infrastructural delivery, the majority said no, whilst 14-36% said yes, and between 13 and 22% claimed to have experienced some deterioration (Moller, 1995:2).²⁴ More specific research of perceptions has

²² For a synopsis of possible reasons for the delays see Michie and Padayachee (1998).

²³ The survey, commissioned by the South African Quality of Life Trends Project, was begun in the 1980s to develop a reliable and valid cross-cultural measure of well-being. Approximately 4 000 respondents were surveyed by MarkData regarding between 31 and 35 aspects of their life during 1983, 1988, 1994, 1995 and 2000.

²⁴ The polls were commissioned by *Information Update* and conducted by MarkData.

consequently occurred, and in terms of the delivery of houses, public opinion of government performance was negative until 1997 and then became increasingly positive, reaching its peak in April 1999. Public opinion regarding the provision of health care was relatively stable over the period of May 1995 to April 1999. Between September 1998 and April 1999, the majority of South Africans (more than 66%) felt that government delivery was satisfactory (Mattes, Taylor and Africa, 1999:43).

The importance of perceptions of economic and political stability and security should also not be underestimated, and the Political Stability Scale (PSS) measures the perceptions of top-level decision maker's confidence in a country's political stability. In June (shortly after the 1994 elections) 42% of respondents felt very optimistic about the future, whilst in September 1995, only 11% were very optimistic (Ehlers and Schutte, 1995:65).²⁵ In a similar survey, it was reported that just over 30% of South Africans felt optimistic about the future in 1995, a figure that gradually increased to 37% in 1997 and a substantially higher 53% in October 1999 (Moller, 2000:22).²⁶

It is an assessment of the real and perceived situation that plays a pivotal role in sketching the backdrop against which an investigation of possible changes in value configurations is executed. It is this backdrop that will assist in analyzing the value change to have occurred over the last 10 years, as this research essay does not only seek to depict and clarify South Africa's value dimension, but also aide in the understanding of the specific nature of South African value change.

1.2. Theoretical Models

1.2.1. The Inglehart Model

As one of the founding fathers of the WVS and creator of the materialist/post materialist value continuum, some of the most extensive research in the field of value dynamics has been conducted by Ronald Inglehart. In the original WVS of 1970/71 only four options were provided, but in 1973 twelve options of issues that could be prioritized by government for the next ten years were listed (1977:28), and from these were constructed two indices to classify the goals into underlying values in a materialist and post-materialist continuum (Inglehart, 1977: 40). In this research essay, values, as a conceptual tool, shall be utilized according to Inglehart's definition, although a brief clarification of the term will be conducted in section

²⁵ Respondent were given a scale of very pessimistic, mostly pessimistic, mostly optimistic and very optimistic, to answer the question of how they perceived the country's level of political stability at the time of the survey.

²⁶ This survey was conducted by MarkData between September and October 1999, with a sample size of 2 219 South Africans.

2.1.1. Values are then defined as “the patterns of choice in the sets of goals of a specified population, which can become indirectly evident through social observation” (Inglehart, 1977:182).

Inglehart’s theoretical justification of classification along this values continuum was partially founded on Maslow’s hierarchy of needs (1954),²⁷ which states that there is a specific direction in which the change of needs will move, given a set of definite conditions. As the basic physiological needs indispensable for survival are met, so human beings will concern themselves with other higher order needs, such as the safety and security needs manifested in Maslow’s second tier, encompassing aspects related to physical and economic security. These needs largely satisfied, citizens will seek to satisfy a new level of needs, those regarding ‘quality of life’ issues (Inglehart, 1977:22). With increasing physical and economic security, economic forces have diminishing marginal utility (Inglehart, 1995:129), whereby subjective well-being is no longer of primary importance, as other aesthetic, intellectual and belonging needs become paramount. Employing the complimentary and interdependent hypotheses of *scarcity* and *socialization*, he asserted that when one category of needs had been fulfilled the next hierarchical category would take precedence. It is within this theoretical framework that the materialist/post-materialist dimension has been situated.

Consequently, in societies where conditions of physical and economic security become more consolidated, “a potentially universal process should occur” (Inglehart, 1995:6), a process that results in the ever greater prevalence of post-materialists in many industrialized nations (Inglehart, 1977, 1997; Abramson and Inglehart, 1995). The *scarcity* hypothesis is built upon the premise that the greatest demand will be made for those entities for which there is the scarcest supply. Inglehart (1985:103) states that “an individual’s priorities thus reflect one’s socioeconomic environment”. The *socialization* hypothesis focuses on the idea of generational replacement, whereby values are relatively stable and specific to a certain age group within a specific population. He asserted that exposure to a specific socialization process and socio-economic environment during one’s formative years has a lasting effect, and can impact equally seriously on one’s choice of priorities at a later stage (Abramson and Inglehart, 1987: 184). He has since recast this argument into a mould of ‘formative security’, claiming that low levels of formative security amongst younger cohorts are more likely to result in the adoption of materialist values, whilst post-materialist sentiments are more common amongst those with high levels of formative security (Inglehart, 1990:121-124).

²⁷ See Abraham Maslow, *Motivation and Personality*, New York: Harper, 1954.

In his more recent work, the entire value shift hypothesis has been placed within a larger context of the shift from modernism to post-modernism, whereby post-materialist sentiments represent “a shift in what people want out of life” (Inglehart, 1997:8), thereby functioning as indicator of the move towards postmodernism, in a similar vein as increased tolerance of diversity or lessening support of big government are indicators of the same (Inglehart, 1997:70).

1.2.2. The Critics

Inglehart's hypothesis has not gone without criticism, most of which can be classified into four categories. Much of the criticism has been focused on the independent variables in Inglehart's *socialization* hypothesis. By employing multivariate analysis on data obtained from eight Western European nations over an eleven year period, Duch and Taylor (1993) assert that temporary economic circumstances, such as increasing inflation, at the time of the survey take greater precedence than the situation of economic and physical security during one's formative years (1993:747). Similarly Clarke and Dutt (1991) argue that short-term economic changes, and in particular the short-term changes in unemployment levels are more crucial to the outcome than 'formative security'. The perceived shift towards post-materialism observed by Inglehart and his colleagues, is in fact unsubstantiated if a question on employment is inserted to replace one of the questions in the original battery (Clarke and Dutt, 1991:905; Clarke, Kornberg, McIntyre, Bauer-Kaase and Kaase, 1999:645). All this criticism appears to be directed towards temporary socio-economic conditions (*scarcity hypothesis*) playing a greater role than circumstances during a respondent's formative years.

Duch and Taylor (1993, 1994) further assert that the increase of post-materialism amongst younger cohorts, identified by Inglehart, is in fact the result of increased educational levels amongst younger cohorts, finding that although the results broadly reflect Inglehart's hypothesis, other factors have not been controlled for, and once education has been controlled for, very little correlation between 'formative economic security' and post-materialism remains (1993:751). Thus this category of critics argues that Inglehart's independent variables are not a true reflection of the causes of value formation and change.

A different category of criticism has been postulated of late and questions the validity of the 12-item battery of questions in the WVS as the most accurate tool to reveal an underlying value dimension. The post-materialist index in particular has come under extensive fire by Davis and Davenport (1999) who contend that the choices made by respondents do not necessarily reflect broader underlying values of society at large, but simply represents single individual choice at a particular point in time, reinforcing at the same time the power of

temporary circumstances. Davis, Dowley and Silver (1999:942) also question the validity of the indexes on the ground that there are very low inter-index correlation scores between the three sets of indexes, thereby questioning the validity and reliability of the dependent variable.

One of the critics in the third category is Marks (1997: 54), who addresses the same dilemma from a slightly differing perspective, by asking whether the hypotheses apply to cohorts or individuals. If it applies solely to cohorts, post-materialist priorities will predominantly occur amongst post-World War II cohorts, but if the process occurs on an individual level, post-materialist values can occur in any cohorts where families provide security for their children. Davis (2000) also questions the fact that the individual level has not been accorded much attention, both critics thus comment on the lack of clarity regarding individual and systemic level analysis.

Davis (2000) also falls into the fourth category, which queries the expectation ensconced within the post-materialist shift theory. He asserts that individual level political and social attitudes and behavior do not always reflect the system level expectations expressed in Inglehart's hypothesis, finding for example, that if certain procedures are utilized there are no differences between post-materialists, mixed types and materialists individuals regarding political tolerance or racial prejudice (Davis, 2000:472). Flanagan also criticizes Inglehart's (1987:1302) "new axis of politics", stating that Inglehart's expected outcome of many working class voters shifting to existing right parties false, claiming instead that they become members of so-called "New Right" parties, such as "rights to life and anti-women's-lib parties"(1987:1306).

Inglehart and Abramson have refuted most of these challenges made, by reinforcing that recognition has been given to the impact, either large or small, that short-term period effects, particularly inflation and unemployment, can impart (1995:26), but even when these period effects have been controlled for, there is still a marked shift towards post-materialism (1999:665). They also recognize the impact of education in itself (1977: 365, 1995: 86), as well as accounting for much of the causality by defining education as an indicator of formative security (1977:73), in terms of it being a function of the respondent's guardian/parent's socio-economic status, as well as providing an indication of physical security within a historical context (Inglehart, 1995:86). The reconceptualization of the *socialization* hypothesis to include 'formative security' also provides a more holistic approach to the impact of everything not encompassed by present socio-economic circumstances. The criticism of Inglehart's value shift hypothesis has thus been noted, but this research essay will

continue to utilize Inglehart's materialist/post-materialist index as a measure to access a central and pervasive indicator of certain basic value priorities, although the entire multitude of possible causal factors of value change will be investigated during multiple regression analysis.

1.2.3. The South African Model

As already mentioned, the locus of Inglehart's research, as well as most of the criticism thereof, has been the industrialized world. Although some recent adaptations have allowed, to a limited degree, for the developing world to be included in the research (Abramson and Inglehart, 1995:11), a dimension that only allows for a materialist/post-materialist classification, does not prove very relevant for most of the developing world, where basic survival needs are often not even met. Further the theory of increasing post-materialism is applicable only to countries presently experiencing increasing economic prosperity and democratic consolidation, making it even more exclusionary in its approach. Taylor, in her analysis of South Africa's value dimension in *Squaring the Circle: Towards a valid Values Dimension for South Africa* (1998), addressed this dilemma and found the materialist/post-materialist framework not very relevant for South Africa.

Utilizing a more appropriate pre-materialist/materialist framework based on items inserted in the 1995 South African WVS, she focused exclusively on the 1995 survey and situated the South African population along this newly conceptualized framework. The results showed that pre-materialist and materialist needs took precedence over post-materialist ones in 1995, and that most South Africans revealed themselves to be mixed types, urging government to prioritize both pre-materialist and materialist needs.

1.3. Value Change

Due to a lack of time series data, Inglehart's hypothesis of increased post-materialism in nations experiencing escalating economic prosperity and democratic consolidation has not been tested.²⁸ In this research essay, the concept of democratic consolidation has been afforded substantial consideration, and therefore needs clarification. Democratic consolidation can be conceptualized as having occurred "when the rules and resources of basic democratic institutions are sufficiently entrenched-sufficiently protected by their own and other vested interests and sufficiently endowed with symbolic significance and normative approval- that they can withstand changes in the environment" (Schmitter, 1991:22-23). This, however, only highlights institutional entrenchment and therefore this needs to be qualified by

the simple requirements that democracy must be perceived “as the only [political] game in town” (Linz). Although a debatable issue in itself, South Africa appears to have embarked upon the path towards democratic consolidation, but the discussion in section 1.2.1 has demonstrated that South Africa is not experiencing rapid economic growth.²⁹

Despite the fact that Taylor (1998) found very low levels of post-materialism in 1995, South Africa has often been depicted as a developing nation with a distinct industrialized element. This contradicting and complex set of circumstances does not make the analysis of whether South Africa complies with the pre-conditions for value change very easy. Inglehart (1997:125) has asserted that non-Western nations do not possess a different worldview, and despite vastly differing socio-economic and cultural-historical backgrounds, he found Poland to be the only nation where the public did not respond similarly to those in Western Europe and North America. His research has included four Latin American nations, Japan, South Korea, China and various Eastern European states.

The issue is further complicated by the fact that Inglehart recognized that gradual value shift may “resist change due to short term fluctuations in the socio-economic environment” (1977:99), in other words, that short term changes, such as ballooning inflation or increased job losses, may result in sporadic fluctuations not reflected by the long term shift. As mentioned previously, relevant data for South Africa is only available for a 10- and 5- year period respectively, restricting this research to the analysis of short-term change. The problem is further compounded by the fact that this short period under observation has been characterized by extensive and pervasive change in all spheres of life.

If the South African application of the international value shift hypothesis does not yield the desired results, it is imperative that the applicability of Inglehart’s hypothesis and related model be questioned. The introduction of a pre-materialist dimension, which proved very relevant in the case of South Africa, creates a space for much debate regarding the expansion of this model for greater universal relevance. The inclusion of the pre-materialist items in two successive waves of the South African WVS makes it possible to test for a value shift from pre-materialist to increased materialist values. The pre-materialist dimension not having been included in any of the present analysis of value change, the circumstances under which a shift from pre-materialist to materialist nations can be anticipated remain to be elucidated. This research essay will attempt to shed some light on at least some of these questions regarding value change in a uniquely South African context.

²⁹ For a discussion of literature regarding the Consolidation of Democracy in South Africa see Habib (1995); Sisk (1994); Van Vuuren (1995) and Giliomee and Schlemmer (1994).

It can be speculated that a change of South African values can be expected on the basis of recent surveys conducted by the HSRC, which have given an indication that aggregate perceptions of national priority have changed over time. When provided with a list of possible priorities for government over the next ten years, data collected in March 1999 categorised job creation as top priority (41%), followed by crime prevention at 32% and service provision as third option at approximately 5%. In a similar survey in October 1995, housing was first priority at 35%, whilst in February 1996, job creation was considered the main concern by 44% of respondents. In February 1998, increased employment was still paramount for 35% of the sample, but crime prevention featured as one of the important priorities, with 29% of respondents ranking this as first priority. In December 1998 crime became more important than job creation, with 41% ranking it as the most important national priority ³⁰(Rule, 1999:25). This notion is supported by data from the Opinion 99 ³¹ project, which reported that only 6% of respondents marked 'crime and security' as one of the top national priorities in 1994, compared with over half of the respondents deeming this one of government's critical responsibilities in mid-1997 and approximately 65% in April 1999 (Mattes, Taylor and Africa, 1999:47). Even over such a relatively short period, some change in perceptions of national priorities have been apparent. This change in priorities is not, however, necessarily indicative of a change in underlying values, but merely indicates the possibility of value shift over a short period of time.

1.4. Problem Statement

The central focus of the research essay will lie in a descriptive-analytical discussion of the transformation of South Africa's value configuration over the last decade, - a decade marked by extensive and pervasive social, political, economic and cultural change. The aim of this study is to determine whether South African value priorities are changing, and, if so, what is the direction and magnitude of this change. It therefore comprises a longitudinal observation of the direction, degree and nature of the dynamics of South Africa's value dimension. The change will be measured in terms of the materialist/post-materialist dimension between 1991 and 2001, and a separate pre-materialist/materialist continuum, between 1995 and 2001.

This entails firstly situating the South African population along the two continuums, in order to ascertain which measure is most pertinent to a South African context- Inglehart's original two dimensions, or the unique three-dimension model proposed by Taylor (1998). This

³⁰ Democracy SA. Public Opinion on National Priority Issues, Human Sciences Research Centre. May 1999. The sample size was 2 200 and was obtained using clustered probability sampling methods.

³¹ A joint venture by the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (Idasa), the Electoral Institute of South Africa (EISA), the SABC and the market research firm Markinor.

investigation will therefore attempt to situate a global, but still largely Western theory, in a South African context. The latter section will then focus explicitly on extrapolating the reasons for this value change, utilizing cumulative data, as well as data that has been disaggregated according to socio-economic and demographic variables.

1.5. Central Questions

The first part of the investigation will entail an exploration of the specific national issues prioritized by the South African population, with the objective of discovering whether South Africa's priorities are changing? This section therefore entails a purely descriptive/explorative examination of national issues, without looking at the underlying value dimension.

This will be followed by the construction of the indices, which will facilitate an investigation of South Africa's value configuration in terms of the original materialist/post-materialist framework. This will be followed by the application of the uniquely South African pre-materialist/materialist dimension. An analytical comparison of these results with those from the previous model will be necessary to deduce whether, six years after the first democratic elections, South Africa's value dimension better fits the materialist/post-materialist paradigm as promulgated by Inglehart (1971,1977,1981,1985,1995,1997) or whether Taylor's (1998) pre-materialist/ materialist framework continues to remain more pertinent. This will largely be achieved by analyzing the impact of the addition of a pre-materialist index on the distribution of value priorities. On the grounds of the socio-economic backdrop sketched in section 1.1, it can be hypothesized that the pre-materialist/materialist continuum offered by Taylor (1998) will be more effective than the original Inglehart materialist/post-materialist dimension in tapping South Africa's value orientation. By extension it can be argued that the pre-materialist/materialist dimension is a better instrument for the measurement and consequent analysis of South Africa's values.

Once a comparison to test this hypothesis has been drawn, the more relevant dimension will be decided upon, and an analysis conducted to determine whether value change has occurred. The results can be extrapolated. Such an analysis will, however, be incomplete without addressing the much-discussed divisions entrenched in the population. The broad level analysis of the value change will therefore be followed by a more specific dissection of the spectrum of opinions for various sub-groups of South Africa's highly heterogeneous population. The investigation will thus revolve around the lines of division in the value configuration. One of Taylor's (1998:165) primary conclusions was that of all the socio-demographic factors, the strongest relationship was that of value orientation and race. South Africa's diversity cannot, however, be reduced to racial divisions, and consequently value

change in other population sub-groups will also be monitored. The data will therefore also be disaggregated by class, gender, educational level and household income levels, with the aim of fostering a real understanding of the reasons for value change in South Africa.

This task complete, the implication of the results will have to be evaluated. Questions to be addressed are: What does South Africa's value dimension look like? Does South Africa fit either of the two paradigms previously discussed in the research essay? What have been the most pervasive changes in the public values? What are possible explanations for these changes? What are the implications of the dynamics of this value change for the present? In which way will these implications influence South Africa future? Can this model serve as the start of a prototype for a more universal model for analyzing value change? The capacity of this research essay should not be overestimated. It should simply be seen as one small set in the process of understanding South African values, as well as the extending of a largely western-industrialized nation model to greater universal applicability and use.

1.6. Research Design

The methodology of this research essay will comprise a thorough literature review and extensive secondary analysis of survey data, utilizing the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences. The study utilizes existing attitudinal data obtained from the World Values Survey for the years 1991, 1995 and 2001. Although a longer time period would have been preferable, the time series analysis could only cover 5- and 10- year periods respectively, for previously mentioned reasons. Although individual opinions form the foundation of this survey, the aggregate quantitative data is utilized to make inferences of the larger society. During data analysis various statistical procedures will be utilized to monitor and analyze the nature of the value priorities of the South African population in 1991, 1995 and 2001. Thereafter, a comparison will be drawn to ascertain the direction and degree of the change to have transpired over the specified period of time. Subsequently, a speculative-empirical analysis will be employed to determine the causes of value change in South Africa.

