Negotiating labour insecurity:
A case study of temporary off-farm workers in the
deciduous fruit sector in Ceres

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Declaration

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March 2016
Abstract

“Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past” (Marx, 1978g:595).

This thesis develops a socio-economic profile of temporary off-farm workers and examines how they negotiate labour insecurity in a context of high unemployment and casualisation of work. This is realised through a case study of temporary off-farm workers in the deciduous fruit sector in Ceres.

The study followed a three-phase exploratory sequential mixed methods research strategy. This meant that exploratory interviews informed semi-structured interviews, the findings of which were verified in focus groups before forming grounded indicators in a questionnaire interviewing 200 temporary off-farm workers employed in peak season. The findings are analysed drawing on Marx’s theory of the division of labour (1978a), social consciousness (1978c) and mechanisation of labour (1978d), which are further developed though the work of other theorists.

The thesis illustrates that the socio-economic profile of farm workers has changed dramatically and that the majority of temporary farm workers are black African. This is attributed to the abolishment of influx control in 1987 and subsequent market deregulation and the flexibilisation of labour in the early 1990s. This meant that new relations of production were incorporated into the existing mode of production and flexibilisation led to a fragmentation of skills into racial categories. Having greater knowledge and skills of farm work, coloured workers accessed higher skilled jobs, permanent or temporary, whilst black African workers were incorporated as feminised workers, in accordance with increased employment of unskilled temporary workers in the sector.

Labour insecurity is negotiated by drawing on formal and informal incomes, including support from household members, co-workers and social assistance grants. Drawing on a wider range of these resources, coloured women negotiate labour insecurity more successfully. Further, considerations in partaking in work are not only informed by labour insecurity but also reproductive insecurity and social relationships in the workplace.

In conclusion, considerations depend on socio-historical contexts, which have led to unequal economic and social conditions of workers. This has meant that workers experience labour insecurity unevenly and make dependent choices in their considerations around work. There is, thus, a complex interplay of considerations between productive and social reproductive work.
Opsomming

"Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past" (Marx, 1978g:595).

Hierdie tesis ontwikkel 'n sosiaal-ekonomiese profiel van tydelike plaaswerkers en ondersoek hoe hulle onsekerheid beding in 'n konteks van hoë werkloosheid en tydelike werk. Dit word bereik deur 'n gevallestudie van tydelike plaaswerkers wat nie op plase woon nie in die sagtevrugtebedryf in Ceres.

Die navorsingstrategie van hierdie studie is 'n drie-fase verkennende opeenvolgende vermengde-metodes strategie. Dit beteken dat kwalitatiewe onderhoude ingelig is deur verkennende onderhoude en hierdie bevindinge is weer in fokusgroepie geverifieer en toe as gegronde aanwysers gebruik in die opstel van 'n vraelys vir onderhoude met 200 tydelike plaaswerkers in die spitsseisoen. Die bevindinge word ontleed volgens Marx se teorie oor arbeidsverdeling (1978a), sosiale bewustheid (1978c) en meganisasie van werk (1978d) en wat deur ander teoretici verder ontwikkel is.

Die tesis illustreer dat die sosiaal-ekonomiese profiel van tydelike plaaswerkers dramaties verander het en dat die meerderheid van werkers swart Afrikane is. Dit word toegeskryf aan die afskaffing van instromingsbeheer in 1987 en markderegulering en fleksibilisering van die arbeidsmag wat in die vroeë 1990s daarop gevolg het. Dit beteken dat nuwe produksieverhoudings opgeneem is in die bestaande produksiewyse en fleksibilisering het tot 'n fragmentasie van vaardighede geleë oor rassekategorieë heen. Met meer kennis van en vaardighede in plaaswerk, het bruin werkers meer toegang tot permanente en tydelike geskoolde werk gehad, terwyl swart werkers aangestel is in ongeskoolde plaaswerk tydens 'n verhoogde indiensneming van ongeskoolde tydelike werkers in die sektor.

Arbeidsonsekerheid word beding deur formele en informele inkomstes, insluitende ondersteuning van ander lede van die huishouding, medewerkers en maatskaplike toelaes. Met 'n groter verskeidenheid van hierdie hulpbronne tot hulle beskikking, hanteer bruin vroue arbeidsonsekerheid meer suksesvol. Verder word oorwegings rondom deelname aan werk nie slegs ingelig deur arbeidsonsekerheid nie, maar ook reproduktiewe onsekerheid en sosiale verhoudings in die werksplek.
Ten slotte, oorwegings rondom werk word beïnvloed deur sosiaalhistoriese kontekste, wat gelei het tot ongelyke ekonomiese en sosiale omstandighede van werkers. Dit beteken dat werkers arbeidsonsekerheid oneweredig ervaar en afhanklike keuses maak in hul oorwegings rondom die werk. Daar is dus 'n komplekse wisselwerking van oorwegings tussen produktiewe en sosiaalreproduktiewe werk.
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Definitions

**Crude waste rate:** A specific form of labour turnover, referring to the total number of employees leaving an organisation during a specific period. This includes terminations, resignations and dismissals.

**Deciduous fruit:** Refers to apples, apricots, nectarines, peaches, pears, plums and prunes.

**Labour force:** The total number of people between the ages of 15 and 64 - in a country or region - this includes the employed, unemployed and not economically active.

**Labour turnover:** A general term referring to the movement of workers in and out of employment.

**Permanent worker:** A worker with a permanent contract, meaning that it is not of a fixed duration or probationary period. Permanent workers may work full-time or part-time.

**Resignation rate:** A specific form of labour turnover, referring to the total number of employees leaving an organisation voluntarily during a specific period.

**Seasonal farm worker:** A worker who is “employed by an employer for an aggregate period of at least three months over a 12 month period with the same employer and whose work is interrupted by reason of a seasonal variation in the availability of work” (Department of Labour, 2003b).

**Stability rate:** A specific form of labour turnover, referring to the number of employees that remain in a post during a specific period, calculated by comparing the years of experience of employees after commencement of employment.

**Survival rate:** A specific form of labour turnover, referring to the number of employees that remain in a post over a specific period, calculated by comparing the number of employees after a specific period. For farm workers this is calculated by comparing the number of employees who return to work for the same employer over two sequential and identical seasons, this being a comparison of employment in February 2014 with January 2015.

**Temporary farm worker:** A farm worker on a fixed-term contract.
**Temporary worker:** Workers with “non-permanent contracts, of whatever duration, except a probationary period. These include short- and fixed-term appointment as well as casual and seasonal ones including contracts through a temporary employment agency. Temporary workers may work full time or part time” (International Labour Organisation, 1993:3)

**Workforce:** The total number of people who are employed in a country, company, industry or project.
Acronyms

**AgriSETA:** Agricultural Sector Education Training Authority

**BEE:** Black Economic Empowerment

**CSG:** Child Support Grant

**CWP:** Community Work Programme

**ESTA:** Extension of Security of Tenure Act

**FARR:** Foundation for Alcohol Related Research

**FASD:** Foetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder

**GATT:** General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs

**LRAA:** Labour Relations Amendment Act

**UIF:** Unemployment Insurance Fund

**UK:** United Kingdom

**USA:** United States of America
Symbols

\( F: \) F distribution
\( \eta^2: \) Eta-squared
\( p: \) Probability of an event or population proportion
\( r: \) Pearson’s correlation coefficient
\( \tau: \) Goodman-Kruskal’s tau
\( U: \) Mann-Whitney U test
\( \chi^2: \) Chi-square distribution
\( \lambda: \) Goodman-Kruskal’s lambda
\( M: \) Mean
\( SD: \) Standard deviation

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1 These are referred to in sub-section 4.5: Data Analysis and explained in Addendum A: Data Analyses.
Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 INTRODUCTION

This thesis does not include workers easily unionised in factories such as those who went on strike for wage increases at a fruit packaging and storage facility in Ceres in September 2015 (Petersen, 2015). Rather, this thesis includes workers living off-farms and directly employed by farms on temporary contracts in the area, in order to address temporary farm workers’ negotiation of labour insecurity within a context of high unemployment and increasing casualisation of work in Ceres, South Africa.

South Africa ranks as the fourth most income unequal society in the world (World Bank, 2013) and has the twelfth highest unemployment rate in the world (Trading Economics, 2015). What is more, income inequality has increased 12% since liberalisation of the economy in 1994 (World Bank, 2015). Economic liberalisation is an approach based on the assumption that economic growth through marketisation and commodification can increase employment and improve the welfare of citizens (Webster & Fakier, 2010). However, global criticism has shown that economic growth can also produce jobless growth.

Jobless growth may have been spurred on by advancements in lean production strategies, such as technological advancements and flexibilisation of the workforce, which have reduced permanent jobs in South Africa by 2.3 million, increased temporary jobs by 2.5 million (Adcorp, 2012; 2014) and outsourced 1 million jobs (Adcorp, 2014). Currently, only 44% of working age (15 – 64 years old) South Africans have work (Statistics South Africa, 2015b), while 35% of the labour force is permanently employed, in contrast to 32% temporarily employed and 33% unemployed (broad definition) (Statistics South Africa, 2015b). In some areas, paid work is scarce and nearly all employment opportunities are seasonal or temporary.

This means that there is a high rate of labour market insecurity and many who are employed experience various forms of labour insecurity. These lead to income insecurity that is not sufficiently mediated through social insurance, designed to bridge short-term unemployment, nor social assistance, accrued by the sufficiently ‘deserving’ elderly, young or sick. As temporary farm workers, the participants in this study fit into this category of insecurity and this thesis examines how they negotiate that situation.
1.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM

Despite the fact that temporary farm workers may have the most insecure employment, farm managers in the United States of America (USA), Canada and South Africa have reported a high labour turnover. Even so, it seems that previous research has failed to give voice to their considerations in participating in paid work. The phenomenon of workers leaving paid employment without working the full length of their contracts contradicts literature suggesting that increasing casualisation of work increases workers’ dependence on paid work (Marais, 2011). It also contradicts a body of literature emphasising the involuntary casualisation of workers and its detrimental impact on workers, especially in countries that provide no or limited social protection (Razavi, 2012) and in economies with limited opportunities for standard employment (Heymann, 2006). This study, therefore, seeks to address farm workers’ negotiation of labour insecurity through an analysis of their considerations in (not) participating in paid work.

1.3 RATIONALE

This study originated as a consequence of farm managers’ concerns about the labour turnover of temporary farm workers in Ceres. From their perspective, labour turnover complicates the ability to train workers, reduces the efficacy and appropriateness of training courses and their ability to improve and maintain productive efficiency as well as the quality\(^2\) of the agricultural produce. Further, despite offering financial bonuses for a full week’s work, farm managers reported no significant reduction in labour turnover.

Farm managers estimate that the number of temporary workers returning to work for the same employer over successive seasons ranges between 20% and 90%, with variation between farms and teams of workers on the same farm. They also suggest a number of possible reasons for labour turnover, the most pervasive being that workers try to evade being registered for the Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF) as this might mean that authorities could retract workers’ social assistance benefits or trace indebted and criminal workers. They also suggest that workers may work towards an income goal, change workplaces due to boredom or prefer to work on farms closer to health facilities and other amenities.

These suggestions coincide with a lack of research explaining temporary farm workers’ own considerations for participation in paid work. Further, as temporary workers, this category of farm workers experiences labour insecurity and what is perceived by employers as labour turnover may,

\(^2\) Quality refers to “specific attributes of the food, or commodity itself such as safety, nutritional content, labels, production processes, or branding which are emphasized and regulated” (Watts and Goodman, 1997:7)
rather, reflect strategies through which workers negotiate labour insecurity. Thus, the objective of this thesis is to research how temporary farm workers negotiate such insecurity.

1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

This thesis seeks to:

- Develop a socio-economic profile of temporary farm workers in the deciduous fruit sector in Ceres.
- Understand how temporary farm workers negotiate labour insecurity and explain their considerations in participating in paid work.

1.5 OVERVIEW OF CERES

Ceres is an area situated in Witzenberg Municipality in the Western Cape Province of South Africa, (Picture 1.1 below). The Gross Domestic Product of this municipality stems mainly from agriculture (35.6%) and food manufacturing (14.4%) (Witzenberg Municipality, 2015).

Picture 1.1: Map of Ceres in South Africa


This region is known for its stone and pome fruit, producing about a third of South African pears, apples and prunes, (Figure 1.1). Overall, Ceres produces 28% of South African deciduous fruit (Hortgro, 2014a).
South Africa is also the second largest producer of pome and stone fruit in the southern hemisphere after Chile, just ahead of Argentina and competing with New Zealand, Brazil and Australia in fruit exports (Figure 1.2).

Approximately 115,946 residents live in the municipality. They are predominantly coloured\(^3\) (66%) with some black Africans (25%) and white residents (8%). Of these, 71% are of working-age, but only 31% are employed and 11% are broadly unemployed (Statistics South Africa, 2012b). Further, in 2007, 12% of residents received social assistance grants, half of which were child grants, a third old age pensions and a fifth, grants for mental or physical disabilities (Witzenberg Municipality, 2015).

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\(^3\) I employ apartheid racial categorisation (coloured, black African and white), as employed in official state statistics (Statistics South Africa, 2015b), because farm work in Ceres has a racialised character stemming from historic segregation policies, see section 3.4.
Farms in Ceres employ approximately 9,700\(^4\) permanent workers and 16,500 temporary workers (Koue Bokkeveld Opleidingsentrum, 2015). This means that there are high levels of temporary work and even for those who have jobs, the duration of employment is not guaranteed. They thus experience employment insecurity. Overall, farm workers in the region are mostly men (61\%) and black African (62\%) (Koue Bokkeveld Opleidingsentrum, 2015). On the one hand, permanent workers are mainly men (64\%), with coloured men constituting the largest category amongst all workers (35\%). They receive employment benefits - such as certified skills training, pension and medical aid - and although wage differentials were flattened with the minimum wage determinations in 2013, permanent workers used to earn higher salaries (Barrientos & Kritzinger, 2004). On the other hand, temporary workers are also mostly men (61\%), however, the majority are black African (80\%), with black African men constituting half of the workforce (52\%) (Koue Bokkeveld Opleidingsentrum, 2015). Many live in residential areas in the region although there are a number of large commercial farms that provide temporary on-farm housing for workers. Although employment data show no growth in the percentages of coloured workers, in the last two years alone black African workers have increased by 24\% and 21\%, for men and women respectively. (Koue Bokkeveld Opleidingsentrum, 2015). This means that job growth in the area is racialised, attracting workers from other provinces, mainly the Eastern Cape.

This thesis distinguishes between permanent and temporary farm workers in that the latter have “non-permanent contracts, of whatever duration … these include short- and fixed-term appointments as well as casual and seasonal ones including contracts” (International Labour Organisation, 1993:3). In this manner, I veer away from referring to temporary workers as seasonal workers. This is partly due to the nature of their work, in that workers are employed for specific tasks on farms according to the seasons of produce and agricultural sectors. This means temporary workers may be employed for one or more seasonal tasks that follow on from each other as harvesting leads into pruning, planting, binding trees and then thinning. Further, in the area of Ceres, the deciduous fruit sector runs concurrent with the local vegetable sector, and at just 100 kilometres away, workers can commute to work in the citrus or grape sector. Some participants in this study worked in the peak season of the citrus sector coinciding with the low season in the deciduous fruit sector. Due to successive seasons and consecutive agricultural sectors, many workers are not only employed for the harvesting season of deciduous fruit. Thus, I refer to farm workers without permanent contracts as temporary workers, rather than seasonal workers.

\(^4\) In lieu of agricultural employment statistics for Ceres beyond 2003 from Statistics South Africa, employment equity data of 80 farms in the region of Ceres published by the Koue Bokkeveld Opleidingsentrum (2015) are used as a reference. In this manner, the figures do not include all farms in the region of Ceres and may be less than actual figures.
1.6 THESIS OUTLINE

This thesis sets out to develop a socio-economic profile of temporary farm workers in Ceres and to understand how they negotiate labour insecurity. Chapter two delineates the theoretical framework through which the findings are analysed. Chapter three reviews previous studies on South African farm workers since the 1990s, as well as studies pertaining to temporary farm workers’ labour turnover and their considerations in taking up paid work. Due to the scarcity of the latter, studies from South Africa and around the globe are included. This chapter also addresses the changing nature of production and work in the deciduous fruit sector since the twentieth century through application of the theoretical framework. It describes the historic, economic, legislative and social trajectories that give rise to a class-gender-race nexus of employment in Ceres today. After delineating the methodology, chapter five gives an overview of participating farms, considering (dis)similar practices and worker profiles before describing the demographics of temporary farm workers and their household compositions and incomes. Findings of this study are addressed in chapter six, commencing with descriptions of temporary farm workers’ workstations, employment patterns and recruitment practices, as these structure employment considerations. Subsequently, workers’ considerations in commencing paid employment, switching, and returning to employers are delineated, as well as considerations for not partaking in paid work on farms, along with income sources during periods without paid work. Finally, workers considerations in not completing the length of fixed-term contracts are addressed before linking the findings to previous studies and bodies of literature in chapter seven.
Chapter 2

Theoretical Framework

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This thesis seeks to develop a socio-economic profile of temporary farm workers in Ceres and understand how they negotiate labour insecurity. I adopt a Marxist framework due to its usefulness in analysing class formation and working conditions. Thus, the first part of this chapter sketches the theoretical framework that comprises an integration of Marx’s theory on social consciousness, division of labour and mechanisation of labour. However, due to the gender-race nexus of farm work in Ceres (Section 3.4) and the flexibilisation of labour, I draw on insights from other theorists, such as Engels (1978), Williams (2001), Oakley (1974; 1981), Bourdieu (1967; 2007; 2013) and Standing (1999; 2009; 2011), to develop Marx’s analysis.

2.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In the broader international context, the nature of work is changing. Work has become increasingly casualised due to the growth of part-time, seasonal and temporary employment. With the privatisation of social insurance, workers struggle to procure their basic needs. This happens on a global scale and is felt by all workers, regardless of gender or race, but unskilled and low paid workers are the most affected. The participants in this study fit into that category of workers.

To understand this process in Ceres I employ Marx’s theory of social consciousness, the division and mechanisation of labour. Additionally, I complement Marx’s analysis of class and production with insights from feminism to furnish an analysis of gender, race and social reproduction. This draws on Marxist feminism as a theory that gained strength in the 1970s and developed to include the differential positions of women, as regards to class, race and ethnicity (Cock & Luxton, 2013; Luxton, 2006). However, I do not exclude men; instead, I endeavour to explain the differential positions of both men and women in farm work in Ceres. For this reason, I implement a Marxist analysis.

Marx’s theory of social consciousness provides the general constructs for studying societies. This is because differing forms of social consciousness arise from specific technologies (including knowledge and skills), forms of distribution and ideologies. Even though Marx did not analyse the unequal relations between men and women in capitalism, his associate, Engels, theorised the origins of gender inequalities. In The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State, Engels (1978) proposes a nuanced version of the family as well as the division of labour within the family, complementing the process in the workplace as described by Marx.
2.2.1 GENDERED DIVISION OF (PAID AND UNPAID) LABOUR

Engels suggests that stratification did not arise in the first instance between the capitalist and the worker, instead “the first class oppression [was] that of the female sex by the male” (1978:739). This, though, occurred under specific circumstances, where men, having accrued considerable wealth through ownership of the means of production and wanting to maintain this wealth in familial lineage, introduced social norms, and legislation, to protect private property though monogamous marriage. In this manner, a certain class of women was oppressed, through marriage and monogamy, in contrast to property-less women.

Similarly, Coontz and Henderson (1986) suggest that the introduction of kin corporate property, in place of communal property, spurred on appropriation of the means of production. They further suggest that patrilineal societies were more successful than matrilineal societies because of larger populations spurred on by the polygamous relations of men. This means that unequal relations arose between husbands and wives alongside an increasingly unequal distribution of wealth.

Before the rise of industrialisation, amongst some classes, both wives and husbands partook in productive work while unmarried children performed housework and childcare (Oakley, 1981). This changed with the rise of large-scale manufacturing, where some forms of work became financially compensated. Although women, men and children worked in factories in 1819 in Britain, the Factory Acts eventually prohibited child labour. This meant that children became dependent on their parents, and according to Oakley, this led to women’s role of housewife and their dependence on men “in marriage and their restrictions to the home” (1974:43).

In this manner, some forms of production became “time-disciplined [and] gendered masculine” (Williams, 2001:1443) whilst other “kinds of production (such as production of food and clothing) [were gendered feminine and] were coded as ‘caring’ rather than ‘work’” (Williams, 2001:1443). Work thus became gendered and separated into unpaid social reproductive work in the household and paid productive work away from home.

The role of the father came to include the responsibility of ‘breadwinner’ and as such, men became defined through their success at work (Williams, 2001:1445). So much so that according to Beck, “in Western culture … work is the only valid measure for the evaluation of human beings and their activities” (2000:10, cited in Vallas, 2012:168). On the other hand, for women domesticity came in two stages (Williams, 2001:1448).

Firstly, from the 1780s women’s role became caring emotionally and physically for their husbands. Although women were able to participate in paid work, this meant that they had the added burden of unpaid reproductive duties. Subsequently, since the 1970s domesticity includes intensive mothering:
the increased intensity in mothers’ feelings for their children, or rather the supposed pleasure that they are expected to derive from childcare. These assumptions, along with the notions that mothers are selfless, men are breadwinners and the economic marginalisation of carers, have endured (Williams, 2001:1449-50).

2.2.2 SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS

Although Marx theorised processes from the primary unit of the family, Engels has suggested that the family developed from the tribe in an ever-narrowing group culminating in the nuclear family. By envisioning the development of society from the premise of a tribe, general characteristics of production can be discerned. These are that production is achieved through tools, “even if the instrument is only the hand”, and stored past labour, which indicates individuals’ knowledge and skills, “even if it is only … repeated practice” (Marx, 1978a:224). In this manner, the general forces of production, these being technology and skills, can be related to particular forces of production in specific societies (Marx, 1978a:224). Thus, any society’s mode of production includes their technologies and skills, that is to say, their means of production.

The mode of production not only refers to the means, but also relations of production. This being based on the labour time in tribes that varied in accordance with “differences of age and sex [and] the seasons” (Marx, 1978b:326). An individual’s labour time was a “portion of the labour-power” of the tribe, whereby the labour of each individual was measured by the time spent working (Marx, 1978b:326). The product of their labour formed a social product, a part of which became the means of production and remaining a social product, whilst another part would be consumed and thereby require a mode of distribution (Marx, 1978b:326). In this manner, distributive laws arise, based on the social relations of societies (Marx, 1978a:226). Thus, production and distribution, means and relations of production, constitute the mode of production. Whether hunter-gatherer or late capitalist societies, all have these general characteristics in common; all have a mode of production.

Having said this, it is insufficient to analyse the mode of production without its conjunction with specific ideologies - political, legal and/or religious - which, together, give rise to different “forms of social consciousness” (Marx, 1978c:4). In other words, technologies (including knowledge and skills), distribution and ideology determine the social consciousness of any given society, and differing modes of production – ancient, feudal, and modern bourgeois – may correspond with differing ideologies. In this manner, “[i]t is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness” (Marx, 1978c:4). Simply put, society constructs individuals and their worldview that becomes the basis of their reality. In Marx’s analysis then, material reality has priority over ideology.
When differing societies interact, differing in stages of production (and ideologies), it does not necessarily follow that the social consciousness of one society will be subjugated by another. Instead, the pre-existing mode of production (and/or ideology) may remain intact or transform into a new, distinct, mode of production (and/or ideology). Whichever the case, it will lead to new relations of production (Marx, 1978a:234). Even when a conqueror’s mode of production and/or ideology predominate, the conquered adopt these through a process of change. This is because

“[n]o social order ever perishes before all the productive forces for which there is room in it have developed; and new, higher relations of production never appear before the material conditions for the existence have matured in the womb of the old society” (Marx, 1978c:5).

In this manner, the development of the capitalist economy does not entail homogenous economic attitudes. This is because economic attitudes depend on material conditions, the level of integration in the economic system, economic activities and the length of these. Bourdieu develops this further, suggesting that attaining a regular and steady income (income security), provides a “security plateau” whereby people are able to satisfy their basic needs (Bourdieu, 1979:54). However, income has to exceed subsistence to be able to envisage a notion of time and plan for the future, the “threshold of calculability” (Bourdieu, 1979:54). That is to say

“inequalities in relation to the "rational" economy and economic rationality, or, to put it another way, unequal rhythms (between one individual or group and another) in the transformation of economic attitudes are primarily the reflection of economic and social inequalities” (Bourdieu, 1979:2).

Thus, technologies (including skills), distribution and ideology determine the social being of societies and their “social being determines their consciousness” (Marx, 178c:4). However, insecurity hinders the even development, of not only economic attitudes, but also social and cultural attitudes. This means that within the same society there can co-exist groups with differing forms of social consciousness (Bourdieu, 1979).

### 2.2.3 WAGE LABOUR

What is distinct in capitalist societies is that products are not only produced because they are useful, for consumption, but also for their exchange as commodities. This is possible because distribution occurs through the transformation of commodities into money, exchanged for other commodities. Through circulating money and commodities, not only are products sold to buy other products, but products are also bought to sell, the latter producing capital. This process arose from the exchange of productive time for money, whereby work was no longer a communal activity. Instead, productive work through wage labour became the pursuit of wages, paid for making products to be commodified and exchanged for money. The wages, in turn, are exchanged by workers, for commodities needed to survive, commodities priced according to the value of abstract labour in society, the socially
necessary labour time required to produce commodities. The labourer however, is supposedly paid according to his subsistence and the cost of replacing him, that is, the cost of his reproduction via procreation and education. However, the latter, being the social wage, although found in welfare state regimes, has since been shown to diminish in accordance with labour flexibilisation. The irony is that although reproductive work has never been financially compensated, it not only replenishes labour power but also produces the greatest demand for commodities - such as education, clothes, food and housing.

There is, thus, a division of compensation between paid productive and unpaid reproductive work, alongside which developed the notions of timed labour and employment, in contrast to unemployment. Employment referring to time spent “geared to productivity”, “obtaining a money income” (Bourdieu, 2013:148) and unemployment refers to being actively looking for work in defined timelines (Statistics South Africa, 2015a:xxv; Posel, Casale & Vermaak, 2014). However, being neither employed nor unemployed does not necessarily imply idleness. On the contrary, it may be a full-time occupation geared towards unpaid social reproductive activities, defined as “not economically active” in today’s terms (Statistics South Africa, 2015a:xiv).

What is evident here are “differing notions of time provided by different work-situations” and, what is more, “their relation to "natural" rhythms” (Thompson, 1967:37). For example, work, as in agriculture, was task-orientated in relation to the seasonal rhythms of work, in contrast to timed labour borne from industrialization. In this manner, agricultural development became associated with the management of a timed labour force and a “greater sense of time-thrift among improving capitalist employers” (Thompson, 1967:38). In entering wage labour, workers’ task-orientated time became timed labour. Although this is true for men, some women do not fully develop this process due to the fact that unpaid social reproductive work remains task orientated (Thompson, 1967:79). Thus, differing notions of what it means to be occupied developed, as well as differing degrees to which people identify with these.

“Where activity is identified with social function and is not measured by the product in kind (still less in money) of the effort and time expended, everyone is entitled to feel and say he is busy, provided he fulfils the role appropriate to his age and status” (Bourdieu, 1979:42).

This means that individuals may not identify with the formal definitions of ‘employment’, ‘unemployment’ and ‘not economically active’ as, firstly, these terms give precedence to paid productive work over unpaid social reproductive work. Secondly, these do not account for work that remains task orientated, as occurs with packinghouse workers on farms in Ceres where such employment is only available during certain months of the year, in lieu of which some workers are occupied in unpaid reproductive work in the household. In this respect, workers identifying with their
roles as packinghouse workers do not cite being unemployed when not in paid productive work, as part of the role of a packinghouse women is the rotation between caring and household work and paid work in accordance with seasonal rhythms.

2.2.4 MECHANISED LABOUR

A further division arises from advancements in technology (Marx, 1978b:306). It stems from increasing production by the repetition of tasks, saving time in changing between tasks, so the worker develops greater efficiency in a particular task. Through specialisation in the labour process, the workers’ skill is fragmented, facilitating the development of labour- or time-saving devices and the development of machines and industrialisation. Breaking down the labour process into mechanical tasks not only led to the fragmentation of skilled work into unskilled parts, but the relocation of labour “from the worker to capital in the form of the machine” (Marx, 1978a:283). In so doing, increasingly the means of production is owned by the capitalist who not only oversees production but also employment conditions, thereby decreasing the capacity of the worker to labour and earn a living and who becomes replaced “by women, adults by children ... and where it is developed, improved and replaced, by more productive machinery” (Marx, 1978d:215). In this way, manual labour is substituted by mechanised labour. In sum,

“the more productive capital grows the more the division of labour and the application of machinery expands, ... the more competition between workers expands and the more wages contract... if capital grows rapidly, competition among workers grows incomparably more rapidly, that is the means of employment, the means of subsistence ... of the working class decrease proportionately” (Marx, 1978d:216).

Not only does mechanisation lead to unemployment but it also increases the numbers of workers fully dependent on wages, proletarianised workers, through “the disintegration of the middle class” (Marx, 1978e:65). The latter specifically referring to the

“lower strata of the middle class - the small tradespeople, shopkeepers, and retired tradesmen generally, the handicraftsmen and peasant – all these sink gradually into the proletariat partly because their diminutive capital does not suffice for the scale on which Modern Industry is carried on, and is swamped in the competition with the large capitalists, partly because their specialised skill is rendered worthless by new methods of production. Thus the proletariat is recruited from all classes of the population” (Marx, 1978f:480).

In accordance with the division of the means of production and wealth, there is also a division in the relations of production. This springs from the reproduction of capital amongst labourers and, on the other hand, amongst capitalists. As theorised by Bourdieu, capital is not only economic wealth but, through the process of socialisation, can be transformed into cultural capital over time and increase in accordance with the length of time a person can be afforded for its acquisition without economic...
constraints. Thus, cultural capital, economic capital disguised, also appears in the form of qualifications and objects such as literature and art, which can be commodified. Further, as a labourer or capitalist, people are members of distinct groups acting as networks of resources, together forming social capital. This increases in accordance with the size of the network and the economic, cultural and social capital of each member, the latter acting as a multiplier of a person’s capital (Bourdieu, 2007). In this manner, the production of a certain category of workers can lead to its reproduction, economically, socially and culturally.

### 2.2.5 FLEXIBILISATION OF LABOUR

However, there is an irony in capitalism in that, apart from the spirit of calculation, it also entails the spirit of enterprise, the pursuit of productivity and efficacy, which leads to lean production. This means that not only are workers replaced by technology, but that the remaining workers are made more productive (ILRIG, 1999:34) whilst some, mainly women, have the added burden of unpaid reproductive work.

Described by Atkinson as the “core-periphery” or “micro dual labor market” model (Kalleberg, 2003:157), this is achieved by breaking the workforce into a core and a periphery allowing for more flexibility and cost effectiveness. Thus, instead of having a constant number of permanent workers with benefits and difficult to dismiss, firms employ peripheral workers according to demand (numerical flexibility), seasons (working time flexibility) and pay piece rates (wage system flexibility). This also allows for the externalisation of unspecialised functions (organisational flexibility) so that firms can improve their area of expertise (functional and job structure flexibility) (Standing & Tawney, 2001:7). For example, in the 1990s the retail industry increasingly outsourced non-essential activities such as cleaning and shelf packing to labour brokers (Kenny, 2003 cited in Webster, 2005:60).

For workers, this means that they are less bound to particular sectors but instead move more freely between them (labour force flexibility) (Standing & Tawney, 2001:7). Employing a flexible workforce in this manner not only reduces employers wage bill, but decreases fringe benefits paid to workers on standard contracts such as holiday pay, medical aid, pension contributions and training. This flexibilisation in turn increases labour insecurity for peripheral workers, referred to below. Some post-Fordist theorists like McDowell (1992) have suggested that peripheral workers are often offered part-time or short-term contracts, increasingly filled by women, along with a decline of men in permanent full-time employment.

In this manner, lean production includes the feminisation of work. This not only refers to a shift towards informal modes of work, which were traditionally associated with women, including
“irregular labour force participation, willingness to work for low wages and static jobs requiring no accumulation of technical skills and status” (Standing, 1999:585). But also to the exertion of a ‘triple burden of care’ on women as “[t]hey are expected to do most of the care work for children and ‘the home’, …[and] labour in the market in order to afford ‘the home’, and … to care for the growing number of elderly relatives” (Standing, 2011:61). Because of historical racial segregation in South Africa, the feminisation of work has a particular racial character, as explained in section 3.4 below.

Not only does mechanisation lead to unemployment, but flexibilisation means that remaining workers are increasingly vulnerable to income insecurity. This increases the underclass, who find themselves “in persistent poverty ... not able ... to gain a living within the dominant processes of production, distribution and exchange” (Crompton, 2008:139). They are in the ranks of the reserve army, the second strata of proletariats, also referred to as sub-proletariats, and are “partially employed or wholly unemployed... always in three forms, the floating, the latent, the stagnant” (Marx, 1978b:429). The lowest ranks, the unemployed, consist of those who are able to work as well as others unable to work due to physical illnesses, disabilities or mental demoralisation (Marx, 1978b:429) as well as women conducting unpaid reproductive work.

However, it is suggested that the reserve army of labour enters employment in accordance with periods of economic growth, and since the numbers of women in part-time and full-time employment in Britain have consistently grown, they cannot be seen as an army in reserve (Beechey, 1986). Similarly, in South Africa 30% more women have taken up paid work in the last 20 years (Statistics South Africa, 1996, 2015a). This has mostly been in “low-paying, categories of employment and occupation[s]” (Casale, 2004:20). In accordance with the flexibilisation of work, the growth of women and men employed in casualised work means that they remain within the reserve army, as sub-proletariats. Further, in accordance with separatist legislation certain races were restricted from freedom of choice in residence, employment and education. The abolishment of that legislation meant that the employment of certain racial categories of workers was feminised.
2.2.6 LABOUR INSECURITY

Lean production strategies have led to the fragmentation of the workforce, as workers gradually lose labour related security and join the ranks of precarious workers. These being workers with insecure livelihoods, according to Marx (1978f:480). Although Marx does not explain what he means by livelihood insecurity, Standing elaborates on one aspect by theorising labour insecurity as the decline in secure forms of work, proposing seven forms of work-related securities and suggesting that precarious workers “fare badly in all respects” (Standing, 2011:8).

Table 2.1: Forms of labour security under industrial citizenship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Labour market security</th>
<th>Adequate income-earning opportunities; at the macro-level, this is epitomised by a government commitment to ‘full employment’.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employment security</td>
<td>Protection against arbitrary dismissal, regulations on hiring and firing, imposition of costs on employers for failing to adhere to rules and so on.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job security</td>
<td>Ability and opportunity to retain a niche in employment, plus barriers to skill dilution, and opportunities for ‘upward’ mobility in terms of status and income.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work security</td>
<td>Protection against accidents and illness at work, through, for example, safety and health regulations, limits on working time, unsociable hours, night work for women, as well as compensation for mishaps.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skill reproduction security</td>
<td>Opportunity to gain skills, through apprenticeships, employment training and so on, as well as opportunity to make use of competencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income security</td>
<td>Assurance of an adequate stable income, protected through, for example, minimum wage machinery, wage indexation, comprehensive social security, progressive taxation to reduce inequality and to supplement low incomes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representation security</td>
<td>Possessing a collective voice in the labour market, through, for example, independent trade unions, with a right to strike.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Standing (2011:10).

For example, in Ceres there is a lack of employment opportunities, especially during the low season. This means that temporary farm workers experience labour market insecurity. Secondly, although most workers are directly employed by farms, some workers conduct informal work without contracts, under self-employed ‘contractors’ during the low season, to bridge periods without paid work. In so doing, they have no protection against dismissals, not being regulated under employment contracts. This is one form of employment insecurity. However, all temporary farm workers are employment insecure in the sense that they are vulnerable to losing their jobs due to the temporary nature of work. Thirdly, informal workers also experience work insecurity due to lack of protection against workplace accidents, health and safety and working time regulations. These are regulated for formal temporary workers; however, they do not have paid rest periods of leave because they are financially compensated instead. This means that they have to create their own leave in between contracts. In this manner, all temporary farm workers experience work insecurity. Fourthly, temporary workers have no opportunity to create a niche in employment, being unskilled general workers with no opportunities for promotion, increases in wages or to hone possible skills. Even for coloured women who have created job security in packinghouses through skills reproduction in socialisation (Section 6.2), their skills are amenable to mechanisation. In this respect, temporary farm
workers experience job insecurity, as they do not have the security to envision careers based on experience, training and promotion. Fifthly, employers also do not invest in the upskilling of temporary workers in the same manner as permanent workers (Section 5.2.5), and temporary workers are mostly employed as general workers who are unable to utilise previously acquired skills, should they have any. Workers are thus subject to skills reproduction insecurity. Sixthly, temporary workers are employed on fixed-term contracts with no guarantee of future re-employment, They are also unable to access social assistance grants, only acquire unemployment insurance in accordance with the length of time employed and have with few or no employment benefits. They are, thus, subject to income insecurity. Lastly, many temporary workers are excluded from workplace forums and are not represented by unions. They, thus, experience representational insecurity.

According to Standing, flexibilisation has increased labour insecurity for some workers, and through the notion of the precariat, he contrasts secure and insecure employment. The notion of the precariat does not fit well with standard notions of class because the precariat cuts across class boundaries. These classes being: the elite, rich influential workers; salariats, permanent full-time employed workers with benefits; proficians, highly skilled, high income consultants; working class, manual workers; precariat, temporary workers; and the unemployed (Standing, 2011:7).

