


Games of Truth in the age of Transparency: International Organisations and the Construction of Corruption

by

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Thesis presented in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts (Philosophy) in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at Stellenbosch University



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March 2017

DECLARATION

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Abstract

The objective in this thesis is to analyse the role that the anti-corruption industry plays in international governance and in the administration of states. The anti-corruption industry has expanded at a very rapid rate since its inception in the mid-1990s. Despite the growth of the industry, anti-corruption reforms have failed to make progress in the alleviation of corruption. This failure to address the widespread prevalence of corruption has not deterred the expansion of the industry. On the contrary, failure in the alleviation of corruption has served only to incite its vigour and vitality. There is very little understanding of what the anti-corruption industry is and what its actual global impact has been. For this reason, it is very important to come to grips with the underlying motivating factors that drives the expansion of the industry, as well as the totalising nature of its discourse. Therefore my aim in this thesis is to create a better understanding of the fight against corruption as an international governmental practice. This entails unpacking its discourses and practices and the role that international organisations have played in bringing the industry to life and driving its global proliferation. I make use of Foucault's method of genealogy to trace the development of anti-corruption discourse since the 1950s. Additionally, Foucault's concepts of governmentality, disciplinary power, normalisation and the three modes of objectification are used to analyse the industry. Utilising Foucault's work presents a clear picture of how knowledge and truth are constructed for the purposes of achieving governmental, political and ideological objectives. The argument is made that International organisations and western actors have fostered into existence a totalising form of discourse which is part of an endeavour to clarify the complexities of the international political economy, as well as part of a strategy to mitigate the risks that are presented by unpredictable and 'abnormal' states, societies and cultures. This indicates that the failure of the industry to address the prevalence of corruption is not due to a lack of support or resources. On the contrary, the industry has not failed at its objective, because fighting corruption is not its primary purpose. The industry is driven, legitimised and globally propagated with the objective of displacing and transposing divergent governmental structures, institutions, policies, and practices of states and societies that operate contrary to international norms. As such, anti-corruption has become an endeavour to instil a normative framework of governance globally; a framework through which alternative modes of governance, different ethical codes, morals and societal values are characterised as abnormal and thereby delegitimised and displaced.

Opsomming

Hierdie tesis het ten doel om 'n analise te doen ten opsigte van die rol wat die teenkorrupsie-bedryf speel in internasionale bestuur en staats-administrasie. Die teenkorrupsie-bedryf het 'n tydperk van baie vinnige uitbreiding en ontwikkeling ervaar sedert dit in die middel-1990s as 'n bedryf ontstaan het. Ten spyte van hierdie bedryfsgroei het teenkorrupsie-regstellings nie voldoende vooruitgang in die vermindering van korrupsie getoon nie. Die mislukking om die omvattende voorkoms van korrupsie te beperk, het egter nie die ontwikkeling en uitbreiding van die bedryf benadeel nie. Dit het intendeel tot gevolg gehad dat daar met groter ywer en doelgerigtheid gepoog word om meer sukses te behaal. Daar bestaan 'n beperkte begrip ten opsigte van die teenkorrupsie-bedryf en die globale impak wat dit tot dusver gehad het. Dit is dus noodsaaklik om insig te verkry in die onderliggende faktore wat as motivering dien tot die ontwikkeling en uitbreiding van die bedryf. Ek het dus met hierdie tesis gepoog om 'n beter begrip te verkry ten opsigte van korrupsie as internasionale bestuurspraktyk. Hierdie navorsing behels die ontleding van die diskoerse en praktyke asook die rol wat internasionale organisasies gespeel het om die teenkorrupsie-bedryf tot stand te bring en aanleiding te gee tot die vinnige globale groei. Ek gebruik Foucault se genealogiese metode om die bedryfsontwikkeling van teenkorrupsie-aktiwiteit sedert die 1950s na te spoor. Tesame hiermee is gebruik gemaak van die konsepte beheerbaarheid (governmentality), dissiplinêre mag (disciplinary power), normalisering (normalisation) en die drie vorme van objektifikasie soos gedefinieer deur Foucault. Deur gebruik te maak van Foucault se navorsing en metodes kan 'n duidelike beeld verkry word van hoe kennis en waarheid gekonstrueer word met die doel om regerings-, politiese en ideologiese mikpunte te bereik. Internasionale organisasies en westerse betrokkenes het 'n allesomvattende vorm van diskoers en praktyk ontwikkel waardeur meer duidelikheid verkry kan word ten opsigte van die kompleksiteite van die internasionale politieke ekonomie. Dit vorm ook deel van 'n strategie om die risiko's en gevolge van onvoorspelbare en 'abnormale' state, gemeenskappe en kulture te versag en verminder. Die rede waarom die teenkorrupsie-bedryf voortdurend verder uitbrei en ontwikkel ten spyte van die teleurstellende resultate is dus nie omdat die studieveld misluk het om voldoende ondersteuning te verkry of omdat dit so 'n besonder skadelike onderwerp is nie. Daar moet kennis van geneem word dat die vermindering van korrupsie nie die primêre doelwit is nie, maar dat die teenkorrupsie-bedryf voortdurend ontwikkel, geregverdig en globaal uitgedra word met die doel om uiteenlopende regerings-strukture, instellings, beleide, etiese waardes en praktyke van regerings en gemeenskappe te omvorm en te normaliseer.

volgens algemeen aanvaarde riglyne. As sulks het die teenkorrupsie-bedryf 'n onderneming geword waardeur gepoog word om ontslae te raak van gebruike wat in konflik is met internasionale norme en praktyke.

Acknowledgements

Firstly, I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr Minka Woermann, for your patience and constructive feedback. I would also like to thank the Kocks Foundation for the generous financial support. Thank you to my parents for proof reading and assisting with the Afrikaans abstract. Finally, thank you to my wife, Mandi. Without your support and motivation I would have never been able to finish this thesis.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Corruption has emerged as one of the primary problems that the contemporary world is faced with. There is scarcely any government that has not implemented one form of anti-corruption reform or another. There are countless organisations, institutions, civil society groups, academics, religious groups and private sector actors involved in studying corruption and fighting its prevalence. However, the fervour that currently surrounds the fight against corruption has not been around for a very long time. The origins of the international anti-corruption movement can be traced back to the mid-1990s, when a wave of anti-corruption discourse swept over the international political scene. As the decade progressed, anti-corruption consultancies sprang up, anti-corruption initiatives were implemented, anti-corruption university courses were established, and perhaps most importantly, international organisations gained interest in corruption and its alleviation.

Three organisations that played an integral role in bringing the international anti-corruption movement to life are the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Transparency International. Since the entry of these organisations into the field, anti-corruption has grown into a global industry with millions of dollars in project funds and countless programmes and initiatives aimed at fighting the worldwide prevalence of corruption. In recent years, the United Nations has also started to play a significant role through its global convention against corruption. However, despite the increased international interest in corruption and despite a substantial increase in investment in the field, anti-corruption reforms have failed to make significant progress in the alleviation of corruption. This failure to address the widespread prevalence of corruption has not deterred the expansion of the industry. On the contrary, failure in the alleviation of corruption has served only to incite its vigour and vitality.

In this thesis, I endeavour to conduct a Foucauldian analysis of the anti-corruption industry by examining the discourse and practices that stem from the World Bank, Transparency International, the IMF, and the United Nations. The institutionalisation of the fight against corruption has had a significant impact on the development of the industry as a whole. Foucault's notions of disciplinary power, governmentality and objectification provide one with an excellent framework for uncovering the strategies of power and knowledge that pervade the contemporary fight against corruption. In linking these concepts to the anti-corruption industry, the goal in this thesis is to shed light on the construction of the concept

of corruption and to clarify the role that the industry plays in the realm of international governance and in the administration of states.

This chapter has five main sections. Section 1.1 is centred on the eruption of corruption discourse that occurred during the 1990s and the role played by international organisations in this eruption. In section 1.2, the difficulty that the industry has encountered in the alleviation of corruption is discussed. Section 1.3 centres on the most prominent criticisms that have been levelled against the anti-corruption industry. Section 1.4 is centred on the methodological framework that will be applied in the analysis of the anti-corruption industry and in section 1.5 an overview of the rest of the thesis is provided.

1.1) International Organisations and the emergence of the Anti-corruption

Industry

Corruption is a historically prevalent phenomenon. It is discussed in the 2,400 year old Indian text, *The Arthashastra*, where an advisor to the Indian king states that: “Just as it is impossible not to taste honey or poison that one may find at the tip of one’s tongue, so it is impossible for a government servant not to eat up at least a bit of the King’s revenue” (Farrales, 2005: 4). Corruption was, of course, not only a problem for ancient India. The democracy of ancient Athens was not spared from widespread corruption (4). Similarly, ancient Rome struggled with pervasive corruption. Some historians even contend that corruption was one of the reasons for the collapse of the Roman Empire (MacMullen, 1988). In its different forms and manifestations, corruption has plagued different societies and different cultures throughout history (Farrales, 2005: 5).

Even though it is reported that corruption has been a persistent problem throughout history, it was only in recent times that it became a problem of international concern. In the early 1990s there was a veritable explosion in discourse centred on corruption. Moisés Naím (1995: 1) called this the “corruption eruption.” As the decade progressed, a wave of public dialogue about corruption swept over the international scene. For example, the number of articles in the *Financial Times* and *Economist* mentioning corruption increased from an average of 229 per year from 1982-1987 to a total of 1,246 in 1995 alone (Glynn, Kobrin & Naím, 1997: 21). According to Glynn *et al.* (1997: 7), the “... world-wide backlash against corruption swept like a firestorm across the global political landscape.” In the space of a decade, the topic

catapulted from the fringes of policy and academic discourse to become one of the primary problems that the developing world is faced with (Bukovansky, 2006: 181).

One key factor that allowed for this eruption in discourse was the end of the Cold War. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, post-communist states opened up and underwent a process of economic liberation, privatisation and democratisation that revealed the corruption that was prevalent during soviet rule, but also provided new opportunities for corruption (Glynn, *et al.*, 1997: 10; Kuris, 2012: 1). According to Glynn *et al.* (1997: 8), the wave of liberalisation that ensued exposed the widespread corruption that was previously hidden from view. Additionally, the establishment of free and active media stimulated public discourse about corruption (Tanzi, 1998: 4). Before the end of the Cold War, there was a tendency by the major international powers to ignore the abuses of the countries that supported them ideologically (4). Once the Cold War ended, however, western nations and donor organisations became more critical of abuses in recipient countries (4). The international community now started to level criticisms at states for issues that were not considered as major problems during the Cold War era (Theobald, 1999: 498).

The end of the Cold War played an important role in turning the global attention toward corruption, but the anti-corruption industry only began to take shape when international organisations became involved. One key role player in this regard is Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO), Transparency International (Sampson, 2010: 274, 275). Through its Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), the organisation established the first statistical instrument with which the global levels of corruption could be measured (De Maria, 2008: 185). The CPI was the first uniform international scale which allowed for the comparison of different levels of corruption in different countries (Galtung, 2006: 108). This stimulated international dialogue concerning the global ramifications of corruption and generated immense competition in the developing world to clamp down on corruption and to improve performance on the index (106-108).

It was, however, only when the World Bank became involved that the international agenda against corruption began to take form (Wanless, 2013: 39). In 1996, at the annual meeting between the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, James Wolfensohn, who was president of the World Bank at the time, placed corruption firmly on the global agenda (39). In his landmark speech, he labelled corruption as a global ‘cancer’ with wide ranging implications for economic growth and development (De Speville, 2010: 49).

Prior to 1996, the World Bank was hesitant to address corruption directly. The Bank is governed by a non-political mandate, which has, up until 1996, precluded the Bank's involvement in anti-corruption (Marquette, 2004: 414). Corruption was seen as a political problem, and therefore the World Bank explicitly avoided addressing it directly (Polzer, 2001: 10). However, after 1996, World Bank discourse underwent a dramatic turnaround and corruption was re-characterised as an issue primarily related to economic development (De Speville, 2010: 49). This change in conception allowed the Bank to openly pursue global governance reform on the back of the fight against corruption without contravening its non-political mandate (Marquette, 2004: 213).

As the World Bank entered into the field, it was followed by a multitude of international organisations, business organisations, regional institutions and non-governmental organisations (Bukovansky, 2006: 185). The World Bank introduced a large team of economists and political scientists into the field and had the capacity to fund and implement wide ranging anti-corruption programmes (De Speville, 2010: 50). The drive to fight corruption quickly transformed into: "... a burgeoning industry with hundreds of millions of dollars in project funds, hundreds of anti-corruption professionals and a continuing stream of reports, indicators, conferences, action plans, conventions and evaluations" (Sampson, 2010: 271). Since its entry into the field, the World Bank has spent approximately US\$ 10 million annually on corruption sanctions and investigations (Wanless, 2013: 39). Its investigative department has launched more than 600 anti-corruption programmes and has implemented governance reforms in more than 100 countries worldwide (39). Countries as diverse as Argentina, Uganda, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Guinea, Malaysia and Ecuador have established the models of anti-corruption reform as promoted by the international community (Heilbrunn, 2004: 10; Meagher, 2007: 74).

However, despite the increased investment in anti-corruption and despite the immense international drive to fight corruption, there has only been limited success in the alleviation of corruption. The anti-corruption industry suffers from one fundamental problem, which is the problem of impact (Sampson, 2010: 264).

1.2) The trials and tribulations of the fight against corruption

Anti-corruption reforms have largely failed to have a substantial impact on the prevalence of corruption. The World Bank recently admitted that: "Some countries have improved, but others have deteriorated, and the world on average has not made sufficient progress on

governance and corruption control” (De Speville, 2010: 52). In the Transparency International *Anti-corruption Source Book* it is stated that: “Successful anti-corruption reform efforts have been all too rare, and the failures numerous” (Pope, 2000: xx). According to Mutebi (2008), there is increasing evidence that anti-corruption programmes and policies often fail miserably. Persson, Rothstein and Teorell (2013: 450) echoes this position and state that many countries remain immersed in pervasive corruption, despite the implementation of countless anti-corruption programmes and initiatives.

There are only a handful of instances where anti-corruption reforms have had a significant impact on the prevalence of corruption. The Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) and the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) from Singapore are considered to be the best examples of successfully implemented anti-corruption commissions (Heilbrunn, 2004: 3-5). During the late 1990s and early 2000s hundreds of anti-corruption commissions modelled on these two examples sprang up around the world (Kuris, 2012: 2, 3; Meagher, 2007: 73, 74). The World Bank was especially adamant in its promotion of the multifunctional approach of ICAC (Kuris, 2012: 3).

It has, however, proven difficult to replicate ICAC and CPIB successfully and sustainably (1). The majority of anti-corruption commissions have either become irrelevant or have been closed down (3). Many anti-corruption reforms have become “... entangled in the very corrupt networks that they were meant to fight” (Persson, *et al.*, 2013: 454). For example, some anti-corruption commissions have been co-opted by political elites and are used to undermine political rivals, thereby only worsening the problem of corruption (Heilbrunn, 2004: 1). According to Heilbrunn (2), the implementation of anti-corruption commissions has had a: “... dismal record of effectiveness.”

Despite these numerous setbacks, the growth of the anti-corruption industry has shown no signs of dissipating. On the contrary, the failure of anti-corruption reform seems to have only incited its expansion (Sampson, 2010: 262). Michael and Bowser (2009: 5) estimate that the number of practitioners involved in the anti-corruption industry ballooned from approximately 250 in the 1990s to approximately 27,000 by 2009. The total value of goods and services procured by donor organisations for anti-corruption projects is estimated to have increased from US\$ 100 million in 2003 to almost US\$ 5 billion in 2009 (1). The United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), which was launched in 2006, already has more than 140 countries as signatories (UNODC, 2014b).

At this point, one is confronted with various puzzling questions. If corruption has been a persistent problem throughout history, why has a global response only emerged in the past twenty years? Why was there this frenetic incitement around anti-corruption discourse in the mid-1990s? Why were international organisations suddenly so interested in fighting corruption? Why have anti-corruption reforms been so ineffective in clamping down on corruption and, importantly, why does the industry continue to expand at such a rapid rate despite its reported failures?

There are no simple answers to these questions. Therefore, in this thesis I endeavour to problematise the fight against corruption and the involvement of international organisations in this fight. This thesis constitutes an investigation into the role played by international organisations in facilitating the emergence of the anti-corruption industry and the continued role these organisations play in its global legitimisation and expansion. The main goal is to investigate the increased institutionalisation of the fight against corruption that has occurred over the past twenty years, and in so doing, shed light on the role that the anti-corruption industry plays in international governance and in the administration of states. The next section discusses some of the most prominent criticisms that have been levelled against the anti-corruption industry and elaborates on how Foucault's work is relevant for a critical analysis of the anti-corruption industry.

1.3) Prominent criticisms

The lack of success in the alleviation of corruption has spawned numerous criticisms of the anti-corruption industry. The majority of these critiques argue that the anti-corruption industry is too involved in the promotion of western neoliberal ideals and thereby the multidimensional nature of corruption as it manifests in local contexts is ignored. For example, Bukovansky (2006: 181) argues that anti-corruption discourse has an irreducibly normative character, which is in tension with the rational, economic-centric discourse that emanates from international organisations. In the same vein, Brown and Cloke (2004: 289) argue that the international fight against corruption is constrained by the fact that insufficient recognition is awarded to the varieties of political and cultural contexts from within which corruption emerges. Similarly, De Maria (2010: 117) contends that corruption stems from deep seated cultural and societal factors; factors that are impervious to the western, supposedly universal, scientific anti-corruption remedies.

Other criticisms focus specifically on the concept of corruption and how it has been misunderstood and misused by the international community. According to Persson, *et al.* (2010: 450), the international community has characterised corruption in Africa as a principal-agent problem. The authors contend that, in certain situations, corruption takes on a systemic character which is resistant to anti-corruption measures centred on the principal-agent framework (450). Bratsis (2003) also focuses on the concept of corruption. For Bratsis (2003), corruption has become a constructed concept in modern society. The contemporary conception is used as a tool to legitimise the distinction between the public sphere and the private sphere, and to promote the notion that all societies are governed by this divide (Bratsis, 2003).

Some critics focus specifically on the major organisations involved in the industry. For example, Gebel (2012: 109) argues that Transparency International defines human nature as rational and self-interested. Gebel (2012) contends that Transparency International will only be more effective in its anti-corruption efforts when this conception of human nature is adapted to incorporate social and moral aspects of human behaviour. Polzer (2001) employs a Foucauldian approach to analyse World Bank discourse. She finds that the World Bank disregards the political implications of its own anti-corruption efforts and therefore only promotes economically-centred definitions and solutions. Everett, Neu and Rahaman (2006) also employ a Foucauldian approach to illustrate how the concept has become a ‘free-floating signifier’ in the anti-corruption discourse that emanates from international organisations. The authors argue that different definitions and solutions are pushed by different groups motivated by preferred outcomes, whether based on increased expert control, increased privatisation, or the promotion of democratic principles and individual human rights (7). Thereby, anti-corruption efforts are motivated more by the pursuit of organisational specific interest considerations and less by the actual alleviation of corruption (7).

The social anthropologist, Steven Sampson (2010), takes a novel approach and directs his analysis at the operations of the fight against corruption as a global industry. Instead of seeing anti-corruption as the result of neo-liberalisation, or characterising failure in the alleviation of corruption as the result of a misinterpretation of the concept, Sampson (2010) analyses the manner in which the anti-corruption movement transformed from relative obscurity into a global industry. For Sampson (2010) this industry drives itself, legitimises itself and can exist without having any impact on the prevalence of corruption (Sampson, 2010). Sampson (2010) suggests that, instead of accepting the anti-corruption industry as a hegemonic and

unstoppable force, one should rather conduct a critical examination of the “consequences of the global institutionalisation of anti-corruptionist discourse and anti-corruption practice” (261).

This thesis enters into the space opened up by Sampson. The goal is to conduct a Foucauldian analysis of the institutionalisation of anti-corruption discourse and practices. There are only a handful of authors that have used Foucault’s work to analyse the anti-corruption industry. Analysing the anti-corruption industry from a Foucauldian perspective allows one to investigate the role played by knowledge and power in the operation, legitimisation and expansion of the anti-corruption industry. Additionally, Foucault’s work allows one to investigate the intimate link between anti-corruption knowledge and governmental practices, as well as the manner in which these practices have been localised on the individual subject. In the next section, a brief overview of Michel Foucault’s work is provided.

1.4) Michel Foucault

Michel Foucault’s work covers many different topics and has had a substantial influence on post-modernism, feminism, post-structuralism, post-colonialism and post-Marxist theorising (Mills, 2003: 1). His work has also had an impact on disciplines as wide ranging as social research, politics, history, sociology, cultural studies, criminology, social anthropology and management studies (May & Powell, 2007: 123; Mills, 2003: 1). Interestingly enough, Foucault would never have identified himself directly with any of these disciplines. Foucault can be characterised as a “masked philosopher” (May & Powell, 2007: 123). He deliberately avoided identifying himself with particular philosophical traditions or specific schools of thought (123). According to Mills (2003: 110), this was primarily due to Foucault’s reluctance to develop a complete methodology. This reluctance stems from the fact that much of Foucault’s work was aimed at criticising social scientific discourse (Graham, 2005: 5). If Foucault was to propose a prescriptive methodology for the application of his work, one would have been able to subject him to the very same criticisms that he used in his critiques of the social sciences (5).

Foucault’s philosophy has two primary dimensions. His early work was focused on employing the archaeological method to investigate the histories of social and medical sciences (Gutting, 2013). Foucault’s most notable use of the archaeological method was in *The History of Madness in the Classical Age* (1961), *The Birth of the Clinic* (1963), *The Order of Things* (1966) and *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1969) (Gutting, 2013). Later in

his life, Foucault's focus shifted to the genealogical method which he used to analyse torture, incarceration and sexuality. Foucault employs the genealogical approach in *Discipline and Punish* (1975) and *The History of Sexuality* volumes 1, 2 and 3.

Briefly defined, archaeology involves studying the discursive practices that constitute discourse (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 92). For Foucault, discourse is made up of systems of statements that are products of discursive practices (Howarth, 2002: 120). These discursive practices are governed by "historically contingent formation rules" (120). Foucault (1972: 138) explains that: "Archaeology tries to define not the thoughts, representations, images, themes, preoccupations that are concealed or revealed in discourses; but those discourses themselves, those discourses as practices obeying certain rules." Thus, Foucault does not study the content of discourse per se, Foucault studies the rules that characterise the emergence of discourse. By investigating these rules, it is not Foucault's intention to uncover the universal structures of knowledge; on the contrary, Foucault studies discourse in order to reveal the conditions that characterise the emergence of specific types of discourse within specific historical periods (Valero-Silva, 1996: 68).

Through archaeology one can compare the different discursive formations of different time periods without accepting any discursive formation as more valid than any other (Gutting, 2013). This allows one to uncover the discontinuities that occur as discourse adapts and evolves with the passage of time. Archaeology enables one also to demonstrate how certain disciplines are characterised by discontinuity, and above all, how the objects of knowledge, to which these disciplines attribute universal validity, are grounded in contingent factors and thus are not scientific and metaphysical truths (Gutting, 2013).

Archaeology is an effective method for understanding the formation of discourse within specific historical periods, but for the archaeological approach to be successful one needs to focus on discourse as it emerges from specific historical epochs, characterised by specific cultural, societal or linguistic rules. In other words, one needs to link discourse to the historical and cultural context that it emerged from. This means that one can identify, but one cannot explain why discourse changes and adapts between historical epochs. For example, with archaeology, Foucault can clearly identify how the discourse centred on sexuality changed from the classical age into the eighteenth century, but he cannot explain why these changes have occurred. Archaeology does not allow for an investigation into the role of social, economic and political factors in the adaptation of discourse. Also, and importantly for

Foucault, with archaeology one is not able to explain how past forms of discourse have impacted the formation of present discourses and practices. It is this issue that Foucault sought to address through the method of genealogy.

With the publication of *Discipline and Punish* in 1975, Foucault systematically moved away from the archaeological approach in favour of the genealogical approach. Although archaeology was not abandoned completely, after *Discipline and Punish* it played a subordinate role to genealogy (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 104, 105). Foucault became less interested in the rules that characterise the emergence of discourse and more interested in the societal factors that make certain types of discourse possible, justifiable and successful.

Briefly defined, genealogy is a method for uncovering the role played by power in the formation of knowledge and discourse. Dreyfus and Rabinow (105) explain that a genealogist as a “diagnostician who concentrates on the relations of power, knowledge, and the body in modern society.” Foucault (1977: 145, 146) explains that:

Genealogy does not pretend to go back in time to restore an unbroken continuity that operates beyond the dispersion of forgotten things; its duty is not to demonstrate that the past actively exists in the present, having imposed a predetermined form to all its vicissitudes. On the contrary, to follow the complex course of decent ... is to identify the accidents, the minute deviations ... the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for us; it is to discover that truth or being do not lie at the root of what we know and what we are, but in the exteriority of accidents.

With genealogy, Foucault takes his historical investigations to a more fundamental level. He is no longer concerned by discourse alone. He sees the relations of power and knowledge, localised on the individual subject, as a very important mechanism in the operation and manifestation of power in Western society (113). For Foucault, the factors that determine the emergence of discourse have historical, cultural, political and economic roots. Through the genealogical method, Foucault sought to investigate these roots. In other words, the difference between the archaeological approach and the genealogical approach lies in the fact that archaeology is centred on the rules that characterise the emergence of discourse while genealogy is centred on the relationship between knowledge and power and how contemporary societies, cultures and individuals are affected by this relationship.

In the article *Subject and Power*, Foucault (1983: 208) wrote that, his objective is to “create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects.” In other words, through his genealogical analyses, Foucault’s goal is to establish a history of the various different ways the relations of power and knowledge have contributed to the formation of the human beings as subjects in the contemporary world (208). Foucault (208) explains that there are three general modes through which the contemporary subject is formed. He calls this the three modes of objectification (208). The first mode of objectification refers to the manner in which the individual subject is objectified through the modes of inquiry that strive to become normalised as scientific disciplines (208). Secondly, individuals are objectified through the dividing practices that separate acceptable behaviour from unacceptable behaviour (208). The third mode of objectification refers to “the way a human being turns him- or herself into a subject” (208). In other words, the “mode of relation between the individual and himself” (Foucault, 1984: 334).

The three modes of objectification is a good framework for understanding how power impacts the formation of the subject in the contemporary world, but also to shed light on the role that the individual plays in the process. For Foucault (1983: 208), the subject is situated in relations of power that are very difficult to unravel. These relations are embedded within the social networks that permeate society (224). In this context, power is not contained within one aspect of society and it cannot be isolated or confined to one specific location, institution or state apparatus. For Foucault, power is not a position to hold, it is not a prize to be captured and it is not a commodity to be accumulated (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 185). Power operates through a multiplicity of mechanisms and procedures and there is not one principal truth that denotes the universality behind its functioning (Foucault, 1983: 224). It is therefore not possible to establish an objective description of power and one cannot create a general theory of power applicable across all societies, cultures and historical periods (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 184).