This first chapter therefore provides a brief introduction to the theoretical framework that will form the backbone of this investigation. A portrayal of the political and socio-economic situation, both real and perceived, at the time the surveys were conducted has already been provided. This chapter will thus form the foundation, where after, in chapter two, the concepts and ideas used later will be conceptualized and operationalized. Chapter two will also focus on extending the theoretical foundation established in this chapter, with the dual aim of furnishing the reader with a better understanding of the framework, but also to elucidate upon the significance of this research. The research design, although referred to in this chapter, will

be expanded upon in chapter two. A portion of the third chapter involves a discussion of the specific issues prioritized by South Africans, whilst the rest will contain a detailed description of the statistical procedures, and the rationale that drive these, to be used in the creation of the indices. This in place, the two models can be applied in chapter four, and the value priorities observed and analyzed. The bulk of chapter four will therefore entail an interpretation of the data and a discussion of the findings. The final chapter will comprise final conclusions, the answers to some of the questions posed, and finally recommendations for future research.

1.7. The Significance of the Research

Although the impact of value change on South Africa at large will not be accorded much emphasis in this research essay, the general effect of the internal and external changes in environment on South Africa's value design will be evaluated. South Africa undeniably has a highly heterogeneous and often conflicting population, with divisions augmented by a destructive past. Most of these divisions, such as race, ethnicity, gender and class, have received much attention, yet very modest consideration has been given to the divisions within the value priorities of the country, and the ramifications of these for a host of issues, not least of which are national unity, diversity management, political tolerance, nation building and the consolidation of democracy. Real transformation merely begins with external restructuring, and only when external change is reflected internally in the individuals of the larger society can this ideal of real transformation be achieved. A conference entitled "*Saamtrek: Values, Education and Democracy in the 21st Century*" held in Cape Town in mid February 2001, emphasized the pivotal role that an open dialogue about a new value conception can play for the consolidation of democracy (*The Sunday Independent*, 25 February 2001). Value research should not, however, be restricted to the classic values generally perceived to accompany a liberal democracy, such as tolerance, respect and honesty.

Inglehart (1977:147) speaks of the difficult situation of attempting to fulfill two different sets of needs simultaneously. More often than not the exact set of circumstances that fulfill the needs of one group are those that renders another lacking. Irreconcilable differences in value priorities may become the focal point of the next generation of political conflict in South Africa. It is for this reason that much of the importance of determining the changes of South Africa's value dimension will lie in the implication thereof for determining a national consensus of value priorities. Giliomee and Schlemmer (1994) speak of the importance of common values for the consolidation of democracy, hence, if South Africa's value dimension reveals itself more divided with little consensus in sight, the project of developing national unity may indeed be in jeopardy. Part of the significance of this research lies in the assisting in the creation of an understanding of the dynamics of South Africa values. An improved

understanding and awareness of a possible value dimension divide is pivotal. The principal significance of the research essay lies in starting to fill a knowledge gap concerning the direction, degree and nature of the dynamics of value change within South Africa.

The research essay is, however, also significant in that it attempts to formalize the first few steps taken towards an expansion of a potentially relevant and insightful theory to incorporate most of the developing world. Part of the importance of the research essay is thus to channel future research for the advancement of fundamental knowledge regarding the value dimensions and value change of non-western, non-industrialized nations.

1.8. The Way Forward

This research essay will thus encompass a systematic descriptive-analytical discussion of South Africa's value dimension by employing an amalgamation of Inglehart's and Taylor's value paradigms. This will begin with an analysis on the level of attitudes towards individual issues of national priority. Thereafter, analysis will move to the next level, namely that of the underlying values that these separate issues represent. By situating 1991, 1995 and 2001 data within the most pertinent theoretical model, an improved understanding of South Africa and the changing dynamics of its value dimension will be facilitated. The interpretation of these findings will hopefully shed light on the question of how this value change came to pass. The findings of this analysis may have dramatic impact upon the country's future, and in particular the precarious issue of national unity. As Abraham Lincoln once said: "If we know where we are and something about how we got there, we might see where we are trending- and if the outcomes which lie naturally on our course are unacceptable, to make timely change" (David, 1999: 2).

Chapter 2: A Theoretical Framework

Whilst the salience of value research for South Africa has been discussed in the previous chapter, the following chapter will attempt the contextualisation of research of this nature within the broader study of political science. As already mentioned, values, at first glance, may indeed seem less than consequent for South Africa, with many more pressing issues being constantly addressed on television screens and around dinner tables. The following chapter will attempt to clarify the importance of value research within the context of democratic culture in general, as well as the uniquely South African context of the project of nation building. Before such a discussion can be embarked upon, it is paramount that the meaning of certain important terms and concepts, as well as the conceptualization and operationalization the three indexes, be elucidated.

2.1. Values

2.1.1. Towards a Definition of Values in Politics

The term *value* has already established itself as a pivotal component of the discussion and hence requires careful conceptualization. A highly ambiguous and abstract term, this concept has been the source of intense philosophical and political debate. Specific aspects of the debate pertaining to this research essay will be mentioned, but the debate in its entirety will not be discussed. Whilst bearing in mind that the concept of values is employed in several fields in various diverse ways, the conceptualization of values in a political context can be rationalized by characterizing politics as relating to the choosing of certain options, often at the opportunity cost of other choices. Values become pertinent to politics when citizens choose one alternative over another conflicting one, thereby employing their subconscious value systems. Hence, cultures contain “competing values, and [these values] have inherent contradictions in them, although to different degrees” (Shamir and Shamir, 1995:107).

These specific values must be appreciated within the larger context of culture. Inglehart (1997:75) has defined culture as “a system of attitudes, values and knowledge that is widely shared within a society and is transmitted from generation to generation.” Due to its subjective nature, culture- as a concept, is not easily be measured, necessitating the construction of assessable indicators of culture- a task attempted by the creators of the WVS. Possible indicators of culture are the thoughts or ideas regarding specific issues, which are measured in the single items of the WVS questions regarding national priorities, such as “fighting crime” or “making cities more beautiful”. Clusters of these views pertaining to similar issues can also be identified in the WVS, one example being a sub grouping of the following three items, namely “maintaining law and order”, “maintaining a strong defense

force” and “fighting crime” into a cluster concerning physical security. To extend the analysis- and the benefits to be accrued from it- the relevant questions in the WVS were structured in such a manner as to also tap broader, long-term goals and concerns, rather than only immediate specific attitudes. Consequently the single items of the whole battery have been categorized into a broader classification matrix, indicating the value level of analysis, which allows analysts to make broader deductions and conclusions about a range of political issues to be discussed throughout this research essay. What has, however, become paramount is that individuals, and hence their value priorities, do not exist within a vacuum, but within bigger cultural realms, hence “values are not individual properties but the social properties of persons who share a universe of meaning” (Van Deth and Scarbrough, 1995:35). Consequently, the desire to maximize one’s subjective well-being on an individual level would be represented on a societal level as a greater emphasis on post-materialist values.

In this perspective, values are one of the pivotal components of culture. Despite the lack of consensus within the social sciences about an universally acceptable definition, this research essay will rely on the notion that the essence of values lies in the three preconditions of values offered by Van Deth and Scarbrough (1995:28), namely that they “cannot be directly observed; engage moral considerations and are conceptions of the desirable”. Values therefore serve as criteria for judgment, preference and choice, although these value systems are often not explicitly identifiable (Rokeach, 1979:16). This would then suggest that values represent a conscious deliberation within an individual’s belief system about what the most desirable end state would be, generally involving ‘the setting of priorities and value trade-offs’ (Shamir and Shamir, 1995:108). Although not tangible and by and large not consciously applied, these values permeate all of society and impact dramatically on all aspects of political and other life. Despite the fact that values can be conceptualized in much broader terms, for the purposes of this research essay, values will be defined as the patterns of choice in the sets of goals of a specified population, which can become indirectly evident through social observation (Inglehart, 1977:182).

This conceptualization of values must also be transported into the behavioral context, and although the debate within behavioural politics, pertaining to the discrepancy between opinion and behaviour has been noted, the interface between values and actions will only be addressed briefly. Values do not simply remain an elusive and abstract notion, without authentic applicability to reality. On the contrary, they certainly “exercise a defining influence over our lives and provide the psychological framework for the formation of attitudes and the propensity for action” (Taylor, 1998:24). Although there is once again little consensus about the procedure by which values are significant in their bearing on behavior and action, there is

broad agreement that values play a considerable role in shaping actions. Rokeach describes values as guides of social behavior, whereby society, culture and personality are antecedents to values and attitudes and behavior are the primary outcomes emanating from these values (Rokeach, 1973:24). Finally Van Deth and Scarborough (1995:30) make a distinction in specifying that values do not directly determine behavior, but that specific actions often occur in the process of attempting to attain the end goals implicit within a certain value dimension.

At this juncture it becomes pertinent to define a value dimension or orientation³², which can be classified as a configuration of values that can be patterned in a theoretically meaningful way, and where the selection of one value over another value would play a defining role in the choice of desirable end goals. A system is generally relatively stable, yet can experience a certain degree of re-arrangement in terms of priority agenda (Rokeach, 1973:11; Inglehart, 1997:107). The pre-materialist/materialist/post-materialist continuum can hence be classified as a value orientation on the grounds that it expresses an ordered pattern of underlying desirable goals for society as a whole, ranging from pre-materialist priorities at the one pole, to the post-materialist ones at the other.

2.1.2. Contextualisation of the Value Dimension

Despite the importance of this value continuum to society as a whole having been mentioned above, the multifarious and complex manner in which this occurs has not been extrapolated. To begin with, it is necessary to revise why the study of values, as measurements of culture, would be important in the South African context. The 1994 elections marked the final leap towards a liberal democracy. Institutionally and structurally, a South African democracy has manifested itself, the question that remains is simply whether a democratic value culture has accompanied this. Issues such as the importance of tolerance and respect for civil liberties, as fundamental components of a democratic culture, have been at the center of much academic debate, yet the consequence of a specific value priority configuration for a democratic culture have been afforded little attention. The following section will discuss the exact link between values and a democratic culture, in preparation for the analysis of the implications of South Africa's value priorities for its democratic culture.


In many, a predominantly industrialized country, democracy has been firmly consolidated,³³ and high levels of human and economic development sustained. Examples such as the oil-rich countries of Kuwait and Libya, certain Asian states (Mills, 2000:68), as well as Taiwan and

³² Rokeach (1973:22) differentiates between value systems and value orientations, but this differentiation is not relevant in the case of the materialist/post-materialist theory.

³³ See section 1.3 for a discussion hereof.

South Korea after WWII (Rueschmeyer, Stephens and Stephens, 1992:2) have revealed high levels of economic growth within varying sustainable free-market economies, implying that economic prosperity is possible without a democratic dispensation. Thus it would seem that economic well-being does not inevitably lead to a democratic way of life. Consequently a certain set of intervening “pre-conditions” would have to exist for democracy to be instated and consolidated in some countries and not in others. The inception of free and fair multi-party elections is also no guarantee of true democracy, but requires the accompaniment of the ethos and customs of true democracy.

Figure 1: The Interface between Economic Prosperity and Democracy.



On the most basic level an explanation can commence with the framework constructed by Inglehart (1997:184) and shown in figure 1 above. From this model one can deduce that social structure and the culture configuration are the two most important catalysts to creating a situation conducive for democracy. Values are thus simply a part of culture, and culture just one of the facilitators for a stable and sustainable democracy. Each society would thus possess such a broad “culture” framework, consisting of a reaction to the needs of the external environment, as well as another, often highly resilient and inflexible facet, - independent of the external environment. Value change, as an indicator of culture, is thus “constrained and limited both by the external ‘reality constraints’ of the before mentioned interpenetrating systems and by the internal dimensions of consistency, congruence, or appropriateness among values and beliefs themselves” (Rokeach, 1979:21).

Accordingly, the economic reality of South Africa as a developing nation with widespread poverty and income inequality, will indeed impact upon the existing democratic culture, particularly when seen within the context of economic growth appearing to create a milieu encouraging for the manifestation of democracy (Lipset, 1959; Diamond, Linz and Lipset, 1995; Rueschmeyer, Stephens and Stephens, 1992; Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1994). It is, however, ultimately “the specific cultural heritage that may [either] facilitate or retard democracy” (Inglehart, 1997:68). These favorable cultural conditions are most prolific in states that rank highest on a post-materialist index.

This increasing concentration of post-materialists is the essence of Inglehart's value shift hypothesis. The result of this scenario is a whole host of new social movements and accompanying social conflicts, amongst them the green and women's movements. Other accompanying social changes include new norms regarding cultural diversity, voting behavior, sexual acceptability, religious ideals (Inglehart, 2000: 224), a change in the social base of protest (Inglehart, 1977:262), diminishing respect for authority and a general increase in the support for intrinsic democracy (Inglehart, 1999: 236). This global trend then marks a change in political agenda-setting, as well as a more active and deeper participation of citizens, largely due to the increase and diversification of political skills and avenues of expressions (Inglehart, 1977:363). Political participation also increasingly takes on non-traditional forms, reduced no longer to simply voting for a political party (Inglehart, 1977:293). These pivotal changes all form part of the largely westernized idea of a post-modern democratic society.

Part of Inglehart's value shift hypothesis then stipulates that, at a certain point, economic forces have diminishing marginal utility (Abramson and Inglehart, 1995:129), implying that economic self-interest provides a dwindling amount of satisfaction, gradually giving way to other needs and desires. Humans are essentially goal maximizing beings, and as physical and economic stability is attained, so psychological satisfaction becomes of greater consequence. Thus, as economic scarcity decreases, other factors play an increasingly important role (Inglehart, 1971, 1977, 1987). The presence of these so-called post-materialist factors is conducive for democratic consolidation, but at the same time their presence denotes a complete and systematic transformation in values and motivations, that has implications for many facets of cultural, economic and political life. The specific dynamics of South Africa's values- in terms of "consistency, congruence, or appropriateness" may thus have great bearing on South Africa's prevalent and future [democratic] culture (Rokeach, 1979:21).

The link between democracy and value orientation is two-fold. The first connection can be explained by the conducive situation that is facilitated by the presence of a high concentration of post-materialists. Although high levels of post-materialism are more probable in countries experiencing economic prosperity, it is neither a universal reaction to economic affluence, nor exclusive to nations with highly prosperous economies. The post-materialist mentality, for lack of a better term, exemplifies the value priorities that allow for real democracy to become consolidated in more than just name.

The tie between democracy and value arrangement can also be transported into the larger frame of modernization. In his earlier work, Inglehart's frame of reference was mostly

restricted to the materialist/post-materialist dimension, at which level most of this analysis will remain. In his later work, the materialist/post-materialist shift theory contributed towards his research of the modernization/post-modernization paradigm. It can then be argued that the relevant position of a nation, in terms of the post-materialist continuum, is only one aspect of a country's position in terms of the modern/post-modern phase of development, encompassing a more sweeping and expansive change in society.

Value research is, however, not only paramount for abstract deliberations on democratic culture, but also significant for the very concrete undertaking of nation building. The impact of value orientation on democracy can also be seen in terms of the difficulty of attempting to fulfill more than one category of values or needs simultaneously. Inglehart (1977:147) warns of the precarious situation of attempting to satisfy numerous types of value priorities at the same time. When the needs inherent in abstract value indexes, are brought onto the concrete, policy level, the needs of one value type are in contrast with those of another. If those policies that fulfill the needs of one group are decided upon, the choice may be made at the opportunity cost of the needs of others. Decisions of which value priorities to address could thus prove paramount for the maintenance of a stable democracy.

Whereas the political conflicts of the past may have been largely along socio-economic lines, the conflict of the future may well be between people of vastly differing and uncompromising value orientations. It can also be argued that any potential future "value conflict" may simply mirror existing racial, class and educational level differences, thereby merely representing a new label for an old conflict. On the other hand, if the boundaries in value orientations extend beyond existing divisions, and the population becomes increasingly polarized around these value types, the future could be marred by an unexpected new division. Alternatively, an overlap of values across these societal divides may draw South Africans together by detracting from social and economic divergences and reinforcing common goals.

Inglehart has investigated the possibility of political conflict based upon uncompromising values. Industrialized nations appear to be facing a situation of a divergence of values at the interface of the Materialist/Post-materialist line. Consequently, political conflict is thought to be located between those of predominantly materialist and those of largely post-materialist convictions. It is at this juncture that it becomes pivotal to monitor the trends in value change, in order to become aware of increasing polarization or convergence between value types.

To determine whether such a value change has transpired, data over an extensive period of time is indispensable, as fundamental value change is non-linear and occurs gradually

(Inglehart, 1997:6; 1977:121), although short-term fluctuations may influence results (Inglehart, 1995:25). WVS data for South Africa, in terms of the materialist/post-materialist paradigm, stretches across a decade, and for the continuum that includes the pre-materialist pole, over five years. Hence South Africa does not have sufficiently extended time-series data to make any conclusive deductions about long-term value shifts. Although not as conclusive as long-term change, the importance of short-term value shift must not be underestimated. The primary aims of this research essay lie in analyzing the short-term changes to have occurred over the last decade, as well as trying to determine the catalysts that may have brought this about.

2.2. Conceptualization of the Value Dimensions

A value shift can only be identified by comparing observable value configurations, and in this research essay both Taylor and Inglehart's frameworks of value dimensions will be employed. The original battery used by Inglehart in 1970/71 contained only four items, later to be increased to a twelve-item battery, which, although proving itself a more reliable and valid measure, was also more costly and therefore less utilized in subsequent research (Inglehart, 1997:199). The data sets for the 1991, 1995 and 2001 WVS all contain the original 12-item battery, testing exclusively for materialist/post-materialist poles along a value priorities spectrum.

The South African WVS executed in October of 1995 and April of 2001 also include a battery containing 18 options of national priorities, a new and unique addition being the inclusion of 6 items that are concerned with basic survival needs. The classification of all 18 options into three underlying indexes, given by Taylor (1998:97), but primarily based upon the original 12 item model used in 1973 (Inglehart, 1977:28), will be utilized to determine these values. They are as follows:

Post-materialist index: Protecting freedom of speech; Giving people more say over government; Keeping cities and the countryside more beautiful; Giving people more say in their work and in their community; Creating a society where ideas count more than money; Making society friendlier and less impersonal.

Materialist index: Fighting rising prices; Maintaining law and order; Maintaining a high rate of economic growth; Maintaining a strong defense force; Fighting crime: Making sure all people are fully employed.

Pre-materialist index: Providing shelter for all People; Providing clean water for all people; Making sure that everyone is adequately clothed; Making sure that everyone can go to school; Providing land for all people; Providing everyone with enough food to eat.³⁴

The discussion of the inadequacy of the 12-item materialist/post-materialist dimension, alluded to in Sections 1.2.3 and 1.3, already suggests some of the justification of the inclusion of the six extra items or so-called pre-materialist dimension. The extension is further justified on the grounds of “the complexity and diversity of the South African population as far as values are concerned and the extent that poverty is affecting value orientations” (Lategan, 2000:410). The inadequacy of a dimension without a pre-materialist index does not, however, simply rest with the fact that some fundamental needs are not represented by the existing items, but that in their absence, certain post-materialist items are wrongly interpreted to express certain pre-materialist or materialist needs, thereby skewing the results towards increased post-materialism, when this is not the case. An example is the item regarding “giving people more say in their work and in their community”, which can be wrongly interpreted as pertaining to the employment situation and could, in fact, be focusing on such materialist needs as greater job security. The questionnaires for 1995 and 2001 have also replaced the item regarding ‘maintaining a stable economy’ with one pertaining to employment levels, possibly due to increasing levels of unemployment already proving themselves a potential problem to the managers of the 1995 leg of the WVS.³⁵

At this juncture it is pertinent to return to the theory of a hierarchy of needs as postulated by Maslow, and referred to in section 1.2.1. As the basic physiological needs indispensable for survival (represented in the first level of the triangle of needs) are met, so human beings will seek to fulfill other higher order needs. In developing nations, such as South Africa, these needs are often not met, hence the inclusion of the pre-materialist index, which represents an extensive although not exhaustive list of basic survival needs. Due to the fact that Inglehart’s research was founded in industrialized nations, it may have been assumed that these basic physiological needs were already generally satisfied, resulting in the second level of the hierarchy, concerned with safety and security needs, being most important. This was labeled the materialist index and included all economic and physical security needs, ranging from general concerns for gross economic performance to more specific concerns with employment levels or rising prices (Inglehart, 1977:22). The physical security needs range from general concern with law abidance to the threat of war (Marks, 1997:53). Once these have more or

³⁴ This was the component added solely to the South African leg to test for pre-materialist value goals along with the materialist and post-materialist value continuum.