Further, precariats are not all affected in the same manner by non-standard employment relations. Those who have more control over their work are able to benefit from these relations. This can occur if they are in control of their skills, such as accountants, or if they can control the market collectively through association with a union or professional body. Similarly, it is difficult for managers to monitor workers who are autonomous, having closed employment relations (Kalleberg, 2003:163). These workers are able to demand higher wages than workers in open employment relations, who can be supervised and whose wages are influenced by market competition (Kalleberg, 2003:163). Thus, the notion of the precariat encompasses both highly skilled and well-paid workers with benefits as well as unskilled, badly paid workers without benefits. As this thesis addresses the work of temporary farm workers, I employ Marx’s definition of the sub-proletariat to specifically refer to deskilled and “partially employed” wage-labourers (Marx, 1978b:429), rather than the precariat as a whole.

Dubbled notes that Legassick and Wolpe “argued that the specificity of primitive accumulation in South(ern) Africa was that it did not lead to (full) proletarianisation” (2015:105). However, in the mid-1800s farms in southwest South Africa employed an “insecure and impoverished workforce consisting of seasonal labour (from mission stations and towns working at day or task rates, and permanent farm residents, who did not necessarily receive cash wages, but … [were] dependen[t] on employers’ land, food, housing, clothing and alcoholic sustenance …)” (Keegan, 1996:125).
Later, when the railway line connected Ceres to Cape Town in 1910, large-scale fruit export began in the region. This meant that farms required not only a larger permanent workforce, but also temporary workers for the peak harvesting season. Consequently, “wealthier farmers in the Western Cape established a system of tied rent” by offering temporary and permanent accommodation to workers (Scully, 1987, 1989, cited in Kritzinger & Vorster, 1997:116). The Union government also helped deter farm workers from leaving to work in higher paying jobs on the mines by restricting them to working solely in agriculture through the Native Labour Regulation in 1911. Restrictions were then extended to farm workers’ families in 1932 with the Native Service Contract Act, requiring farm workers as well as their families to work on the farms for three to six months of the year. The subsequent Coloured Labour Preference Act of 1957 also restricted the recruitment of black African workers from native reserves to farms in Ceres. In this respect, farm workers were “fully dependent upon wages [labour] for subsistence, that is to say … fully proletarianized” (Wolpe, 1972:444). Further,

“[t]he essence of [Wolpe’s] argument [was] that the amount of subsistence available to the migrant labour force and their families in the Reserves had either diminished because the overall decline in production had resulted in a decrease in the product per capita or had virtually disappeared” (Wolpe, 1972:442).

Thereby, arguing that black Africans became fully dependent on their wage labour for subsistence, as proletariats. Having said this, proletariats are not only dependent on wage labour, but also the unpaid social reproductive work, of women.

Whilst Marx theorises social consciousness, the process of proletarianisation, the division of labour, deskilling and mechanisation, he does not furnish an analysis of workers’ considerations in partaking in paid work. Rather, like others, he suggests “someone who has a job is concerned above all not to lose it” (Bourdieu, 2013:170) especially when there is high unemployment (Marx, 1978b:428) because the increasing precarisation of work increases workers’ dependence on paid work (Marais, 2011:184), as does commodification (Barchiesi, 2009:27, cited in Marais, 2011:184).

Standing does not account for temporary workers’ considerations around work, but he does address some of the reasons why precariats are unemployed. For example, “[m]any have too much ‘work’ to do that labourists do not recognise as work, such as caring for frail relatives or children [and m]any have episodic disabilities” (Standing, 2011:143), thus referring to the burden of unpaid reproductive work and the inability of some sub-proletariats to work. Further, “taking up temporary jobs after unemployment tends to lower annual incomes and long-term earnings”, due to the loss or reduction of employment benefits and irregular frequency of employment, “reason for which the unemployed resist pressure to take the first job offered to them” (Standing, 2011:47). What is more, some workers remain unemployed because they are reluctant to take lower paying jobs or jobs that do not match
their skills and expectations (Standing, 2011:114), thereby resisting deskilling and consequent income insecurity. As he is referring to precariats, it is unclear to what extent this applies to sub-proletariat farm workers.

Standing thus suggests that some workers exercise ‘choices’ around paid work and unemployment. This is akin to the rational choice theory that suggests that inequalities between workers stem from a lack of commitment to work, especially women because they ‘prefer’ non-standard contracts and periods of unemployment to care for dependents (Probert, 1999:99). However, even when accounting for these ‘choices’, women earn consistently less and remain in less favourable employment. Similar to the preference theory (Hakim, 2000), these theories do not account for social practices influencing workers’ considerations around paid work or their material conditions stemming from structural inequalities between gendered or racial categories of workers, influencing the availability of work or their constrained considerations to work.

This then forms the rationale for this thesis, to address farm workers’ considerations in participating in paid work. This thesis analyses the extent to which considerations around employment are informed by labour insecurity in constellation with workers’ material conditions, social relationships and traditional modes of production which constrain and interact with workers’ ‘decisions’ around work.

2.3 CONCLUSION

I have adopted a Marxist framework to analyse the considerations of temporary farm workers in participating in paid employment in Ceres. The framework comprises of an integration of Marx’s theory on social consciousness, the division and mechanisation of labour, with insights from other theorists and bodies of literature.

Marx’s material analysis, which suggests that production, distribution and ideology determine the worldview of groups of individuals, with insights from Bourdieu (1979), was developed to show that differing economic, social and cultural conditions lead to uneven development. Thereby groups with differing social consciousness may co-exist within the same society. Similarly, differing notions of what it means to be occupied and differing degrees to which people identify with these co-exist (Bourdieu, 2013; Thompson, 1967) and depending on resources, distinct groups of individuals are reproduced, economically, socially and culturally.

Amongst individuals, unequal relations arose between women and men, to protect private property (Engels, 1978), preceding the division between capitalist and worker in the workplace, leading to the division of labour in the household. Incorporated as waged labourers in the workplace, individuals are vulnerable to labour insecurity through processes of deskilling, mechanisation and flexibilisation,
increasing the division between workers in standard and feminised employment. Flexibilisation leads to increasingly precarious work, but not all workers are precariats in that many join the ranks of sub-proletariats, working in feminised jobs. These jobs being temporary, require no or little skills with little possibility for promotion whilst women also conduct unpaid reproductive work.

Whilst Marx’s theory, with insights from other theorists, can well account for the process of the feminisation of labour, he and other theorists do not explain how workers negotiate labour insecurity in their considerations around paid work. Thus, I turn to contextualising research on farm workers in South Africa with a review of studies since the 1990s before reviewing studies on the labour turnover of temporary farm workers. Few studies have given voice to workers’ own considerations for participating in paid work, suggesting an avenue for research and establishing the rationale for this study.
Chapter 3

Literature review

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Existing research on South African farm workers shows that since the 1990s farm workers have gradually become researched as a heterogeneous group. However, there is scant research on their considerations around work, workplaces and the social and material conditions influencing workers’ constrained considerations in their negotiation of labour insecurity.

Consequently, I examine previous studies on the labour turnover of temporary farm workers. Such studies are few, and those that have been conducted in the USA and Canada were based on interviews with farm managers and owners (Smit, Johnston & Morse, 1985) or secondary data analyses (Taylor & Thilmany, 1993; Gabbard & Perloff, 1997). I thus suggest that research should include the voices of temporary farm workers.

In the third part of this chapter, I elaborate on the theoretical framework by drawing on literature and secondary data on the changing nature of work and production in the deciduous fruit sector. In this manner, I contextualise the changing nature of farm work and production in the deciduous fruit sector and the distinctive manner in which gender and race structure work in this sector.

3.2 REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON SOUTH AFRICAN FARM WORKERS

Most research concerning farm workers in the past has been in line with national and international economic and legislative trends. In the 1990s, research on farm workers was concerned with the following issues: effects of the extension of labour regulations to farm workers (Heunis & Pelser, 1995); land reform (Kinsey & Binswanger, 1993; Beinart, 1994b; Ottaway, 1996; Williams, Ewert, Hamann & Vink, 1998; Bernstein, 1998; Moor & Nieuwoudt, 1998; Hamann & Ewert, 1999); liberalisation of the agricultural sector (van Zyl, Vink, Townsend, & Kirsten, 1998; Naudé, 1998; Penzhorn & Kirsten, 1999) and the implications of these for farm workers (du Toit, 1994). Further research at the time also focused on paternalistic relations on farms (du Toit, 1993; Ross, 1995; Kritzinger & Vorster, 1997; Ewert & Hamman, 1999) and the marginal position of farm working women (Sender & Johnston, 1996; Kritzinger & Vorster, 1998).

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, land reform remained heavily researched (Cliffe, 2000; Graham & AgDarroch, 2001; Sender & Johnston, 2004; James, Ngonini & Nkadimeng, 2005; Moseley, 2006; Fraser, 2007; Moseley, 2007; Lahiff, 2007) as did gender relations and paternalism on farms (Orton, Barrientos & Mcclenaghan, 2001; Kritzinger, 2005; Barrientos, Kritzinger, Opondo
& Smith, 2005). However, many new and more diverse topics came to the fore, two of which received much attention. The first was farm workers’ health, mainly in terms of HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis (Morris, Burdge & Cheevers, 2000; Love, 2004; Viljoen, Gossage, Brooke, Adnams, Jones, Robinson, & May, 2005; Steyn, Labadarios, Maunder, Nel & Lombard, 2005; Clarke, Dick & Bogg, 2006; Dick, Clarke, Van Zyl & Daniels, 2007). The second was the impact of codes of labour practices on farm workers (du Toit, 2002; Nelson, Martin & Ewert, 2005; Nelson, Martin & Ewert, 2007; Moseley, 2008; McEwan & Bek, 2009), how such codes cannot by themselves improve the livelihoods of farm workers (du Toit & Ewert, 2002:99) and the need for codes to be gender sensitive (Barrientos, McClenaghan & Orton, 2001). Whilst some researchers argued for the benefits of agricultural efficiency for farm workers (Schirmer, 2004; Pauw, Mcdonald & Punt, 2007), this was disputed by those who highlighted the servitude of farm workers (Woolman & Bishop, 2007), their state of poverty (du Toit, 2003), the lack of social protection (Barrientos & Barrientos, 2002) and the casualisation of their employment (Barrientos & Kritzinger, 2004; Pons-Vignon & Anseeuw, 2009). Some solutions have been proposed, such as Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) (Williams, 2005) as well as housing projects for farm workers (Hartwig, & Marais, 2005), but these have been largely unsuccessful. Also of particular interest in this decade was that studies of farm workers became multidimensional. Rather than a homogenous group, farm workers were considered as migrants (Mather, 2000; Ulicki & Crush, 2007; Johnston, 2007; Rutherford & Addison, 2007), contract workers (Kritzinger, Barrientos & Rossouw, 2004; Barrientos, 2008), retired workers (Marais, Conradie & Kritzinger, 2006), and even parents (Kritzinger, 2002).

Since 2010, whilst land reform remained a popular research topic (Ntshona, Kraai, Kepe & Saliwa, 2010; Dlamini, Verschoor, & Fraser, 2013; Mbedu, 2014), new interest arose in the livelihoods of farm workers. Hall, Wisborg, Shirinda and Zamchiya (2013) find that proletarianisation, casualisation and the externalisation of farm labour increased post-1994 and the livelihoods of farm workers have not improved since (Bernstein, 2013).

Although farm workers’ livelihoods are heavily dependent on incomes from local agricultural employment (Jacobs & Makaudze, 2012), they do have agency and are able to exercise choices (du Toit & Neves, 2014). Research on migrant farm workers continues to study the livelihoods of legal and illegal migrant farm workers (Rutherford, 2011), their class-consciousness and masculinities (Bolt, 2010). The private lives of farm workers have also been explored through studies of their cultural rituals (Connor, 2010) and relationships, revealing women to be less satisfied than men in their relationships (Lesch & Engelbrecht, 2011). Interest has continued on codes of conduct through studies into the challenges of implementing fair trade in South Africa (Hughes, McEwan, Bek, & Rosenberg, 2014) and the benefits of these for workers when adhered to by commercial farms (Jari,
Adherence often leads to social upgrading for regular workers, in contrast to irregular workers in Global Value Chains (Barrientos, Gereffi & Rossi, 2011) and there is a lack of implementation, which most negatively affects women on farms (Greenberg, 2013). Interest in the paternalistic relations on farms has continued (Connor, 2013), but it would seem that legislation post-1994 eroded paternalistic relations and increased the insecurity of farm workers (James, 2011; Loxton 2015). A new topic of research has been the impact of minimum wage legislation in the agricultural sector (Bhorat, Kanbur, & Stanwix, 2012; Africa Research Bulletin, 2013) and whether farm managers are complying with it (Yamada, 2012). In contrast to much research on farm workers, Nakana and Mkhabela studied farm owners, finding that characteristics such as gender and age significantly influence farms’ performance (2011). Finally, although there is a need to study farm workers as well as owners, Swart and Orsmond suggest that instead of studying the social and economic separately, research should study the social economy of farms (2010).

Although much research has viewed farm workers structurally, that is to say, farm workers have been studied in respect to the consequences of historical and legislative changes, a recent study posits farm workers as agentive (du Toit & Neves, 2014). Since the constrained considerations of temporary workers in relation to how they negotiate labour insecurity is still under-researched, it is the purpose of this study to enrich this emerging body of knowledge. In order to address this, this thesis attempts to give voice to temporary farm workers.

3.3 REVIEW OF TEMPORARY FARM WORKERS’ LABOUR TURNOVER

Even though Barrientos & Barrientos (2002:19) reported on the “high level of flexibility of employment within the sector, with non-permanent workers moving from one employer to another during or between seasons” in 2002, I could trace no study in South Africa specifically analysing temporary farm workers’ explanations for this. Thus, although I am aware that temporary farm workers are heterogeneous, scarcity of research has meant that I reviewed literature that is not specific to South African farm workers.

Although there is scant research from South Africa, an excerpt from a study has shown that temporary farm workers with partners, as well as co-workers, accompany each other to places of work to ‘prevent extra-marital affairs’ and also to increase their salaries or save on costs (Kritzinger, Barrientos & Rossouw, 2004:33). There are also context specific factors that could influence workers considerations in South Africa. For example, according to a study done in a packinghouse in Ceres, around 50% of farm working women tested positive for HIV/AIDS (Van Biljon, 2013). Deaths and illnesses caused by HIV/AIDS are likely to contribute to higher labour turnover, increase labour costs and decrease productive efficiency (Ortmann, 2005:294) on farms. Workers may also leave
employment due to the added stress put on (extended) familial support networks, which increases reproductive insecurity.

Another context specific factor includes the high rate of Foetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder (FASD) in the area (Oliver, 2012). Alcohol consumption in the area can be traced back to the seventeenth century when the wages of the earliest farm workers were supplemented with wine (Marais, 1939:8). Even up to 1918, each farm worker still received two bottles of wine a day (Marais, 1939:269). However, by 1975 some farms in the Western Cape had “abolished the ‘dop’ system entirely and workers [bought their] wine at the Co-operative” (van der Merwe, 1976). In the region of Ceres wage substitution with alcohol was uneven, “four farmers gave no ‘dop’ to workers and on 10 other farms … the ‘dop’ varied from three bottles at weekends to nine ‘dops’ a day or 1½ bottles a day plus a litre at weekends” (Theron, 1976). Alcohol abuse amongst the coloured residents is higher because black Africans “do not have a history of drinking patterns” (Marais, Jordaan, Viljoen, Oliver, de Waal & Poole, 2011:5) and farm workers’ wages in the Eastern Cape were not substituted with alcohol (Atrobus, 1976). Further, although black African farm workers worked on farms in the region in 1857, 1878-1879 and 1897, they returned to their homes after each contract (Marais, 1939:267) and in 1890 legislation prohibited the sale of alcohol to black Africans but not coloureds (Marais, 1939:160). Of the total number of substance abusers in treatment in the Western Cape, alcohol abuse is still greater amongst coloureds (50%) than black Africans (17%) (South African Community Epidemiology Network on Drug Use, 2014:9). However, amongst the youth under the age of 20, alcohol abuse is in decline from 14% in 2010 to about 3% currently (South African Community Epidemiology Network on Drug Use, 2014:12).

Data pertaining to coloured residents in the region indicate that 57% live close to someone with an alcohol problem, whilst 63% of women drink during pregnancy and a further 17% drink throughout pregnancy (Marais, et al., 2011:9). FASD exacerbates the responsibilities of women who have to care for FASD children and alcoholic kin. Because of the “exceptionally high FASD rate in the town of Prince Alfred’s Hamlet [near Ceres]” (Oliver, 2012) the Foundation for Alcohol Related Research (FARR) implemented a prevention programme in the area between 2011 and 2013 (Viljoen, 2011). The findings of a previous study in the area revealing a 60% success rate in changing the drinking behaviour of pregnant women (de Waal, 2010:2).

International data from India also speak to factors external to the workplace that influence women’s considerations in participating in farm work. For example, more women work when from lower castes, widowed, divorced or separated and during peak harvesting season. They also work less when they have more dependants or adult men in the household, have higher standards of living, and when unemployment is generally high (Bardhan, 1979:81).
Further research from USA and Canada suggests that some temporary farm workers have a greater propensity to leave employment before completing the full length of the harvesting season. These are predominantly men, aged under 26, non-locals, inexperienced and/or recruited through employment centres (Smit, Johnston & Morse, 1985:166). Further, a higher proportion leaves employment during peak harvesting season when working on large farms (Smit, Johnston & Morse, 1985:166) and by as much as 20% when working for labour brokers (Taylor & Thilmany, 1993:358). The percentage of workers remaining in employment increases with increased length of work on farms, in regions that have increased wages, as well as when working on farms employing few workers with a low proportion of temporary farm workers (Taylor & Thilmany, 1993:358). This suggests that the more committed farm managers are towards workers, the more committed workers are in return. According to the National Agricultural Workers Survey (NAWS) of 1990 in the USA, 25% of temporary workers leave employment without working the full-length of their contracts (Mines, Gabbard & Boccalandro, 1991:88). This is attributed to workers’ moving residence (7%), familial responsibilities (6%), students in education (5%), illnesses (4%) and workers taking leave (3%) (Mines, Gabbard & Boccalandro, 1991:88). This indicates that reproductive (in)security is the largest contributor to turnover. Finally, based on secondary analyses of the NAWS of 1990, Gabbard and Perloff suggest that farms in the USA retain 40% of their temporary employees (1997:478). Retention was higher amongst single temporary farm workers and those unable to speak English. Further, analyses also suggest increased retention when temporary farm workers are directly hired by employers, offered employment benefits (such as health insurance and free housing), or paid by the hour, instead of piece rates (Gabbard & Perloff, 1997:484). In this respect, retention increased with greater income security.

South African farm managers are not alone in their suspicions that temporary farm workers work towards an income goal. However, contrary to such assumptions in the USA, Billikopf’s survey revealed that only 3% of temporary farm workers do so and that temporary farm workers’ reasons for leaving work are accounted for by the fact that they are hot, tired or underpaid (1995:17). He thus suggested that increasing workers’ wages would discourage them from leaving to seek other work and motivate them to work longer hours, but this only pertains to a context where other employment is available.

In view of the fact that some farm managers in Ceres reported that workers left temporary employment in spite of reportedly offering financial bonuses, this may mean that considerations around employment are not only economic. Numerous studies into the meaning of work (Morse & Weiss, 1955; Gini & Sullivan, 1987; Ezzy, 2001; Kaplan & Tausky, 1974; Tausky, 1969; Jakubowski, 1968; Wiltshire, forthcoming) have shown that apart from economic rewards work is also (highly) valued for providing a structured routine, intrinsic satisfaction, interpersonal experiences, and social
status, while it is also upheld as a morally correct activity (Kaplan & Tausky, 1974). Further, work is also valued as an opportunity for training, remains gendered, and men’s pride at being the breadwinner can deter men from taking low paid jobs even when no other work is available (Wiltshire, forthcoming). Such meanings can also be primary reasons to work in spite of low wages. Thus, individual considerations around work depend on a variety of values attached to the intrinsic meaning of work.

Finally, in spite of the widely reported negative consequences of temporary work, there are also indications that at least some South African workers value the temporary nature of farm work for a sense of empowerment. This is because temporary farm workers value being able to “decide on [their] own when and where and how much [they] want to work” and more so for women who value having housing that is independent of employment (Kritzinger, Barrientos & Rossouw, 2004:36). Similarly, Indian workers with non-wage incomes also prefer temporary work, even when permanent wages are higher, because the combined income from wage and non-wage incomes can be greater than permanent wages alone (Pal, 1996:106). Non-wage incomes of temporary farm workers in South Africa include social assistance, remittances from migrant household members, loans and informal trading (Kritzinger, Barrientos & Rossouw, 2004; Emerson, 1989; Human, 2013; Mosoetsa, 2005) as well as unemployment insurance, performance pay, informal and non-farm work and access to income through employed household members and partners. This means that temporary farm workers’ considerations around work may be influenced by the total value of household incomes; the number of household members, present and migrant; the time of year; access to credit; and any additional income streams, including social assistance grants, as this is usually the only secure income in their households.

Regarding the percentage of workers leaving temporary employment, I could only trace two studies in South Africa addressing this. Between 1949 and 1953, on farms in the area of Cape Town the annual average labour turnover of “regular” employment, in contrast to “irregular or seasonal” employment (van der Horst, 1957:276), that is to say permanent farm workers, was 131% (van der Horst, 1957:277). Another study, of five farms in the region of Piketberg, 115 kilometres from Ceres, where many of the temporary farm workers in this study worked for farms or self-employed supervisors, reported that 82% of temporary farm workers leave employment positions (Odendaal, 2008:13).

Labour turnover has also been shown to be correlated to absenteeism in a time sequence in which “lateness tends to precede absence, and absence predicts turnover” (Harrison, Newman and Roth, 2006:318). This means that one would expect to find that farm managers reporting a high rate of labour turnover also experience high rates of absenteeism. Statistics to this effect, without workers
explanations, have been analysed by Odendaal in Piketberg where 15% of temporary farm workers over the course of a week are absent from work, differing by the day of the week: 23% on Mondays, 13% on Tuesdays, 10% on Wednesdays, 12% on Thursday and 15% on Fridays (2008:13).

The expansion of commercial farming has been accompanied by formalised labour legislation and training required to meet industry codes of conduct, technological advancements, and externalisation of the workforce. With these changes, the agricultural sector is acutely aware of the need to retain and attract skilled and experienced temporary employees, which is why the perception of high labour turnover on farms in Ceres has become a key concern. However, the only research available on the labour turnover of farm workers in South Africa, as discussed above, was published in 1957 (van der Horst). Furthermore, internationally there are only three studies, two from the USA (Taylor & Thilmany, 1993:358; Gabbard & Perloff, 1997) and another from Canada (Smit, Johnston & Morse, 1985). These were based on interviews with farm owners or managers or secondary data analyses of variables in surveys addressing demographic profiles and employment histories. These, thus, did not assist in explaining temporary farm workers’ own considerations around paid work.
3.4 THE CHANGING NATURE OF WORK AND PRODUCTION IN THE DECIDUOUS FRUIT SECTOR

Since 1988, there has been a steady decline in employment in South African agriculture, largely due to mechanisation, in some sectors, while market deregulation played a considerable role across all sectors. Being a deciduous fruit sector, employment trends in Ceres stand in sharp contrast to South African agriculture at large. For example, since 1983 the number of tractors in South African agriculture increased 95% alongside a 56% decrease in employment (Figure 3.1). What is more, between 1995 and 1996 alone, grape harvesters in the wine grape sector increased by 52%, each one “replac[ing] as many as 70 workers per 12-hour shift” and by 1997, 36% of producers used mechanical grape harvesters (Ewert & du Toit, 2005a:328).

Figure 3.1: Trends in employment, mechanisation and farming units in South African Agriculture between 1983 and 2007

Source: Adapted from agricultural censuses and surveys (Central Statistical Service, 1987; 1990; 1998a; Statistics South Africa, 2004a; 2009).

In Ceres, although there was an increase in mechanisation, employment did not decline. On the contrary, it increased by 361% between 1983 and 2015 (Figure 3.2 below). This is because Ceres is predominantly a deciduous fruit sector, where fruit is mainly sold as fresh produce. Due to the sensitivity to bruising of fruit, manual work in this sector has not been mechanised, except for sorting machines in the packinghouses. Whereas a farm of 100 hectares of deciduous fruit creates around 500 jobs per year, a fully mechanised wheat farm of 1000 hectares only employs around 40 workers per year (Andre, wheat farm owner). Thus, although employment across agriculture decreased, partly due to mechanisation, employment increased in the deciduous fruit sector with expansion and more intensive farming.
Employment in Ceres is not only gendered and racialised, but varies according to class because of the historic ownership of farms. Since the advent of colonialism, most farms in Ceres are owned by white farmers due to the issuing of farming licences in 1713, and later the quitrent system in 1813, whereby a necessary legal condition of owning land was for individuals to swear an oath (Marais, 1939). Only Christians could do so, thus excluding native Khoi-Khoi and free blacks from the legal ownership rights. This means that there exists a class division on farms in that the owners are descendants of white European settlers while workers are native coloured and black Africans.

Since the 1800s farms recruited temporary workers from missionary stations, e.g. Rhenish missionary station in Tulbagh as well as Wupperthal mission station, both near Ceres, and local towns as well as permanent residents living on farms, “who did not necessarily receive cash wages, but … [were] dependen[t] on employers’ land, food, housing clothing and alcoholic sustenance …)” (Keegan, 1996:125). Further, although labour regulations were implemented in the nineteenth century, the Native Labour Regulation Act of 1911 restricted farm workers to employment in agriculture. Subsequently, the Native Service Contract Act of 1932, required farm workers as well as their families to work on the farms for three to six months of the year. With no access to the means of their own subsistence, this led to the proletarianisation of farm workers, as suggested by Wolpe (1972:442).

A further consequence was the gendered division of farm work as men constituted the core of the workforce, working in the orchards throughout the year. Women supplemented these as peripheral workers, mostly women living on farms and married to permanent workers, to thin trees before harvesting season while packing and sorting fruit in packinghouses during harvesting. Workers also included children who worked alongside their parents thinning fruit trees (Levy, 1977:93) - child labour in South African agriculture was only abolished in 1997 under the Basic Conditions of Employment Act.
Not only was there a gendered division of labour, but work also became racialised. This was due to Coloured Labour Preference Act of 1957 that required farms to employ local coloured workers, and only in the event that no such workers were available could they apply for a certificate to bring in black African workers from reserves. In this manner, employment on farms in the Western Cape developed a class-gender-race nexus of a particular nature, structuring farm work today.

However, the profile of agricultural workers was set to change. Since 1988, across South Africa there has been a decline in the number of farms (Figure 3.1). As mentioned above, this is not only due to mechanisation but also to deregulation. This began in the 1980s with financial sector deregulation that led to a fall in the value of the rand, increasing the cost of farming inputs (Sandrey & Vink, 2008:7). Secondly, increases in interest rates by the Reserve Bank also led to farming bankruptcies, coupled with decreased investment between 1988 and 1992 due to the uncertain political environment and sanctions. This situation led to a lack of confidence in agriculture (Coetzee, Meyer & Adam, 2002:7) and speaks to the decline in farming units in South Africa and Ceres, although farms became larger.

Increasing internal pressure with the rise of the labour movement in the 1970s, conglomerates wanting to expand abroad as well as external economic sanctions and embargoes led to the fall of the apartheid government in South Africa in 1994. Subsequently, in 1996, the African National Congress, as per the prescriptions of the International Monetary fund and World Bank, adopted the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) economic policy wherein the private sector would generate growth and development through reinvestment of profits (Dale, 2005:77). This “committed the ANC ... to liberalisation of financial markets, a ‘flexible labour market’, trade liberalisation, a conservative fiscal policy including cuts in social expenditure [although social assistance expenditure expanded in South Africa], and export led growth” (Dale, 2005:77).

Thus, restrictions on investing in external financial markets were lifted as well as import restrictions. Essentially the debates about flexibility of labour markets “came to mean explicitly de-regulation” (Bezuidenhout & Kenny, 2000:74) and conglomerates started disinvesting in South Africa by moving capital abroad (Marais, 2011:124).

Consequently, marketing monopolies, such as Unifruco for the deciduous fruit sector, were abolished in 1996 and government subsidies to this sector were withdrawn. Furthermore, in accordance with the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) in 1994, South Africa also reduced tariffs on imports. However, tariffs were reduced at a faster rate than required by GATT such that tariffs on agricultural, forestry and fishing imports that were set at 41.2%, were reduced to 2.2% by 1998 (Nicholson, 2001). This meant that South African farmers not only had to compete in a global market, but also one in which producers in the USA and Europe still received government subsidies.
In line with, and in competition with other countries (Harvey 1989), farm managers and companies across South Africa began to implement lean production to increase efficiency and competitiveness. Firstly, they increased technology. Farms able to invest in technology, such as packinghouses and coolers, adapt to consumer demands and provide traceability of products were able to sell directly to UK (United Kingdom) supermarkets. This included adherence to the rise of Ethical Trade Initiatives and specific supplier codes of labour practices in the 1990s to regulate labour conditions, workers’ rights and produce quality, amongst others. With growing “global and national pressures which on the one hand drive down labour cost and contribute to the growing informalization of work, yet on the other hand increasingly require higher quality and employment standards” (Barrientos & Kritzinger, 2004:19), by the turn of the twentieth century, ten companies exported 84% of South African fruit (Best & Mamic, 2008:37) and many smaller farms had been taken over.

Advancements in technology have been accompanied by changes in the workers’ skills. Since 1995, there has been a slight upward trend in the skills of women (Figure 3.3). However, amongst men there has been a strong trend towards lower skilled work, where over the last twenty years 44% more men are in unskilled employment (Statistics South Africa, 1996 & 2015b). This means that there has been deskilling amongst men.

**Figure 3.3: Changes in gendered skills of the South African workforce between 1995 and 2015**

According to the trends in occupational skills since 1995, the greatest percentage decrease has been in the numbers of skilled agricultural workers, whilst overall, there has been an increase in higher skilled employment, with high growth in managers and the sales and services sector, and lower skilled employment of elementary workers (Figure 3.4).
The overall trend to skilled employment is due to changes in the structure of the economy, referred to as a “skill-biased technological change” which adversely effects the “employment of low-skilled labour” (Standing, 2009:1333). However, the polarisation of skills amongst men may be because “low-skilled unemployed men are not … seeking employment in growth areas of service and non-manual employment [rather they] seek traditional and familiar forms of male-dominated, low-skill manual employment which are now in decline” (Nixon, 2006:201). This speaks to the exorbitant growth of black African farm working men into unskilled temporary employment on farms, referred to below.

Further, lean production has fragmented the workforce into a core and a periphery allowing for more flexibility and cost effectiveness. This is illustrated through an analysis of employment patterns in South Africa over the last fifteen years, whereby the number of permanent jobs have decreased by 2.3 million whereas temporary jobs have increased by 2.5 million (Adcorp, 2012; 2014) and temporary agencies employ about 1 million workers (Adcorp, 2014) (Figure 3.5). Currently in South Africa, 44% of working-age individuals (15-64 years) are employed (Statistics South Africa, 2015b). According to the last official release of Adcorp’s Employment Index, 43% of these are permanent workers, 32% are informal workers, 20% are temporarily employed while 5% are employed through recruitment agencies (Adcorp, 2014).
Similarly, these trends have occurred in agriculture where workers have declined by 21% since 1983 (Central Statistical Service, 1987; Statistics South Africa, 2015b), about 38% for permanent workers and 12% for temporary workers (Central Statistical Service, 1987; Statistics South Africa, 2012a) (Figure 3.7 below). In the deciduous fruit sector, however, the inverse occurred as workers increased by 361%, 121% and 478% for permanent and temporary workers respectively (Central Statistical Service, 1987; Koue Bokkeveld Opleidingsentrum, 2015) (Figure 3.7 below). In addition, in Ceres the numbers of temporary farm workers surpassed permanent workers post-1993. The large increase in temporary workers is a reflection of the introduction of flexible working practices to reduce labour costs. In the South African climate, this reduction was mainly done through numerical and wage system flexibility (Bezuidenhout & Kenny, 2000:78) due to the structural legacy of apartheid Bantu education which meant that coloured and black African workers were undereducated and unskilled (Beinart, 1994a:209).

Although flexible labour practices were a consequence of market deregulation, they were also a mechanism to save on the rising costs of labour brought about by the regulation of labour relations on farms. The first legislation formalising farm workers’ employment being the Agricultural Labour Act of 1993, which amended the Basic Conditions of Employment Act of 1983 and the Labour Relations Act of 1956, to include farm workers for the first time. The latter pertained to labour dismissals, courts and appeals whilst the former stipulated the hours of work, overtime, leave, employment contracts, deduction, pay slips and terminations. Since 1993, the Unemployment Insurance Act extended to farm workers, whereby farm workers contribute to and can claim unemployment insurance. These legislative changes incorporated increased labour costs for some employers by reducing working hours and introducing paid overtime. Further labour costs arose due to increased administration of labour records, audits and management of labour disputes (Newman, Ortmann & Lyne, 1997:75). This meant that some employers required additional workers to compensate for lost labour-time. Others, such as some farms in the Ceres region, had already implemented such changes before legally required to do so.
Possibly as a result of these legislative changes, in the 1990s women were employed permanently for the first time in Ceres. Having reached 17% of the permanent workforce on farms in the mid-1990s (Kritzinger & Vorster, 1998), today women constitute 36% of the permanent workforce in Ceres (Koue Bokkeveld Opleidingsentrum, 2015). This means that a larger percentage of women are able to access employment benefits such as certified skills training, pension and medical allowances.

Subsequently, in 1995, agriculture was no longer exempted from collective bargaining, labour disputes and conditions of employment and became regulated under the 1995 Labour Relations Act. However, being perceived as a sector where workers are not easily organised or accessible to unions, the 2002 Sectoral Determination 13: Farm Worker Sector was introduced. This determined farm workers’ minimum wages, wage deductions, working hours, overtime, number of leave days and termination rules, amongst others (Republic of South Africa, 2002). This meant that as of March 2003 the wages of farm workers increased from R419 per month to R650 or R800, for low-yielding or rural regions and high-yielding or urban regions respectively (Department of Labour, 2003a). Almost a decade later, in 2012 farm workers in South Africa went on strike demanding a minimum wage of R3,247 per month. However, this wage was insufficient to “provide the nutrition that is needed to make them food secure” and such a wage would not allow farm managers to “cover their operating expenses, and hence not be able to pay back borrowing or to afford entrepreneurs remuneration” (Bureau for Food and Agricultural Policy, 2012:51). Thus, farm workers’ wages were amended and increased to R2,273 per month with annual increments. As of 2015, farm workers now earn a minimum wage of R2,606.78 per month, before deductions.

Although regulating farm workers’ wages may have been beneficial for disadvantaged workers, “in the Western Cape… about 75% of workers reported earnings above” the minimum wage determination of 2013 (Bureau for Food and Agricultural Policy, 2015:8). Employers also mitigated the increases by decreased working hours and charging workers for non-wage benefits (Bureau for Food and Agricultural Policy, 2015:35). Thus, participants in this study cited losing employment benefits, such as pensions and medical aid, no longer receiving free uniforms or bonuses for working a full week. Further, temporary farm workers no longer receive payment in lieu of days not worked, meaning that they were no longer paid when unable to work due to rainfall. Minimum wage legislation also flattened wage differentials, in that increases accrued due to secure employment contracts, length of service, seniority and skills were replaced by a standard wage. In this manner, farm workers reported that real wage gains did not offset the price value of wage subsidies lost. That is to say, workers experienced a decrease in (social) wages.

In 1997, residential rights of farm workers were also regulated through the Extension of Security of Tenure Act (ESTA). This meant that a resident who had lived on a farm for more than 10 years and
who was a minimum of sixty years old or was an employee, or former employee who could no longer work due to injury or ill-health, was entitled to lifelong residence on a farm, lest the worker breach his employment contract. What is more, dependants and spouses were also entitled to live in the residence until the expiration of the occupier’s residency.

As a result, where possible, some farm owners chose to cease offering on-farm housing for workers. For example, whilst remote areas of Ceres continued offering on-farm housing for permanent workers and hostels for temporary workers, farms closer to large residential areas were able to recruit workers from the local population. Similarly, farm owners acquiring new property close to pools of labour did so with the provision that tenants be removed where possible. Recruiting from the local labour pool meant that farm managers had to attract and retain workers to curb labour turnover. This was because employing on-farm “there are fewer difficulties to hinder the attempts to obtain loyalty and commitment from their workers” (Newby, 1977:428, cited in Kritzinger & Vorster, 1997:130). Recruitment of local labour also breaks traditional ties of paternalism on farms, as foreseen by Kritzinger and Vorster in 1997. A further tie between worker and farm as credit provider was abolished in 2013 by the National Credit Act. This meant that farm workers could no longer access zero per cent loans from farm managers, having to apply to authorised or informal credit providers instead.

In this manner, both market deregulation and labour regulation influenced the growth of the temporary farm workers, having constituted around 40% of the workforce up to 1993, they consequently increased to 63% in Ceres (Figure 3.6 below). Regulation led to increased labour insecurity for workers as, firstly, real wages did not increase in accordance with the corrosion of social wage subsidies - such as clothing, housing, childcare, training, medical and pension benefits – whereby housing and childcare alone subsidised wages by as much as 30% (Kritzinger, Barrientos & Rossouw, 2004:22). Secondly, in standardising wages, workers were no longer financially rewarded for length of service and skills.
Figure 3.6: Trends in the agricultural workforce in South Africa and Ceres between 1983 and 2015

Source: Adapted from agricultural censuses and surveys (Central Statistical Service, 1987; 1990; 1998b; Statistics South Africa, 2004b; 2009; 2012a) and the Koue Bokkeveld Opleidingsentrum\(^5\) (2015).

