


Evil and Violence: Illiberal Beliefs in South Africa's Liberal Democracy

By Reinet Loubser



Thesis presented in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the faculty Arts and Social Sciences at Stellenbosch University.

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Declaration

By submitting this thesis electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained therein is my own, original work, that I am the authorship owner thereof (unless to the extent explicitly otherwise stated) and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for obtaining any qualification.

Reinet Loubser

Date: 25 May 2015

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Abstract

This thesis examines beliefs regarding spiritual conceptions of evil among South Africans and the role that such attitudes may play in outbreaks of public and other forms of violence. In examining these illiberal attitudes and consequent violence, the thesis contributes to the discourse on democratic consolidation in South Africa. It is argued that illiberal values – such as the belief in evil as a literal force which may be countered with violence - present a challenge to the country's liberal democratic system of governance.

The thesis is both quantitative and qualitative in nature. It includes a longitudinal analysis of the secondary data of the World Values Survey. The latter is used for two purposes: to measure the extent of beliefs in evil among South Africans and to find predictors for these beliefs. Quantitative analysis revealed that the beliefs in evil is widespread in South Africa and that over half the population may believe that violence can be used to rid communities of persons deemed evil. However, despite an exhaustive quantitative analysis of independent variables – including demographic, socio-economic and attitudinal factors as well as trust and tolerance, locus of control and religiosity - no definitive predictors of the attitudes regarding evil could be found. It is concluded that the beliefs in question are so universal and entrenched in South Africa that they cannot be associated with any particular demographic or other group.

In the absence of quantitative findings, the thesis turns to qualitative analysis to explain the widespread nature of illiberal beliefs in South Africa. The thesis examines the country's serious problems with crime and violence. It also posits that South Africa has experienced a decivilisation process in which liberal values have to compete with the absolute individualism of an Hobbesian state of nature.

Opsomming

Hierdie tesis ondersoek geloof in spirituele konsepsies van onheil onder Suid-Afrikaners en die rol wat sulke oortuigings kan speel in die uitbreek van openbare en ander soort geweld. Deur hierdie illiberale houdings en gevolglike geweld te ondersoek, maak die tesis 'n bydrae tot die diskoers oor demokratiese konsolidasie in Suid-Afrika. Daar word geargumenteer dat illiberale waardes – soos die geloof in bese magte as 'n letterlike verskynsel wat met geweld gekonfronteer mag word – 'n uitdaging aan die land se liberale demokratiese regeerstelsel bied.

Die tesis is beide kwantitatief en kwalitatief van aard. Dit sluit 'n longitudinale analiese van die sekondêre data van die “World Values Survey” in. Laasgenoemde is gebruik te bereiking van twee doelwitte: om die omvang van die geloof in onheil onder Suid-Afrikaners te bepaal en om voorspellende onafhanklike veranderlikes vir hierdie oortuigings te vind.

Kwantitatiewe analiese het bevind dat die geloof in onheil baie algemeen in Suid-Afrika voorkom en dat meer as die helfde van die bevolking glo dat geweld gebruik kan word om van sogenaamde bese persone in die gemeenskap ontslae te raak. Ten spyte van 'n deeglike kwantitatiewe analiese van onafhanklike veranderlikes – insluitende demografiese, sosio-ekonomiese en houdings- faktore asook vertrouwe en verdraagsaamheid, “locus of control” en godsdienstelikheid – kon geen voorspellende veranderlikes vir die geloof in onheil gevind word nie. Die gevolgtrekking is dat die relevante oortuigings so sterk en universiël voorkom in Suid-Afrika, dat dit nie met een spesifieke demografiese of ander soort groep geassosieer kan word nie.

In die afwesigheid van kwantitatiewe bevindings, word kwalitatiewe analiese gebruik om te verduidelik hoekom illiberale geloofsoortuigings so algemeen in Suid-Afrika voorkom. Die tesis ondersoek die land se ernstige probleme met misdaad en geweld en argumenteer dat Suid-Afrika 'n proses van “decivilisation” ondervind waarin liberale waardes met die absolute individualisme van 'n Hobbesiaanse “state of nature” moet kompeteer.

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List of Acronyms

AIC	African Independent Church
ANC	African National Congress
AU	African Union
BEE	Black Economic Empowerment
CAPI	Computer Assisted Personal Interview
CICP	Centre for International and Comparative Politics
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
DPT	Democratic Peace Theory
EFF	Economic Freedom Fighters
EU	European Union
FIFA	Fédération Internationale de Football Association
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
IPID	Independent Police Investigative Directorate
KZN	KwaZulu Natal
LOC	Locus of Control
MJC	Muslim Judicial Council
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NP	National Party
PAGAD	People Against Gangsterism And Drugs
PTSD	Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
SABC	South African Broadcasting Corporation
SADD	South Africans Against Drunk Driving
SAIRR	South African Institute of Race Relations
SALC	South African Law Commission
SAPS	South African Police Service
SPSS	Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
UCT	University Of Cape Town
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US(A)	Unites States (of America)
WVS	World Values Survey
WVSA	World Values Survey Association
WVSEC	World Values Survey Executive Committee

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

“If it took two hundred years of political change from the Age of Revolution to 1970 to generate about fifty new democratic states, it has taken only ten years since the mid-1980s to yield the same number again” (Caldeira & Holston, 1999:691).

In 1972 electoral democracies comprised 33% of the world’s 160 states. By 1996 that number had almost doubled to 62% or 118 out of 191 states (Caldeira & Holston, 1999:691). The rapid democratisation of the late 20th century is in stark contrast to the much slower processes that initially occurred in Western countries. Although the democratic newcomers have all the institutional requirements of democracy, they often experience violations of citizens’ civil liberties.

In advanced democracies, civil liberties are associated with the ideology of liberalism:

“Liberals believe that individuals everywhere are fundamentally the same, and are best off pursuing self-preservation and material well-being. Freedom is required for these pursuits, and peace is required for freedom; coercion and violence are counter-productive. Thus all individuals share an interest in peace” (Owen, 1994:89).

Democratisation is often an attempt to achieve this peace, in which the citizenry forge lasting, non-exploitative relationships that are free of violence (and the threat thereof) (Rummel, 1997:85-87). Once peace has been achieved, citizens are free to pursue prosperity. The idea that democracy can promote peace is a feature of Democratic Peace Theory (DPT), which has its origins in the writings of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Kant first noticed the tendency of republics¹ to not wage war against each other (1795/1983:112-115). More recently scholars like RJ Rummel (1997) have further examined the positive link between liberal democracy and domestic peace.

However, democracy as a mechanism for peace is not effective if it is not accompanied by liberal ideology. It has been taken for granted that Western democracies are liberal democracies and therefore ensure basic freedoms - in the form of a human rights charter - through the rule of law. Human rights are a set of rules that promote and protect human

¹By republics Kant meant states in which the power of the executive and the legislature were separated. Unlike many monarchies of the time, such states usually incorporated a degree of democracy and were therefore perceived as “free” (Owen, 1994:94-95).

dignity in civil, political, economic, social and cultural spheres (Landman, 2012:332-333). It acts as a constraint on the power of a democratic government by legally protecting the rights of individuals, even against the interests of the majority and the state. Disputes that arise from the competing claims of democracy and human rights are resolved in favour of human rights. Liberal values² are therefore a safeguard against the dangers of popular rule and the state's abuse of power (Donnelly, 2013:224-225).

Liberal values have to be widely accepted in order to consolidate democracy and obtain peace and stability. A consolidated democracy is one in which the norms and rules of democracy are accepted as "the only game in town" (Schedler, 1998:91). Consolidation occurs when the initial commitment to democracy is deepened by making democratic norms a routine, unquestioned part of life, not just in the political sphere, but also social spheres (Gordon, 2001:124; O'Donnell, 1997:49). Although liberal values and democratic institutions are completely intertwined in consolidated democracies, such a union is not a given and it is entirely possible to have one without the other (Zakaria, 1997:22-26).

The goal of liberal democracy is made easier if a country's liberal values precede and inform its democracy: once everyone accepts liberal norms, no one is unduly threatened by democratic competition and the occasional loss of power. However, many countries have attempted to institutionalise democracy first, in the hopes that liberal culture will follow (Du Toit & Kotzé, 2011:17-18). It is a faster yet riskier process as it may not be in everyone's interests to subscribe to the liberal rules of the democratic game. Certain factors may be present that mitigate against the universal acceptance of liberal norms, for example low levels of economic development, high levels of income inequality and a divided, heterogeneous population (Du Toit & Kotzé, 2011:21-22). A divided population with diverging interests might not trust each other with power and it may not be in every party's interests to uphold democratic institutions or human rights. In fact, one group may feel that the rights of others obstruct their interests. In such a situation a country can be an electoral democracy and still lack the stability, security and peace associated with liberal democracy (Fukuyama, 2011:80-84).

²Values are conceptualised as "appreciative, evaluative, or normative notions, ideas, or conceptions" (Joubert, 1992:48).

A study of South Africa's changing and contradictory values is thus of great importance, since the extent to which South Africans endorse liberal values is one factor that can determine the quality of its democracy (Ariely & Davidov, 2011:271-273). This study therefore aims to measure and describe South African values that are not compatible with the country's liberal democratic institutions, namely the belief in evil as a literal entity and that violence may be used to fight it. These values challenge many of the principles of liberal democracy and can potentially lead to the violation of human rights and the rule of law. At stake is the strength of the liberal democratic system – a system trusted to deliver peace and stability to a troubled country.

1.2 Context of the study: South Africa's transition

The initiation of South Africa's democratic transition in the late 1980s came as an unlikely surprise to many inside and outside the country. Despite unrest in the black townships and economic stagnation, the Apartheid state had remained stable and there was no immediate threat to white domination of the country. It was nevertheless recognised by ruling National Party (NP) leaders that its strong position would not last: domestic and international pressure would continue to build, further damaging the economy and ultimately making the Apartheid system unsustainable. The collapse of communist states - a source of support for the liberation movement – further convinced NP leaders that it was a good time to negotiate a new dispensation from a position of strength (Giliomee, 1995:83-92).

A key factor for all concerned was the political violence that plagued the country. The armed struggle against Apartheid and the government's attempts to quash it had led to escalating violence in the townships (Marx, 1997:481-483). Neither the Apartheid government nor the liberation movement had managed to put an end to the cycle of violence by definitively defeating the other. The deadlock presented both parties with a choice: continue a destructive conflict or negotiate a settlement. The negotiations that followed – primarily between the NP government and the African National Congress (ANC) - were characterised by previously unseen levels of political violence as various political actors tried to undermine each other (Von Holdt, 2013:592). The need for lasting peace quickly became a central concern. A peace deal - and the violence that necessitated it - were therefore at the heart of South Africa's democratic transition.

The transition would deliver all the benefits associated with the liberal democratic system. The new constitution established the necessary democratic institutions: a separation of powers as well as checks on the legislature and executive by an independent judiciary (Lipton: 2014:11). Additionally, various extra-parliamentary institutions – for example the Human Rights Commission - support liberal democracy (Hamilton, 2011:360). The state has a monopoly on the use of violence and is in turn responsible for the safety of citizens (Kucera & Mares, 2013:3).

The Bill of Rights, implemented by the judiciary, ensures the protection of citizens' rights – to life, equality, freedom and dignity – and thus further discourages violence by the state and among the citizenry (Du Toit & Kotzé, 2011:15-20). It also interprets human dignity in a very progressive manner, granting socio-economic rights such as housing, health and social services as well as education (Lipton, 2014:11). The combination of democratic institutions and civil liberties ensures access to peaceful resolutions to any conflicts that may emerge. A set of rules was therefore established by which state institutions function – rules that encourage peace and make the use of violence difficult and in most cases illegitimate. Violence can in fact be interpreted as a failure of liberal democracy (Von Holdt, 2013:590).

The legally enforced human rights that protect citizens' civil liberties are rooted in a secular paradigm (Freeman, 2004:375-382). The advanced liberal democracies that South Africa attempts to emulate tend to be highly secular. They are not only characterised by the official separation of church and state, but also an overall decline in religious belief and fervour. In such societies religious and spiritual beliefs – where and when they occur – have become a private matter that does not shape public life or popular beliefs (Du Toit & Kotzé, 2011:134).

1.3 Research problem and questions

Various outbreaks of public violence in the new liberal democratic South Africa against forces that were described as evil, motivated researchers Du Toit and Kotzé (2011) to question South Africans about their beliefs regarding the matter. Questions addressing the issue were incorporated into the South African versions of the 2006 and 2013 World Values Survey (WVS). One of the events that motivated the introduction of the new questions were the 3 000 reported cases of witchcraft-related violence, including murder, in South Africa's Limpopo province between 1990 and 1998 (Du Toit & Kotzé, 2011:144).

The belief in witchcraft and the fear and practice thereof continue to play a role in various instances of violence, including witch killings, *muthi* murders³ and the use of magic for protection by criminals and protesters such as the striking miners at Marikana in 2012 (Labuschagne, 2004:195; Van der Vlies, 2013:511). There are also numerous examples in South Africa of allegedly bewitched school pupils blaming poor academic performance and illness on witchcraft. University students have reported their fear of being harmed through sorcery by jealous relatives, friends and neighbours (Leistner, 2014:10). Sensationalist stories of evil, witchcraft, demons and the like feature frequently in South Africa's tabloid newspapers like the *Daily Sun*.⁴

The other relevant outbreak of violence took place in the city of Cape Town when community members on the Cape Flats founded People Against Gangsterism And Drugs (PAGAD). Members of PAGAD initiated organised and violent action against gangsters and drug dealers in their communities. In both cases violence, including murder and public execution, was undertaken towards persons perceived to be evil – witches in the former case, drug lords in the latter. These evil persons were perceived as lethal threats to society that had to be eliminated (Du Toit & Kotzé, 2011:143-144). Although PAGAD has since dwindled into irrelevance, vigilante violence has not. South Africans continue to target alleged criminals and others in acts of reprisal (Jensen & Buur, 2004).

In the WVS waves of 2006 and 2013 South African respondents were – for the first time - asked to agree, disagree or remain neutral on the following statements:

- “Evil is everywhere”
- “Evil can take possession of some people”
- “The community must get rid of people possessed by evil even if it means that they have to be killed”

Although both religious and secular members of the public can agree with the first statement, it is thought that only individuals who believe in a literal, spiritual evil can agree with the

³Traditional health practitioners and alleged witches make use of *muthi* (the Zulu word for medicine) to help their clients. *Muthi* can be made from animal, plant or even human material. When it is made from human body parts, it has usually been obtained by attacking live victims. When such attacks lead to the deaths of the victims, it is known as *muthi* murder (Labuschagne, 2004:192-193).

⁴This particular tabloid targets mainly the black working class and sells 430 000 copies a day, reaching 4.6 million readers (Caldwell, 2011:873).

second. Support for both statements was very high and equally strong in 2006: over 80% of respondents agreed to both (Du Toit & Kotzé, 2011:145-152). It can thus be inferred that South Africans not only perceive evil as a pervasive threat, but also have a very literal, spiritual conception of evil as a force independent of humans. The 2006 survey results also showed that about a third (32%) of respondents supported the third statement, thereby endorsing violent action in order to fight evil forces. The beliefs and attitudes in question are in stark contrast to liberal ideals of secularism, peaceful conflict resolution and the rule of law. This thesis uses the data of the WVS to study the above-mentioned attitudes toward evil and public violence as these attitudes may pose a challenge to the legitimacy⁵ of South Africa's liberal democracy (Ariely & Davidov, 2011:271-273).

Du Toit and Kotzé's three statements regarding evil have again been included in the most recent South African wave of the WVS. The results were finalised in 2013 and it is therefore possible to measure the belief in evil among the South African population from the period 2006 to 2013. Even more important is the ability to measure support for the ominous third statement regarding the elimination of evil persons. This study therefore investigates whether the belief in evil and the illiberal support for public violence have increased, decreased or remained the same.

The thesis also aims to identify the attributes of the people who subscribe to the said attitudes. SPSS⁶ is used to analyse the WVS data in order to establish who the South Africans are who agree that radical action may be used against evil persons (Du Toit & Kotzé, 2011:145-152). The South African population is thus analysed according to six categories of independent variables: demographic, socio-economic, trust and tolerance, locus of control (LOC),⁷ attitudinal and religiosity. These variables and their relevance for the study of evil as well as illiberal values in general, are discussed thoroughly in later chapters.

In summary, the following questions are to be examined:

- What are the characteristics of the South Africans who hold beliefs about evil?

⁵Lipset defines legitimacy as "the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society" (Lipset, 1981:4).

⁶The IBM Corporation's computer software programme was formerly known as Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, but is now officially called only by its acronym SPSS (PASW).

⁷See Chapter Three for discussion of LOC.

- What relationships can be found between the independent variables and the belief in evil (and subsequent actions)?
- Which predictors, if any, explain the above-mentioned beliefs and actions? What ultimate explanation can be found for these beliefs?

1.4 Research methodology

The study uses the work of Du Toit and Kotzé (2011) as a starting point to further investigate the aforementioned values. It is grounded in the context of DPT: the belief that liberal democracy fosters peace at home and abroad (Rummel, 1997). Liberal democracy was negotiated and established in South Africa with the aims of peace and prosperity in mind. That inadvertently positions the country as a case study for those who are interested in how democracy and peace relate. The success or failure of South Africa's democratic peace project can therefore be analysed within the context of DPT.

An analysis of values is merely one potential indicator of the depth and quality of a country's democracy. Liberal democracy has to be understood as an ideal as well as an ongoing process. No democracy will be perfect in all aspects nor is there any guarantee that democracies' respective strengths and weaknesses will remain so indefinitely. Democracy is not "an all or nothing affair" and it is acceptable that "certain features may be better developed than others" (Landman, 2011:461). The overall health of a country's democracy cannot be based on the study of just one feature. An ultimate judgment can only be made when taking all features – some of which are touched upon in this study – into consideration.

The thesis is both descriptive and exploratory in nature, providing an accurate, in-depth analysis based on factual knowledge. The aforementioned series of research questions are thoroughly addressed (Mouton, 1996:102). The study aims to find and observe possible relationships between key variables and it seeks to describe values, attitudes and relationships as they exist. It is also a longitudinal investigation – observing the same population over a long period as opposed to providing a glimpse of socio-political beliefs at one point in time. The unit of analysis is the South African citizen. The researcher studies data collected from individuals in order to generalise about the collective traits of South Africans.

The study makes use of a variety of secondary sources of information, including books and journal articles. However, the WVS provides much of the essential data to be studied. The WVS is itself a longitudinal study, which is conducted in 97 societies and covers almost 90% of the world's population (WVS, 2008:2). It has been conducted roughly every five years since 1981. On each occasion a different group of respondents is asked the same or similar questions in order to establish how values in a society might be changing over time. Although the survey consists of the same basic questions in every country, the local conductors of the study are free to include questions of their own among the standard questions. This study examines the relevant South African questions as inserted by Du Toit and Kotzé (2011:145).

The South African edition of the WVS is conducted by the Centre for International and Comparative Politics (CICP) at the University of Stellenbosch and the market research company IPSOS-Markinor. Face to face interviews were conducted with a representative sample of male and female South African residents over the age of 16. The interviews were conducted in local languages by specially trained field workers, who were accompanied by supervisors, quality control officers and field coordinators (WVS, 2007).

The thesis makes use of triangulation: “the combination of two or more theories, data sources, methods or investigators in one study of a single phenomenon” (Yeasmin & Rahman, 2012:156). In this study quantitative and qualitative methods are used to answer the research questions, thus employing methodological triangulation (Hussein, 2009:3-4; Neuman, 2011:165). The use of two methods enables the researcher to combine the strengths of each while possibly overcoming their limitations (Yeasmin & Rahman, 2012:154-156). Although triangulation can also be used to validate results, its primary use in this study is to provide a deeper understanding of the subject at hand (Hussein, 2009:5-8). Social phenomena are notoriously intricate and triangulation can provide a more complete picture of the social realities under investigation.

The study therefore consists of an analysis of quantitative data as well as a qualitative interpretation of the data. Observations and characteristics of individuals have been translated into numbers and studied as such (Antonius, 2013:4). Data from the 5th and 6th South African waves of the WVS is analysed and presented using SPSS: computer software technology

created for the statistical analysis of survey data. SPSS is commonly used to calculate numerical data and uses a representative survey sample to infer about a larger population. It is a valuable method of describing data and finding relationships between variables (Walliman, 2006:110-129). A qualitative interpretation of the numerical results follows the initial statistical analysis of the WVS data. The former establishes what the numerical findings mean in the context of the study's theoretical framework (Antonius, 2013:44).

The WVS provides the researcher with a general idea of how widely held illiberal values are. SPSS makes it possible to determine which beliefs and values are held by whom. Their combined use enables the researcher to seek relationships between the dependent variable of illiberal values and the relevant independent variables. The qualitative analysis sheds further light on the findings.

1.5 Limitations and delimitations

The thesis consists of a secondary analysis of WVS data that has not been obtained by the researcher herself. In fact, the researcher does not produce any new data from which to draw on. She exerted no control over data collection or the content of the survey questionnaires. If any errors occurred during the data collection or capturing processes, it cannot be detected or corrected in this study even though it could affect the findings.

The WVS is global in scale and includes a wide variety of questions and variables, most of which are not suited or relevant to this study's research questions. On the other hand, the WVS may not include all variables that could be of use to this study. Some critics have also questioned whether differences in culture, technology and language can truly be overcome when comparing values across countries the way the WVS does (MacIntosh, 1998:452). It may thus be possible that questions are sometimes framed in a way that does not take local context into consideration.

However, there are also significant advantages to the use of pre-existing data. Firstly, it is not necessary to repeatedly intrude into people's lives in order to obtain information (Neuman, 2011:374-375), which may in any case already have been gathered by others. Refraining from such intrusion reduces the risk of affecting or altering what is being studied. It also reduces the risk of alienating the respondents (Manheim & Rich, 1981:124-125). Secondary

analysis is also extremely cost effective and time efficient. To draw meaningful conclusions about a population of almost 53 million South Africans (South African Police Service [SAPS], 2014a:1), one needs a large sample size. It would be impossible for most independent researchers – especially a master’s student - to have the means to conduct a thorough longitudinal study on a national level.

Furthermore, the WVS is the most extensive database of changing values in South Africa (and the world) – covering South African attitudes before and after the political transition (Kotzé, 2001:134-135). The longitudinal nature of the survey means that it reflects changes in values as well as changes in demographics. It is an essential source of information that makes it possible to compare the beliefs of different groups over time. The WVS is a trusted source of information that is frequently used by social science scholars, researchers and media throughout the world (WVS, 2008:4). The data is generally easy to access and other scholars can therefore join the discussion of any research involving the surveys. Easy access can also lead to further analysis and replication of results (Silver & Dowley, 2000:518).

A further advantage of secondary analysis of the WVS data is that it is the only survey conducted in South Africa that asks respondents what they believe about evil. In fact, these pertinent questions were included in the WVS (South Africa) with this study in mind. A possible disadvantage to this situation however, is that there is unlikely to be much other independent data with which to compare the WVS findings. Also, the three key questions regarding evil have only been included in the latest two rounds of the survey. This study therefore focuses on the more recent survey results of 2006 and 2013. The study also benefits from its timing in that the researcher can make use of fresh findings from 2013 that have not yet been made public.

An important issue to consider in the South African context concerns the matter of race. The race categories applied to South Africans divide the population into four groups: black African, white, coloured (of mixed heritage) and Indian. These categories have their origin in Apartheid classifications, but are still widely used and accepted. It is applied by government agencies when addressing political, social and economic matters. For example, the ruling ANC government has set race-related targets for its land reform and black economic

empowerment (BEE) policies (Simkins, 2011:111-117). The four race categories are also used by the national census and the WVS.

Even though race is viewed as a social construct, it is nevertheless a powerful one in the minds of peoples and governments. It can – and in South Africa does – have real manifestations with serious consequences. Race categories may be an important reflection of inequality and thus useful in policy matters, but its continued use legitimises the problematic construct and all its ambiguities. Various negative consequences may result: from confusion and ambivalence among survey respondents (Nobles, 2000:183-184) to a lack of critical thinking when researchers analyse South Africans. The present thesis uses the four widely accepted South African race categories and acknowledges it as a limitation.

The fact that the present study is a master's thesis provides further limitations and delimitations: a master's thesis does not require the researcher to present completely new research. It does, however, limit the study to 50 000 words when much more could be written on the subject. Lastly, the researcher is constrained by language: African spiritual beliefs comprise an important part of the study, but the researcher lacks knowledge of the relevant African languages.

1.6 Rationale and significance

The topic of democratic consolidation has become popular with scholars (see Inglehart & Welzel, 2003; Landman, 2011) and the faults of South Africa's democracy have not escaped their attention (Lipton, 2014; Gordon, 2001). Some of the studies of democratic consolidation in South Africa have focussed on values as it is believed that political culture⁸ – and not just institutions - is essential to the health of a democracy (Kotzé, 2001:134). This study aims to contribute to the discourse regarding values as an indicator of the quality and legitimacy of South Africa's democracy.

The values investigated by this study are commonly held beliefs (Du Toit & Kotzé, 2011:145-152) that clash dramatically with the values of liberal democracy and yet have been largely overlooked by scholars, especially with regards to quantitative studies. Attitudes

⁸Political culture is defined as all the "attitudes, sentiments, and cognitions" that inform an individual's political decisions and actions (Pye, 1963:78).

about evil and violence, especially in the context of spiritual and witchcraft-related beliefs, can be a sensitive issue: it touches on matters of culture, religion and tradition which many are reluctant to critically engage with (Leistner, 2014:1). It can however not be ignored in light of the possible impact on democratic consolidation, peace and stability as well as economic development. In addition to the general lack of research on evil and violence in South Africa, the specific research questions in this thesis have never been studied before. The thesis addresses this gap in scholarly knowledge, attempts to draw attention to the problem(s) discussed and encourages others to study it also.

1.7 Chapter outline

The first of six chapters provides an introduction to the subject under investigation. It includes important information regarding the context of the study. It also discusses the research aims and methodology. The second chapter reviews the existing literature that informs the theories, concepts and context of the thesis. This includes the literature on DPT and liberal democracy, human rights, religion and witchcraft.

Chapter Three elaborates on research design and methodology. Important variables will be discussed in detail, including their conceptualisation and operationalisation. Chapter Three will also elaborate on measurement issues and data analysis. More attention will be given to limitations and delimitations.

In Chapter Four the results of the quantitative data analysis are presented in tables and graphs. Information is provided on the nature and strength of the relationships between key variables. Chapter Five interprets the implications of the quantitative findings through qualitative analysis. The sixth and final chapter discusses the ultimate conclusion of the research as well as important observations. It also contains recommendations for future research.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONTEXTUALISATION

2.1 Introduction

The following sections provide an overview and contextualisation of the existing literature relevant to this study. None of the subjects under review are without a certain degree of controversy and a lively academic discourse exists on most of them. A thorough review of the relevant discourses will root this study in its wider context.

There is a considerable volume of writing on democracy. Of great relevance is the meaning and expected outcomes of liberal democracy and democratic consolidation. This is especially true with regards to a recently democratised country whose citizens are largely new to liberal democracy and its values and practices.

Lastly, this chapter also examines the literature on religious and spiritual practices in South Africa. South Africans' engagement with witchcraft-related practices serves as the primary—though not only - illustration of the friction between illiberal values and liberal democracy. The study of witchcraft has a long and rich history, but its continued existence and importance are often neglected. This chapter seeks to remedy this neglect.

2.2 DPT: Why liberal democracy is important

Immanuel Kant's initial observation (1795/1983:112-115) has become somewhat of a truism to many political scientists: democracies generally do not wage war against each other (Gat, 2005:73). DPT's modern popularity emerged during the Cold War when leaders like United States (US) president Ronald Reagan declared that governments that respect individual freedom have more peaceful foreign policies (Parmar, 2013:239-240). Scholars began to revisit and develop Kant's initial ideas and some of them - Michael Doyle (1983), Larry Diamond (1991), Francis Fukuyama (1992) - would become influential in US policy circles where democracy came to be viewed as a tool for international peace and stability.

Doyle (1983;2005) ascribes the democratic peace to three interconnected factors: representative institutions, respect for human rights and economic interdependence. However, proponents of DPT have often focused on only two separate explanations for the democratic peace: institutions and norms (Owen, 1994:90-91). Democratic institutions, with their checks

on power and transparency, can make it difficult for leaders to receive the consensus and funds needed for war. It is also difficult to convince a reluctant public to bear the costs of war (in terms of both taxes and lives). Unpopular decisions or attempts to abuse power in this respect can be punished through elections. Everyone in a democracy is therefore sensitised to the costs of war (Layne, 1994:9).

In the domestic arena, democracy is based on compromise and adherence to non-violent rules of political competition. Once the rules of democracy become a norm, this “bargaining culture” (Sobek et al., 2006:521) is carried over to the international arena. Citizens are socialised to expect peaceful relations and rulers therefore prefer to solve international disputes with diplomacy rather than violence. Democracies assume that other democracies share the same norms and policies. Violence is therefore not considered an appropriate means of settling disputes within and between democracies (Owen, 1994:90-91).

However, critics argue that sufficiently bellicose publics, cabinets and legislatures can easily encourage war instead of constraining it. If public opinion constrained war, democracies would be more peaceful in general, not just toward other democracies, as the cost of war is high regardless of the enemy’s regime type. Rosato (2003:594-595) argues that lives lost during war only affects a tiny percentage of the population. Monetary costs on the other hand, may seem less important to a public swept up in nationalist sentiment. Furthermore, institutional checks on power often fail: Rosato (2003:597) cites examples in which US presidents bypassed or simply ignored constitutional processes and unilaterally authorised war or military attacks.

The propensity for compromise among democracies is also only relevant if and when democracies recognise each other as such – a rather subjective exercise that can be argued in self-serving ways (Rosato, 2003:590-593). Realists tend to reject the idea that ideology determines democracies’ national interests and foreign policy. They maintain that power politics in an anarchic world remains the key determining factor of international relations irrespective of regime type. Domestic political systems may change, but the international system remains the same (Parmar, 2013:244; Layne, 1994:10-12). War is in any case such a rare occurrence that democratic peace may just be a statistical coincidence. Alternatively, democracy may be the result of peace rather than the cause: states that experience external

threats will likely make use of authoritarian measures that make the mobilisation of resources easy; states that enjoy relative security can afford more liberal institutions (Layne, 1994:39-45).

Studies of DPT are usually strongly impacted by researchers' methodology. Results often vary depending on definitions of freedom and war as well as the selection of case studies and time periods (Chan, 1984:624-631). Ultimately, the evidence for DPT is therefore a mixed bag: Chan (1984) dismisses the notion that democracies are more peaceful in general. He does, however, believe that democracies tend not to wage war against each other. The belief is shared by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999) who argue that democracies are fearful of going to war against each other, because they are so exceptionally good at it. Other scholars support elements of DPT: Oneal and Russett (1997) agree that democracies do not attack each other, but they stress both democracy as well as trade as causal factors;⁹ Sobek et al. (2006) on the other hand, found a strong relationship between respect for human rights – mostly but not exclusively found in liberal democracies - and peace, irrespective of regime type.

Owen (1994) acknowledges the continued salience of power politics and yet claims that the democratic peace is still a real phenomenon. According to him, it is neither liberalism nor institutions that produce peace at home and abroad, but rather liberal ideology *and* democratic institutions, functioning in tandem.¹⁰ Liberal societies are populated by citizens freely pursuing their own interests – a situation that necessitates peace. Peace is therefore in everyone's best interest and citizens can safely trust and tolerate one another. A liberal democratic society can also safely assume that other liberal democracies function according to the same logic: peace enables freedom; freedom enables the pursuit of material wellbeing and happiness, which is in everyone's interest; democratic governments represent and protect their citizens' interests and are therefore unlikely to violently disrupt the status quo. Liberal democracies can therefore trust and accommodate each other. Other types of regimes may not have the same interests and can not necessarily be trusted (Owen, 1994:89).

