South Africa’s Home Policy and its Foreign Relations: A Study of Transitions Since 1990

by

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Declaration

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is a study of South African transitions. A transition, within the context of South African contemporary history, usually refers to the period in the early 1990s when South Africa underwent a negotiated transition from racial minority rule to a full democracy in 1994. This thesis takes a liberal understanding of South Africa’s transition timeline and is not confined just to South Africa’s political transition, but also examines transitions within transitions. This will be done through three studies beginning with a survey of the global political transitions that took place against the backdrop of South Africa’s domestic political transition in the early 1990s. Secondly, we will look at the role that national historical identity plays in diplomacy and international relations and, more specifically, at the cultivation of a new historic identity in South Africa’s international relations. Lastly, we will examine the policy transitions that came in the “new” South Africa through a case study of the nationalization debate. All three of these focuses will be studied through the lens of South Africa’s foreign relations with China and the United States which provides a unique vantage point for viewing the complexities. The goal of this thesis is to develop a broader understanding of transitions in South Africa and the role that the United States and China played in them. As this theme is interrogated, some of the continuities and discontinuities will be exposed between the “old” and “new” South Africa.
Hierdie tesis bestudeer Suid-Afrikaanse transisies. 'n Transisie, binne die konteks van kontemporêre Suid-Afrikaanse geskiedenis, verwys gewoonlik na die tydperk van die vroeë 1990's toe Suid-Afrika 'n bemiddelde oorgang ondergaan het vanaf radikale minderheidsbewind na 'n volledige demokrasie in 1994. Hierdie tesis neem 'n liberale benadering tot die tydperk waarbinne hier periode beskou word en is nie beperk tot slegs Suid-Afrika se politieke transisie nie, maar ondersoek ook transisies binne-in transisies. Dit sal gedoen word deur drie ondersoek, wat begin met 'n oorsig van die wêreldwyse politieke transisies wat op daardie stadium plaasgevind het teen die agtergrond van Suid-Afrika se binnelandse politieke transisie van die 1990's. Tweedens sal ons kyk na die rol wat nasionale historiese identiteit speel in diplomatiese en internasionale verhoudinge en, meer spesifiek, die kultivering van 'n nuwe nasionale historiese identiteit in Suid-Afrika se internasionale verhoudinge. Laastens beskou ons die beleidstransisies wat ingekom het in die "nuwe" Suid-Afrika. Dit word gedoen deur 'n gevallestudie van Suid-Afrika se debat oor nasionalisering. Al drie hierdie fokusse sal beskou word deur die lens van Suid-Afrika se verhoudinge met Sjina en die Verenigde State. Hierdie verhoudinge verskaf 'n unieke oogpunt waar rondom die kompleksiteite van hierdie debat beskou kan word. Die doel van hierdie tesis is om 'n breër verstandhouding te skep waarin Suid-Afrika se transisies beskou kan word. Soos hierdie tema ondersoek word, word van die kontinuïteite en diskontinuïteite van die "ou" en "nuwe" Suid-Afrika ontbloot.
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**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

Abstract iii  
Opsomming iv  
Acknowledgements v  
Table of Contents vi  

**Chapter One: Introduction and Overview**  
1.1 Introduction  
1.2 Why China and the United States?  
1.3 Research Aims  
1.4 Research Methodology  
1.4.1 Sources  
1.4.2 Discourse Analysis  
1.5 Limitations of the Study  
1.6 Middle Power Theory  
1.6.1 South Africa as a Middle Power?  
1.7 Literature Review  
1.8 Chapter Outline  

**Chapter Two: The “New World Order” and the “End of History”: The Global Context to South Africa’s Political Transition**  
2.1 Introduction  
2.2 Soviet Reforms  
2.3 The End of the Cold War: A Timeline  
2.4 A ‘New Order’ or ‘The End of History’?  
2.4.1 Phrasing History: The Development of the Term “New World Order”  
2.4.2 South Africa and the End of History Theory  
2.5 South Africa and the ‘New World Order’  

**Chapter Three: History as a Diplomatic Tool: Transitions in National Historic Identity**  
3.1 Introduction  
3.2 South Africa’s History in Afrikaner Nationalism  
3.3 The ANC and the Quest for a ‘Usable’ History  
3.4 ‘Africanizing’ and ‘Southernizing’ South Africa’s International Identity  
3.4.1 ‘Africanizing’ South Africa’s Foreign Policy  
3.4.2 ‘Southernizing’ South Africa’s Foreign Policy  

Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
3.5 History as a Diplomatic Tool in U.S.-South Africa’s Relations 66
3.6 History as a Diplomatic Tool in Chinese-South Africa Relations 70
3.6.1 China’s International Identities 77

Chapter Four: Policy Transitions: A Case study of the Nationalization Debate 82
4.1 Introduction 83
4.2 Nationalization under the National Party 83
4.3 The ANC and Nationalization 85
4.4 The ANC and Nationalization.... Again 97

Conclusion 103

Works Cited 105
1.1 Introduction

This thesis is a study of South African transitions. When we talk of transitions within the context of contemporary South African history, we are generally talking about the period in the early 1990s when South Africa prepared and underwent a transition from racial minority rule to inclusive democracy. This period culminated in South Africa’s first democratic election on April 27, 1994. This is not to say that South Africa’s democratic transition was complete after the election, indeed, South African politicians have articulated a broader definition of South Africa’s transition period. During the June 2012 African National Congress Policy Congress, a discussion document was released entitled “The Second Transition? Building a National Democratic Society and the Balance of Forces in 2012”. The document, which was supported by President Jacob Zuma, essentially expressed that the first eighteen years of South African democracy had been a part of the political transition, and that it was time to begin an economic and social stage. While many have dismissed such statements as political jockeying and mere verbiage, it does highlight how some politicians have begun to revise their understanding of South Africa’s transition and the transition timeline. This sentiment is not evident within the African National Congress (ANC) alone. In May 2012, former President, F.W. de Klerk, during an interview said “Fact is that in South Africa, transition

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2 The document was rejected by the majority of ANC commissions, and was revised to read “The Second Phase of the Transition” See Ltsoalo, Matuma, and Michelle Pieterse. “Zuma’s Second Transition Rejected by ANC Commissions.” The M&G Online. N.p., 27 June 2012. Web. 01 Mar. 2013. For further reading see Bauer, Nickolaus, “ANC Accepts Revised ‘second Transition’ Document” The M&G Online. N.p., 28 June 2012 Web. 01 Mar. 2013
This thesis takes a liberal understanding of South Africa’s transition timeline and is not confined just to South Africa’s political transition, but also examines transitions within transitions. I.e. the transitions that accompanied the domestic political transition. This will be done through a focus and study of three transitions beginning with a survey of the global political transitions that took place against the backdrop of South Africa’s domestic political transition in the early 1990s. Secondly, we will look at the role that national historical identity plays in diplomacy and international relations and, more specifically, at the cultivation of a new historic identity in South Africa’s international relations. Lastly, we will examine the policy transitions that came in the ‘New’ South Africa through a case study of the nationalization debate. In order to fully study these transition themes a broad timeline is necessary, and so we will be looking at events ranging from 1990 to 2012. All three of these focuses will be studied through the lens of South Africa’s foreign relations with China and the United States.

1.2 Why China and the United States?

The time period covered in this thesis, from the late early 1990s to 2012 is, as already stated, a critical transition period for South Africa, and this also applies to its diplomatic relations. This thesis finds the United States and China to be two of South Africa’s most important diplomatic relationships for the late twentieth and early twenty-

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4 During this Thesis any mention of “China” refers to the People’s Republic of China. Taiwan will be the title used in any discussions of the Republic of China.
first century. At the time of South Africa’s transition to an ANC-led government, there were no official relations with China. Since the beginning of official diplomatic relations in 1998 however, it has come to be a critical partner for South Africa not only in matters of trade and commerce, but also with regards to issues of global governance and reform. South Africa’s relations with the United States, on the other hand, have been constant since 1799⁵, with the US establishing one of its very first diplomatic posts as a new country, in Cape Town. The differences in a new diplomatic relationship with China, and an established one with the US, offer many avenues of exploration for the topic of transition. Furthermore, the United States, for the period in focus, was, and still is, considered a world super-power from the West, while China was rapidly becoming an emerging power from the East. These differences in both power, and cultural and geographic orientation once again allow unique opportunities for understanding how South Africa has balanced and transitioned into new diplomatic relationships. This study is not one of West versus East, as so many studies involving China and the US tend to be. For South Africa, because of its history and varied population, defies this simple classification system. In answering the present question of why China and the United States, it is useful to quote from a pamphlet written by a South African, C.F. Andrews, in 1928. In the pamphlet Andrews sought to contextualize the political turmoil in China for readers of *The Natal Witness*. The pamphlet was titled *South Africa and the Far East: The Chinese Crisis*. After giving an overview of the domestic political crisis

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besieging China, Andrews concludes by giving an opinion on South Africa's place in the world that is instructive for our study as well.

South Africa herself belongs also by right to the West. It was from the West that her first settlers came. It was to the West that their descendants always looked for support. The West gave the splendid physique, education and enterprise which have largely made South Africa what it is. In character, South Africa to-day is one of the younger nations of the world, fresh and virile, having just attained her western nationhood. But that is not the whole picture. She has also to learn, in the days to come, her own larger international outlook. By doing so, the people of this country must look eastward as well as westward. She is the half-way house on the map of the globe between East and West.6

Some contemporary readers would no doubt find fault with Andrew's Western classification of South Africa, but his thoughts must be contextualized for the period in which he wrote them. The South African government of the period had a definite Eurocentric identity. While the South Africa of today is decidedly more African in its identity, it is still geographically the halfway point between East and West. Andrews advises that South Africa pursue a flexible international relations policy by looking “eastward as well as westward”. In the parlance of contemporary international relations theory, Andrews is advocating that South Africa be a ‘pivot state’ which is flexible in the international system and not bound to any great power. Has contemporary South Africa managed to “look eastward as well as westward”? Further, what possible influences have occurred in South Africa when looking to the east and west, i.e., China and the United States? These are just a few of the questions to be explored. This study, however, is not meant to be an exact comparative analysis of South Africa’s relations with China and the United States. The goal is to locate the role or position that China and the United States have played in our transition themes.

In summary, this thesis uses a study of South African foreign relations with China and the United States as a lens to focus on our study theme of “Transitions”. Through this approach, we hope to be able to gain a unique perspective on these transitions and the “half-way house on the map”.

1.3 Research Aims

Broadly speaking, the research aims of this work are on two interconnected themes: transitions, and South Africa’s evolving position in the world. This thesis approaches these two themes through an historical analysis of key events, people, and documents. By doing so we will hopefully better be able to answer one of the guiding questions of this study, ‘Where in the world is South Africa?’ One other guiding question of this thesis is an interrogation of just how ‘New’ the ‘New South Africa’ is. That is to say, what are the continuities and discontinuities of the ‘Old’ and ‘New’ South Africa, particularly regarding its foreign relations. As we will see in the literature review, some research already exists on, or in relation to, these questions. This thesis aims not only to build upon this existing research but seeks also to unify it.

Finally, this thesis aims to follow the ‘inside/outside’ reading of history that was advocated in the work of English historian R. G. Collingwood. In 1946, Collingwood published a book entitled The Idea of History, in which he outlined a categorical approach to studying history. Collingwood asserts that the historian must make the distinction between the “inside” and “outside” of events. Collingwood explains this
distinction in the following paragraph, which is highly instructive to the broad aim of this thesis and is worth quoting at length.

By the outside of the event I mean everything belonging to it which can be described in terms of bodies and their movements. He [the historian] is investigating not mere events (where by a mere event I mean one which has only an outside and no inside) but actions, and an action is the unity of the outside and inside of an event. His work may begin by discovering the outside of an event, but it can never end there; he must always remember that the event was an action, and that his main task is to think himself into this action, to discern the thought of its agent. 7

Collingwood’s description of events as having an inside and outside makes the distinction between the observation of actions and the thought of the persons or agents that were involved in the actions. Collingwood explains that in doing history “the object to be discovered is not the mere event but the thought expressed in it.” 8 What does this distinction mean for our research purposes? While this thesis necessarily contains descriptions and facts regarding historical events as a foundation, the goal is to go beyond a mere photograph of South Africa’s transition. To do this, we will be looking at the historical forces that underpinned and shaped these events, thereby unifying thoughts and actions, or the “outside” and “inside” of history.

1.4 Research Methodology

1.4.1 Sources

This thesis will make use of a variety of sources, both primary and secondary. These sources will include journal articles, scholarly literature, news sources such as

8 Ibid, 213.
newspapers, magazines, periodicals, government publications, and speeches. This thesis will, at times, blur the usually rigid lines between primary and secondary sources and argue that some secondary sources have, with the passage of time, become primary sources in that they have come to represent an historic period. Examples of this blurring include Francis Fukuyama’s 1992 book, *The End of History and the Last Man*, and Samuel P. Huntington’s influential 1993 article, *The Clash of Civilizations*? Works such as these are valuable not only for the arguments proffered, but also as works that shed light onto the leading thoughts of the period. These works have become blurred in their classification as primary or secondary sources and they have also become examples of leading voices. That is to say, they embody in their own writing a distinct voice of the historical time period in which they were written, and not only do they embody this historical voice, they have either become or were a leading voice of the period when they wrote. This will be a valuable addition that will offset one of the limitations of this thesis.

1.4.2 Discourse Analysis

One of the limitations of this thesis is access to classic manuscript primary sources. Since the study is primarily one of government actions and government relations, there is only so much material available for public research and analysis. This presents a problem for research into the “inside” of events. While it is much easier to observe and analyse the “outside” of events, especially for those who are not on the inside of these “inside” events, a useful method that enables a certain level of penetration is discourse analysis. This thesis makes use of this method, and this
section will briefly outline the method as it relates to our work, as well as to the uses of the method.

Discourse analysis is a broad term for several different approaches for analysing written, oral and other forms of communication. Throughout this thesis, discourse will be understood simply as the conversation, or communications between governments and the public, or government to government communications.\(^9\) Paul Chilton, in his work on analysing political discourse, notes that political activity could not exist without the use of language, and that even when language is being employed as a cloaking mechanism, that in itself is a form of communication.\(^10\) Discourse analysis is often conducted at the cellular level, i.e., a linguistic analysis; however, our analysis will be confined to the content of the discourse or to the statements of the actors in our study. The main resources to be consulted for this analysis will be speeches and published government documents.

1.5 Limitations of the Study

We have already touched on one of the limitations of this study, namely a lack of access to research materials. During the course of research this author contacted many past and present government officials of the South African government. While a few were willing to be interviewed on questions regarding this thesis, the vast majority were opposed. Therefore a close reading of published statements became critical to accomplishing the research aims.


The scope of this thesis is wide ranging, dealing with a time period of over twenty years, and the diplomatic relations of three countries. The complexities of South Africa’s relations with both the United States and China mean there are many tempting rabbit trails to go down. This scope and the ensuing complexities represents a limitation in that there is simply not enough time to deal with all the intricacies of each relationship.

While this study examines South Africa’s relations with the United States and China, it is not meant to be a comparative study, though comparisons will at certain points naturally arise. The purpose is to highlight different aspects and nuances of our three transition themes through a study of South Africa’s international relations.

1.6 Middle Power Theory

The title of this thesis, *Studies on Transition—South Africa’ Foreign Relations with the United States and China*, refers to the broad aim of the study in studying and locating South Africa’s transitions in the context of its relations with two global powers. In terms of power, an admittedly abstract and vague term, South Africa clearly does not compare to either China or the United States. It does not have the material capabilities or economic power of these states, but in terms of the international system it is not one of the ‘weak’ states. Does this make South Africa a middle power? Since the demise of the bipolar international system at the conclusion of the Cold War, many states have had to re-evaluate their power status in the world. This includes South Africa, where a salient feature of many post-apartheid foreign policy discussions is the use and
prominence of middle power theory. As already outlined, this thesis is an historical analysis of South Africa’s foreign relations and transition period, however, its author will also employ the theory of middle powers and middle-‘powermanship’ from the field of International Relations to explore certain aspects of the three transition themes. The purpose of this section is to give a brief outline and definition of middle powers and middlepowermanship and also to explain its use in this work.

The definition of middle power theory, like so many theories and concepts in the social sciences, is rather elusive. The idea of “middle” and “power” are both terms that are most easily defined by their context and relationship to their peripheral. The concept of middle powers or medium powers has been present in writings on international relations since the time of Thomas Acquinas and usually denoted a state that was neither a great nor a small power, based on being able to identify these two extremes. The modern notion of middle powers was revived by Jan Smuts in his 1918 publication “The League of Nations: A Practical Suggestion”, however it was Canadian diplomats and foreign policy makers in the immediate post-Second World War era who popularized the concept amongst international relations practitioners.

