DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR KENYAN HIGHER EDUCATION

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December 2015
Dedication

To my late sister, Rachel Adongo, who died during the final stages of writing my thesis. You will always be remembered through this project.
Declaration of Originality

I declare that Democratic Citizenship Education and its Implications for Kenyan Higher Education is my own original work, except where explicitly indicated otherwise. I swear as a statement of fact that this dissertation has not been submitted previously for any degree or examination at any university.

By submitting this dissertation electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained therein is my own, original work, that I am the sole author thereof (save to the extent explicitly otherwise stated), that reproduction and publication thereof by Stellenbosch University will not infringe any third party rights and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for obtaining any qualification.

Signed………………………… Date…………………………
Acknowledgments

Much of the writing of any dissertation is done as an individual project, completed by writing in isolation. This view, however, does not rightly acknowledge the substantial input of others in the development of a dissertation project. I want to thank all those who have had a part in the conception, pursuit and completion of this dissertation.

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Abstract

Violence in Kenya undermines the role of Kenyan higher education in the transition to democratic practices. This dissertation analyses democratic citizenship education (DCE) and its implications for Kenyan higher education. Higher education as used in this dissertation is centred on the university. The dissertation addresses the main research question, namely: How does a defensible deliberative conception of democracy help us to think differently about higher education in Kenya? This main research question is investigated using the following sub-questions: What space might there be for democratic citizenship education to help Kenyan higher education institutions address ethnic divisions in the country? How can democratic citizenship education in Kenyan higher education reshape ethnic identities and overcome ethnic tensions? Philosophy of education, as the approach used in this dissertation, enabled this research to reach its goal, which was to establish how DCE can help university education in Kenya resolve ethnic violence. In doing so, this dissertation argues that an extended view of liberal DCE – DCE in becoming – fits in with deconstruction as a reflexive paradox that retains the critical potential of DCE. Deconstruction potentially creates space for reimagining the possibilities of the university as a critical and democratic institution. Deconstruction as a method enabled this research potentially to claim openness in thinking about university education in Kenya to unforeseeable in becoming – being other than it currently is, so that it can contend with issues of ethnic violence in whatever singularity. This dissertation found that Kenyan higher education is already conceptualised in liberal DCE in a predetermined sense of belonging, although in a limited form, and that it is actualised, which means that it cannot resist violence. Therefore, a reconceptualised view of DCE in becoming is engendered in the potentialities of speech and thought and withholding rash judgment – as a way of curbing violence. Further, the findings demonstrate that DCE in becoming potentially can enable students and teachers to learn to think autonomously and to respect others with whom they co-belong. DCE in becoming potentially can contribute to the discourses and pedagogical encounters needed to cultivate responsible, relational, emancipative individual agency in becoming humans who respect and co-belong to the coming community.

Key Words: University, Kenya, Re-imagine, Potentialities, Actuality, Deconstruction, Philosophy of education, Democratic citizenship education in becoming, Liberal, Pedagogy, Ethnic violence.
Opsomming

Geweld in Kenia ondermyn die rol van Keniaanse hoër onderwys in die oorgang na demokratiese praktyke. Hierdie proefskrif analiseer demokratiese burgerskapopvoeding (*democratic citizenship education (DCE)*) en die implikasies daarvan vir hoër onderwys in Kenia. Hoër onderwys soos in hierdie proefskrif gebruik, verwys na die universiteit. Die proefskrif spreek die hoof- navorsingsvraag aan, naamlik: Hoe help ’n verdedigbare beraadslagende begrip van demokrasie ons om anders oor hoër onderwys in Kenia te dink? Hierdie hoof- navorsingsvraag is ondersoek deur gebruik te maak van die volgende subvrae: Watter ruimte kan daar wees vir demokratiese burgerskapopvoeding om hoëronderwysinstellings in Kenia te help om die etniese verdeeldheid in die land aan te spreek? Hoe kan demokratiese burgerskapopvoeding in hoër onderwys in Kenia hydra tot ’n hervorming van etniese identiteite en etniese spanning oorkom? Die filosofie van die onderwys, as die benadering wat in hierdie proefskrif gebruik is, het dit vir die navorsing moontlik gemaak op sy doel te bereik, naamlik om te bepaal hoe DCE universiteitsopvoeding in Kenia kan help om etniese geweld op te los. Sodoende hou hierdie proefskrif voor dat ’n uitgebreide siening van liberale DCE – DCE in wording – inpas by dekonstruksie as ’n refleksiewe paradoks wat die kritiese potensiaal van DCE behou. Dekonstruksie skep potensieel ruimte om die moontlikhede om die universiteit as ’n kritiese en demokratiese instansie te herverbeel (*re-imagine*). Dekonstruksie as ’n metode het hierdie navorsing in staat gestel om te aanspraak te maak op oopheid in denke oor universiteitsopvoeding in Kenia as onvoorsienbaar in wording – om anders te wees as wat dit tans is, sodat dit kan worstel met kwessies van etniese geweld in wat ook al singulariteit. Hierdie proefskrif het bevind dat hoër onderwys in Kenia reeds in liberale DCE gekonseptualiseer is as ’n voorafbepaalde sin van behoort, hoewel in ’n beperkte mate, en dat dit geaktualiseer is, wat beteken dat die nie geweld kan teëstaan nie. ’n Herkonseptualiseerde siening van DCE in wording word dus voortgebring in die potensialiteite van spraak en denke en die weerhouding van oorhaastige oordeel – as ’n manier om geweld te beteuel. Verder demonstreer die bevindinge dat DCE in wording potensieel studente en onderwysers kan help om outonoom te dink en om ander met wie hulle saam behoort, te respekteer. DCE in wording kan potensieel hydra tot die diskoerse en pedagogiese ontmoetings wat benodig word om verantwoordelike, relasionele, emansiperende individuele agentskap te kultiveer in wordende mense wat die komende gemeenskap respekteer en gesamentlik daaraan behoort.
**Sleutelwoorde:** Universiteit, Kenia, Herverbeel, Potensialiteite, Aktualiteit, Dekonstruksie, Filosofie van die onderwys, Demokratiese burgerskapopvoeding in wording, Liberaal, Pedagogie, Etniese geweld.
### Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DCE</td>
<td>Democratic Citizenship Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KANU</td>
<td>Kenya African National Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CODESRIA</td>
<td>Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KADU</td>
<td>Kenya African Democratic Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOE</td>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KCPE</td>
<td>Kenya Certificate of Primary Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KCSE</td>
<td>Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIE</td>
<td>Kenya Institute of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIQET</td>
<td>Totally Integrated Quality Education and Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEMA</td>
<td>Gikuyu-Embu-Meru Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HELB</td>
<td>Higher Education Loan Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAMA-TUSA</td>
<td>Association, Miji-Kenda Association and Kalenjin-Maasai-Turkana-Samburu Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAU</td>
<td>National Akamba Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAU</td>
<td>New Akamba Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Table of Contents

Dedication ........................................................................................................................................... i
Declaration of Originality ................................................................................................................... ii
Acknowledgments .............................................................................................................................. iii
Abstract .............................................................................................................................................. iv
Opsomming ......................................................................................................................................... v
Acronyms .......................................................................................................................................... vii
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................................... ix

Chapter One ........................................................................................................................................ 1
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND ................................................................................................. 1
  1.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 1
  1.2. Aim of the Study ..................................................................................................................... 3
  1.3. Problem Statement and Research Questions ......................................................................... 4
  1.4. Scope of the Study .................................................................................................................. 5
  1.5. Methodology and Theoretical Framework ............................................................................. 5
  1.6. Motivation for the Study ......................................................................................................... 8
  1.7. Outline ..................................................................................................................................... 9
  1.8. Summary ............................................................................................................................... 12

Chapter Two ....................................................................................................................................... 13
LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION ........................................................................... 13
  2.1. Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 13
  2.2. Building the First Premise for Democratic Citizenship Education ........................................ 14
    2.2.1. Democracy ..................................................................................................................... 15
    2.2.2. Education ....................................................................................................................... 17
    2.2.3. Citizenship ..................................................................................................................... 20
    2.2.4. The Advocacy Argument for Democratic Citizenship Education .................................. 22
  2.3. Analysing Democratic Citizenship Education ........................................................................ 25
    2.3.1. Rawls's Public Reason as Justice ................................................................................... 25
    2.3.2. Habermas's Communicative Rationality ........................................................................... 33
    2.3.3. Benhabib's Democratic Iteration and Democratic Citizenship Education ...................... 42
    2.3.4. Synthesising Public Reason, Communicative Rationality and Democratic Iteration toward Democratic Citizenship Education ................................................................. 52
  2.4. Summary ................................................................................................................................... 56

Chapter Three ....................................................................................................................................... 58
6.6. Pedagogy and Ubuntu: An Encounter with ‘The Other’ .............................................................. 206
6.7. Summary ..................................................................................................................................... 211

Chapter Seven..................................................................................................................................... 213

AN EXTENDED VIEW OF DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION: POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO
KENYAN UNIVERSITY ACADEMIC PROGRAMMES ............................................................................. 213

7.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 213
7.2. Synopsis of the Research Process ................................................................................................... 215
7.3. Synopsis of Findings ...................................................................................................................... 218
7.4. Contributions of This Research Study ........................................................................................... 226
7.5. Recommendations for University Education in Kenya ................................................................. 229
7.6. Summary ..................................................................................................................................... 231

REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................................... 232
Chapter One

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1.1. Introduction

Kenya faces many challenges as a result of the politicisation of ethnic identities, which led to tribal conflicts over land disputes, positions in government, and access to higher institutions of learning (see Mwiria, Ngethe, Ngome, Odero, Wawire & Wesonga, 2007; Nyakuri, 1997; Oyugi, 2000; Wawire, Chege, Arnot & Wainaina, 2008). The gravity of this challenge is made evident in the violence that erupted after at least two national elections in 1992 and 2007. In 1992, ‘[t]he wave of inter-ethnic conflicts in the Rift Valley, Nyanza, Western and some parts of the Coastal Provinces went down in Kenya’s history as the worst since independence’ (Nyakuri, 1997:1). In 2007, bloody clashes between ethnic groups took place after the December 27th national elections. It was reported that, in these clashes, ‘1 000 Kenyans were brutally killed, another 3 500 were internally displaced and the image of Kenya as a safe and a peaceful destination was instantaneously shattered’¹. These conflicts should not be perceived as a once-off occurrence. In contrast, most Kenyan districts are disturbed by actual or potential ethnic violence, so much so that there is barely a province left where the problem has not occurred: Western, Rift Valley, Nyanza, Coast, Central, North Eastern, Eastern and Nairobi provinces (Klopp, 2002:269; Nyakuri, 1997:2). This is partly so because different communities continue to wilfully or instinctively rely on ethnicity to propagate their supremacy and dominance in an atmosphere typified by limited resources, fear and intolerance. Unfortunately, there is a tendency to shy away from discussing this problem, for, as Nyakuri (1997:1) has observed,

The issue of ‘ethnic conflict’ [is] a very sensitive, yet important subject for discussion, aimed at formulating policy options for conflict management. Indeed, whenever the issue is raised, there has often been panic, confusion and scepticism, within the government, opposition as well as within the entire public circle.

¹ http://media.lonely planet.com, 'Destination Kenya’, retrieved on 15 February 2012, indicates that ‘Kenya is a thriving multicultural country with a wide cross-section of everything classic in contemporary Africa’ and that this has been deterred by the ethnic violence that was experienced in 2007. Inasmuch as the cultural diversity is vibrant, it has also resulted in ethnic conflicts that have divided the country.
This tendency to shy away from the problem at a discursive level is one of the challenges that needs to be confronted if harmony is to be achieved amongst ethnic groups. In this study I will argue that higher education can be used as an instrument to reduce ethnic tensions in Kenya because, at this level, educational systems impact most significantly on students’ political attitudes, behaviours and character. It is also at this level that students are mature enough to engage in politics and contribute ideas to policy formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation (Luescher-Mamashela, Kiiru, Mattes, Ntallima, Ngéthe & Romo, 2011:5). Further, Falola and Atieno-Odhiambo (2002:594) posit that higher institutions of learning have a large role to play in fostering national unity. They (institutions) do so, it can argued, through producing and propagating ideologies of democratic citizenship education in order to lead to the creation of a new political culture that includes the promotion of national unity in diversity.

In this study I examine how and why the notion of liberal democratic citizenship is central to higher education in Kenya in the country’s attempt to fight tensions and imbalances resulting from ethnic politics and polarisation. My focus on liberal democratic citizenship is informed by research that has been carried out on how this concept is instrumental in illuminating the link between the politicisation of ethnicity and a country’s education system (policies and practices) (see Benhabib, 1996:69; Hansen, 2008:19; Waghid, 2002:26; 2009:24; 2010:19; Waghid & Le Grange, 2004:1; Waghid & Smeyers, 2012a). Building on this research, I will explore the degree to which we can and should recognise democratic citizenship as a progressive concept (see Barry, 1989; Biesta, 2011:141; Enslin & White, 2003; Hirst & White, 1998:22 & 38; Mafeje, 1995:6; Matlosa, Elklit & Chiromo, 2006:23-26; Olson, 2011; Peters & Biesta, 2009:15) that can assist researchers and policy makers to chart new ways of counteracting the manipulation of ethnicity for private political and socio-economic ends.

A study conducted in three institutions of higher learning, in Kenya, Tanzania and South Africa, on the concept of a university in Africa and democratic citizenship revealed that most Kenyan university students have a limited understanding of the concept ‘democracy’ (Luescher-Mamashela et al., 2011). According to the findings, students from Kenya’s oldest and most prestigious institution of higher learning, Nairobi University, understood democracy in the following ways: as political rights and civil freedoms (55%); as participation and deliberation (23%); as good governance (only 4%); as equality, fairness and justice (only 4%); and as socioeconomic development (only 1%). Interestingly, 13% of them did not know
what democracy is. These findings call for the need to have a closer look at how democracy is conceptualised in Kenyan higher education with the view to re-conceptualise it so that it is understood in a more compelling way.

1.2. Aim of the Study

The aim of this study was to reconceptualise higher education within the Kenyan context so that it may deal with ethnic conflicts in a more vibrant way. These conflicts have been part of Kenya’s political scene since its colonisation by Great Britain. Using a policy that has come to be called ‘divide and rule’, the British colonial government were accused of favouring some ethnic groups over others, thereby leading to some anomalies and imbalances. These imbalances were blatantly obvious at independence, when the top political offices were held by individuals from the two major ethnic groups – Kikuyu (President Jomo Kenyatta) and Luo (Vice-President Odinga Oginga). Within a few years, these two leaders had conflictual differences that culminated in the resignation of Odinga Oginga as the Vice-President (Ogot, 1995a). This resignation lays bare the fact that political activity in Kenya is highly ethnicised (see Ogude, 2002:202-207; Omolo, 2002:209; Stephen & Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002:223-249). Consequently, studies show that loyalty to the one-party state that ruled Kenya from 1963 to 1990 indicates that Kenyan politics was ethnically driven.

With the advent of multi-party politics in 1992, national elections were marred by ethnic clashes. This meant that, for the first time, tensions that had been repressed by the one-party state came out in the open. Ethnic election clashes have remained the trend to date, with each subsequent election witnessing increased violence, despite the fact that several institutions of higher education are producing thousands of graduates each year who are expected to espouse a patriotic, national consciousness as advocated in policy documents guiding education in Kenyan universities. These graduates are produced by an education system that insists on national unity in diversity, human personality and equality (Eshiwani, 1990:6-7; 1993); however, there appears to be something in the country’s higher education system that has eluded educational experts in relation to how to produce graduates who look beyond ethnic loyalties in order to create a multi-ethnic, united Kenya.

This study has attempted to investigate how Kenyan higher education, in the light of a reconceptualised view of liberal democratic citizenship education (DCE) framework,
potentially can address ethnic violence. I explore the root of the problems by asking several questions: Could it be that the education policies are not well formulated? Are some elements wrong in the implementation of these education policies? What is it that has hindered the implementation of these education policies? How could a liberal framework of democratic citizenship help us to think through the discrepancy between sound education policies and poor implementation?

1.3. Problem Statement and Research Questions

The ethnic tensions in Kenya may signify undemocratic conceptions of citizenship education. According to Luescher-Mamashela et al. (2011), students in Kenyan universities consider their country as fully democratic, yet there are several indications that point to the contrary. One such indication is politicised ethnicity, which, among other things, determines people’s access to goods, employment and public services such as health care and political office. This narrow and limited conception of democratic citizenship is further evident in three other instances. Firstly, students think that belonging to a particular ethnic group is not important, yet in reality, for example, tribal clashes that followed the national elections in 1992, 1997 and, most importantly in 2007, point to the contrary. Secondly, students reduce democracy to political rights and civil freedoms without linking these to good governance, equity, fairness and justice. Finally, a sizeable number of university students (77%) do not consider participation and deliberation as core attributes of democracy, and 13% do not understand what democracy is. Therefore they do not possess the tools with which to judge if government is democratic or not. This suggests that there is a need to reconceptualise the kind of higher education being offered in Kenya to broaden students’ understanding of what a working democracy is in order to develop a defensible conception of democratic citizenship that hopefully will improve, transform and reduce the ethnic tensions in the country and, in turn, produce more mature and virtuous democratic citizens who will handle conflicts democratically.

In view of the above problem statement, this study focuses on the following main research question: How does a defensible deliberative conception of democracy help us to think differently about higher education in Kenya?
This question is investigated using the following sub-questions: What is democratic citizenship education? What space might there be for democratic citizenship education to help Kenyan higher education institutions address ethnic divisions in the country? What have been the findings/consequences of the implementation of democratic citizenship education elsewhere in the world? What are the current and past policies with regard to the equality of and access to Kenyan higher education? What role has ethnic identity played in Kenyan social, political and economic life? How can democratic citizenship education in Kenyan higher education reshape ethnic identities and overcome ethnic tensions?

1.4. Scope of the Study

This study focuses mainly on higher education in Kenya and how it can be used to advocate for a more plausible conception of democratic citizenship education that can contribute towards minimising ethnic violence and political dissension. I focus specifically on higher education to understand its contribution to the cultivation of democratic citizens. This understanding helps to locate the conceptual ambiguities of democratic citizenship education in Kenyan institutions of higher learning in order to buttress a conception that helps to reduce ethnic tensions. Moreover, higher learning institutions constitute higher levels of training and, at this stage, students are expected to emerge as mature graduates with newly formed attitudes and behaviours that point to democratic virtues – that is, virtues that would yield positive results towards national development. It has been argued that higher education plays a major role in socio-economic development in the country (Assié-Lumumba, 2006:96). For this reason it is essential to reconceptualise how the nation’s citizens are prepared for economic, social and political development through a nuanced conception of democratic citizenship education. Therefore, my focus was on examining Kenyan higher education and its formation of democratic citizenship education to address the above problem.

1.5. Methodology and Theoretical Framework

I used philosophy of education as research approach that allowed me to: 1) interpret and uncover meaning, 2) identifies problems in texts and society and 3) to respond evaluatively with judgements (justifications or arguments) that can help to look at the situation – that is, to address it. This dissertation is conceptual in the sense that I examine meanings that underscore DCE by looking at liberal understandings of the concept. The study is conceptual in the sense that I examine meanings that underscore DCE by looking at liberal
understandings of the concept. It is practical because I envisage that uncovering meanings have some implications for both higher education policy texts and the conditions of violence. I would classify the dissertation as interpretivist as I search for meanings and explanations of events. For instance, the problem I have identified is with violence in Kenyan society and that higher education policy texts are in main silent on how such a dire situation should be addressed. The critical and the deconstructionist dimension can be highlighted in the sense that my own extension of the liberal conception of higher education towards DCE in becoming alludes to improvement of the concept. So: this dissertation is about the inadequacy of Kenyan higher education to respond to violence. If it aims to do so it has to adopt an extended view of liberal DCE. This dissertation is also a combination of policy analysis and philosophy of education in the sense that meanings are uncovered that can respond to a particular societal problem, which has implications for education – as an engagement of human beings.

Philosophy of education is ‘an analytical pursuit concerned with the clarification of the concepts and propositions through which our experiences and activities are intelligible’ (Hirst, 1974:1). Philosophy of education approach enabled this research to systematically examine, uncover and understand meanings and identify the implications for pedagogy, curriculum, learning theory and the purpose of education, and that is justified in metaphysical, epistemological and axiological assumptions to reconstruct and deconstruct them to attain more nuanced meanings.

I refer to the work of some African philosophers and Kenyan scholars in particular to examine the concept of politicised ethnicity – a context in which higher education in Kenya is conceptualised (see Appiah, 1992:170; Barasa, 1997; Falola & Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002; Gyekye, 1995; Imbo, 1998; Ogot, 1995b; Oruka, 1983; 1998; Waghid, 2005a; 2011; Waghid & Smeyers, 2012b; Wiredu, 1996. I also use the work of western philosophers to examine, analyse and clarify the concept of democratic citizenship education (see Benhabib, 1996; 2011a; Habermas, 1978; 1987a; 1987b; 1996; Hogan & Smith, 2003:165; Rawls, 1971). Such endeavours have enriched my view of democratic citizenship education towards reconceptualising Kenyan higher education.

The methodology of this research is located within an interpretive paradigm developed by Stanley Cavell. According to Cavell (1979:191), a word gets its meaning in different contexts
and within particular interpretive communities. As a consequence of this, there is a need for reasonable doubt – what he calls ‘scepticism’ – in investigating meanings of concepts. In doing this, he proposes various elements to guide our construction of meanings, namely source of authority, authority’s mode of acceptance, epistemic goal, candidate object or phenomena, status concept, epistemic means (specification of criteria), and degree of certification (Cavell, 1979:9). In this study, each of these elements helps to investigate the relationship between democracy and ethnicity as conceptualised in Kenyan higher education. They also helped me to examine how democratic citizenship education within a liberal framework problematises current conceptions of higher learning, thereby necessitating a re-conceptualisation.

In addition, I used conceptual analysis and deconstruction as methods. Conceptual analysis looks at the meanings of concepts (see Hirst, 1967:44; Peters: 1967:1) and deconstruction searches for meanings that are not there yet (Biesta & Egéa-Kuehne, 2001:8). This research examines the meanings of the concepts beyond their current meanings and, in doing so; it applies Biesta and Egéa-Kuehne’s interpretation of Derrida’s views on deconstruction as a method. Deconstruction as a method has a strong emphasis on differentiations as a possibility for meaning and interpretation. According to Biesta and Egéa-Kuehne (2001:4), Derrida’s work on deconstruction is crucial to rethinking educational issues through the unravelling of inadequacies, contradictions and ambiguities in our education policies and practices. Biesta and Egéa-Kuehne’s understanding of Derrida’s work reveals the inadequacies in the current conceptualisation of higher education as far as democratic citizenship is concerned. Therefore, deconstruction serves as a guide in rethinking why there are persistent and recurrent ethnic tensions, despite sound educational policies and the presence of several institutions of higher learning in Kenya. The notion of otherness within the theory of deconstruction assists in re-examining how the conceptualisation of democratic citizenship in Kenya is related to the challenge of ethnic polarisation. As a method that encourages reflexivity, deconstruction is used in demonstrating that what was hitherto understood as self-evident realities – for example what democracy means – are in fact quite ambiguous, as they may mean different things to different people, as the research conducted by Luescher-Mamashela et al. (2011) reveals. In other words, deconstruction enables us to gain a new perspective of conceptual formulations in order to address inherent discursive loopholes and ambiguities.
This study is located within an understanding of democratic citizenship education informed by liberal thought. In research, democratic citizenship education has been viewed largely as an idea, based on the notion that it is possible to know what good citizenship is, and thus the task of citizenship education is that of producing good citizenship (Biesta, 2011:141). In this study, the question asked is whether and to what degree we can and should recognise democratic citizenship as a progressive identity within higher education. At this level, the study explores deliberative approaches of democracy in investigating the concept of democratic citizenship education to advance a democratic citizenship education that grows from a Kenyan identity.

Liberal democratic citizenship valorises the individual as the subject of democratic governance and fosters freedom by creating spaces in which the voices of marginalised people can be heard. I invoke the paradigm’s notion of democratic iterations to examine how different perspectives on democratic citizenship education can help understand the inadequacies in Kenya’s current conceptualisation of education. Works by several philosophers were used to enrich my reconceptualisation of Kenya’s higher education. Benhabib’s (2011a) idea of the ‘right to have rights’ speaks to the topic at hand by helping us understand the crimes committed against human beings in Kenya’s ethnically-charged post-election violence, in which innocent people are deprived of their rights to live and to access public goods, irrespective of their ethnic identity. Rawls’s (1999) notion of social justice throws light when examining how a narrow and limiting conceptualisation of democracy is a violation of the principles of social justice, and prevents people from understanding the world in which they live, such as the link between poor citizenship education and politicised ethnicity. Jürgen Habermas’s (1978) notion of public reason and communicative action, which opens up space for dialogue and rational deliberation, is used to examine how current conceptualisations of higher education inhibit democracy, since 77% of students in Kenya’s institutions of higher learning do not indicate deliberation as a component of democracy (Luescher-Mamashela et al., 2011).

1.6. Motivation for the Study

Reconceptualising higher education within a liberal framework of democratic citizenship generates new ideas on why the problem of politicised ethnicity has continued to be a challenge, despite sound educational policies. A research study conducted in three countries –
Kenya, Tanzania and South Africa – reveals that 47% of students define democratic citizenship from only a political perspective, that is, a rule that is not autocratic. Aside from the political, these students were unable to identify features of democratic citizenship such as human rights, fairness, equality and justice. Besides, most of the students identified Kenya as a democracy, even with so many cases of politicised ethnicity reported in the media, showing that they do not fully understand what democracy is. Kenyan students in institutions of higher learning feel they already live in a democracy. This means that there is something wrong with the way democratic citizenship is conceptualised, hence the need to reconceptualise what democratic citizenship is in the hope that students may be able to understand what it is and expect better performance by their democracies.

As an educator in Kenya, my motivation for this study also stems from the prevailing inequalities in Kenya that present ethnic discrimination. Such widespread inequalities undermine the concept of nationhood and national unity that Kenyan education policy advocates (Eshiwani, 1990:7; 1993). The country’s current education policy, which promotes equity, access for all and quality in education, creates space for such a study. The past effects of ethnic politics in education and the autocracy that reigned in Kenya are some of the reasons that triggered this research. These policies (on unity and equity in education) have open spaces for discussion on democratic citizenship that seems to be overshadowed by ethnic violence. Other factors that led to this study are that I am Kenyan and my concerns about the wide-scale inequalities that exist in the country; the loss of innocent lives due to tribal violence and political greed during 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007; a concern for social justice and political stability; a concern about the growth, quality and well-roundedness of higher education institutions in Kenya; the quest for education for all citizens; love; and the quest for knowledge.

1.7. Outline

Chapter 1: Introduction and Background. This chapter is an introduction and background to the study and delineates the context, motivation, problem statement, methodology and chapter outlines. This introduction also provides an orientation to the study.

Chapter 2: Investigating Democratic Citizenship Education within Liberal Thoughts. This chapter analyses liberal thoughts on democratic citizenship education from various
philosophical perspectives, and will assist in building and enriching a nuanced conception of democratic citizenship education. Rawls’s theory of justice is explored to elucidate the conception of justice in democratic citizenship education. Benhabib’s (2011a) notions of cosmopolitanism without illusions and of the ‘right to have rights’ are explored to unravel and develop further the concepts that can assist with ideas of freedoms and rights to illuminate meanings of the notion of democratic citizenship. Jürgen Habermas’s (1978; 87a; 87b) ideas of ‘public reason’ and ‘communicative action’ are used for deliberative and dialogical perspectives of democratic citizenship to re-construct the concept further. Therefore, this chapter is built upon theoretical impressions of democratic citizenship education within a liberal framework.

Chapter 3: Higher Education in Kenya: Conceptions of Democratic Citizenship Education

This chapter explores Kenya’s education system in its historical context and focuses on the development of the country’s system of higher education. This understanding unravels the ‘undemocratic’ and ‘democratic’ conceptions of citizenship that are embraced in the education system, thereby establishing space for the reconceptualisation of higher education in Kenya. The interest in higher education springs from the premise that an independent scholarly community supported by strong universities would enhance a healthy, stable democracy. Such involvement in research, intellectual leadership and the development of successive generations of engaged citizens would nourish social, political and economic transformation in Africa (Berresford & Rodin, 2007:xvi). Berresford and Rodin also note that higher education has experienced challenges related to historical political, economic and social instability in Africa. Within this context, I analyse Kenyan higher education policies, governance, access, equality and quality to assess the nature of democratic citizenship that is conceived in Kenyan higher education. The nature of democratic citizenship education will be examined from a wealth of historical, political, economic, demographic and sociocultural sources to bring out the progression of democritisation in Kenyan higher education systems (Oucho, 2012). This chapter is a review of Kenya’s higher education within its historical context and its conception of democratic citizenship education, which is not separated from the country’s political democratisation.
Chapter 4: On the Nexus between Liberal Democratic Citizenship Education and Kenya’s System of Higher Education

This chapter examines the relationship between the liberal notions of democratic citizenship developed in Chapter 2, and how this can strengthen the conceptions of democratic citizenship education held by Kenya’s higher education. This understanding will shed additional light on the contrast between normative democratic citizenship education as depicted in Chapter 2, and that reviewed in Chapter 3. This chapter also identifies the differences between the ideal theoretical hybrid of hypothetical understandings of democratic citizenship education developed in Chapter 2, and the reality of democratic citizenship education that Kenya upholds as in Chapter 3, thereby establishing space for the reconceptualisation of Kenya’s higher education. The evidence of democratic citizenship education in higher education in Kenya will be constructed through an analysis of the political, economic and sociological ideologies and settings in which Kenyan higher education is conceptualised. The progressive reforms that have taken place in the system from independence to the current democratic dispensation will be examined – these include policies, governance, access, notions of equality and quality in higher education. This, I argue, will provide me with an understanding of Kenyan higher education in relation to democratic citizenship education. The analysis of Kenyan higher education will be assessed and examined on the basis of the democratic values depicted in Chapter two, namely deliberative action, justice, equality, human rights, communicative action, imaginative action and compassionate action, amongst others, and their implications within the Kenyan context.

Chapter 5: Democratic Citizenship Education against Ethnic Violence in Kenya

This chapter examines how a reconceptualised view of DCE possibly can countenance ethnic violence in Kenya by focusing on issues such as: firstly, to show what a reconceptualised idea of DCE involves; secondly, to explain how the ideas surrounding a reconceptualised notion of DCE assist in thinking differently about higher education in Kenya; thirdly, to explain the implications of a reconceptualised DCE for the conception of the university in Africa; and lastly, to provide a different understanding of the African university – one that can be socially and intellectually responsive to political and ethnic strife on the continent. This chapter addresses the sub-questions: What space might there be for DCE in becoming (a reconceptualised one) to help Kenyan higher education institutions address ethnic divisions in
the country? How can DCE in Kenyan higher education reshape ethnic identities and overcome ethnic tensions?

Chapter 6: Democratic Citizenship Education and its Implications for Pedagogy in Kenyan Higher Education

This chapter examines the implications of a reconceptualised view of DCE for pedagogy in Kenyan higher education – more specifically, teaching and learning.

Chapter 7: An Extended View of Democratic Citizenship Education: Potential Contributions to Kenyan University Academic Programmes

In this chapter I provide a synopsis of the research process and findings, and then elucidate the contributions this research makes to Kenyan universities, and finally offer recommendations for further research. Thus, the chapter wraps up how the current curriculum potentially can be modified to address issues of an extended conception of DCE and a view of a reconsidered Kenyan university.

1.8. Summary

In this introductory chapter I have presented the conceptual framework and methodological aspects of my research. I explored philosophy of education as an analytical design within the boundaries of an interpretive paradigm to examine liberal thought in deliberative democracy. I used deconstruction and conceptual analysis as methods to examine the notion of democratic citizenship education within the liberal tradition, before I considered the analysis of Kenyan higher education to understand the state and nature of democracy found in this context. This chapter also contains the historical background to, the motivation for this study, the problem and the chapter outline for this study. In the next chapter I analyse the concept of democratic citizenship education for a more plausible understanding of the concept.
Chapter Two

LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION

2.1. Introduction

This chapter is an investigation of meanings of DCE within the liberal views (Rawls, 1971; Habermas, 1987a &b; Benhabib, 2011). The analysis offers this dissertation an opportunity to gain insight into liberal thought and then to examine implications for democracy, citizenship and education. This chapter begins from the premise that a plausible conception of democratic citizenship education could aid in reconceptualising Kenyan higher education. The purpose of this chapter is to investigate and clarify the concept of democratic citizenship education (DCE) using the methods of analytical inquiry, including deconstruction and conceptual analysis. This inquiry involves an examination of the meaning of the concept DCE. The question asked in this section is: what is democratic citizenship education? This chapter will clarify what DCE is before answering the question on the implications it has for higher education in Kenya.

First, the concepts ‘democracy’, ‘citizenship’ and ‘education’ are described to illuminate the theory in which a liberal approach is examined. Second, based on the premise generated from the first argument, this chapter examines a conception of DCE within a liberal understanding. In this regard, Rawls’s public reason is explored to elucidate the concept of justice in conceptualising DCE. Benhabib’s (2011a:60) notion of democratic iteration is examined to shed additional light on the fundamental ‘right to have rights’ of every human being. I will examine Benhabib’s argument of reciprocal recognition of others, and to be recognised in return, as a moral aspect that should be granted legal protection in human communities. Benhabib (2011a:61) maintains that human rights are basic to the moral principles that protect the communicative freedom of individuals. I will examine how she relates the connection between the moral and juridical forms of human rights in order to locate how public engagement, sense of belonging and human interaction are depicted in her argument. Additionally, Habermas’s (1978) idea of communicative rationality is investigated with the intention to uncover a deliberative perspective of democratic citizenship. Third, I synthesise the understandings from these analyses for DCE.
Liberal theories of democratic citizenship education are considered for this analysis because they contain prominent ideas that highlight the notions of community, humanity and responsibility, and the interrelationships amongst people in the public sphere. These ideas promote dialogue, justice, respect, reasonableness, equality and the concern for one another in an attempt to co-exist in the public sphere. In addition to this, I examine how these notions contribute to democratic citizenship education. Liberal conceptions contain significant values in communities that inspire and restrain the choices of their individual members. Such values include liberty and equality and the underlying respect for human beings as independent choosers who base their entitlement on equal freedoms. These are anchored in a pattern of cooperation that allows people to live together in peace, despite the diversity of opinions or ideas (Charvet & Kaczynska-Nay, 2008:10). I consider liberal democratic citizenship education as an important concept that could engender reasonableness and collective dialogue in reaching a consensus to reduce ethnic violence and enhance healthy ethnic politics and equal distribution of public goods for Kenya as a country to thrive politically and educationally. It also is hoped that such a notion of democratic citizenship education would stimulate the Kenyan education system to produce critical thinkers and practical reasoners who would be politically mature enough to appreciate otherness in considering their citizenship, and that of others who might be different from them.

Furthermore, when the subject of education is examined, the implication is that education is meant for humans and that its democratic nature describes the kind of education that is offered to citizens. Before exploring the relationship between democracy, citizenship and education, I discuss some of the crucial concepts and ideas connected to these concepts.

2.2. Building the First Premise for Democratic Citizenship Education

In order to build a premise for the question on what democratic citizenship education is, I will examine the individual concepts separately in order to understand them and address the question. In keeping with Cahen (2001:13) on Derrida and the question of education, I use deconstruction to sharpen my understanding of the construct ‘democratic citizenship education’, that is, I will deconstruct ‘education’, ‘democracy’ and ‘citizenship’ to arrive at a

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2 I refer here to citizens, implying that this kind of education is a process that is carried out by and with humans, and that it explores humans and not things or other animals. It is done to [with, for, by] people. I want to stress this to show that democratic citizenship education is people-oriented education.
system of understanding these concepts to exhibit some of their foundations and to reconstruct new bases.

### 2.2.1. Democracy

Democracy is a process of public engagement that describes how humans interact with one another to reach decisions on a specific issue. Mafeje (1995:7) maintains that the concept of ‘democracy’ is as old as humankind itself; what has changed are the manifestations and conceptions of the various forms of democracy over various periods of time. Some forms of democracy enable freedom and equal participation, while others limit how people contribute to public decision making. Hoselitz (1956:1) sees democracy from two theoretical perspectives: first, the traditional theory, which is characterised by undifferentiating, authoritarian and particularistic characteristics, and secondly, the modern theory of democracy, as characterised by functionalism, differentiation, meritocracy and equalitarianism. He opines that traditional and modern theories of democracy are constructed on the basis of the attitudes, values and beliefs of particular cultures. Harber (1997:2) expounds that, from its traditional root in Greek, democracy refers to ‘rule by the people’. This understanding of democracy has been taken by many to mean autocratic rule that limits freedom of speech and religion. For Harber (1997:3), democracy emphasises reason, open-mindedness and fairness, and the practices of moderation, cooperation, bargaining, compromise and accommodation. Education framed by democratic concepts ought to contribute to a political culture that upholds the values of tolerance and mutual respect. This means treating everyone equally, regardless of their race, gender or ethnic origin, amongst other diversities.

Gutmann (2012:339) describes democracy as an inclusive and deliberate social propagation. In education, democracy ought to recognise the value of parental education, which promotes the good life and professional authority in enabling students to appreciate and evaluate ways of life different from what their parents offer, and also recognises the value of political education, which consist of participating in the rights and responsibilities of citizenship in democratic society. According to Gutmann (2012:340), democratic states need not discriminate; rather, they should allow all citizens who are educable to participate in shaping their future society. The democratic facet of education entails the ability of individuals to deliberate and participate in public education.
In his important works on democracy and education, Dewey (1916;115; 2012:229) maintains that a democratic society (education) is one ‘that makes provision for participation in its good of all its members on equal terms and which secures flexible readjustment of its institutions through interaction of the different forms of associated life’. Dewey uses a democratic societal way of life to shed more light on how such paradoxes can be used to innovate education in formal settings. Education as a social practice involves humans and the various ways in which they communicate in a community of life with one another. This process determines the kind of learning that becomes a community (Dewey, 1916:94). Dewey explains that education involves participation by participants who belong to a learning community of life (who are immature) in how to secure direction and method in learning. In other words, education in a democratic sense entails human association in societies with modes of associated life to bring to fruition the purposes of that association. That is to say, education, in a Deweyan sense, connotes transmission through communication as a process of sharing experience until it becomes a common possession. Education therefore will change the positions of those who participate in it through the kind of communication that goes on between them. The purpose of democratic education depends on the purpose of the community that engages in the communicative practice for educative purposes. Democratic education as a social process entails educational interactions among the members of a social group who share ideas and involve all members. The quality of education in a society depends on the participation, freedom and interactions of all members and the worth of the contributions they bring in their association with one another in public concerns. Flexibility and equality are rudiments that enhance the associated communication in democratic education. Democracy frames education in the sense in which it ‘offers individuals a personal interest in social relationships and control, and the habits of mind which secures social changes without introducing disorder’ (Dewey, 1916:144).

In the same manner, Waghid (2002:26) affirms Dewey’s (1916) exposition of democracy as a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience to advance current understandings of democracy as it relates to education. Elsewhere, Waghid (2009:24) expands on Dewey’s democracy as a mode of association with reasoned and moral discussion in political life, otherwise they might be rendered meaningless. This means that the association or the communication in society that is emphasised by Dewey is noted by Waghid as having to be ethical (moral) and thought through before engaging in public society. In the same vein, Scheffler (2003:345) agrees that moral education in a democratic sense needs to
emphasise the teaching of critical thinking skills that will enable students to participate in collectivities that create a sense of belonging in social arrangements determining free participation by all in a public review of policies, and also that the judgements be made by all who belong to that social organisation. He notes that this process requires the reasoned, persuasive and informed consent of the participants. In keeping with Waghid and Scheffler, Hansen (2008:19) maintains that democracy is a way of life that entails commitment to meaningful communication and necessitates an interest in learning from all one’s contacts in life. This suggests that democracy can neither operate nor develop if people remain private about their thinking in the public sphere. Scheffler (2003:345) adds that democracy is an open and a dynamic ideal – it is prone to critical evaluation in public forums by all stakeholders in order to effect change agreed upon by all concerned. In essence, democracy imagines extensive modes of communication, interactions and mutual agreements in communities through a rational process of argumentation.

Benhabib (1996:69) locates democracy as a model within institutions of society in a cooperative way to exercise power publicly. Benhabib’s notion of deliberative democracy describes the equality of individuals within a particular institution in which power is exercised in such a way that all stakeholders are participants. Walzer (1983:304) explicates democracy as an argumentation by citizens to persuade the largest number of citizens when making decisions. Habermas (1996) considers democracy as an emancipatory activity that provides spaces for rational deliberation. In this regard, citizens debate common problems, focusing on the relationships between economic growth and social culture. In essence, democracy is a process of people engaging with one another in matters of public concern for the purpose of justice for all.

2.2.2. Education

Education is a process of human interaction. It is a social and political process that leads to knowledge acquisition. Peters’s (1967:4-7) analysis of the concept of education indicates that education is a process of acquiring knowledge. This process involves human interactions that aid the understanding of the acquired knowledge and the ability to use it to affect the attitudes of individuals, thereby leading to some form of change and restoration that is of value. Education is a moral process that is value laden. Education is considered as a social process that involves human interaction for the acquisition of knowledge.
Peters (1967) argues that the validation of the morals and values of education is a contentious task, but that it is always defined by the kind of education, and the educational aims or desires that the system poses. In other words, to say one is educated does not depend only on the kind of knowledge that one acquires (inasmuch as this also is important), but also on the moral processes and the ability of one to transform the knowledge into actual values for which education exists, which qualifies the ‘educatedness’.

In situating education in the capability approach and social justice, Flores-Crespo (2007:45) analyses Sen’s (1985) and Martha Nussbaum’s (2000) human capability approaches to education as complementary to each other, but notes the inadequacies in each approach. She points out that both Sen’s and Nussbaum’s capability approach to education sees rationality as central to education in the development of human capabilities. Nussbaum identifies practical reasoning as one of the central capabilities of education. Flores-Crespo (2007:49) notes the similarity in Freire, Nussbaum and Sen’s conceptions of human beings as ‘responsible agents who can alter their destiny’. She notes that Paulo Freire’s perception of education is that ‘education becomes the means by which people can perceive, interpret, criticise and eventually, transform their reality, while Sen and Nussbaum have stressed the importance of individual agency and practical reason in the process of enlarging people’s freedoms’ (Flores-Crespo, 2007:49).

This view of education expands our understanding of how the concept of education has changed with time. Flores-Crespo (2007) further exposes the weakness of this view of education, namely that education appears to be under-theorised if it is considered in terms of Sen’s human capability approach. This approach assumes education to be a social opportunity, a valuable outcome, and a causality of freedom. Yet, according to Unterhalter (2001), education can be viewed as an achievement, as part of a process of an exercising agency and the recognition of one’s right to using these capacities. These arguments point to the fact that education is a complex process and cannot be explained in simplistic terms. Such sentiments fall in line with Banks’s (2008) depiction of the complex processes, such as means and ends of education. Understanding the concept ‘education’ in this way helps to situate and reconceptualise education as human interaction that encourages public engagement and cultivates a sense of belonging.

From another perspective, education is considered as meaningful human interaction only if it enables engagement and success for those who are marginalised and failed by schools
(Hattam, Brennan, Zippin & Comber, and 2009:1). In other words, education should embrace and address the problems of society, and especially that of injustice. Education needs to equip students with knowledge that empowers them to be part of a just society.

The meaning of education is dynamic and depends on the purpose for which education is conceptualised. Egéa-Kuehne (2001:187) advances a definition of education and describes the phenomenon of violence in economic, national and minority wars, and also the rampant occurrences of racism, xenophobia, ethnic conflicts and conflicts of culture and religion pulling apart the ‘democratic waves’ that exist the world over. The proliferation of these occurrences signals the need for educational change. In this sense, education is perceived as that which helps relinquish these disruptions of the peace, unity and harmony that ought to exist amongst people. As such, education is accorded the responsibility to overcome prejudice, racism, ethnocentrism and violence. Schools and higher education institutions therefore are assigned the responsibility of responding to these dilemmas.

In essence, Egéa-Kuehne (2001:188), following a Derridian concern, sees education as that which responds to the promise of quality education and the human right to quality education – as a response to the unprecedented increase in inequality, violence, injustice and violation of human rights in our societies – especially in Kenya, I would argue.

In addition, Standish, Smeyers and Smith (2006) argue that education can be considered as a therapeutic process. However, they note that this understanding comes with exceptions, namely that it detaches itself with ordinary economic overtones and recognises human existence [ethically] and the unforeseeable futures. In their seminal work, The Therapy of Education: Philosophy, Happiness and Personal Growth, Standish et al. (2006) put forward three considerations for understanding education as therapeutic, namely the enthusiastic advocates, the reactionaries and the pragmatists (see Mintz, 2009:642). Standish et al. (2006) argue that these three perspectives of viewing education as therapy are partial, since they differentiate what is effective from what is ineffective. They note that therapeutic education potentially can be viewed as such, if it bears axiology in education and/or looks like education. One such example they offer is that a therapist and a patient have an essential relationship, that of curing the patient. For therapy to happen, the relationships and techniques that can enable curing are necessary. In such a relationship, patients are encouraged to make independent and ethically informed choices (Standish et al. 2006:3). It is
this understanding of the patient-therapist relationship that they suggest can provide education the vocabulary necessary for describing education as therapy. They also note that therapeutic education lends education pedagogy – teaching and learning. In this way, education can be described as an ethical process that requires pedagogical techniques that potentially can steer the learners to acquire knowledge and skills. That is, therapy and education can provide a language for conceptualising education. They note that therapeutic language can enable attention being paid to the language of human existence, but also can be seductive and destructive. So, Standish et al. (2006:225) contend that education can be likened to therapy. Accordingly, education can allow learners to recognise the restrictions of notable hardships and to think of ways in which to avoid these hardships (Standish et al., 2006:227). In their view, therefore, the understanding of education has to delink ordinary purposes of schooling to consider the [im]possibilities of life. In this way, education can be considered for futures that avoid the current obsessions of describing education only in economic terms (Standish et al., 2006:141). The question remains: how can education assume these new responsibilities? I shall address this concern later on.

2.2.3. Citizenship

Citizenship depicts a sense of belonging. Yuval-Davis (2011:12) describes belonging as a social and a political construct. It entails three analytical aspects: first, social locations; second, people’s identification and emotional attachment to various collectivities and groupings; and third, the ethical and political value systems with which people judge their own and others’ belonging. Belonging in this sense depicts both geographical spaces and spaces of socialisation, and the identities and emotional attachment that people develop based on their various groups of identification and the morals and values that govern such relationships. Yuval-Davis (2011) points out that there is a political construction to the sense of belonging, in that the construction of boundaries, inclusion and exclusions are important ideas that frame belonging in such a way that power relations become trivial. I will not grapple with the details of the politics of belonging at the moment, as my concern is with how Yuval-Davis describes citizenship.

Osler and Starkey (2000:243; 2005:8) note that citizenship is contested in that citizens now have greater opportunities to act in new international contexts that are characterised by diversity. Citizenship describes the connections between our status and identities as individuals, and the lives and concerns of others with whom we share a sense of community.
Citizenship has been identified as a site of political struggle, and it has been understood essentially based on status and the practice of and entitlement to rights and, more importantly, a feeling of belonging (Osler & Starkey, 2005:9).

Yuval-Davis (2011:46) affirms Osler’s and Starkey’s (2000; 2005:8) view that the concept of citizenship has been contested and debated, both in political and sociological theory, and especially in feminist debates. The areas of debate entail, first, liberal theory, which claims the extent to which citizenship ought to be conceptualised in relation to an individual contractual relationship, for instance between the person and the state (Yuval-Davis, 2011:47). In this regard, citizenship is categorised as an abstract concept or as embodied in gender, class, ethnicity, sexuality, ability and stage of life in the life cycle. Second is the participatory view of citizenship as a reciprocal relationship – that of ‘rule and being ruled’. This kind of citizenship is governed by rights and responsibilities. The third view is the current view of citizenship, which recognises humans as belonging to a world republic. This understanding of citizenship considers it in relation to global civil society.

Yuval-Davis (2011:48) provides counterarguments to the idea of citizenship as conceptualised in the nation state and refers to Benhabib’s claim that national citizenship is an obsolete and misleading ‘closed society’ way of engendering citizenship. She also discusses a similar view by Walby, who says that current global trends facilitate citizenship as membership in different kinds of polities. Yuval-Davis claims that, despite Walby’s contention about global citizenship, nation-state citizenship still plays an important role in viewing citizenship as a sense of belonging, since the state provides fundamental entitlements and rights.

Yuval-Davis (2011:46-79) indicates that citizenship has been constructed on a variety of notions based on political rights, civil rights and socio-economic rights, cultural rights, spatial security rights and citizenship duties and responsibilities. Modern interpretations of citizenship are based on active/activist citizenship as a result of the struggle for freedom and democracy; and the utilisation of technology, which is prohibited in some states in the Middle East. There also is the intimate citizenship that arises from sexual rights brought about by porous state borders, consumer citizenship in skirmishing for free markets, multicultural citizenship as a result of plural societies, racism or multi-layered citizenship (Yuval-Davis, 2011:68). The complexity of citizenship is alarming; however, the recognition that
citizenship has risen as both an idea and an ontological need for a sense of belonging is my major concern in this chapter.

Education for citizenship should prepare students to deal with both the local and wider global political and social realities that face society today. From a pedagogical perspective, education ought to create a sense of belonging in the micro-spaces, locations, social interactions and contents that students learn. It pictures universities as locations for creating a sense of belonging in relation to how students learn, why they learn and what they learn. It ought to open spaces and public interactions that can help students deal with societal ills that influence their sense of belonging. In essence, universities provide ground for developing students’ sense of belonging at the university community level, the regional and macro-national, and the global level. In this sense, education ought to acknowledge the human need for belonging.

2.2.4. The Advocacy Argument for Democratic Citizenship Education

Democratic citizenship education describes human interaction, which involves a form of engagement that creates a sense of belonging. DCE has been an on-going concern in politics, colonialism and history and in cultural and socio-economic circles (Banks, 2008:129). DCE has received much attention and has been defined in diverse ways. Harris (2005:46) is of the view that democratic citizenship education is not just a matter of learning the basic facts about the institutions and procedures of political life, but that it also involves acquiring a range of dispositions, virtues and loyalties that are immediately bound up with the practice of democratic citizenship. In his examination of what democratic citizenship entails, Harris (2005:46), citing the British Advisory Group on Citizenship (1998:11) and Council of Europe (2004:3), writes that

Political literacy and a critical understanding of democracy and democratic political institutions and systems are key components of citizenship education. However, in addition to strengthening knowledge of political systems, citizenship education should foster respect for law, justice, democracy and nurture common good at the same time as encouraging independence of thought. It should develop skills of reflection, enquiry and debate … It should favour mutual understanding, intercultural dialogue, solidarity, gender equality and harmonious relations within and among peoples.
The above quotation points to the fact that, to some extent, DCE has the human capability elements attributed to education, as depicted previously in Flores-Crespore’s analysis. Waghid (2005b:55) concurs with Harris’s depiction above and accentuates that DCE should be grounded in compassionate imaginative action that encompasses multicultural dimensions of human diversity. This means exposing students to a fundamental perception of the histories and cultures of various groups of people, including major religious and cultural groups as well as marginalised ethnic, racial, gendered and social majorities. This is necessary because it triggers a sense of respect among citizens for others who are different from them and yet occupy the same space as they do. In terms of Waghid’s idea, DCE enables citizens in a public space to enter the life-world of others, who may be the same or different from them, through the stories they tell. This develops imaginative action. The action arises when respect develops through listening, understanding and speaking. Waghid (2005b) suggests that this imaginative action may help students to delve deeper into the inner voices of others’ feelings, experiences, despair, suffering and oppression, and lead to civic reconciliation and compassion.

Waghid (2008:197) argues, from a South African perspective, that DCE is stronger when friendship is encompassed within the education system. Waghid notes that democracy and citizenship co-exist because democracy supports education. When citizens engage in the educational process, the outcome learners exhibit reveals the nature of the learning to which they are exposed. One of the outcomes of DCE is the establishment of an environment in which people can communicate their opinions freely and in which they are amenable to others’ views – without necessarily accepting people’s opinions or imposing theirs on others – as a reciprocal act of respect irrespective of differences. This, he asserts, creates ample spaces for dialogue. Waghid further notes that DCE should first recognise cultural, linguistic, ethnic, race and religious commonalities and then address differences. He emphasises that this creates civic space for sharing our commonalities in the face of the differences of others who otherwise might be considered threatening to our own. He argues that such acknowledgement helps us to create spaces to publicly show these differences and to be able to generate cohesion to engage dialogically with others who have opposing cultural views. Therefore, from Waghid’s (2005b) viewpoint, the underlying idea is that democratic citizenship education ought to acknowledge differences, otherness, dialogism, respect, reciprocity and friendship in order for people from diverse backgrounds to co-exist in civic spaces – a demonstration of what he calls ‘democratic justice’. Banks (2008), who writes
from a Canadian perspective, shares the same concerns as Waghid and insists that, for a better theorisation of DCE, democratic justice should be expanded to include and accommodate cultural rights for citizens from diverse racial, ethnic and language groups.

Banks (2008) further calls for group-differentiated rights rather than just individual rights in order to accommodate the variety of citizens we find as a result of globalisation and migration, and the tenacity of the nationalism that has brought controversies into the citizenship education debates. Banks’s study further illustrates the complexity and ambiguity that has cropped up in the understanding of citizenship. He recognises how narrowly the concept of citizenship has been constructed thus far, especially in the way it is associated with the rights, privileges and duties that link one to a nation state, and the demands for loyalty and allegiance to the government. He advocates for a more robust, inclusive view of citizenship that embraces the civil, political and social dimensions of citizenship. Thus, he argues for a more cultural and multicultural citizenship education that recognises and respects cultural democracy and promotes the equality of all citizens. As such, he criticises historical and contemporary notions of assimilative liberal democracy that neglect, or eliminate, cultural values and identities, such that those citizens who are regarded as different are then swallowed up by the mainstream culture. However, he upholds a multicultural liberal DCE that has regard for all and builds citizenship based on diversity to enrich the nation state. This, he argues, is possible when the commonalities of citizens are used as the starting point for deliberations in educational settings in order to enter into dialogue about the differences, while learning diversity within the classroom. This is a notion that Banks finds very useful for an effective and transformational view of citizenship education.

Different conceptions of democracy and citizenship frame how democratic citizenship is enacted in the education system. According to liberal thought, for instance, democratic citizenship is mostly conceptualised within individual liberties, thereby encouraging educators to emphasise individual knowledge, skills and values that pertain to the protection of both the learners’ and educators’ rights (Ho, Sim & Alviar-Martin, 2011:226). Banks

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3 Banks (2008:129) taps into this notion of Marshall (1965), and it is a concept that he argues has been used by many scholars to conceptualise citizenship. The civic aspects of citizenship provide citizens with individual rights such as freedom of speech, the right to own property and equality before the law. The political aspects give citizens franchise and the opportunity to exercise political power by participating in the political process. The social element provides citizens with the health, education and welfare needed to participate fully in their cultural communities and in the national civic culture. He notes that these three aspects are interrelated and overlap with the ideal of nation states, but are never completely attained.
(2008) extends this further to indicate that this knowledge, skills and values being taught should allow transformation and effectiveness in enabling citizens to deal with all contexts; including the cultural communities they come from, the nation state and the global community. This kind of education, according to Banks (2008), enables citizens to think beyond cultural boundaries to a more cosmopolitan perspective that enables them to enact justice and equality. Ho et al. (2011:226) acknowledge that current democratic citizenship models in education tend to concentrate attention on cultural diversity and monetary disparities on the basis of social justice. Put differently, education systems today need to focus on dealing with the diversity of contexts and also the recognition and redistribution of economic resources to citizens toward an equal and just society.

In keeping with the aforementioned, DCE explicates people’s engagement, sense of belonging and human interaction concerning matters of public concern. On the basis of this understanding I will analyse Rawls’s public reason, Habermas’s communicative rationality and Benhabib’s democratic iteration to examine how they view engagement, belonging and interaction in order to develop a liberal understanding of DCE.

