Praxis and/as critique
In the translations of the oeuvre of Ingrid Winterbach

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DECLARATION

By submitting this dissertation electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained therein is my own, original work, that I am the sole author thereof (save to the extent explicitly otherwise stated), that reproduction and publication thereof by Stellenbosch University will not infringe any third party rights and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for obtaining any qualification.

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(Chantelle Gray van Heerden) 7 August 2014
ABSTRACT

In this dissertation I investigate how aesthetics, politics and ethics intersect as material flows in translation, and how these actualise in the oeuvre of Lettie Viljoen/Ingrid Winterbach. With the emphasis on praxis, I explore these three threads through the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in particular, though not exclusively. With reference to Deleuze and Guattari’s project on ‘minor literature’, I demonstrate that Viljoen/Winterbach’s oeuvre contains a high degree of deterritorialisation through methods such as thematic refrains, stylistic devices and her use of Engfrikaans. In translation these methods are investigated in terms of the ethico-aesthetic framework developed by Guattari, the role of capitalism in its relation to translation and the publishing industry (i.e. the political), and how translation and/as praxis may begin to develop a nomadic ethics.

Aesthetics, from a Deleuzo-Guattarian perspective is shown to be not about the value produced by capitalism, but rather about that which deterritorialises as a singularity. Such a singularity in literature may be said to actualise as a minor literature or, more accurately, a becoming-minor. With regards to politics in translation/translation in politics, I argue that the question of translation should no longer be What does this word/text mean? but rather What is the word/text/translation doing? When the emphasis moves from semantics to praxis I argue that translation, like other forms of literature, has the potential to affect social transformation. I put forth as part of my argument that this is possible through deterritorialising practices like écriture féminine and Viljoen/Winterbach’s use of Engfrikaans and the trickster figure, as such methods allow for bifurcations away from State territorialisations. And finally, I examine how translators might begin to develop a praxis informed by a nomadic ethics which is not reliant on a normative morality, but rather constitutes an orientation founded on heterogeneity and the repudiation of universality.
OPSOMMING

In hierdie proefskrif word daar ondersoek hoe estetika, politiek and etiek as reële elemente saamvloei in vertaling, en hoe dit aktualiseer in the oeuvre van Lettie Viljoen/Ingrid Winterbach. Met die klem op praksis ondersoek ek dié drie elemente in besonder in terme van die filosofie van Gilles Deleuze en Félix Guattari, alhoewel nie eksklusief nie. Met verwysing na Deleuze en Guattari se projek aangaande ’n ‘klein (mindere) literatuur’, demonstree ek dat Viljoen/Winterbach se oeuvre ’n hoë graad van deterritorialisasie weerspieël wat uit haar gebruik van metodes soos tematiese refreine, stilistiese instrumente en die gebruik van Engfrikaans voortspruit. In vertaling word hierdie metodes ondersoek in terme van die eties-estetiese raamwerk wat deur Guattari ontwikkel is asook die politieke rol van kapitalisme in verhouding tot vertaling en die publikasiebedryf, sowel as hoe vertaling as praksis daartoe mag bydra om ’n nomadiëse etiek te ontwikkel.

Vanuit ’n Deleuzo-Guattariaanse perspektief word daar aangetoon dat estetika nie handel oor die waarde wat kapitalisme voortbring nie, maar eerder oor die enkele-uniekheid (“singularity”) wat deterritorialisering meebreng. Dit kan gestel word dat in literatuur sodanige enkele-uniekheid as mindere (“minor”) literatuur gesien kan word of, om meer akkuraat te wees, die voortbring daarvan kan aktualiseer. Betreffende politiek in vertaling/vertaling in politiek word daar aangevoer dat die vraagstuk van vertaling voortaan nie moet wees ’Wat beteken hierdie woord of teks? nie, maar eerder ’Wat vermag ’n woord of teks in die vertaling? ’Daar word verder aangevoer dat wanneer die klem vanaf semantiek na praksis verskuif vertaling, soos ander vorme van literatuur, die potensiaal inhou om sosiale transformasie te beïnvloed. As deel van die onderliggende argument word daar gepostuleer dat die voorgenoemde inderdaad moontlik is deur deterritorialiserende paraktyke soos écriture féminine en Viljoen/Winterbach se gebruik van Engfrikaans asmede die trikster-figuur omdat sulke metodes die geleentheid skep vir splitsing (“bifurcation”) weg van Staatsterritorialisering af. Ten slotte word ondersoek ingestel na hoe vertalers ’n praksis sou kon ontwikkel wat deur ’n nomadiëse etiek en nie’n normatiewe moraliteit geleid word nie, maar wat eerder op ’n orientasie van heterogeniteit en die verwerping van essensie gebaseer is.
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We will never find the sense of something (of a human, a biological or even a physical phenomenon) if we do not know the force which appropriates the thing, which exploits it, which takes possession of it or is expressed in it.

~ Deleuze 1983: 3

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To Ingrid Winterbach whose words “are no longer anything more than intensities” (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 164): a very big thank you for assisting me so graciously throughout this project.

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The book is not an image of the world

Afrikaans (Karolina Ferreira, pp.67-68) English (My translation)

Sy droom die nag dat sy moeg is om op die yskaste van die dooies te vertoef. Onder haar is naamlik die plek waar die dooies in yskaste broei; ’n lewendige plek, daardie ondergrond, met uitgebreide oppervlak en ventilasiegate na bo.

That night she dreams that she is tired of living above the fridges of the dead. Beneath her is the place where the dead hatch in refrigerators: a living, breathing place, covering a vast amount of space with ventilation shafts leading to the surface.¹

“The same applies to the book and the world: contrary to a deeply rooted belief, the book is not an image of the world. It forms a rhizome with the world, there is an a parallel evolution of the book and the world; the book assures the deterritorialization of the world, but the world effects a reterritorialization of the book, which in turn deterritorializes itself in the world (if it is capable, if it can).”

(Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 11)

¹ The published version of this passage (from The elusive moth) can be read in Appendix A. I have substituted it with my own translation as I find Silke’s translation of this passage awkward.
I went looking for a book. Bookshops are no longer what they used to be; you cannot simply walk into one and expect to find what you are looking for. Even when you are not entirely sure exactly what it is that you are looking for. Perhaps especially when you are not entirely sure. When you want to be surprised. When secretly you are hoping that a book will lean out of the shelf and draw you slowly in its direction, compelling you to stop, because for some inexplicable reason you feel drawn in by the cover, or the title, or some other detail you like to think is only ever noticed by you. And maybe you are right to think so. For only then – only when you feel that by now familiar feeling in the pit of your stomach – do you want to pick up a book. The book. The one you were hoping to find. And luckily for me there was just such a book. It was Die boek van toeval en toeverlaat. A book of chance and refuge.

That sounds right, I think, and pull it out. On the cover is a shell. I do not know what kind of shell. I mean I do not know the correct term for it – its name – but it is one of those that can close; enfold and hold space. I glide my hand over the cover. It is smooth, and comforting. I smell the pages like I always do. Then I notice that it is written by Ingrid Winterbach. I do not know this author. But I am intrigued; I have not read an Afrikaans novel for some time now and I am looking for something… Something that will ‘speak’ to me in the way that Marlene van Niekerk’s Triompf spoke to me. A tall order, I know. And part of me has already resigned itself to the fact that I shall, inevitably, be disappointed.

Nevertheless, I open the book at random to give myself a sense of what I am letting myself in for. It opens on page 81; a page that will not only speak to me, but one I shall come to love as I love a page from Italo Calvino’s If on a winter’s night a traveller, or one from Zakes Mda’s The whale caller and Angela Carter’s Nights at the circus. A page I can read again and again in awe. But I do not know this yet. All I know is that I am intrigued as I look down to find a long list of words beginning with the letter D. I scan the list, then slow down my reading pace when I get to the sentence reading “Ook in verbinding met selfstandige naamwoorde ter aanduiding dat die genoemde kleur troebel, dof is en tot droefheid, treurigheid en neerslagtige stem. (Droefrooi.)” I pause, only to feel my own heavy heart melt into this object, this unsuspecting book that I am holding in my hands. (Mirthless red.) I close it and swallow my tears before moving to the cashier where I shall pay for this book I already know as a thing of beauty.

When I got home, I made myself a cup of coffee. I opened the lounge curtains and seated myself in a comfortable position on the couch, facing Lion’s Head. I wondered one last time about this newly discovered author before opening the book. Then, without haste, I started reading, sinking into the couch, falling down the rabbit hole.
I) Of translation and Lettie Viljoen/Ingrid Winterbach’s oeuvre

In *The world republic of letters*, Pascale Casanova introduces the idea of a literary space or universe that is not “reduced to the political and linguistic boundaries of a nation” (Casanova 2004: xi). At the same time, it is not entirely free from these limitations, either in that it is directed by external political pressures, for example through language policies, or in its propagation, formation and maintenance of nation and nationality which may be either for or counter to existing political notions (Casanova 2004: 85). This proposed literary universe, Casanova argues, has its own republics, capitals and provinces, or literary dominating (central) and dominated (peripheral) spaces, delineated and upheld not by national-political pressures, or at least not primarily and exclusively by these, but by (shifting) literary pressures, such as the literary capital and literary value of a language – what Casanova terms the “consecration” or “litterisation” (Casanova 2004: 126) of literatures through translation – which is often influenced by the goals and pressures of publishers. Furthermore, translation does not occur in a vacuum, nor is it merely concerned with textual semantics as Snell-Hornby (1988: 2) explains:

> The idea must be abandoned that translation is merely a matter of isolated words ... translation begins with the text-in-situation as an integral part of the cultural background ... [and therefore] cannot be considered as a static specimen of language ... but [should rather be considered] essentially as the verbalized expression of an author’s intention as understood by the translator as reader, who then creates this whole for another readership in another culture.

Translation, therefore, can be said to move beyond the search for textual or linguistic equivalents and to include an exploration into an author’s intention and subjective experience, cultural background, linguistic style and individual disposition. But it is also, simultaneously, an exploration which takes into consideration the conversion of one language with its own identity and set of rules into another language, as well as the thoughtful consideration of how to achieve this conversion without losing the essence of the original work.

On first reading Ingrid Winterbach’s *Die boek van toeval en toeverlaat* and its translation, *The book of happenstance*, I was struck by the immensity of the translator’s task for, as Benjamin (2012: 77) explains, “no translation would be possible” if it were only “to strive

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22 Unlike Casanova, I shall argue in Chapter 3 that the “political and linguistic boundaries of a nation” (Casanova 2004: xi) are intricately tied to political agendas which, in turn, are directly influenced by capitalism.
for similarity to the original” because an epistemological knowledge of the original does not exist, and the original itself is changed in translation to gain an “afterlife” (Benjamin 2012: 76). We could say that the translator’s task “is to find the intention toward the language into which the work is to be translated, on the basis of which an echo of the original is awakened in it” (Benjamin 2012: 79) again and again and again. But what of aesthetics in translation, one might wonder. What if I ‘like’ Winterbach’s Die boek van toeval en toeverlaat more than The book of happenstance? What if it ‘moves’ me more? How do I justify my subjective experience academically? Because, as Steven Shaviro (2012: 4) explains, in aesthetic judgement “I am not asserting anything about what is, nor am I legislating what it ought to be. Rather, I am lured, allured, seduced, repulsed, incited or dissuaded.” And this, he explains “is part of the process by which I become what I am.”

It is these tensions – the duality of language in translation and the measuring of original and translated works against subjective judgement and scholarly investigation – that served as the basis for this project. In searching for answers, I surveyed the scope of Lettie Viljoen/Ingrid Winterbach’s oeuvre and found in Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s project the terminology I needed to express my ideas. Simon O’Sullivan (2006: 12) explains Deleuze and Guattari’s work as strategies against “the propensity for hierarchy, fixity or stasis (or simply representation) with which we are involved” but which “can stifle creative, and we might even say ethical” investigation, including scholarly research.

It is with this in mind that I investigated the aesthetics, politics and ethics of art, and specifically “its resistance to the present milieu” (O’Sullivan 2006: 98) of which Viljoen/Winterbach could be said to be a case study. This case study centres on subjectivity, though not simply as an emotional response, but rather as “something that is produced through a variety of practices” and which is “not merely something given, something determined and fixed by principles outside our control”, but rather emphasises “our pragmatic involvement in the material production of our own subjectivities” (O’Sullivan 2006: 98).

II) Ingrid Winterbach: the person and the author

Ingrid Winterbach was born on Valentine’s day in 1948. She completed her first degree in fine arts at the University of the Witwatersrand in 1969 and subsequently completed an
Honours Degree in Afrikaans and Dutch in 1970 at the same institution. In 1974 she completed her Master’s Degree at Stellenbosch University in Afrikaans and Dutch, supervised by the well-known Afrikaans poet, D.J. Opperman. She lectured for many years but has been a full-time artist and writer since 2002. Winterbach was a member of the group of Afrikaans writers who secretly met with exiled ANC members at the Victoria Falls Writer’s Conference in 1989. And when she was only eighteen years old, she exchanged letters with forty-something year old Etienne Leroux which would later form an important part of his “Wagnerian” (Fourie 2013) novel *18-44* which was published in 1967 (Human & Rousseau 2014).

Ingrid Winterbach’s novels form an integral part of the contemporary canon of Afrikaans literature in South Africa and have been widely acclaimed. The author’s first two novels, *Klaaglied vir Koos*³ (1984) and *Erf* (1986), were published under Winterbach’s pseudonym Lettie Viljoen, and may be described as ‘struggle novels’ in that they explore the tensions arising from either resistance or loyalty to the Apartheid regime, as well as “the struggle between the centre and those living at the margins” (Foster 2008).

Still writing under her nom de plume, Viljoen/Winterbach next published *Belemmering* (1990), *Karolina Ferreira* (1993) – which was awarded the M-Net Book Prize in 1994 and the Old Mutual Literary Prize in 1997 – and *Landskap met vroue en slang* (1996). The latter novel explores “a brave resistance against an undeniable transience and brevity of earthly experiences” (Human 2012), a theme which becomes a recurrent leitmotif in Viljoen/Winterbach’s oeuvre, especially evident in her last three novels, *Die boek van toeval en toeverlaat, Die benederyk* and *Die aanspraak van lewende wesens*, which form a kind of trilogy centring on loss, evanescence and the need for “closure” (Burger 2012), even though such closure remains elusive.

*Karolina Ferreira* – a novel dealing with human grief and marked by “references to mystics” (Foster 2008) and “an element of baroque fantasy” concretised through “the tension between the comic and the tragic, the city and the platteland, between flights of

³ *Klaaglied vir Koos* means “lamentations for Koos”; *Erf* means “erf” or “premises”; *Belemmering* means “impediment” or “obstruction”; Karolina Ferreira is the name of the protagonist in the novel of the same name, translated as *The elusive moth*, *Landskap met vroue en slang* means “landscape with women and serpent”; *Buller se plan* means “Buller’s plan”; *Niggie* means “cousin” but was translated as *To hell with Cronjé*; *Die boek van toeval en toeverlaat* was translated as *The book of happenstance* but literally means “the book of chance and refuge”; *Die benederyk*, which has been translated as *The road to excess*, means “the netherworld”; and *Die aanspraak van lewende wesens* means “appeal to the living”.
imagination and the magnetic pull of a dark social realism” (Acott 2012) – was the author’s first novel to be translated. The translated novel was published under her own name, Ingrid Winterbach, in 2005 as *The elusive moth*. Karolina Ferreira and *Landskap met vroue en slang* were followed by the publication of *Buller se plan* (1999),4 the first novel published under the author’s own name, and *Niggie* (2002), which won the Hertzog Prize for prose in 2004 (translated as *To hell with Cronjé*). Both *Buller se plan* and *Niggie* are framed by the Anglo Boer War (also used as framing device in *Belemmering* and mentioned in *Karolina Ferreira/The elusive moth*) which Winterbach explains as a way to “understand the male world” of her father and grandfather, but also for the purposes of bringing “to that war ... a modern sensibility” while keeping it grounded in the historical (Visagie 2008). “It is a world”, says Winterbach in an interview with Andries Visagie, “that I have perceived from a distance. It is a world of which my father told me stories. It is a world compared to my mother’s world which is a close-up world with women. It was a family dominated by females against this world that I have always seen from a distance, a male world, a world of stories and war. And I think that is probably what fascinates me, going back to that” (Visagie 2008).

Next, Ingrid Winterbach wrote and published the elegiac novel *Die boek van toeval en toeverlaat* (2006) which was translated as *The book of happenstance* and published in 2008. The original Afrikaans text was awarded four national book prizes, namely the M-Net Prize for Literature in 2007, the W.A. Hofmeyr Prize in 2007, the University of Johannesburg Prize for Creative Writing, also in 2007, and the C.L. Engelbrecht Prize for Literature in 2012 (Human & Rousseau 2012a). These accolades, followed by the success of *Niggie*, firmly established Winterbach as one of the leading writers in the Afrikaans literary scene. The English translation, *The book of happenstance*, was also awarded a prize, namely The South African Literary Award for literary translation in 2010 (Human & Rousseau 2012b). This novel, “through a high degree of intertextuality”, contributes to contemporary Afrikaans and Afrikaner discourse “by offering implied ideological insights into specific socio-political and metatextual phenomena” (Strydom & Van Vuuren 2011). This is achieved by, for example, centring the narrative on themes of language and cultural longevity and/or death, and specifically the “status of Afrikaans as a minority language and of literature as a cultural product” (Strydom & Van Vuuren 2011). Such preservation of

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4 Even though *Karolina Ferreira* brought Viljoen/Winterbach into public focus as an author and was translated, the later published novels, *Landskap met vroue en slang* and *Buller se plan* remain untranslated. Her first three novels, *Klaaglied vir Koos, Erf* and *Belemmering* have also not been translated.
linguistic and cultural heterogeneity forms a central theme of this project, especially in the context of translation from “small languages” (Casanova 2004: 180) such as Afrikaans into assimilating languages such as English. Specifically I explore this vis-à-vis the politics and ethics of translation by paying attention to the structural arrangements and relations that form part of and affect the publishing and translation industries. Consider, for example, that even though 3000 copies of Die boek van toeval en toeverlaat were originally printed in 2006, with 1000 copies reprinted in 2007 and 2009, only 1600 copies of the translation were printed and of these 450 copies have not as yet been sold.\footnote{I obtained all the statistics pertaining to print runs and book sales via email communiqué with Human & Rousseau on 11 November 2013.} Winterbach’s next novel, Die benederyk, was published in 2010 (3000 copies) and won the M-Net prize for literature. This novel has now been translated (published in June 2014) as The road of excess, although only 800 copies were printed.

In keeping with earlier thematic recurrences, Die benederyk too explores motifs of material loss through “the temporary and permanent parting of loved ones; [and] the death of significant others”, as well as “more vaguely defined forms of loss, such as melancholy, yearning, psychological uneasiness and malaise” (Human 2009a). Subject matter such as “transience and mortality” (Human 2009a) is argued for by Adéle Nel (2012) in terms of a “relationality [that] manifests itself in two ways in Die benederyk, namely as an ontological relationship on a personal level between people ... and also as an ontological relationship between specific artists through the ages.” Correspondingly, the experience of making art is explored and related to death; that is, a confrontation with death is seen as either a means to an end when it forms the catabasis for a transformative experience (Adéle Nel 2012) as is personified in the protagonist Aaron Adendorff, or as an end in itself when it leads to either the literal death of an artist or the figurative death of the work of an artist as is embodied by the character Jimmy Harris. (I investigate this tension extensively in Chapter 2.)

The last novel published by Ingrid Winterbach to date is Die aanspraak van lewende wesens (2012a) and the manuscript of this novel was awarded first prize in NB Publisher’s Groot Afrikaanse Romanwedstryd (meaning “big Afrikaans novel competition”). This novel further explores themes of ‘madness’, such substance abuse, dementia, deliriousness, fixation, depression, etc., introduced to the reader in the preceding novels Die boek van toeval en toeverlaat and Die benederyk. Such behaviour is concretised in Die boek van...
toeval en toeverlaat/The book of happenstance through the protagonist Helena Verbloem's obsessive-compulsive behaviour, her colleague Theo Verwey's manic consumerist impulses, and the scientist Hugo Hatting's Asperger's-like manner. In Die benederyk, psychosis is explored through the substance abuse of the character Stefaans Adendorff and the maniacal behaviour of the trickster figure Bubbles Bothma, but the idea of madness, in all its guises, is only fully realised in Die aanspraak van lewende wesens, a postmodern pastoral quest novel (in the sense of an undertaken journey) with two story lines (Van der Merwe 2012). In this novel the first protagonist, Karl Hofmeyr, is en route to his bother Iggie who is having a psychotic breakdown, and the second protagonist, Maria Volschenk, is travelling to Stellenbosch with the aim of coming to terms with her clinically depressed sister's suicide. These journeys reveal the futility of the search for greater coherence and ontological meaning (Van Schalkwyk 2009b; Burger 2012).

In addition to Viljoen/Winterbach’s substantial oeuvre, there is a growing body of scholarly research on her work, addressing a diverse range of foci which include meta-textual and intertextual concerns, thematic recurrences and overlaps in her novels, her creative and idiosyncratic use of language and discourse (Botha & Van Vuuren 2006; Du Plooy 2006), and the positioning of her novels as a form of littérature engagée (Strydom & Van Vuuren 2011) through their implicit critique of embedded leitmotifs. Furthermore, it is argued that Viljoen/Winterbach’s novels offer resistance to the apartheid legacy in South Africa through the juxtaposition of different voices (Van Vuuren 2004), such as the inclusion of various dialects and registers, the presence of the race pejorative in Niggie, and through her distinct feminist register (Botha & Van Vuuren 2007a, 2007b). Epistemes of knowledge and power are also questioned through her understanding of the “archaeology of words as signs” (Du Plooy 2009) in the Foucaultian sense. Yet despite the increasing academic interest in Viljoen/Winterbach’s oeuvre, very little theory has been published on the translations of her novels. Heather Acott (2012) does discuss carnivalesque satire in The elusive moth (Karolina Ferreira) and Heilna du Plooy (2011: 327-342) the importance of symbols and signs in To hell with Cronjé (Niggie) and The book of happenstance (Die boek van toeval en toeverlaat), but scholars have scarcely written about the actual practice of translating Winterbach’s novels, excepting Anelda Susan Hofsajer (2011) who has published research on the method of self-translation in The book of happenstance.

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6 Refer to footnote 23.
7 In The archaeology of knowledge (published in 1969, though I used the 2002 edition for the purposes of this study), French philosopher Michel Foucault proposes that certain knowledges are produced and framed by specific underlying and subconscious structures.
Together with the preservation of linguistic and cultural heterogeneity in translation praxis, this lack of research on the translations of Winterbach’s oeuvre led to considerations of politics, ethics and aesthetics within the field of Translation Studies. I was especially surprised by the fact that a writer of Winterbach’s stature did not receive more attention from the English-speaking literary community in our country. Or abroad, for that matter. Why does this divide exist (if it does, which it seems to)? I wondered. And what does this say about translation praxis and the role of the publishing industry in South Africa? Is this a consequence of the globalisation of capitalism? And what would an ethical response to this state of affairs look like?

With questions such as these in (one) hand, I began to explore the oeuvre of Ingrid Winterbach, and particularly the publication and dissemination of her translated works. And with the map provided by Deleuze and Guattari in the other hand, I set out to find possible explanations for what seemed to me to be not only a pity, but a mark against the larger (hegemonic, English) literary community in South Africa and abroad.

III) The Viljoen/Winterbach oeuvre in the context of Translation Studies

The preservation of cultural heterogeneity in translation, specifically when translating from “small” languages (Casanova 2004: 180), such as Afrikaans, into globalised assimilating languages, such as English, has for some time been “contested ground” (Casanova 2004: 176-187; Venuti 1995, 1998). Such cultural safeguarding methods are measured in translation practice and theory in terms of translation strategies which operate within a gamut of “foreignization” and “domestication”, alternately favouring either one of the conventions or a combination of the two so that values and ideas of the source language (SL) and culture are rendered either familiar or unfamiliar to a larger or lesser degree in the target language (TL) and culture (Venuti 1995, 1998). Venuti (1995: 18) writes:

Translation is the forcible replacement of the linguistic and cultural difference of the foreign text with a text that will be intelligible to the target-language reader. This difference can never be entirely removed, of course, but it necessarily suffers a reduction and exclusion of possibilities – and an exorbitant gain of other possibilities specific to the translating language. Whatever difference the translation conveys is now imprinted by the target-language culture, assimilated to its positions of intelligibility, its canons and taboos, its codes and ideologies.
Be this as it may, Casanova argues that texts written in smaller languages can only really benefit from a “genuine literary internationalism” (Casanova 2004: 172) if and when they are subsumed into larger languages for wider dissemination and use. Lennon (2010: 28) links this to the consequences of globalisation and English as global linguistic medium.

He writes, with reference to Alistair Pennycook’s research on the globalisation of English and language policy, that “For Pennycook, learning English is an ‘act of desire’ for language as capital, understood as ‘embodied’ in Bourdieu’s sense, or accumulated through learning and integrated into a ‘habitus’ that cannot be transmitted instantaneously, like money or property rights…” Learning English, or translating into English, can therefore be seen as an act of consecration which legitimises small languages “in the eyes of the world” as Casanova (2004: 133) argues, though I interrogate the idea of equating literature to capital in Chapter 3.

The difficulty that arises in translation is, as Brisset (2004: 337) explains, that translation “is a dual act of communication” which “presupposes the existence, not of one, but of two distinct codes, the ‘source language’ and the ‘target language’”. This difficulty cannot be explained only in terms of a “deficiency in the receiving code” (Brisset 2004: 338), but has to be examined as a body of complexities that arise from the relationship between texts (by which I mean the lexicon, grammatical structures, syntactic modes, and semantic and pragmatic associations, etc.), their contextualisation (with reference to aspects such as socio-cultural and political histories, etc.) and source language intertexts.

These considerations led to the first research question of this project which is formulated around the subject of aesthetics. In Translation Studies, postmodern aesthetics is best described as an aesthetic “that reveals the relative inadequacy of tradition traductology” in that translation “explicitly becomes polyphonic” (Vieira 1994: 72). Hence, the target text is credited with relative autonomy from the source text and “is seen as enacting its own processes of signification which answer to different linguistic and cultural contexts” (Venuti 2012a: 185). In this project, I take this aesthetic a step further by examining it from a poststructuralist point of view, thus problematising structural imbalances inherent in both source and target texts. This, in turn, allows for “an incisive interrogation of cultural and political effects, [as well as] the role played by translation in the creation and functioning of social movements and institutions” (Venuti 2012b: 275).
In *Accented futures*, Carli Coetzee (2013: 1) argues “against translation” in favour of what she terms *accentedness*. That is, she argues, the translator “has to resist the homogenised (orientalised, some might say as a shorthand) representation of ourselves/themselves, and offer, instead, heterogeneity and a refusal of essence” (Coetzee 2013: 3). This ‘refusal to translate’ requires for writing and translation to *not* be about cultural transfer and the manipulation of linguistic conventions or semantic content, but instead to be an *orientation*. It is thus about “the skill that consists in developing a compass of the cognitive, affective and ethical kind” (Braidotti 2012: 307); an orientation that allows creativity to be accented so that languages become diverse, even within themselves. This, I argue, is especially important in a multilingual, multicultural society such as exists in South Africa where most translations take place into English and are therefore in danger of becoming Anglicised to such a degree that they lose the linguistic and cultural markers of the source text and language. Coetzee (2013: 1) goes on to explain that translation praxis as we currently know it is in fact *not* aimed at mutuality through cultural and semantic transfer as it is thought to be, nor does it allow one to “imagine the position of another.” In fact Coetzee argues that translation, as it currently stands, is a “suspect activity in which inequalities (of economics, politics, gender, geography) are not only reflected but also reproduced in the mechanics of textual production.” In place of translation Coetzee argues for accentedness, stating that the term *accent* is not restricted here to its linguistics sense but is rather “intent on differentiation and stratification”, denoting an acknowledgment of “a specific, even ‘local’, orientation or field of reference” (Coetzee 2013: 3). And it is with this accentedness in mind that I formulated the question of Chapter 2 to investigate possible ways in which the potential for accentedness (as ethico-aesthetic translation praxis) might be retained in a translated work.

In Chapter 3, I investigate the simultaneous subjective immersion and objective detachment inherent in translators themselves, and how this tension concretises in translated works and is informed by politics. By ‘politics’ I mean here specifically the macro-social and somatic contexts within which translation, in this instance, but also life in a more general sense, takes place, because regardless of whether one recognises the explicit socio-political contexts, there always remains an implicit blindside to and complicity with existing socio-political structures and forces. It is this dilemma – which can be described as ‘translation in politics/politics in translation’ – that I investigate and apply to the oeuvre of Ingrid Winterbach in Chapter 3. Specifically I examine the extent to
which capitalism reinforces normative literary and translation practices, and methods for disrupting such normative (often Eurocentric and Western) practices.

In Chapter 4 my research centres on ethical questions related to translation praxis, typically focused on the “moral proximity” of translators which, in translation, affects in-text, intertext, 

8 intertextual and meta-textual aspects, for example which books are translated and how widely they are disseminated, the socio-political and cultural transfer from SL to TL and so on. These considerations may be said to be driven by and validated in terms of larger structural formations and relations such as the “distinctively anglocentric image of translation”, imperialism or colonialism, the largely hermeneutic models of translation, and the translator’s role in “mediating representation” and cultural identity (Venuti 2010) in history.

This idea of ‘translating history’ or ‘making history’, as well as ‘history as future’ is prominent in the works of Ingrid Winterbach as many of her novels “take root in Afrikaans settings and circumstances” (Lenta 2009). But for Winterbach the issue is not merely writing about Afrikaners and Afrikaner history – at least not in a way that is definitive – but rather writing about Afrikaner concerns in such a way that the writing “transcends nationalistic enclosures” (Lenta 2009). As such, foci like “patriotism, the role of religion, discipline, passivity and boredom during the Anglo-Boer War” (Botha & Van Vuuren 2008), as well as recurring themes like death and mortality, mental illness and “the crumbling Afrikaans community” (Botha & Van Vuuren 2008) may be said to explore the ethical dilemma of power distribution within the master narratives of both Apartheid and post-Apartheid South Africa.

However, ethics is not concerned here with an inquiry into an a priori moral code of Apartheid or post-Apartheid. Rather, as Botha and Van Vuuren (2008) argue, it is precisely “the aspects of intertextuality and historiographical metafiction which serve as a reflection of the social conflicts which currently exist in the arguably crumbling Afrikaans community” (my translation). This, then, forms the core focus of Chapter 4: to investigate the master narratives of translation praxis, and particularly translation praxis in South Africa and in Ingrid Winterbach’s oeuvre, by exploring ways in which translation ethics can

8 By which I mean target text to source text considerations and not intertextual considerations in the Kristevian sense.
become a practice which interrogates structural power distributions and the historicity of master narratives.

In summary, the research question in Chapter 2 is formulated as *What emerges from the text in translation?*; that is, how (if it can) is the potential for accentedness retained in a translated work or, to put it differently, transferred from source text to target text? In order to answer these questions I refer to the conceptual framework of minor literature as developed by the philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. The next chapter, Chapter 3, moves away from questions pertaining to semantics in translation by no longer asking *What does the text mean?* but rather asking *What does the text do?* And in Chapter 4, this question is taken a step further to ask *What can the text do?*; i.e. what does the text reveal about structural power distributions and what is the ethical task of the translator?

**IV) Deleuze and Guattari: style, stuttering and minor literature**

In an email communiqué with Ingrid Winterbach (2012b) she refers to her own writing as “om teen die grein van die taal ín te skryf” (meaning “to write against the grain or *into* the grain of the language”) in that her use of Afrikaans “deviates from the norm” in terms of sentence construction, word order and so on. This aspect – Winterbach’s resistance in and through language – has been researched extensively by scholars and is used in her novels in different ways. Human (2006) argues, for example, that a “disinterestedness” in *Landskap met vroue en slang* allows for “the emergence of an even more powerful mode of landscape appreciation, the picturesque.” This kind of disinterestedness, which is presented through the language as well as the narrative, is not one of lack however – it does not signal a lack of interest – but rather points towards a bifurcation, a divergence from the norm which, in this case, allows the protagonist (Lena Bergh) to experience the mystical. In *Die benederyk/The road of excess*, the character Stefaans Adendorff communicates with his brother Aaron Adendorff through SMS text messages in an attempt to communicate (verbalise, share) his experience of ‘the netherworld’ (Nel 2010). He sends the following message, for example (p.263, followed by my translation and p.249 of the published translation):  

The translation of *Die benederyk* was released in June 2014 as *The road of excess*. I opted to keep my translations included in the final form of this dissertation as I had completed it by this date and deemed it of value to the overall study. My translation will, from this point onwards, always appear after the Afrikaans in brackets with Leon de Kock’s translation thereafter. Where passages are long, I have included the translations as an appendix.
When Fanon and Sartre met each other in Paris they spoke for twenty-four hours straight:
the cock-eyed demon and
the guru of the wretched.
Perhaps facts like these
kept me alive.
Bru

When Fanon and Sartre met each other in Paris they talked for twenty-four hours non-stop: the squint-eyed demon and the guru of the wretched.
Perhaps facts such as these kept me alive.
Bru

Here the use of SMS-style language functions as a break: the reader is brought to pause and consider that which has gone before and that which is yet to come in the same way that Stefaans’s substance abuse caused a break between the former and the latter parts of his life. This kind of language resistance is also evident in Viljoen/Winterbach’s other novels, for instance through her feminist idiom, her use of dialects, registers and languages from different domains, the inclusions of taboos, word games and the loss and archiving of lexicon (Botha & Van Vuuren 2007a, 2007b). Furthermore, Botha and Van Vuuren (2007a) examine how her creative use of the *plaasroman* (meaning “farm novel”) – a typically South African and specifically Afrikaans form of the novel which “concerned itself almost exclusively with the farm and *platteland* (rural) society” (Coetzee 1988), often entrenching Afrikaner Nationalist ideas – is subverted through the use of an ideological undercurrent and carnivalesque humour which serves as ironic implicit and explicit commentary on historical and current political discourses and realities. Additionally, this method serves to expose the layeredness of structure and meaning in Viljoen/
Winterbach’s oeuvre, thus unsettling the linearity of the text and allowing for ‘lines of flight’.

Such ‘lines of flight’ (or bifurcations) form part of the vocabulary developed by Deleuze and Guattari in *A thousand plateaus* (1987) and refer to how things – words, people, electric flows, industries, etc. – have the capacity to discohere towards possible creative mutations. And it is these possible mutations, alterings and reimaginings – or bifurcations and deterritorialisations – which allow the book, and in this case the novel, to stutter. But the stuttering of the novel is not the stuttering of speech; it does not refer to a stammering or a faltering, but rather to a break, such as the break brought about by Stefaans Adendorff’s SMS texts. It is a break which, in literature, creates “an atmospheric quality, a milieu that acts as the conductor of words – that brings together within itself the quiver, the murmur, the stutter … and makes the indicated effect reverberate through the words” (Deleuze 1997: 108). It is a break which signals a perpetual variation – the possibility of a variation – and one which forms the cornerstone of Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy of minor literature.

In *What is philosophy?* Deleuze and Guattari (1994: 73) write: “A minor art pushes against the edges of representation; it bends it, forces it to the limits and often to a certain absurdity.” And in so doing, it stutters and bifurcates, allowing for something new to emerge, creating a minor literature within a major milieu. Hence, as Deleuze and Guattari argue, we have to “distinguish between a major and a minor language, that is, between a power (*pouvoir*) of constants and a power (*puissance*) of variables” (Conley 2005: 164). A major language always contains an immanent minor element “which does not exists independently or outside of its expression and statements” but which does “open a passage in... the major language” (Conley 2005: 164) such as the ‘passage’ brought about by Lena Bergh’s experience of the mystical in *Landskap met vroue en slang* and Stefaans Adendorff’s transformation presented in his SMS texts in *Die benederyk/The road of excess*. As such, a minor language may be explained as “a major language in the process of becoming minor... in the process of change” (Conley 2005: 165), and a minor literature may be understood “not necessarily [as] one written in the language of an oppressed minority” but one which is in “a process of becoming other” (Bogue 2005: 169). Here ‘becoming’ means that the world (and also language) is not solely defined by the primacy of representation and identity, but that there is a “continual production (or ‘return’) of
difference immanent within the constitution of events, whether physical or otherwise” (Stagoll 2005a: 21); i.e. becoming is not becoming representation, it is “becoming different”, defining “a world of presentation anew” (Stagoll 2005a: 21).

It is this immanent stuttering and becoming-minor in Ingrid Winterbach’s oeuvre that I have investigated in terms of the politics, ethics and aesthetics of translation, using the conceptual framework provided by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, with the aim of providing an orientation which maps out the accentedness in novels and their translations (if they are capable, if they can).
Chapter 1
Conceptual impasse of the deluded doos

“...”

Translated (English)
Conceptual impasse of the deluded doos
Conceptual impasse of the deluded box
Conceptual impasse of the deluded cunt

Translated (Afrikaans)
Konseptuele impasse van die deluded doos
Konseptuele impasse van die begogelde boks
Konseptuele impasse van die begogelde doos

“A bee that has seen a food source can communicate the message to bees that did not see it, but a bee that has not seen it cannot transmit the message to others that did not see it. Language is not content to go from a first party to a second party, from one who has seen to one who has not, but necessarily goes from a second party to a third party, neither of whom has seen. It is in this sense that language is the transmission of the word as order-word, not the communication of a sign as information. Language is a map, not a tracing.”

(Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 77)

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10 The phrase “deluded doos” is taken from Ingrid Winterbach’s novel Die boek van toeval en toeverlaat (2006: 14).
11 Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 76, 79) explain the order-word as the “elementary unit of language – the statement”, which “do[es] not concern commands only, but every act that is linked to statements by a ‘social obligation’”. Every statement displays this link, directly or indirectly. “Questions, promises, are order-words. The only possible definition of language is the set of all order-words, implicit suppositions, or speech act currents in a language at a given moment.” In The Deleuze dictionary, Verena Conley (2005: 193) explains the order-word as “a function immanent to language that compels obedience.” It thus highlights the inherent political and ethical questioning of what kinds of language we use and how these forms are either reinforced or subverted.
1.1 Introduction: a map, not a tracing

In this chapter I survey the literature of Translation Studies in relation to Ingrid Winterbach’s oeuvre and interpret it through the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari with the aim of showing what is possible when we move away from representation-in-translation – i.e. a tracing – so that accentedness (a mapping) is actualised in translation praxis.

Instead of being partial to an original literary text in the place of a translation – the other – we could, at the outset, agree that the act of translation and the result of the act of translation (the translated work) has an inherent duality and is consequently simultaneously an act of subjective immersion and objective detachment, intent on creating a type of double-sided novel. This double – whether a first, second, third or fourth translation which has no first party in language to begin with, as Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 77) explain – acts as a kind of mirror image of the original, though always through a somewhat distorted mirror as the translation, regardless of its degree of fidelity, can never be an exact replica of the original. That is the curse of Babel, “the inadequation of one tongue to another ... of language to itself and to meaning” (Derrida 1985: 165). Perhaps one of the most accurate descriptions for the process of translation comes from the Chinese phrase, *fan yi*, which means ‘turning over’. Tymoczko (2006a: 22) writes that:

> This concept of *fan yi* is linked to the image of embroidery; thus if the source text is the front side of an embroidered work, the target text can be thought of as the back side of the same piece. Like the reverse of an embroidery – which typically in Chinese handwork has hanging threads, loose ends and even variations in patterning from the front – a translation in this conceptualization is viewed as different from the original and is not expected to be equivalent in all respects.

Certainly translation always reveals the poverty of the other language in some sense and inevitably the inherent loss of translation; be it linguistic, semantic, idiomatic, metaphorical or metonymical. But often the target language also allows the translator, who develops an intimate relationship with the original, to capture a different aspect – a loose thread of the embroidery, multiple threads at the same time, a different stitching technique or a slightly varying hue – perhaps omitted from or ambiguous in the original work, or which has a lexical gap\(^\text{12}\) in the source language existent in the target language.

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\(^{12}\) A **lexical gap** is a “single lexeme” or single word for a notion or concept in one language for which there is no single word in another language, though that language would be able to express it in more than one word or in a sentence.
which, in some way, offers not only a more succinct, but also a conceptually more vivid semantic interpretation of the source text phrase. (I would like to add here, though, that in some sense, all words have lexical gaps in the target language as even seemingly simple words like the Afrikaans word *tafel*, which has the direct English equivalent “table”, is not an entirely direct equivalent as different cultures have different connotations to even such ostensibly straightforward signifiers which remain constantly in flux and change over time.) Nevertheless, the newly created novel is balanced with translational gains, offering more than a mere linguistic equivalent in a second language; a work that not only holds its own, but also offers a kind of annexe to the original, a reverse side, slightly different from the front side of the embroidery. That then is the exchange; a constant balancing of loss and gain, and nowhere is this fine balance more critical than in literary translation, which more than merely serving a linguistic or communicative function, serves to transfer embedded cultural ideology and action in storytelling. As André Lefevere (1992: vii) writes, “Translation is, of course, a rewriting of an original text. All rewritings, whatever their intention, reflect a certain ideology and a poetics and as such manipulate literature to function in a given society in a new way.”

It is this intention of the author, this embedded discursive self of the author which becomes the map for the translator, the embroidery from which s/he starts to build, to create, to write and rewrite, to translate first internally, within her/himself, then within the text – within the author’s voice – and only then within language, culture, socio-political and other frameworks. In Hélène Cixous’s (in Blythe & Sellers 2004: 91) words:

> The work we do is a work of love, comparable to the work of love that can take place between two human beings. To understand the other, it is necessary to go in their language, to make the journey through the other’s imaginary. For you are strange to me. In the effort to understand, I bring you back to me, compare you to me. I translate you in me. And what I note is your difference, your strangeness. At that moment, perhaps, through recognition of my own differences, I might perceive something of you.

It is this difference that I mean to explore in the oeuvre of Ingrid Winterbach (a.k.a. Lettie Viljoen); in her language, her discourse, her thematic concerns and stylistic devices – the stutterings thereof and the disruptions it causes. The term *difference* is used here in the

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(Crystal 2010: 111). There is, for example, no single English lexeme for the Afrikaans word *grii* which, in the English dictionary is explained as “shiver” or “shudder”, but which in fact can only be more accurately described as “shivers running up and down my spine due to something freakish.”
sense that it is used by Deleuze, as “‘difference from the same’ or difference of the same over time” (Stagoll 2005b: 72). Deleuze borrows Nietzsche’s concept of ‘the eternal return’ but explains repetition and difference – this eternal return – not as repetition which constitutes sameness and equivalence, but as a perpetual repetition that is always in flux, always imperceptible; not simulacra, but the “resistance of simulacra” (Deleuze 1994: v-vii). Deleuze is thus particularly concerned with disrupting the primacy afforded to identity and representation in Western philosophy by grounding it in a theory of experience – “difference as it is experienced” (Stagoll 2005b: 72), not as it is perceived due to the demands of a created normativity and the structures that reinforce and disseminate these demands mimetically in the form of structural violence.\(^\text{13}\) It is through the application of this philosophy that Deleuze not only challenges the privilege of the earlier philosophies of Being and representational modes of conceptualisation, but also exposes the objectionable political, ethical and aesthetic material effects (Deleuze 1994) of these privileged ways of seeing and interpreting the world, and the value of disrupting these in different domains, including in literature and translation, as I shall show.

It is with this kind of difference in mind and because of this difference – “a difference that is not grounded in anything else” but rather refers to the “particularity or ‘singularity’\(^\text{14}\) of each individual thing, moment, perception or conception” (Stagoll 2005b: 73) – that Derrida brings the act of translation back to the single word, the solitary lexeme. He writes (2012: 366):

I believe I can say that if I love the word, it is only in the body of its idiomatic singularity, that is, where a passion for translation comes to lick it as a flame or an amorous tongue might: approaching as closely as possible while refusing at the last moment to threaten or reduce, to consume or to consummate, leaving the other body intact but not without causing the other to appear – on the very brink of this refusal or withdrawal – and after having aroused or excited a desire for the idiom, for the unique body of the other, in the flame’s flicker or through a tongue’s caress.

\(^{13}\) I discuss these ideas in more detail in Chapter 3.

\(^{14}\) Singularity is not used to mean “unique” in this study. Derek Attridge (2004: 64), for example, notes that “singularity, like alterity and inventiveness, is not a property but an event, the event of singularizing which takes place in reception: it does not occur outside the responses of those who encounter and thereby constitute it. It is produced, not given in advance; and its emergence is also the beginning of its erosion, as it brings about the cultural changes necessary to accommodate it.” Singularity, Attridge argues, “is not […] to be equated with ‘uniqueness’, a word which I shall employ to refer to an entity which is unlike all other entities without being inventive in its difference – which is to say, without introducing otherness into the sphere of the same. A work that is unique but not singular is one that may be wholly comprehended within the norms of the culture: indeed, it is the process of comprehension – the registering of its particular configuration of familiar laws – that discloses its uniqueness.”
If, then, translators start with the word, use the word – each individual lexeme with all its inherent polysemous connotations, denotations, suggestions and subtexts – as a map, though not in its individual sense as isolated concepts, but rather in relation to other words, to other texts, to the texts within ourselves (their multiplicities\(^{15}\) and unfolding capacities), then it unlocks a true chance at a faithful exploration of the source text and what it means to translate ethically, viewing the source and target texts not as discrete creations, but as two sides of the same embroidery. To accomplish this, however, we must start the process of translation with a map, not a tracing; for a tracing is a replica, a duplicate, a copy, which a translation can never truly be and which, at least politically and ethically, cannot be done in fidelity if it begins with a tracing. But if, on the other hand, we begin our process – the interpretation and translation of each word with all its branches, its borders, its transgressions and its untranslatability within specific contexts – as a mapping, we have a starting point that is “open and connectable in all of its dimensions; it is detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant modification” (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 12). And as a result, it may be viewed as rhizomatic\(^{16}\) and with manifold entry points.

Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 12) write:

> The orchid does not produce the tracing of the wasp; it forms a map with the wasp, a rhizome. What distinguishes the map from the tracing is that it is entirely oriented toward an experimentation in contact with the real. The map does not reproduce an unconscious closed in upon itself; it constructs the unconscious.

