PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN HOSTEL REDEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS IN NYANGA AND LANGA

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DECLARATION

By submitting this dissertation, I declare that the entirety of the work contained therein is my own, original work, that I am the sole author thereof (save to the extent explicitly otherwise stated), that reproduction and publication thereof by Stellenbosch University will not infringe any third party rights and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for obtaining any qualification.

Luzuko Mbulelo Mdunyelwa

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ABSTRACT

Literature on public participation generally assumes the existence of a causal relationship between community participation in urban development programs and the satisfaction of beneficiaries of such programs with the outcomes of these development programs. In this study, the role played by public participation in fashioning perceptions of satisfaction or dissatisfaction of beneficiaries is investigated in the cases of two hostel redevelopment programs.

The role of public participation is investigated by means of the Spectrum of Participation model of the International Association of Public Participation, a model which propagates a set of principles to be fulfilled before it may be said that beneficiaries have thoroughly participated in a program. Satisfaction or dissatisfaction of the beneficiaries is tested by means of the Hirschmann model of Voice, Exit and Loyalty, a model which hypothesizes that potential beneficiaries in a program - in order to express satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the process - may remain loyal to the program, may voice their dissatisfaction, or (as a last resort) may exit the program.

After an analysis of the concept of public participation, this concept is applied-via interviews with samples of stakeholders and potential beneficiaries-to two different communities of interest: members of the Welcome Zenzile Housing Cooperative in Langa and the Ilinge LabaHlali Housing Cooperative in Nyanga, townships situated not very far from the Cape Town CBD, and occupied mostly by African communities. These two housing cooperatives participated in the national Hostel Redevelopment Program, an initiative propagated by the national Department of Human Settlements. Since these cooperatives participated in different ways during identifiable phases of the program, public participation by potential beneficiaries was researched within each phase.

A comparison of research findings in the two programs points to a positive relationship between public participation and beneficiary satisfaction. Though other factors also play a role, such satisfaction could be observed in the Nyanga community where levels of participation by beneficiaries were extremely high. With the Welcome Zenzile beneficiaries, the same could not be said, inter alia, since most of the decisions associated with beneficiary interests were made by the City of Cape Town. In essence this second program was implemented by the City of Cape Town for and on behalf of the beneficiaries.
OPSOMMING

In die algemeen veronderstel die literatuur oor openbare deelname dat daar 'n kousaleverband bestaan tussen gemeenskapsdeelname aan stedelike ontwikkelingsprogramme en die tevredenheid van die begunstigdes van sodanige programme met die uitkomstes daarvan. In hierdie studie word twee hostelherontwikkelingsprogramme gebruik om die rol te ondersoek wat openbare deelname speel in die vorming van persepsies oor begunstigdes se tevredenheid of ontevredenheid.

Die rol van openbare deelname word ondersoek aan die hand van die Internasionale Vereniging vir Openbare Deelname se Spektrum van Deelname-model, 'n model wat 'n stel beginsels voorhou waaraan voldoen moet word voordat daar gesê kan word dat begunstigdes doeltreffend aan 'n program deelgeneem het. Die tevredenheid of ontevredenheid van die begunstigdes word getoets volgens die Hirschmann-model van “Voice, Exit and Loyalty”, 'n model wat veronderstel dat moontlike begunstigdes van 'n program – ten einde hulle tevredenheid of ontevredenheid met die proses te kan uitspreek – aan die program lojaal kan bly, hulle ontevredenheid daarmee kan betuig, of (as 'n laaste uitweg) die program kan verlaat.

Nadat daar 'n ontleding van die konsep openbare deelname gedoen is, word die konsep toegepas – via onderhoude en steekproewe met belanghebbendes en potensiële begunstigdes – in twee verskillende belanggemeenskappe: die Welcome Zenzile-behuisingskoöperatief in Langa en die Ilinge LabaHlali-behuisingskoöperatief in Nyanga, twee townships wat nie ver van die Kaapstadse Sentrale Sakegebied geleë is nie en hoofsaaklik deur swart gemeenskappe bewoon word. Hierdie twee behuisingskoöperatiewe het aan die nasionale Hostelherontwikkelingsprogram, 'n inisiatief wat deur die nasionale Departement van Menslike Vestiging geloods is, deelgeneem. Aangesien hierdie koöperatiewe op verskillende wyses tydens identifiseerbare fases van die program deelgeneem het, is openbare deelname deur potensiële begunstigdes in elke fase nagevors.

'N Vergelyking van navorsings bevindinge ten opsigte van die twee programme dui op 'n positiewe verband tussen openbare deelname en begunstigdetevredenheid. Ofskoon ander faktore ook 'n rol speel, kon sodanige tevredenheid in die Nyanga-gemeenskap waargeneem word, waar vlakke van deelname deur begunstigdes buitengewoon hoog was. Dieselfde kan egter nie van die Welcome Zenzile-begunstigdes gesê word nie, onder andere omdat die meeste van die besluite wat met begunstigdebelange te make het, deur die Stad Kaapstad geneem is. Op die keper beskou het die Stad Kaapstad hierdie tweede program vir en namens die begunstigdes geïmplementeer.
CHAPTER 1

1.1 Introduction

Literature (Hamdi: 2004; Johnson and Wilson: 2000; on public participation generally assumes the existence of a causal relationship between community participation in urban development programs, such as housing, and the satisfaction of beneficiaries of such programs with the outcomes of these development programs. The Urban Management Programme (2001; 16) confirms that “the more stakeholder groups are consulted and involved, the more likely the process will be successful. Plummer further confirms this insinuation of a causal relationship by claiming that:

*Increasingly, governments of developing countries are adopting, in rhetoric and policy, the concept of community participation. In many cases, particularly where governments are pursuing decentralization policies, the responsibility for addressing urban poverty lies with local government and accordingly, it is the municipal levels of administration that are handed the responsibility for implementing policies advocating the participation of poor communities. (Plummer: 2000:1)*

The South African government and community structures have also jumped on the bandwagon and assumed the need for the existence of this relationship in the policy and legislation environment for such policies and legislation to be legitimate and acceptable. However, what even the “Breaking New Ground” policy, which is premised on an “extensive stakeholder consultation process” (MINMEC 2004: 2) or what White et. al. (1994; 16-17) simply regard as “genuine participation” has not managed to live up to the expectation of entrenching a participatory decision making culture in its so-called ‘new housing vision’ and processes. Miraftab (2003; 226) confirms that “despite these positive elements, what is evident coming out of South African since 1995 is how little community participation in processes of housing development has been under the government’s housing policy”. The Breaking New Ground policy does not discuss the discourse of participatory decision-making processes intimated in the provisioning of housing for destitute communities anywhere in the policy, save just for a suggestive reference to “the development of sustainable human settlements”, a statement which may infer that communities are involved in the long term planning of the settlements. (Department of Housing 2004: 7) Plummer (2000; 5) suggests, however, that public participation “dismantle[s] ineffective prescriptive approaches to service delivery”.

Despite this disjuncture between reality and rhetoric, the public participation discourse and sentiment has found its way not only into the Constitution of South Africa, but also in national
policy and legislation related to or governing local government, such as the “Breaking New Ground policy and the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act. This is evident in the section of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act dealing with processes such as performance management and the Integrated Development Plan, processes which are of strategic significance to the conceptualization of the public participation trajectory. This concept has also permeated local government to the extent that public participation has become pivotal to the way local authorities do their business, as in the planning function, and the budgeting process, for an example.

Research reported on in this thesis interrogates causality between participation and satisfaction or dissatisfaction in hostel redevelopment programs in an attempt to examine the extent to which the level of participation in consuming services or products influence the perception of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with that product or service, and the manner in which these consumers of services and or products react when they are satisfied or dissatisfied with such products or services. This research further examines whether it is the involvement of these consumers of these services and or products in the decision-making process pertaining to the production of such services or products that brings about this satisfaction. The outcome of the research intends to offer guidance on whether participation is, indeed, an urban management paradigm to be considered when decisions are made regarding the provision of public services.

1.2 The objectives of study.

The significance of this study emanates from the recent prominence afforded to public participation by all spheres of government in South Africa, a prominence encapsulated and entrenched in current policies and legislation. The policy referred to, in this instance, is the public participation philosophy, which is deliberated in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, in the Batho Pele Principles, and explained, in detail, in Chapter 4 of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act, Act 32 of 2000. Chapter 4 of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act goes as far as prescribing that the public, which in this case are local residents, ratepayers and other stakeholders, must be consulted in the decision making process of the local authority. In fact, the Systems Act goes to the extent of prescribing that municipalities must ‘create conditions conducive to participation by communities in the determination of administrative processes of local municipalities’, processes such as, inter alia, the Integrated Development Plan, performance management systems, and the preparation of budgets. What needs to be analyzed in this participation discourse in South Africa is that public participation has been proposed and legislated without any significant
empirical evidence to establish causality between such public participation and satisfaction with the services rendered. This causality is not only assumed, but confirmed by Mansuri and Rao (2013; 10) they state:

*There is some heartening evidence, though, that participation may have intrinsic value. Communities tend to express greater satisfaction with decisions in which they participate, even when participation does not change the outcome or when outcomes are not consistent with their expressed preferences.* (Mansuri and Rao: 2013: 10)

The insinuation in South African legislation, even by policymakers, presupposes a positive relationship between the two variables even in South Africa, despite the fact that literature (Mansuri and Rao; 2013) are stating that each participation process and outcome is “deeply conditioned by culture, politics, and social structure…and therefore, concluding that “a policy that works in one country, or even one municipality, may fail miserably in another”. Smith and Vawda (2001; 26) contend though that public participation in South Africa, was meant to be a “key strategy for building democracy”… so that “resources could be allocated to improve the lives of the poor”.

Pieterse however, refutes this assumption of untested causality in his observation, when he states:

“… in much of the governance and participation literature there is an assumption that more participatory governance is good for the poor and improves the likelihood of development policies…. Provisional evidence suggests that participation enhancement measures do not necessarily increase the power of the poor or advance their interests, especially in the context of multi-stakeholder politics that rests on deliberative policies” (Pieterse: undated:4).

Chambers, cited in Nelson and Wright (2000; 30) makes an interesting observation that “participation is generally used in “three main ways”, namely, “as a cosmetic label, to make whatever is proposed to appear good”… to “describe a co-opting practice, to mobilize local labour and reduce costs”…and “to describe an empowering process which enables local people to do their own analysis, to take command, to gain confidence, and to make their own decisions”. The third way is, in my view, the context assumed and or intended to connote public participation by the respective legislation. The second way seems to be one of the predominant criticisms against the notion of participation, a criticism which will be discussed later in the paper.

This context, and philosophy of participation to the improvement of service delivery is further elucidated by Smith and Vawda (2003; 27), in a way, in their claim that “… the South African
context of service delivery to the urban poor requires first building a collective sense of citizen engagement in order to improve the level of communication between local authorities and low-income service users”. This perception and approach, claims Chambers (2000), originates from the “recognition that many development failures originate in attempts to impose standard top-down programmes and projects on diverse local realities where they do not fit or meet needs; concern for cost-effectiveness, recognizing that the more local people do the less capital costs are likely to be; preoccupation with sustainability, and the insight that if local people themselves design and construct they are more likely to meet running costs and undertake maintenance; and ideologically for some development professionals, the belief that it is right that poor people should be empowered and should have more command over their lives”. Oldfield (Undated; 105) however argues that, with all good intentions, “community participation and mobilization for infrastructure cannot be assumed therefore, as given, ongoing or stable”. It is “built on the sustenance of linkages, between community organizations and residents, on continuity of leadership, and on at least maintaining if not building linkages between poor, often peripheral communities with officials and offices of the state”.

It is obvious, from this citation that the insinuation does not originate in South Africa, but is premised on international experience, as well, as international literature (Burkley: 1993; De Velliers: 2001; Dudley: 1993) and research done in the United Kingdom. This research claims this causality between participation and satisfaction in philosophies and schools of thought that claim that, if the poor and disadvantaged, especially disadvantaged communities from rural areas, participate in their own development, then the likelihood of success of such projects is guaranteed. However circumstances between these countries in Europe and South Africa are so vast that it would be unscientific to draw any conclusive generalizations about their findings. Hence it is important that such research is undertaken in South Africa.

The aim of the research therefore, is to search for causality between the level of participation of beneficiaries of a housing project and the level of satisfaction of such beneficiaries with the quality of low-cost house delivered. It is, inter alia, to interrogate the conceptualization of participation in South Africa as an ingredient, if not a panacea, for a satisfactory and sustainable provision of low-cost housing. This, in the opinion of the author, will help understand the origins of the perceived role and significance of public participation in service delivery in the country and to comprehend the history behind the romanticised emotions relating to the concept. The research will provide a framework within which the concept can be critically analysed, to further find reason for the need by government, to formally institutionalise the concept. One outcome of the research will be to suggest a model that has
empirical validity and reliability sufficient to give credence to the legislative imperative prescribing public participation. Low-cost housing is selected as an area of research because housing is such a bone of contention in local authorities that it impacts positively or negatively on the perceptions of local communities of the capability of such a municipality to deliver services.

1.2.1 Problem statement and goals of the research

The Hostel Redevelopment Program, described fully in 1.3.2 below, was implemented in two Cape Town sites, in private and grey sector hostels in Nyanga, and in a public sector hostel in Langa. This program started in 2002 in Nyanga and Langa followed in 2006. Participation by intended beneficiaries in the redevelopment of their hostel units is the focus of this study. The research question pertains to the influence such participation played in beneficiary satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the products and processes of the system. The research question is:

- What influence, if any, did participation play in the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of the beneficiaries with the products and program of the process;
- What options did they have to either exit the program or express their dissatisfaction, in cases of dissatisfaction;

The research has three distinct goals, namely:

- To establish the processes of public participation in the two cases of hostel redevelopment program, namely Welcome Zenzile, situated in Langa and Ilinge LabaHlali situated in Nyanga. This part of the research will be dealt with in Chapters 5 and 6 of the paper.
- To determine the degree of satisfaction or dissatisfaction of the beneficiaries with the program and products and the reaction of beneficiaries to such satisfaction or dissatisfaction. The scope and degree of the satisfaction or dissatisfaction will also be dealt with in Chapter 7 of the research paper.
- To identify the causes and effects of such of the differences in degrees of satisfaction and dissatisfaction with these program.
1.3 Definition of terminology

The Hostel Redevelopment Program is a new intervention in South Africa, and as a result very little is known of what the concept entails. Public participation, as a concept, has also been defined and construed in so many ways in South Africa to the extent that it has been linked to a myriad of other concepts contributing to the development of communities. In fact, a significant portion of authors (Meyer and Theron: 2000: 1; Smith and Jones: 1981: 8; Tikare et al; 2001; 11) unanimously agree that public participation cannot and should not be packaged within a single statement, or have a universal definition. Concepts and interventions linked to public participation in South Africa are good governance, transformation, and the Integrated Development Plan. A new imperative that is introduced to the public participation debate is urban management, which is seen as a premise and basis upon which public participation should be founded in the development of communities. To give context to all the links it is imperative that definitions of these concepts and interventions are given to articulate the role each plays in the public participation discourse. This section will deal with the definition of public participation, the hostel redevelopment program, urban management, good governance, Batho Pele, and the administrative transformation.

1.3.1 Defining Public participation

Literature (Arnstein: 1969; Tamasane: 1998; Parry et. al: 1992) on public participation agree on the difficulty and inconsistency in the definition of the term. This difference is, to a great extent, evidenced by the way different literature, for instance, refers to the concept. Some literature refers to the concept as popular participation, while other literature speaks about community participation or citizen engagement. Others use the two terms interchangeably. Some authors have described the process as a philosophy instead of a policy, while others have seen it as a means to an end and not the end itself. Public participation must be afforded the latitude to mean different things to different people. Different authors further agree, rightfully so too, that there is no ‘blue print’ for public participation. Any attempt, therefore, to justify a definition of public participation should adopt a multi-dimensional perspective and be flexible and broad enough to accommodate the different schools of thought.

Most literature on participation (Commonwealth Secretariat: 2000: 9; The Council of Europe: 1991: 3; Taylor: 1994: 106; Bekker: 1996: 41) views participation or citizen engagement, broadly, as an activity undertaken by one or more individuals previously excluded from the
decision-making process in conjunction with one or more other individuals who were previously the protagonists in that process. The purpose of participatory engagement, according to Mansuri and Rao (2013: 5) is to enhance the involvement of the poor and the marginalised in community-level decision-making bodies in order to give citizens greater say in decisions that affect their lives”. The abovementioned literature (Commonwealth Secretariat: 2000: 9; The Council of Europe: 1991: 3; Taylor: 1994: 106; Bekker: 1996: 41), stresses the importance of participation for poor communities, “especially those individuals and community groups whom the decisions affect, in the decision-making process aimed at planning, funding, advocacy, or delivery of services directly, so the results reflect their concerns”. The UN-Habitat / World Bank (2001: 3) supports this literature by defining participation as “a process through which stakeholders influence and share control over development initiatives and the decisions and resources which affect them”. Burkey (1993: 56) adds to this discourse by stating that this process of engaging communities is an “essential part of human growth, that [involves] the development of self-confidence, pride, initiative, creativity, responsibility, cooperation…’ without which ‘all efforts to alleviate poverty will be immensely more difficult”.

A definition of public participation offered by the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (2001: iv.) defines public participation as ‘the on-going interaction between role-players that is aimed at improving decision-making during the planning, design, implementation and evaluation of development projects and processes’. The department further adds that public participation requires the involvement of local stakeholders, including groups that are often marginalized, such as women and youth. The specific reference to women is corroborated by the Commonwealth Secretariat (2000: 9) where it states that ‘participation is focused on the empowerment of citizens, including women…’. The reference to marginalized groups, in general, is reinforced by Arnstein2 (1969) in UN-Habitat (2001: 4) where she describes a participatory process as ‘the redistribution of power that enables communities presently excluded from political and economic processes, to be deliberately included in the decision-making process’. Arnstein further states that the participation of communities that are ‘presently excluded from political and economic processes’ should be seen as the ‘strategy by which the community joins in determining how information is shared, goals and policies are set, resources are allocated, programs are operated and benefits like contracts and patronage are parceled out’. Tikare et. al. (2001: 3) also support the involvement of stakeholders in any participation process because they also emphasize the importance of ‘…

1 Participation to Partnership, Urban Management Programme, UN-Habitat/ UNDP/ UNCHS/ World Bank, UNON, Nairobi, Kenya.
stakeholder influence and sharing control over priority setting, policy-making, resource allocations and access to public goods and services.”

An interesting contribution is made by the Canadian Ministry of the Environment in A People’s Government, The People’s Voice (2001), in which the Minister describes "meaningful public participation" as:

“full access to relevant and required information; must include the opportunity to critically review and comment on the information in a two-way exchange; must be done early enough to allow participants to have an influence on the planning of the project; must allow sufficient time to review and respond; must require a consultation plan to be developed and shared with the public; must be efforts to relate public comment to process or project decisions; must include notification, information out, and information discussion and exchange; must be timely”.

What makes this more interesting is that Canada houses the International Association of Public Participation, which is an association in existence to uphold values and ethics of public participation internationally. Whether South Africa is at this level, in terms of development, remains to be tested.

Taylor (1994) and Paul (1987) support each other’s view of what they perceive as public participation. Their approach is more of an ‘instrumentalist’ approach which is focusing more on the socio-economic impact and the developmental aspects of participation. Taylor (1994: 106), on the one hand, perceives public participation as “a process occurring within the context of a development project, which has as it’s focus the active collaborative involvement of project beneficiaries in influencing base decision making within a broader environment composed of factors which impact upon the nature and scope of community participation”. Paul (1987: 2), on the other hand, views public participation as “an active process by which beneficiary client groups influence the direction and execution of a development project with a view to enhancing their well-being in terms of [either] income, personal growth, self-reliance, or other values they cherish. Both authors assume a developmental paradigm to the concept. They define public participation as an essential part of human growth, that is the development of self-confidence, pride, initiative, responsibility, cooperation. This process, whereby people learn to take charge of their own lives and solve their own problems, is the essence of development. Van der Velde (1983) in Taylor (1994: 103), on the other hand, defines public participation from a process point of view of, “involvement in, sharing in, and

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partaking of the group decision-making process; the who, what, when, where, and how aspects of involvement”.

What is obvious in these definitions is that public participation has to have an element of collaborative decision-making, information sharing, bringing on-board and empowerment of disadvantaged communities, as further confirmed by Parry et al. (1992: 16) that ‘taking part in the process of formulation, passage and implementation of public policies’ is fundamental to participation as the community, itself, takes action which is “… aimed at influencing decisions which are, in most cases ultimately taken by public representatives and officials’.

In this research, the definition of public participation to be used as the official definition of public participation will be the definition of the Human Science Research Council, (2001; xi), the HSRC. The definition views public participation as “voluntary activities by which members of the public, directly or indirectly, share in the processes of governance through democratic institutions”. These activities, according to the HSRC, range from undemanding activities such as seeking information and being interested in politics, discussing politics and voting, to more demanding forms of participation such as attending public hearings, contacting politicians and campaigning for a political organization. The HSRC further claims that the focus is on those aspects of public participation aiming at influencing political procedures and decisions.

The golden thread that permeates significantly through all the definitions is the active involvement of the beneficiaries in a decision-making process from which those participants stand to benefit. Meyer and Theron (2000: 3) explain this notion by stating that definitions of public participation should assume either one of the two distinguishable perspectives, and these are looking at public participation as either ‘a means to an end’ or as process of ‘system-maintaining or system-transforming’. From the above perception public participation can be conceptualized as either embracing ‘involvement’ or ‘empowerment’. The emphasis on the participation discourse however, as claimed by UN-Habitat, is on viewing people not only as beneficiaries or clients, but as ‘important stakeholders in the design and implementation of development assistance programmes’. In that vein therefore, Arnstein (1969) in UN-Habitat in her consideration of the levels of participation, concludes that for any improvement in the outcome of the process real power must be given to the people or stakeholders instead of an empty process of going through the rituals.
In a nutshell the conceptual thrust and dimensions cutting across all the above definitions and which would be applicable to the South African situation is that Public Participation should be seen as:

- The ability to get and share public information;
- The ability to influence the decision-making process;
- The active involvement of beneficiaries;
- An attempt at keeping the process as transparent and involving as many people from disadvantaged groups as possible;
- Empowerment of the public to be able to decide how they would like to participate, as a result of all the above.

Public Participation can therefore be defined as a process whereby stakeholders, e.g. the public, citizens, consumers of public goods and services, are consulted by public authorities with a view to contributing to making decisions on policies that will eventually have a socio-economic and political bearing on the lives of the decision-makers and on any other stakeholders in the process.

1.3.2 Defining the Hostel Redevelopment Program

The Hostel Redevelopment Program is a national policy, approved in 1994, according to Rust and Rubenstein (1996: 142), to:

- Promote humane living conditions;
- Include hostel residents, the neighboring community, relevant public authorities and any others affected by the project, in the decision-making process;
- Be developmentally-orientated, both in terms of empowerment and participation and in terms of promoting economic development;
- Promote social integration within hostel communities and also between hostels and adjacent communities;
- Include plans for accommodating those who are displaced by the project; and
- Initiate local institutions and administrative procedures in order to sustain physical improvements and undertake socio-economic development;

The program entailed converting hostels that were generally meant for migrant workers to family units that could accommodate the families of the migrants who occupied the hostels.

1.3.3 Defining Public, Private and Grey Sector Hostels

1.3.3.1 Public Sector Hostels
Duke (2007; 2) defines a public sector hostel as a “hostel that was built by the local authority” on public land and was, as a result, “owned and managed by the municipality”.

1.3.3.2 Private Sector Hostels

Private sector hostels, claims Duke (2007; 2) “were built by employers on land owned by the company”. One such example, in the Ntnga case study, was RACEC, the only company that owned the land on which the hostel was built.

1.3.3.3 Grey sector hostels

Duke (2007; 1) defines grey sector hostels as “company built hostels on leased public land”. In the Nyanga case study all the other hostels that were the subject of research fell under the category of ‘grey sector hostel’.

1.3.4 Defining Urban Management

Another concept worth introducing in this debate is the notion of urban management, as it participation is intrinsic to the urban management, especially for local governance. In fact urban management is about local government as local government is mostly about managing urban centres.

The term urban management is also as “elusive” and “vague” if not as “polysemic” a concept as is public participation. Its vagueness ‘exists not only as a result of definitional ambiguities but… also as a result of its use in policy papers without any explanation’, according to Werna (1995; 356). As a consequence, concludes McGill (1999; 463), “there is still no accepted definition of urban management”. In spite of that McGill (1999; 463) goes on to define the ‘nature of urban management” as a “far more explicit concern with power relations, the nature of cities and their social and economic structures”. However, as can be deciphered from the definition, McGill is not defining the concept but the ‘nature’ of the concept.

Most literature (Pieterse: 2000; McGill: 1998; Davey: 1993) on urban management define the concept as fundamentally about the “nature, quality and purpose of the totality of relationships that link various institutional spheres—local state, civil society and the private sector—in urban areas” for the production of a “set of activities which together shape and guide the social, physical, and economic development of urban areas”. (McGill; 1998; 463-
It is inter alia, the World Economic Forum that suggests a precise and succinct working definition of the concept, which conceptualizes urban management in terms of space and time insofar as it addresses issues of ‘rapidly urbanizing’ humanity and the state of readiness of urban centers to deal with such urbanization. In the regard, the World Urban Forum suggests that urban management is about:

‘streamlining decision-making and regulatory barriers in urban planning to create space for designing rather than bureaucracy; introducing systems thinking and holistic solutions to urban problems such as water shortages and power; reducing the disparities between rural and urban dwellers; discovering new ways of coping with externalities resulting from increased traffic, heat and pollution in urban conurbations; creating more incentives for inventive thinkers to keep cities attractive as centers for innovation and culture; overhauling urban transport systems or creating mobile cities; mainstreaimg intelligent housing designs; rejuvenating the education system to provide useful job and relevant skills for the future and thereby making the system attractive to “bored youth” prevalent in urban centers and dealing with crime emanating from the concentration of foreign-born and low income residents in an urban centre.’ (World Urban Forum:2005; 10)

This definition, according to the World Economic Forum (2005), supposes that “cities will be hard-pressed to provide basic urban services” such as “clean water, efficient transportation and reliable electricity... without massive investments to build or repair infrastructure”. “Decisions on allocating resources for infrastructure, in almost all urban areas, will shape the options available for other urban concerns: pollution, crime and economic development’ suggests the World Economic Forum. Any urban centre that deals with urban challenges in a sectoral manner, ignoring synergies, integration and transversality “tackles only the parts which are identifiable to each ministry and then each ministry tackle the symptom as a problem in, and of itself”, according to the World Urban Economic (2005).

Davey (1993; ix) adopts a, somewhat, more strategic perspective in his definition of the concept. He regards urban management as ‘concerned with the policies, plans, programs, and practices that seek to ensure that population growth is matched by access to basic infrastructure, shelter, and employment’. He contends that:

The effectiveness of urban government is clearly dependent on a range of contextual factors: political stability, social cohesion, and economic buoyancy, to name only the most obvious. It also depends on the skills and motivations of its policymakers and the staff who serve them. But the widespread concern to change and improve the management arrangements suggests a belief that the structures, processes, and resource bases are themselves factors that contribute to effectiveness. (Davey:1993; ix)
Rakodi (1991; 464) in McGill (1998) repudiates the exclusionary focus on matching “basic infrastructure, shelter, and employment” to population growth, as this encourages the ‘sectoralism’ that McGill is referring to. Instead Rakodi (1991: 464) suggests that urban management should “make possible the daily functioning of a city which will both facilitate and encourage economic activity of all kinds and enable residents to meet their basic needs for shelter, access to utilities and services, and income generating opportunities”. Rakodi’s view of urban management is more developmental and the community-centred in approach, as displayed in his reference to the “need for economic activity to enable the residents to meet their basic needs (1991; 464). His view of urban management resonates well with the new paradigm of a developmental local government, as envisaged by national government, which demands a new social and economic approach to meeting the needs of local communities, in a sustainable manner. Rakodi’s conceptualization of urban management is supported, to an extent, by Pieterse in the Urban Management Programme(2000; 4) in the manner Pieterse sees urban management as the “only viable path open to municipalities to find new ways of working that draw on the resources, experience and capacity of various actors in the city to complement the capacity of the municipality”.

The definition of Urban Management that will be used as a reference point in this research is that of the Urban Management Programme (2000; 4) in which urban management is defined as concerned with “… effective collaborative planning, decision-making processes (and mechanisms) and implementation to co-ordinate distinctive efforts of the local government, civil society organizations and the private sector towards the progressive attainment of sustainable urban development and local democracy”. This definition is adopted because like Rakodi and Pieterse’s definitions it encapsulates inclusive decision making processes to the sustainable provision of local government services. This, in itself, entails issues of accountability and transparency, elements intrinsic to good governance and sustainable governance.

1.3.5 Defining Good governance

Definitions are plentiful in literature (King report: 2002: 11-12; Commonwealth Secretariat: 2000: 7-9; UN-HABITAT: 2002: 12) on good governance. Distinction in good governance is, however, always made, especially by the United Nations, between both political and administrative governance. This distinction will be discussed in the section below, and will be preceded by the various definitions given by different authors.
1.3.5.1 What is good governance?

In all instances, good governance is mostly conceptualized as characterized by tenets of ‘sustainability, subsidiarity, equity, efficiency, transparency, accountability, civic engagement, citizenship and security’. (Common Wealth Secretariat: 2000: 7-9) These principles, according to United Nations (2001: 10), are ‘interdependent and mutually reinforcing’ and comprise the ‘protection of human rights, processes and mechanisms, and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their rights, meet their obligations, and mediate their differences with the state’. Further, according to the Commonwealth Secretariat (2000) good governance in local government implies a ‘vigorous institutionalized system of dynamic, transparent and efficient local government, … to protect vulnerable groups of the population and alleviate the severe conditions of poverty, to promote environmental and sustainable conditions for development, to foster social, ethnic and cultural integration and harmony and to facilitate the participation of the population to play an active role as a promoter and enabler of local economic development and the creation of a conducive economic environment’.

1.3.5.2 Why good governance?

Good governance is pivotal to participation as participation cannot be implemented, or flourish in a situation where principles of good governance are not applied. In that vein therefore it would be a disservice to the discussion to exclude a discourse on the principles of good governance in a debate about participatory governance. This is confirmed by Pieterse (2000: 11) where he posits that ‘participatory governance’ qualifies as one of the tenets of good governance, as it affords an opportunity for decisions to be made in a situation where ‘transparency, accountability, social responsibility, and fairness’, among others, prevail. These principles are to be discussed further in the discussion on the Batho Pele philosophy and its relation to good governance.

1.3.5.3 Political and administrative governance

The United Nations (2001: 11) in its definition of governance has made a distinction between a political and an administrative trajectory of governance, as stated in the previous section. While political governance generally, is a reflection of ‘the traditions and institutions that determine how authority is exercised in a particular country, including government selection, accountability, legitimacy, fairness, inclusiveness, and citizens respect of state institutions
that govern economic and social interaction’ administrative governance is representative of ‘a normative framework for an efficient, transparent, and accountable public service with competent bureaucracies that have adequate capacities for resource management, policymaking and their implementation’, according to the United Nations. In both perspectives, the involvement of civil society by means of ‘accounting to’ and ‘inclusive of’ civil society in the decision-making process is regarded as paramount to good governance. Pieterse, in one of his working notes, concurs with the United Nations’s viewpoint in denoting good governance as ‘the relationality of power as it flows through networks between the state and institutional actors in the market and civil society’. What appears to be a golden thread in both explanations is importance of the relationship between the state and civil society. Good governance is as critical an ingredient to participation as is ‘developmentalism’ and Batho Pele and the Integrated Development Plan.

1.3.6 Defining Batho Pele

The concept of Batho Pele was adopted from a SeSotho dialect which means ‘people first’. Lately, the philosophy has been amended to stand for ‘We belong, We care, We serve’. It was conceptualized and adopted by national government in 2004 as one of the transformation strategies introduced to improve the delivery of public services especially to disadvantaged communities. Interestingly the concept was introduced as a ‘vehicle to take public service to the people, to encourage citizens to know their rights, to put people first, and to mainstream, institutionalize, sustain and foster accountability’ (White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery: 1997) for the services delivered. The principles of Batho Pele, reinforce the importance of good governance in urban management, as they include inter alia, transparency, and consultation. The whole idea of Batho Pele is to reinforce the old business principle of ‘customer comes first’. The framework, seeks to introduce this concept through advocating eight transformation principles which, if applied religiously and fervently, would improve efficiency and effectiveness. These principles encourage the treatment of “citizens more like customers and enables the citizens to hold public servants to account for the service they deliver”, claims the Department of Public Service and Administration (1997: 5), a concept foreign to local government as it is practiced today. The eight principles proposed in the framework by the Department are: “consultation, service standards, access, courtesy, information, openness and transparency, redress and value for money”. There are striking similarities between the founding principles of Batho Pele, and the elements of participation and sustainability. Further, participation and sustainability, as key tenets of developmentalism and democracy, are principles upon which
governance, in general, and local government, in particular is embedded. These principles will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4.

### 1.3.7 Defining Administrative transformation

Transformation is another concept often linked to participation and developmental local government in South Africa. It is also one of those concepts that mean different things to different people, but often thrown in whenever there is dissatisfaction regarding service delivery in a municipal area.

The United Nations in Bekker (1996: 103), for an example, distinguishes between administrative, political, and organizational transformation. The three distinct will not be discussed in this paper as the purpose of introducing the topic is purely to show linkages between the concept and participation. The United Nations (Bekker: 1996: 103) conceptualizes transformation as the ‘use of power, authority and influence to change the goals, structures, and procedures of bureaucracy’. The UN-Habitat / World Bank (2001: 3)\(^4\) defines participation as “a process through which stakeholders influence and share control over development initiatives and the decisions and resources which affect them”. It is clear from the two definitions that both concepts entail stakeholders and participants influencing each other to reach some form of consensus or to change a course of direction. According to Bekker (1996) the fundamental political dimension to political transformation is, “the use [of] …vested power and authority to induce fundamental change”. Invariably, participation is necessary for one to exercise such vested power to influence change. Without participation there would be no “vested power” whether it is “power to”, power with” or “power over invisible individuals, groups and sectors…” (Johnson and Mayoux: 1998: 149)

The definition of the United Nations assumes that the root cause of all transformation is political transformation. This, to an extent, is corroborated by the White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service (1995: 11) in which transformation is perceived to be a “dynamic, focused, and relatively short-term process, designed to reshape the public service fundamentally”. The fact that transformation is seen to be reshaping “public service”, connotes the political objective of and rationale for transformation. Organizational and administrative transformation is therefore ‘rooted in’ political transformation, though administrative transformation. Administrative transformation, in particular, is expected to “enhance the process of political transformation” according to Swilling and Woolridge in

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\(^4\) Participation to Partnership, Urban Management Programme, UN-Habitat/ UNDP/ UNCHS/ World Bank, UNON, Nairobi, Kenya.
Maganya and Houghton. (1996: 159) Swilling and Woolridge (1996) in elaborating on the linkages between the two concepts, i.e. administrative and political transformation, identify ‘three interlinking processes’ which are “restructuring, reorganization and rationalization”. Participation by beneficiaries or stakeholders is embedded, if not inherent, in the three processes, if one analyses the processes carefully.

Most previously disadvantaged and disenfranchised communities probably see transformation as a sign of a better quality of life, in the future, whereas privileged communities generally see transformation as a depletion of already depleted resources due to an increase in the number of recipients of such resources or a lowering of service delivery standards due to inefficient administrations. Be that as it may, it is obvious, as discussed in chapter 2, that transformation had to take place, in whatever form, in South Africa after 1994 as the status quo could not be sustained.

1.4 Structure of the dissertation

The report will be structured in the following way: Chapter 1, will deal with the objectives of the research undertaken, and the definition of the terminology to be used. It will also present the structure of the thesis.

Chapters 2 and 3 will focus on the review of literature dealing with the history of local government and of hostel development in South Africa until 1994. These two chapters will interrogate the origins of single sex hostels in South Africa, and on how local government dealt with the redevelopment of hostels after 1994 as a way of mitigating the shortage of housing in its urban centres, but in particular in Cape Town. As part of the literature review chapter 3 will discuss the South African policies dealing with public participation and hostel redevelopment, and the legislative framework supporting those policies. Developmental local government as a concept and an intervention will also be introduced.

Chapter 4 will deal with the theories related to two critical variables - participation and satisfaction. These comprise detailed discussion of public participation methodologies - Arnstein’s Ladder of Citizen Participation and the International Association for Public Participation models - and of the Hirschman model of Voice, Exit and Loyalty. Chapter 4 will also introduce the research methodology to be used in gathering and analyzing data from fieldwork.
Chapters 5 and 6 will discuss the two hostel redevelopment case studies, i.e. the Ilinge LabaHlli and Welcome Zenzile Housing Cooperatives. These two housing cooperatives apply to single men hostels in Nyanga and Langa, respectively. More specifically, the chapters will look at the profile of stakeholders involved in the projects, and the role of each of the stakeholders in the redevelopment process. Membership aspects and nuances will also be discussed. The chapters conclude with attempts to analyze the impact of participation on the satisfaction levels of the beneficiaries.

Chapter 7 compares the results of the separate analysis of the two redevelopment case studies undertaken in the previous two chapters. The comparison aims to identify similarities and differences in the two processes with the view of explaining, albeit partially, differences in beneficiary satisfaction. The chapter ends with a series of recommendations flowing from these research findings.

1.5 Conclusion

In the chapters below, the terms “Black” and “African” are used interchangeably, in accordance with the literature consulted, to designate South Africans identified, under the apartheid policy of the past, as people belonging to Southern African tribes and accordingly to Bantustans rather than to apartheid South Africa.

In conclusion, this research aims to elucidate the relationship between satisfaction with a hostel redevelopment program and participation in this program. By so doing, it is hoped that a new understanding on the application of public participation in low-cost housing and hostel redevelopment may emerge.
CHAPTER 2
The history of local government and hostel development in South Africa

2.1 Introduction

Since the unbanning of political organizations in the 1990’s and the beginning of a democratic era in 1994 local government in South Africa began a journey of transforming itself from an oppressive political ideology to an ideology that embraced a democratic dispensation. This journey was necessitated by the belief of the majority party in government, i.e. the African National Congress, (Ready to Govern: 1992: 13) that there was a ‘need for strong and effective local government to replace the racist, sexist, undemocratic, and corrupt structures which … existed’. The previous government, through its apartheid policy, utilized local authorities as conduits for the implementation of separate development, a process which encouraged and, indeed, promoted a spatial discourse based on racial lines.

Local authorities were, as a consequence of apartheid policies, "premised on the notion that towns and cities could be separated and managed by separate local authorities, each having their own fiscal, administrative and legal systems". (Ismail and Mphaisha: 1977: 5) Hilliard in Bekker (1996: 1) confirms that "it is truism that South African local government has been managed in a divisive manner, due to erstwhile apartheid policies which caused towns and cities to become racially fragmented". Their most significant mandate at the time was ‘control of urbanization; racial segregation of settlements; racially divided local authorities; and gross racial disparities in access to services and housing’ (Ismail and Mphaisha: 1977: 6), and to enforce strict residential segregation and compulsory removal of black people to own group areas, by denying residential permits to Blacks who were deemed to be ‘surplus labor requirements’, inter alia, in urban areas. (Cameron: 1999: 3) Other measures utilized by the apartheid regime as a means of a rigorous application of influx control, claims Randall (1973: 36), entailed depriving permission for:

"free-hold tenure and home ownership; African traders working with severely circumscribed scope; African professional people (to the extent that they were permitted) also faced pressures to establish themselves in the homelands; and pressure exerted to ensure that settled African community life in the towns became increasingly difficult”.

In line with freezing the development of family housing in urban centres, Randall (1973) further claims that the policy was aimed at “migratizing African labour as far as possible: the
ideal labour unit in terms of policy being the “single, male contract labourer” who works in the ‘White’ area for one year and then returns to his homeland.

The successful enforcement of these policies was made possible by the creation of different types of local authorities such as White Local Authorities (WLA’s) which were “fully-fledged municipal institutions with a political council, administration to carry out the functions of the councils and taxation powers (Pieterse; undated; 12); Advisory Boards for the administration of Black affairs which later (1982) graduated to Black Local Authorities, structures which were “beleaguered from inception due to militant opposition from Black community” over which they had control characterized by “a well-established reputation for inefficiency, graft and collaboration with White interests” (Pieterse; undated; 12); and Indian and Colored Management Committees/Local Affairs Committees for the administration of Colored and Indian affairs. According to Pieterse (Undated; 12) “local government was structured to facilitate and regulate” the agenda of racial segregation.

The apartheid government subsequently created a tri-cameral governance system, a system which gave Coloureds and Indians some form of a universal franchise and a platform for a separate own affairs government. The tri-cameral system had its own sub-classification in that Colored and Indian Local Authorities were still sub-classified into, inter alia “Primary Local Authorities ‘which were dealing with ‘own affairs’, “Joint Service Boards and Regional Services Councils” (TIRI: 1995: 24). In fact all local authorities, “with the exception of White Local Authorities, were to be characterized by fragmentation, oppression, duplication of tasks according to racial area, inefficiency, unresponsiveness to community demands and illegitimacy” in terms of the apartheid regime policy, claims Randall (1973).

In the Western Cape one such legislation, which enabled the implementation of the influx control, was the Ordinance 20 of 1974, which was implemented in conjunction with an array of other discriminatory ordinances and by-laws. Black Local authorities were also introduced with the sole purpose of institutionalizing local governance for Blacks as they were not represented in any of the parliamentary processes that were responsible for policy making. While White Local Authorities were financially sustained with grants from National government and taxes from commercial institutions strategically situated in these areas, Black Local Authorities and Management, on the other hand, were expected to generate their own funds through taxes raised from residents. This contention is articulated in the Reconstruction and Development Program (African National Congress; 1994; Sec 1.2.2) cited in Khosa (2000; 2) in which the commitment to transform the situation was encapsulated in the statement which was:
Towns and cities were divided into townships without basic infrastructure for Blacks and well-resourced suburbs for Whites. Segregation in education, health, welfare, transport and employment left deep scars of inequality and economic inefficiency (Davey:1993; ix).

The similarity in the modus operandi of urban metropolitan local authorities, irrespective of geographical space and area, and the confidence with which the policies were implemented, served as evidence that these discriminatory policies were sanctioned at national level. The only difference was the level of commitment and the willingness of these disparate municipalities to implement the policy. As a consequence the Western Cape was notorious for its unstinting approach, for whatever reason, hence social integration did not take place at the same pace and level as places like Gauteng, where the intensity was not as pronounced.

2.2 The Genesis of single sex hostels in Cape Town

“Single-sex Hostels” (Minaar: 1993) in South Africa are as old as the discovery of wealth in the urban centers of the country, first in Kimberley and subsequently in Johannesburg. Single sex hostels were originally established “in the early 1860's” (Minaar: 1993: 1) to ‘provide housing for mineworkers’ as a strategy to “end illegal diamond trade, prevent drunkenness, and to ensure a constant labour force”(Minaar: 1993: 1). ‘Single-sex hostels’, therefore arose out of a need to control staff turn-over in the mines and related industries, and to curb all the other social-ills emanating from subjecting people to inhumane conditions such as those the hostel-dwellers were subjected to at the time. Xulu (2014; 141) also further confirms that “hostels were primarily designed to contain labour rather than for human comfort: they were badly designed and poorly built”.

