

**‘Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory.
Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat.’ A
comparative study of the Malayan Emergency 1948 to
1960 and the Rhodesian Civil War 1964 to 1979.**

by
Michael David Leonard Stack

*Thesis presented in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts in History in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at
Stellenbosch University*



Supervisor: Prof William R. Nasson

March 2016

Declaration

By submitting this thesis/dissertation electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained therein is my own, original work, that I am the sole author thereof (save to the extent explicitly otherwise stated), that reproduction and publication thereof by Stellenbosch University will not infringe any third party rights and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for obtaining any qualification.

December 2015

Copyright © 2016 Stellenbosch University

All rights reserved

Acknowledgements

First and foremost, thanks are owed to the Harry Crossley Foundation, which awarded me a bursary for the final year of my Master's Degree study. With the generosity of that bursary, I was able to meet the research, travel and other costs associated with postgraduate study. I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Bill Nasson, who aptly guided me through the process of writing my dissertation. I have also been supported through my studies by my family and by the exceptional kindness of the Kierman household. My first year as an undergraduate at university was a challenging time, and I might not have made it through that year nor even this far had my Italian Tutor, Leah Nasson, not inspired me to apply myself to my studies.

Dr Wilhem Snyman should be credited with the idea of comparing the Malayan Emergency and the Rhodesian Civil War, and his input and continuing encouragement has been crucial to all of my research projects. On a research trip to London, I am obliged to my grandparents, Zena and Michael Carr, for providing accommodation and transport. Learning time management is an on-going process for university students, and I am thankful for Chet Fransch's advice on that matter. As no university department can be said to function without thoroughly professional administrative staff, I am indebted to Leschelle Morkel for all matters pertaining to 'admin', and to Melvin Daniels for other assistance. His courteous bearing aside, he was instrumental in developing my understanding of rugby and Afrikaans phrases. The proficient staff of various archives in Zimbabwe, Malaysia, South Africa, Singapore and Britain were helpful in the extreme.

For maintaining my morale and providing support, I am indebted to the friendship of Fiona Brooke. A constant voice of reason and blunt rational thought has been Sebastian Hendrikse. I would also like to thank Dylen Citta and Ryan Kierman. Finally, I would like to express my appreciation of my A-level history teacher's dedication, thank you Mrs. Salmon.

Abstract

This dissertation examines the relationship between particular tactics and strategies of two case studies, the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) and the Rhodesian Civil War (1964-1979). Two chapters illuminate the experiences of two Rhodesian units that served in Malaya as part of the Commonwealth Forces: ‘C’ Squadron (Rhodesia) 22nd SAS Regiment (1951-1953), and 1st Battalion Rhodesian African Rifles (1956-1958). In order to assess their impact on the Rhodesian Civil War, the Rhodesian *Anti-Terrorist Operations (ATOPS)* manual is compared with the British *Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya (ATOM)* manual. The final part of the dissertation comprises of an in-depth comparative study of a pivotal stratagem that the governments of Malaya and Rhodesia employed in their respective conflicts, namely their resettlement programs.

The two case studies were chosen primarily due to a paucity of comparative research involving the Malayan Emergency and the Rhodesian Civil War, and because the military link between the two conflicts has been largely unexplored. A combination of written primary sources and secondary sources were used to conduct the research. The primary sources consisted mainly of state documents, NGO reports, newspaper articles and press briefings from a number of national and public archives. The secondary sources comprised a variety of professional and amateur historical texts, and a selection of journal articles.

The study concluded that while the Rhodesian contribution to the Malayan Emergency may have been relatively minor, the military link was crucial in developing an understanding of the Rhodesian Civil War. A number of the Rhodesians, who served in ‘C’ Squadron 22nd SAS, continued their military careers and their experiences shaped the conduct of the Rhodesian Civil War. The comparative study on resettlement illustrates how the Rhodesian government attempted to replicate the Malayan resettlement program. Findings indicated that while the relationship between political, economic and military tactics and strategy were importance, the two conflicts were essentially political wars, and so every type of strategy and tactic had a political significance. Nevertheless, the study concluded that a variety of historical contexts and structural factors were more decisive in determining the outcome of resettlement.

This research has far reaching implications, particularly for counter-insurgent theorists. One cannot wage today’s wars from doctrine based solely on the lessons of wars from the

past. It is rare that the political, social, cultural, military, geographical, international and economic factors unique to a certain conflict and time period, are reproduced exactly in another theatre of war. The Rhodesian conflict illustrates the dangers of using a previous conflict (due to a shared Imperial consciousness) as tactical and strategic guidelines.

The findings of this dissertation suggest that there are grounds for further comparative research on the Malayan Emergency and the Rhodesian Civil War.

Opsomming

Hierdie tesis het ten doel om die verhouding tussen die spesifieke taktieke en strategieë van die twee gevallestudies onder bespreking, naamlik die sogenoemde “Malayan Emergency” (1948-1960) en die Rhodesiese Burger Oorlog (1964-1979) Twee hoofstukke belig die ervaringe van twee Rhodesiese eenede wat diens gelewer het in Britse Maleisië as deel van die Gemenebes Magte (Commonwealth Forces), naamlik ‘C’ Eskader (Rhodesia 22nd SAS Regiment, 1951-1953) en die 1st Battalion Rhodesian African Rifles (1956-1958). Ten einde hul impak op die Rhodesiese Burger Oorlog te bepaal, word die Rhodesian *Anti Terrorist Operations (ATOPS)* met die Britse *Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya (ATOM)* handleiding vergelyk. (Gebrek aan) Die finale deel van die tesis bestaan uit ‘n diepgaande vergelykende studie van die deurslaggewende oorbruggende strategie wat die regerings in beide Rhodesië en in Britse Maleisië gebruik het in hul respektiewe konflikte, naamlik hulle hervestigings programme.

Die twee gevallestudies was hoofsaaklik gekies weens die gebrek aan vergelykende navorsing met betrekking tot die Malayan Emergency en die Rhodesiese Burger Oorlog en omdat die verband tussen die twee oorloë grotendeels nie behoorlik ondersoek is nie. Om die navorsing te onderneem was ‘n kombinasie van geskrewe primêre bronne and sekondêre bronne was gebruik. Die primêre bronne bestaan hoofsaaklik uit staatsargiewe, NGO verslae, koerant artikels en perskonferensies van verskeie staatlike en openbare argiewe. Die sekondêre bronne bestaan uit ‘n verskeidenheid professionele en amateur historiese tekste sowel as uit joernaal artikels.

Dié studie kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat alhoewel die Rhodesiese bydrae tot die Malayan Emergency relatief gering was, was die militêre verband deurslaggewend ten einde ‘n begrip van die Rhodesiese Burger Oorlog te win. ‘n Aantal van die Rhodesiesiers wat in ‘C Eskader 22ste SAS diens gelwere het, het hul militêre loopbane voortgesit en hulle ervaringe in Britse Maleisië het die gang van die Rhodesiese Burger oorlog bepaal/ Die vergelykende studie t.o.v. hervestiging toon hoe die Rhodesiese regering probeer het om die hervestigings program van Britse Maleisië te herhaal. Bevindinge toon aan dat ofskoon die verhouding tussen die politieke, ekonomiese en militêre taktieke en strategieë belangrik was, was die teen-insurgensie oorloë in beide lande in wese politieke oorloë. Dus het elke tipe strategie en taktiek ‘n politieke beduidenis. Desnieteenstaande kom dié studie tot die gevolgtrekking dat ‘n

verskeidenheid historiese kontekste en en strukturele faktore meer deurslaggewend was t.o.v. die gevolge van hervestiging.

Hierdie navorsing het breedvoerige implikasies, veral vir deskundiges op die gebied van teen-insurgensie Dit is nie haalbaar om vandag se oorloë te meet bloot in terme van vorige oorloë nie. Selde gebeur dit dat die politieke, sosiale, kulturele, militêre, geografiese, internasionale en ekonomiese faktore eie aan een konflik presies herhaal word in 'n ander konflik situasie nie. Die konflik in die destydse Rhodesië toon hoe gevaarlik dit kan wees om dieselfde taktiese en strategiese metodes van 'n vorige konflik (binne 'n gedeelde imperial bewussyn) te herhaal.

Die bevindinge van hierdie tesis dui daarop aan dat die Malayan Emergency en die Rhodesiese Burger Oorlog verdere vergelykende navorsing verg.

Contents

All rights reserved.....	ii
Acknowledgements.....	iii
Abstract.....	iv
Opsomming.....	vi
Table of Figures.....	1
Glossary.....	2
Note on Terminology.....	12
Introduction.....	14
Literature Review.....	17
Chapter 1.....	23
The Roots and Course of the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) and the Rhodesian Civil War (1964-1979).....	23
The Origins of the Malayan Emergency.....	23
Defining the Rhodesian Conflict.....	25
The Origins of the Rhodesian Civil War.....	26
The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960.....	30
The Rhodesian Civil War 1964-1979.....	34
Phase 1.....	34
Phase 2.....	35
Phase 3.....	38
Chapter 2.....	40
The Malayan Scouts 22 SAS Regiment Rhodesian C Squadron.....	40
Introduction.....	40
Historiographical review of the C Squadron of the Malayan Scouts.....	41
Type of War.....	49
The Role of the Malayan Scouts.....	50
Successful Tour.....	51
‘C’ Squadron’s training.....	52
Allegations of Racism.....	55
Sporting Activities of the Malayan Scouts.....	57
Rhodesian Relations with Fijian troops.....	57
South African Sportsmen in the Rhodesian Squadron.....	58
The General Discipline of the Rhodesian Troops.....	59

Conduct of Rhodesian troops	60
Military Operations involving the Malayan Scouts	61
Paratroop training and operations	63
‘C’ Squadron’s experiences with tropical disease	64
Secondment of Rhodesians from combat duties	67
Poor Quality Maps	68
Concerns while on service	68
Cultural Experiences	69
Return of the Rhodesian Squadron	69
‘C’ Squadron’s experiences of Resettlement	69
Conclusion:	70
Chapter 3	73
The Rhodesian African Rifle Tour to Malaya 1956-1958	73
Introduction	73
Historiographical Review	74
The RAR and the Malayan Emergency	77
The RAR Regimental Band	81
RAR Education in Malaya	82
Conclusion	84
Chapter 4	85
Malayan Link to Rhodesian Civil War	85
Structural Comparison of <i>ATOM</i> and <i>ATOPS</i>	86
Comparative Analysis of Chapter 7 Section 5 Use of Dogs in <i>ATOPS</i>	88
Conclusion	90
Chapter 5	91
Protected Villages:	91
Introduction	91
The origins of population control and concentration	93
The role of Population in “Peoples War”	93
Population control in COIN theory	94
Overview of Resettlement in Malaya	95
Overview of Resettlement in Rhodesia	96
Malaya Protected Villages:	97

Reasons for Resettlement in Malaya.....	97
Brief History of Squatters in Malaya Pre-World War 2	97
Effect of World War 2 on the Squatter Population.....	99
The type of land that squatters inhabited	100
Origins of the Whole Scale Resettlement of Squatters	100
Reasons for Resettlement in Rhodesia.....	104
The British Malayan Administrations Goals for resettlement	104
The Rhodesian Military and Government's goals for resettlement	106
Characteristics of Malayan target population	108
Characteristics of Rhodesian Target Population.....	109
Conclusion	112
Chapter 6.....	114
Resettlement Removal Process, Planning and execution:	114
Introduction.....	114
Malaya:	114
Rhodesia:.....	117
Malaya: the immediate and initial conditions of 'New Villages'	120
Agricultural Conditions in the New Villages.....	121
Medical Conditions in the New Villages	122
Physical Security of the New Villages.....	123
The Role of the Home Guard in the provision of security for the New Villages	124
Education in the New Villages	126
The Administration of New Villages	128
Food restrictions and other measures.....	129
Rhodesia Initial and Short Term Conditions	132
Upon Arrival:	132
Medical conditions of Protected Villages	134
Provision of Security for Protected Villages	137
The Administration of Protected Villages	138
Effect of resettlement on economic structures.....	138
Assistance from Government.....	142
The use of Guard Force to provide security.....	143
Education in Protected Villages.....	145

Abuse Suffered in Rhodesian Protected Villages	146
Rural African Response to Resettlement	148
Conclusion	149
Chapter 7	151
Local and External Factors that decided the outcome of the Malayan Emergency and the Rhodesian Civil War	151
Introduction	151
The Effect of the Korean War on the Malayan Emergency and the Resettlement Program .	151
The Rhodesian Economy and Resettlement	155
Culminating Thoughts	159
Bibliography	162
Addendum A: A selection of photographs of ‘C’ Squadron (Rhodesia) 22 nd SAS	167

Table of Figures

Figure 1	4
Figure 2	5
Figure 3	6
Figure 4	7
Figure 5	8
Figure 6	9
Figure 7	10
Figure 8	11
Figure 9	12
Figure 10 SRFEVU waving farewell at the train station	167
Figure 11 Scroll presented to the M.V Tegelberg.....	168
Figure 12 Major Peter Walls shakes hands with General Sloane	169
Figure 13 The 'ulu'	170
Figure 14 Jovial tea break	171
Figure 15 Sgt Major Mazamban gets his wings.....	172
Figure 16 Ground paratroop training	173
Figure 17 Ground paratroop training	174
Figure 18 Less enthusiastic tea break	175
Figure 19 Receiving mail.....	176
Figure 20 Sgt Reid Daly with members of 11 troop	177
Figure 21 'C' Squadron coat of arms.....	178

Glossary

ANC	African National Congress
ARO	Assistant Resettlement Officer
<i>ATOM</i>	Anti-Terrorist Operation Manual
<i>ATOPS</i>	Anti-Terrorist Operations
BEM	British Empire Medal
BMA	British Military Administration
Bn.	Battalion
BSAC	British South Africa Company
BSAP	British South Africa Police
CB	Companion of The Most Honourable Order of the Bath
CBE	Commander of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire
CCJPR	Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia
CIC	Commander In Chief
CO	Commanding Officer
COIN	Counter Insurgency
Col.	Colonel
CT	Communist Terrorist
DA	District Assistant
DO	District Officer
DSO	Distinguished Service Order
DZ	Drop Zone
FARELF	Far Eastern Land Forces
FRELIMO	Frente de Libertação de Moçambique
GOC	General Officer Commanding
HQ	Head Quarters
IDAF	International Defence and Aid Fund

KCIE	Knight Commander Order of the India Empire
JOC	Joint Operations Command
Lt.	Lieutenant
Lt.-Col.	Lieutenant Colonel
Lt.-Gen.	Lieutenant General
LZ	Landing Zone
MBE	Member of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire
MCP	Malayan Communist Party
MCA	Malayan Chinese Association
MM	Military Medal
MPAJA	Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese Army
MRLA	Malaya Races Liberation Army
NAAFI	The Navy, Army and Air Force Institutes
OBE	Officer of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire
PV	Protected Village
RAEC	Royal Army Educational Corps
RAF	Royal Air Force
RAR	Rhodesian African Rifles
RASC	Royal Army Service Corps
RhAR	Rhodesian African Rifles (Malayan Tour 1956-58)
RO	Resettlement Officer
RS	Resettlement Supervisors
SAS	Special Air Service
SATA	Singapore Anti-Tuberculosis Association
SB	Special Branch

Sqn.	Squadron
SRANC	Southern Rhodesia African National Congress
SRFEVU	Southern Rhodesia Far East Volunteer Unit
SWEC	State War Executive Committee
NAS	National Archives of Singapore
NAZ	National Archives of Zimbabwe
TNA	The National Archives (London)
Tpr.	Trooper
TTL	Tribal Trust Land
UDI	Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UMNO	United Malays National Organisation
ZANLA	Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union
ZIPRA	Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army

Maps

Map of Malayan Peninsula



Figure 1¹

¹ <http://www.britishempire.co.uk/images4/malaya1955map.jpg> (28 October 2015)

Map of Malaysian Federation




Figure 2²

² <https://www.sandafayre.com/stampatlas/images/malaysia2.jpg> (28 October 2015)

Johore Province RAR Area of Operations



Figure 3³

³ A. Binda: *Masodja the history of the Rhodesian African Rifles and its forerunner the Rhodesia Native Regiment*, p. 126.

Map of Rhodesia 1973




Figure 4⁴

⁴ http://www.rhodesia.me.uk/images/RSRmap1973smallscale_final.jpg (28 October 2015)

Federation of Rhodesia 1953-1963




Figure 5⁵

⁵<http://s193.photobucket.com/user/orafs/media/Rhodesian%20Heritage/The%20New%20Federation%20of%20RHODESIA%20and%20NYASALAND/Pages2425.jpg.html> (28 October 2015)

Rhodesian Military Operation Areas



Figure 6⁶

⁶ https://taskandpurpose.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Rhodesian_Security_Forces_operational_areas.png
(28 October 2015)

The War in Rhodesia

1972–1980

- KEY
-  ZANLA sectors and main infiltration routes
 -  ZIPRA sectors and main infiltration routes
 - Tangent* Rhodesian operational areas
 - International frontiers



Figure 7⁷

⁷A. Binda: *Masodja the history of the Rhodesian African Rifles and its forerunner the Rhodesia Native Regiment*, p. 249.

Land Apportionment Map




Figure 8⁸

⁸ <http://www.britishempire.co.uk/maproom/rhodesia/rhodesialandmap.htm> (28 October 2015)

Rhodesian Cordon-Sanitaire




Figure 9⁹

Note on Terminology

⁹ <http://www.britishempire.co.uk/maproom/rhodesia/rhodesiauidimap.htm> (28 October 2015)

In the body of this dissertation within quotations, there are terms that are offensive. These terms have remained to retain historical accuracy; 'the past is a foreign country; they do things differently there.'¹⁰

¹⁰ L.P. Hartley: *The go-between*, p. 17.

Introduction

“Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat.”¹¹

The phrase asserts that one cannot win a war by focusing on one while excluding the other. In the successful and timely pursuit of victory; tactics and strategies must be employed in concert. That is to say, the relationship between strategy and tactics is of paramount importance and should not be ignored. This thesis aims to be an exploration of the relationship between the counterinsurgency tactics and strategies of resettlement. This shall be facilitated by a comparative methodology and structure concerning two specific case studies. The two case studies that have been selected are the Malayan Emergency (1948 to 1960) and the Rhodesian Civil War (1964-1979) (also known as the 2nd Chimurenga, the Liberation Struggle and the Bush War). These conflicts are generally deemed to be internal civil wars. The Malayan Emergency has often been compared with conflicts such as the Kenyan Emergency (1952-1960), the Algerian War (1952-1962) and the Vietnam War (1955-1975). While the Malayan Emergency has been compared to various conflicts, a specific comparison between the Malayan Emergency and the Rhodesian Civil War is unprecedented. This particular study does not follow the comparative methodology found in comparisons between the Malayan Emergency and post-World War Two conflicts. The reasoning is that the Rhodesian Civil War lacks certain characteristics of wars that have been compared with the Malayan Emergency. Firstly, conflicts compared with the Malayan Emergency often have similar climatic conditions such as the Vietnam War. Secondly and more significantly insurgents are usually pitted against a major Western power, such as the Algerian War. Thirdly, they are often internal colonial conflicts stemming from the West’s retreat from colonialism as in the case of the Kenya Emergency. That is to say that the Rhodesian War lacks certain similarities that have facilitated prior comparisons. Rhodesia’s climate while also tropical is vastly different to that of the Malayan jungle. The counter insurgency campaign was waged by the national forces of Rhodesia and not a Western power. The Rhodesian War is more aptly defined as a civil war as opposed to a colonial war. It follows that this study cannot follow a conventional comparative methodology.

¹¹ Attributed to Sun Tzu.

A military link between the respective Malayan and Rhodesian conflicts has been referred to in texts on the Rhodesian Civil War but has remained largely unexplored by academic scholars. The study will explore and prove the link and illustrate the value of a comparison. While the impact of the Malayan Scouts C Squadron (1951-1953) and 1st Battalion Rhodesian African Rifles (RhAR) (1956-1958) on the Malayan Emergency may not seem significant, these experiences were indispensable in shaping the Rhodesian military's and government's approach to counterinsurgency on their own soil. Crucial to tracing the extent of this influence will be a comparison of Malayan and Rhodesian military doctrinal manuals.

La guerre sans frontière is a form of total war where the outcome is not decided by just military tactics and strategies. There are all manner of military, political, economic, diplomatic, local and international factors at play. Subsequently, a common stratagem of the two conflicts that encapsulates these many factors has been selected for a comparison: i.e. the respective resettlement programmes of the Malayan and Rhodesian governments. The strategy and implementation of Protected Villages (PV) comprises a variety of factors with military considerations one among many. This will enable a more balanced historical exploration that is not hindered by the overt military focus that would be found in comparing other aspects of the two conflicts, e.g. the use of air power.

Chapter One is essentially the provision of background material on the two respective conflicts. A facet such as resettlement cannot be studied in complete isolation to the greater whole of a conflict. Neither can it be isolated from the origins of the conflicts as Malaya's resettlement problem predates the Emergency; while the origins of the Rhodesian Civil War are highly relevant to the Protected Villages (PV) program. Hence these two rather pragmatic accounts serve to illustrate the significance of resettlement and provides a context for the Rhodesian military expeditions to Malaya.

This study is written in the spirit of David French's sentiments as quoted below from his treatise on British counter-insurgency:

But here it is appropriate to enter a warning. Anyone who hopes that this book will provide easy answers about how to conduct counter-insurgency operations in the early twenty first century should stop reading now. This is not a 'how-to-do-it' manual. It is not an attempt to serve up pre-digested answers based upon historical precedents for those whose task it is to grapple with modern insurgencies. History cannot serve that purpose. The past and present are different, for, as one recent commentator has noted, 'it is rare for the prevailing strategic, political and cultural

conditions of one era to be replicated in another.’ Nor does it try to use the past as a body of examples that observers can plunder to support whatever theories they want to espouse. What it will try to do is to bring some historical rigour to the study of an area of the recent past that has sometimes lacked it.¹²

¹² D. French: *The British Way in Counter-Insurgency 1945-1967*, p. 8.

Literature Review

The Origins of the Malayan Emergency that forms part of Chapter One, has been constructed using predominantly two secondary sources: C. Hale's *Massacre in Malaya Exposing Britain's Mai Lai* and J. Bastin's & R. W. Winks' *Malaysia Selected Historical Readings*. Bastin's collection is a vast selection of treatises on Malaya's pre-colonial and colonial past. Hale's exposition on the Malayan Emergency is a highly unbalanced work that focuses mainly on the origins of the Emergency rather than the actual course of the conflict. It will be asserted that these sources are best suited for understanding the long standing causes and origins of the Emergency. The combination allows for vitalisation from recent research, strengthened by scholarly input that while dated is no less relevant. The majority of other academic works on the Malayan Emergency focus chiefly on the course of the Emergency as opposed to its origins and were deemed less suitable for look at the origins.

The Rhodesian War Origins counterpart is constructed in a similar manner but for different reasons. P. Kiss's *Winning Wars amongst the People Case Studies in Asymmetric Warfare* was chosen because his definition of the conflict is better suited to the purposes of military history research. P. Moorcraft and P. McLaughlin's *The Rhodesian War A Military History* was specifically selected from a vast array of literature. Moorcraft's text is the closest any writer has come to a balanced definitive military history of the Rhodesian War. A text that is more empirical than work influenced by the ideological bias of the Rhodesian Front, ZANU PF, and other perspectives. The use of Moorcraft's work has helped avoid reflecting the myriad ideological bias that is prevalent in much of the Rhodesian War's historical discourse. For this reason Moorcraft was used almost exclusively to provide an empirical account of the Rhodesian War for the purposes of the overview section of Chapter One. An original definitive exposition of the Rhodesian War was considered beyond the scope of this thesis.

The overview section on the Malayan Emergency was assembled through the integration of four secondary sources where M. R. Postgate's *Operation Firedog Air Support In The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960* dominates. Postgate's exposition contains excellent summaries of the course of the Malayan Emergency based on a wide range of British state documents. Many of these primary sources no longer exist and survive only through Postgate's research. References from E. O'Balance's *Malaya: The Communist Insurgent War*

1948-60, and R. W. Komer's *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*, were used to add further nuance to statistics regarding respective strengths of British and MCP forces. The fourth source that was integrated, K. Ramakrishna's *Emergency Propaganda The Winning of Malayan Hearts and Minds 1948-1958*, helped emphasise the role of propaganda in the conflict. A salient feature of any account of the Malayan Emergency is the Brigg's Plan and a report by Sir Harold Briggs from The National Archives in Kew, on the Emergency, contained a breadth of information on his plan not equalled by any secondary source.

Finding references for the Rhodesian Squadron of the Malayan Scouts was highly problematic. Very few texts on the Malayan Emergency have references on the Malayan Scouts and much less individual squadrons. One text that did have a reference was R. Jackson's *The Malayan Emergency and Indonesian Confrontation*. This encouraged the perusal of texts that focused on the history of the British 22nd SAS Regiment. However the references uncovered from the expositions of T. Jones: *SAS The First Secret Wars The Unknown Years of Combat and Insurgency* A. Hoe & E Morris: *Re-Enter the SAS The Special Air Service and the Malayan* and A. Mackenzie: *Special Force The Untold Story of 22nd Special Air Service Regiment (SAS)* were sparse, extremely brief. A far more substantial reference was discovered Cole's text *The Elite, The Story of the Rhodesian Special Air Service*. Cole's laudatory remarks on the Rhodesian C Squadron are at odds with the more critical appraisals of Jones, Hoe & Morris, and Mackenzie.

Due the lack of information in the historical discourse, research trips to three national archives were undertaken to locate primary sources on the Malayan Scouts. The first of these was the National Archives of Zimbabwe situated in Harare. A priceless historical manuscript and a collection of press reports and newsletters are held by the archive. As these documents predate the Rhodesian War, they survived document purges initiated by the Rhodesian Front government on the eve of Zimbabwe's independence. The manuscript is in fact the official scrap book of the Rhodesian Squadron, while the press reports were sent by the Rhodesian Squadron to Rhodesia's military headquarters in Salisbury. All the newspaper cuttings in this manuscript were based on the press reports sent from Malaya. A decision was taken to focus primarily on those reports as they provided a more complete picture than the news articles that were based upon them. A considerable number of Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (aka Central African Republic) newspaper articles were discovered in the UNISA archives in

Pretoria. They were not explored as the UNISA research trip's objective was to find primary sources on resettlement during the Rhodesian War.

The scarcity of Malayan Scout documents in The National Archives in London required two research trips to the National Archives of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur, and another to the National Archives of Singapore. While the Malaysian National Archives did not have Malayan Scout documents in its holdings, the National Archives of Singapore held a collection of British Colonial Office documents on the Malayan Scouts and the Rhodesian Squadron, as well as a number of local newspaper articles on the Rhodesian Squadron. This array of sources has facilitated a revisionist account of the Rhodesian Squadron's service in Malaya. A. Finlan's exposition *Special Forces, Strategy and the War on Terror*, and an article by B. Grob-Fitzgibbon: "Those Who Dared: A Reappraisal of Britain's Special Air Service," in conjunction with the Briggs report, were used to assert the significance the Malayan Scouts' contribution to the Malayan Emergency and that of the Rhodesian Squadron.

The fourth chapter on the Rhodesian African Rifles tour to Malaya faced similar challenges to the Chapter which dealt with the Rhodesian squadron. There are very few references to British colonial African regiments that served in Malaya, much less the Rhodesian African Rifles in the historical discourse of the Malayan Emergency. A. Hoe & E. Morris: *Re-Enter the SAS The Special Air Service and the Malayan Emergency*, contains several negative remarks on the Rhodesian African troops. Further references on the RAR were discovered through a careful reading of R. Miers: *Shoot to Kill*. The work is essentially a narrative of the Commanding Officer (CO) of the South Wales Borderers. The National Archives in London has a meagre War Office file on a military alliance between the RAR and the South Wales Borderer stemming from their shared experiences during the Malayan Emergency. Miers' text touches on his personal perspective of the RAR and proved useful in balancing the more negative assessments of Morris and Hoe. Two promising sources were T. Stapleton's *African Police and Soldiers in Colonial Zimbabwe 1923-1980* and M. P. Stewart's *The Rhodesian African Rifles: The Growth and Adaptation of a Multicultural Regiment through the Rhodesian Bush War, 1965-1980*. However, they too lacked substantial specific references to the RAR's tour in Malaya. Fortunately, A. Binda's *Masodja the history of the Rhodesian African Rifles and its forerunner the Rhodesia Native Regiment* contains a single chapter on the RAR's tour to Malaya.

A distinctive feature of the Chapter 3 is the acute scarcity of documentation, as is the case of Chapter 2 unlike the Malayan Scout Chapter. The National Archives of Zimbabwe holds the Colonel Well's Collection on RAR history although it does not deal with Malayan tour at great length. Aside from the War Office file on the RAR's and the South Wales Borderers' alliance, the National Archives in London holds a War Office file on Operation Eve. The file details the redeployment of 1st Bn. Northern Rhodesian Regiment to Malaya and was of some use to Chapter 3. Debates from the House of Commons in the late 1950s proved instrumental in challenging negative perceptions of Rhodesian African troops in Malaya. The research trip to Singapore facilitated the retrieval of newspaper articles on the Rhodesian African Rifles tour and these proved to be valuable sources, not necessarily due to the quality but more due to the lack of other publicly available primary sources. The conclusion of the Chapter asserts that there is a small window of opportunity to investigate oral history sources from the perspective of Rhodesian African troops.

Chapter Five, on the link between the Malayan Emergency and the Rhodesian Civil War uses a comparative analysis of two military doctrinal manuals from each of the conflicts. The Malayan one is a 1958 edition of the Malayan Anti-Terrorist Operation Manual, *ATOM*, while the Rhodesian one is a 1975 edition of the Rhodesian Army manual Anti-Terrorist Operations, *ATOPS*. References to *ATOM* are to be found in D. French's *The British Way in Counter-Insurgency 1945-1967*. This led to the acquisition of a print-on-demand copy of *ATOM* through the services of a South African book order company. *ATOPS* was located through a thorough internet search in PDF format. While the internet source is missing several of the last chapters, it is relatively complete. No copy of the *ATOPS* manual could be found in the Zimbabwe National Archives. It is conceivable that the Zimbabwe Defence Force Archives may hold a copy; however, civilian researchers are discouraged for reasons of national security. Pittaway and C. Fourie's *SAS Rhodesia: Rhodesians and the Special Air Service* asserts that Rhodesian officers brought back among other articles of war, copies of *ATOM* to Rhodesia. The comparative analysis of Chapter Five supports Pittaway's assertion and the argument of this thesis that the Rhodesians' Malayan experience influenced the tactics and strategies of the Rhodesian Civil War. The team that authored *ATOPS* very clearly copied and incorporated significant portions of *ATOM*.

The final Chapters on Malaya and Rhodesia's resettlement programs, unlike the prior chapters, benefit from a wealth of secondary texts, articles and primary sources. Hale's *Massacre in Malaya* provides a concise introduction to the concept of resettlement. Kiss's *Winning Wars amongst the People Case Studies in Asymmetric Warfare*, and Blaufarb and Tanham's *Who Will Win, A Key to*

the Puzzle of Revolutionary War lucidly conceptualises ‘People’s War’ and how resettlement forms a part of counterinsurgency theory. Through the body of the Chapters, earlier research on Malaya such as A. Short’s *Communist insurrection in Malaya 1948-1960* and R. Stubbs’s *Hearts and Minds in Guerilla Warfare The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960*, are integrated with more recent research such as Hale’s *Massacre in Malaya* and French’s *The British Way in Counter-Insurgency 1945-1967*. As there is a problem with texts that have a wider focus than a specialist one, namely that they inevitably lack the depth that highly specific journal articles can provide. Many of the Malayan secondary texts cover the Malayan Emergency in its entirety thus reducing the offering on Malayan Resettlement. Therefore a selection of journal articles was incorporated to provide insight into Malayan Resettlement. The most important of these was K. S. Sandhu’s “The Saga of the ‘Squatter’ in Malaya: A Preliminary Survey of the Causes, Characteristics and Consequences of the Resettlement of Rural Dwellers during the Emergency between 1948 and 1960.” K. J. King’s “Malaya’s Resettlement Problem,” though shorter also proved helpful. K. Hack’s “‘Iron Claws on Malaya’: The Historiography of the Malayan Emergency”, has proved essential in developing an historical criticism of resettlement in Malaya.

In the case of the Rhodesian Civil War, the choices made on using particular secondary texts are a direct result of the nature of much of the historical discourse. The selection criteria were such that the texts had to be works of military history that as far as possible kept extreme and ideological bias to a minimum. This made much of the material on the Rhodesian Civil War unsuitable for the purposes of this research. Two of the selected texts were written in the 1980s although Moorcraft *The Rhodesian War* published a revised edition in 2008. Dr. J. Cilliers’ *Counter Insurgency in Rhodesia* had a significant and well researched section on Rhodesia’s resettlement strategy. Cilliers’ exposition contains several valuable references to Rhodesian officers’ Malaya experiences and how that affected aspects other than resettlement during the Rhodesian War. D. Richards and G. Mills *Victory Among People Lessons from Countering Insurgency and Stabilising Fragile States* contains an excellent case study analysis of the Rhodesian War that emphasises the importance of the relationship between strategy and tactics. Like the case of the Malayan secondary sources, the Rhodesian sources were insufficient to the task and several resettlement specific articles were required. *The Journal of Southern African Studies* has published several articles the focus primarily on resettlement. A. Weinrich’s “Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia,” could be considered a foundational source on resettlement. Weinrich commenced research during the Rhodesian War despite censorship and associated risks. This however limited her access to research material. E. Msindo’s “‘Winning Hearts and Minds’: Crisis and Propaganda in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1962-

1970', proved instrumental in analysing the Rhodesian attempt at a 'hearts and minds' approach through resettlement. M. Kesby's "Arenas for Control, Terrains of Gender Contestation: Guerilla Struggle and Counter-Insurgency Warfare in Zimbabwe 1972-1980," facilitated the development of a cultural-and-gender-studies understanding of Rhodesian resettlement.

The Resettlement chapters comprise primary sources from the Zimbabwe National Archives, The National Archives in London, the UNISA archives in Pretoria and the Singapore National Archives. Weinrich bases her research on a number of reports that resulted in a thorough search for copies of these reports in the National Archives of Zimbabwe. An incomplete collection of these reports were found among fragments of Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia (CCJPR) documents. With the help of an archivist, a research trip to Pretoria uncovered the UNISA CCJPR collection that provided ample documents pertaining to resettlement in Rhodesia. These documents detail how the humanitarian disaster of resettlement in Rhodesia unfolded. An extensive research trip to the National Archives in London unearthed a number of Colonial Office documents on resettlement in Malaya. The National Archives of Singapore had a catalogue that was easier to navigate and facilitated the retrieval of more Colonial Office papers. The files focus on distinct aspects of resettlement in Malaya, such as education, the supply of stores, protection of the New Villages, law and order, economic effects of resettlement, studies of the squatter problem, and the process and progress of resettlement. The majority of these files were relevant to the research aims of this thesis.

Chapter 1

The Roots and Course of the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) and the Rhodesian Civil War (1964-1979)

The Origins of the Malayan Emergency

The Dutch presence in what became known as Malaya was challenged by the British in the years following their occupation of Penang after the Sultan of Kedah had granted them occupancy rights in 1786. Malacca fell to British forces in 1795 and in 1819, Singapore was occupied by Sir Stamford Raffles courtesy of a claimant of the Empire of Johore.¹³ Dutch sovereignty of Malacca was officially transferred to the British by the treaty of London in 1824. Tin had been mined in Malaya on a small scale for centuries and with the rise in the use of tin cans and the manufacture of tin plate in the 19th century, tin mining expanding rapidly. The alluvial deposits while profitable were soon exhausted and the remaining tin deposits required an influx of capital. The Malay Sultans and Chiefs who were less than judicious with much of the tin revenue turned to Malayan-born Chinese merchants from Malacca and Penang for capital outlay. The Malay ruling classes were in direct competition with Chinese entrepreneurs from Singapore. The Kongsis cooperative systems undermined the Malay Chiefs mining efforts. 'As the power of the chiefs eroded, the Kongsis began to take direct control of tin mining operations. In a very short period of time the Kongsis tightened their grip on the tin mines and plantations, to the dismay of many anxious Malays.'¹⁴

While 'tin mining reconfigured social and ethnic relations and transformed the physical landscape of Malaya'¹⁵, this process was far from peaceful. Business competition gave way to civil unrest and small scale wars as the Chinese and their Malay allies fought each other.¹⁶ This led to a massive decline in profits and prompted the British to use the internecine conflict as the basis for establishing their authority on the Malay Peninsula. In the guise of the Pangkor Conference in 1874 to bring an end to the fighting, British indirect rule was

¹³ J. Bastin & R. W. Winks: *Malaysia Selected Historical Readings*, p. 119.

¹⁴ C. Hale: *Massacre in Malaya Exposing Britain's My Lai*, p. 63.

¹⁵ C. Hale: *Massacre in Malaya Exposing Britain's My Lai*, p. 63.

¹⁶ C. Hale: *Massacre in Malaya Exposing Britain's My Lai*, p. 67.

introduced to Malaya by treaty with Sultan of Perak that led to the appointment a British Resident. The residential system while portrayed as advisory was on a fundamental level, a system of control. The British Residential System was adopted by the remaining sultans through treaties and also by military persuasion if required. 'After the signing of the Pangkor Treaty in 1874 it took nearly half a century for the British to erect that curious and ramshackle edifice of Crown Colonies and protectorates that came to be known as 'British Malaya'. By the end of the First World war, British Malaya comprised the old Straits Settlements and a federation of Malay states governed from Kuala Lumpur.'¹⁷ In the process of constituting this system of indirect and direct rule, the Sultans had a large degree of their political power leached away.

Tin was superseded by rubber as Malaya's primary export in the early 20th century. Rubber production had taken off by 1908; it started with small holding plantations and progressed to large scale corporate plantations. The tin mining industry and the boom in rubber production led to a massive influx of labour from China, India and Java. During the late 19th and early 20th century, the demographics shifted so much that the Chinese minority increased significantly.

During the Second World War the British forces in Malaya were taken by surprise by the Japanese invasion. British Malaya was not adequately garrisoned and the army fought a fighting retreat down the Peninsula, until their final unconditional surrender to the Japanese in Singapore 15th February 1942. The British were quickly defeated and seen to abandon the peoples of Malaya to the Japanese and this resulted in a considerable loss of prestige for the British Empire; in that Britain was defeated by the troops of an Asian power with its protected persons as witnesses. Before the British surrendered, the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) was approached to form a resistance against the coming Japanese occupation. Consequently the MCP formed the Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA).

In the course of a brutal Japanese occupation, the British supported MPAJA and dropped weapons and supplies and operatives to aid them. The MPAJA fought a guerrilla war against the Japanese military authorities in Malaya that did not conclusively challenge them but was indeed a thorn in their sides. The Second World War came to an end in August 1945 before an Allied Expedition set out to retake Malaya. The MCP and MPAJA used the end of the war to consolidate their position and portray themselves as the liberators of the Malayan peoples.

¹⁷ C. Hale: *Massacre in Malaya Exposing Britain's My Lai*, p. 73.

The British Military Administration (BMA) was established in Malaya 12 September 1945, ten days after the Japanese surrendered. The BMA attempted to restore some degree of order and disarm the MPAJA, Kuomintang Chinese supporters, and the Malay Wataniah. Sir Edward Gent and the Malayan Planning Unit developed a Malayan Union plan to be implemented after the end of the BMA.

The three key elements of the 'Malayan Union' plan were:

1. A centrally governed peninsula union comprising the nine Malay states, Penang and Malacca, but not Singapore.
2. A common citizenship scheme for all who regard Malaya as their home.
3. The nine Malay states abrogate their powers to the crown.¹⁸

The plan led to the rise of the Malayan Nationalist Party (UMNO), established to resist Malayan Union. UMNO pressured the Malay Sultans to boycott Edward Gents' inauguration ceremony of the intended union of Malaya. The Sultans and UMNO proved obdurate in their opposition to the Union although they opened up the possibility of a federation. After a set of secret talks, 'the British agreed to reaffirm their commitment to the rulers' sovereignty and the special position and rights of Malays.'¹⁹ This ultimately led to the creation of the Federation of Malaya in 1948.

Defining the Rhodesian Conflict

The Rhodesian War has been generally categorised in two contradictory ways. The conflict has been defined by part of the historical discourse as an anti-colonial national liberation war and by another stratum as a war against communist sponsored 'terrorists.' These two conflicting definitions are representative of the bipolar characteristics of a significant swathe of the historical discourse. These two definitions correlate to the divergent propaganda of the opposing belligerents of those times. The first definition conforms to the liberation struggle paradigm espoused by ZAPU and ZANU while the other stems from the paradigm advocated by the Rhodesian Front. These definitions do not correspond to the true nature of the war. The majority of Europeans, who resided in Rhodesia, were Rhodesian citizens, either by birth or granted after relocating to Rhodesia. The Rhodesian Security Forces were on the whole manned by Rhodesians and were therefore national forces, not

¹⁸ C. Hale: *Massacre in Malaya Exposing Britain's My Lai*, p. 216.

¹⁹ C. Hale: *Massacre in Malaya Exposing Britain's My Lai*, p. 237.

officially soldiers of a European colonial power. ZANU and ZAPU were political parties formed by Rhodesian citizens and their respective armed wings, ZANLA and ZIPRA were for the most part Rhodesian citizens. Despite being banned by the Rhodesian government and supported by foreign powers, including the Soviet Union, China, Britain and America, they and their soldiers could not be legitimately labelled illegal ‘terrorists’ nor do they satisfactorily fit the mould of freedom fighter. ZAPU and ZANU can be better defined as African nationalist movements as opposed to simply liberation movements. These armed cadres better fit the term guerrilla soldier. It follows that ‘it was not a war of national liberation but a civil war between groups of citizens who had different views of the future of their common homeland.’²⁰

The Origins of the Rhodesian Civil War

The genesis of white settlement in Northern and Southern Rhodesia began with Cecil J. Rhodes’ procurement of a mining concession from the Ndebele king Lobengula. This concession facilitated the grant of a Royal Charter from the British Crown. The charter was used as a legal basis for the establishment of a settler state in Mashonaland by the British South African Company (BSAC) with Salisbury as the first town.²¹ In 1893 a war against the Ndebele Kingdom was instigated where the *casus belli* was portrayed as Ndebele aggression. The Kingdom was defeated and subsumed into the settle state. The settlers ‘built a new frontier town Bulawayo, on the site of Lobengula’s razed capital.’²² In 1895 Rhodes secretly attempted to orchestrate a military coup that was intended to topple the Afrikaner dominated South African Republic led by Paul Kruger. The BSAC troops were pivotal to this plan and embarked on what became called the Jameson Raid. The raid ended in abject failure and Rhodes lost his position as Prime minister of the Cape Colony, there were also major internal repercussions in Rhodesia.

The reduction of the BSAC garrison due to the external operation helped precipitate an uprising by the Shona and the Ndebele tribesman. The war was called a Chimurenga and is known popularly as the first Chimurenga. The First Chimurenga lasted about 18 months and was only brought to an end through scorched earth tactics and the destruction of the African

²⁰ P. A. Kiss: *Winning Wars amongst the People Case Studies in Asymmetric Warfare*, p. 51.

²¹ P. Moorcraft & P. McLaughlin: *The Rhodesian War A Military History*, p. 19.

²² *Ibid.* p. 20.

strongholds with dynamite.²³ Both the settlers and the Africans suffered losses and the war ‘bequeathed a legacy of bitterness to both racial groups.’²⁴ During the South Africa War, also known as the Boer War (1899-1902), Rhodesian troops served with British forces against the Afrikaners. This military support set a precedent for Rhodesian involvement in wars that Britain fought in for much of the Twentieth century. Rhodesians both black and white enlisted to fight for Britain during the Great War (1914-1918). ‘Several thousand Africans enlisted in an all-volunteer force, the Rhodesian Native Regiment (RNR). The Regiment saw action in German East Africa.’²⁵ Aside from forming the officer corps of the RNR, white Rhodesians formed two Rhodesia Regiments, one serving in German South West Africa and the other in German East Africa. White Rhodesians also enlisted in British and South African units.

After the First World War, ‘the Twenties and the Depression years saw a widening of racial divisions in Rhodesia. The Land Apportionment Act of 1930 formally divided the country’s land between the races; the whites reserved to themselves the more fertile areas with higher rainfall and ‘gave’ Africans the poorer, more arid areas.’²⁶ The pressure on the environment in the Tribal Trust Lands (TTL) was further exacerbated by the rising population and corresponding numbers of livestock. ‘Labour, agricultural, industrial, educational and health legislation of the late Twenties and Thirties was aimed at creating a secure and prosperous society for the whites at the expense of the blacks, and largely succeeded, despite the hard times of the Depression.’²⁷ These policies were facilitated by the successful efforts by the settlers to wrest control of their affairs from the BSAC. ‘The referendum of 1922 delivered self-government into the hands of the settlers, and the African population’s welfare with it.’²⁸

A defence force was brought into being in the 1920s though it remained somewhat of a skeleton structure until the late 1930s. With the rise of fascism in Europe during the 1930s, came the diversification of the Rhodesian armed forces. An artillery regiment and a reconnaissance company were formed, as was a nascent Air Force. During the Second World War, the following squadrons in the Royal Air Force (RAF) were Rhodesian, 44, 237 and

²³ P. Moorcraft & P. McLaughlin: *The Rhodesian War A Military History*, p. 20.