11 Ian Taylor posits that any redirections in foreign policy of the post-apartheid era has been in a direction that fits theories of middle powers and middlepowermanship. See Taylor, Ian. *Stuck in Middle Gear: South Africa’s Post-apartheid Foreign Relations*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001. Print

12 Due to length and focus constraints, this section is not able to provide a full account of middle power theory debates. Andrew Cooper provides an excellent survey of middle power theory, as well as the effect the end of the Cold War has had on middle power states. See Cooper, Andrew Fenton. *Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers After the Cold War*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan, 1997. Print.

A traditional starting point for defining a middle power has been in assessing the material capabilities of a state. The Gross National Product of a state, for example, may be used by those seeking a material definition of middle powers. Taylor notes that while it is important to assess the material capabilities of a state, most assessment methods provide little explanation of the power. Material assessments of power, however, are not able to adequately account for the origins or projections of a state’s power.

In the post-Cold War period, a critical method for examining many middle powers has been in examining a state’s international behaviour. The behavioural model moves away from quantifiable characteristics such as GNP towards an analysis of diplomatic and international actions. The behavioural model has been concisely articulated by Cooper, Higgott and Nossal who define middle powers by “their tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, their tendency to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and their tendency to embrace notions of ‘good international citizenship’ to guide their diplomacy”. Another term for this type of behaviour is middlepowermanship, which is a foreign policy style that often shows a propensity towards multilateral activity and mediatory diplomacy. It is important to note however, that middle powers are not just middle powers simply because they exhibit these tendencies, but that in some cases they may genuinely be pursuing these actions in a belief that it serves their states’ best interest. This thesis will rely on the


behavioural aspect of middle power theory to examine South Africa’s foreign policy behaviour and its relations with other states.

1.6.1 South Africa as a Middle Power?

In the previous section, we briefly examined two ways of defining a middle power, and now the question arises as to South Africa’s status. There is no question that South Africa is a regional power, or put more bluntly, a local giant. Its economy is more than three times as large as the combined economies of all the members of the Southern African Development Community. In 1993 it produced 27% of the African GNP, 41% of sub-Saharan African GNP, and 64% of sub-Equatorial Africa’s GNP. On top of its economic clout, South Africa’s military is, even after the cutbacks and retrogrades of the 1990s, the continent’s most equipped military force. These credentials have even led some to ask whether South Africa really is a “partner” in Africa, or is it a hegemon? Such a hegemonic relationship would be at odds with most middle power criteria, and thus an active debate within many foreign policy circles has been whether or not South Africa qualifies as a middle power. Despite these seeming contradictions, Taylor argues that one must examine not just South Africa’s behaviour


regionally, but place it within the context of the international system. When given this larger setting, South Africa fits the mold of a post-Cold War middle power.\textsuperscript{20} This thesis accepts South Africa to be a middle power within the international system, both in a material sense, but more importantly in the way that it behaves. The author concurs with Taylor that middle power theory provides an explanatory framework for post-apartheid foreign behaviour and policies. Although the present work is not a study of South Africa’s middle power status, nor an exact study of South Africa’s middle power behaviour and relationship with the United States and China, it will at certain points draw upon middle power theory to explain certain actions and aspects of South Africa’s foreign policy.

1.7 Literature Review

The following section is meant to provide an overview of key texts that have either informed this thesis or which provide a departure point on which this study seeks to build. The topic of South Africa’s domestic political transition has received a great deal of attention with numerous books and articles covering the topic.\textsuperscript{21} While these books are useful in providing context for our study, they fall into the traditional approach to studies on transition in South Africa with their narrow focus on the early 1990s.


There are a few studies that have departed from this approach that involve a broader study of transition in South Africa. This includes James Barber’s 2004 book *Mandela’s World: The International Dimensions of South Africa’s Political Revolution*, which examines the political transition through the lens of South Africa’s international relations and the changes taking place in the international system. Barber’s work is particularly useful in its analysis of Mandela and F.W. de Klerk’s competition for international influence during the negotiation period. Bart Barber’s book is also joined by Christopher Landsberg’s 2004 book *The Quite Diplomacy of Liberation: International Politics and South Africa’s Political Transition*. Landsberg, like Barber, takes an international relations focus for examining South Africa’s transition and focuses on the diplomatic efforts that assisted with bringing about the end of apartheid. Landsberg’s focus on the foreign actors involved in South Africa does not, though, fully take into account the additional influence of the international political atmosphere and how this may have possibly bolstered some foreign actors. Finally, our review of South African texts on ‘transition’ would be incomplete if we did not include Hein Marais’s *South Africa Pushed to the Limit: The Political Economy of Change*. Marais provides one of the most comprehensive accounts of post-apartheid economic policy and the political forces that have shaped those policies. Marais’s analysis is underpinned by an historical sensitivity so that his work charts post 1994 economic developments with a strong grounding in the context of National Party economic policies.

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The topic of United States South Africa relations has been covered in depth by historians, political scientists and sociologists alike, and there are many works that serve as excellent stepping stones to our study aims. Chapter Two will begin with a brief survey of the Cold War’s impact on South Africa. This topic in itself is monolithic and the purpose is to simply establish that the Cold War had an indelible impact on the apartheid regime and its foreign relations. Thomas Borstelmann’s 1993 book *Apartheid’s Reluctant Uncle: The United States and Southern Africa in the early Cold War* focuses on the Truman presidency and its South African foreign policy. Borstelmann’s work is valuable for its research into the early period of the Cold War and how this influenced the United States relations with South Africa. The National Party’s election victory in 1948 occurred just as the ‘Iron Curtain’ was descending over Europe and the contours of the Cold War were being drawn. Borstelmann suggests that the US supported the National Party in the early days for two main reasons; the National Party was staunchly anti-communist, and the United States depended on the South African regime to supply it with uranium ore for its still developing nuclear programme. Princeton N. Lyman’s work, *Partner to History: The U.S. Role in South Africa’s Transition to Democracy* is particularly instructive for our research aims as its focus is on the transition period in South Africa and on the U.S. role in the transition.

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25 Other works that deal with the theme of the Cold War in Southern Africa, but with a broader approach than United States South African Relations include

Lyman was the United States Ambassador to South Africa from 1992-1995, and provides rich details on the end of the cold war and on the massive shifts that took place in world politics, including those of South Africa.

Finally, South Africa’s relations with China; there has not been nearly as much attention given to this relationship, though since the beginnings of official diplomatic relations in 1998 with the People’s Republic of China, there has been an increase in scholarly literature. The period prior to 1998 is more complex, based on the “Two China’s Issue” or the dispute in South Africa over diplomatic recognition between mainland China, (The People’s Republic of China) and Taiwan (The Republic of China). Taiwan was a strong diplomatic partner to South Africa during the apartheid era, and the issue of discontinuing relations with Taiwan in favour of Beijing was one of the first major public foreign policy debates to be held in the ‘New’ South Africa. There is scarce contact between Imperial China (the period up until 1911) and the Republic of China (mainland China from 1912 to 1949), even though during this time South Africa experienced the first wave of Chinese migrant labourers. Historian Karen Harris has


conducted in-depth research into the history of Chinese migration to South Africa, focusing on the colonial period.\textsuperscript{29}

1.7 Chapter Outline

Chapter Two will begin with an examination of the Cold War and its impact on South Africa, and specifically on South African international relations and foreign policy. The purpose of this section is not to provide an exhaustive analysis of the Cold War in South Africa, but to establish that the Cold War had an indelible and defining role in the shaping of South African domestic and foreign policies. Once this impact has been defined, we will look at the subsequent effects of the end of the Cold War and the end of a bipolar world; South Africa’s domestic political transition began against the backdrop of this global transition. Was there a relationship between these two events? As these historic events unfolded, world leaders and academics alike struggled to define this new period of history. What was the position of South Africa in this ‘New World Order’, and just what was this ‘New Order’? The chapter will show that South African leaders early on grasped the gravitas of the period and quickly adopted the language and rhetoric being espoused by the world’s lone superpower --the United States.

Chapter Three will examine the use of history in South Africa’s international relations. A prominent feature of South African domestic politics for many decades has been the use of history, although little attention has been paid to its usage in foreign relations. A brief survey of the use and invocation of history in South African politics will

provide the context for the related study of the use of history in international relations. In examining history as a “diplomatic tool”, we will look at examples of this in South Africa’s relationship with the United States. Within this section a portion will be dedicated to analysing continuities and discontinuities of history usage in the ‘Old’ and the ‘New’ South Africa. This will be contrasted with a section on history usage in Chinese South African foreign relations. The twin themes of history and identity will be considered throughout this chapter, which will conclude with a study questioning whether or not there has been a project in South Africa to consciously embrace a new national historic identity.

Chapter four will examine the issue of transitions in government policy through a case study of the nationalization debate in South Africa. This particular example allows once again for comparisons and contrasts with South Africa under a National Party led government, and South Africa under an ANC led government. The chapter begins with a study of nationalization under the National Party and the connected question of locating the role of the state in the economy under the National Party. The chapter will then pose the same question of the state’s role in the post 1994 economy. The development of ANC economic policy occurred against the backdrop of a global shift towards market led growth and privatization. What impact did this growing global ‘consensus’ have on the ANC, and to whom, if anyone, did they look for policy inspiration?
Chapter Two

The “New World Order” and the “End of History”: The Global Context to South Africa’s Political Transition

“We stand at the gates of an important epoch, a time of ferment, when spirit moves forward in a leap, transcends its previous shape and takes on a new one. All the mass of previous representations, concepts, and bonds linking our world together are dissolving and collapsing like a dream picture. A new phase of the spirit is preparing itself.” – G. W. F. Hegel

“The irony of democratic South Africa’s late entry into international affairs is that we can reap the fruits of a world redefining itself.” – President Nelson Mandela

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31 President Mandela, in a speech at the UN World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen on 12 March 1995.
2.1 Introduction

The political restructuring that took place in Europe at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s resulting in the end of the Cold War, had a profound effect on the entire international community. For over forty years, international politics had been defined by the competition between the Soviet Union and the United States. States’ foreign policies were in large part determined by their position within the Cold War and whether or not they were with the “West” or the Communist states. A defining feature of the Cold War was the lack of direct confrontation between the Soviet Union and America. Instead, conflict was pursued through a series of proxy wars that involved allies and satellite states. As this period of bipolarity drew to a close, so, too, did a number of conflicts that had been fuelled by the two great powers’ rivalry. In this chapter we will first begin with a brief overview of the Soviet Reforms that paved the way for the opening up of the Soviet Union and the thawing of relations with the United States. Along with this overview will be a timeline of the important events that shaped the conclusion of the Cold War with the purpose being to provide an international context for the events taking place in South Africa at the same time. The question of how South Africa was affected by the end of the Cold War, and how certain domestic political decisions were closely linked to the international climate of the period will be given close attention. We will find that South Africa, like all countries in the world, was affected by the end of bipolarity, but that in South Africa this impact was even more profound. Likewise, the exploratory phase that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union and the consolidation of world power to the United States, was a powerful influence on South Africa’s own period of transition. As this new period of world history began, many
attempts were made at defining and classifying the new theme of world affairs. Definitions of the “new world order” are important for this chapter as we continue to consider South Africa’s position in the world and, more pointedly in this case, South Africa’s position in the new world order. Special consideration will be given to two American academics whose theories on the new period of world history stirred worldwide debate, including in South Africa. The end goal of this chapter will be to show that during South Africa’s transition period, it was particularly influenced and sensitive to the events taking place in global politics.

2.2 Soviet Reforms

The 11th of March 1985 saw Mikhail Gorbachev’s accession to power as General Secretary of the Communist party of the Soviet Union. He was the fourth Soviet leader to take up the post since 1982, but at the spry age of 54 it was hoped that he would have more staying power than the former leaders.32 Upon becoming General Secretary, Gorbachev undertook a review period to examine the state of the Soviet economy and labour system. Gorbachev understood that it was absolutely necessary to the Soviet Union’s survival that there be cut backs on arms expenditure and an improvement in economic output. In doing so, he hoped to create a favourable international atmosphere for the Soviet Union that would create space for dialogue with the West. i.e. the United States.33

32 The Previous two General Secretaries of the Party, Konstantin Chernenko, and Yuri Andropov, did not even serve for two years before dying in office.

Gorbachev realized that the economy could not improve without first accomplishing major political reforms of the government system and the modernization of Soviet society. To accomplish this, Gorbachev launched the twin concepts of Glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring). The terms were purposefully vague, so as to allow Gorbachev and other Party leaders leeway as they continued to define and refine the terms. Saki Ruth Dockrill frames these terms in their practical applications saying;

Glasnost meant increasing the circulation of information in society, loosening central political control over the media, and encouraging relatively free artistic and literary activities. Perestroika under Gorbachev came to mean reforming and improving all aspects of Soviet society, its economy and the Party-state political systems, and the term was used synonymously with Gorbachev’s policy of reforms.34

The reform aspect of perestroika meant loosening the state’s iron grip on the economy and moving towards market driven principles. Gorbachev was very pointed in making it clear that this did not mean a complete embrace of capitalism, but rather a slow and steady reform away from a command economy towards a more market based economy. The purpose of this brief overview of Gorbachev’s reform vision was to contextualize relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and frame some of the key summits that were taking place between the United States and the Soviet Union during this period. One of the goals of Gorbachev’s domestic reforms was to open up talks between the West and the Soviets, and the overture did not go unnoticed in Washington. The following section provides a timeline and sketch of some of the

important summits that took place during the late 1980s that paved the way for the ending of the Cold War and the birth of a new world order.

### 2.3 The End of the Cold War: A Timeline

- **1985**—Mikhail Gorbachev becomes General Secretary of the Soviet Communists Party.
- **1986**—On October 11 and 12 Gorbachev and Reagan meet for the Reykjavik Summit.
- **1987**—December 8-10 Gorbachev and Regan hold Washington Summit and sign the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.
- **1988**—May 25 to June 3, the Moscow Summit opened discussions on human rights, security, and other bilateral issues.
- **1988**—December 7th, Gorbachev delivers a groundbreaking speech to the United Nations General Assembly calling for the beginning of a “new world order”.
- **1989**—May 29th to June 4th, Tiananmen Square Protests in Beijing.
- **1989**—November 9th, the Berlin Wall falls.
- **1990**—October 3, German reunification.

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35 The reason Tiananmen Square is included on the list, is because it was an extremely important moment not just for China but for the worldwide community and provided a further catalyst to ending the Cold War. In late May 1989, masses of protesters filled Tiananmen Square to challenge the authority of Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping. The protesters were emboldened by Gorbachev being on an official state visit in the city in order to improve Sino-Soviet relations. On June 3-4 Deng Xiaoping ordered the forceful removal of the protesters from the square. The ensuing violence reportedly shocked Gorbachev who was dismayed by the level of bloodshed. Gorbachev became all the more determined to push through with his reform programme and pursue a different course. Following Tiananmen, China retreated for a period from the world stage. For more on the subject of China’s influence on the end of the Cold War process see, Tuncer, Nancy Bernkopf. “China as a Factor in the Collapse of the Soviet Empire.” *Political Science Quarterly* 110, no. 4 (Winter 1995-1996). Print.
• **1991**—December 26, the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

The Cold War, often dated from 1947 until 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed, in the most basic sense refers to the period of heightened tension and confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, along with each country’s accompanying allies. The complex series of events that culminated in the end of the war cannot be fully analyzed here, but historians36 agree that Gorbachev’s ascension to the helm of the Communist Party leadership in 1985 was a watershed moment. A year later on October 11th and 12th, 1986, Gorbachev and President Reagan held in-person talks in Reykjavik. What has now become known as the “Reykjavik Summit” collapsed and no formal agreements were made, however both sides agreed in principle to the removing of Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces from Europe. Furthermore, the summit was an important testing ground for both parties in calculating what concessions could be pushed for. This has led many observers and historians37 to place the summit as facilitating and laying the groundwork for the Washington Summit on December 8th to 10th, 1987. A notable accomplishment of the Washington Summit was the signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The INF Treaty eliminated all nuclear-armed ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometres. Unlike treaties and talks before it, the INF treaty was the first nuclear arms control agreement to actually reduce nuclear arms, rather than establish


ceilings that could not be exceeded. Several more meetings occurred between the two presidents to discuss issues of human rights, international security, and bilateral issues. The Moscow Summit, held from May 25th 1988 until June 3rd, 1988, examined in detail issues like the impending withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, as well as Soviet involvement in Southern Africa and in particular Angola. The sustained length of the Moscow Summit signalled that the relationship between the United States and the USSR was improving dramatically, and that things were moving beyond the “talkshop” stage. This was confirmed on December 7th, 1988, when Gorbachev delivered a ground-breaking speech to the United Nations General Assembly, which we will examine in greater detail in the next section. The most dramatic event in the wind-down of the Cold War however was, without a doubt, the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9th, 1989. The Berlin Wall was one of the great symbols of the Cold War and stood as both a physical and metaphorical barrier between East and West. The wall came down just two years after Reagan’s famous speech in Berlin in which he called on Gorbachev to “tear down this wall!”38 The next year, on October 3rd, 1990, German unification became official ending the division that had begun in 1945. In less than one year, on December 26th, 1991, the Union of the Socialist Soviet Republics dissolved, bringing not only an official end to the Cold War, but also the beginning of a new period of world history.39

38 See the Reagan Foundation Archive http://www.reaganfoundation.org/berlin-wall.aspx

2.4 A ‘New Order’ or ‘The End of History’?

The disappearance of the power struggle between “East” and “West” or between socialism and capitalism, or however else analysts and practitioners characterized the struggle of the Cold War, ushered in a new age. We must appreciate the disorientation that also ensued with this dramatic ending. Suddenly the orientation and bearings of almost all states and their position within the international system was taken away. States were forced to ask critical questions like “What is the enemy now?” and “Who are our allies?” Many analysts and politicians were cognizant that what was occurring in Europe and the Soviet Union was a turning point in the history of twentieth century international relations, but beyond iterations of a “New World Order”, few were able to articulate a vision that encapsulated and characterized this new phase of international relations. Apart from the absence of the Soviet Union and the end of a bipolar world, what was this “New Order”?

