Left Dislocation in Biblical Hebrew: A Cognitive Linguistic Account

by

Joshua R. Westbury

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Declaration

By submitting this thesis electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained therein is my own original work, that I am the authorship owner thereof (unless to the extent explicitly otherwise stated) and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for obtaining any qualification.

Abstract

The present work consists of an investigation into the form and function(s) of the so-called 'Left Dislocation' construction in Biblical Hebrew. As such, this inquiry is part of a larger domain of research that explores the nature and function of word order variation in Biblical Hebrew. As a result of a pilot study conducted by the present author in 2010, as well as recent advances within the feilds of cognitive linguistics, psycholinguistics, and discourse-pragmatics—particularly with its sub-discipline known as information structure—a fresh examination of Left Dislocation in Biblical Hebrew is called for. Drawing on research from the aforementioned feilds of study, we propose a cognitive-functional theoretical model that provides a framework for a more comprehensive explanation of Left Dislocation in Biblical Hebrew.

Furthermore, this work situates Left Dislocation in Biblical Hebrew against a broader profile of Left Dislocation across langauges. This is accomplished by examining the findings of a range of cross-linguistic studies—with respect to a variety of related and unrelated languages—that are concerned with both the syntactico-semantic and discourse-functional attributes of Left Dislocation. Typological generalizations drawn from these studies are then applied to the identification, classification, and explanation of a data set comprised of over 650 tokens taken from Genesis to 2 Kings. The result of this analysis is twofold.

First, a thorough description is provided in terms of the external (i.e. global) and internal syntactico-semantic attributes of tokens comprising the data set. Consistent with typological findings, the data set reflects a taxonomic network of constructional schemas that are classified according to an exemplar model of conceptual categorization.

Second, utilizing a cognitive-theoretical model, as well as insights garnered from cross-linguistic studies, the aforementioned syntactico-semantic description is explained in terms of the cognitive-pragmatic motivation for the use of Left Dislocation in BH narrative discourse, as well as the prototypical and non-prototypical discourse function(s) accomplished by the construction therein.

Lastly, a developmental framework is proposed that accounts for the form-function variation exhibited by the tokens in our data set. This framework consists of broader developmental processes involving usage-based patterns of language change, as well as a 'panchronic' view of grammar, where synchrony and diachrony are viewed as an integrated whole, and where grammars are always emergent and never completely established.

Opsomming

Hierdie werk verteenwoordig 'n ondersoek na die vorm en funksie(s) van die sogenaamde linksverskuiwingkonstruksie in Bybelse Hebreeus. Dit vorm deel van 'n groter navorsingsinisiatief wat gemoeid is met die ondersoek na die aard en funksie van woordorde-variasies in Bybelse Hebreeus. In die lig van 'n loodsstudie wat in 2010 deur die outeur gedoen is, asook die vooruitgang wat gemaak is op die gebiede van kognitiewe taalkunde, psigolinguistiek en tekspragmatiek—veral in die subdissipline, informasiestruktuur—is ‘n herbesinnig oor linksverskuiwingkonstruksies Bybelse Hebreeus nodig. Gebaseer op die voorafgenoemde studievelde word 'n kognitief-funksionele teoretiese model voorgestel wat as raamwerk sal dien vir 'n meer omvattende verduideliking van linksverskuiwingkonstruksies in Bybelse Hebreeus.

Hierdie ondersoek oor linksverskuiwing in Bybelse Hebreeus word gedoen teen die agtergrond van die profiel van linksverskuiwing oor tale heen. Dit word vermag deur die bevindings van 'n wye reeks taalkundige studies—op verskeie verwante en onverwante tale—wat gemoeid is met beide die sintakties-semanties en diskoersfunksionele eienskappe van linksverskuiwing, te ondersoek. Uit die ondersoek word tipologiese veralgemenings verkry wat dan gebruik word vir die identifisering, klassifikasie en verduideliking van 'n stel data wat bestaan uit 650 voorbeelde wat verkry is uit Genesis tot 2 Konings. Die resultate van hierdie analise is tweeledig.

Eerstens word 'n uitvoerige beskrywing, in terme van die eksterne (of globale) en interne sintakties-semantiese eienskappe van die voorbeelde binne die datastel, verskaf. Die datastel reflekteer, aan die hand van taaltipologiese bevindinge, 'n taksonomiese netwerk van konstruksieskemas wat geklassifiseer is volgens 'n eksemplaarmodel van konsepsionele kategorisering.

Tweedens, deur gebruik te maak van 'n kognitief-teoretiese model, tesame met insigte verkry deur studies oor tale heen, word die voorafgenoemde sintakties-semantiese beskrywing verduidelik in terme van die kognitief-pragmatiese motivering vir die gebruik van linksverskuiwing in Bybels-Hebreeuse narratiewe diskoers. Ook die prototipiese en nie-prototipiese diskoersfunksie(s) van die konstruksie kom aan die bod.

Laastens word 'n raamwerk voorgestel om die vorm-funksies variasies van die voorbeelde in die datastel as ontwikkelingsstadia te verklaar. Die raamwerk berus op ontwikkelingsprosesse wat tipies in gebruiksgebaseerde modelle van taalvariasie-tendense onderskei word. Verder gaan dit ook uit van 'n pankroniese siening van grammatika waarin diakronie en sinkronie as 'n geïntegreerde geheel gesien word en die grammatika van taal as 'n dinamiese entiteit beskou word. Dit stabliseer nooit volledig nie.

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I want to thank my parents for patiently instilling in me a love for learning, despite the many times it must have seemed like a hopeless cause. They have sacrifically supported me in my education at every level, even when it required I move halfway around the world! Without their enduring love and encouragement, I would not be who I am today. I am also eternally greatful to my in-laws who have supported me in countless ways throughout my graduate career.

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Dedication

To Bri and Estelle

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Abbreviations

1	1st Person
2	2nd Person
3	3rd Person
ACC	Accusative Case
ART	Definite Article
AdjP	Adjective Phrase
AdvP	Adverb Phrase
BDB	Brown, Driver and Briggs lexicon
BH	Biblical Hebrew
BHS	Biblia Hebraica Stuttgartensia
CI	Cognitive-Informational
CL	Clitic
CLD	Contrastive Left Dislocation
CLLD	Clitic Left Dislocation
Comp	Complement
COMP/CP	Complementizer Phrase
Cs	Common Singular
cs	Construct State
DAT	Dative
DT	Discourse Topic
FEM	Feminine
GEN	Genitive
HALOT	Hebrew and Aramaic Lexicon of the Old Testament
Infin	Infinitive
LD(s)	Left Dislocation(s)
LME	Late Modern English
LTM	Long Term Memory
LT-WM	Long Term Working Memory
m	Masculine
NEG	Negator
NOM	Nominative
NP	Noun Phrase
NSF	Non-Standard French
pl	Plural
Poset	Partially Ordered Set Relation
POSS	Possessive
PP	Prepositional Phrase
Pro	Pronoun
PSRR	Principle of the Separation of Reference and Role
REFL	Reflexive
S/Subj	Subject
sg	Singular
SF	Standard French
SSF	Spoken Standard French
STM	Short Term Memory
ST-WM	Short Term Working Memory

TNS	Tense
TC	Tizón-Couto
TOP	Topic
V	Verb
vs	Verses
WH	Interrogative or relative words such as: when, what, which, or who
WM	Working Memory
XP	An unspecified phrasal type (e.g. NP, PP, AdjP, etc.)
*	Used to indicate ungrammaticality

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Problem and Purpose

Several publications have appeared in recent years with the aim of providing a better understanding of the so-called 'Left Dislocation construction' in Biblical Hebrew (=BH).[1] Despite these efforts, a unified explanation, which provides a comprehensive formal and functional profile of the construction, continues to elude BH scholars.

A pilot study conducted by the present author in 2010 included a review and critique of noteworthy publications on Left Dislocation in BH (cf. Westbury, 2010:9-47).[2] From this survey we concluded that, despite their valuable contribution, each of these studies suffer from the lack of a robust theoretical framework capable of providing a satisfactory explanation of the construction. In light of this finding, the primary aim of Westbury (2010) was to supply a *provisional sketch* of a cognitive-functional framework that was both theoretically well-justified and empirically driven, with the explanatory power to provide a unified multidimensional profile of the construction. Towards this end, this *preliminary* framework was applied to a sample of 100 randomly selected tokens taken from Genesis–2 Kings. The results of this study—although conclusive with respect to such a framework's capacity to provide a viable alternative way forward—were inhibited by the inherent constraints on the project, both in terms of the time and space allotted, as well as the number of tokens analyzed. Consequently, the project provided no more than a skeletal outline of the framework, and offered only a partial description and explanation of the construction. Positively, and more importantly, however, this pilot study functioned to justify the viability of a more extensive research project involving a more comprehensive articulation of the framework as well as its application to a broader data set.

With Westbury (2010) as our point of departure, the purpose of the present study,

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1. In addition to the term 'Left Dislocation', various alternative terms are used in the linguistic literature. The dislocated constituent is often referred to as 'theme' (Dik, 197; Moutaouakil, 1989), 'link' (Vallduvi, 1992), and in classical grammar 'nominativus pendens' or, more commonly 'casus pendens'. Although 'dislocation' usually connotes some sort of movement, no such assumption is intended by our use of the term. 'Left dislocation' is used here strictly out of linguistic convention.

2. In Westbury (2010), noteworthy publications on left dislocation in BH were divided into five categories and thoroughly reviewed. These categories are as follows: (1) Hebrew grammars: Gesenius (1910), Waltke and O'Connor (1990), Joüon and Muraoka (2009), and Van der Merwe, Naudé, and Kroeze (1999); (2) Preliminary publications concerning left dislocation in BH: Driver (1998), and Muraoka (1985); (3) Publications employing a generative framework to left dislocation in BH: Naudé (1990), and Holmstedt (2000); (4) Discourse-functional approaches to Left Dislocation in BH: Gross (1987), Khan (1988), and Rosenbaum (1997); and (5) Publications employing an information structure framework: Heimerdinger (1999), Van der Merwe & Talstra (2003), Lunn (2006), Floor (2004) and Moshavi (2010). Although the publications within this last group employed a coherent and sophisticated framework, Left Dislocation constructions were only minimally treated. Due to the treatment these works received in Westbury (2010), we will not review them again here.

therefore, is to provide a coherent, empirically verifiable profile—both in terms of syntacto-semantic and discourse-functional attributes—of the left dislocation construction in BH. This will be accomplished through the application of a cognitive-functional linguistic framework, derived from recent advances within the related fields of cognitive linguistics,[3] psycholinguistics,[4] and most notably discourse-pragmatics[5]—with a particular focus on the sub-discipline known as 'information structure theory'.[6] Moreover, the present study will situate the left dislocation construction in BH against a broader typological (cross-linguistic) framework, both in terms of its syntactico-semantic definition and functional explanation. Insights garnered from both the cognitive-functional framework and typological perspectives will supply the theoretical and analytical tools necessary to provide a unified, and empirically based profile of Left Dislocation in BH, with respect to syntax, semantics, and discourse-pragmatics.

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3. The expression 'Cognitive Linguistic' is used as a broad descriptive label for a rather extensive movement within modern linguistics. This enterprise includes a variety of approaches, methodologies, and emphases, that are, nonetheless, unified by a number of common assumptions. According to Taylor (2002:4) these include: "the belief that language forms an integral part of human cognition, and that any insightful analysis of linguistic phenomena will need to be embedded in what is known about human cognitive abilities. Cognitive linguistics [in the broad sense, JRW], aims therefore for a cognitively plausible account of what it means to know a language, how languages are acquired, and how they are used."

Additionally, the term 'cognitive linguistics' has come to signify a more narrow linguistic enterprise within the broader field of linguistic study. In this sense, cognitive linguistics refers to a modern school of linguistic thought that emerged in the 1970's as a result of discontentment with formal approaches to language (Evans and Green, 2006:3). It is an enterprise that has at its core a set of guiding principles, theoretical assumptions, and methodological perspectives which have led to "a diverse range of complementary, overlapping (and sometimes competing) theories" (ibid.). Croft and Cruse (2004:1) argue that this core set of shared premisses can be boiled down to three overarching hypotheses: 1) language is not an autonomous cognitive faculty, 2) grammar is conceptualization, and 3) knowledge of language emerges from language use. Our use of the term 'cognitive', both with respect to the title of the present work and in reference to our theoretical framework is intended to denote this later, more narrow sense.

4. Specifically, we have in mind the 'construction integration' model of comprehension by Kintsch (1998), as well as the construction and coherence of a mental representation of a text by Singer (1990) and Sanders and Spooren (2001).

5. In particular, Relevance Theory as represented by Sperber and Wilson (1996) and Wilson and Sperber (2004), as well as Ariel (2008, 2010) and Birner (2013).

6. Although the terms 'discourse-pragmatic' and 'information structure' are often conflated within the literature, we will follow Lambrecht (1994) in distinguishing the two. Discourse-pragmatics, therefore, is understood as "the general domain of inquiry into the relationship between grammar and discourse (Lambrecht, 1994:2). Information structure, on the other hand, is considered a sub-discipline of discourse-pragmatic inquiry, which emphasizes the *structural implications* of discourse-pragmatic analysis (ibid.).

1.2 Theoretical Assumptions

1.2.1 Word Order and Markedness in Biblical Hebrew

We assume that Verb-Subject-Object represents the pragmatically 'unmarked'[7] word order[8] in BH narrative.[9] Departures from this unmarked order represent a so-called 'marked' ordering of constituents. 'Markedness' as a linguistic concept reflects an asymmetrical marking or unmarking of some feature or information.[10] In this asymmetry, the unmarked option is more basic than the marked. As Battistella (1996:10) explains: "[T]he less informative, less conceptually complex elements will be the norm and the more informative, more complex elements will somehow be foregrounded." By comparison, Miller (2003:309, cf. Floor's discussion, 2004:10) proposes three criteria by which a form may be determined marked or unmarked, namely: frequency (less frequent forms are more marked), complexity (more complex forms are more marked), and prototypicality (unmarked forms are more prototypical).

An easily misunderstood aspect of markedness, however, concerns the state of affairs by which an unmarked form does not necessarily correspond to the opposite of its marked counterpart. In other words, where a marked form necessarily entails the presence of some feature, it does not follow that the unmarked form necessarily entails its absence. The unmarked form is simply neutral with respect to the presence or absence of the feature.

In light of our assumption regarding the unmarked V(S)(O) word order in BH we assume that when a constituent occurs before the main verb—either within the boundaries of the clause, or in an extra-clausal position in front of the clause—the word order is marked for some pragmatic feature. That is to say, that these marked constructions reflect a formal complexity, lack of frequency, and require more effort and time to process than their unmarked counterparts.

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7. Van der Merwe and Wendland (2010:114) write:

> "Statistically the most frequent type of focus in narrative texts is predicate focus, in other words, what discourse active entities (typically pronomnialized) did, will do, or must do. Across languages, clauses with predicate focus tend to display the most unmarked order of constituents.... In [Biblical, JRW] Hebrew the V(S)(O)(M) order is considered its unmarked order."

8. The term 'word-order is a misnomer since what is actually being referred to is 'constituent order'. Nevertheless, 'word order' will be retained in this work due to its established status in the linguistic literature.

9. Cf. Van der Merwe et al. 1999; Van der Merwe; 1999a, 1999b; Buth, 1999; and Moshavi, 2010. For an alternative view, see DeCaen (1995, 1999) and Holmstedt (2002, 2005, 2011, 2013) who argues for a S-V-Comp unmarked order from a generative linguistic theoretical perspective. See Song (2011) and Velupilla (2012) for a discussion on methodological and theoretical issues involved in determining unmarked word order patterns across languages.

10. Cf. Battistella (1996) for a cogent discussion of markedness as a linguistic concept.

1.2.2 Prosody and Intonation Prominence Patterns in Biblical Hebrew

Further, we assume that prosody and intonation prominence patterns are not viable options for discerning the information structure of BH clauses. This is due to the inconsistency of the Masoretic accents and the lack of correlation between the accents and focus patterns (Shimasaki, 2002:58). Therefore, to the extent possible, the information structure of BH must be determined solely on the basis of word-order markedness and other markedness configurations (i.e. pronominalization and re-lexicalization).

1.3 Scope

An exhaustive analysis of every instance of left dislocation in the entire Hebrew Bible, although preferred, is beyond the purview of the present study. We have, therefore, established two parameters designed to narrow the scope of our investigation while also supplying a large enough data set by which to draw conclusions that are empirically valid.

First, we have restricted our investigation to left dislocation constructions that entail a finite verb within the main clause of the construction. Although the question as to whether or not so-called 'tripartite nominal clauses' formally constitute instances of left dislocation in BH continues to be a topic of debate, a treatment of this issue would have exceeded the limits of the study.[11]

Second, we have restricted the corpus to the prose of the Torah and Former Prophets. According to Miller (2003:19), these books provide a corpus that is representative, reasonably extensive, and relatively homogeneous. The present work will, therefore, entail an exhaustive study of every verbal left dislocation construction in Genesis–2 Kings. These two parameters—1) the exclusion of verbless Left Dislocation, and 2) the restricted corpus—are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, below.

1.4 Hypotheses

The overall hypothesis of this study is that a more unified and comprehensive syntactico-semantic and discourse functional profile of Left Dislocation in BH is possible by means of the following:

1. The application of a cognitive-functional framework derived from contemporary research in the distinct but compatible fields of cognitive linguistics, psycholinguis-

11. The tripartite nominal clause is formally grouped into two classes: [X Y PRO] and [X PRO Y]. For further discussion, see Andersen (1971), Gross (1987, 1999), Revell (1989), Geller (1991), Buth (1999), Muraoka (1999), Van Wolde (1999), Naudé (2002), Woodard (2009), and most recently Holmstedt and Jones (2013).

tics, discourse-pragmatics—with an emphasis on information structure theory (cf. §1.1 above).

2. The application of typological insights garnered from cross-linguistic research on Left Dislocation from a variety of related and unrelated languages, and, in some cases, from differing theoretical points of view.

This general hypothesis is grounded in what linguistic typologists refer to as the 'Uniformitarianism Hypothesis', a central tenet of which stipulates that "languages of the past are not different in nature from languages of the present" (Croft, 2003:233). As a result, insights gained from analyses of contemporary languages should, in principle, apply to ancient languages as well (ibid.).

Moreover, the aforementioned hypothesis is supported by the following related hypotheses:

1. Left Dislocation, as a grammatical category, consists of a taxonomic network of 'constructional schemas', or composite symbolic assemblies of form-function pairings, abstracted away from actual instantiated tokens. From a purely structural standpoint, constructional schemas can be thought of as generalized templates consisting of a sequence of ordered slots that may be filled by a variety of words and phrasal types (Taylor, 1995:198).[12] These schemas emerge from entrenched patterns of instantiated usage (Evans and Green, 2006:754; cf. §4.3). In other words, speakers experience actual instantiations (i.e. tokens) of the construction over time so much so that they are able to conceptualize an abstract representation (i.e. schema) of the construction consisting of only common attributes. Not all constructional schemas, however, possess the same degree of abstraction. That is to say that schematicity is not a binary notion, but a matter of degree, with some schemas possessing slots that are more lexico-grammatically specific, constituting more 'substantive' schemas than others (cf. §3.2.1; §4.3).

2. The taxonomic network of left dislocation constructions in BH is best described and explained, both in terms of form and function, according to an exemplar model of conceptual categorization. In other words, constructional schemas are conceptualized

12. Or, in the words of Langacker (2008:168), constructional schemas are "skeletal representations of shared organizational features".

as either closer or further from a prototypical schema depending on their family resemblance (i.e. shared syntactico-semantic or functional attributes) with the prototype.

3. The criteria for formally identifying Left Dislocation has traditionally consisted of the presence of a lexico-grammatically expressed element (usually a pronoun) within the clause that is co-indexed with another constituent (usually a NP) in front of the clause. As a result of this co-indexation, and the impossibility for two constituents to satisfy a single valency slot licensed by the predicate, the initial NP is deemed extra-clausal, and hence, 'dislocated'. Although the present work affirms that instantiations satisfying this criteria constitute cross-linguistically prototypical tokens of Left Dislocation, we contend that this criteria is too narrow for adequately defining this constructional category, both cross-linguistically and particularly with respect to BH. By contrast, we argue for a broader definition, on the basis of cross-linguistic evidence, in which the only attribute necessary for inclusion in the Left Dislocation category is the presence of a constituent(s) located outside, and in front of, the boundary of the clause with which it is semantically or pragmatically associated. In other words, the presence of an intra-clausal coindexed element is not a necessary criterion for category membership.

4. The referent of a dislocated constituent is semantically or pragmatically related to an associated proposition. Accordingly, we hypothesize, following the work of Tizón-Couto (2012), that referents of dislocated constituents in BH are typically in one of three types of semantic coherence relations with a corresponding referent of a constituent within the clause. The three coherence relations consist of the following: Total Identity (the relation is one of co-indexation/resumption in which the referents of the two constituents are identical), Metonymic (the relation is either hypernymic [whole-part] or hyponemic [part-whole]) , or Partial (the relation is one in which the semantic attributes of the dislocate and the clause-internal element only partially overlap). Moreover, left dislocation constructions may be characterized by the lack of any semantic relation between the dislocate and a corresponding clause internal element. In this case, the dislocate stands in a pragmatic 'relevance relation' to the associated proposition. The referent of the dislocated constituent pragmatically constrains the interpretation of the following proposition to a certain semantic domain.

5. Traditionally, the discourse function of Left Dislocation has been inextricably linked to the pragmatic relation of 'topic'. That is to say, its function is typically explained as a communicative strategy by which speakers/writers overtly mark, (or introduce) the topic of the following proposition. Like with hypothesis (3) above, we do not disagree with this explanation, but rather contend that it is only a partial explanation. In other words, it lacks explanatory power necessary to account for all of the data. For example, sometimes, both across languages and in BH, the dislocate does not announce the topic, but the so-called 'Focal Relation' of the associated proposition (cf. §4.2.2.3; §6.3.1.2). We, therefore, contend that the basic-level function of Left Dislocation is independent of any pragmatic relation (i.e. Topic/Focus). Rather, it is a communicative strategy used, prototypically, for the (re)introduction of referents that are assumed to entertain a relatively low degree of cognitive accessibility in the mind of the addressee. The dislocation of the inaccessible referent serves to isolate and *ipso facto* facilitate the cognitive processing of two tasks that would have otherwise been too cognitively costly to process together— i.e. 1) the recall of an inaccessible referent and, 2) the interpretation of this referent's pragmatic relation in the associated proposition (cf. §4.2.2.3; §6.3.1).

Furthermore, the resumptive/semantically linked element within the clause typically functions as either: 1) the primary or secondary topic expression, or, less prototypically, 2) the focal domain of the associated proposition. Thus, in addition to (re)activation, the construction functions as a 'Topic Announcing' or (less prototypically) 'Focus Announcing' device. Moreover, the (re)activation of dislocates that stand in a relevance relation to the associated proposition (i.e. they lack a resumptive/semantic link; cf. hypothesis [4]), simultaneously function to 'Frame' the following proposition (cf. §6.3.3.3).

Finally, assumptions pertaining to the prototypical profile of dislocated referents (i.e. low accessibility) may be exploited in order to disrupt cognitive processing and, *ipso facto*, produce a discontinuity in the flow of discourse. This takes place when referents entertaining a relatively high degree of accessibility occur in a dislocated position. The discontinuity produced by this 'over-use' of the construction, together with the particular context in which it occurs, triggers a variety of additional pragmatic implicatures, which constitute a series of non-prototypical discourse profiles/functions (cf. §6.3.3–§6.3.4).

6. Lastly, we hypothesize that the array of ostensibly arbitrary form-function correlations exhibited by Left Dislocation, both across languages and in BH, can be explained through usage-based patterns of language change. Moreover, this explanation functions within a 'panchronic' view of grammar, where synchrony and diachrony are viewed as an integrated whole, and where grammars are always emergent and never completely established.

1.5 Methodology

The methodology of this study consists of three steps. The first step entails the development of a cognitive-functional theoretical framework. This is accomplished by incorporating insights from a variety of distinct but complementary areas of linguistic research, including: cognitive linguistics, psycholinguistics, discourse-pragmatics—with particular emphasis on information structure theory.

The second step consists of a typological perspective on the syntactico-semantic and discourse functional profile of Left Dislocation across languages. Accordingly, we take as our point of departure Croft's (2003:1–4) three-pronged definition of linguistic typology, which corresponds to three stages of empirical scientific analysis:

1. Typological Classification: the classification of structural types across languages.

2. Typological Generalization: the identification and study of patterns (i.e. universals) that occur systematically across languages.

3. Functional-Typological Explanation: the explanation of linguistic structure specifically in terms of linguistic function.

Our initial aim concerns the first two stages of Croft's definition as we set out to: 1) establish cross-linguistically informed syntactico-semantic criteria for the identification of Left Dislocation, 2) isolate the more prominent types of Left Dislocation schema across languages, based on global syntactico-semantic attributes, and 3) provide a taxonomy of possible syntactic categories and grammatical relations exhibited by the dislocated constituent(s) and resumptive/linked element, respectively, across languages.

Subsequently, we take up Croft's third stage by surveying several studies concerned with the explanation of the form of Left Dislocation in terms of its discourse function. We begin by discussing the findings of a range of early publications on the functional nature of

the construction. Insights gained from these early studies provide a critical frame of reference for understanding the foundation upon which more recent trajectories of functional research on Left Dislocation are built. We then critically engage four more recent publications, each of which provides a critical piece of the construction's discourse functional profile. These pieces consist of: 1) cognitive-pragmatic motivation, 2) governing constraints on felicitous use in discourse, 3) constraints on cognitive processing and, 4) the organization of the discourse functional profile in terms of an exemplar model of conceptual categorization.

Lastly, we suggest an empirically plausible explanation for the formal and functional variation of Left Dislocation constructions exhibited across languages. We contend that synchronic variation can only be explained through diachronic processes (Bybee et al., 1994). Accordingly, we propose a generalized developmental trajectory in which the insights garnered from synchronic typological analyses are recast in terms of a 'panchronic' view of grammar and a 'usage-based' approach to langauge change through a process known as 'grammaticalization'. In light of this approach, form-function correlations that are ostensibly arbitrary and unmotivated from a synchronic perspective, may be alternatively construed from a developmental perspective, as heavily constrained and highly motivated.

Our third and final methodological step consists of the application of the cognitive-functional framework developed in step 1, as well as the insights garnered from the typological analyses in step 2, to an exhaustive study of BH (verbal) left dislocation constructions in the prose of the Torah and Former Prophets. Mirroring the presentation of the typological data, we will begin by providing a syntactico-semantic profile of the construction in BH, which will principally consist of:

1) The establishment of syntactico-semantic criteria for the identification of Left Dislocation in BH. The criteria is then used to locate every instance of verbal Left Dislocation in Genesis–2 Kings.

2) A description of seven types of constructional schemas that comprise the taxonomic network of Left Dislocation in BH. These types are organized according to an exemplar model in which constructions are located at varying degrees of proximity from the exemplar depending on their family resemblance to the prototype (i.e. shared prototypical attributes).

3) A taxonomy of the possible syntactic categories and grammatical relations of constituents occupying the dislocated and resumptive/linked slots, respectively.

Subsequently, we will offer an empirically grounded explanation of Left Dislocation in BH, in terms of its discourse function(s). This is accomplished in two stages. The first stage is concerned with establishing the cognitive-pragmatic motivations for the use of Left Dislocation in BH prose. We hypothesize that these motivations derive from three cognitive-pragmatic parameters: 1) the cognitive status of dislocated constituents, 2) the pragmatic relations (Topic/Focus) satisfied by the resumptive/linked elements within the clause, and 3) referential 'persistence'. In order to substantiate this hypothesis, we exhaustively analyze our data set according to several empirical metrics.

The motivations derived from the aforementioned analysis provide the basis for the second stage of our explanation: a description of the discourse function(s) of Left Dislocation in BH. Like the syntactic-semantic description described above, the various discourse-function(s) accomplished by the use of Left Dislocation in BH are organized according to an exemplar model in which a prototypical, basic-level function is established, and a variety of non-prototypical functions are understood as motivated extensions around this prototype.

Lastly, we briefly suggest a hypothesis for the development of Left Dislocation in BH that explains the synchronic variation of the construction, with respect to form and function, in terms of motivated diachronic processes. This is accomplished by recasting the results of our analysis in terms of a panchronic view of grammar, as well as a usage-based perspective on language change.

1.6 Outline

This study is divided into three parts. In addition to the present introductory chapter, the first part (chapters 1–2) primarily involves a description of the theoretical framework used in this study (chapter 2). The second part (chapters 3–4) involves cross-linguistic considerations on Left Dislocation from a functional-typological perspective. Finally, our study culminates in part three (chapters 5–7) where we apply our cognitive-functional framework and typological insights in an exhaustive analysis of (verbal) left dislocation constructions in the prose of the Torah and Former Prophets.

Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework

2.1 Introduction

Before we begin our investigation, it is prudent we first establish the overall theoretical framework, with its particular guiding assumptions, conceptual notions, and points of departure from which the present study will proceed. This is especially called for in light of the highly interdisciplinary nature of this study, not to mention the array of linguistic approaches and assumptions available for investigating linguistic phenomena. The present chapter will, therefore, entail the following: In section §2.2 we will discuss several precursory notions. These will serve to introduce the reader to some foundational assumptions as well as provide the requisite background for understanding the remainder of our theoretical model. If the assumptions introduced in §2.2 represent the foundation of our framework, those described in §2.3–§2.4 represent the load-bearing pillars, so to speak. In other words, the conceptual notions introduced in these later sections comprise the most essential aspects of the framework. Lastly, in §2.5 we introduce two ancillary notions that provide the final theoretical components to our model.

2.2 Precursory Notions

2.2.1 What is 'Information Structure'?

It is relatively uncontroversial that the principle functions of linguistic communication are, on the one hand, the exchange of information[13], and, on the other that the speaker and listener cooperate to that effect.[14] In relevance theory terms (cf. Sperber and Wilson, 1996; Wilson and Sperber, 2004), communication involves the communicator's informative intention to modify the cognitive environment of his/her audience by making manifest, or making more manifest, a set of assumptions (see §2.2.3). As a result, information which the listener is assumed to already know or believe directly affects the way in which the speaker formulates his/her utterance.[15] The various ways of structuring our utterances serve to reduce the processing effort by assisting the addressee in identifying the most relevant interpretation of

13. Cf. Verhagen (2005) who goes further, arguing that the typical function of communication is the exchange of information in order to influence an addressee to see the world as the speaker sees it.

14. "Communication is a process involving two information-processing devices [i.e. organisms or machines, JRW]. One device modifies the physical environment of the other. As a result, the second device constructs representations similar to representations already stored in the first device" (Sperber and Wilson, 1996:1).

15. For a distinction between the notions 'sentence' and 'utterance' see §2.2.3 below.

the utterance given the context in which the utterance is spoken/written. The specific area of linguistic inquiry concerned with the lexicogrammatical implications of the structuring of information within the conceptual representation of interlocutors is rife with terminological variation: e.g. 'Information-packaging' (Chafe, 1976; Vallduvi, 1992), 'information-flow' (Chafe, 1979); 'f(ocus)-structure' (Erteschik-Shir, 2007). The present work, however, will follow Halliday (1967),[16] Prince, (1981a), Lambrecht (1994) *inter alia* in employing the term 'information structure'.[17]

Prince (1981a:224) defines information structure[18] as "the tailoring of an utterance by a sender to meet the particular assumed needs of the intended receiver", thus reflecting "the sender's hypothesis about the receiver's assumptions and beliefs and strategies."[19] Put differently, the theory of information structure posits that the form of an utterance is directly related to the cognitive states of the interlocutors and the flow of given and new information in discourse. In light of this theoretical insight we can better account for the linguistic phenomenon by which grammars of natural language offer speakers a variety of morphosyntactic and prosodic options for expressing the same propositional content.[20] The following examples (1a)–(1j), serve to illustrate this phenomenon:

(1) a. The student read a book.
b. The book, the student read.
c. There was a student that read a book.

16. "The information structure of the sentence is a term originally introduced by Halliday (1967) to account for the distinction of focus, presupposition, and propositional attitude toward entities in the discourse conveyed by phrasal intonation" (Erteschik-Shir, 2007:1).

17. Information structure is a vast topic of research that is pursued within different theoretical frameworks, and has produced numerous empirical insights. Gómes-González (2009:123) avers that each of these frameworks has "its own focus, with the effect that a considerable range of definitions, identification criteria and terminology for information structure categories have mushroomed in a myriad of studies." It is beyond the scope of this present work to survey all of the different approaches with their various nuances. For an overview of the field, see Erteshik-Shir (2007). Moreover, although the focus here will be on information structure, we do not intend to imply that information structure can account for all variation in the formal structure of sentences. Rather, following Lambrecht (1994:26), ours is a view of 'competing motivations' where information structure plays a critical role, but does not entail exhaustive explanatory power.

18. Prince (1981a) employs the term "information-packaging" following Chafe (1976).

19. Lambrecht (1994:5) provides a more technical definition of 'information structure' as, "that component of sentence grammar in which propositions as conceptual representations of states of affairs are paired with lexicogrammatical structures in accordance with the mental states of interlocutors who use and interpret these structures as units of information in given discourse contexts."

20. It is misleading to think, however, that information structure alone determines the difference in the formal structure between sentences. Rather, a view of 'competing-motivations' is more accurate. In other words, all aspects of grammar—morphosyntax, semantics, prosody, and information structure—compete, or interact with each other, and ultimately determine the form of the sentence (cf. Lambrecht, 1994: 25–35).

d. The book was read by a student.
e. A student read the book.
f. It was the student that read the book.
g. What the student read was a book.
h. The student read the book.
i. (As for) the book, the student read it.
j. The student read it, the book.

Of primary concern for the theory of information structure are sentences with semantically equivalent but formally divergent alternatives, like those in example (1) above. Lambrecht refers to these sentences as "allosentences" (Lambrecht 1994:6). That is, the various formal manifestations of the different ways a speaker may structure their information must always be understood against the background of available, but unused grammatical alternatives for expressing a given proposition (ibid.). Each of the sentences in example (1) convey the same propositional content, viz. that a particular student read a particular book.[21] From the point of view of information structure, the way in which a speaker structures their utterance largely depends on two fundamental factors: (a) what the speaker intends the utterance to be primarily about (as opposed to the new information asserted, questioned, etc.), and (b) what the writer assumes the addressee already knows or believes and/or is attending to (Gundel and Fretheim, 2009:146).[22] Therefore, we can say that information structure goes beyond the sentence grammar of the language, taking into consideration both the immediate context of an utterance and the shared assumptions of the speech participants.

A caveat, however, is in order. In "going beyond the sentence grammar", it should *not* be understood that the theory of information structure is only concerned with abstract psychological phenomenon. To the contrary, as Lambrecht (1994:3) argues, "such psychological phenomenon is only relevant to the linguist insofar as it is reflected in grammatical structure (e.g., morphosyntax and prosody)." Information structure, therefore, is a discourse-pragmatic phenomenon that is an integral component of sentence grammar and a

21. The possibilities could be further multiplied by incorporating sentences that reflect the same constituent ordering but differ in terms of which constituent(s) is stressed via prosody.

22. Vallduvi and Vilkuna (1998) employ the concept "packaging instructions". They write, "[t]wo utterances with identical propositional content may display different packagings if they update different information states. In fact, information states determine the felicity of particular types of packaging, the so-called packaging instructions. A packaging instruction consists of an element which corresponds to the actual update potential of the utterance - the rheme [or focus, JRW]—and, optionally, of an element that spells out how the rheme is to be anchored to the input information state—the theme [or topic, JRW]." (Vallduvi and Vilkuna, 1998:81).

determining factor in the formal structuring of sentences (ibid.).[23]

2.2.2 The Universe of Discourse

An essential aspect of the information structure component of language necessarily involves the accurate contextualization of an utterance in terms of the 'text-internal' vs. the 'text-external' text world.[24] We follow Fillmore (1976) and Lambrecht (1994) in understanding the 'universe of discourse' as a partition between these two text worlds.[25] These two text worlds are defined by Lambrecht (1994:36–37) as follows:

> "The 'text-external world'…, comprises (i) 'speech participants', i.e. a speaker and one or several addressees, and (ii) a 'speech setting', i.e. the place, time and circumstances in which a speech event takes place."

> "The 'text-internal world'…comprises 'linguistic expressions' (words, phrases, sentences) and their 'meanings'. [It, JRW] is the abstract world of linguistic representations created in the minds of the interlocutors in the process of communication."

With respect to the text-internal world, a distinction is made between the meaning of linguistic expressions and the entities denoted by these expressions. Our primary interest concerns the later and will be referred to here as the 'referents' of linguistic expressions (ibid.:37). An additional distinction is made between the referents of linguistic expressions in the real world and the abstract 'cognitive representation' of these referents in the minds of the

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23. Lambrecht (1994.:4–5) makes a theoretical distinction between 'conversational-pragmatics', 'lexical-pragmatics', and 'discourse-pragmatics'. Whereas conversational pragmatics is primarily concerned with the interpretation of a sentence in relation to conversational settings (cf. Grices' 'conversational implicatures'), and lexical pragmatics is concerned with the meaning, or pragmatic structure of individual lexical items (cf. deixis), discourse-pragmatics (e.g. information structure) is concerned with the discourse circumstances under which given pieces of information are expressed via one, rather than another, morphosyntactic or prosodic form. Despite the risk of oversimplification, Lambrecht avers the following in an attempt at clarification, "while conversational pragmatics is concerned with the question of why one and the same sentence form may express two or more meanings, discourse pragmatics is concerned with the question of why one and the same meaning may be expressed by two or more sentence forms" (ibid.:5). With discourse pragmatics, grammatical convention directly determines the relationship between the form and function of the sentence within the discourse.

24. Fillmore (1976:149) writes that "[i]t seems to me that the discourse grammarian's most important task is that of characterizing, on the basis of the linguistic material contained in the discourse under examination, the set of worlds in which the discourse could play a role, together with the set of possible worlds compatible with the message content of the discourse."

25. Fillmore (1976:49) employs the terms "external contextualization" and "internal contextualization" for the two text worlds.

speech participants (see §2.2.3.2) (ibid.). It is these cognitive representations and their affect on the grammar that occupies the primary interest of information structure theory (ibid.). To illustrate the difference between these two text-worlds and how they interact with linguistic expressions, take for example (2) and (3) below (adapted from Fillmore, 1976:149–150):

(2) I like this one better than that one.

(3) He never **had**[26] enjoyed going shopping with her, and this time was no exception.

In contextualizing the sentence in (2) we most likely imagine that two speech participants are within visual proximity to each other, and that the speaker is indicating her preference for a certain entity by appropriate acts of presenting or gesturing (Fillmore, 1976:149–150). It is an intrinsic property of the text-external world that elements within the speech setting (including the participants) need not be overtly established within the discourse, but may be taken for granted by virtue of their being present in, or recoverable from, the speech setting (Lambrecht, 1994:38). Discourse elements, which are a part of the text-external world may be referred to linguistically via deictic expressions (e.g.,"this one" or "that one" in (2))[27] which serve to "point" to the entity, place, time, or circumstance within the speech setting. By contrast, upon reading the sentence in (3), we imagine a man experiencing discomfort while shopping with a particular female. Various linguistic properties of the sentence indicate that this utterance is to be contextualized text-internally[28] and we would expect to find such an utterance in narrative, rather than ordinary conversation. For example, the use of the pronominal forms "he" and "her" indicate that these representations had been previously identified within the preceding discourse.[29] Unlike the text-external world, elements within the text-internal world are not taken for granted, and therefore must be

26. The bold indicates intonational stress.

27. Lambrecht (1994:38) defines 'deictic' expressions as "those which denote (i) the speaker and addressee (e.g. I, You, etc.), (ii) the time of the speech event and points in time measured with reference to it (e.g., now, yesterday, tomorrow, etc.), (iii) the place of the speech event and places situated in relation to it (e.g., here, there, etc.), and in general all expressions whose meaning can only be understood with reference to some aspect of the text-external world.

28. Although, the sentence has a text-external contextualization as well.

29. Moreover, that this sentence can be contextualized text-internally is evident by the tenses used, the expressive relative position of "never" and "had", the emphatic stress on "had", and the use of the phrase "this time" (Fillmore 1976:150).

referred to indirectly via abstract representations which the speaker must set up for the addressee (ibid.). The abstractness of the form employed for a particular referent (or rather, its mental representation) is directly correlated to the 'activation status' (see §2.3.3 below) of that representation within the text-internal world. Thus, as we will explain in more detail below, the decision made by the author in (3) to use the more abstract anaphoric pronominal expressions *he* and *her* rather than a lexical expression (e.g. *Jim* or *Mary*) is indicative of the high activation status of the discourse representations within the mind of the addressee (ibid.). Often, an element in the text-external world (e.g. a speaker and/or addressee) is at the same time a topic (i.e., text-internal, see §2.4.1 below) within the conversation (ibid.:39). In these cases, the two text-worlds overlap and the grammatical form used to express the entity will depend on whether or not the entity is contextualized as part of the text-internal or text-external world. Since our investigation concerns narrative texts, we will be primarily concerned with the text-internal world.

2.2.3 Propositional Information

It was stated at the beginning of §2.2 that the principle function of linguistic communication is the exchange of information. But, what exactly is meant by the term 'information'? We want to be careful not to conflate the notion of 'information' with that of 'meaning'. In other words, the information value conveyed by an utterance of a sentence is not the same as the meaning expressed by that sentence. This, however, implies yet another crucial distinction necessary in differentiating between information and meaning, viz. that between the notions 'utterance' and 'sentence'. According to Huang (2007:10–11), a sentence is "a well formed string of words put together according to the grammatical rules of language. As a unit of the language system, it is an abstract entity or construct defined within a theory of grammar." By contrast, an utterance is "the use of a particular piece of language…by a particular speaker on a particular occasion" (ibid.). Put differently, "an utterance is the pairing of a sentence and a context, that is, the situation in which the sentence is uttered" (Levinson, 1983:18–19).[30] Thus, a single sentence may have a variety of utterances depending on the context in which it is paired.[31]

The distinction between a sentence and an utterance puts us in a position to better

30. "The semantic representation of a sentence… can take no account of such non-linguistic properties as, for example , the time and place of an utterance, the identity of the speaker, the speaker's intentions, and so on" (Sperber and Wilson, 1995:9).

31. According to Sperber and Wilson (1995:9–10), "the study of the semantic representation of sentences belongs to the domain of grammar, while the interpretation of utterances belongs to pragmatics."

understand our original distinction between information and meaning. Meaning, or semantic representation,[32] is associated with a sentence and is expressed by the individual words, or the relations established between words, and thus is a function of the linguistic expressions which it contains. In other words, "[t]he semantic representation of a sentence deals with a sort of common core of meaning shared by every utterance of it" (Sperber and Wilson, 1995:9). Information, by contrast, is associated with the utterance of a sentence. The information value of an utterance depends on the cognitive states of the interlocutors and can only be conveyed relationally through propositions[33] (Lambrecht 1994:43).[34] A brief digression is necessary at this point.

People are constantly employing sensory data in order to construct the best possible 'Cognitive Representation' of the world they perceive. An individual's Cognitive Representation can be defined as the set of facts and assumptions that are 'manifest' to him; that is, that he can perceive or infer (Sperber and Wilson, 1995:39).[35] In the same way, when two or more people engage in a communication they immediately begin building a Cognitive Representation of the discourse in order to aid in comprehension (Kintsch, 1998:93).[36] Some facts and assumptions are more manifest to a person at a given moment depending on the person's physical environment and cognitive abilities. Thus, in a given discourse, a person's Cognitive Representation consists of facts that he is more aware of, and those that he is less aware of (or not aware of at all), but is capable of becoming more aware of (ibid.). The accumulative store of facts and assumptions that a person is aware of, or are at least manifest

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32. In formal semantics, the semantic representation of a sentence concerns logical meaning and truth conditions.

33. The term 'proposition' refers to the denotatum of the states of affairs, situations, events, etc. By having knowledge of a proposition, is to have a cognitive representation of its denotatum (ibid.:44).

34. E.g., "One can inform someone of the price of a book, but not of a book or of ten dollars. The expression *the price of a book* codes the proposition 'The book has a price,' i.e. it codes a relation between a predicate and an argument, but the expressions *a book* or *ten dollars* codes only quantities of entities" (ibid.:46).

35. From this point, we will employ the convention of capitalizing the phrase 'Cognitive Representation' when referring to an interlocutor's accumulative mental store of propositional facts and assumptions (i.e. the sum of one's knowledge), and we will use the lower case 'cognitive representation' when referring to the specific representations of individual entities (i.e. discourse referents) within the more broad notion of an interlocutor's Cognitive Representation.

36. According to Sperber and Wilson (1995:38), "We do not all construct the same representation, because of differences in our narrower physical environments on the one hand, and in our cognitive abilities on the other." Moreover, there is a general consensus within cognitive science that there exists multiple levels of cognitive representation that play a role in behavior and cognition, with lower levels of representation embedded in higher levels (Kintsch, 1998:19–29) (Sanders and Spooren, 2001). Our use of the term 'Cognitive Representation', however, will be restricted to the higher level cognitive representation involved in human linguistic communication which exists in the form of a complex network of propositions (cf. Kintsch, 1998).

to a person provided the right stimulus, we can call her 'knowledge'.[37] Lambrecht (1994:43) defines 'knowledge' as the "sum of 'propositions' which the listener knows or believes or considers uncontroversial at the time of speech."[38] Furthermore, in a given discourse, many of the same facts and assumptions are manifest in the Cognitive Representations of two or more individuals at the same time. We can say, therefore, that they have a 'mutual Cognitive Representation'. The total shared Cognitive Representation of two or more people is the intersection of their total, respective Cognitive Representations: i.e. the set of all facts that are manifest to each of them (Sperber and Wilson, 1995:41).[39] We will refer to this mutual Cognitive Representation as a 'discourse model' (see §2.3.1 below).

This notion of 'Cognitive Representation' is crucial for an accurate description of what we mean by 'information'. Whereas the meaning of a sentence (i.e. semantic representation) remains constant, to inform someone of something is to actuate a change in the hearer's Cognitive Representation by: adding one or more propositions, replacing an existing proposition, or confirming an already existing proposition. Moreover, as propositions are added, replaced, or confirmed within the Cognitive Representation of the hearer, the mutual Cognitive Representation (i.e. discourse model) of the speech participants is simultaneously updated.

2.2.3.1 Given Information vs. New Information

When a speaker sets out to convey a piece of information, she assumes her addressee already possesses a certain model of the world (i.e. Cognitive Representation) which is what the speaker wishes to influence.[40] The successful conveyance of information, therefore, requires the speaker to perpetually update their assumptions concerning the current cognitive state of

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37. The "notion of what is manifest to an individual is… weaker than the notion of what is actually known or assumed" (Sperber and Wilson, 1995:40). That is to say, in a strong sense, to know something requires that one have a mental representation of it, while this is not true of something that is merely manifest (ibid.).

38. This is supported by Kintsch's (1998) comprehension paradigm for cognition in which he argues that knowledge is an extensive network of propositions of various strengths, which he terms a "knowledge net" (ibid.:74–82). Moreover, to be aware of something is to be conscious of it; that is, for it to be in short-term memory (§2.2.5), on the other hand, for something to be manifest is for it to be at least perceptible or inferable; that is, it must at least be accessible in one's long-term memory, or cognitive representation (§2.2.5). Something that is only manifest is known, but something that one is aware of is part of one's consciousness (cf. Lambrecht, 1994:93).

39. For a more comprehensive description of 'cognitive representations' and 'mutual cognitive representations', see Sperber and Wilson (1995:38–46).

40. "It should be noted that when a speaker influences the hearer's 'picture' of the world by adding to it, only a small portion of that picture is normally affected, namely the portion which is 'under discussion' and with respect to which piece of information conveyed is meant to be relevant" (ibid.:44).

the addressee's discourse model as the speech progresses. In other words, the speaker must constantly speculate about what information is already a part of the hearer's Cognitive Representation during the course of speaking. Information that is assumed to be known or cognitively available at the time of speech is termed 'given information'.[41] Alternatively, the information added to that Cognitive Representation is regarded as 'new information' (ibid.:50).[42]

2.2.3.2 Informational Givenness vs. Relational Givenness-Newness

So far we have restricted our definition of information to what Lambrecht (1994:47) terms "propositional information"—i.e. the creation of knowledge via propositions. It is necessary, however, to make explicit what has thus far been left implicit, that is, the distinction between propositional information and "referential elements". By referential elements, we mean the cognitive representation of individual lexical items or phrases that make up the propositional information. In other words, referential elements can be thought of as the building blocks from which propositions are formed (ibid.:47). It is often argued that the properties of givenness-newness can be attributed to referential elements, i.e. referential givenness-newness. In other words, givenness-newness is said to involve a relation between a linguistic expression and a corresponding non-linguistic entity in the speaker/hearer's mind (cf. Gundel and Fretheim, 2009:147; Gómez-González, 2001:35–37). Although this approach seems intuitive, it results in a view in which the information expressed by a sentence is segmented among various sentence constituents and, therefore, contradicts the notion of information as fundamentally propositional in nature.[43] In other words, information must not be reduced to

41. Within the linguistic literature, the notions 'given information' and 'new information' are rife with terminological obfuscation. For example, Prince (1981a) provides a taxonomy of three types of givenness: (1) givenness as 'Predictability/Recoverability', where the speaker assumes that the hearer can predict or could have predicted that a particular linguistic item will or would occur in a particular position within a sentence, (2) givenness as 'Saliency', where the speaker assumes that the hearer has or could appropriately have some particular thing/entity...in his/her consciousness at the time of hearing the utterance and, (3) givenness as *Shared Knowledge*, where the speaker assumes that the hearer 'knows', assumes, or can infer a particular thing (but is not necessarily thinking about it. Most authors have indeed defined givenness in one of these three terms. To give but a few examples: Predictability (Halliday, 1967, 1985); Saliency (Chafe, 1976, 1987); Shared Knowledge (Haviland and Clark, 1974, Clark and Haviland, 1977; Clark and Marshall, 1981). Prince (1992), moreover, reframes this taxonomy in terms of a matrix of two cross-cutting distinctions—between, on the one hand, discourse-old and discourse-new information, and on the other hand, hearer-old and hearer-new information. Discourse-old information is that which has been explicitly evoked in the prior discourse, while hearer-old information is that which, regardless of whether it has been evoked in the current discourse, is assumed to already be known to the hearer (see §2.3.4.1 below for further discussion). See also Gomez-Gonzalez (2001:35–37), who distinguishes between: (1) Relational givenness, which is Given with respect to what is new in individual clauses, (2) Contextual givenness, which is Given information rendered by the co-text in terms of recoverability, predictability, shared knowledge, or assumed familiarity, and (3) Active givenness, what the speaker and/or his addressee have in mind.

42. Cf. Chafe (1976:30).

43. For instance, consider the following example:

the individual terms within a proposition, but is rather, the establishment of a *relation* between terms in a proposition (Lambrecht 1994:48).[44] Therefore, we will account for the cognitive representation of the referential elements in terms of their assumed pragmatic states within the minds of the speech participants instead of by the terms "given" and "new". Moreover, in an effort to avoid the ambiguity surrounding the terms "given" and "new" (cf. Prince, 1981a), we will follow Lambrecht (1994) in dispensing with these terms altogether in favor of the terms "presupposition" and "assertion".[45]

2.2.3.3 Pragmatic Presupposition and Assertion

In the previous section we argued against the approach that would construe givenness-newness as properties of individual sentence constituents. It should not, however, be inferred that the partition between given and new information is not reflected linguistically. Rather,

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Q: "What did you eat last night?"
A: "I ate the left-over pizza."

It seems reasonable to construe the NP "the left-over pizza" as the new information since the remaining portion of the sentence, i.e. the words "I ate" were supplied in the question (where "I" is contextualized as part of the text-external world), and therefore they are assumed to be given information (Lambrecht, 1994:47).

44. In other words, with respect to the aforementioned example:

Q: "What did you eat last night?"
A: "I ate the left-over pizza."

the information conveyed by the answer is not "the left-over pizza", but "the food I ate last night was the left-over pizza." Without the established relation between "the left-over pizza" and the other constituents which comprise the associated full proposition, "the left-over pizza" could not function as an interpretable answer to the question (ibid.:48). Lambrecht argues further that, if 'new information' were equated with 'new constituent', it would be difficult to account for the information structure of the simple sentence "She did it." "In this sentence all constituents must be equally 'old' [given, JRW] because otherwise they could not all appear in anaphoric pronominal (and 'pro-verbal') form: to be able to interpret these constituents we must know from previous discourse who or what they refer to. Nevertheless, in an appropriate utterance context this sentence clearly may convey new information in the sense that it may change the addressee's representation of the world. The conveying of information is in principle independent of the previous mention or non-mention of the designata of the different constituents in a sentence" (ibid.:49).

45. Cf. Gundel (1999, 2003) and Gundel and Fretheim (2009), who distinguish between two distinct and logically independent senses of givenness-newness: referential givenness and relational givenness. Referential givenness concerns the relation between a referential expression used to denote an entity and the cognitive representation of that entity in the mind of the speech participants. Relational givenness-newness, on the other hand, "involves a partition of the semantic-conceptual representation of a sentence into two complementary parts, X and Y, where X is what the sentence is about (i.e. Topic) and Y is what is predicated about X (i.e. Comment/Focus). X is given in relation to Y in the sense that it is independent and outside the scope of what is predicated in Y. Y is new in relation to X in the sense that it is new information that is asserted, questioned, etc. about X" (Gundel and Fretheim, 2009:148–149). Within the framework proposed by Gundel and Fretheim, therefore, a sentence like ″She did it″ could be accounted for by construing the pronominals ″She″ *and* ″it″ as referentially given, while at the same time construing the subject (or topic) ″She″ as relationally given and the predicate (or comment) ″did it″ as relationally new. Although we will formulate the givenness-newness distinction differently than Gundel and Gundel and Fretheim, their proposal is compatible with the present framework.

"sentences typically contain some lexical or grammatical manifestation of the information assumed to be already given in the hearer's mind, as a verbal point of departure or basis for the new information added" (ibid.:51).[46] Therefore, when information is manifested linguistically in speaking or writing, something new is related to something that can be taken for granted, or is given. We will refer to given information which is lexicogrammatically represented in a sentence as the 'presupposition',[47] while the 'assertion'[48] (i.e. new information) is the added proposition expressed by the sentence which the hearer is expected to know as a result of hearing the sentence uttered (ibid.:52).[49] In other words, a presupposed proposition[50] is one which is shared in both the speaker's and addressee's Cognitive Representation—i.e. it is in their mutual Cognitive Representation—at the time of utterance and is *lexicogrammatically evoked* in the sentence, while that which is communicated by the assertion only exists within the Cognitive Representation of the speaker before the utterance is performed (ibid.:77).[51] The relation between the presupposition and the assertion forms a

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46. Although it seems redundant to explicitly state something that can be taken for granted, this is, nevertheless, a necessity as Lambrecht (ibid.:51) aptly demonstrates with the following sentence: "I finally met the woman who moved in downstairs." The proposition expressed by the restrictive relative clause "who moved in downstairs" expresses the fact that the speaker takes for granted that the hearer already knows that someone moved in downstairs. This given information is explicitly stated via the relative clause to help the hearer determine the referent of the phrase "the woman", by relating this referent to some already given piece of knowledge, which the speaker assumes the hearer happens not to be thinking of at the time the sentence is uttered (ibid.).

47. This use of the term 'presupposition' should not be confused with the more traditional use of the term in formal semantics, where it is used to refer to an entailment of the sentence that is constant under negation. Rather, the term, as used here, is more appropriately understood as 'pragmatic presupposition', in that it is the lexicogrammatically evoked set of propositions that the speaker and hearer are assumed to have in common at the time of the utterance. In light of this definition then, the truth-value of any pragmatically presupposed proposition is taken for granted by the interlocutors and therefore cannot be affected by an assertion (ibid.:63).

48. Our use of the term 'assertion' should not be confused with the notion of "asserting a proposition as opposed to denying or questioning it", or as "synonymous with the term 'statement" (ibid.:54).

49. The reader will remember what was stated earlier (§2.2.1), that psychological phenomenon (i.e. given vs. new information) is only relevant to the linguist insofar as it is reflected in grammatical structure. While the notions presupposition and assertion come very close to what has been described above as given and new information, there is nevertheless a distinction. While given information is the speaker's assumption of what the hearer already knows—i.e. the sum of propositions which the hearer knows, or believes, or considers uncontroversial at the time of speech—the presupposition is the lexicogrammatical representation of the propositions evoked in the sentence which the speaker assumes the hearer already knows or takes for granted at the time the sentence is uttered (ibid.:52). In other words, presupposition is a specifically linguistic concept. Shared knowledge between a speaker and hearer that is not linguistically evoked in an utterance does not meet our criteria for presupposition (ibid.:55). Alternatively, while the new information connotes the communicative act whereby a speaker increases the hearer's knowledge by adding a proposition to it, the assertion is the added proposition itself (ibid.:54).

50. Lambrecht (ibid.:53) clarifies that "[w]hat a speaker assumes a hearer knows or takes for granted are strictly speaking not propositions but states of affairs, situations, events etc., i.e. the kinds of things which may be denoted by propositions."

51. Clark and Haviland's (1977:4) "given-new contract" is pertinent here. They argue that, "[t]o ensure reasonably efficient communication, the speaker and listener adhere to a convention regarding the use of this

'pragmatically structured proposition',[52] whereby the presupposition and the assertion occur together in the same sentence, but must *not* be construed as properties of individual sentence constituents (cf. §2.2.3.2), and both are necessary for the successful conveyance of information (ibid.:56). Lambrecht (ibid.:57–58) clarifies this phenomenon when he states:

> "To make an assertion is to establish a RELATION between a presupposed set of propositions and non-presupposed propositions, the latter being in some sense added to, or superimposed on, the former. The assertion is therefore not to be seen as the utterance 'minus the presupposition' but rather as a combination of two sets of propositions. ...[I]t is important to understand that the superimposition of the asserted proposition on the set of presupposed propositions often occurs in such a way that the two cannot be lexically factored out and identified with specific sentence constituents."

The presupposition and assertion thus coexist within the same sentence, but an assertion cannot coincide with the proposition(s) which is presupposed (and vice versa).[53] For example, in the cleft form "It was Mary who cooked", the pragmatically presupposed proposition is "Someone cooked", and yet the addressee is being informed that "That someone was Mary". In other words, the added (new) information is not "Mary", but rather, the non-presupposed or asserted proposition "The person who cooked was Mary".

Additionally, an assertion may consist in relating two or more presuppositions to each other (ibid.:58). Just as a piece of new information may result from the combination of expressions whose referents are entirely 'accessible' (cf. §2.3.3) from the preceding context (e.g. "She did it"), so too an assertion may be produced by the combining of presupposed propositions.[54] Furthermore, it is also possible for the proposition(s) expressed by a sentence

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distinction [i.e. the given-new distinction, JRW] in sentences. The speaker tries, to the best of his ability, to make the structure of his utterances congruent with his knowledge of the listener's mental world. He agrees to convey information he thinks the listener already knows as given information and to convey information he thinks the listener doesn't yet know as new information. The listener, for his part, agrees to interpret all utterances in the same light."

52. Lambrecht (ibid.:52–53) defines a 'pragmatically structured proposition' as "a proposition which reflects not only a state of affairs but also the speaker's assumptions about the state of mind of the hearer at the time of utterance, by indicating what is assumed to be already given and what is assumed to be new."

53. As Lambrecht (ibid.:58) notes, "One cannot inform an addressee of something she already knows (although one can obviously tell an addressee something she knows already."

54. Lambrecht (ibid.:58–59) provides the following example:

A: "Why did you do that?"

to be entirely pragmatically presupposed, but at the same time used as an utterance which is an assertion. This phenomenon takes place when a speaker wishes to communicate to an addressee that he knows a proposition that she did not think he knew (ibid.:59).[55] In other words, the assertion arises from the communicative intention to make explicit that the speaker and addressee share the knowledge of the same proposition (ibid.).

A remark is in order regarding the difference between pragmatically presupposed propositions which are merely cognitively represented and those which are believed. Dryer (1996) argues that this distinction is overlooked in most of the literature, but is nevertheless critical for accurately describing the nature of propositions which make up the non-assertion (or, non-focus) part of the sentence. According to Dryer, the traditional view construes the notion of pragmatic presupposition in a narrow sense, which assumes the presupposed proposition is believed by the speaker and assumed to be believed by the hearer. Dryer, however, argues that this cannot account for examples in which a particular pragmatically presupposed proposition is not believed.[56] However, if we construe the notion of pragmatic presupposition in a broader sense, where the proposition need not be believed but merely cognitively represented, pragmatic presupposition, as so defined, is no longer able to account for various phenomena which require a notion of pragmatic presupposition in the narrow sense of shared belief.[57] Dryer, argues that this descriptive problem is resolved by employing the notion of 'activated' propositions, which are necessarily cognitively represented, but need

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B: "I did it because you are my friend."

Here the assertion in B's informative answer consists of the establishment of a relation of causality between two pragmatically presupposed propositions, e.g. "I did it, and you're my friend."

55. Imagine a scenario where I have gone several months without seeing my sister, during which time, she succeeds in losing a substantial amount of weight. Upon seeing her for the first time I say "you've lost weight." Although the proposition expressed by my utterance is entirely presupposed (in the sense that this proposition is a part of our mutual Cognitive Representation), it nevertheless succeeds in making an assertion. This is because the communicative point of my utterance is to make explicit that both my sister and I have the same knowledge of that proposition in common.

56. Dryer (ibid.:483) uses the example of the proposition "the earth is flat" as one which may be shared knowledge but not believed. Moreover, Dryer observes that there are two ways in which it can be the case that one does not believe a proposition: 1) to believe that a proposition is false (e.g., "the earth is flat"), and 2) to not have a belief with respect to the proposition (ibid.:484). "For example, when one asks a question like 'Did John see Mary?', we can say that the speaker does not normally have a belief with respect to the proposition that John saw Mary" (ibid.:484–485).

57. Dryer (ibid.:515) argues that Lambrecht (1994) fails to make this critical distinction between propositions which are believed by the individual and those which are merely cognitively represented. According to Dryer, this failure leads Lambrecht to employ the expression 'pragmatic presupposition' in a systematically ambiguous way, "sometimes apparently using it to denote only those propositions which are beliefs, and other times apparently using it to denote any propositions that are mentally represented" (ibid.). See Dryer (ibid.:515–517) for a full critique of Lambrecht's theory of pragmatic presupposition.

not be believed (see §2.3).[58] In contrast to the popular assumption that activated propositions are necessarily presupposed, Dryer argues that the notion of pragmatic presupposition and activation are logically distinct categories. Moreover, even more critical to Dryer's argument is the notion that activation and belief are also orthogonal to each other. In other words, activated propositions are not themselves necessarily a part of the pragmatic presupposition in the traditional sense, since they may not be believed.[59] Taking into account Dryer's more nuanced distinction, we understand pragmatic presupposition as a set of propositions which the speaker assumes the addressee knows at the time of utterance, where 'to know' a proposition is to be construed as having a mental representation of it with no judgement implied as to whether or not the proposition is believed to be true. We will briefly return to the issue of the difference between pragmatic presupposition and the activation of propositions in §2.3.5.[60] For our purposes, however, activation will, for the most part, be used to describe the pragmatic states of the denotata of individual sentence constituents, rather than propositions.

2.2.3.4 Pragmatic Accommodation

Lastly, we must make brief mention of the option speakers have of creating a pragmatic presupposition by employing a sentence that requires it. For example, Lambrecht (ibid.:66) quoting from Stalnaker (1973:449) illustrates this phenomenon by the following exchange: "Someone asks of my daughter, 'how old is he?' I answer, '*she* is ten months old'." The presuppositional situation in the conversation is created by the use of the pronoun "she" which differs from the presupposition taken for granted by the addressee's question. Thus, Lewis (1979:172) observes, "say something that requires a missing presupposition, and straightaway that presupposition springs into existence, making what you said acceptable after all." This observation led Lewis to formulate the 'rule of accommodation for presupposition' wherein a presupposition is automatically created by the speech participants if the presupposition evoked by some expression does not correspond to the presupposed

58. By 'activation' we are referring to the notion coined by Chafe (1976) that of the various things in one's mind or memory, a small number are activated in the sense that they are "lit up", in the individual's attention, or consciousness (see §2.3.4).

59. Dryer (ibid.:503) distinguishes three types of propositions: 1) those that are both activated and believed, 2) those that are believed but not activated, and 3) those that are activated but not believed.

60. Dryer (1996) demonstrates that the difference between that of a simple focus construction in English (i.e. where focus is marked by intonation) versus that of a cleft construction (i.e. where focus is marked by morphosyntax) is due in large part to the difference between pragmatic presupposition and activation. While the non-focus portion of simple focus sentences in English involve activated propositions, the non-focus portion of cleft constructions involve pragmatic presupposition.

discourse situation.[61] Once a presupposition is created, it automatically becomes part of the set of pragmatic presuppositions of that particular discourse (Lambrecht, 1994:67).[62] If a presuppositional situation can be created simply by using an expression which requires it, then it can be concluded that presuppositional structures are inherent properties of the words and constructions which encode them (ibid.:66–67).[63]

2.2.4 The Discourse Model

In §2.2.3 is was stated that upon the initiation of a discourse or dialogue, the speech participants each possess an individual Cognitive Representation—i.e. the set of facts and assumptions that are manifest to each of them respectively. Moreover, it was also stated that during any given discourse the speech participants are assumed to share a fare amount of facts and assumptions, which we referred to as their 'Mutual Cognitive Representation' (following Sperber and Wilson, 1995). It is perhaps helpful to think of this Mutual Cognitive Representation as a 'Discourse Model' which is a collaborative cognitive macrostructure constructed by the speech participants. As a discourse progresses, propositional information is constantly added, replaced, or confirmed and discourse referents are introduced and re-introduced resulting in the perpetual updating of the model within the minds of the speech participants as the mutual comprehension of the discourse ensues. Moreover, the speech participants collaborate to maintain, update and, if needed, repair the discourse model in order to ensure that they each possess a similar representation of what is assumed to be known at any given time in the discourse.

The construction of the discourse model is not only necessary for the comprehension of the spoken discourse, but is an essential aspect of the processing and comprehension of written texts. Thus, Kintsch (1998:93) writes "[w]e comprehend a text, understand something, by building a mental model. To do so, we must form connections between things that were previously disparate: the ideas expressed in the text and relevant prior

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61. The rule states, "If at time T something is said that requires presupposition P to be acceptable, and if P is not presupposed just before t, then—*ceteris paribus* and within certain limits—presupposition P comes into existences at t" (Lewis, 1979:172).

62. Likewise, Stalnaker (1974:202) observes that "a speaker tells his auditor something in part by pretending that his auditor already knows it. ....In some cases, it would be indiscreet, ...or tedious, ...to openly assert a proposition that one wants to communicate."

63. Dryer (1996:498) observes, however, that certain constraints apply to felicitous use of pragmatic accommodation. "One property which seems to be shared by the cases for which an account in terms of accommodation seems plausible is that while the hearer may not believe the proposition in question prior to the utterance, it is at least the case that the speaker does (or acts as if they do)" (ibid.:499).

knowledge."[64] Furthermore, Ericcson and Kintsch (1995) and Kintsch (1998) have demonstrated that the higher cognitive functions employed in constructing a discourse model relies heavily upon the cognitive faculty of working memory.

2.2.5 Working Memory

The construction of a discourse model entails a variety of complex cognitive tasks which require the comprehender to maintain access to large amounts of information. For instance, in order for (3) above to be comprehensible—assuming this sentence is part of a larger written discourse—a reader would need access to the cognitive representation of previously mentioned referents in order to resolve the references to the pronouns used.[65] Moreover, access to a substantial amount of contextual information is required in order to coherently integrate propositional information presented by this utterance with the discourse previously read (Ericsson and Kintsch, 1995:211). In order to accomplish such complex cognitive tasks, people rely on their capacity to store information, and retrieve information from their memory.

2.2.5.1 Memory Mechanisms

Within the construction-integration model of text comprehension proposed by Kintsch (1998), memory is depicted as involving three mechanisms: long-term memory, short-term working memory, and long-term working memory. According to Kintsch (1998:217) long-term memory (LTM) is understood as "everything a person knows and remembers", and is described as a complex associative network of propositions. The aggregate amount of one's knowledge stored in LTM, however, is not immediately available for cognitive processing. Rather, cognitive processes are affected only when items in LTM are retrieved and inserted into 'working memory' (WM), a part of the LTM mechanism that contains a short-term memory component, or 'short-term working memory' (ST-WM),[66] and a component referred to by Ericsson and Kintsch (1995) as 'long-term working memory' (LT-WM).[67] ST-WM is the

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64. We do not mean to imply that all of the processes involved in the comprehension of a spoken discourse or dialogue are exactly the same as those involved in the comprehension of a written text. According to Kintsch (1998:371–421) there are indeed significant differences. Cf. Gernsbacher's (1990) "Structure Building Framework" for a similar model, as well as Harken's (1999) ideas concerning how literary texts are processed.

65. See Kintsch (1998:149–157) for a description of anaphora resolution within Kintsch's construction-integration model of discourse comprehension.

66. Short-term memory is commonly termed 'focus of attention' or 'consciousness' in the relevant literature (ibid.). STM is defined by Baddeley (1986:34) as "the temporary storage of information that is being processed in any of a range of cognitive tasks."

67. Kintsch (1998:217) employs a computer analogy to help explain how this works. He writes, "[a] great deal

active part of LTM and is characterized by a severely limited capacity, no more than 4-7 chunks, or about as much as is contained in a simple sentence (Kintsch, 1998:102, 217). LT-WM, however, works by employing items that are available in ST-WM as retrieval cues for those parts of LTM that are connected to them by retrieval structures (Kintsch, 1998:219). In other words, the LT-WM mechanism serves the purpose of facilitating the rapid access[68] of information stored in LTM by employing cues in ST-WM, which are then used to extend one's WM by building retrieval structures to information in LTM.[69]

2.2.5.2 The Two Roles of Working Memory

According to Kintsch (1998:224), working memory plays two significant roles in the construction of a discourse model as a reader comprehends a text: (a) ST-WM serves in the active and sequential processing of the discourse, and (b) given the limited capacity of ST-WM at any given point, information processed in ST-WM must be supplemented by information stored in LTM in order to yield a *coherent* discourse model in the mind of the reader.[70] The almost instantaneous access to information stored in LTM is accomplished by the LT-WM mechanism.

The comprehension process of a written discourse entails that the discourse model be built up sequentially (Kintsch, 1998:101).[71] This sequential construction of the discourse model consists of consecutive processing cycles in WM that serve to integrate new information into the discourse model, simultaneously linking it to information already stored in LTM. After each processing cycle, ST-WM is cleared—with the information constructed immediately transferred to LTM—in order to make room for the processing of the next proposition(s) (ibid.:102) With each cycle, however, a few elements (at least one) from the

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of information is stored in various forms accessible to the computer, but this information does not affect processing unless it is retrieved and installed in the computer's central processor."

68. "The amount of information in working memory consists of two sets of items: those already in STM, which are accessible very rapidly though not instantaneously, and those reachable by a retrieval structure in about 400ms. Whereas the capacity of STM is strictly limited, that of LT-WM is constrained only by the extent and nature of the retrieval structures that can be accessed via the contents of STM" (ibid.).

69. LT-WM, however, is dependent on knowledge stored in LTM. If knowledge is lacking, LT-WM is unavailable. This explains why stories, which are about human goals and human actions with which we are all familiar with are more easily remembered than say, highly technical scientific texts (ibid.).

70. The coherence of a discourse model is a severely complex matter, the adequate description of which involves the combining of the methodological resources of a variety of disciplines (Givón, 1995:341).

71. Kintsch (1998:101) writes, "[i]t not possible psychologically to construct and integrate a text representation for a whole book chapter or lecture. The chapter and the lecture have to be processed word by word and sentence by sentence. As each text segment is processed, it is immediately integrated with the rest of the text that is currently being held in working memory."

previous cycle remain in the ST-WM mechanism and are reprocessed with the next cycle (ibid.:234). This "holding over" of elements in ST-WM is referred to as the "short-term memory buffer" by Kintsch and van Dijk (1983) and Kintsch (1998).[72] The buffer, often in the form of argument overlap, serves as a link, or a bridge, between processing cycles and works to provide a sense of coherence within the discourse model.[73]

However, the construction of a coherent discourse model does not consist solely on the processing and integration of new information. Rather, information already stored in LTM, but directly linked to propositions in ST-WM, including inferred information (e.g. through frames/schemas and scripts;[74] cf. §2.3), can be easily and rapidly retrieved and converted to activated information in ST-WM via the LT-WM mechanism. Put differently, as new information is processed sequentially, various retrieval structures are formed between propositions in ST-WM and propositions in the discourse model that are linked to ST-WM through LT-WM. These retrieval structures are formed via cues in ST-WM, e.g. various referring expressions that are linked to informational elements stored in LTM or inferences that serve to fill in various unspecified details of the text.

For our purposes, it is significant that the area of working memory in operation at any given time during the processing or construction of the discourse model is signaled in the grammar. As Givón (1995:344) argues, "[o]ne may consider the grammatical signals associated with natural language clauses as mental processing instructions that guide the speech comprehender toward constructing a coherent, structured mental representation of the text." These grammatical signals are often in the form of various grammatical constructions or various forms of referring expressions (e.g. pronominal, proper noun, definite or indefinite noun phrase, etc.). In §2.3 below, we will incorporate Kintsch's theory of memory in describing the various activation states discourse referents may assume within the discourse model and the various ways these states are linguistically represented.

2.2.6 Summary

Within §2.2 we have discussed several precursory notions which will serve as the background against which the rest of our framework will operate. We have introduced and defined the

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72. Information in the buffer can roughly be equated with what has been described above as presupposed information. Moreover, as will be described in §2.3.3 below, discourse referents in the buffer can roughly be equated with what we will term 'activated' referents.

73. Explicit connectives also serve to mark coherence in a discourse model.

74. The terms 'frame' and 'script' are often differentiated in that a frame is used to describe a network of interrelated stative concepts, while 'script' is used to describe a network of interrelated concepts involving a sequence of events. Cf. Schank and Abelson (1977).

theory of 'information structure', the partition of the 'universe of discourse' in terms of the 'text-external' and 'text-internal world', and we have clarified the parameters by which we construe the notion of 'information', i.e. the linguistic manifestation of the relation between a presupposed proposition and an assertion. Furthermore, we have observed that presuppositional structures are inherent properties of linguistic expressions in that a presuppositional situation can be created simply by using an expression that requires it. Additionally, the notion of a mutual Cognitive Representation of a given discourse was reframed in terms of the construction of a discourse model which was described as an ongoing process and an essential part of the comprehension of a spoken or written discourse. Lastly, we briefly discussed the critical role memory plays in the construction of a coherent discourse model and the comprehension of a written text.

Lambrecht (1994) has proposed that information structure mediates between utterance-meaning and form by creating a pragmatically structured proposition. The pragmatic structure of a proposition reflects the speaker's assumptions about the addressee's state of knowledge at the time of an utterance (i.e. pragmatic presupposition vs. assertion), and also about the representation of discourse referents in the addressee's mind. In light of this distinction two fundamental discourse-pragmatic categories emerge: (1) Pragmatic States, i.e. the pragmatic status of denotata of individual sentence constituents in a proposition, and (2) Pragmatic Relations, i.e. the pragmatically construed relationship between these denotata and the propositions in which they appear as predicates or arguments (ibid.:49). These two categories will comprise the most salient aspects of our framework.

2.3 Pragmatic States

We noted in §2.2.3.2 that it is preferable to account for the individual referential elements within a proposition (i.e. sentence constituents) in terms of their assumed pragmatic states within the Cognitive Representation of the speech participants rather than with the terms 'given' and 'new', which were determined to be at best conceptually ambiguous, and at worst, misleading. In §2.3 we will set out to describe in detail what is meant by the term Pragmatic States and how they are linguistically represented.

2.3.1 Discourse Referents

The Cognitive Representation of a speech participant was defined in §2.2.3 as the entire network of propositions that are manifest to a speech participant at any given time. In more concise terms, the Cognitive Representation is the sum of propositions that an interlocutor knows (ibid.:43). Propositions are made up of referential elements that are linguistically

represented as arguments and adjuncts to a predicate. The linguistic elements used to code referential elements, however, exist independently from the representation of these elements within the mind of the interlocutors.[75]

During any given discourse, the discourse model is continuously being updated as propositional information is added, replaced, or confirmed within the Cognitive Representations of the interlocutors. As this process unfolds, discourse referents also undergo changes of state as they are introduced and re-introduced into the discourse model. These changes of state are linguistically represented as noun phrases, pronouns, various kinds of tensed and non-tensed subordinate clauses, and certain adverbial phrases (ibid.:75). They do not, however, occur as constituents that serve as predicates, since "predicates by definition do not denote discourse referents but attributes of, or relations between, arguments" (ibid.). The description of the cognitive tasks of introduction and re-introduction of discourse referents within the discourse model requires two information structure categories: 1) Identifiability, and 2) Activation. Moreover, these two categories are defined against the backdrop of two more general cognitive states: 1) knowledge, and 2) consciousness—i.e. knowing the referent (identifiability) and keeping it in the center of one's consciousness (activation).

2.3.2 Identifiability

In order for a speaker to say something informative about a specific discourse referent (i.e. the cognitive representation of a specific discourse entity), the discourse referent in question must first be identifiable within the discourse model. The discourse property of 'identifiability'[76] concerns the speaker's assessment of whether or not a particular discourse referent is already stored in the addressee's Cognitive Representation. In light of the theory of memory described in §2.2.5, an identifiable referent is one that the speaker assumes is present within the addressee's LTM (Chafe 1994:93).[77]

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75. A note of clarification is needed regarding the term 'referent', 'discourse-referent' or other similar terms used to describe the relation between a linguistic expression and the entity denoted by that expression. Unless otherwise specified, these terms will be used in the present work to refer to the cognitive representations of entities in the mind of interlocutors rather than actual entities designated, or denoted by the referring expressions in the real world. Although the conceptual distinction between the two will be upheld, the terminological distinction will, for the most part, be neglected.

76. The term 'identifiably' is first used by Chafe (1976).

77. This distinction is conceptually related to the distinction between pragmatically presupposed and asserted propositions (cf. §2.3.1.3). "A presupposed proposition is one of which the speaker and the hearer are assumed to have some shared knowledge or representation at the time of utterance. Similarly, an identifiable referent is one for which a shared representation already exists in the speaker's and the hearer's mind at the time of utterance, while an unidentifiable referent is one for which a representation exists only in the speaker's mind" (Lambrecht, 1994:77–78).

Chafe (1994:94–101) observes three components of an identifiable referent. "An identifiable referent is one that is (a) assumed to be already shared, directly or indirectly, by the hearer; (b) verbalized in a sufficiently identifying way; and (c) contextually salient" (ibid.:94). Let us examine each of these in detail.

First, in order for a discourse referent to be considered identifiable, a representation of the entity in question must directly, or indirectly exist within the discourse model of the speech participants. That is, a cognitive representation of a discourse referent can be said to be identifiable, not only by its direct representation within the discourse model, but also by way of *association* with knowledge already a part of the discourse model. Take for example the discourse referent *the tags* uttered in (4) within the context of buying a car (adapted from Chafe (1996:43)):

(4) a. "and then, you got to get the tags on it…"
b. "Right?"

There is no reason to assume that the speaker in (4) believed that the addressee had a specific cognitive representation of THE TAGS when she performed this utterance. In other words, the noun phrase "the tags" is brand new.[78] Yet, the speaker assumes the discourse referent is nevertheless identifiable to the addressee by way of association, or 'inference', that buying a car involves acquiring tags.[79] An inferentially identifiable entity is one which is available to the addressee by way of a cognitive 'frame' or 'schema'. The concept of 'frame' is defined as follows by Fillmore (1982:111)[80] as quoted in Lambrecht (1994:90).

78. Although it could be argued that the discourse referent THE TAGS is 'accessible' (see §2.3.4), rather than new by way of inference, Chafe (1996:42–46) argues that an inference involving identifiability is of a different type than an inference involving accessibility. According to Chafe, when inference is involved in the identifiability of a discourse referent, the referent in question is a less essential part of its context, or frame/ schema. In other words, the schema 'buying a car' necessarily includes a number of entities and states of affairs (e.g. a dealer, a sales lot, haggling over a price), but not necessarily or immediately acquiring tags. Although the association is strong enough, or sufficient to make the discourse referent represented by a definite noun phrase identifiable within the Cognitive Representation of the addressee. Moreover, as we will see in §2.3.4 below, inference involving accessibility is stronger, requiring the discourse referent to be an essential part of the frame/ schema evoked. This type of inference is strong enough for the discourse referent to be both identifiable and accessible.

79. Expressions such as (4) are referred to as "inferables" by Prince (1981a), as "bridging inferences" by Clark and Haviland (1977) , "associated anaphors" by Hawkins (1978) and "indirect anaphors" by Erku and Gundel (1987).

80. Although Fillmore (1982) is difficult to access, a thorough overview of Fillmore's concepts can be found in Croft and Cruse (2004:7–39).

> "By the term 'Frame' I have in mind any system of concepts related in such a way that to understand any of them you have to understand the whole structure in which it fits; when one of the things in such a structure is introduced into a text, or into a conversation, all of the other are automatically made available."

The frame within which a discourse referent becomes identifiable may be broad or narrow. It may be so broad as to directly correspond to the hearer's natural or social universe (e.g. the noun phrases: Sun, Moon, The President of the United States, Larry, Dad, etc.); or the frame may be narrow, in terms of a personal frame (e.g. the house, the kids, etc.) or the text-external world of the immediately available physical environment (e.g. that guy over there, etc.*)*. Lastly, the frame may be comprised of the text-internal discourse world. In other words, the addressee is able to identify the discourse referent due to it having been previously introduced within the ongoing discourse (ibid.).[81]

This leads us to Chafe's second parameter on identifiability. In addition to being directly or indirectly shared by the speech participants, Chafe (1994:94) asserts that an identifiable referent must be "verbalized in a sufficiently identifying way." In other words, on the basis of the linguistic expression employed, the addressee must be able to pick the referent out, from among all other referents, and identify it as the one that the speaker has in mind (Lambrecht, 1994:77). In the most basic sense, there exists only one discourse referent within the universe of discourse that can be designated by that noun phrase (Chafe, 1976:39). The examples from the pervious paragraph also serve to illustrate this parameter: Sun, Moon, The President of the United State, Larry, Dad, etc. Each of these NPs designate a uniquely identifiable referent (Lambrecht, 1994:87). Moreover, we will also construe indefinite and defnite generic noun phrases (i.e. a typical instance of a category), as well as noun phrases which denote classes of entities, as identifiable (cf. §2.3.4.3) (ibid.:88).[82] It is reasonable to assume, that in both of these cases, the discourse referents are identifiable due to their permanent status within the long term memory of the speech participants (ibid.). Upon uttering the expression used to

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81. The frame/schema concept is essential to the notion of identifiability. In this regard, Lambrech (ibid.) writes, "I believe that the common cognitive property that unites all instances of identifiability and therefore justifies expression by a single grammatical category [i.e. definiteness, JRW], is the existence of a cognitive schema or frame within which a referent can be identified."

82. This is contra to Chafe (1994:102–105) who argues that generic referents cannot participate in the identifiable-nonidentifiable distinction. He argues that "sharing knowledge of generic referents is different from sharing knowledge of particular referents. Knowing a category..., entails knowing something about a typical instance of that category. Whereas the sharedness involved in identifiability depends on knowing a particular instance" (ibid.:103). Nevertheless, for our purposes we will neglect this technicality and follow Lambrecht (1994:88) in construing generic noun phrases as identifiable due to their salient status within the pragmatic universe of the speech participants.

denote these referents, they can be retrieved with minimal processing effort given the appropriate discourse context.

If, however, a discourse referent is not shared—i.e. a speaker assumes that no representation of an entity exists within the mind of an addressee—then the speaker must create such a representation via linguistic expression before anything informative can be added to it. The metaphor of a 'file' is often used in the linguistic literature for describing the establishment of a new discourse referent within the Cognitive Representation of the addressee.[83] That is, when a new representation is established, it is as if a new referential card is created within the file (i.e. the addressee's Cognitive Representation), with a heading (i.e. referring expression), upon which, information can be added, stored, and retrieved during the discourse (cf. Erteschik-Shir, 1997). Take for example (5):

(5) a. Yesterday, I went for a long walk.
b. On my way back home, I saw a cowboy riding a horse down the street...
c. …
d. …
e. …
f. When I opened the door, I saw that the salesman was wearing boots.
g. They reminded me of the cowboy (that I had seen earlier).

The discourse referent denoted by the noun phrases "a cowboy" and "a horse" in (5b) are assumed to be unidentifiable to the addressee at the time of utterance. This fact is linguistically made manifest by the choice on the part of the speaker to encode the discourse referents with indefinite noun phrases upon their first mention. Once a discourse referent is assumed to be identifiable, however, a speaker is obligated to lexicogrammtically represent the discourse referent in a way that allows the addressee to sufficiently identify it within her Cognitive Representation.[84] This is accomplished by way of a range of lexicogrammatical expressions extending from personal pronouns, demonstrative pronouns, proper names, common nouns with a definite article or a demonstrative article, to more complex noun phrases that include some type of modification (e.g. relative clauses, etc.) (ibid.:97). For example, in (5) above, the discourse referent "the cowboy" in (5g) is represented by a definite

83. Cf. Heim, 1982; Reinhard, 1981; Givón, 2001; Lambrecht, 1994; and Erteschik-Shir, 1997.

84. However, what qualifies as sufficiently identifying can vary over a wide range and is highly dependent on the context (ibid.:97).

noun phrase.[85] In this instance, the use of the definite article functions as a signal to the addressee that the noun phrase expresses an identifiable referent, which was first introduced earlier in the discourse.[86]

In addition, Prince's (1981a:236) observation that an unidentifiable (Prince's 'brand-new') referent can be of two types: 'Anchored' or 'Unanchored', is significant in terms of the lexicogrammatical signaling of identifiability in discourse. An anchored brand-new referent is one that is linked to an already identifiable referent, e.g. "a guy I work with", where the brand-new noun phrase "a guy" is linked to the already identifiable pronoun "I". On the other hand, an unanchored brand-new referent is simply brand-new, e.g. "a guy". This line of thought is picked up by Chafe who argues that a referent may become identifiable through modification. That is, when a common noun is insufficient to identify a shared referent the noun may be modified in such a way that produces identifiability (Chafe, 1994:99). According to Chafe, "[m]odification creates an *ad hoc*, narrower category within which the referent becomes unique, when it would not have been unique within the category expressed by the noun alone" (ibid.). This particular kind of identifiability may be created via possessive pronoun, noun phrase, attributive adjective, prepositional phrase, or a relative clause that serves to modify a noun category with an event or state within which the referent is a participant (ibid.:99–100).[87] For instance, if the speaker in (5) believed that the simple definite noun phrase "the cowboy" would have been insufficient for the identifiability of the referent within the Cognitive Representation of the addressee, or that the processing effort would have been too heavy on the part of the addressee in identifying the specific referent on the basis of a simple definite noun phrase, the speaker could have modified the referent with a relative clause (i.e. "that I had seen earlier") thus creating an *ad hoc* narrower category within which the identifiability of the referent would become unique (ibid.:99).

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85. "Notice that once a previously unidentifiable referent has been introduced into the discourse register [discourse model, JRW] in the form of an indefinite NP, it must from this point on be referred to with a definite noun phrase or a pronoun" (ibid.:89).

86. The cognitive distinction of identifiability/unidentifiability is often marked linguistically by definite/ indefinite noun phrases (but not always: cf. the phenomenon of 'pragmatic boot-strapping' where an unidentifiable referent is encoded as a complex noun phrase; Lambrecht, 1994:92). Although the correlation between the cognitive category of identifiability and the grammatical category of definiteness is at best an imperfect one (cf. Lambrecht, 1994:79–87), this grammatical phenomenon serves to illustrate the significant point that "what counts for the linguistic expression of the cognitive distinction... is not that the addressee know, or be familiar with the referent in question but that he be able to pick it out from among all those which can be designated with a particular linguistic expression and identify it as the one which the speaker has in mind" (ibid.:77).

87. Note also cases where a definite unidentifiable referent is anchored to another unidentifiable referent (e.g. *"I met the daughter of a king"*). Lambrecht (1994:92) terms this phenomenon "pragmatic bootstrapping."

Lastly, an identifiable referent must be contextually salient. In other words, a discourse referent must 'stand out' to a certain degree from other referents that might be categorized in the same way (Chafe, 1994:100). The appropriate degree of contextual salience may be achieved as a result of the discourse referent having been established by: 1) the discourse (text-internal world), 2) by it's presence within the natural or social environment within which the conversation takes place (text-external world), or 3) by the commonness of human experience (ibid.). For example, the contextual salience of the referent *the cowboy* in (5g) was created by the discourse in that this particular referent was introduced earlier in the discourse (5b).

The moment a referent is first established in a discourse, thus becoming identifiable in the mind of the addressee, it is the most focal representation of the hearer's knowledge. That is, it occupies their focus of consciousness, or ST-WM (§2.2.5). For expository purposes, Chafe's (ibid.53) analogy between consciousness and vision works well, in that one's consciousness, not unlike one's vision, is only capable of focusing on one item at a time (i.e. Foveal Vision) (ibid.). Moreover, as with vision, some items in one's consciousness are relegated to the periphery, while others fall out of consciousness (or visibility, in the case of vision) altogether. One's consciousness, like one's eye, is in constant motion, "the eye with its brief fixations, the mind with its continual shifting from one focus to the next" (ibid.).[88] These levels of consciousness are termed "Activation States" by Chafe (1976, 1987, 1994).

2.3.3 Activation States

The theory of memory outlined in §2.2.5 aims, among other things, to account for the minds facility to comprehend a discourse (or a text) through the sequential construction of a discourse model. This complex cognitive task is made possible by the efficient storage and retrieval of elements of information from long-term memory through a working memory mechanism, comprised of the dual components of a short-term working memory buffer and a long-term working memory apparatus. This tripartite process of storage and retrieval corresponds with Chafe's (1987, 1994) notion of cognitive 'Activation States'. Once a referent becomes identifiable, or stored in LTM, Chafe (1987, 1994) argues that it can occupy one of three cognitive Activation States at any given point in the discourse. These three states are: Active, Semi-Active/Accessible, and Inactive. Chafe (1987:25) defines these states as follows:

88. This analogy is also congruent with the theory of working memory as described by Kintsch (1998) and is briefly sketched above (§2.2.5).

- Active: A concept "that is currently lit up, a concept in a person's focus of consciousness."

- Semi-Active/Accessible: A concept "that is in a person's peripheral consciousness, a concept of which a person has a background awareness, but which is not being directly focused on."

- Inactive (or unused):[89] A concept "that is currently in a person's long-term memory, neither focally nor peripherally active."[90]

With respect to these cognitive states, our primary concern lies solely with the hearer's willingness and ability to model her state of consciousness according to the requirements expressed by the presuppositional structures chosen by the speaker (Lambrecht, 1994:93). Put differently, the cognitive activation states of discourse referents, as an abstract cognitive phenomenon, is only relevant for our purposes insofar as these cognitive states are lexico-grammatically represented in the sentence structure. In the following section (§2.3.4) we will introduce research supporting the claim that a speaker's choices concerning the form of nominal expression is constrained by a speaker's assumptions about the status the corresponding referent holds in the mind of the addressee. Conversely, from the hearer's perspective, the nominal form constrains possible interpretations with respect to the identity of the referent, thus resulting in a more congruous mutual representation between interlocutors (Gundel and Fretheim, 2009:148). Before proceeding with this discussion, let us comment further on the dynamic nature of the cognitive status of discourse referents.

Given the limited capacity of ST-WM, and consequently the minds inability to focus on, or light up, more than a minuscule amount of the combined information it holds at any given time, it follows that as referents are activated in a person's consciousness, other referents are replaced and thus pass out of the active status. Accordingly, Chafe (1987:28) argues that "deactivation takes place as frequently as activation." Unless an active referent is either explicitly or implicitly referred to, it immediately begins a process of decay whereby the referent moves gradually from the focus of consciousness (i.e. active) to the periphery (i.e. semi-active/accessible), and ultimately completely out of focus (i.e. inactive)

89. Lambrecht (1994:107) suggests the alternate term 'unused' to further distinguish the category "inactive" from the category "identifiable".

90. What Chafe refers to as a "concept" in his definition of the three activation states has been referred to here as the mental representation of a discourse referent.

altogether.[91] Therefore, when deactivation occurs (i.e. the referent cycles out of ST-WM) the referent does not automatically move from active status to inactive status, but rather becomes 'cognitively accessible' through the LT-WM mechanism. A textually-accessible referent is, therefore, one which was explicitly mentioned via a referring expression and thus active within the consciousness of the hearer, but which subsequently, through replacement or lack of mention, became deactivated.

Deactivation from a previously active state (i.e. textually accessible), however, is not the only way a referent may become cognitively accessible (or semi-active). According to Lambrecht (1994:100), cognitive accessibility, can be attributed to two other factors: 1) an inference triggered by the discourse context (i.e. inferentially accessible), or 2) presence in the text-external text world (i.e. situationally accessible).

An inferentially accessible discourse referent is one that often belongs to a set of expectations associated with a cognitive 'Frame' (cf. §2.3.1).[92] Similarly, Prince (1981a:236) argues that "a discourse entity is inferable if the speaker assumes the hearer can infer it, via logical—or, more commonly, plausible—reasoning, from discourse entities already evoked or from other inferables."[93]

Entities may also be inferred as a result of their membership in a 'partially ordered set' relation, or 'poset'.[94] According to Ward and Prince (1991:171), posets are defined as follows:

> "A partial ordering R on some set of referents b, such that, for all b-1, b-2, and b-3 that are elements of b, R is either reflexive, transitive, and antisymmetric…or, alternatively, irreflexive, transitive, and asymmetric…"

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91. This explains why, for instance, the observation that third person pronouns (used for activated referents) become increasingly difficult to use (or interpret) the farther back it is to the previous reference (Dryer, 1996:481).

92. Similar to Fillmore's notion of 'frame', Chafe (1987:29) employs the concept of a 'schema'. He writes:

> "A schema is usefully regarded as a cluster of interrelated expectations. When a schema has been evoked in a narrative, some if not all of the expectations of which it is constituted presumably enter the semi-active state. From that point on, they are more accessible to recall than they would have been as inactive concepts".

93. Prince (1981a) offers the following example: "I got on a bus yesterday and the driver was drunk." The noun phrase "the driver" is inferable from the assumed knowledge (i.e. schema) about buses viz. that buses have drivers.

94. Originally a mathematical notion, poset relations were first applied to the pragmatic analysis of language by Hirschberg (1985), who used the notion to account for the relation between linguistic form and scalar implicature, and Ward (1985) who used the notion to account for the semantics and pragmatics of preposing constructions. For further discussion on the linguistic notion of poset see Reinhart (1981); Keenan and Schieffelin, (1976); and (Barnes, 1985); Ward and Hirschberg (1985); Ward (1988); Hirschberg (1991); Ward and Prince (1991); and Prince (1997; 1998).

a. REFLEXIVE: b-1 R b-2
TRANSITIVE: (b-1 R b-2 and b-2 R b-3) —> (b-1 R b-3)
ANTISYMMETRIC: (b-1 R b-2 and b-2 R b-1) —> (b-1 = b-2)

b. IRREFLEXIVE: b-1 ~~R~~ b-1
TRANSITIVE: (b-1 R b-2 and b-2 R b-3) —> (b-1 R b-3)
ANTISYMMETRIC: (b-1 R b-2 and b-2 R b-1) —> (b-1 = b-2)

What is more, referents inferred from their relation to a poset may be ranked according to their respective relational values to other previously stated entities or propositions in the discourse.[95] For instance, Birner and Ward (2001:122) note that

> "[t]wo elements, A and B, that co-occur in a poset can be related to each other in one of three possible ways, in terms of their relative rank: A can represent a lower value than does B, A can represent a higher value than does B, or the two can be of equal rank, or 'alternate values' sharing a common higher or lower value but not ordered with respect to each other."

To illustrate this further, Birner and Ward offer the following topicalization (i.e. fronted) constructions (the "B." answers) as examples of each relational type:

a. Lower value
A: Do you like this album?
B: Yeah, **this song** I really like.

b. Higher value
A: Have you filled out the summary sheet?
B: Yeah, Both **the summary sheet and the recording sheet** I've done.

c. Alternate values
A: Did you get any more [answers to the crossword puzzle]?
B: No. **The cryptogram** I can do like that. The crossword puzzle is hard.

In Birner and Ward's example (a.) above, the relation 'is-a-part-of' orders the poset

95. By a 'contextually licensed' poset relation I follow Birner and Ward in referring to a relation involving a poset that the speaker believes the hearer can construct or retrieve from his or her own knowledge store based on the information evoked in the current discourse. "This constraint is designed to restrict these posets to those that are salient or inferable in context, since in principle any random set of items could constitute a poset, yet most such combinations will not licence linking relations between utterances and their contexts" (Birner and Ward, 2001:122).

ALBUM PARTS, within which "this song" represents a lower value than does "this album", since "this song" is part of this album (ibid.). Likewise, in (b.) "the summary sheet and the recording sheet" represents a higher value than does "the summary sheet" within the poset [forms], ordered by a relation "is-a-member-of" (ibid.). In other words, "the summary sheet and the recording sheet" is a superset of "the summary sheet". Lastly, in (c.), "the crossword puzzle" and "the cryptogram" represent alternate, equally ranked values within the poset "newspaper puzzles", ordered by the relation "is-a-type-of" (ibid.). Although the entities above stand in a poset relation to another entity, discourse elements may be associated "with an entity, attribute, event, activity, time, or place, or with a set of such items" (ibid.).[96] Further, contextually licensed posets include a broad range of relations including part/whole, entity/attribute, type/subtype, set/subset, as well as equality relations (ibid.).[97]

In addition to inferential accessibility, a referent can be situationally accessible. In other words, due to a referent's presence in the text-external world shared by the speech participants, a referent is automatically accessible. For example, while on a walk with my wife I might say "those leaves are beginning to change color″ with reference to leaves on a tree which I assume my wife is not presently aware of but which I take to be easily accessible to her.

It is helpful to formulate Chafe's three activation states in terms of the amount of processing effort (i.e. Chafe's 'activation cost') required for activation. In other words, an already active referent will require the least amount of processing effort since it is already in ST-WM buffer. A discourse referent that is accessible will require somewhat more processing effort resulting from the process by which elements stored in LTM are retrieved via the LT-WM mechanism. Finally, converting an inactive referent (i.e. entertaining a low degree of accessibility) stored in LTM to the active state requires the most processing effort of all. Moreover, as we will see in the following section, there is an iconic relationship between a particular activation state and the length of the expression used to encode that referent. Active referents tend to be encoded with short expressions (e.g. pronouns) and accessible/inactive referents with longer forms (e.g. full lexical phrases) (Lambrecht, 1994:96).

Lastly, a few remarks are in order by way of clarification and nuance. The first remark concerns the somewhat implied assumption in the above description that the three activation states, as formulated by Chafe, represent discrete cognitive categories. While this

96. Cf. Ward and Hirschberg, 1985; Ward, 1988; Hirschberg, 1991 and Ward and Prince, 1991.

97. Birner and Ward (1998:234) also discuss the possibility of two or more items belonging to a so-called *ad hoc* poset relation. As Moshavi (2010:98) has noted, however, "[t]he possibility of ad-hoc posets means, in essence, than any items that constitute a pair in a given context qualify as a poset." We agree with Moshavi and will therefore not appeal to the notion of ad-hoc posets in this study.

characterization may be helpful for expository purposes, it is ultimately misleading.[98] Rather, the three activation states should be construed as degrees of activation which operate along a continuum. This becomes apparent when Chafe's definitional criteria of the semi-active/ accessibility state are critically evaluated in light of the two sub-notions of accessibility, viz. inferential and situational. While Chafe employs the criteria of "background awareness" and "peripheral consciousness" in defining the semi-active/accessible state, it is difficult to see how these narrow requirements can account for the extremely broad scope entailed by inferential and situational accessibility. Given the hearer's cognitive capacity to almost instantaneously activate an inactive discourse referent via inference or its presence within the text-external text world, in order to be useful, Chafe's parameters of peripheral consciousness and background awareness would have to be so broadly defined that it would inevitably render them useless as a defining criterion for determining whether or not a referent was objectively accessible or inactive. It is preferable, rather, to understand activation states as a scalar notion, in which referents possess either a lesser (more inactive) or greater (more accessible) potential for activation based on the assumed processing cost for activation on the part of the hearer (ibid.:104). In other words, a referent's degree of accessibility is proportional to the processing cost required to activate the referent. Factors contributing to the potential for activation (accessibility) include but are not limited to: 1) the previous mention of the referent, 2) the semantic relevance relations evoked by a particular schema, 3) its presence within the situational context (ibid.).[99]

That activation status (i.e. accessibility status) is a matter of degree determined by the assumed processing cost on the part of the hearer is also confirmed by Sperber and Wilson's (1996) general theory of utterance interpretation referred to as Relevance Theory. Relevance Theory posits that human cognition tends to be geared towards the maximization of relevance. According to Sperber and Wilson (1995:123–132), relevance is a matter of degree, with the degree of relevance of a particular input determined by the measure of two factors: contextual effects (i.e. reward) and processing effort (i.e. cost). Contextual effects are the result of the interaction between a newly impinging stimulus and a subset of the assumptions already established, or presupposed within the Cognitive Representation of the hearer. Processing effort, on the other hand, is the cognitive effort expended in order to yield a

98. Note that Chafe (1994:56) also allows for the fact that cognitive activation states may be, in actuality, less than categorical in nature. He writes, "Finally, we need to allow for the possibility that the three or more activation states are less categorical than they are depicted here-that they have fuzzy boundaries. However that may be, the effect of these states on language *is* categorical...".

99. As we will see in the next section (§2.3.4) researchers have shown that a referent's degree of accessibility (potential for activation) and *ipso facto* the assumed processing cost associated with the referent is reflected in the choice of referring expression selected by the speaker.

satisfactory interpretation of the incoming information, or informational element. This is summarized by Sperber and Wilson (1995:125) in the two maxims below:

> a. Other things being equal, the greater the positive contextual effects achieved by processing an input, the greater the relevance of the input to the individual at that time.
>
> b. Other things being equal, the greater the processing effort expended, the lower the relevance of the input to the individual at that time.

Furthermore, it is a central claim of Relevance Theory that communication is fundamentally inferential in nature. While inferential communication can be used on its own, encoded communication is only employed to strengthen inferential communication. Within Relevance Theory inferential communication is termed "ostensive-inferential communication" (ibid.:50–54). Ostensive-inferential communication is generally triggered by an ostensive stimulus on the part of the speaker, which evokes an optimal degree of relevance (i.e. 'optimal relevance') within the Cognitive Representation of the addressee. Sperber and Wilson's communicative principle of relevance states that every ostensive stimulus convey's a presumption of its own optimal relevance (ibid.:158). Moreover, the specific procedure employed by the comprehension system on the basis of the presumption of optimal relevance is summed up by the following maxim referred to as the 'Comprehension Procedure' (Wilson and Sperber, 2004:613):

> a. Follow the path of least effort in computing cognitive effects: test interpretative hypothesis (disambiguation, reference resolution, implicatures, etc.) in order of accessibility.
>
> b. Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied.