²⁴ *Ibid.* p. 20.

²⁵ P. Moorcraft & P. McLaughlin: *The Rhodesian War A Military History*, p. 21.

²⁶ P. Moorcraft & P. McLaughlin: *The Rhodesian War A Military History*, p. 21.

²⁷ *Ibid.* p. 21.

²⁸ *Ibid.* p. 21.

266.²⁹ Due to the high casualties during the Great War, no all-white Rhodesian ground units were formed and consequently white Rhodesians enlisted in British and South African armies and served in many theatres, notably North Africa and Italy. A multi-racial unit called the Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR) was raised in 1940. Like its forerunner, the Rhodesian Native Regiment, it was led by a white officer corps. The regiment fought in Burma as part of Field Marshall William Slim's army.³⁰ 'The armed forces immediately after the war comprised a permanent staff of European officers and NCOs to command and administer the RAR as the regular core, the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the Royal Rhodesian Regiment as the European reserve component, and the Royal Rhodesian Air Force, which became a unit of the Permanent Force from 1947. In 1953, Southern Rhodesia joined Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia in the formation of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The Southern Rhodesian defence forces were subsequently incorporated into the Federation's military structures. The Federal defence force 'fitted into Britain's Imperial defence policy under the umbrella of the Central African Military Command.'³¹ Southern Rhodesia dominated the Federation both militarily and politically. This dominance was buttressed by the way the British government considered Southern Rhodesia a crucial part of its policy for regional defence. 'Detachments of the police force, which had never lost its paramilitary functions, were sent to help in quelling disturbances in Bechuanaland in 1950-2, and to Kenya and Nyasaland in 1953. A Rhodesian Far East Volunteer Unit served in Malaya in the early 1950s, and the RAR was deployed there during the Emergency in 1956-58. From 1958-61 detachments served in Kuwait and at Aden in support of British operations in the Middle East.'³² During the Federal years, the Rhodesian Air Force grew in size and was modernized by the introduction of jet fighters and bombers.

African nationalism had been on the rise since the Shamva miners' strike of 1927.³³ This rise was accelerated by the Bulawayo general strike in 1948. 'Legislation such as the Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951, which introduced specific restrictions on African land use and compulsory de-stocking of overgrazed pastures, merely provided a focus for the African discontent in the colony.'³⁴ The first African nationalist party to be formed was the Southern Rhodesian African National Congress. With the growth of African nationalism came with

²⁹ P. Moorcraft & P. McLaughlin: *The Rhodesian War A Military History*, p. 22.

³⁰ NAZ S 3021/3/1/2. Colonel Wells Papers on the RAR, Abridged History 1st Bn. The Rhodesian African Rifles, 1975.

³¹ P. Moorcraft & P. McLaughlin: *The Rhodesian War A Military History*, p. 24.

³² *Ibid.* p. 24.

³³ *Ibid.* p. 24.

³⁴ *Ibid.* p. 24.

radicalisation of white politics, the diversion away from reformist policies was heralded by the fall of liberal Rhodesian Prime Minister Garfield Todd from power in 1958. As argued by this study, the experiences of Rhodesian units in Malaya were used to instruct the Rhodesian Armed forces in counter-insurgency (COIN) techniques in preparation for internal security operations. 'In 1961 all European males aged 18 to 50 were registered for emergency call-up in the Territorial Force if necessary. The political and financial neglect of the armed forces of the 1950s was swept away by the winds of change in Africa, and rearmament was stepped up to a feverish pace.'³⁵ Aside from the establishment of three more reserve European Territorial battalions, it was decided that the regular Rhodesian forces required balancing with the creation of all white regular units, such as the Rhodesian Light Infantry, the Special Air Service (SAS) and the Selous Scouts armoured car unit. The South Rhodesian ANC was banned and reformed as the National Democratic Party, banned once more and was renamed Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) in 1961. The crystallization of white Rhodesian intransigence to the political aspirations of African nationalists was embodied by 'the Law and Order Maintenance Act (1960), which gave the government sweeping powers for the control of political opposition and laid down draconian penalties for politically motivated crimes,'³⁶ and the electoral victory of the Rhodesian Front in December of 1962.³⁷

The Belgian Congo Crisis from 1960 to 1964 was seen by many white Rhodesians as the potential fate of Rhodesia should they accede to majority rule rapidly and served to simply intensify their obduracy. The Federation, which had been brought into being in 1953, as a more liberal counter-balance to Afrikaner nationalism in South Africa, was dissolved in 1963. The dissolution was a result of the wave of decolonization that was sweeping Africa, and pressure from African Nationalists within and without the Federation. Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland emerged as the independent states Zambia and Malawi respectively, while Southern Rhodesian remained a self-governing colony. In 1964 ZAPU split with the formation of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). Due to the British refusal to grant Rhodesian independence without majority rule, and the Rhodesian Front refusing those terms, the Rhodesian Front and the African Nationalists sought to realise their political goals through extra constitutional means. The Rhodesian Front made an illegal Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) on the 11th of November 1965, coinciding with Armistice Day. The African nationalists had already begun to mobilise the international community in

³⁵ P. Moorcraft & P. McLaughlin: *The Rhodesian War A Military History*, p. 25.

³⁶ P. Moorcraft & P. McLaughlin: *The Rhodesian War A Military History*, p. 26

³⁷ *Ibid.* p. 26.

their favour and sent cadres to Communist bloc countries to train in preparation for a guerrilla war. The repressive policies of the Rhodesian government in conjunction with an illegal severance of ties with Britain left no legal political avenue that could be considered practicable for the aspirations of the African Nationalist Parties in Rhodesia. This in effect helped push African Rhodesians down the path of armed insurrection towards a ‘people’s war.’

The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960

The MCP initiated a series of attacks and sabotage attempts in the first half of 1948, allegedly as part of a strategy to overthrow the government of the Federation of Malaya. This strategy while Maoist in design was allegedly implemented at the behest of the Soviet Union. The British federal government of Malaya accused the Soviet Union of instigating the MCP terror campaign. This accusation had been hotly debated in the historical discourse. In response to the violence the Federal government declared a State of Emergency 16 June 1948. ‘Having openly committed itself to armed resistance against the Government the MCP adopted a three-stage strategic plan; firstly to cause terror and economic chaos in rural areas by a programme of assassination and sabotage with the aim of under-mining confidence in the administration, secondly to ‘liberate’ selected rural areas and establish local Communist administration there to serve as the nucleus for the third and final phase of the rebellion during which the urban areas would be ‘liberated’ and a Communist republic declared.’³⁸ At the start of the Emergency the balance of forces was as follows.

The armed wing of the MCP was titled the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA) numbering 3,000 guerrillas. The MRLA was supported by a group known as the Min Yuen. The Min Yuen was an underground clandestine organisation with members in the rural and urban areas that acted as a logistical network, a pool of recruits and a source of intelligence. ‘At no time in the Emergency were the MRLA able to organize external supply lines for their replenishment of arms or recruits, partly as a result of the Security Forces’ blockade of the borders and partly because the Chinese Communists were involved in the Korean War during the period when the terrorists held the initiative in Malaya and were thus in no position to

³⁸ M. R. Postgate: *Operation Firedog Air Support In The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960*, p. 2.

help.³⁹ As such the MCP was entirely dependent on the Min Yuen and internal support. The exact numbers of the Min Yuen were not known, and while there are wild estimates of up to 400,000 members; Edgar O'Balance has a conservative estimate of somewhere between 30,000 and 40,000 members.⁴⁰

The Security Force levels stood at 9,000 men in the Police Force and ten infantry battalions that were under strength,⁴¹ making up approximately 5,800 combat troops.⁴² The Federal government was inadequately prepared to effectively deal with the communist insurgency at a number of levels. The previously mentioned Security Forces were too small to fulfil both a static defensive and aggressive offensive role against the guerrillas. A weakness in the formation of the Federation's constitution was that it did not make provision for Chinese to become full Malayan citizens. Furthermore, MRLA supporters in the rural areas, particularly illegal squatters were not under government administration. Efforts were made in the early years of the Emergency to rectify these and other deficiencies. However, the government lacked strategic direction. This came with the appointment of the first Director of Operations Lieutenant –General Sir Harold Briggs 1 April 1950, who formulated what was known as the Briggs Plan. Briggs identified the MCP's Achilles's heel, as being the MCP's dependence on the support of Min Yuen and on support of the population of Malaya, primarily the illegal squatters, and proceeded to craft a strategy that would target that weakness. The strategy had a civil focus with the military in support. Essentially rural villagers deemed susceptible to the MCP would be resettled wholesale to cut them off from the MCP. The military effect was to deny the MCP of all the advantages conferred by the support of Chinese squatters. However, this was merely one facet; the plan laid out how the resettled villagers would be brought into the government administration and benefit from civil projects and new amenities. The 'New Villages' would also slowly develop political structures and take control of their own defence.⁴³

The Malayan government passed an inordinate amount of legislation during the Emergency as part of their 'legal' counter measures, most of these measure fell under the Emergency Regulations Bill, passed 5 July 1948. One counter-measure was National

³⁹ M. R. Postgate: *Operation Firedog Air Support In The Malayan Emergency 1948-196*, p. 4.

⁴⁰ E. O'Ballance: *Malaya: The Communist Insurgent War 1948-60*, p. 92.

⁴¹ M. R. Postgate: *Operation Firedog Air Support In The Malayan Emergency `1948-1960*, p. 4.

⁴² R. W. Komer: *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*, p. 11.

⁴³ AIR 20-7777. Lieut.- General Sir Harold Briggs, Report on the Emergency in Malaya from April, 1950 to November, 1951.

Registration in 1949 that further extended government administration and hampered MCP movement. Combined with resettlement were operations that disrupted food and medical supplies. These operations were designed to starve the guerrillas and increase their rates of attrition and also provide intelligence on the Min Yuen members who were supplying them. Propaganda played a major role in the course of the Emergency, persuading MCP members to surrender and providing a conceptual framework to counter communist propaganda among the general populace.⁴⁴

The MRLA's advance was halted in the period June 1948 to October 1949. As they fell back to their jungle bases, they launched another offensive from October 1949 to August 1951.⁴⁵ Before resettlement was adopted on a large scale, the Federal government used detention and forced deportations as a deterrent. Detention continued to feature during the course of the Emergency. However, deportations to China came to end when the Chinese Communists seized power from the Kuomintang in 1949. The regroupment of labour formed another part of the resettlement scheme as the MRLA turned to preying on workers in the mines and on plantations. Briggs laid the groundwork for jungle operations and encouraged the formation of units such the Malayan Scouts for penetrating the jungle. A low point for the British authorities was in 1951 when communist attacks were on the rise resulting in the assassination of the High Commissioner Henry Gurney 6 October 1951. It has been argued the arrival of General Sir Gerald Templer marked a turning point in the Malayan Emergency. He was appointed both Director of Operations and High Commissioner on 5 February 1952; thus combining civil and military leadership. Templer certainly injected fresh energy and vigour into the government administration and the security forces as he implemented the plans that Briggs and Gurney had laid down. 'The marked improvement in the Emergency situation that was evident in 1952 continued throughout 1953, which was a year of steady progress against the background of increasing security and the improved moral of the civilian population.'⁴⁶ From August 1951 to July 1954 the MRLA suffered a prolonged reverse with more than half the guerrillas being killed, captured or surrendered. The MRLA were forced to flee deep into the Malayan Jungle.

The improving security situation facilitated the devolvement of static duties, such a guarding installations and 'New Villages' to the Police and the Home Guard. This enabled

⁴⁴ K. Ramakrishna: *Emergency Propaganda The Winning of Malayan Hearts and Minds 1948-1958*.

⁴⁵ M. R. Postgate: *Operation Firedog Air Support In The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960*, p. 14.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.* p. 20.

the Army to focus on the MRLA. Templer was replaced by Lieutenant-General Sir Geoffrey Bourne in 1954, who used the release of soldiers from fixed positions to good effect by planning long deep jungle combined operations to hunt down the MRLA. 'Such protracted operations relied heavily on air support, especially that of the troop-carrying helicopter force that had recently arrived in the theatre, and reflected the degree of confidence that the Army had developed in the air forces by this time.'⁴⁷ The period from July 1954 to the end of the Emergency in July 1960 was from a military point of view, a series of mopping up operations. The Federal government through the Briggs Plan and resettlement had seized the initiative from the MCP. The fostering of the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and the creation of UMNO due to the botched Malayan Union plan, combined with the promise of independence for Malaya, constituted a political outflanking of the MCP. With Merdeka (Independence) on 31 August 1957, the MCP largely lost their *raison d'être* for armed insurrection. The strategy of clearing the MRLA out of Malaya from the centre was largely successful as in the course of the Emergency 'White' Areas were created, where the promising security situation allowed a relaxation of restrictions. After 12 long years, the remnants of the MRLA were driven back across the Thailand border in Northern Malaya and the Emergency was declared over 31 July 1960.

⁴⁷ M. R. Postgate: *Operation Firedog Air Support In The Malayan Emergency `1948-1960*, p. 21.

The Rhodesian Civil War 1964-1979

Phase 1

The Rhodesian Civil War has been demarcated by military historians into three phases or periods. The first of these phases ran from 1964 to 1972. During the early 1960s there was an upsurge of politically motivated violence, particularly in the African townships as African nationalists fought for dominance. On occasion whites were attacked such as Petrus Oberholzer who was murdered by the Crocodile Gang in 1964.⁴⁸ Before UDI small groups of guerrillas were already being trained in Tanzania, China and Eastern European countries.⁴⁹ ZANU followed by ZAPU only constituted an armed response some five months after UDI, once it was clear that there would be no British military intervention to end the Smith regime. The commencement of the 2nd Chimurenga was signalled by the battle of Sinoi. 'In April 1966, a group of 21 ZANU insurgents infiltrated from Zambia into Rhodesia and they split up into three teams. Their aim was to cut power lines and attack white farmsteads.'⁵⁰ One of the splinter groups, a 7 man team titled Armageddon staged an assault on a white owned farm called Hunyani located near Sinoia. The attack failed and the guerrillas were defeated emphatically by the Rhodesian Security Forces who counted no losses. A second splinter group during the night of 16 May and into the early morning of the 17th attacked Nevada farm and murdered Johannes Viljoen and his wife, yet their children, were spared.⁵¹

The armed wings of ZANU and ZAPU made some attempts at urban warfare but focused primarily on conventional penetrations by significant bodies of men. 'Large scale incursions proved futile against highly trained mobile troops, backed by total air supremacy.'⁵² ZAPU formed an alliance with the South African African National Congress (ANC) and embarked on joint operations within Rhodesia. ANC involvement led to the provision of direct military aid by the South African National Party government to the government of Rhodesia. South African Police units were deployed to Rhodesia to assist in anti-terrorist operations. The label 'police-unit' was a propaganda ploy to disguise what was in fact the deployment of troops

⁴⁸ P. Moorcraft & P. McLaughlin: *The Rhodesian War A Military History*, p. 29.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.* p. 29.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.* p. 29.

⁵¹ *Ibid.* p. 31.

⁵² *Ibid.* p. 32.

and the secondment of pilots and helicopters to the Rhodesian Air Force. Inclusive of this aid were military supplies and ammunition. The fact that the SA ANC was helping ZAPU meant that the South African government would assist the Rhodesian government; in so much that it would prevent ANC infiltration of South Africa.

Politically for the South Africans, a police label was essential to give their intervention a veneer of acceptability to the international community. An overtly military presence would have been diplomatically embarrassing for South Africa. Particularly considering that South Africa did not officially recognise the Rhodesian Front government after UDI. Certainly a direct military intervention may not have been favoured by a white electorate that was 60 percent Afrikaans. While the guerrillas may have been soundly defeated in engagements during the first phases, the RSF casualties mounted up. Severe guerrilla losses led to a winding down of offensive operations from 1969 to 1972 with sporadic attacks becoming the norm. The Rhodesian Front and the military were lulled into a false sense of security. The leadership of ZANU negotiated an alliance with the African Nationalist movement in Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique), FRELIMO. The alliance with FRELIMO was tenuous at first but would pay major dividends when they wrested power from the Portuguese. FRELIMO gave ZANU leave to use their bases and material in Mozambique, and they began launching operations from Tete province. These operations were clandestine and were comprised of infiltrations into North Eastern Rhodesia. The aims and objectives of these operations were to politicise the rural populations and lay logistical foundations for the next phase of the war. Crucial to bringing the rural Africans on side, was the co-option of African spirit mediums. Allegedly, the Rhodesian government was taken completely by surprise by the extent of infiltration in that part of Rhodesia.

Phase 2

The 2nd Phase of the Rhodesian War ran from 1972 to 1976. With their logistical foundations ready ZANLA launched a widespread offensive. The onslaught was heralded by an attack on Altena farm 21st December 1972 by ZANLA guerrillas. An 8 year old white girl was wounded in the attack.⁵³ There were subsequent more attacks on more farms and land mines were laid. The RSF accrued a number of casualties not least from landmines. The Rhodesian military responded by opening Operation Hurricane in attempt to counter ZANLA guerrillas. Resettlement schemes in the spirit though perhaps not the letter of the Malayan

⁵³ P. Moorcraft & P. McLaughlin: *The Rhodesian War A Military History*, p. 37

Emergency, were embarked upon. The intention was to cut the rural population off from ZANLA and ZIPRA guerrillas. The Rhodesian Army came up with various solutions to shortages of man power, the length of call ups were extended, a 2nd RAR battalion was formed and both Asians and Coloureds were rendered eligible for conscription. 'From 1974 the regular army was expanded, partly by encouraging foreign recruitment.'⁵⁴ Various repressive measures were implemented such as collective of fines and the shutting down of basic services. Like Malaya, a reward system was instituted for the provision of information on guerrilla whereabouts or caches of arms. The repressive measures like Protected Villages were a well-spring of resentment for rural Africans. Despite this, the results in military terms were promising. 'By the end of 1974, Rhodesian intelligence estimated that only 70 to 100 hard-core guerrillas remained operative inside the country. The insurgents could perhaps have faced total elimination within a few months, if the security forces had kept up the pressure. But then the international factor ruptured Salisbury's COIN campaign. It went by the name of detente.'⁵⁵

The collapse of Portuguese rule in Mozambique marked a turning point in the civil war. It soon opened up the entire Rhodesian-Mozambican border to infiltration by ZANLA guerrillas, in effect extending the front by 700 miles. Furthermore, South Africa saw that with Mozambique's 'fall' the *cordon sanitaire* that she had sought to fashion out of neighbouring countries was starting to crumble: hence, Pretoria decided that a moderate African government in Rhodesia best suited the changing regional situation. Therefore, South African exerted pressure on Rhodesia in December 1974 to declare a ceasefire and South Africa then embarked on a policy of détente. ZANU and ZAPU were pressurised by their respective allies, Zambia and Tanzania, to accede to the ceasefire and to come to the negotiating table. Zambia for one was amenable to détente due to the economic impediments posed by the closure of the Zambia-Rhodesia border. South African pressure came by way of a near complete military withdrawal from Rhodesia, save for a number of pilots and technicians that remained as part of the secret Operation Polo.

Political leaders of ZANU and ZAPU imprisoned by the Rhodesians were released including Robert Mugabe. The talks took place on the Victoria Falls Bridge, they came to naught and the war went on unabated. The released African nationalist leadership including Mugabe escaped into exile. Due to political infighting which the Zambian government

⁵⁴ P. Moorcraft & P. McLaughlin: *The Rhodesian War A Military History*, p. 39.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.* p. 39.

quelled with force, ZANU was forced to relocate to Mozambique. The relocation disrupted ZANU's logistical network. Added to this, the subsequent loss of military and political leaders lowered the quality of ZANLA commanders and contributed to significant losses in the field. The Rhodesian military launched two more operations, Thrasher in Umtali (Mutare) February 1976 and Repulse at Fort Victoria May 1976. In 1975, Prime Minister Ian Smith and Joshua Nkomo entered into talks behind the scenes discussing a potential settlement. On the 9 August 1976, the Selous Scouts prosecuted Operation Eland, an external raid on Nyadzonya camp in Mozambique, 40 kilometres from Umtali (Mutare). The Rhodesian Security Forces insisted that the camp was a purely military target. ZANU disputed this and asserted that the camp was a refugee camp. Accordingly there was a massive international outcry. The majority of those killed at the camp appeared unarmed though many of them were either fully trained guerrillas or completing their training. One posits that the distinction between a military base and refugee camp cannot be satisfactorily drawn in the Rhodesian theatre. The reason is that ZANLA and ZIPRA camps served both a military and civilian function.

Whatever the military benefits to Rhodesia accrued from attacking Nyadzonya, the international political fallout was detrimental. Pretoria immediately rescinded Operation Polo and South African pilots and helicopters were recalled. With the closure of the Zambian and Mozambican borders, Rhodesian trade was forced through South Africa. A combination of the congestion and artificially created choke points by South African authorities further pressured the Rhodesian government. South Africa promptly gave unequivocal support for majority rule in Rhodesia. Due to the mounting pressure, in 1976 'on 24 September on Rhodesian television, Smith conceded the principle for majority rule.'⁵⁶ The Geneva Talks that followed this concession failed, and limited South African supplies resumed. During these talks major external operations against guerrilla bases continued to be mounted, and while a great deal of material was captured and destroyed, there were intelligence leaks that forewarned guerrillas and sometimes resulted in relatively few guerrilla casualties. With the failure of international diplomacy, Smith and Rhodesia shifted away from talks and pursued an internal settlement.

⁵⁶ P. Moorcraft & P. McLaughlin: *The Rhodesian War A Military History*, p. 45.

Phase 3

The third and final phase ran from 1977 to 1979 until the cessation of hostilities. The civil war escalated as the Rhodesian war effort intensified. The military strategy was designed to buy time to negotiate for an internal settlement. As cross border raids increased, guerrillas became more aggressive. In 1977 Combined Operations was organised so that the running of the war effort could be more centralised. The Rhodesian civil-military relationship began to shift in favour of the military. The PV programs were enlarged considerably, severe curfews were extended and no go areas were expanded as more of Rhodesia was placed under martial law. On 23rd November 1977, the RSF launched operation Dingo, an attack on a Camp in Chimoio based in Mozambique, over 2,000 ‘guerrillas’ were killed including women and children, in the initial attacks of the operation. The RSF created several more operational sectors, Grapple in Central Rhodesia, Salops in Salisbury and Splinter around Lake Kariba.⁵⁷ In March 1978, Ian Smith negotiated a transitional government with an executive council comprising moderate Bishop Muzowera, Ndabaningi Sithole (ousted leader of ZANU and rival of R. Mugabe.) and a chief, Senator Jeremiah Chirau, and himself. Despite these political concessions in the executive, political and military power remained in white Rhodesian hands. Smith organised a war council made up of primarily service chiefs to oversee the war effort. On the 3rd of September 1978, the Smith-Nkomo negotiations were scuttled with the shooting down of a civilian passenger plane, a Viscount by ZIPRA, and the subsequent massacre by guerrillas, of ten out of eighteen survivors, 6 of them women. This made any kind of rapprochement with Nkomo politically unacceptable. Retaliatory raids into Zambia and Mozambique ensued while the guerrilla offensive continued to be stepped up. In an attempt to consolidate Muzowera and Sithole’s position, militias called Pfumo re Vanhu translated as Spear of the People were established.

On the 12 of February 1979, ZIPRA shot down another Viscount amid a deteriorating security situation. Further retaliatory raids followed and the Rhodesia Security Forces went so far as to strike a ZIPRA base in Angola. The transitional government culminated in general one-man-one-vote elections in April 1979 and Muzorewa was elected as the first black Prime Minister of the new state of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. In the last few years of the war segregatory legislation was repealed and the colour bar in the Security Forces was removed and the first African officers were commissioned. Despite Muzorewa’s rise to power, there was no end to the civil war as hoped or intended. The internal settlement was not

⁵⁷ P. Moorcraft & P. McLaughlin: *The Rhodesian War A Military History*, p. 147.

internationally recognised by Margaret Thatcher's Conservative Party government or the international community. ZANU and ZAPU labelled Muzorewa as a 'sell-out.' The lack of recognition pressured the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian government into the Lancaster House conference at the behest of Thatcher. The African Frontline States who hosted ZANU and ZAPU, compelled them to come to the table as they had grown weary of the effect of war upon their countries. Hostilities continued during the conference and the Rhodesians adopted an all-out war that targeted military installations and economic infrastructure of the host nations. This all-out war was designed to intimidate the African Frontline States into exerting further pressure on ZAPU and ZANU to be more conciliatory.

Resistance to the cross-border raids during the conference stiffened and Rhodesian and South African aircraft were shot down while Rhodesian ground forces often met heavy fire and stubborn opposition to their assaults. South Africa by this stage had reversed its military withdrawal policy and poured men and material in the Rhodesian war effort. Due to losses and the failure of a number of these cross-border operations, Malayan Emergency veteran and Commander of Combined Operations Lieut. General Walls on 22 November 'ordered ComOps to stop all external raids.'⁵⁸ It is conceivable as Moorcraft asserts that these raids kept ZANU and ZAPU at the negotiating table in a manner that was ultimately politically counterproductive for the Rhodesians. Lord Carrington, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's second option was to recognise Bishop Muzorewa's Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government. The continuing raids on Zambia and Mozambique compelled those two countries to put pressure on Nkomo and Mugabe to remain at the negotiating table. The paradox was that had the raids been stopped earlier, Nkomo and Mugabe may have walked out of the talks, and the Rhodesians would have been left with the less extreme political option. Carrington would have been forced to recognise Muzorewa's government. Nonetheless, the conference was concluded with the Lancaster House Agreement signed 21 December 1979. The ensuing ceasefire and the instalment of Lord Soames as the last British colonial governor of Rhodesia brought an uneasy truce. A commonwealth force and a large contingent of British policemen were dispatched to supervise the general elections in February 1980. Amid alleged intimidation and coercion by ZANLA guerrillas and political commissars, Robert Gabriel Mugabe was elected to power.

⁵⁸ P. Moorcraft & P. McLaughlin: *The Rhodesian War A Military History*, p 166.

Chapter 2

The Malayan Scouts 22 SAS Regiment Rhodesian C

Squadron

Introduction

The main objective of this chapter is to investigate 'C' Squadrons tour of duty in Malaya and present a more complete account that illustrates the significance of the Rhodesian involvement in the Malayan Emergency. The Rhodesian experience of Malaya was limited to Special Forces and to the Regimental level, while the Rhodesian experiences of their own war was extensive regarding the kind of units and included the highest levels of military command hierarchy. Significantly the Rhodesian command hierarchy was dominated by officers who had served in Malaya, including the commander of the Rhodesian army, Peter Walls. It was this group of officers that played a vital role in shaping the tactics and strategies of the Rhodesian Civil War.⁵⁹

Inevitably the experiences of service in Rhodesia were distinct from those of service in Malaya. The Rhodesian Squadron of the Malayan Scouts operated far from Rhodesia in an alien environment; Malaya had a completely different climate and the Rhodesians were a Commonwealth unit, within a British Army formation. Unlike Rhodesian Army units during the Rhodesian Civil War, the Rhodesian Malayan Scouts squadron was detached from the Rhodesian Army for service abroad. Rhodesian Civil War soldiers on the other hand, were operating on home soil or within the borders of Rhodesia's neighbours and were obviously defending their own country. They operated within the Rhodesian Army structure and against an enemy that was dissimilar to the Malayan Communist Party soldiers but professed similar ideological convictions. The ZANU/ZAPU and MCP guerrillas had similar aims in the capture of their respective states. Of cardinal significance to this discussion, is that the fact that the officer commanding the Rhodesian squadron of the Malayan Scouts, subsequently

⁵⁹ J. K. Cilliers: *Counter Insurgency in Rhodesia*. p. 76.

became the commander of the Rhodesian Army and later of Combined Operations during the Rhodesian Civil War

Historiographical review of the C Squadron of the Malayan Scouts

For the most part the Southern Rhodesian contribution to the Malayan Emergency has been overlooked by the histories written on the Malayan Emergency. More often than not there has been no mention of this contribution at all in works by Anthony Short, Edgar O'Balance, John Nagl, Richard Stubbs to name but a few. It is not clear whether the omission is deliberate and driven by an agenda or simply due to a lack of sources or even due to the choices any writer must make in selecting what to include in a work of history or leave out. Robert Jackson's text *The Malayan Emergency & Indonesian Confrontation* is a notable exception to this trend. Unlike other texts Jackson has several excerpts on the Malayan Scouts and later 22 SAS Regiment. Furthermore, against the grain there are several references to the Rhodesian Squadron and Jackson is highly critical of their jungle worthiness and allegedly racist mind-set. Specific texts on the Special Air Service are often far more detailed sources of information on the Malayan Scouts. Combined with the increased detail on the Scouts is a commensurate increase in the information on the C Squadron. SAS history has many branches that can be broadly divided as amateur and professional. The amateur historians tend to write memoirs as well as historical texts that often have derogatory attitudes towards the C Squadron. This can usually be explained if a writer served in one of the three other squadrons in the Scouts, as it appears personal bias affects their portrayal of the Rhodesian Squadron rather than the C Squadron's service record. Professional histories of the SAS tell a different story of the Rhodesian C Squadron. Their remarks are often laudatory of the Squadron and appreciate the Rhodesian contribution to the Emergency. This appreciation is not based on the grand sum of their contribution to the Emergency but rather in their immediate context as the Rhodesian contribution came at a time when the Malayan Scouts sorely needed them and were instrumental in building the unit.

The Rhodesian Civil War historiography on the C Squadron is distinct from that of the Malayan Emergency. Rhodesia's contribution to the Emergency is often alluded to though not at any great length. In terms of information there is considerably less in the more detailed Rhodesian War related texts than there are of the same on the Malayan Emergency.

Nonetheless, there are remarks that speak of links between Rhodesian experiences in Malaya, and the implementation of strategies and tactics in the Rhodesian Civil War. These links however, have not been developed to any significant degree. The Rhodesian Special Forces historiography mirrors that of the British Special Air Service. Where the British SAS had its roots in the Malayan Scouts, so directly the Rhodesian SAS and more indirectly the Rhodesian Selous Scouts had their roots in the Rhodesian C Squadron of the Malayan Scouts. It follows that these texts often include sections on the Malayan Scouts that focus more on the C Squadron. A distinctive feature of the Rhodesian military history texts is that the writers' opinions of the C squadron are polar opposites to that of British and non-Rhodesian authors. Rhodesian narratives tend towards an enthusiastic style that extols the martial virtues of the Rhodesian military and this has shaped their perspective on the 'C' Squadron Malayan Scouts. A more moderate example is Barbara Cole's *The Elite The story of the Rhodesian Special Air Service*, while more extreme one is Peter Baxter's exposition *Selous Scouts Rhodesian Counter-Insurgency Specialists*.

'C Squadron whose men had not always found it easy to adapt themselves to the 'winning of hearts and minds' aspect of the Regiment's work and whose men had proved to be more susceptible to jungle diseases than those of the other squadrons, returned to Rhodesia.'⁶⁰ This reference to C squadron succinctly captures the dominant paradigm found in the majority of texts on the Malayan Emergency that deign to remark on the Rhodesian C Squadron. The paradigm revolves around claims that the Rhodesians were not suitable for jungle operations as they were more vulnerable to tropical diseases, neither were they well trained compared to other and future squadrons in the Malayan Scouts. Jackson alludes to this inferior training by extolling the training of the New Zealand Squadron that replaced the Rhodesian one. 'They were replaced by a New Zealand SAS Squadron, whose men had been well trained in SAS techniques at home before flying to Malaya for further training in jungle warfare.'⁶¹ It seems that the Rhodesian Squadron had difficulties with the Malayan Scouts hearts and minds operations, the reason being that coming from Southern Rhodesia; they were inherently racist by default. The implications being that the other squadrons were better able to adapt themselves to the unit's 'hearts and minds' role, because of the distinct social contexts of their respective countries of origin.

⁶⁰ R. Jackson: *The Malayan Emergency & Indonesian Confrontation*, p. 56.

⁶¹ *Ibid.* p. 56.

Tim Jones author of *SAS The First Secret Wars* makes the following note on Malayan Scouts' training. 'By December 1950, 'B' and the newly drafted Rhodesian contingent of 'C' Squadron underwent jungle training.'⁶² The incorrect date aside (The Rhodesians only 'arrived in Singapore on 29 March, 1951'⁶³) Jones does not suggest there was any difference in training between B and C Squadrons. Moreover, in the book's scant references of the C Squadron, there is no mention of any training deficiencies or the susceptibility of jungle disease. This may suggest that 'C' Squadron was not distinct from the other squadrons as regards disease and training.

Alan Hoe and Eric Morris published *Re-Enter The SAS the Special Air Service and the Malayan Emergency* in 1994. This text is an in-depth study of SAS involvement in the Malayan Emergency. Owing to a narrower focus distinct from general texts on the Malayan Emergency or specifically on the SAS, there are more detailed references to the Rhodesian Squadron. The text contains the following on the Rhodesian Squadron made by Major Dare Newell of the 22nd SAS. This quote seems to be the basis for the paradigm found in much of the Malayan and SAS literature. Jackson and others have based their assessment of the Rhodesian Squadron on this statement.

We asked Dare his opinion of 'C' Squadron (Rhodesian): Of course we owe them a debt of gratitude. Their numbers swelled our ranks at a time when we desperately needed them and they had some very fine soldiers. There are criticisms, of course, I don't think they were as at ease with the aborigines as the Brits but that is understandable given the back ground and they had a lot of trouble with jungle diseases. The quacks have said that British resistance to disease was in no small way due to a more deprived way of life in childhood. I can't say whether that is true but it seems a reasonable school of thought. They were disciplined and well-trained as infantrymen when they arrived, but, like the rest of us, they had to learn as they went. They produced some outstandingly good individuals and they certainly put the Malayan experience into practise during their own war in Africa later on. Peter Walls, of course, was a great leader and went on to command all of their armed forces. Later on, of course, we had the Kiwi Squadron who performed magnificently.⁶⁴

While Dare is highly critical of the Rhodesian Squadron as a unit, he admits that the Rhodesian contribution came at a moment when it was urgently required, to bolster the numbers of the Malayan Scouts. He praises their standard infantry training and discipline, while alluding to limited ad-hoc jungle training. His general criticisms are tempered with

⁶² T. Jones: *SAS The First Secret Wars The Unknown Years of Combat and Insurgency*, p. 155.

⁶³ A. Hoe & E Morris: *Re-Enter the SAS The Special Air Service and the Malayan Emergency*, p. 71.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.* p. 187.

concessions regarding the high quality of particular soldiers in the unit. An important link is made between the Rhodesian experiences in Malaya and the civil war in Rhodesia, and Dare highlights the fact the Commanding Officer (CO) of C Squadron, Peter Walls, went on to command the entire Rhodesian Army. This link was not within the scope of Hoe's treatise and was not developed further than the quotation. The overall message is that of mediocrity compared to the rest of the Malayan Scouts. The paradigm's assertion of the Rhodesian Squadron's lack of training can be linked to a statement made by a Captain John Woodhouse, the Malayan Scouts' intelligence officer.

Now once 'B' Squadron had arrived, within a matter of two or three months came 'C' Squadron from Rhodesia who had been volunteered by the then Rhodesian Government to help in Malaya and the same procedures happened with them. They were given two or three weeks training in the jungle where an officer called Ted Peacock, a Sergeant Eddie Waters and myself were attached to them for this period, doing our best to give them some idea of what they should do; they were then let loose in the jungle after just that short period of elementary training.⁶⁵

According to Woodhouse, the Rhodesians' jungle training was minimal and inadequate preparation for jungle warfare.

This paradigm is not the unassailable fortress that it may seem despite being based on primary sources boasting of an SAS pedigree. Its assertions have been contested by alternative accounts and interpretations of the Rhodesian experience in the Malayan Scouts. Alastair MacKenzie argues that the Rhodesian Squadron was distinct from the other Squadrons due to its selection process. Major Mike Calvert, the commanding officer of the Malayan Scouts, 'made time to widen his search for suitable men, visiting Rhodesia where his staff was able to select some 120, most of whom had wartime experience, to form C Squadron. As there was this opportunity to be selective, 'C' would prove one of the most professional of the SAS Squadrons, serving in Malaya from 1951 to 1953.'⁶⁶ These one hundred or so men were winnowed down from around 1,000 applicants and as a result 'they were, many of them, very big, strong and physically robust men.'⁶⁷ An excerpt from a letter written by John Woodhouse reads as follows.

The Rhodesian squadron in 1951 had a three weeks training exercise before operations advised only by me and one NCO, with perhaps nine months jungle experience between us – it was a case of the blind leading the blind. This squadron with a high percentage of potentially outstanding SAS soldiers never realised its full

⁶⁵ A. Hoe & E Morris: *Re-Enter the SAS The Special Air Service and the Malayan Emergency*, p. 73.

⁶⁶ A. Mackenzie: *Special Force The Untold Story of 22nd Special Air Service Regiment (SAS)*, p. 61.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

potential in Malaya. Through no fault of its own, but because it was never properly trained, the same mistake was not made with the New Zealand SAS squadron, when it joined in 1955.⁶⁸

The letter written 9th December 1981 bears a resemblance to a section from Hoe and Morris' treatise and suggests that they paraphrased the original letter instead of quoting it directly. The original source explains that not only was the training minimal but the instructors themselves were hardly qualified and poor training could not be blamed on the Rhodesians. It is interesting to note that the source creates a firm context in that 'A' squadron was hardly more extensively trained and that the remaining squadrons were trained in the same fashion as the Rhodesians. 'A' squadron in particular had unruly elements and Woodhouse makes a general criticism of the Malayan Scouts having a reputation for ill-discipline on and off duty.

MacKenzie makes the point that Dare 'Newell's comments, which are often repeated in books and journals about the early days of the SAS in Malaya, are certainly at odds with the view the Rhodesians had, particularly regarding their ability to relate to the aboriginals, also known as the Orang Asli.

Military service to the British crown was a dominant feature of Rhodesian culture and Rhodesians were immensely proud of their martial contributions to the Allies in both the Great War and the Second World War. In that vein, Cole writes that 11 years after the Second World War, 'Rhodesia's proud military tradition was maintained when the Communists began giving trouble in the Far East and a Commonwealth Force was needed to help the United Nations in Korea. Rhodesia was still part of the Empire and only too willing to send a token force to Korea.'⁶⁹ Cole puts the number of volunteers at 1,200 and reveals that Rhodesians were not the only applicants, 'South Africans living in Rhodesia, volunteered.'⁷⁰ The volunteers were 'men and boys, old campaigners and civilians.'⁷¹ A fact not mentioned in the Malayan and SAS historiography is that Peter Walls was incredibly young, 24 to be exact and was a Sandhurst graduate.⁷² Ron Reid Daly, a mere corporal is dubbed an individual of significance, not least because of his future role in the Rhodesian Civil War, where he went on to command the Selous Scouts. Out of the 1,200 volunteers, 'ninety civilians and ten regulars, some of them with wartime service, were selected for the Far East Volunteer Unit and the average age was 24.'⁷³ Cole

⁶⁸ A. Mackenzie: *Special Force The Untold Story of 22nd Special Air Service Regiment (SAS)*, p. 61.

⁶⁹ B. Cole: *The Elite, The Story of the Rhodesian Special Air Service*, p. 7.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷³ *Ibid.*

provides a summary of the situation of the Malayan Emergency in its early years and of the creation of the Malayan Scouts. The British Army politics involved in the creation of the Malayan Scouts is not mentioned, unlike the British SAS histories. Cole's interpretation of the Malayan Scouts role is as follows: 'The aim of the unit was not so much to kill the enemy in great numbers but to harass them and drive them on to the roads and more civilised area where other British Army units would do the killing.'⁷⁴

A distinctive part of the C Squadron uniform was that they 'would wear identifying Rhodesian shoulder flashes.'⁷⁵ According to Cole, Peter Walls was envisioned as the training commander, and the Squadron would be sent to Malaya under the command of a more senior and experienced officer.⁷⁶ Instead, Walls was made a temporary Captain and led the Squadron to Malaya.⁷⁷ Cole makes the observation that 'the newspapers were full of stories of the lucky 100 men, and their spirit of adventure and loyalty to the Commonwealth was greatly admired by all.'⁷⁸ It is these newspaper articles both Rhodesian and abroad that will constitute a part of the primary sources used to illuminate the C Squadron further. Cole briefly sketches their journey to Malaya; from Salisbury to Durban by train and onto Singapore by sea.⁷⁹ Cole does not just focus on C Squadron but mentions details of the other squadrons, in particular what the Rhodesians thought of them.

"A" Sqn, they would soon learn, was made up of some "fairly interesting characters", some whose discipline left much to be desired and some of whom were unwanted by their own regiments. "A" Squadron comprised men from units in the Far East and no particular criteria had been set down for selection. Such was the urgent need for men that to have been too discriminating would probably have meant the unit would never have been resurrected. Despite their shortcomings, they did have some very good jungle soldiers and fine officers, and the Rhodesians would be impressed with the way some men could use themselves around the jungle. They had some excellent navigators and navigating was no easy task where it was often impossible to see the sky.⁸⁰

Cole makes the point that 'the Rhodesians clearly had much to learn about the ways of the jungle and the techniques of operating in the tight close undergrowth, just as men in the other Squadrons had. Many of the problems were unique to Malaya and the best way those pioneers had of finding out was to stagger into the jungle themselves and learn the hard

⁷⁴ B. Cole: *The Elite, The Story of the Rhodesian Special Air Service*, p. 9.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹ *Ibid.* p. 10.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.* p. 10.

way.⁸¹ In other words a training course was merely a part of being trained to operate in the jungle, first-hand experience was the rest of the process.

Cole contradicts the official version of two to three weeks of rudimentary jungle training. ‘C Sqn got its first introduction to the jungle during a six-weeks training operation where they learned the ropes of jungle navigation and patrolling.’⁸² Where Woodhouse implies that he was the font of knowledge with his limited jungle experience for the Rhodesian training course, Cole reveals that ‘The training, devised by Calvert, was directed at realism and live ammunition was used. Shooting fast from the hip at point-blank range was another skill that had to be mastered. The jungle was so dark in some places they would only be able to see a few paces in front of them and the undergrowth would have to be hacked away step by careful step . . . and all providing wonderful cover for the quick-off-the-mark ambushing enemy.’⁸³ At the end of this training course constructed by Calvert’s innate knowledge of jungle warfare, instead of a British officer, ‘Peter Walls was called in and told he had been appointed Squadron Commander and promoted to Acting Major.’⁸⁴ Cole outlines the difference in climate between the Rhodesian bush and the Malayan Jungle and how tracking in the jungle took the Rhodesians a while to master.

Cole makes no mention of operations involving Orang Asli and ‘hearts and minds,’ she does however, assert that ‘off-duty, the Rhodesians became the best of friends with the black Fijians, making nonsense of some claims that the Rhodesians with their background were better orientated towards mixing with blacks and coloureds than the average British troops who seldom associated with them.’⁸⁵ More integral to the Rhodesian experience was their training and deployment in paratroop operations. In the first such operation, they formed part of the ground force sent to link up with a 50-man contingent of parachutists.⁸⁶ ‘Most of the Rhodesians were parachute trained by the time their tour of duty ended, and when the second airborne operation was mounted in Malaya, it was the Rhodesians who made up most of the numbers.’⁸⁷

Cole sums up the Rhodesian efforts stating that ‘for the most part, the Rhodesians had been a bunch of inexperienced soldiers when they had left on their Far East adventure. They

⁸¹ B. Cole: *The Elite, The Story of the Rhodesian Special Air Service*, p. 10.