If translation – the practices of translation – is seen as a map, or more accurately, a mapping, rather than a tracing, we can view it in terms of a Deleuzo-Guattarian ontology or diagram of reality, which consists of and is always in flux between the virtual, the intensive and the actual or extensive (the terms ‘actual’ and ‘extensive’ are used synonymously). However, it is important from the outset to recognise that there is no hierarchy between these states and that none of them exist prior to the others. Simply put then, the virtual “contains the way systems behave in their intensive and actual conditions” (Normark 2009). It can be regarded as the continuum of all possible real (but not actual or actualised) existing and emergent properties inherent in heterogeneous

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\(^{15}\) Multiplicity here means “a complex structure that does not reference a prior unity” (Roffe 2005: 176). Deleuze proposes that “any situation is composed of different multiplicities that form a kind of patchwork or ensemble without becoming a totality or whole” (Roffe 2005: 176).

\(^{16}\) Colman (2005: 231) explains that Deleuze and Guattari use the term rhizome to refer to the “connections that occur between the most disparate and the most similar of objects, places and people”, and that it describes all aspects of the virtual, intense and actual “as multiple in the interrelational movements with other things and bodies.”
multiplicities and their immanent singularities and capacity for bifurcations17 or, as these are sometimes synonymously referred to as, lines of flight (De Landa 2002: 56-61). What this means is that at any given moment, the arrangements of properties, capacities, singularities or attractors, etc., change along with changes in the actual. In translativ terms we may view the virtual as all the translational choices available to the translator/s which are real but have not as yet been actualised. Translation as a mapping rather than a tracing thus allows for all virtual possibilities to be available at all times to any given translator; holding the space for different interpretations, alterings, substitutions and re-imaginings – a repetition with difference – each with its own extensive contributions, such as we find in retranslations of the same work. It allows for original literary works, translations and retranslations to have sameness with differences, for single or multiple interpretations, for translations and retranslations of any given source text to bifurcate, for the loose threads of the embroidery to remain loose and disorderly, and for the possibility of continually new rhizomatic and ever mutable formations which also extends to the diverse construals by readers of such texts. Translation as a mapping – as a holding of virtual possibilities – is also that which piqued my interest in terms of Ingrid Winterbach’s oeuvre. Specifically I started wondering what becomes possible when translation praxis is viewed in terms of the virtual, the intensive and the extensive.

The intensive is described by Bonta and Protevi (2004: 15) as “morphogenetic processes that operate far-from-equilibrium and produce equilibrium/steady state/stable systems.” This is perhaps the hardest of the three aspects of Deleuze and Guattari’s ontology to explain but could, in the simplest terms, be said to actualise or realise (concretise) the virtual into the actual or extensive. Bonta and Protevi (2004: 15) further elucidate this state by writing that “What is particularly unique about the intensive level is the fact that it is a realm of inclusive disjunction, where heterogeneity is retained and each virtual singularity really exists despite the fact that they cannot be actualised at once.” The intensive is thus a kind of in between state midst the virtual and the actual; that is, the tendencies of virtual states to actualise in specific ways. For translation purposes we can view the intensive as, for example, the way in which all the structural, thematic, stylistic, linguistic, political, personal, universal, etc. elements within a system tend to configure and reconfigure within the constraints of source and target languages. These are usually directed by, for instance,

17 ‘Bifurcations’ or ‘lines of flight’ is part of the vocabulary developed by Deleuze and Guattari in A thousand plateaus and refers to how things connect, as well as their tendencies in such instances towards possible creative mutations (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 203-205, 510).
dominating views and leading translation strategies and theories but may at times take lines of flight, leading to new ways of reading and interpreting, sometimes even destabilising existing or governing construals. And it is this aspect especially that I wanted to investigate more in terms of translation because it seemed to me to hold the key to a new kind of translation praxis.

The last aspect of Deleuze and Guattari’s ontology is the actual or the extensive, which is really the easiest to understand as it refers to the concrete and the observable. Bonta and Protevi, in *Deleuze and geophilosophy: a guide and glossary* (2004: 14), define the actual as follows:

> Actual or ‘stratified’ substances are equilibrium, steady state, or stable systems, and hence display most prominently extensive properties (such as length or volume), which are by definition divisible without a change in the system (a ruler cut in two would be two rulers), and definite qualities (for instance, the pieces of rulers would display the same weight-bearing capacity per unit measure as the original ruler.

The actual, when viewed from the process of translation, refers to the original or source texts as well as the target texts (translations and retranslations; i.e. the actualised or concretised of the virtual through the intensive). But it is important here that translation be viewed not as static, but as a process or a practice, in constant flux between the virtual, the intensive and the extensive, clearly illustrating why Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy is a productive view of translation, though this has not been widely investigated or applied as yet.

Translation, from this view, could then be seen not as an attempt at imitation (a replica in a different language), but rather as a specific instantiation of the virtual. And it is these instantiations – these specific translational concretisations of a work and the politics, as well as the ontological assumptions and emergent ethical considerations thereof – which present translators with the impossible – the conceptual impasse\(^{18}\) of each word with all its virtual (real but not actual) potentialities and intensive tendencies, its polysemous (polygamous) nature within itself, within texts and within memetic minds. It is the attempt to notice difference (variance, dissimilarity), strangeness (peculiarity, unknown) and bring the Self back to the Other, as Cixous suggests, through comparison (contrast and

\(^{18}\) I adopted this term from Avrum Stroll (2002) which he uses in his article entitled “Interpretation and meaning”.
recognition) so that the Self can translate the Other in the ‘I’ (the ‘you’ in the ‘me’) and then, perchance, observe something of the Other and present that in the text: the work of a deluded doos, the immanent catch-22 of the translator and translation but, alas, also the objective of this study and therefore a necessary line of flight (yet another bifurcation) into the trouble with translation. The trouble with translation is, of course, that it is a game of broken telephone, passing from a second party to a third, from a third to a fourth, all blindfolded – unseeing though not visionless – and searching, grappling with the virtual of each word in context, trying to locate the intensive – the exact meaning and present it – loose threads and all, as an actual translation or retranslation; the careful construction (interpretation, construal, reinterpretation) and inevitable misconstruction (misunderstanding, ambiguation, disruption) of meaning.

1.2 Language that offers resistance: language that stutters and disrupts

In an interview, Ingrid Winterbach said of language (Van Vuuren 2004): “Taal is belangrik. Die naas mekaar stel, by monde van verskillende karakters, van byvoorbeeld die taal van die mistiek, die wetenskap, van die skone kunste. Taal wat weerstand bied.” (Language is important. The juxtaposition, through the voices of different characters, for example of the language of mysticism, of science, of the arts. Language that offers resistance.) It is this resistance and awareness of language in Winterbach’s oeuvre that I shall explore in this section because it illustrates the ways in which her novels bifurcate and stutter as well as the way in which she has created a minor language.

Elaine Showalter (1988: 346) claims that “all language is the language of the dominant order, and women, if they speak at all, must speak through it.” I argue that this can be applied in a wider sense to include all minor voices and highlights two important aspects: 1) the tension between the centre and the margin; and 2) the idea of having a voice – being able to speak and being allowed to speak – or being rendered voiceless through the exertion of power by the centre on the margin. I do not, however, strictly agree with the idea that minor voices can speak only through the dominant order. While it is true that the dominant order is pervasive, and perhaps always so, it can be and has been subverted in a number of ways: through speech, writing, translation and even choice of writing language. Ngugi wa Thiong’o (1986: 7), for example, refers to a speech given by Chinua Achebe in 1964 who questions whether it is “right that a man should abandon his mother tongue for
someone else’s?” Lori Chamberlain (2012: 266) also writes about Suzanne Jill Levine and Carol Maier who actively examine what it means to be “a woman translator in and of a male tradition.” She goes on to say: “Both of these translators’ work illustrates the importance not only of translating but about writing about it, making the principles of a practice part of the dialogue about revising translation” (Chamberlain 2012: 267). We could say that it is the task of writers, translators, critics and academics, amongst others, “to learn to listen to the ‘silent’ discourse – of women [or any minor voice] ... in order to better articulate the relationship between what has been coded as ‘authoritative’ discourse and what is silenced in the fear of disruption or subversion” (Chamberlain 2012: 266).

Ingrid Winterbach is known for her idiosyncratic writing style; for writing against the grain of language and disrupting the hierarchy of texts and salient novelistic structures through a number of stylistic, thematic and linguistic devices. As I mentioned before, Botha and Van Vuuren (2007a) examine, for example, Winterbach’s novel use of the plaasroman (“farm novel”), which she subverts for the purposes of making implicit and explicit commentary on the political realities of Apartheid and post-Apartheid South Africa. In this way her writing creates a relationship between authoritative discourse and minor voices. Specifically, her novel Niggie (translated as To hell with Cronje), as well as novels such as Etienne van Heerden’s Toorberg, modify and transmute “the conventions of the plaasroman genre to give voice to a complicitous critique of the consequences of Afrikaner racial exclusivity in the 1980s” (Warnes 2011). This historiographical-metafictional device allows the author both immediacy through character dialogue as well as a retrospective perspective, implicit dialogical commentary on dominant structures and the fragmentations thereof (Botha & Van Vuuren 2006a), and a textual engagement with current affairs (Strydom & Van Vuuren 2011) – typical of littérature engagée (a term coined and explained by Sartre in 1978). In turn, this serves to highlight the loss of the real (Botha & Van Vuuren 2008a) or what is perceived of as reality, and the consequent incessant but inadequate attempts to simulate reality which creates a kind of hyperreal state (Baudrillard 1994) but ultimately leads to the inevitable disintegration of the familiar (or the dominant) which is brought about by the loss of the previously stable and unquestioned ontological and epistemological seats of meaning.
1.2.1 The centre and the margin: real, represented and representational

In Winterbach’s novel, *Die boek van toeval en toeverlaat* (translated as *The book of happenstance*), the narrative centres on thematic recurrences of language and cultural longevity and/or death, and specifically the “status of Afrikaans as a minority language” (Strydom & Van Vuuren 2011) in post-Apartheid South Africa. This is concretised in the plot through the protagonist, Helena Verbloem, a lexicographer working on a project which aims to collect and archive all Afrikaans lexical items that have fallen into disuse or are used infrequently – a plot element that results in formal difficulties with the translation of the text. This will be discussed at length in Section 1.2.6 but what I am more concerned with in this section is the preservation of cultural heterogeneity in translation, specifically when translating from “small” languages (Casanova 2004: 180) into assimilating languages.

The question I shall investigate arises from the tensions hinted at above: on the one hand, the accumulation of literary capital for smaller languages through translations (as a “particular type of consecration in the literary world”) into assimilating languages (Casanova 2004: 133) and, on the other hand, the role of the translator as a “map-maker” who has the power and responsibility to construct representations of one culture in the language of another (Kolb 2011: 177-196). As I mentioned in the Introduction, Annie Brisset explains this difficulty – the trouble with translation – as a result of it being “a dual act of communication” which “presupposes the existence, not of one, but of two distinct codes, the ‘source language’ and the ‘target language’”. And this tension has become increasingly apparent due to the growing awareness of “both the conceptual complexity and the politico-ethical significance of translation” (Sakai 2006). It is, in particular, the inherent political and ethical considerations and applications of each translation instantiation that I am interested in, and how these tensions play out between Afrikaans and English, specifically in Winterbach’s oeuvre. My intention is to show how translation is “always complicit with the building, transforming or disrupting of power relations” (Sakai 2006). But the question that arises is how translation, as a discursive cultural construct, can – if indeed it is at all able to and in that case, to what extent – reflect all the subtleties of a source text, specifically because its cultural-historical subtexts and intertexts may serve as specific markers of the meta-narrative and are thus imperative for a full reading and understanding thereof, as is the case with Winterbach’s novels. The problem that arises is that such subtexts and source language-specific intertexts may be assumed
embedded cultural knowledge in the ST and may therefore not be available to the larger portion of the target audience. Furthermore, as Sakai (2006) notes, translation is part of a regime, “an institutionalized assemblage of protocols, rules of conduct, canons of accuracy, and ways of viewing.” Recurring motifs from minor canons may then in fact be a way to bring attention to the margin, to reconfigure them into the consciousness of the centre, but if such encyclopaedic (background or assumed) knowledge is lost in the translation, it remains marginalised, unnoticed, untranslated and, in effect, untranslatable. It is this encounter with subtext and with source language-specific intertexts, with its embedded cultural knowledge – the margins of the text, so to speak – that I investigate as the untranslatable, rather than in the more common use of the word which refers to the untranslatability of lexical and phrasal meanings (a contested idea anyway and beyond the scope of this research). It is also the practices of translation which expose the untranslatable – contain it in fact – and make this “initial discontinuity between the addresser and the addressee … continuous … makes something representable out of an unrepresentable difference” (Sakai 2006). It is, as Sakai writes, impossible to reduce this difference or untranslatability to “either specific difference or spatial distance. But when represented as a conceptual difference or gap, it is no longer an incommensurability. It is mapped onto a striated space, which may be segmented by national borders and other markers of the collective (national, ethnic, racial or ‘cultural’) identification” (Sakai 2006). Moreover, the untranslatable – that which I shall refer to as the liminal, the discreet, that which is beyond translation, or which escapes direct and succinct interpretation and textual rendition – does not exist prior to translation but becomes apparent only through the process of translation, emerges from translation. The untranslatable then “is as much a testimony to the sociality of the translator, whose elusive positionality reveals the presence of an aggregate community of foreigners between the addresser and the addressee, as the translatable itself” (Sakai 2006). The co-figurative schema of translation, or what I referred to earlier as the regime of translation, could therefore be said to be of specific politico-ethical importance as it “serves to reify national sovereignty” (Sakai 2006), thus demanding of the translator not to view the untranslatable (in the sense that I am using it here) as a conceptual difference or dilemma, but as the immanence of representation – signs, symbols, images, thoughts, constructions, reconstructions – that which is the virtual of the construal and which, through intensities (central or marginal tendencies), become actualised either as sameness or as difference, as a replica or as a disruption. In this respect, the co-figurational schemas of literature, which tend to
replicate and reinforce “the representation of the Eurocentric world, and ... the legacy of European colonialisms” (Sakai 2006) remain preserved to a large degree. This may indeed be what Elaine Showalter (1988: 346) means when she says that “all language is the language of the dominant order” through which all others are forced to speak. It is also the untranslatable which I shall argue for as way to retain accentedness in translation by referring to the Engfrikaans used in Viljoen/Winterbach’s oeuvre.

1.2.1.1 The minor in the minor and the minor in the major

Undoing the entrenched structures of the dominant and exposing what is centred and what is marginalised, or an awareness of “the manner in which the centre tries to co-opt or erase the margin” (Foster 2008b) is perhaps what Winterbach means when she says that language must offer resistance. This could be understood in two ways: 1) language must resist the (mostly Eurocentric and Western) institutionalised norms of writing through the subversion of structure, content and ethno-linguistic choices; and 2) language must offer resistance in that it must engage in the struggle of minor literature as Deleuze and Guattari explain it in *Kafka: toward a minor literature* (1986). Bogue (2005: 110) explains how Deleuze and Guattari argue that Kafka, within the major tradition of German, was attempting to create a minor literature, “one that experiments with language, ignores canonical models, fosters collective action and treats the personal as something immediately social and political.” Deleuze and Guattari (1986: 16-18) argue that a minor literature has the following three characteristics: 1) the language shows a high degree of deterritorialisation; 2) the personal is always connected to the political; and 3) there is a “collective assemblage of enunciation” (Deleuze & Guattari 1986: 18). While the second characteristic is clear and easy to interpret, the first and third characteristics need some explanation. I shall start by explaining the third and then move on to the first.

For Deleuze and Guattari, language “is a mode of action, a way of doing things with words” (Bogue 2005: 111). Bogue goes on to explain:

*Language's primary function is not to communicate neutral information but to enforce a social order by categorizing, organizing, structuring and coding the world. Every language presupposes*
two strata of relations of power: a discursive “collective assemblage” of enunciation and a non-discursive “machinic assemblage of bodies” (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 88). These discursive and non-discursive assemblages are regulated patterns of social action, one shaping words, the other shaping things, and the two interacting as words intervene in things by producing incorporeal transformations of bodies.

Thus, what is important here is that language variations, deviations from norms and oppositions to rules are not simply linguistic departures from ‘the standard’ but, according to Deleuze and Guattari, are linguistic actions, continually in collaboration, mediation, difference and resistance, which language users make use of to shape their conceptualisations through linguistic means, for example through the coining of novel words and phrases, pattern inflections, semantic variations, gender modulations and so forth. It is a “castle [which] has multiple entrances whose rules of usage and whose locations aren’t very well known” (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 3), and it is in this way that they deterritorialise the language by detaching it “from its clearly delineated, regularly gridded territory of conventions, codes, labels and markers” (Bogue 2005: 111-112). When language users reuse and reinforce linguistic standards we may refer to it as the territorialisations of language. When deterritorialised forms become normative again, linguistic norms can be said to reterritorialise, but in a transformed way; repetition – the eternal return – with difference. And it is specifically the ways in which Winterbach’s language actualises difference and takes lines of flight that I am interested in as these offer new ways of seeing and of ‘translating’ the Other in the Self and the Self in the Other. This, I argue, is also the real work of the translator; not simply to render a text into a target language, but also to recognise the immanence of representation – the virtual of the construal – in an attempt to avoid the trap of actualised pseudo-representations of ethno-linguistic diversity through standard and standardising models. Such representations serve only to constitute “a substratum upon which the national sovereignty can be built” (Sakai 2006) and is disguised by rendering ethno-linguistic communities as translatable and therefore representable, marginalising and silencing them to an even greater degree by not revealing the untranslatable; their difference and their strangeness through which, as Cixious writes, we might glimpse our own difference/s.

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9 Assemblage here means the “play of contingency and structure, organization and change [...] that which is being assembled. An assemblage is not a set of predetermined parts (such as the pieces of a plastic model aeroplane) that are then put together in order or into an already-conceived structure (the model aeroplane). Nor is an assemblage a random collection of things, since there is a sense that an assemblage is a whole of some sort that expresses some identity and claims a territory” (Macgregor Wise 2005: 77). The concept of an assemblage thus reveals to us how institutionalised norms and practices form and disrupt each other, “intersecting and transforming: creating territories and then unmaking them, deterritorializing, opening lines of flight ... but also shutting them down” (Macgregor Wise 2005: 86).
1.2.1.2 Deterritorialisation (disruption, disturbance, disorder) in Winterbach’s oeuvre

Winterbach’s novels reveal a profound meditation on the role of language in human perception and identity, of the constructions and reconstructions thereof, of the frameworks through which our thoughts and language are filtered – each in turn affecting the other, influencing it and changing it – and the conceptual impasse not of words and phrases, but of the text/s of the Self in relation to the text/s of the Other. Bell (1993: 158-159) writes:

[P]articular languages embody distinctive ways of experiencing the world, of defining what we are. That is, we not only speak in particular languages, but more fundamentally become the person we become because of the particular language community in which we grew up – language, above all else, shapes our distinctive ways of being in the world. Language, then, is the carrier of people’s identity, the vehicle of a certain way of seeing things, experiencing and feeling, determinant of particular outlooks on life.

Spivak (2012: 312) reiterates this idea when she writes that language is one of the ways in which we make sense of ourselves (and of others) and that the process of making sense of ourselves is “what produces identity”. This is very important in Winterbach’s oeuvre as each character is given her/his own language (own voice); their own dialect as a reflection of their social group, but also of their own particular and individual way of speaking – an idiolect20 within an idiolect continuum – as I shall illustrate in the subsequent chapters. But languages are not the only ways in which we make sense of ourselves and of others and they are not discreet entities. They are “only a vital clue to where the self loses its boundaries”, to where “we feel the selvedges of the language-textile give way, fray into frayages or facilitations” (Spivak 2012: 313) or, we could say, fray into bifurcations or lines of flight. De Landa (1997: 183-184) writes that human languages are not defined solely by the phonetics, lexicon, semantics and grammatical structures which evolve over time and that languages, as “cultural materials”, do not occur randomly but rather develop systematically and in structural relationships, as well as in relationship “with the human beings who serve as their organic support.” He goes on to write that:

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20 A dialect refers to the ‘standard’ variety of a language which usually has different accents (e.g. the dialect known as ‘standard English’ has many accents which may reflect either a country or a region’s inflections thereof), whereas an idiolect refers to each person’s individual and distinct way of using language – thus his or her “personal dialect” (Crystal 2010: 24).
The “sonic matter” of a given language (the phonemes of French or English, for instance) is not only structured internally, forming a system of vowels and consonants in which a change in one element affects every other one, but also socioeconomically: sounds accumulate in a society following class or caste divisions, and, together with dress and diet, form an integral part of the system of traits which differentiates social strata.

These two ideas – Spivak’s conceptualisation of language as both the construction of identity and the beginnings of the fraying, and De Landa’s theory of how language is integral to the social (class) divisions in society – are some of the aspects that I shall illustrate from Winterbach’s novels. This could be explained in terms of the materiality of language; that is, the value of language is not ontological but arises directly from the relationship between language as a symbolic system and the socioeconomic intentions and constructions thereof, as well as the political importance for the centre to reinforce these differential strata. I shall speak more of the politics of translation in Chapter 3, but what I shall illustrate here is the idea of the voice – in the sense of having a voice or being voiceless (an identity within a specific set of social strata) – through examples and discussions of Winterbach’s novels. I shall pay particular attention to her four most recent novels, the last three of which form a kind of trilogy (thematically and structurally), even though they were not formally constructed as such.

i) Niggie/To hell with Cronjé

In Niggie (translated as To hell with Cronjé), a novel about the Anglo-Boer War (1899 – 1902), particular consideration is given to “the ways in which characters use verbal and written narratives in an attempt to come to terms” with trauma (Human 2009a) and “on the processes of trauma recovery” (Van Coller & Van den Berg 2009). This novel also undermines the traditional hero-fication of patriotism and war (Botha & Van Vuuren 2006a) and exposes the boredom and passivity of life as a commando, as well as the socio-political tensions of multiracial, multicultural and multilingual societies (Botha & Van Vuuren 2008a), the latter a recurring theme in Viljoen/Winterbach’s work.

Furthermore, it “addresses postcolonial issues and predicaments such as a defragmenting identity, as well as the possible demise of the Afrikaans language and culture (Botha & Van Vuuren 2007b), a concern which takes a central role in Die boek van toeval en toeverlaat/The book of happenstance. In Niggie, the liminal manifests through Winterbach’s use of structural elements, but also through thematic and plot elements.
which serve as commentary on personal and collective history. Hence, the political freedom/s and enslavement of individuals and collectives are shown to be interdependent on each other (Du Plooy 2006). With the metanarrative of colonisation and apartheid disintegrated, the narrative of identity for many South Africans also disintegrated (Viljoen & Van der Merwe 2007) and this is especially reflected in the linguistic techniques employed by Winterbach, including what has been termed *Engfrikaans*, “a form of code switching used by certain Afrikaans authors” (John 2004).

An example from Winterbach’s latest novel, *Die aanspraak van lewende wesens* (p.65), illustrates this idea of Engfrikaans very well. One of the characters, speaking about Yngwie Malmsteen, a death metal musician, says: “Hy’s a fokken krismisboom! As jy neat fretwork wil hoor, of inventing shredding, luister na John Petrucci van Dream Theatre. Die man neem progressive metal na ’n nuwe level.” (“He’s a fucking Christmas tree! If you want to hear neat fretwork, or inventing shredding, listen to John Petrucci from Dream Theatre. The man takes progressive metal to a new level.”). From the English translation, it should become clear that the Afrikaans word *krismisboom* is an Anglicisation and colloquialisation of the English word “Christmas” which is actually *kersfees* in Afrikaans, though it is combined with the Afrikaans word *boom* rather than the English equivalent, namely “tree”. English phrases such as “neat fretwork”, “inventing shredding” and “progressive metal”, as well as the word “level” are incorporated into the Afrikaans, seamlessly blending the two languages (at least on some level). This is also reflective of how most Afrikaans people speak in South Africa, especially the younger generations.

Of particular interests to me is the way in which language is used to create the identity of characters, but also to reflect the frameworks they use for meaning-making and how trauma disrupts not only such conceptual structures, but also language use, language comprehension and even language production. Human (2009b) writes that trauma and loss are experiences which lie outside of language in some sense and that our attempts at narrating these or communicating about them actually involves a kind of translation. For example, one of the characters in *Niggie/To hell with Cronjé*, namely Abraham Fouché – a young soldier whose brother was shot and died in his arms – is, for example, completely stripped of the ability to speak coherently and though this is an obvious consequence of post-traumatic stress and shock, it “is also a tacit commentary on how the narrative (the stories that we tell each other and ourselves) is a way of making sense of our lives”
Abraham’s incoherent amphigory – his inability to construct a coherent narrative to make sense of things – can be viewed as Winterbach’s commentary on the senselessness of war and how the anathema thereof remains nonsensical in that it can never be constructed into coherent and meaningful narratives or, in other words, made sense of. On the other hand we have Ben Maritz and Reitz Steyn, a natural historian and geologist respectively, who use language from scientific domains which is in contrast to the other characters who use language typical of a more religious Afrikaner language framework. This device is employed to highlight the tensions between the position of the intellectual and that of the layman (Botha & Van Vuuren 2007b), but also to emphasise the active preservation of conservatism by Afrikaners. Ben and Reitz also play with words (Botha & Van Vuuren 2006a), making lexical and phonological associations which allow for the naming of plants, animals, rock formations, precious stones, veteran soldiers, battlefields and place names, as well as the construction of neologisms (John 2004). This serves as a kind of cataloguing or archiving of language and is also a metafictional reference to the importance of literature for such purposes, a theme I shall explore in more detail when I discuss *Die boek van toeval en toeverlaat/The book of happenstance* and in Section 2.4. Through such word games, the novel *Niggie/To hell with Cronjé* actually becomes an archive of more archaic Afrikaans words and idiomatic expressions.

The other characters in the novel also exhibit very individual ways of speaking, but I shall not discuss all of them here as it is beyond the scope of this thesis. What I do want to highlight is the role of Esegiël, the black worker, “a veritable encyclopaedia of knowledge” who is “called upon to provide answers to any questions that are put to him. He has, ironically enough, an intimate knowledge of all the nooks and crannies of Boer and biblical history, and is never at loss for an answer” (MacKenzie 2008). He does, however, remain silent for the remainder of the time and speaks only when addressed directly. In my view, Winterbach is commenting on colonisation in the physical sense but also in terms of the mind. Esegiël, a black man, has encyclopaedic knowledge of another’s history and is called upon to reflect that knowledge, rather than his own. Secondly, his silence in all other respects reflects the silence of the Other and the effects of what has been termed “the colonised mind” (by, for example, Sharp 2002, but also by many other scholars). Thus, even though he is not strictly forbidden from speaking and would probably not suffer physical consequences if he did, the power relations that are supposed to exist have been entrenched so deeply that it is no longer necessary to exert physical force to ensure the
continuation of such dynamics. As Said (1993: 8) said, “Neither imperialism nor colonialism is a simple act of accumulation and acquisition. Both are supported and perhaps even impelled by impressive ideological formations that include notions that certain territories and people require and beseech domination.” The final aspect of importance here is that Esegiël is completely isolated from other people of his race and culture. Without that contact (which he is implied never to have had as he was orphaned and raised by white people), it is impossible for him to construct an identity either in terms of or against the stereotypical perception of his people (Botha & Van Vuuren 2007a). Esegiël, like all South African black people of the time, is thus not only voiceless, but also stripped of his identity. But through Winterbach’s inclusion of this character, dialogue is created between the margin and the centre.

As concerns the issue of the women in the novel, the Afrikaans title, *Niggie*, can be literally translated as “cousin”. The irony exists in the Afrikaans in that women, especially, were often called by such generic names, rendering them nameless in a certain sense and without individual identity. It is also ironic that even though the title of the novel is *Niggie* and suggests that the novel is about a specific woman, the female characters are only introduced to readers towards the end of the text, allusive of their place within Afrikaner patriarchy. Niggie’s confession that the generic term is not her real name (p. 178) reflects an ambiguity which reveals her as a trickster figure (Botha & Van Vuuren 2008b, John 2008) – an ambivalent figure, sometimes foolish and sometimes wise, who breaks the rules or disrupts the linearity of the text. That then, together with Niggie’s emotional acuity and strength, reflects Winterbach’s feminist subtext, but also her playfulness with archetypes as a way of disrupting the stereotypical one-dimensionality in representations of characters.

Lastly, I want to address the use of magical realism in the novel which serves to illustrate the experience of two opposite ‘worlds’ in (apparent) harmonious existence, such as the religious and the scientific, or the return of the dead to the world of the living (though, in this case, the experience by Reitz of his wife’s appearance is drug-induced and the reality thereof thus uncertain). The use of magical realism is presented to the reader in the text through a play on words and meaning which serves to question “conventional ideas about time, space and identity” and highlights “the anti-bureaucratic viewpoint” which focuses on “collective rather than individual memory” (Botes & Cochrane 2006). Thus, I argue, it
bridges the gap between the experience of the real and that of fictitious or mystical worlds, bringing into question once again the construction of personal and collective narratives and how real they are.

ii) *Die boek van toeval en toeverlaat/The book of happenstance*

In this novel, as in Winterbach’s earlier novels, death, loss and the subsequent experience of grief, as well as mortality and madness are centralised themes (Human 2009a, 2009b). This experience of loss is concretised in shells which the protagonist, Helena Verbloem (her surname in Afrikaans literally meaning “to conceal”), clings to psychologically and spiritually for her *toeverlaat* or “refuge”. For her, meditating on them is a spiritual practice which offers her solace from the chaos of (her) life. Helena says of shells (p.302):

> The shell increases size without changing its shape, for the growth of the shell is logarithmic. The growth is determined by a logarithmic spiral. A clean, predictable, mathematical process. Rhythmic and balanced. So different from our human lives, which are neither rhythmic nor balanced, but for the most part chaotic – far removed from order or regulation, tainted by madness and remorse.

Having relocated to Durban to work on a lengthy etymological project concerned with archiving archaic Afrikaans lexicon, Helena leaves her long-time partner behind, but carefully selects shells to bring with her. Her shells are stolen in the wake of the death of her colleague, Theo Verwey, which triggers a wave of memories of other personal and familial losses (Human 2009a). Her emotional and spiritual investment in the shells as replacement for the religious framework of her childhood, and the loss she experiences when they are stolen points towards questions regarding the epistemological and ideological basis of knowledge and the ontological dismantling of meaning. (Du Plooy 2006) But, as Žižek explains (2006: 91-92):

> The modern atheist thinks he knows that God is dead; but what he doesn’t know is that, unconsciously, he continues to believe in God. What characterizes modernity is no longer the standard figure of the believer who secretly harbours doubts about his belief and engages in transgressive fantasies; today we have, on the contrary, a subject who presents himself as a tolerant hedonist dedicated to the pursuit of happiness, and whose unconscious is the site of prohibitions: what is repressed is not illicit desires or pleasures, but prohibitions themselves.
It is, at least in part, for this reason that Helena clings to her shells and the idea of her shells so obsessively. Her displacement of God in the shells – which have now forcibly been removed from her through the burglary – further disrupts and disintegrates her spiritual framework (as the unconscious site of her prohibitions), causing a profound experience of loss and displacement. As a result, she recites all the names of her stolen shells, repeating that they are gone. Winterbach uses this structural and syntactic repetition as a type of incantation, to emphasise Helena’s loss (Human 2009a, 2009b), but also as a kind of koan21 which she hopes will provide her with a respite (solace, refuge) from her grief and looming sense of futility. Helena tells us (pp.20-21):

That evening I drink two whiskeys before I make a list of the missing shells. The three *Nautilus pompilius* shells are gone – two small specimens and a large one. Both *Murex nigritus* shells are gone. The *Terebra maculata* and the *Terebra aerolata* are gone. The three *Harpa major* shells are gone. The *Conus marmoreus*, the *Conus geographus*, both *Conus textile* shells, the two *Conus betulinus* shells and the two *Conus figulinus* shells, all gone. The top shell, *Trochas maculata*, is gone. The bride of the sea, *Argonauta argo*, is gone. The two white cowries (*Ovula ovum*) and the tiger’s-eye cowrie (*Cypraea tigris*) are gone. All the tonnas and the helmet shells are gone. The *Marginella mosaica* and the blushing *Marginella rosea* are gone.

Ironically, the shells also embody the very idea of transience and disintegration; of loss rather than of refuge. The beauty and psychological solace Helena attributes to the shells function as a mirage (an illusion and deception, or, as her surname suggest, a disguise) of reality and her inability to come to grips with or even acknowledge her loss (Human 2009a). Her partner, Frans de Waard, points out to Helena (pp.270-271): “You don’t want to look,” Frans says. “You don’t want to face your own demons. You don’t want to accept that what the shells represent is more than the shells themselves.” She, in turn, thinks to herself (p.271): “What do you know of what the shells have to offer me, I think resentfully, of the pleasure I experience in contemplating them – more than pleasure: a deep satisfaction, an equanimity that I seldom experience in any other sphere of my life?”

Thematically the novel does not follow a chronological narrative structure (Human 2009b) and presents many binary opposites (Strydom 2010: 8), for example the personal vs. the cosmic, life vs. death, forsaking vs. preserving, the loss of language vs. the creativity thereof and the idea of “chance ... pitted against refuge and solace” (Lenta 2009b),

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21 A koan is a Zen Buddhist saying which contains a problem and is repeated by a student, but which has no solution (Lama Surya Das 1997: 296).
presented in the title of the novel – or at least in the Afrikaans version. And it is here that we find the first of many hurdles (the trouble of translation) contained in the English rendering. The existing translation of *Die boek van toeval en toeverlaat* is translated only as *The book of happenstance*, thus relaying only the first aspect of the original title and offering the English readership only part of the descriptive intimation contained in the original. The second part of the Afrikaans title contains the word *toeverlaat* (meaning “refuge” or “solace”), itself an archaic Afrikaans word form with a double allusion: 1) it refers to the thematic concern with archaic word forms and the collection and archiving of Afrikaans lexicon in particular; and 2) it semantically suggests the idea of refuge or solace which is sought after by the protagonist in the face of the dawning realisation that there is no master narrative or design, but that it is all fluke, all is coincidence, all is happenstance and therefore, possibly, also all meaningless. I shall discuss the exigencies of translating this novel in greater detail in Section 1.2.5 and in Chapter 2. This section serves mainly as a discussion of stylistic devices and thematic – often recurring – themes in Winterbach’s oeuvre.

Besides the loss of her shells, Helena also has to come to terms with the death of her colleague, Theo Verwey. “References to death and mortality play an (increasingly) important role in the works of Lettie Viljoen/Ingrid Winterbach” (Human 2008) but, as I have stated before, death is unknowable and lies outside of personal experience (except as an observer thereof) and is therefore also outside the grasp of language. It is also interesting that even though the idea of death (Theo’s death) is presented to us from the outset of the novel, Theo is present only through his absence (Human 2008) and therefore, like death, unknowable and unable to pin down, except in a kind of translation, presented to the reader through the memories of the other characters. But, as we know, memories, like death, are themselves fickle and unreliable.

When Theo dies, he and Helena have, ironically and for some time, occupied themselves with the collection and archiving of the word dead/death and dead/death-conjunctions. What is of interest here is that these words, connected both to death and the customs around death, are no longer in use. The implication is that these lexical items and their related rituals disappear not only from the language, but also from our consciousness (Du Plooy 2009). I would add that it also points to two other aspects: 1) that we keep the idea or the concept of death at bay by not speaking about it, therefore admeasuring it to the
realm of the subconscious; and 2) that the dead gradually disappear from our consciousness (thoughts) too. Helena (p.37) remarks: “The world is changing,” I say. “We don’t relate to death as intimately anymore. I have never seen a winding sheet. Or felt the wind of death blow. Actually the mere thought of it makes me shiver a little.”

This removal, not only from death, but from language, culture and people, is central to the disillusionment experienced by Winterbach’s characters. The recurring themes of death and mortality is found in what Van Schalkwyk (2009a) terms the ‘metanarrative matrix’ of Die boek/The book which, I argue, consists of the narrative, the intertexts (such as Don de Lillo’s Cosmopolis which reiterates the macabre, dystopian loss, the meaninglessness of life and the senselessness of death) and the subtext, all imbued with what Kermode (1967: 18) explains, not as the imminence (approaching, looming, impending, inevitable) of death, but the immanence (inherent, intrinsic) thereof. For although “the End has perhaps lost its naïve imminence, its shadow still lies on the crises of our fictions; we may speak of it as immanent.” The idea that death is contained within each moment and that there is no master narrative holding it all together in some meaningful way, thus providing solace or refuge from reality, is the thematic technique used by Winterbach to disrupt – the frayings of her language so to speak. These frayings, the dismantling of what is known – the postmodern uncertainty – is echoed in the structure of the novel which does not attempt to neatly tie up all the loose ends at the end of the novel; a kind of protest against (disruption of) the parody of typical happy endings (Van Coller & Van den Berg 2009). On the surface, the novel appears to be a detective novel, (mis)leading the reader to look for clues and attempts to solve the mystery, but being led down the garden path as it were (Human 2009b), only to find, like Helena’s surname suggests, a smokescreen with more questions, more disillusionment, more chance and less solace.

The concept of chance or contingency is part of the dismantling of the teleological and the certain, so integral, along with guilt, to the Afrikaner psyche (Strydom & Van Vuuren 2011; Van den Heever 2010: 1). In fact, certainty in the construction of reality and the narratives of reality we rely on becomes increasingly difficult. However, even though there is an undoing of religious-sociological perspectives, the characters’ language use reveals an enmeshment in the toeverlaat or refuge provided by religious and other spiritual vocabulary from which they cannot seem to disentangle themselves so easily. Alettie van den Heever (2011) writes:
Within the process of secularisation the language of chance or contingency is part and parcel of a prominent discourse. An understanding of the intertwinement of the language of chance with the language of godly refuge must, in the first place, be attempted against the background of the function of language in the nominising process.

We could view this as a type of conceptual blending problem, where the difficulty is really a question of binding, “the problem of how we can perceptually apprehend one integrated thing” (Fauconnier & Turner 2002: 11) to make sense of symbols and symbolism from different domains, or, to put it simply, how we integrate new knowledge (which disrupts) into existing knowledge frameworks. This usually happens first by mapping the new knowledge onto an existing framework through conceptual blending or conceptual integration. Thus, for example, even though Helena does not view herself as religious, she speaks of her shells in religious terms, saying she likes them “because God made them” (p.12) and also that her meditation on the shells is her spiritual practice. Ironically, she also places the shells on her bedside table; traditionally the place occupied by the Bible. To further explain this enmeshment of languages, Peter Berger (1967: 175) writes: “Whatever else it may be, religion is a humanly constructed universe of meaning, and this construction is undertaken by linguistic means.” To undo this entanglement may take years, or, as the earlier quote by Žižek suggests, may forever live on, unconsciously embedded in our need for toeverlaat and meaning. On the other hand, and once more highlighting the tensions within the novel, Helena’s friend, Sof Benade (a pastor’s child), says of religion (p.303): “It’s a nasty habit,” Sof says, and coughs. “Established early. It can be unlearnt.”

Another major theme in Die boek/The book is the idea of the possible demise of the Afrikaans language and culture and, in contrast, the preservation and archiving thereof, but I shall discuss this in detail in Section 1.2.4. It is sufficient to say here that Winterbach’s inclusion of long lists of archaic words in the novel presents a translation problem, but at the same time offers virtual possibilities for bifurcations and accentedness.

iii) Die benederyk/The road of excess and Die aanspraak van lewende wesens

Any novel is a fictive construction of reality representing personal and collective concepts and experiences. The last three novels by Ingrid Winterbach, namely Die boek van toeval
en toeverlaat/The book of happenstance, Die benederyk/The road of excess and Die aanspraak van lewende wesens form a kind of trilogy with thematic and stylistic overlaps. The idea of death, presented in Die boek/The book, is further explored in Die benederyk through a retrospective narrative-philosophical framework which, simultaneously, explores the nature, value and function of art and the artistic process (Nel 2012). Nel also argues that the novel could be read within the framework of relationality which manifests as an ontological relatedness between people on a personal level on account of their shared mortality. This novel does not, however, explore the netherworld only in terms of death, but also as other manifestations thereof, such as addiction.

The violence (physical and psychological) of death and substance abuse, both on the experiencer/s and the observer/s is what serves as “catabatic experience” – that which in Greek mythology refers to a living being descending into the netherworld, only to return relatively unscathed, yet transformed in some way (Nel 2012). This metaphor of the descent into hades is presented to the reader through the actual experiences of the characters, such as Aaron Adendorff’s encounter with a life-threatening illness and the deaths of his partner and mother, as well as his brother Stefaans’s struggle with substance abuse. It is this ‘falling from grace’ which allows the characters to gain insight into their relationality with their own bodies as well as with other beings. This is also tied up with ideas of destruction and salvation, as well as release and denial.

In keeping with earlier themes, Winterbach is once again concerned with words, language and meaning-making. For example, the character Jimmy Harris, a conceptual artist in the novel, says the following (pp. 65-66, followed by my translation and thereafter the excerpt from the published translation on p.64):

Woorde sê hy. Hy werk op die oomblik met woorde; hy combineer video en woorde. Hy isoleer en ondersoek hulle ideologiese load. Die woord dood, die woord destruction, die woord ondergang. *Untergang*. Die woord as ‘n vorm van linguistic expression. Dis wat hom op die oomblik interesseer. Die linguistic and political reality van die woord – ‘n act van reading constructed deur die act van naming. Die authorial daad. Die intensie van sy nuwe piece is die destabilising van die lokus van hierdie authorial daad, om dit te reclaim van die heteronormative structures wat dit probeer naturalise. Die ideologiese load van die woord destruction, van die woord dood, sê Jimmy, dis wat hom interesseer.
Words, he says. Currently he’s working with words; he combines video and words. He isolates and researches their ideological load. The word “death”, the word “destruction”, the word “downfall”. Untergang. The word as a form of linguistic expression. That’s what interests him at the moment. The linguistic and political reality of a word – an act of reading constructed through the act of naming. The authorial endeavour. The purpose of his new piece is to destabilise the locus of this authorial endeavour, to reclaim it from the heteronormative structures aimed at naturalising it. The ideological load of the word “destruction”, of the word “death”, says Jimmy, that’s what interests him.

Words, he says. At the moment he’s working with words. Combining video and words. Isolating and investigating their ideological load. The word “death”. And “destruction”. “Downfall”, too, Untergang. The word as a form of linguistic repression. That’s what interest him at the moment. The linguistic and political reality of the word – an act of reading constructed through the act of naming. The authorial deed. The intention of his new piece is to destabilise the locus of this authorial act, reclaim it from the heteronormative structures that seek to naturalise it. The ideological load of the word “destruction”, the word “death”, says Jimmy. That’s what interests him.

This obsessive reconstruction of words connected to death, or concepts about death and of the naming of death, reiterates its unknowability and elusive nature, but also its reality as part of our experience – immanently rather than merely imminently.

Waansin (or madness, dementia, deliriousness, obsession, depression, and so on) is introduced in Die boek/The book through Helena’s obsessive-compulsive behaviour, Theo Verwey’s manic consumerist impulses and the scientist Hugo Hatting’s Asperger-like manner, which could be said to reflect the effects of modern society to some extent, and which is developed further in Die benederyk/The road of excess and then fully realised in Die aanspraak van lewende wesens.22

In this novel, one of the protagonists, Maria Volschenk, undertakes two journeys: one to Stellenbosch to try and come to terms with her sister’s suicide (her sister, Sophie, represents disillusionment and the material effects of clinical depression), and another to Cape Town where her son, Benjy, who displays symptoms of bipolarity (or even mild schizophrenia), is seemingly caught up in a life-threatening situation. The other protagonist, Karl Hofmeyr, an extreme obsessive-compulsive character displaying some Asperger’s-like characteristics as well, is on route, also to Cape Town, after receiving a call from his brother’s landlord informing him of Iggy’s deteriorating mental stability. Iggy, as

22 Die aanspraak van lewende wesens is currently being translated by Michiel Heyns.
the reader later finds out, is in fact having a psychotic breakdown and according to Van der Merwe (2012), Iggy’s battle is depicted through words and concepts that have almost become forgotten, again illustrating Winterbach’s preoccupation with lost language (the historicity of language as concretised in the leitmotifs, the lexicon and the register) and the preservation thereof. For example, Iggy writes in a letter to his brother Karl (p.201 followed by my translation):

Om sy nek, soos om die hals van ’n Spaanse edelman, soos deur El Greco geskilder, is ’n gekartelde wit kraag. O onfatsoenlikheid! O onheilige verskynsel, o prins van die onderwêreld.

Was dit maar ’n drogbeeld, ’n hersenskim, maar daar is dit, die ding is werklik, ewe werklik as my hand, tásbaar – sou ek my weersin kon oorkom, vorentoe tree en daaraan raak.

(Around his neck, like the collar of a Spanish nobleman, as in the painting by El Greco, is a ruffled white collar. Oh licentiousness! Oh profane manifestation, o prince of the netherworld.

If it was but a spectre, chimerical, but it is there, the thing is real, as real as my hand, tangible; if only I could transcend my repugnance, I would be able to step forward and touch it.)

The literary investigation and exposition of madness, as a direct result of wanting to escape reality or not being able to assimilate the disruptive experience of reality, is presented as multi-layered and complex through the narrative structure which switches between the two story lines. It is also reflected through the complex dispositions of the characters which, along with previous recurring themes such as death and substance abuse, constitute what Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 310-350) call “the refrain”. The refrain could be explained as different aspects of the same thing; it “makes them simultaneous or mixes them” (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 312). They go on to write:

Sometimes chaos is an immense black hole in which one endeavours to fix a fragile point as a centre. Sometimes one organizes around that point a calm and stable “pace” (rather than a form): the black hole has become a home. Sometimes one grafts onto that pace a breakaway for the black hole. [...] The role of the refrain has often been emphasized: it is territorial, a territorial assemblage. [...] Sometimes one goes from chaos to the threshold of a territorial assemblage: directional components, infra-assemblage. Sometimes one organizes the assemblage dimensional components, intra-assemblage. Sometimes one leaves the territorial assemblage for other assemblages, or for somewhere else entirely: inters assemblage, components of passage or even escape. And all of these confront each other and converge in the territorial refrain.
What is important to note about the refrain is that it is territorial, or, more accurately, a territorial assemblage. It thus marks a territory. In this sense, Afrikaans literature has “historically defined itself as a fenced-off terrain (usually the farm) surrounded by threatening forces in the main, hostile natural elements” (De Kock 2001). This theme has been used by Winterbach too and has been expanded by her and expressed as a different aspect of the same thing through her fascination with Afrikaans as a language, as well as its culture and the survival or imminent/immanent death thereof; i.e. Afrikaans as a fenced-off terrain fighting to keep hostile forces at bay. Such territorial assemblages, or refrains, may assume other functions at times. We could say that from chaos, “Milieus and Rhythms are born” (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 313). Milieus, like literary themes for example, are coded and these codes are defined by periodic repetition, but the repetition is marked by difference, “a perpetual state of transcoding or transduction” (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 313); yet another kind of translation. Whenever a passage is transcoded from one milieu to another, there is a rhythm, or a “communication of milieus” (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 313). The territory then is the result of the territorialisation process of milieus and rhythms and these rhythms are what we could call the expressive, or the “emergence of matters” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 315). This emergence, or the expressive, is the reorganisation of territories – the way in which the refrain, or in literary terms the recurrent theme – is expressed in different ways and explored from different angles even though it remains the same subject matter. Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 315) write:

There is a territory precisely when milieu components cease to be directional, becoming dimensional instead, when they cease to be functional to become expressive. There is a territory when the rhythm has expressiveness. What defines the territory is the emergence of matters of expression (qualities).