The further escalation of the migrant labour system, according to Mayer (1980: 83), could largely be attributed to a series of politically well-orchestrated and legislated strategies that led to the erosion of the indigenous economy of the rural areas, such as Transkei and Ciskei, for an example. The migrant labour system, according to Bezuidenhout and Buhlungu (2011; 238) was the cornerstone of the landscape of the colonial and apartheid system..."as it “involved African men being forced to leave their families in rural parts of the sub-continent and travel to mining centers where they were housed in single sex compounds”. Wessels and Wentzel (1989: 6-7) cited in Minaar (1993: 2) conclude that “the single-sex hostel system, a system which dominated patterns of migrant labour in South Africa for more than a century, had its origins in the ongoing pattern of large-scale utilization of cheap migrant labour and the control of that labour by means of pass laws and the compounds”. The Land
Act of 1913 is one such piece of legislation which destroyed the economy of places like Transkei and Ciskei, in particular, as they served as major reserves for migrant laborers.

Municipalities, together with large mining conglomerates, decided to build these jail-like structures for occupation by employees during the time of employment for purposes of managing the movements of the employees. There was a clear distinction made by the Johannesburg Municipality between hostels and compounds, according to Xulu (2014; 141). According Xulu (2014) “hostels were declared ‘Bantu’ areas for the housing of single men or women who worked for more than one employer...while compounds were only for workers on the gold mines and in essential services”. The distinction made by Xulu (2014) between hostels and compounds, while not confirmed in any other literature on hostels, does give credence to the different permutation of hostels in the different areas of South Africa. This distinction becomes clear in places like Cape Town where most of the housing units were actually hostels than compounds. These hostels were occupied by men who worked for different employers for different types of working employment.

Bezuidenhout and Buhlungu (2011; 244) claim that hostels became “node(s) of spatial control, a highly regimented residential space … located close to mining shafts in order for thousands of workers to be mobilized at short notice”. Bezuidenhout and Buhlungu (2011) further contend that these hostels “were created as male-only spaces” and as a result women and children were “… not allowed to stay in the hostels”, and were “… liable for prosecution both for not having residence rights and for trespassing.” (Minaar: 1993: 98) The hostel dwellers were not even allowed to mingle with ‘township people’, as part of this influx control strategy. As a consequence “… strict security measures [were] usually employed at these hostels, aimed at controlling the presence of ‘unauthorized’ residents and visitors” (Minaar: 1993: 99). Single-sex hostels were subsequently, adopted by Bantu Affairs Administration Boards and Black Local Authorities as a way of accommodating migrant labourers, but mainly, a way of controlling the movement of the “outsiders” in urban centers.
### Table 1: The Number of Hostels in Cape Town (1983)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Public</th>
<th>Private</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nyanga</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Langa</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guguletu</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>651</strong></td>
<td><strong>339</strong></td>
<td><strong>990</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Urban Sector Network, WCDHA (2003; 7)

In the Western Cape the perennial problem of labor shortage—which in the previous centuries had been alleviated through the importation of slaves—was resolved ‘by recruiting workers from wherever they could be found’ (Wilson: 1972: 1) a situation which led to the establishment of migrant labor hostels. Hostels in the Western Cape, generally, became ‘sites of “diffusionary control” (Segal: 1991) without the level of rationalization achieved in the mining compounds’ and were ‘more open and less regimented’ and of providing accommodating for migrant laborers, in the process rendering the dwellers “men of four worlds—the hostels, the Black townships, their places of work as well as their rural homes”.

(Segal: 1991)

To accommodate these migrant workers, hostels were built in most of the old African Townships, such as Langa, Nyanga and Gugulethu in Cape Town, inter alia. Table 2 above, gives a breakdown of the hostels in the townships of the Greater Cape Town area, as at 1983. Nyanga, as can be seen in the table, always had a bigger number of ‘public sector’ hostels than any of the townships, at any given moment, whereas Nyanga had the biggest number of ‘grey sector’ hostels.

### 2.3 South African Local Government: the transformation paradigm

The demise of the policy of segregation in 1990 “... produced a radical constitutional reform...” (Millstein et.al: 2002: 458) which culminated in the elections of 1994. This constitution was principled on first world democracies, because it “granted extensive formal rights for all citizens...” (Millstein et.al; 2002) which caused the dismantling of structures and system supporting and promoting the apartheid policy. Parnell and Pieterse (1998; 4) argue...
that “given the disenfranchised past of Black South Africans, creating appropriate and accountable urban local government [was] a key aspect of the democratization process”. The intention and agenda to transform local government is articulated in the policy document of the ANC entitled Ready to Govern (1992; 13) in which it is stated that “no meaningful restructuring can take place at the local level unless is part of a process of national transformation”. This document articulates the areas of transformation the government will focus on, which were such issues as gender representation, and redress. Pieterse (Undated; 12) captures the anomaly of the previous local government well in his statement, in which he claims that local government “was structured to facilitate and regulate this agenda of racial segregation and exclusion”.

One of the most important reasons for transforming Black Local Authorities, in particular, was that besides being conduits for the apartheid strategy the structures were dysfunctional and thus inefficient. Ismail and Mphaisha (1977: 7) attributes this dysfunctionality and inefficiency to the fact that in these Black Local Authorities, “residents were expected to finance the expenditures of the townships based on a principle of self-sufficiency”, and yet the level of poverty and unemployment in these areas was not commensurate with that expectation. Even those local authorities that could generate revenue could not generate sufficient financial resources to sustain themselves. Further, persistent rent boycotts, spearheaded by local civic organizations, depleted their only means of financial survival, thereby rendering them financially malfunctioning. Because these Black Local Authorities had no proper participatory decision-making structures outside the homelands, according to the TIRI (1995), rent boycotts became a strategy to demand “not only new unified non-racial, democratic local authorities which would give them full participation in local government, but also a redistribution of resources among the communities”(Cloete: 1995: 3). Local government transformation and reform, therefore, had to take place to introduce a new paradigm in the management of urban spaces because:

(a) financial inequities and the failure of black local authorities to achieve self-sufficiency, rendered the apartheid local government structures inefficient and thus dysfunctional; (The International Republican Institute: 1995: 26)
(b) these structures were perceived, to be the custodians of such discriminatory policies through by-laws, proclamations and regulations which ‘instituted strict residential segregation and compulsory removal of black people to own group areas’(Cameron: 1999: 72; White Paper on Local Government: 1998: 1).

Perhaps the emotions and rationale behind the transformation of local authorities is nuanced in the remarks of the erstwhile Deputy Minister of Constitutional Development, Valli Moosa
(2006), in his statement at the occasion of the introduction of the interim Constitution, in which the Minister states:

“Local government in this country, as in many other countries, has always been treated as a step-child of the first and second tiers of government. We have attempted, and I think we have succeeded, in removing the second-class status of local government. Local government is now recognized, side-by-side, with the national and provincial level, as a tier of government in its own right with the full constitutional protection that provincial governments enjoy”.

The nuance in the statement is the implication and symbolism of the ‘side-by-side’ recognition of local government as an equal partner with provincial government, a notion denoting a level of importance and autonomy equal to the other spheres of government. van Donk et. al (2008; 113) also confirm that this nuance became visible in the “policy discourse and associated metaphors used to describe ‘governance’ and the relationship between national and local government”. These “metaphors” concludes van Donk et. al (2008) denoted a “mode of decision-making” that was “inclusive” and “consensus-focused”. This was, in itself, the foundation for a local government that was to embrace through its modus operandi, processes and procedures a platform for a participatory democratic governance system. In a sense, the rhetoric and nuance was “emblematic examples of the trends” prevailing at the time, a trend Pieterse (Undated; 4) describes as a “shift representative to participatory democracy and the concomitant shift from a state-centred perspective to a tri-sectoral approach that recognizes the importance of a strong state, a vibrant and autonomous civil society, and a socially-committed private sector”.

The argument for transformation, at the time, was initially galvanized by the reconstruction and development program which necessitated the mandate for the creation of infrastructure, to ‘… improve the quality of life for the majority of those who were disenfranchised prior to 1994’ (Khoza: 2000: 1). Khoza (2000: 2) further posits that the African National Congress saw the key to changing the tapestry of townships as being an “infrastructural program that will provide access to modern and effective services such as electricity, water, telecommunications, transport, health, education, and training for all our people”. The program, according to Khoza (2000) had to “meet basic needs and open up previously suppressed economic and human potential in urban and rural areas”. According to Houston et.al. (2005; 4) local authorities had to “develop a culture of municipal governance that shifts from strict representative government to participatory governance, and [had] for this purpose [to] encourage and create conditions for residents, communities, and other shareholders in the municipality to participate in local efforts”. The desire of the disenfranchised electorate was “the reinvention of the public sector into a servant for the majority of the city-the poor-required more than the political and legislative capabilities of the post-apartheid state” but
“the collaboration and commitment of the captains of the bureaucracy to redesign the instruments of service delivery to meet an agenda of redistribution” (Smith and Vawda; 2003; 26). Hence the strategy document of the African National Congress entitled Ready to Govern (1992: 13-14) articulates this paradigm shift, which must take place in local government to:

- bring government closer to the people and actively involve them in the decision-making and planning process which affect their lives;
- Facilitate the creation of a strong, independent civil society, a high degree of accountability, transparency, and the right to participate in the decision-making processes which affect communities between elections” (1992: 13-14).

The emphasis on actively involving people, a principle of good governance, was not fortuitous in the strategy posited here above. It was to further entrench and re-emphasize the connectivity and seamlessness between the principles of ‘developmentalism’ and good governance. What was positive about the new paradigm was the expectation of local government to create, among other things, conditions which promote the creation of employment and the promotion of social development, conditions which, to a certain extent, were intractable. UMrabulo, an ANC newsletter, (Volume 10; 2003; 25) elucidates this transformation expectation in its explanation of a developmental local government in which it is stated that transformation:

“...means that local government is not just an important site for the delivery of services, but it is crucial for the economic and social development of people. By working effectively with the other spheres of government and a range of public and civil society organizations and the private sector, local government has to contribute to economic growth, job creation and social development.” (UMrabulo: Volume 10; 2003; 25)

The rationale for transforming the old machinery of local government to this new developmental ideal of good governance is, further, clearly articulated in the White Paper on Local Government (1998: 18) where it is asserted that:

*In the future, developmental local government must play a central role in representing our communities, protecting our human rights and meeting our basic needs. It must focus its efforts and resources on improving the quality of life of our communities, especially those members and groups within communities that are most often marginalized or excluded, such as women, disabled people and very poor people.*

Most of these functions are over and above what has been regarded as the conventional core functions of local government, which focused on service delivery provision based on infrastructure development. The new discourse has always been more about a redistribution agenda, a situation, which unfortunately created a perquisitory expectation from the communities, which were meant to benefit from such redistribution. The old order, therefore,
had to be transformed as it was characterized by dysfunctional local authorities, local authorities, which, contrary to the tenets of developmental local governance, were serving the needs of the political masters of the country instead of the needs of local communities, be they Black, Coloured or White.

Parnell and Pieterse (1998: 6) however, argue that perhaps transformation was inevitable for local government in that throughout Africa, Asia and Latin America, local governments were confronted with “new developmental challenges which necessitated the adoption of amended roles, immersion into new task environments and engagement with new sets of actors”. These amended roles, in terms of the authors, included, but were not limited to “mediating global-local dynamics; addressing pent-up demands for service delivery made persistent by enduring urbanization pressures; balancing local economic development policy aimed at both urban competitiveness and poverty alleviation; taking on poverty as a result of senior levels of government's seeming incapacity to operationalize strategic interventions; engaging in more open, transparent and mutually respectful state-society relations; and forging new and reformed intergovernmental relationships”. These extra roles have, over time, increased the level of expectations placed on local government to perform efficiently and creatively in this new task environment, according Parnell and Pieterse. (1998)

Siddle and Koelble (2012; 27-28) argue that the transformation process led to what the authors preferred to call “decentralization”, which the authors explained as “unanticipated consequences of purposive social action”. This ‘decentralization’, according to de Visser (2005; 66-67) was premised on the “notion of self-government” as envisaged by the ANC in its Freedom Charter, and all the choices that had to be made to foster a “people-driven development” as a means of fighting “against the exploitative and cruel urban apartheid policies implemented by apartheid’s local structures”. Decentralization of local government, further claims de Visser (2005) was the lesser of the two evils than to decentralize provincial government as demanded by political parties such as the Inkatha Freedom Party. This, according to Siddle and Koelble (2012) saw municipalities verging on service collapse. Another most significant outcome of the transformation process, which further firmed up the policy of “decentralization” was the reduction in the number of municipalities from 843 before 1994 to 283 in 2000. This reduction was as a result of demarcation lines that were significantly redrawn, with far-reaching redistribution consequences that saw rich, previously White Local Authorities merged with poor Black Local Authorities. Rich municipalities such as Bellville, for an example, ended up merging with Lingelethu West, in Khayelitsha, which was a very poor and volatile Black Local Authority. The old City of Cape Town ended up merging with Langa and Gugulethu.
The other unintended consequence of the transformation process was the increase in size of local authorities, which invariably led to the centralization of service delivery to structures that appeared distant from local communities thereby defeating the very purpose of the transformation process. Dilinger (1994: 8) contended that these big local government structures were always to be ‘inherently incapable of responsive administration…because the costs of influence become increasingly high as decisions are centralized, and because the quality of information about local conditions becomes increasingly distorted as it moves from the field officers to central administration…’. It is this responsiveness, as further posited by Fox (1994: 11), that should have driven ‘decisions on which services to deliver, what technology to employ, how the pricing system operates, and all other processes in service delivery’, and therefore taking that away is a further delusion to the notion of a developmental local government.

The consequence of this transformation, however, was that local authorities ended up with some form of autonomy to decide on the quality and quantity of the services mandated to local authorities by the Constitution. Siddle and Koelble (2012: 7) argue that it is perhaps this autonomy, or “decentralization” that rendered many municipalities dysfunctional. De Visser (2005:19) argues however, that decentralization, alone, could not be the cause for the collapse of local government. The author alleges that, in essence, “decentralization has been proffered by many as an essential means to turn the tide of the erosion of democracy”, even by centralized countries “such as “the Kingdom of Jordan, the People’s Republic of China and Morocco”. If decentralization is not the cause of collapse, as de Visser contends, what then led to the crisis in local government in South Africa which surfaced only after the dawn of the new democracy in 1994? Sidle and Koelble (2012: 7) argue that unintended collapse, perhaps, from one of the following reasons, inter alia:

- the creation of larger areas of jurisdiction through the demarcation of new municipal boundaries
- the devolution of several new powers and functions to local government, without a sufficient corresponding increase in its fiscal base
- New concepts of service delivery
- Lack of capacity
- New developmental duties
- Unrealistic expectations from other levels of government and the citizenry.
  (Sidle and Koelble: 2012: 7)

Abbott (1996; 99) argues that perhaps it is more the form of participation practiced in Africa and Asia that resulted in a crisis in local government, more than decentralization. Abbott (1996) argues that the lack of “institutional capacity” is probably the most single factor from which this crisis in local government originates. However solving just that alone will not
resolve the problem completely. The root cause to be addressed, claims Abbott (1996), is “the relationship between people and the urban environment”. This relationship results in communities appreciating and respecting what the government does to improve the quality of the people. However, other alternative approaches to participation must be experimented with, alternatives such as technology explored.

2.4 The origins of Public Participation in South African local government

There is no doubt that public participation gained prominence in the South African local government with the dawn of the new democracy. This prominence, however, can be explained in the context of the wider political process that has been unfolding in South Africa pre-1994, a process which encouraged the involvement of general citizens in decisions that affect their well-being. It became obvious that this participation philosophy was informed by wider political processes premised on democratic political structures, which gave public participation theoretical significance and ‘philosophical and political’ perspective, and further shaped the conceptualization of, and the discourse on the concept in a democratic and developmental local government.

Olivier (undated: 6) traces the history of participation to “three root sources”. These root sources are linked to distinct date lines. The first root source as claimed by the author began in the 1950’s when participation was a ‘prerequisite for successful project implementation’. In the 1980’s and 90’s Western democracies regarded participation as a significant ingredient for good governance. In South Africa, public participation can be traced back to the times of the political struggles where freedom and democracy were seen to be complimentary. This democratic, hence participatory philosophy and ethos, originated from the original participatory strategy of the African National Congress as first portrayed in the compilation of the Freedom Charter. The Freedom Charter, as a product, comprises of contributions from the general grassroots and disenfranchised masses, from across the lengths and breadths of the country. The Freedom Charter, as a principal strategy of the principles of the African National Congress, epitomizes public participation as an ideal to be further pursued in a free democratic country. The Freedom Charter document, not only epitomized public participation in the manner it was conceptualized, but also in the manner it addressed the role the ‘people’ will play in issues pertaining to governance in a democratic dispensation. This is evident in

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5 Freedom Charter is the strategy of the African National Congress adopted in 1955 for an anticipated future free and democratic South Africa, and which served as a pivotal policy document for political direction and for pulling the organization together.
this statement of the Freedom Charter as cited in Suttner and Cronin (1986; 262)\textsuperscript{6}, which states that:

\begin{quote}
All the people shall be entitled to take part in the administration of the country. The rights of the people shall be the same regardless of race, color or sex;
\end{quote}

The spirit of the Freedom Charter permeated the communities of South Africa leading to what Mazibuko (2012: 218) called, a “relatively vibrant civil society movement...with unrestricted public participation” opportunities. This vibrancy, according to Mazibuko (2012) has sometimes led to racial polarization that “sometimes undermines the core values of democracy”. The vibrancy, in my view, contributes significantly to the opposing views and freedoms of expression requested in a lively democracy, and should not necessarily be frowned upon. It is for that reason that this principle of ‘governance by the people’ was later to be transcribed into the preamble of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, where it is stated, inter alia, that the Constitution is “adopted as supreme law so as to...lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which government is based on the will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by law”.

The fact that the African National Congress valued participation immensely and that it saw local government as a conduit for ushering this participatory paradigm is articulated in the policy guideline of the organization which was adopted in their national congress of 1992\textsuperscript{7}, (ANC: 1992: 13) in which local government is foreseen to:

\begin{quote}
‘... play a crucial role in building democracy in a future South Africa. Local government [would] bring government closer to the people and actively involve them in decision-making and planning processes which affect them’.
\end{quote}

This principle is in tandem with the definition of public participation given by the same organization in which the process is perceived to be ‘facilitating the creation of a strong, independent civil society, a high degree of accountability, transparency and the right to participate in decision-making processes which affect communities between elections’, as part of the ‘catch-all’ phrase. This principle, and other related principles, found its way into the different pieces of legislation such as the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act, Act 32 of 2000, where reference is made to local government having to contribute to building the capacity of “the local community to enable it to participate in the affairs of the municipality;

\textsuperscript{6} Extract quoted from the book entitled 30 Years of the Freedom Charter produced by Raymond Suttner and Jeremy Cronin

\textsuperscript{7} This quotation is extracted from the policy document of the African National Congress entitled Ready to Govern, as adopted in the National Congress of 28-31 May 1992.
and councilors and staff to foster community participation; and use its resources, and annually allocate funds in its budget, as may be appropriate for the purpose of implementing [public participation]”. Public participation, as will be seen in the following section, was to be embedded by means of legislation into the service delivery agenda of both local and national government.

The translation of the principle of the empowerment of the people realized with the approval of the White Paper as a concept document for the ‘new’ local government, which, according to the South African Yearbook (2000/2001:10) would be based on inter alia, “working with local citizens and communities to find sustainable ways to meet their needs and improve the quality of their lives”...“enhanced service delivery” and “representative, accountable, and effective leadership”. Smith and Vawda (2003; 29), further articulated the need for “instigated public deliberations on creating the social and developmental conditions to overcome inequalities with a heavy reliance on government interventions”. Coupled to this, claims the Yearbook (2002/01: 10) “the participation of role-players in the decision-making process in local government and the accountability of local government actors-councilors, officials, and employees alike-to the public would be the basic principles of this new way of operating”. 2

Besides creating an opportunity for local communities to participate in the planning of the implementation of the mandate of the local municipality, the Municipal Systems Ac, Act 32 of 2000, legislated for the establishment of Ward Committees and ward participatory structures as statutory formal structures for local communities to engage municipalities.

Participation has so matured in South Africa that national parliament, and some provincial legislators engage in the process of taking parliament to the people. In such instances portfolio committee members of the various portfolio committees of parliament convene their meetings in areas of need with a view to granting local communities, who otherwise will never have such opportunity, the opportunity to engage with members of parliament. The trend recently has been to hold even the ceremony of opening the provincial legislature in a local area and to invite local people so that they can have a sense of governance. These meetings and ceremonies could be seen to be forms of participation by the people.

2.4.1 Public participation in low cost housing in South Africa

Not much can be deciphered, unfortunately, from the national Department of Housing as to what role could have been envisaged for public participation in the development of housing,
except for the usual rhetoric of the Integrated Development Plan and how it should be a “mechanism for … the formulation of a spatial development framework that provides a spatial overview of planned public and private sector investment” in a local authority. (National Department of Housing: undated: 55) The only challenge with participation being anticipated and considered only during the compilation of a spatial development framework is that these processes are very technical and exclusive and are therefore never consultative, by their very nature. They become the preserve of few experts who compile them and only share the information with developers.

The undated policy document of the Department of Housing (undated: 54) also makes a reference to participation being critical for “deepening democracy and representing a shift from the concept of “government” to the concept of “governance” which should improve planning and “reduce the housing backlog and lead the development of sustainable human settlements”. The policy document, however, does not indicate how this will be achieved except to emphasize how the process will encourage sustainability. As indicated throughout the research paper, the rhetoric, once again, is that the concepts are nicely organized but are not adding any value to how the principle of participation is to be incorporated in housing except for in the spatial planning process, which is exclusively technical, in most instances. Oldfield (Unpublished; 103) concludes on one of her papers, however, that “the process of delivery and the product of low-income housing have shaped social and political relationships within this community [Greenpoint Informal Settlement, Khayelitsha] in ways that prove problematic for organizing the future development of housing and other community needs”. Oldfield does not explain how problematic are these “social and political relationships” and whether these ‘problematic social and political relationships’ are attributable to a lack of consultation and participation or an abundance of these processes. The author stresses though that the complexity of these relationships is symptomatic of the “contradictions in community governance apparent after housing formalization”. One could summarize the process proposed by the national department as focusing on the macro-strategy of housing, which should be embraced in the IDP process. However, it does not address the micro-process of designing the product according to the needs of the people or even consult them on what the finished units will look like.

2.5 The introduction of ‘developmentalism’ and participatory democracy to service delivery

The conceptualization of public participation as the cornerstone of a developmental local government, is alluded to in the Development Facilitation Act, Act No. 67 of 1995, but
articulated, in detail, in the White Paper on Local Government (1998). The White paper became the strategy introduced to address the ills of the then “local government administrative system in order to achieve better levels of service delivery and build developmental local government”. (Boraine: 1999: 293) The White Paper on Local Government (1998: 17) defined a Developmental Local government as a “local government committed to working with citizens and groups within the community to find sustainable ways to meet their social, economic, and material needs and improve the quality of their lives.” The “vantage point of the present model of developmental local government” according to Tshisong and Mafema (2008; 361), is “premised on the primacy of linkages between development, service delivery and local citizen participation”.

The Integrated Development Plan, Houston et al. (2005; 4) concludes, was to be regarded as “one of the tools of developmental local government” as it promoted those linkages and synergies. Both the Green and White Papers on Local Government became beacons of how the government was unambiguous about the transformative developmental role envisaged for South African local authorities. This developmental role, according to the White Paper (1998: 18), introduced the discourse on, inter alia, “maximizing economic growth and social development, and integrating and coordinating development, and democratizing development”-which were all transformation items, as a “prescriptive approach towards municipal transformation”… to “meet community needs and improve citizens’ quality of life”. The transformation vision, further claims Boraine (1999: 294) set out “principles for service delivery including accessibility, affordability, sustainability, value for money and integrated development”. De Visser (2005; 70) further claims how this transformation agenda was then entrenched in the Constitution of the country by the assignment of ‘development duties’ to local government. These developmental duties were to:

- Structure and manage its administration and budgeting and planning processes to give priority to the basic needs of the community, and to promote the social and economic development of the community;
- Participate in national and provincial development programmes;

De Visser (2005) alleges that these two duties could be construed as ‘translating the mandate of local government “into four developmental principles, namely democracy, sustaining and improving an adequate standard of living, a safe and healthy environment and cooperative government”. As can be seen, these “principles” are a significant shift from the old mandate of local government which was purely the provision of services.
What prompted the shift in paradigm was, inter alia, the desire to resolve, what the White Paper (1998: 16) refers to as, “entrenched modes of decision-making, administrations and delivery...” and “the need to rebuild relations between municipalities and the local communities they serve”. de Visser (2005; 72-73) further contends that the shift in paradigm was prompted by the need to shift away from a conception of local government, which was “an instrument in the hands of the apartheid state to segregate communities and exploit Black people whilst systematically ignoring the needs of the rural majority”. The White Paper (1998) then envisaged a local government which would inculcate a culture in which councils and councillors “promote the involvement of citizens and community groups in the design and delivery of municipal programmes”, what Boraine (1999) refers to as “accessibility”- in the development of “strategies and mechanisms (including but not limited to participative planning) to continuously engage with citizens, business and community groups” in the management of the affairs of the municipality. (White Paper: 1998: 18) This ideal, claims de Visser (2005) would “maximize social development and economic growth; integrate and coordinate; democratize development (harnessing the input and energy of local citizens); lead and learn (building social capital at the local level to enable local solutions to development problems)”. Hence any reference to the developmental approach always articulates the desire to involve communities in finding solutions to their socio-economic and material challenges.

The involvement of local communities in economic interventions was one of the most conspicuous significant departures from the original local government legislation, in which the identification and development of strategies for social and economic development was the domain of officials. Pieterse (2008; 11) in addressing the challenges of urbanization concludes that the view that “… greatest resource and opportunity to solve the African urban crises lies with the people who eke out an existence in our slums” is not only pervasive in South Africa. It is prevalent throughout the African continent. What South Africa did, however, was to translate the imperative of the involvement of the poor and disenfranchised into a Constitutional principle through making community engagement and participation a legal obligation for any or all service delivery initiatives. As a constitutional imperative, the developmental imperative enjoins communities in the governance of municipalities, by prescribing to municipalities the creation of “a culture of municipal governance that complements formal representative government with a system of participatory governance”.


The principle of 'developmentalism', in my view is premised on what Pieterse (2008; 13) refers to as “stock of social capital”, which the author claims is the ‘biggest asset of poor
communities’, and which, according to Pieterse (2008) is “enhanced through collective actions that address the physical well-being of the participant people (and households) in one form or another”. Participatory governance, hence developmental local government, is institutionalized and embedded in the developmental local government paradigm by means of the Integrated Development Planning, to enhance and legitimize this “stock of social capital”. The Integrated Development Plan prescribes that participation be an inherent requirement of the planning process, which must integrate all plans in the development of the local area. For that reason the Integrated Development Plan is perceived as a “participatory planning process”, aimed at developing a strategic development plan “to guide and inform all planning, budgeting, management and decision-making in a municipality” and it is meant to be a “… a coherent, long term plan for the co-ordination of all development and delivery in the area”. (Education and Training Unit: 2002: 3) Freire and Stern (2001; 48) argue that the most difficult challenge of strategic planning is that all “decisions and plans formulated by the city leadership [must be] accountable and transparent to the citizenry, and where administrative decisions and the implementation of public services are equitable and efficient”.

If the Integrated Development Plan has always been about “guiding all planning, budgeting, management and decision-making” in the municipality, decisions about low-cost housing and hostel redevelopment programs should be mainstreamed in a municipality and should not be ad hoc, depending on the availability of funding allocated by national government. This would inculcate the concept of “active citizenry” (Masilo-Kambala: 2013: 15) by communities of interest as the cornerstone this developmental philosophy. Active citizenry, is conceptualized in the model shown in Figure 1, as represented by community leadership initiatives such as the Police Development Forums, Business Development initiatives, and active ward committees, which prepare plans and implement programs on behalf of affected communities. These groupings of citizens, in municipalities, are supposed to help identify the vision of the municipality, and prioritize the needs of the municipality in line with that vision, and therefore, contribute to the developmental agenda.

Bernstein (1998: 298) in the “Response to the White Paper by the CDE” identified flaws in the conceptualization of developmental local government as envisaged by the White Paper. One of such flaws was the lack of identification of the “local government crisis” and the ‘analysis of the implications’ of such a crisis. Bernstein further claims that there was an ‘overestimation of the capacity of local government’. The “local government crisis” Bernstein was alluding to pertained to the overestimation of the ability of local authorities to embrace
and take charge of this developmental agenda. As a result, no municipality can claim to have implemented the principles of a developmental local government.

**Figure 1: Model of Community Participation and Development**

(Source: Author with a team of Strategic Directors of the City of Cape Town in 2003)

**2.6 Conclusion**

In conclusion, therefore, much as developmental local government was seen as a move away from the previous form of local government, not much of what was planned came to fruition in the form of transformed local authorities, in that local communities, in many municipalities throughout South Africa, still do not participate in decision making processes in the manner and form anticipated in the White Paper on Local Government and in the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act. It is however, paramount that the transformation of local government is premised on the participation of the citizens of South Africa in the decisions that affect their lives, for the ideals of this new democracy to be realized. It stands to reason, therefore, that after the dawn of the ‘new’ democracy local government could not continue in its form and shape. It had to transform to reflect the philosophy of the changing society, a society transforming from tyranny to democracy.
It also stands to reason that the shape and form of single sex hostels, in Cape Town and everywhere in South Africa, had to change with the transformation of local government, as hostels in their old form could not be accommodated in the ‘new’ agenda espoused in developmental local government. Public Participation, as a new paradigm in South African local government, had to be pivotal in the transformation of single sex hostels. The Hostel Redevelopment Program, as will be shown in the next chapter, was premised on the participation of the residents. Local authorities, as the sphere of government closer to the people were to be responsible for ensuring that single sex hostels be converted to family units.
CHAPTER 3
Developmental Local Government and the Hostel Redevelopment Program: policies and legislation impacting on public participation

3.1 Introduction.

The Interim Report to the Minister of Provincial and Local Government (Ministerial Advisory Committee; 2001: 25) acknowledges that local government in South Africa has “undergone radical and almost continuous transformation since 1994’ in an attempt to achieve what could be construed as one of the most complex transformation processes of any democratic government”. What made the South African local government transformation process complex is what Pieterse in Parnell et.al (2002; 3) appropriately summarized as “a commanding, complex, forward-looking and optimistic manifesto to systematically realize a participatory local governance system that is at the heart of an intergovernmental effort to achieve democratic citizenship, integrated development and reconciliation between the divided communities”. The complexity of this transformation process was exacerbated by the urgency of the attempt of the government to ensure that service delivery backlogs are addressed immediately and that infrastructure development is expanded to even those South Africans who were previously disadvantaged.

This process of transformation could be clearly distinguished into three phases, namely the 1993-1995 pre-interim phase characterized by highly representative Local Government Negotiation Forums responsible for local policy issues while negotiations were underway for a new dispensation; the 1995-2000 transitional/interim phase in which non-racial and democratic local government institutions were ushered; and the final phase of December 2000, which marked the beginning of the new local government, and the end of the restructuring process. While one of the other aims of the transformation process was to make municipalities more accountable and financially sustainable, the question to be asked is whether such an aim has been achieved in the few years of transformation. The “new local government” is marked by significant differences to the old, in that while the old local authority was constituted as a sub-section of national government the new local government is classified as an independent sphere of government in Sec 40 (1) of the Constitution (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa; 1996) where it states:

“...government is constituted as national, provincial, and local spheres of government which are distinctive, interdependent, and interrelated.”
This concept of autonomy is, however, enjoined by legislation to the principle of ‘co-operative governance’ as stated in Sec 40 (1) and Sec 41 (g) to ensure synergy and interdependence between the three spheres of government. Coupled to this the constitution introduced the concept of a developmental local government, which was a concept further premised on working with individuals for purposes of encouraging individualism and sustainability in service provision. Developmental local government and the applicable legislation will be discussed in detail after the discussion on the historical origins of the concept of public participation.

3.2 Local government legislation governing public participation in South Africa.

The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa

The Constitution, being the supreme law of the country, contains the first instruction regarding public participation. The way public participation is perceived in the Constitution gives credence to the value and status attached to the concept. The paradigms contained in the Freedom Charter and the congress policy document, as indicated in the text, were the first extracts to be translated into the preamble of the Constitution, in particular, to show the seriousness with which the process is viewed. In the Preamble (2006: 1) it is stated, for an example, that the Constitution is adopted to ‘lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which government is based on the will of the people [my emphasis]…’. Further in the Constitution, the objects of local government which include, inter alia, ‘…the ‘encouragement of communities and community organizations to participate in the matters of local government’ are clearly articulated in Section 152 (e) of the Constitution (2006: 84). Section 195(1) e, (2006: 111), further states that ‘people’s needs must be responded to, and the public must be encouraged to participate in policy-making’.

As noted in the text, the idea of including participation in the Constitution was to attach credence to the process and to ensure enforcement. The idea, of legislating to embed public participation, had to be adopted because many local authorities were not adept to participation and were, as a result, not decisive in their application of the principles of the concept. The results of the effort of legislating are, surprisingly, not convincing enough relative to the effort and energy invested in preparing legislation. If the notion has indeed realized the objectives intended that should be a subject of another research. But the service delivery unrests are a proof of disillusionment by people of the quality and quantity of services rendered by their local authorities.
The Development Facilitation Act

Before the Constitution was adopted in 1996, public participation was enacted in the Development Facilitation Act, Act 67 of 1995, which urged ‘members of communities affected by land development’ to ‘actively participate in the process of land development’ and further required local governments to consult members of the public and interested bodies in developing land development objectives to ‘redress injustices of the past’. The purpose of this act, according to Parnell et al. (2002: 74) was to ‘fast track’ development and delivery of land to historically disadvantaged people and to ensure that development, inter alia, ‘promotes integration with respect to social, economic, institutional and physical aspects of development’. This objective, further, implicitly implied the consultation of communities in the planning of local development by making it obligatory for municipalities ‘to perform their developmental tasks in a way that prioritizes basic needs of all citizens in an affordable way’, and, to ‘develop the skills and capacities of disadvantaged people, … [and] promote the establishment of viable communities’ (Parnell et al.: 2002: 75-81). What is of significance in this extract is the conceptualization of public participation as pivotal to the economic and social development of local communities to the extent that the Developmental Facilitation Act could be seen as the anchor for developmental local government.

Local Government Transition Act

The Local Government Transition Act, Act 209 of 1993, an act promulgated to regulate the transformation of local government in South Africa, proposed ‘a designed transformation process which encouraged the involvement of local structures of all political persuasions in the negotiation process’ resulting in transitional local authorities that were suited to local needs. The structure which was legally mandated to negotiate the new dispensation was the Local Government Negotiating Forum which was to be constituted by both statutory and non statutory representatives. The results of such a process were transitional local authorities which were not only a reflection of the major political parties in the negotiation process, but also a representation of the diverse racial groups of South Africa. These bodies reached a consensus on a lot of issues pertaining to governance, issues which paved the way to the final phase of transformation.

The Local Government Transition Act, Act 209 of 1993, further institutionalized public participation by demanding that municipalities adopt Integrated Development Plans which were to be consulted with local communities and interested bodies. Section 10 (G) d of the Act created a broad legislative process that demanded that each municipality ‘structure and
manage its administration and budgeting and planning processes to give priority to the basic needs of its community, and promote social and economic development...’. This article demanded that all functions of the municipality be informed by and be responsive to community needs. As though that was not enough, Schedule 2 (3) of the Act further prescribed that participation should be incorporated in such specific services as ‘land use planning, transport planning, infrastructure planning and the promotion of integrated development plan’. To ensure accountability and alignment with community needs Section 10 (G) g, prescribed that these Integrated Development Plans were to be reported to the community ‘annually’ and comments had to be received ‘from its community regarding the objectives set in its integrated development plans.’

The Local Government: Municipal Systems Act

One of the most prominent local government legislations post-democracy, i.e. the Municipal Systems Act, Act 32 of 2000, is very articulate and succinctly spells out the public participation process to be followed by municipalities to avoid any obfuscation which may result from ambivalent interpretations of the sections of the act. Besides dedicating a complete chapter to public participation, the act, in Sec 5, grants rights and duties, not privileges, to local communities to “contribute to the decision-making processes of the municipality’, by requiring that municipalities provide mechanisms, processes and procedures to ‘submit written or oral recommendations, representations and complaints to the municipal council or to another political structure or a political office bearer or the administration of the municipality’. The section further prescribes that local communities ‘be informed of decisions of the municipal council, or another political structure or any political office bearer of the municipality, affecting their rights, property and reasonable expectations’ and should, if this is not the case, ‘demand that the proceedings of the municipal council and those of its committee... be open to the public... conducted impartially and without prejudice...’ inter alia.

Section 16 (1) of the Act, for an example, prescribes that ‘a municipality must develop a culture of municipal governance that complements formal representative government with a system of participatory governance, and must for this purpose-

(a) encourage, and create conditions for, the local community to participate in the affairs of the municipality, including -
   (i) the preparation, implementation and review of its integrated development plan, in terms of Chapter 5;
   (ii) the establishment, implementation and review of its performance management system, in terms of Chapter 6;
iii) the monitoring and review of its performance, including the outcomes and impact of such performance;
iv) the preparation of its budget; and
(v) strategic decisions relating to the provision of municipal Services, in terms of Chapter 8;

(b) contribute to building the capacity of-
   (i) the local community to enable it to participate in the affairs of the municipality; and
   (ii) councillors and staff to foster community participation; and
(c) use its resources, and annually allocate funds in its budget, as may be appropriate for the purpose of implementing paragraphs (a) and (b).

Subsections 2-4 of Section 17 of the Act express the intent of the proposed processes and structures to be implemented to inculcate this culture by stating clearly that:

'a municipality must establish appropriate mechanisms, processes and procedures to enable the local community to participate in the affairs of the municipality, and must for this purpose provide for:-

(a) the receipt, processing and consideration of petitions and complaints lodged by members of the local community;
(b) notification and public comment procedures, when appropriate;
(c) public meetings and hearings by the municipal council and other political structures and political office bearers of the municipality, when appropriate;
(d) consultative sessions with locally recognized community organizations and, where appropriate, traditional authorities; and
(e) report-back to the local community.

(3) When establishing mechanisms, processes and procedures in terms of subsection (2) the municipality must take into account the special needs of-
   (a) people who cannot read or write;
   (b) people with disabilities;
   (c) women; and
   (d) other disadvantaged groups.

Section 18 (1) of the Act further prescribes that:

'A municipality must communicate to its community information concerning-
   (a) the available mechanisms, processes and procedures to encourage and facilitate community participation;
   (b) the matters with regard to which community participation is encouraged;
   (c) the rights and duties of members of the local community; and municipal governance, management and development.

These articles, if one notices, are very specific in regard to what a local authority has to do to promote community participation. In all the instances the emphasis is on ensuring that communities are actively involved in the governance of the institution, without interfering with the right of the municipality to govern itself. Further, these articles compel municipalities and councils not only to develop a culture of municipal governance that shifts from strict representative government to participatory governance, but also a culture that creates
conditions that are favorable for residents, communities and other stakeholders in the municipality to participate in local affairs.

Local Government: Municipal Structures Act

Sec 56 (2) (a) of the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act, Act 117 of 1998, prescribes that ‘the executive Mayor must identify the needs of the municipality’. This article, by default, expects the Mayor to consult the community to identify these needs or to have received these needs through the public participation process. This act therefore, also implies the significance of the participation process, even for the political arm of the council.

3.3 Developmental Local Government

3.3.1 The origins of Developmental Local Government

Developmental local government, as stated in the introduction, is defined in the White Paper on Local Government (1998: 17) as a local government whose strategy entails “working with citizens and groups within the community to find sustainable ways to meet their social, economic and material needs and to improve the quality of their lives”. The Development Bank of South Africa, the DBSA,(2000: 3) corroborates this definition by stating that developmental local government, is by design, meant to address a “system of democratic local government in which the needs of all, but especially those of poor and vulnerable communities, are met by efficient and effective municipalities”. The introduction of the ‘developmental’ paradigm to local government, claims the Urban Sector Network (1998: 2), was seen to be the only method through which ‘participatory and democratic' government, a government ‘…oriented to redress accountability…’ and focusing on ‘holism and integration’ could be premised. The Urban Sector Network (1998), and the DBSA (2000) viewed developmental local government as emanating from the realization that the abolished ‘apartheid local government’ would not promote the envisaged ideal, and thus, to ensure implementation and compliance developmental local government had to be enacted in the Constitution. The Constitution, as a consequence, prescribed, inter alia, that municipalities, in particular, must arrange their structures and budgets to ‘give priority to the basic needs of the community and to promote the social and economic development of the community’ (1996: 85).

Developmental local government, therefore, should put an emphasis on the ‘democratization of local government, as well as improved service delivery, integrated development planning
and continued community involvement [my emphasis] in local governance’ (The Minister of Provincial and Local Government-Interim report: 22 November 2001: 26-27). The emphasis of the developmental approach to local government, as against the ‘classical’ approach of pure service delivery, is that community involvement, especially poor and disadvantaged communities, is paramount, in much the same way that ‘participation’ is highlighting the involvement of marginalized communities in the decision-making process. Invariably, participation, in my view, cannot be effective in a situation that is not developmental in nature, as the one concept complements the other.

The only strategy to break away from the apartheid vestiges and ‘managerial incompetence, inefficiency, ineffectiveness, and unresponsiveness’ so as to achieve ‘participatory and democratic’ government, argue Bond and Zandamla (2000: 14), was to introduce developmental local government. Parnell and Robinson (Feb 2006: 338), confirm the notion that a developmental local government should commit service providers to complementing infrastructure and basic services with public participation, in their quest to improve the livelihood of the urban poor. The Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), in its report (2000: 19) argues that this could “maximize social development and economic growth; integrate and coordinate planning and service delivery, and democratize development while empowering communities and redistributing resources”. The links between the Constitution and ‘developmentalism’ are perfectly illustrated in the diagram by the Urban Sector Network, Figure 2, where the building blocks of developmental local government, finding their roots in the Constitution, are in turn giving rise to the realization of individual rights as envisaged in the Bill of Rights. Participation, in the diagram, is presented as one of the key critical building blocks of a developmental local government. This, however, is still a significant challenge for local government as most local authorities are still grappling with understanding how to institutionalize participation. To all the authors, public participation could be regarded as a ‘central tenet of developmentalist policies’ and urban management discourse. (Chipkin in Parnell et al.: 2002: 69).

Otzen et.al (1999: 2) in their report, construe characteristics and intent of developmental local government as:

- **Exercising municipal power and function in a manner which maximizes their impact on social development and economic growth;**
- **Playing an integrating and coordinating role to ensure alignment between the public and private investment within the municipal area;**
- **Promoting local democracy in a way that citizens and community groups apart from being represented by councilors, are involved in the design and delivery of municipal programs;** [my emphasis]
Building social capital by providing community leadership and vision, and seeking to empower marginalized and excluded groups within the community [my emphasis]

Any municipality that does not meet any of the above characteristics, according to Otzen et al. (1999) has not embraced the developmental ethos as propagated by national government. My emphasis on these extracts is on the involvement of communities, especially disadvantaged communities, in the delivery of services and in particular, in decisions regarding the delivery of services. The emphasis, in particular, is on ‘giving priority to the basic needs of the community’ and to the ‘promotion of social and economic development’, concepts central to the developmental ethos of local government. Developmental local government, in this way, becomes a way of ensuring that poverty alleviation and local economic development programs and initiatives, especially in poor municipal areas, are institutionalized for purposes of sustainability and development. The emphasis on “working with communities”, as stated in the White Paper, is for ensuring that the empowerment of communities for participation, as a developmental intervention, is sustained.