2.3. Analysing Democratic Citizenship Education

In this section I examine the understandings of Rawls, Benhabib and Habermas to determine how they feed into democratic citizenship education. To do this, I build on the previous exposition to ask three questions to guide my analysis of the conceptions of DCE within public reason, communicative rationality and democratic iteration. These questions are: first, how do Rawls, Habermas and Benhabib view engagement, belonging and interaction? Second, what is the purpose of DCE obtainable from their ideas? And finally, what is DCE in a liberal view?

2.3.1. Rawls’s Public Reason as Justice

Rawls’s public reason describes how people engage with one another within the public sphere for the purpose of justice. Rawls’s conception of justice is demonstrated in his book, A Theory of Justice, published in 1971. Rawls (1971) describes justice as a symmetric moral assessment of social circumstances that require public reason. Rawls views engagement as public reasoning that is conducted in a community of people who belong together. This engagement occurs in a just and fair manner. Rawls’s justice entails equal liberty, equal
opportunities and redress as explicated in the principles of justice guiding the basic structure of society. He considers engagement as an ethical concern. According to Rawls, DCE should help individuals to acknowledge the rights of others and ensure justice for all.

**Democratic citizenship education as a deliberative process**

In Rawlsian terms, deliberation refers to a just and procedural communicative process of public decision-making guided by principles of justice. Rawls argues that, for decision making to be fair, the principles of justice are to guide the process of deliberation and everyone concerned in collective decision making, and requires that the ‘original position’ [initial situation] be characterised by stipulations that are widely accepted by all who are concerned. However, Rawls (1999:21) says that there is some difficulty in making rational choices in reaching a general agreement on an original position. As such, Rawls says that the original position should be characterised by equality and redress. Equality is considered in the allocation of basic rights and duties; redress is illustrated in the sense in which there is compensation for injustices for the benefit of citizens who are economically and socially disadvantaged (Rawls, 1999:15).

**Cooperation and community**

Rawls describes communities as cooperative relationships that create a sense of belonging. A community is a group of people who belong together and are driven to live for justice for all who belong. When communities make laws and decisions that guide them, they do so by engaging in a social contract that they all understand through public reasoning. Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness is an alternative theory of justice. It is a contract theory that claims justice in communities. He depicts a collective view of justice as fairness. In developing this theory, Rawls critiques the utilitarian view of justice as individualistic and advances the contract theory of justice as pluralistic. In other words, he critiques an individualistic perspective of moral justice that reflects complexity in groups, society and in public systems so that individual rights are considered just when the good is extended to those who co-exist. This process of decision making that Rawls proposes is geared to benefit primarily the disadvantaged members of a society for whom justice is considered as fair. This is a theory that ethically values the right of maximising the good.
Rawls’s (1971) public reason is an ideal and just concept for basic social institutions [higher education] that illustrates the core of the democratic values of freedom and equality for all citizens. He provides an ideal description of justice that is suitable for educational institutions [society]. Rawls’s views on public reason show how people who are free and equal are capable of realistically accepting the same conception of justice. The following aspects reflect upon the way in which Rawls explicates this possibility to agree based on the principles of justice.

**The principles of justice**

Rawls uses the two principles of justice to describe how public reasoning can be conducted to facilitate engagement, a sense of belonging and human interaction. The principles of justice that Rawls provides are for the basic structure of society that regulates the allotment of rights and duties in institutions for both the benefit and burden of human interactions and their sense of belonging. The institutions Rawls describes are a community system of rules, which distinguishes offices and positions with their rights, duties, powers and immunities. Rawls (1971:55) argues that the implementation of institutional policies facilitates public reason, and that the results they produce determine whether the policies are just or not.

The principles of justice proposed by Rawls (1971:56) apply to human interactions that are understood to be public. He says that specific principles should be decided upon by all who are part of the institutions. This is to be accomplished in such a way that all who engage in the institutional decision-making process are aware of the constitution they are part of producing. This is made public to all participants, who then will abide by the stipulated rules, knowing their consequences or obligations.

**2.3.1.1. The principle of greatest equal liberty**

The principle of greatest equal liberty, also known as the first principle, pronounces constitutional limits on democratic government. This principle states that ‘[e]ach person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others’ (Rawls, 1971:60). This principle indicates that the social systems that outline and secure equal liberties of citizenship and those that establish social and economic inequalities are to succumb to the principle of equal liberty.
This principle distinguishes aspects of a social system that define and secure the equal liberties of citizenship, and those that establish social and economic inequalities. The basic structure of liberties within a political context include the right to vote and to be eligible to run for public office, freedom of speech and assembly, liberty of conscience and freedom of thought, freedom of the person, along with the right to hold (personal) property, and freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined by the rule of law (Rawls, 1971:61). These liberties are considered to be equal within a just society.

Equal liberty can describe a person’s social position and sense of citizenship. This principle also creates spaces for individuals to have the confidence and self-worth, as well as the opportunity, to develop their abilities, to interact freely in expressing their opinions and to live in a desirable egalitarian society. Such liberties also enable individuals not to hold back their opinions and ideas because they are accorded the liberty of equal opportunities. These forms of liberties that Rawls describes enable one to have a sense of belonging, since one decides for the benefit of others. This also suggests that, in a situation in which such rights are denied, alienation, division, conflict and even unforgiving attitudes may follow.

What makes Rawls’s theory imperative is that he capitalises upon liberties he considers essential, valuable and fundamental. In a moral sense, Rawls’s starting point in the moral state of basic liberties that depict the attributes of those looked upon as democratic citizens is a conception of moral good. These principles are essential in enabling individuals to be free and fair in the process of developing judgments relating to others with whom they seek equality. This principle of equality exemplifies the capacity for a sense of justice and the capacity for the conception of good that are envisioned in an egalitarian society. These capacities are moral choices that Rawls draws from traditional moral philosophy. Therefore, this can enable people to think critically, rationally and reasonably when making ethical [moral] judgments in relation to what he argues for in justice as fairness in the original position of equality for all. These moral abilities enable individuals to have the capacity to make rational and reasonable judgments and to choose the right thing to do (Freeman, 2003:5). This moral ability, in turn, depicts the reciprocal act of appreciation and respect for others in a demonstration of democratic citizenry in their perception of a good life. The following is the second principle of justice.
2.3.1.2. **The principle of equality of opportunity and difference**

The principle of equality of opportunity and difference is also referred to as the second principle of justice and deals with distributive justice and redress. It states, ‘[s]ocial and economic inequalities are arranged so that they a) reasonably expected to be everyone’s advantage, and b) attached to positions and offices open to all’ (Rawls, 1971:61). This principle applies to wealth and income and to the design of organisations that utilise differences in authority and responsibility, or chains of command. Rawls notes that the distribution of wealth and income needs not be equal, but must be to everyone’s advantage (Rawls, 1971:61). At the same time, positions of authority and offices must be accessible to all. This second principle can be applied by holding a position open and yet subject to this constraint, which arranges social and economic inequalities so that everyone benefits.

Rawls (1971:61) maintains that the application of these principles must be arranged in a serial order, with the first principle coming before the second principle. Thus, the distribution of income, wealth and authority must be consistent with both the liberties of equal citizenship and equality of opportunity. Rawls (1971:62) rationalises that ‘all social values as liberty, opportunity, income and wealth are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these values is to everyone’s advantage’. In this statement, he suggests that there is an amount of permissible inequality if it is geared to benefit all. In understanding what Rawls is saying, I suggest that equality is a difficult target for implementing justice; however, it minimises opportunities for extreme injustice. If a situation presents itself in which an unequal distribution of social values is to be made, and in doing this everyone will benefit, then justice can be counted as fairness.

Rawls argues that injustice is inequality and not beneficial to all. Therefore, a conception of justice does not necessarily impose restrictions on the type of inequalities permissible – it only requires that everyone’s position be improved.

2.3.1.3. **Democratic equality**

Democratic equality refers to equal opportunities in public engagement. Rawls’s (1971:73) principles of justice illustrate democratic equality in the sense in which he advocates that those with similar abilities and skills should have similar opportunities in life. Therefore, the distribution of natural assets to those with the same level of talents and ability and the same
willingness to use them should have the same prospects of success, regardless of their initial place in the social system, and regardless of income and the class into which they were born (Rawls, 1971:73). Democratic equality also suggests that equal liberty and equality of opportunity occur when those who are better situated are just if and only if they work as part of the scheme that improves the expectations of the least advantaged members of society (Rawls, 1971:75). As such, ‘social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged and b) attached to offices, positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity’ (Rawls, 1971:83).

The second principle, nonetheless, denotes democratic equality as a remedy for a society in which injustices reign, and for an egalitarian society to be created. In other words, when those in more favourable positions operate in such a way that they can improve the situations of those who are in disadvantaged situations, the second principle of justice makes sense. This also means that any social and economic inequalities need to be addressed in such a way that the least advantaged can have various positions open to them. Therefore, equal opportunities benefit all members of society.

Rawls (1971) argues that steps such as investing in education and resources at an early stage may be a good start to rejuvenate societies with the intention of restoring justice. He notes that such acts will require cooperation and collaboration in order to put together a set of public rules and expectations to help restore such justice in education. Rawls (1971:92) maintains that primary social goods [education] are all that a rational person wants in order to advance the greater good to a greater end. Rawls explains that equal citizenship is a relevant social position defined by rights and liberties. Within this context, this may mean that society’s social policies should depict equal citizenship.

The inequalities found in societies prompt an egalitarian understanding of justice. For Rawls, the principle of equality also depicts redress. As such, inequalities at birth and natural endowment are undeserved and are to be compensated. However, in order to provide genuine equality of opportunity, all persons need to be treated equally, despite the state in which they are born. Society must pay more attention to those with fewer natural assets and those born into less favourable social positions (Rawls, 1971:100). To this end, it may mean that more resources have to be allocated to the education of the less intelligent than to that of the more intelligent for a period of time until there is balance and an attainment of a sense of self-
worth (Rawls, 1971:101). Therefore, different principles express a conception of reciprocity. Social order can be justified to everyone, and in particular those least favoured. This process requires collaboration, and cooperation as a set of public rules and expectations ensures that those with prospects of improving their lives do what the system dictates and are rewarded (Rawls, 1971:103).

Rawls therefore suggests that a particular conception of justice interferes with the way in which freedoms, duties and rights are accorded in societies. He observes that, even though societies are accompanied by social cooperation and similar interests and identities, destabilising conflicts may follow if there are no basic guiding rules. In such a situation, Rawls offers a set of principles that he contends are necessary to provide ‘a way of assigning rights and duties in basic institutions of society’ (Rawls, 1971:124), which he calls ‘justice as fairness’.

Rawls again emphasises that, for societies to be just in their social cooperation, they need to be aware of just systems by which the principles guiding their understanding of the concept are constructed, and that everyone in such a society should be aware of the system and the principles that define just decisions. Therefore, any distribution of duties, freedoms and rights is acknowledged and guided by these principles of justice for the benefit of every member of society. However, it is clear that Rawls is aware that no society that is as well ordered as the one he proposes indeed exists, despite the fact that the principles of justice in their serial order as he proposes are able to guide society to this end, even in its differences and diversity of opinions. Thus, every member needs to acknowledge, or be aware of, the principles of justice that define his/her society/community. As such, the principles of justice agreed upon by everyone in the original position guide the distribution of rights, duties and freedoms.

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4 Rawls notes that a basic feature of democracy is the fact of reasonable pluralism – the fact that a plurality of conflicting reasonable comprehensive doctrines – (religious, philosophical and moral) are the normal result of its culture and free institutions; as long as we live in a free society we should expect the diversity of conflicting and irreconcilable doctrines, yet he still believes that there can be some common ground between these different comprehensive doctrines that he calls an ‘overlapping consensus’, a notion closely related to his theory of public reason. In addition, what unites people should be sensitivity about political justice (Gencoglu-Onbasi, 2011:441).

5 Rawls (1971:120) defines original position as ‘a purely hypothetical situation’. He explains that the conception of original position is not intended to explain human conduct except in so far as it tries to account for our moral judgments and helps to explain our having a sense of justice. Thus, he affirms that justice as fairness is a theory of our moral sentiments and is manifested in our considered judgments in reflective equilibrium. Rawls notes that, even though this conception is part of the theory of conduct, it does not follow at all that there are actual situations that resemble it. He also terms original position as ‘the most favoured, or standard, interpretation’. Rawls depicts original position as one in which people are ignorant of social status, inability, fortunes and even
Rawls further identifies that agreeing to the concepts of justice is not enough for a viable human community in which other problems might hinder this process of agreement, vis-à-vis coordination, efficiency and stability.

2.3.1.4. Respect and reciprocity

Respect and reciprocity refer to moral ethical principles that guide the deliberation and justice process in the public sphere. Rawls understands justice as a moral good when it is fair – that is, fairness in the distribution of liberty, freedom, duty and equality. In addition, Rawls (1971:388) stresses the good of self-respect over income and wealth. For Rawls, to give respect to oneself is to give all persons their inherently due respect, not because of what they offer or what they have done, but by virtue of being human. Therefore, Rawls recognises the value and dignity of human beings as worthy of respect, regardless of their social, political or economic status. Zink (2011:331) notes that there is substantial agreement among scholars and critics of Rawls’s theory that self-respect plays an important role in maintaining stability in any liberal democratic society. It is when one recognises a sense of self-worth that one is able to transfer the same respect in communication with others. As such, respect becomes a reciprocal act of justice from one’s ability to recognise autonomously the need for respect that one can then offer others.

In essence, Rawls’s (1971) theory of justice, from the perspective of moral philosophy, embraces justice in communities. For such justice to be experienced, Rawls suggests an egalitarian notion of justice as fairness by using two guiding principles. He notes that, for justice to occur in society, there is a need for deliberation, reciprocity and mutual self-respect among those who live in the public sphere. Another thing that makes Rawls’s theory plausible is its deviation from the traditional understanding of justice that does not consider human interaction, sense of belonging and engagement as a collective concern for society’s responsibility.

intelligence. He identifies it as the ‘veil of ignorance’ in which the principles of justice are preferred. From the foregoing, therefore, Rawls argues for the original position 1) as equality in the assigning of basic rights and duties, that it 2) holds that social economic injustices are just if they result in compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged in the society. Liberties have to be distributed equally and, 3) as good political order, it entails injustices as fairness – in the equal distribution of settings necessary for all this good (also see www.bookrags.com.biography/john-rawls/).
2.3.2. Habermas’s Communicative Rationality

The concept of communicative rationality refers to the interaction of two or more competent speakers and actors who can initiate interpersonal relations (Habermas, 1987b:86). These actors pursue an understanding of the particular situation; they do this by negotiating with one another by way of providing valid reasons in order to reach an agreement. Important to this is the interpretation of the central concept of action. The negotiations that take place during this process are crucial because they will determine the model in which a consensus is determined. Habermas maintains that this process gives language a prominent role. In keeping with Habermas’s notion (1987b:4), Pusey (1987:70) affirms that Habermas’s intention with the theory of communicative action is to develop ‘a model that will show how rationality manifests in ordinary social interaction, communication between speaking and acting subjects’.

Habermas (1987a) is of the opinion that only teleological concepts developed in the tradition of Mead, Garfinkel, Parson and Durkheim offer spaces for a concept of rationality of action. This means that communicative action is understood on the assumption that language as a medium of speech can be used to show how people relate to and reflect on the world in which they live (Habermas, 1987b:94). He notes that communicative action presupposes language as a medium of unconstrained communication, whereby speakers and listeners alike can interpret and understand one another in the context of their reinterpreted life world. This refers simultaneously to things in their objective, social and subjective world in order to negotiate common definitions of the situation.

Given the centrality of communicative action, Habermas’s proposition for communicative rationality addresses the concern of how language has the ability to coordinate action in a consensual and cooperative way, as opposed to one that is forced or manipulated. In other words, Habermas posits how the use of language in contexts of interaction could produce mutual agreement on a course of action. Therefore, the capacity to force agreement can be shown in the possibility of acting communicatively. Habermas (1987a) is not concerned with how arguments are conducted to rationally assess claims of truth or of rightness. He is concerned with the realistic presumptions that competent speakers and actors make in trying to reach agreement on disputed claims with others. He considers as communicative action ‘those linguistically mediated interactions in which all participants pursue illocutionary aims,
and only illocutionary aims, with their mediating acts of communication’ (Habermas, 1987a:19). Conversely, he regards as linguistically mediated strategic action those interactions in which at least one of the participants wants to produce perlocutionary\(^6\) effects with his speech that will influence understanding of the illocutionary acts.\(^7\)

Habermas (1987a:286) contends that the ‘communicative’ use of language to reach agreement in the ‘original mode’ is dependent on ‘strategic’ and ‘parasitic’ use of language. This means that for communication to lead to understanding, it should be organised to do so. In order to advance this contention, Habermas borrows from Austin’s distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary effects. Illocutionary effects of speech are said to be effects created by the speaker, while the perlocutionary effects are the effects created by what the hearer does in response to the speaker’s words (illocutionary effects) (Habermas, 1987a:289). Thus, the perlocutionary effects (in the hearer) produce some form of action as a response to the speaker’s illocutionary effects. This process requires certain predispositions and abilities in both the speaker and the hearer in order to produce worthwhile illocutionary and perlocutionary effects for a successful communicative act. This enables the intended or original intentions of the communicative goal to be realised, thereby reaching an agreement.

In the same vein, the predispositions, prejudices and presuppositions that democratic citizens hold prior to deliberation require subjectation to certain cognitive criticisms and capabilities in order to make informed judgments. To be able to do this, citizens need to analyse critically and rationally what stakeholders want to put across or achieve in order to reach an agreement. For such actions to happen, clear communication and understanding are needed to facilitate negotiations for a consensus on the problem at hand. The appropriate action here is that of understanding what is constructed communicatively. Such analytical abilities help to validate logical capabilities for a stakeholder to give a candidate reasons that will withstand scrutiny, and validate the speech and actions that follow (Habermas, 1987b:18). The stakeholder’s

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\(^6\) Perlocutionary effects are those acts of speech performed as a result of a speech act. They are the actions taken by audiences as a result of speech acts. For instance, in communicative rationality one might give a command or a warning, and the actions of the hearers as a result of the warning or command can be referred to as perlocutionary effects. Habermas (1787a:289) uses this linguistic philosophy to illustrate that communication that leads to understanding is that which causes action as a result of the acts of speech (illustration adapted from [http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/perlocutionary](http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/perlocutionary), [http://grammar.about.com/od/pq/g/perlocutionary.htm](http://grammar.about.com/od/pq/g/perlocutionary.htm)).

\(^7\) Illocutionary acts as used by Habermas mean acts performed by the speaker or writer by uttering certain words in order to steer communication towards a path of justice towards the other; they are acts of communication that trigger action from those who are listening to the speech act. Meaning adapted from [Collins English complete and unabridged dictionary] (2003), retrieved online [http://www.thefreedictionary.com/illocution](http://www.thefreedictionary.com/illocution).
ability to assess reasons for actions and speech is fundamental in order to reach a mutual contract or an anticipated ending. Thus, the concept of rationality must extend beyond the question of rationality of assertions and/or teleological actions, and also should include a wider range of contexts in which validity claims are raised and redeemed.

On this score, DCE needs to be conceptualised in such a way that the content students learn is depicted in a language that will aid better communication. For students to reach an understanding within learning communities, there is a need to learn both the skills of communication and the ability to communicate. Education as a social practice can be achieved when participants adopt an attitude oriented to reaching understanding and not only success (Habermas, 1987a:286). In this manner, understanding is regarded as the mechanism for coordinating actions (Habermas, 1987a:287).

Communicative action explicates how rationality can be a valuable concept for DCE. Being able to communicate by providing reasons in pedagogical encounters and in educational planning and management can improve the understanding of education for democratic citizenry. Habermas asserts that the clarity of rationality claims differs depending on their organisational features. The claim of true statements and rightness of action requires validation, to which claims to truthfulness are not subject. Habermas indicates that this communication process requires that participants be free to raise and challenge claims without fear of coercion, intimidation and deceit, and to have equal chances to speak, make assertions, express themselves and make logical argument to challenge others. This process of communication must be relevant to the problem at hand and must provide valid reasons, as well as having an open mind to accepting criticism.

Habermas’s consensus is not predetermined by the ‘original position’ as in Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness, but is constructed through speech. However, in a situation in which people cannot reach consensus by way of argumentation, then consensus can be reached through voting. In this process, deliberation must yield a majority that does not discourage the views of minorities. However, should the minority have a better reason for reversing the agreed upon temporary consensus, then they are given the opportunity to offer their reasons without exclusion.
2.3.2.1. Culture and communicative rationality: indicators for democratic citizenship education

Culture plays an important role in how communicative communities engage with one another to reach consensus. Rationality embedded in cultural values will enhance cognition for dispositions to arrive at an understanding of and a consensus on just laws that guide societies. Habermas (1987b:136) notes that culture is integral to understanding subjects in communicative practice. In the process of communication, subjects may tell their stories from their cultural background as a way of providing justification for their understanding of the problem under discussion. This manner of reasoning allows participants to locate themselves in the life worlds from which they originate and which inform their understanding of a particular problem. As such, it provides a platform from which interaction can be sustained with all stakeholders as a way of providing reasons for the choice they support to achieve a particular consensus. Allowing cultural stories to be told in decision making may include those that might be excluded from communal decision making. In line with this argument, the notion of rationality as a basis for ascertaining communicative action suggests a particular form of liberalism – a participatory one. Habermas’s (1987b:134) conception of good in a cultural sense requires a conception of a collective right to cultural survival as opposed to individual rights assigned by some traditional liberal thought. Habermas stresses the need to accentuate the meaning of the consensually justified principles that are to be constructed in compliance with cultural and traditional values without pathological tendencies. In other words, Habermas suggests that stories from diverse cultures be shared in order to promote participation by all and to sustain cultures, not in the sense of practising the culture in its entirety, but to learn from the good that cultures provide and discard what is irrelevant for contemporary concerns. In this sense, cultures are sustained for their moral good, while at the same time including voices that might otherwise be silenced by excluding cultural narratives.

Culture has an important place in deciding what constitutes a good life. Therefore, a communicative process in a liberal sense should view cultural values as normative in decision making. This means that, if cultures are to survive, they must co-exist with the current discourses on democracy and freedoms; and people must make a significant effort to understand the values and cultures of others.

Communicative action describes mutual understanding as a means to transmit and renew cultural knowledge; it coordinates action for social integration and establishes solidarity,
acting as a socialisation process in the formation of personal identities (Habermas, 1987b:137). Communicative action therefore is enabled by cultural knowledge that facilitates cooperation and the integration of different perspectives in order for every individual in communicative societies to develop a sense of belonging [developing a sense of self in relation to others]. In essence, DCE conceptualised in a cultural sense will enhance cultural knowledge, integrate different world views and create a social platform that enables individuals to develop a sense of belonging.

In summary, Habermas’s central argument in communicative action is focused on reaching mutual understanding of inter-subjective relationships between individuals who are socialised through communication and reciprocally recognise one another. Habermas contrasts communicative reason with subject-centred reason and the possibility of communicative reason in the life world. Communicative rationality, according to Habermas, establishes the possibility that we can understand each other and agree on a course of action that is acceptable to all concerned. This happens when stakeholders engage in argumentation as a way of persuading each other so that they are all in a better position to agree. Therefore, Habermas’s consensus is not determined before argumentation. He holds the view that consensus needs to emerge from the deliberation process. In essence, DCE ‘ought’ to be configured as a communicative process that engenders universities as communities and public places that require deliberative rationality, cultural compliance and understanding through constructive consensus.

Habermas’s communicative action incorporates what is lacking in Rawls’s justice as fairness. Rawls is concerned with procedural justice and its guiding principles, while Habermas is actually concerned with what happens during deliberation. Whereas Rawls recognises deliberation as the core element that leads to agreement on the original position for equal liberty, Habermas shows how complex the real speech situation is during the deliberation process, despite freedom of speech, and that such opportunities do not guarantee that a consensus will be reached. Habermas shows that each individual has the capacity to communicate; however, how one communicates is what results in an understanding that ultimately leads to an agreement. He shows how speech situations can rationally be used to reach a mutual agreement when all speakers involved are able to understand one another and reach a consensus, which is the purposive action for communication. Habermas’s consensus is constructed in the process of deliberation, an aspect that Rawls does not explain. Therefore,
the rationality of Habermas illustrates the realities of society and calls for inclusion during speech situations in order to reach widely accepted decision.

Despite the fact that Habermas’s methodology and philosophical approach to communicative action provide an egalitarian space for citizens to communicate freely and with openness, they fall short when he assumes that all persons are self-directed and could rationally articulate persuasive arguments in the context of public deliberations. Consequently, deliberation in public spaces requires that individuals are prepared cognitively to generate reasons for problematic situations and, if not, that there is a sense of exclusion that comes with his view – that of internal exclusion (Young, 2003). According to Young (2003:52), this kind of exclusion refers to ways in which some people may lack effective opportunities to influence the thinking of others, even if they were given the opportunity and procedures to participate in discussions. In other words, it may exclude those who do not think critically by offering candidates reasons for problem solving even when access to decision making is open to all. Habermas assumes that everyone in society can offer valid reason for all decision making; however, Young shows how diverse society is in the sense that there are those in society who are more articulate in contributing to debates in public domains than others, and there are those whose voices are heard in relation to particular decision making, depending on the problem at hand, yet there are those who stay in the background whose ideas are never heard. Habermas does not deal with this group of people. He only depicts those who can articulate rationally in deliberations. Young (2003:56) further explains that the reason why some people’s ideas might be excluded from decision making is not because of what they say, but how they say what they say. In this case, Young (2003) provides an inclusive approach to using narratives, rhetoric and greetings to provoke and trigger others to communicate in such a way that they are understood in ways that argument alone cannot do.

I therefore argue that both Rawls’s justice as fairness and Habermas’s critical theory are necessary for constructing democratic citizenship education. Education constructed in Rawlsian and Habermasian terms places it as a social, political, rational and just practice. These theories show that education is a humane practice and requires social justice and communicative rationality for understanding different life worlds and systems.

I shall argue why Habermasian theory can be considered as a form of democratic citizenship education as complementary to Rawls. Habermas draws from both communicative and
procedural understandings in his discussion of liberalism. He depicts a liberalism conjoined with a theory of social behaviour and communicative action and advances to principle-based accounts of moral and procedural accounts of law and justice. Habermas reframes liberalism in the light of both social-behavioural and liberal democratic-constitutional understandings of communication and justice respectively (Johnston, 2012:110-111).

Communicative rationality accounts for deliberative processes in democratic citizenship education. Habermas’s perspectives on communicative action reveal the role higher education ‘ought’ to play in the state and community to develop students’ rational capacity and dispositions to communicate in matters of the public sphere [democratic citizenry]. Habermas (1987b) shows that it is necessary for higher education to prepare students to develop both their political and social potential simultaneously.

2.3.2.2. Communicative action as a democratic capability

Communicative action presupposes that every individual person has a capability to engage in public decision making. As such, every individual displays the potentiality in decision making to include all stakeholders in constructive consensus. Habermas’s theory of communicative action could be said to trigger notions of democracy in the sense that individuals are considered important and included in the process of deliberation. Individuals are seen as people who hold dispositions and abilities that enable them to think and act rationally and critically in communication with others in order to reach consensus. In this light, education becomes a process of developing cognitive potentialities to enable individuals to participate in communication. One such example is how citizens can communicatively construct social norms of society [necessary] for democratic citizenry. In doing this, education recognises individuals as persons of worth, and they are respected for both their rationality and moral attributes in their socialisation in teaching/learning encounters. It also considers all citizens to be free and equal in their right to effective discourse in decision-making processes.

Habermas’s theory of communicative action proposes freedom as a component of democratic citizenship education. This is reflected in the inclusiveness that allows everyone to be involved in the deliberation process. This process is planned in such a way that majority voices are heard without silencing the voices of the minority. Decisions are made by the majority, but if the minority are able to develop valid reasons why other decisions should be
made, they are given an opportunity to argue their case, thus validating constructive consensus. In my view, democratic citizenship can be possible in institutions of learning when deliberations and actions are central to pedagogy.

2.3.2.3. Communicative action as democratic deliberation

Communicative action is unhindered communicative freedom. Communicative action recognises an individual’s engagement in matters of the public sphere. This process encourages human interaction without excluding anyone from communicative processes. Communicative action recognises speech (language, voices) as a process that entails clear thinking on what is to be said before it is said, and recognises the value of diversity of speech and open mindedness. On the other hand it also encapsulates listening as a process that captures patience, respect and the ability to analyse spoken and heard words. Actions taken by the hearer are also included – what Habermas (1987a) terms the ‘illocutionary and elocutionary effects’ that this creates. The process is rigorous and it seems to be the ideologies that trigger a process of learning and teaching. Communicative rationality denotes that education can be used as a tool of cultural production in which individuals are schooled or educated to think and act rationally and critically, and to communicate on a realistic level in order to develop a capable and rational group of citizens who can preside over social, political and economic issues that confront nations/citizens.

Another important fact drawn from Habermas is the idea of agreement. In the process of this rationalisation an agreement must be reached. What Habermas fails to tell us is how this agreement is reached and the normative sense in which such judgement can be made. The process of communication is delineated and well theorised, but how this agreement is reached remains unanswered. However, Habermas’s theory of communicative action illustrates a process of transparency, in that the individual agency within a society [education] is significant for deliberation, rational communication and a social cultural milieu in which human experiences are embedded.

Democratic citizenship education in the context of Habermas’s theory recognises diversity in the cultural voices, rational abilities and communicative dispositions of individuals in society. Habermasian democratic citizenship seeks a constructive consensus through deliberation on matters that concern the public sphere. It promotes the development of rational abilities that are embodied in individuals in order to enhance interaction and deliberation. This contributes
to cultural production and also magnifies dialogue as a process that enhances education and enriches it for citizens.

2.3.2.4. Challenges of communicative action for democratic citizenship education

The analysis of Habermas’s theory of communicative action in relation to the public sphere is seen to be inadequate to construct extended meanings of democratic citizenship education, since it is one dimensional in addressing the concerns of the public. Habermas assumes all humans are capable of reasoning through communication under all circumstances, without being educated. It seems as if he is including all in communication, but his exposition categorically excludes others in the sense in which disagreements might occur. He also assumes that mere speech acts can create human interactions, a sense of belonging and public reasoning that will result in consensus. This is an inadequate assumption, because for ‘democracies to thrive, citizens have to be taught to be democrats’ (Enslin, Pendlebury & Tjiattas, 2001:115); we cannot assume that people naturally can participate in democratic communications without being inducted into doing so. Like Habermas, we cannot depend on Rawls’s procedures alone to develop democratic education, because they provide a thin understanding of democratic citizen education. We cannot rely on constitutional laws and government’s offices to teach citizens to act as democrats; however, formal education can embark on deliberate acts of teaching citizens about justice, communication and reasoning. Following shortly is an analysis of Benhabib’s notion of democratic iteration and cosmopolitanism, and how it addresses unity and the diversity of human rights in the public sphere, assuming that everyone is autonomous and capable of rational argumentation.

It is insufficient to perceive education in terms of rational practice or procedural justice. Rawls’s and Habermas’s views help to develop a sense of deliberative democracy using rationality, communication and justice; these are not enough to address the educational pursuit. Education as a social practice cannot be considered or boxed as a rational practice only, without the notion of a cultural practice. The idea of public deliberation can be enhanced where culture plays a major role in education. However, drawing from culture alone, as Habermas partially notes, is not enough, because it will become an emotive practice. I therefore invoke Benhabib’s iterative and cosmopolitan thinking, which comprehensively acknowledges Habermas, while at the same time deviates by emphasising that education
should engender community by recognising people as human beings with right-holding virtues.

2.3.3. Benhabib’s Democratic Iteration and Democratic Citizenship Education

Benhabibian democratic iteration, it can be argued, offers a complementary argument to Rawls’s and Habermas’s deliberative democracy in relation to the public sphere. Even though Benhabib takes a different position from that of Rawls and Habermas, she advances what I think is the need to augment what is missing in Rawls’s and Habermas’ formulation, as discussed previously. Rawls’s procedure of justice as fairness is limited to constructing laws and constitutions for institutions; however, the egalitarian principles he suggests may act as one of the facets in creating a community sense of belonging and enhancing public rationality. However, creating a sense of belonging might exclude some and favour others. The procedures involved indicate that those involved in this process must have the capacity to follow procedures and the ability to offer rationality towards law making. These procedures are elaborate and might include others, while at the same time excluding some. On the other hand, Habermas’s communicative rationality assumes that an ideal speech situation is enough to create a sense of belonging, and includes public rationality. Communicative rationality alone is inadequate for conceptualising human interaction, sense of belonging, and public engagement, since not everyone has the capacity to engage in public deliberation unless they are taught to do so. Additionally, it is difficult to show how ideas agreed upon are enacted in cases where consensus is not reached. However, Habermas seeks to include all voices by the way people offer reasons and reach agreement, yet this seems impossible. It assumes a homogeneous way of thinking that does not depict public communication. Both Rawls and Habermas insist that an agreement be reached. This assumes that all humans have homogeneous patterns for reaching agreement. It does not depict opposing views that might impair agreement. Benhabib, on the other hand, advances justice as fairness and communicative rationality with the idea of the human right to have rights. She differs from Rawls and Habermas in that there is a possibility that people may not reach agreement; in this case, respect and reciprocity play a major role in appreciating the differences, and are a way of acknowledging the rights of others in a reciprocal manner to our own rights. She notes that reaching agreement is not mandatory to creating a sense of belonging, advancing human interaction and improving public engagement. Benhabib acknowledges various voices and
generates her ideas from a starting point at which others stop, hence expounding a sense of belonging within the social position of cosmopolitanism and the rights of others.

Benhabibian democratic iteration takes the philosophical position of social constructivism to that of normative political theory. It also considers cultures as clearly delineable wholes and provides an analysis that generates coherence and purpose (Benhabib, 2011a:75, 141). Benhabib’s theory contends that, to be and to become a self, is to insert oneself into webs of interlocution and recognise the self in relation to others. She also acknowledges a cosmopolitan sense of belonging, because state borders have become porous, so thinking of citizenship education beyond the borders of our local society imagines justice for all humanity. She recognises an understanding of the public sphere as the space in which identities and affiliations are negotiated. In addition to these, she provides a deliberative model of democracy, and highlights egalitarian reciprocity, voluntary self-ascription and freedom as an exit to constructing democracy (Benhabib, 1996:69; 2011a).

My focus on Benhabib (2011a) is on her publication *Dignity in Adversity: Human Rights in Troubled Times*. In this book she tackles democratic iteration on the issue of the ‘right to have rights’ – a notion that I seek to analyse. Democratic iteration refers ‘to continuing conversations, a complex dialogue, which challenges the assumption of completeness of each culture by making it possible for its members to look at themselves from the perspectives of others’ (Benhabib, 2011a:76).

Benhabib (2011a) traces the discussion on ‘Unity and diversity of human rights’ from Husserl’s project of a transcendental phenomenology in western culture. She views Husserl’s answer to the question of universalism to be an essentialist one. This she achieved by identifying words (logos) used by Husserl as the entelechy of humanity, in other words, anything that is currently happening, including actuality and potentiality. Husserl’s position entails the claim that those from other cultures certainly deserve respect for their achievements, however inferior they may be to occidental or western culture characterised by philosophy, science, a life of theorising and the essence of scrutiny (Benhabib, 2011a:59). Husserl’s universalism came at a time of his life when Europe was dictated by egalitarianism.
and fascism. It is on this premise that Benhabib (2011a:59) indicates that ‘[a]s the globe grows together materially into one world, it becomes all the more urgent to understand how claims to universality can be reconciled with assertions of religious and cultural difference; how the unity of reason can be reconciled with the diversity of life-forms’. She further notes that, due to globalisation, which has become a grand narrative, the search for universalism is uttered in the context of ‘human rights language’, and the defence of institutionalisation has become uncontested language. She points out that this language and the trend of human rights have not yet become a reality in human global politics. Based on this, Benhabib (2011a) argues that there is a fundamental human right, ‘the right to have rights’, an idea that she connotes as follows: that every human being is to be recognised by others, and to recognise others in turn, as persons entitled to moral respect and legally protected human rights.

Benhabib (2011a) contends that human rights articulate moral principles that protect the communicative freedom of individuals and specify legal rights as justification claims. She reflectively acknowledges the work of Michael Walzer, who argues that human rights constitute the ‘[c]ore of universal thin morality’, and Nussbaum (1997:273-300), who claims that human rights form ‘[r]easonable conditions of a world-political consensus’. Benhabib agrees with Nussbaum on the political overlapping with consensus, but disagrees with her conceptions, which she notes are problematic and have a narrow view in philosophical anthropology regarding human capabilities. She notes that Rawls (1971:529-552) cautions for the need to distinguish between the list of human rights included in the law of peoples and that are defensible from the standpoint of a global public reason and the universal declaration of human rights in 1948 (Benhabib, 2011a:60). The work contends that Rawls’s position on human rights is provocative because it valorises the human rights to life, to liberty, to personal property and to formal equality, as expressed by the rules of natural justice. In relation to Charles Beitz (2001:272, cited in Benhabib, 2001a:87), Benhabib acknowledges his contribution to rights requiring democratic political forms, religious toleration, legal equality for women and a free choice of partner, which in many circumstances may certainly be excluded. Benhabib (2011a:87) argues that ‘human rights embody moral principles which need contextualization and specification in the form of legal norms’.

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8 These were forms of global capitalism whose effects were neither rational nor humane. Fascism was manifested in culture, sex and sexuality, abortion, eugenics and euthanasia, indoctrination, social intervention, social Darwinism and national corporation (Joachim, 2012:1).
In this regard, Benhabib is of the opinion that human rights need to shift both the justification strategy and the derivation of the content of human rights away from a minimalist concern towards a more robust understanding of human rights in terms of the ‘right to have rights’ – a notion she claims is borrowed from Arendt’s political stand, but she uses it as the claim of each human being to be recognised as moral and being worthy of equal concerns and equally entitled to be protected as a legal personality by his or her own polity, as well as by the world community. In other words, Benhabib valorises both individual (private) and community (public) rights in engendering the human right to have rights in communicative freedom. She differs here from both Rawls’s and Habermas’s starting points. I see Benhabib’s moral philosophy as lying between the traditional individualistic notions for her claim of the private and Habermas’s and Rawls’s conception of community to explain the relation of the individual to the public sphere. Thus, Benhabib strikes a balance by explaining a human being first as situating the self (private) in relation to others (public). I find her idea to be robust because of the respect she has for the right of an individual, yet she also recognises the public.

2.3.3.1. Methodological iterations

Benhabib (2011a) exposes the many schools of thought that claim that universal facts can be discovered and therefore are understood as being in opposition to relativism. The essentialist universalism claims that human nature consists of stable and predictable passions and predispositions, instincts and emotions, all of which can be discovered and analysed rationally. Justificatory universalism shares the normative content of human reason in the validity of procedures, inquiry, evidence and questioning, which have been the cognitive legacies of western philosophy since the Enlightenment. Moral universalism claims equal moral respect, and juridical universalism asserts that all humans are entitled to respect and rights based on legal and political systems claiming legitimacy. Upon reflection on the existing forms of universalism, Benhabib (2011a) distinguishes her position as that of interpreting communicative freedom in relation to the ‘right to have rights’. She submits that she is not in search of indubitable foundations for a solid ground upon which to build a fully-fledged theory of human rights, but provides ‘a presupposition analysis’. Her contention is that any justification of human rights presupposes some conception of human agency, of human needs, human reason, as well as making some assumptions about the characteristics of our socio-political world. She therefore expands this concept of communicative freedom into
an account of human agency and hospitality. Hospitality, for Benhabib (2011a:7), captures the right of a stranger not to be treated as an enemy when he arrives in the land of another, and at the same time it involves precarious moments of finding out the intention of the guest in such a way that the guest will be welcomed with some suspicion until the intention is defined – a notion she borrows from Derrida’s *hostipitality* – to highlight the risky moments of the first encounter with a stranger when trying to understand his intentions so that one expresses hospitality. She notes that hospitality means a recognition of world citizenship that entails world peace through increasing communication between human beings. Thus, cosmopolitanism creates a sense of belonging in the creation of a fresh legal order and public domain in which humans are warranted rights based on their humanity.

### 2.3.3.2. Human rights

Benhabib warns that human rights need to move away from the naturalistic sense of understanding human rights. This way of looking at human rights depicts rights in the sense of owning property, which cannot be used to generalise the understanding of rights that she imagines. She maintains that the kinds of rights that are tenable are the rights that engender respect for one another in a reciprocal sense. As such, the claim to rights needs to be conceived in a moral sense. Rights imply that one has freedom and liberty not only to resources, but that people tolerate one another in mutual respect. She further examines Kantian rights, which claim ‘what exists; rather, we ask whether our lives together within, outside, betwixt polities ought not to be guided by mutually and reciprocal guaranteed immunities, constraints upon actions, and by legitimate access to certain goods and resource’ (Benhabib, 2011a:66). She contends that rights are not about what there is, but about the kind of world in which we reasonably want to live. She notes that Kant proposed one basic right, namely that ‘every action which by itself or by its Maxim enables the freedom of each individual’s will to co-exist with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with a universal law is right’ (Benhabib, 2011a:66). In her analysis of this concept, Benhabib notes that Kant’s formulation is not about a list of basic rights that is said to precede the will of the republican sovereign. Rather, the Kantian principle establishes how a juridical-civil order can come into existence, which would be in compliance with the moral law of respect for the freedom of each. This implies that rights depend not on one’s will, but on some guiding laws that guide our thought experiment to justificatory processes through which we, in dialogue, must convince each other of the validity of certain norms to which general rules of action
apply. In this sense, the human rights that Benhabib deconstructs develop a sense of belonging to a world republic, in which humans are accorded respect for their virtue of being humans.

2.3.3.3. Human interaction

It is worth noting that Benhabib (2011a) raises a critical inquiry that poses a theory of the right to have rights. She argues that, in order to justify why we should act in certain ways, we must respect another’s capacity to agree or disagree with him/her on the basis of reasons provided. What also is important is the validity on which one accepts or rejects these reasons. This implies respect for the capacity of one’s communicative freedom. This is an aspect of deliberation that Rawls did not consider in detail. He only pictured how individuals can reach an agreement in decision making in a more procedural way, while ignoring the fact that there are differences in opinion, reasoning and ability. On the other hand, Habermas argues for a communicative action in speech that leads to a consensus. He does not consider possibilities of disagreement, and contends that agreement is reached constructively. Benhabib’s argument differs from Habermas’s in the sense that her communicative freedom offers space to agree or disagree. To put this differently, Benhabib considers real-life realities in which there are differences of opinion and circumstances that may lead to disagreement that can be handled with mutual respect on the account of human agency and freedom of communication.

2.3.3.4. Sense of belonging

A sense of belonging can be created in different ways (Yuval-Davis, 2011:12). Benhabib (2011a) provides an analytical illustration of how iterations of human rights can develop a language of belonging. Benhabib (2011a:76) points out that ‘[o]nly when members of a society can engage in free and unrestrained dialogue about their collective identity in free public spheres can they develop narratives of self-identification, which unfold into fluid and creative reappropriations of their own traditions’. Human rights are moral principles that protect the right to exercise one’s communicative freedom and require legal backing. The right to have rights involves acknowledgement of one’s identity in general, as well as that of a concrete other. Therefore, this view requires us to treat each and every individual as being entitled to the same rights and duties we would want to ascribe to ourselves. Our relation to the other is governed by the norm of formal equality and reciprocity. This, in turn, assumes the ideology of equity, and complementary reciprocity and hospitality.
For Benhabib (2011a), such notions in relation to respecting another’s capacity to agree or disagree, formal equality and recognising one another’s identity make human rights different from other perspectives in the sense that a justification of human rights is viewed as a dialogic practice and is not stuck in the metaphysics of natural rights theories or overprotective individualist selves. Benhabib’s justification of human rights differs from essentialist accounts because, in such accounts, human rights are viewed as enabling conditions that allow individuals to employ their agency. In contrast, Benhabib’s view of human rights in the discourse view recognises one’s right to have rights as a prerequisite for one to be able to contest or accept her claim to rights. As such, one’s specific needs can serve as a justification for another only if one presupposes that his or her agent-specific needs can likewise serve as a justification for another. Thus the recognition of each other’s right to have rights is vital.

Benhabib (2011a:70) defends her position to fit that of a theoretical justification discourse. She enables her readers to understand her view of the conception of human rights as the right to have rights in her hermeneutical circularity of practical reasons. Her choice of words, such as equity, symmetrical entitlement and reciprocity of communicative roles, initiates a reflective agenda that is rooted in her ability to exercise her communicative freedom. She does this by unveiling the various understandings of the notions and discourses on human rights, and then analyses, critiques and reconsiders these views not in a pathological sense, but as a redirection and as reasons to reflect on and propose a new discourse based on the ‘right to have rights’. She also adds that her argument is not an absolute one, but arises from reflexive dialogue that emerged from globalisation and human rights and raised philosophical questions that she attempts to theorise. Benhabib (2011a:70) says the ‘motivation for moral discourses arises when the attitudes of our life-worlds break down through conflict, dissent, and disagreement, when there is conflict as well as contention, misery as well as a lack of solidarity’. Benhabib refutes the notion of discourses being hypothetical, but motivates reflexive dialogues that originate in very real life problems.

Benhabib (2011a:76) considers a theory of human rights as ‘interactive universalism’. She contends that conceptualising human rights needs to begin by situating the self and considering ‘democratic iterations’ as a negotiation of ‘unity and the diversity of human rights’ (Benhabib, 2011a:76). She illustrates that this articulation of rights in relation to their moral core and their legal form is one of the most salient differences between her approach
and other contemporary positions. In the light of the foregoing, Benhabib (2011a:75) opines that, ‘through democratic iterations, citizens articulate the specific content of their schedule of rights, as well as making rights their very own’.

2.3.3.5. Cosmopolitanism and democratic iteration

Benhabib (2011a) analyses and appreciates Husserl’s reflection on what happened in Europe and the intellectual political landscape that accompanied war and political violence. In this connection, she argues that, in reaction to modern trends of democracy accompanied by global civil society, individuals are right-bearing not only by virtue of their citizenship within states, but by virtue of their humanity. Benhabib (2011a) claims that we need to rethink the law of people against the background of the newly emergent and fragile global civil society, which is continuously threatened by war, violence and military intervention. Benhabib calls for cosmopolitan imagination as a way of re-thinking human rights in order to overcome the dystopias of the current political and socio-economic greed that robs individuals of natural rights. Thus, she pleads for an approach to natural rights that considers the global sphere. This is vital because the ills and troubles that characterise society are common to the entire world. It also is necessitated by the fact that wars, marginalisation, droughts and natural disasters prompt migration and refugees all over the world (Benhabib, 2011a:195). Therefore, Benhabib calls for a cosmopolitan utopia to countenance the dystopias based on a common humanity.

2.3.3.6. Inclusion and democratic citizenship education

Benhabib (2011a) points out that the continuing cultural dialogues taking place in global civil society require that many citizens be involved. Doing this will enable people to learn from the previous dialogues, thereby contextualising narratives that can enhance communication in the various cultures and protect the human right to have rights in the midst of diversity. Benhabib (2011a) considers both Habermas’s and Rawls’s positions in constructing the ideal of the human right to have rights. However, she deviates from their position in order to argue for a cosmopolitan imagination. Benhabib engenders iteration and reflexivity as ways to conceptualise rights that exhibit realities of life-worlds in order to enhance the communicative freedom of individuals, thereby enhancing their agency, while at the same time respecting others’ capacity to agree or disagree. She argues for the human right to have rights. She also considers this an imagination that goes beyond local society to an
international community, since national borders have become porous. She argues for human rights that can withstand conflicting times – a human right that upholds human identity and agency.

**Democratic iteration and citizenship education**

Benhabib’s methodology is seen as a crucial starting point that can help in reconstructing citizenship education. The generative argumentation and philosophical routes used in constructing her ideas from the theory of transcendental phenomenology to interactive universalism provide articulated coherency and weight, as they validate the authority on which she bases her argument. The reflexivity and iteration of the concept of rights gives credibility to educational concerns. The discussions that Benhabib raises regarding human rights have implications for pedagogy and can ensure universal justice for all. Education engendered within sound morals and values that regards respect for one another in a reciprocal way seeks to improve educational theory and praxis. It is important that certain utopias, such as the one Benhabib suggests, be considered in decision making and in the way we rethink morals and values in education, as a starting point to developing meaning in education. Accordingly, Benhabib suggests that citizenship education needs to be conceptualised in such a way that it counters the threats posed by the dystopias [ills, inequalities, discrimination, ethnic prejudices and the like] in society. Doing this will enable us to foster healthier societies that respect and are aware of the value of human life, rights and the consequences of said abuses. Consequently, Benhabib,(2011a) may be inferring that citizenship education needs to uphold the equality of all beings, no matter their class, the amount of knowledge they may have acquired, their religious background, ethnic origin or culture. Therefore, in Benhabib’s line of reasoning, citizenship education should be able to reflect on how the unity of reason can be reconciled with the diversity of life-forms and the acknowledgement of human agency.

**Iterative universalism and cosmopolitanism as democratic education organisers**

The above ideas are very helpful in thinking about citizenship education. However, Benhabib has not fully demonstrated how this idea of the human right to have rights might be actualised, for instance that of communicative freedom, and how such dialogues can be enhanced in the education system. It could be argued that what Benhabib is suggesting is difficult to implement in Africa in order to reform both education and constitutions, since
much of the continent is still struggling with the legacies of colonialism, tribalism and racism. However, her attempts to deal with real-life issues that dig deep into human agency, identity and human rights create some sense of optimism for Africa.

To summarise this section, it can be argued that, despite the presence of different theoretical perceptions of liberal democratic citizenship education, the liberal theorists, as discussed above, illustrate how educational developments involve more that egocentric aims, and that each of them is driven by realities and ideals for practising justice for all humanity. In this regard, their argumentations for justice are governed by negotiation, deliberation, discussions, rationality, justice as fairness and the recognition of individual rights and a collective sense of belonging, amongst others. These discussions also recognise the diversity of ideas and promote reflexivity, respect, reciprocity and recognition of the value of our common humanity in attaining justice in the public sphere. The section that follows is a synthesis of these theories and how they are complementary in constructing a defensible understanding of democratic citizenship education.

From the above it is apparent that the points from which Habermas, Rawls and Benhabib enter into their arguments and discussions on deliberative democracy differ; however, they all formulate important concepts unique to their own perspectives, and they all develop different arguments that open up spaces for reconsidering deliberative democracy. Despite the fact that Habermas, Rawls and Benhabib wrote during different time periods and contexts, they offer unique interpretations that place emphasis on public reason, communicative freedom and democratic iteration, yet these perspectives are complementary and offer a vocabulary for human interaction, engagement and a sense of belonging. Benhabib’s understanding draws on both Rawls’s and Habermas’s thoughts on communication and opens areas for communicative freedom that propagates moral respect for one another’s capacity to disagree. In turn, this opens up more areas for current discourses, which include human agency and identity in times of conflict in society. It also is paramount that Benhabib brings to focus global influences and concerns. Benhabib (2011a) calls for a cosmopolitan imagination in rethinking deliberative democracy and the right to have rights in engendering human agency.
2.3.4. Synthesising Public Reason, Communicative Rationality and Democratic Iteration toward Democratic Citizenship Education

This synthesis (of public reason, communicative rationality and democratic iteration) signifies the growth of an encompassing version of democratic citizenship education. Thus, a new form is emerging from various historical developments of democratic evaluations to produce a more vibrant notion suitable for DCE that will challenge the experiences and socio-economic problems that we currently face. Researching African citizenship education has become more complex and prompts a synthesis of various global standpoints to deal with societal problems. If the conception of DCE I perceive is to address Africa’s prevailing socio-political and economic anomalies and imbalances, then a hybrid of theories within a democratic sphere could lead to a nuanced conception of DCE. I am not campaigning for an absolute notion of DCE, but rather for creating a normative platform from which steps can be taken to fathom the delicacy of this notion of DCE and the urgency of it in our educational cycles, and especially in the African context.

This section begins with the premise that any form of education rests on moral presuppositions relating to the way we conceive the purposes of education. Those who argue in favour of democratic citizenship education use the language of justice, freedom, liberty and rights, amongst others. In order to make sense of the interpretations of and justifications for DCE and to be able to judge between them, I examined the structure of moral argumentation for democracy, education and citizenship. This helped in the development of a conceptual framework enabling me to judge between competing moral educational positions in Kenya. The conceptualisation of educational concepts as conceived in this dissertation rests on moral presuppositions that have to do with the way we conceive of the purposes of education. The theorists discussed in this chapter use the language of public reason in relation to ‘duty’, ‘rights’, ‘freedom’, ‘equal liberty’, ‘respect’, ‘redress’ and principles of justice (Rawls, 1971); communicative rationality in relation to ‘cognitive abilities’, ‘understanding’, ‘speaking’, ‘hearing’, ‘understanding’, ‘illocutionary and elocutionary effects’ and ‘interaction’; democratic iteration in relation to the ‘right to have rights’ and ‘cosmopolitanism’, ‘reflexivity’ and ‘hospitality’, to mention but a few.

To make sense of different interpretations and analyses of some of the philosophical understandings of DCE, and to be able to judge between them, I need to examine the
structure of moral arguments and develop a conceptual framework that will enable us to judge between competing moral and philosophical positions. First, in order to do this, I used John Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness as a concept to validate the public reason in DCE. Second, I used Habermas’s theory of communicative action to validate communicative rationality in conceptualising DCE. Third, I used Benhabib’s notion of democratic iteration that validates our common humanity and rights to advance universality and cosmopolitanism in conceptualising DCE.

Building on the aforementioned analyses and critique, various authors have argued for the persistence of various features that characterise democratic citizenship education, but do not deny the transformative form of deliberative and iterative forms of democratic citizenship education. The pursuit of constructing a nuanced conception of democratic citizenship education is almost an impossible endeavour. As in the work of Derrida (Biesta, 2009:16), this pursuit is enhanced by the relationship between the impossibilities and the possibilities that are not yet known. Additionally, for Derrida, the very experience of the impossible creates space for the other, which is possible. This means that, although the very act of trying to create a defensible notion of democratic citizenship education up to this point seems almost impossible, the very presence of the theoretical attempt in redefining and reconstructing this notion is a worthy course. Many scholars have trod this space of impossibilities by trying to conceptualise DCE, but have only contributed to what we could refer to as a ‘one-dimensional view’ of democratic citizenship education.

Therefore, the theorisations that are offered by Rawls, Habermas and Benhabib open the spaces for these iterations. In the analysis above (sections 2.3.1, 2.3.2 and 2.3.3), it is evident that certain concepts emerge strongly in the construction of a democratic citizenship education. Such notions include deliberation, rights, freedom, law/order, constitution, agreement/consensus, communication, cultural diversity, society, citizens, institutions, rationality, justice, fairness, recognition, difference, distribution, discussions, globalisation, cooperation, person, human dignity, rationality and conceptualisation. There seems to be an interplay between these concepts. However, there appear to be significant differences in approach and departure in arguments presented by the theorists above. These significant differences also lie in the approach of the philosophical tradition followed, the emphasis of each one of them, as well as the contexts in which the concepts were generated. For instance,
Rawls focused on justice, Habermas emphasises communication and rationality, while Benhabib focuses on the universality of rights and identity.

The origin of Rawls’s argument can be traced to the works of Kant, Rousseau and Locke, who put emphasis on justice, equality, law and contractual consensus. Rawls’s reflective equilibrium and principles of justice also presuppose the possibility of moral deliberation in justice as fairness. I see Rawls’s theory of justice as an ongoing process, a circular process that does not have an end, in that when deliberation has been done, new ideas are co-opted temporarily until other new ideas or opinions emerge from or negate or are stronger than existing ones. This leaves the question why we must be concerned with justice at all. In keeping with Derrida’s hyperbolic description of justice as embodied meaning, this question suggests that there is something in us that longs for justice. As such one cannot give up the institution of justice in that one must work on this institution to make it better to work towards [a better] justice that is not yet known (Biesta, 2009:30). That is to say, the relationship between the impossibilities of justice and the possibilities of injustice prompts the quest for a form of justice that is as yet excluded, a form of justice that will deal with the injustices that are experienced in society. The clue to Derrida’s answer to my question on why we should be concerned with justice lies in the contentions that justice is always directed towards the other – that is, it is in ‘relation to the other’, the ‘other’ that is not yet known. Thus, the very possibility of justice is sustained by its impossibility (Biesta, 2009) – and it is this that triggers the continuous search for justice in which education plays an important role.