These qualities could be explained as the specific style or voice of the author, and it is these territories and their capacity (proclivity) to territorialise milieus and rhythms in order to produce the expressive in their virtual, intensive and actual states, that become important in the translation of texts. But territories are not primary and neither are the functions of territories; rather they “presuppose a territory-producing expressiveness” (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 315). This basically means that the functions of territories exist only because they are territorialised, but that this process of territorialisation leads to the emergent qualities and it is this emergence which Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 316)
propose could be called art, a theme I explore in detail in Chapter 2. They write (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 317): “On the one hand, expressive qualities entertain internal relations with one another that constitute _territorial motifs_ [...] On the other hand, expressive qualities also entertain other internal relations that produce _territorial counterpoints._” This expression could also be explained as critical distance or the marking of the territory through stylistic devices, thematic recurrences and bifurcations, the development of motifs and the presentation of counterpoints through literary disruption as an opening up of the territory. Refrains, accordingly, can be classified as follows (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 326-327):

(1) territorial refrains that seek, mark, assemble a territory; (2) territorialized function refrains that assume a special function in the assemblage (the Lullaby that territorializes the child’s slumber, the Lover’s Refrain that territorializes the sexuality of the loved one, the Professional Refrain that territorializes trades and occupations, the Merchant Refrain that territorializes distribution and products; (3) the same, when they mark new assemblages, pass into new assemblages by means of deterritorialization-reterritorialization...

In terms of Winterbach’s oeuvre then, we could view her recurrent themes as the refrain – refrains of death and mortality, destruction, madness, the loss and/or disintegration of language and identity – as the marking of her territory but, within Afrikaans literature, assuming a special function in the assemblage: that of a minor literature within the major traditions of Afrikaans literature, of territorial motifs pitted against territorial counterpoints which reveal the pointlessness of the search for a greater coherent and inherent meaning to life (Van Schalkwyk 2009b; Burger 2012). Her disruption of old ways of seeing, writing and territorialising, for example her novel use of the literary genre of the plaasroman, her feminist idiom and her questioning of the dominant structures of literature, could be viewed as a deterritorialisation-reterritorialisation process that allows her refrain to territorialise the minor, constantly transforming her territorial motifs and counterpoints, her milieu through rhythms, through transcoding and transduction, as the expressive, and as a kind of translation of ‘art’.

**iv) Earlier works: a brief overview**

Under the pseudonym Lettie Viljoen, Ingrid Winterbach published _Klaaglied vir Koos, Erf, Belemmering, Karolina Ferreira_ (translated as _The elusive moth_) and _Landskap met vroue..._
en slang. Thereafter she published *Buller se plan* and the novels discussed already under her real, but maiden name, Ingrid Winterbach. Recurring themes in *Buller se plan*, *Karolina Ferreira* and *Landskap met vroue en slang* are references to mystics and mystical experiences and the place that women occupy in cultural systems. *Landskap met vroue en slang* explores the physical and surrounding landscape of characters, revealing the “disparity between human suffering in the foreground and the apparent ideality of the view in the background” (Human 2010). This recurring theme of human suffering (the refrain) also features as a prominent theme in *Karolina Ferreira* (Van Coller & Van den Berg 2009). Her first three novels are ‘struggle novels’, motivated by the state of emergency at the time (Lenta 2009b), but all her novels are concerned with history, “familial history, South African history, geological and geographical history, the history of the universe” (Lenta 2009b) and art history; themes which establish the refrain, but which also allow Winterbach to do politics rather than be mired in the political, as I shall argue in Chapter 3. I shall also contend that this may in fact be why she has remained marginalised and why her English translations are not widely disseminated and read.

1.2.2 Stuttering language: style as protest and exploration

Stuttering speech and stuttering language are not the same, though the one may be reflected in the other. But what does it mean to stutter or, more specifically, to stutter language or literature? In speech, stuttering means to falter, to hesitate, to stammer, to stumble over words, to splutter and sputter and, in literature, it is used to “indicate different voice intonations” (Deleuze 1997: 107). But these voice intonations, these forms of expression are not of much use unless they correspond with forms of content, “an atmospheric quality, a milieu that acts as the conductor of words – that brings together within itself the quiver, the murmur, the stutter … and makes the indicated effect reverberate through the words” (Deleuze 1997: 108). These affects (or the changes which occur when configurations of literatures, as in this instance, collide and are, as a result, modified) of language can be explained as that which makes language, rather than speech, stutter. It is the perpetual variation and bifurcation (lines of flight) of a system which allows for the stuttering, the frayings of language. But how does language achieve these disequilibrions and how is it reflected in Ingrid Winterbach’s oeuvre? I argue that for language to stutter, it has to deterritorialise and bifurcate or break the linearity of content,
syntax, semantics, grammatical structures, translation conventions, etc. It has to deviate and disrupt. Christa Albrecht-Crane (2005: 122) writes:

Language, in its social function, is used to convey an agreed-upon connection between a signifier and a signified; in other words, language works through agreed-upon meanings that structure ways of seeing the world. Language provides the terms and meanings with which to establish and divide the world into human beings and animals, nature and society; it divides nature into plants and animals, plants into plant families, animals into species and human beings into races.

In other words, language exists as order-words, with the unity of language and language structures primarily political; a regulating system intent on establishing and reinforcing what is ‘normative’ and, because its functions are conventionally social and repetitive, there is an implied “stable, singular consciousness” (Albrecht-Crane 2005: 125). So then, if language is made to stutter, if it disrupts the normative, “style becomes nonstyle, and one's language lets an unknown foreign language escape from it, so that it can reach the limits of language itself and become something other than a writer, conquering fragmented visions that pass through the words of a poet” (Deleuze 1997: 113), such as the limits of Abraham’s speech in *Niggie* allows for. But what is this ‘other’ supposed to become and how is this captured in a translation?

Here, translation from minor languages into major ones becomes relevant again. Lori Chamberlain (2012: 262), for example, writes that translation is a continual and continued battle of power relations, “of a persistent (though not always hegemonic) desire to equate language or language use to morality; of a quest for unity, and a consequent intolerance of duplicity.” If translation, the language of a translation, can thus be made to stutter, it has the potential to disrupt conceptions about the value of the major language and the striving for unity or, in other words, “to animate the disequilibrium of language, crashing through fixed social organizations with seemingly tiny fragments of experimentation that lead to intensifying and enlarging life” (Albrecht-Crane 2005: 130).

Structurally I argue that Winterbach makes her language vibrate and stutter by not tying up all the loose ends and often breaking the rules of narration, such as chronology. Syntactically, her use of voice (or voicelessness), as well as her use of dialect and idiolect, allow for a disruption of prefigurative syntactic modes and grammatical constructions in language and literature. Deviations from the ‘standard’ are particularly effective through
her hybridisation of Afrikaans and English which questions the ideals of Afrikaner Nationalism, the ‘purity’ of Afrikaans and the superiority of Afrikaners whilst simultaneously offering a translation situation which poses question about the homogenising effects of English on all world languages and cultures. Specifically the question of Engfrikaans became important to me in Winterbach’s oeuvre and led me to ask: 1) how are idiolects and language variations such as Engfrikaans treated in the translations of Winterbach’s oeuvre?; and 2) what is possible when translation strategies and methods are considered from a Deleuzo-Guattarian perspective so that the translations can be made to stutter in the same way that the source texts do?

1.2.3 The taboo and the performativity of language

The philosopher J.L. Austin first constructed a philosophy of performativity in the 1950s. Since then it has gained significance for contemporary studies and has become important in the consideration of language, culture and identity in literary studies. This term was further explored by philosophers such as Jacques Derrida, Pierre Bourdieu, Deleuze and Guattari and, more recently, by Judith Butler (Loxley 2007: 1-2; Pennycook 2004). What is important about performativity for this study is how utterances, and specifically literary utterances, can be performative; words that “do something in the world, something that is not just a matter of generating consequences, like persuading or amusing or alarming” but which are “actions in themselves, actions of a distinctively linguistic kind” (Loxley 2007: 2) which are performed in the world with the intention to make a difference. It thus deviates from the standard narrative in a certain (but specific) way and towards a very specific end. Pennycook (2004) argues that the performativity of language “as a way of thinking about language use and identity avoids foundationalist categories, suggesting that identities are formed in the linguistic performance rather than the pre-given.” I would argue though that linguistic performance is only one aspect of identity formation and only one aspect of performativity and that many other factors such as culture, socio-political and religious frameworks, etc. play a role too. These identity formations are also not static but are modified over time. Pennycook does, however, make a convincing argument for the relinquishing of what he calls the “language concept” and explains that we need a “set of relations that preserves the concept’s differential and relativist functions and avoids the positioning of cosmopolitan essences and human common denominators.” Thus, linguistics, and I would argue the applications of language too, for example in literature...
and even in translation, cannot continue to be defined by constants, with context (pragmatics) and situational semantics placed in the background as incidental elements.

Performativity, in the Butlerian sense, can be described as “the way in which we perform acts of identity as an ongoing series of social and cultural performances rather than as the expression of a prior identity” (Pennycook 2004). Bourdieu explains performativity in a more linguistic sense, calling for a consideration of socio-political historicity and how this is related to power relations in language use (an aspect I explore in more depth in the ensuing chapters, but especially in Chapter 4). He, like Butler, writes that the power of performatve actions are directly linked to the social, cultural and political conditions which allow for an agent to legitimately act in “the social world through words” (Bourdieu 1991: 75). This is a direct result of the symbolic power of language which he explains as follows (Bourdieu 1991: 37):

> In order to break with this social philosophy one must show that, although it is legitimate to treat social relations – as symbolic interactions, that is, as relations of communication implying cognition and recognition, one must not forget that the relations of communication *par excellence* – linguistic exchanges – are also relations of symbolic power in which the power relations between speakers or their respective groups are actualized.

Performativity thus has political and ethical implications as there is a conscious *linguistic intention* connected to it, rather than it merely being the utterance of statements (descriptive, imperative, declarative, etc.) or speech acts (ordinary or conventional language use), and which is intended on “the performing of an action” (Austin 1962: 6). Performatives, however, can only be said to be valid if performed in the appropriate context, “precisely in the way that a marriage can only be said to have taken place if the right words were said at the right time in the right place, if the right kind of person was officiating” (Loxley 2007: 9) and so on. Performative language is also distinguished from ordinary language in that the latter is normative as it provides “pragmatic rules or criteria that structure our lives” and prescribes “how we ought to speak” (Loxley 2007: 32). These linguistic rules therefore have real consequences in terms of their regulating effects on certain forms of behaviour, such as interpersonal relationships, and especially public behaviour through etiquette (Searle 1969: 33). The performative can be said to have many functions, but what I shall investigate here and argue for is the use of the pejorative as performativity which creates a fissure, a rupture (a disruption) – a stuttering – in the
coherence of either the structure, the content, or the implicit socio-political rules that render the iterability of some words taboo and others not.

Foucault (1996: 340) writes of the anxiety that comes with this investigation into discourse when “manifested materially, as a written or spoken object ... the uncertainty when we suspect the conflicts, triumphs, injuries, dominations and enslavements that lie behind these words, even when long use has chipped away their rough edges.” It is especially anxiety provoking when one is faced with, like in Winterbach’s work, that which is not only a taboo, but prohibited by law; not only the pejorative, but the race pejorative which invokes the legacy of Apartheid in literature, forcing us not to see the veil of the ‘rainbow nation’, but rather the socio-political historicity of words and their consequences. It is these prohibitions, Foucault (1996: 330) writes, which are linked to “desire and power” and the censoring of words which inflict social constraints upon people and their behaviour. Such censoring may take different forms, for example how people use “politeness and impoliteness as they interact with orthophemism (straight talking), euphemism (sweet talking) and dysphemism (speaking offensively)” (Allan & Burridge 2006: 1). We could say that the emphasis has shifted from what language and discourse fundamentally is or says to what it does or can do, which I mean here in the politico-ethical sense. The prohibition of words – or the injunction thereof to the realm of the taboo – is in fact an act of excluding such words from the systems governing discourse and, as a result, behaviour (Foucault 1996: 343).

I argue that the use of the race pejorative by Ingrid Winterbach in Niggie/To hell with Cronjé can be said to be performative in that it is employed by her with a conscious linguistic intention which, through the repetition thereof, is intended to disrupt the narrative familiarity of the content and structure of traditional Afrikaans literature by shocking the reader but, at the same time, exemplifying the creativity of language in the kaffir-conjunctions\(^2\) (John 2004; Botha & Van Vuuren 2006a), such as “kafferbessiebos” (a raisin bush) and “kafferwaatlemoenkonfyt” (a type of jam) (from Winterbach 2002: 29). Botha and Van Vuuren (2006a) also note that the censoring of these words and their

\(^{2}\) The word “kaffir” is derived from the Arabic word kafir, meaning “unbeliever, infidel, impious wretch” (Online Etymology Dictionary 2013). In South Africa, and specifically during the Apartheid years, this word came to connote a black person. It was used as “an offensive ethnic slur” (Wikipedia 2013a) and has, since the fall of Apartheid, been banned and removed from the dictionary. As a result, conjunctions and other word forms containing the word “kaffir” are no longer in public domain. As many Afrikaans words contain “kaffir” in non-ethnic contexts, such words have also been removed from the dictionary, thereby also ‘removing’ it from the entire language (and hence from conscious memory also). Winterbach’s use is therefore twofold: to illustrate the creativity of the Afrikaans language whilst simultaneously reminding the reader of the atrocities committed during Apartheid.
consequent law-enforced removal from the dictionary after the fall of Apartheid means that these words have been de-historised (removed from history) and, as Foucault (1996: 329) says, we must “recognise the negative activity of the cutting-out and rarefaction of discourse”, which I admit, in this instance, is a highly controversial debate and beyond the scope of this study, but certain of importance. What I do want to highlight and argue for is that Winterbach’s use of the race pejorative and conjunctions thereof serve two functions: 1) to remind Afrikaners of their history and the brutalities of Apartheid; and 2) to preserve these words in text (see Section 1.2.4). In translation, the race pejorative also functions to stutter language as all white people – Afrikaans and English – in South Africa were, for the most part, complicit under Apartheid.

The race pejorative is of course not the only kind of taboo that exists. Also, taboos in one community may not be considered taboos in another at all (Allan & Burridge 2006: 10). The term taboo was first used with reference to customs around “respect for, and fear of metaphysical powers; it was extended to political and social affairs, and generalized to the interdiction of the use or practice of anything, especially an expression or topic, considered offensive and therefore avoided or prohibited by social custom” (Allan & Burridge 2006: 11). It is in this sense – that of the prohibited topic – that I shall explore, in a more subtle reading of the term taboo, Winterbach’s use of the word dead/death and dead/death-conjunctions in Die boek/The book as a way to consciously disrupt our avoidance thereof (through actual avoidance by not speaking about it as well as through the use of euphemistic terminology) and bring to our attention both the imminence and immanence thereof.

Zosia Kmietowicz (2008), in a review, quotes Ken Arnold saying that “Modern society has succeeded in making death all but invisible.” Raymond L.M. Lee (2011) even goes as far as to write that death “is prejudged as a ‘pornographic’ event that should be veiled” but that the death taboo has been traditionally undermined “by keeping alive the meaning of transcendence” – an afterlife either in heaven or hell or through reincarnation. But is precisely Winterbach’s exploration of chance and evolution, and her foregrounding of death through the actual death of her colleague, introduced to readers at the outset, as well as the archiving and listing of all the dead/death-conjunctions (which take up nearly three pages in both the original novel and the translation) that she makes death visible, even though it ultimately remains unknowable. It is also her preoccupation with death, I
argue, which allows for a thematic stuttering, also in translation. I shall illustrate and discuss this more in the next section dealing with the archivist and the role of archiving in literature.

1.2.4 The archivist (language lost, language regained)

In The infinity of lists, Umberto Eco (2009: 67) writes:

The history of literature is full of obsessive collections of objects. Sometimes these are fantastic, such as the things (as Ariosto tells us) found on the moon by Astolfo, who had gone there to get back Orlando's brain; sometimes they are disturbing, such as the list of malign substances used by the witches in Shakespeare's Macbeth; sometimes they are ecstasies of perfumes, such as the collection of flowers that Marino describes in his Adonis ... sometimes they are poignant, despite a museal, almost funereal immobility, such as the collection of instruments described by Mann in Doctor Faustus.

But lists are almost always inexhaustible; it is a form that suggests infinitude and perpetuity, “the entire history of aesthetics reiterates this” (Eco 2009: 15), yet there remains an almost obsessive compulsion for the collection, cataloguing (listing) and archiving of almost anything and everything known to humankind – the names of such things, their properties, their relations to other things – despite the fact that they remain the “topos of ineffability” (Eco 2009: 49). At least in part the reason we make lists is driven by the fear of forgetting, of the failure of our own memories, but also of the inability to name everything in a certain way, in a certain order, and without omission or marginalisation. Of course there is also the fear of knowledge being forever lost, unavailable to future generations, as if it never existed in the first place.

In Winterbach’s oeuvre we encounter many lists; long lists, yet incomplete ones, or what Eco (2009: 81) terms “the etcetera of lists”. But there are lists and lists, and this distinction is important because the lists found in literature, including those in Winterbach’s novels, are not practical or pragmatic lists, but poetic lists (Eco 2009: 113). Practical lists, such as shopping lists or a menu, are finite, have a specific goal, list things that are known in the real world and are often related to “contextual pressure” (Eco 2009: 116). On the other hand, poetic lists allude to something that eludes human control in the sense of finality (conclusiveness, definiteness, completion). Why then make these lists and
why in literature, and what is it that compels certain authors to embody the archivist’s archetype?

Eco (2009: 115) writes that lists are made to adopt specific forms because their organisation has a “mnemonic function: things in a given order help us to remember them, to remember the place they occupied in the image of the world.” The role of the archivist is harder to explain and, as W. Kaye Lamb said in 1966 already, it is a role which changes over time and one that “has indeed become active rather than passive; [the archivist now] has become a collector of material instead of being primarily a custodian” (Cook 2006). But lists have another function; sometimes they serve to break up “all the ordered surfaces” we familiarise ourselves with, disrupting and threatening the “collapse of our age-old distinction between the Same and the Other” (Foucault 2001: xvi). It would seem, at first glance, that Winterbach’s lists reveal distinct conceptual categories, “the continuous order of their identities or differences as well as the semantic field of their domination” (Foucault 2001: xx), though this is only true if an incondite reading of the text is undertaken at surface level. A deeper reading of her texts, I argue, reveals the disruption of the discreet or the assumed order of things as I shall illustrate hereafter by referring to her last four novels. From this perspective we could say that Winterbach’s lists become lines of flight, forming a rhizome with the world, deterritorialising the world while at the same time being reterritorialised by the world. Hence, I argue, Winterbach’s lists are not tracings of the world, but a mapping which provides information in the virtual for the actualisation of translation/s.

In *Niggie/To hell with Cronjé*, Winterbach lists the names of animals, plants, geological periods, real and invented Anglo-Boer War battles, and word associations. It is in the latter sense that she introduces the race pejorative. I shall only list the translation here (pp.33-34):

“Kaffir thorn,” Ben says, “a kind of tree.”
“Kaffir cow,” Willem says, “cow belonging to a Kaffir.”
“Kaffir sheeting,” says Reitz, “a thick, soft cotton.”
“Kaffir cherry,” says Ben, “a raisin bush.”
“Kaffir beer,” says Reitz, “beverage drunk by Kaffirs.”
“Kaffir work,” says Willem, “work not fit for white people.”
“Kaffir copper,” says Ben, “a large russet butterfly.”
“Kaffir hangman,” says Reitz, “an executor or oppressor of Kaffirs.”
“Kaffir chief,” says Ben, “a bird with an extremely long tail.”
“Kaffir captain,” says Willem, “chief of a Kaffir tribe.”
“Kaffir pebble,” says Reitz, “pebble found in gravel to indicate the presence of diamonds.”
“Kaffirboom leaf minor,” says Ben, “insect found on the kaffirboom.”
“Kaffir grave,” says Reitz, “hump across a road to prevent water erosion.”
“Kaffir kraal,” says Willem, “dwelling place of Kaffirs.”
“Kaffir swallow,” says Ben, “a kind of swift.”
“Kaffir pound,” says Reitz, “nickname for a penny.”
“Kaffir war,” says Willem, “war between white people and Kaffirs.”
“Kaffir-corn midge,” says Ben, “small gallfly with bright wings.”
“Kaffir corn,” says Reitz, “fine, diamond-bearing gravel.”
“Kaffir missionary,” says Willem, “missionary that works among Kaffirs.”
“Kaffir crane,” says Ben, “large bird with long legs and neck.”
“Kaffir half-crown,” says Reitz, “another name for a penny.”
“Kaffir nation,” says Willem, “nation consisting of Kaffirs.”

What is interesting to note here is the contrast between the word associations or kaffir-conjunctions by the different characters. Willem’s free associations and conjunctions reveal the entrenched Afrikaner ideals; that Afrikaners are a superior race and in battle with black people; that black people should be converted to Christianity through noble missionary work; that certain work is not fit to be done by white people and must, therefore, be done by black people who are of less value. In contrast, Ben and Reitz’s associations reveal their disillusion with the war and the idea that white people or Afrikaners are superior to any other race or culture, or have the right to oppress them. Their associations disrupt Willem’s traditional and discreet conceptual category of the term ‘kaffir’ and reveal fragmentations and other associations such as their scientific frameworks – that of natural historian and geologist respectively – in direct conflict with Afrikaner Christian views. This becomes more apparent later in the novel when Ben and Reitz give lectures in which they explain that the world is millions of years old. In reply, Willem says: “Enough!” ... “You have scoffed at the Bible enough!” (p.173) while Ben, then asked by Oom Mannes if he thinks “that there is no difference between a Kaffir” and himself (p.174), answers “yes, I’m convinced there’s no difference between black and white as far as inherent capabilities are concerned” (p.175).

The uneasiness with which this passage is read after the dismantling of Apartheid, overburdened with associations of guilt and a legacy of oppression, forces the reader to confront the realities of the past, but also reveals a deterritorialisation of the race.
pejorative and the creativity of language, illustrating the tensions between language and politics. At the same time, Winterbach not only lists, but also archives these words which were removed from the dictionary by law when South Africa became a democratic country. Foucault (2001: xxii) writes:

The fundamental codes of a culture – those governing its language, its schemas of perception, its exchanges, its techniques, its values, the hierarchy of its practices – establish for every man, from the very first, the empirical orders with which he will be dealing and within which he will be at home.

It is these fundamental codes that Winterbach disrupts by deviating from what is allowed by introducing the race pejorative, but also by using it in such a way that it reveals the invisible power thereof, the entrenched acceptability of perceptions as illustrated by Willem’s utterances, and the initial separation or disentangling from primary codes and ways of thinking as illustrated through Ben and Reitz’s associations and conjunctions with the term.

In *Die Boek/The book*, Winterbach lists classical music, shells and archaic word forms. I have already showed an example of the listing of shells earlier in this chapter and shall not repeat it here. Throughout the novel, the protagonist, Helena Verbloem, recalls her work with Theo Verwey and how they used to listen to classical music. She says (p.8): “Theo Verwey and I used to listen to music as we worked. Mahler, Schubert, Cimarosa, Gluck, Strauss, Schütz, Mozart.” Many more composers are listed throughout the novel and their compositions discussed at length though I shall not illustrate it here as it is only a minor theme. More pertinent are the listings of archaic word forms. I shall list the dead/death-conjunctions here from the translation (pp.36-38).

On the greater majority of these cards are words formed with or containing *dood* (both death and dead). Often descriptive, often to indicate the intensive form “unto death” – to the utmost. *Doodaf* (tired unto death), *doodbabbel* (babble to death), *doodjakker* (gambol or frolic to death).

“*Doodlukas?*”

“Regional. Dead innocent.”

“Nice,” I say. *Doodluters* as a variant of *doodluiters* (blandly innocent or unconcerned), I read, *doodmoor* (murder, torture or strain to death), *doodsjordaan* (crossing the river Jordan as a metaphor for death), *doodsmare* (tidings of death), *doodswind* (wind bearing death), *doodswyn* (total unconsciousness), *doodoek* (register of deaths), *doodbaar* (death bier), *doodbus* (death urn), *dooddag* (day of death), *doodeens* (agreeing completely), *doodellendig* (miserable to death),...
doodgaan-en-weer-opstaan (die-and-get-up-again, aromatic shrub *Myrothamnus flabellifolia* – so called because it appears dead in dry times but revives after rain), *doodgaanskaap* (sheep dying from causes other than slaughterings), *doodgaanjaandel* (flesh of animal that has not been slaughtered), *doodgeboorte* (stillbirth), *doodgegooi* (very much in love; literally thrown dead), *doodgeld* (money paid out at death), *doodgetroos* (resigned unto death), *doodgewaan* (mistakenly assumed dead), *doodgooyer* (heavy dumpling, or irrefutable argument), *doodgraver* (gravedigger, or beetle of the genus *Nectophorus*), *doodhouergoggatjie* (descriptive name for any of various beetles of the family *Elateridae* that keeps deathly still as self-protection), *doodhoumetode* (method by which an animal mimics death).

[...]

I continue looking through the cards. *Doodkiskleed* (black cloth covering a coffin), *doodkisvoete* (feet as large as coffins), *doodknie* (to waste away by continual moping), *doodallie*.

*Doodallie*! I say. “Where does that come from?”

“Very prosperous. A regional word.”

[...]

*Doodshemp* (shroud), *doodshuis* (house of death), *doodsjaar* (year of death), *doodskamer* (room of dying or death), *doodsklok* (death knell), *doodskopertjie* (little knocker of death – deathwatch beetle, family *Anobiidae*), *doodskopaap* (death’s-head monkey), *doodsvelek* (any one of the coloured spots found on a body twelve or more hours after death), *doodsuur* (ignis fatuus: foolish fire, because of its erratic movement).

“I clothe myself in my shroud, my shirt of death, lie down in the room of death at the appointed hour and hark the death knell tolling,” I say.

Theo Verwey smiles.

*Doodsrilling* (shudder as if caused by death; fear of death), *doodsteken* (sign of approaching death; in memoriam sign), *doodvis* (to fish to death). *Doodtuur* or *doodstaar* (gaze to death).

The death of Theo Verwey at the outset of the novel and the naming of the dead/death-conjunctions foreground death thematically and echo it as a plot device by making the listing of these words seem like a clue through its pseudo detective novel construction. This is of course misleading and one way in which the novel emancipates itself from “its linguistic, perceptual, and practical grids, the culture [that is] superimposed” (Foucault 2001: xxii) and which becomes entrenched through practices which normalise it. Also, the archiving of these archaic Afrikaans words which have fallen into disuse and the discussion of them between Helena and Theo in the text, brings them to life again, thus ‘rescuing’ them from their own imminent/immanent death. Winterbach’s role as archivist
of archaic Afrikaans lexicon in literature thus extends from collector and cataloguer – the
arranger of signs and symbols according to specific rules – to incendiary (agitator,
disrupter, destroyer of Babel’s great ideal), revealing these lists not as systematic and
linear, but rather as semantic webs, as rhizomatic and multiplicitous, with a myriad virtual
variations and intensities which may concretise as the actual in a number of ways and not
only according to convention (or the underlying and insidious epistemes of knowledge
which infect our use of language and discourse to homogenise it according to dominant
normatives). Colman (2005c: 232) explains that this rhizomatic view of the nature of
things, including linguistics, language and literature, show how “Variations to any given
system can occur because of interventions within cyclical, systematic repletion.” Thus, the
naming and repetition of the dead/death-conjunctions are not simply a matter of
repetition (as with the examples from Niggie/To hell with Cronjé), but of repetition as
difference, “where semiotic connections or taxonomies can be compiled from complete
root to tree-like” structures, allowing for “polymorphous formations” (Colman 2005c:
232).

In Die benederyk, Winterbach is especially concerned with art and its various functions.
Throughout the book artists are named: Rafael (p.10), Piero (p.57), Masaccio (p.58),
Warhol and Basquiat (p.63), Ryan T, Kalup Linzy and Chris Burden (p.65), Joseph Beuys
(p.68), Piero Manzoni, Andres Serrano and Damien Hirst (p.80), Goya (p.88), Mantegna
(p.98), Paulo Uccello, Piero della Francesca, Paul Cézanne and Fernand Léger (p.142),
Salvador Dali (p.151), Anselm Kiefer and Sigmar Polke (p.157), etc.

The function of art in this context is to highlight the relationality of human beings once
again by showing how artists through the ages are related to each other, associatively and
disassociatively, and if not physically bound to each other, at least conceptually bound.
What is notable is that Winterbach mentions numerous artists, but that none of them are
South African. Also, the protagonist, Aaron Adendorff, himself a painter and a white male,
associates primarily with dominating Eurocentric artists and art forms (Nel 2012).
Ironically, his own art is becoming less and less recognisable according to standardised or
normative painting methods, and becomes abstracted to such a degree that hardly any
definite form is recognisable therein. This tension might suggest that Winterbach is not
only questioning the dominating structures of art (and by implication literature and other
art forms too), but that she is also implicitly commenting on the rupture of these
epistemological arrangements. The archiving of these artists, mainly European and American, also reveals the continued marginality of South African and other African or non-European/American artists and art forms, and questions what aesthetics is and how it comes to be formulated, expressed and then normalised, only to be disrupted again and again through bifurcations and mutations. Foucault (2001: 235-236) asks:

What event, what law do they obey, these mutations that suddenly decide that things are no longer perceived, described, expressed, characterized, classified and known in the same way, and that it is no longer wealth, living beings, and discourse that are presented to knowledge in the interstices of words or through their transparency, but beings radically different from them? For an archaeology of knowledge, this profound breach in the expanse of continuities, though it must be analysed, and minutely so, cannot be ‘explained’ or even summed up in a single word. It is a radical event that is distributed across the entire visible surface of knowledge, and whose signs, shocks, and effects it is only possible to follow step by step. Only thought apprehending itself at the root of its own history could provide a foundation, entirely free of doubt, for what the solitary truth of this event was.

In this sense, the “ordering of empiricity” (Foucault 2001: 238) and the mutations or bifurcations away from the centre can be traced in Winterbach though her idiosyncratic use of language, her disruption of normative novelistic structures, her contentious content and her subtext which serve as political commentary on issues such as the status of women within a legacy of patriotism, the legacy of Apartheid and the continued, though masked, racism still existent in South Africa and elsewhere in the world. And it is these bifurcations, I argue, which allow for virtual stutterings that may be captured in translation, making the translation stutter in the extensive, thereby minoritising it. But do Winterbach’s translations stutter in the same way that her novels do? Do the translations also allow for mutations away from the centre, for a becoming-minor? Or, in other words, is the potentiality for accentedness transferred from ST to TT? These questions, together with an exploration of what art is, form the cornerstone of Chapter 2 and the springboard from which I explore politics and ethics in translation praxis.

In Die aanspraak van lewende wesens Winterbach is concerned with especially madness in all its forms and lists different names for hell or the netherworld and its opposing terms associated with forms of salvation. But the most notable and complete list in this novel is that of heavy metal bands, a genre which developed in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and which, according to the Wikipedia entry (Wikipedia 2014c), is “characterized by highly amplified distortion, extended guitar solos, emphatic beats, and overall loudness”, as well
as with “masculinity and machismo”. I argue, however, that even though heavy metal is associated with machismo, it also does the opposite; that is, it disrupts the discreet heteronormativity of gender through the androgyny of the band members which “provided stylistic and cultural alternatives to youth of both sexes in many countries” (Goodlad 2007). Rooted in the punk movement with its ‘glam’ subcultural history, males started appropriating formerly typical feminine characteristics, such as “long or teased hair, makeup, flowing skirts, bridal costume, jewellery” (Goodlad 2007) and so forth. Winterbach’s listing of heavy metal bands thus serves to highlight the tensions of heteronormative gendering. This theme is recurrent in her work and, in this instance, undermines Afrikaner perceptions of masculinity – a hypermasculine ideal – and gender binarism (which then results in hyperfemininity as well). It could also be argued, as Ramirez (2012) does, that ‘musicianhood’ is sometimes a performativity of gender and that musicians often “illustrate the ways in which musical commitment poses challenges to normative masculinities.” It can be said then that heavy metal, a genre dominated by males and male bands which draws on imagery and metaphors ranging from “mythology, violence, madness, the iconography of horror” (Walser 1993: 109) and residual punk symbolism, simultaneously conforms to and defies “gender hierarchies” (Ramirez 2012). In South Africa it is also a very white genre, with few exceptions.

The bands that are listed include Accept and Deep Purple (p.10), Armored Saint and Anthrax (p.11), Pantera (p.23), Annihilator and Rammstein (p.26), Budgie, Wolfmother and Uriah Heep (p.63), DragonForce, Primal Fear, Kiss, Van Halen, Die Toten Hosen and In Flames (p.64), Machine Head, Dream Theatre, Led Zeppelin, Judas Priest, Avenged Sevenfold, My Dying Bride, Bullet for my Valentine, Trivium and Thin Lizzy (p.65), Mötorhead (p.66), Michael Schenker Group and Whitesnake (p.67), The Edge (p.213), The Buzzcocks, The Clash and The Ramones (p.215), Queensrÿche (p.285), Megadeath and Warrior Soul (p.286), Iron Maiden (p.302), Them Crooked Vultures (p.303), etc.

Two additional aspects related to this list (another kind of refrain) are worth noting. First, that the protagonists Karl Hofmeyr, who is obsessed with these bands, also calls his brother Ignatius by the nickname Iggy, an obvious reference to Iggy Pop, a performer associated with androgyny who often collaborated with other androgynous figures such as David Bowie. The character Iggy, who is struggling with real madness and neuroses, further upsets ideas of gender heteronormativity in that he starts wearing female clothing.
and is convinced that God is in the process of transforming him into a woman for a higher purpose (p.171). Winterbach’s typology of lists, as well as the more chaotic inventories also found in her novels, are, I argue, used as an archetypal basis for her plots and functions to foreground certain aspects and disrupt conventional and formulaic presentations of characters and novelistic structures, while simultaneously collecting and archiving personal and collective memories on the verge of being lost and, as a result, fading from history without a trace. At the same time, it allows for stutterings in the translations of her novels.

1.2.5 Translating *Die boek van toeval en toeverlaat*

In *Die boek van toeval en toeverlaat*, Helena Verbloem is collecting conjunctions with the word “droef” (mourning, mournful). Towards the end of her collection of and deliberation on these conjunctions, “droef” is conjoined with the word “rooi” (red) as “droefrooi” (translated as “mournful red”). This is applied to the entire colour spectrum, and culminates in the following sentence: “Droeforanje, droefblanje, droefblou” (p.81), translated in the English as “mournful orange, mournful white, mournful blue” (p.80). The translation itself is semantically sound, but important subtext pertaining to the thematic question of Afrikaans (and Afrikaner culture) longevity or death is lost in the translation. The Afrikaans text relies on assumed embedded cultural knowledge. Afrikaners used to refer to the old South African flag as “oranje, blanje, blou” or “orange, white, blue”, though the word for ‘white’ in the Afrikaans is a loanword from Dutch to rhyme with orange.24

There is thus unavoidable rhythmic loss in the translation, although the collective lamentation of Afrikaners so poignantly captured in the original, I argue, could be conveyed in some sense in the translation by writing cultural-historical information into the narrative through a kind of mimicking of the author’s style, thus actualising in the translation that which exists suggestively in the virtual of the original text. Such a strategy illustrates the methodological possibilities available to a translator, although it needs careful consideration in terms of its criticality to the central themes of the novel, as well as the effect of such additions as regards the author’s voice and narrative style. Nonetheless, one of my goals for this thesis is to retranslate a few extracts from this novel to illustrate how contextual (as well as intertextual) allusion might be regained by writing cultural-historical information into the narrative where it is deemed appropriate and necessary.

24 An example of how this passage could be translated differently is presented in Chapter 2.
The last aspect I want to address here has already been mentioned – that of the title which in the Afrikaans contains both the words *toeval* (meaning “happenstance”) and *toeverlaat* (meaning “refuge” or “solace”) and which are pitted against each other. This is important especially for the theme of science vs. religion which is central to the novel; the idea that there is no solace if everything, including the existence of humans, is based on chance and not on some grand design which provides solace for the (physical and existential) loss we experience in life. It could also be said that the loss we inevitably experience in life, when framed through religion, is assigned a purpose (or even a ‘higher purpose’) but, when viewed through a scientific framework, is rendered meaningless, left to chance. It is this loss of ontological meaning which results in the existential crises of characters. The difficulty in translating the title is finding a way to repeat the alliteration and rhythm of the Afrikaans title. I would suggest the title be something like *The book of synchrony and sanctuary, The book of chance and solace, The book of fluke and refuge, The book of fate and refuge* or *The book of happenstance and haven*.

1.2.5.1 Sense and affect

If we are to view translation from the Deleuzian ontology, we need to find a way to talk about it which “resists capture by stable categories of the dogmatic image of thought” (May 2005: 97). This is by no means an easy task. Already we are bound by theories of translation and retranslation, with terms like ‘domestication’ and ‘foreignisation’ (Venuti 1995, 1998), ‘source language’ and ‘target language’, ‘word-for-word translation’ and ‘sense-for-sense translation’ (Jerome 2012: 21-30), the ‘skopos’ of translation (Vermeer 2012: 191-202) and so forth. And, as if the burden of these defined categories does not weigh heavily enough on translators and theorists already, we also, in this case, have the terms of literary theory to contend with: author voice and idiom, thematic concerns, style and structure, etc. What are to be made of these terms and how do we speak of the metalinguistic aspects of language without falling into the same traps of fixed conceptual and representational categories? The problem is, of course, that language itself is “inescapably representational” (May 2005: 95). What Deleuze proposes then is “to substitute for the representational view of language a view that allows it to overflow the categories of representation” (May 2005: 96). In order to do this, he proposes a fourth dimension beyond the three dimensions of the conventional theories of language which
include only “denotation, manifestation and signification” (May 2005: 97). This fourth dimension is sense (Deleuze 1994: 129-167), closely related to Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy of affect which I want to introduce and discuss here in closing, though not as a finite closure, but rather one which shall remain open to new interpretations and reinterpretations, and with a fissure into the second chapter which deals with the question of art and aesthetics.

i) Sense

Denotation, the first aspect Todd May (2005: 96) explains with reference to sense, refers to an entity or a set of propositions that a word refers to in the world or, in other words, to its dictionary definition and how that represents the world to us. However, cognitive linguists have in recent years contested reference to or the use of the dictionary definition of a word without reference to its connotations also, as a word (Deleuze and Guattari would surely agree) is not a discreet lexical category with a fixed semantic definition. Rather, it is directly related to our real-world experience of a word and therefore also to its connotations and polysemous networks (Evans & Green 2006: 210), as well as to how these experiences shape the individual and communal associations we form with words in a language (referred to by cognitivists as our ‘encyclopaedic knowledge’ of a word).

The second aspect May puts forward is manifestation, which refers “to the one who utters the proposition” or the interlocutor (May 2005: 98). This does not need further explication as it is self-evident. But what does need some elaboration is the final aspect May addresses, namely signification, which denotes the effect/s of the entity or the set of propositions denoted and manifested, but remains “a system-immanent definition of the sign” (Barnouw 1981) and is thus isolated from the real-world or embodied experience of language, consequently allowing language to function only in its symbolic aspect, entirely removed from its interactive function (Evans & Green 2006: 6-10). Denotation, manifestation and signification could thus be said to be the representational aspects of language. But for Deleuze and Guattari there is another dimension and that dimension is sense. What then, we must ask, is sense?

Sense firstly needs to be contrasted with ‘common sense’ and ‘good sense’, both for Deleuze and Guattari related to the representational, with common sense referring to all
human capacities and aptitudes “brought together under the banner of transcendental identity patterned on the identity of God and the mirroring of the identity of the objects of knowledge” (Poxon & Stivale 2005: 66), thus reducing knowledge to recognisable epistemes. Good sense, for Deleuze and Guattari, is affirming and ordered within predictable configurations of uniformity and identity which, like common sense, “traps us in an image of thought based on recognition and representation” (Poxon & Stivale 2005: 66). In contrast, the Deleuzo-Guattarian use of the word “sense” refers to “a sense that emerges as pure event, and as such is affirmation of difference-in-itself” (Poxon & Stivale 2005: 66). Thus, in some sense, we can refer to sense as the virtual – as the possibilities of what a proposition or set of propositions entail and how they might be expressed. Sense thus converges, but also simultaneously separates, the denotation, manifestation and signification – or the realm of the actual – with “virtual Ideas” (Poxon & Stivale 2005: 68). We could therefore say that sense, when used in this sense, disrupts the representational structure of language so that it does not remain intact. Still, we must note that sense is contained within the expression of propositions, but that is not reducible to it. “It is an event that happens in the proposition but it is not the proposition itself” (May 2005: 101). Sense, therefore, is not an attribute of the proposition, but an attribute of the causal, the experiential and the state of affairs which produce “new lines of becoming” (May 2005: 102). This becoming means that the world (and also language) is not solely defined by the primacy of representation and identity, but that there is a “continual production (or ‘return’) of difference immanent within the constitution of events, whether physical or otherwise” (Stagoll 2005a: 21). This term is closely related to the concept of ‘affect’ which is directly linked to the social production of representation and as such allows for “a material, and therefore political, critique of capital and its operations” (Colman 2005a: 12). Sense and affect are vital to the understanding of the politics of translation and literature as a war machine. And after considering these terms closely, I started formulating my main research question of Chapter 3, moving away from what literature/s and translation/s mean to what they do (or can do) and what the real-world effects are. Thus, do literature/s and translation/s – and particularly those of Viljoen/Winterbach – reinforce that which is normative, or do they ripple away from the centre as a line of flight, deterriorialising some assemblages while simultaneously allowing for the illimitable formations of new assemblages?

ii) Affect
Affect, which operates with sense, refers to the chance variations, modifications or transformations that occur when configurations, like literary configurations (or in Deleuzo-Guattarian terms, ‘bodies’), collide. Claire Colebrook (2002: 21) writes that “If philosophy takes language away from simple definitions and the fixity of opinions to concepts and problems, art creates affects and percepts.” Affects, thus, are becomings which reveal the limits that structural semiotics impose on our “emotional responses to aesthetic and physical experiences” (Colman 2005a: 12) and operate dynamically within assemblages to influence meaning-making and produce intensity situationally, rendering them singular and free from the primary structures and organising principles of representation and identity. It is, through art then, that affects disengage “such that we are no longer capable of simply identifying and delimiting the feelings of boredom, or fear of desire. It is the task of art to dislodge affects from their recognised and expected origins” (Colebrook 2002: 23). In this sense, then, it is the function of literature, as art and a as a nomadic war machine, to disrupt the “smooth space that now claims to control” and make “its object not war, but the drawing of a creative line of flight” (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 422).

1.3 Summary

In summary, what I am arguing for is that translation is more than the sum of its parts; it is more than two sides of an embroidery, it is more than the crossing of a conceptual impasse, it is more than the reworking of the SL/ST into the TL/TT. It is more than all of these – this collection of assemblages – in combination with the assemblages constituting the translator with all her/his knowledge and sources, and it is even more than the personal interpretation of readers – a kind of translation in itself. Instead, I contend, translation is about that which emerges: sense and affect; that which is pried from the virtual: actualised intensities. But translation is also about (sometimes overlooked or waved aside) extraneous forces – the political, which sanctions or hinders texts from seeing the light of day, allowing for the wider dissemination of certain literature/s and not of others. And, most obviously perhaps, it is about the translator’s response to the writer and her/his text/s; a response which has to take into account all of these varied and intersecting flows – ‘holding’ it in the virtual – so that it may be considered, ethically, and then actualised, intensively. But before any of these assemblages can be held and pondered, we need to take a step back and consider what constitutes art? What is art and when is literature art and what does this have to do with translation and politics and
ethics? These are the questions I have grappled with in this project; questions I shall pose to the reader, beginning with art and aesthetics in Chapter 2, then considering the political in terms of capitalism and its effects on translation praxis in Chapter 3 and, finally, examining what an ethical response to translation might look like in Chapter 4. For me, Deleuze and Guattari’s project overlaps in many ways with themes in Viljoen/Winterbach’s oeuvre and explains so many aspects dealt with in Translation Studies, and it is for this reason that I have used their project to explicate my thoughts on translation, and specifically the translations of Ingrid Winterbach’s novels in my project.
Chapter 2
Ethico-aesthetics and the machinic repetition of literature in translation

Afrikaans *(Die benederyk, p.65)*


English *(The road of excess, p.63)*

“Video can make art do things that objects like paintings can’t. It makes new audiences, new routes. Variation lies in the degree of digital engagement. It’s all about speeded-up production and marketing. A mind-blowing mix of pop fantasy and neo-tribalism. It cool, it’s unfazed, it’s zany. It’s virtual-utopian. It engages with the attention-deficit internet culture.”

“Aesthetic singularity and its creative lines of flight always await to be produced, and must be, for only a permanent revolution can resist the incessant reappropriation of art in the spectacle of commodified ‘poses’ and fashionable accessories […] This is the destruction which must precede any true creation, and which frees the material to express its chaotic machinery in constructing sensations.”