In light of the cognitive and communicative principles of relevance as proposed by Sperber and Wilson (1995), we can reformulate the differences between the potential for activation of semi-active/accessibility and inactive referents in terms of their respective degree of relevance. A semi-active/accessible referent, therefore, is one which achieves greater contextual effects and requires less processing effort on the part of the hearer when the corresponding expression is uttered. By contrast, an inactive referent is less relevant in that it requires a greater degree of processing effort on the part of the addressee to retrieve, or

activate an inactive referent—i.e. to model her state of consciousness to that of the speaker according to the requirements expressed by the particular referential expression or grammatical construction chosen by the speaker. Therefore, although there are grammatically justifiable grounds for distinguishing a referent that is semi-active/accessible from one that is inactive (cf. §2.3.4),[100] these cognitive categories should not be construed as discrete cognitive states but rather as points of degree on a continuum of cognitive accessibility.[101] That is, the choice of referring expression is constrained by a speaker's estimation of which expression will achieve a desired degree of relevance (i.e. optimal relevance) in order for the hearer to arrive at the correct interpretation of a particular referent, rather than an assumption that a referent is objectively active, semi-active/accessible, or inactive within a hearer's Cognitive Representation (Lambrecht, 1994:105).

This leads us to our second clarifying remark, which concerns the above characterization of the notions inferential, textual, and situational accessibility. Chafe (1987, 1994) and Lambrecht (1994) argue that these three categories should be understood as discrete cognitive states—a subtype of the semi-active/accessible state. We find this characterization somewhat misleading, and instead follow Gundel et al. (1993:281) in characterizing inferential, textual and situational as a way something can achieve a particular status. Put differently, these three categories do not represent specific cognitive sub-states, per se, but rather describe the means by which certain entities achieve accessibility within the Cognitive Representation of the addressee.

Lastly, we must make mention of the applicability of our previously mentioned notion of pragmatic accommodation (cf. § 2.2.3.4) to the activation status of discourse referents. While pragmatic accommodation almost always concerns the pragmatic presupposition of propositions, Chafe (1976) observes an analogous notion that is applicable in the context of activation. Chafe (1976:34) proposes an example in which Sherlock Holmes exclaims *"The BUTLER did it"* to Watson, who is reading a book and whose attention is elsewhere. Chafe notes that "Holmes evidently was treating this knowledge as if… Watson were thinking of it even though he wasn't" (ibid.). Thus, the speaker may pretend, or act as though a discourse referent has a certain degree of activation (semi-active/accessible) within the discourse model even though it is completely inactive with the assumption that the hearer will be able to

100. As Lambrecht (1994:100) avers, the difference between an inactive and accessible referent "can influence the position of a constituent in the sentence or the choice of one rather than another grammatical construction."

101. Indeed, as Lambrecht (1994:100) observes, from a cognitives standpoint "there is no theoretical upper limit to the number of kinds of cognitive states which mental representations may have in the course of a conversation." Likewise, see Dryer (1996) who divides what we have characterized as the active state, into two states: focus of attention > active but not the focus of attention.

accommodate for the lack of activation.

2.3.4 The Morphosyntactic Coding of Activation Status

In the previous section we provided a corrective to the overly simplistic notion that activation states consist of only a few discrete cognitive categories—an easy misunderstanding in light of Chafe's formulation of activation status in terms of three discrete categories: active, semi-active, and inactive. By contrast, we have suggested that the notion of "activation status" is better understood as a scalar notion, where a referent's degree of accessibility, or potential for activation, is determined by the assumed processing cost required by the hearer to remember or (re)activate the referent. Recall, however, that we are only interested in a referent's cognitive status insofar as it, in some way, is reflected in the grammar. Over the past several decades a compelling body of research has developed predicated on the idea that different types of referring expressions function as memory instructions indicating for the addressee the assumed degree of accessibility of a particular referent at a particular point in the discourse. In other words, a speaker's choice of referring expression (e.g. proper name, pronoun, demonstrative pronouns, etc.) directly correlates with her assumption regarding the referent's degree of accessibility in the mind of the hearer. In this way the referring expression instructs the addressee on how to retrieve the appropriate referent.

It was Chafe (1976) who first argued for a direct connection between the cognitive status of referents and their morphosyntactic coding. According to Chafe, referential forms are chosen by speakers according to the estimated activation status the referent occupies in the mind of the hearer (Ariel, 2001:61). Unstressed pronouns, he contends, cue the hearer to retrieve active referents, while stressed nouns and NPs retrieve semi-active and inactive referents. In repeating our foregoing critique, Chafe's proposal is problematic due to his formulation of the cognitive status of discourse referents in terms of three discrete states. This three way distinction cannot account for the differences between the wide range of referring expressions found in language—for example, the difference between demonstrative "this" and "it" (Ariel, 2001:61).[102] Since the time of Chafe's original proposal, several scholars have taken his model as a point of departure for developing distinctive frameworks for explaining the correlation between the cognitive status of discourse referents and their lexico-grammatical encoding.[103] Constraints on space will only allow us to discuss three of the most

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102. Chafe later recognized a need for more intermediary degrees of activation. For instance, see his discussion in Chafe, 1996:40ff.

103. Cf. Givón (1983), Levinson (1987) and Grosz et al. (1986; 1995).

noteworthy theories in this regard; these include those by Prince (1981a, 1992) Ariel (1990, 2001), and Gundel et al. (1993, 2001).

2.3.4.1 The Familiarity Scale

In an attempt to improve upon Chafe's model, Prince (1981a) argued that referring expressions provide insight into the speaker's assumption regarding the knowledge state of the addressee by indexing one of four cognitive categories of "assumed familiarity" with specific types of referring expressions. Prince's "Familiarity Scale" is as follows:

- Brand-New: entities introduced to the addressee for the first time and typically encoded with indefinite or weak quantificational NPs.
  - Brand-New Anchored: a discourse entity is Anchored if the NP representing it is linked, by means of another NP, or 'Anchor,' properly contained in it, to some other discourse entity.
- Unused: entities that the speaker assumes the hearer is familiar with although they have not been mentioned or eluded to in the discourse. Unused entities are typically encoded by a definite expression of some kind (e.g. proper name, demonstrative descriptions, strong quantifiers, etc.).
- Inferable: entities that the speaker assumes the hearer can infer via logical—or more commonly, plausible—reasoning from discourse entities already Evoked or from other Inferables. Inferables are also typically encoded by definite NPs.
  - Containing Inferable: A special sub-class of inferables where the triggering the inference is properly contained within the NP itself.[104]
- Evoked: entities that have either been explicitly mentioned in the preceding discourse context, or are present in the text-external world (i.e. Situationally Evoked). Pronouns are reserved for the encoding of Evoked entities.

In 1992 Prince revised her original framework to include two cross-cutting

104. Containing inferables are generally a type of lower value poset relation (cf. §2.3.3), in which the inferred referent is in a poset relation with a set expressed by a phrase in the same constituent. Prince (1981:236) gives the example "one of these eggs" where "one" is inferable via a set-member inference from "these eggs".

parameters.[105] The first parameter has to do with the the explicit presence or absence of an entity in the text-internal discourse. Entities that have been explicitly mentioned in the previous discourse she refers to as 'Discourse-old' and those that have not are referred to as 'Discourse-new'. By contrast, the second parameter concerns the assumed familiarity of the entity in the mind of the addressee, whether it has been explicitly mentioned or not. Those assumed to be completely new to the addressee, she refers to as "Hearer-new" and those the addressee is familiar with, as "Hearer-old". Entities that are discourse-old are necessarily also Hearer-old.[106] Yet, Discourse-new entities may, or may not be Hearer-new. That is, entities may be Hearer-old yet also Discourse-new. Discourse-new/Hearer-new entities correspond directly with Prince's earlier category Brand-new, while Discourse-new/Hearer-old correspond to Unused entities (and presumably situationally evoked entities, although Prince failed to discuss these). Discourse-old/Hearer-old correspond to the earlier category (textually) Evoked entities. While Prince's earlier category of Inferables was not discussed in this later work, they seem to fit the pattern of Discourse-new/Hearer-old entities.

Although more nuanced than Chafe's facile proposal, Prince's framework still lacks explanatory power in accounting for the subtle differences in motivation for choosing between one type of referring expression over another, seemingly equally informative option. Ariel's "Accessibility Theory" attempts to provide such an explanation.

2.3.4.2 Accessibility Theory

Ariel's (1988, 1990, 2001) "Accessibility Theory" contends that the speaker's choice of referring expression corresponds directly with the speaker's assumption regarding the degree of accessibility the referent entertains in the mind of the addressee. A referring expression, according to Ariel, actually "encodes a specific (and different) degree of mental accessibility" (Ariel, 2001:31).[107] In this way, referring expressions are "accessibility markers" which instruct the addressee on how to retrieve the appropriate referent based on the degree of cognitive accessibility (ibid.). Ariel proposes the following "Accessibility Marking Scale" proceeding from high accessibility markers to low ones:

105. Cf. Prince, 1992.

106. Although, see Birner (2006) who as challenged this assumption.

107. Bach (1998) takes issue with Ariel's contention that degrees of accessibility are encoded in the grammar. He argues, rather that cognitive states resulting in these pattens of use are derivable via pragmatic considerations.

> Full name+modifier > full name > long definite description > short definite description[108] > last name > first name > distal demonstrative+modifier > proximate demonstrative+modifier > distal demonstrative+NP > proximate demonstrative+NP > distal demonstrative(-NP) > proximate demonstrative(-NP) > stressed pronoun+gesture > stressed pronoun > unstressed pronoun > criticized pronoun > verbal person inflections > zero (Ariel, 1990:73).[109]

Form-function correlations on the accessibility marking scale, according to Ariel, are not arbitrary. Rather, three partially overlapping criteria motivate the convention: Informativity (i.e. the amount of lexical information), Rigidity (i.e. the ability to pick out a unique referent based on the form), and Attenuation (i.e. phonological size). Ariel predicts the more informative, rigid and unattenuated an expression, the lower the degree of accessibility and vice versa, the less informative and rigid and more attenuated the form, the higher the accessibility it encodes (ibid.:32). Therefore, "'true' zero subjects (as in Chinese) verbal person agreement (Italian, Hebrew), cliticized pronouns (Hebrew and English), pronouns, stressed pronouns, demonstrative and definite NPs, and proper names (of all kinds) are each specialized for (slightly) different degrees of accessibility, which accounts for their different discourse distributions" (ibid.). In this way, referring expressions can be thought of as "price tags" on processing effort (ibid.:45).

Almor (1999), for instance, reformulates Ariel's proposal within a broader framework of processing assessment. Low accessibility markers typically take longer to process than high accessibility markers. Accessibility markers with large informational loads are easier to process when the referent entertains a relatively low degree of accessibility. Alternatively, the same low accessibility markers are harder to process if the referent is highly accessible (Ariel, 2001:44).

There are exceptions however, where a low accessibility marker may be used even though the referent is highly accessible, so-called 'referential over-encoding'. Ariel contends that these instances are "limited to cases where specific conversational implicatures are sought, above the referential function" (ibid.:46).[110] She suggests that the extra contextual

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108. Ariel is careful to highlight the fact that, contra other theories (e.g. Chafe, 1994), definite descriptions count as "quite low accessibility markers" here (Ariel, 2001:31n6).

109. Regrettably, Ariel does not discuss indefinite or generics.

110. Likewise, Toole (1992, 1996) found that accessibility marking violations are only performed in order to achieve "special objectives" (Ariel, 2001:44). Additionally, Givón (1976) has observed the same phenomenon with respect to what he terms the "over-use" of the the left-dislocation construction. Cf. §4.2.1.1 and §4.2.2.3 below for further discussion.

implications justify the extra-processing cost.[111] Likewise, Almor formulates this intuition into a principle by which "additional cost must serve some additional discourse function", such as adding additional information about the referent (Almor, 1999:5). Ariel observes that in this way "Almor integrates the cognitive approach with the pragmatic approach" (Ariel, 2001:46). Highly accessible referents can, therefore, be encoded by low accessibility markers (i.e. referential expressions), resulting in additional pragmatic implicatures (ibid.).

But what are the factors that determine a referent's cognitive accessibility status at a given point in the discourse? Put differently, aside from directly tapping into the brain, how can we know a referent's degree of accessibility? Ariel suggests a number of factors. Following Chafe, Prince, and others,[112] she contends that accessibility is determined by text-external and text-internal factors; but she is careful to clarify that discoursal (i.e. text-internal) factors always trump those from the physical context (i.e. text-external). One factor determining accessibility is referred to by Ariel as Salience. Salience concerns the discourse role and prominence of a particular entity in a stretch of discourse. "Discourse topics and other entities mentioned or reliably predicted to be relevant to the discourse at hand can receive high or low degrees of accessibility according to their discourse role" (Ariel, 2001:31). Yet, as Ariel argues, it is the discoursal rather than physical salience of the entities involved that determines the degree of accessibility assigned to particular referents (ibid.). "Whereas the physical accessibility of the speaker in the real world does not change in the course of the conversation, her discourse role and prominence in it may" (ibid.:32).

According to Ariel, saliency and accessibility are in direct correlation where the more salient an entity is in discourse, the higher the degree of accessibility. The question then becomes, how is the degree of saliency determined? Ariel suggests several saliency distinctions in this regard. First, she distinguishes between global discourse topics, local discourse topics and non-topical elements, where global topics possess the highest degree of saliency, local, a relatively high degree, and non-topical, a relatively low degree. A second distinction is that between the speaker and addressee (high degree of saliency), and a referent which is neither (low degree of saliency). Additionally, the degree of saliency depends on the "automaticity/stereotypy" of the inference required in generating an accessibility status for an entity. In other words, all referents accessed via inference do not possess the same degree of saliency/accessibility (ibid.:33).[113] Frame induced inferences, for instance, are typically

111. Cf. Dirven and Verspoor (2004:188) who argue that over-encoding is used to obtain the specific text-structural effect of segmentation, i.e. structuring the text into larger conceptual units.

112. Cf. Chafe (1976, 1996) and Givón (1983, 1992); Dirven and Verspoor (2004:186–189); Runge (2007).

113. Cf. Sanford and Garrod, 1981; Ariel 1985a, 1990, 1996; Oakhill, Garnahm, Gernsbacher and Cain, 1992;

characteristic of entities that possess a higher degree of saliency/accessibility than referents inferred apart from a frame (ibid.).

In addition to saliency, other factors contributing to the relative degree of accessibility include the relationship between the antecedent and the anaphor in terms of unity or cohesion (Ariel, 1990). This relationship may be tight, resulting in a higher degree of accessibility, or loose, resulting in a lower one. Competition between potential antecedents is another factor. "The more potential antecedents there are, the lower the degree of accessibility each is entertained with" (ibid.). Finally, following Givón (1983, 1992), Ariel avers that the distance between anaphor and antecedent is critical in assessing the degree of accessibility. Contra Givón, however, she argues that word or clauses are not the only measures of distance.[114] Paragraphs and episode boundaries also create a type of distance between anaphor and antecedent, despite the fact that they may be in close linear proximity to one another. This is because people have more trouble accessing information at episode boundaries (ibid.). By contrast, units (clauses) that are more cohesively linked entail more dependency in their interpretation since "material from one clause is more readily available for the interpretation of another" (ibid.). The more cohesively linked clauses results in a higher degree of accessibility. Similarly, looser connections require more independent cognitive processing since there is less availability (accessibility) of material in one clause for the interpretation of the other (ibid.). Ariel contends that "such differences account for the different anaphoric patterns observed for subordinations (higher degree of accessibility—repeated proper names are clearly dispreferred) verses coordination (a lower degree of accessibility" (ibid.).[115]

Gundel, Hedberg, Zacharski, 1993).

114. Ariel takes issue with Givón's (1992) conclusion that accessibility is essentially a binary distinction in language—a conclusion arrived at as a result of his findings that definite descriptions retrieve antecedents that occur at a variety of distances. Ariel refutes this claim noting that accessibility cannot be established based on one factor and that, in Givón's case, definite descriptions "do not constitute a homogeneous category of referring expressions in terms of degree of accessibility (Almor, 1999; Ariel 1990, 1996)" (Ariel, 2001:37). That other factors (e.g. grammatical role, degree of saliency, paragraph, episode boundaries, number of previous mentions, etc.) which contribute to a referent's degree of accessibility explain Givón's observation concerning the ability of definite descriptions to retrieve antecedents from a variety of distances (ibid.).

115. Although accessibility factors often converge indicating a high or low degree of accessibility, Ariel notes that this is not always the case. It may happen that accessibility indicators ostensibly conflict. For instance,

> "[G]lobal discourse topics may be referred to by a pronoun even though their last mention occurs across an episode boundary. This is because discourse topics maintain a high degree of accessibility despite large distances. Cf. Brennan (1995) who found that non-prominent entities where referred to by full NPs rather than pronouns despite recency of mention. The more previous mentions an antecedent has enjoyed, the higher its accessibility. Still, discourse topics can usually be referred to by high accessibility markers despite a low count of previous mentions. Perhaps this is due to the fact that some entities, discourse topics more than others, are inferred to be present even when explicit mention is lacking (see also Grosz, Joshi and Weinstein 1995; O'Brien 8c Albrecht 1991)" (Ariel, 2001:34).

In sum, Ariel argues that referring expressions are chosen according to the assessed cognitive degree of accessibility of the referents corresponding to them. Put differently, different referring expressions encode varying degrees of accessibility. The degree of accessibility encoded by a particular referring expression is motivated by its relative informatively, rigidity, and attenuation (ibid.:34). Additionally, these factors may be exploited in order to produce particular contextual implicatures. For Ariel, assessing the degree of accessibility is a complex matter in which a referent's cognitive status depends on numerous overlapping factors, including: the number of previous mentions, the presence or absence of the referent in the preceding discourse, the linear distance between anaphor and antecedent, paragraph and episode boundaries between anaphor and antecedent, the inherent salience of the entity referred to, and the degree of coherence between the antecedent and the anaphor, among others. In the end, however, Ariel contends "it is the complex concept of accessibility which determines referential form, and not any single factor" (ibid.).

2.3.4.3 The Givenness Hierarchy

Lastly, in their now classic paper, Gundel et al. (1993) propose, in similar fashion to Ariel, that different referring expressions are chosen based on assumptions regarding the cognitive status of the referent in the mind of the addressee. Simultaneously, the choice of referring expression serves as processing signals that assist the addressee in restricting and identifying a set of possible referents or a particular referent intended by the speaker. A distinctive aspect of Gundel et al.'s theory pertains to their construal of referring expressions as organized according to a linear entailment hierarchy consisting of six cognitive statuses that are related to specific expressions (ibid.275):[116]

			uniquely		*type*
in focus >	*activated* >	*familiar* >	*identifiable* >	*referential* >	*identifiable*
{*it*}	{*that*}	{*that* N}	{*the* N}	{indefinite *this* N}	{*a* N}
	{*this*}				
	{*this* N}				

Each category in Gundel et al.'s 'Givenness Hierarchy' entails all the constraints of each category to its right. In other words, each status on the hierarchy "is a necessary and sufficient condition for the appropriate use of a different form or forms" (ibid.).[117] By

116. Regrettably, Gundel et al. do not discuss generics.

117. Gundel et al. note that in addition to referring expressions, "[l]anguages also exploit morphological devices

choosing a particular form, as opposed to another located to the left on the hierarchy, the speaker signals she assumes the associated cognitive status is satisfied, in addition to all of the other statuses to the right.[118]

The 'Type Identifiable' status located on the far right requires only that the addressee be able to "access a representation of the type of object described by the expression" (ibid.:276). This status is necessary for appropriate use of any nominal expression and is sufficient for the use of the indefinite article *a* in English.

Next, the 'Referential' status entails that "the speaker intends to refer to a particular object or objects" (ibid.). Not only must a type of representation be accessed by the hearer, he must also retrieve either an existing representation of the intended referent, or he must construct a new one. This status is necessary for felicitous use of all definite expressions, and is necessary and sufficient for indefinite *this* in English.

If the addressee is assumed to be able to "identify the speaker's indented referent on the basis of the nominal alone", the referent is said to be 'Uniquely Identifiable' (ibid.:277). All definite references are necessarily uniquely identifiable, and this status is sufficient and necessary for appropriate use of the definite article *the* in English (ibid.).

Referents that satisfy a 'Familiar' status are those for which the addressee is able "to uniquely identify... because he already has a representation of it in memory (in long-term memory if it has not been recently mentioned or perceived, or in short-term memory if it has)" (ibid.:278) (cf. §2.2.5). This status is requisite for the felicitous use of all personal pronouns and definite demonstratives, and it is sufficient for the use of the demonstrative determiner *that* in English (ibid.).

Beyond familiar referents are those that are represented in "current short-term memory" (ibid.). This status is referred to by Gundel et al. as 'Activated'. Activated referents may have been retrieved from long-term memory, or they may arise from the immediate linguistic or extra-linguistic context (ibid.). This status always, therefore, includes the speech participants themselves. It is necessary for appropriate use of all pronominal forms, and it is sufficient for the demonstrative pronouns *that* and *this* in English,[119] in addition to stressed personal

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such as noun incorporation and syntactic devices such as preverbal vs. postverbal position to signal cognitive status.

118. Gundel et al. (1993:283) state that "[f]or simplicity, we have excluded proper names, generics, and indefinite plurals from our study. We have also excluded zero NPs in conjoined and nonfinite clauses, in relativized position, and in special uses of language such as English casual speech (e.g. smells good) and recipes (e.g. bake for five minutes)."

119. Gundel et al. note that "[b]oth determiner and demonstrative *this* require the referent to be not only activated, but speaker-activated, by virtue of having been introduced by the speaker or otherwise included in the speaker's context space" (Gundel et al., 1993:279). Cf. also Lakoff (1974) in this regard.

pronouns (ibid.).

Finally, a referent may be 'In Focus'.[120] A referent in focus is not only the referent located in short-term memory, but it is also at the current "center of attention" (ibid.:279). Referents expressed by zero and unstressed pronouns are said to be in focus. "The entities in focus at a given point in the discourse will be that partially-ordered subset of activated entities which are likely to be continued as topics of subsequent utterances" (ibid.).

These usages may be illustrated in the series of examples in (6) (adapted from Gundel et al., 1993:255):[121]

(6) I couldn't sleep last night...
a. ...a dog kept me awake. (type identifiable)
b. ...this dog kept me awake. (referential)
c. ...the dog next door kept me awake. (uniquely identifiable)
d. ...that dog next door kept me awake. (familiar)
e. ...that kept me awake. (activated)
Did the neighbor's dog keep you awake last night?
f. Yes! It barked the entire night. (in focus)

A notable feature of Gundel et al.'s model, and one illustrated in (6), is the distinction between demonstratives and definite descriptions based on the status of assumed familiarity. In other words, the givenness hierarchy predicts that in a context in which an intended referent is uniquely identifiable but not familiar, a definite description should seem more felicitous to the addressee than a demonstrative description. Abott (2010:256) illustrates this further with the following example (her example [38]):

(7) a. Ultimatlely Bill selected that car which had seemed the flashiest.
b. Ultimately Bill selected the car which had seemed the flashiest.

Abott locates the two sentences above within a context in which Bill has been car-hunting,

120. This sense of 'focus' must be distinguished from the use of the term to denote a pragmatic relation (i.e. the part of a pragmatically structured proposition where the assertion differs from the presupposition) (cf. §2.4.6). The two senses are virtually diametrically opposed.

121. Gundel et al.'s givenness hierarchy was applied to four languages in addition to English: Japanese, Mandarine Chinese, Russian, and Spanish. Moreover, Runge (2006) has shown that the givenness hierarchy is substantiated by the participant reference system of Biblical Hebrew.

but nothing has been mentioned as to which features he is partial to in his search. Against such a context, (7b) seems appropriate while (7a) appears to be somewhat strained (ibid.).

Furthermore, the categories proposed by Gundel et al. are not mutually exclusive, as with, for instance, Prince's familiarity scale. This allows any expression that satisfies the cognitive requirements of a particular position in the hierarchy to be used in places where tighter constraints would also be satisfied, and by so doing prompt particular pragmatic inferences. Put differently, interlocutors may intentionally exploit the expectations that derive from the givenness hierarchy by, for instance, over-encoding a referent located higher up on the hierarchy in order to trigger specific pragmatic inferences.[122]

An additional difference between the familiarity scale and the givenness hierarchy concerns Prince's category 'inferable'. As we briefly mentioned in §2.3.3, where Prince (mis)construes this category as a discrete cognitive status, Gundel et al. provide a correction stating that 'inferable' should be viewed as "a way that something can achieve a particular status by association with an entity that have been activated" (Gundel et al., 1993:281). They go on to contend that, in relation to the givenness hierarchy, most inferred entities would have a status on the hierarchy of uniquely identifiable or lower (ibid.:282).

When comparing the givenness hierarchy to Ariel's Accessibility Theory, Ariel observes that it appears that the former has one significant advantage over the later. She writes,

> Whereas accessibility theory claims that degree of accessibilitty is responsible for the distribution of referring expressions, no attempt is made to specify a one-to-one cognitive correlate for each referring expression beyond the claim that a representation is supposed to be relatively more or relatively less accessible given a specific referring expression. No cognitive status is described in the absolute. Gundel et al.'s Givenness hierarchy proposes precisely that. Their theory maps mental representations referred to onto six implicationally related cognitive statuses" (Ariel, 2001:62–63).

Yet, Ariel goes on to contend that this advantage is merely superficial due to the inaccuracy inherent in attempting to isolate discrete cognitive activation states. As Ariel sees it, the givenness hierarchy, then, succumbs to the same problems faced by Chafe's model (see above). She writes, "The cognitive basis of referential forms is drastically reduced if

122. Additionally, Lambrecht (1994:103–104) observes the felicitous use of an unaccented pronominal form may be licensed even though the referent is not actually active within the mind of the hearer. This occurs only when the speaker assumes that the hearer will assume the activeness of the referent via pragmatic accommodation (§2.2.3.4).

cognitive statuses are actually defined as a disjunction of statuses" (ibid.:63). To illustrate her point, Ariel draws attention to Gundel et al.'s status of 'uniquely identifiable', which she claims actually consists of two discrete cognitive activities: "the addressee is either to retrieve an existing representation for a specific entity, or else to immediately generate such a representation" (ibid.). Although she concedes that definite descriptions may trigger both of these cognitive processes, there is no justification, in Ariel's opinion, for treating them as one and the same.[123] In fact, the disjunct between 'uniquely identifiable' and 'referential' is not as clear as Gundel et al. would have us believe. Moreover, it is unclear how the disjunct between 'uniquely identifiable' and 'referential' differs in any substantive way from the status of 'familiar', i.e. "[t]he addressee is able to uniquely identify the intended referent because he already has a representation of it in memory" (Gundel, et al., 1993:278).

Although the three competing models described in this section reflect sharp distinctions and evince respective weaknesses, they share the general claim that a referent's assumed cognitive statuses/degrees of accessibility are reflected in the expressions used to refer to them. Thus, the present study (cf. chapter 6) will draw on insights from Ariel's accessibility theory and Gundel et al.'s givenness hierarchy in an effort to explain the function of left-dislocation constructions in BH.

2.3.5 Pragmatic Presupposition vs. Activation

Although we have characterized 'Activation' as a descriptive parameter of the cognitive status of the denotata of propositional elements within the discourse model, Dryer (1996) observes that entire propositions may be activated or non-activated as well.[124] Indeed, this is confirmed by the fact that propositions may acquire the status of discourse referents being formally represented as an argument of a predicate (e.g. as a noun phrase, pronoun, etc.) (Lambrecht, 1994:74).[125] It was briefly noted in §2.2.3.3 that Dryer (1996) persuasively argues that a critical distinction needs to be made between pragmatically presupposed propositions, which are cognitively represented and believed, on the one hand, and on the other, non-presupposed

123. Moreover, Ariel observes that Gundel et al.'s status 'referential' suffers from the same problem where a single cognitive status represents two discrete cognitive processes: "the addressee must either retrieve an existing representation of the speaker's intended referent or construct a new representation" (Gundel et al., 1993:276).

124. Cf. Prince (1981b, 1985, 1986), and Ward (1988).

125. Lambrecht (ibid.) offers the following example, "This package is sold by weight, not by volume... If it does not appear full when opened, it is because contents have settled between shipping and handling." The referent second "it" is the proposition expressed in the antecedent clause, viz. it does not appear full when opened (ibid.:74–75)).

propositions, which are, nevertheless, activated—that is, propositions which are cognitively represented, but are best characterized by their activation status, independent of whether they are believed or not.[126] In other words, pragmatic presupposition and activation are orthogonal to each other in that the activation status and belief status of propositions are independent parameters (Dryer, 1996:519). While a pragmatically presupposed proposition must necessarily have an activation status, an activated proposition may not necessarily be pragmatically presupposed. Moreover, in terms of the two more general cognitive states of knowledge and consciousness, presupposition can be said to involve knowledge (not unlike identifiably), while the activation of a proposition involves consciousness. The distinction between whether or not a proposition is presupposed or activated principally concerns the marking of the focus articulation within an utterance. Dryer argues that the non-focus portion of a pragmatically structured proposition does not always involve pragmatic presupposition (in the traditional sense, where mutual belief is assumed), but must be characterized by the proposition's activation status instead. This is demonstrated through numerous examples where Dryer demonstrates that while cleft sentences in English involve pragmatic presupposition, simple focus sentences (i.e. where the focus is marked by accent) involve activation.

2.4 Pragmatic Relations

In §2.2 we proposed that information structure mediates between the form of an utterance and the information conveyed by that utterance by creating a pragmatically structured proposition. The pragmatic structure of the proposition reflects the speaker's assumptions about the addressee's state of knowledge at the time of the utterance (i.e., pragmatic presupposition vs. assertion §2.2.3.3), and also the cognitive status of the representations of discourse referents within the addressee's Cognitive Representation (i.e., identifiability vs. activation status §2.3.3–2.3.4). We have suggested that these distinctions fall into two discourse-pragmatic categories: pragmatic states and pragmatic relations.[127]

The critical distinction between pragmatic presupposition and assertion as described in §2.2.3.3 underlies the conceptual notions of the pragmatically structured sentence relations of Topic and Focus. Topic and Focus relations exist independently of the linguistic expressions

126. Prince (1981a) makes a similar point by distinguishing between two types of givenness: 'shared knowledge', which corresponds to what Dryer refers to as pragmatic presupposition', and 'saliency', which corresponds to what Dryer refers to as 'activation'.

127. In addition to Pragmatic Relations, the information structure notions of Topic and Focus are also termed 'Pragmatic Roles' (Comrie, 1989:62) and 'Pragmatic Functions' (Dik, 1978:128).

used to encode them. That is to say, that a conceptual and terminological distinction must be made between the relational notions of 'Topic' and 'Focus' on the one hand, and 'Topic and Focus expressions' on the other. This distinction will be further explained in §2.4.2.

2.4.1 Topic and Pragmatic Sentence Articulations

Although some degree of terminological and definitional obfuscation surrounds the pragmatic notion of 'Topic' in the relevant literature, it is beyond the scope of the present work to survey all of the various uses one may come across.[128] Rather, it will suffice for our purposes to say that, following a long tradition, Topic has been construed as that which the proposition is about.[129] Lambrecht (1994:127) follows in this tradition with his characterization of Topic as a "pragmatically structured sentence relation." He writes:

> "A referent is interpreted as the topic of a proposition if IN A GIVEN DISCOURSE the proposition is construed as being ABOUT this referent, i.e. as expressing information which is RELEVANT TO and which increases the addressee's KNOWLEDGE OF this referent. …[W]e may say that the relation of 'topic-of' expresses the pragmatic relation of aboutness which holds between a referent and a proposition with respect to a particular discourse. The term 'pragmatic relation' should be understood as meaning 'relation construed within particular discourse contexts.' Topic is a PRAGMATICALLY STRUCTURED SENTENCE RELATION."[130]

In other words, the Topic of a proposition, according to Lambrecht, is one in which the referent of the topic expression (cf. §2.4.2) is assumed to be the center of current interest about which the assertion is made.[131] This definition of topic, therefore, entails that the topic

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128. The literature on topics is vast and will not be reviewed here. The following is a selection of important contributions on the understanding of the various aspects of the notion: Halliday, (1967), Gundel (1974; 2003), Chafe (1976), Givón (1976), Li and Thompson (1976), Prince (1981a), Sasse (1987), Ward and Prince (1991), Lambrecht (1994), Molnár (1998), Büring (1999), Schwarzchild (1999), Polinsky (2001), Beaver (2002), Basilico (2003), Kidwai (2004), Paul (2005), Taverniers (2005).

129. Cf. Strawson (1964); Kuno (1972); Dik (1989); Reinhart (1982); Gundel (1988); *inter alia*.

130. Gundel's definition of Topic is highly compatible with Lambrecht's. Gundel's definition (1988:210) is as follows: "An entity E is the topic of a sentence, S, iff in using S the speaker intends to increase the addressee's knowledge about, request information about, or otherwise get the addressee to act with respect to E."

131. For the most part, we restrict our discussion to sentence-level topics, excluding the broader notion of discourse topic, as discussed by Halliday and Hasan (1976), van Dijk (1977), and van Oosten (1985), among others.

falls under the scope of pragmatic presupposition. The rest of the clause, viz. 'the comment'[132] is relevant to the topical referent, in that it comments on this referent (ibid.:119). This is illustrated by the example sentences in (6) below:

(8) a. (What did the professor do next?) The professor went to WORK.
b. (Who went to work?) The PROFESSOR went to work.
c. (What happened?) The PROFESSOR went to WORK.
d. (Lucy had a fantastic day.) After the professor went to WORK, she had the whole house to herself.

In the sentence in (8a) the referent of the subject noun phrase "*the professor*" is clearly what the sentence is about, and therefore constitutes the Topic of the sentence. In information structure terms, the sentence possesses a Topic-Comment pragmatic sentence articulation.[133] As a universal feature of language, most Topic-Comment articulations also coincide with the canonical constituent order of that language, where the sentence subject is, most often, also the Topic (ibid:132). Moreover, a linguistic constituent that is the topic of a sentence—i.e. it is the entity that stands in an aboutness relation to the proposition—also interacts with the pragmatic properties of the cognitive representation of discourse referents. Thus, in (8a) above the discourse referent *the professor* is the topic of the sentence in that it is the referent which the proposition is about, and at the same time the referent can be said to be identifiable, active,[134] and a part of the pragmatically presupposed proposition. This interaction between the pragmatic relation of Topic and the pragmatic properties of discourse referents will be discussed further in §2.4.2 below.

While the notion of pragmatic presupposition is related to the topic relation, presupposition does not necessarily entail topichood—i.e. presupposition and topic, though related, are not synonymous (ibid.:122). Indeed, some information is presupposed (e.g. open propositions) but does not involve the topic relation. The difference between pragmatic presupposition and the topic relation corresponds to our earlier distinction between

132. This part of the sentence, in a Topic-Comment sentence articulation, also expresses the Focus (i.e., Predicate-Focus) (cf. §2.4.7).

133. The term 'articulation' employed here for the three topic sentence types is from Andrews (1985) who terms the three pragmatic sentence categories: 'Topic-Comment' articulation, 'focus-presupposition' articulation (our "identificational" articulation) and "presentational" articulation (our 'thetic' articulation) respectively.

134. In an actual discourse situation, the nominal "the professor" would be more naturally (but not necessarily) encoded as an unaccented pronominal, which is the cognitively preferred topic expression (cf. 2.4.2 below) and the most common way of coding discourse active referents (cf. §2.3.4 above).

propositional information and the referential elements that make up propositions (§2.2.3.2). As Lambrecht avers, "anything presupposed is propositional in nature…, but topic referents are for the most part not propositions, but entities" (ibid.:151). For example, in (6b) above, the proposition "X went to work" is incomplete, or open, i.e. it lacks a referent. As an open proposition, the presupposition does not meet the criteria for topichood. In other words, the referent "the PROFESSOR" is not the topic in that the referent is not about "went to work". Rather, this type of sentence articulation is termed by Lambrecht (ibid.) as an 'identificational' articulation in that it serves to identify the missing argument in an open proposition.[135]

Example (6c) represents another pragmatic sentence articulation in which the subject is a non-topic, just as with the identificational type. In (6c), however, the proposition that ″X went to work″ is not pragmatically presupposed, as it is in (6b). The answer in (6c) is not interpreted as conveying information about the professor. Rather, its function is to inform the addressee of an event involving the professor as a participant. Sentences like these are termed 'Thetic' by Lambrecht (ibid.:137-150). Thetic sentences "introduce a new element into the discourse without linking this element either to an already established topic or to some presupposed proposition" (ibid.:144). This "all new" property differentiates the thetic sentence articulation from identificational and topic-comment articulations.[136] Moreover, thetic sentences are topicless in the sense that there is not a topic about which the sentence says something.[137] Lambrecht (ibid.:156) distinguishes two types of thetic articulations: event reporting and presentational. Event-reporting sentences like (6c) introduce a new event, while the presentational sentences introduce a new entity.[138]

A fourth type of sentence articulation discussed by Lambrecht (1994:125-126) is

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135. The correlation between topic and presupposition has lead to a series of 'topic-tests' employed to determine the topic status of an expression. These tests include: 1) the 'question-answer' test, 2) the 'as-for' test, 3) the 'about' test. For a more detailed description of the various topic tests, see Gundel (1988), Reinhard (1982), and Erteschik-Shir (2007). For a critique of such topic tests, see Vallduvi (1992).

136. The difference between thetic sentences and topic-comment sentences is not unambiguously marked (Lambrecht, 1994:137).

137. An alternative view is that the topic of thetic sentences is "the particular situation (time and place) about which it is asserted" (Gundel, 1974, quoted in Erteschik-Shir, 2007:16). In other words, thetic sentences can be "viewed as having implicit 'stage' topics indicating the spatio-temporal parameters of the sentence (here-and-now of the discourse) (Erteschik-Shir, 2007:16). This view of Topic, however, does not seem to accord with Lambrecht's understanding of Topic, since, according to Lambrecht (1994:156), only 'referring expressions' can be topics. We will have more to say in regards to Stage Topics in §2.8.1 below.

138. English existential 'there constructions' are good examples of the presentational type, e.g. "Once there was a king. He was very wise." "The basic communicative function of such sentences is not to predicate a property of an argument but to introduce a referent into a discourse, often (but not always) with the purpose of making it available for predication in subsequent discourse" (ibid.:177). See §4.2.2.3 for more on presentational constructions.

entitled the "Background-Establishing" clause. This type is illustrated in (6d) where the Background-Establishing clause is "After the professor went to WORK." According to Lambrecht (ibid.:125), this adverbial clause is pragmatically presupposed and functions to 'set the scene' for the topic of the clause proper, viz. "she".[139] Lambrecht (ibid.:126) argues that this background-establishing type is characterized by a pragmatically presupposed proposition serving as a scene-setting topic for another proposition, which in turn can be any of the three previously discussed pragmatic sentence articulations. Lambrecht, however, expresses doubt as to whether this articulation can be considered a major information structure category (ibid.). Moreover, his characterization is vague in regards to how the background-establishing clause is to be considered topical since the parameter of 'aboutness' does not seem to apply. In other words, his explanation, lacks clarity concerning the exact pragmatic relationship between the background-establishing clause and the clause it is associated with.

Instead of Lambrecht's notion of 'background-establishing', we will employ Erteschik-Shir's (1997, 2007) notion of 'Stage-Topic' (§2.6.1). Unlike Erteschik-Shir, however, we do not understand the notion of Stage-Topic as somehow related to the definitional criterion of sentence topic as consisting of an aboutness relation between a referent and a proposition. Rather, we will argue that Stage-Topics, which are prototypically encoded as adverbial phrases and used to denote deictic frames of reference, are preferably understood as additional pragmatic operators that are *not* an integral part of the information structure (i.e. Topic and Focus) as such, but serve to provide the spatio-temporal framing information from which the main predication holds (cf. Chafe, 1976).

A remark is in order regarding Lambrecht's observation that there are topic constructions in which the functional feature of 'aboutness' is not a defining characteristic (e.g. background-establishing articulations). This observation implies that a more nuanced, theoretically well-justified description of Topic, which would yield a more comprehensive description of the data, is called for. Rather than construing the Topic relation as reducible to one functional feature (e.g. aboutness), Jacobs (2001) proposes that Topic, and by extension, topic expressions, should be interpreted in terms of its degree of correspondence to a prototype. This is not to suggest that the traditional construal of Topic in terms of aboutness is not descriptively accurate or useful. To the contrary, we believe it to be foundational to the

139. Lambrecht (ibid.) argues that most adverbial clauses are pragmatically presupposed as a result of the operation of pragmatic accommodation (§2.2.3.4). It is true that the adverbial clause in (6d) expresses a proposition which is indeed about the referent "the professor"; however, this aboutness relation is not asserted, but is itself presupposed. This stands in contrast, for example, to (6a) where the aboutness relation is new to the addressee, i.e., it is asserted. For a more detailed discussion of the information structure of subordinate clauses, see Erteschik-Shir (1997).

understanding of Topic, albeit incomplete. In other words, in a construction which expresses a prototypical topic-comment articulation, aboutness is a necessary but not a sufficient feature for comprehensively describing the Topic relation. Jacobs offers the following four prototypical dimensions for topic-comment articulations: Information separation, Predication, Addressation (i.e. aboutness), and Frame setting (cf. §2.4.4). We will describe these four attributes in more detail below (§2.4.5). Moreover, in §2.4.6, we will contend that Jacobs's prototypical criteria, when grouped together in different combinations or configurations, can be used to distinguish four salient topic types.

In summary, Lambrecht, as part of a long tradition, considers a referent to be the Topic of a proposition if that proposition is construed as being about this referent, i.e. expressing information which is relevant to and increases the addressee's knowledge of this referent (Lambrecht, 1994:127). It is our contention, however, following Jacobs (2001) that this characterization only accounts for some of the data. Therefore, while we do not reject the construal of Topic as being in an aboutness relation to a proposition, we argue that Topic, as a pragmatically structured sentence relation, is more comprehensively defined in terms of its similarity to specific prototypical dimensions. In addition, Lambrecht (1994) proposes four pragmatic sentence articulations: 1) Topic-Comment, 2) Identificational, 3) Thetic, with it's two subtypes, viz. event-reporting and presentational, and 4) Background-Establishing.[140] For the purposes of this study, we will primarily be concerned with Topic-Comment articulation and the Background-Establishing (i.e. Stage-Topic) articulation.

2.4.2 Topic Expressions

It was briefly mentioned at the beginning §2.4 that a critical conceptual and terminological distinction exists between the non-linguistic notion of Topic as a pragmatically construed sentence relation, and the linguistic expressions used to encode this relation. In other words, just as the relational construct of information cannot be construed as divisible among individual sentence constituents (see §2.2.3.1–§2.2.3.3 above), so too Topic (and Focus) as a relational category exists independent of linguistic expressions. While, according to Lambrecht (1994), a referent is considered the Topic of a proposition if that proposition is construed as being about this referent, a topic expression is the specific grammatical constituent used to designate a topic referent in a clause. Lambrecht (1994:131) defines 'Topic Expression' as follows:

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140. Pragmatic sentence articulations 1–3 have alternate focus articulations, viz. 1) predicate-focus, 2) constituent-focus, and 3) sentence-focus (see §2.4.6).

> "A constituent is a topic expression if the proposition expressed by the clause with which it is associated[141] is pragmatically construed as being about the referent of this constituent."

This distinction between Topic and Topic Expression is important in that without it, it would be impossible to account for instances where two expressions denoting the same referent occur in the same clause but express different pragmatic relations (ibid.:128).[142] Furthermore, "while a topic expression always necessarily designates a topic referent, a referent which is topical in a discourse is not necessarily encoded as a topic expression in a given sentence or clause" (ibid.:130). This is because a referent is an entity that exists within the Cognitive Representation of the speech participants, independent of its linguistic expression (ibid.). Polinsky (1999:571) summarizes how a clause constituent becomes a topic expression as follows: "To establish the topic expression, one first needs to find referent R associated with proposition P which is construed as being about R and then to map R onto the constituent expressing it."

2.4.3 The Topic Acceptability Scale

Although we have characterized pragmatic relations and pragmatic states as logically independent parameters, the two categories nevertheless interact in various ways.[143] In other

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141. Lambrecht notes that "the somewhat vague formulation of the topic constituent being 'associated' with a clause is necessary in order to account for topic constituents which bear no grammatical relation to a predicate and whose semantic relation to the proposition is determined by principles of pragmatic construal only" (ibid.). At this point we fail to understand how a constituent could ever be a topic expression if that constituent did not possess a grammatical relation to a predicate inside the clause expressing the relevant proposition. Indeed, Lambrecht himself notices this inconsistency later in his discussion on left-dislocation constructions which possess syntactically detached (i.e. extra-clausal) constituents (1994:188). He writes, "Since a detached lexical topic constituent [i.e. topic expression, JRW] does not occupy an argument position in a clause, it is strictly speaking not with the lexical topic NP but with the anaphoric pronominal topic expression [i.e. which satisfies an argument relation inside the clause, JRW] that the pragmatic aboutness relation between the referent and the proposition is expressed. It is, therefore, inconsistent to call such a detached lexical constituent a "topic NP" (ibid.). We will return to this issue in §4.2.2.3 and §4.2.3.

142. Lambrecht (ibid.:127) provides the following example to illustrate this point (his examples 3.29a and 3.30b):

a. Pat said they called her TWICE
b. Pat said they called HER.

The set of expressions (i.e. Pat, her/HER) refer to the same entity (i.e. PAT) who satisfies the topic relation of both propositions. But, while the pronoun "her" in (a) is a topic expression, the expression "HER" in (b) is not.

143. Lambrecht notes that, "[t]he distinction between the mental representation of referents and the pragmatic relations which these referents enter into as elements of propositions is related to the distinction between 'given/new referents' and 'given/new information.'" (cf. §2.2.3.1–§2.2.3.2 above). Moreover, as Lambrecht and Michaelis (1998:495) argue, evoked status does not entail topic status, since pronouns, both deictic and

words, independence does not prohibit interaction (ibid.).[144] Indeed, as Lambrecht (1994:162) argues, "in order to make a referent interpretable as the topic of a proposition and in order to make the proposition interpretable as presenting relevant information about this topic, the topic referent must have certain activation properties…." Put differently, a referent may become an acceptable topic only if it possesses a certain degree of accessibility. Before selecting a topic for a sentence, the speaker must first make certain hypotheses concerning the degree of accessibility the referent possesses within the Cognitive Representation of the addressee. As we established in §2.3.4, a speaker's choices regarding which expression to use for a particular referent are based on assumptions pertaining to the cognitive status of the referent in the mind of the addressee. Therefore, a speaker's decision to encode a referent with a topic expression derives from her assumption that the referent in question entertains a particular degree of accessibility in the mind of her addressee. Lambrecht's "Topic Accessibility Scale" (ibid.165) helps to illustrate the correlation between the topic relation and the pragmatic states of discourse referents. We can measure the degree of pragmatic well-formedness of a sentence containing a topic expression by the position of the topic referent on the topic acceptability scale, represented in Figure 1, adopted from Lambrecht (ibid.), which moves from (1) most acceptable to (5) least acceptable.

Figure 1.:

1. active/given
2. accessible
3. inactive/unused
4. brand-new anchored
5. brand-new unanchored

Active topic referents are most acceptable due to, what Chafe (1987) terms the referent's "low cost" (Chafe, 1987) of cognitive effort of interpretability (§2.3.4). In other words, active referents are preferred topics since they require the least amount of processing effort on the part of the addressee. This coincides with the fact that active referents are normally unaccented and pronominal. Hence, the preferred topic expression is an unaccented pronominal or inflectional morpheme (Lambrecht, 1994:165;195). Alternatively, accessible

anaphoric, may be foci.

144. The independence of the two discourse-pragmatic categories is further attested by the fact that no particular activation state is a sufficient condition for topichood. As Lambrecht (1994:151) avers, "[t]hat the pragmatic relation is not identical to the pragmatic property [i.e., state, JRW] follows from the fact that an active referent may also enter into a FOCUS relation with a proposition."

referents are less easy to interpret, and unused/inactive referents even more so still, requiring a "high cost" of cognitive effort. In light of the topic acceptability scale, Lambrecht (ibid.:176) argues that various widely attested grammatical construction types can be construed as pragmatically motivated structural devices whose basic function is to promote referents from non-active (i.e. brand-new, unused, or accessible) to active status and consequently from lexical to pronominal coding in the sentence.[145] As we will see in chapter 4 below, left-dislocation is a prime example of one such construction.[146]

2.4.4 Four Dimensions of Topic-Comment

As we briefly mentioned at the end of §2.4.1, Jacobs (2001) argues that a variety of syntactic structures can be used by languages to encode the topic-comment sentence articulation *not* as the result of a common semantic or pragmatic feature (e.g. aboutness) but rather, because they all sufficiently resemble prototypical examples of the topic-comment articulation (Jacobs, 2001:642). In other words, this familial resemblance to a prototype, rather than a *necessary* set of attributes is what justifies their membership within this topic-comment category.

As stated in §2.4.1, Jacobs (ibid.:645–658) posits four salient dimensions of prototypical instances of topic-comment:

1. Information Separation: where there is explicit separation in the information structure role of constituents X and Y. X is the topic and Y is the comment."

2. Predication: where X is the semantic subject and Y is the semantic predicate.

3. Addressation: where the comment Y is 'about' the topic X, Y is relevant to X regardless of the grammatical or semantic relation.

4. Frame Setting: where X sets the frame for the interpretation of Y.

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145. According to Lambrecht (ibid.) the grammatical function of such constructions "is to match the requirements of syntactic structure and information structure in cases where the two do not naturally coincide."

146. Another example of a topic promotion construction are presentational thetic sentences, as in: "Once there was a king. He was very wise." In this case, the reason why the referent of the noun phrase *a king* can be expressed at the beginning of the next sentence in the preferred topic form *he* is that the referent was lexically expressed, and thereby pragmatically activated, in the immediately preceding sentence (ibid.:177).

2.4.5 Topic Types

Following Floor (2004),[147] Jacobs' four prototypical dimensions of the topic-comment articulation are combined to produce four distinct topic types:[148]

1. Primary Topic: Primary topics are defined as topics that have 1) informational separation, 2) predication as subjects, and 3) addressation, but not 4) frame-setting.

2. Secondary Topic: Secondary topics are topics that have a component of 3) addressation but not one of 2) predication. The fundamental distinctions between primary and secondary topics concerns the parameters of addressation and informational separation. Unlike primary topics, the aboutness relation of secondary topics does not lie between the referent and the proposition, but rather the referent of the secondary topic expression and the referent of the primary topic expression (Lambrecht, 1994:148; Nikoleava, 2001:39).[149] Secondly, secondary topics also possess the attribute of informational separation; however, it is only in the sense that secondary topics comprise presupposed information. Unlike primary topics though, secondary topics are discourse-active referents that are an integral part of the comment portion (or focus structure) of the pragmatically structured proposition. This is in contrast to the other four topic categories which are prohibited from occurring within the focus-structure. Furthermore, secondary topics also prohibit 4) frame-setting.

3. Topic Frame: Fronted or left-dislocated elements (which have the dimension of frame-setting) are defined in terms of this separate topic category called 'topic frame'. Topic frames seem to "restrict the application of the proposition by the rest of the sentence to a certain domain" (Jacobs, 2001:656). Both fronted and left-*dislocated* constructions can function as topic-frame expressions. Topic frames only exclude 2) predication.

4. Stage Topics: Stage-topics are not topical in the same way as that of the previous three topic types in that stage-topics lack the fundamental dimension of addressation

147. The first three topic types are adapted from Floor (2004:73–107).

148. Although Lambrecht (1994:147–150) mentions a number of sub-categories of topic, he fails to significantly develop these sub-types.

149. Cf. Givón (1984); Polinsky (1995; 1998); Dalrymple and Nikoleava (2011).

(i.e. aboutness).[150] Stage topics are usually presupposed (or pragmatically accommodated, as such). Moreover, they are encoded as fronted or left-dislocated adverbial phrases and serve as a deictic orientation device employed to establish the spatio-temporal framing information necessary for the accurate interpretation of the following clause or discourse unit. Like topic frames, stage-topics also prohibit 2) predication.[151]

The following chart in Table 1., adapted from Floor (ibid.:77), illustrates how Jacobs' four attributes combine within the four topic types:

Table 1.

	Primary Topic	SecondaryTopic	Topic Frame	Stage Topic
Informational Separation	+	—	+	+
Predication	+	—	—	—
Addressation	+	+	+	—
Frame-Setting	—	—	+	+

150. According to Jacobs' (2001:654) the dimension of addressation can only be appropriated to identifiable referents, and if they have identifiable referents, they must have referents in the first place. "Thus, we expect that expressions without referential arguments cannot be addresses.

151. Although we borrow the term 'stage-topic' from Erteschik-Shir (1997, 2007), our conceptual notion of stage-topic differs substantially from that of Erteschik-Shir. Perhaps the most significant difference concerns whether or not stage-topics are to be construed as within the scope of the information structure of the proposition. While Gundel (1974) and Erteschik-Shir (1997, 2007) argue in the affirmative, we contend that stage-topics are pragmatic operators that function outside the scope of the information structure of a given utterance. While stage-topics interface with primary and secondary topics in specific ways, they do so from a domain outside the purview of the information structure component of sentence grammar. Therefore, we will have no more to say about stage-topics in the present section, but will return to them in §2.8.1 below.

2.4.6 Focus

Not unlike the conceptual notion of Topic, the information structure category of Focus is employed to denote a wide array of concepts within the linguistic literature.[152] Lambrecht's definition (1994:207 and 213), however, will suffice for our purposes. It states:

> "The focus of the proposition expressed by a sentence in a given utterance context, is seen as the element of information whereby the presupposition and the assertion DIFFER from each other... It is this UNPREDICTABLE or pragmatically NON-RECOVERABLE element in an utterance. The focus is what makes an utterance into an assertion."
>
> Also: "FOCUS: The semantic component of a pragmatically structured proposition whereby the assertion differs from the presupposition."

It was argued in §2.2.3.3 that an assertion should be construed as a combination of two sets of propositions, viz. a presupposed set and a non-presupposed set, whereby the non-presupposed proposition set is superimposed upon the presupposed one. The result is what Lambrecht refers to as a pragmatically structured proposition, which "reflects not only a state of affairs but also the speaker's assumptions about the state of mind of the hearer at the time of utterance, by indicating what is assumed to be already given and what is assumed to be new" (ibid.:52-53). Focus, as a pragmatically structured sentence relation, indicates that the relation between an informational element of a proposition and the proposition in which it is contained is unpredictable and/or salient for the addressee and therefore constitutes new information conveyed by the utterance. Put differently, the Focus is the semantic element whose presence makes the proposition into an assertion (ibid.:336). The focus relation, however, should not be construed as identical to the assertion, but rather, "just as a topic is included in the presupposition without being identical to it a focus is part of an assertion without coinciding with it" (ibid.:206) (cf. §2.4.1).[153] Unlike Topic, a focus denotatum does

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152. The category denoted by the term focus originates in the pragmatic tradition, going back to the early Prague School. In addition to focus, the category has been termed 'rheme' by Firbas (1964, 1971) and Contreras (1976). Moreover, the concept has been defined as the new information of the sentence (Välimaa-Blum, 1988), the elements in the sentence that are contextually unbound (Rochemont, 1986), and what pushes the communication forward (Firbas, 1964). Callow (1975), draws a distinction between 'focus span' (i.e. items of thematic material which are of particular interest or significance) and 'focus emphasis' (i.e. the intensity between the speaker and hearer); and Givón (2001) links the concept of contrastiveness with focus.

153. Moreover, Lambrecht (ibid.) states that "[t]he focus of a sentence...is generally seen as an element of information which is ADDED TO, rather than superimposed on, the pragmatic presupposition."

not have to be referential. That is, it does not have to exist in the universe of discourse independent of its role in a proposition. Furthermore, just as the topic relation and the pragmatic states of discourse referents were characterized as discrete parameters which nevertheless interact in various ways (cf. §2.4.3), the focus domain of the pragmatically structured proposition, while conveying the unpredictable or non-recoverable element in an utterance, does not necessarily involve newly activated referents (however, often the referent(s) in the focal domain is indeed newly activated).[154]

It is worth clarifying again that, Focus, like Topic, is a relational pragmatic category. Consequently, focus has to do with the conveying of information and with the attribution of the property 'new' to the denotata of individual sentence constituents (ibid.:209). Take, for example the exchange in (9):

(9) a. "Where did you go yesterday?"
b. "I went to the CIRCUS."

The referent "CIRCUS" cannot alone be the focus, since by itself it is not informative. In other words, it is not the fact that the referent CIRCUS (or its denotatum) is new that certifies the referent as 'in-focus', but rather its role as the second argument of the predicate "GO-TO" in the pragmatically presupposed open proposition "speaker went to X". A pragmatic focus relation exists between the denotatum ″CIRCUS″ and the proposition it is a part of.

Different languages mark the pragmatic relation of focus in a variety of ways—for example: prosody, morphology (e.g. focus markers), and syntactic constructions. The syntactic domain in a sentence that expresses the focus component of the pragmatically structured proposition is referred to as the "focus domain" by Lambrecht (ibid.:214). As with the sentence articulations for topic (cf. §2.4.1), there exists three pragmatic articulations for focus, or 'focus-structures', which are closely associated, and can even be said to mirror the three topic articulations:[155] 1) predicate-focus articulation, 2) constituent-focus articulation,[156]

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154. As Floor (2004:116) observes, "this is a very important aspect of Lambrecht's theory, because within this framework he can account for contrastiveness or other asserting devices on presupposed active or accessible referents."

155. Here we exclude Lambrecht's 'background-establishing' topic articulation, as it has no focus counterpart.

156. Although Lambrecht uses the term 'argument-focus', we prefer the more accurate term 'constituent-focus', since more than arguments can occur in this type of focus articulation. In other words, adjuncts as well as arguments can occur in Lambrecht's so-called 'argument-focus' articulation. Therefore, the term 'constituent-focus', which encompasses more than arguments is deemed more accurate and will, therefore, be employed here. Note that Van Valin and LaPolla (1997) refer to the constituent-focus articulation as 'narrow focus'.

and 3) sentence-focus articulation.

Predicate-focus serves to increase information about the topic referent. This articulation is defined by Lambrecht (ibid.:122) as an articulation "in which the predicate is in focus and in which the subject (plus any other topical elements) is in the presupposition." Take (10) for example:

(10) a. "What is Jenny doing?" Or: "What about Jenny?"
b. "She is eating ICE-CREAM."

The predicate-focus articulation adds a predicate to a given argument. The corresponding pragmatic presupposition can roughly be represented as something like "Jenny is doing X", while the pragmatic assertion is "X = is eating ICE-CREAM". The focus domain of this type of articulation can extend over several constituents. For example, in (9), the focus domain covers the verb phrase "is eating" as well as the noun phrase "ICE-CREAM".[157]

The focus domain of a constituent-focus articulation usually (but not always) extends over a single constituent. Operationally, it can be identified as a target of a wh-question, as in example (11):

(11) a. "What is Jenny eating?"
b. "She is eating ICE-CREAM."

The typical function of the constituent-focus construction is to provide the missing argument ("ICE-CREAM") in a presupposed open proposition ("Jenny is eating X"). Moreover, the pragmatic assertion evoked in (11) is represented as "X=ICE CREME".[158] Lambrecht defines the constituent-focus articulation as "any sentence in which the focus is an argument [constituent, JRW] rather than the predicate or an entire proposition" (ibid.:224).[159]

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157. It is possible, however, following Nikolaeva (2001) for non-predicate constituents that enter the domain of predicate-focus to be associated with the pragmatic presupposition—i.e. secondary topics (cf. §2.4.5).

158. Constituent focus articulations may serve other non-prototypical functions such as to confirm a referent's identity or role in an event. For example:

a. "Did she tell you?
b. "Yes, SHE (herself) told me.

The "b." utterance is a constituent focus articulation where "SHE" is marked (by intonation) as the focal constituent, confirming the identity of the referent already shared by the interlocutors.

159. Floor (204:117) avers that a constituent is any non-predicating expression in a proposition including references to time, place, and manner. Moreover, subjects, direct objects, indirect objects, adverbial phrases, and prepositional phrases, are all examples of constituents that can be in focus.

Finally, the sentence-focus articulation corresponds to what was described in §2.4.1 as 'thetic' sentences, in which the focus domain extends over both the subject and the predicate. This type of articulation is pragmatically unstructured in the sense that it lacks an evocation of a pragmatic presupposition. More specifically, in sentence-focus articulations, the proposition lacks a bipartition into either topic and comment or presupposition and focus and provides the basic pragmatic function of introducing a new entity or a new situation into the discourse model.

(12) a. "What happened?"
b. "PETER died."

Since the assertion extends over the entire proposition in (12b), assertion and focus coincide. In other words, "the pragmatic assertion consists in adding both an argument and a predicate to the discourse (Lambrecht, 2010:79). In the case of (12b), it is the lack of presupposition that gives rise to the so-called 'eventive' interpretation of the proposition (cf. §2.4.1) (ibid.:233).[160]

2.5 Additional Pragmatic Parameters

Finally we offer a brief sketch of two specific pragmatic parameters that operate outside the scope of the information structure of the sentence. These two pragmatic parameters are: Stage-Topics and Contrastiveness. It is our contention that, although these two parameters interface with various information structure categories, they cannot be described within the purview of the pragmatic status of discourse referents or the pragmatically construed relationship between discourse referents and propositions.

2.5.1 Stage Topics

In §2.4.1 and §2.4.6 we briefly introduced the notion of 'Stage-Topic' as spatio-temporal frames of reference which we construe to be additional pragmatic operators that function outside the scope of Topic, where Topic is understood as a pragmatically structured sentence relation. While the conceptual notion of Stage-Topic is derived from Erteschik-Shir (1997; 2007), our use of this term differs from hers. Erteschik-Shir's more structural approach to

160. Lambrecht (ibid.) claims that in many languages "the sentence-focus articulation... is formally identical, or near identical, to the corresponding argument-focus articulation" [i.e. constituent-focus, JRW]. As we will see, however, this is not always the case in BH (cf. §6.2.2.2). Moreover, Lambrecht (2001:620-21) observes that sentence focus primarily occurs in intransitive clauses, and transitive clauses with a pronominal object.

information structure is termed F(ocus)-Structure. According to this framework every utterance must necessarily possess a primary topic relation. Moreover, she argues that stage-topics as spatio-temporal arguments can function as primary topics of a given utterance, whether overtly expressed or implicitly inferred.[161] For instance, in the case of thetic articulations (i.e. sentence-focus), the primary topic relation is construed as an implicit stage-topic that serves to indicate the spatio-temporal parameters of the sentence (i.e. the "here and now" of the discourse) (Erteschik-Shir, 2007:16).[162] In short, Erteschik-Shir contends, from the theoretical frame of reference of f-structure, that the conceptual notion of Stage-Topic is an integral part of the information structure component of sentence grammar.

While a full critique of Erteschik-Shir's f-structure framework is beyond the scope of this work, it will suffice to say that f-structure is largely complementary to the Lambrechtian framework presented here (cf. Erteschik-Shir, 1997:56). Despite their similarities, however, the two frameworks diverge in many respects. For instance, while Erteschik-Shir directly relates her conception of Topic to truth value assignments, Lambrecht's framework makes no such claims. In regards to stage-topic in particular, Erteschik-Shir argues that the truth value of the sentence is directly determined by the spatio-temporal parameters of the sentence derived directly from the stage-topic (Erteschik-Shir, 1997:26). Lambrecht convincingly argues, however, that what counts for the information structure of a sentence is not the truth value of the proposition expressed, but the information value of that proposition in a particular discourse (Lambrecht, 1994:159). Furthermore, unlike Erteschik-Shir, Lambrecht's framework does not stipulate that every utterance contain a primary topic. To the contrary, only pragmatically structured propositions contain primary topics; those that lack such pragmatic structuring do not (e.g. Thetic/Sentence-Focus articulations). Therefore, for our purposes we will disregard the conceptual notion of an implicit stage-topic and will only be concerned with stage-topics that are overtly expressed (as preverbal adverbial or prepositional phrases).

The question concerning how sentence initial spatio-temporal adverbials should be accounted for in terms of the information structure of the sentence is a controversial issue within the relevant literature. While both Erteshik-Shir (1997) and Lambrecht (1994) agree

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161. According to Erteschick-Shir (1997:26-27;35-52) only stage-level predicates can take stage-topics. This is because, unlike individual-level predicates, "stage-level predicates have an extra argument position for spatio-temporal location, and the subjects of stage-level predicates are generated in spec, VP and are raised to spec, IP, while subjects of individual-level predicates are generated in the latter position with PRO filling spec, VP" (ibid.:35).

162. Gundel (1974) takes a similar position as that of Erteschik-Shir, arguing that every utterance has a topic, namely "the particular situation (time and place) about which it is asserted."

that spatio-temporal adverbials possess an internal information structure (i.e. in the case of subordinate adverbial clauses that modify the sentence),[163] there seems to be no consensus as to how such adverbials should be explained in regards to the topic relation of pragmatically structured propositions. What seems clear is that initial spatio-termporal adverbials provide critical framing information for the accurate construal of the main proposition expressed by the immediate clause and, sometimes even, for the subsequent stretch of discourse. In contrast to Erteschik-Shir (1997), we will argue that the adverbials in question lack the prototypical topical dimension of addressation (i.e. aboutness).[164] Furthermore, although we will use the same terminological convention, in contrast to Erteschik-Shir, we will construe stage-topics as spatio-temporal deicitc orientation devices that occupy a pragmatic domain beyond the purview of the information structure of the clause or sentence, but which nevertheless interface with information structure categories by providing the spatio-temporal framing information necessary for an accurate interpretation of the pragmatically structured proposition. Below are two syntactic/semantic criteria for identifying prototypical stage-topics in BH.

1. Stage-Topics must be some marked as an adjunct phrase (adverbial phrase/clause or preposition phrase) in a pre-verbal position—i.e. fronted or left-dislocated—which modifies the sentence.

2. Stage-Topics are usually cognitively accessible (cf. Virtanen, 1992; 2004).

3. Stage-Topics, as marked adjunct phrases, must semantically represent the spatio-temporal setting from which the main predication (or subsequent discourse unit) holds (Chafe, 1976:50).[165]

In addition to providing the spatio-temporal setting from which the main predication of a sentence holds, stage-topics also function at the level of the discourse as text-strategic markers for comprehension (Virtanen, 1992, 2004). According to Virtanen (2004:82) stage-

163. Erteshik-Shir (1997) refers to this as 'subordinate f-structure'. Cf. Lambrect, 1994:125.

164. In addition to addressation, stage-topics also lack predication (cf. §2.4.6).

165. What we will regard as Stage-Topics is similar to what Buth (1999) and Rosenbaum (1997) refer to as 'setting', Dooley and Levinsohn (2000) and Virtanen (2004) refer to as 'point of departure', and Chafe (1987) refers to as 'starting point'. Moreover, Heimerdinger (1999) prefers the term 'basis', which was first proposed by linguists from the Prague School (cf. Benes, 1962; Garvin, 1963), and is defined as "the spatial or temporal framework set by a preverbal adverbial and within which the ensuing stretch of discourse holds."

topics function to help create coherence while at the same time signaling text segmentation. In other words, stage-topics contribute to the construction of a coherent text by participating in the chain of text-strategic markers, while simultaneously helping to constitute the spatio-temporal setting for the textual unit that the stage-topic introduces (ibid.:83). Moreover, all of these functions ultimately serve to establish the spatio-temporal framing information necessary for the accurate and comprehensive construction of the cognitive macrostructure, or discourse model.

This kind of distribution is related partially to Dooley and Levinsohn's (2000:47) notion of Point of Departure in that it is considered to be "an initial element, often fronted or left-dislocated" and "is backward-looking, in the sense of locating the anchoring place within the existing mental representation, but is forward-looking in that it is the subsequent part of the sentence which is anchored in that place." They also mention that "temporal and spatial points of departure in narrative commonly indicate the onset of thematic groupings."

2.5.2 Contrastiveness

Within the linguistic literature, the notion of 'contrast' is typically associated with focus (cf. Givón, 2001; Dik, 1989; Gross, 1996; Dik and Hengeveld, 1997; and Gomez-Gonzalez, 2001).[166] Lambrecht (1994:292-296) observes, however, that topics too can be contrastive.[167] Following Vallduvi and Vilkuna (1998), Holmstedt (2000), and Floor (2004), we will argue that contrast, as a pragmatic operation, is best understood as a separate optional pragmatic feature that functions as an overlay for topic articulations as well as focus structures, and even Stage-Topics (i.e. spatio-temporal deictic orientations). In other words, we construe 'contrast' as an additional feature in the semantico-pragmatic structure of the sentence orthogonal to the topic-focus articulation (cf. Chafe, 1976; Givón, 2001; Lambrecht, 1994; and Vallduvi and Vilkuna, 1998). Under this approach, contrast is understood either as an operator-like element (Vallduvi and Vilkuna, 1998), or as a conversational implicature that generates a virtual set of semantically similar alternatives so that the contrastive element is opposed to these alternatives by virtue of participation in a given proposition (Chafe, 1976).

Vallduvi and Vilkuna (1998) argue against the tendency to conflate the two interpretive

166. Moreover, in regards to Biblical Hebrew, Khan (1988), Rosenbaum (1997), Gross (2001), Shimasaki (2002), and Lunn (2006) also describe contrast as a notion associated only with focus.

167. The function of contrastive topics is very different than that of contrastive foci. For instance, "the notion of topic is incompatible with the idea of correction or contradiction associated with contrastive foci. Contradicting or correcting a statement entails negating it or some part of it. However,... topics are outside the scope of negation" (ibid.:291). In regards to topics being outside the scope of negation, cf. Lambrecht (1994:150–160) and Payne (1985:199ff); cf. also Dryer (1996) who has challenged this claim.

notions of informational 'rhematicity'[168] and quantificational 'kontrast' under one term 'focus'. The intentionally peculiar spelling of 'kontrast' is meant to distinguish this particular concept as associated with 'narrow focus' and an "operator-like element, whose exact semantic import varies from author to author" (e.g. exhaustiveness operator, contrastiveness operator, or an identification operator) from the multifarious uses of the term 'contrast' in semantics, syntax and phonology (ibid.:68). According to Vallduvi and Vilkuna kontrast should be "teased apart" from rhematicity (ibid.:80). Kontrast signifies that a certain element associated with a constituent activates a certain membership set, e.g. {membership set M=…a,b,c,…}. The members of M must be comparable, and are thus subjected to ontological and contextual restrictions (ibid.:84). Additionally, kontrast, as defined by Vallduvi and Vilkuna, is not exclusive to either focus or topic. In fact, the pragmatic notion of kontrast should not be construed as an information structure category at all, but as a separate pragmatic overlay for both focus structures and topic types. Put differently, kontrast is a separate pragmatic dimension outside the scope of the information structure of the sentence, but nevertheless interacting with the topic-focus articulations in specific ways.

Vallduvi and Vilkuna propose two specific kinds of kontrast elements that can function as an optional pragmatic overlay: identificational kontrast (e.g. "John paid for Sue (not for Mary)") and exhaustive kontrast (e.g. "Only Sam is playing tonight") (ibid.).[169] In the present investigation, we will use the term 'contrast', using the conventional spelling, with the assumption that this term denotes the concept behind Vallduvi and Vilkuna's "kontrast".[170]

2.6 Summary and Conclusion

In §2.2–§2.4 we described in some detail the information structure framework that will guide our investigation into the structural and functional qualities of LD constructions in BH. The field of information structure research is vast, spanning numerous theoretical frameworks each with its own definitions, identificational criteria and terminology for information-structural categories. As a result, the framework presented here is by no means meant to be a

168. The concept of 'rheme' is defined as the new information of a sentence that is asserted and not presupposed. This is similar to Lambrecht's notion of 'focus'. For Vallduvi and Vilkuna the notion of rheme belongs to the domain of 'information-packaging' (another term for information structure introduced by Chafe, 1976) and possess 'information-packaging instructions'. According to Vallduvi and Vilkuna (1998:81) the information-packaging instructions "consists of an element which corresponds to the actual update potential of the utterance—the rheme—and, optionally, of an element that spells out how the rheme is to be anchored to the input information state—the theme."

169. These examples are adapted from Floor (2004:45).

170. We understand the 'comparative' relation as functioning in the same way. That is, it is a separate pragmatic implicature outside the information structure of a sentence.

comprehensive representation of such an extensive domain of research. Although we have chosen a model of information structure formulated by Lambrecht (1994) as our primary point of departure, where this framework was found lacking (e.g. the development of differing topic types), we have sought to supplement it with insights from other complementary frameworks or research programs.

The question of why grammars of natural language provide speakers so many different ways of expressing the same proposition is the fundamental concern of information structure analysis. It was argued that propositions, as conceptual representations of states of affairs, undergo pragmatic structuring determined by the discourse context in which the propositions are communicated. The pragmatic structuring of propositions is done in terms of the speaker's assumptions about the addressee's state of knowledge at the time of an utterance (i.e. pragmatic presupposition vs. assertion), and the speaker's assumptions regarding the cognitive representation (or lack thereof) of discourse referents in the mind of the addressee. Pragmatically structured propositions are then linguistically made manifest through language specific lexicogrammatical structures (Lambrecht, 1994:334).

The most salient components of our information structure framework were described in terms of two discourse-pragmatic categories: pragmatic states and pragmatic relations. The first involves the cognitive representation of propositions in discourse and the referential elements that make up those propositions. These representations are determined by two cognitive factors: knowledge and consciousness (ibid.). Knowledge is relevant for the speaker's assumption as to whether or not his addressee "knows" of a particular discourse referent, where "to know" refers to the existence of the representation of a particular referent within the addressee's Cognitive Representation, or long-term memory. A discourse referent of which the hearer is assumed to possess a representation is said to be 'identifiable'. In the same way, a proposition expressing a certain state of affairs which is assumed to be known by the hearer and lexicogrammatically represented in the sentence is said to be presupposed. Consciousness on the other hand, concerns the speaker's assumption of the degree of activation a particular discourse referent or proposition occupies within the mind of the hearer, viz. active, semi-active (accessible), or inactive. Furthermore, the speaker's assumptions concerning the status of discourse referents (i.e., identifiability and activation) within the mind of the addressee directly constrains the linguistic forms that may be appropriately used in referring to that referent. What is more, the linguistic expression used facilitates understanding by constraining possible interpretations (Gundel and Fretheim, 2009:148).

Our second discourse pragmatic category concerns the pragmatically construed

relations between denotata and the propositions in which they appear as predicates or arguments. Two types of pragmatic relations were defined and described: Topic and Focus. It was argued that a critical distinction must be made between the relational notions of Topic and Focus on the one hand the linguistic expressions used to encode these relations on the other. Topic, as a pragmatic relation, is traditionally defined as a pragmatically recoverable (i.e. falls under the scope of the presupposition) discourse referent of which the proposition is about. Although the functional feature 'aboutness' is critical for understanding the topic relation, we argued, following Jacobs (2001), that Topic is preferably defined in terms of its degree of correspondence to a prototype with 'aboutness' serving as one of four prototypical dimensions, viz. informational separation, predication, addressation (e.g. aboutness), and frame setting.

Furthermore, for a discourse referent to be construed as having a topic relation to a certain proposition, it must first be identifiable and possess a certain degree of activation within the mind of the hearer, or discourse model. If, however, a speaker determines that a certain discourse referent is insufficiently accessible within the discourse model to function as a cognitively preferred topic (e.g. fully active), various topic promoting constructions may be employed in order to promote the referent from inactive or semi-active to active status.

If the topic of a proposition is that entity which is pragmatically recoverable at the time of an utterance, the focus is the unpredictable and/or salient semantic element whose presence makes the proposition into a potential piece of information—i.e. into an assertion (ibid.:336). The association between the structure of the sentence and the construal of the Topic and Focus relations of the proposition expressed by it gives rise to three pragmatic sentence articulations, which directly correspond to three basic communicative functions: "that of predicating a property of a given topic (predicate focus: topic-comment function); that of identifying an argument for a given proposition (argument focus: identificational function); and that of introducing a new discourse referent or of reporting an event (sentence focus: presentational or event reporting function)" (ibid.:336).

Lastly we offered a brief sketch of two specific pragmatic parameters that operate outside the scope of the information structure component of sentence grammar. The first parameter involves sentence initial adverbial expressions that function as deictic orientation devices providing the spatio-temporal framing information from which the main predication (or subsequent discourse unit) holds. These spatio-temporal adverbial expressions are referred to as Stage-Topics (to borrow a term from Erteschik-Shir, 1997). The second pragmatic parameter involves the notion of 'contrast', which we construe to be an additional feature in the semantico-pragmatic structure of the sentence orthogonal to the topic-focus

articulation. In other words, contrastiveness is an optional feature that functions as a pragmatic implicature for topic expressions and focus-structures.

Chapter 3: Typological Considerations: The Syntax and Semantics of Left Dislocation

3.1 Introduction

The term 'Typology' is commonly used within the field of linguistics to denote a variety of objectives. Croft (2003:1–4) distinguishes three fundamental definitions of linguistic typology that correspond to three stages of empirical scientific analysis:

1. Typological Classification: the classification of structural types across languages.

2. Typological Generalization: the identification and study of patterns (i.e. universals) that occur systematically across languages.

3. Functional-Typological Explanation: the explanation of linguistic structure specifically in terms of linguistic function.[171]

According to the first definition and corresponding to the first stage (i.e. 'typological classification'), language typology is concerned with cross-linguistic comparisons, either of whole languages (so-called 'holistic typology') or specific components of languages (so-called 'partial typology'). On the basis of these comparisons, types are defined, and languages or components of languages are classified into these types. The second definition (i.e. 'typological generalization') is based upon the facts observed in the first stage and aims at identifying cross-linguistic patterns and correlations between these patterns. Generalizations are drawn from the study of these patterns representing a coherent set of universals[172] which

171. Due to this third definition/stage, this approach to typology is commonly referred to as a "Functional-Typological" approach and will be referred to as such here (cf. Croft, 2003:2).

172. Stemming from Greenberg (1960, 1966), typologists have employed the term "language universals" to denote the empirical observation that a substantial number of related and unrelated languages exhibit specific constraints concerning their range of variation. In other words, it is observed as a matter of empirical fact that languages do not vary infinitely and that there exists certain common patterns across languages. These constraints are what (non-generative) typologists refer to as language universals. By contrast, researchers working within the (Chomskyan) generative tradition employ the term 'language universals' in a different sense. In this tradition, language universals refer to innate underlying principles of linguistic organization and structure that are represented in the human mind and play a major role in the acquisition of language (cf. Chomsky, 1976). These innate underlying principles make up what Chomsky has termed a person's 'Universal Grammar'. Linguistic universals, in the generative sense, are thus brought to bear on the learning of a single language and then extrapolated to account for broad patterns of cross-linguistic similarity. In this way, the generative approach to cross-linguistic investigation is deductive. By contrast, (Greenbergian) typology employs an inductive approach in which universals are distinguishable solely through a systematic empirical survey of languages (Croft, 2003:4–5). In general, one can say that the typologist begins with cross-linguistic comparisons, and then compares typological classifications of different structural phenomena searching for relationships, while the generative linguist begins with language-internal structural generalizations and searches for correlations of

occur systematically across languages (ibid.:2). Finally, the structural classifications and the cross-linguistic generalizations derived from recognized patterns lend themselves to various models of explanation—e.g. iconicity, economy, discourse-pragmatics, cognitive processing, diachronic change, etc.—in an attempt to motivate linguistic structure in terms of linguistic function across languages. In light of these three definitions/stages distinguished by Croft, the identification, description, and explanation of left dislocation constructions from a typological perspective can be related to each one of these three stages. Although the following analysis will entail each of these stages, the first and second stages will largely be conflated for our purposes.

The following cross-linguistic analysis is not intended to be comprehensive; such an extensive and complicated endeavor would constitute a separate research program in its own right.[173] Rather, due to the constraints of this project, our primary aim is to provide a moderately sweeping overview of the left dislocation construction as represented in the broader field of linguistic description and typological research, with a tripartite concentration on: 1) the identification and classification of different types of left dislocations constructions, which are themselves instantiations of a more generalized schematic[174] representation, based on their global syntactico-semantic attributes; this external analysis will be complemented by a taxonomic description of the pertinent internal elements that comprise specific constructional instantiations,[175] 2) the discourse-pragmatic functions accomplished by the use of the construction, and its implications for the information structure of the pragmatically structured proposition, and 3) an explanation of the form of left dislocation constructions in terms of their cognitive-pragmatic motivations and discourse-functional uses in conjunction with a usage-based view of language change. The present chapter will concern the first concentration, while chapter four will concern the later two. Together with the theoretical framework outlined in chapter two, the structural description and functional explanation of left dislocation constructions from a cross-linguistic perspective will serve to further inform

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internal structural facts, and only then proceeds to cross-linguistic comparison (ibid.:285).

173. With respect to the complexity and open ended status of the syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic description of dislocation constructions across languages, see Shaer et al. (2009).

174. A constructional schema is a composite symbolic assembly (form-function convention) abstracted from instantiated expressions. In other words, constructional schemas are "skeletal representations of shared organizational features" (Langacker, 2008:168). Cf. §3.2.1 below for further discussion.

175. In this way, ours is a partial cross-linguistic description, rather than a holistic one. In other words, we are not concerned with the classification of languages as wholes on the basis of a significant linguistic feature (i.e. holistic typology), rather we are more concerned with the identification, classification and explanation of a specific feature of languages—in our case, the left dislocation construction.

our identification, classification, and explanation of left dislocation constructions in BH.

Before we proceed with our description, it is necessary to clarify two methodological assumptions that underlie our analysis. First, the definition of linguistic typology presupposed here—with its fundamental assumption that linguistic structure should be explained in terms of linguistic function (cf. definition/stage three, above)—represents a methodology to linguistic analysis that stands in fundamental agreement with the basic tenets of the cognitive linguistic enterprise (cf. §1.1). That is to say, this assumption represents a fundamental departure from the formalist approach to linguistic inquiry, most famously represented by Chomskyan generative grammar.[176] As a result, it is important to note that the following

176. A foundational hypothesis of Chomskyan generative grammar contends that language is an autonomous cognitive faculty, separated from nonlinguistic cognitive abilities. Both in older (cf. Chomsky, 1965) and more recent versions (cf. Chomsky, 1981, 1995, 2000), it is posited that a speaker's grammatical knowledge is organized into three independent mental components that each describe a separate dimension of the sentence: 1) the phonological component, 2) the semantic component, and 3) the syntactic component. In addition to these three components, generative grammar assumes that the basic units of syntactic combination are stored in the mental lexicon, a finite set of memorized units which differs from the three aforementioned components in that the lexicon provides for each unit (i.e. word) its phonetic structure, its meaning, and its syntactic category. These three components are believed to be comprised of highly general rules that apply to all structures of the relevant type. Phonological rules govern the assembly of complex strings of sounds. Syntactic rules govern the assembly of words into grammatical structures, such as phrases and sentences, while semantic rules assign a semantic interpretation to the clause. Information is mapped from one component to another via general 'linking' rules which apply to all sentences of a language. The rules inside each component are conceived of as so highly intertwined and self-contained that they represent a cohesive structure relative to the linking rules. In this model, the meaning of a sentence arises from the meaning of the words it contains, together with the way in which these words are syntactically arranged. This gives rise to a purely semantic meaning that is independent of context. In short, componential approaches to grammatical representation, such as Chomskyan generative grammar, describe linguistic knowledge in terms of levels of representation, linked by derivational rules.

One of the crucial characteristics of this model is that there are no idiosyncratic properties of grammatical structures larger than a single word. For instance, the general rules of the syntactic, phonological, and semantic components, as well as the equally general linking rules, govern the derivation of phrases and sentences. Words, however, represent the only arbitrary and idiosyncratic joining of form (syntactic and phonological) and meaning (semantic). Put differently, within the generative model, the only form-function pairings are words. The structure and meaning of grammatical assemblies, or derivations (i.e. phrases, clauses, and sentences) can always be decomposed into semantic and syntactic primitives that constitute the building blocks of complex linguistic elements. Grammar, is thus entirely compositional from the generative point of view. A significant consequence of componential models of grammar is that they only account for what is "regular" in language. For instance, idiomatic expressions, which do not abide by general rules, have the status of an appendix to the grammar (Fillmore et al. 1988:504). The only complex units that are 'stored whole' are those whose properties cannot be predicted on the basis of the regular rules of grammar. A consequence of this model, therefore, is the rejection of the concept of a 'construction' in the traditional grammar sense of the word. As Chomsky states, "[t]he notion of grammatical construction is eliminated, and with it, construction particular rules" (Chomsky, 1995:4). The functional-typological approach (cf. Croft, 2003) assumed here, is incompatible with many of the foundational tenets of the Chomskyan generative tradition.

This 'incompatibility' principally stems from the rejection of the generative hypothesis that linguistic knowledge is an autonomous cognitive faculty, comprised of independent modular components, in favor of a 'uniform' representation of linguistic knowledge in which phonological, syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic information is intrinsically linked. The uniform (non-compositional) representation of linguistic knowledge is a foundational hypothesis of the 'cognitive linguistic' research tradition assumed by this work (for good introductions into this field, cf. Croft and Cruse (2004); Evans and Green, (2006); Radden and Dirven (2007); as well as the articles in Geeraerts and Cuyckens, (2010), *inter alia*) as well as specific grammatical theories within this tradition, such as the various 'constructional' approaches to grammar (cf. Goldberg, (1995); Croft, (2001); *inter alia*). The basic corollaries of the uniform hypothesis are that "the representation of linguistic knowledge is essentially the same as the representation of other conceptual structures, and that the process in which that knowledge is used are not fundamentally different from cognitive abilities that human beings use outside the

cross-linguistic syntactico-semantic analysis will not assume a derivational syntactic theory, but a monostratal (i.e. non-transformational) framework of the type represented by the various cognitive and functional approaches to grammar. It follows that while the analysis presented here is independent of any particular model of grammar, we do not presuppose the movement of a constituent from a basic (canonical) position, and therefore will not appeal to notions such as 'empty categories' or 'traces'. The term "dislocation", which suggests syntactic movement, is used for convenience only.

Second, it is assumed that the fastidious description and explanation[177] of ancient languages are well served by typological analyses of contemporary related and unrelated languages. This assumption is based upon what researchers working within linguistic typology refer to as the 'uniformitarianism hypothesis', which states that "languages of the past—at least those that we can reconstruct or find records of—are not different in nature from languages of the present. Therefore, the typological universals discovered in contemporary languages should also apply to ancient and reconstructed languages" (Croft, 2003:233).[178] Based upon the uniformitarianism hypothesis, typological analyses of more contemporary languages, for which we have much more evidence, yield various cross-linguistic generalizations allowing researchers to provide a more empirically informed

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domain of language" (Croft, 2004:2). Where componential approaches (e.g. generative) have elevated the distinction between form and meaning to an organizing principle of grammatical knowledge, cognitive linguistic approaches to grammar, by contrast, construe grammatical knowledge as the organization of a repertoire of complex symbolic grammatical assemblies, or 'constructions' that integrate form (i.e. any combination of syntactic, morphological, or prosodic patterns) and meaning (i.e. understood in the broad sense including lexical semantics, pragmatics, and discourse structure) in conventionalized, and in some aspects, non-compositional ways (e.g. as with idioms). In short, constructions are "grammatical assemblies that are characterized by two features: first, constructions combine a specific form with a specific function or meaning (e.g. Lakoff, 1987), and second, constructions exhibit both general grammatical properties and idiosyncratic features (e.g. Fillmore, Kay and O'Connor, 1988)" (Diessel, 2004:14).

Construction-based theories have abandoned the categorial division between lexicon and grammar. Rather, grammar is viewed as a continuum of symbolic units (i.e. form-function pairings) ranging from isolated words to complex grammatical constructions (cf. Langacker 1987). Since both words and grammatical constructions are considered symbolic units, they are uniformly represented in this approach. The functional-typological approach is compatible with the constructional approaches to grammar as represented in Lakoff (1987); Langacker (1987, 1991a, 1991b, 1999); Taylor (2002); Goldberg (1995), and Croft (2001). For a detailed overview of the various constructional approaches to grammar see Croft and Cruse (2004:225–290) and Evans and Green (2006:641–702).

177. See Dryer (2006:207–234) who distinguishes between descriptive (structural) and explanatory (functional) theories. According to Dryer, "[s]tructuralism is fully compatible with functionalism. Structuralism is a descriptive theory, while functionalism is an explanatory theory. There is no incompatibility in describing a language from a structuralist perspective and then explaining, in functionalist terms, the things described". Likewise, see Givón (2001:xv) who emphasizes the need to recognize linguistic structure independent of function.

178. Cf. also Comrie (1989:9) who avers that "within a time-span of several thousand years in either direction from the present, there has been no significant sense in which human language has evolved, i.e. no sense in which human language as a whole today is different in essence from that of ten thousand years ago…. all human languages spoken today represent the same level of evolution".

description and explanation of the grammatical features of ancient languages.

As previously stated, the present chapter will consist of a cross-linguistic syntactic-semantic description of the left dislocation construction. The chapter will proceed in three parts. In §3.2 we will argue that left dislocation—as a constructional schema and therefore a linguistic category—should be understood as possessing a more inclusive scope than is often applied by studies that merely focus on prototypical instantiations of the constructions. This broader scope includes various structurally divergent types of left dislocation constructions which achieve category membership based on their family resemblance to a central prototype. These diverse types are understood as categorial extensions that are motivated directly off of the central prototype, or one of its extensions. In §3.3 we examine the classification of several non-prototypical left dislocation types. First we survey how researchers working within the generative tradition have classified left dislocation constructions across languages. Subsequently, we analyze three additional non-prototypical left dislocation constructions that are pervasive across languages. Finally, in §3.4 we examine the internal syntax of left dislocation constructions across languages, providing a taxonomy of possible syntactic categories and grammatical relations exhibited by the left-dislocated constituent[179] and the resumptive element, respectively.

3.2 Left Dislocation: A Syntactico-Semantic Definition

The Left Dislocation (=LD) construction is a universal syntactic phenomenon. This claim is supported by Lambrecht (2001:1051) who contends that "dislocation constructions can be identified in most, if not all languages of the world, independently of language type and genetic affiliation".[180] Example (13) represents several instantiations of the construction from a variety of languages:[181]

(13) English (Lambrecht, 2001:1051)

a. [The Romans]$_i$, they$_i$ are crazy.

German

b. [Die Römer]$_i$, die$_i$ spinnen.

179. From this point forward we will primarily refer to the 'left dislocated constituent' simply as 'dislocated constituent', or 'dislocate'.

180. The cross-linguistic structural description that comprises the remainder of this chapter is heavily informed by the typological investigation of LD constructions represented in Lambrecht (2001).

181. Each of the structural types of LD represented in (13) will be discussed in more detail throughout this chapter.

Russian

c. [Rimljane]$_i$, oniis uma sošl$_i$

French

d. [Les Romains]$_i$, ils$_i$ sont fous.

Italian

e. [I Romani]$_i$, son-o$_i$ pazz-i

Turkish

f. [Romi-lar]$_i$, ø$_i$ deli.

LD is generally identified by the presence of a referential constituent that could function as an argument or adjunct within the predicate-argument structure of the clause but, instead, occurs outside the left-peripheral boundaries of the clause containing the predicate.[182] This dislocated constituent is prototypically associated with a grammatically complete clause (or sentence), in which a coreferential pronominal element typically occurs; the pronominal represents the role of the referent of the dislocated phrase as an argument or adjunct of the predicate (ibid.:1050). In (13) the dislocated position of the initial constituent is marked by brackets, while the coreferential pronominal argument is shown to be co-indexed with the dislocated constituent by a subscripted 'i'.[183] Despite the relative clarity of this general definition, the label LD has undergone a wide variety of descriptive uses throughout the specialized literature. Thus, before moving on, it is prudent to clarify what we understand the constructional category to entail. In §3.2.1 we will, therefore, aim to provide a description of the grammatical attributes (both syntactic and semantic) that serve as organizing features of the conceptual-schematic category of LD.

3.2.1 Widening the Category: An Exemplar Model

Ross, in his 1967 influential dissertation entitled "Constraints on Variables in Syntax", was the first to offer a sophisticated description of the structural properties of the LD construction

182. For many languages of the world, the term 'Left Dislocation' is a misnomer since the term originated out of the study of English (Ross, 1967) which is written and read from left to right. However, since many languages (e.g. Hebrew) are written and read from right to left, the left dislocated constituent is technically speaking not located to the left, but to the right of the clause. In these languages the dislocated constituent in question is more accurately described as occurring in a dislocated position *in front* of the clause. However, due to linguistic convention, we will continue to use the term Left Dislocation.

183. This method of annotating the various syntactic parts of LD types will be employed throughout the present chapter.

within an early version of (Chomskyan) generative grammar.[184] Ross, working solely with English data, argued (1967:232-236) that LD constructions were derived through a specific copying rule that moves a constituent to the leftmost position in the sentence while leaving a pronominal copy in the source position that anaphorically refers back to the leftmost NP. The dislocated constituent and the pronominal copy were understood as co-referential as a result of the movement transformation. For Ross, the copying rule was the differentiating factor between LD constructions and so-called 'Topicalization Constructions'.[185] In topicalization constructions, a constituent supposedly underwent movement to a fronted position but left behind no trace of itself, whatsoever, in the source position.[186] Ross's program of establishing a series of similar constraints on syntactic rules in a variety of syntactic operations (e.g. why-movement, passive, raising, reflexivisation, etc.) led to a line of research that culminated in the Conditions on Transformations Theory of Chomsky (1973) (van Riemsdijk, 1997:1).[187] While a critique of this early transformational description of LD constructions is beyond the scope of this work,[188] it suffices to say that despite their significance within the early versions of the generative program (e.g. transformational grammar), Ross's transformational analyses of LD constructions were, for the most part, abandoned[189] in later versions of the theory in favor of a view that construes the structural properties of LD constructions as base-generated.[190]

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184. Van Riemsdijk (1997:1) notes that the name 'Left Dislocation' is credited by Ross to Maurice Gross.

185. Ross (1967) distinguished between what he called "chopping rules" and "copying rules". While chopping rules were those that were subject to Ross' constraints on variables—the Complex Noun Phrase Constraint (CNPC), the Sentential Subject Constraint (CSC) and the Coordinate Structure Constraint (CSC)—copying rules are those that are not. For Ross, LD constructions were a prime example of a construction resulting from copying rules. LD constructions contrasts systematically with its chopping counterpart (van Riemsdijk, 1997:1).

186. "[T]he rule of Topicalization is a process which is formally almost identical to Left Dislocation, with the exception that while…[Left Dislocation, JRW] leaves behind a pronoun to mark the position in the sentence that the fronted NP used to occupy, the rule of Topicalization does not (Ross, 1973:232).

187. The Transformational Theory of Syntax represented in Chomsky (1973) was mainly concerned with the major syntactic operations of wh-movement, passive, raising, reflexivization, etc. (van Riemsdijk, 1997:1).

188. For cogent arguments against Ross's transformational description of LD, see van Riemsdijk and Zwarts, 1974; Rodman, 1974, Hirschbühler, 1975; Gundel, 1975; Chomsky, 1977; Rivero, 1980; Radford, 1988; Haegeman; 1991; van der Spuy, 1993; Rodman, 1997; van Riemsdijk 1997. Specifically in regards to BH, see Naudé, 1990.

189. As we will see in §3.2.3, with respect to 'Clitic Left Dislocation Constructions', the situation is more complicated than this, with many researchers arguing that these types of LD constructions are in fact the result of movement operations.

190. In other words, the dislocated constituent is largely assumed to be in a non-argument position through adjunction to the sentence which, along with the coreferential resumptive pronoun, is assumed to be inserted directly from the lexicon into the syntactic structure of the sentence rather than derived through movement operations (van Riemsdijk, 1997:3). For a base-generated description of (English) LD, see Rodman 1974,

Of primary concern for Ross and other contemporary linguists are constructions that fall under a "classic", or "narrow" definition of LD. The definitional criteria for this narrow sense consists of a NP (but see §3.4.1.1) in a preposed dislocated position located outside the boundary of the clause, and an overt independent pronoun (resumptive) that is coreferential with the referent of the dislocated phrase located inside the clause.[191] The resumptive pronominal represents the role of the denotatum of the dislocated constituent as an argument or adjunct of the predicate, as in (13a)-(13d) above (Lambrecht, 2001:1050). Example (14) is an instantiation of an English LD construction that falls under this narrow definition:

(14) [That Joe$_i$], he$_i$ is always running late.

According to Lambrecht (2001:1050) and Givón (2001:266), constructions like (14) are considered "prototypical" instantiations of the LD category across languages. Both of these linguists contend that this central status is achieved by the clustering together of several prototypical attributes.[192] The following list of attributes is modified from Lambrecht

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Hirschbüler, 1975, van Riemskijk and Zwarts, 1974, Chomsky 1977, Vat 1981, Cinque, 1983, Barcelona-Sanchez 1988, Lasnik and Saito 1992, and Lyons 1999.

191. For example, Quirk et al. (1985) only consider formally prototypical LDs. Cf. also Geluykens, 1992, 1993.

192. Although the notion of "prototype" can be traced back to Ludwig Wittgenstein's "Philosophical Investigations" (1953), it was the psychologist Eleanor Rosch (1973a; 1973b; 1975; 1977; 1978) who pursued the most extensive and systematic empirical exploration of prototypes. Her experiments show that people conceptually categorize objects in terms of prototypes and family resemblances rather than in set-theoretical terms. For example, small flying singing birds, like sparrows, robins, etc., are prototypical birds. Chickens, penguins and ostriches are birds, too, but are not central members of the category—i.e. they are non-prototypical birds; but they are birds nontheless, because they bear sufficient family resemblances to the prototype. In other words, they share enough of the relevant attributes of the prototype to be classified by people as birds.

The prototype-theoretical model—also referred to as the 'exemplar model'—of conceptual categories stands in stark contrast to the the so-called 'classical model' of category structure. Under the classical model, categories are assumed to possess definitional structure in the form of a set of necessary and sufficient conditional features which are equal in status. "The features are necessary in that no entity that does not possess the full set is a member of the category, and they are sufficient in that possession of all the features guarantees membership (Croft and Cruse, 2004:76). As a result, the classical model establishes a clear and rigid boundary to a category. However, Wittgenstein and Rosch have demonstrated that an adequate definition in terms of necessary and sufficient features is simply not available for many common categories (cf. Wittgenstein's famous example of the concept GAME).

Furthermore, Rosch's experimental research has verified that some members of a category are judged as *more representative* of a specific category than others (as in our previous example of BIRD). Typically these members are "basic-level" categories—the most salient level of categorization whereby people conceptualize things as perceptual and functional gestalts (Taylor, 2003:50). In other words, it is at this level of categorization that people normally conceptualize and name things (ibid.). For example, it seems impossible to try to visualize, or draw a picture of the categories ANIMAL or FURNITURE, but the task becomes much more reasonable when we isolate a basic-level category of each of these—e.g. BIRD or CHAIR. Finally, no explanation is provided by the classical model for why category boundaries are often indeterminate (cf. Labov's, 1973 famous experiment with household receptacles) (Croft and Cruse, 2004:76–77).

The shortcomings of the classical model provided the impetus for the development of alternative theories of categorization, one of the most prominent and influential of which is prototype theory. For the use of prototype theory in linguistic descriptions, see Lakoff and Johnson (1980); Lakoff (1987); Taylor (2002; 2003); Evans and Green (2006); Croft and Cruse (2004); Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (2004) among others. Also for a critique of

(2001:1050) and Givón (2001:266):

> 1. The extra-clausal position of a constituent preceding the 'matrix' clause.[193]
>
> 2. A possible alternative intra-clausal position for the dislocate within the matrix clause.
>
> 3. Anaphoric co-indexation between the dislocate and an overt pronoun within the matrix clause.[194]
>
> 4. A seperate intonation contour for the dislocate.[195]

The clustering of these attributes is symbolically represented by the exemplar constructional schema in (15) below:[196]

(15) [LD [NP_i]], c[[pro_i]…][197]

A constructional schema is a generalized template that emerges from entrenched patterns of instantiated usage (cf. §4.3) (Evans and Green, 2006:754).[198] They are achieved by removing points of difference between a variety of instantiations leaving only their common attributes. Although constructional schemas entail abstract syntactic, semantic, and discourse-

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prototype theory cf. Geeraeerts (2009) and Croft and Cruse (2004:87–91).

193. Lambrecht intended this attribute to be inclusive enough to describe dislocated constituents preceding the clause (Left Dislocation) and those following the clause (Right Dislocation). However, as we are only concerned with the former, this attribute concerns the fronted position only.

194. That is to say that a strict, or total coreferential relation holds between the dislocate and the resumptive pronominal. For further discussion, see below.

195. We will have little to say with respect to this final attribute as its effects on the structuring of the category are mitigated by the fact that this attribute seems to always be present in the instantiations discussed in the present chapter. Furthermore, since the data examined in this study consists of an ancient unspoken corpus with no living speakers, we have no way of analyzing this attribute (cf. Joüon and Muraoka, 2003: §153).

196. Diessel (2004:18) notes that the symbolic nature of grammatical constructions explains why many grammatical patterns show prototype effects (cf. Givón, 1979, 1984a; Hopper and Thompson, 1980; Bybee, 1995). The prototype effects result from the relationships between a constructional schema and its instantiations through a usage-based process of language change (cf. §4.3). Cf. Geluykens (1993) and Tizón-Couto (2012) who also describe LD according to an exemplar model of conceptual categorization.

197. We symbolically label the dislocated constituent 'LD'. The 'c' marks the beginning of the matrix clause.

198. For a more comprehensive discussion on the nature of constructional schemas, see Langacker (2008:167ff) and Croft and Cruse (2004:255ff), *inter alia*.

pragmatic information, from a structural standpoint, they can be thought of as generalized templates consisting of a sequence of ordered slots that may be filled by a variety of words and phrases of differing grammatical categories (Taylor, 1995:198). By contrast, the 'instantiation' of a constructional schema, as in (14) above, is a lexically specified 'instantiation' of a constructional schema. In other words, the instantiation is the lexico-grammatically realized token of the abstract schematic type. Both constructional schemas and instantiations of schemas coexist in the grammar, the schema being an abstraction that emerges from instantiated usage patterns (Evans and Green, 2006:755).[199] Although by definition, constructional schemas all consist of generalized features, they do not all possess the same degree of abstraction. Rather there exists a continuum of schematicity (Croft and Cruse, 2004:254). The instantiation in (14) for example may be represented by the moderately abstract schema in (15), or by the more abstract schema: [LD [XP_i] c[…[(pro,XP)$_i$]….]]. Notice in (15), the dislocated slot is more substantively specified with the abstract grammatical category 'NP' and likewise, the resumptive is specified with the generalized category 'pro' in clause-initial position. In the later, 'XP' is meant to reflect an unspecified grammatical category, while the parenthesis symbolizes the non-obligatory status of a resumptive (see below), and finally, the '(XP)' reflects the fact that a resumptive may take a non-pronominal form (see below).