As discussed and explained in the discussion on public participation in Chapter 4, Johnson and Mayoux (1998: 149), argue that this empowerment affords communities the ‘power to’ and ‘power with’ to participate in development programs, and it eliminates the ‘power over’ communities. This ‘power to’ concept, further add Johnson and Mayoux, increases the capacities of individuals to make decisions that affect their lives, whereas the ‘power over’ increases the power of some individuals and groups who are stakeholders in an intervention process, while decreasing that of other, traditionally dominant, stakeholders.

Hickey and Mohan (2005: 250), discussed in detail the next chapter, refer to this principle as ‘participation for empowerment’ because they argue that any development should inculcate in the community the culture and desire to ‘challenge existing power relations rather than simply work around them…’; and should be ‘characterized by a focus on and pursuit of participation as citizenship’ capable of disentwining ‘the modes of accumulating political and economic power’ for development to be transformative and sustainable.
### 3.3.2 Characteristics of Developmental Local Government

The White Paper on Local Government (1998: 18-22) suggests what are referred to as ‘key characteristics’ of this developmental paradigm to service delivery and local governance. These, according to the White Paper on Local Government, are:

- maximizing social development and economic growth: which according to the White Paper pertains to granting local authorities sufficient authority to ‘maximize..."
impact on the social development of communities—through meeting the basic needs of the poor—and on the growth of the local economy; integration and coordination: through encouraging the development of local integrated development plans to co-ordinate development within their localities; democratizing development: by ‘promoting the involvement of citizens and community groups in the design and delivery of community programmes’; and leading and learning: which refers to ‘finding new ways of sustaining economies, building societies, protecting the environments, improving personal safety and eliminating poverty’.

Some of the above characteristics are supported by Goulet cited in Pirages (1996: 198) in his argument which supposes that any definition of development, and thus of developmental local government, should have the following dimensions:

- An economic component which deals ‘with the creation of wealth and improved conditions of material life’;
- A social ingredient measured as well-being in health, education, housing, and employment;
- A political dimension embracing such values as human rights, political freedom, legal enfranchisement of persons, and some form of democracy;
- A cultural element to enable the identification of identity and self-worth of people;
- An ecological soundness, which Goulet (1996) understands to be, a ‘mode of extracting, using, and disposing of resources that safeguards and revitalizes nature so as not to deplete it irreplaceably, poison it, or damage it’s life-restorative powers’;
- And lastly, the life-fulfilling paradigm which refers to the ‘meaning of symbols, and beliefs concerning the ultimate meaning of life and history’.

Goleta’s contribution, if one notes, lays a particular significant emphasis on socio-political and economic importance of development, a discourse which, invariably, encourages sustainability, as alluded to by Pieterse, in Parnell et. al. (2002: 3-6) who argues that any discourse on the sustainability of developmental local government will only bear meaning if premised on four policy intents namely, ‘financial viability, institutional capability, political and administrative accountability and purpose-driven’. The sustainability aspect becomes embedded in the ‘financial viability’ and ‘institutional capability’ because it is in these two principles that any principle is sustainable, as confirmed by Parnell and Pieterse (2002: 86) who argue that ‘… embracing developmental local government depends on putting sustained effort and resources into capacity building of the local state by ensuring that there is sufficient technical awareness among councilors to drive the spatial, fiscal and integrated management components of change’…‘to safeguard the political commitment to effective incorporation of the opinion of civil society and to filter their views via local government to provincial and national government’. These according to Pieterse in Parnell (2002) are the cornerstones of sustainability processes and should be observed if a local authority is to transform its function accordingly, to produce and reproduce a local economy and political structure a developmental [structure] that ‘meets and continues to meet basic needs’.
3.3.3 The Integrated Development Plan as a tool for Developmental Local Government

3.3.3.1 What is an Integrated Development Plan?

The Integrated Development Plan (IDP) concept was first introduced in the White Paper on Local Government (1998: 26) as a ‘participatory planning process, aimed at developing a strategic development plan ‘to guide and inform all planning, budgeting, management and decision-making in a municipality’ and is meant to be ‘… a coherent, long term plan for the co-ordination of all development and delivery in their area’. (Education and Training Unit: 2002: 3). It was mooted to be one of the approaches ‘to achieve developmental outcomes’ of a developmental local government through ‘working together with local citizens and partners’ as its key tenets, among others. The national framework discussion document of the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (December 2002: 11) and the Education and Training Unit (2002: 3) define the IDP, as a tool and a strategy to assist municipalities plan in a manner that will encourage local municipalities “to understand the various dynamics operating within their area, develop a concrete vision for the area, and strategies for realizing and financing that vision in partnership with other stakeholders”. (The White Paper on Local Government: 1998: 27) This definition is corroborated by the definition advanced by the National Asset Management Steering Group (2006) which defines the Integrated Development Plan as “a strategic planning tool that is meant to integrate sector priorities and projects within a developmental paradigm based on community participation”.

The IDP was then legislated as a process through which municipalities prepare a strategic plan that supersedes all other plans, to guide local development for a five-year period (SALGA: DPLG and GTZ: 2001; Stellenbosch Municipality in Davids et al.: 2005: 134; Intergovernmental Forum Summit: 2005: 11) and to encourage an integrated, multi-dimensional approach in the identification of challenges and solutions facing local government, according to the institutions cited above. In municipalities where the IDP is fully operational it is meant to support an appropriate “integration of sectoral strategies, in order to inform the optimal allocation of scarce resources between sectors and geographic areas” (Department of Housing undated: 53) and across the population in a manner that “promotes sustainable growth, equity and the empowerment of the poor and marginalized”. (IDP: 1995) It is, as a result, a process that is closely aligned with the principles of sustainable development, and a “key instrument for municipalities to fulfill their developmental vision and objectives at a local level”, according to the discussion document of the Intergovernmental Forum (2005: 14). It is supposed to be a key planning tool in South Africa local government,
at present, and should provide a mechanism through which sustainability principles can be integrated into the planning of development in local areas.

In terms of the above discourses one can surmise that these definitions found their origin from either the White Paper on Local Government (1998) or the Municipal Systems Act, No 32 of 2000, S35 (1), in which the IDP is conceptualized as the “principal strategic planning instrument, which guides and informs all planning, budgeting and development, and all decisions with regard to planning, management and development in the municipality”. The National Asset Steering Group is one of a few definitions that highlight the importance of public participation in the process of putting the plan together because in terms of the Integrated Development Plan all plans must be consulted with the community and so should performance. Other definitions assume that all planning, by design or by default, is meant to be consultative within the affected stakeholders. Stellenbosch Municipality is one such municipality, as cited in Davids et al. (2005: 134), in which it is confirmed that an IDP must be a “the single, inclusive and strategic plan for the development of the municipality which:

(a) links, integrates and coordinates plans and takes into account proposals for the development of the municipality;
(b) aligns the resources and capacity of the municipality with the implementation of the plan and;
(c) Forms the policy framework and general basis on which annual budgets must be based.

In the regard, Davids et al. (2005: 135) assume that the IDP should and does give effect to the developmental duties of the municipality of promoting a democratic, sustainable and participatory process, values entrenched in a developmental local government, and which lay an emphasis on “…working with affected communities…”. (White Paper on Local Government: 1998) This notion of the IDP, as stated previously, is now institutionalized in the Municipal Systems Act which further state that the two main principles are to be adhered to in the IDP process, are, that:

- Planning must be developmentally oriented in that it must support the role of local government as an agent of development. Therefore an IDP is a tool for developmental local government;
- Planning must take place within the framework of co-operative governance government in that it must be aligned with the plans and strategies of national and provincial government as well as other municipalities.

Obviously, the Integrated Development Plan is as much a part of developmental local government as it is of ‘good governance’ and ‘Batho Pele’. What makes the IDP so integral to participation is that the process of the IDP can only be achieved by means of community
participation, as stated in the White paper, and as legislated in the Systems Act. The importance of participation in these processes will be outlined when the origins of and rationale for participation in South Africa is discussed.

The statements by Panel and Pieterse (2002), in the previous section, confirm the significance of sustainability in the integrated development planning milieu as both a strategy and a consequence of a participatory, and hence a developmental approach to service delivery, and a mechanism for encouraging integration in the planning of local service delivery, as enunciated in the White Paper on Local Government (1998: 26) where participation is regarded as one of the elements of a developmental local government. The model depicted in Figure 2, further illustrates that the minimum and, unfortunately, the legislative requirements for an Integrated Development Plan, as claimed by DEAT (2002: 17) are:

- A vision based on and supports the principles of sustainability for long-term development, with special emphasis on the municipality’s development and internal transformation needs;
- An assessment of existing levels of development, including the identification of communities excluded from services;
- An assessment of the environmental assets upon which this development will depend;
- Development priorities and objectives, including local economic development aims. These development strategies, according to DEAT (2002: 17) must be aligned with national and provincial plans and planning requirements and should be informed by and developed with the guidance of sustainability principles. Specific strategies should be closely aligned with the goals of environmental strategies and guidelines and should meet the requirements of environmental legislation and policy;
- A spatial development framework, including basic guidelines for land use management;

The Intergovernmental Forum (undated: 2) concludes that if any Integrated Development Plan includes most, if not all of the above, it will, inter alia:

- Make use of scarce resources;
- Speed up delivery;
- Attract additional funds;
- Strengthen democracy and hence institutional transformation;
- Overcome apartheid legacy at local level;
- Promote intergovernmental coordination;
- *Developmental in approach* [my addition]

Whether these ideals are achieved by local authorities is a subject of another debate. What is significant about the Integrated Development Planning approach, where it has been successful, is that it has encouraged local authorities to begin thinking ‘holistically’ and systemically about service delivery and to embrace the principle of public engagement and participation. Participation has further encouraged the mentality of inclusivity, which encompasses local communities, inclusive of all role players and stakeholders, including
councilors, in particular, as legitimate representatives of local communities. Councilors therefore, should have an intimate appreciation of the processes of the developmental paradigm of local government to be able to successfully drive the agenda of sustainability. The challenge to sustainability, therefore, has to be to find constructive ways of building capacity, in a manner not perceived as patronizing for the political corps.

3.3.4 Shortfalls/challenges facing Developmental Local Government

Transformation in any form or context presents a series of surmountable and insurmountable challenges. The very pertinent idiosyncrasy of any change is the irony that change is a constant. One of such significant challenges of a developmental intervention as far as Honadle and van Sant (1985: 74) observe, is that ‘if the action does not lead to the actor’s betterment, then it is not likely to be sustained’. The authors further claim that sustainability is, to a great extent, impacted upon by ‘financial, organizational, side-effects and policy constraints’. What Honadle and van Sant (1985: 87) propose as a solution to challenges of sustainability and hence ‘developmentalism’ is ‘capacity building’, which to them entails ‘the utilization of local base knowledge and resources instead of importing skills’ and the ‘timing of transferring the intervention to local control’. The philosophy and paradigm of development posits, however, that successful development does not only depend on skills and knowledge which together account for human capital, it must also have something to do with the ‘people’s ability to associate with each other’ which is an ability dependent on ‘shared norms, and values, according to Fukuyama. Fukuyama further posits that a trust relationship will also develop from an honest, cooperative community. But where no such trust exist success in a development project is achieved through coercion and sanction and an unflinching reference to rules and regulations.

Atkinson (2003: 2) identifies a few significant challenges pertinent to a ‘developmentalist’ agenda in local government, and these being ‘weak information management systems,…, ineffective community participation, national and provincial government’s financial and technical support to municipalities which must enable municipalities to manage the development process more effectively by addressing the internal structure of municipal organizations…” . These challenges, coupled with challenges of ‘accountability, stability and sustainability’, for an example, have been synonymous with challenges of good governance, according to Corkery (1999: 39) and Swilling (1997: 14). The ‘protection of human rights and the better management of resources’ is what compounds the challenge, according to Corkery (1999: 41). Rapid and uncontrolled urbanization, which according to Halfani cited in Swilling
(1991: 15) is ‘taking place in an environment of increased economic distress’, has also added complexity to this developmental agenda. Halfani cited in Swilling (1997: 14) contends that corruption, which creeps in as a result of competition for resources, is what makes urbanization a nemesis to good governance.

3.4 The Hostel Redevelopment Program

3.4.1 The conceptualization of the hostel redevelopment program

The Hostel Redevelopment Program, according to Clarke (1994: 3), is an initiative involving a “fundamental change within the community affecting both hostel and neighboring residents.” It does not only involve “the physical alteration to an existing hostel complex”, (Clarke; 1994; 3) it also encompasses the development of communities. The program came about as a result of the national discourse by fora such as the National Housing Forum on social housing for the poor and the previously disenfranchised. The discourse regarding the conversion of hostels to family units could, in a way, also be attributed to the influence of the mining industry in the dismantling of the hostel accommodation philosophy as a strategy of destabilizing and dislodging the organizing ability of labour unions such as the NUM. (Bezuidenhout and Buhlungu: 2011; 250) Mine management at the time, according to Bezuidenhout and Buhlungu (2011; 250) wanted to implement the view expounded by Crush James (1991; 306) that “a policy of home ownership would have the greatest impact on worker and social stability”.

The National Housing Forum resolved to expand the discussion the development of houses to include the development of hostels, as a consequence of these nuances. This notion of extending the mandate of housing to include hostels emanated from Section 2.516 of the Reconstruction and Development Program, according to the Development Action Group (2003; 9), which stated, inter alia, that:

“Hostels must be transformed, upgraded and integrated within a policy framework that recognizes the numerous interest groups in and around hostels and provides a range of housing options, including both family units and single people. The transformation of hostels must not deny any individuals or households access to the cities, including workers who maintain a rural base, families who desire integration into the city, and women with no security. Policies must address integration of hostels into communities, their safety and privacy (especially for women and children), and the various family living arrangements in hostels…. The democratic government must upgrade hostels where residents cannot pay…”
This developmental ethos resulted in housing being regarded as one of the tools for empowering disadvantaged communities. Rust and Rubenstein (1996; 140) claim that a small group of people was then “mandated to develop guidelines for hostel development initiatives…” and “provide a meaningful policy context for planning hostel initiatives and, in so doing, avoid unsustainable precedents”. This group, further claims Rust and Rubenstein (1996), produced a policy document known as “Short term Guidelines for Hostels Initiatives” which were subsequently adopted as national policy and renamed the Hostel Upgrading Program policy. The Hostel Upgrading Program, as indicated in the introduction, was eventually approved in 1990, but could not be fully implemented due to a myriad of constraints, which included the lack of finances. What was to be unique about the policy, according to Rust and Rubenstein (1996: 149) was that the Hostel Redevelopment Program was not to be limited to just the physical and or structural change of hostels, but it was to be the “start of a progressive process of urban renewal for the hostel’s whole immediate locality”. As a consequence, some of the objectives that emerged as pivotal to the implementation of the program were processes such as, inter alia, “urban development, participative process, eligibility, affordability and community needs, displacement, employment creation, institutional development and capacity building, in-budget and out-budget, equity”, among others. Though the objectives will be elucidated later in the text, two or three of the objectives are worth mentioning because they are significant to the concept of participation as a developmental tool and an instrument of ‘progressive’ human development.

These objectives are the “… participative process”, “… community needs” and “equity”. According to Ghai, cited in Griffin and Knight (1990; 219) participation, in the instance of the Hostel Redevelopment Program was to be the “… process of empowerment of the deprived and the excluded”… which would be “interpreted to imply a strengthening of power of the deprived masses” with the sole intention of “sharing of power and scarce resources, [and] deliberate efforts by social groups to control their own destinies and improves their living conditions…”. This was the impact participation would have had in the program.

According to Mothotoana (2011: 26) six objectives were to be achieved with the Hostel Redevelopment Program, namely:

- The promotion of humane living conditions for hostel residents;
- The inclusion of hostel residents, neighboring communities and other stakeholders affected by the redevelopment in decision-making processes;
- The promotion of social integration within hostel communities and also among hostels and neighboring communities;
- The inclusion of plans, in the program, for accommodating those who will be displaced by the project;
The initiation of local institutions and administrative procedures into the system in order to sustain improvements and undertake socio-economic development;

The embodiment of development orientated towards empowerment, participation and the promotion of economic opportunities;

Rust and Rubenstein (1996: 42) add another two dimensions not mentioned by Mothotoana (2011). Besides identifying “relevant public authorities” as pivotal stakeholders to the program, Rust and Rubenstein (1996) highlight the importance of ‘developmental orientation, both in terms of empowerment and participation, and in terms of promoting economic development’ as critical to the program. The authors further emphasize the ‘initiation of local institutions and administrative procedures in order to sustain physical improvements and undertake socio-economic development’. The objectives of the Hostel Redevelopment Program, especially that of ‘sustaining physical improvements’ and ‘socio-economic development’ can easily be construable as intrinsic to the national flagship initiative of infusing principles of ‘developmentalism’ into the social and economic discourse of human development.

The implementation program of the Hostel Redevelopment Program led to the establishment of local structures whose role was “to participate in the planning and design of all hostel upgrades”. In Cape Town that structure was called the “Local Negotiating Group”, and was composed of “the local (or provincial) authority, hostel residents, representatives of the neighboring community and local business people…”. (USN: 2003: 9) The task of this structure, according to the USN (2003: 10) was two-fold. It was:

- decide on the three options available for the conversion of hostels in the redevelopment program, i.e. conversion of hostels to rental units for single people and families where there was a demand for rental in the area, or conversion to ownership of family units where there was no overwhelming demand for single rental accommodation in the area, … or conversion to an alternative use, such as a school or community facility if the hostel was inconveniently located, if there was no demand for hostel-type accommodation or the hostel is so run down that redevelopment would be too expensive;
- to approve all redevelopment plans in the Cape Town area.

One of the most popular innovations to deal with the development of social housing, locally, was the establishment of housing co-operatives, which served as conduits through which the development program would be delivered. Many communities, which were to benefit from the Hostel Redevelopment Program, opted for this approach for the redevelopment of ‘their’ hostels, the reason being that “co-operatives are the best institutional form for collective ownership” (USN: 2003: 18). Most co-operatives are founded on self-help principles, and they “usually conform to the basic principles of the International Co-operative Alliance, with
their key principle being one member, one vote”. (Khan and Thring: 2003: 407) Members of a housing co-operative, according to the USN (2003: 19), must become “members/shareholders of the co-operative (the “shares” can be nominal amounts of money) and jointly own the property”.

Lewin (1981: 10-11), on the advantages of housing co-operatives, argued that “besides the potential to promote integrated and viable urban communities” conducive to the ‘mobilization of self-help sources and positive group dynamics’ the housing co-operative approach is a better option for self-help low cost housing because:

i. It can ‘exercise internal control to prevent speculation and illegal sale, subletting, or transfer of the dwelling’, through by-laws that guarantee that a withdrawing member will sell or return the dwelling to the society;

ii. It can serve as a vehicle to ‘enable collective savings accumulation as well as procurement, disbursement, and repayment of loans, land, and servicing costs’, thereby reducing substantially ‘the costs of loan administration’;

iii. The co-operative can ‘offer a system of mutual security which is controlled internally through the collective repayment of loans’;

iv. Members and their representatives do ‘assume the tasks and functions related to the management and administration of the housing co-operative, gradually,’ thereby reducing management costs, as well;

v. Co-operatives can, and do, make ‘provisions for savings to be collected from members prior to the commencement of the building, and the mobilization of manual and other self-help resources for the construction of infrastructure services’;

vi. Members can participate in the ‘process of site planning and house design through advanced training and organization of members’;

vii. It can enable the ‘collective maintenance and upkeep of houses and neighborhoods, long term planning of maintenance and improvement works, and continual mobilization of the members for the upkeep of their settlement and for running the community facilities’;

3.4.2 Dibanisa lintsapho: The Hostels-to-Homes Program

Dibanisa lintsapho (which means joining families) was the name given to the hostel redevelopment program in the Cape Town area. An unpublished document entitled the “Hostels to Homes Program: a Progress Report (2006)” argues that the Hostel-to-Homes Project was initiated in 1993 when “hostel residents” through the Western Cape Hostel Dwellers Association, “had an agreement from the iKapa Council and the Cape Provincial Administration to implement a redevelopment programme” called the Hostels to Homes Programme. The Hostel Dwellers Association is an association which was “formed in June 1985 in an attempt to bring about an improvement in migrant living conditions” (Urban Problems Research Unit: University of Cape Town: 1987: Preface) The main aim of the association, according to the Urban Problems Research Unit (1987) was “to negotiate the upgrade and expansion of the hostel buildings and their conversion into family units for those
people and their families currently occupying the buildings...". The agreement between the Western Cape Hostel Dwellers Association, the erstwhile iKapa Town Council and the Cape Provincial Administration was to convert hostels into 8000 housing units in 8 phases.

The program entailed redesigning hostels and residential areas and doubling the infill of ‘floor areas of buildings’, and the upgrading of infrastructure of Langa hostels under the banner of the ‘Dibanisa lintsapho’ (Join families) campaign of the City of Cape Town. The first 29 units, according to the document, "were built in Langa, Guguletu and Nyanga, and known as Demonstration Units". 9 of these units were burned down in Langa “in the lead-up to the 1994 elections”. The City of Cape Town, according to this Progress Report, subsequently, took over the Hostels-to-Homes Program after 1995 and built the “Show Units project that housed 47 Households in Langa”. These show units, in terms of this Progress Report, were successfully completed in November 1997. After the successful completion of these units the program started in earnest and houses were built in phases. However like many low-cost housing projects the project was marred by significant problems. By September 2003, about 1325 rental houses were completed and delivered to beneficiaries.

Ramphele (1993: 97) confirms that these negotiations gained momentum, in earnest, with the establishment of the Western Cape Hostel Upgrading Trust in 1987, as a subsidiary of the Western Cape Hostel Dwellers Association. The objectives of this Trust, according to the Urban Problems Research (1987: 29) were, among others, to:

1. Support and assist socially, economically and politically disadvantaged persons and communities in the sphere of housing, amenities, community services and facilities within the Western Cape;
2. Support and assist such persons and communities to acquire vacant land as well as to acquire existing hostel and other dwellings in the Urban Townships of the Western Cape….
3. Generally support, in addition to the work to be undertaken by this Trust, any other similar undertaking and to engage in any related activities which, in the opinion of the Trustees, are likely to further the provision of adequate housing and accommodation for such persons and communities (Urban Research Problems Unit: 1987: 29)

The proposals of the Western Cape Hostel Dwellers’ Trust included, inter alia, the following (WCHDA: 1987):

- Convert public hostels into double storey row housing and private hostels into blocks of flats for single people;
- Add a second storey to all single storey hostel blocks and add new wings in the 25-30m spaces between hostel blocks;
- Demolish old communal ablution blocks, add bathrooms with full plumbing so that every family unit has its own bathroom;
- Build new row housing between existing hostels where space permits;
Public squares defined by buildings with lower storeys used as shops; courtyards for meetings, children to play in, etc.

According to a report tabled at the Housing Portfolio Committee (26-08-2004) the first units to be built in Langa were 29, but 9 of these were burnt down in the lead-up to the 1994 elections. After 1995, when the new City of Cape Town was established, phase 2 of the project comprising 47 units was completed in November 1997. In Phase 4 of the project 32 houses were completed instead of the planned 1000. In her speech at the ceremonial handover of the Langa Hostels to Homes Project on 1 September 2007 Zille, the Mayor of the City of Cape Town, at the time, defined the project as one of the City of Cape Town’s key housing initiatives, carried out in partnership with the Provincial Government to accelerate the provision of housing opportunities to the people of Cape Town. The original number of family units to be built changed, in terms of the Mayor’s speech, was 8000 but ‘by the end of year 2007, at the completion of phase 6 of the Hostel Redevelopment Programme’ only ‘4725 out of a total of over 8000 hostel units were converted into dignified homes’.

The contradistinction in the design, size and architecture of the new homes and the old flats could not be better reflected than in Figure 6, in which the ‘new home’ is built closer to the “old flat”. In the picture, even the style of building reflects the two different eras of modernity between the two types of buildings. Despite the filth of the “old flats” the quality of the building looks sturdier than the flimsy looking home. The similarity between the two blocks, albeit minute, is only in the fact that both buildings are multi-storeyed. In the Nyanga case scenario the conversions would largely depend on the financial viability hence the different permutations. Most of the designs culminated from proposals made by the Hostel Dwellers Association, some of whom could not be entertained due to financial constraints. (Urban Sector Network; 2003)

The key development options, according to Urban Sector Network (2003) were, in effect, the following:

- Upgrading (repairing building defects)
- Conversion to self-contained units through partition and adding private bathrooms (improving access to services, increasing privacy)
- Conversion into self-contained units and de-densifying by building extra units (increasing space and privacy, improving access to services)

The idea of ‘increasing space and privacy through partitioning and extending the building, while keeping and upgrading communal washing-up and ablution facilities’, was one of the possibilities pointed out by the community during the consultation process, but residents “generally prioritize (d) private bathrooms when it comes to the extension of the built area”,

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as a private bathroom was ‘seen as a key element of increased privacy’ " (Urban Sector Network: 2003) It seems as though most of the requests of the Hostel Dwellers Association were accommodated in the renovations albeit nearly twenty years later because the designs of the renovated flats looked typically like the type of design negotiated with the erstwhile administration boards of the different Black Local Authorities. Most of the products were indeed family units, which were a significant improvement and aesthetically pleasing, as seen in the pictures below.

Some of the constraints that limited residents from getting what they wanted were insufficient subsidies for the conversions envisioned. The subsidy amount given to each family unit was R20 300 per family unit in 2002/2003, and with “low and irregular incomes” many hostel dwellers could not “… repay loans or afford the monthly operating costs” (Urban Sector Network: 2003). This, according to the Urban Sector Network (2003), forced the reconsideration of “options for hostel redevelopment… within the context of these financial constraints”. The purpose of the research, therefore, was to test whether, granted all these other variables, the houses were what the ‘owners’ anticipated when they engaged the authorities or that the home-owners are now satisfied with the product irrespective. The research will test the causes of such satisfaction if the product is not necessarily what the owners anticipated.

Repairing building defects, according to the Urban Sector Network (2003), was regarded by all the parties to the project as one of the basic essentials which should be carried out as part of any hostels redevelopment project, but sometimes, as indicated earlier, the lack of funds, and the affordability of service charges or lack of space meant that only fixing the defaults could be undertaken.

The regeneration model was experimented with in some of the old flats by the implementation of the ‘dignified spaces’ program as a means of hostel regeneration, but the experiment was not well received. The end product of the renewal program was aesthetically pleasing as can be seen in Figure 4. Access to services, contends the Urban Sector Network (2003), could only be improved by the provision of a kitchen and ablution facilities in each unit. Increasing space, while simultaneously avoiding the displacement of any residents, required the extension of the hostel and adding new units.
Each unit, as seen on Figure 3, has a front entrance, which leads into a small kitchen, an open lounge area and a bedroom with the bathroom being adjacent to the kitchen. Access to the units on the first and second floors is provided by means of a staircase leading onto covered walkways or access balconies. Only the ground floor has a front and back door. Some of the family units do have a second bedroom, according to the Social Housing Focus Trust (2005), the Trust. Shared units, according to the Trust (2005), were also introduced that consist of up to three bedrooms. The design had to be altered subsequently, “to provide [a] … toilet area separate from the shower area to enable different families to share such a unit”. The construction of this type of a unit, further claims the Trust, had to be “discontinued in the follow-up phases due to lack of demand”. Units are, according to the Social Housing Focus Trust (2005), typically occupied by four or five family members, though privacy and space are quite limited.

The different designs, as shown in Figures 4-7 have improved the quality of the lives of the previous hostel dwellers. It is also apparently, from the designs that space has been utilized to promote social cohesion among the affected communities. This has contributed significantly to the success of the Hostels-to-Homes Program, generally. Whether it was a

Figure 3: The Hostel Renewal Program of the Langa ‘Old Flats’
success in the eyes of the beneficiaries, remains to be tested. The test will be for their levels of satisfaction in regard to their ‘new’ status.

**Figure 4: A Completely Renovated “New Flat” in Langa**

(Picture taken on 15 December 2008)

**Figure 5: A Completely new block-Gap in-fill for Overflowing Residents.**

(Picture taken on 27 December 2008)
**Figure 6:** Other new Gap In-Fill Flats for Overflowing Numbers

(Picture taken on 27 December 2008)

**Figure 7:** Completely New In-Fill Flat in-between Old Hostels

(Picture taken on 27 December 2008)
3.4.3 The link between ‘developmentalism’ and the hostel redevelopment program

There are obvious links between ‘developmentalism’ and the Hostel Redevelopment Program in the way they are configured. One could even argue that the fundamental principles of the Hostel Redevelopment Program are premised on a ‘developmental ethos’. This is confirmed by Rust and Rubenstei (1996: 142) where the authors claim that the purpose of the program was, inter alia, to “… promote human living conditions; include hostel residents, the neighboring community, relevant public authorities and any others affected by a project, in the decision-making process; [to] be developmentally orientated, both in terms of empowerment and participation, and in terms of promoting economic development; [to] promote social integration within hostel communities and also between hostels and adjacent communities…”. As stated in the extract one of the objectives of the hostel program was to be “… developmentally oriented…”, thereby alluding to the idea that ‘development’ was central to the hostel program. Development, in terms of the extract, was not to be promoted for the sake of development, but for social cohesion and economic development- both objects of local government according to the Constitution. One could argue therefore, that the principles of the hostel redevelopment program are embedded in the constitution of the country, making the project pivotal to the development agenda as prescribed in the constitution.

3.5 Conclusion

It can be concluded, from the above discussion, that there ought to be a link between a developmental local government, participation, good governance and the provision of low cost housing. This link, is further explained by Mogale in Mhone and Edgheji (2003: 220) where he states that participation is mandated in four major senses:

“as voters to ensure democratic accountability, as citizens who through a variety of stakeholder organizations can contribute to policy processes, as consumers and end-users who can expect "value for money" and affordable services, and as organized partners engaged in resource mobilization for developmental objectives.”

What is worth noting in this extract is that two of the Batho Pele principles, namely ‘value for money’ and ‘affordability’ are regarded as pivotal to participation and ‘developmental local government’. Developmental local government, upon which the principles of the hostel redevelopment program are based, was perceived to a viable methodology and philosophy to address the challenge of improving the quality of disadvantaged people. The above extract further gives impetus to that notion, and to the notion that not only is participation a
framework for service delivery, but it is also a basis for transparent service delivery, and hence good governance.

The notion of participatory service delivery as a thrust of developmental local government is further canvassed in this developmental discourse, (Cashdan: 2002:162; Pieterse: 2000: 4) in which ‘integrated development planning, service delivery, local economic development, and democratization’ are regarded as the four distinct approaches to ‘developmentalism’. Central to this thrust, according to Cashdan cited in Parnell (2002; 162-163) is the development of ‘holistic strategies for poverty alleviation, through an active participation of citizens’ to improve and sustain the quality of life and safety of the consumers of municipal service. This, according to the author could be achieved through the Integrated Development Plan, which, according to the White Paper on Local Government (1998: 22) is significant for developmental local government as it ‘coerces’ municipalities to ‘become more strategic, visionary, and ultimately influential in the way they operate’.
CHAPTER 4

Theory and Methodology: Public Participation and Hirschmann’s theory of Voice, Loyalty and Exit

4.1 Introduction

Many theorists have contributed to public participation in various ways but few have attempted to scrutinise the application of these public participation theories in a public sector environment. Of the many theories two stand out as relevant- i.e. Arnstein’s Ladder of Participation (Arnstein; 1969) and the Spectrum of Participation articulated by the International Association for Public Participation (2007). By the same token research has been done by Hirschman to try and understand the notion of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with a product or a service rendered. Very little has been done however to put the two concepts together to understand the synergy and discourse regarding the two concepts. The addition of the voice, loyalty and exit theory to the mix is an attempt to understand what strategies beneficiaries have in case of dissatisfaction. The discourse by the various theorists on the principles and levels of participation elucidates the complexity of public participation, and what in essence contributes to satisfactory participation. This becomes apparent in the discussion of challenges and complexities of public participation.

The first part of this chapter will discuss objectives of participation, as articulated by Plummer. The chapter will also review two of the most popular theories of public participation, namely Arnstein’s Ladder of Citizen Participation, and the Spectrum of Participation. The Community Participation Surround will also be mentioned as a possible theory that can be applicable to the public sector theory. The focus will be on the principles of the Spectrum of Participation theory as these principles form the basis of the research questions to be posed to beneficiaries. This discourse on participation, however, not only interrogates the principles of the Spectrum of Participation theory, it will also review the general principles and models of participation so that the concept is understood in its entirety. The second part of the chapter will deal with the voice, loyalty and exit theory as expounded by Hirschmann. In this section of the chapter particular, the theory will be explained in detail and its applicability in the hostel redevelopment program ascertained. The third part of the chapter will deal with the methodology to be applied in the research. The logic and rationale behind the choice of case studies will also be discussed in detail, as will the limitations of the research.
4.2 The concept and theories of Public Participation: Conceptual framework

Participation is conceptualized in different ways by the different theorists and practitioners dealing with the concept, Johnson and Wilson (2000: 189), for example, conceptualize participation as constituting the ‘empowerment’ of disadvantaged and hitherto ‘invisible’ individuals, groups and sectors, and organizations, which, according to Johnson and Mayoux (1998: 149), affords ‘power to’ and ‘power with’ to these ‘invisible individuals, groups and sectors, and organizations’. The principle of ‘participation for empowerment’ is further articulated by Hickey & Mohan (2005: 250), where the authors argue that participation processes should inculcate a culture and desire to ‘challenge existing power relations rather than simply work around them…’, and should be ‘characterized by a focus on and pursuit of participation as citizenship’ capable of disentwining ‘the modes of accumulating political and economic power’ for participation to be transformative and sustainable. Bacquè and Biewener (2012; 2209) define empowerment as a mechanism through which “poor populations are expected to take responsibility for and to self-manage the issues they face, rather than fostering a democratization of power and leaving aside any questions concerning the redistribution of wealth or social solidarity." In terms of this definition, claim the authors (2012; 2209) “empowerment is associated with partnership, choice, responsibility and self-government.”

Johnson and Mayoux (1998), as a consequence, argue that any empowerment process should, by its very nature, eliminate ‘power over’ invisible individuals, groups and sectors, and should, instead, give ‘power to’ and share ‘power with’. The ‘power to’ concept, they assert, increases the capacities of individuals to make decisions that affect their lives, whereas the ‘power over’ increases the power of some individuals and groups who are stakeholders in an intervention process, while decreasing that of other, traditionally dominant, stakeholders. The ‘Power with’ perspective, in the authors’ view, is not zero-sum, but makes it possible to negotiate joint action with others that does not lead to the diminution of anybody’s (or group’s) power.

This conceptual framework proposed by Johnson and Mayoux (1998) is founded on principles of information sharing, and the empowerment of disadvantaged communities. The two concepts, i.e. information sharing and empowerment, delineate two levels of participation shaping contemporary schools of thought, according to White et al. (1994: 16-17) These two levels of participation are ‘pseudo-participation’-which is characterized by informing, therapy, and manipulation, and ‘genuine participation’ as reflected in ‘partnership and delegation of
power to empowerment’. Awatona et al. (1995) refer to this process as ‘genuine participation’, as well.

Miraftab (2004) is critical of this notion of empowerment as a result of participation as propounded by Johnson and Mayoux (1998). Miraftab (2004; 242) argues that the individualization of development projects “inherently depoliticizes the notion of empowerment, often reducing it to individual economic gain and access to resources, and leaving the status quo unchallenged” The author further argues that if “power relations and conflicts in the community and in participatory processes” are left “unexamined” the development process tends to display “anti-democratic” tendencies, which “benefit communities’ elites and their few already privileged, more vocal members”. The points raised by Miraftab (2004) are valid as it is generally true that in most development projects the most vocal of the community tend to benefit more than the quiet and docile type. Cleaver cited in Cooke and Kothari (2004; 36) adds to the criticism of empowerment by claiming that any evidence “regarding empowerment and sustainability is more partial, tenuous and reliant on assertions of the rightness of the approach and process rather than convincing evidence of outcomes.

The different levels and depths of participation, as proposed in the two most dominant theories of participation, namely Arnstein’s ‘Ladder of Participation’ and the International Association for Public Participation’s ‘Spectrum of Public Participation’, fit neatly into the two levels of participation proposed by White et al. (1994), as shown in the conceptual framework of the levels of participation in Figure 8. This conceptual framework describes the interface of the theories in the mind of the author. While using different concepts in the conceptualization of participation, the two theories concur in their assertion that the highest level of participation is: ‘citizen control’ and ‘[citizen] empowerment’ respectively. As can be seen in the diagram, the highest ‘level of participation’ in both theories is largely determined by the amount of ‘power’ and ‘control’ the participants have in the decision making process. The level at which role-players engage in a participatory process depends on the power relations between the role-players, and the level of empowerment of these role-players (White et al.: 1994; Hickey & Mohan: 2005). It is also this level of ‘power’ and ‘control’ that determines whether participation will purely be ‘information sharing’, or ‘consultation’, or ‘decision-making’ only, or whether it will ‘initiate action’, concludes Nelson & Wright (1995: 183).

The first two principles, namely, ‘information sharing’ and ‘consultation’ could be construed as ‘pseudo-participation’, according to White et al. (1994: 16-17) or as ‘power over’, according to Johnson & Mayoux (1998: 149), and thus not empowering or giving participants
sufficient control of the decision-making process. The remaining two principles, namely ‘decision-making’ and ‘initiating action’ could be seen as ‘genuine participation’ by White et al. (1994: 16-17), or as ‘power with’ by Johnson & Mayoux (1998), because these principles result in ‘empowerment, capacity building, improved project effectiveness, increased efficiency, [and] promoting cost sharing between donors, funders, and beneficiaries’ (Awatona et al: 1995: 8).

The discussion of the conceptualization of participation by Arnstein and the International Association for Public Participation will follow in an attempt to establish the extent to which these theories relate to the above discussion.

4.2.1 Arnstein’s Ladder of Citizen Participation

Arnstein (1969), in the Ladder of Citizen Participation theory argues that participation should be seen as the “strategy by which the community joins in determining how information is shared, goals and policies are set, resources are allocated, programs are operated and benefits like contracts and patronage are parcelled out”. The scale of participation, as indicated in the previous discussion, is determined by the relations of ‘power and control’ of the decision-making process.
The UN-Habitat (2002: 3) also supports the view that the “a process through which stakeholders influence and share control over development initiatives and the decisions and resources which affect them” would, to a great extent, be influenced by the level of maturity and sincerity of the parties to the participatory process. In this regard, Arnstein, cited in UN-Habitat (2002: 4-5), proposes a ‘Ladder of Citizen Participation’, as shown in Figure 9, to explain this concept of power redistribution and power sharing. This ‘Ladder of Citizen Participation’ is conceptualized by Arnstein (1969) as comprised of eight levels of public participation ranging in a continuum from “manipulation”, which is tantamount to “rubber stamping”, through therapy, information, consultation, placation, partnership, delegation, to “citizen control”, which is the ideal situation in which citizens have “almost full control over their neighbourhood” (Darke & Walker 1977: 92; Soen et al.: 1984: 207). This full control over neighbourhoods equates to the ‘active citizenship’ proposed by different authors in the subject.
‘Active citizenship’ is reinforced by the UN-Habitat (2002: 8) in its emphasis on the importance of “involving beneficiaries in the development process” as pivotal to enhancing a “genuine partnership” between parties to any development, a partnership which can be easily construed as the ‘highest stage of working relationship between different people brought together by commitment to common objectives, bonded by long experience of working together, and sustained by subscription to common visions’. Arnstein’s ‘Ladder of Citizen Participation’, as supported by UN-Habitat, could easily be perceived as advocating ‘power with’ and ‘power to’ participants, which inculcates a ‘genuine participation’ process in the way it encourages collective decision-making at its higher levels.

One of the most conspicuous limitations of the Arnstein’s Ladder of Citizen Participation model, as poignantly argued in literature (Arnstein: 1969; UN-Habitat: 2001), is that it does not state what needs to happen and or how indigent and disadvantaged communities, which are by no means a homogenous group in any manner or form, but to which this theory refers to as such, so significantly, progress from the level of “manipulation” to that of “citizen control”. Furthermore, the theory does not acknowledge that such individuality and homogeneity of the different communities of interest could contribute to the possible obstructions that each group could experience in its progression from the lowest to the highest level of the ladder.

For an example it does not state how a group interested only in service delivery could obstruct a community whose interest is housing. The theory, as a consequence, is accused of over-simplifying an otherwise already complicated process in which all stakeholders, in their uniqueness and individuality, protect their vested interests, at all costs, throughout a participation process.

Simmons and Birchall (2006: 576) also argue against the eight rungs of the ‘Ladder of Participation’. These authors conceptualize this ‘Ladder of Participation’ as having only three rungs, in the same way shown in Figure 10. These three rungs, according to these authors, are borne out of a consultation process. Consultation, in terms of the ‘three ladders of participation’, culminates in ‘formal representation’, ‘formal negotiation’ and ‘self-management’. According to the authors, self-management is ideal in that it presupposes empowerment and active citizenship whereas the other two processes have a level of dependence indirectly assumed and or implied. In both theories, however, it is obvious that an ideal ‘higher order’ situation is the one in which citizens can either manage themselves or can negotiate for themselves and are therefore in ‘control’ of the situation, thereby determining their destiny.
Figure 9: Arnstein’s Ladder of Citizen Participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rung</th>
<th>Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Citizen control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Delegated power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Placation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Consultation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Informing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Therapy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Manipulation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Arnstein, A Ladder of Citizen Participation 1969:217)
4.2.2 The International Association for Public Participation

While Arnstein (1969) proposes eight levels of participation, the International Association for Public Participation suggests a “Spectrum of Participation” (International Association for Public Participation; 2007) ranging in the continuum from ‘informing’ communities to ‘empowering’ such communities, as shown in Figure 11. In terms of the model, ‘informing’ entails a simple dissemination of ‘balanced and objective information to assist them in understanding the problem, alternatives, opportunities and/ or solutions’ whereas empowering, at the other end of the spectrum, entails placing ‘the final decision-making in the hands of the public’. It is obvious from the model that, once again, informing is ‘power over’ or ‘pseudo-participation’ because officials normally have all the information to share and the community has nothing, whereas ‘genuine participation’ or ‘power with’ or ‘power to’
comprises collective engagement, partnerships and the ability to make decisions collectively. In this regard the Association presented a benchmark of core values of public participation, of some sorts, against which individuals and groups could test compliance with participation principles. This benchmark comprises such aspects as:

- **Basing public participation on the belief that those who are affected by a decision have a right to be involved in the decision-making process;**
- **Promising that the public’s contribution will influence the decision;**
- **Promoting sustainable decisions by recognizing and communicating the needs and interests of all participants, including decision makers;**
- **Seeking out and facilitating the involvement of those potentially affected by or interested in a decision;**
- **Seeking input from participants in designing how they participate;**
- **Providing participants with the information they need to participate in a meaningful way; and**
- **Communicating to participants how their input affected the decision.**
As has been stated throughout the discussion, the two highest levels of participation to be achieved for participation to be construed to have taken place, according to these theories, are ‘citizen control’ and ‘empowerment’. Both theories espouse the importance of ‘citizen control’ as the ultimate objective for meaningful participation. It is against these two theories, but in particular against the theory of the International Association of Public Participation, that the participation of the beneficiaries will be tested in the two case studies, i.e. whether hostels beneficiaries had control over the process or were empowered to run the process when the units were completed.
There are other theories that could be explored in an attempt to understand the disparate perspectives of, and discourses on participation. The two most prominent and interesting other theories to be explored is Levy’s theory of ‘Expanding Room for Manoeuvre’, as shown in Figure 13, because the theory speaks directly to the development of low-cost housing through participation, making it one of the most relevant contemporary theories on the subject, and Abbott’s ‘community participation surround’, in which he argues that the nature of the government framework, whether it is ‘closed’ or ‘open’ determines the participation paradigm to be prevalent in that particular environment. More than his arguments, Abbott’s theory is worth exploring because it is local, and therefore speaking to local conditions of participation.