Similarly, Habermas was inspired by Luckac’s history of class consciousness and by Horkheimer and Adorno’s dialectic of Enlightenment (Horster, 1992:5). His argument is drawn from the traditions of Weber, Mead, Durkheim and Parsons, as well as Marxism. His theory revolves around transformational democracy through communicative action (Elster, 1998:1). Thus, for Habermas, ideal speech is conceived of as permeating deliberation within a rational approach to mutual understanding and agreement in order to instil justice for all. For this reason I see these theories as complementary to one another in leading to a more concrete notion of democratic citizenship education. That is to say, even procedural law and/or justice require ideal speech situations in which deliberation may take place. Education for citizens needs both Rawls’s public reason and Habermas’s communicative rationality to frame engagement, human interaction and a sense of belonging.
It is at this level that Benhabib’s views of democratic iteration on universal rights and cosmopolitanism have connotations that would help enhance engagement, human interaction and a sense of belonging. For Benhabib (2011a:2), ‘cosmopolitanism involves the recognition that human beings are moral persons equally entitled to legal protection in virtue of rights that accrue to them not as nationals, or of an ethnic group, but as human beings’. Benhabib defends the justificatory universalism of human rights on account that it is non-essentialist, non-reductionist and deeply implicated in the democratic project.

Benhabib (2011a) focuses on an explanation of how current progress in human rights law and cosmopolitan norms misinterprets the effects of how justice is generated. Laws on human rights should open spaces for new actors, such as women and ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities to develop new vocabularies of public claim-making to anticipate new forms of justice in processes of democratic iterations. That is, the development of human rights laws should enable the minority to freely express and associate as individual beings whose legitimacy is evident. Democratic iteration is reflective in nature in that it enables actors to empirically import or understand macro-processes and the mainstream discourses that provide criteria for communicative ethics.

It is important to note that Rawls, Habermas and Benhabib advance democratic deliberation as a process of education. They advance the conception of the public sphere through rational argumentation, respect of diversity and of humanity in order to advance the democracy of citizens. What make these philosophies ideal for education are their origins and contexts in which human experiences, injustice, marginalisation and exclusion have characterised society and engendered a demand for complementary lines of argument that would lead to a reconstruction of education to deal with societal problems.

Democratic citizenship education as depicted in the analyses conducted in this chapter should embrace notions of deliberative democracy among free and equal citizens. This deliberation is viewed as transformational, as is evident both in Rawls’s theory of justice and Habermas’s communicative action. Both Rawls and Habermas agree that this process involves collective decision making with the participation of all who are stakeholders and are affected by the decision making at hand. They also agree that there needs to be some form of a consensus to reach a collective agreement. The difference between their views is that one is prescriptive on how the agreement is reached, while the other calls for a constructive agreement that is
generated through deliberation. Rawls’s *A Theory of Justice* therefore is of essence in generating rules/laws for institutions, while, for Habermas, communicative freedom is the highlight in which individual input and rationality play a key role in how decisions are made. Habermas’s focus is on the fact that the communication process enables an understanding that would lead to some form of action.

These forms of deliberative democracy are reinforced by Benhabib’s (2011a:3) cosmopolitan approach to democratic iterations regarding human rights. This focuses on the importance of human rights in the conflicts between democracy and cosmopolitanism, observing that the world has porous borders and that their closure requires democratic sovereignty. Benhabib creates a sense of a global world, in contrast to nationalistic views of closed borders. Thus, she contends in this view of citizenship education that the ‘injustices done in one part of the world would be felt by all’ (Benhabib, 2011a:7). She sees the creation of a new world legal order and a public sphere in which human beings are eligible to have rights owing to their humanity alone, and not by virtue of their race, ethnic group or nationality. Cosmopolitanism creates justice that is generated to allow new space in which the minority groups, viz. women and ethnic, linguistic or religious minorities, will be able to enter the public sphere to develop new vocabularies towards justice in order to propagate democratic interactions. It also is argued that the plurality of human beings demands more creative ways of inclusion. Democratic citizenship education from this view looks at the global factors that influence education and seeks to reverse the ills imposed on countries, ethnic groups and women, amongst others. This demands that education go beyond national borders.

### 2.4. Summary

In this chapter I have analysed and examined the different threads of liberal thought on DCE. Rawls’s theory of justice describes how public reason enables people to interact, engage with and locate themselves in relation to others – a matter of cultivating a community of public reasoners. Habermas’s communicative action explicates how communicative rationality can emancipate individuals’ capacity to participate in public decision making. Habermas shows how language, cognition and inclusion can create understanding and a sense of belonging. Benhabib’s democratic iteration illustrates how recognising individual rights enables individuals to engage in cosmopolitan debates and find their voices in global discussions.
I described how each of these theories invokes the notion of equality, justice, fairness, communication, human rights, human agency, cultural values, importance of respect and deliberation in a pluralistic and diverse society in relation to public decision making. Thereafter, I indicated that these liberal theories articulate, in different ways, how decision making is vital through inclusion and reasoning, while considering factors of justice in the context of different views, societies and capabilities. I also demonstrated how the views of Rawls, Habermas and Benhabib differ in their argumentation and how they complement each other, and how their various philosophical backgrounds influenced how each of these theorists articulated their arguments.

I have delineated how these threads of arguments can be synthesised in an effort to better conceptualise democratic citizenship education. Thus, the concepts of education as depicted by educational theorists may be integrated with the moral arguments presented. I argued in this chapter that a clearer understanding of DCE could provide education systems with spaces that are conducive for decision making, learning and teaching opportunities that require an understanding of DCE in order to advance collective deliberation among the stakeholders in the education system. In essence, DCE involves human interactions that are constituted by rationality and cultivate a sense of belonging for the purpose of justice for all individuals.

In the next chapter I shall explore the state of democratic citizenship education in Kenya in relation to equality, freedom, the rule of law, human rights, access, governance and quality in education. I believe that doing this will enable a better determination of the relationships between liberal democratic citizenship education and the influence it may have on the Kenyan education system.
Chapter Three

HIGHER EDUCATION IN KENYA: CONCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION

3.1. Preamble and Introduction

What this chapter attempted to do is show that higher education policy documents in Kenya are silent about issues of DCE and more silent about recognition of diversity as an important facet of a just education system. If higher education is so mute on the relevance of its education society it seems improbable for such policy texts to address real societal concerns. Of course the question can be asked if this is the task of higher education. Not necessarily, but if the conditions are not conducive to higher learning then policies would not mean much. I am not suggesting that higher education is a panacea (cure) for societal dilemmas such as violence. But for higher education to unfold openly and freely conditions will have to be in place to effect higher education. Therefore, this dissertation is an attempt to argue that an extended view of DCE can contribute towards cultivating non-coercive and non-violent society – if people are initiated into such discourses they can positively influence societal development. Also, liberal view of DCE might not be sufficient to address the weakness and challenges society and within policy texts therefore, my argument is to extend the view to what is still in becoming. It is about what can still potentially happen.

Based on the review of education policy documents [texts] and research published on higher education in Kenya [policy as discourse], there is commitment towards a number of important elements for democratic citizenship education (DCE), inter alia: national development, national unity, socio-economic development, social justice, preparing and equipping the youth with the skills necessary for a collective role using their individual talents and for personality development, and fostering and developing cultural awareness and international consciousness. However, the policy documents indicate that partner policies are weak in planning for democratic citizenship in the light of ethnic bias, conflict management and ethnic violence (i.e. innovation). In addition, there is a notable lack of recognition and promotion of an alternative understanding of citizenship that enhances and equips university graduates with critical and creative abilities to engage and participate in public collectivities so as to exercise equal opportunities, freedoms and pluralism that can deal with ethnic
violence (i.e. towards community management). These appear to be areas in which additional innovation and reconceptualisation are needed to re-imagine and improve sustainable education towards ethnic violence – pedagogy out of bounds (Waghid, 2014) and cosmopolitan education.

Qualitative document analysis [policy texts] and conceptual analysis guided me in analysing written documents in a rigorous and systematic way. As with all forms of research, the findings from analysing policy documents for instances of democratic citizenship are substantiated with other sources of information, including feedback from other policy documents, discourse on policy in higher education in Kenya, and the philosophical frameworks [theoretical] I developed in Chapter 2. This chapter also draws from the abundance of historical, political, economic-demographic and socio-cultural sources to analyse the values and philosophical underpinnings that inform policy in higher education in Kenya (Ball, 2006:51; Oucho, 2002:105). Qualitative document analysis and conceptual analysis are approaches that helped me to refine my understanding of the education policies in Kenya and the practices towards democratic citizenry. In selecting such policies I paid particular attention to policy documents that enabled me to gather data about the trends in education policy in the Kenyan higher education sector that promote democratic citizenship education (DCE). This is in line with Ball’s (2006:45) submission that policies are changed over time by different actors, and represent and interpret a particular timeframe in history. This is a trend I discovered in the Kenyan case. For this reason, policy as texts sometimes is never read individually, but in relation to historical and current patterns – such negligence results in an enactment of policies on the basis of confusion. To avoid such flaws I collected multiple documents from the Kenyan national archive [primary sources], online sources, databases and books, all of which reflect the historical and current trends in Kenya, to supplement and ensure the validity of my analysis. The key areas I articulate in my analysis are concerned with liberal democratic citizenship education. More specifically, I draw attention to notions of equality, public deliberation, cosmopolitan education, access, governance and the philosophical frameworks of the policies, amongst others. All conclusions drawn in this chapter are based on the analysed documents [policy texts] and policy discourses in Kenya in relation to the three liberal strands [theoretical framework] discussed in Chapter 2. The theoretical framework discussed in Chapter 2 provides this research with the language, concepts and vocabulary that are available in democratic citizenship education. I consider Ball’s (2006:2) suggestion that theory should not dictate
entirely and constrain our thinking in policy analysis, but that it should provide the tools for policy analysis. He notes that theory sometimes can be constructive and invigorating, but it can also be violent and destructive; however, it plays a major role in breaking unproductive traditions.

In addition, Ball (2006:44) clarifies that analysing, interpreting and translating policy are complex processes. As such, the fundamental recognition here is that textual policy is not necessarily clear or closed or complete, but is a result of negotiations at various stages, influenced by particular agendas and voices. This may provide insufficient meaning for public interpretation, and is notably true, especially in Kenya, where certain individuals were appointed to commissions to decide on and write policy texts, in many instances with political agendas. Even though there was an indication that public engagement was employed, the majority of citizens were excluded from the negotiations and also from the ‘writerly’ aspects of the policies.

Chege (2006c) maintains that, for one to understand what is wrong with higher education in any country, the philosophical framework that informs the education system needs to be scrutinised – particularly to examine the values that govern the education system. In this context, this chapter employs the three liberal strands on DCE that were discussed in Chapter 2 to analyse and re-think higher education in Kenya in order to address the current challenges facing the country. As a result, I analyse the education policy informing the system of higher education, as well as its socio-political and economic features.

Citizenship education in Kenya has developed as a form of political socialisation from colonial rule to independent Kenya. Citizenship education in independent Kenya stems from the local framework of national education, which is comparable to the ‘Kenyanisation’ of education through the adoption of democracy as a component of educational policy in the framing of national policies in education to advance national identity and national unity (Eshiwani, 1990; Luescher-Mamshela et al., 2011:xvii; Ogot, 1995b; Republic of Kenya, 1964; 1976; 1981; 1999). The major objectives of education for democratic citizenship include ‘political equality, religious freedom, promotion of cultural heritage, social justice, freedom from want, disease and ignorance, human dignity including freedom of conscience, equal opportunity for all citizens, and equal distribution of income’ (Republic of Kenya, 1981:5).
Higher education in Kenya refers to the level of education that follows on secondary education (Boit & Kipkoech, 2012; Republic of Kenya 1999:297). In Kenya, universities are often considered by the government as the peak of higher education. Ogot (2002:647) notes that, traditionally, universities have three major functions: a) to transmit knowledge and values from generation to generation through effective teaching; b) to discover new knowledge through research; and c) to serve their societies by participating in various forms of extension programmes. Hence my focus on higher education in Kenya in this dissertation will refer entirely to university education (Boit & Kipkoech, 2012). This focus on higher education is rooted in the premise that an independent scholarly community sustained by resilient universities can heighten a healthy and unwavering democracy. The universities’ immersion in research, knowledgeable leadership and the development of successive generations of engaged citizens would nurture social, political and economic transformation in Africa (Berresford & Rodin, 2007:xvi).

Berresford and Rodin (2007:1), as well as Chege (2006c:8), note that higher education has experienced challenges that are related to historical, political, economic and social instability in Africa. More specific are the challenges faced by the academic faculties in the universities and the pressure on them to continuously review the curricula and content for subjects taught at universities in order to keep abreast of an ever-changing body of knowledge (Republic of Kenya, 1999:308). However, Berresford and Rodin (2007:1) indicate that drastic structural adjustments, the introduction of democracy, regionalised politics and economic liberalisation have brought stability to Kenya. Subsequently, the new cohort of leadership in Kenya has stepped forward to re-examine a vision for higher education institutions, stirring confidence among all those involved. Another reason for considering university education in Kenya is because this level of education is considered to be the motivating force behind scholarship in the search for truth relating to the major problems of concern to human society, as well as the search for solutions to these problems (Republic of Kenya, 1981:32). Kenyan university education is viewed by the Mackay Commission as ‘a place where intellectualism is cultivated, a place where the training of rational men and women of good character, with creative minds and strong convictions, as well as critical reasoning abilities, is pursued, and an institution where general culture of human society including ideas concerning the world, the universe and man is developed, promoted, and radiated’ (Republic of Kenya, 1981:32). The Kenyan government established five universities, namely; Moi University near Eldoret in 1981, as the second university to be developed from the Mackay Report; Kenyatta
University, established in 1985, which is located on the outskirts of Nairobi; Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology, situated in northwest Nairobi, became a fully-fledged university in 1994; Egerton University, located close to Nakuru, which was founded in 1987; and Maseno, which became a full university in 2000. These universities have experienced expansion and now aim to promote and improve equity, economic development and skilled manpower. During the period between 1985 and 1990, Kenya experienced an unplanned expansion of public university education, from a single dominant university to having two universities and two university colleges.

It can be assumed that the aforementioned core developmental issues are not yet fully realised and still may bar the course of Kenyan projects toward sustainable democratic citizenship education and national development. This is particularly so with the focus on how the concepts of human interaction, a sense of belonging and public reason are depicted in Kenyan higher education to deal with freedoms, equal distribution of public goods and the overall improvement of university education and quality of life of citizens.

This analysis concentrates on two sets of arguments: first are the hegemonic notions sustaining the colonial education legacy and independent governance; and second are the contemporary claims espousing regional politics/ethnic politics, historical and cultural factors, the economic players and their influence on higher education in Kenya. In this chapter the links between a liberal democratic conception of citizenship education and higher education policy texts and discourses in Kenya guided the analysis.

A historical snapshot illustrates how the development of Kenya into a nation-state is characterised by collectivities, ranging from organised groups to groups merged on the basis of ethnic sympathy as well as political position, which provides constructive insight into the country’s traditions (Ochieng, 1995; Ogot, 1995a; Oucho, 2002). An analysis of the major educational policies and how they have influenced the democratic citizenship processes will highlight the state of university education in Kenya. This way of thinking will help explicate the concept of democratic university education and its underlying influences on the Kenyan citizenry and national development (Eshiwani, 1990; Falola & Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002; Luescher-Mamashela et al., 2011; Mwiria et al., 2007; Oucho, 2002). In the next section I

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9 For further details on and a description of each university, see Mwiria et al. (2007:15). Here I want to just highlight the main Kenyan universities in order to set the scene to talk about the reforms.
shall review colonial and post-colonial education, after which I pay more attention to post-colonial educational policies that highlight the development of higher education in Kenya.

3.2. Colonial Education, Citizenship, Human Rights and Plural Culture

Apprehension about democratic citizenship education in Kenya can be traced to the colonial epochs. Colonial education wanted to educate Africans to achieve liberal democracy, yet the education system was restrictive and limited access to proper education (Wainaina, Arnot & Chege, 2011:180). This section examines colonial education in Kenya to determine the foundations and nature of democratic citizenship for progression in the formulation of higher education thus far. In addition, this section also exposes the colonial legacies that influence democracy in Kenya today. McCulloch (1994:9) notes that some historical encounters (colonial ones) have deep-seated influences on the present political, socio-economic and educational developments in Kenya. A scrutiny of the nature of democracy in its historicity [historical context] will enable a reflexivity that is helpful in the diagnosis of the democratic conception of education in Kenya to date.

Colonial education may have denied Africans in Kenya a sense of community, freedom of speech and equal opportunity to participate in building the nation. Colonial education was racially segregated into white, Asian and black schools (Republic of Kenya, 1976:xiii). The system regarded Africans as inferior beings – an African adult brain was regarded as equivalent to that of a seven- or eight-year-old white child, and for this reason education was structured in such a way that it did not strain the African brain (Republic of Kenya, 1976:xiii; Wallbank, 1938:251). Africans were viewed as having less intellectual capacity; therefore limited educational aims were projected in training teachers to teach what was necessary. In this sense, colonial education was structured so as to stereotype and dehumanise Africans in order to locate the imperialist (colonialist) as a superior race (Chege, 2009:55; Eshiwani, 1990:3; Wallbank, 1938).

Colonisation in Kenya lasted from 1895 to 1963 (Chege, 2009:55; Ochieng & Atieno-Odhiambo, 1995:xiv). It aimed to civilise Africans and capture the land, along with the people, so that the colonisers would have power over the raw material and manpower for the economic prosperity of the countries from which the colonial masters originated (Wallbank, 1938). For the British to achieve this, they formulated education for Kenyans to suit their
oppressive needs. In this regard, the education system promoted the learning of practical/vocational skills to provide cheap labour for the colonial industries and to sustain colonial interests (Boit & Kipkoech, 2012:34; Chege, 2009; Wallbank, 1938; Yakaboski & Nolan, 2011:2).

The colonial education for the Africans (Kenyans) equipped them to obey the instructions of the coloniser so that they would be suppressed and subordinate. The system ensured that Kenyans were not encouraged to question the operations of the colonial masters (Chege, 2009:56). In addition, the education was constructed in a particular way to improve the practical skills and attributes of Kenyans so that they could be productive in ways that were determined by the colonisers. In a sense, Kenyans had no freedom of choice and equal rights to education. Kenyans were denied their sense of community. Colonialism divided Africans in such a way that ethnic differences were manipulated to keep the various communities apart so that the British would not face resistance from solidarity among the Africans and therefore could rule (Eshiwani, 1990:3). The Africans viewed colonial education as materialistic, since for them to be educated assured them of material gain; Africans therefore went to school to copy the European lifestyle, which was viewed as a personal achievement. This kind of education does not display the kind of human interaction that Habermas’s inter-subjective sense of belonging in communication among humans as equals suggests. It does not show how a sense of belonging to the human community displays the right to have rights, especially rendering equal opportunities for Kenyan African to choose the kind of education they needed for the integration of their voices. Colonial education denied Africans higher education – an education system that could bring out their potential and enhance their critical thinking abilities. As a result, Habermas’s, Rawls’s and Benhabib’s perspectives on democratic education that prepares citizens for cultivating their capacities were not cultivated.

Kenya’s system of African education was entrusted to the missionaries. The major focus of this education was on building character and discipline (Chege, 2009:56; Muricho & Chang’ach, 2013:218; Wallbank, 1938:525; Wamagatta, 2008:3). This kind of emphasis was to ensure that all Africans were educated to weaken tribal beliefs and train people so that they would not to question the political system and would be obedient to instructions – this meant blind patriotism (Wallbank, 1938:526). The criteria determining access to colonial
institutions also bore similar restrictive characteristics. For instance, the 7-4-2-3\textsuperscript{10} system of education restricted students to spending seven years in primary school, four years in secondary school and two years in advanced secondary, and then three in a higher education programme. This system of education continued in Kenya even after independence, until the year 1980. The 7-4-2-3 system of education was controlled by strict policies and entrance examinations and high school fees, which meant Kenyan Africans were kept out of the higher education system (Republic of Kenya, 1965:21; Yakaboski & Nolan, 2011:3), since they could not afford to pay. Many dropped out of school after lower levels of learning to work in manual labour jobs. This resulted in access problems in higher education, which still is the case today.

Higher education in colonial days had limited projections and objectives for education. Education for Africans was limited to teaching them what they could do as labourers on the white highland farms (Wallbank, 1938:521). Africans were denied equal opportunities to own property. Only their white counterparts could have land. In this regard there was no use for training Africans to become modern farmers, since they could not be farmers in their own homeland (Republic of Kenya, 1964:22; Wallbank, 1938:524). It was only in the teaching profession that African voices were heard. There was no form of education formulated to help Africans enter other professional fields. Thus, African education was limited.

Colonial education was accompanied by intolerance. This is because religious attitudes were used to shape African education and neglect the tribal components that created cohesion among them. As such, Christianity was introduced to abolish African culture, leaving the African natives alienated from their own way of life and respect. Considerations of differences in religion and culture were not considered in colonial African education (Republic of Kenya, 1965:24). In this regard, religion and missionaries played a major role in teaching and propagating morality and discipline in the schools. This does not mean that missionary schools were used entirely for manipulative purposes, but what was initially intended for the purposes of spiritual development was rapidly used as a tool for colonisation. As such, freedom of speech in schools was non-negotiable and Kenyans who attended

\textsuperscript{10} This is the old structure of education – seven years’ primary education, four years’ secondary education, two years’ higher education and three years’ minimum university education. Insufficient technical education was provided at the primary, secondary and higher levels and the amount of success at each level was based on an examination, which took little or no consideration of a child’s progressive growth at school. The system relied mostly on rote learning and memorisation (Republic of Kenya, 1984:v).
mission schools were to adhere strictly to what they were told by the nuns who managed the schools. Subsequently, students were not permitted to ask questions, even if there was a need for them to do so, and they were to take instructions as delivered by the nuns (Muingai, 2002:5). Muingai (2002:4), who experienced this kind of education, recalls:

In the 18th Century formal schools were established in Kenya by the church missionary society at Rabai near Mombasa in the Coast province. This was the start of formal western education in Kenya. Schools were started as a means of Christian evangelism but later developed to be an instrument to produce skilled labour for the white settlers, farms and clerks for the colonial administration.

British education forced new identities upon Kenyans, states Muingai (2002:3):

With the British control all Kenyans felt the need to identify with what was considered to be Western or British and to sacrifice a lot of cultural and traditional beliefs that our forefathers had taught the younger generation ... Changing of names to acquire British identities because the African names were so difficult to pronounce the British changed African names, this brought about identity crisis in the sense that one had to bear different names while at school and another while at home. So one had to be two different people at different locations because of education....

When Muingai (2002) returned home from boarding school, she found it very difficult to fit in at her own home. Education during the colonial period led to some forms of alienation in that Kenyans lost their identities as a result of the colonial manipulation. Colonial educators did not consider Kenyans as a people who had a particular way of life. They did not take time to learn the African way of life, nor to see them as humans who had potential. In consequence of this, they imposed their culture on Africans without any consideration of the Africans’ culture or sense of humanity. Muingai’s (2002) experience exemplifies this, as her name was changed for the purpose of making the life of the coloniser easier. Although this does not mean that there was nothing good in colonial education, what I want to emphasise is the fact that colonial education, inasmuch as it had a goal to civilise Africans, did not take certain contexts into consideration; for instance, the fact that Africans had communicative potential and could reason for their voices to be heard. The British colonialists wanted to bring their own kind of education into Africa, but only in a limited form to train human resources for
their own industries and to build their own colonies without maximising the African potential.

The foundations of higher education in Kenya can be traced back to Makerere University in Uganda, which was founded in 1922 during British colonial rule as a technical college for African students from the East African countries of Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania. The universities at this time focused mostly on teacher training, carpentry, building technology, motor mechanics, medical care, agriculture and veterinary services. Makerere University became a university of East Africa offering degrees from the University of London.

The first Kenyan higher education institution was the Royal Technical College of East Africa, which was established in 1956 to provide instruction leading to a higher national certificate offered in Britain and to prepare matriculated students for full-time study at university. The Technical College became a university in 1961. Due to nationalistic pressure from Kenya and Uganda, the University of East Africa was dissolved and three different universities were established in Kenya and Tanzania. In Kenya, the University College of Nairobi became the University of Nairobi – the first public university in Kenya.

Enough has been said to show that colonial education denied Africans (in Kenya) a sense of belonging, communicative freedom, and equal rights to education and public engagement in developing the nation. This is explicated in the racially segregated education that toned down African education to the production of manual labourers. The next section provides an analysis of post-colonial education.

3.3. Post-Colonial Education, Citizenship and Democracy

Post-colonial education followed shortly after World War 2, when African leaders realised that the prevailing western colonialism was seriously undermining and destroying the African social infrastructure and humanistic traditional values (Bell, 2002:37). Africans, including Kenyans, needed to reclaim their identity, independence and governance. They needed to regain their sense of belonging to African humanism. In doing this, Kenya held on to the ideology of political socialism to plan the nation, including her education system. African traditions, culture and ways of life had been really battered and this brought about a yearning for an emotive attachment to the kind of freedom Kenyans longed to achieve (Bell, 2002:39;
Maxon, 1995:126). There also was a need for Kenyans to revive their sense of human dignity and the relevance of the Kenyan cultural heritage. Cultural heritage refers to ‘[a] unique way of life peculiar to a people, encompassing social institutions, values, norms and ethics as well as attire and various forms of artistic and literary expression’ (Maxon, 1995:139). It was pictured that independence would provide Kenyans with the space to express their autonomy, their unique diversity, their artefacts, songs, art, dance, theatre, literature and other traditions.

Western humanism emphasises liberation and education, while African humanism is rooted in traditional values of mutual respect and a sense of position in the social, natural and cosmic order and dependence on community (Bell, 2002:40; Gyekye, 1995:47). Human dignity and welfare are core concerns of post-colonial education.

In the same vein, this section attempts to situate citizenship education in universities in Kenya after independence – the period from 1963 to date. Earlier I defined citizenship education as comprising three interrelated concepts, namely a sense of belonging, human interaction and public reasoning [refer to Chapter 2]. Citizenship as a sense of belonging is concerned with collectivities that create a feeling of belonging. Human interaction denotes free and equal opportunities for individuals to participate in learning; and public reasoning means being able to engage with the other in a [cognitive] rational argumentative manner to persuade, convince and enable others to reach a consensus about a particular issue of public interest. In Chapter 2 I examined how Rawls illustrates the above components of DCE. Rawlsian citizenship education depicts a procedural manner for developing justice as fairness, and encapsulates certain principles of justice for public engagement in developing policies, rules and laws for public education. Also illustrated was Habermas’s theory of communicative action, which embraces teleological encounters to reach an understanding in developing educational concerns in the public sphere. Most significant was Habermas’s idea of a communicative act as a means of solving the problems of public education. Another perspective was Benhabib’s ideas on democratic iteration – talking back as a means of reflexive dialogue in resolving human rights issues, including cosmopolitan imagination for conceptualising citizenship in both private and public education. Benhabib’s idea of talking back is ideal for democratic education. Accordingly, I will examine how education policy in Kenya resembles or differs from the conceptualisation of liberal DCE.
Earlier education policy documents in Kenya illustrate that university education focused on socio-economic and manpower development to eradicate poverty, ignorance and disease (Republic of Kenya, 1976:83). In comparison to the current national policy on university education -University Act No. 42 of 2012- prominently recommend democratic education in the university. This policy document is a supplement Act in the Kenyan Gazette. In this document, education is described to achieve specific objectives such as: inclusion; promotion of equality of persons mostly with disability, minority and other marginalised groups; also is the realisation of national economic and social development; promote highest standards in quality of teaching and research, fostering the capacity for critical thinking and promoting gender balance and equality, promoting cultural and social life of society and promotion of learning among student and society at large (Republic of Kenya, 2012). However, following Cavell (1971), there is little wrong with an argument of assuming responsibility. In this light, participants in higher education should be held responsible for their capabilities to change societal impediments to higher education like violence.

The importance of such considerations becomes particularly evident when account is taken of the plurality within Kenyan society and the unfolding policies that have informed university education over time (Munene, 2013). Currently, the University Act of 2012 is a national act that guides universities in Kenya; however, each university has developed its own policies that guide it. The continuum found in the current national policy is a reflection of the values reflected in the Kenyan Vision 2030, which in turn contains a translation of NEPAD’s efforts towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals.

The concept of citizenship is rooted in the idea of the individual as a participant in a democratic polity, and this requires an understanding and acceptance of human rights (Benhabib, 2011a; Habermas, 1987a; Osler & Starkey, 2000:4; Rawls, 1971). Human rights enable opportunities for decision making and social interaction in democratic societies, thereby encouraging the equality of all individuals as guided by the countries’ constitutions and policies. These legal statuses enable human dignity and fundamental freedoms, duties and responsibilities (Osler & Starkey, 2003:4; Rawls, 1971).

Currently education policies in Kenya highlight inclusion, human rights, freedom of conscience, freedom from want, ignorance and disease, equality of opportunity, equal distribution of resources, social justice and human dignity (Republic of Kenya, 1965; 1981;
yet the gap between the rich and the poor, who live without proper education, is alarming. Wawire et al. (2008:1) note that education plays an important role in equipping individuals with skills that enable them to participate fully as citizens in society. Their study reveals that, ‘[w]hile [the] Kenyan education system is designed to shape young people’s consciousness, varying schooling experiences based on socio-cultural and geographical divides determine the level to which they are able to enjoy their citizenship rights and see possibilities of achieving full citizenship’ (Wawire et al., 2008:1). This is a legacy that was inherited from the colonial education system, which segregated access to education along racial lines and at the same time divided Kenyans into separate geographical locations in order to rule (Eshiwani, 1990:18).

Another problem that influenced the implementation of education policies in Kenya was the language problem, since English was introduced as the language used in academia and many hence students were disadvantaged. The curriculum inherited from colonial education had contents that did not relate to the needs of Africans. This led to the development of the Kenyan Institute of Education (KIE) to develop a relevant curriculum. This has also been problematic. However, the use of English as the language of instruction in Kenya has facilitated international relations and Kenyans therefore do not require course materials to be translated.

Kenya’s higher education has gone through various transformations in its setting, policy and management, and even in the way universities are governed. The transformation process has posed several challenges to the access to and quality, relevance and expansion of higher education. Mwiria (2007:2-3) describes it as follows:

From a policy perspective, issues of quality, relevance and employment were compounded by the confused state of legislation of governing universities. Each public university in Kenya had their own act, dating back to its date of foundation, but they are also affected by numerous pieces of sectorial legislation that created a situation in the ministry of education. Ministry of education was not the sole institution of government responsible for all matters of higher education.

Consequently, the current policy on education targets key reform areas, namely: i) governance/management, ii) quality/relevance, iii) expansion/integration, iv) access/equity, v) financial/management, and vii) community service and engagement with society (Mwiria,
According to Mwiria (2007:33), members of the communities that made the earliest and more stable contacts with European settlers, missionaries and colonial authorities have enjoyed greater access to formal higher education opportunities than their counterparts in other regions, with students from arid and semi-arid areas being underrepresented in public universities.

**National Education, Identity and Conflicts**

By 1964, Kenya had developed a rationale for national education, which was based on the anomalies and imbalances that were generated by the colonial system of education. At this time, nationality was the basic and safe vocabulary that created a sense of belonging among Kenyans. On this foundation of independence *[uhuru*, literally meaning freedom in Swahili], the new Kenyan government was ripe with ideas about education for a new nation.

Educational planning was anchored in the concepts and philosophy of African democratic socialism (Chege, 2009; Muingai, 2002:1; Ochieng, 1995:91; Republic of Kenya: 1964:1; 1965). Based on democratic socialism, the education system was expected to lead to economic advantages for and the social advancement of all citizens. The principles that guided this process were to: ‘i) draw from the best of African traditions; ii) be adaptable to new and rapidly changing circumstances; and iii) not rest for its success on a satellite relationship with any other country or group countries’ (Republic of Kenya, 1964:3). Democratic education took the form of Africanisation from the traditional sense to provide a background in which education was to carry the task of creating a politically free and equal society in which respect is considered more highly than economic wealth.

African education in Kenya during this period meant that education would draw from African traditions, with their essential ideas of mutual social responsibility and political democracy – where each member of society was equal in his/her political rights – and that no individual member or group was to be permitted to exert undue influence on the policies of the State. This idea seems to have arisen from the emotional abuse and torture that colonial Kenya experienced that denied Kenyans their sense of human dignity and potentialities to advance through formal education.
Based on the fact that colonial education manipulated wealth and did not allow Africans to have their own property, by 1964, the Kenyan government had endeavoured to create equal opportunities, rights and responsibilities, including the right to equal possession of property. Education was seen as a means that would aid the process, and as a redress process. On the achievement of independence, Kenyans recognised the need to build a national culture that would reflect and promote national unity, pride and patriotism (Maxon, 1995:126). There was a need to fix the erosion of Kenyans’ identity that had taken place during the colonial period and led to Kenyans being regarded as ‘primitive’ people. Next, I will briefly examine how democratic citizenship education is depicted in the various policies that guided education in higher learning.

The contemporary policy guiding public higher Education in Kenya is found in Sessional Paper no. 14 of 2012 on reforming education and training (Republic of Kenya, 2012a). The philosophy that drives education in Kenya also aims to ‘instil patriotism, equality, honesty, mutual respect and high moral standards’ (Republic of Kenya, 2012b:18). Subsequently, present-day reforms and innovation in education in Kenya have encompassed free primary and secondary education, which have aided the country to achieve progress in reaching the goal of education for all, as depicted in the Millennium Development Goals. Presently, the reform focus in university education includes access, retention, equity, quality, relevance and the overall efficiency of the education sector. Indicators to attain such objectives should reflect on regional equality, demographic dynamics, macroeconomic performance and the elimination of poverty, as set out in the University Act No 42 of 2012 (Republic of Kenya, 2012c).

### 3.4. Setting the Agenda for Policy Analysis

Policy is the formulation, endorsement and operation of a plan of action approved by law in the public or private sector (Bogenschneider & Corbett, 2010:3). Policy analysis is a combination of diverse concepts and theories. Examining policies requires an investigation of the macro-level policy and micro-level policy development, especially those aspects that entail feedback and the response of stakeholders to the enactment and implementation of policy (Ball, 2006:43). Ball (2006) highlights the complexity of policy analysis and admits that it is a messy process. Policy takes different forms and processes, inter alia rationalisation, dialogue and writing. Policy is not enacted from without, but is intertwined with the contrast...
between structure and agency (Ball, 2006:43). Ball’s perspective brings to the fore the understanding of policy analysis as a contested terrain that ranges between policy as a text and policy as a discourse, and the impact and effects it creates. In keeping with this understanding, the analysis will consider textual and discourse policy to provide a thick description.

Rizvi and Lingard (2010:45) note that there is no recipe for carrying out policy analysis in education. They suggest that an appropriate approach to policy analysis would depend on where it is developed and the nature and kind of policy being analysed. I will analyse educational policies in Kenya to understand why they were developed at particular times, what their analytical assumptions were and the effects they might have had on the Kenyan education system (cf. Rizvi & Lingard, 2010:45). The analysis in this chapter will take a deconstructive turn in relation to the problem constructed by the policies’ content; the values articulated in the policies in relation to democratic citizenship education; production processes; policy actors and processes of advocacy; and policy allocation, dissemination, implementation and evaluation. It will explore how policies are developed and how they are enacted. In addition, I will focus on how human interactions, public reasoning and engagement have been enacted and implemented in policy development in Kenyan higher education. I will take cognisance of the fact that policy as a text relies on commitment, understanding, capability, resources, practical limitations, cooperation, intertextuality and compatibility (Ball, 2006:46). In examining policy as a discourse I will look at the language used, and the concepts and vocabularies that are available for DCE.

I will highlight the colonial values and processes that determined higher education in Kenya, as well as the independent Kenyan policies. I do this to illuminate the links and continuity between the transitions. After independence, the Kenyan government reformed education through the development of commissions, recommendations, sessional papers and education acts to integrate opportunities for citizens to move away from the segregation of colonial education. To further understand the educational transition in the Kenyan education system, it is necessary to examine a variety of commissions that were set up to bring about certain changes that the government deemed fit to improve education. This brings me to an analysis of educational change in Kenya from the colonial period until the present day.
Due to colonial manipulation, the post-colonial government sought to reform education to meet the needs of Kenyans. This led the government to set up major inquiries to look at ways and means to achieve the national education policy, objectives and reforms in education. These policies include: i) the Kenya Education Commission 1964 [the Ominde Commission]\(^{11}\); ii) the National Committee on Educational Objectives and Policy 1976 [the Gachathi Commission]; the Presidential Working Party on Second University 1981 [the Mackay Commission]; and the Totally Integrated Quality Education and Training 1999 [Koech Commission]\(^{12}\). In addition, among the education acts that have contributed to development and reform in higher education in Kenya are the Education Act of 1980, the University Act of 2012, and Vision 2030.

3.4.1. Kenya Education Commission Report 1964 (The Ominde Commission)

The Kenya Education Commission Report of 1964 was the first national report in Kenya. It reported on the whole of national education in the country. I will not focus entirely on the content of the report, but would like to highlight how the report presents democratic citizenship education, especially in relation to higher education. This report noted that the concept of national education enabled the Kenyan constitutional law to legalise equal rights for all citizens, unhindered by considerations of race, tribe or religion. The report acknowledged that the concept of unity [\textit{harambee}\(^{13}\)] became apparent with nationhood.

\(^{11}\) The focus on enrolment in schools became central to the achievement of the developmental goals that were to be achieved. Shortly after independence, the government appointed a commission chaired by Professor S.H. Ominde to survey the existing educational resources and advise the government on an elaborate and systematic plan of action for future schooling and policy. This commission recommended nationalistic thinking on education for Kenya (Maxon, 1995:126). The nationalistic education was aimed at reducing the manipulation of education by missionaries, thereby enabling the expansion of secular education that could respect other faiths of communities and individuals. However, the missionaries were still given the opportunity to run their schools alongside national schools. This was so because, by this time, education in Kenya required a new content.

\(^{12}\) The four reports of the three national commissions were named after the chairmen of the committees, viz. Ominde (1964), Gachathi (1976), Mackay (1981) and Koech (1999).

\(^{13}\) Another notion that was introduced to make schools a reality was the notion of \textit{harambee} schools (see Maxon, 1995:126 and Eshiwani, 1990:3). \textit{Harambee} refers to cost sharing or cooperation in education costs between government and the local communities where the schools are situated. \textit{Harambee} is a Swahili word that literally means, ‘let us pull together’, which was a communal ideology used by Kenyans in the local communities before the arrival of the colonial masters. For instance, Kenyan communities worked together to nurture and cultivate values in children in the community. Thus the discipline of a child in Kenyan society was the responsibility of everyone in the community. In this sense, the communities mapped the need for secondary schools in their region, built the schools and contributed funding to run the schools. When Jomo Kenyatta called upon Kenyans to ‘pull together’ their efforts to build schools in the \textit{harambee} spirit, it was not surprising that their response was a quick one, since this was a notion they were familiar with. This led to striking success in the development of secondary schools, which grew rapidly. During this period, skilled manpower became available that was seen as adequate to Africanise the public service. Thus, African teachers became readily available to take up
However, it noted that the various transformations caused by the divisive influences of the colonial past, such as the attitudes and habits of the colonial system, were going to linger longer than expected. As such, the committee noted that education would be the solution to breaking away from the past, and that this required time. Another problem that faced Kenya was limited manpower to take up colonial positions, because colonial education did not equip Africans to handle certain administrative positions. Due to this, national education was needed to educate and equip citizens with skills to take up the new challenges that the young nation faced.

The committee acknowledged the community concept of cooperation [harambee], in the sense that students were to be encouraged to play responsible roles to build the community, yet they had to struggle with the colonial legacy of competition. The committee members travelled around the country in order to include everyone in decision making towards a national cooperative education (Republic of Kenya, 1964:24). Their observations of the learning conditions of students revealed impoverished and poor infrastructure and insufficient learning materials, and for this reason education was structured with socio-economic purposes towards development; however, the poor learning conditions remain a problem even now. The idea therefore was that post-colonial education was to eradicate poverty, disease and ignorance. The social role of education was partly to render citizens adaptable to change from African colonial education to a free and independent society, and at the same time to educate them for social equality in society. This meant that every citizen was to have an equal opportunity and responsibility to contribute to and in education and to do away with the divisive colonial legacy of segregation.

The national education report also indicated the need to Africanise education, in terms of which traditional social values that were not yet blended were to be reconciled with modernity to form a truly African version of modern society. It was noted that this would take a toll on the older generation, but with adult education in place it would accelerate the process. The committee suggested cooperation with the British government to continue the process of building higher education in Kenya through Makerere University; this, they noted, required friendship and cooperation without colonialism or imperialism.

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In essence, the national education commission report of 1964 saw education in Kenya as a function that fostered nationhood and promoted national unity; served citizens without prejudice; enabled tolerance through respect of religious differences; respected and promoted the cultural traditions of the people of Kenya; encouraged responsibility in cooperation; used education as a tool to foster respect for the traditional beliefs of others; and served as an instrument for conscious change of attitudes and relationships towards modern thinking on nationhood; education therefore was to serve national development and to help promote social equality, social responsibility and respect for humans, and to help citizens adapt to change.

The Ominde Commission was one of the landmark educational policies that influenced educational progression in Kenya. The objective of free primary education became policy and socioeconomic aspiration was accepted as national policy in education, even though it was noted that it would take time to achieve; as a result, the notion of universal primary education became policy. The government recommended that universal free education be expanded in primary schools where the enrolments fell short of the national average. The commission also recommended the incorporation of a single curriculum, but with different fee structures, since Kenya was characterised by racial division in the schooling system (Eshiwani, 1990:3-4; Maxon, 1995:126).

The recommendations made by this commission were implemented in the government planning documents that were used in the first years after independence. By 1970, shortly after independence, it was realised that African socialism in the form of free primary education would lead the country to ruin. The notion of universal education therefore was replaced by the need to develop secondary education if the expansion and development of the nation was to be realised through the development of skilled manpower. The expansion of secondary schools was rapidly realised during this period as a prerequisite for well-skilled manpower.

Government efforts in policy formulation still faced some criticism; for instance, in relation to the inappropriateness of the curriculum and the inherited regional imbalances in schools and enrolment (Maxon, 1995:131). The improvement in the education system was largely linear, since it did not consider the structural changes in the education system (Maxon, 1995). This was evident in the kind of curriculum that was used in schools. The curriculum was seen
to contain colonial perspectives and only prepared ‘experts’ for white-collar jobs, leaving the majority of graduates unequipped for public service. This led to the need for educational change to prepare graduates not only for white-collar jobs, but also to take initiative in their life after school, and to create their own jobs.

### 3.4.2. Sessional Paper no. 10 of 1965

Another landmark policy that influenced the education system in Kenya was the Sessional Paper no. 10 of 1965, in which education was viewed first as an economic value rather than a social service, which meant that education was established as a means of relieving the shortage of domestic skilled manpower and equalising economic opportunities among all citizens (Eshiwani, 1990:6). The goals and objectives of this policy were to fight poverty, disease and ignorance; mobilise resources for rapid economic growth and social progress; promote greater individual and community awareness of better health practice; and to balance the growth of the agriculture industry between urban and rural areas (Republic of Kenya, 1965:9). These objectives still remain a challenge in Kenya due to political inequality in most national planning, and the fact that social justice and human dignity remain problematic, since there still are tribal conflicts and violence across the country. The outcome of the major reforms in education in Kenya has been the creation of more problems, for instance recurring poverty, ethnic conflicts, violence and discord in politics, and educational mediocrity. Major parts of the country have no access to proper health care (Muricho & Chang’ach, 2013:124). The political elites in Kenya have interfered in educational reforms, forcing their way in to solve problems away from what education ought to be. In other words, the political elites have excluded the majority of stakeholders from sharing ideas and playing their roles in developing education in Kenya, resulting in the messy situation Kenya is in today.

### 3.4.3. The Education Act of 1968

The Education Act of 1968 put the responsibility for education in the hands of the minister for education and instituted various organs for the organisation and management of education at all levels. It was only in 1970 that the University of Nairobi Act was established to enable the University of Nairobi to become a national university. During this period, education was conceptualised as engendering the ‘Kenyanisation’ of education in the country, and expanding much-needed manpower skills to enhance development. Thus, the establishment of vocational schools to provide vocational skills was central to the educational themes so
that the Kenyan economy would rise and bring social balance and equality of educational opportunities for national integration and progress in Kenya (Eshiwani, 1990:6). The result of this Act was that the production of manpower was more than the labour market could cope with. The consequence was a mass of graduates who were unemployed. This problem still lingers in the country today. Could the objectives have been better if stakeholders were involved in the planning? What kinds of skills were taught at these institutions that left graduates without innovative skills for self-employment?

3.4.4. Report of the National Committee on Educational Objectives and Policies 1976 (the Gachathi Commission)

The Gachathi Commission was charged with the role ‘to evaluate education in Kenya and define [a] new set of educational goals for the second decade of independence and formulate [a] specific programme of action for achieving those goals’ (Republic of Kenya, 1976:vii). This report was to form part of the sessional paper and policy statement on education by the government. The committee held several meetings and conducted interviews in various parts of Kenya in order to have a national account of education. The government of Kenya supported the committee with a range of technical and professional resources. Members of public were engaged in this review process. The committee reported that cooperation and initiatives were already in place and supported access to formal education. However, they noted that the institutions had not changed; students were still prepared more for white-collar jobs, yet were poorly equipped to deal with the socio-economic development of the young nation. The result was a waste of human resources and disparities in development (Republic of Kenya, 1976:xviii).

In an effort to evaluate national education, the Gachathi Commission found that very little had been done to integrate and implement the national ideals of harambee [cooperation] with formal learning in the country. Harambee means that the social development of the nation depends on every citizen’s contribution within his/her potentiality to build national cohesion.

Another hindrance to the communal sense of belonging that was intended to inculcate an African cultural tradition was the colonial legacy that left parents ingrained in an academic and performativity spirit, which meant that teaching social values was overlooked so that students could pass exams and meet the demand for the socio-economic returns that parents were expecting from formal schooling. The committee recognised that imparting national
unity and development needed education about a national and international consciousness of the regional inequalities that encourage nations to motivate learning for socio-economic purposes. Therefore, the commission recommended the continuous promotion of national unity, the removal of social and regional inequalities to create international consciousness, and to conceptualise education with an emphasis on adaptability and relevance to the real-life situation in Kenya.

In building mutual social responsibility, the commission noted that this was the recognition and an extension of the African family spirit of cooperation. In this regard, the committee recommended the following: i) to develop the talents and personalities of individuals within the context of reciprocal social responsibility; ii) to develop those being educated into useful citizens capable of and motivated towards contributing to improving the nation; iii) to instil positive attitudes in students towards a cooperative effort and mutual social responsibility through an encouraging approach. In relation to social values and ethics, the committee recommended: vi) the teaching of religion and social ethics in the education system as a basis for the continued survival and enhancement of the quality of life of society. In promoting cultural values, the recommendation was to identify traditional methodologies and theories and to integrate such rational education into modern educational practices for lifelong continuing education.

University education in Kenya was recommended as tertiary or post-secondary education (Republic of Kenya, 1976:79). Nairobi University and its constituent, Kenyatta University College, were the main sources of university education that provided manpower for the country. This illustrates the extent to which such education would allow for the participation of citizens in developing the country instead of being spectators. The committee found that the universities had inadequate governance and management to coordinate the various ministries to participate in facilitating the activities of universities. In this regard they recommended a permanent Commission on Higher Education that would advise the government, plan curricula and finance higher education (Republic of Kenya, 1976:87). University education was perceived as essential for advancing knowledge and human welfare through the cultivation of reason, free inquiry and dialogue to create a sense of dedication and personal and social advancement. It is my view that such an understanding of education would promote capacity building that would enable democratic ideals. This period was marked by the planned and controlled expansion of university education. After independence,
Kenyan higher education was provided free of charge in an effort to ensure access and the production of manpower to replace the colonialists in the labour force (Yakaboski & Nolan, 2011:6). Free higher education ended in 1974 and was replaced by student loans to cover other costs apart from tuition fees. The implementation of loan schemes failed because the government had not planned how the loans were to be repaid. The University of Nairobi was the dominant university between the years 1963 and 1984 (Boit & Kipkoech, 2012:33).

3.4.5. The National Council for Science and Technology Act of 1978

The next major development was the establishment of the National Council for Science and Technology Act in 1978, which was focused on the coordination of research in science and technology and also had to guide the government on relevant policy matters. This Act was founded on democratic values such as dialogue among stakeholders, including researchers, society and scientists. It also aimed to cultivate cooperation between the public and the private sector. Allocations of resources are made according to agreed-upon priorities for the benefit of all. It also enables capacity building by enabling an appropriate environment for research, training and knowledge application (Muricho & Chang’ach, 2013; Republic of Kenya, 1978). This Act conceptualises universities as places of democratic action through cooperative ventures in knowledge production and community development. However, there still is difficulty in operationalising the objectives of science and technology in Kenya. This is because higher education in Kenya is coordinated by different ministries, and therefore is cumbersome to manage. For instance, the interaction, collaboration and communication between the ministries paralyse the purpose of establishing the goals in a democratic sense. Some of the challenges contributing to this failure are the high rate of population growth and the hierarchical state of institutional governance.


The Mackay Commission was appointed to review the government’s implementation of the establishment of a second university that had been proposed by the Gachathi Commission. The former commission was established in 1981. The commission reiterated the national objectives contained in the Kenya African National Union (KANU) manifesto, Sessional Paper no. 10 of 1965 and the national development plans (Republic of Kenya, 1981:5). The objectives range from: political equality, human dignity, including equality of opportunity, to
freedom of conscience, freedom from want, ignorance and disease, and equal distribution of income. On these premises, the commission developed a rationale for a second university along with the one that existed at the time [the University of Nairobi] to provide greater access to university education. Another reason for this development was to increase the economic agenda for improving the rural areas of the country. As a result, the university they proposed was to be built in the rural areas, away from the national capital, to improve access by those living in the already marginalised areas of the country, which mostly are perceived as arid areas.

As such, the most important objectives for the second university were to foster national unity, serve the needs for national development, and equip the youth with the knowledge, skills and expertise necessary to play a collective and effective role in ensuring equal opportunities for using individual talents and personalities. Social justice and morality were also depicted as important for developing the right attitude for social obligations and responsibilities. In line with the aforementioned objectives, I will not concentrate on the entire terms of reference for this commission, but will review the philosophical framework that informed the commission in order to diagnose how citizenship education was conceptualised.

The university as an institution was viewed by this commission as a centre for the search for truth in relation to major problems faced by human society and to discover solutions to them. It was also seen as a place where intellectualism was cultivated by training rational citizens of good character, with creative minds and strong convictions, as well as critical abilities in studying human culture universally, and promoting and radiating humanity. Another main function of the university as depicted by this commission was to provide professional training for social development – in such a way that students can maintain a balance between skills, knowledge and correct attitudes.

In relation to cultural heritage, the second university was seen as a place for the regeneration of human values and the development of cultural values. This is because the colonial legacy left behind western values and ways of life, to the extent that Kenyans seemed to have discarded their traditional African values and modes of life. In this vein, universities were seen as possible places where the cultural values that survived colonial manipulation should be preserved and promoted through rigorous research and communication with the youth.
Regarding national development, the university was viewed by this commission as a place where national unity, identity and community service would take precedence by focusing on respect as a common denominator and component that ran through all the communities found in Kenya. It should also promote social values such as responsibility, self-discipline and confidence among students at the university to enable them to live effectively as citizens in their own society. Following the awareness that the Kenyan population was growing, an increase was needed in access to relevant knowledge to help the country resolve some of the predicted problems. For this to be realised, the commission described universities as places where students can be trained so that they can produce practical solutions to the ever-increasing problems of society. In essence, university education should provide students with the ability to fulfil social responsibilities, as well as the expertise and skills to tackle the problems of society.

In essence, the philosophical and conceptual guidelines proposed by this commission were: i) the university must plan its teaching to continuously be adaptive to Kenyan ideological and pragmatic development aspirations; ii) universities should produce graduates who freely interact with people, live comfortably in their own society in rural areas, are effective in serving all, and are innovative and committed; iii) the curriculum should adequately prepare graduates for professional disciplines with sound knowledge of and skills for their society to appreciate humanity and Kenyan aspirational and national goals; and iv) the university, through research, should relate to societal needs in a reciprocal, continuous and positive dialogue to address the relevant national problems.

### 3.4.7. The 8-4-4 System of Education - 1984

The 8-4-4 system of education was and still is a significant education policy in Kenya. It created major changes in the Kenyan education system in 1985 and the impact is still felt today (Muchiro & Chang’ach, 2013:123). It replaced the colonial 7-4-2-3 system of education. The 8-4-4 system of education meant that learners would spend eight years in primary schooling, four years in secondary schooling and four years at university. At the end of every schooling level, students were envisaged to be equipped with the necessary skills to be self-reliant and to be able to create jobs or be self-employed. At the end of primary school, students received the Kenya Primary Certificate of Education (KCPE), after secondary school
the Kenya Secondary Certificate of Education (KCSE), and then university degree qualifications thereafter.

The 8-4-4 system of education was one of the recommendations of the Mackay Commission, and was subsequently implemented in 1982 (Republic of Kenya, 1985:1). The rationale for developing this policy was the challenge of national development, the need for a more relevant curriculum and the equitable distribution of education resources, the need for technical and vocational training, assessment and evaluation, increased opportunities for further training and education for national unity. The focus on university education in the 8-4-4 system of education aimed to

i) produce mature and conscientious graduates with the ability and desire to help with the country’s national development,

ii) provide national service and development that reflect the national cultural heritage,

iii) develop and transmit knowledge and skills through research and training at undergraduate and postgraduate levels,

iv) foster national consciousness and unity,

v) preserve knowledge and stimulate the intellectual life, cultural development and manpower relevant for national needs (Republic of Kenya, 1984:8).

The conceptions of DCE found in this system were its articulation of cultural development, even though respect for diversity was not mentioned. Further, the idea of the equitable distribution of educational resources resonates with Rawls’s second principle of distributive justice [refer to Chapter 2]. Also of importance were the reflective nature of and the iterative manner in which the policy talks back to previous policies as a springboard to develop and redefine the educational needs of the nation further. The implementation was achieved mostly in primary and secondary education, and in the establishment of the second university [Moi University] following the Mackay Commission.

There is speculation about the implementation of this policy. Muricho and Chang’ach (2013:130) note that this system of education faced a lot of criticism, because experts from foreign countries were employed to craft an education system that was in the minds of the president and the political leaders. Parents, teachers and academics were excluded from the planning process. As such, not much research went into the conceptualisation of this policy.
As a result, students became overloaded with work, and worked outside of normal school hours (Republic of Kenya, 1999). Implementation became problematic, since teachers and those at the implementation level were not adequately trained to deal with the curriculum demands. Also, schools in the rural areas were disadvantaged because many learnt in schools built from mud with hardly any resources or qualified manpower to implement the policy requirements.

This policy led to the expansion of post-secondary training institutions. Moi University was established at about the same time as the Commission for Higher Education. The policy aimed to improve the quality of education in Kenya – an aspect that was developed by the Mackay Commission; however, Kenyans resisted the 8-4-4 policy since its formulation did not include the stakeholders. Rather, it was constructed by top experts who neglected the people at grassroots level. For this reason, people resisted and demanded further review (Muricho & Chang’ach, 2013:138). The 8-4-4 system of education was implemented in haste, causing the staggering of students who graduated from secondary education to access university education. There were limited resources to implement this policy, hence quality, access and equality were problematic to implement.

The universities also experienced student strikes that led to their closure for one whole year (1986 to 1987). This meant that there were two sets of graduates from secondary schools who were waiting for university acceptance. This led to an explosion in university intake. Consequently, the universities had a large number of student applicants but limited space available. As a result, middle-level colleges were phased out to accommodate university students. Moi Science Teachers Training College was converted to Moi University, and Siriba Diploma Teachers College and the government training institutes of Maseno University and Kenyatta University took up facilities at the Kasarani international sports centre to accommodate students (Boit & Kipkoech, 2012:36). Even with this expansion, universities were unable to accommodate all the student applicants. There also was a problem of teaching different groups of students together in the same classroom. This necessitated the staggering of admissions for the next intake of students. In addition to this was a shortage of staff with academic qualifications to teach in university programmes. The result was recruiting lower academically qualified personnel with masters’ degrees who had recently graduated from the university to take up teaching positions. Even this did not result in having enough qualified teaching staff to handle the university classrooms, and part-time teaching
staff from polytechnics and private universities were appointed to cut costs. However, this policy has informed the current education policy and Vision 2030, which now guide education in Kenya.

