EXAMINING THE POTENTIAL OF AN ETHICS OF CARE FOR INCLUSION OF WOMEN IN

AFRICAN HIGHER EDUCATION DISCOURSES

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April 2014
DECLARATION

By submitting this dissertation electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained therein is my own, original work, that I am the sole author thereof (unless to the extent explicitly otherwise stated), that production and publication thereof by Stellenbosch University will not infringe any third party rights and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for obtaining any qualification.

Signature: _______________ Date: ____________
DEDICATION

To my iconic grandmother (*meekulu*) and role model, Lakkel Koukulumhu Mukwashivela waNdaedele, to my mom (*meme*), Ndeafetwa Ndapandula Ndikwetepo, to my father-figure, uncle Nathanael Ndikwetepo, and to my son, Tuhafeni Ashley Shilunga Petrus. Your commitment, fortitude and hope inspired me to reach for the sky.
ABSTRACT

This dissertation argues that women on the African continent experience moments of internal exclusion in higher education discourses. Although women are statistically represented in higher education discourses, they remain subjected to internal exclusion on the grounds that their contributions are evidently unsubstantive. Through a conceptual analysis of women’s experiences of African higher education, the study reveals that internal exclusion can be attributed to patriarchy, male chauvinism, authoritarianism and a gendered view of equality, mostly generated in people’s social, political and cultural practices. I contend that a ‘non-gendered’ ethics of care can undermine the debilitating effects caused by the internal exclusion of women in higher education discourses. By examining the implications of a reconstituted ethics of care for teaching and learning at higher education institutions on the continent, the study offers some ways in which exclusionary higher education practices can be remedied. This dissertation contends that, if higher education in Africa were to halt the dilemma of internal exclusion and move towards engendering a reconstituted ethics of care, both conceptually and pragmatically, then it stands an authentic chance of cultivating compassionate, imaginative and responsible citizens who can reason, not only for themselves, but for humanity as well.

*Keywords*: Africa, higher education, women, exclusion, equality, ethics of care
Hierdie proefskrif argumenteer dat vrouens op die vasteland van Afrika momente van interne uitsluiting ondervind. Alhoewel vrouens statisties goed verteenwoordig is in hoër onderwys diskoerse, bly hulle steeds onderhewig aan interne uitsluiting op grond daarvan dat hulle bydrae nie genoegsaam geag word nie. Gegrond op 'n konseptuele analyse van die wedervaringe van vrouens in hoër onderwys in Afrika, bevind hierdie studie dat interne uitsluiting van vrouens toegeskryf kan word aan patriargie, manlike chauvinisme, outoritarisme, en 'n geslagsblik van gelykheid wat meestal aanslag vind in mense se sosiale, politieke en kulturele praktyke. Ek voer aan dat 'n nie-geslagtelike etiek van sorg die verlammende effekte van interne uitsluiting van vroue in hoër onderwysdiskoerse kan ondermyn. Die studie stel maniere voor hoe uitsluitende hoër onderwys praktyke beredder kan word deur 'n ondersoek van die implikasies van 'n rekonstruksie van 'n etiek van sorg aan hoër onderwys instansies op die vasteland. Hierdie proefskrif voer aan dat as hoër onderwys in Afrika die dilemma van interne uitsluiting wil stuit en dan konseptueel en pragmaties wil beweeg na 'n rekonstruksie van 'n etiek van sorg, daar dan 'n outentieke kans kan bestaan om verantwoordbare burgers te kweek wat deernisvol is, wat verbeeldingryk is, en wat nie alleen vir hulleself kan redeneer nie, maar ook vir die mensdom.

Sleutelwoorde: Afrika, hoër onderwys, vrouens, uitsluiting, gelykheid, etiek van sorg
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>Affirmative action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAU</td>
<td>Association of African Universities</td>
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<tr>
<td>AAWORD</td>
<td>Association of African Women for Research and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AHE</td>
<td>African Higher Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUC</td>
<td>Africa Union Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BETD</td>
<td>Basic Education Teachers Diploma</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEDAW</td>
<td>Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEPARRED</td>
<td>Pan African Studies and Research Center in International Relations and Education for Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHE</td>
<td>Council on Higher Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CODESRIA</td>
<td>Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRIAA SA-DC</td>
<td>Centre for Research Information Action in Africa Southern Africa Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELCIN</td>
<td>Evangelical Lutheran Church in Namibia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESRRC</td>
<td>Education Students' Regional Research Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDM</td>
<td>Further Diploma in Education Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GER</td>
<td>Gross enrolment ratio</td>
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<tr>
<td>HE</td>
<td>Higher education</td>
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<tr>
<td>HEMIS</td>
<td>Higher Education Information Management System</td>
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<tr>
<td>HERS-SA</td>
<td>Higher Education Resource Services - South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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NRF  National Research Foundation
MDGs  Millennium development goals
IMF  International Monetary Fund
KENTON  KENTON Education Association of South Africa
SADC  Southern African Development Community
SAPs  Structural adjustment programmes
TFHE  Task Force in Higher Education
RCCG  Redeemed Christian Church of God
UN  United Nations
UNESCO  United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UIS  UNESCO Institute for Statistics
WW I  First World War
WW II  Second World War
## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DECLARATION</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEDICATION</td>
<td>II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPSOMMING</td>
<td>IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ACRONYMS</td>
<td>VII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
<td>IX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREFACE</td>
<td>XIII</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### CHAPTER ONE

**CONTESTING THE SPACE OF WOMEN IN AFRICAN HIGHER EDUCATION: SETTING THE AGENDA**

1.1 Introduction to research - setting the agenda.................................. 1
1.2 The exploration for inclusion of women in higher education in Africa: a snapshot ........ 3
1.3 Motivation for the study...................................................................... 7
1.4 Research questions ........................................................................... 10
1.5 Methodological considerations: Philosophical analysis...................... 10
1.5.1 Some methodological considerations............................................. 12
1.6. The outline of the dissertation .................................................... 14

### CHAPTER TWO

**A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF HIGHER EDUCATION SYSTEMS IN AFRICA AND THE INVOLVEMENT OF WOMEN**

2.1 Introduction..................................................................................... 16
2.2 African higher education: tracing historical moments in relation to women ........ 17
2.2.1 Pre-colonial period and women in African higher education .................... 18
2.2.2 An account of the colonial period and women in higher education in Africa........ 21
2.2.2.1 Higher education in different Western colonial states in Africa .............. 22
2.2.2.2 Recounting colonial higher education and involvement of women in Africa .... 25
2.2.3 Post-colonial higher education in Africa and women’s involvement .............. 26
2.2.3.1 Neoliberalism and globalisation in higher education.......................... 29
2.2.3.2 World Bank policies in African higher education in relation to women ........ 30
2.2.3.3 The effects of globalisation on women in higher education.................. 37
2.2.3.3.1 Women’s representation as students and staff members in higher education ... 39
2.2.3.3.2 African university as an ivory tower to women................................. 40
2.3. Link between higher education in Africa and women’s contribution to knowledge production
2.4. Delineating the position of women in higher education on the African continent: Concluding remarks

CHAPTER THREE
CONCEPTIONS OF INCLUSION AND GENDER EQUALITY IN AFRICAN HIGHER EDUCATION

3.1 Introduction
3.2 Towards an African Conception of Inclusion in Understanding Higher Education
3.2.1 Ubuntu as inclusion – an African perspective
3.2.2 Ubuntu and space for women in African higher education
3.2.3 Outlining meanings and dilemmas of Ubuntu as inclusion in higher education
3.3 Reconceptualising Ubuntu as inclusion in African higher education
3.3.1 Young’s conceptualisation of inclusion/exclusion
3.3.1.1 Understanding external exclusion within African higher education
3.3.1.2 Understanding internal exclusion in African higher education
3.3.2 Nussbaum’s capabilities approach as a way to evoke inclusion for equality
3.3.3 Butler’s gender-troubled view as a means for substantive inclusion
3.3.4 Possibilities and limitations of liberal perspectives in promoting Ubuntu
3.4 A Rancièrean conception of Ubuntu as equality of voice in higher education
3.5 Summary: Rethinking Ubuntu as Inclusion and making a Case for the “Equalisation of Voice”

CHAPTER FOUR
EXAMINING AFRICAN HIGHER EDUCATION DISCOURSES AND THEIR (IN)COMMENSURABILITY WITH THE NOTION OF INCLUSION AS EQUALISATION OF VOICE

4.1 Introduction
4.2 Elucidating the equalisation-of-voice framework: communicative, capable and beyond a gendered view of inclusion
4.3 Scanning African higher education discourses in relation to the experiences and roles of women
4.3.1 Women’s (lack of) access to higher education in Africa: Kwesiga (2002) analysis
4.3.1.1 The connection between girls’ schooling and women’s access to higher education
4.3.2 Making women partners with but not cheerleaders for men in African higher education
4.3.2.1 Portrayal of women’s representation in higher education policy initiatives
4.3.2.2 Women’s experiences of marginalisation in higher education

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
4.3.3 Gender-based human capabilities and human rights to knowledge .................................................. 97
4.3.3.1 The position of women in science and mathematics in higher education .................................. 100
4.3.3.2 Women’s external exclusion as staff members and researchers ............................................... 102
4.3.3.3 Portrayal of women’s internal exclusion as staff members and researchers .......................... 104
4.4 (In)commensurability of the African higher education discourses with the equalisation-of-voice paradigm ..................................................................................................................... 108
4.5 Summary ....................................................................................................................................... 111

CHAPTER FIVE ........................................................................................................................................ 112
PATRIARCHAL IDEOLOGY AND PRACTICES AS CONDITIONS PERPETUATING INTERNAL EXCLUSION IN AFRICAN HIGHER EDUCATION ................................................................. 112
5.1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................. 112
5.2 Conception of patriarchy and related conditions that perpetuate internal exclusion .... 112
5.2.1 Patriarchy: a conception or misconception? ............................................................................... 113
5.2.1.1 Feminist conceptualisation of patriarchy ................................................................. 114
5.2.1.2 Patriarchal male domination in relation to women ......................................................... 118
5.2.1.3 Male chauvinism in relation to women’s internal exclusion ............................................. 119
5.2.2. Cultural practices in relation to internal exclusion .............................................................. 121
5.2.2.1 Power relations between women and men with patriarchal cultures ................................ 123
5.2.2.2 Beyond women’s right to exit towards intercultural dialogue ......................................... 125
5.3 How do patriarchal beliefs undermine internal inclusion in African higher education? 127
5.3.1 Women as students ....................................................................................................................... 127
5.3.2 Women as staff members and academics .................................................................................... 129
5.4 The effects of a gendered response to internal exclusion ............................................................. 133
5.5 Beyond gender a divide: towards a non-gendered approach to internal inclusion ...... 135
5.5.1 Why patriarchal conditions are undesirable acts that undermine our humanity .................... 136
5.6 Summary ....................................................................................................................................... 138

CHAPTER SIX ........................................................................................................................................ 140
ETHICS OF CARE RECONSTITUTED: AN APPROACH TO INTERNAL INCLUSION ........................................ 140
6.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 140
6.2 Ethics of care: from an ancient to a contemporary account .......................................................... 141
6.2.1 A sympathetic relational approach to caring ........................................................................... 143
6.2.2 Ethics of care as an empathetic action: a paradoxical response .............................................. 147
6.2.2.1 Restriction of Noddings’s and Slote’s ethics of care in addressing internal exclusion ...... 148
6.2.3 Caring as evoking people’s rational potentialities ................................................................. 150
6.2.3.1 How do we invoke a caring relationship? ................................................................. 152
6.2.3.2 Debunking a gendered form of caring and situating the ideal caring relation .................. 154
6.3 Towards a reconstituted ethics of care ................................................................. 156
6.3.1 Intellectual equality through an assertion of voice ........................................... 156
6.3.2 Caring as iterations ............................................................................................ 159
6.3.3 Caring as compassionate respect ..................................................................... 162
6.3.4 Caring as acknowledging humanity ................................................................. 166
6.4 Caring as a human capacity – in defence of a reconstituted ethics of care .......... 170
6.5 Summary ............................................................................................................... 172

CHAPTER SEVEN ......................................................................................................... 174
IMPLICATIONS FOR A RECONSTITUTED ETHICS OF CARE FOR UNIVERSITY EDUCATION
AND IT’S RELEVANCE TO RESEARCH ....................................................................... 174
7.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 174
7.2 A synopsis and foundation of the dissertation ..................................................... 174
7.3 Compassionate imagining, responsibility and reasoning: implications for substantive
inclusion ......................................................................................................................... 177
7.3.1 Implications for university teaching and learning ............................................. 178
7.3.2 How do we inculcate caring traits in students? .................................................. 181
7.3.3 Implications for governance and management ................................................... 182
7.4 Significance of the study and its contribution to research .................................... 183
7.4.1 How does a study of this nature fit into higher education? ................................. 184
7.4.2 Finding a voice: how, who and what have I become? ........................................ 185
7.4.2.1 How and who have I become? .......................................................................... 186
7.4.2.2 What have I become? ....................................................................................... 188
7.4.3 Potential criticisms and possibilities for future studies ...................................... 190
7.5 Concluding summary of the dissertation .............................................................. 191
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................... 194
PREFACE

To preface this study, I wish to proceed from a Socratic note, which is that “an unexamined life is not worthy of living”. As the author of this dissertation, my life has been influenced by various events and encounters that have characterised my assumptions and the arguments that ensue. The discussion centres on my experiences, shaped by my upbringing, schooling, higher education (HE) and work. I was born and spent most of my life in one of the remotest areas of Namibia, called Okalongo, which is approximately seven kilometres from the border between Namibia and Angola. I am the daughter of a housewife who, unlike her brothers and younger sister, never went to school. At the age of two, I was taken to my maternal grandmother, who, despite being a “political widow” – whose husband left for exile in search of freedom and who died in the Cassinga Massacre, Angola, 4 May 1978 – managed to care for many children, both biological and adopted. Our schooling was dependent on farming, as we were required to work hard and sell some of our products, such as Mahangu\(^1\), beans, chickens, goats, cows, and so forth. My Oshiwambo (Mbadja\(^2\)) traditional culture aims to nurture hardworking but submissive women who are marriageable. This simply means that marriage lies at the heart of social life. As a result, the education of girls/females is secondary to that of their male counterparts.

Nonetheless, my grandmother succeeded in sending me to school. Through my grandmother’s sense of commitment, fortitude, faith and hope I was inspired to complete my schooling. Afterwards, I was admitted to a teachers’ college of education, which afforded me the opportunity to become a teacher. Despite being in the teaching profession, I struggled to comprehend my identity as a young African woman who was born out of wedlock (never having experienced a father’s care, except from uncles), and became a single mother. As in many African traditional societies, single mothers among the Ovambadja are not really shown respect, since they are presumed to have broken the cultural norm of “no baby before marriage”. One can only imagine the low status of a girl-child, born out of wedlock in such a community, who also becomes a single mother, despite being a dedicated public servant. A woman’s achievement is questionable and mostly measured by her sexual relationships with men (either single or married).

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1 A locally grown Namibian food products, known scientifically as pearl millet and locally called Mahangu. Mahangu is grown mainly in the north of the country, where it is the staple food, and it usually is made into a porridge called “oshifima” or “oshithima”, or fermented to make a drink called “oshikundu” or “ontaku” (Centre for Research Information Action in Africa, 2001: 18).