4.2.3 Other theories

4.2.3.1 Community Participation Surround

Abbott (1996: 113), in his ‘Community Participation Surround’ theory, as shown in Figure 12, argues for the significance of the power of the participants in a participation process. Abbott elaborates the conventional continuum theories proposed by both Arnstein and the International Association of Public Participation by asserting that ‘power’ plays a significant role in the participation space. Abbott (1996; 112) cites Shepherd who argues that:

“Decision making processes are the most obvious instances of the exercise of power. Therefore if participation in decisions can be broadened or made effectively representative, this means that power is being shared and that groups formerly excluded from the exercise of power are included”

Abbott (1996) contends, in this theory, that progression from one level of participation in the continuum is affected by the amount of power the participants have in the decision making process. Abbott further relates the process of participation to the nature of government, i.e. whether government is ‘closed’ or ‘open’ in regard to the amount of power it is prepared to hand over to communities in a decision-making process. Thus to the original continuums Abbott has added to two variables namely ‘power’ and the ‘nature of government’, as reflected in the diagram below.
4.2.3.2 Expanding Room for Maneuver

Levy (2009), in her Expanding Room for Maneuver', proposes a need for strategic action in dealing with the issue of participation in housing development for underprivileged communities. Levy’s ‘strategic action’ is somewhat linked to the process of initiating action proposed by Wright (1995: 183). A synergy is established between these two authors.
because, unlike Arnstein and others who are descriptive in their perception of participation, these two authors are prescriptive in ‘proposing action’ as a logical conclusion to participation. As indicated in the discussion above, the only way in which communities can manifest their empowerment is by means of ‘action’.

Levy (2009) suggests that strategic action has to meet three criteria to be considered effective, and these criteria are:

- The creation of a reinforcing synergy;
- The generation of a cumulative multiplier effect; and
- The expansion of room for manoeuvre

Only two of these criteria will be discussed briefly, namely, ‘the creation of a reinforcing synergy’ and the ‘expansion of room for maneuver’. The two are examined because of their relevance to the discussion, and their applicability to the case study. ‘Creating reinforcing synergy’, according to Levy (2009; slide presentation), pertains to ‘setting precedents for disadvantaged people to define their role’ in the process because it reinforces that:

“the poor need to be able to claim, capture, refine and define certain ways of doing things in spaces they already control and then use these to show city-officials and external agencies that these are “precedents” that are worth investing in.”

This, according to D'Cruz & Satterthwaite (2004: 37) gives ‘legitimacy to the changes that the poor want to bring into a city strategy’. The next concept, namely “expanding the room for maneuver” as proposed by Levy, speaks to the gist of the discussion which advocates “inclusive, participative and collaborate bargaining and negotiation” and the revisiting of “goals, roles, priorities, procedures and resource allocations” in the development of low-cost housing. According to Levy (2009) ‘expanding social interaction and mobilization’ entails deepening and strengthening ‘involvement in modes of inclusive, participative and collaborate bargaining and negotiation’, while ‘improving technical behaviour’ refers to ‘professional (in the broadest sense) innovations and individual or group ethics and behaviours’. ‘Extending institutional and inter-organizational reforms’ speaks to the interrogation of ‘goals, roles, priorities, procedures and resource allocations’ for new meanings and explanations.

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8 This was extracted from a presentation by Caren Levy done at UCT in 2009.
Figure 13: Expanding the Room for Manoeuvre

Expanding the Room for Manoeuvre

(Source: Presentation by Levy at a Sustainability Seminar in the University of Cape Town (2009))

The last dimension, according to the model, refers to ‘enlarging the scope of strategic analysis and tactical response to the dynamics of urban development in time and place’.

What the strategy posits is that beneficiaries must be afforded an opportunity and ‘action space’ to be able to garner resources and information through the dimensions mentioned in the model and to be innovative enough to reconfigure the system to suit their own understanding of the task at hand. This could not have been more valid for low-cost housing because the sustainability of low-cost housing projects hinges on the four dimensions as explicated in the model. One would have to assess the extent to which the roll-out of the case studies related to the core values of the International Association of Public Participation and to the Arnstein’s ‘Ladder of Citizen Participation’. Both theories will have to be counter balanced to Levy’s ‘room for manoeuvre’ to assess if the case studies entail the principles espoused in the theories.

4.3. Objectives of Public Participation

Plummer (2000; 27) argues that the objective of public participation is generally “instrumental” in that it “increases the effectiveness and effectiveness of investment”.

(Safier: 2002: 127-8)
Plummer (2000) further states that public participation encourages a “rights-based approach to development”...and “poverty reduction” which propagates the “strengthening of civil society and democracy”. In the regard, Plummer (2000) argues that objectives of public participation resulting from the abovementioned approaches are:

- To provide infrastructure which is relevant to poor people’s needs and priorities;
- To ensure infrastructure meets the needs of women and other marginalized groups;
- To utilize local knowledge and human resources;
- To improve the quality of infrastructure;
- To improve the maintenance of infrastructure and services and decrease government responsibility for maintenance;
- To establish cost sharing arrangements; and
- To increase people’s ownership of services;

4.4 Public Participation Principles

Literature (Tikare: 2001; Smith and Jones 1981: 27; Paul (1987) in Penderis: 1996: 128) claims that, for the abovementioned theories to be successful, they must be operated within a specific set of basic principles. These principles, according to public participation literature (Tikare: 2001; Smith and Jones 1981: 27; Paul (1987) in Penderis: 1996: 128) render each participation process credible. There are, however, disputes among the very ‘experts’ about what constitutes appropriate principles. But these authors generally concur that institutions such as “councils have to change their practices and machinery and render institutions user-friendly and invitational” before these councils can even begin to look at credible participation processes. (Smith and Jones; 1981) According to Smith and Jones (1981) councils can do this by “promoting a culture of equality which will promote participation, with the understanding that the public will only participate where there is a vested interest”. Paul (1987) suggests that these principles of participation should be premised on the “transfer and multi-directional exchange of information”. This, Smith and Jones (1981) claim, will promote an “open government; informing the public what it is doing, and why”.

Paul (1987) identifies this principle as “initiating action”, a principle which, according to Paul, is “a high order dimension which entails the public proactively taking initiative and ownership of the service delivery process by acquiring greater control over the actions and decisions pertaining to their life situations”. This principle can be realisable through genuine consultation of the affected citizens (Paul: 1987) and characterised by a meaningful “interaction with beneficiaries on key issues” and an understanding of the basic reason for the need. Part of this genuine and meaningful engagement and interaction with beneficiaries, would require that common and “accurate terminology” (Smith and Jones: 1981: 28) be used
in the identification and articulation of common community issues. It also entails a genuine representation of the views and aspirations of the public and not a synthesized, filtered and processed view of events and needs.

Tikare et al. (2001) supports Smith and Jones and Paul. In fact in their conceptualization and articulation of these principles of participation. The only difference in the conceptualization is that Paul speaks of ‘principles’ whereas Tikare et al. (2001) refer to ‘pillars’ of participation. Tikare et al. (2001: 3) perceive these pillars of participation as "increased transparency; improved accountability; increased governance and economic efficiency, and an outcomes based approach". The challenge presented by two of these principles, namely “improved accountability and increased transparency” though, is their ‘quantifiability’ and measurability, to the extent that the concepts could be used to measure the success or failure of a participation process. Tikare’s principles therefore contribute very little value, if any, in the attempt to empirically quantify participation.

The Inter-American Strategy for the Promotion of Public Participation in Decision-Making for Sustainable Development (the Inter-American Strategy) in A Review of Public-Participation in the Law and Policy-making Process in South Africa (June 2001: Appendix: 2-7) introduces a simple and clear set of principles incumbent in the "internalization" of public participation by public institutions. The simple and cryptic set of basic principles is the following:

- **Proactivity.**

According to the Inter-American Strategy (2001: 2-7) ‘proactivity’ requires that governments and civil society take the initiative for public participation, in accordance with their respective roles, to develop their maximum potential and enrich the process of decision-making for sustainable development. This is assuming that governments and civil society would aspire for an effective participation process. What is a challenge, in most cases, is that governments, in particular, are not very enthusiastic about participation, usually. Civil society, generally, aspire for participation, and in most cases, groupings are viewed with suspicion or aspersions are cast on their bona fides.

- **Access**

This entails timely access to information to the political process, and to the justice system, at various levels of government, for the effective involvement of civil society in the development of decisions essential for lasting solutions. Not only is this principle significant for effective
participation it is also one of the pivotal principles of the ‘Batho Pele’ [People first] strategy of the South African government, and of ‘good governance’. Access is therefore pivotal to participation and to all the other concepts linked to participation. It is simple logic that there can be no participation where there is no access to information and to the political process, because the two concepts are the crux of any participation program.

- **Transparency**

Another principle of the Batho Pele strategy, emphasizes accountability and transparency on the part of all concerned parties in a decision-making process to foster productive relationships between civil society and government. Transparency, according to the Inter-American Strategy, ‘facilitates more meaningful participation’ by ensuring that all motivations and objectives are explicit and that ‘all information vital to the decision is reliable and available in a timely manner’.

- **Inclusiveness**

This principle cannot be over-emphasized, because no participation is worthy of the word if it is not inclusive, especially if the solutions are to be durable and sustainable. The principle, according to the Inter-American Strategy, is to stress the importance of the involvement of the private sector, and the creation of ‘equal opportunities for women and vulnerable groups such as indigenous populations, youth, disadvantaged racial and ethnic minorities, including disadvantaged populations of African descent, and other traditionally marginalized groups’.

The Inter-American Strategy, however, singles out minority groups of African descent as critical to inclusive decision-making but no effort is made or logic offered to explain why these minority groups of African descent are singled out, as against many other minority groups in the world.

- **Shared Responsibility**

The Inter-American Strategy argues that this principle, demands upon governments and civil society to share equitably the commitments, burdens, and benefits of development.
Respect for public input

In regard to this ‘principle’ the Inter-American Strategy proposes that citizen participation should only be effective and efficient if there is assurance that, in the process of decision-making, contributions deriving from participation are evaluated, analyzed, and given proper consideration in a timely manner. The credibility of municipalities is on the line because public participation is perceived as just a ‘talk show’ by beneficiaries. It is therefore imperative that a genuine attempt is made, at all times, to integrate the ideas of local communities in the decision making process as much as is possible.

Openness Throughout the Process

This principle, according to the Inter-American Strategy, addresses itself to the enrichment of outcomes, which inspires new ideas and expertise, and legitimizes decisions through the ‘inclusive and continuous participation’ of the public ‘throughout the process of design, implementation, and evaluation of projects, policies, or programs’. This principle highlights a key condition that is necessary for the successful promotion of public participation, premised on firm, and ongoing commitment from government and civil society to be inclusive in the process of governing. The public participation process of the case studies will have to be tested against these principles, at some stage in the research process, to measure whether the process qualifies to be declared successful. The litmus test will be the findings of the perception survey of the beneficiaries of the identified housing projects.

The USAID suggests a set of ‘values’ which lead to the achievement of the principles as proposed by the Inter-American Strategy. The set of ‘values’ which are central to any meaningful public participation process, according to the USAID are:

1. How the activity responds or contributes to efforts that people in the host country are already trying to do;
2. How fully consulted were potential customers (or affected populations), as well as other local stakeholders, to ensure that the program is consistent with their values and priorities;
3. How the approach provides greater voice and influence to the poor and disadvantaged;
4. How the approach puts information into the hands of customers (individuals, organizations, communities) to permit them to hold the organization and its partners accountable for the usefulness of the assistance provided;
5. How the activity strengthens the capacity of institutions throughout the society to carry out programs that are responsive to people’s priorities;
6. How the approach strengthens and broadens communication among players in the development process;
7. How the activity or approach unleashes innovation and local initiative;
MacLagan and Nel (1995: 61), in conclusion, supplement the ‘values’ proposed by the USAID by adding dimensions like ‘customer focus, commitment to performance, shared power rights and responsibilities; access; internalized control; respect for the balance of rational and non-rational; thinking close to doing; broad legitimacy; diversity; and learning’ as also important to the achievement of public participation principles.

4.5 Advantages and Disadvantages of Public Participation

4.5.1 Advantages of Public Participation

When looking at the four theories above, it is evident that there is merit in punting active citizenship as one of the most significant advantage of public participation. Houston et. al (2001: 239), in their study of the Integrated Development Process of the Pretoria Municipality, confirm that any public participation process gives rise to positive advantages for a particular community. Literature (Pieterse: 2000; Houston: 2001; OECD: 2004) does support the notion that public participation does bring about positive results in that it mobilizes communities, and activates urban populations which tend to be mostly individualized, uncommitted, and in extreme cases, alienated. This view is shared by Bekker (1996: 32) in Houston (2001: 217) who views one of the key advantages of public participation as “enhancing the potential for local authorities to meet the expectations of the inhabitants of the local area”, thereby leading these communities to “empowerment”, as envisaged by the International Association of Public Participation. Houston et al. (2001: 217-218), also endorse Bekker’s point of view that public participation does promote “legitimacy and public support for the policies and programmes of local authorities and thereby ensuring democratic stability”. The author further states that participation “encourages community development by building civil capacity and spreading skills gained through participation”.

Another significant advantage of public participation, and indeed participatory democracy, in the delivery of services and urban poverty reduction, is articulated by the UN-HABITAT, in their concept paper, (March 2002: 5) where it is stated that ‘UN-HABITAT’s experience is that participatory processes are the best means for “ensuring the effective use of scarce development resources, for the equitable distribution of development benefits, and for ensuring the sustainability of hard-won benefits”. This advantage, in my view, highlights the positive role played by participation in ensuring the sustainability of limited resources, and which, as we all know, are always challenged by unlimited needs. The UN-HABITAT further claims that, through participation it is possible for the urban poor to “influence local decision-making to determine the “pro-poorness” of local strategic planning, priority setting and capital
investments”. (UNHABITAT: 2002: 5) Participation, according to the UN-HABITAT, encapsulates the notion of an “inclusive city” [as shown in diagram in Chapter 7], which propagates that cities must be places “where everyone, regardless of wealth, gender, age, race or religion, is enabled to participate productively and positively in the opportunities cities have to offer”. (UN-HABITAT: 2002: 3)

Among the reasons Houston et al. (2000) mention as advantageous for communities are that any public participation process:

- Enables the community to be a major stakeholder in determining the agenda, vision and objectives for development in the municipal area;
- Involves people who are familiar with the issues and concerns of the community they represent;
- Enables different communities to reach common ground and develop a united approach to issues affecting each community in the area;
- Promotes the feeling of ownership of local government programmes and projects among communities;
- Promotes capacity building and increases the potential for enhancing relations between any council and the community.

Oakley (1991) in Kumar (2002: 27-28) identifies the advantages of participation as:

- Efficiency in the utilization of resources, which emanates from a collaborative approach to decision-making;
- Effectiveness which is due to participation in not only decisions regarding objectives and strategies, but also in the implementation;
- Self-reliance through their awareness, self-confidence, and control of the development process;
- Coverage which ensures that participation benefits reach the target group;
- Sustainability which results from the sense of ownership that people experience due to their involvement.

De Visser and Baatjies (2007: 625) add a few other advantages of participation namely:

- The provision of vitality to the functioning of representative democracy;
- The encouragement of citizens to be actively involved in public affairs;
- The enhancement of civic dignity of those who participate by enabling their voices to be heard and taken account of;
- The promotion of a spirit of democratic and pluralistic accommodation calculated to produce laws that are likely to be widely accepted and effective in practice;
- The strengthening of legitimacy in the eyes of the people.

All these advantages make public participation the ideal intervention for the problems currently bedevilling local government.
4.5.2 Disadvantages or Limitations of Public Participation

Cleaver cited in Cooke and Kothari (2004; 36) contends that though ‘heroic claims for participatory approaches to development’ have been made there is little evidence of “the long term effectiveness of participation in materially improving the conditions of the most vulnerable people or as a strategy for social change.” Another argument advanced by Cleaver (2001; 44) as problematic about participation and its approaches is its emphasis on “solidarity within communities” which “acknowledges social stratification”, at the exclusion of what Cleaver (2001) refers to as “processes of conflict, and negotiation, inclusion and exclusion”.

Another significant criticism participation processes is that the rate of development is mostly slowed down due to the time it takes to get communities to reach a consensus on issues (Soen et al.: 1984: 217). This, according to the authors, results from the fact that “often, participation groups are opposing each other to such an extent that no decision can be made”, or that decisions take time to be made. Oakley et al. (1991) cited in Kumar (2002: 28) corroborate this view indirectly where they contend that “since participation is a process, once it is initiated, the process has to be allowed to take its own course and hence may not move along the expected time lines”. One of the motivations put forth by Kumar as contributing to the delay in the realization of development goals in a participatory process is that participation, by its very nature, is an “empowering process where the people and communities are empowered to make decisions”. Donors and governments, and other significant role players, claims Kumar, have to ‘relinquish power and control, something which is not easy’. Power relations often get in the way of the decision making process and hence the delay. According to Mansuri and Rao (2013; 5) normally a large injection of resources for a participatory development project can, for example, attract the attention of the better off, making exclusion more likely. It is the exclusion of the minorities that results in opposition to decisions because often than not, whatever the less fortunate do not possess is compensated by their numbers, which makes decisions difficult to reach if consensus is sought.

The Inter-American Strategy for the Promotion of Public Participation in Decision-Making for Sustainable Development (June 2001: Appendix: 2-7) suggests, though, that ‘citizen participation will only be effective and efficient if there is assurance that, in the process of decision-making, contributions deriving from participation are evaluated, analyzed, and given proper consideration in a timely manner’. If any process does not have any “respect for public input” then it will have failed to comply with one of the most significant ‘principles’ of
participation. Further regarding the empowerment process the level of development of the
individuals and communities is not necessarily the same, with those less developed
struggling to catch up and hence the delay in the process, sometimes. Sometimes the less
developed, and or previously disadvantaged individuals ‘hijack’ the process under the pretext
that they do not understand, when in actual fact, they are using their ‘disadvantage’ to
advantage themselves.

Pieterse, in his undated working notes (2004; 12) expands on the criticism leveled against
public participation by stating that public participation, inter alia:

i. Legitimizes decisions that are taken by proxies of elite interests and consequently
fulfills a function of cooptation through ‘corporatist localism’;
ii. Potentially subverts the emergence of oppositional political discourses and
practices by framing such actions as illegitimate and undemocratic, because
these emanate from outside of the negotiation framework;
iii. Reinforces divisions within poor and marginalized communities because these
forums tend to draw in relatively better-off community associations that crowd-out
less organized and articulate associations;
iv. Undermines informal and non-rational livelihood strategies of the poor through an
insistence on working with formal planning framework and rationalities;

Another disadvantage leveled against public participation is that it becomes an end in itself,
instead of a means to an end. What this means is that its success is measured by means of
how many people participated and not by the impact such participation has on service
delivery and decision-making. Houston et al. (2001: 220) suggest that any ‘participation
programme can only be judged to be effective if the participants, through their participation,
have some influence over any resultant decisions’. This is a significant challenge to many
municipalities where after so many years of public participation very little has changed in the
way decisions are made, and where the ward committee system, established to provide a
platform for participation by local communities ended up, as Houston pointed out, an
‘alternative power base’ against councils, particularly ward councilors. More so much as most
municipalities have public participation processes, as per legislation, many do not have a
method or tool of checking the impact of such processes in the decision-making processes of
councils. Hence municipalities resort to claiming that participation is not implementable.

Mostly communities often appear uncertain about their priorities, and dichotomies emerge.
There is also the problem of sufficient, equal and legitimate representation, which, if not
sufficient, impedes decision-making;
Another constraint in participation according to De Villiers (2001: 33) is the challenge of time. Participation, by its very nature, is a time consuming exercise, something which makes it difficult for women who are breadwinners to actively engage in. Many women, in particular, claims De Velliers, prefer to utilize the time ‘constructively’ organizing resources for the family than to participate in endless, and seemingly fruitless discussions.

Another challenge incumbent in participation processes is the diverse nature of ‘communities of interest’. Treating communities like homogenous groups therefore becomes self-defeating, if the different ‘communities of interest’ are not taken into consideration. What complicates the process, according to Houston et al. (2001: 219) is that ‘alternative power bases...’ emerge and these ‘alternative power bases’ challenge existing established structures and which, in most cases, have been legitimately installed. A case in point of these competing powers is that of Ward Committees, who are frequently rendered inoperable because some members of the community believe that the structures are serving the interests of the ‘regime’. Participation suffers in the process of organizing the legitimacy of the committee. Burkey (1993: 59-60) identifies areas, which he believes, are instrumental in creating these “alternative power bases” (Houston et.al; 2001), which generally render participation processes a challenge. These he indicates as:

- The development of participation in different ways in specific situations dependent upon the problems faced by specific groups and the specific factors inhibiting their development;
- Social classes to be approached as a specific group and their economic situation, which has to be improved for participation to be successful. Burkey (1993: 60) contends that this ‘automatically implies conflict with more well-to-do elements in differentiated societies’;
- The complex relationship between self-reliance and the need for external assistance.
- The organization required for participation to take place;
- Participatory processes, which are normally initiated by leadership, whose vision is external to the perceptions and aspirations of the people concerned.

4.6. Causes of failure in public participation

If public participation is this panacea to most social challenges, but specifically, to municipal service delivery unrest why is it such a monumental failure in South Africa? Siddle and Koelble (2012: 139-140) address some of the causes of the failures of public participation in South Africa. Of the most significant causes, according to Siddle and Koelble (2012), is the “lack of social capital” which the authors claim, “prevails in South Africa”, and the lack of “interest or capacity to apply” the “comprehensive and sophisticated institutional design of the public participation mechanisms” provided for in legislation and national policy. Siddle
and Koelble (2012) define ‘social capital’ as that “set of informal rules, norms and long term relationships that facilitate coordinated action and enable people to undertake cooperative ventures for mutual advantage”. The authors suggest the development non-governmental organizations as a possible way of handling participation outside formal structures.

Pieterse (2004: 14), in his working notes, contends that one of the causes of a failure of participation is that it normally takes place only within formal structures of government. The author argues that participation between state institutions, the private sector and civil society should not only take place in formal structures. It can and should operate within five delineated distinct domains, namely “representative forums; neo-corporatist political forums that are comprised of representative organizations, typically the government, the private sector, trade unions and community-based organizations; direct action or mobilization against state policies or to advance specific political demands; the politics of development practice, especially at the grassroots; and symbolic political contestation as expressed through discursive contestation in the public sphere”. In South Africa participation often takes place by means of all the mediums mentioned by Pieterse, but mostly through ‘neo-corporatist political forums comprised of representative organizations such as government and community-based organizations’. These, in the case of South Africa, are formally instituted structures normally directed by parliament or local municipalities. Hickey and Mohan (2004: 78) proffer that formal participation, in most cases, always takes place along ‘unofficial spaces of everyday life’ even though it is taking place in formally instituted structures. This may be one of the significant reasons for failure because South Africa has tried to institutionalize participation and has not allowed space for civil engagement, as has been the case pre-democracy. As can be seen in Figure 14, participation does not only take place formally, it can also take place by means of “development practice at neighborhood scale” and by means of “social mobilization through direct action”, as well. In these cases citizens and the public utilize other conduits in society to communicate and participate in the discourse regarding services and decision-making processes. One such means of communicating dissatisfaction, which has recently become popular again, are protest marches, which if subdued, take a violent form. Sometimes these protest marched and mass meetings are generally so disorganized that the purpose and objective is lost in the process, as has been observed in the City of Cape Town and in Bekkersdal in the year 2013.
Most often than not, these methods are not seen as participation in the truest sense of the word, but could be construed as such, if the definition of participation is considered in its broadest and liberal sense. Pieterse (2004; 9) subsequently corroborates his viewpoint, in his notes, by stating that:

*The point about participatory local governance is to increase the democratic oversight of active citizens, especially those whose human rights are systematically denied due to inadequate services and lack of opportunities. However this is unlikely to take root unless citizens are well organized and supported by municipal government to actively organize themselves to independent and articulate voices.*

Protests, whether organized or not, are an informal way by which communities exercise their 'oversight role', especially in cases of 'inadequate services and lack of opportunities'. This is so because after every protest a policy announcement is normally made to deal with the matter concerning unrest and disillusionment in the community. The example of the service delivery protests of 2009-2010 in South Africa are, once again, a case in point of...
communities forcing the hand of government to make decisions regarding the delivery of quality services in their respective areas.

Outside local government, national government has led the way in terms of creating spaces for participation through national parliament. Some of the institutions and structures available in parliament to promote public participation are, for an example, parliamentary standing committees, joint committees, ad hoc committees established to “monitor, investigate, enquire into, and make recommendations relating to any aspect of the legislative programme, budget, rationalization, restructuring, functioning, organization, structure, personnel, policy formulation or any other matter it may consider relevant and summon any person to appear before it to give evidence or to produce documents required by it” (de Villiers: 2001: 45). These committees, further claims de Villiers (2001), also provide a point of entry to the parliamentary participation process by means of the public hearings which allow the general public an opportunity to comment on policy issues before they are legislated. To ensure participation in each area, these committees are established in such a way that there is a committee at the national assembly for each department and the National Council of Provinces has its own similar structures.

Whether participation is taking place within formal or informal structures certain principles must be adhered to for participation to succeed. The following section will deal with those principles critical for participation to be successful.

4.7 Hirschmann's Model of Voice, Exit and Loyalty

4.7.1 The theoretical background of the model

The Exit, Voice and Loyalty model arose out of a commercial observation of the reaction of customers to a decline in the quality of services, and “in particular, processes related to how consumers respond to perceived dissatisfaction”. (Singh: 1991: 2) The theory, according to literature, (Withy and Cooper: 1989; van der Land and Doff: 2010) was subsequently used “in understanding how individuals may act when things are not going well”. (Withy and Cooper: 1989: 521) According to van der Land and Doff (2010: 431) the Exit, Voice and loyalty model claims that “consumers react to a decline in product quality by either voice or exit”. The theory is based on the principle that “firms, organizations, and states recover from declines in their fortunes to the extent that exit –permanent movement away from the organization-and voice-attempting to improve it-bring about change”. (Withy and Cooper;
The reaction of the dissatisfied user of a particular product or service, whether it will tend towards exit or voicing ones opinion, according to literature (Withey and Cooper; 1989; Hirshmann: 1970; van der Land and Doff: 2010; Allen and Tuselmann: 2009; Hoffmann: 2006) is determined by the ‘cost implications of the action, the efficacy of the action, and the attractiveness of the setting’ of the dissatisfying event. For an example, if the cost of exit is great the individual would have to consider voicing dissatisfaction but if the cost is minimal the individual may opt to exit. Similarly, if there is an element of attraction to the ‘dissatisfier’ then the individual may opt for “voice” instead of exit.

Van der Land and Doff (2010:431) define the voice part of the framework as, “an active tactic, either individually or collectively, to express discontent verbally” and includes, inter alia, an “active appeal or protest and an attempt to change circumstances rather than to escape from them”. Voice, claims Hirschman (1970: 30), is “any attempt at all to change, rather than to escape from, an objectionable state of affairs, whether through individual or collective petition to the management directly in charge, through appeal to a higher authority with the intention of forcing a change in management, or through various types of actions and protests, including those that are meant to mobilize public opinion”. What the voice theory contends is that if an individual is dissatisfied with the quality of the service or product that individual will voice his or her dissatisfaction.

Hirschman (1970: 31) contends that the voice theory operates on the assumption that “there is a decline in the performance of a firm or organization which is remediable, provided the attention of management is sufficiently focused on the task”. To Allen and Tuselmann (2009: 541-542) information sharing is a cardinal aspect of the voice construct. It “… has the function of alerting a firm or organization, or association or cooperative [my addition] to its failings” (Hirschman: 1970: 33) cited in Allen and Tusselmann (2009: 541-542). The voice of customers or, mutatis mutandis, workers and members of a cooperative [my emphasis] in a company, according to Hirschman cited in Allen and Tusselmann (2009: 542), aids the sharing of information between managers and employees or members [my addition].

Singh (1991; 3) claims that, “by exit a consumer voluntarily terminates an exchange relationship such as by switching patronage to another product, service, and/ or retailer. Exit, according to van der Land and Doff (2010: 431), is a "dichotomous variable", in that it is either "you leave or you do not exit and leave a neighbourhood where a change has occurred with unfavorable outcomes for [you]." People and or consumers can ‘exit’ by withdrawing from the neighbourhood in a social sense or by avoiding particular places. (van der Land and Doff: 2010: 431) Exit is said to take place, therefore, when a user abandons or stop using a
service or product, or “reduces his use by withdrawing from it” (van der Land and Doff: 2010: 432) because of dissatisfaction with the quality.

Hirschman, cited in Hoffmann (2006: 2314) defines loyalty as loyalty to the organization, which is described by Withey and Cooper (1989: 522) as a “product of factors that tie the individual to the organization, making exit costly and undermining voice”. Hirschman, cited in Hoffmann (2006), explains loyalty as taking place when ‘people who have an exit option will stay and, instead, engage in voice if (1) “they're willing to forgo the certainty of exit and embrace the uncertainty of possible improvement and (2) they believe they can influence the organization”. In this way, "loyalty holds exit at bay and activates voice" in that it lessens the attractive ease of exiting by raising the cost of exit, making the exertion needed for voice less unappealing. Hirschman, cited in van der Land and Doff (2010: 432), explains loyalty as that which “discourages exit and stimulates voice”. In his simple explanation of the concept Hirschmann claims that, “… a loyal person is likely to choose voice”, but if the person “is not loyal, then it is more likely that an exit tactic will be chosen.” According to Hoffmann (2006: 2315) those people “who have paid dearly to enter will be disinclined to exit readily or to stay and remain passive, but rather will embrace voice to address the problems they see”. Similarly, high exit costs might have a similar effect, further claims Hoffmann (2006) in that “those for whom exit demands great sacrifice will be hesitant to exit and will, instead, consider the option of voice”. The presence of loyalty makes cooperative members “more likely to anticipate engaging in voice” whereas the “absence of loyalty” renders participants “less likely to include voice in their dispute resolution strategies”. (Hoffmann: 2320)

Hirschman cited in Dunn (2010: 570) defines loyalty as “the extent to which customer-members are willing to trade off the certainty of exit against the uncertainties of an improvement in the deteriorated product”.

4.7.2 The relevance and application of the model

Given that the Hirschmann model originated from applications in the private sector, and more specifically the retail sector, its relevance and application to the public service sector requires comment. In the case of the two case studies the model could be said to be applicable and relevant since potential beneficiaries could ‘exit’ the program, at any given moment, for reasons which may include dissatisfaction with either the participation process or the housing products produced by the cooperative.

Hoffmann (2006: 2315) alleges that some researchers claim that the benefits of co-ownership and greater participation result in stronger loyalty to the organization as well as
heightened worker satisfaction and greater productivity. Members of worker Cooperatives, claims Hoffmann (2006), “may have greater loyalty to their workplaces than employees of conventional businesses due to the members' ideological commitment to this particular type of organization, the buy-in cost of putting forward one's own capital to join the business, or both”. According to Hoffmann (2006), the extant literature demonstrates that simply owning a share of the business may not be enough to produce greater loyalty, but collective management and worker participation also appear to be necessary.

4.8 Methodology

4.8.1 Research methodology

In assessing the extent to which the beneficiaries of both programs participated in the program, the International Association for Public Participation model was used. This model, as indicated in Chapter 3, propagates a spectrum of participation processes ranging from ‘informing’ communities to ‘empowering’ such communities. In terms of the model displayed in Figure 12, ‘informing’ entails a simple dissemination of ‘balanced and objective information to assist them in understanding the problem, alternatives, opportunities and/ or solutions’ whereas empowering, at the other end of the spectrum, entails placing ‘the final decision-making in the hands of the public’, whereas empowerment, which meant full participation in the decision-making process entailed “placing the final decision in the hands of the public”.

The benchmark of core values of public participation, as proposed by the Association, was utilized as a tool to measure compliance with participation principles, and to categorize the responses of the beneficiaries in line with the ‘spectrum’. The following principles were tested:

- Was public participation based on the belief that those who are affected by a decision have a right to be involved in the decision-making process;
- Were the participants promised that their contribution will influence the decision;
- Were sustainable decisions promoted by recognizing and communicating the needs and interests of all participants, including decision makers;
- Was the involvement of those potentially affected by or interested by decisions sought out and facilitated;
- Was the input from participants considered in designing how they participate;
- Were participants provided with the information they needed to participate in a meaningful way in such a decision making process; and
Was it communicated to participants how their input will affect the decision;

Figure 15: International Association for Public Participation: Spectrum of Public Participation

(Sources: www. The International Association for Public Participation)

The basis for measuring perceptions of satisfaction with the project was Hirschman’s model of “exit, voice, and loyalty”. The unit of measure was the extent to which beneficiaries left or remained with the project, as and when they experienced satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the project, especially in so far as their participation was concerned, and how they expressed or not expressed their views in regard to the project, and their ability to choose whether they would leave—which was to exit in the Hirschmann model, or remain with the project—as in loyalty. In terms of this model, the options beneficiaries had, insofar, as the opportunity to
exercise their option to express their dissatisfaction, or their ability to exit the program when dissatisfied, was to be tested, as a measure of their satisfaction or dissatisfaction. Beneficiaries had an opportunity to exit the program either by not participating in the beneficiary savings scheme, or selling their share at the cooperative to an interested beneficiary, thereby excluding themselves from being members of the cooperative.

4.8.2 Research design

Mouton (2001: 160) claims that if the main aim of a research is to establish the success or effectiveness of a programme or intervention or to assess outcomes and or impact, then the research could easily be classified as a quasi-experimental outcomes study. This form of research, claims the author, seeks to establish if the programme has materialised or not. The research topic, by its nature, seeks a quasi-experimental approach because it seeks to establish a “causal” relationship (Freeman and Sherwood; 1970; 56) between public participation, as an independent variable, and satisfaction of the beneficiaries, as a dependent variable. The research design used, however, is an “exploratory” (de Vos et. al; 2002; 9) qualitative comparative case study design, using mostly qualitative data. The reason for the type of design is that two case studies, similar in formation, are compared with each other to decipher what exactly is the cause of the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of the beneficiaries in the participatory process and in the houses they occupy.

A study of the nature described above can only be justifiably dealt with if a multifaceted approach to gathering data was adopted. Though the data gathering methodology could have been planned as more quantitative than qualitative, the exploratory approach was chosen both since this promised to produce more data on beneficiaries’ views on participation as well as to identify other factors unknown to the researcher influencing satisfaction or dissatisfaction. In-depth questions based on a questionnaire which was prepared beforehand, were posed to beneficiaries and in focus group settings, to explore what the respondents were bringing to the research. In this regard, the research utilised different forms of data gathering methods such as a literature survey, semi-structured questionnaires administered to respondents of the two case studies, and open-ended interviews held with municipal officials, Architects from ACG, Suppliers, and officials of the parent companies. Because many respondents could not read or write, the questionnaires were completed by the researcher on their behalf. The literature survey was done to build the historical narrative upon which the research will be based and to sketch the theoretical background of the research topic.
Two case studies were identified, namely Ilinge Labahlali, in Hlazo Village, Nyanga and Welcome Zenzile, in Langa. These case studies were identified because they could “provide the insights required to bring the problem into focus and to develop a framework for a study.” (Freeman and Sherwood; 1970; 98) Hostels in Gugulethu could not be chosen because, at the time of research, there was no functional cooperative in any of the hostels that were converted into family units, and the remaining single-sex hostels were in a state of disrepair. The case study method was a research method of choice because in a case study ‘data can be organized in a way that it preserves the unitary character of the social object being studied’ (Alan and Skinner; 1991; 191) especially where the ‘parameters of the two cases are clear; the focus groups are known; the unit of analysis and the time involved is known’. (Henning; 2004; 40) In the case of the two Hostel Redevelopment Programs all the above could be determined beforehand. Case studies also allow for a variety of data-gathering methods, hence the approach is adaptable to the type of research under review.

Very little research, if any, has been done in South Africa in the field of the Hostel Redevelopment Program, especially to understand, specifically, the perceptions of beneficiaries towards the program as a result of their perceived participation in the redevelopment of their hostel. The study of public participation in low-cost housing has also not been done, extensively, where one could argue that inferences can be made from such a study. Most research in public participation has been done in the area of service delivery. The fact that the two cases are housing cooperatives, a concept that is unfamiliar to the South African housing agenda makes the study significant.

Findings from the research may be applicable to other similar cases of hostel development, be they in the public, private or grey sectors. The mechanics of involving beneficiaries in the development of their old hostels is still new to South Africa. The findings of this study will help future cooperatives get a clearer understanding of the ingredients suitable for success in the redevelopment of hostels. Findings will definitely generate more curiosity in the area of participation in other local government services, as public participation in service delivery is topical in areas occupied by the previously disadvantaged sections of our communities.

4.8.3 The rationale for the two case studies: The Welcome Zenzile case and the Ilinge Labahlali

The research universe will be two cooperatives established as part of the ‘Hostels to Homes’ program which was rolled out in the three established erstwhile Black Local Authority
townships in Cape Town, namely Gugulethu, Langa and Nyanga. Both sites are not far from the Cape Town central business district, as can be seen in Map 1, with Langa being approximately eight (8) kilometers from the city center and Nyanga being about twelve (12) kilometers from the city center. The research sites were selected because they are both structured along ‘co-operative’ principles, and the hostel units, in both, had already undergone the program and the family units already occupied by beneficiary families. The other significant criteria for identifying the two sites was that one of the hostels could be identified as traditionally a “grey sector hostel” and another a “public sector hostel” (Urban Sector Network: 2003: 4) The two sites were compared because of the participation dynamics that led to the unique designs, processes and procedures for the allocation of the units in each site, the uniqueness of each of the hostel development programs, something which, according to the findings of the researcher, may have led to the different perceptions of the success or failure of the projects.

4.8.4 Target population and samples

The exercise of compiling a sample compelled one to identify the list of stakeholders involved, as a starting point. These stakeholders, as will be seen in chapters 5 and 6, were divided into primary, secondary and tertiary stakeholders. The primary stakeholders for the sample were beneficiaries, themselves, and the respondents who exited the program, because the research was about their perceptions. Beneficiaries, in the case of the Nyanga case, established what they called a Member’s Board, made up of two members from each savings club, to manage the affairs of the Cooperative on behalf of the members. The Board, in turn, elected six (6) executive members from among the Board Members to take responsibility for the day- to-day operations of the Cooperative. The Chairperson and Treasurer of the Board were the most active executive board members, at the time of research, who were working full-time as administrators in the Office of the Cooperative.

In the case of the Langa Cooperative a Management Committee made up of ten (10) members was established to manage the affairs of the Cooperative. The Committee then nominated a Chairperson who would convene meetings of the Management Committee to discuss the affairs of the Cooperative. The Management Committee had three (3) sub-committees each convened by a Convenor. The Chairperson and the Convenors were meant to be the Executive of the Management Committee, but at the time of the research only the Chairperson was an active member of the Management Committee.
Map 1: Langa (Green) and Nyanga (Purple/Turquoise) in relation to the Cape Town Central Business District

(Source: City of Cape Town: Department of Geographic Information Systems)

The target population group, as explained in the description of the research universe was the residents of the two old hostel complexes, i.e. the Nyanga Hostels and the ‘Barracks’, in Langa, who participated or did not participate in the Hostel Redevelopment Program of a
particular section of hostels in Hlazo Village, in Nyanga and a portion of the “Barracks” in Langa. The reason for identifying those who did not participate in the program was to establish the reasons for these beneficiaries not to participate, an action regarded as ‘exiting’ in the Hirschmann model. The reason was also to establish the stage at which such ‘exits’ took place. This will be significant to understand the participation dynamics, especially in the Welcome Zenzile case, where the majority of hostel dwellers did not participate in the program, for one or other reason. The lists were subjected to a "systematic random sampling" (Burton: 2000: 309) in which the 10th name in the official list of occupants and beneficiaries of the family units was chosen. In the case where the 10th person was not available the 11th name on the list of beneficiaries would be chosen. Fifty-one (51) household heads, in total, were identified for the research. Thirty-seven respondents were from Nyanga and only twenty-nine (29) could be found. Fourteen (14) respondents were from Langa, and these being 10% of the total number of people on the lists provided by the Management Committee and the Board. Eight (8) respondents who ‘exited’ from the programs were identified, five (5) from Nyanga and three (3) from Langa. The respondents ranged in age from the age of sixty-three (63) to the thirty-seven (37). The information about respondents is provided in Annexure 3. The wide variety of reasons for their satisfaction was a reflection of the age difference. Only registered family heads or their partners or spouses were interviewed, because these were the people who participated officially in the program or who could answer all the questions pertaining to their stages of participation or give a detailed account of their perceptions throughout the process.

There was no specific gender preference as the criteria for selection were mainly based on whether a respondent participated or not in the program and if the respondent participated, whether that respondent was a member of a savings club or not. Membership of a savings club was critical, as a criterion for selection, because no beneficiary could participate in the project or benefit from the program unless he or she was a member of the savings club first and foremost. Withdrawal from the savings club was an indication of withdrawal from the program. It was clear, however, that the ‘exits’ that were identified from the Langa case study were acquaintances of the community leader because he also could provide their contact details, immediately. The reason for the small sample of five (5) in Nyanga was that the Chairperson of the Board assisted with identifying the “exits” and as a result he only identified people he was working with in starting a new redevelopment program, which was to start soon.

The names of the respondents who “exited” the program, i.e. those who did not participate, were sourced from the Chairperson of the Board in the case of the Nyanga case study,
because the Board was assisting this group to develop their old hostels, at the time of the research. In the case of Langa the three names identified were obtained from the ex-member and only surviving member of the Western Cape Hostel Dwellers Association, and verified by both the Chairperson of the Management Committee and the municipal official responsible for hostels redevelopment, as reliable respondents. These respondents were staying in undeveloped hostels opposite or close by the developed hostel.

Three open ended interviews were held with the Head of Special projects of the City of Cape Town to verify the responses of the beneficiaries and to confirm validity of information, because he was the main official of the City of Cape Town who was responsible for the hostel redevelopment program, and the only official most knowledgeable about hostel redevelopment. He also provided a lot of information in regard to hostel residents who were active in the hostel redevelopment program and or who will be able to assist me with what information.

Both the Chairpersons of the Board and the Management Committee were the first respondents to be interviewed in both sites because it was through their cooperation that one could gain their trust and confidence. In the Nyanga case, the Chairperson was always accompanied by the Treasury of the Board, who acted as some kind of backup whenever the Chairperson could not respond to a particular question or could not remember facts, or was not available to meet with myself. Unlike the Nyanga case, members of the Management Committee of Welcome Zenzile were never met as a collective. Only the Chairperson was met and the meetings took place in his house, with no other member present. At no stage did the Chairperson of Welcome Zenzile mention names of his Committees. He always referred to Committees members by their title, not surname.