*(Zepke 2005: 167)*
2.1 Introduction: machinic invention and expression

Translation is always repetition; a repetition of a particular kind – a “question of mimesis” (Vieira 1994: 70) which is not mere copying or reproduction, but an act which “virtualizes the notion of mimesis … as the production of difference in sameness” (de Campos 1981: 183 quoted in Vieira 1999: 110). It is repetition – the eternal return – of a cannibalistic kind, a “nourishing from two reservoirs, the source text and the target literature”, but it is also more than that: a polyphonic repetition which “heralds a postmodern aesthetics that reveals the relative inadequacy of tradition traductology” (Vieira 1994: 72). Vieira (1994: 72) writes:

To start with, if translation writes a two-way flow, the very terminology ‘source’ and ‘target’ becomes depleted. By the same token, the power relation between source/target, superior/inferior, ceases to exist. Accordingly, the debt to the original, a point that has also been raised by Benjamin and elaborated by Derrida, is also redistributed. Another point that becomes problematic is the conventional view of the self-effacing translator; the translator’s becomes a voice within the text, and on top of that, tradition speaks through the translation. Translation explicitly becomes polyphonic … [hence] translation is transtextualization.

This kind of transtextualisation spans history – histories in fact – and is a repetition which has been accredited in Translation Studies with relative autonomy from the source text as scholars now largely agree that “translation is an independent form of writing, distinct from the source text and from texts originally written in the translating language… [and] is seen as enacting its own processes of signification which answer to different linguistic and cultural contexts” (Venuti 2012a: 185). In turn, this postmodern aesthetic of translation is taken a step further by poststructuralist translation theories which investigate the structural imbalances of hierarchies inherent in these ‘repetitions’, thus enabling “an incisive interrogation of cultural and political effects, [as well as] the role played by translation in the creation and functioning of social movements and institutions” (Venuti 2012b: 275). That is, despite the fact that translations – or literary repetitions – are regarded as relatively autonomous creations, they still conform, they are still produced.

And if they are produced or “[f]abricated in the socius” (Guattari 1995: 130) – the social megamachine which, in modern societies, “facilitates the functioning of capitalism” which requires that flows continually “become more abstract, since capital requires intersubstitutability, homogeneity, relentless quantification, and exchange mechanisms” (Surin 2005a: 256) – the question begs: does this mean that translations inevitably are
tracings subsumed by systems of powers rather than mappings which allow for bifurcations? For where, “in the conformity and correspondence between the life-form of the subject and the system of power that produced it, has the potential for change gone?” (Massumi 2002: xvi-xvii). This, precisely, forms the core question of this chapter and one which I investigate within the ethico-aesthetic paradigm developed by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. More specifically I ask the following questions: 1) what is art? 2) when is literature art and does Ingrid Winterbach’s oeuvre meet these criteria?; and 3) how can ‘art’ be transposed from an original work to its translation; i.e. how is the potential for accentedness or intensive affect retained in a translated work?

The question of art is directly related to value, to subjectivity and to aesthetics but is problematic in that there is “no objective or scientific way to determine whether an object is beautiful, and – if it is – to explain why” (Shaviro 2012: 2). In other words, beauty “is not in nature; it is rather something we attribute to nature” and by the same token aesthetic judgement is not innate but rather a recognition of the manner in which an object “adapts itself to the way we apprehend it” (Shaviro 2012: 2). Beauty, or rather our experience thereof, is fundamental to aesthetics, yet Derek Attridge (2004: 14) argues that it “cannot be taken as a defining property, both because its extension to all art is problematic and because it is equally an aspect of our response to many natural objects.” What we do know of beauty, however, is that unlike Jimmy’s proclamation in Die benederyk that art is about sped-up production and marketing (p.65), it is – in the Deleuzo-Guattarian sense – actually about resisting this “incessant reappropriation of art in the spectacle of commodified ‘poses’ and fashionable accessories” (Zepke 2005: 167); it is the act of making art “stand up on its own” (Deleuze & Guattari 1994: 164). But Jimmy (The road to excess, p.63) does recognise something about art in his soliloquy: that art in capitalist society – whether visual, literary, musical, etc. – is not produced in a vacuum but in the socius, and that the socius “undermines the preciousness of the object. It fucks the boutique market right up the arse... It engages with the attention-deficit internet culture... Serial soap opera stuff. High art and low art, my friend. The boundaries have collapsed.” Hence, the new aesthetic value – the value produced by capitalism, by sped-up production

In Aesthetic theory, Theodor Adorno (1997: 341) argues that “Art does not stand in need of an aesthetics that will prescribe norms where it finds itself in difficulty, but rather of an aesthetics that will provide the capacity for reflection, which art on its own is hardly able to achieve. [...] The truth content of an artwork requires philosophy.” In What is philosophy, Deleuze and Guattari explicitly refute this stance and instead argue that art does not need philosophy but rather has the capacity to ‘stand up on its own’. That is, art “stands up on its own to the extent that it remains ‘independent’ or autonomous from its creator, from its potential audience, from its material situation, and even from the medium or form in and through which it is expressed” (MacKenzie & Porter 2011: 133).
and marketing – is one of surplus value and, in consequence, this aesthetic value is one of “unrealized potentiality” due to “the becoming-abstract of the flows of desire, and the becoming-private of the organs” (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 144). In such conditions literature and translations are not art in the Deleuzo-Guattarian sense – they do not ‘stand up’ on their own; they are little more than capitalist representations. For capitalism does not produce literature; “[w]riting has never been capitalism’s thing. Capitalism is profoundly illiterate.” Yet capitalism makes use of writing: “not only is writing adapted to money as the general equivalent, but the specific functions of money in capitalism went by way of writing and printing, and in some measure continue to do so” (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 240). So how can literature escape the socius and the “era van diversificatie van production en distribution” (era of the diversification of production and distribution) as Jimmy (Die benederyk, p.63, with my translation in brackets) so accurately points out? The answer lies in machinic invention and expression, but from a very specific kind of machine – the abstract machine which “points to a potentiality” (Shaviro 2012: 3 quoting Alfred North Whitehead), an escape route.

2.2 One socius, many machines: is there an exit strategy?

Jimmy Harris is more talkative this morning than he was last night. He is loud and eloquent, ready for an argument. He sits quietly for a while, then stirs from his ruminations without warning and delivers a long, mostly theoretical, monologue on some or the other art matter, giving preference to the theories underscoring his own work. Aaron can feel the hair on the back of his neck prick up, his armpits drenched in sweat. Jimmy is addicted to theory; he gets high on it. Theory, he says, has taken the place of art. Aaron’s irritation with the bloke is extreme. He would like to give him a sidelong blow and order him to shut up for the duration of the trip.

In this excerpt, the character Jimmy Harris of Die benederyk /The road of excess is in an explicitly dialogic relation with the protagonist Aaron Adendorff. They are, in fact, at opposite ends of the spectrum regarding their relation to art: whereas Aaron embodies the artist marching “into the desert” (Rancière 2004b) where “an extreme point will have to be reached” (Deleuze 2003: 25), Jimmy is more interested in the mechanical reproduction of

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26 Capitalism and its mechanics such as the capitalist axiomatic and capitalist realism, as well as “its capacity to operate directly on decoded flows” (Toscano 2005a: 17) is explored in detail in Chapter 3.

27 My translation of a conversation between the characters Jimmy Harris and Aaron Adendorff in Die benederyk, pp.59-62. The Afrikaans as well as the now published translation of this section can be read in Appendix B.
art or, as Benjamin (1969: 224) writes, “art designed for reproducibility” as becomes clear in the next quote. The effect of this dialogic relationship between Jimmy and Aaron is that the reader is confronted with the difference between fashionable art and its commodified poses on the one hand, and the struggle for art that stands up on its own or takes a line of flight on the other. Aaron presents the following views:

Jimmy, with an unhealthy flush creeping up from his neck into his pale-green cheeks, is getting into his stride now and contends that the artists making meaningful art in this country can be counted on the fingers of one hand. He puts his hand in the air. Aaron glances furtively at him from the corner of his eye. His palm is broad, the base of his thumb unusually fleshy (anarchic energy), his fingers surprisingly slender, the nails eaten into the life. And who, in his opinion, are these artists? asks Aaron, not recognising a single name from the few Jimmy mentions.

Moeketsi mentions a painter.

Without a second thought Jimmy says: “Painting is dead in this country, my friend. There isn’t a single painter doing anything of value. Painting in this country lags behind seriously.”

Moeketsi laughs and says that he still paints.

“Your video work is more cutting edge,” says Jimmy.

Now Knuvelder comes under fire. Knuvelder, holds Jimmy, is a pushover. He isn’t strict enough in the selection of artists he exhibits. He’s uninformed and allows himself to be led by unexamined ideas. Also, he isn’t intellectually rigorous enough; he doesn’t understand his own preferences and prejudices. (Aaron agrees with this but suspects they stand on opposite sides of the spectrum.) He isn’t daring enough, too scared to put his neck on the line.

Scared of what? asks Aaron. Scared he loses his politically correct buyers?

Moeketsi laughs softly in the back of the car.

And his choice for the Berlin exhibition, asks Aaron, isn’t that daring enough?

It’s okay, says Jimmy.

And his two assistant-curators? asks Aaron.

Thick, says Jimmy. Uninformed.

(At least on this they can agree one hundred percent.)

And does Jimmy think Knuvelder’s Berlin exhibition is important?

Yes, it’s important. Important enough. But it’s still not on the forefront, the cutting edge. It’s still not in the hot spot. It’s still not Takashi Murakami. It’s still not multimedia enough, confrontational enough, take-no-prisoners enough. It doesn’t challenge his own views stringently enough and it’s not enough of an assault on high culture.

Harris has a deep blush on his otherwise pale cheeks. He tears off one of his already bitten nails with his teeth.

In the back of the car Moeketsi is taking in the passing veld with its soft range of hills and valleys against changing cloud formations.

Note that Jimmy and Aaron are used here metafictionally to explicate how art functions within the socius; an argument I explicate in scholarly fashion hereafter.
And does Jimmy's own work comply with his strict set of standards? asks Aaron.
He's working on it. He's working on it, says Jimmy, continuing to bite his nails, tearing it off in
self-mutilation.

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And what does he think of the international art scene? Aaron wants to know.

Jimmy laughs his laugh, his manboobs shaking.

"The name of the game is money, my friend." (Aaron takes exception to this mode of address.)

"Wherever art is, there is the spirit of the time. The Zeitgeist. That is to say the world market. Private
collectors pitch en masse at art fairs in their private jets. They bid at the biggest art auctions in New
York and London, pushing the prices of contemporary artworks fucking sky high! The prices are way,
way astronomical. The market is mad; anyone who can profit from art does so. They do it and they
do it big time. No holds barred. Don’t even try to understand the art market," says Jimmy, "it’s
been haywire for a long time. It’s mad. It’s international; I mean the art market’s international. It’s
big and it’s crazy. There’s no difference between art capital and capital proper. Don’t fool yourself!
They’re both subject to the same laws. The art market is ruled by the laws of money. Stuff aesthetic
considerations! Artists, dealers, galleries, collectors, buyers – individual or corporate – auction
houses, consultants and advisors, investors, museums, art fairs, biennales, international art forums
like Documenta and Manifesta, you name it, everyone has a role. It’s competitive, man! It’s a jungle
out there!"

Here Jimmy succinctly describes the socius with its many machines and their relation to
art and aesthetics. Painting – which in this instance moves against the grain of the socius,
or the social megamachine responsible for production and reproduction (including literary
production and reproduction) – is shown to be redundant, drowned out of the market by
the inauthenticity of the new and trendy; in Jimmy’s case, video art. But the socius is made
up of many different machines: the territorial machine, the social machine, the technical
machine, the despotic machine and so forth, each machine marking a different era of
production, each with Knuvelders (the seller archetype) and buyers (the politically correct
buyer archetype and the archivist), with Moeketsi-types treading the fine line between
authenticism and capitalism, and with cutting edge Takashi Murakami-types who blur “the
line between high and low arts” (Wikipedia 2013b).

But such a machine “is literally a machine, irrespective of any metaphor, inasmuch as it
exhibits an immobile motor and undertakes a variety of interventions: flows are set apart,
elements are detached from a chain, and portions of the tasks to be performed are
distributed” (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 141). The function of the social machine is the
coding of these flows, “resulting in a residual share for each member, in a global system of desire and destiny that organizes the production of production, the productions of recording, and the productions of consumption” (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 142). The technical machine, on the other hand, organises and conditions the social machine. The socius – or the organised society – therefore has technical machines with a nonhuman element which “extends man’s strength and allows for a certain disengagement from it” and social machines which, in contrast to the technical machines, “have men for its parts” (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 141). A very simplistic example of this is translators as social machines and their computers, translation software, dictionaries, etc. as technical machines or, from Jimmy’s perspective, artists and their video cameras. These machines now produce and reproduce, consume and then produce and reproduce all over again according to regulated flows, none of which escape coding, none of which escape mimesis. “The socius is the terrain of coding and recoding” and ensures that subjects are “prepared for their social roles and functions” (Surin 2005a: 255). Furthermore, the socius currently serves to consolidate the capitalist order and as a result desire “is simultaneously enabled and limited by capital, which frees it from its previous embodiments or codings so that it can be placed at the disposal of capitalist expansion” (Surin 2005a: 256). As Jimmy says: “Artists, dealers, galleries, collectors, buyers – individual or corporate – auction houses, consultants and advisors, investors, museums, art fairs, biennales, international art forums like Documenta and Manifesta, you name it, everyone has a role”; everyone is a machine connected to the flows and codes of other machines.

So first there was the territorial machine, the “first form of socius, the machine of primitive inscription … that covers a social field” (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 141) and claims territory, divides territory into units. And once “territorialisation has occurred” (Surin 2005a: 256) the social machines – humans – were incorporated, followed by the technical machines which were linked to the humans. The next era of production and reproduction is marked by the barbarian despotic machine, a “machine of the strange [which] is both a great paranoiac machine, since it expresses the struggle of the old system, and already a glorious celibate machine, insofar as it exalts the triumph of the new alliance” (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 192). The despotic machine marks the birth of an empire – of Empire – and may be “primarily military and motivated by conquest” or it may be “primarily religious, the military discipline being converted into internal asceticism and cohesion” (Deleuze &

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29 The role of capitalism is discussed at length in Chapter 3.
Guattari 1983: 193), or a combination of these, but regardless of the specific form it takes, it marks the beginning of the organisation of the State. The State – or the State apparatus – now “becomes the true owner in conformity with the apparent objective movement that attributes the surplus product to the State” (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 194) and these conditions give way to another machine, to capitalism, the current production era which is defined by the universal decoding and deterritorialisation of flows. “Our societies [now] exhibit a marked taste for all codes – codes foreign or exotic – but this taste is destructive and morbid” (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 245) as is evident from Jimmy’s rantings. Thus, all of these machines – human and nonhuman – operate under capitalism in modern society. At the same time, capitalism decodes and deterritorialises flows, thus masking its underlying agenda through foreign or exotic codes; through consumerism and consumer choices. And it is this underlying agenda of capitalism which, I argue, continues to be linked to the expansion of Empire, that must be interrogated because it repeatedly sidelines minor literatures in favour of normative literary and translation practices – commodified art in place of art that stands up on its own.

Furthermore, as Jimmy says, theory has taken the place of art in these sophisticatedly organised societies. This is true of translation theory as well. Talvet (2007), for example, remarks that one “can observe how theory has moved away, almost by a ‘leap’, from the historical practice of translation, to find itself in a labyrinth of auto-contemplation.” He goes on to explain that translation has become a kind of “synonym of whatever transformation, modification and transference” takes place in and between cultures and societies. Thus, theory has not only taken the place of art but has, at least to some degree, become theory about theory – a copy of a copy of a copy. In other instances, and specifically as regards small languages, translation in capitalist societies is non-profitable and therefore not desired (as discussed in Chapter 3). This is true of Ingrid Winterbach’s translations as well. Consider, for example, that only 2000 copies of Winterbach’s first translated novel, *The elusive moth*, were printed, with 300 remaining unsold, while only 800 copies of the latest translation, *The road of excess*, were printed because “the competition in the local market is very strong, with so many English novels imported from overseas” (Human & Rousseau 2013). It is also noteworthy that there is very little theory on her translations. Heather Acott (2012) does discuss contemporary satire in *The elusive...*
moth (the translation of Karolina Ferreira) and Heilna du Plooy (2011: 327-342) the importance of signs in To hell with Cronjé (Niggie) and The book of happenstance (Die boek van toeval en toeverlaat), but scholars have scarcely written about the actual practice of translating her novels, confirming Talvet’s (2007) concerns that what “really takes place in [the] literary and cultural life of the ‘third world’, does not seem to interest theory.” In this sense literature and translation are trapped in the mechanics of the socius and of capitalism. But there is an escape route, one offered by a different kind of machine, namely the abstract machine.

2.2.1 Art as abstract machine: becoming-nonhuman

After this something new began to happen in his art. Less detail, less tonal modelling, the configuration rawer, crasser than before, with more daring in his approach. His colours remained non-naturalistic. Rich pigments, almost tangible. Simplified forms anchored on the canvas by the tangibility of the paint. So fresh and new that at times it felt like sorcery at times. This he achieved only after much anguish. A lifetime of it in fact.

Anelda Susan Hofsajer (2011) has done a research report on the method of self-translation in The book of happenstance but this seems to be the only research on the actual translations and “translation procedures and strategies adopted in the self-translation” (Hofsajer 2011: 1) of Ingrid Winterbach's novels. This, however, may not be due to the oversight of researchers, but might rather be a reflection of the fact that Winterbach's translated works— as well as the translations of other minority language authors worldwide— are not promoted enough from the outset. In contrast, there is a large and growing body of scholarly research on Viljoen/Winterbach’s Afrikaans novels.

Deleuze and Guattari describe many different kinds of machines in their work. In Anti-Oedipus, they explain that a machine may be understood “as a system of interruptions or breaks” but that every machine is also “a machine of a machine”. Hence, these machines are not separate from reality; rather, they are connected to other machines in reality and produce flows; they are “related to a continual material flow that it cuts into. It functions like a ham-slicing machine, removing portions from the associativ flow” (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 36). The abstract or diagrammatic machine is unique in that it “does not function to represent, even something real, but rather constructs a real that is yet to come, a new type of reality” (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 141).

Aaron Adendorff thinking about his own art in Die benederyk, p.8, followed by my translation of the passage, followed by The road of excess, p.8.
Under capitalism, production is marked by *representation* – i.e. reproduction of the copy. That is, “production is always, actually, systematically, reproduction” (Massumi 2002: xvii). As a result any “potential the process may have had of leading to a significantly different product is lost in the overlay of what already is” (Massumi 2002: xvii, my emphasis). Walter Benjamin (1969: 242) writes the following on mechanical re/production:

... the aesthetics of today's war appears as follows: If the natural utilization of productive forces is impeded by the property system, the increase in technical devices, in speed, and the sources of energy will press for an unnatural utilization, and this is found in war. The destructiveness of war furnishes proof that society has not been mature enough to cope with the elemental forces of society.

In other words, the property system has turned the production of art into the production of commodities with surplus value. As Jimmy says, “The name of the game is money, my friend. [...] There’s no difference between art capital and capital proper. Don’t fool yourself! They’re both subject to the same laws. The art market is ruled by the laws of money. Stuff aesthetic considerations!” Consequently, and in order to retain the potential of art, the production of art needs to free itself from representation and the way to do that, according to Deleuze and Guattari, is to find an abstract machine; “abstract because the asignifying signs with which it concerns itself lack determinate form or actual content definition” (Massumi 2002: xx). But even though the machines are abstract, “they are not unreal. They are in transport. They constitute the dynamic ‘matter’ of expression” (Massumi 2002: xx). In other words, the abstract machine “does not function to represent” (Zepke 2005: 1); it is real and always emerging, always becoming and guiding the becoming of art. It is “the foregrounding of art’s asignifying potential” (O’Sullivan 2006: 38); hence, its potential to deterritorialise. In this sense – the sense in which art is a becoming and as a result a “resistance to the present milieu” (O’Sullivan 2006: 98) – art can be said to be effectuating a nomadic politics and ethics which constitutes a becoming-nonhuman, a becoming-abstract machine. That is, the ‘content’ of art is nonhuman in that it is pure *affect*, “a vital clue to where the self loses its boundaries” (Spivak 2012: 313). No longer are we in the world, “we become the world; we become by contemplating it. Everything is vision, becoming. We become universes. Becoming animal, plant, molecular, becoming zero” (Deleuze & Guattari 1994: 168), attaining “a greater degree of abstraction” (Conley 1997) in the same way that Aaron’s painting does; becoming cruder but more daring. At
this junction we might say of Ingrid Winterbach’s novels that they are merely fiction – commodities – but we might also say that they are machines – abstract machines – which produce “a different kind of experience of the world – a new myth – and thus, we might say, an altered consciousness” (O’Sullivan 2006: 119). In this way Winterbach has made her literature – her art – an abstract machine. But we still need to establish what art is and when literature is art.

2.3 What is art?

Adéle Nel (2012) asks the question What is art? in relation to Winterbach’s novel Die benederyk and starts her argument by quoting Lyotard (1992: 16): “The question of modern aesthetics is not What is beautiful? but rather “What is art to be and what is literature to be?” Many scholars, philosophers and artist, amongst others, have grappled with this question and as many answers have been put forth. Sarah Thorton (2008: xix), for example, writes that art “is not a ‘system’ or smooth-functioning machine, but rather a conflicted cluster of subcultures – each of which embrace different definitions of art.” Others, like Peter Goldie and Elisabeth Schellekens (2010), are proponents for conceptual art whereas an artist like Marina Abramović uses performance art to engage with the “boundaries of body and mind” (MIC 2014). For Deleuze and Guattari art can be any of these things, but what defines art is that it “must stand up on its own” (Deleuze & Guattari 1994: 164). And what art does is preserve: it “preserves and is preserved in itself, although actually it lasts longer than its support and materials” (Deleuze & Guattari 1994: 163). But art does not preserve in the same way it does in the industry; i.e. it does not add “a substance to make the thing last” (Deleuze & Guattari 1994: 163). Rather, what is preserved is “a bloc of sensations, that is to say, a compound of percepts and affects” (Deleuze & Guattari 1994: 164). They go on to write:

Percepts are no longer perceptions; they are independent of a state of those experiencing them. Affects are no longer feelings or affections; they go beyond the strength of those who undergo them. Sensations, percepts, and affects are beings whose validity lies in themselves and exceeds any lived. They could be said to exist in the absence of man [the becoming-norhuman] because man, as he is caught in stone, on the canvas, or by words, is himself a compound of percepts and affects. The work of art is a being of sensation and nothing else; it exists in itself.
This is beautifully captured by the character Helena Verbloem (p.124 in *Die boek van toeval en toeverlaat* and p.121 in *The book of happenstance*) when she describes her experience of the *Conus figulinus* shell:

Die grootste van die twee *Conus figulinus*-skulpe was miskien van al my skulpe die mooiste. Dit is ’n swaar skulp; as dit in die palm van my hand rus, sluit my duim en wysvinger nét oor die smaller agterste deel. Dit lê in my hand asof dit daarvoor gefatsoeneer is, soos ’n foutloos afgewerkte handwerkstuig, en tegelyk so uitosonderlik in vorm en konsepsie dat dit menslike vaardigheid en verbeelding oortref. Die spits is besonder afgeplat, die grondkleur is ’n sagte bloubruin, wat dieper by die breë skouer is en geleidelik ligter en gryser word tot by die smal basis. Oor die hele oppervlak loop fyn, donkerder bruin horisontale strepies wat lyk of dit in die oppervlak ingeweef is. ’n Koel, perfek gebalanceerde skulp. Winding vir winding volledig op sigself ingevou. Geslote. Volkome.

Of all my shells the larger of the two *Conus figulinus* shells was possibly the loveliest. A heavy shell, and when resting in the palm of my hand my thumb and index finger could barely encircle even the tapered base. Fitting in my hand as if fashioned for it — a perfectly finished hand tool, and yet so exceptional in form and conception that it surpasses human skill and imagination. The apex has a virtually flattened spire, the base colour is a soft bluish brown, deeper around the wide shoulder and gradually turning lighter and greyer down to the narrow base. Across the whole surface run fine, darker-brown horizontal lines, which seem to be woven into the surface. A cool, perfectly balanced shell. Whorl upon whorl completely folded in upon itself. Consummate. 35

This is the way in which art stands up on its own: not by “having a top and a bottom or being upright” but as an “act by which the compound of created sensations is preserved in itself” (Deleuze & Guattari 1994: 164) in the same way as the shell is wholly closed in on itself, preserving the void perfectly and being perfectly “preserved in the void by preserving itself” (Deleuze & Guattari 1994: 165). We could say that percept and affect are preserved in the void, forming “the two ‘pincers’ of aesthetic composition” (Zepke 2005: 180); that is to say, percept constructs the virtual “as the real conditions of the affect” (Zepke 2005: 180) or the material becoming and as such, art is real and not a representation of the real. The artist’s aim is therefore to “wrest the percept from perceptions of objects and the states of a perceiving subject, to wrest affect from affections as the transition from one state to another” (Deleuze & Guattari 1994: 167). Hence, art as abstract machine — as a bloc of sensations and a compound of percepts and affects — is never an end in itself; it is a means to a new reality and at the same time immanent to that new reality. We could say

35 The final lines actually translate as: Across the whole surface run fine, darker-brown horizontal lines, which seem to be woven into the surface. A cool, perfectly balanced shell. Whorl upon whorl wholly folded in upon itself. Enclosed. Consummate.
that art emerges as “a privileged site of corporeal experiment” (Zepke 2005: 4) and as such constitutes a politics of real or actual experience and an ethical choice which affirms “only what is the most deterritorialised” (Zepke 2005: 8) – a singularity.

In *Die benederyk/The road of excess*, the tension between art that stands up on its own (a singularity) and capitalist art (endless reproduction) is actualised through the characters Aaron Adendorff and Jimmy Harris respectively. Nel (2012) argues that the novel is “a narrative philosophical reflection on the nature, value and function of art and the artistic process.” As in her other novels, Winterbach once again is concerned with the concept of death and lists countless dead artists throughout. It is interesting to note here that even though the listed artists are dead, their art is still ‘alive’, marking the fact that these artists have succeeded in making their art stand up on its own. Death is also directly related to the experience of art in the novel but whereas it forms the catabasis for Aaron’s transformative experience, it is both literally the end for Jimmy when he dies, and figuratively the death of his art. “The title itself,” Nel (2010) contends, “already establishes a connection with death” and the idea of death as catabasis/death as a final ending. Jimmy is especially interested in deathworks and says the following (pp.65-66, followed by my translation and then by *The road of excess*, p.64):


(“Deathworks,” says Jimmy, after packing away the book, “the sociologist Philip Rieff’s coinage. It refers to art works that celebrate creative destruction. Rieff was especially interested in artists who use their bodies as art – the more masochistic and repugnant, the better. Someone like Chris Burden who shot a bullet into his own body and documented the effects thereof. That’s cool man. Head-on.”)

He stares into the distance, pensively, chewing a nail. Words, he says, he’s working with words at the moment; combining words and video. The word “death”, the word “destruction”, the word
“downfall”. **Untergang.** The word as a form of linguistic repression. [...] The ideological load of the word “destruction”, of the word “death”, says Jimmy. That’s what interests him.

“Deathworks,” Jimmy says, putting the notebook away. “It’s a term coined by the sociologist Philip Rief. Artworks that celebrate creative destruction. Rief was especially interested in artists who use their bodies as works of art – the more masochistic and repugnant, the better. Someone like Chris Burden, who shot a bullet into his own body and documented its effects – cool man, head-on.”

Jimmy Harris stares out ahead, reflectively. Works on the nail. Words, he says. At the moment he’s working with words. Combining video and words. Isolating and investigating their ideological load. The word “death.” And “destruction”. “Downfall”, too, **Untergang.** The word as a form of linguistic repression. [...] The ideological load of the word “destruction”, the word “death”, says Jimmy. That’s what interests him.

The irony here lies in the fact that even though any true creation can only take place through a kind of destruction and death which involves the artist clearing “his or her material of all the clichés by which opinion predetermines its possibilities” (Zepke 2005: 167), Jimmy’s art remains riddled with banalities, caught up in the cycle of mechanical (not machinic as is the case with the abstract machine) production, reproduction and consumption, whereas Aaron’s art is transformed by his encounter with death through illness to stand up on its own. As Nel (2012) says: “Vernuwing en regenerasie spreek ook uit sy hernude skeppingsdrii” (instauration and regeneration are also evident in his [Aaron’s] renewed creative impulse). We can therefore conclude that Aaron successfully wrests the percept from perceptions and affect from affections “as the transition from one state to another” (Deleuze & Guattari 1994: 167). But art is not only about percepts and affects in themselves, it is also about their emergent properties – about becoming – akin to the way in which the shell shapes itself out of chaos and chemicals over time to form a singular shell that is more than the sum of its parts; i.e. the shell is more than a mere combination of chemicals and metabolic processes. Helena Verbloem narrates the process as follows (pp.306-307 in Die boek and pp.301-302 in The book):

“... Die skulp word deur die mantel afgeskei en bestaan hoofsaaklik uit kalsiumkarbonaat.”

“’n Baie basiese chemiese stof,” sê Sof.

“Ja. ’n Chemiese stof wat reeds in die vroegste seë aanwesig was. Hierdie kalsiumkarbonaat word saam met ’n proteïenmengsel, conchiolien, deur selle aan die kant van die mantel afgeskei. Die kalsium word in lae neergelê, en op hierdie manier verdik die skulp tydens die groeiproces. Die vorm van die skulp word bepaal deur voue en riwwe op die mantel. Die kleur van die skulp word bepaal deur die afskeiding van pigmente en metabolise afvalstowwe, beïnvloed deur die dier se...
dieet. Variasies in kleur by individuele spesies word veroorsaak deur verskille in dieet en deur die soutinhoud van die water. Hierdie pigmentse raak met kalsium vermeng terwyl die dop nog sag is. Wanneer dit hard word, is dit permanent daarin vasgelê."

"Soos by 'n fresko-tegniek?"

"Ja, so iets. So groei die skulp. Nuwe lae word telkens bygevoeg. Die skulp word vergroot sonder om sy vorm te verander, want die groei van die skulp is logaritmies. Die groeikurwe word deur 'n logaritmiese spiraal bepaal. 'n Skoon, voorspelbare, wiskundige process. Ritmies en gebalanseer..."

"...The shell is secreted by the mantle and consists chiefly of calcium carbonate."

"A basic chemical substance," says Sof.

"Yes. A chemical substance already present in the earliest oceans. This calcium carbonate is secreted by cells at the side of the mantle, along with a protein mixture, conchiolin. The calcium is deposited in layers, and in this way the shell thickens during the growth process. The shape of the shell is determined by folds and ridges on the mantle. The colour of the shell is determined by the diet of the animal. Variations in colour among individuals of the same species are caused by differences in diet and by the salinity of the water. These pigments are mixed with calcium while the shell is still soft, and permanently embedded when it hardens.

"As in a fresco technique?"

"Yes, something like that. This is the way in which the shell grows. New layers are constantly added. The shell increases in size without changing its shape, for the growth of the shell is logarithmic. The growth curve is determined by a logarithmic spiral. A clean, predictable, mathematical process. Rhythmic and balanced..."

From this passage it is evident that even though the shell's evolution is logarithmic, predictable and mathematical, it still emerges as singular in the same way that art can emerge as singular even when the same materials are used over and over again.

So now we have established what art is according to Deleuze and Guattari. We know that art must stand up on its own, that it is an abstract machine; a bloc of sensations and a compound of percepts and affects. We know that it is real and not a representation of the real, that it preserves the void and is preserved in the void; that it emerges as a becoming-singular and maps out the new. This, I argue, is important for translation praxis because it allows for translation to be more than a literary repetition and instead to be a form of art that stands up on its own, forever in the process of becoming. But when is literature art and does Ingrid Winterbach's oeuvre meet these criteria?
2.4 Literature as art

In *The singularity of literature*, Derek Attridge (2004: xi) asks the following:

What does it mean to respond to a work of literature as literature? When we read a novel, attend the performance of a play, or hear a poem on the radio, we are clearly doing many different things at once and experiencing many different kinds of pleasure (or displeasure). Which of these things is a response to specifically literary qualities? Can these qualities be found in works that are not normally classified as literature? And what kind of importance should we attach to them?

For Deleuze and Guattari (1987), meaning – and also the meaning we attach to ‘literary’ qualities or to art – is not innate to objects or words, but is rather constantly produced in the socius by “symbolizing systems of a cultural and political structure” (Abrecht-Crane 2005: 121). Such meaning is not only produced and reproduced, but also changes over time and forms part of assemblages which function according to specified rules and regulations. These rules and regulations – or territorialisations – form the normative axis of assemblages within the socius, but there is also another axis at play, namely that of deterritorialisation which “tends towards excess and breaking away” (Albrecht-Crane 2005: 122). Territorialisations, which function through processes like those that, in the social domain for example, organise socio-cultural and political spaces by categorising the world into definitive roles such as gender, class, religion, etc., are effective because they “provide us with social identities, with a social face” (Albrecht-Crane 2005: 122) and could be said to be the dominant significations in a society. Social production and behaviour according to these structurations are “dear to us because it provides a sense of security, certainty and belonging: a rootedness to the territory of dominant social categories” (Albrecht-Crane 2005: 122). The central conduit of such territorialisations is language which is both informational and communicational (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 75). Thus, language conveys normative meaning and structuring by providing “the terms and meanings with which to establish and divide the world into human beings and animals, nature and society” (Albrecht-Crane 2005: 122), and so on. Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 76) write:

A rule of grammar is a power marker before it is a syntactical marker. The order does not refer to prior significations or to a prior organization of distinctive units. Quite the opposite. Information is only the strict minimum necessary for emission, transmission, and observation of orders as commands.
Hence, language is not “to be believed but to be obeyed” (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 76); it marks a relation of power before it marks a social relation or any other one and as such can be said to be political (i.e. not doing politics)\(^\text{36}\) at its outset. Language thus provides the conceptual structure through which the State apparatus channels meaning already streamlined through processes of normativity; that is, normativity is conventionalised through grammar: “forming grammatically correct sentences is for the normal individual the prerequisite for any submission to social laws” (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 101). Even here we can already see how Ingrid Winterbach’s language use deterritorialises from the norm in that it offers resistance through the juxtaposition of different voices (Van Vuuren 2004), such as the use of different dialects and registers, the inclusion of taboos such as the race pejorative in \textit{Niggie}, her use of feminist idiom (Botha & Van Vuuren 2007a; 2007b) and her understanding of the “archaeology of words as signs” (Du Plooy 2009), as was discussed in Chapter 1. Such deterritorialisations are explained by Deleuze and Guattari through the concepts style and stutter which “directly attend to normative systems of linguistic conventions and articulate ways of resisting such systems by creating lines of (linguistic, cultural-political) rupture and escape” (Albrecht-Crane 2005: 121). Such breakaway, or even breakdown, is viewed by Deleuze and Guattari not as destructive, but rather as “active, productive and affirmative” (Albrecht-Crane 2005: 124) because it is precisely on a line of flight that new imaginings and possibilities – or art-becomings – are created and experienced.

Pertaining to linguistic deterritorialisation/s, Deleuze and Guattari pay close attention to the writer and the novel. “A method is needed,” they write, “and this varies with every artist and forms part of the work... In this respect the writer's position is no different than that of the painter, musician, or architect” (Deleuze & Guattari 1994: 167). The only difference is the materials they use; whereas the painter uses paint, brushes and a canvas, the writer uses words, syntax and style; “the created syntax that ascends irresistibly into his work and passes into sensation” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 167). They emphasise that novels are not created through the memories of a writer's perceptions and affections of people, themselves, their dreams, imaginations or archived information. Memories in fact play an insignificant role in writing that stands up on its own because “literature is

\(^{36}\) This distinction between ‘the political’ and ‘politics’ is based on Jacques Rancière’s (2006: 33-50) definitions. He argues that the political is an inherently dual and hierarchical arrangement of power – “a vicious circle located in the link between the political relationship and the political subject” (Rancière 2001). In contrast, politics is explained as “a specific rupture in the arche... [which] does not simply presuppose the rupture of ‘normal’ distributions of positions” of power, but also “requires a rupture in the idea that there are dispositions ‘proper’ to such classifications” (Rancière 2001). I discuss this at length in Chapter 3.
primarily that [which] has constantly maintained an equivocal relationship with the lived” 
(Deleuze & Guattari 1994: 170) and therefore constitutes a confrontation with memory. 
Deleuze and Guattari (1994: 171) write:

Creative fabulation has nothing to do with a memory, however exaggerated, or with a fantasy. In 
fact, the artist, including the novelist, goes beyond perceptual states and affective transitions of the 
lived. The artist is a seer, a become. How would he recount what happened to him, or what he 
imagines, since he is a shadow? He has seen something in life that is too great, too unbearable 
also, and the mutual embrace of life with what threatens it, so that the corner of nature or districts 
of the town he sees, along with the characters, accede to a vision that, through them, composes the 
percepts of that life, of that monument, shattering lived perceptions into a sort of cubism, a sort of 
simultaneism, of harsh or crepuscular light of purple or blue, which have no other object or subject 
than themselves.

This constructing of the monument, then, is what makes literature stand up on its own. 
But it is not a monument which commemorates memory; rather, its action is fabulation – 
a becoming-minor constituting a “compound of created sensations” (Deleuze & Guattari 
1994: 164) which is not merely another product of society, there to be consumed and 
endlessly reproduced. But how can a monument of the world be rendered durable or made 
to exist by itself in literature? Ingrid Winterbach herself provides the answer (Die boek/The 
book, pp.257-258 and pp.252-253 respectively):

“So sou ek wou kon skryf,” sê sy, “so sonder agtergrondgedruis en tussenkoms van die 
skrywerstem. As ek kon skryf, sou ek tussen myself en dit waaroor ek skryf ’n groot aftand wou hê. 
Begryp jy?”

“Nie heerltemaal nie,” sê ek.
Sy wys na die horison. Lug en see vorm nou een aaneenlopende, somber vlak. ‘n Skip lê 
roerloos op die einder.

“So sou ek wou skryf as ek kon,” sê sy, “met so min wat oënskynlik gebeur, maar met so ’n 
geladenheid.

“That is how I would have liked to write,” she says. “Without the writer’s voice droning in the 
background. If I could write, I would want some distance between myself and what I write about. Do 
you understand?’”

“Not quite,” I say.
She points to the horizon. Sky and sea are now one uninterrupted, brooding plane. The ship 
lies motionless in the distance.

“That’s how I would have liked to write if I could,” she says, “with little happening ostensibly, 
but everything charged with meaning.”
In this passage the narrator is describing how the writer herself becomes affect and succeeds in allowing for the affect to go beyond affections and the percept to go beyond perceptions in literature so that only a bloc of sensations remains, “with little happening ostensibly, but everything charged with meaning” (p.253). Becoming is thus “neither an imitation nor an experienced sympathy”; it is not a resemblance but rather “an extreme contiguity within a coupling of two sensations [percept and affect] without resemblance”, and one which captures percept and affect “in a single reflection” (Deleuze & Guattari 1994: 173). But does Ingrid Winterbach’s oeuvre meet these criteria? I shall explore this in the next section by referring to her novels as well as to secondary literature on her oeuvre.

2.4.1 Ingrid Winterbach’s oeuvre: singularity or reproduction?

In this section I argue that Ingrid Winterbach’s oeuvre is a non-signifying abstract machine in that her novels are not mere reproductions within the capitalist socius, but rather constitutes intensive becomings in literature. Hence, we could say that her oeuvre does “not have opinions” in itself and unravels “the triple organization of perceptions, affections, and opinions in order to substitute a monument composed of percepts, affects, and blocs of sensations that take place in language” (Deleuze & Guattari 1994: 176). But is this monument — this potential for accentedness or intensive affect — retained in the translated works? To answer this question I shall explore Guattari’s ethico-aesthetic framework in more detail.

In A shock to thought, Alan Bourassa (2005: 60-84) lists six modalities characteristic of literature that stands up on its own: 1) the event; 2) affect; 3) force; 4) singularity; 5) the outside; and 6) the virtual. I shall refer only to the first five modalities\(^{37}\) to show that Ingrid Winterbach’s oeuvre can be said to be blocs of sensations — that is, literary becomings (i.e. a singularity) — though it is important to note here that these modalities “are not meant to be a cumulative taxonomy… but rather exist in relations of resonance with each other, of differential repetition, of imperfect overlap, of mutual intensification, and, at times, of mutual capture” (Bourassa 2005: 65). \(^{38}\)

\(^{37}\) I do not refer to the virtual here for two reasons: 1) I discuss it extensively throughout this project; and 2) Bourassa uses the term ‘virtual’ in a distinctly different way than Deleuze and Guattari do.

\(^{38}\) Alberto Toscano (2005b: 39) explains ‘capture’ as follows: “The concept of ‘capture’ is used by Deleuze and Guattari to deal with two problems of relationality: first, how to conceive of the connection between the State, the war machine and capitalism within a universal history of political life; and second, how to formulate a non-representational account of the
Bourassa (2005: 60) argues that literature “is that which shows forth the humanness of the human; it is the human activity *par excellence*. And the human is but the creation of a system of meanings and values that must in large part be called literary.” Yet the literary forms part of other, non-literary, assemblages within the socius and it is for this reason that the question of becoming-nonhuman is important. In other words, I argue that language needs to become intensive affect in literature if it is to escape order-words. In this way literature is produced that stands up on its own; is “nothing but this intensity” (Bourassa 2005: 63). And when literature, as pure intensity, escapes mere signification, it is no longer “caught up in the cycles of repetition whose power extends beyond signification” (Bourassa 2005: 64). As Deleuze (1995: 7-8) explains:

There are, you see, two ways of reading a book: you either see it as a box with something inside and start looking for what it signifies, and then if you are even more perverse and depraved you set off after signifiers. And you treat the next book like a box contained in the first or containing it. And you annotate and interpret and question, and write a book about the book, and so on and on. Or there is another way: you see the book as a little non-signifying machine, and the only question is “Does it work, and how does it work?” How does it work for you? [...] This second way of reading is intensive: something comes through or it does not. There is nothing to explain, nothing to understand, nothing to interpret. It is like plugging in to an electric circuit… It relates a book to what is Outside… one flow among others, with no special place in relation to the others, that comes into relations of current, countercurrent, and eddy with other flows – flows of shit, sperm, words, action, eroticism, money, politics, and so on.

In other words, what I want to establish is how Ingrid Winterbach’s oeuvre works – if it does – as a non-signifying, intensive abstract machine. And if indeed her oeuvre can be seen as an abstract machine – which I argue it can – how it this potentiality transferred in translation? Can it be? Can translation be art? Or does translation necessarily succumb to the pressures of capitalism?

The first aspect which allows for a movement towards this becoming-intensity is the *event*. Attridge (2004: 35) describes it as “a private event”, that which “happens when an individual brings into being something hitherto beyond the reach of his or her knowledge.”

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interaction of different beings and their territories, such as to ground a thinking of becoming.” Hence, capture may be used as a positive or a negative, depending on the context in which it is applied.

39 Here I would like to remind the reader that *sense* “emerges as pure event, and as such is affirmation of difference-in-itself” (Poxon & Stivale 2005: 66).
But such events are not products; they are “a process, rather than a condition or state” (Shaviro 2012: 4) and comprise a kind of immanent death. Deleuze (1990: 151-152) writes:

Death has an extreme and definite relation to me and my body and is grounded in me, but it also has no relation to me at all – it is incorporeal and infinitive, impersonal, grounded only in itself. On one side, there is a part of the event which is realized and accomplished; on the other there is that part of the event that cannot realize its accomplishment.

Death thus marks the crossing of a threshold and plays “an (increasingly) important role in the works of Lettie Viljoen/Ingrid Winterbach” (Human 2008). References to death in literature are, however, not in themselves instances of becoming-intensity. What is of importance in Viljoen/Winterbach’s oeuvre is that death is shown to be what Terry Eagleton (1998: 25) calls “beyond representation” and, as such, is unknowable in life and in death; hence, beyond the “significations which besiege” (Guattari 1995: 29) it. In application to the oeuvre of Viljoen/Winterbach, we see that she often makes use of omnipresent but absent characters, such as Jama in Karolina Ferreira/The elusive moth, Jan de Dood in Buller se plan and Theo van Wyk in Die boek van toeval en toeverlaat/The book of happenstance (Human 2008). Lenelle Foster (2005: 76-77) contends that Jan de Dood’s absence in Buller se plan is pivotal as it allows for the creation of a new social order in Steynshoop. The references to death in the novel are thus a mapping of the new. For example, Jan de Dood is expected to make an appearance a number of times in the novel, but then fails to do so. “Soos die aand vorder, wil dit inderdaad voorkom asof Jan de Dood ook nie vanaand sy verskyning sal maak nie” (p.62). Yet despite his continual absence, life continues, thus metaphorically indicating that life gains meaning only in the face of death (Human 2008) or, we could say that death maps out a new paradigm of meaning for the living. Furthermore, these omnipresent but absent characters function as tricksters or deterritorialising literary devices which map “the way in which diasporic displacement and death can be connected to the problem of identity” (John 2008); that is to say, death loosens the meanings associated with identity which are prefigured around Self and Other. I argue that references to death in Viljoen/Winterbach’s oeuvre could be said to constitute ‘the event’ in that even though they are not in themselves “a disruption of some continuous state”, they point to events underlying the state of things which, “when actualised, mark every moment of the state as a transformation” (Stagoll 2005c:

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40 During the course of the evening it becomes quite clear that Jan de Dood will not be making an appearance tonight either.
An event – like death – is “neither a beginning nor an end point, but rather always ‘in the middle’” (Stagoll 2005c: 88) in the same way that death marks the crossing from the old to the new. Death is thus “no longer (experienced as) imminent, but as perpetually immanent” (Van Schalkwyk 2009a, my emphasis).