2 One of the eight Ovawambo traditional communities in Northern Namibia, with origins that date to the immigration of the Ovawambo ethnic groups into Northern Namibia after their long march from the Great Lakes of Africa. Ovambadja royalty extends through matrilineage. Like the other Oshiwambo-speaking communities, this traditional community occupies a demarcated communal area known as Okalongo. There about 75 000 inhabitants in Okalongo. It forms part of Ombadja, which is situated in Angola and was cut off Namibia during colonial rule. During the colonial era, the Ovambadja in Namibia were placed under the leadership of the Oukwanyama traditional authority, and they were only recognised as a separate authority in 2002. In Okalongo, especially among the Ovambadja, polygamous marriages are still the order of the day, despite the influence of Christianity (Anyolo, 2008: 86-87).
In other words, women's successes are undervalued and no one believes that women can do something worthwhile without men's help. Some people (both women and men) tend to use their powerful roles to demand intimate relations, which provokes continuous harassment, silencing and offending remarks. Many, like me, struggle to acquire higher leadership positions, and this often stirs frustration and uncertainty about one's capabilities. Even though I tend to work hard, which is recognised by some fellows, it is sometimes a disheartening excursion to attain what one is passionate about. For many women in my society, the primary goal is to get married and have children as a way of acceptance by and recognition in society and the workplace. With this goal in mind, the status of a woman who is seen to have failed to fulfil the prescribed patriarchal "universal marriage" norm leaves much to be desired. These attitudes and practices that scuttle women's dreams and plans to acquire leadership positions are not peculiar only to the home, but also to public enterprises. As a woman who could not fulfil the universal expectation to be married, I grappled with apprehension and insecurity about who I am and who I should become in order to be accorded the kind of respect and acceptance every human being deserves. Thus I have found solace in the pursuit of knowledge with the hope that it would earn me respect, not only from my family and community, but also in the church and workplace, which I earnestly miss. This expectation connects profoundly with the common saying that "knowledge is power".

Although the choice to study at a university that was regarded as the "architect of the apartheid machinery" was received with cynicism in my society, this never hindered my mission. The admission brought me joy, but my first impression of the institution was depressing and challenging – academically, socially and financially. Coming from a poor family, it was difficult to sustain myself, my son and my siblings with the salary I received from the government. However, with additional support from the Dean's office, I managed to complete my greatly needed Honours degree (see Shanyanana, 2011). Though my initial goal was to obtain the Honours degree and return to work, my exposure to philosophy of education, which I regarded as difficult initially, led me to decide to pursue more knowledge. I continued with my M.Ed. degree under a dedicated scholar who introduced me to crucial schools of thought. This study exposed me to the intrinsic interest of pursuing knowledge not for its own sake, but for the public good. The exploration in my thesis, Education for democratic citizenship and cosmopolitanism: The case of the Republic of Namibia revealed that HE lacked inclusion of girls in its policies and practices, which does not match the ideals of deliberative democracy. In part, this is because girls/women, especially those from traditional African society and from poor backgrounds (as I was), are brought up to be passive, subservient and refrain from speaking at the same pace as their male counterparts. Nevertheless, such girls and women are expected to participate actively in educational processes as a way of expressing their democratic rights without recognising their incapacities.
After challenging but rewarding encounters in the area of research, the acquisition of a M.Ed. degree (*cum laude*) drove my passion to study towards a doctorate. Although my employers demanded that I return to work after three consecutive years of study, my thirst for knowledge prompted my resignation. One of my uncles approved my resignation because of my exceptional performance, according to the power that tradition vested on him as a man. My supervisor’s encouraging words, “You had better be an unemployed PhD candidate than an employed Master’s holder. Just persevere a little longer and reap the fruits later”, remained my inspiration and helped me to endure amidst all odds in the hunt for scarce knowledge. More significantly, I learned profoundly from my Master’s study, especially in relation to the use of the pragmatic and post-structural paradigms, which opened my eyes to the appalling level of women’s representation and participation in HE. This observation was complemented by experiences gained from attending and presenting papers at various conferences, namely the Education Students’ Regional Research Conference (ESRRC) and the KENTON Education Association Conference, as well as serving as a member of the ESRRC students’ conference organising committee. Despite the fact that many women were responsible for organising these conferences, their inputs as students and members of staff were scarcely acknowledged. I began to wonder and ask myself questions: Why are women less represented at these conferences? Why do only a few female postgraduate students participate in these conferences, despite the great number of female students in universities? These encounters and the search for answers prompted an enthusiasm in me to embark on this study.

To sum up this narrative, I recognise my limited educational background (defined both by apartheid and post-colonial structures) that deprived me of critical thinking and an ability to express myself freely and eloquently like my male counterparts. However, I profoundly acknowledge the foundation in philosophy of education that emerged during my Master’s research, which led to the call for a minimalist-deliberative democracy in Namibian basic education that could advance towards a maximalist-deliberative democracy. I argued that, when learners are cultivated to engage in minimal (less) deliberative democracy, they will gradually grow in knowledge and assertiveness to deliberate in the maximal, desired form of democracy. Taking into account my encounters as a rural African girl and as a female student and woman, my interest in the inclusion of women in African higher education (AHE) becomes inescapable. As a result, I chose to embark on the project, “Examining the potential of an ethics of care for inclusion of women in African higher education discourses”.

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CHAPTER ONE

CONTESTING THE SPACE OF WOMEN IN AFRICAN HIGHER EDUCATION: SETTING THE AGENDA

1.1 Introduction to research - setting the agenda

In this dissertation I embark on a philosophical study regarding the inclusion of women in higher education (HE) in Africa. The first intention is to enhance my own understanding of how women are being included on the continent through the education discourses in social institutions. Secondly, I want to examine the underlying conditions that perpetuate women’s exclusion. And thirdly, I envisage exploring appropriate means of addressing exclusion in African higher education (AHE). The critical analysis of the conceptions of inclusion, equality and an ethics of care will be sought specifically in relation to identifying possibilities to assist HE in Africa to address exclusion, both conceptually and pragmatically.

Different democratic initiatives were spearheaded by the World Declarations and the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to promote a democratic society in which all people live equally and justly. In 2000, the United Nations promulgated the MDGs, with the aim of achieving the following eight fundamental goals: 1) eradicate poverty and hunger; 2) achieve universal primary education; 3) promote gender equality and empower women; 4) reduce child mortality; 5) improve maternal health; 6) combat HIV and AIDS, malaria and other diseases; 7) ensure environmental sustainability; and 8) develop a global partnership for development by 2015 (MDGs, 2005: v). The idea of gender equality and women’s empowerment is at the heart of the MDGs, and all countries are expected to achieve 50% representation of women in decision making at various levels of society by the targeted period. In this regard, African countries introduced the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD, 2002), a project with a vision to achieve the MDGs at all levels of society, especially in the area of women’s inclusion and gender equality in all educational institutions in order to foster social and economic development (UNESCO, 2000: Article 7). Regarding educational institutions, Dunne and Pendlebury (2003: 208) state that (higher) education is required to play the role of cultivating special dimensions of character and special virtues that are necessary for the sustainability of a democratic regime. Gutmann and Thompson (2004: 35) affirm that the school system is one of the central places in any democracy where the preparation for future free and equal citizens can appropriately be done.

They also argue that public schools (including higher education) constitute the best arenas for the promotion of democratic virtues such as inclusion. Consequently, if public schools are not
democratic, this situation is less likely to exist in other institutions of society. It can be conceived that the practices of HE ought to operate effectively if such practices are conducted within an inclusive and democratic environment in which everyone’s interest is considered in education practices, irrespective of colour, race and gender. However, there is a disparity in terms of representation and inclusion in HE in Africa, in spite of its claim of being a democratic institution. The disparity is evident in the different statistics on gender at the HE level in Africa, which exhibit a lack of inclusion particularly of women in higher education practices, especially in governance. One may conclude that exclusion seems to be/is an underlying factor that perpetuates the disparity in women’s representation in HE, and this may thwart the continent’s envisaged MDG aim of attaining 50% female representation by 2015.

To elucidate the concept of exclusion, Young (2000: 52-53) delineates two approaches – (i) internal exclusion and (ii) external exclusion. The first approach involves individuals or groups being formally represented in social institutions, but being excluded from the discussion and decision-making process by means of a specific style of expression, the use of language that is difficult to understand, and the dismissal of the participation of some people as being out of order. The second approach occurs when some members are kept out of the democratic community and its debates or decision-making processes, that is, such people (e.g. women) are not involved in a community of engagement and in public discourses due to their status in the society (Young, 2000: 52-53). Presumably, HE seems to advance external exclusion, as it denies women’s access and contributions to higher education practices. An example of external exclusion is found when women are not admitted to higher institutions at all, while the few with access to HE are internally excluded by being denied space to contribute to debates or decision-making processes. Teferra and Altbach (2004: 21) point out that the challenges experienced by female students include a lack of access to HE, as well as the problem of gender inequality amongst students and academic staff in many African universities.

According to Assié-Lumumba (2007: 472), there is evidence of a severe lack of female access to HE. It is stated that no African country has achieved the goal of universal primary education, much less the goal of ensuring access to HE for women. I contend that, in Africa, exclusion and gender inequality are underlying factors that stir a lack of access of women to HE as both students and staff members. On the notion of access, Morrow (2007: 39) identifies two types, (i) formal access and (ii) epistemological access. Formal access deals with admission to institutions of HE in terms of the number of students, whereas epistemological access entails how many institutions provide access to the goods it distributes to those it formally admits, that is, the knowledge shared system.

For instance, formal access takes place when more women (as students or staff members) are given special entry to HE, but epistemological access is enabled when women who gained formal access to HE are offered spaces to share their knowledge by means of research outputs at
conferences and in publications, and to make contributions to policy changes. Formal access can be exemplified by the number of women at HE institutions, while epistemological access manifests when those who are formally granted access to HE are afforded opportunities to contribute to decision making and share their knowledge in policy formation. So, Morrow (2007: 39) has rightly noted that, if we promise our students (in this case women) spaces in HE by offering them formal access, but break our promise by not offering them adequate epistemological access, we not only betray their personal aspirations, but also undermine some of the central ideals of HE. The point is that women are excluded; therefore they lack formal and epistemological access.

1.2 The exploration for inclusion of women in higher education in Africa: a snapshot

Accessing HE formally should not be the only target; rather, it is necessary to widen epistemological access, which cannot be achieved if only few women gain access to HE. Moreover, HE is deprived of the contributions of women as role models, mentors and other examples of good practices, such as connecting with “the other”, engaging with the differences of others and sharing their commonalities (Benhabib, 2002: 162). This claim can be verified by the low number of female students and staff members in institutions of HE on the African continent. A study of 32 universities in 16 African countries showed that a larger proportion of university dropouts consist of female students (Leathwood & Read, 2009: 3). This implies that women are not only underrepresented numerically, but they are also at a higher risk of non-completion and dropping out. With many student groups still underrepresented, HE continues to be criticised for being elite-based rather than for the masses. The idea that HE limits women’s equal access to its practices seems to say that there is no space for them, thus confirming a kind of exclusion.

A study conducted by the London Institute of Education (2005: 10) shows that the percentage of female enrolment in HE in Africa is low. Nigeria has 39.9%, Tanzania 24% and Uganda 34%, while Lesotho 50% and South Africa are the only countries with 53% female enrolment. Many of the female students in HE institutions are clustered at the undergraduate level, and more are studying for certificates and diplomas, while fewer females are found at the master’s and doctoral levels. It is evident that women are not only under-represented as students at universities, but also as staff members. Undoubtedly, such a selection of data on HE on the continent reveals a sizeable gender gap, the cause of which needs to be investigated.

From the number of women appointed as heads of higher education institutions – as rectors, vice-rectors, chancellors and deans of faculties, it is evident that universities in Africa promote women’s exclusion and gender inequality in staff membership. Onokala and Onah (1998: 10-12) revealed that African universities had produced at least five female vice-chancellors from different
disciplines. It is observed that African universities in the twenty-first century need to strive to become places where the pursuit of knowledge is indeed freely and equally available to all citizens, irrespective of age, religion, sex and race. A research study conducted by the London Institute of Education (2005: 5) shows that there is also a sizeable gender gap in staff employment, particularly at higher decision-making levels. Out of the four Commonwealth African universities examined, the percentage of women at professor, associate professor and senior lecturer levels was decidedly lower than that of men. Even at the lowest level of academic opportunities, such as assistant lecturers, the percentage was surprisingly low, indicating that women are deprived of contributions as role models and mentors in HE. Statistics of positions of professor held by women at the four universities show that Ibadan University had 12.5%; the University of Cape Town 7%; Dar es Salam University 5.2%; and Makerere University 6.1%. Positions of associate professor held by women constituted 17% in Cape Town; 14.8% in Dar es Salam; and 20% in Makerere (London Institute of Education, 2005: 5).

In addition, statistics of women as rectors, vice-chancellors, deputy chancellors, registrars, executive directors and deans of faculties showed that, in 2006, in the overall gender proportion of the 92 African universities, only four countries attained 30%, namely Lesotho, Mauritius, Namibia and Swaziland. Countries such as South Africa, Mozambique, Uganda and Botswana had 28%, while the rest had between 0 and 24% representation of women (HERS-SA, 2008: 2). The foregoing statistics are indicative of women’s exclusion and gender inequality, which seem to prevail not only in higher education, but also at other levels of society. The concept of gender equality is viewed by King and Mason (2001: 34-35) in terms of equality under law, equality of opportunity, including equality of access to HE, knowledge production and human capital as well as other productive resources, and equality of rewards for work and equality of voice (see MDGs, 2005: 3). It seems that women as students and staff members do not have enough access to and experience in HE in Africa. This would therefore validate the claim in this study that there is a lack of both formal and epistemological access, as well as inequality of women in HE, in addition to them being deprived of making a contribution to education discourses in Africa. Mutume (2005) has rightly noted that, without access to HE, women may find it difficult to engage in debate and contribute to political and economic activities of any sort.

Therefore, this study will attempt to investigate the predicament of women that results in their lack of access to higher education, which prevents them from playing their roles as equal members in HE as well as in the wider society. The same understanding is expressed in the MDGs (2005: v), namely that “there can be no development, and no lasting peace on the planet, if women continue to be relegated to subservient and often dangerous and back-breaking roles in higher education and the entire society”. In relation to the question on why HE is the focus of this study, the view of
Frank and Meyer (2007: 287) is relevant. They affirm that the public mission of the modern university is to help solve social problems by improving business organisations and capital investments, protecting the natural environment, preserving human rights and cultural diversity, resolving crises of governance, and promoting democracy. This study seeks to analyse women’s exclusion and inequality in AHE, and its deprivation of women as role models, mentors and other examples of good practice. Firstly, the study examines HE in Africa with reference to some of the practices at various universities, particularly the roles of women in such institutions. The historical background and nature of AHE are fundamental to the study, as well as the efforts of the institutions (universities) to educate women for the contemporary world. In addition, the study tries to determine what aspects of knowledge are considered important to the development of the ailing African society.

Secondly, the study focuses on theories that shape AHE, in particular those theories connected to the production of knowledge(s). Thirdly, the implications of exclusion, of women in particular, and their involvement in higher education in Africa are examined. Fourthly, the study determines how exclusion and gender inequality within an indigenous concept of *Ubuntu* as inclusion/exclusion can be remedied by focusing on the educational implications of a universal ethics of care. Stressing my call for a link between African and Western thought, Wiredu (2004) points out the significance of connecting African to Western knowledge systems, especially when these arrangements are to the advantage of African people, particularly disadvantaged groups (i.e. women). Hence, my decision to reconceptualise an indigenous notion of *Ubuntu* as inclusion from the Western liberal perspectives of an ethics of care, that could possibly enhance and guide the post-colonial AHE system towards desirable democratisation and transformation. To substantiate the claim that exclusion exacerbates women’s lack of access to HE, a brief historical background of AHE is provided. To a considerable extent, HE has come to occupy an integral part of modern society. The institutions of HE (i.e. universities, which are the focus of this study) are the largest repositories of certified knowledge and accommodate the concentration of those certified as experts, and who possess the specialised skills and knowledge that societies need for their advancement and development (Okolie, 2003: 238-239).