The report of the presidential working party on education and manpower training for the next decade and beyond was the Kamunge Report, 1988. This report focused on improving the financing, quality and relevance of education. The policy of cost sharing between government and communities was introduced. This report also recommended the reduction of the workload that came with the inception of 8-4-4.


The commission of inquiry into the education system of Kenya produced the Koech Report 1999 (Republic of Kenya, 1999). This commission was selected to review the education system in Kenya to expedite the following: national unity; mutual responsibility; accelerated and technological development; and consolidation and enhancement of lifelong learning and adaptation in response to changing circumstances (Republic of Kenya, 1999:xix). The panel on the Koech Commission also was required to recommend the following: possible programmes of action, since the government had limited funding – compared to what was obtainable in the legal framework of education; the structure of the 8-4-4 system of education; the role of the private sector in providing educational opportunities and training; ways to improve continuing education; ways and means of improving accessibility, equity, relevance and quality, with special attention to gender sensitivity and the disabled and disadvantaged groups; suggest ways and means of developing alternative educational programmes and promoting the liberalisation of the education sector, with special reference to the utilisation of the specialised resources of universities and similar institutions as vehicles of accelerated national development. In doing this, the Koech Commission reviewed previous official reports and sessional papers and studied the commissions, committees, working parties and task forces to examine Kenya’s educational system in order to obtain an

14 These perspectives formed the mission statements of the Koech Report. National unity was assumed to be an overarching effort by Kenyans to cooperate in strengthening the state of nationhood. Mutual responsibility refers to the contribution education makes to enable freedom and the willingness of people to exercise their moral obligation for the benefit of all members of society. Accelerated industrial technological development refers to the contribution of and training in making improvements, both qualitatively and quantitatively, in the application of technical advances in industry, with special reference to manufacturing, strengthening and increasing the quality of learning for life (Republic of Kenya, 1999:xxi).
accumulative understanding of the system. They opened up their views for review by the public, and invited expert papers and reviews to enrich their inquiry.

This commission recommended totally integrated quality education and training (TIQET). The commission recommended the provision of education to the marginally gifted, the handicapped and to rural areas. The recommendations also included the liberal ideals of gender equity, equality, governance, human rights – especially the rights to medical and health-care services, most specifically for those with HIV/AIDS, who generally were stigmatised. The recommendations of the Koech Report were different from the other commissions in that they articulated the expansion of access to basic education, the eradication of discrepancies in education based on geographical, social and gender factors, the introduction of practicable curriculum content and modular learning in secondary school, and the intensification of access to education through extended alternative continuing education. The report also recommended flexibility in university admission and in technical education and continuous assessment. One of the recommendations made by this commission that relates well to DCE in higher education is that university education needs to improve studies aimed at improving the youth towards nationhood, as well as moral and ethical studies to practise mutual social responsibility and pursue nationalistic values (Republic of Kenya, 1999:309). The government failed to adopt the report due to cost implications (Muricho & Chang’ach, 2013:131). However, some of its recommendations, such as curriculum rationalisation, were adopted and implemented.

3.4.9. Vision 2030 and a Cosmopolitan University

Vision 2030 contains ideas developed from the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The MDGs are internationally accepted standards for gauging development towards poverty alleviation (Republic of Kenya, 2007:ii). In order to reach the benchmarks of the MDGs, Kenya puts together Vision 2030 as a guiding document to attain the global predictions of economic growth levels in order to comply with world economic development predictions. Much emphasis is put on economic growth at the expense of social-cultural growth, hence the emphasis on science and technology.

Currently, education is being channelled to respond to and be aligned with the new Kenyan constitution and Kenyan Vision 2030 (Republic of Kenya, 2010:74). The main thrust of the
current education policy is strategised to address sustainability and efficiency, to improve financial management and accountability, and to make education in Kenya more relevant and inclusive to enhance the country’s competitiveness regionally and internationally.

The vision for education in Kenya is to offer quality education and training to all Kenyans as a fundamental contribution to the government’s agenda for development. The vision for education in Kenya is directed towards government agendas. That is, citizens are to be educated to embrace entrepreneurship so that they are able to engage in lifelong learning. This means acquiring new knowledge in order to apply complex problem-solving skills, a willingness to take more decisions, and understanding their work and being able to do it without being supervised. Education is envisioned to provide vital tools towards better qualitative reasoning and expository skills.

Kenyan education is conceptualised to create an environment in which learners are equipped with the values, attitudes, knowledge, skills and competencies that will help them to develop the country. Emphasis is placed on competencies in technology, innovation and entrepreneurship, while also enabling citizens to develop their full capacity, live and work in dignity, enhance the quality of their lives and make informed personal, social and political decisions as citizens of the Republic of Kenya.

Recent policies for education in Kenya have been developed comprehensively from a framework of earlier commissions on educational policy task forces, the 2010 Constitution and Vision 2030. This framework is aimed at propagating and cultivating a national system of education that will lead Kenya on the path of national unity, economic growth and self-determination. Current policies in Kenyan education draw ideas from previous policies that encouraged the financing of quality and relevance, accelerating industrial and technological development, promoting lifelong learning and re-aligning education to the constitution and Vision 2030.

Despite the fact that the formulation of Vision 2030 was done through a deliberative process in which most of the population was involved, there is a discrepancy with regard to what audience was part of this formulation. It is also noted that a team of both national and local experts was chosen to develop this vision; it therefore does not reflect the opinions of the
marginalised – those who were robbed of the right to life during the post-election violence (Kibaki, in Republic of Kenya, 2007:ii; Oucho, 2002:105).

Even though the draft of Vision 2030 was completed in 2007, the post-election violence that manifested in 2007 was an indication that something was missing in the conceptualisation of educational policies. Although this was not a new phenomenon, attention had to be paid to the myriad of ethnic conflicts that Kenya had experienced over the years that were regarded as the years of the new democratic dispensation. Consecutive elections in 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007 led to post-election violence that scarred many citizens. Despite the fact that 2012 was considered a free and fair election, Kenya still experienced traces of unrest and violence in Garissa and the coastal regions and beyond (Smith, 2013). For this reason it can be argued that the manifestation of ethnic politics and conflict in Kenya points to the fact that citizenship education has not been manifested in the education system, since the consequences of the lack of it leads to the kind of negative conduct that is displayed in post-election violence.

These circumstances call attention to a re-looking at the kind of citizenship education that could help relinquish this phenomenon that has repeated itself and reclaim the human rights to life, peace and education. It is imagined that rethinking education in Kenya requires a re-imagining of the citizenship education that Kenya offers to its citizens to deal with the political instability in the country and the undemocratic scenarios that the country experiences if economic and social growth are to be a reality.

3.4.10. University Act of 2012

Kenya experienced a new democratic regime in 2003 after twenty-five years of autocratic one-party rule. This democratic dispensation was characterised by a peaceful electoral transition that promised transparency, was decentralised in its style, accountable in resources and relevant in objectives and outcomes (Mwiria, 2007:1). The political transition in Kenya effected changes in how universities were governed and managed. Universities in Kenya became autonomous in that the president no longer was the titular head of all public universities. Universities were given the liberty to choose their chancellor. This transition was vital in the sense that the changes that occurred in the political spaces no longer affected how universities were managed and how they conducted their internal affairs.
Kenyan universities have undergone thorough reform in their governance. Mwiria (2007:4) notes that critical attention is needed to deal with the political manipulation of and intervention in the governance and management of universities. He notes that a myriad of strikes and closures of universities over the past decade have postponed graduation days for students and disrupted academic life, making prospective students opt for private universities or consider universities outside of Kenya. Mwiria (2007:4) indicates that steps have been put in place to enhance the democratisation of the leadership of the universities. There is student and staff representation in key areas of governance, especially in the decision-making process and the selection of senior administrators of the university. Each university chooses its own vice-chancellor, which was not the case during Moi’s rule, when the president was the vice-chancellor of all the universities.

By 2005, Kenya had experienced reform in all areas and created an environment that was conducive to innovation and transformation within the higher education system. The focus on reform in Kenya was directed at policies related to equality, access, quality, governance and relevance. These changes reflect the national values. As such, university education is guided in its functions by those values and principles that are also part of the constitution, as articulated in the University Act of 2012. These include: i) promoting inclusive, efficient, effective and transparent governance systems and practices and maintaining public trust; ii) enhancing the equity and accessibility of its services; iii) promoting quality and relevance in its programmes; iv) ensuring sustainability, the adoption of best practices in management and the institutionalisation of systems of checks and balances; v) promoting private-public partnership in university education and development; vi) institutionalising non-discriminatory practices; and vii) community service and engagement with society (Mwiria, 2007:3; Republic of Kenya, 2012). These principles resonate with the liberal perspective of community as a sense of belonging, inclusion in public engagement, equity and accessibility of public resources [refer to Chapter 2].

The University Act of 2012 outlines the educational objectives of educational policy as follows: i) advancement of knowledge through teaching, scholarly research and scientific investigation; ii) promotion of learning in the student body and society generally; iii) promotion of the cultural and social life of society; iv) support and contribute to the realisation of national economic and social development; v) promote the highest standards in, and quality of, teaching and research; vi) education and training of and retraining higher-level
professional, technical and management personnel; vii) dissemination of outcomes of research conducted by the university to the general community; viii) facilitation of life-long learning through the provision of adult and continuing education; ix) fostering a capacity for independent critical thinking among students and promoting gender balance and equality of opportunity among students and employees; and x) promotion of the equality of persons with disabilities, minorities and other marginalised groups (Republic of Kenya, 2012:1862). Consequently, the 2012 University Act spells out the objectives and values that higher education is expected to follow. Below is an exposition.

3.4.10.1. Access and equality as democratic organisers in Kenyan higher education

Access to and equity in Kenyan higher education have been re-moulded to address the inequalities that the country experienced previously. This process entails the inclusion of economically disadvantaged groups and other marginalised groups in decisions regarding access to higher education institutions (Mwiria, 2007:9). Affirmative action programmes were implemented for redress. The government increased its supports for an increase in access by female students, students from remote regions and disabled students with slightly lower grades than the regular student intake. Bursary programmes have also been strengthened to help improve this policy. By the year 2007, Mwiria notes that the idea of improving administrative opportunities for women in higher education was a priority to address disparities that existed in the previous system, which was male dominated. In this regard, Kenya founded an all-female university for the first time in history, rendering equal opportunities to counter gender disparity.

Kenya also implemented parallel degree programmes as a cost-sharing policy in higher education (Yakaboski & Nolan, 2011:8). This means that there are two sets of student admissions to the university – those who are admitted to the university through the admission board with higher grades and whose university fees are funded by the government, and the second group, who have lower grades but still have entry to the university as long as they can pay for themselves. This policy has resulted in inequality, especially in accessing higher education in Kenya. This is because even the highly qualified sometimes do not get access, while those who cannot afford university also are excluded from the university system, leaving the system undemocratic in terms of access. This means that access to higher education remains for those who are rich and have the money to pay for their degrees.
The implication of the parallel programme policy is that the aspirations of students from secondary schools for university education are reduced, since access is dependent on the money one can pay. On the other hand, the system does not guarantee that those who perform with higher grades will have access to higher education in Kenya. Yakaboski and Nolan (2011) note that cost sharing, as a policy introduced by the liberal policies of the World Bank, will paralyse regional development and inter-tribal cooperation.

### 3.4.10.2. Service outreach and engagement with society as democratic indicator in considering ‘otherness’

The university in Kenya has become more engaged with society than before. This has been done in such a way that universities send students for internships and collaborative research in Kenyan society. Jomo Kenyatta University is an example of a university extending research into the surrounding area by responding to the crisis of HIV/AIDS awareness, involvement in improving farming through its relationships with small-scale farmers in the university’s programmes in agriculture, and its technology programmes (Mwiria, 2007:12). This collaboration of universities and society is important because it engenders an improvement in and implementation of belonging together with the wider society, therefore improving citizenship education.

### 3.4.10.3. Expansion and integration as indicators of inclusive democracy

Following the declaration and implementation of the policy on free primary education and free secondary education in 2003, Kenya has seen a massive increase in access to education. Most Kenyans have been able to access primary and secondary education. The success rates of this implementation have pushed universities to expand and integrate students qualifying for university education. The government has also encouraged growth in and the accreditation of most private universities to allow greater access to university education (Republic of Kenya, 2012). Furthermore, the government has opened university centres in almost every province to allow expansion and integration (Mwiria, 2007:8). Universities have also been encouraged to recruit students individually as opposed to the previous system, in which there was a central body (Joint Admission Board) doing the selection. In the previous system, students were admitted based on obtaining residential accommodation, but with the new policy of integration and expansion, university admission is no longer based on this. Catering and accommodation have been diverted to the private sector as a measure to
improve the quality of instruction and the efficiency of resource utilisation so that more students can be admitted.

3.4.10.4. Governance and management as organisers of democratic education

Governance and management have been a thorny issue in university education in Kenya. This is because the manipulation of Kenyan higher education by politics has delayed the growth that it had planned to achieve. This delay was due to numerous strikes and closures in the past regimes, as explained previously, which led to many students postponing their graduation year and limited the number of students that the university could admit. Added to this was the flight of academics in search of better working conditions in other countries. In response to this, the new legislation governing universities provided for a single, integrated act to cover public and private universities (Mwiria, 2007:1). This legislation includes the democratisation of decision making within the universities by promoting wider representation of staff and students in key university bodies such as governing bodies, and allowing staff a greater say in selecting university administrators.

University education experience autonomy in the sense that the governance of universities is partially detached from politicians. The president is no longer the chancellor of all universities, but individuals have been appointed for each university in Kenya, and university councils now have the opportunity to choose their own vice-chancellor and other high-level university officials. This reform has provided universities with a sense of autonomy that did not exist in both Moi’s and Kenyatta’s regimes.

3.5. Democratic Citizenship Education and Ethnic Identity

In this section I explore the main historical developments among Kenyan ethnic identities to understand the roles they played in Kenyan political, social and economic life and how ethnic identities are formed and consolidated. With reference to the analysis conducted in Chapter 2, citizenship signifies a sense of belonging. In Kenya, ethnic identities seem to provide ‘safe social positions’ in the country. The democracy and consensus reached in politics in Kenya suggest that consolidation by the dominant ethnic group has a degree of influence on the way decisions and agreements are reached. It is hoped that this section will highlight and analyse
the democratisation processes that are revealed or depicted in ethnic politics and their influence on higher education Kenya.

The analyses in this section are based on the propositions that the sociocultural life worlds of society depict a pattern that occurs in relationships in humanity, whether of a political, sociological, economical or educational nature. Ogot (1995b) captures the idea that the histories of most societies indicate that, in working out priorities in decolonisation, the reconstruction of technological and economic development is given a greater focus and the cultural aspects are neglected. However, it is evident that cultural concerns should be central to and instrumental in decision making and political undertakings in developing a country’s education system. In most developing countries, the focus has been on modernisation as being synonymous with westernisation and capitalist ideologies.

Atieno-Odhiambo (2002) contends that tribalism as a reality in Kenya, and ethnicity as a universal topic in academic discourses, are cultural contentions that ignite discourses in policy development. He argues that these two terms do not mean the same thing, even though they may be perceived to do so.

Kenyan African do not speak of ethnicity in their offices, on public platforms, or in whispers along the streets. They talk and think about tribalism as a regular experience of their everyday lives in its many enabling capacities, its incapacitating impediments upon the hopes of individuals and its blocking of opportunities for whole communities. They use of tribalism as a practical vocabulary of politics and social movements (Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002:230).

Ethnicity in the Kenyan context and in relation to colonial segregation is tied to the notion of citizenship. This citizenship is connected to ethnic identity, authority and legitimacy. Thus ethnicity is also perceived as a comprehensive birth right that refers to ‘recognition’, ‘identity’ and ‘patrimony’, and a state of citizenship that is rigid and only attainable by the issue of Kipande [Swahili word for the Kenyan identity card] (Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002). Atieno-Odhiambo argues further that ethnicity is a product of social imagination that must be constantly worked at to be achieved. Omolo (2002:213) contends that an ‘understanding of ethnicity and democratisation in Kenya today, lies not only in identifying the important tri-polar relationship between history, agency and contingency, but even more importantly in locating the historical seamless thread of this multi-dimensional process’.
Ethnicity is central to humanity, and it has taken a centre stage in most parts of the world (see Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002:230; Ogot, 1995:234). Understanding that ethnicity can have an immense impact on national democracy is important, since the Kenyan education system aims to promote cultural heritage. Ethnicity and cultural differences are not bad in themselves (Ogot, 1995:234), and many nations the world over possess some form of ethnicity or the other, in terms of either people, customs, language or traditions, and many are multilingual in nature. Thus, multiculturalism should be perceived to be an integral part of any national decision or development, including education.

Contemporary studies conducted in Kenya regarding ethnicity and democracy have highlighted the function of history, agency and eventuality in an ever-changing complex political scene (see Ajulu, 2002; Nyakuri, 1997; Ogude, 2002; Omolo, 2002; Otieno & Munene, 2007; Oyugi, 2000; Stephen & Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002; Wawire et al., 2008). Stephen and Atieno-Odhiambo (2002:230) track the development of ethnicity, with details oriented to the Luo and the Agikuyu. They investigate the conception of citizenship, which they recognise as an organisational obligation. They claim that the advent of politicised ethnicity, popularly known as ‘tribalism’ in Kenya, must be located in the tension between ethnic and bureaucratic citizenship. Both were nurtured and fortified under British colonialism and were achieved by the post-colonial political leadership as part of the instrumentality of survival and the uncertain social formation in post-colonial Kenya, in which only ethnic citizenship seemed to be safe.

Kenya is made up of more than 40 different ethnic groups that vary in size (Ngome, 2003). The Kikuyu (6.6 million), Luhya (5.3 million), Kalenjin (4.9 million), Luo (4.4 million) and Kamba (3.8 million)15 are the most populous ethnic groups, and together with other small ethnic groups amount to ninety-eight percent (98%) of the population (Ngome, 2003). The remaining two percent are composed of Indian, European and Arab immigrant communities. Despite the multi-ethnic nature of the nation, Kenya adopted Kiswahili as the lingua franca and English as the national language and the language of instruction in schools (Ngome, 2003).

15 The information on figures was obtained from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news, “Kenya defends tribal census figures”, dated 31 August 2010, as found in Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, retrieved on 15 February 2012.
Mwiria (2007:33) shows quantitatively that the distribution of Kenyan public university students by ethnic origin reveals a heavy representation of the Kikuyu ethnic group, which makes up to 37% of all students enrolled in public universities. In descending order of representation, we find the Kamba (13%), Luo (12%), Luhyia (10%), Kalenjin (8%), Meru (7%), Kisii (4%) and Embu (3%). Only 6.7% of all students originate from the remaining ethnic groups in Kenya, namely the Teso, Mijikenda, Maasai, Samburu, Turkana, Borana and Somali (Mwiria et al., 2007:33).

The large presence of the Kikuyu within the public university system reflects their strength in the country. They are the largest single ethnic group, with 24% of the country’s population. Additionally, there are various factors that contribute to the Kikuyu’s large access to universities, including geographical, regional and developmental factors. Comparatively, other large ethnic groups such as the Luhya, Kalenjin, Luo and Kamba are under-represented in the university system in relation to their demographic numbers. For instance, the University of Nairobi is situated in the heartland of the Kikuyu community, which, comparatively speaking, is economically advantaged – hence the large student presence at the university (Mwiria, 2007:34).

Universities have compromised their mission to develop national unity and to ensure socioeconomic development, equality and political freedom. Otieno & Munene (2007) illustrates how universities in Kenya have experienced the manifestation of ethnic dominations. This was clearly demonstrated during the 2007 post-election violence. For instance, universities are located in geographical areas where specific ethnic communities are dominant, and professors perceived to belong to different communities other than the majority ones saw their homes burned and were forced to escape, resulting in the closure of institutions for fear of having students on campus intensify the violence (Otieno, 2008:24). Incidents such as those highlighted by Otieno have given rise to ethnic politics in university governance, where students from a particular ethnic group gang together to elect a member of their own ethnic group. In the same manner, the majority of members of university councils come from the dominant ethnic group in the country’s mainstream politics. Accordingly, academic freedom at universities has become compromised.

Research (Menkhaus, 2005:1; Mwiria, 2007:33; Oyugi, 2000:4) shows that massive neglect, coupled with insecurity, banditry and the nomadic nature of the indigenous populace, appears
to have prolonged the underdevelopment that has in turn limited the provision of education to pastoral communities, especially girls.

Ethnic conflicts in Kenya are caused by several factors, namely land disputes (Yamano & Deininger, 2005:1), political power, and the aftermath of colonial rule (divide and rule), when the British in Kenya emphasised keeping various ethnic groups apart (Ringquist, 2011). This has influenced the current ethnic division and discrimination. Unequal distribution of resources [educational resource] and the rise of pluralism in multipartyism are other causal factors of divided ethnicity (Nyakuri, 1997:5 Oyugi, 2000:11). Ethnic conflicts and clashes therefore have left behind diverse effects on and consequences for the country, such as division, suspicion, the destruction of the environment, loss of human life, homelessness, destitution, traumatisation, stigmatisation, stagnation of the education system, hatred and anger (Easterly & Levine, 1997:1206; Menkhaus, 2005; Nyakuri, 1997:5; Oyugi, 2000; Yamano & Deininger, 2005).

Ajulu (2002:251-268) maintains, however, that much of the violence that has constituted the political conflicts in Kenya over the last decade cannot be attributed directly to ethnic hatred, but rather to a deliberate mobilisation of ethnicity by the political elite for political ends. Klopp (2002:269-290) argues that Kenyan politics adds a critical dimension to the struggle for state power based on ethnic lines. This is a concern in many systems today that accompany globalisation and socio-economic development. Ethnicity is a phenomenon that is difficult to negate, but when politicised for the ‘majority’ brings forth inequality for the ‘minority’ and accrues conflicts that threaten human life and dignity.

The political situation in a country usually influences how education is conducted, and this is not different in Kenya. The influence of politics on Kenyan higher education has manifested in inequalities that are triggered by ethnic conflicts, violence and tension (Mwiria, 2007:33; Nyakuri, 1997:6-7). While Kenya now is divided along ethnic lines and educational policies favour the minority, history has it that this was spearheaded by British colonial rule, which implemented education for British administrators and their families, with policies to keep Kenyans out of education. This left Kenyans with little or no knowledge to develop their own education system, which they are still busy creating (Yakaboski & Nolan, 2011:2).
3.5.1. Culture and Education

Similarly, it is noted that not much attention was paid to culture in conceptualising the development that Kenya had highlighted in the early stages of policy development, as discussed in the previous sections. Even though the promotion of cultural heritage was inscribed in policy documents, actual practice, more specifically the great deal of ethnic violence experienced in the country, points to the contrary. I argue that the objective of university education interacting with society ought to have dealt with ethnic anomalies and imbalances in the country, but this has not proven to be so. It could be argued further that culture is perceived as uniform in the current state of democracies, especially in Kenya, where development and modernity are still connected to westernisation. African cultures are not perceived as being part of this development and modernisation, and even though the articulation of mutual reciprocity and respect is highlighted in the policies, the opposite seems to be the norm. Human dignity as an objective also has not been evident since the massacre of citizens, because of political greed. It is argued that, in Kenya, modernisation meant that Kenya had to abandon traditional institutions, beliefs and values to suit the demands of ‘development’ (see Ogot, 1995b:215). The transition from colonialism produced confusing notions of modernisation that demanded that Kenya abandon its ways of living, leadership, administration and doing things to follow western culture for full development to occur (see also Eshiwani, 1990:3; Republic of Kenya, 1981:34). However, the repercussions of such ideologies are felt all over Africa and are evident in civil wars and political unrest. In addition to this, the western institutions and ideologies were complex and foreign to the African need, and because the colonial education did not prepare Africans to deal with such knowledge there was a need to educate Africans for manpower to deal with the modern state of the nation. Consequently, the phenomenon caused repercussions in the formation of various cultural associations with ethnic affiliation (which was also perceived as a political mobilisation of power), which reacted against some liberal notions that wanted to dominate Kenyan politics. This reaction reigned in Kenya until the 1980s, when people became aware of the domination of an alien culture [divide and rule] driving their ethnic boundaries and division.

The response to this challenge was that the Kenyan government realised that education and research could play a role in the reconceptualisation of culture and development. It became clear that the research and documentation at the University of Nairobi was being used by
Africans to promote western values (Ogot, 1995b:218). This led to a liaison between the university and the government to re-think this phenomenon. The re-conceptualisation meant that universities therefore had to be seen to promote African values as well. The result was the establishment of a Centre for African Studies at Nairobi University. This led to a form of democracy and autonomy in the sense that the universities were seen as institutions of transformation and change by undertaking research through which the relevant African culture could form part of African education and development. Emphasis was put on promoting and conducting research in the field of African archaeology, history, social anthropology, musicology, linguistics, oral literature, and traditional arts, crafts and belief systems in order to contribute to the need to Africanise the content of cultural instruction in the university and throughout the Kenyan nation (Ogot, 1995b:219).

Ethnic organisations sprung up early in the period from 1964 to 1978 and increased during the 1980s. The formation of these groups was perceived to be political, even though some of the groups claimed that they were just cultural organisation. Examples of these organisations are GEMA – the Gikuyu-Embu-Meru-Association, the Luo Union (East Africa), the New Akamba Union (NAU), the Abaluhya Association, and the Kalenjin Association, Miji-Kenda Association and Kalenjin-Maasai-Turkana-Samburu Association (KAMA-TUSA) configuration, which was formed in 1990 (Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002:232; Ogot, 1995b:195).

GEMA was founded in 1971 as a cultural and social welfare organisation, but it was viewed as a political organisation because most of its members were in strategic positions in government. GEMA thrived economically and politically and gained roots in politics (see Ogot 1995:196 on how this happened). The Luo Association was also seen as a prominent political agency. It was founded in 1940 to promote Luo welfare. The resultant politics was evident in Oginga Odinga, who was one of the pioneers. NAU was founded in 1960 to promote the welfare of the Akamba people. With it emerged a pioneering politician, Mulu Mutisya, who was an MP. Ogot (1995a) indicates that the other three associations mentioned in the previous paragraph were less political.

The formation of these associations indicates how ethnic politics was becoming prominent in Kenya. Every tribe realised that, for their region to prosper and for their plight to be taken care of, they had to come to a consensus on the welfare of their own tribal people, otherwise their needs would be neglected. This was so because the political parties that ruled channelled
development to the group from which they came. However, at the conference chaired by the President in 1979, a decision was reached that these ethnic organisation were becoming a threat to national unity and had to be removed (Ogot, 1995b:223).

Nonetheless, the opposition grew stronger and KANU was challenged by opposition parties that arose as a result of these ethnic associations. Moi suppressed the growing need for opposition and indicated that Kenya lacked the capacity and space to accommodate this growing opposition. The opposition grew stronger and the universities became a place and space for political recruitment and politicians who became activists for change and transformation. This aroused academic intolerance; for instance, Oginga Odinga was denied a chance to present a lecture at Nairobi University. On the other hand, KANU began to promote the notions of political equality, freedom from want, equal distribution of income, equal opportunities, human rights and the rule of law, which were used for planning education and other sectors of national development. These policies became redundant and the politicians and government officials became corrupt, yet much division remained among the citizens. ‘Problems of greed, selfishness and corruption continued to undermine the national objectives so clearly as spelt out by President Moi in 1982’ (Ogot, 1995:210). Ogot (1995) points out that the kind of human rights propagated by KANU were abstract, unrealistic and theoretical, failed to reflect the state of the Kenyan people, and avoided looking inside the life worlds and culture of the Kenyan people. Ogot (1995) argues that even though human rights should be looked at universally, it also is important that they are relevant to the local people. I will differ from Ogot’s argument that, although such policies were sound, what was lacking was the manpower to implement them; education could have been the greatest weapon to eradicate such ignorance.

It can be argued that KANU limited human rights to freedom of speech and political equality when it insisted on a one-party state, despite the mounting opposition. KANU also amended the constitutional law without notice to the stakeholders, and this limited citizens’ rights to freedom and political equality to enable KANU to survive opposition (see Ogota, 1995:211). Power was given to the police to arrest those who disobeyed and/or opposed KANU. Amendments were also made regarding the abolition of ethnic alliances, thus contradicting the goal of promoting cultural heritage. One could argue that this led to Kenyans showing allegiance to blind patriotism due to their fear of victimisation.
Ogot (1995) explains how the historical literature demonstrates different ideological stances in understanding national unity in Kenya. This literature suggests that colonisation has alienated African culture from its roots and that this alienation has extended to the current, independent Kenya. Ogot describes how Kenyans currently exploit and dehumanise each other, while sacrificing their cultural identity and the national objective of unity, human dignity and freedom. Similarly, the post-independent literature suggests that Kenya’s problems will be solved if Kenyans are able to re-evaluate what has been done to them in the past and what they are doing to one another today (Ogot, 1995:230). To depict the New Kenya, Ogot (1995:230) uses works of literature to indicate that the new Kenyan society is fragmented into three main, discordant elements. These elements are, first, wealth and an insecure elite; second, the poor and frustrated urban working class; and, finally, the mass of people who fit nowhere – the peasantry, the unemployed urban migrants living off their relatives, and those living by their wits – criminals, beggars and prostitutes. Thus, according to these authors, the experience of independence has always been painful and hollow for many Kenyans in both rural and urban sectors.

It could be argued from Ogot’s (1995) interpretation above that Kenya is characterised by an unequal society, despite the fact that the national objectives and principles promote equality. The question could be asked: what form of democratic citizenry does Kenyan society operate on? In response to this question, Omolo (2002:61) contends that, despite the fact that Kenya has embraced a form of democracy by allowing opposition parties to participate in politics in the country, there are striking elements and structural features that still make it difficult for opposition parties to practise democracy as it ‘ought’ to be. In other words, Omolo suggests that liberal democracy has taken roots in Kenya, although there still is a great deal of civil strife, inter-state conflicts and inequalities that have claimed the lives of many Kenyans. Omolo (2002) believes that these conflicts and strife are caused by the refusal of some political actors to play by the rules of democracy.

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16 Ngugi wa Thiong’s novels, *The river between* and *Weep not child*, are some of the literature Ogot (1995:230-233) uses to illustrate the ideas of how history has contributed to our understanding of identity formation in Kenya. Thus, alienation introduced by the colonialists is still causing much of the division in Kenya today.

From a theoretical perspective and in classical dimensions, democracy is constructed as reducing inequalities, improving the state of citizenship, and enabling inclusion and justice and respect for human rights. However, democracy as practised in Africa and Kenya has led to pervasive and endemic conflict in countries such as Rwanda, Kenya, Nigeria, Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Congo and Kenya (Kagwanja, 2003; Omolo, 2002:61). Similarly, since the introduction of multipartyism, democracy has been played out in ethnic politics in Kenya. The question that can be posed is what educational systems are in place to deal with this form of inequality and the reconciliation of past history with the ills of current society that pose conflict and violence? To address this problem, Ogot (1995) shows that many Kenyans have embraced a moralistic approach to this question, while others have no commitment to addressing the problem, but pin the solution on the elimination of the alien policies that are adopted by the ruling élite and place their hope in a revolution. Ogot (1995) urges that Kenyan problems would be solved if Kenyans reaffirmed their traditional humanistic ideals, such as pride, respect, self-confidence, dignity, industriousness and communal spirit. The argument is advanced further that, in an African setting, one does not need to be rich or powerful to be respected. Thus, wealth and power are not core values that determine the respect due to human beings.

Ogot (1995b:233) highlights the ideas of Okot p’Bitek, a Ugandan scholar who contributed to history and literature in Kenya. Ogot explains that Okot p’Bitek says that Kenyan problems can be addressed when scholarship is geared towards an integration of African philosophy with modern development challenges. p’Bitek, like other Kenyan scholars, indicates that Kenya needs to be reconstructed from the shambles that was left behind by slavery and colonialism, and calls for a change in the framework of African philosophy within the existing social institutions, rather than Ngugi’s call for change within the ‘Marxist context’.

In the same way, Ogot (1995:234) contends that culture is a motivation that leads to innovation. Thus, the politicisation of culture can lead to dangerous conflicts and violence. In this manner, it can be argued that ethnicity is a natural phenomenon and is not bad. However, the manipulation of ethnicity to cause division is a negative construction that can lead societies to ruin. I argue that the main concern for Kenya is to seek a national identity. Identity is a cultural question, thus a concern for Kenyan development ‘ought’ to be: what kind of citizen should we project for a Kenyan nation? Our historical experience therefore needs to embrace the diversity present in Kenya, while embracing the philosophical values of
citizenship accepted universally, such as respect, justice, equality, human dignity, communicative action, deliberation and human rights. I will deal with these aspects in Chapters 4 and 5.

3.5.2. Post-election Violence and the Conception of Democratic Citizenship in Kenya

Evidence of political instability in Kenya emerged through the spontaneous violence following the 1992, 2002, 2005 and (most calamitous) 2007 post-elections (Diepeveen, 2010). The political instability in Kenya could be argued to have led to ethnic politics in education in the country (Alwy & Schech, 2004:266; Otieno, 2008). What is evident from the literature is that Kenya embraced democratic principles in governance when it attained independence and in the period that followed. In 1992, Kenya took a new turn in political democracy to multipartyism, which was welcomed with much optimism after the previous one-party state (Kagwanja, 2003; Mwiria, 2007). However, in this period, which was expected to lead Kenya to embrace democratic processes, the country encountered a myriad of conflicts that led to violence during the 2002 elections and in the following years. The 2007 post-election violence was the most severe and claimed the lives of many (Diepeveen, 2010; Oucho, 2002). This violence also threatened ethnic coexistence in the universities (Otieno, 2008).

Political violence marred Kenya’s multiparty election in 1992 and 1997 and has since mined the road to the 2002 elections and the decisive transition to a post-Moi-era. Over a decade after ‘ethnic clashes’ in 1991, Kenya has become a cesspool of all genres of political violence and have effectively confined its embryonic democracy to cold storage. Against this backdrop of mounting domestic and international pressure for political pluralism, the beleaguered one-party elite warned that introduction of multiparty system would trigger cataclysmic tribal violence that would destroy Kenyan nation. President Moi’s own ethnic group publicly demanded the return of majimbo … a notion of ethnic purity which required the expulsion of all other ethnic groups from the land occupied by Kalenjin and Maasai before colonialism… (Kagwanja, 2003:25).

See details on how Kagwanja (2003) describes the nature of the ethnic politics in Kenya. Kagwanja shows how ethnic violence took place culturally. He describes how the Kalenjin ‘warrior’ and the Maasai ‘morrans’ dressed in their traditional costumes and descended on non-Kalenjin populations in parts of the Rift Valley, Nyanza and Western Kenya. This phenomenon of informal repression, he argues, appeared to be a strategy by
Furthermore, an ethnic group called *Mungiki* emerged that was perceived by scholars to be one of the informal repressive political ethnic movements. Kagwanja (2003:29) believes that *Mungiki* is a movement constructed in the context of the culture of violence. He notes that this movement was formed as an element of informal repression to achieve ethnic cleansing in the 1990s. It can be traced largely to a Kikuyu-based religio-political movement with a long history of resistance to civic and religious organisation that transformed into a disruptive force espousing political tribalism – resulting in human rights violations and insecurity in Nairobi and Central Kenya (Kagwanja, 2003:29).

Conflicts in Kenya have manifested in diverse ways – the struggle for grazing land for pastures; the Somali banditry and insecurity that make that part of the country ungovernable unless the military and security forces are in place; the 1997 coastal clashes in Mombasa, where immigrant groups in the region such as the Kikuyu, Luo and Akamba were noted to be a threat to the indigenous people; and the informal repression of ethnic politics by KANU, which led to the violence in Likoni (Oyugi, 2000:3). The ethnic violence in 2007 triggered ethnic hatred in universities in Kenya, for instance lecturers at the University of Kenyatta and Maseno who belonged to the minority ethnic groups were threatened and had to flee for their safety (see Otieno, 2008:24).

Kagwanja (2003) shows how the ‘retribalization’ of the public sphere sharpened the tensions between civic citizenship and ethnic citizenship. State (or civic) citizenship is based on liberal notions, while ethnic citizenship is determined by membership of an ethnic group that ensures access to social and economic rights, such as the right to land. Kagwanja (2003) shows how state citizenship is accelerated by globalisation, and reinforces parochial identities and sensibilities. Thus, globalisation allowed ethnic militia to acquire illegal arms by expanding cross-border smuggling. This has resulted in the violation of human rights by most ethnic groups that have mobilised themselves in politics.

The patterns and trends depicted in political power in Kenya show that political positions have been used as positions of power to accumulate wealth, rather than for good governance. Politics in Kenya has also become personalised. As a result, those in politics during Kenyatta’s and Moi’s administrations encouraged political tribalism – where ethnic identities
were used to foster power relations and retain political power. This practice resulted in increased corruption, and spontaneous violence became even more prevalent after 1992, and has continued up to the present (Diepeveen, 2010). As a result of the political situation in Kenya, a constitutional review commission was formed to evaluate the rule of law in relation to political power. This process is argued by Diepeveen (2010) to have been an open and deliberative process, because it included a survey of and hearings in all the regions in Kenya. Diepeveen (2010) indicates that early constitutional reform was rooted in bad and oppressive governance and a lack of respect for the separation of power and the rule of law. However, he observes that the 2010 constitutional review was inclusive of Kenyans of all regional identities.

Despite the emphasis of the civic education programme on participation and the rule of law, in contrast with elitist perspectives, distrust of the leadership prevailed in the public hearings during the constitutional review. Diepeveen (2010) notes that, during these hearings, there were varied responses from the citizens. Some regions’ responses to the constitutional review showed that they had been neglected and excluded from political endeavours in the country. These regions had also experienced a lack of access to education, infrastructure and educational development, amongst others.

Before undertaking an analysis of the higher education system, it is important to highlight that the mobilisation of ethnicity for political ends has led to ethnic inequalities in education in Kenya (see Alwy & Schech, 2004). As such, ethnic inequalities in education in Kenya are prevalent when geographical factors and ethnic proximity to the ruling elite are considered. In addition to these are factors such as gross enrolment ratios, the number of schools and the number of qualified teachers teaching in those schools. Research shows that ‘relatively small clearly defined ethnic groups have accumulated an advantage over the majority in the national population in terms of education infrastructure and resource’ (Alwy & Schech, 2004:226).

3.6. Summary

This chapter has analysed Kenyan higher education policies within the colonial and post-colonial settings and revealed how policy in higher education has been conceptualised towards democratic citizenship education. It is obvious that Kenyan higher education has
survived, from its beginnings in the segregation of education in colonial times to its nuances of freedom, equality, cultural heritage, national unity, economic development and potential development of skills and abilities to participate in national development in the post-colonial epoch.

What is paramount is that Kenyan higher education has resisted the obstacles of colonial domination and dehumanisation to achieve a more democratic ideation, although Kenya currently struggles with ethnic division and ethnic violence, despite the liberal bracketing of education in most of the commissions, policy documents and reports analysed. Some of the concepts that point to DCE include the promotion of cultural heritage – mutual social responsibility and respect, human dignity, national unity, national development, equality of opportunity, political freedom, social justice, political socialism and freedom of conscience.

Clearly, liberal thought in education describes an already existing educational setting and community, rather than that which is yet to be imagined. This kind of thinking has not envisioned the difficulty Kenya faces in ensuring justice for all because of conflicts as a result of the plurality of ethnic identities. The political setting in Kenya seems to influence the policies in Kenyan higher education and neglects the cultural values that are supposed to determine the equality, interaction, public engagement and rationality needed for equal opportunities for citizens to engage in policy development and participate in democratic citizenry on the basis of the relevant education.

In the next chapter I will show how the conceptualisation of higher education as a community in the becoming can help us think differently about Kenyan higher education.
Chapter Four

THE NEXUS: LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION AND KENYA’S HIGHER EDUCATION SYSTEM

4.1. Introduction

Democratic citizenship education (DCE) as depicted in Chapter 2 provides a liberal understanding for conceptualising education. DCE is not a given; it is an actively constructed concept. Within the liberal setting, DCE highlights the significance of responsibility, belonging, rights and freedoms in assisting individuals to cultivate their potential by escaping the restrictions of social status, traditional roles and ascribed fixed identities (Waghid, 2013:9). For liberals, such practices are made possible when legal systems are organised so that they promote liberal values of freedoms and human rights. For instance, the current Kenyan education policy is arguably founded on liberal principles. It emphasises that students should be equipped with skills and knowledge to enable them to utilise their potential individually and collectively in service of national development and national unity to achieve social equality, religious freedom and the promotion of cultural heritage, equal opportunity and equal distribution of public goods, with specific emphasis of education as a public good (Johnson, 2013:331; Osler & Starkey, 2005:19). Liberal perspectives provide a limited understanding of individual human rights and do not ensure that equality is achieved (Osler & Starkey, 2005:19). This is most evident in the example of Kenyan education, where unequal access to university education is still prevalent; and also in the fact that the gap between the poor and the rich is alarming and that ethnic discrimination and violence remain problems. Nevertheless, the liberal policies of the Kenyan education system promote equity as a target of education.

This chapter analyses Kenyan higher democratic citizenship education with focused links to the three liberal strands depicted in Chapter 2, namely public reason (Rawls, 1971); communicative action (Habermas, 1987a & b); and democratic iteration (Benhabib, 2011a). The reason for doing this is to reconceptualise and address the question whether the depicted liberal thought can address ethnic conflicts and, at the same time, whether it has addressed the intentions of Kenyan higher education towards egalitarian and democratic education as
engendered in the current policy documents, namely Vision 2030 and the University Education Act of 2012. The question is also raised whether education, according to the policies/acts, is adequately engendering the education that Kenya needs. The analysis in this chapter will show that the Kenyan education policies depict a democratic citizenship education that already exists within the liberal framework, especially that discussed in Chapter 2, yet also is absent in certain instances. One example is the prevalence of inequalities and violence that negate the values of deliberative democracy. In this chapter, I argue that the liberal DCE presented in Chapter 2 is narrowly conceptualised in terms of responsibility, rights and belonging (Waghid, 2013:9). Then, I will show how nationalistic framings have posed challenges to Kenyan higher education.

Democratic citizenship education in a Derridian sense is established through various subjects or agents who actually produce and consume it (Waghid, 2002:86). Derrida (1988) notes that we can never arrive at a meaning of a concept that can be said to be actual. This is because the meanings of words can never be actualised perfectly, because when we look for the potentiality of concepts we realise that they also have impotentialities of meanings when they fail to address the problems at hand. In such thinking, meaning making becomes a constant activity.

This chapter argues that liberal DCE in Kenya higher education is thin on the basis that it gives distorted views of participation [including deliberation] and belonging. Kenyan higher education is limited in its conceptualisation of DCE because of its nationalistic cleavage that narrows education to national development and neglects humanistic overtones. Despite the fact that Kenyan universities are purposed to teaching, research and community service, including their role in shaping a civilised and democratic society in order to liberate minds and contribute to shaping an inclusive society, their realisation is still a blur (Nyaigotti-

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19 I consider potentiality as the capacity to do something (Waghid, 2013:24), for instance Bryan’s (2009:736) ideas of ‘potentiality’ and ‘actuality’ in describing friendship in a Derridian sense apply potentiality and actuality to describe ‘how human beings become excellent by becoming who they are’. He notes that human beings become who they are only because of the possibilities they have to engage with each other. This process of engagement provides possibilities for becoming human. In the same vein, I use these concepts to explain democratic citizenship education as signalling the tensions in the nuances of potentialities and impotentialities for DCE in becoming in order to disrupt the three liberal strands analysed in Chapter 2, and to advance plausible nuances for Kenyan higher education.

20 Impotentialities represent the incapacity [lack of capacity] of a concept to do what it is intended to do – this happens when the actual fails to manifest. For instance, certain concepts can be portrayed as having the capacity to solve particular problems, and then, when put into action, prove otherwise, prove incapacious even though they display limited capacities [potentiality].
Chacha, 2002:7). For instance, in Kenya, the meaning of citizenship as leading to bureaucratic enterprise, the culture of capitalism, international aid and sovereignty has assumed centre stage in higher education. This kind of shift means that, even though Africa is a distinct continent [and Kenya a distinct nation], its decisions and conceptualisation [including what education means] are still incommensurate with the aspirations of Kenyan higher education. Despite the massification and expansion of universities to allow equal opportunities, there still are challenges in relation to access. For instance, students from low-income backgrounds continue to be underrepresented in universities. In addition, the computer-based access selection criteria deny entry to applicants who may have been admitted if entrance examinations were used (Nyaigotti-Chacha, 2002:7). Nationalistic discourses encourage ethnocentrism, violence and xenophobia because they draw distinct lines between those who are Kenyans and those who are not, and between those who belong to a particular tribe and those who do not belong (cf. Chapter 3 and Broch-Due, 2005:3; Nasong’o, 2010:221; Osler & Starkey, 2005:20).

A nationalistic conception of DCE therefore is not enough to engender education, which is thin and weak for several reasons. Firstly, the structural policies intended to develop effective public services [including higher education] have turned out to be masking corruption, inequalities, academic capitalism and the force of privatisation from the liberal (international) push for development (Calvert & Muchira-Tirima, 2013; Chege, 1998; Otieno & Munene, 2007:461). This has led to a breakdown in the redistributive functions of the national state and to its inability to cater for the welfare, education and health of and to provide services to its citizens (Broch-Due, 2005:3). This is mostly so because the increasing demands to educate citizens has attracted international aid and donors who dictate policies [even though alien and inappropriate] to necessitate educational policy and practices, hence pose challenges to academic planning and the intensification of the education process. Chege, a scholar who once was a lecturer at the University of Nairobi, recounts his experiences and notes that the challenges facing Kenyan higher education institutions are not money or infrastructure, but a lack of ‘professional and moral integrity among influential Kenyan academics and university administrators, who squander and mismanage what funds they have and dishonour basic academic ethics’ (Chege, 1998:B9). This illustrates how citizenship in Kenya undermines the integrity of higher education in Kenya. Secondly, post-colonialism has resulted in uncertainty about the legitimacy of established identities, rights and claims in that violence [a force for social (re)construction that extends from the post-colonial state and its international relations]
is often used to establish and reinforce specific ideas about identity and belonging that are considered essential (Broch-Due, 2005:2). According to Broch-Due (2005:1), violence in Africa [Kenya alike] and the world over has escalated from the intrinsic modern, translocal, national bureaucracies and business interests (capitalism). In Africa, for instance, Broch-Due (2005) points out that multiparty democracy, privatisation and structural adjustment have increased instability and violence in Africa, and Kenya has not been immune to this.

Violence in Kenya has taken many dimensions. Evident in Kenyan higher education are student riots, which have resulted in violence, academic disruption and the temporary closure of universities in the country (Chege, 1998:B9; Tunbridge, 1997:A37). The major causes of such violence among university students have been identified to be protests against legislation to hike tuition fees and the tightening of the collection of student loans, which the government originally gave as grants, and was implemented by a board that students considered corrupt (Chege, 1998:B9). This escalated into violent disruptions in which students were dispersed by paramilitary police using tear gas and clubs to remove the students from the university premises, and some were left dead and others injured (Chege, 1998; Tunbridge, 1997). In addition, ethnic violence has led to the instability of higher education institutions, and also has cultivated societal hatred and division among so-called citizens (Broch-Due, 2005:6; Johnson, 2013:329). Johnson (2013) notes that the 2007 post-election violence over the contested election results contributed immensely to conflicts and division within Kenya’s public universities. At the heart of the conflict, students, faculty and staff turned against one another and impaired their sense of belonging [relationships] and the ability of higher education institutions in Kenya to contribute to national development as part of a national agenda for the institutions. In this regard, universities had to change their internal policies to deal with such conflict situations in order to build peace (Johnson, 2013).

Broch-Due (2005:6), on the other hand, notes that ethnicity has been used to explain violence in Africa, yet the complexity of the violence is related to identities formed around gender, generation, locality, class, religion, nationality and difference, rather than the universal mask of ethnicity. Regarding gender inequality, for instance, Sifuna (2006:85) claims that gender was not a determinant and or an essential framework in educational policy formulation during the colonial epoch; however, the post-colonial epoch has increased the inclusion of women in higher education. Even though the improvement is noticed, exclusion is still persistent as a result of this legacy, since women’s participation in higher education currently presents instances of inequality (Odhiambo, 2011:667; Sifuna, 2006:85). For this reason, Sifuna
(2006), Otieno and Munene (2007) and Odhiambo (2011) urge the Kenyan government to revisit its education policies and legislation to address this phenomenon of gender inequality, amongst other disparities in policy formulation.

Boit and Kipkoech (2012:78), however, note that, over the years, the Kenyan government has made an effort to equalise educational opportunities for its citizens, although there still are lingering disparities. Participation in and access to education institutions remains highly unequal, and the various socio-economic groups in education are considered to be the cause of such disparities. According to Boit and Kipkoech (2012), higher education is biased for and against particular groups of people in society, especially in terms of the social class composition of students. In this sense, Boit and Kipkoech (2012) argue that the provision of financial support to the needy student is a solution to these disparities. This view is in contrast to Chege’s earlier proposition, that academic and management integrity are more fundamental to citizenship development than financial factors [in as much as this also counts], since finances abound in Kenya. These aspects point to the complexity of the citizenship education challenges in Kenya.

Another challenge faced by Kenyan higher education is the massification [rapid enrolment]21 of universities and their expansion, and the impact these aspects have had on the quality of citizenship education cultivated for critical citizenship. Much emphasis on the marketisation of courses taught at the universities has led to the neglect of nationally needed programmes. This is partly so because the challenges of parallel degree programmes have resulted in lecturers not committing to any institution, because they are doing part-time lecturing (work) at several institutions to meet their financial needs (Nyaigotti-Chacha, 2002:7). Even though parallel programmes are available, there is limited opportunity for part-time classes for students, so those who wish to access such opportunities cannot. This kind of move has led to the commercialisation of Kenyan higher education, in which quality [critical citizenship] is compromised (Nyaigotti-Chacha, 2002:7). Research by Odhiambo (2011) and Misaro, Jonyo and Kariuki (2013) on the quality of higher education in Kenya illustrates how politics has led to the indiscriminate expansion of higher education in Kenya, which has resulted in a risk

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21 Massification, as described by Misaro et al. (2013), signifies ‘rapid enrolment of students’ at the university without considering the impacts this has on the workload of lecturers or the implications for lecturer-student ratios and the available infrastructure. They note that this has deteriorated the quality of higher education in Kenya and caused Kenyan universities to be run as businesses/enterprises without quality. I therefore argue that such policy formulation excludes significant stakeholders and diminishes the quality of citizenship education, hence limits space for deliberation, participation and critical citizenship.
to quality education. Such expansion has had an impact on the lives and identities of academics in Kenyan universities. To such an extent that new higher education institutions are rapidly increasing bureaucracy and accountability, offering innovative ways of management and limited academic freedom (Calvert & Muchira-Tirima, 2013:403). According to Misaro et al. (2013:139), the mass expansion of higher education has dragged Kenyan universities into crisis in terms of quality, relevance, sustainable financing, limited research and low staff morale [especially because their workload has increased due to the double intake in parallel degree programmes and the regular programmes being conducted by the same academics]. For this reason, egalitarian practices in Kenyan higher education institutions have become a challenge. Odhiambo (2011) suggests that a new model of leadership is needed to deal with the rapid expansion of higher education institutions in Kenya. In this regard, questions that arise are: does policy formulation in Kenya consider the perceptions [viewpoints] of students, lecturers and administrators regarding this policy formulation? What critical skills do Kenyan higher education institutions cultivate to enable students to engage in such spaces to create a sense of belonging for them without violent disruption?

I illustrate in this chapter how such links can contribute to DCE in Kenya and, at the same time, recognise the foundations they lay for re-imagining DCE in Kenya. In addition to the concepts presented in Chapter 2, liberal democratic citizenship education highlights the functions of education to achieve intersubjective, mutual interaction through collective effort, to prepare citizens to participate in public deliberations about issues of justice and morality, and to focus on developing capabilities for reasoned arguments in both the written and oral form.

For instance, national borders have become porous, and communication, migration and international relations present ever-changing educational terrains. In the light of this, a cosmopolitan view of citizenship education presents a more plausible perspective for framing education and education policies. Osler and Starkey (2005:20) suggest that cosmopolitanism provides a more plausible conception of citizenship because it challenges purely nationalistic education. Cosmopolitanism creates a sense of belonging to a human community that draws its values from such a community. Constructing education from a cosmopolitan perspective does not devalue nationalistic education, but sees it as a springboard for generating humanistic values that are universal to humanity. ‘Cosmopolitan citizens process their
multiple identities … they actively reflect on the communities to which they belong and the links that join these communities. In so doing, cosmopolitan citizens recognise others as essentially similar to themselves and arrive at a sense of citizenship based on a consciousness of humanity rather than on allegiance to a state (Osler & Starkey, 2005:20).

Further, I argue in this chapter for the use of Derrida’s (1997) and Agamben’s (2007) ideas of the ‘actuality’ and ‘potentiality’ of post-liberal democratic citizenship education to disrupt the liberal understanding developed in Chapter 2 in order to achieve a thicker understanding, which offers a reimagined view of DCE that has the potential to make Kenyan universities excellent as democratic institutions that propagate citizenry and curb ethnic violence in the country. In addition, the notion of Ubuntu within African philosophy circles will assist in contextualising DCE for the African context, which also offers a way of thinking differently about DCE, thus making it substantive (thick). This is aimed at expanding the liberal DCE functions and, at the same time, extending the post-liberal perspective of education as a process in becoming (Agamben, 1993; Derrida, 1988; Waghid, 2013:9; 2014).

4.2. Flaws in Democratic Citizenship Education in Kenyan Higher Education

4.2.1. Deliberation and Governance

Deliberation and governance are core to universities’ role in shaping a civilised and democratic society. Kaimenyi (2013) noted in a stakeholder workshop that Kenyan universities have experienced weak governance and management. This is felt most especially in the separation of powers that delinked channels for communication, hence the unrest in various sectors in university education in Kenya. Nyaigotti-Chacha (2002) notes that universities in Kenya are considered as engines of economic growth, and they also play a role to liberate minds and contribute to cultivating a democratic and inclusive society. To do this, universities need to be innovative, a lack of which is detrimental to civil society’s responsibility for social justice. Since independence there have been several attempts to reform education in Kenya (Chege, 2009; Eshiwani, 1990; Makori, 2005; Maxon, 1995 Muricho & Chang’ach, 2013; Mwiria et al., 2007; Posner & Kramon, 2011; Republic of Kenya, 2010; 2012; Sifuna, 2010). The reforms took the form of recommendations, commissions and policy articulation. Despite these attempts, the implementation of reformed policies has proven cumbersome and has resulted in more educational problems; for instance,
an increase in ethnic conflict and political violence that has led to the death of many citizens – which can be attributed partially to communicative problems [a lack of inclusive deliberation] (Posner & Kramon, 2011). For this reason, the policies have not served Kenya well. Policy development in Kenya shows a trend of excluding stakeholders in policy modification. It is clear from the analysis in Chapter 3 that policy development in Kenya has been delegated to a few political elites. This is exemplified in the top-down administration of policies from the political elite to the university administrators. It is clear from the literature that, when the policies are handed down to the universities’ administrators, they are required to be implemented without questioning. For instance, during the Moi Regime, the administrators of universities were forced to implement reforms without questioning, and failure to do so led to termination of employment and more (Muricho & Chang’ach, 2013). This negates the democratic ideals postulated by the liberal concerns in Chapter 2. On the other hand, the failure to implement the various educational policies and commissions, especially the 8-4-4 curriculum, can be linked to poor communication and a lack of participation by the stakeholders in education in Kenya. The reaction of the mass of citizens to the failure of the 8-4-4 system of education and the workload that came with it, leading to demands for reforms, is an indicator of communicative problems in the construction of education in Kenya. Muricho and Chang’ach (2013:123) indicate the difficulty of operationalising the objectives of the science and technology CAP Act 250 due to a lack of coordination and communication between the various ministries that coordinate policy development and implementation. There is a need to develop interactive channels, a sense of community of practice and public deliberation within higher education. A lack of communication and coordination among policy makers and higher education stakeholders is paralysing the implementation of policy, as documented on liberal DCE in the analysis in Chapter 2. The other question could be whether a liberal bracketing of education in Kenya is plausible. Goodman (2007:193) notes that reflexive solidarities between nationalism and globalism affect how democratisation operates in nation states. He notes that cosmopolitanism brings with it normative ideas that disrupts inclusive forms of national identity. He suggests that there should be a balance between global demands and national divides.

challenges in terms of leadership and the relevance (Misaro et al., 2013) of the education and the suitability of graduates for the job market in Kenya, despite education policies emphasising aspects of capacity building, for instance human resources and skills for job markets, as core roles of university education (Calvert & Muchira-Tirima, 2013; Court, 1980; Chege, 1998; Odhiambo, 2011; Otieno & Munene, 2007:461). Another challenge Kenya faces is rapid expansion of higher education in terms of enrolment in proportion to available resources. This expansion is experiencing a crisis because of the deteriorating quality and relevance of education, for instance the available infrastructure, leadership and student enrolment are not sustainable. This is most pressing in relation to staff morale and workload, as it reduces the research output that is needed for universities as centres of development [which is a policy requirement for university education] (Misaro et al., 2013). Liberal DCE in Kenya is thin because it portrays the impotentialities of the available leadership in higher education institutions in their inadequacy to deal with the rapid expansion of education and the quality of education that its institutions offer in equipping its citizens. Kenyans still long for a change in education, although at the same time have resisted change. The question could be asked why these problems still persist. Do Kenyans still plan their education system? The lack of democratic communication [participation and deliberation] and of inclusive practices in decision making on public higher education has contributed to resistance to change. I also question the nature of the education that goes on in the classrooms in relation to communicative action. Part of the problem is related to the lack of resources, population growth and an obsession with consumerism among the elite; however, the major problem is related to the communication channels in higher education (Muricho & Chang’ach, 2011).