⁸² *Ibid.*

⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴ *Ibid.* p. 11.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.* p. 11.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.* p. 11.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.* p. 11.

were young, new soldiers in a totally foreign environment. But they developed as they went along, and had acquitted themselves well.’⁸⁸ Cole adds that ‘Peter Walls was awarded an MBE for his work in Malaya but says it was definitely in recognition of the entire squadron’s efforts.’⁸⁹ The majority of the Rhodesians went back to their civilian lives upon their return home after their two year tour. Cole renders the experiences of those who continued their careers significant by detailing some of the lessons learned. ‘For the few who did continue to make soldiering their career, the Malayan experience had provided a tremendous grounding. Malaya had been a valuable experience and they had learned the elementary principles of counterinsurgency warfare. They learned the techniques of tracking; had learned what it was like to be ambushed; what the principles were in establishing their own ambushes; the sort of things that would give them away.’⁹⁰ Cole overtly links two concepts used in the Rhodesian Civil War to the Malayan experience. The first being the concept of Combined Operations, ‘where the military and civil forces all worked together with the common purpose of prosecuting the war and defeating the enemy 24 hours a day, seven days a week, under one supreme commander.’⁹¹ The second of which was ‘the protected village idea where the vulnerable, unarmed local population were moved into villages to deprive the enemy of his target and means of support, while providing better community facilities and a more sophisticated infrastructure.’⁹²

There stands an assortment of radically different accounts of the Rhodesian squadron’s tour in Malaya. One is highly critical and portrays the C Squadron in a vastly unfavourable light that if taken at face value would create some doubts as to whether the Rhodesian experiences would have had any kind of reach into the Rhodesian Civil War. If other texts are read in isolation, it would seem that Rhodesia’s contribution has been overlooked entirely or merely alluded to in the appendices. Judging by Cole’s work and other Rhodesian military history texts, the Rhodesians thought highly of their efforts in Malaya and learned from their experiences. Research by the likes of Alastair Mackenzie have presented both perspectives and argued in favour of more balanced appraisal of the C Squadron. What is lacking in these accounts is a degree of depth; through a meagre selection of sources these writers have confined their opinions to a few paragraphs or pages at best. This Chapter is an assessment of the Rhodesian C Squadrons tour based on a selection of Malayan newspaper articles, British

⁸⁸ B. Cole: *The Elite, The Story of the Rhodesian Special Air Service*, p. 11.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.* p. 12.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.* p. 12.

⁹¹ *Ibid.* p. 12.

⁹² *Ibid.* p. 12.

Colonial Office documents and two files of reports sent by C Squadron to Rhodesian Army Head Quarters (HQ) in Salisbury. Many of the reports were written for the press and published in Rhodesian newspapers. There are a number of guiding research questions. A) How well trained were the Rhodesians? B) How well did the Rhodesians interact with Aborigines and people of colour? C) What combined operations were the Rhodesians involved in? D) What was the role of parachutists, ground troops and heliborne troops in these operations? E) Were the Rhodesians susceptible to jungle disease and was that exceptional compared to the other squadrons? F) What was the role of the Malayan Scouts and did the Rhodesians fulfil that role? G) What experiences did the Rhodesians have of resettlement in Malaya and the concept behind the strategy?

Type of War

The Rhodesians who fought in Malaya were faced with a 'war' radically distinct from the Second World War; a war that some of the Squadron had directly experienced as military men while the civilian volunteers would have been young children for its duration and spent their teens and early adolescence steeped in many of its stories. The 'C' Squadron realised that it had to be explained to the Rhodesian public that their conflict was unconventional. Denis Craggs explained, 'there is no front line if by that is meant a clear demarcation between opposing armies. The enemy is seldom seen. Prisoners of war are seldom if ever taken.'⁹³ The idea of *un guerre sans frontières* was further elaborated upon by Craggs, 'the destruction of a bandit camp deep in the jungle; the bombing of a cultivated area from which the terrorists have been obtaining supplies; the finding of a hidden medical store; these constitute material successes in the war against a force which continues to inflict casualties and extensive damage on the forces on the Forces and civil population although hunted constantly by Security units.'⁹⁴ A far cry from the army fronts in the Eastern and Western European theatres of the Second World War, where military objectives were more tangible, for example capturing a city or a bridge. The Malayan Emergency was also the kind of internal war, where the guerrillas were delegitimised by the British Authorities. Craggs conforms to the British mind-set of the period. 'The terrorists generally are Chinese and are

⁹³ NAZ S815. Defence Headquarters, Salisbury. D. Craggs, *The Malayan Campaign*, 22 SAS 'C' (Rhodesia) Squadron, 1951-1952.

⁹⁴ NAZ S815. Defence Headquarters, Salisbury. D. Craggs, *The Malayan Campaign*, 22 SAS 'C' (Rhodesia) Squadron, 1951-1952.

therefore not, as they would have the world believe, representative of the Malayan people. Their aim and object is not Malayan independence but Communist domination of the Federation. It has long been the desire of the Chinese Communists to have the valuable Peninsula as a Red satellite.’⁹⁵

The Role of the Malayan Scouts

A British politician made it very clear to the men of the Rhodesian Squadron the kind of role envisaged for them. “You will find you are not up against a genuine movement for national independence when you get in Malaya, but ruthless Communist organisations are practising murder and torture, and you will have to hunt them out. We hope it won’t be long before we have the trouble in Malaya in hand.”⁹⁶ Hunting out the Malayan ‘communist terrorists’ (CTs) would require lengthy forays into the Malayan jungle. The Malayan Scouts (later 22nd SAS) was specifically formed to patrol the jungle in search of ‘communist terrorists.’ ‘Serving in the emergency in Malaya are the 100 Rhodesian volunteers who arrived in the Federation in March 1951 and became ‘C’ (Rhodesia) Squadron of the 22 Special Air Service Regiment, a regiment formed for deep penetration of the jungle and equipped to spend, if necessary months in the trackless interior.’⁹⁷ At the time of writing the C Squadron had yet to actually kill a member of the MRLA however, tallying kills was not the primary objective of the Malayan Scouts. ‘These bearded men are impatient to make their first kill, but the present role of the Rhodesians is to penetrate the deep jungle areas in which the terrorists are believed to have hospitals and training camps. The Regiments operating on the highways and jungles fringes are almost certain of shooting bandits; but the squadron, patrolling the jungle is to those who flee from the areas which have become too dangerous for them.’⁹⁸ In short the Malayan Scouts were to harass the MRLA and drive the onto the jungle fringes into the guns of conventional infantry. Much in the same way beaters drive game into the killing zone of hunters. The Rhodesians it would seem were not exactly enthused by this support role when success seemed to be measured among them and others by kill counts.

⁹⁵ NAZ S815. Defence Headquarters, Salisbury. D. Craggs, *The Malayan Campaign*, 22 SAS ‘C’ (Rhodesia) Squadron, 1951-1952.

⁹⁶ NAS CO 717/202. Law and Order: Rhodesian Volunteers in Malaya. ‘Hunt out Red killers, he said.’ *Daily Mirror*, 26 January 1951.

⁹⁷ NAZ S815. Defence Headquarters, Salisbury. D. Craggs, *The Malayan Campaign*, 22 SAS ‘C’ (Rhodesia) Squadron, 1951-1952.

⁹⁸ NAZ S814. Special Air Service Regiment 22 ‘C’ (Rhodesia) Squadron, Press Report to Rhodesian Defence Headquarters, 14 August, 1951.

Successful Tour

The likes of Dare contend that the Rhodesian Squadron was not particularly successful. Certainly if success was defined by kill counts the Rhodesians did not make much of an inroad on the MRLA. The Rhodesian reports contain a keenness to come to grips with the enemy and what few kills were made were expounded upon and the tally would be brought up. A typical comment representative of other instances is as follows, ‘to the time of writing four bandits have been killed by ‘C’ Squadron.’⁹⁹ With a hint of envy the reports would often mention the successes of other regiments, ‘but kills made by troops working in conjunction were ascribed to the Squadron’s ‘flushing’ activity.’¹⁰⁰ In many of the operations there were many instances of conventional infantry units tallying contacts and kills as a direct result of Malayan Scout jungle penetration. The Malayan Scouts were an integral part of the counterinsurgency campaign and essential in bringing the elusive MRLA to battle. The Commonwealth Relations Office seemed confident that the Rhodesian Squadron was performing well though double checked with the Far Eastern Land Force (FARELF) before briefing a minister visiting Southern Rhodesia. ‘To the best of my knowledge both units have done admirable work there, though I should be interested to know whether this is confirmed by the Commanders in-Chief on the spot.’¹⁰¹

FARELF responded with its appraisal of the Rhodesian’s performance only six months into their tour. ‘These operations by Rhodesian Sqn have been of very great value to the Emergency campaign. The Malayan Scouts penetrate into areas which cannot be patrolled by other troops, they exercise a constant harassing effect on the bandits, keeping them on the move and so obstructing their recruitment, training and supply organisation and forcing them to be continually on the alert. Without these troops, the bandits would be able to organise themselves unmolested and build up a very substantially increased threat against the populated areas. As information increases as a result of success in the general campaign and improvements in the police organisation the number of kills and captures by this unit can be expected to increase.’¹⁰² When the Malayan Scouts took part in a parade early 1952, it

⁹⁹ NAZ S815. Defence Headquarters, Salisbury. D. Craggs, *The Malayan Campaign*, 22 SAS ‘C’ (Rhodesia) Squadron, 1951-1952.

¹⁰⁰ NAZ S814. Special Air Service Regiment 22 ‘C’ (Rhodesia) Squadron, Press Report to Rhodesian Defence Headquarters, November 1952.

¹⁰¹ NAS CO 717/202. Law and Order: Rhodesian Volunteers in Malaya; correspondence between the UK High Commissioner for the Federation of the Rhodesia I. M. R. McLennan and N. Printonard of the Commonwealth Relations Office.

¹⁰² NAS CO 717/202. Law and Order: Rhodesian Volunteers in Malaya. Communication From FARELF to The War Office, 16 Aug 51.

received praise due to its accomplishments. ‘After the parade the High Commissioner congratulated the Regiment on its performance.’¹⁰³

‘C’ Squadron’s training

Element of the literature assert that while the Rhodesians may have been well schooled in conventional infantry warfare, their jungle training was inferior and thus affected their operational capability. The Malayan press tells a rather different story. *The Straits Times* states that while in Salisbury ‘the Rhodesians have undergone a basic training course on jungle warfare. They are also being put through an intensive physical course to toughen them for the kind of warfare that lies ahead of them deep in the Malayan Jungle.’¹⁰⁴ Not only had the Rhodesians received some degree of jungle training before being sent to Malaya, the CO of the Malayan Scouts organised this first stage of training. ‘Burly Lieut-Colonel Calvert flew to Cairo two weeks ago on his way to Salisbury to train the Rhodesians for the fighting in Malaya.’¹⁰⁵ In other words, their preliminary jungle training was overseen by a specialist, as opposed to Rhodesian instructors with no jungle experience. The Malayan press emphasised that these Rhodesian troops were ‘hand-picked.’¹⁰⁶ This is reflective of the selection process for the Rhodesian Squadron, where over 1,000 volunteers were reduced to about 100.

Typical news articles in Malaya prior to the arrival of the Malayan Scouts stressed their physical prowess and the degree of training they had undergone. ‘Lt Col M Calvert “Mad Mike” of Wingate Expedition and Chindit fame will return to Malaya shortly with 160 tough specially trained Rhodesians for his Malayan Scouts – a branch of the Special Air Service Regiment.’¹⁰⁷ Dare gives the length of training for the Rhodesian troops as two to three weeks, he also gives the distinct impression that the training was second rate. *The Star* has this to say, ‘their arduous jungle training before they go into action is expected to take two or

¹⁰³ NAZ S814. Special Air Service Regiment 22 ‘C’ (Rhodesia) Squadron, Press Report, 20 May – 9 June 1952.

¹⁰⁴ NAS “Rhodesia sending jungle troops,” *Strait times*, 28 Jan 1951, p. 1.

¹⁰⁵ NAS CO 717/202. Law and Order: Rhodesian Volunteers in Malaya. Newspaper article, Reuter, 28 January 1951.

¹⁰⁶ NAS CO 717/202 .Law and Order: Rhodesian Volunteers in Malaya. Newspaper article, Reuter, January 27 1951.

¹⁰⁷ NAS “Rhodesia sending jungle troops,” *Strait times*, 28 Jan 1951, p. 1.

three months. Their average age is 23.’¹⁰⁸ According to reports from ‘C’ Squadron to Rhodesian Army Headquarters, their initial training phase last roughly four weeks.¹⁰⁹ The Rhodesian account concurs with the *Star* article as regards the arduous nature of the training; furthermore the training described in the C Squadron report outlines essential jungle skills being taught. ‘They have been weeks of hard training for everyone, weeks spent in becoming accustomed to the jungle, constantly wet; in learning how to move as quickly as possible with the least noise; learning how to handle and use explosives for demolition and defence, and how to navigate rafts on swift-flowing rivers.’¹¹⁰ Training included forays into the jungle almost from the very start. ‘To start with they went for single day operations, short distances from the camp.’¹¹¹ A report from a *Troop Newsletter* comments on the training in more detail ‘the first few weeks in Dusun Tua camp were spent in training for the jungle. Periodically we were given demonstrations on demolition work, raft building and weapons. Days were spent in accustoming us to the jungle, going on short operation in charge of experienced officers. We learned how to make the best use of our rations, how to build bivvies, and how to cut dropping zones for airdrops.’¹¹²

The *Troop 13 Newsletter* presents a more subaltern perspective of the kind of training the Rhodesians underwent. ‘The Pipeline Scheme gave us our first taste of strenuous climbing, clearing DZ’s, jungle cooking and preparations for a night in the jungle. Consequently some went hungry, others had trouble with hammocks and some were thoroughly wet. Many a head of hair stood on end, followed by furtive looks and glances, when the jungle creatures started their nocturnal noises.’¹¹³ It must be remembered that despite their infantry training, these men were on average 23 years old and were understandably frightened by some of their first jungle experiences during training, the Rhodesian bush being inadequate preparation for the hazards and quirks of the Malayan jungle.

¹⁰⁸ NAS CO 717/202 .Law and Order: Rhodesian Volunteers in Malaya. “100 Join Malaya Jungle Troops,” *Star*, 29 Mar 1951.

¹⁰⁹ NAZ S814. Special Air Service Regiment 22 ‘C’ (Rhodesia) Squadron, Press Report to Rhodesian Defence Headquarters, 14 June 1951.

¹¹⁰ NAZ S814. Special Air Service Regiment 22 ‘C’ (Rhodesia) Squadron, Press Report to Rhodesian Defence Headquarters, 27 April 1951.

¹¹¹ NAZ S814. Special Air Service Regiment 22 ‘C’ (Rhodesia) Squadron, Press Report to Rhodesian Defence Headquarters, 27 April 1951.

¹¹² NAZ S815. Defence Headquarters, Salisbury. 11 Troop Newsletter, 22 SAS ‘C’ (Rhodesia) Squadron ,1951-1952.

¹¹³ NAZ S815. Defence Headquarters, Salisbury. 13 Troop Newsletter, 22 SAS ‘C’ (Rhodesia) Squadron, 1951-1952.

These nerves were countered by the Rhodesian's sense of humour that features in a number of the newsletters. 'Cpl Rowly Swift's fascinated by rivers and takes a plunge into almost every one we cross. He also shared his poncho one night with a snake, and when this was brought to his notice, he really lived up to his name! (The snake was killed later, when the mirth had subsided)',¹¹⁴

From these excerpts it would appear that the Rhodesians' training while in Salisbury and upon arrival in Malaya was of a higher standard than Dare would have us believe. While Dare claims that he was in charge of C Squadron's training, Colonel Calvert very clearly directed their training in Rhodesia and certainly his jungle doctrine was drilled into the Rhodesians in Malaya though he played less of a direct role in their Malaya based training. A 'C' squadron report quotes Colonel Calvert, 'I don't believe in teaching a soldier to swim on dry land. I send him out into the jungle and train him in the element in which he will have to eventually fight.'¹¹⁵ This statement reflects the way the Rhodesians were trained in the jungle and sent on progressively longer patrols as part of this training. This training did not stop after the Rhodesians' first active operation 29 April 1951.¹¹⁶ The Rhodesian Squadron regularly underwent further training post-operations. 'After a week in the camp we moved to Selarang Barracks, Singapore, where the Regiment is undergoing re-training, and making a name for itself in sports.'¹¹⁷ It is important to note that even the active operations were learning experiences for the Rhodesian, especially the early ones during their tour. 'The time has been spent in routine training, with occasional route marches along the coast, and a short operation in the Federation to check on wireless operation and map reading.'¹¹⁸

A significant part of the Rhodesian training was parachute specific. However, this only commenced in June 1952, well over a year after deployment. 'At present the Rhodesians are undergoing parachute training in Singapore. In the course of the coming six months it is hoped to train all members of the Special Air Service Regiment as parachutists, thus enabling

¹¹⁴ NAZ S815. Defence Headquarters, Salisbury. Fifteen Brown Owl Troop Newsletter, 11 June-13 October 1951.

¹¹⁵ NAZ S814. Special Air Service Regiment 22 'C' (Rhodesia) Squadron, Press Report to Rhodesian Defence Headquarters, 27 April 1951.

¹¹⁶ NAZ S814. Special Air Service Regiment 22 'C' (Rhodesia) Squadron, Press Report to Rhodesian Defence Headquarters, 14 June 1951.

¹¹⁷ NAZ S815. Defence Headquarters, Salisbury. 11 Troop Newsletter, 22 SAS 'C' (Rhodesia) Squadron, 1951-1952.

¹¹⁸ NAZ S814. Special Air Service Regiment 22 'C' (Rhodesia) Squadron, Press Report to Rhodesian Defence Headquarters, January 1952.

the Security Forces to make surprise attacks on the terrorists. Thus the men will be fresh and untired by long marches through thick jungle into the operational areas, being able to strike fast and effectively and with the advantage of surprise.’¹¹⁹

When Rhodesian reinforcements arrived towards the beginning of 1952, they too underwent significant training. ‘The reinforcements are now undergoing elementary training prior to jungle training, which will begin soon after the Regiment returns to Kuala Lumpur within the next few weeks.’¹²⁰ The press reports further emphasise the need to bring the reinforcements up to C Squadron standard. ‘Nearby is jungle and rubber where the reinforcements are undergoing training to bring them up to the standard of the Rhodesians at present in the jungle on operations. A training expedition into the jungle is being planned to give the new arrivals practical experience in map and compass reading.’¹²¹ The nature of the Malayan Scouts operations required small patrols of men. Integrating poorly trained troops with jungle experienced men would essentially put lives at risk and so too the success of operations: hence the weight attached to the reports’ remarks regarding the reinforcements’ training. In focusing on the reinforcements’ retraining, the report suggests that the original Rhodesian contingent was by that stage well trained, jungle worthy and experienced and distinct from the Rhodesian reinforcements.

Allegations of Racism

Dale’s assertion of the Rhodesians’ racist behaviour towards the Sakai tribesmen (Orang Asli) on the basis of their background, i.e. racism allegedly being a part of their society and culture is contradicted by ‘C’ Squadron reports to Rhodesian Army Headquarters. There reports contain a number of references to the Sakai. ‘Tribes of Sakai, jungle people who hunt with bamboo spears, blowpipes and poisoned darts, are found in most districts in which the Regiment operates. They are generally friendly and helpful, assisting the troops with

¹¹⁹ NAZ S815. Defence Headquarters, Salisbury. D. Craggs, *The Malayan Campaign*, 22 SAS ‘C’ (Rhodesia) Squadron, 1951-1952.

¹²⁰ NAZ S814. Special Air Service Regiment 22 ‘C’ (Rhodesia) Squadron, Press Report to Rhodesian Defence Headquarters, 1-14 February 1952.

¹²¹ NAZ S814. Special Air Service Regiment 22 ‘C’ (Rhodesia) Squadron, Press Report to Rhodesian Defence Headquarters, 13 February- 1 March 1952.

information and as porters for the heavy equipment.¹²² In contrast, the War Office in Whitehall cannot comment the Rhodesians relations with other races. ‘We are unable to comment on their relations with non Europeans as they have been operating as a self contained unit, and are likely to have had very little contact with the local population (*sic*).’¹²³ The reports suggest that the Rhodesians had extensive contacts with the Sakai tribesmen. The references comment on how welcoming the Sakai were to the Rhodesians. ‘Sakai living nearby welcomed the troops and reported two bandits in the neighbourhood.’¹²⁴ The reports detail instances where Sakai tribesmen aided the Rhodesians on their marches. ‘Strung in file along the track, with a number of Sakai (small pigmy-like men of the jungle) carrying radio equipment, the squadron started its long march.’¹²⁵ Not only did the Sakai welcome the Rhodesians but they assisted them other ways aside from being porters. ‘In the course of the next few days 55 Sakai, who were very friendly, were found by ‘C’ squadron. Eager to help the troops they assisted with the building of bashas and the clearing of a dropping zone for air supplies.’¹²⁶ There are also references to relations with the Malays, ‘and friendly Malays helped with gifts of fish and fruit.’¹²⁷ There were occasions where the Rhodesians appeared to have been generous too. ‘An airdrop was taken at another large kampong, and, as a friendly gesture, some of the food was distributed to the Malays.’¹²⁸ It would seem the Rhodesians found a use for the much despised Heinz tinned vegetable salad referred to by B. A. Glass in his account on the Malayan Scouts.¹²⁹ There are also references to the use of Iban trackers. The following extract is representative of the mode of Rhodesian opinion of them: ‘the Squadron employed Iban trackers for the first time on this operation. They were found to be extremely useful, their ability being highly commended by all ranks.’¹³⁰

¹²² NAZ S815. Defence Headquarters, Salisbury. D. Craggs, *The Malayan Campaign*, 22 SAS ‘C’ (Rhodesia) Squadron, 1951-1952.

¹²³ NAS CO 717/202. Law and Order: Rhodesian Volunteers in Malaya. Letter to E. L Sykes Commonwealth Relations Office, from Lt Col A M Field War Office Whitehall, 16 Aug 51.

¹²⁴ NAZ S814. Special Air Service Regiment 22 ‘C’ (Rhodesia) Squadron, Press Report, 20 April-5 May 1952.

¹²⁵ NAZ S814. Special Air Service Regiment 22 ‘C’ (Rhodesia) Squadron, Press Report to Rhodesian Defence Headquarters, 14 June 1951.

¹²⁶ NAZ S814. Special Air Service Regiment 22 ‘C’ (Rhodesia) Squadron, Press Report to Rhodesian Defence Headquarters, 20 April-5 May 1952.

¹²⁷ NAZ S815. Defence Headquarters, Salisbury. D. Craggs, *The Malayan Campaign*, 22 SAS ‘C’ (Rhodesia) Squadron, 1951-1952.

¹²⁸ NAZ S814. Special Air Service Regiment 22 ‘C’ (Rhodesia) Squadron, Press Report to Rhodesian Defence Headquarters 14 June 1951.

¹²⁹ B. Stewart. (ed.): *Smashing Terrorism in the Malayan Emergency The Vital Contribution of the Police*, p. 204.

¹³⁰ NAZ S814. Special Air Service Regiment 22 ‘C’ (Rhodesia) Squadron, Press Report to Rhodesian Defence Headquarters, 31 March 1952.

Sporting Activities of the Malayan Scouts

A considerable portion of the C Squadron reports revolve around their sporting activities and achievements. This information was requested by the chief editor of the Rhodesian Herald. ‘Your notes may cover the Unit as a whole or the activities of individuals, and items of sporting interest would be welcome.’¹³¹ Owing to the volume and detail on sports one would be forgiven for having the impression that the South Rhodesian Far East Volunteer Unit (SRFEVU) was in fact no more than a glorified sports’ away team sent to Malaya. The Rhodesian took their sports training quite seriously. ‘The Regiment is undergoing re-training, and spending a portion of each day in recreational sports. The Rhodesians are to the fore in all sports. In the near future boxing tournaments will be organised. Some of the men are taking lessons in fencing, and others are playing golf and hockey.’¹³² Sports were taken seriously enough, that the C Squadron Rhodesians became relatively renowned sportsmen in Malaya and back in Rhodesia. ‘The Rhodesians are rapidly building a reputation of good sportsmanship, and as a result are proving to be popular among the troops in Malaya.’¹³³ The reports outline many notable successes of the Rhodesians seasoned with a number of losses. ‘Sport has been the main interest while here, and the Rhodesians have done exceedingly well in all the sports activities.’¹³⁴ One posits that there was a focus on their sporting success due to their apparent lack of ‘successful’ contacts in terms of kills.

Rhodesian Relations with Fijian troops

The National Archives of Zimbabwe Malayan Scouts Files have no overt mention of any friendship between the Fijians and the Rhodesians as Cole argued. However, there are several mentions of sports matches between the SAS Regiment and the Fijian Battalion. The Rhodesians made up the bulk of the SAS rugby team. ‘Rugger training will begin soon. The Fijians at present Malaya offer keen competition, and although they will only begin training

¹³¹ NAZ S814. Special Air Service Regiment 22 'C' (Rhodesia) Squadron, Letter from Defence Headquarters Southern Rhodesia to OC SR Far East Volunteer Unit, 16 March 1951.

¹³² NAZ S814. Special Air Service Regiment 22 'C' (Rhodesia) Squadron, Press Report to Rhodesian Defence Headquarters, 15 November, 1951.

¹³³ NAZ S814. Special Air Service Regiment 22 'C' (Rhodesia) Squadron, Press Report to Rhodesian Defence Headquarters, 14 August 1951.

¹³⁴ NAZ S814. Special Air Service Regiment 22 'C' (Rhodesia) Squadron, Press Report to Rhodesian Defence Headquarters, January 1952.

much later in the year, it is though necessary to start to start training the Rhodesians now.’¹³⁵ There is evidence that suggests that the Rhodesians held a great deal of respect for the Fijians. Certainly the Fijians appear to be one of the few teams to trounce the Rhodesians at Rugby. ‘The most exciting and interesting game up to now was against the Fiji Battalion played on the Padang at Kuala Lumpur. This game was headline news in the local papers and attracted the largest crowd of spectators since the War. The score, although 42 – 0 in the Fiji’s favour, was not an indication of the game. The Regimental side played extremely well.’¹³⁶ The reports suggest that Rhodesians had respect for the Fijians due to their sporting prowess, were willing to play against them and took losing with a degree of dignity; friendships could conceivably have developed off the sporting field.

South African Sportsmen in the Rhodesian Squadron

It was not only Southern Rhodesians who volunteered for the Far East Volunteer Unit, there were South Africans among their ranks. One such South African, Trooper Howell featured in C Squadrons contribution to the regimental team. ‘Durban-born Trooper Howell took part in this week’s Combined Services rugger trail and confused opponents and team mates alike when he broke out in Afrikaans.’¹³⁷ According to the news article, the Rhodesian players often made use of Afrikaans while playing rugby. ‘I’m told that the Rhodesian members of the side frequently use such expressions when playing among themselves so spectators need be alarmed if foreign cries of “huk die bal” and “veet, veet” reach them on the touchline today.’¹³⁸ A consultant on rugby and associated Afrikaans terminology explained that “huk die bal” means hook the ball and refers to how the hooker in the scrum must kick the ball back to the rear of his team’s scrum to gain possession of the ball so it can be passed back. The consultant was puzzled by the phrase “veet, veet” as that is not an Afrikaans rugby phrase. He concluded that Howell was in fact yelling “feet, feet” at the time and the reporter spelt what he heard with Afrikaans phonetics. It is conceivable that Howell

¹³⁵ NAZ S814. Special Air Service Regiment 22 ‘C’ (Rhodesia) Squadron, Press Report to Rhodesian Defence Headquarters, 28 July 1952.

¹³⁶ NAZ S814. Special Air Service Regiment 22 ‘C’ (Rhodesia) Squadron, Press Report to Rhodesian Defence Headquarters, 9 December 1952.

¹³⁷ NAS “Sparkling play by Scouts XV,” *The Singapore Free Press*, 27 October 1951, p. 6.

¹³⁸ NAS “Sparkling play by Scouts XV,” *The Singapore Free Press*, 27 October 1951, p. 6.

realised that his team couldn't understand him and yelled "feet, feet" to encourage the scrum to hook the ball.¹³⁹

The General Discipline of the Rhodesian Troops

The reports at squadron and troop level do not seem to correlate to the Malayan Scouts' reputation of ill-discipline in and out of the jungle. There is no evidence to suggest that there were any court-martial or punishable offences during operations. This suggests that the Rhodesians behaved in a professional manner on operations. For example, there was a casualty on one operation, who being a stretcher case, had to be carried through the jungle to a river in order to be evacuated. The men of the troop concerned virtually destroyed themselves on force marches, to try and get the man to a medical facility. Though he died enroute, the men went about their duty in what could be considered an exemplary manner.¹⁴⁰ The accounts of the squadron's exploits in the jungle are however, leavened with some degree of humour. Indeed it would seem that on occasion some of the Rhodesians would play pranks on each other though they were hardly serious enough to warrant censure. One member may have taken things a bit too far when practising his demolition training. 'Whilst stationed here, someone in the Regiment has taken his Demolitions Course very seriously, for he wanders around in the early hours of the morning demolishing flag poles and NAAFI signs with high explosive. It is thought by some that this chap has the idea he is Guy Fawkes II, but as the political motive seems to be lacking, no credit can be given to this theory. Of late he has been very quiet, and is still enjoying his freedom.'¹⁴¹

There are a few remarks on their behaviour on leave. These were reports sent to the Rhodesian Army Headquarter and so the Squadron is unlikely to have reported misdemeanours when on leave. Analysis of several excerpts does suggest that Rhodesians may have had a more of a wild time on leave. 'After the operation everyone had seven days'

¹³⁹ Mr Melvyn Daniels Rugby and Afrikaans Consultant., interviewed by Michael Stack, October 2015.

¹⁴⁰ NAZ S814. Special Air Service Regiment 22 'C' (Rhodesia) Squadron, Press Report to Rhodesian Defence Headquarters, August 1951.

¹⁴¹ NAZ S815. Defence Headquarters, Salisbury. C Squadron Newsletter, 22 SAS 'C' (Rhodesia) Squadron ,18 December 1951.

leave where all [.....] had a very hectic time at Penang, Singapore, and Malacca.’¹⁴² Though this could hardly be limited to the Rhodesian Squadron or even the Malayan Scouts; ‘An Airborne Re-Union dinner was held in Singapore one night last week, a few Rhodesians attending. From all reports received it was a riotous re-union.’¹⁴³ It is typical of most Army units to ‘let their hair down’ when on leave particularly when returning from a long operation. While the Malayan Scouts had a reputation for drinking and the antisocial behaviour that often follows, it would seem that the Rhodesian Squadron despite their youth, were perhaps a trifle more mature than say ‘A’ squadron. That being said, one Rhodesian clearly enjoyed the delights of Singapore more than he should have: ‘Monty Thane went to Singapore on leave with Basil Leak and Gerald Johnston, after the operation. Monty had a sad tale to tell when he came back. He had been hit on the head and robbed of his money while walking through a park one night. (Well, that’s his story, and he’s sticking to it!)’¹⁴⁴

Conduct of Rhodesian troops

A letter from the War Office brings to light some dissatisfaction regarding the Rhodesian personnels’ salaries. ‘For your Secretary of State’s private information we have been informed that there is dissatisfaction amongst the Rhodesians, due to the alleged non-payment of local overseas allowance whilst serving in Malaya. Our information on this point however, is that the local allowances admissible to British personnel have been included in the basic rates of pay issued by Southern Rhodesia. FARELF are informing the Military Headquarters in Salisbury of this complaint.’¹⁴⁵ In the ‘C’ Squadron reports there is nothing to corroborate this case of dissatisfaction. However, it has hardly something that would be put in the official press reports to HQ.

¹⁴² NAZ S815. Defence Headquarters, Salisbury. 14 Troop Newsletter, 22 SAS ‘C’ (Rhodesia) Squadron, 1951-1952.

¹⁴³ NAZ S814. Special Air Service Regiment 22 ‘C’ (Rhodesia) Squadron, Press Report to Rhodesian Defence Headquarters, 24 September 1952.

¹⁴⁴ NAZ S815. Defence Headquarters, Salisbury. Fifteen Troop Brown Owl Newsletter, 22 SAS ‘C’ (Rhodesia) Squadron, 11 June-31 October 1951.

¹⁴⁵ NAS CO 717/202. Law and Order: Rhodesian Volunteers in Malaya. Letter to E. L Sykes Commonwealth Relations Office, from Lt Col A M Field War Office Whitehall, 16 Aug 51.

Military Operations involving the Malayan Scouts

Many of the operations that the 'C' Squadron participated in were combined. Often Scout Special Forces would work in conjunction with regular infantry and police jungle squads. This would have given Rhodesian officers hands on experience working with other components of the Security Forces. 'Co-operating in this large-scale offensive against the terrorists are Commando and Police units.'¹⁴⁶ The Rhodesians became rather familiar with the concept of stop groups that would cut off guerrillas' lines of retreat. 'This operation in which the squadron were taking part was a combined one, the squadron acting as a stop should bandits try to escape through the area, which was only a short distance from a town and extensive rubber plantations. The Rhodesians had come in the tortuous "back door" route so that the bandits should not know of their arrival.'¹⁴⁷ Footslogging was usually the final stage of coming to grips with the communists. 'Generally the men go into the jungle from a selected point on a road or a rubber estate, but there is no limit to the variety of ways in which they move to their objectives. On a recent operation they left the base camp by truck, then travelled by troopcarrying aircraft to an airfield in the vicinity of the operational area. Then they moved by train to another point from which they continued their journey by truck until the road deteriorated to such an extent that further movement was impossible. Then they walked through clinging, mud heave packs on their backs, for nine heart-breaking miles, which the men later said was the worst march they have ever undertaken. They had to be in position by a certain date and could waste no time (*sic*).'¹⁴⁸

Supply drops by transport helicopter were of paramount importance in keeping the Malayan Scouts on long jungle patrols. 'During that period the men proved their ability and stamina, living mainly on food supplied to them by airdrop. At times airdrops of supplies were delayed or lost in the jungle and the men went hungry, but they managed to survive.'¹⁴⁹ Silk was of course a valuable military asset and so parachutes had to be returned when possible. 'Air drops were taken, and the parachutes used were carried to the road some

¹⁴⁶ NAZ S814. Special Air Service Regiment 22 'C' (Rhodesia) Squadron, Press Report to Rhodesian Defence Headquarters, 14 January to 14 February 1952.

¹⁴⁷ NAZ S814. Special Air Service Regiment 22 'C' (Rhodesia) Squadron, Press Report to Rhodesian Defence Headquarters, August 1951.

¹⁴⁸ NAZ S815. Defence Headquarters, Salisbury. D. Craggs, *The Malayan Campaign*, 22 SAS 'C' (Rhodesia) Squadron, 1951-1952.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

distance away.’¹⁵⁰ While it may seem simple to ditch supplies out of plane to troops below this was not necessarily the case. ‘Dropping supplies to troops in the jungles is an important aspect of the Malayan campaign. It is not always an easy job for those in the air. The RAF aircrew have their hands full particularly when DZs (drop zones) are situated in hilly country, while the RASC (Royal Army Service Corps) air dispatchers relax only after the last chute is away. They slide out packages by placing them on a wooden platform near the open doorway and lifting this up at a signal given by the co-pilot. The Rhodesians have often taken airdrops from Australian air crews with whom they have struck up a firm ground-to-air friendship.’¹⁵¹ Clearly the Rhodesians realised that being on more than civil terms with logistical staff was in their best interests, certainly considering that air supply was their main life line in the jungle.

The Rhodesians were also deployed on operations in a ground role in conjunction with parachutists from the other Squadrons. This was by no means a lesser role to the airborne troops. ‘The parachute operation in Kelantan was one of the most successful the Squadron have had up to now. 13 Troop, commanded by Lieut J. T. Dill Russel, contacted 4 Chinese Terrorists on the march. They killed one who was the orderly to the local Platoon Commander and was carrying all the personal documents of the Commander. They recovered a carbine, a grenade and 250 rounds of ammunition. The documents, after translation were found to be one of the best sets captured in the State of Kelantan and since the Emergency.’¹⁵² The major advantage of parachute dropped troops was that they would arrive in the field fresh without being physically drained by traipsing through hellish terrain. ‘The beginning of the operation was marked by the dropping of paratroops, men of the Regiment, experienced parachutists, who arrived in the area in a more spectacular, if not less tiring manner.’¹⁵³ Of the ‘C’ Squadron only one Rhodesian was a trained parachutist and took part in at least one of the first Malayan Scout combined paratrooper operations. ‘Lt. Charles

¹⁵⁰ NAZ S815. Defence Headquarters, Salisbury. 11 Troop Newsletter 22 SAS ‘C’ (Rhodesia) Squadron, 1951-52.

¹⁵¹ NAZ S815. Defence Headquarters, Salisbury. D. Craggs, *The Malayan Campaign*, 22 SAS ‘C’ (Rhodesia) Squadron, 1951-1952.

¹⁵² NAZ S814. Special Air Service Regiment 22 ‘C’ (Rhodesia) Squadron, Press Report to Rhodesian Defence Headquarters, 9 Nov 1952.

¹⁵³ NAZ S815. Defence Headquarters, Salisbury. D. Craggs, *The Malayan Campaign*, 1951-1952.

Pavlich, BEM, of Bulawayo, an experienced parachutist of the 1939-1945 war, jumped with the Squadron as a troop leader.¹⁵⁴

Paratroop training and operations

The Rhodesians commenced parachute training in batches from June 1952. ‘The first group to undergo parachute training in Singapore left the camp at Klang early in June and will soon complete their jumps. The second group is in Singapore busy with training. Within the next few months it is hoped that all the Rhodesians will qualify as paratroops.’¹⁵⁵ As the Malayan Scouts were not able to recruit enough para-trained men, they were forced to train the men they already had for all Squadrons to be available for operations that required insertion by parachute. A considerable part of parachute training is done on the ground before training jumps. ‘Since returning from the week of rest at Port Dickson the Rhodesians have been engaged on ground parachute training. This has occupied the most part of each morning for the past fortnight.’¹⁵⁶ It would appear that the Rhodesians were trained in stages for mainly logistical reasons. ‘In Singapore now they have all the facilities for complete parachute training, but the courses are taking longer than usual because of a shortage of parachutes and competent packers.’¹⁵⁷ The success rate for the Rhodesian parachute training was relatively high. ‘Twenty Rhodesians were awarded their parachute wings in a ceremony at Changi Airfield last week on completion of their parachute training course. They returned to Klang a few days ago and another group is now in Singapore undergoing training.’¹⁵⁸ There was at least one case where a Rhodesian failed parachute training due to injury. ‘A few weeks ago a further batch of Rhodesians qualified as parachutists in Singapore. One of the men, Tpr Clark, unfortunately injured himself while jumping, and failed to complete the

¹⁵⁴ NAZ S814. Special Air Service Regiment 22 'C' (Rhodesia) Squadron, Press Report to Rhodesian Defence Headquarters, 1-14 February 1952.

¹⁵⁵ NAZ S814. Special Air Service Regiment 22 'C' (Rhodesia) Squadron, Press Report to Rhodesian Defence Headquarters, April–July 1952.

¹⁵⁶ NAZ S814. Special Air Service Regiment 22 'C' (Rhodesia) Squadron, Press Report to Rhodesian Defence Headquarters, 9–30 June 1952.

¹⁵⁷ NAZ S814. Special Air Service Regiment 22 'C' (Rhodesia) Squadron, Press Report to Rhodesian Defence Headquarters, 28 July 1952.

¹⁵⁸ NAZ S814. Special Air Service Regiment 22 'C' (Rhodesia) Squadron, Press Report to Rhodesian Defence Headquarters, 20 August 1952.

course. Another group of seventeen Rhodesians is at present undergoing training, and when they qualify about two thirds of the Rhodesian Squadron will have been trained.’¹⁵⁹

Not only were the Rhodesians being parachute trained, they also helped to pioneer experimental tree jumps that involved landing on the jungle canopy and abseiling to the ground, and search and rescue operations. ‘Since our last letter more than two-thirds of the Squadron have completed their Para Training. Volunteers have also taken part in experimental tree jumps and an experimental “Jungle Rescue Squad” Operation.’¹⁶⁰ The Rhodesians were highly committed to parachute training, so much so even the squadron mascot was parachute trained and earned his wings. ‘At the passing out parade, at which General Stockwell presented the men with their wings, Sergeant-Major Mazamban, the Squadron mascot, who jumped eight times, was also ceremoniously presented with his wings. He has recently been present at rugby matches in which Rhodesians have participated, but, according to the scores, has not brought us much luck.’¹⁶¹

‘C’ Squadron’s experiences with tropical disease

Dare’s criticism that the Rhodesians were particularly susceptible to jungle diseases is puzzling. Certainly the Rhodesian sources are littered with references to tropical disease casualties. ‘During the operation, which lasted for six weeks, a number of men fell ill and were evacuated by helicopter, the guardian angel of jungle fighters.’¹⁶² There are however, cases where reports suggest that jungle diseases were not always prevalent. ‘This essential side of life has been, except for some minor ailments and skin diseases, very good. At the present time two members are recuperating in hospital with NYD (Not Yet Diagnosed) fever.’¹⁶³ The illnesses described seem typical of the Malayan climate. ‘Tpr Gordon Young is still on excused duty, having had a spell in hospital for malaria.’¹⁶⁴ There appears to have been a number of Malaria cases. ‘Tpr Nobby Clark is his old self once again. He had the

¹⁵⁹ NAZ S814. Special Air Service Regiment 22 ‘C’ (Rhodesia) Squadron, Press Report to Rhodesian Defence Headquarters, 24 September 1952.

¹⁶⁰ NAZ S814. Special Air Service Regiment 22 ‘C’ (Rhodesia) Squadron, Press Report to Rhodesian Defence Headquarters, November 1952.

¹⁶¹ NAZ S814. Special Air Service Regiment 22 ‘C’ (Rhodesia) Squadron, Press Report to Rhodesian Defence Headquarters, 24 July 1952.

¹⁶² NAZ S815. Defence Headquarters, Salisbury. D. Craggs, *The Malayan Campaign*, 22 SAS ‘C’ Squadron, 1951-1952.

¹⁶³ NAZ S815. Defence Headquarters, Salisbury. 12 Troop Newsletter 22 SAS ‘C’ Squadron, 1951-52.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

misfortune of contracting malaria on his first bash in the ulu.¹⁶⁵ Towards the end of 1951 a report rather forlornly read 'Quite a number of men are in Hospital.'¹⁶⁶ There were a number of accidental injuries to add to jungle illness casualties. 'During the operation an officer, injured accidentally, and three troopers suffering from illness were evacuated by helicopter.'¹⁶⁷

The Rhodesians were sent on particularly long operations, sometimes spending months in the jungle and were not always well supplied from the air. It only seems natural that the troops were affected by tropical diseases. A number of Rhodesians were repatriated for a variety of medical reasons other than disease. Some casualties were far from accidental; 'A few weeks after the start of the op Lt. Palich Cpl Soutar and Tprs Rheeders and Welensky were unfortunate in walking into a grenade booby trap. Rheeders had his dearest ambition fulfilled since he and the others had to be evacuated by helicopter. We doubt, however, whether he would like to re-live the same period. We know now definitely that all four have the utmost respect for 36 grenades.'¹⁶⁸ This required reinforcements from Southern Rhodesian to make up these losses. 'Reinforcements are due to arrive in Singapore from Rhodesia in the near future. These men will be most welcome, because during the past months the strength of the Unit has fallen far below the original number required, due to men being repatriated for medical reasons.'¹⁶⁹ There seems nothing peculiar about the prevalence of tropical diseases amongst the Rhodesians, as all British units suffered casualties from tropical diseases when on jungle operations. It is unlikely that the other squadrons were in any way more resistant to jungle diseases than the Rhodesians. During the Second World War, Chindits spent a considerable amount of time in jungle conditions much the same way as extended operations undertaken by the Malayan Scouts. 'Tropical infections were a problem in the Far East, especially among troops such as the Chindits with diseases such as

¹⁶⁵ NAZ S815. Defence Headquarters, Salisbury. 12 Troop Newsletter 22 SAS 'C' Squadron, 1951-52.

¹⁶⁶ NAZ S814. Special Air Service Regiment 22 'C' (Rhodesia) Squadron, Press Report to Rhodesian Defence Headquarters, 14-18 December 1951.

¹⁶⁷ NAZ S814. Special Air Service Regiment 22 'C' (Rhodesia) Squadron, Press Report to Rhodesian Defence Headquarters, 14 January to 31 March 1952.

¹⁶⁸ NAZ S815. Defence Headquarters, Salisbury. 14 Troop Newsletter 22 SAS 'C' (Rhodesia) Squadron, 1951-1952.

¹⁶⁹ NAZ S815. Defence Headquarters, Salisbury. 14 Troop Newsletter 22 SAS 'C' (Rhodesia) Squadron, 1951-1952.

malaria, gastroenteritis, tropical ulcers and various forms of typhus.¹⁷⁰ Tropical disease was major concern for the British Army serving in Malaya:

After the Second World War, infectious and tropical diseases continued to be a significant problem for British troops in conflicts such as the Malayan Emergency (1948–1960), the Korean War (1950–1953), the Borneo Confrontation (1962–1966) and the Aden Emergency (1963–1970). The most common problems seem to have been gastroenteritis, undifferentiated febrile illnesses, respiratory infections and skin diseases. The undifferentiated febrile illnesses included malaria, enteric fever, brucellosis, Q fever, leptospirosis, rickettsial infections (including typhus), various arboviruses (including dengue, sandfly fever, Japanese encephalitis) and hantavirus infection. These diseases were a particular concern because they are often clinically indistinguishable and diagnosis requires specialist microbiology investigations that are usually not available on deployments.¹⁷¹

J Parhol, a medical officer in the Malaysian army contents that the Malay troops deployed on jungle operations had more of a natural resistance to diseases like leptospirosis than Europeans in the British Army:

British soldiers had the highest percentage of leptospirosis, the Americans 12% and Malaysian soldiers only 5%. The lower incidence in Malaysian soldiers may be due to immunity derived from constant exposure to leptospirosis as shown in Table II. 12% of Malaysian soldiers had protective antibodies in this study.¹⁷²

Where does the perception come from that the Rhodesians were more susceptible than British troop to jungle diseases? According to medical studies, Europeans in general were susceptible to tropical disease. Nonetheless, while the Rhodesians may not have had a predisposition to towards tropical disease, reports show that there were many cases. Nonetheless, these cases can be linked to several factors. Firstly, the way Rhodesians were supplied, they did not always receive their drops timeously and reduced nutrition would have compromised their immune systems in conjunction with their physical exertions that required a high calorie intake. Secondly, they spent long operations in the jungle, Lieut. Col. T Archer of the Royal Army Medical Corps has pointed out a correlation between tropical diseases and the length of operations in the jungle.¹⁷³ Thirdly, the Rhodesians were dealing with

¹⁷⁰ M. S. Bailey: ‘A brief history of British military experiences with infectious and tropical diseases.’ *Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps*, (159), 2013, p. 154.