³⁵ See Section 1.1.1. regarding the magnitude of unemployment as a national problem.

less been met, the third level, which contained the non-material or so-called “self-actualizing and growth” needs, became most important. This emphasized personal freedoms, self-expression and a better quality of life, and was labeled by Inglehart as the Post-materialist index (Inglehart, 1977:22). This index encompasses the intellectual, aesthetic and belonging needs (Marks, 1997:53). Inglehart does not, however, assert that these indexes are mutually exclusive, whereby “a post-materialist is not an anti-materialist” (1997:35). No needs are ever completely met, hence at any point in time numerous needs may be paramount, although these are usually prioritized, reflecting a certain hierarchy in which unremitting value conflict continues.

The validity and reliability of the entire value dimension as a tool, but in particular the post-materialist index, has been criticized,³⁶ making it imperative that the theoretical and empirical validity and reliability of these factors for a South African context be examined. The hypothetical soundness of the uniquely South African pre-materialist index will be based on the fact that all items pertain to the provision of basic physiological needs- as described by Maslow’s (1954) first level of needs. According to Rescher (1969), values can be classified along many lines, one possibility being according to the types of benefits they pertain to. Thus values can be grouped together on the grounds of the “human wants, needs and interests that are served by their realization” (Rescher, 1969:17). Hence the aims and needs that pre-materialist values fulfill, differ from those of the materialist and post-materialist values, in that they deal neither with security, nor self-actualizing requirements. All the pre-materialist items are necessary for basic human survival, thus realizing a common goal- perfunctory survival.

The theoretical validity of the materialist and post-materialist index can be ratified on the same grounds as postulated above- they seek to satisfy one overarching goal. The combination of economic and physical security into one materialist factor can be explained by both entailing a threat to security, as well as the presence of a hypothetical correlation between poverty and physical insecurity. The poor are most likely to face physical threat, with the least resources to address this. Further, on a more societal level, the absolute financial and economic threat of war, [or excessive crime and social unrest pandemics], cannot be underestimated (Inglehart, 1997:110). The validity of the post-materialist index is premised upon the understanding that all the separate items represent needs of the same nature, namely aesthetic, self-actualizing and belonging needs. Theoretically, at least, the

³⁶ See Section 1.2.2.

indexes have now been clarified, whilst the empirical validity and reliability of the construction of these indexes will be discussed in chapter three.

2.3. Operationalization of the Value Dimension

These terms fully conceptualized, the operationalization of the three value indexes and the entire value dimension can commence. In section 2.2 it was theoretically asserted that in all three data sets the two underlying values of Inglehart's value dimension are present, whilst in the 1995 and 2001 data incorporates a spectrum encapsulating three underlying values. A principal components factor analysis procedure will be executed on both the two- and three-index dimensions of all the relevant WVS data sets, to verify the empirical validity of such theorizing. The reliability of this index will also be addressed, after which the computation procedure can be utilized to construct the three indexes.

Inglehart and colleagues, who worked exclusively with the two indexes of the original 12-item battery, processed these to form the so-called "percentage difference index" (PDI), a dependent variable which represents the percentage of post-materialists minus the percentage of materialists, consequently presenting the 'values balance' (Abramson, Ellis and Inglehart, 1997:42; Abramson and Inglehart, 1995:12). They compared this 'values balance' both cross-nationally and over extended periods of time. For the purposes of this research essay this measure will not be utilized, largely because the materialist/post-materialist divide has proven highly inapplicable.

Therefore, an alternative process will be employed, whereby the percentage of pure pre-materialists, materialists, post-materialists and various 'mixed types' will firstly be calculated separately. The questionnaires are constructed in such a manner as to allow for three opportunities to provide the most important national priorities. Respondents could thus select three items, which will not necessarily represent the same value index, by implication causing them to be classified as 'mixed types'. All these value 'types' will then be mapped onto two separate scales, the one representing the pre-materialist/materialist side and the other the materialist/post-materialist aspect. Despite having to calculate and represent the data on two separate scales, all value types latently form part of the same value dimension, representing a continuous variable, encompassing an infinite number of attributes that flow along a continuum ranging from pre-materialist on the one hand to post-materialist on the other, and the dimension should therefore not be confused.

In section 4.3 the trends in value change, as illustrated by movement along this continuum, will be addressed and the reasons thereof extrapolated. To gain as insightful an understanding of

the cognitive processes leading to this value change, the data will also be disaggregated according to various socio-economic and demographic variables. This allows for the tracking of the specific trends in various population sub-groups, thereby preventing important details from being concealed in the cumulative data. The decision regarding which population sub-groups to disaggregate the data by, is no easy task in the context of South Africa's plethora of complex and interconnected divisions. The following section will then provide the theoretical ratification for the selection of the identified socio-economic and demographic variables, highlighting why value change in these groups could be expected to be different from that in the collective data.

2.4. Disaggregating the Data

Although Inglehart's *socialization* and *scarcity* hypothesis have been acknowledged as the primary factors in value determination, he has, from the beginning, acceded that there are a number of causes of value change that differ over time. These include "a cluster of socio-economic changes, [amongst which are] rising levels of education, shifts in occupational structure, and the development of increasingly broad and effective mass communication networks"(1977:21), "father's educational level, religious affiliation, political party preference, labour union membership, sex, nationality (1977:89). The objectives ensconced within this research are to determine the primary causal agents of the change in South Africa's value orientation over the very critical period between 1995 and 2001.

Application of these classic determinants of value change is unfortunately modeled upon two premises that may not integrate well with the South African situation. To begin with, most of the research looks towards value change in advanced industrialized nations, thus not focusing on the South African context. The other is that the value change under discussion in most of the literature, is that of a shift from materialist to post-materialist values, whilst this research essay hypothesizes a shift along the pre-materialist/materialist dimension.³⁷ Further, the traditional determinants of value change have not been fashioned in a manner that allows for the fact that South Africa is a deeply divided society, no doubt reflected in its value configuration. The direct application to a South African sample would therefore be invalid. The aim of this section is thus to discover the pivotal factors that could impact upon society in such a way as to create value subgroups within the larger population, to pave the way for a later analysis of the overriding causes of the value change to have transpired in South Africa since 1995. Hence the next section will comprehensively explore a number of variables that could cause certain sectors of society to reveal individual value dimension. The variables

³⁷ See section 1.5

included do not represent an exhaustive list of all possible variables suggested in the relevant literature, but only those perceived relevant for the population under investigation.

2.4.1. Race

The first variable under observation is that of race. Race is an imprecise term that possesses a multitude of meanings for different spheres and purposes ranging from the clinically biological to the emotionally charged. For this research essay, race is operationalized by the four-attribute racial classification offered by question 110 of the 1995 WVS and question 242 of the 2001 round of the WVS, namely Black, White, Coloured and Indian. 'Race' is then acknowledged to signify a group of people, broadly descendant from a common origin that form a distinct ethnic category, resembling the racial categorization that was exploited during Apartheid. The hypothesis under investigation is thus an exploration of a potential correlation between race and value orientations.

Two of Taylor's (1998:165) primary conclusions were that race was the "strongest predictor of variance amongst value items and, [secondly] proved to be an antecedent variable mediating the effects of class, income, education and party identification." These findings appear substantiated in the research of public opinions by the HSRC (Rule, 1999:25), which also claim a distinct link between race and value orientation. Although race was not the sole criteria by which the Apartheid segregation was conducted, it was the primary one, thus "given the very essence of apartheid meant that life chances differed fundamentally according to race, individual interests have been structured largely along racial lines" (Mattes and Gouws, 1998:125). Although the danger of oversimplifying the complexity of division within South Africa's population (Friedman, 1995:534) remains imminent, race will be considered a likely causal variable. The possibility of race as antecedent variable to many of the other plausible variables, as stipulated by Taylor (1998:156) and others, will also be noted.

2.4.2 Class

Although described by Inglehart as less important than the pre-industrial factor of race,³⁸ due to the fact that race is non-mobile, whilst class can be largely altered over generations, the impact of class will still be examined. At this juncture it is pivotal to note, that the variable under observation is self-classification of class, rendering it even more tricky and complex. The term class, even as self-identifiable characteristic, cannot be utilized without clear

³⁸ Drawing on Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) classification of factors able to influence the vote, Inglehart classified possible independent variables into Pre-industrial: race, language, religion; Industrial: class, income, education, occupation; Post-industrial: individual level values.

conceptualization.³⁹ For this research essay it will be assumed that respondents base their self-definition on the reading of class as a group of people sharing the same economic or social status. Options of attributes of this variable include upper class, upper middle class, lower middle class, working class and lower class. In South Africa this seems particularly pertinent in the light of “the emergence of a new middle class among communities previously disadvantaged by apartheid, make[ing] the crude use of race less accurate in gauging the different needs of South Africans” (Rule, 1999:26).⁴⁰ This phenomenon appears most prominent amongst the black population group (Marais, 1998:106), where the emergence of an economically active black middle class may have a substantial impact upon future analysis.⁴¹ It has further been asserted that in industrializing nations class remains an important political cleavage, whilst in highly industrialized societies other motivations become paramount, no longer polarizing on the gulf between working and middle class (Inglehart and Flanagan, 1986:1295). For this research essay class will be operationalized by the options provided for in the 1995 questionnaire by q103 and in the 2001 questionnaire by q235. The hypothesis of a relation between class and value dimension has generated much interest, with Inglehart expostulating in 1977, that middle class citizens were most likely to reveal post-materialist interests, with the working class moderately likely to do so and the agrarian class least likely (1977:73).

2.4.3. Income

Although connected with class, household income levels are a separate entity that may often contribute a great deal to an individual’s class classification. This independent variable is operationalized by question 104 in the 1995 data set, and by question 236 in the 2001 WVS. The importance of this variable should not be underestimated in the face of the magnitude of literature suggesting a link between financial status and value type. Clarke, Kornberg, McIntyre, Bauer-Kaase and Kaase (1999), Clarke and Dutt (1991) and Duch and Taylor (1993) are amongst those that postulated a stronger link between present economic situations and value orientation, than that determined by economic conditions during an individual’s formative years. Although Inglehart continues to call attention to ‘formative security’, he has recognized the impact of temporary economic fluctuations (1995:28). It is with this justification that the existence of a correlation between individual economic standing and value dimension can be contended.

³⁹ Inglehart (1977:182) notes the complexity of this concept, in terms of it simultaneously being a self-perceived identification, as well as an existing analytic construct.

⁴⁰ For further reading regarding class as a social construct in South Africa see Wolpe (1988), Callinicos (1999).

⁴¹ For a synopsis of possible reasons for the emergence of a black middle class see Marais (1998), Rivero (2000).

2.4.4. Education

The impact of education on value change has been the focus of a very lively debate, and although there is little consensus on the exact manner in which levels of education impact on value change, a correlation between the two is generally agreed upon (Inglehart, 1977, 1995, 1997; Duch and Taylor, 1993, 1994; Davis, 1999; Warwick, 1998; Marks, 1997). A certain lack of clarity regarding the exact role of education is even observable in Inglehart and Abramson's work. In his first book Inglehart (1977:75) recognized the potential impact of education on values, primarily by the crucial role that education plays during a person's formative years, in terms of an individual's "cognitive development" (level of skills the respondent possesses), in terms of exposure to communication and information networks, and finally through explicit indoctrination whereby democratic values are instilled in school. At a later stage Abramson and Inglehart (1995:86) assert that education is indeed paramount, but often as an indirect indicator of other factors, amongst which are: the current socio-economic standing of the respondent, the socio-economic standing of the guardian or parent of the respondent at the time at which the respondent received their education and the historical context during the respondents education, and accordingly "there is nothing inherent in education that automatically produces post-materialist values" (Inglehart, 1995:81), and that the relationship between educational levels and post-materialism is in fact spurious (Abramson and Inglehart, 1994).

Duch and Taylor (1993, 1994) as the main critics in this regard claim that higher levels of education indeed play an important contributory role, in two possible ways. The first option is the formal and informal indoctrination of democratic values during an individual's education, whilst the other method would be an increased exposure- and socialization- to a democratic way of life, affording "the better educated simply more opportunity to learn to appreciate such [fundamental democratic values] (Duch and Taylor, 1993:773). Both Warwick (1998) and Duch and Taylor (1993, 1994) found the relationship non spurious, and for this reason a link stipulating that higher levels of education are correlated with an increase in post-materialism will be investigated. Level of education is operationalized by question 226 and 94 of the 2001 and 1995 surveys respectively.

2.4.5. Gender

Gender, particularly in a country with a history of gender oppression, such as South Africa, is another possible independent variable to influence the choice of national priorities. In 1977 Inglehart found that gender played a substantial role in priority differences, demonstrated by the fact that in 7 out of 8 countries studied, women were far more likely to vote right than men were (Inglehart, 1977:226). Aggregate public opinion data conducted by the HSRC

shows that almost a third of respondents (31%) felt that women had different priorities to men (Rule, 1999:47).⁴² This notion is supported by Gouws and Kadalie (1994:213), who emphasize the importance of the incorporation of women's self-defined interests into social transformation. In the past, gender discrimination was often ignored in the face of the greater threat of racial and class discrimination, subordinating some women to the so-called "triple oppression" (Gouws and Kadalie, 199:218). Due to the different experience of women in the past, it can be conjectured that they would lay claim to very different needs, and consequent values. Molyneux (1985: 231-234) differentiates between two different needs in a gender framework, namely practical gender needs and strategic gender needs. The practical needs relate to their specific economic and physical survival needs, notwithstanding the existing gendered division of labour, whilst the strategic needs refers to women's relative domination by men, on the basis of which they would strive for a more equal and free society.

The former would thus entail essentially pre-materialist values, whilst the latter would emphasize fundamentally post-materialist values. Thus it can be argued that women's values, particularly amongst those sectors expected to load highest on the pre-materialist needs (i.e. the rural and the poor), to be influenced by another dimension of need, not present amongst male cohorts of that category. Therefore, despite the reality that the most extreme poverty and discrimination within the country is being experienced by African rural women (Marais, 1998:107), one can still expect women to be more likely to be 'mixed' types, emphasizing more than one index. Thus we propose the hypothesis that women are more likely to be mixed types than men, whilst their classification into the pre-materialist/materialist/post-materialist paradigm is more a function of other independent variables, such as class or race.

It is important at this juncture to note that these variables indicate the general public's perceptions of their status and not necessarily their real status, as an individual's perceptions of reality are shaped by their subjective views, which in turn are applied in their value priorities. Thus, although variables such as gender will not prove problematical in this regard, a variable such as class may prove difficult. Hence the aim of the analysis lies in determining the defining predictors that influence value types within the values continuum, which in the case of a highly divided nation such as South Africa, will most frequently be synonymous with the pivotal sources of the process of value formation.

⁴² Democracy SA. Public Opinion on National Priority Issues, Human Sciences Research Centre. May 1999. The sample size was 2 200 and was obtained using clustered probability sampling methods.

2.5. Research Design

To investigate these independent variables, wide-ranging quantitative data analysis techniques have been selected. South Africa's highly heterogeneous society necessitates a very large sample to allow for sufficient representativity, rendering qualitative methods far too time consuming and costly. The South Africa WVS represents some of the most extensive and all-embracing opinion research to have been conducted in the country, and although individual opinions form the foundation of this survey, the aggregate quantitative data is utilized to make inferences to the larger society. As the survey format and structure has changed little over the last decade, a longitudinal comparison can be embarked upon with confidence. The section below will provide greater detail on the organization of the relevant surveys.

2.5.1. The Surveys

Markinor, a reputable South African market research company, conducted the fieldwork of the 1991 South African World Values Survey during October and November. The respondents were interviewed face-to-face or completed the questionnaire themselves with the fieldworker assisting with any questions. The questionnaire was offered in English, Afrikaans, Zulu, Sotho, Tswana and Xhosa and respondents could select the language of their choice. The sample size was 2 736, but was not truly representative, with 500 black respondents from rural areas and 600 black respondents from the metropolitan areas of Gauteng, Durban, Port Elizabeth, East London and Cape Town. Therefore only 40.2% of the sample was black, whilst 45.2% (1 236 respondents) were White. Only 200 respondents (7.3%) were Coloured, and another 200 respondents were Indian. The Indian and Coloured people were only drawn from Cape Town and Durban, and therefore none were selected from rural areas. The sample was, however, weighted and projected onto the universe to increase representativity of the sample. A minimum 10% backcheck was administered

Markinor and Market and Opinion Surveys conducted the 1995 survey during September and October. The Universe comprised all inhabitants of South Africans over the age of 16, and the sample size 2935. Probability sampling was utilized, and the entire population stratified into three groupings, namely by province, by population group and by community size. The numbers of respondents per population group were the same as in the 1991 round, but once again a weighting procedure was used to project the real dimension of the universe onto the sample. Random sampling was employed within the strata and sampling points established. At each sampling point 10 interviews were conducted. The questionnaire was again offered in the same major languages, and a mandatory 20% back check was conducted.

The universe of the 2001 round once again included all people residing in South Africa, aged 16 and older. The fieldwork was also once again executed by Markinor, and took place between March and May. The sample size was 3 000, and the sample was stratified according to population group, gender, province and community size. The gender distribution was 50/50, whilst the distribution in terms of rural-urban geographic location was 60% metropolitan (large cities with populations greater than 250 000) and 40% non-metropolitan (including cities, large towns, small towns, villages and rural areas). In terms of the stratification by population group, 1302 respondents (43.4%) were Black, 900 (30%) were Whites, 498 (16.6%) were Coloured and 300 (10%) were Indian. Six interviews were conducted at each of the sampling points and a choice of major languages was provided again. The sample was then weighted and projected onto the universe to increase representativeness of the sample. Consequently, the results presented are highly representative for the South African population as a whole. Backchecks were again employed to ensure a high quality of fieldwork.

2.5.2. Questionnaire Design

At this point it is crucial to re-affirm that two separate dimensions are under observation, and that these two are clearly separated to prevent potential confusion. The one set of data will focus exclusively on Inglehart's materialist/post-materialist dimension and will involve questions 62 through to 64 of the 1991 survey, question 37 through to 42 of the 1995 round and questions 121 through 125 of the 2001 survey. In all three of these instances the respondents is sketched the following scenario: "There is a lot of talk/People sometimes talk about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years. On this card are listed some of the goals which different people would give top priority." The respondents are then provided with a first set of four items and are requested to select one of them as a first choice, after which they are asked to select a second option. The same procedure is then executed for a second and a third set of four items. The three sets of four items each, remained constant in all three questionnaires, and followed the structure of the 1973 model, in which Inglehart first employed the 12-item scale. The sets are as follows:

First Set:

A high level of economic growth

Making sure this country has strong defense forces

Seeing that people have more say about how things are done at their jobs and in their communities

Trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful

Second Set:

Maintaining order in the nation

Giving people more say in important government decisions

Fighting rising process

Protecting freedom of speech

Third Set:

A stable economy

Progress toward a less impersonal and more humane society

Progress toward a society in which ideas count more than money

The fight against crime

The questionnaire thus allows for two materialist and two post-materialist items in each set, although these have been placed in a different order in each set to prevent a response set. The construction of the questionnaire thus enables the respondent to select three first options, and three second options, after which the answers can be utilized to classify the respondent as a materialist, post-materialist or 'mixed type'.