Owen insists that the harmony of interests as described above is only possible when a democratic society subscribes to liberal ideology. Democratic institutions alone are not

⁹The idea that trade pacifies nations draws from Montesquieu's *The Spirit Of The Laws* (1949:316-330).

¹⁰Owen's argument (1994) is therefore reminiscent of Doyle's (1983; 2005), except that the latter also stresses economic interdependence.

enough: liberal values are necessary for the pacification of citizens who in turn have the power to influence government and hold leaders accountable through democratic institutions. The two features mutually reinforce each other and produce peace (Owen, 1994:99-102). Without liberalism and consequent pacification, the end result may be an illiberal democracy which cannot benefit from the democratic peace.

In conclusion, the democratic peace is a product of the domestic political sphere which happens to benefit international politics. Owen (1994:120) does admit that the peace is not infallible: it may fail if liberal democracies do not perceive each other as such or if illiberal leaders are elected. The latter may obtain enough autonomy over foreign policy to engage in a war that would otherwise not occur. However, the main concern in this study is domestic peace rather than foreign policy. The virtues of democracy in the domestic sphere – protection of rights, the rule of law, accountable government (Patapan, 2012:313) – are of key importance to the South African case study, regardless of whether it also leads to greater international peace.

2.3 Democratisation: history and preconditions

2.3.1 Waves of democratisation

Although various democratic practices can be identified in many places throughout history, the origins of democracy as a form of government are usually traced to Ancient Greece, particularly fifth-century Athens (Huntington, 1991b:5-13). Early forms of democratic participation were restricted to small numbers of citizens and universal suffrage would not be an accepted feature of democracy until the 20th century. Athenian democracy nevertheless allowed fairly broad participation in government: Athens was not ruled by a small elite, but by a larger number of citizens each of whom had equal decision-making power regardless of their abilities or importance in society. This restricted form of majority government gave Athens its reputation for freedom and equality (Andrews, 2004:539-541). Despite their democratic practices however, Athenians were a warrior people who valued conquest and not self-preservation. Owen (1994:98) therefore considers them early democrats, but not early liberals – an ancient example of an illiberal democracy.

The development of modern democracy is associated with the rise of the nation state in the early modern era. Various early liberal and democratic ideas emerged in Western societies

from the 17th century onwards. As previously discussed, the work of Kant focussed on human dignity (1797) and the relationship between democracy and peace (1795). Other influential 17th century thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke both emphasised equal political rights (Fukuyama, 2011:81-86). In his *Two Treatises Of Government* (originally published in 1689), Locke also wrote on government by consensus (1955:67-68) and property rights (14-27). The purpose of government was restricted to ensuring life, liberty and property – early liberal sentiments also echoed by Montesquieu and Mill (Fukuyama, 2012:53-61). The emphasis of these classically liberal authors was thus often on the protection of individual political and economic rights against state power. Social inequalities garnered little attention and it was taken for granted that the rights discourse largely excluded women and slaves (Leary, 1990:17-18).

The revolutionary period that started at the end of the 18th century saw the beginning of the modern democratic age and its emphasis on the individual. What followed was the first of what Huntington (1991a:15) calls the three “waves of democratisation.” Such a wave constitutes a certain period of time in which a significant number of nondemocratic regimes transforms into democracies or at least democratise their political systems to a certain extent. The waves of democratisation are not without reversals in which countries with democratic features or systems regress. Democratisation can also occur outside of the time periods in which significant democratisation generally happens.

Huntington dates the first wave to the expansion of suffrage among the US population in the 1820s (1991a:12). For the first time white men no longer had to own property in order to vote (Fukuyama, 2012:53-61). The progress of political equality was neatly captured by Alexis de Tocqueville’s classic *Democracy In America* in 1840 (2000:12-13), in which he states his belief that political equality was a long, unstoppable historical process.

The first wave consisted of a long, slow period of democratisation in the West that lasted until 1926 and resulted in 29 democracies. The second wave occurred after the Second World War as the victorious allies occupied and transformed the political systems of defeated nations. Many colonies also gained their independence and adopted democratic systems. South Africa forms part of the third wave: starting in the 1970s and resulting in such large-scale spread of democracy that Fukuyama (1992) termed it the “end of history.” It briefly

appeared that Western democracy would be the final word on which form of government was best. Democracy spread far and wide, but civil liberties expanded at a much slower pace.

Each wave of democratisation was followed by some democratic reversals. The democratic gains and losses (and further gains) of the third wave have been well-documented. Key studies in this respect include: Diamond's 1996 investigation of civil liberties in which he found many examples where liberal democracy was not being consolidated; Karatnycky's documentation of democratic gains in many of the same countries in 1999; Diamond's 2002 study was also more positive, finding 73 liberal and 31 electoral democracies; However, in the same year Carothers claimed that fewer than 20 of the third wave countries were clearly heading towards successful democratisation. The rest were in a "grey zone" (2002:9-10) – Carothers' term for countries that, in various ways, fall short of true liberal democracy.

The shortcomings of the grey zone are extremely varied and they have been difficult to analyse and classify – hence the multitude of scholarly terms for the different faulty democracies. Clearly, the road to democracy is neither easy nor linear. Initial success in transitioning to democracy is no guarantee of continued democratic consolidation. In fact, Carothers (2002:18) believes that so many countries are in the grey zone that it is no longer useful to analyse them in terms of their democratic transitioning. Levitsky & Way (2002:51-52) agree, arguing that regimes should be analysed as what they are instead of being measured as partial democracies in a state of transition.

2.3.2 Preconditions of democracy

In *Polyarchy* (1971) Robert A. Dahl identified three preconditions that tend to be present in countries that begin to liberalise their political systems – a process which can lead to democracy. Dahl found that democratic features begin to emerge in countries that are ethnically and culturally homogenous;¹¹ that experience broad-based socio-economic development with little extreme inequality or deprivation; and lastly, that develop liberal values prior to democratic institutions. Although most stable democracies took a long time to become established, Dahl believed a faster way was possible.¹² The presence or absence of

¹¹A finding echoed by Lijphart in *Democracy In Plural Societies* (1977).

¹²Lipset (1959:72) agreed, stating that countries that had prematurely democratised could strengthen their systems by encouraging conditions conducive to democracy.

one or more of his preconditions do not predetermine success or failure, but are helpful indicators when assessing the strength of a country's democracy.

With regards to Dahl's first precondition, Karatnycky (1999; 2002) has presented evidence that democracy is more successful in mono-ethnic countries. In his analyses of the 1998 and 2001 Freedom House surveys,¹³ he determines that countries where two thirds of the population belong to one ethnic group were twice as likely to achieve freedom. Although he is challenged in his assertions by Fish and Brooks (2004), he maintains that democracy is significantly more successful in mono-ethnic countries.

There is widespread agreement on Dahl's second precondition (1971:62-80) that it is rich countries that tend to be democracies.¹⁴ The notion is not a new one:

“From Aristotle down to the present, men have argued that only in a wealthy society in which relatively few citizens lived in real poverty could a situation exist in which the mass of the population could intelligently participate in politics and could develop the self-restraint necessary to avoid succumbing to the appeals of irresponsible demagogues” (Lipset, 1959:75).

Lipset (1959:75-88) found that the average levels of wealth, industrialisation, urbanisation and education are considerably higher in democracies. Todd Landman's work (2002) illustrates a strong relationship between economic development and the protection of rights. Przeworski et al. (1996:40-41) further prove the point in their study which found that rich countries (with an annual income of over \$6 000/R60 000 per capita) do not revert to authoritarianism after obtaining democracy. Less affluent countries are more vulnerable: the lower the per capita income, the less likely democracy is to last in the long-term. If most wealthy countries are democratic and most poor countries are not, it stands to reason that democratisation occurs in middle income countries. Democratic features often emerge in countries that experience comparatively higher economic growth. As Huntington (1991b:60) points out, the third wave of democracy followed the global economic growth of the 1950s and 1960s.

¹³ Freedom House is a non-profit organisation that measures and compares political and civil rights throughout the world. Countries are rated as Free, Partly Free or Not Free depending on the rights citizens enjoy. The ratings reflect not only the nature of a country's government, but also the general reality of citizens' everyday lives (Karatnycky, 1999:114).

¹⁴ See Huntington (1991:59-72), Lipset (1981: 469-476) and Karatnycky (1999:121).

Furthermore, Diamond (1994:16) and Fukuyama (2011:80) warn that inequality can impede democratisation. If a democratic regime is unable to provide services to the poor, people may support populist leaders or political groups that are not committed to liberal democracy, but that do take measures to address inequality. On the other hand, if the middle class feels threatened by the economic demands of the poor, it may in turn start supporting authoritarian rulers who will protect its interests (Fukuyama, 2012:53-61). Ultimately, countries that succeed in decreasing inequality have a better chance of democratic survival (Przeworski *et al.*, 1996:43).¹⁵

Once economic scarcity creates social and political tension, possibilities for various types of conflict and government repression emerge (Sobek *et al.*, 2006:521). Wilkinson (2005), for example, claims a strong relationship between inequality and crime as well as other social ills. Messner *et al.* (2002) found the same relationship between inequality and homicide rates. The problem of violent crime may also be exacerbated by ethnic diversity: some studies (see Altheimer, 2007; 2008) present a positive link between ethnic diversity and homicide rates. Chon (2011) investigated the relationship between ethnic and linguistic diversity and homicide rates in 170 countries. He suggests that both income inequality and diversity independently affect murder rates (Chon, 2011:741-744).

According to social identity theorists,¹⁶ the anxiety caused by the humiliation of poverty – especially when compared to the material success of other groups in society – can find violent expression. Poverty in itself does not cause violence, but the anxiety associated with low social status from which people cannot escape, can lead to resentment and outbreaks of violence (Du Toit & Kotzé, 2011:29-30). The violence may not always be directed towards wealthy and well-protected groups and may instead target a scapegoat population. Amy Chua's *World On Fire* (2004) documents numerous cases of resentment directed towards overly successful ethnic minorities.

¹⁵Przeworski *et al.* (1996:43) point out that countries with decreasing inequality have a better chance of sustaining democracy than countries with increasing inequality.

¹⁶Social Identity Theory posits that people strive for a positive self-image through social identity. A positive social identity is obtained by favourable comparisons of one's own (in-) group with other (out-) groups. If comparisons to other groups are undeniably and persistently negative, individuals must find a way to manage the resultant blow to their self-esteem. An extreme answer would be to eliminate the group causing the unease (Niens *et al.*, 2003:109; Du Toit & Kotzé, 2011:29-30)

2.3.3 The third precondition: values

“The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (Schumpeter, 1947:269).

The Schumpeterian definition of democracy has often dominated the political discourse to the exclusion of other approaches (Huntington, 1991b:6-7). Despite its usefulness in defining and determining institutional democracy, it has been criticised as a limited way of assessing the consolidation of a liberal democracy.

The origin of the problem may lie in the classic conception of the state and civil society as separate spheres. Political matters are traditionally associated with the former and social issues relegated to the latter. The separation makes the study of democracy easier by avoiding confusion over definitions, measurement and ideology (Caldeira & Holston, 1999:720). The intricate social conditions in which democracy is expected to thrive, significantly complicate its study and are often simply ignored in favour of the study of institutions.

Schedler (1998) voices the concern over the above-mentioned complexity and argues for clarity with regards to the definition and study of democratisation. He insists that the concept of democratic consolidation should be reserved for discussions on the survival of the democratic system and nothing else. To use the concept to describe the completion, organisation, quality or deepening of democracy, as opposed to its complete absence in the face of authoritarianism, is to strip it of its analytical power (Schedler, 1998:103-104). There is however strong opposition to Schedler’s perspective.

Lipset (1959:71) states that a political system is by necessity characterised by a value system and democracy cannot function if its values are not accepted by opposing interest groups. Almond and Verba (1963:498) agree that democracy’s stability and efficiency depend not only on its institutions, but also on a supportive political culture. O’Donnell (1997:45-46) suggests that studying democratic institutions makes sense if there is no significant difference between the formal rules of democracy and the actual behaviour of citizens. If, however, citizens’ behaviour diverges from the formal rules of the game, the study of institutions will no longer be a good predictor of political and social outcomes.

Other scholars who argue for a broader approach to the study of democracy, include Diamond (1994:5), who stresses democratic citizenship and culture as well as the study of civil society.¹⁷ He rightly notes that civil society and cultural matters have been viewed as important features of democracy since Tocqueville's *Democracy In America* (1835-40). Diamond maintains that civil society should be studied in order to determine how it may support democracy in some ways and cause tension in others. Additionally, Huntington (1996:8) claims that socio-economic problems have the power to slowly erode democracy. He warns that such slow erosion poses a greater threat to the third wave than the outright overthrow of democratic regimes. Caldeira and Holston (1999) also criticise evaluations of democratisation that focus solely on the transformation of political systems, arguing that social and cultural changes must be taken into account.

Although Schedler (1998:97) acknowledges the arguments of others, he believes that more inclusive analyses of democracy are too ambiguous to be helpful. Caldeira and Holston (1999:726-727) suggest that viewing democracy as disjunctive - always consisting of progressive and regressive features - may neutralise the problem of conceptual ambiguity. Drawing attention to regressive features does not condemn a country's entire political system (in which case there would be no consolidated democracies at all, as all democracies have some regressive features), but it merely criticises a weak element of the system. The idea of democracy as disjunctive is compatible with Dahl's *Polyarchy* (1971) in which he thinks of democracy as an ideal, the realisation of which is always a work in progress.

Broader approaches to the study of democracy are particularly helpful with regards to the non-Western countries of the third wave. Their history and development differ substantially to that of established democracies in the West. In many cases the behaviour of citizens and other actors do not comply with the rules of democracy and an already pacified populace cannot be assumed. Evidence suggests that it is partially democratised countries rather than authoritarian regimes that are often responsible for the worst cases of repression and rights violations (Sobek et al., 2006:521).¹⁸ Although democracy is associated with peace, the

¹⁷Diamond (1994:5) views civil society as an intermediary between the private sphere and the state. He defines it as the voluntary, organised, collective action of citizens in order to voice shared interests or pursue goals.

¹⁸Authoritarian regimes that have already successfully quashed opposition rarely have to engage in further repression against a terrified populace. Partially democratic states on the other hand, allow for some degree of

process of democratisation is not: partly free states are frequently more prone to civil and international war than non-democracies (Mansfield & Snyder, 1995; 2005). The “problematic and at times perverse” (Caldeira & Holston, 1999:691) democratisation in Latin America is often cited as an indication that social and cultural changes – not just changes in political systems – are necessary to establish civil rights and the rule of law:

“Without both, the realization of democratic citizenship remains disabled. It is increasingly evident in the new democracies that without this realization, political democracy loses its legitimacy and efficacy. It suffers not only as a means to frame social interaction but also as a mode of governance” (Caldeira & Holston, 1999:692).

2.4 The importance of secularism and human rights

To find the origin of modern universal human rights, scholars often turn – once again - to the writings of Kant (1797/1996). Kant was the first to write comprehensively on the inherent dignity and worth of all human beings. His ideas had a powerful influence on later conceptions of human rights. All human rights derive from the concept of inherent dignity and worth: the rights one has simply by virtue of being human (Donnelly, 2013:10). Human dignity is therefore the moral source of human rights (Habermas, 2010:464), which ultimately stipulate what may or may not be done to any given person (Perry, 1998:12-13). Human rights are inherent, equal and universal - not given to people by God – and take precedence over religious and other concerns.

According to modern secularist thinking, religion and politics have to be separated in order for democracy to thrive. For many secularists, such a separation entails not only the classic separation of church and state, but also the separation of religion and politics in civil society (Elshtain, 2009:8). In the words of Harkness (1978:11): “Secularism is the organisation of life as if God did not exist.” The democracies of Western Europe are good examples of secular societies. In these mature democracies, religion has all but disappeared from the public sphere and has even faded away in private life (Elshtain, 2009:8). According to this perspective, human rights (and modernity in general) represent the triumph of reason over religion (Malachuk, 2010:128). It is a triumph that has been predicted by great thinkers since the Enlightenment. Secularisation theory – that the importance of religion declines in well-off,

protest, but it is viewed as threatening and institutions are often too weak to channel it without resorting to violence (Sobek et al., 2006:521).

secure, industrial societies – has therefore been taken for granted in the social sciences for most of the 20th century (Norris & Inglehart, 2004:3-4).

Many of the values protected by the Western human rights doctrine can be protected by other means: for example, religious or traditional frameworks. However, Donnelly (1989:109-124) argues that such frameworks are less effective as they are not based on the relatively new concept of equal and inalienable individual rights: “entitlements of all individuals that may be exercised against the state and society” (Donnelly, 2007: 284). The idea that all human beings – citizens, foreigners, slaves, men, women, rich and poor – have inherent, equal rights that should be institutionalised did not exist in any previous human society:

“In the ‘pre-modern’ world, both Western and non-Western alike, the duty of rulers to further the common good arose not from the rights (entitlements) of all human beings, or even all subjects, but from divine commandments, natural law, tradition, or contingent political arrangement. The people could legitimately expect to benefit from the obligations of their rulers to rule justly. Neither in theory, nor in practice, though, did they have human rights that could be exercised against unjust rulers” (Donnelly, 2007:286).

Although religious or traditional procedures of conflict resolution and protection of human dignity may work in small, traditional communities, it is unlikely to suffice in modernised societies with large, diverse urban populations (Leistner, 2014:7-8). In most contemporary societies the human rights doctrine is needed to adequately protect people against violations by the economic, social and political institutions of modernity (Donnelly, 2013:86-87).

Traditional societies and older communal support systems have been greatly changed and in many cases destroyed by the impact of capitalist markets and increasingly powerful bureaucracies. In developing countries there is thus often to be found, not idealistic traditional societies, but rather “a disruptive and incomplete Westernisation, cultural confusion, or the enthusiastic embrace of ‘modern’ practices and values” (Donnelly, 1984:411).

Seen in the above light, human rights are thus not so much a Western doctrine to be imposed on others, but rather a necessary response to the forces of modernity. Human rights are “designed for an effective implementation of the core moral values of an egalitarian universalism in terms of coercive law” (Habermas, 2010:464). The majority of the world’s states have signed the numerous human rights declarations that have emerged since 1948 (Benhabib, 2009:696). There is thus widespread theoretical agreement on the usefulness of

human rights and Donnelly (2007:286-291) claims that, in practice, no other framework has proven more successful in protecting human dignity. Donnelly (1989: 109-124) also argues that the quality of democracy may be undermined if an alternative value system challenges the secular human rights doctrine. If societal values are rooted in religious or spiritual beliefs as opposed to the secular framework, rights may not be perceived as inherent, unconditional or universal. Conflict may thus emerge between groups, individuals and/or the state. In fact, social scientists have often identified religion as a cause of such conflict (Sandal, 2012:66).

In response to the perceived anti-religious perspective of secularists, many attempts have been made to illustrate the compatibility of religion with human rights. Historically, the development of human rights has been closely associated with Christianity (Joppke, 2013:603-604). The events, challenges and personages that shaped the development of human rights in the West are undeniably rooted in religious as well as liberal thinking.¹⁹ Only later did rights become secularised (Freeman, 2004:386; Little, 1990:59-103). In fact, the very idea of humans as sacred beings who are inherently valuable, seems inescapably religious (Perry, 1998:13). It is therefore not surprising that the constitutions of almost all the European democracies contain references to God and Christianity (Joppke, 2013:603).

Scholars have therefore attempted to defend Christianity's compatibility with human rights. The same is true of Islam, especially in light of the well-known democratic deficit in the Muslim world (Elshtain, 2009:8-14).²⁰ Joppke (2013) not only argues for the recognition of Christianity's importance in shaping European culture and politics (including secularism), but also states that a Christian identity for the liberal (Western) state might better enable the implementation of liberal values such as freedom of religion and expression. In openly recognising the religious heritage of the state and the majority of the population (Christianity in the case of the West), a liberal state would also have to recognise the religions of minorities (such as Islam). Such recognition would not entail the implementation of a state religion or religious education, but would acknowledge religion as an historical and cultural heritage and thereby allow religious expression in general.

¹⁹For example, Locke (1955:4) presupposed that the moral authority for rights sprang from God.

²⁰For discussion on accommodating human rights in Islamic culture, see Othman (1999) and An-Na'im (1990).

By acknowledging all religions instead of banishing it from the public domain, the conflict between the secular state and religion may be resolved. According to this argument, the conflict is between religion and secularism and not between religion and liberal democracy or between religions. This would explain why many Muslims in France attend Catholic schools, where all religions may be expressed, and not public schools, where such expression is banned (Elshtain, 2009:9). It is estimated that more than 10% of the two million students at France's 8 847 Catholic schools are in fact Muslim (France only has four Muslim schools). In some of the schools Muslim students form the majority of the student body. They are often accommodated during Ramadan and female students are sometimes allowed to wear head scarves. The Catholic schools teach the national curriculum and participation in religious activities are voluntary (Bennhold, 2008:6).

Although the above-mentioned schools are not without conflict – including disagreements on politics, history and science - there exists the perception that the Catholic Church is more tolerant of Islam than the secular state. The perception is not limited to France: Muslims are also increasingly attending Catholic institutions in other countries, including Scotland (The Economist, 2006:53) and the US (Pethrez-PeOa, 2012:12). The US has seen an increase in foreign Muslims enrolling in Catholic Colleges where they report feeling more comfortable and accepted in a Catholic environment – where religious expression and discussion are permitted and encouraged – than in secular spaces. Comments from the students in the US – “Here, people are more religious, even if they’re not Muslim” and “I don’t have to leave my faith at home when I come to school” (Pethrez-PeOa, 2012:12) - echo the sentiments of religious unity and tolerance in France where Christians and Muslims – “Share the same God” (Bennhold, 2008:6).

The shared interests of Christianity and Islam can also be seen with regards to the January 2015 terror attack on the French satirical newspaper *Charlie Hebdo* in which 12 people were killed. In the immediate aftermath of the attack, speculation was rife that it could have been carried out by either Muslim or Catholic extremists as both groups oppose unrestrained – and at times needlessly offensive – freedom of speech.²¹ Although the attack by Muslim extremists was condemned by Bill Donohue, president of the Catholic League, he also went on to attack the secular intolerance of *Charlie Hebdo*. Donohue stated that Muslims were

²¹As seen on the live news coverage of Al-Jazeera, 7th January 2015.

right to be angry over the “narcissistic” disrespect of their beliefs and that “Muhammed isn’t sacred to me, either, but it would never occur to me to deliberately insult Muslims by trashing him” (Hallowell, 2015).

The shared interests and solidarity among Muslims and Christians support the argument that a religious cultural identity for the liberal state could lead to further interfaith understanding and tolerance. It could also provide better philosophical rationale for human rights and resolve some of the contradictions often found in liberal ideology (Malachuk, 2010:128-129). In this post-secular perspective, it is “in the constitutional state’s own interest to treat with care all cultural sources upon which the consciousness of norms and the solidarity of citizens draw” (Habermas, 2006:258). Indeed, the post-secular perspective may become increasingly important in light of the evidence against secularisation theory. The latter includes the continued importance of religion in the USA and Muslim countries, the persistence of indigenous beliefs around the world, the evangelical revivals in Latin America and Africa, the New Age spirituality that has appeared in the West and the ethno-religious conflicts still plaguing much of the world (Norris & Inglehart, 2004:4-5).

Despite its religious history and the ongoing relevance of religion in modern societies, human rights today are viewed as a “secular religion” (Landman, 2012:333) in terms of its conceptualisation and implementation. Religious references are thus deliberately omitted in the proposed constitution of the European Union (EU) (Joppke, 2013:603). However, the practical implementation of human rights is not uniform. Donnelly (2007) admits that variations in its implementation are possible in order to make allowances for cultural practices so long as such practices do not fundamentally violate basic human rights such as security of person or the right to life. Yet Donnelly (1984:410-414) warns against human rights abuses cloaked in culture-based arguments and states that substantive limits apply to even well-established cultural practices.

There is nevertheless “a legitimate range of variation” (Benhabib, 2009:698) in how rights can be interpreted and implemented. Benhabib (2009:698) argues that such differences are not only legitimate but necessary: people must not only be considered subject to the law, but the law has to be contextualised to local situations. When human rights are contradicted by culture or religion, solutions must come from within society. Scholars like Freeman

(2004:377-378-381) and Othman (1999:169-192) think this can be done by reinterpreting existing beliefs in order to ground universal human rights in non-Western cultures. Appealing to cultural or religious beliefs may be more successful than attempting to invalidate them in favour of the secular approach. Only in finding locally relevant solutions, can human rights attain democratic legitimacy (Benhabib, 2009:698).

History would seem to argue that religious beliefs can have either a positive or negative impact on people's wellbeing in general and human rights in particular. In the South African context, religious organisations played both a positive and a negative role in the struggle for human rights. Although some religious leaders and institutions supported Apartheid, many others were actively involved in human rights activism. It has been argued that the role of these faith-based organisations was vital in ending Apartheid (Palm, 2014:98-99). As with post-secular arguments, it might therefore be possible to view religion as a source from which human rights norms can draw (as it has in the past). This may be a risky enterprise, but perhaps a solution for societies in which secularism is challenged and human rights are disputed (Malachuk, 2010:128-130).

2.5 South Africa in context

2.5.1 Inequality

The ideal liberal democracy is homogenous and prosperous. Its wealth is equitably divided. Poverty is an assault on human dignity that violates the concept of equality. Stability may also be undermined in culturally diverse societies if there is a group that dominates the social, economic and political spheres to the exclusion of others. In such divided countries, democracy can contribute to conflict if competition for votes is organised along divisive ethnic, racial or religious lines. However, it is also possible to accommodate divisions peacefully if democracy is supported by strong constitutional liberalism (Zakaria, 1997:35).

In following the fast, risky route to democracy, there is much that works against the success of the democratic project, since South Africa lacks the favourable preconditions of democracy. Despite socio-economic improvements since democratisation, South Africa still experiences very high levels of poverty and income inequality that disproportionately affect South Africans by race (Lipton, 2014:12). South Africa has succeeded in growing a black elite and middle class and has relieved extreme poverty through social grants. Nevertheless,

economic development has remained slow and unequal, with economic growth sometimes approaching, but never quite reaching government targets (Tregenna, 2011:2582).²²

Despite the government's efforts to provide housing to the poor, demand has grown much faster than supply. The provision of water, electricity and telephone lines has been followed by "unprecedented levels of disconnection due to the inability to pay, as the price of services soared far above the inflation rate" (Bond & Mottiar, 2013:284). Although a certain amount of water and electricity is provided free of charge, rising prices and progressive tariffs (the more you use, the more you pay) have translated into higher overall bills. Consequently approximately 1.5 million people have their water disconnected every year, while others' consumption levels have dropped dramatically. A quarter of electricity provider Eskom's four million customers have stopped (legally) consuming power. 2.1 Million of the 2.6 million households that received new telephone lines between 1994-1998 have been disconnected due to non-payment (Bond & Mottiar, 2013:284-285).

South Africa's white population – about 4.5 million people or roughly 9% of the population – still receives 39% of the total household income. The black majority, over 43 million people and over 79% of the population (SAIRR, 2013:3-4), has increased its share from 20% in 1970 to 45% in 2013. About half the country's population – more than 25.5 million people - live below the poverty line of \$1 (approximately R10) a day and about 91% of this group is black. Only 3% of the people living in households that fall below the poverty line are white. South Africa's other race groups – coloured people (9% of the population or over 4.7 million people) and Indians/Asians (2.5% of the population or over 1.3 million people) – also only constitute a small minority of the poorest of the poor (Simkins, 2011:107-110; SAIRR, 2013:3-4; SAIRR, 2014:5). Race-based inequality is a South African reality when it comes to income and basic services, as well as education (Lipton, 2014; Chetty, 2014) and health (SAIRR, 2013:1-84; SAIRR, 2014:561-639).

Income inequality between rich and poor has widened in the democratic era, in general and within race groups (Du Toit & Kotzé, 2011:77-79). The Gini coefficient, which measures the degree of inequality within nations, is particularly and consistently high in South Africa: on a

²²The government's current growth target is 5% (Vollgraaff, 2014), but growth for 2014 has been estimated at only about 1.4% (Douglas, 2015).

scale of 0 (perfect income equality) to 1 (perfect inequality), South Africa's score is 0.63, making it one of the most unequal countries in the world (SAIRR, 2013:321). According to economist Mike Schüssler (2014), South Africa's extreme inequality is due to high unemployment. When unemployed South Africans are excluded from the calculations, Schüssler estimates that the Gini coefficient could be as low as 0.28 for formal sector workers (after taking South Africa's progressive taxation and welfare spending into account). Inequality in South Africa therefore stems not from an unequal distribution of income and services as such, but rather from the income gap between those with jobs and those without – highlighting the importance of employment.

Data presented by Garcia-Rivero et al. (2002:169) and Du Toit & Kotzé (2011:52-57) illustrate that the South African public has the expectation that democracy should deliver socio-economic goods. In both studies South Africans associate democracy with the expected delivery of goods such as houses, education and jobs. Political goods such as human rights, civil liberties and even regular elections are less strongly associated with democracy and are not as highly ranked among priorities and expectations. Garcia-Rivero et al. (2002:170-177) conclude that South Africans view democracy as a means of poverty alleviation as opposed to a form of government. If democracy does not deliver on expectations, its legitimacy may be damaged as South Africans lose faith in their political system.²³ The possibility exists that South Africa could fall victim to populist or extremist leaders and that democratic consolidation may be stalled or reversed.

According to Alexander (2010:25-37), South Africans' frustration with poverty and inequality is evident in the country's increasingly frequent and violent social protest action. The protests are largely related to service delivery and labour rights, although many also include xenophobic violence.²⁴ The latter culminated in the countrywide xenophobic attacks of May 2008 and the renewed violence of April 2015, primarily directed toward African immigrants (Matsinhe, 2011:295-296; Mavundza, 2015:2). The immigrants are commonly

²³The best example of such an occurrence is Weimar Germany: despite its liberal constitution, the failure to deliver prosperity led to the collapse of the Weimar Republic (Owen, 1994:125).

²⁴According to the SAIRR (2014:728) there were 1 691 reported outbreaks of public violence in 2013-2014, including service delivery protests, industrial action and inter-political conflict. The earliest available data from this source is from 2004-2005 when there were 974 such incidents. Burger and Lancaster (2014), taking their figures from the SAPS, report 1 907 outbreaks of public violence in 2013-2014, which is an increase of 96% from 2010-2011 (971 incidents).

perceived as an economic and criminal threat by poor (and other) South Africans. South Africa has also become known for its poor labour relations as well as its labour militancy, which has been partially responsible for the downgrade of the country's bond rating (Bond & Mottiar, 2013:299). Ironically, violent protests are often perpetrated in the name of democracy and human rights (Bond, 2012: 260-261).

The same is true of community policing and vigilante efforts undertaken to fight crime. South Africa has an excessively high crime rate, including 47 homicides (and another 47 attempted homicides) per day in the period of 2013-2014 (SAIRR, 2014:707). The high crime rate may be viewed in light of the previously discussed literature on equality. Not only is inequality linked to crime, but crime is linked to low productivity as well as high levels of stress, illness, fear and distrust in unequal and divided societies.²⁵ Hamilton (2011:359) asserts that such high levels of fear, distrust and anxiety lead to further conflict and violence among citizens.

It is clear that South Africa lacks the benefits of equitable economic development and cultural unity. South Africans do not share the same resources, access to opportunities and social concerns (SAIRR, 2012:809-811). South Africans also do not share equal access to political power, as the ruling ANC – representative of and largely supported by South Africa's black majority – has been in power since the transition. Smaller opposition parties and racial minorities that do not support the ANC have for the most part been excluded from political office (Lipton, 2014:13). South Africans' diverging interests and concerns do not necessarily endanger its democracy, but it may impede the growth of liberal values as groups feel frustrated at their exclusion from social, political and economic resources. The same values are nevertheless needed as a vital source of stability and cohesion.