¹⁷¹ M. S. Bailey: ‘A brief history of British military experiences with infectious and tropical diseases.’ *Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps*, (159), 2013, p. 154.

¹⁷² V. Supramaniam: ‘Leptospirosis in The Malaysian Army.’ *The Malaysian Journal of Pathology*, (2), 1979, p. 12.

¹⁷³ T. C. R. Archer: ‘Medical Problems of the Operational Infantry Soldier in Malaya.’ *Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps*, (103), (4), 1957, p. 3.

conditions they were unfamiliar with and had to learn how to deal with cases of tropical disease in the jungle through training and experiencing it for themselves. Fourthly, in combined operations, the Rhodesians were often deployed in a ground role. ‘The difference between the British and the Americans is probably due to the mode of operations. The Americans are frequently airlifted while the British having to track on foot in the Malaysian jungles had greater exposure to contaminated water and a higher risk of infection.’¹⁷⁴ The reports on Malayan Scout operations indicated that the other squadrons were often parachuted in as opposed to walking in, and this suggests that they were less exposed to the jungle in such operations. In such an operation, the ground troops would develop more cases of tropical illness than the troops that had been flown and air lifted into the operational zone. One should then hesitate to criticise the Rhodesian Squadron for medical casualties that RAMC officers would consider typical of the role and operations of the Rhodesian Squadron.

Secondment of Rhodesians from combat duties

The strength of the Rhodesian squadron was further reduced by the secondment of their troops for other duties. By the end of 1951 a report stated that of the Rhodesians ‘many have been detached to Signals, Provosts, etc.’¹⁷⁵ Certain Rhodesians fancied themselves as military police; ‘Arthur Strong and Jock Laidlaw volunteered for Regimental Police duties and had hardly become acquainted with their duties when Jock fell out of a bus and had his eye all blackened! (Heard any good yarns lately?)’¹⁷⁶ Members of the Rhodesian squadron were bemused by the secondment of certain comrades to the intelligence section of the Malaya Scouts. ‘Don Leech still had his raucous laugh and doesn’t let the trees get him down. With the usual Army idea of putting the wrong man in the wrong place, he had been transferred to

the Intelligence Section. Perhaps his sense of rumour will have a better chance to develop there, as it didn’t do too badly in the jungle when news was scarce.’¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁴ V. Supramaniam: “Leptospirosis in The Malaysian Army.” *The Malaysian Journal of Pathology*, (2), 1979, p. 12.

¹⁷⁵ NAZ S814. Special Air Service Regiment 22 ‘C’ (Rhodesia) Squadron, Press Report to Rhodesian Defence Headquarters, 18 Dec 1951.

¹⁷⁶ NAZ S815. Defence Headquarters, Salisbury. Fifteen Brown Owl Troop Newsletter 22 SAS ‘C’ Rhodesia 11 June-13 October 1951 .

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

Poor Quality Maps

While the Rhodesians may have been better trained than previously asserted by other writers, the map writing section of the British Army certainly could have used with a trifle more drilling themselves. ‘The Power Line scheme was the first in which the Troop was employed in searching neighbouring hills for bandits, and was also the first time that a few members spent the night in the jungle, unintentionally. Another group had trouble with the little men who dash around putting hills in the wrong places, and ended by swimming in a tin mine water reservoir.’¹⁷⁸ While this excerpt has a somewhat humorous tone, the little men are a reference to map makers. That being said a later report suggests the Rhodesians seconded to produce maps for the Malayan Scouts did not fare any better. ‘Basil Leak still puts down his portable tracks and rivers to upset our map reading.’¹⁷⁹

Concerns while on service

While the reports do not mention the question of rates of pay, the Rhodesians are on record with one particular concern foremost in their minds. ‘Their morale is high, and when I saw them as they set off for their new tour of duty their only concern was that those back home, not hearing from them, might cease to write. All letters that come for the men are dropped with their supplies, and although the men cannot answer them, the letters are always welcome. In fact, when retrieving parachutes in the jungle the only cry heard is: “Where is the Mail?”’¹⁸⁰ While men could receive supplies and letters on patrol, there was no method for posting letters back until the men were at a base camp in conditions conducive to writing home. There was at least one Rhodesian with agricultural concerns. ‘Tpr Chris Fenton Wells still goes about wondering how he could possibly get the ulu under his plow – there are times when he seems to have evil intentions on the parade ground, too!’¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁸ NAZ S815. Defence Headquarters, Salisbury. 13 Troop Newsletter 22 SAS ‘C’ Rhodesia, 1951-1952.

¹⁷⁹ NAZ S815. Defence Headquarters, Salisbury. Fifteen Brown Owl Troop Newsletter 22 SAS ‘C’ Rhodesia 11 June-13 October 1951 .

¹⁸⁰ NAZ S814. Special Air Service Regiment 22 ‘C’ (Rhodesia) Squadron, Press Report to Rhodesian Defence Headquarters, 14 June 1951.

¹⁸¹ NAZ S815. Defence Headquarters, Salisbury. 12 Troop Newsletter 22 SAS ‘C’ Rhodesia, 1951-1952.

Cultural Experiences

The Rhodesian contingent was experiencing Asian culture and Malaya in particular for the first time and underwent a degree of culture shock and acclimatisation to the climate. ‘Singapore is a city of extreme contrasts; a contrast between East and West, and filth and cleanliness. In their own homes the Chinese and Malays are very clean, although their sanitary system is rather primitive, but their villages bordering on Singapore itself are constantly enveloped in a stench of dried fish and unprocessed rubber. This conglomeration of smells especially on a very hot day can be pretty trying, and it is one of the things that we still have to get used to.’¹⁸²

Return of the Rhodesian Squadron

The initial members of the Rhodesian Squadron finished their tour at the end of 1952. ‘On November 8th G.O.C., General Stockwell inspected the Regiment. All Rhodesians awaiting repatriation paraded and the General spoke to each individual. He reminded them that everything possible was being done to speed their return. Since then December 30th has been confirmed as the sailing date.’¹⁸³ The reinforcements are believed to have stayed on until the end of their tour in 1953.

‘C’ Squadron’s experiences of Resettlement

It is doubtful whether the Rhodesians were involved a great deal in the resettlement of Chinese Squatters. However, reports suggest that they were involved in the resettlement of many of the Sakai tribesmen they encountered. Certainly judging from the following report, they were well versed in the resettlement concept of the Briggs Plan. ‘Under the Briggs Plan for Malaya, squatters who live in the jungle or in areas away from civilisation where they are able to supply the terrorists with food and clothing, are resettled in fenced camps where they can be supervised and protected from the Communists. This is an expensive and protracted

¹⁸² NAZ S814. Special Air Service Regiment 22 ‘C’ (Rhodesia) Squadron, Press Report to Rhodesian Defence Headquarters, 18 Dec 1951.

¹⁸³ NAZ S814. Special Air Service Regiment 22 ‘C’ (Rhodesia) Squadron, Press Report to Rhodesian Defence Headquarters, November 1952.

undertaking, but it is showing results. Because of the strict control on food and medical supplies the bandits are finding it to be increasingly difficult to continue in the jungle without support.¹⁸⁴ Strategic resettlement of Malaya's rural population was considered pivotal for the success of the British counterinsurgency campaign. During the Rhodesian Bush War, the Rhodesian government attempted to implement a resettlement program that was based on the Malayan example.

Conclusion:

It is evident from the sources that the 'C' Squadron had a highly active role within the 22nd SAS regiment (formerly Malayan Scouts). Though the Rhodesians only served with the SAS between 1951 and 1953, they bolstered the numbers of the Regiment when men were desperately needed to shore up the position of the regiment and develop its operational capability. The Rhodesian sources support Mackenzie's assertion that 'C' Squadron would prove to be one of the most professional of the SAS squadrons.¹⁸⁵ The British SAS left the title 'C' Squadron open after the Rhodesians left and maintained strong links with the Rhodesian SAS. This would suggest that the British SAS valued the Rhodesian contribution despite what appears largely unfounded criticism in the literature. 'C' Squadron was fully parachute trained before the first volunteers ended their tour, they also helped to pioneer experimental tree jumps and the development of jungle rescue operations. Jungle diseases were clearly a challenge for the Rhodesians. However, they were typically a challenge for any member of the security forces on any length of jungle operations. The evidence suggests that the Rhodesians suffered medical casualties due to the nature of their operations as opposed to having a predisposition in their constitution, as Dare Newell would have us believe. There has been some debate as to the effect the Malayan Scouts/22 SAS Regiment had on the outcome of the Emergency. Finlan contends that 'it was not the bedrock of British strategy; rather a complementary factor that accelerated the collapse of the communists.'¹⁸⁶ The 22nd SAS facilitated this collapse through penetrating the jungle in a clandestine manner that conventional British units were largely incapable of. The SAS would gather intelligence that these more conventional forces and the RAF could act upon. 'Thus 'the SAS was able to

¹⁸⁴ NAZ S815. Defence Headquarters, Salisbury. D. Craggs, *The Malayan Campaign*, 22 SAS 'C' Squadron, 1951-1952.

¹⁸⁵ A. Mackenzie: *Special Force The Untold Story of 22nd Special Air Service Regiment (SAS)*, p. 61.

¹⁸⁶ A. Finlan: *Special Forces, Strategy and the War on Terror*, p. 30.

deny the enemy forces a safe haven, whilst providing the information and means for other British units to launch operations with a larger impact.’¹⁸⁷

Some Historians assert the Malayan Scouts had an insignificant effect on the Emergency. ‘Historian John Newsinger has argued that the SAS contribution in Malaya was negligible, and points out that of the 6,398 Communist insurgents killed there, the SAS could only claim 108.’¹⁸⁸ Of that 108, the Rhodesians merely claimed a fraction. For Newsinger and others ‘this demonstrates that the regiment played only a minor role.’¹⁸⁹ This is a somewhat shallow and superficial judgement of the 22nd SAS Regiment. The SAS played a crucial role in the successful contacts of the more conventional units of the British Security Forces. It follows that of the 6,398 communists insurgents killed, many of them could be attributed to the deeds of the 22nd SAS Regiment.

Fitzgibbon states that ‘it is also true the SAS role was not central British strategy.’¹⁹⁰ Lieutenant-General Sir Harold Briggs, Director of Operations in Malaya 1950-1951, would beg to differ. ‘[...] 6. The primary task of the Army must be to destroy the bandits and jungle penetration.’¹⁹¹ The Malayan Scouts were formed specifically to meet this task. Briggs recommended that deep jungle penetration should be carried out by small groups supplied with actionable intelligence.¹⁹² The Malayan Scouts was structured specifically with this end in mind. Typically the Malayan Scouts patrolled the jungle in small groups often being guided by surrendered enemy persons. Briggs outlines the significant role of the Malayan Scouts and the Army in his report on the Malayan Emergency:

5. Every Force at our disposal will be used in the offensive as under:

A) The Army

The Malayan Scouts and a few selected infantry companies are available for domination of bandit jungle haunts and courier routes.

The Army as a whole should, I think, be used in the correct balance of interception on the jungle fringes and in co-operation with the Police within

¹⁸⁷ Grob-Fitzgibbon, B: “Those Who Dared: A Reappraisal of Britain’s Special Air Service.” *The International History Review*, (37), (3), 2015, p. 545.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁰ B. Grob-Fitzgibbon: “Those Who Dared: A Reappraisal of Britain’s Special Air Service.” *The International History Review*, (37), (3), 2015, p. 545.

¹⁹¹ AIR 20-7777. Lieut.- General Sir Harold Briggs, Report on the Emergency in Malaya from April, 1950 to November, 1951, p. 5.

¹⁹² AIR 20-7777. Lieut.- General Sir Harold Briggs, Report on the Emergency in Malaya from April, 1950 to November, 1951, p. 36.

the framework. I cannot stress too strongly with value of knowledge of the ground by the troop operating in the framework, that small parties are more effective and can cover more ground, and that positions of ambushes and movement of patrols should be unknown to the population as well as the bandits by use of surprise movement and deception.¹⁹³

The Army had a vital role in British strategy during the Malayan Emergency and the Malayan Scouts/22nd SAS regiment along with other jungle worthy units were an indispensable cog without which the Army would not have been able to fulfil its role.

¹⁹³ AIR 20-7777. Lieut.- General Sir Harold Briggs, Report on the Emergency in Malaya from April, 1950 to November, 1951, p. 61.

Chapter 3

The Rhodesian African Rifle Tour to Malaya 1956-1958

Introduction

During the Rhodesian Civil War, the Rhodesian African Rifles forged a reputation as one of the most successful and battle hardened units. This can be attributed to their experiences during their Malayan Emergency tour. However, M. P. Stewart asserts that at the start of the Rhodesian Civil War, the RAR ‘committed a few tactical blunders that hurt its reputation.’¹⁹⁴ The Rhodesian military had expectations that the RAR would perform admirably against the Zimbabwe nationalist guerrillas. Stewart outlines some of the tactical lessons from Malaya that proved unsuitable to Rhodesian bush warfare. Some examples were the carriage of only 50 rounds of ammunition and the setting of weapons on fully automatic.¹⁹⁵ Some ‘blunders’ cannot be attributed to the Malayan experience such as the use of inferior of junior leaders in the RAR at the start of the Rhodesian Civil War.

One may ask what use the Malayan tour considering assertions that the tactics learnt were counterproductive in the Rhodesian theatre of operations: one posits that the value lay not in the knowledge acquired but rather the learning process that that entailed. The RAR in Malaya had to adapt to a novel way of war and this learning experience facilitated their successful adaptation to the conditions of the Rhodesian Civil War. Stewart can be challenged further by evidence that suggests RAR officers were instrumental in disseminating the Malayan Anti-Terrorist Manual (*ATOM*) to the Rhodesian military. A text that formed the basis of the Rhodesian military’s counter-insurgency tactical doctrine. It is most likely that an officer of the RAR brought back the 1958 3rd Edition of the *ATOM* manual, featured in Jonathan Pittaway’s text on the Rhodesian SAS. Chapter 4 categorically confirms that this 3rd edition was in fact the cornerstone of the Rhodesian Army’s *ATOPS* manual. This alone is cause enough to highlight the contribution of this small body of men to the Malayan Emergency that would in turn have shaped the course of the Rhodesian Civil

¹⁹⁴ M. P. Stewart: *The Rhodesian African Rifles: The Growth and Adaptation of a Multicultural Regiment through the Rhodesian Bush War, 1965-1980*, p. 37.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

War. A more specific link to Rhodesia's resettlement program is that the Second in Command of Guard Force, a unit raised to defend Protected Villages in Rhodesia, was a former RAR old Malaya hand, Brigadier Godwin. Godwin later became the commanding officer of Guard Force.

Historiographical Review

The RAR's tour is conspicuous by its absence in much of the literature surveyed on the Malayan Emergency. However, there are some but often the RAR is missing from the orders of battle found in texts appendices. For the duration of its tour its abbreviation was provisionally altered to RhAR so not to be misperceived as the Royal Australian Rifles.¹⁹⁶ There are however, references to the King's African Rifle Battalions and the Northern Rhodesian Regiment though even these too are rare. Often the references merely consist of a unit name and nothing more, lost in a paragraph or a list of units in the appendices. To some extent the RAR's tour has been largely forgotten or overlooked by much of the Malayan Emergency literature. There are a few writers who have deigned to comment on the use of African troops during the Emergency. Hoe and Morris have the following to say: 'The latter, 1st (Nyasa) and 3rd (Kenya) Battalions, King's African Rifles and 1st Rhodesian Rifles, were normally only as good as their heavy complement of white NCOs and junior officers. The Fijians, by contrast, were splendid jungle troops.'¹⁹⁷ According the Hoe, the quality of African troops is suspect and only made up for by its generous leavening of white junior leaders. Hoe implies through comparison with the Fijians that the Africans lacked fighting spirit and were not aggressive. One remark would be that this is a generalisation on the temperament of troops across many distinct African regiments; a remark that does not appear to be supported by any kind of solid evidence. It is curious that Hoe ignores the RAR's meritorious service in Burma as part of Field Marshall William Slim's 14th Army during World War 2.¹⁹⁸

That being said Richard Miers, the CO of the South Wales Borderers during their tour in Malaya, who worked with the RAR on a number of occasions and befriended the RAR CO Lt

¹⁹⁶ A. Peter: *Modern African wars, Rhodesia 1965-80*, p. 14.

¹⁹⁷ A. Hoe & E Morris: *Re-Enter the SAS The Special Air Service and the Malayan Emergency*, p. 194.

¹⁹⁸ A. Binda: *Masodja the history of the Rhodesian African Rifles and its forerunner the Rhodesia Native Regiment*, p. 47.

Col Jock Anderson. Miers wrote a book detailing his and the Borderers experiences. There are several references to the RAR. ‘The Rhodesian African Rifles had been operating alongside us for a long time. Their tough *askari* were eminently suitable for deep jungle work, and as a result they were employed almost exclusively in the more inaccessible places in the jungle where, but for their constant activity, the CT would have soon established a sanctuary for themselves. The Rhodesians’ efforts were very valuable but unspectacular; it was a long time since they had actually met a CT.’¹⁹⁹ Miers and his men held the RAR in high mutual esteem, so much so that Anderson and Miers applied for a formal military alliance between their respective units. This alliance was formerly approved by their respective Headquarters, governments and the Queen of England.²⁰⁰ In the Rhodesian Civil War discourse, there are references to the RAR’s service in Malaya.

In 2011 Timothy Stapleton published the text *African Police and Soldiers in Colonial Zimbabwe 1923-1980*. Without intending to detract from Stapleton’s insightful research, there is a paucity of references to the RAR’s tour to Malaya. Of those few, one notable example was a statement by Corporal Nyasha. ‘On his way to Malaya with the RAR in 1956, Corporal Nyasha arrived at the port of Beira in Mozambique, where “I wondered what lofty buildings that were built on the water. Going closer to them I realized that they were ships. One which was a hundred storey building was the one we were going to sail in.”’²⁰¹

Bereft of substantial secondary sources from the Malayan Emergency literature the search for material was widened to the literature of the Rhodesian Civil War. While the RAR’s tour to Malaya is often mentioned in a number of texts, it is rarely examined in any detail. However, texts that focus on the history of the RAR often have a chapter devoted to their Malayan tour.

One such chapter is found in Alexander Binda’s *Masodja: The History of the Rhodesian African Rifles and Its Forerunner the Rhodesia Native Regiment*. The chapter has a chronological order, starting with the advance party of the RAR making its way to Malaya followed by the rest of the Battalion. Binda’s chapter is rich in details of the operations men of the RAR were involved in and includes personal accounts of several of these patrols, focusing on those where the RAR made contact with MRLA guerrillas. These personal

¹⁹⁹ R. Miers: *Shoot to Kill*, p. 184.

²⁰⁰ TNA WO 32/16725. An Alliance between the Rhodesian African Rifles and the South Wales Borderers, a telegram from the Commonwealth Relations Office to the government of the Federation of Rhodesia, 22 November 1957.

²⁰¹ T. Stapleton: *African Police and Soldiers in Colonial Zimbabwe 1923-1980*, p. 187.

accounts are invariably drawn from European officers who served with the RAR. Placed approximately in the middle and at the culmination of the chapter is a unique collection of photographs from the RAR Malaya Tour. The photos have detailed descriptions but are not convincingly integrated into the chapter. Potentially disturbing photographs are not mediated.

Binda clearly had access to a significant collection of primary sources, the kind that were purged from archival collections in Zimbabwe prior to independence. Despite this rich collection, they are not interrogated thoroughly. There is a particular focus on the kill rates and successes of the RAR. Binda shows that the RAR in Malaya was deployed in deep jungle operations, in a similar manner the Rhodesian Squadron of the 22nd SAS. While his introduction to the Malayan Emergency is simplistic, his explanation of the phase of the Emergency that the RAR found themselves in, is linked to the kind of operations in which they were deployed. Much like the SAS and other jungle companies of the early 1950s, the RAR had a harassing role designed to drive CTs into the jungle fringes for other conventional regiments to engage. The glaring hole in Binda's chapter is a complete lack of sources from the African soldier's perspective. This chapter and the work as a whole is very much based on European's perceptions of the RAR and their perceptions of the black soldiers experiences. This does not invalidate the text but does mean it is a rather incomplete picture of the RAR. *Masodja* is highly reflective of the main primary source it is based upon, a manuscript on the history the RAR by Lieutenant-Colonel Kim Rule OBE.²⁰² Rule's manuscript was intended to be a short history of the RAR for new arrivals to the regiment.²⁰³ Binda's focus on kill rates, successes, patrols, decorations and the like form a counterfoil to Hoe and Morris's disparaging comments on African troops in Malaya. However, the limited nature of this counterfoil does little to answer the following historical questions. Why were the RAR relieving the Northern Rhodesian Regiment? Why were there colonial African Troops deployed to Malaya? From photographic evidence, the regimental band clearly went to Malaya, sundowners aside, what was their role in Malaya? Aside from battle lore, what did the African troops gain from their Malayan experience? Can Binda's assertions be confirmed by independent sources?

²⁰² A. Binda: *Masodja the history of the Rhodesian African Rifles and its forerunner the Rhodesia Native Regiment*, p. 10.

²⁰³ NAZ S 3021/3/1/2. Colonel Wells Papers on the RAR, Abridged History 1st Bn. The Rhodesian African Rifles, 1975.

The RAR and the Malayan Emergency

The RAR were notified in 1954 of their future deployment to Malaya planned for 1956.²⁰⁴ Binda writes that once relieved by the return of the 2nd Bn. KAR, the RAR began to train for their future deployment.²⁰⁵ The training is mentioned in passing and not developed further. Colonel Well's papers are more forthcoming on details. After the RAR was informed of this development 'the tempo of training stepped up and the number of volunteers increased. The accent was on anti-terrorist operations which included patrolling, ambush drills and a general toughening up.'²⁰⁶ This training appears to have carried on from 1954 and all the way through 1955. 'The whole of 1955 was spent on vigorous exercises, forced marches and endless firing on the ranges.'²⁰⁷ The RAR trained for roughly two years before leaving for Malaya, this can be contrasted with the comparatively shorter time the Rhodesian Squadron trained for, before shipping out to join the Malayan Scouts in 1951. Binda states that 'while the advance party was being jungle-trained, the rest of the battalion embarked in *HMT Empire Clyde* at Beira and arrived in Singapore on 26 April 1956.'²⁰⁸ Col Well's papers differ somewhat on that account 'at the beginning of 1956 the advance party flew to Malaya to prepare for the battalion's arrival whilst the main body marched to the Matopos and carried out its final exercise.'²⁰⁹ The RAR was thoroughly trained before leaving for Malaya, and the main contingent did more than simply climb on a ship as suggested by Binda. There was a farewell parade, attended by no less than the Governor General, Lord Llewellyn who took

²⁰⁴ NAZ S 3021/3/1/2. Colonel Wells Papers on the RAR, Abridged History 1st Bn. The Rhodesian African Rifles, 1975.

²⁰⁵ A. Binda: *Masodja the history of the Rhodesian African Rifles and its forerunner the Rhodesia Native Regiment*, p. 117.

²⁰⁶ NAZ S 3021/3/1/2. Colonel Wells Papers on the RAR, Abridged History 1st Bn. The Rhodesian African Rifles, 1975.

²⁰⁷ NAZ S 3021/3/1/2. Colonel Wells Papers on the RAR, Abridged History 1st Bn. The Rhodesian African Rifles, 1975.

²⁰⁸ A. Binda: *Masodja the history of the Rhodesian African Rifles and its forerunner the Rhodesia Native Regiment*, p. 127.

²⁰⁹ NAZ S 3021/3/1/2. Colonel Wells Papers on the RAR, Abridged History 1st Bn. The Rhodesian African Rifles, 1975.

their farewell salute.²¹⁰ Before leaving for the port of Beira, the RAR ‘marched through the streets of Bulawayo;’²¹¹ presumably with some degree of pomp and ceremony.

Where the Rhodesian Squadron had been contributed by the Southern Rhodesian government, the RAR was a branch of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland’s Army and as such ‘was part of the Federation’s contribution to Commonwealth Defence.’²¹² This contribution was part of a wider operation where ‘for several years African battalions had been on operations in Malaya relieving each other in turn.’²¹³ It was typical of the relief operations that an advance party would be sent by air to pave the way for the rest of a battalion. The tour of a serving battalion would overlap the relieving battalion by approximately two months. The serving battalion would assist her relief in jungle training and acclimatisation.²¹⁴ African troops were used to reduce the need for British troops in the Malayan theatre and thus release the British for duty elsewhere or to form reserve formations.²¹⁵ Malaya was only one of Britain’s many Cold War theatres. There were heavy demands at the time for man power in ‘Hong Kong, Korea, the Canal Zone, Kenya, and Cyprus.’²¹⁶ With the bulk of the British Army deployed in Britain 244,000 out of 429,000 and with a forward deployment of 63,000 in West Germany to meet the Soviet threat²¹⁷, Britain was ‘unable to deploy more than a small proportion of their own manpower in the counter-insurgency role.’²¹⁸ This forced a reliance on colonial troops for COIN campaigns. Over and above this military reason there were political and economic considerations. ‘Employing colonial regular soldiers to fight counter-insurgency campaigns had two advantages. If they became casualties the British electorate was, on the whole, indifferent, and their fate was not likely to generate the same level of concern in Britain as the deaths of British soldiers. They

²¹⁰ NAZ S 3021/3/1/2. Colonel Wells Papers on the RAR, Abridged History 1st Bn. The Rhodesian African Rifles, 1975.

²¹¹ NAZ S 3021/3/1/2. Colonel Wells Papers on the RAR, Abridged History 1st Bn. The Rhodesian African Rifles, 1975.

²¹² NAZ S 3021/3/1/2. Colonel Wells Papers on the RAR, Abridged History 1st Bn. The Rhodesian African Rifles, 1975.

²¹³ NAZ S 3021/3/1/2. Colonel Wells Papers on the RAR, Abridged History 1st Bn. The Rhodesian African Rifles, 1975.

²¹⁴ NAS WO 276-38. Operation Eve, documents pertaining to the operation whereby the 1NRR relieved the 2 KAR on service in Malaya, 1954.

²¹⁵ *Hansard*, HC Deb 08 March 1955 vol. 538, cc248-405.

²¹⁶ D. French: *The British Way in Counter-Insurgency 1945-1967*, p. 35.

²¹⁷ *Ibid.* p. 33.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.* p. 36.

were also cheaper.²¹⁹ In the course of the Malayan Emergency, East and Central African battalions were called upon.

There is an implication in Binda's work that the RAR's jungle specific training only really began upon arrival in Malaya. *The Singapore Free Press* quotes the CO of the RAR 'Col Anderson said the regiment had done an intensive course in jungle warfare in Rhodesia.'²²⁰ It is conceivable that jungle training techniques would have been passed on by the Rhodesian Squadron and the men who continued to pursue a military career in the Rhodesian army. In the course of its two year tour the RAR was deployed in deep jungle operations that disrupted MRLA attempts to cultivate their own food, in conjunction with an on-going food denial operation. The effects of these operations were twofold: while the RAR rarely made contact with the enemy, MRLA fighters were invariably forced into the jungle fringes and ambushed by units in that patrol role. The other side was that the MRLA was forced to rely more on its contacts with the Min Yuen, thus creating intelligence aided the Special Branch (SB) in penetrating the Min Yuen. SB would then eliminate the Min Yuen in a manner that would force the MRLA members to rely on the SB informants for supplies. Consequently successful ambushes could be coordinated with the accruing information. Col Well's papers note that 'within three months of the battalion's departure, Hou Lung, the South Malay Bureau chief surrendered with two hundred of his followers. Among the main reasons given for their surrender were the food-denial campaign combined with harassment in the deep jungle.'²²¹

Miers and Binda are in agreement on the jungle worthiness of the troops of the RAR. This assertion is corroborated by Col Well's papers, 'although only fourteen terrorists were eliminated the battalion's kill to contact ratio was as good as any other unit at that time.'²²² These sources are however, more personally invested in the RAR and could be potentially accused of bias. This accusation can be more or less dismissed on the basis of three more impartial opinions. In Col Well's papers and Binda's appendices there is a list of decorations awarded to members of the RAR by the British Army and 'approved by the Queen.'²²³

OBE: Lt-Col J. Anderson

²¹⁹ D. French: *The British Way in Counter-Insurgency 1945-1967*, p. 36.

²²⁰ NAS "New Battalion To Fight Terrorists," *The Singapore Free Press*, 28 April 1956, p. 2.

²²¹ NAZ S 3021/3/1/2. Colonel Wells Papers on the RAR, Abridged History 1st Bn. The Rhodesian African Rifles, 1975.

²²² NAZ S 3021/3/1/2. Colonel Wells Papers on the RAR, Abridged History 1st Bn. The Rhodesian African Rifles, 1975.

²²³ NAS "Queen honours the fighting men," *The Straits Times*, 21 December 1957, p. 9.

MBE: Maj C. B. McCullagh

Military Medal: Warrant Officer II Muzerecho, Pisayi
Warrant Officer II Khumalo, Alexander
Corporal Lengu

Mentioned in Dispatches: Maj F. S. Fitzgerald
Maj J. S. Salt
Maj W. A. Godwin
Capt W. T. D. de Haast
Capt J. R Shaw
Lt F. G. D. Heppenstall
Lt J. R. Wells-West

C in C's Commendation: Pte Nyikavaranda²²⁴

FARELF Command clearly had a degree of respect for the men and officers of the RAR. It is unlikely the RAR would have been decorated if its men were not thoroughly jungle worthy and disciplined. Hoe and Morris's assertion that African troops were not aggressive does not correlate to the accounts surrounding the Military Medals awarded to three NCOs of the RAR. Warrant Officer Pisayi while leading a small patrol made contact with a group of MRLA guerrillas. He managed to shoot one man and proceeded to chase down and capture two guerrillas single handedly.²²⁵ Corporal Lengu supported by a small patrol charged a group of guerrillas during a patrol and managed to personally kill two.²²⁶ When given the opportunity soldiers of the RAR fought with élan. Overlooked by Binda; the story of Private Nyikavaranda's commendation also shows that RAR soldiers could be cool headed under fire. 'Whilst driving his truck on a re-supply run he was ambushed by terrorists. Although his windscreen was shattered by fire and a tyre punctured, he drove clear of the ambush and

²²⁴ A. Binda: *Masodja the history of the Rhodesian African Rifles and its forerunner the Rhodesia Native Regiment*, p. 408.

²²⁵ NAZ S 3021/3/1/2. Colonel Wells Papers on the RAR, Abridged History 1st Bn. The Rhodesian African Rifles, 1975.

²²⁶ NAZ S 3021/3/1/2. Colonel Wells Papers on the RAR, Abridged History 1st Bn. The Rhodesian African Rifles, 1975.

whilst his escort returned the fire change the wheel and then resumed his journey.²²⁷ In the course of earning the Military Medals, it does not appear white NCOs or officers were involved in the immediate contacts. Clearly RAR African Soldiers could use their initiative and were not reliant on European leadership for their martial qualities. ‘Warrant Officer Alexander Khumalo, broke off from a patrol he was leading with a single soldier to investigate some smoke shortly before nightfall. He succeeded in ambushing a minor group of three MRLA guerrillas.’²²⁸ Hoe’s wild charges of the Fijians, are not necessarily conducive to a successful engagement in the Malayan jungle.²²⁹ In conjunction with the British Military, some British politicians spoke highly of African troops that served in Malaya. In the House of Commons Mr Amery in a rather lengthy speech stated: ‘Opinions vary about the martial qualities of African troops, but experience in Malaya and Kenya in recent times has shown that they can be relied upon to give a very good account of themselves.’²³⁰ One Member of Parliament went so far as to refer to the RAR as a fine Regiment.²³¹

A newspaper article from the *Straits Times* in 1958 declares Tengku Abdul Rahmans appreciation for the RAR’s contribution to the Emergency. The Prime Minister ‘praised the 1st Bn. Rhodesian African Rifles, for its successes in the war against the terrorists.’²³² Rahman went on to state that ‘Troops from Central Africa have all achieved out-standing military successes and have also worthily gained the respect and friendship of Malaya’s armed forces and its people.’²³³ The article makes a more general comment on African troops counter to Hoe and Morris, ‘African troops have killed 60 terrorists and captured six since 1951. They have been highly decorated.’²³⁴

The RAR Regimental Band

There is some mention of the RAR band’s activities in Malaya and several photographs in *Masodja*. There is however, more to the band’s ceremonial functions and entertainment at

²²⁷ NAZ S 3021/3/1/2. Colonel Wells Papers on the RAR, Abridged History 1st Bn. The Rhodesian African Rifles, 1975.

²²⁸ NAZ S 3021/3/1/2. Colonel Wells Papers on the RAR, Abridged History 1st Bn. The Rhodesian African Rifles, 1975.

²²⁹ A. Hoe & E Morris: Re-Enter the SAS The Special Air Service and the Malayan Emergency, p. 44.

²³⁰ *Hansard*, HC Deb 08 March 1955 vol. 538, cc248-405.

²³¹ *Hansard*, HC Deb 04 June 1957 vol. 571, cc1085-211.

²³² NAS “Thanks to Last Rhodesian battalion,” *The Straits Times*, 13 February 1958, p. NA.

²³³ NAS “Thanks to Last Rhodesian battalion,” *The Straits Times*, 13 February 1958, p. NA.

²³⁴ NAS “Thanks to Last Rhodesian battalion,” *The Straits Times*, 13 February 1958, p. NA.

sundowners that Binda mentions in passing. According to a set of newspaper cuttings in the Malayan Press, the RAR band was extensively involved in Malaya's cultural scene. For example, there were band concerts that appeared to occur with some regularity. Titled 'Gardens Concert' the article reads, 'The regimental band of 1st Bn. Rhodesian African Rifles will play at the Singapore Botanic Gardens from 5 p.m. to 6.15 p.m. tomorrow.'²³⁵ The news cutting refers to a second concert some two weeks later at the exact same time and place.²³⁶ This would suggest that it may have been a regular performance slot for the RAR band. The band was also embraced working with charities. 'The band of the 1st Bn., Rhodesian African Rifles, will arrive in Singapore from Kluang today specially to assist in a big charity function at the Singapore Cricket Club tonight.'²³⁷ According to this article the regimental band would be involved specifically as a dance band for a fund raiser in aid of SATA.²³⁸ SATA stands for The Singapore Anti-Tuberculosis Association. There is another article in *The Singapore Free Press* that explains that the band would also be playing music for a dress display as part of the function.²³⁹ The collation of these articles and Binda's work shows that the RAR band was much more than a simple military band. That is to say that the band was versatile and multifunctional, and was not limited to military ceremonies. The band played at dance functions, evening concerts, Christmas concerts, light entertainment and sundowners, and adapted itself self to the needs of charity fundraising events. Something perhaps the Malayan public were pleasantly surprised by, as the band was initially 'noted for the unusual way in which it sets Rhodesian war cries to modern rhythm.'²⁴⁰

RAR Education in Malaya

Stapleton's text *African Police and Soldiers*, has investigated to some degree the education of the soldiers of the RAR. Nonetheless, there is no mention of any army education programs during the Malaya tour 1956-58. Binda has several references to education scattered through *Masodja* although they were not expounded upon. Binda's only specific reference to education in Malaya is the mention of an education sergeant leading a patrol:

²³⁵ NAS "Band Concert," *The Straits Times*, 5 January 1957, p. 5.

²³⁶ NAS "Gardens Concert," *The Straits Times* 19 January 1957, p. 7.

²³⁷ NAS "Rhodesia Band To Help SATA," *The Straits Times* 12 December `1957, p. 4.

²³⁸ *Ibid.*

²³⁹ NAS "Nighties on parade to aid SATA," *The Singapore Free Press*, 12 December 1957, p. 7.

²⁴⁰ NAS "Rhodesia Band To Help SATA," *The Straits Times*, 12 December `1957, p. 4.

The battalion was in such deadly earnest that they ambushed the rail line at Bekok for seven successive nights. The patrols were led on the first night by the intelligence officer, on the second by the assistant adjutant, the medical officer and the regimental sergeant-major, on the third by the quartermaster and the ration sergeant, on the fourth by the regimental signals officer and the education sergeant, on the fifth by the pay sergeant and the intelligence sergeant, on the sixth by the orderly room warrant officer and, on the seventh, by the company sergeant-major of HQ company and the GD clerk. There was no result. Clearly the terrified CTs were not keen to try conclusions with such formidable opposition!²⁴¹

This is indicative of *Masodja's* prime focus on purely combative military aspects of the RAR's history. In 1957 a joint civil and military education scheme was launched to increase the Malayan people's literacy. 'Illiterate people in the Federation will soon be taught to read and write English – the Army way. Twelve adult education teachers from the Federation are now in Singapore for 13 days training in a new Army system of teaching English.'²⁴² The course required practical teaching experiences in order to train these teachers, illiterate subjects would have been ideal and they were found within the RAR.²⁴³ 'In Singapore the adult tutors have tough assignments as part of their training – teaching illiterate African soldiers.'²⁴⁴ The teaching methodology imparted to the education teachers involved a large degree of repetition. 'The secret is the limited vocabulary taught to the students again and again till they understand fully before proceeding to other lessons.'²⁴⁵ The repetition technique was not limited to single lessons as there was a constant revision of knowledge imparted post the first lesson. 'In this new method special emphasis is laid on revision and this helps a lot.'²⁴⁶ The news report reveals that originally only one African member of the RAR could speak English fluently. 'They are taking an experimental course. The only one who speaks English is Warrant Officer E. S. Alexander Mzondo, 29, father of four. Mzondo, A Matabele, joined the Army eight years ago after leaving the police. He has a fifth standard education.'²⁴⁷ It is not certain how many soldiers were enrolled in the 'experimental' course, there were however, plans to teach every African soldier of the RAR how to speak, read and write a certain level of English. 'He will help Sgt. Peter Baker, 19, a national serviceman in

²⁴¹ A. Binda: *Masodja the history of the Rhodesian African Rifles and its forerunner the Rhodesia Native Regiment*, pp.129-130.

²⁴² NAS "Reading and writing – the Army shows how," *The Straits Times*, 22 August 1956, p. 7.

²⁴³ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

the RAEC, (Royal Army Education Corps) to educate the whole battalion of 800.’²⁴⁸ One surmises that the Malaya tour marked a watershed moment for education in the RAR, and any further education and training programmes after their Malayan Tour would have built upon the foundations laid there. A prevalent feature of any army was, and continues to be, the education of its recruits.

Conclusion

This short study of the RAR has provided some degree of insight into the RAR’s Malayan tour and illuminated aspects of their deployment that have been neglected in the historical literature. Of particular significance is the education program that Rhodesian African soldiers were enrolled in during their Malaya tour. The education of the African rank and file would have played an important role in the RAR’s adaption and training for modern bush warfare. Their improved learning capabilities would have been instrumental during training for helicopter and para-troop fireforce operations, and in skills related to modern weaponry and counter-insurgency tactics. The Malayan tour would have made RAR officers more amenable to other forms of counter-insurgency doctrine. As a result the RAR officers were opened to learning new and more appropriate tactical methods that were to be highly successful in the Rhodesian Civil War. Major M Stewart author of a United States Army Staff College study on the RAR pointed out a flaw in his own work. ‘The critical missing piece of this research is the perspective of the black soldiers who served in the regiment.’²⁴⁹ The same could be said of the historical literature as a whole. There has been a dearth of research on the RAR African soldiers’ perspective from interviews or even written sources. The chapter on the RAR tour in Malaya has been limited by a lack of primary source documents and unless access can be granted to the remaining private collections, interviews of RAR veterans may be the only way to gain their insight into their experiences of Malaya.

²⁴⁸ NAS “Reading and writing – the Army shows how,” *The Straits Times*, 22 August 1956, p. 7.

²⁴⁹ M. P. Stewart: *The Rhodesian African Rifles: The Growth and Adaptation of a Multicultural Regiment through the Rhodesian Bush War, 1965-1980*, p. 8.

Chapter 4

Malayan Link to Rhodesian Civil War

When the Malayan Scouts returned to Southern Rhodesia, they not only brought back their experiences of the campaign but also several miscellaneous items. Pittaway, who was the ‘adjutant of the Regiment and was in charge of the last section to return to Rhodesia,’²⁵⁰ took back with him:

- The *ATOM* Manual
- A J Pack (the soldier’s personal medical pack)
- A 24-hour ration pack
- A set of 44 pattern webbing
- Jungle greens clothing, boots, hat, poncho and hammock²⁵¹

According to Pittaway, a direct result of this was that 24-hour ration packs were introduced in the Rhodesian Army, ‘and 44 pattern webbing and equipment came into use.’²⁵² As important as these improvements were, the *ATOM* manual was the more significant. The acronym refers to the ‘The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya’ manual. Templar, Director of Operations (1952-1954), instigated the creation of this manual to collate the considerable experience of jungle fighting that had been built up in the years preceding his appointment. ‘At the tactical level it described a series of drills that could be employed by units operating in the jungle to establish jungle bases, carry out silent patrols, and mount and avoid ambushes.’²⁵³ There were three editions, the photograph of the *ATOM* manual in Pittaway’s book is not of the manual he allegedly brought back when he left in 1953, the photograph is of the 1958 3rd edition. It is most likely that that 3rd edition was brought back by officers of the 1st Bn. RAR ‘*ATOM* codified how through a policy of ‘the close control of populated areas such as towns, new villages, kampongs and estate lines’, implemented by means of population control measures and food denial operation, it was possible to produce an operational strategy that could employed to defeat a largely rural insurgency.’²⁵⁴

²⁵⁰ J. Pittaway & C. Fourie: *SAS Rhodesia : Rhodesians and the Special Air Service*, p. 93.

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*

²⁵² *Ibid.*

²⁵³ D. French: *The British Way in Counter-Insurgency 1945-1967*, p. 204.

²⁵⁴ D. French: *The British Way in Counter-Insurgency 1945-1967*, p. 204.

Pittaway asserts that ‘as a result of *ATOM*, the Rhodesian Army later published its own manual based on local conditions called *ATOPS* (Anti-Terrorist Ops).’²⁵⁵ This categorically proves the military link between the two conflicts and illuminates the extent to which the two Rhodesian Tours during the Malayan Emergency influenced the Rhodesian Security Forces, during the civil war, on matters of strategy and tactical doctrine. ‘*ATOM* provided a more detailed gloss on how the Special Branch and military intelligence should co-operate, recommending the establishment of joint operations rooms manned by the police and military intelligence officers.’²⁵⁶ *ATOM* proved instrumental in laying the doctrinal foundations for inter-force cooperation in the Rhodesian Security Forces. During the first phase of the war, the Rhodesian Army relied on the BSAP for actionable intelligence. ‘The major innovation in *ATOM*, repeated in *A Handbook of Anti-Mau Mau Operations* published in 1954, and in subsequent army-wide manuals, was to insist that what had begun as an innovation to harmonize day-to-day tactical policies should be employed to harmonize policy at the political and strategic levels.’²⁵⁷ The RSF system of Combined Operations (COMOPS) and Joint Operations Commands (JOC)²⁵⁸, were based upon the Malayan Joint Operations Centre model and State War Executive Committees. (SWEC)²⁵⁹

What follows, is a structural comparison and a more specific comparison of corresponding sections of the two manuals that will serve as evidence that the Malayan Manual was used to write the Rhodesian one.

Structural Comparison of *ATOM* and *ATOPS*

The Rhodesian manual is divided into chapters without requisite page numbers, in much the same way as the Malayan. The difference being that the Malaya has separate page numbers for each chapter. For example chapter I, page one to eight and chapter three, page one to sixteen, while the Rhodesian manual lacks any kind of page numbering system. The Rhodesian manual has a short preface followed by a set of definitions. The Malayan manual has three forewords, followed by a set of abbreviations and then definitions. Where the

²⁵⁵ J. Pittaway & C. Fourie: *SAS Rhodesia : Rhodesians and the Special Air Service*, p. 93.

²⁵⁶ D. French: *The British Way in Counter-Insurgency 1945-1967*, p. 206.

²⁵⁷ D. French: *The British Way in Counter-Insurgency 1945-1967*, p. 207.