Student strikes and riots are other indicators of a lack of cultivation of a democratic community in Kenya. However, following Cavell (1979), there seems to be little wrong with an argument for human agency along the lines of assuming responsibility. Participants in higher education should be held responsible for their capabilities to change societal impediments to higher education like, violence. For instance, students, management and the lecturers could assume the responsibility to deliberate amicably on disputes at stake, thereby avoiding violent options. Chege (1998) and Tunbridge (1997) show how violence erupted among students upon the passing of legalisation to change into student loans money that initially was given as grants. The student riots, according to Chege (1998) and Tunbridge (1997), were escalated by the students’ knowledge that the management of such loans was in the hands of corrupt leaders who would give loans to those they preferred. If communicative
channels were put in place to deal with students’ anxieties, would there have been an eruption of violence? As indicated earlier, equal opportunity is a necessity for a democratic university. However, student riots, as explained in Chapter 3, are an indication that student voices had been unheard for a period of time in Kenya and that this had tampered with democratic values for citizenship. By saying this I am not implying that universities should be paradigms of perfection. But, as institutions of learning, they should acknowledge students’ voices and involve the communicative abilities of citizens to be present in egalitarian spaces where they are recognised as part of the university community and can contribute to reforms in university education. There is a saying that changing universities is as difficult as moving graveyards. This is not what I am trying to do. What I am emphasising specifically is that communication that leads to understanding in the Habermasian sense has something to offer university education in Kenya. For instance, university education will be engendered to build social intelligence, which will enable students to live together with others and participate in diversity – thereby dealing with the anomalies and imbalances of ethnic diversity in the country.

4.2.2. Equality

The notion of equality can be derived from policy sentiments/principles of education and development throughout the history of education and policy in Kenya. Formal education involves selecting and sorting out the skills that every individual has to acquire by the end of every level of schooling. In Kenya, reforms in higher education are championed by the push from a declining economy, population growth and increasing sectorial competition for scarce financial resources and the neo-liberal policies that dictate policy reforms for financing higher education (Otieno & Munene, 2007). This has resulted in the rapid expansion of universities, leading to the marketisation of universities as enterprises, which poses challenges and risks to students, academics and higher education institutions in Kenya – making equality necessary and yet allowing it to become impossible. Otieno and Munene (2007) note that such policy shifts threaten equity, since universities face the risks of academic capitalism, which means that universities are run more like businesses instead of paying attention to the country’s needs – for instance educating critical citizens who would become participants to counter poverty, violence [war] and other ills that may hamper a peaceful society (Johnson, 2013:330). Johnson (2013:331) shows that universities in sub-Saharan Africa [Kenya included] have been conceptualised as serving the rich, the elite and
the politically connected, and notes that this will result in ‘maldevelopment, social stratification and the centralization of knowledge’, which will undermine the concept of a university as engendering equality.

Accordingly, inculcating cultural heritage is a broad policy statement contained in policy documents throughout the history of Kenyan education. This concept is broad enough to cover issues from cultural instruction to the norms associated with adult membership in society (Eshiwani, 1990; Nyaigotti-Chacha, 2008:7; Republic of Kenya, 1976). In this sense, civic and citizenship education are commonly taught. Morality [conduct] and good grammar are both taught in higher education in Kenya. However, deliberative socialisation is far removed from real schooling in Kenyan higher education. Much of citizenship education includes nationalism in relation to independence, harambee [self-help projects] and African socialism. Kenya has strived to inculcate the ideas of equality in its education policy statements to instil the notions of liberty of person; freedom of speech, thought and faith; right to own property; and rights to justice (Eshiwani, 1990; Luescher-Mamshela et al. 2011:xvii, Mwiria, 2007; Ogot, 1995a; Prewitt, 1972:5; Republic of Kenya, 1964; 1976; 1981:5; 1999; 2010; 2012). Liberalism and political citizenship in Kenya and in its education policies can be traced to the attainment of independence [achievement of a republic and freedom from colonial rule], which improved the rights to economic welfare and security for the country’s citizens.

Despite the massive effort to liberalise education policy in Kenya, equality has not been achieved. In Prewitt’s (1972:8) words, ‘there has not been levelling of societies’. In Kenya today, citizens are still stratified in terms of wealth, power, ethnicity and difference (Hornsby, 2012). Governance [political power] and access to higher education institutions are still linked to minority groups. Inequalities of status remain a problem in Kenya. Some citizens count, while others are ignored or are hardly noticed.

Education in Kenya simultaneously promotes the conditions for equality and the conditions for inequality. Put differently, higher education is Kenya promotes equality in the sense that it enables an individual’s increase in skills and aims at improving the economic wealth and state of the country. However, it also promotes inequality in the way it cultivates hierarchies according to class, status and power (Hornsby, 2012:818). A lack of critical skills in education cripples critical citizenship and marginalises those who are not able to acquire or
access education. Education ought to open spaces for all citizens to claim rights to be different. Prewitt (1972:7) rightly points out that, ‘if equality implies that education should be accessible to all, it also implies that each individual has the right to be educated according to his talents and ambitions’. In this case, the policy formulations in education should consider the equality of all human beings, irrespective of their geographical origin or ethnic affiliation. Equal opportunity means equal chance to display difference.

In the light of the aforementioned, I will argue here that, even though education policy in Kenya promotes equal educational opportunities in higher education, opportunities for education are not equally available to all in the country. I will also point out instances in which this manifests. First, the geographical location [space and place] in which an individual grows up determines his/her chances to access higher education [the question of quality]. Those who grow up or go to school in the central province have greater access to prestigious higher education institutions than those from other parts of the country (Mwiria, 2007), for instance those from the eastern part of the country. This is because the availability of quality higher education institutions in Kenya was centralised in the capital, making it difficult for people from other parts of the country to access them. The quality of higher education institutions also varies in terms of quality of instruction, facilities and resources, as well as academic standards. Geographical inequalities are also expressed in rural and urban differences. For instance, universities located in Nairobi are mostly regarded as prestigious. Even though many people from other provinces get access to rural universities, they prefer to be in the prestigious ones due to the lack of facilities and poor quality of instruction found in the rural universities. In the central part of Kenya, facilities are of high quality and levels of instruction are better because of more qualified academic personnel. Therefore, educational opportunities in Kenya are not distributed equally.

Educational opportunities in Kenya are also influenced by family loyalty (Prewitt, 1972:10). Most elite parents secure positions and cultivate relationships with power to acquire positions for their children in universities they have attended or to which they have ties. Wealthier parents also get more access for their children, for instance to the parallel programme at Nairobi University that caters for Module C students – students with university qualifications who are not considered via direct entry because of the demands and cut-off

Note: The term elite as used here refers to ‘influential subgroups within ethnic groups’ and classes that control every sector, including access to higher education institutions and economic access (Brass, 1991:14).
points for entry in a given year. Such students are then given access based on whether they can afford to pay [they pay more than regular students] or whether they have ties to the institutions. Thus, educational opportunities in Kenya are obtained through family connections and ties, except students who can afford to pay through the indirect route, like Module C entries. The question that arises is: what happens to those students with similar qualifications who cannot afford to pay?

Paradoxically, meritocracy plays a big role in selecting educational opportunities in Kenyan higher education institutions. Prewitt (1972:13) notes that educational attainment, merit considerations, qualifications and job performance determine access to prestigious positions in Kenya. On the other hand, favouritism, patronage, social connections, ethnic affiliations and political loyalties determine opportunities to access higher education. In essence, equal opportunities are not considered in relation to being human, with the intelligibilities that come with it. In other words, inequality is the norm propagated by the most privileged citizens, which is contrary to what is articulated in policy.

The question that arises is: how can democratic citizenship education, career mobility and occupational status be determined by merit and performance if factors such as tribalism [and ethnicity] and patronage play a decisive role? There is a strong emphasis on patriotism and paternalism in Kenyan higher education – blind patriotism by those who are marginalised in society, and paternalism by those destined to occupy privileged positions. This situation in Kenya presents a narrow understanding of self in relation to society.

It was noted in the analysis in Chapter 3 that various commissions were used in the process of reforming education in Kenya. It also is evident that there has been limited collaboration among stakeholders in higher education, which makes the governing of universities problematic. Policy documents were analysed and an articulation of unity, justice and democracy was at the forefront of the description of the purposes of education in Kenya (cf. Chapter 3; Nyaigotti-Chacha, 2008; Republic of Kenya, 2010). However, policy implementation has been problematic in practice. Most particular is the issue of justice and how it plays out in policy formulations. For instance, a few political elites are seen to be the only ones running education reforms in Kenya, marginalising the majority from decision making. As a result there has been much resistance to education reform in higher education, as exemplified in the many student strikes. These strikes point to the fact that students’ voices
have been silenced, leading to them, at times, having to raise their voices violently (details in Chapter 3). Nyaigotti-Chacha (2002:7) notes that funding education is Kenya in done through the Higher Education Loan Board (HELB), which is directed at specific universities rather than to students and programmes. This, he notes, restricts students’ choices in terms of university programmes they would like to follow. On the other hand, Boit and Kipkoech (2012:1) note that there still are disparities, especially in inequitable access and participation by various socio-economic groups.

4.2.3. Access

Access to universities is contentious, unequal and exclusive (Furlong & Cartmel, 2009:17). The Kenyan government has attempted to equalise opportunities for higher education, but there is apprehension about disparities in access and participation by several socio-economic groups. Endeavours to democratise access promoted by public subsidies do not seem to have had any meaningful influence on the participation in Kenyan higher education by students from the lower end of the socio-economic scale (Boit & Kipkoech, 2012:79; Kinyanjui, 2007; Nyaigotti-Chacha, 2002). The number of students from low-income background continues to diminish in higher education. In addition, access to universities currently is problematic; it is interesting to note that access to universities in Kenya is based on how much money an individual is able to pay for access. Those who qualify have no assurance that they will have opportunities to access higher education because the economic factor has been proven to be the key determinant of entry. The question is: how just is this process when it includes some and excludes others? Who participated in making such policies that exclude? Is this policy in tandem with justice as described in the liberal strands of DCE analysed in Chapter 2?

Another access challenge in Kenyan higher education is the computer-based selection of those who gain access. Nyaigotti-Chacha (2002:28) notes that selection according to computer criteria denies access to applicants who may have been admitted if entrance examinations were used. He suggests that other avenues be explored to improve access to higher education. For instance, he suggests that computer-based selection criteria deny applicants who may have gained access if entrance was determined through interactive, rational ways such as personal statements, recommendations from schools and entrance examinations, because these may provide an understanding of the individuals’ potential.
Instances of injustice in Kenya cannot be overlooked, because they have resulted in so much commotion and unrest in the country. The distribution of universities, for example, has not addressed the country’s demographics, and their geographical location does not allow equal opportunities for access by the different ethnic groups. This means that some ethnic groups have had more access to universities than others. Apart from access, the quality of the universities that have risen in Kenya is alarming. Universities have opened in centres in various provinces to cater for those who previously did not have access because of the unequal distribution of universities, but the issue is that the quality offered at these centres does not compare with that on the main campuses, because most of them do not have the qualified staff, resources and infrastructure that universities demand. This undermines the principles of justice that Rawls proposes. Is it just that the ethnically divided provinces have inferior university centres with very limited resources? Will such universities achieve the role of universities as a hub of knowledge for developing a just citizenry? What equal platforms can these centres create, for instance to alleviate injustice and ethnic tensions?

Interestingly, private universities in Kenya are on the increase, with the intention being to increase access. However, the rise of private universities is a challenge because it they are for a select few. This is so because these universities are very expensive (Eisemon, 1992:157), and some socio-economic groups cannot afford access to such institutions, hence the problem of accessibility and inequality posed by private universities in Kenya (Nyaigotti-Chacha, 2002.

4.2.4. Public Reasonableness

The Kenyan constitution [Chapter 2, article 10] provides rights to fundamental freedoms (Republic of Kenya, 2010), specifically freedom of expression, freedom of association, academic freedom and access to justice. While public reasonableness is highlighted in the constitution, there seems to be discrepancies between what is constitutional and the reality in the everyday running of university and societal interactions. Kenyan higher education seems to be an example of a lack of and or an actualised understanding of public reasonableness (Hornsby, 2012:537; Knighton, 2010:107). Students, academics and management alike, could avoid violence by taking responsible action in exercising their public reason as a potentiality. Following the analysis in Chapter 3, it could be argued that colonial education had a greater influence to unresponsive and an unquestioning culture among Kenyans in relation exercising.
their agency [to authority] – Kenyans were taught to respect authority and never to question it. This negates Habermas’s (1987) communicative freedom and undermines the human need for interaction. These issues penetrated post-colonial education. With reference to the analysis in Chapter 3, it is evident that, even at the level of university education, the political elite silenced academics teaching public reasonableness, and students were not encouraged to question or engage in public discourses about public policy or to question political authority in Kenya (Hornsby, 2012:269). Today, with limited freedom of communication [even though the constitution provides space for academic freedom, and freedom of expression], Kenyans would rather keep quiet about their problems in order to maintain the peace. This has remained one of the uncontainable issues that erupted in several instances of violence, culminating in the ethnic violence in 2007 (cf. Chapter 3). I will discuss this further in Chapter 5.

4.2.5. Iterations and Human Rights

From the analysis in Chapter 3, iterations of access, governance, equality and the quality of education in Kenya need to attract parents, academics, politicians and all other stakeholders with an interest in Kenyan higher education to conceptualise education that can provide innovative solutions to Kenya’s problems. By saying this I do not mean that iteration will solve Kenya’s problems instantly, but that a lack of this has a negative effect on the country’s education. Examples are the critical state of poverty that keeps many away from higher education; the reality that ethnic politics has contributed to the conflict and violence that have destabilised the running of universities, as well as given rise to ethnic hatred among citizens; and the domination of the decision-making process by the political elites, thus excluding the majority of Kenyans.

Iterations should also provoke deliberations on how quality universities, similar to the ones accessed by the majority, can be established so that the ethnic minorities without access to quality education and other resources can gain these. Benhabib illustrates how human rights entail moral principles that protect the communicative freedom of the individual – a justification that provokes Kenyans to claim a consensus for deliberation by all without exclusion. This is because human rights call for mutual respect. For instance, the post-election violence that ended the life of many Kenyans signifies a lack of respect for the human right to life. It also illustrates the inability of Kenyans to engage in dialogue to solve
their differences. If one respects another’s right to life, one does so in a moral sense, so as to preserve their life. Therefore, one ought not to end another’s life, as doing so infringes on another’s right to life. As such, one should not protect one’s own right while infringing on the right of others. Benhabib argues that we should respect another’s capacity to communicate in a reciprocal way. In this way, when faced with opposition one can respect the other’s communicative freedom, so that both parties can talk back to each other in order to contribute to addressing public concerns – an act of necessity for a world republic [humanity]. Only a member of a human republic will allow another a chance to communicate freely. In this section, I have addressed the challenges and flaws that Kenyan liberal DCE poses for the country. In the next section I will view these challenges in terms of the minimalist understanding of liberal DCE.

4.3. Viewing the Challenges in Tune with a Minimalist View of Liberal Democratic Citizenship Education

Democratic communication recognises the equality of citizens (Benhabib, 1996; 2011a; Dewey, 1916; Habermas, 1987a & b; Rawls, 1971). It is interesting to note that the political elites in Kenya have interfered with this conception of citizenship in such a way that some citizens are preferred to others in the way the political elites dominate the formulation and administration of policies, leaving out the voices of the majority, yet using the concept of equality in framing policy reforms in education. Of particular interest is the political influence in education reform, which has resulted in the failure to implement the recommendations of education commissions, for instance the Mackay Commission, which has led to technical vocational and practical education remaining a challenge for the country. Education planning needs to be done over a reasonable period of time, with the stakeholders being included through democratic participation [communication] – not through a coercive strategy or [dictatorial] power relation; all citizens should be included as equal participants. This does not suggest that anyone can formulate education policy, but just means that the voices of the masses that have an interest in university education be heard when considering policy formulation.

Communication is a core feature in education and is depicted in liberal strands of thought as providing favourable conditions for participative learning experiences (as discussed earlier in Chapter 2). Communication, as depicted by Habermas (1987), is a democratic action that
enables understanding and consensus in public deliberation on education. In his communicative theory, Habermas sheds light on democratic deliberation as a necessity for the equality of citizens and for the opportunities they have to voice their thoughts and contribute to their own learning and to matters of public concern. Habermas’s theory has historical links that encourage discourses within contextual histories to disrupt modern notions of democratic education. As such, he offers a theory of communicative action to emancipate rationality and reflexivity for meaning making in education theory, policy and practice. This assumption of Habermas requires a reciprocal ‘ear’ to listen actively to what is being communicated and being able to act communicatively, rather than being passive. This process requires clear, critical and logical communication that leads to understanding. At the same time, it requires a reciprocal action of listening, hearing and response – leading to understanding – so that citizens can communicate with each other in order to act appropriately. What Habermas suggests can assist in developing education policy and other public concerns that require stakeholder agreement; for instance, policies that will reflect the voices of all involved in structuring education. The voices of students should be reflected in particular, as they are often forgotten in policy deliberations. Democratic equality in communication depicts substantive types of human relationships and creates a sense of belonging (Anderson et al., 1997; Habermas, 1987; Yuval-Davis, 2011). It depicts an understanding of one’s self [identity] in relation to the other – community. Communication is a channel that can help students to understand the world around them in order to participate in shaping education for the society to which they belong. Such thinking on community defies the current understanding of DCE in Kenyan higher education – because Kenya’s higher education policies conceptualise education [community] in nationalistic terms, which exclude some and include others. This is why the divisive ethnic violence, rioting students, corruption and such vices follow such an understanding [community] of education that excludes the other [human being]. It is such concepts that are taught to students and result in students reproducing irresponsible attitudes and a lack of understanding of diversity and difference. I argue so because, if students understand the richness of tribal difference, plurality and the possibilities of responsible deliberative channels, they can engage critically to encounter their difference and avoid violent occurrences that may infringe on the rights of others.

Rawls shows how respect and reciprocity exemplify democratic communication in egalitarian fairness. Communication is one way in which education enables equal participation by stakeholders in their roles in teaching and learning. In this sense, Dewey comprehends
education as a conjoined, communicated experience (Dewey, 1916:144), because it valorises the development of a consciousness of the interconnectedness of humanity. Benhabib (1996; 2011a) illustrates how recognising humanity wherever it occurs can accelerate the process of communicative freedom and advance the capacity for individuals to consciously respect each other in a reciprocal manner. Such recognition has important implications for educational experiences in higher education. Communication in a democratic sense has potentialities to improve governance and access and to promote culture in higher education. Democratic communication can advance egalitarian social relations, human interaction and a sense of belonging. Communicative democracy has a tendency to promote a culture of sympathy and caring in education (Noddings, 2012; Nussbaum, 1997; Waghid, 2007). Martha Nussbaum (1997) suggests an education for citizenship that develops three distinct capacities that will enable citizens [university graduates/students] to understand the self in relation to others, thereby recognising humanity wherever it occurs. These capacities include, first, the capacity to scrutinise oneself and one’s traditions; second, the capacity to recognise the citizenship of human beings, and not just on the local or regional or group level; and third, the capacity for narrative imagination – being able to understand a person’s story and emotions from speech, which expresses something of importance to the other, and thereby being able to gain an understanding from imagining what others express. This means that, when citizens in higher education recognise one another’s need for social relations, they are able to enter into the mind of others, a caring attitude that promotes respect for the other – humanity. In this sense, teaching and learning become a process of understanding one’s self in relation to other human beings, not just those close to the self, but all of humanity. Citizenship education can enable Kenyans to look beyond ethnic or national citizenship to humans as world citizens – motivating multicultural relations and cooperation. The question is how can Kenyan higher education pursue this?

Higher education comprises a community of individuals who have an interest in advancing education. This makes higher education a deliberative platform that offers environments for collaboration and cooperative public engagement. As such, constructive and meaningful engagement requires democratic communication, in which individual voices are heard in an equal opportunity pattern. Rawls shows how respect and reciprocity exemplify democratic communication in egalitarian fairness. Higher education policies should be designed to inspire communication at all levels – be it at the macro (policy makers) or micro (university classrooms) levels – to maximise learning and teaching. Communication in higher education
has the capacity to enable university autonomy so that the institution can advance initiative, independence and imaginative action to construct own learning. That is to say, public expression grants citizens opportunities to hear others’ feelings about formulating new thinking in education. When this is lacking in education, democracy is not cultivated in the sense of egalitarianism. Democratic communication might mean supporting ethnic politics if it means that it will provide environments for dialogue to abolish the abuse of the human right to life. The end point for democratic communication ought to be egalitarian universities in which every citizen will feel safe and secure and have a sense of belonging, despite the diversity found in these institutions. Dewey notes that communication [deliberation] is central to education; as such there is a need for a theory of communication that can help us understand the practice of education (Garrison, Neubert & Reich, 2012:78). I view Habermas’s attempt at communicative action as helpful. I will revisit the issue of communication later, in Chapter 6, where I will show how communication and pedagogy can improve higher education. I now turn to an examination of whether Kenyan higher education displays some elements of communication.

The development, policies and implementation of Kenyan higher education depict a limited sense of communicative action. This is evident from the analysis in Chapter 3. I will not rewrite aspects of what has already been discussed in Chapter 3, but I have highlighted how the development of higher education in Kenya displays aspects of communicative action.

Justice is fundamental to conceptualising education. Rawls (1971) clarifies justice as a balanced and fair assessment of social circumstances by way of argumentation – a claim to reason to reach agreement. Put differently, Rawls views justice as a reflection of a fair system of cooperation over time by creating a more equitable, respectful and just society for everyone. Rawls notes that such a process must be guided by the principles of the equality of citizens and of equal opportunities, and the principle of distributive justice – whereby any inequality is redressed so that everyone involved participates for the benefit of all. Rawls notes that the process of justice needs moral values such as respect, reciprocity, cooperation and communication, without which fairness cannot be guaranteed. For Rawls, the principle of justice provides liberty and freedom for citizens to participate in building their society and securing their sense of belonging to the community, in which they are valued. What is alarming in Rawls’s case is the exclusion of indifference. For instance, how can such a pluralistic and diverse community be able to deal with disagreements except by agreeing?
The moment fairness is mentioned, the idea of democracy and citizenship is reduced to those who agree. What happens to those who do not agree? Must citizens always agree?

On the other hand, Rawls’s idea of justice brings to the fore the purpose of education, which is that every effort should be made to ensure that all citizens enjoy fair access to education. If education exists to ensure justice for all citizens, then democratic education is a worthwhile practice for higher education to pursue. Justice, as viewed by Rawls – a procedural process – is helpful when considered for policy development in education. It is also worthwhile to consider education as a process of recognising those who are marginalised by the politically elite education system, so that they get the education needed to develop their capacity for critical rationality and opportunities for deliberation. However, the notion of justice needs to extend beyond Rawls’s preoccupation with justice as fairness in reaching agreement.

In ensuring justice, higher education needs to extend and capture ‘opportunities for all citizens’: this statement is a rhetorical one and poses the question whether all citizens are capable of accessing higher education. Specifically, in terms of access, education for justice from Rawls’s perspective is rather narrow and exclusive; for instance, what about citizens who do not have the same intellectual capacity to secure a place in higher education, which espouses meritocracy, high social mobility and a variety of tastes and allegiances? However, as Ryan (1999:43) notes, ‘the idea of university in liberal education is something contrasted with vocational education – no ordinary people will have access to’. Ryan (1999:40) suggests that an educating society is one that tries to maximise the intelligence and perceptiveness of all its citizens, not necessarily to acquire the same educational standards, but to achieve their potential and participate in innovation and the development of themselves and the society they share.

Using justice to conceptualise higher education is a worthwhile venture; however, the meaning of justice needs to be extended beyond reaching agreement. The egalitarian notion of justice needs to capture even the moments when people do not seem to agree. Amy Gutmann (2012) puts forward Rawls’s notion of justice as the purpose of education. She defends a democratic education that acknowledges all role players in identifying the justice factor. As such, she notes that education is a process that involves a number of people, and that it cannot be the role of one person to decide what justice means. In this regard she gleans ideas from Plato, John Locke and Stuart Mill, and argues that justice in democratic education
ought to be decided by the state, parents and the individual learner [student]. In this case, not one entity has more power in contributing to education than the other, but all have equal chances to participate in contributing to the concept of justice in education. This implies that education policies and constitutions need to reflect a collective of contributions by all stakeholders who are involved in such a way that democratic rights and responsibilities become cooperative and collaborative. She implies that the reasons for this are that ‘education may aim to perfect human nature by developing potentialities to deflect into serving socially useful purposes or to defeat it by repressing those inclinations that are socially destructive’ (Gutmann, 1987:328). In this sense, Gutmann believes that developing a normative theory of education, such as the one she suggests, is one way of conserving participation and deliberation in democratic education. For instance, a democratic state recognises the value of professional authority differently from that of the family, and recognises the value of political education that equips students to participate in sharing rights and responsibilities.

According to Habermas, to be understood by others and to understand others’ opinions are ways of making the education process a just one. This is because, for him, communicative action is justice if the process facilitates learning by way of negotiating, persuading and convincing others about what we think is just. For Habermas, this process requires a language of understanding, a cultural platform for negotiation and the recognition of the ‘other’. However, the question is: how many people in our society today are able to participate in deliberation? If education is conceptualised only by a real speech situation, then it might be exclusive and render itself meaningless to those who are not eloquent enough to convince others for consensus. Iris Marion Young adds to the above in that she recognises that, even though some might not be as eloquent as others, opportunities should be provided for such voices to be heard by allowing these citizens to participate in ways that may not be rational. She notes that narrative – that is, listening to the stories or experiences of others – might provide ample data for logical collection that could contribute to deliberations. Young (2003) also suggests that rhetoric can be used to provoke or awaken voices that might otherwise be excluded from conventional conversations. Another way she suggests that might create or trigger a conversation is greeting – a symbolic recognition of others, of recognising their presence. Young’s articulation is timely in including those who might not, in normal circumstances, include themselves or who do not participate in public discussions. It counters
Habermas’s view that rationality is the only way to include others in the discussion of matters of public concern, like education.

According to Benhabib (2011a:151), iterations offer uncompromising accounts for political justice. This process is inclusive and deliberative, interrogates schemas and entails equal participation. Iteration implies the uniqueness of participants, demands the distribution of speech acts, and takes place in overlapping communities. Iterations comprise both international and transnational organisations. They are concerned with both moral and political constitutional obligations to human rights contracts. Iterations arbitrate between collectivities that depict our sense of belonging and institutional duties, and the setting beyond universal human rights and justice to which such a collectivity ought to be distributed equally. Iterations should not be constrained by majority politics or by prescribed, law-making processes.

Benhabib (2011a) moves away from limiting conversations to local communities [an aspect begun by Nussbaum] and introduces the idea of talking back to each other over and over. In this sense, when deliberation takes place in the first instance, certain agreements are reached; however, the exclusion of other voices may prompt disagreements in further discourses and, as such, reflexiveness is necessary to identify decisions in conflicts that discomfort others so that iterations are provoked by those discomforted by the previous decisions. This process is a circular one, until every human need is fulfilled. Benhabib says that, despite the fact that nation states are limiting such discussions, it is the context in which such discourses should begin. They then should transcend borders in relation to international discourse, such as that on human rights in what she calls ‘cosmopolitanism without illusion’ Benhabib, 2011a:15; an account she contextualised in relation to human rights in troubled times. In this context, Benhabib unravels the conflicts that prevail concerning a conceptualisation of human rights that has limited a utopian understanding, and hence descends into conflictive human experiences of war and tension.

Benhabib calls for a human right that protects human dignity, without boundaries relating to where the human being is from. In other words, the human right to dignity and right to life are worth protecting and require iterative discourses to formulate a plausible and universal protection of human rights.
Borrowing Benhabib’s notion of iteration, it can be said that democratic education in Kenyan higher education ought to create spaces for stakeholders to participate in addressing societal needs and the protection of human rights. Benhabib’s thinking informs higher education in Kenya, especially her notion of talking back as a way of reflective thinking in the construction of education. Currently taking place in Kenya is the devolution of governance. This process requires iterations of history and the understanding of education policies, and of the political and current needs of Kenyan citizens. However, I do not want to delve into the concept of devolution, but rather stay focused on Kenyan higher education.

In Benhabibian terms, education is engendered as a process of talking back to each other in the moral sense of respecting another’s communicative freedom by virtue of our humanity. In this sense, we can participate in formulating the kind of higher education that will be relevant to the needs of our society, which will reflect a citizenry we perceive and imagine.

In the next section, I argue that liberal democratic strands [analysed in Habermas, Rawls and Benhabib] are helpful starting points for thinking about education; however, they portray thin and limited thoughts for conceptualising education that will help Kenya to deal with the ever-changing terrain of society and overcome the challenges experienced by education in Kenya. This can be stated on the basis of the analysis in the previous sections, which highlights the flaws of such thinking for Kenyan higher education. In the section that follows, I analyse DCE in becoming as a tenable conception that constantly can help us think differently and provide us with nuances to make meaning of education to challenge the ever-growing challenges.

4.4. Democratic Citizenship Education in Becoming – A Potential Remedy to the Liberal Flaws

4.4.1. Agamben and the Community in Becoming

In this section I will employ Agamben’s (1993) perspective of *The Coming Community: Theory Out of Bounds* to engender DCE in becoming. Doing this will involve whatever

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potentialities DCE displays that relate to its actuality in dealing with conflict situations in Kenya, as well as the impotentialities that determine a DCE in becoming. From Agamben’s perspective, democratic citizenship education holds certain potentialities that determine its actuality, and at the same time manifests potentiality that ends in itself and never passes into actuality – ‘it saves itself of actuality’ (Waghid & Davids, 2013:23). This demands further curiosity about what is absent – [signified when a concept fails to manifest actuality of its meaning] about the conceptualisation of DCE in Kenya. In other words, DCE was found in the Kenyan education system to be a concept that is made by the same people who use it, and as such depicts an obsession with the consumerist sense of its meaning, hence the lack of effort to inquire further about the potentialities that will sustain DCE as a becoming concept [with its sustainable potentialities] in order to deal constantly with the challenges of educating for democratic citizenship [a necessary venture for Kenyan higher education]. In keeping with Agamben’s (1993) seminal thought on ‘the coming community’, DCE is in becoming and is always unpredictable, yet it holds potentialities to counter the anomalies and imbalances in the Kenyan education system. Thus, DCE lies in a state of becoming and not of attainment (Waghid, 2014:41). Moreover, DCE in becoming portrays potentialities in a language and communication that are necessary for human experience [education]. Accordingly, human experience [education] needs to be framed in a language that disengages predictability, thereby enabling endless learning; such learning is considered durable (Waghid, 2014:41).

From the aforementioned, DCE in becoming breaks away from predetermined outcomes in education and brings people together as a matter of engaging – not to determine the actuality of ideas as such, but to find potentialities of meaning for human experience [education]. This kind of engaging in communities creates potential for a sense of belonging determined by whatever results come from such an engagement. In this sense of understanding democratic education, communication does not determine what DCE becomes, but determines what DCE.

Potentiality is a concept Agamben traces from Aristotelian discussion on metaphysics and physics. Potentiality refers to ‘dynamis’ – ‘the presence of an absence’; Agamben is concerned with the idea of ‘existing potentiality’ – Waghid and Davids (2013:23) notes that potentiality is that which preserves itself in itself – in other words, that potentiality is never actualised, for if it is then it holds no potential. This is to suggest that DCE in becoming is one whose meaning is constantly being constructed, and the moment its potentiality is actualised it ceases to have potential (see more in Waghid, 2013:23; Waghid, 2014:38–41). This means that there can be no finality of DCE, also that the DCE potentialities of belonging are not fixed [not actualised], for if they are, they stop holding on to DCE potentials of belonging.

Actuality is the ‘energesia’ – sensation (Waghid, 2014:38).
is becoming. This differs from the liberal understanding of both Habermas and Rawls, who posit consensus in deliberation as an actuality. In the same manner, it shows that justice has the potential for fairness [from Rawls’s perspective] and that, when its fairness becomes unfair, it becomes fairness in becoming [an Agamben/Derridian perspective] – justice in becoming. In the same manner, justice is constantly in becoming. In addition, Benhabibian iterations manifest the potential for reflexivity and talking back, as is necessary for human rights in becoming, and when it becomes, its impotentialities demand continuous iterations of human rights in its becoming. Waghid (2014:4) notes that iteration in the Benhabibian view does not necessarily substantiate how such iterations should be conducted. However, he notes that iteration may mean that participants in a deliberation are given the opportunity to say things again and again. He indicates that such a view of iterations [talking over and over] may not provoke participants to think differently or to see things a new. In this sense, iterations should be such that they evoke new potentialities for DCE in becoming.

In the same light, democratic citizenship education in Kenya is demonstrated in the tensions between civic citizenship and ethnic citizenship. Civic citizenship in Kenya shows potentialities in education policy, inter alia national unity, national development, freedom, the right to economic resources, equality, social justice and the right to education, as portrayed in the country’s liberal policy documents (cf. Chapter 3; Republic of Kenya, 2010). However, the impotentialities of the liberal outcomes of the policy documents suggest predetermined policy stipulations that are not achievable and cannot meet or address Kenyan problems [dual loyalties to citizenship in Kenya]. This is because, in Kenya, one has two or more identities to reckon with – keeping tribal citizenship and, at the same time, observing civic citizenship, which means that national citizenship is controlled by civic laws and ethnic citizenship is tamed by tribal loyalties. To contend with such complexity, citizenship education in Kenya requires reconsideration. This reconsideration, I contend, entails viewing Kenyans first as human beings before noting their national loyalties. I believe that the commonalities Kenyans share provide ample space for constant dialogue on reconstructing DCE that could help Kenya deal with the loyalties to nationalism and ethnicity. In this case, nationalism only is a potential sense of belonging; it is not an actual sense of belonging, for if it is, as proposed in the Kenyan higher education policies, it ceases to have potential. This is why the challenges [impotentialities] that Kenyan education experiences push for a constant search for innovative possibilities [potentialities] to constantly address such challenges; thereby, enabling Kenyan higher education to reimagine how human dignity and democratic practices
can be constructed constantly. The impotentiality of actualising DCE in nationalistic terms portrays its potentialities and denies its actuality, hence the need for a constant search for meaning in Kenyan higher education to deal with the imbalances in Kenyan society. It is safe, therefore, for Kenya to think of DCE in terms of becoming.

This suggests that Kenyan education policy is in becoming, since it has not resolved the ethnic violence, poverty, disease and corruption in the country. Ethnic citizenship recognises one’s right to belong to a particular ethnic/tribal group, with loyalty to what the group demands. Such thinking depicts the possibility that ethnic citizenship holds for Kenyan higher education and suggests that it is in becoming [in the making]. However, the impotentialities that ethnic citizenship displays in ethnic conflicts and post-election violence in the country suggest the absence and inadequacy of the liberal view of DCE in the Kenyan higher education system. In this sense, DCE in Kenya is in becoming. Re-imagining DCE in Kenya demands that DCE be viewed within potentialities and impotentialities, so that education becomes durable DCE in becoming.

I argue that DCE in Kenya demands a re-imagining of citizenship education that transcends the boundaries of possibilities and impossibilities in order to enhance education as a process of becoming in relation to human experience, interactions and/with ethnic relations. Since ethnic rights have the potential to influence the development that the country predetermines in policy documents, it could be viewed as being in a stage of infancy and having the potential to solve higher education problems. A reconsidered notion of DCE in becoming has the potential to enable Kenyan policy makers, educators and students to think and speak differently and to suspend quick judgement on how policies, power and decisions in education are made (Waghid, 2013:24).

4.4.2. Democratic Citizenship Education in Becoming: Emancipation and Equal Intelligence

Rancière’s (2006) philosophical thoughts have in recent times been considered by educational theorists (Bingham & Biesta, 2010; Davis, 2010:100; Lambert, 2011a; Mercieca, 2012; Pelletier, 2011; Waghid, 2014:31) as among the most prominent and valuable contributions to education. The particular emphasis has been on his articulation of equality of intelligence and emancipation as a disruption of the discourses of democratic education. Rancière’s method is not another theory or a solution, but an intervention to produce
innovative solutions to contextual problems that arise in democracies (Rancière, 2009). Most of those who read Rancière (2006) submit that his style of writing is cumbersome and difficult to interpret. However, I find Rancière’s (1991; 2006) provocative thoughts on equal intelligence and emancipation a valuable disruption of what education is becoming and an extension of imaginaries for democratic citizenship education in becoming that can grapple continuously with the flaws in Kenyan liberal democratic citizenship education.

Rancière (2006) describes democracy as an active equality. This implies that there is no end to equal democracy. It also means that democracy begins in equality, rather than ends with it. Rancière disputes Athenian democracy, which was based on classism, and that of those who could obtain sovereignty and contend for a democracy that promotes active equality to counter wrong conceptions of democracy that encourage inequality (Davis, 2010:80). Rancière’s work awakens in us scepticism of the discourses of ‘social exclusion’ – which blocks citizens’ aims to attain political equality. Rancière’s work, when encountering Jacotot’s writing, challenges the conventional understanding of democracy, particularly that the voices of the marginalised can only be included by the marginalised themselves, which means that the elite do not necessarily have to include the minority, since equality of intelligence of speech is found in every human being. Thus, democracy becomes democracy when the marginalised can raise their voices and be heard. It is when they raise their voices that the state of the marginalised will be termed democratic and emancipated (Mercieca, 2012:409).

Davis (2010:100) emphasises that Rancière’s thinking on emancipation and equality of intelligence advances the role of politics rather than that of the police to disrupt power relations. This is because the police are seen as authoritarian. He rather is encouraging us to plan for better forms of social arrangement that are open to disruption by egalitarian politics. This means that what Rancière is concerned with is not a pre-packaged hierarchy that dictates how individuals are included in decision making. Rather, his thoughts on democracy are of it as being a remedy to the hegemonic notion of equality. He intervenes in the constant debates about inclusion and equality. For Rancière, equality is inherent in every individual, and what is needed is the creation of consciousness of this equal intelligence and self-emancipation for possibilities of becoming. In keeping with Rancière’s thought, education is a process of creating consciousness of the inherent equality of intelligence that is present in us, but only
actualised when one is actively engaged through speech. In this sense, education becomes an explanation of society (Mercieca, 2012:410), not a tool for social inclusion.

Rancière’s equal intelligence provides consciousness of what intelligence can do. This is a profound conception of intellectual equality, which must be presumed from the beginning of conversations about social inclusion in democracies. For instance, in pedagogical encounter, equal intelligence must be declared and verified in that encounter (Davis, 2010:27). Waghid (2014:30) notes that equal intelligence is connected to the communicative traditions of democratic education. The intelligence referred to here is the intelligence that every individual holds actively in a democratic society in speaking and being listened to. This means that every individual in a democratic space has equal intelligence to commence speaking and contribute to democratic state building. In other words, each individual has a consciousness of equal intelligence to contribute to politics through speech, and accordingly can contribute through speech to improve the democratic state of education. In this sense, one does not have to be given the capacity to speak; but that we are all capacious in speech, so our initiative to contribute to democratic education is not a given, but is inherent in us and no one has to give it to us. This means, then, that democratic education demands that all voices, from the intelligences that are equal in all of us, should push us to voice our polity to build democratic societies. Failure to contribute through speech is not an excuse for inequality of intelligence. In this sense, Rancière’s view is not about being included or excluded, but that one has to include oneself in conversations, thereby ascertaining one’s own equal intelligence of speech that is found in all humans. Biesta (2009:110) affirms that, when people speak, they exercise their speech and act; they intervene with equality. This understanding of equal intelligence brings to the fore the inclusion of everyone in conversations; that is, if everyone can voice their concerns, no matter the consequences, then one can contribute to polity.

Similarly, according to Rancière, emancipation is found in people being able to verify their equality by being active through their speech as an act of democratic intervention. Through speaking they announce their intellectual equality. In the same way, one does not have to wait to be included by external forces or another person. Emancipation is one’s individual choice to join in conversations in democratic interventions. This is exemplified in Rancière’s encounter with and exposition of Jacotot, a French lecturer who found himself in a university of Flemish-speaking students; he spoke no Flemish and had to teach in English. This exploratory analysis is found in his seminal work, The Ignorant School Master (Rancière,
In this book, Rancière disrupts the power of explanation in learning and questions the role of a teacher in learning. Davis (2010:27) notes that ‘what an emancipated person can do is be an emancipator: to give not the key of knowledge, but the consciousness of what intelligence can do when it considers itself equal to any other equal’. By implication, democratic education in becoming ought to arouse the consciousness of equal intelligence in students so that they can speak and engage actively in building a democratic society. For it is through constant speech that every voice counts in democratic societies. For instance, the development of education policies needs to include the equal intelligences of stakeholders in a constant deliberation for a continuous formulation of democratic citizenship education that can become an intervention to posit innovative solutions to Kenyan educational problems. Accordingly, every individual becomes consciously emancipating, through an education that they constantly engage in themselves, to curb the ever-evolving sense of belonging, interaction and public reasoning.

Rancière’s understanding of equality provokes a new way of understanding equality that differs from the conventional way. It causes all individuals to search within themselves for the conscious equality that is present in them, which can only be realised when they engage in speech to display and verify their equal intelligence, thereby including themselves in conversations as an emancipation for themselves. In this case they do not have to wait for the government or the other to include them. As difficult as Rancière’s thoughts sound, so great is the potential they offer to every individual, an invitation to engage, find a sense of belonging as a way to overcome marginalisation. In a sense, then, individuals begin to blame themselves for not being emancipated. The contention then is how are our voices being heard? Why are our voices included? Instead of waiting to be included, every citizen needs to be an active participant in democratic polity.

Rancière’s intervention has implications for democratic education in becoming and is different from what Rawls, Habermas and Benhabib offer. From Rancière’s perspective, equality is presumed from the beginning, it is the certainty that each individual has equality of intelligence, which is displayed the moment an individual publicly engages in speech. For the former, equality is the outcome of every democratic action. In Rancière’s case, one can include oneself, one does not have to wait to be included; in the views of the former, ‘the well-positioned’ (elite) include those who are marginalised, meaning that one has to wait for
those who are believed to be more capacious to include one, for ‘one’ is incapacious to include oneself.

Lambert (2011b) contends that Rancière views education as a question, not as an answer. Education is an unbounded process of becoming through which people explore and become equal subjects with the other. Education therefore is the connection between intellectual emancipation and democracy (Means, 2011:29). In the next section I provide an exposition of Ubuntu as an instance of DCE in becoming as a further manifestation of a thick conception of DCE.

4.5. Ubuntu as an Instance of Democratic Citizenship Education in Becoming

The concept of Ubuntu is a viable ideology that I want to synthesise with the emerging conceptualisation of DCE in becoming that has the potentialities necessary for African higher education, and for the emerging realities in Kenya in particular. At this particular stage, I want to unravel how this concept has been understood and what its implications are for policy in higher education. Ubuntu depicts the value of people and their cultural heritage. It also highlights how members of a society relate to one another in the midst of global trends.

Following the challenges raised by Benhabib (2011a) [as seen earlier in Chapter 2] regarding talking back as a way of generative learning and a way of constantly thinking reflectively has enabled me to talk back to the understanding of humanity [humanness in Africa] that relates to the universal discourses on understanding humanity and democratic systems in education. Ubuntu is a concept widely considered in Africa, especially in South Africa and Rwanda, as a reconciliatory tool for the shared commonality of being human in relation to the other (Letseka, 2011; Ntamushobora, 2012). Some scholars dispute the validity of Ubuntu in resolving African problems [marginalisation] (Enslin & Horsthemke, 2004:545), while others find Ubuntu to be a viable African philosophical concept (Letseka, 2011) that can be used to revive education and humanity in general toward an ethics of care (Waghid & Smeyers, 2012a; cultivate a pedagogy of hospitality (Waghid, 2014:92); and the implications these may have for reconciliatory purposes (Ntamushobora, 2012).

In the African context, the definition of a person depicts ‘ubuntuness’. Mbiti, an anthropologist from Kenya, describes a person’s existence and identity as ‘I am because we
Mbiti’s (1970) description of a person’s identity entails the existence of one person in relation to another. This prompts a communal sense of belonging, a collective participation, cooperative living and an African solidarity that capture the true African spirit. This concept exhibits the robust excellence of human potential in African identity and dignity. In other words, Mbiti’s description of an individual points to the fact that an individual’s source of humanity comes from synergy with the community of others. It frames the self in relation to others within a moral milieu (Menkiti, 2004:24). Menkiti (2004:24) advances personhood in a community as a normative stance and refutes its limitation to biological explanation, because that is superficial.

I have in mind the lucid example of a diversity of people who exist either as tribes, races, languages, religions, ethnic groups or economic class, but still need others to survive. The fact that, in an African context, an individual realises that there is a common humanity for which they exist, and that this humanity is defined and depicted by the community, symbolises the source of their moral existence.

I would like at this point to use the word ‘Ubuntu’ to refer to the relationship that exists between an individual person and the community [the other apart from self]. It is this relationship that leads to the moral sense of the description of a human person in the African context (Menkiti, 2004:330). This understanding reveals the worth that is attached to a person not only by the ‘African context’, but also by all humankind – this also is a concept similar to Nussbaum’s (1997) cultivation of humanity. As examined in Chapter 2, John Rawls (1971), Seyla Benhabib (2011a) and Jürgen Habermas (1978a &b) [Euro-American contexts] display some universal concepts that resemble the African identity, inter alia humanity. Both the African perspectives and the Euro-American perspectives illuminate this recognition of our common humanity as a relevant concept to begin with in dealing with issues of justice and human rights. The recognition of our common humanity is the thrust and force that compels the thirst for justice and respect for human rights and dignity: the right to life and to freedom of speech.

Community here depicts the spaces that the community provides, whether in abstract form or in tangible human behaviour, the norms, rules, mentors and authority figures from which an individual ethically generates his/her moral being and grounding. An individual person cannot be an island, but ‘ought to’ exist with others to survive. For this survival to occur, the
individual ‘ought to’ learn the rules of the game of existence in the world in which he/she does not exist alone, but with others. This therefore brings to the fore the fact that there are a myriad of things attached to the existence of an individual. Thus, learning about others, with others, by others and for others inevitably forms the potential for and possibility of DCE.

Wiredu’s (2004) and Gyekye’s (1987) expositions of the concept of a person from an Akan worldview - culture is worth considering here. Wiredu (1996) indicates that a person is a result of the union of three elements, which are not necessarily sharply disparate ontologically, although each is different from the other. The first, according to Gyekye, is body, and according to Wiredu is the blood principle, which bear different names: Honam (Gyekye), and mogya (Wiredu); second is the soul/the life principle, to which they both refer as [Okra], and the spirit/personality principle, which they both refer to as [sunsum]. According to Wiredu (1996:157), okra is believed to have been given by god, meaning that it is inborn. On the other hand, Gyekye (1987:85) indicates that the okra is the self, the innermost being, the essence of self. According to him, okra describes the individual person. Okra is also understood to be associated with life. In this exposition it is somewhat unclear how the triune existence manifests in the person. And there also is controversy in their depiction of what okra is, i.e. the immortality of the soul. This notwithstanding, the essence of life is contained in this description. Without much ado, it is notable that both scholars agree that sunsum is the spirit or personality principle in a person. Sunsum is seen to have been inherited from the father of a person. It is not from the gods, as it dies with the body (honam). In the later explanation of sunsum it still is unclear whether the sunsum dies or stays with the soul. The third component is the honam, according to Gyekye, and mogya, according to Wiredu (1996:158). Wiredu shows that mogya depicts clan identity. The term indicates that the person is understood to have come from the mother and that this is the basis for lineage. Honam implies that the arrival of a new member of a family is the continuity of the characteristics of the parents. From this analysis it is clear that Wiredu (1996:158) is talking about the significance of understanding a person, thus the value that should be reflected when we are faced with understanding a person. It points to the value of human dignity and the entitlement it demands to an equal measure of basic respect. The interpretation of what Wiredu and Gyekye portray describes a person in an ecological manner, which can be used to analyse the complexity of a human person in the African context. As such, Wiredu and Gyekye reflect on the cyclic nature of the existence of the human person in Africa, and the cooperative lineages that play a role in building the human person. Their thinking also depicts
the concentric circles of the matrilineal kinship relation and neighbourhoods in the outmost reaches, which may include people in widely separated geographic regions (Wiredu, 1996:158).

Wiredu shows how the Akan community lived together to nurture power relations. Kinship in this community portrayed a political system [political rights]. In the Akan political system, governance was inclusive, in that individuals had a say in it. The community would gather under a tree and give individual opinions on how to run their town, which was headed by the chiefs and the elders. Leadership in this community was deliberative in policy formation, power and questions of citizenship.

Linking Menkiti, Mbiti, Wiredu and Gyekye’s understandings of a person, the basic point is that, from an African viewpoint, a person has capabilities and dispositions that enable one to exist with others; this is contrary to the colonial depiction of the African man (cf. Chapter 3). These capabilities can be nurtured by a person’s existence in community with others. The above exposition indicates the value and synergy drawn from community and its ability and potential to mould a person’s being. It foreshadows DCE and is a process in becoming. This is because no one has an idea of whom or what one will become, but the communal norms and practices and the agency of the community give hope for democratic citizenry. This is the concern of an African philosopher of education. One is always conscious of the ultimate relevance of one’s thinking and for it to be practical in concerns of life, even though what it becomes is considered absent, since it is in becoming (Wiredu, 1980:16).

The Akan understanding of a person reflects Ubuntu in the way it regards the human person and in the way it indicates the involvement of the father, the mother and god in the development of a person. It portrays a nurturing and pervasive spirit of caring, community, harmony and hospitality, with respect and responsiveness that depict an individual person and the person’s existence in society and for others.

The question is, if Africa has/had such a nurturing and a caring attitude to and understanding of a human person, why is there so much violence? Violence has been depicted by Serequeberhan (1994:55) as a phenomenon that has been inadequately addressed by African philosophers, and rather as a fact that has clouded the African experience. The notion of
violence has received less attention in the philosophical literature, except in that of Wiredu (1980) and Oruka (1983; 1998).

Furthermore, Ubuntu in university education in Kenya proffers a constructivist pedagogical approach to teaching and learning. That is, the way Africans live and value community calls for cooperative learning and group dynamics in educational endeavours. It also calls for the virtues of respect, hospitality and the respecting of difference for society to develop. Ubuntu means that education in Africa ought to embrace team spirit, with common goals to achieve moral outcomes in education. It also elevates the notion of individual reason (input) by contributing ideas and making practical contributions to decision making for the betterment of the community as a whole. Ubuntu has the potential to counter tribal wars and violence against the other, and to embrace morality in community development and educational endeavours. The question is: has this been the case in Africa?

4.6. Summary

This chapter has analysed the links between the three strands of liberal democratic citizenship education and Kenyan democratic higher education policies. The chapter’s findings show that there is a similarity between DCE in Kenyan higher education policy and the three liberal strands analysed in Chapter 2. The similarity is seen in how DCE is used to create a sense of belonging, human interaction and public engagement. It is also evident; however, that Kenyan higher education still struggles to create a sense of belonging, since ethnic violence has undermined liberal virtues such as equality, human rights, deliberation and justice. However, the realities in Kenyan higher education have been hampered by the colonial legacy, nepotism, corruption, inequality and poverty, and by ethnic violence – an indicator of the impotentialities of conceptualising DCE in a predetermined state.

Further, I employed the perspectives of Agamben’s (1993) *The Coming Community*, and Agamben’s (1999) and Derrida’s (2000) notions of the ‘potentialities’ and ‘impotentialities’ of democratic community. I further explored the seminal work and method of Rancière on equality of intelligence and emancipation as viable concepts for DCE in becoming, and as a remedy for the liberal flaws in Kenyan higher education. Such considerations I find necessary to advance the liberal conceptions of citizenship to engender DCE as an endless form of learning and a concept in becoming. As such, the impotentialities exhibited in ethnic violence and other ills in Kenyan society, which undermine human dignity and weaken the higher
education system, call for a durable learning in becoming. Equal intelligence and emancipation provide space for individuals to engage actively in polity in speech, and also frames education as an explanation of society rather than an explanation of solutions. In this sense, education becomes an invitation for individuals to include themselves in conversations with others and not wait to be included. Also, education becomes an emancipatory process.

I also reconsidered Ubuntu as an instance of DCE in becoming by contextualising education in Kenya, since the three liberal strands were dominated by Euro-American concepts [that show the universal/transcendental nature of knowledge]. Ubuntu is considered fundamental in its potentiality in relation to the identity and dignity of Africans [as humans] in order to redeem their sense of belonging in a human community.

In the next chapter I will show the implications of DCE in becoming for ethnic conflicts and violence in Kenya.
Chapter Five

DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION IN BECOMING AGAINST ETHNIC VIOLENCE

5.1. Introduction

In this chapter I will attempt the following: Firstly, show what a reconceptualised idea of DCE involves – that is, one that extends a liberal conception of DCE. Secondly, explain how the ideas surrounding a reconceptualised notion of DCE assist in thinking differently about higher education in Kenya. Thirdly, hint at what the implications for a reconceptualised DCE are for the conception of the university in Africa, and lastly, provide a different understanding of the African university – one that can be socially and intellectually responsive to political and ethnic strife on the continent. This chapter addresses the sub-questions: What space might there be for DCE in becoming (a reconceptualised one) to help Kenyan higher education institutions address ethnic divisions in the country? How can DCE in Kenyan higher education reshape ethnic identities and overcome ethnic tensions?

The context of this chapter is linked to the analysis drawn from the previous chapters in an attempt to answer the main research question: How does a defensible deliberative conception of democracy help us to think differently about higher education in Kenya? In Chapter 2 I analysed the framework of three liberal strands (Benhabib, 2011a; Habermas, 1987; Rawls, 1971) of DCE in an attempt to examine the meanings of a liberal DCE, setting the stage on which Kenyan education policies were analysed. Following this was Chapter 3, in which an analysis was conducted of the education system in Kenya in relation to policy texts and discourses. This provided an understanding of the context, history and development of higher education in Kenya. Chapter 4 identified some of the gaps, challenges and crises found within liberal DCE in Kenyan higher education, despite liberal conceptions of education policies. As a result, DCE was reconceptualised as ‘DCE in becoming’ as a way of thinking differently about education in the Kenyan context. DCE in becoming is a nuanced concept that emerged from my analysis of a liberal DCE in the previous chapters while attempting to address the main research question, which is still undergoing scrutiny in this chapter.
In sessional paper No. 14 of 2012, Kenya envisioned that university education would make the country a prosperous and competitive nation. To achieve this, Kenya relies on its education system as a sustainable resource for highly trained citizens who are ambitious and knowledgeable. In this vein, Kenya aims to cultivate skills that its citizens can apply to make the nation prosperous, just, cohesive and democratic (Republic of Kenya, 2012:4). This policy is an example of muteness that Kenyan higher education displays on the relevance of its education system, which seems improbable for such policy text to address real societal concerns such as violence. A question could be raised, how does prosperity and competitiveness resolve issues of violence? Kenya cannot achieve this goal if its education system and society are still characterised by ethnic violence, hatred, nepotism and ethnocentrism. I argue that, when Kenyan university education can be constructed with an imaginary future, there could be a great potential for transformation and constant deliberations that can contribute to resolving the violence. I now turn to an examination of DCE in becoming as an extension of the liberal idea.