Up to 1986, influx controls and the Coloured Labour Preference Act of 1957 restricted employment on farms in the Western Cape to the recruitment of local coloured workers lest no other workers were available. In this respect, some seasonal workers were recruited in the Eastern Cape for peak harvesting. However, the abolishment of influx control led to the rapid increase of black African workers to Ceres (Figure 3.7), although temporary migration only showed a marked increase after 1993.

Research from Agincourt through the demographic surveillance system suggests that temporary migration of black African women increased from 1998 (Collinson, Tollman, Kahn, Clark & Garenne, 2006:13). The latter may be attributed to two factors. Firstly, the migration of women is correlated to older women in rural households and the absence of men. Since 1993, the old-age pension of black Africans was brought up to par with other races and since 1998 child support grants also provided a stable source of income. In this manner, older women could provide access to a stable grant as income (Ardington & Lund, 1995; Ardington Case & Hosegood, 2007) as well as childcare, permitting women to temporarily migrate for work (Ardington \textit{et al}, 2007). Secondly, women are more likely to migrate when they are unmarried or have unemployed men in the household (Posel & Casale, 2003:8). Thus, the shedding of jobs in the mining sector in the 1990s along with a sharp decline from 1997, might also have spurred on the increase in black African women migrating (Crush, 2012:23). In this manner, after deregulation, not only was there a disproportionate growth in the temporary workforce on farms, but employment growth was also racialized (Figure 3.7).

\(^5\) In lieu of agricultural employment statistics for Ceres beyond 2003 from Statistics South Africa, employment equity data of 80 farms in the region of Ceres published by the Koue Bokkeveld Opleidingsentrum are used as a reference. In this manner, the figures do not include all the farms in the region of Ceres and may be less than actual figures.
Figure 3.7: Trends in racial agricultural employment contracts in Ceres between 1983 and 2015

Agricultural censuses up to 1993 categorised farm workers by race and type of contract, while the last available data at local level, the agricultural census of 2003, categorised workers by gender and type of contract. Due to the gap in statistics on the racial and gendered categories of farm workers, a study by du Toit and Ally (2003) of eight farms in the area and statistics from the Koue Bokkeveld Opleidingsentrum (2015) of 80 commercial farms in the region of Ceres serve as a reference (Figure 3.8).

After abolition of influx control, there was a sharp increase in the numbers of permanent black African workers on farms. However, growth has been greater amongst black African men while black African women are a minority in the permanent workforce (Figure 3.8). Today, coloured men still constitute the majority of the permanent workforce although their proportions have sharply declined from about 75% in 2000 to 35% today (du Toit & Ally, 2003; Koue Bokkeveld Opleidingsentrum, 2015). Further, after market deregulation and regulation of labour relations, the numbers of permanent workers have remained almost stable, in contrast to the growth of temporary farm workers to cater for expansion in Ceres (Figure 3.7). Amongst temporary workers, there have been greater increases in the numbers of black African men who now constitute 52% of the temporary workforce on farms. Growing casualised employment has thus been marked by gender and racial characteristics. Today, the permanent workforce consists mainly of coloured workers (59%) and men (64%), while the temporary workforce is dominated by black African workers (80%) and men (61%).
Lean production has thus led to the casualisation of the workforce in an environment of expanding economic growth. The South African economy grew between 1985 and 1995 at an average annual GDP of 0.8% (du Plessis & Smit, 2006). After liberalisation, this increased to an average of 3.1% per annum. Thus, in the last twenty years the economy has grown 63%. However, while the working-age population grew by 35%, those employed only increased by 12% whilst the unemployed decreased by 8% with a 7% decrease in the economically inactive (Statistics South Africa, 1996, 2015a). Thus, economic growth in South Africa has been accompanied by low employment growth.

Further, it has been predominantly women who have moved into the newly created jobs. In the broad economy in South Africa 30% of women left the reserve army of labour to join the workforce over the last twenty years (Statistics South Africa, 1996, 2015a), 21% amongst women in the agricultural workforce in Ceres (du Toit & Ally, 2003; Koue Bokkeveld Opleidingsentrum, 2015). This stands in sharp contrast to men in South Africa for whom the rate of employment has remained stagnant (Statistics South Africa, 1996, 2015a). This speaks to the feminisation of employment, in that there has been a growth in the percentage of women in wage labour, and unskilled temporary employment.

However, in the deciduous fruit sector the numbers of black African men as temporary workers have grown considerably, in comparison to other categories of workers. This is because market deregulation occurred shortly after the abolishment of influx control and being mostly unskilled work, employment growth in this sector led to the incorporation of unemployed men from South Africa’s reserve army of labour in the former homelands. In this manner, black African men were incorporated into irregular, low paid employment with no opportunities for career advancement or skills training (Standing, 1999:585), that is to say feminised employment. Another characteristic of feminisation, the ‘triple burden of care’ of women, was also unevenly experienced as coloured women participate in paid labour while responsible for the unpaid reproductive work in the home, the same cannot be
said for black African women who migrate to the region for work (Section 5.4.3). However, both coloured and black African women experience further income insecurity because they do not receive maternity leave. This arises due to the temporary nature of their contracts whereby they are either not employed or do not seek employment during this time, thus reducing their wages further.

South Africa’s adoption of liberal economic policies in 1996 showed that government believed that the private sector could create enough growth to increase employment and thus development of the country (Dale, 2005:77). It based this decision on the assumption of labour market and income security, whereby it assumed that “employment is available to those who seek it and that wage incomes ensure wellbeing” (Marais, 2011:242). Due to these assumptions only the sufficiently vulnerable young, old and disabled are eligible to receive social assistance grants whilst those able to work have the right to unemployment insurance paid in accordance with the length of time worked. There is thus a lack of social security for structurally unemployed and temporarily employed working age adults. This is because “the agenda is set by private, competitive interests, [and] gains come at tremendous broader social cost [of] increasing marginalisation and insecurity of a far larger section of the farm workforce” (Mather & Greenberg, 2003:411). These trends are accompanied by privatisation of social protection as this is increasingly becoming multi-tiered into “low level of state provision”, “mandatory insurance based” protection, “employment negotiated” protection and “private individual savings-based” funds (Standing & Tawney, 2001:12). This serves to further disadvantage the lower strata of society, as private insurance requires a secure income. However in agricultural rural areas, non-agricultural work is scarce and the only available work may be seasonal, so much so that in some deciduous fruit farming areas 91% of workers are in temporary employment (Theewaterskloof Municipality, 2012:22).

These farm workers can only accrue minimal social insurance because it is paid in accordance to the length of time worked, as per the Unemployment Insurance Contributions Act. UIF accrues at “a rate of one day’s benefit for every completed six days of employment” (Department of Labour, 2003b:9). The peak season for temporary work in the Ceres region is November to March, and as such, registration for UIF would entitle temporary farm workers to receive unemployment benefit for about 18 working days after the peak harvesting season at a maximum of “58% of what [they] earned per day” (The South African Labour Guide, 2014). This would mean that workers could be paid a total of about R1,360 in UIF after every season. Further, temporary farm workers are entitled to holiday pay, which paid at a rate of one day for every 17 days worked means that workers are eligible to financial compensation of about R780 after every season, in lieu of paid leave. These benefits are premised, however, on labour market security and are insufficient to sustain a temporary worker.
throughout the low season stretching about seven months in the deciduous fruit sector, on farms that have not diversified into mixed farming.

Other resources available are subsidised water and electricity, when living in indigent households where income is less than around R3,000 per month. Notwithstanding, the South African state does provide social services including subsidised public schooling, public health services as well as subsidised public housing for households earning less than R3,500 per month. However, due to backlogs, services are oversubscribed and there are long waiting lists for public housing. This means that while there should be a social floor for the indigent, many workers in South Africa find themselves in a social security gap where they are not sufficiently deserving to receive social assistance, nor sufficiently employed to pay for privatised insurances or services. The findings of this study suggest that temporary farm workers’ total household income is accrued through social assistance to children (32%), the income of women (32%) and men (36%) (Section 0). Social assistance contributes a large proportion of household income, and women administer 64% of household income.

Temporary farm workers are socially insecure in that they experience labour insecurity, accrue insufficient unemployment insurance, are not eligible for social assistance grants and rely on oversubscribed public services. This establishes the rationale for examining how they negotiate labour insecurity.

3.5 CONCLUSION

This chapter, reviewed research on South African farm workers to show that since the 1990s farm workers have gradually become researched as a heterogeneous group, yet, there has been scant research on how temporary farm workers negotiate labour insecurity and their considerations in participating in paid work.

The second part of this chapter then examined research on the labour turnover of temporary farm workers. Although studies are few, they suggest that labour turnover amongst young men, non-locals and inexperienced workers might be higher than other workers (Smit, Johnston & Morse, 1985). Similarly, women may work less in areas of high unemployment should they have partners or greater numbers of dependents in the household (Bardhan, 1979). Finally, since studies pertaining specifically to temporary farm workers’ labour turnover were conducted with farm managers, a further avenue for research exists to include the views of workers themselves.

The third part of this chapter applied the theoretical framework in analysing the changing nature of work and production in the deciduous fruit sector in Ceres. This was done with insights from other theorists to integrate gender and race into Marx’s class analysis because, in the current era,
employment on farms in Ceres has a class-gender-race nexus that structures workers’ participation in (paid) work. The class division stems from historical legislation of land ownership since the eighteenth century, while gender and racial inequality are attributed to separatist legislation in the twentieth century. These trends also led to a gendered division of labour on farms whereby women and men were differentially allocated to specific forms of work and lengths of employment on farms, while racial divisions are a reflection of the late entry of black Africans into farm work.

Lean production strategies to increased productivity and efficacy were implemented post 1994 in South Africa, spurred on by market deregulation and regulation of labour relations that meant that companies had to remain competitive in a global market. One of the consequences has been to follow global trends in the mechanisation of labour and although the agricultural sector has experienced job shedding, the deciduous fruit sector is distinct in that production has not been amenable to mechanisation. A further consequence was the increased efficiency of the workforce through flexibilisation that not only reduces employers’ wage bill, but also decreases fringe benefits paid to workers on standard contracts. A consequence of this was the casualisation of workers through an increase in temporary employment and the incumbent loss of employment benefits – housing, uniforms, training and, sometimes, medical and pension - without sufficient increases in the real wages. Occurring alongside the privatisation of social insurance, and means-tested social assistance grants for the sufficiently ‘deserving’ poor, this has meant that increasing numbers of workers are income insecure and have moved into the lower strata of sub-proletariats, the temporarily employed.

Having established the rationale for this thesis, I turn to appropriate methodological applications and solutions to examine temporary farm workers’ considerations. This is achieved through a pragmatic approach where the central tenet is the best methodological recourse, rather than philosophy, to address the research questions.
Chapter 4

Methodology

4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter addresses the methodological approach guiding the implementation of this study. The first part of this chapter delineates how a pragmatic approach gave prominence to the appropriate research methods to address the research questions. The second part addresses the realisation of the research strategy, borne from a number of considerations, including a lack of familiarity with the agricultural sector and employees and a mandate from funders to conduct a survey. In this manner, a sequential exploratory mixed methods strategy was deemed most appropriate to fulfil the above considerations and best address the research questions.

The third part of this chapter examines the research design of the study, being a case study design, of temporary farm workers living off farms, as an exemplifying case of the broader category of temporary off-farm workers in Witzenberg municipality. This was implemented through a sequential exploratory mixed methods research strategy in three phases. Firstly, exploration of farm workers, farms and the local area enabled familiarisation with the sector to conduct qualitative interviews with farm workers about their work, life histories and considerations around work. The results were refined, verified and ranked in focus groups. In the third phase, a survey was conducted through the design and implementation of a questionnaire interviewing 200 temporary off-farm workers. Finally, analysis incorporated thematic and statistical analyses to render a true interpretation of temporary farm workers’ considerations in participating in paid work and how they negotiate labour insecurity.

4.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: A PRAGMATIC APPROACH

The aim of this research is to develop a socio-economic profile of temporary farm workers in Ceres, understand how they negotiate labour insecurity and to link micro-social practices of work to macro structures of employment. I realise this through a pragmatic approach as this gives prominence to actual behaviours, beliefs upon which behaviours are based as well as consequences of behaviours (Morgan, 2007:67). In this manner, I focus on the research problem and appropriate applications and solutions to address it. This means that I am not restricted by a hierarchy of ontological assumptions that inform my methodology and restrict me to a repertoire of methods. Rather, pragmatism’s central tenet of methodology, rather than philosophy, cuts through the epistemological dichotomy of quantitative and qualitative methodology.
Firstly, it abductively connects theory and data in the research process. This was done by consulting literature to deduce explanations for the research problem. However, few studies have been done on temporary farm workers’ considerations around work and those that have been done were in consultation with employers (Taylor & Thilmany, 1993) or through secondary data analyses (Smit, Johnston and Morse, 1985; Gabbard & Parloff, 1997), instead of workers themselves. Secondly, social theorists suggest “someone who has a job is concerned above all not to lose it” (Bourdieu, 2013:170) especially when there is high unemployment (Marx, 1978b:428) because the increasing precarisation of work increases workers’ dependence on paid work (Marais, 2011:184), but they do not account for temporary farm workers’ considerations around work.

This meant that I could not follow a deductive approach of testing pre-existing theories or bodies of literature. Instead, the research required an inductive approach where by the findings would either indicate relevant bodies of literature and theories to consult for analysis, or generate theories to explain findings. In this manner, I moved abductively between theory and data in the research process.

Secondly, pragmatism emphasises intersubjectivity, over objectivity or subjectivity, whereby “different valid perspectives on reality … [which] … can be more or less correct” (Maxwell, 2012:9, emphasis in original) can exist. For this reason, I consulted key informants (farm managers, community development workers, self-employed farm supervisors), temporary farm workers and secondary data on employment trends.

Thirdly, pragmatism does not necessarily restrict data inferences to specific contexts or wide sweeping generalizations. Rather, it emphasises reflexive scrutiny of the transferability of specific findings between different settings as well as the general implications of findings. Thus, a pragmatic approach gives equal consideration to the tenets of epistemological influences, ethical issues and appropriate methods, on their own terms without restrictions from a hierarchy of top-down philosophical assumptions about the nature of knowledge, because “all single approaches for framing how we understand the social worlds of those we study are problematic” (Nyamnjoh, 2013:134).
4.3 RESEARCH STRATEGY: SEQUENTIAL EXPLORATORY MIXED METHODS

The choice of research strategy was borne from a number of considerations. Firstly, I lacked knowledge of the agricultural sector, commercial farms and employment considerations of temporary farm workers. This required a qualitative approach of exploratory and in-depth interviews to gain an understanding of the social worlds of participants and to strive for relationships of trust with participants to enrich data. Secondly, I had a mandate from funders to conduct a survey. Thirdly, I was restricted by the time constraints of the peak season of temporary farm work.

I thus decided to design the research in three-phases. Firstly, a qualitative approach conducting interviews in August 2014, findings from which would inform the design of a survey to be conducted in the harvesting season. In this manner, weight would be given to qualitative findings interpreted with the assistance of quantitative data, in that this would quantify anecdotal interview findings. For instance, whilst conducting interviews I was left with the impression that temporary farm workers desperately wanted to work and that the reasons that so many, especially women, were unemployed in winter was that there was no work available. However, my survey data revealed that although this was true for most temporary off-farm workers, a third of coloured temporary farm working women do not work in the low season due to historical practices of work. Further, they identified with their role of packinghouse employees, an occupation whereby paid employment is followed by a period of unpaid work in the low season (Section 0).

4.4 RESEARCH DESIGN

Studying temporary farm workers’ considerations in participating in paid work required a geographical setting where workers lived off farms, so that they have freedom to choose their workplaces. This is because farm workers who live on farms are obliged to work for the respective employer, even though 18% of workers surveyed in this study were living on farms but working for a different employer. This meant that I required a location where temporary farm workers reside close to farms. I also required the participation of farm management to access workers. Having been approached by a local skills development centre requesting research on farm workers, I had access to farms near Ceres. Farm managers were accommodating and gave me free access to their staff and records because they were interested in the findings of the research.

This meant that I could conduct a case study of temporary farm workers living off farms, as an exemplifying case of the broader category of temporary off-farm workers in Witzenberg municipality. I thus chose to limit my study to farms established on the boundaries of a town. That is to say where all the farms employed a large number of temporary off-farm workers and were easily accessible to workers, to control for variations in findings due to distances to work and on-farm accommodation for temporary workers. For this reason, of a choice of six possible farms, I included four in my study.
This was because the fifth was 20 kilometres out of town and the sixth only employed permanent workers with a team of workers on an ad-hoc basis for picking during the year.

Having selected a sequential exploratory mixed methods strategy as the most appropriate, I planned my research in three phases (Figure 4.2). The first phase was exploratory to familiarise myself with farms, farm workers and managers as well as the local area. The second phase consisted of qualitative interviews with farm workers about their work, life histories and considerations around work. Lastly, the third phase was a survey to interview a larger population of off-farm temporary workers.

**Figure 4.2: Sequential exploratory mixed methods research strategy**

### 4.4.1 EXPLORATORY PHASE

Firstly, not knowing the area, I did an exploratory interview and guided site visit of the area and farms with the local skills development centre in October 2013. I then spent time reading literature and previous studies on farm workers in South Africa and the area, whilst writing my research proposal. Having obtained ethical clearance from the Research Ethics Committee of Human Research (Humanities) at Stellenbosch University in July 2014 to conduct my research, I returned in August 2014 to interview farm management. I conducted interviews with the owners of four farms and the manager of a fifth farm, all of whom have been assigned pseudonyms for anonymity, see Chapter 5 for an overview of farms. I also requested a guided tour of farms with farm managers who were also interviewed. Since Mountain View farm had a commercial bus to transport their workers to and from work, I requested permission to ride on their bus. This enabled me to see where workers live, listen to workers’ conversations and informally introduce myself to workers.

Not wanting to form a biased impression by solely interviewing workers on farms, I also walked around the town to have informal conversations with local people and visited the local health care clinic, as the queues are a good way of getting into conversation. I then also offered women a lift home from the clinic in my car to be able to talk further. However, people were very suspicious of a stranger asking questions and were not willing to talk. Further, I had no way of verifying information. For example, of a group of women whom I took home, one told me that “only the [black] Africans
get contracts and holiday pay, but not us [coloured farm workers] and we do the same work as them” (Tasneem, coloured temporary farm working woman, 30 years old). This contradicted my findings, in that all farm workers had contracts regardless of race. Due to these reactive effects, I decided to find another way of accessing the community in the second phase of my study, see section 4.4.2 below.

I had decided from the outset, that during this exploratory phase I would also request verbal informed consent from each participant, except farm managers and owners from whom I requested written informed consent. This was so that I could include useful data from exploratory interviews in my findings, even though the purpose of these was to develop appropriate questions and themes for subsequent in-depth interviews. I also recorded many conversations. As this was not always possible in public settings, I would recall the interview afterwards on a voice recorder for later transcription. As with the farms, all participants in this research have been assigned pseudonyms for their anonymity, and as a precautionary measure, the exact location of my research remains confidential.

4.4.2 QUALITATIVE INTERVIEWS

On a third visit, I organised interviews on each of the four farms with temporary off-farm workers working on the farms in August 2014. Interviews were negotiated with each farm to minimise loss of farm productivity and assure that participation in my research did not cause workers loss of income. Farm managers were very obliging in this respect and allowed me to interview workers during their working hours in staff rooms, community halls and offices. Farm management also paid workers for the time spent in interviews. The frequent rainfall during winter meant that workers could not work in the orchards and farms would not lose productivity. It also meant that in participating in my research participants would be paid for their time lest they chose to return home without pay. I requested to speak to temporary farm workers living off the farms, but farm managers also introduced me to a few permanent workers and some temporary workers living on the farms. This was useful in understanding differences in living on and off farms and I gained a better understanding of farm work as well as changes in farm work over the years.

These interviews were semi-structured, focusing on work histories and reasons for working. I also probed participants on themes raised by farm managers and owners as reasons for labour turnover. These included absenteeism, unemployment insurance accrual, indebtedness and preferences for cash wages. Many interviews lasted an hour whilst some were two hours. Further, as farm workers were the experts in this study, I tried to reflect this in the interview setting whenever possible. For example, when conducting one-to-one interviews in managers’ offices I seated myself in the chair of the visitor so that the participants sat in the manager’s chair; I also took refreshments and served participants. In introducing my research and myself, I also requested their assistance in my research, admitting I knew
little about the workings of a commercial farm, administration, management, equipment and varietals. Even though the interview settings remained artificial, my attempts to make participants comfortable with my research meant that they were more forthcoming. However, this also meant that inasmuch as I gained valuable information for my research, I also had to listen to issues important to participants but irrelevant to my study whilst gaining necessary data.

Further, as one of the farm owners allowed me free reign to their personnel records, I used this opportunity to telephonically contact workers who had left their posts without completing the length of their contracts, since such workers were difficult to trace for participation in in-depth interviews. Unfortunately, telephone interviews posed their own set of barriers in that many of the numbers were no longer available or people did not answer their phones. This meant that I was able to interview few people in that category. However, once reached, people were surprisingly willing to talk to me without reservations. In each conversation I introduced myself, explained my study, asked for their assistance and verbal informed consent. The nature of these interviews meant that it was difficult to record, therefore I made detailed notes and wrote up the conversations after each interview.

I also decided to pursue interviews with workers off the farms to control for any biases that might arise from conducting interviews at their workplaces. However, having been previously unsuccessful in interviewing locals, I decided to access the local community through a local organisation not affiliated to the farms, and so declined a farm owner’s suggestion to go through the local Farmer’s Union. Familiar with the Community Work Programme, a rural employment guarantee programme, I approached the local municipality for their contact details, instead. There I met the local Community Development Worker who I was able to interview, accompany on community visits and thus interview temporary farm workers who were not working in August 2014. I was also introduced to the local social worker administering indigent subsidies for the area, whom I was able to interview and sit in on her interviews with new applicants and interview them myself. The Community Development Worker also introduced me to a local community home-based care worker whom I accompanied on community visits, allowing me to interview her and conduct more interviews with temporary farm workers who were not in paid work. This meant that I was able to conduct interviews off the farms where people were able to speak freely and did not associate me with farm management. Moreover, I gained insight into the lives and homes of farm workers. Being accompanied also secured my safety and meant that I had a translator nearby when required because some of the residents were from Lesotho. In accompanying these key informants, I could verify information, like the fact that “Bontle” had no ID because she was from Lesotho and as non-nationals her children were not enrolled at school and she did not receive child grants for them either (Bontle, Lesotho temporary farm working woman, 21 years old).
Since farm managers had mentioned that some farm workers prefer working for wages paid in cash, I requested contact details of known self-employed supervisors. I then arranged interviews with a former self-employed supervisor and four of his former staff. My interview with the supervisor was held at a local coffee shop because there were no other facilities available in town. However, although this was a safe and comfortable setting for me, it made him nervous and the management of the shop suggested that I rent a local conference venue. I consulted the local Community Development Worker for a more suitable venue and finally decided to conduct the interviews in the local municipality. This was convenient for participants and they seemed much more comfortable in the setting. Of the eight interviews arranged, only four attended. This effect could have happened because I arranged the interviews for a Monday morning. In retrospect, I should have arranged a day later in the week and possibly in the afternoon. Having said this, the interviews proved invaluable, as the participants were temporary off-farm workers who were directly employed by farms in the peak season and by self-employed supervisors in the low season.

Finally, I organised four focus groups on three farms to explore the emerging themes from in-depth interviews. After asking the participants about their work histories and details, ranking exercises elicited the factors most important in their considerations around work. Group discussions also addressed prominent themes from in-depth interviews, such as the frequency and reasons for absenteeism, as well as topics that participants wanted to discuss. Although it sometimes felt as if participants complained a lot about conditions on farms, I felt that it was because they do not often have an opportunity to talk about issues of importance to them. In this manner, I took the time to listen to them, thankful for their assistance in my study. It also broadened my understanding of farm workers and sometimes very valuable information came from such discussions. These focus groups lasted between two to three hours.

Table 4.1: Temporary farm workers interviewed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Black African</th>
<th>Coloured</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-farm interviews</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Off-farm interviews</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone interviews</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus groups</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This meant that I did a total of 29 interviews and four focus groups with farm workers between the ages of 21 and 65 (Table 4.1). I also conducted interviews with five farm managers and/or owners and six other key informants (Table 4.2).
Table 4.2: Key informants interviewed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Former contractor</th>
<th>Managers of Two Orchards farm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nurse at local health clinic</td>
<td>Owner and managers of Valley Ridge farm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community home-based carer</td>
<td>Owner and managers of Riversend farm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manager of a local skills development centre</td>
<td>Owners of Mountain View farm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social worker</td>
<td>Owners of Two Rivers Farm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community development worker</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes and interview transcriptions from participant observations, unstructured, in-depth, and telephone interviews and focus groups were collated into themes and thematically analysed. This detailed information gives an account of temporary farm workers in the area and their own constructions of considerations around work. The same process was undertaken for key informants’ views of temporary farm workers’ considerations around work. However, I also sought to quantify the prevalence of these findings as well as relationships with the ages, gender, race and experience of farm workers. I thus chose to complement the qualitative observations with a survey.

4.4.3 SURVEY

The survey conducted aimed to test for relationships and generalise findings to the larger population of temporary off-farm workers in the area. The survey data, also being a requirement of my funders, had to include information on temporary farm workers’ certified skills.

Findings from phases one and two allowed me to follow a grounded-indicator approach to design a questionnaire. This meant that thematic analysis of interviews allowed me to generate a survey based on appropriate questions as well as pre-coded answers as generated in the interviews. However, respondents were also asked open-ended questions in the survey, such as their reason for working in each separate job, in this manner they were not prompted to choose from a list of answers and any new information arising out the survey was recorded and subsequently coded. Apart from grounded indicators, I also incorporated findings from previous research in coding the responses to allow for correlations, such as whether temporary farm workers had left work due to extreme hot or cold conditions, as well as including questions such as how long they had lived in the region and the number of years they had done farm work.

Further, the questionnaire also asked for each person’s work history over the last twelve months, and to have a broader understanding of workers’ employment, the survey included a work history of non-farm work, see Addendum B: Questionnaire. Similarly, I included questions regarding periods during which workers were without paid work, soliciting how they supported themselves without work and reasons for not working. Finally, apart from temporary farm workers themselves, I also solicited household information.
The questionnaire was designed in English and translated into Afrikaans to survey Afrikaans speaking farm workers (predominantly coloured). The initial strategy was for the survey to be administered with the assistance of fieldworkers; however, farm managers were concerned about the impact on productivity. In this manner, to be able to conduct the fieldwork in the peak season of January 2015, I conducted the survey without assistance from fieldworkers. Further, due to the high percentage of black African temporary workers and being able to speak Xhosa, they were included in the survey. I also included Sotho speakers as the farm supervisors were willing to translate. Although I did not use quotas, post-analysis my sample was stratified by race.

Thus, in January 2015, I piloted the questionnaire to test for understanding of items, ability to answer, relevance, length of interview and variation. I piloted the questionnaire in sections with numerous respondents until I was satisfied with the outcome, after which I piloted the questionnaire in full. The results meant that I had to make minor changes, such as additional coding options and vocabulary changes to suit the vernacular of workers. I then returned to Ceres later in the month to conduct interviews.

I conducted interviews for the survey on the four farms that had participated in phases one and two of my research. These farms were initially chosen because they employ a large number of temporary workers living off farms, in contrast to farms further away from town that provide on-farm housing for temporary workers. I also surveyed these farms because I already had access and permission to conduct research.

Although lists of temporary workers were available, the high rate of absenteeism and labour turnover meant managers were uncertain as to the exact composition of their workforce on a given day. Respondents were thus selected based on a quota sample of equal numbers of respondents on each farm (50). I also stratified the sample in terms of gender (25 women and 25 men) because findings from my qualitative interviews revealed gender differences.

### Table 4.3: Sample stratification by gender and farm

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender of farm workers</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Two Orchards Farm</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valley Ridge Farm</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riversend Farm</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountain View Farm</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Depending on the workstations of each farm, I conducted interviews with workers at the packinghouses, orchards and/or drying courts. Three of the farms had packinghouses, where I conducted half of my interviews and the other half in the orchards. The fourth farm had no packinghouse but had a large drying court (‘droogbaan’) and I surveyed both workstations. Further, on the second day of surveying Mountain View farm I discovered that they do not employ women in
their orchards. This information had not been revealed in the exploratory phase, and so I conducted more interviews with packinghouse women to maintain gender quotas.

The survey was conducted by completing 25 interviews per day, commencing work at 6.30am. Interviews took longer in the packinghouses because I could not conduct these at their workstation due to health and safety regulations, in contrast to the orchards. In the orchards, farm workers work in teams of eight in winter and twelve to sixteen in summer, depending on each supervisor. The core of each team consisted of eight permanent workers with temporary workers supplementing the teams in summer. This meant that I travelled between teams of farm workers in search of temporary workers, introducing myself to the supervisors and asking for respondents.

The fieldwork for the survey was completed in two weeks and subsequently the information was entered on a data file in a statistical software package, IBM SPSS Statistics. After completion of the survey, I requested payroll information from farm managers for the weeks that I conducted the survey. This meant that I could determine the age, gender, race and workstation of the total population of temporary off-farm workers that had worked on each farm during the time of the survey. I then applied weights to my sample data in terms of gender, age, race, workstation and farm so that the sample would reflect the composition of the total population of temporary workers on the four farms during January (Table 4.4). The total number of temporary off-farm workers across the four farms was 552, of which 36% were respondents in the survey.

Table 4.4: Characteristics of population, sample and weighted sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics of off-farm temporary workers</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Sample Unweighted</th>
<th>Sample Weighted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>43.5%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>43.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>56.5%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>56.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 – 21 years old</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 – 27 years old</td>
<td>25.1%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>25.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 – 34 years old</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 – 44 years old</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 – 64 years old</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Race</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>49.5%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black African</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>50.5%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Workstation</strong>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Packinghouse</td>
<td>39.5%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>39.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orchard</td>
<td>48.4%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>48.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drying Court</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Farm</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two Orchards</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valley Ridge</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riversend</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountain View</td>
<td>34.4%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>34.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total number of workers</strong></td>
<td>552</td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Workstations are unevenly distributed across participating farms (Table 6.1 below).
4.5 DATA ANALYSIS

Qualitative data were thematically analysed, coded and recorded on an Excel spreadsheet. The findings informed indicators in the design of a questionnaire. Correlating the gender, race, age and employment contracts of participants, qualitative findings also served to interpret quantitative data.

Quantitative data were entered into a data file using IBM SPSS Statistics (22). There were two data sets in this study. Firstly, payroll data of 552 temporary off-farm workers across the four farms including variables for age, gender, workstation, race and farm. Secondly, survey data of 200 respondents and their 887 household members. After data entry, the data were cleaned and various transformations were run to create new variables appropriate for analysis.

Analysis of the data commenced with descriptive frequencies to explore percentiles, measures of central tendency, dispersion and distribution of the data. Thereafter, statistical relationships between variables were explored, explained in Addendum A: Data Analyses.

In the next two chapters, the findings that emerged from this three-phase sequential exploratory mixed method research strategy are discussed. In chapter five, I give an overview of similar practices on participating farms, followed by a profile of each farm and temporary off-farm workers. In chapter six, the findings of the study are discussed.
Chapter 5
Overview of farms & temporary off-farm workers

5.1 INTRODUCTION
This thesis is concerned with developing a socio-economic profile of temporary farm workers and examining their considerations around work. Answers to these questions emerge from a particular context, thus it is necessary to depict the farms to highlight the context of this thesis. Farms in this study are not homogenous yet they share similar characteristics. In this respect, the first part of this chapter gives an overview of the participating farms, their workers’ access to housing, social services and workplace forums. Subsequently, farms’ recruitment practices and the training of temporary farm workers are addressed, suggesting that workers are mostly sourced through social networks and that although temporary workers receive on-the-job training, this is not certified as in the case of permanent workers.

The second part of this chapter gives an overview of each farm and the composition of the workforce, while addressing the particularities of each. This is because some farms do not provide any residential accommodation for workers whilst others extend the length of their season through mixed farming of deciduous fruit and vegetables and are thereby able to offer employment throughout the year.

Having provided a context of the participating farms, the final section of this chapter describes the characteristics of temporary off-farm workers according to their gender and race. This section compares an overview of temporary off-farm workers to temporary and permanent workers, to show that a larger proportion of temporary off-farm workers are women, mostly black African. Finally, this chapter gives an overview of temporary off-farm workers’ household compositions and incomes, suggesting that coloured men’s households have a stable income throughout the year due to greater numbers of permanent workers in contrast to black African workers who tend to have a larger proportion of unemployed household members.
5.2 OVERVIEW OF FARMS

All the farms in this study are commercial, export-oriented farms, which indicate a requirement to adhere to national and international regulations. More specifically, due to the high volumes of fruit exported, these farms are also bound by the codes of conduct of suppliers, which include brands such as Tesco’s Nurture, Marks & Spencer’s Field to Fork and Woolworths’ Farming for the Future. With some variation, codes of conduct, in general, assess ethical, environmental, labour, health and safety as well as living standards.

More than half of the produce on the participating farms is exported, and coupled with the short shelf life of the produce; fruit is picked and packed on the same day, as some travel to markets as far as Canada, spending five weeks at sea. Apart from fresh fruit, some farms also produce dried fruits, which give higher returns but are more labour intensive. For these reasons, farms require a large workforce during harvesting season. Farms only producing deciduous fruit employ a workforce predominantly consisting of temporary workers, for instance, nearly 90 percent of workers at Valley Ridge are temporary (Table 5.1). They enter the workforce when harvesting commences around November working until March. Thereafter, depending on whether farms produce late varietals and apples, some harvesting continues until May.

Table 5.1: Overview of participating farms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of farm</th>
<th>Two Orchards</th>
<th>Valley Ridge</th>
<th>Riversend</th>
<th>Mountain View</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Produce</td>
<td>Deciduous fruit</td>
<td>Deciduous fruit</td>
<td>Deciduous fruit Vegetables</td>
<td>Deciduous fruit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peak season</td>
<td>October-March</td>
<td>December-May</td>
<td>October-July</td>
<td>November-March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workstations</td>
<td>Orchard Drying court</td>
<td>Orchard Packinghouse Drying court</td>
<td>Orchard Packinghouse</td>
<td>Orchard Packinghouse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruitment</td>
<td>Ceres Eastern Cape</td>
<td>Ceres</td>
<td>Ceres</td>
<td>Ceres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social services</td>
<td>Crèche After-school Community hall</td>
<td>Crèche</td>
<td>Crèche Community hall</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Permanent workforce | 26% | 11% | 56% | 24% |
| Temporary workforce | 74% | 89% | 44% | 76% |
| Total annual workforce | 756 | 741 | 816 | 438 |
5.2.1 HOUSING

All of the participating farms, except Mountain View, provide housing for permanent workers and their families, who may also be permanently or temporarily employed. Housing is also provided for temporary workers who do not reside locally. This housing may be detached, semi-detached, terraced units or hostels. Migratory temporary workers usually live in terraced housing or hostels, referred to locally as a *kampong* (Picture 5.1 below). This is because these offer shared accommodation; with bunk beds, an entrance area for cooking and an outside toilet and shower on the veranda.

**Picture 5.1:** Housing for temporary on-farm workers at Two Orchards farm

Although temporary housing is meant to house migratory temporary workers during the harvesting season, due to the shortage of housing on some farms, workers may reside in these on a permanent basis throughout the year. Further, based on the needs of workers, farm managers also try to accommodate no more than two couples or one family per unit (John, Two Orchards manager).

Before the farm worker strikes in 2012, although farm managers were legally entitled to charge workers for rent and electricity, housing “was always free and [they] gave them an electricity subsidy” (Lisa, Two Orchards personnel manager). However, “after the [sectoral determination minimum wage] increases, [in 2013, Two Orchards] ask[ed] the head of the house to pay 10% of their salary” towards rent (Lisa, Two Orchards personnel manager). This means that it was only after the minimum wage increases of farm workers that some farm managers deducted rent for housing as per the findings of the Bureau for Food and Agricultural Policy (2015). Of the participating farms in this study, only Two Orchards deducts rent. On the other hand, all participating farm managers started billing workers for electricity as a consequence of the minimum wage increases.

This means that farm work today

“…isn’t like before where you got everything for free. Before when the farmer slaughtered the animals, he called you to come and get your meat, but now you have to buy everything. It isn’t like that anymore,
then you didn’t have to worry if the electricity runs out all the time, now it’s like the town, now you pay electrivity and water” (Runelle, coloured temporary farm working woman, 31 years old).

In this respect, a consequence of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 (ESTA) of 1997 was a decrease in housing with 50% of farms surveyed in Ceres in 2000 planning to demolish or change the functioning of housing according to du Toit and Ally (2003:22). What is more, after the increase in minimum wages some farm workers lost further wage subsidies and, becoming fully reliant on their wages for subsistence, were fully proletarianised.

5.2.2 SOCIAL SERVICES

All participating farms offer some social services, except for Mountain View. These include a crèche, and after-school at Two Orchards, run by certified teachers for which parents pay a fee towards the running costs of about R5 per day (R100 per month). Some farms also have a community hall for residents to hire for functions or use for meetings.