Power is not exercised over others, in an absolute way; power is rather a machine that works on the dominant as well as on the subjugated (192). Foucault does not see this power as an insidious force on the path toward the corruption of the entirety of the social body. Just as Foucault’s intention with archaeology was not to liberate truth from its historical confinement, with genealogy Foucault’s objective is not to free the individual from the shackles imposed upon him by relations of power. For Foucault, power plays a fundamental role in the formation of societal relations. He explains that, without power, society “... can

only be an abstraction” (Foucault, 1983: 222, 223). Therefore, it is not Foucault’s intention to traverse power or dispel power from society (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 186). As such, Foucault’s goal is not to reveal the truth that power distorts, but rather to gain a better understanding of the specific instances where power has become manifest and to uncover the diverse forms through which power operates, the institutions it infiltrates, the organising mechanisms and disciplinary procedures central to its functioning and to reveal the knowledge that constitutes, legitimises and emerges from such practices.

In other words, Foucault is not interested in establishing a general theory of power. Rather, he wants to create an ‘analytic’ of power (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 186). Foucault (1976: 93) understands power as “the name that one attributes to a complex strategical relationship in a particular society.” This strategical relationship has its own coherence. It is governed by internal rules and procedures and it is based on a rationale that stems from specific academic disciplines. There is nothing universal about the way in which this strategic relationship functions, but it can be subjected to analysis, and this is Foucault’s project (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 187, 188). Importantly, the only way to understand this strategic relationship is to approach power in its day to day operations and to analyse power on the level of the cultural practices through which it is localised (185).

The methodological framework that is utilised in this thesis to analyse the anti-corruption industry rests on Foucault’s genealogical method. More specifically, Foucault’s three modes of objectification, in addition to his concepts of governmentality and disciplinary power, are used to analyse the discourses and governmental practices that stem from the industry. These concepts are explained in more detail in chapter 2. It is important to note that Foucault’s approach does have its limitations. Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983: 261) contend that the very strengths of Foucault’s method are intricately connected to its weaknesses. As stated by Dreyfus and Rabinow (204) in applying Foucault’s method:

We have no recourse to objective laws, no recourse to pure subjectivity, no recourse to totalisations of theory. We only have the cultural practices that have made us what we are. To know what these practices are we have to grapple with a history of the present.

Foucault is interested in unpacking the historical emergence and function of discourse. This does not mean that his only interest lies in writing the histories of different forms of knowledge. On the contrary, by investigating the genealogy of specific discourses Foucault is

tracing the manner in which forms of knowledge, as well as cultural and governmental practices, have impacted the formation of the subject in the contemporary world. This means that, Foucault's method is not used to understand history as such. It is a method used to understand the historical factors that contributed to the formation of contemporary practices, discourses and problems (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 118).

In the next section, a brief summary is provided of the structure of the thesis.

1.5) Structure lay-out

Chapter 2 provides an in depth review of the methodology used in the analysis of the anti-corruption industry. This methodology is based on Foucault's concepts of governmentality, discipline, power and knowledge, as well as the three modes of objectification as explained in Foucault's article, *Subject and Power*. This is not an exhaustive review of all of Foucault's work. The objective of the chapter is to review key elements of his work that is applicable in an analysis of the anti-corruption industry.

In chapter 3, an account of the development of anti-corruption discourse is provided for the period from the 1950s up until the present day. This involves applying Foucault's concept of genealogy in tracing the evolution of anti-corruption discourse.

Chapter 4 links Foucault's concepts discipline, governmentality, power and knowledge with the anti-corruption discourses and practices.

Chapter 5 concludes the thesis by providing a summary of my argument and linking Foucault's three modes of objectification with the anti-corruption industry.

Chapter 2: The Objectification of the Contemporary Subject

2.1) Introduction: The Historian of Thought

Michel Foucault was born on 15 October, 1926 in Poitiers, France (Gutting, 2013). In the 1960s he held a number of different positions at French Universities until he was appointed to the Collège de France in 1969 (Gutting, 2013). At the Collège he took his title as Professor of the History of Systems of Thought; a position which he held until his untimely death in 1984 (Gutting, 2013).

The title that Foucault took at the Collège de France speaks volumes about his broad field of interest. The following statement puts this field into perspective. In an interview conducted in 1982, Foucault (1988: 9, 10) stated that:

My field is the history of thought. Man is a thinking being. The way he thinks is related to society, politics, economics, and history and is also related to very general and universal categories. But thought is something other than societal relations. The way people really think is not adequately analysed by the universal categories of logic. Between social history and formal analyses of thought there is a path, a lane – maybe very narrow – which is the path of the historian of thought.

There is no doubt that Foucault was a student of history, but his intention was not to document the truth contained in history as such. Rather, Foucault sought to understand the emergence of different systems of thought from different historical epochs and he sought to uncover why certain concepts, ideas, and domains of knowledge were accepted at certain historical periods only to be superseded in subsequent years. Foucault sought to understand the role played by power in deployment and justification of truth and he wanted to uncover how disparate and sometimes contradictory forms of knowledge contributed to contemporary discourses, practices, sciences and politics.

Foucault's method of analysing historical systems of thought does not involve analysing past events in the context of contemporary thinking (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 118). Foucault's method entails delving into history, not in order to understand the past, but in order to understand present circumstances, politics, societies and cultures (118, 119). Foucault's intention was not to liberate truth from its historical confinement and he did not seek to overthrow the forces that inhibit, control or propagate truth and knowledge. As a historian of thought, Foucault's end goal was to understand how the relations between knowledge, power

and truth have impacted on the formation of the subject in the contemporary world (Foucault, 1983: 208-210). By studying historical systems of thought, Foucault is not writing the history of the past, he is writing the history of the present (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 118, 119).

The goal in this chapter is to discuss some of the central tenets in Foucault's philosophy. This is by no means a complete examination of Foucault's work. His different historical analyses are diverse and multifaceted and it would be very difficult to construct a central methodology that stretches through the entirety of his work. It is certainly the case that his interests covered various disciplines and his historical investigations delved into topics as diverse as sexuality, imprisonment, medical practices and psychology. It is also the case that the methodology he employed changed significantly over the years, moving from archaeology in his early years, to genealogy in his later years.

Nonetheless, clarifying some of the most important themes in Foucault's work will be an excellent starting point for establishing a framework through which contemporary discourses and practices can be analysed. His notions of governmentality, normalisation, objectification and disciplinary power can be very useful methodological tools in an effort to analyse the production and propagation of knowledge in contemporary society and for uncovering the practices of power that catalyse this production. Therefore, the intention behind this chapter is not to search for a golden thread that stretches through the entirety of Foucault's work, rather the intention is to uncover the key themes in Foucault's work that make a critical examination of contemporary anti-corruption discourse and practices prudent and possible.

This chapter starts off with an overview of what Foucault called the three modes of objectification. The three modes of objectification cover three important bases of Foucault's work; the first mode of objectification addresses the social sciences, which is one of the key areas that Foucault's investigations were centred on. The second mode of objectification is centred on dividing practices and brings to light the role of classification and normalisation within social scientific discourse as well as the manner in which these classifications are entrenched within governmental institutions and procedures. The third mode of objectification brings the role of the individual subject into focus.

Section 2.3 is centred on Foucault's notion of disciplinary power. This is a central concept in Foucault's genealogical analyses of torture and incarceration. Getting to grips with this concept assists in understanding how Foucault perceived the operation of power in society. Foucault's definition of power can sometimes become enigmatic and indeterminate, but

digging into the specifics of disciplinary power will clarify many of the ambiguities that one may be confronted with. The goal in section 2.3 is to discuss the emergence of disciplinary power and thereby elaborate exactly on what Foucault perceived power to be and how he endeavoured to analyse it.

The concept of governmentality is the focal point of section 2.4. After Foucault's death, governmentality became one of the most widely used concepts of Foucault's work. Foucault did not provide a methodological connection between the three modes of objectification and the other primary themes of his work, but when it comes to governmentality there are clear areas of confluence. The critical contribution of the concept lies in the fact that it enables one to understand the interrelated relationship between state structures, politics, ethics, knowledge and subjects within contemporary society. It not only illustrates how knowledge and truth is employed by governmental forces to achieve political and societal ends, it also clarifies the central role played by the individual subject in this process.

2.2) The Three modes of Objectification

In the article *Subject and Power*, Foucault (1983: 208) explains that his central concern throughout his various books, articles and lectures was not necessarily to investigate the operation of power in society. His goal was also not merely to uncover the discourses, practices and diverse disciplines that have emerged from and legitimised such operations (208). Rather, in the article Foucault (208) states that the principle concern was to uncover the manner in which the individual subject is objectivised in contemporary society.

Foucault (208) provides a three pronged framework for understanding the manner in which individuals are objectivised in contemporary society. He calls this framework the three modes of objectification (208). According to Foucault's first mode of objectification, individuals are objectified through the modes of inquiry that strive to become part of normal science (208). Foucault sees the modes of inquiry centred on studying human beings, their interaction, and behaviour as the 'dubious' human sciences (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 116). The social sciences ground cultural norms within scientific discourse and this discourse is propagated throughout society on the pretext that it has been attained via legitimate forms of scientific inquiry.

In Foucault's understanding however, the social sciences are not based on any universal knowledge that is attainable through scientific investigation. These modes of inquiry are rather based on ever-changing societal norms, discourses and practices (Foucault, 1983: 208;

Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 116). The social sciences are impacted by social, political and economic forces and are therefore intimately involved with the micropractices of power (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 177). Examples of what can be characterised as dubious sciences include economics, political science, psychology, sociology and social anthropology.

The second mode of objectification is what Foucault calls “dividing practices” (Foucault, 1983: 208). Through the implementation of dividing practices it is endeavoured to normalise anything that does not fit into the framework of classification as advocated by the social sciences. The social sciences produce categories and specifications of abnormal and normal behaviour which are culturally produced but presented as unbiased and neutral knowledge (Madigan, 1992: 267). These specifications serve to separate permissible from impermissible behaviour, after which normalising practices are employed to isolate, identify, transform and rectify any anomalies that may arise (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 258). Good examples of dividing practices are the separation and confinement of the insane in asylums and the confinement of lepers outside of cities during the middle ages.

The third and final mode of objectification is the “mode of relation between the individual and himself” (Foucault, 1984: 334). Simply explained, the final mode of objectification involves the practices employed by individuals to become ethical subjects within the political and societal matrix they find themselves in. Individuals are not only objectivised by dividing practices and social scientific knowledge, but also through the methods they employ to govern their own behaviour. Once norms and different types of knowledge have been established and propagated throughout society, individuals proceed to turn themselves into subjects. As explained by Gutting (2013), individuals are not only controlled “as objects of disciplines but also as self-scrutinising and self-forming subjects.” Individuals internalise norms and thereby normalise themselves (Gutting, 2013).

In the next section, the first mode of objectification is discussed as well the differentiation that Foucault made between the natural and social sciences. Furthermore, the emergence of the social scientific discourses centred on sexuality is discussed in order to illustrate some of the factors that were of interest for Foucault in his analyses of the social sciences.

2.2.1) The Dubious Human Sciences

2.2.1.1) Natural science versus Social science

The first category in the objectification of the contemporary subject are the domains of knowledge that strive to enter into the realms of normal science, but continually fail to do so

(Foucault, 1983: 208). For Foucault, there are two distinct categories of inquiry (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 116). On the one side, one encounters the disciplines that have passed the “threshold of scientificity” (116). One can relate this directly to Thomas Kuhn’s conception of “normal science” (1983: 116). According to Kuhn, normal science occurs within a broadly accepted paradigm, where science takes on a puzzle solving character (Bird, 2011). Within this paradigm, scientists collect information, assimilate data and form scientific conclusions within the scope of a broadly accepted theory base (Bird, 2011). The scientist may fail to solve the puzzle that he is confronted with, or his peers may question the final conclusion that is reached, but the overall parameters of the puzzle stay consistent. The category of normal science accounts for the majority of the natural sciences including disciplines such as theoretical physics and organic chemistry.

On the other side, one finds the modes of inquiry that have been unable to enter into the realms of normal science. For Foucault, any form of knowledge based on human beings specifically, whether it is from a biological, psychological or behavioural perspective, is not able to develop discourses, disciplines and practices capable of passing the scientific threshold as set by the natural sciences. The human sciences are based on societal norms and is characterised by internal struggles and constantly changing discourses and practices (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 116, 177).

It is important to note that Foucault sees the scientist, natural or otherwise, as unavoidably situated in his social, political and historical circumstances (166). The difference between the natural and the social scientist lies in the fact that the natural scientist can study natural phenomena with a certain degree of detachment from normative cultural values (163). The natural scientist can bracket his historical and cultural circumstances without compromising the validity of his scientific inquiry. It may well be the case that background cultural practices are responsible for maintaining the legitimacy and feasibility of scientific investigation on the whole, but the natural scientist does not need to take account of these factors for his scientific inquiry to be successful (162, 163).

In contrast, the social scientist does need to take account of the cultural and societal factors that constitute the foundation upon which his social scientific inquiry is based. As explained by Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983: 163): “... if the human sciences claim to study human activities, then the human sciences, unlike the natural sciences, must take account of those human activities which make possible their own disciplines.” In order to account for these

human activities, the social scientist needs to be able to detach his inquiry from his own history and culture. For Foucault (1977: 152) however, such a suprahistorical position is tantamount to “apocalyptic objectivity.”

In Foucault’s understanding, the emergence of any social science is fundamentally situated within the background historical, social, political and economic practices that gave rise to its emergence (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 163, 164, 182). In other words, the historical development of any social scientific discipline is fundamental in the establishment of the categories and specifications that make social scientific theory possible in the first place. For this reason, social scientists are not able to account for their own legitimacy and it is not possible for the social sciences to explain the societal, political and institutional matrix within which social scientific discourse emerges, thrives and ultimately decays (102, 182).

In other words, social scientists are not able to come to a sufficient understanding of the factors that govern the acceptance or rejection of any particular social scientific discipline as valid science or as pseudo-science. Even if a social scientist succeeds in ignoring the social and cultural factors that gave rise to the historical development of the disciplines, this does not mean that the social scientific discipline has moved any closer to discovering the truth that underlies societal relations. This only means that an orthodoxy has been established (163). In the words of Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983: 163):

[N]ormalcy for any particular social science would mean that it had successfully managed to ignore the social background which made its objects and disciplinary methods possible, and one might suppose that such a systematically self-limiting science would only come up with highly restricted predictive generalisations.

An important point at this stage is that Foucault is not advocating for the abolishment of the social sciences in favour of the natural sciences. He is also not arguing that the objects that the social sciences are centred on are insignificant or unimportant. The classification of certain natural sciences as normal science does not mean that the theories and disciplines within these sciences do not adapt or change. Foucault is focused on the social sciences because these are, to a greater extent than the natural sciences, intimately connected to social, economic and political factors. Foucault does not see all forms of social scientific inquiry as the product of power (177). Foucault does however, see “micropractices of power” at work within social scientific discourse (177).

Foucault's intention here is not to liberate the social sciences from the ambit of power or to merge the social and natural sciences. Furthermore, he certainly does not seek to establish a framework that will enable social scientific inquiry to discover the truths of human culture and society. Rather Foucault seeks to understand the reason for the acceptance of certain social sciences as legitimate knowledge during certain historical periods and to discover why these sciences have the "objects, subjects, concepts, and strategies they do" (102). In other words, Foucault is seeking to uncover the rules that govern the acceptance or rejection of social scientific knowledge as truth or falsity. Furthermore, Foucault wants to isolate the connections between knowledge and power and how this is manifested in society (177).

Foucault is interested in how truth and knowledge is produced, used, co-opted and transformed by political forces and how laws, procedures and cultural rituals follow suit. Foucault analyses the games of truth that surround knowledge and how this relates to and is justified by the operation of power in society. As explained by Foucault:

Truth is of this world; it is the product of multiple constraints ... Each society has its own regime of truth, its general politics of the truth ... There is a combat for the truth, or at least around the truth, as long as we understand by the truth not those true things which are waiting to be discovered but rather the ensemble of rules according to which we distinguish the true from the false (Quoted in Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 117).

This type of inquiry enables one to understand the functions of different types of knowledge and different types of discourse and how this relates to the broader deployment of power in society (117). By focusing on the social sciences, one can investigate the very operation of truth in contemporary regimes of power (133). In this conception, the truth attained through social scientific inquiry is not a universal, objective truth. Rather, truth is moulded, shaped and constructed. Focusing the analysis on the very disciplines that purport to uncover this truth gives one access to the very relations of power from which such disciplines gain their relevance and legitimacy.

The next section is centred on the emergence of social scientific discourse focused on sexuality. This is a good starting point to come to grips with the manner in which Foucault sought to analyse specific social scientific disciplines and the manner in which these are connected to modes of power in society.

2.2.1.2) The emergence of the social science of sex

Social science, including the discourses centred on sexuality, has not always existed in its current form. When social science emerged in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it found its form within the context of administration and processes of government (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 134). The political and technical rationality of the time placed geographic, historical and demographic conditions within the confines of the social sciences (134). For example, the social scientific discipline of demography, which first emerged during this period, analysed birth-rates, infant mortality rates, frequency of sexual relations, the average marital age, population statistics, fertility rates, prostitution levels, the impact of contraceptives and so forth (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 170; Foucault, 1976: 25, 26). Demographers analysed these aspects not only to build scientific knowledge; the health, wellbeing and vitality of populations were seen as vitally important factors in the governance of states (Foucault, 1976: 25).

With the emergence of the social sciences, the population of a state became a resource, which had to be managed, maintained and moulded (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 139). As such, governments were no longer focused solely on governing the people under their control as subjects or citizens (Foucault, 1976: 25). The focus was shifted to entire populations; populations that were affected by their own particular variables, relations and diverse phenomena (25). The health, welfare and efficiency of the population came to be perceived as the ends of the government of the state (Fimyar, 2008: 6). In this context, administrative intervention was “aimed at the optimisation of the health, life and productivity of the population” (6).

In Foucault’s (1976: 25) understanding, the phenomenon of sex was at the centre of the political and economic problem of population. This resulted in a “... veritable discursive explosion” of discourse centred on sex (17). Even though speaking about sex became more secretive and censored, the propagation of knowledge surrounding sexuality reached unprecedented levels; as stated by Foucault (17, 18):

Toward the beginning of the eighteenth century, there emerged a political, economic and technical incitement to talk about sex. And not so much in the form of a general theory of sexuality as in the form of analysis, stocktaking, classification, and specification of quantitative or causal studies.

The eruption of sex as an issue of public interest went hand in hand with the emergence of a “multiplicity of discourses” which, in turn, served to produce wide ranging mechanisms, procedures and policies within different societal and governmental institutions (33). As stated by Foucault (24), an entire “web of discourses, special knowledges, analyses, and injunctions settled upon it.” Over time, these discourses became formalised and codified within specific social scientific disciplines such as demography, medicine, biology and psychology (33).

As the discourse centred on sex became more and more medicalised, psychologists sought new interpretations to make sense of and address the multitudes of newly discovered maladies and ailments. Behaviour that was previously considered as a transgression of norms, laws or religious rules were now seen as symptoms of underlying medical or psychological conditions, perversions or diseases (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 173). For the psychologist, sexuality penetrated the entire life of the individual (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 173; Foucault, 1976: 44). For this reason, if the individual’s sexuality was found to be maladjusted, his entire life had to be researched, analysed, classified and objectified.

The result of the increased proliferation of discourse was an eruption of newly discovered sexual maladies. Psychiatrists coined new types of conditions such as “mixoscopophiles, gynecomasts, presbyophiles, sexoesthetic inverts, and dyspareunist women” (Foucault, 1976: 43). There were zooerasts, zoophiles and auto-monosexualists (43). Even though many of these conditions have long since fallen out of medical knowledge, during the time period, they were seen as very real maladies, in need of appropriate medical or psychological treatment. Another example is that of homosexuality, which was revealed as a diagnosable medical condition. As stated by Foucault (1976: 43), “the homosexual was now a species.” It was now possible to study homosexuality objectively and scientifically. It was no longer a cultural or social phenomenon. It was no longer something to be condemned morally or religiously. Homosexuality was now biological. It was possible to analyse its causes and to manage its impacts and effects.

Once the perverted was identified and classified, steps had to be taken to reach rehabilitation. As explained by Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983: 173) “once a diagnosis of perversion was scientifically established, corrective technologies - for the good of the individual and of society - could and must be applied.” The fact that sex was directly tied to health and vitality of populations means that its dysfunction became a society-wide issue requiring governmental intervention to address. As such, sex was directly connected with

administration, regulation, surveillance and the practices of the state (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 173; Foucault, 1976: 24, 25).

In other words, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, sex became a point of interconnection between the biological and medical sciences and governmental mechanisms introduced to manage populations. As social scientific disciplines emerged, there was an eruption of formalised and codified knowledge centred on studying the phenomenon of sex. Various perversions and maladies were coined and these were thought to threaten the health of society as a whole. This means that sex became an administrative matter and its quantification, measurement and oversight was of relevance in governmental as well as political procedures. As stated by Foucault (1976: 24):

[Sex] was in the nature of public potential; it called for management procedures; it had to be taken charge of by analytical discourses. In the eighteenth century sex became a 'police' matter ... not the repression of disorder, but an ordered maximisation of collective and individual forces ... A policing of sex: that is, not the rigor of a taboo, but the necessity of regulating sex through useful and public discourses.

At this point, it is important to note that it is not Foucault's intention to remove sex from the ambit of governmental discourse. Foucault is also not interested in leading us on a path of self-discovery and sexual enlightenment. Foucault does not see the truth behind sexuality as a natural given or that sex has been contained and constrained by power (105). What Foucault is interested in is the connection between the practices of power and the discourses that seek to uncover and reveal truth (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 177).

For Foucault, the very revelation of sex as a society-wide biological and medical phenomenon enabled it to become enmeshed within the practices of power (178). In other words, the emergence of a seemingly objective knowledge of sex did not enable society to free itself from the constraints imposed upon it by power. Foucault (1976: 105, 106) explains that:

[Sex] is the name that can be given to a historical construct; not a furtive reality that is difficult to grasp, but a great surface network in which the stimulation of bodies, the intensification of pleasures, the incitement to discourse, the formation of special knowledges, the strengthening of controls and resistances, are linked to one another in accordance with a few major strategies of power and knowledge.

In Foucault's understanding, the phenomenon of sex has been constructed in history and culture. Sex is a "historical fiction" which serves as a link between normative practices of power and the biological sciences (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 179). By incorporating governmental technologies and procedures to rectify the sexual ailments that plague society, sex was fundamentally entrenched within the relations of power. Social scientific discourse has not freed sex from power; on the contrary, the very attempt of attaining an objective understanding of sexuality has pushed it further into the realms of power.

This leads one directly to the central questions that Foucault is concerned with when it comes to sex. If sex is a historically constructed concept, what is its function in contemporary society? What are the factors that animate the discourse surrounding it? What impact does it have on general society and how does it manifest and spread itself? What are the political factors that co-opt and propagate this discourse and how are individuals transformed by the knowledge and practices that emanate from it? Why was sex, in the first instance, appropriated by governmental forces? How are individuals objectified and classified by this discourse? And importantly, why does a discipline, which is constituted by constant re-evaluation, revision and adaptation, need to promote itself as truth and objective knowledge?

By employing his genealogical approach and focusing on objectification through social scientific knowledge, Foucault allows one to analyse the rules and factors that impact on the formation of knowledge. Foucault is interested in the games of truth that surround social scientific knowledge and how this relates to the deployment of power in contemporary society. By focusing his investigation on the historical processes that played a role in the formation of social scientific knowledge about sex, Foucault is in no way claiming that he has uncovered the truth that lies behind sex. Rather, Foucault claims that the concept of truth is produced and used by discourses centred on sex. This production of truth is tied not to objective knowledge, but to certain strategies of power (Foucault, 1976: 105, 106). The nature of such strategies of power will come to light in the following sections.

2.2.2) Dividing Practices

Dividing practices is Foucault's second mode of objectification and he uses the term to explain how the human being is objectified by processes of classification and division (Foucault, 1983: 208). The concept designates the demarcation of phenomena as abnormal or normal within the spheres of knowledge, culture and society and the subsequent steps taken to incorporate any anomalies that are encountered. Dividing practices play an important part

in the formation of social scientific knowledge. It is through social scientific classification that categories of normality, abnormality, sickness and health are established (Madigan, 1992: 266, 267). These dividing practices form the foundation upon which academic knowledge about social phenomena can be built.

Dividing practices do, however, stretch further than the social sciences alone. Dividing practices not only rest on the classification of certain individuals, behaviours and moralities as abnormal within social scientific discourse (267). Dividing practices are also at play within governmental institutions (267). These practices involve the implementation of institutional apparatuses aimed at entrenching divisions in society as well as the practices followed to address anything that does not fit in with the established categories. In other words, once these divisionary categories are established and entrenched, practices are employed to normalise the anomalous elements that do not fit into the framework of classification as advocated by the human sciences (266, 267). This normalisation entails “the deployment of force and the establishment of truth” since it involves the shaping and propagation of discourse in addition to the implementation of institutional and governmental practices (Foucault, 1995: 184).

It is also important to note that dividing practices not only entail an academic, spatial, institutional or legal separation. In Foucault’s understanding, dividing practices involve the dispersal of bodies within space and within themselves (Foucault, 1983: 208). Dividing practices penetrate into the emotional, moral and ethical spheres. Therefore, these practices not only frame the manner in which people think about societal characteristics, but also impact on what can be specified as moral or immoral.

Dividing practices may be informed by social scientific inquiry but their justification, implementation and propagation rests on a whole host of factors related to the governance of states. In the context of sexual deviance, for example, once an individual’s sexuality was discovered to be abnormal, that person was removed from society in order to undergo psychiatric and medical treatment. The very behaviour in question was, in the first instance, medicalised through scientific discourse. Subsequently, however, this behaviour was stigmatised and addressed by governmental intervention in social life. The removal of the maladjusted individuals from society was not only done in order to address their respective maladies. The process of removing the abnormal from society was driven by governmental procedures in order to ensure the health and wellbeing of society as a whole.

A good example of a dividing practice being employed to achieve a governmental outcome was the establishment of the General Hospital in Paris during 1656 (Madigan, 1992: 267). The General Hospital detained beggars, vagabonds and the insane in order to prevent “mendicancy and idleness as the source of all disorders” (Madigan, 1992: 267; Foucault, 1984: 129). Despite what the name suggests, the General Hospital was not a medical establishment (Foucault, 1984: 125). The hospital was constructed with the intention to reduce begging and to remove the unemployed from French society (129). In other words, abnormality was entrenched and codified within medical discourse in order to achieve the political and governmental end of reducing begging and vagabondage.