The following sections explore the development and origins of the term “New World Order”. The study will also include an examination of two leading voices from the immediate post-Cold War period, namely Francis Fukuyama and Samuel P. Huntington. These two Americans both attempted to answer the question of “what next?” after the conclusion of the Cold War, and their answers at the time sparked a strong debate that was not just confined to American academic circles, but included responses from Europe, Asia, and Africa. The response from South Africa will be examined in

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40 The Cold War international system was extremely complex and my intention is not to make two simplistic categories of those with the “West” and those with the USSR. Many countries decided to be nonaligned and stay clear of Cold War power politics, but even in nonalignment their international relations were informed by the Cold War dynamic. Put another way the question of “which side are you on?” had to be answered no matter what, even if the answer was “no one’s side”.

Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
particular, but what makes the inclusion of these two voices all the more pertinent for this study is how both examined South Africa’s political transition through their own theories on the development and future of the new world order. As we will see, the inclusion of South Africa in Fukuyama’s and Huntington’s respective theories is an example of how South Africa’s political transition was closely observed by the international community and that attempts were made by certain politicians both inside and outside of South Africa to characterize the transition as not merely domestic, but as part of a broader international movement.

2.4.1 Phrasing History: The Development of the term “New World Order”

The first instance of the term “New World Order” was not in fact issued by an American, but by Russian President Mikhail Gorbachev. On December 7, 1988 Gorbachev delivered a speech at the United Nations General Assembly, which has become enshrined as one of the most groundbreaking speeches delivered to the UN general assembly. The speech was an extension of the unprecedented Moscow Summit earlier that same year in which the United States and the Soviets held bilateral talks on a host of issues. Gorbachev’s UN speech was the first public speech by a Cold War superpower that concretely outlined the steps being taken to end the Cold War. The speech also outlined Gorbachev’s vision of the new period of world history and the beginnings of a new order. In his own words:

We are witnessing most profound social change. Whether in the East or the South, the West or the North, hundreds of millions of people, new nations and states, new public movements and ideologies have moved to
the forefront of history. Broad-based and frequently turbulent popular movements have given expression, in a multidimensional and contradictory way, to a longing for independence, democracy and social justice. The idea of democratizing the entire world order has become a powerful socio-political force. At the same time, the scientific and technological revolution has turned many economic, food, energy, environmental, information and population problems, which only recently we treated as national or regional ones, into global problems. Thanks to the advances in mass media and means of transportation, the world seems to have become more visible and tangible. International communication has become easier than ever before.⁴¹

Definitions of the new world order are often elusive due to the many tendrils and topics that are associated with the concept. This excerpt from Gorbachev’s speech touches on one of the associated topics, globalization⁴², which would later become an important concept in debates surrounding the new world order. Gorbachev talked about a democratization movement that is not confined to the Soviet Union alone, but instead included all corners of the globe. Gorbachev’s use of the term “world order” displaced the nation state as the main driver of international change, and instead the state became a component within an overarching system. In Gorbachev’s interpretation of globalization, the new interconnected world has no local problems, only global – therefore by applying this logic there can no longer be local movements, only global. In short, globalization within this framework is a synonym for universalism.⁴³ To achieve these global aims, Gorbachev called for tolerance to be the banner of the new world


⁴² Globalization, is yet another concept and topic lacking a precise definition. Here it is understood as the movement towards a closer world, one in which trade, borders and ideas flow more freely.

⁴³ This interpretation of globalization is an important point to note and in part aids in interpreting Fukuyama’s theory on South Africa’s part in the “End of History”. It will also be pertinent in our final chapter when we deal with the rise of the “Washington Consensus” and its influence in South Africa.
order saying, “For a new type of progress throughout the world to become a reality, everyone must change. Tolerance is the alpha and omega of a new world order.” The themes of universalism and globalization as associated and inseparable ideas were taken up in the book The Changing Global Order: World Leaders Reflect. The book is a compendium of essays written by world leaders including Fidel Castro, George Bush Senior, Koffi Annan, Benazir Bhutto, and Bill Gates. The impetus behind the book was not just to provide a compendium of world leaders’ thoughts on the development of a new international order, but more precisely to provide a “collage of the unfolding world mind.” The uniqueness of the book is owed to it being one of the first publications following the Cold War to compile the viewpoints of leaders from across the globe with the express purpose of discussing the dramatic changes taking place in international relations, trade, and technology. With more than forty leaders represented in the publication, the goal was not to seek consensus on any one issue, but to represent the plurality of viewpoints on topics of global importance. However, one theme that every leader agreed upon in the book was that as the twentieth century was drawing to a close, a new global order was taking shape, one that was being led by the United States.

America’s leadership in this new world order was put to the test when, on August 2nd, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. The invasion was met with immediate international


46 Ibid,12.
condemnation. For the United States, the invasion of Kuwait provided the perfect opportunity to test its leadership capabilities in a new unipolar world. Taking his cue from Gorbachev, U.S. President H.W. Bush adopted the term “new world order”, using it at least 42 times in public statements between the summer of 1990 until the conclusion of the Gulf War in February 1991.

On September 11, 1990, President G.W. Bush gave a speech to a joint session of Congress on the topic of the Persian Gulf Crisis in which he outlined a plan for pursuing a new world order, intimately connected with the Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Bush saw the invasion as not only a test for the world, but as an opportunity to build a new diplomatic coalition and partnership and mend the divide between East and West. In his own words:

No longer can a dictator count on East-West confrontation to stymie concerted United Nations action against aggression. A new partnership of nations has begun. We stand today at a unique and extraordinary moment. The crisis in the Persian Gulf, as grave as it is, also offers a rare opportunity to move toward an historic period of cooperation. Out of these troubled times, our fifth objective -- a new world order -- can emerge: a new era -- freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which the nations of the world, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony.47

The Gulf War saw the U.S. lead a coalition army of 34 nations. The United States was seeking to mould exactly this type of international cooperation in the new world order; an order that coalesced around a new set of international norms. The important caveat

was that these norms as well as the cooperation were set and led by the U.S. As we will see, this leadership was flexed again during South Africa’s transition to democracy, in what the U.S. saw as another opportunity to help shape a new world order.

Political leaders were not the only ones enamoured with the idea of a new world order. Two leading academics from America, Francis Fukuyama and Samuel P. Huntington, became influential critics in defining the new period of world history.

In 1989, National Interest published an article entitled *The End of History* by Francis Fukuyama. The article put forward an explanation on the events occurring in the Soviet Union as it became more apparent that the world was on the brink of an historic shift in power. The essay’s thesis immediately sparked a debate that went beyond the confines of American academic circles and led to Fukuyama publishing a book under the modified title of *The End of History and the Last Man* in 1992.

Fukuyama proposed that by using a Hegelian historical framework, one could explain the triumph of liberal democracy over communist and authoritarian regimes. The recent events in the communist bloc were proof for Fukuyama that there is “something like a Universal History of mankind in the direction of liberal democracy.” The logic was that since democracy was now victorious, mankind must have reached the “end of history”; not in the sense that important events no longer happened, but that with the universalization of Western liberal democracy, ideological evolution had reached a final

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50 Ibid, 48.
stage in which the major issues have been resolved. Fukuyama, in his own words, described the link between the global political events and his thesis in this way: “We may be witnessing, the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.”\textsuperscript{51} Fukuyama envisioned that with the collapse of ideological competition a harmonious period of international cooperation would ensue and that violent conflicts would dramatically decrease, especially in the developed world.

In 1993, Samuel Huntington published a response in \textit{Foreign Affairs} to his former student Fukuyama\textsuperscript{52}. In contrast to Fukuyama, he envisioned a post-Cold War world order with dramatically increased cultural conflict. He agreed with Fukuyama that the age of ideological conflict was over, but disagreed that it was being replaced with consensus over liberal democratic values and principles. Instead, the world was reverting back to its natural order; an order characterized by cultural and religious conflict. In his own words:

It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate


global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.53

Huntington was acquainted with South African politics, having visited the country several times since his initial visit in 1981.54 Throughout the 1980s, Huntington became a trusted advisor on political reforms to the South African government.55 In 1992, a senior South African government official interviewed by the Executive Intelligence Review (EIR) summed up Huntington’s influence in Pretoria saying:

He has enormous influence among politicians in the government, and has played a very, very important part in influencing politicians like [Foreign Minister] Pik Botha and [Minister for Constitutional Development] Roelf Meyer. Huntington has visited South Africa at the last count I had, 15 times, as a guest of the Department of Foreign Affairs. There were also quite a number of South African government officials and young ministers who spent time in the U.S., studying with him. He was particularly close to Roelf Meyer.56

The influence was reciprocal, and Huntington’s work throughout the 1990s reflected his experiences in South Africa. It was especially evident in his 1991 book, The Third Wave, on the transition of states from authoritarian regimes to democratic governments and referenced the experience of South Africa several times.57 The book placed South Africa’s democratic transition within the broader global transition towards democracy.


54 Huntington’s 1981 visit was as a guest of the Department of Foreign Affairs and during which he provided the key-note address at the Biennial Conference of the Political Science Association of South Africa at Rand Afrikaans University, Johannesburg, September 17, 1981. The paper was later published in 1982. See Huntington, Samuel P. "Reform and Stability in South Africa." International Security Spring 6.4 (1992): 3-25. Print.


In a speech delivered at the Global Strategy Forum, former President F.W. de Klerk spoke of the trends in international relations since the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989. De Klerk pointed to cultural and religious divisions as the main source of conflict in the international environment. He went so far as to say that cultural and religious differences would be the greatest challenge of the new millennium. While there was no mention of Huntington, it was clear that de Klerk was referencing his “clash of civilizations” theory, further proof of Huntington’s deep impact upon South African policy makers and government.  

2.4.2 South Africa and the End of History Theory

In this section, we will look at the South African response to Fukuyama’s End of History Thesis, which unusually involved academics as well as politicians. Opinions on Fukuyama were especially strong after the publication of an article on South Africa by him in 1991, entitled *The Next South Africa*. The article was published in both *The National Interest* and the *South Africa International*. The publication by an eminent American political scientist, following his controversial 1989 article on *The End of History*, highlights two trends important for placing South Africa’s political transition.
within a global context. Firstly, this transition was being closely observed by the international community as already seen from Samuel Huntington’s involvement, and secondly, Fukuyama attempted in his article to internationalize South Africa’s transition by promoting the triumph of capitalism over apartheid. The logic was that capitalism had defeated both the Soviet Union and the Apartheid Government. The article on South Africa places a heavy emphasis on forces of production. Fukuyama asserted that urbanization, education, and the growth of the middle class inevitably led to the birth of democracy, and according to his research all three factors were evident amongst the Afrikaners’ in the preceding fifty years:

... there is no question that economic change provides a very helpful environment for liberal democratic ideas to take hold. Middle-class societies with large numbers of college-educated, urban professionals — those we have learned to call ‘yuppies’ in the 1980s — simply have a different type of politics than uneducated and illiterate smallholders in predominantly agrarian societies. In the latter, it is possible for authoritarian rulers to mobilize poorly educated followers into armies or death squads.... It is precisely the transformation from smallholder to yuppie that has occurred within South Africa’s Afrikaner community over the past forty years. The unbanning of the ANC did not undermine the political base of the National Party among whites; if anything, de Klerk’s support among whites is higher than it was when he first came into office. This indicates that he was not simply leading Afrikaner opinion by his surprising moves, but reflecting it as well.61

Fukuyama’s linkage of economic and demographic change in South Africa as the primary factors leading to political change was challenged in 1995 by South African political scientist, Rupert Taylor. Taylor published an article critiquing Fukuyama’s interpretation of the end of apartheid.62 The article undertook a critical assessment of

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Fukuyama’s conclusion that South Africa’s political transition was a part of the global movement towards the End of History, and in particular Fukuyama’s linkage of economic growth and the demise of Apartheid, observing:

Placing South Africa and the end of apartheid in a larger pattern of world history, Fukuyama sees social change to be the result of a coherent pattern of internal economic growth first played out and made evident in the most developed countries in the world; thereby proclaiming the victory of capitalism over the forces of apartheid.63

Rupert believed that the empirical evidence that Fukuyama employed to back up his theory was both weak and misapplied and that the misapplication was in large part due to his ideological bias. The meta-nature of Fukuyama’s end of history theory and his attempt to place the transition within this theoretical framework blinded him to the unique realities that South Africa faced.64

Rupert’s criticism was not the consensus amongst senior South African government members. According to Dave Steward, chief of staff to President F.W. de Klerk, the phrase “end of history” held a certain resonance for some National Party leaders during the early 1990s. Steward claimed that “there was this feeling amongst some government leaders, and I think it may have contributed to the transition and the thinking of the transition; that it was South Africa’s ‘end of history’ moment. Similar to what Fukuyama talked about.”65 Despite this concession, there is little to suggest that

64 Ibid, 29.
65 “Interview with Dave Steward.” Personal interview. 20 June 2013. Cape Town
South Africa’s leaders were influenced by any more than the dramatic phrasing of Fukuyama’s theory. Steward’s comments, though, are further evidence of just how pervasive Fukuyama’s thinking had become in certain South African ruling circles, even if the exact theory was not grasped.

2.5 South Africa and the “New World Order”

At the dawn of its democratic transition, South African encountered a world it had had little influence in shaping – a world it was fundamentally unprepared for. The following section outlines the ways in which both South Africa’s government, as well as the leading anti-apartheid movement, the ANC, were shaped and influenced by the events taking place in the global arena. It also includes an examination of South Africa’s reactions and role in the “New World Order”.