These services form part of the in-kind employment benefits that some farm workers received in addition to their wages whereby

“the farmer cared for all the basic needs of the workers who lived on his farm, enjoying ‘free’ access to housing and even a small piece of land for cultivation, access to credit at the farm shop and concessional loans for family emergencies, farm schools for farm children and transport to clinics when needed. To celebrate Christmas or a good harvest, the farmer would slaughter a sheep and distribute the meat among the appreciative workers” (Devereux & Solomon, 2010:7).

However, not all farms provided such services “because we are too close to town” (Barnard, Riversend owner), implying that workers could access public services. Where these facilities are available, they are only accessible to resident workers, implying that workers living off farms, both permanently and temporarily employed, access public services instead.

However, by employing resident workers on farms

“it’s far easier to make social inputs into your employees lives if they live on your farm, but our staff live everywhere, and because there are a lot of seasonal workers, a lot of single mothers, there are a lot of social problems. It’s difficult for us if we wanted to make any kind of social input there because people leave [work] at 5.30pm and go somewhere else” (Martin, Mountain View owner).

To address this, some farm managers such as those at Mountain View work closely with other businesses in the area and the municipality. For example, a local study has shown that there is a need for a “250 to 300 unit crèche just in the area around this farm” (Martin, Mountain View owner). Due to this Mountain View is in the process of “trying to negotiate with the municipality … [and] businesses to put forces together” (Martin, Mountain View owner) in the construction of a new crèche in the local town. In this manner, the “slight downside” of having relocated workers to the local town
is the “social problems … like kids not being taken care of while the parents are working” (Martin, Mountain View owner). On the other hand, not having a resident community on the farm means that employers do not have the added burden of social relations, such as farm owner Barnard who reported that

“If they do anything to the kids then they come complain to me, but if I explain it’s not my kids then it’s not the right answer. So that is quite a problem for me” (Barnard, Riversend owner).

Thus, the rationalisation of business practices, flexibilisation of the workforce, along with “the abolition of tied housing and moving farm workers off farm property … significantly reduce farm workers’ dependency associated with a paternalistic system and result in the demise of the ideology of ‘the farm as family’ (Kritzinger & Vorster, 1997:130).

In this manner, where possible, through the employment of off-farm temporary workers, farm managers are rationalising business practices by forging labour relations, thereby breaking traditional paternalistic relations with workers and reducing employment benefits and costs. Although all farm workers receive the same minimum wage, there is a divide between the benefits accrued by some resident and other non-resident workers on farms. The latter having to rely on locally provided public services that are often oversubscribed due to a lack of state investment and the high rate of migration into the area.

5.2.3 WORKPLACE FORUMS

Although differing in structure, all participating farms had workplace forums. Whilst some were managed by appointed workers or resident representatives, others were run by the managers or owners themselves. These forums varied, in that some “basically handle social opportunities, that’s all” (Barnard, Riversend owner), including outings and maintenance of residences on farms, whilst others address employment conditions and are even platforms for training. For instance, at Mountain View farm

“Agendas alternate, one meeting we discuss soft issues and the other meeting hard issues, like when are we getting paid, when are we going to clock in and clock out, do we get time off to do things, which holidays can we swap so that we can have long weekends, those are hard issues. And then the other meeting tends to be what we call soft issues, all the things about how do we make a nice place for people to work at to enjoy it more, how do we address each other, how to address grievances, or unhappiness and life skills training” (Martin, Mountain View owner).

Workplace forums are a form of bargaining council, as per the Labour Regulations Act, which are intended to provide worker participation in firms through consultation between employers (or their managers) and employees on work related matters such as the organisation of “production, training, pay schemes and disciplinary procedures” (Di Paola & Pons-Vignon, 2013:633). These forums are
thus meant to be a method of co-determination of working practices through workplace representation. Instead, they are sometimes rather a means to “co-opt workers and reduce their willingness to oppose employer proposals” (Budlender, 2009, cited in Di Paola & Pons-Vignon, 2013:633). Thereby, forms of “pseudo participation” emerge (Pateman, 1971, cited in Webster & Macun, 1998:66). There is large variation across the four participating farms in the functioning of workplace forums. For instance, some workplace forums are run by elected members and address employment practices as well as social issues; others are run by the farm owners and also serve as a training mechanism, while on some farms consultation is openly avoided. Due to the lack and/or variation of such forums, agriculture, as in a number of other sectors, has a sectoral determination to regulate employment practices.

Having said this, these forums are only available to residents on farms and/or permanent workers. In this respect, this study found that temporary off-farm workers were not represented at workplace forums. This means that casualisation of the farm workforce also externalises workers from workplace representation and decision-making, corroding workers’ control over of their work and employment regulations. That is to say, temporary workers experience representational insecurity in the workplace (Standing, 2011) and lack a collective voice to engage with farm owners and managers.

5.2.4 RECRUITMENT

Recruitment on farms is usually done by word of mouth, except for packinghouses for which some farm managers formally advertise. This is due to the high demand for employment in the area, which means that unemployed workers also approach farms on a daily basis asking for work. Another method of recruiting is to employ a supervisor with a team of workers, these consisting of “16 to 12 workers, as some supervisors can only manage 12” workers (Barnard, Riversend owner). Apart from the high demand for employment in the area, this form of recruitment means that supervisors screen and manage workers on farms to employ “workers with a good track record” (Petra, Mountain View owner). In this manner, farm managers try to employ reliable and hardworking employees by recruiting through social networks.

Participating farm managers did not make regular use of self-employed teams, although they are employed during “the year, maybe in harvest season, maybe one team for about two weeks, if it is a team, to quickly come help with a summer prune” (Barnard, Riversend owner) or “work that we can’t fit in between our picking” (Petra, Mountain View owner). These self-employed supervisors and workers are locally referred to as ‘uitwerkers’,

“they aren’t really [labour] brokers, you could say they are contractors but they aren’t really. But they all have people, usually one guy that has two teams, those men work the whole world … They go in
teams with a guy that looks for work for them basically and then he moves with his whole team, he gets paid and he pays his people and he also takes a cut there” (Barnard, Riversend owner).

These teams consist of a person “who’s got his own team. He would be a team leader that works off and on at different farms, so he would bring in his own team” (Petra, Mountain View owner). However, when they are employed on farms

“we register them for UIF and such, all ourselves, for the time that they are working here because we find that most of the outside teams’ papers and registrations aren’t up to date for what they should have. So we still register everyone and we still pay each person individually because we’ve found in the past that the team leader would often cheat the people that work for him and wouldn’t pay them their full day’s wage” (Petra, Mountain View owner).

Thus, when self-employed teams are employed, the “farmer pays the workers himself”, preferably directly into their bank accounts whenever possible, to assure that the workers receive their full salary (Desmond, coloured temporary farm working man and recruiter, 28 years old). This is because farm managers try to avoid unfair employment practices, as happened to Bonani, who worked as an ‘uitwerker’ in the 2014 low season, explains:

“[The supervisor] deducted wages saying we damaged trees and bought food, so that Friday when we finished there, although we worked the whole week, each of us got paid R200” (Bonani, Xhosa temporary farm working man, 26 years old).

Deductions made by self-employed supervisors can often amount to a considerable proportion of workers’ wages and increase income insecurity.

Farm management in the area are also known for “turn[ing] quite a few teams like that into permanent workers because those people get fed up because they are never at home and we have made a few supervisors” (Barnard, Riversend owner). One such worker is Sandla who was trained by the supervisors at Riversend

“to work with the people, how to pay them, manage a team and to care for them so that they care for you. I was a supervisor there and then I left and looked for work for other people on other farms. The farm manager asked me to get other people for him and then if the work was finished then I worked in Citrusdal too, I worked on the farms and got people. The work people called each other and said there’s a good supervisor, he’s not drunk on the job and such, so here at [Riversend] I worked for them in the first season [of this year] and left the people there and found more workers” (Sandla, Xhosa farm worker recruiter, 42 years old).

Farm management approaches self-employed supervisors as a means to recruit temporary farm workers during certain periods of the year to supplement their existing workforce. However, they become direct employees of farms whilst the supervisor is paid a separate fee. The latter may be a reflection of the survey sample being a case study of four commercial farms. Although, this study did
not research ‘uitwerkers’, few (11%) participants partook in this form of work, doing so during periods without paid work. Even so, those that did, reported that some farms do not follow the above-mentioned practices. This then indicates that employment practices on participating farms may be distinct due to their corporate nature and that adherence to supplier codes of conduct may have led to the social upgrading of workers (Barrientos, Gereffi & Rossi, 2011) in terms of a decrease in the use of contractors.

5.2.5 TRAINING

Once recruited, temporary farm workers receive on-the-job training. According to the survey, only 3% of temporary off-farm workers have ever received any certified skills training and this occurred whilst they were permanently employed. This reflects a facet of the feminisation of work in that temporary workers are employed in static jobs requiring little training.

Temporary farm workers do not receive certified skills training for a number of reasons. Firstly, temporary off-farm workers receive on-the-job training whilst working because formal training on farms is conducted out of peak harvesting season, when the majority of temporary workers are not employed. Secondly, employers are reluctant to invest in the certified skills training of workers who may not remain in employment for the duration of the training or return to the same farm for employment. For instance, depending on the employer, 4% to 31% of temporary off-farm workers do not work the full length of their contracts, while retention of workers, those returning to work for the same employer, ranges between 22% to 59%.

Thirdly, employers receive no subsidies for training temporary farm workers. This is because the Skills Development Act defines learners dichotomously as either (fully) employed learners (18.1) or (fully) unemployed learners (18.2) (Department of Labour, 2008). This means that temporary (partially) employed learners are not specifically catered for. Currently, there are three ways in which the labour force can access subsidised skills training. Firstly, to train a temporary farm worker on a workplace learnership, the worker would have to be an existing employee and enter into a learnership contract, during which time the employer can claim a percentage of the workers’ wages as subsidy from the Agricultural Sector Education Training Authority (AgriSETA). Secondly, unemployed workers can register as a work-seeker with the Department of Labour and apply for a learnership position that an employer advertises at the Department of Labour. If their application were successful, the employer and worker would enter into an employment contract and learnership contract for the duration of the learnership training during which time the employer can claim a percentage of the learner’s allowance as subsidy from AgriSETA. Thirdly, being registered as a work-seeker, they may access skills training through the National Skills Fund that subsidises training in further education training colleges and public work programmes.
Be this as it may, on the Community Works Programme (CWP), for example, the budget is spent on a ratio of 65:35 on wages to non-wage costs (including training), meaning that there is little funding left for training and, according to a case study in another deciduous fruit region in Grabouw, CWP workers do not receive certified training (Wiltshire, forthcoming). This is partly a reflection of the ratio of government spending on skills development levies of 80:20 on workplace learnerships to un/under-employed skills funding (Department of Labour, 2008) which is not representative of the ratio of 35:65 of permanent employees to un/under-employed workers in the South African workforce (Statistics South Africa, 2015b).

In consequence of such administration, no temporary off-farm worker has ever received any certified skills training while temporarily employed and although temporary off-farm workers register as job seekers, 15% in 2014, none have ever received certified training through the Department of Labour. This speaks to the feminisation of work in that workers are employed in static jobs requiring little training. Furthermore, skills development legislation is premised on the assumption of labour market security and does not recognise the growing numbers of casualised workers in South Africa, 63% of the workforce on farms in Ceres. This means that increasing numbers of workers experience skills reproduction insecurity and that special provision is required for state funding not only to increase the skills of permanently employed workers, but also the growing numbers of temporarily employed, as well as the unemployed.

However, some farms such as Mountain View provide induction training at the start of each season, covering health and safety, employment contracts, recycling and specific job training. Even though none of the training for temporary off-farm workers is certified, those who acquire such skills through on-the-job training are able to work for longer periods during the year owing to the fact employers prefer hiring skilled workers. As Mcebisi reported, “I can’t get work now because I can’t prune the trees” (Xhosa temporary farm working man, 42 years old) and “if you can’t prune the supervisor doesn’t take you because he doesn’t have time to teach you” (Johan, permanent coloured farm working man, farm supervisor, 27 years old).

Most temporary off-farm workers (78%) would like certified skills training, reporting that it would increase their frequency of employment (36%), their ability to be promoted (22%) as well as their knowledge and skills (25%). The training that they would prefer includes general farm work skills (42%), such as picking and pruning, technical skills (38%), including driving, irrigation, farming and pest control, as well as supervisory and managerial skills (20%), such as farm supervisors, quality controllers and production managers.

However, in lieu of employers training temporary workers, they have to fund courses from their existing wages, like Johan who funded himself “and paid R1200 for the month and got a certificate”
(Johan, permanent coloured farm working man, farm supervisor, 27 years old). This enabled him to apply for a permanent position because “farm work is also getting more difficult if you don’t have papers [certificates]” (Johan, permanent coloured farm working man, farm supervisor, 27 years old). Now that he is permanently employed, he is able to access in-house training and currently “I’m doing the level one supervisor course” (Johan, permanent coloured farm working man, farm supervisor, 27 years old). In this manner, employment on farms is mediated through skill barriers, with unskilled workers employed in peak season as part of the numerical flexibility of labour on farms in contrast to permanent workers employed throughout the year with access to skills training as an additional wage subsidy.

Having said this, 66% of the permanent farm workers are unskilled\(^6\) compared to semi-skilled (21%) and skilled permanent workers (13%). Further, even though equal proportions of coloured men (36%) and black African men (35%) are permanently employed, half (50%) of coloured men work in skilled positions in contrast to black African men who are employed in unskilled work on farms (85%) (Figure 5.1). In other words, farm workers are mostly unskilled and those who are skilled are predominantly permanent coloured (men) workers. This would indicate that skills reproduction is mediated by race in the workplace.

**Figure 5.1:** Skills of permanent farm workers in Ceres

![Skills of permanent farm workers in Ceres](Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za)

\(^6\) Skilled workers are “[s]killed technical and academically qualified workers, junior management, supervisors, foremen, and superintendents” whilst semi-skilled workers are “[s]emi-skilled and [have] discretionary decision making” and unskilled workers are “[u]nskilled and [have] defined decision making” roles (Department of Labour, 2014:16).
5.3 PROFILE OF FARMS

Having addressed similar practices across the participating farms, the following section includes a profile of each farm and their employees, while also discussing distinctive characteristics.

5.3.1 TWO ORCHARDS

Two Orchards is a 180-hectare farm spanning two farms, both included in the study, producing mainly deciduous fruit, and a small vineyard for exclusive wine. Unlike the other farms, Two Orchards’ outsources packaging and storage of fruit. This farm is managed by appointed professional managers, which include personnel and farm managers in other words the owner is divorced from management.

Figure 5.2: Distribution of the annual workforce at Two Orchards by gender and race

Source: Employment equity data of participating farms (N=756).

The workforce on this farm is predominantly temporary (73%), black African (61%) and men (55%) although more than half of the workforce is black African temporary workers (52%) (Figure 5.2).

Workers at Two Orchards are recruited by contracting farm supervisors with teams of workers into permanent employment, as well as word of mouth. However, this farm has a long history of recruiting workers from the Queenstown area in the Eastern Cape for employment during harvesting season. Supervisors are sent on buses to recruit workers who on their arrival are provided with temporary accommodation, mattresses and cooking utensils whilst employed. However, each season only about 25% of their workers returned home, preferring to seek alternative employment in the area. Due to this, Two Orchards, as of 2011, decided to recruit solely from the local labour pool, the consequence of which was an increase in the labour turnover of temporary workers. Lisa suggests that this is because “living here they can decide they don’t want to work here anymore and get on the next lorry to work somewhere else” (Two Orchards personnel manager). To curb the increased labour turnover, Two Orchards reverted to supplementing recruitment by sourcing some workers from the Eastern

7 Black African in this context refers to South African citizens (93%) who are mainly Xhosa speakers who recently migrated to Ceres and maintain strong ties with their sending communities to which they return on a regular basis. This group, however, also includes some foreign nationals from Zimbabwe (1%) and Lesotho (6%). Coloured refers to South African citizens of mixed race mainly from the Western and Northern Cape.
Cape again in October 2014. This has meant that they have to recruit twice in a season because workers return home for the Christmas period, so they recruit “more workers in January” (Philip, Two Orchards manager).

5.3.2 VALLEY RIDGE

Valley Ridge is a farm spanning four properties. Two of these, covering 130 hectares, produce deciduous fruit whilst the third produces some grain, vegetables and cattle. The fourth is a BEE farm run and managed by shareholders. The farm owner remains actively involved overseeing the management of the first three properties with three managers responsible for the orchards and packinghouse. Having said this, the owner maintains an open-door policy and frequents the various workstations to “keep an open line of communication … and then [they] have less trouble between” workers (Johan, Valley Ridge owner). This means that he is accessible to workers and they feel that they are able to approach him, as last year when thieves burgled workers’ houses they “called the owner and he came in the night” (Sikulwa, Zimbabwean temporary on-farm farm working woman, 32 years old).

Unlike other farms, Valley Ridge has maintained the tradition of increasing wages at the beginning of every harvesting season, in October. Management on other farms, however, changed salary increases to align with the sectoral minimum wage legislation increments, which occur in March. In this manner, Valley Ridge pays higher wages during peak harvesting season.

Workers at Valley Ridge are mostly temporary (88%), black African (68%) and women (59%) although temporary black African women (43%) are the largest category of workers (Figure 5.3).

**Figure 5.3:** Distribution of the annual workforce at Valley Ridge by gender and race

![Figure 5.3: Distribution of the annual workforce at Valley Ridge by gender and race](image_url)

*Source:* Employment equity data of participating farms (N=741)

The workforce on this farm is distinct in that 39% of temporary workers and 18% of permanent workers are foreign nationals. They are mainly from Zimbabwe, which is different from other farms in the area. This came about due to the xenophobic attacks against foreign nationals in the region of De Doorns (82 kilometres from Ceres) in November 2009. The conflict meant that Zimbabweans
who had been working on grape farms were accommodated in refugee camps by the government (Lindiwe, Zimbabwean temporary on-farm farm working woman, 34 years old). Consequently, “a man who was working [at Valley Ridge] told the boss [owner] that there are people there that want work, and that’s why [how] we came here” (Lindiwe, Zimbabwean temporary on-farm farm working woman, 34 years old). Since then the number of Zimbabwean workers on this farm has increased due to the advertisement of work opportunities through social networks. However, of the Zimbabweans, “everyone who works here only comes to this farm because here we are safe. On other farms you pay rent and live off the farm. We can’t manage when we stay [off] the farm, it costs too much. Then we don’t have money to go to Zimbabwe because you need to buy food and save money for the kids” (Lindiwe, Zimbabwean temporary on-farm farm working woman, 34 years old).

In this respect, workers feel protected on the farm and with the added benefit of free accommodation, they are able to remit to their families. Thus, they are loyal to the farm and have a low labour turnover. Being resident workers, these were not included in the survey.

**5.3.3 RIVERSEND**

Riversend consists of three separate farms, one of which is a BEE farm run by the shareholders. The second is in another town and produces mainly vegetables with its own packinghouse. Only the third property was included in this study because the others were farther out of town. This property produces deciduous fruit and vegetables and has a packinghouse for fruit. The farm is a family run business and Riversend follows a strict “communication structure … from team to supervisor to manager and then [owner] because many times the supervisor can sort it out” (Barnard, Riversend owner). In this manner, the owners of the farm are not directly accessible to workers.

**Figure 5.4: Distribution of the annual workforce at Riversend by gender and race**

![Graph showing labor distribution at Riversend](image)

*Source: Employment equity data of participating farms (N=777).*

Workers on this farm are mostly permanent (57%), coloured (53%) and men (65%) Having said this, 30% of the permanent workforce are black African men (Figure 5.4). This farm is, thus, distinct in that just over half of the workforce is permanent. This is due to the fact that Riversend produces deciduous fruit as well as vegetables, enabling the farm to offer employment throughout the year by
deploying workers across the various produce. Further, by producing apples the farm owners have also extended the harvesting season and the packinghouse also “runs for longer, from October to July. It’s only in August and September that it doesn’t work” (Barnard, Riversend owner). This means that farm workers in the packinghouse are contracted to work for about 10 months of the year, in contrast to other farms offering packinghouse contracts of about five months. Since the farm owners are not restricted to deciduous fruit seasons, they are able to offer permanent work opportunities and “it’s a philosophy of this farm … anyone that begins gets a seasonal contract but if after three to four months, if the supervisor thinks he’s worth something then he gets a permanent contract. So we don’t use seasonal people, we only use them in the two packinghouses for fruit … and vegetables” (Barnard, Riversend owner).

This then alludes to the fact that by mixing produce farms are able to offer longer employment contracts, thereby increasing workers’ employment security.

5.3.4 MOUNTAIN VIEW

Mountain View is 200-hectare farm, across three farms, producing deciduous fruit. The largest farm of 97 hectares was included in this study as the other properties were further afield. This farm also has its own packinghouse and packs most of its fruit except for pears that are packed by a local company. This is because different technology is required to pack differing fruits.

**Figure 5.5:** Distribution of the annual workforce at Mountain View according to gender and race

Workers at Mountain View are predominantly temporary (75%), coloured (63%) and men (64%) with notably few black African women (4%) (Figure 5.5). The latter is because this farm does not employ women in the orchards, where black African women usually work due to skills and language barriers in finding employment in packinghouses, as elaborated on in section 6.2.

The farm is run as a family business and the second-generation is actively involved in the day-to-day management of the business. Paul manages the orchards and Petra the administration and packing. They are also similar to Valley Ridge in that they maintain a close relationship with their employees. However, unlike other farms, Mountain View has no housing on the premises. This is because they
decided to relocate 26 households living on the farm as a consequence of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 (ESTA) of 1997. This was achieved by working in collaboration with the Ministry of Land Affairs and the local municipality. Mountain View donated eight hectares of its own land bordering the informal settlement, worth R80,000 in total, and the municipality invested a total of R80,000 to construct 34 houses. The farm owner built houses not only for existing households but “every single person who has worked for [them]” and thus built 34 instead of 26 houses (Martin, Mountain View owner). What is more, on acquiring a third property, Martin did so on the condition that any existing residents be re-located off the property before the sale of the farm. Consequently, the seller offered residents alternative accommodation and/or “reemployed them in his other business … so we bought a farm with no houses” (Martin, Mountain View owner).

The motivation for not having resident workers is to “cut that [social] connection, [so that workers] work here because [they] want to work here” not because they have to “so quite frankly that is how I would like to run a farm because you take a lot of the emotive issues out of it” (Martin, Mountain View owner). However, this restricted Mountain View to recruiting workers from the local labour pool, not being able to house migrant workers. This has meant that the traditional paternalistic relations of the farm as a family have been replaced by labour relations with the farm as a business in accordance with the rationalisation of business, in line with the findings of Walters (2012).
5.4 PROFILE OF TEMPORARY OFF-FARM WORKERS

This section gives a brief overview of temporary off-farm workers, as pertains to their age, workstations, employment patterns and households. Analysis presents the employment equity data of participating farms, pertaining to 2,712 permanent and temporary farm workers, payroll data of 552 temporary off-farm workers employed across the farms in January 2015 (36% included in the survey) and weighted survey data of 200 temporary off-farm workers employed on participating farms in January 2015. Due to the gender-race nexus of workers, I commence with a brief overview of temporary off-farm workers’ gender and race before addressing subsequent characteristics.

5.4.1 GENDER AND RACE

To provide a context for temporary off-farm workers it is useful to compare these to temporary and permanent farm workers. The figures show that the majority of the permanent workforce on participating farms are men (75%) and coloured (52%). However, black African men (43%) constitute almost half of the workforce (Figure 5.6).

**Figure 5.6: Race and gender of permanent farm workers**

*Source: Calculated from employment equity data of participating farms (N=786).*

Compared to the permanent workforce, temporary farm workers are equally women and men, but the majority of temporary workers are black African (62%), with the largest category being black African men (34%) (Figure 5.7).

**Figure 5.7: Race and gender of temporary farm workers**

*Source: Calculated from employment equity data of participating farms (N=1,926).*

This means that greater proportions of men are permanently employed on farms, especially coloured men, who are twice as likely to be in permanent employment than temporary farm work. They thus have access to the most labour security. Further, although women as a whole are twice as likely to be
temporary employees, the findings show that this practice is racialised because, in contrast to similar proportions of coloured permanent and temporary women, black African women are predominantly temporarily employed and the most insecure workers.

Having given an overview of temporary and permanent farm workers, it is now possible to draw a comparison based on race and gender with temporary off-farm workers. The findings show that temporary off-farm workers are predominantly women (57%) with greater numbers of black African women (35%) and fewer black African men (24%) (Figure 5.8). The latter suggests that temporary black African men are more likely to be housed on farms in the area due to longstanding recruitment practices in the region whereby foreigners and South African migrants are housed on farms for the duration of their fixed-term contracts. Further, the data suggest that a greater proportion of coloured women are recruited from nearby residential areas.

**Figure 5.8: Race and gender of temporary off-farm workers**

![Race and gender of temporary off-farm workers](image)

*Source: Payroll data of temporary off-farm workers employed on participating farms in January 2015 (N=552).*

Data were attained from a survey of temporary off-farm workers on eight deciduous fruit farms in Ceres in 2000 (du Toit & Ally, 2003). From this, it appears that in the last fifteen years the numbers of coloured temporary off-farm men have been in decline and that they are being replaced by black African men and some black African women (Table 5.2).

**Table 5.2: Comparison of temporary off-farm workers by race and gender between 2001 and 2015**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Coloured Men</th>
<th>Black African Men</th>
<th>Coloured Women</th>
<th>Black African Women</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>28.5%</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
<td>35.1%</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
<td>23.9%</td>
<td>34.4%</td>
<td>22.1%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>-8.9%</td>
<td>+6.4%</td>
<td>-0.7%</td>
<td>+3.1%</td>
<td>-0.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Having given an overview of the race and gender of temporary off-farm workers and their employment trends, the following sections discuss their profiles based on the payroll data and survey data of temporary off-farm workers on participating farms in January 2015. As such, it is a profile of temporary off-farm workers during peak season, when more employment opportunities are available.
in the area. It is also a time of year when employment is available to workers of various ages, including students working during school vacations and older women working on the drying courts.

5.4.2 AGE

Nearly two-thirds (65%) of all temporary off-farm workers are 34 years old or younger and differ moderately in age according to race and gender (F = 9.321, p = .000, η² = .125) (Figure 5.9). Post-hoc tests of pair-wise mean differences using the Tamhane T2 test indicate a significant difference in the ages of coloured women (M=35.74, SD=12.159) as compared to black African women (M=30.74, SD=7.240), black African men (M=29.61, SD=7.480), and coloured men (M=25.55, SD=10.098).

Coloured men are the youngest category of temporary off-farm workers. They range between the ages of 16 to 44, with a median age of 21 and interquartile range of 19 to 29 years old. This may reflect the fact that temporary coloured men move into permanent employment on farms with age, however further research on the characteristics of permanent workers is required. This category also contains the largest proportion of students (15%) working for cash wages from an early age for ‘financial independence’ during the school vacation, with a median age of 17.

Figure 5.9: Age distribution of temporary off-farm workers by gender & race

Source: Calculated from survey data (N=200).

Coloured women vary the most in terms of age, from 18 to 59 years old, with a median age of 33 and interquartile range of 26 to 47 years old. This is because, firstly, coloured workers live permanently in the area. Further, 19% of coloured women work on the drying courts for the short season coinciding

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8 A boxplot visually displays the range of data. Data are divided into four equal groups, each displaying 25% of the data with values unusually farther from the average, outliers, marked by a circle. Data are distributed across five numbers: the minimum (Q0), first quartile (Q1), median (Q2), upper quartile (Q3) and the maximum (Q4). The lines below the first quartile and above the upper quartile denote the distribution of lowest and highest 25% of data, respectively. The box denotes the range of the middle 50% of scores between the lower and upper quartile, the interquartile range. The middle quartile, a line in the box, denotes the mid-point of the data, the median, above and below which lie 50% of the data. Figure 5.9 thus clearly shows that coloured women span the largest range of ages and that coloured men are younger than other workers, having a lower interquartile range with half below the age of 21 (median).
with school holidays over December, all of whom were paid in cash and half being older than 48 years old. They tend to “look after the grandchild[ren]” throughout the year and take up paid employment during the December festive season to contribute to “food, electricity, the house as well as clothes and shoes for myself and the children” (Fredeline, coloured temporary farm working woman, 50 years old). In this respect, they are occupied in unpaid reproductive work throughout the year and enter paid work during a time of the year when the main breadwinners are not participating in paid work.

Black African women are between the ages of 18 to 43, with a median age of 29.5 and interquartile range of 25 to 38. Black African men are between 16 to 47 years old, a median of 28 and interquartile range of 23 to 35 years old. Almost none of black African workers are over the age of 44. This may be a reflection of the fact that most are migrant workers who return to their sending communities as half have lived in the region of Ceres for four years or less (Figure 6.24) and have done farm work for no more than three years (Figure 5.10).

Figure 5.10: Temporary workers’ length of farm work experience by race

Source: Calculated from survey data (N=200).

As Makazi explains, she will “work until [she] retire[s] or if [her] children start working, then [she will] go back [to the Eastern Cape] and rest and look after the children” (Xhosa temporary farm working woman, 33 years old). Thus, some black African workers return to their communities of origin where “my mother and father look after the children” (Buhle, Xhosa temporary farm working man, 36 years old) and participate in unpaid reproductive work when their children become the main income earners. Migrating to the region for employment, black African farm workers include very few student men and no older workers employed on shorter contracts for cash wages over the December festive season, in contrast to coloured workers.
5.4.3 FARM WORK EXPERIENCE AND YEARS LIVED IN THE AREA

Age of temporary off-farm workers positively correlates with their years of farm working experience. However, this moderately depends on workers’ gender and race \((F = 13.485, p = .000, \eta^2 = .171)\). For instance, although there is a strong association for coloured workers, this is weaker for black African workers (Figure 5.11). According to a Gabriel post-hoc test, the mean number of years of farm work experience of coloured women \((M = 12.55, SD = 11.955)\) is significantly higher than coloured men \((M = 5.12, SD = 7.395)\), black African men \((M = 4.42, SD = 3.757)\) and black African women \((M = 4.68, SD = 5.252)\).

Figure 5.11: Length of farm working experience by age, gender and race

![Graph showing farm working experience by age, gender, and race](source)

Source: Calculated from survey data (N=200).

Although workers between the ages of 16 and 27 have about the same number of years of farm work experience, amongst older categories of workers there is a large variation in the years of experience amongst racial groups. Overall, half of coloured workers have been employed on farms for between two to 15 years \((\text{Median} = 5)\) compared to two to six years \((\text{Median} = 3)\) for black African workers (Figure 5.10). This is because, living in the region permanently, coloured workers have accrued more experience in farm work. Thus, the number of years that temporary off-farm workers have lived in the region of Ceres varies greatly depending on workers’ gender and race \((F = 45.545, p = .000, \eta^2 = .412)\). According to a Gabriel post-hoc test, the mean number of years that coloured women have lived in the region \((M = 26.76, SD = 16.176)\) is significantly higher than coloured men \((M = 16.49, SD = 9.720)\) and both these are significantly different to black African men \((M = 4.83, SD = 4.556)\) and black African women \((M = 7.293, SD = 7.293)\). Overall, the interquartile range for the number of years that coloured workers have lived in the region of Ceres is 13 to 33 years \((\text{median} = 20)\) compared to two to eight years \((\text{Median} = 4)\) for black African workers (Figure 6.24). The correlation in years lived in the area and age categories is weaker for coloured men as fewer are temporary workers and those that are, are between the ages of 16 to 27 years (73%).
Figure 5.12: Number of years workers resided in the region by age, gender & race

Source: Calculated from survey data (N=200).

This then speaks to the fact that black African workers have not necessarily moved into the area more recently, but retain strong ties with their sending communities, sites of reproduction, and predominantly migrate to Ceres for work. Coloured workers, however, live permanently in the area. That is to say, coloured workers are employed at their site of reproduction.
5.4.4 HOUSEHOLDS

Temporary off-farm workers’ live in households with about five members, irrespective of race and gender ($F = .970, p = .408$). Whilst few households accommodate a pensioner (65 years or older), on average households tend to have one child (18 years or younger) and one temporary worker, the latter indicative of the temporary workers surveyed. However, the presence of permanent workers (Brown-Forsythe $= 6.101, p = .001$) and those without paid work (Brown-Forsythe $= 6.922, p = .000$) varies according to the race and gender of temporary farm workers. Coloured workers tend to have a permanently employed household member, as coloured men, being mostly young, live with their families in the area and half of coloured women live with a male partner. On the other hand, black African workers tend to have household members without paid work (Figure 5.13). The difference in the proportions of employed household members affects household income security and workers’ considerations in participating in paid work.

![Figure 5.13: Percentage distribution of household members according employment status](image)

Source: Calculated from survey data, this includes temporary farm workers surveyed and household members (N=1,071).
* Includes household members without paid work (92%) and conducting unpaid reproductive work full-time (8%).

Farm workers’ household income (including social assistance grants) varies moderately by race and gender ($F = (9.757), p = .000, \eta^2 = .131$), in that coloured workers household incomes are higher (Figure 5.14). As shown in a Gabriel post-hoc test, the mean annual income for coloured men (M = R108,696.47, SD = R48,405.83) is significantly different from coloured women (M = R80,655.49, SD = R43,302.59), black African men (M = R62,449.38, SD = R45,989.91) and black African women (M = R59,089.31, SD = R41,451.09). This may be a reflection of coloured workers living in households with permanently employed members where income is almost double, R97,971.21 per annum, as compared to households with none, R55,130.46 per annum.
Figure 5.14: Mean monthly household income of temporary farm workers by race & month of the year.

Source: Calculated from survey data (N=200 households). Data include incomes from (formal and informal) employment, unemployment insurance and social assistance grants.

Temporary off-farm workers live in households with varying incomes, and some of them live in households where there is no income for months at a time. This is because a quarter (25%) of farm workers’ households do not receive any social assistance grants, of which 20% are households with earnings below R5,000 per month. Although 32% of these are foreign nationals from Lesotho and Zimbabwe, the majority are South African citizens who accrue no social assistance grants, as there are no pensioners, children or disabled members in their households.

Overall, including social assistance grants, over the course of a year on average median total household is R5,690 per month (interquartile range of R3,807 to R8,600 per month).

Figure 5.15: Mean monthly household income sources of temporary farm workers

Source: Calculated from survey data (N= 200 households).

In comparing household income sources, figure 5.15 above shows an increase in household income between October and January. This is due to the increase in numbers of employed persons in
households, except for coloured farm worker men’s households, as seen in comparing the figures below.

**Figure 5.16:** Mean monthly household income sources of coloured temporary farm working men

![Graph showing income sources of coloured temporary farm working men](image)

*Source:* Calculated from survey data (N = 33 households).

One of the reasons the household incomes of temporary farm working men remain fairly stable throughout the year is because 31% of working-age persons are permanently employed in these households. Overall men are the main earners in these households, sourcing 39% of income in contrast to 27% from women’s income (Figure 5.16). Secondly, other categories of workers have a higher number of household members who were unemployed until the beginning of the 2014/2015 peak season. These workers entering the workforce were mostly young, aged 26 and below (60%). In this respect, their entry into temporary farm work increased total household income. This also increased men’s incomes as compared to women, whereas prior to this women and men both contributed about 31% of household income (see figures below).

**Figure 5.17:** Mean monthly household income sources of black African temporary farm working men

![Graph showing income sources of black African temporary farm working men](image)

*Source:* Calculated from survey data (N = 54 households).

Apart from wages, income is also accrued through UIF, bonus payments at the end of the season - paid in accordance with attendance at work and the volumes of class one fruit exported - as well as holiday pay paid pro rata in accordance with the number of days worked. These increase household incomes during the low season, most clearly discernible from June to August, especially in the
households of temporary coloured farm working women (Figure 5.18). In this manner, holiday pay, performance bonuses and UIF increase income security in households during low seasons.

**Figure 5.18:** Mean monthly household income sources of coloured temporary farm working women

![Graph showing mean monthly household income sources of coloured temporary farm working women](image)

*Source: Calculated from survey data (N = 75 households).*

Further, for the months of February to September 2014 about 33% of temporary workers’ household income is from social assistance grants, in contrast to 20% the rest of the year. However, this is slightly higher in women’s households, especially during the months of June and July where social assistance grants contributes almost 40% of household income. Social assistance grants thus increase income security not only through increasing household income, but also by being a stable and reliable source of income. What is more, most social assistance grants are paid to women and in combination with income from employment, most household income is accrued, and possibly administered, by women.

**Figure 5.19:** Mean monthly household income of black African temporary farm working women

![Graph showing mean monthly household income of black African temporary farm working women](image)

*Source: Calculated from survey data (N = 39 households).*

Over the course of 12 months, although the annual figures are not a true reflection of the variations in income streams as depicted above, temporary farm working women’s household income is almost equally sourced through social assistance grants and incomes supplied by women and men. However, in men’s households, men source a greater proportion of the income (Figure 5.20) because households of coloured men have more permanently employed members than black African men who are the
most frequently employed temporary workers, in contrast to women who are in paid employment less frequently (Section 6.3).

**Figure 5.20**: Temporary farm workers’ mean annual household income sources by race & gender

![Figure 5.20: Temporary farm workers’ mean annual household income sources by race & gender](image)

*Source:* Calculated from survey data (N = 200 households).

Social assistance grants constitute 32% of household income. This is accrued through child support (67%), grants for older persons (27%), disability (3%) and foster child grants (3%). Overall, women source slightly less household income (32%) than men (36%), however, since social assistance grants are mostly (95%) accrued to women, nearly two thirds of household income (64%) is in women’s hands, potentially. Other studies also show that women take the main responsibility for buying household food and caring for children (Neves, Samson, van Niekerk, Hlatshwayo & du Toit, 2009).