The distribution and acceptance of dividing practices and social scientific categories is, however, not a uniform process. The difficulties that plague the social sciences inevitably result in a steady stream of anomalies (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 182-183). There always seems to remain certain phenomena that are incongruent with reigning social scientific discourse (182-183). The manner in which these anomalies are dealt with is an integral component in the dispersal and success of the contemporary social sciences. Foucault’s concept of normalisation refers to the practices employed to discover, integrate and control anomalies in the social sciences (195). Ball (1990: 2) explains this concept as “the establishment of measurements, hierarchy, and regulations around the idea of a distributionary statistical norm within a given population - the idea of judgement based on what is normal and thus what is abnormal.”

It is important to note that persistence of anomalies does not spell the end of social scientific disciplines (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 182-183). On the contrary, the existence of anomalies serves as a catalyst leading to ever increasing investment in research, monitoring, measurement and quantification. The promise that anomalies will eventually yield to social scientific procedures serves to vindicate the establishment of large government agencies, research facilities and inflated grant proposals through which “the social sciences nourish themselves and spread” (182-183). Importantly, the fact that the social sciences often fail to achieve their objectives does not hamper their expansion, failure is rather used as an argument for the need for even further investment, training and research (182-183).

The drive contained in contemporary forms of knowledge to continuously break up and classify anomalies leads contemporary norms to gravitate towards perpetual totalisation and specification (258). The fact that social scientific disciplines are plagued by internal

discontinuity means that ever greater principles are sought, in order to subsume more and more phenomena (258). There is a strategic directness within contemporary normalisation which serves to continuously break up anomalies into constituent parts until no action can fall external to the network of normality (258). Reason then “becomes regulative, the demand for greater and greater systematisation for its own sake” (258). Importantly however, normalisation does not lead to normal science. Normalisation leads to totalising discourse. Discourse in this context, is about “what can be said and thought, but also about who can speak, when, and with what authority” (Ball, 1990: 2).

For Foucault, since the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, normalisation has become a fundamental aspect of an assortment of practices, techniques, discourses and knowledges prevalent in modern day society (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 258). In Foucault’s (1995, 184) understanding, the drive behind normalisation became “one of the great instruments of power at the end of the classical age.” Arguably, one of the best modern day examples of dividing practices and normalisation can be found in education systems. As explained by Ball (1990: 3, 4):

The use of testing, examining, profiling and streaming in education, the use of entry criteria for different types of schooling, and the formation of different types of intelligence, ability and scholastic identity in the processes of schooling are all examples of such ‘dividing practices’.

Educational institutions act as a conduit for the dispersal of particular types of discourse and knowledge. Reigning educational methods in connection with different organisational practices, different models of teacher-student relationships, different syllabi and curricula, different methods and practices of teaching all shape different subjectivities and identities which are learned and carried over through the passage of time (5). Educational institutions are subjected to reigning discourse but, at the same time, these institutions serve as a central node in the dissemination and propagation of discourse (4). As stated by Foucault (1971: 46): “Every educational system is a political means of maintaining or modifying the appropriateness of discourses with the knowledge and power they bring with them.” Formal education frames the type of discourse that is appropriate for dissemination and thereby the access to and legitimacy of different types of knowledge is controlled (Ball, 1990: 4).

Students are classified, normalised and stigmatised through the creation of advanced groups and remedial groups where the academically superior are separated from the pupils that

require special attention (5). In this way certain abilities and capacities are promoted whilst others are discouraged. Dividing practices in education are also intertwined with sophisticated educational sciences such as “educational psychology, pedagogics, the sociology of education, cognitive and developmental psychology” (5). Through the educational sciences, a rich vocabulary of technocratic concepts stream into educational practices which serve as an explanation for the perceived pathologies existent in contemporary education. This knowledge provides education with modes of containment, control and classification which are often linked to progress and improvement (5). Through this process of driving improvement and reformation, the student is moulded and “constructed” (6).

The point here is that the processes of division and classification that are immanent in the social sciences are central to the establishment of the very institutional and social principles that govern modern day society (2). Social scientific classification is not the straightforward creation of discourse centred on the investigation and clarification of the objectively understandable bits and pieces in social life. On the contrary, dividing practices provide the framework through which different types of discourse are either accepted as legitimate or rejected as illegitimate. Thereby, dividing practices shape the content and structure of discourse, whilst simultaneously facilitating the propagation of knowledge and power to ever greater reaches of society.

The categories and specifications employed by social scientific disciplines to divide, objectify, analyse and normalise societal characteristics all ultimately stem from normative cultural values, political ideologies and economic exigencies. Therefore, whether dividing practices are centred on sexuality, mental illness or education, these practices are directly tied to the historical and cultural development of societies. Dividing practices facilitate the dispersal and propagation of discourse and, importantly, the lack of success within these discourses to eradicate the anomalies that pervade social phenomena creates an incentive and a pathway for the continuous expansion and normalisation of social scientific thought. In this context, discourse is about the “practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak ... Discourses are not about objects; they do not identify objects, they constitute them and in the practice of doing so conceal their own invention” (Foucault, 1974: 49).

Dividing practices are political tools enacted not only to fix issues as identified through social scientific discourse, but to entrench, institutionalise and normalise the very categories that

divide proper behaviour from improper within the structures of society. Individuals are objectified and objectify themselves by the polarity that is created between what is considered legally, morally and scientifically acceptable and what is not. The individual is however, not necessarily subjugated by reigning forms and power and the discourse that goes with it. The role of the individual in the creation and dispersal of dividing practices and social scientific discourse should not be discounted. As stated by Ball (1990: 6), individuals are constructed through objectification but also through subjectification and the practices aimed at achieving “self-understanding”. Individuals appropriate discourse and knowledge and play a central role in driving normalisation.

The next section is centred on the manner in which individuals adapt and mould their behaviour in relation to reigning discourse, power and knowledge, and the manner in which individuals drive their own objectification.

2.2.3) The Technologies of the Self

The third and final mode of objectification is what Foucault calls the “mode of relation between the individual and himself” (Foucault, 1984: 334). The three modes of objectification have an interrelated relationship and the mode of relation between the individual and himself plays a very important role in this interaction. Foucault’s focal point is objectification because this is the entry point through which he wants to analyse the functioning of contemporary technologies of power. Power is a productive process, with knowledge, discourse and cultural rituals stemming from this process (Foucault, 1995: 194). The locus of this process is the individual subject, but he is not necessarily subjugated by power (182). Individuals internalise and grapple with disparate discourses and practices and in such a way they drive their own objectification and normalisation.

Foucault’s notion of technologies of the self refers to the methods employed by individuals to adapt their behaviour in accordance with prevailing discourse, moral codes, norms and values. More specifically, technologies of the self refers to the manner in which moral codes are appropriated, how individuals are invited or incited to adjust their behaviour in accordance with such codes and the actual practices they employ in order to become ethical (Foucault, 1985: 28). Importantly, technologies of the self also refer to the ultimate objectives that individuals strive toward by behaving in an ethical manner. Foucault (1985: 27) refers to this as the ‘telos’ of moral behaviour.

For Foucault (1985: 28), any moral action inherently implies practices of the self. In Foucault's words, moral action is: "... a process in which the individual delimits that part of himself that will form the object of his moral practice, defines his position relative to the precept he will follow, and decides on a certain mode of being that will serve as his moral goal" (28). In other words, moral action, by necessity, requires the individual to work on himself and to test, monitor, improve and transform himself into something that he was not previously (28).

In an interview conducted in 1983, Foucault stated that the relationship between the individual and himself is characterised by four major aspects (Foucault, 1984: 352). This framework is also discussed in more detail in volume two of the *History of Sexuality* (Foucault, 1985: 26). The first aspect relates to the question concerning which part of ourselves is concerned with moral conduct (Foucault, 1984: 352). Foucault calls this the "ethical substance" (353). The ethical substance constitutes the prime material that ethical conduct is centred on, or in other words it is the type of behaviour that ethics is concerned with (Foucault, 1984: 353; Foucault, 1985: 26). The ethical substance can be physical behaviour, moral deliberation, and interpersonal relationships and so on. It can be related to conduct or intention, emotions, desires or aspirations. For example, conjugal fidelity can be seen as ethical due to the mastery of base desires that this implies and the strength that the individual portrays to overcome such base temptations (Foucault, 1985: 26). In this example, the material that ethical conduct is centred on is not the physical action that constitutes being unfaithful, but rather the failure to win the battle over base desires (26).

Foucault calls the second aspect the "mode of subjection" (Foucault, 1984: 353). The mode of subjection is the way in which individuals are "invited or incited to recognise their moral obligations" (353). The mode of subjection involves the manner in which the individual recognises the rules that he is obliged to implement and the way his current behaviour relates to those rules (Foucault, 1985: 27). Moral precepts can be propagated in various different ways, as explained by Foucault (1984: 353):

Is it, for instance, divine law, which has been revealed in a text? Is it natural law, a cosmological order, in each case the same for every living being? Is it rational rule? Is it the attempt to give your existence the most beautiful form possible?

In other words, one can comply with rules and moral codes, because one seeks to be part of a cultural group that espouses such codes, or one can see it as part of a spiritual tradition that is

one's responsibility to maintain, or one can follow moral codes because it is perceived to be universally relevant moral imperatives and so forth (Foucault, 1984: 353; Foucault, 1985: 27).

Foucault (1984: 355) calls the third aspect the “self-forming activity.” The self-forming activity constitutes the means by which individuals transform themselves to become ethical subjects (355). The ethical work that individuals do is not aimed only at compliance with given rules, but also “to attempt to transform oneself into the ethical subject of one's behaviour” (Foucault, 1985: 27). This relates to how individuals alter, adapt and mould their actions (Foucault, 1984: 354, 355). With regards to sexuality, for example, self-forming activity refers to the practices followed to “moderate our acts, or to decipher what we are, or to eradicate our desires, or to use our sexual desire in order to obtain certain aims like having children” (Foucault, 1985: 354). In all these instances, sex is justified in a moral sense for different reasons and there are different factors associated with these justifications.

The fourth aspect is the type of person that one aspires to become by acting ethically (Foucault, 1984: 355). Foucault (355) states: “For instance, shall we become pure, or immortal, or free, or masters of ourselves and so on?” For Foucault, this is the “telos” of moral behaviour (Foucault, 1985: 27). Any moral act gravitates towards its own accomplishment, but this stretches further than mere compliance with specific moral precepts (27, 28). It is directed to a certain “mode of being” (27, 28). There are a variety of different possibilities, as Foucault (1985: 28) explains:

[C]onjugal fidelity can be associated with a moral conduct that aspires to an ever more complete mastery of the self; it can be a moral conduct that manifests a sudden and radical detachment vis-a-vis the world; it may strain toward a perfect tranquillity of soul, a total insensitivity to the agitations of the passions, or toward a purification that will ensure salvation after death and blissful immortality.

Moral actions are aimed thus at something beyond immediate compliance. By behaving morally, according to Foucault, individuals strive to work on themselves in order to transform into something that they were not previously. This occurs in the context of the socio-political background that they find themselves in, but it also depends on the type of moral precepts that are at play as well as the modes of subjectivisation that are employed (27, 28, 29).

All in all, the point here is that, for Foucault, the manifestation of power in society does not take the form a hegemonic force that dominates and subjugates all in its wake. Individuals

play an integral role in driving objectification. Lemke (2000: 5) quotes Foucault, who states that there is “... always a versatile equilibrium, with complementarity and conflicts between techniques which assure coercion and processes through which the self is constructed or modified by himself.” For any norm, value or mode of thought to be dispersed throughout society, it has to be internalised and appropriated by individuals. Knowledge, for example, has to gain a foothold and it has to resonate throughout society to retain its legitimacy. It has to be rational within the social, economic and political milieu of a specific societal setting. Similarly, cultural rituals such as the spectacle of public torture have to be coherent and legitimate within the societal context that it occurs. This legitimacy not only depends on the norms and knowledge that surrounds it, but also on the way individuals appropriate such practices.

To summarise, the three modes of objectification provide one with an excellent starting point for understanding the manner in which power and knowledge impact the subject and also the reciprocal role that the subject plays in this process. The modes of objectification illustrate how social scientific discourse finds its roots within dividing practices; practices which provide the foundation upon which the social sciences are constructed. Additionally however, dividing practices allude to the institutional practices employed in order to implement these categories into the working structure of society as well as the efforts employed to stem the incessant stream of anomalies that the social sciences are confronted with. The combination of these elements, in addition to the role played by the individual, provide a fertile ground upon which knowledge and power is dispersed to further and further reaches of society.

This does however lead one to question the nature of power specifically. Power plays an essential role in Foucault’s philosophy, yet the concept can sometimes become convoluted and indeterminate. The goal in the next section is to unpack Foucault’s investigation into torture and incarceration and the manner in which these are tied to the emergence disciplinary power. This discussion will assist in coming to a more complete understanding of Foucault’s understanding of power and how he endeavoured to analyse it.

2.3) The Power of Discipline: From Torture to Incarceration

2.3.1) Torture

In his book *Discipline and Punish* (1995), Foucault investigated the emergence of incarceration as the primary method for punishing criminals during the eighteenth century. Incarceration did not emerge spontaneously. It was founded within a specific type of punitive

rationality (Foucault, 1984: 337). This rationality emerged as a reaction to the punitive practices that were prevalent in prior ages and served to legitimise the widespread acceptance of incarceration as the primary method for punishing criminals in Europe during the time period. Before the advent of incarceration however, public torture was almost universally applied in Europe as the primary method for punishing criminals. Criminals were forced to endure horrendous torments, such as being drenched in boiling oil, drawn and quartered, placed on the rack and dismembered (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 144).

In part one of *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault (1995: 3) discusses in explicit detail the torture of Robert-François Damiens, who was convicted for regicide in 1757. Foucault (1995: 3) quotes a passage from *Pièces Originales*, where the torture is discussed. Damiens was to be:

[T]aken and conveyed in a cart, wearing nothing but a shirt, holding a torch of burning wax weighing two pounds ... the flesh will be torn from his breasts, arms, thighs and calves with red-hot pincers, his right hand, holding the knife with which he committed the said regicide, burnt with sulphur, and, on those places where the flesh will be torn away, poured molten lead, boiling oil, burning resin, wax and sulphur melted together and then his body will be drawn and quartered by four horses and his limbs and body consumed by fire, reduced to ashes and his ashes thrown to the winds (Foucault, 1995: 3).

Horrendous punishments such as the one explained above stem from the fact that, in feudal Europe, breaking the law was not only seen as a straightforward legal transgression. Breaking the law was seen as an attack on the will of the king. The law was considered to be the epitome of the power of the sovereign (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1983: 145). Any violation was seen as an “act of war, as a violent attack on the body of the king” (145). For this reason, the sovereign was justified to respond with excessive force (145). As discussed by Dreyfus and Rabinow (145): “In this ritual of violence, the criminal was physically attacked, beaten down, dismembered, in a symbolic display of the sovereign’s power.” In such a way, the power of the law and of the sovereign was re-asserted (145).

This “carnival of atrocity” took place as a public ritual of punishment (145). This ritual of punishment was, however, not a simple physical display of the power of the sovereign and it was not merely a public example aimed at instilling obedience in the general populace. The ritual of public torture was underwritten by extensive and formalised legal proceedings, codes and procedures (145). As stated by Foucault (1995: 34), there was an entire “legal code of

pain.” Torture as punishment did not occur indiscriminately, there were detailed rules that governed it as a punitive practice (34). These rules, for example, covered the “number of lashes of the whip, the positioning of the branding iron, the duration of the death agony on the stake or on the wheel, the type of mutilation to be used” (34). There was a framework linking different types of torture with different crimes and there was an entire judicial and legislative process surrounding torture.

Local magistrates were involved in extensive penal investigations into the validity of accusations (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 145). These investigations were characterised by a network of different proofs and evidence. There were, for example, clear legal distinctions between legitimate proof, conjectural proof, approximate proof, manifest proof and semi-full proof (Foucault, 1995: 36). These different distinctions not only had a theoretical function, they were linked directly to different judicial outcomes (36). Complete proof, for example, resulted in any sentence that was deemed sufficient by the magistrate (36). In the cases where there was only partial proof, the magistrates were likely to enact any severe punishment which did not result in death (36). If the investigators only found imperfect or slight proof, the result would be further investigation or the imposition of a fine (36).

This process of collecting and assimilating evidence and determining the truth behind the accusation was an important part in the functioning of the judicial procedures in feudal Europe (36, 37). As stated by Foucault, (1995: 37): “Written, secret, subjected, in order to construct its proofs, to rigorous rules, the penal investigation was a machine that might produce the truth in the absence of the accused.” The ritual of public torture only came into the picture after the judicial investigative procedures were completed.

Torture was employed in order to validate the evidence that was acquired through the preliminary judicial investigation. Right before death was inflicted, the accused was coerced into confessing to the crimes that they were accused of (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 144). Through the confession, the accused committed himself to the procedures of the preliminary investigation (Foucault, 1995: 39). As discussed by Foucault (38):

To a certain extent, it transcended all other evidence; an element in the calculation of the truth, it was also the act by which the accused accepted the charge and recognised its truth; it transformed an investigation carried out without him into a voluntary affirmation. Through the confession, the accused himself took part in the ritual of producing penal truth.

In Foucault's (40) understanding, torture was cruel, but it was not savage, uncontrolled or barbaric. Torture wasn't the expression of pure and unadulterated power and it was not "... some uncontrolled act of animal rage" (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 145). Torture was a regulated practice conducted in accordance with defined and codified local procedures (Foucault, 1995: 40). There were extensive measures and procedures in place to precisely control the application of torture as a punitive practice (145). Torture was not the last resort expression of an exasperated legal system losing restraint and forgetting all its moral principles (34, 35). On the contrary, a whole "economy of power" was invested in torture (35). Power, in this context, is not a physical display of strength or dominance; it is rather the calculated application of pain on the body of the condemned (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 145). The foundation of which is underwritten by extensive forms of rational debate, discourse and deliberation.

To summarise, the ritual of public torture formed an integral part of an extensive judiciary process, which was underpinned by legal and administrative procedures, specialised knowledge, governmental mechanisms, as well as an entire systemised web of different types of proofs, evidence and accusations. In other words, torture was not simply a straightforward method for punishing criminals. Torture, as a punitive practice, occupied an important space in the governance of medieval society. By looking at torture through Foucault's genealogical lens, it is possible to analyse it as a historically significant practice, characterised not by its brutality, but by the extensive forms of discourse, practices and knowledge that served to legitimise and justify its existence. Thus, even though flaying criminals, for example, is not acceptable in the western legal systems of today; Foucault shows how it was possible for something that seems so horrendous in today's terms to be part of a formalised legal and judicial system characterised by its own specific historically situated rational coherence.

2.3.2) Incarceration

In the eighteenth century, the punitive practice of public torture was transposed and replaced by an entirely new interpretation of punishment (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 147). The model of detention and incarceration appeared and rapidly spread throughout Europe (152). Suddenly and almost universally, incarceration replaced public torture as the preferred method of punishment (150). As stated by Foucault (1995: 232):

[P]eople were still aware of its novelty; and yet it appeared so bound up and at such a deep level with the very functioning of society that it banished into oblivion all the

other punishments the eighteenth-century reformers had imagined. It seemed to have no alternative, as if carried along by the very movement of history.

The reinterpretation of punishment was first pushed by the “humanist reformers” (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 147). The reformers argued that, in the violence of torture, “tyranny, confronts rebellion; each calls forth the other ... Instead of taking revenge, criminal justice should simply punish” (147). The ideals of these reformers were never truly implemented and their plans were waylaid by the advent of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars (147-151). Even so, the humanist rationality of punishment served as the foundation upon which incarceration flourished in subsequent years (147-151).

Social contract theory was the theoretical justification for this reinterpretation of punishment (147). Within social contract theory, the formation of society is seen as the result of individuals coming together through a “contractual arrangement” (147). In this context, crime is not seen as a deliberate attack on the will of the sovereign (148). Rather, crime is a breach of the social contract. From this perspective, punishment is seen as the right, and the obligation, of society as a whole and incarceration was aimed at redressing “the wrong done to society and bring the offender back to his rightful and useful place in society” (148). In other words, punishment is seen as a deterrent to future crimes and as method for reincorporating the criminal back into a functioning member of society.

The humanist reformers sought to create an extensive framework of knowledge, within which each specific crime and method of punishment had a place (149). The reinterpretation of punishment did not only happen on theoretical terms. The reformers were driven to transform the institutional functioning of punitive punishment. For this to be successful, new technical forms of knowledge and methods for control and surveillance had to be developed (149). A greater degree of classification and objectification of crimes and criminals followed and the penitentiary system served as a focal point for the establishment of a corpus of knowledge about criminality (148, 149, 194). The factor that was of interest for the psychologist and the criminologist was the criminal as a scientific object (149). To this end, the criminal was identified, isolated, analysed and objectified as a ‘quasi-natural species’ (194-195).

The purpose of punishment was no longer the revenge of the sovereign on the body of the condemned and it also did not serve as a validation for the truth as attained through judicial procedures (152). The purpose of punishment was supervision, confinement and training (152). The criminal was characterised as a specimen to be transformed, moulded and

rehabilitated for the good of the specific individual as well as of society as a whole (194, 195). Punishment became a “corrective technique” and it was not used to expunge the crime, but rather to “transform the criminal” (Foucault, 1995: 127).

This interpretation of punishment is still the norm in contemporary western states. Contemporary forms of punitive punishment are completely removed from causing physical harm. The closest comparison in western states to the torture practices of the Middle Ages is capital punishment. What is interesting, however, is that capital punishment occurs in complete contrast to what happened during the public spectacles of torture of the Middle Ages. There are two key differences between medieval torture and contemporary capital punishment. Firstly, capital punishment is not a public spectacle. Only a handful of individuals are allowed to attend. Secondly, capital punishment is not torture. As explained by Foucault (1995: 11):

Today a doctor must watch over those condemned to death, right up to the last moment ... When the moment of execution approaches, the patients are injected with tranquillisers ... [in order to] take life away, but prevent the patient from feeling it; deprive the prisoner of all rights, but do not inflict pain.

It is important however, to understand how Foucault saw the contrast between the different forms of punishment. To refer back to the previous section, Foucault did not see torture as the epitome of barbarism and he did not see the emergence of contemporary forms of punishment as a natural evolution from the horrendous practices of torture to more humane and moral forms of punishment. Rather Foucault sees the emergence of incarceration as a manifestation of widespread “practices of disciplining both individuals and populations” (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 153).

In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault sought to uncover the widespread societal practices of discipline and control that served to justify, rationalise and promote the entire institutional apparatus that developed together with the emergence of incarceration. It was not Foucault’s objective to uncover precisely the truth or the history behind the practices of torture and incarceration. Foucault saw incarceration and torture as two distinct punitive practices, supported and justified by specific discourses and disciplines, promoted and propagated by particular governmental mechanisms aimed at achieving different societal outcomes. Foucault was interested in incarceration precisely because he wanted to uncover the complex social function that it served (143).

This social function stems from what Foucault calls disciplinary power. In Foucault's understanding, disciplinary power emerged as part of a technology for governing individual conduct (Foucault, 1984: 338). This disciplinary technology first emerged together with the development of modern industrialised states and is tied in with broader socio-economic changes that occurred during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (338). The exact factors that lead to the emergence of disciplinary power are multifaceted and complex. Furthermore, it was not Foucault's intention to uncover the exact origin of knowledge or power (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 106). Rather, Foucault was interested in uncovering the manifestation of power and its overall directionality.

Disciplinary power is specifically settled on deviance (Gutting, 2013). Its focal point is reform and adjustment to the societal norms and standards of the contemporary world (Gutting, 2013). To this end, disciplinary power is "essentially corrective" (Foucault, 1995: 179). As stated by Foucault (170):

Discipline 'makes' individuals; it is the specific technique of power that regards individuals both as objects and as instruments of its exercise. It is not a triumphant power, which because of its own excess can pride itself on its omnipotence; it is a modest, suspicious power, which functions as a calculated, but permanent economy.

This type of power does not take the place of other forms of power in society, it infiltrates and colonises them and ramifies down to the smallest contours and details (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 153). It is driven to achieve certain societal outcomes, but these outcomes are not defined, promoted or championed by specific individuals or institutions (Gutting, 2013). Discipline is a governmental technique that may ramify through various institutions such as armies, prisons, hospitals, schools and law enforcement but it cannot be reduced to the operation of one specific institution alone (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 153).

In Foucault's juxtaposition of torture as a mode of punishment versus incarceration as a mode of punishment, he is not interested in uncovering the most effective, moral or rational type of punishment. Ultimately, the two different modes of punishment are embroiled in contrasting economies of power. Power, in this instance, is not a state structure and it is not an institution. Power is rather: "... the name that one attributes to a complex strategical relationship in a particular society" (Foucault, 1976: 93). The role of knowledge within this strategical relationship is very important. For Foucault, neither power nor knowledge can exist independently of the other (Foucault, 1995: 184). Knowledge and power are both part of the

same process (Ball, 1990: 5). As explained by Ball (5): “Knowledge does not reflect power relations but is immanent in them.” Thus, one cannot analyse the practices of power without simultaneously analysing the correlative and constitutive domains of knowledge that goes with it.

Although Foucault did not specifically make a methodological connection between objectification on the one side and disciplinary power on the other, one can clearly see the areas of confluence and how the different themes overlap on key points. The role of division, normalisation and classification can be connected directly to discipline as a technology of power. Within the sphere of incarceration there is, for example, a type of discourse that is considered as legitimate. There are classifications and definitions of criminality. There are specialised social scientific disciplines like criminology and psychology, and there are recognised practices of treatment, isolation, separation and reintegration. There is an entire rationale behind the prevalence of incarceration as a mode of punishment. This rationale is grounded within the interrelated relationship between knowledge and power.

The manifestation of power in societal practices is grounded in meticulous rituals, debates and discourses. It is tied to political governance, state structures and legal codes and procedures. Modes of punishment such as torture or incarceration did not emerge because these are the most natural or ethical forms of punishment and when one is studying punitive practices one is not studying the essential characteristics of a universal practice. The emergence of these forms of punishment are tied to political and historical developments and the socio-economic changes that occur through the passage of time. These changes and developments are not tied to humanity’s march of progress towards universal enlightenment, on the contrary these changes are grounded in particular economies of power. In order to come to an understanding of power, one has to focus on the meticulous rituals, discourses and diverse practices that emanate from it (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 188).

