The Age of Hyperconflict and the Globalization-Terrorism Nexus:

A Comparative Study of Al Shabaab in Somalia and Boko Haram in Nigeria

By

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Declaration

By submitting this thesis electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained therein is my own original work, that I am the authorship owner thereof (unless to the extent explicitly otherwise stated) and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for obtaining any qualification.

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Abstract

Globalization has radically changed the world we live in; it has enabled the easy movement of people, goods and money across borders, and has facilitated improved communication. In a sense it has made our lives easier, however the same facets that have improved the lives of citizens across the globe now threatens them. Terrorist organizations now make use of these same facets of globalization in order to facilitate terrorist activity. This thesis set out to examine the extent to which globalization has contributed to the creation of a permissive environment in which terrorism has flourished in Somalia and northern Nigeria respectively, and how it has done so. In order to determine this Mittelman's *theory of hyperconflict* and Zimmermann's *heuristic causal model of linkages between globalization and international terrorism* were applied to the case studies of Al Shabaab in Somalia and Boko Haram in Nigeria. The main finding of this thesis is that globalization has contributed to the creation of a permissive environment in which terrorism has flourished in Somalia and northern Nigeria, albeit to different extents. In Somalia, globalization has facilitated the terrorist activities of Al Shabaab by means of technology (especially information communications technology (ICT)), migration channels, and channels of business and commerce. Additionally, the threat of corrupt culture, as spread by globalization, has served as an incentive when selecting targets. Moreover, it was found that globalization played a part in radicalizing Al Shabaab as well as ordinary Somalis. Similarly, globalization has facilitated terrorism perpetrated by Boko Haram in northern Nigeria; it has done so by means of technology, migration channels to a lesser extent, and politico-criminal network as well as support by external states and groups. The threat of a corrupt foreign culture has played a particular role in driving Boko Haram's campaign of terror. Additionally, it was found that globalization played some part, albeit a small part, in Boko Haram's rise to prominence. This thesis proved that in certain states and under specific conditions globalization has led to the creation of a permissive environment in which national/international terrorism can flourish.

Opsomming

Globalisering het die wêreld drasties verander. Dit het teweeg gebring dat mense, goedere en geld vrylik oor internasionale en nasionale grense kan beweeg. Alhoewel die proses van globalisering die lewens van 'n groot gedeelte van die wêreldbevolking vergemaklik het, hou dit egter gevare in. Hedendaags maak terreurgroepe gebruik van die verskillende fasette van globalisering as 'n middel om terreuraanvalle uit te voer. Die doel van hierdie tesis is om te bepaal tot watter mate globalisering 'n milieu geskep het, afsonderlik in Somalië en Nigerië waarin terrorisme kan floreer en hoe dit so 'n milieu bewerkstellig het. Ten einde hierdie doel te bereik het hierdie navorsingsstudie Mittelman se teorië van "hyperconflict" en Zimmermann se "heuristic causal model of linkages between globalization and international terrorism" aangewend tot die volgende gevallestudies, naamlik: Al Sjabaab in Somalië en Boko Haram in Nigerië. In hierdie tesis is daar tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat daar 'n verbintenis is tussen globalisering en terrorisme, met ander woorde, globalisering is verantwoordelik vir die skepping van 'n milieu waarin terrorisme kan floreer. In die geval van Al Sjabaab in Somalië is daar bevind dat tegnologie (veral inligting en kommunikasietegnologie (IKT)), internasionale netwerke van besigheid en handel, asook migrasie kanale die terreuraktiwiteite van Al Sjabaab ondersteun en fasiliteer het. Verder is daar bevind dat "korrupte" buitelandse kulture gesien word as 'n bedreiging en hierdie siening het die seleksie van teikens beïnvloed. Boonop is daar bevind dat globalisering 'n groot rol gespeel het in die radikalisering van Al Sjabaab asook Somaliese landsburgers. Net so, het globalisering die terreuraktiwiteite van Boko Haram gefasiliteer. Boko Haram het gebruik gemaak van tegnologie, migrasie kanale (tot 'n mindere mate), "politico-criminal" netwerke asook die ondersteuning van eksterne state en groepe. Die verspreiding/deurdringing van "korrupte" buitelandse kultuur het veral 'n rol gespeel in Boko Haram se terreur-veldtog. Verder is daar bevind dat globalisering 'n matige rol gespeel het in Boko Haram se opkoms. Hierdie studie het dus bewys dat in sekere lande en onder sekere omstandighede globalisering 'n milieu kan bewerkstellig waarin nasionale/internasionale terrorisme kan floreer.

Acknowledgements

I would like my to thank my supervisor Mr. Gerrie Swart for his assistance, guidance and support throughout my postgraduate studies. Thank you for all the meaningful feedback and tips.

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List of Abbreviations

AMISOM	–	African Union Mission in Somalia
AQIM	–	Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
AU	–	African Union
BIR	–	Rapid Intervention Battalion
ICT	–	Information Communications Technology
ICU	–	Islamic Courts Union
ISIS	–	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
ISWAP	–	Islamic State's West African Province
GDP	–	Gross Domestic Product
MNJTF	–	Multi-National Joint Task Force
OAU	–	Organization of African Unity
ONLF	–	Ogaden National Liberation Front
SAP	–	Structural Adjustment Programme
SFG	–	Somali Federal Government
SNA	–	Somali National Army
TFG	–	Transitional Federal Government
UN	–	United Nations
United States	–	US

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1. 1 Introduction

The introductory chapter serves to provide an overview of this study. In order to place the study in context, a brief background will be given as well as the rationale for choosing the particular field of research. There will then be a brief discussion of the problem statement and focus of the study. The section that follows will elaborate on the research design and methodology used, which will include the aspects of time dimension and units of analysis. The goals, variables, theoretical point of departure, research questions and hypothesis will then be discussed, followed by a contextualization of key concepts used in this study. In addition, the limitations of this study will be mentioned as well as possible means of overcoming these limitations. Lastly, the main aims of each chapter in this study will be briefly discussed.

1.2 Background and Rationale

The last decade has seen terrorism gaining an increasingly international façade (United States Institute of Peace, 2004:1). International terrorism has become a prominent research topic in the field of international and regional security studies, especially in the wake of the 2001 September 11th (9/11) attacks launched against the United Sates (US). The 9/11 attacks sparked a serious interest in finding the root causes of international terrorism, as well as a solution to terrorism; this has become known as the "War on Terror." Even though acts of terrorism were perpetrated in previous decades, the focus of researchers and scholars was elsewhere. One could possibly regard 9/11 as a trigger for a renewed interest in international terrorism as a specific field of study.

Since 9/11, scholars in economics, political science, and other disciplines have devoted much effort to the study of terrorism and its impact on the economy and society. Some studies have investigated the reverse impact – in other words, the influence of the economy and social grievances on terrorism (Sandler, 2011:279). This topic has promoted further interest since there seems to be a correlation between the world becoming increasingly "smaller" and interconnected as a result of globalization, and the occurrences of both national and international terrorism (Cronin, 2003:30; Abrahamsen, 2004:678).

This research study aims to explore the extent to which globalization has fuelled insecurity and has contributed to the creation of a permissive environment in which acts of national/international terrorism flourish. It will then focus on two vastly different regional contexts, namely Somalia in the Horn of Africa and Nigeria in West Africa. Within these regions two terrorist organizations will be focused on, namely *Al Shabaab* in Somalia and *Boko Haram* in Nigeria. The topic of this study falls under the larger study area of international as well as African security and the narrower study area of terrorism.

The rationale behind choosing this area of study is that national/international terrorism seriously affects peace, security and stability, not only in the areas in which it occurs, but across the globe. The rationale for choosing the Horn of Africa and more specifically Somalia as one the case studies is that it is seen as an area that is vulnerable to national/international terrorism and has been considered to be a breeding ground for national/international terrorism (Abrahamsen, 2004:678–679). Furthermore, factors such as porous borders, weak governments and abject poverty are further exacerbated by globalization and could possibly contribute towards acts of terrorism (Carter, 2012:66). Moreover, the majority of literature that examines the link between globalization and international terrorism focuses on the Middle East and North Africa. Extensive research is therefore needed in order to fill the existing gap in the literature on terrorism and globalization in the Horn of Africa and West Africa, respectively. This study will seek to provide insight on how globalization has affected and aided acts of national/international terrorism within and originating in the Horn of Africa. The rationale behind the choice of Nigeria and Boko Haram as a second case study is the increasing insecurity that northern Nigeria has experienced over the last six years as a result of the activities of Boko Haram (Brigaglia, 2012:35). In addition, globalization, especially those facets equated with Westernization, can be seen as contributing to Boko Haram's rise in prominence. The group has lashed out against targets that it perceives to have fallen prey to the decadence and corruption that it associates with Westernization/globalization (Walker, 2012:7). Furthermore, since these are vastly different regional contexts, the study can provide insight on how globalization has affected and aided terrorism in different areas and to what extent it has done so.

1.3 Problem Statement and Focus

Globalization has drastically changed the world we live in, making it increasingly interdependent, and facilitating improved communications as well as the easy movement of people, goods and money across borders. However, these effects of globalization have also

created heightened insecurity as well as permissive environments for terrorist acts. There has been an increasing focus on certain states in Africa, as these states are seen as being vulnerable to terrorism. Furthermore, states such as Nigeria and Somalia have seen an upsurge in violence perpetrated by terrorist organizations. This has become a matter of increased concern not only for the aforementioned and neighbouring states, but also for the entire global community.

1.4 Goals, variables, theoretical point of departure, research questions and hypothesis

The goal of this study is to develop a better understanding of the link that exists between globalization, security and national/international terrorism. In addition, this study aims to determine why and how globalization has affected national/international terrorism in, and emanating from Somalia as a result of the actions of Al Shabaab and in, and emanating from northern Nigeria as a result of the actions of Boko Haram.

1.4.1 Variables

This study will utilize one independent variable namely globalization and one dependent variable namely terrorism/terrorist groups. In addition, this study will examine two cases namely Al Shabaab, focusing on the acts and operational procedures of Al Shabaab from January 2008 to June 2015; and Boko Haram, focusing on the acts and operational procedures of Boko Haram from July 2009, when Boko Haram rose to prominence, to June 2015. Thus, by looking at the independent and dependent variables as well as the two cases it is clear that this study supports the opinion that globalization influenced and possibly exacerbated national/international terrorism in Somalia from January 2008 to June 2015 and in Nigeria from July 2009 to June 2015.

1.4.2 Theoretical Point of Departure

In his book, *Hyperconflict: Globalization and Insecurity*, James H. Mittelman (2010:1) argues that there is undoubtedly a relationship between globalization and security/insecurity. He further argues that globalization has set in motion the phenomenon of *hyperconflict* as insecurity has become an increasing problem. This research study will employ as a theoretical point of departure Mittelman's argument that globalization has brought about a situation of hyperconflict. In addition to employing Mittelman's argument of hyperconflict, this study

will also make use of Zimmermann's (2011) work, specifically his heuristic causal model of linkages between globalization and terrorism.

1.4.3 Research Question and Sub-research Questions

The main research question that this study aims to address and elaborate on is: *How and to what extent has globalization contributed to the creation of a permissive environment in which terrorism has thrived in Somalia and northern Nigeria respectively?* A number of sub-questions will be used to facilitate the answering of the main research question.

The sub-questions are as follows:

1. *Has globalization acted as a facilitator or a deterrent of national/international terrorism in, and emanating from Somalia and northern Nigeria respectively?*
2. *How has globalization aided and facilitated national/international terrorism in, and emanating from Somalia and northern Nigeria?*
3. *How has globalization served as an incentive for national/international terrorism in, and emanating from Somalia and northern Nigeria?*
4. *Which other factors have aided globalization in facilitating national/international terrorism in, and emanating from Somalia and northern Nigeria respectively?*

By finding and investigating the answers to the above questions, this study aims to fill the knowledge gap pertaining to the link between globalization and terrorism in the regions of West and East Africa respectively.

1.4.4   Hypothesis

In current research there are two leading and contrasting arguments with regard to the effect of globalization on terrorism. The first argues that globalization has led to and facilitated national/international terrorism. A prominent proponent of this argument is Audrey Cronin (2003); her views will be discussed in greater detail in the subsequent chapter. In contrast, the second argues that globalization has in fact deterred acts of both national and international terror. A study conducted by Li and Schaub (2004), found that the economic development of countries and their trading partners reduces the number of terrorist incidences in a country, which essentially promotes the idea that economic globalization promotes development

which deters terrorism.[1] Furthermore, existing literature also argues that other factors such as failed states and porous borders are to blame for the acts of terror that the world has witnessed and is currently witnessing. This research study hypothesizes that (1) in certain countries, and under specific circumstances globalization has led to and/or provided a permissive environment in which national/international terrorism has thrived. Furthermore, it hypothesizes that globalization leads to and/or facilitates national/international terrorism in, and emanating from Somalia and northern Nigeria respectively.

1.5 Research Design and Methodology

Following the theoretical framework based on the work of Mittelman (2010) and Zimmermann (2011) this comparative study will seek to determine the link that exists between globalization and terrorism. Thus, the question of whether or not globalization is responsible for facilitating and encouraging terrorist activity will be explored through the comparison of Boko Haram in Nigeria with that of Al Shabaab in Somalia, specifically with regards to their activities. The study will examine the terrorist activities of both groups through the examination and analysis of secondary material, including scholarly articles, news reports and the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) (open-source database that logs and includes information on terrorist attacks around the world, dating from 1970 to 2014) (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2015a). Furthermore, it will examine how the different facets of globalization impacted the activities of the respective terrorist groups. It will do so by looking at the motivations behind their actions as well as the specific targets of attack.

This research study utilizes a comparative case study design. This design examines in rich detail the context and features of two or more instances of specific phenomena, in the case of this research study instances of globalization and terrorism in the areas of Somalia and Nigeria respectively. The goal of this design is to discover contrasts, similarities, or patterns across the cases (Campbell, 2009:174). Thus, this research study aims to discover whether the same facets of globalization has facilitated/encouraged terrorism or whether completely different facets played a part in facilitating/encouraging terrorist activities in the cases of Al Shabaab in Somalia and Boko Haram in Nigeria. Furthermore, these discoveries may in turn contribute to the confirmation of theory, namely Mittelman's *theory of hyperconflict* and

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[1] It is however important to note that this study only considers economic globalization and that its dataset precedes the upsurge in terrorism.

Zimmermann's *heuristic causal model of linkages between globalization and international terrorism* in this research study.

This study contains elements that are characteristic of descriptive, explanatory and exploratory studies. The purpose of the study is primarily descriptive and explanatory. The elements of a descriptive study are evident, as this study will present details with regard to the link that exists between globalization and terrorism by indicating how globalization has facilitated national/international terrorism in, and emanating from Somalia and northern Nigeria respectively; in other words, determining which aspects of globalization have played a role in facilitating/encouraging terrorist activities in, and emanating from the aforementioned regions. In addition, elements of explanatory research are present in this study, as it also seeks to determine why globalization has specifically aided national/international terrorism within and emanating from the aforementioned regions. Finally, this study contains some elements of an exploratory study. This is realized within the study through its attempt to establish whether other factors have assisted globalization in "aiding" national/international terrorism in, and emanating from Somalia and northern Nigeria, respectively.

Sufficient data relating to the terrorist activities of both Boko Haram and Al Shabaab can be found in the GTD. When searching for incidents perpetrated by the aforementioned one is able to apply a further filter where one can look at the attacks according to a specific target type, for example educational institutions, police, government and military amongst others. The data obtained from these searches in addition to scholarly articles and news reports will assist in determining whether or not globalization has played and attributing role in encouraging terrorism because the choice of target can inform about the "feelings" of these two terrorist groups towards for example educational institutions. This will be covered in sections *4.4.1 Threat of Corrupt Culture* and *5.4.1 Threat of Corrupt Culture*. As will be seen in these sections globalization did not necessarily encourage a terrorist attack, but its symbolism or relation to globalization informed the choice of target.

This research study will employ a distinctly qualitative method since it involves the collection and analysis of information from a relatively small number of cases (Burnham, Gilland Lutz, Grant & Layton-Henry, 2008:40). It will also rely on secondary material, using the material as a point of departure, and analysing it to gain a better understanding of the subject matter so as to determine areas in which new literature can be developed.

1.5.1 Time Dimension

In terms of time dimension, this study will utilize a longitudinal case study design. The reasoning behind the selection of this particular design is that it enables one to focus the research of the study and to study the topic area in depth (Burnham *et al*., 2008:63). This research study will examine the effect that globalization has had on national/international terrorism in, and emanating from northern Nigeria within the time period of July 2009 to June 2015. This is due to the fact that Boko Haram rose to prominence during July 2009. In addition, this research study will also examine the effect that globalization has had on national/international terrorism in, and emanating from the Horn of Africa, specifically Somalia, from January 2008 to June 2015. The rationale behind choosing this time frame is, that since early 2008, Al Shabaab has transformed itself into a movement that has embraced international terrorism and has endeavoured to portray itself as part of Al Qaeda's global war against the West (Wise, 2011:1).

1.5.2 Units of Analysis

There are numerous units of analysis that will be employed in this research study. The first unit of analysis that will be employed is Somalia (Horn of Africa) as a region. The second unit of analysis that will be employed is northern Nigeria (West Africa) as a region. The third unit of analysis that will be utilized is terrorist organizations involved in acts of terror in, and emanating from Somalia and northern Nigeria, respectively. These organizations can be identified as Al Shabaab and Boko Haram respectively. The last unit of analysis relates to the period of time, July 2009 to June 2015 in the case of Boko Haram and northern Nigeria, and 2008 to June 2015 in the case of Al Shabaab and Somalia.

1.6 Key Concepts[2]

Globalization:

There are varying definitions of the concept of globalization. It is often seen as the phenomenon responsible for "shrinking" the world, while it simultaneously results in an increased amount of interaction between the different actors that are at play in the world (Ervin & Smith, 2008:5). Zimmermann (2011:S152) argues that globalization can be defined as a process, which leads to the extension and intensification of the exchange of goods,

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[2] The concepts of globalization, terrorism, domestic terrorism and international terrorism will be discussed in greater depth in *Chapter 2: Literature Review.*

persons and ideas. Some scholars have also argued that globalization has often been seen to encompass the Westernization, as well as the Americanization of the world (Nassar, 2005:7; Steger, 2013:1). According to Al-Rodhan and Stoudmann (2006:5), "[g]lobalization is a process that encompasses the causes, course, and consequences of transnational and transcultural integration of human and non-human activities." Baylis, Smith and Owen (2014:9) agree that globalization can be seen as a process that results in increasing interconnectedness (integration) between societies. However, they add that the increasing interconnectedness between societies causes "events in one part of the world [to] increasingly have effects on people and societies far away" (Baylis, Smith & Owen, 2014:9). Even though the aforementioned definitions are "different," the majority of the definitions agree that globalization leads to increasing contact/integration/connectivity among people.

Terrorism:

This is a politically loaded and widely contested concept, which still lacks a universally agreed upon definition. As a result, hundreds of often diverging definitions of terrorism exist (Schmid, 2011a:694). Terrorism can be seen to constitute illegitimate acts or threats of violence perpetrated against targets, individuals or property, in order to coerce government or societies for political objectives (Cilliers, 2003:91). The targets of terrorism are often seen to carry a symbolic meaning (Rasmussen, 2002:324). It is in most cases used as a tactic by a minority grouping (either in power or trying to attain power) that is lacking patience, willingness, public support and/or the ability to employ more morally acceptable instruments to exert political influence (Schmid, 2011a:694).

Domestic Terrorism:

Domestic terrorism[3] takes place when illegitimate acts or threats of violence are perpetrated within the confines of a state's national boundaries, and does not include targets or agents from abroad (Sandler, 2011:280).

International Terrorism:

International terrorism occurs when two or more states, either through target or perpetrator, are involved in illegitimate acts or threats of violence (Aubrey, 2004:13). These acts or threats of violence include incidents where terrorists cross national borders to strike foreign targets, and select victims or targets because of their connections to a foreign country (for

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[3] Domestic and national terrorism are used interchangeably.

example diplomats). However, terrorists do not necessarily need to cross national borders and attack targets for it to constitute an act of international terrorism; for example, if the target is a consulate or embassy it can be considered as an act of international terrorism (Schmid, 2011a:646).

Terrorist:

An individual (in most cases a young male, but rarely a female) who uses (or threatens to use), as an individual or as part of a group, interpersonal violence, in most cases against civilians, in an attempt to intimidate or coerce third parties (for example a government, section of society, or international organization) as part of a strategy to achieve political objectives. These individuals prefer to refer to themselves in positive terms such as jihadists, and mudjahedeen, amongst others (Schmid, 2011a:694).

Terrorist Organization:

Any group that practises national or international terrorism.

Al Qaeda:

Al Qaeda is a global militant Islamist organization that is responsible for terrorist attacks across the globe; it was founded in 1989 as an organization devoted to fighting Soviets in Afghanistan (Mishal & Rosenthal, 2005:4). Al Qaeda has been described as being "a rather loose association of radical Salafist[4] Islamist groups operating in many countries around the world that revere founding members such as Saudi-born Osama Bin Laden, Egyptian-born Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the late Jordanian/Palestinian figure Abdullah Azzam, and is led by a transnational coterie of veterans of Islamist struggles around the world" (Piazza, 2009:66). Their most notable act of terrorism occurred on September 11th 2001 when their operatives flew two planes into the World Trade Centre in New York and another plane into the Pentagon, the US Department of Defence (Byman, 2015:31;34).

Al Shabaab:

Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahidin, commonly known as Al Shabaab, is an Al Qaeda affiliated organization that has rapidly risen to prominence especially in the wake of the 2006

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[4] Those Sunni Muslims who are interested in returning to the beliefs and practices of the original Islamic community founded by the Prophet Mohammed in the 7th Century (Caryl, 2012). In addition, Salafist Islam strongly rejects the West and Western culture, whilst also believing in the use of direct action to purify Islam of false believers as well as reinstating Islam across the world Islamic community (Thomson, 2012:51).

Ethiopian invasion of Somalia (Wise, 2011:1). It developed as an offshoot of the Islamic Courts Union in Somalia. The organization operates in the Horn of Africa region, most prominently in Somalia and Kenya. Its principal objective is to establish a Somali Caliphate in Somali inhabited areas in the Horn of Africa (Ali, 2008:3).

Boko Haram:

A Sunni Islamic sect/terrorist group operating in the area of Northern Nigeria, they are mostly based in the north-eastern states of Yobe and Borno. The name of the group has been contested, as the group's full, formal name is 'Jamaˉʾatu Ahlis Sunnah Laˉdda'awatih wal-Jihad', translated to 'People Committed to the Propogation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad' (Elden, 2014:414). The group has been given a variety of names such as the Nigerian Taliban; however the name that has stuck is Boko Haram, a name that was allegedly given to the group by their neighbours in Maiduguri. When translated from Hausa it roughly means "Western education is forbidden" (Walker, 2012:3). However, the group has contested this meaning, as they contended that it actually means, "Western Civilization is forbidden" (Onuoha, 2012:136). Their ultimate goal is to rid the Nigerian state of any traces of Western values and to establish a socio-political system based on a traditional Islamic model, which implements strict Sharia law (Onapajo & Uzodike, 2012:28).

Horn of Africa[5]:

A region in Africa that comprises Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Uganda, South Sudan and Sudan (International Crisis Group, 2015a). Many, especially the US, have considered the region to be a major source of terrorism (United States Institute for Peace, 2004).

West Africa[6]:

A region in Africa that comprises Nigeria, Niger, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Benin, Cabo Verde, The Gambia, Ghana, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo (ECOWAS, 2015).

1.7 Limitations of the Study

One limitation of this study pertains to the conceptualisation of a key term, namely terrorism. There is a wide variety of definitions for the term, as will be seen in the following chapter. Zimmermann (2011:S153) states that national and international acts of terror are often not

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[5] *See* map of the Horn of Africa in Appendix B.
[6] *See* map of West Africa in Appendix D.

sufficiently distinguished, and ethnocentric definitions are often applied. For example, the Counterterrorism Center "fails" to report a large number of incidents of terrorism, which involve non-state groups in Africa and elsewhere, since citizens of the US are not involved. The fact that many definitions of international terrorism have an ethnocentric or geographical bias can be seen as a significant limitation/shortcoming. Since these definitions are applied when measuring and reporting on acts of international terrorism, a number of acts of terrorism that do not fit the definition/description are not measured or taken into account. Thus, the data recorded/measured does not give us an accurate presentation of the number of incidents of international terrorism and in turn makes it difficult to determine whether terrorism has increased. It is thus important to develop an inclusive definition of international terrorism to ensure that measurement is more accurate. Furthermore, in order to overcome this limitation, this study will make an effort to consult data which makes use of the most inclusive definition of terrorism.

Another limitation pertains to gaining primary data. The nature and subject area of this study makes it almost impossible to conduct interviews with the individuals and groups involved in terrorism. First, safety may be considered a concern as these groups are known to take hostages, especially female hostages. Furthermore, these groups might not be willing to speak to a "Westerner" given their belief that everything pertaining to the West is corrupt. In addition, the cost of travel to and accommodation in these two areas may also be considered not feasible. This limitation can be remedied to an extent by using the material of some scholars who have been able to conduct interviews with former members of these terrorist organizations.

The accuracy of reporting in northern Nigeria also presents a limitation. Since former President Goodluck Jonathan instituted a state of emergency, communication, including that of mobile phone networks has been limited. To further complicate matters, large areas in the north are out of bounds to Nigerian and Western media (Elden, 2014:419). This will be remedied by ensuring the use of a reliable news agency, and cross-checking reports with other news agencies.

1.8 Outline of the study

This research study will consist of six different chapters. *Chapter 1: Introduction* has been dealt with above and mainly serves the purpose of introducing the reader to the topic of this research study by providing a brief background. It also informs the reader of the significance

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that this study holds. Furthermore, it outlines the goals of this study, the questions it will attempt to answer, and the methods used.

Chapter 2: Literature Review aims to inform the reader of the research that has been done on the topics of security, terrorism and globalization. It also serves the purpose of familiarizing the reader with key terminology that will be employed in this research study. In addition, it will indicate how these phenomena are connected and how they influence one another.

Chapter 3: The Age of Hyperconflict and the Globalization-Terrorism Nexus. This chapter seeks to determine how the phenomena of globalization and terrorism are connected and how they have become increasingly interdependent. This chapter will, amongst others, make use of the Mittelman's *Hyperconflict: Globalization and Insecurity* to further develop the argument that globalization and terrorism are inextricably linked and that the former leads to a situation of hyperconflict. It will also examine Zimmermann's causal model for links between globalization and terrorism.

Chapter 4: Al Shabaab: Proof of the Dark Side of Globalization. This chapter will focus specifically on how globalization has impacted the security environment and created a permissive environment in which acts of terror can take place within Somalia. It will seek to determine how the different effects of globalization have enabled Al Shabaab to commit acts of terror more easily. Furthermore, it will examine whether globalization and its effects have encouraged the organization to commit acts of terror. It will also explore how globalization itself has served as a motivating factor in the rise of Al Shabaab, specifically relating to its anti-Western stance.

Chapter 5: Boko Haram: The Scourge of Globalization. This chapter will focus specifically on how globalization has exacerbated insecurity in Nigeria, especially northern Nigeria where Boko Haram operates. It will seek to determine how the different facets of globalization have enabled Boko Haram to commit acts of terrorism more easily. Furthermore, it will look at how increasing Westernization, which is often equated to globalization, has influenced the terror campaign of Boko Haram, specifically as an incentive for acts of terrorism.

Chapter 6: Comparison and Analysis. This chapter will compare the two case studies addressed in Chapters 4 and 5. The purpose of this comparison will be to determine in which ways globalization has affected the two regions and groups; in other words, whether the same or different facets of globalization facilitated and/or encouraged terrorism in these two regions.

Chapter 7: Evaluation and Conclusion. The last chapter will serve as a conclusion to this research study. It will revisit the questions that were set out in the first chapter and determine whether these questions have been answered satisfactorily. Furthermore, it will provide recommendations for future research.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to lay the foundation for the rest of the study. Furthermore, it aims to provide the reader with a background for this specific area of study. It will do so by providing an overview and appraisal of existing scholarship on the various topics relating to this area of study, namely security. By appraising published literature, it will be possible to identify strengths and weaknesses, in other words determine which areas have been well researched and documented, and which have not. This will assist in pinpointing the gaps in existing literature. The topics that will be examined include: security, globalization, terrorism, and the link between globalization and security. Furthermore, there will be an appraisal of literature examining the different ways in which globalization has facilitated and possibly encouraged the occurrence of terrorism, both domestically and internationally. Thereafter, a brief overview of terrorism in the regions of the Horn of Africa and northern Nigeria will follow.

2.2 Security

The following section will briefly review existing scholarship on security, focusing particularly on the difficulty of finding an agreed upon definition, the key features of security and how the scope of security has broadened. According to Rudolph (2003:4) security has been the cornerstone in the study of international relations, essentially its *raison d'être*. However, like many other concepts in Political Science, it has been and continues to be notoriously difficult to define/conceptualize. Security is a social construction, thus the term security has no meaning in itself; rather it is given a specific meaning by people within the emergence of an intersubjective consensus. As a result, over the course of time the term comes to have a particular meaning, although it may change over time (Sheehan, 2005:5). In spite of the efforts by scholars to conceptualize the notion of security in a coherent manner, no one generally acceptable definition of security has yet been produced. In addition to the term being highly contested, some scholars have argued that the term is underdeveloped, so much so that it is inadequate for use. One of the reasons for this situation is attributed to the fact that the term is simply too complex to garner attention and has thus been neglected in favour of other concepts (Transnational Terrorism, Security & the Rule of Law, 2007:15). A

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further problem that Sheehan (2005:5) identifies is that the meaning of security has often been treated as being obvious and nonsensical.

There is much debate and controversy surrounding the conceptualization of security; the debate exists between those who wish to widen the scope of security and those who wish to keep the scope narrower. The "wide" versus "narrow" debate developed from an increasing dissatisfaction with the extreme narrowing of the field of security studies, which was forced onto the field by the Cold War's military and nuclear obsessions (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998:2). The traditional realist approach (narrow) was viewed as being increasingly unsatisfactory in its own terms and as a result of it ignoring important aspects of an international policy agenda (Sheehan, 2005:2). The argument for widening the field was soon followed by a plea from traditionalists (those wishing to keep the scope of security narrow and focused on military security) to confine security studies to issues that were centered on the threat or use of force. Their key argument was that a progressive widening of security could lead to the endangerment of the intellectual coherence of security, loading it to the extent that the essential meaning of security would become void. Traditionalists feared that if non-military issues were to achieve security status, there would be undesirable and counterproductive effects on the entirety of social and international relations (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998:2). By destroying the intellectual coherence of security, it would be even more difficult to find solutions to any of the problems "listed" in a wider conception of security. Traditionalists continue to argue for the primacy of military security; however, they have accepted the need to look at, and address, non-military causes of conflict in the international system and have not made much of an attempt to defend the centrality of the state in security studies, this is probably due to so many non-state actors playing a part in the "military game" (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998:3). Buzan, a widener, has argued for retaining a "distinctively military subfield of strategic studies within a wider security studies" Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998:2).

Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde (1998:5) argue that there is a need to "construct a conceptualization of security that means something much more specific than just any threat or problem." Threats and vulnerabilities can arise from various areas; however, in order to be classified as a security issue they must adhere to strictly defined criteria that distinguish them from those which are merely political. These threats/vulnerabilities have to be presented as existential threats to a referent object (the particular individual, group etcetera that is the target of the threat) "by a securitizing actor [such as the United Nations Security Council]

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who thereby generates endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise bind" (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998:5; Williams, 2008:6).

The realist tradition has exercised an enormous amount of influence in the field of security studies, which in a sense has provided a baseline for other traditions (Elman, 2008:15). Realists harbour a narrow conception of security where security is defined in terms of states, militaries and the use of threat and force (McDonald 2008:59).

The constructivist tradition argues that security is a social construction, in other words it means different things in different contexts. Two opposing actors will view security differently. It can also be seen as a site of negotiation and contestation, where actors will compete to portray the identity and values of a specific group in such way that it provides a foundation for political action (McDonald, 2008:67). Constructivists view identity and norms as central to the study of security, as the two together provide "the limits for feasible and legitimate political action. Finally, agents and structures are mutually constituted, and because the world is one of our own making, even structural change is always possible even if difficult" (McDonald, 2008:67).

Even though security is an essentially contested and highly politicized concept, it is something that is desired by everyone (Williams, 2008:5; Eckersley, 2009:85). Security is said to imply an absence of threat (Robinson, 2008:1). Williams (2008:5) adds that security is also associated with the alleviation of threats to particular values, especially if those threats, if left unchecked, threaten the survival of a particular referent object. Security also gives individuals/groups the ability to pursue their cherished political and social ambitions (Williams, 2008:6). It is stated that a threat can be seen as "a combination of the capability and intent to do harm or enact violence" (Anderson, 2012:34). He adds that both of these components are required to constitute a threat. Thus, security implies that an individual/group is safe from harm or violent actions. Anderson (2012:33) further states that the scope of security is broadened when looking at security at an international level. The threats now have international, transnational and multinational implications. Thus, threats can constitute the harm of individuals across the globe, even if the threat is only "directly" present in one area.

According to Anderson (2012:33–34), it is also important to determine the agent and target (the referent object) of the particular threat. The agent of terrorism, as a security issue, can be defined as the terrorist or terrorist organization and the target (referent object) as

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individuals/groups/property (whichever the group believes will accomplish their specific goal).

2.2.1 National vs International Security

According to Haftendorn (1991:3) there is no one concept of security; she argues that "national security," "international security," and "global security" refer to different sets of issues. The purpose of this section is then to determine what it is exactly that national and international security respectively entail.

The expression "national security" was coined in the immediate aftermath of World War II; it came to describe the area of public policy concerned with the preservation of state independence and autonomy. Thus, national security was directly related to the maintenance of a state's political independence and freedom of national decision-making (Sheehan, 2005:6). According to Richard Ullman (1983:123) "defining national security [only] (or even [mainly]) in military terms conveys a profoundly false image of reality." He proposes a broader definition:

> A threat to national security is an action or sequence of events that (1) threatens drastically and over a relatively [short] span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or (2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state, or to private non-governmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state (Ullman, 1983:135).

In comparison to national security, international security implies that the security of one state is closely linked to the security of other states, or at the least that of one other state. The security affairs of states are interdependent, so much so that the security of one is strongly affected by the actions of the other(s), and vice versa. Keohane and Nye (1977/1989) cited in Haftendorn, 1991:9) defined this structure as complex interdependence. They make the assumption "that the realization of mutual vulnerability leads to the formation of regular patterns and to the evolution of regimes," namely security regimes (Keohane & Nye, 1977/1989 in Haftendorn, 1991:9). Security regimes are characterized by regular cooperative behaviour on issues relating to the national security of two or more states, which are governed either explicitly or implicitly by norms and rules, which in turn causes states to restrain their actions based on the belief that others will respond (Keohane, 1980:33).

According to Transnational Terrorism, Security & the Rule of Law (2007:19), global/international security is said to represent a program of 'collective security' for the global populace. Thus, international security also relates to ensuring that when one state enhances its security, it does not threaten to reduce the security of a potential adversary; this ensures the maintenance of the overall stability of the international system (Sheehan, 2005:2). International security is more firmly rooted in the traditions of power politics, compared to something like social security. In the context of the traditional-military understanding of security, security is said to be about survival. Thus, it is when an issue is seen to pose an existential threat to a particular referent object "usually, but not necessarily, the state, incorporating government, territory and society" (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998:21).

Furthermore, it is stated that international security can be defined as a situation in which "things which happen in one part of the world do not threaten people who live in another part" (Robinson, 2008:1). In other words, the threat does not spread across borders. This includes safety from a variety of issues including economic, social, ecological and demographic. Thus, international security is no longer defined just by the traditional safety from the threat of war between states; it now includes non-traditional security issues such as terrorism (Transnational Terrorism, Security & the Rule of Law, 2007:19; Robinson, 2008:2).

Mittelman (2011:27) goes further in stating that issues of global/international security go beyond the territorial borders of nation states and these issues function according to a more fluid framework. The context of this framework is characterized by transnational flows, which facilitates policies of deregulation and liberalization that lower barriers to trade (associated with Western capitalism), "and speeded by new technologies." These "increasingly penetrate the jurisdiction of sovereign states" (Mittelman, 2011:27).

Thus, national security relates to the absence of threat to the inhabitants of one state as well as its government, whereas international security relates to the absence of threat to more than one state and to prohibiting the spread of the threat from one state to other states.

2.3 Globalization

The following section will provide a brief overview of the extensive scholarship that has been produced on the topic of globalization. This extensive scholarship could possibly be attributed to different notions regarding the phenomenon and the fact that globalization is something that affects the lives of the global citizenry. The purpose of this section is to

introduce the reader to the phenomenon of globalization, the varying conceptualizations of the phenomenon and the key features associated with it.

The process of globalization is somewhat contested, with scholars disagreeing about whether it is a truly new phenomenon or if it is merely the continuation of a process which has been "underway for centuries" (Rudolph, 2003:1). However, even those who are sceptical concede that even though the world has been globalizing for centuries, the speed and degree to which the world has been globalizing has increased dramatically in the last couple of decades (Rudolph, 2003:1). Furthermore, the exact definition of what globalization constitutes is also contested as scholars have very different conceptions of the term.

Cha (2000:392) argues that one can best understand the phenomenon of globalization as a spatial one. Thus, globalization is not an event, but rather a steady and continuous expansion of processes of interaction and forms of organization, as well as forms of cooperation outside of the traditional boundaries defined by sovereignty (Cha, 2000:392)**.** Some scholars liken globalization to interdependence, others to liberalization, whilst others even liken it to universalization, Westernization and imperialism (Nassar, 2005:3). Many scholars argue that globalization can be identified as the leader in the spread of Western culture and practices around the globe (Nassar, 2005:6). Additionally, as the "modern" practices of the West are spreading, they are replacing the older and more traditional ways of doing things. Furthermore, it is argued that the process of modernization (Westernization) that is associated with globalization can be seen as equivalent to the Americanization of the world (Nassar, 2005:7). Steger (2013:1) agrees with Nassar in stating that globalization encompasses the Westernization and therefore the Americanization of the world.

There are a number of different facets to globalization; Heine and Thakur (2011:2) state that the primary aspect of globalization is concerned with the expansion of economic activities across the boundaries of nation states. This expansion has led to an increasing level of interdependence amongst nations and its citizens, through the "widespread diffusion of technology," as well as an increasing volume of cross-border flows of goods, services, investment and finance. Other aspects of the globalization process include the movement of information, ideas and people as well as cultural exchanges across international boundaries (Heine & Thakur, 2011:2).

According to Ervin and Smith (2008:5) globalization can be seen as the "shrinking" of the globe whilst there is an increasing amount of interaction between the different actors that are

at play in the world. Another scholar adds that globalization can be defined as "an extension and intensification in the exchange of goods, persons, and ideas" (Zimmermann, 2011:S152). Globalization is also said to refer to the diffusion of technology and culture (Li & Schaub, 2004:231). Nassar (2005:2) adds that globalization integrates markets, values, environmental concerns and politics across the globe. Furthermore, Cha (2000:392) argues that globalization can be seen as a spatial reorganization of industry, production, and finance amongst others, which causes local decisions to have a global impact. According to Kay (2004:10), the phenomenon of globalization can be best described as the "creation of a variety of transboundary mechanisms for interaction that affect and reflect the acceleration of economic, political and security interdependence." Thus, decisions made in one state affect the lives of citizens across the globe.

2.4 Globalization and Security

This section will briefly examine and review the available literature on international security and globalization, specifically the impact of globalization on international security. The purpose of this section is to determine whether a link exists between globalization and an increasing decline in both national and international security. It will then be much easier to discuss the potential link between globalization and national/international terrorism, particularly the possible role of globalization in facilitating terrorism by providing permissive conditions and a breeding ground for the emergence and proliferation of national/international terrorism. This section will first examine the views on the link between globalization and international security in the period before 9/11 and then briefly in the period after to determine whether views have altered.

Some scholars are of the opinion that globalization improves security; whilst many others contend that it has created instances of declining international security. Many proponents of globalization view it as a facilitator of economic openness, global culture and political transparency. In addition, it channels common human standards and equality across the globe. This leads to an increasing sense of global proximity, which supposedly leads to cooperation, and increases security worldwide (Kay, 2004:10). In contrast, globalization is often viewed as a tool that large hegemonic states use to implement their economic "primacy" whilst other states lag behind. Thus, globalization is seen as threat (by those that lag behind and are disadvantaged), which must be fought against. States might seek to defend against the so-called threat that globalization poses, as groups or individuals organize to fight against the perceived dangers of globalization (Kay, 2004:10).

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The first literature produced on globalization pre-9/11 has almost solely focused on the economic rather than the security implications of globalization. In addition, at the time little literature was produced that interlinked globalization and international security. Cha (2000:393) argues that the reason for the strong focus on the economic effects of globalization is the fact that its effects are easily visible and can be measured by looking at things such as capital flow and Gross Domestic Product (GDP). On the other hand, when looking at security, the implications and effects of globalization are much more difficult to define and measure. In addition, Rasmussen (2002:332) and Weber, Barma, Kroenig and Ratner (2007:50) argue that one of the major reasons that the literature had not focussed on the security implications was the fact that the post-Cold War world was a unipolar one and no one state was strong enough to challenge the US. Thus, the West did not think it possible for globalization to have any serious security implications, as no one could effectively challenge it.

This belief would however change. Already in 1999, the then Prime Minister, Tony Blair asserted that "globalization [was] not just economic, it [was] also a political and security phenomenon" (Rasmussen, 2002:331). In addition, Cha (2000:394) argues that globalization had significantly altered and widened the scope of international security, as instant communication and transportation, the flow of capital and the exchange of information through advancing technology was now possible. These could be responsible for catalysing dangerous phenomena or empowering certain groups (possibly terrorists). This observation of Cha was spot on, as would be seen on 9/11. Furthermore, with globalization there has been a move away from traditional international security, relating to interstate war (although still prevalent and important), to a fight between substate units such as religious organizations, organized crime and terrorists (Cha, 2000: 393–394). This reflects the fact that non-state groups have been granted increasing power and opportunities to achieve their aims as a result of globalization. Thus, international security no longer relates only to states as it did in the past.

The 9/11 attacks can be seen as a watershed moment, as it realized the fears of what globalization might mean for security and it significantly altered the scope of international security to include non-traditional security concerns (Rasmusssen, 2002:334; Cronin, 2003:30). In addition, these terrorist attacks required policy makers to re-examine the "existing analytical frameworks for understanding the relationship between globalization and security if adequate international responses are to be achieved" (Kay, 2004:10).

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It was only after 9/11 that states, scholars and policy makers were truly aware of the "darker side of globalization" and the implications of globalization for security. In the wake of these attacks, there has been an increasing focus on the implications that globalization has for international security. Kay (2004:21) argues that globalization has acted as a rallying cry for terrorists and has provided them with a means to more easily and effectively carry out their actions. International terrorism now features prominently on the global security agenda, especially that of the US.

2.5 Terrorism

Kill one, frighten ten thousand. – Anonymous (Year Unknown)[7]

Finding a definition for terrorism is not always considered easy, as there are a number of different definitions for the term. According to Schmid (2011b:39) a legal definition for terrorism is still elusive even after being proposed by the League of Nations in 1937. No single definition of terrorism has received the international stamp of approval. Thus, it is not surprising that terrorism is a politically loaded and contested concept for which hundreds of often diverging definitions exist (Schmid, 2011a:694). Schmid (2011b:99) and Easson and Schmid (2011:148) provide over 250 different academic, governmental and intergovernmental definitions of terrorism in *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research*, the definitions range from as early as 1794 – where Robespierre defines terror – to as recently as 2010. The extensive range of definitions provided allows one to see how definitions of terrorism have evolved and developed over time. Furthermore, it allows one to see that an agreed upon definition of terrorism has been elusive for some time and is not merely a contemporary problem. One of the major problems the United Nations has experienced in developing an internationally agreed upon conceptualization of terrorism, is the reservations of Arab and Muslim countries (Schmid, 2011a:694). Hoffman (2006:3) attributes the difficulty in defining terrorism to the fact that the meaning of term has changed so frequently throughout history. The meaning and usage of the term have changed over the course of history in order to accommodate the political discourse of each successive era. Furthermore, the term has become increasingly elusive with the passage of time (Hoffman, 2006:20).

According to Cilliers (2003:91) terrorism can be described as the illegitimate use or threat of violence against individuals or property to coerce governments or societies for the purposes

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[7] Old Chinese saying (Easson & Schmid, 2011:99).

of political objectives. Rogers (2008:173) adds that terrorism also makes use of this fear borne out of the threat of violence to gain public attention. According to Cilliers (2003:91) terrorism is different from other forms of organized criminal behaviour in that its proponents do not act to gain financially or economically. Thus, terrorists act to gain politically or to make a point. In addition, terrorism can be regarded as a premeditated act or actions. It is planned before the terrorist actions are carried out. It does not just occur randomly.

Cronin (2003:33) states that terrorism is characterized by a political nature and objectives, the unexpected use of violence (suicide bombings are very popular) against random targets and innocent non-state actors (civilians). This research study however, does not agree with the notion that targets are seemingly random; the targets against which violence is perpetrated usually have some symbolic meaning. For example the 9/11 attack on the Pentagon is not seen as random by the US. It could possibly be seen as attacking the very core of the US government since the Department of Defence plays such a major role in US politics and foreign policy. Rasmussen (2002:324) also agrees that the targets of terrorism carry symbolic meaning. He argues that Al Qaeda specifically chose to attack the World Trade Center because of its perceived symbolic significance to globalization.

Even though the UN has thus far failed to develop a comprehensive agreed upon definition of terrorism, it has made some progress in combatting terrorism. For example, the Security Council resolution 1566 (2004) includes several measures that will strengthen the role of the UN in its efforts to combat terrorism (United Nations, 2015). The UN has emphasized that achieving a consensus definition within the General Assembly will hold enormous value given the General Assembly's unique legitimacy in normative terms. It is thus important that the General Assembly complete negotiations on a comprehensive convention on terrorism, as soon as possible (United Nations, 2015). This definition of terrorism should include a number of elements, namely: a "[r]ecognition, in the preamble, that State use of force against civilians is regulated by the Geneva Conventions and other instruments, and, if of sufficient scale, constitutes a war crime by the persons concerned or a crime against humanity"; a restatement that acts falling under the previous 12 anti-terrorism conventions are regarded as terrorism, and a declaration that these acts are deemed a crime under international law; furthermore there should be a restatement that terrorism in time of armed conflict is prohibited under Geneva Conventions and Protocols; and reference must also be made to the definitions contained in the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the

Financing of Terrorism and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004) (United Nations, 2015). Lastly, terrorism is described as:

> any action, in addition to actions already specified by the existing conventions on aspects of terrorism, the Geneva Conventions and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004), that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act (United Nations, 2015).

However, Adegbulu (2013:262) raises an important point regarding the limitations of the proposed UN definition of terrorism. The UN definition places much emphasis on the threat of harm to civilians and non-combatants. Thus, this emphasis seems to suggest that certain attacks, such as those perpetrated against peacekeeping forces, police or armed forces, or assassinations of heads of state or government, do not constitute terrorism (Adegbulu, 2013:262). This is a very valid point: if one were to use the UN definition of terrorism one would exclude a major portion of terrorist attacks, for example 42 percent of Boko Haram attacks from 2009 – 2013 were perpetrated against military, police and government (Pate, 2015:18).

In comparison to the UN, the African Union (AU) has developed a definition of terrorism that has been ratified by the majority of member states. According to the then Organization for African Unity (OAU, 1999), as set out in the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, a terrorist act can be defined as:

> (a) any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a State Party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, any person, any number or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is calculated or intended to:
>
> > (i) intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or to act according to certain principles; or □
> >
> > (ii) disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to create a public emergency; or

(iii) create general insurrection in a State. □

(b) any promotion, sponsoring, contribution to, command, aid, incitement, encouragement, attempt, threat, conspiracy, organizing, or procurement of any person, with the intent to commit any act referred to in paragraph (a) (i) to(iii).

The 1999 OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism came into force in December 2002 and to date, 40 Member States have ratified it (African Union, 2012). The AU definition of terrorism is also more comprehensive when compared to the UN definition, as it does not specify persons to be civilians and/or non-combatants. Thus, it includes a wider array of attacks.

The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) defines terrorism as "the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation" (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2015b). This definition is also important, as GTD data will be used in some of the subsequent chapters of this thesis.

Even though there is no universally accepted definition for terrorism, the majority of existing definitions agree that the aim of terrorism is to create an atmosphere of fear, to inspire fear and that it is generally done to achieve some political end.

2.5.1 Domestic Terrorism

Sandler (2011:280) states that domestic terrorism is characterized by perpetrators, targets, victims, venues and audience within the boundaries of the same state. Thus, incidents of domestic terrorism have direct consequences for only the state, its institutions, citizens, property and policies (Enders, Sandler & Gaibulloev, 2011:320). Incidents of domestic terrorism can however have indirect consequences for other states and citizens. Sandler (2011:280) cites the example of a domestic terrorist group kidnapping a local politician in order to encourage political change. Even though the majority of terrorism literature has focused on international terrorism, domestic terrorism also poses a major threat. As a matter of fact, incidents of domestic terrorism far outnumber those of international terrorism (Enders, Sandler & Gaibulloev, 2011:320). Thus, one can conclude that domestic terrorism is clearly a security concern. It is interesting to note that since fairly recently there has not been much coverage of domestic terrorist incidents. According to Enders, Sandler and Gaibulloev (2011:323) incidents of domestic terrorism are more frequent, since they are motivated by

issues that are specific to a country, for example ending an unpopular war. Domestic terrorism is meant to redress specific domestic grievances (Agbiboa, 2013:432).

2.5.2 International Terrorism

According to Schmid (2011a:646), 'international terrorism' is a definitional construct that was developed by B.M. Jenkins and his US colleagues. Jenkins (1974:2) defines the term as "acts of violence or campaigns of violence waged outside the accepted rules and procedures of international diplomacy or war." This definitional construct was later elaborated on and defined as, "those acts in which the terrorists crossed national frontiers to carry out attacks, or attacked foreign targets at home such as embassies or international line of commerce as in airline hijackings" (Schmid, 2011a:646).

The concept of international terrorism had competed with 'transnational terrorism' (in analogy with transnational organised crime), however it has since become dominant, "and is often considered a synonym of terrorism, despite the fact that 90 per cent of terrorist acts are confined to the territory of one state" (Schmid, 2011a:646).

Its relationship to 'transnational terrorism' and 'global terrorism' is not always clear. Terrorist groups operating outside their countries are often termed international terrorists. Acts of international terrorism cover attacks against foreign governments or international organisations, or representatives thereof, as well as attacks against any national of a foreign country (Schmid, 2011a:646).

Aubrey (2004:13) argues that international terrorism can be defined as terrorism that involves the citizens or territory of more than one state. Zimmermann (2011:S153) states that national and international acts of terror are often not sufficiently distinguished and ethnocentric definitions are often applied. For example, the Counterterrorism Center "fails" to report a large number of incidents of terrorism, which involve non-state groups in Africa and elsewhere, since citizens of the US are not involved. The fact that many definitions of international terrorism have an ethnocentric or geographical bias can be seen as a significant weakness/shortcoming. Since these definitions are applied when measuring and reporting on acts of international terrorism, a number of acts of terrorism that do not fit the definition/description are not measured or taken into account. Thus, the data recorded/measured does not give us an accurate presentation of the number of incidents of

international terrorism and in turn makes it difficult to determine whether terrorism has increased. It is thus important to develop an inclusive definition of international terrorism, to ensure that measurement is more accurate.

2.6 Globalization as Facilitator of Domestic/International Terrorism

There are a vast number of scholars and policy makers who are of the opinion, especially post 9/11, that globalization has had serious implications for international security and has led to an increasing number of incidents of terrorism, including domestic and transnational/international acts of terrorism (Li & Schaub, 2004:235). According to Cronin (2003:30) the current outbreak of national/international terrorism is not only a reaction to the effects of globalization, but it is also aided by it. She also mentions that acts of terrorism are no longer enacted by state actors, but rather by non-state actors. Cronin (2003:46) argues that globalization comprises a number of penetrating mechanisms that have been exploited by terrorist networks. These mechanisms include the Internet and the media as well as the increased flow of people and goods.

The following subsections will examine the literature available on the different mechanisms associated with globalization and will discuss how each mechanism has facilitated and/or encouraged acts of international terrorism. The subsections include a discussion of technology as an aid to terrorism, terrorists' use of channels of business and commerce, migration and the increasing "irrelevance" of boundaries and how it has acted as a facilitator, the reason behind poverty and inequality acting as contributors of terrorism, and finally the threat of "corrupt" culture and how it has encouraged terrorism.

2.6.1 Technology as Aid

Globalization brings with it an increased availability of and access to information communications technology (ICT). As time progresses, availability of and access to cheap/affordable ICT and other Internet services increases. The following subsection will focus specifically on the way in which technology, mainly ICT, has aided/facilitated acts of international terrorism. According to Heine and Thakur (2011:4) the forces of globalization have unleashed "the infrastructure of uncivil society and accelerated the transnational flows of terrorism." Since globalization is effectively driven by communication technologies, it allows for the establishment and maintenance of elaborate networks across the globe, but it does not allow for one clear leader (Heine & Thakur, 2011:7).

The use of information technologies such as cellular phones and unofficial or official websites in English has enabled terrorist groups to reach further than ever before and has also led to greater efficiency in their activities. Thus, terrorists now find it much easier to coordinate attacks, recruit potential members and communicate with their "members" (Cronin, 2003:47–48). Terrorists have excelled at using information and telecoms technology to promote their cause and foster their objectives – from websites to satellite phones (Heine & Thakur, 2011:11).

Goodman, Kirk and Kirk (2007:196) state that there are a number of characteristics of the Internet, or cyberspace as they refer to it, that creates an environment conducive to the promotion of the ideas and ideals of terrorist organizations. These include anonymity, confidentiality, accessibility, low costs, intelligent interfaces, ease of use and the "force multiplier" (Goodman, Kirk & Kirk, 2007:196). The Internet provides users with an uncensored and essentially anonymous forum, which they can use as a means of conducting research, gathering intelligence and creating communication networks (Goodman, Kirk & Kirk, 2007:196). Recent studies on terrorist communication have revealed a concern for the protection of anonymity, for example a number of posts on terrorist websites inform "users" of ways in which they can avoid spyware and surveillance (Goodman, Kirk & Kirk, 2007:197).

Furthermore, the free availability of encryption programmes has also provided terrorist organizations with the ability to communicate with one another via secure conduits without "detection." In addition, it is also extremely difficult to effectively track terrorist communications when they are utilising emails, as account information is usually anonymous, or the email messages are encrypted (Goodman, Kirk & Kirk, 2007:197). The increased availability of and access to technology has given individuals/groups (including terrorists) increased access to the outside world. It has made communicating with others across the globe very easy and has effectively "flattened" the world (Goodman, Kirk & Kirk, 2007:197). Since one can communicate through the Internet on a 24-hour basis, it is much easier to communicate plans with individuals elsewhere in the world.

Goodman, Kirk and Kirk (2007:197) argue that in the same way as the Internet and the diffusion of ICT has allowed for increased communication for the purposes of government, industrial and private relations, it has enabled terrorist organizations to enhance communications capabilities and productivity. For example, Al Qaeda made extensive use of

the internet prior to the September 11 attacks in order to recruit new members, coordinate plans, communicate with members and to make online reservations (Goodman, Kirk & Kirk, 2007:198). Zimmermann (2011:S155) adds that the Internet's ability to reach a mass audience has been vital and beneficial to the spread of terrorist propaganda. A number of terrorist organizations produce videos, which are placed on Internet sites, for the purposes of indoctrination and probably recruitment. In 2013, social media, such as Twitter[8] was also exploited by a terrorist organization to make known its aims/reasons. Al Shabaab (Al Qaeda's proxy in Somalia) used Twitter to announce that they were responsible for the attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya. They also tweeted, "Kenyans were relatively safe in their cities before they invaded us & killed Muslims #Westgate" (Karimi, Almasy & Leposo, 2013). This tweet gives a clue to the reason behind the attack. The group also tweeted updates of the attack (the account was suspended shortly after) (Karimi, Almasy & Leposo, 2013).

Strange (1998:25) adds that technology such as computers; chips and satellites have significantly altered the structure of international finance. It has significantly reduced the risks that have been associated with illegal international financial transactions. In addition, the costs associated with financial transactions have been reduced significantly, which has facilitated coordination and has made travel and immigration arrangements easier and cheaper (Zimmermann, 2011:S155). Furthermore, the digitization of money that has come about has allowed for the immediate transfer of money across international borders and has led to a significant decrease in the likelihood of being caught in the transportation and use of illegally obtained funds (Strange, 1998:25). Zimmermann (2011:S155) further argues that the ease of travel and money transfers, amongst others, has made a significant contribution to international terrorist groups being persistent and able to replenish their resources.

In addition, cyberspace has also created an avenue for a new type of terrorism to emerge, namely cyberterrorism. Cyberterrorism is defined as the use of computers as weapons, or in some cases, as targets, by individuals/groups whose aim is to threaten or cause violence and create fear for the purpose of influencing a specific audience (Goodman, Kirk & Kirk, 2007:195). These attacks come in various forms, for example: DDOS (distributed denial of service) attacks, which shut down parts of information infrastructure; and the use of

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[8] Twitter is a type of microblogging, in which users may post tweets of up to one hundred and forty characters. These tweets are displayed on the user's profile and can be viewed by either followers or any member of Twitter, depending on the privacy settings. These followers can then retweet the message to their followers and so on. This enables the messages to spread across the globe. Twitter makes use of hashtags (#) and users use hashtags to denote what the tweet is about, for example, the topic. Other Twitter users can then do a search based on a specific hashtag and all the tweets with that specific hashtag appear on the search results.

cyberspace as a means compromising information infrastructure to generate disaster, for example interfering with air traffic control. Although these attacks have not been as devastating as traditional terrorist attacks, they are on the rise. It is also noted that the use of cyber-attacks in conjunction with traditional terrorist attacks could have a more devastating impact (Goodman, Kirk & Kirk, 2007:201–202). For example, if terrorists were to detonate a bomb and interfere with or shut down the communications infrastructure of emergency services, there would possibly be a larger number of casualties as emergency services would not be reached and would be unable to respond.

The increased availability of and access to ICT, specifically the Internet, has made it much easier for terrorist organizations to communicate, plan and coordinate attacks. Thus, globalization has essentially aided terrorists in their aims and could be said to have facilitated international terrorism. Furthermore, the mere existence and evolution of cyberspace has created a new type of terrorism that could possibly be used in conjunction with traditional terrorist attacks. It is however important to note that technology has not encouraged international terrorism, but that it has only aided/facilitated it.

2.6.2 Using Channels of Business and Commerce

It is argued that globalization has also allowed terrorist organizations to move and reach across international borders in the same way that business and commerce do. In addition, terrorist organizations often make use of the same channels as business and commerce. For example, the dropping of barriers has enabled terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda to move without prohibition across borders and establish terrorist cells in states around the globe (Cronin, 2003:48). This subsection will very briefly discuss the ways in which terrorist organizations take advantage of these channels and how these channels have facilitated their plans for terrorist attacks.

Li and Schaub (2004:235) state that international terrorists frequently make use of the international trade network in order to market goods and services in an attempt to gather resources which will assist them in carrying out acts of terror. Furthermore, many terrorist organizations make use of and rely on the network of international trade to trade illegal/smuggled goods in order to finance terrorist operations. In addition, the nature of international investment and distribution networks, which has become more fluid, makes the trading of illegal goods less risky and thus more likely (Matthew & Shambaugh, 1998 cited in

Li & Schaub, 2004:235). Thus, these channels aid terrorist organizations in building up their resources and funds.

The literature on this aspect of globalization is limited and needs further examination and proof to determine to what extent terrorist organizations make use of the channels of business and commerce in advancing their agenda. Furthermore, it could also be beneficial to determine how exactly they make use of these channels.

2.6.3 Migration and the "Irrelevance" of Boundaries

Abrahamsen (2004:678) also agrees with the notion that the process of globalization has aided international terrorism. She states that terrorist attacks have shown that globalization presents many dangers, as the world is "shrinking" and boundaries are becoming increasingly irrelevant since globalization has allowed for the easy flow of people and goods across borders (Abrahamsen, 2004:678). This subsection will discuss migration as a mechanism of globalization and how it has facilitated/encouraged international terrorism. The ease of migration is inextricably linked to the growing "irrelevance" of boundaries.

Adamson (2006:165) argues that since globalization has allowed for the "free" and easy flow of people across borders, migration flows can be seen as a channel for international terrorism. This is highlighted in the example of the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon. The "migration channel" allowed 19 terrorists to travel to, live and train in the US in preparation for the attacks. Even though some scholars showed interest in the relationship between globalization, migration and security; one could argue that in the period before 9/11 the link between migration across borders (facilitated by globalization) and international terrorism was not much of a concern (Adamson, 2006:165).

The link between these components was further reinforced by the terrorist bombings of trains in Madrid in 2004 and the transport network in London in 2005 respectively (Adamson, 2006:166). It is argued that the "migration channel" can interact with other factors in a number of ways that exacerbate the conditions responsible for generating violence, including terrorism. One of the most prominent is the fact that it allows for opportunities for networks of organized crime, including terrorist networks to develop. Furthermore, it also acts as a conduit for international terrorism (Adamson, 2006:191). In the post-9/11 era the lens of international terrorism is increasingly used when answering questions related to migration and security. Adamson (2006:195) argues that immigration and terrorism undoubtedly shares

a link, not because all immigrants are considered terrorists, but because the majority of terrorists in the West have been immigrants. She also further states that migration networks and policies provide terrorist organizations with opportunities to pursue their aims/goals. Adamson is correct in stating that migration flows/channels act as facilitators of international terrorism and greatly "simplify" the process of movement across international boundaries.

However, since governments, policy makers and scholars are aware of the links that exist between migration and international terrorism they introduced mechanisms to prevent entry of possible terrorists into their borders. For example, the cost of applying for a visa to certain countries is relatively expensive, background checks are done on visa applicants (especially males above the age of 16), and "random" (strong focus on individuals of Middle Eastern descent) searches are conducted at airport checkpoints as well as scans of luggage. One could then also argue that these mechanisms will not discourage terrorists, but could possibly act as obstacles and could result in detection.