**Figure 5.21**: Social assistance grants accrued in temporary off-farm workers’ households

![Figure 5.21: Social assistance grants accrued in temporary off-farm workers’ households](image)

*Source:* Calculated from survey data (N = 153 households).
5.5 DISCUSSION

This chapter has sought to give an overview of practices on participating farms, a profile of the participating farms and temporary off-farm workers as well as workers’ households. Firstly, it shows that although most farms share certain practices, such as providing worker accommodation, social services, workplace forums and certified training, these are only accessible to the permanent, core workforce, or those living on farms, which negatively affects the security of temporary off-farm workers.

Recruitment on farms is mostly through social networks rather than formal practices, including word-of-mouth and employing supervisors with their own teams, to increase the reliability of workers and reduce labour turnover. In this way, recruitment is linked to members of distinct groups that act as networks of resources, that is to say the social capital of workers. Farm work occurs at the site of reproduction of coloured workers who gain farm working experience with age, in contrast to black African workers who migrate for work to the region, although this is gradually changing. In this respect, coloured farm workers build up greater social networks and cultural capital through increased knowledge and skills and are able to access higher skilled, and traditionally better-paid employment in the area, as per the findings in the following chapter.

Although employers prefer recruiting experienced workers, some farms do induction training while most offer on-the-job training for workers. Training improves product quality and production efficiency, not the skills of the workers, because temporary workers receive no certification for training and farms do not invest in social skills training. In this respect, neither employers nor the state invest in the development of their skills because employers consider them as a resource merely for harvesting seasons and not a long-term investment, as are permanent workers. The state skills subsidies are based on the assumption of labour market security, which is reflected in the fact that no farm worker receives any certified training on farms whilst temporarily employed. Temporary farm workers thus experience skills reproduction insecurity that increases job insecurity, although coloured workers mediate this through intergenerational transference of skills in socialisation (Section 6.2).

Workplace forums on farms vary between co-determination and co-option of workers, but even so, they do not include temporary farm workers. Union relations were restricted to a few select farms in the region. Farm owners noted that unionised workers had cancelled their subscriptions due to weak union representation and although farms “don’t discourage unions [they] certainly don’t encourage” them either (Martin, Mountain View owner). Rather, farm owners suggest that workplace forums are sufficiently consultative arenas, even though these exclude temporary off-farm workers and some are restricted to addressing social events and housing on farms. This means that temporary off-farm workers lack representational security in the workplace.
Further, of the four participating farms, three offer housing for temporary and permanent workers, although only Two Orchards charges workers rent. This was not always the case, as workers used to receive housing as part of their wage subsidy from the early 1900s (Scully, 1987, 1989, cited in Kritzinger & Vorster, 1997:116). Between 1961 and 1976, farmers built housing especially to attract workers due to the shortage of labour on farms in the Western Cape, as workers were drawn to higher wages in the mining industry (Knight 1978:46). Even today mine workers’ wages are R6,000 per month compared to farm workers’ wages of R2,254 (Dubelo, Xhosa temporary farm working man and ex-miner, 38 years old). By 1998, after the introduction of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act (ESTA) of 1997, farms “were reluctant and even unwilling to fill houses on their farms, while others had demolished existing houses” (Kritzinger & Vorster, 1999, cited in Kritzinger, Barrientos, Rossouw, 2002:4). With the introduction of the Sectoral Determination 8 for Agriculture in 2002 farms also started to charge workers rent for housing in the region (Conradie, 2003:13). This means that regulation of labour legislation caused farmers to withdraw completely from offering housing to permanent and temporary workers, to be less willing to offer housing, or to charge rent in accordance with the legislation.

Consequently, workers have had to find alternative accommodation close to towns, and along with flexibilisation, the greater part of the agricultural workforce is now recruited from nearby towns. A by-product is that farms do not provide off-farm workers with social services. Child-care and health-care facilities, where available on farms, are not accessible to either permanent or temporary staff living off farms. Recruitment of local labour has thus dissipated traditional ties of paternalism on farms, as foreseen by Kritzinger and Vorster in 1997. This means that the relationship between farm worker and employer is increasingly a labour relation, and workers living off farms experience greater insecurity due to the temporary nature of their work, residential insecurity and having to access oversubscribed public services. In this respect, neither employing farms nor temporary off-farm workers have any obligation towards each other, other than as stipulated in labour legislation. This has also meant that workers are no longer obliged to work on a particular farm, but instead are able to choose their employer. This has contributed to increases in labour turnover, and hence some farm managers are reverting to recruiting workers from other provinces or neighbouring countries, rather than from the local labour pool, to work and live on farms during harvest seasons, in an effort to decrease labour turnover.

Since flexibilisation of the workforce, the proportion of casualised workers (63%) has increased in comparison to permanent workers (37%). Thereby, the majority of the workforce does not receive the benefits of standard employment. This has increased labour insecurity as “the agenda is set by private, competitive interests [and] gains come at tremendous broader social costs [of] increasing
marginalisation and insecurity of a far larger section of the farm workforce” (Mather & Greenberg, 2003:411). Currently, temporary farm workers in Ceres experience a lack of employment opportunities (labour market insecurity), and those employed as general unskilled workers have no opportunities for career advancement or increases in wages thereby (job insecurity). Further, they do not receive certified training (skills reproduction insecurity), have short-term (employment insecurity) and irregular employment (income insecurity) and are neither included in workplace forums nor represented by unions (representational insecurity). However, work security is provided for through the sectoral determination for agriculture and adhered to by the employers in this study which may mean that temporary workers do not “fare badly in all respects” of labour insecurity (Standing, 2011:8).

Flexibilisation has occurred alongside a lack of sufficient investment in public services, such as affordable childcare and housing. Thus, although temporary off-farm workers are able to access public social services in the area, such as public health and education, these are overcrowded and oversubscribed, not only due to lack of sufficient investment but also immigration into the surrounding area.

Further, the temporary nature of their employment means that social assistance grants, UIF and state investment in skills training, being based on the premise of labour market security, do not support the growing numbers of casualised workers. This leaves temporary workers in the precarious situation of not being sufficiently employed to access adequate unemployment insurance, nor sufficiently ‘deserving’ to accrue social assistance grants; and since most live in households with incomes above the threshold for means-tested public housing (78%) and indigent subsides (80%), neither are they able to access subsidised social services, other than public schooling and health.

Unable to access services available through permanent employment or state services for the sufficiently ‘deserving’, temporary farm workers have lost much of the social wage accrued through subsidies. Thus, the monetary value of their wages is low because these services have to be paid for in full from their real wages and their wages do not ensure subsistence and the cost of their reproduction. This affects the way they negotiate labour insecurity and their considerations in participating in paid work, as addressed in the following chapter.

The second part of this chapter gave an overview of temporary off-farm workers’ socio-economic profile. To contextualise temporary off-farm workers these profiles were compared to permanent and temporary farm workers living on and off farms in section 5.4.1. It showed that temporary off-farm workers include a greater proportion of women (56%) and are a predominantly young workforce (34 years old and younger). Further, living permanently in the area, coloured workers’ experience of farm work increases with age, in contrast to black African workers who generally migrate to and from the
area for work. Temporary off-farm workers generally live in households with about five members and although coloured workers’ households tend to have a permanently employed member, black African household have more members without paid work. Having permanently employed household members almost doubles the annual income of coloured households and leads to income stability. A significant proportion of household income arrives through social assistance grants paid mainly to women. This income amounts to about 32% of household income but increases during the low season, to as much as 40% in temporary farm working women’s households. Apart from social assistance grants, UIF, holiday pay and work related bonuses bridge periods of unemployment and mediate income insecurity, as illustrated in the following chapter.
Chapter 6  

Negotiating labour insecurity

6.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter addresses workers’ employment patterns and their considerations in participating in paid work. This is done by firstly analysing the workstations of temporary workers, which are shown to be determined by historical practices, job structure flexibility as well as employer and worker preferences. Workstations and gender influence workers’ frequency of employment, in that men tend to work in the orchards and find employment throughout the year.

The second part of the chapter addresses workers’ considerations in taking up paid work and working for specific employers. Since workers also decide not to take up paid work during specific times of the year, the third part of this chapter addresses the reasons for this.

The findings suggest that farm workers’ considerations around work do not only stem from worker preferences, but are also influenced by historical trajectories that have led to the specific social structures and material conditions of farm workers marked by a gender-race nexus.

6.2 WORKSTATIONS

Temporary off-farm workers were employed across three different workstations on farms, the orchards (48%), the packinghouses (40%) and the drying courts (12%) (Figure 6.1).

![Figure 6.1: Distribution of temporary off-farm workers by workplace, gender and race](https://scholar.sun.ac.za)

Source: Payroll data of temporary off-farm workers employed on participating farms in January 2015 (N=552).

Packinghouse temporary off-farm workers are mostly women (84%) and coloured (71%). Work here means packing fruit, palletising crates, labelling, distributing boxes and attending to the cold room (Picture 6.1). Coloured women mostly pack fruit (79%), do all the labelling and distributing of boxes while coloured men are cold room attendants or in charge of palleting (88%). Although black African
men also do some palleting (13%) and packing (6%) and black African women also pack fruit (15%), they form the minority of workers in the packinghouses.

**Picture 6.1**: Mountain View packinghouse

Source: Photo taken by author at Riversend, 20 January 2015, permission granted. Depicts coloured packinghouse women employed to classify fruit that is pre-sorted by the mechanised conveyors, whilst men are employed to palletise boxes of fruit.

On the other hand, the orchards are predominantly worked by men (66%) and black African workers (72%) (Picture 6.2). However, 95% of black African men work in the orchards compared to half of black African women (54%) and coloured men (48%), with a low percentage of coloured women in orchards (13%). Working in the orchards means picking and sorting diseased fruit, thinning, pruning and planting new trees as well as fixing installations and driving tractors. The tractors are mostly driven by coloured men who also fix installations and pallet boxes, while some (21%) pick fruit. Black African men are employed to thin the trees, while also pruning (42%) and picking (59%). Black African women in the orchards are mostly (58%) employed for pruning, planting vegetables, sorting diseased fruit and some (16%) picking. The work of coloured women in the orchards, however, is less varied as they tend to pre-sort fruit, by separating fruit with signs of disease or blemishes, with very few (5%) picking fruit.
**Picture 6.2: Women at Two Orchards preparing dried fruit**

Source: Photo taken at Two Orchards, 15 January 2015, permission granted. Depicts coloured and black African women preparing dried fruit on the drying court, while men are employed as fork lift drivers to palletise crates.

There is also a strong race-gender distribution of workers on the drying courts where 60% of workers are women, mostly coloured women (56%) and young coloured (24%) and black African men (16%) (\(p < .05\)). Working on the drying courts means that workers can either fix and palletise crates or prepare the fruit. Employment on the drying courts is of shorter duration than other workstations, with the majority (46%) workers employed on two-month contracts. Men are equally employed for fixing and palletising crates and few (12%) coloured men prepare fruit, which is predominantly done by women.

There is a racial gendered hierarchy of skilled employees in the orchards, packinghouses and drying courts with coloured men employed in the most skilled jobs as tractor drivers, forklift drivers and cold room attendants. Next, coloured women in packinghouses are quality controllers and manage the labelling, distribution and counting of boxes. The rest of the unskilled work is done by black African and coloured workers.

The racial differences in packinghouses may be accounted for by a generational transfer of skills, as the owner of Riversend explains

“Fruit packing isn’t easy. The coloured women come through the ropes over the years. You’ll see in the packinghouses that the mother worked there all the years and their young daughter also comes through the ropes. Whoever is a good packinghouse woman, her mother was also in the packinghouse because you have to look at it. If you pick up a nectarine, you have to differentiate between four classes, and black [African] women don’t see it, whereas these [coloured] women pack every year and come through it. The young girls begin with folding boxes and then a sorter and so on, so they learn, but we have tried but [black African women] don’t come through” (Barnard, Riversend owner).

Thus, coloured women start working at an early age in the packinghouses, learning the skills over the years as they progress from folding boxes to packing fruit. Further, for coloured children there is an
interpenetration of social reproduction and skills reproduction from the household to the workplace. Girls and boys enter the workforce, alongside their grandmothers, on the drying courts during school holidays and later, alongside their parents, in the packinghouses or orchards learning skills over the years as they progress. This interpenetration of socialisation and skills reproduction does not occur amongst black African workers who leave their site of reproduction to migrate to the area for work. In this manner, there is a cultural reproduction of skills and knowledge, that is to say the transference of cultural capital (Bourdieu, 2007), amongst coloured farm workers who are in closer proximity to their children and successive generations. In contrast to black African workers, whose children and grandchildren remain in sending communities or migrate elsewhere.

Skills reproduction through socialisation, in lieu of training in the workplace, reproduces the means of production (knowledge and skills) of coloured workers, and promotes their job security. Thus, coloured workers create a niche for themselves, fitting in with employer preferences to take on skilled workers. Coloured workers create their own job security, as packinghouse workers in the case of women, or gain entry into permanent work, which explains why fewer coloured men are in temporary employment. Apart from increasing job security, this process reproduces the traditional (and racialised) relations of production on farms, and the social status of coloured workers.

Table 6.1: Temporary off-farm workers’ gender and race by farm and workstation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender &amp; Race of farm workers</th>
<th>Coloured men</th>
<th>Black African men</th>
<th>Coloured women</th>
<th>Black African women</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Two Orchards</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orchard</td>
<td>16.7% &amp;a</td>
<td>86.8% &amp;ab</td>
<td>50.0% &amp;ab, c</td>
<td>53.2% &amp;c</td>
<td>61.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drying Court</td>
<td>83.3% &amp;a</td>
<td>13.2% &amp;ab</td>
<td>50.0% &amp;ab, c</td>
<td>46.8% &amp;c</td>
<td>38.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0% (12)</td>
<td>100.0% (38)</td>
<td>100.0% (4)</td>
<td>100.0% (47)</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Valley Ridge</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Packinghouse</td>
<td>29.4% &amp;a</td>
<td>3.6% &amp;e</td>
<td>63.5% &amp;c</td>
<td>15.4% &amp;a, b</td>
<td>39.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orchard</td>
<td>38.2% &amp;a</td>
<td>92.3% &amp;e</td>
<td>19.0% &amp;c</td>
<td>46.2% &amp;a</td>
<td>40.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drying Court</td>
<td>32.4% &amp;a</td>
<td>3.8% &amp;e</td>
<td>17.5% &amp;a, b</td>
<td>38.5% &amp;a</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0% (34)</td>
<td>100.0% (26)</td>
<td>100.0% (63)</td>
<td>100.0% (13)</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Riversend</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Packinghouse</td>
<td>84.6% &amp;a</td>
<td></td>
<td>92.0% &amp;a</td>
<td>8.3% &amp;b</td>
<td>48.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orchard</td>
<td>15.4% &amp;a</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>8.0% &amp;a</td>
<td>91.7% &amp;b</td>
<td>52.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0% (13)</td>
<td>100.0% (26)</td>
<td>100.0% (50)</td>
<td>100.0% (36)</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mountain View</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Packinghouse</td>
<td>28.6% &amp;a</td>
<td></td>
<td>91.8% &amp;c</td>
<td>92.3% &amp;c</td>
<td>55.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orchard</td>
<td>71.4% &amp;a</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>8.2% &amp;c</td>
<td>7.7% &amp;c</td>
<td>44.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0% (49)</td>
<td>100.0% (42)</td>
<td>100.0% (73)</td>
<td>100.0% (26)</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100% (108)</td>
<td>100% (132)</td>
<td>100% (190)</td>
<td>100% (122)</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each subscript letter denotes a subset of categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level.

Source: Payroll data of temporary off-farm workers employed on participating farms in January 2015 (N=552).

That is not to say that black African workers do not work in packinghouses (Table 6.1), however, the few that do so have all lived in the region for five or more years and speak English or Afrikaans. In this respect, they have accrued the necessary skills over time, including language, because “it’s difficult to explain to someone what 50% colour is on a fruit” (Petra, Mountain View owner).
Productivity also sway farm managers’ preferences, reporting that rather than “a language problem, it’s just that the coloured person packs quickly and the Xhosa [black African] person is slow” (Johan, Valley Ridge owner). In this respect, 71% of packinghouse employees are coloured women although this may change over time.

**Picture 6.3:** Temporary farm working women sorting fruit in the orchard at Valley Ridge

![Temporary farm working women sorting fruit in the orchard at Valley Ridge](source: Photo taken at Valley Ridge, 18 January 2015, permission granted. Depicts a coloured farm working man in skilled permanent employment as a tractor driver, with temporary black African farm working women pre-sorting fruit in the orchard.

In the orchards though, for “picking it will only be men” and employers suggest that “it’s probably to do with the amount of physical work in the job” (Petra, Mountain View owner). This is because picking means climbing tall ladders while wearing overalls, over their clothes in the blazing sun, picking fruit and placing it in shoulder bags to return to the tractor emptying the bags and swiping identification tags. Although some (21%) women do pick fruit, most stand at the back of the tractors bending over the fruit bins to pre-sort damaged and diseased fruit before transference to packinghouses (Picture 6.3).

Picking fruit in the orchards was traditionally the domain of coloured men with some black African migrant men housed in hostels. In this respect, there was a “racialized division between coloured ‘insiders’ and African (mostly Xhosa-speaking) ‘outsiders’” (Ewert & du Toit, 2005b:96). However, as elaborated in section 3.4, the abolition of influx control in 1987, market deregulation and the extension of labour legislation in the early 1990s meant that black Africans became increasingly incorporated into the unskilled farm work. They worked in orchards as temporary workers, in accordance with casualised employment growth in the sector, as well as replacing the decline in the proportions of coloured men in farm work (Figure 3.8). Prior to this, “[t]he wives of permanent (coloured) farm workers and women from neighbouring farms and the nearest town continue[d] to form an important part of the casual labour force” (Ewert & du Toit, 2005b:112).
The appearance of women in the orchards is partly due to the fragmentation of the traditional work of women in packinghouses into the higher skilled work of classifying and lower skilled work of sorting fruit. Instead of fragmenting the process, Mountain View decided to maintain this process within its packinghouse (Paul, Mountain View owner). That is why gender accounts for 77% of the division of labour between workstations on this farm ($\chi^2 = 119.810, p = .000, \lambda = .769$). This suggests that the presence of women in orchards during high season stems from job structure flexibility, spurred on by “increasing demands to meet tight production schedules, standards and quality” (Kritzinger, Barrientos & Rossouw, 2004:20) in the supply chain of farms. For this reason, on some farms there has been an incorporation of black African women into orchards to pre-sort damaged and diseased fruit. Along with the incorporation of black African men in the orchards, this has led to a racial division of labour on some farms, like Riversend where race accounts for 74% of workplace variation ($\chi^2 = 119.810, p = .000; \lambda = .744$) (Figure 6.2).

**Figure 6.2:** Distribution of temporary off-farm workers by workstation, farm, gender and race

![Chart](https://scholar.sun.ac.za)

*Source:* Payroll data of temporary off-farm workers employed on participating farms in January 2015 (N = 552).

This division of labour on farms has meant that some forms of work are associated with workers’ identity. For example, men generally choose not work in the packinghouses because they see it as “a woman’s job” (Caitlin, coloured temporary farm working woman, 45 years old), even though some men complain that their employers “say we have to work in the orchards, we can’t work [in the packinghouses]” (Kevin, coloured temporary farm working man, 27 years old). There are also farm workers for whom the gendered-racial structure of work is less important than satisfying interpersonal experiences in the workplace (Kaplan & Tausky, 1974), which is why some men and women prefer to work “outside [because] we can talk and laugh; you can’t do that in the packinghouse” (Brent, coloured temporary farm working man, 40 years old).
Some workers also prefer the autonomy of working in the orchards in contrast to the close monitoring of the production process in the packinghouses and strict health and safety regulations. “Every time you go to the toilet you have to undress and put on your hat and jacket when you come back, I forgot and got three warnings” (Caitlin, coloured temporary farm working woman, 45 years old). Finally, there are some for whom work is valued as an economic activity (Kaplan & Tausky, 1974). Those workers choose to work in the orchards to increase their earning potential since labour remains manual and based on piece rates. “Picking is [paid] per crate. If we pack fruit we can’t work as quick[ly]” (David, coloured temporary farm working man, 23 years old) because the production line in packinghouses has been mechanised. This means that workers in the orchards have the ability to increase their wages without being reliant on mechanisation of production where they often “stand around and wait for fruit” (Amber, coloured temporary farm working woman, 42 years old). In this manner, being able to set the pace of their work, and work throughout the year in orchards, in contrast to being restricted to shorter packinghouse seasons, the annual income of temporary farm working men is significantly higher than women. Half of men earn R27,928 per annum compared to R18,642 for women, with no significant differences across race. Based on a Mann-Whitney U test, the mean ranks of men and women are 120.25 and 87.88 respectively, with men earning more to a moderate extent (U = 3378.500, Z = -3.886, p = .000, r = -.27). Although the mean ranks of coloured and black African workers are 94.53 and 109.67 respectively, there is no significant difference in the earnings according to workers’ race (U = 4309.000, Z = -1.834, p = .067).

Although some workers express preferences for workstations, historical employment practices on farms have led to a significant gendered and racial division of labour across workstations whereby workers’ race and gender accounts for 45% of workplace variation (χ² = 275.180, p = .000, λ = .453). Since abolishment of influx control, while black African temporary farm workers have been accommodated into the unskilled work traditionally done by coloured workers, they have yet to gain full incorporation, except in some packinghouses in the region where the sorting and classification of fruit has recently been fully mechanised. In this manner although modes of production on farms stem from historical practices of work, these are reproduced through the existing social structures (Bourdieu, 2007). The interpenetration of socialisation and skills reproduction increases the cultural capital of coloured workers. This secures skills reproduction security for coloured workers, in spite of the lack of training in the workplace. In reproducing their skills advantage, coloured workers maintain an employment niche as packinghouse workers or permanent farm workers, for women and men respectively. This increases their job security, in contrast to black African workers. Another consequence of living permanently in the region, coloured workers have more extensive social networks through which labour is predominantly sourced (section 5.2.4 above). This proximity, along with their cultural capital, increases the total social capital of coloured workers. Coloured workers
thus experience greater labour market security, skills reproduction security and job security, which increase their income security, as opposed to black African temporary farm workers.

### 6.3 EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS

Having determined the reasons for the division of labour on farms, this section analyses the employment patterns of workers, linked to workstations, before addressing workers’ considerations in participating in paid work.

**Figure 6.3: Duration of employment by gender and race**

![Duration of employment by gender and race](source)

*Source:* Calculated from survey data (N=200).

Temporary off-farm workers differ moderately in the number of months worked per year, according to gender and race (Brown-Forsythe = 14.807, \( p = .000, \eta^2 = .18 \)), with black African men employed for the most months a year as temporary farm workers. As shown in figure 6.3, 75% of black African men work more than eight months of the year, with half working for twelve months. They stand in contrast to coloured men, half of whom work for less than eight months a year and a quarter working for between two to four months a year. This distribution is a reflection of the high numbers of students amongst them who work during the school vacation, in packinghouses on contracts of shorter duration. Half of black African women work for eight months or more a year compared to 75% of coloured women who work eight months or less a year. This is due to the shorter season of packinghouses where most (75%) coloured women work, in contrast to the other categories of workers who are also employed in orchards (Figure 6.5). Post-hoc tests of pair-wise mean differences using the Tamhane \( T2 \) also indicate significant differences in months worked between black African men, coloured women, coloured men and black African women.

Whilst some temporary farm workers work throughout the year (34.5%), the majority experience periods without paid work. The frequency of workers’ employment is strongly related to their workplace (\( F = 29.757, p = .000, \eta^2 = .232 \)). Workers on the drying courts are employed for the shortest periods, for an average of three months of the year (\( M = 3.41, SD = 2.250 \)), while packinghouse
workers are employed for an average of eight months (M = 7.91, SD = 2.882) and those working in the orchards are the longest employed, about nine months of the year (M = 9.16, SD = 3.767).

**Figure 6.4:** Length of employment by workplace and number of jobs over 12 months

![Length of employment by workplace and number of jobs over 12 months](image)

*Source:* Calculated from survey data (N=200).

The duration of employment increases moderately with the number of jobs that workers have in a year ($r = .319$, $p = .000$). Workers on drying courts tend to have one job (96%) a year working for about two months of the year (65%) (Figure 6.4 and Table 6.2). Drying courts attract a particular type of worker, these being young men in full-time education (42%) and older coloured women (38%) usually occupied in unpaid social reproductive work. Workers in packinghouses are mainly coloured women (75%) who have one job a year (60%), half of whom work between five to seven months per year. Having said this, coloured women who are able to find an additional job, increase the duration of their employment to more than seven months, half working for nine months per year.

Orchard workers are distinct in that even though they have one job in a year, 50% are employed throughout the year. This, however, only includes black African workers and some coloured men, as very few coloured women work in orchards (Figure 6.5). Workers in the orchards, thus, experience greater labour market security being able to work throughout the year in paid employment, as opposed to the shorter packinghouse season, without the burden of unpaid social reproduction work, in contrast to older coloured women.

**Table 6.2:** Distribution of temporary farm workers by workstation and number of jobs over 12 months

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of jobs in 12 months</th>
<th>Packinghouse (%)</th>
<th>Orchard (%)</th>
<th>Drying Court (%)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>53.2a</td>
<td>40.5a</td>
<td>95.8b</td>
<td>52.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>41.8a</td>
<td>42.7a</td>
<td>4.2e</td>
<td>37.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.1a</td>
<td>13.5a</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.0a</td>
<td>3.1a</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100% (79)</td>
<td>100% (96)</td>
<td>100% (25)</td>
<td>100% (200)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Calculated from survey data (N=200).
Because there is a strong relationship between workers and their workstations, workers length of employment is also moderately to largely associated with their gender and race ($F = (12.486), p = .000, \eta^2 = .164$). Black African men are employed for the longest duration at an average of ten months of the year ($M = 9.74, SD = 3.721$) because the majority work in orchards (91%) where they can find work throughout the year. Coloured men are slightly less frequently employed, for about seven months, ($M = 7.31, SD = 3.919$), owing to the high numbers of students amongst these and the fact that half (54%) work on drying courts and in packinghouses with shorter seasons.

**Figure 6.5:** Distribution of temporary off-farm workers by workplace, gender and race

[Graph showing distribution of temporary off-farm workers by workplace, gender and race]

*Source: Calculated from survey data (N=200).*

Black African women who can speak English or Afrikaans are able to find work in the packinghouses (26%) and being able to complement this with working in orchards, are able to work longer than those only working in the orchards who are employed for an average of seven months ($M = 7.19, SD = 3.433$) (Figure 6.6). Coloured women are employed the least for an average of about seven months ($M = 6.50, SD = 3.282$) as 75% work in the packinghouses, which generally offer contracts of five to six months (53%), sometimes even up to nine months (27%) depending on the produce packed. Workers on the drying courts are employed the least because they are mostly student men (38%) and women aged 45 years or above (38%). They are paid in cash at a piece-rate and work during the short peak season coinciding with school holidays on two-month contracts (50%).

**Figure 6.6:** Length of employment of temporary farm workers by workstation, gender and race

[Graph showing length of employment of temporary farm workers by workstation, gender and race]

*Source: Calculated from survey data (N=200).*
Thus, analysing workers duration of employment over a year, there are large disparities between workers. Further, since the survey was conducted with employed temporary off-farm workers in January 2015, workers were fully employed in January and months prior to January. I compared employment patterns for the peak season of February 2014 and March 2014, with the low season of June to August 2014.

**Figure 6.7:** Distribution of temporary off-farm working men by month and employer

![Distribution of temporary off-farm working men by month and employer](image)

*Source: Calculated from survey data (N=87).*

In the peak season, 76% of men and 70% of women were employed. However, discounting the number of student men, only 10% of men are without paid work in the peak season, in contrast to 30% of women (Figure 6.7 and Figure 6.8).
In the low season, 70% of men are in paid employment as compared to about 35% of women. This means that in the low season, those without paid work increase to about 15% for men, but for women this rises to 65%. A reason for this is that in the low season men continue working in the orchards (96%), thinning and pruning, although those without these skills “can’t get work” (Mcebisi, Xhosa temporary farm working man, 42 years old), lest they find work in the citrus sector. Women, on the other hand, prefer employment in vegetable packinghouses in the low season (61%) and although some black African women also access these jobs (21%), most (79%) work in orchards alongside men in the low season.

Duration of employment also relates moderately to workers ages ($F = (7.782), p = .000, \eta^2 = .138$). As shown in Figure 6.9, older categories of temporary off-farm workers are more frequently employed throughout the year.

Source: Calculated from survey data (N=114).
Figure 6.9: Frequency of employment by gender, race and age

Source: Calculated from survey data (N=200).

The youngest categories of workers are employed for about three to six months of the year, except for half of black African men who work eight months and more. Black African men from the age of 22 to 59 are fully employed for 11 to 12 months per year. This stands in contrast to coloured men, being mostly young temporary workers (42%) and students (18%) under the age of 22 (Table 6.3), who are fully employed aged 34 and above (Figure 6.9). The large discrepancy between coloured and black African men is a reflection of the fact that greater proportions of coloured men are employed as permanent workers on farms, which is why fewer coloured men participate in temporary farm work above the age of 21 (39%), as compared to black African men (76%).

Table 6.3: Age distribution of temporary off-farm workers by age, race and gender

| Age (20th, 40th, 60th, 80th & 100th percentiles) | Race and gender of farm workers |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
|                 | Coloured men    | Black African men | Coloured women  | Black African women |
| 16 - 21 yrs     | 60.6%*          | 24.1%**          | 14.7%          | 13.2%          |
| 22 - 27 yrs     | 12.1%           | 20.4%            | 16.0%          | 28.9%          |
| 28 - 33 yrs     | 6.1%            | 27.8%            | 22.7%          | 21.1%          |
| 34 - 40 yrs     | 9.1%            | 18.5%            | 14.7%          | 26.3%          |
| 41 - 59 yrs     | 12.1%           | 9.3%             | 32.0%***       | 10.5%          |
| Total           | 100% (33)       | 100% (54)        | 100% (75)      | 100% (38)      |

* 30% work on the drying courts and 25% are fulltime students
** 31% work on the drying courts and all 31% are full time students
*** 38% work on the drying courts and all 38% have contracts of 3 months of less

Source: Calculated from survey data (N=200).

Although older categories of black African women are also employed for a longer duration, irrespective of age, most work a median of about eight months per year. Finally, coloured women stand in sharp contrast to other categories of workers, as between the ages of 22 to 59 they work less frequently throughout the year, at a median of five to seven months, a reflection of the fact they mostly work in packinghouses where half of the contracts (53%) are for five to six months. This
means that frequency of employment varies according to gender, age, race, and is a reflection of the division of labour across workstations.

6.4 RECRUITMENT PRACTICES

Apart from their frequency of employment, temporary off-farm workers differ according to the type of recruitment over the course of a year (Figure 6.6 and Figure 6.7). As mentioned in section 5.2.4, temporary off-farm workers are recruited in a number of ways, even though they are directly employed by a farm. They also differ in whom they view as their employer. For example, the majority of temporary off-farm workers reported being employed by a farm (79%), but 18% reported working for a farm supervisor. This means that they work in teams and if the supervisor finds alternative employment, these workers move with the supervisor, terminating their employment with the farm. Having said this, this practice varies moderately according to gender and race ($\chi^2 = 37.589, p = .000, \lambda = .122$) as a significantly larger percentage of black African men reported working for a farm supervisor (35%) in contrast to 85% to 92% of the other categories of workers who reported working directly for a farm in January 2015.

**Figure 6.10:** Most frequent annual employer of temporary off-farm workers by gender & race

Even though 47% of temporary off-farm workers worked for more than one employer during 2014, most (76%) still work directly for a farm, with few (15%) working in teams for a farm supervisor, self-employed supervisor (7%), or on their own account (7%) (Figure 6.10). This does vary slightly according to gender ($\chi^2 = 14.312, p = .026, \lambda = .000$) in that more women are employed directly by a farm (82%) than men (64%) ($p < .05$), whilst men are almost twice as likely to work for a farm supervisor (22%) ($p < .05$), although three quarters of them are black African (74%) (Figure 6.11).
More men (16%) also work for self-employed supervisors throughout the year, as ‘uitwerkers’. These work from farm to farm, half of whom are paid by the farm directly into their bank accounts and half in cash. Working in teams is a form of social capital whereby membership increases employment security. The higher proportion of black African workers doing so may be on account of the fact that they have few social networks in the region, in contrast to coloured workers who live at their site of reproduction and are able to find direct employment on farms. This is done by drawing on larger social networks, with employed members, in the region, as Sonia explains: “we ask the other people that work, when they come home, if they aren’t looking for workers” (Coloured temporary farm working woman, 38 years old).

Employment in the region is predominantly a direct relationship between employer and employee and does not reflect an increase in the externalisation of labour to contractors in this region, as suggested by Kritzenger, Barrientos and Rossouw (2004). This is partly due to employers attempting to avoid unfair employment practices, whereby labour brokers do not always complete the necessary administration, such as UIF, for workers and workers do not get holiday pay, sick leave and other benefits (Theron, 2009). Changing employment practices on these farms may be a consequence of adherence to codes of labour practices in buyer-driven global value chains, as well as the recent Labour Relations Amendment Act, No 6 of 2014 (Republic of South Africa, 2014). The latter means that labour brokers’ employees become permanent employees of the client after three months and receive the same wages and benefits as permanent employees unless the work is deemed a temporary service through “collective agreement…sectoral determination” or notice of the Minister (Republic of South Africa, 2014). Having said this, farms are exempt from employing temporary workers permanently after three months on the basis that they are “employed to perform seasonal work” (Republic of South Africa, 2014). Although the specific reasons for this require further investigation, labour practices on participating farms are predominantly a direct employment relationship.
6.5 WORKERS’ CONSIDERATIONS IN PARTICIPATING IN PAID WORK

Having established employment patterns due to employer preferences and historical practices of work determining the division of labour on farms, as well as workers’ preferred employers, this section addresses factors that influence temporary off-farm workers’ considerations in participating in paid work. That is to say, this section addresses workers’ constrained considerations in a context structured by historical practices.

The qualitative interviews suggested a number of factors influencing temporary off-farm workers’ considerations in participating in paid work. These were further analysed through ranking exercises in focus groups, revealing that the order of importance of their considerations differ because they interrelate. As Declan explains:

“The first thing is the money. When it comes to the money people say on that farm they pay 5c and others 10c, then they say they leave the other job for the 10c job. The second thing is the supervisor; you can get on well with the 5c supervisor and workers, but have problems with the 10c people. Now you have 5c and 10c but if 5c is better then you decide to take the 5c because you get on better with the people and others go to the 10c and then don’t like working with the people or don’t know the problems they’ll get there. There is the problem. What is nice for me is the distance from my house; I can run home if there’s a problem” (Coloured temporary farm working man, 41 years old).

Participants in the focus groups were in agreement with the factors influencing workers’ considerations in participating in paid work, even though the importance differed according to each individual. Having said this, they concluded by agreeing that a good relationship with their supervisor and co-workers is the most important followed by the salary, length of contracts and distance from home (Table 6.4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Order of Importance</th>
<th>Considerations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Good relationship with supervisor and co-workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Wages (Income security)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Length of contract (Employment security)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Proximity to residence (Reproductive security)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These findings were then used as indicators in the survey, which revealed a wider range of considerations influencing workers’ reasons for taking up paid work. Although 37% reported working because there is no other work available, further factors influencing workers’ considerations included financial rewards (21%), interpersonal workplace relationships (12%), employment security (9%), higher wages (9%), proximity to residences (6%), preference to work outside or inside (3%), employment benefits (3%) and a preference for working with fruit or vegetables (1%) (Table 6.5).
Table 6.5: Temporary off-farm workers main reasons for working over 12 months

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labour market insecurity</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>36.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial rewards</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal workplace relationships</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment security</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher wages</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proximity to residence</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To work inside/outside</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment benefits</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefer working with vegetables/fruit</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>200</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Calculated from survey data (N=200).*

Just over a third of workers take any available work and in so doing, their considerations are informed by labour market insecurity, whilst a fifth work for financial rewards. For half of workers their main concern is to have work (Bourdieu, 2013:170) spurred on by high levels of unemployment (Marx, 1978b:428). Work is thus instrumental for economic rewards (Kaplan & Tausky, 1974) due to commodification (Barchiesi, 2009:27, cited in Marais, 2011:184) and the increasing precarisation of work (Marais, 2011:184). However, half of workers considerations are informed by social relationships, employment security, increased wages, proximity to residences, working conditions and benefits. Further, considerations for participating in paid work vary according the farms at which workers were employed; whether they were employed by the same farms the following peak season as well as their average levels of annual income. These are addressed separately in the sections below.

The frequency of returning to the same employers for temporary off-farm workers was calculated by comparing their employers across successive peak seasons. However, since the survey included a twelve-month working history, data were not available to compare the same months of the year. Instead, successive months, February and January, were compared across successive peaks seasons, 2014 and 2015.