Power is not a hidden and enigmatic force that is unstoppable in its drive to usurp every aspect of human behaviour. Power can also not be equated to domination. Oppression, coercion and domination might be different instruments in the exercise of power, but these are not the foundation of power relationships (Lemke, 2000:3). Power is very much contained in its day to day operations. Power does not have essential characteristics that can be subjected to objective analysis. Power is not a ubiquitous force that secretly animates what we think and feel. It is not something concrete that could simply be isolated and removed.

The ultimate aim of power is not to normalise, objectify and subjugate all in its wake. In Foucault's conception, power does not corrupt, power creates. Power and knowledge are the constitutive elements that allow for societal relations to emerge, disperse and become entrenched in the day to day functioning of society (Foucault, 1995: 194). Foucault (1995: 194) explains that:

We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it 'excludes', it 'represses', it 'censors', it 'abstracts', it 'masks', it 'conceals'. In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production.

Foucault's intention was not to overthrow power or to liberate us from its influence. Foucault's intention was to provide us with an analytic of power; an analytic with which one can move toward understanding power in its contemporary manifestation and the manner in which the lives of individuals are impacted by this manifestation. Additionally, analysing power is about shedding light on the role played by the individual in the appropriation and propagation of the relations of power. By studying objectification, one is studying the interrelated relationship between technologies of power and technologies of the self (Lemke, 2000: 2). The next section is centred on Foucault's concept of governmentality. The concept ties all three modes of objectification together, and it places the three modes of objectification into the context of Foucault's broader project.

2.4) Governmentality

The goal in this section is to shed light on Foucault's concept of governmentality. As has already been discussed, power is not a hegemonic force and it does not fall under the control of specific institutions, state structures or individuals. According to Foucault, power is dispersed throughout society. Foucault's concept of governmentality will assist in establishing a more complete picture of how the modes of objectification are relevant in an analysis of contemporary society and also to understand the role played by power in driving objectification.

Foucault coined the term 'governmentality' in his lectures of 1978 and 1979 at the Collège de France (Lemke, 2000: 2). This concept is a key term in his overall philosophy as well as in his analyses of power (3). Foucault's understanding of government is broader than the modern notion of political government. He understands government as the "conduct of

conduct” which stretches from self-governance, to the governance of the family, to political governance and the governance of the state (2). In other words, the concept extends from “governing the self” to “governing others” (2). Foucault sees the development of the contemporary state and the emergence of the contemporary subject as a fundamentally interrelated process and he uses the concept of governmentality “to analyse the connections between what he called technologies of the self and technologies of domination, the constitution of the subject and the formation of the state” (Lemke, 2000: 2, 3; Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 143).

The general meaning of governmentality is aimed at analysing different mentalities of government (Fimyar, 2008: 4, 5). The concept merges governing, on the one side, and mentality on the other. Thereby, the fundamental linkage between the practices of government and the forms of knowledge that underpin the legitimacy of such practices is emphasised (5). In other words, governmentality is a guideline for analysing the complex relationship between different modes of thinking and different types of government (4). It emphasises and serves to explain the intimate relationship between “political reason and technologies of governance” (4).

In his lectures on governmentality, Foucault’s initial focus was on tracing the shift that occurred in Western Europe away from problems of territory toward problems of population; away from external threats to the state toward internal threats in relation to the populace (4, 5). Foucault explains this shift as passing from an art of government, which was informed by traditional virtues such as liberty, justice, wisdom, prudence, to an art of government grounded in its own rationality and its own processes which legitimised this rationality (Foucault, 2007: 364). The concept designates the entry of political economy into the different forms of knowledge related to the management of populations and territories (De Giorgi, 2006: 69). Foucault (1991: 102) defined governmentality as:

The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security.

For Foucault (102), governmentality signifies the long term tendency that has led to the pre-eminence of a certain type of power within western states. This type of power involves the implementation of a variety of governmental practices and the development of a complex

series of different types of knowledge (102). Within the context of governmentality, the government of a state means to “maximise the productive potentialities of the population, to enhance its welfare and to set up appropriate mechanisms for the scientific measurement of results – social statistics, census, national accounting and so on” (De Giorgi, 2006: 69). In other words, the governmentalisation of the state can be explained as the creation of a host of different practices that are constituted by organisational, constitutional, fiscal, and juridical strategies aimed at managing the health, habits and socio-economic behaviour of the population, as well as establishing the direct linkage between these practices and social scientific discourse (Rose, 1999, 18).

Thus, the concept refers to the manner in which power is rationalised through the social scientific discourses that form an integral part of its practices and its institutions (Fimyar, 2008: 6). For this reason, one cannot analyse government without analysing the forms of knowledge that provides its rational foundation (Lemke, 2000: 2). The concept highlights the “interdependence between governmental practices and mentalities of government that rationalise and often perpetuate existing practices of ‘conduct of conduct’” (Fimyar, 2008: 6). In other words, governmentality is a concept used to designate a manifestation of power which has resulted in the establishment of various governmental mechanisms centred on the governance of populations as well as the emergence of various forms of knowledge that serve to collect information pertaining to the societal aspects that these governmental mechanisms are centred on. These forms of knowledge underscore and legitimise the rationality of government and serve as a mechanism in their dispersal globally.

This link between governance on the one side and knowledge on the other was latent throughout Foucault’s discussions of the social sciences, dividing practices and the objectification of the self, but the significance of this link was never explicated. As with the medicalisation of sexual perversion or the stigmatisation of vagabondage and begging, the establishment of certain social scientific disciplines is tied centrally to governmental legitimisation and enforcement. The concept of governmentality designates the analysis of the complex governmental relationship within which truth, and its link to cultural, political, economic and social spheres, is produced and subsequently employed to pursue governmental objectives and strategies (4).

The central tenet of governmentality is the fact that it signifies a specific form of power that is underpinned by a type of rationality which defines what counts as objectives to be

achieved, as well as the appropriate methods to achieve such objectives (Lemke, 2000: 5). Governmentality is the “systematised, regulated and reflected modes of power that go beyond the spontaneous exercise of power over others, following a specific form of reasoning, which defines the telos of action or the adequate means to achieve it” (5). In other words, governmentality, and the different forms of knowledge associated with it, is a mode of power that defines what counts as problems, what counts as solutions and what counts as the acceptable steps to take in order to reach those solutions. In this way, governmentality drives and perpetuates its own prevalence.

In the context of governmentality, power and knowledge are inseparable. When it comes to the government of the state, one does not have discourse, truth and objective science on the one side and institutions, state structures and political authority on the other. The link between power and knowledge is the fundamental characteristic that enables specific manifestations of power to emerge and entrench themselves in society. In this context, objectification is not a form of power and it is not the ultimate objective that power is driving towards. Objectification is a tool in the exercise of power in contemporary society and it facilitates and catalyses the governmentalisation of the state.

Modern forms of knowledge such as psychology and criminology render human beings as objectifiable, analysable and classifiable objects of social scientific knowledge (Madigan, 1992: 267). As previously argued, these disciplines establish parameters and classifications that demarcate normal and abnormal behaviour, which is entrenched within certain governmental structures such as punitive institutions. Scientific classification inevitably leads to the revelation of a set of anomalies that do not fit into the framework of normality as espoused within social scientific discourse. The existence of these anomalies acts as a catalyst for increased research and the propagation and normalisation of social scientific discourse throughout various sectors of society. These sciences are promoted and justified on the basis that the knowledge contained within them is directly tied to the universally acceptable parameters of the natural sciences, whilst in actual fact these sciences are driven by political ideologies, cultural biases and economic exigencies.

The locus of this entire process is the individual subject, but individuals are not mindless actors that accept any form of discourse that they come across. Discourse and knowledge emerge out of struggles and disagreements. It is not the uniform acceptance of true knowledge. Individuals play a key role in the appropriation of different systems of rules that

delineate the legitimate forms of discourse from illegitimate. In order to understand the contemporary subject, one thus has to come to grips with the manner in which the subject is situated within the relations of power that permeate society as well as the manner in which individuals are key apparatuses in the propagation of power.

The concept of governmentality provides one with the semantic connection which stresses the importance of the individual subject in the legitimisation and dispersal of power in society, but in addition to this the concept explains the fundamentally western trend that has emerged during the past couple of hundred years that saw the establishment of a specific type of power that has achieved pre-eminence in the global political environment. This type of power centres on the governance of population and that establishment of a whole host of different mechanisms and discourses that justify and propel this form of governance globally. As explained by Fimyar (2008: 4):

Governmentality studies also explore the relations between the forms and rationalities of power and the processes of subjectivation (formation of governable subjects/citizens) and subjectification (formation of individual existence) by problematising, or calling into question, the particular aspects of who can govern, what governing is and what or who is governed and how.

The concept provides one with the framework through which the normatively accepted understanding of the state can be deconstructed and problematised (4). This deconstruction allows one to unpack the role and nature of discourse and knowledge in the governance of individuals and populations. It allows one to tie modes of governance in with the different forms of knowledge that underscore their rationality and, fundamentally, it allows one to deconstruct the truths that have been fostered into existence through the historical and cultural development of societies. Without these truths, contemporary forms of government cease to retain their legitimacy and relevance.

2.5) Conclusion

The aim in this chapter was to provide a brief overview of some of the important themes in Foucault's work. As stated in the introduction, Foucault's work is diverse and multifaceted and the intention was not to provide an exhaustive summary of everything. The intention was to highlight the key themes that would make a critical analysis of contemporary anti-corruption discourse and practices prudent and possible.

The modes of objectification is a good framework for understanding the manner in which the individual is objectified in contemporary society. Social scientific knowledge, for example, is centred on specific societal phenomena that are perceived to be a key problems of concern not only for scientists but also for governmental and political actors. The knowledge that is produced about phenomena is fostered into academic disciplines, which are entrenched within governmental institutions and procedures designed to combat the specific malaise that the social scientific discourse is centred on. No matter how much these social scientific disciplines struggle to eradicate the constant stream of anomalies that they are confronted with, the very existence of these anomalies serves to vindicate the programmes of intervention as well as academic study into the phenomenon involved.

The role of dividing practices is paramount in the establishment and dispersal of social scientific knowledge. For any social scientific discipline to gain traction, there has to be categories of understanding. Before a social scientific knowledge can establish itself, there has to be a division between what is normal and what is abnormal, between the healthy and the sick, between the corrupt and the ethical and so forth. The dividing practice is not merely the division between theoretical concepts. Dividing practices also involve the very implementation of the divisions fostered by social scientific discourse. For example, when it comes to mental illness, for the good of the individual and the good of society, the psychologically disturbed have to be separated and isolated from the rest of society. Their abnormalities have to be addressed and normalised within an isolated setting. In this way, dividing practices are fundamentally ingrained within the establishment of social scientific discourse and the institutional arrangements that follow.

The individual is the object and the subject of this process. The knowledge that is found in social scientific discourse is based on the individual's thoughts, emotions, interactions and behaviours. The individual might be objectified by dividing practices and social scientific discourse, but he is not necessarily subjugated. Social scientific knowledge emerges out of the interaction between individuals within society. The truths contained in social scientific discourse is not discovered in the external world and then applied on ailing and malfunctioning societies. Truth is systematically constructed and fostered into existence. It is subject to the historical development of societies, which is influenced by a variety of factors including cultural and economic dynamics. In other words, the individual plays a fundamental role in the establishment and dispersal of social scientific knowledge. The individual is not a blind actor that unthinkingly accepts any knowledge that crosses his or her

path. Individuals grapple with and internalise knowledge and thereby drive their own normalisation.

At this point, one is driven to ask, what drives the directionality of knowledge? It is clear that there are coherent practices that have developed over time to become entrenched within the very way that people live and think in society. Knowledge is not merely based on a set of random phenomena and social scientists do not arbitrarily select which phenomena to investigate. This is where Foucault's link between power and knowledge comes in. Knowledge cannot exist independently from the relations of power and vice versa. Disciplinary power, for example, is fundamentally ingrained with a particular conception of deviance. Without this conception and without the entire social scientific discipline that grounds this conception, disciplinary power would not have developed in the way that it has.

Power, in this context, is grounded in meticulous rituals and procedures. When it comes to medieval torture, for example, there were countless practices and discourses that grounded the legitimacy and rationality of it as a mode of punishment. There were codes and rules that designated appropriate punishments for specific crimes and transgressions. These practices were rationalised through knowledge, but this knowledge was not tied to objective discourse. Rather, the discourse that rationalised torture as a mode of punishment was tied to cultural and social characteristics which emerged through the historical development of medieval society. Thus, torture as a mode of punishment, emerged out of a specific cultural and societal context, and the knowledge that surrounds it does not stem from objective or scientific thought, but rather it emerged as a necessary requirement for the mode of punishment to retain its legitimacy and relevance. Therefore, the punitive practice of torture emerged in order to serve a societal function that stretched further than punishment alone. Torture formed part of an economy of power that played an integral role in the structure and governance of medieval society.

Ultimately, however, one has to be able to understand why power and knowledge have developed in the way that they have as well as the impact that this development has had on societies and individuals. But, more fundamentally, one needs to uncover the direction that power is working towards. Foucault's concept of governmentality is an excellent tool to assist in this regard. Governmentality ties the modes of objectification together by highlighting the fundamental interconnectedness between modes of thought and modes of governance.

It is important to remember that Foucault was first and foremost a historian of thought. Through his various analyses and investigations he sought to come to grips with the manner in which man is constituted and constitutes himself as a thinking being. Thought, as Foucault understands it, is broader than the “universal categories of logic” (Foucault, 1988: 9, 10). In other words, the manner in which the characteristics of human thought has been unpacked in contemporary analyses of logic does not adequately take into account the role played by social history in framing discourse and knowledge. In this context, human beings are not wholly subjugated by hegemonic forces of power, but they are also not completely free to pursue self-determination. Similarly, the knowledge that is created and dispersed by human beings is not the sole product of power, but in saying that, knowledge is also not entirely centred on uncovering and presenting the objectively understandable aspects of human interaction and society. There is a versatile equilibrium between the practices of power and the practices of the self.

Governmentality, as a methodological tool, allows one to investigate the reciprocity that exists between the governance of the state, the governance of the self, and the government of others. It allows one to understand the role played by power in framing the type of knowledge and discourse that is rational within a particular societal setting and how this knowledge is used and employed to further the reaches of power. Now, from the perspective of the historian of thought one does not delve into history to uncover the truth of how individuals and societies lived in the past. One does not seek objective knowledge about how ancient societies were structured, how individuals engaged with each other or how their political systems were organised. The orientation of the historian of thought is always contemporary. One delves into history to understand how past politics, discourses and governmental practices impacted the development of the contemporary situation. Governmentality, in the context of the three modes of objectification and disciplinary power, constitutes a methodological lens through which one can analyse the fundamentally interrelated relationship between power, knowledge and individual subject within contemporary society.

Before one can use Foucault’s work to analyse the anti-corruption industry, however, it is important to trace the historical development of anti-corruption discourse. The next chapter provides a genealogical account of the development of anti-corruption discourse and its consolidation in the 1990s.

Chapter 3: The Genealogy of Anti-corruption discourse

3.1) Introduction

The goal in this chapter is to provide an account of the development of anti-corruption discourse from the perspective of the historian of thought. As stated in Chapter 2, it is not Foucault's intention to uncover the truth contained in history; his intention is to uncover the manner in which historical circumstances have influenced the emergence of contemporary knowledge and practices, and how these have had an impact on the formation of the contemporary subject. Foucault is interested in uncovering the manner in which disparate and sometimes contradictory forms of knowledge contributed to contemporary practices, sciences and politics. In other words, Foucault delves into history, not in order to understand the past, but to understand the present; with the end goal being to come to grips with the role that power plays in the deployment and justification of truth (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 118, 119).

Importantly, however, before one can move toward analysing the role of power in the contemporary world, one needs to analyse the historical development of the forms of knowledge and governmental practices that underscore the emergence of this form of power. To this end, genealogy is a key conceptual tool that Foucault uses to analyse the history of particular forms of discourse and practices that these are associated with. Foucault (1995: 152) explains that, the role of genealogy is to record "... the history of morals, ideas and metaphysical concepts." The examination of descent allows one to investigate the multitude of causes and effects that influenced the development and formation of a certain concept (146). The genealogical perspective is opposed to the traditional historical method as history is not viewed in terms of continuous development and progress (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 106). On the contrary, for the genealogist, underneath all knowledge and truth lies interpretation (107). Therefore, it is the task of the genealogist to record the history of interpretation (107).

Before one can subject the contemporary anti-corruption industry to a Foucauldian analysis, it is important to trace the historical development of anti-corruption discourse. To this end, this chapter provides a genealogical account of the evolution of anti-corruption discourse and its consolidation through the emergence of the anti-corruption industry. Additionally, the primary criticisms that have been levelled against the industry are also addressed. The goal is to trace the development of anti-corruption discourse since the 1950s in order to come to

grips with the themes and theories that permeate contemporary anti-corruption knowledge and practices. This will allow for a more in-depth Foucauldian analysis of the anti-corruption industry, which will follow in Chapter 4.

The discourse centred on corruption has evolved and adapted over the passage of time, but if one looks back over the past 60 years, two instances of increased proliferation can be identified. It could be said that anti-corruption discourse has disseminated in two waves. The first wave was during the 1950s and 1960s when widespread decolonisation and democratisation sparked a debate about the extent of corruption and its potential impact on newly democratised states. This time period saw the corruption discourse undergo significant changes as a multitude of different interpretations emerged; interpretations that varied depending on the academic disciplines they stem from, and the specific types of corruption they seek to address.

The second wave of anti-corruption discourse occurred in the 1990s, when, as the Cold War subsided, the gaze of the international community turned back to corruption (Kuris, 2012: 1). As explained in Chapter 1, this was followed by an eruption of anti-corruption discourse and the issue catapulted to the forefront of the global agenda. As such, corruption was elevated to one of the primary explanatory factors for the widespread problems that persisted in the developing world, as well as states that were part of the former Soviet Union (Le Billon, 2003: 424, Bukovansky, 2006: 182; Brown & Cloke, 2004: 280). Anti-corruption discourse was consolidated in the 1990s with the emergence of the anti-corruption industry. As the industry developed, the theories centred on the subject became more standardised as the actors involved in the field sought a workable definition that could be applied in a diverse range of constituencies. The result was that Joseph Nye's (1967: 419) definition became the primary manner in which corruption is defined and understood. Nye (419) defined corruption as: "... behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private regarding." As such, with the emergence of the anti-corruption industry and through the proliferation of neoliberal discourse (which, as will be demonstrated, undergirds Nye's definition), the international consensus around the problem of corruption was entrenched and corruption was cast as a public sector problem with a detrimental impact on economic development.

It can be said that the criticisms against the anti-corruption industry have mirrored the development of the mainstream anti-corruption discourse. On the one side, contemporary

anti-corruption discourse has been criticised for being overly ambiguous in defining the concept and, on the other side, anti-corruption discourse has been criticised for utilising the neoliberal definition, which is said to be a normative oversimplification. The goal in this chapter is not to reconcile these different critical perspectives into a unified anti-corruption critique; rather the goal is to sketch a pathway toward analysing the role that anti-corruption discourse and practices play on the international political scene. In other words, the goal is not to criticise anti-corruption industry or to lay bare its failure to address the prevalence of corruption; the objective is to utilise Foucault's genealogical methodology to analyse the role that the anti-corruption industry plays in the sphere of international governance.

This chapter is divided into five main sections. Section 2.2 focuses on the main arguments that characterised anti-corruption discourse in the period from the 1950s up until the early 1990s. The objective in this section is to sketch the development of the discourse around the subject and highlight some of the main themes that constitute the foundation of contemporary anti-corruption discourse. Section 2.3 is focused on the plurality of the concept of corruption. The concept has remained ambiguous and indeterminate despite the fact that anti-corruption discourse was consolidated in the 1990s. The concept refers to a wide range of different behaviours; behaviours that are linked to a multitude of different impacts, causes and motivations. This has made the implementation of anti-corruption programmes, as well as measuring the impact of such programmes, highly problematic. This is one aspect of the anti-corruption industry that has been subjected to criticism. Additionally, the industry has been criticised for its ties to neoliberal ideology. Section 2.4 highlights these criticisms in more detail.

Section 2.5 is centred on the emergence of the fight against corruption as a globally entrenched industry. Sampson (2010) has gone some way to explain the manner in which the anti-corruption industry has come to be established and how this industry has expanded despite the criticisms that have been levelled against it. For Sampson (2010), anti-corruption has become industrialised on the international political landscape, which has made it largely autonomous in its growth and expansion. Sampson's (2010) argument places the broader field into perspective and opens the way for a Foucauldian analysis of anti-corruption discourses and practices.

3.2) The evolution of Anti-corruption Discourse

Foucault (1977: 145) states of history that it “is the concrete body of development, with its moments of intensity, its lapses, its extended periods of feverish agitations [and] its fainting spells.” One can think of the history of corruption in a similar way. There have been times when the topic occupied a preeminent space on the international agenda and there have been extended periods where it faded, almost entirely, out of view. The theories centred on defining the concept has gone through remarkable changes over the past fifty to sixty years. Similarly there have been a multitude of different approaches implemented to curb its prevalence.

Academic study into the topic first gained international attention during the 1950s and 1960s (Farrales, 2005: 6). This was a period of widespread decolonisation and many newly independent states underwent a process of democratisation (6). The implementation of democratic practises highlighted the extent of corruption in developing states and the issue was thereby catapulted into international political and academic discussions (6). The debates that raged during this time can be classified into two different schools of thought; the ‘moralists’ on the one side and the ‘revisionists’ on the other (6, 7). According to the moralists corruption can be seen as a problem of ethical and moral deficiency (Theobald, 1999: 492). Revisionists, on the other hand, characterise the problem as a side effect of economic development, and as unique to the socio-economic development of specific states (Farrales, 2005: 6, 7).

From the moralist perspective, authors such as Ronald Wraith and Edgar Simpkins argue that corruption, in any manifestation, is inevitably detrimental to economic growth, social cohesion and political development (Theobald, 1999: 492). The authors state that corruption in Africa: “... flourishes as luxuriantly as the bush and weeds which it so much resembles, taking the goodness from the soil and suffocating the growth of plants which have been carefully, and expensively, bred and tended” (492). For Wraith and Simpkins, corruption in Africa is a “jungle of nepotism and temptation” (Leys, 1965: 216). From this perspective, the prevalence of corruption is attributable to the breakdown or absence of social values and norms, and stems from excessive greed for wealth and material gain (Theobald, 1999: 492). The authors contrast the widespread corruption in Africa with the relative absence of corruption in England (491, 492). Wraith and Simpkins want to sketch the path that England followed to eradicate corruption during the preceding 200 years in order to come to grips with the issues that prevented African states from doing the same (491, 492). In this work,

African countries are depicted as lagging behind their European counterparts in ethical and social development.

From the revisionist perspective, authors such as Samuel Huntington (1968) argue that corruption is an inevitable symptom of the process of modernisation and industrialisation. In this perspective the prevalence of corruption is bound with different political, social and economic realities that are linked with the historical development of specific societies (Theobald, 1999: 492). In some cases, it is even argued that corruption has the potential to have positive effects on economic development (Brown & Cloke, 2004: 280). Huntington (1968: 68), for example, argues that corruption can play a role in stimulating economic activity by bypassing unnecessary regulations and red tape.

Despite these differences, both the moralists and the revisionists see corruption as a symptom of “backwardness”, whether due to political, social or economic circumstances (Brown & Cloke, 2004: 280). It is seen as a distinctive trait of “... immature societies who need tutoring by those institutions and peoples who had already learned to live by the norms of the modern developed state” (2004: 2). The developed states of the western world are depicted as the ideal toward which the developing states should aspire. Therefore, whether it has to do with social values or economic growth, it is thought that corruption would be systematically traversed as states progress through modernisation (280). During this era, corruption was seen as a growing pain on the path toward industrialisation and economic growth.

The revisionist perspective was challenged during the 1970s by authors such as Rose-Ackerman (1978) and Anne Krueger (1974). These authors argue that corruption is an individual choice rather than a structural component in the modernisation process (Farrales, 2005: 7). From this perspective the act of corruption is seen as a calculated decision made in the pursuit of individual benefit (7). Corruption is seen as an economic choice which is motivated by the same factors as any other economic choice, personal interest (Bracking, 2007: 10). In this context, corruption is thought to be driven by the inherently self-interested nature of individuals and the existence of rents and incentives catalyses corrupt behaviour (10). Furthermore, in contrast to the revisionist perspective, it is argued that corruption has primarily negative consequences and it comes at the expense of society as a whole.

Arguments such as the principal-agent theory and Klitgaard’s corruption equation originated from this perspective. According to the principal-agent theory, corruption may occur when there are diverging interests between principals and agents (Kurer, 2005: 226). In this

conception, corruption takes place when the civil servant betrays the interest of the public in pursuit of their own self-interest (226). In other words, corruption may occur when the interests of principals and agents are not aligned and when the actions of agents cannot be adequately monitored by the principals (Shapiro, 2005: 271). The principal-agent theory places emphasis on the “rational choices of individuals” (Marquette & Peiffer, 2015: 2). From this perspective, it is highly likely that agents will engage in corruption if there is minimal oversight of their behaviour, if there are sufficient incentives to engage in corruption, and if there are minimal risks involved.

For Klitgaard (2008: 3), corruption is an economic crime and its occurrence depends on economic calculations made by the parties involved. Klitgaard (3) explains that “[t]he corrupt individual will proceed if the benefit minus the moral cost minus the probability of being caught times the expected penalty is greater than zero.” Klitgaard (3) distilled this explanation into a formula for corrupt systems: $C = M + D - A$. A system is prone to corruption (C) when individuals have monopolistic power (M) over specific services or goods, as well as the discretion (D) to determine exactly what the payment of the good of service will be (3). At the same time, there are no adequate procedures in place to hold individuals accountable (A) for their actions (3). In other words, “Corruption equals monopoly plus discretion minus accountability” (3). This equation, together with the principal-agent theory has been a core component of contemporary anti-corruption discourse (Forgues-Puccio, 2013: 2; Marquette & Peiffer, 2015: 2).

Other theories contrasting the principal-agent approach have also emerged. The concept of patrimonialism has been used to explain the persistent corruption in African politics (Bracking, 2007: 8). Patrimonialism was first conceived by the sociologist Max Weber in 1947 to explain situations where the line between private and public is blurred, non-existent or not clearly delineated (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2002: 7; Theobald, 1999: 492). In a patrimonial system “a government office is treated as a type of income-generating property” (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2002: 7). It can be defined as a system of government within which state administrative personnel are solely accountable to the political leadership and “government jobs are treated as income producing personal assets” (40). Weber contrasted this with western “rational-legal systems of public management, characterized by a graded hierarchy, written documentation, salaried, full-time staff and political neutrality” (7).