The second dimension will only include questions 90.A2, 90.A3 and 90.A4 of the 1995 survey and VA2, VA3 and VA4 of the 2001 survey, thereby including all the pre-materialist items as proposed by Taylor (1998). The respondent is again sketched the same scenario and three batteries, this time with six items to select from, are provided. They are as follows:

First Set:

Providing shelter for all people

Protecting freedom of speech

Fighting rising prices

Providing clean water for all people

Giving people more say over government

Maintaining law and order

Second Set:

Making sure that everyone is adequately clothed

Keeping cities and countryside beautiful

Maintaining a high rate of economic growth

Making sure everyone can go to school

Giving people more say in their work and in their community

Maintaining a strong defense force

Third Set:

Providing land for all people

Creating a society where ideas count more than money

Fighting crime

Providing everyone with enough food to eat

Making society friendlier and less impersonal

Making sure all people are fully employed

It becomes clear that each battery includes two pre-materialist, two materialist and two post-materialist items, and again the respondent is allowed one first, and one second option for each battery. Thereby the respondent can be classified accordingly as one of the 'pure types' or as any of a number of 'mixed types'. Part of the purpose in including both dimensions in this research essay is to determine the effect the introduction of a pre-materialist band on the materialist/post-materialist distribution.

2.5.3. Methodology

To illustrate the salience of the dimension including the pre-materialist items a comparison between the results of procedures with the two-index dimension and three-index dimension is necessary. Simple frequency procedures of the given responses at each round of the survey will be run, in order to determine the most widespread priorities for the sample as a whole. A longitudinal comparison of these findings will therefore allow for observation of any changes that may have occurred. The original Inglehart dimension will be dealt with first, to be followed by the uniquely South African dimension.

Analysis with the 12 items is, however, rather cumbersome and thus it is imperative that indexes representing the broader underlying values be constructed. It is theoretically asserted that 2 underlying value indexes are present, and these will be constructed by merging the relevant data from the three surveys and performing factor analysis on all 12 items. The factor analysis procedure will be addressed in greater detail elsewhere, but for the moment it is sufficient to mention that factor analysis is a procedure that allows for the detection of any underlying patterns or relationships that may exist in the data. Thereafter, the reliability of these findings will be checked using alpha scores, and this complete, the compute procedure will be employed to create two indexes, which make up one continuum-the value dimension, with materialist priorities at one pole and post-materialist ones at the other. The same procedure will be conducted for the 18-item model.

After index construction, it will be possible to classify the respondents as specific value types, the possibilities including the pre-materialist, materialist and mixed types. - i.e. when respondents emphasize more than one 'type' of need, therefore loading equally on more than one index. Further, an attempt will be made to ascertain whether the sample polarizes around one of the indexes, or whether they spread relatively evenly across the whole spectrum. The value types will once again be cross tabulated by race, gender, class, income and educational level, for the same purpose of examining the value priority type frequencies for the various factions of the South African population.

This will be followed by the analysis of the data to determine if South African values have changed. If change has transpired, this change will be analyzed to determine the nature thereof, in terms of the direction and magnitude. The disaggregated data obtained from the cross tabulation procedure mentioned above will then be utilized to monitor value change within the separate groups, in order to facilitate a more accurate portrayal of the present situation. This complete, the final section will briefly deal with the question of whether Inglehart's hypothesis of a shift to increased post-materialism is substantiated by the South African data.

2.6. Conclusion

Whilst the broad theoretical models were outlined in chapter one, the first part of this chapter provides the reader with a more detailed political and cultural context in which to place the theoretical framework. By placing Inglehart's hypothesis of a global shift towards post-materialism in this broader perspective of culture and its role in society, the arguments made by Inglehart and his colleagues are better understood. Further, the indexes and the broader continuum that they comprise, for both the two-index and the three-index dimension, have been sketched in greater conceptual and operational detail. The theoretical reliability and validity of the value dimension, and the three indexes inherent therein, were also expanded upon, and, whilst the results of the tests for the theoretical validity and reliability will only be provided in chapter three, the statistical procedures to be used were described.

The latter part of the chapter entailed a conceptualization of the variables that could theoretically be asserted to create divergent value dimensions. Thereafter the organization and structure of the relevant surveys, as well as questionnaire construction, were discussed, completing the preparation for the index construction to follow in chapter three.

Chapter 3: Statistical Data Analysis

Whilst the previous chapter focused largely upon creating the conceptual and operational framework in which to conduct the data analysis, this chapter will entail a step-wise description of the statistical procedures and first level of analysis. This will be done with the use of the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS), a programme of specialized quantitative data analysis techniques. This powerful tool facilitates the interpretation of public opinion information, rendering it accessible to the social researcher. Whilst the previous chapter placed partial emphasis on demonstrating the theoretical reliability and validity of the two- and three- indexes respectively, this chapter will concentrate on establishing empirical evidence to fortify these assertions. Once complete, the indexes can be constructed, to be followed by the construction of the continuums, on which to map out the South African population. Before analysis on the level of the constructed indexes can be embarked upon, it is pivotal to conduct a descriptive analysis of the separate items, in order to examine the specific lower-level priorities of the population. Analysis will therefore occur on three levels, that of the separate items, that of the separate indexes, and lastly that of the value continuums. At this point it must, once again, be clarified that there are two separate dimensions under observation, namely the original Inglehart 12-item model, and the uniquely South African 18-item model.

The aim of the first part of this chapter is then to conduct statistical analysis to determine whether the specific issues that South Africans prioritize are changing, and, if so –in what direction and with what magnitude. The first step would thus entail an observation of the most important priorities when Inglehart’s original 12-item model is utilized. Taylor (1998) has, however, conclusively proven that the uniquely South African 18-item model affords a superior representation of South Africa’s value priorities in 1995. For this reason, the most important priorities will then be mapped along the 18-item model, to be followed by a discussion of the results within each of the batteries.

3.1. A Descriptive Analysis of the Priorities

3.1.1. The 12-item Model

At this point it is imperative to note that the selection of each item was done in comparison with the other items in the battery, and thus selection should not be viewed in terms of an absolute rating procedure, but as a ranking process within each of the batteries. Any change in the importance of an item must then be seen in comparison with the accompanying changes apparent in other items. As the percentage of respondents denoting a specific item as most important increases, so the percentage on another must decrease, and sometimes the cause of

an increase in one is just as much a function of that item becoming more important, as the other items becoming less so. As already mentioned, the two-index model utilized by Inglehart will be concentrated upon first. To trace the general trends that have occurred over the last ten years it is perfunctory that descriptive statistics are utilized. The following table demonstrates the frequency with which each of the options within their separate four-item batteries were selected.

Table 2: Battery 1 of the 12-item Model

	1990	1995	2001
High Economic growth	53	60	58
Maintaining a Strong Defence Force	12	14	16
More say at work and in the Community	26	18	21
Keep Countryside and Cities beautiful	8	6	5
Missing	1	3	1

Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

Table 3: Battery 2 of the 12-item Model

	1990	1995	2001
Maintaining Law and Order	38	48	39
More say in important Government Decisions	27	48	20
Fighting rising Prices	29	19	33
Protecting Freedom of Speech	5	24	8
Missing	2	7	1

Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

Table 4: Battery 3 of the 12-item Model

	1990	1995	2001
Maintaining a stable Economy	45	51	47
A less impersonal and more humane Society	17	10	6
Creating a society where ideas count more	13	6	6
Fighting crime	23	32	40
Missing	1	1	2

Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

When looking at the results of the first original 4-item battery in table 2, it becomes clear that economic growth has remained the predominant national priority, experiencing a slight upsurge in 1995. Prioritization of a strong defence force has increased marginally over the ten

years, whilst the drop in 1995, of the prioritization of the item dealing with more say at work and in the community, was substantial at approximately 8%. In table 3, maintaining law and order has remained the most significant priority throughout, although support levels were almost 10% higher in 1995 than in 1990 or 2001. Except for minor fluctuations, fighting inflation and protecting freedom of speech have increased steadily, whilst the item concerning more say in government decisions experienced a marked drop in 1995 and remained consistently low in 2001. In table 4 the items dealing with making society less impersonal and conferring ideas more emphasis, have decreased incrementally over the ten years, whilst maintaining a stable economy remained the most critical priority, experiencing an approximately 5% increase in 1995, only to drop again to 1990 levels in 2001.

3.1.2. The 18-item Model

Table 5: Battery 1 of the 18-item Model

	<i>1995</i>	<i>2001</i>
Provide Clothing	11	9
Keep Countryside and Cities beautiful	5	5
High Economic Growth	40	44
Provide Schooling	27	27
More say at Work and in the Communities	10	11
Maintaining a strong Defence Force	7	4

Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

Table 6: Battery 2 of the 18-item Model

	<i>1995</i>	<i>2001</i>
Provide Shelter	51	49
Protect Freedom of Speech	3	5
Fight rising prices	13	16
Provide Water	11	10
More say over important Government decisions	4	5
Maintain Law and Order	19	15

Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

Table 7: Battery 3 of the 18-item Model

	1995	2001
Provide Land	24	19
Creating a society where Ideas count more	4	2
Fighting Crime	26	41
Provide Food	7	7
A less impersonal and more humane Society	2	2
Full Employment	37	28

Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

Once again it is paramount that it be noted that any item selected in these tables is done so at the opportunity cost of another, thereby involving a value trade off. This is excellently demonstrated by the inclusion of the 6 pre-materialist items, which have caused dramatic differences in the prioritization of the items. The inclusion of the items denoting the provision of shelter and water in table 6 has been particularly significant in corroborating this argument, as approximately 60% of all respondents collectively selected these as primary priorities, highlighting the inapplicability of the materialist and post-materialist items in the face of these more pressing needs.

In table 5 it becomes clear that fostering high economic growth has remained a primary priority and although this emphasis on economic growth would not come as much of a surprise, it is probably better understood when situated within the history of the country's economic growth over the last decade. The country's economy, as outlined in section 1.1.1, have not shown extensive growth, and has therefore further compounded the problem of a relatively low GDP. The slight increase in the number of respondents prioritizing this item of approximately 4% between 1995 and 2001, could be attributed to the fact that in 1995 the RDP strategy, with its emphasis on development and progress at the hand of restructuring within the economy, was still solidly in place, whilst by 2001, this programme had long since been replaced by GEAR, with its primary emphasis on economic growth as the *modus operandi* to prosperity. This change in national economic policy, embodying growth to a far greater deal, may have had an impact of national priorities. The other alternative could be that, in 1995, much national and international interest was still aimed at the performance of the democracy- the euphoria of finally having attained a liberal democracy still rife. By 2001, much of this interest could long since have been replaced by greater emphasis on economic performance, rather than symbolic democratic gestures.

The introduction of the item concerning the provision of education appears to have had a substantial impact, with quite a few respondents opting for this item rather than that of economic growth. The number of respondents ranking education as first priority remained very constant throughout the last five years or so. The substantial emphasis placed on this item is understandable in light of the precarious situation within the national education system, as well as the perceived increased necessity of higher education for the attainment of the few jobs available. Whilst the prioritization of education has remained absolutely stable, the weight afforded the item calling for a stronger defence force, has declined by approximately 3½ %, and this can probably be attributed to the fact that the threat of a violent conflict with other nations seems very improbable to most people, although had the recent terrorist attacks in New York taken place before the 2001 survey was conducted, the results may have seemed somewhat different.

Noteworthy about table 6 is the massive percentage of respondents prioritizing shelter, with approximately half the sample selecting this item. As mentioned previously, even in 1999, the housing backlog was already estimated at 3 million (Idasa e-politics Newsletter, Issue 19. 19th July 2000). This problem has been worsened by increasing levels of urbanization, which have been one of the contributing factors that have lead to the situation, where in 1998 already, almost 9 million people continue live in informal housing (*The Cape Times*, 27 April 1998). One could speculate that the excessive prioritization of shelter could also have been influenced by the ANC emphasis on the provision of housing in their 1994 and 1999 election campaigns. The statistics provided above, seen in conjunction with recent dissatisfaction with the poor quality of housing under the national housing scheme, could contribute to the massive importance this item is accorded. The rest of the table reveals rather predictable results, although emphasis on the item regarding maintaining law and order did experience a drop of almost 5% since 1995. This is contrary to the findings of the 12-item model, where the highest percentage of respondents prioritizing this item was experienced in 1995. This can be explained at the hand of value trade offs between this item and fighting inflation, which experienced an increase of approximately the same amount, during the time span under observation.

Table 7 reveals the most interesting phenomena of the three tables, with both land and employment being afforded less prominence in 2001 than in 1995. This observable fact seems highly unlikely with the dual effects of retrenchment and the dire shortage of opportunities for recent entries into the job market, rendering unemployment one of the biggest and ever escalating problems facing the country. Similarly, in view of the recent land invasions in Bredell, South Africa and the situation of commercial farms in Zimbabwe by war veterans, as

well as the fact that land is such a highly politicized and emotionally charged issue, the decreasing emphasis on land is somewhat of a confounding finding.

This scenario of fewer respondents marking employment and land as the most important issues in 2001 can, however, at least partially, be explained by the presence of one other pivotal item, namely that of crime. The importance of crime fighting received a boost in the order of 15%, making crime the primary priority in 2001, ahead of employment, the 1995 number one priority. Hence crime appears to be one of the greatest threats to South Africans. Although the accuracy of crime statistics is constantly under debate,⁴³ and real crime levels very difficult to determine, due to a host of problems, amongst them the problems of underreporting, and misadministration, crime remains an important national problem. Even though Shaw and Gastrow (2001:243) claim that the demographics of the sector most victimized by crime are African and poor, crime is not restricted solely to that sector of society, but remains a big threat and even bigger fear for most people. This has resulted in a situation where most South Africans have, either been a victim of crime, or closely know someone who has. Further, whilst the biggest problem regarding the issue of crime is that of personal safety, many people, no doubt, also think about the side-effects of such high crime levels, in terms of the detrimental effect it has on investment levels and the tourism industry, to mention but two. Hence, it becomes clear that crime is becoming an increasingly perturbing issue for most South Africans, rendering the massive recognition given this item is understandable.

It is thus the interaction and play off between these three items that presents this most complex and fascinating scenario. This trio of items debatably encompasses the three most important dilemmas facing the majority of South Africans today, and it is only in interaction with each other that true priorities are revealed. Thus the issue of diminishing unemployment and providing the people with land should not be viewed as unimportant issues in 2001, but that at the time of the survey, when weighted up against the fight against crime, they are simply less important. The above discussion highlights the most important priorities, as well as discussing the most pervasive fluctuations to have occurred.

After this broad level analysis of the separate items of the value dimension, a more specific dissection of the spectrum of opinions for various sub-groups of South Africa's heterogeneous population will be conducted. To afford the reader greater insight into the

⁴³ Many South Africans feel crime statistics do not reflect the true nature of the situation and also believed that they have simultaneously become a highly politicized issue and a political tool (Shaw and Gastrow, 2001: 237).

value trends of the last five years it is necessary to determine which sectors of society prioritize which items. One of Taylor's (1998:165) primary conclusions was that the strongest relationship was found to be between race and value orientation, and consequently this will be one of two variables according to which the specific items will be disaggregated. The other will test the relationship between income and value priorities, with income being seen as an indicator of present economic security.

Once the items of each battery have been disaggregated according to race, very pronounced differences are visible. (See appendix 3 to 5 for graphs). Due to the sheer quantity of information available in these graphs, each one will not be discussed in detail, only some points of interest drawn out instead. One of the most poignant observations to be made, is the emphasis on physical security needs amongst the white population. The percentage of respondents selecting the item regarding the maintenance of law and order in appendix 3 and the fighting of crime in appendix 5 as top priority were higher amongst white respondents than any other racial group. Even the item regarding a strong defence force, although very low in priority for white people in 1995 had a dramatic upsurge ending off as a higher priority with the white group in general than any other racial group. There are numerous reasons for this, the most obvious would probably be that in the face of other survival needs not having been met, prioritizing safety as first options is somewhat of a luxury. Overall crime trends highlight the fact that some South Africans are in fact under greater threat from crime than others. Although the media often portrays whites as the primary victims of crime, particularly when regarding the issue of white farmers, Shaw and Gastrow (2001: 243) regard this to be untrue, claiming instead that Africans are at greatest risk ⁴⁴, and that "in the vast majority of crimes of violence the victims are African and poor". Somewhat ironically then, crime appears to be perceived as a bigger problem for Whites, Coloureds and Indians than black people (Rule, 1999: 25; Shaw and Gastrow, 2001: 236).


In the case of basic survival items the portion emphasizing this item within the various racial groups is always highest amongst black respondents, except in the case of the provision of food. This does not come as much of a surprise as the majority of poor people in South Africa fall into the black racial group, and therefore, these so-called pre-materialist needs will remain most important for this category. A more interesting observation is that in all these items concerning basic survival needs, there has been a decrease within the black population from 1995 to 2001. Whether this decrease in prioritization is due to the fact that these needs are increasingly being met, although plausible, could present quite a contentious debate.

⁴⁴ Claims based on findings of the *National Victims of Crime Survey*, Statistics South Africa, Secretariat for Safety and Security, Pretoria, 1998.

It can be argued that although the extent of poverty appears to have increased since 1995, some significant advances in the provision of basic services may have improved the quality of life of a substantial sector of society. The brief discussion in section 1.1.3, demonstrates marked and visible improvements in the provision of some basic services and infrastructure, and any such an improvements in the fulfillment of basic needs might well be experienced more intensely by Black respondents. Although somewhat of a generalization, most Black people had very little access to sufficient services, due to the economically repressive history, and since the inception of the ANC government in 1994, a great improvement may have been felt. The more affluent Whites, and to a smaller extent, Indians and Coloureds, were used to favourable access to these, resulting in inflated standards of living, and conversely leading to the perception that these needs are being increasingly not met. The advances in the field of land reform, provision of water, education, clothing and shelter in the infrastructural or delivery sphere will consequently have had the greatest impact on Black people. The slight progress in terms of meeting basic survival needs, being more acutely sensed by black people could go some distance to explaining these findings.

The results of the last battery should, however, be accorded more attention, with particular regard to the value systemic trade-offs having occurred within the Black and White groups respectively. Chart 1 demonstrates the value trade-offs to have occurred amongst the racial groups over the last five years. Particularly pronounced has been the trade-off between the provision of land, employment and crime. There is a very distinct direct value trade-off between the items with both employment and land experiencing an approximate 10% drop each, and with the prioritization of crime experiencing an almost the exactly the same percentage increase over the same period of time. Further it is noteworthy that the prioritization of the provision of land has only increased amongst Whites, by an approximate margin of 15%. One could speculate that land has always been an important issue for Coloureds and Blacks, but that this sudden increase of prioritization amongst whites is the result of the situation where much of the arable land and most commercial farms are still in the hands of Whites. With an increased perception of the potential threat of loss of this monopoly over land (exemplified by the situation in Zimbabwe and Bredell), coupled with a highly politicized land reform policy, this item is becomingly an increasingly prominent worry. Consequently, a demonstration of the *scarcity* hypothesis, with the threat to- and competition over- land ownership leading to its increasingly prominent position, is once again substantiated.

Chart 1: Battery 3 Disaggregated according to Race.