The developments in the Soviet Union had an immediate impact on Southern Africa, as it had been the leading ally and partner to the ANC as well as of the South African Communist Party. Gorbachev’s domestic reform process initiated in 1986 included the Soviet Union’s international relations, and its withdrawal of military support from Southern Africa. This had a dramatic effect on the conflict in Angola and Namibia where Soviet and Cuban military support played a vital part in the war and posed a threat to the Apartheid regime’s security. In 1988, the New York Accords, or

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66 In 1987, Gorbachev spoke to a group of Western visitors about the new thinking on foreign policy saying “out international policy is more than ever determined by our domestic policy, by constructive endeavors to improve our country. That is why we need peace, predictability and constructiveness in international relations.” Quoted in Campbell, Kurt M. Soviet Policy towards South Africa. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1986. Print.
Three Powers Accord, were signed by the governments of Angola, Cuba, and South Africa at the United Nations headquarters. The accords were strongly supported by the Soviet Union, and brokered by the United States, signalling the easing of Cold War tensions.\textsuperscript{67} The accords ended the direct involvement of foreign troops in the Angolan Civil War and granted independence to Namibia. As a part of the agreement, the ANC were required to remove their bases from Angola. This stipulation dealt a heavy blow to the ANC’s strategy of an armed struggle and the overthrow of apartheid. The final blow to the ANC’s armed struggle came on November 9, 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall.\textsuperscript{68}

The fall of the Berlin Wall set in motion a chain of events across the communist bloc of countries in Eastern Europe that eventually led to the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991. Communism, and the Soviet bloc in particular, had been facing a crisis already for quite sometime, but the speed at which the events took place shocked the entire world. As the balance of power shifted in the international order during this time, regional power transitions and brokerages were enabled. South Africa is a prime example. It is no coincidence that de Klerk’s landmark February 1990 speech unbanning the ANC, came a mere three months after the fall of the Berlin Wall. De Klerk alluded to the developments in Europe and the accompanying opportunities that came with them in his speech, declaring, “The dynamic developments in international

\textsuperscript{67} The New York Accords established a joint monitoring commission with both the United States and the Soviet Union acting as observers to oversee implementation of the accords. This aspect of the accords highlights the importance of Soviet and US cooperation to South Africa’s successful negotiation period.

politics have created new opportunities for South Africa.\textsuperscript{69} These opportunities included being unshackled from the ideological struggle against communism and the prospect of new international relations. The loss of the ANC’s chief ally, the Soviet Union, however, provided the greatest opportunity for De Klerk’s government. De Klerk elaborated on the perceived threat that the Soviets posed to South Africa in his 2009 address at the Global Strategy Forum.\textsuperscript{70} It was a commonly held belief in government circles that the SACP had great influence over key functions within the ANC alliance; by extension, the Soviets did as well, due to their strong relationship with the SACP.\textsuperscript{71} De Klerk acknowledged that the collapse of the Soviet Union, symbolized by the fall of the Berlin Wall, provided the perfect occasion to open negotiations, or in his words, “…it opened a window of opportunity through which we unhesitatingly jumped.”\textsuperscript{72} Surveying the situation in Europe from South Africa, De Klerk surmised that communism was in “headlong disarray”, and the South African Communist Party was in “shell shocked retreat” – “‘never again would the balance of forces be so favourable for an equitable negotiated settlement.”\textsuperscript{73} The experience of the 1988 New York Accords had reassured the South African government that it could secure its core interests through negotiations with its opponents.


\textsuperscript{72} De Klerk, F.W. "The Impact of the Fall of the Berlin Wall on South Africa and the World."

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid
The timing of the negotiations was opportune not only for South Africa and the retreating Soviet Union, but for the United States as well. The U.S. was eager to refocus its international interests with the end of bipolarity, and Southern Africa was given top priority for this restructuring process. According to Princeton Lyman, who was the US ambassador to South Africa from 1992 to 1995, the region had been of great strategic interest to the US during the Cold War. In his memoir of the US role in the transition and his time as ambassador, he recounts the balance of interests shaping US engagement with South Africa:

Southern Africa had been one of the fiercely contended battlefronts of the Cold War. Throughout the region, Cold War concerns had lain heavily over U.S. policy…in South Africa itself, where repugnance at apartheid was tempered by the concern over the ANC’s close alliance with the South African Communist Party. Not only did the Soviet threat vanish at the end of the decade. So did much of the controversy surrounding constructive engagement, after it climaxed in 1988 with an agreement that simultaneously brought independence to Namibia and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.74

As a result of these changes, South Africa was downgraded in its strategic categorization. It still warranted the most American attention in Africa, but there was no longer the same pressure. Ambassador Lyman put it this way; “Southern Africa was no longer on the ‘front line’ of a conflict regarding American global interests.”75

Whilst South Africa may have been strategically downgraded during the early 1990s, the U.S. began to see South Africa as an ally and not just a tactical partner in


75 Ibid, 49.
the fight against communism. Some policy makers began to envision South Africa as a leading example of the “New World Order” being heralded by the Bush Administration. Speaking to one senior policy maker in the State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs, who worked in South Africa during the early 1990s, this respondent described the hopes of South Africa being the African “champion” of the “New World Order”, and the harbinger of a tide of democracy to the continent.76 Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, in a 1996 address at the University of Witwatersrand, spoke of the leadership potential which South Africa had in the new world order, saying “When I look around the world, I see very few countries with greater potential to help shape the 21st century than the new South Africa.”77 South Africa’s foreign policy practitioners recognized that with this new world order came new values, values that were largely set by the United States. South Africa’s diplomat extraordinaire, Pik Botha, described the international climate in realist terms saying, “The world has changed. Western concepts of political and economic freedom are now dominant. Taken as a value system, they are currently unchallenged.”78 Botha’s comments reflected the hegemonic nature of the new world order; but was South Africa willing or prepared to fulfill American hopes of becoming its African champion?

76 “Anonymous interview with former State Department Employee.” Personal Interview. February 19, 2013, Cambridge MA.


South African leaders, both within the ANC as well as the National Party, were eager to take up a leadership role and to steer South Africa’s entry back into the international community. This was displayed with the amount of international travel that both Mandela and de Klerk embarked on in the negotiation period.\(^7\) Between 1990 and mid-1992, Mandela made 16 overseas trips and visited 49 countries. De Klerk, during the same time period, visited 32 countries, and some, like Britain and France, he visited multiple times.\(^8\) Why did the two leaders spend so much time on foreign visits and international relations when there were more than enough challenges at home? James Barber proposes that the reason is partly because South Africa’s conflict had become international—whether it was the ANC seeking international support against the apartheid state, or the government trying to throw off its pariah status.\(^9\) The international setting provided a platform to improve their negotiation positions and project their respected causes.

Despite the strong international dimension to both the negotiations leading up to 1994 as well as the following transition in governments, there was often much confusion regarding South Africa’s foreign policy during this time. Chris Alden offers a compelling explanation arguing that in part the confusion was driven by the ANC’s transition from a liberation force to becoming a government wherein they had to construct policies, not

\(^7\) The role that international politics and actors played during the negotiation period is well documented by Christopher Landsberg. See Landsberg, Chris. *The Quiet Diplomacy of Liberation: International Politics and South Africa’s Transition*. Johannesburg: Jacana, 2004. Print.


\(^9\) Ibid, 94.
just oppose them. For its entire history, the ANC’s international relations and foreign policies had been determined by its opposition to apartheid. With this system quickly fading along with the familiar ideological signposts of the cold war, the ANC was thrown off balance and struggled to adapt to the whirlwind of changes internationally. The difficulty showed in South Africa’s foreign policy of the period, which not only had to adapt to a new international system, but to the merging of historically opposed parties. During the negotiation period of the early 90s, as well as the Government of National Unity (GNU) from 1994 to 1997, there was a convergence of several foreign policy traditions. These included traditions within the ANC as well as the National Party. The traditions ranged from strong and even radical pan Africanist and “third worldist” discourse, to a middle power multilateralism, or even to a complete acceptance of the “new world order” international agenda. Attempts to combine these often contradictory ideological strands created much confusion within the foreign policy making apparatus of South Africa’s government as well as on the world stage. An example of this was the ANC’s insistence on continuing its relations with controversial leaders such as Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi and Cuba’s Fidel Castro. The move both shocked and angered the U.S. and Western leaders. In their view this was hardly behaviour befitting the country that they hoped would be a beacon of the new world order.


In 1997, when news reached Washington that South Africa was preparing to sell arms to Syria, the U.S. responded by warning that millions of dollars in aid to South Africa would be suspended. President Mandela responded angrily, saying “we will conclude any agreements with any country whether they are popular in the West or not.”\textsuperscript{84} In spite of the strong response, the Mandela Presidency often utilized George Bush’s rhetoric in framing its foreign policy, and Mandela’s speechwriters cued the President to use the “new world order” phrase on several occasions.\textsuperscript{85} The end of the Cold War provided few coherent explanations and South Africa’s adoption of the dominant international rhetoric is as much a reflection of the ambiguity of the period as it is of South Africa’s position within it.

In conclusion, we can see that South Africa’s political transition was closely linked to, and was influenced by, the international political events of the period, both in the lead up to the transition as well as in the subsequent negotiations. South Africa’s political transition cannot be understood in full outside the context of global historical patterns.


Chapter Three

History as a Diplomatic Tool: Transitions in South Africa’s International Identity

“My foreign policy is determined by the past, the relations I have had with the country, the contributions they have made to our struggle.”—President Nelson Mandela

“The one thing the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ South Africa have in common is a passion for inventing history.”—Frederik van Zyl Slabbert

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3.1 Introduction

National identity and its construction have played a critical role in the domestic politics of South Africa, China and the United States; however, it has also played a critical role in each nation’s respective foreign policy. Traditional studies of foreign policy posit that a state derives its foreign policy based on an assessment of spatial factors and material endowments in conformity with a broader set of social values. The values that society exerts to influence the foreign policy process are generally viewed as being concerned with security and wealth creation. This materially-biased assessment does not account adequately for the influence which the relationship between history and identity exerts over the foreign policy process. Thus, Chris Alden and Cristina Alves see this relationship as a vital ingredient in the building blocks of a

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91 Ibid, 44
nation saying, “Seminal beliefs about origins of the ‘nation’, the boundaries of citizenship and physical territoriality, ideas about sovereign legitimacy and sources of threat are all products of the twin forces of history and identity.”  

Alden and Alves note that in this regard, national identity is a conscious construction of myths, akin to the historian Benedict Anderson’s “imagined community” in which history plays a vital role in the relationship between individuals and conceptions of the state. They concede that a conscious management of identity through the construction of historical myths is a feature of all modern nations and societies; however, they hypothesize that newly independent states are more visible in their construction. This is due to a determined and definite break with the past or previous regime and with the need for new sources of external and domestic legitimacy. Typically, the natural source for legitimizing and solidifying the national identity is found in foreign policy. In their own words:

> for the governing elites, foreign policy becomes a crucial means of giving explicit content to the emerging national identity (‘us’ versus ‘them’) through public statements as to the sources of regime legitimacy, declarations of intent, and ultimately through the pursuit of a diplomacy of isolation, alignment and rejection or confrontation in relation to the prevailing international order.

This thesis makes a distinction between the construction of national identities and the construction of international identities by focusing on the purpose of the project.

National identities are domestic projects that are formed with the purpose of

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94 Alden and Alves, pg. 45

95 There are competing configurations of what constitutes national identity in nation states. Gary Baines draws a distinction between civic national identity and ethnic national identity as means to mobilize
congregating a political base in order to strengthen a particular political group within a nation. International identities are projects that construct a national identity in relation to other nations with the intention of advancing the nation’s foreign policy aims through the projected identity. Despite the separate definitions of these two projects, the two identities are constantly overlapping due to their most common building material, namely, the forces of history. Furthermore, to complicate matters, the international identity can serve the dual purpose of satisfying or strengthening a domestic political base’s identity while at the same time enabling the aims of the state’s foreign policy.96

The aim of this chapter is to show the transition in South Africa’s international identity in the post-apartheid era and the historical linkages that have accompanied this international identity. We will see that history’s role as a building tool in national identity97 and international identity projects carries historical precedence in South Africa through a brief discussion of the role of history in the development of early Afrikaner nationalism. This will be followed by a comparison with the African National Congress and the role which history has played, especially as a means of leadership

96 The idea of American exceptionalism is an example in the United States of a dual national and international identity. Deborah Madsen traces the development of American exceptionalism from the time of the Puritans through to the post World War II era showing the interplay between a domestic idea that has impacted America’s international identity as well. See Madsen, Deborah L. American Exceptionalism. Jackson: University of Mississippi, 1998. Print.

97 Margaret MacMillan’s book The Uses and Abuses of History, was very useful as a departure point for this chapter, especially her chapters on the use of history in identity building and history’s role in nationalism. See MacMillian, Margaret. The Uses and Abuses of History. London: Profile, 2009. Print.
legitimization. While both of these studies are domestic examples of history becoming a political tool, the task is to highlight how history is a political affair in South Africa whether it is being mobilized for domestic or international usage. The second half of this chapter will study two identity projects that have become important to building South Africa’s international identity in the post-apartheid era: the ‘Africanization’ of South Africa’s international image, and secondly, identifying as part of the Global South or ‘southernization’. The chapter will conclude by examining the role of history as a diplomatic tool in South Africa’s relations with the United States and China.

3.2 History in Afrikaner Nationalism

Writing in his 1961 book, *The Awakening of Afrikaner Nationalism 1868-1881*⁹⁸, F. A. Van Jaarsveld identified three factors⁹⁹ in particular that played a significant role in the development of the Afrikaner nation (volk). The first was the trade policy of the Dutch East India Company. The second was the spiritual heritage of the Dutch colonists through Calvinist doctrines. The third was geography--specifically the detachment, separation, and development of a frontier life. Later in the book, Van Jaarsveld identified history as a fourth factor in the forging of an Afrikaner nation. He pointed out that there was a reciprocal relationship between the development of the Afrikaans language and the development of a distinct Afrikaner history. During the 1870s, the project of solidifying the language beyond mere “kitchen Dutch”, was made in earnest with the formation of the *Genootskap van Regte Afrikaners* (Society of True Afrikaners).


⁹⁹ Ibid, 9
Afrikaners) in 1875, and in the following year with the publication of the Die Patriot (The Patriot). The Society’s purpose was “to stand up for our Language, our Nation and our Land”. That same year Arnoldus Pannevis wrote the “national anthem”, and the words reflected how early mobilising Afrikaners were beginning to think of themselves as a national unit.

’n Ieder nasie het sijn land,
Ons woon op Afrikaanse strand,
Vero ns is daar geen beter grond
Op al die wye wereldrond.
Trots is ons om die naam te dra
Van kinders van Suid-Afrika.

Every nation has its country,
We live on Afrikaans soil,
For us there is no better land
In all the wide world.
Proud we are to bear the name
Of children of South Africa.

The formation of a distinct Afrikaner identity, separate from their Dutch ancestors geographically and now linguistically, in turn led to a discovery of their own history. At first, this historical awakening took place separately amongst the Afrikaners, with the Free State Afrikaners, the Cape Afrikaners, and the Transvaal Afrikaners all discovering their history independently of each other. Van Jaarsveld suggested that before this historical awakening they had lived as a people without history, existing only in the present. By discovering a history that was Afrikaner, the subsequent step to discovering an Afrikaner nation was actually quite short. Van Jaarsveld illustrated the relationship between language, history and national consciousness in the following excerpt from The Awakening of Afrikaner Nationalism:

100 Quoted in, Van Jaarsveld, 112
101 Ibid, 114
The national consciousness, which, on the one hand, led to the discovery of their own language, led, on the other, to the discovery of their own history—to the language because it had to do with their nationality in the present and in the future, and to their history because it had to answer questions on their origin, background and destiny. Their history was to form the background for the language or nationality, because the self-assertive group did not live in the present only; their consciousness of their existence stretched over the past as well. In order to arouse the people’s national consciousness it was necessary to make them historically conscious. The cultivation of historical consciousness would perforce also bring about national self-consciousness. The one presupposed the other.102

History, therefore, became a binding force in the development of Afrikaner nationalism, as was evident in the importance and mythologizing of events like the Great Trek, and the Battle of Blood River.103 Or, a version of history became an anchor to which the idea of a single nation could be firmly attached. Indeed, the very writing of history became an exercise in nationalism, asserted Van Jaarsveld: “the writing of history itself, which was inspired by nationalism, was to be a defensive art: the nation should be defended against attacks, and the faults of the other side exposed. History had to defend and justify the national existence.”105 In this way, history became very much an exercise in instructing the present and thus a political affair. Van Jaarsveld wrote that, “the struggle of the past was the struggle of the present, and the struggle of the present the same as

102 Van Jaarsveld, 114


105 Van Jaarsveld, 224.
that of the past.”¹⁰⁶ In the next section we will see that history has continued to play a
central role to the current politics of South Africa, as we look specifically at the role
history plays under the governance of the African National Congress.

3.3 The ANC and the Quest for a ‘Usable’ History

History has become an important element of ANC ideology and political rhetoric
in the post-apartheid era. Unlike the Afrikaners, the ANC have not “discovered” history
nor has it led to an “awakening” or a nationalist movement¹⁰⁷, but like the Afrikaners and
the National Party, history has become a mobilization tool and a means of justifying
governance. Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, former leader of the Progressive Federal Party
from 1979 to 1986, in his book *The Other Side of History*, pointed out that “inventing
history” has continuity in South Africa’s political history. In his own words, “One thing
the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ South Africa have in common is a passion for inventing history.
History is not seen as a dispassionate inquiry into what happened, but rather as a part
of political mobilisation, promoting some form of collective self-interest.”¹⁰⁸ He asserted
that by “inventing history” politicians are able to secure the future. What Van Zyl
Slabbert referred to as “inventing history”, could also be referred to as political

¹⁰⁶ Van Jaarsveld, 224.