Likewise, Assié-Lumumba (2006a: 18) points out that the contemporary institutions of higher learning in Africa have originated from a colonial or neo-colonial framework, and the idea and reality of HE were alien to the African context before colonisation. Most of Africa’s political leaders, bureaucrats and scholars were educated according to such theories. Unsurprisingly, such theories have caused HE practices to apply the same mechanism of exclusion of women in institutions of higher learning and in leadership. Okolie (2003: 239) asserts that such ideas of modernisation continue to shape the current AHE negatively, particularly its attitudes towards women, which has had a deep impact on women’s involvement in decision making and equal access. Naidoo (2003: 249) states that governments have tended to use “globalisation” as a rationale for HE reform. He
therefore highlights “the attempt by governments to harness public universities in a relatively unmediated manner to economic productivity and to reposition higher education as a global commodity”. It is argued that, if Africa is to succeed economically, culturally and politically, it must have a strong post-secondary education sector, because academic institutions are central to its future (Teferra & Altbach, 2004: 22-42).

In addition, although there are more than 54 universities on the African continent, globalisation as neoliberal economic policies pose the biggest challenge to HE in Africa. Problematising globalisation, various scholars agreed that the concepts neoliberalism and globalisation cannot be used interchangeably. The works of Michael Peters, one of the foremost philosophers of education in the modern world offers a clear analysis. In his view on the aspect of neoliberalism as an ideology, he claims that neoliberalism is a “framework within which ideas about social, institutional and cultural life are expected to operate” (Peters & Roberts, 2008: 1). That entails the implementation of policies namely corporatisation, marketisation, and privatisation across the globe. As a multifaceted process of neoliberal economic policies, globalisation engenders creativity of economic interaction that embraces international communities.

In that regard, globalisation, seen as a project of neo-liberalism, in Africa has been “articulated primarily through structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) and that globalization throughout its projects has accelerated the corporation of unitary management, commercialization of learning and commoditization of knowledge” (Zeleza, 2004: 42). Hence, knowledge has been increasingly commodified as it is packaged into smaller marketable units in an industrialised curriculum (Leathwood & Read, 2009: 2). The project of neo-liberalism has also transformed the nature, governance, identity of scholarly discourse and pedagogical practices of universities in Africa. In other words, globalisation has turned HE institutions into an economic investment rather than a common good that would afford everyone (especially marginalised groups – in these instances, women and the poor) access to institutions of HE and to be fully included. One may possibly conclude that HE in Africa is not only considered as a manufacturer of technicians, but also as a space for the elites and privileged, rather than for all eligible citizens (include women) on the continent. Based on the above view, university practices, as shaped by the ideology of globalisation, spawn exclusion and deny women access to HE. Since the concept of globalisation appears to be complex and contested; there is a need for a deeper exploration of its impact on women’s exclusion in AHE in this study. In the following section I motivate the study and provide some justification for why this investigation is worthwhile pursuing. I also explicate aspects of the methodologies and methods associated with Philosophy of Education as an approach that informs this study. The chapter concludes with an outline of the programme of study, showing how the dissertation will unfold.
1.3 Motivation for the study

One can assume that, since most African states are democratic nations, then HE institutions that are considered as hubs of knowledge ought to cultivate a democratic citizenry who could not only compete in the world market economy, but also assist in addressing local predicaments on the continent. Thus, the mission of the public university should be to educate students to acquire knowledge and skills that will enable them to engage in debate and offer possible solutions to burning issues facing the continent today. Nevertheless, studies have shown that women have been and still are being excluded from higher education (Assié-Lumumba, 2007; Kiamba, 2008; Kyesiga, 2002: 152). Despite the fact that different conferences and studies have proposed ways of inclusion, such as MDG projects that aim to address exclusion and gender inequality, the dilemmas that continue to prevail in HE in Africa provoked my interest to embark on this study.

In addition, my personal experiences as a woman studying for Honours degree (B.Ed Honours) in education contributed to my interest in the topic. I found it difficult to engage in classroom practices because of my lack of eloquence, and I questioned my ability due to a poor educational background and upbringing, which expected girls/women not to speak at the same level with boys/men, as alluded to in the preface of the dissertation. In such an HE environment I felt deeply excluded. Moreover, almost 90% of the lecturers were male, compared to only a few female lecturers. Attending various conferences where male presenters seemed to be more representative than women also raised questions as to why female scholars were not visible and did not present papers. These personal experiences suggested that female students appear not to have access to epistemological spaces to grow and acquire cognitive abilities that would enable them to contribute to knowledge production. Listening to some female doctorate holders as they shared their difficulties/challenges in accessing higher education and obtaining their doctorate confirmed my observations. In particular, married women are often faced with the choice of giving up their studies or losing their marriage. Jacobs (1996: 155) confirms that women lag behind as far as the achievement of a PhD qualification is concerned. The low representation of women in HE institutions on the continent triggered my desire to conduct this study.

Furthermore, despite the fact that studies on girls’ and women's access to education and gender equality on the African continent abound, not much change has taken place in the status of women in higher education and society. Likewise, there are no tangible conceptual studies on Ubuntu as inclusion/exclusion of women in/from AHE practices in relation to the notion of an ethics of care – an important virtue that (as I shall argue for later in the dissertation) can enhance women’s access to HE. I acknowledge that an ethics of care is not comprehensive and there are other approaches to address exclusion like Foucault's work on the ancient care of the self and knowing oneself.
However, I find the ideas of Aristotle, Noddings and Slote (if reconstituted) more feasible in engendering inclusion in AHE. In line with the above reconstruction on the universal ethics of care concept, is the link between an indigenous concept of Ubuntu as inclusion with a specific focus to the equalisation of voice rather than gender, an approach which is explored in chapter 4 of this study.

With the same sentiment on gender research, Jacobs (1996: 178) confirms that educational research focuses on individuals and leads to a de-emphasis of the role of the institutional setting. She notes that the main challenge facing research on gender in education is to go beyond documenting specific gender effects to developing a more theoretically motivated account of the status of women in the education system. Consequently, my intention is to explore HE ideology and practices in relation to women inclusion and gender equality are understood and practised. The idea of gender inclusion is being examined more specifically in chapters 4, 5, and 6 of this study. Although few women who hold leadership positions in HE can be role models and mentors for female students, studies have shown that, in some cases, women have been reluctant to assume leadership positions themselves in other levels of society. This situation is also exacerbated by the fact that HE seems to be dominated by men. Nzomo notes that women have been barred because men monopolise the decision-making structures and are in the majority, while the university remains a man’s world and a male-dominated institution (cited in Kiamba, 2008: 10). It is evident that women seem not only to be excluded from HE, but also face challenges that impede their opportunities to attain high positions. I contend that only by facilitating the genuine entry of more women into leadership positions in higher education and other levels of society will young people have mentors and role models for their future and their careers (HERS-SA, 2008: 2). If women are not educated, their ability to build strong families and societies may be hampered.

Improving the status of women in higher education would also have a positive impact on the overall status of women at all levels of society. Research indicates that, since many African societies are shaped by a patriarchal system, women should not allow only men to continue to dominate and lead the society (Kwesiga, 2002; Onokala & Onah, 1998). It is clear that society remains unequal, and if we do not have a society in which women are educated, contribute to higher education discourses and are placed at the level of governance and decision making, it will not be the kind of democratic society that citizens desire. Moreover, the benefits of a democratic society may not be achieved in the absence of educated women who could act as significant role models and mentors to girls. In a sense, HE offers the means through which women and other historically disadvantaged groups can attain positions of leadership and increase their economic welfare, thereby having a long-term impact on the overall productivity and the idea of equal opportunity (Adetude & Akensina, 2008: 339). It is apparent that women appear not only to be denied their
rights as equal human beings, but their opportunities are curtailed and their voices are silenced. This may be related to discriminatory activities against them in HE as both students and staff members.

I argue that by denying women both formal and epistemological access (a way of exclusion), they are deprived of opportunities in the institutions that would have contributed so much more to their upliftment, empowerment and self-esteem. They would also have been equipped with cognitive ability, become more critical and be afforded critical tools to address societal problems, all things that HE ought to do. Hence, the practices in AHE institutions seem to suggest that women should not access education practices, which is a way of promoting exclusion, a problem that may then further impede gender equality between women and men in the universities. In this regard, the practices of higher education institutions can be considered to operate effectively only if such practices are conducted within a democratic, inclusive HE environment. I argue that the bleak situation of the exclusion of women from HE in Africa requires collective and concerted efforts that engender inclusive and equal institutions if credible knowledge production and development are to be advanced and protected. The university, which is the focus of this study, rests on fundamental ideals as delineated by Von Humboldt (cited in Smeyers, 2011: 5), which are that (a) teaching and research are linked within the individual; (b) by education through research the university nourishes the public debate and enhances the development of an enlightened civic culture; (c) through the arts and sciences men and women can cultivate their potentialities; and (d) the university raises those individuals’ capacities beyond economics and politics.

From the above ideals of the Von Humboldtian University, and how exclusion and gender inequality permeate African higher education institutions, it is questionable whether the current African university can cultivate an enlightened civic culture devoid of gender exclusion. This issue is raised here because some women are excluded and treated unequally. At the same time, women are expected to engage in various levels of economics and politics. Thus, I wish to investigate how inclusion is conceived in HE (universities) and how HE knowledge can engender an enlightened civic culture, irrespective of gender and differences, on the African continent. This is achievable (I hope) by means of an exploration of AHE and its conception of inclusion and gender equality as democratic virtues, which would propose a transformative framework for university practices in AHE.
1.4 Research questions

The main research question for this study is the following:

- Do exclusion and gender inequality undermine the pursuit of higher education in Africa?

The sub-research questions are:

- Can the production of knowledge be credible if higher education in Africa is permeated by patriarchal ideology, practices and gender inequality which perpetuate the exclusion women?
- Would an ethics of care be a feasible notion for remedying exclusion, gender inequality and social injustices, which perpetuate women’s lack of access to higher education institutions in Africa?

To answer the above questions, the methodology for this investigation will now be explored.

1.5 Methodological considerations: Philosophical analysis

This dissertation employs philosophical methodologies and methods to answer the aforementioned research questions. I attribute my use of the philosophical methods to numerous philosophers, ranging from Socrates, Aristotle, Descartes, Kant and Russell, to Wittgenstein and Peters, as well as Warnick and Burbules, to mention just a few. Within this approach one begins to wonder, question and doubt the taken-for-granted narrative, accepted beliefs and their meanings in order to achieve a deeper understanding of the problems of the exclusion of women in HE. Central to philosophical methods are issues of argumentation and justification. Philosophy of education as an approach is used to answer the main question in this study as a way of gaining more clarity about the problem of women’s exclusion in HE.

Conceptualising philosophy of education as an approach to research, Hirst and Peters (1998: 28) provide a definition of philosophy, which is rooted in the Greek words philos (love) and sophos (wisdom). Philosophy is viewed by them as an activity of the mind and is concerned with two distinctive types of concerns: Firstly, to make moral judgements for an action. Nevertheless, it is clarified that not all reflective, second-order questions are philosophical in nature. Hence, Hirst and Peters (1998: 28) pose the following question: “What then, distinguishes philosophy from reflective investigation?” They respond that philosophical reflection entails reflection about the concepts, and the kind of grounds, involved in making philosophical judgements. To put it succinctly, philosophical inquiry is concerned with questions of conceptual analysis and with questions about the grounds of knowledge, beliefs, actions and activities or practices. Thus, conceptual analysis and the grounds that AHE aims to educate while excluding women from its practices are of interest to this study.
Secondly, in terms of education, Richard Peters, a British philosopher of education, argues in his canonical book, *Ethics and Education* (1966), that it is difficult to give a precise meaning of the term. However, as his polemic contribution to the field of philosophy of education, Peters (1966) identified three criteria that distinguish it from other human pursuits. For him, the first criterion entails that something valuable or worthwhile is going on, in this case AHE. This implies that education is connected with learning rather than a mysterious process of maturation. What is clear here is that an educated person ought to have gone through some process of learning. The second criterion involves a normative aspect. Winch and Gingell (1999: 71), in illuminating Peters' criterion, state that the acquisition of a body of knowledge and understanding is that which surpasses a mere skill, know-how or the collection of information. In other words, the knowledge and understanding must encompass the principles that highlight skills, procedural knowledge and information, and must transform the life of the person being educated, both in terms of her or his general outlook, and in terms of her or his commitment to the standards implicit/subtle in the areas of her or his education. The third criterion focuses on the cognitive aspect of education, whereby the educated person will gain some understanding of what is being learnt and will be able to question the knowledge to a certain extent in the process of learning.

Taking into account the aforementioned criteria, especially the second one, my intention is not merely to collect information, but rather to explore how AHE engages in the project of transforming its practice by including all people, specifically women and other excluded groups. Philosophy of education as an activity of the mind and way of thinking is employed to identify a major problem – exclusion from HE in Africa – in society and proposing ways to address this problem (Burbules & Warnick, 2003: 19). The problem of exclusion and gender inequality has been identified in HE in Africa, which invariably draws on a philosophical framework to ensure that it is addressed both conceptually and pragmatically. I used conceptual analysis, in which concepts are analysed by looking for the related concepts or meanings central to the identified problem and argument; in this instance, exploring what constitutes the concepts inclusion, equality and an ethics of care. To clarify the use of philosophy of education, I draw on Smeyers (2011: 1), who delineates some of the main issues with which philosophy of education is concerned:

Firstly the analysis of concepts specific to education – such as ‘education’, ‘teaching’, ‘training’, and ‘university’, and ‘school’ … Secondly, the application of ethics and social philosophy of education should be obvious enough. There are assumptions about the desirability of the procedures by means of which this is to be transmitted …

Based on the aforementioned approach, the analysis of the concepts of education, the university in Africa, the nature of knowledge (which includes all categories of people), and accessing such
knowledge equally, and the desirability of procedures as well as the means by which knowledge is transmitted, are explored. Blake, Smeyers, Smith and Standish (2003: 3) stress that analytical philosophy of education rests on the analysis of the concepts – a matter of clarifying the rules or conditions under which such concepts are used or applied, borrowed from the Wittgensteinian notion of language as a rule-governed activity. The point is that philosophy of education explores what education might be or might become. Importantly, Hirst and Peters (1998: 37) state that philosophy of education is a field of applied philosophy that draws from the traditional fields of philosophy, namely ethics and epistemology, with the intention to address questions about education policy, human development and curriculum theory, amongst others. So, in this study, philosophy of education as a philosophical study using analytical inquiry engages in an exploration of the purpose, process, nature and ideals of higher education in relation to the exclusion of women in AHE.

In addition, Smeyers (2011: 14-15) points out that philosophy of education as an inquiry aim at the formation of practical insights and judgments that can only come into play through engagement with practical higher education issues. Such a form of engagement includes looking for alternatives to the problems that make sense to everyone participating in such an inclusive discourse, in this case higher education practices in Africa. The practice of education takes different forms. Thus, the concept of education practice cannot make sense without a context in which one has learnt to apply it (in this case Africa). I agree with the above view that the conditions in which we find ourselves today, such as the demand for performativity in higher education contexts and practices (exclusion and gender inequality) cannot be ignored, but taken seriously. It is against this background that the study explores how the internal/local ideas and practices are connected to the external/global and thereby influence higher education practices in Africa. Thus, philosophy of education is used because it offers sufficient ways in which to ascertain the conditions that constitute the identified problem of women’s exclusion, and of gender inequality amongst women and others in AHE.