Another interesting finding is that of the interaction of the various racial groups with the post-materialist items. According to Inglehart, people with the highest levels of formative security are most likely to prioritize post-materialist items. Hence one could speculate that, in general, Whites would have experienced the greatest levels of formative security during the Apartheid era, both in terms of physical and economic stability and security. Consequently, it would be most probable that they express the greatest appreciation of post-materialist items. This is, however, far from substantiated in the findings. Although by no great margin, it does appear that the post-materialist items are most important for Coloureds. Except in the cases of keeping the countryside beautiful and having more say in their jobs and their communities,

the prioritization of all the other post-materialist items has increased dramatically with the proportion of people selecting these items being higher for the Coloured group than for any other. This is a very fascinating finding, on the grounds that it implies that there is something distinct about the Coloured community's socialization agents and communication networks, that causes a sense of importance to be bestowed on these items, despite lower levels of formative security. Although only speculation, this situation could have been facilitated by the specific position that Coloured people were accorded during the Apartheid era, in terms of being allowed greater freedoms and economic opportunities than Black people, but still much less than those of Whites.⁴⁵

When the data is disaggregated according to income category, further incongruences become lucid. (See appendix 6 to 8 for graphs). This notion, that the poorest have the highest percentage of respondents supporting basic survival needs, is further demonstrated, although the provision of food is once again nonconformist, with the highest income category having the greatest portion of respondents selecting this option. These findings appear to corroborate Inglehart's *scarcity* hypothesis, which claims that those entities in scarcest supply will be demanded the most.

The pattern found amongst the white population regarding the high prioritization of physical security needs is partially replicated for the two highest income groups, whose emphasis has moved from economic security to increased emphasis on physical security, as the percentage of top income category respondents ranking employment and fighting inflation is the lowest of any of the income categories. The assertion made by Shaw and Gastrow (2001:243), regarding the poverty status of the category most at risk of crime appears validated, with the second most poorest group ranking highest in terms of prioritizing the issue of crime. On the whole, the two top income groups rank highest on physical security needs, implying that with their basic survival needs having been catered for, these top income earners strive for the fulfillment of second order needs, in particular those dealing with physical security.

Interestingly, the top earners do not appear to place great emphasis on post-materialist needs, and even amongst the top two categories, there does not appear to be any marked increase in emphasis on post-materialist items. In four out of six instances, the highest income group showed a decrease on post-materialist items, with absolute levels of support within income groups being highest for the top category only in the instance of keeping the countryside beautiful.

⁴⁵ For a discussion hereof see James *et al*, 1996; Du Pre, 1994 and Sidego and Heymans, 1986.

Overall it does, however, seem that the specific items prioritized by South Africans correlate with at least two factors, namely income and race, and that discernible patterns become clear. Basic survival or pre-materialist items appear most important for black respondents, although there has been a decrease in the number of respondents over the last five years, whilst physical security remain the number one priority for most white South Africans, with Coloureds and Indians somewhere between. In terms of income categories, the predicated scenario of the pre-materialist items being most important to the lowest income earners, and the highest household income groups prioritizing economic security needs and to a greater degree physical security needs, become visible.

3.2. Empirical Validity and Reliability

Now that the separate items have been unpacked, the analysis can be extended by drawing on the underlying values these items represent. Indexes need to be constructed in order to reveal these underlying pre-materialist, materialist and post-materialist values, to be able to make inferences about the greater population. Certain statistical procedures will have to be employed to determine the empirical reliability and validity of this measure. A procedure, known as factor analysis, will be utilized to determine the validity, whilst the reliability procedure is usually employed to determine the internal consistency of combining these separate items into two and three indexes respectively.

Empirical reliability entails statistical proof to corroborate that “the instrument will produce the same results each time it is administered to the same person in the same setting” (George and Mallery, 1999:278).⁴⁶ The statistical method employed most often is that of Chronbach’s Alpha, and the generally accepted level of reliability is an Alpha score of .7. In the case of the model employed here, alpha scores are generally insufficient to prove reliability, due to the high ipsivity caused by the presence of only 4 or 6 items in a battery. Due to this problem, the reliability of this model cannot be substantiated by the use of empirical procedures. It is, however, possible to accept the reliability of this model to consistently and accurately measure these underlying values on the grounds of the approximately 30 years of successful research that has been conducted using these items.

The testing of validity entails a somewhat different underlying principle to that of reliability, as validity does not denote the accuracy and consistency of the items, but involves determining whether all the items really measure the underlying factors they are theoretically

⁴⁶ Also see Neumann, 2000:164; Babbie and Mouton, 2001:119.

set out to represent.⁴⁷ The SPSS procedure employed to determine internal validity is that of factor analysis, which can be defined as “a statistical procedure designed to take a larger number of constructs and reduce them to a smaller number of factors that describe these measures with greater parsimony” (George and Mallery, 1999:342). The main applications of factor analytic techniques are then (1) to *reduce* the number of variables and (2) to *detect structure* in the relationships between variables, i.e. to *classify variables*. Factor Analysis therefore attempts to identify the small number of latent and immeasurable variables from the variables available in the data. There are various means of conducting factor analysis, but for the purposes of this research essay the default option of Principal Components analysis was selected.

3.2.1. Principal Components Analysis

In order to begin this procedure the relevant questions need to be recoded to form separate items, as in the original questions, the respondents were asked to select one option from a battery of four and six items respectively. The first step in this procedure was to recode the original variables in such a way as to render the *don't know* and *refused* responses system missing. In other words, the variables were recoded so that the refused and don't know responses would not be included in the data analysis, as this would skew the results. The next step entailed checking the percentage of missing values to determine whether the missing cases would skew the results further, but in all instances the missing values were well within the reach of statistical accuracy, never even exceeding 7% of the sample. This complete, the next step, namely that of recoding the original three battery-variables into separate items, was begun. Each model contained six questions, the first, third and fifth asking the respondents to select their first option from the battery, whilst the second, fourth and sixth questions prompted the respondents to select a second option. The batteries were decomposed to create 12 and 18 items respectively, with a value label of 0 denoting that the item was neither selected as a first or second option in the battery, whilst a label of 1 represents a second option, and the largest value, 2, signifying that the item was selected as a first option within that specific battery.

These procedures complete, the actual principle components analysis can commence. There are numerous slight variations possible in the execution of this procedure, and even in the various past applications, discussed in section 1.2.1. and 1.2.2, numerous divergencies appear. During the various stages in the run up to the actual principle components procedure, as well as during the procedure itself, a range of slight changes can be made. Examples include the

⁴⁷ See Kinnear and Gray, 1994:215; Nie *et al*, 1975:469; Hedderson, 1987:159.

specifics of the recoding, the replacement of missing values, whether the sample has been weighted or not, the types of rotation, to mention but a few of the steps that could affect the results. For the purposes of this research essay, the principle components procedure, together with varimax rotation was employed.

Inglehart (2001; personal correspondence) stipulated that the loadings in a developing country such as South Africa, will not be as polarized or distinct as is the case in highly industrialized nations, most often quoted in his work. To combat this result, and on the grounds of the model having already been successfully applied across four continents, it was decided that instead of resorting to the default procedure of selecting those variables with Eigenvalue scores greater than one, a desired number of factors were forced out, based on the results of the work of Inglehart (1995: 102-110) and Taylor (1998). Correspondingly, whilst the rule of thumb in statistical social research is to suppress variables that have factor loadings of less than .3, factors with as low a loading as .1 were accepted. The justification thereof is once again the previously mentioned argument of these variables being largely accepted to form part of the core factors on the basis of *face validity*,⁴⁸ as well as the fact that Inglehart and Abramson (1995:104-110) quoted the factor loadings of 41 different countries, with some factor loadings of as insignificant a value as .03 being accepted.⁴⁹

Table 8 reveals the loadings that are attained when the original 12-item model is applied, with the format, question ordering and all the items exactly replicated. The materialist items have been typed in *Italics*, whilst the Post-materialist items are in bold font. If no score was given the item did not load onto the factor at all, whilst any loadings types in a font style inconsistent with that of its item label, signifies that the item either loaded onto the wrong factor, or loaded with the wrong sign. In table 8 it appears as if the measure is relatively valid with the item dealing with 'Keeping the countryside beautiful' being the only one not loading in all three instances. This item has been problematical in many countries, as it appears to load neutrally, scoring as a post-materialist item for some respondents and as a materialist one for others, whilst not loading at all in other instances (Abramson and Inglehart, 1995:102), of which South Africa appears a case in point. Further the item regarding a stable economy did not load onto a component in the case of the 2001 data, whilst the item dealing with a strong defence force loaded with an 'incorrect' sign in the case of the 1995 data. The items that have

⁴⁸ *Face Validity* can be defined as "the quality of an indicator that makes it seem a reasonable measure of a variable" (Babbie and Mouton, 2001:642) See also Manheim and Rich (1981:351) and Neuman (2000:510).

⁴⁹ The factor loading of Iceland's item regarding the fighting of rising prices were included (Inglehart and Abramson, 1995:106)

not loaded as predicted, will still be included on the grounds of *face* validity, as well as the loadings found by Inglehart (1995:104), in order to facilitate time-series comparison.⁵⁰

Table 8: Factor Loadings of Principal Components Analysis with the 12-item Model.

	1990 ⁵¹	1995	2001 ⁵²
<i>Maintaining Law and Order</i>	-0.56	-0.58	-0.36
<i>A stable Economy</i>	-0.47	-0.60	
<i>A High level of Economic Growth</i>	-0.33	-0.64	-0.27
<i>Fighting Rising Prices</i>	-0.31	-0.23	-0.52
<i>Fight against Crime</i>	-0.25	-0.21	-0.48
<i>Strong Defence Forces</i>	-0.21	0.25	-0.14
More say in Government decisions	0.70	0.56	0.63
More say at their Jobs and Communities	0.60	0.41	0.50
Keeping the Countryside Beautiful			
A Society where Ideas count more	0.43	0.40	0.45
A more humane and less impersonal society	0.36	0.50	0.26
Protecting Freedom of Speech	0.26	0.35	0.39

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.⁵³

There are, however, two dimensions under observation, and table 9 demonstrates the factor loadings of the uniquely South African 18-item model in 1995. Table 8 demonstrates that most of the loadings are acceptably high, with the item regarding keeping the countryside beautiful even loading in this application of the 18-item model. The only problem appears to be the item regarding employment, which loads onto the component which houses all the post-materialist items, but doing so with a negative prefix.

⁵⁰ The item regarding Keeping the Countryside and Cities beautiful has been included in the indexes, as the frequency with which it was selected as first option never exceeded 7.5%, usually averaging at approximately 5% in both the 12- and 18- item scales, thus its inclusion will not really skew the results.

⁵¹ Two factors instead of one were extracted to facilitate rotation.

⁵² Two factors instead of one were extracted to facilitate rotation.

⁵³ The factor loadings attained here differ from those of Inglehart (1995: 108) and Taylor (1998: 87-88). The factor loadings can be viewed in appendix 2.

**Table 9: Factor Loadings of Principal Components Analysis of
18-item Model: 1995⁵⁴**

	<i>Component 1</i>	<i>Component 2</i>
Providing Shelter for all People	0.52	
Making sure that Everyone is adequately clothed	0.47	
Providing clean Water for all People	0.45	
Making sure that Everyone can go to School	0.38	
Providing Land for all People	0.36	
Providing enough Food for all People	0.33	
<i>Maintaining Law and Order</i>	<i>-0.66</i>	
<i>Maintaining a high Rate of Economic Growth</i>	<i>-0.55</i>	
<i>Fighting Crime</i>	<i>-0.50</i>	
<i>Maintaining a strong Defence Force</i>	<i>-0.29</i>	
<i>Fighting Rising Prices</i>	<i>-0.26</i>	
<i>Making sure all People are fully employed</i>		<i>-0.74</i>
Keeping the Countryside beautiful		0.42
Protecting Freedom of Speech		0.34
A Society where Ideas count more		0.28
More say at Work and in their Communities		0.25
A more Humane and less Impersonal society		0.19
More say in Government Decisions		0.15

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. Rotation converged in 3 iterations.

The table of 2001 factor loadings (table 10) reveals predictable results, except, once again in the case of the item regarding unemployment. In this instance it does load onto the first component with all the other materialist items, but with the same sign as the pre-materialist items, whilst at the same time, having a much higher loading on the post-materialist component, although once again with the opposite sign. In both data sets the item regarding unemployment appears to simultaneously encompass pre-materialist, materialist and post-materialist needs. One could speculate that in the South African mindset, having a job is cognitized as a basic survival need, primarily because without the means of income derived

⁵⁴ On the basis of the results of the principal components analysis in Taylor (1998:88), only two factors were extracted.

from employment, most of the other basic needs will not be met, thus involving an almost direct link. The item will, of course, represent materialist needs to some degree, in terms of being included in the group of financial and economic factors, which, both on an individual and national level, affect economic security. Unemployment may, however, also entail certain post-materialist underpinnings, by means of the psychologically damaging effects of unemployment, an example of which would include the loss of feelings of self-worth as a result of being unemployed. Although this somewhat complex item appears to reveal a host of underlying values, for the purpose of the continuity of the analysis, it will still be included in the materialist index.

**Table 10: Factor Loadings of Principal Components Analysis of
18-item Model: 2001**

	<i>Component 1</i>	<i>Component 2⁵⁵</i>
Providing Shelter for all People	0.69	
Providing Land for all People	0.46	
Providing clean Water for all People	0.30	
Making sure that Everyone is adequately clothed	0.28	
Providing enough Food for all People	0.18	
Making sure that Everyone can go to School	0.12	
<i>Fighting Crime</i>	<i>-0.69</i>	
<i>Maintaining Law and Order</i>	<i>-0.59</i>	
<i>Fighting Rising Prices</i>	<i>-0.36</i>	
<i>Maintaining a high Rate of Economic Growth</i>	<i>-0.26</i>	
<i>Maintaining a strong Defence Force</i>	<i>-0.24</i>	
<i>Making sure all People are fully employed</i>	<i>0.21</i>	-0.76
More say in Government Decisions		0.54
More say at Work and in their Communities		0.53
A more Humane and less Impersonal society		0.34
A Society where Ideas count more		0.31
Protecting Freedom of Speech		0.19
Keeping the Countryside beautiful		

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser

Normalization. Rotation converged in 3 iterations.

⁵⁵ Factor loadings were clearer on component 3 than component 2.

In general one finds the loadings of table 9 and 10, namely of the 18-item model, demonstrate a higher degree of validity, than the loadings of the two-index model, corroborating the theoretical assumption of the greater applicability of a model encompassing a pre-materialist band made in section 1.2.3, as well as by Lategan (2000:410) and Taylor (1998).

3.3. Index Construction

The theoretical and empirical validity and reliability sufficiently expanded upon, the indexes can be constructed. In both the 12-item and the 18-item model the indexes were created in much the same way. The construction of the index began by adding all the respective materialist and respective post-materialist items together. Utilizing the SPSS computing function, the scores that each respondent attained were tallied up, resulting in a materialist and post-materialist index, each with a scale of 0 to 9. This scale came into being as two items from each table were combined, and as respondents were only allowed one first- and one second- option, with a first option scoring two points and a second option 1, whilst any item not selected scored 0, the maximum score that a respondent could attain in each battery, were they to select a materialist item as their first choice and the other materialist item as their second, would be 3. In this instance, no post-materialist items were selected, thereby leaving the respondent with a score of 0 on the post-materialist component of the battery. When the scores on all three batteries are then added, the highest attainable score is 9 and the lowest 0. This holds true for a battery of 4 or 6 items, as still only one first and one second option could be selected per battery.

A variable with a scale of 0 to 9, does not, however, comply with convention and is less than practical in terms of index construction, making it imperative that the variable be converted to one ranging from 0 to 10. This was facilitated by multiplying all the scores by 1.1 recurring, which, although creating a variable with a scale of 0 to 10, also resulted in a host of fractions, making it once more unworkable. For this reason the scores were then rounded with 0 to .4, being recoded as 0, .5 to 1.4 being recoded as 1, so on and so forth. This finally created a variable with a scale ranging from 0 to 10, and only including whole numbers. Index construction complete, it was possible to assemble a continuum on which to map the population with the pure type materialists forming the one pole, and the other pole exemplifying pure post-materialist types.⁵⁶

In the instance of the 12-item model, only one continuum needed to be constructed, with the materialist pole on the left and the post-materialist on the right. The 18-item model requires

⁵⁶ See the syntax file provided in Appendix 1 for a more detailed description of any procedures.

the construction of two continuums, one along a pre-materialist/materialist spectrum, and one along a materialist/post-materialist spectrum. All three were constructed by theoretically placing the 'lower-order' pole at the left end of the scale, running in the negative numbers, with the 'higher order' index falling on the right. Mathematically this entailed multiplying the 'lower order' index by negative 1, and the 'higher order' index by positive 1, and then simply adding up the products.⁵⁷

3.4. Conclusion

The purpose of this rather lengthy discussion regarding the exact statistical procedures was to furnish a better understanding of the nature of the techniques used, particularly for those unfamiliar with the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, as well as to justify the selection of the specific procedures. This should aid in an enhanced understanding and appreciation of the analysis in the next chapter.

⁵⁷ Pre-materialist/Materialist Continuum = (Pre-materialist Factor x -1) + (Materialist Factor x 1). For an even more detailed description see the syntax file provided in Appendix 1.

Chapter 4: Analysis and Interpretation

Before embarking upon a time-series examination of the most prominent trends to have affected the South African population over this period of extreme political, social and economic restructuring, it is imperative that a brief descriptive analysis of the distribution of the population on these indexes be conducted. The first part of the chapter will thus entail a concise socio-demographic portrayal of the present South African population according to the more relevant pre-materialist/materialist value dimension, although the post-materialist-materialist dimension will also be briefly alluded to. This description will be followed by a discussion of the most visible trends to have affected South Africa over the last decade, in terms of the original two-index Inglehart model. This will be followed by an analysis of the South African population according to the more pertinent three-index model, to facilitate an improved understanding of the development of the needs and values of South Africans over the last five years.

It can be asserted that due to the exceedingly heterogeneous nature of the population, analysis of aggregate national data may not suffice for a truly representative depiction of the transformation of South Africa's values. To provide more comprehensive and insightful information regarding the process of value change in South Africa, the trends in various national 'sub-groups' will be traced. The final chapter will briefly examine whether the South African data in any way concurs with Inglehart's hypothesis of a value shift towards increased post-materialism in countries moving towards greater economic stability and democratic consolidation.

4.1. Socio-demographic Distribution of Value-types.

The information obtained when attempting to establish the socio-demographic distribution of the three value types should be interpreted with care, as some of the distributional features may be misleading as they largely mirror the distribution of that socio-demographic variable in the population as a whole. It is therefore paramount that the change in the proportion of the specific categories across the three value types, rather than the categories within one value type, be compared.


In all the following cross tabulations, the large continuum, spanning 20 points upon which the pre-materialist/mixed/materialist dimension can be mapped, has been collapsed to only three

categories of value types.⁵⁸ Although much of the detail is lost in the process of reducing the information to allow for the classification into pre-materialist, mixed and materialist value types, much insight into the interface between existing socio-demographic divisions and value-type classifications can be gained.

4.1.1. Income

The first variable selected is that of income, and from the following pie charts, a correlation between income level and value type is discernible. The pre-materialist types house the largest portion of the lowest income earners, the portion of which gradually comprises a smaller fraction of the whole, from more than half of the pre-materialist pie, to less than a third of the mixed type, to less than a sixth in the case of the materialist types, as demonstrated by chart 2.

Chart 2: Income Distribution of Value Types.



Amongst the mixed value types, there appears to be a relatively equal distribution between the two lowest income groups. Although all three value types contain a share of the wealthiest


⁵⁸ The recoding for the collapsed variables occurred as follows: -10 to -3 = Pre-materialists; -2 to 2 = Mixed types; 3 to 10 = Materialists.

group, the portions become incrementally larger with the move from pre-materialist to mixed to materialist types. The share of the poorest and wealthiest groups end up being almost equal in the case of materialist types, which represents a drastic change from the highly skewed distribution amongst the pre-materialists. On the whole, despite trends in the differences between monthly household income groups, there is a distribution of varying levels of wealth across the value types, revealing that there is no direct replication of the divisions in economic prosperity and value types.