¹⁰⁷ The ANC as a whole, is not a nationalist movement, but there are groups within the ANC that have
nationalist tendencies. Through his research, William Gumede shows that throughout its 100 year
history, there have been two distinct Zulu nationalist factions that have competed with each other for
dominance within the ANC structure. The one strand being a conservative and more fundamentalist
nationalist movement, and the other strand more inclusive and less hardline. Both strands venerate the
history of the Zulu nation and especially the Zulu King, King Shaka. See Gumede, William. "Zuma and

¹⁰⁸ Slabbert, F. Van Zyl. *The Other Side of History: An Anecdotal Reflection on Political Transition in
mythology. Leonard Thompson’s definition of a political myth given in his book, *The Political Mythology of Apartheid*, also holds validity regarding the ANC’s propagation of historical myths for political means. A political myth is “a tale told about the past to legitimize or discredit a regime.” A collection of these myths becomes a political mythology in which they “reinforce one another and jointly constitute the historical element of the regime or its rival.” By seizing on certain historical elements, the ANC has suppressed other histories to legitimize its rule. There is, then, a direct relationship between the construction of political myths and the maintenance of power. In Walter Hixson’s description of the relationship, “Myth produces a usable past while at the same time empowering certain groups within society at the expense of others. This relationship between myth and power explains why a mythical past must be policed and reaffirmed.” Perhaps some would prefer the term “curated” instead of “policed”, however there is no doubt that to construct a political mythology as the National Party did or as the ANC have, one has to be selective with the history chosen to be written.

Typically, the historian, Stephen Ellis, has been critical of the ANC’s selective history making and what he claims to be a systematic suppression of South Africa’s past. Ellis cites the ANC’s relationship with the South African Communist Party (SACP) as an example of the ANC constructing a political myth for the purpose of maintaining power.

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110 Thompson, 2


and legitimacy. At the time of Nelson Mandela’s imprisonment in 1962, he was a joint member of the ANC as well as the SACP, and not just of the party, but of the SACP central committee. Both the ANC and the SACP have been guarded on the details of Mandela’s relationship with the SACP, and it was only recently that they were willing to admit he had been a member.113 Furthermore, Mandela’s membership of the SACP central committee made him one of the few black members, as the SACP was, at the time, largely controlled by whites. Ellis draws the conclusion that one of the ANC’s key documents, the 1955 Freedom Charter, was written by white communists.114 This fact strikes a hard blow to the ANC’s meticulously cultivated freedom fighter image, an image that seeks to project black liberation fighters, not whites. This liberation fighter image is important to the ANC’s legitimacy and goes a long way towards explaining its suppression of historical criticisms of the movement. Ellis details the method of ANC history suppression and myth cultivation, observing:

> It [the ANC] constantly invokes the history of militancy that justifies its tenure of power as the organization that liberated South Africa. It propagates what one writer calls a ‘battle-centric’ view of the struggle in which a special place is allotted to Cuito Cuanavale as the point at which apartheid was defeated. This is a fantasy or a delusion. A myth concerning the armed struggle has percolated throughout black South Africa. In conformity with the myth that has grown up around the history of opposition to apartheid, the claim to have participated in the armed struggle gives people ‘the power to activate certain claims in the present’.116

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113 On December 6, 2013, the day of Mandela’s death the SACP made a formal announcement for the first time recognizing that he had been a member of the SACP and at the time of his imprisonment in 1962 a member of their central committee. See Mashilo, Alex. "Nelson Mandela Was a Member of Our CC at the Time of His Arrest - SACP." Politics Web 6 Dec. 2013.


Ellis’ description fits Walter Hixson’s theory on the direct relationship between power and myth in politics. The years of exile for the ANC have taken on a mythology of their own, with many “liberation fighters”, who in reality saw little to no battle, using the past to bolster their current claim to power. The liberation image is a component of the ANC’s larger historical myth concerning the founding of the “new” South Africa. The myth propagates a vision that apartheid was defeated largely as a result of the ANC’s armed struggle. While the armed struggle was a factor in the fall of apartheid, it is a gross simplification to reduce it to being the sole factor. Furthermore, it leaves out far more influential causes like the international isolation of South Africa and the end of the Cold War. As Stephen Ellis contextualizes the place of the armed struggle, “the decision of Chase Manhattan Bank in 1985 not to roll over a loan was probably of more consequence than the battle of Cuito Cuanavale, even though it hardly figures in the new official history.”¹¹⁶ It is this international context that is virtually ignored in the ANC’s narrative of the end of apartheid. The dramatic changes in the international order at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s had a far greater effect on the end of the apartheid state than the ANC would like to think. These complicated dimensions do not neatly conform to the founding myth, nor do they serve to reinforce the ANC’s legitimacy to govern.

3.4 ‘Africanizing’ and ‘Southernizing’ South Africa’s International Identity

Since 1990, South Africa has undergone a dramatic and deliberate shift in international identity. Long a pariah in most international settings and forums, South Africa has sought to throw off this mantle by cultivating a number of new identities through its foreign policy. In the early years of the ANC government, it was difficult to discern just what tack South Africa wanted to take with its foreign policy. As Peter Vale observed in 1995, “as in many areas of its emerging personality, South Africa's "new" foreign policy suffers from a crisis of multiple identities.” Garth le Pere explained the confusion by connecting South Africa’s discomfort in finding a domestic national identity and with finding its place in the international arena. Still, twenty years on, South Africa has gained some footing in its quest to find a foreign policy identity: here, two themes or identities in particular have emerged. The first identity is as an African leader and the voice of Africa; the second is as a developing nation from the global south.

117 Foreign Policy is one of the common ways in which countries express their international identity. On the relationship between South Africa’s foreign policy and its international identity see Cilliers, J., “An Emerging South African Foreign Policy Identity?” ICS Occasional Paper, April 1999


120 There are layers and subtleties to this second identity project. Identifying as a “middle power” is an additional component to the identity of South Africa’s as a developing nation of the global south project. Within this context South Africa identifies as an “emerging middle power”, a term that compliments its status as an emerging market. Professor Maxi Schoeman notes that there are many ambiguities surrounding the term “emerging middle power”, but that a defining characteristic of South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy has been its preference for multilateral international institutions, a feature of many middle power states. For more on South Africa as a middle power see Schoeman, Prof Maxi. "South Africa as an Emerging Middle Power." African Security Review 9.3 (2000): 47-58.
These identities are historically informed and, in the same way that the ANC’s legitimacy is bolstered through its historical interpretation and narrative of the struggle against apartheid, so, too, are these two identities connected to an interpretation of South Africa’s past.

3.4.1 Africanizing South Africa’s Foreign Policy

The transformative global events of the early 1990s with the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union left the ANC scrambling to play catch up with its foreign policy, and no doubt contributed to the crisis of multiple international identities. As the political negotiations started in the early 1990s, the ANC came under increasing pressure to outline its foreign policy. The world was eager to know what role the ANC envisioned for South Africa on the world stage after decades of imposed isolation. The influential magazine, *Foreign Affairs*, gave Mandela the opportunity to outline the “new” foreign policy for the “new” South Africa in 1993.\(^{121}\) Mandela made it clear that the first priority of an ANC led government would be the servicing of domestic needs and that the government’s foreign policy would be formulated with this in mind. Above all, human rights would serve as the policy guide both domestically and internationally. In his own words, “issues of human rights are central to international relations and an understanding that they extend beyond the political, embracing the economic, social and environmental.”\(^{122}\) In terms of geographic priorities, Mandela was


\(^{122}\) Ibid, 87.
clear that an ANC government would be African-focused in its identity orientation and foreign policies. In this way, it seems that Mandela was at pains to distance himself from the National Party and what many regarded as a euro-centric foreign policy. The message was simple, South Africa was an African nation, and had a role to play in Africa’s affairs:

South Africa cannot escape its African destiny. If we do not devote our energies to this continent, we too could fall victim to the forces that have brought ruin to its various parts. [...] Southern Africa commands a special priority in our foreign policy. We are inextricably part of southern Africa and our destiny is linked to that of a region, which is much more than a mere geographical concept.\textsuperscript{123}

As discussed in Chapter Two, the Mandela presidency’s foreign policy was largely consumed with the normalisation of South Africa’s foreign relations. Mandela succeeded in establishing a worldwide diplomatic presence and in bringing South Africa back into the fold in international multilateral organizations like the United Nations (UN), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the European Union (EU), as well as a number of other organizations. When Mbeki took over the presidency in 1999, South Africa’s “new” foreign policy was still very much in its formative phase. Under Mbeki, South Africa’s foreign policy identity and identification became more focused. Gerrit Olivier points out that at first the foreign policy changes between the Mandela presidency and the Mbeki presidency were almost imperceptible and seamless, but later it developed into something profound.\textsuperscript{124} The primacy of Africa to South Africa’s foreign policy first heralded by Mandela finally took centre stage, at least rhetorically. The rhetoric

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{123} Mandela, Nelson. "The New South Africa’s Future Foreign Policy." \textit{Foreign Affairs} 72.5 (1993): 87. Print
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
reflected first and foremost South Africa’s new African personality, declared Olivier, “Its essential Afrocentric character and purpose; its role and destiny as a leading nation in Africa, and a primary role-player in the Global South.”

Mbeki’s African theme was first introduced in his famous “I Am an African” speech. Delivered in 1996 while still Vice President on behalf of the ANC on the occasion of the passing of the new South African constitution, the speech sought to knit together the various histories of South Africa and how these peoples and histories had influenced Mbeki in becoming an African. It was Mbeki’s promotion of an “African Renaissance” that encapsulated the focus and international identity of his government. In some respects, the African Renaissance was a catch-all term for Africa moving forward, but Mbeki outlined the essential elements as being social cohesion, democracy, economic rebuilding and growth, and the establishment of Africa as a significant player in geo-political affairs. In his own words;

[...]the raison d’être for an African renaissance in the African continent is the need to empower African peoples to deliver themselves from the legacy of colonialism and neo-colonialism and to situate themselves on the global stage as equal and respected contributors to, as well as beneficiaries of all the achievements of human civilization. Just as the continent was once the cradle of humanity and an important contributor to civilization, this renaissance should empower it to help the world rediscover the oneness of the human race. One of the most fundamental elements which constitutes the content of this renewal is the construction of a growing and sustainable economy capable of assimilating the best characteristics,


127 Peter Vale makes note that Mbeki’s usage of the term was not original. In 1969 Victor Gallencez wrote a book using the title and the African historian Basil Davidson, during an interview in 1997 suggested that “an African Renaissance has dawned”. However, it was Mbeki who popularized the term and brought it into the mainstream parlance. See Vale, Peter, and Sipho Maseko. "South Africa and the African Renaissance." International Affairs 74.2 (1998): 271-87. Print.
contribute to and take advantage of the real flows of economic activities around the world.\textsuperscript{128}

The vision of an African Renaissance had the gloss of pan-Africanism, but it was clear that Mbeki envisioned South Africa leading the renaissance. Notably, Moeletsi Mbeki, the younger brother of Thabo Mbeki, recalls that towards the end of 1997 the African Renaissance began to be referred to as South Africa’s foreign policy. At the ANC’s December 1997 national conference, a discussion document was released, entitled “Developing a Strategic Perspective on South African Foreign Policy”. The African Renaissance was referred to as “the main pillar of our international policy not only relating to Africa but in all our international relations globally.”\textsuperscript{129}

Under Mbeki’s presidency, the idea of Africanizing South Africa’s identity and foreign policy became entrenched. One former speechwriter in the President’s Office during the Mbeki presidency described how they [the speechwriters and public spokespersons] were given instructions on how to relate “everything” in the speeches back to Africa, especially in matters concerning foreign policy. Speechwriters were also instructed to frame South Africa in their speeches as “an African nation”. “It was clear that there was an Africanization project going on, and that it was being directed from the very top of government.”\textsuperscript{130}


\textsuperscript{130} “Anonymous Interview with Former Speech Writer in the President’s Office.” Personal interview. 5 June 2013. Stellenbosch
In this next section, we will see how Africa continues to feature prominently in the international identity of South Africa, but with the added nuance of ‘southernization’.

3.4.2 ‘Southernizing’ South Africa’s Foreign Policy

In 2011, the South African Government released a white paper on its foreign policy. The paper contained a section on the two main international identities of South Africa and the way in which South Africa’s liberation history has informed these identities:

In terms of South Africa’s liberation history, its evolving international engagement is based on two central tenets, namely: Pan-Africanism and South-South solidarity. South Africa recognises itself as an integral part of the African continent and therefore understands its national interest as being intrinsically linked to Africa’s stability, unity, and prosperity. Likewise, the 1955 Bandung Conference shapes our understanding of South-South cooperation and opposition to colonialism as a natural extension of our national interest.\(^{131}\)

South-South cooperation traces its roots to the 1955 Bandung, Africa Asia conference. The conference aims were to promote collaboration and cooperation between Africa and Asia, and to oppose any form of colonialism or neo-colonialism. The conference in turn laid the foundation for the beginnings of the Non Aligned Movement (NAM). NAM was a response to the polarisation that the Cold War had created.\(^{132}\) Members sought a “third way” of non-alignment. Even with the end of the Cold War, the group has remained a force in South-South cooperation, with South Africa’s Department of

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International Relations and Cooperation in its 2011-2014 Strategic Plan labeling NAM as the “flag ship of the South.”\textsuperscript{133} South Africa’s liberation movements participated as observers in the Non Aligned Movement from its outset in 1961, and in 1994 South Africa became an official member.\textsuperscript{134} South Africa’s involvement and participation in the Non-Aligned Movement complements and bolsters its identity as a member of both the developing world and of the Global South.

Even though South Africa is by far the most industrialized and developed country on the African continent\textsuperscript{135}, it sees itself as having more in common with the developing nations of the Global South. The twin concepts of identifying as a developing nation and at the same time as part of the global south are almost inseparable for this aspect of South Africa’s identity. In recent years, South Africa’s southernization identity building has been focused on a new forum; in 2010 South Africa was invited to join the BRIC political bloc. The BRIC acronym was first coined in 2001 paper by Goldman Sachs economist, Jim O’Neill, referring to the economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China.\textsuperscript{136} The paper became the inspiration for the foreign ministers of each respective country to hold an informal meeting on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in

\textsuperscript{133} South Africa, Department of International Relations and Cooperation. \textit{Strategic Plan 2011-2014}. \url{http://www.dirco.gov.za/department/strategicplan%202011-2014/strategic%20plan%202011.pdf}


\textsuperscript{135} South Africa boasts the most developed and diversified economy on the African continent, with an advanced financial services industry, heavy infrastructure, and a per capita GDP that in 2011 stood at $8,078 USD. Despite these impressive figures, South Africa suffers from many of the problems that plague other members of the developing world; namely high unemployment and inequality.

September 2006. In 2009, an official summit was held along with the creation of an official BRIC bloc. South Africa immediately showed interest in joining the BRIC bloc, and in 2010 lobbied each member state. South Africa argued that a political bloc focused on the agenda of the Global South needed at least one African voice. The idea was that South Africa would be representing not just itself on the forum, but the rest of the continent as well. President Jacob Zuma while on a visit to China in 2010 to lobby for a spot in the group, asserted, “participation in BRIC would mean that an entire continent that has a population of over 1 billion people is represented.”

The BRIC forum fulfills both South Africa’s African identity and Southern identity by providing a venue for South Africa to parade its African leadership while being in the company of the world’s leading developing economies.

South Africa has sought to find a usable history to justify its inclusion in the BRICS bloc and to portray the group as being an historic continuation of the spirit of the Bandung conference and the Non-Aligned Movement. Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, speaking at the 2013 BRICS forum in South Africa, asserted:

> BRICS is a continuation of the tradition that was firmly established 57 years ago, in April 1955, when countries of Asia and Africa met at the historic Bandung Conference to galvanise their collective muscle in the context of the Cold War and assert themselves in the international system. The Bandung Conference, which led to the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), was a historic watershed in the international relations of developing countries. South Africa was at the Bandung Conference,


138 South Africa has by far the smallest economy and population of the BRICS bloc and its inclusion has prompted some to ask what it really has in common with the other members. See The Economist, May 29, 2013 as well as Jim O’Neill’s comments, the founder of the BRIC acronym in Naidoo, Sharda. “South Africa’s Presence ‘drags down Brics’” Mail and Guardian 23 Mar. 2012: Print.
represented through the African National Congress. The present context of international relations and cooperation between Asian, African and Latin American countries – collectively known as countries of the South – remains critical, and has become more important than ever before.\textsuperscript{139}

Since it officially joined the BRICS club at the beginning of 2011, South Africa has continued\textsuperscript{140} this theme of African leadership and representation on the forum, standing in stark contrast to the other BRIC members who seek to only represent themselves. Chris Alden and Maxi Schoeman have discerned that woven into South Africa’s Africanist’ dialogue and rhetoric is a trace of exceptionalism that sets it apart from the rest of the continent – “The notion that South Africa retains a unique status on the continent owing to the nature of its political transition and its economic inheritance as a middle-income developing country.”\textsuperscript{141} History is used to reinforce South Africa’s unique status as well. South Africa’s Minister of International Relations and Co-operation, Nkoana-Mashabane, explains that the overarching purpose of BRICS is to reform the architecture of the global system. In an Op-ed released before the 2014 BRICS summit, Nkoana-Mashabane pointed out that South Africa’s inclusion in the reform process carries historical continuity, arguing:

\begin{quote}
The old South Africa played a not-insignificant part in the creation of the old global hierarchy. It is only fitting that on the 20th anniversary of our democracy, we and our partners should today be laying the foundations of a new, more truly representative international order.\textsuperscript{142}
\end{quote}


The statement was a rare nod towards South Africa’s former Prime Minister, Jan Smuts, who played a part in both the Bretton Woods conference of 1944, as well as in the earlier founding of the League of Nations. By invoking this heritage, South Africa seeks to show that it has long played a role in international leadership and world order building.