5.2. The Nexus between Liberal Democratic Citizenship Education and Democratic Citizenship Education in Becoming

Liberal DCE provides foundational and theoretical lenses that I argue can be used in re-thinking/reimagining the concept of university education in Kenya. Although I argue for a democratic citizenship education in becoming informed by notions of critique, friendship, compassionate imagining and scepticism, I would like to show briefly how a liberal version of the concept ‘in becoming’ is actually an extension of the liberal idea. I will do so by first reaffirming a liberal understanding of DCE. This will help clarify the nexus of the imagination of university education for the hopeful feasible future that can resolve ethnic violence in Kenya.

Liberal DCE is a theoretical/philosophical stance that I use in this dissertation to think through [conceptualise] higher education in Kenya so that it can address ethnic conflicts and violence. I believe that understanding the various philosophies of DCE is crucial to unlocking meaningful education, which could provide recognition of its significance in dealing with societal ills. This is because a liberal understanding of education represents individual rights and develops capacity to engage in collective action that respects those rights (Pearl & Pryor, 2005:x). Doing this creates a sense of belonging and shapes interaction with and an
engagement in public concerns. Liberal education integrates values such as ‘liberty/freedom, justice as fairness, equality/equal opportunity, inclusion and provision of a knowledge base sufficient to meet the responsibility of citizenship in an ever more complex world into our teaching’ (Pearl & Pryor, 2005:ix). Liberal DCE as understood in this dissertation [from the perspectives of Rawls (1971), Habermas (1987) and Benhabib (2011a)] portrays the following:

First, a liberal concept of DCE is understood to contain human rights and responsibilities in actuality. Rights are embedded in individual liberties such as freedom of association, speech and conscience, and freedom of choice on how citizens live their lives. Responsibilities refer to certain duties that citizens need to carry out, for instance the duty to tolerate difference, agree on political power, make decisions through public engagement and exercise individual power, and critical/public reasoning as a process of making judgement and as a way of life (cf. Chapters 2 and 4).

The second aspect in which liberal DCE is considered in this dissertation is the way the concept is understood in order to contribute to a sense of belonging [collectivities], for instance in nationalism. In this sense, citizens are regarded as members of a political party, or government and girded and protected by legal constitutions. Liberal DCE also extends the nationalistic sense of belonging to include cosmopolitanism (cf. Chapter 2).

The third consideration of liberal DCE is reasonableness. For citizens to engage in public decision making, liberals note that their ability to reason is primary to the decisions they make regarding public concerns (see Benhabib, 2011a; Habermas, 1987; Rawls, 1971; as analysed in Chapter 2). DCE’s underlying values of reason and civility enable citizens to imagine the life worlds of others in such a way that they temporarily forget their own perception/culture in order to understand others, who may be different from them. Civil education therefore encourages integration and fraternising with members of different groups, and this makes the breakdown of cultural barriers more likely (Kymlicka, 2003:51). On this assumption, liberal DCE sees university education as a place where students are exposed to alternative ways of living with others.

Accordingly, the understanding of liberal conceptions of DCE in the seminal thoughts offered by Rawls (1971), Habermas (1987) and Benhabib (2011a) seem inadequate to counter
violence. This is so because, in a liberal DCE, deliberations, equality, freedom of speech and human rights are already actualised. The moment these deliberations are actualised, they cease to exist and at this point cannot resist violence. This explains why a liberal DCE is inadequate to resolve violence. Further questions could be asked, such as why is there still ethnic violence in Kenya despite the liberal DCE tenets found in policies, Vision 2030 and the education acts as major drivers of education?

The Kenyan education system and constitution already bear some of the features described by these liberal views, yet violence, ethnocentric conflict, nepotism and other imbalances are experienced in society and in the universities (Eshiwani, 1990; Republic of Kenya, 1964; 1976; 1981; 1999; Luescher-Mamshela *et al.*, 2011:xvii; Ogot, 1995). This is why I find these liberal perspectives – those of Rawls (1979), Habermas, (1987) and Benhabib (2011a) – to be relevant, although they lack conceptual vigour since they are already actualised in the policies and standards of university programmes. They do not help solve the problem of violence in Kenya and are contradictory when the results they bring reproduce systemic bureaucratic power relations that are excluding. These liberal perspectives are reflected in Kenyan education policy, and yet (cf. Chapter 3) inequality still is prevalent, for example the unequal distribution of public goods such as infrastructure and educational opportunities that has led to the exclusion of some citizens. In Kenya in particular, the understanding of citizenship education as a nationalistic venture has raised a number of challenges, such as violence, nepotism, corruption, ethnocentric conflicts, inequality, poverty, exclusion and tensions in the country and in its learning institutions.

The disposition of a liberal perspective (Rawls, Habermas and Benhabib) on how the features of DCE can be used to structure university education is a significant starting point to produce an egalitarian university/society (cf. Chapter 2). However, these features do not provide durable nuances for dealing with societal complexities such as the ethnic violence in Kenya. For this reason, DEC in becoming is a way of reimaging and extending the potentialities of the liberal idea. Subsequently, a DCE in becoming is an imagination that begins from where the three liberal views end – that is, it extends DCE to the feasible future. For example: belongingness is imagined beyond the already actualised national/ethnic borders, but as relating to a human community yet to come or that which is ‘in becoming’ [this is a perspective I borrow from Agamben’s (1993) seminal work on *The Coming Community: Theory Out of Bounds*]. Agamben’s perspective is used here to imagine the future of
university education better than it currently is – the future in a feasible, hopeful optimism. Morley (2012:26) shows that the future can be imagined based on the concerns and tensions of the present. This is so because the current state of the university in Kenya seems bleak, impossible, yet the future can be imagined in the light of the current violence and the potentialities of a liberal DCE. Thus, the future of university education in Kenya is full of possibilities yet to be fathomed. Since violence presently mires its prescribed mission, vision and policies, thinking differently can help Kenya evade the current dystopias (Barnett, 2012:7). Barnett (2012) argues that imagining universities is an activity of the mind that shows responsibility – being sensitive to the forces that shape our universities. A becoming idea of DCE is an activity of philosophy – it carries an imaginative weight in the complex world and the global forces and realities that shape the future of our university education systems. Becoming here plays different kinds of roles, different kinds of imagination in extending ‘the in-becoming DCE’. It is actually the beginning of restructuring the liberal thought of becoming. The question is what kind of DCE can enable Kenyan universities to curb ethnic violence?

I now lay the structure, if that is whatever it is to imagine ‘the becoming DCE’, as a pattern of thinking about the future of the Kenyan university. This process involves reflections and iteration that lie in the nexus of liberal DCE (as already analysed in Chapter 2) and the imagined DCE in becoming. Next, I will reflect on what DCE in becoming involves and how different kinds of extended imaginings reflect the futures of university education in Kenya. By doing this it is hoped that university education can reduce ethnic violence and cope with the complexities Kenya faces in different kinds of ways. Thenceforth I will indicate how this is a way of doing philosophy in education. Afterwards, I elucidate why I think Kenyan universities as they are cannot resolve violence unless they are reimagined for futures of DCE in becoming. Lastly, I will show the implication of the extended view of DCE for African universities.

It can be argued that liberal DCE in Kenya is already actualised in the education policies. It could be argued that this actualisation is without consideration of the potentialities of the traditional African political structure, cultural organisation or way of life. As a result, ethnic violence remains problematic despite the liberal policies in education. Such complexes are necessary to imagine the future of higher education in Kenya [Africa] – even though the colonial legacy has tainted the African identity to an extent. For example, teaching citizens to
have the willingness to engage with and look beyond ethnicity holds the potential to curb violence, but liberal DCE does not tell us to do so. Linking this argument to ethnic violence highlights why various tribal groups in Kenya use violence as a means of finding recognition and opportunities to acquire political power and the equal distribution of public resources, such as education, land and property. This is so because the current political system and education have excluded some from national citizenship, even though education is regarded a national thing. Additionally, the distribution of national resources and infrastructure, as well as deliberative opportunities, is not equal. Kymlicka (2003:47) rightly notes that the liberal conception of education and citizenship is a contested one. He points out that nationalism as a sense of belonging has presented many challenges throughout the world, where diversity and difference are seen as uniform, hence the neglect of minority ethnic groups. If DCE is to become a vital part of university education, then the mission of universities needs to reflect a culture of cultivating, incorporating and imagining the potentialities of democratic values in public university education, not only as an actualised practice, but as a constant process of maximising potential [and not the actualisation of it] (Pearl & Pryor, 2005:x).

The tensions between the possibilities and the impossibilities of liberal DCE are manifest in the instability of the Kenyan higher education system. This is specifically evident in the liberal policies in Kenya that promote the virtues/tenets of democracy for Kenyan higher education. For instance, in sessional paper No. 14 of 2012, values such as equality of opportunity, education for all, freedom, liberty and national solidarity describe the kind of education universities ought to provide in tandem with the Bill of Rights and the Constitution of Kenya (Republic of Kenya, 2012:8). Yet, the possibility of such concepts is proven inadequate in the ethnic conflicts, inequalities, poor governance and poverty levels in the country (cf. Chapter 3, section 3.6). It can be argued that the education acts and policies in Kenya reflect a liberal view of DCE that is already actualised in the policies. This view places constraints on those who practise education, because education policies as actualised in Kenya are prescriptive and define education outcomes, and this limits the ability to be imaginative or be critical – which means that, in liberal DCE, deliberation ceases the moment it is realised. Liberal DCE addresses notions of connecting people, but neglects to show that people could be in a position of violence. This view fails to educate people on the potentialities of their willingness to engage continuously and to look beyond ethnicity as a way of constantly avoiding violence. This explains why violence in Kenya persists despite a liberal view of education. So, the political elite in Kenya hold the cultural capital, which is
deeply entrenched in the national policy of education. As shown in Chapter 3, these kinds of policies have not resolved problems in Kenya in relation to the nationalism agenda. This partly could be because most Kenyan citizens are excluded from deliberations, or that the deliberation on and planning of education stop with the ruling class. A question could be raised: What might DCE in becoming offer in reconceptualising Kenyan higher education to deal with inequality, exclusion and ethnic violence?

From a different perspective, Rancière’s (2009) equality is presumed from the beginning; it is the certainty that each individual has equality of intelligence, which is displayed the moment an individual publicly engages in speech. From the liberal perspectives as shown in Chapter 2, equality is the outcome of every democratic action. In Rancière’s case, one can include oneself, as one does not have to wait to be included; in the former, ‘the well-positioned’ (elite) include those who are marginalised, meaning that one has to wait for those who are believed to be more capacious to include one, for ‘one’ is incapacious to include oneself.

Lambert (2011b) contends that Rancière views education as a question, not as an answer. Education is an unbounded process of becoming through which people explore and become equal subjects with the other. Education therefore is the connection between intellectual emancipation and democracy (Means, 2011:29). It is a process out of bounds [a process without borders].

5.3. Democratic Citizenship Education in Becoming as Philosophy

That DCE in becoming can disrupt higher education is a claim I make constantly in this dissertation. I now would like to substantiate/show how it indeed is the challenge of doing philosophy. Philosophy of education is an approach employed in this dissertation in the deconstruction, synthesis of conceptual analysis and interpretive analysis of DCE in becoming for university education in Kenya to resolve violence (Biesta, 2009:81; Carlson, 2011:11; Cavell, 1979:191; McKenna, 1992:28; Wainaina, 2006a:124). Wainaina (2006a:127; 2006d:146) notes that the nature of philosophical investigations can have the philosopher engaged in explaining the goals of investigation on the one hand, and on the other hand the philosopher would be involved with what ordinary people can gain through the process of investigation. The becoming philosophy fits in with deconstruction as a reflexive paradox that retains the critical potential of a liberal DCE – a process of reconstruction.
The deconstruction philosophy creates space for conceptualising and imagining the possibilities of the university as a critical and democratic institution. This means that a DCE in becoming as a deconstructive idea examines the present state of what is already actualised (metaphysics) in universities so as to imagine universities for a hopeful future – that which can contend with ethnic violence. This idea fits in with a DCE in becoming as an extension of the liberal idea. Biesta (2009:9), in a Derridian way, asserts that ‘deconstruction is an openness towards unforeseeable incoming … of the other’.

In this dissertation, philosophical inquiry in education is concerned with the deconstruction of educational values, skills, knowledge and the nature of human beings (learners and teachers) in the context of university education. Educational policies mostly are analysed for a deeper understanding of ourselves and the world around us. Philosophy of education, as used in this dissertation, employs deconstruction as a method and reflexive tool to understand and critique the critiques of the policies that inform the procedures of teaching and learning and related issues in university education. In expanding what philosophy of education is, Wainaina (2006b:138-146) notes that there are four dimensions in which philosophy of education is significant. First, he notes that values in education are concerned with the question: ‘Why do we have’ universities? Second is the concept of knowledge that raises the questions: ‘What is to know? How do we know what we claim to know?’ and ‘What are the sources of knowledge?’ The third aspect is concerned with human consciousness in this pursuit; educators explore the concepts of ‘I’ and the ‘other’ in participating in the process of becoming human. The process of becoming human reveals how experiences outside of the self enable one (educators and learners alike) to discover the outer self in others, and thereby discover the importance of co-existence. The ‘I’ in self is embodied in the concept of personhood. The fourth aspect of philosophy of education that Wainaina depicts is human creativity (Chege, 2006a:167). Wainaina notes that creativity and critique in education are processes of humanising the world. These probe active inquiry, imagination, invention, innovation and originality in the way human beings express themselves. Such an understanding of education creates opportunities for appreciating the nature and the world of culture. This brings into focus conceptual understanding in terms of democracy, citizenship and dialogue as a way of framing/constructing university education. Therefore, university education consists of human beings who are in the process of being human with the other (Chege, 2006d:173). This process involves dialogic learning, which includes two or more people speaking with each other constantly to construct knowledge. Scholars (Benhabib,
2011a; Chege, 2006b; Habermas, 1987; Rawls, 1971; Waghid, 2014) consider speaking to each other as one of the ways human beings create a cultural world. This concept can be enriched by certain values, such as equality and respect for persons. This understanding of education is foundational to liberal university education. In terms of this pattern, this dissertation arrives at the philosophical thought of DCE in becoming as a way of thinking differently about university education (Rancière, 2006).

5.4. Democratic Citizenship Education in Becoming

In this section I will show what a reconceptualised idea of DCE involves – that is, one that extends a liberal conception of DCE. DCE in becoming bears potentialities – potentialities that shed light on the virtues that such a concept presents and how such potentialities address problems in education. One such example of the problems faced by higher education in Kenya is ethnic violence. The occurrence of such problems indicates that the liberal DCE found in Kenya is in a state of infancy – meaning that it is in the making. Such thinking about education considers education as always in the making [since potentiality is never actualised].

Agamben (1999) notes that there are two kinds of potentialities: first is a generic potentiality similar to that of a child. That is, the child has a potential to know or the potential to become a head of state. This, he notes, is an Aristotelian sense of potentiality (Agamben, 1999:182). The generic view of potentiality indicates a becoming other, in the sense that the child is prone in his/her potentiality to become other that he/she is through learning. However, the child at the same time has a potential not to learn. The becoming lies in the ongoing activity that constantly changes or alters the generic potential. The second aspect of potentiality that he notes is the potentiality that belongs to someone; for example, that someone has knowledge or ability to do and not to do. Similarly, an architect has the potential to build; the existing potentiality is different from the generic potentiality. However, the potential (ability) of the architect to build a house becomes meaningful in the process of building [being involved in the building of a house].

Using the analysis of potentiality by Agamben I can argue that the potentiality of liberal DCE to curb violence and the potentiality of it not to curb violence lie in the possibility of DCE in becoming. At present, the liberal DCE in Kenya appears to be in a stage of infancy (as in the case of the child) in that both its impotentiality to curb violence and its potentiality not to
curb violence are the forces that compel DCE in becoming. However, its potentiality to curb violence is in the essence (a possibility), such that being involved in the activity (energesia) of reformulating innovations presents a possibility that violence can be other than it is [in the future]. This implies that the potentiality and possibility of DCE in becoming have the potential to curb violence in whatever singularity – without actualising DCE in becoming, since it is always in motion (dynamic). When DCE is realised or prescribed it becomes actualised, and then it ceases to curb violence since it conserves itself and saves itself in actuality – potentiality survives actuality in the way it gives itself to itself (Agamben, 1999:189).

Following Agamben’s idea that potentiality ceases to exist when it passes into actuality, the notion of liberal DCE as a potentiality would no longer be if it is actualised in relation to shared identities (national education) and a common sense of belonging on the part of those things that constitute liberal DCE (Waghid, 2013:27). To consider DCE as a potentiality is to consider it in a state of becoming.

In his book *The Coming Community*, Agamben (1993), a philologist, paradoxically represents community in an obscure depiction in which it is postulated as an idea of ‘whatever singularity’. In this book, Agamben describes whatever singularity as a form of being that fundamentally discards any manifestation of identity and exclusively appropriates being to itself. According to Agamben, the coming community is conceptualised in terms of potentiality. He imagines a community that is not tied to any common property or by any identity. This community is being in ‘such a way that it always matters’ (Agamben, 1993:9). The coming community in whatever singularity means that it has no identity; it is not determinate with respect to a concept, but neither is it simply indeterminate; rather, it is determined only in relation to an idea, that is to the totality of its possibilities. Agamben (1993:34) notes that it is ‘being that is properly whatever is able to not-be; it is capable of its own impotence’. This signifies that the coming community becomes apparent in the balance between the potentiality to be and potentiality to not-be. That is, the singularities form a community without affirming an identity, such that humans co-belong without any representable condition of belonging. Agamben’s coming community is pictured ‘from limbo’, a kind of sacred space that emerges in his analysis as a space of ease where all destinations are suspended. Limbo is represented as an indeterminate and an impossible space that exists despite attempts to separate the sacred and the profane (Tyson, 2014).
In addition to ‘limbo’ and ‘whatever singularity’, Agamben (1993:62) uses ‘without classes’ to illustrate the potentiality and actuality of the coming community – here, he shows by example that the fortunes of humanity in terms of the stratification of society in classes resulted in fascism and Nazism, yet such stratifications still exist in different forms today. He argues that such stratifications are attached to a false popular identity in which dreams of bourgeois grandeur are an active force. He notes that such stratifications pose destruction to humanity. Hence, a false sense of belonging (that which attaches identity to a proper identity holds impotentiality) can lead to a cut-off of human communication. In his words,

…[i]instead of continuing to search for a proper identity in the already improper and senseless form of individuality, humans were to succeed in belonging to this impropriety as such, in making of the proper being–thus not an identity an individual property but a singularity without identity, a common and absolutely exposed singularity… (Agamben, 1993:64).

Elsewhere, Agamben indicates that the communicative essence of humans serves fundamental politics (spectacle); however; humans are separated by the same communicability itself. He notes that a presupposed communication can be destructive. Hence he argues that the first citizen of the coming community will be one who ‘brings language itself to language’ (Agamben, 1993:82). Referring to the events of Tiananmen Square and presaging the abstruse war and terror, Agamben claims that the future struggles will not be between states, but between state and humanity. According to Agamben (1993:54), the coming community is mediated neither by any condition of belonging nor by simple absence of conditions, but by belonging to itself. In light of the Tiananmen Square, one would argue that education can become other than it is in focusing attention to the human struggle, identity and dignity. Which points to the shift that the coming community [university] will be more focused on becoming human rather than belonging to a particular nationality? This may also mean that the purpose of education may shift to become central to students critical participation rather than being recipients of knowledge in whatever singularity.26

In order to distinguish the juxtaposition between liberal DCE and DCE in becoming, Agamben’s proposition of potentiality is crucial in disrupting liberal DCE to rethink

26 I use whatever singularity in this dissertation equals what iever it can turn out to respond to a problem of violence and ethnic conflict.
education’s potentiality to resolve violence in the future. In the sections that follow I will show how Agamben’s potentiality stretches and disrupts the liberal idea of DCE to the potentialities of DCE in becoming for the future of humanity in whatever singularity in its becoming. In this case, even though violence clouds the Kenyan community at present, the present formulation of its resolution is in potentiality, which even though not realised in actuality, provides an optimistic future. This means that what we reformulate now about DCE is only in becoming, because it has the potentiality to be and not to be. However, there is an optimistic future (messianic time) that may not be actualised, for actuality will cease its reformulation.

In contrast, Agamben (1993:9) uses the idea of ‘whatever singularity’ as a notion of potentiality in contrast to Derrida’s potentiality as an aporia. He notes further that potentiality in Derrida’s work is obscured by Derrida’s utopia – a desire for a humanised utopian future that negates the present as a mere moment within a large deliberation leading towards the full realisation of human potential. For Agamben, ideas such as those of Derrida erase the radical interdependence of impotentiality and potentiality that offers human freedom in the present time. Agamben is concerned with the temporality of progress as the actualisation of potentiality in the form of measurable outcomes that can be organised and interpreted according to logical development. Accordingly, Agamben’s reformulation of potentiality and equality is deferred to the future. In this case, utopia for Agamben is a critique of the present through the imaginative reconstruction of the future and the affective opening up of the possibility for hope, for desiring differently. Thus, there is a distinct closure to the present that must be rejected in full as a negative totality in order for the future to emerge.

Derrida’s potentiality is always absent in the present and is only realised in the future. Derrida claims that difference makes possible all modes of presence, including the binary categories of concepts. For Derrida, dialogue is a presumed moment without qualification. For Agamben, potentiality is temporarily present in whatever singularity, but its potential never comes to actuality, it is never realised – the realisation is based on the progress and reconstruction of the present for the messianic future. Agamben’s logic of potentiality lends the liberal DCE a potentiality in becoming, for at present the presence of liberal DCE in Kenya is mired by violence, but its potentiality is being reconstructed in the presence of violence towards a future of DCE in becoming in whatever singularity.
I now shall refer to the seminal thoughts of Waghid and Davids (2013), following on Agamben’s potentialities of becoming. Waghid and Davids (2013:21) note that Agamben is well known for radical politics, ethics and law. My interest in following Waghid and Davids is spurred by their explication of the philosophy of potentialities in relation to education and violence.

First, a reconsidered view of DCE suggests that higher education needs to help students to speak and think. Speech in this sense signals students to voice things differently, it involves suspending judgment on the way knowledge is presented so that students can learn something new, a way of acknowledging that learning is always in potential and never comes to actuality – the becoming is always in the making (Waghid & Davids, 2013:24). It is only when learning is considered as a potentiality that learning is in becoming, and any judgment of learning is never made in a rush. This means that an education in the becoming state is a formation process in which students will never be allowed to be in their comfort zones; students will be challenged constantly to give account of themselves, and then challenged continuously in speech and reason to uncover, recover and discover their voices, yet act differently – not in a rush to judgement (Barnett, 2007:54). This way of thinking enables the student to have confidence and involvement in her/his learning and becoming.

Secondly, a reconsidered view of DCE is connected to the practice of seeing things differently. Seeing things differently means seeing things not as they always appear to be. Waghid and Davids (2013:25) say that seeing things differently conveys the notion that things will present themselves in different and multiple ways, which prevents one from rushing to judgement. This means that education has the potential to enable students to see things strangely, since it provides the place where students are in becoming. Seeing things differently is in tandem with Agamben’s (1993) potentiality in the becoming. That is, when we see things in the same way there is room for redundancy, yet the becoming state enables innovative thinking; it encourages radical thinking and new ways of knowing and seeing things.

I have explained an instance of democratic citizenship education in relation to Ubuntu as a consideration of humanness (being human) – with more specific emphasis on considering the other in relation to the self (cf. Chapter 4). In this section I use a number of concepts to stretch and advance DCE in becoming so that it presents potentiality that can be used in
encountering ethnic violence. First, I employ Agamben’s potentiality to disrupt Derrida’s concept of friendship to stretch DCE in becoming so that it can guide the imagining of the feasibility of the future of education that can relentlessly sustain human relationships in whatever singularity [with considerations of privation and individuality], since education involves relational encounters with the other. Secondly, I use compassionate and narrative imagination to stretch the liberal idea of DCE to potentially describe how a pluralistic society can actively be engaged dialogically with the other. Imagination as an act of the mind can be a potential way in which humans can enter into dialogue with the other. Thinking and speaking can be a way of being responsible without actualising. For instance, in diverse contexts, compassionate imagining and narration can be potentials for possible deliberative futures (Agamben, 1993; Green, 2012; Nussbaum, 1997). Thirdly, Agamben’s potentiality is used in reconstructing responsibility and critique so that they can be used as potential moral accounts for withholding judgement for a later time (not rash judgement) in education as opposed to the liberal actualised perspectives – a demand for a response that arises through our relationality and being addressed by the other in whatever singularity (Agamben, 1993; Butler, 2005). Fourthly, Agamben’s potentiality offers a different way of thinking about scepticism – not only as an assumption that not everyone cares – and that enables students to think radically, suspiciously and differently before making any rash judgement. The potentiality of being sceptic in Agamben’s view is one that is capable of being in constant scepticism – this means that scepticism never becomes an actualised idea but is an ongoing practice in education, for if scepticism is actualised then dialogue and education cease to take place. Responsibility as being caring indicates how humans (students and teachers) co-belong. Caring as giving an account of oneself becomes a daily practice that is never actualised, but that sustains caring in DCE in becoming. This way of thinking (Agamben’s way) will show how caring can be a potential for engendering DCE in becoming in countering issues of ethnic violence and other societal dystopias that are incommensurate for education [as being caring] (Agamben, 1993; Butler, 2005; Cavell, 1979).

5.4.1. Friendship as a Potentiality for Democratic Citizenship Education in Becoming

In line with the reconceptualised view of DCE in becoming, speech and thought are possibilities that can advance education in becoming. Since education stems from pedagogical encounters, relationships in whatever singularity become a potential for DCE in
becoming (Waghid, 2014; Waghid & Davids, 2013). This is why I consider Derrida’s (1988) deconstructive overtones in his seminal work on the politics of friendship – a potential for speech and thought in education, as well as Agamben’s (1993; 2004) philologic and disruptive potentiality in *The Coming Community* to rethink liberal DCE. I will first explain how Derrida conceptualises potentiality in his work ‘The politics of friendship’, and then show how Agamben’s potentiality in relation to friendship is a disruption of Derrida’s potentiality of friendship that ameliorates liberal DCE to DCE in becoming.

Derrida’s exposition of friendship is derived from the Aristotelian quote, ‘O my friends, there is no friend’ (Aristotle, in Derrida, 1988:632). In keeping with this quote, Derrida notes that Aristotle suggests a possibility for friendship. This is so because the subjects of wonder in the first part of the quote, ‘O my friends…’ (Derrida, 1988:632, citing Aristotle), are his friends. However, in the next part of the quote, ‘…there is no friend’, Aristotle shows that friends do not actually exist. Thus, Derrida pre-empts that friendship is possible based on the possibility and potentiality that human beings can participate actively with the other through speech and thought in relation to what he calls friendship; however, he notes that being passive negates friendship. This means that human beings have the potential for affective relationships in which they can speak and think. According to Bryan (2009:736), Aristotle’s perspective of friendship is proper friendship that makes decision making possible, although such decisions, according to Waghid and David (2013), need not be made rashly – a way in which the becoming is possible. Bryan (2009) likens the Aristotelian conception of friendship to a contemporary understanding of democratic practice. In Bryan’s thinking, it is through constant engagement [speech and thought] with the other that human beings become human beings. It is in this constant interaction in decision making without rash judgment that DCE in becoming is possible.

Derrida (1988) explains issues of critical friendship in his seminal work, ‘The politics of friendship’. He begins his analysis by iterating Aristotle’s view of friendship and advances its meanings to deconstructive overtones. He explains that Aristotle’s conception of friendship denotes virtues and the capacity they provide to describe being human (Derrida, 1988:757). Friendship also holds the essence of good love. In this sense, friendship is not good because of what it leads to, but rather because of the excellence it shows in people being able to constantly think and speak as part of becoming human with the other.
Derrida (1988) presents friendship as a strange affirmation. He notes that friendship as depicted in Aristotle is more in loving than in being loved. According to Derrida, friendship is something being desired, something that has not yet occurred. Derrida (1988) says that friendship has an essence that provides its possibility, but the friend is missing. He notes that the possibility of friendship is encountered through our conversations and dialogue. In this sense, friendship is shaped through conversations, but the formation process is always in the ‘making’ – in becoming.

Derrida (1988:638) notes that the moment we think we have established friendship it ceases to be friendship, because we will begin to question and become dissatisfied with the form of an existing friendship, if there was any form of friendship in the first place. He notes that friendship is impossible, but that its possibility is in the essence of dialogue and the encounters we have with one another. Accordingly, the possibility of becoming lies in our speech and thought with the other in a relation of encounters for a possibility of DCE in becoming.

Respect and responsibility are two notions that Derrida uses in describing the manner in which speech and thought can advance DCE in becoming and the possibility of friendship. According to him, respect and responsibility can help enhance the essence of thought and speech for friendly encounters. Respect and responsibility offer potentialities that can provide friendly platforms for speech and thought, even if such encounters do not portray a sense of belonging or agreement. Friendship as a possible relational human encounter can enable students to speak and think and can demand a response from the other as a way of becoming and learning more about the other without making rash judgements.

In contrast to Derrida’s view of friendship, Agamben (2004) describes friendship as a form of life, not as the difference between two binaries (for example between friend and enemy). According to Agamben, friendship is closely linked to the definition of philosophy, for without it philosophy will not be possible (Agamben, 2004:1). For Agamben, to recognise someone as a friend means not to be able to recognise him as ‘something’. He notes that one cannot say ‘friend’ as one says ‘white’. For him, friendship is not a property or quality of a subject (Agamben, 2004).
Agamben (2004:1) illustrates friendship in the analogy of his friendship with Jean-Luc, which ended incomprehensibly when they had hoped that it would lead to a project. This shows how an actualised form of friendship ceases when we prescribe the nature of friendship. In this sense, their friendship was actualised for a particular purpose, which then ceased immediately and the possibility for a project was thwarted. Why this ended is not necessarily the point here. Agamben further criticises Derrida’s aporia of absence in relation to friendship using the Aristotelian traditional roots of friendship. Agamben explains that, during his encounter with Derrida while the latter was working on his project, ‘The politics of friendship’, they had discussed the philological problem of Aristotle’s phrase as used by Derrida. That is, according to Agamben, Derrida’s use of the Aristotelian phrase to formulate his book was not original. He notes that the original writing in the manuscripts read ‘he who has (many friends), has no friends’ (Agamben, 2004:1), and not ‘O my friends, there is no friend’ (Derrida, 1988:632, citing Aristotle) – Agamben claims he confirmed this through his library search on traditional writings. For this reason he finds Derrida’s use of the phrase as ‘O my friends, there is no friend’ to be problematic. He asserts that he informed Derrida of his findings, and that he was astonished that Derrida went ahead and published his book anyway. For this reason he affirms and distrustfully revokes the book.

Agamben (2004:2) notes that ‘friend’ as used in the above phrase is predicative and is not possible to construct a class of objects. Thus, friend is a ‘transcendent’ existence. This means that friendship is not a property or quality of a subject. Friendship, for Agamben, is the insistence of this concurrent perception of the friend’s existence in the awareness of one’s own existence. This means that friendships has an ontological presence and, at the same time, a political dimension. Friendship names sharing and is identical to itself. He posits that the friend is another self. The friend is not another ‘I’, but an otherness immanent in self-ness, a becoming other of the self. Friendship, according to Agamben, is de-subjectivisation at the very heart of the most intimate perception of self.

Agamben (2004) explains that friendship is concurrently perceived in living together, conversing and sharing thoughts. Friendship is simultaneously a perception of the pure fact of existence. How this original political perception – synaesthesia – could come about in the course of time is a concern for Agamben. The consensus to which democracies entrust their fates in the latest extreme and exhausted phase of their evolution is, as they say, another story – one upon which Agamben is yet to reflect (Agamben, 2004).
Agamben’s view of potentiality in the coming community clarifies the potentiality of friendship in Derrida’s work (as I have discussed). In Derrida’s work, friendship becomes obscured by utopia, a desire for a humanised utopian future that negates the present as a mere moment within a larger deliberation, leading towards the full realisation of human potentiality. Such a narrative of becoming erases the much more radical interdependence of impotentiality and potentiality, which (as I have been arguing) offers fundamental human freedom in the present time. The potentiality of friendship that Agamben presents is a critique of the present friendship through an imaginative reconstruction of the future and the sentimental possibilities of hope – for desiring differently. Thus, friendship is a potential space between a friend and the being a friend. This means that friendship is an impossible accord for the possibility of the future.

From the two philosophical dimensions of understanding potentialities, two Aristotelian scholars seem to be at loggerheads with what potentiality is, even though they both arise from Aristotelian roots. First is Derrida’s potentiality, which resides in negation between binaries and which also rejects potential presence (as found in Derrida’s formulation of friendship). Derrida denies presence in potentiality, which is only realised in actuality. On the other hand, Agamben (1999) argues for potentiality that exists in the present (ontological), although in whatever singularity – autonomous presence, in relation to which its potentiality does not only lie in the present, but never comes into actuality in the future, yet constant activity of ‘being’ determines its becoming. The complexity of deconstruction (Derrida) and philologism (Agamben) presents the contemplation of potentiality in becoming. In this sense, friendship as an in-becoming concept has potentiality at present, which, when enacted in being, can survive the potentiality of DCE in becoming as a way of curbing violence in the future that never comes to actuality.

5.4.2. Compassionate Imagination as a Potentiality for Democratic Citizenship Education in Becoming

Thinking differently, speaking and withholding rash judgement are potentialities for a reconsidered view of DCE in becoming. For one to engage in speech, and to think differently while withholding rash judgement, requires imagination in whatever singularity [that is compassionate, according to Green (2012:420)]. In line with Agamben’s (1999) potentiality, imagination in whatever singularity is never actualised, but is always in the making. It is not
identified by passion or compassion, but in whatever singularity. In this sense, for Agamben, being in imagination is autonomous – imagining the unimaginable. However, passion is what Green (2012:420) uses to describe the affinity one needs in a pluralistic society. He provides an example of how a pluralistic society can be strengthened to avoid division and misunderstanding during encounters. He uses the American community to describe his sense of a pluralistic community. Accordingly, I find his exposition of a pluralistic community descriptively similar to what is already obtainable in the Kenyan community, in that it bears a similar humanistic essence of being human and is already actualised. The commonality of being human is exemplified in societal structures, classes, culture, ethnicity and bureaucracies. Green (2012:420) uses passion to describe ‘the realm of face-to-face relationships’ in human encounters, and emphasises that compassionate imagination can help a pluralistic society build how they think, speak and withhold judgment within societal encounters. He pictures a pluralistic society as a human society consisting of persons who have a variety of needs. Some may be young, others old, some may suffer from powerlessness or poverty, some from ignorance, exclusion and boredom, yet they all need to speak, think and act differently as a way of co-learning and of becoming. He uses imagination as a metaphor to describe the capacity that the past has to imagine the present and the future of a pluralistic society.

Green suggests that compassionate imagination through engagement in acts of speech and thought can expand a diverse community. He refers to Hannah Arendt’s description of plurality as a condition of human action because we all bear a common humanity. Despite the fact that we bear humanness, we are not all the same. Each individual is different and unique in many ways. For this reason, each person is a participant in ongoing dialogue in different ways, but is still open to the perspectives of those who may have different ideas, even though they share the same space.

This kind of speech or dialogue is inclusive and cannot neglect the voices of others while including those of some. Green imagines the unimaginable, thinking of something as though it has happened [can happen], yet is absent and not yet a reality – a way of thinking differently. As such, imagining the unimaginable could entail suspending judgement for a later time, thereby enabling constant learning. In Green’s (2012:421) words, for education [as imaginative passions] we have to
[o]pen up our experiences (to curriculum) to existential possibilities of multiple kinds to extend and deepen what we think of when we speak of a community. If we break through and even disrupt a surface of equilibrium, and uniformity, this does not mean that a particular ethnic or racial tradition ought to replace our own… Individualism, masculinity, social engagement versus historical isolation, acute and ambiguous moral problematic, the thematic innocence coupled with an obsession with figuration of death and hell…

Similarly, Green (2012:424) notes that cultural backgrounds play an important role in how we engage in speech and thought and how we make judgement [shaping our identity], but they do not determine our identity. In this sense, our culture or ethnicity only affirms our humanity and how we relate to one another, not only because others are from our tribe, but because they are citizens of a world republic.

Nussbaum (1997:85), like Green (2012), argues that narrative imagination as a process can enhance speech [dialogue] among various ethnic groups as a means to eradicate violence. For Nussbaum, cultivating a sympathetic imagination will grant students [citizens] the capacity to ‘comprehend [the] motives and choices of people different from ourselves, not seeing them as forbiddingly alien and other but as sharing many problems and possibilities with us’ (Nussbaum, 1997:85). Inculcating imagination [thought] in learning is fundamental to DCE in becoming, although not as Nussbaum puts it. In the coming community, to put Nussbaum’s idea differently, narrative imagination is a potential for DCE, which can and cannot resolve societal ills; however, in an optimistic sense, the possibility of narrative imagination to resolve violence relies on narrative imagination as a form of life, which means that imagination becomes a living process in becoming that continually sustains deliberation toward non-violence. Narratives [speech] can be used to educate students by exposing them to an array of literary work, not as an actualisation, but as a sensation that can expose them to imagining [thinking about] others’ worlds in whatever singularity. Nussbaum suggests that such imagination is capable of enhancing the capability of students to have compassion for the other. Compassion involves the recognition that another person, in some ways similar to oneself, has suffered some significant pain or misfortune for which that person is not, or not fully, to blame. In other words, compassion enables us to be aware of our common ability to suffer. In this sense we will be able, in turn, to imagine the suffering of others as though we are the one suffering, and hence to show compassion with them and suspend rash judgement. Green’s and Nussbaum’s view of imagination is already actualised and does not consider
individuals’ privation. In DCE in becoming, imagination should be freed from any properties or identity, but should be imagination in whatever singularity. This means that individuals will be autonomous in their imagination, and compassion does not become a means to an end but is a living process in whatever issues faced by society. Imagination in whatever singularity has the potential of triggering speech without actualising it, for if imagination and speech are realised then deliberation will cease and the education process will come to a halt.

In line with Nussbaum (1997) and Green (2012), education first needs to consider the humanity of everyone and anyone, in which case others’ speech and thought can be regarded as a way in which students participate constantly in learning as a way of becoming. Education needs to be concerned with new ways of knowing, that is thinking differently. Imagining and being in dialogue can enable students to venture into the unknown. In this way, education can be said to be in the making and never attained, something we keep working toward. We cannot assume that we know when we have not explored or exhausted different ways of knowing, as knowing is always in becoming and is never to be actualised, lest it terminates. In this sense, our passions and imagination can drive our learning to unimagined boundaries (beyond borders). Accordingly, entering into dialogue about histories, and the differences present in humanity, can enable students and learners alike to enter into the realm of knowing the unknown, for instance ways in which a society can live together by appreciating humanity through speech and imagination that transcend our differences, and by acknowledging the uniqueness of others.

Under DCE in becoming, there currently is plurality in Kenya that is actualised. The presence of poverty, violence, classism, ethnicity and political instability, in Agamben’s way of thinking, is in whatever singularity. Agamben describes the coming community as one without classes, since classism has resulted, for example, in Nazism, fascism and violence. For Agamben there is potentiality in DCE in becoming that progressively and concurrently reformulates/imagines itself for a hopeful future. Even though this future may not be realised, the potential acts of being in deliberation and active imagining in whatever singularity can lead to (compassionate) imagining in whatever singularity for a hopeful future. Even though this future may not be realised, the potential acts of being in deliberation and active imagining in whatever singularity can lead to (compassionate) imagining in whatever singularity for a hopeful future. Even though this future may not be realised, the potential acts of being in deliberation and active imagining in whatever singularity can lead to (compassionate) imagining in whatever singularity for a hopeful future. Even though this future may not be realised, the potential acts of being in deliberation and active imagining in whatever singularity can lead to (compassionate) imagining in whatever singularity for a hopeful future. Even though this future may not be realised, the potential acts of being in deliberation and active imagining in whatever singularity can lead to (compassionate) imagining in whatever singularity for a hopeful future. Even though this future may not be realised, the potential acts of being in deliberation and active imagining in whatever singularity can lead to (compassionate) imagining in whatever singularity for a hopeful future.
constant imagining of self in otherness. Accordingly, compassionate imagining is in becoming, not as in Derrida’s potentiality, nor in Agamben’s potentiality, but other than it is in whatever singularity – compassionate imagining without borders – in becoming.

Accordingly, DCE in becoming should educate students about the potentiality of imagining (in the dynamic sense) – bringing students into an imagining without the imaginable. In this sense, students are taught not to reserve their imagination for any matter (privation), but that nothing should remain unimagined in DCE in becoming. Through imaginings in whatever singularity, students are initiated into practices of imagination that stir up speech and thought in which students can practise ‘free use of self’ (Agamben, 1993:28; Waghid & Davids, 2013:28) to speak what their imagination yields, not as a finality and also without rash judgement, so that potentiality in imagination and speech does not cease, but is sustained. Constant imagining has a potential for DCE in becoming to go a long way in addressing issues of violence and other societal concerns.

5.4.3. Responsibility and Critique as Potentialities of Democratic Citizenship Education in Becoming

In addition to friendship, compassionate and narrative imaginings, responsibility and critique are potentials that can help speech, thought and rash judgement to stretch the conceptions of DCE in becoming. I will employ Judith Butler’s perspective on moral philosophy to extend conceptions of a DCE in becoming, and Agamben’s potentiality to disrupt responsibility and critique from a liberal idea of DCE in becoming.

Butler’s (2005) seminal contribution to moral philosophy, especially her work on subject formation, provides a springboard for my argument on responsibility as an act of speech and thought in response to the other. In this way, responsibility as a concept can stretch DCE in becoming to constantly deal with the occurrences of ethnic violence. I argue for responsibility and critique as key concepts in reimagining nuances for DCE in becoming against ethnic conflicts and violence.

According to Theim (2008:5), responsibility is ‘a demand for a response that arises through our relationality and being addressed by another’. Theim’s claim is different from the conventional understanding of responsibility as accountability for the past as a consideration of the present. Theim (2008) does not denounce the notions of accountability as attached to
responsibility, but considers a more nuanced and potential perspective of responsibility and the future it offers to education in becoming. Theim’s understanding of responsibility is aligned with Butler’s (2005) understanding of responsibility as a consideration of the future. Responsibility is drawn from human relational encounters with another [human being] – for the preservation of what is to come, and also as a response to that encounter with the other (Theim, 2008:5). Butler’s mode of critical thinking provides a critique of the subject. The question of subject formation is crucial to education for critical citizenship. Butler’s idea is an intervention of realistic questions on the political and social problematic, like ethnic conflicts. Her work questions how bodies and subjects depend on socially produced and administered realities (Theim, 2008:9).

Theim (2008:11) notes that, for Butler, ‘the process of becoming a subject is a process of becoming subordinated by norms through which power relations work and to exist socially as well as self-consciously requires not only relating to norms but also to become subjected to them’. In her book, Giving Account of Oneself, Butler (2005:30) notes that norms and power are made known to us through the encounters we have with one another – without the dialogue and conversations we have with one another, norms are unknowable. This means that the possibility of knowing is found in the possibilities of encounters we have with one another. In this sense, the ways in which DCE in becoming can deal with ethnic violence, bias or tensions is through constant encounters (being in dialogue with self and the other without actualising it) with others, which has the potential to increase citizens’ know-ability and which cannot be actualised, because when knowing is actualised, then there will be nothing else to know. In order to sustain knowing, withholding the knowable is crucial to knowing (rather, being in knowing). In this sense, knowing is always in becoming and norms in society are always in potential, since they are incomplete and in the stage of infancy – in becoming. So: the norms in becoming are always altered in the encounters we have with one another on issues that bring conflict and from the problematic that comes about as a result of outdated (impotentiality) norms or norms that do not help in dealing with problematic situations. On the other hand, some of the norms that exist and those we come across in our encounters with others can be limited to dealing with the ever-changing societal terrain, as well as to forming the coming community of critical citizens. So, being responsible is a possibility, since it involves being critical as a potentiality that can sustain speech and thought without actualising speech or thought for in-becoming solutions to societal ills.
Elsewhere, Butler (2005:206) notes that norms are very essential to our co-existence with the other. Norms are helpful in guiding human action, living and knowing. Without norms it is difficult to know in which direction to transform society – norms are constantly constructed in speech, thought and action. However, norms can also create situations of violence; in this sense, social justice becomes necessary to protect our becoming. It is from this understanding that Butler suggests critique as a way of constantly questioning the norms to overcome instances of violence and inhumanity in human encounters.

Critique, according to Butler (2005:303), aspires to understand and cross-examine how questions of moral conduct are constructed by social and historical settings and frameworks. More specifically, critique becomes crucial to higher education in Kenya in relation to social and historical contexts and how they acclimatise the form of moral conundrums, which in turn are determined through social norms and structures of power. In this sense, DCE in becoming as a concept of moral philosophy is a critical inquiry that examines how education policies and power structures determine how ethnic anomalies and imbalances in the Kenyan education system and society raise questions on justice and how justice becomes available and urgent. In this sense, responsibility means insisting on critique as a means of raising questions and responding to others in terms of the realities that exist in society. One such specific reality is the issue of ethnocentrism, how it influences educational circles in Kenya and what structures are in place to deal with the divisive aspects of ethnicity. So: the constant culture of a critique of norms and structures of power can enable critical citizenship to deal with ethnic violence in a more non-violent way and can improve education in becoming in Kenyan higher education institutions.

In contrast to Butler’s (2005) views on responsibility and critique, Agamben’s perspective on responsibility and critique can be considered as a present potentiality in whatever singularity. It is not attached to a subject. The act of being responsible and being critical lays the potential for human relationality in whatever singularity that can resolve violence or not resolve violence. However, the act of being critical or being responsible can make violence other than it is. Again, what makes critique and responsibility to be in becoming is active living in critique and being responsible, and these never come to actuality, because if this happens then people stop being responsible and violence becomes actualised and critique ceases.
5.4.4. Scepticism as a Potential for Democratic Citizenship in Becoming

Similar to Butler (2005), Cavell’s (1979) articulation of moral philosophy and scepticism provides ideas that can aid the constant construction of nuances in education [DCE in becoming] to deal with situations of conflict. However, these ideas are already actualised. Some of Cavell’s work in relation to pedagogy can be found in the seminal work of Waghid and Smeyers (2010) and Waghid (2014:49-55). I would like to affirm Waghid’s views and at the same time argue that scepticism and responsibility as moral virtues in philosophy can contribute to nuances in DCE in becoming that can address issues of ethnic violence through subject formation.

Cavell (1979:312) describes moral arguments as ones with the direct aim of determining the positions we are willing to take responsibility for, especially in the discussions we have with the other. He notes that this responsibility takes place in the dialogical discussions we have with others as an extension of the self – as a sign that we care about others. For Cavell, responsibility in this sense includes what we care for, what we are committed to and how this affects how we conduct ourselves in relation to the other. According to Cavell, responsibility is being answerable for our actions.

How we view others informs us who we are. We do not know ourselves until we are able to approve of ourselves in the other. Cavell (1979:331) notes that being sceptical of our own human nature, to the point of doubting who we are rather than suspending what we think we are and finding who the other is, can help us discover who we really are. In Cavell’s (1979:433) words,

Being exposed to my concept of the other is being exposed to my assurance in applying it … I have to acknowledge humanity in the other, and the basis of it seems to lie in me. But what do I know of that basis of it seems to lie in me. ... I thought that there could be no sufficient basis in me, that only an outsider, one free of human nature, could tell me what I would have to know to be assured of the other’s humanity. But I also came to think that if there is an outsider he is in me, in each of us.

Cavell shows that, when I am able to recognise human nature in others, I also will be able to know the human nature in me. This process requires one to suspend the knowledge of self and consider self as a stranger until we discover self in others, and then we come back to self
and verify the human nature in oneself. Thus, acknowledging the human nature in others enables one to discover oneself in unimagined ways. The responsibility here is seeking to encounter the other in order to locate, and understand, the self.

In this way of thinking, which is in Cavell’s (1979) perspectives on responsibility, scepticism and the other, lies the potential for solving problems in education. Education, in terms of Cavell’s thinking, ought to suspend what we think we know until we encounter others, when we can make better judgement of ourselves; that is, when we can claim with reasons that we know or that we are knowing beings. Accordingly, DCE in becoming can be a process of encountering others in being caring in committed ways to discover their humanity, which is richly present in the self. In addition, doing this will delay acts of violence, because no one would like to be violent to self. Education in this sense will recognise humanity wherever it occurs. DCE in becoming therefore will engender/imagine the potentials and future impacts of responsible acts on humanity against ethnic violence by being constantly sceptical, since responsibilities lie in the feasible future.

In contrast to Agamben’s (1999) thought on potentiality, Cavell’s scepticism and responsibility is already actualised. This is because, when we approve of ourselves in the other as an indicator of being responsible, then responsibility ends when the approval is actualised. In Agamben’s sense, responsibility does not begin with the caring for the other, but a consideration of being responsible begins with self for itself as an act of co-belonging. Thus, scepticism that is commensurate with the notion of in becoming involves whatever singularity, in which case scepticism is not attached to any prescribed quality or identity, but being involved in scepticism without actualising becomes a continuous responsibility – that of being sceptical in matters that affect society and of not becoming actualised. In DCE in becoming, being sceptical has the potential to enable and not to enable violence or education in Kenya to be other than it is. However, living in scepticism and being responsible have the potential for DCE in becoming to resolve violence in whatever singularity. Being sceptical or being responsible in whatever singularity autonomously has the potential for DCE in becoming to resolve violence. This means that, in DCE in becoming, the potential to resolve violence depends on the relentless form of life of being sceptical and being responsible in whatever singularity.
5.5. Re-thinking Higher Education in Terms of the Potentiality of Democratic Citizenship Education in Becoming

In this section I will consider how the ideas surrounding a reconceptualised notion of DCE in becoming can assist in imagining and thinking differently about higher education in Kenya. For students to think, speak and see things differently, higher education should be conceptualised to do so. I argue that to think of higher education as a community in becoming renders a different way of thinking about higher education.

First, DCE in becoming will teach students not only as those who share a sense of belonging, but as individuals with their own privations (Agamben, 1993:1; Waghid, 2013:28). In this way, students are not forced to identify with a particular sense of belonging, but to present themselves as autonomous individual beings – what Agamben refers to as ‘whatever singularity’. Students are freed from any identity to enable them free use of self. Being in whatever singularity allows students to become other than they are. This is because the liberal idea of education already actualised students’ sense of belonging, for example being an ethnic other, a citizen of a particular nation or belonging to a particular group or society, or even being an actualised friend. Such an understanding of a sense of belonging annuls the conception of DCE in becoming. For if a particular sense of belonging is actualised, students’ sense of belonging ceases to be in becoming. DCE in becoming allows students to be such that their sense of belonging is hidden. Accordingly, DCE in becoming will enable students to construct/negotiate their sense of belonging according to their privation. This is because DCE does not rely on meanings that are already prescribed, but rather on ones that are constantly constructed and are not always actualised (Waghid, 2013:28). For example, friendship can be a potentially relevant possibility for DCE in becoming in institutions of higher learning. Friendship as a form of life has the potential to allow free use of self in living and sharing ideas. As a form of life, friendship can provide spaces where being in deliberation and co-belonging in whatever singularity can advance education without actualisation. Instead of students sharing a sense of belonging in friendship as actualised terminology, they will strive towards friendship as a way of life that cannot be realised, although it offers potential essence to the optimistic future – not to belong, but to co-belong. Friendship as a form of life can provide potential spaces [in whatever singularity] for imagining the future of university education in Kenya. The complexes and the convergence of ethnic violence presently portray the impotentiality of liberal DCE in Kenya. It is hoped
that the potentiality of friendship can provide possible encounters for educating students on their in-becoming as citizens of a coming community – by being human. This is contrary to the liberal notions of educating students to become democratic citizens; this latter way of understanding education actualises education as in the prescribed outcomes and policy documents. In line with Agamben’s (1993) perception, liberal DCE as found in education policies (Kenya) actualises what education should do or achieve; it does not have room for ‘whatever singularity’. A presupposed notion of education annuls innovation, creativity and critical thinking. If education in becoming is to resolve ethnocentrism, then education should free itself from a sense of belonging, a property or an identity, or even from prescribed outcomes. The possibility of friendship offers a platform for potential interaction on whatever singularity, including being in dialogue about the impotentiality of actualising education and the resultant ethnic violence; this dialogue does not have to lead to agreement, but will be such that it allows privation (autonomous thinking). Accordingly, ethnic conflict (an actualised sense of belonging) as an ontological problem in Kenya in whatever singularity affects (impotentiality) how universities are being run at present, and ultimately interferes with education as a process that aids our becoming human. It could also be said that education in Kenya is already actualised, in the sense that it has been achieved; particular, prescribed outcomes cannot resolve ethnic violence. One could argue that violence in Kenya is as a result of an actualised education. In this way of thinking, friendship has the potential to offer education-oriented relationships and the potential not to offer education-oriented relationships. The potential for friendship to offer education-oriented relationships lies in being involved in speaking and thinking without making rash judgment. Friendship as such signifies potential critical interaction. In this respect, how one speaks, thinks and withholds rash judgement are crucial for the possibilities of relation to the other. This is because speech without critical thinking and with rash judgement can result in conflicting circumstances, which may hinder how we relate to the other and consequently may hamper our becoming human. In other words, conflicts are unavoidable in circumstances of plurality; however, how we engage with one another in times of conflict can either lead to more problems/conflicts or can provide instances for solutions to problems.

In a similar manner, to construct discourses of ethnic conflict is almost an impossible task. However, the possibility of doing this lies in the potentialities of friendship [as a form of life], which, in whatever singularity, offers optimistic feasibility for the future. Accordingly, the potentiality of friendship lies in the everyday acts of speech and thought that are not
actualised in our becoming human. In this regard, a constant and intentional deliberation on violence and ethnic conflict among university students and their lecturers has the potential to limit, and the potential not to limit, the extent of violence and conflicts as experienced in Kenya. It is being in conversation/dialogue [constant and relentless] that friendship is in becoming. Thus, higher education cannot be considered as an actualised solution to human problems, but rather as a potential resolution of societal ills, and cannot be actualised.

In education, friendship as a form of pedagogy accords students and lecturers the responsibility of dialoguing, criticising and sharing as ways of reconstructing the future of ethnic ills without actualising in whatever singularity. It also educates students not to cling to a false/actualised sense of belonging like ethnic inclination, but to free them to self and privation for whatever they may become. Constant and critical dialoguing can create possibilities for altering the human condition and freeing humans from the necessity to cling to a particular sense of belonging.

Waghid (2014:19) acknowledges Derrida’s exposition of friendship as providing a relational invitation to learning. He notes that politeness, as found in friendship, encourages students to get together to learn beyond boundaries that can be imagined, but not actualised. They can take risks because DCE in becoming has the potential for students’ learning, since the environment of learning encourages free self-use and co-belonging. In this sense, students will not be afraid of criticism, for they know they are safe and free to learn beyond containable borders – to learn that which is yet to come but is not actualised. Similarly, Waghid (2014:19) notes that a friend expects nothing in return, because friendship is concerned with equal opportunity for everyone. In this manner the students would have equal opportunities for learning in the best way possible, and this will encourage enthusiasm. Therefore, a friend loves and at the same time critiques. Friendship creates conditions for potentialities by expecting nothing in return; it encourages risk taking, hence provoking one another to think better to become ‘someone else’.

In this sense, friendship potentially sustains reimagining education to be other than it is. It is a non-violent way of inviting the other and respecting their privation and potentiality to deliberate and not to deliberate. In contrast, deliberation in a becoming community is not defined by particular properties or identity; nonetheless, being in deliberation contains
possibilities that can resolve issues of concern in human society in whatever singularity and keep judgment for later. Students are free to negotiate their form of life.