²⁵⁸ P. Moorcraft & P. McLaughlin: *The Rhodesian War A Military History*, pp. 60-61.

²⁵⁹ W. Walker: *ATOM* 3rd Ed. 1958. Chapter III, p. 3.

Malayan has 23 chapters, the Rhodesian has 17. The body of the text of the Rhodesian Manual is formatted in an almost identical manner to the Malayan. The main difference is the use of italics in the Rhodesian one for sub headings. Five of the Rhodesian chapters correlate directly to the chapter headings of the Malayan one in terms of title. This however, is deceiving as content from multiple Malayan chapters can be found within these specific chapters and within chapters with titles that do not bear resemblance to *ATOM* Chapter titles. It follows that the Rhodesian Army copied much of the structure and format of the *ATOM* manual in the creation of their *ATOPS* manual.

It is interesting to note that the writers of *ATOPS* were not only inspired by *ATOM*, but they copied *ATOM* liberally. Initial analysis indicates that entire paragraphs and sentences were lifted verbatim from *ATOM* and inserted in the *ATOPS* manual. The *ATOM* manual was essentially pruned to suit the Rhodesian context and the military's approach to COIN. Once pruned, it formed a skeleton structure for *ATOPS* and was expanded upon using the Rhodesian Army experiences of the Rhodesian Civil War, suiting a rural African context as opposed to that of the Malayan Jungle. Excerpts from *ATOM* were not always used sequentially presenting a slight challenge in tracing parts of the Rhodesian manual to *ATOM*. The methodology used by the writers of *ATOPS* is alien to that of the historical discipline. None of the verbatim *ATOM* excerpts are referenced. However, *ATOPS* has gone well beyond simply copying *ATOM*. *ATOM* formed the foundation of *ATOPS* and many sections that are not lifted directly, are paraphrased or written in the spirit of *ATOM*. Many of the pruned chapters involve information specific to Malaya, the Emergency, the climate and British Security Force operating procedure. Other chapters such as the one on Tracking Dogs have been copied liberally but then expanded upon using Rhodesian Security Force experiences. The end result is a synthesis of the respective doctrines of the Malayan Emergency and Rhodesian Civil War Security Forces. This doctrinal link is grounds for further study in comparing SANDF anti-terrorist manuals, and the Kenyan Emergency (1952-1960) manuals with that of the Rhodesians to identify influences in their respective military doctrines. Rhodesian troops served in Kenya while South Africa had a strong if clandestine military presence in Rhodesia for much of the Civil War.

The manual is a pdf download of the Rhodesian Security Forces *ATOPS* manual circa 1975. It is missing the last three chapters, Chapters 15, 16 and 17; Land/Air Operations, Miscellaneous, and Logistics in COIN respectively. The following analysis is on Chapter 7

on the use of dogs Section. The section has been focused exclusively to facilitate an investigation as to the extent of the influence of *ATOM* upon the *ATOPS* manual.

Comparative Analysis of Chapter 7 Section 5 Use of Dogs in *ATOPS*

This section of the manual is aimed at the infantry commander. It is essentially a summary on the use of dogs in the rural Rhodesian theatre of operations. This summary is intended as a guide for commanding officers (COs) as opposed to detailed instructions on all aspects of the use of dogs in anti-terrorist operations. The *ATOPS* writers with this aim in mind pruned sections from Chapter XX specifically relevant to dog handlers such as instructions on how handlers should advise his commander and their responsibilities towards the war dogs, for example kennel management,²⁶⁰ feeding on patrol²⁶¹ and veterinary notes including first aid.²⁶² The *ATOPS* terminology has a distinctive feature to the *ATOM* manual. Where the *ATOM* reads CT i.e. Communist Terrorist, *ATOPS* will either read ‘the enemy’ or ‘terrorist.’ All of the *ATOM* appendices have been omitted; these being Appendix A for Chapter XX on ‘Advice to Dog Handlers.’²⁶³ This advice is literally a Don’ts and Do’s list on how to handle a military dog.²⁶⁴ The *ATOPS* section five has lifted paragraphs from two *ATOM* chapters. The second Chapter XXI is on tracking, and so the sections specific to tracking dogs have been incorporated in *ATOM*. For the most part the *ATOM* sections on precise tracking tactics have been omitted. It is relatively clear that much of this section has been lifted verbatim from the *ATOM* manual. There are a number of segments where the authors of *ATOPS* have paraphrased and summarised parts of the *ATOM* manual. The major points of interest are the original pieces in this section of the *ATOPS* manual.

The first point is the kinds of dogs used by the Rhodesian Army. *ATOM* refers to merely Patrol and Tracking dogs. *ATOPS* on the other hand goes on to list mine detection dogs,

²⁶⁰ W. Walker: *ATOM* 3rd Ed. 1958. Chapter XX, p. 5.

²⁶¹ *Ibid.* p. 6.

²⁶² *Ibid.* p. 7.

²⁶³ W. Walker: *ATOM* 3rd Ed. 1958. Chapter XX Appendix A.

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

guard dogs and dogs for crowd control.²⁶⁵ Mines were a pernicious feature of the Rhodesian Civil War. Both the guerrilla armies and the security forces made use of anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines. Hence there was a need for dogs trained in mine detection to scout ahead of the main body of a unit. The title Mine Detection Dog, would suggest a focus on mines however, these dogs could detect all manner of dangerous objects beneath and above the ground. Guard dogs feature in the *ATOPS* section as they were used to improve security at all kinds of military and civilian installations. Culturally speaking the Rhodesian Africans had inordinate fear of guard dogs and thus were a useful counter measure to guerrilla threats. While the *ATOPS* section refers to Crowd Control Dogs, the type is not expounded upon.²⁶⁶ One surmises that dogs were used for crowd control primarily by the British South Africa Police (BSAP) and less so by the Rhodesian Army. The sub section on dog pointing has been expanded by several other signs of dog pointing. This is perhaps to make sure that a commander has a clear idea of what the behaviour of a trained dog may mean. The subsection on dog uses has been expanded to reflect the types of trained dogs used. There is no overt mention of the use of dogs in ambushes unlike the *ATOM* manual.²⁶⁷ The sections on the factors that adversely affect tracking have been expanded to include bush fires and animal scents. Bush fires are typical of the Rhodesian climate and not only choke up the air but can destroy the scent on the ground and the scrub.²⁶⁸

Point 7 after Operational Employment, advises that the use of dogs for tracking purpose must be kept secret from the enemy to keep countermeasures to a minimum.²⁶⁹ In the *ATOM* manual there are considerable sections on counter measures used for Malayan CTs that have been omitted by *ATOPS*. Point 8 is not lifted directly from the *ATOM* manual however, it is possible to trace the theory on the use of tracker dogs during night and follow up operations outlined there, to the tactical doctrine in the *ATOM* as regards night and follow up operations involving human soldiers. The section on Mine Dogs is an original one at least according to a comparison with the *ATOM* manual. Mines were used by both the nationalist guerrilla armies and the Rhodesian Security Forces and featured prominently during the Rhodesian Civil War. In the case of the Malayan Emergency, mines were employed by the MRLA on a smaller

²⁶⁵ Rhodesian Security Force, *Anti-Terrorist Operations in Rural Areas* Chapter 7 Section 5 Use of Dogs in *ATOPS*.

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁷ W. Walker: *ATOM* 3rd Ed. 1958. Chapter XX, p. 4.

²⁶⁸ Rhodesian Security Force, *Anti-Terrorist Operations in Rural Areas* Chapter 7 Section 5 Use of Dogs in *ATOPS*, p. 74.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

scale and British Security Forces don't seem to have used dogs extensively in a mine detection role. The Guard Dog section of *ATOPS* is technically an original section although it may have been inspired by excerpts in the *ATOM* manual on the use of dogs in support of sentries.²⁷⁰

Conclusion

The use of War Dogs component of the Rhodesian Anti-Terrorist Operations Manual reflects how the majority of the manual has been constructed. *ATOPS* is structured in much the same the *ATOM* manual was. Considerable excerpts have been lifted directly from the *ATOM* manual while there is also evidence that suggests that parts of the *ATOM* manual have been summarised and paraphrased in conjunction with the verbatim quotations. The *ATOPS* manual is not devoid of original content. Doctrine of the jungle campaign can only be adapted so far to a Bush context; much of the original content is a result of Rhodesian Security force experiences and realities. That being said, there are grounds to compare the *ATOPS* manual with training manuals used by the British Military in Kenya to ascertain if any of the original Rhodesian contents has been influenced by military doctrine from the Kenya Emergency. To a certain degree South Africa was militarily involved in the Rhodesian civil war. It follows that a comparison between the *ATOPS* manual and South African National Defence Force manuals would prove instrumental in investigating the extent to which South African experiences of the Rhodesian Civil War influenced their own doctrine and the South African Border War (1966-1989) specifically.

²⁷⁰ W. Walker: *ATOM* 3rd Ed 1958.

Chapter 5

Protected Villages:

Introduction

Research on the two Rhodesian tours to Malaya has revealed that there is no evidence to suggest that either of the Rhodesian units had direct experience of large scale Malayan resettlement schemes. However, the Malayan Scouts were involved in the resettlement of the Orang Asli on a small scale. There were also indirect experiences that had significance. Malaya's 'New Villages' scheme was the corner-stone of the British counter-insurgency strategy and military campaign framework. Hence, the officers of the Rhodesian units would have been familiar with strategic resettlement concepts, just as much as they were familiar with idea of a Director of Operations and Joint Operations Command,²⁷¹ even though their command experience of Malaya would not have been beyond Special Force squadron and regimental level. 'A number of officers who attained key positions within the Rhodesian Security Forces had served in Malaya during the Emergency.'²⁷² Not least was the commander of the Rhodesian Army Lieut. General Peter Walls who later became of the Chief of Combined Operations (COMOPS), and Lieut. Colonel Ron Reid Daley, commanding officer of the Selous Scouts. The Rhodesian units in Malaya would have worked within the British military campaign framework that was constructed around a resettlement strategy and where 'New Villages' were a source of actionable intelligence.

The Malayan 'clique' in the Rhodesian Security Forces during the course of the Rhodesian Civil War, became convinced of similarities between their conflict and that of the Malayan Emergency.²⁷³ The Rhodesian government and military conducted 'studies of the British concept of protected villages in Malaya and of Portuguese "Aldeamentos" in Mozambique and Angola.'²⁷⁴ It is likely that the Malaya clique within the Rhodesian Army

²⁷¹ J. K. Cilliers: *Counter Insurgency in Rhodesia*, p. 3.

²⁷² *Ibid.* p. 66

²⁷³ *Ibid.* p. 76.

²⁷⁴ <http://www.freewebs.com/dudleywall/guardforce.htm> (posted circa 2007).

instigated these studies and supported their findings to the extent that resettlement formed a part of the Rhodesian military's *cordon sanitaire* defensive strategy. Initially Internal Affairs (INTAF) was responsible for Rhodesia's resettlement scheme and a former British Army officer who had served in Malaya was responsible for the training of INTAF security personnel. INTAF was overwhelmed by the rapid expansion of Rhodesia's resettlement program and a separate military formation known as Guard Force was raised to provide garrisons for Rhodesia's Protected Villages. The deputy commander was 'Brigadier W.A. Godwin DMM, OBE who had seen service with the British army in Malaya,'²⁷⁵ the Brigadier later became the commanding officer of Guard Force. The source quoted is somewhat misleading, in that Brigadier Godwin was in fact a company commander of the RAR during its Malayan tour 1956-58. Hence his service was as a Federal Rhodesian soldier as opposed to a British soldier.

The following chapters adhere to a comparative analytical methodology. The aim is to investigate Britain's resettlement program in Malaya, and illustrate to what extent it both informs and differs from Rhodesia's Protected Village program. The respective governments of Rhodesian and Malaya employed a similar resettlement strategy within remarkably different military socio-political and international contexts. It is hoped that a comparison will develop further insight into why resettlement was so successful in Malaya and ended in abject failure in Rhodesia.

²⁷⁵ <http://rhodesianforces.org/InternalAffairs.htm> (downloaded February 2016).

The origins of population control and concentration

The concept of transferring Chinese squatters into resettlement areas was by no means a novel idea. At the turn of the 20th century “the idea of the concentration camp was invented almost simultaneously by the Germans and British in the same region of the colonial world: in southern Africa.”²⁷⁶ The French had invented barbed wire in 1865 and subsequently by 1874 America had begun to mass produce it for bovine agricultural purposes. This “inspired the construction of vast, cheap internment camps”²⁷⁷ by the British and Germans in the South Africa War (1900-1902) and the Herero War (1904-1907). “In the Second Boer War (1900-1902), Lord Kitchener led a pitiless ‘scorched earth’ campaign to flush out Boer insurgents – burning their farms, slaughtering their livestock, destroying their crops, poisoning wells and evicting their families.”²⁷⁸ Kitchener isolated the Boer soldiers from civilian support and destroyed their supply stockpiles. “The British herded at least 150,000 refugee women and children into hastily improvised internment camps – enclosed by mile upon mile of barbed wire.”²⁷⁹ There was an attempt by Kitchener to name these temporary population centres ‘camps of refuge.’²⁸⁰ However, liberals such as C. P. Scott and John Ellis who criticised his methods of population control, used the term ‘concentration camp.’²⁸¹ Despite these historical roots, it would be a gross simplification to define like Hale has, a Malayan Protected Village as a concentration camp.

The role of Population in “Peoples War”

According to Blaufarb, Mao’s precepts on the ‘Peoples War’ can be reduced to six main principles. It is clear from the initial three that the local populace of the target state plays a pivotal role in such a conflict. “First the doctrine insists on the priority of politics in all aspects of insurgency and especially the supremacy of the political organisation over the military.”²⁸² Therefore the political objectives take priority over military ones and the guerrilla armed forces also act in conjunction with them. “This leads to a second basic

²⁷⁶ C. Hale: *Massacre in Malaya Exposing Britain’s My Lai*, p. 315.

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁸¹ *Ibid.*

²⁸² D. S. Blaufarb & G. K. Tanham: *Who Will Win, A Key to the Puzzle of Revolutionary War*, p. 8.

precept of the Maoist approach, the view that the conflict is essentially one for the support and control of the population. Once gained that support and control does two things: it provides many of the essential sinews of war, men, money, food and other supplies and – of critical importance – intelligence.²⁸³ Therefore rather than attempting to capture a physical objective like a bridge or a piece of territory, Maoist inspired insurgents endeavour to subvert the population through a variety of coercive means.

Winning the population to one's cause does not only reap the benefits referred to but 'at the same time, it deprives the government side of these same benefits, of which – once again – intelligence is critical. Although the government, by virtue of its control of the cities and other assets, can maintain an army in the field, it will be for lack of timely information on the enemy, a blind army, doomed to thrash about futilely without being able to bring its superior firepower to bear on the insurgents.'²⁸⁴ As a result the politicisation and organisation of the rural population develops into a priority activity of Maoist schooled insurgents²⁸⁵ 'and one in which they may develop formidable skills.'²⁸⁶ So vital are the people to asymmetric conflict that Kiss maintains that "according to Mao's theory of multiphased guerrilla war, thorough indoctrination and mobilisation of the people must precede the first combat operations (*sic*)."²⁸⁷ For the belligerents in asymmetric conflict, the "people" are double edged sword. They are both an Achilles heel and a vital part of the route to victory.

Population control in COIN theory

'Population control' is a response by counter insurgents to Maoist inspired war amongst the people in a rural setting. The target population is seen as 'an ideal source of food, money, arms and information'²⁸⁸ for the insurgents. The concentration of rural populations is seen as a way of cutting them off from the insurgents physically in order to deprive them of support and to facilitate government administration.²⁸⁹ The physical isolation is intended not only to reduce support but also to restrict the flow of recruits and politically isolate the insurgents from the population.²⁹⁰ Thompson outlines three goals that have shaped COIN doctrine. 'The

²⁸³ D. S. Blaufarb & G. K. Tanham: *Who Will Win, A Key to the Puzzle of Revolutionary War*, p. 9.

²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁷ P. A. Kiss: *Winning Wars amongst the People Case Studies in Asymmetric Warfare*, p. 33.

²⁸⁸ K. J. King: "Malaya's Resettlement Problem." *Far Eastern Survey*, (23), (3), 1954, p. 34.

²⁸⁹ A. Short: *Communist insurrection in Malaya 1948-1960*. p. 391.

²⁹⁰ R. Thompson: *Defeating Communist Insurgency Experiences from Malaya*, p. 123.

first a prerequisite for the other two, is the protection of the population.²⁹¹ ‘The second object of strategic hamlets is to unite the people and involve them in positive action on the side of the government.’²⁹² The third object of strategic hamlets is this development in the social, economic and political fields.²⁹³ Far from being a purely military measure, population control forms a part of the hearts and minds approach towards a civilian population. The idea being, that once the villagers are protected, provided with amenities and start to be economically and politically integrated, they will wholeheartedly assist the government against the insurgents. The water that Mao’s fish swim in amongst the reeds will essentially be drained until the fish can no longer survive. COIN theory on population control is a realisation that an internal war cannot be won solely by purely military methods

Overview of Resettlement in Malaya

The resettlement programme of the British administration in Malaya can be divided into two phases. The first phase ran from 1949 to 1952 totalling nineteen operations. Of these nineteen, sixteen took place in 1949. These operations entailed the uprooting of 40,000 squatters. 26,000 were deported while the rest were held in detention camps or transported from one place to another. The government’s attempt to deal with the squatters entailed repressive legislation and the destruction of squatters’ crops and homes as part of their punitive operations.²⁹⁴ In January 1950, a government Squatter Committee recommended resettlement as a solution to the vast numbers of squatters on the jungle fringes. While the Federal government accepted the committee’s finding, resettlement was left as a state responsibility.²⁹⁵ 20 squatter resettlement schemes were planned or started from 1949 to 1950. However, Malay State governments did not have the will or the capacity to carry them

²⁹¹ R. Thompson: *Defeating Communist Insurgency Experiences from Malaya*, p. 124.

²⁹² R. Thompson: *Defeating Communist Insurgency Experiences from Malaya*, p. 124.

²⁹³ *Ibid.* p. 125.

²⁹⁴ K. S. Sandhu: “The Saga of the “Squatter” in Malaya: A Preliminary Survey of the Causes, Characteristics and Consequences of the Resettlement of Rural Dwellers during the Emergency between 1948 and 1960.” *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, (5), (1), 1964, p.154.

²⁹⁵ *Ibid.* p. 155.

out successfully. 10 schemes were abandoned while the rest were absorbed into the 2nd phase of resettlement.²⁹⁶

The 2nd phase was initiated by Sir Harold Briggs who became Malaya's first Director of Operations in May 1950.²⁹⁷ General Briggs made resettlement the cornerstone of his strategy to defeat the Malayan Communist guerrillas. Thus, 'under Briggs the resettlement programme became the responsibility of the Federal Government.'²⁹⁸ The programme comprised of two processes, relocation and regroupment. '*Relocation* meant the shifting of dispersed rural dwellers, whether squatters or legitimate settlers, to prepared fortified sites often remote from their existing homes.'²⁹⁹ It is estimated that 573,000 individuals were resettled in 480 "New Villages" from 1950 to 1960. '*Regroupment* meant the transfer of dispersed labourers and their families and dwellings to some fortified point of concentration either on the property of close to it.'³⁰⁰ Approximately 650,000 persons were concentrated in this manner. Of these '71.5 percent of them were on estates, 21.5 percent on mines and the remainder in factories, sawmills and timber *Kongsis*.'³⁰¹

Overview of Resettlement in Rhodesia

The Rhodesian government's first attempts at resettling rural villages began in 1972 in the Zambezi Valley and in the Northern tribal areas. No-go zones were established in the valley and along a 300 km stretch of Rhodesia's Northern Mozambican border. Four protected areas were declared in the Zambezi valley, Gudza and Mukumbura TTLs. 8,000 villagers were transferred. However, these protected areas were not protected villages, and they constituted simply the concentration of the rural population 'around main centres of each reserve to facilitate movement for the Security Forces.'³⁰² Initially resettlement was the prerogative of the Department of Internal Affairs and the Armed forces were not involved.³⁰³ This changed with the commencement of Operations Overload and Overload Two. In 1974 the army insisted that the Department of Internal Affairs should resettle some 50,000

²⁹⁶ K. S. Sandhu: "The Saga of the "Squatter" in Malaya: A Preliminary Survey of the Causes, Characteristics and Consequences of the Resettlement of Rural Dwellers during the Emergency between 1948 and 1960." *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, (5), (1), 1964, p. 156

²⁹⁷ *Ibid.* p. 157.

²⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹⁹ *Ibid.* p. 158.

³⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

³⁰¹ *Ibid.* p. 164.

³⁰² J. K. Cilliers: *Counter Insurgency in Rhodesia*, p. 83.

³⁰³ J. K. Cilliers: *Counter Insurgency in Rhodesia*, p. 83.

villagers in the Chiweshe TTLs into 21 PVs as part of a military operation. This was followed by Operation Overload Two late 1974 where 16500 villagers were moved into 13 PVs.

Rhodesian resettlement followed two forms, Protected Villages (PV) and Consolidated Villages. PVs were fenced and guarded, with the intention of providing amenities. Consolidated villages were the regrouping of villages in a central location without any fencing or substantial resources committed to them. It was a more cost effective version of the PV. 'By early 1976 three strategic areas could be distinguished: the Zambezi valley, the tribal areas on the plateau in the north east of Rhodesia, and the remoter tribal areas in the north east and east which are farther from the capital and white settlement than the tribal areas in the second category.'³⁰⁴ At its height 'the total population gathered into PVs is estimated at around 750,000 African in 200 villages.'³⁰⁵ In 1978, with the advent of the internal settlement, the transitional government subsequently insisted on the opening of PVs to induce residents to accept the internal settlement. Approximately 100 PVs were opened, until the practice was halted abruptly due to an immediate deterioration of the local security situation. In the case of every village that was opened, the inhabitants returned to their prior homes and land.

Malaya Protected Villages:

Reasons for Resettlement in Malaya

Brief History of Squatters in Malaya Pre-World War 2

The majority of squatters in Malaya before the Emergency were Chinese and are therefore directly linked to Chinese immigration into Malaya. While Chinese formed the majority of immigrants, there was also a degree of Indian immigration to provide labour for rubber estates. The origins of Chinese immigration to Malaya date back to the 15th Century

³⁰⁴ A. K. H. Weinrich: "Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia." *Journal of South African Studies*, (3), (2), 1977, p. 210.

³⁰⁵ D. Richards & G. Mills: *Victory Among People Lessons from Countering Insurgency and Stabilising Fragile States*, p 231.

when Chinese settled in parts of the Malacca Empire. Subsequently over the next 500 years or so there were several waves of Chinese who immigrated to the Malayan peninsula from Mainland China and other regions of Chinese settlement. With the culmination of the Perak war of 1876 and encouraged by the British Authorities in Malaya, a trickle over the years interspersed with waves transformed into a flood. Despite the influx of Chinese, Chinese squatters were ‘generally rare till the outbreak of the First World War which dislocated trade, stopped development projects on newly opened rubber estates, and consequently threw a number of persons out of employment.’³⁰⁶ While a considerable number of the newly unemployed were sent back to their country of origin namely China, many chose to occupy rural land illegally.

Before the Emergency, it was practically impossible for immigrants to acquire land legally. This was due to the fact that ‘all unalienated land was vested in the Malay Rulers and land titles in each state were granted only on the authority of the Ruler in Council.’³⁰⁷ Much of this unalienated land was reserved for Malays only. The process for immigrants to acquire land in a legal manner was long and painstaking. It required about 100 procedures before a land title could be granted.³⁰⁸ In comparison, immigrants found squatting to be a great deal simpler than the legal route to land tenure. According to Sandhu squatting was not only simpler but also had other advantages. ‘(a) no rents to pay; (b) no restrictions on crops to be grown; (c) no care of land; (d) no governmental procedures to bother with and finally, freedom to exploit the land till exhausted, and freedom to move to newer pastures.’³⁰⁹ There was a risk of being discovered by the authorities. However, the lack of personnel or government policies meant that neither the government nor the private owners took measures to prevent squatting. Shortly after World War 1, the economy in Malaya had improved and the squatter population may have decreased to a certain degree. However, the advent of the great depression from 1929 through the 1930s and the slump in tin prices, led to a massive movement of Chinese into the Malayan countryside to try and survive by living off the land. The squatter population began to decrease once more as trade started to pick up again.

³⁰⁶ K. S. Sandhu: “The Saga of the “Squatter” in Malaya: A Preliminary Survey of the Causes, Characteristics and Consequences of the Resettlement of Rural Dwellers during the Emergency between 1948 and 1960.” *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, (5), (1), 1964, p. 146.

³⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁹ K. S. Sandhu: “The Saga of the “Squatter” in Malaya: A Preliminary Survey of the Causes, Characteristics and Consequences of the Resettlement of Rural Dwellers during the Emergency between 1948 and 1960.” *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, (5), (1), 1964, p.146.

Therefore the squatter problem was not only linked to the mainly Chinese immigration but also the economic conditions in Malaya and the world economy.

Effect of World War 2 on the Squatter Population

During the course of the Second World War, the squatter population increased dramatically. The Battle for Malaya and the semi-successful scorched earth policy attempted by the British forces during their fighting retreat across the peninsula, destroyed much of Malaya's economic infrastructure. The ensuing Japanese Occupation from 1942 to 1945 fundamentally altered economic patterns that dislocated labour and encouraged mass migration from towns into rural areas.³¹⁰ Chinese immigration was on the rise before World War 2 even with limits imposed upon male immigration. Conversely, there were no limits on female immigration until 1938. 'Malaya experienced a migrational gain of 190,000 Chinese women during the 1934-38 period.'³¹¹ While many of these women found agricultural or industrial employment, the majority also married squatters, therefore leading to a further increase in the squatter population.

During the Japanese occupation illegal immigration into Malaya became rampant, the majority of whom were Chinese. As alluded to earlier, the Japanese Occupation had a disastrous effect on living conditions in Malaya. Tin and Rubber production declined to such a degree that it led to wide scale unemployment. Many male Chinese were rounded up and executed out of hand or pressed into forced labour and sent to work on the Siamese Death Railway.³¹² This and the combination of the inflation of food prices and a practically non-functional Japanese food rationing system resulted in 'a general exodus from the towns as people tried to put as much space between themselves and starvation and the Japanese.'³¹³ As part of a 'grow more food' policy, the Japanese Occupiers also encouraged the illegal occupation of land to take pressure off food supply.³¹⁴ With the surrender of the Japanese in

³¹⁰ NAS CO 717/201 Law and Order, The Squatter Problem, Paper No. 14 of 1950, Federation of Malaya, 1950.

³¹¹ K. S. Sandhu: "The Saga of the "Squatter" in Malaya: A Preliminary Survey of the Causes, Characteristics and Consequences of the Resettlement of Rural Dwellers during the Emergency between 1948 and 1960." *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, (5), (1), 1964, p. 148.

³¹² K. S. Sandhu: "The Saga of the "Squatter" in Malaya: A Preliminary Survey of the Causes, Characteristics and Consequences of the Resettlement of Rural Dwellers during the Emergency between 1948 and 1960." *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, (5), (1), 1964, p.149.

³¹³ *Ibid.*

³¹⁴ A. Short: *Communist insurrection in Malaya 1948-1960*, p. 174.

1945 and the return of British rule to Malaya, many squatters returned to the towns. Nevertheless many of the squatters from the occupation era found agricultural production profitable enough to remain as squatters. As the economy began to revive some even found part time work as tin miners or rubber tappers but they still remained squatters.³¹⁵ ‘There were more than 300,000 squatters in Malaya in 1948 – more than double the pre-war figure.’³¹⁶

The type of land that squatters inhabited

For the most part squatters illegally settled on vacant state land; such as the Forest Reserves, the Malay Reservation Areas, agricultural and mining areas. They also settled on private land held under title, one prime example being land from Rubber Estates. ‘The total area occupied by squatters under this head was estimated to be about 70,000 acres in 1949.’³¹⁷

Origins of the Whole Scale Resettlement of Squatters

The call by Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs, in a plan known as the Briggs plan for squatters to be resettled on a major scale was not a new idea. Post World War 2, the illegal squatters were considered an administrative problem that should be dealt with at a state level. This problem was one that State administration were reluctant to confront comprehensively as they were saw the need for the food produced by squatter farmers; despite the damage the squatters were inflicting on the environment and the illegal nature of their settlements. As a result the problem persisted until it became a security concern as the MCP began a communist insurgency against the British Administration in Malaya. A State of Emergency

³¹⁵ K. S. Sandhu: “The Saga of the “Squatter” in Malaya: A Preliminary Survey of the Causes, Characteristics and Consequences of the Resettlement of Rural Dwellers during the Emergency between 1948 and 1960.” *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, (5), (1), 1964, p. 150.

³¹⁶ *Ibid.*

³¹⁷ *Ibid.*

was declared in June 1948 ‘and a military campaign was mounted to eliminate the Communist rising.’³¹⁸

The squatters were identified by the Federal government as ‘the principal factor which enables armed terrorists in the Federation to retain their numerical strength and mobility is the direct and indirect support which they continue to receive or exact from certain sections of the population. This support may be in the form of victuals and other supplies, voluntary or involuntary recruits to replace casualties in the terrorist gangs, forced subscriptions or information about the movement of the Security Forces.’³¹⁹ Much of this support was coerced from many squatters by violence or merely the threat of it. ‘Great numbers of the squatters were enrolled in the *Min Yuen* (“Mass Organisation”), the fifth column of the MCP, to act as spies, couriers, money collectors food-suppliers, propagandists and general agents for the armed forces in the interior.’³²⁰ This fifth column was by no means a minor security issue. The *Min Yuen* were a major obstruction in the path to victory for the Security Forces. ‘They reported every move of the Security Forces to the guerrillas thereby frustrating their efforts to get to grips with the “enemy”.’³²¹ It was soon realised by the authorities that the squatter problem had to be solved. ‘But at this stage the Government had no positive solution. It could only pass more repressive legislation, uproot thousands of squatters, destroy their crops, burn their homes, transport them hither and thither or herd them into detention camps prior to shipping them back to their country of origin.’³²²

One example of this repressive legislation was Emergency Regulation 17D passed on 10 January 1949.³²³ It ‘gave the High Commissioner the right of ordering collective detention; and that any person so detained, other than a Federal citizen or British Subject, might be ordered by the High Commissioner in Council to leave and remain out of the Federation. The grounds for such detention were that the High Commissioner should be satisfied that they aided, abetted or consorted with the bandits, suppressed evidence relation to the unlawful

³¹⁸ K. S. Sandhu: “The Saga of the “Squatter” in Malaya: A Preliminary Survey of the Causes, Characteristics and Consequences of the Resettlement of Rural Dwellers during the Emergency between 1948 and 1960.” *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, (5), (1), 1964, p. 152.

³¹⁹ NAS CO 717/201 Law and Order, The Squatter Problem, Paper No. 14 of 1950, Federation of Malaya, 1950.

³²⁰ K. S. Sandhu: “The Saga of the “Squatter” in Malaya: A Preliminary Survey of the Causes, Characteristics and Consequences of the Resettlement of Rural Dwellers during the Emergency between 1948 and 1960.” *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, (5), (1), 1964, p. 153.

³²¹ *Ibid.*

³²² K. S. Sandhu: “The Saga of the “Squatter” in Malaya: A Preliminary Survey of the Causes, Characteristics and Consequences of the Resettlement of Rural Dwellers during the Emergency between 1948 and 1960.” *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, (5), (1), 1964, p. 154.

³²³ A. Short: *Communist insurrection in Malaya 1948-1960*, p. 188.

possession of arms, persistently failed to give information to the police concerning bandits or persistently failed to take steps to prevent their escape.³²⁴ Seven operations at a state level were carried out, during which a revolt in the federal administration took root and reached the higher levels rapidly. This aversion to detention and deportation operations was due to a realisation of the suffering and hardship that these operation resulted in for the squatters affected. This led to great deal of criticism within government on humanitarian grounds.

In the face of attacks from colleagues in the Malayan government administration, ‘the Commissioner of Police offered an essentially pragmatic defence. 17 D operations, Gray said, were the only single measure devised and used against armed Communist in Malaya which had achieved marked and indeed spectacular results in the task of restoring law and order.’³²⁵ At a meeting of high ranking officials of the civil administration, it was decided that 17 D operations were to be discontinued with the exception of Pahang though it would remain as a last solution in trouble some areas. 17 D was essentially replaced with Emergency Regulation 17 E. This regulation ‘empowered the Ruler in Council in each state to issue eviction ordered requiring all unlawful occupants of land in specified areas to leave those area and proceed to specified areas after a minimum of one month’s notice.’³²⁶ However, despite the passing of Emergency Regulation 17E, 17 D operations continued intermittently and in states other than Pahang up until October 1949.³²⁷ Regulation 17 E was designed to work hand in hand with organised resettlement. It was soon followed by Emergency Regulation 17 F. 17 F was used to giver squatter removals more flexibility and allowed the administration to move secluded squatters to resettlement villages or other administered areas.

According to Sandhu ‘a total of nineteen operations involving the uprooting or some 40,000 squatters, including dependents, took place between 1949 and 1952, sixteen of them in 1949. Of these some 26,000 people, 24,000 Chinese and 2,000 Indians and Indonesians, were deported.’³²⁸ Despite the progress made by these squatter removal operations, several factors persuaded the civil administration to switch completely to resettlement. The first of these factors was the realisation that for the current strategy to succeed, the squatter population in its entirety would have to be deported. Secondly and perhaps most importantly

³²⁴ A. Short: *Communist insurrection in Malaya 1948-1960*, p. 188.

³²⁵ A. Short: *Communist insurrection in Malaya 1948-1960*, p. 193.

³²⁶ *Ibid.*

³²⁷ *Ibid.* p.194.

³²⁸ K. S. Sandhu: “The Saga of the “Squatter” in Malaya: A Preliminary Survey of the Causes, Characteristics and Consequences of the Resettlement of Rural Dwellers during the Emergency between 1948 and 1960.” *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, (5), (1), 1964, p.154.

was Mao Zedong's victory of Chiang Kai-shek in the Chinese civil war. This effectively closed all Chinese ports and brought deportation to a complete standstill. A third factor was a degree of debate over whether forced removals and deportation were improving the general security situation. A fourth factor to be considered was the findings of the January 1950 Squatter Committee's report. This committee was headed by Chief Secretary Sir Alex Newbould.

Sandhu writes that 'the committee's report was completed in January 1950. Its principal recommendations were: (i) wherever possible squatters should be settled in areas already occupied by them; (ii) where this was not possible, they should be resettled in an alternative suitable area; (iii) any squatter refusing settlement or resettlement should be repatriated; (iv) emergency measures to deal with the security problem of certain areas should be supported by administrative measures designed permanently to re-establish the authority of Government; and (v) legal means should be introduced to provide for the eviction of squatters by summary process.'³²⁹ Despite this progress towards large scale resettlement it soon stalled. 'These recommendations were accepted by the Federal Government but their implementation was left to the State Governments because land was a State matter.'³³⁰ The Administration at State level lacked the necessary resources to implement resettlement on a grand scale. Hence resettlement commenced in the various states piecemeal and at an extremely slow pace. The Malay States began 20 resettlement schemes though ten of these were eventually disbanded. The rest were overtaken by the events following the arrival of General Briggs in May 1950. Sandhu argues that 'what was needed was not only a comprehensive scheme for the whole country and the funds to finance it, but a man to galvanise the administration into extraordinary action.'³³¹ Sandhu and other scholars maintain that General Briggs was indeed that man. Sir Harold Briggs was the first 'Director of Operations, charged solely with the prosecution of the Emergency and the co-ordination of the work of the Security Forces with that of the civil administration.'³³²

³²⁹ K. S. Sandhu: "The Saga of the "Squatter" in Malaya: A Preliminary Survey of the Causes, Characteristics and Consequences of the Resettlement of Rural Dwellers during the Emergency between 1948 and 1960." *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, (5), (1), 1964, p. 155.

³³⁰ *Ibid.*

³³¹ *Ibid.* p. 156.

³³² *Ibid.* p. 157.

Reasons for Resettlement in Rhodesia

Resettlement in Rhodesia was primarily a military solution to what was perceived as a military problem. While planning existed for resettlement to involve economic, political and social measures; military considerations were prioritised amid alleged budget constraints. In the first phase of the war, guerrillas often infiltrated areas that were often sparsely populated in large groups. They were usually reported by local tribesman to the authorities or identified by patrols and reconnaissance. The networks built up by the BSAP proved instrumental in providing intelligence that could be acted upon to neutralise guerrilla groups. However, in the second phase of the war, ZANU switched to a Maoist war amongst the people strategy. ZANLA forces infiltrated into TTLs on the Mozambican border and began to operate amongst the rural villagers.

The Rhodesian military had a mind-set towards the rural population that differed from Thompson's precepts. They identified that villagers were a source of succour for guerrillas. Their attempts to track down guerrillas were frustrated by efforts of villagers to hide guerrillas and warn ZANLA cadres of Security Force movements. The RSF were concerned by the sudden drying up of intelligence sources in areas infiltrated by ZANLA. The guerrillas thus supported by the people and hidden among them had a viable operational capacity. They could attack farms, stage ambushes, mine roads and expand their operational zone through infiltrating TTLs further. This allowed guerrillas to threaten white commercial farming areas and settlements. The fish among the reeds tactic made it extremely difficult for the Security Forces to distinguish between guerrillas and civilians. The Rhodesian military was essentially caught on the back foot and PVs was seen as a way of reversing the fast deteriorating security situation.

The British Malayan Administrations Goals for resettlement

The goals of the Malayan Federal Government are outlined in what the press called the "Briggs Report." In his report General Briggs surmised that the only way to end the Emergency was to eliminate both the armed wing of the MCP and its' extensive support network, the MRLA and the Min Yuen respectively. In Briggs' assessment, the Min Yuen

were able to exist because the rural Chinese population had no confidence in the government to protect them from MRLA guerrillas. However, he emphasised that the chief task here was not a military task but the resettlement and closing-in task with the population.³³³

Resettlement formed the cornerstone of his strategy to defeat the communist insurgency:

In the long run, security, and with it confidence and information, can only be restored and maintained:

- (a) by demonstrating Britain's firm intention to fulfil her obligations in defence of Malaya against both external attack and internal disorder;
- (b) by extending effective administration and control of all populated areas which involves
 - (i) A large measure of squatter resettlement into compact groups,
 - (ii) A strengthening of the local administration
 - (iii) Provision of road communication in isolated populated areas,
 - (iv) Setting up of Police Posts in these areas
- (c) by exploiting these measures with good propaganda, both constructive and destructive.

Broadly, the intention is to clear the country, step by step, from South to North, by:

- (a) dominating the populated areas and building up a feeling of complete security in them, with the object of obtaining a steady and increasing flow of information from all sources;
- (b) breaking up the Min Yuen within the populated areas;
- (c) thereby isolating the bandits from their food and information supply organisation in the populated areas;
- (d) and finally destroying the bandits by forcing them to attack us on our own ground.³³⁴

Gurney writes that, 'the enemy in Malaya is Communism, with all its implications, and is not merely some 3,000 bandits. Communism is and has been for many years deeper and more widespread in Malaya than is generally recognised. It is no just a post-war growth. Success against it is, of course, to be measured not entirely by the progress of operations designed to destroy it in its militant form, but by the achievement of a political, social and administrative programme capable of convincing the vulnerable elements of the positive advantages of opposition to Communism.'³³⁵ While the Briggs Plan emphasised the role of civilian schemes in defeating the insurgency over the role of the military; the security forces

³³³ NAS CO 717/201 Law and Order, The Squatter Problem, Federal Government Press Statement, 18 October, 1950.

³³⁴ TNA AIR 20/777 Report on the Emergency in Malaya Lieut-General Sir Harold Briggs

³³⁵ NAS CO 717/201 Law and Order, The Squatter Problem, Despatch No. 3 from High Commissioner Sir Henry Gurney to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, A. Creech, 12 January 1950.

were still crucial to his plan's success.³³⁶ 'Whatever administrative, social, and protective services are provided for a squatter community, they will not feel secure until the bandit is actually removed, and the bandit can in fact only be removed by offensive operations on the part of the same security forces as are available for protection.'³³⁷

The resettlement programme was aimed at satisfying legitimate Chinese political aspirations, with a mind to relaxing the qualification for Federal citizenship.³³⁸ The Federal government had no intention of 'pampering settlers and aimed to encourage people in the settlements to help themselves.'³³⁹ This invariably involved a degree of forced labour, where settlers had to provide labour with no remuneration for projects such as constructing roads and other amenities.³⁴⁰ Gurney identified that 'the battle against Communist has also to be fought in the schools'³⁴¹ Subsequently one of the Federal Government's aims was 'to bring these schools under proper Government assistance and control.' Therefore resettlement was not a priority that was at the periphery of the campaign. Resettlement was far more important than military efforts to engage to MRLA.

The Rhodesian Military and Government's goals for resettlement

The Rhodesian objectives regarding resettlement were fundamentally different from those of the British administration. For the Rhodesians resettlement was not the basis of an *à la Malaya* Hearts and Minds strategy to bring the war to a close. Resettlement formed part of a defensive military strategy to build a *cordon sanitaire* in Rhodesia's border regions to curb guerrilla infiltration. PVs were merely one among many anti-terrorist measures that the Rhodesians introduced.³⁴² This *cordon sanitaire* involved large stretches of the border being

³³⁶ TNA AIR 20/777 Report on the Emergency in Malaya Lieut-General Sir Harold Briggs

³³⁷ NAS CO 717/201 Law and Order, The Squatter Problem, Despatch No. 3 from High Commissioner Sir Henry Gurney to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, A. Creech, 12 January 1950.

³³⁸ NAS CO 717/201 Law and Order, The Squatter Problem, Despatch No. 3 from High Commissioner Sir Henry Gurney to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, A. Creech, 12 January 1950.

³³⁹ TNA CO 1022/32 Education in the new villages, Director of Operation, Malaya Directive No. 13, Briggs, 26 February 1951.

³⁴⁰ NAS CO 717/201 Law and Order, The Squatter Problem, extract from Secret Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs, February-March, 1950.

³⁴¹ NAS CO 717/201 Law and Order, The Squatter Problem, Despatch No. 3 from High Commissioner Sir Henry Gurney to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, A. Creech, 12 January 1950.

³⁴² UNISA AA5163 CCJPR Appendix 20, *The Man in the Middle*, A report on Protected Villages, 1975.

laid with minefields and the creation of free fire zones for the Security Forces. “Significantly, the need for the establishment of these villages was given as arising out of the policy of creating ‘no-go’ areas.”³⁴³ Free fire zones would give the Rhodesian military considerable latitude to engage terrorists at will.

Operations Overload and Overload Two suggest that the Rhodesians considered ‘the physical isolation of the local population from the insurgents as an end in itself.’³⁴⁴ The aim of this isolation was to deny guerrillas their source of support, in the way of food, supplies and information. These two operations functioned as a blue print for ‘the establishment of Protected Villages in areas that had already been subverted as an impediment to insurgent logistics.’³⁴⁵ This points to how ‘Protected Villages were regarded purely as a means of population control rather than as a basis for winning ‘hearts and minds’.³⁴⁶ Resettlement served military goals in aid of engaging terrorists and undermining their operational capacity. The social, economic and political potential of PVs were of secondary concern to the Rhodesian government. The government made official statements on how PVs were aimed at protecting rural Africans from the depredations of the ‘terrorists.’³⁴⁷

Three reasons are given by the government for the construction of protected and consolidated villages: to isolate civilians from the insurgents and so to starve the latter into surrender, to protect civilians against guerilla attack, and to create growth points for future development. In its public utterances the government normally stresses the second and third points, but the first is clearly of prime importance.³⁴⁸

The security of the African villagers was in fact used by the Rhodesian government as the principle *raison d’être* for the creation of PVs.³⁴⁹ In press briefings, the government stressed that resettlement was aimed at protecting villages from the predations of guerrillas.³⁵⁰ The idea was that improved local security would in turn, improve security nationwide. While infrastructure like electricity would be used primarily for security purposes, it would be made available for domestic use in the PVs.³⁵¹ The Rhodesian

³⁴³ J. K. Cilliers: *Counter Insurgency in Rhodesia*, p. 82

³⁴⁴ J. K. Cilliers: *Counter Insurgency in Rhodesia*, p. 87.

³⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁴⁶ D. Richards & G. Mills: *Victory Among People Lessons from Countering Insurgency and Stabilising Fragile States*, p. 231.

³⁴⁷ A. K. H. Weinrich: “Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia.” *Journal of South African Studies*, (3), (2), 1977, p. 217.

³⁴⁸ A. K. H. Weinrich: “Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia.” *Journal of South African Studies*, (3), (2), 1977, p. 220.

³⁴⁹ UNISA AA5163 CCJPR Appendix 20, *The Man in the Middle*, A report on Protected Villages, 1975.

³⁵⁰ UNISA AA5163 CCJPR Appendix 9 Reports on Protected Villages, excerpt from the Herald, 1974.