Leadership, and the quest for leadership recognition on the African continent, is what unites South Africa’s two main international identities. In this regard, there are historical continuities with previous South African governments and regimes. Peter Vale notes that South Africa’s leaders have long held the belief that the country holds a leadership destiny in Africa:

The notion that their [South Africa’s] presence should feature in African affairs seems to have been a constant thread in the rhetoric of successive South African leaders, irrespective of colour or ideological hue. Each epoch has appeared to offer exciting possibilities of engagement across the continent’s special divides.\(^{143}\)

This destiny has expressed itself most acutely in South Africa’s foreign policy, which Alden and Schoeman have correctly identified as having the overarching aim of being recognized as Africa’s leading state, a continuity guiding the foreign policy of the governments of Smuts, Vorster, Mandela, and Mbeki.\(^ {144}\)

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Our next section explores the use of history in South Africa’s relations with the United States and China. We will see that there is a direct relationship between international identity and using history as a diplomatic tool.

### 3.5 History as a Diplomatic Tool in US - South African Relations

The use of history has long been an important diplomatic tool in the US-South African relationship. One former US diplomat, who served in South Africa during the political transition, summarized the importance of history to the relationship as simply being one of the easiest ways to find something in common. “The essence of diplomacy is finding and working on what you have in common, and if you don’t have something in common, then you build it.”

The United States in particular has been active in its attempts at “building” with history, something that has been a mainstay in the relationship since the 1960s. Interestingly – as well as unusually - the use of history as a diplomatic tool in the US South African relationship has continuities in both the Apartheid and post-Apartheid eras.

Perhaps the most famous example of this bridge building technique was Senator Robert Kennedy’s June 1966 visit to South Africa. This visit remains one of the most important visits by an American to South Africa. Robert Kennedy’s visit came at a time of increasing global isolation for Hendrik Verwoerd’s government, with Nelson Mandela, and other opposition members in prison on Robben Island for already two years. The senator visited and spoke to students at the University of Cape Town, the University of

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145 *Anonymous Interview with Former US Diplomat.* Personal interview. 12 Nov. 2012. Cape Town
Stellenbosch146, the University of Witwatersrand, and the University of Natal.

Kennedy’s speech at the University of Cape Town is considered by some to have been the greatest speech of his career, with one paragraph in particular on the “ripple of hope” becoming an oft-quoted idea in subsequent American political rhetoric. For our study, this speech is important for the precedent it set in American engagement with South Africa.147 Kennedy painted America as having a similar history and developmental path to that of South Africa, especially with regards to issues of race.

The following quote illustrates his comparative approach:

> I came here because of my deep interest and affection for a land settled by the Dutch in the mid-seventeenth century, then taken over by the British, and at last independent; a land in which the native inhabitants were at first subdued, but relations with whom remain a problem to this day; a land which defined itself on a hostile frontier; a land which has tamed rich natural resources through the energetic application of modern technology; a land which once imported slaves, and now must struggle to wipe out the last traces of that former bondage. I refer, of course, to the United States of America.148

Kennedy built a diplomatic bridge by using a comparative history of South Africa and the United States. Both nations had Dutch colonies, and fought a war for independence against the British, and both nations had a history of tense, and often violent race relations. Already, there existed in America at that time a sense of solidarity, especially

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146 It is interesting to note that Senator Kennedy’s visit to the University of Stellenbosch was at the invitation of the Simonsberg’s Men’s Residence. The invitation was strongly criticized by the administration of the university, but allowed to proceed. The visit was important to Kennedy as he recognized it to be the premier Afrikaans university and a way of engaging with the Afrikaner community despite the government’s open rejection of any meeting with him. See RFK In The Land Of Apartheid. Prod. Larry Shore. Dir. Tami Gold. Shoreline Productions, 2009. DVD.

147 In President Obama’s June 2013 visit to South Africa, he made a speech at the University of Cape Town and referenced Robert Kennedy’s 1966 visit and used Kennedy’s speech as a template for his own. See, [http://www.npr.org/2013/07/01/197525593/half-a-century-later-obama-follows-up-kennedys-cape-town-speech](http://www.npr.org/2013/07/01/197525593/half-a-century-later-obama-follows-up-kennedys-cape-town-speech)

amongst the African American community, with South Africa’s race struggles. In 1962, Chief Albert Luthuli and Martin Luther King Jr. issued a joint statement to “Appeal for Action against Apartheid”. This solidarity was reaffirmed, decades later, in 1990 when Nelson Mandela made his first visit to America and, speaking to a crowd in Harlem, declared that the African National Congress had followed the civil rights movement in America for over thirty years. Mandela spoke, saying, “There is an unbreakable umbilical cord connecting black South Africans and black Americans, for we are together, Children of Africa.” This relationship and the resulting empathy is alleged to have inspired a young Barack Obama to become active in politics. While still a Senator, Obama made a visit to Cape Town in 2006 and delivered a speech on the common issues that America and South Africa faced, opening with a short personal biography on South Africa’s influence in his career.

When I was in college, there was one issue that moved me for the first time in my life to become politically active and play a leadership role in my community. The issue was apartheid. And, as a young college student, I became deeply involved with the divestment movement in the United States. I remember meeting with a group of ANC leaders, hearing the stories of their struggles for freedom and their leader Nelson Mandela. We [Americans] have been inspired by the struggles in other nations that have, in turn, helped shape and perfect the very freedoms and rights held

149 There have been links between black South Africans and black Americans for more than a century and a half. In the 1920s there was an idea that spread amongst black South Africans, that African Americans would come and liberate them from racist rule. See Vinson, Robert Trent. *The Americans Are Coming!: Dreams of African American Liberation in Segregationist South Africa*. Athens: Ohio UP, 2012. Print.


dear by citizens of my own country. The relationship between the United States and South Africa is a classic example of this interplay.\textsuperscript{152}

America’s use of history in its diplomacy with South Africa has focused on race issues by using a comparative approach between America’s civil rights movement and South Africa’s liberation movement. There is, undoubtedly, a key difference between the two movements that is rarely elucidated. America’s blacks were not fighting for liberation, they were fighting for equal rights, whereas South Africa’s blacks were fighting for complete and total emancipation with the ultimate goal of taking government.\textsuperscript{153} But a key feature of history usage in diplomacy is, of course, its sweeping and vague nature. United States Consul General to Cape Town, Erica Barks-Ruggles, in a 2012 speech illustrated this:

Our histories are similar in so many ways--some inspiring and some painful. In part because of this history, our two multicultural democracies grapple with very similar issues….a shared history of struggle and continuing search for equality is one important reason that we share so many common challenges and common goals.\textsuperscript{154}

In the United States-South African relationship, it is the US that leads in using history as a diplomatic tool. In fact, except for the example of Nelson Mandela’s speech to Harlem in 1990, there are no recent examples of South Africa trying to use history to build a relationship with the U.S.\textsuperscript{155} There are two reasons for this: the first is that despite a


\textsuperscript{155} Scott Firsing discovered that there are many black South Africans who take offense to the US comparing the civil rights movement and South Africa’s liberation movement, and especially of the US African American community taking credit for helping South Africa’s liberation movement. Firsing, Scott.
strong diplomatic relationship between the two countries, an anti-American group exists within the ANC.\textsuperscript{156} The second reason, which is related to the first, is that South Africa’s relationship with the US does not conform to its Southern or African identity projects. South Africa is sensitive of being seen as merely America’s pawn in Africa or of being too close to the “West”. This would hurt its southern leadership credentials, and its relations with BRIC member countries who are also sensitive to American hegemony. The next section will show that the use of history in the South African-Chinese relationship is much more of a mutual effort.

3.6 History as a Diplomatic Tool in Chinese-South African Relations

South Africa and China have only held official diplomatic relations since 1998. However, a constant invocation in the official discourse between the two is the historic nature of the relationship. South Africa and China do have a long history that stretches back to the 17\textsuperscript{th} century,\textsuperscript{157} although this early history with China is rarely mentioned or used in official discourse. South Africa’s history with mainland China is primarily related to the immigration of Chinese to South Africa, with South Africa being home to the largest Chinese population in Africa.\textsuperscript{158} Interestingly, this social history is never invoked

\textsuperscript{156} Ian Glenn has analysed the anti-American rhetoric of the ANC and presents an overview of this group within the ANC. Glenn, Ian. “Cryptic Rhetoric: The ANC and Anti-Americanization.” \textit{Safundi} 9.1 (2008): 69-79. Print.

\textsuperscript{157} The first Chinese arrived in the Cape as convicts and exiles during the time of Dutch rule in the 17\textsuperscript{th} century. See Yap, Melanie. \textit{Colour, Confusion and Concessions: The History of the Chinese in South Africa}. Hong Kong: Hong Kong UP, 1996. Print.

\textsuperscript{158} Karen Harris has researched the waves of Chinese immigration to South Africa and identifies three distinct immigration patterns beginning in the 17\textsuperscript{th} century with the arrival at the Cape of a very small
by either South Africa or China in their discourse. Rather, the tendency is to point to historical events from centuries earlier\textsuperscript{159}, and instead of a focused history on China and South Africa, sweeping mention is made of China’s engagement with \textit{all} of Africa. Chris Alden points out that that the importance is not on the historical details, but in stressing the continuities of China’s engagement, as well as in constructing a common history.\textsuperscript{160} President Thabo Mbeki, during a speech addressing then Chinese Premier, Wen Jiabao, pointed towards the common history that China and South Africa apparently shared, declaring, “We are united by the past in which our heroic peoples struggled and defeated colonialism and apartheid and have since faced similar challenges confronting all developing countries.”\textsuperscript{161} During the toast, Mbeki focused on the struggle for liberation as a common history. During another speech, he went even further, by telling the audience that South Africa and China not only had a “shared journey”, but that China had apparently provided inspiration to South Africa’s liberation activists:

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\textsuperscript{159} There is little evidence of the Chinese reaching southern Africa prior to the 16\textsuperscript{th} century, though this has not stopped many from speculating and even mythologizing the possibility like President Jacob Zuma. Karen Harris provides an overview of the historiography as well as the history of China’s early maritime contact with Africa in “Early Encounters between China and Africa: Myth or Moment?” \textit{South African Journal of Cultural History} 17.1 (2003): 47-71. Print.


Many in my generation remember the days when as young activists of our liberation movement we learnt from magazines such as China Reconstructs of how you had fought for your own liberation and how you were working to build a new life for the great Chinese people. By watching such epic films as The East is Red we strengthened our resolve not to allow any obstacle to stand in the way of our own struggle to liberate ourselves.162

Besides invoking a common history, Mbeki also sought a common identity with China through their South-South solidarity. While speaking at Tsinghua University, Mbeki showed the historical continuities in this engagement:

Together with China, we are commonly defined by our situation as belonging to the South. I think it is fitting to take a moment to reflect on the history of our engagement going back many centuries. For hundreds, if not thousands of years, seafarers from South West Asia ventured further and further from the mainland in long canoes or rafts fitted with sails, outriggers and rudders and control devices that made them more seaworthy and manoeuvrable, and in ocean-going vessels with complex steering systems and with a seamanship so remarkable that it is said they were even able to cross the six-thousand mile expanse of the Indian Ocean to settle in Madagascar off the East African Coast.163

Mbeki then went on to discuss historian Louise Levathes’ book. When China Ruled the Seas, in which she makes brief mention of ancient Chinese trade with Africa. Mbeki seized on this idea of an ancient relationship between China and Africa, one that predated even colonial European ties to the continent. He took a liberal, even romantic, interpretation of the strength of the relationship:

Many ancient kingdoms on the African continent - in Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and South Africa - had strong political and economic relations with various Asian countries - especially China. These relations were based on equality, friendship, mutual respect and benefit.

Hence, the King of Malindi in Kenya was able to send a special envoy to the Chinese emperor with an important gift of a giraffe.\textsuperscript{164}

Mbeki was clearly at pains to distinguish between China’s interactions with the continent and those of the West. By focusing on how the relations were governed by “equality, friendship, mutual respect and benefit”, it would be obvious to anyone in the audience that he was talking about the way in which colonial relations had been the opposite.

Relations between China and South Africa have continued to strengthen under President Jacob Zuma. Like his predecessor, Zuma has been disposed to using history as a form of diplomatic bridge building with China. Characteristically, President Zuma displayed this in remarks during an official state visit by China’s President Xi Jing Ping, revealing:

> Excellency, historians continue to uncover evidence that the contact between Africa and China predates the written record. It is said that our own kingdom of Mapungubwe in Limpopo province, which is now a UNESCO World Heritage Site, had contact with China already nine centuries ago. Regrettably, colonialism, imperialism, and apartheid disrupted\textsuperscript{165} contacts.\textsuperscript{166}

Jacob Zuma, like other leaders within the African National Congress, has also been at pains to establish a historical link between the ANC and China’s Communist Party (CCP). In the same speech to President Xi Jing Ping, he spoke of the ties between the ANC and the CCP:

\begin{flushend}
\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{165} China’s contact with Africa did not cease because of colonialism, imperialism and apartheid, but because of its own domestic politics. After 1433 Chinese anti-expansionism forced China to withdraw from its overseas ambitions and explorations. See Harris, Karen L. "Early Encounters between China and Africa: Myth or Moment?" South African Journal of Cultural History 17.1 (2003): 47-71. Print.
\end{itemize}
\end{flushend}
I am very proud to say that contact was established in the 1950s, over sixty years ago between the African National Congress and the People’s Republic of China. It was no less than the late Comrade Walter Sisulu who visited China in 1953 to establish ties and garner support for the struggle against apartheid. The People’s Republic of China readily obliged and remained steadfast in its opposition to apartheid until the first free and democratic election was held in South Africa in 1994.167

The PRC support for the ANC’s fight against apartheid, was in reality quite paltry and amounted to little more than rhetorical support.

In 2008, President Zuma proposed to his Chinese counterpart, Hu Jintao, that the CCP organize training workshops for senior ANC members.168 Zuma’s proposal was so that the ANC could “Learn from the CPC on its cadre development and party organizational work on the ground.”169 Since 2008, many ANC senior leaders have attended training seminars in China on economics, national planning, and political structuring. Crucially, these developments are recent for the ANC and CCP, despite leadership comments painting China as an obliging friend and steadfast opponent of apartheid. These are an imaginative interpretation of historical events, if not outright historical revisionism.


Moses Kotane, along with Oliver Tambo and Duma Nokwe made an official visit to China in 1963\textsuperscript{170}, but even with China’s insistence that it was staunchly opposed to the Apartheid government, there was little material assistance provided to the African National Congress. This was in part due to the Sino-Soviet split of the 1960s. During a 1983 interview with Oliver Tambo, he described the relationship between the ANC and China as being strained by the Sino-Soviet conflict. Tambo admitted that there was minimal contact with China throughout the 1960s, 1970s and the early 1980s due to the ANC’s strong association with the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{171}

The conflict affected liberation movements across Africa, with some being supported by the Soviets, and some by the Chinese. The South African Communist Party had strong links with the Soviet Union\textsuperscript{172}, and applied pressure on the African National Congress to side with Moscow. Beijing opted to support the Pan Africanist Congress, but was not able to provide the same level of support that the Soviets provided to the ANC.\textsuperscript{173} It was not finite resources alone that prevented China from becoming a stronger liberation partner of the PAC in South Africa; it was a lukewarm commitment all round. China during the 1960s and through to the 1980s developed a lucrative and clandestine trade relationship with South Africa’s apartheid government.


\textsuperscript{172} The relationship between the South African Communist Party and the Soviet Union had existed since 1921 when the Soviets helped to establish the SACP.