Cognitive grammarians posit that this continuum of schematicity, from highly abstract constructional schemas to substantival instantiations—and to even more substantive idiomatic constructions[200]—exists as a structured inventory of constructional knowledge. This constructional knowledge is hierarchically organized in a taxonomic network where each construction represents a different node in the hierarchy (Langacker, 1987:63–76). This schematic and hierarchically organized network also exists within particular constructional categories. Crucially, the taxonomic organization of a constructional category works in conjunction with an exemplar model (i.e. prototype) of category membership. As Bybee (2010:26) avers, "…what language users experience is specific instances or tokens of constructions. They map similar tokens [i.e. instantiations, JRW] onto one another to establish exemplars and these exemplars group together to form categories that represent both the fixed and schematic slots in constructions". Although the notions of constructional

199. The idea that higher-order constructional schemas emerge out of instantiated usage is in direct contrast to the generative notion that syntactic forms are the result of derivational rules. See Evans and Green (2006:140–146).

200. For example, the highly substantive English idiom "It takes one to know one." See Croft and Cruse (2004:236ff) for further discussion.

schema and exemplar/prototype work in conjunction, it is important that they are not conflated. The difference between them is summed up by Langacker:

> "A prototype is a typical instance of a category, and other elements are assimilated to the category on the basis of their perceived resemblance to the prototype; there are degrees of membership based on degrees of similarity. A schema, by contrast, is an abstract characterization that is fully compatible with all the members of the category it defines (so membership is not a matter of degree); it is an integrated structure that embodies the commonality of its members, which are conceptions of greater specificity and detail that elaborate the schema in contrasting ways" (1987:371).

While contemporary linguistic descriptions of LD constructions tend to focus on instantiations like the one in (15), the present description adopts a more inclusive scope following Lambrecht (1994, 2001); Shaer et al., (2009), and Tizón-Couto (2012). This broader category will not only encompass instantiations of narrow, or prototypical LD constructions, but also those that are syntactically and semantically divergent from the prototype in various ways. As we noted above, we contend that the constructional category known as LD is best described in terms of an exemplar model of conceptual categorization in which a variety of schematic types are organized according to their degree of family resemblance to a prototype. More specifically, constructions lacking one or more of the four prototypical attributes in (14) are not excluded from this specific constructional category. Rather, they are considered fully "paid-up" category members that represent extensions of the prototype because they bear sufficient family resemblance to that schematic exemplar. This is congruent with a core tenet of the exemplar model of categorization, which states that an entity's inclusion in a category does not hinge on the satisfaction of a set of necessary and sufficient conditions (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, 2007:145).[201] It is important to note that this tenet, however, does not entail that certain necessary criteria do not exist for some categories, only that, unlike the classical model, an entity need not possess every attribute in order to achieve category membership. Furthermore, as with other categories which are structured around a prototype, it is the case that some LD schemas resemble the prototype more than others. In other words, the LD category exhibits prototype effects of graded centrality where types evincing more prototypical attributes than others are judged to be

201. "The features are necessary in that no entity that does not possess the full set is not a member of the category, and they are sufficient in that possession of all the features guarantees membership" (Croft and Cruse, 2004:76).

closer to the exemplar, while those lacking more attributes are judged to be closer to the categorial periphery.[202]

The co-referential relation between the dislocate and an anaphoric resumptive element within the clause is traditionally considered the most defining criterion for scholars who hold to a narrow/classic definition of LD. Within a wider conception of the constructional category, however, semantic links, in addition to strict co-referentiality, are observed. For example, Tizón-Couto (2012:38-39) studying LD in English, observes that LD schemas exhibit one of three types of semantic coherence relations that link the dislocated referent and the resumptive element.[203]

First, when the referent of a dislocated constituent is coreferential with a clause internal anaphoric element (e.g. pronoun), the dislocate is said to be in a 'total' identity relation with the co-indexed resumptive. In other words the resumptive element forms a cohesive repetition of the dislocated referent. Total identity links characterize instantiations of the prototypical constructional schema.

Second, a 'metonymic' identity link is one in which the referent of a clause internal linked element stand in a whole-part/part-whole relation to one another. Metonymic links may be 'hypernymic', expressing a whole-part relation, or, more rarely, 'hyponymic', expressing a part-whole relation. With metonymic links, the resumptive often takes the form of a full NP with a possessive pronoun as a determiner that is coreferential with the dislocated referent.

Third, LDs may also evince a 'partial' identity link by which the dislocated referent and clause internal element do not share the same exact semantic features (e.g. total identity), but only partially overlap. From my survey of the LD literature, it seems that these categories are not unique to English, but apply more broadly across languages.

Following these three types of coherence relations, we add an additional type. It appears that some constructions meet all of the qualifications for category membership, but lack a semantic link (i.e. total. metonymic or partial) to any particular element within the clause. Rather, in some cases the dislocate possesses a kind of "relevance relation" to the ensuing clause (Lambrecht 2001:1058). In other words, the dislocate functions as a framing device (cf. Fillmore, 1982; §2.4.5) that constrains the interpretation of the following

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202. Cf. Fariña (1995) and Geluykens (1992) who also employ prototype theory for the structural description of LD constructions.

203. Tizón-Couto (2012:28) notes that this approach is inspired by general textual conceptions, such as Halliday and Hasan's (1976) "textual cohesion". Cf. Rodman, 1974.

proposition to a certain semantic domain. We will refer to this type as a 'relevance' link. Metonymic and relevance links seem to be restricted to what we have termed 'non-resumptive LD's in the following discussion (§3.2.2.1).[204] These cohesive linking relations will be illustrated below.

By assuming this inclusive sense of LD, no specific theoretical claim concerning any particular structure is intended, nor are any significant structural or functional distinctions between them denied. As indicated in §3.2, my primary aim is to provide a representative typological overview of the LD category including the identificational criterion and structural classification of constructions therein. I will offer a more detailed description of the more prominent schematic types that fall within my broader conception of the category in §3.3 below. In this section, however, I merely offer a brief sketch of each in order to demonstrate that the categorial structure does in fact evince prototype effects.

Among the structures that we view as falling within a broader sense of LD, are those that lack criterion 3) 'Overt Pronominal co-indexation' (cf. (13) above):

(16) Italian (Lambrecht, 2001:1051)
a. [I Romani]$_i$, son-o$_i$ pazz-i
"The Romans, they are crazy."

Turkish
b. [Romi-lar]$_i$, ø$_i$ deli.
"The Romans, they are crazy."

In the Italian instantiation in (12e), reproduced here as (16a), the NP "I Romani" is potentially co-indexed with the inflectional affix "-o", which encodes person and number. In this case, a total identity relation characterizes the semantic link between the dislocate and the resumptive. Furthermore, some languages, such as Turkish, may permit LD constructions with the instantiation of a null resumptive element, as in (12f) reproduced above as (16b).[205]

Another construction which represents an extension of the prototype are so-called 'Chinese-style' topic structures (Chafe, 1976:50-51), or what we will refer to as 'non-

204. One could argue that partial identity linking belongs more to the realm of pragmatics than semantics. For instance, concerning the link between the dislocate and the matrix clause in unlinked [non-resumptive, JRW] LD constructions, Lambrecht writes, "the relation is purely pragmatic indicating a kind of relevance relation between the dislocated constituent and the proposition" (Lambrecht, 2001:1058).

205. Cf. §3.4.2.1 for further discussion vis-à-vis the potential LD construction with resumptive elements in the form of inflectional affixes and null pronominals.

resumptive' LD constructions.[206] An instantiation of this type of LD is represented in (17a-d)[207] from English and Indonesian:

(17) English (Lambrecht, 2001:1058)

a. [As for education], John prefers Bertrand Russell's ideas.[208]

English (Tizón-Couto, 2012:108)

b. [As for the democratic nomination], I don't think Mayor Sensenbrenner has a chance.

French/English (Lambrecht, 2001:1058)

c. [Mon premier mari], on avait une voiture puis une moto.
"My first husband, we had a car then a motorcycle."

d. That isn't the typical family anymore, [The typical family today], the husband and the wife both work.

Indonesian (Li and Thompson, 1976:470)

e. [Anak itu]i, ibu-njai membeli sepatu.
child that mother-POSS buy shoes.
"That child, his mother bought shoes."

Non-resumptive LD constructions are considered syntactically and semantically less prototypical than the type represented in (12f) and (16b). One reason for this is that non-resumptive LDs sometimes[209] lack attribute 2) "A possible alternative intra-clausal position" (see (14) above). For instance, in (17a) and (17b), the dislocated constituents "As for education" and "As for the democratic nomination" do not satisfy the valency requirement for the verb "prefer" or "think", nor do they serve as adjuncts to those predicates. Rather, both dislocates entertain a relevance link to their respective ensuing clauses, thereby constraining

206. Our 'non-resumptive' LD category is identitcal to what Lambrecht (2001:1057–1060) refers to as "unlinked LDs."

207. Example (17d) from Indonesian is an instances of a sub-type of non-resumptive LD constructions often (misleadingly) referred to as a 'double-subject' constructions (see §3.2.3.1) (Lambrecht, 2001:1058).

208. Tizón-Couto (2012:61–71) contends that left peripheral constituents headed by an "As for" do not constituent instances of LD. He comes to this conclusion for three reasons: 1) constituents headed by "As for" may occur without a resumptive element in the matrix clause, 2) they possess a profile closer to adverbials, 3) they may co-occur with proper instances of LD.

209. It is possible for a construction to possess attribute 2) "A possible alternative intra-clausal position" and yet sill be considered non-resumptive due to the lack of a total identity relation between the dislocate and a co-indexed resumptive element within the clause.

the interpretation of the propositions to the semantic frames of "education" and "the democratic nomination". By contrast, the instantiation in (17c)[210] and (17d) entertain a partial identity link between the dislocates "Mon premier mari" (My first husband) and "The typical family today", and the respective clause internal elements "on" ("we") and, "the husband and the wife".[211] Finally, a metonymic link characterizes the semantic relation between the demonstrative dislocated NP "Anak itu" ("That child") in (17e) and the subject of the associated clause "ibu-nja" ("his mother"). We will have more to say with respect to non-resumptive LDs in §3.2.3.1 below. For now, it suffices to say that non-resumptive LDs are syntactically and semantically positioned closer, still, to the category boundary.

LD constructions with a dislocated spatio-temporal deictic expression constitute yet another extension of the LD category. These types of constructions are structurally similar to the non-resumptive type except for the fact that, unlike non-resumptive LDs, they do satisfy criterion 2) "A possible alternative intra-clausal position". In other words, the dislocated adverbial phrase may occur in a dislocated or a canonical (i.e. non-dislocated) position within the clause proper (Lambrecht, 2001:1059). Example (19) illustrates this type of LD from German:

(18) German (Lambrecht, 2001:1055)
[In Ostdeutschland]$_i$, da$_i$ ist ein Fünftel der Leute arbeitslos.
"In Eastern Germany, there one fifth of the people are unemployed."

Note, however, that although (18) is an instance of LD with a dislocated spatial deictic with an overt resumptive pronominal element in a total identity relation to the dislocate, the presence of a co-indexed anaphoric element within the clause is not a necessary condition for these types of LD constructions (ibid.).

Two further constructions that we consider to be non-prototypical extensions of the LD category are those with multiple dislocated constituents as well as LDs with dislocated vocative phrases. LD constructions with multiple dislocated constituents are a common cross-linguistic occurrence (ibid.:1060). Examples (19a) and (19b) represent two instantiations of this type:

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210. Note that the dislocate in (17c) could satisfy an argument slot licensed by the predicate. Nevertheless, this construction is still considered non-resumptive due to its non-prototypical semantic link holding between the dislocate and clause (i.e. partial identity).

211. It is also possible to construe the dislocate in (17d) as possessing a relevance relation to the ensuing proposition.

(19) Catalan (Vallduvi, 1995:123)

a. [El ganivet]i [al calaix]j, li'hij ficarrem.
"The knife, in the drawer, we'll put it there."

Chichewa (Bresnan and Mchombo, 1987:745)

b. [Njûchi]$_i$ [alenje]$_j$, zi$_i$-ná-wá$_j$-luma.
"The bees, the hunters, they bit them."

Moreover, these types of constructions may also be 'non-resumptive' or they may possess overt resumptive elements within the clause. It is even possible, within the same construction, for one dislocated constituent to possess an overt resumptive element, while the other is completely unlinked (see §3.2.3.3), or entertains varying kinds of non-coreferential semantic links between the dislocate and element(s) in the matrix clause.

Constructions with a vocative phrase preceding the matrix clause also fall within our broad definition of LD. Some of the idiosyncratic properties of LD constructions with vocative phrases will be considered in more detail below (§3.2.3.3). Here, we merely want to point out that they share a syntactic family resemblance with prototypical LD constructions as well as other less prototypical instances already discussed. For example, they may be unlinked, or linked to a pronominal argument as in (20a) and (20b), and can even be incorporated in a construction with multiple dislocated constituents (see §3.2.3.3 below).

(20) English (Lambrecht, 2001:1065)

a. [Waiter], there's a fly in my soup!

b. [Mary]$_i$, I love you$_i$.

Perhaps the most peripheral member of the LD category are those referred to by Lambrecht (1996:284) as "freestanding" LD constructions. It was stated above that prototypical LD constructions involve a dislocated constituent associated with a grammatically complete clause. Indeed, even the non-prototypical instances discussed thus far were associated in one way or another (i.e. either semantically or pragmatically) with a grammatically complete clause occurring syntactically after the dislocated constituent. As Lambrecht (1996:284-285) argues, however, it is plausible to construe certain expressions that are syntactically or semantically unrelated to any clause, as LD constructions.

"Since…TOP phrases [left dislocated constituents, JRW] can occur without any overt semantic link to an associated clause [i.e. non-resumptive LD, JRW], it is natural that they may occur also in total syntactic isolation from verbal context" (ibid.:284).

(21) French (Lambrecht, 1996:284-285)
a. Les linguistes…(je vos jure!)
"Linguists…(I swear!)"
b. Marie-Claude! (viens manger!)
"Marie-Claude!" (come to dinner!)

Example (21a) assumes a situation in which the speaker's disgust with linguists is evident from the context, while (21b) is a rather well-known vocative expression employed to call someone in order to attract their attention. While these types of constructions are usually constrained to spontaneous spoken discourse (especially non-vocative instances, such as (21a) and, thus, will not be considered further here, they nevertheless serve to illustrate our point that the LD category is structured according to an exemplar model, which evinces prototype effects of graded centrality.

Examples (12)-(21) are illustrative of our claim that the LD construction reflects a broad cross-linguistic grammatical category that consists of a taxonomic network of constructional schemas (with differing degrees of abstractness), organized according to an exemplar model. An exemplar LD is built up through the frequent clustering together of specific syntactic and semantic attributes. Constructional schemas that lack one or more of the core attributes represent extensions of the prototype while still achieving category membership. Although it is not necessary for a construction to satisfy the entire set of criteria in order to achieve category membership, it remains the case that when there is insufficient family resemblance to the prototype, an entity (i.e. a construction in this case) ceases to be a member of that category. This raises the question: what determines 'insufficient family resemblance'? We contend, following Lambrecht (2001), that the sufficient/insufficient distinction with respect to family resemblance centers around attribute 1) The extra-clausal position of a constituent (cf. [14]). In other words, the extra-clausal status of a dislocated constituent is a common attribute among every instance of LD across languages,[212] and therefore represents the necessary (though not sufficient) criterion for category membership

212. By contrast, most generative studies on LD have proposed various syntactic analyses for the inclusion of the dislocated constituent within the CP (cf. Rizzi, 1997, 2000; Benincá and Poletto, 2004). See §3.3.1 for further discussion.

(Lambrecht, 2001).

3.2.2 The Extra-Clausal Status of the Dislocated Constituent

If the preposed position of a constituent outside the boundary of the clause is the common attribute of LD constructions across languages and *ipso facto* the necessary (though not sufficient) structural criterion for category membership, it is prudent that we ask: "What, if any, cross-linguistic grammatical evidence is there for determining the extra-clausality of a constituent?"[213] We should state at the outset that in answering this question it is not assumed that the evidence provided here is comprehensive, nor is it assumed that in every case the extra-clausality of a constituent can be unambiguously determined on grammatical or syntactic grounds. Nevertheless, we believe the evidence provided below will allow us to offer a more empirically verifiable heuristic tool for identifying LD constructions in BH. Before this evidence is presented, however, it is necessary to define more precisely what we mean by the term 'extra-clausal'.

According to Lambrecht (2001:1065), extra-clausal constituents are those which "do not partake in the semantic and syntactic dependency relations between predicates and their arguments". This semantic[214] and syntactic independence results in the constituent being altogether optional with respect to the predicate-argument structure of the clause (ibid.).[215] By positing the syntactic property of optionality with respect to dislocated constituents, Lambrecht is led to make a nuanced distinction between the dislocated constituents and the grammatico-semantic category adjunct, which is also often defined in terms of optionality. "The term adjunct, like argument, or complement refers to a grammatical or semantic relation between a denotatum and a predication. In contrast, the term 'dislocated phrase' refers to a constituent in a specific syntactic position that serves a particular cognitive-pragmatic function (cf. chaptes 4 and 6). Furthermore, adjuncts, unlike syntactically optional dislocated constituents, may occur in various syntactic positions inside the clause and may possess

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213. Since our object of inquiry concerns extra-clausal constituents in the so-called 'left periphery' of the sentence structure, our discussion concerning the syntactic status of extaclausality will only pertain to this domain. That is to say, that while some of the syntactic evidence for the extra-clausal status of dislocated constituents may also apply to the extra-clausal status of constituents in the right periphery (e.g. Right Dislocation Constructions), when we refer to extra-clausal constituents, we explicitly have the left periphery, or more accurately, the 'frontal periphery' in mind.

214. By semantic, here, we only mean the semantic relation between arguments and predicates. As we saw in the last section, an extra-clausal constituent may still be referentially linked in some way to another constituent within the clause.

215. As we will see in the next chapter, however, this does not entail that they are optional from a communicative point of view (ibid.).

either a topic or a focus relation to the main predication. This is not the case with dislocated constituents which cannot stand in a topic or focus relation to the proposition since they do not occupy a syntactic position inside the clause" (Lambrecht, 1994:188). We are sympathetic to this distinction and therefore follow Lambrecht (2001) in arguing that the two categories adjunct and dislocated constituent are not coextensive but are mutually exclusive categories. Thus, we do not understand the category of dislocated constituent as a part of the broader adjunct category, but rather as a formal and grammatical category of its own (ibid.:1066).

Turning our attention to the formal evidence for the extra-clausality of dislocated constituents, we first examine instances where valency slots[216] normally satisfied by the dislocated constituent are occupied by a co-indexed element. In these instances the extra-clausal status of the dislocate is grammatically determined by the presence of a co-indexed element within the matrix clause. In other words, were a constituent to occur within a clause along with another co-indexed element, their double occurrence would violate a fundamental semantic well-formedness condition, i.e. the same valency slot, or so-called 'theta role', may not be filled twice in a single predication.[217] This is perhaps most clearly illustrated when LD constructions are compared with constructions involving a referential constituent in a non-canonical intra-clausal fronted position, or the so-called CP (complementizer phrase/WH-position). By occupying this position, the constituent's syntactic and semantic role as argument or adjunct to the verb is preserved in contrast to that of the dislocated constituents. These types of constructions are commonly referred to as "Topicalization Constructions" in the relevant literature (cf. §3.2).[218] The juxtaposition of the LD constructions with the fronted

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216. Included here are instances where a co-indexed resumptive element is in an adjunct relation to the predicate.

217. Likewise with non-resumptive LD constructions, while no co-indexed element occurs within the clause proper, the extra-clausal status of the dislocated constituent is often confirmed by the fact that all argument positions are filled and, therefore, there is no open valency slot for which the dislocate can satisfy.

218. The term 'topicalization' is employed to denote a variety of notions within the linguistic literature rendering it almost completely impractical for use (cf. Floor, 2004). The term is often used to refer to a pragmatic function of fronting something for some reason or another, while others use it only to refer to a specific syntactic process or configuration (cf. Ross's 'Rule of Topicalization' as described in §3.2 above). What is more, others have conflated the notion of fronting with that of LD under the single term topicalization (cf. Greenberg, 1984). Generally, however, due to the pervasive influence of Chomskyan generative grammar, the term is used to denote some syntactic movement (i.e. Y-movement) for a pragmatic purpose. Typically this is defined as the fronting of an object which, by means of this movement, becomes the (unexpected, and often secondary) topic, rather than remaining in the canonical focus domain. As Lambrecht has argued, however, this definition is insufficient insofar as fronted elements do not necessarily become the topic of the proposition (i.e. they may become the focus, as in constituent-focus articulations) (Lambrecht, 1994:31). We contend that the obfuscation surrounding the term topicalization warrants its disuse. After the present section, we will abandon it altogether. In its place, we will use the term 'Fronted Constructions' (cf. Van der Merwe, 2013) to describe constructions in which a constituent is located in a clause initial, non-canonical position inside the boundaries of the clause, irrespective of its pragmatic relation (i.e. Topic or Focus) to the pragmatically structured proposition.

constructions in (22) and (23) illustrate this fundamental difference:

(22) English (Lambrecht, 2001:1052)
a. [This movie] I saw____ when I was a kid.
b. [This movie]$_i$, I saw it$_i$ when I was a kid.

(23) German
a. [Diesen Film] sah ich___, als ich ein Kind war.
b. [Dieser Film]$_i$, den$_i$ sah ich als ich ein Kind war.

Within both (22a) and (23a) the NP in brackets represents the fronted NP, while the 'gap' represents the position the NP would occupy in its canonical form. In languages that do not permit a null instantiation of definite direct objects (e.g. English and German), the critical difference between the two constructions is that the bracketed constituent can always be omitted without causing any structural ill-formedness (ibid.). This is further demonstrated by the ungrammaticality of the so-called 'fronted constructions', in which the CP/Wh-position is filled by a WH-word, thus preventing the initial NP from satisfying the valency requirements of the transitive verb (i.e. object).[219]

(24) English (Lambrecht, 2001:1052)
a. *[This movie], when I saw___I was a kid.
b. [This movie]$_i$, when I saw it$_i$ I was a kid.

(25) German
a. *[Diesen Film], als ich___ sah, war ich ein Kind.
b. [Dieser Film]$_i$, als ich den$_i$ sah, war ich ein Kind.

The ungrammaticality of (24a) and (25a) is due to the extra-clausal status of the bracketed NP ("This movie/Diesen Film"), which consequently, prohibits the NP from satisfying the valency requirement of the transitive verb. By contrast, (24b) and (25b) are considered well-formed due to the presence of the co-indexed pronominal argument ("it/den"), which satisfies the valency requirement of the transitive verb ("see/sehen"), resulting in the syntactic optionality of the dislocated NP ("This Movie/Dieser Film").

Further formal evidence for the extra-clausal status of dislocated constituents is evinced

219. The * sign represents ungrammaticality.

by their position relative to other sentence elements, such as discourse particles, focus elements, interrogative particles and, negative particles. For example, many languages employ certain discourse particles that are clause external. Thus, any constituent occurring before such particles would *ipso facto* also be extra-clausal. For example, as Greenberg (1984) points out, the fact that a fronted intra-clausal constituent cannot occur to the left of extra-clausal interjections, unlike dislocated constituents, is a clear indication that they are tightly integrated into the structure of the clause, and that dislocated constituents, conversely, are positioned outside of that structure. Greenberg uses the following examples from English to illustrate this point:

(26) English (Greenberg, 1984:285)
a. [John]$_i$, man, Mary really loves him$_i$.[220]
b. *John, man, Mary really loves.

Moreover, Chafe (1976:52) demonstrates this same phenomenon with an example from the Amerindian language of Caddo:

(27) Cado (Chafe, 1976:52)
[Sa?u?úš]$_i$, bah?na sinátti? tučát?i.hahwah$_i$.
"Ms. Owl, they say, she spilled it."

The position of the discourse particle "bah?na" between the initial NP "sa?u?úš" and the rest of the clause signals that "sa?u?úš" is clause-external. By contrast, focus particles are clause-internal elements "[s]ince focal denotata are by definition communicatively indispensable elements of propositions and… propositions are expressed in clauses" (Lambrecht, 2001:1066) (cf. §2.4.7). It follows, therefore, that an extra-clausal constituent cannot follow a focused element within a sentence. This is verified by the ill-formedness of example (28b) as opposed to grammatical instantiation in (28a):

(28) English (Lambrecht, 2001:1066)
a. [My friends]$_i$, FIFTY SIX HUNDRED DOLLARS they$_i$ raised.
b. *FIFTY SIX HUNDRED DOLLARS [my friends]$_i$, they$_i$ raised.

220. The fact that interjections can also precede the dislocated constituent confirms their extra-clausal status. As in,"Man, [John]$_i$, Mary really loves him$_i$" confirms their extra-clausal status.

This same constraint also typically holds for interrogative particles, which are often used to mark the clause-initial boundary (cf. Lambrecht, 2001:1067).[221] Example (29) illustrates this phenomenon.

(29) Arabic (Lambrecht, ibid: citing Moutaouakil, 1989)
a. [Zaydun], ?a najaha masru 'iji?
"Zayd, did his plan come off?"
b. *?a [Zaydun] najaha masru 'uhu?

The LD in (29b) is considered ill-formed because the dislocated constituent "Zaydun" follows rather than precedes the interrogative particle "?a" (ibid.). Lastly, Lambrecht cites an analogous argument with respect to the position of dislocated constituents and negative particles. "Since topics are by definition outside the scope of negation (cf. Lambrecht, 1994:153–155), clause-initial negative particles must follow TOP [LD, JRW] phrases" (ibid.). Consider the constructions in (30):

(30) Mayan (Lambrecht, 2001:1067 citing Aissen, 1992)
a. [A li vo'ot-e]$_i$, mi mu k'us$_i$ xana'i un?
"You, don't you know anything?"
b. Pero [li vo'on-e]$_i$, mu xixanav$_i$.
"But me, I don't walk."

According to Lambrecht, these sentences would be ungrammatical in Mayan if the positions of the dislocated constituent "A li vo'ot-e/li vo'on-e" and the negative particle "mu" were inverted.

Up to this point we have established the extra-clausal status of dislocated constituents on the basis of the presence of a co-indexed element (pronominal or otherwise) within a clause, a constituent's position before CP/WH-position (e.g. interrogative particles, etc.), and the position of a constituent relative to other sentence elements (e.g. certain discourse

221. Lambrecht (2001:1067) avers, "[s]ince what is being questioned is a proposition, expressed in a clause, and since dislocated elements are extra-clausal, a TOP [i.e. LD, JRW] element must precede a question particle." In our opinion, Lambrecht overstates his case on this point, as our data set (cf. chapter 5) has revealed two instances of an interrogative particle preceding the dislocated constituent (cf. Judg. 11.24; 1 Kng. 17.20). Note, however, that in each case, the the dislocated constituent is unambiguously marked as extra-clausal by other means.

particles, focus elements, etc.). In addition to these grammatical indicators, the dislocated constituent evinces a high degree of syntactic autonomy with respect to its associated clause. Evidence of this autonomy may be seen by examining the dislocated constituent's behavior vis-à-vis two different constraints, which we will now briefly discuss in turn.

3.2.2.1 Locality

First, dislocated constituents may be separated from the clause containing the resumptive element, and this clause may be located at an arbitrary depth of embedding (cf. Fariña, 1995:10). For instance, the clause containing the resumptive element may be an embedded complement clause (31a), relative clause (31b), or an infinitival complement (31c):

(31) English (Lambrecht, 2001:1068)

a. [Mary]$_i$, it's obvious that she$_i$'s going to be mad at her brother.

b. [John]$_i$, the books that he$_i$ reads are all in French.

c. [Those kids]$_i$, to put them$_i$ to bed is really impossible for the parents.

Although the clauses containing the resumptive element in the three tokens in (31) are embedded, they are nevertheless positioned relatively close to the front of the clause and *ipso facto* to the dislocated constituent. By contrast, Fariña (1995:10) provides examples where this is not the case:

(32) Fariña (1995:10)

a. [The damn dog]$_i$, you know I've told her a thousand times to let her mother know that I don't want it$_i$ in my house.

b. [Peter]$_i$, believe it or not, as I was strolling along Venice beach the other day, I came across a group of people giving out leaflets and stuff, and there he$_i$ was with this look of mission in his eyes, a leaflet in his hand, all ready to hand the leaflet to me... I couldn't believe my eyes.

As examples (32a) and (32b) illustrate, the resumptive element may occur at an arbitrary depth of embedding, and possesses positional freedom with respect to the dislocated constituent. This lack of constraint with respect to locality is indicative of the syntactic autonomy of the dislocated constituent.

3.2.2.2 Case Marking

Second, in languages which inflect for case, it is widely recognized that the dislocated constituent need not (and often cannot) have the same case as its resumptive element. Consider the following German and Russian examples in (33):

(33) German (Lambrecht, 2001:1070)

a. [Dieser Film]$_i$, als ich den$_i$ sah, war ich ein kind.
this-NOM film when I it-ACC saw was I a-NOM child
"This film, when I saw it, I was a child."

Russian

b. [Volodja]$_i$, ona emu$_i$ napisala.
Volodja-NOM she he-DAT wrote
"Volodja, she wrote him."

The reader will notice that while in (33a) the resumptive pronoun "den" occurs in the accusative case and in (33b) "emu" occurs in the dative, the respective dislocated constituents "Dieser/Volodja" occur in the nominative case.[222] Lambrecht (2001:1070) also observes that the same constraint also holds for prepositional case marking. This is illustrated in the Occitan example in (34):

(34) Occitan (Lambrecht, 2001:1070)

[Lo cinema]$_i$, i$_i$ vau sovent
"The movies, I go there often."

While the lack of case agreement between the dislocated constituent and the resumptive element is prototypical across languages, we will see in §3.3.1 that there exists a subset of LD constructions for which this is not the case.

By way of summary, in this section (§3.2.2) we have presented grammatical evidence for the extra-clausal status of dislocated constituents across languages. Additionally, we have shown the relatively high degree of autonomy of the dislocated constituent with respect to the associated clause, as is demonstrated by its lack of compliance to the constraints of locality and case agreement—evidence which further attests to its extra-clausal status.

222. This non-agreeing nominative case is commonly referred to as nominative pendens ('hanging nominative') in classical grammar (Lambrecht, 2001:1070).

3.3 Global Types of Left Dislocation

In §3.2 we established an inclusive definition of LD utilizing a prototype-theoretical model to describe the construction's categorial structure. Additionally we claimed that the extra-clausal status of the dislocated constituent is the necessary (though not sufficient) criteria for category membership, and that this extra-clausal status is justifiable on grammatical grounds. Having established this criteria for the cross-linguistic identification of LD constructions, we are now in a better position to survey the prominant types of LD constructions evinced across languages.

It is important to reiterate that the present typological-functional description vis-à-vis the structure of LD constructions across languages is fundamentally incompatible with the central hypothesis and methodological assumptions of (Chomskyan) generative grammar. However, as many formal descriptions of LD constructions have been carried out within this research program (especially with regard to Indo-European languages), it is advantageous for our present purposes to examine how researchers working within the generative tradition have categorized LD constructions. Since it is not the aim of this chapter to provide a rigorous syntactic analysis of LD constructions within a single language, various problems concerning how to best syntactically explain specific structural idiosyncrasies characteristic of LD within a given generative language-specific description (e.g. whether or not CLLD constructions involve movement, cf. §3.2.3) lay beyond the purview of this work. Following our discussion of the categorization of LD constructions from a generative perspective, we will describe in more detail three of the non-prototypical LD types briefly mentioned in §3.2.1.

3.3.1 Generative Classifications: HTLD vs. CLLD

Researchers working within the generative tradition commonly refer to prototypical LD constructions of the type represented in (35) as "Hanging Topic Left Dislocation" (HTLD).[223]

(35) [Pizza]$_i$, I absolutely love it$_i$.

Since English only employs HTLD, these types of constructions were the primary focus of early Generative research on LD following Ross (1967). However, as researchers began

223. HTLD were given their name because the dislocated constituent gives the impression that it is hanging off the edge of the sentence as a result of the lack of so-called 'connectivity effects' (see below) (Shaer et al., 2009:7). We should also mention that other less prototypical constructions such as non-resumptive LD constructions are also considered instances of HTLD.

describing the syntax of other languages it was observed that unlike English, many languages make available a second type of LD construction, termed "Clitic Left Dislocation" (CLLD).[224] Unlike HTLD constructions in which prototypical instances are, in part, identifiable by the presence of a regular (i.e. non-clitic) resumptive pronominal within the clause proper, the resumptive pronominal within CLLD constructions takes the form of a clitic.[225] The juxtaposition of the Spanish LD constructions in (36a—CLLD) and (36b—HTLD) exemplifies this distinction:[226]

(36) Spanish (Alexiadou, 2006:670)

a. [A sus amigos]$_i$, Pedro los$_i$ invitó a cenar
ACC his friends Pedro CL-ACC invited-3sg to dine
"As for his friends, Pedro invited them to dine."

b. [Berdardo]$_i$, estoy segura que nadie confia en ese idiota$_i$.'
Bernardo (I) am sure that nobody has confidence in that idiot.'
"(As for) Bernardo, I am sure that nobody has confidence in that idiot."

Notice that in (36a) the dislocated constituent is introduced by the morpheme "A", an accusative case marker, while in (36b) no such case marker occurs before "Bernardo". This morphosyntactic asymmetry illustrates one of the surface hallmarks of CLLD constructions, namely that they display certain 'connectivity effects' between the dislocated constituent and the clause internal position (Alexiadou, 2006:670; Shaer et al., 2009:7).[227] As exemplified in

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224. López (2009:3) credits Cinque (1983/1997; 1990) as the first to have identified the distinction between HTLD and CLLD in Romance languages.

225. While it is possible for an HTLD construction to possess a clitic resumptive pronominal, CLLD constructions can only possess a clitic resumptive pronominal (Alexiadou, 2006).

226. In actuality there are three general types of LD recognized by researches working within the Generative tradition. Originally, HTLD was associated with English, CLLD with Italian, and a third type, "Contrastive Left Dislocation" (CLD), with Dutch. Much of the variation that was discovered was thought to be related in some form or other to the resumptive element—i.e. whether the resumptive is a regular pronoun (HTLD), a special pronoun (e.g. a demonstrative) (CLD), or a clitic (CLLD) (van Riemsdijk, 1997:4). CLD, is a "typical Germanic construction which is characterized by the fact that the resumptive element inside the matrix clause is a demonstrative pronoun, which must be adjacent to the LD-ed element" (Alexiadou, 2006:687). Since CLD is a much more language specific phenomenon, we will not consider it further here.

227. Within the Generative framework the term 'connectivity' refers "to a situation in which a moved phrase behaves as if it was in its base position with respect to principles of binding and scope" (Zeller, 2004:12). As a result, "[c]onnectivity has… been used as an important test to establish whether or not a particular construction is derived by movement" (ibid.). Whether or not CLLD constructions evincing certain connectivity effects are derived by movement continues to be a matter of debate within generative circles. It is noteworthy that arguments suggesting CLLD constructions are the result of movement operations have come under heavy criticism by other researchers working within the Generative program, many of whom argue for a base-generated description. See for example, Cinque (1990, 1997); Iatridou (1994); Anagnostopoulou (1994); Vat

(36a), and perhaps most significant for our purposes, is the connectivity effect which is brought about by the overt case agreement between the dislocated constituent and the clause internal clitic resumptive.[228] Another example of this connectivity effect is seen in the juxtaposition of the HTLD and CLLD constructions in Greek:

(37) Greek (Alexiadou, 2006:673)

a. [I Maria]$_i$, tin$_i$ ematha kala tosa hronia.
The Mary her learnt well so many years
"As for Mary, I know her well after so many years."

b. Ipe oti ti [Maria]$_i$, / *[i Maria]$_i$ tin$_i$ emathe kala tosa hronia.
said that the Mary-ACC/*NOM her learnt well so many years.
"He said that as for Mary, he knows her well after so many years."

In (37a) the dislocated constituent in the HTLD construction bears the nominative case, while the case of the clause internal resumptive clitic is accusative. On the other hand in (37b), only CLLD is possible[229] and therefore case matching is obligatory. This case marking constraint with regard to CLLD constructions indicate that dislocated constituents in CLLD constructions, while extra-clausal, do not exhibit as high a degree of autonomy as those in HTLD constructions (Cf. 3.2.2.1.).

In addition to connectivity effects, Alexiadou (2006:671–674) provides five distinctive structural properties distinguishing CLLD from HTLD.[230] While these properties are principally derived from the analysis of LD constructions in Indo-European languages, further research is needed to determine if in fact these properties hold for non-Indo-European languages as well.[231]

(1997) and Alexiadou (2006) in this regard. Furthermore, see Alexiadou (2006:676–687) and López (2009:212–246) for detailed overviews of the movement debates surrounding CLLD constructions. While the particulars of this debate are beyond the scope of this work, the notion of a 'connectivity effect' between the dislocated constituent and the resumptive element in CLLD constructions—specifically with regard to case agreement—will prove useful in our description of the various syntactic idiosyncrasies vis-à-vis LD in BH (cf. chapter 5).

228. Three additional connectivity effects observed by Anagnostopoulou (1997:152) that are characteristic of CLLD constructions but noticeably absent from HTLD, are the following: 1) Idiom chunks are found in a dislocated position in CLLD but not in HTLD, 2) Bound pronouns can occur embedded in larger dislocated constituent in CLLD but not in HTLD, and 3) Bound pronominal variables can occur within a dislocated constituent in CLLD but not in HTLD.

229. In modern Greek, embedded clauses only license CLLD constructions (Alexiadou, 2006:673).

230. Cf. Cinque (1990); Dobrovi-Sorin (1990); and Anagnostopoulou (1997).

231. Cf. Zeller (2004) who has demonstrated that CLLD and HTLD constructions in Zulu—a southern Bantu language, do not conform to all of these properties.

First, it is observed that while the dislocated constituent in HTLD constructions is generally a specific indefinite or referential definite NP, a variety of constituents typically occur in dislocated position in CLLD constructions.[232] In (38) for example, a PP appears in a dislocated position:[233]

(38) Spanish (Lambrecht, 2001:1061)
[A todo el curso]i, lei gustaba una monja ue se fue.
to all the class it-DAT pleased a nun that REFL went
"The whole class liked a nun who left."

Second, CLLD constructions allow a dislocated constituent to occur in front of any subordinate type, while HTLD constructions generally[234] only occur in root contexts (i.e. without any subordinating elements). The contrast in regards to the well-formedness of the CLLD construction (39a) as opposed to the ungrammaticality of the HTLD in (39b) reflects this distinction:

(39) Italian (Alexiadou, 2006:672)
a. [L' unica person]$_i$, che a Gianni non gli$_i$ ha mia fatto un favore.
"The only person, which to John not him has ever done a favor."

Spanish
b. *Sin embargo estoy que [Bernardo]$_i$, nade$_i$ confia en ese idiotai.
"On the other hand, I am sure that, Bernardo, nobody has confidence in this idiot."

Third, while HTLD constructions only permit one dislocated constituent, there is no theoretical limit to the amount of dislocated constituents permitted in CLLD constructions. This is evident in the contrast between the Italian (CLLD) and English (HTLD) sentences shown in (40a) and (40b):

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232. We will discuss the various parts of speech evinced by dislocated constituents across languages in §3.4.1.1.

233. A further correlation is noted by the fact that Indo-European languages that do not have clitic pronominals, such as English, also do not permit dislocated PPs, as attested by the ungrammaticality of the following English sentence: "*[to John]$_i$, I haven't spoken to him$_i$."

234. Although it is often posited that HTLD constructions are *only* felicitous in root contexts (cf. for example Alexiadou, 2006:671 and Cinque, 1990:58), López (2009:6) cites Lahne (2005) who argues that the ungrammaticality of HTLD constructions in subordinate contexts is not uniform. Lahne provides examples from Occitan that are judged to be grammatical by her consultants.

(40) Italian (Alexiadou, 2006:673)

a. [Di vestiti]$_i$, [a me]$_j$, Gianni in quel negozio non mi$_j$ ce$_i$ ne ha mai comprati.

"As for clothes, for me, John has never bought them in that shop."

b. *[Mary]$_i$ [John]$_i$, she$_i$ likes him$_j$.

Fourth, as stated above, the resumptive element within CLLD constructions must be a clitic pronominal. However, no such requirement holds for HTLD. In fact, as was demonstrated in (37) above, HTLD constructions not only license regular (i.e. non-clitic) pronouns, but clitic pronouns as well.

The final difference between CLLD and HTLD constructions is that only CLLD is subject to locality constraints. Although there seems to be no constraint limiting the distance between the dislocated constituent and the anaphoric resumptive in the HTLD construction,[235] the distance between the detached constituent and the resumptive clitic in the CLLD construction is sensitive to so-called 'syntactic islands'.[236] Take for example the following three HTLD constructions from English:

(41) English (Lambrecht, 2001:1068)

a. [Mary]$_i$, it's obvious that she$_i$'s going to be mad at her brother.

b. [John]$_i$, the books that he$_i$ reads are all in French.

c. [Those kids]$_i$, to put them$_i$ to bed is really impossible for the parents.

In (41a) the resumptive pronominal occurs in a complement clause, in (41b) the pronominal occurs in a relative clause, and in (41d) it occurs as an infinitival complement. In general, no such flexibility with respect to locality occurs in CLLD constructions.[237] Compare the juxtaposed HTLD and CLLD constructions from Greek in (42a) and (42b):[238]

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235. The clause containing the resumptive element in HTLD constructions can occur at an arbitrary depth of embedding (Lambrecht, 2001:1068).

236. With respect to the notion 'island', we are referring more generally to "a constituent across whose boundary certain relations between two elements cannot be held" (Crystal, 2008:255). Also, cf. Szabolcsi (2006) in this regard. "A syntactic island violation involves an interpretative dependency between a gap and an element across some syntactic boundary, such as a relative clause" (Ariel, 2008:125n.12).

237. By contrast, see Zeller (2004) who observes the striking fact that CLLD constructions in Zulu are not constrained by island conditions. This holds true for instances of CLLD in Lebanese Arabic as well (Alexiadou, 2006:682).

238. While locality constraints as those exhibited by syntactic islands are usually construed as evidence for movement, in actuality the situation is much more convoluted. While movement is generally considered to obey

(42) Greek (Anagnostopoulou, 1997:155)

a. [I Maria]$_i$, xtes gnorisa ton andra pu tin$_i$ pantreftike.
The Mary-NOM yesterday met-1sg the man that CL-ACC married-3sg
"Maria, yesterday I met the man who married her."

b. *[Tin Maria]$_i$, xtes gnorisa ton andra pu tin$_i$ pantreftike.
The Mary-ACC yesterday met-1sg the man that CL-ACC married-3sg
"Maria, yesterday I met the man who married."

Presumably, the ill-formedness of the CLLD construction in (42b) derives from the violation of a locality constraint brought about by the occurrence of the resumptive clitic pronominal within the relative clause. By contrast, the well-formedness of (42a) reflects that HTLD is governed by no such constraint.[239]

While there is general agreement among generative linguists that the dislocated constituents in HTLD constructions are outside the boundary of the clause (i.e. CP adjuncts), they are much more divided with respect to dislocated constituents in CLLD constructions. While some argue that they occupy the same CP adjunct position as their HTLD counterparts, others argue that there is good evidence suggesting that dislocated constituents can occupy a more clause-integrated IP-adjunct position (Alexiadou, 2006:674).[240] Space prohibits us from recounting the detailed arguments concerning the CP/IP adjunct debate concerning CLLD.[241] For our purposes, it is sufficient to point out that CLLD constructions exhibit certain morphosyntactic connectivity effects such as case agreement, which seem to indicate that the dislocated constituent is less autonomous and, therefore, in some way more connected to its

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strong and weak islands in languages such as Modern Greek, CLLD constructions are sensitive to so-called "strong islands" (a property of A-bar movement) while failing to license parasitic gaps and weak crossover effects (properties inconsistent with A-bar movement). In other words, it seems that these constructions evince properties of both movement and non-movement by showing sensitivity to strong islands but not weak islands. Many researchers see this as evidence against a movement analysis. For example, Cinque (1990) proposes a base-generated solution in which islands, in fact, do not distinguish movement from base-generated representations. Specifically, Cinque argues that connectivity effects and selective island sensitivity are properties of chains, regardless of the origin of these chains, i.e. whether they are created via movement or not. See Alexiadou (2006) and López (2009) for a more detailed analysis of the evidence for and against a movement analysis of CLLD constructions in the relevant literature.

239. Other, non-Indo-European languages such as Lebanese Arabic contain CLLD constructions where the relation between the dislocated constituent and the clitic *can* violate the island constraint (Alexiadou, 2006:682).

240. The main argument for analyzing dislocated constituents in CLLD constructions as IP adjuncts relies on the fact that these phrases occur in all types of embedded contexts, and not only in so-called CP-recursion environments (Alexiadou, 2006:674–675).

241. For a detailed summary of the arguments from both sides of his debate. see Alexiadou (2006).

associated clause than its HTLD counterpart (Cf. §3.2.2.1.2). Nevertheless, we maintain that the dislocated phrase cannot be a constituent of the same clause as the coreferential pronoun irrespective of any so-called "connectivity effects" between the dislocated constituent and the associated clause (cf. Lambrecht, 1994:194 in this regard). Furthermore, despite the fact that generative studies of LD have made a serious attempt to describe peculiar syntactic phenomena such as case agreement between the dislocated constituent and the resumptive pronoun, we will not utilize their broad descriptive categories (i.e. HTLD and CLLD etc.) in our analysis due to the theoretical freight associated with these terms.

3.3.2 Non-prototypical Types of Left Dislocation

The reader will recall that in §3.2.1 and §3.2.2 an inclusive definition of LD was argued for in which it was shown that the LD category not only includes prototypical instances of the construction but also other structurally divergent types, which are included in the category based upon their degree of family resemblance to the prototype. Moreover, a sufficient degree of family resemblance necessary (though not sufficient) to achieve the status of LD is accomplished by the extra-clausal status of the dislocated constituent. A few of the more notable peripheral types of LD within this more inclusive scope include: 1) Non-resumptiveed LD constructions, 2) Constructions with multiple dislocated constituents, and 3) Vocative LD constructions. Although these were briefly mentioned above (§3.2.1), we will examine them individually and in more detail here.

3.3.2.1 Non-resumptive Left Dislocation

As we stated in §3.2.1, non-resumptive LD constructions are those in which the dislocate lacks a possible alternative intra-clausal position licensed by the predicate, or the construction evinces a non-prototypical semantic link between the dislocate and the ensuing clause. Take for example the two English non-resumptive LDs in (43a) (repeated from (17a) above) and (43b):

(43) English (Lambrecht, 2001:1058)
a. As for education, John prefers Bertrand Russel's Ideas.[242]
b. (If you suffer from the heat here you must have hated it in Austin)
[Austin], at least you can sit near the AC.

242. Example (18a) is repeated here for convenience. Markers like 'as for' in (43a) are used to signal a topic shift and are therefore appropriate only in a subset of the discourse environments that call for the use of a non-resumptive LD construction (Lambrecht, 2001:1058).

In each construction the dislocate lacks a possible alternative intra-clausal position. That is, it cannot satisfy the valency requirement licensed by the verb. Furthermore, neither dislocate possesses a total identity relation with any other constituent within the ensuing clause. Each constituent, rather, stands in a relevance relation to the associated clause and constrains the interpretation of that clause to a specific semantic domain (e.g. "education" and "Austin").

Non-resumptive LD constructions are common in languages in which the topic-comment sentence type is more prominent than the subject-predicate type (Lambrecht, 2001: 1058). These types of languages are typically referred to as 'Topic-Prominent' languages' (Li and Thompson, 1976:475). According to Li and Thompson (1976), the English examples in (43) represent the basic sentence structure in topic-prominent languages such as Chinese, Japanese, and Lakota, while in subject-predicate languages such as English, German, and French, the sentences in (43) are considered pragmatically marked. Let's look at a few more examples:

(44) French (Lambrecht, 2001:1058)
a. [Mon premier mari], on avait une voiture puis une moto.
"My first husband, we had a car then a motorcycle."

Japanese (Li and Thompson, 1976:470)
b. [Sakana wa], tai ga oisii.
fish TOP red.snapper SUBJ. delicious
"Fish, red snapper is delicious."

Indonesian (ibid.)
c. [Anak itu]i, ibu-njai membeli sepatu.
child that mother-POSS buy shoes.
"That child, his mother bought shoes."

The French example in (44a) (repeated from [17c] above) represents a typical non-resumptive LD construction common in French spoken discourse (Lambrecht, 2001:1058). In this instantiation, the semantic link between the dislocate "Mon premier mari" and the first person plural subject pronoun "on" is considered partial since the referent of the dislocate only corefers to one of the referents denoted by the subject pronoun. Examples (44b) and (44c) (repeated from [17c] above), however, represent two subtypes of non-resumptive LD constructions, often referred to as 'double-subject' constructions in the literature.[243] In both

243. Tizón-Couto (2012:72) refers to these types as 'hanging unlinked' constructions (i.e. 'hanging non-

(44b) and (44c) the constructions possess a metonymic link between the dislocate "Sakana" and "Anak itu" and an element in the ensuing clause, viz., "ta" and "ibu-nja". Likewise, consider the French example in (45):

(45) [Napoléon], sa campagne de 1813 est très contestèe.
"Napoleon, his 1813 campaign is quite contested."

Here, like in (44b) and (44c), the construction is considered 'non-resumptive', not because the dislocated constituent is restricted from an alternative position inside the clause, but due to the metonymic relation that exists between the dislocate "Napoléon" and the subject NP "sa campagne de 1813" ("his 1813 campaign").

3.3.2.2 Left Dislocation with Multiple Dislocated Constituents

Another common LD schema represented across languages consists of constructions with more than one dislocated constituent preceding the clause. This type of construction was illustrated by the Catalan and Chichewa examples in (21a) and (21b), reproduced here as (46a) and (46b) for convenience.

(46) Catalan (Vallduvi, 1995:127)[244]
a. [El ganivet]$_i$ [al calaix]$_j$, li'h$_{ij}$ ficarrem.
"The knife, in the drawer, we'll put the knife."

Chichewa (Bresnan and Mchombo, 1987:745)
b. [Njûchi]$_i$ [alenje]$_j$, zi$_i$-ná-wá$_j$-luma.[245]
"The bees, the hunters, they bit them."

Just how many constituents are permitted in a dislocated position before the clause is uncertain. Lambrecht (1981) argues that in French, no more than two dislocated constituents are permitted in a dislocated position. However, in Lambrecht (2001) this argument is revised in light of instantiations such as (44a), in which three dislocated constituents occur. Example

resumptive').

244. In annotating LDs with multiple dislocates we use the convention of labeling each constituent with a different subscripted letter

245. The resumptive elements in (44b) are morphosyntactically realized as inflectional affixes. See §3.4.2.1 for a more detailed discussion concerning resumptive elements of this type.

(47a) is the French translation of the Abkhaz sentence in (47b):

(47) French (Lambrecht, 2001:1061)

a. [L'homme]i [cette femme-là]$_j$ [mon livre]$_k$, il$_i$-le$_k$-lui$_j$-a-donné.[246]

the man that woman there my book he-it-to-her-has-given

"The man he gave my book to that woman."

Abkhaz (Lambrecht, 2001:1061 citing Hewitt, 1979)

b. [a-xàc'a]$_i$ [a-phoʔs]$_j$ [a-soqo 'ʔ]$_k$, ø$_k$-lʔ$_j$-y$_i$-te-yt'

ART-man ART-woman ART-book it-to-her-he-gave-TNS

"The man he gave my book to that woman."

An interesting feature of LD constructions with multiple dislocated constituents is the possibility for the construction to evince either multiple non-resumptive constituents or multiple linked (i.e. to a resumptive element) constituents. What is more, this type of construction is attested with a combination of non-resumptive and linked dislocated constituents. Take for example the French sentence in (48):

(48) French (Lambrecht, 1981)

[Mon frère]$_i$ [sai voiture]$_j$, elle$_j$ est complètement foutue.

my brother his car.FEM she is completely broken

"My brother, his car, it's totally wrecked."

This instantiation is unique in that the first dislocated constituent is non-resumptive, reflecting a metonymic relation with the second dislocate (cf. ex [45] above). The second dislocate, however, is linked via a total identity to the resumptive pronoun "elle″ within the clause proper. Finally, it is worth mentioning one final schematic type: LDs with a dislocated vocative phrase. Vocative LDs syntactically meet the criteria for LD, but, due to their highly non-prototypical semantic features, are located near to the periphery of the category.

3.3.2.3 Vocatives as Left Dislocation

A few decades ago Levinson (1983:71) characterized the vocative as "an interesting

246. Lambrecht (ibid.) does state, however, that this construction is pragmatically unusual in French, but nevertheless grammatical.

grammatical category, yet under-explored" and despite recent advances[247] towards a more comprehensive description, Shaden (2010:176) has maintained that vocatives continue to "remain a poorly understood category." There is little doubt that this state of affairs is due, in part, to the highly complex and idiosyncratic nature evinced by vocative expressions cross-linguistically (Osenova and Simov, 2002:94).[248] One such peculiar property that directly concerns the present study was first recognized by Lambrecht (1996). He observed that the syntactic structure of certain vocative constructions resembled that of LD constructions: specifically vis-à-vis the extra-clausal status of the vocative phrase and the dislocated constituent, respectively.[249] The syntactic parallelism between the two construction types is shown in the juxtaposition of (49a—LD) and (49b—VOC):

(49) French (Lambrecht, 1996:273)

a. [Jean]$_i$, il$_i$ m'a dit qu'il me rendrait mon argent.

"Jean, he told me that he would give me my money back."

b. [Monsieur]$_i$, vous$_i$ m'avez dit que vous me rendriez mon argent.

"Sir, you told me that you would give me my money back."

The reader will notice that (49b) the vocative NP "Monsieur" occupies the same extra-clausal position as the dislocated NP "Jean" in (49a). In other words, both NPs are syntactically optional with respect to the matrix clause. Moreover, as with dislocated constituents, vocative phrases lack a semantic case role in the sentence (Lambrecht, 1996:271). Therefore, following Lambrecht (1996, 2001) we will consider vocative expressions a type of dislocated construction, which bears the necessary prototypical attribute of extra-clausality. We will refer to this non-prototypical type as VLD for convenience.

The main difference between (49a) and (49b) concerns the form of the two sets of pronouns. While the resumptive pronoun in the LD construction in (49a) is in the third-person, the resumptive pronoun in the VLD construction in (49b) is in the second-person. This is the result of the differing discourse functions of the two respective categories (1996:269). The pronominal has an anaphoric function in the LD construction (49a), while in

247. However, Shaden acknowledges recent renewed interest in the topic. Cf. Longobardi (1994); Lambrecht (1996); Zwicky (2004); Portner (2004), in this regard.

248. For an account of the strikingly idiosyncratic syntax of vocative phrases in English, see Zwicky (1974).

249. Lambrecht primarily looked at data from spoken French, however, he claims that his observations and conclusions are applicable cross-linguistically (1996:267).

the VLD construction (49b), the second person pronoun functions deictically.

Although, by definition a vocative is a nominal element referring to the addressees of the sentence (Shaden, 2010:176), it is important to clarify that our use of the term 'vocative' is not restricted to a morphological case form (although such case forms do often occur across languages), but a kind of sentence constituent that "serves to call the attention of an addressee in order to establish or maintain a relationship between this addressee and some proposition" (Lambrecht, 1996:267).[250] We primarily want to emphasize the structural similarity between VLD constructions and the other types of LD constructions discussed above. By structural similarity, we do not mean to imply that vocative phrases syntactically mirror other dislocated constituents. Indeed, as we mentioned above, vocative phrases possess various idiosyncratic characteristics. For instance, although many vocative constructions syntactically resemble dislocation constructions in that the vocative phrase is extra-clausal either in a clause initial or clause final position, an additional syntactic idiosyncrasy involves the occurrence of vocative phrases in a clause medial position, as in (50), which is an attribute not shared with left or right dislocated constructions.

(50) English (Levinson, 1983:71)
The truth is, [Madam], nothing is as good nowadays.

Nevertheless, we submit that the extra-clausal status of the vocative phrase necessitates that VLD constructions and LD constructions are members of the same grammatical construction type.

In §3.2.1 we saw that the vocative phrase in a VLD construction can be semantically linked (via pronominal coreference) or non-resumptive. Examples (20a) and (20b) are repeated here as (51a) and (51b) for convenience:

(51) Arabic (Lambrecht, 2001:1065)
a. [Yo Halidu], qtarib.
"Halid, come nearer."
English
b. [Mary]$_i$, I love you$_i$.[251]

250. According to Lambrecht (1996:270), vocatives are often confused with 'epithets' and 'interjections'. Where vocatives are employed to refer to something/someone, the primary function of epithets and interjections is to predicate.

251. This example is also found in (21b) above.

Given the optional pronominal linking (i.e. resumptive pronouns) of VLD constructions, clauses in which a pronominal is in the third person are subject to potential ambiguity (Lambrecht, 2001:1065). For example:

(52) English (Lambrecht, 2001:1065)
[Mary]$_{ij}$, she$_i$ loves you$_j$

As the subscripted co-indexing in (52) shows, this construction possesses two possible readings. The dislocated NP "Mary" in (52) may be construed as coreferential with the second-person pronoun "you", in which case it is interpreted as a vocative, or "Mary" may be construed as coreferential with the third-person "she", in which case, the dislocated NP is interpreted as the topic (ibid.).

In addition, in §3.2.1, we briefly alluded, to constructions with a vocative phrase are attested in constructions with multiple dislocated constituents preceding the matrix clause. Take for example (53) from Mandarin Chinese:

(53) Mandarin Chinese (Lambrecht, 2001:1065 citing Guo, 1997).
[shushu] [zhèi jiândao]$_i$, zênme ø$_i$ liâng bàn le?
"Uncle, this pair of scissors, how come it is in two pieces?"

In (53) two dislocated constituents precede the matrix clause. The first constituent "shushu" is a non-resumptive vocative phrase, while the second "zhèi jiândao" is linked. The structural resemblance between (53) and other LD types (e.g. LDs with multiple constituents) further illustrate that LDs with vocative phrases are an extensional subtype of the general LD schema.

3.4 The Internal Syntax of Left Dislocation

Up to this point, our discussion has centered on the cross-linguistic identification, classification, and, to a lesser extent, generalization of LD constructions based on a variety of global structural attributes (i.e. external attributes pertaining to the construction as a whole). We now direct our attention to the internal structure of LD constructions, that is, the possible 'syntactic categories' and 'grammatical relations'[252] evinced by the dislocated constituent and

252. My use of the term 'grammatical relation' should not be interpreted as denoting the relation that holds between one element of the construction and that of another element, but rather the relation that holds between a specific element and the construction as a whole (cf. Croft and Cruse, 2004:262).

the resumptive element, respectively, as represented across languages.[253]

3.4.1 The Dislocated Constituent

3.4.1.1 Syntactic Categories

Cross-linguistic evidence suggests that it is possible to dislocate virtually every syntactic type of constituent: NPs, APs, AdvPs, VPs, and PPs. As the vast majority of examples in this chapter demonstrate, the NP is the most predominate and most prototypical syntactic category realized as dislocates across languages. Although the cross-linguistic generalization seems to be that all languages permit the NP category in a dislocated position,[254] in general, languages differ with respect to other types of dislocated categories they allow (Lambrecht, 2001:1061). Some languages, such as French, permit types of dislocates ranging from a broad spectrum of differing parts of speech, including categories at the sub-phrasal level (i.e. so-called 'non-maximal' projections), while others, such as English, are by comparison more conservative (ibid.). For instance, English instantiations of the prototypical LD construction disallow an AP in the dislocated position since English disallows co-indexation between adjectives and pronouns. Fronted APs are rather said to be fronted clause-internal constituents in English. This constraint, however, does not hold for languages like French, where co-indexation between APs and pronouns is grammatically optional, as the juxtaposition of (54) and (55) illustrate:

(54) English (Lambrecht, 2001:1062)
a. [Rich] he is not ___.
b. *[Rich], if he is not ___, she will not marry him.

(55) English (Lambrecht, 2001:1062)
a. $[\text{Riche}]_i$, il ne l_i'est pas.
b. $[\text{Riche}]_i$, s'il ne l_i'est pas, elle ne l'epousera pas.

As Lambrecht (2001:1062) argues, instantiations such as (54a) are grammatical because the adjective occupies the so-called 'COMP' position (i.e. CP-slot), as required for fronted constructions (cf. §3.2.2). Conversely, (54b) is ungrammatical because it occurs to the left of

253. Since dislocated constituents are, however, syntactically outside the boundaries of the clause (i.e. they do not partake in the syntactic or semantic dependency relations of predicates or their arguments), they are necessarily void of any grammatical relation within the associated clause.

254. As will be shown in chapter 4, the cross-linguistic frequency of NPs in a dislocated position across languages is explained in terms of their prototypical discourse-pragmatic function.

the CP-slot (occupied by "if"), in a clause-external dislocated position. Example (55) represents the French counterparts to the English examples in (54). Notice that unlike (54b), (55b) is felicitous since French freely permits the co-indexation of APs and pronouns (ibid.).

Additionally, although certain languages disallow the dislocation of PPs, other languages freely permit this part of speech in a dislocated position. Take for example the grammatical LD constructions with dislocated PPs in (56a) from Catalan and (56b) from German:

(56) Catalan (Vallduvi, 1995:127)

a. [Al calaix]$_i$, hi$_i$ ficarem el ganivet.
"(In) the drawer, we'll put the knife there."

German (Salfner, 2006:2).

b. [In unserem Garten]$_i$, da$_i$ stehen dre$_i$ Apfelbäume.
"(In) our garden, there stands three apple trees."

Perhaps more unusual are instantiations of LD constructions exhibiting a dislocated AdvP with a co-indexed pronominal:[255]

(57) German (Salfner, 2006:2)[256]

und [dreimal in der Woche]$_i$, dasi reicht dann...
"and three times in the week, that suffices then..."

In addition to nominal, adjectival, prepositional, and adverbial dislocated constituents, Lambrecht (2001:1062) demonstrates that even verb-headed phrases (VPs) may appear in a dislocated position:

(58) English

a. [To speak Hebrew]$_i$, everyone knows it$_i$'s not easy.

French (Lambrecht, 2001:1062)

b. [Du lui parler doucement]$_i$, ça$_i$ la ramollissait, la tigresse.
"Speaking gently to her (that) softened (her) the tigress."

255. Of course, dislocated adverbials commonly occur without pronominal co-indexation (Lambrecht, 2001:1062).

256. Cf. also example (19) above.

The English example in (58a) and the French example in (58b) both illustrate the occurrence of non-finite VPs appearing felicitously in a dislocated position. Moreover, the set of possible dislocated VPs contains various kinds of finite complement clauses (ibid.). Take for example (59a) from Classical Arabic and (59b) from German:

(59) Classical Arabic (Lambrecht, 2001:1063 citing Moutaouakil, 1989)

a. [? an tanjaha fi l-imtihani]$_i$, dalika ma$_i$ la sakka fihi
that succeed-2sg in the exam-GEN this that NEG doubt-ACC in-3sg
"That you will pass the exam no one doubts it."

German (Salfner, 2006:3)

b. [Wo die beiden Strassen aufeinander treffen]$_i$, da$_i$ haben sie alle Bäume gefällt.
"Where the two streets meet, there they have chopped down all of the trees."

In languages such as French and Italian, LD constructions are attested in which dislocates may correspond to a so-called non-maximal phrasal constituent in canonical position (Lambrecht, 2001:1063). For instance, LD constructions with a dislocated constituent—which would be of category N rather than NP, if they were to appear in canonical position—are particularly well attested (ibid.). Compare, for example, the canonical sentence in (60a) with the LD construction in (60b):

(60) French (Lambrecht, 2001:1063 citing Gadet, 1989)

a. je mets quelle robe?
"Which dress am I going to wear?"

b. [De robe]$_i$, je mets laquelle$_i$?[257]
"As for a dress, which one am I going to wear?"

It was stated in (§3.2) that dislocation must involve the association of the dislocated constituent with a grammatically complete sentence. Therefore, "for N-dislocation to be possible, the constituent remaining in canonical position must be a well formed NP" (ibid.). According to Lambrecht, this explains the change of the French interrogative determiner "quelle" in (60a) into the pronominal form "laquelle" in (60b) (ibid.).

257. According to Lambrecht (2001:1–63), the French prepositional phrase 'de + N' "is a highly specialized piece of syntax which exists for the purpose of N-dislocation alone."

Lastly, we make mention of the widespread occurrence of dislocated pronouns across languages. Pronouns in a dislocated position commonly occur in isolation (61a), or along with another dislocated phrase (61b):

(61) English (Lambrecht, 2001:1064)
a. Lotta guys don't ask. [Me]$_i$, I$_i$ ask.

French (ibid.:1065)
b. [Tarzan]$_i$ [lui]$_i$, il$_i$ tailait ses calebards dans des panthères.[258]
"Tarzan, him, he cut his pants out of panther skins."

We will return to the phenomenon of pronominal dislocation in the next chapter, where we will discuss in detail the discourse-pragmatic function(s) of LD, in general, as well as the specific pragmatic motivation for this particular form of LD.

3.4.2 The Resumptive/Linked Element

3.4.2.1 Syntactic Categories

Although the coreferential resumptive element in LD constructions is most prototypically realized as a pronoun (cf. §3.2.1), as example (12) illustrates (repeated here as [62] for convenience), this pronominal element is represented by a variety of morphosyntactic types across languages:

(62) English (Lambrecht, 2001:1051)
a. [The Romans]$_i$, they$_i$ are crazy.

German
b. [Die Römer]$_i$, die$_i$ spinnen.

Russian
c. [Rimljane]$_i$, oniis uma sošl$_i$.

French
d. [Les Romains]$_i$, ils$_i$ sont fous.

Italian
e. [I Romani]$_i$, son-o$_i$ pazz-i.

258. Notice that in this example, the dislocated NP and the dislocated PP refer to the same entity. It is also common for a dislocated pronoun to occur along with another dislocated element that refers to a different entity (Lambrecht, 2001:1064).

Turkish

f. [Romi-lar]$_i$, ø$_i$ deli.

In (62a–c), the resumptive is a free pronoun; in (62d) it is a bound atonic pronoun (i.e. a so-called clitic); in (62e) it is an inflectional suffix; and in (62f) it is phonologically unrealized (Lambrecht, 2001:1051). Furthermore, the pronominal may be a possessive pronoun as in (63a), or a possessive affix as in (44c), repeated here as (63b) for convenience:

(63) English (Lambrecht, 2001:1059)

a. and [this guy]$_i$, his$_i$ fishing pole fell down in the water.

Indonesian (Li and Thompson, 1976:472)

b. [Anak itu]$_i$, ibu-nja$_i$ membeli sepatu.
child that mother-POSS buy shoes.
"That child, his mother bought shoes."

Our discussion up to this point has yet to explicitly mention non-prototypical instantiations of LD constructions that morphosyntactically realize a resumptive pronominal as an inflectional affix.[259] In addition to the Italian example in (62e) above, Lambrecht (ibid.:1055) cites the following examples from Occitan (64a) and Chichewa (64b) in this regard:

(64) Occitan (Lambrecht, 2001:1055 citing Sauzet, 1989)

a. [Lo libre de Joan]$_i$, es$_i$ interessant.
"The book of John is-3sg interesting."

Chichewa (Lambrecht, ibid.:1056 citing Bresnan and Mchombo, 1987)

b. [Njuchi]$_i$, zi$_i$-ná-wá-lúm.
"The bees, they bit them."

Instantiations likes those in (62e), (64a), and (64b) raise the theoretically complex issue of the typological categorization of inflectional affixes as either syntactic agreement markers or anaphoric pronominals (ibid.:1056).[260] Indeed, rather than interpreting (62e), (64a), and (64b)

259. Note that we use the cover term 'pronominal' for inflectional affixes.

260. This is commonly referred to as the 'pro-drop' parameter in generative circles.

as LD constructions with inflectional co-indexation, it is possible to intepret them as involving a subject agreement morpheme, in which case such sentences potentially become indistinguishable from their canonical counterparts (i.e. the supposed dislocated constituent [NP] would actually occupy the intra-clausal subject position) (ibid.).[261] Lambrecht, however, interprets the resumptives above as anaphoric pronominals. In the Italian example (62e) the dislocated phrase "I Romini" is co-indexed with the verbal suffix "-o", which codes person and number, in the Occitan example (64a) the dislocated phrase "Lo libre de Joan" is co-indexed with the third person singular verb form "es" in which the stem and person marker are fused; and in the Chichewa example (64b), the subject marker "zi" agrees in person, number, and gender class with the constituent "Njuchi" (ibid.). Constraints on space prevent us here from wading into the details of the agreement marker/anaphoric pronominal debate.[262]

Related to alleged LD constructions that (potentially) realize co-indexed pronominals that are morphosyntactically realized as inflectional affixes are those in which the resumptive element is phonologically unrealized, or 'null'. Languages that permit null-instantiated resumptive elements, such as Chinese, Lahu, Japanese, and Turkish among others, often lack the rich agreement morphology of languages that instantiate resumptive pronominals as inflectional affixes.[263] This is illustrated by the juxtaposition of the Italian example (62e) as well as the Turkish example (62f) above.

Lambrecht (2001:1057), however, has shown that null-instantiated pronominals are also prevalent in the more familiar Indo-European languages, despite their rich inflectional morphology. He provides the following example from French in this regard:

(65) French (Lambrecht, 2001:1057)

a. [Les cacahuètes]$_i$, jj'aime bien ø$_i$ [moi]$_j$.
"Peanuts, I LIKE (them), me."

b. J'aime bien ø
"I like them."

c. [Les cacahuètes]$_i$, [moi]$_j$, j$_j$'aime bien ø$_i$.
"Peanuts, me, I like (them)."

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261. In some languages, such as Classical Arabic, Russian, etc., inflectional affixes are unambiguously interpreted as anaphoric pronominals rather than agreement markers, due to the fact that the dislocated constituent is case marked independently of its resumptive pronoun (i.e. the dislocated constituent and the resumptive pronoun are non-agreeing in regards to case).

262. Cf. Bresnan and Mchombo (1987), and Jelinek (1984) for further discussion.

263. This is often referred to as 'radical pro-drop', 'rampart pro drop', or 'discourse pro-drop' in the relevant literature.

Based on the well-formedness of (65b) Lambrecht contends that (65a) indeed falls within the category of LD with an understood direct-object pronominal (ibid.). This is further supported by (65c) in which the initial NP "Les cacahuètes" is separated from the clause by another dislocated NP, "moi" (ibid.).

So far we have observed that co-indexed resumptive elements may be formally realized as free, morphosyntactically bound, inflectional or null pronominals. In addition, some languages permit the instantiation of resumptive elements in the form of lexical expressions or epithets. An example of this comes from Lebanese Arabic:

(66) Lebanese Arabic (Alexiadou, 2006:670).
[Ha-l-muttahame]$_i$, refto enno ha-l-ma duube$_i$ n abasit.
this-the-suspect know-2p that 3p-the idiot imprisoned-3sf
"This suspect, you know that this idiot was imprisoned."

While some have claimed that epithets are inherently pronominal in nature (cf. Jackendoff, 1972; Lasnik, 1976; Hornstein and Weinberg, 1990), others have argued that epithet phrases are similar to pronominals only when occurring with a pronominal morpheme (e.g. "ha-l-ma in" in [66]) (cf. Aoun and Choueiri, 2000).

3.4.2.2 Grammatical Relations

Unlike dislocated constituents, resumptive/linked elements in LD constructions occur in an intra-clausal position as either arguments or adjuncts of the predicate. Therefore, it is possible for resumptive/linked elements to satisfy a variety of grammatical relations within the clause. Most commonly, they function as either subjects (67a) or objects (67b), across languages (Lambrecht, 2001:1054):

(67) Indonesian (Li and Thompson, 1976:470)
a. [Ibu anak itu]$_i$, dia$_i$ membel sepatu
"That child's mother, she bought shoes."

Spanish (Silva-Corvalán, 1983:765)
b. [Esa monja]$_i$, la$_i$ adoraboamos.
"That nun, we adored her."

Additionally, the resumptive element may function as an oblique object. This is

illustrated by the proclitic (i.e. bound preverbal pronominals) locatives "hi" and "y" in the following French (68a) and Catalan (68b, originally 56a) examples (ibid.):

(68) French (Lambrecht, 2001:1055)

a. [La plage]$_i$, il faut y$_i$ aller quand il fait chaud.

"The beach, you gotta go there when it's warm."

Catalan (Vallduvi, 1995:129)

b. [Al calaix]$_i$, hi$_i$ ficarem el ganivet.

"(In) the drawer, we'll put the knife there."

Lastly, in addition to arguments, resumptive elements may occur in an adjunct relation to the predicate's (ibid.). Lambrecht provides an example from a well known French song to illustrate this:

(69) French (Lambrecht, 2001:1055)

[Sur le pont d'Avignon]$_i$, on y$_i$ danse tout en rond.

"On the Avignon bridge, people dance all around."

The dislocated locative prepositional phrase "Sur le pont d'Avignon" is co-indexed with the adjunctive atonic (clitic) pronominal "y".[264]

3.5 Summary and Conclusion

This chapter constitutes the first of two chapters concerned with a cross-linguistic overview of the LD construction from a functional-typological perspective. The discussion heretofore has centered on the identification, classification, as well as certain generalizations of the construction solely on the basis of its syntactico-semantic properties attested across languages. By way of summary, we first set out to establish a more inclusive definition of the LD constructional category (§3.2), namely, by casting LD as a taxonomy of constructional schemas organized around a central prototype (§3.2.1). The prototypical constructional schema reflects the clustering together of several core attributes (see [14] in §3.2.1). Constructions lacking one or more of these core attributes represent extensions of this prototype, but are nevertheless category members by virtue of their family resemblance to the prototype. We then argued that the syntactic family resemblance is brought about by the

264. Cf. also example (18) in this regard.

extra-clausal status of the dislocated constituent, an attribute common to LD constructions across languages. Put differently, the extra-clausal status of the dislocated constituent constitutes the necessary (though not sufficient) structural attribute for category membership. Grammatical evidence was then provided (§3.2.2) that substantiated the extra-clausality of the dislocated constituent: a status that additionally accounts for the constituents omissibility, its position relative to other elements, as well as its relatively high degree of syntactic autonomy with respect to the associated clause.

Second, we described several types of LD constructional schemas that are cross-linguistically attested (§3.3). We began by broadly sketching the two primary types of LD constructions (i.e. HTLD and CLLD), as they are categorized by linguists working within a (Chomskyan) generative framework (§3.3.1). It was observed that so-called CLLD constructions typically exhibit certain 'connectivity effects' (e.g. case agreement) between the respective dislocated constituent and resumptive element—phenomena that in some way constrain the syntactic autonomy of the dislocated constituent. Subsequently, we provided a more nuanced description of three non-prototypical but nevertheless prominent types of LD constructions attested across languages (§3.2.3).

Finally, we examined the internal structure of the LD construction with a dual focus on the potential syntactic categories and grammatical relations realized by the dislocated constituent and resumptive/linked element, respectively (§3.4). Although the linguistic category of 'grammatical relation' only applies to clause-internal elements, the clause-external dislocated constituent was *ipso facto* excluded from this categorial description. Moreover, like with the external, or global syntactic structure (i.e. schematic types), the internal structure of LD was described in terms of an exemplar model.

All together the above description resulted in the following syntactico-semantic criteria for the prototypical LD constructional schema across languages.

1. A constituent must be syntactically external to the matrix clause.[265]

2. The dislocate is encoded by a NP.

3. The dislocate could satisfy either an argument or adjunct role to the predicate.

4. There is an element inside the clause that is co-indexed with the

265. Although, as we saw in §3.3.1, some constructions evince grammatical connectivity effects, no conclusion is reached, here, with respect to how these connectivity phenomena affect prototypicality judgments.

dislocate. This element is prototypically in the form of an overt pronominal expression, which may take a variety of forms (e.g. independent, clitic, affix, etc.).

5. The resumptive element prototypically satisfies either a subject or object relation to the predicate.

6. Semantically, the dislocate and the co-indexed resumptive possess a total identity link.

7. Some kind of special intonation is associated with the dislocated referent.

On the other hand, the optional and gradable features that mark a construction as a non-prototypical schema are as follows:

1. Dislocates that cannot replace any element in the matrix clause; that is, they cannot satisfy the valency requirements of the predicate or occupy an adjunct position.

2. Dislocates occupying other syntactic categories besides the NP (e.g. PP, APs, etc.).

3. Resumptive elements that occupy grammatical relations other than Subject and Object (e.g. Oblique Objects and Adjuncts).

4. Resumptive elements that, although possessing a total identity relation with the dislocate, are encoded by a non-pronominal element, i.e. NP, PP, AP, etc.[266]

5. Clause-internal elements that are semantically linked to the dislocate by a metonymic partial, or relevance (frame) relation.[267]

266. Tizón-Couto (2012:374) contends that, in English, resumptive NPs are more prototypical than PPs, AdjPs, etc.

267. Tizón-Couto (2012:375) understand constructions with a metonymic link as more prototypical than those with a partial identity relation.

Chapter 4: Typological Considerations: The Function of Left-Dislocation

4.1 Introduction

The previous chapter's cross-linguistic structural description of the LD schema yielded several generalizations which provided empirical criteria for the identification and classification of instantiated constructional types. We now proceed to the second half of our cross-linguistic inquiry where we will take up Croft's third definition/stage of empirically based functional-typological analysis: an explanation of the LD construction in terms of its linguistic function (c.f. §3.1). It is worth restating at the outset that the purpose of this typological-functional analysis (chapters 3 & 4) is to take into account structural and functional cross-linguistic generalizations that will inform our description and explanation of the LD construction in BH.[268] In light of this overarching goal, the present chapter aims to provide a typologically informed, cognitive-functional explanation of the constructional schema represented in chapter 3. This aim is accomplished in two stages.

First, we engage with a series of noteworthy publications that have appeared over the span of several decades concerning the functional nature of LD in various languages. The studies selected reflect different methodological approaches and seek a variety of analytical objectives. Moreover, insights from these studies, particularly with respect to corresponding functional patterns and common use conditions, give rise to a generalized cognitive-functional profile from a synchronic perspective and which is organized according to an exemplar model. This generalized profile does not entail, however, that the LD schema reflects the same instantiations of constructional types in every language, but rather that the innovation of the construction derives from a common cognitive-pragmatic motivation and is governed by common constraints. As a result, although LD schemas may synchronically reflect functional variations depending on the particular grammatical system, as well as the degree of entrenchment into that system (cf. §4.3), they are united by a common set of extra-grammatical motivations that which trigger the innovation of the construction and govern its development.

The second stage entails a diachronic perspective by which we aim to provide a general framework for understanding how form-function correlations arise out of extra-grammatical forces and then develop into constructional schemas (§4.3). Linguists researching grammatical constructions from the standpoint of language change contend that merely

268. Cf. the remarks concerning the so-called uniformitarianism hypothesis in §3.1, in this regard.

offering a taxonomy of functions fails to constitute an explanation for the existence of the construction (cf. Bybee, 1994). That is to say, one must also show how a particular form came to be associated with a particular communicative function, and in the case of LD, how this schematic form came to reflect a one-to-many form-function association. Therefore, we conclude this chapter by providing a general sketch of the processes involved in the grammaticalization of constructional schemas, with particular reference to LD.

The present chapter will proceed as follows. We will begin by presenting the findings of a representative sample of early functional research (§4.2.1). This is followed by a critical engagement with four relatively recent publications (§4.2.2). Each of these studies provide a distinctive piece of the explanatory puzzle, including: 1) a discourse-pragmatic motivation (§4.2.2.1), 2) interactional and cognitive constraints (§4.2.2.2–§4.2.2.3) as well as cognitive processing, and 3) the organization of the constructional network in terms of an exemplar model (§4.2.2.4). Lastly, these aspects are recast in terms of a panchronic view of grammar and a usage-based approach to language change through the process of grammaticalization. As will be shown, only through diachronic processes can we explain synchronic variation.

4.2 Previous Functional Research

Previous discussions of the function of LD constructions fall into one of two general categories, which represent two approaches to the study of communicative function. The first approach we will refer to as the "Cognitive-Informational" approach (CI), and the second as the "Discursive-Interactional" approach (DI).[269] The CI approach is linguistic in origin, and takes a narrower view of the function of communication, the primary purpose of which is the exchange of information (cf. §2.2.1). This approach is traditionally concerned with narrative discourse,[270] although more recently other discourse types have garnered attention.[271] The cognitive-functional framework adopted by this study, and outlined in chapter 2, is that of the CI approach.[272]

The DI approach, by contrast, has its origin in sociology and consequently takes a

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269. Cf. Geluykens (1992) who also distinguishes between these two approaches. Geluykens, however, uses the terms "Discourse Analysis" for what we have termed "Cognitive-Informational", and "Conversation Analysis" for what we have termed "Discursive-Interactional."

270. Geluykens (1992:6) notes the following as exceptions to this rule: Coulthard, 1977; Sinclair and Coulthard, 1975; and Fox, 1987.

271. Geluykens (1992:6), however, notes that with respect to these exceptions "[b]y and large, the interactional aspect of language is neglected, and too little attention is paid to naturally occurring conversational data."

272. Our decision to employ this framework is largely constrained by the fact that our BH data set consists of written narrative discourse.

broader view of the function of communication. Beyond the mere exchange of information, the DI approach argues that communication is principally interactional. That is, communication as the exchange of information only occurs within the constraints put on it by the sociocultural setting (Geluykens, 1992:5). In this way, every piece of information is primarily a piece of interaction. Therefore, in contrast to the CI approach, the DI methodology primarily focuses on analyzing conversational data paying special attention to the social and interactional aspects of language, viz. conversational settings, participant relationships and the so-called turn-taking system.[273]

Although these two approaches are distinguishable based on their respective emphases (e.g. interaction vs. information) and respective text types (e.g. narrative vs. conversation), and therefore are discussed here as though they represent discrete categories, it is important to bear in mind this is merely a heuristic distinction for practical convenience. We have teased these two approaches apart in order to provide a broad descriptive means for categorizing previous functional research on LD based on similar methodological characteristics. We therefore attribute no theoretical significance to these approaches/ categories, whatsoever. In reality, information cannot be neatly distinguished from interaction, nor vice versa. Thus a purely informational, or interactional account of some phenomenon can never, on its own, constitute a comprehensive functional analysis of that phenomenon.[274] This fact will become evident in (§4.3) where we will see how insights derived from both approaches play a part in the progressive development of the constructional schema. Therefore, with respect to the LD construction, we acknowledge that fully examining both the interactional and informational aspects surrounding the felicitous use of the construction would yield a more empirically informed and comprehensive understanding of the overall communicative function of the construction in natural discourse. However, since BH no longer exists in the form of natural/spontaneous conversational discourse, and the scope of our investigation is restricted to narrative texts, the analysis of LD in BH in the chapters that follow relies heavily on the CI approach.

In the discussion that follows we will evaluate a representative sample of publications that fall into one of the above described categories. As we will see, however, the CI approach has received the most attention with respect to the communicative function of LD, with only

273. Geluykens (1992:5) claims "[t]he interactional aspect of discourse is…in a way more important than the informational one, in that the latter is always dependent on the former: language is always constrained by its social setting."

274. We did not come across a single publication in my research adopted a purely DI approach. In other words, each publication that adopted a DI approach also, to some lesser extent, involved aspects of a CI approach.

a few researchers employing the DI approach. We will therefore begin by briefly discussing the studies that fall into the CI category, after which, we will discuss the research and findings of Duranti and Ochs (1979), as this represents the only early publication to employ a DI methodology (§4.2.1). We will conclude this sub-section (§4.2.1) by drawing several conclusions based on corresponding analytical patterns and findings observed from these early publications (§4.2.3.5). Lastly, we will critically examine four relatively recent and prominent studies (§4.2.2) that build upon earlier research and, taken together, provide a more nuanced functional profile of the LD schema.

4.2.1 Early Studies

There is little disagreement among earlier studies concerning the overarching pragmatic function of LD, regardless of whether a DI or CI approach is used.[275] Virtually all descriptions consider the construction to be a strategy for overtly marking a pragmatic topic relation of some sort; although, there is little consensus among these early studies as to what a topic actually is. For instance, Halliday (1967) argues that the topic (or 'theme', in his terminology) of a sentence is formally defined as the sentence-initial constituent *ipso facto* marking the LD constituent as the topic of the sentence.[276] Likewise Lehman (1988:187) states "…sentence-initial position usually identifies the topic of the sentence. This is well known from left-dislocated NPs."[277] By contrast, Gundel (1975:118) among others, contends that the topic should be understood in terms of the pragmatic notion of "aboutness", where the topic is construed as what the clausal predication is about. This informs her functional account of LD as a construction that "names what the following predicative sentence is *about*" (emphasis mine).[278] Still others (Galambos, 1980; Keenen and Schieffelin, 1976; Ochs and Duranti, 1979) have argued that the topic marked by LD is not an intraclausal pragmatic relation, at all. These researchers contend that the topic is best described as relating a sentence and a larger segment of discourse, i.e. a "Topic of Discourse".

Whether it be at the clause or discourse level, earlier studies agree that the LD

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275. Our judgement as to what constitutes an "early" account is purely arbitrary. Generally we have categorized studies published before 1990 as early, although most of the early studies we found were published before 1980.

276. Cf. also Gómez-González, 2001. Halliday (1967) additionally claims that the LD constructions serves to "mark a new information-unit."

277. Prince (1997:119) observes that Lehman provides no supporting references for his claims.

278. Gundel (1988:223) contends that "in syntactic-topic constructions [i.e. LD constructions, JRW] the phrase adjoined to the sentence invariably refers to the topic." See also in this regard, Rodmanm 1974; Givon, 1976; Gundel, 1977; Reinhart, 1981; Lambrecht 1981; Davison, 1984.

construction is inextricably linked to some pragmatic notion of topic. As we will see later on, however, this prevalent assumption fails to adequately explain all of the cross-linguistic data (§4.2.2.3). Although from the vantage point of hindsight, earlier studies lack theoretical precision and employ antiquated terminology, they have nevertheless made a significant contribution to our understanding of how LD functions in discourse and have provided a necessary foundation for future research. The following sub-section will, therefore, consist of a brief overview of a representative sample of early studies that have been selected based on their foundational contribution to a cross-linguistic understanding of how the construction functions in discourse.

4.2.1.1 Keennan and Schieffelin (1976)

Keenan and Schieffelin (1976a) depart somewhat from the standard DI approach by analyzing the function of the LD construction ("Referent + Proposition" in their terminology) in English conversational discourse rather than in narrative.[279] For Keenan and Schieffelin, the use of LD in discourse crucially involves the notion of "foreground", which they take to be the same as Chafe's "hearer consciousness" (cf. Chafe, 1974). They contend that LD constructions most often occur in contexts where the referent of the dislocated constituent does not appear in the immediately prior discourse (ibid.:242). By using an LD construction, the speaker "brings a referent into the foreground of the hearer's consciousness" (ibid.:242). In other words, LD constructions functions to reintroduce, or reforeground identifiable entities that are knowable by the hearer from the non-verbal context, or from some prior background knowledge. Moreover, they contend that on rare occasions the construction may even be used to introduce discourse-new referents (1983:241–243).[280]

Additionally, the LD construction simultaneously serves to mark a referent as the current topic (or in their terms, "center of attention"). In other words, "the referent is usually not currently a 'center of attention' i.e. not usually the current 'topic'…. In producing constructions of this sort, the speaker makes the referent a 'center of attention'" (ibid.). Therefore, in both instances—i.e. where a referent is introduced (i.e. discourse-new) or reintroduced, the referent is simultaneously marked as the current 'center of attention', or 'topic'. Unfortunately, they provide little in the way of a theoretically sophisticated definition of their notion 'center of attention'/'topic'.[281] These two concurrent functions constitute what

279. Recall that the standard DI approach generally privileges narrative discourse over other genres (cf. §4.2).

280. It is worth noting that each example containing what they refer to as a "discourse-new" referent can be construed as identifiable and possessing a low potential for activation according to framework outlined in §2.3.

281. In Keenan & Schieffelin (1976b:338) the authors define "discourse topic" as "the proposition (or set of

Keenan and Schieffelin refer to as the "global function" of LD (ibid.:244).

They go on to describe several "particular" functions of the more basic-level foregrounding function. For instance, they posit that in many cases speakers use LD to reintroduce an "alternative" referent than the one previously specified with, respect to some predication (ibid.:244).[282] In addition, they argue the construction is often used to "draw the listener's attention to a particular case of some general phenomenon under discussion or to some particular member of a previously specified set" (ibid.).[283] The constructions used in these contexts most often introduce referents that "further illustrate the current topic of discussion [i.e. "Topic of Discourse", JRW]" (ibid.:244). In some cases LD constructions are used neither to introduce nor reintroduce a referent but to mention *again* an already foregrounded referent (emphasis mine) (ibid.:245). "In these cases, the speaker is using the basic function of focusing the listener's attention on some referent to amplify the attention paid to some referent under discussion" (ibid.).[284]

Another important observation concerns the information status of the dislocated referent at the time the construction is uttered. Keenan and Schieffelin note that the referent is rarely "new to the discourse" or "already in the foreground of the hearer's consciousness" but virtually always "identifiable." Yet, these categories are deemed insufficient for understanding the information status of the initial constituent. Rather, they contend "that from the speaker's point of view, what is important is that the hearer know certain background information that is critical to assessing the subsequent proposition" (ibid.:247). They continue by noting that it is not enough for the referent to be identifiable, "[t]he hearer must also know certain facts about the referent, facts that are relevant to the main predication" (ibid.). This conclusion is reached by the observation that many of the LDs in their corpus contain an initial dislocated referent that is then followed by one or more propositions (e.g. relative clauses, etc.) which provide more information about the referent; and this in turn is followed by a major predication relevant to the referent (ibid.).

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propositions) about which the speaker is providing or requesting information."

282. Keenan and Schieffelin specifically use the term "alternative" rather than "contrast" because the term "contrast" is usually used in a narrow sense as an alternative considered by both hearer and speaker. However, Keenan and Schieffelin argue that LD constructions are often used to "bring in a referent that the hearer has not yet entertained as a viable alternative" (ibid.:244).

283. Cf. Prince's LD2 function in §4.2.2.1, below.

284. Cf. Givón (1976) who, in reference to what he refers to as an "over-use" of the LD construction in discourse contexts where it is not needed, states "the wasteful over-use of discourse machinery, via 'unnecessary' repetition, may actually have a useful function: When the channel communication is noisy, or when the communicative system is relatively frail, over-use may be just the right strategy to insure that the hearer knows what the speaker is talking about" (ibid.:153–154). We further discuss this so-called "over-use" of LD in §4.2.2.3 below.

A last point worth noting concerns Keenan and Schieffelin's admonition against making assumptions and generalizations regarding the function of LD constructions in other languages based on their function in English. They write:

> "Constructions of the Referent + Proposition format [i.e. LD constructions, JRW] have been treated as comparable to topic constructions in other languages (Li & Thompson, 1976). For example, they often appear as glosses for topic constructions in other languages. It is not clear at this point however, just how such constructions operate in the discourse of different languages. We need to examine the discourse of different languages such as Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Lahu and so on to assess the extent to which the informational status of the topicalized referent(s) is the same. In this way we can assure that constructions that appear similar on formal grounds are similar functionally as well" (ibid.:246–247).

This point will be discussed in more detail in a future section (§4.2.2.3). It suffices to say here, however, that this word of caution has gone largely unheeded over the past few decades as most studies have assumed, a priori that LD necessarily marks a topic relation of some kind. Evidence that this is indeed the case can be seen in Prince's comments, written nearly four decades after Keenan and Schieffelin (1976). She writes, "these discussions [that is, claims that LD always functionally marks a topic, JRW] are often simply claims or, worse, repetitions of claims as general truths, with no compelling evidence backing them up" (1997:119).[285] Moreover, the veracity of Keenan and Schieffelin's caution will be substantiated below (§4.2.2.3) where evidence will be presented suggests this long held assumption is not as universal as the literature leads us to believe.

4.2.1.2 Lambrecht (1981)

Lambrecht (1981) and Barnes (1985) are two book-length treatments on the function of LD in French. The work by Lambrecht contains a study on LD in Non-Standard French (NSF) utilizing a CI approach. He follows Reinhart (1981) in adopting what he refers to as a "unified definition of topic" as the "relation of aboutness that holds between an expression and a proposition" (ibid.: 1981:60). In other words, topic is construed as a relation between

285. Cf. Lambrecht (2001:1072) who claims that there is a general agreement among researchers on dislocation that left-dislocation constructions "are topic marking constructions, i.e. grammatical constructions which serve to mark a constituent as denoting the topic (or theme) with respect to which a given sentence expresses a relevant comment."

an argument and a proposition in a given context. The LD construction and the pragmatic notion of topic are inextricably intertwined in Lambrecht (1981). In fact, the two seem to be so closely related in his mind that the term "topic" is used both as a pragmatic relation between an argument and a proposition, and as a label for the dislocated position.[286]

Lambrecht discusses the various pragmatic constraints that dictate the felicitous use of LD constructions in NSF.[287] He concludes that referents must be either "given"[288] or "evoked"[289] in the discourse. These constraints prevent the referents of dislocated constituents from being "new"[290] to the discourse in NSF.

Lambrecht observes that the use of LD typically functions to mark a shift with respect to the previously established topic, or when no previous topic was established, to create a new topic. Following Givón (1979), Lambrecht contends that in such cases, the use of LD involves "the degree of difficulty the speaker assumes that the hearer will experience in trying to identify the referent" (ibid.:64). In other words, "when a speaker uses such an LD he does so because he assumes this difficulty will be too great for simple anaphoric pronominalization to do the job" (ibid.). The dislocated referents in these contexts are said to occupy the pragmatic status of "evoked" when the construction is used in the discourse. In other words, dislocated referents must have either been mentioned in the previous discourse (textually accessible), salient parts of the situational context (situationally accessible), or otherwise inferable by way of a semantic link to some aspect of the discourse context (inferentially accessible) (ibid.:64) (cf. §2.3.3). The use of the LD construction then serves to "mark the transition from an evoked to a given entity" (ibid.).

Additionally, Lambrecht observes the use of the LD in contexts where the referent is already given. In these contexts, the question arises as to why the speaker would not choose to use an LD construction instead of the default canonical expression—i.e. the topic-comment articulation where the given referent is an anaphoric pronoun. He contends that the use of LD in these contexts functions to "establish some sort of communicative agreement

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286. In fact, Lambrecht (1981) refers to LD as a "topic construction".

287. Lambrecht admits, however that he is unable to come up with a unified pragmatic definition of the LD construction in NSF (1981:60).

288. Lambrecht adopts Chafe's (1976) definition of givenness as referents that are assumed by the speaker to be "present in the addressee's consciousness" at the time of utterance (1981:63).

289. Lambrecht adopts Prince's (1979) notion of evoked as a referent that is "put on the counter of the communicative situation either by mention in the previous discourse or by being as salient aspect of the extra linguistic context of the utterance" (1981:64).

290. By "new" Lambrecht is presumably referring to referents that Prince calls "Brand-New". That is, referents that are not identifiable in any way to the hearer (cf. §2.2.3.1).

between speech participants" (ibid.:63). It signals to the addressee that the speaker "wishes to espouse something like the following notion: 'you want to know something about X in question? OK, let's talk about X. X is…'" (ibid.:63). Unlike the simple use of a pronoun, the dislocation of the lexicalized referent that is already given in the mind of the addressee "marks the referent as important to the communication" (ibid.).[291] The saliency attributed to the referent by use of the construction in this type of context (i.e. where the referent is given) explains why the informational scope of the topic usually extends over multiple clauses (ibid.:64).[292]

Lastly, Lambrecht takes up Chafe's description of "contrastiveness", which he terms "emphatic contrastiveness", or simply "emphasis". Chafe (1976) stipulates that a sentence must satisfy the following three conditions in order to be contrastive: 1) existence of presupposed knowledge about some state of affairs; 2) knowledge of a set of possible candidates for involvement in the state of affairs; and 3) the assertion of which candidate is, in fact, the correct one. In other words, emphatic contrastiveness necessarily involves a constituent-focus articulation in which one of the set of possible candidates fills an open proposition. According to Lambrecht, emphatic contrastiveness necessarily involves a negative connotation, so that a test for this type of contrastiveness is the possibility of inserting the phrase "rather than (instead of, not) […]" after the focus of contrast (Lambrecht, 1981:67–71). For Lambrecht, the distinguishing factor between emphatic contrastiveness and non-emphatic contrastiveness is whether or not a contrastive relation involves a negative connotation. LD in NSF regularly marks non-emphatic contrastiveness.

To sum up, Lambrecht contends all referents of dislocated constituents be at least textually or situationally recoverable (i.e. evoked/accessible) or already given. By using the LD construction, the speaker "announces the domain of his discourse, or a shift in the domain of the discourse, and expresses the desire to establish a communicative agreement as to the importance of the referent of the topic for the discourse" (Lambrecht, 1981:77). Moreover, the identifiable and evoked status of the referents makes it impossible for referents to be (brand-) "new" to the discourse. Lastly, LDs in NSF often function to mark a non-emphatic contrastive relation between two or more entities in the discourse.

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291. Cf. Keenan and Schieffelin, 1976 (§4.2.1.1).

292. In the present work, the pragmatic notions of newness, identifiability, givenness and the relations between them lack the nuanced description found in Lambrecht's later work (1994) (cf. §2.2–§2.3).

4.2.1.3 Barnes (1985)

Barnes (1985) is a detailed study of the functions of LD in Spoken Standard French[293] (SSF) and is intended to be a more nuanced sequel to Lambrecht (1981). Although Barnes utilizes a CI approach in her analysis, like Keenen and Schieffelin (1976a), her corpus consists of spontaneous conversation. Barnes's principle aim is the "formulation of a more precise description of the pragmatic function(s) of each type of detachment construction occurring in her corpus through the close examination of contexts in which each occurs (1985:2).

Barnes's research stems from a dissatisfaction with the prevailing view of LD as merely overtly marking the topic-comment relation and effecting a topic shift of some sort (cf. Lambrecht, 1981; Keenan and Schieffelin, 1976a). Her aim to provide a more thorough description of the function(s) of LD in SSF, therefore, results in a reanalysis of the pragmatic factors motivating the use of LD in various discourse contexts in addition to critiquing previously established functional categories. An example of the latter is illustrated in Barnes's engagement with Lambrecht's (1981) construal of the functional categories of "contrast" and "topic-shift" as occurring in distinct contexts. By contrast, Barnes insists that a close relation exists between them. In fact, she posits that these two contexts reflect two extremes of the same broad contextual domain that she terms a "comparative context". This comparative context subsumes a variety of particular types of contexts that are located on a continuum that spans from the more narrow "explicitly contrastive" to the broader context that is usually described in terms of topic shift (ibid.:23).[294] Put another way, contrastive LDs should be construed, according to Barnes, as a specific type of topic shift (ibid.).

Additionally, Barnes observes a diversity of specific functions that are connected at a more general level by a basic unity of functions (ibid.:111). For instance, although the referent of the resumptive is the sentence topic (=ST) in virtually every LD in her corpus, in only one instance, she contends, is this the sole motivation for the construction (ibid.).[295] In most every other case, the referent is also what Barnes refers to as a "Discourse Topic" (ibid). This notion of Discourse Topic (=DT) and its relation to LD is perhaps one of the more significant contributions of her work. Her development of this notion is rooted in what she argues to be one of the most neglected areas of research among previous studies on LD,

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293. According to Barnes (1985), what she calls SSF is essentially the same as what Lambrecht as termed NSF. It is "the language spoken by educated speakers in an informal situation" (1985:115).

294. It seems that Barnes's notion of "comparative" is similar to that of Keenan and Schieffelin's "alternative" notion, in that comparative is meant to connote a broader category than the narrower category of contrast as defined by Chafe (1976) (cf. §4.2.1.1).

295. Barnes follows Reinhart (1981) and Lambrecht (1981) in defining the sentence topic as what the proposition is about.

stating that "the notion is considerably more complex than previous literature would have one to believe" (ibid.:28). Indeed, she goes so far as to contend that an accurate description of the function(s) of LD in SSF necessitates "a multi-level notion of topic" (ibid.:28). For this reason, she sets out to "give some precise content to the notion of DT" in order to clarify the role of LD with respect to ST and DT (ibid.). According to Barnes, a DT "is roughly the same thing which a segment of discourse larger than the sentence is about, i.e. about which it supplies information" (ibid.). A requirement for DT is that of super-sentential scope. Usually this scope is grammatically evinced by the occurrence in successive sentences of anaphoric expressions referring to the given entity, or less frequently a given proposition (ibid.). She also posits a pragmatic constraint by which a given stretch of discourse is understood as intending to "expand our knowledge (i.e. the discourse participants knowledge) of the entity or the proposition which is the DT" (ibid.). Thus, Barnes argues for a view of DT that incorporates the same informational aboutness constraint at the discourse level that is applied for topics at the sentence level. Additionally, Barnes specifies that there are often various levels of DT with lower level DTs often embedded within higher level, more general DTs.

Some have argued on the basis of the above description that ST is simply the lowest level of DT, and in so doing conflate the two notions. Barnes counters this position by offering two reasons for why the notions should be kept separate: First, ST, unlike DT, must be explicitly represented in the sentence. Second, a DT, unlike an ST, necessarily possesses a degree of saliency, or prominence that goes beyond the level of the sentence in which it occurs. That is to say, a DT necessarily possesses a super-sentential scope. Although most LDs in Barnes's corpus mark a referent as an ST that is also a DT, some referents failed to satisfy these two criteria. Therefore, although the association of LD with the notion of DT held for the majority of LDs in her corpus, the functional relation was not universal. Clearly, some dislocated referents were only STs. LD as a strategy to establish or mark a switch between DTs appears, therefore, to be only one of several possible functions of LD in SSF.

The majority of LDs in Barnes's corpus (62%) have a pronominal NP as the detached constituent (1985:13). Moreover, the majority of pronominal (82%) and lexical (79%) detachments have anaphors that are the grammatical subjects of the accompanying clause (ibid.:15). For this reason, the bulk of her discussion centers on the pragmatic description of LDs with these particular syntactic profiles.

Concerning LDs with a detached pronominal NP, a significant amount of attention is given to so-called *moi*-LDs—i.e. LDs with a French first person pronoun *moi* in dislocated position. It suffices to say for our purposes that Barnes finds the use of *moi*-LDs to be pragmatically constrained by a maximal degree of givenness (where givenness is defined

according to Chafe (1976) as that which is present in the addressees consciousness). Accordingly, *moi*-LDs function to mark the speaker as the DT and typically evoke a discontinuity in the discourse, which serves to mark a shift in DT, often in contexts where a comparative (non-emphatic contrastive) function is evinced, as well.