The only member of the Hostel Dwellers Association still staying in hostels was also interviewed to verify and confirm some of the facts and data collected during the fieldwork and interview. He also became a contact point for the Langa residents who exited the program.

From the parent companies, the Project Manager assigned by Peninsula Beverages was interviewed to confirm the participation of the company in the program, and so was the owner of Racec. The two respondents were interviewed telephonically, because this was the only convenient method of interviewing at the time.
A representative of NewRes, the company that provided building material was also interviewed to get an understanding of the relationship the company had with the Board, in the case of Nyanga.

4.8.5 Data Collection

Three methods of gathering data were utilized in the research. These were namely a literature survey of material dealing with the two cases, semi-structured questionnaires administered using ‘systematic random sampling’ (Burton: 2000: 309), and interviews with specifically selected respondents such as Municipal officials, Board members and Owners or representatives of parent companies, and community leaders. These three methods of data collection were chosen because very little research has been done in the field of hostels, especially in South Africa, and therefore there is very little reference material. The administration of the questionnaire was twinned with interviews, because not all respondents could write. The questionnaire therefore had limitations, as a method of collecting data.

The primary source documents for information on the historical background of the research in the literature survey, was mostly national legislation, Council policy and decisions of the City of Cape Town, White and Green papers, Commission Reports. Other relevant municipal source documents, such as the Integrated Development Plans were also consulted for information. The historical background and data on past practices was primarily gathered by means of interviews conducted with officials of the housing department of the City of Cape Town, working mainly with the hostel redevelopment. One particular official, the Head of the unit, contributed most of the information as he initiated the process, first as a member of the Hostel Dwellers Association, then as an employee of a non-governmental organization dealing with hostel-dweller issues and subsequently appointed by the City of Cape Town as a member of unit established to implement the Hostels-to-Homes program of the City of Cape Town, a hostel redevelopment strategy of the City of Cape Town.

Most of the historical data and information on the hostel program and the co-operative was sourced from beneficiaries and members of the Board of each cooperative. One official from the national department of Human Settlements dealing with the Hostel Redevelopment Program was also interviewed, telephonically, so as to understand the role of the department in the two projects.
As mentioned in the previous paragraph, semi-structured questionnaires - attached as annexure 1 - were administered to respondents but often completed by the researcher. These questionnaires were used for all respondents, i.e. the 10% of the beneficiaries selected randomly from the beneficiary lists of both case studies. There were two slightly different questionnaires, in that the first questionnaire, used in the 2008-2009 fieldwork, did not test the second variable based on Hirschmann’s theory, i.e. the voice, loyalty, and exit theory. It only tested for participation as articulated by the International Association for Public Participation. It is the second fieldwork with the Welcome Zenzile that tested both variables.

For the iLinge labaHlali Cooperative, a second round of fieldwork had to be undertaken in 2013, to test for the voice, loyalty, and exit imperative. Only residents of the hostels who were beneficiaries and potential bona fide participants and those who purposefully opted to exit from the program were asked to respond. Those residents who did not opt for the program were also subjected to the same questionnaire to establish the reasons why they decided to exercise the option of not participating.

Questions to the respondents, in both case studies, were posed in isiXhosa because most, if not all, of the respondents felt comfortable speaking in their mother–tongue, except for one community-worker who stayed in the Nyanga site, who was a graduate from the University of the Western Cape who insisted on being interviewed in English, as he claimed to be comfortable in the English language. The rest of the respondents were interviewed in the vernacular. The translations into English were done by me and recorded in writing on each questionnaire.

Contact with respondents was made mainly during weekends and after hours because of the working patterns of the respondents, which were very different. Some of the beneficiaries working for the Parmalat group, for instance, started very early and finished during the day, times which did not suit a full-time working individual, like myself. The fact that respondents could only be seen during Weekends and after hours contributed, somewhat, to the time taken to complete a questionnaire because where a respondent was contacted after working hours the engagement would be more relaxed and longer, but where the questionnaire was administered before they started their work shifts, the time taken to answer the questions would be quicker, as was the case with one respondent from Langa, with whom I spent only about 15 minutes of the usual thirty (30) to forty-five (45) minutes because I could only see him before he assumed his late-night shift. The interaction could not be recorded as many of the Nyanga respondents felt very uncomfortable with being recorded. Only summarised notes of each session were taken and these were summarized into a report that was translated into the findings.
In the case of both study areas, “probability samples” (Burton: 2000: 309) were chosen because of the nature of the similarity in respondents. For an example all respondents were occupants of either the unconverted hostels or the converted family units. Beneficiaries had the same criteria for qualification and membership. The only difference or individuality in the case studies was in the manner in which each respondent participated or not in the project and that respondent’s level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the project. Otherwise each participant, in both case studies, had an equal opportunity to participate so long as that applicant has met the requirements for participation.

While all attempts were made to schedule appointments, meetings with beneficiaries took place as and when respondents were available due to irregular work schedules of respondents and to the fact that I had a busy schedule during the day. The schedule of meetings was also very irregular in that I would plan to interview one beneficiary, only to realise that the appointment had been cancelled. Or, as a second example, the office would inform me that a beneficiary was available, only to be informed on-site that another two or three other beneficiaries in the list were also available for meetings. In such cases, I utilised the opportunity to meet with all the members as a focus group and to have a discussion with the group.

4.8.6 Limitation of the research

A number of limitations on research design and research outcomes were identified during the research process. Some of the most important limitations referred to the size of the sample and to trust issues. The fact that I was not entirely trusted by the leaders of the Nyanga and Langa cooperatives and not known, at all, by the respondents posed limitations for the research in that during the fieldwork in Nyanga, for example, I became suspicious of the similarity of responses, to the point of thinking that some respondents were ‘trained’ or briefed to respond in a certain way. It seemed as though the responses were ‘choreographed’ and or that some respondents were prepared, beforehand, for the interviews. This was possible because the questionnaire was discussed in one of the Board meetings, to which I was not invited, before approval was granted. Moreover because the interviews were completely anonymous in both cases it was extremely difficult, if not impossible, to confirm whether I was, indeed, interviewing the respondents on the list provided to me and selected systematically, or whether I interviewed respondents predetermined by the Board. Because of trust relations the interviews had to be completely
anonymous. In fact, access to the community was granted on the basis of the fact that the interview was going to be anonymous, and because of safety considerations I had a community member accompanying me during the fieldwork, though the community member did not attend the interview.

Another limitation of the research was that the research could not test the level of participation of each beneficiary at the meetings, as most of the meetings took place almost two to four years before the research took place. Such information would have given a good indication of the level of empowerment and familiarity with the process, and could have assisted in gauging the depth of participation as proposed by Arnstein’s ‘Ladder of Citizen Participation’ and the International Association for Public Participation’s ‘Spectrum of Public Participation’. Given the length of time since respondents participated, most of their responses were based on their long-term memory. As a consequence, it was also difficult to determine, during the interview, the extent to which individual beneficiaries had complete control over their neighbourhood, as anticipated by Arnstein.

Another significant limitation is the time lapse of the fieldwork between the two sites. Research in the Nyanga site was done from 2008-2009, and in the Langa site it was done from 2012-2013. In the Langa case, the relationship between the Board and the beneficiaries had deteriorated so much so that the National Department of Housing had to intervene to assist the cooperative to operate properly. Therefore, had the research been done earlier in Langa, the perceptions of the beneficiaries in regard to the Board would probably have been less critical. Moreover because of the intervention by national government any fieldworker or ‘outsider’ was viewed with suspicion because no one was clear as to who was doing what on the project. Many respondents were therefore very cautious in the way they responded to questions and in their comments.

Low numbers of beneficiaries interviewed for the research posed an additional limitation for the research. Due to financial and time constraints only 10% of the beneficiaries could be interviewed in both cases, which worked out to about 30 households. In the case of Nyanga, hardly any beneficiaries refused to participate in the research, for whatever reason, which was unfortunately not the case with the Langa site. The timing for the Langa research site moreover was inappropriate in that there was so much tension that fieldwork had to be postponed because of a mediation intervention by officials of the national Department of Human Settlements.
These limitations on research design and research outcomes notwithstanding, I would like to claim that the conclusions drawn from my research remain largely valid and reliable and, accordingly, they may be used to make meaningful recommendations on the main research issue.

4.9 Conclusion

From the above discussion, it is clear that public participation has well developed theories upon which the discourse is to be based. The validity of these theories will be tested in the two case studies chosen to see whether they are applicable. The theory of the International Association for Public Participation will mostly be the theory applied in the test for public participation.

By the same token the principles of the theory of Hirschmann will also be evaluated against the two case studies. The link between the two theories will be confirmed, as per topic of research. Of critical importance would be the applicability of the Hirschmann theory to the group of respondents who exited from the program. All the limitations notwithstanding, I believe that the empirical research will produce a reasonably representative set of opinion regarding the research question.
CHAPTER 5

The Hostel Redevelopment Program in Nyanga

5.1 Introduction

This chapter will summarise the context of the Nyanga hostels. The profile of the relevant stakeholders of the Nyanga case study will then be introduced. Subsequently, the participation process undertaken for the consultation of the stakeholders and or beneficiaries for the project will be described. Issues emerging from such a consultation process will also be identified and analysed with a view to assessing how these issues ultimately impacted on the final consultation process. Eventually, the chapter will look at the effectiveness of the consultation process when measured against the model of the Institute for Public Participation.

The first case study to be investigated was the Ilinge LabaHlali, in Nyanga, which can be loosely translated as ‘the initiative of the residents’. This housing development is situated in Zwelinzima Hlazo Village, seen in Figures 16-17, which is on the outskirts of the Nyanga township, as can be seen in Map 1. The Housing Cooperative is shaded dark in Figure 20 and has green roofs in Figure 16. The green roofs clearly differentiate the development from the rest of the old hostels and give a context to the extent of the redevelopment program in the Nyanga township.

The housing cooperative was registered in 2002, as per Letters of Association, attached as Annexure 2, as a vehicle for developing the hostels donated by parent companies. It was borne out of a donation of old and dilapidated migrant labour hostels by ‘parent companies’ to their occupants as a result of the abolition of the migrant labour system. The hostels that are left untouched, as seen in the Figure 17, are public hostels, belonging to the City of Cape Town. These hostels are not part of the redevelopment program. It is only now that moves are afoot to convert even the public hostels into family units.

The idea of establishing Nyanga, the township, was mooted in 1946 when, according to Awatona et al. (1995: 2-4), it became obvious that ‘the lack of housing programs in the 1940’s’ was leading to ‘extremely overcrowded conditions in Cape Town’s only township, Langa’. This situation, further allege Awatona et al. (1995: 4) resulted in the ‘excess population’ establishing ‘visible squatter settlements’ on the outskirts of Cape Town thereby creating a predicament for the authorities. The authorities were forced to establish a
township to accommodate this ‘excess population’ in an area that was generally reserved for a different population.

**Figure 16:** Ilinge labaHlali Housing Cooperative Family Units [Green Roofed Units]

(Source: Picture sourced from the City of Cape Town)
Figure 17: Schematic diagram of Ilinge labaHlali in Hlazo Village - [Dark shaded units]

(Source: City of Cape Town)
Nyanga, the township is situated approximately 25 kilometers from Cape Town along the N2 highway opposite the Cape Town international airport. The township is made up of approximately 58 000 inhabitants of which nearly 99% is African Blacks and about 1% Coloured. The size of the township is about 3.39 squared kilometers. Nyanga has this dubious history of being the crime capital of the country, with the highest number of murders per annum, and the highest rates of unemployment at 80 % and HIV/AIDS infections at nearly 30% (Awatona et.al; 1995). The township, therefore, is facing a lot of socio-economic challenges.

Nyanga hostels were never meant to be a permanent solution for housing African migrant laborers to the extent that the hostels were ‘designed so that they could be converted easily to private flats for Coloured people when all the Black people had left Cape Town’ (Duke: 2007: 6). As shown in Figure 18, only three timelines signify the development of hostels in Nyanga: the first of which is 1952 when only 12 units were built; the second 1957 when 128 units were built; and the last was between 1962 and 1970 when 304 units were constructed. The absence of further development in the area gave rise to the proliferation of informal settlements which were more pronounced in Crossroads, a portion of Nyanga, and in Brown’s Farm, a small farm-holding adjacent to Nyanga(Awatona et.al; 1995).

Initially there were “deep-rooted cleavages that have historically divided hostel dwellers and township residents”. In Cape Town one is reminded of the incidences of “Wit Doeke” and “Blou Doeke”, the armed hostel-dwellers, working hand in hand with the police and army acting as a buffer between the so-called “comrades”-who were mostly students engaging in an unrest and the law enforcement agencies, at the time.

Moss (1982: 97-98) cited in Minaar (1993: 7) explains the tension between hostel dwellers and township residents in the following manner:

“As an institution largely separated from the rest of township life, housing men in barracks-like conditions, and displaying some of the features of “total institutions”, hostels create the basis for splits between their inmates and other township residents. These splits and conflicts are reinforced and reproduced through a process of antagonistic stereotyping which is associated with the inmates of total institutions, separated as they are from the community. They stereotyping process occurs both in relation to the inhabitants of the hostels, and to township residents living in rented or eased houses.... The primary material basis for a split between hostel and house inhabitants is situated within the nature of the hostel itself, as an institution specific to a certain form of working class reproduction.”
This further led to a simmering tension between township communities and hostel dwellers. It was the realization that it was the isolation of the hostels that made them vulnerable to abuse by state institutions of the apartheid government. However with time and due to the “importance of ethnic ties and political factors in hostel life” these artificial divisions dissipated. When hostels became a source of political violence and an obstruction in the liberation agenda of the country political organizations began to infiltrate these hostels to diffuse the negativity.

Nyanga was chosen as one of the research sites because it is the only township in the greater Cape Town area that had a significant number of the traditional ‘grey sector hostels’, which formed a significant portion of the so-called township.

**Figure 18: Timeline of the Establishment of Nyanga, Including Hostels**

(Source: Diagram compiled by author in 2008)
5.2 The Hostel Redevelopment Program in Nyanga

The Hostel Redevelopment Program in Nyanga was called the Ilinge Labahlali, (which can be loosely translated as meaning- the initiative of residents). Theron (2007) classifies Ilinge LabaHlali as a ‘Primary Housing Co-operative’ (the Co-operative) because it fits one of the permutations of the People’s Housing Process Policy Framework (2005; 6), which defines a housing co-operative as:

’a housing delivery mechanism whereby beneficiary households build, or organize between themselves, the building of their own homes, make a “sweat equity” contribution through their labour and exercise a greater choice in the application of their housing subsidy through their direct involvement in the entire process’.

The beneficiaries preferred a co-operative, as a vehicle for this development, according to Duke (2007: 12) because the Co-operative ‘would manage the development itself and that members would contribute some of their own labour to the project’ in order to access ‘an establishment grant and a facilitation grant’. The Co-operative arose as a solution to a unique, and somewhat complicated, problem of developing what the housing policy regarded as ‘private hostels’, which were not catered for in the policy. The Co-operative initiative was a unique strategy in South Africa, at the time, and as a consequence, the provincial government, as well as the Municipality, was skeptical about the approach. The idea of a co-operative was not necessarily bad because it was a further affirmation of Hammerschold’s principle, cited in Hamdi (1995: 28), in which he emphasizes that each housing development should be:

‘... aimed at meeting human needs, endogenously defined and with primary focus on those who have been deprived and exploited. It [should] recognize(s) the importance of equality, freedom of expression, conviviality and creativity. Each society [should be] left free to operate according to its values and cultures and articulate its own vision of the future. No universal mode is to be imposed; each society can build on its own. For development a society has to rely essentially on its inherent strength, although collective self-reliance is not ruled out’.

Hammerschold’s approach is premised on the ‘critical modernist’ approach as articulated by Hickey and Morgan (2005: 237) which argues that “some form of participation is necessary for development to be relevant, sustainable and empowering”, as a consequence, it provides a platform for beneficiaries to “build, or organize between themselves, the building of their own homes, make a ‘sweat equity’ contribution through their labour and exercise a greater choice in the application of their housing subsidy through their direct involvement in the entire
process‖ (People’s Housing Process Policy Framework: 2005: 5). The PHP process propagates that beneficiaries in a housing development must “enjoy greater choice over the use of their housing subsidies, resulting in positive housing outcomes, increased beneficiary input, and enhanced beneficiary commitment” (People’s Housing Process Policy Framework: 2005) through the utilization of ‘recycled material’, ‘building the house him/herself’ or even soliciting assistance of a technical expert ‘to assist the beneficiaries with the installation of electricity and plumbing, and later, the certification of their houses’. (PHP Framework: 2006: 6). The Co-operative, in my view, meets some, if not all, of the principles espoused in the policy of housing co-operatives as articulated by Hammerschold, because the project has broadened community support and maximized development opportunities in a manner ‘promoting transparency within and among the beneficiary groups and supporting agents’ (Hamdi: 1995: 30). This is further confirmed by the South African Revenue Services (SARS) in its assessment of the tax liability of the Co-operative in March 2009. In this document SARS states that the Co-operative has indeed served the purpose of “acquiring, developing, holding and maintaining immovable property and has made housing units, comprising such immovable property, available for use by its members in accordance with co-operative principles”, a notion attesting to the level of development, and hence empowerment, of the community. The occupants of the hostels, who subsequently became members of the Cooperative, approached the owners of the land, the City of Cape Town, to propose the development of the hostels into family units. The hostels that were part of the Ilinge LabaHlali program were handed over to the Co-operative after it was legally established as an entity in 2002.

A majority of the hostels in Cape Town were public sector hostels, built, owned and managed by the Municipality, with a few grey sector hostels in Nyanga owned by such companies as, inter alia, ‘PenBev (Coca Cola), Bonnita (Parmalat Dairy), Racec, Frankipile and Watertite’ (Duke: 2007: 1). At some stage, claims Selvan (1976; 48) about 38 companies owned about 107 hostel units occupied by almost 2140 men in Nyanga alone. Initially, not all the hostels and companies handed over their properties or their part-ownership of the properties to the Co-operative for conversion, according to the Chairperson of the Co-Operative (Qolweni: interview: 8 April 2009) It was only these six named companies that agreed to participate in the project and each contributed between R 150 000-R 200 000 to assist with the establishment of the Co-operative; as a result only 274 units could be converted in the first phase. It was only in 2009 that the remaining hostels, which comprise 326 units, joined the Co-operative to have their hostels converted. It is worth mentioning that Peninsula Beverages and Bonnita were quite supportive of the Co-operative and ‘agreed to transfer the hostels and their rights under their leases to the co-op’ on top of pledging R200 000 and
R150 000" respectively. Eskom pledged R200 000, and Frankipile contributed R150 000. (Di Lollo: 2007: Duke 2007). Watertite and Racec, according to the authors, ‘did not make any contribution of funds’ and, indeed Racec ‘insisted on payment for the land’, as was stated previously.

The Stakeholder profile

The Ilinge LabahLali, like Welcome Zenzile, is constituted by a variety of stakeholders. Like in the case of Welcome Zenzile the stakeholders can be classified into three namely, primary, secondary and tertiary stakeholders. Like in the case of Welcome Zenzile, primary stakeholders will be those stakeholders which are directly affected by the project, insofar as implementation is concerned. Secondary stakeholders will be those stakeholders that provided services and support, and tertiary stakeholders would be those that had an indirect impact on the project or were indirectly affected by the project, such as, for example, ward councilors and area politicians.

In terms of the above classification, primary stakeholders would typically be the national and provincial governments, the City of Cape Town, the Ilinge LabaHlali Board, beneficiaries, and some parent companies that took an interest in the project on behalf of their employees, such as, Peninsula Beverages, Frankipile, Racec, Eskom, Parmalat and Watertite. Secondary stakeholders would be service providers, such as, ACG Architects, Rooftops, Newres, etc. Tertiary stakeholders would, in my view, be the ward councillor, the then chairperson of the Housing Portfolio Committee of the City of Cape Town, and the local branch of SANCO.

Primary stakeholders

The most important stakeholder in the development is the erstwhile Department of Housing of the Provincial Government of the Western Cape, because the Department is a major source of funding for any low-cost housing development. The mandate to build houses is the constitutional responsibility of the department. In this case the City of Cape Town, being the landowner, albeit with insufficient financial resources, had to implement these low-cost housing development programs on behalf of the provincial department. The project is implemented on behalf of provincial government because, constitutionally, housing, of all kinds, is a national and provincial competence implemented through local authorities. All that the Department does is to transfer the funds, and thereafter appoint its own ‘quality controller’ to ensure that the product meets national standards. The Department, further,
processes all applications for subsidies in line with national requirements and monitors compliance with national building norms and standards. The Department is classified as a primary stakeholder because it is the only department that is officially mandated and financially resourced to build houses for the indigent.

**The City of Cape Town**

The interest of the City of Cape Town was derived from the fact that most of the hostels were built on its land. Only Racec owned the land on which the top structures were built, and the company subsequently donated this land to the city as its further contribution to the project. The City of Cape Town, as a landowner, had to deal with the hostel ‘problem’ for the simple reason that nationally there was a hostel redevelopment program, mooted by national government as part of its housing policy, to convert all public single-sex hostels into family units. As a sphere of government owning the land on which the hostels were built the City of Cape Town was under an obligation to comply with national legislation by converting some of the hostels. In short, the mandate of the City of Cape Town was derived from the law and from its contractual and moral obligations to improve the quality of the lives of hostel dwellers on its property.

The City of Cape Town has, for a long time, acted as a building agent for the Department of Housing of the Provincial Government. This the City of Cape Town did by assuming the responsibility of administering the accounts of the Department insofar as the payment of goods and services are concerned, including the procurement of all service providers, such as, project managers, builders, etc. Because of the relationship that Newres has developed with all the stakeholders, the company has, in the process, taken over the responsibility of a ‘runner’ between the City of Cape Town and the various stakeholders, ensuring that all the signatories to a claim have appended their signatures.

The only challenge was that most of the hostels had been built by companies but were no longer managed by them as many of their original employees had left the hostels and some ‘hostel landlords’ had taken over the allocation of these hostels and the collection of rent. The City of Cape Town then appointed a dedicated official who took an active interest in the ‘hostels redevelopment program’.
The Ilinge LabaHlali Housing Co-operative Board

The Ilinge LabaHlali Housing Co-operative Board (the Board) is another significant primary stakeholder because it is the structure which was established by beneficiaries, on the advice of the City of Cape Town. Its mission was: ‘to acquire, develop, hold and maintain immovable property and make housing units comprising such immovable property available for use by its members in accordance with co-operative principles’ and to ‘manage housing’ for members to “benefit from secure, good quality, affordable housing which the co-op will provide” and “from the return of their member's contribution should they leave the co-op” (Statute for Ilinge Labahlali Housing Co-Operative Limited).

The Board is structured so that each hostel savings group nominates a member (or two) to represent the savings group on the Board. The representative (or representatives) must also report back to the savings group members. The Board, in the case of Ilinge LabaHlali, elected an Executive Committee consisting of the Chairperson, the Secretary and the Treasurer who are charged with the day-to-day operations of the Board. The Executive Committee of the Board is, in turn, accountable to the Board.

The interest of the Board has always been to improve the quality of life of its members by utilizing the resources obtained from employers and the government to improve the condition of the hostels they owned. The Board became a landowner because of the choice of ‘vehicle’ to develop these hostels, which was a co-operative. Each hostel had a Committee, even prior to the establishment of the Co-operative, which, in most hostels, simply graduated to becoming ‘savings groups’. The challenge that the board faced was that out of the 600 members who could participate in the program only 274 participated initially, and alternative accommodation had to be sought for some of the members who were not participating. There was also political contestation over control of the program, because the Board was assuming what would traditionally have been the role of SANCO, which was effectively dysfunctional until the project was approved and funds allocated. According to Duke (2007: 9) the leadership of SANCO, ‘was concerned that the co-op was a parallel structure that challenged the legitimacy of SANCO’. It became obvious to the members that SANCO had ulterior motives and their overtures were rebuffed by the members. This created a lot of political tension because some beneficiaries were very active executive members of the SANCO committee, who felt that they had the political mandate and clout to run the project.
Parent companies

Parent companies are all the companies mentioned previously who made significant contributions to the successful implementation and maintenance of the project, some playing a significant role in the planning and implementation of the project. Of the ‘parent companies’ the two or three to single out are Peninsula Beverages and Frankipile. The other parent companies also contributed to the success of the project by investing ‘seed funding’, and project management skills to ensure the success of the program. It does not appear as though there was any proportionality between the number of members from a particular company and the amount of time invested by the company in the project. On the contrary, it appears as though the larger the number of its employees participating in the Co-operative the more inclined a company was to donate as little as possible and the more vociferous it was for such company to demand as much back from the project as it possibly could. For example, a company like Racec—which had 60 members—was less committed to the project than Peninsula Beverages (PenBev)—which had 48 members—and Frankipile—with only 20 members. Peninsula beverages and Frankipile had shown a whole-hearted commitment to the project, according to interviewees. Bonnita (later taken over by Parmalat), on the other hand, which had the highest number of members (90)—had unashamedly and unapologetically expressed its desire to be dissociated from the project to such an extent that the request was even included in the agreement. Racec—with 60 participants—is still demanding payment for its land from the Board of the Co-operative even though there was some kind of ‘gentleman’s agreement’ that the Board will reimburse it in kind once it is in a position to do so. Watertite—with the smallest number of participants at 4—transferred everything ‘voetstoots’ to the Co-operative eventually, after initially resisting the request by the Board for the company to donate the property. Eskom, the last to join the project, had 52 participants in the program. Eskom refused to join earlier because it did not want to be caught up in the political fray that was ensuing between the Board of the Co-operative and the South African National Civic Association (SANCO) regarding political mandates and constituencies.

Peninsula Beverages is one of the companies that took an active interest in the process because many of its employees were still staying in the hostels, as they still are. According to the informant from Peninsula Beverages, this interest did not originate when the project was mooted, but has been present since the hostels were built. Peninsula Beverages was, according to the informant, the only company that maintained the hostels by, among other things, providing garden services, gas utensils, and maintaining the geysers of the hostels, unlike most of the other companies that never had any interest in the welfare of their
employees. Later, when the hostels redevelopment program was being established, the company not only made a contribution to the capital fund of the project, but also assigned one of its staff members from the Social Corporate Responsibility and Human Resources Unit to become a member of the Board in order to report back to the company continuously on the progress of the project. This staff member of Peninsula Beverages is still involved in the project as both a representative of PenBev and as a Board member of the Co-operative. The company also made its resources available for the selection of suitable architects to achieve the objectives of the Co-operative in a manner that secured the interests of the Co-operative and did so in conjunction with beneficiaries. The company’s mandate, like that of Frankipile, was derived from the fact it has a significant number of employees in the hostel and that most of its staff are still actively involved in the company; hence its direct involvement in the project. To the extent possible, senior officials of the company are doing on-site inspections of the project to ensure that the interests of its employees are protected in the process. As a major multinational it became imperative for the company to be seen to be looking after the interests of its workers.

Racec, unlike other companies, had a more vested interest in the process as a landowner. The land was reflected in its books as one of the assets of the company. Duke (2007: 12) alleges that managers of Racec ‘were initially reluctant to negotiate with the residents but instead wanted to sell the land to the City’. When the project started the Board also made overtures to buy the land from the company, but the company has never honoured its intention; hence a tension exists between the Cooperative and the company. Up until today the company is still being owed money for the asset. In fact from the telephonic conversation the author had with the Chief Executive Officer and Owner of the company, it became obvious that the company was on the verge of writing off the asset. At some stage the company seconded one of its own staff to become an ex-officio member of the company on the Board so as to safeguard this interest. This board member also became responsible for ensuring that the project meets its deadlines, in terms of planning for the development.

**Beneficiaries**

Beneficiaries, in the first phase of the project, are the 224 members of the Co-operative who have joined it by becoming members of the savings clubs that were established to save money for the project. As the sample survey will indicate, most beneficiaries are no longer the original occupants of the hostels because if the original occupant was not interested in joining the Co-operative that potential member had a right to transfer membership to a nominated person, irrespective of the relationship between them. As a consequence some
beds were given even to distant relatives who were not previous hostel dwellers. One beneficiary was still at school when the project started, but her sister who was living in the hostel with her aunt, had negotiated with one old gentleman who was returning to the Eastern Cape, to hand his bed ownership to her younger sister; hence respondent younger than 30 years. Most of the female beneficiaries under 30 years of age took over ownership of the house from a father or relative who had passed away just after the project was started. The sample survey indicated that 80% of the beneficiaries had lived in the single sex hostels for more than 10 years and only 20% had lived there for less than 10 years.

In terms of the ‘parent company’ make-up of the total population of beneficiaries: 60 members were either originally from Racec or had beneficiaries linked to the company; 48 members were from PenBev; 20 members were from Frankipile; Bonnita had the highest number of participants at 90; Watertite had only 4; and Eskom had 52 participants in the program. The sample drawn from the community indicated that only 40% could be regarded as original beneficiaries still working for the various ‘parent companies’. The other 60% was made up either of relatives of beneficiaries, such as children of beneficiaries, or, in some instances, distant relatives of beneficiaries.

**Secondary stakeholders**

Secondary stakeholders, in this study, are those stakeholders who played a significant and unique role by providing goods and services to the project, such as, planning and architectural services, material and labour, and any other services whose absence would have led to the project not being realized. It is significant to mention that many of the secondary stakeholders interviewed became interested in the project because of its experimental nature. They mentioned that, as the conduit for housing delivery, iLinge LabaHlali was the first successful housing cooperative of its kind in the country. Companies like ACG, for example, went beyond the call of duty, and did more than expected in the contractual agreement, to ensure the success of the project.

**Rooftops**

Rooftops is a non-governmental organization established in Canada in 1994 to ‘support the development of co-operative and community based housing in southern countries’ especially in ‘Sub-Saharan Africa’ (Moore: undated correspondence). From the correspondence perused one can surmise that their mandate is to ‘assist co-op staff members and volunteers share the practical experience of the Canadian co-operative housing movement through
technical exchanges with community-based and co-operative housing organizations in other countries’. Rooftops has contributed tremendously to the ‘capacitation’ of Board members and the general membership of the Co-operative. Their strategy, it is obvious, hinges on ‘replicating, adapting, or promoting’ the Canadian co-operative concept for the purpose of widening the network of communities that can share information, knowledge and skill with other less privileged communities. The fundamental premise of the Rooftops initiative is to empower beneficiaries with socio-economic management skills that will help them sustain the project and thereby improve their outlook on life.

Rooftops introduced experimentation with ‘co-operatives’ because they were involved in some housing project in South Africa and were approached by the City of Cape Town to investigate alternatives to low-cost housing, which were not costly and could be ‘rolled-out’ with minimal involvement of the City of Cape Town. The idea of the co-operative originated with Rooftops as one such alternative vehicle for housing in which beneficiaries themselves take responsibility for the development. The mandate of Rooftops was to introduce the concept to beneficiaries and to empower them with skills and ability to drive the project to its fruition. Rooftops extended its obligation by even taking responsibility for the initial consultation process with the beneficiaries to ensure that they were versed in their choices and the consequences of such choices.

**ACG Architects**

ACG Architects is another stakeholder that went beyond the call of duty in the project. It was initially mandated to assist with the redesign of the hostels, but ended up getting itself involved in other sub-projects of the program, such as social facilitation, compiling family profiles, compiling bills of quantities, completing draw-downs for work completed, and even negotiating for tax concessions with the Receiver of Revenue. The company, however, became involved by default, when two of its partners, who were initially involved in the project in their individual capacities, joined the company. The two were appointed by the City of Cape Town to facilitate a participatory redesign process which would ultimately lend itself to the improvement of the hostels and to the development of the community. The idea of a participatory redesign process, according to Wicht, one of the architects, in one of the interviews held with her, was ‘to demystify what architectural designs were about’ by explaining the design logic and ensuring that beneficiaries took responsibility for their choices (Wicht: 2009: interview). ACG Architects sometimes had to even intervene in cases when beneficiaries were disputing the calculation of the number and size of the rooms added and the additional finishes to be installed against the savings of each member.
Newres Developer

Another stakeholder which played a significant role in the project is Newres Development (Newres). Newres was selected by the community as a preferred supplier since the company had the right profile and credentials to meet the requirements of the national Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment policy and because of the company’s experience in low cost housing development. Newres was, apparently, involved in the Wallacedene development and many other low cost housing initiatives. What made its approach of procuring and providing supplies unique, compared to other building suppliers, is that they dealt directly with the manufacturers of building materials, and thereby obtained good quality material at reasonable prices. These savings could be transferred to the beneficiaries.

Newres played a significant role in the development project in that it not only supplied materials, but also employed a construction manager who controlled and monitored the quality of the work done by the builders through their building manager. The building manager’s role was to ensure that the right supplies are available for the construction workers to do their work, and to act as a go-between between the beneficiaries and the rest of the stakeholders, on behalf of the Board. NewRes extended its mandate to even involve the appointment of sub-contractors to build the units, thereby acting as project managers for the actual development of the units. Because Newres assumed an even bigger role in the development they took it upon themselves to act as ‘runners” to ensure that signatures are obtained for the submission of claims against the budget. This, in effect, makes Newres a de facto project manager of the development.

Tertiary stakeholders

As indicated in the definition, a tertiary stakeholder is one whose interest and involvement has no significant impact on the achievement of the objectives of the project, but who has an interest nonetheless.

The Ward Councilor

Despite the expected legislated role of ward councilors, the councilor of the area played a very insignificant role in the hostel development program. Save for the consultation before engaging and negotiating with the local authority, the ward councilor had no impact on the success or otherwise of the project after it was fully endorsed by the local authority. If
anything, the ward councilor has always been viewed with suspicion because of the political dynamics and tapestry of the area. He has, by and large, been marginalized from participating in the process because of the general allegation of corruption normally leveled against ward councilors in the allocation of completed units.

SANCO

SANCO was never given an opportunity by the community to participate in the project because the organization was perceived to be too political, and therefore as having a potential to derail the process. The potential for destabilization was seen in the way SANCO contributed to what was known as the ‘ESKOM problem’, which contributed to the reason why ESKOM employees became the last beneficiaries to join the project. Moreover, SANCO wanted to curtail the role of participants by acting as custodians of the project on behalf of beneficiaries. Beneficiaries saw this as a threat to the achievement of the objectives of the Co-operative; hence a decision was taken by beneficiaries to exclude SANCO.

5.3 Public Participation in the Program

The premise and nexus of a co-operative project, as proclaimed in the policy framework, and as opposed to any other form of housing project, is that beneficiaries have to be pivotal in the implementation of the housing project. In fact, the policy framework contends that the purpose of a People’s Housing Process is to encourage ‘communities to actively contribute and participate in the housing development process so that communities take ownership of the process and not just act as passive recipients of housing’. This is what made the project a success because, besides a committed Board and an unstinting commitment to the savings clubs, members were consulted throughout the process. According to Duke (2007: 10), ACG Architects not only acted as project managers but also “played a much greater role … as facilitators in the development of the co-op, as a group, as well as facilitators of the physical development, consulting with the co-op on all issues and meeting at least weekly with the Board”. ACG Architects further assisted members with applying for their housing subsidy, in compliance with the policy framework in terms of which beneficiaries were to be:

“empowered individually and collectively so that the community ultimately takes control of the housing process themselves’... including ‘identifying the land, planning the settlement, getting approvals and resources to begin the development, contracting out or building the houses and providing the services, living in and upgrading their homes and continually improving the community” (Di Lollo: 2007 ).
Duke (2007) further states that “as the architects and co-op members continued the design process the outcome of the initial feasibility assessment was developed in more detail”, which gave rise to a mosaic of different styles and designs. Participation in the design process by beneficiaries became so detailed that individual homeowners were responsible for choosing even the types of finishes they preferred for their houses. The choice of design, therefore, became a product of an, often, protracted negotiated processes and consideration of the financial implications of such choices.

The first significant consultation, and participation, according to Duke (2007), was about the type of ‘development vehicle’ best suitable to residents for the development of the hostels. The choice residents had to make was between the self-help building program, the construction contractor approach or a People’s Housing Process (PHP) approach. After a robust engagement process the vehicle adopted unanimously by residents was the People’s Housing Process (PHP) approach. ACG Architects confirmed during an interview held with the firm of Architects on 30 April 2009 that “various options for development and construction were explored … with co-op members, and the PHP approach was chosen unanimously by the co-op members”. Duke (2007) contends that the implications of their choice which were that “the project design and costing required for the submission of the applications for institutional housing subsidies and for the PHP facilitation and establishment grants”, had to be explained and acknowledged by residents. The most important consideration in the consultation process was to ensure that beneficiaries were aware of the implications of a People’s Housing Process with regard to the role and responsibilities of each beneficiary in the implementation of the project. The establishment of savings schemes was one of the criteria for establishing a co-operative, as opposed to any ordinary People’s Housing Project’, according to Theron (2007). These were, inter alia, to manifest the ability of the would-be home-owner to pay municipal rates and for municipal services, and to maintain the house in line with the standards agreed upon by the Co-operative’s members, and to show commitment to the adopted choice as well as to the entire proposal. Each aspirant home-owner had to become a member of the Co-operative by joining such savings schemes.

Serious consultation had to take to place, therefore, to establish these savings groups because many potential members were skeptical about the idea of saving money, because the concept was new. The purpose and function of the savings clubs had to be explained. What was to be done with the excess funds, which were to be made available to homeowners to renovate their houses and add whatever extras they wished to beautify them, had to be explained thoroughly to would-be participants.
Membership

The Co-operative was originally started by hostel dwellers from the six companies, namely, Peninsula Beverages, Bonnita, Racec, Frankipile, Watertite, and Eskom. According to Duke (2007: 6-7) “residents of PenBev (Coca Cola) hostel were the first to join the Co-operative, followed by Bonnita (formerly Parmalat Dairy) residents”. These two companies, according to Duke (2007: 7), were subsequently joined by “Committee members of Eskom hostel… Frankipile, Watertite and Racec hostels” respectively. Membership was effected in compliance with ‘a co-op statute based on the statute of housing co-ops’ which was drawn up by the City of Cape Town.

In order to become a member of the Co-operative there were two criteria, namely residence of any of the hostels owned and or managed by the parent companies, and a payment of contributions to the savings club. The first criteria for qualifying as a member, according to City Review (31 October 2007)9, was that each member should have been a resident of either Peninsula Beverages, Bonnita, Eskom, Racec, Frankipile or Watertite hostels and earning ‘incomes of up to R3 500 per month’. The original members of the Co-operative, therefore, were to be employees of the six employers who were willing to either work with the Co-operative or to assist in setting aside capital to meet the costs for the establishment and operation of the housing co-operative. The second criteria was that interested hostel residents had to establish a savings group and contribute a minimum of R 2 000 and a maximum of R6000, amounts regarded as sufficient “for some initial costs of the co-op such as the purchase of tools, but the main use of the savings would be to increase the space the members would have when their house was upgraded…” to “a two bedroom unit with a living room, kitchen and bathroom while additional savings could provide a third bedroom, boundary walls and a higher level of finishes” (Duke: 2007: 11). The author further claims that:

“each savings group had its own bank account and each hostel managed its own savings groups. The typical size of a savings group was about 20 members so there were several savings groups in some of the larger hostels. For example there were three savings groups among the 60 or so members from Bonnita hostel”.

The bulk of the membership fees was contributed by companies as capital costs for the establishment of the Co-operative. Different funding strategies had to be adopted to accommodate the various needs, such as, accessing “…a housing subsidy the government

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9 The City Review is a news release agency of the City of Cape Town.
provides, which is used to acquire building materials” and through savings by members to cover the costs of construction (Theron: 2007).

Not all of the savings groups were established at the same time due to the unique circumstances of each savings block or group. For example, Parmalat /Bonnita was the first group to establish a savings club and the first to occupy houses, because the Chairperson of the Board and the Treasurer were originally employees of Bonnita and thus the level of trust of beneficiaries and the Board was stronger with Bonnita than with the other companies. Eskom beneficiaries, on the other hand, were not keen on participating because the parent company was initially reluctant to contribute seed funding and the capital funds agreed upon by all the stakeholders to kick-start the project, as Eskom claimed that many of the hostel dwellers in its hostels were no longer its employees. Moreover, the few hostel dwellers employed were mostly approaching retirement, if not planning to leave Eskom. Strangely, it was relatives of these residents who were more interested, and more than willing to participate, in the program. As a result Eskom hostel dwellers became members of the Co-operative later than the others, and thus their perceptions of the program were slightly different to those of the earlier members, such as the employees of Peninsula Beverages and Bonnita. Another extraordinary case was that of Watertite employees, who nearly lost out on participation in the program because the occupants of the one hostel block to be converted had a problem with an informal settlement around the block occupied by relatives and acquaintances of the hostel residents. These shack dwellers refused to relocate because they were using their position as leverage to negotiate a suitable alternative piece of vacant land or space for their shacks. Unfortunately the Board was not prepared to intervene, even as mediators, as it claimed that it was not prepared to involve itself in ‘domestic’ disputes which are not within their mandate.

Some of the reasons advanced for the delay in joining the venture vary from skepticism about the project to not understanding how the initiative would eventually unfold. Even among members of a single hostel there were those who were not members of the Co-operative or who preferred hostel life to family life. Space had to be created for the non-participants by renovating some hostel structures without reconfiguring the rooms. The idea of renovating the old hostels was to entice those that resisted joining the Co-operative to move easily to these hostel structures in order to create space for the conversions.

Participation by beneficiaries not only took place at micro-level with each beneficiary, but also at meso-level with the community, and at macro-level with other interest groups and stakeholders, such as, the City Council, the Revenue Office and the group of architects, inter
alia. Furthermore, consultation and participation took place during the preliminary feasibility assessments based on the family profile and savings of each household and the amount of ‘sweat equity’ to be determined, in order to obtain an indication of the design permutations possible when the hostel structures are reconfigured.

Intense consultation also took place when the Ilinge LabaHlali Co-operative engaged the City of Cape Town for assistance, and subsequently “entered into an agreement with the local authority to acquire about 24ha of land on which their hostels were located…” under a 30 year lease program, to realize the ideals and objectives of the Co-operative’s members. The Cooperative further engaged the City of Cape Town, as the landowners to convert the hostels into 274 houses consisting of two to three bedrooms, a lounge, kitchen and a bathroom for each member household. In terms of this 30 year lease agreement the Co-operative would ‘rent the land from the City of Cape Town at R150 per annum’ on behalf of members of the Co-operative whose membership was acquired after the payment of ‘a once off fee of R10.00’, according to City Review (31 October 2007).

Further intense consultation took place in regard to the design, as shown by the findings of the study, as well as on other matters, such as the number of rooms that a beneficiary wanted and the types of finishes that each individual preferred for his or her house. Beneficiaries were also constantly updated on the progress of the developments, and on any negotiations or discussions that took place between the Board and other government structure or service group. Beneficiaries, therefore, constantly participated in the decisions affecting their lives and the development of the area.

The community of beneficiaries in the Co-operative, with the assistance of Peninsula Beverages, became involved in the appointment of consultants for the project. The City of Cape Town provided the necessary administrative and financial support for the appointment. According to Di Lollo (2007: 5) ACG Architects were appointed because of their commitment to “work on an ongoing basis” with the Co-operative providing ‘a wide range of services’ including ‘capacity building for the co-op as a group, assistance in raising funds, delivery of workshops and seminars and facilitation of physical development in addition to the usual design services’.