³⁵¹ UNISA AA5163 CCJPR Appendix 9, Reports on Protected Villages, excerpt from the Herald, 1974

government saw resettlement as a permanent move and claimed to have long term developmental goals for the villages.³⁵² There is a clear indication from reports on PVs that the Rhodesians focused primary on the military aspects and potential tactical benefits in the planning and implementation of resettlement from 1972 to 1978.³⁵³ Resettlement was in effect, a short term COIN strategy forced upon the Rhodesians by a shift toward Maoist inspired warfare by ZANLA.

Characteristics of Malayan target population

The individuals marked for resettlement were by no means a homogenous group. While it may appear that illegal Chinese squatters were the sole *raison être* for the resettlement program that Briggs proposed and then implemented, there were two kinds of resettlement, relocation and regroupment. Relocation affected both illegal squatters and legal land holders. While the Chinese were the dominant ethnicity, other racial groups were caught up in this vast social engineering project. ‘A total of 537,000 persons were transferred into New Villages between 1950 and 1960. Three hundred thousand of these were squatters, the vast majority Chinese. The remaining 273,000 legitimate land occupiers were also largely Chinese. Of the total population of the New Villages 86 per cent were Chinese, 9 percent Malay, 4 per cent Indian and 1 per cent Others. The “Others” were almost all Siamese, Javanese and *Orang Asli*.’³⁵⁴

‘The types of people resettled fall into four main categories: (i) Farmers dependent for their livelihood on the growing of food, chiefly vegetables and the keeping of pigs and poultry; (ii) Persons engaged in tin mining, rubber growing or other crops, who were forced to live in the sanctuary of the New Villages; (iii) Wage earners, working in the neighbourhood in tin mines, rubber plantations, etc.; and (iv) Shop-keepers.’³⁵⁵ Group one and two dominated the new villages, forming approximately three fifths of the population.³⁵⁶

³⁵² UNISA AA5163 CCJPR Appendix 10 Reports on Protected Villages, Report on Chiweshe 3 September 1974.

³⁵³ UNISA AA5163 CCJPR Appendix 9, 10, 11, Reports on Protected Villages. 1974-76.

³⁵⁴ K. S. Sandhu: “The Saga of the “Squatter” in Malaya: A Preliminary Survey of the Causes, Characteristics and Consequences of the Resettlement of Rural Dwellers during the Emergency between 1948 and 1960.” *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, (5), (1), 1964, p. 159.

³⁵⁵ *Ibid.* p. 160.

³⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

The second type of resettlement was regroupment. ‘A total of 650,000 persons are estimated to have been regrouped. About 71.5 percent of them were on estates, 21.5 percent on mines and the remainder in factories, sawmills and timber *Kongsis*. Indians, who formed the majority of the estate workers, were the dominant group in the estate regroupments, forming 50 per cent of the population. The remainder were made up of 29 per cent Chinese, 16 per cent Malays and 5 per cent Javanese. This composition was quite dissimilar to the structure of the population of the New Villages, where the Chinese were the dominant group and Indians the least important numerically. The Chinese were also the dominant group in the mining regroupment areas, where they virtually monopolised the labour.

‘Estate labour regroupment was two types: (a) Internal or domestic regroupment and (b) external or extra-estate regroupment. In the former the dispersed labour lines were concentrated at one point – the factory site. In the large estates two or more such concentrations were not uncommon.’³⁵⁷ This was done to avoid disruption of work. ‘In the case of the latter, labourers from some of the Asian medium-holdings and small estates without resident managers were regrouped on a large, usually European, estate together with its own labour force. The number of medium holdings and the small estates thus affected is unknown for the whole of Malaya. Squatters on estates were also resettled in the regroupment areas. This generally applied only to squatters who provided the particular estate with casual labour.’³⁵⁸ The majority of the Chinese and other ethnic minorities resettled were not full citizens of Malaya.

Characteristics of Rhodesian Target Population

Resettlement was targeted at rural African Rhodesians residing in TTLs adjacent to Rhodesia’s borders. The two kinds of resettlement, protected and consolidated villages, regrouped Africans from pre-existing rural villages. These villages were administered by a patriarchal system of chiefs and elders. A CCPJR report states that, ‘in rural areas African people live as family groups and several families live together in a village known as a kraal under the leadership of a kraal head. Basically, they live a pastoral life raising food crops and

³⁵⁷ K. S. Sandhu: “The Saga of the “Squatter” in Malaya: A Preliminary Survey of the Causes, Characteristics and Consequences of the Resettlement of Rural Dwellers during the Emergency between 1948 and 1960.”

Journal of Southeast Asian History, (5), (1), 1964, p. 164.

³⁵⁸ *Ibid.* p. 164.

domesticated animals, principally cattle.³⁵⁹ It was a rather traditional and conservative society.³⁶⁰ ‘In the past community problems had been discussed by the elders under a tree in the village or, in some areas, in a special shelter erected for this purpose.’³⁶¹ The tribesmen that were resettled were considered indigenous and citizens of Rhodesia. Villages were based on relation by blood.

Weinrich writes that the Shona are a kinship based society and the family is the pivot of social life. Traditionally a village consisted of the families of a group of brothers. This pattern had already been disrupted by the European administration in the 1940s and 1950s, when villages were regrouped in order to facilitate the implementation of modern agricultural methods. Still, kinsmen continued to constitute the largest percentage of residents in every village and ‘strangers’, i.e. unrelated people, were in the minority.³⁶² Shona society had set traditional gendered structures. ‘Gendered identities have always played a central role in the structuring of Shona society’³⁶³ ‘The Shona are used to strict segregation of the sexes in home life. Each man has his own hut and so has each of his wives. Grown up boys and girls also have huts of their own. The whole kinship ideology of the Shona is based on this respect for privacy.’³⁶⁴ While privacy may be a factor, Shona and Ndebele society were patriarchal to the extreme that ‘a man’s economic, political, social and legal status was intimately related to the size of his area of jurisdiction.’³⁶⁵ A man’s status was also affected by the cattle he owned, ‘Cattle are not to be regarded simply as livestock. They play an important part in ritual – birth, marriage and death ceremonies – and they are the yardstick of social status.’³⁶⁶

Before resettlement, rural Africans on the whole already had access to a degree of educational and medical services.³⁶⁷ In the case of Chiweshe: ‘In the past the hospital, run by the Salvation Army, as well as a small government clinic without doctor in the north of

³⁵⁹ UNISA AA5163 CCJPR Appendix 20, *The Man in the Middle*, A report on Protected Villages, 1975.

³⁶⁰ UNISA AA5163 CCJPR Appendix 20, *The Man in the Middle*, A report in Protected Villages, 1975.

³⁶¹ A. K. H. Weinrich: “Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia.” *Journal of South African Studies*, (3), (2), 1977, p 226.

³⁶² A. K. H. Weinrich: “Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia.” *Journal of South African Studies*, (3), (2), 1977, p. 225.

³⁶³ M. Kesby: “Arenas for Control, Terrains of Gender Contestation: Guerilla Struggle and Counter-Insurgency Warfare in Zimbabwe 1972-1980.” *Journal of Southern African Studies*, (22), (4), 1996, p. 566.

³⁶⁴ A. K. H. Weinrich: “Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia.” *Journal of South African Studies*, (3), (2), 1977, p 226.

³⁶⁵ M. Kesby: “Arenas for Control, Terrains of Gender Contestation: Guerilla Struggle and Counter-Insurgency Warfare in Zimbabwe 1972-1980.” *Journal of Southern African Studies*, (22), (4), 1996, p. 567.

³⁶⁶ UNISA AA5163 CCJPR Appendix 20, *The Man in the Middle*, A report on Protected Villages, 1975.

³⁶⁷ A. K. H. Weinrich: “Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia.” *Journal of South African Studies*, (3), (2), 1977, p. 222.

Chiweshe, were reasonably adequate for the needs of the people.’³⁶⁸ The rural Rhodesian Africans were not usually alien to education or its worth. ‘Chiweshe, Madziwa, Mrewa, and to a lesser degree Mtoko, are areas which had a reasonably well developed system of primary education, with some secondary schools. Because of the proximity of the capital, the people are well aware that only a higher education can guarantee their children good employment.’³⁶⁹ The tribesmen had historic ties to their land that went back generations. ‘The graves of the ancestors had never been far away and through this ancestral link with the soil the people felt rooted to the land and one with each other.’³⁷⁰

More remote rural areas notwithstanding, the TTLs were to some extent integrated into Rhodesia’s economy. ‘Chiweshe lies only 40 miles north of Salisbury and its people have for many years been closely drawn into the national economy. The educational system in the area has been well developed and consequently many men have found skilled and clerical jobs in the capital.’³⁷¹ While some rural villages focused on subsistence farming, others tended towards small scale commercial farming like Chiweshe. ‘Chiweshe has become famous as an African tobacco producing area; also much more maize has been produced there than could be locally consumed, and from the sale of surplus crops many African farmers have been able to build themselves modern houses and to buy good furniture. Chiweshe has been one of the most progressive African areas in Rhodesia.’³⁷²

There was also a spiritual dimension to African village life. ‘An African’s “musha” (home village) is, in the first instance, his spiritual home – the place where his ancestors are buried and where the “midzimu” (spirits of his forefathers) reside. A family cannot move without first consulting a spirit medium in order to obtain the approval of the spirits and taking some soil from the ancestral graves to the new places. To ignore the observances or act contrary to the wishes of the spirits is to invite calamity. To move under duress is to generate insecurity and fear regarding unforeseeable repercussions.’³⁷³ It can be deduced from these characteristics that ‘that the social “contentment” of rural African people is completely bound

³⁶⁸ A. K. H. Weinrich: “Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia.” *Journal of South African Studies*, (3), (2), 1977, p. 227.

³⁶⁹ A. K. H. Weinrich: “Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia.” *Journal of South African Studies*, (3), (2), 1977, p. 222.

³⁷⁰ *Ibid.* p. 226.

³⁷¹ *Ibid.* p. 213.

³⁷² *Ibid.* p. 213.

³⁷³ UNISA AA5163 CCJPR Appendix 20, *The Man in the Middle*, A report on Protected Villages, 1975.

up with their deep need to observe these norms of privacy, relationships, and customary structures which make up the everyday pattern of their lives.³⁷⁴

Conclusion

The Malayan squatter problem predated the Malayan Emergency by some decades and before Japanese occupation (1942-1945), the Malayan government had begun planning solutions. In the case of Rhodesia, the need for a resettlement scheme stemmed directly from the Rhodesian Civil War and only became apparent to the Rhodesian military and government several years into the conflict. In the case of Rhodesia there was no pre-existing squatter population in the rural areas as in Malaya. There were also significant differences between the land tenure of the respective target populations from the two conflicts. In Malaya the resettled Chinese, for the most part, had previously occupied their land with no legal form of land tenure. That said, some were issued with temporary land occupancy rights by the Malayan government. In the case of Rhodesia, the resettled Rhodesian Africans occupied their land under communal land tenure, enshrined in the Rhodesian constitution and Land Apportionment Act of 1930. Chinese immigrants were therefore short-term occupants of their land. Rhodesian Africans, on the other hand, were long-term occupants with historical, cultural and spiritual ties to their land that went back generations. The citizenship status of the conflicts respective target populations were completely different. The majority of those resettled by the Malayan Federal government were not Federation of Malayan citizens and most were recent immigrants that had not been born in Malaya. The African tribesmen were distinct in that they were not immigrants and were Rhodesian citizens by birth. The illegal Chinese squatters had very few forms of political expression in colonial Malaya, while Rhodesian Africans were a part of Rhodesia's political structures, through a system of Chiefs and a qualified franchise.

The strategic thought behind Malaya's resettlement program was based on a civil-military relationship, where the civilian focus dominated. The strategy was designed to bring illegal squatters in Malayan government administered areas of control. While the strategy had a predominant civil socio-economic political focus, the military aspect was considered crucial

³⁷⁴ UNISA AA5163 CCJPR Appendix 20, *The Man in the Middle*, A report in Protected Villages, 1975.

to the success of the strategy. The Chinese in Malaya would be given an economic stake in the country and drawn into Malaya's political structure, and protected from the predations of the MCP. This would be combined with a sophisticated propaganda campaign that would aim to convince them that co-operation with the Malayan government was preferable to siding with the MCP. The Rhodesian strategy was primarily a military one which formed a part of the Rhodesian military's *cordon sanitaire* defensive strategy. This strategy was designed to deprive ZANLA and ZIPRA guerrillas of support within Rhodesia once they had infiltrated. The aim was to improve security for resettled Africans, white farming communities and population centres. Any civil projects were a secondary concern. While the Malayan strategy aimed at creating political and economic benefits where they had been lacking, the Rhodesian strategy's military focus was at the expense of pre-existing economic and political structures. The Malayan government's strategy was long term and aimed at the successful conclusion of the Emergency while in contrast, the Rhodesian government's chief objective was an improvement of the short term and immediate military tactical situation in the field. Therefore Malayan resettlement had mainly overt civilian objectives while the Rhodesian resettlement had mainly overt military objectives.

Chapter 6

Resettlement Removal Process, Planning and execution:

Introduction

Chapter 6 essentially contrasts the way the Malayan and Rhodesian governments planned their resettlement schemes and proceeded to implement them. The initial and short term conditions of Malayan New Villages and Rhodesian Protected Villages shall be investigated through a common thematic structure. Examples of these themes are: agricultural conditions, village administration and security, education, economic and political structures. This chapter shall serve to illustrate the many similarities between the initial stages of the resettlement programs of the Malayan Emergency and the Rhodesian Civil War. Attention will also be drawn to a number of distinctive features such as the different degrees of planning, and the material support provided for the resettled populations by their respective governments. Of particular significance were the incidents of prolific human rights violations in the Rhodesian Protected Villages that far exceeded those of the Malayan New Villages.

Malaya:

In the case of the Malayan government, inordinate of planning was supposed to precede the transfer of legal and illegal rural communities to a resettlement village. The first stage of this planning involved several vital types of surveys. First an agricultural survey was required, so that the official estimate of agricultural land needed by the incoming settlers is met in the designated resettlement area. A general map survey is conducted of the area and local opinions are taken into consideration. A more detailed geographical survey is made of the actual site of the village. In situ ‘administrative, police and technical officers’³⁷⁵ work out: ‘a) overall suitability of site for settlement. b) layout of house plots. c) position of police

³⁷⁵ K. S. Sandhu: “The Saga of the “Squatter” in Malaya: A Preliminary Survey of the Causes, Characteristics and Consequences of the Resettlement of Rural Dwellers during the Emergency between 1948 and 1960.” *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, (5), (1), 1964, p. 173.

station and other building. d) siting of wells. e) roads and bridges required. f) latrines, pigsties and refuse disposal. g) position of perimeter wire, etc.³⁷⁶ The conclusions of these officials were used to construct an official site plan that included an estimate of the costs involved. This plan and all the surveys and maps were then used to create a draft resettlement scheme. The draft would then be sent to the State Resettlement Officer (RO). The scheme had to be ‘approved by the State Resettlement Officer, Senior Executive Committee of Technical Officers, and State War Committee.’³⁷⁷ Only after this approval would the Resettlement Scheme then executed.

Nevertheless, ‘when detailed plans were drawn up, they were usually ignored because of lack of time, trained staff to interpret them, and the urgency of the situation. Putting the squatter inside a fence, and quickly, was all that seemed to matter.’³⁷⁸ While it may appear on paper that the Malayan government prioritised the resettled villagers, this was not the case. ‘This task, however, invariably prove frustrating because the resettlement sites were chosen for reasons other than that they should be adjacent to plenty of defensible, fertile, agricultural land. For the Government, the primary concern was security.’³⁷⁹ Due to the combination of urgency and an overriding need to improve the security situation ‘such factors as the fertility of the soil, the possibility of flooding, the ease of irrigation, and access to markets were not always fully explored.’³⁸⁰ The urgency of the programme also influenced the kind of surveys the government was prepared to conduct. ‘The speed with which resettlement took place meant that the process of creating the resettlement areas was ‘a hurried one’ that did not afford ‘the opportunity for careful sociological and economic surveys and planning which would normally precede so abrupt a disturbance of a long established pattern of rural life.’³⁸¹

There were two main methods employed in moving the target population to a resettlement village. Essentially the first type of movement was without warning. ‘The relocation operation was carried out suddenly, usually at dawn, with no previous warning. This was to prevent the escape of able-bodied men who, as experience had shown,

³⁷⁶ K. S. Sandhu: “The Saga of the “Squatter” in Malaya: A Preliminary Survey of the Causes, Characteristics and Consequences of the Resettlement of Rural Dwellers during the Emergency between 1948 and 1960.” *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, (5), (1), 1964, p. 174.

³⁷⁷ K. S. Sandhu: “The Saga of the “Squatter” in Malaya: A Preliminary Survey of the Causes, Characteristics and Consequences of the Resettlement of Rural Dwellers during the Emergency between 1948 and 1960.” *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, (5), (1), 1964, p.174.

³⁷⁸ R. Stubbs: *Hearts and Minds in Guerilla Warfare The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960*, p. 103.

³⁷⁹ *Ibid.* p. 104.

³⁸⁰ *Ibid.* p. 104.

³⁸¹ *Ibid.* p. 103.

disappeared whenever a warning of intended relocation was given. Security Forces surrounded the area before sun-rise and officials from various Government departments went in and told the inhabitants to take whatever movable possessions they could and get into the waiting transport. Compensation for immovable property was calculated on the spot, but paid later. As soon as the operation of getting the people out of the area was completed, the dwellings, or what was left of them after the removal of walls, doors, etc., were fired and the crops destroyed.’³⁸² The British government and many accounts assert that this method was the exception rather than the rule. Sandhu writes that ‘such ruthlessness was, however, not common, the general practice being to give warning of removal. This procedure, described in detail in Appendices A and B below, was briefly as follows. After the layout plans of a New Village had been finalised, notices of removal were served on the people to be removed. After sufficient time had lapsed and the intended relocation had been explained the move was effected and the abandoned settlement destroyed. The people were paid a small sum as "upheaval allowance" and given assistance, mainly in the form of materials to put up new dwellings. This assistance was a loan, which had to be repaid. Each family was allocated a surveyed and pegged area for a house and pigsty (in case of Chinese) of about 1/6 of an acre. Squatters and legitimate settlers who were farmers and who unable to work their former plots were given about 2 acres of agricultural land within a radius of two miles of the New Village.’³⁸³

French has challenged and presented a different interpretation. In both cases French asserts that ‘resettlement was done at gunpoint, and not just to prevent the insurgents from interfering,’³⁸⁴ but to ensure complete compliance with the removal. ‘In Malaya, so the Federal government claimed, squatters about to be moved were given several days’ notice so they could get their affairs in order. Care was to be taken to explain to them why they were to be moved, where they were going, and that the government would provide them with land and the materials to build new homes.’³⁸⁵ French posits that the more punitive removal process was the norm. ‘More usually, however, no such warning was given in case the insurgents tried to interfere. Even the official Federal government report admitted coyly that ‘Where there was a failure to prepare the people, there was some degree of passive

³⁸² K. S. Sandhu: “The Saga of the “Squatter” in Malaya: A Preliminary Survey of the Causes, Characteristics and Consequences of the Resettlement of Rural Dwellers during the Emergency between 1948 and 1960.” *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, (5), (1), 1964, p. 160.

³⁸³ *Ibid.* p. 160.

³⁸⁴ D. French: *The British Way in Counter-Insurgency 1945-1967*, p. 118.

³⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

resistance.’ Resistance was no more than passive because the authorities mustered an overwhelming force of troops and police and carried out each move a military operation. Troops surrounded the squatter area at night and policemen went from door to door, telling people to gather their movable belongings and then loading them onto army lorries for the journey. A British official who organized resettlement near Ipoh remembered that ‘we had to use a good deal of forceful persuasion to get some of them to move . . . If you would not dismantle your own house and bring it along and rebuild it in the new village we will just pull it down, and we did.’³⁸⁶

Rhodesia:

The government’s first small scale attempts at resettlement involved transferring villagers through transit camps before finally placing them in a PV. In the Zambezi valley ‘by the end of 1973 some 8,000 people had been moved from the no-go areas and some 6,000 had passed through a transit camp at Gutsa which soon became notorious for its poor living conditions. At one time four to five children were dying daily in the camp from cholera or measles. There were only three water taps in Gutsa and two African orderlies for medical attendance.’³⁸⁷ It was typical for the first major resettlement schemes in Rhodesia to involve a considerable amount of planning. ‘Four weeks of planning preceded the simultaneous movement of 49 960 people into 21 Protected Villages in Chiweshe Tribal Land within a period of 6 weeks.’³⁸⁸ Like Malaya there were primarily agricultural surveys though there tribal classifications were also taken into consideration. ‘Particular emphasis was placed on the retention of tribal groupings during the resettlement of the local population into Protected Villages. As far as possible, villages were sited near to existing agricultural fields.’³⁸⁹ Some Rhodesian Africans moved voluntarily into PVs, while others had to be forced to move. Often those most eager to move without being coerced had been terrorised and abused by guerrillas.

Cilliers writes that: ‘the people living in the northern part of Chiweshe TTL had been subject to a considerable degree of intimidation by insurgent forces, many moved in

³⁸⁶ D. French: *The British Way in Counter-Insurgency 1945-1967*, p. 119.

³⁸⁷ A. K. H. Weinrich: “Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia.” *Journal of South African Studies*, (3), (2), 1977, p. 210.

³⁸⁸ J. K. Cilliers: *Counter Insurgency in Rhodesia*. p. 84.

³⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

Protected Villages voluntarily. This was not the case to the south however, where resistance was encountered.³⁹⁰ Rhodesian Africans' livestock were treated in several ways. If there was a strong guerrilla presence in the TTL and evidence that suggested that villagers were supporting the guerrillas, often livestock and specifically cattle were confiscated with no compensation as a punitive measure before being forcibly resettled. In case where villagers were given notice of removal and informed that their cattle could not go with them, members of the community would sell their livestock on the market. 'When the district commissioner informed them of the move, he also told them that they could not take their cattle with them. On hearing this, some people sold their cattle privately and kept the money.'³⁹¹ Less fortunate villagers who did not do this would end up having their livestock sold through government channels. Others sold their livestock at a government sponsored sale. However, they received only receipts, no cash, and were told by the district commissioner that government would keep their money to buy food for all those who would settle in the keep.'³⁹² Irrespective of whether the government dispersed the proceeds or used them to offset the costs of providing food for the newly resettled villagers, the livestock were sold at a fraction of the market value. 'The people in Mukumbura thought that they had a strong reason for refusing to cultivate the land: all their cattle had been taken away from them and sold for a mere \$5 or \$6 a head, that is, for a quarter of the price normally paid for African cattle.'³⁹³ More fortunate villagers were able to take their livestock with them to the PV.

Resettlement was typically a weapon of last resort, preceded by a variety of stern measures. 'Early in 1973 government officials imposed collective fines on people in Chiweshe for not reporting the presence of terrorists, cattle were confiscated, tribesmen were arrested and beaten; this may have increased the political consciousness of the people and many people are believed to have run away to join the guerrillas.'³⁹⁴ The Rhodesian government began by moving targeted rural communities with very little notice. In the case of Operation Overload, '21 sites of approximately a hundred acres each had been chosen and surrounded by a high chain-linked fence with barbed wire at the top and by strong electric flash lights on poles facing outwards. The people were given short notice of the move and on the fixed day lorry after lorry drew up at their villages to transport men, women and children,

³⁹⁰ J. K. Cilliers: *Counter Insurgency in Rhodesia*. p. 84.

³⁹¹ A. K. H. Weinrich: "Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia." *Journal of South African Studies*, (3), (2), 1977, p. 215.

³⁹² *Ibid.*

³⁹³ *Ibid.* p. 212.

³⁹⁴ UNISA AA5163 CCJPR Appendix 9, Reports on Protected Villages, Report on Chiweshe 1974

together with whatever belongings they could take, to the fenced-in areas. These were now called 'keeps', reminiscent of mediaeval strongholds. No resistance was tolerated.³⁹⁵ Future operations starting with Overload 2 generally gave rural villagers notice before being removed.

In most cases nothing was left behind for the guerrillas. At the start of or post removal, what was left of the village after the inhabitants had salvaged what they could was razed to the ground. Any crops adjacent to the village were also put to the torch or sprayed with defoliant. 'Before the people of Madziwa were moved to the south, security forces destroyed their huts and crops and sold their cattle'³⁹⁶

When a TTL was selected for resettlement, one of two precedents from Operation Overload One and Two would be followed. The first was a simultaneous transfer of the population, while the second was gradually in stages. Either method was employed in concert with the security forces. In the case of Overload One 'the resettlement of Chiweshe Tribal Trust Land was preceded by a High Density Force operation lasting 4 to 5 days. About 17 companies of troops were deployed clandestinely through the adjacent white commercial farming lands to seal off the Tribal Trust Land.'³⁹⁷ The main aims of this influx of troops were to prevent the local guerrilla groups from interfering with the resettlement process and from infiltrating the PVs. 'It was an attempt to saturate Chiweshe with Security Forces, thus either eliminating or forcing the flight of all insurgent forces in the area. Following this, 21 construction teams were moved in to construct the villages. They were followed by transportation, intelligence and fencing teams that enable the total resettlement to be executed simultaneously. This was concluded on 15 August 1974, according to schedule.'³⁹⁸

Lessons from Overload One resulted in several changes; the most important a process of stages, to create more time to move villagers, and so negate the need for movement *en mass*. 'Based on the experience gained during Operation Overload, Operation Overload Two in Madziwa Tribal Trust Land, some weeks later proved to be an improvement in a number of respects. Instead of the massed movement of the total population in Protected Villages, the movement was extended of several weeks. The operation consisted of four phases. Phase one

³⁹⁵ A. K. H. Weinrich: "Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia." *Journal of South African Studies*, (3), (2), 1977, p. 214.

³⁹⁶ A. K. H. Weinrich: "Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia." *Journal of South African Studies*, (3), (2), 1977, p. 215.

³⁹⁷ J. K. Cilliers: *Counter Insurgency in Rhodesia*. p. 84.

³⁹⁸ *Ibid.* p. 85.

entailed a High Density Force operation, during which a single contact resulted in the elimination of virtually the total insurgent presence (16 insurgent casualties out of a total group of about 18). Phase two ensured that the local population could move about freely and thus accomplish the resettlement with little insurgent harassment. To this end roads were patrolled and cleared of mines. Phase three entailed the provision of rudimentary shelters and amenities within the envisaged Protected Villages. Phase four covered the period 9 September 1974, to 31 October 1974, which was the compulsory moving period.³⁹⁹

Malaya: the immediate and initial conditions of ‘New Villages’

The target populations of resettlement were not entirely convinced by the glowing picture of the new villages painted by the British Administration. ‘In the best resettlement centres, people could take advantage of the supply of clean drinking water, the mobile medical units, and the school for the children. Plots of land were made available to those who had farmed and the new roads made it much easier to market their fruits, vegetables, pork, and chicken. In some centres recreational facilities with a coffee shop were set up, and in one case the inhabitants, acting as shareholders, built a cinema.’⁴⁰⁰ However, these were exceptional cases and ‘most of the people who became caught in the resettlement machine found that their apprehensions were well founded.’⁴⁰¹ Resettled villagers more often found themselves mired in rather basic conditions. ‘Just how basic those conditions were was described by Moo Kaiw, who with her family was moved to a new village near Kuala Lumpur where:

All that they saw was a piece of cleared rubber estate land with lots drawn out. ‘The tree stumps were still there and the British soldiers pointed to the lots and said Pick you lots and build your houses,’ she recalled. Those who could afford it engaged builders but those who could not built their own houses using planks and zinc from their old dwellings.⁴⁰²

The resettlement programme initiated a drastic rise in the cost of building materials, one that the government failed to curb. ‘Furthermore, the simultaneous resettlement of thousands of people naturally created a great demand for all types of building materials: with the

³⁹⁹ J. K. Cilliers: *Counter Insurgency in Rhodesia*. p. 86.

⁴⁰⁰ R. Stubbs: *Hearts and Minds in Guerilla Warfare The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960*, p. 102.

⁴⁰¹ *Ibid.* p. 102.

⁴⁰² D. French: *The British Way in Counter-Insurgency 1945-1967*, p. 120.

Government failing to control supplies, the increased demand forced up prices. For a poor rural family, just reconstructing a liveable home entailed the outlay of a considerable sum of money.⁴⁰³

Agricultural Conditions in the New Villages

‘But probably the most important problem facing all who were resettled was that the move undermined their livelihood. Most critical was the loss of land. While squatters could be classified as farmers or mine labourers or estate labourers and so on, almost every family, and most individuals, had more than one source of income and nearly all cultivated a piece of land.⁴⁰⁴ The government did recognise that the resettled inhabitants of the new villages would not be able to provide for themselves until they had begun to harvest crops and secure jobs nearby. There was also recognition of the cost of building a new home. To that end ‘each family received up to \$100 as an allowance to assist in building their new home as well as a small subsistence allowance for about 6 months.’⁴⁰⁵ Nonetheless, Stubbs writes that these sums by no means compensated for the cost of materials needed or the loss of wages or income from their produce that resulted.⁴⁰⁶

A cornerstone of resettlement was that there was an official prioritisation of providing arable farm land. ‘The New Villages were usually sited on flat land near a stream or river and away from highlands as a safeguard against being overlooked. Theoretically, every site was chosen after an examination of the soils, water potential, employment possibilities and accessibility. But in practice these preliminaries were generally ignored; speed was the driving force and there was neither the time nor the staff for such "niceties". The resettlement programme was essentially a security measure and as such the overriding consideration in the choice of a New Village site appeared to be defence.’⁴⁰⁷

Due to the haste of the programme and security concerns ‘many New Villages came to be located on sandy lalang, colonies, lopaks, tin tailings and other inhospitable spots. Such

⁴⁰³ R. Stubbs: *Hearts and Minds in Guerilla Warfare The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960*, p.103.

⁴⁰⁴ R. Stubbs: *Hearts and Minds in Guerilla Warfare The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960*, p.103.

⁴⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰⁶ R. Stubbs: *Hearts and Minds in Guerilla Warfare The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960*, p.103.

⁴⁰⁷ K. S. Sandhu: “The Saga of the “Squatter” in Malaya: A Preliminary Survey of the Causes, Characteristics and Consequences of the Resettlement of Rural Dwellers during the Emergency between 1948 and 1960.” *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, (5), (1), 1964, p. 161.

were the circumstances of, for example, the poor siting of Batu Rakit/Pulai (Trengganu), located on a sandy wasteland, Jemaluang (Johore), sited on lode tin tailings, of Kg. Abdullah (Johore), sited in an area which is regularly in undated, of Kg. Paya (Johore), built in a *lopak*, and of Mahsan (Negri Sembilan) in which the settlers were left to scratch for food on a *lalang* waste.’⁴⁰⁸ This nullified the policy whereby ‘areas of limited opportunities for employment on nearby estates and mines, the squatters were also to be given three acre farm plots outside the village perimeter.’⁴⁰⁹ William Newell observed that ‘one goes to village after village in which the land surrounding the village allegedly for agricultural purposes is bare and untended.’⁴¹⁰ In many cases, the “waste” land that many New Villages had been situated on was quite literally uncultivable.⁴¹¹

Even in cases where villagers were settled in areas suitable for farming, this did not automatically guarantee every villager an agricultural livelihood. During the planning process villagers were classified according to their occupation. Only those classified as farmers would receive a several acre plot of land. Wage labourers, for example, did not receive land beyond their housing plot. This policy did not take into account that most Chinese squatters farmed land even if they worked part time on a mine or estate. ‘However, when they were resettled, many of these people were simply classified as wage labourers and not always assigned land that was equivalent in size to their previous plots.’⁴¹² Yet being assigned several acres of land was no simple panacea to the loss of their former livelihoods. ‘Even those who were officially designated as farmers often fared badly: compensation for the crops or livestock that were destroyed was paid later than on the spot, and the subsistence allowance was on \$12 per person per month for five to seven months. During this period the farmers were expected to coax their newly acquired land into production.’⁴¹³

Medical Conditions in the New Villages

While the government extolled the virtues of the amenities that were to be provided, in many villages not even basic ones were provided from the start. ‘Sanitation and water needs

⁴⁰⁸ K. S. Sandhu: “The Saga of the “Squatter” in Malaya: A Preliminary Survey of the Causes, Characteristics and Consequences of the Resettlement of Rural Dwellers during the Emergency between 1948 and 1960.” *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, (5), (1), 1964, p. 161.

⁴⁰⁹ K. J. King: “Malaya’s Resettlement Problem.” *Far Eastern Survey*, (23), (3), 1954, p. 35.

⁴¹⁰ R. Stubbs: *Hearts and Minds in Guerilla Warfare The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960*, p. 104.

⁴¹¹ *Ibid.*

⁴¹² R. Stubbs: *Hearts and Minds in Guerilla Warfare The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960*, p. 104.

⁴¹³ *Ibid.*

were not always immediately satisfied. In some centres it proved impossible to provide for safe water supplies and the proper disposal of sewage. Medical officials were very concerned about the increased incidence of malaria, enteric fever, and dysentery, especially given the acute shortage of doctors and nurses.⁴¹⁴ The resettlement project was vast and suffered from acute shortages of trained personnel and resources. Thus ‘important projects such as the provision of basic water, drainage, and sewage services in the resettlement centres fell seriously behind schedule. In fact, few settlements ever received the planned complement of drains and stand pipes. By the end of 1951, only just over 200 of the approximately 360 centres had schools, and most centres were without medical services.’⁴¹⁵ In the short term the government was forced to employ traveling medical dispensaries,⁴¹⁶ and accept the assistance ‘of the British Red Cross Society, St. John’s, and various missionary bodies’⁴¹⁷ in the provision of medical services. It took several years for more substantial medical services to develop, and for ‘health measures, for example anti-malarial work, drainage, provision of pure water supply, hygiene measures conservancy, and scavenging,’ to be extended to all of the new villages.’⁴¹⁸

Physical Security of the New Villages

It was intended that ‘many of the villages were to be enclosed in wire, and in cases where security required it, the perimeter would be lighted at night. A police guard of a size determined by security requirements was to be assigned to the defense of each new village.’⁴¹⁹ Malaya simply did not have the required stocks of barbed wire to construct sturdy double perimeter fences in the numbers required. ‘The shortage of barbed-wire meant that the perimeter fences themselves were very flimsy and of relatively little value. Of the 350 or so centres built by then end of 1951, only fifty-six had double fences, and only twenty-five had perimeter lighting as an added form of protection.’⁴²⁰ The decision to extend perimeter

⁴¹⁴ R. Stubbs: *Hearts and Minds in Guerilla Warfare The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960*, p. 104.

⁴¹⁵ *Ibid.* p. 106.

⁴¹⁶ TNA CO 1022/32 Education in the new villages, Director of Operation, Malaya Directive No. 13, Briggs, 26 February 1951.

⁴¹⁷ TNA CO 1030/277 New Villages in the Federation of Malaya, telegram from the Federation of Malaya to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 12 March 1955.

⁴¹⁸ TNA CO 1030/277 New Villages in the Federation of Malaya, telegram from the Federation of Malaya to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 12 March 1955.

⁴¹⁹ K. J. King: “Malaya’s Resettlement Problem.” *Far Eastern Survey*, (23), (3), 1954, p. 35.

⁴²⁰ R. Stubbs: *Hearts and Minds in Guerilla Warfare The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960*, p. 106.

lighting to a considerable of new villages required the import of the requisite materials and generators.⁴²¹ While Stubbs highlights the barbed wire shortage, the Federal government seemed confident it had enough barbed wire for resettlement needs and was more concerned about sourcing equipment for perimeter lighting.⁴²² While New Villages attracted MRLA reprisals, these attacks were considered more of a nuisance.⁴²³ Timeous reinforcements were sent to garrisons in the event of an attack, and as a result attacks would immediately cease.⁴²⁴ ‘Reinforcements quickly restored morale among the garrison and squatters.’⁴²⁵ Intelligence reports noted that ‘Bandits show no inclination to press home the attacks.’⁴²⁶ It follows that while New Villages were targets, the settlers overall security had improved.

The Role of the Home Guard in the provision of security for the New Villages

Central to the concept of security for the New Villages was that a home guard would be raised to work with a police unit to provide protection for each New Village.⁴²⁷ ‘Police and Home Guard units, organised in some 300 new villages, have the primary task of physical protection of the inhabitants.’⁴²⁸ The basis of this idea was that communities would be given the means of defending themselves from MRLA guerrillas, as opposed to relying solely on others to defend them. It was hoped that the Chinese would ‘become fully responsible for the protection of their homes.’⁴²⁹ The role conceptualised for the home guard went far beyond settlement security. ‘Of special significance are the Home Guard units, who represent not only an additional force for local defense but also an instrument for the development of ideas of civic responsibility. Recruited from among the new village inhabitants, these units assume, as far as possible, responsibility for local perimeter defense and patrol, internal defense and

⁴²¹ TNA CO 852/113 Supply of Stores, Protection of New Villages in Malaya. Savingram from High Commissioner for the Federation of Malaya, Sir Gerald Templer, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 20 August 1952.

⁴²² TNA CO 852-113 Supply of Stores, Malaya, Protection of New Villages.

⁴²³ NAS CO 717/201 Law and Order, The Squatter Problem, extract from Weekly Intelligence Summary, No. 31. December 1950.

⁴²⁴ NAS CO 717/201 Law and Order, The Squatter Problem, extract from Weekly Intelligence Summary, No. 31. December 1950.

⁴²⁵ NAS CO 717/201 Law and Order, The Squatter Problem, extract from Weekly Intelligence Summary, No. 31. December 1950.

⁴²⁶ NAS CO 717/201 Law and Order, The Squatter Problem, extract from Weekly Intelligence Summary, No. 31. December 1950.

⁴²⁷ K. J. King: “Malaya’s Resettlement Problem.” *Far Eastern Survey*, (23), (3), 1954, p. 36.

⁴²⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴²⁹ TNA CO 1022/29 The Resettlement of Squatters in Malaya, report on resettlement, 1951.

other static commitments.⁴³⁰ One of the reasons that the idea of a Home Guard was attractive to General Briggs and his staff was that it would perform the static defence duties expected of the police and army. ‘As reliable Home Guard units become trained and equipped for village duty, it is expected that they will free the regular police and Security Forces in increasing numbers for more active operations against the terrorists in the jungle.’⁴³¹ While the home guard was being trained and formed, the police unit that garrisoned a New Village was pivotal in its defence. The raised Home Guard Units would eventually ‘relieve the Special Constable in the role of watching the perimeter.’⁴³²

However, these resettlement centres did not ‘afford the squatters the security and protection they were seeking. Indeed, the centres became a key target for guerrilla attacks. Under such circumstances, actions of the special constables detailed to defend the resettlement areas were crucial. Nevertheless, they were especially young, poorly trained, and without proper leadership.’⁴³³ Combined with being badly trained and not led well, the police were mainly Malays and not Chinese. ‘They were Malays and the Chinese squatters were not really surprised that they were unwilling to risk their lives to defend Chinese settlers whom they did not know and whom they generally distrusted.’⁴³⁴ Combined with this distrust was a feeling of resentment that the Malaya special constables were allowed to carry arms while the Chinese in the home guard were not. The Chinese also complained that the special constables took advantage of guerrilla attacks to fire into houses within the perimeter fence, sometimes with fatal results.⁴³⁵ It was intended that after some development the Home Guards raised in each village would ‘relieve the Special Constable in the role of watching the perimeter.’⁴³⁶

⁴³⁰ K. J. King: “Malaya’s Resettlement Problem.” *Far Eastern Survey*, (23), (3), 1954, p. 36.

⁴³¹ *Ibid.*

⁴³² NAS CO 717/202 Law and Order, Economic Effects, minutes of a meeting between a British government deputation, and the High Commissioner and the Director of Operations of the Federation of Malaya, 21 June 1951.

⁴³³ R. Stubbs: *Hearts and Minds in Guerilla Warfare The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960*, p. 105.

⁴³⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴³⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴³⁶ NAS CO 717/202 Law and Order, Economic Effects, minutes of a meeting between a British government deputation, and the High Commissioner and the Director of Operations of the Federation of Malaya, 21 June 1951.

Education in the New Villages

According to an official government resettlement scheme plan, the organisation of schools was considered procedure. Like the Home Guard, the government soon considered primary school and adult education to be ‘an important vehicle for development of community consciousness and responsibility.’⁴³⁷ Resettlement entailed a major expansion of education system and the costs were shared between the Federal, State and settlement governments with the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA). The MCA was heavily involved with education in the New Villages, primarily because the majority of schools were Chinese.⁴³⁸ The federal funding was intended to last for two years.⁴³⁹ This required significant funding and the recruitment of teachers. These schools had to be formed from scratch and so upon arrival and few provisions were made for education immediately. ‘Initially, the Malayan Chinese Association donated money to help build new schools, but they found it impossible to satisfy the many they received for funding.’⁴⁴⁰ A combination of government funding, local community’s resources and labour were used to provide buildings, equipment and teacher’s salaries. School fees were decided by the village school committee and the ability of settlers to pay.⁴⁴¹ ‘Government assistance was gradually increased as officials began to appreciate the key role education played in the fight against communism.’⁴⁴²

Malay and English were taught as subjects in the New Village Schools.⁴⁴³ This was intended to facilitate the integration of the schools into a future Malaysian system of education.⁴⁴⁴ With independence in mind, schools were also considered a means by which a Malayan national consciousness could be developed in each village.⁴⁴⁵ A legislative paper set out several of the methods designed to achieve this. ‘Flags and large scale maps of the Federation and of the respective State or Settlement will soon be available for every

⁴³⁷ K. J. King: “Malaya’s Resettlement Problem.” *Far Eastern Survey*, (23), (3), 1954, p. 37.

⁴³⁸ TNA CO 1022/32 Education in the new villages, excerpt pertaining to education from a report on New Villages, 1952.

⁴³⁹ TNA CO 1022/32 Education in the new villages, Scheme for Aid to Chinese Schools in Resettlement Areas, 1952.

⁴⁴⁰ R. Stubbs: *Hearts and Minds in Guerilla Warfare The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960*, p. 170.

⁴⁴¹ TNA CO 1022/32 Education in the new villages, Scheme for Aid to Chinese Schools in Resettlement Areas, 1952.

⁴⁴² R. Stubbs: *Hearts and Minds in Guerilla Warfare The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960*, p. 170.

⁴⁴³ TNA CO 1022/32 Education in the new villages, Scheme for Aid to Chinese Schools in Resettlement Areas, 1952.

⁴⁴⁴ TNA CO 1022/32 Education in the new villages, Malaya Legislative Council Paper 33, 1952.

⁴⁴⁵ TNA CO 1022/32 Education in the new villages, Malaya Legislative Council Paper 33, 1952.

classroom, and these schools, in common with all others, are encouraged to perform a simple ceremony of raising the Federation and State or Settlement flags to start each day.⁴⁴⁶ New Village settlers were discouraged from giving their respective schools Chinese names and were urged ‘to take the name of the village as the name of the school.’⁴⁴⁷ In terms of the Federal Governments propaganda aimed at the villages, children were seen as another avenue with which to influence adult settlers.⁴⁴⁸ Effectively the creation of schools gave the Federal government control over education in the New Villages, which allowed the government to counter communist propaganda and also intercept any propaganda coming from China.⁴⁴⁹

A report states that, ‘by the end of February, 1952, 216 schools containing 957 classrooms had been established. Much remains to be done and several hundred additional classrooms are under construction.’⁴⁵⁰ Providing education in the new villages had its challenges. Due to the serious economic disruptions between two thirds and a half of new village children were attending school in 1952. The majority of the pupils were boys, as many female pupils were kept back by parents to assist in rebuilding their homes.⁴⁵¹ Sourcing the large numbers of teachers required was problematic in the extreme. Teaching in a New Village was simply not as attractive as teaching in an older village or town, despite the offer of a decent salary.⁴⁵² Due to the high demand for teachers, lower teaching qualifications were required in an attempt to bolster numbers. This inevitably affected the standards in the new schools.⁴⁵³ New Village teachers were not free from the possibility of intimidation and neither were parents. Many parents refused to send their children to school either out of fear of communist informants in the village, or because they thought that the schools provided the wrong sort of education for their children.⁴⁵⁴

⁴⁴⁶ TNA CO 1022/32 Education in the new villages, Malaya Legislative Council Paper 33, 1952.

⁴⁴⁷ TNA CO 1022/32 Education in the new villages, Malaya Legislative Council Paper 33, 1952.

⁴⁴⁸ TNA CO 1022/32 Education in the new villages, Malaya Legislative Council Paper 33, 1952.

⁴⁴⁹ NAS CO 717/202 Law and Order, Economic Effects, minutes of a meeting between a British government deputation, and the High Commissioner and the Director of Operations of the Federation of Malaya, 21 June 1951.

⁴⁵⁰ TNA CO 1022/32 Education in the new villages, excerpt pertaining to education from a report on New Villages, 1952.

⁴⁵¹ TNA CO 1022/32 Education in the new villages, excerpt pertaining to education from a report on New Villages, 1952.

⁴⁵² TNA CO 1022/32 Education in the new villages, excerpt pertaining to education from a report on New Villages, 1952.