In recent times, many developing states have put into place structures that resemble the rational-legal state administrations of western countries, but the foundations of this administrative system is characterised by patrimonial rule (8). This system of government has come to be called “neopatrimonialism” (40). These systems are characterised by decentralisation and an informal hierarchy of rules and norms (7). Within many African states, neopatrimonialism is not at the periphery of governmental administration; it is at the very centre (9). As explained by Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (9): “[t]hese hybrid systems represent an effort by elites to adjust to and manipulate the rational-legal arrangements they inherited from the colonial powers” (9). In this context, corruption forms part of the fabric of political governance. It is a day to day occurrence and many individuals partake in corruption because there is no alternative.

This idea that corruption can become embedded within society has led some authors to suggest that anti-corruption discourse centred on the principal-agent model is ineffective in situations where corruption is widespread and pervasive (Persson, *et al.*, 2013: 450, 458). In this context, corruption is a “... qualitatively different problem, embedded in political and economic systems in ways that both reflect its impact and help sustain its force” (Johnston, 1997: 86). In short, the argument goes that when corruption is systemic and it constitutes a normal part of life, people may be unwilling or unable to implement reforms or sanctions (Marquette & Peiffer, 2015). Individuals may not want to report corrupt behaviour if there are not adequate whistleblowing procedures in place and if reporting corruption may be riskier than engaging in corruption. In other words, it is argued that anti-corruption solutions based on the principle-agent theory become ineffective in situations where there are no “principled principals” willing to hold corrupt individuals accountable (Persson, *et al.*, 2013: 450).

The collective action theory has become an alternative approach for dealing with the problem of systemic corruption (Marquette & Peiffer, 2015). Even though the collective action theory has been around since 1965, when it was first conceived by Mancur Olson, the topic has only recently transitioned into a policy issue relevant for anti-corruption (Pieth, 2012: 9). In contrast to the principal-agent theory, the collective action theory does not depict corruption as merely a choice made by individuals in pursuit of their own personal and economic interest. Rather, collective action theory stresses that corruption occurs within a broader context, which may serve to justify or incentivise an individual’s engagement in corrupt behaviour (Marquette & Peiffer, 2015: 3). Marquette and Peiffer explain that:

Collective action theory highlights the relevance to individuals' decisions of group dynamics, including trust in others and the (actual or perceived) behaviour of others. When corruption is seen as 'normal', people may be less willing to abstain from corruption or to take the first step in implementing sanctions or reforms. This theory highlights the challenges of coordinated anticorruption efforts.

Anti-corruption measures from a collective action perspective take the form of partnerships between private and public actors and "multi-stakeholder initiatives" (Pieth, 2012: 9). It entails cooperation and coordination between various state and non-state actors. In other words, collective action theory highlights the collective and systemic nature of corruption, and it stresses the difficulty of alleviating corruption in societies where norms and values reinforce and entrench persistent corruption (Marquette & Peiffer, 2015: 3).

To summarise, discourse centred on corruption has evolved and adapted through the passage of time. The period from the 1950s to the early 1990s was characterised by numerous different approaches, interpretations and definitions. Some of these approaches have areas of confluence, while others contrast each other starkly. This made anti-corruption literature highly diverse and multifaceted, but it has also had the effect of making the field ambiguous and indeterminate. The diversity of the discourse was consolidated during the 1990s with the emergence of the anti-corruption industry, as I will demonstrate in section 3.5 of this chapter. This consolidation did not, however, result in conceptual refinement. This means that, despite the emergence of a more uniform international field centred on corruption, the concept remains difficult to clarify and authors are divided on the scope of behaviour included in its ambit. The next section is centred on the plurality of the concept of corruption.

3.3) Conceptual Plurality

As stated in the previous section, the multifaceted nature of anti-corruption discourse was consolidated during the 1990s, when the fight against corruption emerged as a global industry. At the core of this consolidation was a refined definition of corruption. As the anti-corruption industry emerged, a workable definition of corruption was required. This definition had to be universal to the extent that it could be applied in a diverse range of states and cultural constituencies. Thereby, Joseph Nye's definition of corruption, which was coined in the 1960s, became one of the primary ways in which corruption was understood (Farrales, 2005: 17).

In his article, ‘Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis’, Joseph Nye (1967: 419) defined corruption as: “... behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private regarding.” This definition is based on three primary assumptions. Firstly, it is assumed that private versus public interests exist independently and are mutually exclusive (Bratsis, 2003: 11). Secondly, it is assumed that public officials can only fulfil their role properly if they remove themselves from the private sphere (11). Thirdly, it is assumed that corruption primarily comes to the fore in the public sphere. According to Bratsis (15) this definition means that:

Private interests and public interests are both perfectly fine, as long as they stay in their proper places. Once we have the contamination of the public by private, politicians and politics itself becomes dirty, tainted, infected and thus corrupt.

It is important to note that Nye’s definition is not the only definition utilised in the anti-corruption field. According to Farrales (2005: 24, 25), however, this definition has become the primary way in which the actors involved in the field define corruption. The majority of organisations involved in the field specifically refer to the actions of public figures, politicians and bureaucrats when they talk about corruption (Everett, *et al.*, 2006: 3). Organisations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund almost exclusively refer to the public sector when they talk about corruption, with corruption alleviation efforts firmly grounded in anti-state rhetoric (Brown & Cloke, 2004: 287; Everett, *et al.*, 2006: 6, 7). Importantly, however, the consolidation of the anti-corruption discourse did not result in a more refined concept. It is indeed the case that the broader discourse around the subject moved from plurality to consolidation, but the concept itself has remained open-ended. As stated by Johnston (1997: 89): “Despite the fact that most people, most of the time, know corruption when they see it, defining the concept does raise difficult theoretical and empirical questions.”

The concept refers to a host of different behaviours linked to a diverse range of motivations and settings. The main types of corruption include bribery, fraud, abuse of power, embezzlement, favouritism, nepotism, extortion, misappropriation of funds and insider trading (Andvig & Fjeldstad, 2001: 8; Bracking, 2007: 4). Additional forms of corruption include petty, bureaucratic, political, grand, systemic, private-to-public, fiscal and official (Everett, *et al.*, 2006: 3). Caiden *et al.* (2001) even go so far to suggest that there are sixty different acts that can be labelled as corrupt.

These different acts are linked to different motivations and occur in different situations and locations. For example, petty corruption refers to exchange of small amounts of money or minor favours (Brunelle-Quraishi, 2011: 102). It would be petty corruption if a police officer is bribed to avoid a traffic offence. Grand corruption refers to corruption involving high-ranking officials and involves large sums of money (102). It is grand corruption, for example, when a government official receives a large kickback for the allocation of a tender to a specific company. Active corruption refers to the act of offering a bribe, and passive corruption involves the act of accepting a bribe (102). These different acts are not only associated with financial gain. An individual can engage in corruption without expecting financial profit as there can be interpersonal, political or ideological motivations (Brown & Cloke, 2004: 282).

The reported impact of corruption is similarly broad. Corruption is said to have a major impact on economic growth and development (Everett, *et al.*, 2006: 1, 2). It is stated that corruption has detrimental effects on governmental revenues, governance structures and rule of law (3). Corruption is thought to especially affect the “poorest and most marginalised sectors of society” (Brown & Cloke, 2004: 274). It is said that corruption undermines “good governance” and it distorts “standards of merit” (Everett, *et al.*, 2006: 3). Some additional reported impacts include increased public investment, decreased efficiency of institutions and public services, lower quality infrastructure and ineffective public administration (Everett, *et al.*, 2006: 3; Brown & Cloke, 2004: 274). Furthermore, it is argued that corruption “promotes the illegal export of resources, encourages conspicuous consumption, and generates distrust” (Everett, *et al.*, 2006: 3). Corruption is also said to “breed cynicism” and “criminality” (Brown & Cloke, 2004: 274). Some authors even suggest that there are illegal, as well as legal, forms of corruption. Kaufmann and Vicente (2005: 2) contend that:

Legal lobbying contributions by the private sector in exchange for passage of particular legislation - biased in favour of those agents - or allocation of procurement contracts may be regarded as examples of interaction of both private and public sector representatives where the second makes use of her publicly invested power at the expense of broader public welfare.

Thus, the concept is linked to a variety of different settings, locations, institutions and organisations; all of which have an influence on underlying motivations and eventual impacts (Everett, *et al.*, 2006: 5). Much of this plurality can be attributed to the diversity of the

discourse leading up to the 1990s. As discussed in section 2.2, when international interest was first sparked about corruption in the 1950s and 1960s, there was an influx of new theories and arguments. As such the discourse around the subject became highly multifaceted, which means that corruption, as a concept, became encumbered referring to an endless array of different behaviours. Even though the discourse was consolidated in the 1990s, the concept has remained indeterminate. This means that contemporary anti-corruption discourse is characterised by conceptual plurality on the one side and definitional uniformity on the other.

It is these two aspects that have generally attracted the majority of the criticism against anti-corruption. In the next section these criticisms are highlighted.

3.4) Corruption, Neoliberalism and Critique

The criticisms against anti-corruption have generally come in two categories. On the one side, the concept is criticised for being overly ambiguous and indeterminate. On the other side, critics argue that the reigning definition of corruption is oversimplified and linked to normative neoliberal ideology. In the first line of criticism authors such as Brown and Cloke (2004: 277) argue that there remains “considerable problems in defining what exactly is meant by the term corruption itself.” According to Sampson (2010: 262), corruption is a “slippery concept, summarising a whole gamut of attitudes and practices.” Similarly, Everett, *et al.* (2006: 1) contend that the problem of corruption and its solution is very difficult to uncover due to the numerous impacts and causes that is found in the literature. Marquette (1999: 1215) echoes this position and argues that “no matter how many times it is prodded, poked at or pulled apart, more questions than answers seem to arise from the literature”. For Everett, *et al.* (2006: 1) something that adds further complexity to the already over saturated discourse is the fact that “the ethical dispositions of those working in the anticorruption field are complex, sometimes contradictory, and often hidden.” This means that the concept is used in a variety of different contexts and is linked to a variety of different behaviours.

This has indeed been cited as a significant problem for the anti-corruption field. Conceptual ambiguity is not merely a peripheral issue; different interpretations of the problem have fundamental implications for the eventual outcomes of research projects, as well as the impact of alleviation efforts (Kurer, 2005: 222). For Brown and Cloke (2004: 282), the indeterminate nature of the concept has meant that it is used “as a basic descriptor for a myriad of behaviours loosely linked by some sense of breaking laws, illicit personal

enrichment or the abuse of power/privilege.” According to Sampson (2010: 266) this has made corruption a phenomenon which is immensely difficult to measure, record, research and document accurately.

According to Everett, *et al.* (2006: 7) this ambiguity enables different groups to problematise various different phenomena in different ways. The concept has thus become a “free-floating signifier”, with different definitions and solutions being pushed by different groups motivated by preferred outcomes rather than the reduction of corruption (7). In other words, the plurality of the concept has enabled different individuals, organisations and activists to characterise the problem in a very interest specific manner, and to further their specific goals.

In the second line of criticism, critics claim that the drive to fight corruption is a direct extension of western neoliberal norms and values and that the anti-corruption field takes the promotion of market economics at face value. Indeed, many of the anti-corruption initiatives that have been implemented since the early 1990s have direct ties to neoliberal theory (Ivanov, 2007: 28). With the emergence of the second wave of anti-corruption discourse, and the establishment of an industry dedicated to fighting corruption, the discourse centred on the subject became consolidated around Nye’s definition of corruption. It is the fact that this consolidation occurred on the basis of a neoliberal definition of corruption that has attracted the majority of the criticism against the industry.

Bratsis (2003: 17), for example, argues that the contemporary anti-corruption discourse takes the division between the private sphere and the public sphere “as a quality immanent in all societies” (Bratsis: 2003: 17). This division between the public sphere and the private sphere is, however, a characteristic element of the historical development of western states, which means that it stems from cultural and societal norms (Brown & Cloke, 2004; Bukovansky, 2006: 183; De Maria, 2010: 117; Robbins, 2000: 425). Critics argue that this normative dimension is not taken into account by the reigning internationally focused anti-corruption discourse (Bukovansky, 2006: 183; De Maria, 2010: 117; Brown & Cloke, 2004).

For Bukovansky (2006: 183, 184), the fact that the normative component is negated allows anti-corruption activists to evade key questions around the ethicality of the fight against corruption and therefore the “... ends of modernity, particularly economic growth and a governing structure that maximizes individual rights, are taken as given and unproblematic.” For De Maria (2010: 118, 119), corruption is targeted “not so much for the injustices it extracts from ordinary people, but for the structural problems it could cause private

investment.” For Brown and Cloke (2004: 282) the increased interest in anti-corruption has originated from the “development mainstream which unthinkingly accepts the neoliberal mantra of pursuing liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation as goals in their own right, despite mounting evidence of their role in accentuating the opportunities for corruption.” Brown and Cloke (285) continue to state that the contemporary approach is “limited to explaining how the activities of public servants distort the efficient functioning of markets.” Similarly, De Maria (2010: 119) criticises anti-corruption as part of the strategy of Western donors to facilitate democratisation, as well as economic liberalisation. These arguments against anti-corruption have led authors such as Bracking (2007: 3) to assert that the campaign against corruption may very well be “one of the final episodes in a redundant development intervention paradigm, illustrating as it does the weaknesses in conception, delivery, resources and context that accompany the expert-led, sanitised, technocratic and medicalised view of the development subject and process.”

For Bukovansky (2006: 182), it is important, however, to consider the manner in which the contemporary fight against corruption has been framed. The international anti-corruption consensus evokes an explicit appeal to the “moral underpinnings” of a successful market economy (182, 183). Anti-corruption is promoted as a “global moral project” (Sampson, 2010: 265). The prevalence of corruption elicits widespread moral condemnation from international actors and the solutions proposed are not merely justified for their potential economic gains, but also for the inherent ethicality that is attached to the fight against corruption. This makes the fight against corruption different in the sense that neoliberal economics is promoted not only for its functionality and utility, but also for its intrinsic morality.

This explicit appeal to the ethicality of market economics is illustrated by the manner in which organisations such as Transparency International and the World Bank have characterised the problem. Arguably one of the best examples is the manner in which the previous World Bank president, James Wolfenson, focused the world’s attention on the “cancer” of corruption and revealed the widespread consequences it has on economic growth and development (De Speville, 2010: 49). More recently a similar argument was echoed by the current World Bank president, Jim Yong Kim, who stated that: “In the developing world, corruption is public enemy number one” (World Bank, 2013). At the 2016 Anti-Corruption Summit, Mr Kim also cited the “zero tolerance” that the World Bank has for corruption, and he called for more cooperation to address the “scourge of corruption” (World Bank, 2016).

Similarly, Transparency International refers specifically to moral aspects of the fight against corruption in its strategies to counter corruption (Gebel, 2012). The organisation defines ethics as “[b]ased on core values, a set of standards for conduct in government, companies and society that guides decisions, choices and actions” and integrity as compliance with “relevant national laws” and ethical standards (Gebel, 2012: 114). For Transparency International, ethics is nothing more than compliance with a certain set of laws and standards. In other words, Transparency International’s conception of human nature frames morality and integrity in terms of rules and rule following behaviour (Gebel, 2012).

On the basis of the above, one could argue that within organisations such as Transparency International and the World Bank, human nature is defined as mechanistic, rational and self-interested (Gebel, 2012: 109; Brown & Cloke, 2004: 289). Corruption is taken as a technocratic problem which can be eradicated through the implementation of “toolkits” formulated along the line of “one-size-fits-all” approaches (Bratsis, 2006: 29; Persson, *et al.*, 2013: 451). In this context, corruption is seen as something that can be solved by establishing disincentives for corrupt behaviour (Gebel, 2012: 109; Brown & Cloke, 2004: 289). The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have anti-corruption strategies centred on economic growth, structural adjustment, efficiency and the promotion of individual “economic rights and freedoms” (Everett, *et al.*, 2006: 6). In this context, fighting corruption is about institutional reforms and the establishment of rules, economic policies, laws and codes of behaviour, as well as oversight mechanisms, in order to ensure compliance (Gebel, 2012: 109; Brown & Cloke, 2004: 289). The goal is to increase the risk of, and penalty for, engaging in corrupt behaviour. The solution to the problem of corruption is thought to lie in proper management and proper governance (Bratsis, 2006: 29). In this way, it is thought that the “public interest could be realized” if greed is kept in check through the implementation of specific policies and procedures (29).

Thus, despite the specific moral undertones that characterises anti-corruption discourse, the neutral language of economics is used to understand the issue at hand and to formulate solutions (Bukovansky, 2006: 183). This means that there is an ahistorical understanding of political phenomena built into the contemporary conception of corruption (Bratsis: 2003: 17). Furthermore, the fight against corruption is promoted as a universally applicable, impartial and apolitical project (17). The contradiction here is that technical economic centric solutions are promoted on the basis that these are tied to the morally acceptable solutions of fairness, equality and individual freedom, whilst simultaneously avoiding the ethical and political

dimensions of corruption. These solutions, whether they have to do with privatisation or democratisation, are all “underpinned by one or more ethical perspectives, whether the adherents of these solutions are aware of this or not” (Everett, *et al.*, 2006: 9). This means that normative neoliberal ideals are used to legitimise the fight against corruption, but that the same attention to normative factors is not given to the societal and cultural characteristics of the countries within which anti-corruption initiatives are implemented.

In other words, the fight against corruption is caught in a paradox. On the one side, corruption is labelled as a universal malady; a global moral problem. This elicits widespread moral condemnation from activists, economists and politicians alike (Brown & Cloke, 2004; De Maria, 2010). On the other side, corruption is defined as a normatively neutral concept and its solution is perceived to lie in structural adjustment and economic liberalisation. It is for this reason that critics argue that the international consensus on corruption does not allow for the incorporation of complexities that emerge from different cultural, political and social circumstances (Brown & Cloke, 2004: 289; De Maria, 2010: 117). For Bratsis (2003: 17), this makes it all but impossible for the socially embedded characteristics of the concept to be taken into account, and there is very little space to consider the multifaceted way in which corruption can manifest within different local contexts.

As argued by Ivanov (2007: 28) there is a gap between “global and local discourses”, which anti-corruption activists and NGOs have “struggled to bridge.” For Brown and Cloke (2004: 280):

There is precious little recognition of the complexity of the formation of regional and national political cultures, the importance of the interactions between the global and the local and, in particular, of the continuing role of strategic interests in determining what and who are labelled as corrupt.

Bracking (2007) also follows this line of criticism and argues that the failure to bridge the gap between local and international perspectives has led to the establishment of an interventionist paradigm which has seen the dissemination of policies, ideologies and governance structures from western states to the rest of the world. Any approach that takes the debate closer toward a more variable and responsive interpretation is side-lined for the more simplified economic centric understandings (Brown & Cloke, 2004: 285). This causes an ethical problem which is related to the imposition of normative standards on cultures and societies that played no role in the formation of those standards (Bukovansky, 2006: 184). Furthermore, for Bukovansky

(184), the avoidance of this problem not only has moral ramifications, but also raises questions regarding the legitimacy of standards that are externally imposed. As stated by Bukovansky (184): “... a standard must be embraced as right or fair by a social actor to be considered legitimate.” It is unlikely that standards without local legitimacy will be effectively enforced and implemented (184).

There are clear similarities between contemporary anti-corruption discourse and the debates that raged in the 1950s and 1960s. There remains a tendency to promote western states as the ideal form of political and economic progress, despite the fact that the development of western states is generally recognised as inimitable (Brown & Cloke, 2004: 280). This tendency to promote western states as the “pinnacle of political development” stems from the unerring drive to search for universal solutions (280). For this reason, uniform and standardised anti-corruption measures are implemented in countries as diverse as Nigeria and Bulgaria, regardless of the fact that these countries are characterised by fundamentally different socio-political circumstances (Ivanov, 2007: 28). For Bratsis (2003: 18) this search for universal solutions is fuelled by the belief that:

The public and private are essential attributes of human societies, that political development and advancement entail the realization of this fact and the formation of institutions, laws, and attitudes that end the systematic corruption prevalent in these underdeveloped societies.

It is in this sense that the fight against corruption has been criticised as a global effort to stigmatise legal and economic policies of non-western states rather than an attempt to solve a global problem (Kennedy, 1999: 465). Kennedy (465) emphasises that the anti-corruption field:

Even at its most reasonable core remains an ideological project, an effort to leverage the rhetorical advantages of a shared moral opprobrium for a series of specific legal or institutional changes without having to specify who will win and who will lose as a consequence.

As shown by the preceding discussion, the criticisms against the anti-corruption industry have primarily characterised the fight against corruption as an endeavour to propagate and globalise western norms and values, centred on the ideological separation between private and public life. Criticisms have also been levelled at the ambiguity of the concept and the way in which it can be used as a catch all variable by different parties with their specific

interests in mind. The problem with these criticisms, however, is that anti-corruption is condemned either for being too ambiguous or too focused. If, for example, local cultural characteristics is incorporated into mainstream neoliberal anti-corruption discourse, the field will undoubtedly become saturated with a diverse range of perspectives and theories. This will only serve to increase the ambiguity of the literature. On the other side, for the ambiguity surrounding corruption to be reduced, one would inevitably require a definition that is broad enough to be applicable in different contexts, but also focused enough for it to be useful in the implementation of anti-corruption programmes. Such a definition, especially for a contentious issue like corruption, will inevitably have ties to social norms and values. In other words, just as contemporary anti-corruption discourse seems unable to bridge the gap between its universalising dialogue and local contexts, so too there is an uneasy balance between anti-corruption criticisms that centre on oversimplification on the one side, and too much ambiguity on the other.

The social anthropologist, Steven Sampson (2010), has taken a novel approach to this issue. Instead of criticising anti-corruption as the result of neo-liberalisation, or characterising failure in the alleviation of corruption as the result of an indeterminate concept, Sampson (2010) analyses the manner in which the fight against corruption transformed from a relatively obscure and peripheral movement in the early 1990s into a globally entrenched agenda with its own array of consolidated discourses and practices. This is discussed in more detail in the next section.

3.5) The Anti-Corruption Industry: From grassroots concern to global movement

The arguments and criticisms that have been discussed in the preceding section all point toward some general questions around the viability of the fight against corruption. The anti-corruption industry has shown a very real aptitude for continued expansion, despite the problems that it has been confronted with. Furthermore, the field has withstood some substantial criticisms; criticisms that are mainly centred on the field's links to neoliberal discourse, the conceptual ambiguity that characterises the literature, as well as the lack of success in the alleviation of corruption.

This leads one to question the reason behind the anti-corruption industry's influence and legitimacy despite its continued failure to address the global prevalence of corruption. What are the factors that have enabled anti-corruption to develop so rapidly into a globally

entrenched movement? Why have international actors been allowed to promote anti-corruption as an unbiased drive to fight a universal malady, when corruption is so clearly a normative concept? Why has the discourse centred on the topic multiplied and dispersed at such a prolific rate since the 1990s despite the fact that the core arguments employed today have an uncanny resemblance to the ones of the 1950s and 1960s?

Steven Sampson (2010) has gone some way to answer a number of these questions. Sampson provides important insights into the characteristics of contemporary anti-corruption, and he has opened up a previously unanalysed avenue of critical anti-corruption analysis. For Sampson, the fight against corruption has become a homogenised and self-sustaining industry. This industry justifies and legitimises its own policies and practices and it can seemingly coexist with corruption without having an impact on its prevalence (Sampson, 2010). In the context to the other perspectives offered, Sampson moves one step further in his critical analysis of corruption in order to come to grips with the successful growth and expansion of the fight against corruption. For Sampson, the key question does not concern the reason for anti-corruption's apparent failure to reach its objective; rather, one should ask what the institutionalisation of the fight against corruption means for the actual alleviation of corruption. The goal in this section is to provide a brief overview of Sampson's argument.

Sampson provides a framework for what he calls a "generic industry". This framework stipulates some of the steps that international movements have gone through before these became industrialised on the global political landscape. One can trace similar developments in other industries such as the development industry, the human rights industry and more recently the climate change industry (Sampson, 2010: 263). Sampson does not posit that this framework is universally applicable, but it nonetheless offers some valuable insights into the transformation of the fight against corruption from relative obscurity in the early 1990s into a globally entrenched movement not much more than a decade later.

Firstly, Sampson (268) argues that there has to be an expressed "grassroots concern" about a specific issue and it has to be on the agenda of a number of actors. As the actors involved engage in advocacy work, lobbying and raising awareness the issue starts to gain more and more international traction (268). As a consequence, a multitude of initiatives emerge and frameworks are established (268). Sampson (265) argues that there came a point in the 1990s, when corruption was revealed as one of the primary global developmental issues (265). This resulted in an eruption of anti-corruption discourse, which was followed by wide ranging

declarations, commitments and agreements (Naím, 1995: 1; Sampson, 2010: 268). As a result, statements were made, conventions established, monitoring coalitions were set up and civil society became involved (268).

As the issue becomes elevated on the international agenda, influential international institutions and organisations start to weigh in and publicly express their concerns and reservations. With regards to corruption, a good example is the manner in which the World Bank became involved in the field following James Wolfensohn's now famous 'cancer of corruption' speech (De Speville, 2010: 49; Wanless, 2013: 39). The World Bank was followed by a number of other international organisations such as the International Monetary Fund and the United Nations. Following the entry of international organisations, partnerships are formed between agencies, NGOs, civil society groups and companies (Sampson, 2010: 266). These different actors work to form international strategies and plans of action with the goal of expanding the field and getting more and more actors involved (266). Organisations start to promote their own strategies and actors are encouraged to follow a 'zero tolerance' approach (272). Organisations such as the United Nations establish global conventions in an attempt to universalise the agenda. For example, the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) quickly expanded since its inception in 2006 and already has 140 countries as signatories (UNODC, 2014b).

As more and more actors become involved, the agenda starts to attract its own budget line (Sampson, 2010: 268). The agenda thereby becomes self-sustaining as more resources are made available for the implementation of programmes and procedures (268). The influx of resources is followed by the entry of secondary actors, such as aid agencies and consultancies with their own perspectives and agendas (268). Anti-corruption, for example, grew to a multibillion dollar field in the space of a decade and the number of active anti-corruption practitioners ballooned from approximately 250 in the early 1990s to more than 45 000 by 2009 (Michael & Bowser, 2009: 1, 5). The flood of new actors and resources allows the field to enter into previously unexplored areas and sectors (Sampson, 2010: 268). With regards to corruption, new areas include corruption and crime, corruption and security, corruption and healthcare, corruption and climate change, corruption and sport, and corruption and education (Sampson, 2010: 268; Transparency International, 2016a).