The majority of the her work, however, focuses on the pragmatic factors governing the occurrence of French LDs with detached lexical phrases, particularly LDs where the resumptive is the grammatical subject of the clause. Specifically, Barnes evaluates previous claims regarding the constraints on the information-status pertaining to the dislocated referents. Like Lambrecht, she takes as her point of departure Chafe's (1976) notion of "givenness" as well as Prince's (1981) notions of "new" and "evoked" status (§4.2.1.2). Barnes takes it as uncontroversial that referents of LD cannot be Brand-New to the discourse/ addressee. Therefore her use of the term "new" coincides with the the notion of New-Unused (i.e. identifiable) as well as referents that are in any way inferable from the textual or situational context.

One third of all NP-LDs in her corpus (with subject anaphors) were characterized by dislocated referents that were new to the discourse. These referents, according to Barnes, are "linked to the preceding discourse" by one of two types of linking devices, as stipulated by Reinhart (1982:19): 1) there is a co-referential or a set-membership relation between the dislocate and another referent or set of referents in the preceding discourse, or 2) the dislocated referent belongs to the "frame of reference" established by a previously mentioned referent.[296]

The majority of dislocates in her corpus were textually evoked, with only a few being situationally evoked. Moreover, Barnes specifies four specific contexts in which textually evoked dislocates occur; these are are distinguishable by the following criteria: 1) the length of interval between the last mention of the referent and the LD, 2) whether the referent has the status of DT before its occurrence in the LD, and 3) whether the referent is given before the utterance of the LD (ibid.:65).

The first, and by far the most common context distinguished by Barnes are instances where the referent has just been mentioned (usually as an object) but has yet to be established as a DT. Hence, the use of the LD serves to mark the textually evoked referent as a DT. Second are contexts in which the referent is one of two or more given DTs. The use of LD in these contexts serves to mark a shift in attention (cf. §4.2.1.2) in contexts where there are two or more primary DTs, notably in comparative contexts (ibid.:66). The third context involves

296. Cf. Chafe's discussion of the notion "schema" in §2.3.3.

referents that possessed the status of DT in a remote part of the discourse but has since lost its status. The use of LD therefore serves to reintroduce the earlier topic. Lastly, her corpus contains LDs that are not only evoked and a DT, but are also given. In these contexts, the use of a pronoun in a default topic-comment articulation would be sufficient but the speaker uses an LD with a dislocated lexical NP instead. Barnes explains the use of LD in these particular contexts by invoking Keenan and Schieffelin's explanation, viz. the LD "gives special emphasis to an entity already under discussion" (ibid.:67) (cf. Lambrecht, 1981).

Barnes, therefore, argues that the only pragmatic constraint concerning the dislocation of referents in SSF is that they cannot be Brand-New (i.e. not already identifiable by the hearer) (ibid.:112). This, however, is also the pragmatic constraint for the use of non-detached lexical subjects in canonical position in SSF. In other words, Barnes finds no discernible difference in the inherent pragmatic status between the referents of detached constituents and non-detached lexical subjects in SSF. If this is the case, what then is an accurate predictor of the occurrence of LD vs. a lexical subject? Barnes follows Lambrecht (1984a; 1984b) who borrows from Hopper (1979) in proposing a "grounding principle" by which lexical subjects tend to be limited to backgrounded portions of discourse.[297] By contrast, dislocated referents tend to occur in the foregrounded portions of discourse,[298] an attribute that supports Barnes's claim that the majority of dislocated referents are DTs. Moreover, Barnes found this principle to be operative not only for lexical detached NPs but for pronominal (*moi*) LDs as well (ibid.).

Barnes briefly compares her findings with that of Keenan and Schieffelin's research on LD in English, contending that their description of the primary function of LD applies just as well to LD in SSF. In other words, LDs in French—like in English—prototypically function "to bring into the foreground of the listener's consciousness a referent which is usually not currently a 'center of attention'" (Keenan and Schieffelin, 1976:242). Additionally, Barnes illustrates French examples of Keenan and Schieffelin's "particular" sub-functions of the construction in English (cf. §4.2.11), hence further illustrating the similarity of the functional profile of the construction in the two languages.

Barnes does, however, observe a slight difference between LD in SSF as opposed to English. This difference lies in the relative frequency and pragmatic status of the LD referent.

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297. Hopper and Thompson (1980:280) define "background" as "that part of discourse which does not immediately and crucially contribute to the speaker's goal, but which merely assists, amplifies, or comments on it."

298. Hopper and Thompson (1980:280) define the foregrounded portion of discourse rather vaguely as "material which supplies the main points of the discourse."

At the moment of utterance, dislocated referents in French tend, on average to have a higher degree of prominence in the listener's consciousness (i.e. a higher degree of accessibility, cf. §2.3.3) than dislocated referents in English. Barnes's data reveals that the LD construction is frequently used with referents that were mentioned in the immediately prior discourse.[299] By contrast, Keenan and Schieffelin suggest that the introduction of discourse-new (i.e. New-Unused) referents is the most common function of LD in English. Barnes suggests that this pragmatic difference between the two languages also accounts for the apparent higher frequency of LD in spoken French as compared to spoken English (ibid.:113).

Barnes concludes her analysis with a brief description of the function of two non-prototypical types of LD. She begins with what she refers to as "No-anaphor LDs" (i.e. what we have referred to elsewhere as "Unlinked LDs", cf. §3.2.2.1). Barnes follows Chafe in describing this LD type as not marking the topic of the accompanying proposition, but rather setting "a spatial, temporal, or individual framework within which the main predication holds" (Chafe, 1976:50). Secondly, Barnes discusses what she refers to as "Double LDs" (i.e. what we have referred to elsewhere as "LD with multiple dislocated constituents", cf. §3.2.2.2). Although she observes several variations of this type of construction in her data-set, she posits a general pragmatic principle that seems to be at work in all cases: Where an LD construction has two (or more) dislocated expressions, one of the two LD expressions will only be loosely linked (semantically or pragmatically) to the following predication, and this expression must come before the one which is more closely related to the predication (ibid.:107). In other words, "the first expression refers to a more general topic and sets the limits within which the second expression is to be interpreted" (ibid.).

In summary, Barnes aims to build on previous descriptions of LD in SSF (in particular Lambrecht, 1981) by providing a more nuanced description of pragmatic motivations determining the use of the construction. Perhaps her most significant contribution in this regard is the development of a multi-level notion of topic that involves a pragmatic "aboutness" relation at the sentence/propositional-level (ST) as well as at higher discourse-levels (DT). Although there were a small minority of dislocated referents in her data for which the resumptive element was clearly only the ST of the accompanying clause, Barnes found that the majority of LDs functioned to establish or mark a shift between STs that were also higher-level DTs. Furthermore, Barnes' study provides a more thorough analysis of the pragmatic status of dislocated referents than is found in previous work on LDs. One-third of her corpus comprises dislocated referents that she refers to as "new" to the discourse—where

299. Barnes cities the high frequency of first person pronominal *moi*-LDs in French as further evidence that LD in French typically involves referents that are more prominent to start with (1985:113).

"new" refers to referents that are either identifiable to the addressee, or are in some way inferable from the situational or discourse internal context. The majority, however, are considered textually evoked and fall into one of four contextual categories.

She also posits that this is the primary difference between the use of LD in French as compared to English. Where the majority of French LDs have dislocated referents that are textually evoked, the majority of English LDs have dislocated referents that are new to the discourse. Barnes concludes, however, that the only pragmatic constraint with respect to the information status in French, and English for that matter, is that the dislocated referent not be Brand-New (i.e. Unidentifiable, or Hearer-New) to the discourse. Since this constraint also applies to the use of lexical subjects in canonical position, Barnes proposes that the use of LD is motivated over the use of lexical subjects by a "grounding principle". This principle stipulates that while lexical subject constructions tend to occur in backgrounded portions of discourse, LD constructions tend to occur in foregrounded portions: a fact that supports her claim that most dislocated referents in SSF are DTs.

4.2.1.4 Givón (1983)

We briefly mention the work by Givón since he examines LD constructions in narrative, utilizing a form of the CI approach from a typological perspective.[300] Although Givón does not offer a detailed study of the construction, his typological observations are nevertheless noteworthy in that they provide generalizations of the function of LD across languages. For instance, the common observation made by Keenan and Schieffelin (1976) for English, and Lambrecht (1981) and Barnes (1985) for French, that the use of LD is constrained by the dislocated referent's less-than-maximal degree of accessibility is generalized by Givón who contends that this is prototypical for all languages. He proposes a "Topic Accessibility Hierarchy"[301] by which the lexico-grammatical coding of a referent across languages depends on its accessibility as a topic; this hierarchy is shown in Figure 2. below:[302]

300. Cf. Also Givón (1976) where it is argued that pronominal verb agreement arises from the "grammaticalization" (or "syntacticization") of LDs and RDs. The overuse of these two constructions leads to, what Givon calls "topic agreement" to subject, direct object or indirect object agreement. See §4.2.2.3 for further discussion in this regard.

301. Cf. Lambrecht's "Topic Acceptability Scale" §2.4.3.

302. Cf. Ariel's (1990, 2001) "Accessibility Theory" for a more robust explanation of how the degree of accessibility of a referent determines referential form (cf. §2.3.4.2.).

Figure 2.:

most accessible topic

1. zero anaphora

2. unstressed bound pronouns or grammatical agreement

3. stressed/independent pronouns

4. R-dislocated DEF-NP's

5. Neutral-ordered DEF-NP's

6. L-dislocated DEF-NP's

7. Y-moved NP's

8. cleft/focus constructions

9. referential indefinite NP's

most inaccessible topic (Givon, 1983:17)

As Figure 2. shows, the LD construction is a marker of topics with a low degree of accessibility, the only constraint being that they be identifiable (definite). Givón argues that the construction is "typically a device to mark topical referents, most commonly definite and anaphoric, that have been out of the focus of attention for a while and are being brought back into the discourse" (2001:265). Moreover, he observes that when the dislocated referent is textually evoked (accessible), the anaphoric distance of the dislocated referent is one of the highest of all referent-coding devices across languages (ibid.). As we will see in the next section, Duranti and Ochs (Keenan) confirm this generalization for LDs in Italian as well.

4.2.1.5 Duranti and Ochs (1979)

To our knowledge, Duranti and Ochs (1979) is the only early study to adopt a DI perspective. They examine the function of LD in Italian conversation with respect to informational and interactional dimensions of communication. Concerning the former, Duranti and Ochs measured the pragmatic status of the dislocated referents in their corpus with respect to the categories of definiteness (identifiability), evoked (accessibility), and center of attention (i.e. the active topic of the sentence or discourse).[303] They found one hundred percent of the LD constituents in their corpus were definite (i.e. identifiable). The referent's evoked status was measured according to its last mention in the prior discourse (i.e. textually evoked). They found that dislocated referents tended not to occur in the recent discourse history—i.e. they possessed a low degree of accessibility—further confirming Givón's generalization (cf.

303. Cf. Keenen and Schieffelin (1976a).

§4.2.2.3).[304] Finally, concerning their notion of "center of attention", Duranti and Ochs (ibid.:393) provide a broad definition, stating that it can mean: a) the "center of attention with respect to speaker, to hearer, or to both, b) the center of attention with respect to prior, current, or immediately subsequent concerns, c) the center of attention of a particular utterance (e.g. sentence topic), or d) the center of attention of a particular discourse (e.g. discourse topic). Duranti and Ochs contend that, generally speaking, LD functions to (re)introduce a referent as a center of attention, after which the referent typically continues to receive attention beyond the utterance in which it occurs. In other words, the (re)introduced referents overwhelmingly recur in the immediate subsequent discourse (Duranti and Ochs, 1979:394).[305] Thus, dislocated referents in Italian, also satisfy Barnes's super-sentential scope criterion for DTs (cf. §4.2.1.3).

In addition to informational concerns, Duranti and Ochs aver that social interaction influences the use of LD constructions in Italian. They contend that LD is primarily used as a competitive "floor-seeking" move in Italian conversation. That is, speakers regularly employ LD for "the seeking, occupying and holding onto the floor as a means of controlling the direction of talk and the social situation at hand" (ibid.:403). In the spoken conversational data they examined, Duranti and Ochs found LD constructions were specifically used to achieve these interactional tasks. LD constructions function as a competitive move to not only gain access to the speaking floor but also to block or reduce the access of others participating in the social interaction (ibid.:405).[306] Duranti and Ochs argue that LD constructions are an especially effective means for these purposes because they nearly always

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304. Duranti and Ochs provide a more nuanced discussion of the context of prior discourse than mere frequencies of prior mention. They argue, rather, for a view that addresses the relation of the referent to the global concerns or themes expressed in the discourse up to the point of mention. Duranti and Ochs refer to these global concerns or themes as "frames". These frames link referents to one another in a semantically coherent way (Duranti and Ochs, 1979:395). They found the vast majority of referents of LD constituents that are not mentioned in the previous two clauses are linked to an on-going frame of reference. "Rarely is an LD constituent not relevant to on-going concerns" (ibid.). They contend that referents are linked to frames via: 1) repetition, or 2) intra-frame referent shift. Repetition concerns topic continuity or non-topic to topic shift. Intra-frame shift involves item-to-frame shift, where the referent of the LD constituent expresses a general concept that previous referents were apart of. Intra-frame shift may also involve shifts among items within a frame, where the discourse moves from one item to another item relevant to a global theme under discussion (ibid.:398). According to Duranti and Ochs, referents of Italian LD constituents do not function in topic-continuity contexts. Italian LD constructions appear to be reserved exclusively for topic-shifting functions (ibid.:401).

305. Thus, dislocated referents in Italian, also satisfy Barnes's super-sentential scope criterion for DTs (cf. §4.2.1.3).

306. Duranti and Ochs (1979) note that it is difficult to specify what factors encourage competition for the floor. "For example, several of our left-dislocations appear in the course of decision making, where interlocutors often disagree with one another's judgements or wish to foreground their own assessment. Additionally, competition for the floor appears greater with an increase in the numbers of conversational participants" (1979:405).

relate to some general concern under consideration other than the immediate subject spoken about at that instant (ibid.:406–407).[307] In other words, they are generally used to shift attention away from some immediate point of reference to a different point of reference that is relevant to some aspect of the prior conversational discourse (ibid.:407).

4.2.1.6 Summary and Conclusion: Cognitive-Pragmatic vs. Discourse-Functional Information

The publications discussed in this section provide a frame of reference for understanding how early researchers have traditionally approached the question of the function of LD in discourse. Despite their differences, we observe corresponding patterns concerning the methodological approaches used by these studies as well as general points of agreement in the findings issued. The congruence among these early studies is noteworthy in two respects: First, their arguments have proven foundational for later research, often serving as *a priori* points of departure for additional claims (cf.§4.2.2). This is most evident in the general assumption that LD is inextricably linked to some sentence-level notion of topic. Second, they contribute towards our aim at formulating testable hypotheses for determining the function(s) of LD in BH. By way of summary, we identify several of these points of agreement in what follows.

As a first observation we note the proclivity of early publications to adopt a CI approach to their research. The aims of researchers adopting this methodology are largely determined by a view of communication that is particularly concerned with the cognitive dimensions of the exchange of information. Duranti and Ochs (1979), however, provide some insight, albeit general in nature, into the value of a DI approach, particularly with respect to its role in the turn-management system of spontaneous-spoken discourse. As we will see in §4.2.2 this approach is taken up by Geluykens (1992), and to a lesser extent by Tizón-Couto (2012), to explain the innovation and development of LD in English through interactional processes.

Further, we observe a variety of analytical patterns that are classified in one of two informational categories, namely Cognitive-Pragmatic and Discourse-Functional, respectively. Cognitive-Pragmatic information is contextually determined and concerns such information as the dislocated referent's informational-status and sentence/discourse topic status at the time of utterance, as well as the referent's persistence as a topic after the

307. By the phrase "some general concern under consideration", they mean that the referent of the dislocated constituent may have appeared in the prior spoken conversational discourse, and therefore constitute a legitimizer of subsequent conversation, or that the referent may be semantically linked to some frame (i.e. global theme) (Duranti and Ochs, 1979:406).

utterance. By contrast, Discourse-Functional information, as the name implies, concerns the overall communicative task(s) the construction is said to accomplish at the discourse level, such as referent activation/foregrounding, topic-promotion, topic-switch etc. Cognitive-pragmatic information is often construed as motivating the discourse-functional claims.

The informational status of the dislocated referent figures prominently in each study as a critical cognitive-pragmatic motivation for the use of LD. The referent's status was generally quantified according to two sets of parameters: Brand-Newness vs. Identifiability, and Evoked (Accessibility) vs. Given (Active) status. (Note that these parameters were given more theoretical description in some studies (i.e. Barnes) than in others (i.e. Keenan and Schieffelin, and Lambrecht). With respect to the first set of parameters, early researchers agree that dislocated referents must necessarily be identifiable to the addressee. In other words, a pragmatic constraint exists by which referents assumed by the speaker to be Brand-New (i.e. Unidentifiable) to the addressee are precluded from dislocation. In each study, however, the notion of identifiability alone was deemed insufficient for describing the informational status of the dislocated referent. Most argued that the referent was not only identifiable, but in some way contextually evoked (i.e. accessible), either by mention in the previous discourse (textually), the presence of the entity in the text-external context (situationally), or by way of a semantic relevance relation to some other entity or proposition in the discourse context (inferential). With the exception of LDs in French (cf. Barnes, 1985; Lambrecht, 1981), the referents of LD constituents typically entertained a low degree of accessibility, or evoked status. However, dislocated referents with a given/active status were also attested. Moreover, in virtually every case, the degree of accessibility was quantified textually by measuring the distance with which the referent was last mentioned in the discourse.

As mentioned at the start, these studies unanimously agree that dislocated referents are necessarily the topics of the accompanying sentence/proposition. Moreover, in some cases, the referent's topical relation was construed as having scope over a super-sentential segment of discourse. That is to say, the researchers observed a tendency for referents to persist as topics after their mention (cf. Barnes). However, there is less homogeneity with respect to what exactly is meant by the term "topic", with some authors defining it as what the proposition is about (Lambrecht, Barnes, Givón) and others defining it as the current "center of attention" (Keenan and Schieffelin, Duranti and Ochs).

Cognitive-pragmatic information is construed as motivating the discourse-function(s) of LD. Each study agreed that the primary communicative goal for which LD is employed is the (re)introduction/(re)activation of identifiable referents, and, for the most part, these

referents entertained a low degree of accessibility. This (re)introduction simultaneously serves to promote the referent from accessible non-topical, to given/active topical status in the mind of the addressee. In addition, several related sub-functions were also observed. Most noteworthy in this respect were constructions used in contexts where the dislocated referent was pragmatically given/active. This use of the construction—particularly when the dislocated constituent is a lexical NP—triggers a pragmatic effect, namely, signaling to the addressee that a shift to a new higher-level topic of discourse has occurred.[308] Related to this usage are instances where the already active referent is encoded as a dislocated pronoun. In these instances, a contrastive relation usually accompanies the topic-shift function.

We now move to broaden our perspective by examining the arguments of four relatively recent publications that figure prominently in research on the functional nature of LD in discourse. The publications by Prince (1997, 1998), Geluykens (1992), Lambrecht (1994, 2001) and Tizón-Couto (2012) develop, and in some cases challenge, the arguments advanced by earlier studies. By evaluating the claims of these more recent publications, we aim to provide a nuanced typological description of the competing cognitive-pragmatic and interactional motivations that trigger the use of LD in various contextual domains. Ultimately, this information will allow us to clarify the prototypical versus non-prototypical discourse-functions of LD from both a CI and DI perspective, and, in turn, will further inform our ultimate aim of providing a functional explanation of LD in BH.

4.2.2 Four Prominent Studies

4.2.2.1 Prince (1997, 1998)

Prince's studies on the functions of LD are of the most detailed among previous research (Ziv, 1994:633). In line with earlier studies, Prince employs a CI approach, utilizing cognitive-pragmatic notions such as givenness, cognitive processing, and inferencing to explain how LD functions in English discourse. Nevertheless, Prince's claims are unique in many respects. Most noteworthy in this regard is her opposition to the commonly held view that LD possesses a one-to-one form-function correlation in discourse.[309] By contrast, Prince's research leads her to conclude that "no single function can in fact account for all of the Left-dislocation data in English" (1997:120). She argues instead for a one-to-many form-function correlation by demonstrating that LD constructions are used to accomplish three distinct

308. See §4.2.2.3, where this is discussed in more detail.

309. The reader will remember that most early researchers argued that LD constructions serve the overarching function of establishing or (re)introducing a new topic (however that notion may be defined) (cf. §4.2.1).

communicative goals (Prince, 1997, 1998). Moreover, for Prince, the fact that a single form can reflect three ostensibly unrelated functions attest to the randomness of grammatical conventions.[310] This leads her to contend that form-function correlations, as represented by grammatical constructions, are arbitrary, language specific, and unmotivated. In her own words, "the relation between syntactic form and discourse function is no less arbitrary than, say, the relation between phonological form and lexical meaning" (1998:282).[311]

The following discussion will proceed as follows: First, we will offer a brief overview of Prince's three functions of English LD constructions. Second, we will present evidence against Prince's specific claim that LD is dictated by distinct and unrelated conventions. We will contend, rather, that not only is this particular correlation between form and function motivated, but each purportedly discrete type reflects the same basic-level motivating attribute. We will then offer an alternative view to Prince's more general claims regarding the inherently unmotivated/arbitrary nature of form-function correlations in grammar—a view which we will argue stems from Prince's narrow estimation of what constitutes "motivation" in grammar. By contrast, we will suggest that a more robust understanding of "motivation" is called for. Despite the seemingly capricious nature of many linguistic facts exhibited across languages, this view nevertheless suggests that grammatical development is not random, but heavily constrained, and not arbitrarily so.

The first of Prince's LD types consist of what she refers to as "Simplifying LDs" (LD1). These "serve to simplify the discourse processing of discourse-new entities by removing them from a syntactic position disfavored for discourse-new entities and creating a separate processing unit for them" (1997:124). Moreover, "[o]nce that unit is processed and they have

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310. This evidence largely contributes to her rejection of the belief, widely held by functional-typologists and discourse grammarians, that grammatical constructions are motivated by extra-grammatical forces. Although there is a debate as to what constitutes 'extra-grammatical' in the literature (see Fischer, 2007 for further discussion). Prince contends that extra-grammatical, or pragmatic explanations regarding specific forms must constitute part of the grammar (e.g. definite NPs encode Given/identifiable information, LD constructions introduce new entities, etc.) (Ariel, 2008:117).

311. Prince's position is congruent with a strong tradition in modern linguistic research which rests on the assumption that grammar is a self contained system, autonomous from external forces. According to this view, language "must be arbitrary, for there is no particular reason why grammar must take some specific shape, but not another" (Ariel, 2008:118). Typological research has, however, demonstrated that there exists significant universal regularities among languages, regularities that cannot be traced back to a common ancestry (ibid.). If this is so, then "either the regularities are due to language-internal forces, or else language is not arbitrary, for it is motivated by extralinguistic forces" (ibid.). As we have noted elsewhere (cf. §3.1) the generative tradition assumes the first alternative, by which an innately endowed Universal Grammar accounts for such consistencies. Most linguists working within the cognitive-functional tradition reject this proposal arguing, among other points, that the innateness hypothesis is merely a name for a set of universals, not an explanation (see Comrie, 1980:24 and Haimen, 1985:7 in this regard). These linguists seek external explanations for linguistic phenomenon. In other words, "the claim is that natural languages are shaped the way they are because of our general (rather than language-specific) human cognitive capacities, and due to the common use we put language to, namely, communicative acts" (Ariel, 2008:119).

become discourse-old, they may comfortably occur in their positions within a clause as pronouns." (ibid.). She offers the following as an example of the LD1 type:

> (70) "It's supposed to be such a great deal. [The guy$_i$], when he came over and asked if I wanted a route, he$_i$ made it sound so great. Seven dollars a week for hardly any work. And then you find out the guy told you a bunch of lies." (ibid.:121 her ex. [4])

The NP "The guy" evokes the first mention of this entity in this passage (ibid.:124n5). Were this NP not dislocated, it would have occurred in subject position, making it too difficult to process.[312] The LD1 construction serves to remove the discourse-new entity from a position in the clause that favors discourse-old entities and replaces it with a discourse-old entity. That is to say that the LD1 type belongs to a "conspiracy of syntactic constructions resulting in the non-occurrence of NPs low on the familiarity scale [cf. §2.3.4.1, JRW] in subject position" (Prince, 1981a:247). In this way, the LD1 accomplishes a "meta-discourse" function "in that they facilitate the incrementation of the discourse-model under construction but do not affect the contents of that model" (ibid.:127).

The second functional type of LD (LD2) distinguished by Prince involves the referent of the dislocated constituent contrasting with an inferentially related element in the discourse.[313] In other words, the dislocated constituent "triggers an inference on the part of the hearer that the entity represented by the initial NP [i.e. dislocated constituent, JRW] stands in a PARTIALLY-ORDERED SET RELATION to some entity or entities already evoked in the discourse model" (cf. §2.3.3) (1997:126). The LD token in (71) is an example of Prince's LD2 type:

> (71) "'My father loves crispy rice,' says Saboon, 'so we must have it on the menu. And [Mee Grob$_i$], he loves it$_i$, just as much.' Mee Grob is a rice noodle […]" (ibid.:1997:125 her ex. [9])

Unlike the LD1 type, here the resumptive pronoun is in object position—the prototypical position for discourse new entities. Thus, no simplification function is needed for this

312. This principle is also captured by discourse-pragmatic constraints including the "Light Subject" constraint (Chafe 1987, 1994), the "Given A" constraint (Du Bois, 1987), and Lambrecht's "Principle of Separation of Reference and Role" (1994) (cf. §4.2.2.3).

313. Cf. Keenan and Schieffelin, 1976 (§4.2.1.1) and Barnes, 1985 (§4.2.1.3).

instance. Rather, the use of the LD2 construction serves to mark the dislocated constituent "Mee Grob" as a member of a poset relation—i.e. the set of items on the menu. Prince claims that LD2 constructions possess what she refers to as a "true discourse function" in that they "signal substantive aspects of the discourse-model being constructed, in particular, poset relations among entities in that model" (Prince, 1997:133).

Prince's third type, "Resumptive Pronoun" LDs (LD3) have to do with preempting violations of certain structural constraints on long-distance dependencies. More specifically, they serve to "rescue" a fronted topic constituent (her "Topicalization") which would either be ungrammatical or hard to process. As Ross (1967) first showed, fronted topic constructions (i.e. his "Topicalizations") observe syntactic constraints upon long-distance dependencies, while LD does not (cf. §3.2). According to Prince, LD3 constructions are actually fronted topic constructions with a resumptive pronoun—i.e. they are "Topicalizations in disguise" (Prince, 1997:130). It is beyond the scope of this section to discuss in detail Prince's views on fronted topic constructions. It suffices to say, however, that Prince essentially argues for the existence of two constraints on the felicitous usage of fronted topic constructions. The first constraint is identical to the one on LD2, viz. the fronted constituent refers to an entity that stands in a poset relation to a discourse-old entity. The second constraint stipulates that an open proposition is cognitively accessible to the addressee at the point of utterance. Prince offers (72) as an example of a fronted topic construction:

> (72) "She had an idea for a project. She's going to use three groups of $mice_{ijk}$. One_i she'll feed $them_i$ mouse chow, just the regular stuff they make for mice. $Another_j$ she'll feed $them_j$ veggies. And the $third_k$ she'll feed $_k$ junk food."
> (1998:7 her ex. [10])

In this example, the third group of mice stand in a salient relation to the first and second groups of mice. Additionally, the open proposition "she'll feed the third group of mice, which is part of the set of three groups, X" is highly available to the addressee. Moreover, the NP "junk food" is the missing argument that completes the assertion of the pragmatically structured proposition—i.e. X = junk food. In other words, the proposition is what we have referred to elsewhere as a constituent-focus articulation (cf. §2.4.7). For Prince, the only difference between LD2 and fronted topic constructions is the requirement that an open proposition is presupposed to the addressee with fronted topic constructions, while no such requirement holds for LD2 constructions. Now, if the fronted topic construction in (72) were to occur as part of a construction in which the extraction site of the fronted constituent were

one from which it was difficult or impossible to extract (i.e. a syntactic island violation),[314] an LD3 construction would have occurred, according to Prince. (1997:130). Example (72) illustrates the contrast at issue:

(73) GC: "You bought Anttila?"
EP: "No, this is Alice Freed's copy."
GC: "[My copy of Anttila$_i$], I don't know who has it$_i$."
*My copy of Anttila$_i$, I don't know who has ___$_i$. (Prince, 1997:133 her ex. [24])

The use of an LD construction in (73), according to Prince, is purely due to the impossibility of extracting from the *wh*-island. Thus, Prince argues, the only reason LD3 constructions are used by interlocutors is to avoid syntactic island violations, which would result in ungrammatical expressions (ibid.:133).[315] Otherwise, they share the same discourse appropriateness conditions with respect to their usage as fronted topic constructions.

For Prince, these three distinct types of LD represent strong evidence that the correlation between syntactic form and discourse function is essentially arbitrary, language specific, and unmotivated in grammar. As briefly mentioned above, this argument stems from Prince's particular view concerning what constitutes motivation in grammar, which in turn derives from two overarching assumptions (Ariel, 2008:121).[316] First, Prince assumes that a construction is motivated only if there is "an iconic relation between its form and the function it indicates "an iconic relation obtains between forms and their messages when the former resemble the latter" (ibid.:120).[317] The isomorphic relationship between form and meaning/

314. "Syntactic island violations involve an interpretative dependency between a gap and an element across some syntactic boundary, such as a relative clause" (Ariel, 2008:125n.12) (cf. §3.3.1.).

315. Indeed, Prince states that if this syntactic constraint were not present in English "Resumptive pronoun Left-Dislocations [i.e. LD3, JRW] would be indistinguishable from 'Poset' Left-Dislocations [LD2, JRW] since all involve poset inferences triggered by the initial NP" (ibid.:133).

316. Ariel contends "Prince is certainly right when she argues that the intuitive feeling we sometimes have regarding the 'natural', 'inevitable' connection between forms and their extralinguistic functions may be the result, rather than the cause of those form-function correlation. Indeed, Diderot's (1751/1875) and Lancelot's (1660) position, which she quotes from Chomsky (1965:7), that word order (in the French they spoke) merely reflects the natural order of thought, is no doubt untenable. As we shall see, however, her arguments against Lancelot (1660) do not carry over to more sophisticated views on the question of grammar and external motivations" (2008:120).

317. For example, "it has been argued that when two events are encoded in a conjoined sentence, the first clause (in terms of linear order) encodes the first event (in terms of chronology), and the second clause encodes the later event. In this case, linear order resembles (metaphorically) chronological order, and we can say that there is an iconic relationship between the sentence and the events described in it" (ibid.:120).

function as stipulated by the principle of iconicity, however, does not necessarily reflect a correspondence between grammatical structures and real-world objects and events, but rather conceptual categories and cognitive models of the real world (cf. Haiman, 1983; Simone, 1994, Givón, 1994). With respect to LD, Prince contends that the possibility of an iconic relation is precluded since "the same form cannot simultaneously resemble three different conceptualizations" (ibid.:121). Second, she assumes a *necessary* connection between form and function (her emphasis) (ibid.). This results in the expectation that form-function correlations across-languages should be identical. Her cross-linguistic research, however, indicates otherwise. Prince (1998) compared LD in English with the same construction in Yiddish, a closely related language. Her research showed that Yiddish has an LD construction almost identical to that of the English LD. Strikingly, however, LD in Yiddish is only used for the LD2 and LD3 functions. That is, she found no LD constructions functioning to introduce discourse-new entities; and her attempts to elicit such examples from native speakers were also unsuccessful. This non-occurrence of LD1 in Yiddish is explained by the fact that Yiddish has another frequently used construction, "Subject-Postposing", that serves to remove discourse-new subjects from the preverbal position, a position that disfavors discourse-new entities in Yiddish as much as it does in English (Prince, 1998:297).[318]

We will comment further on the general question of what constitutes motivation in grammar as well as the two key assumptions underlying Prince's view, below. We first turn our attention to Prince's central claim that the LD construction in English reflects three discrete discourse functions, and is therefore unmotivated. It is our contention, following Ziv (1994), Gregory and Michaelis (2001), Ariel (2008) among others[319] that this argument fails to withstand closer inspection. In other words, we assert that not only is the form of LD motivated, but that Prince's three functions reflect one general, basic-level function (Ariel, 2008:123).

To our knowledge, Ziv (1994) was the first to observe that Prince's three types of LD are united by a common pragmatic attribute rather than existing as a fortuitous collection of functions. Utilizing Ariel's (1990, 2001) "Accessibility Marking Scale" (§2.3.3), Ziv contends that the morphosyntactic form of the dislocated referring expression in each of Prince's three types designates that the denotatum entertains a relatively low degree of cognitive

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318. In Prince (1988), she offers a similar argument comparing *it*-cleft constructions in English and Yiddish. In this instance, the functions of the constructions in their respective languages are identical, but the form of the constructions themselves differed substantially.

319. See also Birner and Ward (1998) *inter alia*.

accessibility.

Recall that Prince's LD1 (i.e. her "Simplifying LDs") is said to ease the processing costs associated with the introduction of discourse new entities by creating a separate information unit for them and removing them from syntactic positions reserved for discourse-old entities. Ziv (1994:636) argues, however, that LDs can only effectively accomplish this task if the dislocated constituent is an informative referring expression, or in Ariel's terms, a low accessibility marker—i.e. one that designates an inaccessible referent (Ziv, 1994:636). Low accessibility markers are typically long definite descriptions in the form of lexical NPs + modifiers or proper names (cf. Ariel, 1990). It is not our intention to discount the veracity of the processing constraint observed by Prince. To the contrary, as we will argue in §4.2.2.3 and §4.3, this constraint is a critical piece of the puzzle when it comes to explaining how this particular form came to be associated with this particular communicative goal. Our point, rather, is to suggest that the simplifying constraint is motivated by the low degree of accessibility of the referent encoded by the complex dislocated phrase.

Alternatively, LD2 (i.e. poset LDs) functions to introduce an entity that is inferentially related via a set relation to a previously discourse-evoked entity. As with LD1, Ziv notes that the dislocated constituents in LD2 are also typically expressed by low accessibility markers (ibid.:636–637). This makes sense, as the referents of LD2 entertain a relatively low degree of accessibility as well (although perhaps not as inaccessible as the discourse new referents of LD1). In the case of LD2, however, this low accessibility derives from their inferential association to an already evoked entity in the discourse context (cf. §2.3.3).

Lastly, LDs that allegedly function to amnesty island constraint violations (LD3) are shown by Ziv to, in fact, have "no other option but that the referential expressions display the pattern evident above, namely, proper name or definite description in NP1 position [dislocated position, JRW], and a co-referential pronoun in NP2 position [resumptive pronoun, JRW] (ibid.:637). Although Prince argues that the resumptive occurs in these instances merely to aid in "restoring" grammaticality to these otherwise ungrammatical configurations, accessibility theory offers a motivated explanation (§2.3.3). "In terms of activation, a gap [i.e. fronted constituent with no resumptive, JRW] points to high accessibility which is not available in cases of referential dependency across a syntactic island. A (resumptive, [JRW] pronoun on the other hand encodes a somewhat lower degree of accessibility" (Ariel, 2008:126).

Ziv's observations suggest that each of Prince's functions have in common a single motivation, namely the dislocation of a referent that entertains a relatively low degree of cognitive accessibility. As a result, rather than an accidental collection of functions, á la

Prince, LD is more appropriately understood as accomplishing a single generalized communicative function: the (re)activation of an entity within the universe of discourse.

Nevertheless, despite this common motivation and overarching function, there remains an intuitive sense that each of Prince's uses are nevertheless distinct in some way, and indeed, they are. The distinction, however, lies not with a difference in function per se, or even motivation, but the *reasons* for the low degree of activation in each case. In §4.3, we will introduce an important distinction, following Ariel (2008), between the notions "Discourse Function" and "Discourse Profile" in order to further describe this difference.

The results of a study conducted by Gregory and Michaelis (2001) confirm Ziv's general observation regarding the low accessibility of entities encoded by dislocated constituents in each of Prince's types. In this study, English conversational data from the Switchboard Telephone Corpus was analyzed in order to empirically test Prince's claims regarding the difference between her LD1 and LD2 types.[320] These authors concluded that Prince "made a logical error in reasoning about the function of LD"; and further, "nothing in Prince's findings should be taken as refuting the claim that LD has a single function" (Gregory and Michaelis, 2001:1675).

Gregory and Michaelis first call attention to a circularity in Prince's claim that the distinguishing factor between LD1 and LD2 is the presence or absence of a poset relation. "[B]y definition, the denotatum of a pre-clausal NP in LD1 is not in a poset relation to a previously evoked entity (Prince, 1997). Thus, if LD1 and LD2 are distinguished by the presence or absence of a poset relation, a circularity arises: LD1 and LD2 will always be distinct in this regard (ibid.:1681). In order to determine what factor might prove to distinguish LD1 from LD2 besides a poset relation, two cognitive-pragmatic tests were applied to quantify the discourse status of the dislocated entity in each type. The first test measured the degree of givenness, or accessibility of the referent at the time of utterance. Gregory and Michaelis applied Gundel et al.'s (1994) implicational Givenness Hierarchy (cf. §2.3.3), which, in similar fashion to Ariel's Accessibility Marking Scale, provides an index of the assumed cognitive status of an entity in the mind of the hearer by the morphosyntactic form used by the speaker to encode that entity. The second test measured the anaphoricity scores—that is, the index of the degree to which a referent can be said to have an antecedent in the preceding discourse.[321] Although an entity that is anaphoric is necessarily accessible, an

320. Gregory and Michaelis (2001) only examine LD1 and LD2. The LD3 type were deemed insignificant since they rarely occurred in their corpus (2001:1672).

321. Gregory and Michaelis measured for LDs containing dislocated entities that had not been mentioned in the preceding discourse, LDs containing dislocated entities that were members of a poset, and LDs containing

accessible referent need not be anaphoric since accessibility may be achieved by other means (cf. §2.3.3) (ibid.:1681). Thus, these two coding schemes serve as independent instruments to tease apart two related cognitivie-pragmatic properties, which jointly define discourse status but which are not mutually entailing (ibid.).

Gregory & Michaelis found that LD1 and LD2 differ significantly in regards to their average givenness statuses, with dislocated entities of LD1 exhibiting a lower degree of givenness—corresponding to less accessible referents—than LD2 constructions. Moreover, the average anaphoricity measurements between LD1 and LD2 were also substantially divergent. None of the denotata of the dislocated constituents in LD1 had an anaphoric relation to the preceding discourse, while 62% of the denotata of the dislocated constituents in LD2 are anaphorically related to the preceding discourse (ibid.:1690). In other words, instances of LD2, on average, are more accessible than the referents of LD1 as measured both by their givenness status, as indicated by their morphosyntactic realization, as well as their anaphoric relation to the prior discourse.

Although LD1 and LD2 display strikingly divergent characteristics concerning the average givenness and anaphoricity of their respective dislocated entities, Gregory and Michaelis' empirical study confirms Ziv's initial observation: that the referent in each type entertains a less than maximal degree of accessibility. They rightly conclude from this that each of Prince's LD types are used to accomplish the same general task. Again, the differences between the types pertain not to a distinction in function, but a distinction in the prototypical discourse conditions under which the respective type is used (i.e. anaphoricity and givenness).

But what then is the function of LD according to Gregory & Michaelis? In agreement with Givon (1984a) and Lambrecht (1994, 2001) among others, they contend that LD1 and LD2 each accomplish the general function of 'topic-establishment' (ibid.:1693). This conclusion is arrived at on the basis of their evaluation of the anaphoric and cataphoric discourse status of the denotatum. While the anaphoric status is measured by the denotatum's givenness/anaphoricity scores (reviewed above), the cataphoric status is measured by the average 'topic-persistance' score—that is, the number of times the referent persists as a topic of an utterance in the immediate subsequent discourse. They found that referents of dislocated constituents in LD1 and LD2 possess relatively low anaphoric/givenness scores at the time the construction is used, and generally continue as topics of subsequent predications after the fact. These specific discourse conditions lead them to conclude that LD is generally

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dislocated entities that were mentioned previously in the discourse (Gregory and Michaelis, 2001:1687).

employed in English to establish new topics (ibid.:1698).

Returning to Prince's more general arguments concerning the unmotivated/arbitrary nature of grammar, recall that Prince's position derives from two key assumptions: first, motivation in grammar necessities an iconic relation between form and function, and second, a necessary connection between form and function should result in identical form-function correlations across languages. In other words, for a form-function correlation to be motivated, according to Prince, the convention must meet these two criteria. Yet, the irregularity and seemingly language-specific nature of form-function correlations in grammar lead her to conclude that these conventions are merely cases of constructional homonomy paralleling lexical ambiguity (ibid.). But must these seemingly inconsistent and arbitrary facts necessarily lead to the conclusion that grammar is arbitrary/unmotivated? Indeed, as Ariel observes "these very same points have been made in the functional-typological literature" by those who, alternatively from Prince, view the development of grammar as externally motivated and the differences between languages as being quite restricted (ibid.).[322] Ariel writes:

> "Prince is certainly right about all these seemingly inconsistent facts. Form-function correlations are not necessarily iconic, specific functions are not necessarily attached to some forms, forms are not fully predictable from functions, nor functions from forms. They are even arbitrary to some extent, forms bearing a one-to-many relationship to functions (and vice versa), and they vary across languages" (ibid.).

The question naturally arises then as to how Prince and functional-typologists/discourse grammarians arrive at different conclusions from the same facts? Ariel answers by claiming that the former do not share Prince's naive concept of motivation (ibid.).[323] Again, Ariel writes:

> "For them [functional-typologists, discourse-grammarians, JRW], being motivated

322. Cf. Haiman (1985), Du Bois (1985), Bates and MacWhinney (1989), Givón (1979; 1993), Chafe (1994), Dik (1986), and Nuyts (1992) *inter alia*.

323. Comrie (1988:266) writes in this regard, "syntax is potentially independent of semantics and pragmatics, in the sense that there are many syntactic phenomena in many languages that cannot be given complete or even nearly complete analyses in purely semantic or pragmatic or semantic-pragmatic terms. However, in many instances such syntactic phenomena can be given partial explanation in such nonsyntactic terms; in particular, many syntactic phenomena can be viewed as phenomena semantic and/or pragmatic in origin which have become divorced from their semantico-pragmatic origin, in other words as instances of grammaticalization."

> means that there is a motivated, not an inevitable path of change which has led to the grammatical form…. There is no claim that contexts causally shape grammar, that extralinguistic factors are uniformly encoded, that codes are always transparent, that structures isomorphically or exclusively correspond to extralinguistic functions, that language-internal factors are not involved, or that language does not contain arbitrary facts" (ibid.:121–122).[324]

In other words, argues Ariel, Prince's concept of an unmotivated/arbitrary grammar can only be sustained if she can show that "anything goes" in grammar. For example, that her three discourse functions for LDs can be served by completely different constructions—e.g. right dislocation or by *it*-clefts, etc. (ibid.). The evidence, however, suggests otherwise.[325] Research concerning the nature of language change through the process known as 'Grammaticalization' (cf. §4.3) has shown that the development of form-function correlations in grammar are not random, and that grammatical variability is highly constrained across languages.[326]

Functional-typologists, for example, have long observed that language change generally occurs along certain clines of grammaticality[327] whereby "historical changes are virtually always unidirectional, that is, certain forms (lexical items) may develop new grammatical functions, but these developments are not random nor reversible" (ibid.:122). For instance, "main verbs may turn into auxiliaries, but the opposite is not attested" (ibid.:122).[328]

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324. "While there are some equations of motivation or function with iconicity, mainly Haiman (1985:71) Croft (2003:104), and Hopper and Traugott (2003:207), this is not the common definition of motivation. In fact, Haiman too emphasizes that there is arbitrariness in language due to competing motivations" (ibid.:122).

325. Cf. Bybee et al. 1994; Traugott and Dasher, 2002; Croft, 2003; Hopper and Traugott, 1993; Traugott and Heine, 1991; *inter alia.*

326. Hopper and Traugott (1993) note that the linguistic literature attests to two uses of the term 'grammaticalization'. First, it is regularly used to denote a framework for language study that "highlights the interaction of use with structure and the non-discreteness of many properties of language" (ibid.:xv). This framework "is concerned with the question of whether boundaries between categories are discrete, and with the interdependence of structure and use, of the fixed and the less fixed in language. It therefore highlights the tension between relatively unconstrained lexical structure and more constrained syntactic, morphosyntactic, and morphological structure. It provides the conceptual context or a principled account of the relative indeterminacy in language and of the basic non-discreteness of categories" (ibid.:1–2). Secondly, it denotes a process observable in language whereby "lexical items and constructions come in certain linguistic contexts to serve grammatical functions and, once grammaticalized, continue to develop new grammatical functions" (ibid.:18).

327. For example, "most linguists would agree that there is a 'cline of grammaticality' of the following type: content item> grammatical word> clitic> inflectional affix" (Hopper & Traugott, 1993:6–7).

328. "Unidirectionality derives from the fact that recruiting lexical items for grammatical purposes is a more reasonable innovative step than the other way round (recruiting a grammatical category for lexical purposes). For more on the unidirectional nature of linguistic change, see Givón (1976); Croft (2003); Haspelmath (1999, 2004); Bybee et al. (1994); and Trauagott and Dasher (2002), *inter alia*.

Therefore, in contrast to Prince's narrow view of motivation, functional-typologists and discourse-grammarians contend that for grammar to be motivated only entails that variability in grammatical development is not unlimited but heavily constrained, and not arbitrarily so. In other words, it is not necessary to show that grammar or particular grammatical conventions could only have originated and developed according to certain inevitable paths of change. Indeed, as Prince has demonstrated, natural language abounds with ostensibly synchronic form-function correlations that appear to be arbitrary. This does not mean, however, that these arbitrary facts did not originate and develop from various (often competing) extra-grammatical motivations. "[W]hat seems arbitrary from one perspective often turns out to be motivated from another" (ibid.:123). In other words, motivation is not a transitive relation (ibid.). "While the changes from x to y and from y to z may be motivated, the relation between x and z may not be motivated, so cumulative changes often create synchronic arbitrariness" (ibid.). In this way, motivation then constitutes the innovation of new conventions from a variety competing extra-grammatical forces. Once a conventional form-function correlation is established, these original motivating forces are less important, for the convention itself motivates abiding by it (ibid.). As we will discuss in more detail in §4.3, the path of conventionalization of form-function correlations into grammatically entrenched constructional schemas (that often represent a variety of form-function types), while not determinate, is highly constrained.

Lastly, what are we to make of Prince's contention for the arbitrariness of grammar as evidenced by the mismatch in form-function correlations between LDs in English and Yiddish.[329] Recall that Prince finds no LDs in Yiddish that function according to her LD1 (simplifying) type. Despite these facts, we nevertheless find a motivated reason for this. In fact, Prince herself observes the motivating force: the same simplifying function is accomplished in Yiddish by another construction, viz. Subject Postposing, which, like LD1, removes from subject position an inaccessible entity disfavored for that position (Ariel, 2008:126). That is to say, the reason for the non-use of Yiddish LDs in the discourse contexts that license the LD1 type is because that particular grammatical system possesses another perfectly suitable construction that accomplishes this function under those contextual conditions (ibid.).

An obvious question arises, however: Why then doesn't English make use of a parallel subject postposing construction? And, more generally: If grammar is motivated, why aren't the form-function correlations between languages identical, as Prince stipulates? Again,

329. The reader will recall that Prince finds no LDs in Yiddish that function according to the LD1 (simplifying) type.

ostensibly arbitrary facts are not equivalent to lack of motivation in grammar. As Haiman (1983:815) states, "to the extent that different generalizations are possible, some arbitrariness is possible." Therefore the mismatch between English and Yiddish represents a set of partly arbitrary form-function correlations only in so far as "English could have gone the Yiddish way but didn't, and Yiddish could have gone the English way but didn't" (Ariel, 2008:126). The crucial point, as Ariel emphatically states, "is that neither language could go just any which arbitrary way." As noted earlier, "while form-function correlations are not fully determinate, they are heavily restricted, and definitely not arbitrarily so" (ibid.:126–127).[330]

In sum, LD constructions in English (and Yiddish) evince a form-function correlation that is not as arbitrary as Prince would have us believe. In contrast to the view espoused by Prince—that LD constructions are evidence that form-function correlations in language are completely arbitrary/unmotivated—we have shown that each of Prince's three types demonstrate a sensitivity to the same cognitive-pragmatic motivation, viz. low-accessibility. As a result, we suggest that Prince's three distinct discourse-functions for LD are more accurately construed as one basic-level function, namely, activating an inactive referent with a less-than maximal degree of accessibility. Furthermore, Gregory and Michaelis (2001) have shown that the referent of the dislocated constituent prototypically satisfies the topic relation of the pragmatically structured proposition. Furthermore, the difference between Prince's types is not one of motivation or function, but rather concerns the respective prototypical patterns of usage, or non-obligatory discourse conditions in which the construction occurs (cf. §4.3 for further discussion in this regard).

Next, we discuss the work of Geluykens (1992) who, unlike Prince, examines LD in English from a DI perspective, highlighting the use of LD in the turn-management system of spontaneous conversational discourse.

4.2.2.2 Geluykens (1992)

Geluykens (1992)[331] employs a DI[332] approach in the analysis of a large corpus of

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330. Bybee et al. (1994:12) posit that differences between form-function correlation's between grammatical systems are actually differences between earlier versus later stages of one grammaticalization path. Ariel conjectures that Bybee et al's observation "could explain the difference between English and Yiddish LDs, provided we can establish that the grammaticalization path of LDs proceeds from the second and third discourse functions to the first one, which hasn't (yet?) happened in Yiddish" (2008:127).

331. Cf. also Geluykens, 1988, 1989a, 1989b.

332. Geluykens employs aspects of both the DI and CI methods in his analysis (ibid.:153). He argues, however, that the DI methodology is more important than the CI approach, and therefore this approach is privileged throughout the work.

conversational data in order to empirically determine the discourse processes that trigger the use of LD in English.[333] Ultimately, he contends that the construction is typically the result of a three-stage interactional process used to facilitate the (re)introduction of new referents into the discourse (Geluykens, 1992:33). As his primary object of inquiry, Geluykens examines prototypical instantiations of LD, which he defines by the combination of specific semantic properties, the most important of which is the co-referential relationship between the dislocated constituent (his "REF") and the resumptive element (his "GAP") that occurs in the associated clause (his "PROP") (ibid.).[334] In addition to conversational discourse, a small subset of LDs were examined in non-conversational spoken and written registers in order to determine if the construction exhibits a different functional profile in non-conversational contexts.

The foremost defining characteristic of conversational discourse, according to Geluykens, is the frequency with which there are changes of speaker (ibid.:16). These changes operate according to a rule-based system, managing floor allocation on a turn-by-turn basis (cf. also Levinson, 1983:296ff). Units of speaker change are referred to as "Turns", and a new turn typically occurs at a so-called "Transition Relevance Place (TRP)". At any TRP, the rule system, shown in Figure 3. and adopted from Levinson (1983:298), comes into operation (C stands for current speaker, N for next speaker).[335]

Figure 3.:

"Rule 1 – applies initially at the first TRP of any turn
(a) If C selects N in current turn, then C must stop speaking, and N must speak next, transition occurring at the first TRP after N-selection.
(b) If C does not select N, then any (other) party may self-select, first speaker gaining rights to the next turn.
(c) If C has not selected N, and no other party self-selects under option
(b) then C may (but need not) continue (i.e. claim rights to a further turn-constructional unit).

333. Geluykens takes into account other discourse types as well (i.e. non-conversational and written), but they mostly serve as comparative material.

334. According to Geluykens (ibid.:19), defining the construction in solely semantic terms allows him to "ignore superficial syntactic differences."

335. Cf. Hidalgo, 2000.

> Rule 2 – applies at all subsequent TRPs
> When Rule 1(c) has been applied by C, then at the next TRP, rules 1(a)–(c) apply, and recursively at the next TRP, until speaker change is affected." (Geluykens, 1992:17)

This turn taking system is essential for Geluykens's explanation of LD. According to this model, LD is identified as a three step process in which the speaker introduces the referent (topic) in the first turn, the hearer acknowledges it in the second turn, and the speaker completes the proposition in the third turn. Consider the following example, which is a slightly modified version of the one found in Geluykens (1992:35 his ex. [2]).

(74) C: [Turn A] Now [the last paragraph]$_i$
N: [Turn B] yes
C: [Turn C] I seem to remember it$_i$ being different from what's printed

At the initial TRP, speaker C utilizes turn A to introduce a referent; at the second TRP, speaker N utilizes turn B to acknowledge it;[336] and at the third TRP, speaker C utilizes turn C to establish it as a topic (ibid.).[337]

Furthermore, Geluykens contends that in English (and across languages) the conventionalized LD construction derives from this collaborative process. Over time, and through frequency of use, this collaborative strategy for introducing referents is gradually "syntacticized"[338] into a grammatical construction (ibid.:151–152). The construction then continues to coalesce as it becomes more entrenched in the grammatical system. The increased structural integration of the construction is coupled with an expansion of its functional scope. In other words, as the constructional schema becomes more entrenched in the grammatical system, the more functionally productive it becomes (ibid.:145).[339] We will

336. Geluykens notes that there is some debate as to whether or not minimal turns, consisting of only short utterances should really be labelled turns. He introduces the term "stage" as a neutral term for these short turns in order to avoid this problem (1992:17). He notes, "it should be kept in mind that there is no one-to-one correspondence between turns and stages; although stages are usually realized linguistically as turns, a turn may consist of more than one interactional stage" (ibid.:18).

337. This routine is referred to as a "recognition search sequence" in conversation analytic work (Sacks and Schegloff, 1979).

338. This is a term Geluykens borrows from Givón (1979). Givón defines syntacticization as the process by which "loose, paratactic, 'pragmatic', discourse structures develop over time into tight, 'grammaticalized' synatcitc structures" (1979:208).

339. Cf. §4.3 for further discussion in this regard.

return to this discussion concerning the construction's diachronic development in §4.3.

Despite the three distinct stages represented by Geluykens's exemplar interactional process, not all of the instances of LD analyzed by Geluykens exhibited this prototypical form. In fact, the majority of Geluykens's database consists of LDs that lacked a second intervening turn (ibid.:40). Most of these types exhibited an intervening pause in between the dislocated constituent and the matrix clause. Although no verbal acknowledgment is provided, Geluykens contends that these pauses are not interpreted as a lack of acknowledgment, but as a silent indication that the identification of the referent has been satisfactorily established on the part of the hearer (ibid.:42).[340] In addition, approximately 30% of the constructions in his database exhibit neither a second turn nor a pause in between the dislocated constituent and the matrix clause. In these instances, the speaker uses a descriptive term that represents a referent that is unrecognizable by the hearer, and is immediately followed by the proposition expressed by the matrix clause. These constructions represent the most maximally integrated, and hence, the most grammaticalized form of the construction. Indeed, the functional distribution of Geluykens's research supports this claim. The majority of maximally integrated forms were not used to primarily introduce new referents, but were used in non-prototypical discourse contexts, becoming specialized for other purposes (see the discussion on 'contrastive LDs' below).

From a synchronic perspective, the functional distribution of LD in Geluykens's database is as follows: The majority of LDs are said to be referent-introducing, accounting for 79.9% of his database. The majority of the remainder (13.7%) were instances of LD that function to mark a contrastive relation between a set of opposites (ibid.:155).[341] Contrastive LDs are less procedural with respect to the turn-taking system than referent-introducing LDs.[342] Intriguingly, a correlation exists between contrastive LDs (among others) and the maximally integrated form of LD discussed above (i.e. those forms not exhibiting a second

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340. By contrast, Ford et al. (2003) and Tizón-Couto (2012) argue that the acknowledgement turn is not necessary, but optional. For these authors, the inherent quality of the process is the pause after the initial referent is uttered. If an acknowledgement does occur, it is simply a by-product of Grice's (1975) cooperative principle (Tizón-Couto, 2012:312).

341. Geluykens differentiates a so-called "listing" function as a subset of the contrastive category. While both contrastive and listing LDs function to highlight one member of set, listing LDs involve more than two members (ibid.).

342. Geluykens's "contrastive/listing" LDs appear to be similar in some respects to Prince's poset LDs (LD2). Prince argues, however, contra Geluykens (1992) and Chafe (1976), that contrast is not "a primitive notion, but rather arises when alternate members of some salient set are evoked and, most importantly, when there is felt to be a salient opposition in what is predicated of them" (1998:291).

turn or a pause). It is hypothesized that since the referents of contrastive LDs are not introduced, there is no need for the hearer to acknowledge the referent of the dislocated constituent in a subsequent turn (ibid.). The remaining constructions, comprising nearly 10% of the database, were neither referent introducing nor contrastive. Geluykens concedes that these cases were "hard to classify", and refers to them as "idiosyncratic" functions (ibid.:96). These include LDs that function to "sum up" or "synthesize" some aspects of the previous context, and those that predicate some new quality or attribute to a referent by adding a subordinate clause of some sort to the dislocated constituent. In both cases, complex constituents are dislocated in order to facilitate the cognitive processing involved. Moreover, Geluykens is careful to point out the fact that "the main function of LD is [sic] referent-introduction does not disqualify if from carrying additional functions" (ibid.:95).

LDs in non-conversational discourse registers are substantially less frequent than their conversational counterparts (ibid.:115). Among the 32 non-conversational instances analyzed, Geluykens finds that they are, for the most part, direct reflections of the conversational uses of LD (ibid.:124). That is to say, LDs in non-conversational contexts generally function as referent-introducing constructions, or, less often to mark a contrastive relation between two or more entities. As with the conversational data, however, a few constructions remained that exhibit idiosyncratic functions; these included, among other things, so-called "emotive" and "scene-setting" functions.[343] Like with conversational tokens, however, Geluykens contends that these idiosyncratic functions do not preclude the main referent-introduction function of LD (ibid.). Furthermore, in each case where LD was used for a so-called idiosyncratic function, he contends that the referent-introducing function could, in some way be detected.

Geluykens realizes, however, that certain questions pertaining to the informational status of the dislocated referent within the prior discourse context, and how these referent's are treated in the subsequent discourse are, left unanswered by a strictly DI approach. Therefore, he attempts to incorporate informational dimensions into his analysis, although he is careful to state that informational aspects are always dependent on interactional ones (Geluykens, 1992:3). Two informational categories are employed in his analysis which concern the previous and subsequent discourse contexts respectively. These are

343. Geluykens also examines the use of, what he refers to as "quasi-LD" in non-conversational discourse. Quasi-LD constructions are non-prototypical LDs which lack a co-referential resumptive with a 'total identity' relation within the proposition (1992:21; 115). They are what we have referred to elsewhere as 'non-resumptive' constructions (§3.3.2.1). Geluykens argues that quasi-LDs are mostly used for referent-introduction in his corpus or to mark a contrast. That is to say, no functional difference was discernable between quasi-LDs and prototypical LDs by Geluykens. Moreover, we come to a similar conclusion with respect to LD in BH (cf. chapter 6).

"recoverability" and "topicality"; although, and as we will see, only recoverability is truly defined from an informational standpoint.

Geluykens employs the term "recoverability" for what is traditionally referred to as "givenness" in the literature. Prince's (1981a) three "givenness parameters" (i.e. Predictability, Saliency, and Shared Knowledge),[344] which represent a summary of the most widely held views, are evaluated and deemed unsatisfactory and unoperational by Geluykens due to their theoretical and unverifiable nature (ibid.:10–12).[345] Particularly, Geluykens rejects the idea that a speaker's assumptions concerning the cognitive model of the hearer is in any way determinate on the choice of the expression used. As an alternative, he argues that information is best categorized as either "recoverable" or "irrecoverable". Recoverable information is derivable from the prior discourse context, while irrecoverable information is not (ibid.:12). "This derivability can be either relatively direct (when the information is explicitly present in the preceding clause, for instance) or more indirect (… where certain inferences have to be made)" (ibid.). Thus, the recoverability status of a referent is not a strict dichotomy, but a matter of gradation on a scale between complete recoverability and irrecoverability. Moreover, intervening factors such as "Interference" and "Distance" are said to also have an influence on the recoverability status of a referent. By interference, Geluykens has in mind issues surrounding ambiguities in anaphora resolution where a referring expression (e.g. a pronoun) is a possible candidate for coreference with more than one antecedent. In these instances, the other possible antecedents "interfere" with the recoverability status of the referent in question. Additionally, the referent's recoverability status decreases as a result of its remoteness from its previous mention.[346]

According to Geluykens, the majority of referents of dislocated constituents in English LD constructions are irrecoverable. That is to say, they are not mentioned before in the discourse,[347] or are re-introduced after a fairly long stretch of discourse in which it was not mentioned (ibid.:53). This explains, he argues, why acknowledgement of the information in

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344. Cf. §2.2.3.2 for a more detailed discussion of these parameters.

345. For Geluykens, Prince's three givenness parameters are unverifiable because they are framed in terms of speaker-assumptions and "there is no way we can have access to the speaker's assumptions" (ibid.:10). Additionally he claims the phraseology used in these definitions, such as "could have predicted", "could appropriately have", and the like make them hard to work with in an empirical way. In other words, the definitions are so theoretical they are of little use.

346. Geluykens is careful to note his notion of Distance is more than strictly a linear, quantitative measure (cf. Givon, 1983) arguing that "clearly, it is the nature of the intervening material which is important here as well as the amount" (ibid.:14). Cf. also Ariel (2001) in this regard.

347. Prince (1998:287) states that when Geluykens says that LDs introduce a new referent, these are what she has referred to as "Simplifying LDs."

the second turn (i.e. the turn utilized by speaker N in ex. [74] above) is considered necessary by the interlocutors (ibid.). This acknowledgement confirms for the speaker that the referent is, indeed, now recoverable to the hearer and, thus, the speaker may proceed in saying something about that referent.

It is our contention, however, that Geluykens's notion of recoverability is problematic in several respects, not least of which is the fact that his recoverability measurements are based on such a small portion of the preceding discourse. This makes it impossible to determine just how irrecoverable the referents of the LD constructions actually are. In other words, although it may be true that a referent is not directly (textually) or indirectly (inferentially) recoverable from the minimal discourse portion he examines, we are unable to verify his claim (i.e. that referents of LD are typically irrecoverable) from a larger discourse context. Moreover, his notion of recoverability is hardly the solution to what he claims to be the "inherently unverifiable" and "loose, non-rigid manner" in which "terms such as given-new are often employed", and neither is it the "clear, empirically verifiable characterization" he claims it to be (Geluykens, 1989:129; 1992:9). Since we have already articulated our particular view of givenness/newness as redefined by the notion of pragmatic states (i.e. accessability) on the referential level, and presupposition/assertion on the propositional level (cf. §2.2.3 and §2.3) we will not recover that ground here. It suffices to say, however, that his recoverability model lacks explanatory power at best, and at worst, leads to inaccurate analyses. By way of example, Geluykens's disregard of speaker assumptions with respect to a referent's degree of recoverability in the mind of a hearer results in a misinterpretation of the data. Take for instance the following slightly modified example from Geluykens's corpus (ibid.:66 his ex. 25):

(75) "Sabre was out in the back garden… [this huge Alsatian sort of covered in flakes of snow]$_i$, it$_i$ was really like a sort of beautiful wolf"

In this example the NPs "Sabre" and "this huge Alsatian…" are co-referential, but Geluykens contends that since the dislocated expression "this huge Alsatian…" expresses a completely new aspect of this referent, it cannot be said to be recoverable (Geluykens, 1992:66). However, if we take into account the speaker's natural instinct to form her utterance to match the assumed cognitive state of the addressee, an alternative explanation becomes possible. Having introduced the dog by name (i.e. "Sabre"), the speaker assumes that the hearer has some knowledge of this referent, that is, that the referent is identifiable to the addressee (otherwise, using only a proper name would not be sufficient for hearer

identification). Once this particular canine is activated in the mind of the hearer, other attributes (in this case the size and breed, etc.) become semi-recoverable (i.e. accessible) via inference to the hearer. In other words, what is being activated by the LD construction is not the referent per se (since the referent has already been activated by the proper name) but the specific attributes of the referent, attributes that became cognitively accessible to the hearer once "Sabre" was mentioned. In this light, it seems that the contextual circumstances within which this LD is used fit Prince's LD2 type (cf. §4.2.2.1). The activated attributes were semi-recoverable as a part of a set relation with the already active canine.

Not unlike his rejection of the theoretical notion of givenness, Geluykens also finds prevalent explanations of topicality to be "theoretically vague" and therefore unhelpful for his purposes (ibid.:14). Rather than correcting this ostensible lack of theoretical rigor, however, he concedes that his aim is a more modest one, namely, to "develop a notion of topicality which aims at operationality rather than at theoretical sophistication" (ibid.). His so-called "operational" definition of topicality is based solely on quantitative measures of referents within the turn-taking system, one where "the more topical a referent is, the more it will tend to be mentioned in the discourse" (ibid.).[348] More specifically, an element is considered to have some degree of topicality if it recurs in one or more of the following positions in the turn-taking system:

1. In a subsequent clause, or subsequent clauses, of the same turn in which the element first occurs;

2. In the hearer's turn immediately following this turn;

3. In the 'third turn', i.e. the speaker-turn immediately following the above-mentioned hearer-turn (ibid.:16).

Therefore, Geluykens criteria for "topicality" lacks any connection to the discourse-pragmatic attributes assumed to constitute topical relations in the informational dimension (cf. §2.4). From this standpoint, it is difficult to understand how this "operational" notion of topicality is any less vague than his estimation of the views he dismisses. Furthermore, it prohibits him

348. Geluykens notes "[o]ur notion of topicality bears some resemblance to Givón's (1983) notion of Topic Continuity… Topic continuity of an element depends on two factors: 'lookback' and 'persistence'. Lookback relates to the relationship of an element to the preceding discourse; since this aspect is covered by our recoverability concept, we need not go further into this. Persistence measures to what extent a given element can be found in each of the clauses of the subsequent discourse" (ibid.:15). Schmid (1999:67) notes that the differences between Givon's notion of "topic persistance" and Geluykens's notion of "topicality" "can be put down to the different text types they mainly concern themselves with (narrative vs. interactional discourse)."

from explaining the data. Anticipating this, he states, "[b]efore we have a look at the data, it must be pointed out that the existence of exceptions should not worry us unduly. Since topic-introduction is an interactional strategy, depending for its successful functioning on at least two participants, at least a few failures to develop a referent as a topic should be expected" (ibid.:78). However, as Birner (1996:459) points out, "the data show failures of topicality due not only to the hearer, but also the speaker's developing some topic other than that represented by the REF (79–80) [dislocated entity, JRW], and these are left unexplained." Nevertheless, Geluykens maintains that these quantitative measures indicate that LD constructions are used overall to mark a very high degree of topicality within his data set.[349]

Based on the measured recoverability and topicality rates of the dislocated entities in his corpus, Geluykens concludes that, in the majority of cases, LD constructions were used to introduce referents with a low degree of recoverability. Once these entities were established, they possessed a relatively high degree of topicality (i.e. they appeared frequently as arguments of propositions) in the immediate subsequent discourse.

Notably, Geluykens positions his research and findings against a broader backdrop of typological research on LD. Specifically, he compares his findings in English with that of LDs in non-standard spoken French as represented in Lambrecht (1981), and with Duranti and Ochs's (1979) research on LDs in Italian.[350] He concludes that the three languages pattern differently with respect to the construction's frequency of occurrence, as well as the information status (recoverability) of the dislocated entity. Italian and French utilize LDs more frequently across discourse types than does English, with French LDs occurring more frequently than Italian ones. Moreover, if a threefold distinction is made along the scale of recoverability between irrecoverable, inferable (i.e. indirectly recoverable), and directly recoverable referents, a clear distinction between English, Italian, and French LDs is thrown into sharp relief. In English, dislocated referents are usually irrecoverable, rarely inferable and cannot be recoverable. In Italian, dislocated referents are most often inferable, sometimes irrecoverable and, like English, cannot be recoverable. Finally, in French, dislocated referents

349. Geluykens divides his notion of topic into two discrete categories: direct and indirect. Direct topicality occurs when the resumptive is co-referential with the dislocated constituent. In these instances, the resumptive may occur in three different positions: 1) in the same turn as the dislocated constituent (i.e. in which the referent was introduced, 2) in the third turn (i.e. after an intervening turn by the hearer), and 3) in the hearer turn (i.e. immediately following the LD turn) (ibid.70–74). Indirect topicality occurs when the "referent is not picked up explicitly in any of the three above-mentioned locations, but is picked up implicitly" (ibid.:75). In other words, the resumptive is not co-referential with the referent of the dislocated constituent but "to a closely related referent which is linked indirectly, for instance via a scenario-type connection" (ibid.). This notion is similar in many respects to what Chafe (1987:29) refers to as a "schema" (cf. §2.3.3). Moreover, indirect topicality can also appear at each of the three above-mentioned positions (ibid.:75).

350. Cf. §4.2.1 for a brief description of these studies.

are most frequently inferable, sometimes irrecoverable and even possibly recoverable.

Geluykens explains these ostensibly arbitrary cross-linguistic facts by appealing, again, to a diachronic perspective. As mentioned above, the more entrenched the construction has become in the grammatical system, the larger its area of applicability (ibid.:145). According to Geluykens, this accounts for why LDs in French occur in a wider array of discourse contexts than in Italian or English, and, in turn, why Italian LDs evince a slightly broader distribution than in English. Each language represents the construction at different developmental intervals on a cline of grammaticalization, with LDs in French and English representing opposite ends of the continuum.[351] In other words, of the three languages, English LDs are the least grammaticalized, French the most, and Italian falls somewhere in between.[352] Furthermore, this explains, perhaps, the ubiquitous presence of French LDs in other registers, even formal written varieties, while in English, LDs are primarily constrained to informal, spontaneous conversation. Presumably, the more grammaticalized the construction becomes the more pervasive its use in various registers.

Lastly, although his analysis ostensively depicts English LD as a multi-functional phenomenon (e.g. referent-introduction, contrastive, etc.), Geluykens asserts that, at a higher level of generalization, a common functional denominator relates each functional type (ibid.:157). This common feature is the relative degree of saliency held by the referent of the dislocated constituent. Geluykens, therefore, suggests that the superordinate function of all English LDs is "referent-highlighting"—i.e. "the introduction of a referent which is for some reason communicatively salient" (ibid.:158).[353]

In sum, Geluykens's DI analysis of LD in spontaneous spoken discourse suggests that the primary function of the construction is "the introduction of irrecoverable, topical referents, by way of an interactional, three stage collaborative process" (ibid.:137). Furthermore, it is hypothesized that LD arises in every language to meet this common communicative need. The construction is grammaticalized through this interactional constraint and slowly becomes more entrenched in the specific grammatical system. This

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351. This also perhaps explains the prevalence of seemingly non-prototypical LDs in the studies on French LDs by Lambrecht (1981) and Barnes (1985).

352. Givòn (1983) contends, however, that the infrequency of LD in English is due to the fact that English is characterized by a more rigid word order than other other languages that possess more pragmatically-controlled word order.

353. Geluykens notes that depicting the functional profile of LD at a higher level of abstraction comes at a cost. First, he notes that the interactional dimension is lost at this level of generalization. Second, all functions are represented as belonging to the same level, whereas in actuality, the referent-introducing function is more basic than the other uses. Lastly, this generalized representation says very little about the actual communicative function of specific instantiations of the construction in discourse (ibid.:159).

entrenchment allows for the construction's use in more diverse discourse profiles as well as an acceptability of use in more formal discourse registers (cf. §4.3). According to Geluykens, this explains the unexpected functional and distributional differences of LD in the related languages of English, Italian, and French. If the construction is understood to be at different stages on a cline of change in each language, the differences can be accounted for. Where LD constructions were found not to serve this basic referent-introduction function in his corpus, they nearly always served to express a contrastive/listing relation between two or more referents in a set. Finally, Geluykens suggests that a generalized superordinate function of "referent-highlighting" governs every instance of LD, regardless of the construction's particular communicative function (e.g. contrastive/listing, etc.).

From the studies reviewed thus far, we observe a general consensus, from both CI and DI perspectives, that a low degree of accessibility is a primary motivating factor for the use of LD in discourse. Moreover, this singular motivation results in a basic-level, or prototypical discourse function, namely the (re)activation of a (topical) referent into the discourse model. Although all of the studies adopt a synchronic analysis of the construction, Geluykens (1992), employing a DI approach, posits an interesting diachronic hypothesis in an effort to explain the innovative process by which the form-function correlation developed through spontaneous spoken discourse. If LD constructions share the same motivation and prototypical function, and develop presumably out of the same interactional process, what cognitive constraints might contribute to the innovation and use of this particular form-function correlation? To explore this question further, we turn to the work of Lambrecht (1994, 2001), who contends that the particular form of LD iconically reflects a fundamental cognitive constraint for facilitating the processing of inactive discourse referents.

4.2.2.3 Lambrecht (1994, 2001)

According to Lambrecht, it is an empirical fact of natural language that a preference exists for a new referent to be introduced into the text-internal text world (cf. §2.2.2) before one can predicate a property about the referent (1994.:177–178).[354] Two grammatical "topic-promotion" strategies are generally employed to accomplish this task (c.f. §2.4.3). First, when a speaker wants to introduce a brand-new referent into the discourse, there is a preference to use a presentational (thetic) clause (c.f. §2.4.1) to activate the referent. The referent may then satisfy a topic relation in the following proposition, which asserts new information about this

354. Since many of the salient aspects of Lambrecht's theory were discussed elsewhere (cf. chapter 2), we will not take the time to redefine Lambrecht's theoretical notions (i.e topic, cf. §2.4.1) here.

referent (ibid.:178). Take for example (75):

(75) Once there was a king. He was very wise.[355]

In English, existential "there constructions", represented by the the first clause in (75), are prototypical examples of presentational constructions. This clause introduces and activates "king" in the mind of the reader, consequently making it an acceptable topic of the following clause, which predicates something (i.e. "was very wise") about this referent. When an interlocutor, however, needs to (re)activate a referent in the discourse model that possesses some degree of accessibility (i.e. inactive but not brand-new), either from the text-internal or text-external discourse universe, the presentational construction is not the preferred grammatical strategy. Rather, a speaker will more often employ a second strategy, an LD construction (Lambrecht's "detachment" construction), for the (re)introduction and (re)activation of accessible referents.[356] In other words, for Lambrecht, the pragmatic difference between the presentational construction and the LD construction concerns the difference in the pragmatic state of the respective referents in each construction. While the referent is usually brand-new, or at least unused in the presentational construction, the referent of the dislocated constituent is cognitively accessible to some degree. Example (76), adapted from Lambrecht (ibid.:177, his ex. 4.43) illustrates the prototypical discourse-pragmatic functions of these two constructions:

(76) Once there was a king. He was very wise, rich, and was married to a beautiful queen. They had two sons. The first was tall and brooding, he spent his days in the forest hunting snails, and his mother was afraid of him. The second was short and vivacious, a bit crazy but always game. [Now the king]$_i$, he$_i$ lived in Switzerland.

The "KING" is introduced and activated by the presentational construction. This referent then begins a process of cognitive decay (i.e. deactivation, cf.§2.3.3) in the mind of the reader/

355. "Often the grammatical relationship between the presentational clause and the subsequent clause in which the referent just introduced appears as an unaccented pronominal topic expression is one of the syntactic dependency, the second clause being grammatically subordinated to the first" (ibid.:180). This can be seen in the use of a relative clause (e.g. "Once there was a king who was very wise"), or non-finite participial clauses (e.g. "There was a cat running down the alley"). "The most common and grammatically most clearly marked presentational clause type is characterized across languages by the presence of a limited set of predicates whose arguments have a highly non-agentive and often locative case-role, such as "BE," "BE AT," "LIVE", "ARRIVE," "HAVE," "SEE," etc." (ibid.).

356. Lambrecht emphasizes that "this pragmatic characterization accounts only for what I take to be the basic discourse function of the detachment construction" (ibid.:183).

hearer as this referent ceases to be talked about, or even mentioned in the subsequent propositions. The LD construction is, therefore, employed in the sixth sentence to reactivate the "KING", making it possible for the referent to be encoded as the ratified topic expression (i.e. "he") of the following proposition. Although the presentational construction and LD both serve to make possible the new encoding of a previously non-active referent as an active topic expression, Lambrecht is careful to reiterate the opposing pragmatic constraints that hold for the constructions, respectively: Active referents may not occur in presentational clauses, and brand-new referents may not be encoded as the dislocated constituent in an LD construction (ibid.:183–184).[357] Moreover, he avers that, for LD in particular, two general pragmatic constraints hold for their felicitous use across contexts and across languages.

First, Lambrecht contends that dislocated constituents must be encoded as definite expressions in languages which have a grammatical category of definiteness. This grammatical constraint is in turn motivated by a cognitive identifiability constraint that necessitates the referent of a topic expression be identifiable for the hearer (Lambrecht, 2001:1073). "One cannot assess a predication relative to a given topic unless one knows what the topic actually is" (ibid.).[358] Secondly, the referent of the dislocated constituent must possess a certain degree of salience in the present discourse (ibid.). In other words, the referent must be in some way "a center of present concern" (ibid.). With respect to its potential for activation (cf. §2.3.3), this means that the referent is not only identifiable but is to some degree accessible, having been, in one way or another, evoked in the prior discourse or in the extra-linguistic context (ibid.).[359]

The presentational construction and the LD construction each serve to activate an inactive referent, and in each construction a referential expression is syntactically separated from its canonical position as the argument of a predicate at the clausal level (ibid.:184). The preference to syntactically separate the lexical representation of a non-active referent that is being (re)introduced or (re)activated from its position as an argument of the predicate is

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357. This is a debated topic in the literature. Some say (e.g. Prince and Geluykens) that, although rare, LD can indeed introduce brand-new referents.

358. Exceptions to this constraint—i.e. where a dislocated constituent is indefinite—are explained by the generic interpretation of the denotatum in these instances (2001:1073). According to Prince (1992:303), "some indefinite NPs represent Hearer-old entities. This is the case, for example, with generics.... That is, if a speaker thinks the hearer knows the meaning of some noun, a minimal condition on its normal felicitous use, and if that noun denotes an entity type, then the speaker must assume that the hearer already knows that there is a class of such entity-types; therefore, generics are Hearer-old [i.e. identifiable, JRW]" (cf. §2.3.2–§2.3.3).

359. Lambrecht notes that "[i]n Prince's (1992) terms, a topic referent must not only be 'hearer-old', i.e. identifiable by the hearer at utterance time, but 'discourse-old'" (ibid.).

cognitively motivated. Lambrecht argues that this separation serves to ease the cognitive processing cost associated with the (re)introduction of new referents. If this separation did not occur, "the mental effort necessary to interpret the proposition which expresses the new information about the topic would be performed simultaneously with another processing task, the task of remembering, inferring, or otherwise determining the referent of the topic expression" (ibid.:166). The inherent necessity for the separation of these two cognitive tasks is termed by Lambrecht (1994:184–188) "The Principle of the Separation of Reference and Role" (PSRR). This principle is summed up by a sentence-production instruction: "Do not introduce a referent and talk about it in the same clause" (ibid.:185).[360] Thus, the PSRR represents an iconic relation between the cognitive process and the grammatical form.

Furthermore, the PSRR is advantageous for both the speaker and the hearer. "From the speaker's point of view, it is easier to construct a complex sentence if the lexical introduction of a non-active topic referent is done independently of the syntactic expression of the proposition about the referent" (ibid.). Moreover, the hearer is cognitively helped by the construction in that "it is easier to decode a message about a topic if the task of assessing the topic referent can be performed independently of the task of interpreting the proposition in which the topic is an argument" (ibid.). Hence, topic referents that are not yet active, and thus cannot be encoded as preferred topic expressions (i.e. pronouns), appear as lexical phrases outside the clauses that express propositional information about them (ibid.:186).[361]

According to Lambrecht, the PSRR dictates that a theoretical distinction be drawn between the grammatical strategies employed in coding a referent as a topic expression in a sentence (ibid.:186–187). This distinction results in two types of topic expressions: Reference-oriented, and Role-oriented. Reference-oriented topic expressions merely serve to designate a topic referent, prototypically by means of a nominal phrase, while on the other hand, role-oriented topic expressions designate the topic referent anaphorically or deictically by way of a pronominal expression (ibid.:186–187). Furthermore, while the semantic role of reference-oriented topic expressions are unrecognizable from their form or position in a sentence, role-oriented expressions serve as "grammatical links between the topic referent and the proposition by indicating the semantic role of the referent as an argument, i.e. as a participant in the action, event or state expressed by the proposition" (ibid.:187). With respect to the LD construction in particular, the dislocated constituent prototypically serves to

360. See Kuzar and Netz (2010) for a concise overview of the history of research concerning the cognitive constraint summed up by Lambrecht's PSRR.

361. Prince's "simplifying" function for LD comes close to the notion of the PSRR (cf. §4.2.2.1).

activate the referent about which the following proposition conveys some new information. Lambrecht, therefore, refers to the dislocated constituent as a referent-oriented topic-expression. The resumptive element, in turn, serves as a role-oriented topic expression that satisfies an argument position in the clause proper (ibid.).[362] While the cognitive constraints that constitute the PSRR are universal, their grammatical manifestation in individual languages is subject to typological variation (cf. chapter 3).

At this juncture, it is important to highlight an inconsistency in Lambrecht's description of the PSRR, specifically as it relates to the coding of the Topic relation. It was stated in the previous paragraph that the LD construction codes two co-referential topic expressions (i.e. referent-oriented and role-oriented). The referent-oriented expression is coded as the dislocated constituent, and the role-oriented expression as the resumptive pronoun. Yet the referent-oriented expression stands outside of the clause which codes the pragmatically structured proposition, hence precluding it from coding a pragmatic relation between an entity and an assertion about that entity relative to a given discourse (cf. §2.4.2). According to Lambrecht, topic (and focus) is a pragmatic relation relative to a proposition. It is, therefore, divergent from Lambrecht's own theoretical criteria to refer to the detached extra-clausal constituent as a topic-expression since this constituent is syntactically independent from the matrix clause. Indeed, Lambrecht himself recognizes this contradiction:

> "Since a detached lexical topic constituent does not occupy an argument position in a clause, it is strictly speaking not with the lexical topic NP but with the anaphoric pronominal topic expression that the pragmatic aboutness relation [i.e. topic, JRW] between the referent and the proposition is expressed. It is therefore slightly inconsistent to call such a detached lexical constituent a 'topic NP'. Rather it is a 'topic-announcing' NP" (ibid.:188).

Despite this inconsistency, Lambrecht insists on using the terminological convention of referring to the dislocated constituent as a topic expression (his "TOP" phrase) in virtually all of his discussions on the LD construction (cf. Lambrecht, 1981, 1994, 1996, 2001). This

362. The findings of a recent psycholinguistic experiment reported in Kuzar and Netz (2007, 2010) and Kuzar, Netz, and Eviatar (2011) provide empirical support for the claim that cognitive processing is facilitated by the PSRR as instantiated by the LD construction in particular. The experiment aimed to examine a subject's ability to recall propositional topics from a variety of marked-topic constructions with the assumption that facilitated memory is an indication of facilitated cognitive processing. The results overwhelmingly indicated that recall was greatest for the topic of the LD construction, thus empirically verifying the claim that the PSRR facilities cognitive processing.

naturally derives from Lambrecht's *a priori* understanding of LD as solely a "topic-marking construction", which he defines as:

> "[a] grammatical device used to promote a referent on the Topic Acceptability Scale [cf. §2.4.3, JRW] from accessible to active status, from which point on it can be coded as a preferred topic expression, i.e. as an unaccented pronominal" (1994:183).

Regrettably, however, Lambrecht fails to discuss the possibility of LD functioning at a more basic level to activate referents of topic types other than Primary Topic (e.g. Secondary Topics, Topic Frames, etc. cf. §2.4.5). As such, Lambrecht obtains a place among a long succession of claims averring that LD is exclusively relevant to the pragmatic parameter of Topic.[363]

Lambrecht's inconsistency with respect to the encoding of the dislocated entity as a "topic" constituent, together with his definition for topic-marking constructions as "promoting a referent from accessible to active status" leads one to wonder if a more precise functional description of the dislocated constituent is available? It is proposed that this is indeed the case. We contend that it is more consistent with Lambrecht's own framework, as well as the PSRR, to describe the dislocation of a constituent as functioning to activate a referent irrespective of any pragmatic relation to the following proposition. Once activated, the referent may then be encoded as a (role-oriented) resumptive expression inside the adjacent matrix clause. While we agree with Lambrecht and others that this co-referential resumptive element prototypically satisfies a pragmatic topic relation, this need not necessarily be the case.[364]

In a 2011 article, Yamaizumi presents compelling cross-linguistic evidence suggesting that LD is not limited to marking the topic relation of the following clause. He uses evidence from Japanese, Korean, and even English to show that LD constructions are felicitously employed to answer a *wh*-question, thus supplying the variable in an open proposition. In these instances, the resumptive element is construed as the focal expression in an argument-focus articulation, not the topic. Take for example the Japanese instantiation of LD in (77), Yamaizumi's (13):

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363. In Lambrecht (2001:1072), he asserts that LD constituents are "necessarily **non-focal** sentence elements" (emphasis his).

364. Note that in Lambrecht (2000), the author briefly mentions in passing the possibility of different pragmatic sentence articulations (i.e. Predicate-Focus or Constituent-Focus, etc.) combining in a single sentence construction. In this case, the referent of the dislocated constituent may not function as the pragmatic topic of the associated proposition.

(77) Japanese (Minoru, 2011:83)

A: Dare=ga Itirô=no haha=des=u=ka?

who=NOM Itirô=GEN mother=COP.PLT-NPST=Q

"Who is Ichiro's mother?"

B: [Yamada Hanako]$_i$, kanozyo$_i$=ga haha-desu.

Yamada Hanako 3sgf=NOM mother=COP.PLT-NPST

Yamada Hanako, SHE is his mother."

In (77), Speaker A asks the value of the variable in the open proposition "X is Ichiro's mother", and Speaker B complete's this open proposition by providing the value of the variable "Yamada Hanako" in an LD construction. In Speaker B's reply, the dislocated expression "Yamada Hanako" functions to activate the referent, while the co-referential resumptive pronoun "kanozyo" satisfies a focal relation in an argument-focus [constituent-focus, JRW] articulation. Moreover, one can imagine a context in which the following construction by Speaker B in (78) could felicitously occur in English:

(78) A: Who forgot the pizza?

B: [That forgetful brother of yours]$_i$, HE$_i$ forgot the pizza.

Notice in this example that the particular referring expression used for the dislocated constituent functions not only to (re)activate an accessible entity (i.e. "YOUR BROTHER"), but also to activate a particular conceptual profile. Or, put differently, it predicates a specific quality or attribute to a referent (i.e. forgetfulness).[365] Thus, the activation parameter associated with the dislocated position may apply to more than purely referential activation. Additionally, instantiations of LD, like the one in (78), possess complex dislocated constituents that would be difficult to process if left in canonical position. By dislocating them, the speaker eases the processing cost associated with the complex expression (cf. Keenan and Schieffelin, 1976).

In light of the cross-linguistic facts presented by Yamaizumi, we are compelled to reconsider the longstanding general claim that LD is exclusively associated with the topic relation.[366] To quote Yamaizumi:

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365. For further discussion in this regard, cf. Ono and Thompson, 1994; Tizón-Couto, 2012.

366. Prince (1997:119), in reference to the claims that LD is exclusively associated with notion of topic correctly asserts that "these discussions are often simply claims, or worse, repetitions of claims as general truths,

> "It seems that the left-dislocated position does not determine whether the announced discourse referent represented there turns topic, focus or some other information structural category in the succeeding clause. It may be the case that what left-dislocation does is only to make the announced referent activated, and that the information structural role (i.e. topic or focus) of the referent depends on whether the 'pronominal' [i.e. resumptive element, JRW] is a topic or focus" (ibid.:84–85).

If, at its most generalized level, LD serves to activate a referent irrespective of its information structure relation in the succeeding clause, how are we to account for the processing constraint as stipulated by the PSRR? Put differently, in instantiations in which the resumptive marks the focal relation of a proposition, what motivates the separation of a reference-oriented expression from a co-referential role-oriented expression? This is indeed a question in need of further research, and one we will not explore in much detail here. We do surmise, however, that the description of the PSRR as stated by Lambrecht can be generalized to entail the (re)activation of referents that entertain a focal relation as well as referents that entertain a topic relation to the proposition. In this way, the PSRR facilitates cognitive processing by separating two information-structure parameters that would otherwise be processed simultaneously. The task of remembering, inferring, or otherwise determining the identity of the referent is separated from the task of interpreting the proposition which expresses either the new information about the topic (e.g. topic-comment), or the new assertion as it relates to a presupposed open proposition (e.g. constituent-focus).

Although Speaker B, in (78) above, could have responded to Speaker A's question without the use of an LD (i.e. "THAT FORGETFUL BROTHER OF YOURS forgot the pizza") the processing cost would have increased substantially. The hearer would be required to simultaneously activate the referent, activate the referential profile, and interpret the focal relation.[367] Hence, it is reasonable to assume that the PSRR also applies in these contexts. By using an LD construction, the speaker facilitates the cognitive processing on the part of the hearer by separating these competing cognitive tasks. In the case of (78) above, this strategy allows for the activation of the referent and the referential profile before the matrix clause is

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with no compelling evidence backing them up."

367. It is common across languages for the focal constituent in an assertion to carry a prosodic accent (Lambrecht, 1994:218ff). Moreover, when that constituent is especially long, it is difficult to evenly distribute the accent over the constituent. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that, by dislocating the constituent, the resumptive pronoun may then be delegated to carry the accent (Khan, 1988:94).

uttered. This often results in an epiphenomenon by which the entity receiving the focal relation is given an extra degree of prominence facilitated by removing the competing task of activation.[368]

It is worth reiterating that non-topical LD constructions are non-prototypical across languages. Nevertheless, they offer an important correction to the long standing assumption that LD is exclusively a topic marking construction. Moreover, they lend additional support to the claim that the dislocated position prototypically functions to (re)activate a referent (or a referential attribute, or profile) regardless of the referent's pragmatic relation in the succeeding proposition.

We are careful to say that "LD *prototypically* functions to activate referents" since, as earlier studies have observed, there is a proclivity across languages for currently active referents to occur in the dislocated position before the clause. These active referents may be coded as a pronoun (the default coding of active referents) or, in more marked instances, as a full lexical phrase. Lambrecht cites Enç's (1986) discussion of the dislocation of lexicalized phrases that code active referents. According to Enç, this use of LD "signals a shift in…the 'topic of discourse'" (Lambrecht, 1994:184).[369] The following example, adapted from Lambrecht, illustrates this use (ibid., his ex. 4.48):

(79) CONTEXT: Once there was a king. He was very wise, powerful and was married to a beautiful queen. He lived in a magnificent castle by the lake, had forty-nine servants, and owned an important collection of rare books.
DEVELOPMENT SHIFT: [Now the king]$_i$, he$_i$ was very ambitious. He had been planning for years to conquer the world and finally he was ready.[370]

Givón refers to the use of LD in contexts like that of (79) as the "over-use of discourse machinery"—that is, the use of LD in contexts where no need exists to (re)activate the referent of the dislocated constituent (1979:153–154). As we described above, Lambrecht's PSRR stipulates that the dislocated structure of LD prototypically serve to facilitate cognitive

368. This perhaps explains why such a strong prosodic accent tends to be placed on the resumptive in cases like (78). In non-configurational languages, this also explains why the resumptive is often fronted when satisfying a focal relation.

369. Or, the set of propositions about which the speaker is providing or requesting information (Keenen and Schieffelin, 1976b:338).

370. Manetta (2007) observes similar uses of LD in spoken English discourse which she refers to as "Unexpected LDs".

processing in contexts where an inactive referent is (re)activated in the discourse model (§2.2.4). However, the exploitation of the PSRR in contexts like (79), has the effect of disrupting the cognitive processing of the discourse since the hearer would expect the entity to be encoded as a ratified topic expression (i.e. a pronoun). This cognitive disruption prompts the hearer to infer that a new higher-level development has been signaled. In Relevance Theory terms, the construction's prototypical activation function is not interpreted by the hearer as cognitively relevant since the processing effort (cost) required for the construction does not yield sufficient cognitive effects (rewards).[371] However, from the speaker's perspective, the (over-)use of LD with an active referent is an efficient strategy for signaling that a new development in the discourse has occurred. According to the cognitive and communicative principles of relevance (§2.3.3), the speaker assumes the hearer will make the appropriate inference due to the cognitive effects produced by the ostensive stimulus—i.e. the use of the construction in the non-prototypical context. Likewise, assuming the use of the construction is a piece of ostensive communication,[372] the hearer infers the maximally relevant interpretation, that is, the interpretation that yields the greatest cognitive effects with the least amount of processing effort. This results in the hearer correctly inferring that the speaker is signaling a higher level shift, or development in the topic of discourse (i.e. from the general description of the king to his plans to conquer the world).[373]

Lambrecht also observes the regular occurrence across languages of LD used to mark a shift in attention between two or more active topic referents (Lambrecht, 1994:183). The dislocated constituents in these contexts may be realized as lexicalised NPs or pronominal expressions. Moreover, they regularly occur with a contrastive overlay; that is, they explicitly prompt the hearer to infer a contrastive relation between members of a set of alternatives. Take for example (61) adapted from Lambrecht (2001:1064) and repeated here as (79) (cf. §3.4.1.1):

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371. In terms of the classical Gricean theory, a speaker ostensibly flouts/exploits the maxim of conversation (i.e. Quantity), thus engendering a particular type of conversational implicature (i.e. a non-logical inference) on the part of the hearer. The hearer, in turn, assuming the speaker is abiding by the co-operative principle, infers that the speaker has violated the maxim in order to convey some extra meaning or accomplish some other function. See Grice (1989) and Huang (2007) for further discussion.

372. An act of ostensive-inferential communication is defined by Sperber and Wilson as the informative intention to inform an audience of something, and the communicative intention to inform the audience of one's informative intention (Sperber and Wilson, 1995:49).

373. We do not develop the notion of "discourse topic" here. For further discussion in this regard see: van Dijk, 1977; Brown and Yule, 1983; Barnes, 1985; Floor, 2004.

(80) Lotta guys don't ask. $[ME]_i$, I_i ask.

The referents of "Lotta guys" and "me" are both active referents as indicated by their pronominal encoding. Hence, there is no need to reactivate the referents in this context. Nevertheless, an LD construction is exploited in (80) for two reasons: first, although the speaker in (80) is highly active, he/she is not the expected topic of the second sentence. Due to the default expectation that newly established topics will continue as topics in subsequent propositions,[374] the hearer naturally expects the referent of the first sentence to occur as the ratified (pronominally encoded) topic of the following sentence. In other words, the hearer's attention is centered on the representation of the referent "Lotta guys" at the time the second sentence is uttered. The use of LD in this context is, therefore, pragmatically motivated by the speaker's desire to unexpectedly mark a shift in attention to another active referent (i.e. in this case, the speaker). Not unlike (80) above, the shift is marked by the discontinuity in the discourse. This discontinuity is the result of the use, or rather exploitation of the PSRR in a context where the referent is already active. Unlike the higher discourse-level discontinuity in (79), however, the discontinuity in (77) occurs on a lower, propositional level. The particular contextual conditions within which the LD in (77) is used leads the hearer to make the appropriate inference.

Second, due to the distinct contextual conditions under which the discontinuity occurs, the hearer is constrained to infer a particular interpretation, in this case that a contrastive relation exists between the members of a set of alternatives (cf. §2.5.2). In other words, by using an LD construction in a marked context (i.e. where a referent is already active), the speaker can prompt the hearer to infer an intended, but underdetermined contrastive relation. In this case, the contrastive relation is between the topical referents of "Lotta guys" and the speaker, both of whom are assumed to be members of the set of people who "don't ask". The interpretive effect obtained is the assumption that if property P holds of one member of the set, the same property holds of other members of the set. The (over) use of the construction under such marked contextual conditions results in the additional pragmatic effect of prompting the hearer to infer that a contrastive overlay should be mapped onto the following proposition. In (77) the contrastive relation is realized by the contradiction and elimination of the assumption that the speaker "doesn't ask" by the proposition "I ask".

To sum up this sub-section, Lambrecht contends that LD prototypically functions as one of two topic-promoting strategies used to (re)activate identifiable, accessible, and relatively

374. Cf. Givón's (1983) discussion of topic-continuity in discourse.

salient referents in the mind of an addressee. The construction is cognitively motivated by Lambrecht's PSRR which, in its most narrow application, stipulates that cognitive processing is facilitated when the task of identifying and activating a topical referent is separated from the task of interpreting the proposition that expresses the new information about the topic. It was suggested that the PSRR may be applied more broadly to motivate the cross-linguistically attested occurrence of LD by which the resumptive element function's in a focal relation to the proposition. Moreover, in light of these 'focus-announcing' uses of LD, it was suggested that Lambrecht's core function of LD as a "topic-marking" construction be recast in terms of a more basic-level "activation" function. In light of this assumption, the PSRR, therefore serves to facilitate cognitive processing by separating two cognitive tasks that would otherwise be processed simultaneously. The task of remembering, inferring, or otherwise determining the identity of the referent is separated from the task of interpreting the proposition, which expresses either the new information about the topic (e.g. topic-comment), or the new information as it relates to a presupposed open proposition (e.g. constituent-focus). Lastly, it was shown that the PSRR may be exploited by the dislocation of already active referents in order to produce higher-level and lower-level discontinuities in the discourse, which in turn produce various pragmatic effects. These include, but are not limited to, marking a new discourse development, marking a switch in attention between two or more active referents, and triggering an inference that a contrastive relation holds between two members of a set.

Among other insights, the three studies evaluated thus far have shown that LD constructions are the result of a cognitive-pragmatic motivation (i.e. low accessibility), an interactional procedure, and a cognitive (processing) constraint. Moreover, as we will see in §4.3, each of these factors contribute to the conventionalization of a particular form with a prototypical function, that, depending on the context, may yield various pragmatic effects. We turn our attention now to the work of Tizón-Couto (2012) who takes into consideration much of the research discussed thus far in an effort to provide a functional profile of LD in Late Modern English, organized according to an exemplar model.

4.2.2.4 Tizón-Couto (2012)

We conclude this section by providing an overview of the research and findings reached by Tizón-Couto (2012), who examines the formal and functional aspects of LD in a variety of written genres in Late Modern English (LME), from the eighteenth century onwards. Tizón-Couto (TC) views LD as a configuration that operates at the interface between syntax and discourse. In line with previous research, he contends that LD "cannot be explained without

resorting to discourse functional features, with all the implications such a choice brings to the investigation" (ibid.:279). TC's research, however, moves the discussion forward in several respects. Most noteworthy, in this regard, is the explicit framing of his explanation in terms of an exemplar model of categorization. In other words, TC employs an exemplar model for explaining the organization of the LD constructional schema by which syntactic and semantic, and pragmatic features distinguish between central and peripheral constructional types of LD. In turn, these constructional types correspond to prototypical and increasingly non-prototypical discourse functions which are derived by his quantificational analysis of contextual and interactional information. For our purposes, the discussion here will primarily focus on the author's discourse-functional analysis and the conclusions issued in this regard.[375]

TC contends that referents of dislocated constituents prototypically occur as sentence level topics of the clause with which they are associated. That is to say, in the majority of constructions in his corpus, the dislocate is pragmatically construed as what the proposition is about (Tizón-Couto, 2012:206). Moreover, the majority of dislocated referents are said to also function as topics at a higher "referential" or "textual" level, although the semantic/ pragmatic notion of aboutness is not used in determining text-level topics (ibid.:275). Rather, TC employs a contextual and quantitative approach in this regard. The topicality scope of dislocated referents is assessed by measuring the referent's anaphoric coherence relations. This is accomplished by tallying the occurrence of co-referential anaphoric expressions that occur in the ensuing discourse after the LD construction is employed.[376] Two distinctions are made within the general notion of text-level topic: topic continuity and subsequent mention. Topic continuity concerns the occurrence of co-referential anaphoric expressions that occupy the subject role in a given sentence, where subsequent mention concerns the anaphoric expressions that occupy any other role (ibid.:211). TC found that for topic continuity and subsequent mention, the average spans were 1.08 and 2.18 clauses respectively (ibid.:278). In other words, LD seems to trigger text-level, or discourse-chunk topics in the majority of cases (ibid.).

With respect to the information status of dislocated referents, TC briefly reviews the cognitive-pragmatic theory of information-structure (i.e. activation states) as set forth by

375. The aim of §4.2.3.4 is limited to that of a brief overview of the central claims made by Tizón-Couto (2012), as they directly apply to the objective of the current chapter. As a result, this overview is not intended to be a comprehensive treatment of this publication.

376. In this way, TC follows Givón's (1983) efforts to measure 'topic persistence' scores in discourse. Cf. also Gregory and Michaelis (2001) in this regard.

Chafe (1994), Lambrecht (1994) and Erteschik-Shir (1997) (cf. §2.3). Although he considers this approach to be "the most groundbreaking proposal" in determining the status of dislocated referents, it is ultimately rejected due to TC's estimation that it lacks operational feasibility with respect to written data.[377] In its place, TC follows Geluykens (1992) in opting for a (con)textual "recoverability" approach. As we saw in §4.2.2.2, the recoverability approach only concerns itself with items that are derivable from the discourse record, i.e. from the (con)text.[378] That is to say, the approach adopted by TC focuses on "what the speaker presents, rather than on what he/she 'expects to be', 'believes to be', or 'treats as likely to occur or identifiable' [sic]" (ibid.). In this way, virtually all cognitive-pragmatic categories are abandoned in his analysis of dislocated referents in discourse. Rather, a referent's degree of recoverability is determined by quantifying it's anaphoric features. This is done by counting the number of intervening clausal units between the occurrence of the referent in a dislocated position and its prior occurrence in the discourse record (ibid.:233).[379]

The results of TC's analysis suggest that the recoverability status of dislocated referents is considerably homogenous with no clear tendency towards recoverability or irrecoverability in the data (ibid.:384). Despite not discerning a pattern with respect to the average recoverability scores, TC does observe a correspondence between recoverability/ irrecoverability and the different syntactic types of LD in his corpus, especially as far as the distinction between prototypical and less prototypical types are concerned.[380] Thus, prototypical LDs, together with what TC refers to as "Listing LDs", (a close sibling to the prototype), evince a higher percentage of new/irrecoverable referents in dislocated position (ibid.:278). The informative difference between the non-prototypical syntactic types is less relevant, according to TC, but nevertheless critical when linked to specific discourse functions.

TC construes LD in LME as a multi-functional construction that, depending on the

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377. TC's use of the term 'operational' derives from Geluykens (1992). Cf. §4.2.2.2.