In addition, Kagwanja (2006:75) argues that the geographical proximity to the Middle East of regions such as the Horn of Africa, have exacerbated the influx of undetected terrorists. This proximity, in addition to the "irrelevance" of boundaries, aids in the movement of terrorist agents and "goods" within and across the region as well as between states. Furthermore, many states in the Horn of Africa region suffer from porous borders, which facilitate the migration of people from one state to another. A recent example, which relates to porous borders, migration and terrorism, was the Westgate Mall attack, which was mentioned previously. The Al Shabaab militants responsible consist of a number of nationalities (American, Canadian, Finnish, Somalian and Kenyan) and were trained in Somalia, where the terrorist cell is situated (Karimi, Almasy & Leposo, 2013). The fact that the militants came from countries across the world showcases the ease with which individuals can "migrate" across international borders. Furthermore, one can cite porous borders as possibly facilitating these militants in moving from Somalia into Kenya.

It is clear that migration flows, facilitated by globalization, have played a major part in aiding/facilitating the movement of terrorists/terrorist organizations across borders. These migration flows have enabled terrorists to travel to the destinations they wish to attack. Other factors such as proximity and porous borders have further facilitated the process of migration and have in turn facilitated terrorism. It is important to note that migration flows have not necessarily encouraged terrorism; they have simply made travel easier for the perpetrators.

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2.6.4 Increased Inequality and Poverty

Nassar (2005:103) states that the 21st century directed the world through the "gates" of globalization, after which it felt the "flames" of terrorism flaring beyond it. He argues that globalization acts as a breeder of terrorism by leaving people behind. Heine & Thakur (2011:3) argue that the growing economic interdependence is highly asymmetrical, in other words the benefits/advantages of globalization are not equally distributed amongst all states in the world. Thus, it creates winners and losers and it entails risks as well as providing opportunities. This section will examine the existing scholarship dealing with the issue of how increased inequality and poverty caused by globalization has resulted in increased feelings of dissatisfaction and a tendency towards terrorism.

Globalization has led to increasing inequality and has widened the gap between rich and poor. Not only has globalization created a large number of poor and disinherited people, it has also informed these people of their abject poverty and dispossession (Nassar, 2005:103). Zimmermann (2011:S154) adds that globalization often exacerbates the degree of economic and social inequality and polarization within certain states. Thus, there now comes into existence a group of "losers" who are unable to keep up with the rest of the populace who benefit from globalization, since they have stagnating/declining incomes. Nassar (2005:104) further argues that the combination of globalization with poverty and dispossession has led to frustration and violence, as these people are unable to achieve the dreams associated with globalization. Other scholars also argue that the roots of terrorism can be found in poverty and inequality (economic deprivation). It is argued that poor economic conditions generate frustration, which increases the potential for violence. Furthermore, economic deprivation in the source countries of terrorism is important because terrorist organizations should find it much easier to recruit members, if they are frustrated with their economic circumstances. Economic deprivation can also lower the opportunity costs of violence, as perpetrators have less to lose. On the other hand, economic success might attract terrorism when comparing wealth and poverty globally (Krieger & Meierrieks, 2011:6).

Furthermore, the areas that have been marginalized by globalization have attracted terrorist organizations, as these areas are perceived as weak, easily accessible and susceptible to extremist dogma. Kagwanja (2006:75) states that the abject poverty and deep sense of marginalization that is present in the region of the Horn of Africa has been exploited by terrorist organizations and has allowed them to find fertile ground to spread their extremism

amongst the Muslim minorities. Al Qaeda has also been able to find sanctuary and garner support in a number of areas that have not been "blessed" with the political and economic benefits of globalization (Cronin, 2003:38). These areas have essentially been left behind. Li and Schaub (2004:236) also agree that a primary cause of terrorism, including international terrorism, is underdevelopment and poverty. They argue that these conditions create breeding grounds for terrorists, as dissatisfied peoples turn to terrorist activities as a means of showing dissatisfaction and attempting to find a solution to their problems. Furthermore, they agree with Cronin that states plagued by poverty, underdevelopment and instability attract terrorist organizations, and often provide a safe haven or are unable to expel terrorists from their borders (Li & Schaub, 2004:237).

In addition, Cronin (2003:52) argues that international terrorism originates mostly from the disenfranchised areas of the Arab world. This is not only as a result of religious extremism, but also as a result of feeling left behind by globalization's promises of greater freedom and prosperity. Even though this is true, she fails to mention that large numbers of Africans have also been denied the promises of globalization and have been left behind. It is important to mention Africa, especially West Africa and the Horn of Africa, when discussing international terrorism and the implications of globalization, since these areas have become terrorist hotspots.

2.6.5 Threat of Corrupt Culture

As stated earlier, globalization is often associated with Westernization and Americanization, thus globalization allows for the entry of a foreign and perceived "corrupt" culture. This can alienate certain individuals who do not share in the beliefs associated with this new culture (Zimmermann, 2011:S154). In addition, globalization also includes secularization, consumerism and the growth of market capitalism, which is seen as an assault on the less privileged populations of conservative cultures, the reason being that they are repelled by the major changes that are brought about by the forces of globalization or are dissatisfied by the unequal distribution of benefits (Cronin, 2003:45).

Many individuals/groups perceive globalization as a force that corrupts indigenous customs, languages and religions. They believe that it causes distortions in their local communities. As a result they are apprehensive of globalization and try to fight and ward it off through expressive violence towards objects/people that they perceive as being proponents of globalization (usually Western targets) (Cronin, 2003:45). In 2013, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the

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Al Qaeda leader, published a message that "showcased" the template that terrorists use when planning and implanting operations. One of the key requirements was that the target had to be Western (Cruickshank & Lister, 2013). This can be seen as supporting the argument that terrorist organizations see Westernization as corrupt and something that needs to be fought against.

2.7 Terrorism in the Horn of Africa

The following section will provide a brief overview of existing scholarship on terrorism in the Horn of Africa, specifically Somalia. The purpose of this section is to determine the areas that researchers and scholars have focused on. This will facilitate the identification of gaps in the literature, with specific reference to the influence of globalization on terrorism within Somalia. The first section will briefly examine the historical and regional context, then it will move on to an overview of scholarship's opinion with regards to Somalia being a terrorist hotspot. The last subsection will be an appraisal of existing literature on Al Shabaab.

2.7.1 Historical and Regional Context

The majority of literature available on terrorism in the Horn of Africa/Somalia starts off with an overview and often an in-depth discussion of the historical and regional context/background (Ibrahim, 2010; Møller, 2009). Ibrahim (2010) provides a brief overview of the historical and regional context of the rise of radical Islam in Somalia. He argues that the historical and regional contexts, namely the numerous failed attempts at national reconciliation have created a vacuum which has led to the rise of Islamists, which has most often been negative (Ibrahim, 2010:284) In addition, Møller (2009:2–5) sketches a brief picture of how different external powers have shaped the region throughout the periods of colonial rule, the First World War and the Cold War. The impact that US "rule" has had on Somalia is especially focussed on. Furthermore, he also examines Somali Nationalism as well as clans and identities so as to better understand the current situation (Møller, 2009:12).

In addition, existing scholarship has also dedicated much attention to the so-called War on Terror, especially the American War on Terror, in the Horn of Africa (Møller, 2009). The vast number of articles produced on this topic can undoubtedly be attributed to the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US.

2.7.2 A Hotbed and Safe Haven for Terrorists?

Many scholars ask whether one should actually consider the Horn of Africa, especially Somalia, as a hotbed/safe haven for terrorists (Møller, 2009; Ibrahim, 2010; Falola & Oyebede, 2010). After the 9/11 attacks and the ensuing War on Terror there was much concern over Somalia becoming a safe haven for terrorists given the lack of a central government and a failed state (Menkhaus, 2004:49). There was especially concern that Al Qaeda would exploit the weak political environment of Somalia (collapsed state) and that they would possibly reconstitute an operational base in Sub-Saharan Africa (Falola & Oyebade, 2010:157; Stevenson, 2010; Møller, 2009; Davis, 2007:6). This fear was rightly justified as Somalia has acted as a safe haven for fundamentalist Islamic groups since the late 1980s (Falola & Oyebade, 2010:157). According to a leading commentator, Somalia is like a potential melting pot of recruitment and extremism, that if left unchecked, it will present an increasing danger not only to the region, but also to the US and the West (Murphy, 2011:150).

Møller (2009:8) has however observed that the fear of Somalia becoming a terrorist hotspot is grossly exaggerated. The situation is not nearly as alarming as it is made out to be; in the fact the number of incidents per year is not very high (an average of eleven). He thus argues that the threat from terrorism, specifically Islamic terrorism (where terrorist incidents are largely politically motivated) is overstated and blown out of proportion (Møller, 2009:11). However, the situation seems to have changed. Møller (2009:11) rightly argued that even though the region was not a terrorist hotbed it had the potential to become one. 2013-2015 has delivered terrorist incidents in the region almost weekly and in some cases daily. One could thus argue that the region has in fact "flourished" into a terrorist hotspot. Examples include the 2013 Westgate Mall Attack and the 2015 attack on the Garissa University College (Onuoha, 2013a; Al Jazeera, 2015a).[9]

2.7.3 Al Shabaab

One cannot study terrorism in Somalia, or even the greater Horn of Africa without examining the Al Qaeda affiliated group, Al Shabaab. The majority, if not all, of contemporary literature studying the phenomenon of terrorism in the Horn of Africa examines Al Shabaab. The reason why only the more contemporary scholarship examines Al Shabaab is that the group

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[9] These attacks will be discussed in greater detail in *Chapter 4: Al Shabaab: Proof of the Dark Side of Globalization.*

rose to prominence only fairly recently (late 2000s). The main aspects of Al Shabaab that scholars have focused on are: their origin; the evolution and transformation of the group; their motivation and goals; and their future trajectory. Scholars have also mentioned how certain facets of globalization have facilitated the terrorist activities of Al Shabaab. The purpose of this subsection is to determine what literature has said about Al Shabaab.

2.7.3.1 Origin and Emergence

The first aspect that scholars tend to focus on relates to the origin of the terrorist group. Marchal (2009:381) delves into the phenomenon of radical Islam within Somalia in order to develop an understanding of the dynamics that led to the creation of Al Shabaab. This sets the stage for the origin of the group. According to Roque (2009:2) there is no consensus regarding their exact date of origin. It is however known that the group sprouted as the militant remnant of al Itihaad al Islamiya (AIAI), a Somali Islamist Organization, in the early 2000s (Wise, 2011:3). Two different scholars trace Al Shabaab's origin to 2004 (Marchal, 2009; Mwangi, 2012:518). The group was formally incorporated at an AIAI conference in 2003, but the name "Al Shabaab" only came into use in 2007 (Shinn, 2011:206).

Wise (2011:2) links Al Shabaab's origin to Somalia's tumultuous past, whilst he relates their radicalization and rise to prominence to the Ethiopian invasion in December of 2006. He further states that the period between the Ethiopian invasion on 24 Decemebr 2006 and early 2008 can be marked as the true emergence of the group (Wise, 2011:4). Murphy (2011:149) agrees with Wise in stating that the Islamist group fed off the resentment that Somalis felt towards the presence of the Ethiopian military. In addition, Roque (2009) and Hansen (2013) support their argument. They argue that the presence of the Ethiopian military forces, in addition to that of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces prepared the ground in which organized radical responses could flourish (Roque, 2009:2; Hansen, 2013:5). The creation of Al Shabaab was thus a radical response to the presence of the Ethiopian military. Mwangi (2012) also shares the sentiments of these scholars. The occupation by Ethiopian troops created "a complex cocktail of nationalist, Islamist, anti-Ethiopian, anti-American, anti-Western [and] anti-foreigner sentiments" (Mwangi, 2012:521).

2.7.3.2 Motivation and Goals

Al Shabaab originally emerged as an Islamist-nationalist guerrilla movement dedicated to combatting the insurgence of Ethiopian troops as well as the TFG forces (Wise, 2011:6). This was one of its principal goals/rallying points, but they would have to seek a new means of staying "relevant" with the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops in 2009 (Roque, 2009). The exact aims of the group are somewhat murky and unclearly expressed. However, Wise (2011:6), Mwangi (2012) and Ali (2008) argue that the group aims to establish a Somali Caliphate (Islamic State for Somalis of Somalia, Djibouti, Kenya and Ethiopia). This would entail taking over Somalia and spreading their ideology throughout the Horn of Africa. In addition, they also wish to spread their ideological beliefs onwards to the areas of Central, South and Eastern Africa (Ali, 2008). Wise (2011:6) and Ali (2008) add that the group aims to wage jihad (holy war) against the enemies of Islam; this includes the removal of Western influence (something one can link to globalization), not only in Somalia or even the Horn of Africa, but also throughout the whole of Africa. Furthermore, they also wish to eliminate all other forms of Islam that are not in line with their Salafi-Wahhabist strand (Wise, 2011:6; Ali, 2008).

In order to achieve these goals and to win favour amongst the populace, the group has provided the citizenry with essential services and welfare. They have cleared roadblocks, repaired roads, organized markets and re-established order and a justice system through employing Sharia courts (Roque, 2009:2). By continuously expanding their local community infrastructure and support, Al Shabaab is able to sustain its goal of jihad.

2.7.3.3 Evolution, Transformation and Future Trajectory

A second area that scholarship has examined relates to the evolution and transformation of the Islamist group. According to Wise (2011) Al Shabaab underwent major changes starting from 2008. Marchal (2009:399) adds that the Global War in Terror acted as a facilitator for Al Shabaab's rapid development as well as their use of brutal tactics. He argues that if it were not for the War on Terrorism, Al Shabaab would have ended up as a group of radical militants isolated within their own society. The attitude of Western states and the recurrent weaknesses of other Islamist groups enabled Al Shabaab to grow dramatically (Marchal, 2009:399).

Another change would come as the group evolved from a local movement into an Al Qaeda aligned movement designed to attack Western targets (Wise, 2011:6). Since early 2008 Al Shabaab had been working towards aligning its interests with the Al Qaeda core as well as strengthening ties with them (Wise, 2011:6). It formally joined ranks with Al Qaeda on 12 February 2012 (Mwangi, 2012:519).

Wise (2011:10) predicts that within the next decade the world will probably witness the splintering of Al Shabaab, which will lead to the dispersal of trained and radicalized fighters across the globe.

2.7.3.4 Globalization as Facilitator of Terrorism in Somalia

Some of the literature indirectly links terrorism in Somalia to globalization in the sense that it has helped facilitate the terrorist activities of Al Shabaab. The specific mechanism of globalization that has enabled Al Shabaab to carry out its activities with greater ease is ICT technologies. The group has increasingly used these technologies to propagate their message, to communicate with the global jihadi movement and to recruit new followers (Mwangi 2012:522; Wise, 2011:8, Menkhaus, 2014:324). Furthermore, some scholars have mentioned Al Shabaab's anti-Western sentiments. However, they do not examine this facet in much depth.

2.8 Terrorism in Northern Nigeria

The following section will briefly examine scholarship relating to the study of terrorism in northern Nigeria. The purpose of this section is to determine the areas on which researchers and scholars have focused. This will facilitate the identification of gaps in the literature, with specific reference to the influence of globalization on terrorism in northern Nigeria.

2.8.1 Background/Historical Legacy

Bamidele (2012) and Forest (2012), like many others, link the upsurge in violence, especially terrorist activities, to Nigeria's historical legacy. Bamidele (2012:35) argues that even after more than five decades of independence, the Nigerian population remains divided. The Nigerian state has experienced a number of military coups since independence and ethnic and religious tensions remain high – Nigeria is made up of multitudes of ethno linguistic groups and the state is split between the Christian and Islamic faiths (Forest, 2012:ix). However, the problem of division along religious lines goes further back than Nigerian independence.

According to Waldek and Jayasekara (2011:169) the roots of this division and tension lie in colonial Britain's policy of non-intervention in northern Nigeria. During the colonial period, missionary schools were founded in the south but not the north, this created a separation between the provision and style of education available in these areas. The different types of schooling had and still have a major effect on access to employment wealth and social mobility. Furthermore, throughout northern Nigeria, Western education is most often associated with attempts to convert Muslims and is related to a fear of southern domination (Waldek & Jayasekara, 2011:169). It is thus not surprising that violence runs rampant throughout the Nigerian state.

2.8.2 Factors Fanning the Flames of Terrorism

There are a number of factors that have contributed to the upsurge in violence and terrorism in Nigeria. The first of these factors relates to state failure. A number of scholars have argued that Nigeria is on its way to becoming a failed state like so many others in Africa including Somalia. There are however signs that Nigeria will become Africa's first global superpower (Louw-Vaudran, 2015). Nonetheless, in order to do so it will have to overcome a number of challenges, the most prominent of which are corruption and Boko Haram. Onapajo and Uzodike (2012:31) argue that one can directly link Nigeria's "state failure" to the high level of corruption. Forest (2012:60) argues that corruption is one of the most entrenched and endemic challenges faced by the Nigerian state today. Rampant corruption has significantly weakened citizens' trust in the state and is even celebrated as a political culture. Political elites siphon state resources in order to enrich themselves, thereby oppressing the masses (Onapajo & Uzodike, 2012:31). Forest (2012:35) adds that another factor that has led to violence in the form of terrorist activity in the region is that of inequality with regard to income, employment and provision of basic services.

2.8.3 Boko Haram

The Islamic sect popularly known as Boko Haram, officially "Jama'atul Alhul Sunnah Lidda'wati wal Jihad" (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad), has unleashed a wave of terror upon the populace of Northern Nigeria in the last few years (Agbiboa, 2013:432; Bamidele, 2012:32). This has become a nation-wide and even a global concern, especially with such events as the kidnapping of the Chibok girls. Bamidele (2012:32) mentions that on a daily basis websites, magazines and news channels run stories

as well as pictures of the acts of violence perpetrated by the group. The following subsections will provide a brief overview of the different areas of interest that scholars have focussed on with regard to Boko Haram.

2.8.3.1 Origin and Emergence

Bamidele (2012:35) argues that the group emerged in 2002, even though it only became prominent in 2009. On the other hand, Connell (2012:88) argues that the group was founded much earlier, in 1995, under the original name of "Ahlulsunna wal'jama'ah hijra." It is thus not surprising that the majority of scholars agree that the precise date relating to the emergence of Boko Haram is unclear (Maiangwa, Uzodike, Whetho, & Onapajo, 2012:45; Onuoha, 2012:135). This lack of clarity is as a result of the fact that very few journalists/scholars have been granted the opportunity to interview the group, which in effect makes it necessary to rely on unverified accounts.

The majority of literature on Boko Haram is also somewhat inconclusive with regard to the real purpose behind its creation and existence (Bamidele, 2012:35). Some scholars argue that the group's roots lie in the "Maitatsine" doctrine (a brand of fundamentalist Islam introduced to northern Nigeria in 1945). On the other hand others argue that Boko Haram emerged as a part of the resurgence of Islamic militant movements globally (Bamidele, 2012:35). However, Onapajo and Uzodike (2012:25) dispute the claim that Boko Haram's roots can be found in the Maitatsine group and their uprisings of the 1980s. Hussein Solomon aptly describes the reasons behind the emergence of Boko Haram. He argues that the group emerged in response to local grievances in Nigeria, including: an increasing dissatisfaction with deteriorating living conditions, especially in the north, an unresponsive and corrupt political elite and a Nigerian state that has reinforced religious divisions and has been unable to transcend the many divisions of ethnicity, language and religion (Oyeniyi, 2014:90; Aghedo & Osumah, 2012:861; Cook, 2014:5).

2.8.3.2 Motivations and Goals

One can arguably link the group's motivations to the meaning of their name. Boko Haram is a Hausa term that is loosely translated into "Western education is forbidden." This translation has however been rejected by the group which prefers "Western culture is forbidden," as it is broader and includes education (Agbiboa, 2013:432). As the name suggests, the group is

opposed to everything they believe to have been infiltrated by Western beliefs and values. Boko Haram believes that the infiltration of Western beliefs and values, including Western style education, poses a threat to the traditional beliefs, values and customs of the Muslim communities of northern Nigeria (Forest, 2012:1). According to Oyeniyi (2014:77), the group's hatred of Western education stems partly from a longstanding negative attitude that Muslims of northern Nigeria have harboured against Western education. Thus, the group has vowed to rid the Nigerian state of the corrupt ruling elite (who have been perverted by the decadence of Western culture) and institute what it believes to be religious purity (Agbiboa, 2013:432). Connel (2012:88) adds that the principle objective of the group has been the toppling of the secular Nigerian government and the implementation of a government based on anti-Western Sharia law. In addition, Onapajo and Uzodike (2012:28) argue that the group wants to establish an entire socio-political system based on the Islamic model. In 2014, the group declared the establishment of an Islamic State in northern Nigeria (BBC, 2014a).

The group further expanded their aims following the execution of their leader, Mohammed Yusuf in 2009. Boko Haram now aimed to violently engage with the state security structure as a means of retaliation. The group also stated that they were aiming to convert former President Goodluck Jonathan from Christianity to Islam and evict non-Muslims from northern Nigeria (Oyeniyi, 2014:83). The death of Yusuf arguably led to the further radicalization of the group (Onuoha, 2012:142). The Islamic militant group has been seen to target individuals/objects that it has perceived as being corrupted by Westernization. Although most of its targets are not overtly Western, many of their targets have embraced the "decadence" associated with globalization/Westernization and have turned away from true Islam (Walker, 2012:7). Their aim is thus to purify Islam in the Nigerian state.

2.8.3.3 Other Areas of Focus

Other areas that scholarship has examined relate to the structure, funding and membership of Boko Haram (Connell, 2012; Forest, 2012; Onuoha, 2012, Pate, 2015:23–25). Not much is known about the group's structure, but scholars have briefly discussed the changing leadership (Onuoha, 2012:136). They have argued that very little is publicly known about Boko Haram's sources of finance (Forest, 2012:70; Connell, 2012:88; Stewart & Wroughton, 2014). Connell (2012:88) and Onuoha (2012:137) mention that members had to pay a daily levy to their leaders and other funds came from donations. Forest (2012:71) agrees that much

of the group's financing has come from the patronage of powerful and wealthy individuals in Nigeria. He adds that bank robbery has also provided much financing for the group.

The literature also examined the membership of Boko Haram. According to the majority of accounts, the group draws its membership from the ranks of disaffected youths, unemployed graduates and former street children (Almajaris) (Onuoha, 2012:137; Waldek and Jayasekara, 2011:171; Pate, 2015:17). This supports the argument that abject poverty creates a fertile breeding ground for violence and terrorism.

2.9 Analysis of Literature

The purpose of the following section is to analyse the literature consulted and used in the chapter. In the examination and analysis of past and current scholarship on globalization and international terrorism a number of observations can be made. First, the 9/11 attacks altered the way in which governments, policy makers and scholars thought about international security. It revealed the negative implications of globalization and created concern for a new type of international insecurity, namely terrorism. International terrorism had become prominent on the global security agenda. In addition, it initiated an increasing focus by scholars on the link that exists between globalization and terrorism. The 9/11 attacks also brought about the argument suggesting that globalization contributes to increasing incidents of international terrorism.

Furthermore, the existing literature is unclear on whether a link truly exists between globalization increasing international terrorism. There is no clear evidence that suggests that globalization results in either increasing or decreasing incidents of international terrorism. What is however clear, is that globalization definitely aids in the facilitation of international terrorism. Globalization makes it much easier for terrorists to plan, coordinate and initiate attacks. It is important to note that globalization does not necessarily cause terrorism, but that it facilitates it. Terrorism could still occur without the "help" of globalization, albeit with increased difficulty. The existing literature on international terrorism also attributes incidents of terrorism to the presence of failed states, fragile economies, poverty, and porous borders. These factors can be said to further facilitate/enhance acts of international terrorism and are exacerbated by globalization. The following two subsections will determine and discuss the strengths and shortcomings of the literature and will then identify the areas that warrant further exploration as well as the gaps that are present in the literature.

2.9.1 Strengths of Literature

The literature produced on the notions of security, globalization and terrorism is extensive. All of these topics have garnered much attention. Scholarship has showcased the difficulty that their predecessors have had in developing an agreed upon conceptualization of the aforementioned terms. They have showcased how the respective terms have developed and evolved with the changing times. This literature is extremely important, as one would not be able to do research on this specific topic if one did not have a solid base to build on. Furthermore, the literature focussed on globalization and terrorism has increased significantly in the post-9/11 era. The scholarship has increasingly examined the different implications of globalization and how it facilitates terrorism and has not only focused on the economic implications of globalization. The literature examines the implications of technology, migration flows, flows of goods and services as well as poverty and inequality. Furthermore, current research is able to show how and why globalization facilitates international terrorism. The literature on technology is especially strong, as it examines in great detail how different technologies have enabled individuals/groups to carry out terrorist plans. Furthermore, the data collected and reported is quite extensive and detailed. One is able to isolate incidents based on date, perpetrator and region, amongst others.

In addition, the literature indicates that other factors (failed states, instability) play a role in further facilitating terrorism. Thus, these scholars make it clear that globalization is not the only factor that aids in the facilitation of international terrorism. This is made especially clear in the section on terrorism in The Horn of Africa (Somalia) and northern Nigeria. The literature highlights the fact that state failure has played a major contributing role in the upsurge of terrorist violence in both of these regions. Another major strength of the literature, in the cases of terrorism both in Somalia and northern Nigeria, is the examination of historical legacy/background and the influence that it continues to have on security in these two regions. The literature on historical background is vast and well researched. It provides a solid foundation on which future research can build.

Furthermore, existing literature has done a good job of probing the motivation behind the actions of both Boko Haram and Al Shabaab, respectively.

2.9.2 Shortcomings of Literature

The literature on globalization and its implications for international terrorism have a number of shortcomings. One of the biggest is possibly the fact that the literature does not provide a clear link between the two. In addition, some of the definitions used when measuring terrorism are ethnocentric, which means that all acts of terrorism/international terrorism are not necessarily recorded.

Even though the literature arguing that globalization facilitates international terrorism examines many of globalization's implications, some of these need to be supported with more and stronger evidence. The lack of evidence can make the argument and hypothesis seem weak. It could be beneficial if one was able to determine the percentage of terrorist attacks that occur as a result of being facilitated by the different mechanisms of globalization. This could however prove to be an extremely difficult, if not impossible task, as one would for example not have access to information pertaining to electronic communication (unless it is public).

Another shortcoming of the literature is the "excessive" focus on international terrorism in and emanating from the Middle East. It is as if scholars completely ignore terrorist hubs in West Africa and the Horn of Africa, where Boko Haram and Al Shabaab operate, respectively. Since little research has been conducted on the impact of globalization on national/international terrorism in and emanating from these two areas, this can be seen as a gap in the literature which warrants further investigation. In addition, some of the scholars who argue that economic development will deter terrorism seem to forget that the primary cause of terrorism is not linked to economic circumstances, but is rather encouraged by the achievement of political goals. Furthermore, much of the data available on terrorism does not take into account the impact of globalization on incidents of terrorism. Some scholars like Li and Schaubs' analysis focuses solely on the economic impact of globalization and is derived from data pre-9/11. It would be useful to design a study that examines the implications of globalization for terrorism in the post-9/11 period.

Even though the literature on the terrorist activities of Al Shabaab is quite extensive, there should be more focus on how globalization has effectively facilitated or even encouraged terrorist activity. As stated in the subsection "Globalization as Facilitator of Terrorism in Somalia," the literature indirectly links globalization (the technological aspect) to the facilitation of Al Shabaab's activities. However, this needs to be stated more directly and

overtly. Furthermore, there is not much focus on how the other facets of globalization have facilitated and/or encouraged the terrorist activities of Al Shabaab. This provides this study with the opportunity to exploit these gaps in the existing literature.

Like the literature on Al Shabaab, the scholarship focussing on Boko Haram is quite extensive. However, scholars do not actively link globalization to the terrorist activities of the group. Even though they mention that their opposition to Western culture and influence motivates the group's activities, they do not clearly state that Westernization can be equated to globalization. In addition, although scholars attribute increasing inequality to Boko Haram's violent upsurge, the inequality is not linked to the effects of globalization (at most it is indirectly stated). This warrants further investigation in determining how the different facets of globalization have contributed to facilitating and/or encouraging terrorism in northern Nigeria.

2.10 Conclusion

In the preceding pages, this chapter introduced the reader to key concepts relating to globalization and international terrorism. It showed the reader how the concepts have evolved and how the notions of security, globalization and terrorism are linked. It also examined the existing literature pertaining to the hypothesis that globalization has facilitated and encouraged terrorism. This chapter also provided the reader with an overview of published literature on the topics of terrorism in the Horn of Africa and northern Nigeria respectively. In doing so it has established the areas that scholars have focussed on and determined the areas that warrant further investigation. Furthermore, in the previous section, this chapter did an analysis of consulted literature pertaining to the link between globalization and international terrorism. It was abundantly clear that globalization served as a facilitator of terrorism. However, the existing literature has not been able to determine whether globalization actually encourages international terrorism. In the analysis, a number of shortcomings were identified which could be seen as possible gaps in the existing literature. These gaps need to be exploited and investigated. Furthermore, the section analysing published literature was also able to determine which areas, relating specifically to globalization as facilitator of terrorism in the Horn of Africa and northern Nigeria respectively, warrant further investigation.

The main gap, that needs to be exploited further, pertains to the link between globalization and international terrorism in and emanating from the Horn of Africa as well as the northern

Nigerian region. Existing research does not examine the link between the two when looking at these regions specifically. Furthermore, an empirical study that analyses data pertaining to globalization and international terrorism in the Horn of Africa and northern Nigeria, respectively, also needs to be conducted. This will serve as an aid in determining whether globalization has facilitated/encouraged incidents of national/international terrorism in and emanating from these two regions. Further investigation in this area could prove fruitful to both international and African security studies.

Chapter 3: The Age of Hyperconflict and the Globalization-Terrorism Nexus

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter examined how the phenomena of globalization and security have become increasingly interlinked with the passage of time. It also looked at how and why globalization has facilitated and/or encouraged incidents of terrorism. The purpose of the following chapter will be to further expand upon the argument that in certain countries and under certain circumstances the processes of globalization create a permissive environment in which national/international terrorism can thrive. The chapter will start with a brief discussion of the security-development nexus as terrorism can be seen as a security threat, whilst development is unarguably a component of globalization. It will then consult and make use of the theoretical framework developed by Mittelman in *Hyperconflict: Globalization and Insecurity,* in other words, the fact that globalization has created the perfect conditions for a situation of hyperconflict to develop. However, before going into too much depth on how and why this is the case, the term hyperconflict along with hypercompetition and hyperpower will be briefly discussed. Thereafter, an overview of the characteristics of hyperconflict will follow. In addition, this chapter will also make use of Zimmermann's (2011:S158) *heuristic causal model of linkages between globalization and international terrorism* to elaborate on the argument that globalization facilitates and encourages terrorism, especially on the international front. Additional sources will be consulted in order to further elaborate on and support the aforementioned arguments. This chapter will serve as a foundation for the two case studies that will follow in Chapters 4 and 5. It will also provide an outline for Chapters 4 and 5 to follow in order to ensure that it meets the requirements of a comparative research study. In addition, this chapter will serve to lay the groundwork for Chapter 6 which will be dedicated to examining and comparing which factors of globalization have played a role in facilitating or encouraging terrorism in the Horn of Africa and northern Nigeria respectively.