1.5.1 Some methodological considerations

The present study lies between the interpretive and critical, with a touch of the deconstructive flavour based on the questions the dissertation aims to address. Smeyers (2011: 8) posits that “there is no need for one single method nor to prioritise one; much depends on the problem that is studied, but also on the kind of theoretical interest one is pursuing”. Critical analysis of HE policy documents and other educational literatures, and their practices in relation to women, are also utilised, along with interpretive theory in order to probe deeper meanings and to understand the issues at hand. I have chosen this methodology because HE in Africa needs to be given meaning
within its historical context. Interpretive theory has in mind constructing understandings, meanings and interpretations of HE in Africa that involve the way we use words, and the recognition that we are using them in the right way, as if we were following a rule (Wittgenstein, 1958: 50). Interpretative theory is used not as a main methodology but, because I cannot begin to critique higher education practices and propositions without gaining a clear and more nuanced understanding of its history and what influenced and shaped AHE, I rely on interpretation.

Another important methodology I rely on in this study is critical theory and its emancipatory potential, as mere interpretation of women’s exclusion is not enough. As the study shows, an amended ethics of care is used on the grounds of its critical orientation to counteract women exclusion and gender inequality in AHE. Habermas (1978) posits that critical educational theory should prioritise “human interests”, given that it seeks to liberate human beings from all forms and circumstances of repression. Thus, I make use of critical education theory as an action that could lead to the transformation, emancipation and empowerment of those excluded from HE in Africa, specifically women. Moreover, in a pragmatic way, my intention is to be a voice that contributes and proposes a defensible argument to address exclusion in AHE. It is only when I announce my presence through an equal voice in AHE as an emerging woman researcher, with my contribution to democratic processes and possibly disrupts the status quo through philosophy of education.

Since my intention is to suggest apt ways of facilitating the higher education environment that may possibly enable women to emancipate themselves, I also rely on some aspects of deconstruction. Deconstruction is used, on the one hand, to expose the hidden or obscure meanings in the conception of higher education discourses – inclusion, equality and an ethics of care, and, on the other hand, gives an account of unstated assumptions that contribute to exclusion and gender inequality. As Derrida (1978: x) argues, deconstruction demands continuous questioning and dismantling of contained or unconcealed notions of presence, and focuses on meanings that are unstated. In his view, meanings are always somewhere else, never in the words we use; they are always “absent” (Derrida, 1978: 4). In the same way, Waghid (2008a: 14) concurs that deconstruction tries to open up the system in the name of that which cannot be thought of in terms of the system and yet makes the system possible, that is HE in Africa. In other words, since the university is an integral social institution that cultivates knowledgeable citizens, but which seemingly excludes women’s contribution from educational discourses, it is vital to explore how African higher education practices could become transformed. And this can be done if one uncovers those hidden meanings not always explicitly mentioned in relation to exclusion and gender inequality in AHE.
Chapter 1 introduces and sets the agenda for the study. It contains a brief exploration of the concept of HE in Africa and the use of philosophy of education as a form of research inquiry to address the problem of exclusion and gender inequality. Chapter 2 examines some of the theories that shape AHE. The conceptions of HE in three epochs, a deeper understanding of what shapes university practices and the underlying theories of HE (university) policy frameworks, as well as the aspects that have an impact on its practices, are probed. In Chapter 3, the conception of inclusion and gender equality in AHE practices is linked to the discussion of internal/local practices (e.g. Ubuntu) and external/global practices (e.g. cosmopolitanism). The chapter shows why AHE practices and ideas of Ubuntu as inclusion cannot be divorced from local views and situations. Chapter 4 examines AHE discourses and their (in)commensurability with the idea of inclusion, based on a purposive sampling of some universities in which conceptual studies have been carried out and where data is readily available, as a justification of women’s experience of HE on the continent. Through a reference to selected cases, the study examines and develops a contemporary framework in order to uncover underlying conceptions of higher education in relation to inclusion and gender equality, especially the roles and experiences of women in such practices. The selection is motivated basically by the availability of research on HE in such countries and universities. Because not much seems to be written on higher education in some countries, using these countries as samples in this study would have proven problematic. Significantly, some of the African scholarly work on HE can be found in Teferra & Altbach (2003), Zeleza & Olukoshi (2004), Kwesiga (2002), Assié-Lumumba (2007) and others. Thus, I consider it vital to draw from countries where data is readily available to offer a general depiction and a representative sample of other AHE institutions in relation to women’s exclusion. Chapter 5 exposes the underlying issues perpetuating women’s exclusion in AHE and calls for a defensible form of HE that integrates inclusion and gender equality. Chapter 6 conceptualises an ethics of care with the intention to explore defensible meanings that may assist AHE to transform its pedagogical practices to emancipate excluded people.

Chapter 7 shows the implications of a reconstituted ethics of care framework for university education in Africa, both conceptually (which is analytically) and pragmatically (which is a matter of practice and experientially), that is through teaching and learning as well as governance and management. It offers a reflection of my personal and epistemological journey in educational research. Similarly, the chapter responds to potential critiques as well as identifies possibilities for future studies. It is argued that, if African universities cultivate this framework whereby more women gain access to HE, contribute to decision making and have the opportunity to air their views, it will show that citizens have concern for others (ethics of care) and not exclude them. This may move the understanding of some universities on the African continent towards attenuation
with what is cosmopolitan. In such a society all people are considered, irrespective of differences and the otherness of others, while their rights and human dignity are appreciated by all. This is not an easy task, as this dissertation demonstrates in exploring the ideas of inclusion, equality and an ethics of care, and related meanings in the context of Africa. Hence, a need for understanding the current state of HE in relation to women’s exclusion, which can possibly result in their inclusion, seems to be the primary focus of this study. The ensuing Chapter 2 gives a historical account of AHE, spanning from antiquity to the contemporary era, to gain a deeper understanding of women’s involvement in education practices during different epochs.
CHAPTER TWO

A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF HIGHER EDUCATION SYSTEMS IN AFRICA AND THE INVOLVEMENT OF WOMEN

2.1 Introduction

African countries have experienced a long period of colonialism imposed by most prominent Western colonial powers such as France, Belgium, Britain, Germany and Portugal, to mention just a few. Upon liberation, the assumption was that higher education institutions in these countries would be accessible to all people, irrespective of gender, race, status, ethnicity or religion, resulting in knowledge production relevant to the context and local interest. The idea of liberation in Africa was influenced extensively by the Brazilian philosopher, Paulo Freire’s (2004) “liberatory” perspectives on education, which entailed setting one free from all forms of domination and dependence. Thus, the recognition of the local aspirations and interests of all people as equal agents in education practice ought to be the epicentre of HE transformation in Africa. This chapter offers a historical account of HE in Africa, covering three periods, namely the a) pre-colonial, b) colonial and c) post-colonial periods, in relation to how women have been involved in such practices.

Critical questions that gave impetus to this journey are: What are the underlying meanings associated with HE in Africa in different periods? What theories or dominant ideas drive HE in the different periods, by unpacking for whom, for what and why HE was designed at each period? Was or is there sufficient consideration of the interests of all people, especially women, in such practices? These questions are enthused by the notion that history helps to yield an understanding of how past events shape present systems; in this study, the current HE system in Africa. Hogan and Smith (2003: 166), using Rorty’s view, argue that public HE is not an autonomous practice, but rather a component of the whole system within a given society or government, either autocratic or democratic. This implies that, since HE is not an independent entity, it cannot be examined without touching on the politics embedded in its practices. As a consequence, this chapter traces the historical moments of HE on the African continent with the intention of demonstrating how women were marginalised in different eras. The second objective of the chapter is to expose how gender inequality unfolded during these stages. In other words, it is important to the dissertation as a whole to establish to what extent women have been involved, specifically in the post-colonial universities, where liberation seems to have been ingrained in their practices. At the outset, pre-colonial HE in Africa will be described, with particular interest in the indigenous and Egyptian education systems. This is done in reaction to widespread contemporary and post-colonial type of
HE was pioneered by the Western colonial states (see Assié-Lumumba, 2006a; Divala, 2008; Lulat, 2005). Secondly, colonial HE will be investigated based on the different influences on the continent, namely Arab-Islamic, Anglophone, Francophone and other Western colonial powers. This succinct exploration is pertinent in order to gain a better and deeper understanding of existing HE on the continent. Thirdly, the post-colonial period, which is the focus of this study, is analysed in terms of the shift from colonial supremacy to democracy in relation to the participation of women. This analysis interrogates how the Neoliberalism project of globalisation pervaded and influenced the discourses of HE in Africa. It also shows the link between AHE knowledge production and the contribution of women.

2.2 African higher education: tracing historical moments in relation to women

This section explores an account of African higher education (AHE), tracing its three historical and political periods that shaped the contemporary university. Although this dissertation discusses HE in Africa (as tertiary education), Lulat (2005: 25) contends that history reflects that, in the absence of all other forms of HE in a society, HE may mean any post-primary level of education (such as at secondary level and teacher training). In other words, HE is an educational system that constitutes universities and any other degree-granting colleges. The same point is clarified by Abdalla (1977, as cited in Assié-Lumumba, 2006a: 19), who expounds that:

A university is but one of the institutions of higher education. It brings men and women to a high level of intellectual development in the arts and sciences, and in the traditional professional disciplines, and also promotes high level research. On the one hand, therefore, it is a community of persons engaged in study and research. On the other, it is a source of highly trained manpower (sic) for the professions. But it is not alone in this second role. There are other institutions of higher education which offer post-secondary education and training courses and programmes of instruction in technical and vocational subjects and practical fields of work, all geared to producing middle grade technicians.

The above citation underscores the fact that institutions of higher learning can be categorised broadly on the basis of their mission and goal, their primary functions with regard to teaching and learning, research and service, the requisite qualifications of the faculties, the criteria for admission of students, the duration of the programmes they offer, and the types of degrees they confer (Assié-Lumumba, 2006a: 19). It can be said that the terms “higher education” and “tertiary education”, which embody all forms of organised educational learning and training activities
beyond the secondary level, are often used interchangeably. These terms therefore may refer to either universities, polytechnics, training colleges or all forms of professional institutions. With this understanding, an investigation of HE in Africa during the pre-colonial period in relation to women is necessary.

### 2.2.1 Pre-colonial period and women in African higher education

In this section, African higher education is associated with the ancient African indigenous forms of learning before the colonial period. Various studies prove that HE was not a new practice in African society before the Western colonial influx. In their separate research, Ajayi, Lameck, Goma and Ampah (1996) and Lulat (2005) trace the inception of HE back to the ancient centres of civilisation on the African continent, such as Egyptian knowledge and the entire African indigenous ways of knowledge production at large. All studies recognise that HE in Africa was not initiated by European influences, but had been there before the colonial period. Although the existence of indigenous HE in Africa has been criticised and refuted by a number of scholars, many African researchers have defended its uniqueness and survival prior to colonial occupation. In his work entitled *Contemporary Africa: Continent in transition*, Wallbank stated that, in the pre-European period, some Western scholars were cynical about the significance of African indigenous cultural influences and argued that “Africa south of Sahara has always been poor and powerless” (1964: 14-15). For this reason, African historians and publicists responded actively in their attempts to destroy the “myth” of Africa's barren and primitive past.

Likewise, Brown and Hiskett (1975: 19; 22) argue that HE in ancient Africa was characterised by initiation into the life of the adult community. This form of education was non-formal in nature, and children and young people were expected to imitate and emulate adult achievements through the inculcation of traditional wisdom in the form of folklore and modes of learning. One can construe that indigenous education in Africa existed, although not in a written form. Profoundly, Wallbank (1964: 16) underlines that the unique and admirable features of various elements in African indigenous culture, particularly those of art and music, were meant for boys and men, rather than for girls and women. Unfortunately, this prestigious education system favoured male over female and thus perpetuated gender inequality.
Reinforcing the existence of indigenous HE, Ajayi et al. (1996: 5) argue that:

Indigenous higher education produced and transmitted new knowledge necessary for understanding the world, the nature of man, society, God and various divinities, the promotion of agriculture and health, literature and philosophy.

This picture of HE in Africa as per the above authors was initially drawn from elements of African sagacity or knowledge.

Nevertheless, Divala (2008) posits that, despite the fact that African societies lacked technological advancement, their form of education meant that their forms of knowledge superseded what an ordinary person needed to know in order to survive as a member of a particular society. Moreover, using Odera Oruka’s interpretation, Ajayi et al. (1996: 3-5) said that this kind of knowledge did not rely only on the repetition of traditional norms, but went further to provide rational explications for such bodies of knowledge, and provided justifications and refutations. Ajayi et al. (1996) then used some of Oruka’s findings on African sagacity to argue for the existence of philosophers or original thinkers in African indigenous cultures who created and nurtured forms of informal HE. In his view, the system of HE at that period remained “predominantly oral, eclectic and even esoteric” (Ajayi et al., 1996: 4). At the same time, such forms of knowledge could range from metaphysical to epistemological to social. Furthermore, specific individuals – mostly men – were rewarded with gifts and even pieces of land for certain forms of higher knowledge that were recognised and promoted by the society. Although it is evident that HE existed long before the colonial period, it was not in a written form, but rather oral for the benefit of the general well-being of the community.

It is compelling to note that the distinctiveness of African forms of HE in which philosophic sagacity existed, regardless of the fact that there were operated outside the confines of the communal pool of knowledge, were highly treasured by the community and considered as part of the community (Divala, 2008: 37). Simply put, Oruka’s (1990) descriptions of philosophic sages give the idea that such individuals managed to offer explanations for things or events beyond the ordinary community pool of explanations presented. It is furthermore clear that, due to the nature of African traditional societies, that is their communal nature, such explanations were not recognised or considered as totally oppositional to the framework of the community, although in most cases they would be critical of community traditions (see Lulat, 2005; Oruka, 1992: 38). Apart from the given oral forms of indigenous HE in some parts of Africa, as emphasised above, there was a written form of HE that originated in Egypt. Lulat (2005: 3) argues that, long before the arrival of Western colonisation, some parts of Africa possessed institutions of higher learning, thus could boast of a tradition of HE in which the pursuit of knowledge was a worthy endeavour that any society would want to encourage. More importantly, Egypt piloted HE in the written form, which makes her one of the
world’s early great civilisations – the Egyptian civilisation. Evidently, the first examples of formal HE institutions\(^3\) in Africa can be traced to Ancient Egypt, where high arts, religious education, medical education and many other forms of education were enacted. This HE educational institution nurtured young generations as early as c. 2000 BC specifically their construction of the pyramids (Asante, 2011; Ashby, 1964: 96; Lulat, 2005: 44). Egypt completed the pyramids long before European HE had been initiated. As a result, the Bibliotheka Alexandrina\(^4\) is one of the early institutions of HE on the African continent. The nature of the HE offered was intended to satisfy the quest for knowledge, while taking into account the fulfilment of responsibilities relevant to the community and within a particular culture (Ajayi et al., 1966: 5). It is on these grounds that one can conclude that HE in Egypt strived to nurture knowledge in the people for the good of the community, while addressing daily issues. Riad, cited in Ajayi et al. (1996: 6), points out that:

Scientists and men of letters lived in the [HE] institution. They were housed and fed and were able to give themselves up entirely to their research and students, with no menial duties to perform. Its organisation was similar to that of modern universities, except that the resident scholars were not required to give lectures.

Considering the above analysis, African indigenous HE is diverse, not only in terms of the acquisition of knowledge (indigenous), but also in the degree of civilisation. As a result, African indigenous HE and Egyptian HE serve as forerunners of world civilisation, of which such an advanced knowledge was meant only for men. This education is justified as being of current significance and safeguarded by numerous African scholars, even in the 21st century. The foregoing affirms that African indigenous HE in the pre-colonial period emphasised high skills and knowledge to be imparted into boys and men for the well-being of the community. Girls and women, on the other hand, were assigned to inferior duties and unrecognised skills attributed to child bearing and rearing babies, looking after children, and caring for men and the elderly. This is one of the issues not interrogated in the marginalisation and keeping of women at the periphery of HE during that period. It could be summed up that women’s exclusion from AHE can be traced to pre-colonial times, and it is symbolic that women were not regarded as equal members of society in comparison with men, which clearly indicates how the pre-colonial period initiated a male-dominated society. Considering the change from self-rule to Western colonial invasion, it is necessary to probe women’s involvement in AHE.