378. TC's methodology is more restrictive than that of Geluykens (1992) in that TC only considers as recoverable "those items that have been previously introduced (cohesively) in the text before their occurrence as dislocates…" (Tizón-Couto, 2012:232). In other words, in measuring for recoverability, TC disallows other pragmatic information that may contribute to the recoverability status of the referent, such as shared cultural information residing in long-term memory, information inferred from the situational context, or informational that is relevant due to its relation to other elements in the discourse context, either text-internal or text-external.

379. We have expressed our disagreement with the recoverability approach in §4.2.2.2 and will therefore not restate those views here.

380. TC's estimation of what constitutes a prototypical LD in LME corresponds to our typological conclusions set forth in §3.2.1. Cf. Tizón-Couto, 2012:143.

context, may carry out various pragmatic functions that derive from its prototypical "referent foregrounding" [i.e. activation, JRW] function in discourse (ibid.:331). TC examines the discourse-functional nature of LD from three perspectives, two of which correspond to what we have called CI and DI approaches, respectively. The third is referred to by TC as a "(con)textual" perspective and principally concerns the (sub)functions triggered by the use of the construction in particular discourse contexts.

With respect to the CI perspective, TC observes two general sub-functions that are closely related to the prototype: Introductory and Forefronting.[381] These two functions, along with the more generalized prototypical activation function, are claimed to derive from cognitive-pragmatic mechanisms. In other words, LD is a strategy used by a speaker/writer to facilitate the processing of an inactive referent to active status while avoiding grammatical complexity (ibid.:385).[382] As a consequence, referents are typically coded as pronominal resumptives within the ensuing clause where they carry out the function of expressing the pragmatic relations (i.e. topic, etc.) of an already active referent. The introductory and forefronting functions share the prototypical or basic-level function of (re)activating referents that serve as sentence level topics in the accompanying clause. They are distinguished, however, by their respective recoverability ratings, with introductory LDs activating new referents not yet mentioned in the discourse, and forefronting LDs (re)activating referents that were previously introduced.[383] In addition to the majority of introductory LD referents being new (87.93%),[384] they also possess syntactically long dislocated constituents. Perhaps more surprising is the fact that just over half of the dislocated constituents were NPs, with a majority of the remainder classified as clausal dislocates.

Concerning their status as discourse level topics, the referents possessed an average topic continuity of one clause, and an average subsequent mention score of two clauses (ibid.:336). Lastly, TC observes that although introductory LDs most often correspond to prototypical syntactic LDs, virtually any syntactic configuration of LD may accomplish this function.

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381. This is not to be confused with the so-called "foregrounding" function noted by Keenan and Schieffelin (1976) and Barnes (1985).

382. Cf. Lambrecht's (1994) "PSRR" as described in §4.2.2.3, and Prince's "Simplifying LD" (LD1) as described in §4.2.2.1. Cf. also Chafe's (1994) "Light Subject Constraint" and Du Bois's (1987) "Given A Constraint".

383. Cf. §4.3 where we will argue that this difference does not necessarily constitute a completely distinct function.

384. 10.91% were semantically inferable, while only 1.15% were recoverable (Tizón-Couto:335).

By comparison, "forefronting LDs" also typically correspond to the prototypical configuration. Unlike introductory LDs, however, the only other type used to accomplish this function is what TC has labeled NP+*ing* LDs.[385] Forefronting LDs function to (re)activate recoverable referents that have gone unmentioned for a long stretch of discourse that, in turn, function as sentence level topics of the ensuing clause. Like introductory LDs, forefronting LDs typically evince long dislocated constituents and possess an average topic continuity score of one clause. With respect to subsequent mention, however, topicality scores are much higher than introductory LDs, a factor that leads TC to conclude that LD "boosts continuity in a text" (ibid.:340). Interestingly, TC contends that forefronting LDs figure much closer to the prototype as far as syntactic features are concerned, with over 80% of dislocated constituents occurring as NPs (ibid.).

As close relatives to the forefronting function are LDs that TC contends contribute a "predicative" function in discourse. "This function relies on an initial constituent by means of which a speaker attaches a quality—via a NP including an adjective or several adjectives—to the entity resumed by the copy" (ibid.:345).[386] Elsewhere we have noted that these LDs may be understood as activating a particular conceptual profile against which the referent is construed (cf. §4.2.2.3). Accordingly, it makes sense to assume that the referent itself is already present in the conversation/discourse (i.e. identifiable/accessible). Indeed, TC observes that this assumption is confirmed by the data, with only 10.89% of predicative referents possessing irrecoverable status at the time of utterance. Moreover, as one would expect, dislocated referents fulfilling this role are typically long. They furthermore possess the highest rate of topic persistence of any of TC's LD types, with an average topic-continuity score of one clause and a subsequent mention score of over three clauses.

Further, TC discusses the interactional (DI) perspective as it pertains to the function of LD in discourse. As we have seen with Duranti and Ochs (1979) and Geluykens (1992), TC understands the interactive dimension as comprised of two functions, namely: 1) negotiating a referent to be set up within a discourse/conversation, or 2) a competitive move to select a turn or to seek the floor of the discourse/conversation. Moreover, TC considers "floor-taking and 'referent negotiation' in conversation as innate to the LD configuration in general" (ibid.:333).[387] As intrinsic as this dimension may be, however, TC avers that it nevertheless

385. NP+*ing* LDs are particular to English and constitute dislocated NPs that are modified by an "-ing" clause of some kind (e.g. "[A young Elephant in Town dying]$_i$, Sr. Hans Sloan bought it$_i$ for us to dissect") (ibid.:85).

386. Example (78) in §4.2.2.3 illustrates this function.

387. Since TC's account of the interactional approach more or less corresponds to that offered by Geluykens (1992), and discussed in §4.2.2.2, it is not discussed in detail here.

derives from the CI role of referent activation/topic announcing as motivated by constraints on cognitive processing (ibid.:315).[388] Since TC's account of the interactional approach more or less corresponds to that found in Geluykens (1992) (cf. §4.2.2.2), and since none of his eight (non-prototypical) functional types derive from the DI perspective, this approach will not be discussed further.

As a third perspective, TC distinguishes what he refers to as a "contextual standpoint", where "specific functions for English LD spring from the juxtaposition of the constructions's pragmatic relevance or salience and the discourse context/background where it appears" (ibid.:317). Moreover, he states "[i]ts main [i.e. prototypical, JRW]… role seems to achieve different functional shades depending on the grammatical and interactional context given" (ibid.:318). In other words, the use of LD in specific (non-prototypical) contexts may yield a variety of pragmatic effects, effects that are understood by TC as constituting distinct (non-prototypical) sub-functions (cf. §4.2.2.3). What's more, virtually all of these "functional shades" serve as "discourse-organizational devices" according to TC. That is to say, they signal what the discourse level topic will be for the ensuing stretch of discourse, or they set up a logical or semantic relation (such as "narrowing" or "contrast") between two referents (ibid.:385). TC observes five sub-functions fitting this description, which are discussed below.

Of the five sub-functions, two of them are understood by TC as being related functions which represent extensions of the forefronting function due to the shared attribute of recoverability. The first, and more predominant of the two derives primarily from interactive contexts and is, therefore, termed the "Acknowledge/Confirmation" function. This function is elicited due to the exploitation of LD in contexts where the dislocated referent is highly active, having just been mentioned by another speaker in the previous turn. By dislocating this highly active referent, the speaker creates a cohesive link in the turn change through repetition or grammatical parallelism (ibid.:341–342). Thus, the use of LD creates an adjacency pair as in (81) (modified from TC's ex [52]) (ibid.:324):

(81) A: I like cake
B: [Cake]$_i$, I love cake$_i$.

By exploiting LD in a highly active context, Speaker B overtly acknowledges, or confirms

388. In this way, TC departs from Geluykens who argues that the information approach (CI) is always dependent on the interactive (DI) approach (Geluykens, 1992:5).

the referent's topicality. TC found that LDs exhibiting this Acknowledge/Confirmation function were highly recoverable, most having just occurred in the previous turn. Moreover, the dislocated constituents were typically very short. They also possessed low topic continuity scores, with significantly higher subsequent mention ratings (ibid.:343).

The second function is termed "Correction" and is closely related to the Acknowledge/ Confirmation function, even to the extent that TC suggests that it could be construed as a sub-type of this later function (ibid.:354). It's syntactic and informative characteristics are nearly identical to the Acknowlege/Confirmation function. However, there is due cause for the distinction, as TC writes: "the fact that one speaker repeats an idea/constituent mentioned right before by another interlocutor (acknowledgment) and then offers an alternative as the integrated copy inspires this distinction" (ibid.). The example in (82) illustrates this function:

(82) A: I like being a student
B: [A student!], I thought you were a **professor**.

The two most significant pieces of the construction, namely the dislocated constituent (repetition) and the resumptive (correction), used in a particular context reflects the corrective attitude of the speaker (ibid.:354). In other words, "the essential circumstances under which LD may carry out the Correction function are the speaker's attitude of correction and the semantic relation of partial identity/opposition between the left-dislocate and the copy in the following clause" (ibid.:356–357). The Correction function possess an even lower topic-continuity and subsequent mention span than the Acknowledge/Confirmation function. The Correction function is also syntactically less prototypical with a high percentage of verbs and adjectives occurring in the dislocated position.

A further functional distinction that results from contextual factors is the "Summarizing" function. TC adopts a definition for this function from Geluykens (1992:351) as a type that sums up, or "synthesizes some aspect of the previous context in order to give some further comment on it." In contrast to the Acknowledge/Confirmation function and the Correction function, however, LDs accomplishing the Summarizing function possess new/ irrecoverable referents and virtually all of them correspond to the syntactic "Listing LD" type (i.e. multiple dislocated constituents). In this way, TC considers the Summarizing function to be a sub-type of the more prototypical introductory function. Moreover, the average topic-continuity span for this function is more or less identical to that of the introductory function. Its subsequent mention span, however, is significantly lower.

TC distinguishes two final functional types he terms "Narrowing" and "Contrastive",

respectively. These two types are closely related to a more general topic shifting function (ibid.:323). The Narrowing and Contrastive effects are triggered from the particular contextual domains in which the LD is used. In each case, these effects occur as the result of a referent's relevant semantic relation to a partially ordered set (poset) which has previously been made available. With respect to Narrowing LDs, this poset relation occurs with the combination of the dislocated referent and the ensuing resumptive. In other words, the narrowing function is "based on a metonymic (part-whole) semantic relationship between the left-dislocate and the copy;… the copy in the main clause is part of the whole expressed by the left-dislocate" (ibid.:349). By using this kind of LD, the speaker causes the narration to become more precise by narrowing down the discourse/conversation in order to specify the part that he/she is going to talk about (ibid.:349). For the most part, LDs accomplishing this Narrowing function correspond to prototypical LDs at the formal and functional levels. That is to say, this function is usually fulfilled by the formally prototypical LD type, or the NP+*ing* construction. They usually possess long dislocated constituents and generally align with the Forefronting LDs with respect to the relatively high percentage of recoverable referents in a dislocated position, a characteristic that generally coincides with high topic continuity and subsequent mention spans (ibid.:361).

Alternatively, a contrastive function results from the use of LD to activate a member of a partially ordered set in a context where the referent replaces another member's previously evoked relation to a particular proposition. At the syntactic level, LDs triggering a Contrastive function resemble fairly prototypical features with the majority evincing long dislocated constituents and corresponding overall to the prototypical LD type (ibid.:348). Furthermore, with respect to persistence, Contrastive LDs evince prototypical topic-continuity spans and the overall highest subsequent mention spans.

In sum, TC analyses the functional nature of LD in LME from three discourse/ conversational perspectives. His first two perspectives correspond to what we have termed CI and DI respectively. Beyond these two, TC distinguishes a Contextual perspective that constitutes uses of LD in non-prototypical contexts that result in the evocation of particular pragmatic effects. These effects are in turn construed as functioning as organizational devices in discourse. According to TC, these perspectives yield eight discourse functions that are organized according to an exemplar model. The eight functions are construed as extensions of the prototypical activation function. They are related to this prototype and to each other by a variety of formal and semantic/pragmatic criteria of family resemblance, namely information status (recoverability/irrecoverability), discourse topicality (persistence), length of dislocated constituent, in addition to a variety of other semantic and syntactic attributes. Based on the

analysis of these features, four of the eight functions are distinguished as major functional categories. These are: Introductory (CI), Forefronting (CI), Predicative (CI) and Acknowledge/Confirmation (DI).

Two minor functions are identified as close sisters to two major categories; thus the Summarizing function (Contextual) is classified as an extensional sub-type of the Introductory function, and, in turn, the Correction function (Contextual) is considered a sub-type of the Acknowledge/Confirmation function. Each of these four functions share the general attribute of activating a recoverable or irrecoverable referent in discourse. Two additional minor functions, Narrowing and Contrastive (Contextual), are functionally related to the Predicative function in that all three not only activate a referent, *but do so in a particular way*, namely by activating/predicating additional information (Predicative), specifying an alternative referent for a given proposition (Contrast) or by establishing a metonymic relation (Narrowing). In short, TC's analysis constitutes an effort to define the discourse functions of LD in a systematic manner by taking into account various motivational perspectives and quantifying a variety of formal and functional features. Moreover in some cases TC observes correlations between various functions with specific structural types, although he does not discuss what particular motivating factors may have led to these correlations.

4.2.2.5 Summary and Conclusion

The studies examined in §4.2 have enriched our understanding of how researchers have sought to explain the functional dimensions of LD in natural discourse. Additionally, this survey manifests several salient methodological and conceptual distinctions made by researchers in their pursuit of a functional explanation. It is prudent that we review and clarify these distinctions before proceeding.

First, we noted a (heuristic) distinction between two methodological approaches to the study of discourse features; we referred to these as: (C)ognitive-(I)nformational and (D)iscursive-(I)nteractional, respectively. While these two approaches possess distinct origins (Linguistics vs. Sociology) and reflect differing views concerning the overall function of communication (Information vs. Interaction), they both provide important insights regarding a functional explanation of the construction. For the most part, previous studies evince a clear predilection for the CI approach in correlation with a synchronic analysis of the construction in a given language. The application of this approach yields valuable insights with respect to cognitive-pragmatic factors (e.g. information status, etc.) involved in the form and use of the construction in discourse. The few studies to adopt a DI approach, by contrast, focus on the

interactional (cf. §4.2.2.2) and sometimes, competitive (e.g. floor-seeking, cf. §4.2.1.4) processes involved in triggering and shaping the particular form-function correlation in spontaneous spoken conversation.

Secondly, we observed a variety of analytical patterns classified in one of two informational/conceptual categories, namely Cognitive-Pragmatic and Discourse-Functional (cf. §4.2.3.5). Cognitive-Pragmatic information concerns contextually determined information such as the information-status of the dislocated referent, pragmatic relation of the proposition, topic-persistence, etc, where Discourse-Functional information focused on the particular communicative task(s) the construction accomplishes in different contexts, such as referent activation/foregrounding, discontinuity resulting in particular inferences related to topic establishment/switch, contrast, etc.

Thirdly, the distinction between Cognitive-Pragmatic information and Discourse-Functional information was reframed in terms of a distinction between 'Motivation' and 'Function' (§4.2.2.1). The prototypical motivation, as evinced by virtually every previous study reviewed, is cognitive-pragmatic in nature and concerns the low degree of accessibility of the dislocated referent. In turn, this motivation engendered a prototypical discourse function, namely, the (re)activation of a referent with a low degree of accessibility.

Lastly, in an effort to shed light on the question of why this particular motivation/ function came to be associated with this particular form, a distinction was made between two constraints, each derived from the DI and CI approaches respectively. The interactional constraint (DI), as espoused by Geluykens (1992), suggests that this form-function correlation is the syntacticization/grammaticalization of an interactional process used to negotiate the (re)introduction/(re)activation of inactive (irrecoverable) referents into the discourse. Alternatively, from the CI perspective, Lambrecht (1994, 2001) posits a cognitive constraint (i.e. the PSRR) that facilitates the processing of inactive referents by isolating two cognitive tasks which would otherwise be processed simultaneously. This facilitation of cognitive processing prompts the innovation of a construction (e.g. with an extra-clausal constituent) well suited for the costly processing of referents with a low degree of accessibility, or potential for activation (cf. §2.3.3). Thus, these two constraints are construed as innovative mechanisms that trigger the particular form-function correlation evinced in the LD construction. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the cognitive constraint is also operative in the interactional process, a fact that serves to demonstrate the somewhat artificial dissociation between the CI and DI approaches described at the beginning of §4.2.

In addition to the prototypical function of the (re)activation of referents that entertain a low degree of accessibility, virtually all previous research observe several common

(sub)functions (i.e. topic shift, contrast, etc.) achieved by the use of the LD construction.[389] Tizón-Couto (2012) showed how a variety of these (sub)functions are synchronically represented as extensions from this prototype through family resemblance that is achieved by a confluence of various structural and functional attributes derived from cognitive-pragmatic, interactional, and contextual perspectives.

Despite the value of the exemplar model in describing the diversity of a synchronic functional profile, an explanation for this functional variation necessitates a diachronic perspective. Up to this point we have made passing reference to this perspective, particularly with respect to the role played by the mechanisms of discourse-pragmatic motivation (§4.2.2.1) and governing constraints (§4.2.2.2–4.2.2.3) in the innovation of the LD form-function pairing. We conclude this chapter by recasting these insights in terms of a broader framework of language change. A usage based approach to the acquisition and development of constructional schemas through a process of grammaticalization provides a principled way forward in this regard. The framework will provide a more comprehensive understanding of how form-function correlations emerge out of extra-grammatical forces, how they become conventionalized, and ultimately lead to other form-function conventions. Indeed, it is only through a diachronic lens of typologically attested patterns of language change, that we are able to explain the synchronic and ostensibly arbitrary variation evinced by LD across-languages.

4.3 The Development of a Constructional Schema: A Usage-Based Explanation

In chapter 3 we argued that LD is a typologically attested constructional schema. That is to say, it is a general configuration of symbolic structures represented by instantiated types that reflect differences in form, and possess positions that may be filled by different constituents of varying syntactic categories. Furthermore, we argued that the taxonomic network of structural types are best construed according to an exemplar model in which a diversity of sub-structures (types) are related, through different degrees of family resemblance, to a schematic prototype (§3.2.1). Likewise, with respect to the functional explanation, the present chapter has shown that the construction is used to achieve a variety of communicative goals, and, like with the structural representation, Tizón-Couto has shown the exemplar model is critical for representing the relation between the prototypical and non-prototypical uses (§4.2.2.4).

389. Virtually none of the previous studies examined frame their descriptions in terms of a prototype theoretic model, TC (2012) notwithstanding. There is a proclivity, however, to use terms such as "primary function" or "main function" in reference to the (re)activation/(re)introduction of inactive referents.

But how did this typologically attested network of form-function correlations emerge? As Bybee et al. aver, "[d]emonstrating that a given form or construction has a certain function does not constitute an explanation for the existence of the form or construction; it must also be shown how that form or construction came to have that function" (1994:3). In other words, synchronic variation must be explained through diachronic processes. In light of this approach, we affirm the arguments of Ariel (2008) and Bybe (2010), *inter alia*, which stipulate that much of the ostensibly arbitrary phenomena observed in grammar turns out to be heavily constrained and motivated (cf. §4.2.2.1). It is the primary aim of this section, therefore, to discuss, by way of a broad sketch, some of the general typologically attested processes involved in the conventionalization of form-function correlations across languages. Moreover, this discussion will offer a clearer understanding, albeit in a generalized fashion, of how it is that the LD constructional schema has come to reflect a variety of forms associated with an array of communicative goals. Moreover, while we have already discussed a few of the mechanisms that play a role in the innovation and development of the LD construction at the form-function interface, viz. cognitive-pragmatic motivation (low-accessibility; §4.2.2.3) and interactional (§4.2.2.2) and cognitive (§4.2.2.3) constraints, it is the aim of this section to situate these mechanisms within a broader usage-based framework of language change.[390]

A general consensus exists among Functional Typologists, Cognitive Linguists, and Discourse Grammarians that grammar is made up of a structured inventory of symbolic form-function conventions. This inventory is represented as a taxonomic network of constructions arranged hierarchically, such that some constructions are more general than others and lower-level constructions often inherit attributes from higher level constructions (Croft and Cruse, 2004:262).[391] This does not mean, however, that all ad hoc form-inference/function correlations are conventional. A conventionalized correlation between some form and some function is defined by Ariel as one in which the particular (pragmatic) interpretation and use conditions associated with the correlation are grammatically encoded (Ariel, 2008:27).[392]

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390. We must clarify by way of a caveat that this section is merely intended to be a general sketch of some key features of a usage-based approach that specifically help us to make sense of the synchronic data we have encountered in this chapter. This is not intended to be a comprehensive and nuanced description of a usage-based framework.

391. The 'construction' as defined in various works by Fillmore and colleagues (Fillmore et al. 1988), Goldberg (1995, 2006) and Croft (2001) provides an appropriate unit for morphological and syntactic representation. As Bybee (2010:9) claims "the crucial idea behind the construction is that it is a direct form-meaning pairing that has sequential structure and may include positions that are fixed as well as positions that are open."

392. In the first part of this section we make reference to the structure of constructions by the generic term 'form'. This is done out of convenience only, and should not be taken to imply a concrete instantiated token.

Thus, correlations where functions can be inferred are classified as pragmatic, and correlations where inference cannot be invoked for interpretation are grammatical (ibid.). Moreover, conventionalized correlations routinely evolve as a response to pragmatic[393] (extra-grammatical) motivations (ibid.:117).[394] In other words, recurrent inferences may gradually turn into codes (ibid.:27). This occurs when speakers *frequently* produce an innovative form as a means for expressing, or accomplishing a particular communicative goal in discourse.[395] From a synchronic analytic perspective, the fact that grammar is constantly evolving makes it difficult to establish whether or not the correlation at hand constitutes a conventionalized construction.

In an effort to distinguish between extralinguistic aspects associated with a construction and those aspects that a construction has come to encode, Ariel (2004, 2008) proposes a distinction between two notions she terms "Discourse Function" and "Discourse Profile", respectively. Discourse Profiles are defined as "relatively concrete, low level generalizations about the conditions of use and interpretations of linguistic forms in actual discourse" (Ariel, 2004:92). They are extra-grammatical patterns made up of non-obligatory features that frequently co-occur with a construction (Ariel, 2008:54). Moreover, Ariel's notion of "Discourse-Profile" correlates with what we have previously described as 'cognitive-pragmatic' information (cf. §4.2.3.6). By contrast, Ariel's "Discourse Functions" correlates with what we have referred to elsewhere as 'discourse-functional' information (§4.2.3.6). Ariel describes "Discourse Function" as "higher-level generalizations abstracted away from various discourse profiles" (2004:92). They are necessary discoursal conditions obtaining when a linguistic form is (prototypically) used (2008:53). In other words, whereas Discourse Profiles are only discoursal tendencies, Discourse Functions are grammatically defined.

The rational behind this distinction, as Ariel asserts, is that specific discourse functions predict specific contexts where the form would be useful. Discourse profiles support points

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Indeed, as we have argued elsewhere (§3.1) the form of a construction may be a generalized pattern that entails a network of symbolic structures that share common organizational features. Later in this section, we will argue that use of specific instances in varying contexts gives rise to these generalized patterns.

393. For our purposes, Pragmatics is defined as inferences speakers intend their hearer's to draw based on their explicit message, the specific context, and a set of pragmatic principles. Although this general definition is consensual among functional linguists, there is disagreement among semanticists, neo-Griceans and Relevance theoreticians on what should count as code and what as inference in specific cases.

394. According to Comrie (1983:87) functional motivations can account for "a significant set of constructions cross-linguistically."

395. Cf. Bybee and Hopper (2001:7) who aptly define grammar as the "internalized aggregate of formations [i.e. conventionalized form-function correlations, JRW] from usage." See also Langacker (1987) who similarly sees grammar as the cognitive routinization of recurrent patterns of mental activity.

about discourse functions. For example, in order to support the idea that LD constructions prototypically encode the activation of entities that are entertained at a relatively low degree of accessibility, several contextual conditions (i.e. discourse profiles) are measured—e.g. the textual (anaphoric) distance between the last and current mention of the referent, and in the case that the referent has not been mentioned in the text, it is determined if the referent is semantically inferable by way of a poset relation, situational context, or a frame/schema of some kind. As previous studies have shown, the prototypical discourse profiles associated with LD constructions (e.g. greater distance from the antecedent, or accessibility via inference) support the claim about the discourse function of the activation of referents with a low degree of accessibility. As Ariel contends, "if some form [e.g. LD, JRW] is claimed to carry some function (e.g. low activation) and if x is predicted to manifest itself in certain (but not other) contexts [e.g. large distance, etc., JRW], then demonstrating that those contexts frequently obtain when the form under discussion occurs supports the conclusion that the form encodes that function (2008:54–55).

To further illustrate the difference between discourse profiles and discourse functions, recall our earlier discussion in §4.2.2.1 concerning Prince's claim that LD exhibits three arbitrary and discrete form-function correlations. It was determined that upon closer inspection, each of Prince's three form-function correlations actually evinced a single discourse-pragmatic motivation, namely, a low degree of accessibility. This common attribute prompted us to suggest, following Ziv (1994), Ariel (2008) and others, that what Prince takes to be three discrete discourse functions, is in fact, a single, abstracted discourse function with differing discourse profiles. Thus, in each type, the (schematic) construction can be construed as encoding the function of (re)introducing/(re)activating a referent that entertains a low degree of accessibility back into the discourse model. The differences associated with each type, therefore, do not concern differences in function, per se, but differences in particular non-obligatory contextual conditions that are compatible with one discourse function. In this particular case, the distinct profiles amount to the different contextual reasons for the low accessibility of the referent in each type (e.g. anaphoric distance, inference, etc.).[396]

Up to this point our discussion has presumed a clear grammar/pragmatics divide, in addition to a purely synchronic analytic perspective, which has implicitly assumed a clear distinction between synchrony and diachrony. In reality, however, the situation is much more complex. As previously mentioned, conventional form-function correlations routinely

396. In the same way the notion of discourse profile can explain the differences, for example, between Tizón-Couto's "introductory" and "forefronting" functions (cf. §4.2.2.4). Like with Prince, the distinction is not one of function, but of differences in contextual profiles.

(re)emerge out of extra-grammatical conditions. It is suggested, therefore, that "grammar is often pragmatics turned code" (Ariel, 2008:111). In other words, pragmatics, along with other extra-grammatical patterns and triggers, provide the raw materials and impetus for grammar (ibid.). This means that at any given point, aspects of synchronic grammar are interwoven with diachronic processes and the direct link is provided by extra-grammatical forces (ibid.:112).[397] Thus, there is no clear dividing line between grammar and pragmatics or between synchrony and diachrony. Indeed, synchronic grammar is most comprehensively understood in relation to the diachronic processes that gave rise to them.[398]

Likewise, it is impossible to understand diachronic processes without reference to synchronic grammar (ibid.:112). As Traugott and Dasher stipulate, "[t]here is no way to account for change except by appealing to structures and processes that exist synchronically" (2002:16).[399] The point is that synchronic grammar encompasses co-evolving layers of form-function (form-inference) correlations at different positions on a path to conventionalization. Some of the correlations are new and some are old. Thus, even when two or more sets of correlations seem incompatible with each other—e.g. as when they govern the same form but make different predictions about its use so as to give the synchronic appearance of arbitrariness—the fact that diachrony occurs within synchrony helps us to make sense of the ostensibly arbitrary synchronic variation exhibited in grammar (ibid.113). What we are proposing, then, is a panchronic view of grammar,[400] where synchrony and diachrony are viewed as an integrated whole, and where grammars are always emergent and never completely established (Hopper, 1987:142).[401]

Discourse is, above all, a set of patterns (Ariel, 2008:180). In light of a panchronic view

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397. For further discussion on the intimate link between diachrony and synchrony, especially with respect to the traceability of diachrony in synchrony, see Hopper and Traugott (2003), Croft (2003), and Ariel (2008).

398. Some researchers reduce synchrony to diachrony. For instance Hopper (1987) and Bybee et al. (1994: 22) have taken a radical position, re the grammar/pragmatics interface, as well as the synchrony/diachrony divide: "we regard 'system' or 'structure' to be epiphenomenal rather than basic to the nature of grammatical substance . . . rather than studying the 'structure' of grammatical expression in a language, we advocate the study of the way that grammatical meaning and expression are attained across languages as a way of understanding the inherent properties of natural language" (Bybee et al., 1994: 22). Ariel notes, however, that "in practice, however, it is not clear that their research is restricted in this way. And while some change is always in the making, most of grammar is quite stable at any given point in time (see Croft, 2000; Givón, 1999)" (2008:113).

399. Cf. Hare and Elman, 199; Joseph, 1992; and Labov, 1973.

400. Although the term 'panchrony' is not new (cf. Saussure 1916:134–135 and Hjelmsley, 1928), only recently has it been used to refer to the combination of diachrony and synchrony.

401. See also the work of Andrason (2013a; 2013b; 2013c; 2012a; 2012b; 2011a; 2011b; 2011c; 2011d) who has utilized a panchronic view of grammar in order to provide an explanation of the BH verbal system.

of grammar, we can say that at any given point, discourse reflects a mixture of pragmatic patterns (discourse profiles, i.e. form-inference correlations) and grammatical patterns (discourse functions, i.e. form-function conventionalization). But how exactly do pragmatic patterns develop into grammatical conventions? A 'usage-based' approach to language change stipulates that grammar is a dynamic system that is constantly changing by virtue of extra-grammatical forces involved in language use.[402] This change principally involves the (re)emergence of grammatical constructions out of extra-grammatical conditions through the use of language in natural discourse (cf. Langacker 1988, 2000; Bybee 1995; Elman et al. 1996).[403] One of the central assumptions of the usage-based approach is that the representation of linguistic elements correlates with frequency of occurrence (e.g. Bybee 1985, 2001, 2010; Langacker 1988, Ariel, 2008). The frequency with which particular patterns are used over time provides a path between the extra-grammatical and the grammatical (cf. Hawkins, 1994, 2003).[404] In other words, linguistic expressions and grammatical patterns that occur with high frequency in language use become more deeply entrenched in mental grammar than expressions that are infrequent. This entrenchment of form-function/meaning conventions occurs by a process known as 'Grammaticalization'.[405] Although the relevant literature reflects a variety of definitions for this term,[406] the one offered by Hopper and Traugott (1993:xv) will suffice for our purposes:

"Grammaticalization is the process[407] whereby lexical items and constructions come

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402. The usage-based model comprises various network models in which linguistic knowledge is shaped by language use (cf. Bybee 1985, 1994, 2001, 2010; Langacker 1987a, 1991; Barlow and Kemmer 2000; Elman, Bates, Johnson, Karmiloff-Smith, Parisi, and Plunkett 1996, Ariel, 2008). The discussion here is not intended to be a nuanced description of the usage-based model, but rather a general sketch made with broad strokes.

403. Note that this position is in direct opposition to the central assumption of generative grammar: that the basic principles of grammar are innate.

404. Accordingly, Bybee and Hopper (2001:7) define grammar as "the internalized aggregate of formations from usage." Similarly, Langacker (1987) defines grammar as the cognitive routinization of recurrent patterns of mental activity.

405. While many believe grammaticalization (some prefer "grammaticization") to be a young sub-field of linguistics, in fact, it is actually nearly as old as the field of linguistics itself (Narrog and Heine, 2011:1). For accounts on the history of grammaticalization studies, see Heine, Claudi, and Hünnemeyer (1991); and Hopper and Traugott (2003).

406. Cf. Kurylowicz, 1975; Traugott and Heine, 1991; Bybee, 1994, 2001, 2010; Heine, and Kuteva, 2004; and Narrog and Heine, 2011.

407. In the second edition, Hopper and Traugott replace the word "process" with the word "change" in order to clarify the misconception that grammaticalization is a force with an impetus of its own (2003:xv). While we are in fundamental agreement with Hopper and Traugott we will continue on occasion to use the term "process". This is done without intending any of the implications Hopper and Traugott warn against.

> in certain linguistic contexts to serve grammatical functions, and, once grammaticalized, continue to develop new grammatical functions."

Language change through grammaticalization is so pervasive that, as Hopper and Traugott (2003:1) point out, the term has come to have two meanings.[408] The first concerns the phenomena themselves and is used to describe the process of language change as reflected in the definition quoted above. The second meaning, however, refers to the overall framework which serves to account for these phenomena.[409] Our use of the term will, for the most part, reflect the former meaning rather than the later. That is to say that the term, as used here, refers to the particular steps and paths through which non-grammatical form-function/ meaning correlations become more entrenched in the grammatical system over time. Where the later meaning is intended, however, we will use the capitalized form, i.e. "Grammaticalization".

The process of grammaticalization is precipitated in small increments generally over some period of time.[410] It proceeds by minimal steps, not abrupt leaps or parametric changes. This incremental process is triggered by speakers routinely selecting an innovative form as a successful means for expressing a specific communicative goal under particular contextual conditions (regardless of whether the speaker generated the form-function association themselves or heard someone else do it). Ariel (2008:181) aptly draws attention to Keller's (1994) comparison of the emergent grammatical convention to the creation of a diagonal path through a lawn, leading from building A to B. Keller writes:

> "The work of 'an invisible hand' in creating the path is actually produced by many individuals, each deciding to make themselves a shortcut on the way from one building to another. Each individual may have come up with the shortcut idea on their

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408. See Narrog and Heine (2011) for a recent compendium of the state of the art in cross-linguistic research on grammmaticalization. See also Heine and Kuteva (2004), in this regard.

409. In this regard, Hopper and Traugott aver that "[a]s a term referring to a research framework, 'grammaticalization' refers to that part of the study of language change that is concerned with such questions as how lexical items and constructions come in certain linguistic contexts to serve grammatical functions or how grammatical items develop new grammatical functions. This research framework is also concerned with characterizing the subset of cross-linguistically recurring correlations across time among semantic-pragmatic, morphosyntactic, and (sometimes) phonological changes. It highlights the tension between the fixed and the less fixed in language, between relatively unconstrained lexical (semantic) structure and more constrained syntactic, morphosyntactic, and morphological structure. It provides the conceptual context for a principled account of the relative indeterminacy in language and of the basic non-discreteness of categories" (2003:1–2).

410. Although, see Bruyn (1995) who shows evidence that suggests that in some instances grammaticalization takes place instantaneously.

> own, or they could have seen somebody else do it. What is important is that it takes many individual footsteps along more or less the same track to create a long stretch that's lawn-free, a path." (cf. Haspelmath, 1999)

The same applies for the emergence of an association between a linguistic form with a certain function. "Hence, grammaticalization is the unintended product of an aggregate of local, intended actions" (ibid.181–182).[411]

The innovative association between form and function, however, is often heavily constrained by a speaker's cognition as well as other socio-cultural forces. With respect to the LD construction for instance, in §4.2.2.3 we presented evidence suggesting that the particular form of the (schematic) LD construction was optimally tailored for the prototypical communicative goal for which it is used. Specifically, we argued, following Lambrecht (1994) that the particular form of the LD construction was, in part, the result of a cognitive constraint (i.e. PSRR) facilitating the processing of the (re)activation of referents entertaining a low potential for activation. Thus, the requisite motivation of low accessibility together with the cognitive restrictions stipulated by the PSRR result in the innovation of a form well suited for it's communicative goal. We see then, that the choice to associate some form with some communicative goal within a specific set of use conditions (profile) is heavily constrained, and not arbitrarily so.[412]

When speakers frequently choose optimal expressions to accomplish particular communicative goals, relatively privileged discourse profiles emerge. These privileged profiles are what Ariel refers to as "Salient Discourse Patterns" (Ariel, 2008:182).[413] She writes:

> "The salient discourse pattern or profile results from consistently skewed uses speakers make of their current grammar. If the emerging pattern is salient enough, it may bring into being new forms and new form–function correlations, a new grammar,

411. Ariel adds, "Speakers do have local communicative intentions. What they don't have are intentions to create grammatical conventions. Just as people did not convene to agree on creating a shortcut path, speakers cannot convene to create conventionalized forms for 'worthy' functions" (2008:182).

412. For further evidence in support of this claim, see Ariel (2008).

413. Although frequency of use is the primary means by which specific profiles receive a privileged status, Ariel observes that form-function correlations may become privileged through other means as well. Such reasons may be that "the form–function correlations are exceptional, or they may be especially useful because they are compact in expressing some complex message, or they may be used by the "right" set of speakers one wants to identify with" (2008:188–189).

in other words" (2008:306).

Thus, generally speaking, the grammaticalization of form-function conventions is mediated by functionally motivated patterns that arise from speaker's innovative use of grammatical structures under new contextual conditions. If a particular pattern (form-inference correlation) is used often enough, or is perceived to be an exceptionally advantageous communicative strategy, it inevitably increases in saliency, becoming a salient discourse pattern. At this stage, the pattern is neither explicitly pragmatic, nor explicitly grammatical, but a privileged routinization technique followed by speakers for the communicative advantages it affords under certain contextual conditions (ibid.:61).[414] Through increased adoption by other speakers, the salient pattern will be used more and more frequently thus becoming further entrenched into the grammar, and ultimately reaching a conventionalized grammatical status.

As we mentioned earlier, however, not all innovative form-inference patterns become conventional. That is to say, some ad hoc correlations are never grammaticalized.[415] As Ariel stipulates, it is only by forming salient discourse patterns that grammaticalization occurs. Thus, the salient discourse pattern "is the final gate-keeper for conventionalization" (ibid.:185).

Recall, for instance, Geluykens's (1992) hypothesis that the conventionalized LD construction is the result of the frequent repetition of a multi-stage interactional process employed to negotiate the (re)introduction of a referent (back) into the current discourse model. Motivated by particular discourse-pragmatic conditions (i.e. low-accessibility) and facilitated by a particular cognitive constraint (i.e. PSRR), this frequently used strategy gives rise to a salient discourse pattern. In addition to frequency effects, the saliency of this pattern is likely due, in part, to the exceptionally economic nature of this process for accomplishing this particular communicative goal. Recall that the alternative is usually a comparatively inefficient bi-clausal presentational construction (cf. §4.2.2.3). The crucial point is that a high degree of saliency—often due to the frequent use of some form for some function under certain use conditions—gradually leads to a stronger association between form and function (Ariel, 2008:206). This entrenchment process ultimately results in the necessary triggering of a certain interpretation for a certain form. Or, in terms of our earlier distinction between profile and function, the construction has come to encode the discourse function.

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414. Cf. Haspelmath, (1998); Detges (2000, 2001, 2004); and Detges and Wlatereit (2002).

415. See Ariel (2008) for examples, in this regard.

In correlation with the gradual process of entrenchment, grammaticalization often involves the progressive 'schematicity' of a construction (cf.§3.2.1). Although some highly entrenched constructions are more substantive (i.e. lexically specific),[416] some undergo a process of increased schematization due to frequency effects involving the gradual abstraction of instantiated form-function pairings. This abstraction often occurs as a result of analogical[417] operating procedures that speakers-hearers perform through unconscious categorization of similar instances (cf. Slobin, 1985; Peters, 1985). These procedures ultimately lead to the deduction of schematic patterns based on the shared attribute(s) of instantiated types.[418] As the number of instantiated types increases, so does the degree of abstraction of the constructional schema. In short, levels of abstraction are built up through categorization of similar instances of use (i.e. types) into more abstract representations (Bybee, 2010:9).[419] The level of entrenchment of a constructional schema is directly proportional to the number of types that are associated with that schema. As Diessel avers, "[o]ther things being equal, schemas that are instantiated by a large number of types are likely to be more deeply entrenched than schemas that are related to only a few types" (2004, 30). Thus, a deeply entrenched constructional schema consists of a network of discrete constructional types of varying degrees of schematicity united by certain prototypical attributes (cf. Croft and Cruse, 2004; Evans and Green, 2006; Langacker, 2008).[420] This network forms a constructional category organized according to an exemplar model in which instantiated types are related via family resemblance to a schematic prototype (cf. chapter 3).

Since constructional schemas are based on abstractions over actual instantiated types, their pairing with an exemplar model of the constructional category is rather straightforward (Bybee, 2010:9). This is because people build up abstract prototypes of categories—in which the central member or members share more attributes than the marginal members (cf. chapter

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416. For instance, Bybee and Scheibman (1999) have argued that expressions such as "I don't know", "I don't think", and "Why don't you" are concrete constructions that constitute prefabricated chunks stored as holistic units (Diessel, 2004:29).

417. Analogy is the process by which novel utterances are created based on previously experienced utterances (Bybee, 2010:8).

418. In a construction-based framework, a "type" can be defined as a construction that instantiates a particular constructional schema. A "token" on the other hand is an instantiation of a concrete construction (Diessel, 2004:30).

419. Cf. Langacker, 1987; 2000.

420. Similarly, Evans and Green define schematization as "a special kind of abstraction, which results in representations that are much less detailed than the actual utterances that give rise to them" (2006:115). Schematization, they contend, "is achieved by gradually setting aside points of difference between instantiations of constructional types and leaving the points they have in common" (ibid.).

3)—by using the same domain of general cognitive processes that are at work in schematization. As language users experience specific instantiations of a construction type, they generalize over similar tokens to establish schematic exemplars which represent the fixed attributes and schematic slots in the generalized constructional pattern. For example, in chapter 3 we showed how the LD construction is a typologically attested constructional schema structured according to an exemplar model. Recall how the cross-linguistically attested prototypical type reflects a schematic representation: [NP]i s…proi…, which in turn reflects the more generalized representation: [XP]i s…(pro)i…(cf. §3.2.1). While typologically attested LD schemas reflect various degrees of abstractness, the notion of schematicity explains why it is, for instance, that the dislocated position is filled by virtually all syntactic categories across languages. Moreover, this also explains the variability concerning the resumptive slot: a position satisfied by a diversity of syntactic categories fulfilling a variety of grammatical relations (cf. §3.4).

It has long been observed by researchers working within a Grammaticalization framework that as a construction becomes more schematic and *ipso facto* entrenched in the grammatical system, the contextual conditions under which an appropriate use of the construction is licensed also increase. In other words, grammaticalization leads to an increase in a constructional schema's 'productivity'. Productivity can be defined as the likelihood that a construction will be used for new functions.[421] Constructions that are highly entrenched are more likely to be selected for constructing novel expressions (Diessel, 2004:31).[422] Generally speaking, the degree to which a constructional schema is productive is proportional to the number of types within the schematic network. If the constructional schema reflects a high type frequency, then it is likely to be highly productive, thus reflecting a variety of functional types.[423] The development of multiple functions within the same constructional schema emerge as a result of various mechanisms.[424] Regardless of what mechanism might trigger a new form-inference/function association out of an existing exemplar representation, the change always emerges out of a new salient pattern.

For example, we suggested in §4.2.2.3 that new non-prototypical salient discourse

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421. Cf. Langacker, 2000; Diessel, 2004; Croft and Cruse, 2004; Croft and Cruse, 2004; Bybee, 2010.

422. Cf. Rumelhart and McClelland, 1986.

423. Cf. Diessel (2004:32) who cautions that productivity is not only determined by type frequency.

424. Cf. Harris and Cambell (1995:50) who claim that there are only three basic mechanisms involved in language change: reanalysis, extension (analogy) and borrowing. See also Fischer (2007) who contends that analogy is the main mechanism for change. See also Croft (2000:63) who refers to analogy but also conversational maxims and discursive practices.

pattens often emerge from the intentional use of LD for the exploitation of conversational maxims. This occurs as a result of using the construction in a marked and unexpected context (i.e. where the referent is already highly accessible/active). Thus, a device optimally designed to facilitate cognitive processing (PSRR) becomes an impediment in this respect. The disruption in processing results in a discontinuity in the discourse that—in combination to a variety of contextual profiles—prompts the hearer to infer an ostensively relevant interpretation. Depending on the particular profile(s), this interpretation may be the highlighting of a contrastive relation that holds between two active referents, or it may indicate a shift to a new higher-level development (cf. §4.2.2.3). Hence, progressive schematization engenders an increasingly productive constructional schema. As speakers frequently use LD in marked discourse profiles, the non-prototypical inferences generated by this usage may become privileged, and thereby elevated to the status of a salient discourse pattern. The correlating processes of schematization and productivity give way to an explanation as to how a constructional schema originating out of motivations and constraints concerning the activation of inactive referents also cross-linguistically reflects instantiations of types with an active referent encoded by a pronoun in dislocated position (cf. Barnes, 1995; §4.2.1.3). In other words, only in light of a panchronic view of grammar and a usage-based conception of language change can we provide a motivated explanation for ostensibly arbitrary one-to-many form-function correlations within the same overarching constructional schema.[425]

In sum, it is our contention that a panchronic view of grammar, along with the diachronic processes involved in a usage-based conception of grammaticalization—i.e. salient discourse patterns, entrenchment, schematically, productivity, etc.—provide a framework for explaining the structural and functional variation that is typologically attested by LD. Although more could be said with respect to these processes, and how they relate to LD, such an endeavor is beyond the scope of the present chapter. Nevertheless, the general sketch provided here allows us to draw some tentative conclusions in terms of an explanation of how the LD constructional schema comes to reflect the synchronic variation attested by cross-linguistic research.

425. Ariel writes, "the fact that grammar is as motivated as it is, is due to the fact that it is a natural historical product. It can only arise in motivated steps. It doesn't have to stay motivated and, in fact, it often doesn't (or, at least not perfectly so), since the cumulative effect of a series of motivated changes may very well lead to arbitrariness" (Ariel, 2008:118).

4.4 Summary and Conclusion

The present chapter has provided a generalized cognitive-functional explanation for the typologically attested LD schema. This was accomplished, in part, by drawing on the findings from a selection of noteworthy publications which were heuristically categorized according to one of two methodological approaches. The first, we termed Cognitive-Informational (CI) and the second, Discursive-Interactional (DI). Most researchers have adopted a CI approach focusing on the cognitive-pragmatic and discourse-functional information pertaining to the felicitous use of LD under particular contextual conditions (cf. §4.2.3.5). Two significant cognitive-pragmatic parameters pertained to: 1) the information status of the dislocated constituent at the time of utterance, and 2) the pragmatic relation satisfied by the resumptive/linked element within the associated clause. Where information status is concerned, virtually all studies found that referents of dislocated constituents were identifiable, and typically entertained a low degree of accessibility when the construction was uttered. Moreover, in §4.2.2.1, we suggested that this particular use condition (i.e. discourse-profile) amounts to the prototypical cognitive-pragmatic motivation for LD. In addition to information status, every study stipulated that LD was inextricably related to some notion of topic, where in most cases, this denoted a pragmatic relation of aboutness at the sentence level. Following a note of criticism made by Prince (1997), we surmised that many later studies have adopted this assumption *a priori* as an accepted typological fact handed down from earlier research. While there is little doubt that this is indeed the prototypical state of affairs, Yamaizumi (2011) presents cross-linguistic evidence suggesting that resumptives, in fact, may satisfy a focal relation to the accompanying proposition in some non-prototypical contexts (§4.2.2.3).

Where discourse-functional information is concerned, we contend that the basic-level (prototypical) function of LD is the (re)activation of an entity entertaining a low degree of accessibility back into the discourse model (§4.2.2.1). This (re)activation serves to either: 1) ratify the referent as an acceptable topic of the associated proposition, or 2) simplify the interpretation of the resumptive/linked element as one that satisfies a focal relation to the proposition. In support of this claim, we demonstrated that the particular bi-furcated form of the (schematic) LD construction was optimally tailored for this prototypical communicative goal. Moreover, this tailoring process was governed by two particular constraints: a cognitive constraint, described in terms of Lambrecht's (1994) "PSRR" (§4.2.2.3), and an interactional constraint, described in terms of Geluykens's (1992) "turn-taking" process (§4.2.2.4).

In addition to this generalized function of (re)activation, each study observed that LD is

used to accomplish additional non-prototypical functions in their respective copora.[426] While not all of these sub-functions were instantiated in every language, many were observed cross-linguistically. Moreover, several of these sub-functions were shown to result from the exploitation of the PSRR in highly marked contexts (i.e. where the referent was is already accessible). Rather than facilitate processing, this overuse of LD results in a discontinuity in the discourse and triggers one of a variety of pragmatic implicatures, depending the contextual conditions involved. The interpretations may entail that a contrastive relation holds between the dislocated entity and another contextually relevant entity, or that a higher level shift in the discourse has occurred. Furthermore, some non-prototypical functions derive from an analogical extension of the prototype. This can be seen, for example, in the propensity of speakers to employ LD, not to activate a referent, but to activate (or predicate) a particular profile against which the referent should be construed. The dislocated referent in these types are typically long, and so entail a higher processing cost for the hearer, hence, further motivating the use of LD. We will not take the time to recount all of the functional distinctions attested by each individual study discussed above. Nevertheless, the critical point is that the typologically attested constructional schema synchronically reflects a diversity of structural and functional types represented according to an exemplar model.

The fact that the LD reflects multiple and sometimes ostensively unrelated functions from a synchronic analytic perspective, does not, however, entail, as some have argued (cf. Prince, 1997, 1998), that the LD schema is an arbitrary and unmotivated form-function correlation. As we have shown in §4.3, when the synchronic generalized functional profile of LD is recast in light of a panchronic view of grammar, as well as usage-based patterns of langauge change, a more nuanced explanation emerges. In short, synchronic variation is given explanation through diachronic processes.

426. Although in some instances these additional functions were shown not to be discourse functions but low-level conditions of use (i.e. Discourse Profiles). Cf. §4.2.2.1 and §4.3.

Chapter 5: The Syntax and Semantics of Left Dislocation in Biblical Hebrew

5.1 Introduction

With this chapter we come to the third and final part of this study. By way of review, Part 1 (ch. 2) established the necessary theoretical foundation, providing definitions and explanations of various concepts, and otherwise orienting this study against a broader linguistic backdrop. In Part 2, a typological component was added to this framework (§3.1), and cross-linguistic research on LD was considered from both structural (ch. 3) and functional (ch. 4) perspectives.

We now aim to apply insights established in these previous chapters by way of a careful examination of the LD construction in BH. Like with Part II, this final section will be divided into two chapters (chs. 5–6). The present chapter will begin by offering a few brief remarks concerning the rational for the parameters of this study (§5.2). Subsequently, we will describe specific syntactico-semantic criteria for the identification of LD in BH that are grounded in the typological generalizations established in ch. 3. The application of this criteria to the prose corpus of Genesis–2 Kings has yielded over 650 tokens, which have been analyzed and categorized according to their global (§5.4) and internal (§5.5) grammatical features. The global classification of these constructions (§5.4) was carried out according to the exemplar model of conceptual and *ipso facto* constructional categories described in ch. 3. That is to say, from the syntactic-semantic generalizations of LD constructions across languages, we have conceptualized LD in BH as a productive constructional category comprised of a taxonomic network of constructional schemas which are, depending on their family resemblance (i.e. shared syntactico-semantic attributes), located at various degrees of extension from the prototype. It is worth noting that, while the category structure of LD in BH presented in this chapter is described strictly from a syntactico-semantic perspective, a full-orbed view of this constructional category necessitates a discourse functional perspective as well (ch. 6) (see §3.1). The segregation of the syntactico-semantic description (ch. 5) from the functional (discourse-pragmatic) explanation (ch. 6) is done for heuristic purposes, only.

5.2 The Parameters of the Study

Regrettably, a comprehensive analysis of every LD construction in the Hebrew Bible exceeds the scope of this work. In light of this, we provided few brief remarks in chapter 1 concerning the parameters of the present project. In this section we will elaborate further on those initial

remarks and provide a rational for the corpus selected for this study as well as the types of constructions analyzed.

5.2.1 Corpus

The Hebrew data analyzed for this study derives from the prose of the Torah and Former Prophets (Genesis–2 Kings). According to Miller (2003:19) these books provide a body of data that is representative, reasonably extensive, and relatively homogeneous; three criteria suggested by Greimas (1983:163–166) as a standard for a suitable corpus used for linguistic analysis. Beginning with the last of these criteria and working forward, the criterion of homogeneity is especially problematic when it comes to the study of the Bible.[427] For example, linguists analyzing modern pieces of discourse often take for granted the criterion of homogeneity due to the fact that the piece under investigation is typically of a single genre, often spoken/written by a single person over a relatively short period of time.[428] By comparison, linguists analyzing BH are afforded no such luxury. The entirety of the extant BH manuscripts comprise a body of literature that is profoundly heterogenous in different ways. In particular, these biblical texts consist of books of varying linguistic genres composed and redacted by a variety of people over a long period of time.[429] One of the aims therefore in delimiting our corpus to the MT of Genesis–2 Kings (as exemplified in BHS) is to curtail this problem of heterogeneity by focusing on a smaller, more homogenous body of literature which, by and large, consists of mostly prose material,[430] and which is traditionally understood as belonging to the same chronological period.[431] Secondly, the selected corpus yields a relatively extensive data set of over 650 tokens of varying types of LD constructions

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427. Cf. Moshavi (2010:2).

428. Cf. Wallace Chafe's famous study on the "Pear Stories" (Chafe, 1980).

429. For further discussion on the complexities and methodological issues involved in the linguistic analysis of biblical texts, see Miller (2003:14–22) and Holmstedt (2006). For further discussion regarding the dating of biblical texts see Sáenz-Badillos (1997), Young, et al. (2008) and Miller-Naudé and Zevit (2012). And lastly, for further discussion on the formation of the Hebrew Bible, see Tov (2011), Carr (2011) and Van der Toorn (2009), *inter alia*.

430. In point of fact, the exact difference between prose and poetry is often difficult to determine as prose texts may make use of distinctively poetic devices, e.g. parallelism and chasms (Miller, 2003:19).

431. The books of the Hebrew Bible are traditionally divided into two general chronological categories: Classical Biblical Hebrew and Late Biblical Hebrew. Traditionally Classical Biblical Hebrew has entailed the prose portions of the pre-exilic periods (of which the Pentateuch and the Former Prophets are a part), while most scholars consider books such as Chronicles (in those portions not parallel to Samuel–Kings), Ezra, Nehemiah, Esther, Ecclesiastes, Daniel and the DSS as belonging to Late Biblical Hebrew. For a brief summary of the issues involved in dating Hebrew texts, see Hackett (2002). For a more extensive discussion, see Young, et al. (2008), and Miller-Naudé and Zevit (2012).

(see §5.3), all of which were exhaustively analyzed. Finally, this corpus is comprised of a large portion of Hebrew narrative, thus supplying a representative sample of this genre (Miller, 2003:22).[432]

5.2.2 Data Set

In addition to confining our corpus to the Torah and Former Prophets, we have also chosen to limit our analysis to LD constructions with a finite verb in the matrix clause. That is to say, LD constructions of the types represented in (83a) and (83b) below are excluded from the present investigation:[433]

(83a) Gen. 48.5a[434]

וְעַתָּה שְׁנֵי־בָנֶיךָ הַנּוֹלָדִים לְךָ בְּאֶרֶץ מִצְרַיִם עַד־בֹּאִי אֵלֶיךָ מִצְרַיְמָה$_i$ לִי־הֵם$_i$ אֶפְרַיִם
וּמְנַשֶּׁה כִּרְאוּבֵן וְשִׁמְעוֹן יִהְיוּ־לִי׃

"And now, your two sons who were born to you in the land of Egypt before coming to you in Egypt$_i$, they$_i$ are mine. Ephraim and Manasseh are mine, just as Reuben and Simeon are."

(83b) Num. 16.7

וּתְנוּ בָהֶן ׀ אֵשׁ וְשִׂימוּ עֲלֵיהֶן קְטֹרֶת לִפְנֵי יְהוָה מָחָר וְהָיָה הָאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר־יִבְחַר יְהוָה$_i$
הוּא$_i$ הַקָּדוֹשׁ רַב־לָכֶם בְּנֵי לֵוִי׃

"Put fire in them, and place incense on them before Yahweh tomorrow, and the man whom Yahweh chooses$_i$, he$_i$ shall be the holy one. You have gone too far, son's of Levi!"

Further, although I have argued elsewhere (§5.2.3) that typologically speaking, vocative expressions are syntactically detached from the matrix clause—those occurring before the matrix clause located in the left (front)-dislocated position—space has prohibited us from

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432. Moshavi (2010:2) cites Joosten (2002), who notes that "it is a general rule in research in morphosyntax to take on poetic texts only when the prose rules have been approximately established." Moshavi also notes that this rule is equally apt with respect to syntactic-pragmatic research (Moshavi, 2010:2).

433. These two tokens represent the two major classes of verbless LD clauses in BH: (83a) dislocate + predicate + independent personal pronoun, and (83b) dislocate + independent personal pronoun + predicate.

434. The greyed-out portion of the verse(s) indicate the dislocated constituent and a clause internal element semantically related to the dislocate. In addition to being greyed out, a total identity relation between the dislocate and the resumptive will be marked with a subscripted 'i'. Tokens lacking subscripted 'i' denote either that a resumptive element is absent altogether, or that a clause-internal element stands in a metonymic or partial relation to the dislocate. In the case of the later, the clause internal linked element is also marked in grey.

including tokens meeting this description in our analysis.[435]

To reiterate, we have included in our data set only constructions with a dislocated non-vocative constituent preceding an associated matrix clause with a finite verb form. Every LD token has been manually retrieved due to the lack of a reliable electronic database that could be used to query every instance of LD as formally defined in this work. This retrieval process is part of a larger database project commissioned by Logos Bible Software entitled "The Lexham Discourse Hebrew Bible".[436]

5.3 Methodological Considerations

5.3.1 The Clause and the Sentence in Biblical Hebrew

In BH, as in all languages, a clause is the smallest grammatical unit that includes a predicate and expresses a complete proposition (Kroeger, 2005:322). Moreover, predicates may be realized as verbal or non-verbal phrases. Clauses with verbal predicates are further subdivided into 'finite' and 'non-finite', depending on the form of the predicate phrase employed. As noted in §5.2.3, this study will focus exclusively on LD constructions consisting of a dislocated constituent + a finite clause. In BH, finite verb forms include: *qatal*, *weqatal*, *yiqtol*, *wayyiqtol*, Cohortative and Imperative.

A further distinction involves the difference between simple clauses consisting of a single predication, and complex clauses consisting of a predication that is coordinated with another nonsubordinate clause, or contains one or more subordinate clauses, each with its own distinct predication. BH is no exception in this regard, and as we will soon see, the matrix clauses associated with dislocated constituents in BH reflect both simple and complex clause types.

A final distinction worth noting is the difference between non-subordinate and subordinate clause types.[437] Nonsubordinate clauses are those that are not syntactically dependent to another clause.[438] Finite subordinate clauses, on the other hand, are syntactically

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435. For a syntactic analysis of vocatives in BH, see Miller (2010).

436. The Lexham Discourse Hebrew Bible database consists of the annotation over 30 lexico-grammatical and syntactic devices that have a discourse-pragmatic function above the sentence level. This database is fully searchable and includes annotation of the information structure of every clause/proposition in the Hebrew Bible.

437. While much can be said regarding the formal properties of BH nonsubordinate and subordinate clauses, a through description of each clause type is beyond purview of this section. For such a description, see Moshavi (2010:50–59). The comments made here reflect a distillation of the parts of Moshavi's discussion that are most relevant for this study.

438. Moshavi (2010:50) notes that the term 'nonsubordinate clause' is preferred over the term 'independent clause' since the later often refers to a clause that is not coordinated with another clause.

dependent and function as constituents of the superordinate clause that contains it (Moshavi, 2010:50). Often, but not always, the finite subordinate clauses are marked by a subordinator;[439] the two most commonly found in BH are אֲשֶׁר and כִּי. A few noteworthy types of subordinate clauses most relevant to this study are as follows:

1. The relative clause: The relative clause functions as a modifier within a NP and may contain an explicit or implicit anaphoric pronoun that is co-referential with the head noun. Relative clauses in BH may occur with or without a relativiser[440] (i.e. so-called, 'bare' relatives) or they may occur with or without an explicit head noun (i.e. so-called, 'headless' relatives). A further semantic distinction between 'restrictive' relatives and 'non-restrictive' relatives will be discussed in §5.3.1.1.[441]

2. The adjunct clause: Adjunct, or adverbial clauses function, as their name suggests, as adjunct or adverbial elements of a superordinate clause. As Moshavi notes, a number of semantic types of adjunct clauses are found in the BH corpus (ibid.:55). Three types especially pertinent to this work are: Conditional adjunct clauses, Causal adjunct clauses, and Temporal adjunct clauses.[442]

2a. The conditional adjunct clause: Typically introduced by the subordinators אִם and כִּי, conditional clauses consist of two parts: the subordinated 'protasis' and the matrix clause 'apodosis'.[443] The protasis denotes a state of affairs that have yet to take place, whereas the apodosis expresses the resulting state of affairs that will exist contingent upon the protasis coming true.[444]

2b. The causal adjunct clause: Causal adjunct clauses are most commonly

439. While infinitive clauses are always subordinate, they are never marked by a complementizer.

440. Finite relative clauses in BH are typically marked by the subordinator אֲשֶׁר, functioning as a relative pronoun.

441. For a thorough study of relative clauses in BH, see Holmstedt (2002).

442. See also Purpose adjunct clauses (Moshavi, 2010:54).

443. Conditional clauses in BH also occur without any lexical marking.

444. Moshavi also draws attention to so-called 'hypothetical' conditionals like in Judg. 13.23. She further notes that hypothetical conditionals are marked by לוּ, while negative hypothetical conditionals, such as Gen. 31.42, are marked by לוּלֵי.

marked by כִּי and provide the motivating reason for a preceding proposition or a series of propositions.

2c. The temporal adjunct clause: Temporal adjunct clauses are typically marked by בְּ + infinitive construct or כְּ + infinitive construct. Additionally, they are often marked by כִּי, or less often by אִם. Additionally, many fronted and dislocated temporal adjunct clauses are preceded by the discourse markers וְהָיָה / וַיְהִי (see §5.3.8.2 for further discussion).

A finale note with respect to BH subordinate clauses pertains to the disputed issue of the coordinator וְ used as a subordinating conjunction, introducing conditional, purpose, complement, or relative clauses.[445] A growing consensus among Hebrew scholars is that וְ is generally lacking in semantic freight and that various translation values associated with this conjunction primarily reflect the semantic relationship between the two units that וְ connects, rather than the conjunction itself (cf. Steiner, 2000). Since no distinction can be made on formal grounds between coordinate and subordinate וְ, the present work will not construe them as two discrete grammatical categories.

Where clauses are relatively straightforward in their formal definition and are often easy to delimit in BH,[446] the same cannot be said for the superordinate linguistic unit: 'sentence'. The concept of a sentence is intuitively clear, yet a formal definition that specifies the syntactic parameters for identifying this unit across languages continues to elude linguists. Indeed, the complexities surrounding the definition of the sentence in BH are so acute they have lead at least one BH linguist to declare that "the quest for the sentence is probably an exercise in futility" (Moshavi, 2010:48).[447] The inefficacy of the endeavor stems from the difficulties inherent in attempting to delimit the boundaries of BH sentences, since virtually every clause in BH narrative begins with a coordinator וְ (ibid.). Thus, the present

445. Moshavi (2010:56) lists the following examples of each type: conditional (Gen. 44.22); purpose (Gen. 27.4); complement (Gen. 47.6); relative (Gen. 11.4).

446. There are, however, cases where the clause is not so easily determined. Moshavi (2010:49) correctly draws attention to cases where, because Hebrew verbs are inflected for person, number and gender, the occurrence of two successive verbs sharing the same implicit subject may be construed as two separate clauses, or alternatively a single clause with two compound verbs.

447. For further discussion on the difficulties of defining the sentence in BH, see Andersen (1974), and Waltke and O'Connor (1994:77–79).

work dispenses with the syntactic notion of the sentence and instead takes the clause as its primary unit of inquiry.

5.3.2 Identifying Left Dislocation in Biblical Hebrew

It was established in §3.2.2 that the sole structural attribute for identifying LD constructions across languages is the extra-clausal status of a constituent that is located before an associated matrix clause. In light of this, several formal criteria for determining extraclausality across languages were described. In §5.3.2.1, we will draw on insights from chapter 3 in order to demonstrate that the same formal means used to establish extraclausality cross-linguistically are applicable to the BH data as well. This discussion will focus strictly on the grammatical and syntactic grounds for determining extraclausality of dislocated constituents in verbal LD constructions in BH. Subsequently, in §5.3.2.2, we will provide a few brief remarks concerning the occurrence of lexico-grammatical elements that precede dislocated constituents in our data set.

5.3.2.1 Determining Extra-Clausal Status in Biblical Hebrew

Extra-clausal constituents in BH, as in other languages (cf. §3.2.2), are those which are independent of the semantic and syntactic dependency relations between arguments and their predicates (Lambrecht, 2001:1065). In other words, they are completely optional with respect to the predicate argument structure of the clause.[448] Prototypically, the extra-clausal status of a dislocated constituent in BH is determined by the presence of a coindexed element within the matrix clause. The constituent is, therefore, considered to be detached from the associated matrix clause by virtue of the fact that the coindexed resumptive element satisfies the necessary valency requirements licensed by the predicate, or stands in an adjunct relation to the predicate, leaving every intra-clausal slot occupied. To consider the constituent as somehow inside the clause would result in the occurrence of two separate constituents for the same syntactic-semantic slot—a violation of a fundamental semantic well-formedness condition (cf. §3.2.2).

Further, it was argued in §3.2.1 that the presence of a coindexed resumptive element is only a sufficient, but not a necessary criterion for extraclausality across languages. The BH data also supports this claim. In other words, when no coindexed or otherwise semantically linked item occurs in the matrix clause (i.e. non-resumptive LDs, cf. §3.2.1 and §3.2.2.1),

448. Note the distinction made in §3.2.2 with respect to the notion of 'optionality' between the grammatico-semantic category 'adjunct' and 'extra-clausal constituent', respectively. In BH, as in the above mentioned discussion in chapter 3, we understand 'adjunct' and 'extra-clausal' constituent as mutually exclusive categories.

extraclausality may additionally be established by the presence of an intervening grammatical element of some kind occurring in the clause initial slot—i.e. the so-called CP/Wh-position—located between the dislocate and the associated matrix clause. In non-resumptive LD constructions of this type, the intervening element is typically וְ. This intervening וְ is usually prefixed to a yiqtol (*wayyiqtol*) or qatal (*weqatal*) verb form, as in (84a) and (84b):[449]

(84a) Exod. 9.21

וַאֲשֶׁר לֹא־שָׂם לִבּוֹ אֶל־דְּבַר יְהוָה וַיַּעֲזֹב אֶת־עֲבָדָיו וְאֶת־מִקְנֵהוּ בַּשָּׂדֶה׃

The one who did not regard the word of the Lord, he left his slaves and livestock in the open field.

(84b) Lev. 26.36

וְהַנִּשְׁאָרִים בָּכֶם וְהֵבֵאתִי מׇרֶךְ בִּלְבָבָם בְּאַרְצׇת אֹיְבֵיהֶם וְרַדַף אֹתָם קֹול עָלֶה נִדָּף
וְנָסוּ מְנֻסַת־חֶרֶב וְנָפְלוּ וְאֵין רֹדֵף׃

And as for those of you who are left, I will send faintness into their hearts in the lands of their enemies$_i$. The sound of a driven leaf shall put them to flight, and they shall flee as one flees from the sword, and they shall fall when none pursues.

Less often the וְ may precede a fronted non-verbal constituent or the discourse marker הִנֵּה,[450] as illustrated in (85a) and (85b):[451]

(85a) 2 Sam. 3.6

וַיְהִי בִּהְיוֹת הַמִּלְחָמָה בֵּין בֵּית שָׁאוּל וּבֵין בֵּית דָּוִד וְאַבְנֵר הָיָה מִתְחַזֵּק בְּבֵית שָׁאוּל׃

While there was war between the house of Saul and the house of David, Abner was making himself strong in the house of Saul.

449. In two tokens (Gen. 39.10; Exod. 13.17) from our data set, a וְ in clause initial position precedes a negator וְלֹא + *qatal*.

450. On the issue of describing הִנֵּה as a discourse marker, see Van der Merwe, et al. (forthcoming). For a thorough treatment of the functional profile of הִנֵּה, see Miller-Naudé and Van der Merwe (2011).

451. These examples are representative of what I have elsewhere (§5.4.7) called "Temporal LDs".

(85b) Gen. 38.29

וַיְהִי ׀ כְּמֵשִׁיב יָדוֹ וְהִנֵּה יָצָא אָחִיו וַתֹּאמֶר מַה־פָּרַצְתָּ עָלֶיךָ פָּרֶץ וַיִּקְרָא שְׁמוֹ פָּרֶץ׃

But as he drew back his hand, behold, his brother came out. And she said, "What a breach you have made for yourself!" Therefore his name was called Perez.

Besides וְ, various other functional elements may fill this clause-initial slot, thus marking the preceding constituent(s) as extra-clausal. Most prominent in this regard are the interrogatives מַה or אָנָּה and the subordinating conjunction כִּי,[452] as illustrated in (86a) and (86b) respectively.

(86a) 2 Sam. 24.17

וַיֹּאמֶר דָּוִד אֶל־יְהוָה בִּרְאֹתוֹ ׀ אֶת־הַמַּלְאָךְ ׀ הַמַּכֶּה בָעָם וַיֹּאמֶר הִנֵּה אָנֹכִי חָטָאתִי
וְאָנֹכִי הֶעֱוֵיתִי וְאֵלֶּה הַצֹּאן מֶה עָשׂוּ תְּהִי נָא יָדְךָ בִּי וּבְבֵית אָבִי׃

Then David spoke to Yahweh when he saw the angel who striking the people, and he said "Look, I have sinned and I have done wrong, but these sheep$_i$ what did they$_i$ do? Please let your hand be against me and my father's house.

(86b) Lev. 22.12

וּבַת־כֹּהֵן כִּי תִהְיֶה לְאִישׁ זָר הִוא בִּתְרוּמַת הַקֳּדָשִׁים לֹא תֹאכֵל׃

"A priest's daughter, if she is married to a layman, she shall not eat of the offering of the gifts."

5.3.2.2 Elements Preceding the Dislocate

Not unlike LD constructions in other languages, dislocates in BH are not the only grammatical elements that occur in the anterior extra-clausal domain. A variety of other elements including conjuncts, focus particles, discourse markers/connectives and adverbs often precede the dislocated constituent. The most prevalent element to occur in this position is the coordinator וְ, as in (87a). Other elements less commonly represented include: גַּם, as illustrated in (87b), רַק in (87c), אַף in (87d), and הִנֵּה in (87e):

452. In our corpus, virtually every instance where כִּי marks the clause initial boundary, it introduces the protasis of a conditional clause.

(87a) Deut. 2.23

וְהָעַוִּים הַיֹּשְׁבִים בַּחֲצֵרִים עַד־עַזָּה כַּפְתֹּרִים הַיֹּצְאִים מִכַּפְתֹּור הִשְׁמִידֵם וַיֵּשְׁבוּ תַּחְתָּם׃

As for the Avvim, who lived in villages as far as Gaza$_i$, the Caphtorim, who came from Caphtor destroyed them$_i$ and settled in their place.

(87b) Deut. 28.61

גַּם כָּל־חֳלִי וְכָל־מַכָּה אֲשֶׁר לֹא כָתוּב בְּסֵפֶר הַתּוֹרָה הַזֹּאת יַעְלֵם יְהוָה עָלֶיךָ עַד הִשָּׁמְדֶךָ׃

Also every sickness and every affliction that is not written in the book of this law$_i$ Yahweh will bring them$_i$ upon you until you are destroyed.

(87c) Josh. 11.13a

רַק כָּל־הֶעָרִים הָעֹמְדוֹת עַל־תִּלָּם לֹא שְׂרָפָם יִשְׂרָאֵל

"But all of the cities that stood on their mounds$_i$, Israel burned none of them$_i$."

(87d) Exod. 12.16

וּבַיּוֹם הָרִאשׁוֹן מִקְרָא־קֹדֶשׁ וּבַיּוֹם הַשְּׁבִיעִי מִקְרָא־קֹדֶשׁ יִהְיֶה לָכֶם כָּל־מְלָאכָה לֹא־יֵעָשֶׂה בָהֶם אַךְ אֲשֶׁר יֵאָכֵל לְכָל־נֶפֶשׁ הִוא לְבַדּוֹ יֵעָשֶׂה לָכֶם׃

"On the first day you shall hold a solemn assembly, and on the seventh day a solemn assembly; no work shall be done on those days; only what everyone must eat$_i$, that$_i$ alone may be prepared by you."

(87e) Num. 22.11

הִנֵּה הָעָם הַיֹּצֵא מִמִּצְרַיִם וַיְכַס אֶת־עֵין הָאָרֶץ עַתָּה לְכָה קָּבָה־לִּי אֹתוֹ אוּלַי אוּכַל לְהִלָּחֶם בּוֹ וְגֵרַשְׁתִּיו׃

"Look, the people who have come out of Egypt. They cover the face of the earth. Now come, curse them for me. Perhaps I shall be able to fight against them and drive them out."

5.3.3 Semantic Coherence Relations Between the Dislocate and the Associated Clause

In §3.2.1, we discussed four specific coherence relations characterizing the semantic link between the dislocate and, either a particular intra-clausal element, or the proposition as whole. These four semantic relations are repeated here for convenience:

1. Total identity relation: A co-referential relation exists between the dislocate and an anaphoric resumptive element within the clause, such that the resumptive forms a cohesive repetition of the dislocated reference.

2. Metonymic relation: The dislocate and an intra-clausal linked element stand in a whole-part relation to one another. Metonymic relations may be hypernymic (whole-part) or, more rarely, hyponymic (part-whole).

4. Partial identity relation: The semantic features of the dislocate and an intra-clausal element only partially overlap.

5. Relevance relation: The dislocate is not semantically linked to any particular expression within the associated clause, but rather pragmatically functions as a framing device, which constrains the interpretation of the following proposition to a certain semantic domain.

It is argued below that these cross-linguistically attested categories sufficiently capture the corresponding relations in the BH data.

5.3.4 Text-Types

As a final methodological note, this study distinguishes two primary text-types represented in the prose of Genesis–2 Kings: narrative and direct reported speech.[453] Although BH exhibits two types of reported speech, viz. direct and indirect,[454] this work will only be concerned with direct quotations. Miller (2003:200–201) and more recently, Moshavi (2010:60) have pointed out that direct speech quotations may be analyzed at two different levels: the level of the reported utterance, or the reporting clause. A measure of syntactic uncertainty, however, exists regarding the syntactic status of the reported utterance to that of the reporting clause. For instance, Moshavi (ibid.) writes, "[a] direct speech quotation

453. For a lucid and thorough study of reported speech in BH narrative, see Miller (2003).

454. According to Moshavi (2010:59), "In direct speech, deictic elements are interpreted in relation to the context of the quoted utterance: "I" and "you" refer to the reported speaker and his addressee, rather than to the reporting speaker and addressee. In indirect speech, the deictic elements are interpreted in relation to the context in which the speech is reported. First- and second-person pronouns refer to the reporting speaker and his addressee, while the quoted speaker and addressee are referred to by third-person pronouns." Hatav (2000) claims that there exists a third type: "free direct discourse", which is syntactically introduced by the infinitive לֵאמֹר and represents not an exact repetition of the original, but "more or less" what the original speaker intended to say. However, see Miller (2003:412–418) for a cogent refutation of Hatav's claims.

functions as a nonsubordinate clause on the level of the reported utterance, whether or not it is subordinated to the reporting clause." Due to this uncertainty, direct reported speech clauses will be analyzed in this study exclusively on the level of the reported utterance (ibid.).

5.4 The Taxonomic Network of Left Dislocation Based on Global Syntactico-Semantic Attributes

This section consists of an exhaustive description of eight types of LD constructions identified in our corpus and distinguished on the basis of a variety of global (i.e. external) syntactico-semantic attributes. As noted in the introduction, this constellation of constructional schemas is organized according to an exemplar model, and are conceptualized as a taxonomic network of constructions located at varying degrees of remoteness from a prototypical constructional schema. Thus, we begin by describing the exemplar schema in §5.4.1, and then proceed to a description of seven other constructional extensions in §5.4.2–5.4.8—each of which may exhibit attributes of previous schemas located closer to the prototype.[455]

5.4.1 Prototypical Left Dislocation

LD constructions that instantiate the exemplar schema comprise 14%[456] (93/651)[457] of our overall data set. Tokens instantiating the prototypical schema exhibit the following syntactic and semantic attributes:

1. A single NP[458] is syntactically detached from the matrix clause with which it is associated.

2. The dislocated NP is coindexed with an anaphoric resumptive pronoun (clitic or full) inside the matrix clause with which it is semantically linked.

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455. For example, Multiple LDs (§5.4.3) may exhibit attributes of Non-resuptive LDs (§5.4.2), etc.

456. Percentages have been rounded to the nearest whole number (e.g. 14.35% = 14%).

457. Cf. Gen. 3.12; 4.4; 4.22; 13.15; 15.4; 19.38; 21.13; 22.24; 23.11; 24.7; 24.14; 25.10; 26.15; 28.13; 28.22; 35.12; 44.17; 47.21; 49.19; 50.5; Exod. 1.22; 9.19; 12.16; 12.44; 15.15; 19.18; 32.1; Lev. 3.9; 7.7; 7.8; 7.9; 7.30; 11.3; 11.9; 14.6; 22.11b; Num. 4.29; 9.17b; 14.31; 17.3; 22.20; 22.35; 22.38; 26.33; 35.19; 35.33; Deut. 1.30; 1.36; 1.38; 2.23; 3.13; 4.3; 12.11; 12.14; 13.1; 14.6; 14.27; 16.6; 18.19; 20.20; 28.61; Josh. 1.3; 11.13; 15.16; 17.3; Judg. 1.12; 5.11; 7.4; 11.24 (2x); 1 Sam. 9.20; 15.9; 17.37; 18.17; 2 Sam. 6.21; 13.32; 13.33; 14.19; 1 Kng. 5.19; 6.7; 6.32; 8.19; 9.20-21; 12.17; 15.13; 22.14; 2 Kng. 1.4; 1.6; 1.16; 10.29; 17.36; 22.18; 25.22.

458. As we will see in §5.4.1.1 below, dislocates occur in a variety of syntactic types. In some cases, the fact that the LD is not a NP, but a PP, or some other phrase type is the only attribute excluding it from the typologically defined exemplar category.

3. The resumptive pronoun satisfies an argument relation to the predicate.

4. The semantic link between the dislocate and the resumptive pronoun is one of total identity. Hence, the resumptive is directly replaceable with its correlative dislocate such that the dislocate could satisfy a semantic valency slot licensed by the predicate.

The majority (79%; 73/93)[459] of prototypical LDs occur in reported speech, with a remaining (20%; 19/93)[460] in narrative. Representative instantiations of the prototypical schema include the following:

(88a) Gen. 3.12

וַיֹּאמֶר הָאָדָם הָאִשָּׁה אֲשֶׁר נָתַתָּה עִמָּדִי$_i$ הִוא$_i$ נָתְנָה־לִּי מִן־הָעֵץ וָאֹכֵל׃

The man said, "the woman who you gave to be with me$_i$, she$_i$ gave me from the tree and I ate."

(88b) Exod. 1.22

וַיְצַו פַּרְעֹה לְכָל־עַמּוֹ לֵאמֹר כָּל־הַבֵּן הַיִלּוֹד$_i$ הַיְאֹרָה תַּשְׁלִיכֻהוּ$_i$ וְכָל־הַבַּת תְּחַיּוּן׃

Then Pharaoh commanded all his people, saying, "Every son who is born$_i$, cast him$_i$ into the Nile, and every daughter you are to keep alive."

(88c) Deut. 1.30

יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵיכֶם הַהֹלֵךְ לִפְנֵיכֶם$_i$ הוּא$_i$ יִלָּחֶם לָכֶם כְּכֹל אֲשֶׁר עָשָׂה אִתְּכֶם
בְּמִצְרַיִם לְעֵינֵיכֶם׃

"Yahweh your God who goes before you$_i$, he$_i$ will fight for you, just like all that he did for you in Egypt before your eyes."

459. Cf. Gen. 3.12; 4.4; 13.15; 15.4; 21.13; 23.11; 24.7; 24.14; 25.10; 26.15 28.13; 28.22; 35.12; 49.19; 44.17; 50.5; Exod. 1.22; 9.19; 12.16; 12.44; 32.1; Lev. 3.9; 7.7; 7.8; 7.30; 11.3; 11.9; 14.6; 22.11b; Num. 4.29; 14.31; 17.3; 22.20; 22.35; 22.38; 35.19; 35.33; Deut. 1.30; 1.36; 1.38; 2.23; 3.13; 4.3; 12.11; 12.14; 13.1; 14.6; 14.27; 16.6; 18.19; 20.20; 28.61; Josh. 1.3; 15.16; Judg. 1.12; 5.11; 7.4; 11.24 (2x); 1 Sam. 17.37; 18.17; 2 Sam. 6.21; 13.32; 13.33; 14.19; 1 Kng. 5.19; 8.19; 22.14; 2 Kng. 1.4; 1.6; 1.16; 17.36; 22.18.

460. Cf. Gen. 47.21; 4.4; 4.22; 19.38; 26.15; 22.24; Exod. 15.15; 19.18; Num. 9.17b; 26.33; Josh. 11.13; 17.3; 1 Sam. 14.15; 15.9; 1 Kng. 6.7; 6.32; 15.13; 2 Kng. 10.29; 25.22.

In each of the prototypical instantiations in (88a–c) above, a dislocated NP is detached from an associated matrix clause (criteria #1–2). The extra-clausal status of each NP is confirmed by the presence of a co-indexed pronoun that satisfies an argument valency slot (i.e. theta-role) required by the predicate (criterion #3). Since the two elements cannot co-occur in the same slot without violating the semantic well-formedness condition (§3.2.2), the greyed out NPs in each example are considered extra-clausal. Furthermore, the dislocated NP and the resumptive pronominal are co-referential in the sense that they share a total identity relation with the referent denoted in each example (criterion #4). Lastly, in each case the dislocate and the resumptive are replaceable with respect to the syntactic and semantic dependency relations specified by the predicate.

5.4.1.1 The Form of the Dislocate

In 69% (64/93)[461] of prototypical LDs in our data set, the dislocated NP is modified by a relative clause. The relative clauses in these cases may be restrictive or non-restrictive. Restrictive relatives provide information about their head NP that is necessary for the successful identification of the intended referent of the NP on the part of the hearer. By contrast, the head of a non-restrictive relative is sufficiently identifiable to the hearer solely on the basis of its referring expression, independent of the modifying relative clause. In these instances, the clausal modifier simply presents additional information about the referent.[462] Examples (89a) and (89b) below, adapted from Kroeger (2005:218), are prototypical examples of these two semantic types in English:

(89a) Restrictive

a. The police are looking for **the man who escaped from prison yesterday**.

(89b) Non-Restrictive

b. The police are looking for **Al Capone, who escaped from prison yesterday**.

461. Cf. Gen. 3.12; 13.15; 15.4; 23.11; 24.7; 24.14; 25.10; 26.15; 28.13; 28.22; 35.12; 44.17; 50.5; Exod. 9.19; 12.16; 12.44; 32.1; Lev. 7.7; 7.8; 7.9; 11.3; 11.9; Num. 14.31; 17.3; 22.20; 22.35; 22.38; Deut. 1.30; 1.38; 2.23; 4.3; 12.11; 12.14; 13.1; 14.6; 14.27; 16.6; 18.19; 20.20; 28.61; Josh. 1.3; 11.13; 15.16; 17.3; Judg. 1.12; 7.4; 11.24 (2x); 1 Sam. 9.20; 15.9; 17.37; 2 Sam. 6.21; 1 Kng. 5.19; 8.19; 9.20–21; 12.17; 22.14; 2 Kng. 1.4; 1.6; 1.16; 10.29; 17.36; 22.18; 25.22.

462. For a treatment of relative clauses in BH from a generative perspective, see Holmstedt (2002).

While both restrictive and non-restrictive relatives modify the dislocated NP of prototypical LDs in our corpus, 64% of the relatives are restrictive (41/64),[463] while 21% are non-restrictive (14/64).[464] Representative instantiations of the restrictive type include the following:[465]

(90a) Gen. 23.11

לֹא־אֲדֹנִי שְׁמָעֵנִי הַשָּׂדֶה נָתַתִּי לָּךְ וְהַמְּעָרָה אֲשֶׁר־בּוֹ$_i$ לְךָ נְתַתִּיהִ$_i$ לְעֵינֵי בְנֵי־עַמִּי נְתַתִּיהָ לָּךְ קְבֹר מֵתֶךָ׃

"No, my lord, hear me; I give you the field and the cave that is in it$_i$, I give it$_i$ to you. In the presence of the sons of my people I give it to you; bury your dead."

(90b) Gen. 44.17a

וַיֹּאמֶר חָלִילָה לִּי מֵעֲשׂוֹת זֹאת הָאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר֩ נִמְצָא הַגָּבִיעַ בְּיָדוֹ$_i$ הוּא$_i$ יִהְיֶה־לִּי עָבֶד וְאַתֶּם עֲלוּ לְשָׁלוֹם אֶל־אֲבִיכֶם׃

"But he said, 'Far be it from me to do this. The man in whose possession the cup has been found$_i$, he$_i$ shall be my slave."

Prototypical LDs with non-restrictive relatives include:

(91a) Num. 14.31

וְטַפְּכֶם אֲשֶׁר אֲמַרְתֶּם לָבַז יִהְיֶה$_i$ וְהֵבִיאתִי אֹתָם$_i$ וְיָדְעוּ אֶת־הָאָרֶץ אֲשֶׁר מְאַסְתֶּם בָּהּ׃

"But your little ones, who you said would become prey$_i$, I will bring them$_i$, and they will know the land that you rejected."

463. Cf. Gen. 13.15; 23.11; 24.14; 25.10; 26.15; 28.13; 28.22; 35.12; 44.17; 50.5; Exod. 9.19; 12.44; Lev. 7.7; 7.8; 7.9; 11.3; 11.9; Num. 17.3; 22.20; 22.35; 22.38; Deut. 2.23; 4.3; 12.11; 12.14; 13.1; 14.6; 14.27; 16.6; 18.19; 20.20; 28.61; Josh. 1.3; 11.13; Judg. 11.24; 1 Sam. 9.20; 1 Kng. 12.17; 2 Kng. 1.4; 1.6; 1.16; 25.22.

464. Cf. Gen. 3.12; 24.7; Exod. 32.1; Num. 14.31; Deut. 1.30; 1.38; Josh. 17.3; 1 Sam. 17.37; 2 Sam. 6.21; 1 Kng. 5.19; 8.19; 2 Kng. 10.29; 17.36; 22.18.

465. This data for restrictive and non-restrictive relatives eschews headless relatives as dislocated constituents as well as the syntactically obscure case of the second relative in Exod. 14.13. Cf. Holmstedt (2002:265) who follows Vervenne (1995) in interpreting the relative as an "initial subordinate clause" (1995:197), or in Holmstedt's (2006:265) words "a null relative head".

(91b) 2 Kng. 17.36

כִּי אִם־אֶת־יְהוָה אֲשֶׁר֩ הֶעֱלָה אֶתְכֶם מֵאֶ֨רֶץ מִצְרַ֜יִם בְּכֹ֤חַ גָּדוֹל֙ וּבִזְרוֹעַ֙ נְטוּיָ֔ה אֹת֖וֹ תִּירָ֑אוּ וְל֣וֹ תִשְׁתַּחֲוּ֔ וְל֥וֹ תִזְבָּֽחוּ׃

"But Yahweh, who brought you out of the land of Egypt with great power and an outstretched arm$_i$, him$_i$ you shall fear, and you shall bow yourselves down to him, and you shall sacrifice to him."

Lastly, we have included in this category prototypical LDs in which the dislocate is a so-called headless, or free relative clause. Headless relatives are clauses that arguably lack an overt domain nominal.[466] Prototypical LDs with headless dislocates comprise only 14% (9/64)[467] of the instantiations in our corpus, two of which are illustrated in the following examples:

(92a) Judg. 1.12

וַיֹּאמֶר כָּלֵב֮ אֲשֶׁר־יַכֶּה֒ אֶת־קִרְיַת־סֵ֣פֶר וּלְכָדָ֔הּ וְנָתַתִּ֥י ל֛וֹ אֶת־עַכְסָ֥ה בִתִּ֖י לְאִשָּֽׁה׃

"And Caleb said, 'He who attacks Kiriath-sepher and captures it$_i$, I will give him$_i$ Achsah my daughter for a wife'."

(92b) Gen. 15.4

וְהִנֵּ֣ה דְבַר־יְהוָ֣ה אֵלָ֗יו לֵאמֹר֙ לֹ֣א יִירָשְׁךָ֔ זֶ֖ה כִּי־אִם֙ אֲשֶׁ֣ר יֵצֵ֣א מִמֵּֽעֶ֔יךָ הוּא֙ יִירָ֖שֶׁךָ׃

"And look, the word of Yahweh came to him: This one will not be your heir, but one who will come from your own body$_i$, he$_i$ will be your heir'."

466. See Holmstedt (2002:71–79) for a more detailed discussion regarding headless relative clauses in BH.

467. Cf. Gen. 15.4; Exod. 12.16; Josh. 15.16; Judg. 1.12; 7.4; 11.24; 1 Sam. 15.9; 1 Kng. 9.20-21; 22.14.

468. Cf. Gen. 4.4; 4.22; 19.38; 21.13; 22.24; 47.21; 49.19; Exod. 1.22; 15.15; 19.18; Lev. 3.9; 7.30; 14.6; 22.11b; Num. 4.29; 9.17b; 26.33; 35.19; 35.33; Deut. 1.36; 3.13; Judg. 5.11; 18.17; 2 Sam. 13.32; 13.33; 14.19; 1 Kng. 6.7; 6.32; 15.13.

(93) Exod. 19.18

וְהַ֣ר סִינַ֔י עָשַׁ֖ן כֻּלּ֑וֹ מִ֠פְּנֵי אֲשֶׁר־יָרַ֨ד עָלָ֜יו יְהוָ֗ה בָּאֵשׁ֙ וַיַּ֣עַל עֲשָׁנ֔וֹ כְּעֶשֶׁ֖ן הַכִּבְשָׁ֑ן וַיֶּחֱרַ֥ד כָּל־הָהָ֖ר מְאֹֽד׃

Now Mount Sinai$_i$, all of it$_i$ was wrapped in smoke because Yahweh had descended on it in fire. And its smoke ascended like the smoke of a furnace, and the whole mountain trembled greatly.

5.4.1.2 The Type of Resumptive Element

Prototypical resumptives appear as cliticized pronominal suffixes or independent pronouns. The majority take the form of pronominal suffixes (65%; 60/93).[469] Moreover, 55% (33/60)[470] of these resumptive suffixes occur in situ, while 45% (27/60)[471] occur in a fronted position before the verb:

In situ:

(94a) Gen. 28.22

וְהָאֶ֨בֶן הַזֹּ֜את אֲשֶׁר־שַׂ֣מְתִּי מַצֵּבָ֗ה יִהְיֶה֙ בֵּ֣ית אֱלֹהִ֔ים וְכֹ֗ל אֲשֶׁ֛ר תִּתֶּן־לִ֖י עַשֵּׂ֣ר אֲעַשְּׂרֶ֑נּוּ לָֽךְ׃

"And this stone that I have set up as a pillar, will be God's house, and all of that you give me I will surely give a tenth of it$_i$ to you."

Fronted:

(94b) 1 Sam. 15.9

וַיַּחְמֹ֤ל שָׁאוּל֙ וְהָעָ֔ם עַל־אֲגָ֖ג וְעַל־מֵיטַ֣ב הַצֹּ֑אן וְהַבָּקָ֗ר וְהַמִּשְׁנִים֙ וְעַל־הַכָּרִ֔ים וְעַל־כָּל־הַטּ֖וֹב וְלֹ֣א אָבוּ֑ הַחֲרִימָ֗ם וְכָל־הַמְּלָאכָ֛ה נִמְבָּזָ֥ה וְנָמֵ֖ס אֹתָ֥הּ הֶחֱרִֽימוּ׃

469. Cf. Gen. 13.15; 21.13; 23.11; 24.14; 26.15; 28.13; 28.22; 35.12; 47.21; 49.19; Exod. 1.22; 9.19; 12.44; 15.15; 19.18; 32.1; Lev. 3.9; 7.7; 7.8; 7.30; 11.3; 11.9; 14.6; Num. 4.29; 14.31; 17.3; 22.20; 22.35; 22.38; 26.33; Deut. 2.23; 4.3; 13.1; 14.6; 14.27; 18:19; 20.20; 28.61; Josh. 1.3; 11.13; 15.16; 17.3; Judg. 1.12; 11.24; 1 Sam. 15.9; 18.17; 2 Sam. 13.32; 13.33; 1 Kng. 6.7; 6.32; 12.17; 15.13; 22.14; 2 Kng. 1.4; 1.6; 1.16; 10.29; 17.36; 22.18; 25.22.

470. Cf. Gen. 28.22; 47.21; Exod. 1.22; 9.19; 12.44; 15.15; 19.18; 32.1; Lev. 3.9; 7.7; 7.30; 14.6; Num. 4.29; 14.31; 17.3; 26.33; Deut. 4.3; 14.27; 18.19; 28.61; Josh. 1.3; 15.16; 17.3; Judg. 1.12; 2 Sam. 6.32; 12.17; 15.13; 2 Kng. 1.4; 1.6; 1.16; 10.29; 22.18; 25.22.

471. Cf. Gen. 13.15; 21.13; 23.11; 24.14; 26.15; 28.13; 35.12; 49.19; Lev. 7.8; 11.3; 11.9; Num. 22.20; 22.35; 22.38; Deut. 2.23; 13.1; 14.6; 20.20; Josh. 11.13; Judg. 11.24; 1 Sam. 15.9; 18.17; 2 Sam. 13.32; 13.33; 1 Kng. 6.7; 22.14; 2 Kng. 17.36.

"But Saul and the people spared Agag and the best of the sheep, and of the oxen, and of the fattened calves, and the lambs, and all that was good, and were not willing to destroy them utterly; but everything despised and worthless$_i$, they utterly destroyed that$_i$."

By contrast, independent resumptive pronouns make up only 33% (31/93)[472] of our overall data set. Interestingly, unlike resumptive suffixes, the majority of independent pronouns are fronted (90%; 28/31),[473] with only 10% (3/31)[474] located in situ.[475]

In situ:

(95a) Gen. 4.4

וְהֶ֫בֶל הֵבִ֥יא גַם־הֽוּא$_i$ מִבְּכֹרוֹת צֹאנ֖וֹ וּמֵחֶלְבֵהֶ֑ן וַיִּ֤שַׁע יְהוָה֙ אֶל־הֶ֔בֶל וְאֶל־מִנְחָתֽוֹ׃

"And Abel$_i$, he$_i$ also brought of the firstborn of his flock and of their fat portions. And Yawheh had regard for Abel and his offering."

Fronted:

(95b) 1 Sam. 17.37

וַיֹּ֣אמֶר דָּוִ֗ד יְהוָה֙ אֲשֶׁ֣ר הִצִּלַ֔נִי מִיַּ֖ד הָאֲרִ֣י וּמִיַּ֣ד הַדֹּ֑ב הֽוּא$_i$ יַצִּילֵ֕נִי מִיַּ֖ד הַפְּלִשְׁתִּ֥י הַזֶּ֛ה
ס וַיֹּ֤אמֶר שָׁאוּל֙ אֶל־דָּוִ֔ד לֵ֖ךְ וַיהוָ֥ה יִהְיֶ֖ה עִמָּֽךְ׃

"And David said, 'Yahweh who delivered me from the paw of the lion and from the paw of the bear$_i$, He$_i$ will deliver me from the hand of the Philistine.' And Saul said to David, 'Go, and may Yahweh be with you'."

5.4.1.3 The Relational Marker of Agreement

In 11% (10/93)[476] of the prototypical tokens, a relational agreement marker syntactically links

472. Cf. Gen. 3.12; 4.4; 4.22; 15.4; 19.38; 22.24; 24.7; 25.10; 44.17; 50.5; Exod. 12.16; Lev. 22.11b; Num. 9.17b; 35.19; 35.33; Deut. 1.30; 1.36; 1.38; 1.39; 3.13; 12.11; 12.14; 12.22; 16.6; Judg. 5.11; 7.4; 1 Sam. 14.15; 17.37; 2 Sam. 14.19; 1 Kng. 5.19; 8.19.

473. Cf. Gen. 3.12; 4.22; 15.4; 19.38; 24.7; 25.10; 44.17; 50.5; Exod. 12.16; Lev. 22.11b; Num. 9.17b; 35.19; 35.33; Deut. 1.30; 1.36; 1.38; 1.39; 3.13; 12.11; 12.14; 12.22; 16.6; Judg. 5.11; 7.4; 1 Sam. 17.37; 2 Sam. 14.19; 1 Kng. 5.19; 8.19.

474. Cf. Gen. 4.4; 22.24; 1 Sam. 14.15.

475. Note that with each instantiation in which the independent pronoun is in in default position, the pronoun is governed by גַּם.

476. Cf. Gen. 13.15; Lev. 14.6; Num. 17.3; 22.20; 22.35; Deut. 13.1; Josh. 17.3; Judg. 11.24; 1 Kng. 22.14; 2 Kng. 17.36.

the dislocate with its anaphoric resumptive pronoun.[477] In every case but one[478] the agreement marker is the so-called 'Accusative' אֵת. These types correspond to the CLLD constructions described in §3.3.1.[479] Representative examples from our corpus include:

(96a) Num. 17.3 (16.38)

אֶת מַחְתּוֹת֙ הַחַטָּאִ֣ים הָאֵ֔לֶּה בְּנַפְשֹׁתָ֑ם וְעָשׂ֨וּ אֹתָ֜ם רִקֻּעֵי֙ פַּחִ֣ים צִפּ֣וּי לַמִּזְבֵּ֔חַ כִּֽי־הִקְרִיבֻ֥ם לִפְנֵי־יְהוָ֖ה וַיִּקְדָּ֑שׁוּ וְיִהְי֥וּ לְאֹ֖ות לִבְנֵ֥י יִשְׂרָאֵֽל׃

"As for the censers of these men who have sinned at the cost of their lives$_i$, let them$_i$ be made into hammered plates as a covering for the alter, because they offered them before Yahweh, they are holy; and they will be a sign for the Israelites."

(96b) Lev. 14.6

אֶת־הַצִּפֹּ֣ר הַחַיָּ֗ה יִקַּ֤ח אֹתָהּ֙ וְאֶת־עֵ֣ץ הָאֶ֔רֶז וְאֶת־שְׁנִ֥י הַתּוֹלַ֖עַת וְאֶת־הָאֵזֹ֑ב וְטָבַ֞ל אוֹתָ֣ם וְאֶת֩ ׀ הַצִּפֹּ֨ר הַחַיָּ֜ה בְּדַ֣ם הַצִּפֹּ֣ר הַשְּׁחֻטָ֗ה עַ֚ל הַמַּ֣יִם הַחַיִּֽים׃

"As for the live bird$_i$, he shall take it$_i$ together with the cedar wood and the scarlet string and the hyssop, and shall dip them and the live bird in the blood of the bird that was slain over the running water."

5.4.1.4 The Preceding Element

The majority of syntactically prototypical LDs (61%; 57/93)[480] have some kind of element in an initial position preceding the dislocate; these include: conjunctions (both coordinating and subordinating), discourse markers, focus particles/adverbials, among others.[481] Of the 47% of prototypical LDs with a conjunction, 34% (32/93)[482] occur with a

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477. Cf. Khan (1987), who refers to this type of LD as a "pronominal agreement" construction.

478. Cf. Gen. 17.3, in which the agreement marker is the preposition לְ.

479. Recall that with CLLD constructions, it is said that a case marking constraint between the dislocate and the resumptive results in certain "connectivity effects" which reduces the syntactic autonomy of the dislocate.

480. Cf. Gen. 4.4; 4.22; 13.15; 15.4; 17.14; 19.38; 21.13; 23.11; 24.14; 35.12; 47.21; Exod. 19.18; 12.16; 12.44; 32.21; Lev. 7.8; 22.11b; Num. 5.10**;** 9.17b; 14.31; 17.3; 22.20; 22.35; 26.33; 35.33; Deut. 1.36; 2.23; 4.3; 14.6; 14.27; 12.11; 12.14; 12.22; 16.6; 18.19; 20.20; 28.61; Josh. 11.13 (2x); 17.3; Judg. 7.4; 11.24; 1 Sam. 6.23; 15.9; 2 Sam. 13.32; 13.33; 14.19; 1 Kng. 6.7; 6.32; 12.17; 8.19; 15.13; 22.14; 2 Kng. 10.29; 17.36; 22.18; 25.22.

481. Single tokens possessing a preceding interrogative particle, and a preceding oath formula also occur. See below.

482. Cf. Gen. 4.4; 4.22; 17.14; 19.38; 21.13; 23.11; 24.14; 35.12; 47.21; Exod. 19.18; 12.44; Lev. 7.8; 22.11b; Num. 9.17b; 14.31; 17.3; 22.20; 22.35; 26.33; Deut. 2.23; 14.6; 14.27; 18.19; Josh. 17.3; Judg. 7.4; 1 Sam. 6.23;

coordinating וְ, as in (97a) and another 5% (5/93)[483] with a coordinating כִּי אִם, as in (97b):[484]

(97a) Gen. 19.38

וְהַצְּעִירָה$_i$ גַּם־הִוא$_i$ יָלְדָה בֵּן וַתִּקְרָא שְׁמוֹ בֶּן־עַמִּי הֽוּא אֲבִי בְנֵי־עַמּוֹן עַד־הַיּוֹם׃

"As for the younger$_i$, she$_i$ also bore a son, and called his name Ben-ammi, he is the father of the sons of Ammon to this day."

(97b) 2 Kng. 17.36

כִּי אִם־אֶת־יְהוָה אֲשֶׁר֩ הֶעֱלָה אֶתְכֶם מֵאֶ֨רֶץ מִצְרַ֜יִם בְּכֹ֤חַ גָּדוֹל֙ וּבִזְרוֹעַ֙ נְטוּיָ֔ה$_i$ אֹת֥וֹ$_i$ תִירָ֖אוּ וְל֣וֹ תִשְׁתַּחֲוּ֑ וְל֥וֹ תִזְבָּֽחוּ׃

"But Yahweh, who brought you out of the land of Egypt with great power and an outstretched arm$_i$, him$_i$ you shall fear, and you shall bow yourselves down to him, and you shall sacrifice to him."

and finally, 8% (7/93)[485] possess a subordinating כִּי,[486] as in (98) below:

(98) Num. 35.33

וְלֹא־תַחֲנִיפוּ אֶת־הָאָ֗רֶץ אֲשֶׁ֤ר אַתֶּם֙ בָּ֣הּ כִּ֣י הַדָּ֔ם$_i$ הֽוּא$_i$ יַחֲנִ֖יף אֶת־הָאָ֑רֶץ וְלָאָ֣רֶץ לֹא־יְכֻפַּ֗ר לַדָּם֙ אֲשֶׁ֣ר שֻׁפַּךְ־בָּ֔הּ כִּ֖י־אִ֥ם בְּדַ֖ם שֹׁפְכֽוֹ׃

"So you shall not pollute the land in which you live, for blood$_i$, it$_i$ pollutes the land and no atonement can be made for the land for the blood that is shed on it, except by the blood of him who shed it."