3.2 Security-Development Nexus

In 2004 former Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, stated that "[d]evelopment and security are inextricably linked" (Stern & Öjendal, 2010:5). Other scholars have also come to the conclusion that development and security are interlinked and

that their interrelationship is growing in significance given the evolving global political-economic landscape (Hettne, 2010:312; Stern & Öjendal, 2010:5). The so-called development-security nexus has garnered much attention, as the security policies of many states have made explicit references to development and poverty reduction in the fight against global terrorism. According to Stern & Öjendal (2010:13), many regard "global development" (effectively globalization) as a process that undermines the authority of the state, along with its capacity to govern and improve the lives of its citizens; one could argue that it weakens the state. 'Development' also arguably fuels change, which is environmentally unsustainable, mobility, and the restructuring of (g)local power structures. This in turn exacerbates the vulnerabilities, such as poverty, of those who are most at risk, which could then trigger conflict (Stern & Öjendal, 2010:13–14). Thus, one could argue that development can lead to a situation of insecurity. This argument will be further elaborated and supported in the subsequent sections.

3.3 Mittelman's Hyperconflict – Globalization and Security/Insecurity Nexus

Mittelman's (2010:1) major focus is the relationship that exists between globalization and security or insecurity. He examines how these phenomena are connected, as well as the implications that they hold for world order. In developing the single concept of hyperconflict Mittelman maps the debate amongst policymakers and scholars with regards to the aforementioned. The conception of hyperconflict does not disregard the findings of empirical studies, which claim that the frequency of armed conflict has indeed decreased, or remained steady in recent decades. He rather argues that a distinct pattern is forming (Mittelman, 2010:1). His argument is that insecurity is being globalized in an "emergent configuration of hyperconflict, a galaxy of conflicts in historical motion" (Mittelman, 2010:1). Thus, globalization is driving a unique convergence of forces that foreshadows a situation of hyperconflict. The following section will focus its attention on Mittelman's argument that the contemporary world order has entered an era of hyperconflict. It will begin by briefly discussing the key concepts of hyperconflict, hypercompetition and hyperpower that he employs in his argument. A discussion of the most distinct characteristics of hyperconflict will then follow.

3.3.1 Hyperconflict

Hyperconflict effectively amounts to: a reorganization of political violence; prevailing uncertainty characterized by a rising climate of fear; a change in the structures of armed and

other forms of conflict that are not necessarily in the hands of governments or their agents, but rather that of non-state actors such as terrorist organizations; and mounting instability at a global level (Mittelman, 2010:1). In addition, it is argued that globalizing processes are the driving forces of hyperconflict, which in turn points to a disturbance in world order. Conflict is propelled by the changing dynamics of control and transformative action. Hyperconflict, which entails insecurity, is propelled by the polarities and vulnerabilities that are brought about by globalization. Furthermore, hyperconflict arguably emerges as a result of the tensions that exist between the logics of state-centric and polycentric worlds (Mittelman, 2010:22). It can also be seen to come about from a decline in legitimacy and a restructuring of hegemony. Legitimacy is vital, as power cannot be exercised effectively without it. In order to ensure that people obey rules or orders, power holders must strive for legitimacy. A lack of legitimacy arises from an unequal distribution of surplus or even when there is an absence in shared norms, values and institutions for public decision-making (Mittelman, 2010:23). As has been emphasized, hyperconflict is underpinned by a confluence of shifts in security, legitimacy and hegemony (Mittelman, 2010:24).

Hyperconflict should not be viewed as a totalizing phenomenon, as it only pertains to those entities, individuals and corporations that interact with global structures. There are a myriad clashes, especially on a domestic level, that intermingle with hyperconflict. These clashes are filtered through multiple global pressures (Mittelman. 2010:16). In addition, Mittelman's analysis suggests that in the era of globalization the balance in a different direction from the thoughts of classical liberal thinkers such as Adam Smith, who underscored "the harmony of motives" and the constant need of assistance required by humans from their fellow man, and contemporary institutionalists such as Robert Keohane, "who seek to trace international regimes that ensure stability" (Mittelman, 2010:17). Furthermore, the term hyperconflict is useful as it provides the academic community, who are despairing about the current direction of world order, with a language that recognizes this direction and which asks questions about strategic alternatives to the present direction. In addition, hyperconflict provides a lens through which one can see the ways in which globalization brings about "multiple changes in scale" (Mittelman, 2010:17). Hyperconflict also holds the potential to constitute a historical turning point, in other words a watershed moment "that does not merely exacerbate transnational security, but rather may transform world order as we know it" (Mittelman, 2010:17).

3.3.2 Hypercompetition

Contemporary globalization is marked by a compression of time and space, which brings about more direct competition amongst capitalists. These so-called head-on encounters, or even collisions, can be characterized as hypercompetition. Hypercompetition includes the practices of "aggressive market disruption" as well as "smart bombing" to outmanoeuvre competition; "counter-revolutionary strategies to buy time," as well as manoeuvres which help build corporate spheres of influence (Mittelman, 2010:4). Hypercompetition is profoundly, but not completely American in a number of its facets, for example: the long reach of American markets, the organizational technologies that were developed or adapted in the US, the American predominance in spending on research and development (R&D); and the US's ongoing capacity for cultural innovation and the spread of these cultural practices, amongst others. These are essentially what Joseph Nye refers to as "soft power", which is the means to get others to do what you want (Mittelman, 2010:4).

3.3.3 Hyperpower

Another term that is employed in Mittelman's argument is that of "hyperpower." The term *hyperpuissance* or "hyperpower" was coined in 1998 by former French foreign minister Hubert Védrine in order to replace the term superpower, which related to the bipolarity of the Cold War era, and was now out-dated. According to Védrine, hyperpower describes "a country that is dominant or predominant in all categories" (The New York Times, 1999). Amy Chua (2007 cited in Mittelman, 2010:7) equates hyperpower with world dominance. Mittelman's (2010:7) usage of hyperpower like that of Védrine is distinct from "superpowers," and is singular, there can be only one hyperpower, which is currently the US, thus the notion of rival or regional hyperpowers is non-existent. Hyperpower does not only constitute state power, as it is diffuse and includes a chain of military bases in overseas territories as well as a collection of allies. Furthermore, hyperpower also integrates the ideological components of hegemony (Mittelman, 2010:7).

The US can clearly be identified as the incumbent hyperpower, as it boasts the world's largest national economy, unmatched technological expertise and a defence budget that exceeds that of the next twenty-five states. Its power is unparalleled and it plays a major role in the security of the world. It is often a determinant of whether insecurity or security prevails. It is however important to note that hyperpower constitutes neither unipolarity nor omnipotence.

Unlike polarity, which centres on the nation state without capturing globalizing processes, hyperpower signifies a relationship with distinctive mechanisms (Mittelman, 2010:9). In addition, the construct of hyperpower is advantageous as it joins both relational and structural forms of power. This concept has more fluidity and flexibility compared to imperialism or empire. This is because it allows for ways in which political and economic forces seek to expand networks of coercion, and opens interaction with hypercompetition. This in turn makes the production and transportation of weapons cheaper (Mittelman, 2010:150).

Hypercompetition, marked by a vast dislocation and a highly skewed distribution of benefits and losses, can be seen to coincide with hyperpower, "which seeks to secure its enabling conditions" (Mittelman, 2010:13). During this era of globalizing, hypercompetition and hyperpower have grown together. These two phenomena entail coercion and the application of coercive measures, which in turn, triggers a "spiral of resistance to dominant structures." Mittelman (2010:13) hypothesizes that when hypercompetition and hyperpower "encounter" one another they produce a situation of hyperconflict.

3.3.4 Characteristics of Hyperconflict

According to Mittelman, hyperconflict has seven distinct characteristics and these traits form a complex that sets hyperconflict apart from other familiar forms of conflict (Mittelman, 2010:13; 16). The first is that hyperconflict is at the present time in a nascent phase, in other words it is just beginning to come into existence and display signs of future "potential." Thus, one could possibly argue that it has the potential to engulf the entire global populace, or at least a large section of the global populace in a situation of hyperconflict. Second, as globalization develops, hyperconflict is a shift rather than a total break from prior patterns as this shift is not merely the familiar turn from interstate to domestic violence as the major source of conflict. Furthermore, during this era of globalization, hyperconflict is boiling over with the potential for spillovers. It is important to note that hyperconflict does not erupt automatically; in all instances where it does erupt it "merges with the complexity of history." In other words, the conflicts that we see erupting in contemporary times rest on prior occurrences throughout the history of that region, for example its colonial legacy and historical accidents such as natural disasters. The world has undoubtedly entered an epoch in which security threats and the efforts to circumvent them are globalized (Mittelman, 2010:14).

Some scholars are of the opinion that the number of armed conflicts worldwide have declined or at least remained level. Although the time lines utilized by scholars differ, this statistical

observation is supported by a number of different studies conducted by Marshall and Gurr (2005), Gleditsch (2007) and Mack (2006) amongst others (Mittleman, 2010:14). As mentioned before Mittelman does not disregard the statistics. However, in this era of hyperconflict, a decrease in armed conflicts, albeit domestic or international, does not necessarily mean less violence or even more security from the threat of political terror (Mittelman, 2010:14). In fact, conflicts have become more violent and have arguably caused a greater feeling of insecurity in the current period of time. This is made especially clear when looking at the way in which ISIS (ad-Dawlah al-ʾIslāmiyyah/Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) has carried out its activities, for example the beheading and crucifixion of not only Christians, but also of other individuals who stand in the way of their establishing an Islamic Caliphate. Their acts of violence seem to grow every day and along with that, a major feeling of insecurity, not only in Syria and Iraq but also in neighbouring states (McCoy, 2014).

Every single episode of hyperconflict has a different hypercompetition to hyperpower ratio; this is directly dependent on the specific setting (region, the groups involved, economic circumstances etcetera). Thus, hyperconflict is not a one-size-fits-all mould, but is rather the product of a set of systemic drivers. These forces/drivers are contingent, in other words they are subject to "proximate" causes under a variety of conditions. The immediate cause often becomes "submerged" or "lost in an escalating conflict and engulfed in political violence" (Mittelman, 2010:15). The incidents of hyperconflict differ in intensity, they range from manifest to latent and in addition there are numerous types of catalysing moments. Thus, there is not one specific catalyser that sparks hyperconflict.

Furthermore, Mittelman (2010:15) states that hypercompetition within geo-economics[10] interacts intensively with hyperpower in geopolitics[11]. Even though the aforementioned realms do not cleave together neatly, the correspondence between the two is becoming more apparent; it constitutes a sporadic shift from the old order to a new one characterized by the rise of hyperconflict.[12]

Lastly, although hyperconflict does not necessarily entail a sudden outbreak of war, it may nevertheless spread at "lightning speed." Thus, if hyperconflict does not emerge as one big

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[10] Geo-economics is the study of spatial, cultural, and strategic aspects of resources, with the aim of gaining a sustainable competitive advantage (Soilen, 2012:2).

[11] "[G]eopolitics refers to the theory and practice of politics at the global scale, with a specific emphasis on the geographies that both shape and result from that politics" (Dittmer & Sharp, 2014:3).

[12] This characteristic will not be compared to the case studies in Chapters 4 and 5, only those that correspond to the case studies will be applied.

"blow-up," it will take shape as "multiple forms" sped on by new technologies that enable its elements to spread swiftly from one state or region to another (Mittelman, 2010:15). The Arab Spring comes to mind as an example of hyperconflict spreading swiftly throughout the North African region. The revolution that started in Tunisia swiftly spread to Libya and Egypt, engulfing the entire region in conflict and strife. The "recent" spread of ISIS' Islamic Caliphate throughout areas in Syria and Iraq could also be seen as an example of hyperconflict spreading from one area to another. According to Mittelman (2010:15) the spill over effects of this contagion may threaten to bring about mass destruction as well as some states' capacity to maintain a monopoly on legitimate violence. Some aspects of globalization can be considered as volatile; these "volatile" aspects of globalization are driven by a combination of new weaponry systems, an economic policy that has lowered barriers to trade and across borders, and integrated financial markets (Mittelman, 2010:16). Transnationally, the chain reaction of hyperconflict consists of several links, that is, channels that vary**.**

3.4 Causal Model of Linkages between Globalization and Terrorism

According to Ekkart Zimmermann (2011:S152) globalization alters the opportunity cost of market participants; in turn he proposes that this will have an effect on terrorism, at least in the long term. As such Zimmermann (2011:S152) constructed a list of factors that "potentially mediate the relationship between globalization and terrorism," this list forms the foundation of the causal model of linkages between globalization and international terrorism. In order to develop his model, Zimmermann (2011) reviews existing literature on globalization and terrorism, specifically with regards to the influence that globalization has on terrorism, much like that presented in Chapter 2 of this thesis. What Zimmermann aims to do with this model is to specify the potential links that exist between globalization and terrorism. This causal model makes links between globalization and terrorism explicit and incorporates additional considerations. In the interest of making the model less complex and more readable, variables such as economic growth and counter-terrorist policies are left out, even though they do have a marked influence on the dependent variable, namely "the persistence of international terrorist strategies" (Zimmermann, 2011:S155).

The following section will examine the causal model of linkages between globalization and international terrorism as developed by Zimmermann (2011). The dependant variable in the model, that is, "the persistence of international terrorist strategies," is influenced by incentives for international terrorism (line 1) and opportunities for international terrorism (2).

The independent variable of this model, "globalization," can be divided into economic and financial effects, and into political, cultural and social effects.

Figure 3.1 A heuristic causal model of linkages between globalization and terrorism (Zimmerman, 2011:S158).

Globalization is a major contributor to the shifts in relative prices and market relations (3), which leads to constraints on national governments and to a weakening of the state (4). Globalization is directly responsible for an increase in economic and social inequality, in other words the societal polarization within countries (5) (Zimmermann, 2011:S155). Here one could cite the effect of "free trade", instead of benefitting from this many poorer developing countries are unable to compete with heavily subsidized goods, from example the European Union and the US, which in turn leads to economic and social inequality (Murphy, 2002:83), and leaves those countries lagging behind. In addition, this can lead to a widening gap between the rich and the poor, which may in turn serve as a source of anger and resentment against those who have and those who do not have (Helton & Zagorcheva, 2002:92), which may encourage the have-nots to lash out in the form of terrorism. Globalization also leads to social and economic inequality indirectly via a weakened state that no longer has the ability to protect economically disadvantaged groups against the global economic challenges (6) (Zimmermann, 2011:S155). For example the state may be unable to provide goods with subsidies, as other countries are able to do, which in turn means that they are unable to protect citizens, especially those who are vulnerable. As previously mentioned,

Stern and Öjendal also make the argument that globalization undermines the authority of the state, in other words weakening it.

Freytag, Krüger, Meierrieks and Schneider (2011:S7) argue that poor (country-specific) socio-economic conditions, such as poverty, slow growth, and trade disadvantages amongst others may influence the cost-benefit considerations of terrorists, which may then serve as an incentive for terrorism. Thus the opportunity cost of non-violence is lower than the benefits that are to be gained from terrorism, in this case the mental rewards. Their research shows that poor socio-economic conditions need to be taken into account as they influence the decisions of terrorists as well as their supporters (Freytag *et al.*, 2011:S14). Although Freytag *et al.* do not explicitly mention globalization as the cause of poor socio-economic conditions, their research does correlate with the fact that societal polarization may serve as an incentive for terrorist activity.

In the "middle axis" of the model, globalization promotes new information technologies[13] (7), which leads to a further weakening of state power of control (8). These new information technologies facilitate the decentralization of terrorist groups, who could possibly emulate other terrorist organizations or work through a system of "franchising" under a distant command (9), which in turn makes a further contribution to the weakening of the state (10). A decentralized organizational structure such as this advances the links to political-criminal networks (11), which then in turn benefit from an enlarged means of funding deviant behaviour (12), which again is an effect of globalization (13) (Zimmermann, 2011:S155).

Globalization also has the direct effect of fostering the growth of politico-criminal networks (14), which has multiplied the opportunities for international terrorist strategies (15). External state or group support makes a major contribution to opportunities for such terrorist activities (16). Increasing social and economic inequality is a crucial component of this model, through both the effects on incentives for international terrorism (17) and opportunities for international terrorism (18) (Zimmermann, 2011:S155).

In the upper half of this model, globalization is a major contributor to the spreading of foreign "corrupt" cultures (19), which have an effect on the incentives for international terrorism (20). Globalization also leads to value changes (21), be it directly or indirectly, via new information technologies such as the Internet, mobile phones and digital cameras (22). Changes in values are also brought about by the spread of perceived "foreign corrupt

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[13] Technology as aid to terrorism is explored in *2.6.1 Technology as Aid* in Chapter 2.

culture"[14] (23). A special case of changes in values is the occurrence and spreading of supreme values (24), which has a major influence on increasing the incentives for international terrorism (25) (Zimmermann, 2011:S155).

A further effect of globalization is the immigration of workers (26). Two forces are at work here, the push effect, which drives unemployed and underpaid individuals/groups to other countries and the pull effect for qualified workers elsewhere. This process of immigration has the effect of creating new minorities (27) as well as contributing to changes in values (28). These new minorities can also assist in the weakening of the state (29). They may also increase the incentives for international terrorism (30) and contribute to increased social and economic inequality (31) (Zimmermann, 2011:S155). Before 9/11, immigration was not considered as being a threat to national security, however the events of 9/11 shifted the immigration debate to a vital security concern (Helton & Zagorcheva, 2002:92). The concern is that new immigrating or recently immigrated minorities are providing safe haven to international terrorist groups. Two positions have emerged regarding immigrated minorities, the first, argues that successful integration and sufficient assimilation can take place. However, the second position that is in line with the causal model argues that integration is absent and that immigration will lead to a rising unqualified proletariat that not only lacks educational and traning skills, but also affirms the "supreme values" of Islam (Zimmermann, 2011:S155–156), which in turn serves as an incentive for terrorism.

Zimmermann (2011:S156) also identifies four levels of analysis to be pursued in order to determine if globalization indeed has an influence on terrorism, namely: the global level, that of the nation-state, the level of terrorist groups and organizations, and the individual level.[15] He argues that multi-level analysis is imperative as it is theoretically richer and it also provides a more thorough understanding of terrorism. This becomes especially clear when one broadens the analysis from individual terrorists and brings groups into focus. The level of group analysis for example makes the understanding of strategic and tactical elements of terrorist behavior more clear (Zimmermann, 2011:S156;158).

This model makes it clear that the globalization-terrorism nexus is quite complex, as there are numerous factors at play. At first glance the model seems overly complex and difficult to comprehend, but on closer analysis one can see how the different variables interact with one another. These variables are interlinked and have a major influence on one another.

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[14] The perceived threat of foreign corrupt culture is explored in *2.6.5 Threat of Corrupt Culture* in Chapter 2.
[15] This research study will not explicitly refer to the level of analysis utilized.

Zimmermann's (2011:S159) final analysis, findings and theoretical arguments do not ultimately demonstrate a positive relationship between globalization and terrorism. Furthermore, trends have indicated that there has been a decline in transnational terrorist attacks since the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center, with only two statistical outliers namely Iraq and Afghanistan. It is however important to note that Zimmerman's research precedes the current upsurge in terrorist activities, both domestic and international. Thus, what was true at the time of publishing has now changed significantly when looking at a number of specific areas, more particularly the two case studies that will follow in the subsequent chapters. Zimmermann (2011:S159) further argues that globalization can be understood as a background factor for international terrorism. Globalization does indeed provide a new means of ideological competition and easier access to new financial resources and weapons for terrorists. However, political terrorism is a reaction to local circumstances even though these may be influenced by global developments in a manifold manner (Zimmermann, 2011:S159).

3.5 Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to expand on the theoretical argument that globalization and terrorism are inextricably linked, and that globalization has essentially acted as a facilitator of terrorism. In order to develop a theoretical framework against which the subsequent chapters will be compared, this chapter examined the security-development nexus, Mittelman's theory of hyperconflict and Zimmermann's heuristic causal model of linkages between globalization and terrorism. In developing and expanding on the theoretical framework of the globalization-terrorism nexus, it will now be possible to apply this theory to real world situations – specifically Al Shabaab in Somalia, and Boko Haram in northern Nigeria. By applying the theoretical framework to these case studies it will be possible to determine whether a globalization-terrorism nexus actually exists. In addition, this will provide the framework necessary to compare the two case studies in Chapter 6 where it will also be possible to determine which facets of globalization influenced terrorist activities in Somalia and northern Nigeria specifically, and to what extent. Thus, one will be able to determine if the same facets of globalization facilitated/encouraged terrorism or whether completely different facets played a part in facilitating/encouraging terrorist activities. This framework therefore forms the foundation for a comparative research design.

Chapter 4: Al Shabaab: Proof of the Dark Side of Globalization

4.1 Introduction

This chapter will focus specifically on how globalization as a whole has impacted on the security environment and created an environment permissive to acts of terror, within the Somali state and the greater Horn of Africa region. The purpose of this chapter is to determine whether the Somali case serves as an example of *hyperconflict* as developed by Mittelman and discussed in the preceding chapter. It also seeks to determine how the different facets of globalization, for example technological advances, improved transportation networks and the lowering of barriers to trade and commerce, have enabled Al Shabaab to more easily commit acts of terror. Furthermore, it will also examine whether the effects of globalization have encouraged the terrorist organization to commit acts of terror. It will refer back to Zimmermann's causal model when exploring these sections. In addition, it will also explore how globalization itself has served as a motivating factor in the rise of Al Shabaab, specifically relating to its anti-Western stance.

4.2 Hyperconflict and Somalia

The following section will examine the security environment of Somalia within the context of hyperconflict. The purpose of this section will be to determine whether a situation of hyperconflict has erupted or is in the process of erupting. In order to do so this section will start by examining the factors responsible for hyperconflict and determine whether these factors are present in the case of Somalia. The first factor that will be taken into consideration is a decline in legitimacy. Thereafter, the characteristics of hyperconflict in the case of the Somali state will be compared.

4.2.1 Legitimacy and State Collapse

As argued by Mittelman (2010:23) in the previous chapter, hyperconflict can be seen to arise from a decline in legitimacy. The reason behind this is that the legitimacy of power holders is vital if they are to exercise power effectively. If there is a decline in legitimacy, it will

become more difficult for power holders to ensure that people obey the rules and orders set out. A decline and a lack of legitimacy can come about for a number of reasons.

In the case of Somalia, Al Shabaab has exploited the condition of state collapse to gain legitimacy, which has in the process delegitimized the country's former Transitional Federal Government (TFG). It has done so by setting itself up as an alternative to local-level governance in Somalia. Al Shabaab has gained legitimacy by exploiting Somali nationalism and xenophobia, and by the provision of social services (Mwangi, 2012:513). State collapse has played a major role in facilitating persistent and pervasive conflict; one could even argue that it has facilitated a condition of hyperconflict. The reason for this is that legitimacy is an unknown factor in a collapsed state since the state is unable to provide basic services. This ultimately creates a vacuum which can be filled by non-state actors in a bid to acquire legitimacy. In the case of Somalia, Al Shabaab exploited this vacuum.

As mentioned previously, Al Shabaab has employed various tactics to discredit/delegitimize the Transnational Federal Government, whilst simultaneously legitimizing itself. The first tactic employed is Somali nationalism and xenophobia. This was used extensively in the 2006 Ethiopian military intervention (Mwangi, 2012:520). Since the intervention generated much radical national sentiment and was supported by the TFG, Al Shabaab used this as a means to delegitimize and discredit the government. Al Shabaab subsequently emerged as the main source of armed resistance to the occupation by Ethiopian troops which led to the group winning both passive and active support from numerous Somalis (Mwangi, 2012:520). In the process, the group was able to attain some legitimacy as it was seen to resist and fight the foreign enemy.

A further reason for the Somali state and hence the TFG losing legitimacy relates to its inability to perform the basic function of providing political and economic goods and services to citizens. The provision of these goods and services is vital if power holders want to maintain legitimacy. Mwangi (2012:524) mentions that the TFG, during its tenure from 2004 to 2012, was never able to provide sufficient or meaningful civil services. This failure on the part of the TFG was exploited by Al Shabaab and they became the only organisation to provide these desperately needed, basic services to large areas of Somalia. By providing political and economic goods such as justice and security, education and training, food distribution (vital since drought and famine is rife), local-level administration and public works (for example building bridges and repairing roads), and employment, Al Shabaab has

gained legitimacy which has given them power over many areas of Somalia (Mwangi, 2012:525). Al Shabaab's provision of education is vital to their legitimacy as few Somali's are able to access education and in many areas throughout Somalia, Al Shabaab is the only organization to provide education (albeit limited and fundamentalist). Their "legitimacy" is further cemented by employing the Somali populace (Mwangi, 2012:525). Furthermore, Al Shabaab was able to cement its legitimacy by paying its soldiers a US$300 per month loyalty fee in addition to free food, water, *khat* (a local drug) and weaponry; whereas the TFG was only paying it soldiers US$200 every two months and in 2011 there were reports that soldiers went without pay for four consecutive months (Sterley, 2014:56).

Wise (2011:5) reiterates Mwangi's arguments that inadequate governance (as a result of state collapse and declining legitimacy) over large portions of Somalia gave Al Shabaab a foothold. Since the collapse of Mohammed Siad Barre's regime in 1991, the greater part of Somalia has remained largely ungoverned. This has enabled groups such as Al Shabaab to operate freely in these ungoverned areas. Thus, the inability of the TFG to provide basic services and the TFG's support for the Ethiopian intervention led to a loss of legitimacy. This in turn led to a security and services vacuum in the country which led to a situation of hyperconflict since Al Shabaab was able to operate easily and without restraint. Furthermore, this vacuum was exploited by Al Shabaab as they started providing the goods and services for which government is usually responsible, and thus increased their legitimacy. One can also argue that since Al Shabaab is the provider of these basic goods and services, it is highly unlikely that the Somali populace will oppose the group's activities for fear of losing out on these goods and services. Thus, an element of fear is present and allows Al Shabaab to continue its terror activities without much resistance.

The establishment of a new federal govenrment marked a milestone for Somalia as well as a dream of moving away from the ineffectivness of past transitional governments. However, despite optimism and winning the support and recognition of many in the international community (it is viewed as Somalia's first "post-transition" government), the Somali Federal Government (SFG) is weak and ineffective and wields very little power outside of Mogadishu (Bryden, 2013:1; Guled, 2014). Furthermore, in comparison to central and local authorites, which it opposes, Al Shabaab seems less corrupt which to an extent makes it more legitmate than these authorities. In addition, the group is able to obtain a degree of legitimacy, because unlike the SFG, Al Shabaab pays it soldiers and operatives well and regularly. It also

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makes provision for its veterans as well as the families of its "martyrs" (International Crisis Group, 2014a:15). By taking better care of its people financially compared to the SFG, Al Shabaab is able to obtain legitmacy in this area. It also gives them a source of resilience. Moreover, Al Shabaab has also been seen to infiltrate some SFG agencies despite its loss of territory, specifically the loss of Mogadishu in August 2011. One small but significant example is that during the latter part of 2013, the group effectively controlled the Mogadishu Central Prison (Internatioanl Crisis Group, 2014a:12). This does not bode well for the legitimacy of the SFG if Al Shabaab has already infiltrated the SFG and its agencies, despite the fact that the group has suffered major territorial losses.

It can then be argued that Al Shabaab was able to legitmitize itself by deligitmizing the TFG throughout its tenure in office, thus a situation of hyperfconflict was able to develop within this period. Furthermore, by being better able to provide for its people than the SFG, it delegitimizes the SFG in some way and gives Al Shabaab some power. Whether the situation of hyperconflict will continue with the establishment and continuation of the SFG is unknown. If the situation of hyperconflict is to come to an end the SFG must establish itself as the legimate and sovereign authority over all of Somalia, especially in the rural areas as these are the areas where Al Shabaab exercises the most control. In order to achieve this, the SFG will have to ensure the provision of basic services, an area which Al Shabaab has taken over and obtained much legitimacy. Furthermore, the SFG will need to ensure that Al Shabaab does not infiltrate more of its agencies.

4.2.2 Characteristics of Hyperconflict

The purpose of this section is to determine whether the Somali case fits the characteristics of hyperconflict as described by Mittelman. It will do so by briefly reminding the reader of the characteristics of hyperconflict before applying these to the case of Somalia and Al Shabaab. It will only discuss those characteristics which relate to the case study.

4.2.2.1 Potential to Engulf

First, hyperconflict is at the present time in a nascent phase, in other words it is just beginning to come into existence and display signs of future "potential." Thus, one could possibly argue that it has the potential to engulf the entire global populace, or at least a large section of the global populace, in a situation of hyperconflict (Mittelman, 2011:15). The

Somali case displays signs that indicate that Al Shabaab has the potential to engulf the entire Horn of Africa region, specifically Kenya in a situation of hyperconflict.

Harper (2012:184) agrees that the crisis/conflict in Somalia has regional implications, as it has affected many countries in East Africa as well as the Horn of Africa. Al Shabaab's violence has destabilized neighbouring states and it has dragged some directly into the conflict, as will be discussed in the following paragraphs. In effect what was initially a local form of militant Islam has metamorphosed into a regional, or even an international force (Harper, 2012:184). The fact that Al Shabaab's targets extend beyond the borders of the Somalian state are indicative of this. Many of Al Shabaab's targets are located in neighbouring Kenya. A series of kidnappings in Kenya in 2011, allegedly by Al Shabaab militants, including that of tourists (which dealt a serious blow to Kenya's tourism) led to the launch of "Operation Protect the Nation" on 16 October 2011. Even though it had not been confirmed that Al Shabaab was responsible for the kidnappings, Kenya went ahead and launched a military incursion of approximately 2000 soldiers into Somalia (Abdulkadir, 2012:6). This supports the argument that Al Shabaab has engulfed neighbouring states in its conflict. It is effectively encouraging neighbouring states to become involved in the conflict.

Al Shabaab has launched many other attacks, for which it has claimed responsibility. Another example of this was the 2013 Westgate Mall attack in Nairobi which claimed the lives of 67 individuals (mostly innocent civilians). During the aforementioned attack Al Shabaab tweeted that "[f]or long we [Al Shabaab] have waged war against Kenyans in our land, now it is time to shift the battleground and take the war to their land" (Agbiboa, 2014a). This tweet supports this characteristic of hyperconflict as it displays signs of engulfing further areas into conflict. It is no longer restricting itself to fighting within the borders of the Somali state. This is further supported by statistics from Kenya's anti-terrorism police unit. According to this unit, since the incursion of Kenyan troops into Somalia in 2011, Kenya has suffered approxiamtely 133 terror-related attacks, which translates into one attack every eight days (Wafula, 2014).

Additionally, the fact that Al Shabaab has warned tourists to stay clear of Kenya as it is now "officially" a war zone also gives support to the notion that Al Shabaab has engulfed Kenya in hyperconflict. This warning came in the wake of attacks along the Kenyan coastline that claimed the lives of at least 48 (Omar, Flood & Smith, 2014). The attacks were launched in retaliation against Kenya as a result of the "Kenyan government's brutal oppression of

Muslims in Kenya through coercion, intimidation and extrajudicial killings of Muslim scholars" (Omar, Flood & Smith, 2014). Al Shabaab went further in stating that "[they] hereby warn the Kenyan government and its public that as long as [Kenyan soldiers] continue to invade our lands and oppress innocent Muslims, such attacks will continue and the prospect of peace and stability in Kenya will be but a distant mirage. Do not ever dream of living peacefully in your lands while your forces kill the innocent in our lands" (Omar, Flood & Smith, 2014). This statement makes it clear that Al Shabaab will continue to involve Kenya in its conflict, if Kenya continues to fight against it. This makes the prospect for the continuation of hyperconflict all the more likely.