4.1.2. Education

The distribution of levels of education amongst the population of various value types also yields a clear pattern, although again there is a relatively consistent distribution of educational levels amongst the value types, as is discernible in chart 3.


Chart 3: Educational Distribution of Value Types.



Due to the fact that the majority of the sample falls into one category, the patterns are somewhat blurred, but what is clear is that there is a proportionally large increase in the number of University students and graduates in the mixed, and to a greater degree, the materialist types. Conversely the pre-materialist value types contain a greater portion of

uneducated people, than do the mixed and materialist types.⁵⁹ In general it would thus appear that it is more likely to find uneducated people amongst the ranks of the pre-materialists types, whilst the chance of finding university graduates and students amongst the pre-materialist is relatively unlikely. No pattern of choice appears visible for those with a moderate level of education, which shows up in equal numbers in all three value types.

Chart 4: Gender Distribution of Value Types.



4.1.3. Gender

Disaggregation by gender does appear to yield a slight pattern, although it is by no means very concentrated, and could easily be caused by the fact there are only two groups, which are represented in practically equal proportions in the sample and the population as a whole. The gender distribution of the value types appears to show that men are slightly more likely than women to be polarized towards the two extremes of pre-materialism and materialism, whilst women are more liable to prioritize both values simultaneously.


4.1.4. Race

The final, and debatably most important, demographic variable to be accorded attention here is that of race. Contrary to the gender distribution, the ethnic distribution appears to yield some intriguing patterns. This variable needs to be addressed in relative detail, and therefore each racial group will be dealt with separately. The portion of Coloured people amongst each value type does not change much, leading one to believe that no one value type carries

⁵⁹ The percentage of pre-materialists without any schooling is 7.5, whilst the portion of mixed types without any schooling is 2.3 and that of materialists 1.5. The percentage materialists with University education is 8.2, mixed types is 2.2% and in the case of pre-materialists 0.7%.

particular importance for this racial group. The portion of Indian people in each category remains stable across the pre-materialist and mixed value types, but practically doubles in the case of materialists, indicating that materialist values are relatively entrenched amongst a large portion of the Indian population.

Chart 5: Racial Distribution of Value Types




The changes in the proportions of black people across value types are relatively drastic, with a slight increase amongst the mixed types, but a drastic drop of approximately 30% in the case of the materialists. This unequal distribution indicates a prevalence of pre-materialist and mixed values, as opposed to purely materialist ones, in this racial category. The opposite appears to be true in the case of the white respondents. The distribution of Whites amongst the pre-materialists and mixed types is relatively low, and increases by approximately 26% in the case of the materialist types, indicating a stronger prevalence of these value types for this population sub-group. Although the black and white groups appear to portray two opposing tendencies in value prioritizations, the divisions between the racial categories is not entirely replicated in the value types, as might have been expected. The fact that the Coloured racial category spans equally across all three value types, and that each of the other racial groups is, in relation to their size, substantially represented amongst each of the value types, implies that values do not appear to follow a “racial census”, but leave quite some room for other independent variables.

4.1.5. The Post-materialist Index


Although the intra-category differences can no longer be compared with those of the pre-materialist, mixed and materialist- types, as these data have been taken from a different continuum, the post-materialist types have been disaggregated according to socio-demographic variables, although once again the real distribution of these variables in the population as a whole must be borne in mind. The disaggregation of this value type has been accorded such modest attention because only 3% of South Africans can be classified as post-materialist types on the materialist/post-materialist continuum constructed from the 18-item model, making any statistics less than insightful due to the very small sample size.

Chart 6: Income Distribution of Post-materialist Types⁶⁰



This value type appears dominated by the two groups signifying earnings of less than R3 000, with the top three income groups only comprising 20% of the distribution. This would appear somewhat contrary to expected, but can largely be explained by the small sample size.

Chart 7: Educational Distribution of Post-materialist Types⁶¹



In the case of the educational distribution, the data appears skewed by the disproportionately large sector of the South African population falling into the category “high school complete”,


⁶⁰ The Materialist/Post-materialist Continuum was utilized.

⁶¹ The Materialist/Post-materialist Continuum was utilized

as well as the small sample size. Only 2% of the post-materialist types have some level of University education, which is quite contrary to some of the expectations espoused by researchers, amongst them Warwick (1998) and Duch and Taylor (1993, 1994), of higher levels of post-materialism amongst highly educated cohorts.⁶²

In terms of racial disaggregation, the distribution appears relatively similar to that of the pre-materialist types, with racial distribution largely mirroring that of the greater population as a whole. Thus it would seem that there is no correlation between racial groups and the post-materialist types.

Chart 8: Racial Distribution of the Post-materialist Types⁶³



At this point it may appear that the data have simply been presented without sufficient extrapolation. This has been done intentionally in order not to replicate much of the analysis that will follow in the subsequent sections. Whilst the former discusses the value distribution along the three value continuums across 5 and 10-year periods respectively, in order to assess the change to have transpired, the latter will look at value change within the separate population sub-groups, some of which have been alluded to above. It is hoped that these two discussions will adequately address the phenomena discovered above.

4.2. Analysis of the Inglehart Materialist/Post-materialist Dimension

As stipulated previously, one of the primary objectives of this research essay lies in addressing the issue of whether South Africans are undergoing value change, making it crucial that time-series data be analyzed. The following graph depicts the location of the South African population along the original dimension first proposed by Inglehart in 1973.


The chart can be interpreted in terms of a score of 10, whether negative or positive, denoting a 'pure' materialist or post-materialist type, with scores of between -2 and 2 denoting neutral or

⁶² See debate regarding the relationship of education and values in section 2.4.2.

⁶³ See 3.

‘perfect mixed’ types, who express both materialist and post-materialist values in roughly equal proportions. Those scoring between 4 and 8 (or –4 and –8) can be thought of as mixed types with greater emphasis on either materialist or post-materialist needs, depending on their location in terms of the two poles. Hence the larger the score, the more intense the prioritization of the index located on the nearest pole.

Chart 9: Scores on the Materialist/Post-materialist Continuum



From chart 9 it becomes clear that there has been very little shift in the portion of pure materialists and pure post-materialist between 1990 and 2001. The percentage of respondents being ranking positive and negative 10 has remained almost exactly the same, although in both instances the size of this group is very small. A substantial increase in the number of mixed typed materialists (i.e. those scoring -6 and -8) is, however, discernible. Therefore, despite no visible increase in pure materialist types, there has been an unmistakable increase in the prioritization of materialist values over the last decade. In the 1995 data set one sees the highest portion of respondents ranked at -8, illustrating that almost one quarter of the population have very strong materialist convictions. When added to the 5% and 20% of respondents that respectively ranked -10 (pure materialists) and -6 (relatively strong materialists), it becomes apparent that half of South Africans strongly prioritized materialist items in 1995. In 2001, the highest percentage of respondents were collected at a score of -6, which represents relatively strong materialist underpinnings, but is buttressed by the 5% pure materialists and the 20% with very strong materialist underpinnings. Again approximately half of South Africans reveal themselves to favour materialist needs.

As mentioned previously, the increasing prioritization of one item is inevitably linked to a decrease in the prioritization of another. The same holds true in the case of the underlying values, where this enlarged prioritization of materialist values is paralleled with an overall reduction of respondents on the more neutral and post-materialist side of the scale. For both the 1995 and 2001 data, the frequency of respondents being ranked on all the scores, between those depicting weak materialist underpinnings (-4), to those of quite strong post-materialist foundations, is approximately 4% lower than scores attained in 1990. Overall, a trend of South Africans increasingly seeking to fulfill post-materialist needs is not substantiated in the time-series data. Any further analysis of the data in the format of the two-index model shall be foregone in favour of analysis according to the three-index model, for which an adequate case has been made in section 3.3.

4.3. Analysis of the Pre-materialist/Materialist Dimension


As already demonstrated in section 4.2, most South Africans can be defined as varyingly polarized pre-materialists and materialists, and therefore longitudinal analysis of this dimension may prove the most pivotal for broadening the understanding of South African value change. Chart 11 depicts how South Africans feature in terms of the Pre-materialist/Materialist dimension found to be most applicable by Taylor (1998).

Overall there is a higher portion of respondents that prioritize pre-materialist needs in 1995, than in 2001, except in the case of those scoring -4, which represents relatively weak pre-materialist orientations. This situation appears to be compensated for by the large percentage of respondents with weak to medium materialist underpinnings in 2001. An exception is found in the case of those scoring a positive 8, in other words those with highly polarized materialist values, where there is a higher frequency in 1995 than in 2001.

Taken as a whole, there does appear to be a trend of slight increase in the emphasis on materialist, as opposed to pre-materialist, needs over the last five years. The overall decrease, albeit a slight one, in pre-materialists of varying polarizations, could be attributed to a number of factors. What is important to bear in mind at this juncture is that value changes are fuelled by changes in perceptions, and these in turn are driven by subjective judgments of situations. Hence, in attempting to understand why this value change may have occurred, it is imperative that all the possibilities for such a change in subjective judgments be addressed. Although the classic political behaviour debate of 'affect' versus 'cognition' in the making of decisions and judgments has been noted, this research essay will be built on the premise that most people

rely on both ‘affect’ and ‘cognition’⁶⁴ in the making of decisions, and therefore, despite being ‘cognitive misers’, will utilize at least some objective facts in the processing and substantiating of their opinions. In the following sections various potential paths of reasoning will be extrapolated, and examples of corroborative information, that people could have utilized, provided.

Chart 10: Scores on the Pre-materialist/Materialist Continuum



The first plausible rationale involves a general perception that the basic survival needs of the people are being catered for, rendering the provision of basic survival needs a progressively less pre-occupying need. There is a multitude of plausible reasons for this change. The most obvious conclusion to be jumped to would entail a real improvement in state and para-statal delivery of basic services and infrastructure. Both the RDP and GEAR, although the RDP to a greater extent, placed substantial emphasis on meeting the basic survival needs of the poor. A workable economic platform was put in place, need assessments were conducted, target policies drafted and finances, according to some to the tune of approximately R100 billion (*Indicator SA*, 2000:80), made available. This alone could go some distance to explaining why pre-materialist needs reveal declining prioritization. Kinder and Kiewiet (1981: 129-161) asserted that people make electoral decisions on socio-tropic assessment, and this argument could be transported to the assessment of general conditions. People not in need of state provision of these goods and services, could be lead to believe that once these previously mentioned steps have been taken, the issue has been sufficiently addressed. This would then imply that these needs will have been met, and that other needs and values could then be

⁶⁴ See Kuklinski *et al*, 1991.

prioritized. Such a rationalizing process would, however, be most likely in the case of those who do not need the state for the provision of goods and services. This is due to the fact that those in need would be more likely to try and access the provisions made by these plans, as well as being in greater contact with the other people who would have attempted to do the same, and would therefore be more likely to have experienced the inconsistency between policy and delivery.

If one speculates that most citizens, even those not in direct contact, are more critical, relying on results and not plans to make judgments, there is indeed sufficient evidence to suggest that primary needs are increasingly being met, once again allowing for other values to be prioritized. A recent report in *Indicator SA*, which monitored infrastructure delivery, revealed that in some areas the delivery of social services has improved dramatically. Examples include the approximately one million housing subsidies that have been granted, the improvements made in terms of the provision, access and equity of education, the large number of clinics that have been built, as well as the progress in water delivery (Education: Achieving..., 2000:78).

Table 11: Experience of Change since 1994

	<i>Percentage of Respondents</i>
Housing	16
Electricity	16
Greater freedom of movement	13
Health care	11
Education	9
Jobs, job prospects	5
Feeling better about self	6
Water	6
Other	1
No change for better	18
Total	100

Data obtained from the South African Quality of Life Trends Project, October 1999.

Other examples have been cited in Section 1.2.3. Table 11, quoted in Moller (2000:22), portrays how South Africans feel in terms of whether they have perceived a change for the better in their lives since 1994. The fact that four of the top five fields in which South Africans perceived the most pronounced changes for the better, represent basic survival needs, would imply that a large portion of South Africans feel that their basic survival needs

are being fulfilled to greater satisfaction now, then was the case 6 years ago. The perception of improvements in other fields, such as the creation of jobs or increased crime prevention, is far smaller, leaving much room for these types of needs to be prioritized.

Another plausible argument to explain the apparent public perception of basic needs having been better met in 2001 than in 1995, could be that, although social service delivery may not have improved, people have greater access to the services and infrastructure provided by the state. Very often it is insufficient to simply look at the statistics, one actually needs to look at the accessibility and distribution of the resources. It is possible that these resources have become increasingly accessible over time, leading to this decrease in the prioritization in pre-materialist values. Particularly in the field of water and electricity provision, more effort has been made to reach the poor, rural and disenfranchised. More than 1.3 million rural people now have access to clean water within 200 metres of their house, and over 1.5 million houses have been electrified (*Indicator SA*, 2000:79). The fact that women and children, two of the sectors of society most disadvantaged in the past and most in need at present, are the only ones given free health could further substantiate the perception that basic needs are being better met.

Another alternative entails a more even distribution of basic social services and infrastructure, independent of the increasing income inequality gap. This would mean that although people do not have more income available, they have experienced a higher standard of living due to benefits handed out in kind and not in cash. Examples include free education (Van Den Berg, 2000, quoted in Nattrass and Seekings, 2001:56) free health care to pregnant women and children under the age of 6, as well as food stamps or producer subsidies (*Indicator SA*, 2000:82). Statistics provided by Moller (2000:26) reveal that in the October 1999 Quality of Life Trends Project, 13% of poor people felt that there had been absolutely no change for the better since 1994, whilst 21% of rich people held this belief. Hence it would seem that the poor people, although no better off financially, are seeing a greater positive change in the provision of basic goods and services than those South Africans falling into higher income categories. This situation would be further augmented by the fact that the higher income groups pay more tax than they receive social delivery goods or services, whether in cash or kind, whilst the opposite is true for the poorest categories, whose benefits greatly exceeded the amounts of tax they pay (Nattrass and Seekings, 2001:56).

Hence, there is a wealth of statistics to substantiate the perception that perfunctory survival needs are being increasingly met. There is, however, just as large an amount of literature and

statistics that all but prove the exact opposite.⁶⁵ The argument of more equal access to social services is disputed by indications such as the situation where the main beneficiaries of a reformed housing policy were the urban poor, with the rural poor being largely excluded from the process, leaving many worse off than at the outset (Nattrass and Seekings, 2001:59). Another case in point is the provision of non-grid electricity, which does not allow for the use of electric stoves, which means that women, who are largely responsible for the cooking, still do not benefit from this service (Hassen, 2000:15), and will therefore not consider their needs better met.

Critical citizens could easily find a host of information substantiating the notion that increasing financial and personnel allocation does not guarantee a better output of social services and goods. More money having been spent on schools, children nutrition schemes and housing subsidies, does not ensure that people received the goods and services. Some of the reasons for this include implementation problems and corruption. A case in point would be that despite many rural clinics having been built since 1994, many suddenly had to contend with 30% staff cuts (*The Mail & Guardian*, 6 February 1998). Further, many people may have originally received access to resources, but due to a lack of maintenance and proper upkeep, only experienced the spoils for a short while. An example here would be the more than 50% of taps that have been broken since the implementation of the thousands of communal taps since 1994 (Bond, 2000:18).

The decline of the prioritization of pre-materialist needs could, however, also be based on completely different notions, one possibility being that poor and needy people are increasingly looking to other sources for the provision of basic needs, and finding them there. Superior social networks facilitating community and family delivery of perfunctory goods and services is simply one example. Statistics regarding this would be near impossible to attain, but one could argue that extended family networks are becoming increasingly important as people opt out of the system of relying on the state. Other non-state actors, such as NGOs, churches, community and foreign aid organizations could be fulfilling the needs of people more successfully now than in 1995. An example in this instance would be some of the houses that have been built by women's self-help groups, in conjunction with *stokvels*, or the Protea scheme, which is helped by an NGO called the South African Homeless People's Federation, which builds houses with the use of second hand materials, collective labour and finances them with moneys made available by the rotation of financial assets (*The Star*, 25

⁶⁵ For an overview of the two positions on the delivery of basic social services and goods see Bond, P. (2000) "Infrastructure Delivery: Class Apartheid" in *Indicator SA*. Vol. 17, No. 3. and Hassen, E. (2000) "Are Bricks and Mortar enough: Infrastructure Delivery" in *Indicator SA*. Vol 17. No 3.

February 1998). People could however, increasingly be opting for the private provision of goods, as is being seen in the increasing reliance on the provision of private security and health care. ⁶⁶Here, once again, aggregate statistics (if any could be unearthed), would not be truly representative of the real situation, and consequently the argument that people are increasingly seeing their primary needs met by non-state sources, must remain simply speculative.

Another alternative is to reconceptualize why pre-materialist values would be deemed less important, and three conceivable arguments shall be examined. The first scenario asserts that the de-prioritization of pre-materialist could be due to excessive and ever-escalating levels of crime and unemployment, coupled with the perceptions that the state is performing worse in these fields than in others. This scenario could mean that South Africans are increasingly prioritizing the items regarding the fighting of crime and on the economic security side, the item dealing with employment, to such a degree as to skew the results. Thus although the respondents would score very low on the other materialist items, the scores on these two are very high, thereby falsely designating people as materialists instead of the pre-materialists that they truly are. Hence, although primary needs may be far from adequately met, the unnaturally high levels of crime results in pre-materialists selecting this item, rather than important pre-materialist items in the battery.

Although crime levels are very high by international standards, crime has become an even more critical issue as a consequence of the framing it has undergone. The media has been largely guilty of sensationalizing violent crimes to increased viewer figures, whilst the national government has increasingly framed crime as one of the potentially biggest obstacles to democratic consolidation (Shaw and Gastrow, 2001:253). Various political parties and media sources, have utilized crime to realize political agendas and maintain specific support bases, in terms of White conservative parties framing white farmers as under constant fatal threat from black criminals.

A testing of this argument could yield very interesting results, and could be done in much the same format as the experimental research conducted by Clarke and Dutt (1991:905), in which the perceived shift towards post-materialism observed by Inglehart and his colleagues, was in fact, unsubstantiated if a question on employment was inserted to replace one of the questions in the original battery. By replacing the item regarding crime or unemployment with other items, such as reducing the income inequality (if the economic security item is left out), or

⁶⁶ For a detailed analysis of the increased reliance on private security, see Schonteich (1999)

improving the criminal justice system (if the physical security item is left out), more real results could possibly be computed. For the moment we will simply have to bear in mind that this possibility exists, and thus the results may not necessarily be as representative of real value underpinnings as expected due to measurement error.

Based upon the same premise, namely that materialist values are not being prioritized on the grounds of pre-materialist needs having been more satisfactorily met, the second alternative concerns another possible measurement error. The specific phrasing of the question asked of respondents could be less than reliable in testing underlying value priorities, and more adequate at testing people's evaluations of which parts of government policy are still inadequate, requiring more work. The exact wording of the question is as follows: "People sometimes talk about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years. On this card are listed some of the goals which different people would give top priority. Would you please say which one of these you, yourself, consider the most important?" It is possible that people could interpret this question, not in terms of what the national needs are, but in terms of the weaknesses in government policy. Table 1, quoted previously, highlights those fields in which people have seen a marked improvement. There is only one materialist item listed, with 5% of South Africans feeling that there has been an increase in the provision of jobs and job prospects (Moller, 2000:22). Thus it would seem that most South Africans feel that the government has focused to a greater extent (and with much more success), on items of pre-materialist foundation, than on items of materialist underpinning. Hence they could rationalize that these 'materialist' items need to be accorded more attention in the future, despite pre-materialist needs largely still inadequately met.