As this agenda becomes more formalised a "corpus of key texts emerges" (Sampson, 2010: 268). These texts constitute the foundation of discourse centred on the subject (269). The

emphasis is on providing simplified definitions, highlighting best practices, as well as elaborating on the best measures for the quantification of the problem (269). These texts serve to consolidate the different theories centred on the subject into a more unified knowledge regime, with standardised concepts and solutions (270). An example is the Transparency International Plain Language Guide. According to Transparency International (2009), the guide offers “a set of standardised, easy-to-understand definitions.” It is in this way that the consolidation of anti-corruption discourse, centred on the neoliberal definition, took place in the 1990s.

The emergence of uniform definitions go hand in hand with the establishment of resource centres and databases with the aim of making relevant information readily available. In recent times, a multitude of resource centres have emerged, including the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, The International Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, the Global Infrastructure Anti-Corruption Centre and the Ethical Alliance Resource Centre. These centres provide anti-corruption activists with access to research, publications, training services and consultancy services. In this way, uniform tool-kits and best practices are easily accessible to any individual interested in engaging with the field (Sampson, 2010: 270). Thereby the field becomes saturated by technocratic arguments, standardised classifications and a one-size-fits-all approach (Persson, *et al.*, 2013: 451).

Together with the establishment of standardised toolkits and definitions, is the emergence of global comparative and monitoring mechanisms (Sampson, 2010: 269). Since the 1990s, numerous indexes have emerged measuring and comparing the global levels of a variety of issues, including transformation, development, democracy and political freedom. The Freedom House Index, for example, analyses individual countries in the areas of political rights and civil liberties, including the efficacy of the electoral process, the extent of political participation, the functioning of government, freedom of expression, as well as rule of law (Freedom House, 2016). The Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI) evaluates more than a 120 developing states on the quality of political management, market economics and democracy (Transformation Index BTI, 2016). There is also the Global Competitiveness Index, the Human Development Index and the Press Freedom Index. With regards to corruption, Transparency International publishes the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) on an annual basis (Sampson, 2010: 269). The CPI measures the “perceived levels of public sector corruption” in 167 countries globally (Transparency International, 2016b).

For Sampson (2010: 271), one of the final signs that an industry has become entrenched is that an “academic critique” emerges, questioning the effectiveness of its programmes, its applicability and “political correctness”. Some of these criticisms have been highlighted in section 2.4. For Sampson (271), however, these criticisms have had “little impact on the evolution of the anti-corruption industry.” On the contrary, criticisms seem to unite anti-corruption activists in their response. The resulting effect is that it has become more and more difficult to formulate a position that stands against anti-corruption without being perceived as justifying its widespread prevalence and thereby belittling the grievous impact that corruption has had globally. According to Polzer (2001: 5), arguing that “... the discourses about fighting corruption are partial, biased or even self-serving runs the risk of appearing to say that corruption is not really as damaging as it is portrayed.”

The different debates, criticisms and arguments surrounding anti-corruption thereby serve to “consolidate the anti-corruption industry” (Sampson, 2010: 262). In this way, the fact that the concept remains highly indeterminate becomes “hidden as the industry emerges” (266). As explained by Kennedy (1999: 455):

However difficult it might be to define corruption, in polite society one must be opposed to it. Opposition to corruption, much like opposition to terrorism or genocide or weapons of mass destruction, seems to unite the international class of commentators.

The fact that the indeterminate nature of the concept is often overlooked makes it immensely difficult to evaluate and quantify the actual impact of anti-corruption initiatives. For Sampson (2010: 276), this means that:

A well-organised programme, with many events, reports, coalitions formed and training modules conducted, with the setting up of action plans, formulation of anti-corruption strategies and self-evaluations, such a programme will be considered ‘successful’ even though ‘reduction of corruption’ itself will be next to impossible to measure over the short term.

In other words, determining the success or failure of anti-corruption initiatives does not necessarily rely on reducing the levels of corruption. Anti-corruption initiatives can be deemed successful even if it is very difficult to gauge their actual impact on the prevalence of corruption. The quantification of the phenomenon through global indices, the technical specialisation in the field, the immense dispersal of discourse on the subject, the involvement

of influential global actors, as well as the involvement of countless secondary NGOs, consultancies and activists are all key factors that serve to entrench the agenda against corruption on the global political landscape. These factors have played an important role in the transformation of what was nothing more than a movement in the early 1990s, into a specialised field filled with technocratic experts, professional analysts, consultants and activists (269). All the different specialists and organisations involved “coordinate with each other, harmonising their terminologies, statistical categories, understandings and view of appropriate solutions” (269). Thereby, there is convergence around the “conventional” approaches and definitions (269). In this way, any alternative perspectives are marginalised and dispelled as “unprofessional” or “confrontational” (277).

As a result, the mainstream understanding of corruption is entrenched and other approaches are stigmatised (277). In so doing, the discourse, programmes and interests that define the fight against corruption has gained an existence which is divorced from the problem of corruption (262). In the words of Sampson (266), the “vibrant anti-corruption industry seems to lead a life of its own.” The industry facilitates its own expansion and it justifies its own theories and practices.

3.6) Conclusion

The goal in this chapter was to provide a genealogical account of the manner in which anti-corruption discourse has evolved over the past 60 years, but also to highlight the main criticisms that have been levelled against the industry. The first wave of anti-corruption discourse was in the 1950s when the attention of the international community was turned to the widespread reported corruption in newly democratised states. This sparked immense academic interest in the subject and new theories and arguments came to life. As such the discourse around the subject became highly multifaceted, which meant that corruption, as a concept, became encumbered referring to an endless array of different behaviours linked to different settings and different motivations. The plurality of the discourse was consolidated in the 1990s with the emergence of the anti-corruption industry. Importantly, however, the consolidation of the discourse did not result in conceptual refinement. The concept remains ambiguous and includes a host of different behaviours linked to different motivations and situations. This means that contemporary anti-corruption discourse is characterised by conceptual plurality on the one side and definitional uniformity on the other.

It is this aspect that has created a schism between critics who have either argued against conceptual ambiguity or against the simplicity and normativity of the neoliberal definition of corruption. The criticisms noted in this chapter do, however, point out some of the shortcomings of the fight against corruption, even if none have had a particular impact on the development of the industry. The anti-corruption industry seems to echo the arguments of the 1950s in justifying interventionist methods to address governance reform and facilitate development. One can see the same tendency of legitimising the fight against corruption from a moral basis, and of depicting the western world as the ideal toward which developing states should aspire. The solutions proposed are, however, framed in, what is purported to be, a normatively neutral manner. This has allowed different parties to pursue interest-specific or ideological objectives under the pretext that these objectives are tied to the value-free fight against a global problem. This means that anti-corruption is a globalised moralising endeavour that presents itself as an apolitical project in search of solutions to a seemingly collective global malady. Importantly, as illustrated by Sampson's argument, the anti-corruption industry has the influence to legitimise this approach on the arena of global politics and to keep expanding despite its contradictions and despite its shortcomings.

The lack of success of the criticisms against the industry is not due to the fact that these criticisms are unfounded or ill-conceived, but because anti-corruption as an industry has become entrenched and consolidated in the arena of global politics to the extent that it can drum out opposing voices by its sheer size and influence. Therefore, the plurality of the concept becomes an insignificant issue in the light of the countless articles stressing the important new areas that need to be addressed and the new forms of corruption that hamper developmental progress. In this sense, local and variable definitions and interpretations are overlooked not only due to the endless search for universal solutions, but also because of the need to promote a uniform and workable definition that can be used globally.

All in all, Sampson has evaluated the fight against corruption from a new perspective, which has brought into perspective the lack of impact that the primary criticisms have had, as well as the manner in which the discourse was consolidated through the emergence of the anti-corruption industry. The next chapter enters into the space opened up by Sampson. There are only a handful of authors that have analysed the anti-corruption industry on the basis of Foucault's work. The goal is to contribute to the anti-corruption debate by analysing the role that the anti-corruption industry plays in the sphere of international governance, with a specific emphasis on the role of international organisations. Analysing the anti-corruption

industry from a Foucauldian perspective allows one to investigate the role played by knowledge and power in the operation, legitimisation and expansion of the anti-corruption industry. Additionally, Foucault's work allows one to investigate the manner in which the processes and practices that stem from the industry have been localised on the individual subject.

Chapter 4: The role of the Anti-corruption Industry in International Governance

4.1) Introduction

As discussed in the previous chapter, investigating corruption from the perspective of the historian of thought entails evaluating the manner in which anti-corruption discourse has evolved, adapted and transformed over the past sixty years. Additionally, however, taking this perspective involves uncovering the role that the relations of power play in the anti-corruption industry. Sampson (2010) provides a good explanation of how the fight against corruption became industrialised on the international scene, following the eruption of anti-corruption discourse in the 1990s. His explanation also provides a good framework for understanding the continued expansion of this industry, despite the multiple criticisms that have emerged and despite the lack of success in the alleviation of corruption. Some pertinent questions still remain unanswered, however. If corruption is a timeless, universal problem, why was it only in the 1990s that an international movement was established to combat its prevalence? What are the factors that accounted for the consolidation of the anti-corruption discourse? Why was it only during the mid-1990s that international financial institutions became involved in fighting the prevalence of corruption? More importantly, what role does the anti-corruption industry play in the realm of international governance and in the administration of states?

The objective in this chapter is to utilise Foucault's work in analysing the role that the anti-corruption industry plays in the governance of contemporary societies. This analysis involves uncovering the manner in which corruption was transformed into a quantifiable object of study within social scientific discourse, as well as the role played by power in the institutional arrangements that were subsequently implemented. This entails analysing how anti-corruption discourses and practices link up with Foucault's notions of power, discipline, governmentality and the three modes of objectification.

This chapter is divided into three main sections. Section 4.2 consists of two subsections and is centred on the factors that allowed for the consolidation of anti-corruption discourse around a central understanding of corruption in the 1990s. This involves discussing the manner in which anti-corruption discourse became more quantified and economic centric, as well as the way in which international financial institutions altered their conception of corruption on the back of this quantification. In short, this section draws parallels between

Foucault's first mode of objectification, which is centred on the social sciences, and the construction of corruption as a problem of economics.

Section 4.3 consists of two subsections, and analyses the links between the anti-corruption industry and Foucault's concepts of disciplinary power and governmentality. The consolidation of anti-corruption discourse in the 1990s and the transformation of corruption into a problem of economics had an impact on the governance of the international realm and on the administration of states. The objective in this section is to unpack this impact and how it relates to Foucault's understanding of power.

4.2) The Social Science of Anti-corruption

4.2.1) The quantification of corruption

The objective in this section is to illustrate how corruption was transformed into a quantifiable concept in the 1990s. As discussed in the previous chapter, anti-corruption discourse has evolved and adapted over time. The development of this discourse is characterised by two waves; the first starting roughly in the 1950s and the second in the 1990s. During the first wave, anti-corruption discourse proliferated and expanded as numerous academics entered into the field. The discourse became broad in scope with a variety of different perspectives and theories. In contrast, the second wave of anti-corruption discourse was characterised by consolidation. With the establishment of the anti-corruption industry, and the entry of international organisations into the field, the international consensus regarding corruption was entrenched. As such, during the second wave of anti-corruption discourse, corruption became a public sector problem which was viewed as having a detrimental impact on economic growth.

Before international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF could get involved in the anti-corruption industry, however, corruption had to be a quantifiable concept. One had to be able to measure its global prevalence, and one had to be able to quantitatively analyse its impact on economic growth. To this end, the establishment of Transparency International and its Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) left a permanent mark on the anti-corruption industry (Ivanov, 2007: 32). The CPI played a fundamental role in vitalising the anti-corruption agenda during the 1990s (Galtung, 2006: 106).

The CPI was first launched in 1995 and it is an index that ranks the perceived prevalence of corruption in 167 countries globally (Transparency International, 2016b). Bukovansky (2006: 193) explains that the CPI "is a poll of polls which gathers information on perceptions from

polls conducted by various research institutes.” The methodology of CPI is based specifically on the perception of corruption in the public sector (Transparency International, 2015: 1). The figure below shows the result of the 2015 CPI. Countries are rated on a scale from 0 to a 100, with 100 being ‘very clean’ and 0 ‘very corrupt’ (Transparency International, 2016b).




FIGURE 4.1: TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2015

Up until the early 1990s, the global levels of corruption was not gauged within a statistical framework to the extent of the CPI. With the advent of the CPI, however, individual countries could now be benchmarked and ranked from the most to the least corrupt (Sampson, 2010: 274). CPI was the first uniform international scale which allowed for the comparison of different levels of corruption in different countries (Galtung, 2006: 108). This stimulated international dialogue concerning the global ramifications of corruption and generated competition in the developing world to improve performance on the index (106-108). Importantly, statistical surveys such as Transparency International’s CPI created a space of intelligibility that supported reigning definitions of governance and corruption, while simultaneously punishing non-conformity (Bracken, 2007: 14). According to Ivanov (2007: 28), economists “seized on such quantifications” to perform “regressions showing that corruption obstructs growth, exacerbates inequality, and expands the unofficial economy.”

Based on the six different corruption perception indices, including the CPI, Gupta, Davoodi and Alonso-Terme (1998: 29) conducted a cross-country regression analysis and found that high levels of corruption has a negative impact on poverty and income equality by “reducing economic growth, the progressivity of the tax system, the level and effectiveness of social

spending, and the formation of human capital.” Gupta *et al.* (1998: 29) also found that corruption has a direct impact on poverty and income inequality by exacerbating unequal educational opportunities and “perpetuating unequal distribution of asset ownership.” According to Chetwynd, Chetwynd and Spector (2003: 9), a World Bank (2000: 169) study found that:

When Gini coefficients for income per capita (measures of income inequality) were graphed against the Transparency International (TI) Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), lower levels of corruption were seen to be statistically associated with lower levels of income inequality.

Chetwynd *et al.* (2003: 3) argue that corruption hampers domestic and foreign investment, limits tax income, strains entrepreneurship, negatively impacts infrastructure projects, and distorts the “composition of public expenditure.” Economists also found that there is more corruption in countries which “restrict the freedom of international trade” and that corruption obstructs growth, worsens inequality and fosters the expansion of the informal economy (Ades & Tella, 1994; Mauro, 1995; Gupta *et al.*, 1998; Johnson *et al.*, 2000).

Figure 4.2 below is from a study conducted by Shao, Plamen, Podobnik and Stanley (2007) to show the direct quantitative relation between GDP per capita and performance on the CPI from 2001 to 2005 (Shao *et al.*, 2007: 159, 160). Graphs (a) to (e) show the comparison between GDP per Capita and performance on the CPI from 2001 to 2005 and graph (f) shows the comparison between GDP per capita and the World Bank Control of Corruption Index (CCI). This figure illustrates the manner in which economists and analysts use the CPI to quantitatively illustrate the correlation between economic growth and corruption (Chetwynd *et al.*, 2003: 3).

Jia Shao et al.: Quantitative relations between corruption and economic factors




FIGURE 4.2 (SHAO ET AL., 2007: 157)

Following the success of the CPI, perception based indices became important tools in “projecting economic growth, estimating the effectiveness of the government administration, making decisions for strategic investment, and forming international policies” (Shao *et al.*, 2007: 157). The impact of CPI on investment can be seen in figure 4.3 below, which shows the correlation between performance on the CPI and direct investments per capita in US dollars received from the United States during 2004 (164). This correlation indicates that CPI became more than a mere analytical tool to measure the impact of corruption on economic

growth. The prevalence of perceived corruption also has a direct impact on foreign investment.




FIGURE 4.3 (SHAO *ET AL.*, 2007: 164).

It is very important to emphasise the significance of the quantifiable connection that was made between corruption and economic growth. The quantification of corruption through the CPI ushered in a fundamental change in the manner in which international financial institutions approached corruption. Before the advent of CPI, there was never an internationally accepted statistical framework allowing for the analysis of the correlation between corruption and economic factors. Furthermore, it was only once this economic connection was empirically illustrated that organisations such as the World Bank could incorporate it into their discourse (Polzer, 2001: 10). Once this was possible, the way was open for the World Bank and the IMF to amend their discourse around the subject and thereby open the path to enter into the anti-corruption debate.

It is important to note that the objective here is not to question the validity or accuracy of the economic studies into the relations between the CPI and economic growth. The point is also not to assess whether or not corruption has economic ramifications. Rather, the goal is to unpack what this quantification has meant for the industry and how it allowed international financial institutions to change their discourse and thereby alter the trajectory of their involvement in the anti-corruption industry. It was the transformation of corruption into an

economic problem that allowed for the consolidation of anti-corruption discourse in the 1990s. This led to the appropriation of Nye's definition of corruption by the primary actors involved in the industry, as discussed in chapter 3.

There are direct parallels that can be drawn between the consolidation of anti-corruption discourse in the 1990s and Foucault's analyses of the discourses centred on sexuality of the 18th century. According to Foucault (1976: 17, 18) there was a "veritable discursive explosion" of discourse centred on sex in the eighteenth century (17, 18). The proliferation of sex as an issue of public interest went together with the emergence of a multitude of different policies and institutional procedures (33). Over time, these discourses became formalised and codified within specific social scientific disciplines such as demography, medicine, biology and psychology (33). As these disciplines became consolidated, more and more conditions and maladies were discovered (43). Novel sexualities and abnormalities emerged as psychologists and academics grappled with newfound problems and anomalies. Many of these conditions have long since fallen out of medical knowledge. Importantly, however, during the time period these conditions were seen as very real medical problems diagnosed in accordance with reigning social scientific disciplines and procedures. These conditions called for the appropriate medical or psychological treatment. As such, through the immense proliferation of discourse, sex was 'constructed' as a problem of medicine and social science during the 18th and 19th centuries (105, 106).

The ramifications of this construction was not limited to academic discourse alone. The construction of sex had a very real impact on societies and individuals. The discourse called for institutional changes. Processes and policies had to be implemented. Governmental departments became involved and played a role in isolating individuals found to be maladjusted. The link between social scientific discourse centred on sex and governmental procedures made the drive to fix the societal problem of sex a power-infused political project. Behaviour that was previously seen as transgressions of norms, laws or religious rules were now seen as symptoms of underlying medical or psychological conditions, perversions or diseases (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 173). These classifications were consolidated and entrenched in reigning social scientific discourses, as well as medical and institutional practices. As such, sexual variance became abnormality and divergence became disease. In Foucault's understanding, the phenomenon of sex is a "historical fiction" which serves as a link between normative practices of power and the biological sciences (179).

If one looks at anti-corruption discourse from this perspective, it is evident that there are clear similarities between the consolidation of anti-corruption discourse and the emergence of social scientific discourses centred on sexuality. There was an “eruption” of anti-corruption discourse in the 1990s and corruption quickly became a central issue on the global development agenda (Naím, 1995: 1; Bukovansky, 2006: 181). Similar to the discourses centred on sex, anti-corruption discourse became more formalised and was consolidated into a unified knowledge regime with standardised concepts and remedies (Sampson, 2010: 270). This went hand in hand with an influx of new authors and academics. Anti-corruption was included in university courses and the discourse became more social scientific in character. New areas opened up for anti-corruption research, as corruption was revealed to be relevant in the areas of security, healthcare, climate change, sport, and education among others (Sampson, 2010: 268; Transparency International, 2016). The same as with sex, there was a proliferation of behaviours that could now conceivably fall under the classification of corruption (Brown & Cloke, 2004: 277; Caiden *et al.*, 2001; Sampson, 2010: 262). As such, new forms of corruption were identified, isolated and criminalised.

Significantly, for both corruption and sex, the emergence of a consolidated regime of knowledge occurred following a change in conception. Sex was transformed into a medical phenomenon; a problem concerning social scientific discourse and medical practices. Corruption, on the other hand, changed from being considered as a political problem in the years leading up to the 1990s, into a problem of economics (Polzer, 2001). This change of conception was done on the basis of the quantification of the corruption through CPI, which allowed for tracking the annual performance of different countries on the index and linking this performance with economic growth.

Similar to what occurred with regards to sex in the eighteenth century, the development of the anti-corruption industry has had an impact on the manner in which states are administered. The anti-corruption industry calls for legislative and institutional changes. The industry drives the implementation of specific policies and programmes and anti-corruption has become embedded in the governance of states. The similarities between the discourses centred on sex of the eighteenth century and anti-corruption discourse raises important questions. Is corruption a constructed concept? More importantly, if this is the case, what role has power played in this construction? The next subsection is centred on the manner in which the World Bank and the IMF altered their anti-corruption discourse following the quantification of corruption.

4.2.2) The Construction of Corruption: The evolution of World Bank and IMF discourse

The World Bank's involvement in the anti-corruption field officially began in 1997, when its Executive Board approved its anti-corruption strategy (Khan, 2002: 1). The World Bank brought with it large a team of economists, political scientists and the capacity to fund and implement numerous anti-corruption initiatives (De Speville, 2010: 50). Since its entry into the field, the Bank has been involved in extensive research on corruption and the promotion of anti-corruption governance reforms globally (Marquette, 2004: 415; Samson, 2010: 275). The Bank has also released its own indices and rankings which roughly corresponds with that of Transparency International (Ivanov, 2007: 34). Since its involvement started in the mid-1990s, the World Bank has spent approximately US\$ 10 million per year on corruption sanctions and investigations (Wanless, 2013: 39). Furthermore, its investigative department has launched more than 600 anti-corruption programmes and has implemented governance reforms in more than 100 countries worldwide (39).

The first decisive shift in World Bank discourse happened at the 1996 Annual General Meeting between the IMF and the World Bank (Polzer, 2001: 9). It was on this occasion that James Wolfensohn delivered the now famous "cancer of corruption" speech and committed the Bank to fighting the global prevalence of corruption (Sampson, 2010: 275; Polzer, 2001: 9). The speech marked the World Bank's acknowledgement of Transparency International's work in anti-corruption, and it signalled the start of the inclusion of "government effectiveness and legitimacy in its loan policies" (Sampson, 2010: 275).

Before its Annual General meeting in 1996, the World Bank expressly avoided the topic of corruption. The concept was "taboo" in World Bank discourse (Polzer, 2001: 2). According to James Wolfensohn, corruption was referred to as the "c-word" in World Bank discussions (Ivanov, 2007: 31). The reason for this is the fact that the Bank is governed by a non-political mandate, which precludes any involvement in political matters (Polzer, 2001: 9). This means that, working in the anti-corruption field was expressly forbidden by the Bank's legal department (9). In other words, the World Bank could not get involved in anti-corruption earlier because the concept was still considered to be too political (10). Transparency International, for example, was "refused funding by some sections of the World Bank" because corruption was seen as outside the ambit of the Bank's mandate (9).

In Wolfensohn's speech, however, he stated the following: "I visited a number of countries and I decided that I would redefine the "C" word not as a political issue but as something

social and economic” (Ivanov, 2007: 31). After this re-characterisation, the way was open for the Bank to make sweeping statements about corruption. For example, the World Bank states on its website that corruption is the “single greatest obstacle to economic and social development. It undermines development by distorting the rule of law and weakening the institutional foundation on which economic growth depends” (Bukovansky, 2006: 191). In other words, following Wolfensohn’s speech, the World Bank’s discourse underwent a fundamental turnaround; moving from complete avoidance of the issue to subsequently ranking corruption as the single most significant impediment to global economic growth.

The involvement of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the anti-corruption industry follows the same general timeline as the World Bank. The IMF did not address corruption directly in the years leading up to the 1990s. It was only from around 1995 that economists and academics working at or in association with the IMF started publishing papers centred on the links between corruption, investment and economic growth (Bukovansky, 2006: 189). Once these linkages were made there was a flush of new articles. Ades and Di Tella (1997) discussed the ‘New Economics of Corruption.’ Mauro (1995) discussed the relation between the prevalence of corruption and economic growth. Rose-Ackerman (1997) discussed the impact that corruption has on the global political economy. Tanzi (1995) elaborated on the connections between corruption, governmental practices and financial markets. Tanzi and Davoodi (1998) discussed the impact of corruption in public investments on economic growth.

This increased proliferation of anti-corruption articles went hand in hand with the increased attention that the IMF was paying to governance related issues (Bukovansky, 2006: 189). In 1996, the IMF adopted the ‘Partnership for Sustainable Global Growth’ declaration, which was centred on the promotion of good governance, the rule of law, accountability in the public sector, and addressing the problem of corruption (189). The IMF Board adopted the ‘Guidelines Regarding Governance Issues’ in 1997, which further clarified the IMF’s involvement in governance related issues (189). Abed and Gupta (2002: 7, 8) sums up the IMF’s approach when it comes to corruption and governance:

The IMF is contributing to strengthening governance in membership countries through various means. The first is by supporting economic policies and structural reforms that limit the scope for ad hoc decision making, for rent seeking, and for preferential treatment of individuals or organisations. This approach is founded on the

IMF's mandate to promote macroeconomic stability, and limits its role to those aspects of governance that could have a significant macroeconomic impact.

In other words, the IMF's involvement in anti-corruption is solely based on the macroeconomic ramifications of corruption (Bukovansky, 2006: 189). In this context, the quantification of corruption, as discussed in section 4.2.1, played a very important role in the evolution of IMF and World Bank anti-corruption discourse. As stated by Polzer (2001: 17), the empirical approach to analysing corruption has had a "central place in the project of depoliticising corruption." Importantly, however, the turnaround in the IMF and World Bank discourses was not only a direct reaction to the increased levels of perceived corruption as per the CPI. It is indeed the case that the CPI allowed for a quantitative link between corruption and economic growth to be made, which, in turn, opened the door for these organisations to enter into the corruption debate. Additionally, however, the concept still had to be moulded to fit into the respective mandates of these organisations.

Simply because perception based indices showed that corruption has a quantitative economic impact, does not mean that international financial institutions were able to enter into the anti-corruption industry with immediate effect. The concept had to be adapted and depoliticised. In other words, similar to how sex was constructed as a medical concept in the eighteenth century, corruption had to be constructed as an economic concept in the mid-1990s.

The concept required fixed parameters before it could be used within World Bank discourse (Polzer, 2001: 10). Polzer (12) explains that there are very clear restrictions of the type of knowledge that is accepted as legitimate by the World Bank. According to Polzer (12):

The spheres of knowledge accepted by the Bank are universalising, empirical, quantitative, institutional, and based on the assumption of the calculating and rationally maximising individual. Alternative views, such as moral, cultural or political understandings of corruption, are considered to be naive, specious or malicious arguments made by interested parties such as corrupt businessmen or politicians.

This means that a broad consensus around the concept had to be established, before the World Bank and the IMF could become involved. This was about building and legitimising the type of discourse, data and information that could justifiably "contribute toward finding the 'truth' about corruption" (12). It was on the basis of the quantification of corruption that the World Bank and the IMF repackaged their discourse around concept and "reinvented"

their respective approaches (Ivanov, 2007: 31; Polzer, 2001: 12). According to Ivanov (2007: 37), this entailed constructing corruption “as a measurable problem requiring global, technocratic solutions, including a smaller role for the state and a larger one for civil society.” It is in this way that the concept was depoliticised and moulded into a technocratic problem of economics (31). Krastev (2000: 39) echoes this sentiment, and argues that the major actors in the anti-corruption movement share a “definite social construct of what corruption is about and how to challenge it.”