15.9; 1 Kng. 6.7; 6.32; 12.17; 2 Kng. 22.18; 25.22.

483. Cf. Gen. 15.4; Deut. 12.14; 16.6; 1 Kng. 8.19; 2 Kng. 17.36.

484. In two tokens, Josh. 11.13 and Deut. 1.36, an initial זוּלָתִי occurs before the dislocated NP. Both HALOT (2000:267) and BDB (2000: 265-266) note that זוּלָתִי can sometimes be construed as a conjunction.

485. Cf. Gen. 13.15; Exod. 32.1; Num. 35.33; Deut. 4.3; 2 Sam. 13.32; 13.33; 14.19.

486. In 1 Kng. 22.14, the initial כִּי following the oath formula should be interpreted as a modal particle expressing confirmation of the following proposition.

The particles גַּם as in (99a),[487] אַךְ as in (99b),[488] and רַק as in (99c)[489] also precede dislocated NPs in 8% (7/85) of the prototypical tokens.[490]

(99a) Gen. 21.13

וְגַם אֶת־בֶּן־הָאָמָהi לְגוֹי אֲשִׂימֶנּוi כִּי זַרְעֲךָ הוּא׃

"Also, the son of the slave woman$_i$, I will make him$_i$ into a nation, for he is your descendant."

(99b) Exod. 12.16

וּבַיּוֹם הָרִאשׁוֹן מִקְרָא־קֹדֶשׁ וּבַיּוֹם הַשְּׁבִיעִי מִקְרָא־קֹדֶשׁ יִהְיֶה לָכֶם כָּל־מְלָאכָה לֹא־יֵעָשֶׂה בָּהֶם אַךְ אֲשֶׁר יֵאָכֵל לְכָל־נֶפֶשׁi הוּא לְבַדּוֹi יֵעָשֶׂה לָכֶם׃

"On the first day you shall hold a solemn assembly, and on the seventh day a solemn assembly; no work shall be done on those days; only what everyone must eat$_i$, that alone$_i$ may be prepared by you."

(99c) 2 Kng. 10.29

רַק חַטֹּאֵי יָרָבְעָם בֶּן־נְבָט אֲשֶׁר הֶחֱטִיא אֶת־יִשְׂרָאֵלi לֹא־סָר יֵהוּא מֵאַחֲרֵיהֶם עָגְלֵי הַזָּהָב אֲשֶׁר בֵּית־אֵל וַאֲשֶׁר בְּדָן׃

"Only, as for the sins of Jeroboam the son of Nebat, which he made Israel sin$_i$, Jehu did not depart from these$_i$—that is, the golden calves that were at Bethal and were at Dan."

Dislocates preceded by discourse markers occur in only 4% (4/93)[491] of the cases in our data set. In each case, the tokens are preceded by the form וְהָיָה, which functions as a discourse marker.

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487. Cf. Gen. 21.3; Deut. 28.61; 1 Kng. 15.3.

488. Cf. Exod. 12.16.

489. Cf. Deut. 20.20; Josh. 11.13; 2 Kng. 10.29.

490. In §3.2.1 it was argued that focus particles are inherently clause-internal elements (cf. Lambrecht, 2001:1066) and therefore, when in clause-initial position, often serve to formally identify the clausal-initial boundary. Although the particles אַךְ, גַּם, and רַק often function as focus particles in BH, it is also possible for them to function as conjunctive adverbs or discourse connectives, especially when they govern the entire sentence (i.e. clause external + clause internal elements).

491. Cf. Gen. 24.14; Deut. 12.11; 18.19; Judg. 7.4.

(100a) Gen. 24.14

וְהָיָה הַנַּעֲרָ אֲשֶׁר אֹמַר אֵלֶיהָ הַטִּי־נָא כַדֵּךְ וְאֶשְׁתֶּה וְאָמְרָה שְׁתֵּה וְגַם־גְּמַלֶּיךָ אַשְׁקֶה$_i$
אֹתָהּ$_i$ הֹכַחְתָּ לְעַבְדְּךָ לְיִצְחָק וּבָהּ אֵדַע כִּי־עָשִׂיתָ חֶסֶד עִם־אֲדֹנִי׃

"Now, the young girl whom I shall say, 'Please let down your jar so that I may drink,' and who answers, 'Drink, and I will water your camels also$_i$'—let her$_i$ be the one whom you have appointed for your servant Isaac. By this I shall know that you have shown lovingkindness to my master."

(100b) Deut. 12.11

וְהָיָה הַמָּקוֹם אֲשֶׁר־יִבְחַר יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵיכֶם בּוֹ לְשַׁכֵּן שְׁמוֹ שָׁם$_i$ שָׁמָּה$_i$ תָּבִיאוּ אֵת
כָּל־אֲשֶׁר אָנֹכִי מְצַוֶּה אֶתְכֶם עוֹלֹתֵיכֶם וְזִבְחֵיכֶם מַעְשְׂרֹתֵיכֶם וּתְרֻמַת יֶדְכֶם וְכֹל
מִבְחַר נִדְרֵיכֶם אֲשֶׁר תִּדְּרוּ לַיהוָה׃

"Then, the place that Yahweh your God will choose for his name to dwell$_i$, there$_i$ you shall bring all that I command you: your burnt offerings and your sacrifices, your tithes and the contribution of your hand, and all your choice vow offerings which you will vow to Yahweh.

Two tokens (2%; 2/93)—represented in (101a) and (101b) below—possess an initial interrogative הֲ and an initial oath formula,[492] respectively.

(101a) Judg. 11.24

הֲלֹא אֵת אֲשֶׁר יוֹרִישְׁךָ כְּמוֹשׁ אֱלֹהֶיךָ$_i$ אוֹתוֹ$_i$ תִּירָשׁ וְאֵת כָּל־אֲשֶׁר הוֹרִישׁ יְהוָה
אֱלֹהֵינוּ מִפָּנֵינוּ אוֹתוֹ נִירָשׁ׃

"That which Chemosh your god gives you to possess$_i$, will you not take possession of it$_i$?"

(101b) 1 Kng. 22.14

וַיֹּאמֶר מִיכָיְהוּ חַי־יְהוָה כִּי אֶת־אֲשֶׁר יֹאמַר יְהוָה אֵלַי$_i$ אֹתוֹ$_i$ אֲדַבֵּר׃

"But Micah said, 'As Yahweh lives, whatever Yahweh says to me$_i$, that$_i$ I shall speak."

Lastly, it is also possible for a prototypical LD to occur embedded as a complement

492. See Conklin (2011) for an extensive discussion on the function of various oath formulas in BH.

clause, where the כִּי functions as a complementizer, as in (102):

(102) Deut. 4.3

עֵינֵיכֶם הָרֹאֹת אֵת אֲשֶׁר־עָשָׂה יְהוָה בְּבַעַל פְּעוֹר כִּי כָל־הָאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר הָלַךְ אַחֲרֵי בַּעַל־פְּעוֹר הִשְׁמִידוֹ יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ מִקִּרְבֶּךָּ׃

"Your eyes have seen what Yahweh has done in the case of Baal-Peor, how all the men who followed Baal-Peor$_i$, Yahweh your God has destroyed them$_i$ from among you."

5.4.1.5 The Clause-Initial Element

A final class of syntactically prototypical LDs are those with a clause-initial element located between the dislocate and its associated matrix clause—the so-called CP/Wh-slot. These comprise 13% (12/93)[493] of the prototypical LDs in our corpus. In all but two instances, the clause initial element is a וְ attached to either a *wayyiqtol* (50%; 6/12),[494] or a *weqatal* (50%; 6/12)[495] verb form, as in (103a) and (103b) below:

(103a) 1 Kng. 12.17 (*wayyiqtol*)

וּבְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל הַיֹּשְׁבִים בְּעָרֵי יְהוּדָה וַיִּמְלֹךְ עֲלֵיהֶם רְחַבְעָם׃

"But the Israelites who lived in the cities of Judah$_i$, Rehoboam reigned over them$_i$."

(103b) Num. 14.31 (*weqatal*)

וְטַפְּכֶם אֲשֶׁר אֲמַרְתֶּם לָבַז יִהְיֶה וְהֵבִיאתִי אֹתָם וְיָדְעוּ אֶת־הָאָרֶץ אֲשֶׁר מְאַסְתֶּם בָּהּ׃

"But your little ones, who you said would become prey$_i$, I will bring them$_i$, and they will know the land that you rejected."

The remaining two consist of a וְ + imperative form (104a) and an intervening subordinate adjunct (purpose) clause (104b):

493. Cf. Gen. 22.24; Exod. 9.19; 12.44; Num. 14.31; 17.3; 14.24; Judg. 1.12; Josh. 15.16; 2 Sam. 6.21; 1 Kng. 6.32; 12.17; 2 Kng. 25.22.

494. Cf. Gen. 22.24; Num. 17.3; 14.24; 1 Kng. 6.32; 12.17; 2 Kng. 25.22.

495. Cf. Exod. 9.19; 12.44; Num. 14.31; Judg. 1.12; Josh. 15.16; 2 Sam. 6.21.

(104a) Num. 17.3 (16.38) (וְ + imperative)

אֶת מַחְתּוֹת הַחַטָּאִים הָאֵלֶּה בְּנַפְשֹׁתָם וְעָשׂוּ אֹתָם רִקָּעֵי פַחִים צִפּוּי לַמִּזְבֵּחַ
כִּי־הִקְרִיבֻם לִפְנֵי־יְהוָה וַיִּקְדָּשׁוּ וְיִהְיוּ לְאוֹת לִבְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל׃

"As for the censors of these men who have sinned at the cost of their lives$_i$, let them$_i$ be made into hammered plates as a covering for the alter, because they offered them before Yahweh, they are holy; and they will be a sign for the Israelites."

(104b) Num. 14.24 (subordinate adjunct clause)

וְעַבְדִּי כָלֵב עֵקֶב הָיְתָה רוּחַ אַחֶרֶת עִמּוֹ וַיְמַלֵּא אַחֲרָי וַהֲבִיאֹתִיו אֶל־הָאָרֶץ
אֲשֶׁר־בָּא שָׁמָּה וְזַרְעוֹ יוֹרִשֶׁנָּה׃

"But my servant Caleb$_i$, because he has a different spirit and has followed me fully, I will bring him$_i$ into the land into which he entered, and his descendants shall possess it."

5.4.1.6 Left Dislocation Lacking Prototypical Attributes

Lastly, 6%; (41/651)[496] of the LDs in our data set lack only one of the stipulated attributes for structurally prototypical LDs described in §5.3.1. Given the gradient nature of the exemplar model, it is unclear as to whether these instantiations represent extensions of the prototypical schema, albeit ever so slightly, or whether the typologically informed attributes for prototypical LDs listed in §5.3.1 should be broadened to include the following BH instantiations. In either case, most of these instances differ from the aforementioned prototypical instantiations (§5.4.1.1–§5.4.1.5) with respect to the syntactic and/or grammatical categories of either the dislocate or the resumptive element. Given that §5.5 will involve a thorough discussion of the internal syntactic categories exhibited by LDs in BH, the present section will only provide a cursory description of these instantations.

Approximately 39% (16/41)[497] of these possess dislocated constituents in syntactic categories other than the prototypical NP, be it a PP, AdjP, or some other phrasal type, as in the dislocated participial phrase exemplified in (105):

496. Cf. Gen. 2.17; 3.3; 17.14; 17.17; Exod. 12.15; 12.19; 26.12; 31.14; 35.29; Lev. 7.19; 7.20; 7.25; 7.27; 7.33; 18.29; 20.6; 20.16; 21.3; Num. 9.13; 14.36–37; 18.8; 19.20; 33.54; 35.30; Deut. 17.12; 18.20; 21.3; Judg. 18.30; 1 Sam. 9.20; 13.2; 20.8; 2 Sam. 6.21; 6.22; 6.23; 14.10; 15.30; 22.41; 1 Kng. 13.33; 2 Kng. 13.19; 22.18; 23.15.

497. Cf. Gen. 2.17; 3.3; Lev. 7.33; Num.18.8; 33.54; 1 Sam. 9.20; 20.8; 2 Sam. 6.21; 6.22; 6.23; 14.10; 22.41; 1 Kng. 13.33; 2 Kng. 13.19; 22.18.

(105) 2 Sam. 14.10

וַיֹּאמֶר הַמֶּלֶךְ הַמְדַבֵּר אֵלַיִךְ$_i$ וַהֲבֵאתָו$_i$ אֵלַי וְלֹא־יֹסִיף עוֹד לָגַעַת בָּךְ׃

So the king said, "Whoever speaks to you$_i$, bring him$_i$ to me, and he will not touch you again."

By contrast, the majority of these tokens (63%; 26/41)[498] exhibit resumptive elements as lexical phrases, rather than the prototypical pronominal form.

(106) Deut. 17.12

וְהָאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר־יַעֲשֶׂה בְזָדוֹן לְבִלְתִּי שְׁמֹעַ אֶל־הַכֹּהֵן הָעֹמֵד לְשָׁרֵת שָׁם אֶת־יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ
אוֹ אֶל־הַשֹּׁפֵט$_i$ וּמֵת הָאִישׁ הַהוּא$_i$ וּבִעַרְתָּ הָרָע מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל׃

"The person who who acts arrogantly, refusing to listen either to the priest who stands there serving Yahweh your God, or the judge$_i$, that man$_i$ must die. You shall purge the evil from Israel."

Finally, three tokens involve the syntactic embedding of either the entire construction as in (107a) and (107b),[499] or of a particular constituent within the construction, as in (107c):

(107a) Deut. 4.3

עֵינֵיכֶם הָרֹאֹת אֵת אֲשֶׁר־עָשָׂה יְהוָה בְּבַעַל פְּעוֹר כִּי כָל־הָאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר הָלַךְ אַחֲרֵי
בַּעַל־פְּעוֹר$_i$ הִשְׁמִידוֹ$_i$ יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ מִקִּרְבֶּךָּ׃

"Your eyes have seen what Yahweh has done in the case of Baal-Peor, how all the men who followed Baal-Peor$_i$, Yahweh your God has destroyed them$_i$ from among you."

(107b) 1 Sam. 3.11

וַיֹּאמֶר יְהוָה אֶל־שְׁמוּאֵל הִנֵּה אָנֹכִי עֹשֶׂה דָבָר בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל אֲשֶׁר כָּל־שֹׁמְעוֹ תְּצִלֶּינָה שְׁתֵּי
אָזְנָיו׃

"Then Yahweh said to Samuel, 'Look, I am about to do a thing in Israel at which, everyone who hears it, his two ears will tingle'."

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498. Cf. Gen. 17.14; 17.17; Exod. 12.15; 12.19; 26.12; 31.14; 35.29; Lev. 7.19; 7.20; 7.25; 7.27; 18.29; 20.6; 20.16; Num. 9.13; 19.20; 35.30; Deut. 17.12; 18.20; 21.3; 1 Sam. 6.21; 13.2; 15.30; 1 Kng. 13.33; 23.15.

499. Cf. Gen. 3.5.

(107c) Deut. 21.3

וְהָיָה הָעִיר הַקְּרֹבָה אֶל־הֶחָלָל וְלָקְחוּ זִקְנֵי הָעִיר הַהִוא עֶגְלַת בָּקָר אֲשֶׁר לֹא־עֻבַד בָּהּ אֲשֶׁר לֹא־מָשְׁכָה בְעֹל׃

"And the city that is nearest to the slain man$_i$, the elders of that city$_i$ shall take a heifer that has never been worked and has never worn a yoke."

In (107a), the entire LD construction is embedded as a complement clause. Likewise, with (107b), the LD is embedded as a subordinate relative clause modifying the NP דָּבָר. Lastly, in (107c) the co-referential resumptive NP הָעִיר הַהִוא is embedded in a construct relation to the noun זִקְנֵי.

5.4.2 Non-resumptive Left Dislocation

Our corpus also exhibits a variety of non-prototypical LDs that entertain a certain degree of family resemblance to the exemplar, but lack specific prototypical attributes. One of the more common types of non-prototypical LDs are so-called Non-resumptive LDs. This constructional schema was introduced in §3.2.1 and §3.2.2.1 above. Although full members of the LD category, non-resumptive LDs lack certain prototypical attributes (see discussion in §3.2.1) as reflected in their identifying criteria listed below:

1. Non-resumptive LDs must exhibit a constituent that is syntactically detached from the matrix clause with which it is associated.

2. Non-resumptive dislocates may occur in a variety of syntactic phrasal types in addition to NP.

3. The dislocate may or may not be semantically related to any overt element in the associated clause. In cases where it is not, the extra-clausal status is often not determined by the lack of a valency slot, but by an intervening element—usually a conjunction וְ, occurring at the juncture between the dislocate and the associated matrix clause.

4. When a semantic relation occurs between a dislocate and a clause internal element, that relation is characterized as either: Metonymic, Partial, or as a Relevance Frame.

Non-resumptive LDs comprise 7% (46/651)[500] of our data set. Like the exemplar category, the majority of non-resumptive LDs occur in reported speech (80%; 37/46),[501] with only 17% (8/46)[502] occurring in narrative. Representative examples of non-resumptive LDs include:

(108a) Gen. 17.15

וַיֹּאמֶר אֱלֹהִים אֶל־אַבְרָהָם שָׂרַי אִשְׁתְּךָ לֹא־תִקְרָא אֶת־שְׁמָהּ שָׂרָי כִּי שָׂרָה שְׁמָהּ׃

"And God said to Abraham, 'As for Sarai your wife, you shall not call her name Sarai, but Sarah shall be her name.

(108b) Num. 3.46–47

וְאֵת פְּדוּיֵי הַשִּׁלֹּשָׁה וְהַשִּׁבְעִים וְהַמָּאתָיִם הָעֹדְפִים עַל־הַלְוִיִּם מִבְּכוֹר בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל׃
47. וְלָקַחְתָּ חֲמֵשֶׁת חֲמֵשֶׁת שְׁקָלִים לַגֻּלְגֹּלֶת בְּשֶׁקֶל הַקֹּדֶשׁ תִּקָּח עֶשְׂרִים גֵּרָה הַשֶּׁקֶל׃

"And as for the price of redemption for the 273 firstborn of the Israelites, 47. You shall take five shekels for each person. You shall collect them according to the standard sanctuary shekel."

(108c) 1 Sam. 25.27

וְעַתָּה הַבְּרָכָה הַזֹּאת אֲשֶׁר־הֵבִיא שִׁפְחָתְךָ לַאדֹנִי וְנִתְּנָה לַנְּעָרִים הַמִּתְהַלְּכִים בְּרַגְלֵי אֲדֹנִי׃

"And now, this gift that your servant has brought to my lord, let it be given to the young men who follow my lord."

5.4.2.1 The Form of the Dislocate

Non-resumptive dislocates modified by a relative clause comprise 67% (31/46)[503] of the non-

500. Cf. Gen. 9.6; 17.15; 21.12; 34.8; 44.9; Exod. 4.9; 9.6; 9.21; 26.12; 30.33; 30.38; Lev. 11.33; 13.45; 15.18; 20.10; 20.12; 20.13; 25.33; 26.36; Num. 3.46–47; 21.8; 22.11; 23.3; 34.6; 35.8; Deut. 21.3; 28.54; 28.56; Josh. 21.40; Judg. 11.31; 19.30 1 Sam. 2.10; 3.11; 11.7; 11.11; 20.4; 25.27; 2 Sam. 2.23; 21.5–6; 24.3; 24.17; 1 Kng. 8.41; 11.26; 17.20; 2 Kng. 11.7; 16.14.

501. Cf. Gen. 9.6; 17.15; 21.12; 34.8; 44.9; Exod. 4.9; 26.12; 30.33; 30.38; Lev. 11.33; 13.45; 15.18; 20.10; 20.12; 20.13; 25.33; 26.36; Num. 3.46–47; 21.8; 22.11; 23.3; 34.6; 35.8; Deut. 28.54; 28.56; Judg. 11.31; 1 Sam. 2.10; 3.11; 11.7; 20.4; 25.27; 2 Sam. 21.5–6; 24:3; 24.17; 1 Kng. 8.41; 17.20; 2 Kng. 11.7.

502. Cf. Exod. 9.6; 9.21; Josh. 21.40; Judg. 19.30; 1 Sam. 11.11; 2 Sam. 2.23; 1 Kng. 11.26; 2 Kng. 16.14.

503. Cf. Gen. 21.12; 44.9; Exod. 4.9; 9.21; 30.38; 30.33; Lev. 11.33; 13.45; 15.18; 20.10; 20.12; 20.13; 25.33; Num. 3.46–47; 22.11; 23.3; 35.8; Deut. 21.3; 28.54; 28.56; Josh. 21.40; Judg. 11.31; 1 Sam. 3.11; 11.7; 20.4; 25.27; 2 Sam. 2.23; 21.5–6; 1 Kng. 8.41; 17.20; 2 Kng. 16.41.

resumptive LDs in our data set. Restrictive relative clauses comprise 83% (26/31)[504] of this set, while a remaining 16% (5/31)[505] have a headless relative. Both types are represented in (109a) and (109b) below:

(109a) Gen. 21.12 (restrictive):

וַיֹּאמֶר אֱלֹהִים אֶל־אַבְרָהָם אַל־יֵרַע בְּעֵינֶיךָ עַל־הַנַּעַר וְעַל־אֲמָתֶךָ כֹּל אֲשֶׁר תֹּאמַר אֵלֶיךָ שָׂרָה שְׁמַע בְּקֹלָהּ כִּי בְיִצְחָק יִקָּרֵא לְךָ זָרַע׃

"But God said to Abraham, 'Do not be distressed because of the boy and your maid; Whatever Sarah says to you, listen to her, for through Isaac your descendants shall be named'."

(109b) Gen. 44.9 (headless):

אֲשֶׁר יִמָּצֵא אִתּוֹ מֵעֲבָדֶיךָ וָמֵת וְגַם־אֲנַחְנוּ נִהְיֶה לַאדֹנִי לַעֲבָדִים׃

"Whoever is found with it from your servants, he must die, and we also will be my lord's servants."

By contrast, 33% (15/46)[506] of non-resumptive dislocates consist of an unmodified referential phrase of some kind, as in (110) below:

(110) 1 Sam. 11.11

וַיְהִי מִמָּחֳרָת וַיָּשֶׂם שָׁאוּל אֶת־הָעָם שְׁלֹשָׁה רָאשִׁים וַיָּבֹאוּ בְתוֹךְ־הַמַּחֲנֶה בְּאַשְׁמֹרֶת הַבֹּקֶר וַיַּכּוּ אֶת־עַמּוֹן עַד־חֹם הַיּוֹם וַיְהִי הַנִּשְׁאָרִים וַיָּפֻצוּ וְלֹא נִשְׁאֲרוּ־בָם שְׁנַיִם יָחַד׃

"And the next day, Saul put the people in three companies; and they came into the midst of the camp at the morning watch and struck down the Ammonites until the heat of the day. Those who survived, they were scattered, so that no two of them were left together."

As mentioned in §5.4.2, non-resumptive dislocates may appear in a variety of syntactic phrasal types, including PPs, substantivised AdjPs, and participial phrases. See §5.4.1.1

504. Cf. Gen. 21.12; Exod. 4.9; 30.33; 30.38; Lev. 11.33; 13.45; 15.18; 20.10; 20.12; 20.13; Num. 3.46–47; 22.11; 23.3; 35.8; Deut. 21.3; 28.54; 28.56; Josh. 21.40; Judg. 11.31; 1 Sam. 3.11; 25.27; 2 Sam. 2.23; 21.5–6; 1 Kng. 8.41; 17.20; 2 Kng. 16.14.

505. Cf. Gen. 44.9; Exod. 9.21; Lev. 25.33; 1 Sam. 11.7; 20.4.

506. Cf. Gen. 9.6; 17.15; 34.8; Exod. 9.6; 26.12; Lev. 26.36; Num. 21.8; 34.6; Judg. 19.30; 1 Sam. 2.10; 11.11; 2 Sam. 24.17; 24.3; 1 Kng. 11.26; 2 Kng. 11.7.

below for a more detailed discussion concerning the syntactic categories of dislocated phrases exhibited in our data set.

5.4.2.2 The Form of the Linked Element

Approximately 46% (21/46)[507] of the non-resumptive LDs are characterized by the lack of any overtly expressed resumptive/linked element within the clause. Among these tokens, however, the inflectional morphology of the main verb agrees with the dislocate in person, number, and gender. In other words, if a resumptive exists, it is morphosyntactically realized as an inflectional affix within the VP, a so-called 'incorporated pronoun' (cf. Bresnan and Mchombo, 1987; cf. §3.2.1 and §3.4.2.1). Example (111) illustrates this type:[508]

(111) 1 Sam. 25.27

וְעַתָּה֙ הַבְּרָכָ֣ה הַזֹּ֔את אֲשֶׁר־הֵבִ֥יא שִׁפְחָתְךָ֖ לַאדֹנִ֑י וְנִתְּנָה֙ לַנְּעָרִ֔ים הַמִּתְהַלְּכִ֖ים בְּרַגְלֵ֥י אֲדֹנִֽי׃

"And now, this gift that your servant has brought to my lord, let it be given to the young men who follow my lord."

Although non-resumptive LD constructions lack a prototypical total identity relation between the dislocate and a corresponding pronoun within the matrix clause, as we will soon see below (cf. §5.3.2.4), other non-prototypical semantic (or pragmatic) relations often characterize the connection between the dislocate and the associated proposition in the non-resumptive schema.

In 50% (23/46)[509] of non-resumptive constructions, the semantic relation corresponds to a single constituent within the matrix clause. In 64% (14/22)[510] of these, the linked element is a NP modified by a possessive determiner (pronominal suffix), as the token in (112)

507. Cf. Gen. 44.9; Exod. 4.9; 9.21; 30.33; 30.38; Lev. 25.33; Num. 21.8; 22.11; 23.3; Judg. 11.31; 19.30; 1 Sam. 11.11; 20.4; 25.27; 2 Sam. 2.23; 24.3; 24.17; 1 Kng. 8.41; 11.26; 2 Kng. 11.7; 16.14.

508. The extra-clausal status of the dislocates of this type is established by one of three forms that fill the clause initial CP/Wh-slot: 1) a *wayyiqtol*: Exod. 4.9; 9.21; Num. 22.11; 1 Sam. 11.11; 2 Sam. 2.23; 1 Kng. 11.26; 2) a *weqatal*: Gen. 44.9; Exod. 30.33; 30.38; Lev. 25.33; Num. 21.8; 23.3; Judg. 11.31; 1 Sam. 20.4; 25.27; 1 Kng. 8.41; 2 Kng. 11.7; or 3) an interrogative particle: 2 Sam. 24.3; 24.17.

509. Cf. Gen. 9.6; 17.15; 21.12; 34.8; Exod. 9.6; 9.21; 26.12; Lev. 11.33; 13.45; 20.10; 20.12; 20.13; 26.36; Num. 4:46–48; 34.6; 35.8; Deut. 28.54; 28.56; Josh. 21.40; 1 Sam. 2.10; 3.11; 2 Sam. 21.5–6; 1 Kng. 17.20.

510. Cf. Gen. 9.6; 21.12; 17.15; 34.8; Exod. 9.21; Lev. 13.45; 26.36; Deut. 28.54; 28.56; Josh. 21.40; 1 Sam. 2.10; 3.11; 2 Sam. 21.5–6; 1 Kng. 17.20.

illustrates:

(112) Gen. 17.15

וַיֹּאמֶר אֱלֹהִים אֶל־אַבְרָהָם שָׂרַי אִשְׁתְּךָ לֹא־תִקְרָא אֶת־שְׁמָהּ שָׂרָי כִּי שָׂרָה שְׁמָהּ׃

"And God said to Abraham, 'As for Sarai your wife, you shall not call her name Sarai, but Sarah shall be her name.

By contrast, 41% (9/22)[511] of the linked elements possess no such determiner:

(113) Num. 35.8

וְהֶעָרִים אֲשֶׁר תִּתְּנוּ מֵאֲחֻזַּת בְּנֵי־יִשְׂרָאֵל מֵאֵת הָרַב תַּרְבּוּ וּמֵאֵת הַמְעַט תַּמְעִיטוּ אִישׁ כְּפִי נַחֲלָתוֹ אֲשֶׁר יִנְחָלוּ יִתֵּן מֵעָרָיו לַלְוִיִּם׃

"As for the cities which you shall give from the possession of the Israelites, from the larger tribes you shall take many, and from the smaller tribes, you shall take few; each shall give some of his cities to the Levites in proportion to his possession which he inherits."

5.4.2.3 The Preceding Element

Not unlike prototypical LDs, the majority (61%; 27/46)[512] of non-resumptive dislocates are preceded by some kind of lexico-grammatical element. In the majority of cases (64% 18/27),[513] this element is a coordinating וְ:

(114a) Num. 34.6

וּגְבוּל יָם וְהָיָה לָכֶם הַיָּם הַגָּדוֹל וּגְבוּל זֶה־יִהְיֶה לָכֶם גְּבוּל יָם׃

"As for the western border, you shall have the Great Sea and its coast. This shall be your western border."

511. Cf. Exod. 9.6; 26.12; Lev. 11.33; 20.10; 20.12; 20.13; Num. 3.46–47; 34.6; 35.8.

512. Cf. Exod. 4.9; 9.6; 9.21; Lev. 13.45; 15.18; 20.10; 20.12; 20.13; 25.33; 26.36; Num. 3.46–47; 21.8; 22.11; 23.3; 34:6; 35.8; Judg. 11.31; 19.30; 1 Sam. 11.11; 25.27; 2 Sam. 24.3; 24.17; 1 Kng. 8.41; 11.26; 17.20; 2 Kng. 11.7; 16.14.

513. Cf. Exod. 9.6; 9.21; Lev. 13.45; 15.18; 20.10; 20.12; 20.13; 25.33; 26.36; Num. 3.46–47; 23.3; 34.6; 35.8; 1 Sam. 25.27; 2 Sam. 24.3; 24.17; 1 Kng. 11.26; 2 Kng. 11.7.

In 18% (5/27),[514] non-resumptive dislocates are preceded by וְהָיָה / וַיְהִי:

(114b) 2 Sam. 2.23

וַיְמָאֵן לָסוּר וַיַּכֵּהוּ אַבְנֵר בְּאַחֲרֵי הַחֲנִית אֶל־הַחֹמֶשׁ וַתֵּצֵא הַחֲנִית מֵאַחֲרָיו וַיִּפֹּל־שָׁם
וַיָּמָת תַּחְתּוֹ [תַּחְתָּיו] וַיְהִי כָּל־הַבָּא אֶל־הַמָּקוֹם אֲשֶׁר־נָפַל שָׁם עֲשָׂהאֵל וַיָּמֹת וַיַּעַמְדוּ׃

"But, he refused to turn aside. Therefore, Abner struck him in the stomach with the butt of his spear, so that the spear came out of his back. And he fell there and died on the spot. Now, all who came to the place where Asahel had fallen and died, they stood still."

(114c) Num. 21.8[515]

וַיֹּאמֶר יְהוָה אֶל־מֹשֶׁה עֲשֵׂה לְךָ שָׂרָף וְשִׂים אֹתוֹ עַל־נֵס וְהָיָה כָּל־הַנָּשׁוּךְ וְרָאָה אֹתוֹ
וָחָי׃

"And Yahweh said to Moses, 'Make a fiery serpent and set it on a pole, and everyone who is bitten, when he sees it, he will live."

And a remaining 14% (4/27),[516] are preceded by either an adverbial particle, interrogative particle, or a discourse marker:

(114d) 1 Kng. 17.20

וַיִּקְרָא אֶל־יְהוָה וַיֹּאמַר יְהוָה אֱלֹהָי הֲגַם עַל־הָאַלְמָנָה אֲשֶׁר־אֲנִי מִתְגּוֹרֵר עִמָּהּ
הָרֵעוֹתָ לְהָמִית אֶת־בְּנָהּ׃

"And he called to Yahweh, 'O Yahweh my God, even the widow with whom I am staying, have you brought calamity by killing her son?'"

5.4.2.4 The Clause-Initial element

Non-resumptive constructions with a clause-initial element located between the dislocate and the matrix clause (i.e. CP-slot) comprise 57%; (26/46)[517] of the non-resumptive LDs in our

514. Cf. Exod. 4.9; Num. 21.8; Judg. 11.31; 19.30; 1 Sam. 11.11.

515. See §4.3.2.4.

516. In 1 Kng. 8.41; 17.20, the preceding element is גַּם. Note that 1 Kng. 17.20 possess a preceding vocative expression and an interrogative הֲ. In 1 Sam. 25.27, the preceding element is וְעַתָּה, and in Num. 22.11 the preceding element is the discourse marker הִנֵּה.

517. Cf. Gen. 44.9; Exod. 4.9; 9.21; 30.33; 30.38; Lev. 15.18; 25.33; 26.36; Num. 3.46–47; 21.8; 22.11; 23.3;

data set. In the majority of cases (92%; 24/26),[518] a conjunction וְ intervenes between the dislocate and the matrix clause, syntactically marking the clause initial boundary. Unlike prototypical instantiations, however, the majority (83%; 20/24)[519] of non-resumptive LDs with clause initial וְ possess no overt syntactic or semantically linked element within the matrix clause, as illustrated by (115a) and (115b) below:

(115a) Exod. 9.21

וַאֲשֶׁר לֹא־שָׂם לִבּוֹ אֶל־דְּבַר יְהוָה וַיַּעֲזֹב אֶת־עֲבָדָיו וְאֶת־מִקְנֵהוּ בַּשָּׂדֶה׃

"He who did not regard the word of the Lord, he left his slaves and livestock in the open field."

(115b) Num. 22.11

הִנֵּה הָעָם הַיֹּצֵא מִמִּצְרַיִם וַיְכַס אֶת־עֵין הָאָרֶץ עַתָּה לְכָה קָּבָה־לִּי אֹתוֹ אוּלַי אוּכַל לְהִלָּחֶם בּוֹ וְגֵרַשְׁתִּיו׃

"Look, the people who have come out of Egypt, they cover the face of the earth. Now come, curse them for me. Perhaps I shall be able to fight against them and drive them out."

The initial clause boundary in (115a) and (115b) is demarcated by a conjunctive וְ plus a verb (*wayyiqtol*), *ipso facto* marking the initial constituents located to the right of this boundary as extra-clausal.[520] In cases like (115),[521] the dislocate and the clause initial verb are in agreement with respect to person. It is arguable that the verbal inflection in these cases is not to be construed as an agreement morpheme, but as a null resumptive pronoun. The null

34.6; Josh. 21.40; Judg. 11.31; 19.30; 1 Sam. 2.13; 11.11; 20.4; 25.27; 2 Sam. 24.3; 24.17; 1 Kng. 8.41; 11.26; 2 Kng. 11.7; 16.14.

518. Cf. Gen. 44.9; Exod. 4.9; 9.21; 30.33; 30.38; Lev. 15.18; 25.33; 26.36; Num. 3.46–47; 21.8; 22.11; 23.3; 34.6; Josh. 21.40; Judg. 11.31; 19.30; 1 Sam. 2.13; 11.11; 20.4; 25.27; 1 Kng. 8.41; 11.26; 2 Kng. 11.7; 16.14.

519. Cf. Gen. 44.9; Exod. 4.9; 9.21; 30.33; 30.38; Lev. 25.33; Num. 21.8; 22.11; 23.3; Judg. 11.31; 19.30; 1 Sam. 11.11; 20.4; 25.27; 2 Sam. 24.3; 24.17; 1 Kng. 8.41; 11.26; 2 Kng. 11.7; 16.14.

520. Cf. Holmstedt (2000:8–9). Holmstedt rightly offers a corrective to the analysis of Naudé (1990), who misconstrues tokens like (115a-b) as instances of topicalization. Moreover, Holmstedt (2000:8) argues that this type of construction exhibits a covert (phonologically null) pronominal resumptive in the place where the dislocate would normally occur.

521. Cf. Gen. 44.9; Exod. 4.9; 9.21; 30.33; 30.38; Lev. 25.33; Num. 21.8; 22.11; Judg. 11.31; 19.30; 1 Sam. 11.11; 14.19; 17.24; 25.27; 2 Sam. 24.3; 24.17; 1 Kng. 8.41; 11.26; 2 Kng. 11.5–6; 11.7.

instantiated pronoun would then be in a total identity relation to the dislocate, thus locating this type of construction closer to the exemplar. In any case, it is clear that instantiations like (115) are syntactically non-prototypical instances of LD.

Similar to the tokens in (115), but far more rare, are constructions like (116):[522]

(116) Num. 23.3

וַיֹּאמֶר בִּלְעָם לְבָלָק הִתְיַצֵּב עַל־עֹלָתֶךָ וְאֵלְכָה אוּלַי יִקֶּרֶה יְהוָה לִקְרָאתִי וּדְבַר מַה־יַּרְאֵנִי וְהִגַּדְתִּי לָךְ וַיֵּלֶךְ שֶׁפִי׃

"And Balaam said to Balak, 'Stand beside your burnt offering, and I will go; perhaps Yahweh will come to meet me, and whatever he shows me, that I will tell you.' So he went to a bare hill."

Like (115), the dislocate is marked as outside the boundary of the clause. Unlike (115), however, in (116), the dislocate and the clause internal verb form do not agree with respect to person.

Finally, in two instances (8%: 2/26), the clause initial boundary is demarcated by an interrogative, as in (117a) and (117b):

(117a) 2 Sam. 24.3

וַיֹּאמֶר יוֹאָב אֶל־הַמֶּלֶךְ וְיוֹסֶף יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ אֶל־הָעָם כָּהֵם ׀ וְכֹהֵם מֵאָה פְעָמִים וְעֵינֵי אֲדֹנִי־הַמֶּלֶךְ רֹאוֹת וַאדֹנִי הַמֶּלֶךְ לָמָּה חָפֵץ בַּדָּבָר הַזֶּה׃

"But Joab said to the king, 'May Yahweh your God add to the people a hundred times as many as they are, while the eyes of my lord, the king, still see; But my lord, the king, why does he delight in this thing?'"

(117b) 2 Sam. 24.17

וַיֹּאמֶר דָּוִד אֶל־יְהוָה בִּרְאֹתוֹ ׀ אֶת־הַמַּלְאָךְ ׀ הַמַּכֶּה בָּעָם וַיֹּאמֶר הִנֵּה אָנֹכִי חָטָאתִי וְאָנֹכִי הֶעֱוֵיתִי וְאֵלֶּה הַצֹּאן מֶה עָשׂוּ תְּהִי נָא יָדְךָ בִּי וּבְבֵית אָבִי׃

Then David spoke to Yahweh when he saw the angel who was striking the people, and he said, "Look, I have sinned and I have done wrong, but these sheep$_i$ what did they$_i$ do? Please let your hand be against me and against my father's house."

522. Cf. Num. 23.3; 1 Sam. 20.4; 2 Kng.16.14.

5.4.2.5 The Semantic Link

A key semantic attribute distinguishing the non-resumptive LD schema from that of the prototype is the lack of a total referential identity relation (i.e. co-referential) between the dislocate and a corresponding anaphoric resumptive pronoun within the matrix clause. This does not entail, however, that the dislocate is altogether semantically/pragmatically unconnected from the following proposition. As we saw in §3.2.1, there are at least three other types of semantic/pragmatic coherence relations that may hold between the dislocate and an element within the matrix clause, or the proposition as a whole: metonymic, partial, or relevance (§5.3.3). Of the 46 non-resumptive LDs in our data set, 52% (24/46) exhibit one of these three, non-prototypical semantic relations.

Approximately 28% (13/46)[523] possess a metonymic relation between the dislocate and a clause internal element, and in every case, the relation is hypernymic (whole-part), as in (118) below:

(118) Lev. 26.36

וְהַנִּשְׁאָרִים בָּכֶם וְהֵבֵאתִי מׇרֵךְ בִּלְבָבָם בְּאַרְצֹת אֹיְבֵיהֶם וְרָדַף אֹתָם קֹול עָלֶה נִדָּף
וְנָסוּ מְנֻסַת־חֶרֶב וְנָפְלוּ וְאֵין רֹדֵף׃

And as for those of you who are left, I will send faintness into their hearts in the lands of their enemies. The sound of a driven leaf shall put them to flight, and they shall flee as one flees from the sword, and they shall fall when none pursues.

A partial identity relation characterizes constructions in which the dislocate and a clause internal constituent(s) reflect only a partial referential overlap. With only 13% (6/46),[524] constructions entailing a partial identity link are in the minority.

(119) Num. 35.8

וְהֶעָרִים אֲשֶׁר תִּתְּנוּ מֵאֲחֻזַּת בְּנֵי־יִשְׂרָאֵל מֵאֵת הָרַב תַּרְבּוּ וּמֵאֵת הַמְעַט תַּמְעִיטוּ אִישׁ
כְּפִי נַחֲלָתוֹ אֲשֶׁר יִנְחָלוּ יִתֵּן מֵעָרָיו לַלְוִיִּם׃

523. Cf. Gen. 9.6; 17.15; 21.12; 34.8; Exod. 9.6; Lev. 13.45; 26.36; Deut. 28.54; 28.56; 1 Sam. 3.11; 11.7; 2 Sam. 21.5–6; 1 Kng. 17.20.

524. Cf. Exod. 26.12; Lev. 20.10; 20.12; 20.13; Num. 35.8; Josh. 21.40.

"As for the cities which you shall give from the possession of the Israelites, from the larger tribes you shall take many, and from the smaller tribes, you shall take few; each shall give some of his cities to the Levites in proportion to his possession which he inherits."

A final class of non-resumptive constructions consist of those in which the dislocate is not in a specific coherence relation with a particular clause internal entity, but rather functions as a framing device by which the interpretation of the associated proposition is constrained to a certain semantic domain. Only 11% (5/46)[525] of non-resumptive LDs in our data set entertain a relevance relation, as in (120) below:

(120) 1 Sam. 2.13

וּמִשְׁפַּט הַכֹּהֲנִים אֶת־הָעָם כָּל־אִישׁ זֹבֵחַ וּבָא נַעַר הַכֹּהֵן כִּבְשֵׁל הַבָּשָׂר וְהַמַּזְלֵג שְׁלֹשׁ־הַשִּׁנַּיִם בְּיָדוֹ׃

"Now, the custom of the priests$_i$, anyone offering a sacrifice$_j$, the priests servant would come while the meat was boiling with a three-pronged fork in his$_j$ hand."

5.4.3 Multiple Left Dislocation

In §3.2.1, we introduced an additional typologically attested type of LD characterized by the occurrence of two or more constituents in dislocated position, which share a number of attributes with both the exemplar and non-resumptive schemas (cf. §3.3.2.2). In addition to constructions with multiple dislocated constituents, we will expand this category to include constructions with one dislocated constituent comprised of multiple referring expressions, each denoting a discrete referent. The Multiple LD category comprises 6% (37/651)[526] of our data set. Of these, LDs with multiple dislocated constituents make up 19% (7/37)[527] of the category, while the majority (81%; 30/37)[528] consists of those with one dislocated constituent

525. Cf. Lev. 11.33; 15.18; Num. 3.46–47; 34.6; 1 Sam. 2.10.

526. Cf. Exod. 4.21; 12.44; Lev. 2.11; 3.3b–4; 3.14–15; 4.8–9; 4.11–12; 7.9; 9.19–20; 11.42; 18.9; 18.10; 21.14; 22.3; 22.4b–6a; 22.8; 22.22; 22.23; 22.28; 25.44; Num. 4.46–48; 6.7; 14.24; 30.10; 30.14; 31.22–23; Deut. 1.39; Josh. 13.6; 1 Sam. 2.13; 14.15; 14.19; 17.24; 1 Kng. 8.37–39; 9.20–21; 2 Kng. 11.5–6; 24.16; 25.16.

527. Exod. 4.21; 12.44; Lev. 22.3; Num. 14.24; 1 Sam. 2.13; 14.19; 17.24.

528. Lev. 2.11; 3.3b–4; 3.14–15; 4.8–9; 4.11–12; 7.9; 9.19–20; 11.42; 18.9; 18.10; 21.14; 22.4b–6a; 22.8; 22.22; 22.23; 22.28; 25.44; Num. 4.46–48; 6.7; 31.22–23; 30.10; 30.14; Deut. 1.39; Josh. 13.6; 1 Sam. 14.15; 1 Kng. 8.37–39; 1 Kng. 9.20–21; 2 Kng. 11.5–6; 2 Kng. 24.16; 2 Kng. 25.16.

comprised of multiple referring expressions. The later type is represented in (121a) below, and the former in (121b):

(121) Lev. 11.42[529]

כֹּל֙ הוֹלֵ֣ךְ עַל־גָּח֔וֹן$_{i}$ וְכֹ֖ל ׀ הוֹלֵ֣ךְ עַל־אַרְבַּ֑ע$_{j}$ עַד֙ כָּל־מַרְבֵּ֣ה רַגְלַ֔יִם$_{k}$ לְכֹל֙ הַשֶּׁ֣רֶץ הַשֹּׁרֵ֔ץ עַל־הָאָ֖רֶץ$_{l}$ לֹ֣א תֹאכְלֻ֑ום$_{ijkl}$ כִּי־שֶׁ֖קֶץ הֵֽם׃

"Whatever crawls on its belly$_{i}$, whatever goes on all fours$_{j}$, or whatever has many feet$_{k}$, any swarming thing that swarms on the ground$_{l}$, you shall not eat them$_{ijkl}$, for they are detestable."

(121b) Exod. 12.44

וְכָל־עֶ֥בֶד אִ֛ישׁ מִקְנַ֥ת־כֶּ֖סֶף$_{i}$ וּמַלְתָּ֣ה אֹת֑וֹ$_{j}$ אָ֖ז$_{j}$ יֹאכַ֥ל בֹּֽו׃

"But every slave that is bought for money$_{i}$, after you have circumcised him$_{j}$, then$_{j}$, he may eat of it."

The Multiple LD schema reflects the following non-prototypical attributes:

1. At least two constituent phrases (of any syntactic category) with discreet referents, or a single constituent comprised of at least two referring expressions denoting discrete referents must be syntactically detached from the matrix clause with which they are associated.

2. The dislocates[530] need not be semantically related to any overt element in the associated clause. In these cases, the extra-clausal status is not determined by the lack of a valency slot, but by an intervening element (either dislocated or in the clause initial position) located between the dislocate and the associated matrix clause.

3. One or more of the dislocates may be semantically connected to an element within the matrix clause.

4. The dislocates may potentially reflect any combination of a semantic relation with

529. In cases where one dislocated constituent is comprised of multiple referring expressions, each discrete expression is marked with a subscripted letter. Likewise, where multiple dislocated constituents occur, each constitute is marked by a separate subscripted letter.

530. The plural term 'dislocates' is used here generally to refer to multiple dislocated constituents as well as multiple referring expressions within a single dislocated constituent.

a linked element or the proposition as a whole, be it: total, metonymic, or a relevance relation (rare).

5. Multiple dislocated referring expressions may be coextensively linked to a single coindexed resumptive element (usually a pronoun), in which case a total identity relation holds between all of the dislocates and the single resumptive.

6. The dislocates need not satisfy a valency slot licensed by the predicate. In other words, the dislocates may not be directly replaceable with the connected element in terms of its semantics or its syntactic and grammatical function.

Multiple LDs overwhelmingly occur in reported speech (78%; 29/37),[531] with only eight tokens occurring in narrative (22%; 8/37).[532]

5.4.3.1 The Form of the Dislocate

Contrary to prototypical and non-resumptive instantiations, over half of LDs with multiple dislocates are *not* modified by a relative clause (59%; 22/37).[533]

(122) Num. 6.7

לְאָבִיו$_{i}$ וּלְאִמּוֹ$_{j}$ לְאָחִיו$_{k}$ וּלְאַחֹתוֹ$_{l}$ לֹא־יִטַּמָּא לָהֶם$_{ijkl}$ בְּמֹתָם כִּי נֵזֶר אֱלֹהָיו עַל־רֹאשׁוֹ׃

"For his father$_{i}$, for his mother$_{j}$, for his brother$_{k}$ or for his sister$_{l}$, he shall not make himself unclean for them$_{ijkl}$ when they die, because his separation to God is on his head."

In the remaining 41% (15/37),[534] at least one of the dislocates is modified by a restrictive relative clause.

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531. Cf. Exod. 4.21; 12.44; Lev. 2.11; 3.3b–4; 3.14–15; 4.8–9; 4.11–12; 7.9; 9.19–20; 11.42; 18.9; 18.10; 21.14; 22.3; 22.8; 22.4b–6a; 22.22; 22.23; 22.28; 25.44; Num. 6.7; 14.24; 31.22–23; 30.10; 30.14; Deut. 1.39; Josh. 13.6; 1 Kng. 8.37–39; 2 Kng. 11.5–6.

532. Cf. Num. 4.46–48; 1 Sam. 2.13; 14.15; 14.19; 17.24; 1 Kng. 9.20–21; 2 Kng. 24.16; 25.16.

533. Cf. Exod. 12.44; Lev. 2.11; 4.11–12; 9.19–20; 18.9; 18.10; 21.14; 22.8; 22.22; 22.28. Num. 6.7; 14.24; 31.22–23; 30.10; 30.14; Josh. 13.6; 1 Sam. 2.13. 14.15; 17.24; 1 Kng. 8.37–39; 24.16; 2 Kng. 25.16.

534. Cf. Exod. 4.21; Lev. 3.3b–4; 3.14–15; 4.8–9; 7.9; 11.42; 22.3; 22.4–6; 22.23; 25.44; Num. 4.46–48; Deut. 1.39; 20.14; 1 Sam. 14.19; 1 Kng. 9.20–21; 2 Kng. 11.5–6.

(123) Lev. 3.4

וְאֵת֙ שְׁתֵּ֣י הַכְּלָיֹ֔ת[i] וְאֶת־הַחֵ֖לֶב אֲשֶׁ֣ר עֲלֵהֶ֑ן אֲשֶׁ֥ר עַל־הַכְּסָלִ֖ים[j] וְאֶת־הַיֹּתֶ֥רֶת עַל־הַכָּבֵ֛ד[k]
עַל־הַכְּלָיֹ֖ות יְסִירֶֽנָּה[ijk]׃

"And the two kidneys$_{i}$, and the fat which is on them at the loins$_{j}$, and the lobe of the liver$_{k}$, he shall remove it$_{ijk}$, with the kidneys."

5.4.3.2 The Form of the Linked Element

Only 16% (6/37)[535] of the multiple dislocates lack a semantic coherence relation with a clause internal element. In the remaining 31 instances, the dislocates are either linked to an independent pronoun (6%; 2/31),[536] a cliticized pronominal suffix (47%; 18/37),[537] as in (124), or a corresponding lexical element (27%; 9/37),[538] as in (125). The two remaining instances exhibit a linked element in the form of a demonstrative pronoun[539] and a temporal adverb.[540]

(124) 2 Kng. 24.16

וְאֵת֙ כָּל־אַנְשֵׁ֣י הַחַ֔יִל שִׁבְעַ֥ת אֲלָפִ֖ים[i] וְהֶחָרָ֣שׁ[j] וְהַמַּסְגֵּ֑ר אֶ֥לֶף[k] הַכֹּ֛ל גִּבּוֹרִ֥ים עֹשֵׂ֖י
מִלְחָמָ֑ה[l] וַיְבִיאֵ֤ם[ijkl] מֶֽלֶךְ־בָּבֶל֙ גּוֹלָ֔ה בָּבֶ֖לָה׃

"All the men of valor, seven thousand$_{i}$, and the craftsman$_{j}$, and the smiths$_{k}$, one thousand, all strong and fit for war$_{l}$, these$_{ijkl}$ the king of Babylon brought into exile to Babylon."

(125) Lev. 22.3

אֱמֹ֣ר אֲלֵהֶ֗ם לְדֹרֹתֵיכֶם֙[i] כָּל־אִ֣ישׁ ׀ אֲשֶׁר־יִקְרַ֣ב מִכָּל־זַרְעֲכֶ֗ם אֶל־הַקֳּדָשִׁים֙ אֲשֶׁ֣ר
יַקְדִּ֣ישׁוּ בְנֵֽי־יִשְׂרָאֵ֔ל לַיהוָ֖ה וְטֻמְאָת֣וֹ עָלָ֑יו וְנִכְרְתָ֣ה[j] הַנֶּ֣פֶשׁ הַהִ֣וא מִלְפָנַ֔י אֲנִ֖י יְהוָֽה׃

535. Cf. Num. 4.46–48; 1 Sam. 2.13; 14.29; 17.24; 1 Kng. 8.37–39; 2 Kng. 11.5–6.

536. Cf. Deut. 1.39; 1 Sam. 14.15.

537. Cf. Exod. 4.21; 12.44; Lev. 2.11; 3.3b–4; 3.14–15; 4.8–9; 7.9; 11.42; 21.14; 22.8; 22.23; 22.28; 25.44; Num. 6.7; 14.24; Josh. 13.6; 1 Kng. 9.20–21; 2 Kng. 24.16.

538. Cf. Lev. 4.11–12; 9.19–20; 18.9; 18.10; 22.3; 22.4b–6a; Num. 31.22–23; 30.14; 2 Kng. 25.16.

539. Cf. Lev. 22.22.

540. Exod. 12.44.

"Say to them, 'Throughout your generations$_i$, anyone among your decendents who approaches the holy things that the Israelites dedicate to Yahweh while he has an uncleanness$_j$, that person$_j$ shall be cut off from my presence: I am Yahweh'."

5.4.3.3 The Preceding Element

Nearly half of the constructions (43%; 16/37)[541] in this category possess a construction-initial element of some kind. In all but two cases (36%; 14/16),[542] this preceding element is a coordinating וְ.[543]

(126) 1 Sam. 17.24

וְכֹל֙ אִ֣ישׁ יִשְׂרָאֵ֔ל$_i$ בִּרְאוֹתָ֖ם אֶת־הָאִ֑ישׁ$_j$ וַיָּנֻ֣סוּ מִפָּנָ֔יו וַיִּֽירְא֖וּ מְאֹֽד׃

"All the men of Israel$_i$, when they saw the man$_j$, they$_i$ fled from him and were very afraid."

5.4.3.4 The Relational Marker of Agreement

Our data set contains only four instantiations of LDs with multiple dislocates in which an agreement marker syntactically links one of the dislocates to a clause internal element (11%; 4/37).[544]

(127) Lev. 4.11–12

וְאֶת־עֹ֣ור הַפָּר$_i$ וְאֶת־כָּל־בְּשָׂרֹ֗ו$_j$ עַל־רֹאשֹׁ$_k$ וְעַל־כְּרָעָיו$_l$ וְקִרְבֹּ֖ו וּפִרְשֹׁ$_m$׃ 12. וְהוֹצִיא
אֶת־כָּל־הַפָּר$_{ijklm}$ אֶל־מִחוּץ לַמַּחֲנֶה אֶל־מָקֹום טָהוֹר֮ אֶל־שֶׁפֶךְ הַדֶּשֶׁן וְשָׂרַף אֹתֹו
עַל־עֵצִים בָּאֵשׁ עַל־שֶׁפֶךְ הַדֶּשֶׁן יִשָּׂרֵֽף׃

541. Cf. Exod. 12.44; Lev. 3.3b–4; 4.11–12; 7.8; 9.19–20; 22.4–6; 22.23; 22.28; 25.44; Num. 14.24; 30.10; 31.22–23; 1 Sam. 2.13; 14.19; 17.24; 2 Kng. 24.16.

542. Cf. Exod. 12.44; Lev. 3.4; 4.11–12; 7.8; 9.19–20; 22.4–6; 22.23; 22.28; 25.44; Deut. 1.39; Num. 30.10; 1 Sam. 2.13; 17.24; 2 Kng. 24.16.

543. Cf. Lev. 2.11 preceded by כִּי; Num. 31.22–23 preceded by אַךְ, and 1 Sam. 14.19 preceded by וַיְהִי.

544. Cf. Lev. 4.11–12; 7.9; 9.19–20; Num. 6.7.

"But the skin of the bull$_{i}$, and all its flesh$_{j}$, with its head$_{k}$, and its legs$_{l}$, its entrails and its dung$_{m}$, 12. and he shall carry all of the bull$_{ijklm}$ outside the camp to a clean place, to the ash heap, and shall burn it up on a fire of wood. On the ash heap, it shall be burned up.

5.4.3.5 The Clause-Initial Element

Not unlike instantiations of the prototypical and non-resumptive schemas, constructions with multiple dislocates may possess a clause initial element in the CP-slot (41%; 15/37).[545] The majority of these exhibit an initial וְ + *wayyiqtol* or *weqatal* verb form (87%; 13/15),[546] as illustrated in (129) below:[547]

(128) 2 Kng. 24.16

אֶת־כָּל־אַנְשֵׁי הַחַיִל שִׁבְעַת אֲלָפִים$_{i}$ וְהֶחָרָשׁ$_{j}$ וְהַמַּסְגֵּר$_{k}$ אֶלֶף הַכֹּל גִּבּוֹרִים עֹשֵׂי
מִלְחָמָה$_{l}$ וַיְבִיאֵם$_{ijkl}$ מֶלֶךְ־בָּבֶל גּוֹלָה בָּבֶלָה׃

"All the men of valor, seven thousand$_{i}$, and the craftsman$_{j}$, and the smiths$_{k}$, one thousand, all strong and fit for war$_{l}$, these$_{ijkl}$ the king of Babylon brought into exile to Babylon."

5.4.3.6 The Semantic Link

Lastly, in most cases (75%; 27/37),[548] a semantic coherence relation exists between at least one of the dislocates and a corresponding clause internal element. Resembling the prototypical schema, the majority of tokens have dislocates that are coindexed with an anaphoric resumptive pronoun.[549] In other words, the dislocates and the resumptive are in a prototypical total identity relation, as in (129):[550]

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545. Cf. Exod. 4.21; 12.44; Lev. 4.11–12; 9.19–20; 22.3; 22.4–6; 22.8; Num. 4.46–48; 14.24; 1 Sam. 2.13; 14.19; 17.24; 1 Kng. 8.37–39; 9.20–21; 11.5–6; 2 Kng. 24.16.

546. Cf. Exod. 4.21; 12.44; Lev. 4.11–12; 9.19–20; 22.3; 22.4–6; Num. 14.24; 1 Sam. 2.13; 14.19; 17.24; 1 Kng. 8.37–39; 9.20–21; 11.5–6; 2 Kng. 24.16.

547. In 1 Kng. 8.37–39, the intervening conjunctive וְ precedes a fronted pronoun.

548. Cf. Exod. 4.21; 12.44; Lev. 2.11; 3.3b–4; 3.14–15; 4.8–9; 4.11–12; 7.9; 9.19–20; 11.42; 18.9; 18.10; 21.14; 22.3; 22.4b–6a; 22.22; 22.23; 22.28; 25.44; Num. 6.7; 14.24; 31.22–23; Josh. 13.6; 1 Kng. 9.20.21; 2 Kng. 24.16; 25.16.

549. Cf. Exod. 4.21; 12.44; Lev. 2.11; 3.3b–4; 3.14–15; 4.8–9; 7.9; 11.42; 18.9; 18.10; 21.14; 22.3; 22.4b–6a; 22.8; 22.22; 22.23; 22.28; 25.44; Num. 6.7; 14.24; Deut. 1.39; Josh. 13.6; 1 Kng. 9.20–21; 2 Kng. 24.16; 25.16 (in 2 Kng. 25.16 the total identity resumptive is a demonstrative phrase).

550. In these instances, the single pronominal suffix often (but not always, cf. Lev. 7.9) anaphorically refers to all of the referents of the multiple dislocates, allowing the speaker to comment on them as a whole.

(129) Num. 6.7

לְאָבִיו$_{i}$ וּלְאִמּוֹ$_{j}$ לְאָחִיו$_{k}$ וּלְאַחֹתוֹ$_{l}$ לֹא־יִטַּמָּא לָהֶם$_{ijkl}$ בְּמֹתָם כִּי נֵזֶר אֱלֹהָיו עַל־רֹאשׁוֹ׃

"For his father$_{i}$, for his mother$_{j}$, for his brother$_{k}$ or for his sister$_{l}$, he shall not make himself unclean for them$_{ijkl}$ when they die, because his separation to God is on his head."

A few tokens, however, possess a metonymic relation between one or more of the dislocates and an element within the associated matrix clause. As we discussed in §5.3.2.5, all of the non-resumptive LDs in our data set that are characterized by a metonymic relation are hypernymic (whole-part). Interestingly, the opposite is the case with LDs exhibiting multiple dislocates. In 11% (4/37)[551] of the instantiations, at least one of the dislocates is in a metonymic relation to a correlative lexical element within the matrix clause, and in every case, this relation is hyponymic (part-whole), as in (130) below:[552]

(130) Lev. 4.11–12

וְאֶת־עוֹר הַפָּר$_{i}$ וְאֶת־כָּל־בְּשָׂרוֹ$_{j}$ עַל־רֹאשׁוֹ$_{k}$ וְעַל־כְּרָעָיו$_{l}$ וְקִרְבּוֹ וּפִרְשׁוֹ$_{m}$׃ 12. וְהוֹצִיא
אֶת־כָּל־הַפָּר$_{ijklm}$ אֶל־מִחוּץ לַמַּחֲנֶה אֶל־מָקוֹם טָהוֹר אֶל־שֶׁפֶךְ הַדֶּשֶׁן וְשָׂרַף אֹתוֹ
עַל־עֵצִים בָּאֵשׁ עַל־שֶׁפֶךְ הַדֶּשֶׁן יִשָּׂרֵף׃

"But the skin of the bull$_{i}$, and all its flesh$_{j}$, with its head$_{k}$, and its legs$_{l}$, its entrails and its dung$_{m}$, 12. and he shall carry all of the bull$_{ijklm}$ outside the camp to a clean place, to the ash heap, and shall burn it up on a fire of wood. On the ash heap, it shall be burned up.

5.4.4 Pronominal Left Dislocation

Constructions in which the dislocate consists of a pronominal form of some kind represent 2% (13/651)[553] of our overall data set.[554] Although not quantitatively significant, this schema

551. Cf. Lev. 4.11–12; 9.19–20; Num. 31.22–23; 30.14.

552. Note that, in two instances (1 Sam. 2.13; Num. 30.10), it could be argued that the dislocates are in a relevance relation to the associated proposition.

553. Cf. Gen. 6.21; 24.7; 48.7; Lev. 17:3–4; 17:8–9; 17.10; Num. 5.10 (2x); 18.8; Deut. 18.14; Josh. 23.9; Judg. 5.3; 2 Sam. 13.13.

554. We have not included in this category LDs headed by the indefinite pronoun כָּל. LDs fitting this profile make up 7% (43/651) of our overall data set: Gen. 13.15; 21.12; 26.15; 28.22; Exod. 9.19; 12.15; 12.19; 12.44; 31.14; 35.29; Lev. 2.11; 7.25; 7.27; 9.19; 11.3; 11.9; 11.33; 11.42; 18.29; 22.3; Num. 4.46–48; 21.8; 30.14; Deut. 3.13; 4.3; 13.1; 14.6; 28.61; Josh. 1.3; 11.13; 13.6; 21.40; Judg. 11.24; 19.30; 1 Sam. 2.13; 3.11; 10.11; 15.9; 17.24; 2 Sam. 2.23; 15.30; 1 Kng. 9.20–21; 2 Kng. 24.16.

nevertheless warrants attention due to its acute non-prototypicality in both structure and function (as we will soon see in chapter 6).[555] We have included in this category those tokens that satisfy the following syntactic and semantic criteria:

1. A single pronominal (clitic or full) detached from the matrix clause with which it is associated.

2. The dislocated pronominal is often coindexed with a corresponding anaphoric pronoun or lexical phrase within the associated clause; or it is semantically linked to some clause-internal element.

3. In the case where no resumptive is present, an intervening element in the CP/Wh-slot marks the pronoun as syntactically detached.

4. The resumptive, when present, satisfies an argument relation to the predicate.

5. In every case, there exists a total identity relation between the dislocated pronoun and the resumptive.

Every instantiation of pronominal LDs in our data set occur in reported speech. Examples (131a) and (131b) are two representative tokens of the pronominal LD type.

(131a) Gen. 24.27

וַיֹּאמֶר בָּרוּךְ יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵי אֲדֹנִי אַבְרָהָם אֲשֶׁר לֹא־עָזַב חַסְדּוֹ וַאֲמִתּוֹ מֵעִם אֲדֹנִי אָנֹכִי$_{i}$ בַּדֶּרֶךְ נָחַנִי$_{i}$ יְהוָה בֵּית אֲחֵי אֲדֹנִי׃

"And he said, 'Blessed be Yahweh, the God of my master Abraham, who has not forsaken his steadfast love and his faithfulness toward my master. As for me$_{i}$, Yahweh has led me$_{i}$ in the way to the house of my master's relatives."

(131b) Josh. 23.9

וַיּוֹרֶשׁ יְהוָה מִפְּנֵיכֶם גּוֹיִם גְּדֹלִים וַעֲצוּמִים וְאַתֶּם$_{i}$ לֹא־עָמַד אִישׁ בְּפְנֵיכֶם$_{i}$ עַד הַיּוֹם הַזֶּה׃

555. See Khan (1988:67-104) for more examples of the pronominal LD type from beyond the borders of Gen–2 Kng.

"For Yahweh has driven out before you great and powerful nations. And as for you$_i$, no man has been able to stand before you$_i$ to this day."

5.4.4.1 The Form of the Dislocate

In every instance (13/13),[556] the pronominal dislocate is an independent pronominal form. The dislocated pronominal is usually in either the first or second person, as exemplified in (132a) below. In five (38%; 5/13)[557] instances, the dislocate consists of the indefinite pronoun אִישׁ, as exemplified in (132b) below:

(132a) Judg. 5.3

שִׁמְעוּ מְלָכִים הַאֲזִינוּ רֹזְנִים אֲנֹכִי$_i$ לַיהוָה אָנֹכִי$_i$ אָשִׁירָה אֲזַמֵּר לַיהוָה אֱלֹהֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל׃

"Hear, O kings; give ear, O rulers; I$_i$, to Yahweh, I$_i$ will sing praise to Yahweh, the God of Israel."

(132b) Num. 5.10

וְאִישׁ$_i$ אֶת־קָדָשָׁיו לוֹ$_i$ יִהְיוּ אִישׁ אֲשֶׁר־יִתֵּן לַכֹּהֵן לוֹ יִהְיֶה׃

"Each man, they shall be his holy objects: whatever any man give to the priest, it becomes his."

5.4.4.2 The Form of the Linked Element

The majority of pronominal LDs (62%; 8/13)[558] have an inter-clausal coindexed resumptive functioning as an argument or adjunct of the predicate, as in (133).[559] Typically, the resumptive is realized as a pronominal suffix; however, in one instance it is realized as an independent pronoun (cf. 132a, above), and in three tokens, the resumptive is in the form of a

556. Cf. Gen. 6.21; 24.7; 48.7; Lev. 17:3–4; 17:8–9; 17.10; Num. 5.10 (2x); 18.8; 18.14; Josh. 23.9; Judg. 5.3; 2 Sam. 13.13.

557. Cf. Num. 5.10 (2x); Lev. 17:3–4; 17:8–9; 17.10.

558. Cf. Gen. 6.21; 24.27; 48.7; 18.14; Num. 5.10 (2x); Josh. 23.9; Judg. 5.3.

559. The two remaining cases (Num. 18.8; 2 Sam. 13.13) lack an overt resumptive element. As we will see in §5.3.5.4, however, the initial pronoun in both tokens is marked as extra-clausal by an intervening element in the CP/Wh-slot.

lexical phrase, as in (134):[560]

(133) Gen. 24.27

וַיֹּאמֶר בָּרוּךְ יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵי אֲדֹנִי אַבְרָהָם אֲשֶׁר לֹא־עָזַב חַסְדּוֹ וַאֲמִתּוֹ מֵעִם אֲדֹנִי אָנֹכִי בַּדֶּרֶךְ נָחַנִי יְהוָה בֵּית אֲחֵי אֲדֹנִי׃

"And he said, 'Blessed be Yahweh, the God of my master Abraham, who has not forsaken his steadfast love and his faithfulness toward my master. As for me$_i$, Yahweh has led me$_i$ in the way to the house of my master's relatives."

(134) Lev. 17.8–9

וַאֲלֵהֶם תֹּאמַר אִישׁ אִישׁ מִבֵּית יִשְׂרָאֵל וּמִן־הַגֵּר אֲשֶׁר־יָגוּר בְּתוֹכָם אֲשֶׁר־יַעֲלֶה עֹלָה אוֹ־זָבַח׃ 9. וְאֶל־פֶּתַח אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד לֹא יְבִיאֶנּוּ לַעֲשׂוֹת אֹתוֹ לַיהוָה וְנִכְרֶת הָאִישׁ הַהוּא מֵעַמָּיו׃

"And to them you shall say, 'Any one from the house of Israel, or of the strangers who sojourn among them, who offers a burnt offering or sacrifice$_i$, 9. and does not bring it to the entrance of the tent of meeting to offer it to Yahweh, that man$_i$ shall be cut off from his people'."

5.4.4.3 The Preceding Element

Just under half (46%; 6/13)[561] of the pronominal LDs in our data set are preceded by a grammatical element of some kind. Virtually every dislocated pronoun is preceded by a conjunction וְ, as in (135). One token, however, exhibits an an initial גַּם.[562]

(135) Num. 18.8

וַיְדַבֵּר יְהוָה אֶל־אַהֲרֹן וַאֲנִי הִנֵּה נָתַתִּי לְךָ אֶת־מִשְׁמֶרֶת תְּרוּמֹתָי לְכָל־קָדְשֵׁי בְנֵי־יִשְׂרָאֵל לְךָ נְתַתִּים לְמָשְׁחָה וּלְבָנֶיךָ לְחָק־עוֹלָם׃

560. Cf. Lev. 17:3–4; 17:8–9; 17.10.

561. Cf. Num. 5.10a; 18.8; Deut. 18.14; Josh. 23.9; 2 Sam. 13.13; 2 Kng. 9.27.

562. Cf. 2 Kng. 9.27.

"And Yahweh spoke to Aaron, 'Look, As for me$_i$, I$_i$ have given you charge of the contributions made to me, all the consecrated things of the Israelites. I have given them to you as a portion and to your sons as a perpetual allotment'."

5.4.4.4 The Clause-Initial Element

In five instances (38%; 5/13),[563] there occurs a clause-initial element intervening between the dislocate and the associated matrix clause. In three instances, this element is a clause initial וְ.[564] The remaining two tokens possess an intervening interrogative אָנָה, as in (136), and the discourse marker הִנֵּה[565] (see ex. [135] above), respectively:

(136) 2 Sam. 13.13

וַאֲנִי אָנָה אוֹלִיךְ אֶת־חֶרְפָּתִי וְאַתָּה תִּהְיֶה כְּאַחַד הַנְּבָלִים בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל וְעַתָּה דַּבֶּר־נָא אֶל־הַמֶּלֶךְ כִּי לֹא יִמְנָעֵנִי מִמֶּךָּ׃

"As for me$_i$, where could I$_i$ carry my shame? And you will be like one of the fools in Israel. Now therefore, please speak to the king, for he will not withhold me from you."

5.4.4.5 The Semantic Link

Every pronominal dislocate that is semantically linked to an intra-clausal constituent stands in a total identity (137a) or metonymic (137b) relation with that entity (62%; 8/13).[566]

(137a) Num. 18.8

וַיְדַבֵּר יְהוָה אֶל־אַהֲרֹן וַאֲנִי$_i$ הִנֵּה נָתַתִּי$_i$ לְךָ אֶת־מִשְׁמֶרֶת תְּרוּמֹתָי לְכָל־קָדְשֵׁי בְנֵי־יִשְׂרָאֵל לְךָ נְתַתִּים לְמָשְׁחָה וּלְבָנֶיךָ לְחָק־עוֹלָם׃

"And Yahweh spoke to Aaron, 'Look, as for me$_i$, I$_i$ have given you charge of the contributions made to me, all the consecrated things of the Israelites. I have given them to you as a portion and to your sons as a perpetual allotment'."

563. Cf. Lev. 17:3–4; 17:8–9; 17.10; Num. 18.8; 2 Sam. 13.13.

564. Cf. Lev. 17:3–4; 17:8–9; 17.10.

565. Cf. Num. 18.8.

566. Cf. Gen. 6.21; 24.27; 48.7; 18.14; Num. 5.10 (2x); Josh. 23.9; Judg. 5.3.

(137b) Josh. 23.9

וַיּוֹרֶשׁ יְהוָה מִפְּנֵיכֶם גּוֹיִם גְּדֹלִים וַעֲצוּמִים וְאַתֶּם֙ לֹא־עָמַד אִישׁ בִּפְנֵיכֶ֔ם עַד הַיּוֹם הַזֶּה׃

"For Yahweh has driven out before you great and powerful nations. And as for you$_i$, no man has been able to stand in your presence$_i$ to this day."

5.4.5 Left Dislocation with Anaphoric כֵּן

LD constructions characterized by the presence of a co-indexed anaphoric כֵּן, as in (138a) and (138b), represent 7% (46/651)[567] of our data set:

(138a) 2 Sam. 9.11

וַיֹּאמֶר צִיבָא אֶל־הַמֶּלֶךְ כְּכֹל֙ אֲשֶׁר יְצַוֶּה אֲדֹנִי הַמֶּלֶךְ אֶת־עַבְדּ֔וֹ כֵּן֙ יַעֲשֶׂה עַבְדֶּ֔ךָ וּמְפִיבֹשֶׁת אֹכֵל֙ עַל־שֻׁלְחָנִ֔י כְּאַחַד מִבְּנֵ֖י הַמֶּֽלֶךְ׃

"Then Ziba said to the king, 'According to all that my lord the king commands his servant$_i$, so$_i$ your servant will do.' So Mephibosheth ate at David's table as one of the king's sons."

(138b) Num. 8.22

וְאַחֲרֵי־כֵ֗ן בָּ֚אוּ הַלְוִיִּ֔ם לַעֲבֹ֖ד אֶת־עֲבֹדָתָ֑ם בְּאֹ֣הֶל מוֹעֵ֗ד לִפְנֵי֙ אַהֲרֹ֣ן וְלִפְנֵ֣י בָנָ֔יו כַּאֲשֶׁ֣ר צִוָּ֔ה יְהוָ֖ה אֶת־מֹשֶׁ֑ה עַל־הַלְוִיִּ֔ם כֵּ֖ן עָשׂ֥וּ לָהֶֽם׃

"And after that, the Levites went in to perform their service in the tent of meeting before Aaron and before his sons; just as Yahweh had commanded Moses concerning the Levites$_i$, so$_i$ they did to them."

Constructions of this type are identified by the following syntactic-semantic criteria:

1. An PP or an NP (rare) is syntactically detached from the matrix clause with which it is associated.

567. Cf. Gen. 6.22; Exod. 7.6; 12.28; 12.50; 25.9; 27.8; 39.32; 39.42; 39.43; 40.16; Num. 2.17; 2.34; 5.4; 8.4; 8.20; 8.22; 9.5; 9.14; 9.17a; 15.12; 15.14; 15.20; 17.26; 32.31; 36.10; Deut. 7.19; 8.20; 12.22; Josh. 1.17; 10.39; 11.15; 14.5; 23.15; Judg. 1.7; 15.11; 1 Sam. 9.13; 11.7; 2 Sam. 7.17; 9.11; 13.35; 16.19; 1 Kng. 1.30; 1.37; 2.38; 2 Kng. 16.11; 22.18.

2. The anaphoric adverb כֵּן[568] is in a fronted position within the matrix clause and is semantically linked to the referent (proposition) expressed by the detached constituent.

3. In each token, כֵּן is replaceable with the correlative dislocate, such that the dislocate could satisfy the semantic valency slot licensed by the predicate.

The majority (59%; 27/46)[569] of tokens instantiating this type of LD occur in narrative discourse, while a remaining 41% (19/46)[570] occur in reported speech.

5.4.5.1 The Form of the Dislocate

In an overwhelming majority (91%; 42/46)[571] of LDs with an anaphoric כֵּן, the dislocate is realized as a PP. Moreover, in all but two tokens,[572] the dislocated phrase is headed by the preposition כְּ. Of these, 47% (22/46)[573] are headed by כַּאֲשֶׁר, as in (138b) above, and (139a) below, and another 39% (18/46)[574] are headed by כְּ, as in (139b):

(139a) 2 Sam. 16.19

וְהַשֵּׁנִית לְמִי אֲנִי אֶעֱבֹד הֲלוֹא לִפְנֵי בְנוֹ כַּאֲשֶׁר עָבַדְתִּי לִפְנֵי אָבִיךָ i כֵּן i אֶהְיֶה לְפָנֶיךָ׃

"Furthermore, whom should I serve? Should I not serve his son? As I have served your father$_i$, so$_i$ I will serve you."

568. Note that in one instance (1 Sam. 11.7) the resumptive adverb is כֹּה.

569. Cf. Gen. 6.22; Exod. 7.6; 12.28; 12.50; 25.9; 27.8; 39.32; 39.42; 39.43; 40.16; Num. 2.34; 5.4; 8.4; 8.20; 8.22; 9.5; 9.17a; 17.26; 36.10; Deut. 7.19; 8.20; 12.22; Josh. 10.39; 11.15; 14.5; 2 Sam. 7.17; 2 Kng. 16.11.

570. Cf. Num. 2.17; 9.14; 15.12; 15.14; 15.20; Josh. 1.17; 23.15; Judg. 1.7; 15.11; 1 Sam. 9.13; 11.7; 2 Sam. 9.11; 13.35; 16.19; 1 Kng. 1.30; 1.37; 2.38; 2 Kng. 22.18.

571. Cf. Gen. 6.22; Exod. 7.6; 12.28; 12.50; 25.9; 27.8; 39.32; 39.42; 39.43; 40.16; Num. 2.17; 2.34; 5.4; 8.4; 8.20; 8.22; 9.5; 9.14; 9.17a; 15.12; 15.14; 15.20; 17.26; 36.10; Deut. 8.20; 12.22; Josh. 1.17; 10.39; 11.15; 14.5; 23.15; Judg. 1.7; 15.11; 2 Sam. 7.17; 9.11; 13.35; 16.19; 1 Kng. 1.30; 1.37; 2.38; 2 Kng. 22.18.

572. See Num. 9.17 and 2 Kng. 22.18.

573. Cf. Exod. 7.6; 12.28; 12.50; 27.8; 39.43; Num. 2.17; 5.4; 8.22; 15.14; 17.26; 36.10; Deut. 12.22; Josh. 10.39; 11.15; 14.5; 23.15; Judg. 1.7; 15.11; 2 Sam. 16.19; 1 Kng. 1.30; 1.37; 2.38.

574. Cf. Gen. 6.22; Exod. 25.9; 39.32; 39.42; 40.16; Num. 2.34; 8.4; 8.20; 9.5; 9.14; 9.17a; Deut. 8.20; Josh. 1.17; 2 Sam. 7.17; 9.11; 13.35; 2 Kng. 16.11.

(139b) Deut. 8.20

כַּגּוֹיִם אֲשֶׁר יְהוָה מַאֲבִיד מִפְּנֵיכֶם כֵּן$_i$ תֹּאבֵדוּן עֵקֶב לֹא תִשְׁמְעוּן בְּקוֹל יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵיכֶם׃

"Like the nations that Yahweh makes to perish before you$_i$, so$_i$ you will perish; because you would not listen to the voice of Yahweh your God."

Of the remaining three tokens that are not headed by a preposition, two are headless relatives,[575] and one is a complex NP.[576] Moreover, dislocates modified by a restrictive relative clause, as in (140), make up 28% (13/46)[577] of the LDs in this category, while tokens with nonrestrictive relatives do not occur.

(140) Exod. 25.9

כְּכֹל אֲשֶׁר אֲנִי מַרְאֶה אוֹתְךָ אֶת תַּבְנִית הַמִּשְׁכָּן וְאֶת תַּבְנִית כָּל־כֵּלָיו$_i$ וְכֵן$_i$ תַּעֲשׂוּ׃

"According to all that I am going to show you, as the pattern of the tabernacle and the pattern of all its furniture$_i$, and so$_i$ you will make it.

5.4.5.2 Other Distinctives

In addition to the anaphoric adverbial כֵּן located in a fronted position in each token,[578] a few other attributes of this LD type are worthy of note. The finite verb is realized by the lexeme עָשָׂה in 65% (30/46)[579] of the tokens. Additionally, only two instances[580] have an intervening element occupying the CP/Wh-slot between the dislocate and the associated clause, and in only four instances[581] are there clause initial elements preceding the dislocate.

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575. Cf. Num. 32.31; 1 Sam. 11.7.

576. Cf. Deut. 7.19.

577. Cf. Gen. 6.22; Exod. 25.9; 39.32; 39.42; 40.16; Num. 2.34; 8.4; 8.20; 9.5; Deut. 7.19; Josh. 23.15; 2 Sam. 9.11; 2 Kng. 16.11.

578. Note that in Num. 9.17 the anaphoric adverb is headed by a preposition אַחֲרֵי and takes the form אַחֲרֵי־כֵן.

579. Cf. Gen. 6.22; Exod. 7.6; 12.28; 12.50; 25.9; 27.8; 39.32; 39.42; 39.43; 40.16; Num. 5.4; 8.4; 8.20; 8.22; 9.5; 9.14; 15.12; 15.14; 17.26; 32.31; 36.10; Deut. 7.19; Josh. 10.39; 14.5; Judg. 15.11; 1 Sam. 11.7; 2 Sam. 9.11; 1 Kng. 1.30; 2 Kng. 2.38; 2 Kng. 16.11.

580. In Num. 9.17a, the clause-initial element is וְ, while in 1 Kng. 1.30, it is כִּי.

581. Cf. The particle אַף in Deut. 12.12; וַיְהִי in Josh. 23.15; וְ in 2 Kng. 22.18; and כִּי in 1 Kng. 1.30.

Finally, while the anaphoric adverb (כֵּן) is semantically linked to the dislocated phrase, the relationship between these two elements cannot be described according to our previously stated categories, viz. total, metonymic, partial, or relevance. This is because, in contrast to the previously discussed tokens, dislocated constituents in theses types usually refer to an action(s) or state of affairs rather than to discourse participants or entities. The semantic relation, rather, is one that expresses the corresponding manner with which the subsequent action(s) or state of affairs are to be performed, as in (141) below:

(141) Deut. 8.20

כַּגּוֹיִם אֲשֶׁר יְהוָה מַאֲבִיד מִפְּנֵיכֶם כֵּן$_i$ תֹּאבֵדוּן עֵקֶב לֹא תִשְׁמְעוּן בְּקוֹל יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵיכֶם׃

"Like the nations that Yahweh makes to perish before you$_i$, so$_i$ you will perish; because you would not listen to the voice of Yahweh your God."

5.4.6 Conditional Left Dislocation

A non-prototypical extension located even further from the prototypical schema, but nevertheless still within the category structure, are LDs that contribute to the formulation of a conditional clause (5%; 32/651).[582] In virtually every instance, tokens of this type occur in legal contexts as casuistic precepts.[583] Conditional LDs exhibit the following attributes:

1. A constituent(s), usually an indefinite NP (or indefinite pronoun), is dislocated before the protasis of a conditional clause which is marked by an initial כִּי, or, on rare occasion, אִם or וְ.

2. The dislocate may or may not be semantically linked to a correlative overt element in the protasis or apodosis portion of the conditional clause.

3. When a semantic relation occurs between the dislocate and an overt clause internal element, the relation is characterized as either total or metonymic.

582. Cf. Lev. 1.2; 2.1; 4.2; 5.4; 5.15; 5.21; 7.21; 12.2; 13.2; 13.18; 13.24; 13.29; 15.16; 15.19; 15.25; 19.20; 20.27; 22.12; 22.13; 22.14; 22.21; 22.27; Num. 5.6; 5.12–15; 5.20; 6.2; 9.10; 27.8; 30.3; 30.4; 1 Kng. 8.37–39; 9.4.

583. Cf. Khan, 1988:98–104.

It is not surprising, in light of the legal contexts in which they are used that all Conditional LDs occur as reported speech. Representative examples of this type of construction are as follows:

(142a) Num. 5.6

דַּבֵּר֮ אֶל־בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל֒ אִ֣ישׁ אֽוֹ־אִשָּׁה֩i כִּ֨י יַעֲשׂ֜וּ מִכָּל־חַטֹּ֣את הָאָדָ֗ם לִמְעֹ֤ל מַעַל֙ בַּיהוָ֔ה וְאָשְׁמָ֖ה הַנֶּ֥פֶשׁ הַהִֽוא֑i׃

"Speak to the Israelites and say, "A man or a woman$_i$, if they commit any of the sins that people commit by breaking faith with Yahweh, that person$_i$ is guilty."

(142b) Lev. 22.14

וְאִ֕ישׁ כִּֽי־יֹאכַ֥ל קֹ֖דֶשׁ בִּשְׁגָגָ֑ה וְיָסַ֤ף חֲמִשִׁיתוֹ֙ עָלָ֔יו וְנָתַ֥ן לַכֹּהֵ֖ן אֶת־הַקֹּֽדֶשׁ׃

"Any man$_i$, if he$_i$ eats a holy thing unintentionally, then he shall add the fifth of its value to it and give the holy thing to the priest."

5.4.6.1 The Form of the Dislocate

Like Pronominal LDs, the majority (75%; 24/32) of Conditional LDs exhibit a pronominal dislocate, albeit with Conditional LDs, the dislocate is most often an indefinite (generic) pronoun, such as אִישׁ / אִשָּׁה[584] (see ex. [142b] above), נֶפֶשׁ,[585] or אָדָם[586] as exemplified in (143a) and (143b):

(143a) Lev. 2.1

וְנֶ֨פֶשׁ֙ כִּֽי־תַקְרִ֣יב קָרְבַּ֔ן מִנְחָה֙ לַיהוָ֔ה סֹ֖לֶת יִהְיֶ֣ה קָרְבָּנ֑וֹ וְיָצַ֤ק עָלֶ֙יהָ֙ שֶׁ֔מֶן וְנָתַ֥ן עָלֶ֖יהָ לְבֹנָֽה׃

"Anyone$_i$, when he$_i$ presents a grain offering as an offering to Yahweh, his offering shall be of fine flour, and he shall pour oil on it and put frankincense on it."

584. Note the possibility in some contexts to interpret these lexemes as NPs: Lev. 12.2; 13.29; 15.16; 15.19; 15.25; 19.20; 20.27; 22.14; 22.21; Num. 5.6; 5.12–15; 6.2; 9.10; 27.8; 30.3; 30.4. Note that a double אִישׁ אִישׁ occurs in: Num. 5.12–15 and 9.10.

585. Cf. Lev. 2.1; 4.2; 5.4; 5.15; 5.21; 7.21.

586. Cf. Lev. 1.2; 13.2.

(143b) Lev.1.2

דַּבֵּר אֶל־בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְאָמַרְתָּ אֲלֵהֶם אָדָם כִּי־יַקְרִיב מִכֶּם קָרְבָּן לַיהוָה מִן־הַבְּהֵמָה מִן־הַבָּקָר וּמִן־הַצֹּאן תַּקְרִיבוּ אֶת־קָרְבַּנְכֶם׃

"Speak to the Israelites and say to them, 'Anyone of you$_i$, when you$_i$ bring an offering to Yahweh, you shall bring your offering of animals from the herd or the flock'."

In another 25% (8/32), the dislocate is realized as either an indefinite NP,[587] or a second person independent pronoun.[588]

5.4.6.2 The Form of the Linked Element

Less than half of the dislocates in this category (41%; 13/32)[589] are semantically linked to an overtly expressed lexical or pronominal element in either the protasis or apodosis portion of the associated conditional clause. Of these, only two (15%; 2/13)[590] occur with a linked element in the protasis, as in (144):

(144) Lev. 13.24

אוֹ בָשָׂר כִּי־יִהְיֶה בְעֹרוֹ מִכְוַת־אֵשׁ וְהָיְתָה מִחְיַת הַמִּכְוָה בַּהֶרֶת לְבָנָה אֲדַמְדֶּמֶת אוֹ לְבָנָה׃

"Or, a body$_i$, when it$_i$ as a burn on its skin and the raw flesh of the burn becomes a spot, reddish-white or white...."

Another nine (69%; 9/13)[591] occur with a resumptive/linked element in the apodosis (145):

(145) Lev. 7.21

וְנֶפֶשׁ$_i$ כִּי־תִגַּע בְּכָל־טָמֵא בְּטֻמְאַת אָדָם אוֹ ׀ בִּבְהֵמָה טְמֵאָה אוֹ בְּכָל־שֶׁקֶץ טָמֵא וְאָכַל מִבְּשַׂר־זֶבַח הַשְּׁלָמִים אֲשֶׁר לַיהוָה וְנִכְרְתָה הַנֶּפֶשׁ הַהִוא$_i$ מֵעַמֶּיהָ׃

587. Cf. Lev. 13.18; 13.24; 22.12; 22.13; 22.27; 1 Kng. 9.4.

588. Cf. Num. 5.20; 1 Kng. 8.37–39.

589. Cf. Lev. 2.1; 7.21; 13.24; 13.29–30; 15.19; 15.25; 22.12; Num. 5.6; 5.12–15; 5.20; 27.8; 30.4; 1 Kng. 9.4.

590. Cf. Lev. 13.24; Num. 27.8.

591. Cf. Lev. 2.1; 7.21; 15.19; 15.25; 22.12; Num. 5.6; 5.20; 30.4; 1 Kng. 9.4.

"Anyone$_i$, when he$_i$ touches anything unclean, whether human uncleanness or an unclean beast or any unclean detestable creature, and then eats some flesh form the sacrifice of Yahweh's peace offerings, that person$_i$ shall be cut off from his people."

And finally, in another two, (13%; 2/13)[592] there occurs a resumptive element in both the protasis and apodosis (146):

(146) Lev. 13.29–30

וְאִישׁ אֹו אִשָּׁה$_i$ כִּֽי־יִהְיֶה בֹו$_i$ נֶגַע בְּרֹאשׁ אֹו בְזָקָן׃ 30. וְרָאָה הַכֹּהֵן אֶת־הַנֶּגַע וְהִנֵּה מַרְאֵהוּ עָמֹק מִן־הָעֹור וּבֹו שֵׂעָר צָהֹב דָּק וְטִמֵּא אֹתֹו$_i$ הַכֹּהֵן נֶתֶק הוּא צָרַעַת הָרֹאשׁ אֹו הַזָּקָן הִוא׃

"Any man or woman$_i$, if he$_i$ has an infection on the head or beard, 30. then the priest shall look at the infection, and if it appears to be deeper than the skin, and the hair in it is yellow and thin, then the priest shall pronounce him$_i$ unclean. It is a scale, a leprous disease of the head or the beard."

5.4.6.3 The Clause-Initial Element

The particle כִּי fills the clause initial position between the dislocate and the protasis in virtually every Conditional LD in our data set (97%; 31/32).[593] It is noteworthy that, in some instances, there exists a semantic ambiguity with respect to the interpretation of the clause initial כִּי as either introducing a protasis of the conditional clause, or as introducing a temporal clause.[594] Further, a וְ occurs between the protasis and apodosis in just over half of the conditional tokens (53%; 17/32)[595] in our data set:

592. Cf. Lev. 13.29–30; Num. 5.12–15.

593. Cf. Lev. 1.2; 2.1; 4.2; 5.4; 5.15; 5.21; 7.21; 12.2; 13.2; 13.18; 13.24; 13.29; 15.16; 15.19; 15.25; 19.20; 20.27; 22.12; 22.13; 22.14; 22.21; 22.27; Num. 5.6; 5.12–15; 5.20; 6.2; 9.10; 27.8; 30.3; 30.4; 1 Kng. 8.37–39. The two exceptions consist of 1 Kng. 9.4 where an intervening אִם occurs, and Lev. 15.18 that has an intervening וְ.

594. Cf. Lev. 12.12; 15.16; 15.19; 22.27; Num. 27.8.

595. Cf. Lev. 4.2; 5.4; 5.15; 7.21; 13.2; 13.18; 13.24; 13.29; 15.16; 22.14; 22.27; Num. 5.6; 5.20; 5.12–15; 9.10; 27.8; 30.4.

(147) Lev. 22.14

וְאִ֣ישׁ כִּֽי־יֹאכַ֣ל קֹ֔דֶשׁ בִּשְׁגָגָ֑ה וְיָסַ֤ף חֲמִשִׁיתוֹ֙ עָלָ֔יו וְנָתַ֥ן לַכֹּהֵ֖ן אֶת־הַקֹּֽדֶשׁ׃

"Any man$_i$, if he$_i$ eats a holy thing unintentionally, then he shall add the fifth of its value to it and give the holy thing to the priest."

5.4.6.4 The Semantic link

As stated in §5.4.6, where a semantic relation exists between the dislocate and a clause internal linked element, this relation may be characterized as either total or metonymic. A total identity relation characterizes 19% (6/32)[596] of the tokens in this category (148a), while in 25% (8/32)[597] of the tokens, the relation is metonymic (148b).

(148a) Num. 5.6

דַּבֵּר֙ אֶל־בְּנֵ֣י יִשְׂרָאֵ֔ל אִ֚ישׁ אִ֣ישׁ כִּֽי־יַעֲשׂ֔וּ מִכָּל־חַטֹּ֖את הָאָדָ֑ם לִמְעֹ֤ל מַעַל֙ בַּיהוָ֔ה וְאָשְׁמָ֖ה הַנֶּ֥פֶשׁ הַהִֽוא׃

"Speak to the Israelites, 'a man or a woman$_i$, if they commit any of the sins that people commit by breaking faith with Yahweh, that person$_i$ is guilty'."

(148b) Lev. 15.19

וְאִשָּׁ֗ה כִּֽי־תִהְיֶ֤ה זָבָה֙ דָּ֣ם יִהְיֶ֣ה זֹבָ֔הּ בִּבְשָׂרָ֖הּ שִׁבְעַ֣ת יָמִ֑ים תִּהְיֶ֣ה בְנִדָּתָ֔הּ וְכָל־הַנֹּגֵ֥עַ בָּ֖הּ יִטְמָ֥א עַד־הָעָֽרֶב׃

"Any woman, when she has a discharge, and the discharge in her body is blood, she shall be in her menstrual impurity for seven days, and whoever touches her shall be unclean until the evening."

5.4.7 Temporal Left Dislocation

As a final type of LD, we include constructions with a dislocated temporal deictic clause or phrase (§3.2.1). Within the network of schematic types that make up the LD constructional category, temporal LDs are located furthest from the prototype. This is partly due to the fact that, unlike the previously described schemas, dislocates of temporal LDs refer not to a participant (specific or generic) or entities/objects, but rather deictically refer to temporal parameters under which the following proposition (or discourse unit) should be interpreted.

596. Cf. Lev. 7.21; 13.29; 22.12; Num. 5.6; 5.20; 27.8.

597. Cf. Lev. 2.1; 13.24; 15.19; 15.19; 15.25; 22.27; Num. 30.4; 1 Kng. 9.4.

Despite its remoteness from the exemplar, instantiations of this type occupy 56% of our overall data set (363/651).[598] These constructions are identified according to the following syntactico-semantic attributes:

1. A temporal expression, identified by a lexicogrammatical temporal marker, is in a detached position preceding an associated matrix clause.[599]

2. The dislocate may or may not be semantically related to an overt element within the associated matrix clause.

3. The temporal expression is marked as extra-clausal by a clause initial element in the CP-slot, or on rare occasion, a coindexed resumptive element within the clause.

A small minority (7%; 27/363)[600] of temporal LDs occur in reported speech, while the balance occur in narrative discourse. The token in (149) illustrates this schema:

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598. Cf. Gen. 3.5; 4.3; 4.8; 6.1; 7.10; 8.6; 11.2; 12.11; 12.12; 19.15; 19.29; 19.34; 20.13; 21.22; 22.1; 22.4; 22.20; 24.20; 24.22; 24.30; 24.45; 24.52; 25.10; 25.11; 26.8; 26.32; 26.34; 27.1; 27.30; 27.34; 27.40; 29.10; 29.13; 29.23; 30.41; 31.10; 31.37; 32.18; 34.25; 35.16; 35.17; 35.18; 35.22; 37.18; 37.23; 38.1; 38.9; 38.24; 38.38; 38.29; 39.7; 39.10; 39.11; 39.13; 39.15; 39.18; 39.19; 41.8; 42.35; 43.2; 43.21; 44.3; 44.24; 44.31; 46.33; 47.24; 48.1; 50.5; Exod. 1.16; 1.19; 2.11; 2.23; 4.21; 4.24; 6.28–29; 12.3; 12.25; 12.26; 12.29; 13.5; 13.11; 13.14; 13.15; 13.17; 15.19; 16.5; 16.7; 16.10; 17.4; 17.11 (2x); 18.13; 19.1; 19.16; 30.12; 32.19; 32.30; 32.34; 33.22; Lev. 22.3; Num. 7.1; 7.89; 9.17 (2x); 9.19; 10.9; 10.10; 10.35; 11.25; 15.2; 15.8; 15.14; 15.18; 16.31; 17.7; 17.32; 18.26; 18.30; 22.41; 25.19; 35.10; 35.51; Deut. 2.16; 4.30; 5.23; 6.10–11; 6.20; 7.1–2; 9.9–10; 9.23; 11.29; 12.11; 12.14; 15.16; 16.6; 17.18; 20.2; 20.9; 20.10; 21.10–11; 22.8; 23.10; 23.14; 23.25; 23.26; 24.1; 25.1; 26.1; 26.12; 27.2; 29.18; 30.1–2; 31.20; 31.24–25; Josh. 1.1; 2.5; 2.14; 3.2; 3.3; 3.14; 3.15; 4.1; 4.11; 4.18; 5.1; 5.8; 5.13; 6.15; 6.20; 8.5; 8.14; 8.24; 9.1–2; 9.16; 10.1–2; 10.11; 10.20; 11.1; 15.18; 17.13; 22.7; 23.1; 23.16; 24.29; Judg. 1.1; 1.14; 1.28; 2.18; 3.18; 3.27; 5.11; 6.7; 6.25; 7.9; 7.15; 8.7; 8.33; 9.42; 11.4; 11.16–17; 11.26; ; 11.35; 11.39; 12.5–6; 13.20; 14.11; 14.15; 14.17; 15.1; 16.1; 16.4; 16.16; 16.25; 19.5; 21.4; 21.22; 1 Sam. 1.4; 1.20; 2.15; 4.5; 4.18; 4.20; 5.9; 5.10; 7.2; 8.1; 9.26; 10.2; 10.9; 10.11; 12.8; 13.10; 13.22; 14.1; 14.19; 16.16; 16.23; 17.24; 17.48; 18.6; 18.10; 18.19; 20.27; 20.35; 24.2; 24.6; 24.17; 25.20; 25.30; 25.37; 25.38; 28.1; 30.1; 30.25; 31.8; 2 Sam. 1.1; 1.2; 2.1; 3.6; 4.4; 4.10; 5.24; 6.13; 7.1; 7.4; 7.12; 8.1; 10.1; 10.14; 10.15; 11.1; 11.2; 11.14; 11.16; 11.19; 12.18; 13.1; 13.23; 13.28; 13.36; 15.1; 15.2; 15.5; 15.7; 15.32; 16.16; 17.6; 17.9; 17.21; 17.27; 19.26; 21.18; 1 Kng. 1.14; 1.21; 2.39; 3.18; 5.21; 6.1; 8.10; 8.33; 8.35; 9.1; 11.15; 11.29; 12.2; 12.20; 13.4; 13.20; 13.23; 13.31; 14.6; 14.12; 15.21; 16.18; 17.7; 18.4; 18.17; 18.27; 18.29; 18.36; 18.44; 18.45; 19.13; 20.12; 20.26; 20.29; 20.40; 21.15; 21.16; 21.27; 22.32; 22.33; 2 Kng. 2.1; 2.9; 2.11; 3.5; 3.15; 3.20; 4.6; 4.8; 4.11; 4.18; 4.25; 4.40; 5.7; 5.8; 6.5; 6.20; 6.24; 6.26; 6.30; 7.12; 8.3; 8.15; 9.22; 10.2; 10.7; 10.9; 10.25; 12.11; 13.21; 14.5; 17.21; 19.1; 19.35; 19.37; 22.11; 25.3.

599. We follow Gross (1987) in excluding ambiguous instantiations beginning with וַיְהִי, where it could be construed as its own sentence (e.g. 2 Sam. 13.30).

600. Cf. Gen. 3.5; 39.15; 39.18; 43.21; 44.24; Exod. 1.19; 12.3; 16.5; 16.7; 17.4; Deut. 6.10–11; 6.20; 7.1–2; Judg. 16.2; 1 Sam. 10.2; 12.8; 2 Sam. 7.12; 11.19; 13.28; 1 Kng. 14.12; 2 Kng. 7.12.

(149) 2 Sam. 11.16

וַיְהִי֙ בִּשְׁמֹ֣ר יוֹאָ֔ב אֶל־הָעִ֖יר וַיִּתֵּ֣ן אֶת־אֲוּרִיָּ֔ה אֶל־הַמָּקוֹם֙ אֲשֶׁ֣ר יָדַ֔ע כִּ֥י אַנְשֵׁי־חַ֖יִל שָֽׁם׃

And as Joab was besieging the city, he assigned Uriah to the place where he knew there were valiant men.

5.4.7.1 The Form of the Dislocate

The first attribute listed in §5.3.8 stipulates that the dislocated temporal expression be overtly marked as such by an overt lexical or grammatical temporal marker of some kind.

In 38% (134/356)[601] of the tokens, the temporal marker consists of a preposition בְּ + infinitive construct (54/356) or כְּ + infinitive construct (23%; 81/356), as in (153a) and (153b) below. According to Van der Merwe et al. (1999:156–157), the action implied by the בְּ + infinitive construct is construed as *simultaneous* to that of the matrix clause, while כְּ + infinitive construct signals the action as occurring just prior to the events predicated by the matrix clause (cf. Jenni, 1992; 1993):[602]

(150a) Deut. 29.18 (29.19)

וְהָיָ֗ה בְּשָׁמְעוֹ֙ אֶת־דִּבְרֵ֣י הָאָלָ֣ה הַזֹּ֔את וְהִתְבָּרֵ֥ךְ בִּלְבָבוֹ֖ לֵאמֹ֑ר שָׁלֹ֣ום יִֽהְיֶה־לִּ֗י כִּ֚י בִּשְׁרִרוּת֙ לִבִּ֣י אֵלֵ֔ךְ לְמַ֥עַן סְפוֹת֙ הָרָוָ֔ה אֶת־הַצְּמֵאָֽה׃

"And when he hears the words of this sworn covenant, he will bless himself in his heart saying, 'I shall be safe, though I walk in the stubbornness of my heart.' This will lead to the sweeping away of moist and dry alike."