\(^3\) On the philosophical bases of an African university, Asante (2011) points out that, in the imposition of the Eurocentric worldview in HE, "there was a Greek at every corner" but that the Greeks themselves "were but children to Africa, and to India and to China".

\(^4\) This library became known as the greatest cultural repository of its time. It attracted all the leading scholars from the Egyptian, North African, Greek, Roman and Jewish worlds (Ajayi et al., 1996: 6).
2.2.2 An account of the colonial period and women in higher education in Africa

Africa has a long history of colonisation. The first wave was called ancient colonisation and began in Northern Africa from Europe and Western Asia as early as 570 to 526 BC, led particularly by the Greeks and Phoenicians (Lulat, 2005: 81). Since Islam started to spread in Africa in the middle of the 7th century, this is the period when Africa fell into the hands of Arabs, who brought the Islamic religion and Arabic language. Then came the early modern period, when the European states (the British, Dutch, French, German and others colonisers) engaged in the exploration of Africa, especially sub-Saharan Africa, in order to increase Western knowledge, to spread Christianity and to increase national esteem on the basis of colonisation. This period was followed by the famous phase referred to as the “Scramble for Africa” in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. One can infer that colonisation commenced in the period before the birth of Christ in different regions of the continent. In Wallbank’s (1964) analysis, colonisation of Africa stirred by a rapid change, tension and unrest that took place in the world in 1950s. These events led to a major political development in the Western world to invade the so-called “unchanging Dark continent” Africa (Wallbank, 1964: 11). This is due to the fact that Africa appeared as a new factor in world affairs. It is said that the colonial rationale for increasing trade with Africa, especially sub-Saharan Africa, was that it promised an outlet for European capital and skills, would lead to a reduction in currency problems (especially the dollar shortage), provide access to valuable raw materials, and offer some possibility of an area for settling surplus population (Wallbank, 1964: 17). Taking the above into account, it is relevant to question the rationale for the introduction of European education in Africa and their objective to establish or not to HE on the continent. This reveals that the purpose was to fulfill the colonisers’ vision mainly to exploit the raw materials found on the continent for their benefit, while educating African men as their means of achieving their goal.

Amongst the Western settlers who invaded the African continent were British, French, German, Italian, Belgian and Portuguese colonisers, and also some from East India, Arabs, Greeks and Syrians, who united to form a federation in different parts of the continent. In this way, Africa was demarcated and divided among some Western countries, as it was seen as a continent of potential resources. According to Wallbank (1964), Africa can claim to have one quarter of the earth’s potential cropland. It can be argued that the colonial states were more captivated by the richness of African natural resources, which were still raw and unexplored, than by the people and their development. In relation to HE, Ekong (in Rottenburg, 1986: 37) states that Western colonial powers had no interest in university education in their African dependencies. In spite of the above, some local colonial administrators initiated vocational training institutions to produce assistants to support the colonial ideologies in different countries in Africa.
2.2.2.1 Higher education in different Western colonial states in Africa

Here I want to discuss the education of the colonial states in different parts of the African continent, beginning with Afro-Arab Islam African colonial education. Since the Northern part of Africa has been subjected to contested and complex scrutiny, primarily on whether it really is an African region, Lulat (2005: 107-108) points out that many Western writings on Africa tend to categorise the continent into Northern Africa and sub-Sahara (black) Africa, and question the Northern nations’ authentic position in Africa. Due to the combination of both the Western (Middle Eastern) Arabic language and African cultures, this part of Africa, which is called Afro-Arab Islam, is legitimately African. The noticeable diversity in the different regions of the African continent can be attributed to the influences of the colonial invaders and traditions of the local people. Among the earliest manifestations of Western colonialism in Africa were colonial projects in Islamic education. In the Northern part of Africa, the west manifested itself in the form of religion, just as it did in other parts of the continent. These religions were Judaism, Christianity and Islam, which originated in the Middle Eastern desert and together hold sway over most of the globe today (Lulat, 2005: 60-72). It is worth mentioning that both Christian and Islamic-dominated regions developed vibrant centres of higher learning in Northern African countries. The development of Islamic HE, for instance, came in the form of madrasas, which means a school or university in Arabic. In Mali, a city called Timbuktu was home to one of the first places where a madrasa was situated. It is argued that, although the education might have been adequate for the needs of the people, it is viewed in terms of the transmission of ecclesiastical knowledge coupled with the production of mere religious administrative personnel for a modern era (Lulat, 2005: 60). This chapter begs the question: who attended HE the madrasas? Lulat (2005) is of the view that women and girls, unlike men and boys, were not necessarily regarded as being able to carry out the sophisticated task. Therefore, women were encouraged to learn basic skills related to their assigned place, which was the home, and their unrecognised gendered menial roles such as child bearing and rearing, taking care of their husbands and elderly.

In relation to Anglophone colonial education in Africa, Ashby states that missionaries laid emphasis on British education. The British education system emphasised that “education should be adapted to the mental aptitudes, occupations and traditions of the various peoples, conserving as far as possible all sound and healthy elements in the fabric of their society” (1964: 16-20). Ironically, regarding HE, the British education advisory committee did not give serious attention to universities in the colonies. Even so, the plea to offer HE was considered, but only a few institutions were established. Although various colonial governors expressed their satisfaction of the existing educational facilities, they feared that a sudden increase in facilities for HE would lead to an overproduction of graduates. The curriculum was fundamentally patterned in accordance with

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5 Countries like Algeria, Djibouti, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Sahrawi (west Sahara), Sudan, Tunisia and Egypt (Lulat, 2005: 108).
British civic universities in constitution, standards and curriculum. They demanded from their students, who were mostly men, the same entry standards as stipulated by London or Cambridge (Ashby, 1964: 20). Although there were few institutions of HE on the continent, all systems were prepared externally and transmitted to the few selected elite African male graduates, who were produced to serve the colonisers’ interests and sustain their ideologies. One can posit that HE in the British colonies, such as Nigeria, Uganda, Ghana, Kenya, Zimbabwe and Malawi inherited an education system closely linked to the British one with the aim of fostering colonial ideology and maintaining male dominance. Ajayi et al. (1996: 37) confirms that English was used as the dominant mode of teaching and learning at universities in Africa, inspired and fashioned according to the British university tradition and knowledge. I construe from this is meaning that colonial universities in Africa were similar to those in England, which had the primary purpose of producing more men and few women with the standards of public and capacity for leadership that their colonisers required.

In terms of Francophone colonial education, toward the end of formal colonial rule, HE was developed via France’s colonial mode of assimilation and association. The concept of association, according to Lulat (2005: 9-10), was a principle of indirect rule in which the indigenous rulers were not swept aside, but permitted to continue governing under the watchful eyes of the colonial power. Nonetheless, local values, practices and languages were totally discouraged in education, and the French language was used to assimilate people into the Western way of life and ensure that they discarded their indigenous languages and ways of life. Whereas French colonial rule sought to sustain the traditional madrasa system for the masses, it encouraged some degree of alternative secular education for a small group of the elite (Lulat, 2005: 10). Furthermore, Ajayi et al. (1996: 38) stress that the purpose of French Western colonial education was the spread of their secular culture, with no interest in constructing HE for the African masses. Instead, they sent selected elite men to pursue their studies in France in order to feel at home there, rather than in Africa. These men were expected to become loyal upholders of French culture and colonial rule. In consequence, it is clear that the French colonial powers, unlike other Western colonisers, tried to assimilate the African people into their way of doing and encourage the natives to be like them. Above all, HE was not promoted in the French colonies, although general education was intended to educate Africans to be like their colonisers, although to remain inferior in all ways. Clearly, HE was discouraged and only a few elite male Africans were prepared to preserve the colonial ideology, which also advanced male domination.

The influences of colonial states such as Belgium, Portugal, Germany and Italy on AHE can be traced in Africa – though for a short period – in comparison to other colonial states. According to Ajayi et al. (1996: 41-42), Belgian education focused more on elementary schools, meant solely for boys. The brightest and most obedient boys were selected to serve at mass and were sent for
training at one of the few established colleges. The content of such education, like that of other colonisers, had a strong emphasis on vocational, trade and technical education for the few who qualified for the priesthood. Mainly, boys were the only children who qualified for education and positions in priesthood during that period. The Belgian powers discouraged education that could lead to self-help, community involvement or HE. Like the Belgian powers, the Portuguese followed the same policy of cooperating with missionaries (Ajayi et al., 1996: 41). This simply meant that the Portuguese had less to invest in AHE and promoted limited elementary education. Such established elementary and few HE institutions were meant to cater for the needs of the children of Portuguese settlers, officials and a handful of the assimilados. Clearly, the Portuguese had no interest in HE for African people, and particularly not for women. However, in a few African states like Somalia they cooperated with missionaries, while in Ethiopia they advocated a modernisation policy for the development of state-sponsored secular systems of education.

In terms of Germany’s influences in Africa, Chapman (1995) posits that evidence of their colonial influence is expressed especially via the teaching of German in some of the South African and Namibian schools. This colonial state, like many others, was not interested in HE for the local people. Germany’s colonial power, spearheaded by Bismarck, was established to guide the acquisition of African territory. For instance, the invasion of Namibia met with resistance and revolt from the local people. It is worth mentioning that the earliest case of genocide in the 20th century was committed by the German government in Namibia (formerly called Germany South West Africa), where the Herero and Nama people were killed in August 1904 (Chapman, 1995). This event led to the demise of the German colonial regime in Africa. After the WWI, at the Treaty of Versailles, all German colonies in Africa were taken and redistributed among the European victorious allies, that to manage first as League of Nations Territories and under the trusteeship of the United Nations after WWII: Tanganyika, Western parts of both Cameroon and Togo for Great Britain; Eastern and largest part of both Cameroon and Togo for France; Rwanda and Burundi for Belgium; and Namibia for South Africa (Assié-Lumumba, 2006a). Thereafter, former South African colonial powers (descendants of the Dutch and Germans) called Afrikaners took over South Africa (SA) and the former South West Africa (SWA) Namibia from the German regime.

Disconcertingly, these apartheid educational ideologies emphasised racial and segregated education for white, coloured, Indian and black Namibian and South African people. The education for black people focused more on post-primary education within what was called Bantu Education. This system focused more on industrial and agricultural as well as training institutions for teachers

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6A term used to describe the African subjects of the Portuguese colonisers, while assimilation refers to a racist system that defined both progress and humanity as moving from that which was African to that which was European (Disney, 2010: 10).
and pastors (Ajayi et al., 1996: 31). Consequently, the aim of this education system was to train Bantu male youth to act as interpreters, evangelists and schoolmasters amongst their own people. Even so, there were Afrikaans-speaking universities and colleges that specifically barred the admission of non-Europeans. The reason for the reluctance to offer HE to Africans was that the colonisers feared that education would enable them to "swamp" the white communities, who were defending an island of European colonisation (Ajayi et al., 1996: 33, 53). Suffice to say that colonisation had a strong religious character and intended to brainwash the locals by imposing the colonisers’ ideology so as to weaken local knowledge and practices.

2.2.2.2 Recounting colonial higher education and involvement of women in Africa

AHE during the colonial period was highly structured to prepare people to serve as government machinery that maintained and promoted a colonial ideology in different regions and countries on the African continent. HE was neglected during the colonial era and was designed to fulfil the needs of the colonial powers, and thus was not suitable to serve the national development of the newly independent states (Magubushka, Schomburg & Teichler, 2007: 1). From the preceding discussion, I infer that religious and colonial education during the colonial period was basic and favoured men, rather than empowering all people, including girls and women. This colonial HE process had not only starved the African masses of education, but also sustained male domination, which has exacerbate the subjugation of women on the continent. From capturing the history, I recognise how African countries vary significantly from one another in ideology and features that influenced HE institutions. Different political and economic histories and geographical circumstances have created an array of situations in which such institutions function. At different periods, HE was used as a tool to discourage natives from ‘backward beliefs and practices’, and to assimilate them into Western colonial beliefs and trends of male domination. Also, despite the fact that colonial basic education was encouraged for the local people, specifically for males, HE was promoted only slightly but solely for the few, was highly elitist and irrelevant to the broader needs and contexts of Africa.

So, I infer that African people were starved of education, specifically girls and women in comparison to men, which in a way promoted male domination on the continent. In sum, I have argued that both the pre-colonial and colonial education systems in Africa excluded girls and women from HE, which gave rise to a male-dominated society. This means that colonial education used mostly men to maintain colonial ideologies. The above portrayal of HE shows that a historical journey is required to have a deeper understanding of existing AHE. This makes sense, as Assié-Lumumba (2006a: 15) cautions that studies of contemporary institutions require critical reflection.
on the complexity and legacy that impede genuine transformation. Thus, it is necessary to trace the pedigrees of Western education systems and processes, and the agents of their transfer to Africa, to fully appreciate current achievements and make relevant suggestions. With this in mind, let me examine contemporary HE, paying attention to the continent’s transformative agenda.

2.2.3 Post-colonial higher education in Africa and women’s involvement

The notion of “post-colonial” can be explained in two ways: firstly, as a state that came after the colonial state; and secondly, as an ideology that a state uses to surpass or supplant colonial rule (Spencer, 2012). In this context, I will engage with both ideas, which underline the intention of liberation and independence on the African continent. At the time of independence, education, particularly HE, was expected to play a central role in the national project of social progress. However, “higher education is not the sole space but it is, without doubt, central to the acquisition and production of knowledge that shapes the contemporary world” (Assié-Lumumba, 2006a: 9). In the period after independence, from the 1960s through the 1970s was regarded as a liberal and transformative period for the post-colonial society in Africa (Khelfaoui, 2009: 23). The first wave of creating African universities took place during the 1960s, which was declared by the United Nations as the “Development Decade”. Moreover, most independent African countries required concerted efforts to initiate substantial reforms. The theory of human capital was prominent in industrialised nation-states such as the United States of America (USA), where education was expected to be a powerful instrument for redressing the structural inequalities embedded in society (Assié-Lumumba, 2006b: 9). As a result, human capital theory became dominant in developing regions such as Africa. In spite of the continent’s struggle for political liberation, this theory of human capital was infused into the nationalist discourse and liberation agenda.

The assumption of the theory is the creation of a linear and positive relationship between education and development, both at the individual and societal level, that is, the higher a person’s level of HE, the higher their productivity. For that reason, some African leaders such as Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah, Senegal’s Leopold Senghor and Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere thought it was imperative to transform education. Sawyerr (2002: 2) articulates the African idea of transformation as follows:

Widespread university is essentially a postcolonial phenomenon … and only 18 out of 48 countries of sub-Saharan Africa had universities or colleges before 1960. With the approach of political independence or immediately thereafter, many African countries regarded the establishment of local universities as a major part of the postcolonial national development projects. The new universities were to help the new nations build up their capacity to manage and develop their resources, alleviate
the poverty of the majority of their people, and close the gap between them and the developed world.