It is important to emphasise that this construction did not happen on the basis of a new definition. As discussed in the previous chapter, Nye’s definition, which was coined in the 1960s, remains the basis of the contemporary understanding of corruption. What was altered, however, was the manner in which this definition was understood and utilised in the anti-corruption industry. The World Bank and the IMF only became involved after corruption was depoliticised to the sufficient extent that its alleviation could be pursued without contravening their respective non-political mandates. As such, the relabeling of corruption became a “pillar of the neoliberal agenda against corruption” (Ivanov, 2007: 34). It is in this same line of thought that Bratsis (2003) makes the suggestion that the construction of corruption has enabled the use of the concept as a political tool to delegitimise the political systems and governance structures of states that do not fit in with the dominant international consensus.

It is at this point that the link between Foucault’s work and the contemporary anti-corruption industry is most evident. In terms of the first mode of objectification, Foucault focuses on the social scientific discourses that strive to become part of normal science, but fail to do so because these social scientific discourses are founded upon social and cultural norms. Foucault is interested in the games of truth that surround social scientific knowledge and how this relates to the deployment of power in contemporary society. For example, by investigating the scientific discourses centred on sexuality, Foucault does not want to uncover the true meaning or significance of sex. Rather, for Foucault, the concept of truth is produced and used by discourses centred on sex; a production which is not tied to objective knowledge, but to certain strategies of power (Foucault, 1976: 105, 106). In the *Birth of Biopolitics*, Foucault (2004: 19) states the following:

The question here is the same as the question I addressed with regard to madness, disease, delinquency and sexuality. In all of these cases, it was not a question of showing how these objects were for a long time hidden before being finally discovered, nor of showing

how all these objects are only wicked illusions or ideological products to be dispelled in the light of reason finally having reached its zenith. It was a matter of showing by what conjunctions a whole set of practices - from the moment they become coordinated with a regime of truth - was able to make what does not exist (madness, disease, delinquency, sexuality, etcetera), nonetheless become something.

In the context of anti-corruption, once it was possible to measure the level of corruption through an internationally accepted statistical framework, and once this framework was linked up with economic analyses, the discourse around the subject became consolidated to the sufficient extent that a homogenous regime of knowledge could emerge, with corruption as an economic concept at its core. Once this consolidation occurred and once the influential international financial institutions entered into the field, anti-corruption discourse became, in Foucault's (2004: 19) words, "coordinated with a regime of truth." This regime of truth went hand in hand with the emergence of a whole set of practices and policies that served to shape the development and legitimisation of an entire industrial field centred on the fight against corruption.

Thus, if one looks at corruption from this perspective, it is not the question of economists and academics finally uncovering the truth about how corruption has a fundamental and empirical linkage to economic growth. From a Foucauldian point of view, it is not about the emergence of a pioneering industry tasked with fighting a global malaise. Rather, it is the question of how the anti-corruption industry has fostered into existence a domain of knowledge that serves as a justificatory principle for its own practices, objectives and discourses. As stated by Krastev (2003: 117)

It was the radical transformation of the social sciences' discourse on corruption that made the current global anti-corruption campaign possible. The new anti-corruption consensus brought to life the new anti-corruption science. And the new anti-corruption science manufactured the data that have justified the new anti-corruption consensus.

Similar to the way in which sex became the point of interconnection between the biological sciences and the practices enacted to govern populations, corruption has become a point where the divide between economics and politics is at its most tentative. Using a Foucauldian perspective to investigate the anti-corruption industry is thus about uncovering how the discourse around the subject has been constructed, as well as the role that broader forms of

power play in the justification and institutional deployment of this construction. As such, the re-characterisation of corruption was not only significant within anti-corruption discourse; it had a very real impact on the manner in which the fight against corruption was institutionalised globally.

As the World Bank and the IMF entered into the field, an entire industry came to life; anti-corruption agencies were established, international frameworks and conventions were launched, and policies were implemented. In short, governments amended their practices around the area of governance and corruption. In other words, this is not only about tracing the historical development of discourse. Using Foucault's work is also about linking the development and emergence of discourse with governmental, ideological and political strategies and practices. In the next section, the connection between Foucault's notions of governmentality, disciplinary power and the anti-corruption industry is discussed in more detail.

4.3) Discipline and Governmentality in the fight against corruption

As discussed in the previous section, it was only with the advent of statistical models showing the relation between corruption and economic growth that the space was opened up for the World Bank and the IMF to alter their discourse around the topic of corruption. To this end, the advent of the CPI transformed the manner in which the international community approached corruption. There was now an instrument that allowed for the measurement of the global levels of corruption and the direct comparison of different states and regions. Thereby, the link between CPI and economic growth gave the World Bank and the IMF the opportunity to construct corruption as a problem of economics. This facilitated the emergence of an entire field of intelligibility and a regime of knowledge surrounding corruption, with economic discourse at its core. Importantly, the construction of corruption as a problem of economics has had an impact on the manner in which states govern their citizens.

As discussed in chapter 2, Foucault's objective in *Discipline and Punish* is to uncover the societal practices of discipline and control that rationalised and justified the institutional apparatus that emerged together with incarceration as a mode of punishment. Thus, his intention is not to shed light on the objective truth that lies behind incarceration and he is also not interested in uncovering the most moral, effective or rational type of punishment. Foucault is interested in the complex role that different modes of punishment play in society

and the manner in which this function is tied to strategies of power (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 143).

Therefore, when it comes to analysing the anti-corruption industry from a Foucauldian point of view, one is not attempting to uncover the hidden truth that lies behind its discourses and practices. One is attempting to come to grips with the societal role that anti-corruption plays and the link between this role and broader strategies of power. Foucault (1976: 25) shows with his analysis of sexuality that the emergence of sex as a societal problem is tied to the emergence of governmental strategies aimed at managing populations. For Foucault, the establishment of discourses that are proclaimed to be neutral and objective does not mean that these discourses are free from the effects of power. On the contrary, the emergence of a scientific discourse centred on sex allowed for it to become further enmeshed in the practices of power. Thus, despite the fact that anti-corruption is labelled as the neutral and unbiased fight against a universal problem, its discourses and practices are used to further, not only economic, but also political and ideological ends.

The fight against corruption can thus be seen as a method that international actors use to manage uncertainties, to mitigate risks and to instil a specific framework of governance globally. According to Zanotti (2006: 150, 151), since the end of the Cold War, the international arena has become increasingly multifaceted and complex. This has resulted in international organisations devising new strategies to mitigate the risk that is posed by this complexity and to maintain international order (150, 151). Zanotti (151) states that: “In the face of the impossibility of devising strategy and controlling all variables, international risk is managed by domesticating and normalising states that are perceived as potential sources of threat and instability.” Zanotti (163, 164) continues:

In the post-cold war era, international organisations respond to the unpredictable, multifarious and polymorphous microphysics of threats through a microphysics of interventions. International order is pursued through the multiplication of disciplinary and regulatory mechanisms aimed at transforming behaviour. International power functions as a network where international actors are the connective elements rather than the passive victims or the perpetrators.

After the end of the Cold War, international organisations embarked on new ways to incorporate and normalise divergent countries into the international fold. Countries that were perceived as politically unstable, economically inefficient, ideologically abnormal or as

plagued by pervasive corruption had to be managed in order to alleviate the potential risk that these countries pose to international order and stability. In this sense, international organisations can be seen as nodes in the dissemination of the relations of disciplinary power.

In this context, the emergence of the anti-corruption industry is not another step in the evolution of a more ethical international economic sphere, and the fight against corruption is not only centred on the alleviation of corruption. On the contrary, the anti-corruption industry plays a role in the governance of the international realm. It plays a role in the rationalisation and propagation of a set of discourses, policies, institutions and governmental procedures designed to normalise the relations between western states and states that function with different internal rules, norms and practices.

In other words, the process of classifying countries within the sphere of a perception-based statistical framework opened the way not only for the reformation of discourse around the subject; it also allowed for wholesale institutional change and the implementation of specific policies and programmes aimed at reforming cultural norms and values. Under the umbrella of corruption alleviation, countries not only had to be made more accessible to international business, but also more amendable to international norms, values, discourses and practices. The United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) is a very good example of a method that is used by international actors to normalise internationally accepted modes of governance globally and to discipline states that are non-compliant. UNCAC is not necessarily based on an economic view of corruption. The United Nations is not bound by a non-political mandate, such as the World Bank and the IMF. International measures such as UNCAC do, however, entrench the economic conception of corruption globally even if the UN is not explicitly in pursuit of the same objectives as the IMF and the World Bank. UNCAC was launched almost ten years after the emergence of the anti-corruption industry, and therefore is fundamentally based on the discourses and practices that preceded it.

The next section looks specifically at the linkages between Foucault's concept of disciplinary power and UNCAC.

4.3.1) The United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC)

International organisations steer the conduct of national governments through the establishment of international agreements, rules, regulations and laws that pertain directly to the manner in which these states govern their citizens (Zanotti, 2006: 152, 153). According to Zanotti (152), these organisations endeavour to change the internal processes of “disorderly”

states so that these states become manageable and understandable, and so that the risk of unpredictability is mitigated. In terms of the anti-corruption industry, a good example of this is UNCAC. The UN General Assembly adopted UNCAC in October 2003 (Hechler, 2013: 1). The convention has played a significant role in the global institutionalisation of the anti-corruption industry, and it was one of the first internationally binding agreements on corruption (Webb, 2005: 191). The figure below shows how prolific the international adoption of UNCAC has been. UNCAC has a total of 140 signatories and 170 state parties (UNODC, 2014b). Figure 4.4 shows the states that have ratified the convention in blue, the states that are signatories in orange and the states that have declined to sign the convention in red.




FIGURE 4.4: UNCAC (UNODC, 2014A)

Under UNCAC, corruption is characterised as a major threat to security, stability and development (Hechler, 2013: 1). UNCAC requires the states that have ratified the convention to comply with its four pillars, which are: corruption prevention, criminalisation of corruption, international cooperation, and asset recovery (UNODC, 2014a).

The first pillar refers to the implementation of measures aimed at uprooting corruption before it can take hold (Brunelle-Quraishi, 2011: 107). UNCAC requires states to establish an institutional and legislative environment within which corruption is prevented (UNODC, 2014a). In this context, states are expected to ensure that public services are transparent and that there are measures and safeguards in place to ensure that governments operate transparently and efficiently, and that new appointments are based on merit (UNODC,

2014a). UNCAC requires the establishment of independent anti-corruption agencies, with the task of holding public officials accountable (UNODC, 2014a). It is also stated that “public servants should be subject to codes of conduct, requirements for financial and other disclosures, and appropriate disciplinary measures” (UNODC, 2014a). Additional elements include greater transparency in the financing of political parties, as well as the adoption of anti-corruption measures for private sector corruption (Forgues-Puccio, 2013: 4; Brunelle-Quraishi, 2011: 107, 109).

With regards to the second pillar, signatories of the convention are required to criminalise corruption offences that are not classified as crimes under domestic laws (UNODC, 2014a). Hechler (2013: 1) states that the offences that are classified as corruption include “the acceptance of an undue advantage by foreign and international public officials, abuse of function, illicit enrichment, bribery and embezzlement within or among private sector entities.” UNCAC goes beyond other international anti-corruption initiatives of its kind by criminalising not only the basic forms of corruption (bribery, embezzlement), but also “trading in influence and the concealment and laundering of the proceeds of corruption” (UNODC, 2014a).

In terms of the third pillar, signatories are required to cooperate with international partners in the prevention, investigation and prosecution of corruption (Forgues-Puccio, 2013: 4). This includes mutual legal assistance, the transfer of evidence, the extradition of offenders, as well as tracing the proceeds of corruption (Forgues-Puccio, 2013: 4; UNODC, 2014a). The convention also requires the cooperation of signatories in the areas of human resources, financial assistance, training and research (Hechler, 2013: 1).

The fourth pillar is centred on recovering the proceeds that have been gained through corrupt activities (Forgues-Puccio, 2013: 4). UNCAC requires signatories to “take measures to restrain, seize, confiscate, and return the proceeds of corruption” (Brun, Gray, Scott & Stephenson, 2011: 2). The process of recovering assets starts with the collection of evidence, intelligence and tracing assets in foreign and domestic jurisdictions (Brun *et al.*, 2011: 6). This is followed by securing the assets, undergoing the court process, enforcing the court orders, and then returning of the assets (6). UNCAC is the first international anti-corruption treaty to include the recovery of the assets in its mandate (Brunelle-Quraishi, 2011: 122).

In terms of Foucault’s notion of disciplinary power, UNCAC can be characterised as the dispersal of a collection of practices that are designed for disciplining states, populations and

individuals. To refer back to chapter two, disciplinary power is “essentially corrective” and is centred on adjustment to the norms and standards of the contemporary world (Foucault, 1995: 179; Gutting, 2013). According to Zanotti (2006: 152), international organisations use a variety of methods to redesign governmental institutions “along disciplinary lines” and to make “modalities of domestic government readable to international organisations and bilateral partners.” In this light, UNCAC is an instrument that international organisations use to change the internal processes of disorderly states with the goal of mitigating the risks that these states pose to global stability, as well as for fostering compliance with international norms of governance.

The establishment of anti-corruption agencies is a very good example of how the internal processes and procedures are altered with the objective of normalising state behaviour. The establishment of an anti-corruption agency is a core component of the first pillar of UNCAC (UNODC, 2014a). Anti-corruption agencies have an array of different functions, but generally these functions fall into four categories: prevention, investigation, education and policy coordination (Kuris, 2012: 1). Kuris (1-3) summarises what a successful anti-corruption agency should achieve:

A successful anti-corruption agency should demonstrate independence, build capacity, establish support coalitions, and work to change the rules of the game and the hearts and minds of the players. Popular pressure supporting anti-corruption reforms is an integral component in the alleviation of corruption and in situations where scandals or economic decline can be attributed to corruption it becomes much easier to garner public support.

In states where corruption is perceived as systemic, the issue at hand is that corrupt behaviour is ingrained within the internal processes of the state and the behavioural norms of the populace. As such, this socio-political environment is governed by rules of behaviour that do not conform to international standards. In this context, the objective of the anti-corruption agency is to contrast itself with local systems by establishing a reputation for working efficiently, transparently, effectively and with the interest of the general public in mind. According to Iyer (2011) the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) in Ghana, for example, was able to establish a reputation as the defender of the public. According to Iyer (12):

CHRAJ was able to build a reputation for itself as an institution of integrity, willing to take on political heavyweights in pursuit of its mandate to tackle corruption, uphold administrative justice and defend human rights. It also built a popular constituency by working with and catalysing the creation of civil society organisations while ensuring media coverage to keep the public abreast of its investigations.

In other words, for anti-corruption agencies to be successful, there has to be emphasis on capacity building, training, education and catalysing the emergence of a civil society engaged in fighting corruption. Additionally, it is about building a popular support base by pursuing senior governmental officials. Importantly, anti-corruption agencies use the opportunities presented by crises to force corruption onto the agenda. According to Kuris (2012: 3) anti-corruption agencies can catalyse society-wide change by “igniting popular pressure” and by taking advantage of a “political opportunity, often presented by a scandal or economic crisis.”

The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) offers a good example of how anti-corruption agencies enlist international and local support, as well as media coverage, to entrench a localised anti-corruption agenda. The KPK was established in Indonesia following the collapse of the 32 year Suharto regime (3). The KPK is a powerful agency responsible for corruption prevention, investigation, research, prosecution and for working with government to establish sound anti-corruption policies (3). The KPK was established following sustained international and domestic pressure (3). According to Kuris (7, 8):

The KPK worked furiously to tap all its sources of support. The commissioners actively defended themselves in the media, strongly proclaiming their integrity ... KPK appealed directly to the public to demonstrate its support. Civil society partners planned a campaign of defence. The KPK’s international partners applied pressure as well, including international media, NGOs, business leaders, and representatives of foreign governments and multilateral organisations.

In other words, the goal of an anti-corruption agency is not necessarily to eradicate all instances of corruption in a particular society; it would, for example, never have the capacity or the resources to investigate all instances of petty corruption. The goal of an anti-corruption agency is foremost to reform institutions, to restructure norms of behaviour, and, in the words of Kuris (2012: 1-3), to reshape the “rules of the game and the hearts and minds of the players.” In this way, the anti-corruption agency endeavours to garner public and political support with the objective of establishing a society where there is zero tolerance for

corruption, and where its prevalence is seen as an absolute impediment to political cohesion, economic growth and social stability.

Therefore, with regards to the first pillar of UNCAC, the objective is to infiltrate a system with an organisation that can systematically work to reshape internal rules of behaviour through implementing educational initiatives, launching investigations, prosecuting, catalysing popular discontent, and lobbying governments to introduce new policies and procedures. The implementation of anti-corruption agencies is done within the broader international context of the anti-corruption industry, which provides the required support and influence so that the credibility and legitimacy of the agency's actions is maintained and supported. Additionally, the other pillars of UNCAC serve to further enforce the local implementation of anti-corruption programmes and procedures.

The second pillar, the criminalisation of corruption, entrenches a normative conception of corruption within an internationally accepted legal framework. The criminalisation of a whole multiplicity of behaviours serves to embed reigning international anti-corruption definitions and practices; which entails criminalising behaviour that is perceived as abnormal, unethical or inappropriate within the context of the international anti-corruption knowledge regime. The third pillar of UNCAC, international cooperation, builds on the international consensus against corruption by making signatories accountable to one another in the international sphere. Countries are not only expected to pursue corrupt individuals within the confines of their own border, they also have to assist in international investigations and prosecutions. And finally, the fourth pillar of the convention, asset recovery, gives UNCAC more authority in the application of its principles by giving it the power to punish. In other words, through the establishment of UNCAC, the United Nations has created a convention that not only holds countries accountable to each other on the international arena, but also localises a set of rules within legislative and institutional environments of sovereign states.

To summarise, UNCAC drives the reformation of institutions, policies and legislations. It is an intervention that has been designed to identify and criminalise a multifarious host of behaviours; behaviours which have been classified as corrupt within the context of a normative neoliberal framework. To use Zanotti's (2006: 163, 164) words, UNCAC can be depicted as a "microphysics of interventions." Zanotti used this phrase to refer to the practices of international organisations in general, but this phrase is also applicable to UNCAC. It is practice of discipline and control with the objective of reforming governmental

practices and for propagating the norms of international governance globally. This means that international organisations strive to create international order, not by containing perceived threats, but by classifying, disciplining and normalising these threats. It is in this way that international organisations endeavour to transform states into “orderly, predictable, disciplinary and disciplined administrations” (152).

It is important to note that, it is not only through legislative disciplinary mechanisms that the anti-corruption agenda is embedded in local administrations. Anti-corruption is not only centred on the establishment of international conventions or legal frameworks. The World Bank and the IMF are, for example, precluded from making overtly political prescriptions. Even though these organisations are intimately involved in the industry, they are still governed by non-political mandates and can therefore not establish conventions such as UNCAC. Similarly, Transparency International, as an NGO, is primarily involved in advocacy work, conducting perception based surveys, raising awareness, conducting research and publishing reports. These organisations do, however, use anti-corruption as a method for exerting influence and for applying pressure on states that are perceived as lax in the implementation of anti-corruption initiatives. In other words, even though the IMF and the World Bank take a more overtly economic approach, in comparison to the approach of the UN, the discourses and practices of all these organisations play a role in fostering the rationality of international anti-corruption governance. Thus, even though the World Bank and the IMF express themselves as non-political actors, their actions are undoubtedly political, as will be shown in the next section. Similarly, even though the UN seeks to address corruption by amending the political practices of states, its actions are a reflection of and serves to reinforce the anti-corruption practices of the industry as a whole.

The next section expands on the manner in which the World Bank and IMF use anti-corruption, not only as a method of control, but also to entrench the governmentality of the fight against corruption.

4.3.2) Governmentality and the fight against corruption

Since the entry of World Bank and the IMF into the anti-corruption field, these organisations have used their stance on corruption as a method for controlling states that are perceived as non-compliant with international norms, guidelines and practices. As stated by Polzer (2001: 17), while empirical studies into the economic ramifications of corruption is “presented as a liberation from the uncertainties of politically manipulated perceptions, it is also a new means

of control.” Thus, on the one side, the World Bank and the IMF have played an important role in the construction of the anti-corruption discourse and in rationalising the conception of corruption as a problem of economics. On the other side, these organisations also use anti-corruption as a method for furthering the implementation of specific policies and programmes, as well as for the punishment of non-conformance. According to Zanotti (2006: 152, 153) international organisations manage the behaviour of states through “mechanisms of control, reward and punishment.” Following the construction of corruption and the emergence of the anti-corruption industry, it became common practice for the World Bank and the IMF to engage with states about bribery and corruption concerns. Especially with regards to development financing and the provision of loans.

The IMF and the World Bank enforce the anti-corruption agenda by including a number of stipulations as conditions to the provision of loans, as well as by withdrawing support from countries where corruption is thought to be so widespread that economic growth is affected (Ivanov, 2007: 32). For example, in 1997 “the IMF suspended a \$220 million loan to Kenya because the government had not done enough to curtail bribery” (32). In 2006 the World Bank suspended all loans to Chad, due to the state not allocating all of its oil revenues to poverty alleviation projects (Dugger, 2006). It was stipulated in Chad’s agreement with the World Bank that oil revenues had to be spent on initiatives aimed at alleviating poverty, but the country’s parliament approved the allocation of a proportion of the revenue to defence spending (Dugger, 2006). In 2012, the World Bank cancelled a \$1.2 billion loan to Bangladesh, due to concerns that the project has been hampered by corruption (Al-Mahmood, 2012). Subsequently, Transparency International called on Bangladesh to establish a judicial committee for the investigation of the incident (Al-Mahmood, 2012). In 2016, the IMF suspended all loans to Mozambique due to concerns over unreported and undisclosed loans received from other banks (Wernau, 2016). Under its agreement with the IMF, Mozambique has to fully disclose all loans received and that it is obliged to attend regular meetings with the IMF (Wernau, 2016).

Interestingly, before the emergence of the anti-corruption industry, withholding a loan from a country because of bribery was not common practice for the international financial institutions. Even in the 1990s, it was still commonly accepted business practice for businesses in some countries to bribe government officials of other states (Hines, 1995: 1). Up until the mid-1990s, the United States was the only country to outlaw international bribery (Salbu, 1997: 232, 233). Many companies even received tax deductions for foreign

bribery payments (232, 233). It was only in 1996 that the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) addressed the “tax policy that is widely believed to encourage or support international bribery - the deductibility of bribes paid to foreign officials as business expenses in a number of industrialised nations” (233).

In the wake of a scandal implicating a Canadian company with bribing Argentine and South Korean officials in the 1970s, the then trade minister of Canada stated that the “commercial practices in other countries sometimes are different from ours...It would be very presumptuous for Canadians to tell other people how to conduct their morals” (Ivanov, 2007: 30, 31). According to Ivanov (30, 31), a statement such as this would be “unthinkable” in the context of the contemporary fight against corruption. This means that it was around the time of the consolidation of anti-corruption discourse and the construction of corruption as an economic problem that bribery became considered as illegitimate and illegal in international business dealings.

It is important to keep in mind that the majority of states that perform poorly on CPI are states that have been plagued by extended periods of instability, violence and armed conflict (Transparency International, 2016b). These are the states that are in desperate need of loans from financial institutions and it is these states that are most likely to agree to conditions that involve institutional and political alteration to get access to financing. Developing countries, for example, have to comply with a very high number of conditions in order to gain access to IMF and World Bank funding (Eurodad, 2006: 3). It is reported that, on average, these countries face up to 67 conditions, but Uganda had to comply with 197 conditions in order to receive a development grant from the World Bank in 2005 (3). The majority of these conditions are related to privatisation and trade liberalisation, but a number of these conditions are related to public sector reform and anti-corruption (Eurodad, 2006).

It is also developing countries that have to alter local governmental structures, policies and procedures to gain access to regional and multilateral organisations, such as the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Latvia, for example, established the Corruption Combating and Prevention Bureau (KNAB) to demonstrate its progress in corruption alleviation in order to be accepted into the EU and NATO (Kuris, 2012: 9). Another example is that of Croatia. According to Zanotti (2006: 159):

The admission of Croatia to the EU can be read as an endeavour to modify behaviour by making inclusion/exclusion from a particular association conditional upon the

achievement of a given set of benchmarks. This process is based upon definition of detailed rules of behaviour, constant scrutiny and examination of performance.

This means that compliance with a set of international criteria has become a core condition “for the allocation of international assistance and for the inclusion in supranational political organisations” (151). In other words, the construction of corruption as a problem of economics enabled the World Bank and the IMF to exert control over states for not implementing specific governmental policies and procedures. The IMF, for example, can now make recommendations with regards to removing “unnecessary regulations and opportunities for rent seeking” (Ivanov, 2007: 31). Under the banner of fighting corruption, the IMF can compel countries to alter local laws and institutions, whilst maintaining that its actions are non-political.

Importantly, the implementation of anti-corruption strategies does not simply result in the removal of inefficient policies leading to direct economic benefit. Anti-corruption does not only imply “technical adjustments within a largely functioning system”; on the contrary anti-corruption discourse “categorises and thereby delegitimises entire societies” (Polzer, 2001: 24). This means that addressing the non-political characteristics of corruption has enabled organisations such as the World Bank and the IMF to become directly involved in the political practices of sovereign states. In fighting corruption, the World Bank, for example, circumvents and mistrusts “local and national politics, while itself acting politically” (18). In other words, the irony here is that the depoliticisation of corruption, and the construction of corruption as an economic problem has allowed the World Bank and the IMF to themselves become politicised.

It is at this point that one can bring Foucault’s notion of governmentality into the discussion. The concept refers to the linkage between the practices of government and the forms of knowledge that underpin the legitimacy of such practices (Fimyar, 2008: 5). The concept clarifies the relationship between political rationality and methods of governance (4). In the context of governmentality, power serves to rationalise its own existence through the social scientific discourses that form an integral component of its practices and its institutions (6). Therefore, the concept designates the analysis of the manner in which truth, and its linkage to cultural, political, economic and social spheres, is produced and subsequently employed to pursue governmental strategies (4).