The next modality referred to by Bourassa is affect. Affect is not emotion; rather, it “is the change, or variation, that occurs when bodies collide, or come into contact... It is determined by chance and organisation” (Colman 2005a: 11), a tension which is actualised in Die boek van toeval en toeverlaat/The book of happenstance through many different plot elements which emphasise the idea of “chance... pitted against refuge and solace” (Lenta 2009a). The protagonist, Helena Verbloem, describes this collision of happenstance and order as follows (The book, p.202): “Evolution teaches us that everything could have been different – one different move and we wouldn’t have been here now. Neither you, nor I, nor the shells. Coincidence and transience, bear those in mind.” And it is precisely the examination of the instability of life and meaning (Strydom & Van Vuuren 2011) in Die boek/The book which allows for affect to be wrest from affection in that contingency reveals the constructedness of master narratives and meaning, such as is explained in the following conversation between the characters Helena Verbloem and Sof Benade (p.303):

“You must understand, Sof,” I say, “I am not a believer. I believe in the indifference of the universe, in the insignificance of human beings. I believe in coincidence, in the chance evolution of our particular human form. In the chance evolution of all forms, also those of shells. And yet I have to say – and here you, a child of the pastorie, could perhaps help me – I cannot look at the beauty and variation of shells without thinking in terms of the wonder of creation.”

“It’s a nasty habit,” says Sof, and coughs. “Established early. It can be unlearnt.”

Sof’s remark, in particular, points to meaning as a product of society; that is, it points to meaning construction as the “‘form of forms’ underneath or beyond” (Massumi 2002: xxiv) meaning itself, and it is precisely in the pointing towards this ‘form of forms’ that Sof’s language becomes more than mere form and in fact becomes an affective intensity which is no longer linked to a language form or any other kind of ‘form of form’. That is to say, Sof’s language points to something beyond conceptual and linguistic representation. But affect is “not only an experiential force, it can become a material thing, and as such... it can compel systems of knowledge, history, memory and circuits of power” (Colman
In this regard, Foster (2008a) argues that it is through “references to mystics, [that] the author Lettie Viljoen/Ingrid Winterbach creates a framework within which characters who exhibit mystic tendencies – namely Fonny Alexander and Boetie Kareltjie (*Buller se plan*) and the master (*Landskap met vroue en slang*), as well as Oompie (*Niggie*) – “can be compared”. This framework, in turn, allows for an investigation into systems of knowledge and history in that it “activates a number of issues: the place of women within a religious-cultural system and the power they wield within such a system” (Foster 2008a). Thus, I argue, these mystics allow for affective intensities to be materialised though the literature of Viljoen/Winterbach in that they enable a material and political critique of existing power structures and relations. In translation this is important because the event, like affect, I argue, take place in experimentation; that is, literature as art is not a method “of discovery but [one] of invention” (McMahon 2002: 3). And it is this ‘invention’ which allows for accentedness.

*Force* is Bourassa’s third modality and may be understood as “the power to be affected” which is not physical, but “like a *matter* of force, and the power to affect is like a *function* of force” (Deleuze 1988: 71). It can therefore be described as that which allows affect to move through the event. “Structures, institutions, stratified relations,” writes Bourassa (2005: 68), “do indeed capture and shape forces (and indeed could not exist without force), and forces can only ever be seen within stratified formations” such as language/s and literature/s. Hence, language/s and literature/s are “possessed of these forces and may enter into relations with other forces of the outside” (Bourassa 2005: 68). Such a force is, for example, evident in the societal structuring of language through order-words and, conversely, I argue, through the stutterings of language/s and literature/s. Such stutterings – the “frayings” and “disruptive rhetoricity” of languages as Spivak (2012: 313) calls it – is that which “makes language grow from the middle, like grass; it is what makes it a rhizome instead of a tree, what puts language in perpetual disequilibrium” (Deleuze 1997: 111). And, I contend, it is force which allows affect to run through the original novel and into the translation, thus minoritising translation in the Deleuzo-Guattarian sense.

One of the ways in which Ingrid Winterbach’s use of language stutters and vibrates is through her use of Engfrikaans, as I explained in Chapter 1. I shall discuss this linguistic deterritorialising technique in detail in Section 2.5.4 and successive chapters and shall, therefore, not dwell on it here. Another way in which Winterbach’s language stutters is
through language games and idiosyncratic syntax formations (Botha & Van Vuuren 2006a). In Niggie/To hell with Cronjé (p.29 and pp.32-33 respectively), for example, the characters Ben and Reitz (with one interjection from Willem in the Afrikaans version and two in the English translation) play word games through free association and homophony which contain satirical elements:

Hulle kyk skuins op na die voëls in die lug.
“Aasvoëloë,” sê Reitz, “waarmee hulle ons dophou.”
“Aasvoëlvet, as geneesmiddel,” sê Ben.
“Aasvoëlkrans,” sê Reitz, “waar aasvoëls broei.”
“Aasvoëltree,” sê Ben, “laat die diere vrek.”
“Aasvreter,” sê Reitz, “dier wat aas vreet.”
“Aaskewer,” sê Ben, “kewertjie wat op dierlike reste leef.”
“Bokdrol,” sê Reitz, “die drol van ’n bok.”
“Bokdruwe,” sê Ben, “verwant aan die bokduwweltjie.”
“Bokmelk,” sê Reitz, “die melk van ’n bok.”
“Bokdrolbessie,” sê Ben, “die sap is soet en klewerig.”
“Daspis,” sê Reitz, “Die pis van ’n das.”
“Jaspis,” sê Willem, “strate van jaspis en goud.”

There must be a cliff nearby, Ben remarks, watching the birds.
“Buzzard,” Reitz says, “predatory bird.”
“Bird of prey, that hunts animals for food,” says Ben.
“Bone,” says Ben, “the remains after death.”
“Botfly,” says Ben, “dipterous fly with stout body.”
“Carrion,” says Reitz, “dead, putrefying flesh.”
“Carrion crow,” says Ben, “bird feeding mainly on carrion.”
“Devonian,” says Reitz, “geological period.”
“Devil,” says Willem, “lord of the kingdom of evil.”
“Devil’s coach horse,” says Ben, “large rove beetle.”
“Eland piss,” says Reitz, “the piss of an eland.”
“Everlasting,” says Ben, “plant used as remedy for a cold.”
“Goldfield,” says Reitz, “district where gold is found.”
“Gold,” says Willem, “streets of jasper and gold.”
“Good heavens, Willem!” Ben exclaims. “Goldcrest, with its heavenly warbling.”

The Afrikaans version and English translation of these passages differ significantly – and I shall deal with this in the next section on the translations of Viljoen/Winterbach’s oeuvre –
but what is evident in both of these passages is the way in which Ben and Reitz’s free associations are secular and grounded in natural history, whereas Willem speaks from a religious and specifically Christian-historical perspective (as I have also illustrated in Chapter 1 from a different passage in which these characters also form free word associations). The tension between these opposing frameworks, I contend, is what allows for a stuttering in the reader; that is, the reader is confronted by the different ways in which meaning is constructed and the fact that whether scientific or religious, it is still – albeit to varying degrees – produced within the socius. Such a thematic stuttering is often easier to deal with in translation than, for example, an element such as Engfriekaans, as I shall demonstrate in the section dealing with Karolina Ferreira/The elusive moth.

The fourth modality is singularity. “The novel”, argues Bourassa (2005: 69), “encloses singularities, single points” and is that which is “pre-individual, non-personal, [and] a-conceptual (Deleuze 1990: 52). Like singularity in art, singularity in literature “is not a property but an event”, one which takes place in literature itself but at the same time “does not occur outside the responses of those who encounter and thereby constitute it” (Attridge 2004: 64). In fact, singularity could be said to be the very heart of potentiality and constitutes the “crossing over from the human to the literary, to the outside of both” (Bourassa 2005: 70). It thus acts as a mirror which allows “the subject to perceive the world in [two] ways, infinitesimally in microperceptions and gigantically, in macroperceptions” (Conley 2005: 252). In other words, singularity is the becoming-intensive; it is that which allows for art to stand up on its own, and it is also that which forms the central research question of this chapter: how is art (or singularity) transposed from ST to TT?

Ingrid Winterbach’s oeuvre allows for this double-perception through liminality (Du Plooy 2006) in the narration of Afrikaner concerns “in Afrikaans settings and circumstances – the dorp, the Boer War, the history/continuity of the Afrikaans language”, but also through the simultaneous “transcending [of] nationalistic enclosures, transcending the past, accepting contemporary challenges” (Lenta 2009a). Through, for example, the use of a histiographical-metafictional framework in Niggie/To hell with Cronjé, both author and reader simultaneously access the history of the Boer War on one hand, and implicit commentary on Apartheid and the post-Apartheid future of Afrikaners and Afrikaans (Botha & Van Vuuren 2006a; 2008b; Warnes 2011) on the other. Furthermore, her novels
do “not represent the human, it does not trace itself back to an ideology that places the human at the centre of society and the universe, but is clearly concerned with the human” (Bourassa 2005: 70). This can also be applied to Die boek/The book (pp.307-308 and pp.302-303 respectively):

“…My reaksie is subjektief. Ek reageer op skulpe met my hart, met my niere, met my ingewande…”
“Hieruit lei ek af,” sê Sof, “dat die skulp, en nie die mens nie, die kroon van God se skepping is…”
“Dit het ek by Hugo Hattingh geleer, ja,” sê ek, “dat die mens nie noodwendig die hoogtepunt van die skepping is nie.

“…My response is subjective. I respond to shells with my heart, with my kidneys, with my entrails…”
“From this I cannot but conclude,” Sof says, “that the shell, and not the human being, is the crowning glory of creation…”
“I did indeed learn from Hugo Hattingh,” I say, “that humans are not necessarily the apex of creation.”

I argue, therefore, that Winterbach’s oeuvre is singular in that it points to a potentiality – the becoming-nonhuman – whilst concurrently being immanent to that potentiality and grounded in actual experience.

The fifth and last modality in literature that I shall discuss here is the outside (Bourassa 2005: 70-73). The outside in this context does not refer to an exteriority such as the way in which “a body is outside another, or one is outside of an institution, or the unconscious contents are outside of consciousness...” (Bourassa 2005: 71). Rather, as Deleuze (1988: 86) writes, “it is always from the outside that a force confers on others or receives from others the variable position to be found only at a particular distance or in a particular relation.” Hence, we can deduce from this that force and the outside are intricately linked and that if force constitutes “the power to be affected” (Deleuze 1988: 71), the outside constitutes the place from which the power to be affected moves; i.e. the outside constitutes “the outside particular determinations” (Bourassa 2005: 71). These determinations are forces outside of “institutions and formations” as well as outside of “actuality” but even though it is ‘outside’ of actuality, it is real and forms the “interiority of thought” (Bourassa 2005: 71). Deleuze (1988: 97) writes:

If thought comes from the outside and remains attached to the outside, how come the outside does not flood into the inside, as the element that thought does not and cannot think of? The unthought
is therefore not external to thought, but lies at its very heart, as that impossibility of thinking which doubles or hollows out the outside.

For Maurice Blanchot the outside is akin to death, though “not as a final possibility toward which we move, not as an imminent necessity to which we must surrender, but as the ultimate impossibility, indeed as the very model of impossibility” (Bourassa 2005: 71). Because the writer, through writing, attempts to give a voice to this interiority which is outside, yet it remains an impossibility as it gives voice “to the unnameable, the inhuman, to what is devoid of truth, bereft of justice, without rights” (Blanchot 1982: 232). The outside can therefore be said to constitute those determinations which allow for an ethical encounter with the Other and which, in literature, “creates new tools” (Bourassa 2005: 73) for mapping out the impossibility of saying the unsayable.

The use of the race pejorative in *Niggie/To hell with Cronjé* is one example of such a ‘giving voice to the unsayable’ (or an ethical encounter with the Other) in Winterbach’s oeuvre. This mnemonic act serves to fragmentise “all the ordered surfaces” with which we have familiarised ourselves and collapse “our age-old distinction between the Same and the Other” (Foucault 2001: xvi). Such ethical encounters are also evident in her other works, some of which even disrupt the division between human and non-human, such as the crumbling, almost imperceptible distinction between Helena Verbloem and her shells and Karolina Ferreira and moths. Karolina, for example, thinks the following (*The elusive moth*, p.54):

> The human body with its organs and systems now seemed to Karolina to be like an enormous map – to which additional information may constantly be added.

> Because she had hitherto devoted herself to the study of insects, she tended to see the human species (*order Primate*, family *Hominidae*) as no more than a subdivision in the broad order of the animal kingdom. A subdivision of the subphylum *Vertebrata* – of no more importance than the other subphylum *Invertebrata*, the subject of her research. (Its principal focus being the phylum *Arthropoda*, class *Insecta*, with its twenty-nine orders.)

Thus, by examining Viljoen/Winterbach’s oeuvre in terms of Bourassa’s modalities, we see how literature functions as art. But what are the capacities and limitations of translation in transferring these modalities from a ST to a TT?
2.5 Retaining aesthetic potential in translation: the ‘machinic repetition’ of art

In Guattari’s (1995) final work, *Chaosmosis: an ethico-aesthetic paradigm*, he postulates that aesthetics in itself “has no more transformative power than philosophical thought, scientific knowledge or political action” but that it does highlight “a creative process necessary for ethical activity in all fields” (Zagala 2005: 20). Here Guattari does not solely refer to art in the sense that he and Deleuze do (and as I have discussed throughout this chapter), but to an “artistry” or “power of emergence” (Guattari 1995: 102) which traverses all spheres. The ethical part of his ethico-aesthetic paradigm could be said to constitute the mapping of the new “in contact with the real” (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 12). But what does the aesthetic part refer to?

Typically, aesthetics could be said to be about the value judgment of beauty, but for Guattari aesthetic judgement is that which holds potentiality. Thus, in aesthetic judgement, “I am not asserting anything about what is, nor am I legislating what it ought to be” (Shaviro 2012: 4). It is not about a judgement of ‘good’ or ‘bad’, ‘beautiful’ or ‘ugly’, but rather “part of the process by which I become what I am” (Shaviro 2012: 4). In the same way that art is an event, beauty – from this perspective – can also be seen as an event; as “a process, rather than a condition or state” (Shaviro 2012: 4) which is devoid of opinion and interest. But even though it is ‘disinterested’, it is not neutral: it is still about “how it affects me” (Shaviro 2012: 5). Aesthetic affects are therefore not about representation: they “do not represent that experience, nor do they explain how it is possible to know things in experience” (Shaviro 2012: 32) because they are immanent to the experience already. This kind of aesthetics does not prefigure experience, nor does it “predetermine the actualities that emerge from it” (Shaviro 2012: 35). Rather, what it does is create a disruption which allows for a potentiality that “has never existed in the universe in quite that way before” (Shaviro 2012: 35) and which affects an individual as pure intensity. Deleuze (1990: 260) describes this as follows: “The conditions of experience in general must become conditions of real experience; in this case the work of art would really appear as experimentation.”

When I first encountered Ingrid Winterbach’s novel *Die boek van toeval en toeverlaat*, my affective experience was one of being in contact with a singularity – a literary bifurcation. Yet this was not my affective experience of the translation, *The book of happenstance*; that is, I was not ‘moved’ by it in the same way as I was by the original. But if ethico-aesthetics
is not about a value judgement of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ or any other such binary, but rather about a mapping of that which is emergent (a singularity), then can the translations of Lettie Viljoen/Ingrid Winterbach’s oeuvre be said to hold this potential for accentedness or intensive affect despite the difference in the two experienced reading contexts? That is, are the translations of her novels mechanical reproductions within the socius or can they be described as machinic repetition in that they are abstract machine-becomings which map out the new?

2.5.1 The elusive moth (2005)

The elusive moth is the most straightforward translation from Ingrid Winterbach’s oeuvre in that it is not faced with challenging text elements such as Engfrikaans or other elaborate language games as is the case in all three of the other translations discussed in this section. In Karolina Ferreira/The elusive moth, contact with the Other is shown to the reader through Karolina’s experience of the mystical and “the place of women within religious-cultural systems and the power they wield within such a system by resorting to mysticism, engagement with existing systems of authority and the possibility of exerting power by withdrawing” (Foster 2008a). The recurring theme of human suffering is also prominent in this novel (Van Coller & Van den Berg 2009). What is of importance though is whether or not the translated novel stutters in the same way that the original does.

Walter Benjamin (2012: 75) argues that a translation is meant for readers who do not understand the original. “That,” he claims, “seems sufficient to explain the differing status of the original and translation in the domain of art. Moreover, it appears to be the only possible reason for saying ‘the same thing’ over again.” Benjamin also contends that art – including the novel – is not meant for an audience. “No poem,” he writes, “is meant for the reader, no picture for the beholder, no symphony for the audience.” This is in contrast with Bourassa (2005: 75) who argues that the virtuality of the novel is not only actualised through the novel itself, but also through literary criticism, a view echoed by Attridge who argues that singularity in literature “does not occur outside the responses of those who encounter and thereby constitute it” (Attridge 2004: 64). From this view we might deduce that a translation is intended to be read in its original and translated forms by the same person/s, or at the very least by scholars. And it is this encounter with both original novel and translated text, I argue, which allows for an ethico-aesthetic evaluation; i.e. not a value
judgement of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ of the original and its translation, but rather an assessment of the two forms against criteria of potentiality and accentedness. Because what “aesthetics indicates, is a change in perspective: a change occurring when thought about the work of art no longer refers to an idea of the rules of its production” (Rancière 2004a).

In her article on Banquet at Brabazan and The elusive moth, Heather Acott (2012) argues that The elusive moth contains “an element of baroque fantasy” and exhibits “the tension between the comic and the tragic, the city and the platteland, between flights of imagination and the magnetic pull of a dark social realism…” Set at the end of the Apartheid era in South Africa, The elusive moth narrates the journey of Karolina Ferreira on her way to the fictional Free State town of Voorspoed (meaning “prosperity” as well as “good fortune”) in search of “a small inconspicuous moth” (p.18) known as Hebdomophruda creniline. On her way to this conservative town she picks up a hitchhiker – the ‘coloured’ herbalist Basil September, with whom she becomes friends. This element – i.e. the joint journey of white female and mixed-race male – introduces the taboo early on in the novel and its translation and is one of the ways in which the potential for accentedness is retained.

The ‘carnivalesque’ component referred to by Acott takes place mostly in the hotel where Karolina Ferreira lodges. Here she “is both spectator and observer in the carnivalesque activities” (Acott 2012), though I contend that these baroque fantasies and excesses are even more prominent in Karolina’s dreams which represent her encounter with the real and the imagined, as well as the increasingly blurred boundaries between these. The opening scene of the novel reads as follows (p.7): “Long ago, Karolina Ferreira had had a dream: of a promenade by the sea with a row of palm trees growing down the centre, and the body of a man, hacked in two, with blood spurting from it.” The ordinary is thus set against the macabre from the outset although the novel questions ‘ordinary’ or normalised conventions and in fact proposes that it is the territorialised which is most macabre, such as the accepted violence of the white policemen in the ‘townships’ (pp.49-52) or informal settlements.

41 This term is used by South Africans to refer to a person of mixed race.
42 The so-called ‘Immorality Act’ included “two acts of the Parliament of South Africa which prohibited, amongst other things, sexual relations between white people and people of other races” (Wikipedia 2014d). The ban prohibiting interracial sex “was lifted in post-Apartheid South Africa although it continues to be contentious, especially in more conservative areas in the country.
A few pages into the novel, Karolina has another dream (p.19) in which “a stain appeared. It was wet and spread like blood” and after that, she has one in which a man who first despised her now confesses his love. “In a scene of obscene, improper, indecorous lewdness he made a public confession”, Karolina tells us (p.20). Here again we see the ordinary – a love confession – exposed as macabre and carnivalesque. Karolina also dreams of locusts (p.18), of the man she loved most (p.20), of other “lovers, adversaries, friends” (p.28). “She dreamt she was going down on some man, she practically fell forward on his penis, she took him in her mouth, but time and again he was unable to sustain an erection” (p.35). She dreams of her mother (p.37) and she dreams of “death and mutilated bodies” (p.39), of insects, “great masses of water” and of crossing “unfamiliar landscapes” (pp.44-45), of “brides [who] in dreams were often harbingers of death” (p.65). In these dreams a thread can be traced: that “time and again satisfaction was postponed, delayed, frustrated, impeded, thwarted, until at last her desire became painfully acute, a situation she had to escape from at all costs” (p.72).

In her dreams, Karolina’s repressed emotions take flight into the bizarre and the macabre, the yearned for and the feared. And it is precisely her dreams which act as a bifurcation, as a line of flight which maps out new possibilities; a potential for new possibilities. Ingrid Winterbach’s thematic exploration could thus be said to be one of the elements that allows for a stuttering and this is present in both the original text and the translation. I therefore argue that The elusive moth is indeed a machinic repetition of Karolina Ferreira and that it retains its accentedness through the ‘dorp’ milieu which, though set in a ‘normal’ South African context, allows for a questioning of the dominant significations in South African society, and also society at large in that the ordinary becomes the macabre; that which must be interrogated and revealed for what it truly is, namely inhumane and carnivalesque.

2.5.2 To hell with Cronjé (2007)

For the evaluation of Niggie/To hell with Cronjé, I refer again to the quotation in which the characters Ben and Reitz (with some interaction from Willem) play word games through free associations (quoted from Niggie and To hell with Cronjé, pp.29 and 32-33 respectively):

Hulle kyk skuins op na die voëls in die lug.
“Aasvoëloë,” sê Reitz, “waarmee hull ons dophou.”
“Aasvoëlvet, as geneesmiddel,” sê Ben.
“Aasvoëlkrans,” sê Reitz, “waar aasvoëls broei.”
“Aasvoëltee,” sê Ben, “laat die diere vrek.”
“Aasvreter,” sê Reitz, “dier wat aas vreet.”
“Aaskewer,” sê Ben, “kewertjie wat op dierlike reste leef.”
“Bokdrol,” sê Reitz, “die drol van ’n bok.”
“Bokdruwe,” sê Ben, “verwant aan die bokduwweltjie.”
“Bokmelk,” sê Reitz, “die melk van ’n bok.”
“Bokdrolbessie,” sê Ben, “die sap is soet en klewerig.”
“Jaspis,” sê Willem, “strate van jaspis en goud.”

There must be a cliff nearby, Ben remarks, watching the birds.
“Buzzard,” Reitz says, “predatory bird.”
“Bird of prey, that hunts animals for food,” says Ben.
“Bone,” says Ben, “the remains after death.”
“Botfly,” says Ben, “dipterous fly with stout body.”
“Carrion,” says Reitz, “dead, putrefying flesh.”
“Carrion crow,” says Ben, “bird feeding mainly on carrion.”
“Devonian,” says Reitz, “geological period.”
“Devil,” says Willem, “lord of the kingdom of evil.”
“Devil’s coach horse,” says Ben, “large rove beetle.”
“Eland piss,” says Reitz, “the piss of an eland.”
“Everlasting,” says Ben, “plant used as remedy for a cold.”
‘Goldfield,” says Reitz, “district where gold is found.”
“Gold,” says Willem, “streets of jasper and gold.”
“Good heavens, Willem!” Ben exclaims. “Goldcrest, with its heavenly warbling.”

With reference to translation methods, Lewis (2012: 228) argues that “the question [of translation] would, predictably, focus on a paradoxic imperative: how to say two things at once, how to enact interpretations simultaneously?” The exigencies of this imperative become highlighted in the above-quoted passages in that the word games and free associations are almost ‘untranslatable’. That is, a direct translation becomes impossible as the phonetic quality of the Afrikaans words is not present in the English language in the order in which it appears in the Afrikaans novel. Yet the translation does manage to retain the general atmosphere and semantic flow of the original through what Lewis (2012: 235) terms an “abusive fidelity”. That is to say, the intensive affect is retained through “an abuse that estranges it from each other”, which allows the “trope” to “circulate between
the two of them, exercising both an irruptive and an integrative function” (Lewis 2012: 236). The reader, in both instances, moves through the landscape with Ben and Reitz, beholding nature through the eyes of a natural historian and a geologist respectively, noticing predatory birds, carrion and death, as well as the regenerative capacities of plants which is then reinterpreted through the more conservative teleological perspective of Willem. The reader is therefore confronted with opposing world views – i.e. territorialised and deterritorialised perspectives – in the same way through the original and translated texts. This type of translation strategy is used throughout To hell with Cronjé and as such, I argue, it is the ‘abusive fidelity’ of the translation that constitutes “the destruction which must precede any true creation, and which frees the material to express its chaotic machinery in constructing sensations” (Zepke 2005: 167). It is thus through an abusive fidelity that the ethico-aesthetics of the original is retained in the translation – at least to some degree. This also reveals the difficulty of the task (the trouble of translation) faced by the translators of Viljoen/Winterbach’s novels.

2.5.3 The book of happenstance (2008)

In Chapter 1 I argue that the embedded socio-cultural and historical leitmotifs in Die boek van toeval en toeverlaat act as indispensable cultural-specific markers of both the immediate plot and the metanarrative, and that this embedded knowledge allows for a nuanced reading of the text. Specifically I refer to the passage culminating in the sentence “Droeforanje, droefblanje, droefblou” (p.81 in Die boek), translated in the English as “mournful orange, mournful white, mournful blue” (p.80). This sentence and the preceding passage, as I explained, do not convey in the translation the sense of loss felt by Afrikaners in post-Apartheid South Africa in the same way as the original does. I therefore argue that such cultural historical information should be added in the translation through, in this case, a kind of mimicking of the author’s style as such a translation strategy allows the translation to retain the allusion to the old South African flag colours suggested in the original text. I further contend that the incomplete translation of the title which, in the Afrikaans version, contains both the words toeval (“happenstance”) and toeverlaat (“refuge” or “solace”) pitted against each other, but in the English version contains only the first part, does not adhere to an ethico-aesthetics in that the English reader is not presented with the same virtual potential or intensive affect from the start. But does this
mean that *The book of happenstance* is a ‘failed’ translation, especially in view of the fact that it was awarded The 2010 South African Literary Award for literary translation?

In her article “The politics of translation”, Gayatri Spivak (2012: 313) asks “What is the place of ‘love’ in the ethical?” to which she replies: “The task of the translator is to facilitate this love between the original and its shadow, a love that permits fraying, holds the agency of the translator and the demands of her imagined or actual audience at bay.” But the facilitation of this ‘love’, Spivak argues, is, paradoxically, not possible in that it is impossible “to imagine otherness or alterity maximally. We have to turn the other into something like the self in order to be ethical” (Spivak 2012: 315). Keeping in mind that Ingrid Winterbach jointly translated *The book of happenstance* with her brother, Dirk Winterbach, one might argue that self and other remain ‘the same’ in both the Afrikaans and English texts in that the author was present during the writing of both texts. Yet the translation still requires conceptualisation into another language and therefore, by implication, into another culture which may not understand the ‘self’ in the same way the author does in both the original text and the translation. From this view, the direct translation of a sentence such as “Droeforanje, droefblanje, droefblou” (p.81) into “mournful orange, mournful white, mournful blue” (p.80) does not engage sufficiently with “the rhetoricity of the original” (Spivak 2012: 313). In this instance, for example, the word “mournful” could be further described and elaborated, reflected on, and woven into the narrative, as Winterbach does throughout the text with many of the archaic words. Such embellishment would thus not contravene her style and may be viewed as another example of an abusive fidelity or cannibalistic transtextualisation. An example of how this might be done can be seen on the next page (p.81 in *Die boek* and pp.79-80 in *The book*):
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Die boek van toeval en toeverlaat</strong></th>
<th><strong>The book of happenstance</strong></th>
<th><strong>My translation</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maar dit is veral droef wat my interesseer. ’n Neerslagtige stemming. Van leed getuigend. Wat leed veroorsaak of daarmee gepaardgaan. Wat ’n somber stemming wek. Bedroewend. Ook ’n verbinding met selfstandige naamwoorde ter aanduiding dat die genoemde kleur troebel, dof is en tot droefheid, treurigheid en neerslagtigheid stem. (Droefrooi.)</td>
<td>It is especially <em>droef</em> that interests me. Woeful. Indicative of sorrow. Causing grief or accompanying it. Evoking a somber or doleful mood. <strong>Bedroewend</strong> – saddening. Also, in combination with colours, to indicate that a particular colour is murky or muted and can elicit sadness, sorrowful and mournful; inclined to dejection, depression and despondency; something gloomy, cheerless and downcast, as opposed to joy. Is that all? I think. So few words for an emotion with so many shades? The complete colour spectrum – <em>droefwit</em> (mournful white) to <em>droefswart</em> (mournful black), from <em>droefpers</em> (mournful purple) to <em>droefrooi</em> (mournful red). <em>(Droeforanje, droefblanje, droefblou – mournful orange, mournful white, mournful blue.)</em></td>
<td>But it is especially <em>droef</em> that interests me. Low in spirit. Testament to affliction. That which causes affliction or is accompanied by it. That which evokes a sombre spirit. <strong>Bedroewend</strong> – dispirited. Also in conjunction with nouns, like colours, as indication of designated colour being turbid, or murky, and which can elicit sorrow, melancholy, mournfulness. <em>(Droefrooi - mournful red, mirthless red.)</em> And mourning indicating the state or quality of dolefulness, woefulness, chagrin; dejectedness, despondency; something mirthless, poignant; heartbreak as opposed to joy. <em>(To mourn the loss of.)</em> Is that all? I think. Such sparing language for an emotion with so many hues. The complete colour spectrum – <em>droefwit</em> (mournful white) to <em>droefswart</em> (mournful black), from <em>droefpurper</em> (mournful purple) to <em>droeforanje</em> (mournful orange). <em>(Droeforanje, droefblanje, droefblou – mournful orange, mournful white, mournful blue. The loss of a flag, the loss of, the loss.)</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Another example, from the same translation, does however reflect the rhetoricity of the original. Consider the following passage and its translation *(Die boek/The book, pp. 255-256 and pp.250-251 respectively)*:


My pa sou plesier gehad het aan elkeen van hierdie woorde, veral aan die dierename – die graatjiemeerkat (ghartjie, gharretjie, ghratjie of ghariemeerkat), maanhaarjakkals (ghaip) en die akkedis (ghabertjie), en aan die nabootsing van die voël- en diergeluide.


My father would have taken pleasure in each and every one of these words, especially the animal names – the meerkat (ghartjie, gharretjie, ghratjie or ghariemeerkat), the maned jackal (ghaip) and the lizard (ghabertjie), and in all the various imitations of bird and animal sounds.

The translation of this passage contains several additions and omissions, but even so, the general ‘rhetoricity’ of the Afrikaans is retained in the English translation, allowing the English reader to engage with the words from Hottentot origin in a similar way that the
Afrikaans reader would, thus “virtuali[sing] the notion of mimesis ... as the production of difference in sameness” (de Campos 1981: 183 quoted by Vieira 1999). Accordingly, I argue, even though the translation does not entirely actualise as machinic repetition, it still allows for an ethico-aesthetic engagement with the Other in that it facilitates “the process by which I become what I am” (Shaviro 2012: 4); hence, the translation – if not entirely – still facilitates an affective becoming to a large degree.

2.5.4 The road of excess (2014)

Of translation and imitation Derek Attridge (2004: 73) writes the following:

If the singularity of the literary work arises from its existence as a series of specific words in a specific arrangement, it may seem that a translation of the work into a different language will result in a completely new literary work, since none of those words survives in the new version. There is a sense in which this is true, and importantly so, for it underlines the distinctiveness of literary inventiveness and singularity: other kinds of inventive text – scientific, philosophical, theological, and so on – can be translated without loss of their singular inventiveness (at least to the degree that this inventiveness is not literary). However, there is also a sense in which literary singularity, far from being opposed to translatable, goes hand-in-hand with it.

This is so, Attridge (2004: 73) contends, because a singular literary work is “not merely available for translation but is constituted in what may be thought of as an unending set of translations.” But there is a further sense in which this may be understood: a singular literary work demands translation; it “provokes translation (in all senses) as a creative response rather than a mechanical rewording” (Attridge 2004: 74). And the extent to which translation – as transtextualisation – takes place as machinic repetition rather than mechanical reproduction, marks its own singularity. For example, of the translations of Eugene Onegin Douglas Hofstadter (1997: 253) writes:

I found myself nostalgically wishing that my old high-school teacher had assigned us Falen’s version of Eugene Onegin instead of the more standard fare (Hawthorne, Hemingway, etc.), which I found turgid and dull. [...] Well, all I can say is ... [if] I had had the chance to read Falen’s translation when I was very young: I bet it would have bowled me over, intoxicating me with its snappy rhymes and pungent phrasings, perhaps bringing out the poetry lover in me much earlier in life.
Here Hofstadter is clearly remarking not on the translation’s uniqueness or imitation of the original only, but on its singularity. However, this does not mean that uniqueness or imitation “is opposed to singularity” (Attridge 2004: 75). Rather, “the singular literary work is singular only by virtue of its translatability and its imitability”; that is, “its capacity to provoke new and singular responses” (Attridge 2004: 75).

Regarding such invention and imitation in translation, I was particularly interested to see how the translator of Die benederyk would deal with the Engfrikaans passages in The road of excess as the usage of this form of code switching has become a mark of Winterbach’s singular voice for me. Of all the characters, Bubbles and Jimmy’s use of Engfrikaans is the most striking, but particularly Jimmy’s as it also serves to illustrate his manic disposition. Consider the following example (pp.63-64 in Die benederyk and pp.62-63 in The road of excess):

“En anything goes. Kuns is nie meer alternative nie. Anything goes. Die diversity of possibilities is eindeeloos. Alles kan gejustify word: figurative, abstract, New German Painting, performance, video, kitsch. Enige bloody genre, style, enige estetiese approach, enige political of societal of what have you point of reference. Take your pick. Dis die era van diversificatie van production en distribution, my friend. Daar’s geen agreement oor wat belangrik is, of trendsetting, of left-field of pioneering is nie. Die prevailing taste in die art business is die taste van die ouens wat prevail. Elke Tom, Dick en Harry met genoeg kapitaal, ’n groot genoeg infrastructure en staff kan sy eie standarde construct, elkeen in sy eie nis of network. Vat die directors van Documenta en die Venice Biennale, byvoorbeeld, Roger Buergel en Robert Storr, hulle is albei heavy into political aesthetics, en die director verskaf die overarching concept. As hy kies vir ’n konsep van politicised aesthetics, dan is dit die name of the game in daardie konteks. Dan is dit cutting edge. Daar’s nie ’n agreement oor wat belangrik of op die forefront of wat die vanguard is nie. Waar is die groot kunsdebatte? Dood. Non-existent.”

“Jy kies video as jou medium,” sê Aaron.

June Paik het met video ’n hoofstuk in die geskiedenis van kuns oopgemaak. They paved the way, man!45

“And anything goes. Art’s no longer alternative. The diversity of possibilities is endless. Anything can be justified: figurative, abstract, New German Painting, performance, video, kitsch. Any bloody genre or style. Any aesthetic approach. Any political or societal or what-have-you point of reference. Take your pick. It’s the era of diversification of production and distribution, my friend. There’s no consensus about what’s important, or what’s setting the trend, what’s left-field, or what’s pioneering any more. The prevailing taste in the art business is the taste of the dudes who prevail. Any Tom, Dick and Harry with enough capital, a big enough infrastructure and staff can construct his own standards, each in his own niche or network. Take Roger Buergel and Robert Storr, the directors of Documenta or the Venice Biennale, for example. They’re both heavily into political aesthetics. The director provides the overarching concept. If he chooses a concept of politiced aesthetics, then that’s the name of the game in that context. Then that’s cutting edge. There’s no agreement about what’s important or what’s at the forefront or what’s avant-garde. Where are the great art debates? Dead. Non-existent.”

“And you choose video as your medium,” Aaron says.

“Yes,” says Jimmy Harris. “Video has come a long way, my friend. It’s come far since the sixties. Nowadays it’s serious stuff. Head-on. Angst-free. It’s a cool take on contemporary life. Without the aesthetic baggage of painting. From the beginning it was associated with television and newsreels, so it arrived without aesthetic expectations. It’s free to explore, man – freer than any other art form. Painting comes with too much aesthetic baggage. In painting you can hardly move your arse any more. If you try, you bash into some constraint or the other. Artists like Vito Acconci, Joan Jonas and Nam June Paik opened up a new chapter in art history with video. They paved the way, man!”

In translation, as in writing, the question of language – its uses, meanings, subversions and poetics – is confronted. Translators, however, are faced with the double responsibility of confronting two languages with two histories which may be dialectically opposed – or even dialogically opposed as in the Bakhtinian (1984) sense – as regards their position in the literary world, as well is in the real world political arena. Casanova writes: “For an impoverished target language, which is to say a language on the periphery that looks to import major works of literature, translation is a way of gathering literary resources, of acquiring universal texts” (Casanova 2004: 134). Conversely it could be argued that writers writing in languages on the periphery may want to be translated into languages that

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45 In the Afrikaans excerpt I underlined that which would need translating, though words such as “konsep” and “standaarde” are close enough to “concept” and “standards” respectively so that even a reader who does not understand any Afrikaans at all would glimpse the gist of the meaning.
occupy a more central position in the literary universe for wider dissemination of their texts. The case of Afrikaans is particularly interesting in that it has occupied both a majority and a minority space. Fanie Jansen van Rensburg (2003) writes:

Whereas most of the evolution and history of “Afrikaans” started from its proponents’ opposition of English and its imperialist backing, the current debate is about Afrikaans being displaced and neglected to a lowly position by an English speaking black-majority government.

The politics that necessarily arise when a peripheral language is translated into a central one may, however, be transmuted to a large degree through a careful consideration of translation strategies and goals, but what is important to note here is that besides these dominated/dominating language politics, Winterbach’s novels are already politically charged in content. In Niggie, for example, the potential dissolution of Afrikaner identity and the prospect of imminent Afrikaner cultural and language death are addressed (Winterbach 2002; Botha & Van Vuuren 2007b). In Die boek van toeval en toeverlaat there is a continued exploration of the fate of the Afrikaans language, its obsolete lexicon and the inherent question of language death or longevity, almost as a measurement of Afrikaner culture. Réna Pretorius (in Van Rensburg 2004: 1) writes:

Afrikaans is die belangrikste groeiloot van die Afrikanerkultuur; dit is ‘n barometer waarmee die Afrikaner se prestasie op die terrein van die geestelike lewe gemeet kan word; dis die Afrikaanssprekende se grootste geskenk aan die groter kultuur van Suid-Afrika en aan die Germaanse taalfamilie.

(Afrikaans is the primary point of growth of Afrikaner culture; it constitutes the barometer with which to gauge the Afrikaner’s achievement on the spiritual plain; it is the Afrikaner’s greatest gift to the broader culture of South Africa, and to the Germanic language family.)

Despite the historically dialogic relationship between Afrikaans and English, translation from Afrikaans into English allows for a larger readership of the Afrikaans literary canon. In an interview with Ingrid Winterbach (2012b), she expressed the desire for her books to be translated into English, principally for a South African audience, but also for a more global readership as translation into English allows for a more international distribution of peripheral literary capital (as Casanova argues), not only because of the widespread use of English, but also because an English translation allows for further translation into other languages.
Bearing this in mind, I contend that the use of Engfrikaans by Winterbach could be seen as a political act in that it disrupts the idea of a ‘pure’ or ‘standard’ (territorialised) language. Philip John (2004), for example, argues convincingly that far from being an indictment of the decay of Afrikaans (as purists have claimed), the use of Engfrikaans reveals the creativity of the language and demonstrates Winterbach’s incisive humour. A failure to recognise this and preserve the use of Engfrikaans in some form or the other in the translation reveals the translation as imitation, which is not to say it lacks inventiveness, but rather lacks the “capacity to provoke new and singular responses” (Attridge 2004: 75). Also, Engfrikaans is in itself ‘untranslatable’ as it presupposes the use of two language codes in the ST, thus – in a sense – demanding the use of two codes in the TT as well. From this view, *The road of excess* cannot be seen to preserve the potentiality for accentedness. And considering that it is meant for a South African audience only (at least at this stage), I argue that the passages containing Engfrikaans – at least large parts of Jimmy’s speech, for example – could have been kept the way it is as it retains enough content words to construct sense meaningfully from it, while simultaneously causing a rupture or fissure – a bifurcation – for the reader. Using Engfrikaans also allows for the language variations which take place within a single language to be kept, thus causing Afrikaans to be diverse even within itself. In this way, translation might become a cannibalistic practice of transtextualisation; one that transfers the potentiality for accentedness and singularity from the original to the translated text.44

2.6 Summary

In conclusion, Rancière writes that the “question of an aesthetic modernity, that of art after the death of art” can be “formulated in terms of an affirmation of the power of artistic presentation against representative doxa” (Rancière 2004a, my emphasis). The question of art – and of literature and translation as art – from an ethico-aesthetic perspective is thus about immanent creativity and machinic potentiality that is not marked by mechanical representation and endless reproduction, but by intensive becomings. And from this perspective, Lettie Viljoen/Ingrid Winterbach’s novels and translations – the latter at least to some degree – may be said to be art becomings in that they effectuate the

44 It should be said that *The road of excess*, though not singular in the way *Die benederyk* is, is still a worthwhile read and there are instances in the text where Leon de Kock keeps the Engfrikaans beautifully, for example when Jimmy’s term “speeded-up” (p.65) – a lexeme which combines the Afrikaans past tense construction with the English verb sped-up – is kept in the translation.
new through bifurcations away from normative, territorialised perceptions, language use and thematic explorations in literature.

In the next chapter I shall relate the question of art to capitalism to show how political assemblages can capture minor literatures and transform them into State territorialisations but also, and conversely, to show how major literatures can be transformed into minor literatures and, in so doing, deterritorialise so that they can do politics.
Chapter 3
To flee, but in fleeing to seek a weapon

“A society, but also a collective assemblage, is defined first by its points of deterritorialization, its fluxes of deterritorialization. The great geographical adventures of history are lines of flight, that is, long expeditions on foot, on horseback or by boat: that of the Hebrews in the desert, that of Genseric the Vandal crossing the Mediterranean, that of nomads across the steppe, the long march of the Chinese – it is always on a line of flight that we create, not, indeed because we are dreaming but, on the contrary, because we trace out the real on it, we compose there a plane of consistence. To flee, but in fleeing to seek a weapon.”

(Deleuze & Parnet 2002: 135-136)
3.1 Introduction: translation in politics/politics in translation

I begin this chapter where I ended Chapter 1: with the duality of translation – “the inadequation of one tongue to another ... of language to itself and to meaning” (Derrida 1985: 165). I described this in Chapter 1 as the conceptual impasse of the deluded doos, or the double-sided embroidery which constitutes an ‘original’ work and its translation. Then, in Chapter 2, I explored what art is and when literature can be said to be art. Now that I have established that, I shall explore in this chapter how this linguistic dichotomy of translation is informed by politics (i.e. macro socio-political and somatic contexts), and how this affects translation praxis. Because regardless of whether explicit political intentions and interferences are recognised and engaged with, they nevertheless have material affects which extend to literary and translation practices as well. Of particular interest to me is how this is evidenced in the South African publishing industry and what effects this has had on the publications, translations and dissemination of Ingrid Winterbach’s oeuvre.

In *Hatred of democracy* (Rancière 2006: 33-50), Jacques Rancière contrasts what he refers to as ‘the political’ with ‘politics’. He argues that politics, in contrast with the political (which includes reified political, geographical, gender, economic, class etc. hegemonic structural arrangements and relations) has the potential for actual or extensive social transformation. In this chapter, I argue that the political is deeply mired in capitalism and its mechanics referred to by scholars as the capitalist axiomatic and capitalist realism as described by Mark Fisher (2009), and what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as ‘the State apparatus’ – an ‘apparatus of capture’45 (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 424-473) which relies on binary overcoding. I also argue that even though these are distinct structural arrangements and relations, they are interlinked in many ways and affect literatures and the wider dissemination of certain types of literatures via the publishing industry. I put forth as part of my argument that this is one of the main reasons why Ingrid Winterbach – one of the foremost literary figures in Afrikaans literature – is not widely published and read in English or other languages, not even in South Africa. My argument is thus that all of these structural forces, which have extensive political and ideological effects/affects, reinforce established relations of power through various mechanisms such as binary

45 Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 424-473) refer to many different types of apparatus of capture of which the State apparatus is one, but I shall explain this distinction in the next section and show how it is distinct, yet deeply linked to capitalism and capitalist realism and how, even though the capitalist axiomatic functions differently from State apparatus binary overcoding, these mechanisms compliment and reinforce each other in many ways.
overcoding and the capture of assemblages. For example, the capture of literary and translation assemblages by the State apparatus reinforces normativity and homogenisation, or, we could say, territorialisations into State\textsuperscript{46} forms. As Deleuze (Deleuze & Parnet 2002:139) writes:

... a State of absolute peace [is] still more terrifying than that of total war, having realized its full identity with the abstract machine,\textsuperscript{47} and in which the equilibrium of spheres of influence and of great segments intercommunicates with a ‘secret capillarity’ – where the luminous and clearly dissected city now shelters only nocturnal troglodytes, each embedded in his own black hole, a ‘social swamp’ which exactly completes the ‘obvious and super-organized society’.

It is this “secret capillarity”\textsuperscript{48} and the super-organised society which I mean to investigate, i.e. \textit{why} it is that we are often not aware of the macro political arrangements or assemblages at play and \textit{how} these forces (e.g. the cooperative operational strategies of capitalism, the capitalist axiomatic and capitalist realism, as well as the functioning of the State apparatus and binary overcoding) may be disrupted. In particular, I refer to Ingrid Winterbach’s usage of the trickster figure to accomplish such disruption.

I also investigate in this chapter methods of \textit{doing politics} by looking at ways in which literatures have the capacity to deterritorialise and create fluxes in the State system by referring to a writing style coined as \textit{écriture féminine} by Hélène Cixous (1976) and used by her and many other feminist and political writers.\textsuperscript{49} I then demonstrate from Ingrid Winterbach’s oeuvre how similar techniques are recognisable in her writing style which, I argue, is another reason why her works have not been more widely disseminated in English-speaking countries or by English readers in our country. That is to say, her novels represent a ‘deterritorialised mutating nomadic war machine’\textsuperscript{50} or, if you will, a corpus of literary assemblages with agency which do not conform to the rules of binary overcoding.

\textsuperscript{46} Deleuze and Guattari view the State “as an overarching power that brings together labour power and the prior conditions for the constitution of labour power, enabling the creation of surplus-value” (Surin 2005b: 265). What is especially important is the relationship between the State and capital and the “State’s capacity to engage in the formation of a collective subjectivity” (Surin 2005b: 265).

\textsuperscript{47} The abstract machine is used here in its negative manifestation, rather than its positive one as in Chapter 2.

\textsuperscript{48} Capillarity refers to the propensity of liquid placed in an absorptive substance to fluctuate according to surface pressure or forces. It is used in this instance to refer to the largely unconscious structural forces which create specific entrenched thought patterns and behaviour which may fluctuate due to applied surface pressure by the State apparatus.