The Board had to procure building material for the project, as the Board was the main developer. This building material was sourced from a local supplier, in bulk, to save costs. Construction was to be outsourced to a preferred local ‘small construction’ company chosen by members in an inclusive and participatory process, so as to support the local economy.
Members had to be consulted on the choice of the company and on the supplier of the material. The services of this company were to be augmented by ‘sweat equity’. Though the ‘sweat equity’ program did not materialize as anticipated, as admitted by the Chairperson of the Board and supported by ACG Architects (Interview: 14 April 2009), this program had to be consulted extensively so that members understand the quantification formulae to be used in converting ‘sweat’ to a product. This was one of the major reasons of the failure of the program, the difficulty of quantifying the amount of ‘sweat’ that participants contributed in terms of Rands and cents. The ‘sweat equity’ program was eventually discontinued as members opted to pay whatever amounts had to be augmented for the conversion of a unit.

At community level there were various savings clubs which were established, by the community, to assist participating members of the community with saving some funds for contributing to the development. Each savings club, consisting of a minimum of six members, nominated one or two representatives, depending on the size of the savings club, to sit on the Board. These two representatives got information, first hand from the Board, information they had to share with their constituencies after every Board meeting. Respondents confirmed that most, if not all, of the Board members gave these report back briefings to their constituencies when the project started, but that the meetings ‘fizzled out’ as soon as beneficiaries started occupying their units.

The community, through the Board, therefore, has always been ‘the initiator and driver of the process’ and not just ‘passive recipients of housing’. The institutional arrangements of the housing co-operative were of such a nature that whatever the Municipality or the consultants did had to be in compliance with that participation ethos, as contemplated in the People’s Housing Process.

Consultation with each household and with each member of the Co-operative and savings clubs members, therefore, took place regarding the nature of the housing vehicle to be utilized for developing the area, the design, the size, and the quality of the materials to be used in the family units.

**How was the consultation done?**

Consultation and participation with the government, service providers and beneficiaries normally took place at different levels. First, at the level of strategy, the Board consulted with such organizations and institutions as the Municipality and the service providers, appointed by the City of Cape Town to assist the community with the conceptualization of the project.
The Board also engaged with the two spheres of government responsible for housing, namely, the provincial and national governments, on issues pertaining to subsidy applications and the conditions for qualifying for a subsidy. At the lower and/or operational level, consultation was done by Board members, who were also Committee representatives of the Savings Clubs elected to represent them at Board level, and to deal with local problems relating to the project. Another exciting phenomenon about the first phase of the project was that each committee member, and therefore Board member, had another responsibility for the overall project, namely, taking responsibility for the procurement and distribution of materials for that particular group, but still reporting back to the Board for purposes of control. The one committee member spoken to was responsible for the safekeeping of the doors still to be installed in the houses under construction.

**Figure 19: A private sector hostel with the name board of the parent company**

(Source: Picture taken in September 2013)
Figure 20: A Hostel converted to a Family Unit in Nyanga

(Source: A picture taken by author on 8 April 2009)

Figure 21: Two semi-detached double storey family units

(Picture taken by author on 28 September 2013)
Different service providers, namely, the architects and suppliers, also consulted individual beneficiaries on the design and outlook of the property. Because many people were illiterate, other means of communication such as miniature designs of the houses on scale were created and used by the designers when consulting the communities. The consultation and participation approach adopted by the architects, one would surmise, derived from the alternative paradigm of ‘new pragmatism’ as advocated by Hamdi & Geothert (1997: 26). In terms of this paradigm the bias in development is more towards ‘enabling’ than towards ‘providing’ because of the assumption that ‘best solutions always derive from the grassroots, power is always more equitably exercised by communities, and projects are always more efficient if they are designed, implemented, and managed by community-based organizations’.

5.4 The phases of participation

Participation, in terms of the above process and layout, could be classified into about five phases, namely the pre-development phase, the establishment phase, the design phase, the development phase, and the allocation phase. The pre-development phase consisted of canvassing the support of the beneficiaries on the concept, on savings, and on membership of the program. In this phase the main stakeholders, according to an interview with the Chairperson (2009) were the parent companies, in particular Peninsula Beverages, the City of Cape Town, and a few residents including the current Chairperson. All the hostel dwellers wanted, according to an interview held with the Chairperson of the Board (May 2009), “was to change their living conditions”. The residents did not appreciate “the magnitude of the problem and the challenges ahead”. A series of meetings were convened, for about eight to ten (8-10) months, according to the Chairperson, at a central venue “to sell the idea to the potential beneficiaries”. A series of meetings were also held with interested potential beneficiaries from each parent company grouping, i.e. the Parmalat group, the Peninsula Beverage group, etc., according to the Chairperson, to try and explain how the concept would impact on the hostel dwellers as individuals and as a group. According to the Chairperson, these meetings were well attended by almost all beneficiaries because they were still curious and enthusiastic about the development. The community had to be convinced of this because this idea was never known to them or tested anywhere in the country where the community could go and see.

This consultation and participation process, according to the Chairperson, was successful because the Board managed to convince about +/- 240 potential beneficiaries to participate and to contribute, willingly, to the savings clubs. One of the participants, a young woman,
when asked, during the interview, why she participated, consistently, from the beginning, her response was that “she was tired of staying in a hostel which had no security, a place not conducive for young, single women”. When this process was measured against the participation template, it could be perceived as having been satisfactory, if not good, because it resulted in a lot of enthusiasm being generated for the future phases. In one of interviews held with the Chairperson of the Board, who was driving the process, he said:

“despite the fact that this process was probably the toughest of all the phases of the project, we managed to get the people to understand what we were trying to put across to them. What helped was that our people were desperate for houses and no one was prepared to help us. We had to help ourselves”,

The other stakeholder in this phase was the City of Cape Town. The municipality was represented by the Head of Special Housing projects, who had to assist the Board with the logistics of arranging the meetings, and had to address community questions in these meetings to bring legitimacy to the project. He also had the role of ensuring that all the beneficiaries are kept abreast of the process, and that the city gets regular feedback on the project, as one of the key stakeholders. The city, as a municipality, could not abdicate its constitutional responsibility of providing safety and security to its citizens, and if there was a convenient route it would have been this route of working with a willing community that was ready to do whatever it took to make the project a success. the Ward Councillor, as an elected representative of the area, and a political representative of the council was also consulted, during this phase. Though he was merely informed, the view of the Chairperson was that they wanted to deny him the “opportunity to be destructive” as he was very close to South African National Civic Organization (SANCO) who was very much against this project due to the fact that the organization was denied a role. SANCO was denied a role, because the Board did not want to “politicize this project”, so claimed the Chairperson. SANCO’s role, by default therefore, became very minimal, and peripheral, as the organization was merely informed of the progress made.

The second phase of the project was the establishment phase. This phase consisted of the establishment of the Savings Clubs, which were to be the backbone of the program. In this case the stakeholders were the beneficiaries themselves, and only those who had agreed to participate. Each participant had to become a member of a savings club, which had to be established by a group of beneficiaries per hostel unit. Each member, according to Treasury of the Board, had to have the account number so that they could deposit the money themselves. Each beneficiary grouping, i.e. PenBev, Frankipile, Racec residents, etc. had to establish its own savings club, which was to be used to purchase material and finishes for
each member. Beneficiaries indicated that even during this stage a series of meetings took place between the Board and Savings Club members and within Savings Clubs, to help explain what and how the contributions of each member were to be handled. This, according to the Chairperson of the Board, was the most critical consultation stage of this project because it involved people having to part with their money, “and you know for yourself how difficult it is for people to part with their money”. One respondent, an old lady beneficiary, stated that she attended all these meetings because she “wanted to hear for herself where the money is going and what will be done with it.” The success or failure of this program depended on this phase because without the contributions from the members the project would also have died. After the Savings Clubs were established the Board, which was to be entrusted with executive authority was established. The Board could not be established before the Savings clubs were established because the board was made up of two members from each savings club. According to the Chairperson, this process was also a success because they managed to convince the groups to form about twenty (20) Savings clubs some made of one block of hostels and others established in terms of the place of work. As a result this phase also ended up being a huge success as the objective was achieved.

The next phase was the design phase in which the different designs were discussed with beneficiaries. The most pivotal stakeholder in this process was the firm of Architects, ACG Architects. As indicated in the introduction, two officials of this company Astrid and Peter, went beyond the call of duty to ensure that consultation processes pertaining to design are meticulously conducted and documented. The response of Astrid when asked why she stated that for ACG Architects, a professional firm, “getting involved in a project of this nature was a learning curve, because hostels were uncharted waters in that there was no blueprint for developing hostels, and this was going to give them the experience to take on more similar challenges, as a company”. For a company that had no experience of working with semi-literate people, ACG Architects also did a good job. The company built small models of houses, which were used when consulting households. These models would be displayed in the public meetings for collective buy-in, where after each household would give its input on the size and shape of the house, to give the family unit a unique finish. When there was agreement on the shape and size the finishes would also be discussed with the full household, the cost of the project, in relation to the savings of the individual family group. This phase was, in my opinion, also very successful as the whole consultation process was generating excitement among the beneficiaries that something was eventually happening.

The development phase began once the design phase was concluded. In this phase the housing units were being built, eventually. The most significant stakeholder became Newres,
the social development-cum-hardware buyer who worked with the Board to procure the building material. When interviewed (June 2009) on why their involvement in this project the Owner of the company indicated that he “helps these communities because I [he] understands where they are coming from, coming from the Eastern Cape myself [himself]”. Newres saw its role as being “sole suppliers of the building material”. The company struck a deal with the Board to deliver the material on credit, at risk to the company, and to bill the Board. The Board would recoup the money from individual savings club members and future owners of the family unit. A relationship of trust, therefore, had to be built between the company and the Cooperative. Like any relationship it is built over a long period of time. Progress report meetings took place weekly, on Sundays, to potential owners, once again to give status reports on the development process. Beneficiaries were also consulted on the challenges experienced by the developers in each hostel with a view to getting collective solutions or to learn, as a collective, from the challenges. The development phase became the longest and most continuous phase, in that it continued so long as units were built. It however took a different form and shape when houses units became completed and occupied. The households whose units were completed were no longer that enthusiastic in attending community meetings. In fact only the members whose houses were not completed attended meetings religiously until their units were completed.
Table 2: Phases of Development and Levels of Participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Stakeholders</th>
<th>Stakeholder participation</th>
<th>Stakeholder opinion of process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Predevelopment</td>
<td>Parent companies; General residents and potential members; City of Cape Town</td>
<td>Participation by parent companies was excellent because they pledged capital funding; General residents and potential beneficiaries also participated well because they wanted information; City of Cape Town initially saw their role purely as providing land and donating hostels but their responsibility changed to educating the community and assisting with establishing administration systems for the Board;</td>
<td>Parent companies supported the process; Community and potential beneficiaries were skeptical of the process as it was not clear to them. Many just joined because they wanted houses; The City of Cape Town initially wanted nothing to do with program as it saw the hostels as private hostels. The attitude however when the municipality realized the commitment of the community;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment</td>
<td>Board/Beneficiaries Parent companies ACG City of Cape Town</td>
<td>Board members were still very enthusiastic; Parent companies helped set up the Board; ACG advised on the savings clubs and participation structures;</td>
<td>Board was positive; Parent companies were enthusiastic; ACG was optimistic; City of Cape Town was a cautious participant;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Design</td>
<td>Board ACG Beneficiaries</td>
<td>Board had to sustain the momentum; ACG played a significant role as Architects; Beneficiaries designed own homes with ACG;</td>
<td>Board was very positive about this phase; ACG assisted beneficiaries to design homes; Beneficiaries were fully involved and participating;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>Board; Beneficiaries City of Cape Town ACG; NEWRES;</td>
<td>Not fully involved in this process except to coordinate feedback meetings; ACG acted as project managers for the development; NEWRES provided building material, at risk, sometimes to assist the project;</td>
<td>Board was still positive; ACG liaised with Supplier to get material; City of Cape Town processed top-up housing subsidy applications; NEWRES took the risk because they were positive about the project;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allocation</td>
<td>Board Beneficiaries</td>
<td>Board provided administration and had lists of qualifying beneficiaries; Took occupation of their houses after completion;</td>
<td>Board Chairperson perceived process as good because allocation was systematic; Beneficiaries were satisfied because they got the houses they 'designed'.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The allocation phase was, in my view, the last phase of the process. The most important stakeholders, in this phase, were the Beneficiaries, the Board and the City of Cape Town. According to the official, the City resolved to “run education campaigns on the roles and responsibilities of being a home-owner”. In essence they were educated on their responsibilities as “owners” of the units, roles and responsibilities, which were totally different to their role as hostel dwellers. These campaigns, further claims the official, had to be run “in collaboration with the Board so that the Board and Beneficiaries could “understand their individual and collective responsibilities of property ownership”. The Board ran the collective campaigns while the city ran the household door-to-door and pamphlet knock and drop campaigns. Each family was individually consulted so as to avoid claims of ignorance by home owners. As a result each respondent knew, in extensive detail, what was expected of each household and co-operative member. Families were also informed of how to maintain the units versus what the cooperative will be doing. The beneficiaries, in the case of Ilinge labaHlali, were consulted for their input every step of the way.

5.5 Conclusion

In conclusion therefore, critical questions to be answered are whether “public participation was based on the premise that those who are affected by a decision have a right to be involved in the decision-making process”, or whether participants saw “their contributions” as influencing the decisions” or whether “sustainable decisions [were] promoted by recognizing and communicating the needs and interests of all participants, including decision makers” or whether “the involvement of those potentially affected by or interested by decisions was sought out and facilitated” or whether “the input from participants was considered in designing how they participate or whether “participants were provided with the information they needed to participate in a meaningful way”. The scenario sketched above presents a picture of thorough consultation with the beneficiaries, every step of the way. Pumla (pseudonym), one of the residents interviewed, confirmed that the reason she was satisfied with her house was that the “committee never did anything in the project without first asking for our views and opinions. This kept us informed of where the project was going”. It is obvious from the content and this comment that beneficiaries were part and parcel of the decision making process.

It is clear from the opinion of stakeholders as articulated in Table 2, that the process of participation was not only made possible by the support of parent companies, but the success of the process was also made possible by the Board and service providers.
throughout the five stages of development. The Board provided all the leadership with the assistance of the other stakeholders and by so doing gave the project a trajectory that lead to success. Compared to the Welcome Zenzile case, the Ilinge labaHlali project was indeed a ‘people driven’ process, which in turn, displayed the ‘power with’ approach as explained in Chapter 4. As a consequence a significant number of the original members of the program did not “exit” the program; instead they used the structures to ‘voice” any dissatisfaction they had with the program.
CHAPTER 6
The Hostel Redevelopment Program in Langa

6.1 Introduction

This chapter, like the previous chapter, will summarize the context of the Hostel Redevelopment Program in Langa. The profile of the relevant stakeholders of the Langa case study will then be introduced. The chapter will interrogate the participation process proposed for the consultation of the stakeholders and or beneficiaries for the project. Issues emerging from such a consultation process will also be discussed with a view to discussing how these issues ultimately impacted on the final consultation process. Eventually, the chapter will look at the scope and degree of this participation process when measured against the model of the Institute for Public Participation to determine the extent to which it impacted on the perceptions of the beneficiaries and participants.

The Langa township, is the first black township in the Cape which was created as a result of forced removals of over five hundred African people from a farm called Uitvlug lately known as Ndabeni, to Langa. The township was established in 1901 in the wake of the Bubonic Plague. It grew bigger in 1918 when more Africans were moved due to the outbreak of the Spanish flu epidemic. African people were regarded as health hazards by the state hence the forced removals. The township, according to literature (http://www.etownship.co.za) was named after the chief of the Hlubi tribe, Langalibalele, who was imprisoned on Robben Island in 1875 for resisting local government in Natal. The township is situated about ten kilometers from the Cape Town Central building district, as can be seen in Map 1 (Page 96).

The blueprint for the township, according to the Kasi Life Township Life website, was in agreement with apartheid strategies of guaranteeing surveillance of black people, in the same way that hostels in Johannesburg were designed to control the staff turn-over and movement of migrant laborers. It was built with wide streets, floodlights, and a police station located at its only entrance to observe and be in command of the residents.

Housing in Langa, according to the organization, has for a long time been mainly dormitory style hostels, but many of these hostels have been converted to family units since the 80’s. These hostels, further contends Kasi Life, Township Life, were packed quarters intended for men who were forced to leave their families in their former homelands in search of work in
the Cape. Living conditions and facilities were tremendously poor with apartheid policies entrenching these dismal conditions.

Unlike the Nyanga and Gugulethu hostels, most of the Langa ‘single-sex hostels were “public sector” hostels, meaning that they were wholly owned and managed by local authorities.

**Figure 22: Main Barracks in the Centre of Langa Township**

(Source: City Maps, City of Cape Town)
Figure 23: Langa Barracks and Welcome Zenzile Hostel Redevelopment Program [Red roof]

In this case the City of Cape Town, or the administrations before it, built and owned many of the hostels owned by the present day municipality. Such hostels, i.e. hostels built by government institutions, were classified as “public sector hostels". (Duke: 2007: 10)

‘Public sector’ hostels constituted one of the three types of hostels identified in the national housing policy, namely: the ‘public sector hostels’; ‘private hostels’ owned by private companies on land owned by the companies; and ‘grey sector hostels’ which were built by private companies on land leased from the City of Cape Town. Segal (1991; 1893) concludes that while the inner city hostels, like the Langa Hostels, were designed to be sites of control for the urban migrant population, they differed from the hostels on the mines in four important ways, namely that “government bureaucracies, rather than a single employer, were responsible for their management and upkeep”. They also “housed workers who [did] not necessarily work for the same company or work the same hours or shifts”. Most importantly, claims Segal (1991), “ethnicity” was never “the official organizing principle of this world … and men from a variety of backgrounds [could] and [did] share rooms”. This may explain why such hostels were not characterized by the violence that characterized hostels in Johannesburg in the late 80’s and early 90’s because people mixed freely across ethnic
lines. Lastly the hostels, according to Segal (1991) were not used to “exercise the same 'total control' or 'hegemony' over their inmates as do the mining compounds”. Although both could have easily been construed as “total or ‘carceral’ institutions and as pivotal forms of social control of the African workforce”, the urban hostel dwellers in the Western Cape were a more diffuse grouping than their mining counterparts.

According to the Urban Sector Network (2003: 6-7) the different types of hostels in Langa ranged from large multi-storey and double-storey complexes, to small single storey blocks, as seen in Figures 24-26, but all hostels in Langa consisted of the following:

- Living space (bed, storage space) ranging from rooms with single bed spaces up to 16-bed dormitories.
- Kitchen space (kitchen sink, space for cooking and eating)
- Ablution facilities (toilets, showers, wash hand basins)
- Laundry facilities (wash troughs)
- Outdoor space: washing lines, parking area, etc.

Hostel buildings, according to the Urban Sector Network (2003: 8) were usually variations of a few standardized designs similar to the design shown in Figures 24 and 26. A typical public sector hostel in Langa had 6 rooms, 2 with 2 beds each, and 4 with 3 beds each. There was a kitchen, a bathroom (with toilet, urinal and shower) and a storeroom. In Langa alone, there were 986 units of this type, in 425 single storey hostels called Langa Zones (as shown in Figure 26) and 34 double storey hostels, called the New Flats since they were built in the 70's, as shown in Figure 25. The double storey 'New Flats' had a total of 15 776 bed spaces (Selvan: 1976).

Grey sector hostels, generally in Cape Town, were built to a similar design. Hostels, according to the Urban Sector Network (2003), had shared cooking/eating facilities and ablution/laundry facilities. In a small block, further claims the Network, the shared facilities mostly consisted of a kitchen/dining area, a toilet and a shower, wash hand basin and a wash trough (for laundry) shared by two families. In a large hostel six 4-bed dormitories shared the following facilities: a kitchen/dining area, 2 showers, 4 wash hand basins, 4 toilets, 2 urinals and a laundry with 4 wash troughs.

The Langa Barracks, which are the research site, were, however, different from the Zones, which are the structures described above. The “accommodation blocks, planned in an open ‘U’ shape or square, made of two large rooms ‘housed’ 24 or 26 men per room on double
bunks built end-to-end along each side of the room”. (Granelli and Levitan: 1977: 64) The bunks, according to Granelli and Levitan (1977) were made of “solid boards fixed to brick supporting walls”. The authors further claim that “no mattresses” were included, nor were “any lockers for clothes or personal belongings”. The belongings of the residents, according to Granelli and Levitan (1977) were “kept under or on the bunks, or hanging from lines strung across the room.” The Urban Sector Network (2003) concurs that the living conditions in the single-sex hostels were generally inadequate, and hostels were, mostly characterized by:

- Overcrowding and lack of privacy, e.g. in 1999 there was an average of 3 people per bed space in the hostels in Cape Town (DAG; 1999).
- Inadequate access to services: In the hostels in Cape Town, there was an average of 14 people per toilet, 16 people per sink, 17 people per shower, 22 people per washbasin, 23 people per kitchen (DAG: 1999). By comparison, the Cape Town City Council Building Regulations of 1972 stipulated that residential institutions must have one toilet and one bath or shower for every 12 men (Selvan; 1976).
- Poor state of repair. The survey of hostels in Cape Town found the following defects to be common (in order of prevalence): problems with walls (cracks, dampness); broken fence/wall around hostel; plumbing problems: broken toilets, blocked drains, geysers not working, leaking taps, showers not working; leaking roof, bad guttering; no refuse collection, unhygienic conditions, yard not maintained; broken doors, broken locks; electrical wiring faulty; ceiling is broken/collapsing; floors in bad condition. A survey of public sector hostels in Gauteng found similar problems, and also noted a lack of fire hydrants, no regular checking of fire extinguishers and hoses and hose reels in a state of bad repair (CASE: 2001). Figure 28 shows a poorly maintained communal cooking and eating area in a hostel.
- The nature of the external space around hotels: most hostel blocks are surrounded by badly littered and poorly drained open space and/or densely packed shacks.
- Lack of integration of hostels into surrounding areas: Hostels were often both physically and socially separated from surrounding formal residential areas. The relationship of hostels to surrounding shack dwellers can be even more complex. In some instances, shack dwellers use the services of hostels. In many cases, there are tensions between hostel dwellers and surrounding shack dwellers. For example, in Guguletu, the Martin and East hostel was surrounded by a wall and
hostel residents continually guarded the gate. The hostel dwellers protected their open space inside the hostel walls, while outside the hostel they were vulnerable.

Hostels dwellers, further alleges the Urban Sector Network (2003: 7) lived under sub-human conditions, as seen in Figures 27-28, hereunder, with very little privacy and individual space as dwellers had to ‘share small rooms that had two single-beds' which served as sleeping and storage space, as shown in Figure 27. For an example, the rooms of the Barracks, had “no doors or window frame filling the openings in the walls” (Granelli and Levitan: 1977: 67). Most of the blocks, according to the authors were “large and impersonal, cold damp and draughty and the possibility of creating a warm, private area for relaxation or personal needs seemed remote”.

Most hostels had no proper bathroom facilities, as a consequence, families had to share ablution areas. In the Barracks, “separate ablution blocks housed the washing facilities, each block serving over 500 men”, with “no separate, individual toilets, [and] only a few timber rails for personal support with water running continuously in open channels beneath them”. (Granelli and Levitan: 1977: 64) Granelli and Levitan (1977) further state that “despite being hosed regularly, the conditions in these ‘hostels’ [were] most unsanitary”, further adding to these sub-human living conditions.

**Figure 24: Typical hostel blocks in Langa, Cape Town-“Old Flats”**

(Picture taken 27 December 2008)
Figure 25: The ‘New Flats’ in Langa

(Picture taken 27 December 2008)

Figure 26: Langa Zones

(Source: Emerging from the “Grey Sector” - Jim Duke; March 2007)
Figure 27: A Typical Hostel Bed and Storage Space in a Hostel in Langa.

(Source: Design Options and Delivery Models: Urban Sector Network; 2003)

Figure 28: A badly maintained communal cooking and eating space in a hostel in Langa

(Source: The Urban Sector Network; 2003)
Figure 29: The Usage of the space adjacent to the Langa ‘New Flats’


Figure 30: Informal settlements outside old Langa Zones (Hostels)

(Picture taken 27 December 2008)
The situation and the condition of the hostels, as depicted in Figure 28, confirms the assertion by Segal (1991: 4) that “inner city hostels, which were the logical outcome of the apartheid policy - designed as it was to prevent African people from settling in the urban areas on a permanent basis – were sorely neglected” and definitely unsuitable for human habitation because of, inter alia, neglect by both the owners and government. The management of these assets, at the time, became an unintended casualty of the transition exercise as asset owners became embroiled in the transition process which unfolded at the time.

The usage of the outdoor space surrounding the hostels, as shown in Figures 29 and Figure 30, varied considerably, from hostel to hostel. According to the Urban Sector Network (2003) the space around some hostels comprised of congested, haphazardly built, and sometimes rickety shacks, while other hostels had “extensive open space around the hostel blocks”. But the picture painted in Figures 29, is that of mix-use of the front and back space for both laundry and informal settlements. The relationship of hostels to the surrounding residential areas also varied considerably, but there was usually some degree of separation, though this was not the general trend in many hostels. In many hostels the occupants of the in-fill informal settlements were generally related, in some or other way, to the registered occupants of the adjacent hostel, to an extent that services such as ablution and water were shared by all the dwellers in that space, in most cases.

Not all occupants of the informal structures were necessarily related to the occupants of the formal structure. In Figure 30, there seemed to have been no relationship between the owners of the ‘shacks’ in the in-fill space behind the block of hostels because the informal structure was not attached at all, both figuratively and literally, to the formal building and the door, the only entry and exit to the to the informal structure was facing the road in front, away from the formal structure, whereas in Figure 30, the informal structures are so close to the hostel suggesting some kind of relationship between the ‘shack dwellers’ and the hostel dwellers or even a sharing of facilities such as ablution and laundry.

6.2 The Hostel Redevelopment Program in Langa

The Hostel Redevelopment Program in Langa was called the Welcome Zenzile. The Housing Co-Operative, like most of the other hostel redevelopment programs of the public hostels, was part of the ‘Dibanisa lintsapho’ project initiated by the City of Cape Town in the Langa, Gugulethu and Nyanga townships. Unlike the Ilinge LabaHlali Housing Cooperative, which is built on the so-called ‘Grey sector hostels’ the Welcome Zenzile Cooperative is situated in...
the Barracks, which are the “oldest of the single quarters” (Granelli and Levitan: 1977: 64) of the single-sex “public sector” hostels. The hostel, according to the Community Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE) (2004: 3) “used to be owned by the construction company, LTA,” but “LTA stopped taking an interest in the hostel in the 1980’s”. The Barracks, as the hostels are known, were built “in about 1927 and consist[ed] of two separate but similar complexes, as shown in Figure 23, known as the Main Barracks and North Barracks”. (Granelli and Levitan: 1977: 67) The two Barracks were divided by means of a service road, which was originally used for monitoring the activities of the hostel dwellers. The hostel “then became Council property”, according to CASE, (2004) until the residents took interest in the development of the hostel. Residents then approached the City of Cape Town, as a property owner, and started negotiating terms and conditions for the development of the hostel. These conditions will be discussed in detail in the chapter.

**Figure 31:** The old North Barrack

(Picture taken by author on 28 September 2013)
Figure 32: The Old Beer Hall in Langa—which has also been converted into single rooms for unmarried residents

(Picture taken on 31 August 2013)

Figure 33: A recently ‘renovated’ block of the old South Barack

(Picture taken on 31 August 2013)
Figure 34: An old LTA owned hostel-the North Barack

(Picture taken in September 2013)

The co-operative was named after Mr Welcome Zenzile, a ‘prominent leader in the Western Cape Hostel Dwellers Association (WCHDA), who led the association from 1984 up to 1993’. The Progress Report (2003) claims that Mr Zenzile became involved in the South African National Community Association (SANCO) after the WCHDA was disbanded to form the United Civic Organisations, which later became SANCO’. Mr Zenzile, according to the Progress Report, became active in both Sanco and hostel struggles until his death in a car accident in September 1999. Mr Zenzile, further claims the Progress Report, (2003) represented the Western Cape Hostel Dwellers association ‘during the National Housing Forum negotiations’ and was one of the members ‘that drove the thinking that ultimately resulted in the adoption of the Hostels Redevelopment programme’.

The Welcome Zenzile Housing Co-operative, like the Ilinge labahlali Housing Co-operative, is registered as a primary co-operative because it also meets the requirements of a cooperative as defined in the People’s Housing Process Policy Framework (2005: 6), which defines a housing co-operative as “a housing delivery mechanism whereby beneficiary households
build, or organize between themselves, the building of their own homes, make a “sweat equity” contribution through their labour and exercise a greater choice in the application of their housing subsidy through their direct involvement in the entire process”. Another definition espoused in the Co-operative Bill (2005) cited from the Social Housing Trust perceives a co-operative as essentially “an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common economic and social needs and aspirations through a jointly owned and democratically controlled enterprise organized and operated on co-operative principles” or as “a primary co-operative which provides housing to its members, or a secondary co-operative that provides services to primary housing co-operatives”.

The purpose of the Welcome Zenzile Housing Cooperative, according to an undated article entitled “Exposition of the objectives of Welcome Zenzile Housing Co-operative”, was to acquire, develop, own and manage housing and to make it available for use by the co-op members”. The community of beneficiaries preferred a co-operative, as a vehicle for the redevelopment, according to according to Duke (2007: 12) because a co-operative “would manage the development itself and that members would contribute some of their own labor to the project” in order to access “an establishment grant and a facilitation grant”, with members making a contribution to the re-development. Just like the Ilinge labaHlali the Welcome Zenzile Housing Cooperative affirmed Hammerschold’s discourse and principle. Hammerschold’s approach, as indicated in the previous chapter, was premised on the “critical modernist” approach articulated by Hickey and Morgan (2005: 237) which argued that “some form of participation is necessary for development to be relevant, sustainable and empowering”. As a consequence, the Housing Cooperative provides a platform for beneficiaries to “build, or organize between themselves, the building of their own homes, make a ‘sweat equity’ contribution through their labour and exercise a greater choice in the application of their housing subsidy through their direct involvement in the entire process” (People’s Housing Process Policy Framework: 2005: 5).

However, unlike the Ilinge LabaHlali Cooperative Welcome Zenzile beneficiaries did not contribute that much in designing the hostels, or in “sweat equity”. The Welcome Zenzile beneficiaries did, however, “enjoy greater choice over the use of their housing subsidies, resulting in positive housing outcomes…”. (PHP Framework: 2006: 6) Welcome Zenzile Co-operative members also have an agreement with the City of Cape Town to own the property units in a cooperative on behalf of the owners. But, unlike the Ilinge labahlali, members of the cooperative opted for a committee structure model to govern and manage the institution. (Social Housing Foundation: undated: 6) The City of Cape Town was more involved in Welcome Zenzile than was the case with Ilinge labahlali, in the development of and capacity-
building support for members of the cooperative, to the extent that it even managed its finances until the cooperative was stable enough to handle the administration on its own. The building complex is still owned by the City of Cape Town until certain administrative processes have been completed, where after the property will be transferred to the housing co-operative.

The Stakeholder profile

The Welcome Zenzile Cooperative, like the Ilinge LabahLali Housing Cooperative, is constituted by a variety of stakeholders. Like other cooperatives, the most important stakeholders are the beneficiaries, the City of Cape Town, national and provincial governments, who are under a constitutional obligation, in terms of section 26 (1-2) and Schedule 4 a, to provide ‘adequate housing’ and to ‘take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realization of this right’. It was in response to this principle that the state introduced the “Breaking New Ground” strategy which, inter alia, addressed the conversion of hostels to family units.

Stakeholders are classified into three even in this case study, namely, primary, secondary and tertiary stakeholders. Primary stakeholders will be those stakeholders that were directly affected or involved in the project, insofar as implementation is concerned. Secondary stakeholders will be those stakeholders that provided services and support, such as, finance, goods and services. Lastly, tertiary stakeholders are those that indirectly affected, or were indirectly affected by, the project, as well as those stakeholders whose role did not impact severely on the completion of the project, such as for example, ward councilors and area politicians.

Primary stakeholders

The City of Cape Town

The City of Cape Town is a primary stakeholder in the project, because it was, and still is, the owner of both the land and the building. In the case of Welcome Zenzile, the City of Cape Town, as a landowner, is still responsible for the maintenance of the complex such as in, for instances, when the perimeter wall collapsed due to a car accident, the municipality rebuilt the wall, and when there was a blockage in the sewer system the municipality came to fix the blockage. The City of Cape Town became a primary stakeholder due to its statutory obligation, as an owner of ‘public sector hostels’ to convert the hostels under the auspices of
the Hostel Redevelopment Program, when the program was adopted by national government. The City of Cape Town took over the control of the hostel after LTA, the parent company donated the building to the municipality. In fact, the City of Cape Town became the owner of the building, by default, as a landowner. Because the City of Cape Town was the owner of both the land and the building, it was under obligation to comply with national legislation by converting the hostels into family units. However, in line with the Hostel Redevelopment Program, arrangements for accommodation had to be made for those who did not want to participate. The City of Cape Town had to procure the services of a construction company used for other hostel redevelopment programs because the cooperative did not have the capacity to manage the renovation project of the hostel. The City of Cape Town, actually, became the ‘body corporate’ by collecting all the fees due to the cooperative on behalf of the cooperative and disbursed those accordingly in consultation with the Board. For the same purpose, it took over the responsibility of administering the accounts of the cooperative to ensure that service providers are paid and municipal services are paid. The City of Cape Town became project managers of the redevelopment project.

The Welcome Zenzile beneficiaries

The beneficiaries of the Welcome Zenzile Cooperative are the most important stakeholders of the project in that they stand to benefit directly from the project. Beneficiaries, in this project, are the 110 members of the Co-operative who joined the savings club established to save money for the project. As the sample survey will indicate, most beneficiaries comprised of young families who were not necessarily linked to the original parent company, nor are they, necessarily, related to the original occupants of the hostels because many new residents moved to the hostel after LTA disowned the hostel. Most of the beneficiaries are first time ‘property owners’. The sample survey indicated that about 60% of the beneficiaries had lived in the single sex hostels, of some sorts, at some stage in their lives, but most came from informal settlements at the time the project was planned. They became part of the program purely through their contribution to the saving plan for the redevelopment program.

The Welcome Zenzile Board of Directors

The Board of Directors is a structure established in terms of the Letters of Association of the Welcome Zenzile Housing Cooperative. The Letters of Association of the cooperative were adopted at the time of establishment of the entity. The Board manages the Cooperative by means of three Management Committees, namely the Finance Committee, the Membership Committee, and the Maintenance Committees. As stated previously, the structures were
established to “acquire, develop, own and manage housing and to make it available for use by the co-op members”. (Duke; 2007) These committees are established from paid up members of savings clubs.

The original parent company-LTA

As a ‘public sector hostel’ The Welcome Zenzile Cooperative never had a parent company. LTA Construction Company once owned the section of the Barracks in which the Welcome Zenzile Cooperative was based, but the company handed the hostel back to the City of Cape Town before the conversion started. The company was then never involved in the establishment of the cooperative, nor in the conversion of the hostels. The parent companies, in the case of Ilinge LabaHlali, invested significant amounts of money as capital funding. Funding for this project came only from the beneficiaries and the government, as it will be explained in the membership sub-heading. Unlike in the Nyanga case, the parent company could not be claimed as stakeholders as the parent company never took any part in the development.

The Developer

The developer in the case of Welcome Zenzile had very little or no engagement with the ‘community of beneficiaries’. The developer never engaged the community of beneficiaries, nor discussed the project with them as was the case with the Nyanga Cooperative, in which New Res Development, the Project Managers, worked hand in hand with the Board.

Tertiary stakeholders

As indicated in the definition, a tertiary stakeholder is one whose interest and involvement has no significant impact on the achievement of the objectives of the project, but who has an interest nonetheless

Secondary stakeholders

The Ward Councilor

The Ward Councilor, as was the case with the other project, never played a role in the roll-out of the project. The project was purely managed by the administration of the City of Cape Town, the developer, and the Management Committee of the project.
SANCO

Unlike with iLinge labaHlali, the South African National Civic Organization was not involved in the Welcome Zenzile project at all. The project was implemented, purely by the City of Cape Town and by the identified beneficiaries of the project. The national department was, at some stage, involved in the resolution of a dispute over roles and responsibilities of the committee.

6.3 Public Participation in the program

Unlike in the Nyanga case study very little interaction took place between and within beneficiaries regarding the program, as was indicated in the responses of the beneficiaries when asked. As with the iLinge labaHlali Hostel Redevelopment Program, the premise and nexus of the Welcome Zenzile hostel redevelopment program was that beneficiaries had to be pivotal in the implementation of the housing project, as advocated by the Public Housing Process Policy Framework. Consultation with beneficiaries not only had to entail a scrutiny of the designs, but it had to also focus on the types of finishes that each individual preferred for his or her house. However, beneficiaries and their management committees did not interact with external service providers and did not account to this Management Committee on progress, but to the City of Cape Town. In the words of Eunice (pseudonym):

“Because of all the problems in the project, no one was talking to no one in the project. We can saw people coming in and out and just doing things without talking to us, the beneficiaries”.

Membership

According to the Social Housing Foundation (Undated paper: 6) membership of the cooperative was by means of joining a savings club to which a contribution of R 1050 had to be made. This amount was to be added to the “institutional housing subsidy of R 21, 300-00 to provide total capital of R 22 360-00 per unit or R 2 346 750 for the development of 105 units in phase one. In terms of the article, “the ongoing expenses of administration, maintenance and other operating costs, including an allocation toward a reserve fund [would] be met by the payment of a monthly members levy of R 220 per unit or R 23 100 for phase one…..” (Social Housing Foundation) All these funds were used as renovation and construction costs. The special top-up from the City of Cape Town, only applied to Welcome Zenzile, and not to other projects.
How was consultation done?

Beneficiaries were updated, not as frequent as with the other cooperative, on the progress of the development, and on negotiations or discussions taking place between the Management Committee and the City of Cape Town, as confirmed by the responses to the questionnaire. Beneficiaries, therefore, did not participate as fully as expected in the decisions concerning the development. Hence when the project started, a significant portion of the residents demanded a refund of their contributions. It can be claimed from the responses of the respondents interviewed, that consultation was not as intense. One of the respondents, Sylvia (pseudonym) made the following statement, when asked about the role she played in designing her unit:

“I don’t know anything about this project. I don’t know who decided on the houses. It might have been the Committee. All I am excited about is that I have a house I can call mine. I can now wash in my own bathroom. I don’t have to clean the mess of other people.”

The City of Cape Town, according to the official of the City of Cape Town, provided the same support ACG provided in the case of Ilinge LabaHlali in the beginning of the project, support such as training for committee members of the Co-operative, and support with planning workshops and seminars for the development of the project, on top of the services rendered for the design of the family units. It is obvious that these workshops were held in the beginning of the project, as many of the beneficiaries spoken to did not know much about how the cooperative operated. It can also be that because most of the beneficiaries were new to the program they were not part of those workshops and seminars. As a consequence, Welcome Zenzile members were not as empowered as the Ilinge LabaHlali members when it came to the management of the project.

The most emergent issue, which impacted significantly on the perceptions of beneficiaries was this concept of savings club, especially the purpose and function of the savings club. Unlike the Nyanga group, when the development took time to get off the ground many of the potential beneficiaries demanded to be refunded. The Chairman of the Board of Committees stated that the Board “had to refund nearly all the savings to the owners and to restart the program only with those members who were still interested”. This event changed the nature and form of the consultation process as the City of Cape Town became operationally involved for purposes of regaining the confidence of those potential beneficiaries who still wanted to be part of the program. The design, and the size of the family units had to be determined by the City of Cape Town resulting in family units that were exactly the same in shape, size and form, as can be seen in Figures 35-36, except for the finishes added by
individual owners. Most of the consultation, with each household and with each member, therefore, entailed the establishment of institutional structures such as the Co-operative, the savings club, and the Committees. The design of the family units, the size of the units was decided by the City of Cape Town based on the financial viability of the project.

Consultation and participation with provincial government, the City of Cape Town and beneficiaries normally took place at different levels. First, the Committees consulted with the City of Cape Town to assist the community with the conceptualization of the project. The Committee also engaged with the two spheres of government responsible for housing, namely, the provincial and national governments, on issues pertaining to subsidy applications and the conditions for qualifying for a subsidy. Officials of the City of Cape Town consulted beneficiaries, mostly, by means of community meetings, to discuss the design and outlook of the property. The consultation process, was more information ‘providing’ in the case of Welcome Zenzile whereas in the case of the Nyanga project the process was more ‘enabling’. What was also of interest to note was that the number of meetings in the case of the Langa Hostel Redevelopment Program was far too few when compared with the numbers of meetings of the Nyanga case, where, at the conceptual stages of the project a community was held every Sunday.

**Figure 35: A three storey building of family units in Langa**

(Pictures taken by author on 31 August 2013)
Figure 36: A combination two and three storey building at an angle

(Pictures taken by author on 31 August 2013)

Residents interviewed could not even recall how many meetings they attended, due to the infrequent number and schedule of meetings. A young couple interviewed (27 August 2013) thought “there were three meetings in all” whereas others could remember only two meetings. The essence of the response, therefore, was that residents could not remember meeting to discuss the project or challenges in the development of units.

Figure 37: Another housing design for the Langa Hostel Redevelopment Program

(Picture taken by author on 31 August 2013)
6.4 The Phases of Participation

Even in the case of Welcome Zenzile, participation could be classified into about five phases, namely the pre-development phase, the establishment phase, the design phase, the development phase, and the allocation phase.

In the case of the Langa case study, the pre-development phase was also the phase in which possible beneficiaries were consulted about the project. In this case, the main stakeholder was the City of Cape Town, as the owner of the property, and the beneficiaries. The City of Cape Town negotiated with the residents, out of their own initiative, as prescribed by the national Hostel Redevelopment Program, to revamp the hostels and to hand them over to the residents. This phase was more complex, in the Langa case than in the Nyanga case, because there was nothing common about this group, as was the case with the Nyanga case, where the beneficiaries were staying in the same place and most of the beneficiaries working for the same companies or relatives of employees of same companies.

According to the official of the City of Cape Town responsible for hostel programs, ‘consultation with this group was, however, better than consultation during the development phase of the Nyanga project, because in this case, the city consulted the people and did everything in its power to make this consultation process a worthwhile exercise”. In his view, consultation on the project was very intense and therefore successful. However, according to one the residents interviewed, a single parent of two young children and a head the family, she “attended the first meeting and she never attended the rest of the meetings because there was so much confusion regarding the process, and all [she] wanted was a decent place to stay”. In her view the consultation process was chaotic as the meetings were not properly arranged, and no notices of meetings and minutes of previous meetings were circulated. Participation by beneficiaries was therefore not as good as anticipated in the methodology prescribed in the theory. These issues, it seems, were never discussed with the officials because the site and the case was regarded as one of the most difficult and complex to deal with.

The establishment phase was when the Housing Cooperative was formed as an entity that will be responsible for the development of the hostel. During this phase the key stakeholders were the beneficiaries themselves, and the City of Cape Town, which played an administrative role. It is clear from the subsequent reaction of the hostel dwellers that this was where problems started with this project. It is the considered view of the author that the concept was either not properly understood or properly explained in that when it took longer than usual for the development to take place a significant number of the members of the
savings club decided to claim their membership fees back. It can therefore be said that consultation and or participation was not as ideal as prescribed in the Spectrum of Public Participation model, to the extent that the project was nearly discontinued after the a significant number of potential beneficiaries ‘exited’ the program due to frustration with the delay in the implementation of the program. The main stakeholder, which is the City of Cape Town, however, tried its level best, religiously, to ensure that the Board and its committees are established. It can be argued that if the members were provided “with the information they need[ed] to participate in a meaningful way” as prescribed the Spectrum of Public Participation model, the process members would have been clear of the next steps. As a result, only a third of the original group continued with the project. The other 70%, almost 2/3 of the hostel dwellers and potential members of the Cooperative exited and remained in the old hostels, as seen in Figure 23.