This is illustrative of the way in which national leaders in Africa viewed and envisioned the transformation of HE on the continent. An example of a transformative agenda in African states incorporates the goals of post-colonial HE. During the conference of the Association of African Universities (AAU), held in Accra, Ghana in 1972 under the theme ‘Creating African Universities’, participants deliberated on the rising and increasing issues confronting African universities. At that conference, Rottenburg (1986: 52-54) asserts that participants agreed that, despite the fact that they had drawn their inspiration from the foreign Western HE institutions; it was essential to free themselves from intellectual domination and begin to derive incentives from their African environment and seek continuity with African tradition. Besides that, AAU tasked universities with “a commitment to active participation in social transformation, economic modernisation and the training and upgrading of the total human resources of the nation and not just small elite” (in Rottenburg, 1986: 52-54). Importantly, the AAU commitment appears to be a response to an urgent need for women’s inclusion and gender equality in AHE towards transformation. To achieve the above goal, African universities would have to adhere to fundamental roles7, of which the pursuit and dissemination of knowledge have to be locally motivated and orientated. Such fundamental roles, as prescribed by the AAU, demonstrate the African people’s aspirations and vision to break away from the colonial influences, and to include girls and women in HE. I am particularly fascinated by the AAU’s call for a transformative agenda towards the production of locally motivated knowledge that is relevant to local needs and aspirations.

The foregoing roles have placed the university in a position as a conduit of transformation to educate manpower – specifically women. However, it is questionable to why AAU roles were silence regarding women’s access to HE, since they were side-lined in the pre-colonial and colonial epochs. In my view, the continent’s transformative commitment could not be realistic without an indication of the mechanism for the acceleration of women’s access to AHE. Providing a glaring image of women enrolment to HE in Africa, UNESCO-UIS (2009) showed that, globally, the enrolment ratios of women and men reached parity between 1970 and 2007. However, in Africa –

7Research, fundamental and applied, priority being given to local problems to ameliorate the life of the ordinary person and especially rural population; Provision of intellectual leadership to the population as well as to governments, industry and commerce, especially preparing and executing plans of economic and social development; Manpower development shifting its emphasis from academic to professional and practical, and participating in the planning, organization curriculum development and superintendence of institutions for training middle-level manpower; Promoting social and economic modernization through extension services to the small-scale entrepreneur, artisan and farmer, and itself setting an example in social cohesion and establishment and operation of democratic institutions; and Promoting inter-continental unity and international understanding, especially through its research and dissemination of knowledge contributing to the emancipation of the African continent from ignorance, and to the breakdown of barriers of artificial isolation imposed by colonialism as well as natural barriers of language and cultural separation; also identifying with and promoting the ideals of the Organization of African Unity for continent rapprochement and international understanding” (Rottenburg, 1986: 54-55).
taking Ethiopia and Mozambique as examples – a third or fewer tertiary graduates are female, in comparison with North America, Europe, Latin America, the Caribbean and Central Asia, where female enrolment rates are higher than in Africa (UNESCO-UIS, 2009). The given statistics indicate that, internationally, the call for women’s access to HE had been made in the early 1970s, yet this appeal has not been given the priority it deserves in Africa. The point is that, although gender issues have drawn some attention in HE during these epochs, marginalisation along gender lines has been firmly identified throughout the African continent as constituting the most rampant expression of injustice in terms of access to and achievement based on educational opportunity.

In the main, historical, cultural and economic factors have been identified that hindered women’s opportunities to access and derive benefits from formal education, and more so at tertiary level (UNESCO, 1998a). I echo Yesufu’s arguments that Africa adopted pro-Western liberal ideologies and capitalist systems, which conceived of HE as a fitting agent of development, imbedded in the notion of “development university”, with the mission to formulate relevant programmes and equip human resources with knowledge for the actualisation of the government’s project of national development (cited in Assié-Lumumba, 2004: 1). Given the above viewpoint, one can deduce that AHE is characterised by a systemic dependency and neo-colonial framework that represent agencies that do not necessarily take into account Africans’ perspectives and interests. On a similar note, Assié-Lumumba (2006a: 9) stressed that, in African states, HE institutions as social communities of higher learning are still being organised according to the parameters of the colonial legacy with regard to the nature of institutions, and the criteria for access to them. Even though AHE institutions have been mirrored after those of the former colonial powers, the African societal realities, needs, constraints and assets demand innovations that respond to local needs in search of transformation.

Primarily, the postcolonial nationalist struggled for independence with the primary idea of having an equal right to have access to HE, with the aim of producing skilled manpower to run a modern government and economy, as well as for other areas of governance. The underlying assumption was that HE ought to be opened to all people in Africa, including girls and women. However, different studies argue that, if Africa was to succeed economically, culturally and politically, it must have a strong post-secondary/tertiary education sector, because academic institutions are central to the continent’s future (Assié-Lumumba, 2007; Teferra & Altbach, 2004; Waghid, 2011a). It is postulated that, although the state and trend of HE institutions in Northern Africa are considerably different from those in sub-Saharan Africa, which spurred diversity in terms of function and quality, there are common aspects such as financial resources, demand for access, the legacy of colonialism, and longstanding economic and social crises in many countries that affect their efficient functioning (Teferra & Altbach, 2004: 22-23). I agree that this backlog thwarts the
continents envisioned higher education commitment towards self-reliance. It also addresses the gender inequality that has been inherited from the previous epochs.

Paradoxically, although AHE has risen to occupy an integral part of modern societies with the largest repository of certified knowledge focusing on the production of those certified as experts who possess the specialised skills and knowledge that societies need for their advancement and development, such experts were mostly men (Okolie, 2003: 238-239). One can argue that the focus on men to acquire such skills and knowledge, as it was in the colonial system, provoked male-dominated HE on the continent. Again, since AHE favoured men (just like the pre-colonial period) the post-colonial system has also failed to create an inclusive and equal environment for all people, including women. Assié-Lumumba (2006a: 18) says that, since most of Africa’s political leaders, bureaucrats and scholars are products of colonial education, this resulted in AHE institutions applying the same mechanism of excluding women from knowledge and leadership positions. One can say that AHE has largely passed colonial strategies and practices into the postcolonial education systems – a situation that deprives women of making valuable contributions to higher education.

Expressing a similar sentiment, UNESCO (1998b: 2) asserts that although there were no formal obstacles preventing women from reaching high positions in colleges and universities at the time, men still dominated at all levels of society. The above concern raises questions about why women are unable to obtain equal access, despite the fact that there are no explicit hindrances to such roles – therefore necessitating critical exploration. Sawyerr (2002) showed that, AHE policy has been shaped by international ideologies and events, specifically the neoliberal economic model that underlined increased application of market instruments in public management and a radical withdrawal of government funding. Taking into account the evolution of neoliberalism, I proceed to probe its influence on AHE.

2.2.3.1 Neoliberalism and globalisation in higher education

Conceptualising neoliberalist theory and its globalisation project, Novelli and Ferus-Comelo (2010) signify it as a hegemonic approach that perceives societies as functioning best when the market is left alone to determine distribution, production and consumption patterns. Neoliberalism represents a commitment to the primacy of markets and a belief that competition, both among businesses and in the provision of public services, best fosters growth and is the most efficient basis for social distribution (Novelli & Ferus-Comelo, 2010: 8-9). They further clarify that this theory emerged as a response by powerful factions of transnational capital supported by governments in the North to the economic recessions of the 1960s and early 1970s. So, the key elements of globalisation
comprise: a) the knowledge society; b) information and communication technologies; c) the market economy; d) trade liberalisation; and e) changes in governance structures across borders (Knight, 2008: 5). To execute this ideology, policies were implemented, either voluntarily by national governments or through the disciplinary mechanisms of structural adjustment policies (SAPs) implemented in low-income countries by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) throughout the 1980s and 1990s, as a condition for debt-ridden nations to receive access to international loans and grants. It is under these conditions that the World Bank drew up HE policies to implement the SAPs of neoliberalism. To get to grips with how this globalisation permeates AHE, it is vital to interrogate some of the World Bank HE policies in relation to women’s involvement.

2.2.3.2 World Bank policies in African higher education in relation to women

There are different themes that underscore neoliberal ideology and a call for the economic globalisation of HE in Africa. The idea was strongly imposed on higher educational policies across the developing countries by the World Bank’s SAPs in the 1980s (Ajayi et al., 1996). Because the World Bank is a main donor and leading agent, it introduced numerous major policies to support reform and implementation based on relevance, quality and efficiency. However, SAPs created a bottleneck for African states to achieve gender equality because of the permeation of globalisation in HE, which caused severe gender parity. This project created the assumption that exported industrial production inevitably would create possibilities for women’s inclusion in AHE, yet there were inherent predicaments.

Firstly, lack of agency leads AHE to implement SAPs without contemplating their effects on its transformative agenda, specifically the promotion of gender equality and the inclusion of women. UNESCO (1998b: 1-3) maintains that, despite the fact that African countries have made efforts to implement various international policies and strategies to meet the challenges, is was unfortunate that such efforts have not sufficiently addressed both the needs of the people (inclusion of girls and women in HE) and the demands of a rapidly changing society. As a result, UNESCO elucidates the effect of globalisation on HE as follows: a) deterioration of working conditions and quality of academic staff and researchers; b) brain-drain; c) dwindling research and capacity; d) lack of teaching and research materials; e) decline in internal and external efficiency; and f) graduate unemployment, which affects the practices of HE and its focus on the needs of the people (1998b: 3). Thus, these kinds of crises lead to strikes in some countries that are often countered with violence, resulting in damage to property and the closure of some universities. This portrayal in itself reveals how institutions of AHE, particularly universities, face difficulties in promoting educational development, which thwarts the attainment of women’s inclusion and gender equality.
Subsequent to some negative outcomes of this policy in Africa, the World Bank encouraged privatisation, coupled with careful planning and high standards of management in AHE. It is argued that, for public funding to play a more consistent role, students, institutions, business and philanthropy need to join hands. As a result, the World Bank (1994: 10) made a call for the optimal use of human and physical capital to encourage the development of new technologies for communication and the integration of developing countries into the global intellectual community. The World Bank stated that the financing of HE did not need to be limited to the public purse (1994: 11). For them, when HE is relying solely on public funding it leads to high dependency on government resources. This resulted in the call for private financing as a necessary possibility to alleviate the expenses of the governments. Ironically, this move prevented AHE from devoting resources to urgent needs, particularly responding to women’s access. One can argue that this introduction of private financing had negative effects on AHE advancing its initial goal of including girls and women in education.

As a consequence, Jegede (2012), a Secretary General of the AAU, has indicated that, due to the economic SAPs, many governments cut public spending on HE, paving the way for the proliferation of private institutions. Currently, Africa has about 800 universities and more than 1,500 tertiary institutions, but the proportion of private universities has risen radically, with a high concentration of private institutions demanding and backing marketable courses that out-compete the public universities regarding their high-earning programmes. One can conclude that HE in Africa is highly framed according to globalisation ideas of marketisation – impacting on the vital role of the public. It is on this basis that the establishment of private institutions of HE skyrocketed on the continent after the introduction of neoliberal policies. Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether African countries will attain their national goal of democratisation and achieve the socioeconomic agenda, as this demands private financing of HE without considering the contextual needs of the people, especially access by women and other marginalised groups. If one looks at World Bank policy, there is a dominating voice for higher educational institutions to implement global economic policies as a condition for the provision of funding.

I therefore agree with Amaral, Meek and Larsen’s claims that the World Bank seems to apply and enforce a “one model fits all” system, even in some impossible environments, in this case in Africa, where women are still gravely marginalised (2003: 14). More importantly, the above viewpoint demonstrates how the World Bank’s policies of structural development work against women’s access to HE. In my view, taking into account the African need to create space for the less

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8 Uganda has seven public and 27 private universities; in Somalia, all 40 universities are privately owned; Ethiopia has 22 public universities and more than 30 private institutions; South Africa has 23 public universities and 87 private institutions; Ghana has six public and 42 private universities; and Nigeria has 36 federal, 37 state and 45 private universities (Jegede, 2012).
privileged and marginalised groups, particularly women, requires special consideration. What is more, along with UNESCO, the World Bank convened a Task Force on Higher Education (TFHE), which brought together experts from thirteen countries to explore the future of tertiary education in developing countries. Their report, *Higher education in developing countries: Peril and promise* (TFHE, 2000), argued that HE is essential to developing countries if they are to prosper in a world economy in which knowledge has become a vital area of advantage. According to the TFHE (2000: 32-33), this quality of knowledge “is becoming increasingly critical to national competitiveness”. One can clearly note how HE knowledge production is deeply embedded in the idea of becoming competitive in the world market, and ignores the local crises of gender inequality in AHE.

A subsequent World Bank (2002) report, *Constructing knowledge societies: New challenges for tertiary education*, generated further momentum for HE. This report stressed the role of tertiary schooling in building technical and professional capacity and bolstering primary and secondary education. The Bank’s policy reiterated that the significance of universities rested in constructing knowledge societies in general, and in training a qualified and adaptable labour force, including high level scientists, professionals, technicians and teachers. Vital questions pertaining to the generation of new knowledge were to address the use and personal interest thereof. It is stated that HE should receive no more than 20 per cent of a country’s total education budget, but also argued that the state should create enabling frameworks to encourage tertiary education institutions (see Bloom, Canning and Chan, 2005). In this report, the World Bank explained why continuing public support for HE was necessary, while addressing the appropriate role of the state, as well as how to diminish the adverse effects of reforms. It had promised its support to tertiary education institutions in developing countries, and emphasised a comprehensive approach rather than the previous area approaches:

Through effective partnerships with other multilateral institutions, national governments, NGOs, and the private sector, the World Bank aspires to apply its financial resources and extensive knowledge base toward increased efforts in the tertiary education and science and technology sectors, which will help create the foundations of democratic, knowledge-based economies and societies (World Bank, 2002: 99).

The foregoing quotation leads to the conclusion that, in order to minimise disputes within the institution, the Bank favours consensus building and solutions adapted to each society through effective management and financial modalities. In contrast, many countries in Africa were reported to be struggling to fulfil the agreement. As an example of challenging the World Bank policy on financial modalities, Malawi University academics and students were asking questions about why they had to be forced to get loans which they had not applied for (Brock-Utne, 2003). Among some
of the commitments and implementations of the World Bank globalisation policy by African states, it was evident in and attested to by various countries’ initiatives to implement the Bank’s advocacy in expansion, favouring the science and technology field over other fields (such as fine arts, social sciences as well as humanities) in HE (Bloom et al., 2005: 7-8). Noticeably, African states tried to adopt the Bank’s call to increase HE in promoting faster technological skills as a way of improving a country’s ability to maximise its economic output. Yet, although many universities in Africa, such as those in Malawi and Senegal, tried to implement policy that would enable girls and women to access education, it is evident that institutions put more emphasis on engineering, IT and vocational training for the market than considering other disciplines. To me, this seems to be a significant initiative in efforts to break the barrier to education experienced by women. However, authentic equality could only be attained when women are afforded enabling opportunities and are well prepared to excel in predominantly male fields such as engineering.

So, it is doubtful whether this economically driven model that encourages cost sharing between donors and states and leads to private HE will indeed drive African states to economic development and create conditions in which women will excel. This is because HE structures and staff members focus on producing knowledge for the global market, rather than addressing local issues. In my view, the likelihood is high that HE may continue to disadvantage and exclude women, because these institutions are trying to answer the call for commoditised knowledge for the global market. The challenge of the globalisation policy in Africa lies in the way African states and their universities include the policies in their systems, as prescribed by the international donors. For me, the Bank’s policy, reinforced and determined by the provision of finance and loans, has put African states in a vulnerable position. This is because such institutions of higher learning end up intensifying their policies in relation to the need for the globalisation vision and ignore their context and local crises, such as the exclusion of women and other marginalised groups. It is clear that the World Bank (2000: 15) postulates that the global “markets require profits and this can crowd out important educational duties and opportunities”. The World Bank therefore perceives HE as a manufacturer of technicians for economic development, in which the few elites (mostly men) acquire technical skills for a competitive world. In this sense, those in possession of the commodity (knowledge) will determine and dominate AHE, whereas the under-represented will only marginally influence the production of knowledge.