2.5.2 Religious and spiritual beliefs

In light of the concerns discussed above, it is necessary to examine whether South Africa's liberal values face serious challenges from contradictory beliefs. Of particular concern is the belief of South Africans in the concept of evil forces that have the power to do harm and the role that such beliefs may play in outbreaks of public violence. Unlike liberal democracies in Europe and elsewhere, South Africa has remained very religious. In contrast to the secular

²⁵Wilkinson (2005:101-143) found that levels of mental illness are 500% higher in very unequal societies – among all strata of the population – than among very equal societies.

values of the political system, the vast majority of South Africans consider themselves religious (Du Toit & Kotzé, 2011:133-138; also see Chapter Four). Various aspects of religiosity measured by the WVS - religious attendance and the importance of God - show that the South African public has consistently remained very religious regardless of factors such as race and social class (Du Toit & Kotzé, 2011:133-138; Chapter Four).

In South Africa the belief in evil can be placed in three different contexts: the concept of evil found in the monotheistic Abrahamic religions, traditional African spiritual beliefs and the secular view. The monotheistic religions in question - Christianity, Islam and Judaism – traditionally view the world as a battlefield in which a malevolent spiritual being is in direct conflict with God. God is omnipresent and omnipotent and it is considered good to conform to his prescriptions (Du Toit & Kotzé, 2011:139). Satan is his malevolent challenger who aims to undermine him by tempting his followers away from his prescriptions. Evil is the result of the machinations of this malevolent force and his adherents.

As mentioned in the first chapter, one of the examples of public violence that motivated Du Toit and Kotzé's work (2011) was the PAGAD movement. PAGAD was responsible for a series of terror attacks in Cape Town in the 1990s. The acts of violence included attacks against alleged gangsters as well as anyone perceived as a threat to the organisation. PAGAD therefore not only attacked supposed criminal elements, but also targeted the state through attacks on police stations, courts and judges (Isima, 2007:33). One of the organisation's most notorious acts of violence was the public execution of alleged gangster Rashaad Staggie who was shot and set a light (Pillay, 2002:60-63). Alleged criminals such as Staggie were often conceived as evil threats to the community and thus eliminated.

Although PAGAD at times claimed to be a diverse community organisation, its membership and leadership were predominately Muslim (as were many of its victims). PAGAD seems to have conceptualised "community" not just in the local South African sense, but in terms of the *ummah* - the universal community of Muslim Believers. The neighbourhood watch groups out of which the organisation emerged were often organised from mosques. Local *imams* (Muslim religious leaders) often provided leadership and general support. At times PAGAD even endorsed Shari'a law and it was briefly supported by the Muslim Judicial Council (MJC), which acts as an interpreter of Islamic law for Muslim South Africans (Pillay,

2002:60-65). It would appear that PAGAD's worldview and beliefs about evil were at least partly rooted in religious thinking.

Although the example of PAGAD pertains to Islam, Christianity is in fact by far the most common of the Abrahamic faiths in South Africa.²⁶ European missionaries established the Anglican, Dutch Reformed, Methodist and Roman Catholic churches who have an estimated following of over 11.1 million. The African Independent Churches (AICs), of which the Zion Christian Church is the biggest, broke away from the missionary churches in order to preserve traditional cultural practices. The AICs have over 14.5 million members. Pentecostal Christians also separated from the mainline churches in the early 1900s in order to celebrate a more enthusiastic form of Christianity often influenced by American ideas (Rule, 2007:419-420).

As in other parts of the developing world, South Africa has seen a new growth in conservative and fundamentalist Pentecostal sects (SAIRR 2012:81-83; 2014:68). The new Pentecostal and Charismatic establishments have attracted worshippers from the other churches as well as non-believers. Jenkins (2002:63) notes that Pentecostal churches tend to be especially popular among the poorest sections of society. In total, Pentecostal and similar churches have over 6.8 million members. Many of the new churches have been influenced by ideologies from Latin America, Nigeria and other parts of Africa, that are characterised by spiritual revelations received directly from God (supplementing or replacing instructions from the Bible), warfare against evil spirits, miraculous healing and the promise of instant God-given wealth (Jenkins, 2002:63; Rule, 2007:420-421; Comaroff & Comaroff, 2004:528).²⁷

Followers of the Pentecostal sects are encouraged to confront evil as a tangible and malignant force. It is believed that God intervenes in human affairs and believers therefore rely on his direct guidance in their spiritual warfare. Evil can take the form of outright cruelty and injustice, but it can also manifest in more subtle and mundane ways. From this perspective

²⁶Islam has about 673 005 followers (2% of the South African population) (SAIRR, 2014:68).

²⁷Brazil's Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, which opened chapters in South Africa, has promised the public instant material gratification and has also been "rumoured to issue charmed credit cards that register no debt" (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2004:528).

social ills and failed government policy can be interpreted as the work of the devil, which must be confronted with the help of divine intervention (Du Toit & Kotzé, 2011:139).

The existence of a literal evil is also widely accepted in traditional African spiritual beliefs. Although there are many anthropological studies that focus on the practice of witchcraft within African spiritual life, there are few that examine the implications of witchcraft-related violence in contemporary Africa. Among the former type of research, Evans-Pritchard's study (1937) of the Azande in the Sudan has been one of the most influential works on witchcraft in Africa. In the same decade Wilson's study (1936/1979) of the Pondo provided an in-depth analysis of witchcraft practices in South Africa. Her study would be followed by many others.²⁸

In more recent times, scholars like Geschiere (1997; 2008) and Comaroff and Comaroff (1999; 2004) have researched how witchcraft practices in Africa relate to the political and economic forces of modernity. Other works of interest to this study is that of Adam Ashforth (2005b; 2011) and Isak Niehaus (2001; 2012) who examine the tension that witchcraft beliefs create in South Africa's liberal democracy. The work of John Hund (2003) and John Cohan (2011) also provide insight into legal aspects of the witchcraft matter.

The use of words like "witch," "witchdoctor" and "witchcraft" can be considered pejorative as they have negative connotations of evil, crime, backwardness and superstition. Many Africanist academics therefore refuse to use such terminology. Even with the best of intentions, translation can be notoriously distorting (Geschiere, 2008:316). However, the terminology is commonly understood and accepted in South Africa (and beyond) and are also consistently used by scholars like Ashforth (2005b), Niehaus (2012) and Geschiere (2008) who are expert in their field. Geschiere argues that:

"These Western terms have been generally appropriated by African populations: public debates in the media and elsewhere are waged in these terms and so it seems quite futile to refuse to use them. Refusing to address the topic as such because it is politically incorrect seems to be not very helpful either"(2008:316).

These terms will therefore be used interchangeably with their widely known English and Zulu synonyms.

²⁸See for example Hammond-Tooke (1962).

According to African traditional belief, there are various benevolent and malevolent actors, both human and spiritual in nature, who battle each other and make decisions that affect people's lives. (Ashforth, 2010:100). The power of unseen spiritual forces and those who claim to communicate with them, can be accessed for good – personal protection and the solution of problems – or evil. As in Pentecostal Christian belief, evil forces can perpetrate any kind of harm including large-scale suffering such as poverty and disease as well as everyday misfortunes and seemingly random events including suicide and car accidents (Niehaus, 2012:36-37). Evil can also play a role in politics: the Apartheid regime was considered evil and violence was used to fight it. In *Politics Of Evil* (2002) Crais argues that violence was used not just as a tool for regime change, but was also seen as a way of purifying a disordered world by ridding it of evil.

Evil forces can be used not only to cause undeserved suffering, but also for undeserved gain such as self-enrichment and the accumulation of power (Crais, 1998:52). Traditional African belief views good fortune or luck as a finite resource of which everyone receives a portion. If someone is exceptionally successful – especially when there is no known explanation for it – he or she must have obtained more than their fair share of luck. It is assumed that such unfair advantage is obtained through devious or supernatural means (Labuschagne, 2004:193). The unfair appropriation of limited supplies of good fortune occurs to the detriment of others and disturbs the natural order of life. The result is a general fear of individuals who are believed capable of using supernatural means to cause harm (witches) as well as the fear of being too successful and thereby provoking jealousy and allegations of witchcraft (Leistner, 2014:5-18). Witchcraft therefore negatively impacts on the local economy and illustrates how inequality can encourage illiberal attitudes.

The concept of *ubuntu* (from the Zulu saying “*umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu*” – “a person is a person through other persons”) (Christians, 2004:241) is also an aspect of traditional African culture that can contribute to illiberalism. Although often viewed as a form of African humanism, the dark side of this idea that “personhood comes as a gift from other persons” (Schutte, 2001:12) is that people whose behaviour deviate from that of the community and its perceived well-being can become suspect. Although there are inclusive and exclusive

conceptualisations of *ubuntu*,²⁹ according to one exclusive interpretation, the community is entitled to “reject and repel” (Gade, 2012:498) people who lack *ubuntu* or humanity. In some cases communities have been known to attack and even kill such persons. They may include alleged criminals or witches – people who are often described as “anti-social” (Niehaus, 2012:38). Anti-social behaviour can include the accumulation of wealth or status as well as any strange, unpopular, unfriendly, temperamental or miserly behaviour (Cohan, 2011:820-821). The traditional concept of *ubuntu* can thus be fairly different from the ideas of Western individualism and liberalism.

When the natural order has been disturbed, it must be corrected in the same way it was upset: through spiritual intervention. Relations with unseen spiritual entities can and should be managed correctly to ensure a good outcome. The believer must find the appropriate assistance with which to counter evil powers: one of South Africa’s 350 000 traditional healers (Ashforth, 2005b:8), consulted by up to 85% of African households (Cohan, 2011:828). African healing largely concerns battling the evil forces held responsible for both illness and general misfortune.

Traditional healers – also referred to as witchdoctors or diviners – include: *sangomas*, who communicate with ancestors in order to diagnose diseases and address problems relating to personal well-being and spiritual matters (King, 2012:1175); and *inyangas* who use *muthi* to help clients. In reality these categories often overlap³⁰ and among *sangomas* and *inyangas* there are also believed to be witches who use their power for evil and illegitimate ends (Ashforth, 2005a:213-228). In fact, there is a widely recognised conflict of interest regarding traditional health practitioners. They depend on the existence of witches for their revenues and are thus likely to promote the fear of witchcraft among clients. Clients in turn often suspect *sangomas* of being in league with the witches in order to generate revenue (Cohan, 2011:823).

²⁹In his study, Gade (2012) found that some black South Africans view *ubuntu* as a moral quality that everyone is subject to. Others associate the concept only with black people or only with people who behave according to the principles of *ubuntu*.

³⁰Both *sangomas* and *inyangas* give clients *muthi*, which often consists of a purgative substance (Nattrass, 2005:163). *Muthi* is believed to prevent harm, heal suffering and counter evil (Semenya & Letsosa, 2013).

Traditional healers are recognised by the South African government and often cooperate with Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) to promote wellbeing in communities (Gqaleni et al, 2012:129). Traditional health practitioners are often accorded respect similar to that of biomedical doctors and their services are sometimes covered by medical insurance policies (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2004:518). A South African court determined in 2013 that an employer may not take disciplinary action against sick employees who take time off work to visit healers (Narsee, 2013). The court called for more cultural sensitivity in the case of a chef, Johanna Mmoledi, who took time off work to train as a traditional healer. Her decision was triggered by visions of ancestors, illness and fear of misfortune and death if she did not respond to the calling to become a healer. Mmoledi's employer allowed her time off for the training, but dismissed her after she took an additional five weeks leave without permission. The employer did not acknowledge a certificate from a traditional healer as justification for the absence. However, Mmoledi was reinstated through the court's decision.

Various studies have focused on analysing individuals who visit traditional healers, mostly focusing on health-seeking preferences. Such studies (Case et al., 2005:6; Liverpool et al., 2004:824) indicate that many people visit both medical doctors and traditional healers. However, Case et al. (2005:15) found that better educated persons were less likely to seek out traditional healers in the event of short illnesses (though there was no difference with regards to prolonged illness). A 2005 survey of 570 people in Khayelitsha – a large black settlement in Cape Town – also delivered interesting results. The study found that clients of traditional healers were not more likely to have rural backgrounds (Natrass, 2005:171-173). This is in accordance with Ashforth's research (2005b; 2011), which has shown that traditional beliefs and practices are thriving in urban Soweto (Johannesburg). It was also found that *sangoma* clients in Khayelitsha were less likely to state that they had good English reading and writing abilities. They were also more likely to believe that finding a job was a matter of luck (Natrass, 2005:171-173).

Natrass interpreted these findings as evidence that *sangoma* clients were more marginalised in the modern economy and likely to view their situation as a matter of bad fortune. Natrass (2005:173-175) also found that those who visit traditional healers are more likely to be older, less educated, poorer and less trusting of other people. Interestingly, it was also found that receiving a disability grant from the government was the best predictor of whether someone

was likely to visit a traditional healer. Natrass suggests that the likelihood of someone becoming a *sangoma* client “is affected by health-related, attitudinal and material factors” (2005:179). This study examines most of these variables to see if they also relate to attitudes on evil and violence.

Although not all the activities of traditional healers are dangerous, their spiritual beliefs and practices can lead to violence. A report issued by the Commission of Inquiry into Witchcraft Violence and Ritual Murders in the Northern Province of South Africa recorded 389 witchcraft-related deaths (including the mass killing of alleged witches) between 1985-1995 in what is now the Limpopo Province (Ralushai, 1996:191-239). The data only covers the former bantustan³¹ areas of the province and Niehaus considers it “a vast underestimate” (2001:210). Kohnert agrees (2007:42), stating that the violence has reached “hitherto unknown dimensions” and claims that anti-witchcraft movements are responsible for the deaths of thousands of supposed witches in the Northern- and Eastern Cape Provinces. According to Comaroff & Comaroff (2004:514), the rise in the persecution of supposed witches is due to “populist fears of an alarming increase in witchcraft practices, zombie-conjuring, and the traffic in body parts.” Along with the popular need to punish evildoers in general, such fears have led to “hybrid cultural styles of informal justice.”

In pre-colonial times the crime of witchcraft was dealt with by traditional courts who sought reconciliation, ordered compensation or sometimes forced migration (Cohan, 2011:826). Hund (2003:9-10) states that those who were falsely accused were normally cleared while false accusers were fined. He believes that traditional systems of social control kept witchcraft accusations and violence to a minimum. Colonial courts, however, usually dismissed charges of witchcraft because tangible evidence and direct causation could not be established. Today most African countries, including South Africa outlaws the practice of witchcraft (Cohan, 2011:823-827).

The twice-amended Witchcraft Suppression Act of 1957 does not acknowledge witchcraft as a real phenomenon, but still outlaws all witchcraft-related practices. It is illegal to practice witchcraft, to seek to identify witches or make related allegations. South Africa’s courts treat

³¹Bantustans were supposedly independent territories to which black people could be relegated under Apartheid (King, 2012:1180; Lipton, 2014:7).

the belief in witchcraft as a mitigating factor, but generally expects citizens to be in control of their beliefs and actions (Cohan, 2011:849). The Act has largely been ineffective in suppressing witchcraft beliefs and practices. By not acknowledging witchcraft as a reality, it fails to protect those who fear it as well as those accused of it.³² Contrary to the more lenient punishments of pre-colonial times, the fear of witchcraft in the modern era can result in violent vigilantism. In this situation suspected witches no longer have the protection of customary courts and are left vulnerable (Cohan, 2011:823-827).

Scholars of witchcraft generally offer few solutions to the problem. While some believe that harmful beliefs must be quashed (Wilson, 1967:135), others suggest the revival of traditional courts or the establishment of special courts to deal with witchcraft in a sensitive manner (Cohan, 2011:870-871). Hund insists that “traditional structures have all but collapsed” (2003:34) and that most Africans no longer respect traditional courts. He does however, allow for the possibility of special courts, possibly as “appendages to the formal legal system” (Hund, 2003:34-35). Hund also draws attention to the complex nature of such an undertaking: it is unclear how the metaphysics of witchcraft would relate to due process or what role *sangomas* would play in legal procedures.

Tebbe (2007:231-233), using Cameroon as an example, highlights all that can go wrong when witchcraft is recognised as a reality and criminalised: the arbitrary charges and convictions based on little evidence and suspicious testimony pose a threat to the rule of law and notions of freedom and equal citizenship. Ultimately, Niehaus (2001:183) may be right when he states that consensus regarding witchcraft is not possible. There will always be disagreement between those who believe witchcraft is dangerous superstition, those for whom such beliefs have cultural value and those trying to find a middle ground (see Ralushai, 1996).

In addition to traditional healers, troubled South Africans can turn to any number of religious leaders who claim to be in contact with God. It is within this context that the growth of Pentecostal and other religious sects can be understood, because “the most successful religious movements and entrepreneurs in contemporary Africa are those promising

³²In Comaroff & Comaroff (2004:529), Inspector Jackson Gopane with the SAPS is quoted as saying “The law is no good. The courts don’t believe in witchcraft...They should bring a proven witch into the courtroom. That would convince them.”

protection from occult assault” (Ashforth, 2011:141). Although the mainline churches tend to reject witchcraft related practices as superstition (Leistner, 2014:10-11), many of the new churches condemn it as a very real evil and aim to deliver believers from its influence through faith in God, prophets and prayer (Jeannerat, 2009:260-264).

The traditional African beliefs and the fundamentalist Christian interpretations of evil are thus not mutually exclusive: both belief systems as well as Western scientific knowledge may inform the lives of South Africans in contradictory and changing ways (Ashforth, 2005a:216). Whereas Western science can explain what happens and how, it can't explain why. Spiritual paradigms explain why misfortune happens and why it happens to a specific person at a specific time. Spiritual and religious beliefs also provide comfort and reassurance in times of trouble (Norris & Inglehart, 2004:19). It addresses fundamental and existential questions regarding the nature and origin of suffering (Ashforth, 2002:126-127).

According to Jensen (2012:93-95), the above-mentioned interaction between two seemingly dichotomous strands of thought is also evident in South Africa's political culture: on the one hand, formal politics are informed by a liberal, human rights-based political culture; on the other hand, occult or traditional elements have always played a role in popular politics.³³ In fact, the violence sometimes generated by this strand of political culture proved quite helpful in the struggle against Apartheid. Everyday life and politics in South Africa is thus often characterised by the friction of two interacting paradigms: the modern and the traditional, the secular and the spiritual. The problem is not restricted to South Africa, as can be surmised from the ongoing debates on religion and secularism in Europe and elsewhere (see Norris & Inglehart, 2004). However, in South Africa the problem is further complicated by the lack of a single, coherent, unchallenged spiritual explanation for everyday suffering.

African and Christian beliefs have been influenced by different ethnic, religious and medical traditions from around the region and the world. The only consensus is often that unseen evil forces cause very real injury. According to Ashforth (2005b; 2011) the lack of consensus from numerous authorities about what to do in the face of spiritual challenges has resulted in widespread fear and confusion about whom to turn to for explanation and advice. In this state

³³ One recent example is the use of a *sangoma* to bless proceedings during an ANC function in Cape Town (Steward, 2015).

of “spiritual insecurity” (Ashforth, 2011:133) people turn to any number of traditional or religious options or a confusing, contradictory mixture of both. In this context it is possible for over 80% of African households to visit traditional healers (Cohan, 2011:828) and yet only 5% of the South African population identify traditional African beliefs as their primary religion (SAIRR, 2014:70). According to King (2012:1176), people often “pray at the church in the day and visit the *sangomas* at night.”

Lastly, the secular view of evil, which is sometimes shared by liberal Christians, is very different from the spiritual interpretations. It is not believed that suffering and tragedy are caused by spiritual beings. In fact, malicious spiritual entities and literal manifestations of evil are often viewed as superstition (Leistner, 2014:1). In a secular context the word “evil” is often used simply to describe an exceptionally bad act: one that is worse, more unreasonable, more prohibited than standard wrongdoing. “Evil” is thus a condemnation of excessive wrongdoing, not necessarily on a large scale, but borne out of a lack of mercy and conscience or the deliberate silencing of the conscience. Although the secular concept of evil is still disturbing, there is nothing supernatural about it and it is not characterised as an offence against God (Garrard, 1998:44-60).

Despite people’s ability to commit harmful – even evil – acts, in (secular) liberal democracies, humanity is believed to be fundamentally good. Individuals are sometimes flawed or misguided, but they are not viewed as inherently malicious or sinful (Glenna, 2002:207). When people engage in harmful acts, it is because of ignorance or error. The source of evil is perceived as human and it can often be corrected through education (Du Toit & Kotzé, 2011:140-143). The secular view of wrongdoers as misguided rather than truly malicious results in more lenience with regards to correcting their behaviour. Criminals, for example, are to be rehabilitated rather than punished and may therefore receive arguably light sentences (van der Walt, 2004:104). Their inherent human rights remain protected even if they have violated the rights of others.

2.6 Marikana

The Marikana massacre which occurred in August 2012 in South Africa’s Northwest province illustrates not only the socio-economic frustrations and tensions discussed in this chapter, but also the salience of supernatural beliefs. As previously mentioned, South Africa

is no stranger to social protests. Strikes in the mining sector are no exception. South Africa possesses over 80% of the world's platinum resources, which has seen a 350% price increase between 2002-2008 (Bond & Mottiar, 2013:294). Mineworkers generally did not share in the prosperity of the platinum boom and leading up to August 2012, there were several reports of unrest (Van der Vlies, 2013:508).

At Lonmin PLC,³⁴ the world's third largest platinum producer, rock drill operators earned on average \$511 (R5 110) a month and a housing allowance of \$204 (R2 040). As most of the miners in the region are migrants, they often have to maintain two households: their own and that of their family (usually in a rural area). In August 2012, 3 000 Lonmin workers (mostly rock drill operators) went on strike, demanding \$1 420 (R10 420) per month (Bond & Mottiar, 2013:294).

On August 16th the mineworkers gathered on a hill where they had been striking for several days. Over the preceding days the strike had turned violent, resulting in the murder of two policemen, two security guards and several miners. There were also attempts to stop mining operations (De Villiers, 2013:1; Ledwaba, 2013:17-20). However, on the day, the miners were not on Lonmin property. They were nevertheless ordered by police (accompanied by national special commando forces) to leave. The miners, carrying machetes, sticks and other weapons, were surrounded by barbed wire and fired on with teargas and water cannon. At least one miner responded by firing a shot. It is also claimed that the miners charged at the police as they left the hill. The police opened fire, resulting in 34 dead and 78 injured miners while no police were harmed (Bond & Mottiar, 2013:292-293; Van der Vlies, 2013:508-509).

The massacre at Marikana exposes the fault lines of poverty and lack of socio-economic transformation as well as class tensions between workers and elites. The massacre provided political capital for extremist politicians such as Julius Malema of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), who has gained popularity by exploiting the ruling ANC's failures (Van der Vlies, 2013:510). Marikana also illustrates the supernatural beliefs common in South Africa. Some of the striking miners had visited a traditional healer, from whom they bought *muti*.

³⁴One of the company's shareholders, the Shanduka Group, is owned by ANC stalwart and South African Deputy-President Cyril Ramaphosa (Van Der Vlies, 2013:510-511).

The miners relied on the *muthi*,³⁵ traditional rituals and help from ancestors for protection against bullets (Starkey, 2012:27). The *sangoma* had charged about \$100 (R1 000) per person for the *muthi* and had also offered the men bee swarms and lightning strikes to defend them against the police (Jika, 2013:89). The miners' belief in their own supernatural invincibility and invisibility has been identified as the reason why they allegedly charged at heavily armed police (Bond & Mottiar, 2013:293; Van der Vlies, 2013:511).³⁶

Journalist Lucas Ledwaba provides an in-depth description of one of the rituals mentioned above:

“On Saturday night 11 August, striking men gather on the banks of a stream near the koppie. Under cover of darkness, they strip naked and undergo a ritual reminiscent of those undertaken by warriors over centuries. Supervised by a medicine man, they roast two live sheep, one black, one white, over a fire. Incisions are made on their ears, cheeks, backs, thighs, and feet with a razor blade, and ashes from the fire, mixed with herbs, are rubbed into the wounds. This, they are told, will make them invincible. A firearm is produced and shots are fired [unsuccessfully] at a box smeared with the concoction³⁷[...]The men are now ready for war” (Ledwaba, 2013:17).

Even after the deaths of 34 of the miners, it was still believed that the *muthi* had been effective. It was credited for earlier successes in skirmishes against the security guards and police. Many also believed that the weapons of the guards and police had malfunctioned, due to the *muthi* (Jika, 2013:89). Some of the miners believed the reason for the deaths of their colleagues was that they had not completed all the necessary rituals. Tholekile Mbhele was quoted as saying, “I was right next to Mambush [one of the dead miners] when they fired the shots – but look at me, I don't have a single scratch on my body, because I had gone through all the rituals” (Jika, 2013: 90). Mbhele is reportedly a religious man, who prayed to God before having participated in the rituals. After the massacre, he and others sought out a different *sangoma* in order to procure even better protection.

Although the media and authorities have been accused of using the miners' beliefs to portray them as irrational and violent (Bond & Mottiar, 2013:293), it is nevertheless of great significance that spiritual beliefs could play such a central role in South Africa's deadliest

³⁵The *muthi* reportedly consisted of animal fat and herbal mixtures (Starkey, 2012:27), although the Marikana commission of inquiry also found that a tongue had been removed from one of the murdered security guards for the purpose of making the *muthi* (Ledwaba, 2013:19).

³⁶The *sangoma* whose sons were involved in the Marikana matter as well as several mine union employees were subsequently murdered before they could testify at the commission of inquiry (De Villiers, 2013:3-5).

³⁷Police have suggested that dummy bullets may have been used to fool the miners (Ledwaba, 2013:17).

police action since Apartheid (Van der Vlies, 2013:508). The events at Marikana remind not only of the well-known political massacres perpetrated by the Apartheid state,³⁸ but also of other historical massacres involving supernatural beliefs.

Parallels have been drawn with the 1921 Bulhoek massacre in the Eastern Cape where the self-proclaimed prophet Enoch Mgijima and his followers (up to 3 000 people) had gathered on private land to await an apocalyptic war. They relied on divine protection against the 800-strong police force that showed up to disperse them (Anthony, 1990:415-416). More than 200 believers were killed in the violence that followed, while others, including Mgijima, were arrested (Madondo, 2012). Marikana has also reminded some commentators of the notorious cattle killings of 1856 (Van der Vlies, 2013:511) in which the visions of a teenaged prophetess, Nongqawuse, drove the Xhosa nation to kill their cattle and destroy their crops. The expectation was that dead Xhosa warriors would arise and drive out British colonists. Instead a famine resulted that decimated the population and ensured victory for the British (Davies, 2007:19-20).

2.7 Conclusion

It is clear that South Africa's democracy faces many challenges with regards to consolidation. As a member of the third wave – and taking Dahl's preconditions (1971) into account – South Africa will have to pay attention to economic development and the problem of inequality as well as the state of its political culture. If the country's diverse citizens are to enjoy democracy's promise of peace, they will need to embrace the system's liberal values. How this is to be accomplished is not a problem unique to South Africa. In fact, many societies are grappling with how to reconcile conflicting values.

On the one hand liberalism calls for respect of non-Western cultures, especially in light of a long history of Western racism and colonialism. On the other, a liberal system can only tolerate what are considered reasonable deviations that do not violate fundamental human rights. Attempts to accommodate traditional healing while condemning witchcraft-related violence have been criticised as self-defeating as it is not possible to eradicate the violence while accommodating the ideologies in which it is rooted (Niehaus, 2001:189). By attempting

³⁸For example, the Sharpeville massacre of March 1960 in which police fired on political protesters, killing 69 and injuring more than 180 people (Wagner, 2011:486).

to accommodate traditional practices the state also risks becoming entangled in the ambiguities that characterise them (Geschiere, 2008:315).

It is also not advisable to simply ignore the issue in the hope that the values and institutions of liberal democracy will erode it. Witchcraft-related beliefs are simply too common, too much a part (and subtext) of everyday life and too adaptable to new contexts, to simply disappear. To ignore the matter is likely to lead to vigilantism as there is no provision made for persons who hold suspicions and fears of witchcraft (Jensen & Buur, 2004:198-199). The lack of legitimate channels for dealing with witchcraft is evidently part of the problem of South Africa's spiritual insecurity. However the problem is addressed, it will have to be done in a clear and uniform way, leaving no space for alternative authorities or interpretations.

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This study seeks to discover, describe and explain the characteristics of South Africans who believe in evil and who may choose to act on this belief. The research questions can best be answered using methodological triangulation (Hussein, 2009:3-4). Statistical analysis of the WVS's longitudinal studies in South Africa enable the identification of the potential predictors of belief in evil. Six categories of variables will be analysed in an attempt to identify the traits of believers in evil: demographic as well as socio-economic variables, trust and tolerance factors, LOC variables, attitudinal measures and religiosity. A qualitative analysis of the findings will also add value to the interpretation of the data.

The quantitative and qualitative aspects of the thesis both rely on the use of secondary sources. The key sources in question are the WVS data of 2006 and 2013 as well as the numerous studies mentioned throughout the thesis. This chapter includes a discussion on the research designs and methodologies relevant to the present study. Attention is also given to the conceptualisation and operationalisation of important variables.

3.2 Survey research

Survey research is the most common method of data collection in the social sciences (Bradburn & Sudman, 1988:61). A relatively large sample of respondents – representative of an even larger population – is chosen to answer a set of questions. The answers are numerically coded and analysed (Singleton & Straits, 2010:263). This form of research provides insight into how often a characteristic may be present in a population. It enables researchers to make generalisations about a population by studying a sample of that population (Singleton & Straits, 2010:9-10). The survey method can be used in the study of most subjects and has the advantage of freeing researchers “to ask the questions they want to ask when and where they want to do so” (Brady, 2000:48).

Well-administered surveys are the most effective method of describing a population as they can provide a wealth of detailed and accurate information about large groups of people (Singleton & Straits, 2010:270). Surveys can be administered in various cost effective, indirect ways (over the phone, Internet or through the post) (Fink, 2003:1-30), but face-to-

face interviews are preferred. Face-to-face interviews are more expensive and time-consuming, but result in higher response rates and allow for longer and more complex questionnaires (Neuman, 2011:339). Personal interviews by well-trained professionals give researchers a measure of control over the survey process and help to eliminate a lot of confusion and bias that might occur in self-administered surveys. The use of standardised questionnaires and procedures also counter any bias that might occur on the part of interviewers with regards to how and when they question respondents (Payne & Payne, 2004:130).

Surveys are often the only way to gather in-depth information on intangible issues such as opinions, beliefs or emotions. It is also a very effective way to learn about behaviour (past, present or future). However, there is a risk that respondents might tailor their answers to suit perceived expectations or social norms. Survey research leaves little room for direct observation and is therefore largely dependent on the respondents to be truthful (Singleton & Straits, 2010:270-271). Survey data can be compromised when respondents are unwilling to cooperate or are unable to remember important information. Although surveys can be used to study a wide range of topics, the survey procedure is very structured. Standardised procedures and methods result in answers that are easy to quantify and compare, but the research process cannot easily be adapted to changing circumstances or new concerns once it is underway. Researchers are able to obtain answers to their questions, but not necessarily the wider context of those answers (Babbie, 2008:303).

Analysing survey data enables researchers to discover patterns of association between variables. It is however more difficult (than in, for example, scientific experiments) to establish causation between variables.³⁹ In analysing survey data, it is more difficult to manipulate variables and exclude rival explanations when trying to determine a causal relationship (Singleton & Straits, 2010:271). It is also often the case that statistical analysis “provides evidence for average effects rather than evidence that some particular cause results in a particular effect” (Crasnow, 2012:658). Scholars may therefore use statistical methods to establish that one variable tends to affect another, but when studying specific events or situations, qualitative research can still offer a lot of descriptive and explanatory power. This

³⁹Association between variables is defined as “a connection between two social phenomena, demonstrated by one tending to vary according to variations in the other.” Causality is “a special case of association” in which changes in one variable “systematically result in direct changes in the other” (Payne & Payne, 2004:13-14).

study therefore makes use of statistical methods to look for relationships between variables and turns to qualitative methods for context.