Al Shabaab's attack on Garissa Univeristy college, in north-eastern Kenya, earlier this year is another example of the group retaliating against Kenya's war against Somalia. This attack proved to be the group's deadliest attack to date, claiming the lives of 147/148 people, mostly students (BBC, 2015a; Al Jazeera, 2015a). In the aftermath of the attack, Al Shabaab officials warned that Kenyan cities will "run red with blood" and that a "long, gruesome war" awaits Kenya, unless it withdraws its troops from Somalia (Al Jazeera, 2015a; Al Jazeera 2015b). This foreshadows even more attacks against Kenyans, and in turn supports the notion of continuing hyperconflict. Kenya responded to the Garissa attack by launching airstrikes against several Al Shabaab bases in Somalia (Al Jazeera, 2015c). In May, the group ambushed police officers in Garissa county, allegedly killing 20 officers. Garissa police confirmed that 20 officers perished in the attack (Al Jazeera, 2015b).

In addition, Ethiopian forces have also been heavily targeted by the organization, largely due to the enmity between Ethiopians and Somalis which is deeply rooted in centuries of conflict and which was further enflamed by the Ethiopian invasion in 2006 (Menkhaus, 2009:224). In October 2014, the U.S. embassy in Ethiopia issued a warning of a possible attack by Al Shabaab militants (Maasho, 2014). Furthermore, Al Shabaab's regional ambitions have further threatened the internal security of Ethiopia through its support for the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), an ethnic Somali separatist group in the Ogaden region of the country (Abdulkadir, 2012:6). These attacks have the potential to further fuel the conflict, especially if these states were to retaliate against the attacks.

Furthermore, the involvement of many African countries' soldiers and peacekeepers in Somalia has effectively placed a target on those countries. Al Shabaab has often threatened to attack those who oppose them or support their enemies. This was clear, when on 11 July 2010,

Al Shabaab launched twin bombings on two groups of soccer fans wathching the World Cup games in Kampala, Uganda. The attacks killed 79 people, whilst injuring many others. This was Al Shabaab's first attack in a foreign country; it was launched to punish Uganda for contributing the bulk of the African peacekeeping force in Somalia (Onuoha, 2013a:3; Harper, 2012:184).

Moreover, as will be discovered in a subsequent section, Al Shabaab has attracted many foreign fighters[16], there are fears that foreign fighters from Kenya, Yemen, the US, Britian, Australia and Scandinavia, who are mosly ethnic Somalis, might return to their host nations and plot terrorist attacks in these nations, after fighting alongside Al Shabaab (Harper, 2012:181). If this is to happen, furhter areas are set to become part of this situation of hyperconflict.

4.2.2.2 Shift from Prior Patterns

Second, as globalization develops, hyperconflict is a shift rather than a total break from prior patterns. This shift is not merely the familiar turn from interstate to domestic violence as the major source of conflict. Many cases of political violence do not fit tidily in one category (Mittelman, 2010:14). In the case of the hyperconflict brought about by Al Shaabab it does not fit tidily in either category. It has elements of both interstate and domestic violence as can be seen in the preceding paragraphs. It has elements of interstate violence whereby Al Shabaab and the armies of the aforementioned African states attack one another or targets in the other's "territory." On the other hand it has elements of domestic terrorism whereby Al Shabaab has targeted areas and individuals/groups (Somali) within the borders of Somalia. Al Shabaab's twin bombings in Kampala, Uganda, and the attack on the Westgate Mall in Kenya, as mentioned previously, are prominent examples of interstate terrorism. These attacks, amongst others also indicate that Al Shabaab has transformed itself from a domestic to a transnational terror organization, and even international. This transformation is a direct result of Al Shabaab's partnership with Al Qaeda[17] (Agbiboa, 2015: 185–186).

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[16] *See* page 76.
[17] On page 39 it is mentioned that since 2008 Al Shabaab has worked to align it interest with the Al Qaeda core and in 2012 formally joined ranks with Al Qaeda.

4.2.2.3 Boiling Over, with a Chance of Spillovers

Third, hyperconflict is boiling over with the potential for spillovers. It is important to note that hyperconflict does not erupt automatically; in all instances where it does erupt, it "merges with the complexity of history." When one considers Al Shabaab's activities, one could argue that it has definitely led to spillovers. As mentioned previously, Al Shabaab's targets are not confined to the borders of Somalia. The conflict has spilled over to neighbouring states inside the Horn of Africa, most prominently Ethiopia and Kenya. Furthermore, Somalia's complex and tumultuous past certainly has some part in the eruption of conflict, or even hyperconflict. As was argued by Ibrahim (2010)[18] in an earlier chapter, the numerous failed attempts at national reconciliation had created a vacuum which led to the rise of Islamists, like Al Shabaab. The activities of Al Shabaab could consequently engulf Somalia as well as neighbouring states in conflict as a result of spillovers.

A further factor that led to the spillover of conflict to neighbouring states is the involvement of these states' militaries within Somalia. The best example would be the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in December 2006, as was mentioned earlier. This invasion played a major role in fuelling conflict between Ethiopians and Somalis. Further examples include the presence of Ethiopian troops alongside forces from Kenya, Djibouti, Burundi and Uganda who form part of an AU mission to fight Al Shabaab militants within the borders of Somalia (Maasho, 2014). As a result of the involvement of these troops in fighting and killing Al Shabaab militants, Al Shabaab has retaliated by targeting people and buildings within these states. This is clear when one looks at the examples mentioned with regard to the first characteristic of hyperconflict and has thus led to the conflict spilling over to the aforementioned states.

4.2.2.4 Increased Violence is the Order of the Day

Fourth, in this era of hyperconflict a decrease in armed conflicts, whether domestic or international, does not necessarily mean less violence or even more security from the threat of political terror. In order to determine whether this in fact true of Al Shabaab in Somalia, it is imperative that one examines the number of attacks perpetrated by the group, the violence with which these attacks are carried out and whether there exists a situation of security.

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[18] *See* page 35.

According to data available on the Global Terrorism Database[19] (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2015c) the average number of attacks perpetrated by Al Shabaab increased between 2008 and August 2014, therafter declining drastically, with a slight increase, before declining towards the end of 2014. The decline in the number of attacks is probably due to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) seizing a number of villages and towns from Al Shabaab during the month of August. In addition, the loss of the coastal stronghold, Barawe, to the Somali National Army (SNA) and AMISOM forces in October dealt a severe blow to Al Shabaab; this loss most likely affected the number of attacks carried out by the group (International Crisis Group, 2015b). A total of 866 attacks were carried out in 2014 compared to a mere 26 attacks in 2008 (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2015d). The violence with which the Westgate Mall attack of 2013 was carried out is indicative of this surge of violence. The Garissa University College attack is yet another example of this surge in Al Shabaab's violence and deadliness, claiming the lives of 147/148 in their dealiest attack yet.

4.2.2.5 Different Drivers, Different Catalysers

Fifth, hyperconflict is not a one-size-fits-all mould, but rather the product of a set of systemic drivers. These forces/drivers are contingent, in other words they are subject to "proximate" causes under a variety of conditions. The immediate cause often becomes "submerged" or "lost in an escalating conflict and engulfed in political violence" (Mittelman, 2010:15). The instances of hyperconflict differ in intensity, ranging from manifest to latent, and in addition there are numerous types of catalysing moments. Thus, there is not one specific catalyser that sparks hyperconflict. The forces/drivers that have led to the conflict in Somalia might be very different when compared to other contexts. The same can be said for the moments that have acted as a catalyser for conflict.

There are a number of "drivers" that can be identified in this situation of hyperconflict. One can determine these drivers by looking at factors such as Al Shabaab's motivation in

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[19] For graph displaying Al Shabaab attacks from 2008 – 2014, *see* http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=2008&end_yearonly=2014&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&asmSelect1=&perpetrator=20036&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max= (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2015c). Please note because of terms of the GTD graphs cannot be displayed in this thesis.

launching jihad in the region. One of the major aims of Al Shabaab is the establishment of a Somali Caliphate and in order to do so the organization must rid the region of all elements that oppose this aim. It aims to do so by waging jihad against the enemies of Islam, which includes the removal of all forms of Western influence (linked to globalization. This is a possible reason for targeting individuals and properties linked to wersternizaton/globalization. In addition, they also wish to eliminate all other forms of Islam which are not in line with their Salafi-Wahhabist strand (Wise, 2011:6; Ali, 2008).

One of the major catalysing moments that sparked the current conflict in Somalia relates to the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006, as well as the occurrences thereafter. This invasion gave Al Shabaab the necessary "tools" to convince Somalis, even those who did not fully agree with their doctrine, that the group was in fact fighting the enemy. They were able to draw on deep-rooted animosity. Furthermore, since the Ethiopian invasion was backed by the US and the US launched several bombs onto targets in Somalia, Al Shabaab was able to convince Somalis that this was a threat to Islam. This effectively bred a sense of anti-westernism and anti-Americanism.

In addition, the Kenyan invasion of Somalia in 2011 served as another catalyser of conflict. According to Anderson and McNight (2014:1) the invasion turned into an occupation of "attrition," whilst the repercussions of the invasion have "consolidated" in a series of deadly Al Shabaab attacks in Kenya.

On 1 September 2014, Al Shabaab leader Ahmed Abdi Godane was killed in a US air strike in Somalia (Omar & Sheikh, 2014). Even though this was hailed as a "major symbolic and operational loss" for Al Shabaab by the Pentagon, the loss of a leader has the potential to catalyse further and possibly even more violent conflict. This sentiment has also been expressed by some alanalysts (Omar & Sheikh, 2014). Samantha Lewthwaite, or the "White Widow"[20], discussed in a subsequent section, was a devoted follower of Godane and counter-terrorism police feared that Lewthwaite and her cohorts were planning reprisal attacks. The fear of reprisal attacks was realized when Al Shabaab militants launched an attack on the AU's main base in Somalia on Christmas Day, claiming the lives of at least nine people (Guled, 2014). According to Al Shabaab spokesperson, Sheikh Ali Mohamud Rage, the attack was launched in retaliation for the US airstrike that was responsible for killing their

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[20] *See* page 77.

former leader Godane (Guled, 2014). Fortunately, there has not been any indication that more attacks have been launched for the purpose of revenge.

4.2.2.6 Conflict spreads like Wildfire

Although hyperconflict does not necessarily entail a sudden outbreak of war, it may nevertheless spread like wildfire. Thus, if hyperconflict does not emerge as one big "blow-up," it will take shape as "multiple forms" aided by new technologies that enable its elements to spread swiftly from one state or region to another.

When one examines this situation of conflict/hyperconflict in Somalia, it is possible to argue that it did not "blow up" into one massive war and then engulf the region. However, it can be argued that the conflict has spread to other states in the region. This has been made possible by the spillovers of conflict in Somalia, as discussed earlier. New technologies have played a definitive role in the spread of Al Shabaab's activities. The effect of new technologies will be examined and discussed in depth in the next section.

4.3 Globalization as Facilitator of Acts of Terror

The purpose of the following section is to determine how the different mechanisms of globalization have impacted the security environment of Somalia and whether and to what extent these mechanisms have facilitated acts of terror committed by Al Shabaab. In so doing it will be possible to determine whether globalization does facilitate terrorist activity within the region. The mechanisms that will be examined in the subsequent pages include: technology as facilitator of terrorism; the use of channels of business and commerce to facilitate terrorist activity, under the title of funding for terror; and migration and the "irrelevance" of boundaries, in other words, how the permeability of borders facilitates Al Shabaab's terrorist activities. Zimmermann's causal model will be consulted when examining these aspects.[21]

4.3.1 Technology as Facilitator

Al Shabaab has exploited the growth of information and communication technologies, and ICT is employed for a number of reasons. According to Menkhaus (2014:324), Al Shabaab has exploited the internet and social media platforms to recruit, raise funds, issue threats,

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[21] *See* page 55.

monitor enemies, amplify its message and reinforce its narrative. He further states that Al Shabaab has been successful in its quest to harness social media in order to advance its radical narrative as a result of appropriation rather than creation. The reason for this is that the organization inherited a narrative of Somali grievance, which it in turn adapted, repackaged in a more radical Islamist garb, and then disseminated via social media back to an audience which had already "internalized the basic story line." Furthermore, the group has made use of the remittance and telecommunication sectors to aid in the movement of money and to raise revenues (Menkhaus, 2014:324).

Mwangi (2012:522) adds that Al Shabaab's internet strategy has three main aims: first, it is a response to the distrust it has for other media sources and outlets, including those located in Western and some Muslim countries. Second, it is proof of the group's sophistication and success (it is able to show off successes through means of professional videos). Lastly, the internet is employed to interact with and gain support from the global terrorist community as well as the Somali Diaspora (Mwangi, 2012:522; Wise, 2011:8). Mwangi (2012:522) adds that the group has used the internet as a platform to disseminate its propaganda.

Wise (2011:5) notes that in the period 2006 to 2008, Al Shabaab recruited "almost entirely" from the local Somali population who had volunteered to fight the invading Ethiopians. However, since 2008 (possibly due to increased access to and awareness of ICT) Al Shabaab has increasingly employed the Internet as a method of recruitment, mainly to recruit ideologically motivated foreigners. Facebook and chatrooms have been especially powerful tools for recruitment (Menkhaus, 2014:324). ICT has also allowed the group to tap into and benefit from wealthy Salafi networks that are keen to support Al Qaeda's global jihad campaign. For example, in August 2009 Al Shabaab launched an online fundraising forum that raised the impressive sum of 40 000 USD from members of the Somali diaspora for their transnational jihadist cause (Agbiboa, 2014a).

The groups's foundation for media productions, Al Kata'ib, started creating a series of "professionally" produced videos, such as "No Peace Without Islam" and "At Your Service, Oh Osama" (Wise, 2011:8). The purpose of these productions was to appeal directly to the foreign audience by highlighting Al Shabaab's connection to the Al Qaeda core, portraying the conflict in Somalia as an important part of the global war against the West, and depicting their fighters as effective and successful (Wise, 2011:8). One can find numerous videos produced by Al Kata'ib on a variety of internet sites. The group has even produced videos in

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English; this has enabled them to reach an international audience (Wise, 2011:8). According to Menkhaus (2014:324), some of the videos produced by Al Kata'ib have been quite powerful and have assisted Al Shabaab in building a brand which was especially popular at one point. One such video is "They are the Enemy so Beware of Them" (Al Kata'ib Foundation for Media Productions presents They are the Enemy so Beware of Them 2 in ENG, 2013). This particular video (like many others) portrays the West, especially the CIA, as absolutely evil with the aim of murdering innocent Muslims. It can be viewed as a propaganda video that aims to turn those foreigners, with radical sympathies against the West. Mwangi (2012:522) adds that ordinary people believe the powerful rhetoric of these videos as a result of the politico-religious discourses that are ingrained in them.

Early in August of 2014 a video was released on Radio Al-Furqaan, allegedly showing how the residents in the town of Marko (Merca)[22] were being harassed by the AMISOM troops. The purpose of this video was to build up anger and resentment towards AMISOM, by portraying them as the enemy. The video went further, stating that these troops had killed citizens of Marko and had raped their women.[23] In addition, the troops had allegedly destroyed the development in the city (pioneered by Al Shabaab) relating to Islamic governance, business and education (African troops invading Somalia kill, rape and torture in the city of Marko, 2014). The video thus portrays Al Shabaab in the light of a saviour, which had pioneered development, and on the other hand, put the troops in a bad light as they are seen to be the destroyers of development. The video further casts a bad light on AMISOM troops as it argues that when residents stood up against the activities of the troops, by chanting and burning tyres, they were met with violent action in the form of shelling (African troops invading Somalia kill, rape and torture in the city of Marko, 2014). Even though the group might have been correct in arguing that the troops terrorized citizens, their presentation was very one-sided. This video essentially attempts to discredit AMISOM and the nations that support it, whilst simultaneously legitimizing itself. One can further argue that by delegitimizing AMISOM, the Somali government is also discredited and delegitimized as the Somali government works alongside AMISOM to fight Al Shabaab. Al Shabaab have also uploaded photos of areas they had recently "captured," as well as some grisly images of dead civilians, their bodies smashed to pieces purportedly by AMISOM peacekeepers and government troops (Harper, 2012:95). These images further led to the delegitimization of

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[22] *See* Appendix A: Map of Somalia.
[23] Video was uploaded to TRAC Somalia's YouTube account and English subtitles were added, *see*: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YN3UkrNEuf8

AMISOM as well as the Somali government. This relates to Zimmermann's (2011:S155) causal model which showcases that globalization leads to the spread of new technologies and ICT which then in turn leads to a weakening of the state. The weakening of the state comes from a loss of legitimacy as the government supports a mission that allegedly harasses, murders, rapes and wreaks havoc on the Somali people.

Early this year Al Shabaab released another video calling for attacks on shopping malls in the US, Canada and the United Kingdom. However, according to Jeh Johnson, Homeland Security Secretary, there is no credible or specific evidence which suggests that an attack on an American mall is being planned. Nevertheless, he warned Americans to be vigilant (Karimi, Fantz & Shoichet, 2015). The Department of Homeland Security and the FBI believe that the video was an attempt by Al Shabaab to compete for attention as well as to attract recruits from other terrorist organizations. One of the malls mentioned in the video, the Mall of America, is situated in Minnesota which "houses" the largest number of Somalis in the US (Karimi, Fantz & Shoichet, 2015). It would make sense as a way to recruit individuals, as a number of American Al Shabaab fighters are of Somali descent (Masters & Sergie, 2015).

Al Shabaab has also made use of social networking technologies such as Twitter. The group has been a devoted user of Twitter since September 2011 (Alexander, 2013). Initially the move onto this social networking platform was an attempt to counter the tweets of Kenya's military spokesman, Major Emmanuel Chirchir, which highlighted the successes of fighting Al Shabaab. The group's Twitter account was shut down numerous times, only to resurface under a new Twitter handle (different name). This makes it clear that it is impossible to silence terrorists that choose to make use of this platform (Alexander, 2013). Al Shabaab has used Twitter as a means of reinforcing a narrative of Somali grievance by employing "shards of evidence and images" that conform to the values and beliefs of its target audience (Menkhaus, 2014:324).

Al Shabaab has mainly employed Twitter as a means through which to make claims of enemy kills and to disseminate its views with regard to events in Somalia and the Horn of Africa (The Guardian, 2013). According to Meleagrou-Hitchens, Maher and Sheehan (2012:31), Twitter aids in bolstering the group's legitimacy as well as undermining competing sources of information about the group. Since Twitter can be used to report activities in real time it prevents governments or news organizations from framing actions in a light which is contrary to what the group wants. The employment of Twitter to instantaneously upload photos has

helped shape its media coverage. The group openly criticizes Western media outlets, proclaiming that only Al Shabaab has the real facts and that these outlets are not be trusted. It is also used as a means of communicating with the Somali Diaspora as well as English speaking Muslims (Meleagrou-Hitchens, Maher & Sheehan, 2013:31). As mentioned in Chapter 2, Al Shabaab made use of Twitter as a running commentary on the Westgate Mall attack. The purpose of these tweets was to taunt Kenyan security forces, justify their actions, boast about their "military prowess" and instil fear in the public.

One can thus argue that technology has played a decisive role in facilitating the spread of Al Shabaab's message, which in turn has indirectly facilitated terrorist activity. It has also served as a means of delegitimizing the enemy and simultaneously legitimizing itself. Furthermore, since it has been employed as a recruitment tactic and has encouraged so many foreign fighters to join, one can argue that this led to a growth in the number of fighters and consequently an increase in the number of terror attacks. Al Shabaab's use of technology does not wholly relate to Zimmermann's causal model, specifically with regard to its use of technology as a means of recruitment. A new "channel" should therefore be added to Zimmermann's existing model where technology leads to recruitment of fighters (especially foreign) which in turn leads to opportunities for terrorism. It does however relate to the model to the extent that Al Shabaab's use of videos has delegitimized the Somalian government and has thus weakened the state.

4.3.2 Funding for Terror

As was briefly outlined in Chapter 2, some scholars have argued that terrorists frequently exploit international trade networks in order to market goods and services. The money that comes from these goods and services enables the terrorist organization to finance its terrorist operations. It can also be noted that many of the goods traded are illegal/smuggled (Li & Schaub, 2004:235). This section will examine the ways in which Al Shabaab has exploited networks of international trade in order to provide financing for operations. In addition, it will examine the other means that Al Shabaab has used in order to fund its terror activities.

According to a study conducted by Vilkko (2011:19), the port of Kismayo plays a major role in generating revenue within Somalia. Since there are many traders that seek to benefit from Somalia's de facto duty free status, the ports are of both economic and strategic importance. Many of the individuals interviewed argued that the taxes and fees derived from the port of

Kismayo were the single largest source of revenue for Al Shabaab. Furthermore, since Kismayo is a major logistical hub, control of the port means control of strategic trade lines, some of which run to the Arabian Peninsula and the entire East African region. Of all the commodities traded, the export of charcoal can be identified as the one which generates the most income for Al Shabaab (Vilkko, 2011:19; Walker, 2014:41). The group has relied on charcoal revenues to finance and execute numerous plots against Somali, regional and international targets (Walker, 2014:42). The reason that Al Shabaab is able to make such large revenues from the sale of charcoal is linked to the demand for quality charcoal, particularly in the Gulf. The charcoal, made from Somali acacia trees, is prized as it burns for much longer when compared to charcoal from other states. Thus, the group is able to charge a much higher price for the charcoal and in turn generate large revenues (Charcoal and Terrorism in Somalia: A charred harvest, 2014:60). The continued trade of charcoal is thus vital to the operation of Al Shabaab as it plays a major part in financing the organization.

Walker (2014:41) argues that Al Shabaab would be unable to conduct transnational terrorist attacks and rule important swathes of central and southern Somalia without the revenue from charcoal. Even though the port was lost by Al Shabaab to Kenyan Defence forces in 2012, it did not deal a blow to Al Shabaab's revenue. In addition the UN, via UN Security Council Resolution 2036 of February 2012, issued a ban against the export of Somali charcoal, the main reason being that charcoal was used to finance terrorism (Walker, 2014:43). However, the ban has been observed to be mostly in breach. In actual fact since the "takeover" by Kenyan Defence Forces and the ban on Somali charcoal, Al Shabaab's revenue from the port has increased. The revenues are derived from the taxes imposed on the transport of the charcoal as well as the "shares" in the smuggling business. Al Shabaab has been able to continue to finance, amongst other things, weapons imported from Yemen[24] because of a profit-sharing agreement. According to a report presented to the UN Security Council, the profit generated through exports from Kismayo is divided between rebels, the region's government and members of the Kenyan Defence Force (Charcoal and Terrorism in Somalia: A charred harvest, 2014:60). However, it is unlikely that a similar arrangement will be made with regard to the port of Barawe[25], which Al Shabaab lost to SNA and AMISOM forces on the 3rd of October 2014 (Omar, 2014). The port was also used for the export of charcoal and

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[24] Somalia's geographical proximity to Yemen also aids in importing weapons.
[25] Thus far there have been no indications that AMISOM and SNA forces have colluded with Al Shabaab in a profit-sharing agreement.

the import of weapons and other goods (Omar, 2014). This is likely to affect Al Shabaab's revenue negatively.

Thus, through the above example one can clearly see that Al Shabaab has taken advantage of the channels of business and commerce, which have been created by the process of globalization. In this instance, globalization has indirectly facilitated the terrorist activities of Al Shabaab by allowing the group to generate revenue in order to finance operations. As was mentioned earlier it would be nearly impossible to conduct operations without the vital revenue generated through these channels. Thus, by being able to generate revenue Al Shabaab has been able to operate and conduct terrorist activity. Although the channels of business and commerce do not form part of Zimmermann's model it should be added to the existing model as a means of funding terror, as the channel has served to create opportunities for terrorism.

In addition to exploiting the channels of business and commerce, there have been a number of reports that state that Al Shabaab has turned to piracy as a source of financing (Childress, 2010; Keene, 2012; BBC, 2013a). According to Childress (2010) Al Shabaab has taxed the ransom extorted by Somali pirates and has also dispatched it own fighters to attack ships, especially American ships. The relationship between Al Shabaab and the pirates has been disputed, given diverging ideologies and motivations. However, Al Shabaab's decline in popularity has led to a decline in external funding, including donations from the Somali diaspora (Keene, 2012). This decline in funding has thus made for some awkward bedfellows in Al Shabaab and the Somali pirates. It has been noted that Al Shabaab provides pirates with protection and allows them to move around in areas controlled by the group; in return Al Shabaab demands a commission on every ransom paid (Keene, 2012). In February 2011, Al Shabaab seized a number of pirate gang leaders and forced them to accept a multimillion-dollar deal, which would have pirates paying a 20 percent commission on future ransoms to Al Shabaab (Lough, 2011). According to a Reuters investigation, a number of payments were made to Al Shabaab's "marine office" in 2011. These include amongst others: on February 25, $200 000 from the release of the Japanese owned MV Izumi after pirates received $4.5 million in ransom; on March 9, $100 000 after the release of Singapore flagged MV York; and on April 13, $600 000 from the release of the German ship Beluga Nomination after the payment of a $5.5 million ransom. Pirates, Al Shabaab militants and residents of Haradhere[26]

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[26] Pirate haven north of Mogadishu.

verified the aforementioned amounts (Lough, 2011).

4.3.3 Migration and "Irrelevance" of Boundaries

As was mentioned in Chapter 2[27], globalization has allowed for the "free" and easy flow of people across borders (Adamson, 2006:165). Globalization has effectively created a "migration channel" and this channel can be exploited by terrorist organizations. The following section will determine whether individuals have made use of these migration channels to join the ranks of Al Shabaab as fighters; whether Al Shabaab militants have made use of this migration channel in order to carry out terror attacks and in what way have they done so. Furthermore, it will also examine porous borders as an additional factor that has assisted the migration channel, especially concerning the launching of attacks.

A number of sources confirm the presence of foreign fighters within the ranks of Al Shabaab. According to Terrance Ford, AFRICOM's Director of Intelligence and Knowledge Development, there were approximately 200 foreign fighters and another 1,000 ethnic Somalis from outside Somalia within Al Shabaab in September 2010 (Shinn, 2011:210). There were possibly between 200 and 300 non-Somali foreign jihadis fighting for the Al Shabaab cause. These non-Somali fighters were mainly from Saudi Arabia, Kenya's Swahili coast, Sudan, Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, Tanzania, Yemen, Uganda and Bangladesh (Shinn, 2011:210). One could argue that the presence of fighters from Yemen and Saudi Arabia is linked to Somalia's geographical proximity to the Middle East. Furthermore, proximity coupled with globalization's channels of migration has facilitated and possibly even exacerbated the influx of jihadis into Somalia.[28] In addition, the migration of these jihadis from their home nations into Somalia could possibly be attributed to the porous borders of many African states, especially those bordering Somalia. There are however fighters from what one would term Western states, such as the US, the United Kingdom, Canada and Denmark. The majority are of Somali descent (Harper, 2012:98-99).

Shinn (2011:211) argues that though the foreign element of Al Shabaab is usually involved in planning activities such as suicide bombing, there are several who have acted as suicide bombers. For example in October 2008, the US's first known suicide bomber, Shirwa Ahmed from Minneapolis, drove into a group of people with a vehicle loaded with explosives.

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[27] *See* page 31.
[28] The loss of the port of Barawe is likely to negatively impact the "migration" of foreign fighters as the port was used to bring in fighters from abroad (Omar, 2014).

The attack killed thirty people in Puntland in the northern part of Somalia (Shinn, 2011:211). In the next year, a Somali-American from Seattle was one of two suicide bombers who drove into the AU force headquarters in Mogadishu, with vehicles bearing a UN logo. The suicide attack killed 21 peacekeepers. In another incident, a Dane of Somali descent blew himself up at a hotel in Mogadishu during a college graduation ceremony during December 2009 which resulted in the death of 24 people, 3 of whom were government ministers (Shinn, 2011:211). In September 2010, a Somali-American, Dahir Gurey Sheikh Ali Guled, died on the streets of Mogadishu following a battle with pro- government forces. An estimated twelve U.S. citizens have been killed fighting alongside Al Shabaab in Somalia (Shinn, 2011:211).

The most prominent example of foreign jihadis fighting for Al Shabaab was in the Westgate Mall attack. The Al Shabaab militants responsible for this attack comprise a number of nationalities. Following the attack, Al Shabaab released a list of those involved in the attack. According to the list, there were three Americans, one Canadian, one from the United Kingdom, one Finn, two Somalis and one Kenyan (Onuoha, 2013a:4). It is interesting to note that two-thirds of the militants hail from Western states, albeit from the Somali diaspora. This showcases the reach that Al Shabaab has across the globe. All of these militants were trained in Somalia, where the terrorist cell is situated (Karimi, Almasy & Leposo, 2013).

Samantha Lewthwaite, a British citizen, better known as the "White Widow" (she was married to one of the 7/7 London bombers) was allegedly involved in the Westgate attack (Van Zuijdewijn & Bakker, 2014:8; Crawford, 2014). According to Kenyan intelligence authorities, Lewthwaite and her husband, Salim, pose a major threat to security as they are working at a high level in Al Shabaab; and have been responsible for planning bombing raids within Somalia and Kenya. Furthermore, Lewthwaite is also considered to be an important banker/logistician to Al Shabaab, she is believed to be the logistician of a six-person terror cell (Tomlinson, 2014; Crawford, 2014). Interpol issued a Red Notice for her arrest in September 2013. However, Lewthwaite has evaded capture and is still wanted for prosecution by Kenyan authorities (INTERPOL, 2013). In comparison, to the majority of other foreign fighters in Al Shabaab, Lewthwaite was raised in what one could consider a Western family. She defies the norm of a typical foreign jihadist.

The fact that the militants came from countries across the world showcases the ease with which individuals can "migrate" across international borders. Furthermore, one can cite porous borders as possibly facilitating the movement of militants from Somalia into Kenya,

in order to launch the attack. For example, Lewthwaite and her husband Salim have been known to cross the porous border between the two countries (Tomlinson, 2014). In addition, every year hundreds of millions of individuals, including terrorists are making use of international transport and crossing national/international borders without having the authenticity of their travel or identity documents checked. This makes it extremely difficult for organizations such as INTERPOL to effectively screen and identify suspected terrorists at airports and land crossings. For example, Lewthwaite used a fraudulently obtained South African passport (INTERPOL, 2013). It is highly unlikely that she is the only one to do so.

It thus clear that foreign jihadis have taken up the banner for Al Shabaab and are willing to die for the cause. The reasons behind joining Al Shabaab may vary, but one could argue that the channels of migration have facilitated the movement of terrorists and thus facilitated terrorist activity. Again, the "migration" channel does not relate to Zimmermann's causal model, as the model only refers to immigration of workers. In the case of Al Shabaab there has been an "immigration" of fighters. Thus, it should be considered that the concept of immigration be widened to include fighters as well. Thus, globalization would lead to the creation of a migration channel which facilitates the movement of fighters which in turn creates opportunities for terrorism.

4.4 Globalization as Incentive for Acts of Terror

According to the preceding chapters, globalization is often seen as a motivating factor for terrorist activity. The purpose of the following section is to examine whether the different facets of globalization have indeed led to increased terrorist activity, perpetrated by Al Shabaab, within Somalia and the surrounding area of the Horn of Africa. It will do this by consulting Zimmermann's causal model and looking specifically at how the threat of corrupt culture, as well as increasing inequality and poverty have contributed to and encouraged terrorist activity.