In an effort to address the above impasse, UNESCO (2002) brought together 120 participants from various universities in the world (Asia, Africa, Pacific, Arab states, Mediterranean, Europe, North America and Caribbean) as well as HE institutions, leading donors of the World Bank, and agencies. During this conference, the participants argued that globalisation in HE is associated with a substantial growth in international trade in the global markets. This growth is driven by political, economic and technological factors and there is no reason to expect a slowdown of the
process in the near future (UNESCO, 2002: 42). This depiction manifests how HE stakeholders are immensely polarised with regard to trade and markets in their institutions and have no space to cater for the needs of marginalised groups, particularly women, who have encountered and still are encountering exclusion. Those who strongly opposed the treatment of HE as a commodity or tradable service claimed this would negatively affect various regions of the world, but the hardest hit depended on the context, in this case Africa (UNESCO, 2002: 43). I agree with the UNESCO report that it is impossible to expect Africa, like other developing regions, to achieve the intended outcome of including previously excluded people, mainly women and the non-affluent or marginalised groups, in HE, given the World Bank’s pressing demand for a market-driven model. It is further argued that this situation has rather increased the vulnerabilities of women, who are already excluded and marginalised, since African universities in particular could not cope with the demand of producing knowledge for the market and responding to local needs, including addressing women’s marginalisation. Thus Knight (2008: 5-6) asserts that, due to each nation’s individual history, traditions, cultures, resources and priorities, globalisation has ultimately impacted negatively on the educational development at universities in these countries.

In the light of the above, the second dilemma rests on the way the SAPs programmes seem to be imposed on developing countries and their educational institutions, particularly their universities. A study by Brock-Utne (2003) asserts that it is problematic when powerful and undemocratic international financial institutions use neoliberal frameworks to shape domestic policies that further deprive marginalised groups (women) of their basic human rights, especially inclusion in AHE. To illustrate this point, one example of SAPs, namely the imposed fees for access to basic education and far-reaching tuition fees for HE, directly reduced access of the most marginalised and vulnerable groups, particularly women. Equally, Assié-Lumumba (2006b) emphasises that the main outcome of the World Bank’s involvement in defining HE policy and financing priorities in Africa is the damaging implication for the efforts to bridge the gender gap in higher institutions of learning. In some post-colonial countries such as Mali, these policies were actually presented to parents as a compensation for the opportunity cost that imposed factors forbidding the enrolment of girls in schools. In my view, the World Bank promoted education for the deprived groups, in this case girls in schools, as a mechanism to increase women’s participation in HE in Africa. Nonetheless, such policies caused pressure on AHE, with its emphasis on knowledge for the global economy, which hinders the agency and capacity of local institutions to include women.

The third issue is unequal distribution of investment, which reinforces women’s exclusion from AHE. Subbarao, Roney, Dundar and Haworth (1994: 28) posit that the World Bank’s policy on investment and unequal distribution influenced gender equality in HE on the African continent as early as the 1970s. The proportion of the World Bank’s education projects acknowledging gender was 28 per cent for the period 1972 to 1981, whereas the proportion of total investment in
education projects acknowledging gender was 16 per cent in the same period. However, between the 1980s and 1990s there was a clear “regional shift” in favour of South Asia, where the number of education projects acknowledging gender increased from 12 per cent to 38 per cent, and the investment in the projects recognising gender significance also increased, from eight per cent to 65 per cent (Subbarao et al., 1994: 32). From this depiction, unlike Asia, Africa has been under threat between the 1970s and 1990s, which hampers the continent’s vision to address local needs especially gender inequality. This silence or discouragement through a lack of investment led to the non-recognition of women’s representation in comparison to the earlier period, and created imbalances in HE and its efforts to create space for female enrolment in HE. This was hampered by the World Bank’s SAPs, with their unequal distribution of investment in regions to reach gender equality.

Fourthly, the absence of gender issues in the World Bank SAPs is made evident in Moja’s (2007) study, Politics of exclusion in higher education: The inadequacy of gender issues in the globalization debates. She pointed out that the phenomenon of globalisation is characterised by the absence of gender issues in the discourse on its implications for education and the policies and practices of the labour market. She emphasises the significance of women’s involvement in the discourse in all policies of globalisation. However, the challenge of taking women seriously as students, researchers, faculty members and educational leaders cannot be sacrificed if Africa is to develop a wealth of professional talent, skill, creation and innovation (Moja, 2007: 62-64). Despite several conferences calling for equal representation of women and their contribution to knowledge production and scholarship and as students in AHE, women are still shunned in such practices, which lead to their underrepresentation at all levels.

Equally, Mlama (2007: 120) and Moja (2007: 62-64) argue that university curricula have remained generally non-responsive to gender issues, thus producing experts in the form of economists, engineers, teachers, planners, scientists, doctors and others who then go on to lead professional development sectors without the necessary skills to mainstream gender in the development process. It is undeniable that the impact of the pre-existing structural inequality that emanated from the colonial system and the capitalist economy has been intensified further by increasing global and national imbalances in access to power and resources, especially for African women (see Assié-Lumumba, 2006a: 39). SAPs did not change the status quo, but rather stirred the under-representation and exclusion of women. Thus, social progress can be achieved only through social inclusion of all members of African society, especially of the female population, which constitutes a half or more of the population (Assié-Lumumba, 2007: IV; Meena, 2007: 105). The point is that African universities ought to secure the inclusive institutions and knowledge production that are needed to break out of their developmental predicaments.
Examining HE in South Africa, Waghid (2012: 72) states that, with the legacy of apartheid [colonial], the production of knowledge which merely focusing on research, teaching and learning, and community engagement require a paradigm shift. In his view, the function of postcolonial universities ought to propel towards producing advanced, high-quality scientific knowledge and technology, to train highly skilled professionals and researchers as a necessarily workforce, and to cultivate a democratic citizenry through social engagement. Like other universities in Africa, South African universities also have limited impact on the citizenry, because, in the first case, they do not adequately address inequalities in terms of race, gender and disability, and do not contribute to the eradication of global problems such as poverty, environmental degradation and conflict. Secondly, universities do not commit themselves to the education of enlightened, informed and critical citizens, and can be said to be elitist because elitist education would not engender in students a capacity for judgement and for informed participation in democratic life. The point is that public universities pay more attention to producing knowledge for the market rather than instilling in people, specifically the marginalised groups, and the capacity to engage critically and demand their rightful spaces in a democratic society. Waghid (2012: 72) posits that such universities do not succeed in developing in students a questioning, critical and democratic attitude.

I concur with Waghid’s position that African universities’ focus on producing knowledge for the market rather than producing democratic citizens has several effects, namely (a) universities remain sites of exclusive expertise, that is only the academics know best; (b) students (like many during the apartheid/colonial era and perhaps also today) do not have critical minds to initiate social change; and (c) universities remain representative of a small percentage of the population (as if scientific research of a high quality is the preserve of only a few privileged intellectuals). In this way, the knowledge monopoly remains confined to those who speak with authority and whose arguments are given priority because they speak with superior knowledge and rationality. In Waghid’s depiction, the contemporary African universities have the implication of commodified knowledge for the global market, rather than knowledge for responding to local needs, such as the inclusion of women and other marginalised groups. In the absence of democratised knowledge, universities in Africa would remain elitist and would not necessarily make a contribution to the democratisation of knowledge and society, which aims to produce students and academics from marginalised sectors, such as women, who eagerly wait to be taken up in the knowledge monopoly of such universities (Waghid, 2012: 72). In this respect, one can acknowledge the efforts made by the World Bank and other international donor agencies such as the IMF to widen HE in Africa. Yet, the focus of globalisation on the commodification of knowledge for the global market imposes difficulties on HE institutions in their bid to create institutional spaces in which all people flourish, irrespective of their background or lack of capacities to flourish. Taking the above predicament into consideration let me illustrate the effects of globalisation on women.
2.2.3.3 The effects of globalisation on women in higher education

One of the primary responsibilities assigned to AHE was to promote the skills necessary for functioning effectively in an increasingly competitive global economy. Due to the severe effect imposed upon African universities by global forces, Zeleza refers to globalisation as a project of neo-liberalism where it has been “articulated primarily through SAPs and that globalisation throughout its projects has accelerated the corporation of unitary management, commercialization of learning and commoditization of knowledge” (2004: 42). As a result of this neo-liberalism project, the nature, governance and identity of scholarly discourse and pedagogical practices at universities in Africa have also changed. Zeleza (2004: 51-52) further traces the impact of globalisation on HE on the African continent through what he calls the “six Cs”:

- Corporatisation of management (adoption of business models for the organization and administration of universities);
- Collectivization of access (growing massification of higher education, continuing education or lifelong learning, and accountability to outside stakeholders);
- Commercialization of learning (expansion of private universities, privatized programmes in public universities and vocational training);
- Commodification of knowledge (increased production, sponsorship, and dissemination of research by commercial enterprises, applied research, and intellectual property norms);
- Computerization of education (incorporation of new information technologies into the knowledge activities of teaching, research, and publication);
- Connectivity of institutions (rising emphasis on institutional cooperation and coordination within and across countries).

This introduces the debate on what one can expect of the interaction between HE systems and practices on the African continent and globalisation and neo-liberalism. Zeleza regards globalisation as the biggest challenge affecting HE on the African continent, showing how the initial mission of educating Africa’s citizens to become self-reliant is being compromised. Asserting the impact of globalisation, a 2005 survey of higher education by various economists (Mohamedbhai, 2008: 12) shows that university as a traditional institution of higher learning is undergoing major changes, which are affecting them to the very core. There are four main reasons for this. Firstly, the democratisation of education in all states poses a threat to the traditional position of universities as institutions of HE for the elites; secondly, the rise of the knowledge economy has put pressure on traditional learning methods and the courses offered at universities; thirdly, the phenomenon of globalisation is turning higher education into an export industry; and lastly, competition comes into play, as traditional institutions have to compete for students, funds and
research grants. These are some of the aspects that negatively affect the African universities’ implementation of gender equality.

To a profound extent, globalisation causes universities to adopt a neo-liberal discipline in the way they conduct their affairs, teaching and learning as well as governance and management. This simply means that universities in Africa perceive students as consumers of commoditised knowledge and competitors in the global market, rather than as transformers of the past imbalances and injustices on the continent. Nonetheless, I agree that the onus is on African leaders of both states and universities to prepare themselves to navigate through these complexities. This simply means that the management and leadership of African universities should take a new look at the way in which they adopt the external policies that Amaral et al. (2003: 14) call the “one model fits all”, so as to redefine these and make them relevant to the context, particularly in relation to advancing gender equality. The point I am making is that globalisation can be regarded as another form of enslavement and indoctrination, considering its influence on the state discourses and governance systems, as well as the way it affects higher education arrangements and practices on the African continent. I concur with Yizengaw’s (2008: 10) viewpoint that weak leadership in management and governance exacerbates the challenges faced, as management inefficiencies drain scarce resources away from the fundamental objectives of increasing access, quality and relevance and thinly spread human and financial resources.

This prioritisation of the international demands of knowledge production for the global market certainly leaves HE without agency to fulfil the goal of producing self-reliant citizens who can address local challenges, such as gender inequality. Divala (2008: 175) argues that universities in Africa had to adopt, negotiate and struggle with the neoliberal forces and concomitantly had to achieve transformation towards “localised” relevance and “globalised” recognition and competence. This has affected most of the universities’ operations, from the kind of knowledge pursued and recruitment of teaching staff to student enrolment and graduation rate imperatives. The point is that even though African countries, through their Ministries of Education, have taken on the task to pursue a number of strategic objectives, including improved access, participation and equity with an emphasis on science and technology education and training and decentralised management and efficiency gains, the whole project is demanding. One can concede that the acquisition of knowledge to navigate through the complexities of this world is a necessity for everyone, especially in the light of the fact that the gross enrolment ratio (GER) has increased to five per cent in sub-Saharan Africa; however, gender disparities have traditionally been wide and remain so since 2005 (UNESCO-UIS, 2009: 2). It is clear that there has been and still is a gap in gender parity in African universities, which ties in with the way such institutions are run – according to the adoption of international policies. Hence, the sudden explosion of AHE is seen as a lucrative and viable commodity that requires good leadership to succeed in engendering equality.
2.2.3.3.1 Women’s representation as students and staff members in higher education

There are conflicting influences to the enrolments of women to AHE due to the SAPs’ and globalisation project which positioned learning into a mere technical and professional fields at the expense of humanities and basic sciences. Ironically, statistics illustrate that there has been an increase in the raw numbers of female students in HE. Nonetheless, high attrition rates in the lower levels of the education system comprises a persistent dilemma, as this leads to low enrolment at the HE level (Meena, 2007). Regarding the representation of women as students, Yizengaw (2008: 10-13) points out that the problems are mismanagement and divergence in adopting the World Bank policy as reflected by the gross enrolment ratio of female students remained at around 2% between 1995 and 2004, compared to 5% and above for male students. In 2004, of the 3.4 million total student enrolment in tertiary education, the proportion of female students was only 38%, while the enrolment of female students in mathematics, science and engineering was particularly low. UNESCO-UIS (2009: 15-16) illustrates the disparity in growth between men and women in sub-Saharan Africa. Some statistics on the disproportion among students who have access to HE shows that approximately 6.8% are male while 4.5% are female. These statistics mean that, for every 100 male students enrolled in 2007, there were only 66 female students.

The preceding statistics reveal that women are at the margin of HE in Africa in comparison to men, which incite gender inequality. I argue that universities in Africa are integral sites by virtue of their emphasis on the production of knowledge and research; however, they also perpetuate gender biases, which to a large extent is problematic. Even if women have access to HE, they will not secure better work prospects, since they are excluded from the dominant disciplines, which are reserved for men. The foregoing picture demonstrates that gender inequality is evident in AHE based on the discrepancy on opportunities for female in comparison to their male counterparts. One can concede that HE in Africa continues to lag behind in addressing the equal access of female students in comparison to their male counterparts. As a result, Kyomuhendo (2001: 10) calls for a re-examination of the systems, structures, norms and values of society that govern and define the universities and their ways of operation, which are distinctly patriarchal in nature.

The low representation of women as staff members and academics can be linked to the under-representation of female students in AHE. The concern is that women access disciplines that are considered as lower in value that will not necessarily secure them good work prospects in society. Yizengaw (2008: 10-13) shows that the number of female teaching staff was just 4% in 2004, which had a negative impact on the number of women researchers in AHE. A UNESCO-UIS report (2009) claims that women are under-represented and under-measured in science in AHE, and that women still have a long way to go to attain parity in employment. At the same time the report
pointed out that, women made up approximately 25% of the world’s researchers. The argument is that under-representation of women in research activities can be traced back to education systems, particularly at the higher education level. It is proposed that other aspects, such as stereotyping, work-life balance, labour market conditions, governance and the role of researchers in society may also hinder women’s access to continuity and advancement in research positions. It is questionable whether AHE institutions ought to equip women with research capability and expertise to contribute to a democratic society.

Taking into account the figures provided above, one can conclude that women’s exclusion in AHE is connected to their consistent under-representation in AHE teaching, research and academic administrative positions. For instance, Meena (2007) points out that, while women are minimally included, and really marginalised, many tend to be clustered in the lower levels of the academic occupational ladder. Mama (1996) affirms that various mechanisms have been introduced that are aimed at eliminating gender inequality by establishing gender-focused academic units and programmes in teaching and learning, and research on relevant learning and knowledge production, these seem to have proved futile. Stromquist (1997) attributes their exclusion to the relationship between the empowerment of women and the structural gender-based power relations in AHE and society at large. Therefore, there is a need to interrogate the structures and encompassing values that the HE system itself reproduces. This verifies how gender disparity has been a concern for many researchers on the continent, and persists.