\textsuperscript{49} I used the word ‘political’ here to connote the practices of \textit{politics}; i.e. not the \textit{political} as distinguished by Rancière. (He often does the same as it is difficult to distinguish between these words in English – a prime example of a conceptual impasse of translation.)

\textsuperscript{50} I shall distinguish between different machinic assemblages, such as war machines, nomadic war machines and so forth in a later section and discuss how these concepts are related to translation in politics/politics in translation at length.
or the capitalist axiomatic, thus – at least to some degree – destabilising the rigid and dominant planes of the State and of the West. This is not exclusively true of the works of Winterbach, though her novels are prime examples of how Afrikaans literature is currently doing politics in South Africa.

But how can literature/s or certain literatures and translation, at least to some degree, accomplish this, i.e. do politics? The Alistair Reid poem quoted below might be a line of flight in this direction, a mapping of language and translation as always in translation, as always becoming-translated/translation (quoted from Grossman 2010: 1189-119):

**Lo que se pierde/What gets lost**

I keep translating traduzco continuamente
entre palabras words que no son las mías
into other words which are mine de la palabras a mis palabras.
Y, finalmente, de quién es el texto? Who has written it?
Del escritor o del traductor writer, translator,
o de los idiomas or language itself?
Somos fantasmas, nosotros traductores, que viven
entre aquel mundo y el nuestro
between that world and our own.
Pero poco a poco me ocurre
que el problema the problem no es cuestión
de lo que se pierde en traducción
is not the question
of what gets lost in translation
sino but rather lo que se pierde
what gets lost
entre la ocurrencia – sea de amor o de desesperación
between love or desperation –
y el hecho de que llega
a existir en palabras
and its coming into words.

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51 This poem code switches between Spanish and English (‘Splanglish’) in the same way that EngAfrikaans code switches between Afrikaans and English, and is a good example of why I argue that passages containing EngAfrikaans in Winterbach’s oeuvre could have been kept as is in the translated novels.

52 ‘Becomings’ are described by Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 232-309) as a disruption of the primacy of identity, i.e. it is “a world of re-presentation (presenting the same world once again), then becoming (by which Deleuze means ‘becoming different’) or, we could say, repetition with difference (Stagoll 2005a: 21-23) – the ‘eternal return’.
Para nosotros todos, amantes, habledores
as lovers or users of words
el problema es éste this is the difficulty.
Lo que se pierde what gets lost
no es lo que se pierde en tradducción sino
is not what gets lost in translation, but rather
what gets lost in language itself lo que se pierde
en el hecho, en la lengua,
en la palabra misma.

When viewed as becoming-translated/translation, the question regarding the role/s of language/s shift/s. The question is no longer *What does this word/text mean?* but rather *What does this word/text do or produce?* and, when applied to translation, *What is the translation doing?* In other words, what is the language (the word, the text, the novel, the translation) undertaking and achieving rather than what does it signify or connote? Thus, is it stuttering and mapping a becoming or is it incapable of escaping the State apparatus, writing with order-words which, in reality, create literatures and translations that are tracings rather than mappings, or, as the quote on the first page of this chapter suggests, a form of dreaming? In Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987: 29) words:

> I know that the periphery is the only place that I can be, that I would die if I let myself be drawn into the centre of the fray, but just as certainly if I let go of the crowd. [...] To be fully a part of the crowd and at the same time completely outside it, removed from it: to be on the edge, to take a walk like Virginia Woolf (never again will I say "I am this, I am that").

### 3.2 The political vs. politics: what is literature/translation doing?

If, as Rancière (2001) claims, the political is an inherently dual arrangement of power, or, as he writes, “a vicious circle located in the link between the political relationship and the political subject” and thus a hierarchical distribution of power relations, what is politics? According to Rancière’s (2001) explanation, to understand politics, we first need to investigate the political, which he describes as follows:

> An interrogation into what is ‘proper’ to politics must be carefully distinguished from current and widespread propositions regarding “the return of the political”. In the past several years, and in the

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53 It should be noted here, however, that these are not either/or mappings and/or tracings as movements of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation may – and often do – occur simultaneously.
context of a state-consensus, we have seen the blossoming of affirmations proclaiming the end of the illusion of the social and a return to a ‘pure’ form of politics. [...] On this basis, the frontier between the domestic and the political becomes the frontier between the social and the political; and to the idea of a city-state defined by its common good is opposed the sad reality of modern democracy as the rule of the masses and of necessity. In practice, this celebration of pure politics entrusts the virtue of the ‘political good’ to governmental oligarchies enlightened by “experts”; which is to say that the supposed purification of the political, freed from domestic and social necessity, comes down to nothing more (or less) than the reduction of the political to the state [l’étatique].

Consequently, we can deduce that the political is always based on a ranked diffusion of power relations, enforced by what Rancière refers to as ‘the police’. The political is thus always a structural organisation with a ruling party to whom power over the individual or the political subject is entrusted, decreed as ‘being for the good of all’. But even a ‘democracy’ – which relies on rhetoric of ‘freedom’ and ‘personal choice’ – is situated in the political and is not a form of doing politics. On the contrary, politics, unlike the political, does not rely on hierarchical relations with political subjects; i.e. it cannot be defined in terms of an a priori philosophy that assumes the existence of a “pre-existing subject”, but must be viewed from the point of view of the different political arrangements or relations which allow for the existence of this political subject (Rancière 2001). The focus is thus on the relationships which are established when tiered political allocations or social strata are accepted as ‘normal’ and participated in as if these are ‘natural’ manifestations, rendering the political subject powerless to varying degrees (depending, often to a large degree, on the political subject’s social standing) to ‘the way things are’. On the other hand, politics, according to Rancière (2001), may be understood as:

... a specific rupture in the logic of the arche. It does not simply presuppose the rupture of ‘normal’ distributions of positions between the one who exercises power and the one subject to it. It also requires a rupture in the idea that there are dispositions ‘proper’ to such classifications.

This idea is closely linked to Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of lines of flight away from accepted existing nomological[54] and normative territorialisations. But what does politics have to do with literature, or rather, what does politics reveal about the political relations between literature and the publishing industry, and what does an investigation into this

[54] Nomological denotes certain assumed ontological principles such as the ‘rules of reasoning’ which may in fact not be theoretically sound but are accepted as such.
relationship reveal about translation, and specifically about the translations of Ingrid Winterbach’s novels?

3.2.1 Politics in Viljoen/Winterbach’s oeuvre

Before I demonstrate how Ingrid Winterbach uses the trickster figure in her novels, I shall briefly sketch an outline of her publications, the relevant translations and the number of copies printed of each novel to remind the reader of these facts, but also because it is pertinent to my argument in terms of capitalism and the State apparatus, and how Winterbach’s literary methods disrupt these structural forces.

Ingrid Winterbach’s first three novels, *Klaaglied vir Koos* (1984), *Erf* (1986) and *Belemmering* (1990) were published under her pseudonym, Lettie Viljoen, and may be described as ‘struggle novels’ as they explore resistance and adherence to the Apartheid regime, as well as the resulting disenchantment created by it. These novels have not as yet been translated and are out of print. Furthermore, I could not obtain statistics about these novels as Taurus – the ‘underground’ publishing house that printed these novels – is no longer operative.55

Still writing under her nom de plume, Viljoen/Winterbach next wrote and published *Karolina Ferreira* (1993) which, as I mentioned before, was awarded the M-Net Book Prize in 1994 and the Old Mutual Literary Prize in 1997. This novel was translated by Iris Gouws in collaboration with Winterbach as *The elusive moth* and published in 2005 with 2000 copies printed and 300 remaining unsold, whilst 2000 copies of the original novel were printed in 1993, followed by 1000 in 1997, 2000 in 2003, 1000 in 2007, and another 300 copies in both 2011 and 2012. Of these, 200 copies remain unsold.

55 Ingrid Winterbach (2014b) contacted Ampie Coetzee, one of the founding members of Taurus, on my behalf. He had the following to say about it: “Taurus did not begin as an organisation, and never became one. That was perhaps one of the reasons that it could exist [during Apartheid]. When André P. Brink’s novel *Kennis van die aand* (published by Buren publishers) was banned in 1973, three of us, Wits lecturers from the Afrikaans Department, John Miles, Ernst Lindenberg and I decided that we would try publishing ‘underground’. It was a time of deep depression in South Africa, and the government had established a Publications Board. The books banned were mostly novels in which sexuality and politics were main themes.” He goes on to write that the publishing of these banned books made them “feel like activists” and that they published them through “mail orders”. The books were typeset at night “on what was called an Electronic Composer.” Those who were interested in obtaining books sent their addresses to Taurus and they then “sent the books ‘secretly’”. Coetzee writes that he cannot remember when Taurus was disbanded, but adds that they “never made money, because we were ‘true’ Communists!”
Subsequently Viljoen/Winterbach wrote and published *Landskap met vroue en slang* (1996) of which 3000 copies were originally printed and sold. Thereafter, 1700 copies of *Buller se plan* (1999) were printed and published under the author’s real name, Ingrid Winterbach,\(^5\) followed by *Niggie* (2002) which won the 2004 Hertzog Prize for prose, with 2000 copies printed in 2002, another 1000 in 2004 and yet another 1000 copies in 2008. There are 300 copies still in stock which have not been sold. The English version, titled *To hell with Cronjé*, was translated by Elsa Silke in collaboration with Winterbach and released in 2007. Only 2000 copies of the translation were printed and of these 170 copies remain in stock.

*Belemmering, Buller se plan* and *Niggie* are all framed by the Anglo-Boer War which is an important recurring theme in the works of Winterbach. She explains, as I have stated before, that the reason for this is that it serves as a way for her to comprehend and know the world of her father (Visagie 2008). I argue that this theme – which is linked to the formation of Apartheid and thus highly controversial – may have affected Viljoen/Winterbach’s readership and, in consequence, the print runs and dissemination of her novels as it represents not only a commodity, but is also linked to a specific ideology – Apartheid in this instance – which may be considered uncouth (especially coming from a white woman) in the new ‘rainbow nation’ of South Africa. As Žižek says in the documentary, *The pervert’s guide to ideology* (Fiennes 2012):

> It was already Marx who, long ago, emphasised that a commodity is never just a simple object that we buy and consume [or use]. A commodity is an object full of ideological – even metaphysical – niceties. Its presence always reflects an invisible transcendence..."

From this one might deduce that ideology is not necessarily negative but that it is linked to desire, i.e. what we desire to be associated with or not. It is what Žižek refers to as the ‘*it* factor’ – an imperceptible quality which represents to us something mystical which is either desired or not desired. But it is precisely this desire, in close relationship with the political or the master-signifier (Žižek 2008: 22), which results in us no longer having to consciously think about what we desire; i.e. we are told what it is that we desire or should desire through the media, advertising, etc. (Žižek in Fiennes 2012). Furthermore, this recurrent theme of Viljoen/Winterbach is in itself also deceptive as it may appear on the

\(^5\) Winterbach is Ingrid’s maiden name which she chose above her current, married surname, namely Gouws.
surface to be pro-Apartheid rather than a questioning of Afrikaner cultural traditions as I have shown in Chapter 1. As such, there may be a kind of knee-jerk reaction by readers to Viljoen/Winterbach’s novels as a form of protest against conservative Afrikaner ideology even though, ironically, the author is doing exactly the same, i.e. remonstrating her own cultural traditions and assumptions.

_Niggie_ was followed by the elegiac novel _Die boek van toeval en toeverlaat_ (2006) which won four national book prizes. The novel was translated as _The book of happenstance_ (2008) by Dirk and Ingrid Winterbach and was awarded The South African Literary Award for Literary Translation in 2010. The original was first printed in 2006 (3000 copies) and then reprinted in 2007 and 2009 (1000 copies in each case) with 400 copies still in stock. Only 1600 copies of the translation were printed and of these 450 have not as yet been sold.

Winterbach next published _Die Benederyk_ (2010) of which 3000 copies were printed, with 600 remaining unsold. This novel was translated as _The road of excess_ (2014a), with only 800 copies printed for distribution. _Die Benederyk_ was followed by _Die aanspraak van lewende wesens_ (2012a) with 3000 copies printed and 300 remaining unsold. This novel is currently being translated by Michiel Heyns.

I obtained these statistics from Human & Rousseau although their first response to me was: “Dear Chantelle, I’m afraid it is our policy not to give this kind of detailed information on print runs and book sales. I’m really sorry that I cannot help you” (29 October 2013). After speaking to the author herself to obtain permission to get this information (Ingrid Winterbach kindly wrote to H&R on my behalf), I was provided with the statistics which were explained as follows (11 November 2013):

_Dear Chantelle_

Ingrid asked that we reconsider our policy in this case. See attached info I compiled from our stock records of the titles published by Human & Rousseau. I’ve rounded off the numbers. Of the three titles published before Karolina Ferreira, Ingrid’s first book with H&R, we have no record of print runs and sales. (If Ingrid still has her royalty statements from Taurus for those titles, she might be able to give you print runs.)
The info on our print runs and the stock we still have should give you some indication of sales. However, it does not explain why certain titles sold better than others. There are obviously many factors, like a slump in the economy (which affected the sales of Benederyk, I think), the possible appeal (or non-appeal) of a cover or title, the change of the author’s name (Buller se plan), whether a book is prescribed at some universities (that is why Karolina Ferreira has been reprinted more often), etc.

The sales of two titles on the list will be deceptive, since it only shows that the titles have gone out of print and not how they sold. Landskap met vroue en slang: we realised a year or so after publication that the print run for this title was too big for the market, so that is why we did a smaller print run of Ingrid’s next novel, Buller se plan. (We also realised that sales of Buller might be negatively affected because of the name change from the Lettie Viljoen-pseudonym to the author’s real name.)

As for English translations: we have not had much success with our translated editions in general (this also applies to other authors’ translated books); the competition in the local market is very strong, with so many English novels imported from overseas, and little exposure in the media. Our print runs are therefore shrinking; now down to 1000 copies.

Although there are various factors at play in these statistics, I argue that they do in fact reveal – at least partially – the following assumptions: 1) despite the growing interest in Winterbach’s work in the Afrikaans community, she, like many other Afrikaans writers (with a few exceptions such as Marlene van Niekerk, Deon Meyer and Eben Venter), are not widely read by the English South African community nor abroad and remain of interest to a marginal socio-political group within South Africa; 2) this may reflect residual Apartheid apprehensions about Afrikaans and Afrikaners by non-Afrikaners; 3) marginalised communities remain largely overshadowed by imported novels; and 4) this, in turn, reveals something about the continued domination of the West, capitalism and the State apparatus, and the political impacts of these forces on our ideological desires. I further argue that it is precisely due to Ingrid Winterbach’s use of methods which disrupt these structural forces, such as her usage of the trickster figure and écriture féminine, which keep her in obscurity, but simultaneously demonstrate why her oeuvre may be viewed as a minor literature.

3.2.1.1 Winterbach’s use of the trickster figure/Winterbach as trickster figure

In Chapter 1 I explained the trickster figure as a writing tool which disrupts normative thinking patterns and which, in literature, is thus a technique which allows a writer to
move away from the political and actually do politics, i.e. the writer her/himself becomes a trickster. Scholars have described the use of the trickster figure as a heuristic framework (John 2008) which is intended to expose certain elements of (Afrikaner) identity and, as such, is linked to identity politics as a Jungian archetype which is “counter to religious, social and ethical codes” (Botha & Van Vuuren 2008). John (2008) writes:

Hierdie modusse staan in ’n noue verband met die idee van die triekster, ’n figuur wat regoor die wêreld verskyn in mondelinge tradisies van ’n verskeidenheid bevolkings. In hierdie tradisies word die triekster by uitstek geassosieer met verschillende fasette van identiteit, of meer presies, van syn of bestaan.

(These modes are in close association with the idea of the trickster, a figure which occurs worldwide in the oral traditions of various peoples. In these traditions, the trickster is pre-eminently associated with different aspects of identity, or, more precisely, with being and existence.)

I argue that tricksters are markers of fluxes in State territorialisations, such as identity, and highlight both the acceptance of and resistance to (hetero) normative ideas. As the trickster figure is a recurring theme in Winterbach’s oeuvre, I argue that we can assume that she is using this literary device consciously, thus deliberately disengaging from State territorialisations and “the formation of a collective subjectivity” (Surin 2005b: 265). But I also argue that Winterbach does not only use the trickster figure as a heuristic framework or disruptive force, but that she herself is a trickster figure, and one in a nomadic war machine. But how does a trickster in a nomadic war machine translate into doing politics?

I argue that it is only when literature and translation are acts of deterritorialisation – what Lennon (2010: ix) refers to as the “liminal character” of translation – that this is possible. Hence, for literature/s and translation/s to be art,37 they have to constantly be on lines of flight, mapping out the new rather than tracing that which is. And it is for this reason that we need to flee, but in fleeing to also be seeking a weapon: the nomadic war machine.

The nomadic war machine, Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 380) explain, “is the invention of the nomads (insofar as it is exterior to the State apparatus and distinct from the military institution)”. What makes it necessary to seek a nomadic war machine is that it differs from State apparatus related war machines in that war is not its primary objective, but

37 I mean this in the way that Deleuze and Guattari refer to art which refers to “the descriptive nature of art” not merely as “art’s ability to redescribe; [but] rather [that] art has a material capacity to evoke and to question through non-mimetic means, by reproducing different affects” (Colman 2005b: 15).
rather “its second-order, supplementary or synthetic objective, in the sense that it is determined in such a way as to destroy the State-form and city-form with which it collides” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 418). The main purpose of the nomadic war machine is therefore to deteritorialise the sedentary regime of the State apparatus and domination of the West. It is a constantly mutating war machine of insurrection with its power “no longer based on segments and centres” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 392) and the probable resonance between these. Rather, it allows for becomings and the multiplicity of assemblages.

In short, I argue that writers as tricksters in nomadic war machines is one way in which art and artists can be in a mode of becoming, and in so doing do politics. In turn, I argue, translating works such as Winterbach’s so that they are accented is a way for translators to become tricksters in nomadic war machines. As such, translation becomings may be viewed as the practising of politics in that they question and disrupt habitual thinking patterns and behaviour.

This brings me once again to why viewing Translation Studies and translation through poststructuralist lenses, and particularly with reference to Deleuze and Guattari, is so useful. As Lennon (2010: x) writes:

... the return to the system [structuralist literary criticism] – if I am right to call it that – can be understood as a tactic (or reflection) of interdisciplinary competition: in this case, an opportunity for long-standing new historicist or resurgent neo-Marxist projects to ensure that antisystemic (poststructuralist) “high” theory in its pure form is (and remains), so to speak, “dead”.

We can deduce from this that even scholarly thinking and academic projects reinforce, for the most part, State territorialisations through structuralist approaches which conform to ‘the system’; a condition described by Paul Gilroy as “postcolonial melancholia” (Lennon 2010: x). In Todd May’s (1994: 94) words: “... the articulation of poststructuralism’s political values – and, more important, the metaethical and epistemological status of those values – are crucial to any general account of it.” We could refer to this as the micro political view or what I shall explain as the ethical considerations of literature/s and translation/s in Chapter 4 which, if distinct, are not separate from the macro political.
3.2.2 Écriture féminine

Écriture féminine is a deterritorialising writing practice which was used by Hélène Cixous and other feminist writers, although it should be noted that it is only one of many different writing styles. Developed in the early 1970s, écriture féminine literally means ‘women’s writing’ and relies to a large extent on the idea of prosopoeia – a term which describes the personification of abstract things (Blythe & Sellers 2004: 2) and which specifically investigates ways in which meaning is produced and reproduced. As Cixous herself said: “What is important is not to forget”; not to forget Paradise when you are in Hell, nor to forget Hell when you are in paradise, for “Paradise promises Hell, but ... Hell [also] promises Paradise” (in Blythe & Sellers 2004: 103). Cixous, along with the other foundational feminist literary theorists such as Julia Kristeva, Luce Irigaray, Chantal Chawaf, Catherine Clément and Monique Wittig were specifically, though not exclusively, interested in the many ways in which meaning production allows for violence/war against women (and all Others) and wrote about how women (Others) undermining State territorialisations in their work “are subject to feelings of guilt, of doubt as to the value of their work, together with all the censoring effects of the logocentric ploy” (Sellers 1994). Cixous refers to this as “the imbecilic capitalist machinery in which publishing houses are the crafty, obsequious relayers of imperatives handed down by an economy that works against us and off our backs” (Cixous 1976).

Écriture féminine “carries the themes of loss and separation”, as well as “abandonment and betrayal”, all of which “appear to relate back to the feeling of being ‘outside’”. Furthermore, this method of writing also explores death (as always unknown) and the “question of love” (Blythe & Sellers 2004: 43), themes which are central and recurring (with difference) in Ingrid Winterbach’s novels. Also, it is not viewed as a method of writing only available to women, but rather as the deterritorialisation of the fictitious dichotomy between Self and Other, making room for “the other with a truly radical act of letting go” (Blythe & Sellers 2004: 44), although Cixous does believe that women are closer to this method of writing than men currently are (Sellers 1994: xxix). Écriture féminine could thus be said to employ writing as a line of flight with the power to be transformative, yet dangerous – a flux in the system – but at the same time “fragile and transient” (Blythe & Sellers 2004: 58). I argue that écriture féminine – if consciously transferred from ST to TT – is a way for translation to do politics by ensuring accentedness.
in translation and, as a result, transforming translation from a static practice to an active orientation which is always becoming-translated/translation

**3.2.2.1 Examples of écriture féminine in Ingrid Winterbach’s novels**

In this subsection I shall give examples of how Ingrid Winterbach uses écriture féminine. The first example is from Karolina Ferreira (p. 1), translated as The elusive moth (p. 1):

“Uit hierdie blaar maak jy ’n geneesmiddel vir bloed wat spuit uit ’n wond,” sê hy. “Dit moet behoorlik spúit. Dit moet saam met die hartklop uitpomp. Ander soorte bloeding is stadiger, byvoorbeeld ná ’n geboorte, en die bloed is donkerder.”

“You can use these leaves to prepare a cure for blood spurting from a wound,” he said. “But only if it gushes quite strongly. If it is pumped away with every beat of the heart. There are other kinds of bleeding that are slower – after childbirth, for instance – and then the blood is darker.”

Here, écriture féminine is used by a male character rather than by a woman, thus blending Self and Other as becoming-androgynous. One might argue that this passage shows nothing more than the language of a medically informed person (the herbalist Basil September in these passages), but the feminine bifurcation is embedded in the reference to giving birth and Basil’s explanation of birth through the colour of the blood, rather than as personal experience, but still as a way of understanding childbirth in his own terms. This creates a rhizomatic literary assemblage, allowing both the Afrikaans and English texts to be in continual states of becoming-translated/translation. This melting of Self and Other is akin to Virginia Woolf’s idea of the “androgynous mind”. She writes (Woolf 1932: 179): “If one is a man, still the woman part of his brain must have effect; and a woman also must have intercourse with the man in her.” Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Woolf is said to have believed, meant this when he stated that a “great mind must be androgynous”.

Écriture féminine may thus be viewed as an attempt at doing politics by becoming-androgynous (in this instance): the translation of the man in the woman and of the woman in the man; the blending of Self and Other and of literatures and translations as always in a state of becoming-translated/translation – as the double-sided embroidery with its neatly arranged front part as well as its loose frayings at the back. In this way, the potential material and political effects/affects contained in literatures and translations may

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58 Quoted from the ‘goodreads’ (2013) website.
generate lines of flight; as the walk as taken by Virginia Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway who says that she will never again say “I am this, I am that” (Woolf 2012: 11).

Two other examples of this kind of blending are from Die aanspraak van lewende wesens. The first is concretised through the recurrent listing of heavy metal bands as I noted in Chapter 1, characterised by the distortion of masculinity through the androgynous attire of band members. As I illustrated this extensively in Chapter 1, I shall not repeat it here. The second example is illustrated by the character Iggy’s insistence that he has been chosen by God to become a woman. As a result, he starts wearing female clothing (Die aanspraak van lewende wesens, p.171, followed by my translation):

Ek het begin besef dat my lyding nie tevergeefs is nie, maar dat God my begin uitsonder het en dat Hy ’n plan met my lewe het.

Ek dink, ek weet dit trouens nou vir seker, dat God besig is om my te transformer vir ’n hoër doel. God is besig om my in ’n vrou te verander, dit is die teken wat Hy my gegee het.

(I have started realising that my suffering has not been for naught, but that God has carefully chosen me and that He has a plan for my life.

I think, in fact I know it for certain now, that God is in the process of transforming me for a higher purpose. God is in the process of changing me into a woman; that is the sign He has given me.)

A third example of écriture féminine is from Die benederyk/The road of excess, concretised through the trickster-character, Bubbles, who I described in an earlier section. An implied lesbian, she exhibits both female and male traits, thus becoming-androgynous. She also befriends Aaron Adendorff’s servant which further serves to dismantle the boundaries of Self (typically the employer or white person in Afrikaner culture) and other (typically the servant or person of colour).

The fourth and final example I shall refer to in Winterbach’s novels is from Niggie (pp. 7-8), translated as To hell with Cronjé (Winterbach p. 8):

Hy het gedroom, sê die boer, van die triekstervrou – hy het altyd gedink dis ’n man, maar in die droom was dit ’n vrou. Daar was ’n klomp mense rondom die dorpskerk vergader. Hy het niemand herken nie. Toe sien hy ’n vrou wat hy ken. Haar hare is rooi, haar gesig witgepoeier en sy dra ’n verehoedjie. […] Hy en die vrou beweeg mettertyd weg van die mense, na ’n kamer met ’n bed. Toe
He dreamed, the farmer says, of the trickster woman – he’s always thought of the trickster as a man, but in his dream it was a woman. A small crowd had gathered at the town church. He recognised no one. The he saw a woman he knew. She had red hair, her face was powdered white and she wore a little feathered hat. […] In due course he and the woman moved away from the others, to a room where there was a bed. When the time came to lie down together and he held out his arms to her, a strange man was suddenly in her place and he heard her laughing on the stoep outside. It was then that he realised she was the trickster.

This passage, which inflicts distress on the farmer (as homosexuality for Afrikaners and during the Anglo-Boer war period was considered a taboo and a sin – an abomination in the eyes of God) reveals Winterbach as a trickster figure herself. Her writing, which has received much attention in the South African Afrikaans community but which has not been widely read by English readers, I argue, is a consequence of her having become a trickster in a nomadic war machine. One could say that in this way her novels are always in the process of becoming-translated/translation (or mutating assemblages) and that their lines of flight in opposition to State territorialisations may be one of the reasons that she has not become ‘famous’ except within a small community; this, debatably, an encomium rather than a criticism if we view her novels in terms of Deleuze and Guattari’s ontology. To better elucidate this, I shall now describe how capitalism and the State apparatus work and continue to influence people’s desires for certain kinds of commodities and ideologies above others.

3.3 Capitalism and the capitalist axiomatic

CAPITAL MADE A DOLL WHO LOOKED EXACTLY LIKE HERSELF.
IF YOU PRESSED A BUTTON ON ONE OF THE DOLL’S CUNT LIPS
THE DOLL SAID, “I AM A GOOD GIRL AND DO EXACTLY AS I AM TOLD TO DO.”

[...]

WROTE DOWN “PRAY FOR US THE DEAD,” THE FIRST LINE IN
THE FIRST POEM BY CHARLES OLSON SHE HAD EVER READ WHEN
SHE WAS A TEENAGER. ALL THE DOLLS WERE DEAD. DEAD
HAIR. WHEN SHE LOOKED UP THIS POEM, ITS FIRST LINE
WAS, “WHAT DOES NOT CHANGE/IS THE WILL TO CHANGE.” (Acker 1990)
Kathy Acker, if in a rather crude fashion, captures the essence of the material and politico-ideological effects/affects of the capitalist axiomatic in this passage, but at the same time she also alludes to the possibility of lines of flight in the last line of the passage. In Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987: 13) words, the capitalist axiomatic can be explained as a “tracing that has already translated the map onto an image” which, consequently, means that it creates a mechanism or structural arrangement/s which, in its relations with capitalism, creates a false impression that “it is reproducing something else, [when] it is in fact only reproducing itself.” This axiomatic is complexly linked to and in relationship with capitalism or “the flow of capital [which] produces an immense channel, a quantification of power” (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 20). This ‘quantification of power’ may be described as the political in that it reduces the value of everything to its economic viability and is therefore a commodity linked to an ideology which is “not a personal, but a social power” (Marx & Engels 1888: 11), as was described originally in 1848 by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in *The communist manifesto*. They write (Marx & Engels 1888: 3):

> [Capitalism] has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervour, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation. It has resolved personal worth into exchange value. And in place of the numberless and feasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom – Free Trade. In one word, for exploitation, veiled by religious and political illusions, naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation.

This, I argue, holds true for the publishing industry as well which, more than ever before, no longer regards mainly the literary value of literature, but rather, or at least to a larger degree than before, considers the profitability of a novel and also, according to the same criteria, whether a novel is translated or not. At the same time the publishing industry, in its relations with capitalism and the capitalist axiomatic, is also intricately related to the State and Western domination which, in turn, affects what is published and how widely it is disseminated in accordance with the relationship between these structural assemblages. Consider again H&R’s words: “As for English translations: we have not had much success with our translated editions in general (this also applies to other authors’ translated books); the competition in the local market is very strong, with so many English novels imported from overseas, and little exposure in the media.” This is further complicated by the fact that capitalism intersects with so many assemblages. As Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 20) explain: “There is no universal capitalism, there is no capitalism in itself; capitalism is at the crossroads of all kinds of formations, it is neocapitalism by nature. It
invents is eastern face and western face and reshapes them both – all for the worst”; i.e. it duplicates itself whilst representing itself as something different.

Literature, like all other aspects of life, has also been equated with capital. Pascale Casanova (2004: 133), for example, explains that translation from “small languages” into assimilating ones, such as English, are consecrated through translation; that is, they gain ‘literary capital’. Reducing literature in this way to its ‘capital’ value also reveals the conceptual entrenchment of capitalism in our daily thinking and action. Lawrence Venuti, in accordance with the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari (1987), argues that it is precisely for this reason that translation should aim at minoritising (especially) U.S. English, as it is only through such liminal minoritising that translation can avoid State territorialisations and be practiced in such a way that it recognises the “irreducible heterogeneity of linguistic and cultural situations” (Venuti 1998: 159).

In a similar vein, Lennon (2010: 80-81) argues that literatures and translation, or

... the book production of contemporary literature, [as well as] the strength or weakness of the plurilingualism of a published literary text is largely a measure of its conformation to editorial standards of publishability determined by measures of marketability (including marketability in and for translation rights), themselves determined by benchmarks for growth and profitability within necessarily segregated national-language markets linked by (and in) translation.

In other words, the publication, dissemination and translation of a book, novel or any other kind of text, relies on its conformity to State territorialisations and its intersection with market logic. The latter is closely linked to copyright and translation rights (Lennon 2010: 58). Here again Kathy Acker’s 1990 essay illustrates the role of the publishing industry as the ‘police’ who enforce conformity to normative cultural practices. She writes:

I didn’t create language, writer thought. Later she would think about ownership and copyright. I’m constantly being given language. Since this language-world is rich and always changing, flowing, when I write, I enter a world which has complex relations and is, perhaps, illimitable. This world both represents and is human history, public memories and private memories turned public, the records and actualizations of human intentions. This world is more than life and
death, for here life and death conjoin. I can’t make
language, but in this world, I can play and be played.

[...]

All these male poets want to be the
top poet, as if, since they can’t be a dictator in the
political realm, can be dictator of this world.

Want to play. Be left alone to play. Want to be
a sailor who journeys at every edge and even into the
unknown. See strange sights, see. If I can’t keep on
seeing wonders, I’m in prison. Claustrophobia’s sister
to my worst nightmare: lobotomy, the total loss of
perceptual power, of seeing new. If had to force
language to be uni-directional, I’d be helping my own
prison to be constructed.

There are enough prisons outside, outside
language.

Decided, no. Decided that to find her own voice
would be negotiating against her joy. That’s what the
culture seemed to be trying to tell her to do.

We could, following this argument, deduce that if something is in fact different – politics rather than the political – it may cause undesirable fluxes in the State system and may therefore be either banned or excluded from entering social discourse or, more likely, at least as regards the publishing industry, be disseminated either by a ‘radical’ publishing house or distributed within a limited zone as Acker, Bourdieu, Venuti, Lennon and other scholars have argued. Should such a text be translated due to some pressure to have an ‘eastern’ (other/Other) and a ‘western’ (Self) face, i.e. appear inclusive rather than exclusive and normative, translations are often limited even more. For example, and specifically with regards to Ingrid Winterbach’s oeuvre, even though her second-last novel, Die Benederyk, was an acclaimed Afrikaans text which won a prestigious award, only 800 copies of the translation were printed and are available only in South Africa. Her first novel, Klaaglied vir Koos, which was published in 1984 and deals with Apartheid – or, rather, the resistance of a white minority against Apartheid – has not as yet been translated and is no longer in print. Ingrid Winterbach herself told me that this novel was only published because Taurus was an ‘underground’ publishing house and would never have been printed in Apartheid South Africa as censorship and information control were
important aspects of the then government’s apparatus (Winterbach 2014b). I therefore argue that this novel does politics by questioning the accepted structural political arrangements of the time. That it was published at all, I contend, is an example of a publishing house also doing politics, by which I mean allowing for a bifurcation away from conventional State territorialisations. That it is no longer in print and has not been translated, even though Winterbach is currently one of the most prominent Afrikaans novelists, I would argue is, on the contrary, political. One of the reasons for this may be that the novel serves as a reminder of hierarchical social arrangements and thus of diverse power distributions which are in conflict with the current State territorialisations reliant on so-called ‘rainbow nation’ rhetoric. This rhetoric, employed as a political device to replicate many of the same political and social arrangements which existed under Apartheid, was overtly stated in the past and thus obvious to those who were rendered powerless or had less access to power currencies, but is now disguised by the unifying ‘rainbow nation’ conceptualisation of South Africa (see for example Hamilton et al. 2001, etc.).

The capitalist axiomatic could thus be said to allow for all these distinct social, power and political arrangements and relations to function together as it creates an environment in which all of these different forces are able to proliferate, but in which all of them are reduced to market logic because that is now the largely accepted and assumed reasoning underpinning all of these structural arrangements. As Toscano (2005a: 17) writes, the term axiomatic is derived from “the discourse of science and mathematical set theory in particular” and “denotes a method that need not provide definitions of the terms it works with, but rather orders a given domain with the adjunction or subtraction of particular norms or commands (axioms)”. Unlike binary overcoding, the capitalist axiomatic could thus be said to be ‘deregulatory’ as it allows for all forms of diversification, even though all of these forms are insentiently subjected to market logic. However, this does not fully clarify how or why this political reality or normative ‘realness’ is co-constructed by all of us. To further explicate this, I shall now describe capitalist realism and show how it relates to translation praxis.

59 It is interesting to note that this publishing house, namely Taurus, is no longer operational. And although we may not be able to explain this outcome as a definite result of the political power arrangements of the publishing industry, it is certainly worth noting.
3.4 Capitalist realism

One of the reasons why capitalism is so disquietingly convincing and prevalent is that it creates the sense that “there is no alternative” (Fisher 2009: 78). As Fredric Jameson and Slavoj Žižek famously said: “it is easier to imagine the end of the world than it is to imagine the end of capitalism” (quoted from Fisher 2009: 2). But why is this the case? Mark Fisher (2009: 3) argues that it is because people are no longer “capable of producing surprises”; i.e. they are uninterested in creating due to the fact that conventions are “no longer contested and modified.” Hence, capitalist realism creates a very specific form or sense of reality, one which presents itself as ‘the one true reality’ with endless choices (consumer choices), thus rendering the political subject scarcely more than a “consumer-spectator, trudging through the ruins and relics” (Fisher 2009: 4).

But capitalist realism is more than mere postmodern uncertainty although it is linked to some of postmodernism’s postulates. Both of these theories and practices recognise that part of the problem lies in “the sense of [an] inner subjective attitude” of the individual “at the expense of the beliefs we exhibit and externalise in our behavior” (Fisher 2009: 13) as collectives in structural arrangements. Žižek (1989: 33, my emphasis) phrases this as follows: “the structural power of ideological fantasy [means that] even if we do not take things seriously, even if we keep an ironical distance, we are still doing them.” Fisher takes this a step further by explaining that (Fisher 2009: 16):

> Capitalist realism as I understand it cannot be confined to art or to the quasi-propagandistic way in which advertising functions. It is more like a pervasive atmosphere, conditioning not only the production of culture but also the regulation of work and education, and acting as a kind of invisible barrier constraining thought and action.

Thus, in order for anyone to move away from the political to politics – or to regain political agency – we need to start by acknowledging our complicity in creating and sustaining State and capitalist territorialisations, or what Fisher refers to as the ‘pervasive atmosphere’ of capitalist realism. If our complicity in these structural arrangements and relations is not acknowledged or remains unconscious knowledge, this ‘unreal real’ state will remain viewed as normal and without recourse to bifurcations or deterritorialisations. This, at least in part, is an answer to what literature is doing for the most part: replicating
itself whilst presenting itself as something different, or, we could say, further entrenching market logic and capitalist realism, hence producing more State literary territorialisations.

One of the main consequences of capitalism and capitalist realism is different forms of ‘madness’ – a recurring theme throughout Ingrid Winterbach’s oeuvre as I have shown to some extent already and shall discuss further in this section. Fisher (2009: 21) refers to these forms of ‘madness’ as “depressive hedonia” by which he means that illnesses, such as depression, anxiety, schizophrenia and so forth, are now pathologised as illnesses rather than viewed as symptoms of something deeper which “already forecloses any possibility of politicization.” As a result, many of the forms of madness we may experience are reduced to hereditary conditions or chemical and neurological imbalances, thus in fact vetoing the possibility of questioning the structural violence of capitalism and capitalist realism or any other inquiry into such systemic interconnections. These ideas have also been investigated by Foucault in much of his philosophy as well as by Deleuze and Guattari, but specifically in Deleuze’s article entitled “Postscript on societies of control” (Deleuze 1992). In their collective works, all of these philosophers investigate the effects of external surveillance that leads to internal surveillance and modifications in behaviour, resulting in different forms of madness such as the ones I mentioned above. Deleuze and Guattari (1987), in fact, argue that if schizophrenia indicates the surface boundaries of capitalism, then bipolar disorder designates the interior chaos thereof, but whereas Foucault described disciplinary societies, Deleuze argues that we are now living in a kind of post-disciplinary society of codes and modulations, or what Marks (2005a: 54) calls “a deeper level of modulation, a constant variation, [for example] in the wages paid to workers.”

Rancière (2001) refers to this state of affairs as the partitioning of the sensible and the police, where ‘the police’ is in fact “a ‘partition of the sensible’ [le partage du sensible] whose principle is the absence of a void and a supplement.” For him, politics is thus opposed to the police (by which he means all forms of surveillance; he specifically explains the police “not as a social function but [as] a symbolic constitution of the social”). At its core, the police is thus always in a structural relationship with the State, whereas politics is always a disengagement from the police, aiming to “disturb this arrangement” by bifurcating away from State territorialisations. I argue that many publishing houses now function as the ‘police’ of literature, allowing certain literature/s to be published and
disseminated widely, while curbing the wider dissemination of others, often minor literatures (in the sense that Deleuze and Guattari use this term), as is evidenced in the communiqué with H&R.

3.5 The State apparatus and binary overcoding

The *apparatus of capture* – or “machinic processes specific to State societies” (Toscano 2005b: 39) – works through two main strategies or poles: tools and signs. But for it to work effectively there must be a ‘master’ who combines these strategies to form sign-tools or order-words which “constitute the differential trait of political sovereignty, or the complementarity of the State” (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 425). Thus, what Deleuze and Guattari are describing here is how the State turns itself into this ‘master’ and ‘captures’ or creates structural arrangements and relations between itself, capitalism and other war machines to “bolster and expand its sovereignty” (Toscano 2005b: 39). These war machines, described virtually as abstract war machines, materialise extensively as many different kinds of war machines, such as organised religions, specific kinds of educational systems which may restrict or alter knowledge according to specific dogmas or political agendas, and so on. It is these kinds of war machines that symbolise the legitimisation of structural violence by the State in its relations with capitalism, for example the machinic enslavement of workers’ time and energy through various mechanisms such as clock-in/clock-out systems which, by its very nature, consumes the creative capacities of individuals and turns them into State-owned commodities.

Language is another sign-tool or assemblage of order-words used by the apparatus of capture as a means to ensure State territorialisations. This takes place also in literature/s and, by implication, translation/s. Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 430) write:

> Speech communities and languages, independently of writing, do not define closed groups of people who understand one another but primarily determine relations between people who do not understand one another: if there is language, it is fundamentally between those who do not speak the same tongue. Language is made for that, for translation, not for communication. And in primitive societies there are as many tendencies that “seek” the State, as many vectors working in the direction of the State, as there are movements within the State or outside it that tend to stray away from it or guard themselves against it, or else to stimulate its evolution, or else already to abolish it: everything coexists, in perpetual interaction.
This passage highlights the need for always being in a state of becoming-nomad, allowing for constant mutations, deterritorialisations and lines of flight which resist the internalisation of surveillance and censorship; i.e. the recognition that all of language is forever in the process of becoming-translated/translation assemblages. Consequently, literary pursuits are, or at least should be, viewed as always in a state of becoming, of forming rhizomatic assemblages that are at war with the State apparatus and its mechanism of binary overcoding which lead to homogenised and (hetero)normative assemblages, even in terms of literatures and their translations. Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 223) explain this mechanism of binary overcoding as follows:

There is on the one hand an abstract machine of overcoding: it defines a rigid segmentarity, a macrosegmentarity, because it produces or rather reproduces segments, opposing them two by two, making all centres resonate, and laying out a divisible, homogenous space striated in all directions. This kind of abstract machine is linked to the State apparatus. We do not, however, equate it with the State apparatus itself. [...] The most we can say is that the State apparatus tends increasingly to identify with the abstract machine it effectuates.

Thus, although the structural relations between capitalism, the capitalist axiomatic and capitalist realism allow for ostensive diversification, this diversification is always regulated by binary overcoding through, for example, dualistic formations such as ‘good’ vs. ‘bad’ or ‘normative acceptability’ vs. what is labelled as ‘deviant behaviour’, and so on, which guide our perceptions, conceptualisations and behaviour. However, the capitalist axiomatic, although in relationship with the State apparatus which allows all these diverse structural arrangements to resonate together, is not reducible to it. The reason for this is that axiomatic systems “are indifferent to the properties or qualities of their domain of application and treat their objects as purely functional, rather than as qualitatively differentiated by some intrinsic character” (Toscano 2005a: 17). Axiomatic systems thus differ from systems reliant on coding and overcoding due to “its capacity to operate directly on decoded flows” (Toscano 2005a: 17). This demonstrates how complex the structural arrangements and relations between all these varied systems are, even though they co-exist in seemingly ‘natural’ ways that, on the face of it, appear complimentary and unproblematic. It also serves to indicate why minor literatures still remain marginalised: because they are in opposition to State territorialisations, but it is extremely difficult to recognise this because of consumer choice which creates a sense of empowerment, even though it is political empowerment, rather than a form of politics. This, to my mind, also
goes to show why certain translations gain more structural visibility while others, such as those of Ingrid Winterbach, remain largely obscure.

3.5.1 State assemblages in literary practices

Two aspects which have affected literatures and their translations in particular in terms of all the structural arrangements and relations I discussed before are copyright and the increasing acceptance of the universalisation of English as communal lingua franca. Deborah Cameron (2003) writes that “translation has always been an important medium, enabling ideas to flow from one culture to another. It is debatable, however, whether that flow has invariably advanced the great liberal causes of progress, tolerance and mutual understanding.” Rafael (2012) explains the logic of this law (the “fostering [of] the ability to translate”) as a way for the “‘we’ [to] make use of the foreigner’s language in order to keep their native speakers in their proper place”; i.e. to seemingly creating something else whilst in fact reproducing itself over and over again. The universalisation of English could thus be seen as a form of colonisation with the implication that “all other languages ought to be reducible to its terms and thereby assimilable into the national linguistic hierarchy” (Rafael 2012).

This highlights the inherent political (as defined by Rancière) nature of language, writing and translation. One example of this is the idea that we have ‘personal choices’ regarding books, novels, other commodities and our political realities, but there remains a largely sidelined investigation into the practices of the publishing industry and other industries, as well as secrecy around these practices, for example Human & Rousseau’s policy to not give out statistics of printing runs and book sales. The globalisation of English as universal lingua franca in effect also leads to a persistently decreasing need (‘demand and supply’ according to market logic) for more languages to continue existing and being used (Pym 2008).

Carli Coetzee (2013: x) argues that in order to prevent this accepted normalisation, we need what she terms “[a]ccented thinking and accented conversations” which take into account the asymmetrical legacies of different histories and particularly of Apartheid in South Africa. She writes (2013: xi):
I argue for the preference of accent over translation as a way of understanding activist reading and teaching practices, and the book often makes arguments against translation – or at least translation of a particular kind. Translation has often been held up as a benevolent metaphor for imagining and learning the position of others. But when the relationship between the languages involved is unequal, I argue, translation can strengthen the inherited inequalities in society. Therefore this book makes an argument against translation in contexts where being ‘understood’ is not to the advantage of the speaker.

This idea of ‘speaking for others’ has been problematised by a number of scholars. Linda Alcoff, for example, already wrote about this ‘problem’ which Coetzee refers to as the lack of and need for accented knowledge in 1991. Alcoff states that this problem arose from two main sources: 1) “the growing recognition that where one speaks from affects the meaning and truth of what one says”; and 2) that “not only is location epistemically salient, but certain privileged locations are discursively dangerous” (Alcoff 1991). The accepted universalisation of English as common lingua franca could thus be said to be a discreet continuing normalisation of colonisation through language practices. Of course this is not a simple debate as there are instances when it is acceptable to speak for others, for example on behalf of children or animals. I shall say more about these practices when I discuss ethics in Chapter 4. For now, I argue that Ingrid Winterbach’s use of Engfrikaans (for example the monologue by the character Jimmy quoted earlier) is an attempt at disrupting State literature and translation formations as the combined use of Afrikaans and English poses by its very nature an ‘impossibility’ for direct translation into English, although such ‘impossibilities’ are often simply ignored. That is, code switching is often disregarded in translations and simply assimilated monolingually into the target language (as is the case in The road of excess). In consequence, this not only highlights the macro socio-political nature of translation, but also leads to ethical or micro considerations of translation which, as I stated above, I shall discuss in more detail in the next chapter. It is sufficient to say that it is becoming clear that what Translation Studies and translation practices could or should be doing is to move away from studies and practices centring on what a word or text signifies in order to “discover a culture, a body of knowledge ... to defend or disseminate religious, philosophical, or political ideas, to struggle against an oppressor ... to reveal a literature” (Homel & Simon 1988: 44, quoting Suzanne de Lotbinière Hartwood’s translation of Henri van Hoof’s 1983 article).