4.4.1 Threat of Corrupt Culture

According to Zimmermann's causal model, globalization is believed to spread/export foreign "corrupt cultures." It is also believed to lead to changes in values, which is arguably triggered by the infiltration of foreign "corrupt" cultures. The spread of foreign and perceived corrupt cultures then create incentives for terrorism (2011:S158). Globalization is seen as spreading

corrupt/foreign culture, because it is often associated with Westernization and Americanization. The culture associated with Westernization/Americanization is perceived to erode indigenous and "conservative" cultures. These changes in values are said to cause distortions in local communities. The purpose of this subsection is to determine whether Zimmermann's causal model holds true in the Somalian environment and surrounding states in the Horn of Africa.

The continuous spread of globalization has been accompanied by a spread in consumerism. The extensive spread of consumerism is clearly visible in the large number of shopping centres spread throughout the globe. As consumerism is associated with Western and American values it is often dismissed and seen as distorting conservative values. The Westgate Mall attack in Kenya on 21 September 2013 (lasting until 24 September) could serve as an example of where consumerism, which is part of a foreign "corrupt" culture, served as an incentive for Al Shabaab to attack the centre. The Westgate Mall is essentially a symbol of Western culture, it cultivates and is associated with the abhorred notion of consumerism. The view that foreign/corrupt culture in the form of consumerism can be seen as a possible reason for the choice of target is shared by others. McConnell (2013) argues that the Westgate Mall is symbolic of everything that the group abhors. He characterizes it as a temple of Western consumerism, where one can buy expensive products such as iPhones, watch movies and drink cocktails – the consumption of alcohol is prohibited in Islam. Furthermore, the activities that malls offer attract individuals whom Al Shabaab perceives as being corrupted by the decadence of Western culture. Thus, by choosing this specific target the group struck at "the heart and soul of a society [it] despises" (McConnell, 2013). It is important to note that the threat of corrupt culture is only a possible reason for the choice in target, and is not necessarily the reason behind the attack.

Furthermore, as much as 98 percent of respondents in a study (88 former Al Shabaab fighters were interviewed) perceived Islam to be under threat and that it needed to be defended by the actions of Al Shabaab (Botha & Abdile, 2014:6). This threat was often associated with non-Muslim countries. In addition, many were told by "preachers" that the Christian crusaders (possibly Ethiopians, individuals/organizations) from the West had invaded their beloved country and were in the process of attempting to convert Somalis to Christianity (Botha & Abdile, 2014:6). This provides further proof that Al Shabaab perceives Somalia to be under threat of corrupt culture.

It is important to note that shortly after the incidents of 9/11, the US froze the assets of Somalia's largest remittance agency, al-Barakat, an important pillar of Somalia's economy. As the company's bank accounts were frozen, it meant that Somalis in the diaspora were unable to send money home to their relatives who were dependent on the remittances for survival. This also meant that many Somalis lost money (Harper, 2012:168). Less than a year after freezing the assents, al-Barakat was removed from the US terror list, given that there was insuficient evidence to prove that it seved as a conduit for Al Qaeda finances. Unfortunately, this proved too late as the US had already alienated many Somalis by severing a lifeline for hundreds of thousands of people (Harper, 2012:168). As a result, many Somalis now perceive the US in a negative light, and arguably that which it represents, in other words, globalization.

In addition, US action in the form assassination, interrogation and bombing, has led to the US being perceived as an enemy of Somalia. As a result of this Al Shabaab regards humanitarian aid as a tool of Western political strategy, which one can equate with globalization, and thus refuses to allow the majority of Western aid agencies access to the country (Bunting, 2011). In 2011, a severe famine hit two areas controlled by Al Shabaab. The UN worked carefully to discuss with Al Shabaab the delivery of aid to these areas and had made some progress. Unfortunately, the US then announced that they would also be channelling aid to the famine stricken areas. As a result, Al Shabaab refused not only the US, but also other foreign aid agencies access to the areas. This was mostly as a result of Al Shabaab's hatred of the US (Harper, 2012:182–183). However, one could also argue that if Western aid agencies were allowed to deliver the much needed food to starving Somalis, these Somalis would possibly have seen the West as their saviours, which could have damaged the view that the West is an enemy – a view that Al Shabaab needed to keep in place in order to maintain their position of authority.

Al Shabaab's hatred of Westernization is clear when one examines its attacks on targets of Western origin or associated with Westernization. Since the US labelled Al Shabaab a Foreign Terrorist organization in October 2008, the organization has made clear its intent to target Western interests both within and outside the Somalian state. There are numerous examples of such attacks. For example in April 2009, the group fired mortar shells at the plane of a US congressman as the plane was lifting off from a Somalia airport (TRAC, 2014). Another example is the Christmas Day attacks, mentioned earlier, on the main AU base in

Somalia. The group was targeting a Christmas party (Western tradition) at the base; furthermore the base also houses Western embassies and UN offices. These are clearly Western targets. The group has also launched a limited number of attacks against educational institutions offering Western education; between 2011 and 2014 the group launched nine attacks (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2015e). The most significant attack against an educational institution is that of the Garissa Univeristy College attack mentioned previously. As stated, the attack was launched in retaliation to Kenya's war against Al Shabaab; therefore the university's link to "Westernization" did not serve as an incentive; however, just like the Westgate Mall, its symbolism could have informed the choice of target.

One is therefore able to argue that the spread of "corrupt" Western culture (exported by globalization) into Somalia and other areas in the Horn of Africa, most prominently Kenya, has played a definitive role in the selection of targets by Al Shabaab. The spread of globalization, Westernization and those that are seen to embody it has in some sense led to an increase in terrorist activity in Somalia as well as in Kenya.

4.4.2 Increasing Inequality and Poverty

Most scholars will agree that globalization has led to increasing inequality and has widened the gap between the rich and the poor. Zimmermann's model links globalization to an increase in economic and social inequality, in other words, the societal polarization within countries. Furthermore, increasing economic and social inequality is also linked to a weakened state (the result of globalization), as the state no longer has the ability to protect the economically disadvantaged groups against the challenges of the global economy. The model links economic and social inequality to opportunities for terrorist activity (Zimmermann, 2011:S155). The purpose of this section is to determine whether these links are present in the case of Somalia and the Horn of Africa region; in other words, whether increased inequality and poverty can be linked to globalization and a weakening of the state; and then subsequently create opportunities for terrorist activity in Somalia and neighbouring states. In order to determine the above stated aims it is important to examine the ways in which globalization (modernization) has changed and impacted the Somali state.

According to Ukpere (2011:6072) the current form of globalization has aggravated the problem of unemployment, the repercussions of which translates to widespread income

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inequality and mass poverty in Africa. In actual fact, the "trickle down economy pattern" has constantly failed African states and its citizens. Thus, what is good for Wall Street, in other words the West, is not necessarily good for Africa. Furthermore, no matter the angle one views it from, its seems as if the African continent has been marginalized and left behind by globalization. Thus, it is for the most part a loser of globalization. One cannot deny that capitalist globalization has created wealth in Africa, but it has also led to an intensification of inequality and poverty (Ukpere, 2011:6072). Many African states boast incredibly high growth rates, however higer Gross Domestic Product (GDP) figures do not translate into greater equality and employment. In addition, in many cases the wealth generated by these economies is held by a small group of elites, whilst a large portion of the population remain desitute and never see any benefits from the so-called benefits of globalization (Ukpere, 2011:6072). Ukpere's argument ties in with the first part of one of the links in Zimmerman's model, namely that globalization has led to increased economic inequality and marginalization. However, this relates to Africa as a whole rather than to Somalia and the Horn of Africa, specifically. Thus, it is vital to look at this in the context of Somalia and the Horn of Africa.

Webersik (2004:517) argues that the process of modernization (globalization) played a major role in shaping violence in Somalia. The Somali state underwent drastic changes in its "transformation" from a pre-capitalist to a capitalist society, whereby the modes of production changed. Ohanwe (2009:139) agrees that the transformation of Somali society as well as the integration of Somalia into the world economy, lies at the root of societal conflict. The inclusion of the Somali state into the world economy resulted in a capitalist order arising, which in turn gave rise to competition between pastoralists, an influx of people to cities (presumably in search of jobs), as well as increased opportunities for individuals or groups to make profits by engaging in transnational economic activities, thus using the channels of business and commerce, which were most likely illegal (Pettersson, 2011:75). Pettersson (2011:750) further argues that the changes brought about by the processes of modernization and globalization within traditional Somali society have increased social tensions and have made a contribtion to the outbreak of conflict.

According to Ross (2013), as well as a report by the United Nations Development Programme (2012), there are some social grievances present in Kenya, Somalia and the rest of the Horn of Africa region, such as marginalization, that will encourage individuals to

either join the ranks of Al Shabaab or other networks allied to Al Qaeda. These grievances can possibly be linked to the effects of globalization.

This is especially true in the big cities, where there will always be individuals who feel that they are not being given a chance or that they are being left behind. In particular, younger men feel that they are often overlooked and are not being given the same opportunities they see others being given, in other words, inequality of opportunity arises (Ross, 2013). One could then argue that this marginalization serves as a push factor for individuals, especially for younger men, to join Al Shabaab as they are at least given an opportunity to do something with their lives. Abdulkadir (2012:4; 7) states that Al Shabaab recruits young men through promises of financial security. These men are often disillusioned and they tend to be encouraged by the group's leadership. Al Shabaab thus gives these men the opportunity of a "better" and more "comfortable" life. It offers them a chance to escape a life lived in poverty.

Hassan (2012:18) cites unemployment as a major push factor in young Somalis joining the ranks of Al Shabaab. Carter (2012:70) adds that Al Shabaab has taken advantage of unemployment in Somalia by offering generous salaries with benefits to potential young fighters. According to the findings of a focus group of 15 former Al Shabaab members, 5 out of the 15 indicated that joining Al Shabaab provided them with a form of employment. In addition, Al Shabaab provided a decent monthly salary without requiring much effort – they merely had to carry around a gun and patrol streets. Thus, being able to provide for themselves and their families played a major part in the decision to join Al Shabaab. Hassan (2012:18) adds that poverty does not directly encourage the joining of Al Shabaab, but rather the low self-esteem and idleness that is caused by it. The fact that a large majority of Somali youth are unemployed and rely on relatives for provision, either in Somalia or in the diaspora, crushes their self-worth in such a way that when an opportunity to fend for themselves arises, they are quick to take advantage (Hassan, 2012:18).

A recent study by Botha and Abdile (2014:5) agrees that unemployment has been a major push factor in young Somalis joining Al Shabaab. In their study of 88 respondents (former Al Shabaab fighters) 27 percent indicated that they joined Al Shabaab for economic reasons. These individuals essentially saw Al Shabaab as a potential employer, as they were allegedly being paid between $150 and $500 per month. This is somewhat contradictory to Hassan's argument that states that poverty (which can be caused by unemployment) does not directly encourage the joining of Al Shabaab.

The above clearly supports the argument that social inequality creates opportunities for terrorism, as it encourages individuals to join the ranks of Al Shabaab in an effort to make something of their lives. However, there is no clear evidence that links globalization to social inequality, poverty, and unemployment in Somalia. The high level of social ineqaulity, poverty, and unemployment is attributed to factors such as: a weak and distorted economy brought about by corruption and civil war, amongst others; uneven power and weak insitutions; inter-group inequalities, where some clans are favoured whilst others are marginalized; and the youth bulge, (where the number of youths entering the job market is too high) which is possibly the major contributor, causing the supply to far exceed the demand (United Nations Development Programme, 2012:18–40). One could therefore argue that the aforementioned factors are partly repsonsible for encouraging individuals to join groups such as Al Shabaab. However, the available evidence does not support the notion that globalization has exacerbated unemployment and poverty, which are considered to be driving factors of terrorism, in Somalia and the Horn of Africa.

4.5 Globalization as Motivating Factor in the Rise of Al Shabaab

If one considers globalization as a means of standardizing the world, and terrorism is a form of resistance to that, then terrorism can be viewed as a subset of the anti-globalization movement (Perry, 2008:20). This is the case when one looks at the fact that globalization played a prominent role in motivating the rise of Al Shabaab. "In Somalia, US-backed Ethiopian soldiers fought to crush an al-Qaeda offshoot [Al Shabaab] that espoused the most extreme end of Islamic exceptionalism" (Perry, 2008:21). These US-backed Ethiopian soldiers were globalizers whilst Al Shabaab could be viewed as anti-globalizers. According to an Al Shabaab commander in Mogadishu, Mohammed Mahmood Ali, the US presence had "invigorated the resistance." America's aggression aided the organization in gaining support (Perry, 2008:213). This is supported by the fact that the US, in the flesh, was raining down death and destruction on Somalis and "muscling in on Africa as though it were part of a grand White House Scheme to preserve the US's place at the top of an unfair world order" (Perry, 2008:214). Al Shabaab was of the opinion that the only reason for US soldiers to travel to Somalia was the hatred of Islam. Al Shabaab fighters essentially saw themselves as victims fighting the evil America, a bastion of globalization (Perry, 2008:214).

There are many others scholars who agree with Perry such as Agbiboa (2014a) who states that the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in December 2006 played a major role in the development and radicalization of Al Shabaab. The invasion unearthed major internal rivalries within the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), pitting the moderate leaders of the ICU against the more radical elements that would later emerge as Al Shabaab. Al Shabaab emerged victorious from the power struggle, effectively dismantling the leadership of the moderate leaders (Abdulkadir, 2012:3).

Menkhaus (2009:226) adds that thousands of Somalis were radicalized by their inhumane treatment – by means of looting, assault and rape – at the hands of the TFG and Ethiopian forces (backed by the US). Their radicalization led them either to becoming active or passive supporters of the increasingly violent and radical Al Shabaab (Menkhaus, 2009:226). Thus, the radicalization of "normal" Somalis played a major part in the rise of Al Shabaab. Menkhaus (2009:231) goes further in stating that most Somalis are convinced that the Ethiopian invasion and occupation was authorized and directed by the US. They are not entirely wrong as the US played a major part in sourcing development and military assistance to Ethiopia; within the UN Security Council they shielded Ethiopia from criticism of its occupation of Somalia; collaborated with the Ethiopians as well as the TFG in multiple cases of interrogation (usually inhumane) of Somalis suspected of involvement in terrorismand engaged in gunship and missile attacks on suspected terrorist targets (Menkhaus, 2009:231).

Harper (2012:172) supports the above notion in stating that in concert with the Ethiopian invasion, the US carried out a number of air strikes against senior Al Qaeda members and other Islamist suspects purportedly hiding in Somalia. However, the majority of these airstirkes did not hit the intended targets (if they were even in Somalia at the time), instead they killed civilians as well as livestock. This resulted in futher alienation of the Somali people and could have played a role in provoking more Somalis into joining radical and violent "religious" groups such as Al Shabaab (Harper, 2012:172). Menkhaus and Harper are in agreement with Perry with regard to America raining down death and destruction on Somalis and in the process alienating them. As a result of the aforementioned events, anti-American and anti-Western sentiment rose and this posed the risk of more Somalis becoming passive or active supporters of Al Shabaab, which was the case.

Thus, one can argue that globalization played a definite part, albeit not the only part, in the rise of Al Shabaab. It served as a means of radicalizing the group as well as radicalizing

ordinary Somalis, and encouraging them to support or even join the group. If it were not for the involvement of the West and its "pawns" in Somalia, it is possible that Al Shabaab would not have become the radical organization it is today.

4.6 Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to apply the theoretical frameworks, namely Mittelmann's theory of hyperconflict and Zimmermann's causal model to the case study of Somalia (and the Horn of Africa region) and Al Shabaab, and to determine whether this case study fits the aforementioned frameworks. In the case of Mittelman's theory of hyperconflict, it seems clear that this case study corresponds to the the characteristics of hyperconflict. It is possible to argue that Al Shabaab has engulfed Somalia and parts of the Horn of Africa region in a condition of hyperconflict. With reference to Zimmermann's causal model, the case study corresponds to some sections of the model, for example the threat of corrupt culture, the impact of technology, the impact of migration and channels of migration as well as the channels of business and commerce. However, there is insufficient evidence for the case study to correspond to globalization leading to social inequality and then perpetuating terrorism. The above findings will be analysed more in depth in Chapter 6.

Chapter 5: Boko Haram: The Scourge of Globalization

5.1 Introduction

This chapter will focus specifically on how globalization as a whole has impacted on the security environment and created a climate for acts of terror within the Nigerian state, especially in the northern region. This chapter will follow an outline similar to that in Chapter 4. The purpose of this chapter is to determine whether the Nigerian case serves as an example of *hyperconflict* as developed by Mittelman and discussed in Chapter 3. It also seeks to determine how the different facets of globalization, for example technological advances, improved transportation networks and lowering of barriers to trade and commerce, have enabled Boko Haram to more easily commit acts of terror. It will also examine whether the effects of globalization have encouraged the terrorist organization to commit acts of terror. It will refer back to Zimmermann's causal model when exploring these sections. In addition, it will also explore if and how globalization itself has served as a motivating factor in the rise of Boko Haram, specifically relating to its anti-Western stance.

5.2 Hyperconflict and Nigeria

The following section will examine the security environment of Nigeria within the context of hyperconflict. The purpose of this section is to determine whether hyperconflict has erupted or is in the process of erupting in Nigeria.[29] In order to do so, it will begin by examining the factors responsible for hyperconflict and determine whether these factors are present in the case of Nigeria. The first factor that will be discussed is a decline in legitimacy which will be followed by a comparison of the characteristics of hyperconflict and the case of the Nigerian state.

5.2.1 Legitimacy and State Failure

As mentioned in Chapter 4, Mittelman (2010:23) argues that hyperconflict can be seen to arise from a decline in legitimacy. It is vital that power holders have legitimacy if they are to exercise their power effectively. A decline in their legitimacy will make it problematic for

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[29] *See* Map of Nigeria in Appendix C.

power holders to ensure that people, in this case citizens, obey the rules and orders as set out by power holders. A decline in and a lack of legitimacy can arise for a number of reasons; these will be identified and discussed in the following paragraphs.

One of the major contributors to declining legitimacy is corruption. According to Forest (2012:5), government corruption is often cited as a driver of collective political violence. In states where corruption is rampant, resources, privileges and advantages are reserved for a select group of people, the ruling elite. Corruption impedes the fair distribution of social goods and services, whilst simultaneously adding to the resentment caused by a lack of political participation by the rest of society, as they have no voice. Corruption then essentially erodes the legitimacy of government in the eyes of its people (Forest, 2012:6). Nigeria has consistently been ranked as one of the most corrupt countries in the world.[30] In Nigeria, as in much of West Africa, statist economic policies – "building on the early post-independence nationalization of former colonial private industries" – combined with patronage systems, created an environment in which the state no longer fulfilled its purpose of serving its people, but instead became a means to access wealth (Forest, 2012:6). Thus, the Nigerian state has to an extent failed to adhere to the social contract between government and the people. Boko Haram has often cited that corruption is one of the drivers behind its campaign of terror (Forest, 2012:6).

Furthermore, the widely acknowledged levels of corruption among elites greatly detract from the effectiveness of the Nigerian government. Patronage and corruption fuel a perception amongst citizens that government officials (including law enforcement) cannot be trusted. This distrust in turn further undermines the legitimacy of the government as well as its ability to positively influence the behavior of its citizens, "away from the [appeal] of radical extremist ideologies like that of Boko Haram" (Forest, 2012:16). The distrust of government has created a fragile relationship between the state and its citizens. This can arguably be traced back to decades of plundering of massive oil resources by kleptocratic leaders (Forest, 2012:20). A report by International Crisis Group (2014b:2) adds that elites from all factions –

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[30] According to Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions index of 2014, Nigeria is ranked 136th out of 175 countries. Nigeria was given a score of 27 (where 0 is highly corrupt and 100 is very clean); it improved upon its 2013 ranking by 2 points; however it is still categorized amongst the world's most corrupt countries (Transparency International, 2014). In addition, Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer of 2013 found that 72 percent of respondents felt that corruption had increased in the last two years (Transparency International, 2013).

political, economic, bureaucratic, traditional, and religious – have been lured into a political economy characterized by massive oil receipts.

It is important to note that corruption is not a new phenomenon, but rather a trait that has been present throughout Nigeria's history. For example, during the 1990s, the Sani Abacha regime set the standard for plundering the resources of the Nigerian state. Under this regime, money was stolen openly and with "impunity," (some estimates place the money stolen at more than $8 billion). Furthermore, those responsible were never held accountable for their crimes. The system that enabled such robbery is still in place today; where resources are channeled through state entities that control access to jobs and wealth. This endemic corruption has denied millions opportunities. According to former World Bank Vice President for Africa Dr Obiageli Ezekwesili, Nigeria has lost over $400 billion to large-scale corruption since independence in 1960 (International Crisis Group, 2014b:2). In addition, often the only way to make money is to hold a position in government, as these officials have access to large amounts of resources. "A university professor's salary is 400,000 naira (roughly $2,500) per month, while a local government chairman's salary is 1.2 million naira (over $7,500) per month" (Forest, 2012:32).

As mentioned earlier, the Nigerian people distrust the government, thus it is not strange that their views about the government are extremely negative. The Nigerian people have widespread grievances, which can be cited as drivers of not only distrust but also conflict and violence, which further exacerbates the challenges faced by the government (Forest, 2012:21). The distrust of government is supported by grievances such as corruption (mentioned earlier), cronyism, a lack of service delivery, including a lack of reliable electricity (which has led to a chronic energy shortage), and low quality education amongst others (Forest, 2012:30–31; International Crisis Group, 2014b). The aforementioned grievances, have, on the one hand, led many Nigerian citizens to place their trust in other forms of governance and economic systems. One could argue that Nigerian people no longer view the Nigerian government as legitimate. On the other hand, many have done whatever they can to get what they can from the system of central governance that they ironically view as ineffective and untrustworthy (Forest, 2012:30–31).

The rampant corruption in Nigeria could possibly see it becoming a failed state. According to Bamidele (2012:32) Nigeria seems to meet the criteria of a failed state such as Somalia. In failed states, as was seen in the previous chapter, terrorists are often able to operate without

restraint, plan sophisticated attacks and stockpile weapons; this is not because government officials support and sponsor these people, but merely because they lack the political will to bring the terrorists to justice (Bamidele, 2012: 32). Thus Adegbulu (2013:271) argues that Boko Haram is the product of a society presided over by incompetent and corrupt leadership in a system that deprives people of their means of livelihood and leads them to suffer despite living in a country with abundant natural resources.

5.2.2 Characteristics of Hyperconflict

The purpose of this section is to determine whether the Somali case fits the characteristics of hyperconflict as described by Mittelman. It will do so by briefly reminding the reader of the characteristics of hyperconflict before applying these to the case of Nigeria and Boko Haram. It will only discuss those characteristics which relate to the case study.

5.2.2.1 Potential to Engulf

First, hyperconflict is at the present time in a nascent phase, in other words it is just beginning to come into existence and display signs of future "potential." Thus, one could possibly argue that it has the potential to engulf the entire global populace, or at least a large section of the global populace in a situation of hyperconflict (Mittelman, 2011:15). For the most part Boko Haram represented a threat to only the Nigerian state. In 2011, Cook (2014:22) predicted that one of the signs pointing to Boko Haram becoming a globalist Salafi-jihadi group, as opposed to having aspirations restricted to Nigeria only, would be that it would comence operations in the neighbouring countries of Cameroon, Niger and Chad. Thus, with recent events involving Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Benin, Boko Haram has threatened regional security and it seems as though Cook's prediction has held true. The AU's approval of the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF),[31] consisting of 8700 military police and civilian personnel (African Union, 2015) could add further fuel to the fire and engulf the aforementioned nations in hyperconflict. According to Pham (2012:1), Boko Haram may evolve into a transnational threat, given its links with other terrorist groups in North, West and East Africa (Al Shabaab).

The state, apart from Nigeria, that has suffered the most at the hands of Boko Haram is Cameroon. For the most part of the 2011 to 2014 period, Boko Haram avoided launching a

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[31] Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria.

major operation in Cameroon, instead utilizing it as a cash cow (Cook, 2014:22). Thus, when the group was in need of funds, it kidnapped Westerners as well as other foreigners in northern Cameroon, who would then be held for ransom. According to reports all the kidnappings were allegedly coordinated by Boko Haram with the Ansaru[32] (Cook, 2014:22).

However, for the past two years, Boko Haram has been carrying out cross-border attacks and raids on Cameroon, in the process slaughtering hundreds and torching enitre neighberhoods (Chimtom, 2015). Cameroon has come under increasing pressure since the beginning of 2014, with its elite Rapid Intervention Battalion (BIR) losing dozens of men in the fight against Boko Haram. Approxiamtely 1000 men from BIR, trained by US and Israeli forces, have been deployed along the porous 500 km border with Nigeria. This has been done in an attempt to protect the border and to keep it intact, as Boko Haram forces are advancing in the region (BBC, 2014b). In mid-2014, Boko Haram embarked on an increasingly aggressive strategy towards Cameroon. In an alleged response to growing Cameroonian resistance towards the group, Boko Haram carried out several attacks against the Cameroonian government and security forces between July and September (Waddington, 2014:49). On 27 July, the group conducted a raid on the border town of Fotokol, resulting in the kidnapping of the vice-prime minister's wife, even though the target was the prime minister himself. Analysts regard this as a direct response to Cameroon's then recent agreement to support regional efforts to counteract the group. The vice-prime minister's wife, along with other hostages, was released in October (Waddington, 2014:49). In late 2014 a further 2000 soldiers were dispatched to the border region (BBC, 2014b). On 29 December 2014, Boko Haram militants attacked the Assighasia camp in northern Cameroon; Cameroonian forces had to withdraw after trying to defend the position. This was the first time that Boko Haram had successfully taken a military base in Cameroon. Shortly after the attack, Cameroonian President Paul Biya personally ordered an air strike on the base, after which Boko Haram fighters were forced to flee (Al Jazeera, 2014a).

The Cameroonian military are also of the opinion that Boko Haram is determined to seize several of the border towns in Cameroon in order to expand its caliphate into the far north of Cameroon. Furthermore, there is also a belief that the group has recruited fighters in

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[32] Ansaru is a Boko Haram splinter group, which announced its breakaway from Boko Haram on 1 January 2012 (International Crisis Group, 2014b:26).

Cameroon (Al Jazeera, 2014a). If this is true, Cameroon will be engulfed in even more violence and conflict.

In February, Boko Haram expanded its attacks to another neighbor, this time Niger. According to reports, the group attacked the border towns of Bossa and Diffa before being pushed back by Nigerien security forces. The fighting claimed the lives of four soldiers and one civilian, whilst Boko Haram suffered the loss of 109 fighters (Al Jazeera, 2015d). Since then, southern Niger has been attacked numerous times. In April, Boko Haram's deadliest attack on Niger claimed the lives of 74 people, 46 of whom were soldiers. In June the group launched yet another deadly attack, which claimed the lives of 38 people (AFP, 2015).

Earlier this year, Boko Haram carried out its first attack on Chadian soil, leaving 10 dead. This attack was without a doubt the result of Chad's participation in the MNJTF, as well as its successes against Boko Haram. The Chadian military has conducted airstrikes against the group in both Nigeria and Niger and now they are paying the price (BBC, 2015b). On 15 June 2015, Boko Haram carried out its most deadly attack on Chad, with twin suicide bombings in the capital city of N'Djamena. The attacks killed at least 34 people. The Chadian military responded with a series of airstrikes on Boko Haram bases in Nigeria[33] (Nako, 2015). Thus, Chad has also been effectively embroiled in Boko Haram's hyperconflict.

When one takes the above into account it becomes clear that Boko Haram has engulfed neighbouring states in a situation of hyperconflict. The involvement of Cameroon, Niger and Chad in the MNJTF has undoubtedly contributed to the situation. Their involvement and successes against Boko Haram, sparked revenge attacks by the group that in turn led to retaliatory attacks by the respective militaries against Boko Haram. It is thus fair to argue that the Boko Haram case corresponds to Mittelmann's first characteristic of hyperconflict.

5.2.2.2 Shift from Prior Patterns

Second, the development of globalization leads to a shift rather than a complete break from prior patterns of conflict/violence. This does not merely constitute a simple shift from interstate to domestic violence as the major source of conflict. In addition many cases of political violence do not fit neatly in one category (Mittelman, 2012:14). The

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[33] Nigerian authorities denied the Chadian military's reports, suggesting that their airstrikes hit in neighbouring Niger instead.

conflict/violence brought about by Boko Haram relates to this characteristic of hyperconflict in that it does not fit into one category. The Boko Haram case portrays characteristics of both interstate and domestic conflict as seen in the previous section. The characteristics of interstate violence/conflict can be seen in Boko Haram's engagement with the militaries of the MNJTF and its attacks on targets in neighbouring countries while its attacks on areas and individuals/groups in Nigeria relate to domestic conflict/terrorism.

5.2.2.3 Boiling over, with a chance of spillovers

Third, hyperconflict is seen to be boiling over with a potential for spillovers. It is important to note that hyperconflict does not erupt automatically; in all instances where it does erupt, it "merges with the complexity of history." According to Pham (2012:1), the emergence of Boko Haram, and thus the conflict in Nigeria, cannot be understood without placing it in the context of the social, religious, economic and political background of nothern Nigeria. It is important to note that the context has been created by the past. Thus, it is key to examine the complexity of Nigeria's history as it has a definite impact on the conflict seen today.

Unemployment and illiteracy rates are highest in the northern areas of Nigeria, where Muslims are predominant and where Boko Haram mainly operates (Forest, 2012:5). One can trace these high levels of unemployment and illiteracy to colonial times, where the British had a policy of non-intervention in the north of Nigeria. During British colonial rule, Christian missionaries founded schools in the south, but not in the north. As a result of the British policy of non-intervention those in northern Nigeria did not receive the benefits of Western education. The outcome of this is a lasting and destabilizing North/South dichotomy (Hackket, 2003). Without a doubt, the inequality and poverty prevalent in Nigeria today, has links to past policies of the colonial period. Furthermore, inequality, unemployment and poverty, which can be linked to illiteracy in some cases, have fuelled conflict in northern Nigeria. [34] Thus, one can argue that the abovementioned factors correlate with this characteristic of Mittelman's hyperconflict, in other words that hyperconflict does not just erupt automatically, but in all instances it "merges with the complexity of history" (Mittelman, 2011:15).

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[34] This will be discussed in greater detail in section *5.4.2 Inequality and Poverty*.

5.2.2.4 Increased Violence is the Order of the Day

Fourth, in this era of hyperconflict a decrease in armed conflicts, whether domestic or international, does not necessarily mean less violence or even more security from the threat of political terror. In the case of northern Nigeria, Boko Haram has launched an increasing number of deadly assaults against the Nigerian people as well as others. The conflict in Nigeria corresponds to one part of this characteristic of hyperconflict and that is that increased violence and less security are the order of the day. For example, since late 2010, Boko Haram has been the perpetrator of a brutal campaign of terror attacks against public officials and institutions, and increasingly, against ordinary men, women and children (Pham, 2012:1). According to Pate (2015:18), Boko Haram's violence greatly increased in terms of frequency of attacks, lethality and scope of target since Abubakar bin Muhammad Shekau assumed leadership of the group in 2010. In 2011 alone, at least 550 people were killed in 115 separate attacks (Pham, 2012:1).