3.3 Longitudinal research

Survey research can be either cross-sectional (the data is collected at only one point in time) or longitudinal (the same questions are asked at more than one point in time). Longitudinal surveys are more expensive than cross-sectional studies, but are also considered more reliable because they provide repeated evidence of relationships between variables and are more accurate when studying patterns of change in a population over time (Singleton & Straits, 2010:273). Longitudinal studies can be designed in various ways depending on the research aims. Researchers can choose to question the exact same individuals repeatedly over time (panel studies) or use different samples to track changes within a group that shares the same life experiences at the same time (cohort studies) (Singleton & Straits, 2010:273-276). Data can also be collected from different people over time – either regarding a specific subject such as opinions on a political candidate (trend studies) (Babbie, 2010:107) or simply in general (time series studies) (Neuman, 2011:44-46).

Although the WVS is a time series study that now includes six waves of investigation over more than 30 years (WVS, 2008:2), the questions pertaining to evil have only been included in the last two waves. Although this provides a vital source of information on the subject, there are some limitations in only being able to draw from two waves of study. According to Ployhart & Vandenberg (2010:97) one such limitation is that:

“All change from Time 1 to Time 2 is by default linear [...] and it is impossible to determine the form of change over time. It is merely an increment of difference between two times, and thus we cannot assess whether change was steady or delayed or whether it plateaued and then changed again.”

Two waves of inquiry into the belief in evil is thus a limitation in the sense that it does not provide a history of this social phenomenon (Payne & Payne, 2004:144). It also makes it harder to speculate about possible future trends. However, given the fact that research into the matter is at an early stage, this particular limitation is likely to be remedied in the future. Future waves of study will no doubt provide more information on the long-term trends of these beliefs and might even correct possible mistakes of earlier research. In the absence of

knowledge on this topic to begin with, this study lays a groundwork on which others can build.

A final concern with regards to longitudinal research is that variables may be conceptualised – and measured – in different ways over time (Perry, 2011:156). The relevance of a question may also change over time. A question nevertheless has to be asked in the same way each time in order for comparisons to be possible.

3.4 Secondary data analysis

Secondary data analysis refers to the analysis of data that was originally collected by someone else (Singleton & Straits, 2010:268). The focus is thus on reinterpreting the data of others, often with different research questions in mind. Although primary data analysis – where researchers are personally responsible for the entire research process, including the collection, analysis and presentation of their data – was the dominant approach to social research in the past, secondary data analysis has become very popular.

The 1970s saw the “advent of surveys designed expressly for the purpose of making high quality data available to the social science research community” (Singleton & Straits, 2010:268). The availability of high quality secondary data as well as the reality of financial constraints have contributed to the popularity of secondary data analysis. It is thus not uncommon today for researchers to use the data of others in their work and “the potential for accomplishing original research with precollected data is nonetheless tremendous” (Kiecolt & Nathan, 2012:21).

It is nevertheless important to take note of possible differences in research design when using data not originally collected for one’s intended purpose. Different research projects are conducted with different aims in mind and with different theoretical bases. This may have an impact on the methodology used, the conceptualisation of variables and how they are measured. It can even impact the quality of the data and the conclusions of a study (Stewart & Kamins, 2012:17-21). It is well-known that the choice of methodology can have a significant impact on findings. For example, when studying behaviour, researchers often obtain different results with direct observation than they do when they ask people to self-report on their actions. Differences in conceptualisation and measurement can have similar

effects on the end results. It is necessary to carefully assess measurement techniques, units of analysis, research samples and response rates to make sure that secondary sources are truly usable (Thorne, 1998:6-7). Seemingly relevant and credible studies can still be inappropriate for certain research purposes.

Another factor to consider when examining secondary data is time. Researchers naturally want to access the latest and most conclusive data, while avoiding data that has become obsolete. There is a period of time that passes between data collection and publication. One has to keep in mind that freshly published data may not be quite as new as it appears. It is also important to consider factors that may affect results at certain times and not others. For example, survey respondents may be exceptionally sensitive to an issue if it happens to be a highly publicised and debated matter at the time of the interviews. During other times – when the subject in question is not really being discussed publically – people may feel less strongly about it (Stewart & Kamins, 2012:22-23). The decision of when to measure a phenomenon can therefore impact a study and users of secondary data may be unaware of potential implications.

An additional challenge of secondary research is that the researcher tends to be “removed from the context of the original research” (Thorne, 1998:7-8) and thus runs a bigger risk of being accused of misrepresentation or misappropriation of data. The researcher therefore has a responsibility to not only use secondary sources in an ethical manner (Brewer et al., 2012:174), but also to evaluate the implications of varying research designs and to ensure the quality and relevance of the information that is used. This is done by studying the original data collection process, how information was categorised and summarised, how threats to the credibility of the research were managed and how conclusions were ultimately reached (Thorne, 1998:4-8).

Stewart and Kamins (2012:17-19) advise a healthy scepticism in the evaluation of secondary sources. It is important to know why the research was conducted and by whom. Knowledge of the original investigators can inform the researcher of their qualifications and reputation, their possible biases and the credibility of their work. It is also necessary to know what data was collected as well as when and how. Such information can indicate the relevance and quality of the data. One can also compare one’s secondary data with other sources to see if

findings have been replicated elsewhere. It must be ascertained that the secondary data is relevant, credible, timely, accurate and affordable (Kolb, 2012:114-115). Even petty errors in the original research procedures can affect the end result of a study. Such small errors can be magnified when data is used for a purpose other than the original researchers intended (Kiecolt and Nathan, 2012:25).

Fortunately, Boslough (2010:1330-1331) notes that the quality of secondary data tends to be high and that the methodologies employed by original researchers are usually well-documented. Stewart and Kamins (2012:19) confirms that it is the norm for “sources of high integrity” to provide plentiful information – such as copies of measurement instruments, questionnaires and coding forms - regarding the research process. Other researchers can thus determine the adequacy of the information for their own work. This is certainly the case with regards to the WVS, which provides ample information on the technical aspects of the surveys (WVS, 2007).

Although the use of secondary data leaves the researcher without control over important parts of the research process (including quality control, the content of questionnaires and research design), the benefits of this method, as mentioned in Chapter One, are significant. This is particularly true with regards to time, effort and money saved (Brewer et al., 2012:174). Finding appropriate datasets for secondary analysis can be difficult, but it takes considerably less time and resources than initiating a new investigation. Secondary analysis can be done independently, with no need to hire staff or secure funding from organisations (whose objectives or demands may have a detrimental effect on the project) (Kiecolt & Nathan, 2012:23).

It is the researcher’s assertion that the qualitative and quantitative data used in this study meet the requirements and standards discussed above. The fact that the South African edition of the WVS was conducted with the present research topic in mind, renders its datasets appropriate. The WVS is well-established, respected and covers a wide range of beliefs and behaviour, which enables its effective use in a broad range of secondary research projects (WVS, 2008). There is no doubt that it qualifies as a source of high integrity and quality.

3.5 Description of datasets

The World Values Survey Association (WVSA) is a non-profit association situated in Stockholm, Sweden. It was founded under the auspices of leading social scientist Ronald Inglehart. The primary goal of the WVSA is to enable a better understanding of national and global changes in people's beliefs, values and motivations (WVS, 2008:2-3). The Association has therefore established a global network of social scientists who study the aforementioned changes by carrying out representative national surveys as well as sharing and studying the results.

Each national survey is headed by a member of the WVSA who acts as the principle investigator. He or she is responsible for carrying out the survey in his/her country as well as for the analysis and interpretation of results. The principal investigator shares the data with other social scientists, policy makers and the public. The WVS therefore allows all stakeholders and interested parties to assess a society's changing values and its possible impact on social, political and economic life (WVS, 2008:2-3).

The WVS studies are designed with input from experts around the world. Questionnaires are largely similar across countries in order to make cross-national studies possible. However, as previously discussed, principle investigators are able to insert their own questions as well. The fact that the investigators conduct their work in their own countries, means that they are knowledgeable about local circumstances. They can therefore design and implement the research process in a manner that suits the society in question. They can also share their experiences and research techniques with their fellow social scientists, resulting in the worldwide dissemination of data and methodological techniques. (WVS, 2008:2-4).

Although the surveys are designed with the input of WVSA members from around the world, all the principal researchers must ensure that the World Values Survey Executive Committee's (WVSEC) rules and procedures are followed. The rules and procedures include (WVS, 2008:2-4; WVS, 2005):

- Face-to-face interviews carried out by a local research organisation and supervised by academic researchers.
- Interviews conducted in local languages (questionnaires have to be translated).

- The use of random probability samples (as far as possible)⁴⁰ that are also nationally representative.⁴¹
- A minimum sample size of 1 000 persons.
- The WVSEC's acceptance of the sampling and documentation procedures of each national survey before data collection begins.
- The completion of designated checklists by the responsible research organisation in order to report on the fieldwork.
- Internal consistency checks during the survey process.
- The WVS data archive's extensive data-cleaning measures.
- The deliverance of complete documentation to the WVSA.

When the procedures above have been adhered to, the national survey is officially included in a WVS wave. South Africa has participated in the WVS since its inception and is therefore included in all six waves of the study. Researchers studying South Africa can therefore draw on WVS datasets from 1982, 1990, 1995, 2001, 2006 and 2013 (WVS, 2013). The questionnaires administered in each wave are largely – but not entirely – the same. This study's key questions were only included in 2006 and 2013. The focus will therefore be on the latest two datasets.

3.5.1 The 2006 dataset

The fifth wave of the WVS in South Africa was conducted in November and December of 2006 by Ipsos Markinor. The lead investigators were Mari Harris and Professor Hennie Kotzé. 2 988 South African residents (male and female respondents, 16 years and older) were personally interviewed in their homes. The languages employed were Afrikaans, English, North Sotho (Pedi), South Sotho, Tswana, Xhosa and Zulu. The respondents were representative of the population and chosen by means of random probability sampling (WVS, 2006b). The survey took place in urban and rural areas of all nine South African provinces. The data was also weighted to accurately represent the South African population.

⁴⁰Once researchers have established a sampling frame (a list or approximation of cases in a population), a mathematically random method is used to select the cases to be interviewed. In random probability sampling, each sampling element of the population has an equal chance of being selected as part of the sample (Neuman, 2011:246-249).

⁴¹Data may be weighted to correct for the under-representation of certain groups in the sample. When a variable is weighted (multiplied by a certain number), it's influence in the sample increases to accurately reflect the realities of the population in question (Neuman, 2011:223-224; Field, 2013:886).

Prior to the start of the interview stage of the survey, all interviewers received training from Ipsos Markinor's sampling expert. Interviewers were fully briefed and participated in mock interview sessions before fieldwork began. Once fieldwork began, interviewers were accompanied by supervisors, quality control officers and field coordinators. The quality control officers and field coordinators back-checked 30% of the sample and spot-checks were also conducted while fieldwork was in progress (WVS, 2006b).

3.5.2 The 2013 dataset

The sixth wave of the WVS – once again conducted under the auspices of Harris and Kotzé - took place between August and October 2013. A nationally representative sample of 3 531 adults were interviewed in the aforementioned South African languages. The Face To Face Computer Assisted Personal Interview (CAPI) method was used to execute the survey. Interviews were personally conducted and answers entered into the CAPI computer. Paper copies of the questionnaire were available for use in instances of electricity failure or absence. According to Ipsos (2013), the CAPI methodology provides results that are highly representative of the population. Ipsos also estimates that the margin of sampling error⁴² is 1.65%. Researchers can be 95% confident that the true opinion of South Africans fall within a margin of 1.65% of either side of the survey results (Ipsos, 2013:14-26). The data was also once again weighted to represent the population.

As was the case with the 2006 survey, the field workers who conducted the sixth wave were experienced and well-trained. They completed the Ipsos training course (including training in probability sampling and questionnaire administration) and passed competency tests. Field workers were thoroughly familiarised with all aspects of the study (including sampling and respondent selection) and once again participated in mock interviews before taking to the field. Once fieldwork was underway, the 192 fieldworkers reported to 20 supervisors who in turn informed the field coordinators of the progress made and challenges encountered. 17.75% Of the interviews were back-checked for quality control purposes (Ipsos, 2013:14-29).⁴³

⁴²Sampling error reflects how much the sample differs from the real population. The use of random sampling enables the researcher to calculate how big the sampling error is (Neuman, 2011:248-249).

⁴³Excluding further checks made by supervisors to confirm respondents' details.

3.6 Conceptualisation and operationalisation of variables

The study of values is an attempt to measure the intangible. In order to do so one needs very clear, conceptual definitions of the relevant values (conceptualisation) as well as trusted ways in which to measure them (operationalisation). Researchers who want to study intangible matters that cannot be directly observed and easily measured, have to:

“Obtain an estimate indirectly by using a surrogate measure that is observable and assumed to be related to the more interesting phenomenon. The critical assumption of such indirect measurement techniques is that there is a relationship between the observable measure and the unobservable event of interest. Even when this assumption is correct, however, the relationship may be decidedly less than perfect” (Stewart & Kamins, 2012:20).

Researchers therefore need to have confidence in the validity and reliability of the measures they use, thereby ensuring minimal measurement error (Field, 2013:12). Validity refers to correctness or truthfulness: whether scientific measurement is an accurate reflection of reality. Validity is lacking when the ideas used to analyse a society differ significantly from the lived experience in that society. Reliability is broadly defined as the dependability or consistency of the results obtained (Neuman, 2011:207-208). If measurement techniques have an undue influence on results, the results may be unreliable and unlikely to be consistent with that of other studies.

Neuman (2011:208-214) distinguishes between four main types of measurement validity: face validity, content validity, criterion validity and construct validity. He also mentions three types of reliability: stability reliability, representative reliability and equivalence reliability. Face validity occurs when there is consensus in the scientific community regarding which indicators measure which constructs. It is quite common for consensus of the definitions and measurement of constructs to be lacking (Stewart & Kamins, 2012:20-21). Inconsistent results are therefore often due to simple differences in how a concept is defined rather than disagreement of the actual nature of the subject under study.

Content validity refers to whether all aspects of a definition are represented in a measure. If a construct is defined as consisting of three specific elements, the measure must accurately measure all three elements – the entire content of the definition. If only part of the construct is measured, the researcher will have low content validity. In such cases, Neuman (2011:212-

213) suggests that the measure must either be expanded or the definition narrowed in order to obtain content-validity.

Criterion validity is when a researcher uses objective criteria to establish that an instrument does indeed measure what it claims to measure (Field, 2013:12). Researchers can establish that an instrument or indicator is valid by comparing its results with that of a trusted indicator (for example, one that has face validity) (Neuman, 2011:213). When researchers record data while using both the trusted indicator and the one being tested, they are assessing concurrent validity. When data from the new indicator is used to predict future observations, researchers are assessing predictive validity (Field, 2013:12). Concurrent and predictive validity are both subtypes of criterion validity.

Finally, construct validity refers to measures with multiple indicators. There are two types of construct validity: convergent and discriminant. Convergent validity occurs when many indicators are associated with each other and tend to converge. If researchers measure a construct and find that all the construct's indicators converge, there is strong convergent validity. Discriminant validity occurs when a construct's indicators not only converge, but are also negatively associated with an opposing construct. For example, one would expect the indicators of political conservatism to converge and to be negatively associated with the indicators of liberal political attitudes (Neuman, 2011:213-214).

The three kinds of reliability refer to whether one's measures are reliable (deliver the same answers) across time (stability reliability), across different subpopulations (representative reliability) and when using multiple indicators to measure the same construct (equivalence reliability) (Neuman, 2011:208-209). The variables used to measure values in this study are reliable across time and across the subpopulations of South Africa. The variables are also valid in terms of face validity (their conceptualisation is widely accepted and makes sense) and content validity (they measure what is intended).

3.6.1 Evil

Evil as a belief is conceptualised in two ways in this study, namely the literal and the secular definitions as discussed in Chapter Two. The belief in a literal evil is defined as the belief in real (if unseen), malignant spiritual forces that can cause real and direct harm in the lives of

individuals. Secular evil is conceptualised as an entirely non-spiritual phenomenon characterised by wrongdoing on the part of flawed human beings. In the WVS (2006a; 2013) respondents are asked to strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree with three statements regarding evil:

- “Evil is everywhere”
- “Evil can take possession of some people”
- “The community must get rid of people possessed by evil even if it means that they have to be killed”

As explained in Chapter One, all believers in evil can agree with the first statement – it therefore measures the belief in evil in general. The other two statements specifically refer to evil as a force that can take possession of people. These statements are therefore meant to measure only belief in literal evil. Evil is thus included as a categorical variable in this study. With regards to the latter two statements, it should be noted that although the statements were formulated with the intention that respondents interpret evil literally, one cannot be sure of such interpretation. A figurative understanding of “possession” may still have been possible on the part of some respondents. However, regardless of literal or figurative interpretation, there is no mistaking the serious nature of the third statement. This statement measures support for the harsh and violent punishment of evil-doers. It is therefore of relevance as an illiberal value regardless of the individual understanding of evil.

3.6.2 Demographic and socio-economic variables

The first category of variables to be analysed in conjunction with evil is that of demographic variables. The demographic variables largely consist of characteristics that individuals acquire because of birth or socialisation. Race in the South African context – referred to as “ethnic group” by the WVS (2006a;2013) – has four categories relevant to the majority of the population: black, white, coloured and Indian. Although “other” is also a response category, it is selected so rarely that it has been excluded from analysis. Other demographic variables include ethnic community and home language as well as sex, age and province.

The socio-economic variables to be analysed include marital status, level of education, class and household income. The 2006 WVS also asked respondents whether they considered themselves to be poor or not (self-reported poverty). However, the 2013 survey omitted this

particular question and only the 2006 data can therefore be looked at. Lastly, respondents were asked – in 2006 and 2013 – whether they receive a government grant. This question is included in the analysis.

3.6.3 Trust and tolerance

Although not considered preconditions of democracy, trust and tolerance are nevertheless strongly associated with it. Trust and tolerance have often been studied by scholars of democratic consolidation as both constructs are widely recognised as very good indicators of political culture (Garcia-Rivero et al., 2002:163). Citizens in a democracy do not rule directly, but through representatives and various government and other institutions. Democracy therefore requires high levels of trust in institutions and people. Although citizens of a democracy are required to be vigilant against abuse of power - and therefore need to be suspicious and even distrustful of those in power (Warren, 1998:96) - if people harbour extensive distrust of the majority of the actors in the system, democracy begins to weaken. For the purposes of this study, only social trust (trust in people rather than institutions) is analysed.

Sztompka's definition of social trust as a "bet about the future contingent actions of others" (1999:2) implies a risk that others' actions may be harmful. The definition can therefore be extended as the "belief that others will not deliberately or knowingly do us harm, if they can avoid it, and will look after our interests, if this is possible" (Newton, 2004:17). Social trust is considered necessary for the effective functioning of civil society. As already discussed in Chapter Two, a dynamic civil society is considered a feature of a healthy democracy (Steenekamp, 2011:88-89).

The WVS includes a number of questions meant to measure social trust: respondents are asked whether most people can be trusted or whether one needs to be careful of others. Answers range from 1 (most people can be trusted) to 10 (need to be careful). There is also a "don't know" category which has been excluded (as missing data) from analysis. Steenekamp (2011:93) draws attention to some of the weaknesses of this measure, including the lack of social context to the question and the fact that respondents can't distinguish between trust in family, friends, strangers and so on. The measure is nevertheless recognised as the standard indicator of social trust.

Additionally, respondents are also asked whether the following people can be trusted (completely, somewhat, not much or not at all): family, neighbours, people of other race groups, people who are personally known to the respondent, people one meets for the first time, people of another religion, foreigners, black people, coloured people, Indians, whites, Chinese people, politicians, businesspeople, friends (WVS, 2006a & 2013).

Tolerance is simply defined as “putting up with something that one does not like” (Vogt, 1997:1). Tolerance requires people to support the rights of those they may not like or approve of for whatever reason. It can be an indication of how willing people are to accept different or unpopular groups and political opponents. Tolerance is therefore closely linked to the acceptance of the rules of a democratic system (Garcia-Rivero et al., 2002:170). Although the dislike of others may stem from prejudice, it does not become intolerance until discriminative action is taken against the people in question (Steenekamp, 2011:94). Tolerance can therefore be seen as an act of “intentional self-restraint in the face of something one dislikes, objects to, finds threatening, or otherwise has a negative attitude toward – usually in order to maintain a social or political group or to promote harmony in a group” (Vogt, 1997:3).

Vogt (1997:17-20) distinguishes between three types of tolerance: political, moral and social. Political tolerance applies to public acts of a political nature such as public speeches, rallies and campaigning. Moral tolerance refers to acts in the private sphere, for example, unmarried couples living together, homosexuality and abortion. Lastly, social tolerance is tolerance of people who are perceived as different due to qualities they are born with (such as skin colour) or acquire at an early age (language, for instance). These individuals are sometimes discriminated against not necessarily because of the above-mentioned qualities as such, but because of the inappropriate behaviour that people may associate with those who have these qualities (Steenekamp, 2011:95).

Tolerance is often measured by asking survey respondents to express dislike towards a variety of target groups (Garcia-Rivero et al., 2002:171). In the WVS, respondents are therefore presented with the following target groups and asked whom they would not want as their neighbours: drug addicts, people of another race, people with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), immigrants or workers from another country, homosexuals, people who practice another religion, heavy drinkers, unmarried couples who live together, people who speak

another language, black people, coloured people, Indians, white people (WVS, 2006a & 2013).

The measures above are indicators of moral and social tolerance. The present study does not attempt to analyse political tolerance. The only potential concern with regards to measuring tolerance is that there may very well be a difference between a respondent's professed tolerance and their lived reality. It is nevertheless an accepted and recognised way to measure tolerance: it is believed that the measures genuinely reflect tolerance or intolerance where it exists, regardless of the fact that the actual behaviour of respondents remains unknown (Garcia-Rivero et al., 2002:171; Steenekamp, 2011:97-98).

3.6.4 LOC

LOC is a psychological construct that was developed to study people's perceived levels of control over their lives as well as the influence that this perception may have on their subsequent behaviour and expectations (Rotter, 1966 & 1975). The LOC variables thus aim to measure beliefs regarding how much control people think they have over the outcomes of their lives. While some people feel that the outcome of their lives is largely determined by their own actions, others believe that external factors determine positive or negative outcomes. Broadly speaking, analysing LOC can shed light on possible feelings of insecurity or even helplessness among South Africans. It is also a useful concept in light of the traditional African view of good fortune as an allotted portion (that others can interfere with) rather than the result of individual effort.

Respondents were asked to answer the following questions on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being the most negative answer and 10 the most positive:

“Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair?”

“All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?”

“Some people feel they have complete free choice and control over their lives, while other people feel that what they do has no real affect on what happens to them. Please use this scale [...] to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns out.” (WVS, 2006a)

The fourth LOC question asked people to rate their overall level of happiness and provided several response categories: very happy, rather happy, not very happy, not at all happy and do not know (excluded).

3.6.5 Attitudinal factors

This category of variables measured attitudes and beliefs that could potentially have a bearing on the belief in evil. Each of the four questions in this category was answered on a scale of 1 to 10. Respondents were asked if the death penalty is ever justifiable. They were also asked to express their satisfaction with their household financial situation. The last questions in this category asked respondents' views on hard work (whether hard work brings a better life or whether success is a matter of luck and connections) and wealth (whether people can only get rich at the expense of others or whether wealth can grow so that there is enough for everyone). Details of the recoding of these and other variables are included in Chapter Four.

3.6.6 Religiosity

Four variables of the WVS's questions on religion were chosen to measure how religiosity may impact on the belief in evil. Respondents were asked how important God and religion were in their lives. They were also asked if they belonged to a church or religious organisation. Lastly, respondents were asked about how often they attend a religious organisation.

3.7 Conclusion

This chapter reviews the methodology used in the present study as well as the limitations and challenges faced in pursuit of the research aims. The thesis relies on data obtained from the WVS's well-established longitudinal survey research. It is therefore a secondary analysis of the WVS data, but it also offers qualitative explanation. The strengths and weaknesses of the chosen methodology have been discussed and the researcher believes that the former outweighs the latter.

This chapter also includes detailed descriptions of the relevant datasets as well as information on the conceptualisation and operationalisation of key variables. The data used in this study is of high quality and from a source of high integrity. The variables can also be considered

reliable and valid in all the ways that are applicable. There is thus every reason to have confidence in the results of the study.

CHAPTER FOUR: DATA ANALYSIS

4.1 Introduction

The following chapter presents the statistical analysis of the data from the 2006 and 2013 waves of the WVS in South Africa. The data analysis consists of univariate (frequencies), bivariate (crosstabulations) and multivariate (multiple regression) analysis presented in tables and figures as appropriate. The findings are also briefly discussed, although further qualitative interpretation is presented in chapters five and six.

As previously mentioned, the dependent variables in this study are the three statements on evil. The study attempts to find predictors for these dependent variables. The potential predictors have been categorised into six groups or models: demographic, socio-economic, trust and tolerance, LOC, attitudinal and religiosity (as discussed in Chapter Three). The most significant results from the crosstabulations with each group of variables are presented first. The multiple regression analysis conducted on the six models follow in a separate section.⁴⁴ Comparisons of the 2006 and 2013 findings are also made.

Univariate analysis is the simplest form of quantitative analysis. It describes the distribution of attributes that comprises a single variable. Univariate analysis is therefore a count of the attributes of a variable (Babbie, 2010:462). For example, gender usually has two attributes – male and female. Univariate analysis executes a count of each and shows how frequently each attribute occurs – thus how many respondents are male and how many are female.

Bivariate analysis indicates whether there is a relationship between two variables. This is done by examining the pattern or distribution of responses for both variables. Two variables are related when:

“The distribution of values for one variable is associated with the distribution exhibited by another variable. In other words, the variation exhibited by one variable is patterned in such a way that its variance is not randomly distributed in relation to the other variable” (Bryman & Cramer, 2009:199).

This study’s bivariate analysis consists of crosstabulations, for which Chi-Square tests were carried out to indicate whether the results were statistically significant or simply a matter of

⁴⁴All figures have been rounded and percentages may not always add to 100 as a result. Where necessary the response categories “don’t know” and “refused” have been coded as missing data and excluded.

numerical chance. In order for the findings to be significant, the Sig. value of Pearson's Chi-Square has to be .05 or less (Pallant, 2011:219). All the findings below are statistically significant unless otherwise stated. The Chi-Square test does not indicate the strength of a relationship, but merely whether a finding occurred by chance or not (Bryman & Cramer, 2009:205-211). To find the strength of relationships – or effect size – the appropriate statistical tools were selected depending on table size and type of variable.⁴⁵ An effect size of .1 (or thereabouts) indicates a weak relationship, while .3 and .5 respectively indicate moderate and strong relationships (Pallant, 2011:220).

Multiple regression analysis (a form of multivariate analysis) is used to find out how well a group of (usually continuous) independent variables can predict a continuous dependent variable. It provides the researcher with information about the model (or group of variables) as a whole as well as the individual contributions of each variable in the model. It gives an idea of the predictive power of the model - stating how much of the variance of the dependent variable is explained by the independent variables. It also indicates which particular variable in the model is the best predictor. Multiple regression analysis can also indicate whether a variable is still able to predict a certain outcome when another variable's effects are controlled for (Pallant, 2011:148-153). Multiple regression analysis includes tests of statistical significance and results that are not significant (where the Sig. value is more than .05) have been clearly marked in the relevant tables.

4.2 Evil

A basic univariate analysis was carried out on the three questions in the WVS that measure belief in evil. The response categories were collapsed into three options: agree, neutral and disagree.⁴⁶ Tables 4.1 and 4.2 below show that the belief in evil has remained stable in South Africa from 2006 to 2013. Indeed, the belief that evil is everywhere was affirmed by over 85% of respondents in both waves of the WVS. At least 80% of respondents also affirmed the belief that evil can take possession of some people.

The most significant finding is the number of people who agreed that the community must get rid of evil people even if they have to be killed (Table 4.3). Whereas roughly a third of

⁴⁵For larger tables, Cramer's V was selected to test the strength of relationships between nominal variables or a nominal and an ordinal variable. Gamma was used when two ordinal variables were analysed.

⁴⁶Categories 1 and 2 were recoded as 1 (in other words 1+2=1), category 3=2, categories 4+5=3.

South Africans (32%) agreed with the statement in 2006, over half (55%) were in agreement in 2013. The general belief in evil has therefore remained very high, while the belief that evil persons need to be removed has become more widespread. One could even argue that the general belief in evil seems to be entrenched and that South Africans are perhaps hardening their attitude toward perceived perpetrators of evil.

Table 4.1 Evil is everywhere

Evil is everywhere	2006	2013
Agree	89%	86%
Neutral	6%	9%
Disagree	6%	5%
Total	100%	100%

Table 4.2 Evil can take possession of some people

Evil can take possession of some people	2006	2013
Agree	87%	80%
Neutral	9%	15%
Disagree	4%	6%
Total	100%	100%

Table 4.3 The community must get rid of people possessed by evil even if it means that they have to be killed

The community must get rid of evil people	2006	2013
Agree	32%	55%
Neutral	20%	20%
Disagree	47%	25%
Total	100%	100%

4.3 Demographic factors

As discussed in Chapter Three, the demographic variables that were analysed as possible predictors of the dependent variables were as follows: ethnic group (race), ethnic community, home language, sex, province and age.


4.3.1 Race

Table 4.4 below shows the racial identity of the WVS respondents. The racial demographics of the surveys more or less correspond with that of the South African population.

Table 4.4 Race

Race	2006	2013
Black	80%	77%
White	11%	12%
Coloured	7%	9%
Indian	2%	3%
Total	100%	100%

Crosstabulations revealed weak relationships between race and evil.⁴⁷ No particular race group is thus significantly more likely to be in agreement with the three statements. A closer look at the data does however reveal some points of interest. While all four race groups had similar levels of agreement for the first statement in 2006, the situation changed somewhat in 2013 (see Figure 4.1 below). Most significantly, there was a 10% drop in agreement among white respondents and a smaller decrease among coloured people.


Figure 4.1 Evil is everywhere: agreement according to race

Although support for the second statement (Figure 4.2) decreased among all race groups, white and coloured people once again stood out with significantly decreased support. Support among both demographics dropped by more than 10%: 13% among white respondents (to 75%) and 14% among coloured respondents (to 72%). Support was comparatively higher among black (82%) and Indian (81%) people. Although the relationships are weak, it seems that support for the first two statements might be decreasing among the white and coloured

⁴⁷Cramer's V for the 2006 crosstabulations were 0.03 (Evil Is Everywhere), 0.04 (Evil Can Take Possession Of People) and 0.1 (The Community Must Get Rid Of Evil People). For 2013 it was 0.1 for all the relationships.


demographics. It is also possible that their support is decreasing a little sooner and/or faster than among the other groups. It remains to be seen whether the pattern persists in the future.

Figure 4.2 Evil can take possession of people: agreement according to race



With regards to the third variable (Figure 4.3), all races showed a marked increase in their support for getting rid of evil people. Support was strongest among black respondents - approximately 58% of whom agreed with the statement. Support among the other race groups was roughly 46%. Indians, whose initial support for the statement was weak (12%), showed the biggest increase – a rise of approximately 35% to 47%.

Figure 4.3 The community must get rid of evil people: agreement according to race



4.3.2 Ethnic community


Table 4.5 Ethnic community

Ethnic community	2006
English	6%
Afrikaans	8%
Zulu	20%
Xhosa	13%
North Sotho/Pedi	9%
South Sotho/Sesotho	8%
Tswana	10%
Tsonga/Shangaan	3%
Venda	2%
Swazi	2%
Ndebele	1%
Black	8%
White/European	1%
Coloured	5%
Indian	2%
South African	2%
Total	100%

It is only in the 2013 WVS that South Africans were asked to identify their ethnic community. Response categories consisted mostly of race and ethno-linguistic groups. Most South Africans identified with their ethno-linguistic groups. Very few respondents chose to identify themselves in terms of race. For example, although black respondents comprised roughly 77% of the total number of respondents, only 8% chose to identify as black (Tables 4.4 and 4.5). Similarly, although about 12% of the respondents were white, only 1% identified as such. A mere 2% of the respondents identified as South African. Whenever possible South Africans had a clear preference for identifying themselves in terms of a language group that almost always overlapped with ethnicity.