The third phase, the design phase, was also done a bit different to the Nyanga process. In Welcome Zenzile the City of Cape Town was, once again, the main stakeholder and therefore the City of Cape Town had to take over the design and implementation phases when it became obvious that the project was under threat. The City of Cape Town, a firm of Architects and the beneficiaries were the main stakeholders. Architects to design the family units were appointed by the municipality, according to the Municipal official, with very little contribution, if any, from the beneficiaries. . In terms of the City official, “it was in the interest of the City of Cape Town to take over because the alternative would have been for the city to maintain the hostels, as property owner”, and attempt to recoup its expenses through rates and tariffs, a task the City of Cape Town could not perform. The City of Cape Town, therefore, took it upon itself to design the hostels and to negotiate with the Developers, the implementation of the development plans, on behalf of the beneficiaries. In the same vein the municipality took over the development of the hostels, on behalf of the Committee or Board, so as to ensure that the project is a success. When it comes to stakeholders, therefore, the City of Cape Town and its firm of Architects consulted each other consistently, but the participation by beneficiaries was bad, if not non-existent.

The allocation function, which was the last phase was also performed by the municipality, as well, with minimal or no participation by the ‘community of beneficiaries’ and the Committees established by the Board of the Cooperative for such tasks. This was because the Committee responsible for the allocation did not have sufficient capacity nor the information to deal with the sensitivities that were incumbent in the process, according to the City official. Obviously therefore, the participation process in this phase was, somewhat, not as intense as was the case with the Ilinge Labahlali case study. Participation by beneficiaries according
to the city official, involved only written communication confirming ownership of the unit, and possible date of occupation. When compared to the model by the International Association of Public Participation, this whole process was run by the City of Cape Town with no participation by beneficiaries, once again. This was because during the entire process of the development, the Board was never as confident about its position and legitimacy, especially after a significant portion of the possible beneficiaries withdrew because they suspected that their money was abused.

In Welcome Zenzile, hardly any beneficiary knew what was taking place, which in my view was an indication of an absence of involvement by beneficiaries. The Head of Special Projects of the City of Cape Town, together with the then Chairperson of the Management Committee, were the only stakeholders who were clear about the process and the steps. Of the thirteen (13) beneficiaries of the project interviewed not one was happy or bothered about their involvement in the predevelopment phase, nor the establishment phase, which were the preparation stages of the cooperative. Only 8 respondents, indicated that they took interest and participated in the design phase, because they were curious to see what they were paying for. The only phase all beneficiaries participated fully in was the allocation phase, because they did not want to lose their houses.

The theoretical explanation for the indifference of these beneficiaries could be founded in the Spectrum of Participation theory, in that the Management Committee, with the support of the City of Cape Town, “did not ‘believe’ that beneficiaries of the Welcome Zenzile project had a right to be involved in the decision-making process”, according to the City Official, (Interview conducted in March 2013), due to all the factional, inter and intra group squabbles that persisted throughout the project phase. According to the official:

“The level of maturity of the two projects was different. Where in the Ilinge labaHali project you had a group of people who were determined to see the project through, in Langa there were leadership challenges, which led to the members not fully realizing their goal of getting the project to run smoothly.”

The contribution of beneficiaries, towards the development of the hostel, was minimal, if it ever existed, once again because the factional groupings spent their time fighting about power and control, and were not necessarily bothered about the project. The development was seen to be the “problem” of the municipality. Obviously, the “needs and interests of all participants” were not articulated and communicated clearly between and among stakeholders. Hence the management and maintenance of the property is not sustainable, among other things. Only the “needs and interests" of the City of Cape Town reigned
supreme, mainly because the City of Cape Town did all the work without much consultation with beneficiaries, as a group. Once again, according to the City Official (Interview, March 2013), due to the constant changing of the management structure of the project “the involvement of those potentially affected by or interested by decisions” (Spectrum of Public Participation model), were not necessarily “sought out and facilitated”, nor was the “input from participants considered in designing how they participate”, for obvious reasons. As indicated previously, almost all the beneficiaries interviewed, excluding the erstwhile Chairperson, claimed that they were never “provided with the information they needed to participate in a meaningful way”, unless they approached the City official for clarity. As a consequence, the Welcome Zenzile redevelopment project took longer than necessary, and most, if not all the respondents, were not satisfied at all with the project. The only cause of satisfaction, among the beneficiaries, was the fact that they owned homes eventually. None of the beneficiaries who eventually occupied their homes became involved in any of the processes of the compound. This grouping, therefore, had nothing in common except that they were occupying the same space, something which was the opposite of the Ilinge labaHlali group. Maybe the fact that the Nyanga group was made up of beneficiaries who worked together or whose relatives worked together, maybe the fact that specific groups were originated from the same area in the Eastern Cape or were relatives played a significant role in bringing about group cohesion. However no such cohesion existed among beneficiaries of the Welcome Zenzile Hostel Redevelopment program.
### Table 3: Phases of Development and Levels of Participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phases</th>
<th>Stakeholder</th>
<th>Stakeholder opinion of participation</th>
<th>Stakeholder opinion of process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Predevelopment</td>
<td>Board; Beneficiaries; City of Cape Town;</td>
<td>Board positive in spite of problems; Beneficiaries were skeptical; City of Cape Town played an administrative role;</td>
<td>Board endorsed process; Beneficiaries had doubts but were willing to give try the process; City of Cape Town was more positive after stop and start delays;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment</td>
<td>Board; City of Cape Town;</td>
<td>Board encouraged members to pay; City of Cape Town registered cooperative;</td>
<td>Board positive but process experienced serious challenges; City of Cape Town provided administrative support;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Design</td>
<td>Management Committee; City of Cape Town;</td>
<td>The Management Committee had been disestablished; City of Cape Town designed changes with its own Architects;</td>
<td>City of Cape Town wanted to see project completed;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>City of Cape Town; Project Management Team;</td>
<td>A development company procured by City of Cape Town was responsible for the development and for managing the project;</td>
<td>Project Management team positive;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allocation</td>
<td>City of Cape Town; Management Committee; Beneficiaries</td>
<td>City officials assisted ‘new’ Management Committee with allocations; Management Committee provided support to City officials;</td>
<td>City of Cape Town process difficult but achieved; management Committee relieved project complete; Beneficiaries glad to own houses but not clear about the future role of Committees. Also dissatisfied with maintenance program of property;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.5 Conclusion

As discussed above, it is clear that, in regard to the Welcome Zenzile Housing Cooperative, the principles of the Spectrum of Participation model were never applied in this project, to the extent that public participation would have been seen to be “based on the premise that those who are affected by a decision had a right to be involved in the decision-making process”, or that beneficiaries perceived “their contributions” as influencing the decisions" or that “sustainable decisions [were] promoted by recognizing and communicating the needs and interests of all participants, including decision makers” and that “the involvement of those potentially affected by or interested by decisions was sought out and facilitated”. It is obvious that none of these principles were applied to the extent of the Ilinge Labahlali Housing Cooperative. It is clear from the interviews with family unit owners that their “input” was not considered in designing how they participated in the process. One cannot claim, however that beneficiaries were not fully “provided with the information they needed to participate in a meaningful way”, as confirmed by Sylvia (pseudonym) in her response in which said

“I don't know anything about this project. I don't know who decided on the houses. It might have been the Committee. “

Unfortunately, despite many attempts to meet with members of the established Committees, no one could reply on behalf of the Committee to the allegations. The fact that the sub-committees of the Management were dysfunctional may have been the reason why official from the national Department of Housing visited the Cooperative during the research period to reconstitute the sub-committees of the Management Committee.

It is, however, clear that the City of Cape Town tried, to keep those interested participants informed of developments, but not necessarily as detailed as in the other project. The Welcome Zenzile project was not ‘people driven, and as a consequence a significant number of the original members of the program ‘exited’ the program, instead of utilizing established institutional structures to ‘voice” their dissatisfaction with the manner in which the program was managed.

It will be clear in the next chapter, which compares the two case studies that one of the deciding factors in the satisfaction levels of the beneficiaries is the level of participation of the beneficiaries in the decision making process of the project. The Langa group, unlike the Nyanga group, was not as involved as their counterparts in the development of their new hostel.
CHAPTER 7
Comparison and Conclusion: The two case studies

7.1 Introduction

This chapter assesses the findings of the research and compares the two case studies, according to what is similar and different between them, with a view to understanding the causes of the different perceptions and responses in the two communities. This approach is premised on a statement by Hamdi (2004: p.xi) that “when dwellers control the major decisions and are free to make their own contribution to the design, construction or management of their housing, both the process and the environment produced stimulate individual and social well-being”, something which brings about a feeling of satisfaction to the participants. These perceptions, as indicated in the previous chapters, are measured against the participation continuum model and the reactions of the participants when they experience dissatisfaction. This chapter will evaluate how beneficiaries on both projects exercised their options, i.e. whether they “voiced” their dissatisfaction, or whether they “exited” the project, or whether they became “loyal” to the programme, despite the odds. In the same vein, this chapter will look at plausible explanations as to why one project was perceived to be more successful than the other, whether there were different perceptions of success, and why beneficiaries made the choices they did in regard to their reaction to the processes. These differing beneficiary reactions will be related to the levels of participation in both case studies, with a view to analyzing the extent to which this participation brought about satisfaction or dissatisfaction. The chapter will also interrogate the degree and scope of such satisfaction in both cases.

While there were significant differences in both the level of participation and satisfaction of the participants in both projects there were a lot of similarities. These similarities will be summarised in the chapter so as to confirm that despite differences, the premise and fundamental principles of the two housing cooperatives were the same. The purpose of discussing these similarities is to highlight the fact that such shared premises and principles cannot be identified as partial causes for differences in outcomes in the two cases. The chapter will also look at other possible reasons that may partially explain differences in the two case studies, such as the context of the case studies, influences from neighbouring housing projects or differing local community cohesion. These and other factors will also be analyzed in the chapter as possible causes, which may have influenced the differences in outcome between the two case studies.
This chapter comprises three sections, a conclusion and a number of suggested recommendations. The first section will deal with the level and extent of participation of beneficiaries in each case study. The second section of the chapter will deal with the degree of satisfaction and dissatisfaction of beneficiaries with both the project and the products and how they expressed this satisfaction or dissatisfaction. The third section of the chapter will compare the level of participation between the two case studies and the scope and degree of satisfaction between the two case studies so as to establish (partial) causality between these variables. A conclusion will then be drawn in regard to participation and satisfaction, and on whether there is causal relationship between the two variables. The conclusion will also discuss other possible causes of satisfaction or dissatisfaction of beneficiaries, which could have influenced the experiences and perceptions of these beneficiaries.

7.2 The level of participation in the projects

7.2.1 Ilinge Labahlali Housing Cooperative

When participation was tested against the principles of the International Association for Public Participation model Participation with the processes of Ilinge labaHlali it was found that the process generally adhered to these principles of participation, in “that those who [were] affected by decisions [had] a right to be involved in the decision-making process” (International Association of Public Participation model), a right which was exercised fully by beneficiaries. The Ilinge labaHlali Housing Cooperative, for an example, had an office in the complex and two of the Board members, i.e. the Chairperson and the Treasury of the Board, were responsible, on a full-time daily basis, for the day-to-day operational duties of the cooperative relating to the “management and administration of the housing cooperative” (Lewin; 1981).

The Ilinge LabaHlali Board worked independently from the City of Cape Town, with various stakeholders such as Architects and developers, to implement the housing program. The Board decided on the group of Architects to design the units, and on the developers who would work with the community to develop the area. The Board decided on their Suppliers and negotiated with these Suppliers to provide material at risk so that the project can be implemented. The Board, as a representative grouping elected by beneficiaries, basically took instructions from beneficiaries, and was mandated by representatives of the various savings clubs, which were members of the Board, to take decisions pertaining to the program on behalf of beneficiaries, and to report back to beneficiaries on a monthly basis. The iLinge
labaHlali Board was, and still is, responsible for all its “procurement, disbursement, and repayment of loans, land and servicing costs”. (Lewin: 1981) The City of Cape Town only gave advice as and when requested to do so by the Board, after obtaining a mandate from beneficiaries. The community of beneficiaries, in the case of the Ilinge labaHlali Housing Cooperative, “were not only promised that their contribution will influence the decision” (International Association of Public Participation model) they knew that no action and or decision could be taken without consultation. Most beneficiaries knew that all decisions were based on their contributions, and they demanded an explanation if that was not the case. The Board went out of its way to seek the involvement of beneficiaries through encouraging the convening of meetings of savings clubs to report back on the deliberations of the Board and to get fresh mandates for the Board. The Board also convened weekly public meetings of all beneficiaries, in the beginning stages of the project, to give progress report backs to the collective of beneficiaries. More than 80% of beneficiaries of Ilinge labaHlali Housing Cooperative had attended most of the savings groups meetings and public meetings called by the Board, at one or other stage during the project, some before their houses were completed, and others after they had moved into their houses. Members of the cooperative knew, from the beginning, that the general upkeep and maintenance of the public open spaces of the Ilinge labaHlali Housing Cooperative is the responsibility of the Board through revenue generated from members. One respondent, Anne (pseudonym) from Nyanga, when asked whether she was constantly consulted, and by whom on the design and on the savings club said:

“I want to liaise with the Board only because the Board is the only structure that can account for my savings, in case something goes wrong”.

Participation by the Ilinge labaHlali community may be construed as being at the highest level of participation, which is the level of “empowerment”, in terms of both Arnstein’s ‘Ladder of Citizen Participation’ and the model of the International Association for Public Participation, because beneficiaries were granted “…full control over their neighbourhood”, through their representative Board members, to implement the project in the manner that suited their conditions and circumstances. (Darke & Walker: 1977: 92; Soen et al: 1984: 207) It is for that reason that the Board, together with all the beneficiaries interviewed, in the case of the Ilinge LabaHlali Co-operative, were proud of their achievement and were more than willing to share their successes with whom ever appeared to be interested in the project.

In a nutshell, the Ilinge LabaHlali Housing Cooperative met most if not all the principles of participation, and therefore confirming the view of the UN-Habitat (2001: 8) that “involving
beneficiaries in the development process” is pivotal to enhancing a “genuine partnership” between the parties to a development, a partnership underpinned by the “highest stage of working relationship between different people brought together by commitment to common objectives, bonded by long experience of working together, and sustained by subscription to common visions”. The Ilinge labaHlali Cooperative encouraged the “collective maintenance and upkeep of houses and neighbourhoods” (Lewin; 1981), and was intimately involved in the “long term planning of maintenance and improvement works”, and in the “continual mobilization of the members for the upkeep of their settlements and for the community facilities. (Lewin: 1981: 11) The iLinge labaHlali cooperative went as far as encouraging unemployed beneficiaries to assist in the construction of their units through the ‘sweat equity program’, thus, not only empowering members with decision-making authority but also empowering them with skills to use in the future for their own livelihood.

7.2.2 The Welcome Zenzile Housing Cooperative

When the same principles of the International Association for Public Participation model were tested against the Welcome Zenzile Housing Cooperative most of the principles were found to either be non-existent, or rarely applied, hence the low satisfaction levels and less enthusiasm. Their level of participation could be classified as swinging between the first stage of the International Association of Public Participation model, which is the “inform” and “consult” stages, because, in most cases, members of the Cooperative were just ‘informed’ of what will happen, and from time to time, they were ‘consulted’ on the project. The Board Members and beneficiaries were, also, merely kept abreast of all progress in regard to the development, but did nothing beyond that. For an example, the Welcome Zenzile Housing Cooperative was never involved in the actual renovation of the hostels, nor was it involved in the maintenance of the new family units. The maintenance of the buildings and the communal space is still done by the City of Cape Town, till today. Board members of the cooperative do not own an office in the complex, nor was the Chairperson actively involved in the upkeep and general oversight of the complex, at the time of the fieldwork. Instead, the Chairperson of the Board became elusive in regard to who was actually responsible for their administration. The City of Cape Town was, to a great extent, responsible for the administration of the cooperative, according to the Head of Special Projects, but the extent of the involvement of the municipality was also indiscernible. This, in my view, explained why the complex was in the condition it was in because there was no clarity on who was responsible for the maintenance of the property. The Welcome Zenzile cooperative did not even “mobilize for manual and other self-help resources for the construction of infrastructure
services”. (Lewin: 1981) Not much of this total commitment and engagement was observed with the Welcome Zenzile Cooperative, instead the Management Committee was defending allegations of maladministration and corruption from beneficiaries, and as a consequence the term of office of the Management Committee was summarily changed during the period of research. The cooperative looked to the City of Cape Town to provide all the assistance in regard to the building of the blocks, including the mobilization of resources.

Unlike the iLinge LabaHlali project, in which the involvement of professional consultants in the consultation process was utilized to ensure the professional participation of beneficiaries, Management committee members tried to consult on their own, with disastrous consequences, in the case of the Welcome Zenzile project. Only one respondent out of the thirteen (13) beneficiaries interviewed could remember having been consulted by the Board on the project. The Welcome Zenzile beneficiaries saw the municipality as responsible for, inter alia, consultation, and therefore they expected the municipality to assume the function of the Board, which entailed, inter alia, keeping members regularly informed of progress prior to the completion of construction of the project, besides the fact that the City of Cape Town assisted with “acquiring, developing, holding, and maintaining immovable property for use by its members in accordance with co-operative principles”. (SARS; 2009) Officials from the City of Cape Town acted as external consultants on the design of the hostel complex and individual units, and on the allocation of completed units.

The Cooperative did not have records of the project or an indication of the number of meetings called by the Committee or minutes of the savings clubs meetings convened. Most respondents recall attending about 2-3 public meetings to discuss the project, and, as a result, most of the beneficiaries were indifferent when asked about their satisfaction with the program. Most, if not all, strategic decisions regarding the Welcome Zenzile housing project were made by the City of Cape Town. All these records and information could only be found from the official of the City of Cape Town.

7.3 The degree of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the Program

7.3.1 Ilinge Labahlali beneficiaries

Out of the 25 households that were interviewed only two could be classified as being dissatisfied with the program, in the first phase of the development. These two families, however, were loyal to the project and rather opted to “voice” their dissatisfaction in meetings and at whatever platform presented to them. Their dissatisfaction came as a result of what
they referred to as “unfulfilled promises”. The one claimed to have been promised plastering of his inner wall and a perimeter masonry wall, but was given nothing. Upon deeper enquiry it became obvious that his contribution was insufficient for the interior cupboards and carpets, etc. he was claiming, but what was frustrating him was that he was unemployed and therefore could not buy the building material out of pocket. What was not clear was why he was not allowed to obtain this building material through the ‘sweat equity’ program. Obviously he became very ‘vocal’ when he was not getting the answers he was looking for and was subsequently marginalized by the Board..

The other dissatisfied owner was very critical of the manner in which the Board conducted its business, but was not prepared to sell his house or even exchange it with another family. After intense probing, it became apparent that the dissatisfaction emanated from the fact that, at some stage, he was a Deputy Chairperson of the Board and when he became unemployed he demanded full-time employment from the Board, a request the Board did not accede to. His dissatisfaction, therefore, had little to do with the project but rather with personal beneficiation. What is significant about these two households was that despite their dissatisfaction, the families were more contented with “voicing” their dissatisfaction than with abandoning the program.

A vote of confidence in the ability of the Ilinge labahlali Housing Cooperative, and an indication of general satisfaction with the project is currently being displayed by a group of hostel dwellers from public hostels, who originally “exited” the Ilinge Labahlali project, before the project was conceived, for a lot of reasons, among which was the fact that their hostels were public and not private. The potential beneficiaries are now in 2014, bothering the Ilinge Labahlali Housing Cooperative Board for membership so that their hostels could, now, be converted.

At the time of writing, the program had about 204 new members. Of these 204, about 50 households opted to “exit” the program before it even started, when they realized that their hostels were public hostels, something which made their condition slightly different. Another reason advanced for “exiting” the Ilinge Labahlali project was the fear of mismanagement of development funds by Board members, a fear which was proven to be unfounded and baseless, eventually. Other reasons advanced for “exiting” were that they did not want semi-detached houses similar to those developed by Ilinge Labahlali. According to the unofficial leader of the “dissident group” these beneficiaries wanted a green-fields “stand-alone and fully furnished turnkey property development project, with better quality finishes, and household appliances such as washing machines and fridges”. This group broke away from
the ilinge labahlali project to form a housing development company called “Householding Investment”, which was meant to be a PHP. The group started its own hostel redevelopment program, whose objective was to demolish the old hostels and build new houses on the land. However, their project could not go ahead because they could not solve a problem of a group of backyard dwellers which was never included in the development, yet these ‘backyard dwellers’ were relocated by the City of Cape Town to vacant plots in-between these hostels, with a view to building them houses as soon as land was identified. This program failed despite the fact that they paid more deposits than Ilinge Labahlali members because the leaders of the “dissident group” disappeared with their member fees. This “dissident group” has however, decided to rejoin the housing cooperative after nearly six years of attempting, unsuccessfully, to replicate the Ilinge Labahlali Housing Cooperative. The level of dissatisfaction of this ‘dissident group’ is displayed in the words of the leader of the members who ‘exited’ the program. When asked why he exited in the first place, his response was the following:

“a number of uninformed initiatives have wasted our time and finances, promising to deliver similar or better housing units than Ilinge labahlali. We learned a hard lesson from these initiatives as they simply disappeared with our hard earned money. Ilinge labahlali has in the eyes of the said community, proven to be capable of responding to the development needs as they have so far usefully completed a number of units to the satisfaction of their beneficiaries.”

Another leader who has just rejoined the Ilinge Labahlali Housing Cooperative recently claimed to have “exited” the Ilinge labahlali because he was not happy with the finishes and facilities promised.

7.3.2 The Welcome Zenzile Housing beneficiaries

There was a significant level of dissatisfaction with public participation process of the program, in the case of the Langa Hostel Redevelopment Program level. This level of dissatisfaction was displayed by the nearly 65% of the total number of potential members who exited the program and opted to stay in an undeveloped hostel, just opposite the new family units. The reasons for this dissatisfaction, in the words of David (pseudonym) one of the most outspoken hostel dwellers who exited the program, was that:

“[he] got suspicious because this looked like one of those schemes that collect monies from people, promising heaven and earth, and thereafter disappearing with the money. When no meetings were called, I, with a few others, organized a community meeting to demand our monies back. These things
look good on paper, but they end up robbing desperate people”.

The fact that these hostels were less than five hundred (500) meters from the new N2 Gateway project, a housing project fully funded by the City of Cape Town, could have influenced the behavior and perceptions of the hostel residents against making financial contributions to the Welcome Zenzile Housing Cooperative. Because Welcome Zenzile was established at around the same time as the N2 Gateway, and because there was an outcry and a negative reaction from potential tenants of the N2 Gateway towards paying for flats and family units in the N2 Gateway project, at around the same time as the Welcome Zenzile, this could have influenced the mass “exit” by beneficiaries of the Welcome Zenzile Housing Project. The residents of the N2 Gateway also protested against paying rent for the family units, at almost the same time that the Welcome Zenzile beneficiaries were demanding their savings. The protest could have influenced the mass “exit” by beneficiaries of Welcome Zenzile, but this could not be determined from the fieldwork. David (pseudonym), however, when asked about demanding his savings back replied by asking:

“why must I pay for these old hostels when my neighbours next door, are not paying for their new houses which are better looking than our hostel”

This could be one of the main reasons and a possible plausible explanation for the change of heart of the beneficiaries of the Welcome Zenzile project, a change of heart which became the turning point of the Welcome Zenzile Housing Project, because after this mass exodus, the project was faced with insurmountable challenges of non-payment of the savings and mass “exits” which resulted from allegations of maladministration and corruption against the then Management Board, allegations which attracted the attention and intervention of senior officials of the national Department of Human Settlements.

Potential beneficiaries, and current single-sex hostel residents, opted for refunds because they were disillusioned with the way in which the program was run, resulting in the total collapse of the program. Those who persevered did so out of desperation and a need for shelter. But, they did not “voice” their dissatisfaction, as there was no avenue for that. When asked, most of them claimed that they would also have ‘exited’ if they had other alternatives.

The second disillusioned hostel resident interviewed, Andile (pseudonym) claimed that:

“these unknowns, [the leaders of the program] came from nowhere, demanding that we deposit money into an account. No one explained what the money was for. No meetings were held to give feedback to the people. All we saw was that they started...
driving cars and they were always meeting officials of the municipality, but nothing was reported back”.

The new owners have, on a numerous occasions, just recently, “voiced” their dissatisfaction with the different Boards and Committees by voting the Board and Committee members out and replacing them with new members and by lodging formal complaints with the national Department of Human Settlements. As a result, unlike the Nyanga Housing Cooperative, which had, more or less, the same Board and Executive Committee members since establishment, the Welcome Zenzile Housing Cooperative, has changed its Board and Executive Committee members three times already, since the research started. This instability has contributed significantly to the lack of consultation of and participation by the members. This new trend of ‘voicing’ dissatisfaction emanates from the feeling that there is no way that they, as homeowners, can “exit” the program by selling their share of the property. The only option left for them is to attempt to improve the situation by voting in new Board members and Committee members.

A further confirmation of dissatisfaction is that, out of the households interviewed, the only sense of satisfaction that could be deciphered resulted from the fact that the ‘ownership of the unit’ vested with the user. Very few of the Cooperative members could remember much about the participation process. This sense of collective ownership and pride, which is always reflected in the manner in which public open spaces are maintained, was absent in the Welcome Zenzile property, as can be seen in the maintenance standard of the houses. As a consequence, the maintenance of the common spaces and public open spaces in and around the hostel left much to be desired, and was strikingly different from the family units in Nyanga, most of which were well maintained, except for a few odd cases which were under the watch of the Board. Moreover the Langa property was enclosed, and not accessible to the general public as thoroughfare, as against the Nyanga units most of which were not fenced. If the general condition of the property could be used as a measure of their satisfaction with the product, the Langa Housing comes second, by a large margin, to the Nyanga project that comes first.

7.4 Comparison of the scope and degree of participation and satisfaction with the project between Ilinge LabaHlali and Welcome Zenzile

As indicated in the introduction to the chapter, there were significant similarities in the projects, one of which was that both projects were implemented by means of legally registered and formally recognized housing cooperative programs. As a consequence, both had formally endorsed ‘Letters of Association’. The establishment of these housing
cooperatives was chosen as a method of ownership for the reasons stated in the discussion on cooperatives, i.e. that in both instances the development had to be premised on a ‘self-help’ principle, in which beneficiaries have “collective ownership” (Urban Sector Network: 2003: 18). In both instances, members had to be “shareholders of the cooperative” and were supposed, by law and by Letters of Association, “to jointly own the property”, according to the Urban Sector Network (2003). One of the principles embedded in a cooperative is that ‘internal control’ must be exercised in regard to “speculation and illegal sales… and withdrawal of membership”. (Lewin: 1981: 10-11) In both instances if a member withdraws from the cooperative the unit is returned to the cooperative, which then reallocates the unit to another member on the list or to a new member after the payment of membership fees. Membership, in both instances, is by payment of a membership fee, which is used for the administration of the cooperative, and by joining a saving club to fund the redevelopment project. This principle, in effect, discouraged those who were already participating from withdrawing because the process of getting the savings invested back was not so clear-cut and easy as it sounded.

Both cooperatives appear to have experienced a correlation between the levels of participation and expressed opinions of satisfaction or dissatisfaction in their beneficiary communities. Whereas more than 60% of potential beneficiaries opted to exit from the cooperative housing program in Langa because they were suspicious of the modus operandi of the management structures of the project, the Nyanga project actually had less than 12% exits, at the time of research. The Nyanga project was inundated with requests from beneficiaries of the other hostels who wanted to join the Ilinge LabaHlali Housing Cooperative so that their hostels could also be developed, another sign of loyalty to the program. When beneficiaries were asked why they opted for participating in the program their response was more that they understood the concept because the program was thoroughly explained to them. Satisfaction, therefore, was found to be more observable in the case of the beneficiaries of the Ilinge LabaHlali Housing Co-operative than in the Welcome Zenzile Housing Cooperative thereby proving the assertion by Hamdi true and valid.

The Welcome Zenzile project experienced “exits” (Hirschman: 1970) by more than half the number of beneficiaries who qualified for the project, because out of a total of almost 300 eligible hostel residents of the old LTA hostel complex only 108 residents opted to participate in the program. The reasons for ‘exiting’ varied from not understanding the concept of a cooperative and its inherent condition of saving money to that the process of savings was not clearly explained to beneficiaries. Most of the potential beneficiaries exited just after the consultation stage of the project, before the development took place. As a consequence,
those who exited demanded back all the money they had already saved, because, as indicated, they thought their money would be mishandled, and or that the project will never materialize, especially after a few starts and stops. This decision might have been influenced by the development of family flats in the so-called N2 Gateway project and the conversion of most of the hostels in the Langa township into family units, a project which was solely driven by the City of Cape Town, with funds from national government. Some of those who ‘exited’, however, regretted their decision as soon as they saw the finished product, but they could no longer join the program because the project has been concluded.

The Welcome Zenzile Housing Cooperative project, as a consequence, took time to get off the ground, in its early stages, because of this exodus of ‘exits’. By claiming their contributions these beneficiaries were, in essence, discontinuing their membership and stopping the financial lifeline of the project. The Ilinge labaHlali Housing Cooperative, on the other hand, could simply be seen to be having 82% percent “loyalty” because out of the 250 potential beneficiaries of the first phase 204 beneficiaries remained in the program until occupation. Whereas there was a backlog of beneficiaries who were waiting for houses in the ilinge labaHlali project, nearly 60% of possible beneficiaries opted to move out of the Welcome Zenzile project back to the old hostel opposite the developed complex, which was to remain unchanged for those who did not want to participate. As a consequence, there are more ‘unconverted’ hostels in the complex than is the case with Ilinge labaHlali where almost every hostel block was converted or is in the process of being converted to a family unit, because a significant number of residents wanted to be part of the project.

Interestingly, in both projects, there was a correlation observed between the number of people who were not satisfied with the project, and the number of meetings attended by the respondents. The 12% or so potential beneficiaries that were not completely satisfied with the project in Nyanga consisted of a group of beneficiaries who attended a few meetings of the members, or were members who attended as and when they felt like it. Moreover, their dissatisfaction was not caused by the prospect of having to relocate from a hostel to a family unit, more than it was caused by an inability to contribute to the savings club due to unemployment or other financial commitments. The general dissatisfaction, or indifference, in the Welcome Zenzile Housing Cooperative, however, was caused by a lack of information about the project due to non-participation in the decision making process. Members of the Welcome Zenzile Housing Cooperative were so ill informed that beneficiaries did not even know whether the cooperative was formally established or not. Though this was the case, most if not all beneficiaries, however, perceived the allocation to have been more orderly and fair than was the case with the Ilinge LabaHlali community of beneficiaries who felt that there
was favoritism, in so far as the allocation of units was concerned. The fact of the matter, though, even in the Ilinge Labahlali project was that units were allocated first to the most active beneficiaries of the project, before those who were less active, even though they were all up to date with their payments. These observations confirmed the correlation between the satisfaction level of beneficiaries and the rate of participation of each beneficiary.

Another interesting observation regarding the Welcome Zenzile Housing project is that most of those who opted to stay with the project had just moved in to stay at the hostel just before the project started or had not been living in the hostels for more than five years before the project started. As a result, nearly 90% of the members of the Welcome Zenzile Housing Cooperative were young couples, who were ‘owning houses’ for the first time. Most of the residents who “exited” the housing project, were hostel dwellers who have been staying in those hostels for a long periods and had opted to still remain in the hostel, instead of joining the cooperative.

What is further interesting to note is that, unlike in Nyanga where the completion of the hostels generated renewed enthusiasm, the completion of the houses in Langa never changed their view on the project instead it created a wedge between two groups, i.e. those who stayed in the new family units and those who remained in the old hostels. Those who opted to remain in the hostel did not see the group staying in the family units as part of them.

The new family unit owners of the Welcome Zenzile houses used their “voice” to register their dissatisfaction with the lack of clarity and information on issues such as the maintenance program of the buildings and the monthly rental that is paid to the municipality. For an example, beneficiaries did not know who was responsible for the maintenance of the ‘complex’ and or whether their rent was used, or not, for maintenance purposes. This sense of general dissatisfaction is further confirmed by the findings of a research by CASE (2004: 4) on the Welcome Zenzile Cooperative, in which one of the men respondents claimed that:

“in the hostels it was much better because [they] were seen as foreigners and [they] accepted that, but now things are worse as [they] feel that [they] have been given false hopes”.

Most of the women residents of Welcome Zenzile however, thought this was too trivial a matter to push them out of the cooperative, as they were generally satisfied with the product, especially with the fact that they “have electricity and clean water”. (CASE: 2004)
It could be safely concluded, therefore, based on these observations, that the level of satisfaction of beneficiaries with the project and products, as displayed by their ability to voice their dissatisfaction with the program, and or to exit the program at any stage of the program, could be attributable to their level of participation, as measured against the Association of Public Participation model. The research has also confirmed that there is, in the case of the two projects, a definite correlation between the level of engagement, as in the number of meetings attended by beneficiaries to discuss the redevelopment of the hostels and to receive feedback on progress regarding the project, and their level of satisfaction. It was the case of the lesser the participation, the more the exits, but the more empowered the beneficiaries, the more they could ‘voice’ their dissatisfaction and thereby decide whether they would prefer to remain in the program to enhance it or exit the program for better options.

Regarding the “exit, voice and loyalty” model (Hirschmann; 1970) therefore, one can conclude that the more “loyal” the cooperative members were to the program, the more they felt obliged to “voice” their opinion and expectations of the management of the outcomes of the project, than to exit the program. Maybe the fact that it was difficult to “exit” the programs contributed to their “loyalty”. It was further observed in the two case studies that there was a causal relationship between participation and “exit” in that the more participative the beneficiaries, the more “loyal” they were to the project, and the more “loyal” they were to the project the more they were willing to “voice” their opinion on the project and product and the lesser they exit the program.

What was different about the two case studies was that while the Board was involved in the operational running of the project in the case of Ilinge LabaHlali the Chairperson of the Welcome Zenzile Housing Cooperative was not very forthright about who was running the administration or responsible for administrative tasks. The Head of Hostel Development of the City of Cape Town indicated, in one of the interviews held with him, (17 August 2013) that the City of Cape Town was requested by beneficiaries, “about 10 years ago”, to run the process on behalf of beneficiaries, and merely to report to the committee on progress. That was one of the main reasons why the community of beneficiaries of the Welcome Zenzile Housing Cooperative depended on the City of Cape Town for the implementation of the program.

The other difference, which may have influenced the perceptions of beneficiaries was that the Ilinge LabaHlali Housing Cooperative was situated among ‘private hostels’ which were all in a similar situation. As a result there was more enthusiasm about the achievement of the
project, The Langa Housing Cooperative, on the other hand, is bordered by different hostels which are at different stages of development, some of which are also being renovated. The fact that the hostel dwellers of the other hostels were not paying for their hostel redevelopment program influenced the outcome of the Langa Hostel program immensely, in that beneficiaries of the Welcome Zenzile Hostel Redevelopment Program did not understand why they had to pay for their development. As a consequence many refused to contribute and ‘exited’ the program.

7.5 Conclusion

In conclusion, the findings of the research, in both cases, confirm the significant role played by participation in the satisfaction levels of beneficiaries of the Hostel Redevelopment Program. It confirms that where participants are involved in decision-making the chances of such participants becoming satisfied with the outcomes of the process are greater than where the participants are excluded from the decision-making process. This finding is also confirmed by literature, Mansuri and Rao (2013; 10) who claim that one of the “intrinsic values” of participation is that “communities tend to express greater satisfaction with decisions in which they participate, even when participation does not change the outcome or when the outcomes are not consistent with their expressed preferences”. It has also been shown that the “Spectrum of Participation” model, as propounded by the International Association for Public Participation, provides a useful benchmark of core values of public participation against which compliance with participation principles could be benchmarked. These ‘core values’ were utilized, extensively, as a guide to measure the level of participation of beneficiaries in the program. The core values also provide a guideline to measure the level of participation against a scale ranging from ‘informing’ communities to ‘empowering’ such communities. As stated in previous chapters, the model has provided a useful guideline of determining whether in the two case studies, the beneficiaries were either ‘informed’ of the project which entailed a simple dissemination of “balanced and objective information to assist them in understanding the problem, alternatives, opportunities and/ or solutions” as was the case with the Welcome Zenzile Housing Cooperative, or whether the beneficiaries were “empowered”, as was the case with Ilinge labaHlali Housing Cooperative. In terms of the model the ‘empowering’ approach entailed placing “the final decision-making in the hands of the public”. Where the beneficiaries were empowered, which is the highest phase of the spectrum, the participants became particularly satisfied with the products of the project, as against when beneficiaries were informed, in which case there was little ‘buy-in’ from the people.
The potential weakness and challenge of the research presents itself in the quality of responses of the respondents in the Nyanga case in particular, responses that appear to be strikingly similar. This could be attributed to the fact that the questionnaire was discussed in detail in one of the Board meetings of the beneficiaries in the Nyanga case, when permission was asked to conduct the research. The spread and variety of responses, however, especially in key areas appears to point toward the validity of the findings. The summaries of the responses in the different project phases express a wide range of orientations and views in regard to the perceptions of the respondents.

Similarly, we have seen how full participation brought about a level of satisfaction of the beneficiaries with the Ilinge labaHlali project, and how this, in turn, brought about “loyalty” to the project. In the same way that the “Spectrum of Participation” model provided a useful guideline for understanding the public participation discourse the Hirschmann's theory of Voice, Loyalty and Exit has provided a useful guideline and methodology to predict, with a sense of certainty, a possible reaction, by beneficiaries and or recipients of a product and or a service, to perceived satisfaction or dissatisfaction with that particular service or product. The theory provided a useful framework to understand why the Nyanga beneficiaries were “loyal”, to the project whereas the beneficiaries of the Welcome Zenzile Housing Cooperative were ‘voicing’ their complaints the way they did to a person they did not know that well. Unlike in Nyanga, where beneficiaries were not only “loyal” to the project, but to the Board, as well, beneficiaries of the Langa project did not show any loyalty to the project or to the management Committee. They were just glad that they had a house of their own to occupy. For that reason, a significant portion of the residents of the Welcome Zenzile Housing Cooperative opted to “exit” the program when they were dissatisfied with the lack of information and progress of the project. From the fieldwork it is also clear that these potential beneficiaries ‘exited’ when they realized that their ‘voices’ were not heard and or there was no satisfactory feedback from the leaders of the project. The Hirschmann theory, therefore, provides an explanation on how less or no participation by beneficiaries can bring about indifference and, subsequently, dissatisfaction, with a project, but in particular with a specific housing project. The research has shown how this dissatisfaction with the project eventually led to a significant number of the potential beneficiaries ‘voicing’ their dissatisfaction with the project and finally ‘exiting’ the project in large numbers.

The issue of duality, in the Hirschmann model, presented a challenge, in that the model only makes a reference to either loyalty as a result of satisfaction or exit (or voice) due to dissatisfaction. The model does not entertain situations where beneficiaries are satisfied with the product but maybe not be equally satisfied with the consultation process. Though the
perceptions of beneficiaries per phase is captured in the chapters dealing with each case, there is no analysis provided by the model of the case of beneficiaries who are neither categorically satisfied nor dissatisfied, but who are none the less still part of the program.

These core values of the “Spectrum of Participation” model have assisted in determining factors that caused the two projects to fall on the side of the spectrum specified in the above paragraph. For an example in the case of the Ilinge LabaHlali Housing Cooperative, in Nyanga, beneficiaries knew that they had “a right to be involved in the decision-making process” hence the establishment of the Board, whereas the Welcome Zenzile Group did not play much of a role in the decision-making process, as described in Chapters 6. The decisions made by members of the Ilinge labaHlali Housing Cooperative have sustained the Cooperative because these decisions were based on “the needs and interests” of the members, whereas in the case of the Welcome Zenzile Cooperative because the project was not driven by the “needs and interest” of beneficiaries the housing cooperative exists only in name. Ironically, one would have thought that because the Welcome Zenzile Housing Cooperative was getting assistance from the City of Cape Town, the project would have been a huge success, but it was a complete opposite in terms of involvement, and satisfaction. The Nyanga Housing Cooperative Board also went out of its way to ‘seek out and facilitate the involvement of those potentially affected by or interested in the project’ and as a result, the project became a success whereas with the Langa project, because the involvement of the beneficiaries was not paramount, the project could not be comparable to the Nyanga project when it came to participation. It can also be stated that with the Ilinge LabaHlali, beneficiaries were ‘provided with all the information they needed to participate in a meaningful way, and it was further ‘communicated to participants how their input affected the decision’ regarding the Board and the housing project. Obviously very little communication took place between the beneficiaries of the Langa Housing Cooperative and as a result many of the beneficiaries did not have basic information on the project. The “spectrum of participation” model has played a significant in the analysis of the participation levels of beneficiaries in the initiatives of the housing cooperatives.

The research has shown how members of the Ilinge labaHlali Housing Cooperative became “empowered” on issues of decision-making and management (Otzen et. al: 1999: 9) as a result of their full involvement and participation in the redevelopment program of the hostels. The research displayed how this empowering dimension managed to encourage participants of Ilinge Labahlali to explore:
different ways not only to bring people into the political process and hence independent decision-making [my emphasis], but also to transform and democratize the political process in ways that progressively alter the ‘immanent’ processes of inclusion and exclusion operating within particular political communities, and which govern the opportunities for individuals and groups to claim their rights to participation and resources’. (Hickey & Mohan; 2005: 251)

This empowerment dimension, as alluded to by Otzen et. al (1999), emanated from the extent to which the participation process in the Ilinge labaHlali Housing Cooperative, did “allow and actively solicit a certain degree of control over their allocative mechanisms by underprivileged groups”. Hickey & Mohan (2005: 250) saw this typical ‘participation for empowerment’ process, as having inculcated in the Ilinge LabaHlali Housing Cooperative members as a culture of “challenging existing power relations rather than simply working around them…” a culture ‘characterized by a focus on and pursuit of participation as citizenship’ capable of disentwining ‘the modes of accumulating political and economic power’.

We have also seen how satisfied beneficiaries have been prone to voicing their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the process of the projects and how those who were not fully participating opted to ‘exit’ because of their dissatisfaction with their project. Though the theory did not provide an explanation to the cause of such reaction, it did, however, provide a guideline and a sense of predictability to the reactions of the beneficiaries in relation to their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the project. The research has, as a consequence, attempted to associate the reaction of the beneficiaries to a particular perception, by looking at when and why did respondent beneficiaries reacted the way they did.

It was, however, not clear in the research, whether, the fact that Ilinge labahlali was based on private hostels and the Welcome Zenzile on public hostels had a significant impact on the outcomes of the research. It can be said though that in the Ilinge labaHlali Board case, success of the project depended on beneficiaries, whereas the Welcome Zenzile group could hand the project to the owners of the property, the City of Cape Town, if and when it failed, as the Management Committee did from time to time. However because the research did not test for the link between the perceptions of the respondents and the ownership status of the hostels it is difficult to link the response and perceptions of the respondents to the status of the hostel.
7.6 Area of future research

It was not the intention of this study to look at the continuum between satisfaction and dissatisfaction, nor was it the intention to assess the applicability of the Hirschmann model in the public sector. The intention has always been to investigate the effect of participation on the levels of satisfaction or dissatisfaction of the hostel redevelopment program.