⁴⁵³ TNA CO 1022/32 Education in the new villages, excerpt pertaining to education from a report on New Villages, 1952.

⁴⁵⁴ TNA CO 1022/32 Education in the new villages, excerpt pertaining to education from a report on New Villages, 1952.

The Administration of New Villages

The Brigg's plan required a strengthening of local administration and from the beginning of resettlement the new villages were administered and supervised by District Officers (DO) at state level⁴⁵⁵ supported by Resettlement Supervisors (RS), Resettlement Officers (RO) and Assistant Resettlement Officers (ARO). These government officials operated as Assistant District Officers (ADO).⁴⁵⁶ The AROs were predominantly Chinese.⁴⁵⁷ There were two main goals, to bring the settlers 'under effective administration control in new settlements and so under State and Settlement administration,'⁴⁵⁸ and the eventual self-government of these new settlements. To this end, 'at the start of the resettlement program, village committees were formed in many *kampongs* and new villages to assist the DOs, although they served solely in an advisory capacity and had no legal status or responsibility other than that outlined by the DOs.'⁴⁵⁹ This situation was by no means static and in 'In July 1952 an ordinance was passed which paved the way for popular, direct and personal participation in local government throughout Malaya. Under the terms of this Local Councils ordinance, the village committee of a new village or *kampong* may make application to the DO to establish a local council whenever it feels the community has reached the point of development.'⁴⁶⁰ While the path to self-governing colonies seemed clear on paper, it was fraught with problems. The task of administering the settlement was not made any easier by the failure of the Government to provide some of the basic services which were anticipated in the original resettlement plans.'⁴⁶¹

The government at both a state and federal level suffered from a shortage of Chinese officials and Chinese speaking European officials. This was reflected in the lack of suitable recruits to act as Resettlement Supervisors (RS), Resettlement Officers (RO), and Assistant Resettlement Officers (ARO). 'When recruits could speak Chinese and understand the Chinese ways and culture, and when they took an active role in developing the amenities of the settlement and created a sense of community among the inhabitants, then resettlement

⁴⁵⁵ K. J. King: "Malaya's Resettlement Problem." *Far Eastern Survey*, (23), (3), 1954, p. 37.

⁴⁵⁶ TNA CO 1022/32 Education in the new villages, Director of Operation, Malaya Directive No. 13, Briggs, 26 February 1951.

⁴⁵⁷ TNA CO 1022/32 Education in the new villages, Director of Operation, Malaya Directive No. 13, Briggs, 26 February 1951.

⁴⁵⁸ TNA CO 1022/32 Education in the new villages, Director of Operation, Malaya Directive No. 13, Briggs, 26 February 1951.

⁴⁵⁹ K. J. King: "Malaya's Resettlement Problem." *Far Eastern Survey*, (23), (3), 1954, p. 37.

⁴⁶⁰ K. J. King: "Malaya's Resettlement Problem." *Far Eastern Survey*, (23), (3), 1954, p. 37.

⁴⁶¹ R. Stubbs: *Hearts and Minds in Guerilla Warfare The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960*, p. 106.

worked well and people were generally happy. But this was all too rare.⁴⁶² Rare or not, the Federal government recognised that it was critical that New Village settlers, who had mostly been exposed to Communist pressure, should be protected against Communist physical and intellectual attack and helped to become contented communities.⁴⁶³ The Federal government had no intention of abandoning the New Villages, and from the start Briggs outlined that the Administration would focus on the “after care” of New Villages after the completion of resettlement.⁴⁶⁴

Food restrictions and other measures

Food restrictions formed part of a wider food denial campaign; because the MCP and MRLA had no external supply lines, they were wholly dependent on local Malaysians for food supplies. Strict food controls increased the number of guerrilla surrenders and was considered an efficacious weapon against them.⁴⁶⁵

Resettlement was used as an opportunity by Special Branch (SB) to infiltrate New Villages in attempt to break the Min Yuen organisation. The police installed informers who report on inhabitants who were aiding the communists.⁴⁶⁶ ‘The placement of Chinese squatters and legal settlers behind barbed wire made it considerably easier for the police to screen, detain, and deport suspected communist sympathizers, and for the security forces to intimidate them.’⁴⁶⁷ One of the first restrictions that New Villages were subjected to, was the imposition of a curfew from 7.00 pm to 6.00 am.⁴⁶⁸ Combined with this curfew were security checks conducted at the village gates that caused considerable delays. These delays served to exacerbate the long distances that New Villagers had to travel, to either reach their new farming plots, or places of work in the mines or rubber estates.⁴⁶⁹ This served to limit the

⁴⁶² R. Stubbs: *Hearts and Minds in Guerilla Warfare The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960*, p. 106.

⁴⁶³ TNA CO 1022/32 Education in the new villages, Director of Operation, Malaya Directive No. 13, Briggs, 26 February 1951.

⁴⁶⁴ NAS CO 717/202 Law and Order, Economic Effects, minutes of a meeting between a British government deputation, and the High Commissioner and the Director of Operations of the Federation of Malaya, 21 June 1951.

⁴⁶⁵ TNA CO 1030/277 New Villages in the Federation of Malaya, letter from A. T. Lennox-Boyd to Mr. Awberry, 20 June 1955.

⁴⁶⁶ R. Stubbs: *Hearts and Minds in Guerilla Warfare The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960*, p. 106.

⁴⁶⁷ *Ibid.* p. 107.

⁴⁶⁸ *Ibid.* p. 104.

⁴⁶⁹ *Ibid.* p.104.

villagers' potential income and 'generated considerable antagonism towards officials.'⁴⁷⁰ Curfew orders were also applied to children as they too could have been used as sources of supplies and information.⁴⁷¹ While this may seem extreme, it did prevent children from being accidentally shot at night by patrols who had to challenge anyone met after dark and shoot if there was no response.⁴⁷²

On top of this 'in June 1951 all existing and future resettlement areas were designated 'food restricted centres'. Under this law, all shopkeepers had to limit their stocks or restricted goods such as medicines, clothing, high energy foods, salt, pepper, and batteries; they had to open all tinned goods when they were sold; and they had to ensure that they sold goods only to people with valid identification cards. Settlers could not take food out to their place of work, and the movement by road of certain restricted goods was prohibited during curfew hours.'⁴⁷³ This did not bode well for the viability of the New Villages because 'the lack of land and the consequent restrictions on the supply of food, prices for pork, chicken, and even the most inferior vegetable increased markedly. The general cost of living, a chronic irritant in the years since the return of the British, once again became a major source of discontent.'⁴⁷⁴

The food restrictions were not arbitrary; they formed part of Federal food denial operations that 'began in June 1951. Typically, such operations fell into three phases. In the initial phase, which might last for two or three months, the SB built up its knowledge of the area and penetrated the Min Yuen. In the second phase, lasting for six months or more, the authorities introduced strict controls over all supplies of food and other essential supplies. Houses were searched and every ounce of surplus food was confiscated. Rice rations were either issued uncooked or families were required to collect a ration of cooked rice that had been prepared in a central village kitchen.'⁴⁷⁵ Serving cooked rice was an important regulation as it 'could not be passed to insurgents outside the village because it was liable to

⁴⁷⁰ R. Stubbs: *Hearts and Minds in Guerilla Warfare The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960*, p. 106.

⁴⁷¹ TNA CO 1022/56 Imposition of Curfews and other restrictions in the Federation of Malaya, parliamentary questions and answers sent to the High Commissioner by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 4 June 1952.

⁴⁷² TNA CO 1022/56 Imposition of Curfews and other restrictions in the Federation of Malaya, telegram from Federation of Malaya, Sir Gerald Templer, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 26 May 1952.

⁴⁷³ R. Stubbs: *Hearts and Minds in Guerilla Warfare The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960*, p. 105.

⁴⁷⁴ R. Stubbs: *Hearts and Minds in Guerilla Warfare The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960*, p. 105.

⁴⁷⁵ D. French: *The British Way in Counter-Insurgency 1945-1967*, p. 121.

go bad quickly. Food denial forced the insurgents to rely for food on a limited number of supporters in the villages.⁴⁷⁶

Not all of the Federation was affected by food restrictions. During the course of the Emergency, areas were declared “white” and in them restrictions such as food control were relaxed.⁴⁷⁷ Rubber tappers and other labourers were potential sources of food for guerrillas and were prevented from taking food out the New Village.⁴⁷⁸ ‘Labourers found it very difficult to keep going from 6.00 am or 6.30 am until mid-afternoon, their normal work day. The inconvenience, not to say indignity, of daily searches at the gate, the time lost in the mornings, and the problems, of not being able to have a proper midday meal, all contributed to a bitterness and resentment within the resettlement centres.’⁴⁷⁹

Another restriction employed by the Federal government, was the forced detention of entire villages that did not cooperate with the authorities, in cases such as the murder of members of the security forces.⁴⁸⁰ New Villages could also have communal fines levied upon them as punishments for assisting guerrillas or not assisting the government.⁴⁸¹ Templer introduced the use of secret questionnaires distributed to settlers in an attempt to persuade them to divulge information.⁴⁸² While these measures were severe, they were balanced by more constructive and progressive measures put in place to improve conditions in New Villages. ‘Sir Henry Gurney’s view was that “collective fines are only justifiable as long as they are balanced by constructive and progressive measure to assist the people who show any signs of willingness to co-operate in restoration of law and order.”’⁴⁸³ Food restrictions were considered highly successful as guerrilla documents show that it was impossible for them even purchase food legally, aside from coercion.⁴⁸⁴

⁴⁷⁶ D. French: *The British Way in Counter-Insurgency 1945-1967*, p. 121.

⁴⁷⁷ TNA CO 1030/277 New Villages in the Federation of Malaya, letter from A. T. Lennox-Boyd to Mr. Awberry, 20 June 1955.

⁴⁷⁸ TNA CO 1030/277 New Villages in the Federation of Malaya, letter from A. T. Lennox-Boyd to Mr. Awberry, 20 June 1955.

⁴⁷⁹ R. Stubbs: *Hearts and Minds in Guerilla Warfare The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960*, p. 105.

⁴⁸⁰ TNA CO 1022/56 Imposition of Curfews and other restrictions in the Federation of Malaya, report from Sir Gerald Templer to the Secretary of State of the Colonies. 20 August 1952.

⁴⁸¹ TNA CO 1022/56 Imposition of Curfews and other restrictions in the Federation of Malaya, “Malayan Village Fined £500 Terrorist Outrages,” *Manchester Guardian*, August 1952.

⁴⁸² TNA CO 1022/56 Imposition of Curfews and other restrictions in the Federation of Malaya, Federal Government Press Statement, “Operation Question,” 11 May 1952.

⁴⁸³ TNA CO 1022/56 Imposition of Curfews and other restrictions in the Federation of Malaya, “Collective Punishment in Malaya 1950-51.

⁴⁸⁴ NAS CO 717/202 Law and Order, Economic Effects, minutes of a meeting between a British government deputation, and the High Commissioner and the Director of Operations of the Federation of Malaya, 21 June 1951.

Rhodesia Initial and Short Term Conditions

Upon Arrival:

The Rhodesian government extolled the virtues of resettlement in the state controlled press. They were to become growth centres and facilitate the provisions of services previously unknown to the rural Rhodesian Africans. While there were model PVs, the reality did not relate to this glowing image. ‘Prior to the regroupment heavy communal fines had been imposed on a number of village communities.’⁴⁸⁵ Pole speakers were put in between huts that played recordings and radio music. However, they were used to control information by censoring Shona news.⁴⁸⁶ In the case of Operation Overload in Chiweshe and the majority of those that followed, a basic camp structure was prepared. ‘The set-up of all the keeps is uniform. The huts are built in lines according to kraal- heads, each family having a space of about one eighth of an acre. On this space, it is supposed to stand basic accommodation like a kitchen, a bed-room and a granary. If a man had many grown up children who needed separate huts and also if he had a big harvest to store, his stand would become crowded.’⁴⁸⁷

The camps had several gates and were ringed with a tall fence topped with barbed wire and electric lights on poles facing outwards.⁴⁸⁸ No form of habitation was prepared for the incoming villagers, just empty plots. ‘The protected villages merely consisted of security fencing around an area that had been marked out in smaller plots one per family.’⁴⁸⁹ The administrative staff however, had a small keep constructed for them at the centre of each camp. Each of the 21 sites was about one hundred acres. ‘The people were given short notice of the move and on the fixed day lorry after lorry drew up at their villages to transport men, women and children, together with whatever belongings they could take, to the fenced-in areas.’⁴⁹⁰ These villagers would find themselves assigned a patch of ground with which to place themselves and their belongings and subsequently construct a home. The space was

⁴⁸⁵ UNISA AA5163 CCJPR Appendix 11 Reports on Protected Villages, Report on Chiweshe 3 September 1974.

⁴⁸⁶ NAZ MS 1184/7, Reports on Protected Villages, Madziwa Keeps circa 1976.

⁴⁸⁷ NAZ MS 1184/7, Reports on Protected Villages, Madziwa Keeps circa 1976.

⁴⁸⁸ NAZ MS 1184/7, Reports on Protected Villages, Madziwa Keeps circa 1976.

⁴⁸⁹ J. K. Cilliers: *Counter Insurgency in Rhodesia*. p. 85.

⁴⁹⁰ A. K. H. Weinrich: “Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia.” *Journal of South African Studies*, (3), (2), 1977, p. 214.

about '15 by 15 yards. Members of a former village were assigned adjacent spaces and were told to start building. In very few cases was building material provided.'⁴⁹¹

There were a number of complaints raised by villagers and the solution was to grant permission to use materials from their previous more substantial homes.⁴⁹² This lack of provision for immediate housing and sufficient building materials meant that 'they too, like most resettled Shona, had for some time to sleep in the open.'⁴⁹³ Up to now, the villagers have managed to put up small, thin grass-thatched huts, which have no walls – only grass from bottom to top.'⁴⁹⁴ The elderly and in particular widows struggled as no assistance was provided in the construction of their homes.⁴⁹⁵ The need for building materials was exacerbated in Chiweshe and similar areas by the lack of forests and a scarcity of bushes, insufficient to meet the scales required by resettlement.⁴⁹⁶ While the difficulties faced by the elderly and widows have been noted, many families were faced with a similar problem in that most of the men 'were absent as labour migrants'⁴⁹⁷ Hut building was traditionally a male role as it required a degree of strength. A number of 'church organizations tried to help.'⁴⁹⁸ However, some people, even old widows, refused it saying that such assistance would dampen the anger of the people and dull their resistance to government.⁴⁹⁹ 'Mr. A. is very angry and dismayed at having been put in this protected village. He says that convicted prisoners are better cared for than he and his people, since prisoners have at least a roof over their heads, clean drinking water and toilets. None of these facilities have been provided.'⁵⁰⁰

⁴⁹¹ A. K. H. Weinrich: "Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia." *Journal of South African Studies*, (3), (2), 1977, p. 214.

⁴⁹² *Ibid.*

⁴⁹³ *Ibid.* p. 216.

⁴⁹⁴ NAZ MS 1184/7, Reports on Protected Villages, Makaha Protected Village, June 1975.

⁴⁹⁵ *Ibid.* p. 214.

⁴⁹⁶ NAZ MS 1184/7, Reports on Protected Villages, Roy Henson, 22 March 1976.

⁴⁹⁷ A. K. H. Weinrich: "Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia." *Journal of South African Studies*, (3), (2), 1977, p. 220.

⁴⁹⁸ *Ibid.* p. 214.

⁴⁹⁹ *Ibid.* p. 220.

⁵⁰⁰ UNISA AA5163 CCJPR Appendix 9, Reports on Protected Villages, Report on Chiweshe 1974

Medical conditions of Protected Villages

There were no immediate provisions for sanitation.⁵⁰¹ ‘People were told to dig themselves private latrines several feet deep. But before they could do this, they used the open adjacent country for defecation.’⁵⁰² As more people would arrive at a PV, so the space inside available for off-loading belongings would decrease. This resulted in the lorries dumping these belongings that included foodstuffs like maize and ground nuts, onto the very ground that had been defecated upon.⁵⁰³ Each family was ordered to construct a pit ‘of three to five feet on each family plot, and most families were provided with 3-foot concrete pipes. Some built shelters over these toilets. The people were enraged to have to live and eat in the sight of their own defecation. Soon big flies settled down on the refuse and mosquitoes started breeding all over the new settlements.’⁵⁰⁴

The problem with field latrines is that they eventually fill up. They are traditionally a short term waste disposal method, whereby new latrines must be dug as the old ones reach their limited capacity. For an army on the march or staying limited periods at a specific locations this is considered a suitable method of sanitation. However, PVs were far more long term. In the case of Chiweshe, ‘the shallow toilet pits which the people were instructed to dig on occupying their keeps became full to ground level. Maggots crawled everywhere and from these came the feared big green flies which carry disease. The flies settled on toilet waste and, from there, on food because the people lack adequate covers for their cooking utensils. If meat is left uncovered for only a few minutes, it can no longer be seen because of the swarms of flies that have settled on it. Filth lay everywhere.’⁵⁰⁵ A better and relatively cheap reticulation system and insect proofed toilet doors was apparently designed but did not prove to be viable⁵⁰⁶ as the resettled villagers rejected their use on grounds of affordability.⁵⁰⁷

It is not surprising that under these conditions, disease ran rampant. ‘The most common diseases have been typhoid and diarrhoea. Many patients suffering from these are receiving

⁵⁰¹ UNISA AA5163 CCJPR Appendix 9, Reports on Protected Villages, Report on Chiweshe 1974

⁵⁰² A. K. H. Weinrich: “Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia.” *Journal of South African Studies*, (3), (2), 1977, p. 214.

⁵⁰³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰⁴ *Ibid.* p. 220.

⁵⁰⁵ A. K. H. Weinrich: “Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia.” *Journal of South African Studies*, (3), (2), 1977, p. 227.

⁵⁰⁶ *Ibid.* p. 227.

⁵⁰⁷ NAZ MS 1184/7, Reports on Protected Villages, Roy Henson, 22 March 1976.

no medical care.⁵⁰⁸ These disease prone conditions were exacerbated by a chronic shortage of clinics.⁵⁰⁹ Before the PV program, medical services in the TTLs were often capable of meeting the medical needs of Africans in their former villages. In Chiweshe, for example, there was a Salvation Army Mission Hospital and a government run clinic that was sufficient before the concentration of population.⁵¹⁰ Post resettlement ‘however, both hospital and clinic are overcrowded with patients, many of whom sleep on the floors of the passages. Those who can be taken to the hospital and clinic are fortunate; the others just lie down in their huts and wait until they either recover or die.’⁵¹¹

The death rate in the PVs of Chiweshe was considerably higher than that of the former villages. A report stated ‘Old people are dying from starvation. Enteritis is killing children in large numbers. The crops have mostly been destroyed by cattle and baboons.’⁵¹² The majority of deaths are attributed to ‘stomach troubles, diarrhoea and dysentery.’⁵¹³ The age groups that were affected the most were the young and the elderly, although deaths among the groups in between also occurred. A report went so far as to state that ‘Among the old over 60 years of age, half are said to have died.’⁵¹⁴ Weinrich was unable to verify these statistics. According to Weinrich the government ordered villages to slash grass and destroy mosquito larvae where possible.⁵¹⁵

Nevertheless, there were few attempts at improving the supply of water, making it difficult to control typhoid and water related diseases. In Chiweshe ‘an adequate supply of fresh water had been provided in only one or two villages prior to completion of the resettlement.’⁵¹⁶ In general PVs had three main water supply conditions. Some only received contaminated water while other PVs had no water thus forcing people to travel long distances to obtain their daily water needs. Even if water was piped to a PV, this was no guarantee of a pure water supply. A report on a PV in Chiweshe stated, ‘this water cannot be drunk and a

⁵⁰⁸ A. K. H. Weinrich: “Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia.” *Journal of South African Studies*, (3), (2), 1977, p. 227.

⁵⁰⁹ NAZ MS 1184/7, Reports on Protected Villages, Roy Henson, 22 March 1976.

⁵¹⁰ A. K. H. Weinrich: “Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia.” *Journal of South African Studies*, (3), (2), 1977, p. 227.

⁵¹¹ *Ibid.* p. 227.

⁵¹² NAZ MS 589, Reports on Protected Villages, Emergency Relief Committee, April 1976.

⁵¹³ A. K. H. Weinrich: “Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia.” *Journal of South African Studies*, (3), (2), 1977, p. 227.

⁵¹⁴ *Ibid.* p. 227.

⁵¹⁵ A. K. H. Weinrich: “Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia.” *Journal of South African Studies*, (3), (2), 1977, p. 227.

⁵¹⁶ J. K. Cilliers: *Counter Insurgency in Rhodesia*, p. 85.

visitor from Salisbury who did drink it vomited strongly.⁵¹⁷ The last condition involved villages that had been sited near a source of water. This however, was not a simple panacea to water requirements. During the rainy season water would collect in the surrounding lower areas and result in the PVs being ‘plagued by dampness and mosquitoes.’⁵¹⁸ Reports stated that due to the wet ground, ‘mosquitos are found in big numbers in most keeps, they breed easily and very quickly in these toilets and in some pools of standing water found anywhere in the keeps. As a result diseases like Typhoid, Diarrhea and Malaria have broken in greater number of cases.’⁵¹⁹

The defoliation campaigns of the RFS also had medical ramifications for locals in affected in area. ‘In the Zambezi Valley. In this Area it is the government policy to destroy all vegetation, thus depriving the insurgents of both cover and food. The defoliant scheme carries with it the possibility of some disquieting side effects. Towards the end of 1974 there were reports from one border area of a strange illness which caused children to shake violently and sometimes to die. The visiting doctor ascribed this to the spraying of vegetation from the air with defoliants earlier that year.’⁵²⁰

Amid CCJPR papers are reports outlining surges in the prevalence of venereal disease. ‘During the month of June this year, a government member of Parliament mentioned in the House of Assembly that venereal disease was common and was spreading in the T.T.L’s, and he blamed this on the guerrillas. For the first time this disease is becoming common in the T.T.L’s, particularly in the protected villages, because of the grouping of people. In my last report I warned that the disease would become more widespread because of the crowded condition in which people were force to live, and the lack of privacy V. D is not carried or caused by the guerrillas at all, but by the District Assistants (DA) as well as by the ordinary people. This is getting worse and worse all the time. Clinics are even worried about this matter.’⁵²¹

⁵¹⁷ UNISA AA5163 CCJPR Appendix 9, Reports on Protected Villages, Report on Chiweshe, March 1975.

⁵¹⁸ A. K. H. Weinrich: “Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia.” *Journal of South African Studies*, (3), (2), 1977, p. 227.

⁵¹⁹ UNISA AA5163 CCJPR Appendix 12 Reports on Protected Villages, Report on Chiweshe 3 September 1974.

⁵²⁰ A. K. H. Weinrich: “Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia.” *Journal of South African Studies*, (3), (2), 1977, p. 211.

⁵²¹ UNISA AA5163 CCJPR Appendix 13, Reports on Protected Villages, Report on Chiweshe , July 1977.

Provision of Security for Protected Villages

For all the Rhodesian government's claims of providing security for resettled villages, the most secure part of the camp was the administrative headquarters. The HQ was placed at the centre of the camp and usually on top a small hill.⁵²² The security of this enclave was more substantial than the perimeter of the camp proper. The HQ was protected 'by a double wire fence'⁵²³ and 'often also by a number of embrasures made of sand bags.'⁵²⁴ The residents of the HQ consisted of the commanding European officer and the African assistants. It was the most protected part of the camp and revealed that it was the administrative staff and armed guards of the camp who were actually protected.⁵²⁵ Chiefs were intimidated by guerrillas⁵²⁶ and the establishment of PVs often created targets for the guerrillas, mortar attacks were one method.⁵²⁷ Curfews were enforced but often led to a loss of life as villagers did not observe the 6pm to 6 am curfew properly. A report notes that, 'In May, a chief's old wife was shot for breaking the curfew.'⁵²⁸ Despite incidents like that, villagers have been recorded asserting that they felt safer from the RFS and the guerrillas in the keeps.⁵²⁹ The pole lights were solely a security feature and do not appear to have benefited the villagers. 'There are pole lights right around the keep fence. The Lights face outwards. In other words they are security lights. The inside where the huts are, is completely dark at night.'⁵³⁰ Perimeter control was not as tight as the government claimed and the villagers were not categorically isolated from the guerrillas.⁵³¹ A report on Mrewa stated that, 'although the main purpose for these confinements is to prevent people from feeding terrorists, it said the later continue to order the same people to feed them (*sic*)'⁵³²

‘

⁵²² A. K. H. Weinrich: "Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia." *Journal of South African Studies*, (3), (2), 1977, p. 219

⁵²³ *Ibid.*

⁵²⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵²⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵²⁶ NAZ MS 1184/7, Reports on Protected Villages, Confinement in Mrewa, June 1975.

⁵²⁷ UNISA AA5163 CCJPR Appendix 10 Reports on Protected Villages, Report on Chiweshe 3 September 1974.

⁵²⁸ NAZ MS 1184/7, Reports on Protected Villages, Makaha Protected Village, June 1975.

⁵²⁹ NAZ MS 1184/7, Reports on Protected Villages, Madziwa Keeps circa 1976.

⁵³⁰ NAZ MS 1184/7, Reports on Protected Villages, Madziwa Keeps circa 1976.

⁵³¹ NAZ MS 1184/7, Reports on Protected Villages, Confinement in Mrewa, June 1975.

⁵³² NAZ MS 1184/7, Reports on Protected Villages, Confinement in Mrewa, June 1975.

The Administration of Protected Villages

‘In the middle of each keep there is a fenced pit where Internal Affairs staff of several district assistants stay. There are Africans and European D. A. who acts as an officer, in administering the keeps.’⁵³³ The white officer’s role was that of the Protecting Authority of the camp and fell ‘under the direct control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.’⁵³⁴ For the most part these officers were practically fresh out of secondary school. They would be ‘seconded to a protected village as an alternative to doing active military service.’⁵³⁵ The African DAs were also fairly young men and while responsible for the security of the camp, had received minimal training. The training was merely a six week crash course, hardly sufficient for the task they were set to. These assistants usually volunteered simply for comparatively higher wages. These assistants had to stand guard at the gates of the PVs and control movement in and out⁵³⁶ ‘and patrol the outer fences at night.’⁵³⁷ The presence of African assistants was intended to improve camp security and they were ‘supposed to inform themselves of all that goes on in a keep and to pass on any irregularities to the European officer.’⁵³⁸ Patrols of the fence during the day were not organised.⁵³⁹

Effect of resettlement on economic structures

Before resettlement, Chiweshe had a robust agricultural based economic structure that went beyond subsistence and could sell surplus produce on the market. As a result of resettlement the agricultural production of the TTL soon collapsed. There were a number of factors that contributed to this collapse. First and foremost was the imposition of curfews that made it extremely difficult to cultivate their fields that were quite a distance from the PV.⁵⁴⁰ The enactment of food restrictions forbade villagers from taking food with them out to the fields, thus forcing them to work for the duration of the day without any form of

⁵³³ NAZ MS 1184/7, Reports on Protected Villages, Madziwa Keeps circa 1976.

⁵³⁴ A. K. H. Weinrich: “Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia.” *Journal of South African Studies*, (3), (2), 1977, pp. 224.

⁵³⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵³⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵³⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵³⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵³⁹ J. K. Cilliers: *Counter Insurgency in Rhodesia*. p. 85.

⁵⁴⁰ NAZ MS 1184/7, Reports on Protected Villages, Mrewa, letter from E. Mavudzi (Parish Priest) to Sister M. Dymphna, 20 November 1975.

sustenance.⁵⁴¹ Agricultural work is extremely physical and requires a considerable intake of calories, this restriction greatly reduced productivity.

Curfews also drastically altered traditional work rhythms. ‘Traditionally people started their agricultural tasks early in the morning and returned home in the middle of the day when the sun is very hot, and then resumed their field work in the afternoon.’⁵⁴² Curfews compelled villagers to start their work later in the day and thus work through the heat of the day without food or rest. They then had to return to the PV well before sunsets, further reducing the available working hours. ‘People have not been assigned new fields, but are told to cultivate their old fields.’⁵⁴³ This necessitated long journeys to and from their plots. ‘The movement of the people means the disruption of their farming system and their way of life; The cattle cannot be looked after properly, only a fraction of the grazing land can be used, many areas have been ‘burnt’ to help the military operation, not in most cases can land be ploughed or looked after.’⁵⁴⁴

The brunt of this physical hardship was borne by women who were performing the majority of the work in these fields.⁵⁴⁵ Even when crops were successfully coaxed out of the ground under these conditions that did not guarantee a successful harvest. As the villagers were held with in the camp overnight they could not ‘keep watch in their fields during the night.’⁵⁴⁶ As a result the harvest was often destroyed or reduced ‘by stray cattle and wild animals.’⁵⁴⁷ In addition to this, it was common for the Security Forces to destroy entire harvests just before they ripened ‘for fear lest the guerillas get food from the fields.’⁵⁴⁸ The mode of this destruction took the form of defoliants and poisonous chemicals. This went far beyond food denial as shown by the following report.

Each camp at Mukumbura was given a garden in which we should grow our own vegetables. Each village headman was allocated a section from which each family

⁵⁴¹ A. K. H. Weinrich: “Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia.” *Journal of South African Studies*, (3), (2), 1977, p. 228.

⁵⁴² *Ibid.*

⁵⁴³ UNISA AA5163 CCJPR Appendix 9, Reports on Protected Villages, Report on Chiweshe 1974.

⁵⁴⁴ NAZ MS 589, Reports on Protected Villages, Programme for assistance to inhabitants of Protected Villages in Zimbabwe, circa 1976.

⁵⁴⁵ A. K. H. Weinrich: “Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia.” *Journal of South African Studies*, (3), (2), 1977, p. 228.

⁵⁴⁶ A. K. H. Weinrich: “Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia.” *Journal of South African Studies*, (3), (2), 1977, p. 228.

⁵⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

could get a small bundle of vegetables once the rains had started. But now that the rains have started, people are suffering from a strange sickness. They started shaking and then they die. Children die almost daily and some adults have also died. On 27 November 1974 the doctor was here and stated that the deaths were caused by poisoning: the army had used defoliants in May to clear the no-go area of vegetation. By now the rains have washed the chemicals into the soil and plants have absorbed the poison.⁵⁴⁹

The food restrictions caused a further break down in traditional social norms. ‘In the past families usually shared their food with relatives and friends.’⁵⁵⁰ However, under the new restrictions food cannot travel privately between keeps. In theory villagers can apply for permission but it is rarely granted.⁵⁵¹ The official policy was that villagers should sell their food to the PV shops and then take the proceeds to friends and relatives in neighbouring keeps so that they can the food themselves.⁵⁵² This process is profitable for the middlemen but at the expense of the villagers attempting to share according to previous practice. While there were roads to and from keeps, the prevalence of landmines and potential ambushes often restricted the bus routes which only catered for a fraction of the keeps. Thus villagers traveling from one keep to another would generally have to buy food. The restrictions were further irksome in that workers in nearby towns could not even bring food back to the keeps for their dependents, nor could ‘maize produced in one keep be taken to another for grinding.’⁵⁵³

In the Zambezi valley, the government instituted a forced labour agricultural system. ‘In December 1974 Government took the garden plots from the people and declared that the land would in the future be ploughed for them; they had merely to offer their labour to cultivate it. For this work they were to be paid a modest wage: 30 cents a day for adult labour and 15 cents for child labour. At first the people refused to co-operate, but soon they were forced to work on the land.’⁵⁵⁴ Weinrich asserts that this system of forced labour was confined to the

⁵⁴⁹ A. K. H. Weinrich: “Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia.” *Journal of South African Studies*, (3), (2), 1977, p. 211.

⁵⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵⁴ A. K. H. Weinrich: “Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia.” *Journal of South African Studies*, (3), (2), 1977, p. 211.

Zambezi valley regions.⁵⁵⁵ Villagers refused initially as the cattle that they normally used had been taken from them with minimal compensation.

The Rhodesian government attempted to provide some degree of entertainment to the resettled villagers. The ‘government installed loudspeakers to pipe music to the people,’⁵⁵⁶ however, the speakers were also used to disseminate propaganda though the radio news tended to be censored. Film units were sent to PVs as part of the propaganda campaign.⁵⁵⁷ Another form of ‘entertainment’ that had economic and moral implications was the opening of beer halls. The beer halls were supplied by the Rhodesian Breweries and thus prevented the development of home brews by local women that could have benefited them. While this helped subdue the PVs, the more sensible villagers bitterly resented the existence of beer halls as they plundered what remaining money villagers had and contributed to a lowering of ‘the moral standards in the keeps.’⁵⁵⁸

Contrary to the government’s assertions that ‘that protected villages are meant to become growth points of future economic development,’⁵⁵⁹ it is clear from the kind of infrastructure developed that this was not the case. The basic camp structure did not allow for quality housing or other amenities. The much vaunted electricity was only used for security purposes. No sources of employment were created within the keeps. The collapse of local agriculture made hundreds of thousands of Rhodesian Africans dependent on government and non-government food aid.⁵⁶⁰ Plots that were allocated were often too small to support a family and helped to precipitate the collapse of farming.⁵⁶¹ In essence the resettlement program in Rhodesia created static settlements that could not under those circumstances grow into towns.⁵⁶²

‘Church life has been equally disrupted, and so have many social services. Shops and mills owned by the people had to close down. Instead of the small rural entrepreneurs who lost their livelihood, some richer men from town have come and set up small shops in the keeps. The money spent on goods in these shops comes mainly from the wage earnings of

⁵⁵⁵ A. K. H. Weinrich: “Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia.” *Journal of South African Studies*, (3), (2), 1977, p. 212.

⁵⁵⁶ *Ibid.* p. 219.

⁵⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵⁹ *Ibid.* p. 222.

⁵⁶⁰ *Ibid.* p. 229.

⁵⁶¹ NAZ MS 589 Reports on Protected Villages, Emergency Relief Committee, April 1976.

⁵⁶² NAZ MS 1184/7, Reports on Protected Villages, Roy Henson, 22 March 1976.

sons, husbands and brothers working in town, for the people in the keeps have no means of earning money. The point is that the so-called economic growth points of the future are at pre-sent rural slums whose people live off the charity of labour migrants.’⁵⁶³

Henson notes that, ‘Every family in any Tribal Trust Land depends on the natural vegetation for their cooking, for building homes, for making some small furniture, making ox-drawn carts as well as for fencing poles and for thatching the roofs of their houses.’⁵⁶⁴ Subsequently areas around villages were cleared of all vegetation that severely damaged the local ecology.⁵⁶⁵ A CCJPR report stated that, ‘The commission also received and investigated allegations of the deliberate bombing by the Rhodesian Air Force of civilian villages after the inhabitants had been removed to safety and of the destruction of their houses, property and crops. These facts have been clearly established and cannot be denied.’⁵⁶⁶ This was simply one method of destroying villages, their destruction further damaged the local economy.

Assistance from Government

Resettled Africans received very little in the way of assistance from their government. Weinrich reported that ‘no compensation has been paid to the people for their loss.’⁵⁶⁷ So for their loss of homes, property and crops there was no system of compensation in place. The villagers were essentially ‘expected to fend for themselves.’⁵⁶⁸ Villagers’ cattle were sold off to provide a degree of food support to the PVs.⁵⁶⁹ A European District Commissioner was quoted stating that ‘the security forces are definitely not here to give them everything.’⁵⁷⁰ In contrast European farmers were compensated handsomely for disruptions, with ‘over four million dollars’⁵⁷¹ paid to them in 1975, according to one report. When infrastructure projects were initiated, such as ‘bridge building, irrigation and drainage systems, the installation of

⁵⁶³ A. K. H. Weinrich: “Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia.” *Journal of South African Studies*, (3), (2), 1977, p. 228.

⁵⁶⁴ UNISA AA5163 CCJPR Appendix 13, Reports on Protected Villages, Report on Chiweshe July 1977,

⁵⁶⁵ UNISA AA5163 CCJPR Appendix 13, Reports on Protected Villages, Report on Chiweshe July 1977,

⁵⁶⁶ UNISA AA5163 CCJPR Appendix 20, *The Man in the Middle*, A report in Protected Villages, 1975.

⁵⁶⁷ A. K. H. Weinrich: “Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia.” *Journal of South African Studies*, (3), (2), 1977, p. 220.

⁵⁶⁸ *Ibid.* p. 223.

⁵⁶⁹ NAZ MS 1184/7 Reports on Protected Villages, Makaha Protected Village, June 1975.

⁵⁷⁰ A. K. H. Weinrich: “Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia.” *Journal of South African Studies*, (3), (2), 1977, p. 223.

⁵⁷¹ NAZ MS 1184/7, Reports on Protected Villages, extract of a report by Roy Henson, 1975.

protective fencing and the installation of latrines,⁵⁷² government would provide resources and expertise while villagers were forced to provide labour requirements.⁵⁷³ These projects were at the behest of the military, and soldiers of the RAR were used to organise this forced labour. As the Security Situation deteriorated they were often abandoned because the RAR was redeployed on military operations. As a result many of these projects remained half finished. Resettled Africans were promised a considerable amount of food assistance by the government. One man gave this report.

‘The people are also very hungry. Village headmen had been promised 15 to 20 bags of mealie per month for their villagers, but now they get only nine bags. One bucket of mealie is allocated to each adult and half a bucket to each child. Also one bucket of beans is given to each family, irrespective of how large the family is. This is far too little food and the people are very hungry. They have been promised food every month, but they receive it only every third month.’⁵⁷⁴

Food was often not distributed evenly and there was usually a disregard for the numbers of children.⁵⁷⁵ As such an array of Church Organisations, NGOs and the Red Cross had to step in and provide the support that the government failed to provide.⁵⁷⁶

The use of Guard Force to provide security

Initially the Department of Internal Affairs was responsible for the security of PVs.⁵⁷⁷ In the early stages the Department having no military or paramilitary trained elements was forced to ‘draw personnel from other areas to assist in manning Protected Villages. In the interim the Protected Villages in Chiweshe ‘were in some instances also manned by members of the South African Police. The Department of Internal Affairs in order to meet these new demands ‘established a new category of officer termed District Security Assistants who were distinct from the career DAs that performed normal administrative duties.’⁵⁷⁸ However, the Department could not cope with the training required and so the BSAP and Prison Service

⁵⁷² A. K. H. Weinrich: “Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia.” *Journal of South African Studies*, (3), (2), 1977, p. 223.

⁵⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷⁴ *Ibid.* p. 211.

⁵⁷⁵ NAZ MS 1184/7, Reports on Protected Villages, Report on Chiswiti and Kandeya Protected Villages, 27 November.

⁵⁷⁶ NAZ MS 1184/7, Reports on Protected Villages, Emergency Relief Committee, April 1976.

⁵⁷⁷ J. K. Cilliers: *Counter Insurgency in Rhodesia*, p. 93.

⁵⁷⁸ J. K. Cilliers: *Counter Insurgency in Rhodesia*, p. 94.

were tasked with the first training programmes. These programmes were then taken over by the army. ‘The department was allocated a number of National Servicemen for their normal 18 month period of service.’⁵⁷⁹ These national servicemen were posted to PVs as superintendents in charge. ‘In many cases a vedette was the only official within a Protected Village. His major responsibilities entailed the welfare and discipline of his 15 to 20 District Security Assistants, and the safety and protection of the Protected Villlage.’⁵⁸⁰ The call up age was raised to 25 to 38 in an attempt to have more mature and experience officers in charge of PVs.

The resettlement programme grew considerable and this put an enormous amount of strain on the Department of Internal Affairs whose primary function was administrative as opposed to military. As the Police and the Army ‘were loath to perform this function as part of their normal normal operations, it was eventually decided to form an autonomous force, the Guard Force.’⁵⁸¹ Initially ‘a guard force of about a thousand men’ was created using mainly ex-service Africans and an influx of Department of Internal Affairs Security Assistants. ‘Half of the Department of Internal Affairs National Service allocation and the Chikurubi training base was transferred to the Guard Force.’⁵⁸² To begin with Guard Force had only static defence duties involving PVs and other sites in need of security. Guard force was trained ‘by a former Rhodesian army officer, Lieutenant-Colonel R. Peart, who fought in Malaya and in the Middle East with the British army, and so is thought to have experience of protected villages and insurgency operations. He left the Rhodesian army in 1970.’⁵⁸³ Furthermore the CO of Guard Force, Brigadier Godwin, had served with the RAR during its tour to Malaya (1956-58).

⁵⁷⁹ J. K. Cilliers: *Counter Insurgency in Rhodesia*, p. 94.

⁵⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸² *Ibid.* p. 95.

⁵⁸³ A. K. H. Weinrich: “Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia.” *Journal of South African Studies*, (3), (2), 1977, p. 224.

Education in Protected Villages

The Rhodesian government claimed that it would be a lot easier to provide education to rural Africans after they had been concentrated, and that the provision of education that would be superior to that available for former villages. Each keep area did include at least one school.⁵⁸⁴ Evidence to the contrary suggests that education was heavily disrupted by the resettlement programme. Before resettlement areas like ‘Chiweshe, Madziwa, Mrewa, and to a lesser degree Mtoko’⁵⁸⁵ were ‘areas which had a reasonably well developed system of primary education, with some secondary schools.’⁵⁸⁶ The system had developed due several factors. The first of which was these areas proximity to the capital. This promoted unawareness among African parents that education would ensure their children decent employment. Thus they were prepared to plough significant funds into their children’s education. This attitude was assisted by the formation of schools that were built up by missions and then taken over by local councils.⁵⁸⁷ ‘With resettlement, very many of these schools have been closed, thirty in Chiweshe alone. It is only in cases in which the school is physically included in the fenced-in area that its buildings can still be used for teaching. Even where the schools stand just outside the fence, they had to be abandoned by order of the administration.’⁵⁸⁸ Existing schools only continued operating if they happened to be included in the perimeter of a PV.⁵⁸⁹ There were cases where even schools that were outside PVs on the perimeter were ‘abandoned by order of the ad-ministration.’⁵⁹⁰

Like the increased pressure on existing medical services, the reduction in the number of schools resulted in an excessive degree of pressure on the remaining schools in the PVs. This pressure was worsened further by the requirement for children who went to schools outside the confinement, to transfer to the keep school.⁵⁹¹ To deal with overcrowding double streaming had to be introduced⁵⁹² and teachers gave ‘morning and afternoon classes to

⁵⁸⁴ NAZ MS 1184/7, Reports on Protected Villages, Confinement in Mrewa, June 1975.

⁵⁸⁵ A. K. H. Weinrich: “Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia.” *Journal of South African Studies*, (3), (2), 1977, p. 228.

⁵⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹¹ NAZ MS 1184/7, Reports on Protected Villages, Confinement in Mrewa, June 1975.

⁵⁹² UNISA AA5163 CCJPR Appendix 9, Reports on Protected Villages, excerpt from the Herald, 1974

different groups of pupils.⁵⁹³ Teachers were far from satisfied with the living conditions within the keeps and applied for transfers to more salubrious schools. ‘The higher turn-over due to unsettled conditions and the severity of counter measures from both insurgents and the Security Forces has aggravated the situation.’⁵⁹⁴ This meant the teachers were rotating in and then out swiftly and this had a detrimental effect on the standard of teaching and the learning capabilities of students as they adjusted to new teachers.⁵⁹⁵ Unlike white state provided education the schools available to the resettled villagers required fees. Due to the disruption and partial collapse of the local economy, villagers lost the means with which to pay for their children’s schooling. As a result there was a ‘tremendous drop in education standards’⁵⁹⁶ and pupils were often held back a year by the initial school closures.⁵⁹⁷

Abuse Suffered in Rhodesian Protected Villages

There are a number of reports of cases where district security assistants abused their positions of power. While Weinrich notes that the complaints presented to her research assistants could not be verified, the frequency of these complaints does suggest that there is some truth to them. The circumstances with which the commanding white officer and his district security assistants operated can support their plausibility. Weinrich asserts that the security assistants were deployed to the keeps without their families and thus they were ‘forced to lead bachelor lives.’⁵⁹⁸ The CO was normally quite young and inexperienced and the only white officer in the PV. This helped create an environment whereby security assistants would use their control of the villagers to sexually harass women and to coerce them into intimate relations. In cultural terms this constituted a circumvention of these women’s traditional guardians.⁵⁹⁹ ‘The state, however, was interested in the behaviour of villagers only insofar as it complied with, or transgressed, the PV disciplinary structure.

⁵⁹³ A. K. H. Weinrich: “Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia.” *Journal of South African Studies*, (3), (2), 1977, p. 228.

⁵⁹⁴ UNISA AA5163 CCJPR Appendix 20, *The Man in the Middle*, A report on Protected Villages, 1975.

⁵⁹⁵ A. K. H. Weinrich: “Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia.” *Journal of South African Studies*, (3), (2), 1977, p. 228.

⁵⁹⁶ UNISA AA5163 CCJPR Appendix 13, Reports on Protected Villages, Report on Chiweshe, July 1977.

⁵⁹⁷ UNISA AA5163 CCJPR Appendix 10 Reports on Protected Villages, Report on Chiweshe, March 1975.