In the first crosstabulation – with “evil is everywhere” (Figure 4.4) – the highest levels of agreement was among those who identified as black (approximately 94% agreement), Indian (93%) and South Sotho (91%). Those who tended to agree the least were people identifying as white or European (66%) and English (75%). There is clearly a considerable difference in agreement among the former and latter groups.

Figure 4.4 Evil is everywhere: agreement according to ethnic community




The highest levels of agreement for the second statement was found among the following groups: black (88%) and South African (87%) as well as Tsonga/Shangaan and South Sotho (86% for both). The lowest levels of agreement were once again found among those who identified as white (64%) and English (68%) as well as coloured (69%). See Figure 4.5 below for further reference.

Figure 4.5 Evil can take possession of some people: agreement according to ethnic community



Analysis of the third statement (Figure 4.6 below) revealed that, yet again, the respondents who described themselves as black had the highest level of agreement: about 73%, which is well above the 55% agreement for South Africans as a whole (Figure 4.3). The North Sotho respondents had the same level of agreement for this particular statement. The lowest level of agreement was found among coloured respondents: 35%. This is, relatively speaking, an exceptionally low level of agreement. The English respondents once again also had a relatively low level of agreement (roughly 43%) and so did the Shangaan (45%).

Figure 4.6 The community must get rid of evil people: agreement according to ethnic community



Bivariate analysis of evil and ethnic community does seem to reveal a few patterns: the comparatively small number of respondents who primarily identify as black – rather than as a specific ethno-linguistic group – have the highest level of agreement for every statement. Sotho respondents – whether Pedi or Sesotho - also tend to record high levels of agreement. On the other hand, English respondents stand out with consistently low levels of agreement.⁴⁸

4.3.3 Language

Eleven official languages are spoken in South Africa (Table 4.6) with Zulu being the most common mother tongue.⁴⁹ Weak relationships were found between home language and the

⁴⁸The effect size for the three statements were, respectively, .2, .1 and .2 – thus indicating weak relationships.

⁴⁹Also see SAIRR (2014:71).


dependent variables. However, some of the relationships were stronger than those between the beliefs in evil and race.⁵⁰

Table 4.6 Home languages spoken in South Africa

Home Language	2006	2013
English	10%	11%
Afrikaans	11%	15%
Zulu	25%	23%
Xhosa	18%	15%
North Sotho/Pedi	10%	10%
South Sotho/Sesotho	8%	9%
Tswana	9%	9%
Tsonga/Shangaan	4%	4%
Venda	3%	2%
Swazi	2%	2%
Ndebele	1%	1%
Total	100%	100%

The belief that evil is everywhere is very strong among all language groups (Figure 4.7). The levels of agreement range from 76% for Swazi speakers to 95% for Sesotho speakers (in 2006). Swazi speakers consistently have the weakest agreement (76%-77%).

Figure 4.7 Evil is everywhere: agreement according to language group




⁵⁰The effect size for the relationships in this section is .1 (weak). The only exception is the 2006 data for “The Community Must Get Rid Of Evil People” and “Home Language,” which has an effect size of .2 (weak).

The highest consistent agreement for both data sets come from Zulu and Sesotho speakers (over 90% agreement in 2006 and 2013). Tswana speakers show the biggest drop in agreement from 91% in 2006 to 78% in 2013 and Ndebele speakers show the biggest increase: 80% in 2006 to 92% in 2013.


Agreement with the second statement (Figure 4.8) is also generally very high. However, many groups registered a significant decrease in support: agreement decreased by 10% or more among English (68%), Tswana (74%), Venda (73%) and Swazi (75%) speakers. In fact, agreement declined among English and Swazi speakers by as much as 18%, with the former group indicating the least enthusiasm for this statement. The groups that did not register a decrease, tended to show stable levels of agreement.

Figure 4.8 Evil can take possession of some people: agreement according to language group



All language groups indicated a significant increase in support for the third statement (Figure 4.9 above), with the exception of Tswana speakers who were in very strong agreement to begin with. As with the previous statement, English speakers were least enthusiastic (42% agreement) even though they are twice as supportive in 2013 than they used to be. The highest levels of agreement can clearly be found among Sotho (66%-69%), Ndebele (63%) and Tswana speakers (62%).

Figure 4.9 The community must get rid of evil people: agreement according to language group



When taking all three crosstabulations into account, Sotho speakers seem to stand out in their consistently high agreement to the statements on evil. The relationships are not strong, but they do present a persistent pattern.

4.3.4 Province

As can be seen from Table 4.7, most respondents in the WVS are residents of South Africa’s most populous provinces: KZN and Gauteng. In contrast, only 1%-2% of respondents are from the Northern Cape.

Table 4.7 Population according to province

Province	2006	2013
Gauteng	19%	23%
Mpumalanga	7%	7%
KZN	21%	21%
Western Cape	9%	10%
Eastern Cape	16%	13%
Northern Cape	1%	2%
Free State	6%	6%
Limpopo	12%	11%
Northwest	9%	7%
Total	100%	100%

Although many provinces recorded a noticeable increase or decrease of support for the first statement, the Northwest registered the most noteworthy result: agreement fell by 15% from a high of 90% to 75% - the lowest figure. In addition, KZN shows the greatest support (96%) in 2013, but it appears to be the Northern Cape and the Free State that are the most consistently supportive across time, with levels of agreement ranging between 91%-96% (Figure 4.10). KZN (86%-88%), the Northern Cape (90%-91%) and the Free State (85%-87%) also show the greatest consistent support for the second statement (Figure 4.11). In contrast, agreement has fallen significantly in the Western Cape (by 26% to 63%), Mpumalanga (by 17% to 75%) and the North West (by 16% to 72%).

Figure 4.10 Evil is everywhere: agreement according to province






Figure 4.11 Evil can take possession of some people: agreement according to province



In Figure 4.12 one can see that the belief in getting rid of evil people has grown greatly in almost every province. The only exception is the Northern Cape where agreement fell from an astonishing 73% in 2006 to 45% in 2013. The province therefore went from having the most support for eliminating evil people to having the least. Apart from the Northern Cape, the provinces that stand out as showing consistently strong agreement are the North West and Limpopo. These two provinces had the strongest support in 2013 (about 69% and 65% respectively) and also had strong agreement in 2006 (55% and 40%).⁵¹

Figure 4.12 The community must get rid of evil people: agreement according to province



4.3.5 Other demographic variables

Two other demographic variables were analysed: sex and age.⁵² The crosstabulations for sex and beliefs regarding evil revealed no great differences in the attitudes of men and women. Similarly, age seems to have no real impact on the beliefs in question (when only taking crosstabulations into consideration).

⁵¹The relationships between evil and province were weak, although the 2013 data had a bigger effect size (.2 compared to .1 in 2006) with regards to the first two “evil” statements. For the last statement there was an effect size of .2 in 2006 and .1 in 2013.

⁵²Age was recoded into three categories: 16 to 30 years=1; 31 to 50=2; 51 or older became 3.

4.4 Socio-economic variables

It is often believed that the more formal education people obtain, the less likely they are to hold supposedly irrational or superstitious beliefs. Level of education was used to test this assertion,⁵³ which according to Ashforth (1996:1217-1218) is erroneous. Analysis found that South Africans' strong belief in evil is not affected by education. The relationships that were found were so weak as to be meaningless and often the minor differences in opinion were in favour of less educated respondents. This study can therefore confirm that Ashforth is right: education does not affect beliefs in evil, at least not in South Africa.

Household income⁵⁴ was also analysed to test whether a rise in income leads to a decrease in the belief in evil. This analysis tests the assertion that prosperity leads to a decline in spiritual and religious endeavour (Norris & Inglehart, 2004:3-4). However, crosstabulations indicated little to no relationship between income and attitudes on evil. As with level of education, relationships were very weak and did not show that higher income groups generally expressed different opinions than low income groups. Similarly, the analysis of (self-reported) class found no differences between the upper, middle and lower classes.⁵⁵

In 2006, respondents were asked whether they considered themselves to be poor, not poor or "something in the middle." Only a relatively small difference in agreement was found with regards to the third statement, with those who identified as poor showing somewhat greater agreement (37%) than the other two groups (28%-30%). The lack of data from 2013 made further bivariate analysis impossible. Analysis of the class and poverty variables can therefore not be said to indicate that an increase in material wellbeing affects attitudes on evil.

Analysis with Marital Status produced mixed results across the two data sets. No particular group was consistently more likely to agree with any of the statements. There was, however, a general decrease in agreement for the first two statements and an increase in agreement for the third. The last socio-economic variable that was analysed was whether or not people

⁵³Level of education was recoded into five categories: None; Primary School; High School Or Secondary School; Other Qualification; University/Professional. To achieve this the 2006 data was recodes as follows: 1=1; 2+3=2; 4+5=3; 6+7+11+12+13=4; 8 to 10=5. Response categories for 2013 were different and so was the recoding: 1=1; 2+3=2; 4 to 7=3; 10=4; 8+9=5.

⁵⁴Six income categories were created: R0-R899 (20+21=1); R900-R3999 (15 to 19=2); R4000-R7999 (11 to 14=3); R12000-R18999 (4 to 7=4); R20000+ (1 to 3=5).

⁵⁵The original five response categories (excluding "don't know") were recoded into three: 1+2=1 (Upper Class); 3+4=2 (Middle Class); 5=3 (Lower Class).

receive a government grant. The question was not included in the 2013 WVS. No noteworthy relationships were found with the 2006 data.

4.5 Trust and tolerance

4.5.1 Generalised trust

In the WVS respondents were asked whether they think most people can be trusted or whether one needs to be careful of others. The respondents have been divided into three groups: those who think most people can be trusted, those who think they need to be careful of others and a group that is neither too trusting nor too cautious. It is clear from Table 4.8 that most South Africans are not very trusting: only a minority of 4%-6% believe that most people can be trusted. In 2006 a majority of almost 60% believed they needed to be careful of others. In 2013 this figure decreased to approximately 46%, with a similar number of people opting to neither trust too much nor to be overcautious.

Table 4.8 Generalised trust

Generalised trust	2006	2013
Most people can be trusted	4%	6%
Neither too trusting nor too cautious	37%	48%
Need to be careful	59%	46%
Total	100%	100%

The analysis of generalised trust with the first statement (Figure 4.13) found a high level of agreement among everyone in 2006 (89%-91%). In 2013 the more trusting groups showed a small decrease in fervour while the least trustful did not. A similar pattern was detected for the second statement in 2013: the most trusting people registered a big decline in support (from 93% to 71%). The less trusting the group, the smaller the decrease: the moderate group's agreement fell by only 7% to 77% and the distrustful group did not really register a noteworthy decrease at all. The most distrustful people thus show the strongest agreement (85%-88%) – see Figure 4.14 below. The 2013 data indicates that the more trustful South Africans may be experiencing a decrease in belief in evil. The pattern may have to be studied further in the future.

Figure 4.13 Evil is everywhere: agreement according to generalised trust






Figure 4.14 Evil can take possession of people: agreement according to generalised trust



As can be seen in Figure 4.15, support for getting rid of evil people was highest among the most trusting respondents in 2006 (44%). Their level of support remained stable. In contrast the other two groups show a significant increase in agreement of at least 20%. Those who are very careful in their dealings with others show the greatest support for the third statement in 2013: about 59%.

Figure 4.15 The community must get rid of evil people: agreement according to generalised trust




To conclude, by 2013 the least trusting respondents generally show the greatest belief in evil (see Figures 4.13-4.15).⁵⁶ There does therefore appear to be a connection between generalised trust and evil: distrustful people are somewhat more likely to express a belief in evil and a desire to fight it.

4.5.2 Interpersonal trust

Univariate analysis of the interpersonal trust variable (Figure 4.16) showed that South Africans generally trust the people they know and love: family (96%-98%), neighbours (73%-75%) and friends (72%-77%). South Africans expressed less trust in people they've only recently met (31%-41%). The level of trust in immigrants/foreign workers and Chinese people (about 33% for both groups) is also very low. This is perhaps unsurprising given the xenophobic attacks that periodically occur in the country. Trust in people of other nationalities is higher (49%). It may be that this category is at least partly associated with Western tourists and not only foreign workers from Africa and Asia.

⁵⁶Unfortunately the relationships are weak. For Generalised Trust and the first statement the effect size is: .1 (2006) and -.2 (2013). For the second statement: -.1 (2006) and -.3 (2013) – the latter indicating at best a weak to moderate relationship; Finally, .1 (2006) and -.1 (2013) for the third “evil” variable.

Figure 4.16 Interpersonal trust



Several relationships of weak or moderate strength were found between Interpersonal Trust and attitudes regarding evil. All the relationships revealed the opposite of what may be expected: the most distrustful people showed the lowest levels of agreement. In the case of trust in family, the same pattern was found for all three statements in 2013.⁵⁷ In other words, South Africans with high levels of trust in family, also show high levels of belief in evil and support for fighting it. Other variables (trust in new people, trust in politicians and trust in business people) showed similar patterns, but only with the third statement.

4.5.3 Tolerance

To measure tolerance respondents were asked which persons they would not like as neighbours. Respondents were presented with a number of possibilities that are meant to measure moral and social tolerance. South Africans' preferences can be viewed in Table 4.9. South Africans prove to be most intolerant toward the targets that measure moral tolerance.

⁵⁷Effect size for the three relationships are as follows: Statement 1) -.1 and .6 (2006 and 2013 respectively); 2) .1 and .4; 3) .03 and .1.

For example, drug addicts and heavy drinkers do not make popular neighbours, with disapproval rates of approximately 86%-91% and 60%-69% respectively.

Table 4.9 Moral and social tolerance

Whom do you not want as neighbours?	Do not want as neighbours	
	2006	2013
Drug addicts	91%	86%
People of a different race	8%	19%
People with aids	7%	18%
Immigrants/foreign workers	25%	41%
Homosexuals	46%	38%
People of a different religion	5%	16%
Heavy drinkers	69%	60%
Unmarried couples	10%	15%
People who speak a different language	8%	15%
Black people	1%	15%
Coloured people	9%	17%
Indian people	14%	20%
White people	9%	16%

Although South Africans are generally more socially tolerant, their acceptance of those who are different has declined. There seems to be a general rise in intolerance in this respect, but most significantly towards immigrants, people of a different race and people of a different religion. In 2006 roughly a quarter of respondents did not want immigrants or foreign workers as neighbours. The figure rises to over 40% in 2013. Intolerance toward those of a different race also increased by over 10% to about 19%. All race groups in South Africa were less accepted by their peers in 2013 than they used to be. However, intolerance rose most sharply toward black people: the most accepted group in 2006 was no more tolerated in 2013 than other groups. People of a different religion are also less tolerated: in the past only 5% of South Africans rejected them as neighbours; in 2013 the figure rose to more or less 16%. Various relationships were found with crosstabulation, but they were always limited to one or other of the datasets and could not be detected a second time. No long-term patterns could therefore be established.

4.6 LOC

Analysis of the LOC variables aimed to find relationships between people's sense of control (or lack thereof) over their lives and the beliefs and attitudes on evil. It seems plausible that

people who feel they have little control over their lives might blame external factors – like evil forces - for their troubles. Unfortunately, none of the variables in this category confirmed this expectation. In fact, two variables – exploitation and fairness (in which respondents indicated whether they think most people will treat them fairly or take advantage of them) and satisfaction with life – indicated the opposite. The people most inclined to believe in fairness and those who were very satisfied with their lives were more likely to agree that evil people must be eliminated. The relationships were weak and in the case of satisfaction with life, limited to 2006. Analysis of the other two variables in this category – self-reported happiness and choice and control (in which people were asked if they thought they had choice and control over their lives) – did not reveal any relationships.⁵⁸

4.7 Attitudinal variables

This category includes four variables meant to measure South Africans' attitudes toward the following: capital punishment, wealth, hard work and the state of their household finances. The results are presented below.⁵⁹

4.7.1 The death penalty

It stands to reason that people who think evil persons must be removed from the community – violently if necessary – would also be supportive of the death penalty. South Africans' general views on capital punishment are presented in Table 4.10. It was found that people were about evenly divided over the death penalty in 2006: almost half of South Africans were against capital punishment and everyone else thought it was justifiable (either sometimes or always). However, by 2013 support for the death penalty seems to have grown by

⁵⁸As mentioned in Chapter Three, three LOC variables were answered on 10-point scales and thus recoded in the same or similar manner as Generalised Trust (see footnote 12). In the case of Exploitation And Fairness (1 to 3=3; 4 to 7=2; 8 to 10=1), category 1 was labelled as "People Would Try To Take Advantage Of You," and 3 as "People Would Try To Be Fair." Satisfaction With Life was recoded in the same manner as Exploitation And Fairness, with 1="Completely Satisfied" and 3="Completely Dissatisfied." Choice And Control was recoded exactly like Generalised Trust (footnote 12) and the categories labelled as 1="No Choice" and 3="A Great Deal Of Choice." Category 2 was in all cases a neutral category. Self-Reported Happiness had four response categories and was not recoded.

⁵⁹All attitudinal variables were answered on a scale of 1 to 10 and all were recoded like Generalised Trust (footnote 12): 1 to 3=1; 4 to 7=2 and 8 to 10=3. The death penalty variable was relabelled as follows: category 1="Never," 2="Sometimes" and 3="Always." Hard Work: 1="Hard Work Brings A Better Life," 2="Combination Of Factors" and 3="It's A Matter Of Luck And Connections." Views On Wealth: 1="People Get Rich At The Expense Of Others" and 3="Wealth Can Grow So There's Enough For Everyone." Satisfaction With Household Finances: 1="Completely Dissatisfied" and 3="Completely Satisfied." Category 2 was in all cases a neutral category.


approximately 10%: over 60% of respondents proved in favour while those who thought it was never justifiable fell to about 39%.

Table 4.10 Support for the death penalty

Is the death penalty ever justifiable?	Year	
	2006	2013
Never	49%	39%
Sometimes	29%	35%
Always	22%	26%
Total	100%	100%

Bivariate analysis– in the form of crosstabulation - could only find a relationship with the third statement. Differences in opinion were minimal in 2006 (Figure 4.17), but as agreement rose, opinion became more divided.⁶⁰ The data – especially in 2013 - indicates that the stronger the sentiment in favour of the death penalty, the stronger the agreement to get rid of evil people is likely to be. The greatest supporters of the death penalty show significantly more agreement (64%) than those who tend to reject it (49%). Those who are more supportive of capital punishment are thus somewhat more likely to believe evil persons must be eliminated.

Figure 4.17 The death penalty and evil



⁶⁰This is also reflected by the different strength of the relationships in 2006 and 2013. The effect size for the 2006 data is -.1 – there is thus a weak relationship between support for the death penalty and support for the third statement. The effect size for 2013 is -.2, indicating a stronger (yet still weak) relationship.

4.7.2 Views on hard work

The hard work variable measured whether South Africans believe success is an eventual result of hard work or whether it is due to luck and the right connections. The expectation was that those who view the world in terms of good and evil forces, might be inclined to hold such forces responsible for success and failure.

Table 4.11 Views on hard work

Does hard work bring a better life?	Year	
	2006	2013
Hard work brings a better life	58%	36%
Combination of factors	30%	46%
It's a matter of luck and connections	12%	18%
Total	100%	100%

Whereas most South Africans used to think that hard work brings a better life (58% in 2006), this belief has declined to 36% in 2013. In 2013 the majority of people (46%) indicated that neither just hard work nor luck alone can bring a better life. A minority of 12%-18% thought luck and connections necessary to obtain a better life (Table 4.11).

Figure 4.18 Hard work and evil




Figure 4.18 presents the results of the crosstabulation between “views on hard work” and “the community must get rid of evil people” (the only relationship found). In 2006 there is a clear pattern of opinion between people who have faith in hard work, people who do not and those of divided opinion. About a quarter of the first group agrees that evil people must be removed;

more than a third (37%) of the more neutral group holds this view and over half (56%) of people who believe in luck and connections are in agreement. The pattern is still present in 2013 and each group has experienced a rise in agreement. Among those who believe in hard work, agreement has doubled to roughly 50%. The neutral group has also experienced a significant increase in agreement (to 56%). Those who think success is due to luck and connections had a very high level of agreement to begin with and show a smaller rise in agreement of about 7% to 63%.

Despite the fact that the above-mentioned relationships are rather weak,⁶¹ they do indicate a pattern. It seems that people who do not believe hard work will bring them a better life are more likely to support the third statement on evil. It should however be kept in mind that agreement rose to high levels among everyone.

4.7.3 Other attitudinal variables

Satisfaction with household finances and views on wealth had similar relationships with the third “evil” statement. In both cases the most positive group registered the highest degree of agreement. The relationships were weak and with regards to the views on wealth, limited to 2006.

4.8 Religiosity

Variables analysed in this category include the importance of religion, membership of a religious organisation, religious attendance (of a church or other religious organisation), importance of God and self-reported religiosity. Only “importance of God” revealed relationships with the relevant statements on evil during the crosstabulations. Univariate analysis did however provide interesting information on religiosity in general.

At first glance it might appear that religion has declined in importance in South Africa (Table 4.12). Indeed, the proportion of people who think religion is very important has decreased from 70% to 57%. However, the proportion of South Africans for whom religion is important in general (either very or rather important) is still extremely high: 85%-90%. The proportion of people who think religion is not important (10%-15%) has not increased significantly. It

⁶¹Effect size for 2006 is -.3 (thus indicating at best a weak to moderate relationship) and -.2 for 2013 (weak).

would therefore seem that for some people religion has become less important, but not at all unimportant.

Table 4.12 Importance of religion

How important is religion in your life?	2006	2013
Very important	70%	57%
Rather important	20%	29%
Not very important	7%	10%
Not at all important	3%	5%
Total	100%	100%

Similar to the importance of religion, it would seem that the importance of God has also decreased to a certain degree.⁶² South Africans who think God is very important have decreased by about 23%. Those who think God is neither very important nor unimportant have more than doubled to 34% in 2013 (Table 4.13). It would seem that God – just like religion - has become less important, though not unimportant, to a large number of people. Furthermore, the majority of South Africans (over 80%) are members of religious organisations (Table 4.14 below). In fact, over half of the population are active members. According to the data on religious attendance for the period 2006-2013, roughly 55%-62% of South Africans claim to attend a religious organisation at least once a week.

Table 4.13 Importance of God

How important is god in your life?	Year	
	2006	2013
Very important	87%	64%
Neither very important nor unimportant	12%	34%
Not important	1%	2%
Total	100%	100%

Table 4.14 Membership of religious organisation

Religious membership	2006	2013
Active member	51%	56%
Inactive member	31%	25%
Don't belong	18%	19%
Total	100%	100%

⁶²Importance Of God was originally answered on a ten-point scale and was recoded in the same manner as Exploitation And Fairness (see footnote 16). The new response categories were labelled as follows: 1="Very Important" and 3="Not Important" with category 2 being the neutral category ("Neither Very Important Nor Unimportant").

Crosstabulations revealed a relationship between “evil is everywhere” and “importance of God.” In both 2006 and 2013, agreement was highest among those to whom God is most important (89%-91%) and lowest among those to whom God is not important (70%-77%) – see Figure 4.19 below. The same pattern was found with regards to the second statement, but only in the 2013 data set (Figure 4.20). Whereas the results from 2006 were mixed, in 2013 those to whom God is most important were most likely to agree (85%) and the other groups were less likely to do so (72%).

Figure 4.19 Evil is everywhere and importance of God






Figure 4.20 Evil can possess people and importance of God



Agreement to the third statement (Figure 4.21) runs counter to the above-mentioned pattern: in 2006 those to whom God is not important were most likely to agree (42%). The people to whom God is very important were least likely to do so (32%). In 2013 there was an overall 55%-61% level of agreement among everyone.⁶³

Figure 4.21 The community must get rid of evil people and the importance of God



The final variable that was analysed in this category was self-reported religiosity in which people were asked if they were religious, not religious or atheist. In both datasets a similar number of respondents described themselves as religious (80%), not religious (17%-18%) and atheist (1%-2%). Crosstabulation – as seen in Figure 4.22 – indicated that agreement with the first statement was similar among everyone in 2006. However, in 2013 the religious group's agreement remained at a high level (88%) while the atheist group's agreement dropped (to 73%). The group that is neither religious nor atheist is in the middle with roughly 80% agreement.

⁶³The relationship between the first statement and Importance of God is very weak in 2006 (with an effect size of .03), but moderate in 2013 (.4). For the second statement the effect size is .2 in 2006 and .3 in 2013. Finally, the last relationship has an effect size of -.2 in 2006 and -.1 in 2013.

Figure 4.22 Evil is everywhere: agreement according to self-reported religiosity






Figure 4.23 Evil can take possession of some people: agreement according to self-reported religiosity



The second statement (Figure 4.23 above) revealed the exact same pattern: although agreement was the same for everyone in 2006 (87%-89%), in 2013 the level of agreement seems to be a reflection of the respondents' religiosity. There is an 82% agreement rate among the religious and a 72% agreement rate among those who are not religious, but are also not atheists. The agreement level of the atheist group is approximately 66%, which is relatively low.

Figure 4.24 The Community Must Get Rid Of Evil People: Agreement According To Self-Reported Religiosity



Agreement with the third statement revealed a more curious pattern. In this instance, atheists reported more agreement in 2006 than the other respondents did: a high 54% agreement compared to the 32%-34% agreement of others. In 2013 agreement once again takes on the familiar pattern as discussed above. It is once again highest among the religious (56%). Those who are neither religious nor atheist record a similar level of agreement of 53%. Atheists again have the lowest agreement (more or less 46%). See Figure 4.24 above.⁶⁴

In conclusion, it would seem that those who are more religious are more likely to believe in the general existence and powers of evil. The need to remove evil persons is, however, rather more general and less strongly associated with religion.

4.9 Multiple regression

In the previous part of the chapter potential predictors for evil were sought through crosstabulations. Although some variables were shown to be related to the dependent variables, many were rather weak in this respect. However, multiple regression analysis makes further investigation possible by examining the predictive power of the study's models as well as the individual variables.

⁶⁴The effect size for the first statement and Self-Reported Religiosity is .1 (weak) in 2006 and .3 (weak/moderate) in 2013; For the second statement it is -.015 (extremely weak) in 2006 and .3 (weak/moderate) in 2013; For the third statement it is -.1 in 2006 (weak) and .3 (weak/moderate) in 2013.

Presented in the multiple regression tables are the standardised regression coefficients – or beta values – for each relationship in the analysis. These figures describe the relationships between the variables by indicating their strength as well as their direction (thus the effect size). The bigger the beta value, the stronger the relationship. The bigger values therefore indicate which variables make the “strongest unique contribution(s) to explaining the dependent variable, when the variance explained by all other variables in the model is controlled for” (Pallant, 2011:161).

The beta values range between -1.0 (meaning a perfect negative relationship between the variables in question) and 1.0 (a perfect positive relationship). According to Dalton (2008:265-266), values under .1 (whether positive or negative) can be considered weak; values between .1 and .2 indicate relationships that are moderate in strength and the values that are above .2 indicate strong relationships. A value can be negative or positive depending on the direction of the relationship of the variables in question. A positive beta value means that both variables in the relationship are moving in the same direction: as the value of one increases, so does the value of the other. A negative value indicates the opposite: as the value of one variable increases, the value of the other decreases.

In addition to the standardised regression coefficients, the regression tables also provide the R Square values for each model. A model's R Square is an indication of how much of the variance of the dependent variable can be explained by the model (Pallant, 2011:160). In other words, the R Square value gives an idea of the explanatory power of the model with regards to the dependent variable.

The multivariate analysis is presented in two tables: Table 4.15 presents the 2006 data and Table 4.16 contains the 2013 data. The results from each data set are discussed separately and then compared.

4.9.1 Predictors of evil 2006

Table 4.15 Predictors of evil (2006)

	Evil is everywhere	Evil can take possession of people	The community must get rid of evil people
Model 1: Demographics			
Ethnic group/Race	.011*	-.036	-.021*
Home language	.045	.024	-.004*
Province	-.061	-.031	.073
Sex	.041	-.019	.009*
Age	.035	.002*	-.034
R	.066	.046	.175
R Squared	.004	.002	.031
Adjusted R Squared	.004	.002	.030
Model 2: Socio-economic variables			
Marital status	-.066	-.043	-.034
Level of education	.000*	-.053	.003*
Household income	-.095	.044	.025*
Class	.139	.113	.019*
Self-reported poverty	-.096	-.132	-.139
Government grant	-.056	-.018	.008*
R	.154	.132	.200
R Squared	.024	.018	.040
Adjusted R Squared	.023	.017	.039
Model 3: Trust and tolerance			
Generalised trust	-.026	-.006*	.016
Trust in family	-.006*	-.004*	.059
Trust in neighbours	-.022	.038	-.014*
Trust in other races	-.077	-.044	-.050
Trust in known people	.012*	.056	-.048
Trust in new people	.131	.039	.147
Trust in people of other religions	.036	.053	.005*
Trust in foreigners	-.012*	.025	.000*
Trust in black people	-.064	-.011*	.007*
Trust in white people	.101	.031	.114
Trust in coloured people	-.049	-.074	-.122
Trust in Indian people	-.033	-.025*	-.097
Trust in politicians	-.001*	-.022	.055
Trust in business people	-.025	-.025	.097
Trust in friends	.040	.025	-.045
Tolerance of drug addicts	-.009*	.025	.027
Tolerance of other races	.011*	-.037	.018
Tolerance of people with Aids	-.021	.037	-.030
Tolerance of immigrants	-.001*	-.043	-.041
Tolerance of homosexuals	.011*	-.004*	.008*
Tolerance of other religions	.042	.037	-.009*
Tolerance of heavy drinkers	.023	-.004*	.046
Tolerance of unmarried couples	-.074	-.024	-.003*
Tolerance of speakers of other languages	-.023	-.002*	-.070
Tolerance of black people	.009*	.014*	.016
Tolerance of coloured people	.010*	.090	.031
Tolerance of Indian people	.097	.055	.054
Tolerance of white people	-.028	-.017*	.037

R	.246	.228	.349
R Squared	.060	.052	.122
Adjusted R Squared	.058	.050	.120
Model 4: Locus of control			
Advantage versus fairness	-.029	-.002*	.048
Self-reported happiness	.047	.061	-.024
Satisfaction with life	.019*	-.074	.049
Choice and control	-.028	.018	-.034
R	.253	.239	.365
R Squared	.064	.057	.133
Adjusted R Squared	.062	.055	.130
Model 5: Attitudinal variables			
Death penalty	.006*	.016*	.069
Satisfaction with household finances	-.053	-.018*	.088
Views on hard work	.008*	.010*	-.154
Views on wealth	.060	.081	.056
R	.263	.252	.413
R Squared	.069	.063	.171
Adjusted R Squared	.067	.061	.168
Model 6: Religiosity			
Importance of religion	.080	.077	-.020*
Membership of a religious organisation	.014*	.033	.032
Religious attendance	.028	-.012*	.001*
Importance of God	-.018*	-.024	.015*
Self-reported religiosity	-.099	-.065	-.063
R	.281	.265	.417
R Squared	.079	.070	.174
Adjusted R Squared	.076	.067	.171

The standardised regression coefficients that are not statistically significant have been clearly marked with an asterisk (*).