**Figure 6.12:** Temporary off-farm workers by employer in February ’14 and January ‘15

*Source: Calculated from survey data (N=200).*

Analysis revealed that whilst the majority (39%) of temporary off-farm workers returned to work for the same employer the following peak season, almost as many were unemployed the previous peak season (36%), while 25% worked for a different employer (Figure 6.12).
Table 6.6: Previous employer of temporary off-farm workers by workstation, race and gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Workstation</th>
<th>Employer Feb 2014 vs. January 2015</th>
<th>Race and gender of farm workers</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coloured men</td>
<td>Black African men</td>
<td>Coloured women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Packinghouse</td>
<td>Not previously employed</td>
<td>41.7% (a)</td>
<td>100.0% (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>33.3% (a)</td>
<td>49.1% (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Different</td>
<td>25.0% (a)</td>
<td>12.3% (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100% (12)</td>
<td>100% (57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orchard</td>
<td>Not previously employed</td>
<td>31.3% (a,b)</td>
<td>16.3% (b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>12.5% (a)</td>
<td>42.9% (b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Different</td>
<td>56.3% (a)</td>
<td>40.8% (a,b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100% (16)</td>
<td>100% (49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drying Court</td>
<td>Not previously employed</td>
<td>100.0% (a)</td>
<td>100.0% (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Same</td>
<td></td>
<td>38.5% (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Different</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100% (6)</td>
<td>100% (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Not previously employed</td>
<td>47.1% (a)</td>
<td>24.1% (b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>17.6% (a)</td>
<td>38.9% (b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Different</td>
<td>35.3% (a)</td>
<td>37.0% (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100% (34)</td>
<td>100% (54)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each subscript letter denotes a subset of race and gender of farm workers categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level.

Source: Calculated from survey data (N = 200).

Temporary off-farm workers returning to work for the same employer over successive peak seasons differ moderately according to workstation \((\chi^2 = 20.890, p = .002; \lambda = .205)\). In packinghouses, significantly more black women (89%) return to work for the same employer, however, none were previously unemployed (Table 6.6), as opposed to 39% of coloured women who were not employed on farms the previous peak season. This speaks to the skills barriers that block black African workers entry to packinghouses, in contrast to the job security of coloured women in packinghouses gained through skills reproduction in socialisation (Section 6.2).

In the orchards, significantly more black African men (43%) return to work for the same employer, although almost as many work for a different employer (41%). The only significant difference being that the latter were single (75%) and lived in larger households of four to ten members \((r = .374; p = .017)\), as opposed to the former, half (52%) of whom were single and lived in households of up to six members. In this respect, the propensity of black African men to work for the same employer is related to living with a partner in smaller households. In contrast, few coloured men (13%) in orchards work for the same employer, while significantly more (56%) work for a different employer. They were all temporary workers of varying age, half of whom worked due to labour market insecurity (52%).

On the drying courts, only coloured women (39%) return to work for the same employer. Most other categories of workers in the orchards were previously unemployed. Although the numbers of black African women were too few for analysis, the larger group pertained to young men under the age of 22 previously in full-time education (100%) and coloured women over the age of 52 (71%). Thus, as
per the findings in section 6.2, working on the drying courts means earning an income during periods of rest from social reproductive unpaid work.

Table 6.7: Temporary off-farm workers reasons for working in February 2014 and January 2015 by a comparison of employer

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employer in February '14 vs. January '15</th>
<th>Previously Unemployed</th>
<th>Same Employer</th>
<th>Different Employer</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No other job available</td>
<td>40.8% (a)</td>
<td>41.3% (a)</td>
<td>46.0% (a)</td>
<td>42.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better work conditions</td>
<td>4.2% (a)</td>
<td>16.3% (b)</td>
<td>8.0% (a,b)</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Longer contract</td>
<td>8.5% (a)</td>
<td>8.8% (a)</td>
<td>6.0% (a)</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher wages</td>
<td>8.5% (a)</td>
<td>5.0% (a)</td>
<td>8.0% (a)</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close to home</td>
<td>2.8% (a)</td>
<td>7.5% (a,b)</td>
<td>12.0% (b)</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial independence</td>
<td>18.3% (a)</td>
<td>1.3% (b)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship with supervisor/co-workers</td>
<td>13.8% (a)</td>
<td>2.0% (a)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide for children</td>
<td>7.0% (a)</td>
<td>2.5% (a)</td>
<td>10.0% (a)</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7.0% (a)</td>
<td>2.5% (a)</td>
<td>6.0% (a)</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner/Friends work there</td>
<td>2.8% (a)</td>
<td>1.3% (a)</td>
<td>2.0% (a)</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100% (71)</td>
<td>100% (80)</td>
<td>100% (50)</td>
<td>100% (201)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each subscript letter denotes a subset of employer in February 2014 vs. January ’15 categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level.

Source: Calculated from survey data (N = 200).

Irrespective of whether workers did not work the previous season or whether they changed employer, a large proportion did not exercise a ‘choice’ in their employment because there is no other work available (42%). This means that their considerations in working are constrained by labour market insecurity in the region (Table 6.7). Further, significantly more workers return to work for the same employer due to better working conditions - receiving expected wages, respectful and dignified workplace communication and behaviour (Section 6.7.2.1) - and good relationships with supervisors and co-workers. Considerations for returning to the same employer are, thus, informed by income security, interpersonal workplace relations, and social relations with other workers (Kaplan and Tausky, 1974:186). Finally, although reasons for changing employer vary, significantly more temporary off-farm workers do so to work in closer proximity to their residences, although further analyses indicate no significant differences amongst this category of workers. This speaks to reproductive security, in that reducing time travelling to work, workers are able to dedicate more time to unpaid reproductive work in the household, and is an important consideration in changing employer.
6.5.1.1 CONSIDERATIONS IN COMMENCING PAID EMPLOYMENT

The percentage of temporary off-farm workers not previously employed on farms ranged between 25% and 53% across farms. They were mostly women (61%), above the age of 21 (87%), with a higher percentage of coloured women (57%) who work in packinghouses (32%) or drying courts (17%). The reason that most were working in January 2015 was that there were no other job opportunities although some worked on longer contracts or to provide for their children (Figure 6.13).

Although just over a third (39%) of workers not employed the previous peak season were men, these were mostly workers under the age of 22 (76%), of which nearly a third were students the previous season (29%). In this respect, the youngest category of workers mostly reported working for financial independence, during the school vacation of January 2015.

Figure 6.13: Previously unemployed temporary off-farm workers’ reasons for working in January 2015 by gender, race and age

Source: Calculated from survey data (N = 75).

Temporary farm workers’ considerations for entering the workforce on farms thus include labour market insecurity, income security and the economic rewards of working (Kaplan & Tausky, 1974).
6.5.1.2 CONSIDERATIONS IN CHANGING EMPLOYER

The percentage of workers working for a different farm ranged between 15% and 35% across farms. Overall, temporary off-farm workers changing employers over successive peak seasons constituted a quarter of the workforce and were mostly black African men (40%). Almost half of workers changing employers tended to do so because of labour market insecurity (48%) and specific reasons for doing so varied greatly with no significant differences across workers. Reasons included working closer to home (10%), earn higher wages (8%) or provide for children (8%), amongst others (Figure 6.14). Although significantly more workers changing employer did so to work closer to home, they were too few for further analyses. This means that temporary farm workers’ considerations in changing employer are mostly informed by labour market insecurity.

Figure 6.14: Reasons for changing employer over successive peak seasons

Source: Calculated from survey data (N=50).
6.5.1.3 CONSIDERATIONS IN RETURNING TO PREVIOUS EMPLOYERS

The retention rate of workers ranged between 22% and 59% across farms. Returning to the same employer is moderately related to temporary farm workers’ reasons for working ($\chi^2 = 51.567, p = .002; \lambda = 0.172$). Workers returning to work for the same employer sought better work conditions (16%) and had strong social ties with employees (14%). Further analyses indicated that the proportions of workers returning to work for the same farms varied moderately across employing farms ($\chi^2 = 20.943, p = .002; \lambda = .132$) as well as workstations ($\chi^2 = 33.654, p = .000$) to a small extent, although the relationship between workstation and returning is negligible. The highest percentage of workers returned to work in the packinghouses at Riversend (75%) and Mountain View (55%), as well as the orchards at Valley Ridge (50%) and Riversend (46%).

Table 6.8: Distribution of temporary off-farm workers by employer in the peak season of 2014 and 2015 and workstation on each farm

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Workstation</th>
<th>Farm</th>
<th>Two Orchards</th>
<th>Valley Ridge</th>
<th>Riversend</th>
<th>Mountain View</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Previously Unemployed</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>61.1% \text{a}</td>
<td>25.0% \text{b}</td>
<td>28.6% \text{b}</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Same farm</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16.7% \text{a}</td>
<td>75.0% \text{b}</td>
<td>54.8% \text{b}</td>
<td>51.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Different farm</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>22.2% \text{a}</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16.7% \text{a, b}</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Packinghouse</td>
<td>Previously Unemployed</td>
<td>38.5% \text{a}</td>
<td>22.2% \text{a}</td>
<td>26.9% \text{a}</td>
<td>19.2% \text{a}</td>
<td>27.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Same farm</td>
<td>30.8% \text{a, b}</td>
<td>50.0% \text{b}</td>
<td>46.2% \text{b}</td>
<td>15.4% \text{a}</td>
<td>34.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Different farm</td>
<td>30.8% \text{a}</td>
<td>27.8% \text{a}</td>
<td>26.9% \text{a}</td>
<td>65.4% \text{b}</td>
<td>38.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orchard</td>
<td>Previously Unemployed</td>
<td>90.0% \text{a}</td>
<td>61.5% \text{a}</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>73.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>38.5% \text{b}</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Different</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>10.0% \text{a}</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drying Court</td>
<td>Previously Unemployed</td>
<td>52.8% \text{a}</td>
<td>46.9% \text{a}</td>
<td>26.1% \text{b}</td>
<td>25.0% \text{b}</td>
<td>35.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Same farm</td>
<td>22.2% \text{a}</td>
<td>34.7% \text{a}</td>
<td>58.7% \text{b}</td>
<td>39.7% \text{a}</td>
<td>39.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Different farm</td>
<td>25.0% \text{a, b}</td>
<td>18.4% \text{b}</td>
<td>15.2% \text{b}</td>
<td>35.3% \text{a}</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0% (37)</td>
<td>100.0% (49)</td>
<td>100.0% (46)</td>
<td>100.0% (68)</td>
<td>100.0% (200)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each subscript letter denotes a subset of farm categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level.

Source: Calculated from survey data (N = 200).

Riversend has the highest percentage of workers returning to work on the same farm, at 59% overall, the highest number returning to work in a packinghouse (75%) and the second highest returning to work in the orchards (46%) (Table 6.8). Black African men\textsuperscript{9} mostly return to the farm due to the lack of other job opportunities (55%). Although this is true for almost a quarter of women (23%), the main reason they return is because of longer contracts (31%), in contrast to a quarter of men (25%) (Table 6.9). This is because this employer conducts mixed farming of deciduous fruit and vegetables, which enables it to offer longer contracts, nine months, in the packinghouse. The owners also have a policy of offering workers permanent contracts after a trial period of three months. This means that although

\textsuperscript{9} Men returning to work for the same employing farm the successive peak season were mostly (82%) black African. This means that the analysis cannot account for coloured men’s considerations in returning to work for employers.
workers’ considerations to return to this employer are informed by labour market security, employment security is also an important consideration especially for women able to commence employment on longer fixed-term contracts. Another reason for returning to work is interpersonal relationships with co-workers (16%). In this respect, social ties between workers decreases labour turnover. For instance, at Riversend a group of packinghouse women “have a weekly collection and each week we buy a person a gift, for birthdays as well, and I know I can call on them if I need them” (Junine, coloured temporary farm working woman, 36 years old). Although this is not accounted for in Standing’s typology of labour securities (2011), it does relate to one of the meanings of work (Kaplan & Tausky, 1974) in that work can have more meaning as an interpersonal experience than an economic activity. Social ties in the workplace are also a means through which workers negotiate labour insecurity.

Table 6.9: Reasons why workers return to work at Riversend by gender & workstation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Workstation</th>
<th>Gender of farm workers</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men (1)</td>
<td>Women (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Packinghouse</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Longer contract</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No other job available</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better work conditions</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher wages</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner/Friends work there</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship with supervisor/co-workers</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide for children</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100% (1)</td>
<td>100% (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orchard</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No other job available</td>
<td>54.5%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Longer contract</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship with supervisor/co-workers</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100% (11)</td>
<td>100% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No other job available</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Longer contract</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>30.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship with supervisor/co-workers</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better work conditions</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher wages</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner/Friends work there</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide for children</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100% (12)</td>
<td>100% (13)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated from survey data (N=25).

Overall, considerations in taking up employment vary by 21% according to particular employers ($\chi^2 = 101.234, p = .000; \Lambda = .214$) but these consideration are similar to reasons for returning to work for employers. For example, overall, workers at Riversend report working due to labour market insecurity (43%) and some cite working here due to familiarity from working on the farm over the years (7%). However, significantly more work here, as compared to other farms, due to employment security (25%, $p > .05$). Thus, labour market insecurity and employment security are the most important considerations in partaking in paid work at Riversend (Figure 6.15).
Figure 6.15: Reasons for working at Riversend

![Reasons for working at Riversend](image)

Source: Calculated from survey data (N=46).

Valley Ridge has the highest survival rate of orchard workers (50%), but the lowest in the packinghouse (17%). Women generally return to the farm to work because they can find no other employment (80%), especially on the drying courts. Men, in the orchards, on the other hand, report returning due to good working conditions on the farm (63%). This may be due to management communicating respectfully with workers in that they “will always help you right he won’t shout at you if you do something wrong” (David, coloured temporary farm working man, 23 years old). This speaks to dignified and respectful interpersonal communication in the workplace, although regulated, it can be difficult to monitor. Thus, disrespectful communication and behaviour amongst employees increases labour turnover on farms (Section 6.7.2.1).

This farm also has a social club where workers, permanent and temporary, on- and off-farm workers, “have game evenings, especially pay weekends. We play dominoes and the one that wins maybe gets a cake or cool drink, that’s why it’s nice, we are actually close to each other” (Brent, coloured temporary farm working man, 40 years old) and “every pay Friday we sell [hot dog rolls] with drinks” (David, coloured temporary farm working man, 23 years old). This means that interpersonal experiences between employees, spurred on by social activities, increase the numbers of workers returning to this farm. Although, this can be seen as a form of work security, it is less a factor of labour than social ties between individuals and thus speaks to meaning of work as positive interpersonal experiences (Kaplan & Tausky, 1974), which as aforementioned has more meaning than the economic rewards of working for some workers. As such, negative interpersonal experiences can increase labour turnover.
Table 6.10: Reasons workers return to work at Valley Ridge by gender & workstation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Workstation</th>
<th>Gender of farm workers</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Packinghouse</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher wages</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better work conditions</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide for children</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100% (1)</td>
<td>100% (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orchard</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No other job available</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better work conditions</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100% (7)</td>
<td>100% (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drying Court</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No other job available</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100% (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100% (8)</td>
<td>100% (10)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall, considerations for working at Valley Ridge do not fully correspond to reasons for which workers return to work at this farm. This is because overall, significantly more temporary farm workers working at Valley Ridge, irrespective of age or workplace, do so to pay for their (grand) children (12%, p > .05), than other farms (Figure 6.16). Further analysis attributed this to the fact temporary off-farm farm workers at Valley Ridge live in households with more grandchildren (13%) than other farms where grandchildren constitute between 1% to 5% of the household ($\chi^2 = 111.375, p = .000$). In this respect, considerations for participating in paid work were informed by the economic rewards to provide for children.

Figure 6.16: Reasons for working at Valley Ridge

Source: Calculated from survey data (N=49).

Having said this, significantly more temporary farm workers reported work at Valley Ridge because of labour market insecurity (51%, p > .05) and work security stemming from good working conditions on the farm (14%, p > .05).

Table 6.11: Reasons why workers return to work at Two Orchards by gender & workstation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Workstation</th>
<th>Gender of farm workers</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orchard</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>83.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No other job available</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better work conditions</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial independence</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100% (2)</td>
<td>100% (6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated from survey data (N=8).
Unlike other farms, Two Orchards has no packinghouse. Further, it has the lowest percentage of workers returning to work at this farm (22%). Although the numbers are too few to be statistically significant, these workers work in the orchards, are mostly (63%) women and return to this farm due a lack of alternative employment opportunities (71%) (Table 6.11). The low percentage returning to this farm may be because the workforce is predominantly black African workers, half of whom have up to 3 years farm working experience (Figure 5.10) and who have lived in the region for up to four years (Figure 6.24). In this respect, employing fewer coloured temporary farm workers as compared to other employers, the numbers of workers returning to work on this farm are fewer.

**Figure 6.17: Reasons for working at Two Orchards**

Overall, half of temporary farm workers employed on this farm reported working here because they can find no other work (50%) and significantly more of them work on this farm for financial independence (31%, $p > .05$). This is because the survey was conducted in January during the school holidays and Two Orchards employs the highest number of scholars amongst participating farms. In this respect, they are working for economic rewards. Further, workers are as likely to work on this farm, as on any other, because they are satisfied with the working conditions (8%).

Finally, at Mountain View 40% of workers return to work at the farm, 55% in the packinghouse but only 15% in the orchard. Apart from the fact that this farm offers the shortest packinghouse contract at five months and most workers work here due to scarcity of employment (30%), workers return to this farm because they have a good relationship with supervisors and co-workers (22%) and can work in close proximity to their residences (19%). Workers returning to work on this farm are mainly women (84%) returning to work the packinghouse due to the lack of alternative opportunities (29%), positive social ties between staff (19%) and good working conditions (19%). However, this farm is distinct in that a greater percentage of workers return to work here due to the close proximity of the farm to the local residential area, reason for which 24% of women reported returning to this farm. This means that their consideration in partaking in paid work are informed by reproductive security in that by working close to residences they are able to spend less time travelling to work and more time in the household.
The workers on Mountain View are least likely to work because they can find no other employment (36%) (Figure 6.18). However, significantly more workers at this farm work because the farm is close to their home (10%, p < .05). This is because this farm borders the town where the newly built government subsidised housing and an informal housing settlement is located. In this respect the convenience of working close to home is important in the sense that “living nearby I know what time I’ll arrive at work or home in the morning and evening” (Amber, coloured temporary farm working woman, 42 years old) and “I can run home if there’s a problem” (Declan, coloured temporary farm working man, 41 years old). This reflects that workers considerations to work on this farm are informed by greater reproductive security in the sense that they spend less time travelling home and possibly losing working hours due to familial responsibilities. Workers also report working here due to better working conditions (12%) and higher wages (10%). This is because farm management increased minimum wages by R100 a week to compensate for the loss of social wages when relocating workers to live off-farm.

**Figure 6.18:** Reasons for working at Mountain View

Source: Calculated from survey data (N=69).

Few workers reported working on farms due to higher wages even though the basic salary across farms varied greatly (Brown-Forsythe = 49.354, p = .000, $\eta^2 = .564$). The weekly wages as shown in

```
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No other job available</th>
<th>Higher wages</th>
<th>Better work conditions</th>
<th>Close to family</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated from survey data (N=69).
```
a post-hoc test Tamhane $T_2$: Two Orchards $M = R597.87$, $SD = 5.026$; Valley Ridge $M = R612.00$, $SD = 6.156$; Riversend $M = R556.89$, $SD = 5.203$; Mountain View $M = R641.74$, $SD = 5.741$.

According to interviews with farm managers, workers minimum mean weekly wages were R558 at Riversend, R620 at Two Orchards, R620 at Valley Ridge and Mountain View paid R650 per week. This means that Riversend pays the sectoral minimum wage and other farms pay significantly more, with Mountain View paying the highest. With wages not being a significant reason for working on any of the farms, it indicates that wages as income security are less of a consideration than employment security through employment of longer duration.

Finally, workplace also accounts for 23% of the variation in reasons for working, ($\chi^2 = 89.228$, $p = .000$, $\lambda = .225$). This is because 67% the workforce on drying courts consists of senior citizens and scholars who work for economic rewards (100%).

In conclusion, at Valley Ridge significantly more temporary off-farm workers’ considerations to work are informed by the scarcity of employment opportunities. In this respect, their primary concern is to have work (Bourdieu, 2013:170), spurred on by high levels of unemployment (Marx, 1978b:428). Work is thus instrumental for economic rewards (Kaplan & Tausky, 1974), as occurs with workers at Two Orchards and Valley Ridge. However, the latter are older workers who work to provide for their (grand) children. In this respect, apart from decreasing the social wages of workers, flexibilisation of labour means that greater numbers of household members enter productive work and work until a later age to pay for the increased burden in social reproductive costs that have to be funded through wage labour.

### Table 6.13: Reasons for working by individual farms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Farm</th>
<th>Main Reasons for working</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Two Orchards</td>
<td>Financial independence (young men)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valley Ridge</td>
<td>No other work &amp; Provide for children (older coloured women)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountain View</td>
<td>Close to home (coloured packinghouse women)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riversend</td>
<td>Longer contract</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As well as economic rewards, employment security is also a consideration for participating in paid work. It is for this reason that workers report working at Riversend, rather than other farms, because it offers contracts beyond the standard three months with the possibility of becoming permanently employed. Finally, reproductive security through proximity to residences significantly influenced workers considerations by decreasing the time spent away from home or travelling home to conduct unpaid social reproductive work. Mountain View being closest to a large residential area is why workers seek employment there.

In this manner, although sub-proletariats considerations in partaking in paid work are informed by labour market and income insecurity, their considerations in participating in paid work are also informed by other factors. These being, employment security through contracts of longer duration as
well as respectful impersonal workplace communication. Social ties through interpersonal relationships also inform considerations, and recourse to these provides workers with a means to negotiate labour insecurity. Preferences to work in close proximity to residences means that reproductive security also informs considerations, allowing workers to balance reproductive and productive work.

Table 6.14: Reasons temporary off-farm workers return to work at farms by gender & workstation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Workstation</th>
<th>Gender of farm workers</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Packinghouse</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No other job available</td>
<td>33.30%</td>
<td>25.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better work conditions</td>
<td>33.30%</td>
<td>17.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close to home</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship with supervisor/co-workers</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Longer contract</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher wages</td>
<td>33.30%</td>
<td>5.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide for children</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner/Friends work there</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100% (3)</td>
<td>100% (35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orchard</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No other job available</td>
<td>40.90%</td>
<td>80.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better work conditions</td>
<td>22.70%</td>
<td>10.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship with supervisor/co-workers</td>
<td>13.60%</td>
<td>10.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Longer contract</td>
<td>13.60%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher wages</td>
<td>4.50%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial independence</td>
<td>4.50%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100% (22)</td>
<td>100% (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drying Court</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No other job available</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100% (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated from survey data (N=75).

Apart from considerations in participating in work in general, considerations also vary as to whether temporary off-farm workers return to work for the same employer the following peak season. This not only differs according to employer, but also workstation and gender of workers. Although a quarter (26%) of women in packinghouses return to work for an employer due to labour market insecurity, other considerations include working conditions (17%), proximity to residences (14%), interpersonal experiences (14%) and length of contracts (11%). These stand in sharp contrast to women in the orchards who return to work at a previous employer due to lack of employment opportunities (80%). This may reflect the fact that packinghouse staff is mostly coloured women who have job security spurred on by skills reproduction through socialisation. This means that they maintain a niche as packinghouse workers and do not experience as much labour market insecurity.
as black African women in the orchards, reasons for which partaking in paid employment include a wider range of considerations.

In analysing the considerations for which men return to work for the same employer, most (82%) are black African, this means that the analysis cannot account for coloured men’s considerations. With this in mind, 41% of black African men return to work for the same employer due to labour market insecurity, however, working conditions accounts for almost a quarter of considerations (23%) and employment security (13.6%) and interpersonal experiences (13.6%) also inform considerations. Being able to find employment throughout the year and working more frequently than other categories of workers, black African men experience less labour market insecurity, as do coloured women due to job security. This may account for the wider range of considerations in returning to work for the same employer, the following section suggesting a hierarchy of these labour insecurities.

### 6.5.1.4 RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CONSIDERATIONS TO PARTICIPATE IN PAID WORK & EARNINGS

Calculations based on the temporary farm workers’ earnings over twelve months, including months without paid work, revealed that 27% of worker’s reasons for working varied moderately to strongly according to workers’ annual average monthly income categories \( (\chi^2 = 101.534, p = .000; \lambda = .268) \). For example, workers earning an average monthly salary of up to R670 predominantly work because there is no other work available (29%). However, workers earning wages of up to R1,555 per month prefer longer contracts (47%). While there is no relation between reasons for working and income between earnings of R1,556 to R2,220 per month, those earning up to R2,533 on average per month reported preferring better interpersonal workplace relationships (38%). Finally, workers earning more than this prefer employment closer to their residences (42%) (Table 6.15).

#### Table 6.15: Reasons for working according the annual average monthly income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average monthly income categories* (not real wages)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Had no work</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R13-R670</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R671-R1,555</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R1,556-R2,250</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2,251-R2,533</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2,534+</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Longer contract</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close to family/home</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R671-R1,555</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R1,556-R2,250</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2,251-R2,533</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2,534+</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close to family/home</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R13-R670</td>
<td>29.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R671-R1,555</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R1,556-R2,250</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2,251-R2,533</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2,534+</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insecurity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R13-R670</td>
<td>57.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R671-R1,555</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R1,556-R2,250</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2,251-R2,533</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2,534+</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R13-R670</td>
<td>29.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R671-R1,555</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R1,556-R2,250</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2,251-R2,533</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2,534+</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal relationships</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R13-R670</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R671-R1,555</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R1,556-R2,250</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2,251-R2,533</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2,534+</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial independent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R13-R670</td>
<td>57.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R671-R1,555</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R1,556-R2,250</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2,251-R2,533</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2,534+</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each subscript letter denotes a subset of average monthly income categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level.

* Income categorised calculated as the 20th, 40th, 60th, 80th and 100th percentiles

Source: Calculated from survey data (N=133).

Thus reasons for working vary according to income levels in that temporary off-farm workers’ earning up to about R2,250 are primarily concerned with income security, that is the economic rewards of work (Kaplan & Tausky, 1974). However, when income exceeds this, workers seek
respectful communication and meaningful interpersonal relations in the workplace as well as the ability to participate in reproductive work (Table 6.16). This speaks to Bourdieu’s “security plateau” (1979) which is a minimum level of income required to satisfy basic needs. The findings suggest that this security plateau stands at a wage of R2,250 per month, for farm workers this means near full employment throughout the year. Thus, having attained near full employment, considerations around paid work include conditions of employment.

**Table 6.16: Significant relationships between average monthly earnings and reasons for working**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annual average income (not real wages per month)</th>
<th>Reasons for working</th>
<th>Form of security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R13 – R670</td>
<td>Financial independence (young men)/ No other work</td>
<td>Labour market security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R671 – R1,555</td>
<td>Longer contracts</td>
<td>Employment security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2,251 – R2,533</td>
<td>Interpersonal workplace relationships</td>
<td>Social relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2,534+</td>
<td>Proximity to home</td>
<td>Reproductive security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Based on calculations from survey data (N=200).*

The findings thus suggest that there is a hierarchy of labour insecurity. Those who are the most labour market insecure seek any form of work. Once they are employed, they aim to decrease income insecurity by seeking greater employment security through longer contracts. Having gained a “security plateau” (Bourdieu, 1979) of near full employment, temporary farm workers’ considerations are informed by the quality of social relationships through respectful and dignified interpersonal communication and behaviour in the workplace. Finally, when fully employed, according to the minimum wage determinations of farm workers, workers seek reproductive security through employment in close proximity to residences, to spend more time in the household and participate in unpaid social reproductive work in their households. Although the finding is statistically significant with a strong association between variables, there is a complex interplay of considerations depending on individuals and their social, economic and material conditions.
6.6 CONSIDERATIONS NOT TO PARTICIPATE IN PAID WORK

Having analysed workers’ reasons for taking up paid work, this section addresses workers’ reasons for not partaking in paid employment. Analysis of temporary off-farm workers’ employment histories revealed that 68% had experienced periods without paid work during the previous twelve months. The main reasons for these were: scarcity of work (34%), childcare responsibilities (19%), full-time education (17%), to rest (16%) as well as illnesses and cold weather (7%).

Table 6.17: Temporary farm workers without paid work by season, race & gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race and gender of farm workers</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without paid work</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb-March</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured men (34)</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black African men (52)</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With paid work</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured women (75)</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black African women (39)</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With paid work</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb-March</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured men (34)</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black African men (52)</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With paid work</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun-Aug</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured women (75)</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black African women (39)</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated from survey data (N=200). Peak season calculated based on February to March 2014, as compared to low season from June to August 2014.

However, since periods without paid work varies in accordance with peak and low seasons in the deciduous fruit sector, as well as the gender and race of workers (Table 6.17), seasons are analysed separately.

Although a third of workers did not partake in paid employment during the course of year due to the scarcity of work (34%), two thirds reported various other reasons for doing so (Figure 6.19). These reasons vary according to season.

Figure 6.19: Temporary off-farm workers’ reasons for not partaking in paid employment in the peak and low season of 2014

Source: Calculated from survey data (N=105). Peak season calculated based on February to March 2014, as compared to low season from June to August 2014.

Discounting labour market insecurity (Figure 6.19), during peak season, workers - coloured packinghouse women (86%) - report attending to care responsibilities (33%), while young men, under the age of 22 (93%), are in full-time education (33%). In the low season, reasons for not partaking in paid employment from coloured packinghouse women (83%) are that it is a time of rest (34%) and...
to conduct care responsibilities (26%), while young men (93%) engage in full-time education (20%). Other reasons for not working included illnesses and cold weather conditions in winter.

**Table 6.18: Reasons temporary farm workers do not work in the low season by race & gender**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Coloured men</th>
<th>Black African men</th>
<th>Coloured women</th>
<th>Black African women</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No work available</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
<td>25.5%</td>
<td>61.9%</td>
<td>33% (33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To rest</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>32.7%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>22% (23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care responsibilities</td>
<td>42.9%</td>
<td>70.0%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>14% (14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5% (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4% (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illness</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5% (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100% (14)</td>
<td>100% (10)</td>
<td>100% (55)</td>
<td>100% (21)</td>
<td>100.0% (100)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Calculated from survey data (N=100). Data pertain to months of June to August 2014.

A smaller percentage of men are without paid work during the year and those that are, are mostly young men under the age of 22 in full-time education (Table 6.18). A larger percentage of women, on the other hand, experience periods without paid work, mostly not working due to the division of labour in the household whereby they are responsible for unpaid social reproductive work such as care responsibilities in the household, as per Standing (2011), as well as illnesses and cold weather conditions (Figure 6.19).

**Figure 6.20: Reasons for not partaking in paid employment by gender and season**

![Figure 6.20: Reasons for not partaking in paid employment by gender and season](https://scholar.sun.ac.za)

*Source:* Calculated from survey data (N=105).

Although the numbers of unemployed men were too low to further explore reasons for not working, women do differ by race in the peak season ($\chi^2 = 13.545, p = .019; \tau = .111$) and low season ($\chi^2 = 18.726, p = .002; \tau = .071$) although the relationship is weak.
Figure 6.21: Reasons why women do not partake in paid work by race and season

![Graph showing reasons for not partaking in paid work by race and season]

* Significantly different from each other at the .05 level.

Source: Calculated from survey data (N=111).

During the peak season, 36% of coloured women do not take up paid work, mainly due to care responsibilities (42%). This is because most live at their site of reproduction and conduct unpaid reproductive work. However, in the low season, 73% of coloured women do not participate in paid work (Table 6.17). Reasons include a preference to rest (33%), care responsibilities (27%), no available work (26%), illnesses (7%) and other reasons (7%). In contrast, 33% of black African women are unemployed in peak season, compared to 54% in low season. Their reasons for not partaking in paid work are predominantly due to a lack of available work (62%), cold weather (19%), care responsibilities (9%), a preference to rest (5%) and full-time education (5%). This means that compared to black African women, not partaking in paid work in low season for coloured women is not only informed by labour market insecurity but reproductive insecurity and task orientated historical employment practices.

Their preference to rest in the low season speaks to the reproduction of the traditional distribution of farm work, that is to say a reproduction of social practices amongst coloured farm workers. What is evident here are "differing notations of time provided by different work-situations and their relation to "natural rhythms" (Thompson, 1967:37). Further, the role of working in a packinghouse is "identified with social function" of coloured women and thereby they are entitled to feel and say [they are resting], provided they fulfil the role appropriate to [their] age and status" (Bourdieu, 1979:42). This speaks to reasons for which coloured women do not participate in other work, as Kyle explains, "[my wife] works on a farm seasonally. She finished last week and she is at home for a time waiting for the packinghouse to open" (Coloured temporary farm working man, 34 years old). Runelle elaborates saying, "I stay at home because I want to rest, it’s hard work. Sometimes of the year, I can get other work if I want, but my husband gives me money and I buy things every Friday. It is your choice to look for other work until they call you in to work again for the [packing] season" (Coloured...
temporary farm working woman, 31 years old). In this manner, coloured women reproduce the traditional distribution of farm work that includes periods of rest as packinghouse women, in contrast to unemployment. This bestows them with status and prestige (Kaplan & Tausky, 1974) as packinghouse workers and they define themselves as such.

Coloured women stand in contrast to unemployed African women who, irrespective of the season, did not work mainly due the scarcity of employment. This stems from the fact that many black African women migrate from areas of high unemployment to the region for work while leaving their dependents in the care of family in sending communities. This may allude to the fact that negotiating labour market insecurity overrides considerations around respectful and meaningful social relationships in the workplace and reproductive security.

**Figure 6.22: Coloured temporary off-farm women’s reasons for preferring temporary work**

The reproduction of traditional social practices amongst coloured women is reflected in the preference of a large proportion for temporary work (39%), in contrast to other categories of workers who prefer permanent work (92%) for income stability (94%). As shown in figure 6.22 above, coloured women preferring temporary work are mostly aged 45 and above (57%), while a third are between the ages of 28 to 34. The oldest category of workers prefer temporary work due to illnesses (although they do not receive disability grants), injuries, old age, and lack of permanent housing. Preference for temporary work stems from coloured women’s job security as packinghouse staff, where they have developed a niche, and from their access to a wider range of income sources. In this respect, working in a packinghouse is an activity bestowing status (Kaplan & Tausky, 1974), and amongst coloured women, there is a disdain for working in orchards.

In the peak harvesting season, women without paid employment mostly do not have partners (68%) and report not working because of ‘involuntary’ reasons (81%) - such as illnesses, childcare and scarcity of work ($\chi^2 = 8.956, p = .005; \tau = .218$). On the other hand, women who voluntarily – due to
a preference to rest or not wanting to work outside - do not partake in paid work predominantly have partners (70%) and are coloured women.

**Table 6.19:** Reasons for which women do not work in peak season

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason unemployed in peak season</th>
<th>Voluntary</th>
<th>Involuntary</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>70.0% a</td>
<td>19.4% a</td>
<td>31.7% (13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>30.0% b</td>
<td>80.6% b</td>
<td>68.3% (28)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each subscript letter denotes a subset of Partner/Spouse categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level.

*Source:* Calculated from survey data (N=41).

In the low season, while a third of women report not partaking in paid employment due to cold weather conditions and wanting to rest, two thirds are not able to find employment and are responsible for care responsibilities. Overall, those who report not partaking in paid employment voluntary have employed household members (74%) ($\chi^2 = 4.868$, $p = .023$, $\tau = .055$) and are coloured women.

**Table 6.20:** Reasons for which women do not work in low season

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason unemployed in low season</th>
<th>Employed household member</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary</td>
<td>25.8% a</td>
<td>50.0% a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involuntary</td>
<td>74.2% b</td>
<td>50.0% b</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each subscript letter denotes a subset of Unemployed household member categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level.

*Source:* Calculated from survey data (N=89).

In conclusion, temporary off-farm workers who experience periods without paid work are mainly women, although there are a small percentage of men who are mainly under the age of 22 and in full-time education. Amongst women, reasons for not working vary by race because black African women leave their children in sending communities to migrate to regions of employment. They mostly report not working due to a scarcity of employment although some do not work due to unpaid reproductive work especially when without a partner as income security. In contrast, coloured women, living at their site of reproduction, tend not to work due to unpaid reproductive work in the home. Traditional task orientated work - thinning trees and packing fruit - includes periods of rest in the winter and today they mainly (75%) work in packinghouses. Work in packinghouses reflects a form of social prestige spurred on by the fact that they are able to access greater income security through partners and other employed household members, as opposed to black African women.
6.6.1 INCOME SOURCED DURING PERIODS WITHOUT PAID WORK

Income insecurity is negotiated through recourse to a number of means of support during periods without paid work. The means, however, vary by gender ($\chi^2 = 23.532, p = .001; \tau = .208$). Men (mostly coloured) are mainly supported by their parents (60%), being mostly young and in full-time education.

Women, however, who are without paid work across all age categories, use multiple forms of support, from partners, parents, other family members and or social assistance grants (Table 6.21 below).

**Table 6.21: Assistance received by workers during unemployment by gender and race**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race and gender of farm workers</th>
<th>Race and gender of farm workers</th>
<th>Race and gender of farm workers</th>
<th>Race and gender of farm workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coloured men</td>
<td>Black African men</td>
<td>Coloured women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boy/Girlfriend/Husband/Wife</td>
<td>15.8% $a, b$</td>
<td>6.3% $a$</td>
<td>38.5% $a$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents</td>
<td>57.9% $a$</td>
<td>62.5% $a$</td>
<td>30.8% $b$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other family</td>
<td>15.8% $a$</td>
<td>12.5% $a$</td>
<td>20.0% $a$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SASA grant</td>
<td>4.6% $a$</td>
<td>22.9% $b$</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UIF</td>
<td>3.1% $a$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5.3% $a$</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.9% $a$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holiday and bonus pay</td>
<td>5.3% $a, b$</td>
<td>12.5% $b$</td>
<td>2.9% $a, b$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal savings</td>
<td>6.3% $a$</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.1% $a$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100% (19)</td>
<td>100% (16)</td>
<td>100% (65)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each subscript letter denotes a subset of Unemployed household member categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level.