In a nutshell, on the first point, DCE in becoming has the potential to educate students to cultivate communities in becoming without the claim of belonging to any particular community, but rather as humans who co-belong as they continue to tackle daily issues such as violence in society. It also encourages students to think of the potentiality of speech without rash judgement as one way of negotiating solutions to problems without actualising speech. When students potentially are prepared to think, see and speak differently on a constant basis, and to suspend hasty judgement, then DCE in becoming can address violence and other societal dystopias.

Second, DCE in becoming is not determined by a sense of belonging. This suggests that students will be introduced to practices on the basis of undisputable allegiance to bringing about change without favouring any hegemonic ethnic/cultural community or idea, since they are freed from their self and their identity [privation]. In this case, students will be encouraged to participate in communication without bias or predisposition of belonging. This is important in the sense that they will be communicating on neutral ground on the basis of being human. This also means that students’ imagination will be a form of life, through which they will negotiate the coming community on a continuous basis. For instance, the plurality that exists in Kenya is an ontological reality that has potential for Kenyan higher education in becoming. The problem that exists is that universities in Kenya have actualised education by constituting it to contribute to a sense of belonging. Kenya has various tribes [about 60 tribes] and, apart from this, it is a centre for refugees from East Africa; it also has diplomats, Indians who remained in Kenya after the colonial regime, as well as British people who remained as Kenyans after the colonial epoch [just to mention a few cases of diversity] (Branch & Cheeseman, 2008:18) – this makes Kenya a pluralistic society with a potential for DCE in becoming. One of the most striking difficulties faced by Kenya is the aftermath of ethnic politics that transcends all sectors of national planning, including education. Education in Kenya has been actualised, and nationalising education and regionalising education has naturally sensitised ethnocentrism in the learning institutions (Branch, Cheeseman & Gardner, 2010). These tribes [plurality] consist of various individuals who already make up an existing community, as well as the nation. The expectation that university education would
prepare university students for particular things in society is blurred by the view of DCE in becoming.

Unless education in Kenya is freed of a sense of belonging or predispositions, or is instituted towards imagining, critiquing and communicating, education will become an actualised practice and ethnic violence will become imperative to education, as is currently the case. DCE in becoming potentially can educate students to imagine societal problems and concerns in whatever singularity to bring about potentiality without actualising it. This means students will be engaging in dialogue about public matters that are concerned with the coming community, not as though there will be instant solutions to the problems, but rather continual deliberations that potentially can contribute to the coming community. However, this is not what happens in the Kenyan reality. So, in this sense, higher education in Kenya will become an invitation for students to live a life of dialoguing with the self and the other, and at the same time create a place where nothing remains unsaid. In keeping with Waghid (2005b), compassionate action in relation to Green’s proposition can enable university students to create a space in which teachers and students in higher education institutions can look at things afresh. In DCE in becoming, students will resume imagination as a form of life – for being in imagination has the potential to make violence other than it is. Imaginative action in this sense will enable us to imagine the different voices of our students and how they react to what is taught in the classroom. It will enable teachers and learners to connect with students [the other] from different backgrounds without singling out identities or difference. It will allow students chances to participate actively in building cohesion with the other.

Third, DCE in becoming potentially will educate students to intentionally become a part of the becoming community through communication. This in-becoming communication is contrary to the Habermasian (1987) type of communication, which leads to understanding through agreement. DCE in becoming is concerned with bringing students into ‘communication with the incommunicable’ (Waghid, 2013, citing Agamben, 1993:7). This means that students will be taught not to stay silent regarding anything, even if it will lead to disagreement. It is in relation to such being in communication that violence in society can be renounced. If students are taught to speak their minds, they should also be taught not to rush to judgement, as this may actualise communication and may render null the DCE in becoming. One of the problems Kenya faces is ethnic violence. If students speak their minds and rush to judgement there increasingly will be violent situations, since speech will already
be actualised. Thus, being in communication should entail practices that continuously guide students in negotiating innovative solutions to solve violent occurrences in society.

DCE in becoming, in a philological sense, can prepare students potentially to participate and responsibly to communicate in public space/life with privations, without actualising speech. Accordingly, being in continual speech can contribute to fresh ways of thinking about societal ills and concerns (Agamben, 1993). This means that, while students are prepared for their future careers, university education needs to prepare them also with potential skills, knowledge, purposes and attitudes in whatever singularity that will continuously sustain their becoming (as form of life) – as a possibility of a feasible future. Such knowledge may include: ability to continuously deliberate in public spaces, being responsible, a willingness to tolerate, being respectful, and being fair in whatever singularity.

The complexity of the violence in Kenya gives rise to the question of moral education. In keeping with Theim (2008:1), ‘moral conduct cannot be reduced to what we owe others, to duties and obligations and not to virtues which can have equality restraining effects’. What Kenyan education requires is an education that can enable students to undertake the task of learning to live together with others without interfering with their privation. The violence and ethnic tensions have given rise to a problematic situation in Kenya, thereby resulting in an increase in poverty, social decadence and hatred among citizens, which lead to defeat and dogmatism. How can education thrive when it is actualised?

I argue that responsibility as a concept can provide nuances for DCE in becoming in the sphere of moral education. In line with Cavell (1979:441), responsibility is the capacity or ability to act on a situation, and also the ability to amend a situation. Being responsible for what happens to others means that their opinions are acknowledged, even though one might not be in agreement with the other. One shows concern for the other. According to Cavell (1979:9), being responsible means that an individual will negotiate his/her relations with the other, because lack of responsible action would mean a collapse of society. Violence is both an ethical and a moral issue. It is concerned with making judgement on what is right and, at the same time, what is good for the self and the other in considering living together with the other without actualising belongingness. On this basis, DCE in becoming is considered a normative viewpoint from which education constantly can be in the making/reviewed. The provocative view posed by responsibility for DCE in becoming is the potential for critical
citizenship that can expand opportunities for justice for all people without rash judgement. In other words, responsibility as a concept potentially suggests the possibility of embedding it in DCE in becoming in whatever singularity. It also gives way to a potentially just education system that can tackle issues of violence and humane practices in our universities.

Responsibility and self-formation can provide a relevant ethics for developing a critical citizen; however, this does not mean that responsibility is going to solve all ethnic violence problems in Kenya, just that it persistently can emancipate citizens [students and teachers] to be responsible for the actions of violence. In this sense, my concern will be more with the problem (question) of ethnic violence, rather than the solution.

In times of ethnic conflict, scepticism can help us to assume that not everyone can care about, or can be committed to, a moral course; consequently, denial may be the norm. In this case, Cavell (1979:326) suggests a moral relationship, which he says does not always happen or may not even be possible, but he notes that confrontation of the other may be a better option, not because we do not like the other, but because it is a moral way to engage with the other, rather than being silent. It is our willingness to encounter the other and bear the consequences of our relational encounter that makes responsibility a worthwhile course in addressing issues of violence. It is in moral or relational encounters that we may discover the unimaginable.

In a manner, then – if, through the narration of the historical past, students in Kenya can read about, comprehend and imagine the suffering that the past has brought to the nation, they potentially can live in compassion in whatever singularity, while ontologically they can imagine the experiences in Kenya for whatever future. For instance, the post-election violence that erupted in Kenya in 2007 should be a point of reflection to revisit citizenship in Kenya. This phenomenon should enable students to imagine the suffering of those who died, and those who were orphaned or affected by the phenomenon, and to begin to think differently about their belonging – as co-belonging rather than belonging to a particular identity. In this respect, students can free themselves from belonging, so that they assume living in their privations. They can deliberate on the basis of being human, without particularities of belonging. This could enable students to empty themselves of a presupposed sense of belonging that blocks their thinking and living innovatively with respect to their privations. In addition, imagining the poverty, the exclusion and the marginalisation of
certain citizens in Kenya is another focal narrative that students can reflect on as they think anew in reconstructing self for itself in whatever singularity.

In a nutshell, DCE in becoming has the potential to educate students to combat violence. Such an education is one that is not yet arrived at, but one that is in becoming. This means that students will be taught how to handle their everyday experiences as individual and independent thinkers. For instance, such an education in becoming will teach students to enter into speech with others concerning the issues they face. When in speech, students are taught not to actualise speech, but to suspend a rush to judgement, as they will value humanity. This means that a relation that entails to co-belong is essential for speech in which the coming community is nurtured. In this sense, students will value human relations (friendship) in whatever singularity and take responsibility in speech and critique without actualising speech as a way of countering everyday life experiences and challenges. For example, concerning violence in Kenya, students can be taught to see things other than they are. That is, if they view violence, or the violated, as part of the coming community, students will take responsibility in speech without making rash judgement, but will reconsider the values of humanity such as respect, human dignity, self-respect and respect for the other – seeing others ‘within an outside’.

5.6. Why Current Kenyan Higher Education Might not Resist Violence

In connection with Agamben’s (1993) idea of the coming community and the account of DCE in becoming, it is significant to ask whether university education in Kenya is potentially viable in becoming. That is, would it be possible for Kenyan higher education in becoming to potentially resist violence (impotentiality)?

Kenyan higher education in its current form might not resist violence. My contention is that the current forms of higher education, more specifically university education in Kenya, are unresponsive to the political and ethnic tensions and conflict in the country. The expectation that university education in Kenya would prepare university students for specific things in society is weakened by this view of DCE in becoming. University education aims to equip students in Kenya to ‘realise socio-economic development … achieve manpower development … promote the discovery, storage and dissemination of knowledge, encourage research, innovation and application to development and contribute to community service’
(Republic of Kenya, 2012:121). This process is guided by specific values such as equity, rights, culture, ethical behaviour, national values and national interests, enhanced equity and access, the promotion of inclusive, efficient, effective and transparent governance systems and practices, and the maintenance of public trust (Republic of Kenya, 2012:122). Following the in-becoming idea, universities in Kenya teach students to conform to presupposed notions of education and pre-existence. They do not prepare students to think independently. Notions such as effective, efficient, realised and achieved, and specific preconceived notions or thinking, do not allow creativity and independent thinking, which nullifies DCE in becoming as a process.

Following the identities/properties attached to what education is to do using terminology such as ‘to realise’, the ‘achievement of’ or the ‘effective’ and ‘attainment of’ prompts mastery. Mastery of such ideologies actualises university education and has a repercussive impact on society as a whole. No wonder then that, despite such preconceived ideas of education, Kenya is still characterised by: inadequate facilities and an inappropriate teaching and learning environment; inadequate staff; weak collaboration with professional bodies; a lack of external quality assurance; large class sizes; weak linkages between the acquired competences in some programmes and the demands of the market and inadequate research funding; and intolerance, violence, poverty, inequality and poor management of universities (Republic of Kenya, 2012:125). An education in becoming only has potentialities for education, not the actuality. The actualisation of education has stifled innovation that potentially can contest violence in societies, in universities and the world over. Like Waghid (2013), I argue that unless university education moves to in becoming, there is no point to trust universities to resolve violence and other societal concerns.

First, I argue that the massification of university education has become a phenomenon in Kenya as an actualised liberal DCE idea. It has actualised human capital to reduce the inequalities and poverty that exist in the country (Mohamedbahai, 2008:11). However, massification has posed drastic challenges to teaching, learning and research (Oketch, 2009). The increased enrolment does not match the available facilities for academic development. These include infrastructural aspects such as lecture halls and laboratories and the student/teacher ratio, leading to a lack of individual attention and dialogic learning. Dialogic learning in becoming has the potentiality to enable students and teachers to enter into speech with the other. This process can sanction stakeholders in education to become understanding,
appreciating and respecting of each other as they create a coming community [a cultural world] (Chege, 2006b:173). Since education is a humanisation of self and the world, Chege (2006b:173) argues that human beings have the task to co-exist – to co-belong. Thus, university education has the potential to enhance interpersonal relationships that can encourage dialogue as a means of building the coming community – massification in Kenyan education as implemented hinders this potential interaction.

Second, governance in Kenya potentially can lead the country into a coming community. However, governance as it currently is causes the impotentiality of university education in Kenya. This is because university education faces undue interference from government on how the institution should be run. The reason for this is the rigid governance models and management practices, which hinder institutions from incorporating change and innovation (Mohamadbahai, 2008:11). Mohamadbahai (2008) points out that the government at times selects people who do not necessarily have managerial competence for the ‘effective’ running of universities and places them in management positions, which leads to poor governance, mostly because this was of leading is subjective - autocratic. University education in Kenya runs parallel to the universities’ missions to pursue democratic endeavours. Otieno and Levy (2007:24) point out that Kenyatta University is an example of this. One of the missions of this university is to contribute to national cohesion; however, this is in contrast to what is obtainable. Otieno and Levy (2007) explain that university administration is ethnicised. They note that administrative posts have been allotted to one ethnic group, which then follows the political pattern of power in the country. He also notes that these appointments are made so that the politicians can have loyal academics in the universities for favourable politicisation in the country. They explain further that this ethnicised leadership pattern also influences the student leadership and elections. As such, the universities’ mission to achieve diversity is thwarted by highly politicised and ethnicised bureaucratic administration, which counters the mission to pursue democratic practices.

The third challenge in Kenya is the actualised sense of belonging. The Kenyan education system contains the complex realities of nationalism and ethnocentrism. Citizenship education in Kenya is demonstrated in the tensions between civic citizenship and ethnic citizenship. Civic/national citizenship in Kenya shows potentialities for democratic education. These can be found in the education policy documents and include national unity, national development, freedom, the right to economic resources, equality, social justice and
the right to education (Republic of Kenya, 2014; cf. Chapter 3). However, the impotentialities of the liberal outcomes of the policy documents suggest predetermined policy stipulations that are not achievable and cannot meet or address Kenyan problems [dual loyalties to citizenship in Kenya]. This is because, in Kenya, there are two or more identities to reckon with – keeping tribal citizenship and at the same time observing civic citizenship, which means that national citizenship is controlled by the civic laws and ethnic citizenship is tamed by tribal loyalties. Alwy and Schech (2004:267) note that Kenyan education policy advocates for equal opportunity and access to educational institutions; however, access to institutions has been ethnicised. They explain that the ethnic group that rules politically in Kenya dictates the level of access to educational institutions. To contend with such complexity, citizenship education in Kenya requires reconsideration. This reconsideration, I contend, entails viewing Kenyans first as human beings with their own privations in whatever singularity, before noting their national loyalties, which prompt a predisposition of a sense of belonging. In addition, ethnicity should become an important policy discourse, since it influences decision making and plays a vital role in relation to achieving equal opportunities. I believe that the potentiality of DCE in becoming can help Kenyan universities to teach students independent thinking and the fluidity of co-belonging. This means that the students will not have to relate to the other because of the differences or commonalities that Kenyans share, but because they (he or she) can be other than they (he or she) are. This can enable students to make an autonomous choice in their own privation about how or what direction to take as they co-belong. This way can provide ample space for constant imagining and dialogue on reconstructing DCE that could help Kenya deal with the loyalties brought about by nationalism and ethnocentrism.

The fourth reason is the prevalence of violence in the country. The aftermath of ethnic politics and the post-election violence experienced after the recent general election, among other violent experiences in the country, reflect how actualised Kenyan higher education is conceptualised to deal with political differences and humane education. On the other hand, some scholars depict violence as having deeper historical roots in the colonial legacy of divide and rule (Branch, 2012:19). This has extended to the post-independence period to date, in which ethnocentrism has become central to educational leadership, and to political and power relation discourses (Branch, 2012:19). Kenya’s fetishisation of order and authoritarian leadership has hindered the state’s development policies and has violated human rights (Branch, 2012:118). The result of this process is nepotism, corruption, hatred, un-forgiveness,
division and emotional torture – for instance by those who lost their loved ones as well as those who were humiliated and marginalised because of their tribal affiliation [cf. Chapter 3]. These experiences have developed among Kenyans the vocabulary of a sense of belonging in terms of ‘we’ and ‘them’. We rule so we get all the benefits. The seminal work of Branch et al. (2010) illustrates how Kenyan politics is central to ‘Our turn to eat’. These authors illustrate how independence in Kenya was held in high esteem and was expected to bring freedom and democracy to the nation. However, independence only makes freedom and democracy possible; it does not instantly create them. As a result, Kenyan politics has been ethnicised, favouring the ethnic group from which the ruling class comes. The book, Our Turn to Eat (Branch et al., 2010:1) illustrates how the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin had their turns to eat in the sense that they had access to the best educational institution, jobs and economic opportunities, leaving the minority tribes to fend for themselves. Equality becomes hindsight, something that was only inscribed (actualised) in policy documents but appears impotent in practice in Kenyan politics and education. Wainaina (2006b:173) notes that education institutions are perceived as spaces of micro-political organisation because it is in these institutions that human beings ought to learn and practise how to adapt to life as citizens. Thus the life of a learner and a teacher should thoughtfully reflect coherence in the way power relations [ethnic relations and diversity] are addressed. However, this is in contrast to what is obtainable even within university education, let alone in society, which integrates the citizenry.

The foregoing suggests that Kenyan education policy is in becoming, since it has not resolved ethnic violence, poverty, disease and corruption in the country. Ethnic citizenship recognises one’s right to belong to a particular ethnic/tribal group, with loyalties to what the group demands. On this assumption, the possibility that ethnic citizenship bears potential for imagining Kenyan higher education suggests that it is in becoming [in the making]. However, the impotentialities that ethnic citizenship displays in the ethnic conflicts and post-election violence in the country suggest the solidarity, actuality and inadequacy of the liberal view of DCE in the Kenyan higher education system. Consequently, DCE in Kenya is in becoming. Re-imagining DCE in Kenya demands that liberal DCE, as contained in policy documents, be reviewed in terms of potentialities and impotentialities, so that education in Kenya becomes fluid and durable to contend with ethnic violence – DCE in becoming.
I argue that, unless university programmes are reconceptualised and restructured in terms of the potentialities of teaching, learning and management to constantly address the social ills in Kenyan society, university education would not be enacting a responsible public role. I am of the opinion that DCE in Kenya demands a re-imagining of citizenship education that transcends the boundaries of possibilities and impossibilities in order to enhance education as a process of becoming in relation to human experience, interaction and/with ethnic relations. Since ethnic rights have the potential to influence the development that the country predetermines in policy documents, these documents could be viewed as being in a stage of infancy and having the potential to solve higher education problems. Also, students should be freed from their sense of belonging so that they can choose or rethink self for itself. That is, students should be free to co-belong. This is a choice that is not determined by an a priori sense of belonging to whatever singularity.

5.7. Implications of Democratic Citizenship Education in Becoming for the Conception of the University in Africa

In this section, DCE in becoming is examined for its implications for university education in Africa. I argue that a liberal conception of DCE needs to be augmented (extended) on the basis of certain gaps within the liberal tradition(s). Drawing from Agamben’s (1993) account of the coming community and its implications for DCE in becoming, I argue in defence of DCE in becoming and its concomitant link with African thought and practice in the form of Ubuntu. In this way, Kenyan higher education and the university in Africa have a better chance to respond to ethnic tension and public violence, and hopefully the university’s public role can change into it becoming more accountable to a Kenyan (African) citizenry.

Earlier I argued for a reconsidered view of DCE along the lines of potentiality and in becoming. This view is concerned with teaching students to co-belong to a university community as humans in whatever singularity, without considering or insisting on their sense of belonging. That is, students will be freed from a common or shared sense of belonging. In this case, students will be left to choose as independent thinkers how to co-belong without being prescribed to. Through DCE in becoming, students will be introduced to practices of dialogue (speech) in which they can think and speak independently; speaking here is not an actualised idea, but speaking as not to speak and thinking as not to think. This means that speaking and thinking become a form of life in which the fluidity of education is in
becoming. DCE in becoming is a reconceptualised idea, and can only educate students to internalise learning from the in-becoming community – that is a community that is potentially possible and is yet to be, and that can contend with the everyday societal challenges that universities face, including those challenges that come as a result of speech as actualised idea.

As illustrated in Chapter 4, Ubuntu provides a significant and relevant understanding of being human, that is, recognising human beings as speaking, thinking and rational beings. In this sense, education conceptualised by Ubuntu as a philosophical approach potentially configures students and lecturers as human beings in becoming, and their education and being as always in the making. Such an education therefore considers a constant unfolding of an individual’s potential in becoming human with other human beings to whom they co-belong. A potential aspect of Ubuntu considered by some scholars is the possible viability of communality as an African philosophy. Ubuntu’s relevance to/potentiality for African universities is its possible conceptual understandings rooted in community and belonging to a community as a way of life (Mbiti, 1970:108; Van Wyk & Higgs, 2012:162). Ubuntu in the Agambenian way is in becoming. Accordingly, Ubuntu potentially is not an actualised idea of communality, but one that can be. This means that Ubuntu can be freed from any properties and can be other than it is. Ubuntu possibly can render students’ needs to function as free human beings in becoming who co-belong. Communality, according to Agamben, does not have a shared or intersubjective identity; that is, a community that can free itself from any description or difference. It can be argued that such a community (Ubuntu) can be possible but does not yet exist. If such a communality exists, then issues of violence could have been dealt with. This means that Ubuntu can be in the fluidity in the life forms of our everyday experiences. In this sense, how we live every day with one another (co-belong) can have the capacity to resolve violence in society and be a possibility for a non-violent society, yet this is in becoming. Following Agamben (1993), the thought community can be freed from any property or identity. Communality, according to Van Wyk and Higgs (2012), should trigger how research is conducted in African universities. That is, researchers in universities can recognise the values/potentialities of communality to enhance research that can counter African problems, in which case both the community and the university lecturers form part of the research – not as subordinates, but as co-researchers who will aid in solving societal problems – a democratic practice in becoming. One aspect that communality can contribute to is brainstorming on how to counter the violence and imbalances in society that arise as a result of ethnocentrism.
The community becomes an active agenda setter for research in higher education rather than just a passive data provider and consumer of research results … The future university research in Africa should develop appropriate research methodologies based on conceptions of communality … [that entails] common interests, goals, values, intellectual, emotional and ideological attachment, interpersonal bonds, grouping of persons, association, communal beings and interdependence (Van Wyk & Higgs, 2012:183, 185).

In its public role, a becoming African university education can teach students to become human with others – that is, seeing the other from within an outside, which means to respect and value human dignity. In this regard, universities can be structured in such a way that their potentials are always in becoming, so that individuals can be taught to speak, think and make decisions regarding their becoming without making any rash judgements. Such an education, as discussed in previous sections of this chapter, considers friendship (Derrida, 1988; Waghid, 2014; Waghid & Davids, 2013), responsibility (Butler, 2005; Cavell, 1979), compassionate imagination (Green, 2012; Nussbaum, 1997) and caring through scepticism and critique as a form of life, not as an end or actuality, but as a potentiality for DCE in becoming (Butler, 2005; Cavell, 1979).

Universities as constitutive of and instituted by society can be spaces where the potentialities of responsibility and humanity can be cultivated primarily in pedagogical practices. Waghid (2013:76) notes that the value to humanity of co-belonging is embedded in its potentiality to recognise the otherness of others. This means that we act responsibly and enact our humanity when we recognise our differences and yet acknowledge our co-belonging. Waghid (2013) further contends that cultivating humanity is an understanding that one has to engage with others by doing the improbable; in this instance, learning to forgive and temporarily forget, and doing the unexpected, even though it goes against the grain of one’s beliefs. Accordingly, forgetting and forgiving (as acts of being responsible) elicit all kinds of emotions or violence.

Judith Butler (2005) contends that responsibility potentially involves accountability in relation to the embodiment, caring for and enactment of the good life. Butler notes that giving an account of oneself is a way in which one shows that one cares about others. According to Butler, the intellectual ability of speech is inbuilt in all humans. For this reason one can express care and show care by being able to think, speak and make decisions about matters that concern others – seeing others ‘from within an outside’ (Waghid, 2013:27). For instance,
Butler explains that one way in which we show that we care is by taking responsibility for the critique of another’s ideas as a way of showing love and concern. For if one does not take responsibility to critique the other, then one fails to care for the other. In this way, education conceptualised for a public role, as that of the university, ought to cultivate a culture of caring by enabling, teaching and creating environments that allow students to develop their speech potential so that they can critically analyse situations of self and others in order to provide solutions, and a space for others to enter into dialogue on public issues that affect society and their becoming human in whatever singularity. If one does not exercise or develop students’ potential of thought and speech within the educational settings, then such individuals (citizens) will be doing injustice to teaching and learning.

The re-imagined idea of DCE in becoming suggests that universities in Africa are constantly evolving. This means that the university in Africa can be imagined for future feasibility in becoming. Thinking about universities in terms of fixed or predetermined missions or visions limits what universities can be or are in becoming. This way of thinking means that universities should constantly seek to counter societal complexities while maintaining their academic competencies not in actuality, but in potentiality. Besides, university policies potentially can be imagined not as fixed ideas, but in fluidity – encapsulating the future of universities beyond what exists and to what the university is becoming. That is, university policies and educational practices can be imagined within the impotentialities and possibilities of the future of an in-becoming university. According to Barnett (2011:1), ‘universities could be other than they are’. As such, universities need to be seen as ideas (imaginaries) and also as real social institutions, not as actualised ideas, but as institutions in becoming. To imagine universities in Africa in relation to DCE in becoming calls for thinking about universities within the ironic realities of universities not as actualised, but as possible social institutions, as well as within ideas of an ideal future or of imaginaries of universities yet to come.

A university is an institution in public life and potentially can report its results. DCE in becoming has implications for the university in the dimensions of relationality and how universities arrive at decisions. This means that the university in Africa needs to think about community in becoming. Such communities strive to become responsible and rational (especially with regard to pedagogical encounters), not in an actualised state but in being such other than it is. The form of teaching should be that of a dialogue, potentially in which
speech and thought can be primary in developing ideas of a becoming university (supported by Ziembiński, 1997:25). This also means that the university potentially can value the place of reason in whatever singularity, especially in thinking and speaking as possibilities of imagining the idea of a becoming university. Speech and thought as potentiality of DCE in becoming can help universities in Africa to construct the roles, policy and place of universities in public space without actualising these roles and policies. As such, decision making becomes crucial in the way universities make decisions without rash judgement. A rational university withholds rash judgement and allows speech and thought to drive decision making and to portray the potential for a becoming university in whatever singularity.

Pedagogically, universities need to imagine teaching and learning as relational encounters. This brings to mind universities as social institutions (relational) consisting of a becoming community that can comprise responsible citizens who, through rational encounters, seek to think, speak and carefully make judgement on the potentialities of the African university. This means that notions of friendship can be considered as imaginaries that can provide a bond in the relationship between university students and lecturers to guide the teaching and learning process. In this way, universities can save ‘personal bonds between those who teach and those who are being taught and especially within the strict sphere of the university corporation’ (Ziembiński, 1997:23).

On the concept of a university, Minogue (2005:xvi) notes that

[A] university is an association of persons, locally situated, engaged in caring for and attending to the whole intellectual capital which poses a civilisation. It is concerned not merely to keep an intellectual inheritance intact, but to be continuously recovering what has been lost, restoring what has been neglected, collecting together what has been dissipated, repairing what has been corrupted, reconsidering, reshaping, reorganising, making more intelligible, reassuring and reinvestigating. In principle, it works undistracted by practical concerns; its current directions of interest are not determined by any but academic consideration; the interest earns it all invested.

Universities in Africa are in crisis, facing numerous challenges, and Kenya is no exception. Some of the realities portrayed in Kenya are explained in Chapters 3 and 4. What emerges

27 Minogue uses Oakeshott’s view, to which the concept of a university is dedicated (see Oakeshott, 1962).
from these realities is an enormous struggle within the complexities of globalisation and the local needs of the country. For instance, universities in Kenya framing education policies in line with the Millennium Development Goals, as found in Vision 2030 and the University Act No. 14 of 2012, aim towards global requirements, yet local unrest, poverty and ethnic unrest remain problematic in the country. This indicates that universities are not yet what they can be and may not become what they ought to be if we actualise them; yet the potentiality of imagining (dynamic and fluid sense) universities is a possibility with endless potentialities for universities in Kenya and in Africa as a whole. The potentiality of imagination carries with it possibilities for resolving societal demands in whatever singularity.

Critical thinking and reasoning as potentialities of DCE in becoming can play a significant role in shaping an academic community in becoming that can produce honest and scholarly innovations in whatever singularity. With its present-day bureaucratic structures, academic life is hampered by obsessive opinions on applications for promotions and grants, and in totalitarian states this is socially destructive instead of being stimulating (Ziemiński, 1997:25). This is so because an academic university in becoming can nurture academy that is potentially relevant to local needs, yet it also can be globally compliant in whatever singularity. For instance, where is the place of reason in Kenyan universities in relation to responsible actions, thought or contributions to counter the anomalies within Kenyan universities and the entire Kenyan society? What reasons are guiding scholarship in ethnic squabbles?

To imagine the possibility of an in-becoming African university, students and lecturers can reflect on the unfolding of universities. This means that iterating the historical (past) ideas of universities and the realities of universities (including the impotentialities) can aid in the imagining of future universities in Africa and Kenya alike. Barnett (2011:2) notes that, to think of universities as becoming, means understanding universities ‘as being-possible’. That is,

\[\text{to comprehend their being implies their sense of becoming, their possibilities and their movement over time towards their possibility’.}^{*}\]  

[Barnett notes that the] university’s becoming implies full realisation of its potentialities. So in front of us must lie a search for
what it might be for universities – albeit in a broad-brush-sense – to realise their possibilities’ (Barnett, 2011:2)

This begs the question, what might it be for a university to fully be a university in becoming? Ziembiński (1997:22) notes that universities potentially can preserve the idea of being a university by dedicating themselves to the study ‘of fundamental problems and transmission of theoretical knowledge, and not only solving problems that have practical applications … it is too late to think about making dressings when there are wounded people whose lives are in danger’.

The university potentially is a scientific and a teaching institution, which means that a university consists of those who are being taught and those who are teaching. The university teacher therefore prepares the students to maximise their potential in the way they think, speak and make judgement. DCE in becoming means that universities would provide students with learning spaces that are logical and rigorous in thinking, and with acquaintance with reasoning about the specifics of various disciplines for career development for both the individuals, and for nations. This kind of teaching is associated with open attitudes. This means that students should not accept research results uncritically or treat findings as final or changeless. It demands constant rigor and thinking differently without hasty judgement.

Universities therefore have the responsibility to shape themselves towards becoming academic communities, with integral scholarship that can imagine and become innovative in building a coming community of Africans who can think, speak and act without rash judgement. Such thinking about the coming university community can help universities to rectify their narrow focus on achievability/actualisation and focus instead on stimulating the becoming process – the in becoming of the university in Africa.

5.8. Towards a Different Understanding of the African University

Universities in Africa face multiple challenges. Waghid (2011:231) notes that African universities experience great instability, especially arising as confrontations between students, faculties, administration and the government. These challenges become even more complex as a result of economic failure, stagnation and regression, which have an impact on the pace of development in universities. African universities still lag behind universities in the developed world in meeting the social needs of citizens. Some of the factors suggested by
Waghid (2011:231) to be responsible for this retrogression are alienation from the broader society, and the actualised state of the university administration, organisation and management.

Universities in Africa potentially could tackle locally occurring problems. This could become possible if university education is commensurate with an extended view of DCE in becoming. This means that even though global pressures predetermine what African education should look like, the university in Africa can be reimagined in whatever singularity, in its own autonomy. African universities can become autonomous in making choices about the kind of university they want to be on whatever singularity for the sake of humanity. Ubuntu potentially provides a possibility for African thought and community encapsulating a nurturing of DCE in becoming for university education in Africa in whatever singularity. African universities are in becoming, that is, universities in Africa are in a stage of infancy and are always in the making. This means that the public roles of universities in Africa are constantly evolving and require constant research that can tackle the crises and challenges of humanity on the African continent (and in Kenya). Such challenges are exemplified in the Kenyan case, for example, in local problems such as poverty, ethnic violence, corruption, inequality in university access, and inadequate conceptualisation and implementation of policies to serve the needs of the citizens. However, African universities contain greater potentialities and possibilities for a democratic African society. For instance, Ubuntu potentially can engender a humanistic education that is commensurate with the coming community; that is, an education that can educate students on their becoming human. Being human bears the potentialities of being caring, taking responsibility and creating relational encounters that can encourage dialogue, imagination and critical (not rash) judgement.

Universities can serve the public in whatever singularity in their in becoming other than they are to respond to the state of violence. For this reason the university’s public mission potentially can be essential to its development into an in-becoming university. Waghid (2011) notes that the public missions of universities ought to help improve social problems, such as protecting the natural environment, preserving human rights and cultural diversity, resolving conflicts and crises of governance and promoting democracy. Yet this has not been achieved. This could be because the universities’ missions are already actualised, which annuls their

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28 Relational encounters can be informed by potentialities of friendship and imagination discussed in chapter 5, 5.41.
becoming such. In addition, universities in Africa need to rethink the way they steer their public roles, especially the way they conduct research. Research in African universities can focus on the potentiality of thought and its possibility for research, teaching and learning. This can be possible when students and lecturers or research practitioners render reasons for what they do (Waghid, 2011). For instance, in conceptualising national policy on education, universities in Kenya can render reasons for university education potentially to cultivate willingness for deliberative engagement, critical responsibility and caring and compassionate education as potentialities that can free Kenyans to participate in whatever singularity, regardless of ethnic background, race or economic status. Reflecting on the discussion in Chapter 4, violence, poor governance, corruption, inequality, nepotism and poverty are some of the impotentialities of actualised education, and these possibly can be revisited to amend the university’s mission to serve the public in whatever singularity.

Another contribution that provides nuances for the African university is DCE in becoming, building from my earlier analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 – that which is drawn from Ubuntu as a concept that depicts the becoming community. Ubuntu can be configured as a potentiality for the understanding of education as a human process. Ubuntu bears the potential forms of deliberative constructions possible for African university education in becoming. This is because, if African universities are to deal with their public roles to resolve particular problems that are local to the African experience, then education potentially can be reconstructed to counter a predetermined sense of belonging. These African problems include ethnic violence, poor governance, poverty, favouritism, nepotism and corruption, amongst the other ills on the continent in whatever singularity. For universities in Africa potentially to serve their public role, they can build potentially responsible missions/policies that can propagate a culture of responsibility and critique in relation to the way knowledge is produced. This also relates to the relevance of the knowledge produced to the African community in becoming, and the global network in becoming in whatever singularity. One of these crucial issues that universities need to focus on is how to equip citizens to have the potential to tackle societal issues in their own privation in whatever singularity. Being human connotes potentialities of thought and speech not in an actualised sense, but as possibilities that can help us think through and generate knowledge about how to overcome violence, and can create a sense of responsibility towards the other – as they co-belong.
To enact one’s humanity (Ubuntu) requires that one enacts caring as a humanistic potential. A caring university education considers comfort zones as antagonistic to the development of a DCE in becoming. Such a university potentially cares for its students’ lives, research and learning in such a way that each student can become constantly critical and sceptical and look for solutions to the problems they face, especially those of others to whom they co-belong. In this way they can care for one another and can consider another’s care, and constantly seek to care for and about others in whatever singularity.

Universities in Africa have the potential to be critical and responsible institutions. This means that a university can be a place where students’ potential is stretched to being responsible/answerable and critical as a way of educating potentially responsible citizenry in whatever singularity. Butler (2005) notes that responsibility is the ability to think, speak and see things differently beyond their existing state. If students can be taught to think and speak differently about the state of poverty, violence, education and inequalities found in Africa, we potentially will build rational citizens in becoming who can participate actively in changing their world view and that of others with whom they co-belong in a potentially non-violent manner.

In relation to a potential relational university, universities in Africa can provide potential friendly spaces for their students who co-belong to relate to one another as they respond to change/amend situations in which others (with whom they co-belong) find themselves. This potentially could happen if students are taught dialogue so as to love, respect and reciprocate in whatever singularity without denying others their individuality. This means that universities can be potentially dialogical spaces in which students and lecturers can share (mutual/non-mutual) teaching and learning encounters in whatever singularity. Potentially, dialogue, rational thinking and reciprocal critique can be a way of caring for one another without necessarily agreeing, but being in whatever singularity. In so doing, the university potentially can become a safe place to nurture difference, manage critique and undertake open dialogue with fair and just approaches in whatever singularity.

Universities in Africa need to rethink potential values of communality as a possibility for organising, conceptualising and conducting research. Communality is a value derived from Ubuntu as a sense of interdependence (Van Wyk & Higgs, 2012:186), and as such it can help in conducting relevant research to counter African problems, such us ethnic violence and other ills, to engender the coming African community.
5.9. Summary

This chapter has demonstrated that a reconceptualised idea of DCE in becoming extends a liberal conception of DCE and has the potential to counter ethnic violence. The chapter reveals that a reconceptualised notion of DCE is one in becoming. The difference in this extension lies in the potentialities of liberal DCE and its imaginings of the future of Kenyan universities to curb ethnic violence. Liberal DCE sees actuality as the aim of education, while DCE in becoming sees liberal DCE as a potential for education. An illustration of DCE in becoming is one that can enable students to speak and think differently and suspend rash judgment. Such an education potentially can be relational in whatever singularity. This relation is possible in friendship as a potential projection of co-belonging. Its potentialities are being loving, being caring, trusting/mistrusting and respecting the humanity of the other in whatever singularity. Universities as constituted by the coming community have to be spaces where the cultivation of responsibility and humanity is fundamental. Being responsible means that one potentially has the capacity to respond to the conditions of others. Responsibility potentially denotes being sceptical and critical in problem solving; it requires relentless imagination of the futures that are yet to exist; and bears compassion that moves citizens away from self to imagine the plight of others in the spirit of Ubuntu.

This chapter has disclosed that current Kenyan higher education cannot resolve violence and is unresponsive to societal ills such as ethnic violence. This is so because liberal DCE is already actualised in the policy and regulations of university education in the country, yet ethnic violence and other societal ills are on the increase. Subsequently, the chapter has described how imagining education in terms of DCE in becoming hopefully can counter ethnocentrism and ethnic conflicts in the unforeseeable future. On this assumption, university education can constantly grapple with the complexities of violence and other anomalies and imbalances in Kenya. Within liberal DCE, deliberation is already actualised. Yet DCE in becoming considers the potential of deliberation as willingness to engage, and not engagement itself, and looks beyond a narrow sense of belonging, such as ethnocentrism, to co-belonging in whatever singularity.

In addition, the chapter emphasises the implications that DCE in becoming can have for universities in Africa. That is, universities need to reconceptualise education in terms of ‘in becoming human’, since education is a social process. DCE in becoming can be central to
reconceptualising university education in Africa. Accordingly, university education potentially can be relevant for the African context in the way it conducts its teaching, learning and research. Universities potentially can be conceptualised as a coming community. This is so because Ubuntu potentially provides space for possible humanistic education. The idea of communality drawn from Ubuntu in becoming can become a potential philosophy of and approach to research, teaching and learning in African universities. Ubuntu as a concept has the potential that can help rethink the African university. Communality also recognises the significant other, and at the same time values the democratic participation of all citizens in tackling African problems in their co-belonging relation. In the next chapter I will show what the implications of a reconceptualised notion of African university mean for pedagogy in Kenyan universities.
Chapter Six

A RECONCEPTUALISED VIEW OF AN AFRICAN UNIVERSITY: ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR PEDAGOGY IN KENYAN UNIVERSITY

6.1. Introduction

This chapter will explain the implications of a reconceptualised African university for teaching, learning and governance on the continent and how such a university can be more attentive to the debilitating social and political conditions in Kenya. The chapter will consider how university classroom encounters can be transformed into spaces for democratic pedagogical practices in which students and their instructors can constantly learn to think differently and innovatively about societal and educational challenges that the country/continent faces, especially in higher education.

This chapter begins with the premise that university education can be a place for pedagogical transformation towards a democratic society in becoming; this, I contend, can happen in an environment in which education is potentially viewed as an ‘in becoming’ process. According to Bourdieu and Passeron (1997), political socialisation takes place in one’s surroundings, through ‘habitus’ [which may include family, peers, the school and the media], in which case I consider the classrooms in a university as a potential space for pedagogical encounters in whatever singularity. Universities are potential locations for socialisation, which possibly can be stratified to potentialities for educating students about their potential co-belonging in order to transform universities against violence in whatever singularity.

In a pluralist society like Kenya, universities are viewed as places and sites where different social forces and ideologies struggle for domination and hegemony. This is the case in a democratic dispensation, where civic society rises and becomes a dominant feature in politics in various public sectors, including university education. In university education, students are socialised concurrently with their initial habitus, such as their family. DCE in becoming bears the potentialities that can enable students potentially to determine the choices (in their own privations) they make regarding how they co-belong. I argue that the kinds of socialisation to which students are exposed potentially can determine who they are becoming. Therefore, the
idea of citizenship and of a university to which we potentially expose students can help students potentially to think critically, create relational encounters of responsible friendship, think radically to emancipate themselves, and value the humanity of the other so that they can enter into dialogue [in meaning making] to continuously address societal challenges in whatever singularity – a case for DCE in becoming that is commensurate with the reconceptualised view of the African university. This kind of conceptualisation can enable students to integrate their cultural experiences into what they learn in the classroom with others – with whom they co-learn to co-belong.

In this vein, classroom encounters in a reconceptualised African university potentially can allow students to think differently in their own privations. This means that, in the teaching and learning process, students’ independent ability to think and speak is a potential aspect in their learning. For this reason, teaching in the university classroom potentially can cultivate a culture of speaking and thinking anew – that is, thinking differently about innovative ways that potentially can deal with new problems or conflicting situations that students encounter – without rash judgement. Biesta (2009:20) affirms [in deconstructionist thought] that pedagogy ought to allow students to be different, in which case students’ understandings might be teachers’ misunderstandings, and teachers’ understandings and students’ misunderstandings. In this manner, education ought to open windows or spaces for the other – who co-belong, and for the new – fresh ways of thinking about particular problems that affect humanity.

The challenges depicted in Chapter 4 point to the fact that Kenyan universities face impotentiality – pedagogical challenges. This is so because the liberal ideologies are actualised in policies that influence pedagogy in the universities in Kenya. For if it were not so, then issues of violence and other ills in society would not arise. This suggests that Kenyan higher education is wanting, and that it requires potentially innovative pedagogy that can disrupt such anomalies and imbalances in both the education system and in society, in whatever singularity. Violence is one of the challenges faced by Kenyan society, and this disrupts the running of the universities. Second are challenges of access to institutions of higher learning. Third are the challenges of leadership, actualised deliberation and inequality; for instance, the distribution of infrastructure and educational resources is biased and full of favouritism – in terms of priority being given to individuals from certain socio-economic groups at the expense of others, classism and corruption (Alwy & Schech, 2004:267). All
these seem to be problems that arise as a result of an actualised sense of belonging, and actualised speech and thought, which hinder the enactment of potential responsible human action.

The analysis in Chapter 4 sheds more light on these challenges (impotentialities) faced by the Kenyan education system, and Chapter 5 hints at the implications this has for Kenyan/African universities. Consequently one would argue that liberal DCE in the Kenyan system of education is already actualised and contains impotentiality, such as injustice, violence, inequality and corruption. In deconstructionist thinking, such challenges signal the absence of something, something that is different, yet something that would provide possibilities for a more humanistic Kenyan/African education system. Despite the fact that the present system is characterised by actuality and impotentiality, there still is optimism in the reconsidered view and the in potentialities of DCE in becoming. This view of education potentially promises future possibilities, despite the tensions that linger between the possibilities and impossibilities of a ‘better Kenya’. However, the absence of something better [a just education system] is the force that pushes us to think differently about the Kenyan education system. This is put better in Biesta’s (2009:21) words:

Presence cannot present itself but needs ‘help’ of what is not present, of absence. This puts non-presence in a kind of double position. On the other hand, the non-present is what is totally different from what is present. And yet the presence upon which its definition depends can itself be articulated only with the help of that which is not.

Against this background, this chapter examines the implications of a reconceptualised view of the African university in becoming as a framework for a becoming pedagogy in university education in Kenya – more specifically in teaching and learning in the universities in whatever singularity. Pedagogy is generally understood as what happens in the classroom. Bartlett (2004) explains that pedagogy is a description of a set of complex interactions that occur in the classroom between the instructor and his or her students, between and among students, between the instructor and the subject matter, and between the students and the subject matter.

In the literature, pedagogy has been described in various ways to illustrate what pedagogy may mean to different people, namely as inclusive pedagogy (Danowitz & Tuitt, 2011; Lawy
& Biesta; 2006; Osberg & Biesta, 2010), public pedagogy (Biesta, 2012), critical pedagogy (Biesta, 1998; Durkin, 2008; Kapitulik, Kelly & Clawson, 2007; McArthur, 2010), transformative pedagogy (Fetherston & Kelly, 2007), pedagogy of change (Collier & O’Sullivan, 1997), nurturance pedagogy (Perumal, 2007) and innovation pedagogy (Kettunen, 2011). Others describe pedagogy in terms of teaching and learning – as relational learning (Pearce & Down, 2011), as friendship and responsible teaching (Sinha, 2013), as cooperative and dialogic learning (Jenkins & Jenkins, 2010), and as reflective pedagogy (Butvilofsky, Escamilla, Soltero-Gonzalez & Aragon, 2012), and still others as the pedagogy of poverty (Thadani, Cook, Graffis, Wise & Blakey, 2010). This chapter will consider pedagogy in the light of the reconceptualised view of an African university that is commensurate with DCE in becoming.

6.2. On the Possibilities of a Reconceptualised View of an African University in Becoming for Pedagogy

A reconceptualised view of an African university in becoming, as considered in this chapter, is concerned with pedagogy [as it happens in university classrooms] in whatever singularity for various reasons. First, such a view of university presupposes that most students’ experiences in the classroom alienate the students and confuse their sense of belonging; and that they are exposed to negative experiences in the education system that propagate and contribute to violence, inequality, injustice, prejudice, hatred and poverty. In this sense, a DCE pedagogy in becoming is concerned with how the equality and rights of students and instructors [teachers] are evolving within classroom practices in whatever singularity with respect to their independent thinking, speech and decision making without rash judgement (privations). In this case, pedagogy potentially is considered a relational (co-belonging) practice that includes the teleological communicative aspect of learning and the rights of students as being significant in the learning environment in whatever singularity (see Benhabib, 1996; 2011a; Habermas, 1987a & b; Rawls, 1971). Such pedagogy (in becoming) potentially can encourage students to participate and be responsible (not in an actualised sense) in the teaching and learning process in whatever singularity with respect to their own individuation.

Second, a reconceptualised view of an African university in becoming considers universities’ pedagogy as a potential process in which students and teachers potentially and dynamically
can be in becoming. This becoming process potentially can provoke critical interaction that occurs and continues to occur between the students and their instructors in the classroom, and between what they both become through these encounters of teaching and learning in whatever singularity and in respect to their privations. The becoming process is essential to the concern of this chapter. This is because it holds a potential that is yet to become – that which Agamben (1993) would describe as being in limbo – a place where judgement in whatever singularity is suspended as a potential optimism in becoming. How can the reconceptualised view of a university shape classroom pedagogies in Kenya to counter ethnic violence and the challenges faced by Kenyan society?

Third, the reconceptualised view of an African university questions the neutrality of positivism and objectivity and challenges the hegemonic actualisation of knowledge. In addition, an African university in becoming reviews the potentiality of being responsible, of being a friend (a form of life), and the possibility that compassionate imaginings can hold for cultivating humanity [i.e. the human right to life] in universities in whatever singularity. In a university in becoming, pedagogy potentially can be considered as being in becoming, and as humanistic. Such a university educates students to think, speak and make judgement without being rash and to respects students’ independent initiatives (privations) in whatever singularity as a potential for education against violence. Consequently, within classroom practice, pedagogy in becoming potentially values humanity not in an actualised sense, but in relation to what the students can become in being human – co-belonging. DCE in becoming can contend with the impotentialities of actualising education, as well as the complexities that an actualised pedagogy (predetermined/fixed) brings to current misconceptions of human commonality and difference, and how the other is regarded or can be regarded in the spaces of learning. When a student frees self, such that he/she can make use of free-self to co-belong or to co-learn, then students can be said to have portrayed the potentiality of in-becoming pedagogical learning. Instructors in the reconceptualised view of university, I argue, value education as a potential process of becoming and, at the same time, utilise potential pedagogies in becoming to realise conscious potential impacts that humane practices and humane pedagogies may have on the complexity of representations within classroom spaces in whatever singularity. For example, teaching students to co-belong erases the impotentialities that a predetermined sense of belonging brings. When students potentially can free self of any identity or property, they potentially can choose afresh in their own privation to co-belong in whatever singularity. Freeing self potentially can challenge the
ideas of conforming to presupposed ways of making judgement – especially in relation to difference or commonalities, and rather to choose whatever singularity in which to co-belong for the sake of humanity. This means that students or lecturers will not make judgments based on their present sense of belonging (such as their ethnic group of economic class), but from within the potentialities of their own reimagined co-belonging in whatever singularity. Accordingly, university pedagogy can be said to be in becoming, since it potentially can educate students to think independently in whatever singularity, and this potentially can counter violence.

Fourth, in the reconceptualised view of the African university, the instructor sees pedagogies as methods that are used to transform classroom practices to provide an environment in which students and instructors can engage critically, responsibly and constantly with one another, and with the subject matter, as they strive to possible potentialities of whatever singularity they can become as they co-belong or co-learn (human with another). This kind of pedagogy grows from my discussions and analysis in the previous chapters. In addition, transformative educational thought, as exemplified by Cavell (1979), emphasises scepticism, responsibility and the other as potentialities for democratic education. According to Cavell, classroom pedagogy should recognise the composition of students as consisting of human beings, who are strangers [scepticism] with whom they engage [through dialogue] in order to understand the self. Being sceptically responsible potentially means to take an initiative to dialogue with the other stranger [human being]. Becoming sceptically responsible can help students to co-learn and co-discover self in the other to co-belong. It is through such a process that Butler (2005) notes that we can learn to take responsibility to critique the other in order potentially to know what/who the other is, in which case this can aid our becoming process with the other in whatever singularity.

It is impossible to engage with the other unless we recognise that human beings potentially can become equal, since equality is in becoming. This means that equality cannot be achieved by mere actualised deliberation, but by being in deliberation, since equality is only a potential for education and cannot be realised. Since students and teachers potentially can engage in dialogue with the other they can bridge the gap of the (im)possibility of equality. Accordingly, dialogic pedagogies [in becoming] potentially value humanity. For this reason, the pedagogical experiences in becoming potentially recognise that equality cannot be actualised, but is a potential of our communicative potentialities in whatever singularity.
Every human being has an equal intelligence (only in potentiality) to communicate with the other so as to co-belong, co-learn and co-teach in whatever singularity (Agamben, 1993; Davis, 2010; Rancière, 1991). The capacity/potentiality of equal intelligence can enable students and instructors potentially to emancipate themselves. Such practices depict that the teacher and the student are co-learners and co-teachers, in the sense that each of them can claim potentialities of being equal and capacious in intelligence to engage with the subject matter in the classroom and with one another in the process of their becoming in whatever singularity. Viewing pedagogy in this way potentially portrays the classroom as a place and space where students and instructors can form a community in becoming in whatever singularity. This potentially demonstrates the possibilities for conscious encounters of human beings in becoming. In view of such a community in becoming, the humanity of one another is foremost, thus respect and the value of humanity potentially can become a priority in whatever singularity. Green (1998; 2012) suggests that such a pedagogy should also recognise the uniqueness of every human being. To his mind, students’ and instructors’ uniqueness are recognised in order to balance and recognise unique humanness in each student, along with the unique contributions they offer or bring to the classroom to necessitate their becoming humans. Each student becomes a participant in the classroom in his/her own independent thought and speech in whatever singularity.

Another aspect considered by a reconceptualised view of an African university in becoming is the potential content of university education in becoming. Even though students and instructors engage dialogically within their learning and teaching spaces, the outcome of their dialogue is not predetermined; the content of the discussion is guided by their histories, predispositions, presuppositions and the background knowledge that both the students and the teachers independently carry into the conversations in whatever singularity. In Waghid’s (2014) view, the content of their discussion is in its infancy [it is not yet known] until they engage in dialogue with one another. One example could be that the students want to find solutions to or deliberate on the ethnic conflicts in Kenya. The outcome of their conversation is only known when they all engage independently of their own privation, either through potential questioning, critiquing and arguing to come to a consensus, and at times none, in whatever singularity. However, such an engagement potentially provides relatively possible, innovative solutions for the task at hand, yet there also can be no actualised solution.
In the sections that follow I will use philosophical approaches to argue how a reconceptualised view of an African university [DCE in becoming] potentially can enhance and improve pedagogical encounters in the university classroom in becoming in order to potentially enrich critical citizenship and to grant students potential opportunities to think differently about the problems Kenya/Africa faces as a result of inequality, injustice, ethnic violence, political instability, lack of access to education, and lack of respect for human dignity and human rights, including the right to life.

6.3. On The Potentiality of Critical Pedagogy for Kenyan Universities in Becoming

Higher education in Kenya, especially the public university sector, is in crisis. The analyses in Chapters 3 and 4 show how violence, inequality, poverty, politics and ethnocentrism have complicated the state of university education. For example, the massification of higher education has resulted in the neglect of small-group teaching, which can encourage dialogue and interaction; rather, higher education is characterised by poor learning conditions and inadequate facilities, an increased teaching load and problems of student assessment, and thus has reduced opportunities for access by low-income citizens and unequal access due to funding demands (Mohamedbahai, 2008:41). At the same time, ethnic violence in Kenya, especially the post-election violence, has created friction and a confused sense of belonging for the various students and lecturers in the universities (cf. Chapter 4). Such a scenario of actualised education suggests impotentialities in the education system that in turn affect society.

In this section I argue through the eyes of students and teachers [university lecturers] that opportunities should be provided in university classrooms for students and lecturers alike to systematically voice their thinking [democratically and deliberatively] to deal with instances of injustice and inequality in the university education system in Kenya. Doing this provides spaces for pedagogy with nuances of DCE in becoming for sustainable university education (see Cho, 2013:1, 19; Monchinski, 2011:45). Biesta and Stams (2001:57) suggest that criticality should be driven by concerns for justice.

Accordingly, critical pedagogy offers students and lecturers potential opportunities for becoming critical citizens. Kapitulik et al. (2007:135) note that critical pedagogy can provide a chance for students and lecturers to study, think and talk about the social-political
transformation in university education for justice. In addition, critical pedagogy can encourage university students to act against inequality and undemocratic changes in universities, in which case lecturers can provide students with information as a starting point for conversations on what kind of university they have and what they want their university to become (McAuthor, 2010:304).

In critical pedagogy, students can become active, not passive, participants in their learning. This means that students potentially can contribute to criticality in meaning making when they can transcend the given. Being critical potentially can enable students and teachers to find their own voice and privations in whatever singularity. According to Waghid (2014:23) and Green (1995:34), students are considered critical when they do not just look at themselves as passive recipients of information, but rather when they are able to demonstrate a willingness ‘to tell their stories, to pose their own questions, to present – from their own perspectives – to the common world’ (Waghid, 2014:23). One example is that a student from a Kenyan university who is able to learn about the violence others face in their own country [or on a university campus] not only imagines the consequences and effects [or the trauma] that come with such encounters, but also thinks of how s/he might react to [or experience] similar violence, and then considers ways to alleviate the vulnerability of others so that s/he offers a response to the suffering of others. In this way, students demonstrate a critical attitude by looking for meaning beyond their current situation and finding solutions for future problems in case they reoccur. In this way, students find the motivation to act differently should they face a similar situation of suffering. I have in mind university students in Kenya – as explicated in Chapters 4 and 5 – regarding the violence in the country and the subsequent challenges this has posed to the democratic vision the nation aspires to attain. I challenge university students to reimagine or think critically about the suffering of individuals who have incurred loss, a university education system that entertains the effects of such violence, individuals who have suffered ethnic violence, and citizens who suffer access issues – either due to their economic situation or to a lack of political connectedness, and to imagine anew by responding critically to the disruptive actions of others and perhaps to come up with new ways to divert or deal with the challenges the country faces.

Secondly, in relation to Waghid’s (2014:24) concern that ‘many students do not consider it their right to question what they are being taught, since teachers often treat academic texts as encyclopaedic as authorities that cannot be questioned’, I argue that critical pedagogy should
enable students to actively become part of the inquiry alongside what they are taught. In other words, students should find their voices in relation to their contexts and everyday experience. For instance, teaching DCE in a classroom from a liberal perspective [one example: Rawls’ justice as fairness to a university student in Kenya] should allow students equal opportunity to question such ideas, and allow this to resonate with their contexts and cultural experiences. In this way, students are able to reimagine and think afresh on how their everyday experiences relate to what they are learning so that they can and are able to think anew as a way of solving new problems. It (critical pedagogy) bears the potential to encourage students to be critical about what they are learning in relation to how they participate in society, thereby finding their voices and constantly becoming participants – critical citizens (active ones).