According to the results from the multiple regression analysis (Table 4.15), the six models explain about 7.6% of the variance of “evil is everywhere” (Adjusted R Squared=.076). The independent variables included in this study also account for 6.7% of the variance of “evil can take possession of some people.” Additionally, the variables explain approximately 17.1% of the variance of “the community must get rid of evil people.” The explanatory power of the models is thus greatest for the third, more extreme, statement.⁶⁵

The beta values of the first model indicate that province is the best predictor of evil, especially for the first and third statements. With regards to the first statement, the relationship is negative (-.061). Given the coding of the variable, it seems that people in the provinces coded with lower values (Gauteng, Mpumalanga and KZN) are more likely to

⁶⁵All three statements on evil were recoded so that “Strongly Disagree”=0 and “Strongly Agree”=4.

agree with the statement. Province's relationship with the third statement is positive (.073), meaning that people in the provinces on the opposite side of the scale (Limpopo, the Free State and the Northern Cape) are somewhat more likely to agree to this statement.⁶⁶

One of the strongest predictors of evil in the second model is self-reported poverty.⁶⁷ It has a weak relationship with "evil is everywhere" (-.096) and a moderate relationship with "evil can take possession of some people" (-.132) as well as "the community must get rid of evil people" (-.139). In all three cases the relationships are negative. These results indicate that people who perceive themselves to be poor are more likely to agree to all three statements.

Class (also self-reported) proved a good predictor of the first two statements: there is a moderate relationship between class and the first (.139) as well as the second statement (.113). The positive nature of these relationships contradicts the results of self-reported poverty – this time those reporting to be in the lower and working classes are less likely than the middle and upper classes to show agreement. Unfortunately, the beta value for class and the third statement is not statistically significant.

The relationship between household income and the first statement (-.095) seems to support the results for self-reported poverty. It indicates that the lower one's household income, the more likely one is to agree with the first statement. This relationship is not, however, repeated with the other statements.

Analysis of the third model,⁶⁸ resulted in moderate relationships between trust in new people with the first (.131) and third (.147) statements. Since a complete lack of trust is coded as 0, it would seem that the more trusting South Africans are of people they meet for the first time, the more likely they are to agree with the relevant statements.

⁶⁶Recoding for the first model is as follows: Race: Black=0, Indian=1, Coloured=2, White=4; Home Language: English=0 and Ndebele=10 (following the same order as Table 4.6); Province: Gauteng=0 and Northwest=8 (following the same order as in Table 4.7); Sex: Male=0; Age 16=0.

⁶⁷The second model's variables were recoded as follows: Marital Status: Married=0 (recoded in the same order as in the WVS); Level Of Education: No Schooling=0, Some Primary School=1, Primary School Completed=2, Some High School=3, Completed High School=4, Some University=5, Technical, Secretarial, Artisan and Technikon=6, Completed University=7, Professional=8; Household Income: R0-R499=0; Class: Lower Class=0; Self-Reported Poverty: Poor=0; Government Grant: No=0.

⁶⁸Recoding of Model 3: A complete lack of trust was in all cases coded as 0. With regards to the tolerance variables, intolerance was in all cases coded as 0.

The same relationship was found with regards to trust in white people: the more trust in white people, the more agreement with the first (.101) and third (.114) statements. Many of the other racial trust variables indicated the opposite: the less the respondents trust other races or black people, the more likely they are to agree with the first statement (-.077 and -.064 respectively); the less respondents trust coloured people, the more likely they are to agree with the second (-.074) and third (-.122) statements; finally, the less respondents trust Indians, the more likely they are to agree with the third statement (-.097). There seems to be a connection between trust, race and the attitudes on evil: trust in white people as well as distrust of the other race groups seem to be connected to the general belief in evil. It is however, not known if it is the same respondents expressing all these beliefs.

The last noteworthy trust beta is trust in business people (.097), which shows a weak relationship with the third statement. There is thus a weak tendency for those who trust business people to agree that evil people must be removed.

The best predictor among the tolerance variables was tolerance of Indian people, which has a positive relationship with the first statement (.097). In other words, contrary to the results from the trust variables, increased tolerance of Indian people is weakly linked to strong agreement with the first statement.

Only one LOC variable proved to have a mentionable relationship with the beliefs in evil: satisfaction with life has a weak, negative relationship with the second statement (-.074). Those who are dissatisfied with their lives are therefore more likely to agree with the second statement, but not with the other two.⁶⁹

All the attitudinal variables had a relationship with at least one of the “evil” variables.⁷⁰ Respondents who indicated support for the death penalty were more likely to indicate agreement for the violent third statement (.069). Those who are more satisfied with their household financial situation are also more likely to support the third statement (.088). The

⁶⁹In Model 4, Advantage Versus Fairness was coded so that “People Would Take Advantage”=0; Self-Reported Happiness so that “Not At All Happy”=0; Satisfaction With Life so that “Completely Dissatisfied”=0; and Choice And Control saw “No Control At All” as 0.

⁷⁰The coding of the variables are as follows: Death Penalty: “Never Justifiable”=0; Satisfaction With Household Finances: “Completely Dissatisfied”=0; Views On Hard Work: “It’s A Matter Of Luck And Connections”=0; Views On Wealth: “People Get Rich At The Expense Of Others”=0.

people who tend not to believe that hard work brings a better life (that it is rather a matter of luck and connections) showed the strongest inclination to support the third statement (-.154). A last, weak relationship was also found between views on wealth and the second statement: it seems that South Africans who think wealth can grow so that there's enough for everyone, are more likely to support this statement.

Of the religiosity measures,⁷¹ self-reported religiosity showed weak, negative relationships with all three statements. This indicates that atheists – and not religious believers – are more likely to support the statements on evil. Lastly, weak, positive relationships were found between the importance of religion and the first two statements. People who think religion is important are therefore more likely to agree to these statements. However, they are not especially likely to agree to the third. These results are clearly very contradictory.

4.9.2 Predictors of evil 2013

Table 4.16 below presents the results from the multiple regression analysis of the 2013 WVS dataset.⁷² In this dataset the six models explain 17.2% of the variance of the first statement. This is almost 10% more than in the 2006 data set. The models explain 13.7% of the variance of “evil can take possession of some people” – more than double the 6.7% of 2006. Finally, the independent variables explain 10.4% of the variance of the third statement, less than in 2006 (17.1% - see Table 4.16).

⁷¹Model 6's coding: Importance Of Religion: “Not At All Important”=0; Membership Of A Religious Organisation: “Don't Belong”=0; Religious Attendance: “Never/Almost Never”=0; Importance Of God: “Not At All Important”=0; Self-Reported Religiosity: “Atheist”=0.

⁷² The recodings of the 2013 data are the same as the 2006 data, with two exceptions: Ethnic Community was not included in the 2006 data set and Level Of Education had different response categories in the different data sets. Ethnic Community was coded as follows: Ethnic Community (in the 2013 data set): English=0, Afrikaans=1, Ndebele=2, Xhosa=3, North Sotho=4, South Sotho=5, Tswana=6, Shangaan=7, Swazi=8, Venda=9, Zulu=10, White/European=11, Coloured=12, Indian=13, Black=14 and South African=15. Level Of Education (2013) was recoded as follows: “No Formal Education”=0, “Some Primary School”=1, “Completed Primary School”=2, Incomplete Secondary Or High School”=3; “Completed Secondary Or High School”=4, “Some University”=5, “Completed University”=6.

Table 4.16 Predictors of evil (2013)

	Evil is everywhere	Evil can take possession of people	The community must get rid of evil people
Model 1: Demographics			
Ethnic group/Race	-.089	-.076	-.122
Ethnic community	-.011*	.019	-.092
Home language	-.071	-.013*	.030
Province	.006*	.000*	-.023
Sex	-.005*	-.008*	-.036
Age	.021	.098	.075
R	.132	.124	.173
R Squared	.018	.015	.030
Adjusted R Squared	.017	.015	.030
Model 2: Socio-economic variables			
Marital status	.011*	.049	.066
Level of education	.019	-.014*	.068
Household income	.011*	.023	.045
Class	-.004*	-.064	-.040
Government grant	.039	-.064	.000*
R	.150	.144	.195
R Squared	.023	.021	.038
Adjusted R Squared	.022	.020	.038
Model 3: Trust and tolerance			
Generalised trust	-.044	-.097	-.128
Trust in family	.221	.143	-.032
Trust in neighbours	.022	-.015	-.006*
Trust in other races	-.024	.038	.011*
Trust in known people	-.094	-.095	-.011*
Trust in new people	.011*	.006*	.018*
Trust in people of other religions	-.040	-.083	-.053
Trust in foreigners	.064	.070	.028
Trust in black people	-.038	-.080	.015*
Trust in white people	-.018*	-.031	.015*
Trust in coloured people	.108	.085	.041
Trust in Indian people	-.153	-.102	-.072
Trust in immigrants/foreign workers	.061	.029	.000*
Trust in Chinese people	.008*	.033	-.018*
Trust in politicians	-.016*	.018*	.049
Trust in business people	.041	.016*	.075
Trust in friends	-.001*	-.022	.003*
Tolerance of drug addicts	-.041	-.046	-.091
Tolerance of other races	.060	.012*	.017*
Tolerance of people with Aids	-.003*	.003*	.020
Tolerance of immigrants	.030	.016*	-.039
Tolerance of homosexuals	.017	.005*	-.062
Tolerance of other religions	.003*	-.040	-.028
Tolerance of heavy drinkers	-.090	-.050	.001*
Tolerance of unmarried couples	.005*	-.044	.005*
Tolerance of speakers of other languages	-.002*	.009*	-.042
		.033	.020
Tolerance of black people	.043		
Tolerance of coloured people	-.050	-.030	-.011*
Tolerance of Indian people	.006*	.005*	.062
Tolerance of white people	.004*	.002*	-.039

R	.379	.317	.295
R Squared	.144	.101	.087
Adjusted R Squared	.141	.099	.085
Model 4: Locus of control			
Advantage versus fairness	.055	.023	.048
Self-reported happiness	-.003*	-.029	-.038
Satisfaction with life	.007	.046	-.101
Choice and control	.061	.071	-.015*
R	.391	.340	.309
R Squared	.153	.115	.096
Adjusted R Squared	.150	.113	.093
Model 5: Attitudinal variables			
Death penalty	-.009*	.040	.082
Satisfaction with household finances	-.041	-.001*	.066
Views on hard work	.049	.085	.000*
Views on wealth	-.006*	-.015*	-.032
R	.397	.353	.325
R Squared	.158	.124	.106
Adjusted R Squared	.155	.122	.103
Model 6: Religiosity			
Importance of religion	.025	.025	-.002*
Membership of a religious organisation	.010	-.028	.003*
Religious attendance	.009*	.020	.034
Importance of God	.141	.112	-.010*
Self-reported religiosity	-.008*	.051	.002*
R	.417	.373	.327
R Squared	.174	.139	.107
Adjusted R Squared	.172	.137	.104

The standardised regression coefficients that are not statistically significant have been clearly marked with an asterisk (*).

In 2013, race turned out to be a good predictor of attitudes on evil and has a relationship with every statement. The relationships with the first and second statements are weak (-.089 and -.076 respectively) while the relationship with the third statement is moderate (-.122). All these relationships are negative, meaning that the race group coded as 0 – black respondents – are more likely to agree with all three statements on evil. These relationships seem to validate the results from the crosstabulations.

Another fairly good predictor of evil among the demographic variables was age. Age has weak, positive relationships with the second (.098) and third (.075) statements, which indicates that the older the respondent, the more likely he or she is to agree with these statements.

Ethnic community and home language each had a weak relationship with one of the dependent variables. Ethnic community has a relationship with the third statement (-.092) and home language with the first statement (-.071). Both of these relationships are negative and in both cases this points to English and perhaps Afrikaans respondents who seem to show a higher level of agreement with the two statements in question. This is contrary to what was found in the bivariate analysis.

Among the socio-economic variables, level of education and marital status revealed weak relationships with the third statement (beta values of .068 and .066 respectively). These relationships indicate that those with a higher level of education show more agreement. In the case of marital status, it is single respondents who exhibited more agreement than the other groups. Class and the receipt of a government grant displayed weak relationships with the second statement (beta values of -.064 for both). The implication is that the lower class is more likely to show agreement. However, in the case of “government grant,” it is those that do not receive grants that are more likely to agree.

Many noteworthy relationships were found between the trust variables and attitudes on evil. In the 2013 analysis there are relationships between generalised trust and the second (-.097) and third (-.128) statements. The former relationship is weak and the latter moderate. Both are negative. The less trustful South Africans are, the more agreement they show for the second and third statements. This is also true with regards to South Africans’ trust in people known to them. South Africans who do not really trust the people they know, tend to agree with the first two statements. These relationships are of a weak nature, with beta weights of -.094 and -.095.

The strongest relationship was found between trust in family and “evil is everywhere” – the beta value of .221 indicating a strong relationship. Trust in family also had a moderate relationship with “evil can take possession of some people” (.143). These relationships are positive, meaning that the more a respondent trusts their family, the more likely they are to support the two statements. This finding was also present in the crosstabulations (see Table 4.9).

The analysis further revealed that trust in people of other religions had a weak, negative relationship (-.083) with the second statement. People who distrust those of another religion therefore show a weak tendency to agree more with this statement. However, the relationship cannot be found with the other two statements.

Several curious relationships were also found among the race variables. Trust in coloured people has a moderate relationship (.108) with the first statement and a weak one with the second (.085). Negative relationships also exist between trust in Indian people and all three statements as well as between trust in black people and the second statement (-.080). It would seem that those who trust coloured people and those who distrust Indian and/or black people are more likely to agree with the various statements. It is unknown if – and it seems rather unlikely that – these respondents are one and the same people. The last of the noteworthy trust variables is trust in business people. For the second time this variable registers a weak relationship (0.75) with the third statement: those who trust business people being more likely to agree.

Among the tolerance variables, tolerance of drug addicts and tolerance of heavy drinkers – both measuring moral tolerance – are the best predictors. Both have weak, negative relationships with the beliefs regarding evil: the former with the third statement (-.091) and the latter with the first (-.090). The people who are intolerant of drug addicts and heavy drinkers are more likely to agree with the third and first statements respectively.

In Model 4, satisfaction with life records a beta value of -.101 (indicating a moderate relationship) with regards to the third statement on evil. People who are dissatisfied with their lives are more likely to show support for getting rid of evil people. The choice and control variable has weak, positive relationships with the first two statements (0.61 and 0.71). This would indicate that those respondents who believe they have control over their lives are a little more likely to agree than those who do not. Unfortunately, the data for the third statement is not statistically significant.

The death penalty once again recorded a weak relationship with the third statement (0.82), thus twice meeting the expectation that those in favour of capital punishment are more likely to support the removal or elimination of evil people. For the second time the multiple

regression analysis finds that those who are more satisfied with their household's financial situation are also more supportive of the third statement (0.66 indicating a weak relationship). The other variable of note in Model 5 is views on hard work. This variable has a weak, positive relationship with the second statement. South Africans who think hard work brings a better life seem to be more supportive of this statement than those who do not share such a belief.

The only good predictor among the last model proved to be "importance of God." This variable's moderate, positive relationships with the first (.141) and second (.112) statements indicate that the more important God becomes to someone, the more likely they are to agree to the first two statements.

4.9.3 Multiple regressions compared

It has already been mentioned that the predictive power of the six models is different for 2006 and 2013. The 2013 models explain a lot more variance in the first two statements. However, it is the 2006 model that has more predictive power for the third statement. Very seldom does a particular variable prove to be a good predictor in both datasets. However, the reason for this is often that one dataset contains results that are not statistically significant. It is therefore not always possible to know if a variable's predictive power has truly diminished or if it is just unknown. What follows is an attempt to identify the strongest and/or most consistent predictors of each statement on evil.

4.9.3.1 Best predictors of "evil is everywhere"

Table 4.17 contains only the strongest relationships found for independent variables and the belief that evil is everywhere. None of the variables recorded relationships in both datasets. In fact, most of the variables had only one statistically significant beta weight and it is therefore unknown whether they are good predictors in general. The best predictor is trust in family, which has a strong relationship with "evil is everywhere" (the more trustful of family, the greater this belief). This is also the strongest single relationship found in all the multiple regression analyses.

Other good predictors (showing moderate relationships with the dependent variable) are: trust in Indian people (the less trust, the greater the belief), trust in white people as well as trust in

coloured people (the more trust, the greater the agreement), trust in new people (the more trust, the greater the belief), importance of God (the greater the importance of God, the greater the belief in evil) and class, with the middle and upper classes likely to be more supportive of the statement.

Table 4.17 Predictors of “evil is everywhere”

Variable	Beta value	Dataset
Race	-.089	2013*
Class	.139	2006*
Self-reported poverty	-.096	2006**
Household income	-.095	2006*
Trust in family	.221	2013*
Trust in known people	-.094	2013*
Trust in new people	.131	2006*
Trust in coloured people	.108	2013
Trust in Indian people	-.153	2013
Trust in white people	.101	2006*
Tolerance of heavy drinkers	-.090	2013
Tolerance of Indian people	.097	2006*
Self-reported religiosity	-.099	2006*
Importance of religion	.080	2006
Importance of God	.141	2013*

Variables that only have one statistically significant beta value are marked with an asterisk (*).

Variables that were only included in one data set are marked with two asterisks (**).

4.9.3.2 Best predictors of “evil can take possession of some people”

Many of the same variables that were good predictors for the first statement are also good predictors for the second. The strongest predictor is again trust in family (see Tables 4.17 and 4.18 above). Unfortunately, the 2006 data for this variable is not statistically significant. Self-reported poverty is once again a good predictor in 2006, but no data is available in 2013.

Class is noted for a second time, again indicating that the upper class is more likely to agree with the statement in 2006, but not at all in 2013.

The importance of God again indicates that religious people are more likely to hold beliefs about evil. Importance of religion (2006) indicates the same thing, but is excluded from this particular table (for this weaker relationship see Table 4.15). The last relationship of moderate strength is trust in Indian people – once again indicating that as trust in Indian people decreases, belief in evil rises.

Table 4.18 Predictors of “evil can take possession of some people”

Variable	Beta value	Dataset
Age	.098	2013*
Class	.113 & -.064	2006 & 2013
Self-reported poverty	-.132	2006**
Generalised trust	-.097	2013*
Trust in family	.143	2013*
Trust in known people	-.095	2013
Trust in people of other religions	-.083	2013
Trust in black people	-.080	2013*
Trust in coloured people	-.074 & .085	2006 & 2013
Trust in Indian people	-.102	2013*
Tolerance of coloured people	.090	2006
Views on hard work	.085	2013*
Views on wealth	.081	2006*
Importance of God	.112	2013*

Variables that only have one statistically significant beta value are marked with an asterisk (*).

Variables that were only included in one data set are marked with two asterisks (**).

4.9.3.3 Best predictors of “the community must get rid of evil people even if it means that they have to be killed”

Views on hard work is the best predictor of the third statement (Table 4.19): those who do not think that hard work brings a better life, are the most likely to show agreement for this statement. The second best predictor is trust in new people: respondents who trust new acquaintances faster or more easily are also more likely to support the removal of evil people. The opposite is however indicated by generalised trust: the less trusting South Africans are in general, the more likely they are to agree.

Race is another moderate predictor of the third statement, with black people being somewhat more likely to agree. Respondents that tend to trust white people are also more likely to agree, while the opposite is true when it comes to trusting coloured and - to a lesser extend - Indian people (the less trust, the more agreement).

For the third time, Self-reported poverty records a moderate, positive relationship with the attitudes on evil. It is unfortunate that the 2013 data set excluded this variable, making it impossible to know whether the pattern has persisted. All indications in this study seem to point to a moderate relationship between South Africans who think themselves poor and the belief in evil.

Table 4.19 Predictors of “the community must get rid of evil people even if it means that they have to be killed”

Variable	Beta value	dataset
Race	-.122	2013*
Ethnic community	-.092	2013**
Self-reported poverty	-.139	2006**
Generalised trust	-.128	2013
Trust in new people	.147	2006*
Trust in white people	.114	2006*
Trust in coloured people	-.122	2006*
Trust in Indian people	-.097 & .062	2006 & 2013
Trust in business people	.097 & .075	2006 & 2013
Tolerance of drug addicts	-.091	2013
Satisfaction with life	-.101	2013
Death penalty	.069 & .082	2006 & 2013
Satisfaction with household finances	.088 & .066	2006 & 2013
Views on hard work	-.154	2006*

Variables that only have one statistically significant beta value are marked with an asterisk (*).

Variables that were only included in one data set are marked with two asterisks (**).

4.10 Conclusion

This chapter presents the exhaustive quantitative search for predictors of South Africans’ attitudes regarding evil (as expressed by the three statements in the WVS). However, this quantitative analysis has largely resulted in mixed findings. Different patterns of response were found in the two datasets used. The responses also differed with regards to the three statements.

It is not altogether surprising that the most extreme measure of belief in evil often stood out from the other two in its relationships with the independent variables. The element of violence contained in the third statement distinguishes it from the first two statements. The predictors for the third statement therefore tend to be different. There are several scenarios that might account for this.

It is possible that the first two statements were not interpreted literally by all the respondents. In this case the pattern of responses is different for the third statement because it’s serious nature is more likely to draw agreement from believers in literal evil. Alternatively, the third statement might draw agreement from people who hold illiberal beliefs in general – regardless of their definition of evil. It is possible to hold a secular view on evil and still be in favour of the removal of evil persons.

It is also possible that all the statements were indeed interpreted literally by many respondents. This would mean that the general, literal belief in evil is fairly entrenched in the country. The rise in agreement for the third statement could therefore be the result of some South Africans hardening their attitudes toward those thought responsible for pervasive levels of evil. South Africa's high levels of religiosity would appear to argue in favour of a scenario involving mostly literal interpretations of evil.

It would therefore appear that there aren't many definitive predictors of the attitudes South Africans hold regarding evil and violence. The reason appears to be that the relevant beliefs are so pervasive in South Africa that they can't really be associated with any particular group. The answer to the question of who holds the stated beliefs on evil seems to be: everyone or anyone.

CHAPTER FIVE: INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS

5.1 Introduction

Chapter Four contains the extensive quantitative analysis conducted in order to find predictors for attitudes on evil in South Africa. The predictors – grouped into six models – were selected in order to test whether some of the theories discussed in Chapter Two had any predictive power in the South African context. The mixed results of Chapter Four seem to indicate that – pending further research - the beliefs and attitudes regarding evil are pervasive in South African society. There does not seem to be a particular variable or group of variables that can definitively predict South Africans' beliefs in this regard: neither identity, background, status, accomplishments, circumstances nor any other beliefs or factors can predict the attitudes toward evil that are the focus of this study. The answer for such pervasive beliefs must lie elsewhere.

It would therefore appear that there is something else about South Africa that results in the above-mentioned beliefs and attitudes. The quantitative analysis leads to the conclusion of the pervasive nature of the beliefs and attitudes in question. It is only with the help of qualitative analysis that one can speculate beyond this point. To seek an explanation it is necessary to return to theory and the uniquely South African context.

5.2 Existential insecurity

According to secularisation theory – mentioned in Chapter Two – wealthy industrial societies experience a decline in religious belief. In their attempt to update secularisation theory and explain the variation in religious beliefs still found around the world, Norris and Inglehart (2004) identify existential security as a key factor. They claim that rich countries – with higher levels of sustainable human development and less socioeconomic inequality – provide higher standards of living and reduce their populations' vulnerability to existential threats (2004:13-14).

Human security can be undermined by a broad range of threats, including various forms of violence, disease, natural disasters and environmental problems. Poor societies tend to face the biggest number of existential (and other) challenges on a fairly consistent basis. The resources of developed countries greatly reduce the impact of existential threats among their

people. Although these countries are not immune from threats like terrorist attacks, natural disasters and economic collapse, it is primarily poor nations where one finds the greatest levels of insecurity (Norris & Inglehart, 2004:13-18). It is also the societies facing these high levels of insecurity that tend to be the most religious.

Norris and Inglehart's *Sacred And Secular* (2004:18) proposes that "the experience of growing up in less secure societies will heighten the importance of religious values, while conversely experience of more secure conditions will lessen it." People living under conditions of greater security do not experience the same need for religious assurance as those living with constant existential threat. Where the secular state is powerful enough to assure people of protection against threats, citizens tend to become indifferent to religion. Where the state cannot fully provide such assurance, religion remains salient. The reassurance provided by religious prescriptions and promises of future well-being becomes an important safeguard against chaos and danger. Reassurance of protection – from either the state or religious leaders - is necessary to relieve stress and enable people to carry on with the everyday functions of their lives. According to Norris and Inglehart (2004:19), "without such a belief system, extreme stress tends to produce withdrawal reactions."

South Africa's problems with poverty and inequality have been discussed earlier. There is no doubt that these challenges produce insecurity among a large number of the population. Poverty and inequality do not, however, explain the pervasive illiberal beliefs found in the present study (see Chapter Four). It is therefore argued that another factor contributes to South Africa's existential insecurity and consequent illiberal values. The third factor from which there is no escape regardless of race, income or education is violent crime.

Crime and violence do not only pose a physical threat to the country's people, but also undermine the various economic and social tools with which other causes of insecurity – poverty and inequality – are to be addressed. Criminal violence is therefore not an isolated problem, but one that affects and is affected by other socio-economic matters. Although this chapter mainly analyses violent crime in South Africa, such violence is an extreme manifestation of a larger lawlessness in the country. Violent crime is therefore contextualised as part of a larger moral decay that will be discussed in due course.

According to Møller (2005:311), although different South Africans are sometimes subject to different types of crime, all are united by fear and dissatisfaction with personal safety.⁷³ Security is regarded as the very foundation of society and safety is a social good that is required by every person (Shearing, 2008:2). Crime is therefore generally acknowledged as a source of insecurity (Allen, 2002:53) that negatively affects social order, economic progress and quality of life. Individuals do not need to be directly affected by crime in order to feel insecure. Fear of crime is typically more widespread than crime itself and affects social life in a variety of ways. Fear is a driving factor in:

“Dividing communities, destabilising social relations, creating insecurity that permeates individuals’ lives, and [acts as an] invisible intimidation that induces a constant state of surveillance [...] Fear can become routinised and normalised, until [people] become desensitised to it” (Allen, 2002:54).

Crime of all kinds are so common in South Africa⁷⁴ that South Africans (including police, courts and media) often simply ignore the numerous lesser offences. The mainstream media tends to focus on stories of murder, rape and other violent attacks. Indeed, in a country with the established reputation of being one of the most dangerous places in the world (George & Swart, 2012:202), there is little appreciation for media coverage or police action focused on lesser offences (Bezuidenhout, 2011:36). The perception and the reality of pervasive crime – violent and otherwise – have created a “climate of fear” (Allen, 2002:54) which has become normal and often goes unchallenged (Outwater et al., 2005:135-139). In fact, “ideologies and activities that consent to violence are promoted, and become part of everyday life, forcing people to manage and negotiate fear and danger as if it were natural” (Allen, 2002:54).⁷⁵

It should be noted that the fear of violence and its consequent problems and constraints have a stronger impact on women than men (Sulemana, 2014). Women experience society differently from men and their fear is different in its extent, effects, nature and relation to genuine threat. Women are more afraid of every kind of crime and more often take more

⁷³In Møller’s survey of crime and quality of life in the Eastern Cape, 65% of respondents reported that putting their faith in God was their preferred method of coping with misfortune (2005:285). This may support Norris and Inglehart’s assertion (2004:19) that people under existential stress are more likely to turn to religion for reassurance.

⁷⁴See SAIRR (2014:701-792) for extensive statistics on all types of crime in South Africa.

⁷⁵Powdthavee’s study (2005:540-542) found that although South Africans become distressed when they are victims of crime, the distress is lessened if many others in their neighbourhood are also victimised. The higher a community’s crime rate, the less bad people feel about their own personal victimisation, because it is so normal.

precautionary action against it even though they are statistically less likely to be victimised. However, the cost of victimisation is higher. The threat of sexual violence in particular – which may accompany other forms of crime when the victim is female - is quantitatively and qualitatively different for women. Everyday exposure to fear “leads to a continuous state of stress that can severely limit their movements, activities and participation in society” (Allen, 2002:56-57). Given the importance of social and political participation in a democracy, crime poses a serious problem when it impedes civil participation and equal citizenship.

South Africans have responded to crime and the fear of crime in ways that have deeply affected their society. Behavioural changes are common among fearful South Africans, including hyper levels of alertness and caution as well as the decision to limit freedom of movement and night time socialising. Most South Africans take measures to improve security at home in an effort to escape victimisation. Some also report that they have become more suspicious of others and more aggressive in their behaviour (Møller, 2005:278-279). Møller concludes that although South Africans seem resilient in the face of crime, compared to international standards of behaviour, they “appear to be obsessed and intimidated” (2005:305).

One could argue that the “withdrawal reactions” mentioned by Norris and Inglehart (2004:19) are present in South Africa, especially with regards to spacial dimensions. In addition to limiting social activities and instituting general safety measures, South Africans who can afford it – often members of the white population⁷⁶ - withdraw behind heavily protected security complexes with high walls, electric fencing, camera surveillance, guards and armed response (Allen, 2002:55-61). However, withdrawal is not only a matter of geographical space and private security, but also perhaps a psychological response. Nomali Hadebe was tortured for more than three hours before being killed by her male partner. Although neighbours heard her screams, no one responded in any way whatsoever (Nöthling-Slabbert, 2006:7).

5.3 Violent crime in South Africa

South Africa’s violent crime and the way that it can undermine society and democracy were already briefly discussed in Chapter Two. In light of the findings from the statistical analysis,

⁷⁶Modi (2010:57) also draws attention to the isolation and insularity of South Africa’s Indian community.

it is necessary to return to this issue in more depth. South Africa features among the world's most violent countries. Research has confirmed that the country has extremely high rates of violent crime, sexual violence and domestic abuse (Kaminer et al., 2008:1589). Social scientists generally identify the country's history of political violence (in terms of state oppression as well as resistance) and its socio-economic inequality and deprivation as root causes (Nomoyi, 2000; Pelsler & De Kock, 2000).

It is possible that the politics of resistance did much to encourage fearless disrespect for all kinds of authority. It has also demonstrated that violence and crime can bring material and immaterial gain. Furthermore, due to the illegitimate nature of Apartheid's laws and law enforcement, incarceration was not always accompanied by stigma or social rejection. Historically speaking, it has not been morally unacceptable to break the law or to blame the system's corruption and illegitimacy when caught breaking the law. In some cases imprisonment was an honour and an initiation into manhood (Nomoyi, 2000:67-69).

It is also not unusual for societies that have experienced internal conflict and rapid, large scale socio-economic and political transition to experience a rise in crime. The sudden and unexpected democratic transition may therefore have played a role in the country's social instability. Even in Ancient Greece, Plato noted that:

“Democracy is a stage in which liberty is likely to grow at the expense of order, as people tend to do what they like without regarding themselves morally and socially bound to any set of rules” (quoted in Nomoyi, 2000:66).

Additionally, some of the human rights introduced by the country's secular constitution are contested by religious, cultural and social systems. This has led to confusion and possibly contributed to cultural, religious and social insecurities (Slater, 2013:11). In other words, South Africa has experienced a dramatic change from conservative and confrontational politics to liberal democracy. In the process, methods of social control have weakened and have not been replaced by legitimate alternatives (Nomoyi, 2000:67), resulting in widespread disorganisation and insecurity. Criminals have successfully exploited the situation.

According to the latest figures (2013-2014), 47 people are murdered in South Africa daily and another 47 suffer an attempt on their lives (SAIRR, 2014:706-708). South Africa therefore experiences 32 murders, as well as 32 attempted murders, per 100 000 people. A

more acceptable rate – based on international standards – would be less than 10 murders per 100 000 people (Du Plessis et al., 2007:532). Although South Africa’s current homicide rate is one of the highest in the world, it has actually declined from the 71 murders and 73 attempted murders per day of the 1994-1995 period (SAIRR, 2014:706-708).

Although the murder rate has declined in the twenty year period from 1994-2014, the overall violent crime rate has not. In 1994 South Africa recorded 1 728 contact crimes per day. In 2014 the figure remained 1 700. As one can see from Table 5.1, although murder, attempted murder and assault crimes have decreased, sexual offences and robbery-related attacks have increased (SAIRR, 2014:707).⁷⁷

Table 5.1 Daily contact crimes in South Africa: 1994/1995 and 2013/2014

	Number of contact crimes per day	
	1994-1995	2013-2014
Murder	71	47
Attempted murder	73	47
Sexual offences	123	172
Serious assault	591	502
Common assault	549	458
Robbery with aggravated circumstances	232	327
Common robbery	90	148
Total	1 728	1 700

Data from the SAIRR (2014:707).