601. Cf. Gen. 4.8; 11.2; 19.29; 24.30; 27.34; 27.40; 29.13; 35.17; 35.18; 35.22; 38.28; 38.29; 39.10; 39.13; 39.15; 39.18; 39.19; 44.31; Exod. 1.16; 13.17; 16.10; 33.22; Num. 7.89; 9.19; 10.35; 11.25; 15.18; 16.31; 17.7; 18.30; Deut. 5.23; 9.23; 9.9–10; 17.18; 20.2; 20.9; 23.14; 29.18; 31.24–25; Josh. 2.14; 3.14; 3.15; 4.18; 5.1; 5.13; 6.20; 8.14; 8.24; 9.1–2; 10.1–2; 10.11; 10.20; 11.1; 15.18; 23.16; Judg. 1.14; 3.27; 7.15; 8.7; 11.16–17; 11.26; 11.35; 13.20; 14.11; 1 Sam. 4.5; 4.18; 5.10; 9:13; 10.2; 10.9; 13.10; 16.16; 16.23; 17.24; 18.6; 24.17; 30.1; 2 Sam. 3.6; 4.4; 5.24; 9.26; 11.16; 11.19; 13.28; 13.36; 15.5; 17.9; 17.27; 1 Kng. 1.21; 3.18; 5.21; 8.10; 8.33; 8.35; 9.1; 11.15; 12.2; 12.20; 13.4; 14.6; 14.12; 15.21; 16.18; 18.4; 18.17; 18.29; 18.36; 19.13; 20.12; 21.15; 21.16; 21.27; 22.32; 22.33; 2 Kng. 2.1; 2.9; 3.5; 3.15; 3.20; 4.6; 4.20; 4.25; 5.7; 5.8; 6.20; 6.30; 9.22; 10.2; 10.7; 10.25; 12.11; 19.1; 22.11.

602. Note that in one instance (Josh. 2.5), the infinitive construct is preceded by לְ.

(150b) Josh. 6.20

וַיָּרַע הָעָם וַיִּתְקְעוּ בַּשֹּׁפָרוֹת וַיְהִי כִשְׁמֹעַ הָעָם אֶת־קוֹל הַשּׁוֹפָר וַיָּרִיעוּ הָעָם תְּרוּעָה גְּדוֹלָה וַתִּפֹּל הַחוֹמָה תַּחְתֶּיהָ וַיַּעַל הָעָם הָעִירָה אִישׁ נֶגְדּוֹ וַיִּלְכְּדוּ אֶת־הָעִיר׃

So the people shouted, and the trumpets were blown. As soon as the people heard the sound of the trumpet, the people shouted a great shout, and the wall fell down flat, so that the people went up into the city, every man straight before him, and they captured the city.

Additionally, 38% (137/356)[603] of the dislocates in this category consist of a preposition + a specific lexical and/or deictically modified temporal reference:

(151a) 2 Kng. 25.3

בְּתִשְׁעָה לַחֹדֶשׁ וַיֶּחֱזַק הָרָעָב בָּעִיר וְלֹא־הָיָה לֶחֶם לְעַם הָאָרֶץ׃

On the ninth day of the fourth month, the famine was so severe in the city that there was no food for the people of the land.

(151b) Gen. 22.20[604]

וַיְהִי אַחֲרֵי הַדְּבָרִים הָאֵלֶּה וַיֻּגַּד לְאַבְרָהָם לֵאמֹר הִנֵּה יָלְדָה מִלְכָּה גַם־הִוא בָּנִים לְנָחוֹר אָחִיךָ׃

Now, after these things, it was told to Abraham, "Look, Milcah also has borne children to your brother Nahor."

Dislocated temporal clauses with a temporal כִּי + finite verb make up 17% (61/356)[605]

603. Cf. Gen. 3.5; 4.3; 7.10; 8.6; 12.11; 19.15; 19.34; 20.13; 21.22; 22.4; 24.22; 24.52; 26.32; 27.30; 29.10; 29.23; 30.41; 31.10; 34.25; 37.18; 37.23; 38.1; 38.24; 39.11; 41.8; 43.2; 47.24; Exod. 1.19; 2.11; 2.23; 4.24; 6.28–29; 12,3; 12.29; 16.5; 17.11 (2x); 18.13; 19.1; 19.16; 32.19; 32.30; 32.34; Num. 7.1; 9.17; 10.10; 17.23; 22.41; Deut. 2.16–174.30; 23.21; 27.2; Josh. 3.2; 3.3; 4.1; 5.8; 6.15; 9.16; Judg. 3.18; 6.25; 7.9; 8.33; 9.42; 11.4; 11.39; 14.15; 14.17; 15.1; 16.2; 19.5; 21.4; 1 Sam. 1.20; 4.20; 7.2; 8.1; 12.8; 13.22; 14.19 (2x); 18.10; 18.19; 20.27; 20.35; 24.2; 25.37; 25.38; 28.1; 30.25; 31.8; 2 Sam. 1.2; 7.4; 11.1; 11.2 11.14; 12.18; 13.23; 15.7; 16.16; 1 Kng. 2.39; 6.1; 11.29; 17.7; 18.27; 18.44; 18.45; 20.26; 20.29; 2 Kng. 6.1; 8.3; 8.15; 10.9; 14.5; 19.35; 25.3.

604. The preposition אַחֲרֵי heads 23/138 of the PPs in this category: Gen. 22.1; 22.20; 25.11; 39.7; 48.1; Num. 25.19; Josh. 1.1; 24.9; Judg. 1.1; 16.4; 1 Sam. 5.9; 24.6; 2 Sam. 1.1; 2.1; 8.1; 10.1; 13.1; 15.1; 17.21; 21.18. Note that in 2 Sam. 15.1, the adverb is מֵאַחֲרֵי.

605. Cf. Gen. 6.1; 12.12; 26.8; 27.1; 31.37; 32.18; 38.9; 43.21; 44.24; 46.33; Exod. 12.25; 12.26; 13.5; 13.11; 13.14; 13.15; 15.19; 30.12; Num. 10.9; 15.2; 15.8; 15.14; 18.26; 33.51; 35.10; Deut. 6.10–11; 6.20; 7.1–2; 11.29; 15.16; 20.10; 21.10–11; 22.8; 23.10; 23.25; 23.26; 24.1; 25.1; 26.1; 26.12; 30.1–3; 31.20; Josh. 8.5; 17.13; 22.7; Judg. 1.28; 2.18; 6.7; 12.5–6; 16.16; 16.25; 21.22; 1 Sam. 17.48; 25.30; 2 Sam. 4.10; 6.13; 7.1;

of our overall data set:[606]

(152) Gen. 26.8

וַיְהִי כִּי אָרְכוּ־לוֹ שָׁם הַיָּמִים וַיַּשְׁקֵף אֲבִימֶלֶךְ מֶלֶךְ פְּלִשְׁתִּים בְּעַד הַחַלּוֹן וַיַּרְא וְהִנֵּה יִצְחָק מְצַחֵק אֵת רִבְקָה אִשְׁתּוֹ׃

When he had been there a long time, Abimelech king of the Philistines looked out of a window and saw Isaac laughing with Rebekah his wife.

Participial clauses preceded by וַיְהִי comprise 3% (11/356)[607] of the temporal dislocates:[608]

(153) 1 Kng. 13.20

וַיְהִי הֵם יֹשְׁבִים אֶל־הַשֻּׁלְחָן פ וַיְהִי דְּבַר־יְהוָה אֶל־הַנָּבִיא אֲשֶׁר הֱשִׁיבוֹ׃

And as they sat at the table, the word of Yahweh came to the prophet who had brought him back.

On occasion (2%; 9/356),[609] the temporal dislocate is preceded by וַיְהִי (see ex. [153] above), but only rarely (1%; 3/356)[610] does the temporal dislocate take the form וַיְהִי + NP, as in (154):

(154) 1 Sam. 1.4

וַיְהִי הַיּוֹם וַיִּזְבַּח אֶלְקָנָה וְנָתַן לִפְנִנָּה אִשְׁתּוֹ וּלְכָל־בָּנֶיהָ וּבְנוֹתֶיהָ מָנוֹת׃

On the day when Elkanah sacrificed, he would give portions to Peninnah his wife and to all her sons and daughters.

7.12; 19.26; 1 Kng. 17.21; 2 Kng. 7.12.

606. Note that in Gen. 38.9, the temporal clause is marked by אִם rather than כִּי. Additionally, in Judg. 16.25, the dislocate consists of a כִּי + verbless clause.

607. Cf. Gen. 42.35; 1 Sam. 15.32; 25.20; 1 Kng. 1.14; 13.20; 20.40; 2 Kng. 2.11; 6.5; 6.26; 13.21; 19.37.

608. In these instances, we take the discourse marker וַיְהִי + the participial clause as signaling an overt temporal reference.

609. Cf. Gen. 35.16; Exod. 16.7; 17.4; 1 Sam. 1.4; 2.15; 14.1; 2 Kng. 4.8; 4.11; 4.18.

610. Cf. Gen. 26.34; 44.3; 2 Sam. 15.2.

5.4.7.2 The Preceding Element

The majority (88%; 316/356) of tokens instantiating the Temporal LD schema are preceded by some kind of grammatical element. In almost every instance (83%; 265/316), the preceding element consists of an initial וַיְהִי or less often (9%; 28/316) an initial וְהָיָה. While the syntactic, semantic and pragmatic functions of וְהָיָה / וַיְהִי remains a disputed issue in BH studies, it is beyond the purview of this chapter to discuss the particulars of this debate.[611] It suffices to say here that, with respect to this particular syntactic configuration (i.e. וַיְהִי / וְהָיָה + temporal expression), we take וְהָיָה / וַיְהִי as optional subjectless predicates functioning as discourse markers.[612] In particular, וְהָיָה / וַיְהִי contribute towards the temporal organization of the discourse by "anchoring an event, state of affairs, episode or narrative to the time line" (Van der Merwe, et al., 1999:331). In addition to וְהָיָה / וַיְהִי, a coordinating וְ precedes the dislocate in 4% (12/316)[613] of the Temporal LDs, while the remaining 2% (8/316) exhibit other grammatical elements, such as לָכֵן, הִנֵּה, כִּי, גַּם, or וְעַתָּה / עַתָּה. Examples (155a) and (155b) are representative of Temporal LDs preceded by וְהָיָה / וַיְהִי.[614]

(155a) Judg. 3.27

וַיְהִי בְּבוֹאוֹ וַיִּתְקַע בַּשּׁוֹפָר בְּהַר אֶפְרָיִם וַיֵּרְדוּ עִמּוֹ בְּנֵי־יִשְׂרָאֵל מִן־הָהָר וְהוּא לִפְנֵיהֶם׃

When he arrived, he sounded the trumpet in the hill country of Ephraim. Then the people of Israel went down with him from the hill country, and he was their leader.

(159b) Deut. 20.2

וְהָיָה כְּקָרַבְכֶם אֶל־הַמִּלְחָמָה וְנִגַּשׁ הַכֹּהֵן וְדִבֶּר אֶל־הָעָם׃

611. For a brief overview of the interpretive options pertaining to וְהָיָה and וַיְהִי, see Moshavi (2010:57). For a more thorough overview, as well as a detailed profile of the use of וַיְהִי in 1 Samuel, see Van der Merwe (1999a).

612. For further discussion on the advantages of the subjectless predicate interpretation over against the traditional view (i.e. that the finite clause is subordinate, functioning as the subject of וְהָיָה / וַיְהִי), see Moshavi (2010:57).

613. Cf. Gen. 19.15; 37.18; Exod. 16.7; 32.34; Num. 9.19; 9.23; 10.9; 10.10; 15.14; 15.8; Judg. 2.18; 1 Sam. 17.24.

614. Cf. Gen. 3.5; Josh. 22.7; Judg. 8.7; 11.16–17; 1 Sam. 2.15; 1 Kng. 1.14; 2 Kng. 10.2.

"And then, when you draw near to battle, the priest shall come near and speak to the people."

5.4.7.3 The Clause-Initial Element

A וְ occupies the clause-initial position in 89% (317/356) of the Temporal LDs in our data set. Of these, 82% (261/317) begin with a *wayyiqtol* verb form (156a), and another 18% (57/317) with a *weqatal* form (156b):[615]

(156a) Judg. 21.4

וַיְהִי֙ מִמָּחֳרָ֔ת וַיַּשְׁכִּימ֥וּ הָעָ֖ם וַיִּבְנוּ־שָׁ֣ם מִזְבֵּ֑חַ וַיַּעֲל֥וּ עֹלֹ֖ת וּשְׁלָמִֽים׃

And the next day, the people rose early and built there an alter and offered burnt offerings and peace offerings.

(156b) Deut. 22.8

כִּֽי־תִבְנֶ֣ה בַ֔יִת חָדָ֖שׁ וְעָשִׂ֣יתָ מַעֲקֶ֑ה לְגַגֶּ֔ךָ וְלֹא־תָשִׂ֥ים דָּמִ֖ים בְּבֵיתֶ֑ךָ כִּֽי־יִפֹּ֥ל הַנֹּפֵ֖ל מִמֶּֽנּוּ׃

"When you build a new house, you shall make a guard-rail for your roof, that you may not bring the guilt of blood upon your house, if anyone should fall from it."

In an additional 7% (24/317), a clause initial וְ precedes a fronted NP (157a), and in 2% (7/317) the clause begins with a וְהִנֵּה, as in (157b).[616]

(157a) 1 Kng. 11.29

וַיְהִ֣י בָעֵ֣ת הַהִ֗יא וְיָרָבְעָם֙ יָצָ֣א מִירוּשָׁלִָ֔ם וַיִּמְצָ֣א אֹת֗וֹ אֲחִיָּ֤הוּ הַשִּׁילֹנִי֙ הַנָּבִ֣יא בַּדָּ֔רֶךְ וְהוּא֙ מִתְכַּסֶּ֣ה בְשַׂלְמָ֔ה חֲדָשָׁ֖ה וּשְׁנֵיהֶ֣ם לְבַדָּ֑ם בַּשָּׂדֶֽה׃

And at that time, when Jeroboam went out of Jerusalem, the prophet Ahijah the Shilonite found him on the road. Now Ahijah had clothed himself with a new cloak; and both of them were alone in the field.

615. Two tokens (Gen. 39.10; Exod. 13.17) have the pattern וְלֹא + *qatal*.

616. In Gen 31.37 an interrogative occupies the clause initial position.

(157b) 2 Sam. 13.36

וַיְהִי ׀ כְּכַלֹּתוֹ לְדַבֵּר וְהִנֵּה בְנֵי־הַמֶּלֶךְ בָּאוּ וַיִּשְׂאוּ קוֹלָם וַיִּבְכּוּ וְגַם־הַמֶּלֶךְ וְכָל־עֲבָדָיו בָּכּוּ בְכִי גָּדוֹל מְאֹד׃

And as soon as he had finished speaking, look, the king's sons came and lifted up their voice and wept. And also the king and all his servants wept very bitterly.

5.4.7.4 The Semantic Link

Virtually every dislocate in the Temporal LD category stands in a relevance relation to the associated proposition. In only three instances do we find the dislocated temporal expressions semantically related to a clause internal element. In each case (162a-c), the linked element consists of a fronted temporal deictic expression in a total identity relation with the dislocated temporal expression:

(158a) Exod. 19.1

בַּחֹדֶשׁ הַשְּׁלִישִׁי לְצֵאת בְּנֵי־יִשְׂרָאֵל מֵאֶרֶץ מִצְרַיִם$_i$ בַּיּוֹם הַזֶּה$_i$ בָּאוּ מִדְבַּר סִינָי׃

"On the third new moon after the people of Israel had gone out of the land of Egypt$_i$, on that day$_i$, they came into the wilderness of Sinai."

(158b) Num. 9.17a

וּלְפִּי הֵעָלוֹת הֶעָנָן מֵעַל הָאֹהֶל$_i$ וְאַחֲרֵי־כֵן$_i$ יִסְעוּ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל

"And whenever the cloud lifted from over the tent$_i$, after that$_i$, the people of Israel set out...."

(158c) 2 Sam. 5.24

וְיִהִי בְּשָׁמְעֲךָ [כְּשָׁמְעֲךָ] אֶת־קוֹל צְעָדָה בְּרָאשֵׁי הַבְּכָאִים$_i$ אָז$_i$ תִּתְגָּרֶה כִּי אָז יָצָא יְהוָה לְפָנֶיךָ לְהַכּוֹת בְּמַחֲנֵה פְלִשְׁתִּים׃

"And when you hear the sound of marching in the tops of the balsam trees$_i$, then$_i$ rouse yourself, for then Yahweh has gone out before you to strike down the army of the Philistines."

5.5 The Internal Syntax of Left Dislocation in Biblical Hebrew

5.5.1 The Dislocated Element

5.5.1.1 Syntactic Categories

It was shown in §3.4.1.1 that some languages (e.g. English) only license the dislocation of phrases realized in certain syntactic categories (e.g. English prohibits the dislocation of APs), while others (e.g. French) permit the dislocation of a broad spectrum of syntactic types, be it NP, AP, PP, or VP. In other words, typological evidence suggest that restrictions on the dislocation of certain syntactic categories is a language particular phenomenon and that no universal restrictive rule exists by which some phrasal types are ineligible for dislocation. Although cross-linguistically speaking, it is possible to dislocate any phrasal type, all are not considered equal. As argued elsewhere (§3.4.1), NPs are typologically considered the prototypical dislocated phrase, with other syntactic categories located at various degrees along a cline of non-prototypicality. As we have already seen (cf. §5.3.1), BH is no different in this regard. Moreover, consistent with the cross-linguistic pattern, BH licenses a variety of non-prototypical syntactic phrasal types in the dislocate position.

The most common type of non-prototypical dislocated expressions are those in which the head is realized as a preposition. These types of dislocates make up 48% (311/651) of our data set. Of these cases, 43% (135/311)[617] consist of a preposition + NP, as in (159):

(159) Gen. 50.5

אָבִי הִשְׁבִּיעֵנִי לֵאמֹר הִנֵּה אָנֹכִי מֵת בְּקִבְרִי אֲשֶׁר כָּרִיתִי לִי בְּאֶרֶץ כְּנַעַן שָׁמָּה[i]
תִּקְבְּרֵנִי וְעַתָּה אֶעֱלֶה־נָּא וְאֶקְבְּרָה אֶת־אָבִי וְאָשׁוּבָה׃

"My father made me swear, saying, 'Look, I am about to die: In my grave that I hewed out for myself in the land of Canaan$_i$, there$_i$ you shall bury me.' Now therefore, please let me go up and bury my father; then I will return."

In another 44% (137/311),[618] the dislocate consists of a preposition + an infinitive

617. Cf. Gen. 2.17; 3.3; 3.5; 4.3; 6.22; 7.10; 8.6; 19.34; 21.22; 22.1; 22.4; 22.20; 24.22; 25.11; 26.32; 29.23; 30.41; 31.10; 34.25; 38.1; 38.24; 39.7; 39.11; 41.8; 47.24; 48.1; 50.5; Exod. 2.11; 2.23; 4.21; 4.24; 6.28–29; 9.6; 12.3; 12.29; 16.5; 18.13; 19.1; 19.16; 25.9; 32.30; 32.34; 39.32; 39.42; 40.16; Lev. 21.3; Num. 2.34; 6.7; 7.1; 8.4; 8.20; 9.5; 9.14; 9.17 (2x); 10.10; 15.12; 15.20; 17.23; 18.8; 22.41; 25.19; 33.54; Deut. 1.36; 4.30; 8.20; 16.6; 27.2; Josh. 1.1; 1.17; 3.2; 6.15; 9.16; 23.1; 24.29; Judg. 1.1; 5.11; 6.25; 7.9; 9.42; 11.4; 11.39; 14.15; 14.17; 15.1; 16.2; 19.5; 21.4; 1 Sam. 1.20; 4.20; 7.2; 13.22; 14.19; 18.10; 18.19; 20.8; 20.27; 20.35; 25.37; 25.38; 28.1; 30.25; 31.8; 2 Sam. 1.2; 6.21; 6.22; 6.23; 7.4; 7.17; 9.11; 11.1; 11.2; 11.14; 12.18; 13.23; 13.35; 15.7; 1 Kng. 2.39; 6.1; 8.41; 11.29; 17.7; 17.20; 18.27; 18.44; 20.26; 20.29; 2 Kng. 8.3; 8.15; 10.9; 16.11; 19.35; 22.18; 25.3.

618. Cf. Gen. 4.8; 11.2; 19.29; 24.30; 27.34; 27.40; 29.13; 35.17; 35.18; 35.22; 38.28; 38.29; 39.10; 39.13; 39.15; 39.18; 39.19; 44.31; Exod. 1.16; 4.21; 13.17; 16.10; 33.22; Num. 7.89; 9.19; 10.35; 11.25; 15.18; 16.31;

construct (160a), and in 9% (28/311),[619] the preposition heads a constituent with a finite verb (160b):

(160a) 2 Kng. 13.19

וַיִּקְצֹף עָלָיו אִישׁ הָאֱלֹהִים וַיֹּאמֶר לְהַכּוֹת חָמֵשׁ אוֹ־שֵׁשׁ פְּעָמִים$_i$ אָז$_i$ הִכִּיתָ אֶת־אֲרָם עַד־כַּלֵּה וְעַתָּה שָׁלֹשׁ פְּעָמִים תַּכֶּה אֶת־אֲרָם׃

Then, the man of God was angry with him and said, "In striking five or six times$_i$, then$_i$ you would have defeated Aram until finishing them, but now you will defeat Aram only three times."

(160b) Gen. 19.15

וּכְמוֹ הַשַּׁחַר עָלָה וַיָּאִיצוּ הַמַּלְאָכִים בְּלוֹט לֵאמֹר קוּם קַח אֶת־אִשְׁתְּךָ וְאֶת־שְׁתֵּי בְנֹתֶיךָ הַנִּמְצָאֹת פֶּן־תִּסָּפֶה בַּעֲוֹן הָעִיר׃

As morning dawned, the angels urged Lot saying, "Up! Take your wife and your two daughters who are here, lest you be swept away in the punishment of the city."

Finally, 3% (8/311)[620] of the dislocates consist of the prepositional phrase אַחֲרֵי־כֵן, as in (161):[621]

(161) 1 Sam. 24.6

וַיְהִי אַחֲרֵי־כֵן וַיַּךְ לֵב־דָּוִד אֹתוֹ עַל אֲשֶׁר כָּרַת אֶת־כְּנַף אֲשֶׁר לְשָׁאוּל׃

And then afterward, David's conscious bothered him, because he had cut off a corner of Saul's rob.

17.7; 18.30; Deut. 5.23; 9.23; 9.9–10; 17.18; 20.2; 20.9; 23.14; 29.18; 31.24–25; Josh. 2.14; 3.14; 3.15; 4.18; 5.1; 5.13; 6.20; 8.14; 8.24; 9.1–2; 10.1–2; 10.11; 10.20; 11.1; 15.18; 23.16; Judg. 1.14; 3.27; 7.15; 8.7; 11.16–17; 11.26; 11.35; 13.20; 14.11; 1 Sam. 4.5; 4.18; 5.10; 9.13; 9.26; 10.2; 10.9; 13.10; 16.16; 16.23; 17.24; 18.6; 24.17; 30.1; 2 Sam. 3.6; 4.4; 5.24; 11.16; 11.19; 13.28; 13.36; 15.5; 17.9; 17.21; 17.27; 1 Kng. 1.21; 3.18; 5.21; 8.10; 8.33; 8.35; 9.1; 20.12; 21.15; 21.16; 21.27; 22.32; 22.33; 2 Kng. 2.1; 2.9; 3.5; 3.15; 3.20; 4.6; 4.25; 4.40; 5.7; 5.8; 6.20; 6.30; 9.22; 10.2; 10.7; 10.25; 12.11; 19.1; 22.11.

619. Cf. Gen. 12.11; 19.15; 20.13; 24.52; 27.30; 29.10; 37.18; 37.23; 43.2; Exod. 1.19; 17.11 (2x); 32.19; Deut. 2.16–17; Josh. 3.3; 4.1; 4.11; 5.8; Judg. 3.18; 8.33; 1 Sam. 2.15; 5.9; 8.1; 12.8; 14.19; 24.2; 2 Sam. 16.16; 2 Kng. 14.5.

620. Cf. Judg. 16.4; 1 Sam. 24.6; 2 Sam. 2.1; 8.1; 10.1; 13.1; 15.1; 21.18; 1 Kng. 18.45; 2 Kng. 6.24.

621. Cf. One token (1 Kng. 18.45) consists of the double occurrence of the PP עַד־כֹּה.

In §5.3.5, we described a (rare) type of constructional schema characterized by the dislocation of a pronoun. Dislocated pronouns constitute 5% (15/656) of the non-prototypical dislocates in our data set. We refer the reader back to §5.3.5.1 for a description of the various types dislocated pronouns in our data set.

Other non-prototypical dislocated phrasal types exhibited include dislocated AdvP (3%; 8/656)[622] and dislocated substantivised APs (2/656),[623] each of which is represented in (162a) and (162b), respectively:

(162a) Exod. 17.4

וַיִּצְעַק מֹשֶׁה אֶל־יְהוָה לֵאמֹר מָה אֶעֱשֶׂה לָעָם הַזֶּה עֹוד מְעַט וסקלני [וְסָקְלֻנִי]׃

So Moses cried out to Yahweh, saying, "What shall I do to this people? A little longer, then they will stone me."

(162b) 1 Kng. 13.33

אַחַר הַדָּבָר הַזֶּה לֹא־שָׁב יָרָבְעָם מִדַּרְכּוֹ הָרָעָה וַיָּשָׁב וַיַּעַשׂ מִקְצוֹת הָעָם כֹּהֲנֵי בָמוֹת
הֶחָפֵץ$_i$ יְמַלֵּא אֶת־יָדוֹ$_i$ וְיִהְיוּ כֹהֲנֵי בָמוֹת׃

After this event, Jeroboam did not return from his evil way, but he returned and he made priests for the high places again from among all the people; any who would$_i$, he ordained them$_i$, and they became priests of the high places.

Finally, constructions with dislocated participial phrases functioning substantively constitute 2% (8/656)[624] of the non-NP dislocates in our data set.

(163) Lev. 7.33

הַמַּקְרִיב אֶת־דַּם הַשְּׁלָמִים וְאֶת־הַחֵלֶב מִבְּנֵי אַהֲרֹן$_i$ לֹו$_i$ תִּהְיֶה שׁוֹק הַיָּמִין לְמָנָה׃

"Whoever among the sons of Aaron who offers the blood of the peace offerings and the fat$_i$, the right thigh shall be for him$_i$, and his portion."

622. Cf. Gen. 35.16; Exod. 16.7; 17.4; 1 Sam. 1.4; 14.1; 2 Kng. 4.8; 4.11; 4.18.

623. Cf. 1 Kng. 13.33; 2 Kng. 11:5–6.

624. Cf. Gen. 9.6; Lev. 7.33; 22.4b–6a; 26.36; Judg. 11.31; 19.30; 2 Sam. 4.10; 22.41.

5.5.2 The Resumptive/Linked Element

5.5.2.1 Syntactic Categories

LDs with a clause internal coindexed resumptive or otherwise semantically linked element make up 40% (258/651) of our overall data set. Of these, a majority (56%; 145/258) consist of prototypical coindexed resumptives realized as independent pronouns[625] or cliticized pronominal suffixes. For a more detailed description of these prototypical pronominal forms, we refer the reader back to section (§5.4.1.2). The discussion here, however, will center on the remaining 44% (113/258), that is, on the various types of non-prototypical (i.e. non-pronominal) categories realized by resumptive/linked elements.

The majority (51%; 58/113) of non-prototypical resumptive/linked elements are realized as an AdvP of some kind. The anaphoric adverbial כֵּן constitutes 79% (46/58)[626] (cf. §5.3.6) of these cases, while locative adverbials (14%; 8/58)[627] and temporal adverbials (7%; 4/58)[628] account for the remainder, as represented by the tokens (164a) and (164b):

(164a) Gen. 25.10

הַשָּׂדֶה אֲשֶׁר־קָנָה אַבְרָהָם מֵאֵת בְּנֵי־חֵת שָׁמָּה קֻבַּר אַבְרָהָם וְשָׂרָה אִשְׁתּוֹ׃

The field that Abraham purchased from the Hittites$_i$, there$_i$ Abraham was buried, with Sarah his wife.

(164b) 2 Sam. 5.24

וְיִהִי בְּשָׁמְעֲךָ [כְּשָׁמְעֲךָ] אֶת־קוֹל צְעָדָה בְּרָאשֵׁי הַבְּכָאִים אָז תִּתְחָרֵץ כִּי אָז יָצָא יְהוָה לְפָנֶיךָ לְהַכּוֹת בְּמַחֲנֵה פְלִשְׁתִּים׃

"And when you hear the sound of marching in the tops of the balsam trees$_i$, then$_i$ rouse yourself, for then Yahweh has gone out before you to strike down the army of the Philistines."

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625. Indefinite pronouns are excluded.

626. Cf. Gen. 6.22; Exod. 7.6; 12.28; 12.50; 25.9; 27.8; 39.32; 39.42; 39.43; 40.16; Num. 2.17; 2.34; 5.4; 8.4; 8.20; 8.22; 9.5; 9.14; 9.17; 15.12; 15.14; 15.20; 17.26; 32.31; 36.10; Deut. 7.19; 8.20; 12.22; Josh. 1.17; 10.39; 11.15; 14.5 23.15; Judg. 1.7; 15.11; 1 Sam. 9.13; 11.7; 2 Sam. 7.17; 9.11; 13.35; 16.19; 1 Kng. 1.30; 1.37; 2.38; 2 Kng. 16.11; 22.18.

627. Cf. Gen. 25.10; 50.5; Num. 9.17; Deut. 12.11; 12.14; 16.6; Judg. 5.11; 2 Sam. 9.11.

628. Cf. Exod. 12.44; 2 Sam. 5.24; 7.17; 2 Kng. 13.19.

Alternatively, resumptive/linked elements realized as NPs make up 40% (45/113) of our data set. In only 13% (6/45)[629] of these tokens is the resumptive/linked element an unmodified NPs (165a), while 55% (25/45)[630] are modified by a demonstrative, as in (165b), and another 22% (10/45)[631] are NPs with a possessive pronominal suffix (165c). Finally, in 9% (4/45),[632] the resumptive is an indefinite pronoun (169d):

(165a) Lev. 20.12

וְאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁכַּב אֶת־כַּלָּתוֹ$_i$ מוֹת יוּמָתוּ שְׁנֵיהֶם$_i$ תֵּבֶל עָשׂוּ דְּמֵיהֶם בָּם׃

"A man who sleeps with his daughter-in-law$_i$, surely both of them$_i$ shall be put to death. They have committed perversion; their blood in upon them."

(165b) Gen. 17.14

וְעָרֵל ׀ זָכָר אֲשֶׁר לֹא־יִמּוֹל אֶת־בְּשַׂר עָרְלָתוֹ וְנִכְרְתָה$_i$ הַנֶּפֶשׁ הַהִוא$_i$ מֵעַמֶּיהָ אֶת־בְּרִיתִי הֵפַר׃

"Any uncircumcised male who is not circumcised in the flesh of his foreskin$_i$, that person$_i$ shall be cut off from his people; he has broken my covenant."

(165c) 1 Sam. 3.11

וַיֹּאמֶר יְהוָה אֶל־שְׁמוּאֵל הִנֵּה אָנֹכִי עֹשֶׂה דָבָר בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל אֲשֶׁר כָּל־שֹׁמְעוֹ תְּצַלֶּינָה שְׁתֵּי אָזְנָיו׃

Then Yahweh said to Samuel, "Look, I am about to do a thing in Israel at which, everyone who hears it$_i$, his two ears will tingle."

629. Cf. Lev. 20.12; 20.13; 20.16; 22.4b–6b; 9.19–20; 2 Kng. 23.15.

630. Cf. Gen. 17.14; 17.17; Exod. 12.15; 12.19; 31.14; 35.29; Lev. 4.11–12; 7.20; 7.21; 7.25; 7.27; 17.8–9; 20.10; 22.3; Num. 5.6; 9.13; 14.36–37; 19.20; 30.10; 31.22–23; 34.6; Deut. 9.13; 17.12; 18.20; 21.3.

631. Cf. Gen. 21.12; 34.8; Lev. 7.19; 18.9; 18.10; 18.29; Num. 4.46–48; 1 Sam. 3.11; 1 Kng. 13.33; 2 Kng. 25.16.

632. Cf. Exod. 9.6; 1 Sam. 13.2; 2 Sam. 15.30; 21.5–6.

(165d) Exod. 9.6

וַיַּעַשׂ יְהוָה אֶת־הַדָּבָר הַזֶּה מִמָּחֳרָת וַיָּמָת כָּל מִקְנֵה מִצְרָיִם וּמִמִּקְנֵה בְנֵי־יִשְׂרָאֵל לֹא־מֵת אֶחָד׃

So Yahweh did this thing on the next day and all the livestock of Egypt died; but from the livestock of the Israelites, not one died.

Lastly, 9% (10/113)[633] of the non-prototypical resumptive/linked elements are governed by a preposition, as in (166):

(166) Lev. 17.10

וְאִישׁ אִישׁ מִבֵּית יִשְׂרָאֵל וּמִן־הַגֵּר הַגָּר בְּתוֹכָם אֲשֶׁר יֹאכַל כָּל־דָּם וְנָתַתִּי פָנַי בַּנֶּפֶשׁ הָאֹכֶלֶת אֶת־הַדָּם וְהִכְרַתִּי אֹתָהּ מִקֶּרֶב עַמָּהּ׃

"Any man from the house of Israel, or from the strangers who sojourn among them, who eats any blood$_i$, I will set my face against that person who eats blood$_i$ and will cut him off from among his people."

5.5.2.2 Grammatical Relations

Consistent with the typological data (§3.4.2.2), resumptive/linked constituents in BH LD constructions satisfy a variety of intra-clausal grammatical relations. They prototypically function as subjects (29%; 76/258)[634] or direct objects (34%; 89/258)[635] of the predicate, as examples (167a) and (167b) illustrate:

633. Cf. Exod. 19.1; Lev. 17.3–4; 17.10; 20.6; Num. 9.17; 35.8; 1 Sam. 20.7; 20.8; 2 Sam. 6.21; 6.22.

634. Cf. Gen. 3.12; 4.4; 4.22; 6.21; 9.6; 15.4; 17.14; 17.17; 19.38; 22.24; 24.7; 34.8; 44.17; 48.7; Exod. 12.15; 12.16; 12.19; 19.18; 26.12; 31.14; 35.29; Lev. 1.2; 2.1; 7.20; 7.21; 7.25; 7.27; 11.33; 15.19; 17.8–9; 18.29; 20.10; 20.12; 20.13; 22.3; 22.4b–6a; Num. 4.46–48; 5.12–15; 5.6; 9.13; 14.36–37; 19.20; 30.4; 30.10; 31.22–23; 34.6; 35.19; 35.33; Deut. 1.30; 1.36; 1.38; 1.39; 3.13; 17.12; 18.20; 21.3; 28.54; 28.56; Josh. 21.40; Judg. 5.3; 7.4; 18.30; 1 Sam. 2.10; 3.11; 14.15; 17.37; 20.8; 2 Sam. 13.32; 13.33; 14.19; 15.30; 1 Kng. 5.19; 6.7; 8.19; 2 King. 25.16.

635. Cf. Gen. 2.17; 3.3; 13.15; 17.15; 21.12; 21.13; 23.11; 24.14; 24.27; 25.10; 26.15; 28.13; 28.22; 30.3; 35.12; 47.21; 49.19; 50.5; Exod. 1.22; 4.21; 4.8–9; 4.11–12; 7.19; 7.30; 9.6; 9.19–20; 12.44; 15.15; 26.1; 32.1; Lev. 3.4; 3.9; 3.14–15; 11.3; 11.9; 11.42; 13.29; 13.45; 14.6; 15.25; 18.9; 18.10; 20.16; 21.14; 22.22; 22.23; 22.28; Num. 4.29; 14.24; 14.31; 17.3; 18.8; 22.20; 22.35; 22.38; 27.8; 30.14; Deut. 2.23; 4.3; 13.1; 14.6; 14.27; 18.14; 18.19; 20.20; 28.61; Josh. 1.3; 11.13 (2x); 13.6; 15.16; Judg. 1.12; 11.24; 1 Sam. 9.20; 13.2; 15.9; 18.17; 2 Sam. 14.10; 22.41; 1 Kng. 9.4; 9.20–21; 13.11; 13.33; 15.13; 17.20; 22.14; 2 Kng. 17.36; 23.15; 23.16.

(167a) Gen. 17.14

וְעָרֵל ׀ זָכָר אֲשֶׁר לֹא־יִמּוֹל אֶת־בְּשַׂר עָרְלָתוֹ וְנִכְרְתָה הַנֶּפֶשׁ הַהִוא מֵעַמֶּיהָ אֶת־בְּרִיתִי הֵפַר׃

"Any uncircumcised male who is not circumcised in the flesh of his foreskin$_i$, that person$_i$ shall be cut off from his people; he has broken my covenant."

(167b) Exod. 1.22

וַיְצַו פַּרְעֹה לְכָל־עַמּוֹ לֵאמֹר כָּל־הַבֵּן הַיִלּוֹד הַיְאֹרָה תַּשְׁלִיכֻהוּ וְכָל־הַבַּת תְּחַיּוּן׃

Then Pharaoh commanded all his people, saying, "Every son who is born$_i$, cast him$_i$ into the Nile, but every daughter you are to keep alive."

In addition, the resumptive/linked constituent may (rarely) operate as a modifying adjunct of some kind. As discussed in §5.4.8.4, only 1% (3/258) of the resumptive/linked constituents occur as temporal adjuncts. Another 3% (8/258)[636] occur as locative adjuncts (168), while a much larger percentage (18%; 46/258) occur with an anaphoric כֵּן functioning as an adjunctive adverb of manner (for examples, see §5.4.5).

(168) Num. 9.17b

וּבִמְקוֹם אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁכָּן־שָׁם הֶעָנָן שָׁם חָנוּ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל׃

"... and in the place where the cloud settled down$_i$, there$_i$ the Israelites camped."

Lastly, 15% (38/258)[637] of the resumptive/linked constituents function as oblique objects, as in (169):

(169) 1 Kng. 12.17

וּבְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל הַיֹּשְׁבִים בְּעָרֵי יְהוּדָה וַיִּמְלֹךְ עֲלֵיהֶם רְחַבְעָם׃

But the Israelites who lived in the cities of Judah$_i$, Rehoboam reigned over them$_i$.

636. Cf. Gen. 25.10; 50.5; Num. 9.17b; Deut. 12.11; 12.14; 16.6; Judg. 5.11; 2 Sam 6.21.

637. Cf. Exod. 9.19; 14.13; Lev. 2.11; 7.7; 7.8; 7.9; 7.33; 13.29; 17.3–4; 17.10; 20.6; 21.3; 22.8; 25.44; 26.36; Num. 5.10; (2x); 5.20; 6.7; 26.33; 33.54; 35.8; Deut. 12.11; 12.14; 16.6; Josh. 17.3; 23.9; 2 Sam. 6.22; 6.23; 21.5–6; 22.3; 1 Kng. 6.32; 12.17; 2 Kng. 1.4; 1.6; 1.16; 10.29; 25.22.

5.6 Summary and Conclusion

The present chapter has demonstrated the utility in applying syntactico-semantic generalizations from cross-linguistic data in developing criteria for the identification and classification of the LD category in BH. An exhaustive application of this typological criteria to the prose corpus of Genesis–2 Kings yielded seven global types of constructional schemas of varying degrees of resemblance to an exemplar constructional schema. Instantiations of these schemas were analyzed and described according to their respective component parts. Following this, a description of the internal syntax of LD in BH was provided. Having established a taxonomic network of LD constructional schemas based on syntactico-semantic attributes, we are now prepared to provide an explanation of LD in terms of its linguistic function in BH discourse.

Chapter 6: A Cognitive-Functional Profile of Left Dislocation in Biblical Hebrew

6.1 Introduction

In correspondence with Croft's third stage of empirical scientific analysis (§3.1), the present chapter aims to explain the syntactico-semantic profile of LD described in chapter 5 in terms of its function in discourse. The functional explanation provided here is informed by the cognitive-functional theoretical framework established in chapter 2, as well as the insights gleaned from contemporary typological research presented in chapter 4. In light of these insights and under the assumption of the "uniformitarian" relation between modern and ancient languages (cf. §3.1), six hypotheses are proposed and evaluated:

1. A central motivating factor influencing a biblical writer's choice to employ LD in discourse pertains to his assumptions concerning the low degree of accessibility (i.e. potential for activation) of a discourse referent(s) in the Cognitive Representation of the addressee.

2. Referents of resumptive/linked constituents within the clause—although typically functioning as topics of the pragmatically structured proposition—may also function in a focal relation to the proposition.

3. Denotatums predominantly persist as salient referents within the subsequent discourse context following their occurrence as dislocated constituents.

4. Since referents that entertain low degrees of accessibility are prototypically highly costly to process, LD is employed to facilitate the cognitive tasks required to both retrieve an entity with a low degree of accessibility and interpret its role in the proposition.

5. Given hypothesis (1., 2., and 4.), the prototypical discourse function of LD in BH is to (re)activate an entity entertaining a low degree of accessibility, irrespective of the referent's pragmatic relation to the proposition.[638]

638. Note that no assumption is made regarding a one-to-one correlation between exemplar structure and exemplar function. In other words, the occurrence of a prototypical form does not necessarily entail a prototypical function, and vice versa.

6. Given hypothesis (5.), the expectations associated with the default accessibility marking of referring expressions, as well as the expectations regarding the prototypical function of LD may be exploited by writers through dislocating entities that entertain a high degree of accessibility. The dislocation of such entities impedes a readers cognitive processing which results in a discontinuity in the flow of discourse. This discontinuity, in turn, prompts a variety of pragmatic implicatures depending on the context.

In §4.2.3.6, we established that common analytical patterns used by researchers to provide an explanation for the function(s) of LD may be classified as one of two types of information: Cognitive-Pragmatic and Discourse-Functional. Cognitive-pragmatic information was described as the cognitive and contextual information (both text-internally and text-externally; cf. §2.2.2) that motivates the use of LD in a stretch of discourse. This information coincides with what Ariel (2008) refers to as the "discourse profile" of a construction— i.e. the extra-grammatical patterns of non-obligatory features that frequently co-occur with a particular form (§4.3). Discourse-Function, on the other hand, pertains to the "higher level generalizations abstracted away from discourse profiles" (Ariel, 2008:58). They are the communicative goal(s) or pragmatic effect(s) achieved by the use of the form in discourse.

Although some researchers have privileged one type of information over the other, others have conflated the two categories, confusing motivation for function (cf. §4.2.2.1). We aim to avoid each of these pitfalls by construing cognitive-pragmatic (discourse profile) and discourse-functional information as distinct, yet equally essential for understanding the function of LD in BH discourse. They are, in a sense, two sides of the same coin. Our study, therefore, aims to systematically evaluate the aforementioned hypotheses by analyzing LD constructions in our data set in relation to specific cognitive-pragmatic parameters. The conclusions reached from this analysis will then be used to motivate an explanation for LD in BH in terms of prototypical and non-prototypical discourse functions.

6.2 Cognitive-Pragmatic Information

We evaluate our first hypothesis by analyzing the data set in relation to two metrics, each of which is designed to yield an accurate assessment of the cognitive status of dislocated referents (§6.2.3). These are: Accessibility Markers (§6.2.1) and Anaphoricity (§6.2.2). Our second hypotheses will then be assessed in §6.2.4, where the referents of resumptive/linked elements will be evaluated according to their pragmatic relation as either topical or focal

elements within the pragmatically structured proposition. Finally, in §6.2.5, we will measure the degree to which dislocated referents persist in the ensuing discourse in order to assess our third hypothesis. The conclusions reached in §6.2 will provide a point of departure for the evaluation of the prototypical and non-prototypical discourse function(s) accomplished by the variety of structural types of LD constructions (cf. chapter 5) evinced in BH discourse (i.e. hypotheses 2–4. above).

6.2.1 Referring Expressions as Accessibility Markers

In §2.3.3, we established that referents entertain certain degrees of cognitive accessibility in the minds of the interlocutors at any given point in the discourse. Subsequently, we introduced three theories of cognitive status in §2.3.4. Each of these theories operate under the general premise that referents's assumed degree of accessibility are reflected in the expressions used to refer to them. Simply put, referential expressions function as cognitive accessibility markers. As a general pattern, the more informative (i.e. the amount of lexical information), rigid (i.e. the addressee's ability to pick out a unique referent based on the form alone), and unattentuated (i.e. phonological size) the expression, the lower the degree of accessibility, and vice versa (cf. §2.3.4.2) (Ariel, 2001:32). Although attempting to delimit a *precise set of discrete cognitive states* that are in a one-to-one relation to particular referring expressions (à la Gundel et al.'s Givenness Hierarchy[639]) inevitably results in inaccuracy, there is heuristic value in distinguishing certain *sphere's of accessibility* along the cline of possible activation states that, in turn, correlate with specific types of expressions. By reformulating the Givenness Hierarchy's discrete states as non-discrete spheres of accessibility,[640] we can utilize Gundel et al.'s entailment scheme while also heeding Ariel's caution that reducing the cognitive accessibility continuum to a few discrete statuses severely compromises the cognitive basis of referential forms (Ariel, 2001:63).

Dislocated constituents in our data set were, therefore, analyzed according to insights yielded by both Ariel's accessibility theory and Gundel et al.'s Givenness Hierarchy in order to assess referent's respective degrees of accessibility.[641] We have adopted the cognitive categories reflected in the Givenness Hierarchy for heuristic purposes, reformulated as non-dis-

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639. Cf. Ariel's (2001) critique of Gundel et al.'s "Givenness Hierarchy" in §2.3.4.3.

640. I.e. *In Focus* > *Activated* > *Familiar* > *Uniquely Identifiable* > *Referential* > *Type Identifiable*. See §2.3.4.3.

641. Due to the deictic nature of temporal expressions, we have excluded Temporal LDs from this analysis (§5.4.7). See §6.3.4.3 for further comment regarding the functional nature of this type of LD.

crete spheres along a continuum.[642] That is to say, although we affirm, along with Ariel, that differences in referring expression, no matter how minute (cf. Ariel's "accessibility marking scale" §2.3.4.2) constitute differences in assumed degrees of accessibility, isolating each referent's particular degree of accessibility is beyond our purview. Rather, we have utilized Gundel et al.'s cognitive categories in order to provide a generalized index of the accessibility status of dislocated entities in our data set. Therefore, it is important to bear in mind that while two different expressions may be categorized as "type identifiable" for example, in actuality, they may signify a more nuanced accessibility distinction that will not be specified here.

Despite the fact that the relation between form and function—with respect to referring expressions and degree of accessibility—is not one-to-one,[643] and often involves a complex array of factors (cf. §2.3.4.2), speaker's assumptions pertaining to a referents degree of accessibility are essential for understanding why one expression is used over another in a particular discourse context. Alternately, and more importantly for our present purposes, by construing referential forms as accessibility markers, differences in the type of referring expression used provide an empirically justifiable means by which to assess the cognitive status of discourse referents. We contend, therefore, that the analysis presented here, coupled with information concerning the degree to which a referent can be said to have a discourse antecedent (cf. §6.2.2) substantiates our first hypothesis—i.e. that referents entertaining a low degree of accessibility constitute the primary motivating factor for the use of LD in BH discourse.

6.2.1.1 Type Identifiable

Recall that the least restrictive accessibility sphere specified by the Givenness Hierarchy describes referent's that are "type identifiable" (§2.3.4.3). Referents occupying this sphere of accessibility are those for which the addressee is only able to access a type of referent described by the expression (Gundel et al., 1993:276). Expressions used to signal this status make up approximately 15% of the dislocates in the data set. They are typically encoded as indefinite

642. Recall that Ariel's accessibility theory makes no attempt at isolating specific cognitive states.

643. Recall, for instance, that assumptions pertaining to referent's degree of accessibility may be exploited in order to evoke specific, contextually bound, pragmatic effects (cf. §2.3.4). The various degrees specified by the Givenness Hierarchy entail all lower degrees so that a default expression used to encode a lower status may be used for a referent entertaining a higher status, i.e. referential over-specification (cf. §2.3.4.3). In cases where this occurs, the mismatch between cognitive status and the type of referring expression used will be highlighted by the analysis provided in §6.2.2 and discussed in §6.2.3.

phrases that connote generic referents.[644] Examples (170), (171), and (172) represent type identifiable tokens from our data set:

(170) Lev. 22.8[645]

נְבֵלָה וּטְרֵפָה$_i$ לֹא יֹאכַל לְטָמְאָה־בָּהּ$_i$ אֲנִי יְהוָה׃

"A corps or an animal carcass torn by wild animals$_i$, he shall not eat, and so make himself unclean by it$_i$; I am Yahweh."

(171) Lev. 21.14

אַלְמָנָה$_i$ וּגְרוּשָׁה$_j$ וַחֲלָלָה זֹנָה$_k$ אֶת־אֵלֶּה$_{kij}$ לֹא יִקָּח כִּי אִם־בְּתוּלָה מֵעַמָּיו יִקַּח אִשָּׁה׃$_i$

"A widow$_i$, or a divorced woman$_j$, or a prostitute$_k$, he shall not marry these$_{ijk}$. But he shall marry a virgin from his own people."

(172) Num. 27.8[646]

וְאֶל־בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל תְּדַבֵּר לֵאמֹר אִישׁ כִּי־יָמוּת וּבֵן אֵין לוֹ וְהַעֲבַרְתֶּם אֶת־נַחֲלָתוֹ לְבִתּוֹ׃

And you shall say to the Israelites, "A man, if he dies and he has no son, then you shall transfer his inheritance to his daughter."

6.2.1.2 Referential

"Referential" expressions are those in which the writer intends to refer to a particular entity or entities. Addressees are expected not only to be able to recall an appropriate type of representation, but are expected to construct a representation of a specific entity intended by the writer (ibid.).[647] Approximately 26% of the dislocates in the data analyzed constitute expressions that reflect a referential status. These expressions typically take the form of long indefi-

644. Cf. Haspelmath (1997:109) who has observed that non-specifics are not necessarily non-referential. Moreover, on the identifiable status of generics, Prince (1992:303) writes, "some indefinite NPs represent Hearer-old entities. This is the case, for example, with generics... That is, if a speaker thinks the hearer knows the meaning of some noun, a minimal condition on its normal felicitous use, and if that noun denotes an entity type, then the speaker must assume that the hearer already knows that there is a class of such entity-types; therefore, generics are Hearer-old [i.e. identifiable, JRW]" (cf. §2.3.2–§2.3.3).

645. Cf. Lev. 21.14; 22.8; 22.22; Num. 5.10 (2x); 15.20.

646. It is likely that generic human referents encoded by indefinite pronouns like the one in (176), in fact, occur much higher on the hierarchy due to their inherent saliency in any discourse model. Cf. Exod. 26.1; Lev. 1.2; 2.1; 4.2; 5.1; 5.4; 5.15; 5.17; 5.21; 7.21; 12.2; 13.2; 13.18; 13.24–25; 13.29; 15.8; 15.16; 15.19; 15.25; 19.20; 20.27; 22.11; 22.12; 22.13; 22.14; 22.21; 22.27; Num. 5.6; 5.12–15; 6.2; 9.10; 27.8; 30.3; 30.4; 1 Kng. 8.37. Cf. §6.3.4.1.

647. "...[E]xpressions which are referential but not uniquely identifiable require the addressee to construct a new representation as determined by the content of referential expression.." (Gundel et al., 1993:277).

nite phrases (+modifiers) that connote specific entities or sets of entities (i.e. so-called Specific Indefinites). Examples (173) and (174) are illustrative of this category in our data set:[648]

(173) Judg. 1.12[649]

וַיֹּאמֶר כָּלֵב אֲשֶׁר־יַכֶּה אֶת־קִרְיַת־סֵפֶר וּלְכָדָהּ$_i$ וְנָתַתִּי לוֹ$_i$ אֶת־עַכְסָה בִתִּי לְאִשָּׁה׃

And Caleb said, "The one who attacks Kiriath-sepher and captures it$_i$, I will give him$_i$ my daughter Achsah for a wife."

(174) Deut. 14.6[650]

וְכָל־בְּהֵמָה מַפְרֶסֶת פַּרְסָה וְשֹׁסַעַת שֶׁסַע שְׁתֵּי פְרָסוֹת מַעֲלַת גֵּרָה בַּבְּהֵמָה$_i$ אֹתָהּ$_i$ תֹּאכֵלוּ׃

"Any animal having a split hoof and has a hoof cloven in two and chews the cud$_i$, you may eat it$_i$."

6.2.1.3 Uniquely Identifiable

Approximately 51% of the dislocates in our data set constitute expressions that mark a referent as "uniquely identifiable". In other words, the addressee is expected to be able to identify and retrieve a specific referent solely on the basis of the information encoded in the referring expression (ibid.:277). Moreover, expressions marking uniquely identifiable referents are necessarily definite and reflect the prototypical use of the BH definite article. Uniquely identifiable dislocates typically occur as proper names/eipthets+modifier, as in (175), or long/short definite descriptions+modifier, as in (176) and (177):

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648. It is worth reiterating Ariel's observation concerning Gundel et al.'s lack of firm criteria for distinguishing between expressions that represent referential versus uniquely identifiable status. The formal distinction, for our purposes, is one of definiteness. That is to say, with the exception of certain definite generics (cf. Bekins, 2013), we use definiteness as a grammatical means by which to distinguish "uniquely identifiable" from "referential" status.

649. Cf. Gen. 9.6; 15.4; 17.14; 44.9; Exod. 9.21; 12.16; 30.33; 30.38; Lev. 17.3–4; 17.8-9; 17.10; 20.10; 20.12; 20.13; 20.16; 22.23; 25.32; 25.33; Num. 15.14; 9.13; 19.20; 23.3; 30.10; 32.31; 33.54; 35.30; 36.10; Deut. 20.20; Josh. 15.16; Judg. 1.7; 7.4; Josh. 14.5; 1 Sam. 11.7; 20.4; 2 Sam. 16.19.

650. Cf. Gen. 6.22; Exod. 12.15; 12.19; 12.44; 25.9; 35.29; 39.32; 39.42; 39.43; 40.16; Lev. 2.11; 7.25; 7.27; 11.3; 11.9; 11.33; 11.42; 18.29; 22.3; Num. 8.20; 30.14; Deut. 14.6; 28.61; Josh. 1.3; 1.17; Judg. 19.30; 1 Sam. 2.13; 2 Kng. 16.11.

(176) 2 Sam. 6.23[651]

וּלְמִיכַל בַּת־שָׁאוּל$_i$ לֹא־הָיָה לָהּ$_i$ יֶלֶד עַד יוֹם מוֹתָהּ׃

And Michael the daughter of Saul$_i$, she$_i$ had no child until the day of her death.

(177) Exod. 15.15[652]

אָז נִבְהֲלוּ אַלּוּפֵי אֱדוֹם אֵילֵי מוֹאָב$_i$ יֹאחֲזֵמוֹ$_i$ רָעַד נָמֹגוּ כֹּל יֹשְׁבֵי כְנָעַן׃

Then, the chiefs of Edom were horrified. The leaders of Moab$_i$, trembling seizes them$_i$. All of the inhabitants of Canaan have melted away.

(177) Num. 14.31[653]

וְטַפְּכֶם אֲשֶׁר אֲמַרְתֶּם לָבַז יִהְיֶה$_i$ וְהֵבֵיאתִי אֹתָם$_i$ וְיָדְעוּ אֶת־הָאָרֶץ אֲשֶׁר מְאַסְתֶּם בָּהּ׃

"But your little ones, who you said would become prey$_i$, I will bring them$_i$, and they will know the land that you rejected."

6.2.1.4 Familiar

According to Gundel et al. (ibid.:278), familiar referents are those that the addressee is assumed to already have a representation of in long-term (i.e. if the referent hasn't been mentioned recently) or short-term memory. Expressions prototypically used to connote familiar referents are typically modified by the distal demonstrative (i.e. הַהוּא, הַהִיא), or occur as proper names or epithets.[654] Although no dislocates in our data set are modified by the distal

651. Cf. Judg. 18.30; Josh. 17.3; 1 Sam. 2.10; 2 Sam. 14.19; 24.3; 1 Kng. 15.13; 17.36.

652. Cf. Gen. 21.13; 22.24; 47.21; 49.19; Exod. 15.15; 19.18; Lev. 3.9; 7.30; 14.6; Num. 4.29; 26.33; 35.19; 35.33; Deut. 1.36; 3.13.

653. An accessibility distinction can also be made, however, based on the semantics of the modifiers (relative clauses) of definite expressions, viz. between non-restrictive and restrictive relative clauses. Expressions modified by restrictive relatives are marked as less accessible than those marked by non-restrictive relatives. For uniquely identifiable dislocates with restrictive relatives, cf. Gen. 3.3; 13.15; 21.12; 23.11; 24.7; 24.14; 26.15; 28.13; 28.22; 31.14; 35.12; 44.17; 50.5; Exod. 4.9; 9.6; 9.19; 31.14; Lev. 7.7; 7.8; 7.9; 7.20; 13.45; 20.6; 21.3; 22.4b–6a; 25.44; Num. 3.46–47; 4.46–48; 8.4; 9.5; 14.36-37; 17.3; 22.11; 22.20; 22.35; 22.38; Deut. 2.3; 4.3; 7.19; 13.1; 14.27; 17.12; 18.19; 18.20; 28.54; 28.56; Josh. 11.13; 21.40; Judg. 11.24b; 11.31; 1 Sam. 9.20; 14.19; 15.9; 2 Sam. 2.23; 6.21; 6.22; 15.20; 21.5–6; 1 Kng. 8.41; 9.20; 12.17; 7.20; 2 Kng. 1.4; 1.6; 1.16; 11.5–6; 23.15; 25.16; 25.22. For those with non-restrictive relatives, cf. Gen. 3.12; Num. 14.31; Deut. 1.30; 1.38; 1.39; 1 Sam. 17.37; 1 Kng. 5.19; 8.19; 2 Kng. 10.29.

654. Cf. Runge (2007:33) who has applied Gundel et al.'s Givenness Hierarchy to BH and Koine Greek, demonstrating the prototypical expressions in each of these languages that reflect the particular cognitive status specified by each level of the entailment scheme.

demonstrative,[655] two tokens occur with dislocated proper names (178; 179) and one occurs with a dislocated epithet (183):[656]

(178) Gen. 4.4

וְהֶ֫בֶל$_i$ הֵבִ֥יא גַם־הֽוּא$_i$ מִבְּכֹרוֹת צֹאנ֖וֹ וּמֵחֶלְבֵהֶ֑ן וַיִּ֤שַׁע יְהוָה֙ אֶל־הֶ֔בֶל וְאֶל־מִנְחָתֽוֹ׃

And Abel$_i$, he$_i$ also brought of the firstborn of his flock and of their fat portions. And Yawheh had regard for Abel and his offering.

(179) Gen. 19.38

וְהַצְּעִירָ֖ה$_i$ גַם־הִ֣וא$_i$ יָ֭לְדָה בֵּ֣ן וַתִּקְרָ֣א שְׁמ֔וֹ בֶּן־עַמִּ֑י הֽוּא־אֲבִ֖י בְנֵ֣י־עַמּ֔וֹן עַד־הַיּֽוֹם׃

And the younger$_i$, she$_i$ also bore a son and called his name Ben-ammi. He is the father of the Ammonites to this day.

(180) Gen. 4.22

וְצִלָּ֖ה$_i$ גַם־הִ֣וא$_i$ יָ֭לְדָה אֶת־תּ֣וּבַל קַ֑יִן לֹטֵ֥שׁ כָּל־חֹרֵ֖שׁ נְחֹ֣שֶׁת וּבַרְזֶ֑ל וַאֲחֹ֥ת תּוּבַל־קַ֖יִן נַעֲמָֽה׃

And Zillah$_i$, she$_i$ also bore Tubal-cain; he was the forger of all kinds of tools made of bronze and iron, and the sister of Tubal-cain was Naamah.

6.2.1.5 Activated

"Activated" referents are those that are assumed to be represented in the addressee's current short term memory (ibid.). Expressions prototypically used to connote referents occupying this accessibility sphere include: independent personal pronouns (181) and proximal demonstratives (182). Only 4% of the dislocates analyzed reflect expressions denoting activated referents.

655. Cf. Ariel's criticism regarding the difficulty inherent in distinguishing between uniquely identifiable and familiar status on the basis of the form of the referring expression alone (Ariel, 2001:64).

656. Note that in each of these examples the focus particle גַם occurs before the proper noun. Each token occurs in a context in which the LD signals a topic shift (cf. §6.3.1.1 below). Placing גַם before the dislocate, however, would have obscured this function.

(181) Deut. 18.14[657]

כִּי ׀ הַגּוֹיִם הָאֵלֶּה אֲשֶׁר אַתָּה יוֹרֵשׁ אוֹתָם אֶל־מְעֹנְנִים וְאֶל־קֹסְמִים יִשְׁמָעוּ וְאַתָּה$_i$ לֹא כֵן נָתַן לְךָ$_i$ יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ׃

"For these nations which you are about to dispossess listen to those who practice witchcraft and diviners, but as for you$_i$, Yahweh your God has not allowed you$_i$ to do this."

(182) 2 Sam. 24.17[658]

וַיֹּאמֶר דָּוִד אֶל־יְהוָה בִּרְאֹתוֹ ׀ אֶת־הַמַּלְאָךְ ׀ הַמַּכֶּה בָּעָם וַיֹּאמֶר הִנֵּה אָנֹכִי חָטָאתִי וְאָנֹכִי הֶעֱוֵיתִי וְאֵלֶּה הַצֹּאן מֶה עָשׂוּ תְּהִי נָא יָדְךָ בִּי וּבְבֵית אָבִי׃

Then David spoke to Yahweh when he saw the angel who was striking the people, and he said, "Look, I have sinned and I have done wrong, but these sheep$_i$ what did they$_i$ do? Please let your hand be against me and against my father's house."

6.2.1.6 In Focus

Finally, referents which are assumed to be "in focus", or the "current center of attention" in the mind of the addressee occupy the highest and most restrictive accessibility sphere (ibid.:279). These referents are typically encoded as zero or clitic pronominals in BH.

If our first hypothesis is correct—that dislocates in BH typically encode referents entertaining low accessibility—then we would expect the number of dislocates marking this cognitive status in our data set to be extremely low, if not zero; and indeed this is the case. In the data analyzed, there were no dislocates encoded with expressions encoding referents that are in focus.

Applying Gundel et al.'s Givenness Hierarchy and Ariel's Accessibility Marking Scale to our data set[659] provides a first step in evaluating our initial hypothesis. This analysis reveals that an overwhelming majority of dislocates (approximately 92%) constitute expressions that prototypically signal referents entertaining a relatively low degree of accessibility, registering no higher on the Givenness Hierarchy than uniquely identifiable (referential > type identifi-

657. Cf. Gen. 6.21; 24.27; 48.7; Num. 5.20; 18.8; 18.14; Josh. 23.9; Judg. 5.3; 2 Sam. 13.13.

658. Cf. Exod. 32.1; 1 Sam. 25.27. Note that the dislocates in these two examples involve a proximal demonstrative+modifier, unlike the simple proximal demonstrative+NP in (186). According to Ariel's accessibility marking scale, proximal demonstrative+modifer expressions entertain a lower accessibility rating than proximal demonstrative+NP expressions. It is possible that, unlike the dislocate in 2 Sam. 24.17, those in Exod. 32.1 and 1 Sam. 25.27 should be categorized as familiar or uniquely identifiable rather than activated.

659. Note that we exclude temporal expressions in this accessibility analysis.

able). Moreover, these expressions are typically highly informative, rigid and unattenuated, thus also correlating with phrasal types low on Ariel's accessibility marking scale.

Although it serves as a valuable starting point, attempting to measure the degree of accessibility on the basis of the referential expression alone is problematic. This is because, as noted above, the form-function correlation between expression type (form) and cognitive status (function) is not always one-to-one. In other words, the interface between referential form and cognitive status creates an entailment scheme whereby referents of a higher degree of accessibility may be (over-)encoded by an expression prototypically reserved for referents entertaining a lower accessibility status (e.g. to ellicit specific pragmatic implicatures, cf. §6.3.3). Therefore, we must apply an additional cognitive-pragmatic measure, apart from the evaluation of the form of expression, which will provide further clarity as to the actual accessibility status of the referent at the time of use.

6.2.2 Anaphoricity

We follow Gregory and Michaelis (2001:1687) in our use of the term "anaphoricity" to refer to an index of the degree to which a referent can be said to have an antecedent (Gregory and Michaelis, 2001:1687).[660] As we saw in §6.2.1, the form of the referring expressions represents the *output* of assumptions pertaining to the cognitive-status of a referent in the mind of the addressee. By comparison, assessing the anaphoricity of dislocated referents yields *input* information pertaining to the source of identifiability/accessibility of a given referent in a particular context.

We assessed dislocated referents according to three potential identifiability/accessibility sources: textual, inferential, and situational (cf. §2.3.3). Besides providing an additional metric by which to establish a referent's degree of accessibility, instances where there exists a mismatch between the expected accessibility status and the expected referential form are thrown into relief when a referent's source of accessibility is accounted for.

We apply the label of anaphoricity to an attribute with three possible values: 0–2. Tokens with dislocates whose referents possess a lexico-grammatically expressed antecedent in the preceding discourse (i.e. textually accessible) were given an anaphoricity score of 2. Tokens with dislocates whose referents were in some way inferable—either by a semantic frame/schema or membership in a poset relation, or general world knowledge—were given a

660. Gregory and Michaelis use the term "anaphoricity" in a more narrow sense to refer to only those entities that have an antecedent explicitly mentioned in the previous discourse. In this study, however, the term is used in a broader sense following Birner and Ward (1998), to include inferential antecedents and referents with exophoric antecedents.

score of 1. Finally, those dislocates with referents that were construed as accessible by way of their presence in the text-external context (i.e. situationally accessible) were given a score of 0.

6.2.2.1 Textual

Approximately 25% of the dislocates analyzed involve textually accessible referents. Virtually all of these are encoded by expressions that register as uniquely identifiable or higher on the Givenness Hierarchy. Therefore, we would expect that textually accessible referents will generally have a relatively higher degree of accessibility; and indeed this is the case. Nearly 80% of textually accessible dislocates have a lexico-gramatically expressed antecedent that occurs within a span of 15 clauses prior to its use, as in (183) and (184) below:

(183) Gen. 3.12[661]

וַיֹּאמֶר הָאָדָם הָאִשָּׁה אֲשֶׁר נָתַתָּה עִמָּדִי$_i$ הִוא$_i$ נָתְנָה־לִּי מִן־הָעֵץ וָאֹכֵל׃

The man said, "The woman who you gave to be with me$_i$, she$_i$ gave me from the tree and I ate."

(184) Exod. 9.6

וַיַּעַשׂ יְהוָה אֶת־הַדָּבָר הַזֶּה מִמָּחֳרָת וַיָּמָת כָּל מִקְנֵה מִצְרָיִם וּמִמִּקְנֵה בְנֵי־יִשְׂרָאֵל$_i$ לֹא־מֵת אֶחָד$_i$׃

So Yahweh did this thing on the next day and all the livestock of Egypt died; but from the livestock of the Israelites, not one died.

A remaining 20%, however, exhibited antecedents at a greater distance from the dislocate—often separated by one or multiple discourse boundaries (e.g. chapter breaks, paragraph breaks, or even different books)—and as a result, entertain a low degree of accessibility. The antecedent of the dislocated referent in 1 Sam. 9.20 (185), for example, is first mentioned in v.3 with its final mention before the dislocate occurring in v.5:

661. Cf. Gen. 4.4; 4.12; 6.21; 13.15; 17.17; 19.38; 21.13; 23.11; 34.8; 47.21; 48.7; Exod. 1.12; 4.9; 19.18; 32.1; 35.29; Lev. 7.19; 13.45; 22.8; Num. 17.3; 22.38; Deut. 1.30; Josh. 1.3; 21.40; 1 Sam. 14.19; 14.24; 17.37; 20.8; 2 Sam. 6.21; 6.22; 6.23; 14.19; 21.5-6; 24.3; 24.17; 1 Kng. 6.7; 15.13; 17.36; 2 Kng. 22.18; 24.16; 25.16.

(185) 1 Sam. 9.20[662]

וְלָאֲתֹנֹת הָאֹבְדוֹת לְךָ הַיּוֹם שְׁלֹשֶׁת הַיָּמִים אַל־תָּשֶׂם אֶת־לִבְּךָ לָהֶם כִּי נִמְצְאוּ וּלְמִי כָּל־חֶמְדַּת יִשְׂרָאֵל הֲלוֹא לְךָ וּלְכֹל בֵּית אָבִיךָ׃

"As for your donkeys that were lost three days ago$_i$, give no further thought to them$_i$ because they have been found. And who does all Israel desire but you and all your father's family."

There is a span of fifteen verses, or approximately 60 clauses, between the antecedent and anaphor. Recall that activated referents that are not maintained (i.e. by reuse) quickly decay in activation status (cf. §2.3.3). It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that, with tokens like this, the distance between anaphor and antecedent indicates a low degree of accessibility. Likewise, an antecedent may occur in a subsequent chapter, as in (190), where the dislocated referent first occurs in Gen. 21.30:

(186) Gen. 26.15[663]

וְכָל־הַבְּאֵרֹת אֲשֶׁר חָפְרוּ עַבְדֵי אָבִיו בִּימֵי אַבְרָהָם אָבִיו סִתְּמוּם פְּלִשְׁתִּים וַיְמַלְאוּם עָפָר׃

Now all the wells that his father's servants had dug in the days of Abraham his father$_i$, the Philistines stopped them$_i$ up and filled them with dirt.

Finally, we would be remiss not to make mention of tokens in which the dislocated referent occurs in relative close proximity to its antecedent, but nevertheless entertains a low degree of accessibility due to other discourse factors. Recall that in §2.3.4.2, we discussed Ariel's argument that in addition to the textual proximity between anaphor and antecedent, the discourse role, or saliency of a referent may also be a determining factor influencing its accessibility status (Ariel, 2001:31). We contend that this is precisely the case with tokens such as (187) below:

662. Cf. Gen. 2.17; 3.3; 17.15; 26.15; 30.3; Num. 14.24; 14.36-37; 14.31; 22.35; Deut. 1.39; 14.27; 1 Sam. 9.20; 15.30; 18.17; 1 Kng. 5.19; 17.20; 2 Kng. 23.15.

663. Cf. Deut. 1.39 (antecedent mentioned in Num. 14.3; 14.31); 1 Kng. 5.19 (antecedent mentioned in 2 Sam. 7.13); 2 Kng 23.15 (antecedent mentioned in 1 Kng. 13.4).

(187) 1 Sam. 17.24[664]

וְכֹל֙ אִ֣ישׁ יִשְׂרָאֵ֔ל$_i$ בִּרְאוֹתָ֖ם אֶת־הָאִ֑ישׁ$_j$ וַיָּנֻ֣סוּ מִפָּנָ֔יו$_j$ וַיִּירְא֖וּ מְאֹֽד׃

And all the men of Israel$_i$, when they saw the man$_j$, they$_i$ fled from him$_j$ and they were very afraid.

The dislocated referent in v.24 is relatively close to its antecedent in v.19. Nevertheless, the referent has occupied an immaterial role in the discourse up to v.24. That is to say, it lacks saliency in its relation to the broader discourse context, and, therefore, is assumed by the writer to entertain a low degree of accessibility, thus motivating the use of an LD construction in v.24. We will have more to say with respect to the discourse-function of these types of LDs below (6.3). Here, we primarily want to highlight the fact that close proximity between anaphor and antecedent does not always result in high accessibility.

6.2.2.2 Inferential

In §2.3.3, we discussed various ways that researchers have attempted to explain the source of the assumed identifiability/accessibility of referents that have neither been mentioned in the subsequent discourse context (i.e. textually accessible), nor are contextually available via the text-external context (i.e. situationally accessible). It was determined that a writer may assume a referent is identifiable/accessible[665] in the mind of the reader by virtue of the reader's capacity to infer the referent based on: 1) its relation to other entities in the discourse, or a phrase within the constituent itself or, 2) from general knowledge pertaining to the universe of discourse (i.e. knowledge pertaining to the natural, social, and cultural universe) shared by the writer and addressees. With respect to the former, referents may be inferred by virtue of their membership in a so-called "partially ordered set relation" (i.e. poset relation, cf. §2.3.3), their relation to a particular semantic frame/schema (à la Fillmore (1982) or Chafe (1987, 1994), cf. §2.3.2–§2.3.3), or by virtue of being anchored to another accessible entity in the discourse (cf. §2.3.4.1). Concerning the later, some referents in BH narrative (e.g. Moses, Abraham, Sun, Moon, etc.) are assumed to be identifiable/accessible (inactive) due to their assumed inherent saliency in the long-term memory of the reader.[666]

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664. Cf. 2 Sam. 6.22.

665. Referents assumed to be inferentially evoked presumably require the addressee to accomplish two cognitive pragmatic tasks: 1) that of identifying, or creating, a representation of an entity, and 2) accessing that representation.

666. It is important to keep in mind that ancient BH narratives recount the lives of famous and infamous men and women of Israel's past, in addition to famous locations and artifacts of Israel's heritage. These figures,

Approximately 73% of the referents analyzed were found to be inferential and, therefore, only remotely accessible. The relative low degree of accessibility entertained by inferential dislocates is corroborated by the fact that all of the expressions encoding inferential referents registered as uniquely identifiable or below on the Givenness Hierarchy.[667]

A majority of inferential referents (72%) are accessible by virtue of their relationship to other members in a poset relation. In §2.3.3, we discussed Birner and Ward's (2002:122) observation that contextually licensed posets are typically one of three value types: lower, alternate, and higher. Lower value poset relations are those in which the referent is accessible by virtue its component relation ("is-a-part-of") to an already activated set.[668] The LD in Josh. 11.13 (188) illustrates this type of poset:

(188) Josh. 11.13[669]

רַק כָּל־הֶעָרִים הָעֹמְדוֹת עַל־תִּלָּם׀ לֹא שְׂרָפָם׀ יִשְׂרָאֵל זוּלָתֵי אֶת־חָצוֹר לְבַדָּהּ שָׂרַף יְהוֹשֻׁעַ׃

All of the cities standing on their mounds$_i$, Israel did not burn any of them$_i$ except Hazor alone which Joshua burned.

The dislocate כָּל־הֶעָרִים הָעֹמְדוֹת עַל־תִּלָּם / "all of the cities that stood on their mounds" is in a lower value relation to the set וְאֶת־כָּל־עָרֵי הַמְּלָכִים־הָאֵלֶּה / "all of the cities of those kings" (v.12). Although the dislocate in v.13 has not been mentioned before, it nevertheless possess a potential for activation by virtue of being a subset of a previously activated set.

An additional example occurs in Deut. 21.3 (189) in which the dislocate once again occurs in a lower value relation to a previously activated set.

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places and artifacts are often assumed by the writers to be identifiable due to the universe of discourse shared by the writer and reader, or that there existed only one notable referent which could be denoted by these NPs, e.g. Abraham, Moses, David etc. The reader is assumed to know these unique referents and therefore they need not be introduced every time they appear in a new story. Rather, they are considered inactive referents stored in the long-term memory of the reader (cf. Heimerdinger 1999:133–134).

667. 20% = Type Identifiable; Referential = 33%; Uniquely Identifiable = 47%.

668. As was noted in §2.3.3, contextually licensed posets include part/whole, entity/attribute, type/subtype, set/subset, as well as equality relations (Birner and Ward, 2001:122).

669. Cf. Gen. 24.14; 44.9; Exod. 9.19; 12.15; 12.16; 12.19; 26.12; 30.33; 30.38; 31.14; Lev. 2.11; 3.9; 7.25; 7.27; 7.30; 7.33; 9.19–20; 11.3; 11.9; 11.33; 11.42; 20.6; 20.16; 22.3; 22.22; 25.33; 26.36; Num. 4.29; 14.24; 19.20; 22.20; 30.14; 31.22-23; 35.8; Deut. 1.36; 1.39; 17.12; 18.19; 21.3; 28.54; Josh. 11.13; 15.16; Judg. 7,4; 11.24a; 1 Sam. 2.13; 11.7; 11.11; 14.15; 2 Sam. 14.10; 1 Kng. 6.32; 9.20-21; 13.33; 2 Kng. 11.5–6; 25.22.

(189) Deut. 21.3

וְהָיָה הָעִיר הַקְּרֹבָה אֶל־הֶחָלָל$_i$ וְלָקְחוּ זִקְנֵי֙ הָעִ֣יר הַהִ֔וא$_i$ עֶגְלַ֥ת בָּקָ֖ר אֲשֶׁ֣ר לֹא־עֻבַ֑ד
בָּ֣הּ אֲשֶׁ֥ר לֹא־מָשְׁכָ֖ה בְּעֹֽל׃

"And the city that is nearest to the slain man$_i$, the elders of that city$_i$ shall take a heifer that has never been worked and has never worn a yoke."

Like with (188) above, the referent denoted by the dislocated constituent הָעִיר הַקְּרֹבָה אֶל־הֶחָלָל / "the city nearest to the slain man" in (189) is inferentially accessible by way of the activated set הֶעָרִים אֲשֶׁר סְבִיבֹת הֶחָלָל / "the cities surrounding the slain man" in (v.2). The lower value relation derives from the fact that the dislocated referent stands in a part-whole relation to the aforementioned set.[670]

Our data set also contains dislocates that are accessible by virtue of an alternate value relation to another entity of equal status in a previously activated set. Take for example the dislocate in Deut. 2.23 in (190):

(190) Deut. 2.23

וְהָעַוִּ֗ים הַיֹּשְׁבִ֥ים בַּחֲצֵרִ֖ים עַד־עַזָּ֑ה$_i$ כַּפְתֹּרִ֗ים הַיֹּצְאִ֛ים מִכַּפְתֹּ֥ור הִשְׁמִידֻ֖ם$_i$ וַיֵּשְׁבוּ֙ תַּחְתָּֽם׃

As for the Avvim, who lived in villages as far as Gaza$_i$, the Caphtorim, who came from Caphtor destroyed them$_i$ and settled in their place.

Although the dislocated referent הָעַוִּים הַיֹּשְׁבִים בַּחֲצֵרִים עַד־עַזָּה / "the Avvim who were living in the villages as far as Gaza" in v.23 is a component member of the set "peoples disposed by foreign incursions" (cf. Khan, 1988:81), it is not inferable by virtue of its lower value relation to this poset, but rather by its relation to previously activated alternate members of the same set, viz. רְפָאִים / "Repharim" (v.20) and הַחֹרִי / "Horites" (v.22).

Likwise, in 1 Sam. 13.2 (191) the dislocate וְיֶתֶר הָעָם / "the rest of the people" is inferentially accessible by virtue of its relation to two previously mentioned members of the set "three thousand men chosen by Saul" (v.2a):

670. In §2.3.4.1, we introduced a special sub-class of lower value relations which Prince (1981b) refers to as "Containing Inferables" where the entity triggering the inference is referred to within the referring expression itself. The following dislocated referents could arguablly be classified as containing inferables: Gen. 21.12; Lev. 17.3–4; 17.8–9; 17.10; 20.10; 20.12; 20.13; Num. 35.30; 1 Sam. 20.4; 3.11.

(191) 1 Sam.. 13.2[671]

וַיִּבְחַר־לוֹ שָׁאוּל שְׁלֹשֶׁת אֲלָפִים מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל וַיִּהְיוּ עִם־שָׁאוּל אַלְפַּיִם בְּמִכְמָשׂ וּבְהַר בֵּית־אֵל וְאֶלֶף הָיוּ עִם־יְוֹנָתָן בְּגִבְעַת בִּנְיָמִין וְיֶתֶר הָעָם שִׁלַּח אִישׁ לְאָהָלָיו׃

Saul chose three thousand men of Israel. Two thousand were with Saul in Michmash and the hill country of Bethel, and a thousand were with Jonathan in Gibeah of Benjamin. And the rest of the people$_i$, he sent away each man$_i$ to his tent.

The dislocated referent is in an alternate value relation with the two thousand who were with Saul at Michmash (v.2b) and with the thousand who were with Jonathan at Gibeah of Benjamin (v.2c).

Lastly, dislocated referents may be accessible by virtue of a higher value relation to a previously activated set. In these tokens, the dislocated referent represents a superset of a members in a poset relation. For example, in Deut. 14.6 (192):

(192) Deut. 14.6[672]

וְכָל־בְּהֵמָה מַפְרֶסֶת פַּרְסָה וְשֹׁסַעַת שֶׁסַע שְׁתֵּי פְרָסוֹת מַעֲלַת גֵּרָה בַּבְּהֵמָה אֹתָהּ תֹּאכֵלוּ׃

"Any animal having a split hoof and a hoof cloven in two and chews the cud$_i$, you may eat it$_i$."

The informative dislocate represents a superset of members included in the set "animals permissible for consumption" (v.4). The list of animals in vv.4b–5 represent specific members of this poset. Due to their mention before the dislocate as well as common world knowledge regarding their shared physical attributes, these members provide an inferential trigger for the accessibility of the dislocated referent. The higher value relation derives from the broad referential scope of the dislocate. It includes the list of animals in vv.4b–5, but is not limited to this list.

671. Cf. Gen. 15.4; 17.14; 22.24; 44.17; 49.19; Exod. 9.21; 12.44; 15.15; Lev. 4.11–12; 5.1; 5.4; 5.17; 7.7; 7.8; 7.20; 7.21; 13.24–25; 14.6; 15.19; 15.25; 18.9; 18.10; 21.3; 21.14; 22:4–6; 22.8; 22.11; 22.21; 22.23; 25.32; 25.44; Num. 9.13; 30.4; 30.10; 34.6; Deut. 1.38; 2.23; 18.20; 20.20; 28.56; 28.61; Judg. 11.24; 1 Sam. 13.2; 15.9; 1 Kng. 12.17; 22.14; 2 Kng. 10.29; 11.7; 13.19.

672. Cf. Gen. 9.6; Exod. 7.6; 12.28; 12.50; 25.9; 27.8; 39.32; 39.42; 39.43; 40.16; Lev. 17.26; 18.29; Num. 2.34; 4.46–48; 8.4; 8.22; 9.5; 9.14; 33.54; 36.10; 4.46–48; 8.4; 8.20; 8.22; 9.5; 9.14; 17.26; 33.54; 36.10; Deut. 13.1; 14.6; Josh. 13.6; 2 Sam. 7.17; 9.11; 1 Kng. 2.38; 2 Kng. 16.11.

Many of the dislocates in our data set that are in a higher value relation involve LDs with anaphoric כֵּן (cf. §5.4.5). Take for examnple (193):

(193) Num. 9.5[673]

וַיַּעֲשׂוּ אֶת־הַפֶּסַח בָּרִאשׁוֹן בְּאַרְבָּעָה עָשָׂר יוֹם לַחֹדֶשׁ בֵּין הָעַרְבַּיִם בְּמִדְבַּר סִינָי ׀ כְּכֹל
אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה יְהוָה אֶת־מֹשֶׁה כֵּן ׀ עָשׂוּ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל׃

And they kept the Passover in the first month, on the fourteenth day of the month, at twilight, in the wilderness of Sinai; according to all that Yahweh commanded Moses$_i$, so$_i$ the people of Israel did.

The dislocate represents a superset of the particular instructions imparted to Moses by Yahweh concerning the observance of the passover in vv.2–3.

In addition to inferential referents that are made accessible via poset relations are those that are identifiable and have achieved a potential for activation by way of a conceptual frame/schema. In §2.3.2 we noted that conceptual frames may be narrow or broad. Narrow frames are restricted to the particular text-internal world of the interlocutors. In other words, the frame is evoked within the discourse. An example of a dislocated referent made accessible by a narrow conceptual frame is found in Num. 35.33 (194):

(194) Num. 35.33[674]

וְלֹא־תַחֲנִיפוּ אֶת־הָאָרֶץ אֲשֶׁר אַתֶּם בָּהּ כִּי הַדָּם ׀ הוּא ׀ יַחֲנִיף אֶת־הָאָרֶץ וְלָאָרֶץ
לֹא־יְכֻפַּר לַדָּם אֲשֶׁר שֻׁפַךְ־בָּהּ כִּי־אִם בְּדַם שֹׁפְכֹו׃

"So you shall not pollute the land in which you live, for the blood$_i$, it$_i$ pollutes the land and no atonement can be made for the land for the blood that is shed on it, except by the blood of him who shed it."

The subordinate כִּי clause in (194) possesses the dislocated constituent הַדָּם / "the blood" which is accessible by way an inference through the conceptual schema "murder" evoked in v.30.[675]

673. Cf. Exod. 7.6; 12.28; 12.50; 25.9; 27.8; 39.32; 39.42; 39.43; 40.16; Lev. 18.29; Num. 2.34; 8.4; 8.22; 9.5; 9.14; 17.26; 33.54; 36.10; 2 Sam. 7.17; 9.11 1 Kng. 2.38; 2 Kng. 16.11.

674. Cf. Gen. 28.13; Num. 21.8; 23.3; 35.29; 35.30; Deut. 7.19; Judg. 1.12; 2 Kng. 1.4; 1.6. 1.16.

675. Croft and Cruse (2004:17) note that the term "script" is often used for a frame/schema with a sequence of events (cf. Schank and Abelson, 1977). They use the term to describe a canonical sequence of events

Another type of narrow semantic frame involves referents made identifiable/accessible by virtue of a so-called 'anchoring' relation. An anchoring relation occurs when a complex NP representing an otherwise unidentifiable referent is linked, by way of an additional expression contained within it, to another identifiable/accessible referent (Prince, 1981b:236). As a result of this linking, the otherwise unidentifiable referent is made identifiable by a kind of "pragmatic boot-strapping" (cf. Lambrecht, 1994:92). See for example, Num. 26.33 (195):

(195) Num. 26.33[676]

וּצְלָפְחָד בֶּן־חֵפֶר$_i$ לֹא־הָיוּ לוֹ$_i$ בָּנִים כִּי אִם־בָּנוֹת וְשֵׁם בְּנוֹת צְלָפְחָד מַחְלָה וְנֹעָה חָגְלָה מִלְכָּה וְתִרְצָה׃

Now Zelophehad the son of Hepher$_i$, he$_i$ had no sons, but daughters. And the names of the daughters of Zelophehad were Mahlah, Noah, Hoglah, Milcah, and Tirzah.

The LD construction in v.33 represents the first instance of the proper name וּצְלָפְחָד / "Zelophehad" in the Hebrew Bible and is therefore presumably unidentifiable to the reader. With unidentifiable (brand-new) entities, the writer must first introduce the referent into the discourse model. This is typically accomplished with a presentational construction (cf. §2.4.6; §4.2.3.3).[677] In v.33, however, the proper name is anchored by way of a construct relation to another NP, בֶּן־חֵפֶר / "son of Hepher", which represents a textually accessible referent (cf. v.32). The anchoring relation has the cognitive-pragmatic effect of boot-strapping the identifiability of חֵפֶר to וּצְלָפְחָד, allowing the writer to introduce the entity by means of an LD construction.

By contrast, some referents exist in a constant state of identifiability and maintain a low degree of accessibility by virtue of their permanent status in the interlocutor's long-term memory store. These types of referents are a part of the conceptual background that comprise

presupposed by a social activity such as going to a restaurant. Following Croft and Cruse, we subsume scripts under frames/schemas. Note the use of LD in Num. 35.30. One could argue that the "murder script" stems back to Num. 35.11.

676. Cf. Lev. 22.12; 22.13; Num. 26.33; Deut. 4.3; Josh. 17.3; Judg. 18.30; 2 Sam. 2.23; 1 Kng. 8.19.

677. While Lambrecht (1994) argues that presentational constructions typically resemble constructions like the one used to introduce Job in Job 1.1, Heimerdinger (1999:141–155) and, more recently Moshavi (2010:43–44), have pointed out, however, that this type of presentational construction is rare in BH. Rather, brand-new entities in BH are usually introduced following a *wayyiqtol* verb of movement (e.g. Exod. 2.21.8, 2.2; 1 Sam. 2.27; 11.1; 17.45).

the natural, social, and cultural universe shared by the interlocutors. Take, for example, the dislocated referent in Num. 3.46–47 (196):

(196) Num. 3.46–47[678]

47. וְאֵת֙ פִּדוּיֵ֣י הַשְּׁלֹשָׁ֔ה וְהַשִּׁבְעִ֖ים וְהַמָּאתָ֑יִם הָעֹדְפִ֕ים עַל־הַלְוִיִּ֖ם מִבְּכֹ֥ור בְּנֵֽי־יִשְׂרָאֵ֛ל׃
וְלָקַחְתָּ֣ חֲמֵ֤שֶׁת חֲמֵשֶׁת֙ שְׁקָלִ֔ים לַגֻּלְגֹּ֖לֶת בְּשֶׁ֣קֶל הַקֹּ֑דֶשׁ תִּקָּ֖ח עֶשְׂרִ֥ים גֵּרָ֖ה הַשָּֽׁקֶל׃

"And as for the price of redemption for the 273 of the firstborn of the Israelites, 47. you shall take five shekels for each person. You shall collect them according to the standard sanctuary shekel."

The complex dislocated NP is inferable from general knowledge pertaining to cultic regulations of redemption. The number of the Levites numbered in the census is provided in v.39 and the number of firstborn males of the people of Israel is given in v.43, yielding a surplus of 273 firstborn Israelites. That a surplus of Israelites should evoke a principle of redemption is inferable from the shared cultic conceptual framework of the writer and his audience (cf. Exod. 13.7–22; 22. 29–30; 34.19–20; Num. 3.12–13).

Many of the generic dislocates in our data set also fit this category. These referents are typically expressed by indefinite pronouns or NPs that occur as dislocated constituents in conditional LD constructions (cf. §5.4.6), as in example (197) below:

(197) Num. 5.6[679]

דַּבֵּר֙ אֶל־בְּנֵ֣י יִשְׂרָאֵ֔ל אִ֥ישׁ א�ֹו־אִשָּׁ֖ה$_i$ כִּ֣י יַעֲשׂ֗וּ מִכָּל־חַטֹּ֤את הָאָדָם֙ לִמְעֹ֣ל מַ֔עַל בַּיהוָ֖ה
וְאָשְׁמָ֥ה הַנֶּ֛פֶשׁ הַהִ֥וא$_i$׃

Speak to the Israelites and say, "A man or a woman$_i$, if they commit any of the sins that people commit by breaking faith with Yahweh, that person$_i$ is guilty."

The dislocated indefinite NPs denote generic referents that are presumed to be type identifiable and accessible due to the salient status human beings occupy in the conceptual world of the interlocutors.

678. Cf. Gen. 6.22; Num. 3.46–47; 6.7; 15.14; 15.20; 22.11; Deut. 1.17; 8.20; Judg. 11.31; 19.30; 1 Kng. 1.37; 8.37–39; 8.41; 11.26.

679. Cf. Lev. 1.2; 2.1; 4.2; 5.15; 5.21; 12.2; 13.2; 13.18; 13.29; 15.16; 19.20; 20.27; 22.14; 22.27; Num. 5.12–15; 6.2; 9.10; 27.8; 30.3.

6.2.2.3 Situational

Lastly, approximately 2% of the dislocates analyzed represent referents that are accessible by virtue of their presence in the text-external world shared by the speech participants, so-called "exophoric (deictic) reference".[680] This category not only includes objects in the immediate proximity to the speech participants, but also the interlocutors themselves. Moreover, virtually all situationally accessible dislocated referents in our data set are encoded by expressions that register as active on the Givenness Hierarchy. This does not entail, however, that all situationally accessible entities necessarily entertain the same degree of accessibility. For instance, inanimate objects are generally assumed to entertain a lower potential for activation than the speech participants themselves. This is because animate entities are generally more salient in the discourse model than inanimate ones (Ariel, 2001:32). Furthermore, speech participants are generally encoded as zero and unstressed pronominals, an expression type prototypically used for highly active entities (cf. §2.3.4).

For example, in 1 Kng. 9.4 (198), the dislocated expression is an independent pronominal (2ms):

(198) 1 Kng. 9.4–5[681]

וְאַתָּה אִם־תֵּלֵךְ לְפָנַי כַּאֲשֶׁר הָלַךְ דָּוִד אָבִיךָ בְּתָם־לֵבָב וּבְיֹשֶׁר לַעֲשׂוֹת כְּכֹל אֲשֶׁר
צִוִּיתִיךָ חֻקַּי וּמִשְׁפָּטַי תִּשְׁמֹר׃ 5. וַהֲקִמֹתִי אֶת־כִּסֵּא מַמְלַכְתְּךָ עַל־יִשְׂרָאֵל לְעֹלָם כַּאֲשֶׁר
דִּבַּרְתִּי עַל־דָּוִד אָבִיךָ לֵאמֹר לֹא־יִכָּרֵת לְךָ אִישׁ מֵעַל כִּסֵּא יִשְׂרָאֵל׃

"And as for you, if you will walk before me, as your father David walked, in integrity and heart of uprightness, doing according to all that I have commanded you, 5. then I will establish your royal throne over Israel forever, as I promised David your father saying 'You shall not lack a man on the throne of Israel'."

In the context of 1 Kng. 9:1–9, Solomon has just completed the building of the temple when Yahweh speaks to him a second time (v.3). The reported speech begun in v.3 continues into v.4–5 where we encounter a pronominal LD. Solomon, the referent of the dislocated pronoun, is presumably highly accessible due to his role as the addressee in the conversation.

680. Cf. Dirven and Verspoor (2004:84) who contrast endophoric and exophoric (deictic) reference. The former are interpreted through the text-internal context, while the later are interpreted through the text-external context.

681. Cf. Num. 5.20; 18.8; Judg. 5.3; 1 Kng. 9.4.

By comparison, in 1 Sam. 25.27 (197) the situationally accessible dislocate is not a speech participant, but an inanimate entity within the text-external context of the interlocutors:

(197) 1 Sam. 25.27

וְעַתָּה֩ הַבְּרָכָ֨ה הַזֹּ֜את אֲשֶׁר־הֵבִ֤יא שִׁפְחָתְךָ֙ לַֽאדֹנִ֔י וְנִתְּנָה֙ לַנְּעָרִ֔ים הַמִּתְהַלְּכִ֖ים בְּרַגְלֵ֥י אֲדֹנִֽי׃

"And now, this gift that your servant has brought to my lord, let it be given to the young men who follow my lord."

In v.18, the narrator tells us that Abigail, in an attempt to intercede on behalf of her husband, Nabal, gathers a variety of gifts for King David. These items are not mentioned again until v.27, where, in a conversation between Abigail and the King (i.e. reported speech), the epithet הַבְּרָכָ֨ה הַזֹּ֜את אֲשֶׁר־הֵבִ֤יא שִׁפְחָתְךָ֙ לַֽאדֹנִ֔י / "this gift which your maidservant has brought to my lord" is dislocated. At least two points of evidence suggest that the referent is assumed by Abigail to be situationally accessible to David when the LD construction is used. First, there is no discussion of the gift within the preceding dialogue (vv. 24–26) between Abigail and David. Second, and perhaps more significantly, the dislocate is in the form of a NP modified by a proximal demonstrative הַזֹּ֜את, which functions as a spatial deictic expression specifically used by the writer/speaker to indicate an entity in the text-external context of the speech participants. Since the reader has been informed of the gift by the narrator in v.18, the writer is thus able to recount Abigail's giving of the gift to David in such a way that the reader assumes David is already aware of the gift by virtue of its presence in the interlocutor's shared text-external context. In contrast to tokens like (196) above, where the dislocated referent is a speech participant, and thus, highly accessible, instantiations like (197) involving inanimate objects typically entertain a lower degree of accessibility.

6.2.3 The Cognitive Status of Dislocated Referents

Our analysis of dislocated referring expressions as accessibility markers in §6.2.1 yielded *provisional support* to our initial hypothesis—with over 90% of the dislocated expressions registering as uniquely identifiable or lower on the Givenness Hierarchy. The *provisional* nature of this analysis stems from a speaker's/writer's ability to exploit form-function expectations by over-encoding referents in order to produce particular pragmatic implicatures. To account for this, we examined the anaphoricity of dislocated referents by evaluating the

derivation of their identifiability/accessibility status according to three potential sources: textual, inferential, and situational. This provided a more accurate assessment of the cognitive status of dislocated referents by allowing us to distinguish exploitive uses of referring expressions (i.e. over-encoding) from normative ones.

Our anaphoricity analysis in §6.2.2 further confirmed the provisional evidence from §6.2.1. Although 25% of the dislocated referents were found to be textually accessible, only 20% of those referents were located far enough from their antecedent to justify the low accessibility marker used to encode the referent. In other words, despite being encoded with a relatively low accessibility marker, the majority of textually accessible dislocates were construed as entertaining a high degree of accessibility, as a result of the close proximity between the dislocated referent and its antecedent.[682] This mismatch between form and function will be further explained in §6.4.2–§6.3.3. For now, it suffices to say that while a majority of textually accessible dislocates entertain a relatively high degree of accessibility, this does not reflect the prototypical cognitive status of dislocated denotatums.

Equally non-prototypical were dislocated referents that were ostensibly assumed to be identifiable simply by virtue of their presence in the text-external context of the interlocutors. Virtually every token fitting this description involved a dislocated referent that represented one of the speech participants. Unlike textually accessible referents, however, no mismatch between form and function was found in these instances. Rather, these referents are presumed to be highly accessible (active) entities by virtue of the author's choice to encode them as pronouns—an accessibility marker reserved for active entities.[683]

By contrast, 73% of the dislocated referents analyzed lack a textual or situational antecedent. The referents in these cases are assumed to be at least identifiable merely by virtue of an inference relation prompted by one or more contextual factors (e.g. poset relation, schema/frame, etc.). While it is difficult to specify the precise degree of accessibility of inferred referents, it is reasonable to assume that they entertain lower degrees of accessibility than entities explicitly mentioned in the preceding discourse (textual) or exophoric referents available in the text-external context (situational). This is a result of the tendency for inferred entities to obtain looser cohesive links to their triggers and, thus, entail a greater degree of

682. Other factors resulting in a low accessibility interpretation despite close proximity, viz. intervening paragraph boundary, etc. were accounted for.

683. Recall that the entailment scheme of the Givenness Hierarchy only works in one direction. In other words, writers and speakers may over-encode for pragmatic effects, but not under-encode. Thus, when we encounter pronominally encoded referents we assume that they reflect the writer's assumption that the referent entertains a highly accessible status in the mind of the addressee.

processing cost to activate them. For instance, inferred referents require the addressee to accomplish two separate cognitive tasks simultaneously: that of identifying or creating a cognitive representation, and that of accessing that representation. It is conceivable, however, that some inferred denotatums may entertain higher degrees of accessibility than some textually accessible referents. This is perhaps the case with referents that are a permanent fixture of the natural, social, or cultural universe (cf. Ariel, 2001:33). Nevertheless, inferentially identifiable/accessible entities, overall, entertain a relatively low degree of accessibility as compared to other recently mentioned referents, or those immediately accessible from the text-external context. Furthermore, their low degree of identifiability/accessibility is substantiated by the types of expressions (i.e. accessibility markers) used to encode these referents. As we observed in §6.2.2.2, virtually all inferential referents in our data set are encoded by accessibility markers that rank no higher than uniquely identifiable on the Givenness Hierarchy. This then supports our initial hypothesis:[684] that a central motivating factor influencing the choice to use LD in a particular context is in direct correlation with the low degree of accessibility of a referent in the Cognitive Representation of the addressee.

6.2.4 Pragmatic Relations

Apart from the cognitive status of dislocated referents, two other cognitive-pragmatic parameters provide ancillary evidence for the motivation to use LD in BH discourse: the pragmatic relations of resumptive/linked elements (hypothesis 2), as well as referential persistence (hypothesis 3). We will discuss the former in this section, and the later in §6.2.5 below.

In §2.4 and §4.2.2.3, we argued that Topic and Focus are pragmatic relations relative to a proposition. Put differently, the topic/focal expressions occupy positions within the argument structure of the clause. Since dislocated constituents are situated outside the boundaries of the matrix clause, strictly speaking, these expressions cannot encode pragmatic relations relative to a proposition. Rather, the Topic/Focal relations are encoded by resumptive/linked expressions, which occupy a valency slot licensed by the predicate of the matrix clause. It is therefore, with these clause-internal resumptive/linked expressions that our present analysis is concerned.

Our overview of research pertaining to the discourse function of LD in chapter 4 revealed a significant consensus: virtually all previous studies contend that, in some way, LD is fundamentally a topic announcing construction across languages. From this insight, we ex-

684. Recall that dislocated referents in our data set entertaining a low degree of accessibility not only include inferential referents but also a sub-set of textually accessible referents located at a distance from their antecedents.

pected that a majority of tokens in our data set would exhibit resumptive/linked elements that satisfied a topic relation to the pragmatically structured proposition; and indeed, this was the case. Approximately 67% of resumptive/linked elements are realized as either primary (43%) or secondary (24%) topics within the proposition.

Example (198a–b) represents two tokens involving resumptive/linked elements as primary topics, one unmarked (198a) and the other marked (i.e. fronted) (198b), while examples (199a) and (199b) illustrate resumptive/linked elements functioning as secondary topics:

(198) Primary Topic

a. Gen. 4.4[685] unmarked

וְהֶ֖בֶל הֵבִ֣יא גַם־ה֑וּא מִבְּכֹרוֹת֙ צֹאנ֔וֹ וּמֵחֶלְבֵהֶ֖ן וַיַּ֣שַׁע יְהוָ֔ה אֶל־הֶ֖בֶל וְאֶל־מִנְחָתֽוֹ׃

And Abel$_i$, he$_i$ also brought of the firstborn of his flock and of their fat portions. And Yawheh had regard for Abel and his offering.

b. Judg. 18.30[686] marked

וַיָּקִ֥ימוּ לָהֶ֖ם בְּנֵי־דָ֑ן אֶת־הַפָּ֣סֶל ׀ וִיהוֹנָתָ֣ן בֶּן־גֵּרְשֹׁ֗ם בֶּן־מְנַשֶּׁה֙ הֽוּא וּבָנָ֣יו הָי֔וּ כֹּהֲנִ֖ים לְשֵׁ֣בֶט הַדָּנִ֑י עַד־י֖וֹם גְּל֥וֹת הָאָֽרֶץ׃

And the Danites set up for themselves the graven image, and Jonathan son of Gershom, the son of Moses$_i$, he$_i$ and his sons$_i$ were priests for the Danite tribe until the time of the exile from the land.

685. Cf. Gen. 6.21; 22.24; Exod. 12.15; 12.19; 19.18; 31.14; 35.29; Lev. 7.7; 7.20; 7.21; 7.25; 7.27; 17.8–9; 18.10; 18.29; 22.3; 22.12; 22.4b–6a; 22.8; Num. 5.6; 9.13; 14.36–37; 19.20; 35.30; Deut. 17.12; 18.19; 18.20; 21.3; 28.61; Josh. 17.3; 23.9; Judg. 5.3; 2 Sam. 6.23; 15.30; 2 Kng. 25.16. Approximately 11% of the tokens exhibited formally non-resumptive constructions (§5.4.2.4) in which there exists no overtly encoded topic expression within the matrix clause. Rather, the topic relation is implicitly encoded in the inflectional morphology of the verb. Representative tokens of this type include: Gen. 44.9; Exod. 4.9; 9.21; Lev. 1.2; 5.1; 5.17; 13.2; 13.18; 15.19; 22.14; 22.27; Num. 6.2; 9.10; 18.8; 21.8; 22.11; 30.3; Judg. 11.31; 19.30; 1 Sam. 2.13; 11.11; 14.19; 17.24; 25.27; 2 Sam. 2.23; 13.13; 24.3; 24.17; 1 Kng. 6.7; 8.41; 2 Kng. 11.5-6; 11.7.