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60 I shall discuss this theory in more detail in Chapter 4 as it is apposite to situational ethics.
The second aspect I shall address in this section is that of copyright. Due to the fact that the structural arrangements and relations between the State apparatus, capitalism and their associative systemic links have reduced (almost) everything to market logic and thus to saleable commodities, the practice of copyright was introduced. David Shields (2010: 29) writes that capitalism “implies and induces insecurity, which is constantly being exploited, of course, by all sorts of people selling things. [...] At a lower level, it’s a sentimental narrative about fall and forgiveness.” Copyright, in essence, implies that creativity can be ‘owned’ by, for example, a publishing house, and ‘sold’ with the aim of making a profit. The growth of the industrialised world in the early 19th century led to the mass production of goods, including novels and other books which meant that “Copy makers could profit more than creators” (Shields 2010: 16). Together with the introduction of copyright and the normalisation of capitalism, there also exists the fictitious notion that original thought is created in a vacuum and is not reliant on previous social, political and other public discourses and knowledge. This tension has become even more noticeable than ever before due to the current technological advances that have been made, and specifically with the ‘internet boom’. David Shields (2010: 23) writes:

The web’s peer-to-peer architecture: a symmetrical traffic load, with as many senders as receivers and data transmissions spread out over geography and time. A new regime of digital technology has now disrupted all business models based on mass-produced copies, including the livelihoods of artists. The contours of the electronic economy are still emerging, but while they do, the wealth derived from the old business model is being spent to try to protect that old model. Laws based on the mass-produced copy are being taken to the extreme, while desperate measures to outlaw new technologies in the marketplace “for our protection” are introduced in misguided righteousness. [...] Many methods have been employed to try to stop the indiscriminate spread of copies, including copy-protection schemes, hardware-crippling devices, education programs, and statutes, but all have proved ineffectual. [...] Value has shifted away from a copy toward the many ways to recall, annotate, personalize, edit, authenticate, display, mark, transfer, and engage a work. Art is a conversation, not a patent office. The citation of sources belongs to the realms of journalism and scholarship, not art. Reality can’t be copyrighted.

This quote not only addresses the invalidity of copyright and the idea that knowledge is ‘owned’, but also dispels the idea that copyright or the lack thereof is linked to creativity.

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61 These ideas were explored by, for example Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Roland Barthes, Mikhail Bakhtin and so forth. In fact, Barthes’s 1968 essay entitled “Death of the author” (in Heath 1977: 142-148) is, according to Rivkin and Ryan (2004: 81) often referred to as “a Post-structuralist manifesto”. Barthes, like the other theorists, argues against the idea that the author is the creator of meaning or that any thought is original. Julia Kristeva, however, was the first theorist to coin these concerns as ‘intertextuality’ in her essay “Word, dialogue and novel” (Moi 1986: 34-61).
and the making of art or “reality”.\textsuperscript{62} Shields (2010: 27) further states that he doesn’t “feel any of the guilt normally attached to ‘plagiarism’, which [to him] seems ... organically connected to creativity itself.” Many scholars, writers, commentators, publishers and so forth, such as Kathy Acker, Leo Tolstoy, CrimethInc., Lawrence Liang, Jorge Cortell, etc. have strongly expressed their views against copyright law.

Copyright, in its relations with capitalism and the State apparatus, allows for higher degrees of the practice of censorship, i.e. the right for a publishing house to choose what is published, what is appropriate to publish,\textsuperscript{63} how widely it is disseminated (thus its readership) and whether or not it is profitable to translate and if so, into which languages. In essence, it creates what Foucault (1972) called ‘the document’ which, more often than not, is a State territorialisation of knowledge. It is precisely for this reason that Foucault (1972: 138) investigates the archaeology of knowledge, which, unlike the document, could be said to be accented, to use Coetzee’s terminology, and as a result does not attempt to define the “thoughts, images, themes, occupations that are concealed or revealed in discourses; but those discourses themselves, those discourses as practices obeying certain rules” which are reinforced through the “repeatable materiality that characterizes the enunciative function” (Foucault 1972: 105). In short, we need to question the ontological assumptions and epistemological ideals according to which functionalism, structuralism and textual hermeneutics in literature/s and translation/s have become the objects of study, or what Foucault terms ‘the epistemes of knowledge’. By doing this, we are able to move, if gradually, from the political to politics. Thus, what is needed is an “emerging deterritorialisation” (Craith 2007: 1) of language/power relations: the becomings of minor literatures rather than State territorialisations with the aim of turning art into a weapon. But can anything extricate or at least disentangle itself to some degree from the State model? “Is it possible,” Venuti (2010) asks, “to think of translation as a gift that does not incur debt or participate in a contract, whether with a publisher or a reader?” The answer to this lies partially in an understanding of the agency of assemblages, including literary original and translated assemblages and how these allow for art becomings.

\textsuperscript{62} The word “reality” is used in quotation marks here as a reminder of the author Vladimir Nabokov who once said that reality “is the one word that is meaningless without quotation marks” (Shields 2010: 12).

\textsuperscript{63} The children’s author, Roald Dahl, was for example “accused of being vulgar, excessively violent, and disrespectful towards authority figures (West 1997: 109) and as a result, his books were banned by a number of libraries and schools for being ‘politically incorrect’ even though he is now widely respected as a children’s author. In South Africa, particularly during the Apartheid years, censorship was widely applied so that Afrikaner Nationalism would not be questioned.
3.5.2 The agency of assemblages

In this section I return to the question of how it is possible to create a ‘new language’. This question starts to touch on ethics and is concerned with the possibility of real bifurcations and deterritorialisations; mappings (of singularities) rather than tracings (of reproductions). Butler (2002) writes:

My argument is that there need not be a “doer” behind the “deed”, but that the “doer” is variably constructed through the deed. [...] The question of locating “agency” is usually associated with the viability of the “subject,” where the “subject” is understood to have some stable existence prior to the cultural field it negotiates. Or, if the subject is culturally constructed, it is nevertheless vested with an agency, usually figured as the capacity for reflective mediation, that remains intact regardless of its cultural embeddedness.

This echoes what Rancière says about the political subject and highlights three important aspects: that of the subject, that of the constructedness of the subject and that of agency. In terms of the subject, discourse practices have set up a dichotomy between Self and Other and it is this construction of Self vs. Other, I argue, which needs to be examined and questioned. What the construction of this dichotomy achieves is the embeddedness of structural violence which, as the norm, appears to be a ‘normal’ aspect of our lives but which in fact is the beginning of the separation or tearing of language from the body.

It is for this reason, I argue, that we need to move away from signification to production; to what literatures and translation do when they are trapped in the political, and what becomes possible when they start doing politics. In order to get to the root of this we need to investigate the construction of individuals and groups of individuals who are alike (i.e. ‘hierarchical normativity’) and the agency afforded to them. But these individuals and the agency they are afforded are not “determined by the rules through which it is generated because signification is not a founding act, but rather a process of repetition that both conceals itself and enforces the rules” (Butler 2002, my emphasis) through the ‘police’. This police enforcement, as I argued earlier, then becomes internalised as surveillance and enacted as self-censorship, legitimising the existence and structural operations of State apparatus assemblages. It could therefore be said to be an enforcement of political

64 It is interesting to note here that the original French term used by Deleuze and Guattari – agencement – translated and accepted as ‘assemblage’ in English, not only connoted “the arrangement of these [assemblage] connections” (Phillips 2006) in French, but also connotes the agency of becomings; both of these connotations lost in the English translation of agencement to “assemblage”. This, as translations inevitably do, leaves us with a loose thread of
performativity and it is this performativity that needs to be dismantled by becoming-trickster in a nomadic war machine as I have demonstrated in this chapter.

3.6 Summary

In this chapter I argue that literature, translation and the wider dissemination of these are informed by politics. I also argue that the political is deeply mired in capitalism and its mechanics referred to by scholars as the capitalist axiomatic and capitalist realism, in turn intersecting with the State apparatus and its mechanism of binary overcoding which reinforces normativity and homogenisation, also of literature/s and their translations. As ways of doing politics, I looked at Winterbach’s use of the trickster figure and écriture féminine as mappings of language and translation as always in translation, as always becoming-translated/translation. And when viewed as becoming-translated/translation, I argue that the question regarding the role/s of language/s shift/s from What does this word/text mean? to What does this word/text do or produce? This, I contend, transforms translation from a static practice to an active orientation which is always becoming-translated/translation.

In the next chapter, I re-examine ethics in translation praxis to see what texts reveal about the historicity of structural power arrangements and relations.

embroidery – an unstable signifier – emphasising once more why we need to do away with obsessions of signification and move to investigations of the material and political effects/affects that this has on literatures and translations.
Chapter 4

Ethical cleansing: the dislocation of meaning in history

Afrikaans (Die aanspraak van lewende wesens, p.92)

Sal jy my nog ken, het Sofie geskryf, wanneer jy terugkeer met jou verbrede horison en jou nuwe kinetiese hande? Ek gaan my hande aan jou bemaak, het Sofie geskryf, tot by die gewrigte, sodat jy my hande op aarde kan wees wanneer ek dood is.

English (My translation)

Will you still know me, Sofie wrote, when you return with your expanded horizons and your new kinetic hands? I shall bequeath my hands to you, Sofie wrote, up to my wrists, so that you can be my hands on earth when I am dead.”

“There is an ethical choice in favour of the richness of the possible, an ethics and politics of the virtual that decorporealizes and deterritorializes contingency, linear causality and the pressure of circumstances and significations which besiege us. It is a choice for processuality, irreversibility and resingularisation.”

(Guattari 1995: 29)
4.1 Introduction: towards a nomadic ethics in translation praxis

In Chapter 3 I explored how translation praxis might pass from the political to politics; how a mapping of language as always becoming-translated/translation allows us to move away from what a word/text means to what it does or produces so that we can distinguish whether it is writing in the order-words of the super-organised State assemblage or, on a line of flight, stuttering a becoming. However, this intersection of language with ideological effects/affects brings into question not only the political/politics, but also the ethical. As Inghilleri (2010: 153) writes:

> Whatever the limitations on their social and interactional status in a given context, in situations where conflicting agendas arise or where the proper exercise of human or legal rights may be in doubt, translators’ ethical and political judgements become as central to their task as cultural or linguistic competence. Translators cannot escape the burden of their moral proximity to others.

In Translation Studies and translation proper, ethical questions have centred on this ‘moral proximity’ of translators which, in translation, affects in-text, intertext,\(^{65}\) intertextual and meta-textual aspects, for example which books are translated and how widely they are disseminated, or the cultural transfer from SL to TL and so on. These considerations may be said to be driven by and validated in terms of larger socio-political deliberations on the “distinctively anglocentric image of translation”, colonialism, the largely hermeneutic models of translation, and the translator’s role in “mediating representation” and cultural identity (Venuti 2010).

With regards to these considerations, Venuti – arguably one of the most prolific contributors to the field of Translations Studies – asks the following important question: “Is it possible to think of translation as a gift that does not incur a debt or participate in a contract, whether with a publisher or a reader?” (Venuti 2010). What is noteworthy about this question is that: 1) it invokes a discussion on capitalism and the relationship between capitalism, publishing, writers, translation/translators, readers and so on; and 2) it moves away from prior Translation Studies arguments describing the vicissitudes between licentious and faithful translations (and even a combination of the two) and moves towards a discussion on models of translation which set up a kind of hierarchy about how translation is done. That is, the discussion moves away from foci of signification and

\(^{65}\) By which I mean target text to source text considerations and not *intertextual* considerations in the Kristevian sense.
semantics to themes of power relations and the distribution of power and excesses of power in the translation industry, therefore dislocating meaning by disrupting “the pressure of ... significations which besiege us” (Guattari 1995: 29). However, even though Venuti and other theorists recognise the fact that the “translator’s application of interpretants recontextualizes the source text, replacing intertextual and interdiscursive relations in the source language and culture with relations in the translating language and culture” and thus involves more than mere semantics, he nevertheless argues within the “usefulness of the hermeneutic model” (Venuti 2010), remaining within the constraints of structuralism and hermeneutics.

This preoccupation with the hermeneutics of source text (ST) and target text (TT) remains a constant thread throughout the history of translation praxis and is often discussed in terms of a text’s translatability or untranslatability. This is unavoidable as translation proper involves the actual transference of meaning and is therefore inextricably linked to meaning-making. Lezra (2008), for example, writes the following on the translation of the Astérix et Obélix series into Castillian:

> Years later, when I read these same works in French and English, I realized to my shock that the footnotes were not deliberate parabases but marks of melancholia or exasperation, a sort of throwing-up-of-the-hands left diacritically by a nameless translator who was unable if not unwilling to render into Spanish the French jeux de mots.

Here Lezra describes a feeling that most, if not all, translators are familiar with. For him, history “emerges as the criterion for understanding and evaluating the place of responsibility in translation.” The pointer to this ‘emerging’ of history in conjunction with “the place of responsibility” are, to my mind, the most important aspects of his deliberation as it suggests a space of becoming, but these facets are not explored in any detail by Lezra and, in fact, remain almost incidental aspects of his argument although he does conclude that it is necessary to translate the seemingly untranslatable and that this is how history ‘is made’. However, this emerging history, constructed from the ostensibly ‘untranslatable’, is more important than what Lezra suggests, especially when it intersects with translation because it poses the following question: how can history be dealt with ethically in translation? Or, considering Lezra’s phrasing, what does a responsible ethics

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66 Translatability and untranslatability are not used as absolute and discreet terms, but are rather discussed as occurring on a gamut which ranges from ‘more translatable’ to ‘more untranslatable’ due to certain constraints.
look like when a historicity emerges in translation? Walter Benjamin (2012: 76) refers to this historicity as the “afterlife” or “survival” of a translation and I argue that it is precisely this historicity or afterlife which marks the importance of the intersection between translation, politics and ethics as it is directly related to structural power relations and master narratives which often become perpetuated through time.

In this sense then ethics is not discreet and separable from politics. Rather, it exists on the same plane of consistency67 along a philosophical continuum describing certain salient expressions; i.e. politics and ethics are different relations to the same regulatory socio-economic arrangements. On this plane it may be said that nomadic ethics diverges from moral philosophy and universalism in that it questions the new emerging grand or master narratives which, to a large extent “entail American [and broader colonial] hegemony of the world markets” (Braidotti 2006: 2), resulting in a paralysed social agency. And this is precisely the focus of this chapter: namely to investigate the master narratives of translation praxis, and particularly translation praxis in South Africa and in Ingrid Winterbach’s oeuvre, by looking at the intersection between politics, translation and ethics. However, this ethics is not one of meaning transferral or adherence to a specific code of conduct, but rather one which dislocates meaning by interrogating structural power distributions and the historicity of master narratives with the aim of reclaiming social agency.

This idea of ‘translating history’ or ‘making history’, as well as ‘history as future’ is prominent in the works of Ingrid Winterbach as many of her novels “take root in Afrikaans settings and circumstances” (Lenta 2009a). But for Winterbach the issue is not merely writing about Afrikaners and Afrikaner history – at least not in a way that is definitive – but rather writing about Afrikaner concerns in such a way that it “transcends nationalistic enclosures” (Lenta 2009). In Niggie/To hell with Cronjé, a novel set in the Anglo Boer War, broader and on-going contemporary leitmotifs of Afrikanerism are explored in several ways, as I have mentioned before. The characters, for example, are both emotionally and ethically implicated in the political aspects of their social milieu (Du Plooy 2006) and

67 In A thousand plateaus (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: xvii), the world “plane” is used to “designate both a ‘plane’ in the geometrical sense and a ‘plan’”. Deleuze and Guattari primarily use this word in the first sense. They write: “The plane of consistency, or planomenon, is in no way an undifferentiated aggregate of unformed matters, but neither is it a chaos of formed matters of every kind ... it creates continuity for intensities that it extracts from distinct forms and substances” (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 70). In other words, all possible arrangements are brought together on this plane and all possible connections between these arrangements are made here but are also continuously disbanded. Also note that ‘plane of consistency’ is synonymous with the term “virtual”.

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topics such as “patriotism, the role of religion, discipline, passivity and boredom during the Anglo-Boer War” (Botha & Van Vuuren 2008b) are considered through Winterbach’s adaptation of the Oorlogsboek van Jan F.E. Cilliers, 1899-1902 (The war diary of Jan F.E. Cilliers, 1899-1902) which, even though “seemingly dwelling on the past” is also a metaphor for more current and post-Apartheid dilemmas of “the crumbling Afrikaans community” (Botha & Van Vuuren 2008b). Nigjie/To hell with Cronjé may therefore be said to explore the ethical dilemmas of power distributions both within the master narrative of Apartheid and that of the post-Apartheid ‘rainbow nation’.

But here ethics is not – as is more typical – concerned with an inquiry into an a priori moral code of Apartheid or post-Apartheid. Rather, as Botha and Van Vuuren (2008b) write: “dit is juist die aspekte van intertekstualiteit en historiografiese metafiksie … [wat] dien as ’n weerspieëling van die sosiale konflikte wat tans in die argumenteerbaar verbrokelende Afrikaans gemeenskap bestaan” (it is precisely the aspects of intertextuality and historiographical metafiction which serve as a kind of reflection of the social conflicts which currently exist in the arguably crumbling Afrikaans community). Thus, I argue, we could say that history and the historicity of master narratives allow for ethical reflection on “the underground of society” and a reading of the “symptoms of history” (Rancière 2004b, my emphasis); that is, the symptoms of a constructed social imaginary of ‘self’ and ‘other’, ‘original’ work and ‘translation’, and so on. And it is this social imaginary which constitutes the core issue at hand and the one I shall examine in this chapter, namely the tension between the normative proclivity for conservative territorialisations of master narratives on the one hand, and the increasing demand for subjective singularity on the other. The ‘ethics of translation’ is thus not used here as “a set of constraining rules that judge actions and intentions in relation to transcendent values of good and evil” but rather as “a creative commitment to maximizing connections, and [expanding] the possibilities of life” (Marks 2005b: 85). It is also in this sense that ethics, for Deleuze and Guattari, is “inextricably linked with the notion of becoming” and may be seen as an “experiment rather than [a] contract” (Marks 2005b: 85). Hence, it is a movement away from the ‘mechanical memory’ of linguistic signs where the “true, the good, [and] the beautiful are ‘normalising’ categories for processes which escape the logic of circumscribed sets” resulting in the reduced “ontological polyvocality” of human dialectal creativity (Guattari 1995: 4-29). A nomadic ethics, unlike morality, is therefore not about how we should or should not be or act, or about what we should translate and why
and according to which norms, but rather about a philosophy of becoming which is situational and removed from transcendent values. Such transcendent values are prevalent in many spheres of life and are often used to normalise hierarchical power distributions, including the master narratives of cultural identity.

4.2 Cultural identity and the minoritising of major cultures and languages

“Translation”, writes Annie Brisset (2012: 281) “is a dual act of communication. It presupposes the existence, not of a single code, but of two distinct codes, the ‘source language’ and the ‘target language’”. Translation is therefore, to paraphrase Brisset, about cultural identity, a recurring theme in Translation Studies debates on ethics. She goes on to explain that a “linguistic community is a market” and that languages are “symbolic commodities, each with its own use value and own exchange value” (Brisset 2012: 287); i.e. it is subject to market logic. Like Casanova (2004: 133), Brisset argues that translation from a small language into a major language consecrates the small language and its cultural identity and can even serve to elevate the status of a dialect to that of a language (Brisset 2012: 285). Language conflict, from this vantage, is seen as a “battle to conquer the symbolic-commodities market ... [and] to become institutionally dominant” (Brisset 2012: 287.) The ethical issue at hand here is therefore once again that of power relations and of power distributions within capitalist realism as so-called major languages are viewed here as more legitimate than small languages. From this one might deduce that creativity is assumed to be tied to regimes of power which can be used to manipulate sets of conventions; in this instance, narrative conventions and translation norms. Hence, both creativity in language and creativity in translation are not seen as structures of difference and are thus not “multiple and complex process[es] of transformation ... flux[es] of becoming” (Braidotti 2012: 306), but are seen rather as reterritorialising operations. In Brisset’s words: “Language must be co-extensive with a territory. There can be no sharing of language or territory” (Brisset 2012: 291). Hence, Brisset is reducing the codes not only to territory and market logic, but also to the languages worked with, and does not take into consideration the myriad codes involved in each translation instantiation which may – and often do – also include non-signifying ones. Brisset, like Casanova, may therefore be said to be describing translation as an apparatus of capture (in the negative sense, i.e. capture by the State apparatus) rather than as a process of becoming.
Of importance to this discussion, and as way of not turning translation into yet another State territorialisation, is a debate on small or minor languages within major languages. Afrikaans, as I have explained before, is rather unique as it was a major language during the Apartheid years in South Africa and even though its current status, alongside that of other indigenous languages, is now a minority language, it still enjoys the privileges of a major language in that despite the fact that it is spoken by a minority group and mainly within the borders of South Africa, it has been developed in the way a major language would be. For example, major works have been translated into Afrikaans, the language has an extensive vocabulary which includes technological and scientific jargon and which continues to grow, many educators are (still) fully proficient in Afrikaans, and so on.

Within this context of major and minority languages, Winterbach's novels may be viewed as doing something more than merely claiming (or reclaiming) ‘literary territory’ in that Afrikaans is minoritised in the Deleuzo-Guattarian sense within its major milieu.

Deleuze and Guattari (1986: 16-18) write: “A minor literature doesn’t come from a minor language; it is rather that which a minority constructs within a major language” and it is recognised by three distinctive characteristics, namely 1) a high degree of deterritorialisation; 2) political contiguity; and 3) a marked degree of collective enunciation. There are, therefore, “no possibilities for an individuated enunciation that would belong to this or that ‘master’” and, consequently, minor literatures make no attempt at furthering national identity or observing market logic. Hence, contrary to Brisset and Casanova’s understanding of languages and literatures, minor literatures are not co-extensive with a territory, do not aim at being consecrated and, as such, may be viewed as doing politics rather than being political (according to Rancière’s distinction as clarified in Chapter 3).

Winterbach’s writing may also be said to be a minor literature in that it is characterised by the three abovementioned features. Winterbach’s writing style (e.g. syntax construction) and thematic concerns, for example, are marked by a high degree of deterritorialisation through the use of the enigmatic trickster figure and references to dreams and the supernatural which run “counter to [normative] religious, social and ethical codes” (Botha & Van Vuuren 2008a). Her continual attempt at transcending individual and nationalistic parameters through, for example “references to death and mortality” (Human 2008), is characteristic of collective enunciation, and her work can be said to be doing politics.
through her usage of the writing style coined as *écriture féminine* by Hélène Cixous (1976). From this we may deduce that Winterbach employs a nomadic ethics in that her works constitute perpetual fluxes of becoming. But how is this minor aspect transferred from original novel to translated novel, if at all? Or, we might ask: if translation is about becoming rather than about the consecration of a minority language through semantic and cultural transfer into a major language, what are the ethical questions that come into play?

One of the difficulties faced by a translator dealing with Winterbach’s oeuvre is that of names – an aspect which renders something about Winterbach’s minor tenor of Afrikaans within its major tradition in that the character names not only betray something about the character, but also about the character within a specific context and from a specific history. The names can therefore not simply be transferred into an English equivalent. In *Niggie/To hell with Cronjé*, for example, the name Niggie (meaning “cousin”) is kept in the translation, but much of the connotation is lost. Niggie – as used in the novel – is a structural element which serves as commentary on the personal status of women in Afrikaner history as well as the political freedom of individuals and collectives and how these are interdependent on each other (Du Plooy 2006). The master narratives of colonisation and Apartheid, as well as the disintegration of Afrikaner identity (Viljoen & Van der Merwe 2007) are also called into question. The irony of the name Niggie lies in the fact that women, especially, were often called by such generic names, rendering them ‘nameless’ and thus void of individual identity. Furthermore, the fact that the title of the novel is *Niggie* suggests that the novel is about a specific woman, yet the female characters are only introduced to readers towards the end of the text, alluding to their place within Afrikaner patriarchy. This aspect is lost in the translation as the title is changed to *To hell with Cronjé* which may indicate that the translator assumed that much of the irony of the title would be lost on an English readership anyway. Niggie’s confession that the generic term is not her real name (p.178) reveals her as a trickster figure (Botha & Van Vuuren 2008b, John 2008) and this aspect at least is kept in translation.

From this example it becomes clear that if translation is about meaning or cultural transfer only, it narrows translation praxis to issues centring on losses and gains, but if the translator recognises from the start that translation inevitably comprises losses and gains,
s/he can move beyond semantic and cultural representation to find a mode of translating which constitutes a becoming, thus finding the minor within the major.

Another characteristic of Ingrid Winterbach’s oeuvre which is important here is her continuous contention with issues of representation and definitive characterisation – also a longstanding debate within the field of Translation Studies.

4.3 The problem of speaking for others or: imperialist assimilation

It is not difficult to imagine why it might be politically dishonest and unethical to speak for others. Linda Alcoff (1991), as I mentioned in Chapter 3, writes that this ‘problem’ has arisen mainly from two sources. The first is “a growing concern that where one speaks from affects the meaning and truth of what one says”, and the second is a recognition that “certain privileged locations are discursively dangerous”. In other words, one cannot assume to be capable of transcending one’s own socio-political location and neither can one assume to fully know or understand another’s plight. Furthermore, the delineation of group identity is in itself unstable and even speaking only for oneself is not uncomplicated as one is also representing (signifying, demonstrating) oneself “as occupying a specific subject-position, having certain characteristics and not others” (Alcoff 1991), etc.

In translation praxis the representation of others is almost assumed to be sanctioned to some degree – if not unproblematically – as it is a seemingly inherent and ‘natural’ function of translation in that it forms part and parcel of linguistic and identity transfer from ST to TT. But translating linguistic and cultural identities are also bound up in the co-construction and mediation of others’ subject-positions. However, as Baltrush (2010) states, “this culturalization should not be considered as a social fact, but as a symptom of a methodology imposed by a privileged Western system which is primarily concerned with controlling the canonical definitions of cultural identities, science, art, etc.” His main concern could thus be said to be with methods that enable stable territorialisations and reterritorialisations of representation, i.e. State territorialisations. It is possible then, we might ask, to find different methods that create on lines of flight so that discursive private and public ‘selves’ and ‘others’ remain open to a nomadic ethics?
In part-answer to this question, it is necessary to interrogate Baltrush’s view which takes only methodology into account and does not account for representations in themselves. For Deleuze, representation itself is implicitly precarious as it “entails an essentially moral view of the world ... drawing on what ‘everybody knows’” (Marks 2005c: 227). This may be said to be a philosophy of transcendent values which relies on fixed norms and invariable ‘essences’ and thus assumes an inherent or a priori set of deterministic guiding values which is not linked to specific locations and situations. What is called for, in a sense, is to start from a place in favour of anti-representational thought; that is, to “undermine the primacy of the original over the copy” (Marks 2005c: 227).

This idea of the original and the copy is not a novel one in Translation Studies and debates on this issue became particularly nuanced when they moved from discussions around signification and semantics in the original work vs. the translated work to include deliberations on ideological and intercultural transfer (e.g. Tymoczko 2006b). This also includes debates on “the homogenizing ambition of Anglo-American as universal language” (Venn 2006) which, once again, centres on relations of power and excesses of power. Couze Venn continues by arguing that “translation-as-colonization” is deeply embedded in capitalism and market logic which, in effect, “abolishes the possibility of alternative worlds” or assemblages of difference.

This kind of structural violence may be viewed as a direct result of a normative ethics and the legitimisation of the ‘right’ to universalise. The danger lies in the fact that the promise of universalisation, namely cosmopolitanism and inclusivity, is little more than a thinly disguised façade. Janofsky (2006), quoting President George W. Bush, writes:

> In order to convince people we care about them, we’ve got to understand their culture and show them we care about their culture. You know, when somebody comes to me and speaks Texan, I know they appreciate Texas culture. When somebody takes time to figure out how to speak Arabic, it means they’re interested in somebody else’s culture. [...] We need intelligence officers who, when somebody says something in Arabic or Farsi or Urdu, know what they’re talking about.

This view on translation – what Rafael (2012: 466) terms “imperial assimilation” – may seem a crude one, but it is not uncommon and often remains relegated to translation

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69 Deleuze holds that representation “cannot help us to encounter the world as it appears in the flow of time and becoming” as it is based on ‘fixed’ norms and ‘static’ knowledge which “is unable to acknowledge difference ‘in itself’” (Marks 2005c: 227). Anti-representational thought is thus an acknowledgement of the difference of becoming.
discussions centring on ideological and intercultural transfer, or remains buried in cumbersome national language policy documents. This is applicable to South Africa as well which, despite the fact that the country has eleven official languages named in its constitution, promotes mainly English in its language policy (Alexander 2003; Ndlovu 2008). The effect of this is that representation is no longer merely an ethical question related to speaking for others, but is now related to ‘others’ representing *themselves* from a homogenised Anglo position. This, I argue, is the direct result of discipline in the Foucaultian sense which in essence means that power arrangements controlling the visibility of the centre and the invisibility of the marginalised has territorialised not only externally, but internally as well. There is thus an inevitable reduction of diversity – even in languages and literatures – in favour of the preservation of homogenisation and a single world-view. Mary Midgley (1996: 123) writes:

> If humans need wood, trees must be replanted, but they should always be trees that will supply this need most quickly and economically. There is no reason to conserve existing species, and certainly not to aim at diversity as such. And after all there are a lot of kinds of trees about. So, what could possibly go wrong with universal monocultured eucalyptus?

In this excerpt Midgley succinctly captures the violence of the disciplined society; the supplanting of a homogenising and normative ethics by the centre onto the periphery, and self-representation from a homogenised Anglo position (and an Afrikaner position during Apartheid in South Africa) undertaken by the marginalised. In Deleuzian terms it simultaneously reflects the absolutist aspect of the majority and the dispossessed aspect of the minorities. “This is a system,” writes Braidotti (2006: 60) “of centreless but constant surveillance and manipulation, which pitches the centre against the many peripheries in a complex logic that operates not only between the geopolitical blocks, but also within them.”

In *Die boek/The book*, Ingrid Winterbach continuously lists Afrikaans words that have fallen into disuse or have become obsolete as resistance to the disciplined society in that the minor language is preserved both in the original and in the translated works. In *Die boek van toeval en toeverlaat* (pp.80-81) we find the following list (one of many) which allows both the protagonist – Helena Verbloem – as well as Winterbach herself to act as

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70 As discussed in Chapter 3.
archivist or collector who gathers, organises and preserves this linguistic and cultural knowledge for future use:


In *The book of happenstance*, this passage is translated as follows (pp. 79-80):

I sit with the cards in my hand. We are still busy with the letter D. *Dorskuur* – cure brought about by restriction of fluid intake. Dorsnood. Suffering from the throes of thirst? I ask. Similar to other less commonly used word combinations like *dorsbrand* (burning caused by thirst), *dorsdood* (death from thirst), *dorspyn* (pain caused by thirst), Theo explains. Shall we go and have a drink? I ask. (Theo smiles). *Dos* (checked out). (How charming he looked this morning, decked out – *uitgedos* – in that fine, cream silk shirt.) “Gedos in die drag van die dodekleed,” Leipoldt says.

Decked out in the apparel of the shroud. *Doteer* (donate). *Douig* (dewy) – not a word particularly suited to this province. *Douboog* (rainbow formed by dew), *doubos* (dew bush – word used in West Griqualand for the shrub *Cadaba termitaria*), *doubraam* (bramble bush of which the fruit is covered with a thin waxy layer). The many word combinations formed with *draad* (wire), with *drag* (variant of *dra* – carry) and with *draai* (turn). Who would have thought, I say to Theo, that simple words like these could be the basis for so many combinations? *Draaihaar* (regional word for hair crown). Has it been your experience as well that people with many crowns in their hair are unusually hot-tempered? Theo smiles and shakes his head. *Draaihartigheid* (disease caused by a bug found in cruciferous plants whereby their leaves turn inward). The word sounds like a character trait, I say, a twisting and turning state of the heart. Theo nods and smiles. *Draais* (the word used by children when playing marbles, yet sounding so much like a synonym for *jags* – horny). But it is especially *droef* (sad) that interests me. Woeful. Indicative of sorrow. Causing grief or accompanying it.
Evoking a sombre or doleful mood. *Bedroewend* – saddening. Also in combination with colours, to indicate that a particular colour is murky or muted and can elicit sadness, sorrowfulness and dejection. *Droefwit* (mournful white). And *droefheid* is the condition of being sad, sorrowful or mournful; inclined to dejection, depression and despondency; something gloomy, cheerless and downcast, as opposed to joy. Is that all? I think. So few words for an emotion with so many shades?

The complete colour spectrum – from *droefwit* (mournful white) to *droefswart* (mournful black), from *droefpers* (mournful purple) to *droefrooi* (mournful red). (*Droeforanje, droefblanje, droefblou* – mournful orange, mournful white, mournful blue.)

In these two passages – ostensibly two sides of an embroidery – something fascinating takes place: even though the lists of archaic Afrikaans vocabulary is preserved in both the original and the translation and thus resists self-representation from a homogenised Anglo position, we find that there is less emphasis on the meanings of each of these archaic word forms in the Afrikaans version than there is in the English. In the original, more emphasis is placed on using the obsolete words in new contexts, thereby reviving them and giving them ‘new life’ as a form of resistance to the final sentence which alludes to the crumbling post-Apartheid Afrikaner culture also referred to by Botha and Van Vuuren (2008b) as I mentioned before. Additionally, in addressing the question of language and cultural death, as well as the status of Afrikaans as a minority language, Winterbach, through Helena Verbloem, critically engages with current debates centering on the fate of Afrikaner culture and Afrikaans and invites the reader – both Afrikaans and English – to do the same. In this way Winterbach reclaims social agency in that she questions the master narrative of Anglocentrism by giving prominence to Afrikaans and even archaic Afrikaans lexicon. The focus is therefore once again not on meaning transfer but rather on a kind of ethical resistance – against Anglocentrism in this case – which allows for new becomings.

### 4.4 Becoming-nomad, becoming-woman

The material affects of discursive rights, by which I mean here the structural eviction or ‘backgrounding’ of certain languages and literatures, forms part of Translation Studies debates centring on the contentious nature of colonialism and its lasting effects which, in translation practices could be referred to as the “distinctively anglocentric image of translation” (Venuti 2010). Pennycook (1994: 108) describes this process as the

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71 Refer to Chapter 2 for the translation of the final sentence.
imperialistic need for language to be disciplined in the Foucaultian sense; “that is to say that the construction of the discipline of linguistics and the discipline of applied linguistics had a disciplining effect (cf. surveillance in French) on the construction of knowledge” about how languages work, but also about what languages should be made to do. Consequently, very definitive power relations have been created between “knowledge forms and forms of power” (Simon 1992: 85) which materially affect industrialisation and standardisation, and also have a marked influence on the production and contextualisation of, in this case, literary distribution. Linguistics (in its broadest sense) could thus be said to be a form of cultural politics (i.e. the political) following a moral or normative ethics where language has emerged “as a homogeneous unity, as objectively describable, [and] as an isolated structural unity” in which meaning is seen as stable and “taken either to reside in a world/world correspondence that is best articulated in English or within the system itself” (Pennycook 1994: 109). It thus delimits creativity within the boundaries of State territorialisations.

To counter the existing power of dominant forces, Deleuze and Guattari (1987) return to a rhizomatic politics and a nomadic ethics; that is to say they take as their point of reference “historical experience” and “specific location” (Braidotti 2006: 67) which allows for a shift in the structural position of ‘others’ by reintroducing the “difference immanent within the construction of events” (Stagoll 2005a: 21). In other words, rather than imposing an external code which is assumed to be innate and universal, and which allows only for creativity within a stable structure, their focus is on the in-between space, or the becoming-space (the immanent), which is not static, but rather constitutes a dynamic space through which something passes on its way to another becoming-space and during which it may be altered or intensified. As a result there exists a continual production of singularities or, as Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 29) explain, it is on this plane that one is “fully part of the crowd and at the same time completely outside of it”; it is here with Virginia Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway that we will never again say “I am this, I am that” (Woolf 2012: 11). Instead there is now a becoming-space as the one described by Winterbach in Die boek/The book (pp.257-258 and pp.252-253 respectively):72

“So sou ek wou kon skryf,” sê sy, “so sonder agtergrondgedruis en tussenkoms van die skrywerstem. As ek kon skryf, sou ek tussen myself end dit waaroor ek skryf ’n groot afstand wou hê. Begryp jy?”

72 I have quoted this passage before (in Chapter 3) but it was used in a different context.
“Nie heerltemaal nie,” sê ek.
Sy wys na die horison. Lug en see vorm nou een aanenlopende, somber vlak. ‘n Skip lê roerloos op die einder.
“So sou ek wou skryf as ek kon,” sê sy, “met so min wat oënskynlik gebeur, maar met so ’n geladenheid.

“That is how I would have liked to write,” she says. “Without the writer’s voice droning in the background. If I could write, I would want some distance between myself and what I write about. Do you understand?”

“That’s how I would have liked to write if I could,” she says, “with little happening ostensibly, but everything charged with meaning.”

It is in this way then that Winterbach’s writing – her language use, her nonlinear style, her thematic refrains and so on – create stutterings or the experience of difference in protest of the major and in exploration of the minor in the major: on the surface, ostensibly little is taking place, but at a closer glance it becomes clear that “everything is charged with meaning” even though a stable meaning is not the end goal but merely a passing; a constant process of becoming. As a consequence of this becoming-minor or becoming-nomad, the periphery gains structural visibility and reclaims heterogeneity. A nomadic ethics emerges here, accentuated by the “necessity of not having control over language, of being a foreigner in one’s own tongue, in order to draw speech to oneself and bring something incomprehensible to the world” (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 378). Such is the nature of becoming-nomad or becoming-woman: an allowing which gives rise to the formation of a war machine. And it is just such an allowing, I argue, which is captured so beautifully in Winterbach’s use of Engfrikaans; an allowing which not only creates space for stutterings in Afrikaans, but also creates virtual possibilities for stutterings or immanent becoming-spaces in the translation as well.

Engfrikaans, as I explained in earlier chapters, is “a form of code switching used by certain Afrikaans authors” (John 2004). The effect of Engfrikaans may be seen as a form of protest against the rigidity of ‘standard’ Afrikaans and Afrikaner stereotypes and, in terms of translation, creates difficulty for any complete or monolingual English translation.

Winterbach (2012b) wants to be translated and therefore assumes that a translation will be done.
(without such a monolingual transfer losing the creativity of this particular form of code switching). Some readers, however, have voiced disapproval of Engfrikaans, such as Johannes Comester (2014) who writes the following (with my translation thereafter):

Is dit werlik ’n weerspieëling van die toestand waarin Afrikaanse resensente en literatore verval het; dat doelbewus onsuwiere Afrikaans sonder protes gelees, bespreek en hartlik aanbeveel word? Is my suiwer taalgegronde kruistog teen Kaaps, wat aan dieselfde (ongeneeslike) Engelse siekte ly, onredbaar outyds en uit die bose? Is dit nie simptomaties van Afrikaners, wat hulle trots, insluitende hulle moedertaaltrots, verloor het...

(Is this truly a reflection of the state of decay in which Afrikaans reviewers and literators find themselves; that impure Afrikaans is read, discussed and recommended without protest? Is my pure linguistic crusade against Kaaps, which suffers from the same (incurable) English disease, hopelessly evil and obsolete? Is this not symptomatic of Afrikaners who have lost their pride, including pride in their mother-tongue...)

I argue that the use of Engfrikaans in Winterbach’s oeuvre is not “a reflection of the state of decay” in Afrikaans but is a deliberate structural element as Ingrid Winterbach’s novels clearly demonstrates that she has a strong command of the Afrikaans language and is herself concerned with its decay. This is illustrated most clearly in Die boek van toeval en toeverlaat/The book of happenstance in which these concerns are actualised through the lists of archaic Afrikaans lexicon. Engfrikaans, I contend, is used by Winterbach to create a becoming-space. Consider, for example, the following passage from Die aanspraak van lewende wesens (p.188, Maria Volschenk in conversation with her son Benjy):

Hoe gaan dit? wil sy weet. Hy is ontwykend. Nee, dit gaan okay. (Dit help nie om langer uit te stel nie.) Wat makeer, vra sy hom, wat is die probleem?
Hy’s actually soos in hierdie besigheid, hierdie kind of venture wat jy ’n besigheid kan noem maar dis ook nie actualy eintlik nie, ennieway hy en twee ander ouens het dit soos in eintlik ge- initiate, hy sal haar soontoe neem, die premises is shit great, dis actualy shit hot en die prospects is soos van yslik, as hulle net, as dit nie was, as dis soos van vast, die possibilities is endless, dis net soort van hierdie initial stumbling blocks, soos in obstacles, net erger. Maar dis eintlik soort van ’n ideal opportunity.

All the English words/phrases or Anglicised words/phrases have been underlined. A direct translation would read:
How are things? she wants to know. He is evasive. No, it's okay. (It doesn't help to postpone any longer.) What's up, she asks him, what is the problem?

He's actually as in got this business, this kind of venture that you can call a business but also as in actually not. Anyway, he and two other guys actually as in initiated it, he'll take her there, the premises is shit-great, its actually shit-hot and the prospects are as in massive, if they only, if it wasn't for, it's as in vast, the possibilities are endless. It's just kind of these initial stumbling blocks, as in obstacles, only worse. But it's actually sort of an ideal opportunity.

This translation concretises one of the ‘problems’ of translation, especially in a multilingual society such as South Africa where translation happens predominantly “into English, out of other South African languages”, so that “this monolingual privilege can be confirmed and extended” (Coetzee: 2013: 3), rendering the Other without agency. But if we move away from a concrete (or extensive) translation such as mine above and consider instead the virtual possibilities and the intensive multiplicities which exist there – i.e. the in-between space which allows for a creative leap – there emerges a nomadic ethics which allows for an ontological polyvocality or intensity which may also be viewed as a reclaiming of social agency. The above passage can therefore be said to represent only one extensive possibility, but there are still many more possibilities which may in fact contain far greater creative possibilities. I am thus arguing here in favour of plurality; that is, a reclaiming of social agency which is not reliant on an ethics of moral normativity (subject to the Self), but instead seeks out the intensive or becoming-space where the dislocation of meaning – and meaning over time or in history – takes place. But does this mean that meaning-making or semantic transference is made obsolete? In order to investigate this question, I shall return here to the intensive as described by Deleuze and Guattari and relate it to Carli Coetzee’s notion of accentedness.

4.4.1 Reclaiming social agency

In Chapter 1 I explained Deleuze and Guattari’s ontology or diagram of reality as consisting of and being in constant flux between the virtual, the intensive and the actual or extensive, i.e. it contains all real (but not actual) existing and emergent properties inherent in diverse multiplicities and their immanent singularities with the capacity for bifurcations (De Landa 2002: 56-61). In terms of translation praxis, the virtual may be seen as the entire translational range available to the translator/s which is real but not actual (or actualised). The intensive, in turn, may be described as that aspect of the virtual which is
changed in its movement from one becoming-space to another. It is, in other words, the realm “where heterogeneity is retained and each virtual singularity really exists despite the fact that they cannot be actualised at once” (Bonta & Protevi 2004: 15).

Accordingly, the intensive – at least with regards to translation praxis – could be said to represent the point of origin for a nomadic ethics. Carli Coetzee (2013: 1) discusses this kind of nomadic ethics – or the reclaiming of social agency as a practice of nomadic ethics – as an argument “against translation” – in favour of what she terms accentedness; that is, the translator “has to resist the homogenised (orientalised, some might say as a shorthand) representation of ourselves/themselves, and offer, instead, heterogeneity and a refusal of essence” (Coetzee 2013: 3). I contend that this ‘refusal to translate’ may in fact be viewed not only as the reclaiming of social agency, but also as a kind of ‘ethical cleansing’ (i.e. the dislocation of meaning) in that translation, from this view, requires for writing and translation not to be about cultural transfer and the manipulation of linguistic conventions or semantic content, but instead to be an orientation. It is thus about “the skill that consists in developing a compass of the cognitive, affective and ethical kind” (Braidotti 2012: 307); an orientation which allows creativity to exist as a multiplicity or to be accented so that languages become diverse, even within themselves (e.g. Engfrikaans).

Coetzee (2013: 1) goes on to explain that translation praxis, as we currently know it, is in fact not aimed at mutuality through cultural and semantic transfer as it is thought to be, nor does it allow one to “imagine the position of another” as I have shown earlier in this chapter. Instead, she argues, it is a “suspect activity in which inequalities (of economics, politics, gender, geography) are not only reflected but also reproduced in the mechanics of textual production.” In place of translation Coetzee argues for accentedness, stating that the term “accent” is not restricted here to its linguistics sense but is rather “intent on differentiation and stratification”, denoting an acknowledgment of “a specific, even ‘local’, orientation or field of reference” (Coetzee 2013: 3). Accentedness in favour of translation can therefore be seen as a kind of nomadic ethics of translation; a multiple intensity which is not static and does not defer to the transcendent, but instead is “in defence of difficulty, of failure and of misunderstanding” (Coetzee 2013: 167). I further contend that a nomadic ethics of refusal in Coetzee’s sense is also a reclaiming of social agency in that it is a
choice for resingularisation, a “defiant response to the TINA (‘There Is No Alternative’) doctrine” (Jun & Smith 2011: 2) which is reified by the hyper-colonial capitalist society.

This society, which functions from a normative and moral ethical code is not, however, merely a description of the state of things in the abstract. If it were it would be relatively innocuous but, as I illustrated in Chapter 3, it is in fact a suspicious, politically charged material flow in relation with many other material flows such as biological flows, geographical flows, linguistic flows, etc. and, as such, has the capacity to influence or even drive collective action. Furthermore, such a material flow is not defined only in terms of “its internal milieu, but also ecologically, by the external movements which preside over its distribution within an extensity” (Deleuze’s 1994: 217). In other words, people and their environments are in constant material fluxes with each other, “everywhere a staging at several levels” (Deleuze 1994: 217), continually forming many different virtual and extensive connections which alter one another internally and externally.