6.4. On the Potentiality of Cultivating a Culture of Friendship and Responsible Pedagogy in Kenyan Universities

I use friendship in a philosophical sense to show that relationality as a potential can enrich teaching encounters in university education in whatever singularity. I highlighted earlier how Derrida (1988) explains the concept of friendship (Chapter 5, section 5.3.1). Accordingly, Derrida (1997) notes that friendship takes on an active role of loving, rather than of being loved [passive]. That is, friendship is an ongoing action of loving. This kind of active/fluid form of friendship that Derrida explicates can provide students and teachers with the potential responsibility of being loving, which means that students or teachers will not wait for teachers or students to show them love, but will love as an act of being a friend (friendship), since friendship is always in the making. This suggests that, when friendship informs pedagogy, both students and teachers take up the active role of loving. Waghid (2007:200) notes that such kind of love may mean evoking the potentialities of students in such a way that they (students) will come up with possibilities that teachers do not even think of. Waghid notes that this kind of friendship does not expect anything in return. However, the active role students play in deconstructing knowledge and finding new ways of knowing is crucial to cultivating a DCE in becoming that potentially can address the social, political and educational problems faced by universities and society in Kenya in whatever singularity. Such an understanding of friendship can advance critical learning. In this section I will be concerned largely with how friendship can extend pedagogy [for teaching and learning] in Kenyan universities for the sake of justice.
Elton (2005:113) suggests that love provides pedagogy a concept/language of ‘intellectual love’. This kind of concept he explains claims the love of one’s discipline. This presents teaching and learning with two kinds of pedagogical love. That is, the love for students and the love for academic discipline. This kind of love that Elton (2005) suggests bears potentialities that can advance pedagogical in becoming for the love not only for students but also the love academic discipline. This means that pedagogical friendship as potential for love can spur the love for academic discipline and for students. Such a provocation can provide university curricula with the language for teaching and learning that influences not only how students learn but also what they learn to overcome violence in whatever way. This according to Elton (2005:115) can return hope for research-teaching nexus in traditional teaching into practical ways that can be used with the current potentialities in education systems with student (as citizens) central to the education unfolding.

Waghid (2007) notes that literature on cultivating DCE in university education abounds, but that little is known about friendship and its significance in continuing democratic societies. In this section I argue that friendship is another way of cultivating DCE in becoming within teaching and learning encounters in university education. Waghid (2007) notes that friendship understood in terms of mutuality and love can be used normatively in pedagogy to nurture friendship, in which case mutuality and love can encourage both students and teachers to take risks in inculcating justice. Friendship therefore professes possibilities for the educator to nurture students to become human with others. This kind of thinking about education reshapes the sense of duty and responsibility that is possible during teaching and learning processes in higher education. Derrida (1997) explains that these ways of teaching have not yet been achieved and only are possible when educators and students engage in critical questioning, constant learning and association in becoming humans who are capable of democratic citizenry.

Waghid (2007:200) notes that friendship can signify ‘mutual attachment – as a matter of doing things together’. This reflects the schooling environment, in which teachers and students can demonstrate their willingness to give priority [time and resources] to one another without dismissive attitudes. In this way, students and teachers can listen to one another with respect and trust so that, when they participate freely in teaching and learning activities, they do this with flexibility and the willingness to be corrected or critiqued, since mutuality is a
binding commonality. Mutuality therefore encourages students and teachers to appreciate one another in their efforts of teaching and learning for democratic justice.

Mutuality in friendship also potentially can ensure that teachers and learners are attuned to each other. This is so because, when both teachers and learners are aware of their co-belonging in whatever singularity [mutuality], they are able to relax and be willing to engage in arguments without necessarily becoming violent with one another, a way in which the university community can model democratic dialogue. Such dialogue should extend to include all learners in the classroom by considering their various capacities. I have in mind Young’s (1996) proposition of using rhetoric, stories and greetings as a way of including all learners, as this is necessary for those who might be silenced by the eloquence of other students in the classroom (see also Waghid, 2007:200).

Waghid (2007:200) notes that mutuality has the potential to enable teachers to introduce students to new ways of thinking [knowing] – that is, being able to see things differently. In this manner, students, in turn, will learn in such a way that they are able to make sense of new ways of knowing and being able to think differently. This point to the fact that, in a mutual sense, friendship can enable both students and teachers to engage in new ways of knowing that can sustain constant ways of learning. Therefore, friendship as mutuality points to the fact that DCE in becoming can enable students and teachers to nurture their sense of belonging to a community of learning/teaching [and knowledge production] to deal with new ways of knowing. In this sense, teachers and students can connect with one another to deliberate in whatever way – to argue, narrate and deconstruct knowledge in new ways, for instance – to counter imbalances and anomalies in Kenyan universities/society by just alternatives.

Friendship provides potential nuances for responsible teaching. Friendship, understood in terms of mutuality and love, provides pedagogical understanding that potentially can be nonviolent for DCE in becoming. The potentialities displayed by friendship make friendship possible, yet the impossibility of this in the Kenyan higher education system points to the constant search for nuances that can deal with the challenges faced by Kenyan higher education so that justice becomes the motivation for education.
6.5. On Potentialities of Emancipating Equal Intellectual Agency - A Radical Pedagogy for the Kenyan University

In relation to the analysis in Chapter 4 (section 4.5.2), Rancière’s (2009) seminal work on democracy brings in the elements of emancipation and equal intelligence as possibilities that can advance and disrupt democracy as it is conventionally understood (actualised). Rancière notes that democracy in its existing state is distinguished by the police in contrasting ways (Davis, 2010). This is so because the police imply an authoritarian agency that imposes on and insubordinates some while favouring others. Rancière hints that understanding democracy in this way restricts instead of frees. In view of this, Rancière argues that democracy [as a potential pedagogical encounter] does not need to be freed from regulations, for instance the justice system. However, the justice system should consider the potentialities of intellectual equality of opportunity for all citizens [students and teachers] to be active participants in meaning making [education] in whatever singularity. The logical connection Rancière makes is that human beings [citizens] bear potential equal intelligence and have the capacity to exercise their potential intellectual agency in a democracy. Therefore, every student and teacher bears potential equal intelligence that can enable them to participate in the teaching and learning environment to determine whatever they may become through such democratic (pedagogical) encounters. It follows that the justice system and democracy within university settings should enable each citizen [students and teachers] to be active participants in their democratic [pedagogic] encounters in whatever singularity in respect of students’ individual thought, thereby recognising their own potential intellectual agency for their becoming (own privations). In contrast, the police (policy) should not restrict (actualise) participation, but encourage it in whatever singularity.

Accordingly, radical pedagogy, says Rancière, should be arranged in such a way that it allows the teaching and learning process in the university to be emancipatory. In other words, classroom spaces in the universities can be organised so that they potentially can enable students and teachers to have spaces in which to encounter the intellectual agency of everyone in a co-teaching and co-learning environment. Such a process provides opportunities for both the learner and the teacher in a university classroom to emancipate themselves. It follows that the intellectual emancipation found in encounters in university classrooms [with one another] is the signification of equality – it symbolises equality of intelligence in all humans. Such a kind of university education can enable both the student and the teacher to play the role of activist. Despite Rancierè’s controversial position, his
views provide the nuances necessary for DCE in becoming that opens pedagogical spaces to restructure/reconsider laws, rules and policies in university education or justice systems to counter societal ills. Rancière’s thought also accords equal opportunities to the voices of both the teacher and the students, and recognises their capacity and possibilities for seeing things differently [anew, afresh].

Even though Rancière seems sceptical about the state of justice systems, he notes that such structures are necessary to guide society – as in university education. However, such structures sometimes act as police rather that politics. This implies that structures/policies can limit the intellectual agency of people. If such hierarchies were altered it would enable people to deal with the ever-changing contests of politics [decision-making processes]. In view of this, equality, in Rancière’s thought, finds its meaning through expression. In this way, pedagogy in university education ought to be engendered through the in-becoming thought. This will mean that such an education will consider the fundamental capability [capacity] of all people to think, speak and act as equals. Rancière’s thought signifies absent realities that require encounters [political ones] in order to actualise them. In other words, Rancière shows how university education can be a process of learning the unknown. That is, the unknown can be knowable only when students and teachers [citizens] potentially are able to engage with one another in their equal intellectual agency to make decisions – decide – and to learn together as a process of emancipating themselves without actualising learning. Emancipation, according to Rancière (1991:51), is ‘the will to question and express thought outside a position of mastery … it is not a key to any science but a privilege relation of each person to the truth, the one that puts him in his path of power to know’. ‘Knowing is an intellectual labour’ – this entails interrogation, translation and communication. Such a process must be shared through either spoken or written works by which communication with thinking beings is possible (Rancière, 1991:62)

Rancière’s underlying argument is that all human beings possess uniform qualities to think and speak as equals. These he refers to as qualititative capacities that enable people to engage with and act meaningfully in the world. University pedagogy therefore ought to reflect pedagogy as disruptive encounters for just practices. Radical pedagogy indicates that pedagogical encounters should be disruptive ones in the way they contribute constantly to meaning making. Rancière suggests that human intelligence is capable of communicative acts that can disrupt teaching and learning to break away from old ways of doing for better
practices. This kind of thinking stretches pedagogy from non-prescriptiveness to pedagogy beyond boundaries.

6.6. Pedagogy and Ubuntu: An Encounter with ‘The Other’

With reference to the discussion in Chapter 4 (section 4.5), I reconsider Ubuntu as a kind of ethic of care that potentially can contribute to pedagogical encounters that can transform university education for a just course (Waghid & Smeyers, 2012a). This is because Ubuntu, as explicated by Waghid and Smeyers (2012a), demonstrates a Universalist ethics that considers the condition of oneself in relation to the other. In this sense, ‘Ubuntu relies on human moral enactment such as forgiveness, hospitality and nonviolence to remedy some portraits of violence and hatred on the African continent … Ubuntu remains an ever evolving concept of human goodness which can hopefully act against the contextual malaise of aspects of African morality and politics’ (Waghid & Smeyers, 2012a:13). Therefore, Ubuntu mainly highlights humanity in oneself and in the other (Cavell, 1979:433). I use this concept to interrupt how violence and injustice in Kenya affect citizens, and how it (Ubuntu) can be undertaken pedagogically in university education. Therefore, I use Ubuntu to argue for pedagogical potentialities that can do justice to the situations that one finds oneself in and to caring and acknowledging the concerns of others.

Noddings (2006:339; 2012:387) hints that caring is an ethical ideal in professions in which encounter is frequent and is unavoidable. Noddings (2006:339; 2012:387) notes that teaching is one of those professions in which care is needed. Thus a teacher becomes one who gives care. This kind of caring, according to Noddings, is not a romantic caring, but rather entails being receptive to the other [students]. This kind of caring commences with ideals of respect and regard for the other. In this sense, the teacher becomes responsible for probing, and for interpreting and clarifying, during classroom encounters. Thus the teacher seeks the involvement of the cared for [students] in whatever singularity. In caring relationships [encounters], the teacher recognises the student’s experiences, from which the teacher begins instruction not in an actualised sense; this can enable learners to find connections to what they learn and how what they learn offers solutions to their daily problems/concerns. Caring potentially requires the intrinsic interests of trust and inclusion. In this sense, teachers potentially can acknowledge the intelligence of students as a starting point from which student learning objectives begin. Caring encounters need the participation of both students
and teachers. In this sense, the teacher needs to encourage dialogue, model caring and encourage cooperative learning to mirror the moral ethical ideal.

Accordingly, my use of Ubuntu shifts from just the idea of belonging or a collective act of care or co-care to undertaking an empathic act of care in relation to respect and concern for the other. This is because of instances, as Waghid and Smeyers (2012a) highlight, in which a collective act of Ubuntu has manifested the lack of considering the plight of the other. One example they proffer is the collective act of genocide in Rwanda, when a collective act among the Hutu tribe in the spirit of African Ubuntu led to the death [massacre] of many Tutsis (Waghid & Smeyers, 2012a:9). This kind of Ubuntu portrayed by the Hutus arouses scepticism about what Ubuntu really ought to be, and also triggers a re-imagining of Ubuntu. Similarly, the violence in Kenya has also been enacted by particular solidarities in order to forcefully cause harm to the other, a case that has left Kenya in a state of wanting (cf. Chapters 3, 4 and 5). These occurrences of violence in Kenya and Rwanda point out that some collective acts of solidarity (Ubuntu as an actualised sense of belonging) can impose negative care (immoral and egocentric behaviour towards the other, impotentialities) by terminating the life of others.

The Cavellian (1979) moral sense of being human entails being sceptical – which potentially considers the other as a stranger first as one establishes oneself in the other. In this manner, Ubuntu as an ethic of care accommodates reimagining in order to re-establish potential moral and ethical behaviour and encounters with the other. Cavellian Ubuntu negates blind collectivity that acts against humanity [as in the Rwandan and the Kenyan post-election violence]. This is because both instances cited above led to the death of many citizens, which is in contrast to potential respect for the moral human right to life. In the same way, Ubuntu as portrayed in Kenya [the harambee spirit] entails actualised ethnic collectivities that impose harm on human life. An example is the violent reactions of a ‘group of citizens’ who consciously plan and tamper with others’ rights to life, which is essentially unbecoming.

In order to reimagine citizenship education within university education and society in Kenya there is a need for students and teachers to think differently about collective acts that are actualised (Ubuntu, ethnic violence) to co-belong in whatever singularity. That is, ethnically imposed violence, or any other form of collective violence that is predetermined or
actualised, can be reconsidered and dealt with pedagogically within classroom encounters, since such acts and sense of belonging divide Kenyans and undermine human dignity.

From a Cavellian point of view, Ubuntu should not be viewed as an actualised concept, but rather as a potential ‘Ubuntu in-becoming’. On the other hand, the ever-increasing conflicts and violent encounters potentially can empower students and teachers to constantly reimagine, and interrogate, their [our] collective acts to be of a more durable and humanistic kind in the spirit of an ethics of care. Waghid and Smeyers (2012a:9) note that acknowledging our own humanity, as found in our emotions, feelings and compassion towards those who are vulnerable, potentially can be ethically caring, since it valorises human life. If humanity (Ubuntu) means that we are answerable to the other, then ethnic violence negates the responsibility we have of taking care of and respecting the other. Violent riots by students negate moral approaches to the other. Encounters that may resolve students’ conflicts [especially at the university] differently are more necessary than violent ones. Pedagogical encounters within university classrooms ought to provide deliberative, respectful and non-violent encounters to enable students and teachers to speak and think differently about problem-solving mechanisms that are non-violent and that can enhance care for the other. This is because violent encounters have the tendency to spark distressing confrontations that may stir violence.

So: reimagining Ubuntu as a pedagogical concept can promote moral philosophy [ethic of care], which potentially can necessitate being responsible by acknowledging oneself in the other (Cavell, 1979:433). This means that the encounters we have in university classrooms and university spaces potentially can evoke critique, respect, care and compassion, so that the encounter we experience can enable us to mirror others in ourselves. Students therefore can take on imagination as a way of constantly knowing and unveiling the humanity in the other, thereby establishing self-humanity. Such an exercise (praxis) potentially has the capacity to enable students to co-belong in whatever singularity, such that the essence of Ubuntu can constantly awaken students’ imagination to potential moral encounters with the other, thereby respecting others’ humanity in whatever singularity.

Waghid and Smeyers (2012a) suggest that Derridian thinking on imaginative action, and on forgiveness, hospitality and non-violence, can enable students to think differently about their sense of belonging and their relations with the other, thereby reimagining their humanity.
differently as to co-belong in whatever singularity. Based on the premise that violence in Kenya undermines the role of Kenyan higher education as a democratic space for propagating citizenship, I argue that forgiveness and hospitality potentially can enable students and lecturers to think differently about one another and about how they view and transform citizenship education, inter alia to co-belong, and their relational encounters with the other as a reflection of self. In this case, therefore, forgiveness — as described by Derrida (1997:44) — denotes forgiving the unforgivable (see also Waghid & Smeyers, 2012a:11). This means that the violence that was imposed on some Kenyan citizens may seem impossible to forgive, but in the Derridian sense the potentiality of teaching students to live a life of forgiveness can mediate the possibility of forgiveness. Similarly, it is possible within classroom encounters that students and teachers may cross others’ paths and that such act can create uncomfortable encounters and hinder learning and deliberation. In this case, Derrida’s proposition becomes necessary to avoid instances of violence. Secondly, hospitality as a potential act of compassion toward the other can provide nuances for stretching the possibilities for and the impossibility of Ubuntu to improve the encounter with the other. Derrida notes that every human being has a right to universal hospitality without limits. This suggests that those who face violence or discrimination need to be taken care of by the government and by all who understand universal hospitality — university education potentially can be a space for cultivating notions of universal hospitality.

Waghid (2014:93) notes that stretching hospitality to ‘hostipitality’ provides grounds for democratic education that can avoid provocative and disruptive pedagogical encounters, especially those that exclude others and hinder engagement within such encounters. He explains that ‘both welcoming the other (hospitality) and suspicion towards the other (hostility) are pedagogical speech acts that potentially can function to avoid exclusion, as the possibility is always there to find a variation — that is — to including the other by making them more curious and attentive’ (Waghid, 2014:93). In keeping with Waghid, I argue that hostipitality offers nuances for deliberative action that provides universities with ideas to conceptualise safe speech in their various encounters and environments of learning, so that a reasonable and moral acceptance is shared within their community of practice. So that their pedagogical encounters become deliberative ones, those who can challenge complacency avoid compromise and provoke doubts about ethnic violence, exclusion and the lack of public reasonableness. Such a reconceptualised view of university education can transform how encounters in African universities characterise African society, citizenry and human dignity.
When the university community engenders pedagogical encounters as hospitable ones, then students and teachers potentially can counter, or tackle, issues that affect Kenyan society, such as ethnic violence. I contend that Ubuntu as a pedagogical encounter can embrace human dignity when understood in potentialities of hospitality and responsibility (Butler, 2005; Cavell, 1979:433 Waghid, 2014:96). This is because Ubuntu, as explicated in this section and in Chapters 4 and 5, illuminates the communal ecological relations that can promote the cultivation of the African spirit of humanness. Ubuntu potentially provides nuances of an ethics of care that can explain how pedagogical practices within the classroom can promote responsible, just, critical and humane university education in whatever singularity.

Cosmopolitan education and hospitality are potential concepts that can help the Kenyan university to reimagine teaching and learning. ‘Cosmopolitanism is a philosophy developed during the period of the Enlightenment, notably by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) It is an extension of liberalism, the moral philosophy underpinning liberal democracy, which is concerned with upholding the dignity and inherent rights of individuals, understood as instantiations of universal humanity’ (Berner, 1995:2, cited in Osler & Starkey, 2000:20; see (Gregor, 1996).). A liberal account of citizenship accentuates the equality of all human beings with regard to their rights. A cosmopolitan citizen is one who views her/himself as a citizen of a world community based on common human values (Anderson-Gold, 2001:1; Osler & Starkey, 2000:20). In view of the reconceptualised African university, cosmopolitanism can be other than it is. That is, freeing cosmopolitanism from properties or identities can refresh pedagogical encounters in the classroom. This is especially possible when students and lecturers choose to co-belong, co-learn and recognise the potentialities of those with whom they share the classroom (human beings) in whatever singularity.

A cosmopolitan view of citizenship negates the nationalistic understanding of citizenship that emphasises a nationalistic community rather than one that considers a community of all human beings (Osler & Starkey, 2005:20). In this sense, such a community is guided by common human values. These values, which frame cosmopolitan citizenship, are delineated by international structures/bodies that constitute the standards that guide human rights. Human rights are based on the premise that human beings are equal, as are their entitlement to rights and the necessity to respect their basic human dignity. This does not mean that cosmopolitanism denies nationalism, but it does recognise that universal values as standards.
for measuring the equality of human rights are common human values (Osler & Starkey, 2005:21). Cosmopolitan citizens are not born; they become this through education (Osler & Starkey, 2005:25).

For cosmopolitan citizens, university education enables students and educators [citizens] to learn citizenship as a whole, not limiting citizenship to students’ settings only, but expanding it also to global settings. This kind of education conscientises students to their common humanity – the connections they themselves make with the other – a community of human beings, rather than loyalty to their states of citizenship only. Thus, Ubuntu conceptualised in this way can promote non-violence, inclusion and deliberation in public universities in Kenya and in Africa. Human dignity should be fundamental in reimagining pedagogy in Kenyan university education.

For a reconceptualised view of the African university, cosmopolitanism could be other than it is – a community in becoming, which does not bear any properties or identities in whatever singularity, but is one that is yet to become. Teaching students to be cosmopolitans is teaching them to actualise being cosmopolitan citizens. However, teaching students to imagine the coming community teaches them to imagine a community that potentially can comprise active participants in their in becoming, that is, to co-belong, co-learn and interact with others in whatever singularities.

6.7. Summary

This chapter has shown that, when pedagogical encounters are critical, bear mutuality and love [friendship], become radical and emancipative, and are hospitable, then students and teachers in universities in Kenya potentially can address the challenges facing the country. It is my opinion that potentialities in criticality, friendship, disruption, emancipation and Ubuntu, as conceptualised in this chapter, can steer university education in Kenya from a starting point toward democratic citizenry in whatever singularity, yet leave room for advancement, since education is always in the making [the becoming community].

Friendship is that which potentially is characterised by love and mutuality, and which can create relational spaces for trust in which students can be free to take risks and become free participants in their learning. Pedagogical encounters in this sense can become friendly ones.
Critical pedagogy potentially allows learners and teachers space to be active participants in resolving the problems facing Kenyan society for justice in whatever singularity. Critical encounters potentially look beyond comfort zones and can become uncomfortable with others’ discomfort and suffering, and imagine new ways of resolving such dilemmas. Radical pedagogy can enable students to maximise their potential by exercising their intelligence to disrupt traditional ways of understanding things, especially when the old ways do not solve conflicting challenges in our society. Disruptive pedagogy can support students to think out of the box and develop new ways of thinking, thereby becoming innovative as a way of solving new problems in society. In addition, Ubuntu is an underlying pedagogy that potentially emphasises human interdependence, with moral ideals of caring for the other. Ubuntu potentially provides a springboard for in-becoming education, since it potentially conceptualises human dignity and caring relations [hospitality and forgiveness] that can contend with complex societies like Kenya in whatever singularity.
Chapter Seven

AN EXTENDED VIEW OF DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION: POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO KENYAN UNIVERSITY ACADEMIC PROGRAMMES

7.1. Introduction

This chapter provides an extended view of DCE and a possibility of what it potentially can offer to Kenyan university academic programmes. In this chapter I provide a synopsis of the research process and findings, and then elucidate the contributions this research makes to Kenyan universities and finally offer recommendations for further research. Thus, the chapter wraps up how the current curriculum potentially can be modified to address issues of an extended conception of DCE and a view of a reconsidered Kenyan university. The questions remain on what and how this consideration should be present for this modification. I argue that the considerations made in this research potentially can transcend the different disciplines offered in universities in Kenya.

In considering curriculum, one thing that comes to mind is the content of curriculum that needs modification. DCE in becoming in this research does not offer any specifics of what Kenyan education will look like; rather, it provides potential principles, knowledge, epistemologies and philosophical ideologies that can guide Kenyan universities as they plan their programmes (curriculum) with the complexities that come within the various fields and contexts of study. The programmes offered in university education cannot be the subject of this chapter; however, the programmes offered in universities potentially can be conceptualised to reflect the principles of DCE in becoming. I argue that programmes in Kenyan universities potentially can be organised in such a way that they engage students [citizens] deliberatively. Barnett and Coate (2005:1) point out that students are human beings and should be inquirers after knowledge and, at the same time, possessors of skills. For this reason, programmes [curriculum] should be designed in such a way that they potentially encompass knowing, acting and being [becoming], which means that they constantly should seek to deliberatively know [speech], act rationally and relentlessly strive to ‘becoming human’. Even though the curricula that exist in Kenyan [African] universities already are
engaging, the extent to which they are engaging in terms of policy statements seems inadequate and questionable. This is because ills and inhumane acts still exist in the system and society at alarming levels. For instance: Ethnic tensions within society and within university faculties and the environment suggest that there is a missing link in the extent to and manner in which the university curriculum in Kenya is actually engaging and deliberative. If education is a process of knowing, acting and being, as suggested by Barnett and Coate (2005:2), then the curriculum process in Kenya needs a reconceptualisation. In addition, the cases of intolerance, violence, favouritism and nepotism within the university point to the opposite of what educational aims should be. Barnett and Coate (2005:3) explain that a designed curriculum ought to be a curriculum in action, that is, one that manifests knowing and engaging and is action oriented.

Curricula in universities in Kenya need to be designed not as complete entities that end in a particular action (actualised), but rather should capture imagination to inspire students to think innovatively and constantly be engaged in knowing, acting and becoming [being], while at the same time recognising the humanity of the other. Put differently, universities in Kenya ought to enable students to discover themselves in relation to others as a way of knowing, engaging and acting in whatever singularity. In this chapter I contend that the design of university programmes should be attuned to the aims of education. The question that lies underneath this contention is what is it to educate in contemporary Kenya [Africa]? Barnett and Coate (2005:4) note that the framings of university programmes depend on the contexts within which a curriculum is designed. The Kenyan context, as explained earlier in Chapters 3 and 4, poses challenges of violence, ethnocentrism, poverty, nepotism and a lack of criticality, which counter the understanding of education as a process of becoming human. It perhaps also suggests that being human is never a complete process, but one of becoming. This point to the fact that becoming human touches the matrix of human identity and, ultimately, relationships that influence the becoming process (education) in whatever singularity.

This chapter therefore challenges what it means to be and to become human, which ought to define the educational aims and policies of universities in Kenya and in Africa. Thus, the becoming process is what this thesis engenders to be the aims of education and its purposes and implementation. Curricula should widen students’ sense of self and self-understanding of their being and becoming, mostly in relationships of co-belonging. University education
needs to develop the vocabulary essential for capturing the philosophical, sociological and cultural experiences and perspectives of students in their becoming human – who co-belong to a coming community.

7.2. Synopsis of the Research Process

In this section I will sum up the research process to provide a summary of and reflection on the research process. This research study examined how and why the notion of liberal democratic citizenship is central to university education in Kenya as an attempt to fight the tensions and imbalances resulting from ethnic politics and polarisation. The focus on liberal democratic citizenship was instrumental in clarifying the link between the politicisation of ethnicity and Kenya’s education system (policies and practices) (see Benhabib, 1996:69; Waghid, 2002:26; 2009:24; 2010:19; Waghid & Le Grange, 2004:1; Waghid & Smeyers, 2012a). Building on this research, I explored the degree to which we can recognise democratic citizenship as a progressive concept (see Barry, 1989; Biesta, 2009:15; 2011:141; Enslin & White, 2003; Hirst & White, 1998:22, 38; Mafeje, 1995:6; Matlosa et al., 2007: 23-26; Olson, 2011) that can assist researchers and policy makers to rethink counteracting the manipulation of ethnicity for private political and socio-economic ends. This research aimed to reconceptualise university education in Kenya so that it can deal with ethnic conflicts in a more vibrant way.

The problem statement of this research underscored that ethnic tensions in Kenya signify undemocratic conceptions of citizenship education. According to Luescher-Mamashela et al. (2011), students in Kenyan universities consider their country as fully democratic, yet there are several indications that point to the opposite. One of these indications is politicised ethnicity, which, among other things, determines people’s access to goods, employment and public services such as health care and political office. This narrow and limited conception of democratic citizenship is further evident in three other instances. Firstly, students think that belonging to a particular ethnic group is not important; yet, in reality, the tribal clashes that followed the national elections in 1992, 1997 and, most importantly, in 2007, point to the opposite. Secondly, students reduce democracy to political rights and civil freedoms without linking these to good governance, equity, fairness and justice. Finally, a sizeable number of university students (77%) do not consider participation and deliberation as core attributes of democracy, and 13% do not understand what democracy is. Therefore they do not possess the
tools with which to judge if the government is democratic or not. This suggests that there is a need to reconceptualise university education in Kenya to broaden students’ understanding of what a working democracy is in order to develop a defensible conception of democratic citizenship that hopefully will improve, transform and reduce the ethnic tensions in the country and, in turn, cultivate potential education that can contend with the ethnic conflicts and other ills in Kenyan society.

In order to address the above, this research posed the following main research question: How does a defensible deliberative conception of democracy help us to think differently about higher education in Kenya? This question was investigated using the following sub-questions: What is democratic citizenship education? What space might there be for democratic citizenship education to help Kenyan higher education institutions address ethnic divisions in the country? What have been the findings/consequences of the implementation of democratic citizenship education elsewhere in the world? What are the current and past policies with regard to equality in access to Kenyan higher education? What role has ethnic identity played in Kenyan social, political and economic life? How can democratic citizenship education in Kenyan higher education reshape ethnic identities and overcome ethnic tensions?

This study focused mainly on university education in Kenya and how it can be used to advocate for a more plausible conception of democratic citizenship education that potentially can contribute towards minimising ethnic violence and political dissension. I concentrated on university education in Kenya to examine its contribution to the cultivation of democratic citizenship. This approach helped this research to locate the conceptual ambiguities of democratic citizenship education in Kenyan institutions of higher learning in order to rethink the liberal conceptions of DCE to DCE in becoming, which potentially can address ethnic tensions.

I used philosophy of education as research design to analyse and clarify the concept of DCE in relation to the conceptualisation of university education in Kenya (Hirst, 1974:1). Philosophy of education is used in a normative sense in this dissertation. This is because educational theory (philosophy) links pedagogy, curriculum, learning theory and the purpose of education and justifies these in particular metaphysical, epistemological and axiological assumptions.
In addition to this I referred to the work of some African philosophers and Kenyan scholars to examine the concept of politicised ethnicity – a context in which university education in Kenya is conceptualised (see Appiah, 1992:170; Barasa, 1997; Falola & Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002; Gyekye, 1995; Imbo, 1998; Ogot, 1995a; Oruka, 1998 Waghid, 2011; Wiredu, 1996). I also used the work of western philosophers to examine, analyse and clarify the concept of democratic citizenship education (see Benhabib, 2011a; Habermas, 1987; Hogan & Smith, 2003:165; Rawls, 1971). Such endeavours augmented my view of democratic citizenship education to enable a reconceptualisation of university education in Kenya.

The methodology of this research was located within an interpretive paradigm as developed by Stanley Cavell. According to Cavell (1979:191), a word gets its meaning in different contexts and within particular interpretive communities. As a consequence of this, there is a need for reasonable doubt – what he calls ‘scepticism’ – in investigating the meanings of concepts. In this study, Cavell’s interpretive view helped this research to investigate the relationship between democracy and ethnicity as conceptualised in Kenyan universities. It also helped me to examine how liberal DCE problematises current conceptions of higher learning, thereby necessitating a reconceptualised view of DCE.

I also used conceptual analysis and deconstruction as methods. Conceptual analysis helped me to analyse the meanings of concepts (DCE and DCE in becoming) (see Hirst, 1967:44 and Peters: 1967:1), and deconstruction helped me to search for meanings other than they were portrayed (Biesta & Egéa-Kuehne, 2001:8). The choice of deconstruction as a method provided a strong emphasis on thinking differently. According to Biesta and Egéa-Kuehne (2001:4), Derrida’s work on deconstruction is crucial to rethinking educational issues through the unravelling of the inadequacies, contradictions and ambiguities in our education policies and practices. Biesta and Egéa-Kuehne’s understanding of Derrida’s work helped me to reveal the inadequacies in the current conceptualisation of university education as far as democratic citizenship is concerned. Therefore, deconstruction served as a guide in rethinking/reconceptualising. Deconstruction philosophy created space for conceptualising and imagining the possibilities of the university as a critical and democratic institution. This means that a DCE in becoming as a deconstructive idea was used to examine the state of university education in Kenya and found that liberal DCE is already actualised. Deconstruction helped me to potentially imagine university education in Kenya as openness.
towards unforeseeable in becoming – that is, education in Kenya potentially can be other than it currently is.

Liberal DCE was used as preliminary philosophical foundation (minimalist view) in this study because it contains prominent ideas that emphasise the notion of community, humanity and responsibility, and interrelationships amongst people in the public sphere. These ideas potentially subscribe to dialogue, justice, respect, reasonableness, equality and the concern for co-existence in the public sphere. In addition, liberal conceptions contain potential values that can advance the coming community. Such values include liberty and equality and the underlying respect for human beings as autonomous individuals who can establish their entitlement to potential equal freedoms. This is possible if people cooperate and co-live together in peace, despite their differences in opinions and ideas (Charvet & Kaczynska-Nay, 2008:10). I considered liberal democratic citizenship education to be an important concept that could engender reasonableness and collective dialogue in reaching a consensus to reduce ethnic violence, improve politics and ensure the distribution of public goods equally in Kenya. In addition, it was hoped that such a notion of democratic citizenship education could stimulate the Kenyan education system to produce critical thinkers and practical reasoners who would be politically mature to appreciate otherness.

The aforementioned philosophical considerations served a number of purposes in this study, namely to assess the validity of the conceptualisation of university, and to measure the impact of university education on societal engagement and public reasoning. These philosophical foundations provided this research with a minimalist view and the language, concepts and vocabulary that are available in liberal DCE, which I used to analyse university education in Kenya.

7.3. Synopsis of Findings

In Chapter 2 I analysed liberal DCE as comprising three interrelated concepts, namely a sense of belonging, human interaction and public reasoning. First, the liberal concept of DCE is understood to contain human rights and responsibilities in actuality. Rights are embedded in individual liberties, such as freedom of association, speech and conscience, and freedom of choice on how citizens live their lives. Responsibilities refer to certain duties that citizens need to carry out, for instance the duty to tolerate difference, agree on political power, make
decisions through public engagement and the exercise of individual power, and the use of critical/public reasoning as a process of making judgements and as a way of life (cf. Chapters 2 and 4; Benhabib, 2011a & b; Habermas, 1987; Osler & Starkey, 2000:4; Rawls, 1971).

The second consideration of liberal DCE is understood to contribute to a sense of belonging [collectivities], for instance as in nationalism. In this sense, citizens are regarded as members of a political party or government with solidarity, and are girded and protected by legal constitutions. Liberal DCE also extends the nationalistic sense of belonging to include cosmopolitanism (cf. Chapter 2).

The third consideration of liberal DCE is reasonableness. For citizens to engage in public decision making, liberals note that their ability to reason is primary to the decisions they make regarding public concerns (see Benhabib, 2011a &b; Habermas, 1987; Rawls, 1971, as analysed in Chapter 2). DCE’s underlying values of reason and civility enable citizens to imagine the life worlds of others in such a way that they temporarily forget their own perceptions/culture in order to understand others who may be different from them. Thus, liberal DCE encourages integration and association between members of different groups, and this makes the breakdown of cultural barriers more likely (Kymlicka, 2003:51). On this assumption, liberal DCE sees university education as a place where students are exposed to alternative ways of living with others.

Research on higher education in Kenya in relation to DCE is relatively new, although there are many historical accounts of universities and higher education in Kenya. Chapter 3 showed that university education in Kenya developed from a nation-state that had been characterised by collectivities, such as organised groups merged on the basis of ethnic sympathy and political position, which provides constructive insight into the country’s traditions and education (Ochieng, 1995; Ogot, 1995b; Oucho, 2002).

Research on education policy in Kenya potentially shows how policies have influenced the democratic citizenship processes and the state of university education in Kenya. The analysis in Chapter 3 also explained the concept of democratic university education and its underlying influences on the Kenyan citizenry and national development (Eshiwani, 1990; Falola & Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002; Luescher-Mamashela et al., 2011; Mwiria et al., 2007; Oucho, 2002). Education policy, acts and universities’ policies describe missions and visions for
university education toward democratic education, but a systematic study of the development of these policies into actual university programmes is lacking. University acts and policies point out the commitment towards a number of important elements for democratic citizenship education (DCE), inter alia national development, national unity, socio-economic development, social justice, preparing and equipping the youth with the skills necessary for a collective role using their individual talents and for personality development, and fostering and developing cultural awareness and international consciousness. However, the policy documents indicate that partner policies are weak in planning for democratic citizenship in the light of ethnic bias, conflict management and ethnic violence (i.e. innovation). In addition, there is a notable lack of recognition and promotion of an alternative understanding of citizenship that enhances and equips university graduates with critical and creative abilities to engage and participate in public collectivities so as to exercise the equal opportunities, freedoms and pluralism that Kenya hopes for, as this is marred by ethnic violence. These appear to be areas in which additional innovation and reconceptualisation are needed to re-imagine and improve sustainable education in relation to ethnic violence.

Citizenship education in Kenya has developed as a form of political socialisation from colonial rule to independent Kenya. Citizenship education in independent Kenya stems from the local framework of national education, which is comparable to the Kenyanisation of education through the adoption of democracy as a component of educational policy in the framing of national policies in education to advance national identity and national unity (Eshiwani, 1990; Luescher-Mamshela et al., 2011:xvii; Ogot, 1995b; Republic of Kenya, 1964; 1976; 1981; 1999).

One such study conducted by Kenyan citizens hoped that post-independent higher education would provide spaces to improve their livelihoods, alleviate poverty, increase economic development, promote cultural heritage and increase intellectual capacity for the country’s development. In reaction to this hope, Kenya made efforts to raise access to and increase the number of universities and university enrolments over the years. Despite such efforts, and the country’s yearning to achieve democracy [better human rights standards] through its higher education system, Kenya has been confronted with the complexities characterised by its deep legacy of gender and ethnic inequalities embedded in the political structures and systems of university education. This continuing impact of unequal education in Kenya has its roots in the colonial epoch under British rule. University education in Kenya must be understood in
the light of its ethnic and political structures negotiated between the colonial masters and the independent movements (Alwy & Schech, 2004; Mwiandi, 2010). Mwiandi (2010:105) notes that ‘the distribution of universities in Kenya is uneven, with some parts of the country having [a] heavy concentration of universities while others have few or none at all’. The nature of political transitions in Kenya has determined the development and distribution of universities.

The first university that was established in Kenya was the University of Nairobi in 1970. University education was established to engage in the discovery, transmission and preservation of knowledge and to stimulate the cultural and intellectual life of society (Mwiandi, 2010:110).

University education in Kenya is currently envisioned in Sessional Paper No. 14 of 2012 to provide

… a pool of highly trained human resource capital that underpins the nations’ ambitions of being a knowledge-based economy. To realise the country’s ultimate goal as a prosperous, just, cohesive and democratic nation, the Government will enable citizens to develop skills and apply the same, their knowledge and creativity to their daily endeavours. Kenya’s university education must be focused, efficient and able to create knowledge and deliver accessible, equitable, relevant and quality training to sustain a knowledge economy that is internationally competitive (Republic of Kenya, 2012:5).

Following this broad expectation, universities have developed their own policies at institutional and departmental levels. What is alarming is that, in general terms, Kenyan university policy connotes an acquisition of skills. The question of skill is crucial to becoming human; in which sense Kenya has failed to educate citizens with skills to become human, mostly because of the inhumane violence and crimes committed against humanity.

The evolution of the policy of education in Kenya suggests that much emphasis has been laid on equity, quality, relevance and the strengthening of governance and management, but this also has not been realised fully, which suggests an actualisation of liberal DCE (Alwy & Schech, 2004:267; Otieno, 2007:24; Republic of Kenya, 2005:6).
Other principles and values that frame university education in Kenya include the sharing and devolution of power, the rule of law and participation by people, equity, inclusiveness, equality, human rights, non-discrimination and the protection of marginalised groups, good governance, integrity, transparency and accountability and sustainable development (Republic of Kenya, 2012:6). How these policies are translated into the actual university programmes is contentious. The constitution recognises the role of science and indigenous technologies in the development of the nation, and the promotion of the intellectual property rights of the people of Kenya (Republic of Kenya, 2012:6), but how such ideas become real in university education is still contentious.

In Chapter 4 I argued that liberal DCE in Kenyan higher education is thin on the basis that it entails distorted views of participation [including deliberation] and belonging. Kenyan higher education is limited in its conceptualisation of DCE because of its nationalistic inclinations that narrow education for national development and neglect any humanistic overtones. Despite the fact that the purpose of Kenyan universities is teaching, research and community service, including shaping a civilised and democratic society in order to liberate minds and contribute to shaping an inclusive society, the realisation of these remains unclear (Nyaigotti-Chacha, 2008:7). For instance, in Kenya, the meaning of citizenship as leading to bureaucratic enterprise, the culture of capitalism, international aid and sovereignty has assumed centre stage in higher education.

This research potentially demonstrates that the Kenyan education system and constitution already bear some of the features described by these liberal views, yet violence, ethnocentric conflict, nepotism and other imbalances are experienced in society and in the universities (Eshiwani, 1990; Luescher-Mamshela et al., 2011:xvii; Ogot, 1995a; Republic of Kenya, 1964; 1976; 1981; 1999). This is why I find these liberal perspectives – those of Rawls (1971), Habermas, (1987) and Benhabib (2011a) – to be relevant, although they lack conceptual vigour since they are already actualised in the policies and standards of university programmes. They do not help solve the problem of violence in Kenya and are contradictory when the results they bring reproduce systemic bureaucratic power relations that exclude.

Accordingly, the understanding of liberal conceptions of DCE in the seminal thoughts offered by Rawls (1971), Habermas (1987) and Benhabib (2011a) seem inadequate to counter violence. This is so because, in a liberal DCE, deliberations, equality, freedom of speech and human rights are already actualised in the Kenyan education system. The moment these
deliberations are actualised, they cease to exist, and at this point cannot resist violence. This explains why a liberal DCE in Kenya is inadequate to solve violence. A further question could be asked, namely why is there still ethnic violence in Kenya despite the liberal DCE tenets found in university policies, Vision 2030 and education acts as major drivers of education?

Next, I argued for the potentialities of Derrida’s (1997) and Agamben’s (1993) ideas of the ‘actuality’ and ‘potentiality’ of post-liberal democratic citizenship education to disrupt the liberal understanding developed in Chapter 2 for a thicker understanding, which offers a reimagined view of DCE that has the potential to advance Kenyan universities as democratic institutions in becoming – ones that propagate citizenry and curb ethnic violence in the country in whatever singularity. I borrow from Agamben’s (1993) seminal work in *The Coming Community: Theory Out of Bounds*. Agamben’s perspective is used here to imagine the future of university education better than it currently is – the future in a feasible, hopeful optimism.

In Chapter 5 I argued for a DCE in becoming informed by notions of critique, friendship, compassionate imagining and scepticism, to show how a liberal version of the concept ‘in becoming’ is actually an extension of the liberal idea. I reaffirmed a liberal understanding of DCE and then explained how DCE in becoming can be considered as an extension of a liberal idea. This helped to clarify the nexus of the imagination of university education for the hopeful feasible future that can resolve ethnic violence in Kenya.

DCE in becoming is commensurate with deconstruction as a reflexive paradox that retains the critical potential of a liberal DCE – a process of reconstruction (Biesta, 2009:89; Carlson, 2011:11). DCE in becoming as a deconstructive idea potentially examines the current state in universities in Kenya so as to imagine universities for a hopeful future – one that can contend with ethnic violence. This idea fits in with a DCE in becoming as an extension of the liberal idea. DCE in becoming as a reconceptualised view of liberal DCE has the potential to help Kenyan universities to address issues of ethnic violence and the impotentialities of an actualised education. This is so for the following reasons: First, a reconsidered view of DCE suggests that university education in Kenya potentially needs to help students to speak and think. Speech in this sense signals students to voice things differently, and involves suspending judgment on the way knowledge is presented so that students can learn something
new, a way of acknowledging that learning is always in potential and never comes to actuality – the becoming is always in the making (Waghid & Davids, 2013:24). It is only when learning is considered as a potentiality that learning is in becoming, and any judgment of learning is never made in a rush. This means that an education in the becoming state is a formation process in which students will never be allowed to be in their comfort zones; students will be challenged constantly to give account of themselves and then challenged continuously in speech and reason to uncover, recover and discover their voices, yet act differently – not in a rush to judgement (Barnett, 2007:54). This way of thinking enables the student to have confidence and involvement in her/his learning and becoming.

Secondly, a reconsidered view of DCE is connected to the practice of seeing things differently. Seeing things differently means seeing things not as they always appear to be. Waghid and Davids (2013:25) say that seeing things differently conveys the notion that things will present themselves in different and multiple ways, which will prevent one from rushing to judgement. This means that education has the potential to enable students to see things strangely, since it provides the place where students are in becoming (Agamben, 1993). That is, when we see things in the same way there is room for redundancy, yet the becoming state enables innovative thinking; it encourages radical thinking and new ways of knowing and seeing things. Rethinking higher education in terms of DEC in becoming offers the following potential practical ways of university teaching: first, teach students not only as those who share a sense of belonging but as individuals with their own privations (freedom, individuality). This means that students will be introduced to practice on the basis of undisputable allegiance to bringing about change without favouring any hegemonic community or idea since they are freed from their self. Second, teachers will educate students to intentionally become a part of the becoming community through communication to respond to the problem of violence. Such an education is not yet arrived at, but one in becoming – so every day experiences – can enable students to enter into speech and thought without rush judgment. This process can be guided by potential values of respect, human dignity, self-respect and seeing others within an outside.

Chapter 6 explained the implications of a reconceptualised view of African university for teaching, learning and governance on the continent and how such a university can be more attentive to the debilitating social and political conditions in Kenya. The chapter illustrated how university classroom encounters can be transformed into spaces for democratic
pedagogical practices for students and their instructors to constantly learn to think differently and innovatively about the societal and educational challenges faced by the country/continent, especially in higher education. This chapter showed that, when pedagogical encounters are critical, bear mutuality and love [friendship], become radical and emancipative and are hospitable, then students and teachers in universities in Kenya potentially can address the challenges facing the country. It is my opinion that potentialities in criticality, friendship, disruption, emancipation and Ubuntu, as conceptualised in Chapter 6, can steer university education in Kenya from a starting point toward potential democratic citizenry in whatever singularity, yet leave room for advancement, since education is always in the making [the becoming community].

A university that employs potentialities of critical pedagogy enable students in their becoming to be active participant in their co-learning. This means that students own perspectives of learning become crucial to university pedagogy and policy research. This will enable students to develop their own intellectual agency as they can be taught to question what they are taught and not treating academic text as encyclopaedic authorities.

The concept of Friendship has implications to Kenya university, in the sense in which it provides the language and concept of ‘pedagogical love’ (Elton, 2005:113). Cultivating a culture of friendship, relationality brings to the fore the idea of a relational university driven by love potentials, not only for their students but also of the ‘intellectual love’ – the love of their discipline which can bridge the gap of pedagogical encounters to mutual attachment and attunement to the other and being aware of their co-belonging.

Ubuntu as an African concept can provide an institutional culture of caring. Caring that is commensurate to DCE in becoming is one that is not yet arrived at but one that can respond the problem of violence in whatever singularity. Caring provides potential pedagogical concepts of being hospitable, imagining the state of others being other than they are. So such understandings can continually become part of a university curriculum, vision, and policy in becoming.
7.4. Contributions of This Research Study

In Chapter 1 I indicated that reconceptualising higher education within a liberal framework of democratic citizenship can generate new ideas on why the problem of politicised ethnicity has continued to be a challenge, despite ‘sound educational policies’. This research found that Kenyan universities are already conceptualised by the identities and properties of liberal DCE. This means that liberal democratic citizenship is conceptualised in actuality, since ethnic violence and other societal imbalances remain despite the sense of being democratic – hence the need to reconceptualise what DCE is in the hope that students potentially will be able to understand what it is and expect better performance from their democracies.

To a large extent, the motivation for this study also stemmed from the prevailing inequalities in Kenya that entail ethnic discrimination. Such widespread inequalities undermine the concept of nationhood and national unity that Kenyan education policy advocates (Eshiwani, 1990:7). Other concerns of this research were the wide inequalities that exist in the country, and the loss of innocent lives killed due to tribal violence and political greed in 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007.

As a study contributing to the philosophy of education, this study has reconceptualised a way of thinking differently about higher education in Kenya that potentially can address ethnic violence in the country. So, I extended the liberal DCE to DCE in becoming. This research has shown that DCE in becoming has the potential to educate students to cultivate communities in becoming without the claim of belonging to any particular community, but rather as humans who co-belong as they continue to tackle daily issues such as violence in society. It might also encourage students to think of the potentiality of speech without rash judgement as one way of negotiating solutions to problems without actualising speech. When students potentially are prepared to think, see and speak differently on a constant basis and to suspend hasty judgement, then DCE in becoming can address violence and other societal dystopias.

Students can be introduced to practices on the basis of undisputable allegiance to bringing about change without favouring any hegemonic ethnic/cultural community or idea, since they are freed from their self and their identity [privation]. Unless education in Kenya is freed from a sense of belonging or predispositions, or is instituted to imagining, critiquing and
communicating, education will become an actualised practice and ethnic violence will become imperative for education, as is currently the case. DCE in becoming potentially can educate students to imagine societal problems and concerns in whatever singularity to bring about potentiality without actualising it. This means students will be engaging in dialogue about public matters that are concerned with the coming community, not as though there will be instant solutions to the problems, but rather in continuous deliberations that potentially can contribute to the coming community. So, in this sense, higher education in Kenya will become an invitation for students to live a life of dialoguing with the self and the other, and at the same time creating a place where nothing remains unsaid. In keeping with Waghid (2005b), compassionate action in relation to Green’s proposition can enable university students to create a space in which teachers and students in higher education institutions can look at things afresh.

DCE in becoming potentially can educate students to intentionally become a part of the becoming community through communication. This in-becoming communication is contrary to the Habermasian (1987) type of communication, which leads to understanding through agreement. DCE in becoming is concerned with bringing students into ‘communication with the incommunicable’ (Waghid, 2013, citing Agamben, 1993:7). This means that students will be taught not to stay silent regarding anything, even if it will lead to disagreement. It is in relation to such being in communication that violence in society can be renounced. Thus, being in communication should entail practices that continuously guide students in negotiating innovative solutions to solve violent occurrences in society.

DCE in becoming, in a philological sense, potentially can prepare students to participate and communicate responsibly in public space/life with privations, without actualising speech. Accordingly, being in continual speech can contribute to fresh ways of thinking about societal ills and concerns (Agamben, 1993). This means that, while students are prepared for their future careers, university education needs to prepare them also with potential skills, knowledge, purposes and attitudes in whatever singularity that will continuously sustain their becoming (as form of life) – as a possibility of a feasible future. Such knowledge may include the ability to deliberate continuously in public spaces, to be responsible, to have a willingness to tolerate, to be respectful, and to be fair in whatever singularity.

227
The complexity of the violence in Kenya gives rise to the question of moral education. In keeping with Theim (2008:1), ‘moral conduct cannot be reduced to what we owe others, to duties and obligations and not to virtues which can have equality restraining effects’. What Kenyan education requires is an education that can enable students to undertake the task of learning to live together with others without interfering with their individuation (privation). The violence and ethnic tensions have given rise to a problematic situation in Kenya, thereby resulting in an increase in poverty, social decadence and hatred among citizens, which lead to defeat and dogmatism. How can education thrive when it is actualised? Maxwell (2007) notes that the global crisis reflected in violence requires an entire structural overhaul and revolution of educational aims and methods of inquiry to contend with societal pressures.

I argue that responsibility as a concept can provide nuances for DCE in becoming in the sphere of moral education. In line with Cavell (1979:441), responsibility is the capacity or ability to act about a situation, and also the ability to amend a situation. Being responsible for what happens to others means that their opinions are acknowledged, even though one might not be in agreement with the other. One shows concern for the other. According to Cavell (1979:9), being responsible means that an individual will negotiate his/her relations with the other, because lack of responsible action would mean the collapse of society. Violence is both an ethical and a moral issue. It is concerned with making judgement on what is right and, at the same time, what is good for the self and the other in considering living together with the other without actualising belongingness. On this basis, DCE in becoming is considered a normative viewpoint from which education can constantly be in the making/reviewed. The provocative view posed by responsibility for DCE in becoming is the potential for critical citizenship that can expand opportunities for justice for all people without rash judgement. In other words, responsibility as a concept potentially suggests the possibility of embedding it in DCE in becoming in whatever singularity. It also gives way to a potentially just education system that can tackle issues of violence and humane practices in our universities.

Pedagogically, universities potentially can imagine teaching and learning as relational encounters. This signifies universities as social institutions consisting of a becoming community that potentially can exemplify responsible human beings, who, through rational encounters, seek to think, speak and make judgement carefully on the potentialities of the African university. This signifies that notions of friendship potentially can be considered as imaginaries that propose the relationship between university students and lecturers to guide
the teaching and learning process. In this way, universities can protect the teaching-learning relations between teachers and learners within the university.

To enact one’s humanity requires that one enact caring as a humanistic potential. A caring university education considers comfort zones as antagonistic to the development of a DCE in becoming. Such a university potentially cares for its students’ lives, research and learning in such a way that each student can become constantly critical and sceptical and look for solutions to the problems they face, especially those of others to whom they co-belong. In this way they can care for one another and can consider another’s care, and constantly seek to care for and about others in whatever singularity.

Universities in Kenya/Africa have the potential to be critical and responsible institutions. This means that a university can be a place where students’ potential is stretched to being responsible/answerable and critical as ways of educating potentially responsible citizenry in whatever singularity.

Being human in becoming (Ubuntu potentially) can inform how research is conducted in African/Kenyan universities. That is, researchers in universities can recognise the values/potentialities of co-belonging to enhance research that potentially can counter African problems, in which case both the community and the university lecturers form part of the research – not as subordinates but as co-researchers who potentially can address societal problems – a democratic practice in becoming. One aspect that in-becoming humans can contribute to is deliberating on how to counter the violence and imbalances in society that arise as a result of ethnocentrism.

Universities potentially can be responsible to shape themselves towards becoming academic communities, with integral scholarship that can imagine and become innovative in building a coming community of Africans/Kenyans who can think, speak and act without rash judgement. Such thinking about the coming university community can help universities to rectify their narrow focus on universities and focus instead on stimulating their in-becoming.

7.5. Recommendations for University Education in Kenya

At the beginning of this study I examined how and why the notion of liberal democratic citizenship is central to higher education in Kenya in the country’s attempt to fight tensions
and imbalances resulting from ethnic politics and polarisation. I recommend the following: A university as becoming community should be conceptualised in terms of advancing speech and thought and withholding rash judgement.

The university curriculum should be reconsidered as one which is in becoming as opposed to actualised notions that must be realised. This is because the notion of a coming community opposes preconceived notions of a curriculum and a university. Furthermore, it is because predetermined outcomes in education limit and actualise curricula, create borders to criticality and creativity and restrict deliberations on actuality, rather than create potentialities for advancement. This way of thinking about a university curriculum frees it from presupposition, and potentially can lead to innovations in the education system to transform its everyday problems.

The university as a place for becoming human is a place to co-belong, in which the autonomy and participation of every individual counts. It is not a place where agreement is a defining factor, but a place for independent thinking, where responsibility is defined by being in constant critique as a way of becoming innovative. Relationality is crucial to deliberative spaces where students can be open to speak their minds without fearing others’ criticism, and also to co-belong.

I recommend that further studies on university education in Kenya should focus on the following:

First, in order to gain an understanding of university education in Kenya, researchers should gain knowledge about the philosophical foundations that inform Kenyan universities. Knowing how university education is conceptualised can help researchers, teachers and students to unravel the problems faced by the university.

Second, further empirical and pragmatic research can be conducted on how the reconceptualised view of DCE can help inform and disrupt universities to potentially address ethnic violence.
Third, research is needed on how DCE in becoming can serve as an epistemology for thinking about university education in terms of leadership, curriculum, pedagogy and policy making.

Further philosophical study is needed to understand DCE in becoming in relation to the role of ethnicity in university education in Kenya.

A study on how DCE in becoming can help Kenyan citizens deal with the increasing violence and fear of terrorism would also be meaningful.

Violence and ethnic discrimination are concerns not only in Kenya, but in the world at large. The 2007 post-election violence put Kenya in the international news, and posed various challenges to Kenyan society. For these reasons and more, as posed in this research, education researchers should continuously search for educative solutions to current and recurring societal problems.

7.6. Summary

This chapter has provided a synopsis of the research process and findings and the contribution of this research to Kenyan higher education, and has made recommendations for further research.
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