According to statistics from the GTD[35], there have been 1304 separate, confirmed attacks by Boko Haram from 2009 to 2014. The number of attacks increased dramatically until January 2012, thereafter increasing and decreasing alternately. Even though there was decline in the number of attacks from 2012 to 2013, it is interesting to note that judging by the number of fatalities, many of the attacks launched in 2013 were far more deadly than those launched previously. However, in 2014 the number of attacks increased dramatically up until June/July, thereafter decling sharply until October. Moreover, the attacks launched in 2014 resulted in even more fatalities than those in 2013 (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2015f). Thus, the attacks have grown more violent even though it seems that the number of attacks have in some cases decreased.

The number of deaths attributed to Boko Haram has definitely increased over time. There are no exact figures for the number of casualties from Boko Haram attacks, but according to former Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan, the group has claimed more than 12000 lives, with an additional 8000 persons injured or maimed, "not to mention the displacement of

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[35] For graph of Boko Haram attacks from 2009 – 2014 *see* http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=2009&end_yearonly=2014&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&asmSelect1=&perpetrator=30101&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max= (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2015f). Please note because of terms of the GTD graphs cannot be displayed in this thesis.

thousands of innocent Nigerians" (Onuoha, 2014:2). The 2015 Baga Massacre, believed to have claimed the lives of 2000 people, is a testament to Boko Haram's brutality (Abubakar & Karimi, 2015). This is in line with the fourth characteristic of hyperconflict. Agbiboa (2014b:413) adds that the increasing frequency of violent attacks carried out by the group, now almost on a weekly basis, suggests that the prospects for attaining peace and unity in Nigeria remain bleak which in turn poses major problems for the security and stability of the region. This futher supports the notion that hyperconflict will remain in the Nigerian state.

5.2.2.5 Different Drivers, Different Catalysers

Fifth, hyperconflict is not a one-size-fits-all mould, but rather the product of a set of systemic drivers. These forces/drivers are contingent, in other words they are subject to "proximate" causes under a variety of conditions. The immediate cause often becomes "submerged" or "lost in an escalating conflict and engulfed in political violence" (Mittelman, 2010:15). The instances of hyperconflict differ in intensity; they range from manifest to latent, and in addition, there are numerous types of catalysing moments. Thus, there is not one specific catalyser that sparks hyperconflict (Mittelman, 2010:15).

A definite catalyser for hyperconflict in Nigeria, and the event that further ended the relative calm between the Nigerian state and Boko Haram, was a security raid on a Boko Haram hideout in Bauchi State on 26 July 2009. The raid led Boko Haram to launch reprisal attacks on police and resulted in five days of rioting which spread across the states of Bauchi, Kano, Yobe and Borno. The violence eventually came to an end when Mohammed Yusuf (Boko Haram leader) was captured, beaten, interrogated and finally shot – apparently after attempting to escape, but not before over 700 people were killed and numerous public buildings, which included government offices, churches, mosques, schools and police stations were destroyed (Forest, 2012:3).

Bamidele (2012:36) and Agbiboa (2014b:404) add that the extrajudicial killing of Yusuf, which ignited the need for revenge, as well as the attempts by security forces to eliminate Boko Haram, marked a turning point for the group; it transformed Boko Haram into one of the continent's most ferocious and deadly terrorist groups. The July "ordeal" acted as a catalyser from which the group emerged as stronger, bolder, more sophisticated and even more daring in its attacks (Bamidele, 2012:36; Agbiboa, 2014b:404). It effectively made the group more violent. This can be seen as a potential driver for hyperconflict. The killing of

Yusuf was avenged well beyond his death; in 2012 the group launched numerous attacks against police offers, where they demanded the release of all prisoners linked to Boko Haram as well as the prosecution of those individuals responsible for the extrajudicial killing of former leader Mohammed Yusuf (Agbiboa, 2014b:405).

One prominent driver for hyperconflict, which was seen to further fan the flames of Boko Haram's campaign of violence, was the dispute of over the 2011 election results. This dispute led to the deaths of over 800 people (Agbiboa, 2014b:406). The reason that this can be seen as adding to the flames of hyperconflict in Nigeria, is the fact that many Nigerians in the north regard the former presidency of Goodluck Jonathan (a Christian from the south), as illegitimate, as he ignored an informal power-rotation agreement (there is a rotation between a Christian and Muslim president) that should have allowed a Muslim to be in the position of power. In actual fact, Boko Haram demanded that the former president either convert to Islam or step down as president of Nigeria, as Islam will not accept an 'infidel' as its leader (Agbiboa, 2014b:406). The election of Muhammadu Buhari, a Muslim, in the 2015 elections is not likely to appease Boko Haram as the new president has vowed to defeat Boko Haram (McBain, 2015).

A further driver/catalyser for hyperconflict relates to the cumulative effect of a lethal mixture of grievances. The combination of bad governance, exacerbated by corruption, centralization of power and wealth, regional disparities, ethnic identity and decaying or nonexistent infrastructure, amongst others, have served as a driver of conflict in Nigeria. These conditions present an ideal breeding ground in which extremists are able to flourish. These conditions allow the extremesists to recruit members, especially those who have been marginalized, and it facilates the launch of violent movements (Forest, 2012:39). Agbiboa (2014b:406) makes the drivers of hyperconflict more clear, as he argues that the following factors have been cited to explain why Boko Haram "rebels" (in other words the factors that are responsible for driving hyperconflict): first, a sense of alienation from the more developed, "well-off" Christian south of the Nigerian state; second, the pervasive and relative poverty in northern Nigeria;[36] third, the extensive corruption of the Nigerian government, as discussed earlier; fourth, the incompetence and brutality of the Nigerian state security services and fifth, the

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[36] "[T]he economic disparities between the north and the rest of the country are particularly stark—in the north, 72 percent of people live in poverty, compared to 27 percent in the south and 35 percent in the Niger Delta" (Agbiboa, 2014b:406). This will be discussed in greater detail in a subsequent section.

profound belief that any relationship with the West will produce a corrupting influence.[37] Furthermore, Boko Haram has also stated the desire to establish an Islamic Caliphate in Nigeria and beyond. In August 2014, Boko Haram claimed the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate[38] in northeastern Gwoza; however the, Nigerian military rejected this claim (Al Jazeera, 2014b). Moreover, Boko Haram also changed their name to the Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP) (Withnall, 2015); this further supports the notion of establishing a Caliphate.

5.2.2.6 Conflict spreads like Wildfire

Although hyperconflict does not necessarily entail a sudden outbreak of war, it may nevertheless spread like wildfire. Thus, if hyperconflict does not emerge as one big "blow-up," it will take shape as "multiple forms" aided by new technologies that enable its elements to spread swiftly from one state or region to another.

When one examines this situation of conflict/hyperconflict, it is possible to argue that it did not "blow-up" into one massive war and then engulf the region. However, it can be argued that the conflict has spread to other states in the region. In the case of Boko Haram and Nigeria, hyperconflict has not erupted into one big war, rather the conflict is spreading to other states in the region. For example, conflict has spread to neighbouring Cameroon, Chad and Niger as discussed earlier.

5.3 Globalization as Facilitator of Acts of Terror

The purpose of the subsequent section is to determine how the different facets of globalization have impacted the security environment of Nigeria. Furthermore, it will determine whether or not and to what extent these mechanisms have facilitated acts of terror committed by Boko Haram. In doing the aforementioned it will be possible to determine whether or not globalization facilitates terrorist activity within the region. The mechanisms that will be examined in the subsequent pages include: technology as facilitator of terrorism, the creation of politico-criminal networks under the heading funding for terror and migration and the "irrelevance" of boundaries, in other words how the permeability of borders

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[37] This will be discussed in greater detail in section *5.4.1 Threat of Corrupt Culture.*
[38] In March 2015, Boko Haram pledged allegiance to ISIS and ISIS accepted the pledge (Alkhshali & Almasy, 2015).

facilitates Boko Haram's terrorist activities. Zimmermann's causal model[39] will be consulted when examining these aspects.

5.3.1 Technology as Facilitator

The last 20 years have has seen a huge increase in the use of new media (Internet) in Nigeria. The Internet has had a major impact on Nigerians today as approximately 43 million people have access to the Internet. In addition, this is complemented by the growing popularity of mobile phones (Musa, 2012:116).

Despite Boko Haram's denunciation of Western culture and that which is associated with it, the group has shown that it is more than willing to exploit the "the fruits of Western education when it suits them" (Walker, 2012:7). For example, the group has made extensive use of mobile phones, video cameras, DVDs and YouTube in its operations. According to Musa (2012:116) the group has made use of the Internet and mobile phones in the coordination of its activities as well as to communicate messages to the world. The Internet enhances Boko Haram's ability to reach out to people; their use of YouTube to upload propaganda videos is a case in point as YouTube is accessible to millions of people. The group also used to have an official webpage in the form of a blog, but it has been removed. Musa (2012:116) also noted that whilst the blog was active it was not quite functional as it was hardly updated.

On 18 January of this year, an Arabic-language Twitter account, @Alurwa_Alwuthqa was launched, claiming to be the official outlet for a new Boko Haram media group called Al-Urwah al-Wuthqa (BBC Monitoring, 2015; Laing, 2015).[40] Within a few days of the launch, the account had gained 4000 followers. Boko Haram has used the feed to publish a stream of propoganda, which includes several new videos. The Twitter feed revealed short statements about the group's activities and claiming operations in a timely manner, for example on 25 January the group tweeted that they had successfully captured Monguno, a strategic town close to Maiduguri (BBC Monitoring, 2015; Laing, 2015). There have however been several disruptions and inconsistencies in Boko Haram's media operations; this suggests that there is a lack of professionalism amongst those responsible for publishing propaganda. For example, a video featuring Shekau giving a speech in Arabic appeared online on 9 February, but failed to be disseminated on the Twitter feed. In addition, the account has been suspended several

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[39] *See* page 55.
[40] Following this launch, many analysts have cited the influence of ISIS in Boko Haram's media operations.

times, reappearing quickly but without the original tweets. The suspension of the original account has led to the feed becoming less prolific (BBC Monitoring, 2015).[41]

Even though Boko Haram has made some use of the Internet and technology, they have not exploited it to the extent that they could have. Boko Haram's use of new technologies does not necessarily correspond with Zimmermann's causal model, as he links these new technologies to value changes and a weakening of the state that eventually leads to creating incentives and opportunities for terrorism. However, Boko Haram's use of technology should not be discounted; it would be better to add a new channel to Zimmermann's model where new technologies lead to recruitment (indirectly in Boko Haram's case) and thus opportunities for terrorism.

5.3.2 Funding for Terror

As mentioned in both Chapters 2 and 4, there are some scholars who argue that terrorist groups often exploit international trade networks as a means through which to market goods and services. The money generated from these goods and services is then employed as a means of financing the terrorist operations of the respective groups. One must however take into account that many of the goods traded by terrorist groups are illegal/smuggled (Li & Schaub, 2004:235). In addition, Zimmermann's causal model links globalization to directly fostering the growth of politico-criminal networks which in turn multiplies the opportunities for terrorism. Furthermore, external state or group support also makes a major contribution to opportunities for such terrorist activities (Zimmermann, 2011:S155). This section will examine whether, and if so how, Boko Haram has sourced its funding from the by-products of globalization.

Boko Haram's sources of funding remain opaque, as it has proved immensely difficult to track their funding. This can be attributed to the group's use of hard-to-track human couriers to move cash, their reliance on local sources of funding, as well as their engagement in limited financial partnerships with other terrorist/extremist groups. Boko Haram effectively operates outside the banking system (Stewart & Wroughton, 2014). There are however other sources of funding that have been identified; these include kidnapping for ransom;[42] bank robbery and illicit trafficking (Pate, 2015:23–25; Campbell, 2014:3; Stewart & Wroughton, 2014). There have also been indications that Boko Haram has sourced as much as 40 percent

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[41] At the time of writing there was no evidence of a new Twitter Account.
[42] As mentioned in *5.2.2.1 Potential to Engulf.*

of its income from the trading and trafficking of illegal ivory and rhino horn[43] (Sterley, 2014:56).

When examining Boko Haram's financial support and activities in Cameroon, it is possible to argue that a politico-criminal network has emerged. Financiers from Borno and the areas bordering Cameroon's Extreme North region have provided Boko Haram with weapons as well as a route to negotiate with the Cameroonian government when it comes to kidnapping for ransom (Zenn, 2014:8). In addition, ties exist between Boko Haram and arms traffickers in Cameroon that could also form part of a politico-criminal network (Zenn, 2014:8). Thus, the existence of these politico-criminal networks can be said to enhance the effectiveness of Boko Haram's operations. Furthermore, since these networks provide Boko Haram with either funding or weapons, it creates an opportunity for terrorism. If these networks were not in place one could argue that Boko Haram would not have access to the finances or weapons that it needs to carry out its activities. Thus, these networks have effectively facilitated Boko Haram's terrorist activities.

Furthermore, Boko Haram has allegedly received funding from external groups that include the Saudi Arabian Islamic World Society, the Al Muntada Trust Fund[44] based in the United Kingdom and an unknown Algerian sect that has provided the group with training, as well as a 400 million naira donation. Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have also been linked to the provision of training (Anatomy of African Terrorism: Boko Haram: Nigeria's Homegrown Terror Network, 2012:16–17). The aforementioned sources of funding and training, respectively, relate to Zimmermann's causal model where support by an external state/group provides opportunities for terrorism. Thus, the support of the aforementioned groups has allowed Boko Haram to operate efficiently and to carry out terrorist attacks. These sources of support have in effect created an opportunity for Boko Haram to carry out terror attacks, whereas without the support Boko Haram may not have been as successful in their campaign of terror. It should however be noted that mainstream Salafist and Al Qaeda funding decreased as a result of Boko Haram's massacres, the collapse of Ansaru's shura in Kaduna in 2012, and the 2013 French-led military intervention in northern Mali, which in turn disrupted AQIM's supply line to Boko Haram (Zenn, 2014:8).

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[43] Evidence suggests that Boko Haram is conducting poaching operations in neighbouring Cameroon (Sterley, 2014:56).

[44] The Al Muntada Trust strongly denied allegations that it had links with Boko Haram; however it should be noted that allegations about the trust's connection to terrorism go back more than a decade and that it has a long history of promoting and supporting radical Islamic preachers (Stand for Peace, 2014).

It is therefore possible to say that Boko Haram's funding has in some ways been facilitated by globalization given that it fosters the growth of politico-criminal networks, which creates opportunities for terrorism. Furthermore, the support of external groups also facilitates Boko Haram's terrorist activities.

5.3.3 Migration and "Irrelevance" of Boundaries

As mentioned in preceding chapters, globalization has facilitated the "free" and easy movement of people across borders. Thus, it has created a channel of migration, which can be exploited by terrorist organizations. The purpose of the following section is to determine whether individuals have made use of these channels in order to join Boko Haram and whether Boko Haram has exploited these channels when carrying out attacks.

There have been reports that foreign fighters have joined the ranks of Boko Haram; for example one informant reported involvement in the arrest of foreign fighters, however he could not disclose the nationalities of those arrested. Other informants reported that Boko Haram attack victims identified their attackers as non-Nigerian and non-Kanuri, but specifically Tauregs; and the Cameroonian government has identified two Taureg fighters amongst Boko Haram militants killed in a September 2014 clash (Pate, 2014:17). According to Cameroonian police Boko Haram also recruited along the border with Nigeria (Zenn, 2014:8). However, since the nationalities of some of these foreign fighters have not been revealed it is difficult to determine if these fighters have indeed used the channels of migration. It is most likely that these foreign fighters have been recruited in Nigeria's neighbouring countries. Since the borders are porous it is probable that fighters have exploited the porous borders instead of using the migration channel. Onuoha (2013b:2) cites Nigeria's porous borders with Cameroon, Niger, Benin and Chad as worsening the Boko Haram insurgency. Furthermore, there is no indication that fighters from "Western" countries have joined Boko Haram.

Thus, given the limited information available on the presence of foreign fighters in the ranks of Boko Haram it is not possible to argue that individuals have made use of the migration channel created by globalization to join Boko Haram. It is seems most likely that these individuals exploited the porosity of borders just as Boko Haram has used it to carry out cross-border attacks.

5.4 Globalization as Incentive for Acts of Terror

According to the preceding chapters, globalization has often been cited as a motivating factor for terrorist activity. The purpose of the following section is to examine whether the different facets of globalization have indeed led to increased terrorist activity perpetrated by Boko Haram in Nigeria and more specifically in northern Nigeria. It will do so by consulting Zimmermann's causal model and looking specifically at how the threat of corrupt culture, as well as increasing inequality and poverty have contributed to and encouraged terrorist activity.

5.4.1 Threat of Corrupt Culture

According to Zimmermann's (2011:S158) causal model, globalization is believed to spread/export foreign "corrupt cultures." It is also believed to lead to changes in values, which is arguably triggered by the infiltration of foreign "corrupt" cultures. The spread of foreign and perceived corrupt cultures then in turn create incentives for terrorism. Globalization is seen as spreading corrupt/ foreign culture, because it is often associated with Westernization and Americanization. The culture associated with Westernization/Americanization is perceived to erode indigenous and "conservative" cultures. These changes in values are said to cause distortions in local communities. Furthermore, in the case of Boko Haram, the view of Western culture is even more extreme as it views Western education (as well as that which arises from it) to be sacrilege. The purpose of the following subsection is therefore to determine whether Zimmermann's causal model holds true in the case of Nigeria and Boko Haram.

According to Pham (2012:2), in Boko Haram's denunciation of Western civilization, it has come to reject the legitimacy of the secular Nigerian state, which it sees as evil and unworthy of allegiance, and has ended up in waging war against the state in an effort to replace it with what it sees as a "purified" Islamic regime. In essence, Boko Haram is not just a name the group is known by, but also a slogan that "cries out" that Western education and that which results from it (such as Western values) is sacrilege (Pham, 2012:2).

In 2010, Shekau surfaced in a video, threatening attacks against the Nigerian state as well as "outposts of Western culture" (Pham, 2012:3). A number of Boko Haram's attacks showcase its hate for everything associated with the West. For example, in August 2011, Boko Haram claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing of the United Nations building in Abuja, which

killed more than 20 people and injured at least 80 (Agbiboa, 2014b:410; Pham, 2012:4). Since the UN is arguably a creation of the West, it is possible to argue that the UN is perpetuating a corrupt culture, in the eyes of Boko Haram. Thus, the choice of target is not surprising. The group released a statement following the attack, which read as follows: "All over the world, the UN [United Nations] is a global partner in the oppression of believers. We are at war against infidels. In Nigeria, the Federal Government tries to perpetuate the agenda of the United Nations. We have told everyone that the UN is the bastion of the global oppression of Muslims all over the world" (Agbiboa, 2014b:410).

Boko Haram has also launched smaller-scale attacks on people engaging in a "corrupt" lifestyle (from a Muslim point of view) – this includes the consumption of alcohol, gambling and prostitution – as well as the establishments associated with the above. Boko Haram has also targeted marketplaces where non-halaal meat was sold (Cook, 2014:10; Elden, 2014:416).

Furthermore, as their colloquial name suggests they are opposed to Western educational norms, thus it comes as no surprise that the group has increasingly targeted "temples" of Western education. Boko Haram started targeting schools in 2012 on a regular basis, with a reported 47 attacks and 77 deaths in that year. Attacks on schools decreased the following year with only 14 attacks, but fatalities rose with 119 deaths (Simonelli, Jensen, Castro-Reina, Pate, Menner & Miller, 2014). According to Pate (2015:18) Boko Haram's attacks on educational institutions constitute 7 percent of total attacks between 2009 and 2013; and the number of attacks until 2014 amount to 77 (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2015g). A notable attack was launched on 6 July 2013 against the Government Secondary School in the Potiskum local government area of Yobe state. Boko Haram assailants set fire to the building, which resulted in school children and teachers fleeing the burning building only to be met, by gunfire. The attack claimed the lives of 46 whilst injuring 4 others (Simonelli *et al.*, 2014). Shortly after the attack, Shekau appeared in a video calling for more attacks against schools citing Western education as a "plot against Islam" (Mark, 2013). In September 2013, Boko Haram gunmen opened fire on sleeping students at the College of Agriculture in Yobe state. According to reports, 50 students were killed in the attack (BBC, 2013b).

According to Bagaji, Etila, Ogbadu and Sule (2012:37), Boko Haram believes that the *Umma Mahammadiya* (Muslim faithful) and *Dar-ul-Islam* (Islamic community) cannot be

compromised in the face of Western influence in the Nigerian secular society. According to Boko Haram rhetoric, a secular nation/society is responsible for the promotion of idolatry, in other words it amounts to state worship. It believes that the state is a "nest of corruption" responsible for exploiting the poor. In addition, Western values and education shape and sustain the state; both the aforementioned are against the will of Allah (Campbell, 2014:2). Therefore, in order to curb the "evil" which is brought about by moral decadence and the influence of Western civilization, it is imperative that an Islamic society is entrenched through the destruction of modern political institutions and infrastructures (Bagaji *et al*., 2012:37). This, amongst other factors, explains why the majority of Boko Haram's attacks are aimed at the police, military, government establishments and properties (Bagaji *et al*., 2012:37). According to Pate (2015:18) in the 2009 – 2013 period, 22 percent of Boko Haram's attacks were aimed at police, while 9 percent were aimed at the military and 11 percent at government. The 20 January 2012 Kano attacks are notable in this case as Boko Haram insurgents targeted police stations; government buildings, such as passport offices and immigration centres as well as the State Security Service's headquarters. According to reports more than 178 people died in the attacks; some locals put the figures much higher (Elden, 2014:418; Oboh, 2012).

Another bastion of Western civilization, which has been denounced by Boko Haram, is elections. During the Nigerian elections this year, Boko Haram sent warnings discouraging citizens from supporting democracy by participating in voting (Associated Press, 2015). Elections are considered to be a forbidden innovation imposed by the West and democracy is considered as being a corrupt Western concept (Pham, 2012:4; Associated Press, 2015). According to Borno state Governor, Kashim Shettima, the group invaded the town of Miringa in the early morning hours of 28 March (the date of the election) torching houses and then shooting people as they tried to escape. A reported 25 people died in the attack. Two voters were killed at polling stations during another Boko Haram attack in the twin Gombe towns of Birin Bolawa and Birin Fulani (Associated Press, 2015). These attacks were clearly motivated by the group's hatred of Western practices and encroaching corrupt culture.

One of Boko Haram's specific goals has been to expel northern Nigeria of corrupt and false Muslims. These corrupt and false Muslims are known as "*yan boko*," which if literally translated means "child of the book." It refers to the elites who were created by the British policy of indirect rule during the colonization of Nigeria – they have turned their heads away

from Allah as a result of easy money and corrupt Western values (Walker, 2012:7). This supports Zimmermann's idea that foreign cultures, especially Western culture is perceived to erode conservative culture. Boko Haram has accused the Islamic "establishment" in Nigeria of corruption and the "perversion" of Islam. Thus, it is not too surprising that Boko Haram has often targeted the Islamic "establishment."

According to Campbell (2014:2) Boko Haram presents a direct threat to the traditional Islamic establishment, which is led by the sultan of Sokoto and the Shehu of Borno, both of whom have been the targets of failed assassinations. Other members of the Islamic establishment have also been the targets of Boko Haram. In 2013 the then Emir of Kano, Al Haji Ado Bayero, was the target of an assassination attempt; his driver and bodyguards were killed in the process. Boko Haram has however successfully assassinated a number of senior Muslim political and religious figures, whom they deemed to be guilty of mixing Islam with "infidel" concepts such as democracy, Western education and secularism (Lister, 2015; Zenn, 2014:5). In the period from 2009 to 2013, 10 percent of Boko Haram attacks were targeted at religious figures and institutions including Christian figures and institutions (Pate, 2015:18); however a greater percentage of Muslims have been targeted compared to Christians. In order to rectify the "corrupt" Islamic establishment, Boko Haram has called for the replacement of the sultan of Sokoto with a *shura* (council) headed and dominated by it (Campbell, 2014:2).

The targeting of the Islamic establishment along with Muslim political and religious elites satisfies the notion that Western culture "erodes" and "corrupts" conservative culture which in turn creates incentives for terrorist action by Boko Haram. It thus supports Zimmermann's causal model.

5.4.2 Increasing Inequality and Poverty

In Chapter 2, it was argued that globalization has the tendency to leave people behind as the benefits of globalization are unequally distributed, thus creating winners and losers. The gap between rich and poor also widens. Zimmermann's model links globalization to an increase in economic and social inequality, in other words societal polarization within countries. Furthermore, increasing economic and social inequality is also linked to a weakened state (the result of globalization), as the state no longer has the ability to protect the economically disadvantaged groups against the challenges of the global economy. The model therefore

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links economic and social inequality to opportunities for terrorist activity (Zimmermann, 2011:S155). The purpose of this section is to determine whether these links are present in the case of Nigeria; in other words whether increased inequality and poverty can be linked to globalization and a weakening of the state and then subsequently create opportunities for terrorist activity in Nigeria.

One of the most popular explanations for the rise of Boko Haram is the issue of poverty and underdevelopment which are characteristic of northern and northeastern Nigeria, in which Boko Haram operates (Cook, 2014:5). Previously, it was mentioned that British policies of non-intervention in northern Nigeria led to missionary schools being established only in the south. This gave an advantage to those Nigerians in the south as they were able to access proper education, which served as a stepping-stone later in life. The effects of this are still evident today, as northern Nigerians are lagging behind their southern counterparts. Furthermore, for the most part northern Muslims still associate Western education with attempts by evangelical Christians to convert Muslims (Waldek & Jayasekara, 2011:169). In addition, many view Western education as opening a door to corrupt Western culture. Thus Western education is largely rejected in northern Nigeria. This in turn negatively impacts access to proper education, which leads to illiteracy, which in turn leads to unemployment and poverty. The purpose of this section is to examine and prove the ways in which inequality and poverty have served as a driving factor of conflict. First, indirectly as a recruitment tool of Boko Haram, as without recruits Boko Haram would be unable to carry out its attacks.

According to a study conducted by the CLEEN foundation in Nigeria, where factors which contribute to youth radicalization and recruitment into armed groups such as Boko Haram were examined, the main causative factors were of an economic, social, political and religious nature (Onuoha, 2014:3–4). This subsection will however only focus on the economic and social factors examined in the study. The CLEEN study argues that unemployment and poverty makes youths more vulnerable to radicalization, thus making it much easier for Boko Haram to recruit these individuals. It is interesting to note that Boko Haram draws a large majority of its members from disaffected youths, unemployed high school and university graduates, as well as destitute children – mostly, but not limited to, northern Nigeria (Onuoha, 2014:3).

According to figures from Nigeria's National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), the unemployment

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rate averaged 14.60 percent until it skyrocketed to 23.90 percent in 2011 (Onuoha, 2014:6). Furthermore, despite favourable economic growth, the poverty rate rose from 54.7 percent in 2004 to 60.90 percent in 2010. In 2011, it was estimated that 100 million Nigerians were living in absolute poverty, while a further 12.6 million were moderately poor. Young people, especially in northern Nigeria are the worst hit by unemployment and poverty (Onuoha, 2014:6). This study supports Forest's claim that unemployment and illiteracy rates are highest in northern Nigeria.

The socio-economic challenges of poverty and unemployment are intricately connected and are most obvious in northern Nigeria as mentioned previously. The de-industrialization of the north is a major contributing factor to the aforementioned. The Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) of 1986 and the liberalization of the economy throughout the 1990s, led to a flood of cheap Asian textiles as well as other goods into the Nigerian economy (Hoffmann, 2014:17). In addition, oil revenues constitute 85 percent of Nigeria's total GDP, which has led to a flood of foreign currencies, which in turn makes imports cheaper for the newly rich (Thomson, 2012:49). The combination of the above has led to local industries closing down, as they were ill equipped to compete in this new environment. This was exacerbated by a poor supply of electricity[45] and a deteriorating infrastructure, which led to a large number of factories shutting down and hundreds of thousands of workers losing their jobs (Hoffmann, 2014:17). In the mid 1980s, there were 175 textile mills; over the next 25 years all but 25 were shut down (Burgis, 2015). In addition, the collapse of the northern textile industry also destroyed cotton production in the region, a key agricultural good in 11 northern states. Approximately half of the million farmers involved in the growth of cotton for textile factories, no longer do so; some have however switched to other crops. Each person working in the textile industry is said to support about 6 relatives; thus it is possible to argue that the decimation of the Nigerian textile industry has destroyed millions of lives (Burgis, 2015). In addition, the collapse of agriculture and manufacturing has led to mass migration to the cities where there are already limited employment opportunities (Thomson, 2012:49). This has then led to further unemployment in the cities.

Although one cannot directly link the decimation of the textile industry and the loss of jobs that accompanied it to the radicalization of youths and joining Boko Haram, there is a

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[45] In 2014, South Africa produced 40 000 megawatts of electricity for a population of 50 million where Nigeria was only able to produce 4000 megawatts for a population that was three times larger (Hoffman, 2014:16).

possibility, even if small, that those youths who joined Boko Haram as a result of unemployment and poverty, could have been dragged into poverty as a result of a parent or parents losing their jobs in the textile industry (either through the growth of cotton or the manufacturing of textile). This argument may seem unfounded, however given that the farming of cotton and manufacturing of textiles used to be the backbone of the northern economy (Thomson, 2012:49) and thus employment, it could be a possibility. It would however require further research on the ground to determine whether individuals joining Boko Haram were indeed affected by the decimation of the textile industry.

Furthermore, given that Nigeria's oil wealth flows into the coffers of the powerful and elite, social services, public safety, and education are either of extremely low quality or non-existent. In addition, Nigeria ranks amongst the poorest populations in the world, with 75 percent of the population living on approximately US$ 1.25 per day (Thomson, 2012:49). This in addition to the collapse of cotton farming and textile manufacturing points towards the state being unable to protect the economically disadvantaged, which constitutes 75 percent of the population, against the challenges of the global economy. If this is the case then it would be in line with Zimmermann's causal model where globalization leads to shifts in relative prices and market relations (Asian textiles were/are cheaper than those produced in Nigeria, thus local manufacturers are unable to compete) and this in turn leads to a weakening of the state as the state is unable to protect it citizens against the effects of globalization (loss of livelihood). The inability to protect citizens leads to economic and social inequality as these citizens are in effect left behind, which then makes them vulnerable to radicalization and creates opportunities and possibly an incentive for terrorism.

However, in contrast Cook (2014:5) sees the "poverty created Boko Haram" argument as somewhat weak. The core of this argument states that in order to defeat the Boko Haram insurgency, there must be development in the region and economic opportunities need to be created. Although this is a creditable goal, there are a number of deficiencies when one uses it as the interpretive framework for the appearance of Boko Haram. Furthermore, the argument fails to explain why Boko Haram does not emphasize or even allude to economic issues in its videos and statements, nor does it explain why, given similar circumstances of poverty throughout Nigeria, such a violent group has not appeared elsewhere. In addition, when one broadly examines the context of West African societies that are impoverished, these societies have not produced violent groups as a means of channelling desperation (Cook, 2014:5).

Even though poverty and inequality cannot be identified as the reason behind the rise of Boko Haram, it would be unwise to dismiss it entirely as poverty and inequality have played a contributing role in making youths more vulnerable to radicalization.