⁵⁹⁸ A. K. H. Weinrich: “Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia.” *Journal of South African Studies*, (3), (2), 1977, p. 224.

⁵⁹⁹ M. Kesby: “Arenas for Control, Terrains of Gender Contestation: Guerilla Struggle and Counter-Insurgency Warfare in Zimbabwe 1972-1980.” *Journal of Southern African Studies*, (22), (4), 1996, p. 576.

Official disinterest was obvious at every level. The number of 'seductions' by DAs was not considered noteworthy. Complaints of sexual harassment were explained as an over-reaction to necessary searches and calls for female guards to search women were dismissed as impractical.⁶⁰⁰ This disinterest included the security assistant's direct superior the national serviceman commanding the PV. One such officer with regard to 'his men's periodic desertion of their barracks to drink, 'womanise' and fight with cuckolded men.'⁶⁰¹

We tried to stop it; but 'boys will be boys' ... I accepted what was going on as pretty power for the course.⁶⁰²

The security assistants exploited the official disinterest in a predatory manner. For example men were searched in a rapid and efficient way upon entry or exit of the PV while 'the handling of women's bodies was laboured.'⁶⁰³

The soldiers enjoyed the searching, they did it with lustful eyes. They would feel the line of beads worn around the tummy for sex appeal.⁶⁰⁴
They made sure they touched every part ... touching the breasts.⁶⁰⁵

One method of coercing women to satisfy their sexual and also domestic requests was by 'manipulating the system of punishments'⁶⁰⁶

It was a dirty game, he would punish you today; you would have labour.

The next day he will say; 'I said I loved you but you rejected me, so what do you think is better; falling in love with me and forget about these punishments, or you continue?'⁶⁰⁷

Any attempts by menfolk to resist this kind of abuse were put down violently.⁶⁰⁸ More often though there cases of men and women speaking out, coping mechanisms developed. Men tended to turn to alcohol while targeted women would often succumb to the predations of the security assistants.⁶⁰⁹ Excuses were often made for the shooting of protesting husbands.

⁶⁰⁰ M. Kesby: "Arenas for Control, Terrains of Gender Contestation: Guerilla Struggle and Counter-Insurgency Warfare in Zimbabwe 1972-1980." *Journal of Southern African Studies*, (22), (4), 1996, p. 576.

⁶⁰¹ M. Kesby: "Arenas for Control, Terrains of Gender Contestation: Guerilla Struggle and Counter-Insurgency Warfare in Zimbabwe 1972-1980." *Journal of Southern African Studies*, (22), (4), 1996, p. 576.

⁶⁰² *Ibid.*

⁶⁰³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰⁵ *Ibid.* p. 577

⁶⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰⁸ UNISA AA5163 CCJPR Appendix 20, *The Man in the Middle*, A report on Protected Villages, 1975.

⁶⁰⁹ M. Kesby: "Arenas for Control, Terrains of Gender Contestation: Guerilla Struggle and Counter-Insurgency Warfare in Zimbabwe 1972-1980." *Journal of Southern African Studies*, (22), (4), 1996, p. 577.

‘Jacob’s father found one of his daughters pregnant. Another was always hanging around the gate with the D.A.’s, the hated District Assistants. He knew who was the father of the child but he kept his mouth shut. Mathew did not. One day his wife came back from the river where she gone to fetch water and told him that one of the D.A.s had pulled her into the bushes, threatened her and then raped her. The angry husband went and complained to the District Officer (DO). The next day he was shot because ‘he was outside the fence after six o’clock. No one complained after that and, willing or unwilling the D.A.’s had their pick of the women.’⁶¹⁰ The rampant sexual abuse lead to unwanted pregnancies that were often aborted, unsuccessful abortions often killed the mothers.⁶¹¹

Sexual abuse was not the only form of infraction by the security assistants. ‘On 13 December 1975 the Rhodesia Herald reported that a 22-year-old European DO and four DAs had been convicted of assaulting another DA in May 1975 in keep 20 in Chiweshe. The European DO was described by the magistrate as sadistic and cruel. The assaulted assistant needed ten days in hospital as a result of the injuries he had received. A well-documented case which was taken to court, but was suppressed when the government passed the Indemnity and Compensation Act, is that of a DA who shot dead two African boys and injured a third when these wanted to leave their keep at the check point in order to work in the fields. The district commissioner offered the children’s parents some money to cover the funeral expenses.’⁶¹² There are other ‘reports of people being shot for being a few minutes late in arriving at the gate, tales of harsh punishments given by the officers ruling the camps.’⁶¹³

Rural African Response to Resettlement

The crowding together of strangers broke down communal controls.⁶¹⁴ Social life was put under a great degree of strain. Elders were worried about the moral implications of

⁶¹⁰ NAZ MS 1184/7, Reports on Protected Villages, Roy Henson, 1976.

⁶¹¹ UNISA AA5163 CCJPR Appendix 20, *The Man in the Middle*, A report on Protected Villages, 1975.

⁶¹² A. K. H. Weinrich: “Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia.” *Journal of South African Studies*, (3), (2), 1977, p. 224.

⁶¹³ NAZ MS 1184/7, Reports on Protected Villages, extract of a report by Roy Henson, 1975.

⁶¹⁴ UNISA AA5163 CCJPR Appendix 20, *The Man in the Middle*, A report on Protected Villages, 1975.

consensual and no-consensual interactions between village women and the security forces.⁶¹⁵ Attempts to placate villagers with beer halls upset them, as it prevented earning money from home brewed beer and encouraged a moral decline.⁶¹⁶ Not all PVs were prevented from brewing beer.⁶¹⁷ Reports suggest that there was not a complete cultural break down in the PVs; marriage ceremonies still took place,⁶¹⁸ and kraal-heads still settled minor disputes and chiefs held customary civil cases.⁶¹⁹ Evidence suggests that villagers were sceptical of the radio services provided and film screenings, and were well aware that they were attempts to disseminate propaganda.⁶²⁰ Of the grievances created by resettlement it was their children's hunger that parents resented most.⁶²¹ For all the government's assertions that PVs were there to protect villagers, they did not feel protected, but rather they felt they had been imprisoned.⁶²² Reports indicate that they hated the wire and the Government for putting them there.⁶²³ Villagers saw the PVs as temporary and yearned to return to their ancestral lands, despite the destruction of many of their former homes.⁶²⁴

Conclusion

The Federation of Malaya government made to considerable efforts in planning their resettlement program. The Rhodesian government used a similar planning methodology to that of the Malayan government though it was not as comprehensive or thorough. Even so, in both cases the resettlement process was rushed on a massive scale and preparatory plans were usually abandoned or ignored. Both governments set aside inadequate resources for their respective resettlement schemes. However, the Malayan government provided a degree of compensation for destroyed property, goods and livestock, and paid resettled villagers a temporary subsistence allowance. The Malayan government also aided resettled villagers in constructing new homes. While this support was not completely adequate, it eased the

⁶¹⁵ UNISA AA5163 CCJPR Appendix 9, Reports on Protected Villages, Report on Chiweshe 1974.

⁶¹⁶ UNISA AA5163 CCJPR Appendix 9, Reports on Protected Villages, Report on Chiweshe 1974.

⁶¹⁷ NAZ MS 1184/7, Reports on Protected Villages, Madziwa Keeps circa 1976.

⁶¹⁸ NAZ MS 1184/7, Reports on Protected Villages, Madziwa Keeps circa 1976.

⁶¹⁹ NAZ MS 1184/7, Reports on Protected Villages, Madziwa Keeps circa 1976.

⁶²⁰ UNISA AA5163 CCJPR Appendix 9, Reports on Protected Villages, Report on Chiweshe 1974.

⁶²¹ UNISA AA5163 CCJPR Appendix 12 Reports on Protected Villages, Report on Madziwa 26 December 1974.

⁶²² NAZ MS 1184/7, Reports on Protected Villages, extract of a report by Roy Henson, 1975.

⁶²³ NAZ MS 1184/7, Report on Protected Villages, Roy Henson, 22 March 1976.

⁶²⁴ NAZ MS 1184/7, Reports on Protected Villages, Roy Henson, 22 March 1976.

hardship of relocation to some degree. In contrast, the Rhodesian government had no system of compensation and did not provide a living allowance. Instead of compensating villagers for their livestock losses, livestock were often confiscated and sold by the Rhodesian government to provide food for the newly resettled inhabitants of Protected Villages.

Despite the differing levels of compensation, the initial conditions in Malayan New Villages were much the same as Rhodesian Protected Villages. Disease and malnutrition were prevalent and mortality rates showed a sharp increase. Both resettlement programs had a collection of model settlements that were used for propaganda purposes. In both cases, camp administration with rigorous and oppressive systems of control was imposed upon the resettled villagers. At the start resettled villagers had practically no say in the running of their new environment. Hence both schemes did not initially cater for new political structures or participation. There was an acute shortage of administrative and medical staff in both resettlement programs. In particular, the Malayan government struggled to recruit staff that could speak a Chinese dialect. The security situation of resettled villagers did not show any improvement and tended to deteriorate in both conflicts, as their respective guerrilla forces prioritised attacks on New Villages and Protected Villages. The wider security situation also showed no immediate improvement. In the case of Malaya, there was a correlation between resettlement and a general increase in MRLA attacks.

The Malayan government had promised to improve the educational, political and economic opportunities for the resettled villagers, yet nothing tangible materialised at the outset of their program. The Rhodesian government had also made promises though more on better security for villages and the provision of amenities; instead pre-existing economic, education, medical and political structures were compromised. It is clear that initially both resettlement programs were humanitarian disasters of little benefit to the military aspects of the campaign. This begs the question, why was resettlement an effective strategy in the Malayan Emergency and an unsuccessful one in the Rhodesian Civil War?

Chapter 7

Local and External Factors that decided the outcome of the Malayan Emergency and the Rhodesian Civil War

Introduction

Chapter 7 identifies a set of key factors, unique to each conflict, which can be directly linked to the success of resettlement in Malaya and its failure in Rhodesia. The prior chapters have revealed several vital aspects of the local context in Malaya that facilitated resettlement. Chief among them are characteristics of the population targeted by resettlement. Rhodesia's target population was distinct to that of Malaya's. This chapter will assert how characteristics such as culture, citizenship, land tenure and long standing ties to land, influences the success or failure of resettlement. An important difference between the two resettlement programs was how the Malayan and Rhodesian governments conceptualised their respective conflicts. Their diametrically opposed understanding of their respective internal wars is highly relevant to their different approaches to counter-insurgency and in turn, their resettlement programs. The Malayan resettlement program had a more civilian focus while the Rhodesian resettlement had a more military focus. Of particular significance to the Malayan Emergency was an external factor, namely the Korean War (June 25, 1950 – July 27, 1953). This chapter will illustrate the Korean War's significance and posit that that lack of a similar external factor, in the case of Rhodesia, proved detrimental to Rhodesia's resettlement program.

The Effect of the Korean War on the Malayan Emergency and the Resettlement Program

In 1952 a news article stated with a degree of despondency, 'resettlement has caused changes in the country's economic structure. The acreage under food crops, other than rice, has fallen by one-third. The cost of food-stuffs has risen: supplies of fresh vegetables, pigs, and poultry have been short, and there has been an increase in vegetable imports from abroad.

There are still no schools in 196 out of the 410 new villages. Many of the teachers in the new schools have had little training and the medical service is still inadequate.⁶²⁵ For all the Federal government's policies, resettlement appeared to be floundering. 'War is a matter not so much of arms as of money.'⁶²⁶ A government cannot wage a war, politically or militarily without the requisite finances. 'The Korean War could not have come at a more opportune time for the Malayan Government. In May 1950, the High Commissioner had predicted that even with a British Government contribution of about \$25 million, the Malayan reserves would be exhausted by the end of the year.'⁶²⁷

The Korean War (1950-1953) caused a sharp rise in tin and rubber prices, while nations began to build their strategic stockpiles. 'The price of rubber rose dramatically, doubling within a few months and ultimately reading over \$2.20 per pound in February 1951, before dropping again to an average \$1.70 per pound for the year, or over four times the average price for 1949. The price of tin rose less quickly, but even so, in early 1951, it was over £1,300 per long ton on the London Market – a marked increase over the April 1950 price of £590.'⁶²⁸ Tin and rubber prices continued to remain at these high levels for much of 1952.⁶²⁹ Malaya's primary exports were tin and rubber and so the profits of mines and plantations improved enormously. This in turn gave 'a great boost to the Government's revenue. The duty collected from the export of rubber rose from \$28.1 million in 1949 to \$89.3 million in 1950.'⁶³⁰ In effect the fresh inflow of taxes into the government exchequer saved the Malayan government from bankruptcy and austerity measures. This vastly improved the financial resources at the government's disposal and consequently provided funding for the resettlement program and aspects of the military campaign.

The resettlement of labour while enforced on plantations and mines by the government was not state funded. Briggs 'would not concede that the cost of regrouping should be borne by Government, and explained that this was a measure of special protection for which in an Emergency individuals could reasonably be expected to accept liability.'⁶³¹ The costs were

⁶²⁵ TNA CO 1022/29 The Resettlement of Squatters in Malaya, Improvements to New Villages, news article circa June 1952.

⁶²⁶ Thucydides & R. Crawley (translation): *History of the Peloponnesian War*, p. 36-37.

⁶²⁷ R. Stubbs: *Hearts and Minds in Guerilla Warfare The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960*, p. 108.

⁶²⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶²⁹ *Ibid.* p. 109.

⁶³⁰ R. Stubbs: *Hearts and Minds in Guerilla Warfare The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960*, p. 108.

⁶³¹ NAS CO 717/202 Law and Order, Economic Effects, minutes of a meeting between a British government deputation, and the High Commissioner and the Director of Operations of the Federation of Malaya, 21 June 1951.

borne privately by the large mining and plantation companies. The rise in profits restored what had been a major decline in those two sectors and gave companies the capacity to meet the costs of regroupment without compromising their operations and solvency. If regroupment had been forced on the tin and rubber sectors with a continuing decline, those industries could very well have collapsed under the additional financial pressure. This in turn could have prompted an economic recession. The windfall in profits also facilitated healthy managers' bonuses that steadied morale and hefty spending on plantation and mining security. 'In 1949, for instance, only \$4 million had been spent on defence by European estates; during 1951, \$ 16 million was spent. Dunlop, one of the major rubber plantation owners, alone spent well over \$4 million on, among other things, seventy armoured cars and a number of highly trained European security officers.'⁶³²

Due to the way the larger rubber plantations employed one year forward contracts, it was the small holders in the rubber industry that began to benefit first. As soon as those contracts expired the larger plantations began reaping the benefits of economic fortune. Operations in both the large and small holders were scaled up. 'In the tin industry, the expansion took place towards the end of 1950 with forty-one mines being reopened or started. Seven more were opened in 1951, and labour was in demand.'⁶³³ With the vociferous demand for labour came a massive increase in wages. 'Moreover, the high wages paid to rubber and tin workers forced other industrial and commercial employers, as well as the Government, to grant substantial pay raises so as to stop labour deserting them altogether. Hence, despite the inflation which always accompanies commodity prices booms, most Malaysians experienced an increase in their 'real wage' and many did very well indeed.'⁶³⁴

For the people of the New Villages, the Korean War boom, created jobs and economic opportunities. The prosperity created by the growing economy, combined with the improvements that came with higher resource allocation to the resettlement schemes, helped to 'sugar coat' the Malayan Authorities repressive law and order regulations and COIN operations. A 1953 report stated, 'additional funds to the extent of \$5 million are to be made

⁶³² R. Stubbs: *Hearts and Minds in Guerilla Warfare The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960*, p. 112.

⁶³³ *Ibid.* p. 110.

⁶³⁴ R. Stubbs: *Hearts and Minds in Guerilla Warfare The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960*, p. 112.

⁶³⁴ *Ibid.* p. 111.

available for the purposes of carrying out permanent improvements to new villages during the year.⁶³⁵

The Federal government recognised that resettlement had led to a sizeable reduction in the cultivation of food and of husbandry, for example, poultry, fish and pig farming.⁶³⁶ The main challenge facing the government was the provision of suitable arable land near the New Villages.⁶³⁷ The government assumed that after the Emergency some of the settlers would return to their former holdings and hence it focused on meeting mainly the immediate cultivation needs of settlers.⁶³⁸ The government surmised there were two main causes, the first that ‘squatters’ were usually far removed from their previous holdings and that made it difficult to cultivate them. The second being, that ‘the boom conditions existing at the time of resettlement reduced the significance of the agricultural aspect of the family economy.’⁶³⁹ The first cause persuaded the government to ensure that land provided to settlers for agriculture, should be as close to the New Villages as practicable.⁶⁴⁰ The cost of purchasing arable land in the immediate vicinity of New Villages would be high. Nonetheless, the Korean Boom would provide the funds with which to buy such land.⁶⁴¹ The agricultural policy had two main aims: the first would be ‘to increase the amount of food, e.g. vegetables, pork, eggs and poultry; the second to provide a stable occupation for those whose skill and inclination make them wish to farm.’⁶⁴²

The government’s intention was to make the New Villages self-sufficient and also suppliers of agricultural produce to towns.⁶⁴³ There was an awareness of the mixed-economy of the new villages. To that end the policy set out guidelines for the distribution of land ‘For those families whose menfolk are in paid employment half an acre should be sufficient; for those families whose menfolk wish to practise full-time farming not less than three acres should be allocated and more if extensive animal fodder is to be grown.’⁶⁴⁴ Tobacco farming

⁶³⁵ TNA CO 1022/29 The Resettlement of Squatters in Malaya, Improvements to New Villages, 1953

⁶³⁶ TNA CO 1022/33 Food cultivation around new villages, extract from a report, March 1953.

⁶³⁷ TNA CO 1022/33 Food cultivation around new villages, extract from a report, March 1953.

⁶³⁸ TNA CO 1022/33 Food cultivation around new villages, extract from a report, March 1953.

⁶³⁹ TNA CO 1022/33 Food cultivation around new villages, letter from the Acting Chief Secretary, 18 July, 1952.

⁶⁴⁰ TNA CO 1022/33 Food cultivation around new villages, letter from the Acting Chief Secretary, 18 July, 1952.

⁶⁴¹ TNA CO 1022/33 Food cultivation around new villages, letter from the Acting Chief Secretary, 18 July, 1952.

⁶⁴² TNA CO 1022/33 Food cultivation around new villages, Agricultural Policy for Resettlement Areas, 1952.

⁶⁴³ TNA CO 1022/33 Food cultivation around new villages, Agricultural Policy for Resettlement Areas, 1952.

⁶⁴⁴ TNA CO 1022/33 Food cultivation around new villages, Agricultural Policy for Resettlement Areas, 1952.

was not encouraged though neither was it prohibited.⁶⁴⁵ Cultivation and in particular husbandry was funded through a combination of government grants and loans.⁶⁴⁶ While farmers were only issued with temporary licences to start with, if they farmed well, they could progress to leasing their land.⁶⁴⁷ Hence while resettlement and the Korean War Boom had retarded agricultural, accruing revenue was used by the Malayan government to rectify the problem.

Due to the Korean War ‘boom’, the Federal government had built schools for 411 New Villages, comprising of 2,068 classrooms and 1,785 teachers quarters, at a cost of six million straits dollars.⁶⁴⁸ By 1955 the Federal government was confident that adequate provisions have been made for services such as education and medical care.⁶⁴⁹ In effect the resettled villagers found themselves in an environment where alongside repressive measures, their immediate conditions were improving as amenities were put in place, their economic mobility had improved considerable and British promises of political inclusion were gradually being fulfilled. Contrary to Hack, one posits that the Korean War was a significant event that altered the course of the Malayan Emergency.⁶⁵⁰ It can be argued that the ‘British Way of War’ in Malaya would not have been mythologised for its Malayan success was it not for the vagaries of the global economy. One cannot divorce trade from warfare as the two are firmly enmeshed. This is abundantly clear from the Rhodesian Civil War, where Rhodesia did not have its own ‘Korean War’ moment.

The Rhodesian Economy and Resettlement

Hard on the heels of Ian Smith’s UDI came international economic sanctions. First applied by Great Britain in 1965 and then followed by United Nations selective sanctions that gave way to mandatory sanctions in 1966. However, these sanctions did not bring an end to Rhodesia’s rebellion in the weeks and months envisaged by Harold Wilson. The Rhodesians managed to develop highly successful sanction busting techniques and significant trading

⁶⁴⁵ TNA CO 1022/33 Food cultivation around new villages, Agricultural Policy for Resettlement Areas, 1952.

⁶⁴⁶ TNA CO 1022/33 Food cultivation around new villages, Agricultural Policy for Resettlement Areas, 1952.

⁶⁴⁷ TNA CO 1022/29 The Resettlement of Squatters in Malaya, news article circa 1951.

⁶⁴⁸ TNA CO 1030/277 New Villages in the Federation of Malaya, telegram from the Federation of Malaya to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 12 March 1955.

⁶⁴⁹ TNA CO 1030/277 New Villages in the Federation of Malaya, telegram from the Federation of Malaya to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 12 March 1955.

⁶⁵⁰ K. Hack: ‘“Iron Claws on Malaya”: The Historiography of the Malayan Emergency,’ *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, (30), (1) (1999), p. 103.

powers like South African continued to do business. Immediately after the war, the consensus was that sanctions were a complete failure as they did not succeed in their overt goal of bringing down the Rhodesian government. While the Rhodesians were able to circumvent the economic strangle hold in part, this was not without cost. The illegality of doing business with Rhodesia may not have deterred certain nations and businessmen. Nevertheless there was a marked increase in the cost accrued by Rhodesians when undertaking business deals. This state of affairs created an inordinate amount of economic friction that that was a constant factor for the duration of the war. The Rhodesian economy was forced to become more self-sufficient while economic measures and restrictions like fuel rationing were put in place. The combination of sanctions and a war that damaged the economy in a myriad of ways, contributed to an economic decline, though not a complete collapse. As a result insufficient resources were diverted to the Rhodesian government's resettlement program. Unlike Malaya there were no external or internal economic factors that vastly improved the flow of revenue into the Rhodesian treasury.

While certain segments of the resettled rural Africans were more prosperous than others (like Chiweshe), resettlement more or less levelled out previous economic differences. It was much more than simply transplanting rural poverty behind barbed wire. The resettlement scheme was a thorough economic dislocation. Studies and reports have shown that villagers lives were not improved by resettlement as asserted by the Rhodesian Front; instead they invariably worsened. 'Otherwise the 'growth points of prosperity'' will turn out to be growth points of poverty and misery.'⁶⁵¹ Due to the destruction of their livelihoods and a worsening of their living conditions, the resettled villagers were forced into a dependency on the Rhodesian State. The Rhodesian government was under the delusion that the villagers would be able to provide for themselves and did not take the appropriate measures to support them. The reports on mortalities alone point to the level of neglect of these PVs.

Culture was a crucial factor in the success of resettlement in Malaya and its failure in Rhodesia. In the case of the Malayan Emergency, the majority of those resettled were Chinese. For the most part, they were not yet Malayan citizens, many of them had not legal title to the land they had previously occupied and were classified as illegal squatters. A commonality between the majority of those who were settled or regrouped was that they were either recent or historically immigrants. As immigrants they tended to migrate within Malaya

⁶⁵¹ NAZ MS 1184/7, Reports on Protected Villages, Report on Chiswiti and Kandeya Protected Villages, 27 November 1975.

in search of work and land to provide for themselves. In other word their ties to the land they were relocated from did not go back countless generations. Therefore their ties to their land could be considered somewhat looser than that of Malay Kampongs where they had legal title or not. It could be asserted that as immigrants and economic migrants, the concept of moving when required was not completely alien to them. Consequently while highly resentful of being coerced to move from their former homes, they would prove somewhat easier to convince once their new resettled conditions began to improve.

The Ndebele and the Shona tribes were completely different in this respect. In Zimbabwe's long history there had been major migrations, though for all intents and purposes they were indigenous to Rhodesia. The tribesmen who were resettled had been living in their villages for generations, and their ancestors were buried on their land. As agriculturalists they had significant ties to their livestock, in particular cattle that transcended a pure monetary value. Shona society was patriarchal with a structure of chiefs and elders. Unlike Malaya's illegal squatters, African tribesman held their land legally through communal tenure. They had historic rights to the land. However, the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 had left the Africans with less than half the land in Rhodesia, with much of it arid and not capable of supporting the increasing population. In 1965, the Native Areas were converted to TTLs, with Tribal Trust Lands Act. In 1969 with the Land Tenure Act, Rhodesia's land was divided roughly in half between Africans and Europeans with a significant number of acres marked as national land. This act was amended in 1977 to allow Africans to purchase European farmland and land in urban areas. The land grievances of Rhodesian Africans stretched back to 1890 and have not yet healed to this day. Resettlement à la Rhodesia could only have produced an adverse reaction to this population group.

There is also the question of Government legitimacy. The British Malayan government was seen as legitimate, if temporary as they had promised Malayan independence. The Federation of Malaya was internationally recognised as part of the British Empire, and as such there were normal diplomatic relations and economic ties. As part of the Empire and then Commonwealth, support was forthcoming from the British Empire and the Commonwealth, and allies such as the United States. The Rhodesian government, due to UDI, was an illegal regime and a pariah state. Internationally Rhodesia was not recognised and could not confidently count of support from most quarters. While Rhodesia was a self-governing colony and part of a greater Federation from 1953 to 1963, it should be remembered that the Rhodesia was created by force of arms and deceit. This is hardly

conducive to creating the perception of legitimacy in the eyes of Rhodesian Africans, and less so when the government has been declared illegal by the international community. The question of legitimacy spiked the guns of the Rhodesian Front's belated attempts at reforms.

In Malaya, New Villages were gradually integrated in government administration and political structures. Often members of the village councils formed were associated with the MCA and this facilitated canvassing for support during federal and state elections. The councils allowed New Village to be devolved from government officials and created direct forms of liaison with state and federal officials.⁶⁵² They could raise their own taxes and embark on projects and provided excellent political experience. New Villages became a permanent part of the Malaysian landscape while in Independent Zimbabwe they no longer exist. In Malaya, New Villages had opportunities for advancement in political, economic, and social spheres. The former micro quasi political structures were not as entrenched or a fundamental part of custom as in Rhodesia. PVs in Rhodesia broke down existing village structures i.e head man and elders, who in the new dispensation had no power. The Rhodesian government replaced that system with a repressive camp structure where young men were given power over the elderly; thus replacing them with an alien and abusive system with a political dead end. Rhodesian PVs had no economic or social mobility. The villages' micro political system was not replaced with a new kind of political system that would allow villagers a political voice or rights. In essence at best the PVs put the resettled Africans in a static situation. Though in reality they found themselves was far worse than their previous villages. The fabric of their society had been ripped apart and replaced with a repressive structure, while being dislocated from the economy. While there were reports of model villages, in the balance, they seem to have been Potemkin Villages, a façade to distract the public eye from the real conditions of the majority of villages.⁶⁵³

The Resettlement scheme was embarked upon by the Rhodesian government only after they became aware of widespread guerrilla infiltration. Many of the villages that were resettled had already have reached by ZANU and ZAPU political commissars. The Rhodesian resettlement program played into the hands of ZANU politicisation, proving that Rhodesian government was not working in the interests of the 'people'. Resettlement was seized upon as a prominent grievance by ZANU and ZAPU, perhaps rightly so. 'Many of the people who spoke distrust the security forces, and many, in fact, look to the guerrillas as their

⁶⁵² R. Stubbs: *Hearts and Minds in Guerilla Warfare The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960*, p. 215.

⁶⁵³ UNISA AA5163 CCJPR Appendix 20, *The Man in the Middle*, A report on Protected Villages, 1975.

liberators. The immediate effect, which during the last three years the events in Chiweshe, have had on the people, is a great intensification of political awareness and this includes women as well as men. In fact, a spirit of resistance is discernible in the TTL.⁶⁵⁴

In political terms, resettlement completely alienated Rhodesian Africans from the Rhodesian government. One posits that resettlement helped create widespread support for ZANU and ZAPU, support that ZANU capitalised upon in the 1980 elections. Certainly there is evidence that there was coercion and intimidation of voters in those elections but that this was the only reason that ZANU came to power is a complete fallacy. The Rhodesian Civil War, at a fundamental level, was a war for the support of the Rhodesian Africans. The Rhodesian Front was a right wing party whose prime focus was the support of its white constituents. The Rhodesian Front was therefore ill equipped politically to win the Rhodesian Africans confidently to their side. The Rhodesian Government devoted much of the budget and effort to the military side of the war. Resettlement served military goals, instead of serving as a vehicle for transforming Rhodesia's political landscape. Even if the government had allocated more resources to resettlement and had adopted a more political approach; the local context was simply not suited to resettlement. Furthermore, there were no external global economic changes that could have created economic conditions conducive to resettlement.

Culminating Thoughts

Primarily due to the example set by the British counter-insurgency campaign in Malaya, there has been a fixation by COIN theorists on the 20 – 80 per cent balance between the military and political aspects of such campaigns. This has largely been inspired by the works of Thompson and Galula, where case studies of scenarios in which governments have been defeated have been analysed to show that a military - political imbalance was a major factor in their demise. Conventional historical texts on the Emergency further buttress the balance argument by asserting the paradigm of a uniquely British way of waging counter-insurgency. Historians such as French have striven to show that this paradigm of British military-civil balance and limited war is a myth, and that the British counter-insurgent practice was ruthless and coercive. Elsewhere, in his treatment of the Rhodesian Civil War,

⁶⁵⁴ UNISA AA5163 CCJPR Appendix 9, Reports on Protected Villages, Report on Chiweshe 1974.

Moorcraft asserts that the Rhodesian military fulfilled the 20 percent of the military part of equation while the political leaders failed to meet the demands of the 80 percent political part.

One posits that the Malayan Emergency and the Rhodesian Civil War were both political wars in the sense captured by the nineteenth-century theorist Clausewitz, ‘when whole communities go to war – whole peoples and especially civilized peoples – the reason always lies in some political situation, and the occasion is always due to some political object. War, therefore, is an act of policy.’⁶⁵⁵ In the case of the Malayan Emergency, both the MCP and the British authorities recognised they were fighting a political war, and devised stratagems accordingly. The Rhodesian Civil War differs in that the African Nationalists waged the war politically, while the Rhodesian government fought it militarily, and only introduced reformist political measures as a last resort.

Therefore the crux of the argument is that there was no balance between the military and political in either of these two conflicts. The belligerents of both conflicts had political goals. That is to say, both the Malayan Emergency and the Rhodesian Civil War, were political wars. Clausewitz states: ‘that however, does not imply that the political aim is a tyrant. It must adapt itself to its chosen means, a process which can radically change it; yet the political aim remains the first consideration. Policy, the, will permeate all military operations, and, in so far as their violent nature will admit, it will have a continuous influence on them.’⁶⁵⁶ In effect, one affirms that ‘war is not a mere act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political activity by other means.’⁶⁵⁷ Therefore, the military aspects of a campaign are, invariably, a smaller part of a greater political whole, in that, ‘the political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and mean can never be considered in isolation from their purposes.’⁶⁵⁸ The British Malayan Government established the political nature of its war while the Rhodesian government failed to realise that it was embroiled in a political war, to its detriment.⁶⁵⁹

This dissertation has sought to demonstrate the significance of historical military link between the Malayan Emergency and the Rhodesian Civil War. To that end, the Rhodesian contribution to the Malayan Emergency has been illuminated beyond the previous extent of the historical discourse. The comparative methodology has added fresh insight to the

⁶⁵⁵ C. Clausewitz: *On War*, pp. 86-87.

⁶⁵⁶ *Ibid.* p. 87.

⁶⁵⁷ *Ibid.* p. 88.

⁶⁵⁸ *Ibid.* p. 87.

⁶⁵⁹ *Ibid.* p. 88.

Resettlement programmes of both conflicts. This thesis has clarified the degree to which the Malayan Emergency has informed the way in which the Rhodesian Civil War was fought. On that basis, one concludes that this provides grounds for a more extensive comparative study of the Malayan Emergency and the Rhodesian Civil War.

The comparison of two resettlement programs has shown that many factors, military, social, economic, medical, political, cultural, and international, decided the success or failure of resettlement, and its subsequent influence on the outcome of both conflicts. This study has determined that it is perilous to take COIN techniques based on the historical record of one conflict and blindly employ them in a present campaign that has a completely different local and international context.

While it can be argued that ‘strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory and that tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat’⁶⁶⁰, the crucial conclusion that this study has reached is that without a compatible context, both military and political tactics and strategies are worthless, and may yet reap a bitter harvest of defeat.

⁶⁶⁰ Attributed to Sun Tzu.

Bibliography

Archival Documents

National Archives, Publish Record Office, Kew

Air Ministry: AIR 20/7777

Colonial Office: CO 1022/56, CO 852/1113, CO 1022/32, CO 1022/33, CO 1022/29

War Office: WO 32/16725.

National Archives of Singapore

Colonial Office: CO 717/202, CO 717/201, CO 1030/277,

National Archives of Zimbabwe, Harare

Defence Headquarters, Salisbury: S 814, S 815.

Wells, Col. Ge 1962-1975: S 3021/3/1/2

Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia: MS 1184/7, MS 589

Historical Manuscripts: SP2

UNISA Archives

Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia Collection: AA5163

Published Primary Sources

Anti-Terrorist Operations in Rural Areas Chapter 7 Section 5 Use of Dogs in *ATOPS*.

W. Walker: *ATOM* 3rd Ed. 1958. Chapter XX, p. 5.

Secondary Sources

Bastin, J. & Winks, R. W: *Malaysia Selected Historical Readings*. Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1966.

Baxter P: *Selous Scouts Rhodesian Counter-Insurgency Specialists*. Helion & Company Ltd, United Kingdom, 2011.

Binda A: *Masodja the history of the Rhodesian African Rifles and its forerunner the Rhodesia Native Regiment*. 30° South Publishers, Johannesburg, 2007.

Blaufarb D. S. & Tanham G. K: *Who Will Win A Key to the Puzzle of Revolutionary War*. Taylor and Francis, New York, 1989.

Brooker P: *Modern Stateless Warfare*. Palgrave MacMillan, United Kingdom, 2010.

Cilliers J. K: *Counter Insurgency in Rhodesia*. Croom Helm, London, 1985.

Clausewitz C: *On War*. Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1976.

Cole B. *The Elite, The Story of the Rhodesian Special Air Service*. Three Knights Publishing, South Africa, 1984.

Finlan, A: *Special Forces, Strategy and the War on Terror*. Routledge, United Kingdom, 2009.

French, D: *The British Way in Counter-Insurgency 1945-1967*. Oxford University Press, United Kingdom, 2011.

Grob-Fitzgibbon B: *Imperial End Game Britain's Dirty Wars and the End of Empire*. Palgrave Macmillan, United Kingdom, 2011.

Hale, C: *Massacre in Malaya Exposing Britain's My Lai*. The History Press, United Kingdom, 2013.

Hartley, L.P: *The go-between*, New York Review Books, United States of America, 2002

Hoe A. & Morris E: *Re-Enter the SAS The Special Air Service and the Malayan Emergency*. Leo Cooper, London, 1994.

Jackson, R: *The Malayan Emergency & Indonesian Confrontation*. Routledge, United Kingdom, 1991.

Jones T: *SAS The First Secret Wars The Unknown Years of Combat and Insurgency*. I. B. Taurus and Co Ltd, London, 2005/2011.

Kiss P. A: *Winning Wars amongst the People Case Studies in Asymmetric Warfare*. University of Nebraska Press, United States of America, 2014.

- Komer R. W.: *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*. Advanced Research Projects Agency Department of Defence, RAND, United States of America, February 1972.
- Mackenzie A: *Special Force The Untold Story of 22nd Special Air Service Regiment (SAS)*. I. B. Taurus and Co Ltd, London, 2011.
- Miers, R: *Shoot to Kill*. Faber and Faber Ltd, London, 1959.
- Moorcraft P & P. McLaughlin P: *The Rhodesian War A Military History*. Pen & Sword Military, United Kingdom, 1982/2008.
- Nagl, J. A. *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*. University of Chicago Press, America, United States of America 2002/2005
- O'Ballance E: *Malaya: The Communist Insurgent War 1948-60*. Archon Books, United States of America, 1966.
- Peter, A: *Modern African wars, Rhodesia 1965-80*. Osprey, London, 1986.
- Pittaway J. & Fourie C: *SAS Rhodesia : Rhodesians and the Special Air Service*. Dandy Agencies, Musgrave, 2003.
- Porch, D: *Counterinsurgency Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War*. Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, 2013.
- Portelli, A: *The Death of Luigi Trastulli and Other Stories, Form and Meaning in Oral History*. State University of New York Press, United States of America, 1991.
- Postgate M. R: *Operation Firedog Air Support In The Malayan Emergency `1948-1960*. Her Majesty's Stationary Office, London, 1992.
- Ramakrishna, K: *Emergency Propaganda The Winning of Malayan Hearts and Minds 1948-1958*. Routledge, Oxfordshire, 2015/2002.
- Richards D. & Mills G: *Victory Among People Lessons from Countering Insurgency and Stabilising Fragile States*. Royal United Services Institute, London, 2011.
- Short A: *Communist insurrection in Malaya 1948-1960*. Muller, London, 1975.
- Stapleton T: *African Police and Soldiers in Colonial Zimbabwe 1923-1980*. University of Rochester Press, United States of America, 2011.
- Stewart B. (ed.): *Smashing Terrorism in the Malayan Emergency The Vital Contribution of the Police*. Pelanduk Publications, Malaysia, 2004.
- Stewart M. P: *The Rhodesian African Rifles: The Growth and Adaptation of a Multicultural Regiment through the Rhodesian Bush War, 1965-1980*. Military Bookshop, United States of America, 2012.

Stubbs R: *Hearts and Minds in Guerilla Warfare The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960*. Oxford University Press, Malaysia, 1989.

Thompson R: *Defeating Communist Insurgency Experiences from Malaya*. Chatto and Windus Ltd, Great Britain, 1966/1974.

Thucydides & Crawley R: (translation): *History of the Peloponnesian War*, Dover Publications, United States of America, 2004, 1910.

Journal Articles

Archer, T. C. R: "Medical Problems of the Operational Infantry Soldier in Malaya." *Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps*, (103), (4), 1957, pp. 1-13.

Bailey, M. S: "A brief history of British military experiences with infectious and tropical diseases." *Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps*, (159), 2013, pp. 150-157.

Grob-Fitzgibbon, B: "Those Who Dared: A Reappraisal of Britain's Special Air Service." *The International History Review*, (37), (3), 2015, pp. 540-564.

Hack, K: "'Iron Claws on Malaya': The Historiography of the Malayan Emergency," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, (30), (1) (1999), pp. 99-125.

Kesby, M: "Arenas for Control, Terrains of Gender Contestation: Guerilla Struggle and Counter-Insurgency Warfare in Zimbabwe 1972-1980." *Journal of Southern African Studies*, (22), (4), 1996, pp. 561-584.

King, K, J: "Malaya's Resettlement Problem." *Far Eastern Survey*, (23), (3), 1954, pp. 33-40.

Lowry, D. "The Impact of Anti-communism on White Rhodesian Political Culture, ca. 1920-1980." *Cold War History*, (7), (2), 2007, pp. 169-194.

Msindo, E: "'Winning Hearts and Minds': Crisis and Propaganda in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1962-1970." *Journal of South African Studies*, (35), (3), 2009, pp. 663-691.

Sandhu, K. S: "The Saga of the "Squatter" in Malaya: A Preliminary Survey of the Causes, Characteristics and Consequences of the Resettlement of Rural Dwellers during the Emergency between 1948 and 1960." *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, (5), (1), 1964, pp. 143-177.

Supramaniam V: "Leptospirosis in The Malaysian Army." *The Malaysian Journal of Pathology*, (2), 1979, pp. 11-14.

Weinrich, A. K. H: "Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia." *Journal of South African Studies*, (3), (2), 1977, pp. 207-229.

Newspaper Articles

NAS "Rhodesia sending jungle troops," *Strait times*, 28 Jan 1951, p. 1.

NAS “Sparkling play by Soucts XV,” *The Singapore Free Press*, 27 October 1951, p. 6.

NAS “New Battalion To Fight Terrorists,” *The Singapore Free Press*, 28 April 1956, p. 2.

NAS “Queen honours the fighting men,” *The Straits Times*, 21 December 1957, p. 9.

NAS “Band Concert,” *The Straits Times*, 5 January 1957, p. 5.

NAS “Thanks to Last Rhodesian battalion,” *The Straits Times*, 13 February 1958, p. NA.

NAS “Gardens Concert,” *The Straits Times* 19 January 1957, p. 7.

NAS “Rhodesia Band To Help SATA,” *The Straits Times* 12 December `1957, p. 4.

NAS “Nighties on parade to aid SATA,” *The Singapore Free Press*, 12 December 1957, p. 7.

NAS “Reading and writing – the Army shows how,” *The Straits Times*, 22 August 1956, p. 7.

Internet Sources

<http://www.britishempire.co.uk/images4/malaya1955map.jpg> (28 October 2015)

<https://www.sandafayre.com/stampatlas/images/malaysia2.jpg> (28 October 2015)

http://www.rhodesia.me.uk/images/RSRmap1973smallscale_final.jpg (28 October 2015)

<http://s193.photobucket.com/user/orafs/media/Rhodesian%20Heritage/The%20New%20Federation%20of%20RHODESIA%20and%20NYASALAND/Pages2425.jpg.html> (28 October 2015)

https://taskandpurpose.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Rhodesian_Security_Forces_operational_areas.png (28 October 2015)

<http://www.britishempire.co.uk/maproom/rhodesia/rhodesialandmap.htm> (28 October 2015)

<http://www.britishempire.co.uk/maproom/rhodesia/rhodesiaudimap.htm> (28 October 2015)

<http://www.freewebs.com/dudleywall/guardforce.htm> (posted circa 2007).

<http://rhodesianforces.org/InternalAffiars.htm> (downloaded February 2016).

**Addendum A: A selection of photographs of 'C' Squadron
(Rhodesia) 22nd SAS**



Figure 10 SRFEVU waving farewell at the train station⁶⁶¹

⁶⁶¹ NAZ SP2"C" (Rhodesia) Squadron, 22 Special Air Service Regiment (The Malayan Scouts), photographs from the unit scrap book, 1951-1953.




Figure 11 Scroll presented to the M.V Tegelberg⁶⁶²

⁶⁶² NAZ SP2"C" (Rhodesia) Squadron, 22 Special Air Service Regiment (The Malayan Scouts), photographs from the unit scrap book, 1951-1953.



Figure 12 Major Peter Walls shakes hands with General Sloane⁶⁶³

⁶⁶³ NAZ SP2 "C" (Rhodesia) Squadron, 22 Special Air Service Regiment (The Malayan Scouts), photographs from the unit scrap book, 1951-1953.



Figure 13 The 'ulu'⁶⁶⁴

⁶⁶⁴ NAZ SP2 "C" (Rhodesia) Squadron, 22 Special Air Service Regiment (The Malayan Scouts), photographs from the unit scrap book, 1951-1953.




Figure 14 Jovial tea break⁶⁶⁵

⁶⁶⁵ NAZ SP2 "C" (Rhodesia) Squadron, 22 Special Air Service Regiment (The Malayan Scouts), photographs from the unit scrap book, 1951-1953.



Figure 15 Sgt Major Mazamban gets his wings⁶⁶⁶

⁶⁶⁶ NAZ SP2 "C" (Rhodesia) Squadron, 22 Special Air Service Regiment (The Malayan Scouts), photographs from the unit scrap book, 1951-1953.



Figure 16 Ground paratroop training⁶⁶⁷

⁶⁶⁷ NAZ SP2 "C" (Rhodesia) Squadron, 22 Special Air Service Regiment (The Malayan Scouts), photographs from the unit scrap book, 1951-1953.



Figure 17 Ground paratroop training⁶⁶⁸

⁶⁶⁸ NAZ SP2 "C" (Rhodesia) Squadron, 22 Special Air Service Regiment (The Malayan Scouts), photographs from the unit scrap book, 1951-1953.



Figure 18 Less enthusiastic tea break⁶⁶⁹

⁶⁶⁹ NAZ SP2 "C" (Rhodesia) Squadron, 22 Special Air Service Regiment (The Malayan Scouts), photographs from the unit scrap book, 1951-1953.




Figure 19 Receiving mail⁶⁷⁰

⁶⁷⁰ NAZ SP2 "C" (Rhodesia) Squadron, 22 Special Air Service Regiment (The Malayan Scouts), photographs from the unit scrap book, 1951-1953.



Figure 20 Sgt Reid Daly with members of 11 Troop⁶⁷¹

⁶⁷¹ NAZ SP2 "C" (Rhodesia) Squadron, 22 Special Air Service Regiment (The Malayan Scouts), photographs from the unit scrap book, 1951-1953.



Figure 21 'C' Squadron coat of arms.⁶⁷²

⁶⁷² NAZ SP2 "C" (Rhodesia) Squadron, 22 Special Air Service Regiment (The Malayan Scouts), photographs from the unit scrap book, 1951-1953.