Another eventuality could be that South Africans are undergoing a conceptual overhaul, a mind shift exemplified by the move from the RDP to GEAR. This would entail that people no longer think in the order of needs as postulated by Maslow (1954), whereby the fulfillment of basic survival needs is a pre-requisite for the prioritization of security needs. It is possible that South Africans are increasingly re-organizing their needs, whereby the *modus operandi* to fulfilling basic survival needs is to have economic and physical security and safety. High levels of economic growth, low inflation and full employment may thus be prioritized ahead of items such as the provision of food, clothing, land and water, as people could rationalize that these can be bought, once money has been earned. The item regarding shelter, and to a greater degree that regarding education, will probably be exceptions, making it no surprise that these are the two most mentioned pre-materialist items.

Shelter could represent an exception because such large portions of South Africans are still without a shelter fit for human habitation. Another reason could be that this item may also have certain post-materialist and materialist underpinnings. Many South Africans lay great emotional claim to owning their own homes, a conviction conceivably amplified by the forced removals under the Apartheid government. The positive self-reinforcement experienced when owning your own home is not easily paralleled, and therefore the item regarding shelter could cater to post-materialist needs for some. Further, the item may reveal materialist values, in terms of the ownership of a home representing some kind of financial stability, in terms of it being a costly commodity, which can be sold if large debts were to be incurred, as well as it functioning as collateral when applying for loans. The item regarding schooling may also be an exception because a solid education may be perceived as the ticket to employment, bringing with it financial security. Consequently South Africans could be prioritizing economic security needs in a value trade-off between present and future gain. People could be willing to compromise on the prioritization of certain pre-materialist needs on the grounds that these will be automatically met, if economic stability and prosperity has been established.

It becomes clear that there are a multitude of motivations for the visible decrease in the emphasis of pre-materialist values, in favour of low-polarized materialist items. Different respondents will employ various motivations, often no doubt in interaction with each other, to come to the conclusions demonstrated in the results. Most probably it is the dynamics of the dual effects of decreasing pre-materialism and increasing materialism that can be held liable for these findings. The fact that most of the increase is experienced amongst the least-polarized materialists (those scoring 2) highlights the fact that the results have been altered by just one or two fewer pre-materialist and one or two more materialist items being selecting in 2001 than in 1995. Thus it would seem that this change is very short-term, and that the orientations in the South African case are still very fluid, and far from any kind of crystallization.

4.4. The Disaggregated Pre-materialist/Materialist Dimension

The value change discussed above may be better understood when the data is disaggregated according to certain prominent social divisions already present in the South African tapestry. In section 4.1, the different value types were disaggregated according to socio-demographic variables in order to assess whether the division into value types in any way mirrors the much-lauded differences inherent in the South African population. Although certain trends amongst specific groups may have been discovered, there was no unequivocal evidence that people of specific groups overwhelmingly constitute certain value types.

To further investigate the dynamics within the specific socio-economic and demographic groups, each of these groups will be dealt with separately, in order to ascertain whether any specific change in the value dimension of these groups may have occurred. To prevent repetition of the analysis in section 3.1, and that of the first part of this chapter, the charts containing the disaggregated data will not be dealt with in much detail, with greater focus simply on identifying most of the trends.

4.4.1. Income

Chart 11: Value Distribution according to Income Group: 1995.





Chart 12: Value distribution according to Income Group: 2001



In the first instance the data has been disaggregated according to income groups. In order to facilitate further comparison, the income categories of the 1995 data have been reworked to correspond to 2001 prices, which means that the groups across both data sets are perfectly comparable, as inflation and devaluation have been fully accounted for.⁶⁷ Between 1995 and 2001 there has been a decrease in strong pre-materialists, across the board of income categories. In two out of five income categories there has, however, been an increase in the weak pre-materialists over the same period of time. Both the poorest- and wealthiest- two income categories have shown a slight increase in the percentage of weak pre-materialists.

Whilst the portion of mixed types has remained relatively stable for most income categories, the second highest and second lowest categories have experienced a dramatic increase in the region of 10% and 20% respectively. The percentages of weak materialists in the first two categories have remained constant, whilst the middle-income earners have shown a marked increase in weak materialists values. The top two income categories showed a marked decrease in both the weak- and strong- materialist types. Overall, a decrease in strong materialist values across all income categories becomes discernible.

On the whole, there seems to be a move towards greater congruence between value orientations across the income groups. In general strong pre-materialist and materialist types have decreased over the last five years, with both the wealthiest and poorest revealing increasing levels of weak pre-materialism, whilst the middle income earners are increasingly becoming mixed types. This somewhat confounding finding could be explained, in terms of the previously mentioned phenomena of the poorest, although financially no better off, experiencing a slight increase in standards of living, largely via state supplied basic social services and infrastructure delivery. The wealthiest, on the other, besides being more exposed to the needs of the rest of the country, have simultaneously experienced threats to the provision of basic survival needs, cases in point being the threat to land ownership (in the past only the wealthy owned land) and less service delivery, despite consistently high tax rates. The middle-income earners, whose perfunctory needs one would assume, have sufficiently been met, would prioritize both materialist and pre-materialist needs. For the most part, however, it would appear that South Africans, regardless of income bracket, are increasingly prioritizing materialist and pre-materialist needs simultaneously, with fewer extreme types present in 2001 than in 1995.

⁶⁷ The worked out conversions were provided by a working document by Unilever, Durban.

4.4.2. Class

When the data is disaggregated according to class, this trend of increasing value congruence is again revealed. In 2001 there are much fewer strong pre-materialists and strong materialists than was the case in 1995. There has, however been an increase in weak pre-materialists amongst all the classes, except in the case of the lower class, where the portion of pre-materialists was higher in 1995 than in 2001. This could be due to the previously mentioned rationale that lower class people would have experienced the improvements made to a greater extent than any of the other groups, explaining the interchange of emphasis from pre-materialist to increased materialist values.

Chart 13: Value-type Distribution according to Class: 1995





Chart 14: Value-type Distribution according to Class Category: 2001




Except in the case of the upper middle class, where levels of mixed types have remained constant, there has been a slight increase in mixed types over the last five years. Interestingly enough, there has been a drop in the portion of materialists in all but two class categories. Only the upper middle class and lower class showed an increase in materialists. The increase in materialist values in the upper middle class could very well be a function of the emerging upper class, recently having come into ownership of property and valuable goods, being increasingly aware of safety and security needs, hence the increase in materialists.

The interesting set-up of the overlap across class groups, such as demonstrated by both the upper middle class and lower class exhibiting the same tendency towards increased materialism, increasingly becoming apparent.

4.4.3. Gender

The same trends of decreased polarization around the strong value types in favour of mixed and weak value types is demonstrated when the data are disaggregated according to gender. Both the percentage of strong pre-materialists and strong materialists has decreased since 1995, with the portion of weak pre-materialists having remained constant for both males and females. Whilst the percentage of mixed types amongst women remains higher than amongst men, both exhibit a marked increase in respondents classified as mixed and weak materialist types.

Chart 15: Value-type Distribution according to Gender: 1995 and 2001.



4.4.4. Education

The data, when disaggregated according to educational level, illustrates some interesting scenarios. The percentage highly polarized pre-materialist types has decreased in the last five years across all educational levels, with almost no strong pre-materialists amongst University students and graduates in 2001. Except in the instance of those with some university education, be it under- or post-graduate, a decrease in the weak pre-materialists was also evident. It appears highly likely that the conceptual overhaul, of a sound economic framework bringing about greater prosperity- and also the better provision of basic needs, would be most prominent amongst this group.

Chart 16: Value-types Distribution according to Education: 1995





Chart 17: Value-type Distribution according to Education: 2001



As discussed previously, a decrease in the prioritization of one set of values must always be paralleled by an increase in another. By implication the decline in the percentage pre-materialists must reveal an increase in the percentage of the mixed or materialist types. This is in fact demonstrated by an across-the-board increase in mixed types, the only exception being those with no schooling and some University, who have instead revealed a distinct increase in materialists. It is also these highly educated respondents that display an increase, albeit a slight one, in the percentage of strong post-materialists. So far, this has been the only population sub-group that has revealed a higher portion of strongly polarized materialists in 2001 than 1995.

Despite the now much replicated general pattern of decreasing levels of extreme value types in favour of the more middle of the range types, we see some relatively new trends. The one entails the fact that those with the least and those with the most education displaying similar trends, in terms of both showing a decrease in mixed types, paralleled by an increase in weak materialist types. The other is the before mentioned increase in strongly polarized materialists.

4.4.5. Race

The last category of population sub-groups, and the arguably most important one, is that of race. To begin with we will look at the dynamics to have transpired within the black population group. Whilst the strong and weak pre-materialists-, as well as mixed and weak materialist types, have experienced a decrease since 1995, the weak materialist types have displayed an increase over the same period of time. The plausible causes of this increasing coalescing around the weak materialist pole has already been speculated upon in section 4.3, as well as in section 3.1. of the previous chapter, and will therefore not be addressed in great detail. Suffice it to say that it is probably the dual interaction of increasing emphasis being laid on physical security needs, with Africans being the primary victims of crime (Shaw and Gastrow, 2001:243) and the possibility of perfunctory survival needs having been better met.

A slightly divergent pattern is visible in the Coloured groups, who, whilst displaying a slight decrease in strong pre-materialist types, reveal a slight upsurge in all three the weak pre-materialist, mixed and weak materialist types. They also reveal a marked decline in the portion strong materialists. Coloured people therefore seem to be exhibiting this trend of escalating convergence around the middle-of-the-range value types to a far greater extent than Blacks.

Chart 18: Value-type Distribution according to Race: 1995.





Chart 19: Value-type Distribution according to Race: 2001.



A strikingly different trend is visible amongst Indians. The visible decline in weak and strong pre-materialists appears offset by an increase in mixed types. This picture appears replicated once again, by a drop in weak materialists being compensated for by an increase amongst strongly polarized materialists.

The White group, however, portrays a scenario unlike that of any of the other groups, starting with a marginal increase in both the strong and weak pre-materialists. No longer protected by

a favourable Apartheid state and having to content with affirmative action policies, Whites people are increasingly feeling the pinch. Together with the situation of greater integration since 1994 having dispelled some of the ignorance of the poverty stricken situation amongst other, largely non-white, groups, Whites could be more aware of pre-materialist needs of the country as a whole. The largest determinants in terms of the increase in pre-materialists is probably, however, the increasingly experienced threat to white ownership of land and White pre-occupation with the perceived deterioration of the national education system.

This increase in pre-materialists must then be offset by a decrease elsewhere. Despite the much lauded emphasis on security needs amongst the white population, the greater prioritization of the previously mentioned pre-materialist needs outstrips this concern with security, resulting in a situation where a value trade-off reveals a decrease in materialists amongst the white population.

4.4.6. Broad-spectrum Trends

On the whole a process of incrementally more convergent value orientation becomes apparent. Whilst very few isolated groups display an increasing polarization towards the extremes, the majority is increasingly representing middle-of-the-range alternatives, with an ever-increasing portion prioritizing both materialist and pre-materialist values. Further, value change appears to be undergoing a plethora of fluctuations within the various population sub-groups, indicating that the short-term value priorities of most South Africans are in no way crystallized. The implications of this will be addressed in the final chapter.

Chapter 5

Implications and Conclusions

The crucial task of incorporating the diversity of findings into a coherent synopsis, from which to draw conclusions about the direction and magnitude of South Africa's value orientations befalls this final chapter. Not only is this paramount for the facilitation of an enhanced understanding of the country's changing dynamics, but it is also pivotal in making informed forecasts about the future prospects of the country. The first part of the chapter therefore necessitates an examination of the materialist/post-materialist dimension to gain an indication of how South Africans feature in terms of Inglehart's value shift hypothesis. This complete, the fundamental question regarding South Africa's value change can be addressed. The second part of the chapter will concentrate on the implications of South Africa's location, in terms of the materialist/post-materialist continuum, as well as the findings regarding South Africa's value orientation along the more prevalent pre-materialist/materialist continuum, for democratic consolidation and the ambitious nation building project. As part of the aim of this research essay lies in furthering the understanding of value change in developing countries, the appropriateness of this model must also be focused upon, with most of the recommendations for the direction of future research entailing the revision and improvement of this value model.


5.1. Analysis of Change in the Materialist/Post-materialist Dimension

The pre-materialist/materialist dimension having been exhaustively examined in the previous chapter, it is now necessary to institute a speculative analysis of the population located on the materialist/post-materialist spectrum. Section 4.2, in which the population was situated on the original Inglehart materialist/post-materialist dimension, has already demonstrated that a very small portion of South Africans actually prioritizes post-materialist values. It has, subsequently, been concluded that the batteries containing the pre-materialist items represent a better method of tapping underlying value structures, rendering the 18-item model the more pertinent one.

Right from the outset of the analysis of chart 20, it is quite clear that there has only been marginal change in terms of this dimension over the last five years. The orientation of the population along the materialist/post-materialist dimension reveals little change, with only very slight deviations at some points. The only information that can really be gathered from this graph is the massive inequality in the distribution of frequencies, with the percentage of respondents revealing any degree of post-materialist prominence never exceeding 3%. Due to the results of section 4.2, a very even distribution about the median of the data in graph 20

was not expected, but this only serves to reinforce the previously discussed lack of applicability and relevance of the materialist/post-materialist continuum.

Chart 20: Scores on the Materialist/Post-materialist Dimension



As expected, these results then do not concur with Inglehart’s proposed hypothesis of an increasing shift towards post-materialism.⁶⁸ South Africa does not, however, appear to be moving in the opposed direction either, as the greater coalescing around the materialist pole can largely be offset by a decreasing emphasis on pre-materialist values. Hence it would seem that the primary location of value trade-offs appear to be the interface between pre-materialist and materialist values, with post-materialist values simply remaining quite irrelevant.

Table 12: Change in Materialist/Post-materialist Dimension

	1995	2001
Materialists	81.5	83.5
Mixed Types	7.5	5.8
Post-materialists	10.5	10.5

Table 12 aptly demonstrates the fact that there is no overall increase in post-materialism, but that a slight increase in the prioritization of separate materialist items, accompanied by a slight decrease in the prioritization of post-materialist items, resulted in a situation of a 2 % decrease amongst the mixed types. The possible reasons for an increased prioritization of materialist needs have been expanded upon in chapter 4, and will not be addressed again. In terms of the post-materialist values, the Apartheid government having being replaced by a democratic one, could catalyze a subconscious decline in the perceptual importance of certain

⁶⁸ See section 1.5.

post-materialist needs. This move could have brought about the perception that the abolition of repressive Apartheid laws, the inception of an electoral liberal democracy and an exemplary constitution, makes it unnecessary to pre-occupy oneself with a number of the post-materialist items, such as the freedom of speech and more say in important government decisions. With the change in institutional and legal structure, and many protective measures enshrining and guaranteeing many important rights and freedoms, these items may be receiving less attention. Speculation of the possible reasons aside, the value shift hypothesis-entailing a redistribution of values towards increased post-materialism, is definitely not observable in the South African context, with post-materialist values remaining rather marginal in the bigger picture of South Africa's value orientation.

5.2. Are South Africa's Values Changing?

Despite the absence of a shift towards increased post-materialism, South Africa's values appear to be undergoing a slight reorganization along the pre-materialist/materialist dimension. This value movement has, however, not been as large as might have been expected, in light of the massive restructuring that has occurred within the country over the period under review.⁶⁹

Table 13: Change in the Pre-materialist/Materialist Dimension

	<i>1995</i>	<i>2001</i>
Pre-materialists	30.1	24.6
Mixed Types	36.2	40.9
Materialists	33.4	34.3

A superficial observation of the end statistics provided in table 13, could result in deductions that South Africa's values are not undergoing systematic change. Conclusions of such a nature could be arrived at, as the largest visible change entails a decrease in pre-materialists, in conjunction with an approximately equal increase amongst mixed types, denoting a moderation in polarization, and not a 'real' change, with the percentage increase in materialists being a marginal 1.1%. Such an interpretation would, however, not be reflective of the real extent of movement occurring within various sub-groups of the population. Although South Africa's value configuration is displaying an increasing convergence towards mixed types and more moderate value orientations, most of the dynamics of change are manifesting themselves amongst and across various population groups. South Africa's values are therefore undergoing relatively dramatic fluctuations, mainly reflected when the data are disaggregated for the various population sub-groups, despite the end results not always

⁶⁹ See section 1.1.

reflecting this. Overall, there does, however, appear to be a decrease in pre-materialism, with an ever so slight increase in the portion of materialists, with levels of post-materialism remaining unchanged, yet insignificant.

5.3. Democratic Consolidation without Post-materialists?

This scenario, of South Africa not displaying a noticeable increase in the appreciation of post-materialist values, raises the pertinent question of the impact this lack of post-materialists will have upon South Africa's fledgling democracy. Inglehart unpacks the notion of a "specific cultural heritage that may [either] facilitate or retard democracy" (Inglehart, 1997:68), asserting that these favorable 'pre-conditions' for true democratization are most proliferous in states that rank highest on the post-materialist index.⁷⁰ Without a substantial post-materialization of the population, will South Africa be destined to remain a democracy only in name?

To begin any analysis of this nature, it should be noted that South Africa has not reached that point of economic well-being and security at which Inglehart prophesized a nationwide value shift towards increased post-materialism (Abramson and Inglehart, 1995:129). The discussion in section 1.1.2. clearly demonstrated that much of South Africa's population still battles along in abject poverty. The paradox that this scenario propagates is aptly demonstrated in the following quote, which states that: "for the poor, the bottom line is that you cannot eat votes or seek shelter under a constitution" (Blake, 1998:40). Hence, one can conjecture that even if South Africa were to possess a latent cultural structure and value orientation conducive for democratic consolidation, manifestations thereof would not be revealed. This is due to the previously discussed process of value trade-offs occurring in all individuals of a society. In view of other needs, such as those of basic survival and security – both economic and physical, being more prevalent amongst most of the population, South Africans, as a whole, will reveal values that prioritize these at the opportunity cost of post materialist ones. When set against the backdrop of present economic reality, the observable fact of South Africans revealing low levels of post-materialism is then not at all surprising.

The model, however, only really allows for primary value orientations to be revealed. The blatant presence of a specific value orientation, in the South African case a pre-materialist/materialist one, does not, however, automatically preclude the possibility of other values being solidly entrenched within a national mindset. This notion of "a post-materialist not [being] an anti-materialist" (Inglehart, 1997:35), has already been alluded to, and could

⁷⁰ See section 2.1.2.

indicate that, although South Africans do not prioritize post-materialist values above materialist and pre-materialist ones, they do value the fulfillment of post-materialist needs. Inglehart mentions that no needs along Maslow's hierarchy are ever fully satisfied, hence, at any point in time, more than one type of need may be paramount, necessitating the prioritization of these into an order from most to least important. This model does not really allow for the testing of these secondary value orientations, and is therefore somewhat limited in its application.

For this reason the degree to which South Africans also prioritize post-materialist values cannot be determined from the data, and therefore remains unknown. This debate aside, post-materialist values undeniable do not feature prominently in the South African value dimension, a situation that does not bode well for future democratic prospects. The considerable debate regarding the need for a common set of (post-materialist) values, exemplified by the conference held in Cape Town in mid February 2001, entitled "*Saamtrek: Values, Education and Democracy in the 21st Century*," demonstrates that there is recognition of a need, albeit only at the level of the elite. Wilmot James, former UCT deputy vice-chancellor, recommended six values for the basis of a new common destiny, namely "equity, tolerance, multilingualism, accountability, openness and honour" (*The Sunday Independent*, 25 February 2001). Most of these values are underpinned by post-materialist needs and seek to create the situation embodied in most countries that rank highly on the post-materialist index. Although the impact of such an open dialogue about a new value conception for the consolidation of democracy should not be underestimated, this dialog about essentially post-materialist values has not truly manifested itself, in terms of South Africa revealing higher levels of post-materialism. A specific set of values cannot be propagated by prescription, but is naturally fostered over time and will, as Inglehart asserted, in all probability only occur when economic and physical security have been sufficiently maximized.