This was in addition to the official diplomatic relations that South Africa had with the Republic of China. China maintained its official line of opposing the National Party government and no official government to government relations ever existed. Both the ANC as well as the PAC were aware of the trade with the result being an at times tense relationship.\footnote{Whytock, Ian A. "Spitting into the Wind: Communist China and South African Trade and Foreign Relations, 1960-1993." Honours Thesis. University of Stellenbosch, 2011. Print.}

Of course, all of this is now forgotten because it is not a very usable history for relations between China and South Africa. Soon after the unbanning of the ANC in 1990, a move was made to strengthen relations with China. Nelson Mandela in a speech to at a conference of Umkhonto we Sizwe in 1991, specifically thanked China for its support and assistance in the liberation movement.\footnote{Mandela, Nelson. "Address of Comrade President Nelson Mandela to the Conference of Umkhonto We Sizwe." 09 Aug. 1991. \url{www.nelsonmandela.org/speeches}. Web. 14 Apr. 2014.} In 1992\footnote{Seven years later in 1999, Mandela would make his first state visit to China becoming the first South African President to do so. Mandela during the visit called on history as a binding force in South African and Chinese relations. See "History of Solidarity Binds South Africa to China." \textit{The Star} 26 Apr. 2000. Print.} Mandela made his first visit to China, where he was greeted with great aplomb by the Chinese leadership. It is this visit that was the real beginning of the present relationship between South Africa and China. The visit was strategic for both China and the ANC. China was eager to find new friends after experiencing three years of international isolation and condemnation following the Tiananmen Square massacre. Being seen with the world’s most recognized and beloved liberation leader boosted China’s battered image. China was also playing catch up after having not paid much attention to the ANC. South Africa was just two years away from its first democratic election, and it was clear that the ANC would play a significant role in the new government – the government of...
the most wealthy and powerful nation in Africa. For the ANC, the strategic interests lay in diversifying its international relations. China was a rising power that significantly was not from the West. The ANC was also still reeling from the dramatic collapse of the Soviet Union just a year earlier, and the loss of a key ally.

In this next section we will examine China’s international identities and will attempt to see how China and South Africa have moved beyond the current events of the day in pushing their ties, and have instead begun relating to each other through a common international identity.

3.6.1 China’s International Identities

China, more than any power in the world, possesses a number of competing international identities. Consequently, China’s foreign policy often exhibits a conflicting range of orientations. David Shambaugh, in his book *China Goes Global: the Partial Power*\(^{177}\), identifies seven main international identities exhibited in China’s foreign policy discourse and debates. The diagram below represents the identities in extremes with China’s *Nativists*, or isolationists being the one extreme and the *Globalist*, or interventionists being the other extreme.

For the purposes of our study, these differences in China’s global identity are important since they also represent the diversity in which China projects its identity in its diplomatic relations. China’s relations with South Africa have almost exclusively involved the projection of its Global South international identity. Shambaugh identifies historical experience and an emphasis on China’s developing economy status as distinguishing features from China’s other global identities. “They [Global South identifiers] argue that given China’s historical experience with colonialism and imperialism, and as a developing country, its main international identity and responsibility lies with the developing world.”\(^{178}\) China’s dramatic economic growth over the last two decades has put it in a very different class from most emerging economies after becoming the world’s second largest economy in 2009. Nevertheless, proponents of the Global South identity see it as an imperative to identify and align with the developing world, especially for diplomatic support to help fend off the West on issues such as Tibet, human rights, Taiwan, climate change, and so on.\(^{179}\) Not surprisingly, it is this group that has actively advocated and advanced the ideals of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) political bloc.

Just like South Africa, China makes use of the Bandung conference as a historical tool in its diplomacy with South Africa.\(^{180}\) South Africa sent three delegates from the African National Congress and the South African Indian Congress to the


\(^{179}\)Ibid.

conference. Included in this delegation was Moses Kotane, secretary general of the South African Communist Party and who, ten years later, headed the African National Congress office in Dar es Salaam.\(^{181}\) Despite the credentials of the South African delegates, there is no evidence that official contact was made by the small delegation towards China at Bandung.

China’s Ambassador to South Africa, H.E. Tian Xuejun, in an address to the South African Institute of International Affairs in 2012, elaborated on the driving forces behind China’s relationship with Africa. His comments highlighted the technique of using history as a diplomatic tool, as well as in employing China’s Global South identity in its relations with South Africa:

The China-Africa relationship is a centuries-old journey. China and Africa were in contact with each other as early as in about the 2\(^{nd}\) century B.C. and direct marine trade started in the 1\(^{st}\) century A.D. Chinese navigator Zheng He of the 15\(^{th}\) century led fleets to the eastern coast of Africa, visiting places in what is today Somalia, Kenya and Mozambique. Instead of establishing colonies or engaging in slave trade like western colonists of the time, Zheng He traded goods with local people and introduced the Chinese culture.\(^{182}\)

Ambassador Xuejun’s comments reflected those of both President Thabo Mbeki and President Jacob Zuma, focusing on distinguishing China’s interactions with the continent from those of the West, as well as highlighting the historical continuities in China’s relations with Africa. Again, the history that is drawn on or invoked is self-consciously ancient history, separated by centuries from the present governments.


Xuejun then went on to express solidarity with Africans and specifically the support that his country had shown to Africa in its struggle for independence from colonialism:

Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the Chinese government and people have firmly stood with the African people in your fight for national independence, and in your endeavour pursuing national development. African countries have also rendered China precious support on the restoration of our legitimate seat in the United Nations and many other important issues concerning China’s core interest.183

In veiled terms, Xuejun thanked South Africa and the continent for its support in “issues concerning China’s core interests.” This was almost certainly referring to China’s ‘One China’ policy, which has been an important element of the Chinese-South Africa relationship.184 In the Joint Communique signed on January 1, 1998, establishing diplomatic relations between China and South Africa, one of the four articles stipulated South Africa’s recognition of but “one China”. The article reads:

The Government of the Republic of South Africa recognizes that there is but one China in the world, the Government of the People’s Republic of


184 One of the first great hurdles that South Africa’s foreign policy faced after the 1994 election was on the issue of South Africa’s official diplomatic relations with the Republic of China rather than with the People’s Republic of China. Prior to 1998, and during the National Party era, South Africa had cultivated a strong relationship with Taiwan. During the 1994 elections Taiwan supplied the ANC with significant financial aid to support their election campaign. The New York Times estimated that Taiwan donated $10 million to the ANC for their war chest, along with numerous paid trips for ANC dignitaries to Taiwan. It’s estimated that this intensive courting stalled the diplomatic transition from Taiwan to Beijing by two years. See “South Africa’s Foreign Policy: A Tough Balancing Act.” New York Times [New York] 3 Jan. 1997. Print. Also, Martyn Davies conducted a comparative study of South Africa’s relations with the Republic of China versus the People’s Republic of China. It provides wonderful historical context for the debate of the early 1990s. Davies, Martyn J. “South Africa Relations with the PRC and the ROC 1949 to 1995: The Questions of Diplomatic Recognition.” M.A. Thesis. University of Witwatersrand, 1996. Print.
China is the sole legal government representing the whole of China and recognizes China's position that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China.\(^{185}\)

The article reveals the strategic nature of South Africa and China's relationship. They are not simply bound by "historical solidarity", but rather the constraints and needs of their respective states---in short, the essence of *realpolitik*. This realism underscores another fact addressed in this chapter, that history is but a tool in diplomacy, and this tool can be wielded according to the needs and goals of the diplomatic relationship.

Chapter Four
Policy Transitions: A Case Study of the Nationalization Debate

“The nationalization of the mines, banks and monopoly industries is the policy of the ANC” —Nelson Mandela

“In our [ANC] economic policies…there is not a single reference to things like nationalization, and this is not accidental.”—Nelson Mandela

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4.1 Introduction

Economic nationalization has been an enduring debate in South Africa from the time of the National Party’s ascendancy. The debate has had its ebbs and flows, often in tandem with global economic trends. Each reappearance of the debate centers on the role of the state in the economy. Is the government to be a referee in the nation’s economy, or is it to be the main engine through ownership of key industries and corporations? This chapter begins by way of a brief examination of what nationalization looked like during apartheid. This is followed by a study of the ANC’s stance towards nationalization up until the 1994 elections. The focus will be the international influence and the context of the international environment in shaping the ANC’s economic policies. Finally, the chapter will conclude with the re-emergence of the debate in the second decade of the 21st century and how the international environment shaped this debate, and especially with regard to China.

4.2 Nationalization under the National Party

Merle Lipton, author of *Capitalism and Apartheid: South Africa, 1910-1986*, noted that intimately bound to Afrikaner nationalists was the economic struggle for the Afrikaner people.\(^{188}\) The nationalists even called the goal to conquer the cities and to dominate the economy as the “second great trek.”\(^{189}\) Tim Cohen examined the principles adopted by the Afrikaner organization the Broederbond in 1940 for examples


of nationalization. The Broderbond economic policy included “abolition of the exploitation by foreigners of the national resources” and “the nationalization of finance and planned coordination of economic policy.” One economic institution created by the Broederbond which exemplified their commitment to Afrikaner capital was the Volkskas Koöperatief Beperk, founded in 1934. The bank was committed to abolishing foreign capital, but above all to the uplifting of Afrikaners out of poverty. The bottom line for Afrikaners of this period was their perceived need for ethnic survival, and all policies including economic served this notion.

The opinion of Dr Nico Diederichs is useful to quote, who wrote a 1941 book, Die Republikeinse Volkstaat van die Toekoms, and contained his idea of the role of the state in the economy:

Critically, the State will have to exercise strong oversight over the businesses within its territory that are controlled by citizens of foreign states. All key industries, including the mines, must be placed under State control, in order to ensure that they provide the greatest possible service to the community and general national interest and [are] not just purely focused on achieving the highest level of profit possible. A state bank should be established to ensure that it has a purely indigenous character and that the capital and credit of the State is controlled in the interests of the community.

Though Diederichs was considered to have been on the fringes of the Nationalist Party before the Second World War, he would serve as Minister of Economic Affairs between 1958 and 1967, where his opinions became more tempered.


World War II dramatically changed the economic landscape in South Africa and almost eliminated talk of economic nationalization, as white nationalists benefited from the war industries. Lipton described the opportunities provided by the war, noting, “white unemployment, endemic since Union, was practically eliminated by the manpower needs of the armed forces and the war industries. White farms gained from high food prices.” Nonetheless, while the war moderated talk of nationalization, the urge for state intervention and state-led development in the economy was not quashed. This was evidenced by the state-led investments in key infrastructures such as the silos that supported commercial agriculture and agro-processing, the rail infrastructure that facilitated the movement of goods in mining and agriculture, and investments in technology in selected sectors.

As we will see in our next section, these actions and policies inspired the ANC and formed part of its own justifications for state intervention.

4.3 The ANC and Nationalization

The issue of nationalization has a fraught history within the ranks of the ANC. Shortly before Mandela’s release from Robben Island, he issued a brief statement on ANC economic policy:

[I]he nationalization of the mines, banks and monopoly industries is the policy of the ANC, and a change or modification of our views in this regard is

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inconceivable. Black economic empowerment is a goal we fully support and encourage, but in our situation state control of certain sectors of the economy is unavoidable.195

Mandela’s statement was consistent with a similar statement he had made at his 1964 trial where he outlined the ANC policy of nationalizing mines, banks and monopolies that were held by one race only. The goal was not just political emancipation; it was economic emancipation as well. Mandela pointed out that this economic policy goal was similar to what the Nationalists had in mind, “The ANC’s policy corresponds with the old policy of the present Nationalist Party which, for many years, had as part of its programme the nationalization of the gold mines.”196 After being interviewed in 1990 by veteran journalist, Allister Sparks, on the logic behind nationalization, Mandela once again used the example of the Nationalist Party. The apparent success of the Nationalists in lifting poor Afrikaners out of poverty through state directed economic policies and intervention could be replicated in the new era, Mandela reasoned, only this time for poor black South Africans.197 Mandela’s statements on nationalization were not stand alone policy, but an interpretation of the Freedom Charter adopted by the Congress of the People in 1955, which contained a section on redistribution and transfer of wealth. The section reads:

The national wealth of our country, the heritage of South Africans, shall be restored to the people;
The mineral wealth beneath the soil, the Banks and monopoly industry shall be transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole;


This section of the Charter has been particularly contentious and has been used both to support nationalization and to oppose it. Ben Turok, one of the authors of the economic clauses of the 1955 Charter, weighed in on nationalization in 2009, and what the authors of the Charter had intended saying,

[what] was in our minds at the time was to emphasize that white economic power had usurped the historical legacy of the indigenous people whose ownership had to be restored. It was the colonial aspect that the charter sought to reverse, not private ownership of property. It has never been the intention of the ANC to create a command economy by nationalization, either then or now.\footnote{Ben Turok, “Calm down, the ANC is not about to seize mines.” The Times. 19 July, 2009. Web.}

One must also consider the context of the time in which Turok wrote the section. In 1955, industrial state led monopolies were common, even in Western countries like Britain and France, where the state played a large role in the rebuilding effort following the Second World War.\footnote{Legassick, Martin. “Nationalisation and the Freedom Charter.” Amandla September.9 (2009):Web. http://www.amandla.org.za/special-features/nationalisation-of-mines/407-nationalisation-and-the-freedom-charter.}

Mandela’s statements on nationalization reflect the historical legacy of the Freedom Charter, and also the way in which the ANC was influenced by the Nationalist Party. The world had changed drastically since 1955 though, and Mandela and the ANC at the start of 1990 were not sensitive to the shift in international economic thinking. They were still steeped in the Soviet thinking of a command economy, even as the Soviet Union was in the throes of collapse. In Chapter Two, we saw that with the
collapse of communism in Europe and the Soviet Union, a “new world order” was heralded. This order accepted liberal democracy to now be the international norm. Leaders of this world order did not just celebrate the triumph of liberal democracy over communism; for them, it was as also a victory of capitalism over the command economy. The new economic thinking was epitomized by the phrase “Washington Consensus”. Originally coined by American economist John Williamson in 1990, the term summarized ten policy recommendations for the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the U.S. Treasury Department. The policies were for aiding market reforms in developing countries and covered market liberalization, trade liberalization, and privatization of state enterprises. The term became more broadly understood as the marriage of liberal democracy with free market principles that Washington espoused in the “new world order”. It also became interchangeable to some degree with the term neoliberalism, which, in the context of the 1990s, refers to economic liberalization policies such as the ones suggested by Williamson. The “consensus” of market fundamentalism and of neoliberalism became a self-fulfilling doctrine, as those who advocated it also drew on its increasingly global hegemonic characteristics. As Adam Habib described this:

The principal ideological resources available to actors’ advocating a neo-liberal economic programme was the rise to hegemony of market ideology. This resulted from the collapse of the communist bloc in Eastern Europe and the

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202 Williamson, notes that both terms became almost interchangeable in the parlance of many policy makers in western economic circles. Ibid.
Soviet Union. This collapse of communism ensured that there was no alternative economic discourse to that of the market.\textsuperscript{203}

The Nationalist Party were ahead of the ANC when it came to reading the international climate, and had already identified the global shift towards free-market thinking. The starting point for this evolution had already begun in 1987 with a government publication entitled \textit{White Paper on Privatization and Deregulation in the Republic of South Africa}.\textsuperscript{204} In 1988, the government went from theory to action when President P.W. Botha announced the privatization of several state-controlled industries, and in November 1989, Iscor was sold for R3 billion. There were domestic concerns that weighed on the privatization programme, such as the government’s dire need for capital, but also weighing on the decision was the adoption of purer free market principles.