As such, governmentality is used to describe a manifestation of power that drives the implementation of mechanisms aimed at the governance of populations, as well as the emergence of the forms of knowledge that serve to collect information about the societal characteristics that these governmental mechanisms are centred on. These forms of knowledge underscore and legitimise the rationality of government and serves as a mechanism for facilitating its global dispersion. In this context, fighting corruption is about legitimising particular governmental practices through the provision of academic and institutional discourses that rationalise the applicability and utility of those practices. Additionally, it is the establishment of mechanisms through which anti-corruption policies are implemented and compliance with international norms and rules is monitored and enforced.

Therefore, the governmentality of the anti-corruption industry is about the establishment of a consolidated regime of knowledge that supports, legitimises and rationalises international governance reform under the banner of fighting corruption. Thus, if one relates this to UNCAC, for example, whether it has to do with the criminalisation of new forms of corruption, or the establishment of anti-corruption agencies, these actions are supported and legitimised by a host of influential international actors, as well as by an endless array of articles, research reports, assessments and position papers. UNCAC can be seen as a governmental disciplinary tool which calls for the global implementation of international norms of governance and the normalisation of states that are non-compliant. The legitimacy of UNCAC is grounded in the consolidated knowledge regime through which its conception and implementation is rationalised. This means that the policies and practices of the anti-corruption industry are justified by the very knowledge regime upon which the anti-corruption industry has been constructed.

Importantly, the concept of governmentality illustrates that one cannot separate the operation of power from the forms of knowledge that underscore its legitimacy. This power does not, however, fall into the ambit of specific institutions or organisations. On the contrary, power infiltrates various spaces, and occupies divergent areas. Zanotti (2006: 151) quotes Foucault when she states that, power can be classified as “infinitesimal mechanisms, which have their own history, their own trajectory, their own techniques and tactics.” As such, power works through a multiplicity of mechanisms embedded within the sphere of international governance, as well as localised within the operating procedures and institutions of sovereign states.

Foucault's concept of governmentality shows that power and knowledge, in the governance of society, are inseparable. In Foucault's (1995: 27) words, "... power and knowledge directly imply one another ... there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations." In Foucault's understanding, power is driven to achieve certain outcomes, but these outcomes are not defined, promoted or championed by specific individuals or institutions (Gutting, 2013). Disciplinary power, for example, is a governmental technology that may ramify through various institutions such as armies, hospitals, prisons, schools and law enforcement but it cannot be reduced to the operation of one specific institution alone (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 153). In this sense, power "is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical relationship in a particular society" (Foucault, 1976: 93). This does not mean that power is reprehensible or that it has in some way corrupted the anti-corruption industry. Power is not a hidden and enigmatic cancer that needs to be uncovered, isolated and dispelled. On the contrary, power is a core element in the creation of societal relations as well as the forms of knowledge that serve to underpin such relations. This means that power forms the foundation of how the problems of society are identified, isolated and addressed.

In this context, international organisations are not puppet masters pulling the strings of international order in pursuit of self-centred and self-interested ideological and political gain. These organisations have, no doubt, played a significant role in the development of the anti-corruption industry and they are very influential actors in the international realm, but the locus of power does not rest solely in their ambit. International organisations are situated international actors. The strategies and discourses championed by these organisations are the result of the social, economic, ideological and political environment that they operate within. These organisations are not all-controlling nefarious entities; on the contrary international organisations respond to the threats, insecurities, instabilities and complexities of the international realm. These organisations generate information, data and knowledge to clarify the ambiguities that persist in the international political economy and endeavour to create order in a space that is characterised by unpredictability.

Foucault's concept of governmentality provides one with a framework that can be used to problematise and deconstruct the normatively accepted understanding of governmental and state practices (Fimyar, 2008: 4). This deconstruction opens up the forms of knowledge and

the discourses that are utilised in governance of populations and individuals. Fundamentally, governmentality allows one to deconstruct the truths that have been fostered into existence through the historical development of societies. These truths underpin the very rationality of governance. Without these truths, contemporary forms of government cease to retain their legitimacy and relevance. Without the constructed truth of corruption, and without the layer upon layer of discourse that obfuscates this construction, the fight against corruption loses its legitimacy and international organisations lose their accountability in their application.

Therefore, if one asks the question, why does the anti-corruption industry continue to expand despite its failure in delivering on its objective? The answer is that the anti-corruption industry has not failed to achieve its objective. This is because the objective of the industry has never solely been the alleviation of corruption. Addressing the prevalence of corruption is only one component of its broader objective; which is centred on the global implementation of a normalised mode of governance. As such, the anti-corruption industry operates autonomously, and without respite, by classifying what counts as problems, what counts as solutions and what counts as legitimate discourse and knowledge. In this way, the governmentality of the anti-corruption industry drives and perpetuates its own prevalence.

4.4) Conclusion

The objective in this chapter was to make use of Foucault's work to analyse the role that the anti-corruption industry plays in the realm of international governance and in the administration of states. The establishment of Transparency International and the emergence of the CPI played a very important role in the quantification of corruption. It was only once the prevalence of corruption was quantitatively measured within an internationally accepted statistical framework that the impact of corruption on economic growth could be illustrated. Once this link was made, it was possible for international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the IMF, to alter their discourse around the subject and to enter into the fight against corruption. The entry of these organisations resulted in an influx of resources and an immense proliferation of discourse, which served to entrench the conception of corruption as a problem of economics.

This allowed the IMF and the World Bank to become directly involved in the political practices of sovereign states, while maintaining that their actions are non-political. Importantly, conventions such as UNCAC, serve to further propagate and embed anti-corruption practices and discourses globally. This convention has become an international

mechanism which is used, not only to discipline and control states that are not complying with international standards, but also for transposing local business norms and ethics. All in all, even though the UN takes an overtly political approach when it comes to corruption alleviation while the international financial institutions take an economic approach, all of these organisations are nodes in the dissemination and propagation of the industry as a whole. This industry is based on a consolidated regime of knowledge which justifies and rationalises its own practices. In other words, by determining what counts as legitimate discourse and what does not, the industry drives and perpetuates its own prevalence. This means that failure in the alleviation of corruption does not hamper the growth of the industry; on the contrary perceived failure is used for further investment and research. Importantly, without the construction of corruption, and the measures taken in the fight against it, contemporary norms of governance fail to retain their legitimacy.

Using Foucault's work to analyse the anti-corruption industry thus does not take us any closer to solving the problem of corruption. Foucault's work does, however, allow us to analyse the manner in which corruption has been constructed as a problem of economics. It shows clearly how the reigning discourse is ideological and normative and the alleviation of corruption is a governmental practice that is aimed less at enhancing the morality of economic interaction and more at standardising and entrenching a global framework of 'good' governance. As such, the industry, and the knowledge regime associated with it, acts as a justificatory principle for the involvement of international actors in the political practices of sovereign states, while legitimising their behaviour as non-political. This means that the fight against corruption plays a definite, active, political role in the manner in which international actors endeavour to govern the global political economy. Importantly, the objective of the industry is not necessarily related to the alleviation of corruption alone; the objective of the industry is to propagate and disseminate the norms of international governance globally and to embed these norms in the administrative procedures and institutions of sovereign states.

Chapter 5: The modes of Objectification and the Paradigm of Good Governance

5.1) Introduction

The objective in this chapter is to conclude the thesis by providing a brief summary of what has been discussed in the preceding chapters. Additionally, I will make a link between Foucault's three modes of objectification and the anti-corruption industry. Discussing contemporary anti-corruption discourses and practices in the context of the modes of objectification is a good way to consolidate the argument and to highlight the role played by the individual subject in the propagation of the anti-corruption industry. This chapter has three main sections. The introductory section summarises the argument that was put forward in chapters 3 and 4. In section 5.2 the relations between the anti-corruption industry and Foucault's three modes of objectification is discussed in more detail and in section 5.3 some final remarks and conclusions are provided.

The original aim of this thesis was to unpack the discourses and practices that emanate from the anti-corruption industry in order to analyse the role that the industry plays in the governance of the international realm. In other words, the goal has not been to criticise the anti-corruption industry as such, nor has it been to overthrow contemporary norms of governance; the goal was to unpack and understand the constructed truths upon which contemporary forms of governance are based and to understand the role played by power and knowledge in this construction.

The anti-corruption industry, as a global governmental practice, has expanded at a very rapid rate since the mid-1990s. The industry draws significant resources and attention, and it has had a very real impact on the way states endeavour to govern their citizens. The fight against corruption is presented as an apolitical international drive to eradicate what is constructed as a universal problem. Upon closer inspection, however, it becomes evident that the anti-corruption industry is based on normative concepts, values and ideals. Contemporary anti-corruption practices involve embedding normative morals, codes and business standards into the structures of societies that played no role in the formation of these standards. This means that the industry is a global moralising endeavour that presents itself as an apolitical project in search of solutions to a seemingly collective global malady. Importantly, there is a limited understanding of what the anti-corruption industry is and what its actual impact has been. For this reason, this thesis was motivated as an attempt to come to grips with the underlying

factors that drives the industry, as well as the totalising nature of its discourse. This entailed unpacking the discourses and practices of the industry and the role that international organisations have played in bringing the industry to life and driving its global proliferation.

Chapter 3 provides a genealogical account of the evolution of anti-corruption discourse and its consolidation through the emergence of the anti-corruption industry. This chapter is also centred on the primary criticisms that have been levelled against the industry since its inception. The goal of this chapter was to trace the development of anti-corruption discourse since the 1950s. It can be said that anti-corruption discourse disseminated in two waves, with the first starting roughly in the 1950s and the second in the 1990s. The first wave was characterised by an immense proliferation of multifaceted theories and arguments. Some authors argued that corruption has a fundamentally detrimental societal and economic impact, whilst other authors argued that corruption is part of the developmental process and that it could even have a positive impact on economic growth. As such, the discourse on the subject became highly diverse and the concept came to be broad and linked to a variety of different behaviours.

In contrast, the second wave of anti-corruption discourse was characterised by consolidation. With the emergence of the anti-corruption industry, a more uniform understanding of corruption was entrenched. Notably, a version of Nye's definition, the abuse of public power for private gain, became the primary way in which corruption was defined and understood. Importantly, however, the consolidation of the anti-corruption discourse did not result in a refined concept. The concept retained its indeterminate character. This means that the contemporary conception of corruption is characterised by conceptual ambiguity on the one side, and definitional uniformity on the other. It is for this reason that there has been a schism in contemporary anti-corruption critiques, with some criticisms centred on the overly simplistic and normative neoliberal definition of corruption, and other criticisms centred on the ambiguity of the concept. Importantly, the lack of impact of these criticisms on the anti-corruption industry is not due to the fact that they are ill-founded; on the contrary these criticisms centre on very important shortcomings of the industry. The anti-corruption industry has, however, grown to the sufficient extent that criticisms are overcrowded by its sheer influence and magnitude.

As discussed in chapter 4, Foucault's concepts of governmentality, objectification, and disciplinary power provide a good framework for understanding the relationship between

knowledge and power in the anti-corruption industry. The consolidation of anti-corruption discourse in the mid-1990s and the emergence of the anti-corruption industry was the result of numerous factors. One key factor was the proliferation of perception based instruments used for gauging the global prevalence of corruption, the primary of which is the Transparency International CPI. As the CPI gained prominence, it became an important tool used by economists and analysts to quantitatively track the impact of corruption on economic growth, inequality and poverty. Perception based statistical surveys such as the CPI created a space of intelligibility that supported the reigning interpretation of corruption (Bracken, 2007: 14). Importantly, the proliferation of these indices allowed organisations such as the World Bank the IMF to amend their discourses around corruption and it allowed these organisations to construct corruption as a problem of economics.

On the back of this construction, the way was open for international financial institutions to enter into the anti-corruption and governance debate in full force, circumventing their respective non-political mandates in the process. Importantly, however, the construction of corruption allowed these organisations to include governmental and institutional stipulations into loan policies and thereby to force states into complying with international norms of governance. The political nature of this interaction means that the World Bank and the IMF occupy a contradictory position. These organisations present themselves as non-political actors, but their actions are inherently political. To this end, the construction of corruption as a problem of economics has enabled the IMF and the World Bank to become directly involved in the political practices of sovereign states, while retaining an air of legitimacy around their interventions.

In terms of governmentality, these organisations play a role in the construction of anti-corruption discourse as well as the implementation of the institutional arrangements that are called forth by this discourse. In this way, anti-corruption practices are fundamentally based on the very discourses that underscore their own rationality. As such, the anti-corruption industry perpetuates its own prevalence by determining what counts as problems, what counts as solutions and what counts as legitimate discourse in the context of the fight against corruption. International conventions such as UNCAC further entrenches the practices and discourses of the industry. UNCAC is an international disciplinary tool that is used to control states that are non-compliant with international norms, but it is also a tool used for deligitimising and removing business norms, practices and ethics that run contrary to international standards. Importantly, this convention serves to further embed the international

legitimacy of the industry by identifying, classifying and criminalising the actions that count as corruption. Furthermore, the convention ties states together within a realm of international cooperation and prosecution. Thus, in terms of governmentality and the disciplinary mechanisms associated with it, the actions of the international financial institutions and the UN are interlinked and serve to further drive the international expansion of the industry. As such, even though the UN makes explicitly political prescriptions, while the World Bank and the IMF make explicitly economic prescriptions, in terms of the drive to fight corruption, the actions of these organisations are two sides of the same coin.

The next section links Foucault's three modes of objectification with contemporary anti-corruption discourse and practices. Using Foucault's three modes objectification is a good way to conclude the thesis by presenting an overall perspective on the links between the anti-corruption industry and Foucault's work.

5.2) Corruption and the three modes of objectification

The relations between anti-corruption discourse and the first mode of objectification was discussed in sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, but, to summarise, anti-corruption discourse was consolidated in the 1990s, with the establishment of the CPI and the subsequent characterisation of corruption as a problem of economics. This allowed for the emergence of a uniform regime of knowledge, which opened the way for international organisations and financial institutions to amend their discourse on the subject. This discourse serves to elevate the relevance of particular forms of knowledge (empirical, quantitative and econometric) above other forms of knowledge (cultural, local, interpretive, and non-western). As such, similar to the manner in which sexuality was constructed within the context of the biological and medical sciences in the eighteenth century, corruption was constructed as an economic concept within neoliberal discourse in the 1990s. This means that corruption is a topic where one can clearly identify the production of truth, in the pursuit of normative, ideological and political objectives. This production occurs within the context of the consolidated anti-corruption knowledge regime, which serves to rationalise and legitimise the fight against corruption as an international governmental practice.

In terms of Foucault's second mode of objectification, dividing practices, the actors involved in the anti-corruption industry endeavour to normalise everything that does not fit into the framework of classification as advocated by the consolidated anti-corruption knowledge regime. Divisions and specifications serve to separate permissible from impermissible

behaviour, after which normalising practices are employed to isolate, identify, transform and rectify any anomalies that are encountered (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983: 258). The role of dividing practices is very important in the creation and dissemination of anti-corruption knowledge. Dividing practices involve the division and classification of what counts as acceptable and what does not. In other words, the anti-corruption industry produces specifications and categories of abnormal, normal, corrupt and ethical behaviour; classifications which have been culturally and socially defined but that are presented as unbiased and neutral knowledge. Additionally, however, dividing practices also involve the entrenchment of these divisions into the governmental and institutional structures of society. As such, dividing practices are not limited to classification and separation in the realms of discourse alone; they also characterise separation within the context of institutional and governmental practices and policies.

In other words, by striving for the alleviation of corruption, organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank, endeavour to embed the international norms of governance within processes of the states that they engage with. Thereby, divisionary categories, and the discourses associated with these categories, are incorporated in the administrative and institutional practices of states. Subsequently, conventions such as UNCAC are used to embed the normative conceptions of corruption into an internationally entrenched legal framework, which is dissipated globally and implanted into the governance practices of sovereign states. In this way, new types of corruption are coined and specific behaviours are isolated, delegitimised, criminalised and prosecuted. The delegitimation of these behaviours largely occurs unopposed, because it is rationalised and codified within reigning anti-corruption discourse of influential international organisations, non-governmental organisations, governments and civil society groups.

Foucault's point with regards to dividing practices is that the processes of classification and division that form a core component of social scientific discourse are also central to the establishment of the institutions and state practices that govern contemporary society (Ball, 1990: 2). As is clearly identifiable in anti-corruption discourse, these classifications are all rooted in normative cultural values, political ideologies and economic exigencies, which means that dividing practices, and the anti-corruption knowledge that is tied to it, are rooted in the historical development of societies. In this context, it would never be possible to establish an objective definition of corruption, because it is fundamentally tied to normative cultural rules, standards and ethics. Any attempt to situate concepts such as corruption in a

realm of neutral and unbiased discourse, Foucault helps us to see very clearly, is driven to justify the implementation of certain governmental practices or policies.

Corruption is a normative, value-laden term, but for the industry to be able to exist, it necessarily requires a concept that is universal to the sufficient extent that it would be applicable in the implementation of alleviation programmes in a diverse range of cultural constituencies. Importantly however, this concept, also needs to be indeterminate, to allow for additional behaviours to be isolated, classified and criminalised. The totalising character of anti-corruption discourse requires the discovery and normalisation of a constant stream of anomalies. For the industry and the discourse to maintain its expansion, there has to be hidden, as yet undiscovered, forms of corruption to identify and to expose. It is this supposedly hidden corruption that justifies and catalyses the continual drive to investigate and uncover new forms of behaviour that could be classified as corruption.

In other words, the anti-corruption industry is characterised by a consolidated social scientific knowledge regime based on corruption as a problem of economics, with processes of classification and division that serve to delegitimise and criminalise certain behaviours while legitimising others. Furthermore, this industry is engaged in the implementation of an internationally standardised code of conduct with the aim of adjusting individual behaviour to international norms and values. Therefore, the anti-corruption industry is not only centred on the adjustment of the governance practices of states. Individuals play an important role in the appropriation of anti-corruption discourse and legitimising its prevalence. This is where Foucault's third mode of objectification comes in.

The third mode of objectification refers to the "mode of relation between the individual and himself" (Foucault, 1984: 334). This entails the practices that individuals employ to transform themselves into ethical subjects within the political, societal and economic matrix in which they are situated. To refer back to chapter 2, any moral action implies the practices of the self (Foucault, 1985: 28). In Foucault's words, moral action is: "... a process in which the individual delimits that part of himself that will form the object of his moral practice, defines his position relative to the precept he will follow, and decides on a certain mode of being that will serve as his moral goal" (28). This means that moral action requires the individual to work on himself and to monitor, improve and transform himself (28).

In Foucault's understanding, power is not a force that dominates everything in its wake; it is diverse and distributed in different sectors of society and individuals play a very important

role in its legitimisation and propagation. For Foucault, there is a “versatile equilibrium, with complementarity and conflicts between techniques which assure coercion and processes through which the self is constructed or modified by himself” (Lemke, 2000: 5). This means that for any discourse, behavioural norm, policy or practice to be dispersed throughout society, individuals have to play a role in its appropriation and internalisation. Anti-corruption knowledge, for example, has to resonate throughout society and it has to be perceived as rational for it to retain its legitimacy. In this context, the fight against corruption has to be coherent and rational within the societal context in which it occurs. This legitimacy not only depends on the norms and knowledge that surrounds it, but also on the way individuals appropriate such practices.

Therefore, with regards to anti-corruption industry, individuals play a role in managing, adapting, moulding and governing their own behaviour. Individuals are not slaves to reigning anti-corruption discourse. Individuals form their perceptions and ideas about what corruption is and how it is relevant to their lives within the context of different forms of information they are presented with, the different challenges and opportunities that they are faced with, as well as the societal context that they find themselves in. Importantly, however, individuals frame what they perceive as normal, abnormal, moral or immoral in the context of broader ideological narratives that are at play as well as the global economic and political factors that these are tied to. This means that, in terms of the third mode of objectification, individuals are not necessarily dominated by power; individuals are key nodes in the dissemination of power. There is space for individuals to react and respond to reigning discourse and not to blindly accept this discourse as true knowledge.

The problem, however, is that anti-corruption discourse, and the industry that drives the propagation of this discourse, has a totalising character. According to Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983: 182, 183), this is a general characteristic of social scientific discourse. For Dreyfus and Rabinow (182-183), contemporary social scientific disciplines gravitate toward perpetual totalisation and specification (258). Ever greater principles are sought in order to subsume more and more phenomena and in order to eliminate anomalies (258). Importantly, this normalisation does not lead to normal science; on the contrary, it leads to totalising discourse. For Ball (1990: 2) this discourse is about “what can be said and thought, but also about who can speak, when, and with what authority.” This means that, even though individuals are not necessarily subjugated by reigning anti-corruption discourse, the all-encompassing nature of this discourse provides them with no real alternative. This makes it all but impossible to

formulate positions that oppose reigning anti-corruption discourse and there is no space left to establish new approaches and new forms of governance. Furthermore, the sheer size and resources of the anti-corruption industry makes it impervious to criticism, which means that it has the influence to deligitimise alternative approaches and to label them as contrary to economic growth and social cohesion.

5.3) Final remarks: The Paradigm of Good Governance

Foucault described himself as a historian of thought. Through his genealogical investigations, Foucault was interested in analysing the way in which man constitutes himself and is constituted as a thinking being. In this context, thought stretches further than the “universal categories of logic” (Foucault, 1988: 9, 10). One can also not characterise thought as the sole product of societal relations and social history. As stated in chapter 2, human beings are not wholly subjugated by hegemonic forces of power, but they are also not completely free to pursue self-determination. In this sense, there is a versatile equilibrium between the practices of power and the practices of the self. Knowledge is not the sole product of power, but it is also not only centred on finding the objective truths that characterise human interaction.

The concept of governmentality gives one the opportunity to analyse the reciprocity between the governance of the state, the governance of the self, and the governance of others. Importantly, this concept emphasises that the social scientific discourses that are produced about society are a product of governmental practices and vice versa. These discourses are fundamentally related to relations of power. Power, in this sense, is embedded within the micropractices of the anti-corruption industry. It is grounded in the countless initiatives, policies, procedures, conventions and documents that are produced by anti-corruption actors. As already emphasised, this power is not inherently negative and the point is not to eradicate the relations of power that form part of the anti-corruption industry. Rather, the point is to shed light on the ideological, political and governmental role that the industry plays in the realm of international governance.

A key strength of the anti-corruption industry is the constant proliferation of discourse, which serves to underscore the rationality of anti-corruption as a global governmental practice. In this sense, anti-corruption knowledge did not emerge due to the newfound discovery of the impact that corruption has on economic growth; anti-corruption knowledge emerged as a necessary requirement for the justification of the societal role that anti-corruption plays in the governance of the international realm. As such, the anti-corruption industry has a function

that stretches further than merely fighting corruption. Anti-corruption is a central component in an economy of power that pertains to the governance of contemporary states and its constitutive and correlative relation to the governance of the global political economy.

The anti-corruption industry is thus driven, legitimised and globally propagated with the purpose of transforming and transposing divergent governmental structures, institutions, policies, ethics and practices of states and societies that operate contrary to international norms. In this way, international organisations and western actors have fostered into existence a totalising form of discourse which is part of an endeavour to clarify the complexities of the international political economy, as well as part of a strategy to mitigate the risks that are presented by unpredictable and ‘abnormal’ states, societies and cultures. Individuals are not necessarily subjugated by this industry, but its totalising character makes it all but impossible to resist and to formulate alternative governance structures, procedures and discourses.

In countries that are plagued by political and economic difficulties, the anti-corruption industry makes possible the comprehensive alteration and reformation of not only governmental policies, practices and institutions, but also provide for the disposal of societal, cultural and business norms and values. This means that, under the umbrella of fighting a global malady, alternative modes of governance are delegitimised and different norms and cultures, different codes of behaviour and business practices, morals and ethics are classified as abnormal and, thereby, condemned into oblivion. As such, variance is depicted as abnormality and divergence as disease.

To quote the title of a famous article by Leys (1965), “What is the Problem about corruption?” The problem is not that the fight against corruption plays a role in the governance of the international realm. The problem is also not that it is used as a tool to achieve political and ideological ends. The problem is that, in the search for transparency, the ideological objectives that permeate the anti-corruption industry are obfuscated and blurred. Thereby, the truth of what corruption is and why it should be fought is constructed; a construction which has been hidden under endless layers of discourse. It is constructed truths such as corruption that provide different modes of governance their rationality; without such constructed truths contemporary modes of governance lose their relevance and international actors lose their legitimacy in its application.

So, where does this leave the fight against corruption and resistance against this fight? The fight against corruption, and the involvement of international actors in this fight, should not be blindly accepted as a just and moral endeavour. The fight against corruption is characterised by interests and ideologies. It stems from normative evaluations and cultural preferences. There is nothing universal about anti-corruption discourses and practices. Importantly, the objective of the international drive to fight corruption may be obfuscated, but this does not mean that the concept is without meaning or significance. This only means that, before anti-corruption measures are instinctively accepted, there should be concerted effort to unpack these measures and to come to grips with the moral ramifications of implementation.

Therefore, my suggestion is that anti-corruption actors make explicit the fact that their interventions are not only motivated by economic considerations, but also by ideological and political interests. Simply because this is the case does not render the international fight against corruption meaningless. What it does mean is that actors advocating the alleviation of corruption should make clear, from the start, that they seek commonality, not only on the economic front, but on the cultural, ideological and political fronts as well. There is no reason why it is not possible to bridge the gap between different modes of governance. International order can be facilitated, not by the global normalisation of a particular mode of governance, but by fostering acceptance and cooperation between different types of governance and different governmental practices. In this way, the forms of knowledge that rationalise alternative modes of governance in their respective local cultural constituencies are not dismissed and discarded, but recognised and understood.

This means that the responsibility for overcoming the totalising character of contemporary anti-corruption discourse lies with both local and international actors. This does, however, come after the recognition that different modes of governance are fundamentally embedded with factors that stem from the cultural and historic development of societies. From a Foucauldian perspective, there can be no neutral framework of governance that can simply be installed into divergent societies. Each form of governance brings with it a regime of truth, which is based on normative and cultural variables. This does not mean that there should be renewed vigour in the search for the universals that define and describe human society. In terms of Foucault's work, there can exist no such universals. This is not an inherently negative sentiment. Just as power forms a core component of how societies are governed,

constructions of truth and knowledge are extensions and reflections of governmental practices.

The point here is to recognise that different forms of knowledge stem from different societal characteristics and exigencies. Even though it has become contemporary practice to situate knowledge within a realm of objective discourse, this does not mean that these forms of knowledge have gained independence from the societal characteristics they were constructed upon. Knowledge plays a role in society and its objective is not necessarily to uncover the objective truths of societal interaction. On the contrary, the function of knowledge is to rationalise certain governmental practices and policies. That being said, individuals can respond, react and incorporate different forms of knowledge into their own self-understandings. Importantly, if one can recognise the constructions upon which social scientific discourse is based, one can also sketch a pathway to the emergence of new modes of governance; modes of governance that may be able to shed the totalising character of the anti-corruption industry.

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