*Source:* Calculated from survey data (N=135).

Having said this, women’s additional sources of income vary by race; in that coloured women have employed partners (39%), rely on parents (31%) and family (20%). In contrast, black African women mostly do not have partners (58%) and thus rely less on partners (29%) and more on social assistance grants, 23% in contrast to 5% of coloured women ($p < .05$).
6.6.1.1 NON-FARM WORK

Another income stream during periods of unemployment is non-farm work. However, only a small proportion (19%) of temporary farm workers took up non-farm work during the previous 12 months.

**Table 6.22: Non-farm work of temporary off-farm workers by gender**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>House/kitchen work</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>46.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hairdressing</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shop work</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selling goods</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood factory</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Builder</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanic</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taylor/Seamstress</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicken Farm</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Work Programme</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gardening</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collect money for taxis</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woodcutter</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catering</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated from survey data (N=33).

Non-farm work bridges periods between farm employment (Figure 5.7 and Figure 5.8) because it is conducted when workers have no other sources of income (82%). This work is mostly precarious and informal, although some men had been formally employed in other sectors. Temporary farm workers reported mostly working in shops (26%) or conducting domestic work (13%) for a full working day (76%) spanning either five (24%), two (26%) or three (13%) days per week. Non-farm work was done for an average of five months, ($M = 5.76$) with considerable variation ($SD = 4.02$), for which 76% earned less than R2,249 per month on average.

Having said this, it is mostly coloured temporary off-farm workers (78.9%) ($\chi^2 = 14.150, p = .000$) who conduct non-farm work, probably a reflection of the fact that half of black African workers have come to the region recently (Figure 6.24), which may mean that they not have built up social networks through which to access such work. Further, non-farm work is gendered ($\chi^2 = 25.147, p = .048, \tau = .086$), in that domestic work, tailoring and catering are done by women, while men do hairdressing, sell goods, are builders, do car repairs and gardening, although men and women equally work in shops in the area.

Thus, some (coloured) temporary farm workers are able accrue income through non-farm work during periods without farm work. Even though such work is scarce, it remains gendered (Wiltshire, forthcoming). Non-farm work is also racial in the region, probably because some black African workers do not remain in the region for extended periods, maintaining strong ties and returning to their sending communities.
6.6.1.2 UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE

Another source of income during periods of unemployment is accrued through the Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF), with 15% of temporary off-farm workers having applied during the previous year. This was mostly collected for one (38%) to four months whilst unemployed (83%). However, 17% chose to “work [for cash] while I got my blue card [UIF] and when it was finished I looked for another job” (Brent, coloured temporary farm working man, 40 years old). This means that workers claimed unemployment insurance whilst employed informally.

Temporary farm workers who claim UIF were mostly women (72%) ($p < .05$) and between the ages of 21 and 40 (86%), predominantly women in packinghouses (76%) aged between 21 and 30 (38%). This is because they claim “UIF until [they] start work again in” packinghouses the following season (Lara, coloured temporary farm working woman, 23 years old). However, workers report that it cannot be claimed annually otherwise “it would be too little” (Claudia, coloured temporary farm working woman, 29 years old), which is why some alternate between claiming UIF and informal work or cash wage jobs on farms. A packinghouse woman explains, “I applied for UIF in 2012 but not last year. Last year, I worked in a shop over the weekends” (Runelle, coloured temporary farm working woman, 31 years old).

This corresponds with farm managements’ reports that UIF affects recruitment on farms because temporary farm workers “don’t want to work outside [in the low season] because they get UIF” (Barnard, Riversend owner) or only choose to commence work in packinghouses once they have claimed the full amount of UIF they are entitled to (Martin, Mountain View owner). Farms suggest that it is because “they have the perception that they are going to lose it” (Barnard, Riversend Owner), as Tasneem explains, “I want all my money and I don’t want to pay that little money for UIF and tax” (Tasneem, coloured temporary farm working woman, 30 years old).

6.6.1.3 CONCLUSION

In conclusion, income insecurity is negotiated through recourse to household income and familial networks as well as UIF, social assistance grants and informal work. Although the survey did not elicit the value of income accrued through social networks, table 6.23 below depicts the mean incomes accrued by temporary off-farm workers through farm work, non-farm work, social insurance and assistance.
Table 6.23: Percentage mean annual income accrued by temporary off-farm workers through employment, UIF and social assistance grants by race and gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Farm work</th>
<th>Non-farm work</th>
<th>Employment insurance</th>
<th>Social Grants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coloured men</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black African men</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured women</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black African women</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated from survey data (N=200).

Wages, bonus and holiday pay make up the largest proportion of black African worker’s mean annual wages, 83% for women and 93% for men. Coloured men accrued the highest percentage of mean annual wages through non-farm work (18%), compared to coloured women (9%), black African men (5%), with no black African women doing non-farm work in the previous year. Although all workers draw on UIF, this contributes 5% to coloured women’s mean annual wages and less for other categories. Finally, while some (3%) coloured men accrue child support grants, it goes mainly to women and contributes to 16% of women’s mean annual wages.

In this respect, income received from employment on farms is the largest contributor to the mean annual income of temporary off-farm workers (82%). However, this contributes least to coloured women’s income (70%) as they also source 9% of income from non-farm work, 5% from UIF and 16% from social assistance grants. This means that they negotiate income security through recourse to: formal and informal employment, formal social assistance through grants and unemployment insurance as well as informal social networks through employed household members, partners and co-workers.

These options inform their considerations around participating in productive and reproductive work, their economic attitudes, which are distinct from other categories of workers. This demonstrates that the development of the capitalist economy does not entail the development of homogenous economic attitudes. While coloured women are able to draw on a number of income streams, which allow them to alternate between periods productive and reproductive work, other categories of workers are fully incorporated into waged labour. For men, this stems from the gendered division of labour and “that their dignity is linked with success at work” (Williams, 2001:1445). Black African women, however, are constrained by labour insecurity, not only experiencing labour insecurity without the support of employed partners, but income insecurity in sending communities. This means that differing considerations in participating in paid work “are primarily the reflection of economic and social inequalities” (Bourdieu, 1979:2).
6.7 CONSIDERATIONS IN NOT COMPLETING FIXED-TERM CONTRACTS

Having assessed temporary off-farm workers’ considerations regarding paid work, this section addresses the reasons why workers do not complete the length of their employment contracts. This section illustrates two forms of labour turnover. Having addressed the percentage of workers who return to the same employer the following peak season, in section 6.5.1.3 above, this section first analyses the total labour turnover, or ‘crude waste rate’, which includes resignations and terminations, and secondly analyses labour turnover as the ‘resignation rate’ (Hamermesh, Hassink & van Ours, 1996). Since most farm workers do not formally resign from employment and leave without notice, the term resignation rate encompasses both forms of leaving employment.

6.7.1 RATE OF NON-COMPLETION OF FIXED-TERM CONTRACTS

Analysing the employment records of participating farms as secondary data, labour turnover as pertains to permanent and temporary employees was calculated for each farm. The term labour turnover itself is a general concept, referring to the outflow of workers from an organisation, usually expressed as the percentage of employees leaving an organisation during a specific period. In human resource literature, this is called the ‘crude wastage index’, or the standard measure.

Considering that there are a number of reasons why employees leave organisations, turnover has been divided into the dichotomous categories of voluntary and involuntary turnover. Most research has focused on voluntary turnover, which refers to an employee’s decision to leave, measured by the number of resignations. On the other hand, involuntary turnover is usually due to a decision made by the employer and referred to as job turnover – the total number of retrenchments and terminations of contracts – as well as dismissals. In this manner, the crude wastage index measures the total voluntary and involuntary turnover, whereas job turnover and resignation rate measure specific forms of turnover (Hamermesh, Hassink & van Ours, 1996). Further, not all workers formally resign from employment, some leave without prior notice. In this respect, the resignation rate refers to both categories of workers. What is more, the dichotomous definition is a simplification of the complexity of reasons for turnover. For instance, although an employee is deemed to leave an organisation voluntarily, resignations due to familial relocations, illness or in anticipation of termination of contracts are not entirely voluntary, but exist on a continuum between voluntary and involuntary turnover (Maertz & Campion, 1998:50).

Apart from measuring the number of employees leaving an organisation, labour turnover can also refer to those remaining. Retention can be measured in two manners, the stability and survival rate. Firstly, an organisation can measure the effectiveness with which it retains recruits. This is done by calculating the percentage of employees that remain in the organisation, or department, after a certain
length of time, the stability rate. Alternatively, it is possible to measure how long employees stay within a company. To do so the percentage of employees recruited at a specific point in time that remain in the company for a specified number of years is calculated, this is the survival rate. Of course, farms are also interested in the retention of temporary workers. This would need to be calculated as the number of employees returning to work for the same farm for a successive season(s).

To measure the survival rate of temporary off-farm workers, for example, this study compared temporary farm workers’ employer in February 2014 with January 2015.

What is more, there are “literally thousands of studies including voluntary turnover” (Maertz & Campion, 1998:49), mainly from management studies. These have shown that many variables relate to labour turnover, however most of these have very weak associations in that they usually do not individually account for more than 21% of variance (Mobley, Griffeth, Hand & Meglino, 1979:511). The strongest predictors of labour turnover remain the intention to stay in an organisation, accounting for 19% of variation \( r = .44 \) (Porter, Crampon & Smith, 1976), and the intention to leave which accounts for 24% of variation \( r = .49 \) (Mobley, Horner & Hollingsworth, 1978).

The crude wastage rate of permanent and temporary farm workers was calculated from the 2014 employment equity data and compared to the resignation rate of temporary off-farm workers, as calculated from the survey data. Figure 6.23 depicts the crude wastage index of permanent on and off-farm workers, temporary on and off-farm workers as well as temporary off-farm workers’ resignations. Since the resignation rate was calculated from survey respondents’ reports of not completing the full length of their fixed-term contracts, it is most likely that workers under-reported their resignation rates. Further, due to the variance in labour turnover across the four farms and the small percentage of workers reporting not completing the full length of their fixed-term contracts, it is not appropriate to report the average rate of turnover across farms.

**Figure 6.23:** Labour turnover of farm workers on each farm over 12 months

* Crude wastage rate – calculated from employment equity data of participating farms for 2014 (N=2,712).
** Respondents’ reporting not completing the full term of fixed-term contracts - Calculated from survey data (N=200).
Figure 6.23 clearly shows that the crude wastage rate of permanent and temporary workers differ substantially per farm. This is because the labour turnover of temporary workers includes terminations of contracts after peak season. The crude wastage rate for permanent workers that at Riversend and Two Orchards is about 30% as compared to 8% and 4% on Valley Ridge and Mountain View respectively. The resignation rate of temporary off-farm workers also vary across farms from 4% to 30% and it is almost the same as the crude wastage rate of permanent farm workers, except for Two Orchards. The latter is because Two Orchards lost a number of supervisors during 2014 and since some workers viewed the supervisor as their employer, teams of permanent workers left with their supervisors, increasing the crude wastage rate at this farm (Lisa, Two Orchards manager).

Having said this, the fact that on three farms the crude wastage rate of permanent workers and the resignation rate of temporary off-farm workers are similar may mean that labour turnover does not differ by the type of employment contract and that further research on labour turnover should include permanent workers on farms.

From the survey data, the percentage of temporary off-farm workers who reported not completing their contracts produced an estimated resignation rate of 13% (N=25). As shown in table 6.24 below, most (40%) of the temporary off-farm workers reported not completing the length of their contracts in the previous year on farms in the area not included in the survey, whilst 32% resigned from Riversend, 16% from Two Orchards, 8% from Valley Ridge and 4% from Mountain View.

Table 6.24: Frequency of temporary off-farm workers not completing fixed-term contracts by contracting employer at the time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contracting Employer</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other farms in the region</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riversend</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two Orchards</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valley Ridge</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountain View</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>25</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated from survey data (N=200).

Even though the percentage of workers reportedly not completing the length of their contracts are too small for detailed analysis, five temporary off-farm workers (19%) resigned from permanent jobs, two leaving permanent positions at Two Orchards and another two at Riversend. The reason for leaving permanent posts, were that two decided to take leave for the December festive season, one caused a tractor accident and two left due to bad working conditions. These were all men who all found temporary employment positions the following month. This means that workers not only leave temporary employment positions, but also permanent, secure, work on farms.

Whether workers found alternative employment is moderately related to reasons for leaving ($\chi^2 = 4.573, p = .032; \tau = .183$). For example, 73% of workers who resigned due to ‘voluntary’ reasons – work insecurity (to create a leave period for themselves), reproductive insecurity (to return home for
the festive season, to work closer to home), disrespectful interpersonal workplace experiences, and increased employment security - found alternative employment the following month, whereas 70% who resigned due to ‘involuntary’ reasons – illnesses, maternity leave, care responsibilities and shortage of housing - became unemployed (Table 6.25 below).

**Table 6.25:** Temporary off-farm workers’ reasons for resignation and employment status the following month

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason for resignation</th>
<th>Start new job following month</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary</td>
<td>73.3%</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involuntary</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
<td>70.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0% (15)</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0% (10)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Calculated from survey data (N=25).*

The majority (60%) of temporary off-farm workers found alternative employment the following month and over half (56%) resigned due to voluntary reasons. In other words, those who chose not to complete the length of their contracts were more likely to find alternative employment, or left having found alternative work, to increase labour security, than workers resigning due to circumstances beyond their control.

Workers experiencing residential insecurity or care responsibilities are more likely to experience periods without paid work when leaving employment. In this respect, poor material conditions and the lack of social support increase the likelihood of workers experiencing periods without paid work. However, far more leave employment due to work security (leave), disrespectful interpersonal workplace communication, employment insecurity (low wages) and reproductive security (return home for the festive season, to work closer to home) and these tend to find alternative employment, whether before or after leaving existing employment. This then means that theorists suggesting that a worker who has “a job is concerned above all not to lose it” (Bourdieu, 2013:170) especially when there is high unemployment (Marx, 1978b:428) because the increasing precarisation of work increases workers’ dependence on paid work (Marais, 2011:184), only represents a minority of workers. Local resignations seem to contradict literature emphasising the involuntary casualisation of workers and its detrimental impact on workers, especially in countries that provide no or limited social protection (Razavi, 2012) and in economies with limited opportunities for standard employment (Heymann, 2006). Far more workers leave employment and are able to find alternative work in the area than those who remain unemployed. This means that labour turnover is partly due to temporary off-farm worker’s negotiating not only labour insecurity, work and employment insecurity, but also reproductive insecurity and positive interpersonal workplace relationships.
6.7.2 REASONS FOR NON-COMPLETION OF FIXED-TERM CONTRACTS

In the following section, I elaborate on the reasons why temporary off-farm workers left employment. These are due to reproductive insecurity (36%), interpersonal relationships in the workplace (20%) residential insecurity (16%), employment insecurity (12%), and work insecurity (8%) (Table 6.26).

Table 6.26: Reasons for which temporary off-farm workers resigned

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reproductive insecurity</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>36.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal relationships</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential Insecurity</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment insecurity</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work insecurity</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>25</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Calculated from survey data (N=25)*.

Further statistical analyses included bivariate correlations and cross-tabulations between labour turnover and other variables. However, due to the small number of resignations, although there were some significant relationships between some of the variables, their effect sizes were either small or not significant for which none were significant predictors of labour turnover.

6.7.2.1 REPRODUCTIVE INSECURITY

Temporary farm workers not working the full length of their contracts due to reproductive insecurity included women with household and care responsibilities, coloured men and women wanting to work in closer proximity to home to partake in care responsibilities and black African men who returned to sending communities.

Although there are formal childcare facilities in the area, the local public school and crèche are oversubscribed. For instance, the primary school has about 50 children per class (Lisa, schoolteacher at local public primary school), coupled with a school dropout rate of 38% (Witzenberg Municipality, 2015:54), and many children do not complete secondary school. Temporary off-farm workers also struggle to pay for school expenses. For instance, Calvin left temporary farm work to become a petrol attendant because this offered increased labour security including employment benefits such as being able to earn an income on rainy days and a pension allowance. However, his sister who still works on farms is unable to “pay the school fees of R290 per month due to her financial situation, and I help her with the books and clothes as well” (Calvin, coloured ex-temporary farm working man, 28 years old). Further, pre-primary childcare is also fee based, as Mihlali explains: “I have to pay the crèche for my child of R170 but other months it’s R340 because I missed a month to buy food and clothes for him” (Xhosa temporary farm working man, 28 years old). Thus, the lack of sufficient and affordable childcare facilities means that some women have to leave employment due to reproductive insecurity to care for their dependents.
Having said this, alternative pre-primary childcare is sometimes provided by family members, friends and designated unemployed people living in residential communities. However, grandmothers endure most of the responsibility of childcare, as one explained:

“we look after the children but we are tired with the noise of the kids. I don’t want to do it anymore because I forget things, I forget about the children and they run around in the streets” (Nadine, retired coloured temporary farm working woman, 68 years old).

Using informal childcare has shown to increase accidents and emergencies experienced by children, while parents work, as well as the likelihood of children developing behavioural or academic difficulties, in comparison to children in formal childcare facilities (Heymann, 2006:43). Due to inadequate or insufficient childcare services, some children are left unattended. This also came forth in the exploratory observations and in-depth interviews in that many children of school-going age were not at school during the day. This included children of illegal foreign nationals, as they do not have the necessary documentation to enrol their children.

In this situation, not only do coloured women fail to complete the length of their contracts due to unpaid social reproductive work, but the lack public investment in formal facilities providing reliable and affordable childcare also increases reproductive insecurity. This reflects the “prioritization of social grants over the direct care services” wherefore “care for the needy remains predominantly a private household concern” (Fakier, 2014:137). This leads to the economic marginalisation of carers and “consigns the children of poor families to childcare of questionable quality” (Williams, 2001:1446), or as Fakier argues, “suboptimal care for the poor by the poor” (2014). Although findings from the NAWS of 1990 showed that the primary reasons for farm workers leaving employment in the USA was reproductive insecurity (Mines, Gabbard & Boccalandro, 1991:88), this study has shown that reproductive insecurity stems from the lack of social services so that some women leave employment without completing the full length of their fixed-term contracts.

Further, the peak season in the deciduous fruit sector coincides with the December festive season and, rather than taking leave during the low season, some workers prefer not to work over this period. This is because workers reported being able to find work in the nearby citrus sector during the winter months, which meant that they could work throughout the year and sacrifice their income over the December festive season to return to their sending regions. In this way farms “lose many over Christmas and New Year when we are at our busiest” (Barnard, Riversend owner). These are predominantly black African workers. This category of workers constitutes 46% of the temporary off-farm workforce, half of whom have lived in the region for four years or less (Figure 6.4).
Workers sacrificing their income over December are mostly migrant workers with strong ties to their sending communities who maintain social practices of taking leave from work over the December festive season. These rural linkages afford access to lowered costs of living through “its (relatively) non-commodified land, housing, water and even fuel resources” (Neves & Toit, 2013:102). They also provide reproductive security in times of illness and unemployment whilst serving as sites of reproduction to which children are sent to be raised by extended family. For instance, Nobuntu is caring for her sister’s child who is working in Cape Town while she herself is sick “but after December he [the child] will go back home to the Eastern Cape” (Xhosa temporary farm working woman, 35 years old). Further, the death of Desmond’s wife means “there isn’t anyone to look after the child so I look after him myself and in December my aunt is going to look after him in the land [former Transkei/Ciskei]” (Xhosa temporary farm working man, 32 years old). Rural-urban linkages thus increase reproductive security for migrant workers.

Social reproduction not only refers to the regeneration and maintenance of people, but “includes the construction of individual and collective identities and the maintenance across generations of cultures” (Cameron, 2006:45). For migrant workers, the December festive season is also a time when social rituals, such as weddings and rites of passage to adulthood, are performed. It is the time of year when students, urban relatives and “the most economically important group” of migrant workers return to sending communities (Ngwane, 2003:690). That is when “I take my money home” (Likhaya, Xhosa temporary farm working man, 56 years old) and “fix my mother’s house” (Bonani, Xhosa temporary farm working man, 26 years old). Thus, in returning to sending communities migrant workers maintain and forge mutual social relations and patronage (Neves & Toit, 2013:104) in accordance with the natural rhythms of not only work (Thompson, 1967:37), but also social practices. There is, thus, a disjuncture between the peak season in agriculture geared toward the task of
harvesting and the December festive season when social relations are maintained and forged in sites of reproduction.

After the festive season workers return to the region for work. For example, three permanent workers who returned to Mountain View, from which they had ‘absconded’, were accepted back into employment upon their return in January 2015, albeit with written warnings. In contrast, Riversend terminates employment contracts because “ten out of ten times that place gets filled in a week, so you get a bit of a dip in people where the teams dip to eight or ten, but we are very strict that those guys mustn’t come back because next year he’s going to do the same” (Barnard, Riversend owner). The difference lies in the fact that Riversend offers “permanent work, all year work and holidays in June/July” and in so doing expects mutual ‘loyalty’ from their workers in return, which Riversend suggests “is paying back now and the culture is changing” (Barnard, Riversend owner). Further, in offering the possibility of permanent employment in close proximity to a large residential area of temporary farm workers, employment on this farm is in high demand.

These migrant workers leave employment without completing the full-term of their contracts, as per the findings of (Smit, Johnston & Morse, 1985:166), however the findings suggest that this is in order to maintain social linkages with their sites of reproduction and negotiate reproductive insecurity.

6.7.2.2 RESIDENTIAL INSECURITY

All categories of temporary off-farm workers reported unfinished employment contracts due to housing problems (16%). Although data on housing structures was not collected during the survey due to time constraints, the qualitative interviews and participant observations revealed that coloured temporary off-farm workers were equally likely to stay in formal (brick) government housing as informal (corrugated iron or wooden) housing, but black African workers were more likely to stay in informal housing.

As mentioned in section 6.2 above, farm work was traditionally the domain of coloured workers with some black African migrant men housed in hostels on farms in the area. With market deregulation and regulation of labour relations, firms implemented lean production strategies to reduce costs and increase efficiency and competitiveness. One of the manners in which this was achieved was to increase employment of off-farm temporary workers at the expense of on-farm labour (Kritzinger, Barrientos & Rossouw, 2004:18). This coinciding with the “abolishing of influx controls [which] saw large population shifts to urban areas of people seeking better opportunities. This, compounded by the fact that the apartheid regime had not built new housing stock since 1976, saw a burgeoning of informal settlements as in any rapidly urbanizing city” (Mashatile, 2003, cited in Knight, 2004)
There has thus been a sharp increase in informal housing in the region of Ceres. Coloured workers are more likely to come to the area from the Northern Cape and North West provinces in South Africa, whilst black African workers migrate from the Eastern Cape; they all do so in search of work and amenities. They either rent informal structures, a room in formal housing or stay with family members, as Claudia explains:

“We stayed on the other side there in shacks. Before the shacks, we stayed on a farm in Interdoring in the Karoo. My father’s health got worse and he came here to be closer to the hospitals when he retired and we followed him to be close to him. We moved over [from the shacks] when we got the plot, its mum’s plot, it’s very big because they are going to build a house here one day, a housing project that the government funds. If I don’t get a plot then I’ll stay with my mum” (Coloured temporary farm working woman, 29 years old).

Claudia lives with her extended family together on one plot where they have built four separate informal structures to accommodate the family: the grandmother; the first daughter, her husband and three children; the second daughter, her husband and two children; and the fourth structure is rented for an extra income.

**Picture 6.4: Informal housing in the local town**

In the local town alone, 3,368 residents are on the waiting list for government housing, a total of 8,916 in the municipality. It will take the municipality “more than 10 years to address” (Witzenberg Municipality, 2015:107) the backlog, notwithstanding the growth in demand, as in 2007 there were 1,594 residents on the waiting list in the local town where this research was conducted (Witzenberg Municipality, 2009:13). Since December 2014, those residents who are next on the waiting list to receive government housing have been allocated plots. These were bordered by fences and each plot has an outside toilet with a tap and basin.
The shortage of housing in the area means that people are forced to live together because the younger generation cannot find or afford independent housing. To rent a bedroom or an informal (corrugated iron) house costs “R580 a month” in the area (Mihlali, Xhosa temporary farm working man, 28 years old). Even when workers receive public housing for ‘free’ they are bound to pay “the house tax and water of R687 a month and then there’s electricity” (Caitlin, temporary farm working woman, 45 years old).

Further, in the case of the death of a breadwinner in the household, some workers are also recalled to family homes to support siblings, like Brent who had

“a job at the municipality. I did the sewage there. It was permanent job and I had worked there for five years. Then my father died and they said I had to go back home because there was no income as my mother was also dead. I had to leave my job and move back to help my sisters” (Brent, coloured temporary farm working man, 40 years old).

Households are structured around income earners, but, as Mosoetsa (2011) has shown, this does not mean that they distribute their resources evenly. The shortage of housing coupled with decreasing social wages increases the strain on household resources and thereby the stability provided by households becomes increasingly fragile (Mosoetsa, 2005:28). To negotiate residential insecurity, some workers move between households leaving positions of employment.

Finally, the cramped living conditions and low quality housing impacts the health of workers, in that approximately 50% of residents in the area suffer from tuberculosis (TB) (Simone, senior nurse at local primary healthcare clinic). Many off-farm workers cannot afford decent housing or housing materials and live in informal structures. Although there are exceptions such as those who were able to source free wood when working at the wood mill, the majority of residences are constructed of corrugated metal sheeting and cardboard. Inside these, there is no flooring and water runs through the residences on rainy days (Picture 6.5). These cold and wet living conditions lower workers’ immunity against infections making them more susceptible to TB (Simone, senior nurse at local primary healthcare clinic). Workers could also become contaminated by others in the workplace.

*Picture 6.5: Informal housing in the local town*

*Source: Photo taken in local informal settlement, 25 August 2014, permission granted by Bontle (Xhosa temporary farm working woman, 31 years old).*
Residential insecurity and illnesses stemming from living conditions, that is to say the material conditions of workers, increases reproductive insecurity and means that some workers are unable to complete the length of their fixed term contracts.

6.7.2.3 INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS

Workers also reported resigning due to interpersonal relationships arising from undignified and disrespectful communication and behaviour in the workplace. This was due to “farmers talk[ing] badly” to them and “the foreman [who does not] speak well with me, he swore” (Brent, coloured temporary farm working man, 40 years old). However, workers equally cited leaving due to co-workers who “swear, smoke dagga, stay out of work, get drunk [and] … they fight in the location [township] and bring it to work” (Desmond, coloured temporary farm working man, 28 years old).

Alcohol and drug consumption is related to labour turnover on farms, as Sandle explains:

“the problem is the people drink at work and then get a warning and complain about the work and the farmer gives them three warnings before they get chased away. If one potato is rotten then it rots the others, so take him out and that’s what the farmers does because it makes the workers weak. They drink and smuggle on the farm and are chased away, but they don’t tell [the researcher] that, they must tell the truth. I’m not for the worker or the farmer, I just say it must be fair” (Sandla, Xhosa farm working man, recruiter, 42 years old).

This also suggests that some workers may have underreported not completing the full length of their fixed term contracts and the reasons for leaving. High rates of alcohol abuse in the area (Marais, et al., 2011:9) reduces productivity because, according to focus groups, the numbers of workers absent on Mondays ranges from two out of twelve to five out of twenty in every work team. To illustrate this, payroll data from Riversend for the week of the survey indicated that 68% of permanent workers and 56% of temporary off-farm workers worked the required five days for a full week (Figure 6.25).

Figure 6.25: Distribution of farm workers by days worked per week at Riversend

The high rate of absenteeism is probably confounded by farms with labour turnover; but these absences are distinct although they correlate with a time sequence in which “lateness tends to precede...
absence, and absence predicts turnover” (Harrison, Newman & Roth, 2006:318). The high rate of absenteeism at Riversend does certainly speak to the high rate of turnover of permanent (29%) and temporary off-farm workers (31%) on this farm (Figure 6.23 above). However, although I was able to research labour turnover, I could not do so for absenteeism, simply because workers were less forthcoming with the frequency to which they were absent from work. In the interviews I tried to verify workers’ accounts of absenteeism with attendance records, for example, Johan (Coloured temporary farm working man, 23 years) denied having been absent from work except for getting “a new bank card last week”, however, he was on his last written warning for repeatedly taking off beyond weekends. For reasons of seemingly low reliability and anonymity of respondents in the survey, I only addressed this in the interviews and did not include absenteeism in the survey of 200 temporary off-farm workers.

Further, workers reported experiencing the access to tractors and other vehicles used on the farm as racialised and disrespectful towards them. Only licenced personnel are allowed to drive vehicles. However, when these drivers report to work late they decrease the earning potential of other workers. “we can’t drive the tractor … like in the morning when we clock in if I want to take the tractor so we can start work, we can’t. It’s only those [coloured] people that can drive the tractor” (Bonani, Xhosa temporary farm working man, 26 years old). Some supervisors are also unable to exercise decisions without authority from farm owners, leading to resignations. As Dumile explains “if I get sick in the orchard the foreman has a bakkie [pickup truck] but doesn’t take you to hospital, you have to wait until the famer says he can take you home” (Dumile, Xhosa temporary farm working man, 28 years old).

Due to the race/skilled division of labour on farms, worker dissatisfaction is often expressed racially, for instance “what I see is they take their people, not us black people, we don’t get it, the [coloured] people look after their people first” (Misumzi, Xhosa temporary farm working man, 42 years old). In this respect, negative interpersonal workplace communication and behaviour, sometimes expressed racially, means that workers leave employment without completing the full length of their fixed-term contracts.
6.7.2.4 INCOME AND EMPLOYMENT INSECURITY

A number of workers reported resigning due to an inability to accrue expected earnings. This concerns workers who are paid piece rates who reported that some farm managers first see “how we work and then if they see we work a lot then they change the price. They first count then say the price, so we know we can make R1.50 [per tree] but we will not make R2.50 [per tree]” (Kevin, coloured temporary farm working man, 27 years old). For this reason, some workers complained about income insecurity in that “we don’t know how much money we are going to make, we must work quickly so that we can make money but we don’t know how much we are going to make” (Mihlali, Xhosa temporary farm working man, 28 years old). This speaks to the findings of Gabbard and Perloff (1997:485), in that workers retention is higher when temporary farm workers are paid by the hour instead of piece rates.

Workers also left for employment of longer duration. For instance, Sonia works “at [Mountain View] from November and then move[s] to [a vegetable packinghouse] in February until July when the contract is finished every year” (Sonia, coloured temporary farm working woman, 38 years old). In this manner, she extends her employment for the usual five months at the packinghouse at Mountain View to work nine months of the year. Similarly, for the last three years Dumile works at a vegetable packinghouse from “November to August and when the work is finished I come to” Riversend, however he was warned by the farm manager that “this is the last time. Next year, they won’t take me again” (Dumile, Xhosa temporary farm working man, 28 years old). Apart from increasing his duration of employment, working in the vegetable packinghouse increases his wages from R558 to R838 per week.

In this manner, labour turnover is attributed to workers’ negotiation of labour insecurity searching for jobs offering increased income and employment security.

6.7.2.5 WORK INSECURITY

Leave is seen as a health and safety issue in prescriptions about of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act – and therefore forms part of work insecurity. Temporary farm workers do not receive paid leave; rather they are financially compensated in lieu of annual leave at the end of their contracts on a pro-rata basis. However, annual leave is insufficient to sustain workers during the low season. Thus, Kyle “do[es] loose work in teams in the holiday” (coloured temporary farm working man, 34 years old) or “when the farms are closed I take a chance to do uitwerk [work for a self-employed supervisor] on farms near Worcester” (Misumzi, Xhosa temporary farm working man, 42 years old). Thus, negotiating employment insecurity in search of employment of longer duration, some temporary farm workers do not complete the lengths of their contracts due to work insecurity in order to create their own periods of leave.
6.8 DISCUSSION

This chapter addressed temporary off-farm workers’ considerations in participating in paid work, commencing with a general overview of the gender-race division of labour on farms. At first these patterns of labour preference are hard to dismantle, however, analysis revealed the changing characteristics of farm workers.

Although some workers do express preferences for particular workstations, these are largely governed by a history of functional flexibility on farms, where men worked in orchards throughout the year while women were recruited for thinning and packing seasons. Subsequently lean production strategies included employment flexibility by hiring temporary workers who could easily be dismissed, labour cost flexibility by reducing wage subsidies and mechanisation of labour through fruit sorting technology and, recently, fruit classification. On some farms, job structure flexibility has also segmented work in packinghouses by pre-sorting fruit in orchards.

Influx control meant that most farm workers were local coloured workers, with some black African men recruited for peak seasons. Its abolition, shortly before flexibilisation of labour, led to a sharp increase in employment of black African workers (Figure 3.7), and their permanent residence in the area, employed into feminised jobs on farms. Most were employed as temporary workers with no employment benefits or certified training. Temporary workers thus experienced employment, income, residential and skills reproduction insecurity as compared to most permanent workers. Coloured workers secured their skills reproduction through intergenerational transfer of skills in the household and workplace. This maintained their niche as skilled farm workers and, coupled with employers’ preference to recruit skilled workers, created their job security and status as packinghouse workers or permanent workers, for coloured women and men respectively.

Unrestricted entry of black Africans into farm work led to new relations of production. However, the means of production (technology and skills) remained intact, reproducing racial hierarchies in farm work through “an upward floating colour bar” (Bezuidenhout, 2005:93) whereby the material reality of farm workers reinforces racial preference ideology as “their social being … determines their consciousness” (Marx, 1978c:4). In this way, “racialised post-colonial society [has reproduced] colonial values” (Bezuidenhout, 2005:93) on farms in Ceres.

Marx said “[n]o social order ever perishes before all the productive forces [skills and technology] for which there is room in it have developed” (Marx, 1978c:5). This suggests that changing the distribution of the means of production may alter racial relations of production. Locally, this may occur, firstly, through technological advances on farms, as with the recent mechanisation of fruit classification in some packinghouses, where preliminary findings indicate equal employment of black African and coloured women. Secondly, racial hierarchies may be altered through increased skills of
black African farm workers, whether through training or permanent residence and intergenerational transference of skills.

However, “higher relations of production never appear before the material conditions for their existence have matured” (Marx, 1978c:5). Material conditions include social and economic conditions. This speaks to, firstly, the gendered relations of production on farms. Men are usually in paid work throughout the year; in contrast, women conduct paid productive and unpaid social reproductive work. Women thus partake in the market economy and the care economy. The latter consisting of paid and unpaid care work in the domestic, public, private and non-governmental sectors (Adams, 2010:x). Working at their site of reproduction, this is clearly illustrated through coloured women, who are not in paid work or who leave employment due to reproductive responsibilities, while older generations of women are responsible for care work whilst the main breadwinners are in employment. Their participation in the market economy is restricted by the lack of (affordable) public care services. In lieu of state services, women as primary caregivers receive social assistance in the form of child grants, however these are insufficient to pay for private care services and reflects the “prioritization of social grants over the [provision of] direct care services” therefore “care for the needy remain predominantly a private household concern” (Fakier, 2014:137). This restricts women’s level of integration into the market economy, as compared to men.

Moving to work away from their site of reproduction, half of black African workers have lived in Ceres for up to four years and return annually to sending communities. This means that social reproduction (of future generations, social relations and practices) necessitates returning to sending regions. This historically occurs over the December festive season, coinciding with the peak harvesting season of deciduous fruit. Thus, for black African workers, social reproduction over a distance thwarts their even integration into farm work.

Reproduction occurs in residences and necessitates residential security. Increased recruitment of off-farm workers, shortage of low-cost housing provided by the state coupled with increased migration to Ceres, means that many farm workers increasingly live in informal residences, especially black Africans. Household members also move between residences in search of income and food security. Poor material conditions and incumbent illnesses thus hinder the economic activities of workers.

The ability to participate in the market economy depends on material conditions, levels of integration into the economic system, paid and unpaid activities and the duration of them. In this way, workers do not have homogenous considerations around participating in paid work because “unequal rhythms (between one individual or group and another) in the transformation of economic attitudes are primarily the reflection of economic and social inequalities” (Bourdieu, 1979:2).
As depicted in table 6.27 below, participation in paid work is informed by a number of considerations that varied in order of importance according to focus groups, frequencies of preferences in the survey, and income categories of workers. Although the order of importance varies, the most important considerations are labour market, income, employment and reproductive insecurity as well as interpersonal workplace relationships. Workers’ considerations around productive work and reproduction, thus, interrelate and sub-proletariat farm workers do not only experience labour insecurity, as per Standing (2011).

Table 6.27: Temporary farm workers’ considerations in participating in paid work

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Considerations according to:</th>
<th>Income categories</th>
<th>Frequency of preferences</th>
<th>Focus groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labour market/Income security</td>
<td>Labour market insecurity</td>
<td>Interpersonal workplace relationships</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment security</td>
<td>Income security</td>
<td>Income security</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Interpersonal workplace relationships</td>
<td>Interpersonal relationships</td>
<td>Employment security</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reproductive security</td>
<td>Employment security</td>
<td>Reproductive security</td>
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</tbody>
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Amongst all four categories of workers, coloured women negotiate labour insecurity more successfully by drawing on economic, cultural and social capital. Cultural capital, economic capital in disguise, is created through skills reproduction in socialisation. This is rare for temporary workers. Economic capital is accrued through a wider range of income streams. Coloured women tend to have permanently employed household members, including employed partners. They also source income from parents, partners, extended family, social assistance grants, holiday pay, performance pay, formal work, as well as income from informal work or UIF in a biannual rotation. This range of income streams is exceptional as compared to other categories of temporary workers and spreads the risk of income insecurity. Social capital is derived in two manners. Firstly, living and working at their site of reproduction, and having established families in the region, coloured workers have formed extensive social networks over time. Social networks provide access to resources to mediate insecurity, and employment on farms is primarily sourced through social networks. Secondly, social capital increases in accordance with the size of networks as the economic, cultural and social capital of each member acts as multiplier of each person’s capital (Bourdieu, 2007). This means that coloured farm working women have greater social capital with which to mediate insecurity. It also illustrates how categories of workers are reproduced, culturally, economically and socially.