This web of connections and their frayings is a central and recurring theme in Ingrid Winterbach’s oeuvre and is also an extensive actualisation of her reclaiming social agency in that these webs constitute one of the ways in which she refuses deferment to the transcendent. For example, her description of linguistic (obsolete and active Afrikaans lexicon), geographical (topographical and terrestrial evolution) and biological (the evolution of shells, insects, humans, etc.) flows in Die boek van toeval en toeverlaat/The book of happenstance, Niggie/To hell with Cronjé and Karolina Ferreira/The elusive moth in particular demonstrate this refusal (as I have illustrated in the preceding chapters), which is also emphasised in other ways in her other novels. Of most interest to me, however, are not her descriptions and depictions of the connections amid these flows, but rather the accounts of what happens when the networks between these flows break down, because it is precisely in this kind of collapse that the Other becomes structurally visible and which allows for the translation to become accented.

In Niggie/To hell with Cronjé, we are told that young Abraham watched his brother die in front of him during combat and as a result of intense metaphysical pain, Abraham loses his ability to speak in any coherent fashion (Botha & Van Vuuren 2006a). Yet despite the

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74 Resingularisation in the Guattarian sense, refers to “the potentiality for, and practicalities of, refiguring our subjectivities” (O’ Sullivan 2014) and is, for both him and Deleuze, a materialist project aimed at the formation of new relations which allow for novel experiences.
fact that his speech has been reduced to mainly monosyllabic utterings, his language still reveals something about the broader socio-political context and Afrikaner narrative. Botha & Van Vuuren (2006a) describe, for example, how Abraham’s utterings “ghams”, “moffel” and “petoeter” (p.65) may in fact be onomatopoeic repetitions of a machine gun sound and can therefore be seen as commentary on the war and on Afrikaner culture and language. Furthermore, I argue, these utterances structurally centre Abraham as the Other in that his broken speech draws attention to him as a marginal figure both within the novel and in a broader context as his broken speech is indicative of the loss of Afrikaner identity and the minoritising75 of Afrikaans.

In the translation, however, Abraham’s distorted speech is simply translated as “The blast, the blast” (p.75) and, as a result, becomes focused on meaning rather than on accentedness. In this sense, the translation of Abraham’s utterances has failed as it does not allow for a becoming and in fact deprives the reader of “difficulty, of failure and of misunderstanding” (Coetzee 2013: 167). Rather than allowing for a plurality in the material possibilities of interpretation and multiple translations, this very literal translation of Abraham’s aphasia removes the minoritising76 aspect of Winterbach’s writing, separating it “from its power of acting” (Smith 2011: 125) and thus from an immanent or nomadic ethics; that is, an ethics of desire.

4.4.2 Desire as resistance

If desire is not linked to a transcendent set of morals, will it not inevitably be reduced to subjectivism and relativism? This indeed has been the question raised in regards to Spinoza and Nietzsche’s philosophies on ethics. Deleuze and Guattari, in continuation of Spinoza and Nietzsche’s work, developed a philosophy of desire that contests the “conception of desire as premised on [an internal] ‘lack’ or regulated by [an external] ‘law’” (Ross 2005: 63). The question for Deleuze thus shifts from What should I do? or How should I do it? to “What can I do, what am I capable of doing?” (Deleuze 1994: 41); i.e. the emphasis shifts from morality (the transcendent) to power (the immanent). This

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75 Used here to denote the political change from major to minority language; it is thus not used here in the Deleuzo-Guattarian sense.
76 Used here in the Deleuzo-Guattarian sense.
immanent desire is also no longer located within the individual as a closed-off entity, but is now a social force that flows within and between bodies and is “able to form connections and enhance the power of bodies in their connection” (Ross 2005: 63). Desire – because it is no longer linked to privileged ways of seeing/being, nor regulated by lack – is thus an on-going experiment or becoming; a continuous relation or assemblage of material flows on a plane of immanence. Hence, desire is that which flows through assemblages but also that which holds them together and may be said to be that which ‘holds’ the space for accentedness in both an original work and its translation.

Here we reach an interesting point: if we agree with the philosophy of desire as developed by Deleuze and Guattari and agree that it allows for a redistribution of power in that it does not pit Self against Other but in fact locates power as a social arrangement of intensive affect (i.e. accentedness) which is not linked to the transcendent in any way, we may deduce that desire in this sense is in fact a form of resistance (to State territorialisations). In other words, desire may be viewed as a nomadic war machine which is at once linked to a rhizomatic politics and an immanent philosophy of ethics in that it does not promote deference to the transcendent and thus to imperialist assimilation. Moreover, it does not distribute power in a hierarchic fashion, but instead transforms such social conditions (i.e. that of political subjectivity to an external and imposed moral philosophy) by fastening power to action once more, thus dislocating dominant power formations and the void left by them. Braidotti (2006: 74) writes:

The vacuous nature of dominant power formations has been analysed by Foucault as the Panopticon; the void that lies at the heart of the system and which defines that contour of both social and symbolic visibility. Deleuze and Guattari also comment on the fact that any dominant notion such as masculinity or race has no positive definition. The prerogative of being dominant means that a concept gets defined oppositionally, by casting outwards upon others the mark of oppression or marginalization. The centre is dead and void; there is no becoming there. The action is at the city gates, where nomadic tribes of world-travelled polyglots are taking a short break.

In other words, a philosophy of desire – that is, an ethics of immanence – supports a conception of life as assemblages of material flows, intent on finding new modes of becoming-translated/translation or accented. It is at this juncture then that we come full

37 In other words, desire is premised to be inherently connective; assemblages flowing through and between individuals or desiring machines.
circle to “a choice for processuality, irreversibility and resingularisation” (Guattari 1995: 29).

If we consider Abraham’s nonsense-speak again and from the perspective of desire, we might ask: what can the translation do? In so doing, we move away from preoccupations centring on the lack of an English equivalent to finding an accentedness in translation. For example, the broken phrases could have been kept untranslated rather than seeking imperialist (English) assimilation with its finality in “The blast, the blast” (p.75). If Abraham’s utterings “ghams”, “moffel” and “petoeter” (p.65) are simply kept, they allow for a becoming as the interpretation remains in constant flux and will vary from person to person, allowing for multiple translations. In this way the reader has to confront – through a struggle – the loss of meaning and the disintegration of self and other in that the reader, like Abraham, can no longer rely on predefined knowledge. This, I argue, is also why (at least some of) the passages containing Engfrikaans in Winterbach’s oeuvre should remain untranslated.

Winterbach’s preoccupation with the history of the Anglo-Boer War may also be seen as a form of desire in that desire here becomes a positive and productive force which “supports the conception of life as material flows” (Ross 2005: 63). Hence, the Anglo-Boer war is a material flow which marks the furthest point in history shared as collective Afrikaner memory because Afrikaner historians only emerged during this time (Botha & Van Vuuren 2006b). The conflation of history and literature, explains Dominick La Capra (2001: 15), may seem to be binary opposites, but in fact the “interaction or mutually interrogative relation between historiography and art (including fiction) is more complicated than suggested by either an identity or binary opposition between the two.”

As I explained earlier, history and the historicity of master narratives allows for ethical reflection on the “symptoms of history” (Rancière 2004b, my emphasis) and the use of the Anglo-Boer War in Winterbach’s novels, I argue, allows the reader to interrogate the constructed social imaginary of self and other. This becomes especially interesting in translation when the race pejorative is used by Ingrid Winterbach in *Niggie/To hell with Cronjé*. Botha and Van Vuuren (2006a) observe that the censoring of these words and their consequent law enforced removal from the dictionary after the fall of Apartheid means that these words have been de-historised. The question we are left with is: is it ethical to translate the kaffir-conjunctions used by Ingrid Winterbach in *Niggie* considering
The answer to this question – if seen from a moralistic point of view – is almost certainly no! But if looked at from a nomadic ethics we have to ask: what is the race pejorative and conjunctions thereof doing? And what can it do in translation? I argue that Winterbach uses the race pejorative in *Niggie* to: 1) serve as a reminder of Afrikaner history and the brutalities of Apartheid; and 2) to preserve these words in text, thus re-historising them but in a way that it questions the grand narratives of Afrikanerism and Afrikaner history rather than furthers any form of nationalism. Furthermore, the kaffir-conjunctions reveal the entrenched Afrikaner social imaginary exemplified by the character Willem who holds that Afrikaners are a superior race at war with Black people who should be converted to (white) Christianity and serve the Afrikaner. In contrast, the characters Ben and Reitz reveal their disillusion with the war through their word associations, thus disrupting the normative Afrikaner framework as is clear from these kaffir-conjunctions (I have listed only the translation here as this quote has been used earlier in this dissertation, pp. 33-34):

“Kaffir thorn,” Ben says, “a kind of tree.”
“Kaffir cow,” Willem says, “cow belonging to a Kaffir.”
“Kaffir sheeting,” says Reitz, “a thick, soft cotton.”
“Kaffir cherry,” says Ben, “a raisin bush.”
“Kaffir beer,” says Reitz, “beverage drunk by Kaffirs.”
“Kaffir work,” says Willem, “work not fit for white people.”
“Kaffir copper,” says Ben, “a large russet butterfly.”
“Kaffir hangman,” says Reitz, “an executor or oppressor of Kaffirs.”
“Kaffir chief,” says Ben, “a bird with an extremely long tail.”
“Kaffir captain,” says Willem, “chief of a Kaffir tribe.”
“Kaffir pebble,” says Reitz, “pebble found in gravel to indicate the presence of diamonds.”
“Kaffirboom leaf minor,” says Ben, “insect found on the kaffirboom.”
“Kaffir grave,” says Reitz, “hump across a road to prevent water erosion.”
“Kaffir kraal,” says Willem, “dwelling place of Kaffirs.”
“Kaffir swallow,” says Ben, “a kind of swift.”
“Kaffir pound,” says Reitz, “nickname for a penny.”
“Kaffir war,” says Willem, “war between white people and Kaffirs.”
“Kaffir-corn midge,” says Ben, “small gallfly with bright wings.”
“Kaffir corn,” says Reitz, “fine, diamond-bearing gravel.”
“Kaffir missionary,” says Willem, “missionary that works among Kaffirs.”
“Kaffir crane,” says Ben, “large bird with long legs and neck.”
“Kaffir half-crown,” says Reitz, “another name for a penny.”
“Kaffir nation,” says Willem, “nation consisting of Kaffirs.”
These conjunctions could be said to reflect the “fundamental codes of a culture” (Foucault 2002: xxii); codes which have a materiality to them and which are carried through in history. These conjunctions reveal – through language – an important aspect of Afrikaner imperialism as well as Afrikaner disillusionment, and the intersection between history and literature allows here for a reassessment of entrenched worldviews. Literature thus gains a ‘historical consciousness’ which is transferred in the translation of Niggie to To hell with Cronjé. In this way the translation also gains a historical consciousness and disrupts the primacy afforded to Afrikanerism by rendering Afrikaner history into English. Also, the notions of ‘self’ and ‘other’ are conflated in that Afrikaners no longer occupy the central position in the South African milieu. This is brought into sharp focus in Winterbach’s Niggie and the translation thereof as the grand narratives of Afrikanerism are interrogated. In this sense, both the novel and its translation may be viewed as acts of resistance to pervasive memes and norms and, as such, may be said to employ an ethics of desire which is a material, social force that is no longer linked to privileged ways of seeing, but instead is “able to form connections and enhance the power of bodies in their connection” (Ross 2005: 63). It is thus an ethical orientation away from “the flow of norms through generations (and across communities) [which] may result in both meshworks and hierarchies” (De Landa 1997: 186). But such an ethical orientation, I argue, requires more than accentedness and the dislocation of meaning in translation and history, and in fact requires a grounding in a materialist philosophy because translation does not occur in a vacuum; it is influenced by myriad material flows, some apparent and some not, which in turn have their own material effects/affects linked to certain “knowledge forms and forms of power” (Simon 1992: 85). Thus, a nomadic ethics of translation has a responsibility to consider the materiality (or material flows) of a novel so that “historical experience” and “specific location” (Braidotti 2006: 67), as well as the structural position of ‘others’ are held within the virtual, allowing for intensive multiplicities and minor-becomings which, in turn, redistributes excesses of power so that the periphery gains structural visibility and heterogeneity is reclaimed. As a result, the emphasis shifts from meaning-making and morality (the transcendent) to social power and an ethics of desire (the immanent).

4.5 Material flows in the ethics of translation

In the preceding sections I explained Deleuze and Guattari’s ontology as being one of “self-organizing processes and becoming rather than [of] substance and being” (Lorraine
2011: 1) and how this relates to ethical questions in translation. These questions include issues such as anglocentrism and the ‘problems’ associated with the representation of selves and others which, in turn, are tied in with broader subjects such as colonialism and its remnant material effects/affecks on translation praxis. This may be viewed as the result of “dynamical mixtures of energy, matter, and catalytic replicators of different kinds (genes, memes, norms, routines) [which] greatly influenced linguistic evolution” (De Landa 1997: 212) in urban and other territorial centres, and which was aimed at the structural development and advancement of homogenising languages, such as English through imperialism and Afrikaans through Apartheid legislation, and which is reflected in literatures and their translations. I also discussed the limitations of the largely hermeneutic models of translation and explained why it is necessary to move from a philosophy grounded in transcendent values to one that is “premised on immanent criteria” (Lorraine 2011: 1), thus allowing for an ontological intensity. Furthermore, translation was presented as a material flow in relation with many other material flows and with the capacity to map out difference, becoming and accentedness; a relation which may be seen as analogous with the relationship between the wasp and the orchid as described by Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 12):

The orchid does not produce the tracing of the wasp; it forms a map with the wasp, a rhizome. What distinguishes the map from the tracing is that it is entirely oriented toward an experimentation in contact with the real. The map does not reproduce an unconscious closed in upon itself; it constructs the unconscious.

Thus, if according to this description of the difference between a tracing and a mapping, we view an original work and its translated mirror as resembling the rhizomatic relationship between the wasp and the orchid, we could say that in the same way as the orchid-wasp relationship represents a reciprocal becoming – i.e. the becoming-orchid of the wasp and the becoming-wasp of the orchid – translation may be viewed as the becoming-original of the translated work and the becoming-translated of the original work. But such a becoming does not take place in a vacuum consisting only of a novel and a translation; it is interlocked by and interwoven into many different structural arrangements and relations linked to history and the master narratives of history, as well as to socio-political movements, ideological flows, linguistic currents and many other material intersections.
In the next section I shall explore how the intersection of different material flows may influence the ethics of translation and how a nomadic ethics is more likely to emerge if the convergence of material flows is considered. Hence, I shall look at how a mapping of these different flows might allow for reflection on both existing and emerging master narratives and the structural power arrangements between them.

4.5.1 Intersecting states, intersecting lives: a mapping

In *In other words*, Mona Baker (*2011: 274*) writes the following on ethics in translation:

> Of central concern ... is the need to develop critical skills that can enable translators and interpreters to make ethical decisions for themselves, rather than have to fall back uncritically on abstract codes drawn up by their employers or the associations that represent them. This is important for at least three reasons. The first is that no code can ever predict the full range of concrete ethical issues that arise in the course of professional practice, and hence translators – like other professionals – are often faced with situations in which it is difficult to interpret or apply the relevant code. Second, codes, like laws, are elaborated by people like us, and are therefore never infallible, ethically or otherwise. [...] And finally, it is in the interest of society as a whole for individuals to be accountable for their decisions, in professional life as elsewhere. Adopting the default code unquestioningly undermines this accountability.

An ethics of translation, according to Baker, thus needs to question the historicity of abstract codes (such as master narratives) and be situational rather than given (or assumed), and her claim that translators and interpreters need to develop critical skills is an important argument in Translation Studies. That an ethics of translation should question abstract codes and be situational is indisputable but, unlike Baker who remains within the scope of the transcendent and ties morals to ethics as “clearly inseparable”, I argue that a *nomadic* ethical relationality or orientation *should* be separate from any moral code if it is to critically question it, and should take into consideration the complexities of our times through a mapping of material flows which is grounded in “the notion of material embodiment” (Braidotti 2006: 5) and embeddedness, and includes “a critical or reactive and an affirmative or active phase” (Braidotti 2006: 10). The mapping of intersecting material flows, I contend, allows for critical reflection on – or ethical cleansing of – historical “default codes” (Baker *2011: 274*) which, as Baker writes, are never infallible and are intrinsically linked to some form of meaning-making, such as the underlying meaning of moral or immoral acts, etc.
For instance, when we take into consideration South Africa’s history of Apartheid, bound together with the master narrative that Afrikaners are a kind of super-race, we see that it resulted in diminished cultural heterogeneity in the country and consequently much of the “visible corpus of South African writing” took place in “the English language” (De Kock 2001) and in Afrikaans. The Afrikaans publishing industry was also coterminous “with the rise to power of Afrikaner nationalism” (De Kock 2001). Moreover, this extended to translation praxis and to such an extent that for “Afrikaners, the rubric South African literature largely comprise[d] the canon of Afrikaans literature”, though for exiled writers South African literature was “a site of struggle, often set up in contradistinction to what was perceived as the smug complacency of the [mostly] uncommitted writers inside the country” (De Kock 2001). It stands to reason that after the dismantling of Apartheid, much of South African Translation Studies was concerned with postcolonial approaches that posed “the crucial but long-neglected question of how blatant power differentials, particularly in the age of European colonialism, have influenced the practice of translation” (Baker & Saldanha 2009: 200). This allowed for a review of cultural representation in South African literature/s and the reintroduction of other literatures into the South African canon. But Anglocentrism, to a large extent, replaced the domination of Afrikaans and most of the country’s authors who published internationally – including “Nadine Gordimer, Peter Abrahams, Alan Paton, Es’kia Mphahlele, Athol Fugard, Mongane Wally Serote, J.M. Coetzee, Breyten Breytenbach, André Brink, and Zakes Mda” did so “in English, or [was] translated into English” (De Kock 2001). Much of the African indigenous languages thus remained structurally backgrounded in a homogenised “place of non-difference” (De Kock 2001) where all South African literatures were represented (and even self-represented) in English. This continues to be the case.

In reviewing Viljoen/Winterbach’s oeuvre, we see that she published her debut novel, *Klaaglied vir Koos* (“lamentations for Koos”) under her *nom de plume*, Lettie Viljoen in 1984. This marks the year in which P.W. Botha became the sixth State President of South Africa and international divestment from South Africa was implemented on a significant scale to force South Africa to dismantle the Apartheid system (Wikipedia 2014a). And yet, even though 1984 was a time of majority Afrikaner rule, we see how Viljoen/Winterbach was already crafting a minor literature within a major one as the themes in *Klaaglied* centre on the disillusionment of a white couple with the Apartheid government and their struggle
within themselves, as well as their struggle to engage with the greater ‘Struggle’. This novel remains untranslated, as I have stated before.

Viljoen/Winterbach’s second novel, *Erf*, was published shortly after the first in 1986 and is concerned with the relationship between the Afrikaner and her/his surroundings as well as with the past. This novel too remains untranslated, reflective of the conservatism of South African politics and culture at the time, as well as the fact that translation was probably not a major priority in the country as South Africa remained largely insulated from the rest of the world and was concerned mostly with the promotion of Afrikaans and Afrikaner ideals. It is interesting to note, however, that Translation Studies abroad started recognising issues related to ideology and ethics at this time (Venuti 2012a: 183-190).

During the 1990s, Viljoen/Winterbach published four novels, namely *Belemmering* (1990), *Karolina Ferreira* (1993), *Landskap met vroue en slang* (1996) and *Buller se plan* (1999). Politically, the 1990s were characterised by a move towards democracy but, simultaneously, by global unrest, whereas culturally it was “characterised by the rise of multiculturalism and alternative media” (Wikipedia 2014b). In 1990 the then State President of the country, F.W. de Klerk, initiated negotiations to end Apartheid and lifted the ‘state of emergency’ which had been in place for a decade. In protest, former head of state, P.W. Botha, resigned from the National Party. Furthermore, Nelson Mandela, the future president of the country, was released. At this time, South Africa was in the limelight once more, though this time for more favourable reasons than those of the 1980s.

At this time, feminist and postcolonial issues come to the fore and are reflected in Viljoen/Winterbach’s novels which now revealed a broadening of themes that may be said to be ‘universal’ in content, though such themes would unfold to their full potential only during the 2000s. What does start coming through more – even though this has been prevalent in Winterbach’s work from the start – is the theme of the fractured self and may be said to be a reflection of the outcome of the schism between Self and Other in post-Apartheid South Africa. That is, where Afrikaans and Afrikaners formerly constituted the ‘self’ in South Africa, they now formed part of ‘other’ which, inevitably, led to a disruption in the constructed social imaginary.
In the 2000s, Ingrid Winterbach published four novels, namely *Niggie* (2002), *Die boek van toeval en toeverlaat* (2006), *Die benederyk* (2010) and *Die aanspraak van lewende wesens* (2012a). She also co-translated three of her earlier novels, namely Karolina Ferreira as *The elusive moth* (2005), Niggie as *To hell with Cronjé* (2007), and *Die boek van toeval en toeverlaat* as *The book of happenstance* (2008). This is indicative not only of South Africa’s acceptance into the ‘global village’, but also of the changing status of Afrikaans which was now a minority language. During these years, Ingrid Winterbach’s narratives moved from being language-based to being plot driven. In fact, Winterbach’s three latest novels, namely *Die boek van toeval en toeverlaat*, *Die benederyk* and *Die aanspraak van lewende wesens*, have crime novel elements, though these are pseudo-crime elements in reality as these plot devices are meant to mislead the reader and thus act as a kind of trickster-element. The fractured self also becomes a dominant theme and culminates in the different forms of ‘madness’ experienced by the characters in Winterbach’s most recent novel, *Die aanspraak van lewende wesens*.

From this it is evident that languages as “cultural materials do not accumulate randomly but rather enter into systematic relationships with one another, as well as with human beings who serve as their organic support” (De Landa 1997: 183). Furthermore, a language evolves socioeconomically and politically and as such “communicates information not only about the world but also about the group-membership of its users” (De Landa 1997: 184), resulting in “meshworks and hierarchies [that] may also account for the systematicity that defines and distinguishes every language” (De Landa 1997: 185). Afrikaans, as I explained earlier, has occupied both majority and minority capacities within South Africa. First it was kept from diverging too much through Afrikaner nationalism and thereafter became meshed into a changing English post-Apartheid South Africa, culminating in phenomena such as Engfrikaans which may be seen as a linguistic outcome of political, cultural and socioeconomic changes. But to better understand the intersections between politics, ethics, language, writing, translation, etc. and how these may materially affect one another, it is important to elucidate languages as *replicators* which conform to norms or *social obligations*. De Landa (1997: 191) writes:

The concept of social obligation is crucial to an understanding of not only naming but language itself. If sounds, words, and constructions are indeed replicators, and if, unlike memes, they do not replicate through imitation but through enforced repetition, then the key question becomes, *How exactly are linguistic norms enforced?* In what sense are they socially obligatory?
In terms of Afrikaans, we could say that enforcement mechanisms, such as Apartheid and legislation promoting the widespread use of Afrikaans, ensured that linguistic norms spread throughout the country. This use applied also to literature and it may be for this reason that Ingrid Winterbach’s novels are often framed by these concerns in different ways. *Klaaglied vir Koos*, for example, is framed by the master narrative of Apartheid and the ‘Struggle’ whilst her second novel, *Erf*, is framed by Afrikaners’ experience and conceptualisations of life. *Die boek van toeval en toeverlaat/The book of happenstance* investigates the decline of Afrikaans in post-Apartheid South Africa and both *Niggie/To hell with Cronjé* and *Buller se plan (Buller’s plan)* are framed by the South African War and, as such, continue Viljoen/Winterbach’s interest in Afrikaner history.

Winterbach explains that she is particularly fascinated by the war because “it is probably the beginning of [her] history” (Visagie 2008) as her father’s parents experienced the War first hand and her father was born shortly after the war. She writes (Visagie 2008):

> It is very much a male world of my father. It is a world that I have perceived from a distance. It is a world of which my father told me stories. It is a world compared to my mother’s world which is a closed-up world of women. It was a family dominated by females against this world that I have always seen from a distance; a male world of stories and war.

Winterbach’s interest in the war is not only about her own history or the world of her father, but also about “identity and rediscovery” (Visagie 2008) in a more general sense, as well as the instability of identity (John 2008). Using the war as a framework also allows for an investigation into “the history/contiguity of the Afrikaans language” (Lenta 2009) and Afrikaner culture, the representation of trauma and loss through language (Du Plooy 2009; Human 2009a; Van Coller & Van den Berg 2009), and the “the ungraspable nature and unknowableness of death” (Human 2008). By making use of Jan F.E. Cilliers’s war diary in *Niggie/To hell with Cronjé*, history and literature intersect through intertextuality in such a way that the novel “is cleverly layered with commentary on the past, its people and governments as well as commentary on these facets in the present, and to a certain extent a possible future for this country and its people” (Botha & Van Vuuren 2008b). The *Oorlogsdagboek van Jan F.E. Cilliers, 1899-1902* – although a historical document – is characterised by modern South African (and global) concerns such as race conflict, language concerns, musings on territory and landownership, class differences, exile, religion and apartheid regulations (Botha & Van Vuuren 2008b). But it is important to
remember that even autobiography is representation and thus signifies and demonstrates the self “as occupying a specific subject-position, having certain characteristics and not others” (Alcoff 1991). This may be precisely what allows for a questioning of both history and literature on a structural level in that the connections between ‘old world knowledge’ and ‘new world knowledge’, science and religion, and Afrikaner nationalism and post-Apartheid Afrikaner identity comes to the fore as issues of past, present and future in Niggie/To hell with Cronjé.

From this mapping we see how the trends of history and of master narratives through time may be explained in terms of major and minor flows. And when minor flows are transferred from novel to translation, I argue, a nomadic ethics of translation emerges. That is to say, a rhizomatic ethics emerges which takes into account the many different material flows with which it may intersect (and does), thus allowing for a mapping not rooted in fixed semantics, but rather one grounded in an ontological polyvocality of accentedness and resingularisation. Myth-construction (i.e. the weaving together of history and fiction) is here thus “a form of ‘counter-knowledge’” to that propagated by State territorialisations in that “mythopoeisis does not so much create a people [and its history] as invoke them” (O’Sullivan 2006: 145) through literature. And literature here is not “merely a fiction” but “is also a [desiring] machine that produces a different experience of the world – a new myth – and thus a different, we might say altered, consciousness” (O’Sullivan 2006: 119). As a result the emphasis shifts from semantics and morality (the transcendent) to social power and an ethics of desire (the immanent). A consideration of material flows thus allows a translator to critically understand structural elements in an original text such as the role of Engfrikaans in Winterbach’s oeuvre as well as her use of the Anglo Boer War and other Afrikaner elements as framing narrative devices. Hence, by transferring Engfrikaans to the translations of Winterbach’s novels, the translation – like the original text – does not “reflect the state of decay” (Comester 2014) of Afrikaans, but rather gains a historical consciousness in that it reflects the becoming-minor of Afrikaans within its major tradition. This applies also to the aphasia of Abraham in Niggie/To hell with Cronjé as I illustrated earlier. In this way, then, the translator becomes the author’s “kinetic hands” on earth, making “an ethical choice in favour of the richness of the possible” (Guattari 1995: 29). In Hélène Cixous’s (1975) words: “Writing [and translation] is the very possibility of change, the space that can serve as a springboard for subversive thought, the precursory movement of a transformation of social and cultural structures.”
4.6 Summary

In this chapter I argue that the material affects of discursive rights, i.e. the structural backgrounding of certain languages and literatures, should be considered in translation praxis in terms of a rhizomatic politics and a nomadic ethics, thus taking into consideration historical experience and specific location. In so doing, the emphasis moves from semantics to immanent creativity and thus allows for an ontological polyvocality or accentedness in languages, literatures and translations. Such accentedness in turn, I argue, may be regarded as an ethical orientation which is not linked to any moral code and is not static but rather situational, taking into account the myriad material flows which affect languages, literatures and translations. By considering translation as a material flow in relation with many other material flows and with the capacity to map out difference, becoming and accentedness, a new kind of translation praxis can emerge, one which takes into consideration existing and emerging master narratives and the structural power arrangements between them.

In the next chapter I summarise all the major arguments of this thesis, bringing together the threads of aesthetics, politics and ethics in the oeuvre of Ingrid Winterbach, with specific reference to her translations and filtered through the immanent philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari.
Conclusion
Praxis and/as translation

Afrikaans (Landskap met vroue en slang, pp.137-138)
So moet die tekstuur van die jong Infantas se hare en velle (agter hulle ore, in hulle nekke, in hulle armholtes) ook gewees het, dink Lena. So skilder Velasquez hulle. Daarin lê sy grootheid. Dat hy die ontwykende delikaatheid, die onvátbare subtiliteit van die veloppervlak kon vasvang en verbeeld.

English (My translation)
That is what the texture of the young Infantas’ hair and skins must have been like (behind their ears, on their necks, in their axillae), thinks Lena. This is how Velasquez paints them. Herein lies his genius: that he captures the elusory delicateness, the unattainable subtlety of the skin surface on canvas.

“Thus the BwO [Body without Organs] is never yours or mine. It is always a body. It is no more projective than it is regressive. It is an involution, but always a contemporary, creative involution. The organs distribute themselves on the BwO, but they distribute themselves independently of the form of the organism; forms become contingent, organs are no longer anything more than intensities that are produced, flows, thresholds, and gradients.”

(Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 164)
I) The picture of the thing from that quote from the book that was a movie

A translation is required. A particular kind of translation. A translation that is continually being translated – becoming-translated/translation. It involves each reader translating an image – Salvador Dali’s “City or drawers” to be exact. But this image does not stand alone. It marks the beginning of a reading only; a reading followed by an extract from one of Ingrid Winterbach’s novels, followed by a quote from *A thousand plateaus*. The reader may have read *Landskap met vroue en slang*, or not. The reader may or may not know what *Landskap met vroue en slang* means, depending on her/his working knowledge of Afrikaans. It may, therefore, remain untranslated, the reader having access to the translation of the excerpt only and that in itself a translation of a translation because language is “not content to go from a first party to a second party, from one who has seen to one who has not, but necessarily goes from a second party to a third party, neither of whom has seen” (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 77). The reader may experience this kind of ‘blindness’ at first, but at closer glance may begin wondering about Velasquez’s rendering of the skin in comparison with Dali’s pencil sketch of the body. What is the writer trying to say? Keeping this question in mind, the reader may move to the next quote; the one by Deleuze and Guattari. If the reader is familiar with these philosophers, s/he may notice the date of publication; a date familiar to many Deleuze and Guattari followers for it marks the publication of that most singular of books – *A thousand plateaus*; a book translated by one of the bravest (in my estimation at least) translators, Brian Massumi. For who would undertake the translation of Deleuze and Guattari? Who would dare, the reader familiar with their work may wonder. But to another reader this may be unfamiliar territory. It may be the first time s/he reads the surnames Deleuze and Guattari. And what of this BwO? What is a Body without Organs? Why does it follow Dali’s sketch and a Winterbach excerpt? Ah! the reader may think. A Body without Organs for a body of drawers. A hand held out in rejection, seeking the delicate painting of a skin on itself. Or perhaps not. Perhaps the body is mutating; the hand stretched out as if experiencing birth pains, embracing the becoming-nonhuman, the losing of the ‘my’ body in exchange for ‘a’ body; ridding itself of all pretext, all semantic content. A deathwork. Like Jimmy Harris’s obsession with deathworks, the reader familiar with Ingrid Winterbach’s *Die benederyk* may think, adding a layer of translation, lost to someone else. But the Deleuze and Guattari reader may stop themselves – warn themselves in fact – to remember that a book is not “a box with something inside” (Deleuze 1995: 7) that should be opened in search of signifiers as they are doing right now. Why not again? s/he might ask, looking for the clue
buried somewhere deep inside memory. But then, slowly, something emerges. Could emerge, rather. (A latent probability.) Something that is unique to every translation of the reading. And in all of these translations – before they are actualised, before they become permanent (and even after they do) – lurks the potential for an intensive reading, for accentedness, for singularity. And though the process that leads to a singularity may not be fully understood because it lies hidden somewhere in the drawers of a BwO, “it is undeniable that this moment will not have been one of discovery, but one of invention” (McMahon 2002: 3).

II) In conclusion: becoming-translated/translation

In this dissertation I set out to show how aesthetics, politics and ethics – as material flows – intersect in translation in general, but also how these actualise in Lettie Viljoen/Ingrid Winterbach’s oeuvre. With the emphasis on praxis, I explored these three threads through the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in particular, though not exclusively.

In Chapter 2 I asked three questions which form the cornerstone of this project: 1) what is art?; 2) when is literature art and does Ingrid Winterbach’s oeuvre meet these criteria?; and 3) how can ‘art’ be transposed from an original work to its translation; or: how is the potential for accentedness or intensive affect retained in a translated work.

In answer to the first question, I examined how art is related to aesthetics and briefly discussed the immeasurability of aesthetics which Shaviro (2012: 2) explains to be so because there is “no scientific way to determine whether an object is beautiful, and – if it is – to explain why.” Aesthetics, from a Deleuzo-Guattarian perspective, was shown to be not about the value produced by capitalism, but rather about that which makes art ‘stand up on its own’; i.e. that which affirms “only what is the most deterritorialised” (Zepke 2005: 8) – a singularity. Such a singularity in literature may be said to actualise as a minor literature or, more accurately, a becoming-minor.

“Minor authors”, Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 105) explain, “are foreigners in their own tongue. They are bastards” who, through their language use and style, create ‘stutterings’, the frayings of a language, allowing the language to “grow from the middle, like grass; it is what makes it a rhizome instead of a tree, what puts language in perpetual
disequilibriums” (Deleuze 1997: 111). It is such ‘disequilibriums’ which I found in Winterbach’s oeuvre, thus showing her works to be singular in that they point to a potentiality whilst concurrently being immanent to that potentiality. In translation, I argued, her novels may be said to be art-becomings to at least some degree even though the translations do not always deterritorialise to the same degree as the original novels do.

Chapter 3 investigates literature as art in its relation to capitalism. Specifically I looked at how translation and the publishing industry are influenced by capitalism, often reproducing State territorialisations rather than creative becomings. I argued that translation, like other forms of literature, has the potential to affect actual or extensive social transformation if – and only if – it is able to disentangle itself from what Rancière (2006: 33-50) terms the ‘political’ so that it can begin to do politics. I put forth as part of my argument that this is possible through deterritorialising practices, like écriture féminine and Viljoen/Winterbach’s use of Engfrikaans and the trickster figure, as such methods allow for a bifurcation or line of flight “that we create, not, indeed because we are dreaming but, on the contrary, because we trace out the real on it, we compose there a plane of consistence. To flee, but in fleeing to seek a weapon” (Deleuze & Parnet 2002: 136). Such a ‘fleeing to seek a weapon’, I argued, allows for a movement away from signification and semantics so that the question of translation is no longer “What does this word/text mean? but rather What is the word/text/translation doing? That is, is the translation stuttering and mapping a becoming or is it reproducing State territorialisations which are tracings rather than mappings, or, as the quote suggests, a form of dreaming.

In the final chapter I examined how translators might begin to develop a praxis informed by a nomadic ethics. Such an ethics is not reliant on a normative morality, but rather constitutes an orientation founded on “the skill that consists in developing a compass of the cognitive, affective and ethical kind” (Braidotti 2012: 307) so that language is seen as continually becoming-translated/translation. Carli Coetzee (2013) explains this as an argument against translation in favour of what she terms accentedness, which is “intent on differentiation and stratification”, denoting an acknowledgment of “a specific, even ‘local’, orientation or field of reference” (Coetzee 2013: 3).

In order for such an accentedness to be effectuated, I argued that translations have to take into consideration the historicity of master narratives so that meaning becomes dislocated
from the political, and that it furthermore requires a grounding in a materialist philosophy because translation does not occur in a vacuum; it is influenced by myriad material flows, some apparent and some not, which in turn have their own material effects/affects linked to certain “knowledge forms and forms of power” (Simon 1992: 85).

All of these aspect were applied to Ingrid Winterbach’s oeuvre which was shown to preserve not only cultural heterogeneity but accentedness through the crafting of a minor literature, thereby undoing the entrenched structures of the dominant and exposing what is centred and what is marginalised through her awareness of “the manner in which the centre tries to co-opt or erase the margin” (Foster 2008b). The translations of her works were shown to retain a high degree of deterritorialisation, though sometimes neglecting to keep in translation all the lines of flight employed in the original text, as is the case with passages containing Engfrikaans. Nevertheless, her oeuvre – including the original novels and their translations – were shown to be art that ‘stands up on its own’, if to varying degrees, thus becoming-art, becoming-politics, becoming-ethics that is virtually contained in the becoming-translated/translation of literature.
APPENDIX 1

During the night she dreamt that she had had enough of living over the fridges of the dead – it seemed there was a place down below where the dead were hatching in fridges. This place, this underground, was alive – it extended over a vast area and there were ventilation shafts leading to the surface above.\(^7\)

\(^7\) From *The elusive moth*, p.72.
APPENDIX 2

Jimmy Harris is vanoggend meer spraaksaam as gisteraand. Hy is luid en welsprekend, oorgehaal om te argumenter. Hy sit ‘n tyd lank roerloos, lig homself dan sonder waarskuwing uit sy diep nadenke en lewer ‘n lang en meesal teoretiese monoloog, by voorkeur oor een of ander kunskwessie. En by verdere voorkeur oor die teorie onderliggend aan sy eie werk. Aaron voel die hare in sy nek rys en die sweet in sy armholtes prik. Jimmy is verslaaf aan teorie; hy raak hoog daarop. Teorie het die plek van die kunswerk ingeneem. Sy irritasie met die kêrel is ekstreem. Hy sou hom graag ‘n sydelingse oorveeg wou gee en beveel om sy mond vir die res van die reis toe te hou.

Die kunstenaars in hierdie land wat werk maak wat die moeite werd is, kan hy tel op die vingers van een hand, beweer Jimmy, nou goed op dreef, met ‘n ongesonde blos wat stadig van die nek af in sy bleekgroen wange opstoot. Hy hou sy hand in die lug. Aaron kyk vlugtig uit die hoek van sy oog. Die handpalm is breed, die basis van die duim besonder vlesig (anargistiese energie), die vingers is verbasend slank, die naels tot in die lewe gebyt.

En wie reken hy is hierdie kunstenaars? vra Aaron. Die enkele name wat Jimmy noem, herken hy nie.

Moeketsi noem die naam van iemand wat skilder.

Jimmy sé, sonder omhaal: “Skilder is dood in hierdie land, my vriend. Daar is nie enkele skilder hier wat worthwhile werk maak nie. Painting in hierdie land lags seriously behind.”

Moeketsi lag en sê dat hy nog skilder.

“My videowerk is meer cutting edge,” sê Jimmy.

Nou kom Knuvelder onder skoot. Knuvelder, beweer Jimmy, is a pushover. Hy is nie streng genoeg in sy seleksie van die kunstenaars wat hy uitstal nie. Hy is uninformed, hy laat hom te veel lei deur unexamined idees. Hy is nie intellectually rigorous genoeg nie. Hy verstaan nie sy eie preferences en prejudices nie. (Hiermee kan Aaron saamgaan, maar hy vermoed hy en Jimmy staan aan teenoorgestelde kante van die spektrum.) Hy waag nie genoeg nie. Hy is te bang om sy nek uit te steek.

Bang waarvoor? vra Aaron. Bang hy verloor sy polities korrekte kopers?

Moeketsi lag agter in die motor.

En sy keuse vir die Berlyn-tentoonstelling, vra Aaron, is dit nie daring genoeg nie?

Dis okay, sê Jimmy.

En die twee assistentkuratore? vra Aaron.

Dom, sé Jimmy. Uninformed.

(Ten minste is hulle dit hieroor een honderd persent eens.)

En dink Jimmy Knuvelder se Berlyn-uitstalling is belangrik?

Harris het `n diep blos op sy andersins bleek wange. Hy skeur met die tande aan een van die afgebyte naels.

Agter in die motor neem Moeketsi die verbygaande veld af, die sagte deininge van die heuwels en dale, die veranderende wolkvormasies.

En beantwoord Jimmy se eie werk aan sy streng vereistes? vra Aaron.


[...]

En hoe lees hy die internasionale kunstoneel? wil Aaron by Jimmy weet.

Jimmy lag sy lag. Sy vroueborste skud.


79 Conversation between Jimmy Harris and Aaron Adendorff in Die benederyk, pp.59-62.
This morning Jimmy Harris is more talkative than last night. Loud and eloquent; ready for an argument. For a long time he sits motionlessly, then without warning lifts himself out of his deep reverie and delivers a long, mostly theoretical monologue on some art issue or other or the theory underlying his own work. Aaron can feel the hairs on his neck rising and the sweat in his armpits pricking his skin. Jimmy’s addicted to theory; he gets high on it. Theory has taken the place of art. Aaron’s irritation with this man is extreme. He would love to give him a sideways smack, right on the ear. Tell him to be quiet for the rest of the trip.

The artist in this country who are making art that’s worth the effort are so few and far between he can count them on the fingers of one hand. He’s well on his way now, with an unhealthy blush rising slowly from his neck to his pale green cheeks. He raises his hand for emphasis. From the corner of his eye, Aaron flashes a glance at the hand. Jimmy’s palm is broad, the base of his thumb unusually fleshy (anarchic energy), while his fingers are surprisingly slim, the nails bitten down to the flesh. And who, asks Aaron, does he think these artists are? The few names that Jimmy mentions, Aaron doesn’t recognise.

Moeketsi mentions the name of one, a painter.

Without ceremony, Jimmy announces: “Painting is dead in this country, my friend. There isn’t a single painter here who’s making worthwhile art. Painting in this country lags seriously behind.”

Moeketsi laughs softly and says he still paints.

“Your video work is more cutting edge,” Jimmy says.

Now Knuvelder’s the one who’s coming under fire. Knuvelder is a pushover, Jimmy reckons. He’s not tough enough in his selection of the artists he exhibits. He’s uninformed; allows himself to be led far too much by unexamined ideas. He’s not intellectually rigorous enough. Doesn’t understand his own preferences and prejudices. (Aaron feels he and Jimmy might agree on this matter, but he suspects they occupy opposite points on the spectrum.) Knuvelder doesn’t take big risks. He’s afraid to stick his neck out.

Afraid of what? asks Aaron. That he’ll lose his PC buyers?

Moeketsi laughs quietly in the back of the car.

And his choice for the Berlin exhibition, Aaron queries – is that not daring enough?

It’s okay, says Jimmy

And the two assistant curators? Aaron presses on.

Stupid, says Jimmy. Uninformed.

(At least on this matter they agree one hundred percent.)

And, Aaron asks Jimmy, does he think Knuvelder’s Berlin exhibition is important?

Yes, it’s important. Important enough. But it’s still not at the forefront, the cutting edge. It’s not yet in the hot spot. Not yet Takashi Murakami. Insufficiently multimedia. A far cry from take no prisoners. Not confrontational enough. It doesn’t challenge his own assumptions stringently. Not enough of an assault on any high culture.

By now Harris is sporting a deep blush on his otherwise pale cheeks. With his teeth, he tears at one of the bitten-down nails.

Behind, in the back seat, Moeketsi takes pictures of the passing veld, the soft undulations of the hills and dales, the changing cloud formations.

And does his own work satisfy the very high standards he upholds? Aaron asks Jimmy.
He’s working on it, Jimmy says, he’s working on it. Carries on chewing his nails. Tearing them off. Self-mutilation.

[...]

So how does he read the international art scene, Aaron asks Jimmy. Jimmy laughs softly. His womanly breasts jiggle.

“The name of the game is money, my friend,” he says. (Aaron objects to this mode of address.) “Where there’s art, there you’ll find the spirit of the times. The Zeitgeist. That is to say: the world market. Private collectors in corporate jets pitch up in their hundreds at the doors of artists. They bid at the biggest art auctions in New York and London. Push the price of contemporary art up fucking sky high. These prices are way, way out. Astronomical. The market’s hysterical. Whoever can profit from art, does so. They’re doing it, and they’re doing it big time, my friend. No holds barred. Don’t even try to understand the art market. It’s haywire. Been like that for a long time already. Hysterical. It’s international, it’s big, it’s crazy. If you think there’s a difference between art capital and ordinary capital, think again. Don’t kid yourself. Both are subject to exactly the same laws. The laws of money run the art market. Stuff aesthetic considerations! Artists, dealers and galleries, collectors, buyers – individual as well as corporate – auction houses, art consultants and advisors, art investors, museums, art fairs, biennales, international art forums like Documental and Manifesta, you name it – each has its own role. It’s competitive. It’s a jungle out there!”

Conversation between Jimmy Harris and Aaron Adendorff in *The road of excess*, pp.58-61.
A few days later, as he’s reversing his car out of the garage, in the late afternoon, Bubbles Bothma, his new neighbour, comes around the corner. He’s on his way to the post office. Can she please go with him, she needs to get a few things at the Spar. And Lotto tickets. Her car’s still not back from the garage. [..]

“Get in,” he says.

She breathes with difficulty – she’s slightly asthmatic. Lights up a cigarette, but he forbids her from smoking in the car.

“You have a lot of free time. Do you work?” he asks her. (He has often wondered why she’s home so much.)

“Yes,” she says, “I work. Keep the pot boiling.”

“What do you do?”

“Oh,” she says, “this, that and the other. [...]”

After she’s done her shopping at the Spar, and he’s been to the post office to fetch a package from his elder daughter, she asks him if she can pay a quick visit to the butchery next door to the Red Dolphin in Queen Mary. She wants to get some bones for tonight’s soup, and quickly give someone a message at the Red Dolphin.

He waits outside, in the car. [...]”

After a while she comes rushing out the door, almost running.

“Drive!” she says, getting into the car in a huge hurry.

He reverses. “Drive!” she says. “They didn’t see me getting into the car.”

As he turns right into Queen Mary (now Siphiwe Zuma), she looks over her shoulder and pulls out a pistol. [...]”

“Drive!” she says suddenly. “That bastard’s behind us!”

In the rearview mirror he sees a red bakkie racing around the circle.

“Turn down here!” she says, grabbing the steering wheel with her left hand so that his car takes the turn with screaming brakes. [...]”

By the time he comes to a halt in front of his garage, his legs are shaking.

“You owe me an explanation,” he says.

“Thanks, man,” she says. “In the fullness of time.”

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81 From The road of excess, pp.20-23.
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LIST OF FIGURES

(In order of appearance)