The SAPS labels residential robberies⁷⁸ one of the most feared crimes in the country and a serious factor in promoting insecurity. It is a crime– often accompanied by violence - that violates victims’ sense of privacy. Robbery at residential premises has increased by 105.3% over the last ten years and is not restricted to wealthy neighbourhoods, sometimes occurring even at the most modest dwellings in poor areas (SAPS, 2014:11-37). Ironically, the SAPS

⁷⁷Serious assault is defined as the unlawful and intentional, direct or indirect use of force in order to cause serious bodily harm to another person. Common assault is also defined as the unlawful and intentional, direct or indirect use of force to the body, but without the intent to cause grievous harm. However, common assault also includes the threat of using personal violence against another in circumstances in which the victim has reason to believe the threat. Sexual offences include not only all forms of rape and indecent assault, but also many other crimes such as incest, the distribution of child pornography and paying for sex. Robbery with aggravated circumstances and common robbery both involve the unlawful, intentional removal and appropriation of the property of another. However, the former is committed with a dangerous weapon (usually a firearm), while the latter is not (SAIRR, 2014:702).

⁷⁸Break-ins or home invasions that occur while the occupants are at home, as opposed to burglaries, which occur when they are not (SAIRR, 2012:685).

believes that improvements in security with regards to theft-prevention has contributed to the rise in more serious crimes: as citizens take measures to prevent property theft (which has declined), criminals have turned to burglary, robbery and carjacking in order to steal desired items. There has been a constant increase in robbery of non-residential premises: over the last ten years this crime has grown by about 460.7%. One recent and disturbing trend is the rise in armed robberies at shopping malls, which has increased by 142% in the three financial years up to 2013/2014 (Burger & Lancaster, 2014). Although there has been a general decrease in carjackings over the last ten years (by 19.3%), the 2013-2014 period saw an increase of 12.3%.

The contact crimes listed above make up about a third (33%) of the total crimes committed in the republic.⁷⁹ According to the SAPS the majority of contact crimes – especially the first five offences listed in Table 5.1 – occur among people known to each other. These crimes:

“Result from the phenomenon of existential social interactions. The majority of these crimes are caused by feelings of anger, disappointment, frustration and stress that are not channelled by self-restraint towards non-destructive outlets, resulting in individuals acting on violent impulse. Furthermore, a common denominator of these crimes is the prevalence of alcohol and substance abuse, which affect the cognitive control mechanisms required to guide the behaviour of individuals.”⁸⁰ A considerable proportion of these crimes are either domestic violence cases or occur in the vicinity of taverns or shebeens” (SAPS, 2014:10).

South Africa’s struggle with criminal violence becomes even more striking when looking at the entire period of 1994-2014 (Table 5.2). In the democratic era South Africa has experienced a total of over 14 million contact crimes, haemorrhaging over 400 000 lives from homicide alone. Although South Africa’s 14 million contact crimes do not imply 14 million victims – some people have been repeatedly victimised – the number of lives directly and indirectly affected by this scale of violence can only be estimated as a significant proportion of the population.

There is also the matter of unreported crimes. Even wealthy countries with efficient institutions and record-keeping, experience underreporting (Louw, 1997:140). Some estimate that up to 50% of crimes committed in South Africa are not reported (Brown, 2001:270).

There have been allegations regarding the accuracy of crime statistics, particularly that the

⁷⁹In contrast to the widespread criminal violence in the country, there were only 13 reported events involving political violence in 2013, resulting in 17 deaths (SAIRR, 2014:704-728).

⁸⁰ Another key factor is the prevalence of firearms in South African society (Du Plessis et al, 2007:534).


SAPS might be accidentally (due to incompetence) or deliberately underreporting and misreporting crime. The crime statistics are not independently audited (Brodie, 2013). It can be safely assumed that at least some of the figures quoted in this chapter are underestimates.

Table 5.2 Total number of contact crimes 1994-2014

	Total number of contact crimes
Murder	409 937
Attempted murder	477 042
Sexual offences	11 91 987
Serious assault	4 544 244
Common assault	4 321 777
Robbery with aggravated circumstances	2 138 063
Common robbery	1 334 866
Total	14 417 916

Data from the SAIRR (2014:704).

Figure 5.1 Murder, attempted murder and sexual offences 1994-2014



Data from the SAIRR (2014:708).

Figure 5.1 illustrates three of South Africa’s most serious crimes: murder, attempted murder and sexual offences. The murder rate peaked in 1995-1996 with 26 877 murders and has fallen to 17 068 in 2013-2014. The rate of attempted murder peaked in 2002-2003 (35 861 people were almost killed), but is now similar to the murder rate (17 110 attempted homicides

in 2013-2014). Although the murder and attempted murder rates have improved since the end of Apartheid, they are still extremely high. The general homicide rate includes occult-related crimes such as *muthi* killings, which persist.⁸¹ The conviction rate for murder in South Africa is estimated at only about 10% (Scott, 2013).⁸²

It is obvious that South Africa suffers from an epidemic of sex-related crimes. Sexual violence – and rape in particular - is a “a humiliating, degrading and brutal invasion of the privacy, the dignity and the person of the victim” (Ndashe, 2004:220). The reported number of these crimes has increased in the democratic era from 44 751 in 1994-1995 to 62 649 in 2013-2014. Although it is mostly men who fall victim to murder and attempted murder (approximately 81% of homicide victims and 79% of attempted homicide victims are men), the victims of sexual offences are mostly women (47%) and children (35%) (SAIRR, 2014:708-722). The murder of men tends to involve attacks from strangers, whereas women are much more likely to be attacked by male family members or partners (Nöthling-Slabbert, 2006:5-6).

Sexual offences are notoriously underreported due to fear of intimidation and social stigma as well as familial pressure to hide scandals and keep families together (US Department Of State, 2013:26; Posel, 2005:242). Some of these crimes are reported and then withdrawn as victims refuse to take action against family members on whom they are financially and emotionally dependent (SAPS, 2014:10). Distrust of and lack of faith in the police and justice system also play a role. Police stations and courts are sometimes distant and inaccessible to many South Africans. Many police stations – especially in impoverished areas – are understaffed and badly managed (Louw, 1997:140-141).

Furthermore, incidents of corruption, misconduct and brutality on the part of the SAPS (Singh, 2004:89-91; Møller, 2005:269) means that many citizens consider it unsafe or

⁸¹The US Department Of State’s human rights report for South Africa (2013:31-40) lists several recent examples of alleged witchcraft-related killings: Stanley Modikane from Daveyton (Ekurhuleni) was arrested after killing and beheading his wife so that he could use her head for wealth-generating *muthi*. There was also the shooting death of Nocupheni Ngoyana (from Gotyibeni Village in the Eastern Cape) who was accused by village members of using witchcraft to kill people.

⁸²Research by the South African Law Commission (SALC) found that only 6 out of every 100 violent crimes resulted in a conviction after two years (Lancaster, 2012).

undesirable to interact with police.⁸³ The US Department of State's human rights report for South Africa (2013:1-4) has drawn attention to the SAPS's excessive, often illegal, use of force, including torture, beatings and rape. During the 2012-2013 period 706 people died while in police custody or due to police action.⁸⁴ During the same period 146 complaints of rape were made against on-duty and off-duty police officers. In fact, there were a total of 6 728 complaints against the police – made to the Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID). 1 040 Of these cases were considered incidents of misconduct and referred back to the police for internal action; 545 complaints were serious enough for criminal prosecution; 125 SAPS members were arrested, resulting in 57 convictions and 21 acquittals (US Department Of State, 2013:9).

Due to underreporting, the real extend of South Africa's sexual violence can only be guessed at. Rape alone is thought to be seriously underreported: the Medical Research Council has estimated that the report rate is only one out of nine (Daily Maverick, 2014). A study conducted in Gauteng in 2010 found that only one in 13 women report rape when the perpetrator is not a partner and a mere one in 25 report the crime when the guilty party is a partner (The Guardian, 2013). According to the South African Law Commission (SALC) about 1.69 million rapes occur every year, but only an average of 54 000 rape survivors press charges (Britton, 2006:146). South Africa's high levels of domestic violence – one of the highest in the world – means that rape often occurs within the home.⁸⁵

It is thought that a quarter of South African women are in abusive relationships, but most do not report it (US Department Of State, 2013:27). Studies have shown that between 25%-38% of South African men admit to having committed an act of rape and over 50% report that they have been physically violent toward their partners (Dworking et al., 2012:98; US Department Of State, 2013:25-27). A study of women who visit antenatal clinics also found that 55% of the women had at one time or another suffered physical or sexual violence from a male partner (Choi & Ting, 2008:838). The conviction rate for sexual offences is 65.8%. However,

⁸³Recent survey results indicate that 83% of South Africans believe the SAPS is corrupt (Brodie, 2013).

⁸⁴The most notorious example of police brutality in recent years is probably the 2013 death of Mozambican taxi driver Mido Macia, who was handcuffed to a police vehicle and dragged to a police station where he died from his wounds. He was accused of having caused a traffic jam and having resisted arrest. The event was filmed by members of the public (US Department Of State, 2013:2).

⁸⁵Additionally, sexual violence in the domestic sphere is thought to be a major contributor to the spread of HIV/Aids in South Africa (Outwater et al., 2005:138).

given all the cases that are never reported or never referred for prosecution,⁸⁶ some estimate that the real conviction rate for a crime like rape is as low as 4.1% (US Department Of State, 2013:26). Critics claim that judges use the victim's behaviour and/or relationship to the offender as cause for imposing lighter sentences. Convictions are thus less likely and sentences shorter in cases involving domestic violence (Nöthling-Slabbert, 2006:7).⁸⁷

Despite the constitutionally enshrined principle of gender equality and attempts to effect the socioeconomic empowerment of women, gender violence is widespread and affects girls and women regardless of race, ethnicity, class or geographical location. Slater (2013:1-2) argues that South Africa's women and girls are failed by a criminal justice system that does not adequately examine and punish sexual violence. The result is a culture of impunity among offenders and insecurity among victims and potential victims. There is even the possibility that the institutional protection and advancement of women's rights appear as threatening to the many men who continue to experience high unemployment, economic marginalisation and the growth of a service economy in which women are very active.⁸⁸ Women are often the beneficiaries of the government's welfare programmes, which also raises their income and status (Dworking et al., 2012:100-103). The economic pressures felt by men are worsened by their belief that they bare principle responsibility for raising a family and acting as its head and provider. Many South Africans hold patriarchal values in which men are accorded power over women and children (often including power over their bodies) (Richter & Dawes, 2008:85). Now they are confronted by the higher status and greater institutional protection granted to these groups.

In the face of the ongoing economic challenges, the increased status of women can be perceived as a zero-sum loss of social, economical and political status on the part of men. Women's empowerment is not only a fact in the public sphere, but also carries over into private relationships, which many men are finding increasingly difficult to dominate

⁸⁶Fewer than half of reported sexual offences are referred for prosecution (US Department Of State, 2013:26).

⁸⁷Convictions and sentencing are also affected by matters of race, class and reputation with black women, drug users and sex workers meeting with less sympathy from the justice system and the media than other victims (Nöthling-Slabbert, 2006:7).

⁸⁸Dworkin et al.'s study documents that there is also frustration over women's entrance into formerly male-dominated economic sectors, thus challenging the traditional perception of physical labour being a man's domain (2012:103-104).

(Dworking et al., 2012:100-106).⁸⁹ Research has shown that there is indeed a high risk of violence in households where women's income and/or educational achievements exceed those of men. This is especially the case in families where men subscribe to traditional gender roles and stereotypes (Choi & Ting, 2008:835-844).⁹⁰ In South Africa, all race groups traditionally subscribe to various patriarchal attitudes and values that sometimes contribute to victim-blaming or the condoning of violence against women (Van der Hoven, 2001:16-18).

Faced with economic and social pressures, it is interesting that men report feeling not just "undermined" but also "unsafe" (Dworking et al., 2012:104). It is also interesting that the perceived loss of "respect" (Dworking et al., 2012:109) is often blamed on the human rights of women and children – framed as a Western notion being imposed on the country. One reported response to the perceived disempowerment and marginalisation is the adoption of a hyper masculine identity that emphasises personal status based on all-male contexts, engaging in violence and seeking more sexual opportunities (Dworking et al., 2012:100-106). The empowerment of women and consequent anxiety and loss of self-esteem among some men may also be contributing to South Africa's high suicide rate – particularly among men (Botha, 2012:543).⁹¹

Slater (2013:7-10) suggests that gender-based violence (GBV) is (another) example of the hold that illiberal values have on South Africans: despite the legal proscription of human and women's rights, the association of manhood with domination over women and girls is entrenched in the country's social norms and sometimes legitimated by religious and cultural beliefs.⁹² The same may very well be said of violence towards children. Corporal punishment of children has been outlawed in public institutions, but not as private punishments. This is partly due to the difficulty of policing private homes, but also because of expected resistance from various cultural and religious communities. Despite the legal protection of children's rights, high levels of violence against children still occur in homes, schools and communities.

⁸⁹Research has shown that violence can easily occur when women challenge the gendered labour customs in their domestic circumstances (Krishnan et al., 2010).

⁹⁰In fact, any relationship where the principles have unequal status is associated with an increased risk of domestic violence. Choi and Ting (2008:845) also found that there was an increased chance of spousal abuse and severe wife-beating in polygamous households (a tradition among some African cultures).

⁹¹Suicide is one of the leading causes of unnatural death in South Africa: 7 000 suicides occur every year, amounting to 20 deaths per day. Approximately 79% of suicides in South Africa are men (Botha, 2012:526-539).

⁹²It should be noted that men's perceived right to control and punish errant women is commonly accepted by both sexes (Outwater et al., 2005:140).

Richter and Dawes (2008:84-85-87) argue that child abuse is rife within this sanctioned culture of violence. They also warn that those who experience or witness violence as children – especially violence directed toward their mother – are more likely to become violent in turn.⁹³

South Africa's children are, by all accounts, very vulnerable to exposure to violence. Shields et al.'s study (2009:1199) of children from impoverished suburbs of Cape Town found that most of the children in question witnessed and/or experienced various forms of violence both at school and in their neighbourhoods. Over half the children that were studied reported being in fights at school and in their neighbourhoods; over 90% had seen people being hit in both places and over 60% had been hit themselves. 40% Of the children in the study had witnessed a homicide in their communities.

Other studies report similar findings throughout the country: an incredible 95% of Xhosa-speaking children in Khayelitsha reported witnessing violence – 56% were victims themselves; another Cape Town survey reported that about 63% of grade 10 pupils had witnessed violence and almost a third had been mugged or robbed; in yet another Cape Town survey, 58% of pupils from 18 high schools said they had seen acts of violence being committed in the city; in the Northwest, 52% of pupils from two high schools had witnessed a rape in their community –another 56% reported having seen a murder; (Bach & Louw, 2010:25-26); in the same study, roughly 90%-94% of teenagers had witnessed at least one act of violence and 68%-73% had been victims themselves (Bach and Louw, 2010:28-29); a national study conducted in 2008 reported that 15.3% of South African children (between grade 3 and grade 12) have experienced some type of violence at school. In fact, a third of the rapes of young girls are believed to be committed by educators (Le Roux & Mokhele, 2011:319). Shields et al. (2009:1199-1205) found that the children in their study were likely to progress from being witnesses of violence, to victims and finally to perpetrators. None of the children were perpetrators only and all the forms of violence produced signs of psychological distress in the children.

⁹³According to Abrahams et al. (2013:2) "having witnessed or experienced domestic violence in childhood results in more acceptance of violence, lower self-esteem, attachment problems, and personality disorders."

The occurrence of high levels of violence despite a very public rights discourse might be an indication that the speed of South Africa's transition has contributed to a certain degree of confusion, frustration and even fear. It is possible that rapid social, economic and political changes have disorientated the population, leading to general uncertainty and insecurity. Although the present study does not have gender relations as its focus, it is unavoidable that violence is a problem of men:

“Men form a large proportion of the moral degeneration that we see in our society. There is not a single crime – whether rape, robbery or abuse – where a man is not the common denominator. Until you address the issue of men, and the violence they perpetrate in our society, you will not begin to steer society towards moral regeneration” (quoted in Posel, 2005:249).

South Africa's violence is thus often seen as a crisis of manhood (Posel, 2005:249) or at the very least a failure of its citizens – including women - to act with responsibility in the private sphere. This failure is having a pernicious effect on responsible and equal citizenship in the country's liberal democracy.

5.4 Anti-crime initiatives

Another way of illustrating the hold that violent crime has on South Africa is to look at the government's anti-crime expenditure as well as the private security sector. Table 5.3 shows how the South African government has increased spending on police services, the law courts and prisons:

Table 5.3 Anti-crime expenditure 1994/1995 and 2013/2014

	Expenditure		
	1994-1995	2013-2014	Change
Police services	10.2	74.1	626%
Law courts	1.6	16.5	931%
Prisons	2.6	18.8	623%
Total	4.4 Rbn	109.4 Rbn	660%
Total government expenditure	148.2 Rbn	1149.3 Rbn	676%

Data from the SAIRR (2014:747). Multiply expenditure by 10 for the US dollar amount.

Government expenditure on the country's crime-fighting institutions has increased, in real terms and as a percentage of overall expenditure.⁹⁴ There have been many attempts to

⁹⁴The increased expenditure on crime-fighting does of course come at the expense of social services (Pelser & De Kock, 2000:89).

strengthen and modernise police and detective work. Training has been provided to the police to enable them to address a variety of crimes including violence against women and children as well as occult-related crimes (SAPS, 2014b:60). The SAPS has made a point of initiating anti-crime awareness campaigns, especially with regards to crimes against women and children. The reinstated Family Violence, Child Protection and Sexual Offences (FCS) Units have had some success in fighting crime – having convicted 3 718 people, sentenced to a total of 51 631 years imprisonment (including 659 life sentences) (SAPS, 2014:10).

Despite the government's attempts to address crime, problems persist. According to Du Plessis and Louw (2005:435-436), the work load of the justice system has increased dramatically, but human resources and performance have not kept pace. Allegations of police abuse cited above is not the sole problem. Police have continued to struggle with internal corruption and the SAPS has remained short of staff, badly trained and ill equipped (criminals are often better armed than police) (US Department Of State, 2013:2-10).

Furthermore, despite access to social workers, mental health professionals and religious counselling, police officers are negatively affected by the violence and loss they experience on a daily basis. Members of the SAPS also suffer from poor remuneration and the bad reputation they have with the public, who often regard them with suspicion and contempt. As a consequence police morale is low and many officers – especially specialist investigators – leave the service to work in the private sector (Singh, 2004:92-94).

Similar problems plague the other institutions of justice: the work load of South Africa's understaffed and underfunded courts are such that legal proceedings can continue for years without reaching a conclusion (Du Plessis et al., 2007:535). South Africa has a high number of pre-trial prisoners (over 48 000 in the 2012-2013 period) and these defendants may face prolonged detention while awaiting trials that are frequently delayed. The high rate of pre-trial detention is attributed to the high number of arbitrary arrests that occur as well as poor case preparation and unaffordable bail tariffs (US Department Of State, 2013:11-12). Most defendants (approximately 60%) are not convicted. In fact, the overall conviction rate in South Africa may be as low as 10.3% due to inadequate evidence collection and investigation as well as long and ineffective court proceedings. More than half of the roughly two million criminal cases reported in South Africa every year are not resolved.

The country's prisons are also under pressure: about 28% of correction centres are overcrowded, with many prisoners having less than 13 squares of living space.⁹⁵ The overcrowding as well as poor ventilation aides the spread of disease. Adequate medical care is not always available (US Department Of State, 2013:1-22). There have also been cases of prisoners being attacked and even tortured and raped by prison guards. During 2012-2013, 3 101 hearings were held regarding offences committed by prison staff and 121 employees were dismissed. Prison conditions amount to a violation of prisoners' basic human rights (to which South Africans are largely unsympathetic) (Peté, 2006:429-430).


Policies meant to address crime are therefore not always effectively implemented and do not always achieve their goals (Cawthra, 2005:104). According to Posel (2005:247), violent crime is interpreted by the public as a failure of political leadership. There is thus an occasional defensive reluctance on the part of government to publish information or engage with civil society with regards to crime (Cawthra, 2005:100-102). Despite the increased spending seen in Table 5.3, the perception remains that the country's justice system is under-resourced and unresponsive and simply not capable of arresting, convicting and incarcerating criminals (Louw, 1997:141). Additionally, some argue that South Africa's "war against crime" (Cawthra, 2005:100) is geared more towards managing crime instead of preventing it.

South Africa's large private security industry can perhaps be seen as an indictment on the government's attempt to cope with violent crime. According to the SAIRR (2014:790) there were 4 437 private security companies in 1997, which has increased to 8 144 in 2014. These businesses include armed response, cash-in-transit and general guarding services. Figure 5.2 below illustrates the size and growth of South Africa's public and private security forces. In 1997 the private security sector resembled the SAPS in size: there were 115 331 registered guards and 110 177 police. However, while the private sector has grown to over four times its earlier size – registering 487 058 guards in 2014 – the SAPS experienced only modest growth: there being only 153 116 police officers in 2014 (SAIRR, 2014:790).

⁹⁵South Africa incarcerates about 4 out of every 1 000 people – one of the highest rates of incarceration in the world (Peté, 2006:449). As may be expected given the discourse on masculinity and crime, almost 98% of South African prisoners are male. The pressure on South African prisons is periodically relieved with special remissions of sentence. For example, 35 506 prisoners were released in March 2012 by special permission of the president (SAIRR, 2014:771-775).

There is thus more than three times as many private security guards in South Africa than police officers: the ratio of police to the population is 1:353⁹⁶ and the ratio of private security guards to the population is 1:111. The UN recommends a police-to-population ratio of 1:450 (SAPS, 2014a:1). South Africa is therefore not far behind the UN standard and yet South Africans believe that this is not sufficient. The demand for security appears to be indicative of an extremely fearful and insecure society.

Figure 5.2 Public and private security officers 1997-2014



Data from the SAIRR (2014:790).

5.5 Effects of crime and violence on society

If security is the bedrock of all social activity, crime and violence have the power to permeate every sector of society. Satisfaction with one's community is a key determinant of life satisfaction and it stands to reason that quality of life decreases as crime and violence in the community increases. Victims of crime report significantly lower levels of happiness— a trend that is also present in South Africa (Powdthavee, 2005). Interestingly, Møller's study in the Eastern Cape (2005:300-303) found that the fear of crime and fear for personal safety decreased life satisfaction even more than actual victimisation.⁹⁷

Crime spreads fear and distrust among people – even more so in unequal societies. As discussed in Chapter Two, high levels of fear and distrust can itself lead to violence

⁹⁶According to the SAPS the ratio of police to population is 1:346 – thus similar to this figure from the SAIRR (SAPS, 2014:1).

⁹⁷Unsurprisingly, contact crimes – a physical violation - were found to have a stronger effect on feelings of safety and life satisfaction than other crimes (Møller, 2005:303).

(Hamilton, 2011:359). PAGAD, for example, was discussed as a vigilante organisation that aimed to violently confront both the public and the state (Isima, 2007:33). Although PAGAD is an extreme example that has been contained, low level vigilante actions continue.⁹⁸ There also exists the aforementioned xenophobic violence, especially against foreign Africans, who are blamed for crime, low wages and a loss of jobs and services (foreigners are therefore blamed for being a source of insecurity) (US Department Of State, 2013:36).

Additionally, South Africa routinely experiences calls for the return of the death penalty - not only for murder, but also for rape and child abuse (Posel, 2005:244-247). Strong support for the death penalty – like the beliefs in evil – is a rare example of South African opinions converging (Møller, 2005:268; Chapter Four). This could possibly constitute a desire to use violence to purge South Africa of evil – in the same way that violently removing Apartheid was seen as purifying a disordered world (Crais, 2002). The perpetrators of popularly justified violence – vigilante crimes, xenophobic attacks and political- or protest-related violence – are rarely prosecuted, resulting in a sense of impunity and perhaps an air of legitimacy (York, 2015).

Crime has an effect on the mental and general health of the population (Wilkinson, 2005:101-143; Sulemana, 2014). The fear of victimisation causes people to spend less time out of doors and to socialise less often, which can negatively affect health and well-being. The extreme measures and lifestyle changes that South Africans take to try and ensure their own safety can be seen as symptomatic of trauma (Møller, 2005:306). The practice of hiding violence – often the case with regards to sexual crimes – can lead to worsening trauma as problems are denied and suppressed (Posel, 2005:242-243). Conversely, the experience of reporting crimes to a distrusted and at times unsympathetic justice system also increases anxiety. All the psychological effects associated with crime and violence – depression, anxiety, feelings of aggression and personal violation as well as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) – negatively affect health, well-being and quality of life (Powdthavee, 2005:532).

Kaminer et al.'s study (2008) confirms that the high levels of violence experienced and witnessed by South Africans heighten the risk of PTSD. The disorder is also associated with life in squalid urban surroundings where there is a higher than average chance of being

⁹⁸For example, the 2012 stoning of Boikie Molefe by mob in a village near Mafikeng, which took place while police drove by. Molefe was suspected of killing his girlfriend (US Department Of State, 2013:10).

exposed to violence. Those suffering from PTSD are likely to experience feelings of powerlessness, a lack of confidence, anxiety and depression. Previous studies have shown that survivors of violence who develop PTSD are more likely to suffer from ill health (over longer periods) and to die sooner than their peers. They are also more likely to abuse alcohol and drugs and to have less successful work lives (typically characterised by many periods of sick leave) (Hirschowitz & Orkin, 1997:169-172).

Children who experience or witness violence can also be affected by depression, anxiety, PTSD or worse (Bach & Louw, 2010:26). Indeed, this was often found to be the case in the studies of violence among the youth that were mentioned earlier in this chapter (Bach & Louw, 2010:28-29; Shields, 2009:1199-1205). Violent communities are associated with PTSD in children and proximal violence is associated with developmental problems, including speech and feeding problems as well as aggressive behaviour (Shields et al., 2009:1192-1195). In violent neighbourhoods children are more likely to be both witness, victim and perpetrator of violence and to experience mental anguish because of it.

In 2005 Powdthavee attempted to quantify the psychological costs of crime. He claims that crime has by far the biggest psychological burden when compared to other socio-economic challenges. If the psychological cost of crime could be expressed in numbers, a household spending R1 187 per month would require an extra R97 424 per month to compensate for an experience of crime. The South African average household would therefore “require a financial package worth 82 times of their current spending to make them feel indifferent about their experiences of crime” (Powdthavee, 2005:538). On the other hand, the estimated psychological costs of unemployment and lack of formal education are on average R4 300 and R7 370 respectively.

Kaminer et al. (2008:1594) warn that developing countries like South Africa do not have the well-resourced mental healthcare system needed to address PTSD and other psychological problems. Furthermore, the problem of violent crime undermines any attempt at improving South Africa’s healthcare sector. Any progress that is made and money that is spent will have

a limited affect if people are not safe. This is as much true of the health sector as it is of other social sectors or the economy.⁹⁹

Crime is known to affect the economy in numerous ways: it results in a loss of earnings for households and increased state expenditure on the justice system (Powdthavee, 2005:532); it affects international economic relations and has been associated with low levels of productivity. While economic investment and job creation are needed to address the socio-economic roots of crime, economic activity - formal and informal - requires security. Both local and international investors are scared off by crime and instability (Pelser & De Kock, 2000:89).

The small business sector is particularly vulnerable to crime, but it is hard to operate a successful business of any kind when neither businesspeople nor customers nor merchandise are safe (Shearing, 2008:1-2). Even non-violent offences such as cable theft harm business as the resultant power failures reduce productivity. Cable theft alone has been estimated to cause an annual loss to the economy of between R5 billion and R10 billion (Burger & Lancaster, 2014). Meanwhile, commercial crimes – fraud, forgery and embezzlement – have increased by 70% over the last decade.

The assertion that crime is bad for business is confirmed by the quantitative study of Roxas et al. (2012) that found that companies identify crime as one of the most urgent constraints to doing business in South Africa. During the first six months of 2014, 65% of respondents in a survey of the business community reported that they, their staff members or family had experienced some form of serious crime (Burger & Lancaster, 2014). A majority of business executives (74%) identified security costs as their biggest burden. 37% Of respondents also noted that crime led to decreased productivity and motivation. A further 20% indicated that crime resulted in a loss of personnel.¹⁰⁰ Burger and Lancaster (2014) conclude that:

“Business is finding it increasingly difficult to absorb the direct and indirect effects of crime. The business sector is the main contributor of disposable household income and the country’s

⁹⁹For example, education expenditure goes to waste if schools are plagued by violence (Shearing, 2008:2). Violence in schools typically lead to poor academic results, absenteeism and a high dropout rate (Le Roux & Mokhele, 2011:325).

¹⁰⁰These figures from 2014 were higher than in 2011 when 45% of respondents said security expenditure was their biggest burden; 16% said crime led to less motivation; 15% reported that crime led to less productivity, and 9% claimed it resulted in a loss of staff (Burger & Lancaster, 2014).

revenue base through taxes and levies. The increase in the cost of crime means that less income is available to pay for wages and for contributing to the state coffers.”

Crime therefore has a double impact on security: violence poses a direct threat to physical security, but all forms of crime also impede economic growth on which people rely for material security. Democratic South Africa’s ability to deliver on much desired material security – as discussed in Chapter Two – is thus seriously threatened by crime.

An industry such as travel and tourism, which has the potential to lift many people out of poverty, is a good illustration of the impact that crime can have on growth. South Africa has been Africa’s top destination for travellers, attracting one out of four visitors to the continent (Ferreira & Harmse, 2000:80). However, widely publicised crimes committed against foreign visitors, which has an immediate effect on the industry, means South Africa has the reputation of being a high risk destination.

Crime was reportedly a key factor in Cape Town’s failure to win the 2004 Olympic bid (Ferreira & Harmse, 2000:80-84). It once again emerged as a concern with regards to the country’s ability to successfully host the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup tournament in 2010 (George & Swart, 2012:201-203). The South African government spent R1.3 billion on safety and security during the tournament, deploying an extra 44 000 police officers around the country at key locations. The country’s transport infrastructure was also upgraded and policed. Special courts were created to address any World Cup-related crimes. These extraordinary measures may be why there were few crime-related problems during the event.¹⁰¹ In fact, robbery in general decreased by almost 12% during 2010 although this success has not been sustained (Daily Maverick, 2014).

The hosting of sporting and other events signals South Africa’s attempt to develop an event-driven economy that will display the country’s economic, social and political strengths to an international audience. In turn such events may lead to an increase in tourism, employment, economic activity and publicity. Despite the growth in South African tourism, crime and violence have the potential to adversely affect this industry, thus also affecting the livelihoods

¹⁰¹Survey data has shown that most World Cup tourists to Cape Town (79%) felt safe during their stay, compared to 50% of respondents in a 2003 study (George & Swartz, 2012:214). Several surveys also reported that 92% of World Cup visitors would recommend South Africa as a travel destination. Most were also willing to return to the country in the future.

of thousands of people. For example, the positive impression of World Cup visitors was marred by the highly publicised murder of Swedish tourist Anni Dewani, which occurred shortly after the World Cup when most soccer fans – and presumably most of the extra security forces – had left (George & Swart, 2012:203).

It has been estimated that the murder of one tourist results in 200 potential visitors deciding on a different destination (Ferreira & Harmse, 2000:84). Those who persist in visiting South Africa despite its bad reputation often report crime as a key concern and tend to avoid the areas – such as central Johannesburg - with the worst reputations. South Africa has to compete with over 200 other emerging markets in the travel and tourism sector, some of whom can spend far more on marketing their brand.