There is also a reproduction of historical gendered divisions of labour amongst coloured workers. About 70% of coloured temporary farm working women prefer not to work due to social reproductive work or to rest in low season. These live in households with significantly higher incomes, than women who do not work due to labour market insecurity. Coloured women identify themselves as packinghouse workers in that their “activity is identified with [their] social function” (Bourdieu,
1979:42). Further, “differing notions of time [are] provided by different work[stations] and their relation to "natural" rhythms” (Thompson, 1967:37). In contrast to men’s work which is timed productive work, packinghouse women’s work remains task-orientated in relation to seasonal rhythms of productive and reproductive work, As long as they “fulfil the role appropriate to [their] age and status”, they are “entitled to feel and say [they are] busy” (Bourdieu, 1979:42). In this way, coloured women do not identify with the notion of unemployment, being occupied in social reproduction or periods of rest from productive work, in low seasons. Yet, this depends on access to employed household members and partners. In this way, coloured women reproduce historical gendered relations of production and reproduction.

Reasons for working also vary according to levels of employment. With a “security plateau” (Bourdieu, 1979) of near full employment throughout the year, considerations include respectful and dignified interpersonal communication in the workplace, meaningful interpersonal workplace relationships and working in close proximity to residences to participate in social reproductive work (Table 6.27), that is, social relationships and social reproduction. Below this, workers considerations in participating in work are informed by income, labour market and employment security, that is to say, labour insecurity. For instance, the retention rate of black African women is spurred on by labour market insecurity, in contrast to coloured women, who draw on greater social capital than other workers, and black African men, who work throughout the year, who reported a wider range of considerations. This means that considerations around work are informed by differing levels of labour insecurity.

Similarly, these considerations can induce workers to leave employment. Firstly, findings suggest that the labour turnover of temporary off-farm workers in Ceres is due to the gendered division of labour, coupled with the lack of public investment in formal, reliable and affordable childcare facilities, coloured women’s labour turnover is attributed to reproductive insecurity. For black African workers, the disjuncture of the peak harvest season and the December festive season, when workers forge and maintain social relations at their sites of reproduction, means that workers’ absence over the festive season also increases labour turnover.

Secondly, there is a backlog in construction of public housing and migration to urban nodes and regions of employment has increased. This has led to a shortage of housing, increased informal housing and conglomeration of households in Ceres. Further, labour market insecurity and increasing feminisation of work have meant that farm workers’ household resources are strained and increasingly fragile (Mosoetsa, 2005:28) and that workers move between households in search of income and food security. In so doing, they leave employment positions. What is more, the poor
quality of informal housing leads to illnesses thwarting workers’ ability to complete fixed-term contracts.

Thirdly, disrespectful interpersonal communication and behaviour, sometimes expressed racially, also means that some workers do not complete their contracts.

Fourthly, unable to accrue expected earnings and seeking work of longer duration meant that workers leave employment in favour of employment security. Finally, temporary workers receive financial compensation in lieu of leave. This means that in creating leave between contracts some do not complete fixed-term contracts. Overall, workers not completing their contracts due to circumstances beyond their control, such as care responsibilities and residential insecurity, are more likely to remain unemployed than workers leaving employment voluntarily, due to disrespectful interpersonal relationships, income, employment insecurity. Thus, poor material conditions and the shortage of public care facilities increase insecurity.

In conclusion, workers’ considerations around work are not only informed by labour insecurity but also reproductive insecurity and social relationships. Temporary farm workers negotiate labour insecurity through formal and informal incomes, including support from household members, co-workers and social assistance grants. However,

“[m]en [sic] make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past” (Marx, 1978g:595).

This means that their considerations depend on socio-historical contexts, which have led to unequal economic and social conditions of workers. This has meant that workers experience labour insecurity unevenly and make dependent choices in their considerations around work. There is, thus, a complex interplay of considerations, between productive and social reproductive work.
Chapter 7

Discussion & Conclusions

7.1 Changing Nature of Work and Production

This thesis developed a socio-economic profile of temporary farm workers in Ceres to understand how they negotiate labour insecurity in Ceres. Analysis of the findings employed a Marxist framework, further developed with insights from other theorists, to explain the development of the gender-race division of labour on farms. Although Marx’s theory on the mechanisation of labour is applicable to the industrialisation of work in the broader economy and agriculture at large, this has not occurred to such an extent in the deciduous fruit sector, as labour remains mainly manual due to the nature of the produce. Further, although farm workers experienced a process of proletarianisation in becoming fully dependent on their wage labour (Wolpe, 1972), they also draw on the unpaid social reproductive work of women, unemployment insurance, social assistance grants and social services. This interplay is most clearly illustrated amongst coloured temporary farm working women.

Other significant changes in the deciduous fruit sector include the flattening of wage differentials due to the introduction of sectoral minimum wages. Thus, women and temporary workers in general no longer receive lower wages than permanent staff, as occurred in 2004 (Barrientos & Kritzinger), however this has come at the cost of employment benefits. The results also suggest no indication of an increase in the externalisation of labour to contractors in the area, as foreseen by Kritzinger, Barrientos and Rossouw (2004). It is suggested that this may be a consequence of adherence to codes of labour practices in buyer-driven global value chains, as well as the recent amendment to the Labour Relations Act. However, farmers also cite preferring direct employment to maintain produce quality standards.

What is more, although “[t]he wives of permanent (coloured) farm workers and women from neighbouring farms and the nearest town[s] continue[d] to form an important part of the casual labour force” (Ewert & du Toit, 2005b:112), black Africans are the majority of temporary workers today. This is largely because flexibilisation and the feminisation of labour occurred shortly after the abolishment of influx control whereby the incorporation of black Africans into the farm workforce has been through irregular, low paying “static jobs requiring no accumulation of technical skills and status” (Standing, 1999:585). In this manner, feminised employment grew in the sector through the incorporation of black Africans, especially men, into temporary unskilled work on farms.

This trend has been met with increased recruitment of off-farm workers and a decline in wage subsidies - food, housing, utilities, education, uniforms, medical, leave, pension and training. They
are no longer provided by the employer and have become the onus of temporary workers. With housing and childcare benefits alone subsidising on-farm workers’ wages by 30% (Kritzinger, Barrientos & Rossouw, 2004:22), social wages have eroded without a sufficient increase in real wages. This process is a consequence of flexibilisation of the workforce into a smaller permanent core of employees with benefits supplemented by a flexible periphery of temporary employees. It stems from a market economy based on the assumption that economic growth, through marketisation and commodification, can increase employment and improve the welfare of citizens (Webster & Fakier, 2010), and that “employment is freely available … and that wage incomes ensure well-being” (Marais, 2011:242). Thus, only the sufficiently vulnerable young, old and disabled are eligible to receive social assistance grants and only those able to work have the right to unemployment insurance (notwithstanding public health services and education as well as subsidised housing and utilities for sufficiently deserving households). Consequently, flexibilisation distinctly increased labour and reproductive insecurity for proletariats and sub-proletariats - the structurally unemployed and temporarily employed working age adults - because “the agenda is set by private, competitive interests [and] gains come at tremendous broader social cost [of] increasing marginalisation and insecurity of a far larger section of the farm workforce” (Mather & Greenberg, 2003:411). One of the consequences of marketisation has been the lack of sufficient investment in public services, such as affordable childcare and housing. Along with the externalisation of reproductive costs to the household, through decreased social wages, this lack of services has increased the burden of paid productive and unpaid social reproductive work.

7.2 HISTORICAL PRACTICES OF WORK

Although macro processes structure workers’ social and material conditions influencing considerations around work, those conditions are also structured by the gender-race nexus of employment on farms. This nexus stems from historical practices of work on farms, where men worked throughout the year in the orchards while women were recruited during thinning and harvesting seasons. Since the abolishment of influx control, increasing numbers of black Africans have been accommodated into feminised jobs, along with a shift of coloured workers into higher skilled positions. In this manner, instead of deskilling in the workforce, there has been a fragmentation of skills into racial categories, reflecting “an upward floating colour bar” of employment (Bezuidenhout, 2005:93) on farms. This is primarily owing to employers’ drive for cost reductions and greater efficiency, as by assigning the pre-sorting of fruit to orchards on some farms.

Secondly, the cultural and social capital of coloured workers, as well as employers’ preference to employ skilled workers, has facilitated their access to higher skilled employment and thereby reproduces a gendered and “racialised post-colonial society [and] colonial values” (Bezuidenhout,
Having said this, new technology has now been implemented in select packinghouses in the region which fully mechanises the classification and sorting of fruit and preliminary findings suggests that the workforce consists equally of black African and coloured women. This would indicate that mechanisation of the traditional skills of coloured women removes the skills barriers that continued to bar black African women from this workplace in most packinghouses in the region, suggesting a further avenue for research.

The division of labour, in turn, structures the employment patterns of workers, as those working in the orchards are able to work throughout the year, as opposed to shorter packinghouse seasons. Although these patterns structure workers’ considerations around work, workers exercise constrained considerations, dependent on their respective economic, social and material conditions and therein the resources available to each.

7.3 TEMPORARY OFF-FARM WORKERS’ CONSIDERATIONS AROUND WORK

Flexibilisation has decreased wage subsidies as well as increasing labour insecurity (Standing, 2011). This means that greater numbers of household members enter productive work until a later age, to pay for the externalisation of social reproductive costs to the household. Thus, considerations around participating in paid work are informed by labour market insecurity (Bourdieu, 2013:170; Marx, 1978b:428) and commodification of services (Barchiesi, 2009:27, cited in Marais, 2011:184).

Considerations also include employment security, through contracts of longer duration or moving between contracts, and work security to create periods of leave. The findings suggest a threshold of near full employment below which considerations are informed by labour insecurity, and above which considerations include social relationships and reproductive security. However, there is a complex interplay of considerations that vary according to social, economic and material conditions.

Temporary workers mediate income security through recourse to a variety of income streams. Coloured workers tend to find informal work in the area, and coloured women accrue income from informal work and unemployment insurance in a biannual rotation. Other avenues include recourse to permanently employed household members, employed partners and extended family. However, social assistance grants constitutes a third of total annual household income, and is the single biggest contributor to temporary farm working women’s annual income. Coupled with wages from formal work, women are the main income earners in temporary off-farm workers’ households and potentially administer nearly two thirds of household income.

Thus, temporary farm workers negotiate income insecurity through social networks, unemployment insurance, social assistance grants as well as formal and informal employment. In so doing, they
mediate between formal and informal incomes. This is clearly illustrated through coloured women who draw on all the above-mentioned resources, in comparison to other categories of workers.

Workers’ also consider not participating in paid work, however, mostly coloured women do so. Drawing on numerous income sources, they have the most economic capital and are able to spread the risk of income insecurity. They also have greater cultural capital through skills reproduction in socialisation and together with employers’ preference to employ skilled workers, have developed themselves a niche as packinghouse workers. Their access to networks of resources, such as longstanding familial networks in the region and permanently employed household members and partners, bestows on them a higher level of social capital as compared to other categories of workers. This affords them the ability to consider not participating in paid work, to conduct unpaid reproductive work in the household during low season, or rest in accordance with seasonal rhythms of work (Thompson, 1967). By drawing on social capital, coloured women thus preserve their historical gendered division of production and reproduction, and hold social prestige as packinghouse workers.

The findings of this thesis confirm those of Bardhan (1979) in that factors external to the workplace also influence workers’ considerations around employment and that more women work in peak season. However, contrary to temporary Indian farm workers, rather than working less in accordance with higher numbers of dependents or adult men, temporary farm working women in this study work more when they have unemployed household members or partners and less with increased household income. Further, temporary off-farm workers also work for longer periods when coming from areas of high employment, rather than less (Bardhan, 1979), as illustrated by black African women.

7.4 TEMPORARY OFF-FARM WORKERS’ CONSIDERATIONS IN NOT COMPLETING FIXED-TERM CONTRACTS

As considerations in participating in paid work also include leaving employment, this study addressed the reasons for which temporary off-farm workers do not complete the length of their fixed-term contracts. This was attributed to reproductive security, social relationships in the workplace and labour insecurity.

Firstly, a shortage of formal (and affordable) childcare facilities meant that (coloured) women left employment due to care responsibilities. The disjuncture between the December festive season and the peak harvesting season in the deciduous fruit sector means that some black African workers also leave employment due to social reproduction. Reproduction security is also informed by residential insecurity, with workers leaving employment due to the lack of (formal) housing and incumbent illnesses.
Secondly, workers value respectful interpersonal communication and behaviour in the workplace, for a lack of which they leave employment, and also value meaningful interpersonal workplace relationships through which they mediate insecurity.

Thirdly, workers leave employment in search of income security and employment security through employment of longer duration, as well as work insecurity to create leave between contracts. Resigning due to care responsibilities and residential insecurity meant that workers experienced longer periods without paid work, meaning that poor material conditions and social services increase reproductive insecurity.

The findings contest those of Smit, Johnston and Morse (1985) in that farm workers not completing the length of their contracts spanned all ages and there was no correlation with non-local workers. What is more, although 48% resigning had been working on farms for five years or less, this is true for the majority (63%) of workers and thereby labour turnover is not significantly higher amongst inexperienced workers, as per the findings of Smit, Johnston and Morse (1985) and Taylor and Thilmany (1993). Further, contrary to the findings of Taylor and Thilmany (1993), increased wages did not reduce labour turnover and labour turnover is reduced through increased length of contracts rather than increased length of service on farms (Taylor & Thilmany, 1993:358). The findings also confirm those of the National Agricultural Workers Survey in the USA, in that workers leave employment without working the full-length of their contracts due to reproductive, residential and work insecurity (Mines, Gabbard & Boccalandro, 1991:88). However, temporary farm workers also leave due to disrespectful workplace communication and increased employment security.
7.5 CONCLUSION

Worker’s considerations in participating in work are not only borne from personal preferences (Maertz & Campion, 2004) or labour market and income insecurity (Marx, 1978b; Bourdieu, 2013; Marais, 2011:184), but also social relationships in the workplace, reproduction insecurity, including material conditions, as well as traditional rhythms of work. By means of a sociological perspective, this thesis has brought the macro, meso and micro constrained considerations of workers to the fore. This is because sub-proletariats not only have precarious employment, but live in communities without recourse to (sufficient) services, at greater risk of illnesses, in precarious residences, reliant on the unpaid reproductive work of poor (elderly) women. Production and reproduction thus interrelate in considerations around work. These considerations depend on socio-historical contexts, which have led to unequal economic and social conditions of workers. This has meant that workers experience labour and reproductive insecurity unevenly and make dependent choices in their considerations around work.

In employing a Marxist perspective, this study has shown the development of the historical distribution of work (in the household and workplace) and workers (in close proximity to their sites of reproduction and removed); and how this increased farm working skills (cultural capital) and localised social ties (social capital) amongst coloured temporary off-farm workers, shaped by separatist racial preference ideology. Post-apartheid, new relations of production were incorporated into the existing mode of production and flexibilisation led to “an upward floating colour bar” (Bezuidenhout, 2005:93) on farms. Having greater knowledge and skills of farm work, coloured workers accessed higher skilled, permanent or temporary, jobs whilst black African workers were incorporated as feminised workers, into unskilled temporary work. Thus, the distribution of farm work changed, without changes in the means of production, reinforcing racial preference ideology. The racial relations of production may, however, change in accordance with changes in the means of production, brought on by technological advances on farms or increased skills of black African farm workers. However, changes in gendered relations of production require a restructuring of production to allow men and women to participate in reproductive work, or a restructuring of the economy of care that hinders the even incorporation of (poor) women and men in production.
7.6 IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The findings of this thesis suggest implications for further research. Firstly, studies need to be
cognisant of the varying social practices and material conditions that structure workers’
considerations around work.

Secondly, studies addressing temporary farm workers in consultation with employers (Taylor &
Thilmady, 1993) or through secondary data analyses (Smit, Johnston and Morse, 1985; Gabbard &
Parloff, 1997), instead of workers themselves, do not render an accurate understanding of factors
influencing workers’ considerations. The findings of this study are borne from the research design
whereby findings from qualitative in-depth interviews formed grounded indicators for a survey to test
the prevalence and reliability of findings. Although this design is time consuming and expensive,
mixed methods data collection has been shown to render more differentiated generalisable findings.
However, the analyses of the data can further benefit from more sophisticated statistical analyses,
suggesting a further avenue for research.

Thirdly, the findings suggest that increasing numbers of farm workers are black African and that new
technology mechanising the classification of fruit may lead to a decrease in the proportion of coloured
women in packinghouses. In this respect, a further avenue for research is a longitudinal study tracing
the changing socio-economic profile of farm workers in the deciduous fruit sector as well as
discerning the reason(s) for the decline in coloured men in farm work.

Fourthly, this study suggests a possible relationship between management styles and labour turnover
on farms, which could form the focus of further research. Moreover, since the findings suggested a
similar crude wastage rate of permanent and temporary off-farm workers, future studies should
investigate both categories of workers.

Finally, agricultural statistics no longer differentiate between temporary and permanent workers by
race or gender. Due to the gender-race nexus of employment in the deciduous fruit sector, it is only
through ongoing surveys of workers that changing socio-economic profiles can be traced, and future
studies should include these variables.

In conclusion, temporary farm workers’ considerations in participating in paid work are borne
from, not only, personal preferences or labour insecurity, but the quality of interpersonal workplace
relationships, reproductive insecurity and material conditions. In this manner, their considerations are
constructed and internalised, appearing as ‘free’ choices when they are largely dependent on socio-
historic contexts. In sum, sub-proletariats experience constrained considerations, and the manner in
which they negotiate labour and reproductive insecurity is borne from their social and material
history.
References


Google Maps. 2015. Ceres, South Africa, Map view. [Online] Available at: https://www.google.co.za/maps/place/Ceres/@-33.397913,19.3052664,10z/data=!4m2!3m1!1s0x1dcd699073578c4b:0x392808e69c847c75?hl=en [Accessed 22 April 2015].


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Addenda

ADDENDUM A: DATA ANALYSES

A.1 CHI-SQUARE

A chi-square ($\chi^2$) test is a test of statistical significance, to know whether results were produced by chance (Healey, 2012:274). It tests whether a dependent categorical (nominal or ordinal) variable is dependent on or independent from another variable. That is to say, that the position of a case on one variable does or does not affect whether the case appears in a particular category of another variable. This is done by calculating whether the relationship between the two variables is due to chance. For purposes of this study a statistical test is regarded as significant when there is less than a 5% chance that the relationship is due to random chance, when the statistical significance ($p$) is equal to or less than 0.5 ($p \leq .05$), meaning that the variables are dependent on one another. In other words, for every 100 cases in a variable, 5, or less, would be classified in a category of the second variable by chance, or conversely, 95 or more of every 100 cases on a variable would not occur in the category of another variable by chance. Thus, one could be 95% certain that the relationship is not due to chance.

Having ascertained that a relationship between cases on two different variables is not due to chance, measures of association are calculated to ascertain the strength of a relationship and even the direction. For chi-squared tests, I used Goodman and Kruskal’s Lambda and Tau as measures of association.

A.1.1 GOODMAN AND KRUSKAL'S LAMBDA & TAU

Goodman and Kruskal's Lambda ($\lambda$) is a measure of association based on two predictions about cases on a dependent variable (Healey, 2012:322). Firstly, the errors made in predicting the category of cases on a dependent variable while ignoring the independent variable are calculated (X). From this, the errors made in predicting the category of cases on the dependent variable while taking into account what is known about the independent variable (Y), are subtracted ($X - Y$). That is to say that the stronger the relationship between two variables, the less errors will be made. In a perfect association Y would be equal to zero, however, no association would mean that Y would equal X.

Dividing the difference between X and Y by X gives the Lambda score ($\lambda$), which multiplied by one hundred tell us by how much percent predictions of cases on the dependent variable improve by taking the independent variable into consideration. The Lambda is calculated based on the modal proportions which can be less sensitive than Goodman-Kruskal’s Tau ($\tau$) which is based on the marginal...
proportions (Argyrous, 2011:133). Due to the latter being more sensitive to large variations in proportions, Tau is sometimes used instead of Lambda in the data analyses.

For example, in section 6.2, I tested the relationship between workstation and workers’ race at Riversend farm. The result was statically significant ($p = .000$). Consequently, to find out the strength of the relationship between the two variables, I calculated Goodman and Kruskal’s Lambda ($\lambda$), the result of which was $\lambda = .744$. This meant that knowing the independent variable race reduced errors in predicting the dependent variable workstation by 74%. This means that 74% of workplace variation is statistically explained by race, or that there is a strong association between workstation and race at Riversend farm.

A.2 PEARSON’S R

Pearson’s $r$ ($r$) is used to test two variables that are both measured on an interval or ratio scale. The coefficient ($r$) lies between 0 and 1, indicating the strength of the relationship. Zero indicates no relationship while 1 would be a prefect relationship. The coefficient is also positive or negative, indicating the direction of the relationship (Healey, 2012:378). The qualitative interpretation of the result is calculated as depicted in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Interpretation of effect size for correlation coefficients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>.90 to 1.00</td>
<td>Nearly, practically, or almost: perfect, distinct, infinite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.70 to .90</td>
<td>Very large, very high, huge, very strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.50 to .70</td>
<td>Large, high, major, strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.30 to .50</td>
<td>Moderate, medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.10 to .30</td>
<td>Small, low, minor, weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.00 to .10</td>
<td>Trivial, very small, insubstantial, tiny, practically zero</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Addendum table 1:** Qualitative interpretation of strength of association for correlation coefficients


However, this table may be too precise since “in social science, we deal with probabilistic casual relationships …[thus]…expecting measures of association to approach 1 is unreasonable” (Healey, Boli, Babbie & Halley, 1999:84, cited in Babbie, Halley, Wagner, Zaino, 2011:219). Rather than precise interpretations, Babbie et al. (2011) suggest general guidelines for the strength of association between variables, depicted in the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strength of Association</th>
<th>Strength of association (Lambda, Gamma, Pearson’s $r$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak/Uninteresting</td>
<td>$\pm .01$ to $0.09$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate/Worth noting</td>
<td>$\pm .10$ to $0.29$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence of strong association/Extremely interesting</td>
<td>$\pm .30$ to $0.99$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perfect/Strongest possible association</td>
<td>$\pm 1.00$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Addendum table 2:** Guidelines for interpreting strength of association


For example, in section 6.3, I tested the correlation between the frequencies of employment of temporary off-farm workers against the number of jobs workers had over twelve months. This produced a significant ($p = .000$) result of 100% certainty that the relationship is not due to chance.
Further, the relationship between variables was moderately strong \((r = .319)\) and positively correlated, meaning that as the number of jobs increased, the frequency of employment increased.

**A.3 ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE (ANOVA)**

A one-way analysis of variance (F) test is used when testing a categorical variable, with three or more groups, against a continuous, ratio, variable (Healey, 2012:242). The results indicate whether there are significant differences between the mean scores of groups in the categorical variable. Although a test is statistically significantly, it does not indicate whether the difference between the means of groups is small or large. The effect size of the result is thus tested using eta-squared \(\eta^2\), illustrated in the table below. Further tests may be then used to establish which groups’ means significantly differ from each other.

**Addendum table 3:** Qualitative interpretation of effect size for eta-squared

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Interpretation of effect size for Eta-squared (\eta^2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>.2600</td>
<td>Large effect size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.1300</td>
<td>Medium effect size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.0196</td>
<td>Small effect size</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


For example, in section 5.4.3, I used an ANOVA to test whether the number of years that temporary off-farm workers have lived in the region of Ceres varies according to race and gender. The results indicated a 100% certainty that the mean number of years lived in the region varied according the workers’ race and gender \((F = 45.545, p = .000)\). Further, analyses indicated large effect sizes between the four categories of workers \((\eta^2 = .412)\). Subsequently, I used a Gabriel post-hoc test to show that the mean number of years that coloured women had lived in the region \((M = 26.76, SD = 16.176)\) was significantly higher than coloured men \((M = 16.49, SD = 9.720)\); and both these groups have lived in the region significantly longer than black African men \((M = 4.83, SD = 4.556)\) and women \((M = 7.293, SD = 7.293)\).
ADDENDUM B: QUESTIONNAIRE

University Stellenbosch - Stellenbosch University
Department van Seisologie & Seisale Antropologie

1. Wry jy as ‘n:
☐ Seisoenale/Tydelike Plaaswerker – jy het geen kontrak of ju kontrak is slegs vir ‘n bepaalde tydperk.
☐ Permanente Plaaswerker – jy het ‘n kontrak waarin die tydperk is onbepaald.

2. Waar woon jy?
☐ Op ‘n plaas
☐ Prince Alfred Humlet
☐ Nduli
☐ Bella Vista

☐ Ander: (Spesifieke)

3. Kan jy Afrikaans goed praat? ☐ Ja ☐ Nee

As hulle se PERMANENTE werker is of OP ‘n PLAAS WOON of NIE VLOK in AFRIKAANS is nie, se onthou: Base dankie dat jy om te praat het maar ek is baie jammer dat jy nie sal kan deelneem in di projek nie omdat ek slegs met Afrikaans spesifieke seisoenale of tydelike plaaswerkers wat op plaas woon vandag praat. Ek is baie jammer.

Andere, gaan voort met die onderhoud:

Ek doen opname oor seisoenale en tydelike plaaswerkers se werk en opleiding. Hierdie is vir my se universiteitsprojek.

Ek sal graag met jou wil praat om hierdie vrae met jou te voltoo, dit behoort so ongeveer 30 minute te vate. As jy enige vrae nie wil beantwoord of selfs die onderhoud wil stak, dan kan ons aanbeveel na die volgende vraag of ons stop die onderhoud. Ongehuiskig is daar geen betaling vir deelnemers en die onderhoud maar die plaas het gesê dat jy sal nog betaal word vir di tyd wat jy met my gesels.

Alles wat jy vir my sê sal tussen my tuifhou en ons bly. Ek gaan nie jou naam neer skryf nie en in die verslag wat ek skryf sal dit nie mensekiel wees om te weet dat jy betrokke was in die navorsing nie. Die resultate van di onderzoek sal ook miskien gepubliseer wort.

Wil jy deelneem in die opname? ☐ Ja ☐ Nee
4. Wat is jou bevolkingsgroep?
- Bruin
- Swart
- Wit
- Indiese
- Ander (Specificeer):

5. Wat is jou nasionaleiteit?
- Suid-Afrikaans
- Zimbabweër
- Lesotho
- Ander (Specificeer):


8.1 Het jy enige sertifikate ontvang vir opleiding, terwyl jy plaaswerk gedoen het?
- Nee
- Ja

8.2 Indien Ja: het dit jou gehelp om werk te kry?  Nee  Ja

8.2.1 Gee asseblief 'n rede vir jou keuse:


8.3 Indien Nee: dink jy dit sal jou help om werk te kry?  Nee  Ja

8.3.1 Gee asseblief 'n rede vir jou keuse:


9.1 Is daar enige plaaswerk waarvoor jy 'n opleiding wil ontvang?  Nee  Ja

9.2 Gee asseblief 'n rede vir jou keuse:


*Omsig en Opleiding van Plaaswerkers - 2015*
10.1 Verkies jy tydelike of permanente werk? □ Ja □ Nee

10.2 Gee asseblief 'n rede vir jou kiesie.

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

11.1 Sommige plaaswerkers los hulle werk op een plaas voordat die werk op is en skuif na 'n ander plaas. Wat dink jy is die belangrikste rede?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

11.2 Verskaf dit vir mans en vrouens?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>12. In (maand) het jy werk gedoen op 'n plaas of pakstoor?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13. Het jy gewerk:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1: As 'n uitweker 2: Vir 'n kontrakteur 3: Dierk: vir 'n plaas 4: Ander (specifieer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14. Was jy konstast of in die bank betaal?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1: Konstant 2: Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15. Wat was die naam van die plaas/pakstoor?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Indien meer as 1 in 'n maand dit eenteen en een voor later oor 2de en in q. 17.1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16. In (maand) het jy gewerk as 'n:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Vir kombinaries skryf alle nommers]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17. In (maand) het jy gewerk met:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0: Nie gewerk 1: Minder as 'n week 2: 1 week 3: 2 weke 4: 3 weke 5: 4 weke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18. In (maand) hoeveel weke het jy gewerk, behalwe booms, vakansie en oortyd?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[As hulle nie wil se nie ← q. 19.2]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19.1 In (maand) min of meer hoeveel het jy verdien, behalwe booms, vakansie en oortyd?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0: R0 1: R1 - R600 2: R601 - R1,100 3: R1,101 - R1,600 4: R1,601 - R2,100 5: R2,101 - R2,600 6: R2,601 - R3,100 7: R3,101 - R3,600 8: R3,601 - R4,100 9: R4,101 - R4,600 10: R4,601 - R5,100 11: R5,101+ 12: West nie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19.2 In (maand) hoeveel min of meer het jy verdien, behalwe booms, vakansie en oortyd?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ja-15

Des-14

Nov-14

Okt-14

Sep-14

Aug-14

Jul-14

Jun-14

Mei-14

Apr-14

Mar-14

Feb-14
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>20.1</th>
<th>20.2</th>
<th>20.3</th>
<th>21.1</th>
<th>21.2</th>
<th>21.3</th>
<th>22.1</th>
<th>22.2</th>
<th>22.3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Het jy oor tyd verdiend in (maand)?</td>
<td>In (maand) min of meer hoëkoel oor tyd het jy verdiend?</td>
<td>In (maand) min of meer hoëkoel was die bonus?</td>
<td>In (maand) min of meer hoëkoel was die vakansiegeld verdiend?</td>
<td>In (maand) min of meer hoëkoel was die vakansiegeld verdiend?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0: Nee</td>
<td>0: Nee</td>
<td>0: Nee</td>
<td>0: Nee</td>
<td>0: Nee</td>
<td>0: Nee</td>
<td>0: Nee</td>
<td>0: Nee</td>
<td>0: Nee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1: Ja</td>
<td>1: Ja</td>
<td>1: Ja</td>
<td>1: Ja</td>
<td>1: Ja</td>
<td>1: Ja</td>
<td>1: Ja</td>
<td>1: Ja</td>
<td>1: Ja</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[As hulle nie wil se nie ⇒ q.21.1] [As hulle nie wil se nie ⇒ q.22.1] [As hulle nie wil se nie ⇒ q.23.1]


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>23.1</th>
<th>23.2</th>
<th>23.3</th>
<th>23.4</th>
<th>24.1</th>
<th>24.2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vir (pos) het</td>
<td>Hoe lank was</td>
<td>Het jy die kontrak</td>
<td>Wat was die belangrikste rede waarom jy</td>
<td>Wanneer het jy</td>
<td>Wat was die belangrikste rede bekom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jy 'n kontrak</td>
<td>die kontrak</td>
<td>klaargemaak?</td>
<td>nie jeu kontrak klaar gemaak het nie?</td>
<td>met 'n nuwe werk</td>
<td>jy die werk gevat het?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gehad?</td>
<td>in maande?</td>
<td>[Stafief meer</td>
<td>1: Vakansie gevat</td>
<td>1: Ek was sonder werk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0: Nee</td>
<td>1: Ja</td>
<td>die getal</td>
<td>2: Ek was seker</td>
<td>2: Langer kontrak</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>→ q. 24.1</td>
<td>q. 24.1</td>
<td>maande]</td>
<td>3: Moes seker volwassene familiedien versorg</td>
<td>3: Hoër salaris</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0: Minder as</td>
<td>1: Ja</td>
<td>4: Moes my kinders versorg</td>
<td>4: Betaal kontant, nie in bank</td>
<td>5: Betaal daaglikse</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n maand</td>
<td></td>
<td>5: Moes ander mensen se kinders versorg</td>
<td>5: Naby familie</td>
<td>6: Naby aan familie</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6: Behandelings probleme</td>
<td>7: Naby aan bali</td>
<td>7: Naby aan bali</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7: Skuld probleme</td>
<td>8: Boer/Voormaler se skuld probleme</td>
<td>8: Boer/Voormaler/Vriend werk daar</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8: Gedeelde in die werk</td>
<td>9: Vriend/Voormaler se plan verknip</td>
<td>9: My voormaler/vrou het werk daar gekry</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9: Boer/Voormaler se skuld probleme</td>
<td>10: Boer se plan verknip</td>
<td>10: Boer se plan verknip</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10: Dit was maag</td>
<td>11: Boer voormaler</td>
<td>11: Boer voormaler</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11: Dit was te warm</td>
<td>12: Boer voormaler</td>
<td>12: Boer voormaler</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12: Dit was te koud</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>In (maand) het jy ook 'n ander werk gedoen?</strong></td>
<td><strong>Watse werk was dit?</strong></td>
<td><strong>Het jy gewerk:</strong></td>
<td><strong>In (maand) hoeveel dae het jy die werk gedoen?</strong></td>
<td><strong>In (maand) min of meer hoeveel dae het jy gewerk?</strong></td>
<td><strong>In (maand) min of meer hoeveel dae het jy gewerk?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1: Ja, nie op 'n pleas of plaas of plaats nie —q.25.2</td>
<td>1: Huise/Strykie/ Kombuiswerk 2: Tuinwerk 3: Hare oey 4: Tuin Bestuur 5: Winkelwerk 6: Ek het goud verkoop, nie in 'n winkel nie 7: Du Toi Hout 8: Ander (Spesifieer)</td>
<td>1: Hieldag 2: Halfdag 3: Minders as halfdag</td>
<td>[Skei in die werk] —q.19.2</td>
<td>[As die laaste van die maande]</td>
<td>[Skei in die werk] —q.20.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Jan-15
Dec-14
Nov-14
Okt-14
Sep-14
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Jul-14
Jun-14
 Mei-14
Apr-14
Mar-14
Feb-14
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>29.1</th>
<th>In (maand) wat was die belangrikste rede hoekom jy sonder enige betaalde werk was?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>1. Geraffigeerd werk bevindbaar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Vakansie of Wou nie werk nie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Ek was siek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Ek was swanger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Moet sien volwassene familieid versorg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Moet my kinders versorg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. Moet ander mens se kinders versorg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8. Geld te min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9. Student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10. Anders (Spesifieer)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>29.3</th>
<th>Hoe het jy reggekom sonder 'n iskomste van werk?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. My boy/greef/aanvrou ondersteun my</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. My ours ondersteun my</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. My ander familie ondersteun my</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. My buevriend ondersteun my</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. SASA/AIF pay</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. UIF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Anders (Spesifieer)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>30.1</th>
<th>Ja (maand) het jy UIF gelei?</th>
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<td>0. Neen — q.31</td>
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<th>30.3</th>
<th>In (maand) min of meer hoeveel UIF het jy verdien?</th>
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Jan-15

Feb-14

Mar-14

Apr-14

Mei-14

Jun-14

Jul-14

Aug-14

Sep-14

Okt-14

Nov-14

Dec-14

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</table>
31. Vertel my asseblief van die mense wat in jou huishouding woon
Hierdie is mense wat in jou huidige huise geredd skoep so vel as hulle en familie lede in agter kamere:

Teken 'n familie boom van die respondent se huishouding hieronder.

Teken 'n ∆ vir mans en 'n ○ vir vroue.
Maak 'n dubbele lyn tussen partners/geskouspare.
Lans die skoolvol skoef laie ouderdomme en merk die respondent met 'n R.

Nommer die mense, begin met 1 vir die respondent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nummer van huis lid</th>
<th>Gesig</th>
<th>Verhouding met respondent</th>
<th>Onderdom</th>
<th>Huwelik status</th>
<th>Wie in hierdie huishouding is (nommer) se huwelik/lewensmaat?</th>
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<td>1: Man</td>
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<td>Respondent</td>
<td>1: Getrou</td>
<td>1: Getroud</td>
<td>[Skryf die huwelik/lewensmaat se nummer seer long persoon]</td>
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<td>2: Vrou</td>
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<td>2: Geskied</td>
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Voltoo die naamkaart vir die huishouding om die volgende vrae te antwoord.

_Lees dit met die respondent wanneer jy klaar is_

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nummer van huis lid</th>
<th>Naam</th>
<th>Geslag</th>
<th>Onderdom</th>
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</table>
33. *Vir die lede van die huishouding wat werk: dui aan hoeveel hulle verdien het in elke maand:*

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<thead>
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<th>Nummer van huis</th>
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<th>Des-14</th>
<th>Nov-14</th>
<th>Okt-14</th>
<th>Sep-14</th>
<th>Aug-14</th>
<th>Jul-14</th>
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0: R0
1: R1 - R500
2: R601 - R1,100
3: R1,101 - R1,600
4: R1,601 - R2,100
5: R2,101 - R2,600
6: R2,601 - R3,100
7: R3,101 - R3,600
8: R3,601 - R4,100
9: R4,101 - R4,600
10: R4,601 - R5,100
11: R5,101-
12: Weer uit

Omskring en Opleiding van Plaaswerkers – 2015
39. 'n Mens mag mos werk en geld van SASA/AllPay kry. Sê vir my asseblief:

<table>
<thead>
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<th>39.3</th>
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Beie dankie dat jy met my gesels het.
Ons waarder jou hulp om die situasie op plase beter te verstaan.