5.5 Globalization as Motivating Factor in Rise of Boko Haram

No explicit links exist between globalization and the rise of Boko Haram. However, one of the factors that have attributed to the rise of Boko Haram can be linked to globalization in some way. As mentioned previously in section *5.2.1 Legitimacy and State Failure*, corruption has been a driver in Boko Haram's campaign of terror. In addition, as mentioned in section *5.4.1 Threat of Corrupt Culture*, corruption not only served as a driving factor, but it has also served to influence Boko Haram's choice in targets. It is important to note though that corruption is not the product of globalization alone; rather globalization has played a part in it, even if only a small one. This can be said given that Boko Haram firmly believes that the corruption entrenched in the Nigerian state and within society is the result of the infiltration of corrupt Western values, which are spread by globalization.

5.6 Conclusion

This chapter set out to apply two theoretical frameworks, namely Mittelmann's theory of hyperconflict and Zimmermann's causal model, to the case study of Boko Haram and Nigeria, and to determine whether this case study corresponds to the aforementioned theoretical frameworks. The characteristics of the Boko Haram conflict correspond to Mittelmann's theory of hyperconflict. By examining these characteristics it is possible to argue that over the course of the last six years Boko Haram has engulfed Nigeria and a significant portion of West Africa, as well as other neighbouring states in a situation of hyperconflict. With reference to Zimmermann's causal model, the case study corresponds to some sections of the model, including: the growth of politico-criminal networks and the support of external groups who create opportunities for terrorism via funding and training respectively; the spread/threat of corrupt culture which leads to an incentive for terrorism and increasing inequality and poverty (as a result of shifts in relative prices which leads to a weakening of government as they are unable to protect citizens against the effects of globalization) that create opportunities and incentives for terrorism. Other facets of globalization that should be added to the model relate to new technologies being used as a possible recruitment tool which would then create opportunities for terrorism and the concept of immigration which should be

expanded to include the migration of fighters across borders leading to opportunities for terrorism. The above findings will be compared to the findings in Chapter 4 and analysed in the following chapter.

Chapter 6: Comparison, Analysis and Conclusion

6.1. Introduction

The aim of this research study was to explore the extent to which globalization has fuelled insecurity and has contributed to the creation of a permissive environment in which acts of national/international terrorism flourish. It aimed to do so by examining the effects of globalization on two terrorist organizations in two regional contexts, namely Al Shabaab in Somalia (Horn of Africa) and Boko Haram in Nigeria (West Africa). The effects of globalization on the aforementioned terrorist organizations within the respective regions was analysed within the framework of Mittelman's theory of hyperconflict and Zimmermann's causal links between globalization and terrorism within Chapters 4 and 5. Although there have been a number of studies on the link between globalization and terrorism, none of these studies have examined the aforementioned links specifically relating to the regional contexts of the Horn of Africa and West Africa. In addition, although there is extensive scholarship on both Al Shabaab and Boko Haram none of these studies actively link globalization to the terrorist activity of these two groups. This study took specific notice of this and assisted in filling the gap by actively examining the link between globalization and the terrorist activity of Al Shabaab in the Horn of Africa and Boko Haram in West Africa.

This chapter will serve as a comparison of the two case studies examined in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively. The purpose is to determine whether or not both case studies correspond to the characteristics of hyperconflict, and to establish in which ways they are different or similar. Furthermore, this chapter will seek to determine the ways in and extent to which globalization has facilitated and/or served as an incentive for terrorism in Somalia (the Horn of Africa) and Nigeria (West Africa). This analysis will make it possible to evaluate the research question and sub-questions stated in Chapter 1 and determine whether these questions have been answered satisfactorily. Furthermore, the chapter will make recommendations for future research.

6.2 Hyperconflict

Both case studies, Al Shabaab in Somalia and Boko Haram in Nigeria, signal a situation of hyperconflict that has already erupted, and that has the potential to become even greater. This can be deduced as both case studies are seen to correspond to the characteristics of hyperconflict as set out by Mittelman (2010).

6.2.1 Legitimacy and State Collapse/Failure

According to Mittelman (2010:23), hyperconflict arises from a decline in legitimacy and there is a lack of legitimacy present in both case studies, albeit to a different degree and for different reasons. Legitimacy is lowest in the case of Somalia and this is not surprising given that legitimacy is an unknown commodity in a collapsed state. The lack of legitimacy present in the Somali state created a vacuum in which a situation of hyperconflict could erupt. Al Shabaab has exploited this situation, and in the process further delegitimized the TFG and to a lesser extent the SFG. By exploiting Somali nationalism, xenophobia, and the lack of service delivery, Al Shabaab was able to delegitimize the TFG throughout its tenure in office. Therefore, it is not surprising that Al Shabaab was able to legitimize itself in the eyes of some Somalis by virtue of supplying basic services to large areas of Somalia. Al Shabaab was also able to delegitimize the SFG to a certain extent and this can be seen as being due to their ability to provide for their soldiers, something that could not be done by the SFG. Currently, it is unknown whether the situation of hyperconflict will in fact continue due to the Somali government's lack of legitimacy. Thus, if the SFG should desire to impede the continuation of hyperconflict, they would need to ensure that they established themselves as the legitimate authority in the eyes of the Somali populace, especially those in rural areas, as these are the areas where Al Shabaab still maintains a degree of influence.

In comparison, Nigeria depicts a state that is experiencing a decline in legitimacy, which is due to a situation of rampant corruption, rather than state collapse, as is the case in Somalia. Moreover, it has been argued amongst analysts that Nigeria is fast on its way to becoming a failed state, similar to that seen in the case of Somalia. However, Nigeria has not reached such a point yet, and thus has not failed or collapsed as a state. Nonetheless, Nigeria is still failing in crucial areas that have caused tremendous instability. Corruption has eroded the legitimacy of the Nigerian government and its apparatuses, which has led to a major distrust of government officials, and which in turn negatively affects government's ability to draw its citizens away from the appeal of groups such as Boko Haram. The group has also cited corruption as a driver in its campaign of terror, thus it is possible to argue that the declining legitimacy of the Nigerian government has precipitated conflict in Nigeria, and most likely hyperconflict.

6.2.2 Characteristics of Hyperconflict

6.2.2.1 Potential to Engulf

Both Al Shabaab and Boko Haram have showcased their ability to engulf their countries and regions in a situation of hyperconflict. Al Shabaab has engulfed Kenya, as well as other states within the Horn of Africa in a situation of hyperconflict, whilst on the other hand; Boko Haram has engulfed Nigeria and a number of West African, and other neighbouring states in a situation of hyperconflict. Thus, despite the fact that both terrorist groups have faced setbacks in the last year, they have remained dangerous and have continued to engulf neighbouring countries in hyperconflict. A vicious cycle has therefore been established, whereby any attacks perpetrated by Boko Haram or Al Shabaab, have been met with warranted retaliations from the respective militaries. This in turn has exacerbated the situation and has led to further retaliations by Boko Haram and Al Shabaab. Thus, the situation of hyperconflict has decidedly increased, resulting in more and more people suffering the consequences thereof.

6.2.2.2 Shift from Prior Patterns

Globalization has led to a shift, rather than a break from prior patterns of violence. In addition many cases of political violence do not fit tidily into one category. This is the case with regard to both Al Shabaab and Boko Haram; both have elements of interstate and domestic terrorism. Both terrorist groups attack targets in their countries of origin as well as targets in neighbouring states. For example, Al Shabaab has targeted soldiers in Somalia as well as in Kenya, whereas Boko Haram's targets have been in Nigeria, as well as across the border in neighbouring Cameroon, Niger and Chad. It should however be noted that Al Shabaab has officially transformed into a transnational terror organization and even international, much more so than in the case of the Boko Haram. This is the direct result of Al Shabaab's partnership with Al Qaeda.

6.2.2.3 Boiling Over, with a Chance of Spillovers

In both cases, history has played a major part in shaping and informing conflict. In the case of Boko Haram, Nigeria's colonial history comes into play; this relates specifically to the North-South dichotomy. The consequences of the British colonial policy of non-intervention in the

north are still visible today, where the north lags behind the south in terms of greater unemployment and poverty. These factors play some part in fuelling the Boko Haram (hyper)conflict. In the case of Al Shabaab, the numerous failed attempts of Somalia at national reconciliation created a vacuum, which Al Shabaab later exploited. Thus, in both cases conflict merged with the complexity of history, and this relates to the third characteristic of hyperconflict.

6.2.2.4 Increased Violence is the Order of the Day

A decrease in armed conflicts, either domestic or international, does not necessarily guarantee less violence or more security from the threat of political terror. The activities of Al Shabaab in the Horn of Africa and Boko Haram in Nigeria, as well as neighbouring countries, serve as examples where increased violence in conflict can be seen as the norm. In both cases, the number of attacks perpetrated by the groups, respectively, has increased from 2009. The number of attacks perpetrated by Al Shabaab rose dramatically (with dips in between) until August 2014, thereafter declining. The decline can possibly be attributed to AMISOM seizing a number of villages and towns held by Al Shabaab, and the loss of the port of Barawe to AMISOM and SNA forces. In effect, Al Shabaab is being pushed back. In comparison, Boko Haram's attacks rose drastically until January 2012, experiencing a dip in 2013, and increasing again in 2014. Despite a decline in attacks from 2012 to 2013, these attacks were far more deadly than those previously launched. This supports the notion that fewer attacks/conflicts do not necessarily mean less violence. In addition, Boko Haram's attacks in 2015 have grown more deadly; the Baga massacre is a case in point.

The brutality and violence with which Al Shabaab undertook the Westgate Mall attack (2013) and the Garissa University College attack (2015) and Boko Haram the Baga massacre (2015) serve as proof that both cases correspond to the fourth characteristic of hyperconflict.

6.2.2.5 Different Drivers, Different Catalysers

When one examines the drivers and catalysers of conflict one is able to identify a number of similarities between Al Shabaab and Boko Haram. In both the case of Al Shabaab and Boko Haram the death of a leader sparked some form of retaliatory attack. However, the extrajudicial killing of Yusuf affected Boko Haram's trajectory to a greater extent in comparison to the effect of Godane's death (through airstrike) on Al Shabaab. Yusuf's death

marked a turning point for Boko Haram as his death transformed Boko Haram into the violent, deadly group known today. His death served as a catalyser, but also a driver of conflict since he was avenged well beyond his death. On the other hand, Godane's death led to reprisal attacks on the AU's main base in Somalia. However, following the attacks on the AU base there was no indication that other attacks were launched for the purpose of revenge.

Furthermore, the establishment of an Islamic Calipahte, in their respective areas of operation, is another driver that Al Shabaab and Boko Haram share. Al Shabaab's aim to establish a Somali Caliphate has led the group to wage war against the perceived enemies of Islam, including those associated with Westernization/globalization. Likewise, Boko Haram has also expressed the aim of establishing a Caliphate, and this aim becomes even clearer when taking into account that Boko Haram has pledged allegiance to ISIS and changed its name to ISWAP.

6.2.2.6 Conflict Spreads like Wildfire

As Mittelman (2010) explains, conflict does not necessarily erupt into one massive war, however over time it has the potential to transform into a war – this is the case with both Al Shabaab and Boko Haram. In both cases, conflict began as something small: in the case of Boko Haram – an insurgency, and in the case of Al Shabaab – resistance to invasion, but as time passed these "conflicts" morphed into war. At first only the "home" countries of the two terrorist groups were affected, but with time more countries became involved in the conflict, either by being directly targeted by Al Shabaab/Boko Haram, or by assisting the "home" countries with military support. In the case of Al Shabaab, Kenya and Ethiopia were involved. However, recently Al Shabaab's attacks have been focussed on Somalia and Kenya. On the other hand, Boko Haram's violence spread to neighbouring Cameroon, Chad and Niger. The involvement of these countries in the MNJTF surely added fuel to the fire. Thus, despite not erupting into hyperconflict from the start, both Al Shabaab and Boko Haram have managed to cause a situation of hyperconflict in their respective regions. It can be said that conflict has spread like wildfire in both the case of Al Shabaab and Boko Haram.

6.3 Globalization as Facilitator of Acts of Terror

6.3.1 Technology as Facilitator

Both Al Shabaab and Boko Haram have made use of technology, specifically information and communication technologies, albeit to a different extent and with varying degrees of success. When examining the use of these technologies by both groups, it becomes clear that Al Shabaab is more tech savvy when compared to Boko Haram. Furthermore, Al Shabaab has used these technologies for a number of different reasons, whereas Boko Haram has mainly employed them as a propaganda tool and a source of information.

Both groups have made use of Twitter; however, Al Shabaab's use of Twitter is much more sophisticated and the group has employed it for a longer period of time. Boko Haram only started using Twitter recently, which seems to be the result of the influence of ISIS. In addition, the account was suspended several times, reappearing swiftly but without the original tweets; the account has since been shut down and no new account has appeared. In comparison, Al Shabaab's account has been shut down multiple times only to reappear at a later stage. Both groups have employed Twitter as a means of informing about activities as well as claiming responsibility for attacks; the running commentary of Al Shabaab's Westgate Mall attack and Boko Haram's claiming the capture of Monguno serve as an example. In addition, Al Shabaab's tweets were published in English, whereas Boko Haram's tweets were in Arabic. Al Shabaab's use of the lingua franca makes its reach far wider than that of Boko Haram. Furthermore, Boko Haram has also used Twitter as a means of publishing a feed of propaganda which includes videos.

Moreover, Boko Haram has also used technology as a means of coordinating attacks. This does not relate to Zimmermann's causal model; however, since it has been used as a means of coordinating attacks it has facilitated terrorist activity.

Al Shabaab's use of ICT is more in line with Zimmermann's causal model as it has used YouTube videos to discredit AMISOM and those who support them. Thus, by discrediting AMISOM the Somali government is delegitimized, as it works alongside AMISOM. In doing so the Somali government is weakened as suggested by Zimmermann's model.

In addition, Al Shabaab has also effectively used Facebook and online chatrooms as a recruitment tool; and it has made use of ICT to launch fundraising campaigns. This does not relate to Zimmermann's causal model; however, as suggested, a new channel should be

added to the existing model, where technology is employed as a tool for recruiting fighters, which in turn leads to opportunities for terrorism. Although there is no specific mention of Boko Haram using ICT to recruit individuals, the impact that, for example Boko Haram's YouTube propaganda videos can have on individuals, should not be discounted. As YouTube is accessible to millions of people there is a possibility that these videos could inspire individuals to join Boko Haram. This would then indirectly relate to this added channel.

It is possible to argue that technology has facilitated the terrorist activities of Al Shabaab, as it has been used as a tool for recruitment and financing, delegitimizing the Somali state (weakening it) and facilitating the spread of Al Shabaab's message. Similarly, Boko Haram's terrorist activities have been facilitated by the use of technology as a means of communicating and coordinating attacks.

6.3.2 Funding for Terror

Unlike Boko Haram, Al Shabaab has exploited the channels of business and commerce, in other words international trade networks to fund its terror activities. Although business and commerce does not form part of Zimmermann's causal model, it was suggested that it be added to the model as a means of funding terror, which in turn creates opportunities for terrorism. Al Shabaab has exploited this network through its use of the port of Kismayo to export (illegal) charcoal. Even after losing the port to Kenyan Defence Forces in 2012, Al Shabaab has been able to finance its operations through charcoal revenues. This is as a result of a profit-sharing agreement between Al Shabaab, the region's government and members of the Kenyan Defence Force. It has been suggested that Al Shabaab would be unable to conduct its terrorist activities without the revenue from charcoal. Therefore, it is possible to argue that the export of charcoal has created an opportunity for terrorism as it has facilitated Al Shabaab's terror activites through funding.

In addition, criminal activity has played a part in raising funds for both Al Shabaab and Boko Haram: in the case of Al Shabaab – piracy, and in Boko Haram's case – kidnapping for ransom, bank robbery and illicit trafficking. However, Boko Haram has made far greater use of criminal activities in sourcing funds for terror operations in comparison to Al Shabaab. Zimmermann's causal model suggests that globalization fosters the growth of politico-criminal networks, which then creates opportunities for terrorism. Boko Haram's financial support and activities in Cameroon suggest that of a politico criminal network(s). This can be assumed as Boko Haram's financiers have provided weapons in addition to supplying a route

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to negotiating with the Cameroonian government in cases of kidnapping for ransom. The existence of a politico-criminal network is further suggested as a result of links between Boko Haram and arms traffickers in Cameroon. The existence of these politico-criminal networks have enhanced the effectiveness of Boko Haram's operations as they have provided Boko Haram with the funding, channels and weapons necessary for conducting terror operations; in other words these networks have facilitated terrorism.

Furthermore, Zimmermann's causal model suggests that the support of an external state/group creates opportunities for terrorism. The financial support allegedly given by the Islamic World Society, the Al Muntada Trust Fund and an unknown Algerian sect, and the training provided by the latter as well as Al Shabaab and AQIM have provided Boko Haram with the means to conduct terror activities. Therefore, the support of these groups has facilitated terrorism in that it provided Boko Haram with opportunities to conduct terror attacks, be it nationally or internationally.

Both Boko Haram and Al Shabaab have been able to source funding in some way relating to globalization whether through politico-criminal networks or channels of business and commerce.

6.3.3 Migration and "Irrelevance" of Boundaries

Globalization has allowed for the "free" and easy flow of people across borders, thus it has essentially created a migration channel and terrorist groups or individuals wanting to join the ranks of terrorist groups have exploited this channel. This is more the case for Al Shabaab compared to Boko Haram. The use of the migration channel becomes clear when taking into account that a large number of foreign fighters and ethnic Somalis, outside of Somalia, have joined Al Shabaab. These fighters come from a number of geographical areas, including: the Horn of Africa, the Middle East, North America, Scandinavia, Western Europe and the Indian subcontinent. The geographical diversity present in Al Shabaab's foreign element showcases the reach that the group has as well as the ease with which individuals, including terrorists, can migrate across international borders. The migration channels do not correspond to Zimmermann's causal model; however it was suggested that "immigration," which forms part of the model, be expanded to include the "immigration" of fighters. Globalization would then create a migration channel, which facilitates the movement of terrorists, which in turn creates opportunities for terrorism. In addition to the migration channel, the proximity to the Middle East, and the porosity of many African borders has contributed to the migration of

fighters. Porous borders have also enabled Al Shabaab to carry out attacks in neighbouring Kenya. Therefore, one is able to argue that migration through means of globalization, and the irrelevance of boundaries has facilitated Al Shabaab's terror activities.

On the other hand, it is not possible to argue that foreign fighters have made use of the migration channel to join the ranks of Boko Haram, given that there is limited information available. It is more likely that these foreign fighters have made use of Nigeria's porous borders to join Boko Haram. Thus, in this case, boundaries have become irrelevant, but not as a result of globalization as in the case of Al Shabaab.

6.4 Globalization as Incentive for Acts of Terror

6.4.1 Threat of Corrupt Culture

Globalization leads to the spread of foreign cultures, which are often perceived as being corrupt. These corrupt foreign cultures are often associated with Westernization/Americanization. Both terrorist groups have expressed a hatred for Western culture, and in the case of both Al Shabaab and Boko Haram the threat of corrupt culture has informed their activities, specifically with regard to the choice of target.

Both of these terrorist groups have launched attacks against individuals and buildings that are perceived as symbols of a corrupt Western culture. For example, the Westgate Mall, Al Shabaab's most prominent attack, is in effect a temple of Western consumerism. However, as noted in Chapter 4, the threat of corrupt culture informed the choice of target, but is not necessarily the reason behind the attack. This attack corresponds to Mittelmann's causal model as the Westgate Mall and those who visit it are representative of a change in values and this provides an incentive for terrorism with regard to the selection of target. Other notable attacks against symbols of Westernization or targets of Western origin include the firing of mortar shells at a US congressman's plane taking off from a Somali airport in 2009; and the Christmas Day attacks on the main AU base in Somalia in 2014. It is important to note that Somalia's negative experience with the US could have informed some attacks. On the other hand, Boko Haram's attack on the UN buildings in Abuja in 2011 is possibly its most prominent attack against an outpost of Western culture. Boko Haram perceives the UN as perpetuating the oppression of Muslim believers and since the UN was the brainchild of the West it is not surprising that they chose it as a target.

Al Shabaab and Boko Haram have also been seen to target institutions offering Western education. However, thus far Al Shabaab has launched only nine attacks between 2011 and 2014, the most prominent attack being in 2015, namely the Garissa University College in April this year. However, Al Shabaab has promised similar attacks. On the other hand, Boko Haram is well known for its attacks on educational institutions against which the group launched 77 attacks between 2009 and 2014. Given the meaning of the group's colloquial name, "Western education is forbidden," it is not surprising that Boko Haram has targeted educational institutions.

However, it does appear as though the threat of corrupt culture has influenced Boko Haram to a greater extent when compared to Al Shabaab; the reason being that Boko Haram believes, and has often stated, that the Nigerian state has become corrupt as a result of moral decadence and the influence of Western values. This explains the large number of attacks against the police, military and the government. In addition, Boko Haram has attacked and denounced Western "inventions" such as elections, whereas Al Shabaab has not. Furthermore, unlike Al Shabaab, Boko Haram has launched attacks against Muslims and the Islamic establishment in Nigeria, which it views as being corrupted by Western values.[46] This corresponds to Zimmermann's causal model, which states that foreign cultures are perceived to erode conservative culture, which in turn creates an incentive for terrorism. There is however support for the argument that Al Shabaab perceives Somalia and Islam to be under threat from corrupt culture, as former Al Shabaab members believed that Islam had to be defended by the actions of Al Shabaab.

Therefore, it can then be said that the spread of foreign cultures through globalization has served as an incentive for the terrorist activities of both Al Shabaab and Boko Haram, especially with regard to the selection of targets. It does however seem as though Boko Haram has been affected by threat of corrupt culture to a greater extent.

6.4.2 Increasing Inequality and Poverty

Globalization has a tendency to create winners and losers and it has widened the gap between rich and poor. This appears to be the case in Nigeria, as severe inequality reigns between the north and south with the north lagging behind in terms of literacy and employment. This situation can be traced back to British colonial policies of non-intervention, which established

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[46] Boko Haram has launched attacks against Christians, but the number of attacks against Muslims far outweighs the attacks against Christians.

schools in the south, but not the north. The effects of this policy are still visible today. In addition, Western education is still largely rejected in the north, as it is believed to open a door to corrupt Western culture. This negatively impacts on the employment opportunities of those in the north.

Unemployment and poverty have served as a push factor for many young Somalis and Nigerians to join the ranks of Al Shabaab and Boko Haram, respectively. Furthermore, it has created opportunities for both groups to recruit marginalized youths and young men who are vulnerable to radicalization. The integration of both the Somali and Nigerian economy into the world economy has negatively affected both countries. In Somalia it led to an influx of people to cities in search for jobs. Given the existence of a youth bulge and the fact that unemployment is a major problem in Somalia, the problem of unemployment was further exacerbated. Often individuals feel as though they are not given the same opportunities as those around them and this leads to sense of marginalization as these individuals are left behind. However, in the case of Somalia, unemployment, inequality, and poverty cannot be clearly linked to the effects of globalization, as they can be attributed to factors such as corruption and civil war amongst others. Thus, it cannot be said that inequality and poverty as by-product of globalization has served as an incentive for terrorism in Somalia and the Horn of Africa.

Similarly, Nigeria was negatively impacted by the liberalization of the economy; shifts in relative prices meant that Nigerian textile factories were unable to compete with the cheap Asian textiles flooding the market. This led to the decimation of the textile industry and in turn the cotton industry, which in the process led to the destruction of the lives of millions of Nigerians. The result was mass migration to cities which then led to greater unemployment. In addition, social services, public safety and education are either non-existent or are of an extremely low quality. The aforementioned suggests that the Nigerian state is incapable of protecting its economically disadvantaged citizens against the challenges brought about by the global economy. This is in line with Zimmermann's causal model where shifts in relative prices lead to a weakening of the state (as the state is unable to provide) which in turn leads to economic and social inequality and serves as an incentive for terrorism. However, it is not possible to link the decimation of the cotton and textile industries to the individuals who have joined Boko Haram. It would require further research in the field to determine this. Therefore, the notion that inequality and poverty as by-product of globalization has served as an incentive for globalization appears weak.

In both case studies, there is a weak link between globalization causing inequality and poverty, which in turn serves as an incentive/opportunity for the terrorist activities of Al Shabaab and Boko Haram respectively.

6.5 Globalization as Incentive in the Rise of Al Shabaab and Boko Haram

In the case of Al Shabaab, globalization served as a means through which the group, as well as ordinary Somalis, was radicalized. The involvement of the US – through airstrikes – and their support for Ethiopian forces and the TFG (known for inhumane treatment) alienated Somalis and encouraged them to either join or support Al Shabaab. Thus, the involvement of the US as a bastion of globalization played a major role in the radicalization of Al Shabaab and many Somalis, which arguably attributed to their rise. On the other hand, there are no direct links between globalization and the rise of Boko Haram. However, one of the reasons that relates to the rise of Boko Haram is that of corruption within the Nigerian state. Even though this has not necessarily been caused by globalization, Boko Haram believes that the corruption visible in Nigerian society is the result of the infiltration of corrupt Western values, which are spread by globalization.

6.6 Evaluating the Research Question

This study aimed to answer the following question: *How and to what extent has globalization contributed towards the creation of a permissive environment in which terrorism has thrived in Somalia and northern Nigeria respectively?* It is possible to answer this question with the assistance of the sub-questions set out in Chapter 1:

1. *Has globalization acted as a facilitator or a deterrent of national/international terrorism in, and emanating from Somalia and northern Nigeria respectively?*

When taking into account the above findings, it is possible to argue that globalization has acted as a facilitator of national/international terrorism in both the case of Somalia (Horn of Africa) and northern Nigeria. There are no indications that globalization has deterred terrorist activity both nationally and internationally in Somalia or Nigeria.

2. *How has globalization aided and facilitated national/international terrorism in, and emanating from Somalia and northern Nigeria?*

This question was addressed in section 4.3 of Chapter 4 and section 5.3 of Chapter 5, and section 6.3 of this chapter. The analysis undertaken in section *6.3 Globalization as Facilitator of Acts of Terror* established that globalization has aided and facilitated national/international terrorism in and emanating from Somalia and northern Nigeria in a number of different ways.

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3. *How has globalization served as an incentive for national/international terrorism in, and emanating from Somalia and northern Nigeria?*

This question was answered in section 4.4 of Chapter 4 and section 5.4 of Chapter 5. These sections, along with the comparison in section *6.4. Globalization as Incentive for Acts of Terror* of this chapter revealed that globalization has served as an incentive for national/international terrorism in, and emanating from, Somalia and northern Nigeria in two different ways and to varying degrees.

4. *Which other factors have aided globalization in facilitating national/international terrorism in, and emanating from Somalia and northern Nigeria respectively?*

Subsection 4.3.3 in Chapter 4, subsection 5.3.3 in Chapter 5 and the analysis in subsection *6.3.3 Migration and "Irrelevance" of Boundaries* of this chapter found that in both cases, porous borders have aided the terrorist activity of Al Shabaab and Boko Haram.

When taking the above into account it is possible to answer the main research question in the positive; the case studies in Chapters 4 and 5 support the notion that globalization has indeed created a permissive environment in which terrorism has thrived in both Somalia and northern Nigeria. Furthermore, as was seen in the above the different facets of globalization facilitated and/or encouraged the terrorist activities of Al Shabaab and Boko Haram to different extents.

6.7 Theoretical Implications

According to Zimmermann's (2011:S159) findings there does not appear to be a positive relationship between globalization and terrorism, rather globalization is a background factor and political terrorism is a reaction to local grievances. As the study revealed in subsections 5.2.1 and 5.4.1, and section 5.5 in Chapter 5, corruption in the Nigerian state has served as a major driver of Boko Haram's campaign of terror. Although this can be perceived as a local grievance, Boko Haram firmly believes that the prevailing corruption present in the Nigerian state is the result of the infiltration of corrupt Western culture and values. Therefore, in this case, globalization is not merely a background factor, but has informed local grievances and the terrorist activity of Boko Haram. This then points to a positive link between globalization and terrorism. In the case of Al Shabaab and Somalia, globalization can also not be dismissed as being a mere background factor. As revealed in section 4.5 in Chapter 4, globalization played a prominent role in motivating the rise of Al Shabaab,[47] as it was through US

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[47] It should be noted that it did not play the only part.

aggression (in the form of airstrikes) and US support of the Ethiopian invasion and the TFG (known for inhumane treatment) which served to radicalize Somalis to either join Al Shabaab or to support the group. In this case, globalization combined with a local grievance and served as an incentive for terrorist activity. Furthermore, as revealed in section 7.2 of this chapter, globalization has played a definite role in facilitating terrorist activity and to some extent serving as an incentive. Therefore, it is possible to argue that there is indeed a positive relationship between globalization and terrorism. This should however be tested in other case studies.

In addition, this study revealed that both case studies correspond to the characteristics of hyperconflict as set out by Mittelman. This finding provides support for Mittelman's argument that the world is moving towards a new type of conflict, namely hyperconflict.

6.8 Recommendations for Future Research

Further research is warranted, given that the scope of the study was limited to two regions on the African continent. Since this study only examined the impact of globalization in the regions of the Horn of Africa and West Africa, it is not possible to state that globalization has unequivocally created permissive environments in which terrorism can flourish. Therefore, further case studies analyses should be done in order to determine whether or not globalization has indeed created a permissive environment in which terrorism can flourish in other regional contexts, for example South Asia. Further case study analysis would do one of two things; either strengthen the claim that globalization creates permissive environments in which terrorism can flourish, or, it would support the notion, that these effects of globalization are limited to certain geographical and cultural contexts.

In addition, the correlation between inequality/poverty, as a by-product of globalization, and terrorist activity is somewhat weak[48] as it was impossible to determine whether or not the decimation of the cotton and textile industries in northern Nigeria (the result of the liberalization of the economy and the flooding of the local market with cheap Asian textiles) directly or indirectly resulted in individuals joining Boko Haram. Consequently it is recommended that field research be conducted so as to determine whether or not the decimation of the aforementioned industries either directly (the individual losing their livelihood) or indirectly (a parent or family member losing their livelihood) encouraged individuals to join Boko Haram.

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[48] As indicated in Chapter 5.

6.9 Conclusion

When taking into account the findings of this research study it is possible to conclude that a situation of hyperconflict has erupted in the regional contexts of both Al Shabaab and Boko Haram. This can be argued, since both case studies correspond to the characteristics of hyperconflict as set out by Mittelman. Furthermore, globalization has facilitated the terrorist activities of both terrorist groups, albeit to different extents, through the use of technology, sourcing of funds, and through migration and the "irrelevance of boundaries". In addition, globalization has served as an incentive for the terrorist activities of Al Shabaab and Boko Haram through the spread of corrupt foreign culture, which presents a threat. On the other hand it is not possible to argue that inequality and poverty brought about by globalization have served as an incentive for the terrorist activities of these two groups, as there is not enough evidence to support it. In this way this study has made a contribution towards understanding the ways in which globalization can facilitate and encourage terrorism both nationally and internationally. Moreover, it has provided insight as to how globalization affects different regions and groups.

Thus one can argue that the link between globalization and terrorism appears to be positive. The study has revealed that in certain countries, and under specific circumstances, globalization has led to and/or provided a permissive environment in which national/international terrorism has thrived. This was revealed through the aforementioned case studies of Al Shabaab in Somalia (Horn of Africa) and Boko Haram in Nigeria (West Africa).

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# Appendices

Appendix A: Map of Somalia

(United Nations, 2011)

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Appendix B: Map of the Horn of Africa

(United Nations, 2012)

Appendix C: Map of Nigeria

(United Nations, 2014a)

Appendix D: Map of West Africa

(United Nations, 2014b)