The economic section of President de Klerk’s opening address to parliament in 1990 could have been taken almost directly from Williamson’s 1990 paper, except Williamson would not publish the paper until three months after de Klerk’s speech. De Klerk’s speech touched on tax reform, foreign exchange, trader liberalization, fiscal reform, and inflation reduction, all points in Williamson’s paper highlighting a global “consensus” emerging on economic policy. The section also reaffirmed that de Klerk’s government was committed to the economic reform process begun under the Botha


administration. Most critically, de Klerk outlined a new role for the state in South
Africa’s economy with a complete rejection of the statist economy:

[...]he Government’s basic point of departure is to reduce the role of the public
sector in the economy and to give the private sector maximum opportunity for
optimal performance. In this process, preference has to be given to allowing the
market forces and a sound competitive structure to bring about the necessary
adjustments.205

Mandela’s statement on nationalization, just days prior to de Klerk’s speech, was a
study in contrast. Mandela envisioned a larger role for the state in the economy, while
de Klerk was making plans on reducing its size and scope. Yet, just four years later and
two days after the national elections that swept the ANC to power, Mandela would
declare that “In our [ANC] economic policies…there is not a single reference to things
like nationalization, and this is not accidental. There is not a single slogan that will
connect us with any Marxist ideology.”206 How did this radical transformation come
about? What influenced the change in Mandela’s thinking? Several studies have been
devoted to studying the underlying causes for the transition from nationalist economic
policy to a free market policy. Patrick Bond, in Elite Transition: From Apartheid to
Neoliberalism approaches the question through a Marxist class structure, and focuses
on what he calls the “elite pacting” that took place between the ANC and the
transnational elites.207 As the ANC prepared itself for government in the time leading up
to the 1994 election, it underwent a “steep forgetting curve” as it was introduced to the

http://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv02039/04lv02103/05lv02104/06lv02105.htm


new economic orthodoxy by the global elites. Bond critically examines the way in which the ANC elite were absorbed into the governing structure of both South Africa and internationally, by their acceptance of this ‘consensus’. In contrast to Bond’s class approach, Hein Marais’s book *South Africa Pushed to the Limit: The Political Economy of Change*, focuses on the historical underpinnings of South Africa's economic transition from the National Party to the ANC. The book is a sweeping historical study of South Africa’s post-apartheid economic policies, but includes an important chapter on the evolution of the ANC’s economic policy from 1990 to 1994. Marais identifies the ANC’s lack of experience in economic policy making as a contributing factor to the organization’s muddled policy stance. The ANC was aware of this hole, and gave up the position of Finance Minister in the initial Government of National Unity. In a June 1994 meeting convened by Mandela for the appointment of a new Finance Minister after Derek Keys’ resignation, Mandela cautioned those present, advising, “I don't think we are ready yet for an ANC appointment.” Instead, political outsider, Chris Liebenberg, was appointed.

Another element that played a decisive role in the ANC’s change of thinking was the influence and pressure of the international community; it is this element that is most pertinent to our study. The ANC came under immediate pressure after its unbanning

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208 Ibid, 17.


over its nationalization policy. Threats, ridicule, and badgering came from all corners, but especially from Western governments. Mandela and the ANC quickly adopted and went on an international charm offensive. In December 1991, Mandela embarked on a tour of America to build support for their position in the negotiations. An important aspect of the trip was assuring American investors that South Africa was open for business. Unsurprisingly, American investors were nervous after the initial ANC call for nationalization. Mandela spoke to a crowd of 200 American CEO’s in Pittsburgh to reassure them that the ANC was not an enemy of private enterprise:

"The private sector must and will play the central and decisive role in the struggle to achieve many of [the transformation] objectives [...] let me assure you that the ANC is not an enemy of private enterprise [...] We are determined to create the necessary climate which the foreign investor will find attractive. Let me further make the point that the ANC has no ideological commitment to nationalization. [...] What we visualize is a mixed economy which, led by the private sector, will include a public sector, small business and cooperatives."^212

So, Mandela did not completely reject nationalization, it was only that the ANC was not ideologically committed to it. Mandela’s speech in Pittsburgh however, marked the beginning of a shift that would continue over the course of 1991, as the ANC leadership started projecting more moderate, business-friendly policies. Senior ANC leaders cultivated close relationships with top South African businessmen. Patti Waldmeir wrote of Mandela’s business ties, noting, "he constantly sought the views of international businessmen and bankers on South Africa’s future. [...] and dined regularly with Anglo patriarch Harry Oppenheimer."^213 This relationship with capital was described by


Sampie Terreblanche, who wrote that South Africa’s business elite exerted pressure on ANC economic thinking in part because of U.S. pressure on themselves.²¹⁴

The last stand for nationalization would come in February 1992 at the World Economic Forum, in Davos, Switzerland. South Africa was represented at the forum by Mandela, de Klerk and Inkatha Freedom Party leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi. Davos was an opportunity for the leaders to present themselves to world and business leaders alike. Mandela began the conference by defending the ANC’s intention to use state-owned industry to rebuild the economy, just as Britain, Germany and Japan had done in the post war years. Reportedly, the Dutch Minister of Industry remarked wryly to Mandela that this was a different economic era with interdependent economies.²¹⁵ Even China and Vietnam weighed in, and told Mandela that they had accepted private enterprise, especially in light of what had happened in the Soviet Union.²¹⁶ Pippa Green gives an account of how Mandela had been encouraged to attend Davos by Tito Mboweni, director of the ANC’s Economics Department, in order to quell Western fears that the ANC was a radical organization.²¹⁷ When Mboweni arrived at Davos, he found that the speech Mandela was to deliver had already been distributed to the media, and that the economic section had been filled in by one of the left-wing ANC economists from London. The prepared speech dealt with the nationalization issue, declaring,


²¹⁶ Ibid, 429.

“Nationalization in our view does not mean a universal blanket policy or sticking rigidly to an old dogma. It means examining selected major enterprises on a case by case basis beginning with corporations already in state hands.”

Mboweni understood that the international consensus on economic policy had shifted and that international support for the negotiations could be gained by conforming to the new dispensation. He counselled Mandela not to proceed with the speech, insisting that “You can’t deliver this speech here…you can’t go in front of thousands of business executives and talk about nationalization…We’ve moved on. We now talk about a mixed economy…[t]hese people consider you a hero, don’t disappoint them.”

The Chinese took a particular interest in the ANC’s economic position, and Chinese Premier Li Peng, questioned Mandela on why he was pursuing a nationalization policy. He said “Madiba, I don’t understand why you’re talking about nationalization. You’re not even a communist party. I am a leader of a communist party in China, and I’m talking privatization.” The conversation left an indelible impact on Mandela, and, according to Mboweni, he would reference the Li Peng remarks during every ANC discussion on the economy. Mboweni quotes Mandela as saying, “Even Li Peng, general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party doesn’t believe in nationalization. Who are we? We are not a communist party.”

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219 Ibid, 347.

220 Ibid, 347.

221 Ibid, 348.
Mandela was convinced, and that night struck out the prepared passage on nationalization and instead substituted one that described an ANC policy of a mixed economy where the private sector would play a central and critical role in creating wealth and jobs. After the meetings at Davos were concluded, Mandela visited Copenhagen where he made similar statements. Upon returning home to South Africa, he summoned a meeting of ANC leaders to share with them his change in thinking: "chaps we have to choose. We either keep nationalization and get no investment, or we modify our attitude and get investment." William Gumede notes that the reaction from the leadership was an emphatic rejection, with some accusing Mandela of betraying the Freedom Charter. The die had been cast though, and in the lead up to the 1994 election, the majority within the ANC leadership would fall in line behind Mandela. The international environment played a role in this organizational shift, and in particular the United States. The U.S. focused a considerable amount of help and money into developing a cadre of ANC economic thinkers and leaders. Some of the ANC economists were sent to the U.S. for training, including Tito Mboweni, who was supported for several visits, including one to attend a special program on antitrust. U.S. Ambassador to South Africa, Princeton Lyman, recalls Mboweni as a convert to free market policies after his visits, saying "Mboweni, who had been a longtime supporter of nationalization of key industries, became over time a champion of antitrust policies instead." In addition to these foreign educational opportunities, the U.S. coordinated

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conferences and training seminars in South Africa. In the fall of 1992, a group of private American companies, along with the U.S. government, put together a series of economic models that came to be known as the Mt. Fleur scenarios. Each model was given a bird name, with the “ideal model” being the “flamingo” as Lyman put it. Lyman described the model, depicting it as, “the flamingo contained a combination of controlled deficits, promotion of private investment, and select improvements in key social sectors.” The presence of key ANC economic leaders at the Mt. Fleur meetings was taken as a positive indication by the U.S. government on the direction of ANC policy.

The ANC was also courted by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank during this period, with several ANC officials being sent to the World Bank for a familiarization course. Ian Taylor describes the interaction between the ANC and the powerful financial institutions:

> [t]hroughout the transition period, the ANC leadership came under relentless pressure from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to abandon its proposed inward investment programme in favour of a more ‘realistic’ investment-led, export-oriented growth strategy.

In 1993, the Transitional Executive Committee (TEC) composed of 8 National Party leaders and 8 ANC leaders requested a $850 million from the IMF. The IMF condition for giving the loan was that all 16 members of the TEC sign a “Statement on Economic Policy”. The document institutionalized the policy recommendations that the IMF had been making to the ANC of market liberalization, open investment, and free

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trade. All 16 TEC members signed the document. Looking back, Ronnie Kasrils refers to the signing of the document as the ANC’s “faustian moment”. The nationalization debate, for the time being, had been banished to the fringes of the ANC, and the free market mantra of the “Washington Consensus” was adopted. In our next section, we will see that this would not last for long.

4.4 The ANC and Nationalization…Again

The nationalization debate resurfaced on the national political debate once more in 2008. This time, the movement was led by a young firebrand ANC Youth League President named Julius Malema. It had been fourteen years since the ANC was swept to power, and there was growing dissatisfaction with the state of the economy, both within ANC ranks and in the country’s townships; youth unemployment was still extremely prevalent, and the divide between rich and poor was largely race based despite the efforts of Black Economic Empowerment policies. Tim Cohen cites some of these domestic factors in bringing back the nationalization debate, but he also contextualizes it internationally. The 2007 economic crash in the U.S. property and debt markets had spread to the banks of Europe by 2008. As the Western economies began to slow, and in many cases contract, the effects were acutely felt in emerging markets such as South Africa. Cohen theorizes that as the international economy


weakened and with it the consensus on neoliberal economic policy, nationalization surfaced. This was simply part of the cycle of history. In Cohen’s words:

[i]t occurred to me that nationalization and privatization take place in contradictory waves through economic history, ebbing and flowing as the economic cycle turns. The year 2008 was definitely an ‘ebb’ year for privatization and a ‘flow’ year for nationalization internationally.230

Cohen points out that the historic cycle was domestic too, drawing comparisons between Malema and the National Party’s Dr. Nico Diederichs, from 70 years earlier.231

As the old model of neoliberalism began to be questioned in earnest following the crisis, it was not replaced with outright nationalization. Instead, a hybrid model, mixing elements of the state with capitalism began to emerge. China had been developing an alternative economic model ever since the market reforms of the mid-1990s. In a 2004 paper, Joshua Ramo published a paper titled *The Beijing Consensus*.232 A tongue-in-cheek reference to the “Washington Consensus”, Ramo was the first to identify that China had developed a unique development model, but he provided little detail of what this model looked like, in part because there was no ‘Chinese model’ per se. *The Economist* defined state capitalism as states that provide financial and political backing to corporations and State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and who then competed in international markets. The champion of this model? China.233 The financial crisis


231 Cohen provides the most comprehensive examination of the nationalization debate that emerged in 2008 and traces its historical parallels as well as the factors that influenced the debate. See, Cohen, Tim. *A Piece of the Pie: The Battle over Nationalisation*. 64.


provided the ‘break out moment’ for the Chinese model, as China’s economy, led by a powerful state, continued to grow at breakneck speed through the international financial downturn. American political analyst Ian Bremmer in 2009 declared that “state capitalism had come of age”. Bremmer described the end of the free market wave of the 1990s and the characteristics of state capitalism:

[the] free-market tide has now receded. In its place has come state capitalism, a system in which the state functions as the leading economic actor and uses markets primarily for political gain. This trend has stoked a new global competition, not between rival political ideologies but between competing economic models.

Put simply, the state was back, and no longer was it generally accepted that it should play a minor role in a country’s economy. The success of China in using the state for development was described by The Economist:

With the West in a funk and emerging markets flourishing, the Chinese no longer see state-directed firms as a way-station on the road to liberal capitalism; rather, they see it as a sustainable model. They think they have redesigned capitalism to make it work better, and a growing number of emerging-world leaders agree with them.

South Africa was among that group of world leaders who were interested in what the Chinese were doing. After a protracted debate on nationalization, the ANC officially rejected the policy in 2012, but declared a larger role for the state and an expansion of State Owned Enterprises. President Jacob Zuma’s State of the Nation Address in the


235 Ibid, 44.


same year called for mass scale state spending on infrastructure projects to stimulate the economy. Many within the media labelled the move as South Africa’s “Chinese Moment”. The label was premature and simplistic, but there was no denying that South Africa was inspired by the accomplishments of the Chinese. Since the beginning of official relations in 1998, South African diplomatic and commercial ties had strengthened dramatically. As the climate shifted both globally and domestically for the role of the state in the economy, South Africa began to study China. Enoch Godongwana, head of the ANC’s economic transformation committee, even spoke of an exact replication of the Chinese model, “the Chinese model of building infrastructure and growing jobs will be a key focus of the ANC’s economic policy” Public Enterprises Minister, Malusi Gigaba, during a 2012 interview outlined the role of the state in the Chinese model, saying, “they [the Chinese] reached the level of development because the state played an active part in the economy. It didn’t sit back and say to the private sector that all we do is establish regulation.” Gigaba, along with Economic Development Minister, Ebrahim Patel, visited China during 2011 with the purpose of studying Chinese SOEs’ and their role in strengthening the economy. Their study trip followed a 2010 visit by 35 senior ANC members who were sent to Beijing for two weeks of “intensive political education” which included lectures on Chinese national planning and the Communist Party’s political education system. The visit fulfilled a


240 Ibid.

2009 ANC request that all members of its national executive committee take part in Chinese Communist Party lessons. Very little is known about the lessons that the ANC received, but the subjects include governance, social planning, development economics, and state enterprise management.

President Zuma, more than any previous South African leader, has shown great interest in learning from the Chinese experience. In a 2010 address at Renmin University in Beijing, Zuma criticized the Western hegemony of the old economic order, but wondered what the developing world could learn from China.

[j]In the past, economists from the developed countries told the developing countries that they should behave more like the developed countries. [...]The developing world was told that if it did not Westernize and change its political systems to mirror those of the West, they could forget about achieving economic growth and development. Now we are asking what we could learn from other political systems and cultures. Is the political discipline in China a recipe for economic success, for example?242

The regular learning trips to Beijing have not been enough, and in August of 2014, senior ANC leaders held a meeting with the Chinese Ambassador to South Africa to discuss the Chinese Communist Party financing the building of a political school in South Africa. The school would be modelled after the Chinese Communist Party School in Beijing.243

There is an element of déjà vu in all of this. Not even twenty years beforehand, the ANC had been jetting off to Washington and New York to learn from economists and politicians there about the latest thinking in economic development. In terms of economic models and counsel, the role of the state has formed the common thread in


South Africa’s relationship with the U.S. and with China. History shows that the state will continue to feature prominently in debates and discussions on South Africa’s economy—another continuity between the “old” and “new” South Africa. These future debates, like the past ones, will no doubt be informed and influenced by the international order.
Conclusion

This thesis set out to develop a broader understanding of transitions in South Africa. Chapter Two sketched the global context to South Africa’s political transition. South Africa’s transition to democracy was not an isolated domestic event, but was shaped and influenced by the seismic shifts taking place in the international order. By employing a global historic perspective, the chapter came to a more nuanced understanding of the interplay between the global transition and South Africa’s political transition. This international dimension to the shaping of South African politics was not new. Speaking of this force, Helen Suzman concluded, “the government in power in the days of Verwoerd and Vorster frankly didn’t give a damn…but don’t forget the impact of the outside, it was there.” This “impact of the outside” exemplifies a striking continuity between the “old” and “new” South Africa.

Chapter Three, the most in-depth of the three transition themes, examined the role of history in South Africa’s politics and in particular its role in crafting an international historic identity. The chapter showed that the politicization of history in South Africa has extended to the foreign policy realm as well, where South African leaders and foreign policy practitioners use history as a diplomatic tool. This was shown through a consideration of history as ‘usable’ history in South Africa’s relations with the U.S. and with China.

Finally, the study concluded with a case study of the nationalization debates in South Africa as an example of the policy transitions that accompanied South Africa’s political transition. There have been three waves of debate, at the heart of which was the role of the state in the economy. A complete history of the nationalization debates was not possible, nor required for the goals of this thesis. Instead, the context focus was on the shaping role and influence that the U.S. and Chinese had in the debate over the role of the state. This subject is rich in potential for future research – specifically, the internal debate within the ANC in the early 1990s over the adoption of a neoliberal economic policy. Details are slowly emerging that a free market economic

policy was adopted by the ANC leadership despite vehement opposition. On the outside, it appeared that consensus had been built within the organization from 1990 to 1994, but in reality the leadership may have ‘steamrolled’ the policy adoption process. Ronnie Kasrils is one of the very first ANC senior leaders to have criticized this process and Mandela’s handling of it, arguing that “attempts within the ANC to critique neoliberal policies were imperiously put down by Mandela, who firmly believed the opposite and by then was used to getting his way”.

The study of South African foreign relations with the U.S. or China is complex on its own, without the consideration of nationalization, international historic identity, and global context. This thesis has sought to come to terms with the challenges of studying broad and expansive subjects by focusing on the theme of transition, thereby demonstrating the benefits of using a global historic framework for studying South Africa’s contemporary history.

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