The process of value change towards greater post-materialism might, however, be promoted and encouraged by measures such as the new inclusive dialogue launched at the conference. One of the outcomes of the conference was the decision that the development of common post-materialist values should be fostered at school level: debates have begun about oaths of allegiance in schools, for instance (Idasa e-politics Newsletter, Issue 32, June 2001). Such a task is, however, fraught with obstacles, as is indicated by the following quote stating that "Many of the tenets of democracy, such as tolerance and respect for other people's rights and liberties are hard to communicate and their practice is accordingly difficult for the large majority of people" (*New Agenda* Editorial, 2001:5). If such a dialogue, and the concomitant practical measures, however, proves to facilitate an increased awareness of- and respect for-

post-materialist values, the consolidation of democracy appears more probable, as “our democracy is young and in the process of being developed. Inculcating the values of fairness, equity and tolerance would clearly be an asset for future generations of leaders” (*New Agenda* Editorial, 2001:5).

5.4. Value Clashes the Political Conflict of the Future?

Although the absence of post-materialist values does appear to undermine the promise for democratic consolidation somewhat, the recent birth of a dialogue to promote such values does enhance prospects somewhat. The next section needs to address the question whether the project of democratic consolidation is also undermined by new polarized divisions, with the political conflict of the future being one between groups of uncompromising value types. Inglehart (1977:147) speaks of the difficult situation of attempting to fulfill two different sets of needs simultaneously. More often than not the exact set of circumstances that fulfill the needs of one group are those that renders another lacking.

Whilst some of the conflict in much of the industrialized world can be located between materialists and post-materialists.⁷¹ In South Africa the interface between pre-materialist and materialist needs would be the most probable setting for a values conflict. If conflict were to occur it would take the form of pitting pre-materialist against materialist needs. The debate, in which the RDP is set in opposition to GEAR, partially reflects some aspects of this conflict. In 1996, Zwelinzima Vavi, then Assistant General Secretary of Cosatu, claimed that GEAR can not “in any way help the poor, the working people and those who have been looking at the RDP to deliver social needs like houses, electricity, water, roads and infrastructure” (*Citizen*, 23 July 1996). There thus seems to be some conflict between these needs, and government policy in addressing it, with “the government, caught between the realities of global economics and its commitment to social reconstruction, dancing a delicate minuet, first with one and then the other” (*The Sunday Independent*, 28 July 1996).

The heightened value conflict, however, appears to be reflected to a much greater degree amongst elites and in policy debate, with the data largely indicating an increasing convergence of values amongst ordinary citizens. Regardless whether the aggregate data or the data disaggregated by race, class, income, gender or education, is examined, South Africans display a general trend towards simultaneously prioritizing both materialist and pre-materialist needs, with the largest percentage of respondents (40.9%) being classified as mixed types in 2001. This phenomenon could indicate that South Africans are increasingly

⁷¹ See section 2.1.2.

changing their perceptions towards the idea that pre-materialist and materialist values can work together in a type of symbiotic relationship. Without the fulfillment of basic survival needs, economic and physical security cannot be ensured, and without such sustained security, basic survival is not guaranteed.

This increasing congruence of value orientations not only renders the possibility of the next conflict being one of pre-materialists in opposition to materialists, highly unlikely, but also could provide positive reinforcement for the process of nation building. The Centre for Development and Enterprise (CDE) has released a publication, emphasizing the needs for common goals that all can strive for. The report claims that South Africa has “neither the skills nor the capital to achieve all our economic and developmental goals if we attempt to reach them all simultaneously” (*The Mail & Guardian*, 11 May 2001). At present the government has to stretch its resources to fulfill the large number of priorities it has set itself, and the report recommends more intense focus on fewer, but far-reaching priority issues. The greater congruence in value priorities facilitates the formulation of such an improved and more effective policy to address the needs of the country. The interaction of these two scenarios results in a decreasing likelihood of the conflict of the future being one between citizens with inflexible value orientations.

5.5. The Appropriateness of the Three-Index Model

Without the introduction of the pre-materialist index, these inferences about the population and its future democratic prospects could not have been drawn. The original materialist-post-materialist dimension proved highly inappropriate in tapping South Africa’s true value orientations. The inclusion of pre-materialist items in two successive waves of the South African WVS, proved to be a crucial element in attaining a true portrayal of South Africa’s value orientations. The pre-materialist index appears to go some distance towards making this model more applicable for this specific developing country. The drawing of any decisive conclusions, regarding the universally greater appropriateness of this model, would have to be preceded with applications to the data of other African, developing and even industrialized nations.

5.6. Future Research

The fact that value research, in conjunction with empirical quantitative data analysis, is still somewhat of a rarity amongst much of the developing world, implies that much still needs to be done. The direction of future research can broadly be classified into two categories. The first direction, in which future research could be aimed, would entail extending the application of this model to include other African, Developing and even First World

countries. By comparing results cross-nationally and over time, a more universal typology of value orientation, and the shifts inherent therein, could be constructed. All of this could eventually be amalgamated with the previously conducted research in the field, allowing for an enhanced and more accurate understanding of universal, national and sub-national value change.

The other side of the coin would entail heading towards increased emphasis on South Africa, with this research essay having contributed towards opening a space for greater dialogue surrounding the dynamics of the country's value orientations. There are many aspects that need to be addressed, amongst them the debate regarding values and public policy, previously alluded to, whilst another possibility entails delving into an investigation of value priorities and electoral behaviour. A more explicit focus on the South Africa-specific pre-conditions for a shift towards post-materialism, combined with an analysis of the applicability of the *socialization* and *scarcity* hypotheses, could present another alternative. The statistical findings of this research essay provides an opportunity for a more detailed analysis of some of the more complex and interesting trends within various population sub-groups, or even a more in-depth cross-group examination of value shifts. There is thus no lack of potential channels for future research.

5.7. Conclusion

In conclusion one can assert that the expansive external political, social and economic changes to have transpired since 1990 and 1995, have brought about internal fluidity in the value dimension of South Africa as a whole, as well as for the various population sub-groups individually. Whilst the value shift hypothesis promulgated by Inglehart appears largely unconcurred, an overall trend away from pre-materialism towards increased mixed type value priorities, with an ever so slight increase in materialists, has become evident. It is clear that the predication made by Rescher (1969:118) at the outset of this research essay, claiming that the "change in the operational sphere- in the whole range of social, cultural, demographic, economic, and technological factors that comprise the way of life in that society- has enormous repercussions for values- providing tremendous opportunities for the enhancement of some of our traditional ideals and aspirations, and great threats to the realization of other," is validated. The task of determining whether South Africa's value priorities are changing, has been undertaken with relative success. In the process of conducting these analyses, this research essay has also begun to situate a global, but still largely Western theory, in a South African and developing world context, denoting a small step towards expanding knowledge regarding the direction, degree and nature of the dynamics of value priorities.

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Appendix 1

*Copy of 2001 WVS data syntax file.

*Here I recode into new variables to make each one a separate item (2 index model).

RECODE

v120

(1=2) (2 thru 4=0) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO v120_1 .

EXECUTE .

RECODE

V120

(1=0) (2=2) (3=0) (4=0) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO V120_2.

EXECUTE.

RECODE

V120

(1=0) (2=0) (3=2) (4=0) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO V120_3.

EXECUTE.

RECODE

V120

(1=0) (2=0) (3=0) (4=2) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO V120_4.

EXECUTE.

RECODE

v121

(1=1) (2=0) (3=0) (4=0) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO v121_1 .

EXECUTE .

RECODE

V121

(1=0) (2=1) (3=0) (4=0) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO V121_2.

EXECUTE.

RECODE

V121

(1=0) (2=0) (3=1) (4=0) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO V121_3.

EXECUTE.

RECODE

V121

(1=0) (2=0) (3=0) (4=1) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO V121_4.

EXECUTE.

*Here I recode into new variables to make each one a separate item.

RECODE

v122

(1=2) (2 thru 4=0) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO v122_1 .

EXECUTE .

RECODE

V122

(1=0) (2=2) (3=0) (4=0) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO V122_2.

EXECUTE.

RECODE

V122

(1=0) (2=0) (3=2) (4=0) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO V122_3.

EXECUTE.

RECODE

V122

(1=0) (2=0) (3=0) (4=2) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO V122_4.

EXECUTE.


```
RECODE
  v123
  (1=1) (2=0) (3=0) (4=0) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO v123_1 .
EXECUTE .
RECODE
V123
(1=0) (2=1) (3=0) (4=0) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO V123_2.
EXECUTE.
RECODE
V123
(1=0) (2=0) (3=1) (4=0) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO V123_3.
EXECUTE.
RECODE
V123
(1=0) (2=0) (3=0) (4=1) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO V123_4.
EXECUTE.
```

*Here I recode into new variables to make each one a separate item.

```
RECODE
  v124
  (1=2) (2 thru 4=0) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO v124_1 .
EXECUTE .
RECODE
V124
(1=0) (2=2) (3=0) (4=0) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO V124_2.
EXECUTE.
RECODE
V124
(1=0) (2=0) (3=2) (4=0) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO V124_3.
EXECUTE.
RECODE
V124
(1=0) (2=0) (3=0) (4=2) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO V124_4.
EXECUTE.
```

```
RECODE
  v125
  (1=1) (2=0) (3=0) (4=0) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO v125_1 .
EXECUTE .
RECODE
V125
(1=0) (2=1) (3=0) (4=0) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO V125_2.
EXECUTE.
RECODE
V125
(1=0) (2=0) (3=1) (4=0) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO V125_3.
EXECUTE.
RECODE
V125
(1=0) (2=0) (3=0) (4=1) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO V125_4.
EXECUTE.
```

*Next I computed the variables, to create 12 items that looked like this:

0=not selected

1=selected as second option

2=selected as first option

some missing values, but they are less than 15%.

*Here are the results using the original 12 item index.

FACTOR

```
/VARIABLES groweco forcedef say@job beauty nationor say@gov inflatio  
speefree ecostab morehum ideascou crimefi /MISSING LISTWISE /ANALYSIS  
groweco forcedef say@job beauty nationor say@gov inflatio speefree ecostab  
morehum ideascou crimefi  
/PRINT INITIAL EXTRACTION ROTATION  
/FORMAT SORT BLANK(.10)  
/CRITERIA FACTORS(1) ITERATE(25)  
/EXTRACTION PC  
/CRITERIA ITERATE(25)  
/ROTATION VARIMAX  
/METHOD=CORRELATION .
```

*Here are the results using the original 12 item index asking for two factors.

FACTOR

```
/VARIABLES groweco forcedef say@job beauty nationor say@gov inflatio  
speefree ecostab morehum ideascou crimefi /MISSING LISTWISE /ANALYSIS  
groweco forcedef say@job beauty nationor say@gov inflatio speefree ecostab  
morehum ideascou crimefi  
/PRINT INITIAL EXTRACTION ROTATION  
/FORMAT SORT BLANK(.10)  
/CRITERIA FACTORS(2) ITERATE(25)  
/EXTRACTION PC  
/CRITERIA ITERATE(25)  
/ROTATION VARIMAX  
/METHOD=CORRELATION .
```

*Here is the 18 item factor analysis.

FACTOR

```
/VARIABLES shelter speech price water saygov laword clothes citypret  
ecogrow school saywork defense land ideas crime food society employm  
/MISSING LISTWISE /ANALYSIS shelter speech price water saygov laword clothes  
citypret ecogrow school saywork defense land ideas crime food society  
employm  
/PRINT INITIAL EXTRACTION ROTATION  
/FORMAT SORT BLANK(.10)  
/CRITERIA FACTORS(3) ITERATE(25)  
/EXTRACTION PC  
/CRITERIA ITERATE(25)  
/ROTATION VARIMAX  
/METHOD=CORRELATION .
```

*Results correspond more with the 1995 results when both are unweighted.

*Unweighted results were used in the thesis.

FACTOR

```
/VARIABLES shelter speech price water saygov laword clothes citypret  
ecogrow school saywork defense land ideas crime food society employm  
/MISSING LISTWISE /ANALYSIS shelter speech price water saygov laword clothes  
citypret ecogrow school saywork defense land ideas crime food society  
employm  
/PRINT INITIAL EXTRACTION ROTATION  
/FORMAT SORT BLANK(.10)  
/CRITERIA FACTORS(2) ITERATE(25)
```

```
/EXTRACTION PC
/CRITERIA ITERATE(25)
/ROTATION VARIMAX
/METHOD=CORRELATION .
```

*Dealing with the 2-index model.

*Now that we have the scores, with 0 being minimum and 9 maximum, we need to convert this to a new scale ranging from 0 to 10, or something

*Computing the indexes

```
COMPUTE material = groweco + forcedef + nationor + inflatio + ecostab +
  crimefi .
```

```
EXECUTE .
```

*This leaves us with a scale of 0-9, which we need to change to one from 0-10.

```
COMPUTE mscale =(material * 1.1111111111111111).
```

```
EXECUTE .
```

*Now we need to get rid of the decimal places.

```
RECODE
```

```
  mscale
```

```
  (Lowest thru .4=0) (.5 thru 1.4=1) (1.5 thru 2.4=2) (2.5 thru 3.4=3)
```

```
  (3.5 thru 4.49=4) (4.5 thru 5.49=5) (5.5 thru 6.4=6) (6.5 thru 7.4=7) (7.5
  thru 8.4=8) (8.5 thru 9.4=9) (9.5 thru Highest=10) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO
  mscale2 .
```

```
EXECUTE .
```

```
COMPUTE postmate = say@job + beauty + say@gov + speefree + morehum + ideascou
```

```
EXECUTE .
```

*This leaves us with a scale of 0-9, which we need to change to one from 0-10.

```
COMPUTE pscale =(postmate * 1.1111111111111111).
```

```
EXECUTE .
```

*Now we need to get rid of the decimal places.

```
RECODE
```

```
  pscale
```

```
  (Lowest thru .4=0) (.5 thru 1.4=1) (1.5 thru 2.4=2) (2.5 thru 3.4=3)
```

```
  (3.5 thru 4.49=4) (4.5 thru 5.49=5) (5.5 thru 6.4=6) (6.5 thru 7.4=7) (7.5
  thru 8.4=8) (8.5 thru 9.4=9) (9.5 thru Highest=10) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO
  pscale2 .
```

```
EXECUTE .
```

*Now we want to make a dimension ranging from the materialist to the post-materialist.

```
COMPUTE bigscale = (mscale2 * - 1)+(pscale2 * 1) .
```

```
EXECUTE .
```

*Dealing with the 3-index model.

*We need to make the three indexes.

```
COMPUTE pre1 = shelter + water + clothes + school + land + food .
```

```
EXECUTE .
```

```
COMPUTE mat1 = price + laword + ecogrow + defense + crime + employm .
```

```
EXECUTE .
```

```
COMPUTE post1 = speech + saygov + citypret + saywork + ideas + society .
```

```
EXECUTE .
```

*Now that we have the scores, with 0 being minimum and 9 maximum, we need to convert this to a new scale ranging from 0 to 10, or something

*This leaves us with a scale of 0-9, which we need to change to one from 0-10.

```
COMPUTE m3scale =(mat1 * 1.1111111111111).
```

```
EXECUTE .
```

*Now we need to get rid of the decimal places.

```
RECODE
```

```
  m3scale
```

```
  (Lowest thru .4=0) (.5 thru 1.4=1) (1.5 thru 2.4=2) (2.5 thru 3.4=3)
```

```
  (3.5 thru 4.49=4) (4.5 thru 5.49=5) (5.5 thru 6.4=6) (6.5 thru 7.4=7) (7.5
```

```
  thru 8.4=8) (8.5 thru 9.4=9) (9.5 thru Highest=10) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO
```

```
  mscale3 .
```

```
EXECUTE .
```

*This leaves us with a scale of 0-9, which we need to change to one from 0-10.

```
COMPUTE p3scale =(post1 * 1.1111111111111).
```

```
EXECUTE .
```

*Now we need to get rid of the decimal places.

```
RECODE
```

```
  p3scale
```

```
  (Lowest thru .4=0) (.5 thru 1.4=1) (1.5 thru 2.4=2) (2.5 thru 3.4=3)
```

```
  (3.5 thru 4.49=4) (4.5 thru 5.49=5) (5.5 thru 6.4=6) (6.5 thru 7.4=7) (7.5
```

```
  thru 8.4=8) (8.5 thru 9.4=9) (9.5 thru Highest=10) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO
```

```
  pscale3 .
```

```
EXECUTE .
```

*This leaves us with a scale of 0-9, which we need to change to one from 0-10.

```
COMPUTE pr3scale =(pre1 * 1.1111111111111).
```

```
EXECUTE .
```

*Now we need to get rid of the decimal places.

```
RECODE
```

```
  pr3scale
```

```
  (Lowest thru .4=0) (.5 thru 1.4=1) (1.5 thru 2.4=2) (2.5 thru 3.4=3)
```

```
  (3.5 thru 4.49=4) (4.5 thru 5.49=5) (5.5 thru 6.4=6) (6.5 thru 7.4=7) (7.5
```

```
  thru 8.4=8) (8.5 thru 9.4=9) (9.5 thru Highest=10) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO
```

```
  prscale3 .
```

```
EXECUTE .
```

*Now we want to make a dimension ranging from the pre-materialist to the materialist.

```
COMPUTE Pre_mat3 = (prscale3 * - 1)+(mscale3 * 1) .
```

```
EXECUTE .
```

*Also one dimension ranging from the materialist to the post-materialist.

```
COMPUTE Mat_pos3 = (mscale3 * - 1)+(pscale3 * 1) .
```

```
EXECUTE .
```

Appendix 2

Factor Loadings of Principal Components Analysis obtained by Iglehart.

	<i>1990</i>
Maintaining Law and Order	-0.54
A stable Economy	-0.72
A High level of Economic Growth	-0.64
Fighting Rising Prices	-0.11
Strong Defence Forces	-0.08
Fight against Crime	0.01
More say in Government decisions	0.52
More say at their Jobs and Communities	0.56
Keeping the Countryside Beautiful	0.24
A Society where Ideas count more	0.50
A more humane and less impersonal society	0.36
Protecting Freedom of Speech	0.23

Source: (Abramson and Inglehart, 1995:108)


Factor Loadings of Principal Components Analysis obtained by Taylor.

	<i>1990</i>
Maintaining Law and Order	-0.46
A stable Economy	-0.43
A High level of Economic Growth	-0.53
Fighting Rising Prices	-0.18
Strong Defence Forces	-0.09
Fight against Crime	-0.21
More say in Government decisions	0.40
More say at their Jobs and Communities	0.36
Keeping the Countryside Beautiful	0.42
A Society where Ideas count more	0.43
A more humane and less impersonal society	0.36
Protecting Freedom of Speech	0.40


Source: (Taylor, 1998:87)

Appendix 3: Crosstabulations of Priorities by Race for Battery 1


Providing Shelter




Protecting Free Speech




Fighting Inflation




Providing Water



More Say over Government




Maintaining Law and Order




Appendix 4: Crosstabulations of Priorities by Race for Battery 2


Provide Clothing




Keeping Countryside beautiful




Economic Growth




Education



More say at Work




Strong Defence Force




Appendix 5: Crosstabulations of Priorities by Race for Battery 3


Provide Land




Making Ideas count more




Fighting Crime




Providing Food









Making society less Impersonal









Employment



Appendix 6: Crosstabulations of Priorities by Income for Battery 1



Appendix 7: Crosstabulations of Priorities by Income for Battery 2



Appendix 8: Crosstabulations of Priorities by Income for Battery 3