Further research, in my view, should be pursued to investigate how participation can be utilized as a general tool for intelligent urban management in South Africa, to mitigate the myriad of service delivery needs of the country, and to get citizens actively involved in the effective management of their respective municipal areas. The purpose would be to look at how participation can be used as a strategy for such active citizenship. This, in my opinion, would go a long way in resolving the method and approach of dealing with the disillusionment with service delivery currently prevailing in South Africa. Urban management, as a philosophy, encourages, a strategy of “working with people”. Literature (UN-HABITAT: 2001; World Bank: 1992) claims that urban management is “about systems thinking and holistic solutions to urban problems such as water shortages and power; reducing the disparities between rural and urban dwellers; discovering new ways of coping with externalities resulting from increased traffic, heat and pollution in urban conurbations; creating more incentives for inventive thinkers to keep cities attractive as centers for innovation and culture; overhauling urban transport systems or creating mobile cities; mainstreaming intelligent housing designs; rejuvenating the education system to provide useful job and relevant skills for the future and thereby making the system attractive to “bored youth” prevalent in urban centers and dealing with crime emanating from the concentration of foreign-born and low income residents in an urban centre”. Werna (1995: 354) calls this process ‘decentralization’, which takes effect if everybody in the system is empowered to participate. Chakrabarty (2001) prefers to call it “integrated urban management”, which, he claims, advocates for a holistic and systematic approach to challenges of urban centres.

The principle of empowerment is articulated well in the conceptualization of the concept of the ‘inclusive city’, a concept which encourages administrations and governments to habitually consult, and engage their citizens on issues of service delivery. These “inclusive cities”, according to Boraine (undated) are cities “where everyone, regardless of their economic means, gender, race, ethnicity or religion, is enabled and empowered to fully participate in the social, economic and political opportunities that cities have to offer”. The inclusive city concept, when examined closely, espouses the same principles espoused by
developmental local authorities. It can therefore be argued that a city can never be inclusive unless it is developmental in approach, and a developmental local authority can never be developmental if it is not inclusive. Boraine (undated) confirms this when he claims that a city can only become an inclusive city, if it “promotes growth with equity.” Inclusive cities, as indicated in the diagram, emphasize the importance of “equitable sharing of social benefits” by the residents of that city, including vulnerable groups such as hostel dwellers and residents of low-cost houses. The promotion of ‘growth with equity’ further resonates well with McCarney’s concept of ‘local governance’ in that until a city is inclusive it cannot ‘empower’. However, the same concept of empowerment needs to be researched further since it may, under certain circumstances, be used as a tool to disempower beneficiaries. The area of research, in particular, pertains to the extent to which the beneficiaries of the housing cooperatives were disempowered by the process.

Coupled to the “inclusive city” concept is the idea of ‘intelligent urban management’ upon which the low-cost housing, as a social intervention, should be strategically premised. ‘Intelligent urban management’, according to Stubbs et al. (2000: 1805) emphasises a process of building hope and awareness amongst individuals who appear (to each other and/or any appointed process facilitator) most able to make a difference to some complex issue. This concept of building hope resonates well with the principles of Davids et. al. (2005: 112), summarised, inter alia, as follows:

i. Sovereignty resides with the people, the real actors of positive change;
ii. The legitimate role of government is to enable the people to set and pursue their own agenda;
iii. The people must control their own resources, have access to relevant information and have the means to hold the officials of government accountable;
iv. Those who would assist the people with their development must recognise that it is they who are participating in support of the people’s agenda, not the reverse;

These principles support the notion of ‘building hope’ by empowering those who are able to make a difference, in the manner espoused in ‘intelligent urban management’. Local communities, but in particular communities in need, must be collectively enhanced, “in an organized framework to pool their efforts and whatever other resources they decide to pool together, to attain objectives they set for themselves”. (McCarney: 2000: 8-9) To galvanize such ‘collective enhancement’ McCarney (2000: 8-9) suggests the introduction of a “local governance discourse” to local government, as a strategy for local urban management. “Local governance” is defined by McCarney (2000) as “the relationship between civil society
and the state‖, a relationship which “includes elements which, in conventional terms, are often considered to be outside the public policy process, but nonetheless are instrumental in the socio-economic and cultural development of third world cities, and highly responsible for shaping the urban landscape and built form of cities”. She argues that “governance, when conceived of locally, … encourages meaningful engagement of citizens in the decisions affecting the development course of their localities-whether that be achieved by meaningful engagement between civil society and the state in planning, decision-making and project initiatives around issues of land, housing and services; by involvement of citizens with local government in broader policy discussions on municipal budgets and taxes, or socio-economic questions of urban poverty, employment creation, enterprise support, and local economic development initiatives; by political participation in the form of voting; or by political action in the form of policy negotiation, public consultation, participatory planning, or urban protest”. Some of the elements of this relationship, according to McCarney (2000) are “civic associations, “illegal” operators, “informal sector” organizations, community groups and social movements, all of which, in fact, exert an indelible impact on the morphology and development of urban centers”.

Participative governance, therefore, would have to be one of the tools and strategies for addressing “rapidly urbanizing humanity, characterized in most instances, by lack of housing and slum developments in and around urban centres”. (McCarney: 2000) Housing cooperatives, as vehicles for housing solutions, would have to be part of this urban management paradigm because of its inherent participative methodology. Such an urban management paradigm would have to be founded in the integrated development framework, as shown in Figure 38, so that low-cost housing, and indeed hostel redevelopment programs, fulfill the role envisaged in the integrated housing development strategy. The participation of beneficiaries in the development of their houses is pivotal in that strategy and in the approach of housing cooperatives. Housing cooperatives create that social contract between the government and affected communities so that the provision of low-cost housing is the responsibility of all stakeholders. Housing cooperatives are proving that when participation is done properly it will go a long way towards solving many of the problems experienced in South Africa today. If urban management is indeed about creating an environment in which “a set of activities which shape and guide social, physical, and economic development” in the regeneration of urban centers (Pieterse: 2000; MacGill: 1998; Davey: 1993) it can be concluded from the literature (Pieterse: 2000; Werna: 1995) that public participation should be one of the most logical strategies of dealing with urban challenges, such as low-cost housing. Caution must however be sounded that participation, cannot be seen as panacea for all the socio-economic challenges of the government.
ANNEXURE 1

QUESTIONNAIRE

UNIVERSITY OF STELLENBOSCH

HOUSING CO-OPERATIVES

RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE

This mini-thesis research is done as partial fulfillment of requirements of a Masters degree with the University of Cape Town to establish the extent to which beneficiaries were part of the design and allocation of the family units converted from hostels.

The questionnaire is completely anonymous so if you do not want to give your name feel free to just complete it without completing your name.

1.1. How old are you?

1.1.1. Under 30 years

1.1.2. Over 30 years

1.2. Which company are you working for or did you work for before?

1.3. What is your sex?

1.3.1. Male

1.3.2. Female

1.4. Are you a beneficiary or a relative of the beneficiary?

1.4.1. Yes

1.4.2. No

1.5. How many years have you been a resident in the hostel?

1.5.1. Less than 10 years

1.5.2. Ten years and more

1.6. Are you a member of a savings club?

1.6.1. Yes

1.6.2. No
1.7. If you are a member when did you join the savings club?

| 1.7.1 Since inception | 1.7.2. Just joined recently |

1.8. What made you join the savings club?

| 1.8.1 Because you thought it will assist you in getting a home? | 1.8.2. You were not sure why you joined? |

1.9. Were you told the reasons why you need to join the savings club?

| 1.9.1 Yes | 1.9.2. No |

1.10. Who explained these reasons to you?

| 1.10.1 Consultants | 1.10.2. Board |

1.11. Have you been attending any meetings since you became a member?

| 1.11.1 Yes | 1.11.2. No |

1.12. If yes, how many meetings did you attend a month on average?

| 1.12.1 Once a month? | 1.12.2. More than once a month? |

**Regarding the design:**

2.1. Were you consulted about the design of your house?

| 2.1.1. Yes | 2.1.2. No |

2.2. Who consulted you?

| 2.2.1 Consultants | 2.2.2 Board |
2.3. Was this in a meeting or on a one to one basis?

| 2.3.1 Public meeting | 2.2.2 One-to-one |

2.4. Were you consulted about how your house is going to look like when it is completed?

| 2.3.1 Yes | 2.3.2 No |

2.5. Who consulted you?

| 2.5.1 Consultants | 2.5.2 Board |

2.6. Are you satisfied with the house you occupy?

| 2.6.1 Yes | 2.6.2 No |

2.7. What can you attribute your satisfaction to? Are you satisfied because of the house or that you were consulted about the house?

| 2.5.1 The house | 2.5.2 Consultation |

### 3. Board

3.1. Do you know who your board members are?

| 3.1.1 Yes | 3.1.2 No |

3.2. Do you know what role the board is playing in the development?

| 3.2.1 Yes | 3.2.2 No |

3.3. Are you happy with their role and representation?

| 3.3.1 Yes | 3.3.2 No |
3.4. Has the board been calling any public meetings?

| 3.4.1 Yes | 3.4.2 No |

3.5. Can you think of the number of meetings they have called since the development was started?

| 3.5.1 Few | 3.4.2 Many |

3.6 What was discussed in such public meetings?

| 3.6.1 Savings club | 3.6.2 Housing development |

3.7. Were these meetings useful?

| 3.7.1 Yes | 3.7.2 No |

3.8. In what way were these meetings useful?

| 3.8.1 Information sharing | 3.8.2 Solving problems |

4. Savings clubs

4.1. Why are you a member of the savings club?

| 4.1.1 Saving for a house | 4.1.2 To know more about the housing project. |

4.2. Were you involved in the nomination of the signatories of the savings club?

| 4.2.1 Yes | 4.2.2 No |

4.3. Do you have frequent meetings of the savings club?

| 4.3.1 Yes | 4.3.2 No |
4.4. How frequent have you had your meetings so far? Are your meetings weekly or monthly?

4.4.1 Weekly | 4.2.2 Monthly

4.5. What is normally discussed in your savings club meetings?

4.5.1 Housing issues | 4.5.2 Financial statements

4.6. How do you get involved in the housing scheme?

4.6.1 Through the savings club? | 4.6.2 Directly liaison with the board?

4.7. Do you think the savings club is a useful vehicle to participating in the housing scheme?

4.7.1 Yes | 4.7.2 No

4.8. Is your savings club represented in the board?

4.8.1 Yes | 4.8.2 No

4.9. Were you involved in the nomination of a board representative?

4.9.1 Yes | 4.9.2 No

4.10. Is your representative reporting back to you on a frequent basis?

4.10.1 Yes | 4.10.2 No

4.11. How frequent are you getting report backs?

4.11.1 Once a month | 4.11.2 More than once a month
4.12. What reports are you getting from the feedbacks? Are reports relating to progress reports on development or on how much have you saved and what will it be used for?

| 4.12.1 Housing development | 4.11.2 Savings and what it will be used for |

4.13. Any thing you would like to add to the answers you have given?

_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________

Thank you / Ndiyabulela / Dankie / Realeboga
ANNEXURE 2

STATUTE FOR ILINGE LABAHLALI HOUSING CO-OPERATIVE LIMITED [Letters of Association]

1. This is the statute of an undertaking formed as a primary trading co-operative with limited liability in terms of the provisions of the Co-operatives Act, 1981 (Act 91 of 1981.)

INTERPRETATION OF TERMS

2. In this statute, unless the context indicates otherwise, a word or expression to which a meaning is attached in the Co-operatives Act, 1981 (Act 91 of 1981) shall have a similar meaning and -

“board” means the board of directors referred to in clause 20;

“building and financing proposal” means a proposal prepared by the housing co-operative setting out details pertaining to the project as contemplated in clause 8(2);

“documents of access” means the documents evidencing the member’s rights in respect of the share, the user agreement and the member’s contribution in respect of the specific housing unit which shall be inextricably linked and not be capable of being transferred separately;

“housing co-operative” means Ilinge Labahlali HOUSING CO-OPERATIVE LIMITED which is incorporated in terms of the Act;

“house rules” means the house rules to be adhered to by members of the housing co-operative as set out in Schedule 3, subject to amendments by the board;

“member’s contribution” means an amount paid by a member to the housing co-operative subject to the provisions of regulation 46 of the Banking Regulations made under GN. R.628 in GG.17115 of 26 April 1996, if required in the building and financing plan, which amount shall only be repayable to the member to the extent that a new incoming member approved by the board, in accordance with the seniority principle, shall be prepared to acquire the documents of access in an amount not less than the aggregate of the share amount and such payment;

“user agreement” means an agreement concluded between the housing co-operative and a member in respect of a specific housing unit which shall be inextricably linked to a share in the housing co-operative and any member’s contribution and which shall substantially be in the form of Schedule 2;

“pre-emptive right” means the right of a person on the waiting list of the housing co-operative, in accordance with the seniority principle, to acquire documents of access from a member wishing to transfer his or her membership of the housing co-operative;

“project” means the project pursuant to which the housing co-operative has been established;

“seniority principle” means in accordance with the seniority of people on the waiting list of the housing co-operative determined with reference to when they applied for membership in the housing co-operative in accordance with the rules in this statute;
"registered office" means the registered office of the housing co-operative;

“the Act” means the Co-operatives Act, 1981 (Act 91 of 1981);

A reference to one gender includes the others; the singular includes the plural, and vice versa and headings are not taken into account in the interpretation.

NAME

3. The name of the co-operative is ILINGE LABAHLALI HOUSING CO-OPERATIVE LIMITED.

PLACES OF BUSINESS

4. The main place of business of the co-operative is situated at Cape Town.

5. The housing co-operative may not establish any branches.

OBJECTS

6. The object of the housing co-operative is to acquire, develop, hold and maintain immovable property and make housing units comprising such immovable property available for use by its members in accordance with co-operative principles.

The purpose of the Ilinge Labahlali Housing Co-operative is to acquire, develop, own and manage housing and to make it available for use by the co-op members. Members will benefit from secure, good quality, affordable housing which the co-op will provide. They will also benefit from the return of their member's contribution should they leave the co-op.

POWERS

7. [1] The board shall, subject to the provisions of the Act and this statute, exercise, for and on behalf of the housing co-operative, the following powers set out in section 49(1) of the Act subject to the qualifications mentioned -

[a] acquire and make housing units owned by the housing co-operative available for use by members;

[b] open accounts with financial institutions registered under the Banks Act, 1990;

[c] raise loans or overdraw a banking account: Provided that a special resolution of members has been obtained in terms of clause 58 of this statute;

[d] invest money not immediately required in financial institutions registered in terms of the Banks Act, 1990;

[e] become a member of another co-operative, or of any association or organisation which promotes any matter in which the co-operative has an interest; and

[f] provide associated services to its members as are customary for a social housing institution, subject, however, to sub clause (3) below.

[2] Apart from the powers mentioned in sub-clause [1] but subject to the provisions of the Act and the provisions of this statute, the housing co-operative shall have all such powers as may be necessary to carry out its objects.
[3] In the event of the housing units owned by the housing co-operative having been funded from government housing subsidies, it shall comply with the rules pertaining to such subsidies and be prohibited from carrying on business activities other than:

[a] dealing with housing units in accordance with the guidelines for institutional subsidies of the housing subsidy scheme; and

[b] letting any non-residential component contained in its immovable property in any manner in which it deems fit.

[4] The housing co-operative may not sell any housing unit as contemplated in section 49(1)(c) of the Act without a decision of its members, as contemplated in clause 55.

[5] The housing co-operative shall not issue any surety, indemnity or other security, except under authority of a special resolution.

HOUSING SPECIFIC ISSUES

8. [1] The housing co-operative is established pursuant to a building and financing proposal made by the housing co-operative attached hereto as Schedule 1.

[2] The financing and building proposal sets out details of the project, the various issues relating to the construction or upgrading of immovable property comprising housing units and the financing thereof, the relevant time frames and funding commitments, any member's contribution required to finance the project, the proposed monthly charges pertaining to the housing units, drawings, descriptions and specifications of the housing units, cost estimates, and an operating budget from which the housing co-operative shall not be able to deviate substantially without the consent of the members of the housing co-operative.

[3] If the housing co-operative is established prior to the completion of construction or upgrading in respect of the project has been completed, the housing co-operative shall:

[a] keep members regularly informed of progress in the project;

[b] not require the payment of any member's contribution prior to written confirmation by the auditors that the financing commitments set out in the building and financing plan are in place, unless held in trust with an attorney or auditor.

[4] The member having concluded a transaction with the housing co-operative to acquire documents of access in respect of a housing unit in a project based upon the building and financing proposal is entitled to a certificate confirming the payment of the member's contribution and the fact that such member's contribution is linked to the member's share and the user agreement.

[5] Where building work has not commenced within one year of payment of the member's contribution to the housing co-operative, the member may cancel the transaction.

[6] If changes are effected to the building and financing proposal, not required for technical or financial reasons or ordered by public authority, which has the effect that any member's contribution needs to be increased by more than 10% or if the standard of the housing unit is significantly lowered, a member who has not approved the change may cancel the agreement. If changes are made that have such consequences and a shareholder was not informed in advance, he or she can cancel the agreement irrespective of whether the change was necessary or ordered. A member's right to cancel the transaction according to this
clause lapses if he or she has not exercised such right within three months of learning of the circumstances.

[7] If an agreement is cancelled as contemplated in sub clause 8, the housing co-operative is obliged to repay any member's contribution, and to redeem the share against payment of an amount determined in accordance with clause 18.

[8] A member may, while he or she is unable to occupy the housing unit, sub-let the housing unit with the consent of the board, subject to the provisions of the user agreement.

[9] A user agreement shall lapse when the member ceases to hold the relevant share linked to the housing unit.

[10] The housing co-operative may only terminate the user agreement in the event of non-compliance with the terms of the user agreement, including specifically the payment of the payments required under the user agreement, or pursuant to the termination of the member's membership.

[11] When the housing co-operative terminates the user agreement, it may order the shareholder to transfer his or her share and the member's contribution to a new incoming member identified by the board in accordance with seniority principles prepared to acquire the documents of access.

[12] A member who, for any reason, refuses to conclude a user agreement may be ordered by the board to transfer his or her share and the member's contribution to a person appointed by the board.

MEMBERSHIP

9.[1] The member of the housing co-operative is a person who has acquired a share in the housing co-operative in accordance with this statute.

[2] Any person who is over the age of 18 years may, on application to the board, become a member of the housing co-operative, subject to the availability of housing units and compliance with the provisions of this statute and clause 10[2] in particular.

[3] The number of members and shares shall be limited to the number of housing units owned by the housing co-operative.

[4] Only natural persons and municipalities may be members of the housing co-operative.

[5] No member may hold more than one share.

APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP

10.[1] Application for membership shall be made on the form provided for that purpose which shall include a duly completed and signed user agreement substantially in the form of Schedule 1, subject to changes approved by the board and shall be accompanied by the share amount and the member's contribution.

[2] The board shall consider every application for membership and has the right to accept an application or reject an application on the basis that -
[a] somebody else has a pre-emptive right based on the seniority principle;

[b] in the event of the housing co-operative being funded from government housing subsidies, the proposed member not meeting the eligibility criteria in terms of government housing subsidies generally;

[c] the proposed member is not able to pay the price determined by the board in respect of the documents of access as set out in clause 18 or to meet his or her obligations and specifically the obligation to pay the required monthly charges under the user agreement.

[3] The board shall, within one month after receipt of an application for membership, cause the applicant to be notified of its decision and, in the event of an application for membership being rejected, any amount paid by the applicant to the housing co-operative shall be refunded to him or her and written reasons shall be provided should the application be declined.

COMMENCEMENT OF MEMBERSHIP

11. Subject to the provisions of section 28(c) of the Act, a person becomes a member of the co-operative when his or her application for membership has been accepted by the board.

MEMBERSHIP AND SHARE AMOUNT

12. The nominal value for a share is R 10.00, which shall be paid on registration of the housing co-operative. Each member shall pay a subscription fee of R150.00 per month until such time that the members agree to stop paying it.

REGISTER OF MEMBERS

13. A register of members of the co-operative shall be kept at the registered office of the housing co-operative and the following minimum particulars entered therein -

[a] the full name of each member and the address of the housing unit occupied by each member;

[b] confirmation to the effect that the member has signed the user agreement and holds one share in the housing co-operative;

[c] the amount paid in respect of the share of each member;

[d] the date on which a person became a member;

[e] the date on which a member ceased to be a member.

MEMBERSHIP CARDS AND COPIES OF STATUTES

14. [1] Membership cards may be issued on request of the member and under authority of the board and shall be in such form as the board shall determine.

[2] A member shall be entitled to a copy of this statute, free of charge.

LIABILITY OF MEMBERS
15. The liability of a member by virtue of his or her membership shall be limited to the payment of any amount owing by him or her to the housing co-operative in terms hereof.

TRANSFER OF MEMBERSHIP

16.[1] Membership may be transferred only with -

[a] the transfer of a share, the user agreement and any member's contribution in respect of the specific housing unit (“documents of access”) which shall be inextricably linked and not capable of being transferred separately;

[b] the approval and on the authority of the board which shall satisfy itself that the proposed transferee is qualified to be a member of the housing co-operative, as contemplated in clauses 9 and 10.

[2] The board may at any time refuse to approve and register a proposed transfer.

[3] The transfer may be refused on the basis that -

[a] the transfer is in contravention of the criteria set out in clause 10[2];

[b] any other objective ground, reasonably determined, including previous unacceptable or unsocial behavior.

[4] The board may order the transfer of a share to a specific person subject to -

[a] the transferee qualifying in terms of clause 10[2];

[b] payment of the amount contemplated in clause 18.

[5] An order contemplated in clause 16[4] shall be in writing and shall set out -

[a] the reason for the order;

[b] the fact that if such transfer is not effected within a period set out in the notice, a court order ordering such transfer shall be obtained at the cost of the member;

[c] that the member's user agreement shall lapse when he or she ceases to be owner of the share.

[6] The transfer of any membership shall be in writing in such form and signed in such manner as the board from time to time may stipulate.

[7] When such transfer has taken place the board shall issue to the transferee a membership card.

CANCELLATION OF MEMBERSHIP

Cancellation on death

17.[1] The membership of a member who has died may in terms of clause 16 be transferred to a member of that deceased member's family residing in the housing unit and regarding the housing unit as its primary home or another person appointed by the executor of the deceased member's estate subject to the approval by the board of the proposed transferee and the ability of such person to meet the obligations under the user agreement as
contemplated in clause 10[2][c]. In the event of such transfer not taking place, the membership of the deceased member shall be cancelled by resolution of the board.

18 Resignation

TRANSFER OF SHARES

18.[1] A member wishing to terminate his or her membership of the housing co-operative shall make application to the board by completion of the standard form approved by the board for that purpose. Membership will be transferred against a new incoming member determined by the board in accordance with the principles set out in clause 10[2], having paid the share amount and the member’s contribution together with such amount as may be determined by the auditors of the board indicative of the increase in value of the housing unit since acquisition of the share by the outgoing member (“the increased value”), whereupon the share amount and the member’s contribution, together with such increased value shall be paid to the outgoing member.

[2] In determining the increased value, the net asset value of the housing co-operative shall be determined as well as the value of the member's rights expressed as a proportion of the net asset value, having regard to any depreciation, the amortization of any loans taken up by the housing co-operative, the extent of cash surpluses or investments of the housing co-operative, further investment in the building and any additional loans taken up, based upon the floor space of the housing unit proportionate to all housing units owned by the housing cooperative.

[3] To the extent that there has been a decrease rather than an increase in the value of the member’s rights, the member shall only be entitled to a lesser amount of the member’s contribution, if any, as determined by the board.

[4] Any dispute as to value shall be finally determined by the auditors of the housing co-operative.

EXPULSION

19.[1] A member who repeatedly contravenes a provision of this statute, the user agreement or the house rules set out in Schedule 3, subject to any amendment by the board, or who refuses to comply with such provision or to meet an obligation imposed on him or her by the housing co-operative under the Act or in terms of this statute to which he or she agreed to meet, may be special resolution be expelled from the housing co-operative.

[2] The expulsion of a member may be revoked by resolution of the board at any time.

[3] A member shall not be expelled from the housing co-operative unless he or she has been given prior written notice of the board's intention to expel him or her or to recommend to members that he or she be expelled.

[4] The notice to such member shall contain the following particulars-

[a] the reasons for the proposed expulsion with reference to the non-compliance with a specific provision of this statute, the user agreement or the house rules; and

[b] a time when, and place where the member may appear in person, with or without witnesses, before the board or to which he or she may send a written statement signed by him or herself setting out his or her objections to the proposed expulsion.
[5] The board shall, if it is decided to expel a member, notify him or her in writing of the date on which his or her expulsion comes into effect.

[6] Upon a court of law making an order for the eviction of a member due to non-compliance with the provisions of the user agreement, the member’s membership shall be automatically terminated.

[7] Termination of membership shall not terminate a liability in respect of amounts owing under the user agreement.

[8] In the event of termination of membership, the share shall -

[a] be cancelled in accordance with section 81 of the Act be cancelled and the value thereof be applied towards any indebtedness of the member; or

[b] be transferred to a person approved by the Board in accordance with the criteria set out in clause 10[2].

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Management of Housing Co-operative

20.[1] The affairs of the housing co-operative shall be managed and controlled by a board consisting of a minimum of three and a maximum of nine directors. The directors shall, subject to the provisions of the Act and this statute, exercise the powers and duties of the housing co-operative.

[2] The number of directors shall, subject to the approval of members at the next general meeting, be determined by the board from time to time. If, however, the members do not approve the decision of the board and a vacancy arises as a result thereof, such vacancy shall be regarded as a casual vacancy to be filled in terms of clause 28.

21. Without prejudice to the provisions of clauses 28 and 30 of this statute, directors shall be elected at the annual general meeting. Retiring directors are eligible for re-election.

22. In the event that housing units owned by the housing co-operative have been funded from government housing subsidies, the Provincial Housing Development Board, or any successor in title, shall be entitled to appoint a director to the board.

Persons not qualified to be director

23. In accordance with to the provisions of section 108 of the Act, no person shall hold the office of director if he or she -

[a] is a juristic person;

[b] is a minor;

[c] is a patient as defined in section 1 of the Mental Health Act, 1973 (Act no. 18 of 1973);

[d] save under the authority of a competent court -
[i] is an un-rehabilitated insolvent;

[ii] has been removed from an office of trust on account of misconduct;

[iii] has at any time been convicted (whether in the Republic or elsewhere) of theft, fraud, forgery or uttering a forged document, perjury, an offence under the prevention of Corruption Act, 1958 (Act 6 of 1958), any offence involving dishonesty or in connection with the formation or management of a co-operative or company and sentenced therefore to imprisonment without the option of fine or to a fine exceeding two hundred rand.

Term of office

24.[1] The term of office of the directors of the housing co-operative shall be three years.

[2] The directors to retire each year shall be those who have been longest in office since their last election at the annual general meeting but as between members who became directors on the same day, those to retire shall, unless they otherwise agree among themselves, be determined by ballot.

Nomination of directors

25.[1] Candidates for the position of director shall be nominated openly at the annual general meeting held for the purpose electing one or more directors.

[2] Without prejudice to the provisions of clauses 28 and 30, a member, including a retiring director, qualifies for election as director only if he is nominated in terms of sub clause [1].

[3][a] If the number of candidates nominated does not exceed the number of vacancies on the board to be filled such candidate or candidates shall be declared elected at the annual general meeting.

[b] If the number of candidates nominated exceeds the number of vacancies on the board, as many directors as there are vacancies shall be elected from the nominees at the annual general meeting.

[c] If insufficient or no candidates are nominated to fill the vacancies on the board, such vacancies shall be regarded as casual vacancies to be filled in accordance with clause 28.

Voting of members

26.[1] At the election of directors a member shall vote for as many candidates as there are vacancies to be filled on the board, and those candidates receiving the highest number of votes shall be declared elected.

[2] Subject to the provisions of this statute and the act, the method to be followed in electing directors shall be as determined by the chairperson of the meeting.

Register of directors

27. A register of directors shall be kept at the registered office of the co-operative in which the following particulars in respect of each director shall be entered -

[a] his or her full name and address;
[b] the date of his or her election;
[c] the term of office; and
[d] the name and address of each co-operative or company of which he or she is director.

Casual vacancy on the board

28. Any casual vacancy occurring on the board during the year shall be filled until the next annual general meeting by a member appointed, by the remaining directors, subject to the provisions of clause 23. At the said annual general meeting a member shall, subject to the provisions of this statute, be elected to fill the casual vacancy. Any director elected at such annual general meeting shall not hold office for a period longer than the unexpired portion of the period of office of the director whose office became vacant.

Vacation of office

29. A director shall vacate his or her office -
[a] if he or she becomes incompetent in terms of clause 23 of this statute to hold the office of director; or

[b] if he absents himself from more than three consecutive ordinary meetings of the board without its leave (and such leave shall not be granted for a period covering more than six consecutive ordinary meetings, unless the absence be on the business of the housing co-operative); or

[c] upon the expiry of 30 (thirty) days, or such shorter period as may be approved by the board, after he has resigned as a director of the housing co-operative; or

[d] if he or she is relieved of his office in terms of clause 30; or

[e] if he or she is more than one month in arrears in respect of any amount owing in terms of a user agreement.

Director may be relieved of office

30A director may, after due notice, be relieved of his office by resolution of a general meeting before the expiration of his term of office and another qualified member may be elected in his place at that meeting. Nominations for the election of such a director shall be made at the meeting. If that meeting does not fill the vacancy it shall be regarded as a casual vacancy. A director so elected shall not hold office for a period longer than the unexpired portion of the term of office of the vacating director.

Chairperson and vice-chairperson of board

31. [1] At the first meeting of the board held after the formation meeting and thereafter at the first meeting of the board held after every annual general meeting of members or when the necessity arises, the directors shall elect from among themselves a chairperson and vice-chairperson.

[2] The vice-chairperson shall act as chairperson whenever last-named is absent or unable to act as chairperson, and if both the chairperson and vice-chairperson are absent or unable to
carry out the functions of the chairman, the board shall elect another director to act as chairperson during such absence or incapacity.

Vacation of office by chairperson and vice-chairperson

32.[1] The chairperson of the board of the co-operative shall vacate the office of chairperson if he or she -

[a] ceases to be a director of the housing co-operative; or

[b] resigns as chairperson; or

[c] is relieved of the office of chairperson by the board; or

[d] is no longer a member of the housing co-operative.

[2] The provisions of sub-clause [1] shall apply, with the necessary changes required by the context, to the vice-chairperson of the board.

Board meeting

33.[1] A meeting of the board shall be convened by the board or the chairperson of the board or any two directors of the housing co-operative.

[2] The majority of directors shall constitute a quorum of a meeting of the board.

[3] Questions arising at a meeting of the board shall be determined by a majority of the directors present at the meeting and in the case of an equality of votes, the chairperson of the board or the person acting as chairperson shall have a casting vote in addition to his deliberative vote.

Interests in contracts

34. A director of a housing co-operative who in a capacity other than that of director, member, affiliated member or duly authorised agent of the housing co-operative is interested in a proposed contract which the housing co-operative considers entering into or becomes interested in a contract after it has been entered into by the housing co-operative, shall disclose to the housing co-operative full particulars relating to the nature and extent of his interest in accordance with the provisions of section 117(2) or (3) of the Act, and may not vote in respect of such contract or proposed contract with the housing co-operative or any matter resulting therefrom, and if he or she does so vote, his or her vote shall not be counted.

Register of interests in contracts

35. The housing co-operative shall keep at its registered office, a register of interests of directors of the housing co-operative in contracts and shall cause to be entered therein particulars of every disclosure of interests in terms of clause 34 of this statute.

Minutes of meetings

36.[1] The board shall, subject to the provisions of section 113 of the Act, cause to be kept minutes of all proceedings of meetings of the board or a committee thereof and, within two months of the date of such meeting cause the said minutes to be entered in one or more
books kept for that purpose at the registered office. Minutes shall be available at the registered office for scrutiny by all members during normal office hours.

[2] Minutes of a meeting of the board drawn up in accordance with sub-clause [1] shall be submitted at a board meeting as soon as possible, but not later than at the first board meeting held after the expiry of two months, reckoned from the date on which the meeting to which the minutes refer, was held.

Attendance register

37. Every director present at a meeting of the board or committee thereof shall sign his name under the date of the meeting in a register, with permanently bound pages, which shall be kept for that purpose. Such register shall be kept at the registered office.

Remuneration

38. All necessary and actual out-of-pocket expenses incurred by directors by reason of their attending meetings of the board or being engaged on the business of the housing co-operative may be refunded to them.

By-laws and fines

39. Subject to clause 42 of this statute, the members make by-laws or house rules or amend same provided they are not repugnant to this statute.

Delegation of powers to a committee

40. [1] The board may delegate one or more of its powers to a director or to a committee, the members of which are directors of the housing co-operative, or empower such director or committee to perform a duty of the housing co-operative or to act as its representative or agent.

[2] Any director or committee of directors so appointed shall in the exercise of the powers so delegated, abide by such rules as may be made and follow such instructions as may be issued, in regard thereto, by the board.

[3] The provisions of clause 36 shall apply, with the necessary changes required by the context, to such a committee.

Insurance

41. The board shall provide for insurance of the assets (including any building or housing units comprising the project) of the housing co-operative, including cash, against loss or damage, and in respect of liability of the housing co-operative in regard to ordinary business risks and shall also provide for such insurance in respect of products and other goods whilst under the care and control of the housing co-operative.

Meetings of Members

42. An annual general meeting of members shall be held within 120 days after the end of each financial year of the housing co-operative for the purpose of -

[a] considering the financial state of affairs of the housing co-operative and dealing with the annual financial statements relating to the preceding financial year;
[b] electing directors and if necessary appointing an auditor;

c) disposing of other matters which in terms of the Act or this statute can or should be disposed of at that meeting; and

d) dealing with any general business, including any complaints that may be made by members.

43. Subject to the provisions of section 123(1) of the Act, the housing co-operative may from time to time in addition to its annual general meeting hold extraordinary general meetings of its members to dispose of any matter relating to its affairs specifically set out in the notice convening the meeting.

44. Without detracting from the generality of clause 43, the meeting of members may order any investigation the meeting may consider necessary in relation to the business of the housing co-operative and appoint an investigator who shall report back to the meeting.

45.[1] An annual general meeting shall be convened on authority of the board.

[2] An extraordinary general meeting shall be convened -

[a] by the board; or

[b] by at least two directors of the housing co-operative; or

[c] by five or more members of the housing co-operative constituting in number at least 10% (ten percent) of all the members of the housing co-operative: Provided that such members shall not be entitled to convene an extraordinary general meeting unless they have beforehand in writing petitioned the directors to convene such a meeting and the meeting is not convened within 21 (twenty one) days reckoned from the date the petition was lodged, or unless for any reason there are no directors to whom such a petition can be addressed.

[3] Any meeting convened in terms of sub-clause [2][c] by the requisitionists shall, as far as possible, be convened and held in the same manner as is prescribed for meetings convened and held by the board and any reasonable expense incurred by the requisitionists in securing the names and addresses of members, in sending notices of the meeting to them and hiring accommodation for the holding of the meeting, if so resolved by such meeting, be refunded to the requisitionists by the housing co-operative.

Notice of general meeting

46.[1] A general meeting shall be convened by at least 14 (fourteen) days notice in writing to each member of the housing co-operative. The notice shall be exclusive of the day on which it is served or deemed to be served and of the day for which it is given.

[2] The notice convening the meeting shall in addition to the time and place of the meeting state the purpose for which it is convened.

[3] A notice may be delivered personally or be forwarded by post to the member at his registered address.

[4] A notice forwarded by post shall be deemed to be delivered at the time when the letter containing the notice is posted and proof that the letter containing the notice has been
correctly addressed and posted shall be sufficient proof that the notice has been delivered by post.

[5] Non-receipt by a member of a notice of a general meeting of the co-operative does not render such meeting invalid.

[6] If a notice of a meeting is returned to the housing co-operative because the member to whom it was sent is no longer resident at the registered address, the housing co-operative shall be relieved of its obligation to send further notices of meetings to the member concerned unless the member makes an appearance and requests that such notices be sent to his or her new address.

Quorum

47.[1] A quorum for a general meeting shall be not less than one quarter of the members of the housing co-operative.

[2] Notwithstanding the provisions of sub clause [1], a quorum at a general meeting shall under no circumstances be constituted by less than five members, who are present in person.

48. No item of business shall be transacted at any general meeting unless a quorum of members is present during the time when the meeting is considering that item.

49.[1] If within one hour from the time appointed for the meeting a quorum is not present, the meeting - [a] if convened by members or in consequence of a petition of members, shall be deemed to be cancelled;

[b] if otherwise convened, shall be adjourned to the same day in the next week at the same time and place, or if that day is a public holiday, to the next day following which is not a public holiday.

[2] If the same hall or building is not available for an adjourned meeting it may be held at another venue within convenient distance if members are advised of the change of venue either by notice posted at the original venue or by some other means.

[3] If a quorum is not present within one hour after the time fixed for an adjourned meeting, the members present, provided they are not less than five in number, shall be deemed to constitute a quorum, provided that a special resolution may not be passed by such a meeting.

Chairperson of general meetings

50.[1] The chairperson of the board or in his absence the vice-chairperson or in the absence of both, another director elected by the meeting shall act as chairperson of an annual general meeting or an extraordinary general meeting with the exception of a meeting convened in terms of sub clause [2] hereof.

[2] A person elected by the meeting shall act as the chairperson of an extraordinary general meeting convened by petition of members.

Voting by members

51. Subject to the provisions of section 128 of the Act, each member shall have one vote.
52.[1] Any matter for decision by a general meeting shall be decided by means of a vote on a show of hands or by ballot.

[2] A vote by ballot shall not be held unless it is demanded by at least five members present at the meeting.

[3] A vote by ballot shall be held in such manner as the chairperson stipulates. Scrutineer/s shall be nominated to determine the result of the vote by ballot which shall be declared by the chairperson of the meeting as the resolution of the meeting at which the vote was demanded.[4] A declaration by the chairperson that a resolution has, on a show of hands or by ballot, been carried, or carried unanimously or by a particular majority, or lost, and an entry to that effect in the minutes of the proceedings of the meeting, shall be conclusive proof thereof, without evidence as to the number or proportion of votes recorded for or against such resolution.

53. If no objection is raised in terms of the provisions of this statute against the validity of any vote cast at the meeting, whether on a show of hands or by ballot, every vote cast at the meeting which has not been disallowed shall for all purposes whatsoever be deemed to be valid.

54. In the case of an equality of votes, whether on a show of hands or in a vote by ballot, the chairperson of the meeting shall have a casting vote in addition to his deliberative vote.

55. Every matter submitted to a general meeting for decision, except for a matter requiring a special resolution, in terms of this statute and/or the Act shall be determined by a majority of votes recorded at the meeting.

Special resolution

56. A resolution by a general meeting of the housing co-operative shall, in terms of the provisions of section 130(1) of the Act, constitute a special resolution if -

[a] the notice by which the general meeting was convened specified particulars of the proposed resolution and stated the intention to propose same as a special resolution; and

[b] the resolution has been passed -

[i] in the case of a vote on a show of hands, by not less than two-thirds of the persons present at the meeting and entitled to vote in a vote on a show of hands; or

[ii] in the case of a vote by ballot, by not less than two-thirds of the votes of the persons present at the meeting and entitled to vote in a vote by ballot;

[c] the resolution relates to the winding-up of the housing co-operative and was passed by at least seventy-five percent of the votes of all the members of the housing co-operative, both in an vote on the show of hands and a vote by ballot.

Minutes of general meetings

57. Subject to the provisions of section 131 of the Act, the housing co-operative shall cause minutes to be kept of the proceedings at general meetings and shall cause same to be entered within two months after the meeting in one or more books kept for that purpose at the registered office. Minutes shall be available at the registered office for scrutiny by all members during normal office hours.
Borrowing Powers

58. In terms of the provisions of section 53 of the Act, the co-operative shall not borrow or raise money or overdraw a banking account except on authority of a special resolution: Provided that the housing co-operative may borrow or raise money or overdraw a banking account without the said authority up to an amount not exceeding one half of the aggregate of its share capital and general reserve.

Banking Account

59. [1] The co-operative shall open a banking account in the name of the housing co-operative in which all moneys received shall be deposited as soon as possible after receipt thereof.

[2] Cheques drawn on the banking account shall be signed by two of the directors or a director and the manager or another senior officer of the housing co-operative authorized thereto by the board and shall be countersigned by the secretary or other senior officer authorized thereto by the board: Provided that a cheque shall not be signed and countersigned by the same person and that adequate security shall be furnished for all officers who are authorized to sign or countersign cheques.

FINANCIAL YEAR

60. The financial year of the housing co-operative shall end on the last day of March of each year.

FINANCIAL RECORDS

61. [1] The housing co-operative shall cause to be kept such accounting records as are necessary fairly to reflect the state of affairs and business of the housing co-operative and to explain the transactions and financial position of the business of the housing co-operative including at least the records, registers and statements of account stipulated in section 134 of the Act.

[2] The accounting records shall be kept at the registered office of the co-operative and shall be available at all times for examination by the directors or members; provided that this right shall be exercised not to interfere with the normal running of the business of the housing co-operative.

ANNUAL FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

62. [1] The housing co-operative shall, in terms of the provisions of section 135 of the Act, in respect of each financial year of the housing co-operative cause annual financial statements to be drawn up.

[2] The provisions of sections 135 to 142 of the Act are applicable to the annual financial statements of the housing co-operative.

AUDIT

63. An auditor shall be appointed, his duties regulated and his remuneration fixed in accordance with the provisions of sections 143 to 156 of the Act.

SURPLUS
64. The surplus resulting from the operations of the housing co-operative during any financial year shall be set aside as general or contingency reserve and may be applied to avoid any increase in monthly charges.

BUSINESS

65. The business of the housing co-operative shall be the carrying out of all or any of the objects mentioned in clause 6 of this statute on such terms and conditions as may from time to time be decided on by the board.

AMENDMENT OF STATUTE

66. The statute of the housing co-operative may be amended by special resolution in accordance with clause 55.

APPOINTMENT OF COMMITTEE BY MEMBERS

67.[1] By resolution of a general meeting of members or of a meeting of the board, a committee may be appointed to carry out any special task that may be deemed desirable.

[2] A committee so appointed shall, in carrying out the special task with which it has been charged, abide by the rules made and follow the instructions issued by the members and/or the board.

COPY OF CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION AND OF STATUTE

68. At the registered office of the housing co-operative shall be kept the certificate of incorporation and a true copy of this statute.

GENERAL

69. The housing co-operative shall sue and be sued in the name of the housing co-operative and all powers of attorney and documents in connection therewith shall be signed by the chairperson of the board, or any director lawfully acting in that capacity, and by the secretary.

LIQUIDATION

70. In case of liquidation the patronage proportion mentioned in section 224(4) and (5) of the Act, shall be determined with reference to the user agreement payments made by a member as a percentage of the total payments made by all members for either the five years which preceded the commencement of the winding-up of the housing co-operative or the period for which the housing co-operative has existed, whichever period is the shorter.

SCHEDULES B

1. Financing and Building Proposal
2. User Agreement
3. House Rules
ANNEXURE 3

List of respondents in the two case studies

LANGA CASE STUDY
Fourteen (14) respondents: 11 Males and 3 Females, interviewed during February and March 2013

NYANGA CASE STUDY
Thirty-seven (37) respondents: 21 Males and 16 Females, interviewed during 2008 from August 2008 –March 2009
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