Crime is also identified as one of the primary reasons for South Africa's brain drain: the exodus of thousands of skilled people to more peaceful and prosperous societies (Petzer, 2014). Estimating the number of South African emigrants has been rather difficult – it is hard to know who really leaves the country permanently - and figures differ wildly. Minimum estimates range from 232 000 to one million (Mattes & Mniki, 2007:26). A recent survey found that close to 11% of recent graduates either have left or want to leave the country (MacGregor, 2013). Mattes and Mniki (2007:32-38) found that there is only a moderate desire among potential emigrants to settle permanently in other countries, but that students are motivated by financial and safety concerns.

The loss of human resources is sure to affect the country's economic growth, especially if emigrants do not return. Their emigration deprives the country of the investments made in their education and training and the economy also loses potential consumers (Mattes & Mniki, 2007:25). Thus despite the reported return of approximately 400 000 South Africans who had previously left the country, there still remains a skills shortage amounting to 830 000 vacancies (especially in engineering, finance, medicine and management) (Petzer, 2014).

5.6 The “sick society”

It is perhaps appropriate that crime and violence have been incorporated in a larger discourse on moral decay in South Africa. South Africa does not just have a violent crime problem, but

a problem of general lawlessness and entitlement that manifests in a variety of ways. There is a:

“Lack of respect for the sanctity of life, for the next person, private property, disregard for the law of the land, lack of parental control over children, and the general blurring of the lines between right and wrong [that] are continuing to plague our communities” (Jacob Zuma, quoted in Posel, 2005:247).

In this “sick society” (Jacob Zuma, quoted in Posel, 2005:247) moral threat is not perceived as a problem outside of mainstream society, but rather as a sickness at the heart of it, affecting everybody in one way or another. Violence may simply be the most extreme expression of the problem. Outwater et al. (2005:135-139) states that violence has become normative in South Africa: an accepted expression of masculinity and method of conflict resolution. It has become the default strategy for resolving disputes and winning arguments. Violence is the method by which criminals brutalise their victims, who in turn want to use violence to remedy violence. In the process the lines between right and wrong and perpetrator and victim are blurred.

As mentioned in Chapter Two and confirmed by the data in Chapter Four, the perception exists that human rights are an impediment to justice and safety – that the constitution extends more protection to criminals than to victims. There is thus great support for the return of capital punishment as well as severe sentencing practices and the use of force against suspects. The pressure on the police to address crime is so great, that they have increasingly turned to the use of militaristic tactics against criminal elements. Violent crime and the perception of violent crime are therefore “bad news” (Du Plessis & Louw, 2005:438) for the credibility and survival of democracy and human rights. South Africans are unlikely to fully embrace human rights norms in the face of extreme levels of everyday violence. In chapters one and two it was noted that the widespread attitudes regarding evil and violence may damage democratic consolidation by undermining the political system’s human rights culture. This fear is borne out by the results from Chapter Four and the context presently provided.

Liberal democratic rules of behaviour – or norms – seem to be weak in South Africa. There is thus a need for a more thorough understanding of human rights (and responsibilities) as well as a process of entrenching such rights as norms. Although South Africans acknowledge that there is a crime problem, they do not acknowledge the possibility of personal responsibility

for creating a disorderly environment in which crime thrives. Despite fear of, and outrage over crime, the average South African is often guilty of lesser or so-called victimless offences, such as littering or traffic violations.¹⁰² South Africans are more likely to be critical rather than supportive of attempts to address minor offences (Bezuidenhout, 2011:36). Everybody wants a solution to violence, but nobody wants resources to be wasted on petty crimes which they themselves may indulge in.¹⁰³

According to the well-known “broken windows” theory (Wilson & Kelling, 1982), an unwillingness to address small criminal infractions signals an unwillingness or inability to address larger infractions. A lax attitude regarding lesser offences either encourages the growth of crime or attracts criminals to dilapidated areas. Conversely, the strict application of the law with regards to minor offences, indicates a seriousness in dealing with all crimes, thus discouraging it. Once a small group of people start committing lesser offences with impunity, others tend to follow their lead and the situation can escalate to more serious problems. An orderly environment on the other hand, signals a social norm: “This is the kind of place where people obey the rules” (Pinker, 2011:124). Policing lesser crimes seems to discourage petty rule-breaking by otherwise law-abiding citizens. It also leads to the arrest of serious offenders as they often tend to be responsible for both serious and minor crimes (Fulda, 2010:101-102).

The issue of traffic violations is a good example of the above-mentioned dynamic. The London Department of Transport found a connection between traffic violations and more serious crimes (Bezuidenhout, 2011:36). They determined that those who commit traffic offences were often characterised by (at least) one of the following: a history of traffic

¹⁰²South African roads suffer from poor law enforcement and reckless disregard for traffic rules (Bezuidenhout, 2011:34). According to South Africans Against Drunk Driving (SADD), traffic accidents is the second biggest killer of males in South Africa after homicide (the order is reversed for females). The road traffic fatality rate is 39.7 per 100 000 persons, mostly caused by drunken driving (31.9 deaths per 100 000) (SADD, 2015). Road accidents cost the country about R307 billion a year (Steyn, 2013).

¹⁰³This is also illustrated by the South African president himself: his speech quoted in this chapter – made when he was deputy-president - was in reference to the phenomenon of baby rape (Posel, 2005:247). However, in response to the numerous allegations of corruption against him (Du Plessis & Du Plessis, 2014; Smith, 2013), he called it (corruption) a crime that only exists in a “Western paradigm” (Du Plessis & Du Plessis, 2014) and even if it were a crime, there were no victims.

violations; a criminal record; involvement in other illegal activities.¹⁰⁴ Table 5.4 illustrates this connection between traffic offences and other violations.

Table 5.4 The connection between traffic violations and other offences

Description of offence	Illegally parked vehicles	Legally parked vehicles
Of immediate interest to police (stolen car, owner wanted by police, false registration)	21%	2%
Criminal record	33%	3%
History of traffic violations	49%	11%
Past use in crime	18%	0%
Current illegality	11%	1%

Table from London Department of Transport Research Report, quoted in Bezuidenhout (2011:36).

The connection above was confirmed by the Albuquerque Police Department in the US, which noticed that the parts of the city with the highest incidents of car accidents and road rage were also the parts with the highest general crime rates. Their increased policing of traffic violations – which declined by 12% - also coincided with a 9.5% decrease in crimes against persons and a 3% decrease in property crimes.¹⁰⁵ The preventing of traffic accidents alone saved \$34 million in damages, while the traffic fines generated \$4 million for New Mexico's education fund (Bezuidenhout, 2011:34-35).

It would appear that the restoration of basic law and order (the enforcement of norms) does play a role in reducing crime in general (even though it may not be the only factor). It is not a substitute for addressing other causes of violence, but it may be part of a larger strategy in addressing the culture of crime and disorder.

5.7 Conclusion

The reality of pervasive crime and violence in South Africa as well as the problems of poverty and inequality mean that the country is confronted with many sources of existential insecurity. Existential insecurity makes the adoption of liberal values and peaceful conflict

¹⁰⁴Similarly, when police in plain clothes started arresting turnstile jumpers in New York's subway stations in 1990, many offenders turned out to be wanted by police and/or carrying illegal weapons. As the arrests continued, all types of subway crimes declined. The strategy of targeting misdemeanours was implemented in New York in general and despite a lack of empirical evidence, has been credited as a major reason for the city's reduction in all kinds of crime (Miller & Wilson, 2001).

¹⁰⁵Including a 29% decrease in murder, 17% decrease in kidnapping, 10% decrease in assault, 36% decrease in arson, 10% decrease in fraud and a 9% decrease in robbery and burglary (Bezuidenhout, 2011:34-35).

resolution difficult. People are unlikely to seek peaceful resolutions when living with the stress of violent existential threat. Instead, they are likely to turn to other strategies: withdrawal from a disorderly and unsafe environment, the use of violent or aggressive tactics when having to deal with the outside world and the reliance on religious and spiritual guidance as a source of comfort. The beliefs and attitudes regarding evil and violence that are illustrated in Chapter Four are indicative of the problem of disorder and the consequent need for spiritual reassurance. While existential insecurity remains, it is doubtful that the liberal values discussed in Chapter Two can make significant headway with the population. Crime and violence weaken liberal values and norms, which then contribute to the disorder in which criminals thrive.

The socio-economic causes of insecurity doubtless need to be addressed, but this cannot be done easily or quickly. In the meantime an effort must be made to signal a change in culture. South Africa may require a concerted effort to entrench human rights and responsibilities (such as civil participation) as norms in the country. It may be possible to use sources of local and traditional culture (the concept of *ubuntu* for example) as well as religion to frame such a discourse.

CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION

6.1 Introduction

The larger goal of this study has been to examine South Africa's illiberal values and behaviour – the belief in evil and consequent violence – within the context of democratic consolidation. The quantitative and qualitative data presented in the thesis point to the conclusion that these beliefs and actions are widespread and entrenched among South Africans of all backgrounds. Crime and violence appear to be fuelling existential insecurity, which reinforces illiberal beliefs. The end result is a society characterised by moral decay or normlessness¹⁰⁶ and a struggle with opposing values (cognitive dissonance).¹⁰⁷ This chapter briefly examines the forces that can counter a state of normlessness and how they are currently failing to do so in South Africa. This part of the study also makes suggestions for future research.

6.2 The decline of violence

In *Leviathan* (1651), Thomas Hobbes outlines three principal causes of violence: competition, diffidence and reputation (Hobbes, 1957:185). Violence may occur when people compete over resources. It also occurs when people(s) attack one another out of fear. In this case, the fear that one might be attacked by an enemy leads to a pre-emptive strike out of self-defence. Lastly, people become violent to protect their reputations or honour: if the enemy is sufficiently convinced that one will react to punish any disrespect, they may refrain from initiating any such disrespect (Pinker, 2011:33-34).

According to Hobbes (1651/1957), the presence of a Leviathan – a strong central authority – reduces the anarchy (what he calls the state of nature) in which the above-mentioned forms of violence occur. The Leviathan intervenes in conflicts in order to reduce their negative social, economic and political impact. It does so through the use of the legal system. In the process it

¹⁰⁶ A state of normlessness occurs when the social norms that regulate behaviour become so weak that they are no longer effective rules of conduct (O'Donnell et al., 2006:217).

¹⁰⁷ Cognitive dissonance theory posits that someone who is confronted with two conflicting cognitions will experience psychological discomfort, which the person will try to reduce. This can be accomplished in various ways, for example: conflicting information can be changed or denied outright; It can also be accepted and thus induce a change in behaviour; alternatively, people may try to justify or rationalise the dissonance (Festinger, 1957).

monopolises the use of violence and becomes the sole legitimate punisher of aggressors (Pinker, 2011:35).

In addition to the pacifying influence of a strong state, another factor in the reduction of violence in modern times has been the “civilising process” (Pinker, 2011:59). In response to the emergence of the Leviathan in early modern Europe, European elites became more restrained. Impulse control was necessary if elites were to curry favour at the court of the king – the wellspring of most opportunity for advancement. It would no longer be the strongest warlord that automatically gained relative wealth and status – instead, positions, titles and land were often allocated to the most agreeable, responsible and refined. Those who were too aggressive, ambitious or impulsive could lose all in punishment. European elites adapted to the new situation and the bourgeoisie, seeking similar success, started to imitate them. Eventually the lower classes followed suit and the entire culture changed:

“Europeans increasingly inhibited their impulses, anticipated the long-term consequences of their actions, and took other people’s thoughts and feelings into consideration. A culture of honour – the readiness to take revenge – gave way to a culture of dignity – the readiness to control one’s emotions. These ideals originated in explicit instructions that cultural arbiters gave to aristocrats and noblemen, allowing them to differentiate themselves from the villains and boors. But they [the new norms] were then absorbed into the socialisation of younger and younger children until they became second nature. The standards also trickled down from the upper classes to the bourgeoisie that strove to emulate them, and from them to the lower classes, eventually becoming a part of the culture as a whole” (Pinker, 2011:72).

Three forces are therefore responsible for the modern decline in violence: the power of the state, the civilisation process spearheaded by elites and economic interdependence (already discussed in Chapter Two with regards to the democratic peace). However, Pinker (2011:106-116) also notes the occurrence of a decivilisation process. Whereas the civilising process was a flow of norms from elites downward, it is also possible to experience the obverse.

According to Pinker, as the Western world became more democratic, “hierarchies of taste and manners were levelled” (2011:110). Everyday life – including dress, language and manners - therefore became more casual and overly formal behaviour was ridiculed. Additionally, Western elites suffered a crisis of moral legitimacy as political scandals came to light from the 1960s onwards.¹⁰⁸ A more democratic and informal world in which upper class behaviour

¹⁰⁸Pinker (2011:110) mentions the mistreatment of minorities and women as well as questionable military attacks as examples of the criticism directed at ruling elites in the West.

is rigorously criticised has tarnished some of the prestige traditionally associated with middle and upper class lifestyles, values and ambitions.

A counterculture therefore emerged in the 1960s which challenged notions of interdependence, self-discipline and propriety and instead stressed individualism, self-expression and the indulgence of impulses. At this time various forms of unconventional, dissolute and authority-flouting behaviour became permissible and even admirable. Sometimes this resulted in a tolerance for and romanticisation of violent behaviour as often expressed in popular entertainment. According to Pinker, “the glorification of dissoluteness shaded into an indulgence of violence and then into violence itself” (2011:112). Although there is no direct causal connection between violence in popular culture and actual violence, Pinker claims that the rejection of the values of the civilising process probably caused an increase in violence in the West as well as the increased celebration of violence in popular culture.¹⁰⁹ One can expect general beliefs and popular culture to reinforce one another and “where susceptible individuals and subcultures can be buffeted one way or another, there are plausible causal arrows from the decivilising mindset to the facilitation of actual violence” (2011:113-114).

6.3 Decivilisation in South Africa

Once again one finds that the forces responsible for the West’s decline in violence are not particularly strong in South Africa. In fact, Pinker (2011:89) mentions South Africa and Russia as examples of countries that may be experiencing a decivilisation process. As discussed in Chapter Two as well as Chapter Five, South Africa’s economy faces many challenges and has not grown as fast as necessary to increase material security. Additionally, South Africa’s transition from a strong, oppressive state to the freedoms of liberal democracy has loosened methods of social control (Nomoyi, 2000:67). Democratic South Africa’s institutions are struggling to cope with social problems that were previously kept in check through the coercive methods of the Apartheid state. In South Africa, the Leviathan has weakened. Furthermore, the illegitimate nature and wrongdoings of the Apartheid state discredited the old ruling elite. Unfortunately, when the new ruling elite is compared to the old, it is often found wanting too.

¹⁰⁹Despite the lack of a direct causal relationship between popular culture and violence, many studies have found various effects between violent media and aggressive behaviour – see Anderson et al., 2003 and Gunter, 2008).

Despite some successes, South Africa's new rulers have not delivered the desired levels of economic growth and prosperity. Policies such as BEE have been labelled as reversed discrimination or tools for the enrichment of a corrupt few (Lipton, 2014:14). Such policies have certainly maintained and reinforced the racialised worldview and tensions of the Apartheid era. The same may be said for the comments of high ranking politicians, including the president, in which Westerners – and thus by extension the white minority – are blamed for South Africa's problems and failings (see Steward, 2015). The controversial removal of symbols and names reflecting the white minority's history and leaders continues even twenty years after the end of Apartheid.¹¹⁰ Whatever the possible merits to these practices may be, the end result is certainly not the non-racial society promised in 1994.

It can also be argued that South Africa's new ruling elite has not proven capable of moral leadership. Allegations of fraud and corruption against high ranking officials are not uncommon in South Africa. Examples include the former chairperson of the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), Ellen Tshabalala, who lied about her qualifications (Presence, 2014), former police chief and former president of Interpol, Jackie Selebi, who was convicted of corruption in 2010 (Cohen, 2015) and the president himself. Corruption allegations against President Zuma include money-laundering and racketeering charges that originate from a 1999 arms deal; the 2005 conviction of businessman Schabir Shaik who made payments to the then deputy-president in return for his assistance in business matters (Mail & Guardian, 2005); and the more recent scandal of R246 million that was improperly spent on upgrading Zuma's private residence at Nkandla (Du Plessis, 2014). Although Zuma has not been convicted of any wrongdoing, the persistent allegations of corruption and interference with the country's independent institutions have tarnished the reputation and credibility of the president and the ANC government.

The president has also been accused of immorality, sexism and homophobia. Zuma – who was acquitted of rape in 2006 – has admitted to infidelity, fathering children out of

¹¹⁰The recent removal of the statue of Cecil John Rhodes at the University of Cape Town (UCT) (Felix, 2015:2) triggered numerous vandalous attacks on statues throughout the country. Examples include the burning of a Port Elizabeth statue commemorating the Anglo-Boer War (Schoeman, 2015:2), attacks on statues of General Louis Botha and Queen Victoria in Cape Town (Die Burger, 2015 & Scheun, 2015:2) as well as Paul Kruger in Pretoria (Mailovich, 2015:2).

wedlock¹¹¹ and having unprotected sex with an HIV positive woman (thus acting in contradiction of the government's attempts to promote condom use and fidelity in order to counter the spread of the virus) (BBC News, 2014). Zuma has also sparked outrage with various offensive comments and claims, including that the accuser at his rape trial had provoked their sexual encounter by wearing provocative clothing (BBC News, 2006); that it is wrong for women to remain single – that they should marry and have children (Pillay, 2012); and his boast that, as a youth, he would have beaten a gay person who dared approach him (Daniels, 2006).

According to Hunter (2011:1108-1121), the rise to power of Jacob Zuma – a populist leader with little formal schooling – is partly illustrative of poor South Africans' sense of betrayal at the failures of the government to deliver prosperity. While the previous president, Thabo Mbeki, is viewed as an aloof, intellectual neoliberal, Jacob Zuma started his career with a reputation for being down-to-earth and pro-poor. His lack of formal education and patriarchal values resonate with many South Africans. Many women, while acknowledging Zuma's sexism, also admire him as a "traditional respectable man" (Hunter, 2011:1107) who at least marries and provides for his girlfriends and children as opposed to discarding them as other men do.

As class divides have deepened in post-Apartheid South Africa, those of the poor who have not been a part of the country's new black middle class success, have become derisive of the so-called "*amamodelC*" South Africans (Hunter, 2011:1108): the well-educated, prosperous black middle and upper middle classes whose success have left the poor feeling dispossessed and demoralised (Coplan, 2011:383). Their leadership – as epitomised by the elitist "intellectual king" (BBC News, 2014) Thabo Mbeki – has left the poor disaffected (Hunter, 2011:1108).

Zuma's early promise as the "peoples' president" (BBC News, 2014) has however also soured due to the corruption allegations against him. At former president Nelson Mandela's memorial service in 2013, Zuma was heckled and booed in front of world leaders by ruling party supporters. "He is eating when we are hungry" remarked one member of the public (BBC News, 2014). The sentiment that the government still does not care about the South

¹¹¹Zuma is a polygamist who has married six times and currently has four wives (BBC News, 2014).

African poor also found expression in the aforementioned attacks on foreigners. Those held responsible for such xenophobic attacks report feeling like foreigners in their own country who are marginalised and even actively disliked by the authorities (Coplan, 2009:377-378).

Post-Apartheid rulers and elites have thus proved disappointing. Their perceived avarice and neglect of the poor have sometimes led to negative comparisons with Apartheid elites. The massacre of the miners at Marikana – so reminiscent of Apartheid era bloodbaths – serves as another case in point (see Chapter Two). Discredited elites make the downward flow of civilising norms as described by Pinker (2011:72) quite difficult.

A final important factor in the civilising process is the role of marginalised young men in violent societies (Pinker, 2011:166). When a large number of young men fail to integrate into society – when they fail to find steady employment and start families – an increase in violence is often experienced. According to Brooks (2013), men have traditionally strove the hardest for status and respect from their peers in order to improve their chances of finding a mate. Young men are accordingly most sensitive about their status in society and when suffering from low status, they are more likely to engage in dangerous behaviour in an attempt to remedy the situation:

“Young men discount their futures and take ridiculous risks in order to improve their prospects. They also become more violent, rising more readily to perceived slights and insults, and starting more fights – often over trivial issues. These are the triggers for most man-on-man assaults and homicides” (Brooks, 2013).

Hudson and Den Boer (2002:15) warn that single young men with low status are bound to socialise together, compete with each other and legitimise each other's risky choices. When grouped together they are likely to take bigger risks and become more violent than they would as individuals. Brooks (2013) and Pinker (2011:166) point to the lawlessness of the American frontier or “Wild West” as an example of the kind of violence that occurs when too many men have too little chance of a stable family life. Marriage and a settled family life appears to temper risky behaviour in men (literally decreasing their levels of testosterone). In fact, unmarried men (aged 24 to 35) are three times more likely to commit a murder and also more likely to commit other crimes such as robbery and rape (Hudson & Den Boer, 2002:12-14).

Although South Africa does not have the serious imbalance of sex ratios of countries like China and India (Hudson & Den Boer, 2002), it does have a large population of impoverished, unemployed and unemployable young people. Young men from this demographic are likely to be keenly aware of their low social status and inability to support a family (Brooks, 2013). As discussed in Chapter Five (see also Dworkin et al., 2012), this lack of esteem may be responsible for the risky and violent behaviour of young South African men.

Men's lack of social status may also be responsible for the breakdown of family life in South Africa as documented by the SAIRR. According to the SAIRR (2014:65), 47.2% of South Africa's children are growing up without their fathers even though the fathers in question are still alive. Only 34.8% of children in the country are being raised by both their parents. The majority of children are lacking at least one parent – usually their father. The lack of willingness or ability on the part of South African men to support their children may be indicative of their lack of social integration as discussed above. This lack of social integration – in such high numbers – increases the likelihood of risky behaviour among this demographic.

South Africa's decivilising process therefore appears to be characterised by a number of factors: the history of political violence, the weakening of authority, the lack of moral leadership and finally, the large number of economically and socially marginalised young men. If this is indeed the case, one may expect to find the violence that plagues the country reflected in its popular culture. Two examples of the glorification of violence in South Africa have already been mentioned: the heroism of violent political struggle in which breaking the law was honourable (Chapter Five) and the sensationalist stories of evil and violence in the media (Chapter One).

The history of violent struggle has remained a relevant part of popular politics. The symbolic politics of name changes and statue removals mentioned above is one example of the continued importance and reinforcement of historical divides and conflicts. Another is the continued use by political leaders and supporters of violent struggle songs like “Bring Me My Machine Gun” and “Shoot The Boer” (even though the latter has been ruled hate speech by South Africa's Equality Court) (Davids, 2014; IOL News, 2011).

As mentioned at the beginning of the thesis, South Africa's tabloid newspapers frequently feature sensationalist stories with violent and supernatural themes. The *Daily Sun*, which reaches 4.6 million readers, mostly from the black working class (Caldwell, 2011:873), is one of the most relevant examples. Examples of the kind of stories commonly featured include:

- Buried Without His Head! Tears For Madala After Muthi Murder
- The Head In The Fridge! Sangoma Bust Over Horror Find!
- Credo Warns: Evil Is Upon Us!¹¹²
- Dead Talk To Sangoma On Sun TV!
- My Hair Talks To Ancestors!
- Village Of Zombie Kids!
- Satanists Did It! Dying Girl Tells Her Mum Of Bloody Attack!
- SMS From The Devil! Family's Terror After Two Kids Die!

In January 2014, the *Daily Sun* even reported that President Zuma used to practice witchcraft in order to defeat his Apartheid enemies (City Press, 2014).¹¹³ *Daily Sun* editors have freely admitted that – much like other newspapers – it tends to take the perspective that will be popular with its readers (Coplan, 2009:368). In other words, it is not informing its public of matters unknown to them, but rather catering to and reinforcing their existing beliefs, attitudes and interests. It is in fact common for newspaper coverage to be, not an objective reporting of the facts, but rather subjective descriptions of events with ready-made interpretations provided by journalists. Journalists and editors “select events that are atypical, present them in a stereotypical fashion and contrast them against a backdrop of normality which is overtypical” (De Wet, 2009:46).

Although tabloids tend to be the most sensationalist in their content and reporting, other (print and broadcast) media also frequently report – in sensitive and insensitive ways - on South Africa's extreme violence (see De Wet, 2009). Coverage of high profile cases like that of accused murderers Oscar Pistorius (convicted of culpable homicide) and Shrien Dewani (case dismissed) as well as the mystery of the Stellenbosch axe murders have been highly

¹¹²Credo Mutwa is one of South Africa's best known traditional healers (Labuschagne, 2004:192).

¹¹³An allegation that was denied by the president (City Press, 2014).

speculative and emotional.¹¹⁴ The long-term and sensationalist nature of the coverage give the impression that crime and violence can become entertainment. In fact, during his murder trial, Pistorius and his legal team were approached for autographs (Daily News, 2014).

In addition to the news media, South Africans are exposed to the same forms of violent entertainment found in Western countries and documented by Pinker (2011:112-114). These forms of entertainment include movies, music and games with violent protagonists, scenes, lyrics and themes. While a form of escapism to some, such entertainment may have a more pernicious effect on others. Olivier and Cunningham (2004:99) have noted that the youth's first exposure to gang culture is often through music, television and movies. For those living in economically marginalised communities plagued by gang activities, the media glorification of violence (for example, Martin Scorsese and Quentin Tarantino films, television shows like *The Sopranos* or the gangsta-rap music genre) can give the impression that crime provides excitement and status in an otherwise poverty-stricken and mundane existence.

The media does not only romanticise violent criminals – often turning them into darkly alluring protagonists - but also glorifies the violence of the heroes. The heroes of Western action movies are usually extremely violent and anti-social characters who embark on widespread destruction in pursuit of an ideal of justice that often has more in common with the revenge killings of honour-bound societies rather than the legal proceedings of the Leviathan. In these films the focus is very much on the protagonist and/or the villain and not on the fate of helpless bystanders, shown as “nameless, faceless, shouting, hysterical people, slightly blurred, often out of focus” (Pillay, 2002:50). It is not very difficult to identify the parallels between the movie narrative and real violence such as gang warfare, daring mall robberies or police chases. Films – and other forms of media like gangsta-rap and hip-hop - articulate “the values of absolute individualism which are posited as oppositional to collective and social responsibility, that speaks more to a Hobbesian state of nature where life is ‘nasty, brutish and short’” (Pillay, 2002:52).

It is therefore not a coincidence that communities suffering from high levels of violence also tend to relate to and consume more violent entertainment. As Pillay (2002:50) points out,

¹¹⁴Some headlines include: “Corrections: No ‘Royal’ Treatment For Oscar” (News24b, 2015) and “Anni’s Sister: This Will Haunt Us For The Rest Of Our Lives (News24, 2014). See also News24a (2015) and Eggington (2015) for speculation about the murders in Stellenbosch.

cinemas located in Cape Town's working class neighbourhoods are more likely to be dominated by violent action movies. By contrast, "art house cinemas" for the "discerning film goer" (Pillay, 2002:50) are exclusively located in wealthy areas. Violence sells cultural products and those living closer to Hobbes's state of nature often prove especially good consumers. This is not because violent entertainment causes violence, but because the fiction reflects and reinforces aspects of reality and vice versa.

The South African situation is thus one where the values of the liberal democratic state are competing with the absolute individualism of the Hobbesian state of nature. Values become weak because there is a "high expectancy that socially unapproved behaviours are required to achieve given goals" (Schoultz, 1978:82) and that "departures from prescribed behaviour are common" (83). The result is that liberal values are not always able to inhibit transgressive actions. The consequent disorder is further evidence of an aggressive and unpredictable world in which the individual must survive. It is in these circumstances that cognitive dissonance – psychological discomfort arising from conflicting beliefs and actions (Festinger, 1957) - becomes possible. Hinton (1996:819) illustrates cognitive dissonance with the example of smoking:

"Upon hearing a report that cigarette smoking is bad for their health, for example, many smokers will likely be motivated to reduce the resulting psychological discomfort/dissonance by changing cognitions to make them more compatible (e.g., dismissing the research out of hand); circumspectly adding new cognitions that bridge the gap between the cognitive elements (e.g., finding information that indicates smoking is less dangerous than driving a car); or changing her or his behaviour (e.g., stopping smoking)."

South Africans may not deny that breaking the law is wrong, instead it is justified in a variety of ways: larger crimes are not entirely the individual's fault, but due to bad circumstances or injustice – in fact, the offender is often the hero, using violence defensively to fight evil and obtain rights; smaller offenses, on the other hand, are not really as bad as real crime and can thus be overlooked. These kinds of "cognitive schemata" (Hinton, 1996:819) can become culturally shared, which seems to be the case in South Africa.

6.4 Future research

As pointed out previously (Chapter Three and Chapter Four), the conceptualisation and operationalisation of evil is rather problematic. Although researchers have conceptualised evil, it remains uncertain exactly how individual respondents interpret the concept. The WVS

presents respondents with questions on evil, but it neither clarifies these concepts to respondents, nor does it ask them about their personal interpretations. It can therefore not be definitively known what respondents mean when they register support for the statements on evil. The first statement certainly captures all possible definitions of evil, but the second and third statements can be interpreted literally or figuratively. In fact, it is possible for definitions of evil to converge, as may be the case when people refer to the evils or demons of poverty, drugs and disease (Jenkins, 2002:78). In this case the evil is literal in its effects and yet spiritual in its origin.

Future research on evil will therefore in all likelihood have to take the problems of conceptualisation and operationalisation into account. It may be necessary to develop various definitions for survey respondents to choose from and to design studies around such definitions. This could clarify what South Africans mean when they refer to evil. Studies on the local level – in communities and neighbourhoods – could also provide insight on how different demographics might differ in their definitions, beliefs and behaviour. Despite these problems of definition, it will nevertheless be important to study future patterns of response to the WVS questions. This includes the three statements on evil and the many inconclusive relationships found in Chapter Four.

Future research could also perhaps be linked to the study of normlessness in South Africa. Attempts to measure normlessness have been made in countries like the USA (see Kapsis, 1979) and it may be productive to attempt the same in South Africa. It might be useful to study possible relationships between normlessness and attitudes regarding evil and violence as well as trust and tolerance. Research of the connections between norms and values on the one hand, and violence on the other, could produce potential solutions for illiberal attitudes and actions that threaten South Africa's democracy.

Possible solutions may include the reinterpretation of religious or traditional values and customs like *ubuntu* in order to promote a liberal democratic culture, which would in turn strengthen – and be strengthened by – institutions. These solutions for South Africa may be quite similar to attempts to reinterpret religious and traditional values and practices in other parts of the world (see Chapter Two). In South Africa's case, attention must also be given on how reinvented values can be disseminated as norms. If elites prove to be ineffective

disseminators, there may be a need for grassroots or community-based organisations to take the lead. Additionally, policing of minor offences – as in Wilson and Kellings’ “Broken Windows” (1982) approach, which is also discussed by Pinker (2011:123) - might help to signal a change in culture. The enforcement of lesser rules and laws need not necessarily be a long-term practice in order to be successful (also see Chapter Five).

6.5 Conclusion

This study embarked on an exhaustive search for predictors of the beliefs in evil and support for consequent forms of violence among South Africans. This was done in the belief that illiberal values and actions hold implications for democratic consolidation. Quantitative analysis confirmed the strong presence of the said illiberal beliefs and attitudes. However, it was found that these beliefs and attitudes cannot be identified with any specific demographic or other group. Although relationships were found to exist between various groups and the statements on evil, these relationships were usually weak in nature and often contradictory. It was therefore concluded that the attitudes regarding evil are so widespread that minor differences between groups are less important than the overall strength and universality of the attitudes.

Although further research is no doubt necessary to shed light on the subject, this study’s qualitative analysis indicates that answers may be found in South Africa’s high levels of violent crime and general disorder – produced by a weakened state, ineffective leadership and norm setting by elites, as well as challenging economic conditions. The situation has given rise to widespread insecurity, normlessness and cognitive dissonance as people perceive themselves to be in a disorderly environment where aggression is often the best strategy for safety and success. The study therefore urges the continued research of illiberal values in South Africa – particularly those surrounding beliefs and attitudes regarding evil and violence – so that more knowledge may lead to solutions.

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