686. Surprisingly, only five tokens exhibited fronted resumptive/linked elements in a topic relation to the proposition: Gen. 4.22; 9.6; 48.7; Lev. 13.45; Judg. 18.30.

(199) Secondary Topic

a. Gen. 26.15[687]

וְכָל־הַבְּאֵרֹת אֲשֶׁר חָפְרוּ עַבְדֵי אָבִיו בִּימֵי אַבְרָהָם אָבִיו$_i$ סִתְּמוּם$_i$ פְּלִשְׁתִּים וַיְמַלְאוּם עָפָר׃

Now all the wells that his father's servants had dug in the days of Abraham his father$_i$, the Philistines stopped them$_i$ up and filled them with dirt.

b. 1 Kng. 6.32

וּשְׁתֵּי דַלְתוֹת עֲצֵי־שָׁמֶן$_i$ וַיְקַלַּע עֲלֵיהֶם$_i$ מְקֻלְעוֹת כְּרוּבִים וְתִמֹרוֹת וּפְטוּרֵי צִצִּים וְצִפָּה זָהָב וַיַּרְ עַל־הַכְּרוּבִים וְעַל־הַתִּמֹרוֹת אֶת־הַזָּהָב׃

And the two doors of olive wood$_i$ he carved on them$_i$ carvings of cherubim, palm trees, and open flowers. He overlaid them with gold and spread gold on the cherubim and on the palm trees.

In §5.4.2.2 we noted that 20 tokens exist in our dataset that lack any overtly expressed resumptive/linked element within the clause, as illustrated by (200) below:[688]

(200) Exod. 9.21[689]

וַאֲשֶׁר לֹא־שָׂם לִבּוֹ אֶל־דְּבַר יְהוָה וַיַּעֲזֹב אֶת־עֲבָדָיו וְאֶת־מִקְנֵהוּ בַּשָּׂדֶה׃

But he who paid no regard to the word of Yahweh, he left his servants and his livestock in the field.

The VP in these tokens possesses an inflectional morphology that agrees with the dislocate in person, number and gender and may, therefore, be interpreted as an incorporated (i.e. phonologically unrealized) pronoun. Understood this way, the agreement inflection is interpreted

687. All tokens in our data set with resumptive/linked elements in a secondary topic relation exhibited topic expressions in default position following the verb, cf. Gen. 2.17; 3.3; 17.15; 21.12; 21.13; 23.11; 24.27; 26.15; 28.13; 28.22; 30.3; 35.12; 47.21; 49.19; Exod. 1.22; 9.19; 12.44; 15.15; 32.1; Lev. 2.11; 3.9; 4.11–12; 7.19; 7.30; 9.19-20; 14.6; 17.3–4; 17.10; 18.9; 20.6; 20.16; 20.27; 22.22; 22.23; 22.28; 26.36; Num. 4.29; 5.12-15; 6.7; 14.24; 14.31; 17.3; 18.8; 26.33; 30.14; Deut. 2.23; 4.3; 14.27; 18.14; Josh. 1.3; 11.13; 13.6; 15.16; Judg. 1.12; 1 Sam. 9.20; 13.2; 2 Sam. 14.10; 21.5–6; 1 Kng. 6.32; 9.20-21; 15.13; 2 Kng. 1.4; 1.6; 1.16; 24.16; 25.22.

688. The extra-clausal status of the dislocate in these tokens, and *ipso facto* their membership in the LD category, is established by a clause-initial וְ (*wayyiqtol* / *weqatal*) or interogative particle (cf. §5.4.2.2).

689. Cf. Gen. 44.9; Exod. 9.21; 30.33; 30.38; Lev. 25.33; Num. 21.8; 22.11; 23.3; Judg. 11.31; 19.30; 1 Sam. 11.11; 20.4; 25.27; 2 Sam. 2.23; 24.17; 24.3; 1 Kng. 8.41; 11.26; 2 Kng. 11.7.

as a resumptive pronoun in a total identity coherence relation with the dislocate. Moreover, in every case, the alleged inflected pronoun functions as the primary topic of the proposition.

The question remains, however, as to: why an overtly expressed resumptive/linked element is not required in these instances. Regrettably, our analysis did not reveal a conclusive answer to this question, although an interesting correlation was observed. In the majority of these tokens,[690] a strong case can be made for the high degree of accessibility of the dislocated referent. This is supported by Ariel (2008:126), who writes: "[i]n terms of activation, a gap [i.e. fronted constituent with no resumptive, JRW] points to high accessibility which is not available in cases of referential dependency across a syntactic island. A pronoun [i.e. resumptive, JRW] on the other hand encodes a somewhat lower degree of accessibility."[691] Although more research is required in this regard, it is plausible that a similar constraint exists in BH for LD constructions fitting this profile.

The propensity for LD constructions to be associated with topic relations, particularly in Indo-European languages, has prompted some researchers to assume that this construction can only be associated with the topic relation across languages (cf. chapter 4). In §4.2.2.3, however, we presented evidence to the contrary. Although resumptive/linked elements do, in fact, prototypically satisfy topic relations across languages, they may also satisfy focal relations to the pragmatically structured proposition. Moreover, our BH data provides additional support for this claim. Approximately 28% of our entire data set exhibited tokens like (201) and (202) in which the resumptive/linked elements satisfy a focal relation to the proposition. In the majority of tokens, the resumptive/linked element is in a fronted position.[692]

(201) Gen. 3.12[693]

וַיֹּאמֶר הָאָדָם הָאִשָּׁה אֲשֶׁר נָתַתָּה עִמָּדִי הִוא נָתְנָה־לִּי מִן־הָעֵץ וָאֹכֵל׃

690. A high degree of accessibility was not obvious in the following tokens: Num. 21.8; Judg. 11.31; 1 Sam. 20.4; 2 Sam. 2.23; 1 Kng. 8.41; 11.26.

691. Cf. also Ariel (1999), where she demonstrates that languages that evince resumptive pronouns in relative clauses possess a cognitive constraint by which relatives, with highly accessible heads, do not require an overt resumptive.

692. Cf. 1 Sam. 14.15 in which the resumptive is a focal expression marked by גַּם in default position. For other examples of focal resumptives in situ see: Lev. 11.42; Num. 6.7; and 2 Kng. 10.29.

693. Cf. Gen. 15.4; 17.17; 19.38; 24.14; 44.17; Exod. 12.16; Lev. 7.8; 7.9; 7.33; 11.3; 11.9; 21.2-3; 21.14; 25.44; Num. 5.10; (2x) 22.20; 22.35; 22.38; 31.22-23; 33.54; 35.8; 35.33; Deut. 1.36; 1.38; 1.39; 13.1; 14.6; 20.20; Judg. 11.24 (2x); 1 Sam. 14.15; 15.9; 18.17; 20.8; 2 Sam. 6.22; 14.19; 1 Kng. 5.19; 8.19; 22.14; 2 Kng. 13.19; 17,36; 22.18; 23.15.

The man said, "The woman who you gave to be with me$_i$, she$_i$ gave me from the tree and I ate."

(202) Num. 35.19

גֹּאֵל הַדָּם$_i$ הֽוּא$_i$ יָמִית אֶת־הָרֹצֵחַ בְּפִגְעוֹ־בוֹ הֽוּא יְמִיתֶֽנּוּ׃

The avenger of blood$_i$, he$_i$ shall put the murderer to death. When he meets him, he shall put him to death.

That resumptive/linked elements occur in focal relations to the pragmatically structured proposition confirms our second hypothesis. We will further discuss the significance of pragmatic relations as they relate to the discourse function of LDs in BH in §6.3.1. Before explaining the discourse-function(s) of LDs, however, a final cognitive-pragmatic parameter concerns the degree to which a dislocated referent maintains a salient cognitive status in the ensuing discourse model.

6.2.5 Persistence

The cataphoric discourse status of dislocated denotatums is often referred to as referential 'persistance' in the literature. This primarily concerns the degree to which a referent functions as a central and global organizing concept (i.e. discourse topic) about which the reader's attention is oriented for a particular stretch of discourse (cf. §6.3.1.1 below, for further discussion).[694]

Following Gregory and Michaelis (2001:1689) we employed a metric consisting of three possible values (0–2) in order to measure the persistence of dislocated referents. A score of 0 was given to denotatums that did not persist at all within a span of 10 subsequent clauses. If a referent was encoded with a lexical phrase within that span, it was given a score of 1, and if it was encoded with a pronoun it was given a score of 2.

A majority (53%) of the LDs analyzed possessed dislocated referents that lacked subsequent mention within a span of 10 clauses, thus receiving a score of 0. A remaining 47% obtained scores of 1–2. Dislocates with ensuing referents encoded by a zero or an independent pronoun (score: 2) comprise 63% of these remaining tokens, while those with ensuing referents encoded by a lexical phrase of some kind (score: 1) make up the remaining 37%. Our third hypothesis—i.e. that dislocated referents *predominately* occur as salient entities within

694. Cf. Brown and Yule, 1983; Givón, 1984a; Tomlin, 1986; Callow, 1998; Dooley and Levinsohn, 2001; and Floor, 2004.

the subsequent discourse context—is therefore falsified by the data. Although dislocates do, on occasion, reflect a high degree of persistence, this is not the case in the majority of instances.

6.2.6 Summary and Conclusion

So far we have assessed LDs in our data set (excluding temporal LDs) in light of three cognitive-pragmatic parameters. Before we proceed in providing an explanation of LD in BH in terms of discourse-function(s) (§6.3), it is prudent that we briefly review the conclusions of our analysis in §6.2, since these three cognitive-pragmatic parameters form overlapping and sometimes competing motivations for the function(s) of LD in discourse.

The first parameter concerned the degree to which a referent is assumed to be accessible to the addressee at the point it occurs as a dislocated constituent. In §6.1, it was hypothesized that dislocated referents prototypically entertain relatively low degrees of accessibility. To evaluate this hypothesis, we applied two metrics to the dislocates in our data set. We first examined output information pertaining to cognitive status. The various forms of referring expressions were assessed in terms of their function as accessibility markers. This analysis showed that an overwhelming majority of dislocates occur as highly informative and rigid expressions, *ipso facto* indexing relatively low spheres of accessibility on the Givenness Hierarchy and providing provisional support for our initial hypothesis.

A second metric was applied in order to assess the degree to which referents possess antecedents in either the preceding discourse (textual), the text-external context (situational), or by some inferencing relation (inferential). If referring expressions represent output information for determining the degree of accessibility, by comparison, the source of a referent's identifiability/accessibility status represents input information. Evaluating referents in terms of their anaphoricity ratings was deemed necessary due to the Givenness Hierarchy's entailment scheme as well as the propensity for speakers/writers to employ over-encoded expressions in order to trigger specific pragmatic implicatures. This effectively means that any attempt to measure cognitive status based on the output information alone can only be provisional. We contend, however, that by accounting for the source of identifiability/accessibility, we can provide a more acute evaluation of the cognitive status of dislocated referents.

Our analysis concluded that a majority of the dislocated referents analyzed were inferentially identifiable/accessible, and thus, entertained a relatively low degree of accessibility: a conclusion supported by the low accessibility markers used to encode these referents. A large portion of the remaining tokens were found to be textually accessible, with a majority of these encoded with low accessibility markers. Most of these, however, were analyzed as in-

stance of over-encoding, as a result of the fact that, despite being encoded with low accessibility markers, these referents possessed antecedents in close proximity—an indication of high accessibility. Finally, a few tokens were found to be situationally accessible, with most of these being one of the speech participants. These referents were determined to entertain a high degree of accessibility due to the inherent saliency of speech participants as well as their encoding as a pronoun Therefore, although LD in BH does not preclude the dislocation of highly accessible or even active referents—indeed, several tokens in our data set fit this description—our analyses indicate a propensity for dislocated referents to entertain a relatively low degree of accessibility. This conclusion was confirmed by both the accessibility markers used to encode dislocated referents as well as their overall anaphoricity scores.

Finally, we examined two ancillary cognitive-pragmatic parameters that factor into the motivation to use LD. The first concerns the pragmatic relations satisfied by the resumptive/linked elements. It was shown that while the majority of resumptive/linked elements occur in either a primary or secondary topic relation to a proposition, a significant number of tokens evinced resumptive/linked elements in a focal relation. Although the findings pertaining to the topical relations are in concordance with typological claims that LD is fundamentally a topic marking construction, evidence that resumptive/linked elements may also satisfy a focal relation provide a corrective to the false assumption that LD *always* functions in this way. The significance of this analysis will come into sharper focus in §6.3.1.1–§6.3.3.2 below.

The final parameter involves the degree to which a dislocated referent persists in the subsequent discourse. Although we expected referent's to possess a high persistence rate upon being dislocated, this was not the case. Our analysis showed that just over 50% of the tokens analyzed exhibited no subsequent mention within the ensuing discourse.

This section has aimed to assess three cognitive-pragmatic parameters that serve as central motivating factors influencing the use of LD in BH discourse. We are now in a position to examine the communicative goal(s) and pragmatic effect(s) achieved by the use of the construction in context.

6.3 Discourse-Functional Information

The cognitive-pragmatic motivations discussed in §6.2 serve as the basis for an explanation of LD in BH in terms of its discourse function(s). We submit that LD fundamentally functions as a cohesive device in BH narrative, one that plays a contributing role in the construction of a coherent discourse model (cf. §2.2.4).[695] Corresponding to the structural description

695. Cf. Dirven and Verspoor (2004:184–189) for a cogent discussion on Cohesion vs. Coherence in discourse.

in chapters 3 and 5, the discourse functional profile of LD in BH is understood and organized according to an exemplar model of conceptual categorization. In other words, this section will provide a motivated explanation of LD in terms of its prototypical and non-prototypical discourse-function(s) in BH (cf. hypotheses 5 and 6 in §6.1). In order to justify the rationale for these explanations, we will appeal to insights gleaned from the cognitive-pragmatic motivations discussed above (§6.2), in addition to typological evidence presented in chapter 4.

This section will proceed as follows. In §6.3.1 we begin by explaining the prototypical discourse function of LD in BH, the impetus for which derives from processing constraints associated with the cognitive status of the dislocated referent (cf. hypothesis 4–5). By contrast, we will show that expectations associated with the prototypical use of LD are often exploited in BH narrative, giving rise to a variety of non-prototypical, but nevertheless motivated, extensions form the exemplar category. These non-prototypical profiles are the topic of §6.3.2–§6.3.3 (cf. hypothesis 6). Finally, in §6.3.4, we discuss three types of LD constructions that are judged to be more substantive than schematic in terms of both structure and function.

6.3.1 (Re)activation

We submit that, at its most basic level, LD in BH functions as a discursive strategy used to (re)activate[696] an entity(s)[697] or proposition that is assumed to be at least identifiable, and entertain a low degree of accessibility in the mind of the addressee. Support for this claim derives foremost from the cognitive processing constraint stipulated by the Principle of the Separation of Reference and Role (cf. §4.2.3.3). If an LD construction were not used in certain contexts, the high processing cost associated by activating a referent with a low degree of accessibility would be incurred simultaneously with the cost associated with another processing task: that of interpreting the semantic and pragmatic roles of the referent in the proposition. According to the PSRR, however, this processing load is mitigated by the use of the LD construction, which serves to partition competing cognitive tasks. The dislocation of a constituent outside the clause allows the addressee to separate the costly task of: 1) remembering, inferring, or otherwise determining the identity of the referent, from the task of 2) interpreting the proposition which expresses either the new information about the topic (e.g. topic-

696. The prefix "(re)" is used to distinguish the activation of entities that have already been explicitly activated in the previous discourse context (e.g. textually accessible referents) from those that have not (e.g. inferentially accessible referents). In the case of the former, the referent is, strictly speaking, reactivated, while in the later, the referent is simply activated.

697. The (s) is meant to refer to the activation of multiple referents at once, i.e. Multiple LDs (§5.4.3).

comment), or the new assertion as it relates to a presupposed open proposition (e.g. constituent-focus).

The cognitive advantages of employing this discursive strategy, however, do not only affect the hearer/reader. To the contrary, the use of LD also facilitates the production of the utterance on the part of the speaker/writer. This is because referents entertaining low degrees of accessibility are typically encoded with syntactically complex and highly informative expressions (cf. §6.2.1). Therefore, it is easier to construct these expressions independently of the clause in which the referent functions. As in other languages (cf. chapter 4), the need to partition cognitively costly tasks associated with the (re)introduction and interpretation of inactive referents yields a construction that isomorphically reflects this motivation.

While its basic discursive function is that of (re)activation, LDs that fit this functional profile also fall into one of three sentence-level pragmatic categories: Topic announcing, Focus Announcing, and Framing. To which category a token belongs depends on either the resumptive/linked element's pragmatic relation to the proposition, or the pragmatic relation between the dislocate and a linked element within the associated clause.

6.3.1.1 Topic Announcing Left Dislocation

Topic Announcing LDs serve to (re)activate referents entertaining a low degree of accessibility, thereby ratifying it as a suitable topic for the following proposition. Recall that active referents constitute the most acceptable topics (cf. §2.4.3). Accordingly, LDs that function to (re)activate referents and simultaneously announce the topic of the associated proposition constitute the exemplar LD function in BH narrative.

We established in §4.2.2.3 that dislocated denotatums exists independently of any pragmatic relation (i.e. topic or focus) since they are syntactically located outside the clause (proposition) to which they are associated (cf. §4.2.2.3). In other words, the topic of the proposition cannot be, strictly speaking, satisfied by the dislocate, since the topic relation exists within the pragmatically structured proposition. The topic relation is rather satisfied by a clause-internal resumptive/linked element that functions syntactically as an argument of the predicate. Furthermore, Topic Announcing LDs may involve either primary or secondary topic relations (cf. §2.4.5). Primary topics usually coincide with the syntactic subject, while secondary topics coincide with the direct object. The following examples illustrate each of these types.

Deut. 17.8–13 (203) provides instruction for the Israelites for resolving insoluble legal cases. In v.12, the Israelites are told what will happen on the occasion one of them contemp-

tuously refuses to comply with the ruling of the tribunal. To communicate this, the writer activates an inferentially accessible referent by way of LD:

(203) Deut. 17.12[698]

וְהָאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר־יַעֲשֶׂה בְזָדוֹן לְבִלְתִּי שְׁמֹעַ אֶל־הַכֹּהֵן הָעֹמֵד לְשָׁרֵת שָׁם אֶת־יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ
אוֹ אֶל־הַשֹּׁפֵט וּמֵת הָאִישׁ הַהוּא וּבִעַרְתָּ הָרָע מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל׃

"The person who who acts arrogantly, refusing to listen either to the priest who stands there serving Yahweh your God, or the judge$_i$, that man$_i$ must die. You shall purge the evil from Israel."

The complexity of the dislocated NP (def.N + restrictive relative) results from the referent's low degree of accessibility. The high processing cost associated with activating the referent together with the effort required to produce such a highly informative expression, precipitates the use of LD in this context. By using LD, the task of activation is separated from that of interpreting the proposition, thus mitigating the processing effort required by the reader. Moreover, the construction simultaneously announces the primary topic of the following proposition, a pragmatic relation that is satisfied by the resumptive demonstrative phrase.

Another example of topic announcing LD is found in 2 Sam. 15.30 (204). In this context the writer intends to switch topics between the final clause of v.29 and the the beginning of v.30.

(204) 2 Sam. 15.30[699]

וְדָוִד עֹלֶה בְּמַעֲלֵה הַזֵּיתִים עֹלֶה ׀ וּבוֹכֶה וְרֹאשׁ לוֹ חָפוּי וְהוּא הֹלֵךְ יָחֵף וְכָל־הָעָם
אֲשֶׁר־אִתּוֹ חָפוּ אִישׁ רֹאשׁוֹ וְעָלוּ עָלֹה וּבָכֹה׃

But David went up the slope of the Mount of Olives, weeping as he ascended. His head was covered, and he was walking barefoot. And all the people who were with him$_i$, each one$_i$ covered his head and went up weeping as they went.

698. Gen. 4.4; 4.22; 9.6; 17.14; 22.24; 24.7; 34.8; 44.9; Exod. 4.9; 9.6; 9.21; 12.15; 12.19; 19.18; 26.12; 30.33; 30.38; 31.14; 25.29; Lev. 7.20; 7.25; 7.27; 13.45; 18.10; 18.29; 20.10; 20.12; 20.13; 22.4b–6a; 25.32; 25.44; Num. 4.46–48; 9.13; 14.36-37; 19.20; 21.8; 22.11; 30.10; 34.6; 35.30; Deut. 1.30; 3.13; 17.12; 18.20; 21.3; 28.54; 28.56; Josh. 17.3; 21.40; Judg. 11.31; 18.30; 19.30; 1 Sam. 2.13; 3.11; 11.11; 17.37; 25.27; 2 Sam. 2.23; 15.30; 21.5-6; 24.3; 24.17; 6.23;1 Kng. 6.7; 8.41; 11.26; 2 Kng. 11.5–6; 11.7; 25.16; 11.7.

699. Cf. Gen. 34.8; 44.9; Exod. 12.15; 12.19; 30.38; 31.14; Lev. 17.8–9; 18.10; 20.10; 20.12; 20.13; 22.27; 22.4b–6a; 7.20; 7.25; 7.27; Num. 14:36–37; 19.20; 22.11; Deut. 28.54; Josh. 17.3; Judg. 11.31; 19.30; 1 Kng. 8.41; 11.26; 2 Kng. 11.5–6.

However, the textually accessible dislocate (cf. v.18) is assumed to be identifiable to the reader but entertains a low degree of accessibility resulting from the textual distance between the antecedent and anaphor. Thus, the LD construction is employed to reactivate the referent and announce it as the topic of the following proposition. The primary topic relation is then satisfied by the anaphoric primary topic expression אִישׁ / "each man".[700]

In addition to primary topics, topic announcing LDs also (re)activate, and thereby ratify, referents that function as secondary topics in the associated proposition. Recall that like primary topics, secondary topics must be presupposed information.[701] Unlike primary topics, however, secondary topics exist as integral parts of the focus structure of the proposition (cf. §2.4.5). What is more, the aboutness relation inherent in secondary topic relations does not lie between the referent and the proposition (i.e. primary topics), but rather between the referent of the secondary topic expression and that of the primary topic expression (cf. §2.4.5). See, for example, (205) below:

(205) 1 Sam. 9.20[702]

וְלָאֲתֹנֹת הָאֹבְדוֹת לְךָ הַיּוֹם שְׁלֹשֶׁת הַיָּמִים אַל־תָּשֶׂם אֶת־לִבְּךָ לָהֶם כִּי נִמְצְאוּ וּלְמִי כָּל־חֶמְדַּת יִשְׂרָאֵל הֲלוֹא לְךָ וּלְכֹל בֵּית אָבִיךָ׃

"As for your donkeys that were lost three days ago$_i$, give no further thought to them$_i$ because they have been found. And who does all Israel desire but you and all your father's family?"

The referent of the complex dislocated NP is remotely accessible from v.5. In addition to mitigating the processing cost associated with reactivating the referent, the dislocation of the phrase serves to ratify the referent as a secondary topic in the associated proposition.

In similar fashion, 1 Kng 9.20–21 consists of two complex dislocated phrases (i.e. Multiple LD; §5.4.3):

700. It is noteworthy that the resumptive אִישׁ profiles the distribution of "each man" in the matrix clause, rather than the expected 3rd pl. pronoun (i.e. "they"). By using LD, the writer is able to both reactivate the referent (dislocate) and frame the referent with a particular profile (resumptive). It is difficult to imagine how both of these objectives could have been accomplished within one construction without using LD.

701. Secondary topics of propositions in LD constructions are interpreted as presupposed as a result of their prior activation by the dislocated constituent.

702. Cf. Gen. 2.17; 3.3; 26.15; 28.13; 28.22; 30.3; 35.12; 49.19; Exod. 1.22; 15.15; Lev. 2.11; 3.9; 4.11–12; 7.19; 7.30; 9.19-20; 18.9; 20.6; 20.16; 22.22; 22.23; 26.36; Num. 4.29; 14.27; 14.31; 26.33; Deut. 2.23; 14.27; 18.19; 28.61; Josh. 15.16; 2 Sam. 14.10; Judg. 1.12. 1 Kng. 6.32; 12.17; 2 Kng. 25.22.

(206) 1 Kng. 9.20–21

כָּל־הָעָם הַנּוֹתָר מִן־הָאֱמֹרִי הַחִתִּי הַפְּרִזִּי הַחִוִּי וְהַיְבוּסִי אֲשֶׁר לֹא־מִבְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל הֵמָּה׃
21. בְּנֵיהֶם אֲשֶׁר נוֹתְרוּ אַחֲרֵיהֶם בָּאָרֶץ אֲשֶׁר לֹא־יָכְלוּ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל לְהַחֲרִימָם וַיַּעֲלֵם
שְׁלֹמֹה לְמַס־עֹבֵד עַד הַיּוֹם הַזֶּה׃

All the people who were left of the Amorites, the Hittites, the Perizzites, the Hivites, and the Jebusites, who were not Israelites$_i$—21. their descendents who remained in the land after them, those whom the Israelitse were unable to destroy$_j$—Solomon imposed forced labor on them$_{ij}$ until this day.

The first dislocate is inferentially accessible by way of a lower value relation to all those conscripted by Solomon to forced labor in the construction of the Temple (cf. v.15). The second dislocate, in turn, is anchored to the first by way of a possessive pronoun. Had not the LD construction been used, the writer would have had to introduce each of these constituents in a less economic fashion—presumably by using bi-clausal presentational constructions (cf. §4.2.3.3). Because the referents were assumed to be identifiable and somewhat accessible, however, the more economic LD construction was used, thereby ratifying the referents as acceptable secondary topics within the associated proposition. Moreover, in addition to the direct object, the coindexed 3mp pronominal suffix (וַיַּעֲלֵם) functions as the secondary topic expression within the matrix clause.

In addition to ratifying a sentence-level topic, Topic Announcing LDs may also simultaneously (re)activate a referent that functions as a so-called 'Discourse Topic'. In other words, the (re)activated entity is a 'global organizing referent' about which the reader's attention is oriented for a stretch of discourse (cf. Chafe, 1994, Callow, 1998, Floor 2004 *inter alia*). This is the case, for example, with the activation of "MERARITES" in Num. 4.29.

(207) Num. 4.29[703]

בְּנֵי מְרָרִי$_i$ לְמִשְׁפְּחֹתָם לְבֵית־אֲבֹתָם תִּפְקֹד אֹתָם$_i$׃

"As for the Merarites$_i$, you shall list them$_i$ by their clans and their father's houses."

The use of LD in this context not only serves to ratify the referent "MERARITES" as an appropriate secondary topic of the following proposition, it also functions to introduce a new

703. Cf. Gen. 17.15; Exod. 19.18; Lev. 13.45; 22.3; 26.36; Num. 4.29; 9.13; 17.3; 19.20; 22.11; 34.6; Josh. 1.3; 1 Sam. 2.13; 1 Kng. 8.41; 2 Kng. 25.16.

higher-level discourse topic from that which precedes (i.e. "GERSHONITES" vv.21–28). The referent's high degree of persistence in vv.22–23 (cf. §6.2.5) is, indeed, indicative of the fact that this referent functions as a salient discourse topic, one that contributes to the construction of the cognitive macrostructure of the ensuing unit of discourse.[704]

6.3.1.2 Focus Announcing Left Dislocation

Focus Announcing LDs represent an extension of the prototypical Topic Announcing category. Like the prototype, Focus Announcing LDs involve the basic-level function of (re)activation. But where the previous category manifests resumptives in a topic relation, Focus Announcing LDs exhibit resumptives that satisfy a focal relation to the proposition. In §4.2.3.3, we argued that the PSRR, as a cognitive explanation for the use of LD, should be expanded to include more than just the Topic Announcing variety. Indeed, the choice to use a form specifically designed to mitigate the processing load incurred by the would-be simultaneous tasks of referent activation and (pragmatic) role interpretation applies for Focus Announcing LDs as well.

Rather than ratifying a topic referent, however, Focus Announcing LDs mitigate the processing cost associated with activating a referent and interpreting that referent's role within the propositional assertion (§2.2.3.3; §2.4.6). Indeed, as we mentioned in §4.2.3.3, it is not uncommon across languages for focal constituents within an assertion to carry a prosodic accent (cf. Lambrecht 1994:218ff). Along these lines, Khan (1988:94) has averred that in BH, when a constituent is long, it is difficult to evenly distribute the accent over the constituent. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that by dislocating the constituent, the resumptive pronoun may then be delegated to carry the accent. See, for example, (208) below:

(208) Deut. 20.20[705]

רַ֗ק עֵ֚ץ אֲשֶׁר־תֵּדַ֣ע כִּי־לֹ֣א־עֵ֔ץ מַאֲכָ֖ל הֽוּא$_i$ אֹת֣וֹ$_i$ תַשְׁחִ֑ית וְכָרָ֔תָּ וּבָנִ֙יתָ֙ מָצ֣וֹר עַל־הָעִ֔יר
אֲשֶׁר־הִ֥וא עֹשָׂ֖ה עִמְּךָ֥ מִלְחָמָ֖ה עַ֥ד רִדְתָּֽהּ׃

"Only the trees that you know are not used for food$_i$, them$_i$ you may destroy and cut so that you may build siege works against the city that is waging war against you, until it falls.

704. See Floor (2004) for a through discussion of how marked configurations, resulting from the information structure of the sentence, contribute to the construction of the cognitive macrostructure, or "theme" of a text.

705. Cf. Gen. 15.4; 24.14; 44.17; Exod. 12.16; Lev. 7.7; 7.8; 7.33; 11.3; 11.9; 21.3; 25.44; Num. 6.7; 22.20; 22.38; 35.19; 35.33; Deut. 1.36; 1.38; 20.20; Josh. 11.13; Judg. 7.4; 1 Sam. 14.15; 15.9; 18.17; 2 Sam. 6.22; 1 Kng. 8.19; 22.14; 2 Kng. 10.29; 17.36.

The poset "trees of a besieged city" is activated in v.19. Within this set, the referent "FRUIT TREE" (v.19) stands in an alternate value relation with the dislocate "TREES NOT USED FOR FOOD" in v.20. The need to activate a referent entertaining a low degree of accessibility along with the complexity of the NP precipitate the writer's use of LD in v.20. The open proposition "you may cut down X" is inferred from the previously activated proposition "you may not cut down fruit trees" (v.19). Moreover, the particle רַק preceding the dislocate functions to constrain a limiting and countering interpretation of the following proposition (cf. Levinsohn, 2011). As a result, the newly activated referent of the fronted resumptive pronoun (אֹתוֹ) stands in a constituent focus relation (assertion: X = TREES NOT USED FOR FOOD) with the pragmatically presupposed proposition. With respect to prosody, it is supposed that by first activating the referent by dislocation, a form more suitable for carrying the focal accent (e.g. pronoun) may be used.

Another example of a Focus Announcing LD occurs in Num. 22.20. In an effort to defeat the Israelites, Balak, the king of Moab summons Balaam, a man with a reputation for blessings and cursing, to put a curse on the Israelites. After heeding Yahweh's instruction to refuse Balak's initial summons (vv.7–14), Balaam's emissaries come to Balaam a second time, offering more money in return for his service to Balak. That night, Yahweh speaks to Balaam, giving him permission to go with the leaders of Moab, but prohibiting him from speaking on his own:

(209) Num. 22.20

וַיָּבֹא אֱלֹהִים ׀ אֶל־בִּלְעָם לַיְלָה וַיֹּאמֶר לוֹ אִם־לִקְרֹא לְךָ בָּאוּ הָאֲנָשִׁים קוּם לֵךְ אִתָּם
וְאַךְ אֶת־הַדָּבָר אֲשֶׁר־אֲדַבֵּר אֵלֶיךָ אֹתוֹ תַּעֲשֶׂה׃

And God came to Balaam at night and said to him, 'Since these men have come to summon you get up and go with them, but only what I tell you to do$_i$, you shall do it$_i$.

The open presupposed proposition "you will perform X" was previously activated by Balak's request that Balaam speak a curse on Israel (vv.11; 17). The use of LD in v.20b serves to activate the referent and simultaneously announce the assertion (X = ONLY THE WORDS I TELL YOU) of the following proposition. Therefore, the pragmatically structured proposition exhibits a constituent focus articulation where the fronted resumptive pronoun satisfies the value for X in the open presupposed proposition.[706]

706. Note also the function of the preceding אַךְ, which is used to restrict the referent of the constituent it

As a final note with respect to topic and focus announcing LDs, we note instances where LDs may serve a topic or focus announcing function in contexts where some additional coherence relation may be inferred. In these cases, we maintain that the (prototypical) discourse function of LD is constrained to the (re)activation of entities entertaining a low degree of accessibility. By contrast, other pragmatic implicatures that arise due to discoursal conditions pertaining to either the propositional content or discourse organization are constrained to the discourse profile of the construction (cf. §4.3).

In some tokens, for example, a contrastive relation exists between two propositions, the second of which happens to be in the form of an LD construction.[707] We contend, however, that the contrastive relation is not the result of the use of LD; that is, LD does not encode the contrastive meaning. Rather the contrastive relation is a pragmatic implicature that results as a natural consequence of the propositional content, information structure, and juxtaposition of the two propositions in question. In other words, the contrastive implicature would have been present even if LD was not used. The LD construction solely functions to facilitate the cognitive processing required for the (re)activation of an inaccessible entity. By contrast, in §6.3.3.2 we show that the processing constraint associated with the prototypical use of LD (i.e. PSRR) may be exploited in order to pragmatically inflate a contrastive or comparative implicature in contexts where it would have otherwise been left implicit.

6.3.3.3 Framing Left Dislocation

Lastly, like Topic and Focus Announcing LDs, Framing LDs accomplish the basic level function of (re)activating referents entertaining a low degree of accessibility. Unlike the former, however, with Framing LDs, the dislocated referent is not semantically coindexed in a total identity relation with an expression in the matrix clause (cf. §5.3.3). Rather, the (re)activated dislocate stands in a relevance relation to what follows (cf. §3.2.1). As such, it functions to restrict the interpretation of the following proposition to a certain semantic domain. The token in (210) is a good representative of this type:

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governs to "*only* what Yahweh says" (cf. Levinsohn, 2011:99).

707. Cf. Gen. 15.4, 17.14, Lev. 4.11–12; 15.18; 21.14; 22.8; 22.11; 22.23; Num. 9.13; Deut. 1.38; 39; 1 Kng. 12.17; 22.14; *inter alia.*

(210) 1 Sam. 2.13[708]

וּמִשְׁפַּט הַכֹּהֲנִים אֶת־הָעָם׃ כָּל־אִישׁ זֹבֵחַ׃ וּבָא נַעַר הַכֹּהֵן כִּבְשֵׁל הַבָּשָׂר וְהַמַּזְלֵג שְׁלֹשׁ־הַשִּׁנַּיִם בְּיָדוֹ׃

Now, the custom of the priests$_i$, anyone offering a sacrifice$_j$, the priests servant would come while the meat was boiling with a three-pronged fork in his hand.

The LD construction consists of two non-resumptive dislocated NPs, each representing a topic framing function. The first dislocate activates a referent that provides a general semantic frame (i.e. priestly customs), that constrains the interpretation of what follows. In turn, the second dislocate, likewise, activates a type identifiable referent that provides a more narrow semantic frame within the more general one that precedes—i.e. in this case, the event of offering a sacrifice). Both dislocates, then, exhibit a framing function: the first is more general, while the second is more narrow. Together, they function to constrain the interpretation of the following proposition(s).

The majority of Framing LDs not only constrain the interpretation of what follows, they also establish a pragmatic anchoring relation for the easy activation of a semantically linked element within the clause. Unlike the token in (210) above, the coherence relation between the dislocate and the linked element within the clause is one of partial identity or metonymy. Moreover, the linked element may function in either a topic or focal relation to the pragmatically structured proposition. Gen. 9.6 (211) is illustrative of the former type, while (212) is representative of the later:

(211) Gen. 9.6[709]

שֹׁפֵךְ דַּם הָאָדָם בָּאָדָם דָּמוֹ יִשָּׁפֵךְ כִּי בְצֶלֶם אֱלֹהִים עָשָׂה אֶת־הָאָדָם׃

"Whoever sheds the blood of man, by a man shall his blood be shed, for God made man in his own image."

The dislocate and the clause-internal topic expression stand in a metonymic (whole-part) relation as a result of the framing function accomplished by the LD construction. The use of LD activates the dislocated referent, which simultaneously establishes a semantic frame that functions to promote the accessibility status of the second of the two fronted constituents in

708. Cf. Lev. 11.33; 25.32–33: Num. 3:46–47; 34.6; 34.10.

709. Cf. Gen. 17.15; Exod. 9.6; 26.12; Lev. 11.33; 26.36 (secondary topic); 1 Sam. 3.11.

the clause (i.e. דָּמוֹ / "his blood").[710] Further, by activating the dislocate, the writer is able to employ דָּמוֹ as a ratified topic expression. This is accomplished through anchoring the referent to the dislocate by way of a possessive pronoun.

As we mentioned above, the clause-internal linked elements in Framing LDs are not constrained to the topic relation; they may also function as constituents within the focal domain of the proposition. See, for example (212) below:

(212) Josh. 21.40[711]

כָּל־הֶעָרִים לִבְנֵי מְרָרִי לְמִשְׁפְּחֹתָם הַנּוֹתָרִים מִמִּשְׁפְּחוֹת הַלְוִיִּם׀ וַיְהִי גּוֹרָלָם׀ עָרִים שְׁתֵּים עֶשְׂרֵה׃

As for the cities of the Merarite clans, that is, the remainder of the clans of the Levites$_i$, their lot$_i$ was twelve cities.

Josh. 21.8ff recounts the cities given by Israel to the various tribes of Levi. In v.40 a Framing LD is employed to reactivate a referent encoded by a complex NP. The newly activated dislocate establishes a frame that constrains the interpretation of the following proposition to a specific semantic domain (i.e. cities of the Merarite clans). The assertion of the proposition is then interpreted in light of this frame. The focal expression עָרִים שְׁתֵּים עֶשְׂרֵה / "twelve cities" is linked by a metonymic relation to the dislocate.

6.3.2 Activation of a New Attribute/Profile

Despite its particularly high degree of activation, a referent may still be encoded with an expression typically used for inaccessible referents[712] (i.e. structurally complex and highly informative), thus triggering the use of LD in accordance with the PSRR. With these tokens, it is often the case that the referential expression entails a modifying element of some kind (e.g. non-restrictive relative clause) that predicates some new attribute to the referent. LD is used non-prototypically in such instances, *not* merely to reactivate the referent, but to activate a new conceptual profile, according to which the referent is recast (cf. §4.2.3.3).

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710. We interpret the first of the two fronted constituents (i.e. בְּאָדָם / "by a man") as a marked focal constituent.

711. Cf. Num. 35.8; Josh. 21.40; 2 Sam. 21.5–6; 1 Kng. 17.20.

712. Recall that the Givenness Hierarchy's entailment scheme stipulates that referents of higher degrees of accessibility may be encoded by lower accessibility markers (cf. §2.3.4.3; §6.2).

In Gen 3.12, for example, the dislocated constituent represents an over-encoded referring expression.

(213) Gen. 3.12

וַיֹּאמֶר הָאָדָם הָאִשָּׁה אֲשֶׁר נָתַתָּה עִמָּדִי$_i$ הִוא$_i$ נָתְנָה־לִּי מִן־הָעֵץ וָאֹכֵל׃

The man said, "The woman who you gave to be with me$_i$, she$_i$ gave me from the tree and I ate."

The referent of the NP הָאִשָּׁה / "the woman" was recently mentioned in v.8 and is a salient participant in the immediate context. Therefore, unlike the referents in §6.3.1, the motivation for using an LD construction in this instance does not stem from the referent's low degree of accessibility. Rather, dislocation is used to recast the hearer's/reader's existing cognitive representation of the referent against a new conceptual profile. To accomplish this, the non-restrictive relative modifier אֲשֶׁר נָתַתָּה עִמָּדִי / "whom you gave to be with me" is added to the definite head N הָאִשָּׁה / "the woman". The use of LD is, therefore, not triggered by the referent itself, but the activation of a particular profile against which the referent is to be construed. By recasting the woman against this new conceptual profile, the man is able to implicitly implicate Yahweh as the one culpable for his own actions.

Moreover, this particular instance also functions as a Focus Announcing LD (cf. §6.3.1.2). The LD construction announces the assertion of the open proposition "X gave you fruit from the tree" activated by Yahweh's questioning in v.11. The proposition is pragmatically structured as a constituent-focus articulation, where the referent of the fronted pronoun supplies the value for X (=THE WOMAN) of the open proposition.

The token in (214) further illustrates this function:

(214) 2 Sam. 21.5–6[713]

וַיֹּאמְרוּ אֶל־הַמֶּלֶךְ הָאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר כִּלָּנוּ וַאֲשֶׁר דָּמָה־לָּנוּ נִשְׁמַדְנוּ מֵהִתְיַצֵּב בִּכְלֹ־גְּבֻל
יִשְׂרָאֵל׃ 6. יִנָּתֶן [יֻתַּן־]לָנוּ שִׁבְעָה אֲנָשִׁים מִבָּנָיו וְהוֹקַעֲנוּם לַיהוָה בְּגִבְעַת שָׁאוּל בְּחִיר
יְהוָה ס וַיֹּאמֶר הַמֶּלֶךְ אֲנִי אֶתֵּן׃

713. Cf. Gen. 3.3; 13.15; 24.7; Exod. 9.19; 32.1; 35.29; Num. 14.24; 17.3; Deut. 1.30; 1.39; Josh. 1.3; 1 Sam. 17.37; 25.27; 2 Sam. 21.5-6; 2 Sam. 24.17; 6.23; 1 Kng. 5.19; 13.33; 17.20; 2 Kng. 17.36; 22.18; 23.15.

And they said to the king, "As for the man who annihilated us and plotted to destroy us so that we would not exist within the whole territory of Israel$_i$, 6. let seven of his male descendents$_i$ be handed over to us so we may hang them in the presence of Yahweh at Gibeah of Saul, the chosen of Yahweh.' And the king said, 'I will give them."

In v.4, King David asks the Gibeonites what they require of him for the bloodguilt incurred by Saul as a result of killing the Gibeonites (vv.1–2). Their response in vv.5–6 comes in the form of a Framing LD. The referent SAUL, however, is presumably highly accessible in this context. Not only was he just mentioned in the narrative discourse in vv.1–2, his actions have precipitated the Gibeonite's meeting with the king. Yet, rather than referring to the referent with the default proper name "Saul", the Gibeonites employ an alternate complex referring expression in order to activate a new conceptual profile. This has the effect of forcing David (and the reader) to conceptualize SAUL in light of the qualities attributed to him by the expression. Moreover, the construction also serves a framing function by making accessible the referent of the metonymically linked phrase שִׁבְעָה אֲנָשִׁים מִבָּנָיו / "seven men from his sons".

6.3.3 Discontinuity

Constituting an even greater departure from the exemplar are LDs that function, not to facilitate cognitive processing, but to disrupt it (cf. hypothesis 6 in §6.1). In these cases, expectations derived from the communicative and cognitive principles of relevance (§2.3.3) are exploited in order to produce additional pragmatic implicatures. This happens as the result of the dislocation of referents that are already active or entertain a high degree of accessibility. Since there is no need to (re)active these referents, the use of LD in these contexts results in what Givón (1979:153–154) has called the "over-use of discourse machinery" (cf. §4.2.3.3). In other words, where the PSRR serves to facilitate cognitive processing under prototypical discoursal conditions, the opposite effect is created (i.e. interference) in contexts where the processing costs are already mitigated.

In Relevance-Theoretic terms, the hearer does not interpret the (over-)use of LD as cognitively relevant in these contexts since the processing cost required for the construction does not yield sufficient cognitive rewards (cf. 2.3.3). This disruption in cognitive processing, in turn, creates an epiphenomenon in which a discontinuity in the discourse is created—one which would not have otherwise been perceived. The reader is therefore forced—in accor-

dance with the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure[714]—to search for an alternative interpretation that satisfies her expectation of relevance. In other words, assuming the over-use of the construction and resultant discontinuity is a piece of ostensive communication, the reader infers the maximally relevant implicature—i.e. the interpretation that yields the greatest cognitive effects with the least amount of processing effort—in that particular context.[715] These additional pragmatic implicatures include, among others: marking a development shift in the discourse, marking a contrastive/comparative inference, or foregrounding the associated proposition. In light of our distinction between Discourse Function and Discourse Profile, however, it is perhaps more accurate to refer to the following three categories as non-prototypical salient discourse patterns (i.e. profiles; cf. §4.3) that trigger particular pragmatic effects.

6.3.3.1 Marking a Thematic Shift in the Discourse

In §4.2.3.3, we noted that the over-use of LD in spoken conversation is regularly used to disrupt the flow of discourse in order to prompt the hearer to infer that a thematic shift of some kind has occurred (cf. ex. [79]). Although perhaps not as frequent as in spoken discourse, this usage is nevertheless also attested in BH. See, for example (215) below:

(215) Lev. 13.45[716]

וְהַצָּרוּעַ אֲשֶׁר־בּוֹ הַנֶּגַע בְּגָדָיו יִהְיוּ פְרֻמִים וְרֹאשׁוֹ יִהְיֶה פָרוּעַ וְעַל־שָׂפָם יַעְטֶה וְטָמֵא ׀ טָמֵא יִקְרָא׃

"As for the person inflicted with a skin disease$_i$, his clothes$_i$ shall be torn and his hair shall hang loose, and he shall cover his upper lip and cry out, ' Unclean, unclean'."

Verses 43–44 introduce a person unclean from a grievous skin disease. Due to the referent's active status, the writer could have begun the sentence with the possessive NP בְּגָדָיו

714. The Comprehension Procedure stipulates that, when interpreting an utterance, the hearer/reader: a) Follow the path of least effort in computing cognitive effects: test interpretative hypothesis (disambiguation, reference resolution, implicatures, etc.) in order of accessibility, and b) Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied (Sperber and Wilson, 2004: 613) (cf.. §2.3.3).

715. In terms of classical Gricean theory, a speaker exploits the "Cooperative Principle" (i.e. conversational maxim of "Quantity"), which triggers a particular non-logical implicature on the part of the hearer. Similarly, in terms of Neo-Gricean theory (cf. Levinson, 1985:62-68), the speaker flouts the "Information Principle" (i.e. "I-Principle"), which stipulates that a speaker should not make her contribution more informative than is required. The recipient's corollary is to enrich or amplify the content of the speaker's utterance in order to locate the specific interpretation of what the recipient judges to be the speaker's intended point.

716. Cf. Gen. 48.7; 2 Sam. 13.13.

/ "his garments",[717] or some other high accessibility marker; instead, the writer chose to relexicalize the referent using a complex NP (defNP+restrictive relative) in a dislocated position. The intentional over-encoding of the referent, along with the over-use of LD disrupts the cognitive processing of the discourse. Assuming this over-use of discourse machinery to be a piece of ostensive communication, the hearer seeks the maximally relevant interpretation for this strategy in this context. This, then, yields the pragmatic implicature that a higher level thematic development has occurred. In this case, the LD signals a mainline[718] developmental shift from that of the introduction of the diseased person and the declaration of their uncleanness (vv. 43–44), to how he is to behave (vv.45–46).

In addition to marking a shift in the mainline development of a discourse, the discontinuity evoked by the over-use of LD also marks a thematic shift from mainline to offline discourse.[719] This is the function of the LD in Exod. 19.18 (216). Exodus 19:1–25 recounts Israel's arrival at Mt. Sinai, where Yahweh will reveal his covenant through Moses on the third day. On that day, the mountain is depicted as one filled with smoke, thunder, lighting, and a loud trumpet blast (v.15). After consecrating the people, Moses brings the people, trembling at the sight of the tumultuous mountain, to the foot of Sinai (v.17):

(216) Exod. 19.17–18[720]

וַיּוֹצֵא מֹשֶׁה אֶת־הָעָם לִקְרַאת הָאֱלֹהִים מִן־הַמַּחֲנֶה וַיִּתְיַצְּבוּ בְּתַחְתִּית הָהָר׃ 18. וְהַר סִינַי עָשַׁן כֻּלּוֹ מִפְּנֵי אֲשֶׁר יָרַד עָלָיו יְהוָה בָּאֵשׁ וַיַּעַל עֲשָׁנוֹ כְּעֶשֶׁן הַכִּבְשָׁן וַיֶּחֱרַד כָּל־הָהָר מְאֹד׃

717. We recognize the possibility that by simply beginning the clause with בְּגָדָיו / "his garments", the writer felt that it would result in ambiguity since the subject/topic of the previous clause is different than that of the referent of the possessive suffix. Nevertheless, the complex NP used, not to mention the use of LD in this context exhibits an over-use of discourse machinery.

718. By "mainline" we mean the main event line, steps of procedure, points of an argument, or commands of an exhortation that directly contribute to the speaker's/writer's primary communicative goal. This contrasts with material that is "offline" and, therefore, does not directly contribute to the speaker's goal but provides essential supportive material that assists, amplifies, and comments on the mainline information (Hopper and Thompson, 1980:280). A number of aliases are used in the literature for the mainline/offline distinction. These include, foreground/background and figure/ground, *inter alia*.

719. With respect to the ostensible contradiction that offline material cannot be thematic, Floor (2005:318) writes:

> "Thematic background information sounds like a contradiction in terms: how can information that is backgrounded at the same time be thematic and part of the macrostructure? Thematic backgrounding information as a concept is possible if it is recognized that some background information, backgrounded in the sense of being offline to the main event line of the narrative, is at the same time providing information that is critical to the correct construction of the mental macrostructure and situation model.

720. Cf. Gen. 47.21; Num. 17.3; 1 Kng. 6.7.

Then Moses brought the people out of the camp to meet God, and they stood at the foot of the mountain. 18 Now Mount Sinai$_i$, all of it$_i$ was wrapped in smoke because Yahweh had descended on it in fire. The smoke of it went up like the smoke of a kiln, and the whole mountain trembled greatly.

Although v.17 ends with the definite expression הָהָר / "the mountain", v.18 nevertheless begins with a dislocated constituent that encodes the same referent. What is more, in similar fashion to the previous example, the writer over-encodes the dislocate as well (i.e. הַר סִינַי / "Mount Sinai"). Because of the referent's highly active status, the writer could have facilitated the processing of the clause by beginning v.18 with ...עָשַׁן כֻּלּוֹ / "all of it was wrapped in smoke...." However, by using an LD construction with an over-encoded dislocate, the opposite effect occurs. Processing is disrupted resulting in a discontinuity in the discourse and simultaneously triggering the pragmatic implicature that a thematic shift has occurred. Unlike (215), however, the discourse profile of the LD in (216) indicates that the shift does not involve a thematic development of the mainline, but rather a shift from the main event-line to offline information. Verse 18a supplies necessary background information explaining why the mountain was filled with smoke.

6.3.3.2 Inflating a Contrastive/Comparative Inference

The discontinuity evoked by the over-use of LD may also serve to enhance a coherence relation, typically one of "contrast" or "comparison" (cf. §2.8.2), between two propositions that would have otherwise only been contextually implicit. As was stated in §6.3.1.2, LD in no way encodes the relations of "contrast" or "comparison". In other words, these relations are not explicit, but inferred on the basis of contextual assumptions resulting from the propositional content and juxtaposition of two or more clauses (cf. Blakemore, 2002: 89–148). The dislocation of a highly accessible entity, however, elicits an interruption in the processing of the discourse. This, in turn, results in a discontinuity which serves to pragmatically inflate an implicit coherence relation that exists between two entities or propositions. The use of LD in Deut. 18.14b (217) illustrates this function:

(217) Deut. 18.14[721]

כִּי ׀ הַגּוֹיִם הָאֵלֶּה אֲשֶׁר אַתָּה יוֹרֵשׁ אוֹתָם אֶל־מְעֹנְנִים וְאֶל־קֹסְמִים יִשְׁמָעוּ וְאַתָּה$_i$ לֹא כֵן נָתַן לְךָ$_i$ יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ׃

"For these nations which you are about to disposes listen to those who practice witchcraft and diviners, but as for you$_i$, Yahweh your God has not allowed you$_i$ to do this."

The contrastive relation between the nations—characterized as those who listen to those who practice witchcraft or divination (v.14a)—and the Israelites, who are prohibited from such activities is contextually inferable from both the content of the two propositions as well as their juxtaposition. Indeed, if one rereads v.18b without the dislocated pronoun, the contrastive relation is still inferable, albeit not as conspicuous. The interference of cognitive processing resulting from the over-use of LD for an active referent (i.e. Israelites) creates a discontinuity in the flow of discourse. This, in turn, prompts the reader to search for the most relevant interpretation of LD in this context. The reader finds that the dislocation of the pronoun creates a pragmatic enrichment of the contrastive relation that exists between the activities of the nations, and those prohibited by the Israelites.

In addition to contrast, LD may also be used to highlight a *comparative* relation between two juxtaposed propositions. This is the case, for example, in Gen. 24.27 (218):

(218) Gen. 24.26-27[722]

וַיִּקֹּד הָאִישׁ וַיִּשְׁתַּחוּ לַיהוָה׃ 27. וַיֹּאמֶר בָּרוּךְ יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵי אֲדֹנִי אַבְרָהָם אֲשֶׁר לֹא־עָזַב חַסְדּוֹ וַאֲמִתּוֹ מֵעִם אֲדֹנִי אָנֹכִי$_i$ בַּדֶּרֶךְ נָחַנִי$_i$ יְהוָה בֵּית אֲחֵי אֲדֹנִי׃

Then the man bowed down and worshipped Yahweh. 27. He said, "Blessed be Yahweh, the God of my master Abraham, who has not forsaken his steadfast love and his faithfulness toward my master. As for me$_i$, Yahweh has led me$_i$ in the way to the house of my master's relatives."

Yahweh's swift answer to the prayer of Abraham's servant (v.14) evokes an immediate response of worship and praise. In v.27a, the servant blesses Yahweh on account of his covenantal love and faithfulness to his master, Abraham. In v.27b, the servant extols Yahweh

721. Cf. Lev. 14.6.

722. Cf. Gen. 6.21; 17.17; 19.38; 21.13; 22.24; 24.27; 4.22; Lev. 25.44; Deut. 12.22; 28.56; Judg. 11.24; 1 Sam. 13.2; 2 Sam. 16.19.

further by recounting his faithfulness in leading the servant to Laban's house. The comparison between Yahweh's faithfulness to Abraham and his faithfulness to the servant is inferable from the content and juxtaposition of the propositions in v.27. The dislocation of the active referent (1cs pronoun) in v.27b, however, disrupts the flow of discourse between these two related propositions, thus making the comparative implicature more explicit and accentuates Yahweh's faithfulness.

An additional example is found in Gen. 4.4 (219). The brothers Cain and Abel are both salient participants in Gen. 4. After they are introduced in vv.1–2, the writer recounts Cain's offering of the fruits of the ground to Yahweh (v.3). This is immediately followed by an LD construction beginning v.4:

(219) Gen. 4.4

וְהֶ֔בֶל$_i$ הֵבִ֥יא גַם־ה֖וּא$_i$ מִבְּכֹרֹ֣ות צֹאנ֑וֹ וּמֵחֶלְבֵהֶ֗ן וַיִּשַׁ֤ע יְהוָה֙ אֶל־הֶ֔בֶל וְאֶל־מִנְחָתֹֽו׃

And Abel$_i$, he$_i$ also brought of the firstborn of his flock and of their fat portions. And Yawheh had regard for Abel and his offering.

Although the need to switch between two active topics often precipitates the fronting of the new topical referent in BH (cf. Van der Merwe et al. 1999; Heimerdinger, 1999; Floor, 2004), this is not what we find in v.4. Rather, the highly accessible referent and new topic "ABEL" is expressed with a proper name in a dislocated position. Like with the previous examples, the over-use of LD in this context creates a discontinuity in the flow of discourse. As a result, the implicit comparative relation between the two juxtaposed propositions in vv.3–4 is pragmatically enhanced.[723]

6.3.3.3 Marking Salient Information in the Discourse

Finally, the over-use of LD is sometimes used as a "foregrounding mechanism" (cf. Heimerdinger, 1999:223–225) to draw attention to information that the writer considers especially salient in the immediate discourse context. This function derives from the same exploitative processes involved in the over-use of LD to mark thematic shifts or to inflate contrastive/comparative implicatures. In these contexts, however, the unexpected disruption in the flow of discourse has the pragmatic effect of throwing into relief the propositional infor-

723. The use of גַּם here is used to evoke the notion of noteworthy addition, thus further confirming our interpretation (cf. Van der Merwe et al. 1999:315).

mation following the dislocated constituent. This explains the use of LD, for instance, in Exod. 4.9 in (220) below:

(220) Exod. 4.9[724]

וְהָיָה אִם־לֹא יַאֲמִינוּ גַּם לִשְׁנֵי הָאֹתוֹת הָאֵלֶּה וְלֹא יִשְׁמְעוּן לְקֹלֶךָ וְלָקַחְתָּ מִמֵּימֵי הַיְאֹר
וְשָׁפַכְתָּ הַיַּבָּשָׁה וְהָיוּ הַמַּיִם אֲשֶׁר תִּקַּח מִן־הַיְאֹר וְהָיוּ לְדָם בַּיַּבָּשֶׁת׃

"And if they will not believe even these two signs or listen to what you say, you shall take some water from the Nile and pour it on the dry ground; And the water you take from the Nile, it will become blood on the dry ground."

If the first two signs fail to convince the Israelites and Egypt's Pharaoh, Yahweh tells Moses to take water from the Nile and pour it on the dry ground. After this proposition, the reader naturally expects the active referent WATER FROM THE NILE to be pronominally encoded, either by an independent pronoun *in situ*, or by zero anaphor. Surprisingly, however, the writer uses a dislocation construction and over-encodes the dislocated referent.[725] The flouting of expectations disrupts the flow of discourse which has the added pragmatic effect of marking the following, unexpected proposition וְהָיוּ לְדָם בַּיַּבָּשֶׁת / "it shall become blood on the dry ground" as especially salient in this context.

Another example is found in Josh. 23.9 (221). In this verse, Joshua recounts Yahweh's faithfulness to his promises to drive out other nations from the land (cf. Deut. 7.1; 7.24; 11.23, 11.25; Josh. 1.5).

(221) Josh. 23.9

וַיּוֹרֶשׁ יְהוָה מִפְּנֵיכֶם גּוֹיִם גְּדֹלִים וַעֲצוּמִים וְאַתֶּם$_i$ לֹא־עָמַד אִישׁ בִּפְנֵיכֶם$_i$ עַד הַיּוֹם הַזֶּה׃

"For Yahweh has driven out before you great and powerful nations. And as for you$_i$, no man has been able to stand before you$_i$ to this day."

The unexpected dislocation of the pronoun in v.9b, however, creates a disruption in the flow of discourse. Indeed, without the pronoun, the discourse proceeds as the reader would

724. Cf. Gen. 21.12; 47.21; Num. 18.8a; 21.8; Judg. 5.3; 1 Sam. 20.8.

725. Note that this token represents a highly non-prototypical usage of the וְהָיוּ—the plural form of the verb וַיְהִי. It appears as though the first occurrence of this form (i.e. preceding the dislocate) is a case where the verb is used in analogy to the discourse marker וַיְהִי—one that, typically, need not agree in person or number with a subject.

expect. The discontinuity, however, functions to trigger an additional pragmatic effect in which the following proposition in v.9b is thrown into relief.

6.3.4 Substantive Left Dislocation

As mentioned elsewhere (cf. §3.2.1), cognitive linguists and construction grammarians have long observed that constructions tend to occur on a continuum between those that are more schematic and those that are more substantive (cf. Croft and Cruse, 2004:225–247). More schematic constructions exhibit abstracted generalized templates where sequential open slots may be filled by a variety of different words or phrases (cf. Taylor, 1995:198). By contrast, constructions with fixed components that occur in the same slot in every instance are considered more substantive. For the most part, the functional description of LDs in §6.3.1–§6.3.3 have involved more schematic instantiations. The present section, however, aims to evaluate the discourse function of three, more substantive LD schemas that have, to some degree, conventionalized different aspects of their discourse profiles such that they have taken on a formulaic interpretation. Nevertheless, as we will see, these constructions, for the most part, exhibit the same discourse functions described above, while less often, they exhibit an additional, albeit motivated, discourse function.

6.3.4.1 Conditional Left Dislocation

In §5.4.6 we introduced a non-prototypical LD schema that we referred to as "conditional LDs". This type of LD exhibits a more substantive syntactico-semantic profile, one which is characterized by an indefinite phrase or a personal pronoun (rare) in dislocated position and is followed by the particle כִּי, which opens the initial protasis clause of a conditional construction.[726] Virtually every instantiation of a conditional LD occurs in legal contexts,[727] specifically the so-called casuistic laws in Leviticus and Numbers.[728]

We contend that the use of this formulaic construction functions to elicit the same pragmatic effects discussed in §6.3.3.1. In other words, conditional LDs create a discontinuity in the discourse that, in turn, prompts the reader to infer that a developmental shift has oc-

726. On rare occasions (1 Kng. 9.4; Lev. 15.18), the particle אִם or conjunction וְ is used.

727. Cf. Khan (1988:98) who contends that this constructional type also primarily occurs in legal contexts in post-Biblcial law corpora (e.g. the Qumran text "The Rule of the Community" and the halak̲ic works of the Tannaim).

728. By contrast, see 1 Kng. 8:37–39; 9.4.

curred.[729] For example, the majority of conditional LDs exhibit a dislocated indefinite pronoun (cf. §5.4.6.1), as in Lev. 2.1:[730]

(222) Lev. 2.1

וְנֶ֫פֶשׁ$_i$ כִּֽי־תַקְרִ֣יב קָרְבַּ֣ן מִנְחָ֣ה לַֽיהוָ֗ה סֹ֚לֶת יִהְיֶ֣ה קָרְבָּנ֔וֹ$_i$ וְיָצַ֥ק עָלֶ֖יהָ שֶׁ֑מֶן וְנָתַ֥ן עָלֶ֖יהָ לְבֹנָֽה׃

"Anyone$_i$, if they bring a grain offering to Yahweh, their offering$_i$ shall be of fine flour. They shall pour olive oil on it and put frankincense on it."

By dislocating a short and uninformative indefinite pronoun like נֶ֫פֶשׁ / "anyone", the flow of discourse is interrupted. This results in a discontinuity between the preceding and subsequent discourse. From this, the reader infers that a mainline thematic development has occurred—i.e. a shift between "laws pertaining to burnt offerings" (vv. 1:1–17) and "laws pertaining to grain offerings" (vv. 2:1–16).

Moreover, this formula also occurs with dislocated indefinite NPs. For example, the discussion of Lev. 13.9–17 surrounds the purity status of a person with a severe skin disease with exposed בָּשָׂר חַי / "raw flesh". In v.18 (223), however, a thematic development is signaled between the בָּשָׂר חַי (vv.9–17) to that of נֶגַע־צָרַעַת / "infectious skin disease" (vv.18–23).

(223) Lev. 13.18–19[731]

וּבָשָׂר$_i$ כִּֽי־יִהְיֶ֥ה בּ֛וֹ$_i$ בְּעֹרֵ֖ו שְׁחִ֑ין וְנִרְפָּֽא׃ 19. וְהָיָ֗ה בִּמְקֹ֛ום הַשְּׁחִ֥ין שְׂאֵ֖ת לְבָנָ֣ה אֹ֑ו בַּהֶ֣רֶת לְבָנָ֣ה אֲדַמְדֶּ֔מֶת וְנִרְאָ֖ה אֶל־הַכֹּהֵֽן׃

"A body$_i$, if it has a sores on its skin$_i$ and it heals, 19. and a white swelling or a reddish-white spot develops where the boil was, the person must show himself to the priest."

729. It is plausible, however, on the basis of the construction's substantive form, as well as with the discursive constraints on its use in legal contexts, that this particular form-function pairing has become conventionalized. If this is the case, what was described in §6.3.3.1 as a pragmatic *implicature* deriving from an exploitative use of LD in an unexpected discourse profile, may, in this instance, be better described as a conversational *explicature*. In other words, this particular form may have come to encode this particular function.

730. Cf. Lev. 2.1; 7.20; 21; 13.29; 15.16; 15.19; 15.25; 19.20; 20.27; 22.14; 22.21; Num. 30.4. In two instances the dislocate is realized by a personal pronoun: Num. 5.20; 1 Kng. 9.4. Moreover, the following tokens occur immediately after a quotative frame introducing a new span of reported speech: Lev. 1.2; 4.2; 5.15; 21; 12.2; 13.2; Num. 5.6; 5.12–15; 6.2; 9.10; 27.8; 30.3.

731. Cf. Lev. 13.2; 13.18; 13.24–25; 22.11; 22.12.

The reader infers this development as the result of the discontinuity produced by the dislocation of the generic indefinite NP בָּשָׂר / "flesh"—the referent of which is highly accessible from the immediate context of vv.9–17.

6.3.4.2 Left Dislocation with Anaphoric כֵּן

LD constructions formally characterized by a fronted resumptive adverb כֵּן represent a second substantive type. That these constructions are more formulaic than schematic is confirmed by the fact that the dislocated constituent, in virtually every instance, is realized by a PP headed by either כְּ or כַּאֲשֶׁר (cf. §5.4.5.1). Moreover, not unlike Framing LDs, the dislocated PP (re)activates accessible information that functions as a comparative frame. This, in turn, constrains the interpretation of the associated matrix clause by providing the basis by which the matrix proposition is compared.

Further, the propositional information communicated by these constructions share a similar semantic profile. This profile is schematically represented as follows: "כַּאֲשֶׁר / כְּ X_i כֵּן$_i$ Y", where X typically consists of an abstract accessible proposition that reasserts, in generalized fashion, some state of affairs between participant A and participant B that took place within the previous stretch of discourse—i.e. "(As) Yahweh commanded Moses"; and, in turn, Y asserts that participant C has acted in conformity to X—i.e. "(So) the Israelites did." In this way, the dislocate functions to reframe an accessible, and in some cases, active proposition. The construction as a whole may be interpreted as a summery statement pertaining to the discourse unit that precedes.

In light of this semantic profile, it is not surprising therefore that the use of this discursive formula prototypically occurs at the close of a span of reported speech, or a narrative scene or episode (i.e. the discourse-profile). The consistent pairing of this substantive form with the particular semantic and discourse profile results in a formulaic construction that becomes a convention in BH narrative for marking the close of a unit of discourse.[732]

For example, Num. 5.1–4 represents a discrete discourse unit of reported speech in which Yahweh instructs Moses that he is to expel from the camp anyone who has become unclean by bodily discharge, exposure to a corpse, or a skin disease. Then, in v.4, represented in (224) below, we read the following:

732. Note that in several instances, the construction is followed by the paragraph markers Setuma (ס): Exod. 12.28; 12.50; 27.8; 40.16; Num. 2.17; 8.22; 17.26; Or Petukha (פ): Exod. 39.32; 39.43; Num. 5.4; Deut. 8.20; 2 Sam. 16.19.

(224) Num. 5.4[733]

וַיַּעֲשׂוּ־כֵן בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וַיְשַׁלְּחוּ אוֹתָם אֶל־מִחוּץ לַמַּחֲנֶה כַּאֲשֶׁר דִּבֶּר יְהוָה אֶל־מֹשֶׁה כֵּן עָשׂוּ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל׃

And the Israelites did so. And they sent them outside the camp. As Yahweh had instructed Moses_i, so_i the Israelites did.

The Israelite's obedience to the instructions given to Moses is stated in v.4a. The use of LD in v.4b functions to reframe the previously activated proposition—"The Israelites did so" (v.4a)—with a comparative proposition that reasserts the source of the instruction. This has the added effect of simultaneously summarizing and signaling the close of the discursive unit.

Another example is found in Exod. 12.28, represented in (231) below. Verses 21–27 record Moses's instructions to the Israelite elders concerning the passover rite. Then, similar to (224) above, the reported speech ends, and the narration resumes in v.28a with a statement asserting that the Israelites were obedient to the aforementioned instructions:

(225) Exod. 12.28

וַיֵּלְכוּ וַיַּעֲשׂוּ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוָּה יְהוָה אֶת־מֹשֶׁה וְאַהֲרֹן כֵּן עָשׂוּ׃

Then the Israelites went and did so; as Yahweh commanded Moses and Aaron_i, so_i they did.

In v.28b, however, an LD construction is used in which the activated assertion from v.28a is reframed by a comparative proposition encoded by the dislocated PP. Although Moses is the one instructing the elders (cf. v.21), the dislocated PP in v.28b reasserts the original source of the instruction. The formula as a whole, however, provides a generic summary statement for what precedes and functions to signal the close of the reported speech unit begun in v.21.

Additionally, at least one token shares the functional profile exhibited in §6.3.3.2. In other words, rather than functioning prototypically to mark the close of a discursive unit, this construction may also be used to enhance a contrastive/comparative relation by creating a discontinuity in the flow of discourse. This is the case in Josh. 23.15, represented in (226) below.

Just prior to this verse, in v.14, Joshua comforts the people in light of his imminent death by reminding them that Yahweh has been faithful to do all of the good things that he

733. Cf. Gen. 6.22; Exod. 7.6; 12.50; 25.9; 27.8; 39.32; 39.42; 39.43; 40.16; Num. 2.17; 2.34; 5.4; 8.4; 8.22; 9.5; 15.14; 17.26; 36.10; Deut. 8.20; Josh. 10.39; 11.15; 14.5; Judg. 1.7; 2 Sam. 7.17; 9.11; 13.35; 16.19; 1 Kng. 1.37; 2.38; 16.11.

had promised. In v.15, however, this active propositional content is dislocated by the PP and then resumed by an anaphoric כֵּן.

(226) Josh. 23.14–15

וְהִנֵּה אָנֹכִי הוֹלֵךְ הַיּוֹם בְּדֶרֶךְ כָּל־הָאָרֶץ וִידַעְתֶּם בְּכָל־לְבַבְכֶם וּבְכָל־נַפְשְׁכֶם כִּי
לֹא־נָפַל דָּבָר אֶחָד מִכֹּל ו הַדְּבָרִים הַטּוֹבִים אֲשֶׁר דִּבֶּר יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵיכֶם עֲלֵיכֶם הַכֹּל
בָּאוּ לָכֶם לֹא־נָפַל מִמֶּנּוּ דָּבָר אֶחָד: 15. וְהָיָה כַּאֲשֶׁר־בָּא עֲלֵיכֶם כָּל־הַדָּבָר הַטּוֹב
אֲשֶׁר דִּבֶּר יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵיכֶם אֲלֵיכֶם כֵּן יָבִיא יְהוָה עֲלֵיכֶם אֵת כָּל־הַדָּבָר הָרָע
עַד־הַשְׁמִידוֹ אוֹתְכֶם מֵעַל הָאֲדָמָה הַטּוֹבָה הַזֹּאת אֲשֶׁר נָתַן לָכֶם יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵיכֶם:

"Look, I am going the way of all the earth, and you know with all your heart and all your soul that none of the good promises Yahweh your God made to you has failed. Everything was fulfilled for you; not one promise has failed. 15. But just as all the good things that Yahweh your God promised you have been fulfilled$_i$, so$_i$ he will bring on you every bad thing until he has annihilated you from this good land Yahweh your God has given you.

This has the effect of disrupting the flow discourse and inflating the contrastive relation between the dislocated active proposition and the newly asserted proposition encoded by the matrix clause.

6.3.4.3 Temporal Left Dislocation

A final substantive type involves LDs characterized by a dislocated temporal expression. Unfortunately, constraints on space prohibit a full investigation of this construction here. Indeed, due its frequency of use and its varied distribution, a comprehensive description of this constructional type—which accounts for the range of syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic variables—would require a dissertation length study of its own.[734] Nevertheless a few brief remarks are in order.

In §5.4.7, the inclusion of this constructional schema as a non-prototypical member within the LD category was justified based on its syntactico-semantic features. By way of review, this type of LD is identified by the dislocation of a temporal expression of some kind before an associated matrix clause. The temporal dislocates are identified as such by a lexico-grammatical temporal marker of some kind and typically lack a resumptive/linked element within the clause. The dislocated (i.e. extra-clausal) status is therefore identified in most cases

734. This is the central focus of a PhD dissertation currently in progress by James Coakley from the University of Stellenbosch.

by a clause initial וְ (either *wayyiqtol*, *weqatal*, or וְ + fronted XP).[735] Moreover, in a majority of tokens, the dislocate is preceded by the discourse markers וַיְהִי or וְהָיָה.

Predictably, the functional profile of this constructional type also occupies a non-prototypical status. As a preliminary hypothesis, we submit that this type of LD generally functions to create a discontinuity between the mainline events of a narrative by activating a 'temporal stage-topic'[736] (cf. §2.4.5; §2.8.1) that specifies or updates the reference time[737] of a scene or episode (cf. Van der Merwe, 1999; Van der Merwe et al. 1999; Floor, 2004).[738] The specification of the reference time may occur at the onset of a scene, a development within an episode, or the concluding scene of an episode. For example, in 2 Kng. 4.11, the discontinuity produced by the dislocated temporal expression signals the onset of a new episode:

(227) 2 Kng. 4.11[739]

וַיְהִ֣י הַיּ֔וֹם וַיָּבֹ֥א שָׁ֖מָּה וַיָּ֣סַר אֶל־הָעֲלִיָּ֑ה וַיִּשְׁכַּב־שָֽׁמָּה׃

One day, he came there and turned in to the upper chamber and rested there.

Moreover, the LD may serve to update the reference time of an event in a scene. In most instances, the updated reference time provides the temporal frame, or stage-topic, for a subsequent event (cf. Van der Merwe, et al., forthcoming). This is the case, for instance in Gen. 20.13 below:

735. By contrast, only three tokens were found that exhibit a resumptive temporal expression within the matrix clause: Exod. 19.1; Num. 9.17a; 2 Sam. 5.24 (cf. §5.4.7.4).

736. Stage-topics were defined in §2.4.5 as deictic orientation devices employed to establish the spatio-temporal framing information necessary for the accurate interpretation of the following clause or discourse unit. In this way they serve as strategic devices used to facilitate the comprehension of a text by creating coherence and signaling text segmentation (cf. Virtanen, 1992, 2004).

737. "Reference Time refers to that point in time that provides one with a vantage point from which an event is viewed" (Van der Merwe, 1999:94). This is distinguished from "Event Time" (i.e. the time of the event itself), and "Speech Time" (i.e. when reference to an event is made) (ibid.).

738. In his study on the formal and functional profile of וַיְהִי in 1 Samuel, Van der Merwe (1999:112) writes, "...breaking the wayyiqtol sequence in biblical Hebrew is normally associated with some type of discontinuity between events on the time-line".

739. Cf. Gen. 6.21; 22.21; 27.1; 38.1; 48.1; Josh. 1.1; 5.1; Judg. 1.1; 5.1; 5.13; 9.1; 11.1; 23.1; 24.29; Judg. 1.1; 6.25; 2 Sam. 1.1; 10.1; 15.1; 2 Sam. 11.1; 1 Kng. 9.1; 18.1; 2 Kng. 2.1; 6.24. For tokens that signify a development within an episode, see: Gen. 26.8; 26.32; 30.25; 31.10; 38.24; 38.27; Exod. 16.13; Judg. 3.27; 8.33; 16.4; 1 Sam. 16.6; 18.6; 20.35; 2 Sam. 2.21; 8.1; 11.14; 15.7; 17.21; 21.18; 31.8; 1 Kng. 13.23; 18.36. For those that signify the concluding scene of an episode, see. Gen. 39.7; 40.20; Deut. 31.24; 2 Kng. 19.35.

(228) Gen. 20.13[740]

וַיְהִי כַּאֲשֶׁר הִתְעוּ אֹתִי אֱלֹהִים מִבֵּית אָבִי וָאֹמַר לָהּ זֶה חַסְדֵּךְ אֲשֶׁר תַּעֲשִׂי עִמָּדִי אֶל כָּל־הַמָּקוֹם אֲשֶׁר נָבוֹא שָׁמָּה אִמְרִי־לִי אָחִי הוּא׃

"And when God caused me to wander from my father's house, I said to her, 'This is how you will show your loyalty to me: at everywhere we go, say of me, "he is my brother"'."

Lastly, Van der Merwe, et al. (forthcoming) avers that, in cases where the temporal proximity of two events on the time-line is involved,[741] the וְיִהִי preceding the dislocate functions to minimize the inherent discontinuity triggered by the dislocated temporal expression, thus allowing speakers to "describe the immediate temporal proximity of two events, without breaking the mainstream of events in the scene". Furthermore, "these constructions are often used at the climax of a scene in order to signal what triggered a climactic event". In these contexts, the content of a preceding proposition (usually the main verb) is repeated in the following dislocated temporal expression. The result is a cohesive device referred to in the literature as "Tail-Head Linkage" (cf. Hengeveld and Mackenzie, 2008:3; de Vries, 2005; Levinsohn, 2001:197–200). The use of this device has the effect of slowing down the discourse while maintaing continuity with what precedes. This has the pragmatic effect of throwing the subsequent proposition(s) into sharp relief. A good illustration of this occurs in Gen. 19:16–17:

(229) Gen. 19:16–17[742]

וַיִּתְמַהְמָהּ ׀ וַיַּחֲזִקוּ הָאֲנָשִׁים בְּיָדוֹ וּבְיַד־אִשְׁתּוֹ וּבְיַד שְׁתֵּי בְנֹתָיו בְּחֶמְלַת יְהוָה עָלָיו וַיֹּצִאֻהוּ וַיַּנִּחֻהוּ מִחוּץ לָעִיר׃ 17. וַיְהִי כְהוֹצִיאָם אֹתָם הַחוּצָה וַיֹּאמֶר הִמָּלֵט עַל־נַפְשֶׁךָ אַל־תַּבֵּט אַחֲרֶיךָ וְאַל־תַּעֲמֹד בְּכָל־הַכִּכָּר הָהָרָה הִמָּלֵט פֶּן־תִּסָּפֶה׃

But he lingered. So the men seized him and his wife and his two daughters by the hand, because of Yahweh's compassion for him; and they brought him out and set him outside the city. 17 And as they brought them out, one said, "Escape for your life! Do not look back or stop anywhere in the valley. Escape to the hills or you will be swept away."

740. Cf. Gen. 44.24; 1 Kng. 13.31.

741. In these instances, the dislocate is typically headed by the preposition כְּ.

742. Gen. 24.30; 39.13; 39.15; 39.19; Num. 11.25; Josh. 6.20; Judg. 11.35; 1 Sam. 4.18; 1 Kng. 14.6; 15.21; 16.18; 19.13; 21.16.

Despite the angel's warning in v.15, Lot resists leaving Sodom, and therefore, he and his family are seized by the visitors and brought outside the city (v.16). The initial dislocate beginning v.17 is preceded by וַיְהִי and repeats the final proposition of v.16 by way of a temporal expression headed by כְּ. This updates the reference time of the subsequent event as one of immediate temporal proximity with what precedes, while maintaing continuity between the mainline events of the scene. Moreover, the use of tail-head linkage slows down the processing of the discourse which has the effect of foregrounding, or highlighting the following propositional event. In this case, it is the insistent urging by the angel that Lot and his family flee the city at once.

6.4 Left Dislocation in Biblical Hebrew: A Developmental Perspective

In light of the diverse formal and functional profile of LD in BH narrative described in chapters 5 and 6, we offer a few brief remarks from the perspective of a usage-based conception of language change within a panchronic view of grammar, as outlined in §4.3. The aim here is not to argue for any specific claims regarding the particular developmental paths of the LD construction in BH, as this would require an independent study of its own. Our aim is, rather, a more modest one. We only wish to provide, in broad-sweeping form, a plausible developmental hypothesis that would explain the synchronic variation—both in terms of syntactico-semantic and discourse functional attributes—of LD in BH by taking into account diachronic processes that concord with generalized typologically attested patterns of language change.

Recall that in §4.3, we noted that a central tenet of the usage-based approach stipulates that grammar is a dynamic system that is constantly changing by virtue of extra-grammatical forces involved in language use. Moreover, the frequency with which particular patterns are used over time provides a path between the extra-grammatical and the grammatical (cf. Hawkins, 1994, 2003). The more frequent a particular form occurs with a particular discourse profile(s), the more likely it is that a form-function conventionalization will become entrenched, or grammaticalized in the grammar. This is precisely what we contend has occurred with prototypical LDs in BH.[743] It is reasonable to believe that the same factors that gave rise to the innovation of the constructional scheme in other languages, likewise led to the use of the construction in the proto-grammar of Hebrew which eventually evolved into the grammar(s) we see in the biblical text (BH). Specifically, competing cognitive and communicative

743. We include in this category prototypical and non-prototypical formal types that intersect with the prototypical discourse function of the (re)activation of a referent entertaining a less than optimal degree of accessibility.

constraints (i.e. PSRR) motivated the use of an optimally tailored bifurcated form which economically accomplished the intended goal: the (re)activation of an entity with a low degree of accessibility. The frequent use of this form-function correlation engendered a salient discourse pattern that eventually grammaticalized[744] into a conventionalized constructional schema.

Furthermore, that the more prototypical LDs in our corpus are highly schematic is consistent with the usage-based approach. As the construction became more entrenched in the grammar, it undergoes increased schematization as a result of the deduction of schematic patterns based on the shared attributes of instantiated types. Recall that levels of abstraction (schematic patterns) are built up through categorization of similar instances of use (i.e. types) into more abstract representations (Bybee, 2010:9). As language users experience specific instantiations of a construction type, they map similar instantiations to establish schematic exemplars that represent the fixed attributes and schematic slots in the generalized constructional pattern.

Now, the further entrenched in the grammar a (prototypical) constructional schema becomes, the more likely it is that the schema's productivity will also increase; that is, the more likely it is that the construction will be co-opted for novel uses. This happens as a result of a variety of potential mechanisms (i.e. reanalysis, analogy, or borrowing, cf. §4.3). In short, the frequent use of the construction in unconventional discourse profiles may give rise to new salient discourse patterns. Indeed, we see evidence of this in BH (cf. §6.3.3). The frequent use of LD in marked discourse profiles and the non-prototypical inferences generated by this exploitative usage may become privileged and thereby elevated to the status of a new salient discourse pattern. From here, it is possible that these non-prototypical patterns became conventionalized such that they encode, or grammaticalize their salient discourse profile. In this case, the profile may become a new prototypical form-function convention. Moreover, it is conceivable that this is precisely how the more substantive constructional types discussed in §6.3.4, developed such a substantive (formulaic) profile.

The diverse profile of LD in BH offered here likely represents co-evolving layers of form-function (form-inference) correlations at different positions on a developmental path to conventionalization. A panchronic, usage-based perspective, therefore, provides a plausible explanation for what may appear to be—from a purely synchronic perspective at least—arbitrary form-function correlations.

744. Our use of the term 'grammaticalization' entails a broader notion than mere morphological shortening (cf. §4.3).

6.5 Summary and Conclusion

The present chapter consists of an evaluation of our data set in light of six hypotheses (§6.1). The result was a motivated explanation of the syntactico-semantic profile of LD construction in BH narrative (chapter 5), in terms of both its cognitive-pragmatic discourse profile(s) (§6.2) as well as its prototypical and non-prototypical discourse-function(s) (§6.3–§6.4).

We began by evaluating hypotheses 1–3. This was accomplished by analyzing our data with respect to three competing cognitive-pragmatic parameters: 1) degree of accessibility of the dislocate (§6.2.1-6.2.3), 2) pragmatic relations satisfied by the resumptive/linked elements (§6.2.4), and 3) the persistence of the dislocate (§6.2.5). We concluded from this analysis that the use of LD in BH discourse is not unmotivated but heavily constrained, and not arbitrarily so. Moreover, this is particularly the case with respect to the proclivity for dislocates to entertain low degrees of accessibility and *ipso facto* be encoded by complex referring expressions (cf. §6.2.6).

Having established the motivation for the use of LD in §6.2, in §6.3 we moved to describe the discourse-functional profile of LD in terms of an exemplar model of category structure (hypotheses 4–6). We argue that the basic-level (prototypical) discourse function of LD in BH is the (re)activation of referents that are assumed to entertain low degrees of accessibility in the mind of the addressee. The otherwise simultaneous tasks of recalling identifiable but low-accessible referents and interpreting those referents role in the proposition, requires a high degree of cognitive effort—both in terms of formulation (writer) and processing (addressee). The LD construction is employed in order to mitigate this heavy cognitive cost. The bifurcated form of the construction is optimally tailored to facilitate the processing of these two cognitive tasks by removing the need for the hearer to accomplish both tasks simultaneously, which would increase the risk of a breakdown in communication. In addition to (re)activation, the dislocation simultaneously serves to ratify a referent as an acceptable primary or secondary topic (§6.3.1.1). In this way, prototypical LDs may be construed as 'Topic Announcing' constructions. Moreover, two extensions of the ratification process were described as 'Focus Announcing' (§6.3.1.2) and 'Framing' (§6.3.3.3), respectively.

As an extension of the basic-level function, it was shown in §6.3.2 that LD is employed not for the (re)activation of a referent, but rather to activate a new conceptual profile within which the already accessible referent is recast. Moreover, LDs located at an even further remove from the exemplar are those that, in contrast to the prototype, are used to disrupt cognitive processing resulting in a discontinuity in the flow of discourse. In these cases, expectations derived from the communicative and cognitive principles of relevance are

exploited in order to produce additional pragmatic implicatures. This happens as highly accessible referents are dislocated, resulting in an over-use of discourse machinery. The pragmatic implicatures produced by the over-use of LD include: those that mark a thematic shift in the discourse (§6.3.3.1), those that inflate a contrastive/comparative inference (§6.3.3.2), and those that mark salient information (§6.3.3.3).

In contrast to the highly schematic nature of the tokens described in §6.3.1–§6.3.3, a functional analysis of three, more substantive LD types were described in §6.3.4. Although the functional profile of these constructions correspond, for the most part, to non-prototypical discourse patterns described in §6.3.3, it was argued that these constructions have ostensibly formalized aspects of their respective usage patterns such that they have developed into discrete form-function conventions.

Finally, we concluded this chapter by providing a plausible explanation for the synchronic variation of LD in BH by taking into account diachronic processes that are consistant with generalized typologically attested patterns of language change.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

Due to the extensive summary and conclusion sections throughout chapters 2–6, the present chapter will be brief. We begin by providing a succinct overview of our study (§7.1), including the central hypothesis of this study, the methodological approach taken, and the findings issued. This is followed by suggestions of several avenues in need of further research (§7.2). Lastly, we offer a few concluding remarks (§7.3).

7.1 Hypotheses and Research Results

The overall hypothesis for this study, as stated in chapter 1, was as follows:

> 1. A more unified and comprehensive syntactico-semantic and discourse functional profile of LD in BH is preferable by means of the following:
>
> > a. The application of a cognitive-functional framework derived from contemporary research in the distinct but compatible fields of cognitive linguistics, pragmatics, psycholinguistics, and information structure theory.
> >
> > b. The application of typological insights garnered from cross-linguistic research on LD from a variety of related and unrelated languages from differing theoretical points of view.

Although the present work has not answered every question regarding the formal and functional profile of LD in BH (cf. §7.2 below), the aforementioned hypothesis was, nevertheless, confirmed by both the syntactico-semantic description of LD in BH offered in chapter 5, along with the discourse-functional explanation in chapter 6. Moreover, we also proposed several ancillary hypotheses (§1.4) that were also confirmed by our study.

From a detailed survey of cross-linguistic research on the syntactico-semantic profile of LD (chapter 3), we have argued for several typological generalizations, which consist of the following:

> 1. More inclusive criteria for the identification of LD across languages by which only one criterion is necessary for category membership: the extra-clausal status of a pre-posed constituent (§3.2; §3.2.2).

2. The grammatical category of LD consists of a taxonomic network of constructional schemas organized around a central exemplar schema. This exemplar is defined by the clustering of several prototypical syntactico-semantic attributes attested across languages (cf. §3.2; §3.2.1). These include: 1) the dislocate is preposed and outside the boundary associated clause, 2) the dislocate is encoded by a NP, 3) the dislocate could satisfy either an argument, or adjunct role to the predicate, 4) a resumptive element exists inside the boundaries of the clause that is co-referential (i.e. total identity relation) with the dislocate, and is encoded by an overt pronominal expression, 5) this clause-internal resumptive may satisfy either a subject or object relation to the predicate.

3. In addition to the prototypical schema, several non-prototypical LD types were described based on specific global (external) syntactico-semantic attributes. These included: Non-resumptive LDs, LDs with multiple dislocates, and certain vocative constructions (cf. §3.3).

4. Finally, the internal syntax of LD was described in terms of a taxonomy of cross-linguistically attested syntactic categories and grammatical relations realized by the dislocated constituent and resumptive/linked element, respectively (cf. 3.4). Although, cross-linguistically, the prototypical dislocated category is a NP, our survey demonstrated that virtually any syntactic category is eligible for dislocation across languages. Likewise, pronominal expressions hold the exemplar category for resumptives, but a variety of other morphosyntactic types are evinced. Moreover, they prototypically satisfy either subject or object relations to the predicate.

The syntactico-semantic generalizations listed above were then applied to a corpus consisting of the books of the Torah and Former Prophets (Genesis–2 Kings). In chapter 5, we presented the results of this analysis, where over 650 tokens were identified based on cross-linguistically informed syntactico-semantic criteria (cf. [1] above). These tokens were construed as a taxonomic network of constructional schemas, and classified according to an exemplar model of categorization. Accordingly, non-prototypical schemas with differing syntactico-semantic profiles were structured at varying degrees of proximity to an exemplar schema according to their respective family resemblance (i.e. shared prototypical attributes) to the exemplar. In addition to the exemplar schema, this taxonomic network consisted of six global schematic types: Non-resumptive LDs, Multiple dislocate LDs, Pronominal LDs, LDs with Anaphoric כֵּן, Conditional LDs, and Temporal LDs. Finally, the internal syntax of LD in

BH was described by way of a taxonomy of syntactic categories and grammatical relations realized by the dislocate and resumptive/linked elements in our data set.

In addition to the syntactico-semantic description of LD in BH, a discourse-functional explanation was also provided. This was accomplished in two steps. First, in chapter 2, we developed a sophisticated and empirically grounded cognitive-functional framework derived from contemporary research within the related fields of cognitive linguistics, psycholinguistics, and most notably discourse-pragmatics—with a particular focus on the sub-discipline known as 'information structure theory'. Secondly, in chapter 4, several cross-linguistic generalizations were drawn—both with respect to the methods of investigation employed and findings issued—from a variety of early, and more recent studies on the functional profile of LD across languages. Furthermore, these studies were heuristically categorized according to two methodological approaches: Cognitive-Informational, and Discursive-Interactional. The functional-typological generalizations drawn from these studies consist of the following:

1. Analytical strategies used by researchers to provide a functional profile of LD can be classified as one of two informational types: Cognitive-Pragmatic, and Discourse-Functional. Cognitive-pragmatic information consists of the cognitive and contextual information that motivates the use of LD in a stretch of discourse. This largely coincides with what Ariel refers to as the "discourse profile" of a construction—i.e. the extra-grammatical patterns of non-obligatory features that frequently co-occur with a particular form (§4.3). Discourse-functional information, on the other hand, concerns the overall communicative goal(s) or pragmatic effect(s) achieved by use of the form in discourse.

2. Two significant *cognitive-pragmatic* generalizations pertained to: 1) the relative degree of accessibility of the dislocate, and 2) the pragmatic relation satisfied by the resumptive/linked element within the associated clause. With respect to the former, there is a general consensus that referents of dislocated constituents are assumed to be at least identifiable, and to entertain a low degree of accessibility within the mind of the addressee. As for the latter, virtually every early study claims that the resumptive/linked element satisfies the topic relation of the associated proposition. Although this is indeed prototypical across languages, later cross-linguistic evidence suggests that the resumptive/linked element may also satisfy a focal relation to the proposition. These two parameters constitute the central motivating factors for the (prototypical) use of the construction in discourse across languages.

3. With respect to generalizations pertaining to the *discourse-function(s)* of LD across languages, we contend that cross-linguistic studies, either directly or indirectly (e.g Prince, 1997, 1998; cf. §4.2.2.1) demonstrate that the basic-level (prototypical) function of LD is the (re)activation of an entity that entertains a low degree of accessibility, back into the discourse model. This (re)activation serves to either: 1) ratify the referent as an acceptable topic of the associated proposition, or simplify the interpretation of the referent of the resumptive/linked element as one that satisfies a focal relation to the proposition. In support of this claim, specific constraints were discussed in detail which led to the optimal tailoring of the bifurcated form of LD for this particular function—in particular, Lambrecht's cognitive principle of the separation of reference and role (PSRR), and Geluykens's interactional turn-taking process.

4. Several non-prototypical sub-functions, common across a variety of languages, were also observed. These sub-functions are the result of an exploitation of the PSRR—a constraint that prototypically operates to facilitate cognitive processing. This happens as LD is used in highly marked discourse profiles (i.e. where the dislocated referent is already highly accessible). Rather than facilitating cognitive process ing, the construction, via exploitation of the PSRR, *disrupts* cognitive processing resulting in a discontinuity in the flow of discourse. This discontinuity, in turn, triggers one of a variety of pragmatic implicatures, depending on the contextual conditions involved—e.g. a developmental shift in the discourse, or the pragmatic inflation of a comparative coherence relation between two entities or propositions that would have otherwise only been contextually implicit. Furthermore, some non-prototypical functions derive from analogical extension of the prototype. For example, speakers often employ LD, *not* to activate a referent, but to activate (or predicate) a new conceptual profile, according to which the referent is recast.

5. Lastly, we drew several generalizations from a usage-based approach to language change through a process known as 'grammaticalization' and a panchronic view of grammar, in order to suggest an empirically plausible explanation for the formal and functional variation of Left Dislocation constructions exhibited across languages. Accordingly, it was argued that synchronic variation can only be explained through diachronic developmental processes. In light of this approach, form-function correlations that are ostensibly arbitrary and unmotivated from a synchronic perspective, may be alternatively construed from a developmental perspective, as heavily constrained and highly motivated.

Lastly, in chapter 6, the syntactico-semantic profile of LD in BH (chapter 5) was explained in terms of the aforementioned cognitive-pragmatic framework (chapter 2) and functional-typologoical generalizations (chapter 4). This was accomplished in two steps. First, we analyzed our data set according to three competing cognitive-pragmatic parameters: 1) degree of accessibility (i.e. activation status) of the dislocate, 2) the pragmatic relations satisfied by the resumptive/linked elements, and 3) the persistence of the dislocate within the subsequent discourse. As a result of this analysis, it was concluded that—in concordance with the findings from functional studies of LD in other languages—the central motivating factor for the use of LD in BH is the relative low degree of accessibility entertained by the dislocate, and *ipso facto,* the complex referring expression(s) used to encode this referent.

Moreover, although resumptive/linked elements prototypically occur in either a primary or secondary topic relation to a proposition, our data indicates that a significant number of tokens exhibit resumptive/linked elements in a focal relation to the proposition. Thus, BH provides further evidence against the common assumption found in the literature that LD is only a topic announcing device.

Finally, in accordance with other cross-linguistic studies, we hypothesized a high persistence rating for dislocates within the immediate subsequent discourse. Our data, however, did not bear this out, with over 50% of the tokens exhibiting dislocates that lacked any persistence rating, whatsoever.

These three cognitive-pragmatic parameters provided the basis for our second step—an explanation of the constructions in our data set in terms of their discourse-functional profile, as organized according to an exemplar model of categorization. If the central motivation of LD in BH is the relative low degree of accessibility entertained by the dislocate, the prototypical discourse-function is, in turn, the (re)activation of referents fitting this discourse profile. This was explained by appealing to Lambrecht's PSRR. The otherwise simultaneous tasks of: 1) recalling identifiable but low-accessible referents, and 2) interpreting those referent's role in the proposition, requires a high degree of cognitive effort, both in terms of formulation (writer) and processing (addressee). The LD construction is employed in order to mitigate this heavy cognitive cost. The bifurcated form of the construction is optimally tailored to facilitate the processing of these two cognitive tasks by removing the need for the hearer to accomplish both tasks simultaneously, and *ipso facto* risking a breakdown in communication. In addition to (re)activation, the dislocation simultaneously serves to ratify a referent as an acceptable primary or secondary topic. In this way, prototypical LDs may be construed as 'Topic Announcing' constructions. Moreover, two extensions of the ratification process were de-

scribed as 'Focus Announcing' and 'Framing'. Corresponding to functional-typological findings, the tokens in our data set also exhibit a variety of non-prototypical discourse profiles, which accomplish additional pragmatic tasks. For instance, as an extension of the basic-level function, it was shown that LD is employed, not for the (re)activation of a referent, but rather to activate a new conceptual profile within which the already accessible referent is recast.

Further removed from the exemplar function are tokens that are used to disrupt cognitive processing in order to produce a discontinuity in the flow of discourse. In these cases, expectations derived from the communicative and cognitive principles of relevance are exploited in order to produce additional pragmatic implicatures. This happens as highly accessible referents are dislocated, resulting in an over-use of discourse machinery. The pragmatic implicatures produced by this over-use of LD include: 1) those that mark a thematic shift in the discourse, 2) those that inflate a contrastive/comparative inference, and 3) those that mark especially salient information.

Lastly, three schematic types were described as exhibiting a more 'substantive' conventionalizations. These included: 1) Conditional LDs, 2) LDs with Anaphoric כֵּן, and 3) Temporal LDs. Although the functional profile of these constructions correspond, for the most part, to other non-prototypical discourse functions previously discussed, it was argued that these constructions have ostensibly formalized aspects of their respective usage patterns such that they have developed into discrete form-function conventions.

We concluded this study with a few brief remarks concerning a plausible explanation for the synchronic variation of LD in BH. Drawing on typologically attested, 'usage-based' patterns of language change, as well as a panchronic view of grammar, we submitted a plausible developmental hypothesis to explain the synchronic variation of LD in BH, with respect to both its syntactico-semantic and discourse functional attributes. In short, the diverse profile of LD in BH presented in this study is construed as co-evolving layers of form-function (form-inference) correlations at different positions on a developmental path to conventionalization.

7.2 Avenues for Further Research

7.2.1 Left Dislocation and Mappings Between Form and Function

Although the present study argued for a distinct functional difference between differing forms of LD in BH—particularly with respect to more 'substantive' schemas (cf. §.3.4)—more research is needed to determine if other more subtle mapping patterns between form and function can be discerned. For example, can a difference be discerned between instantiations of

LD that are formally characterized by the occurrence of a resumptive/linked element within the clause proper, and those in which the dislocated constituent is marked as extra-clausal (e.g. by way of *wayyiqtol/weqatal*) but exhibit no resumptive/linked element within the clause. In §6.2.4, we suggested that the formal difference between the two types may be motivated by the respective degree of accessibility entertained by the dislocate in each type, where forms lacking any resumptive/linked element generally exhibit dislocates with higher degrees of accessibility than those with resumptive/linked elements. However, more research is needed verify this hypothesis.

7.2.2 Left Dislocation vs. Fronting in BH

One of the most intriguing areas in need of further research concerns the functional difference between LD constructions and the less complex 'fronted' construction in BH (cf. chapter 3), where the fronted constituent does not comprise a marked focus configuration (i.e. constituent focus articulation). Although some functional overlap between the two constructions likely exists (cf. Van der Merwe, et al. 1999; Floor, 2004; Moshavi, 2010),[745] it is unlikely that the two constructions are functionally synonymous in every respect. In light of the findings of the present study, it is hypothesized that a central point of distinction pertains to cognitive-pragmatic motivation—particularly with respect to the the cognitive status of the dislocate and fronted constituents, respectively. If dislocates typically refer to referents that entertain low degrees of accessibility, it is plausible to suggest that, at least in an earlier stage of its development, the (non-focal) fronted construction in BH was prototypically used for referents that, conversely, entertained a relatively higher degree of accessibility. It is proposed, therefore, that what is needed is an in-depth investigation into the pragmatic and functional difference between these two constructions in BH, not unlike the investigation carried out by Gregory and Michaelis (2001) for English. It is surmised that such an investigation would yield further insight into the precise nature of the discourse-pragmatic constraints on LD and fronting in BH.

7.2.3 Left Dislocation and Temporal Stage Topics

The present work provided a general syntactico-semantic description (cf. §5.4.7), as well as a preliminary functional explanation (cf. §6.3.4.3) of the so-called 'Temporal LD' schema. As stated in §6.3.4.3, this particular schema calls for a more in-depth study due to 1) its frequency of occurrence, 2) it's varied distribution, and 3) the range of syntactic, semantic,

745. Floor (2004) offers several examples where fronting is used as a (re)activation device for primary topics, secondary topics, and topic frames.

and pragmatic variables exhibited. In addition, the more general question as to why preposed temporal adjuncts sometimes occur in an extra-clausal dislocated position, while other times they are located in an intra-clausal fronted position, is in need of further research.

7.2.4 Left Dislocation within Other Biblical Genres

The scope of this study was confined to the Torah and Former Prophets. As a result, we did not examine instantiations of LDs in genres outside this corpus (e.g. poetry, prophetic, wisdom, etc.). However, we did observe that so-called 'conditional LDs', are largely restricted to legal contexts as casuistic precepts. This raises the question as to whether other genres may exhibit additional LD types and/or functions. Hence, more research is needed to determine if the profile of LD provided here also accounts for the syntactico-semantic and functional profile of LDs in other genres, or if our proposal should be expanded to account for additional genre-specific types.

7.2.5 Other Types of Left Dislocation

Lastly, constraints on space prohibited us from analyzing other types of constructional schemas that, due to their syntactico-semantic profile, likely fall within the LD category. Two noteworthy constructions in this regard are: 1) LD constructions with verbless clauses (i.e. the so-called tripartitie nominal clause), and 2) constructions exhibiting pre-clausal vocative expressions. More research is needed to determine the extent to which the syntactico-semantic and discourse-functional profiles of these construction types align or differ with respect to the profile of LD presented here.

Additionally, the present study uncovered no functional explanation as to why some LDs are formally marked by relational markers of agreement between the dislocate and resumptive/linked elements (i.e. so-called "connectivity effects", cf. §3.3.1; §5.4.1.3; and §5.4.3.4). Further research is needed in this regard.

7.3 Concluding Remarks

We have accomplished our intended aim of providing a *more* comprehensive profile of LD in BH. This was accomplished through the application of a cognitive-functional linguistic framework, as well as typological considerations from a variety of related and unrelated languages. In the end, the theoretical and analytical tools garnered from both the theoretical framework (chapter 2) and typological insights (chapters 3–4) provided the theoretical and analytical tools necessary for accounting for the syntactico-semantic and discourse-functional distribution of (verbal) LD within our BH corpus of Genesis–2 Kings.

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