2.2.3.3.2 African university as an ivory tower to women

The effect of globalisation on women in HE underlines that knowledge production with regard to women and gender from an African perspective is imperative (Assié-Lumumba, 2007: IV). Cloete (2002) points out that many emerging global knowledge partnerships and research networks continue to be dominated and controlled by men in areas that are historically gender biased, such as research and consulting. Using a South African example, Cloete (2002) argues that research remains in the hands of white males, as was evident from the research, which found that men produced 83% of the scientific output between 1990 and 1998. This simply implies that women are less likely to engage in research, and hence men dominate knowledge production. In so doing, knowledge production has been and continues to be produced to the advantage of its producers, who are men, and relegates issues related to women to the periphery of HE. Chachage (2001: 8) contests that:
The tying of education to the apron strings of the 'market' is essentially an imposition of restrictions on those forms of knowledge that aim at raising larger social and political issues ... The fundamental objectives of the university – scientific inquiry, pursuit of knowledge and the search for the whole truth in the interest of social transformation – are increasingly being relegated to the position of what cynics of institutions of higher learning consider to be mere 'ivory tower' ('elite', 'luxury' and 'esoteric') activities.

A close consideration of the above citation emphasises the point that, even during the postcolonial period, universities seem to maintain the traditional way of favouring some model and imposing their hegemonic form of knowledge for their own sake, rather than that of the public. It is with this understanding in mind that I use the words of Chachage (2001: 8) to refer to the African university as an “ivory tower”. One can vividly conceive that the production of knowledge in public AHE, like elsewhere in the world, is faced with competing perspectives in terms of what, for whom, and in whose interests they are producing knowledge, i.e. that they are responding mainly to local aspirations and the needs of the 21st century. It is evident that the initial goal that Africa would produce self-reliant citizens who can respond to local needs, especially the inclusion of marginalised groups such as women, has been wiped away and moved to the periphery of educational discourses and practices. Thus, knowledge production in AHE remains in the hands of the powerful and a few elites (mostly men).

The UNESCO-UIS (2009) report acknowledges that women are faced with considerable barriers when pursuing HE on the continent. As a result, the patriarchal system persists and men remain dominant in accessing HE as students and researchers, retaining leadership positions and determining the form of knowledge to be offered (see Meena, 2007; Mlama, 2007). Women continue to depend on men to produce knowledge for their benefit, rather than contributing to it themselves. Sawyerr (2004) poses a profound question regarding male-dominated roles in HE that: what is the way forward when universal patriarchal power appears so hard to denaturize? In his view, instead of picking on the negative factors only, it is equally important to critically examine the factors in African culture that are empowering for women (Sawyerr, 2004). Considering this call, it therefore is essential to interrogate why women continue to be excluded and what is keeping them at the edge of HE and knowledge production, access to which could empower them for social growth. I contend that, despite the call for women’s empowerment, contributions from women appear to be at the periphery of HE decision making, and their voices are not heard in educational discourses, i.e. in research and at all levels of leadership.

In essence, my argument is that globalisation lives itself out in different ways and permeates HE on the continent. Thus, one cannot go without restating various dissatisfactions of the effects of globalisation on AHE, especially its radical call for a market model, as is evident in the work of
African scholars such as Assié-Lumumba (2007), Mlama (2007), Meena (2007), and Waghid (2011a, 2012). Moreover, Adesina (2006: 3-5) delimits globalisation as the neo-liberal conservative ideology and mind-set that shaped the idea of education as a public good and that was replaced by a commodity logic that insisted on applying the market as a resource-allocative mechanism to the sector. The dilemma lies in the commodity approach, which misinterprets the valid importance of universities, especially in the African context (Adesina, 2006: 15-16). This simply means that universities need do much more than transmitting marketable skills, and should focus on the primary roles of the production and dissemination of knowledge as a public good, rather than solely on the market. I agree with Waghid (2012: 72) that university education is distinct from and should not try to replicate the functions of technikons (polytechnics), but rather take as its role equipping people (both men and women) with technical know-how and with democratic virtues such as critical thinking, respect and caring, to mention a few, which seem lacking in our postcolonial university system.

2.3. Link between higher education in Africa and women’s contribution to knowledge production

The idea of globalisation has radically distorted the ideals of HE in Africa in terms of research, development and knowledge production, particularly the call for the commoditisation and marketisation of knowledge, which have a negative impact on women’s access to HE institutions, to employment as well as to making a contribution to knowledge. This situation is attested to by the number of women who are researchers and academics, as well as the number of publications on the continent. Subotzky (1999a: 1) asserts that this negation allows universities to generate new organisational forms, practices and knowledge production, with an emphasis on entrepreneurial skills, characterised by increasing market-like behaviour and governance, which are already dominated by men. He further claims that, on one hand, HE is under pressure to become more market oriented and to respond to rapid changes in technology and knowledge production, while on the other hand it is expected to work for the benefit of society, promoting social equity and responding to community needs, such as including women in AHE (Subotzky, 1999b: 34). The assumption is that AHE ought to address the under-representation of women in its institutions, yet rather focuses on producing knowledge for the global market. This places women in the disadvantageous position of further exclusion. The point is that, even though the World Bank has made an effort to finance institutions to implement this globalisation ideology, it concurrently expects them to solicit money or fundraise to sustain themselves. This idea posed a major threat to HE in Africa, which triggered high fees.

As a result, universities have become elitist institutions producing knowledge for their own sake, rather than for the public need, and most importantly not addressing the gap of women’s
participation and their lack of contribution to knowledge on the continent. This impasse leads public universities to increase their fees as a way of sustaining themselves, and thereby abandon the continent’s initial agenda of transforming HE by making it accessible to all people, particularly women. There is a link between HE and knowledge production, whereby universities can be related to a market where knowledge has to be bought as a product (Knight, 2008: 13). This means that education is perceived as a private good for individual consumption and benefit, and only those who possess the capital and are already well prepared to access such markets will get the best products. Most male students tend to follow IT and science subjects due to high funding allocations in those fields, while fewer (female) students register for Humanities and Social Science subjects. In this way, women are unable to access institutions of HE due to their economic and social status and capacities. I reiterate the Commonwealth Secretariat’s (1999: 10) position that a more truly gender-responsive culture requires gender equity in access, the redressing of structural barriers that influence the access and participation of both sexes, and women’s active role in decision making in the management and administration of HE. Conversely, African universities appear to discard their national obligation to realise their social interest – mainly attaining equality and inclusion – when these continue to provoke women’s lack of access to knowledge production.

2.4. Delineating the position of women in higher education on the African continent: Concluding remarks

In this concluding section, I wish to highlight the position of women in HE in three epochs. The argument is that HE was found in Africa even in the pre-colonial era. Yet HE skills and knowledge were meant mainly for boys and men, which gave rise to male-dominated institutions. Ajayi et al. (1996) pointed out that men were seen as valuable agents to bring about national development and therefore were held responsible for the well-being of women and children. Women were educated with low-level skills, while men were equipped with arts and music and so forth for societal evolvement. Upon the arrival of the colonisers, HE was not a priority and few institutions maintained the male-dominated education system. Such institutions were vehicles to impart Western ideology and ways of life to African people. The perception was that African culture and ways of knowing were uncivilised and primitive, thus in need of Western civilisation to change. Within the context of post-colonial HE in Africa, human capital was a dominant theory that drove HE systems from the 1970s, followed by the neo-liberal project of globalisation, which emphasised knowledge production as a commodity in the global market. Students were expected to access such social institutions to acquire special knowledge. However, with the legacy of the patriarchal system and male-dominated spaces, HE institutions worsened the lack of women’s access to such institutions and their under-representation in knowledge production. The main theory that underpins HE in Africa is neo-liberal theory, with its globalisation project resting on capitalism as an
economic driver for nation-state development. The expectation is that people need to be educated with technical skills and knowledge to be human resources to boost the economy of their countries. This ideology of producing technocrats with technical know-how does not have the ethos of caring for others, since there is a greater concern about what is produced (the end product), than with who produces and how the perceived prominent knowledge is produced.

Consequently, marginalised groups such as women – either as students or researchers – remain at the periphery of HE in a democratic system, as they have been in the pre-colonial and colonial periods. This clearly demonstrates how HE rather is interested in sustaining economic development at the expense of the people. I argued that the World Bank’s policy of globalisation pervades HE policy and practices, and has encumbered the continent’s initial transformational agenda of improving the lives of the people and educating self-reliant citizens. Because AHE adopted the commodification of knowledge, it will not be possible to have concern for people, especially for marginalised groups (particularly women). The dilemma is that the universities are turned into markets and continue to exclude women as students and staff members, which invariably results in gender inequality on the continent. In this way, universities in Africa could be referred to as “ivory towers” that are favourable to the male gender and retaining their position in terms of marginalising women. People in such institutions therefore cannot really learn how to demonstrate concern and care for others, since their practices are driven and determined by economic, rather than human, interests.

Considering that World Bank policy drives current policy evolution in HE in Africa, it emphasises knowledge as a commodity and remains silent on how other aspects, such as gender equality and empowerment, can be construed in its discourses. Thus, I contend that the above disproportion has created a dichotomy that poses a threat to the initial goals of social interest, and thus perpetuates inequality and lack of inclusion through an emphasis on knowledge as a commodity for the global market. The next chapter examines the conception of inclusion as Ubuntu and gender equality from different theoretical perspectives. The focus lies on how Ubuntu as a local world view can assist in bridging the gap of gender inequality in AHE. And why AHE practices should not be divorced from local needs, but rather be connected to both local and global practices.
CHAPTER THREE

CONCEPTIONS OF INCLUSION AND GENDER EQUALITY IN AFRICAN HIGHER EDUCATION

3.1 Introduction

The preceding chapter has shown that AHE during different epochs, and particularly in the post-colonial era, which is the focus of this study, has excluded women as students and staff members. Their exclusion resulted in gender inequality, despite the shift to democratic rule claimed by many African countries. In this chapter, the notion of inclusion, which could be construed as Ubuntu from an African philosophical perspective, will be examined in the light of a number of theories drawn from African, Western liberal, and post-liberal perspectives. Each of these perspectives provides a particular understanding from which the notion of Ubuntu can be understood as inclusion. This could provide a broad understanding of what inclusion means and how gender equality could be achieved in a post-colonial democratic HE system in Africa. I argue that AHE continues to exclude women in diverse ways, despite numerous expansion policies such as affirmative action. Since the concept of inclusion requires critical interrogation, I begin by probing the existing understandings of Ubuntu by different African scholars. Secondly, I examine and synchronise Western liberal views of inclusion in an attempt to offer an extended view of Ubuntu. Lastly, I draw on a post-liberal Rancièrean perspective of equality of voice to frame Ubuntu as the inclusion of all people, particularly women, in a post-colonial AHE system. In the main, my exposition of the notion of Ubuntu is premised on an understanding that AHE requires an indigenous concept in terms of which the inclusion of women in HE can be secured. And, if the notion of Ubuntu can be framed differently, the possibility that women will be included equally in HE might be realised.

3.2 Towards an African Conception of Inclusion in Understanding Higher Education

In conceptualising inclusion, I draw on some African scholars’ conception of Ubuntu to foster women’s inclusion in HE in Africa. However, it will be helpful first to consider the context of an African philosophy of Ubuntu9 (humanness). Ubuntu is a world-view and a contextually guiding concept of Afrocentricism10. According to Van Binsbergen (2002: 6), Ubuntu is a revived African

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9 The root of the term Ubuntu is ntu/ntu, or human, or person and similar terms are found in other African languages, such as nti in Wolof, nti in Egyptian, and nedio in Paul. The designation of a person by a generic term meaning human is evident throughout Black Africa, starting with Egypt (Dio, 1974:198). I would add that omunhu/ntu (a person) and ounhu/ntu (humanness) occur in the Namibian Oshiwambo (Oshimbadja) language.

10 Afrocentrism is a worldview that considers African people and their values, cultures, histories, collective struggles, needs and aspirations to be central to the interpretation and utilisation of their normative concepts. Afrocentricity commonly contends that
concept that does not only focus on a particular locality or region, but rather on the entire continent. De Tejada (cited in Ramose, 2002: 324) sees *Ubuntu* as a way of life and practice of many Africans in most parts of the continent, especially in those regions stretching “from the Nubian desert to the Cape of Good Hope and from Senegal to Zanzibar”. However, Ramose explains that this geographical delimitation is problematic, since it creates a barrier to the desert as Africa’s birthmark, and therefore obscures the meaning and import of human interaction on the continent before the desert sneaked in. This means that connecting a philosophy of *Ubuntu* to a geographical location may delimit the relevance to the entire continent.

So, the concept of *Ubuntu* is used in several Bantu languages, e.g. Zulu, Xhosa and Ndebele; *botho* is the equivalent term in Sotho, and *hunhu* in Shona, which then presupposes that *Ubuntu* manifests an African philosophical way of life, in terms of which each person is regarded as a human being who may engage in all processes of knowledge (Mapaure, 2011: 160). *Ubuntu* corresponds to ‘*umundu*’ (in Kikuyu, Kenya), ‘*umuntu*’ (in Kimeru, Kenya), ‘*bumuntu*’ (in kiSukuma and kiHaya, Tanzania), ‘*vumuntu*’ (in shiTsonga and shiTswana, Mozambique), ‘*bomoto*’ (in Bobangi, Democratic Republic of Congo), and ‘*gimuntu*’ (in kiKongo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and in giKwese, Angola) (Kamwangamalu 1999, 25-26). In addition, Waghid (2009: 76) confirms that *Ubuntu* means “human interdependence through deliberative inquiry … [that] exists in most of the African languages, although not necessarily under the same name”. In other words, an African philosophy of *Ubuntu* is not something new; it must have existed among the peoples of Africa since ancient times. Hence, in order to understand fully the fundamental nature and significance of *Ubuntu*, one has to approach it both pragmatically and conceptually in order to relate it to AHE. I will now turn to the underlying idea behind African philosophers’ conceptualisation of *Ubuntu* as an opportunity for the inclusion of all people, and particularly women, in AHE.

### 3.2.1 Ubuntu as inclusion – an African perspective

Ramose (2002) describes a comprehensive conception of *Ubuntu* – a notion that exists in many Bantu languages. For him, *Ubuntu* could be perceived in terms of three maxims: “The first maxim means that to be human is to affirm one’s humanity by recognizing the humanity of others and, on that basis, establish respectful human relations with them .... “the second maxim means that if and when one is faced with a decisive choice between wealth and the preservation of the life of another human being, then one should opt for the preservation of life”. The third maxim is a “principle
deeply embedded in traditional African political philosophy”, which says “that the king owed his status, including all the powers associated with it, to the will of the people under him” (Ramose, 2002, 324-325). This implies that the concept of Ubuntu is a personified way of life – a word with no English equivalent.

The first designation means “a person is a person through other persons”, which is the meaning of the Zulu maxim, “umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu” (Ramose, 1999: 49). This shows how the being of an African person is not only embedded in the community, but in the universe as a whole. This is articulated mainly in the prefix ubu- of the word Ubuntu, which, refers to the universe as being enfolded, containing everything. The stem -ntu means the process of life as the unfolding of the universe by concrete manifestations in different forms and modes of being. This process includes the emergence of the speaking and knowing human being (Ramose, 2002: 325). As such, this being is called umuntu or, in the Northern Sotho language, motho – one who is able by common endeavours to articulate the experience and knowledge of what ubu is. Thus, -ntu stands for the epistemological side of “being”. This is the wider horizon, in which the intersubjective aspects of Ubuntu should be seen. Mutual recognition and respect in the different intersubjective relations are parts of the process of unfolding of the universe, which encompasses everything in the speaking and knowing of human beings. In the main, Ubuntu as a philosophical concept is associated with the being of a person, which is determined by his or her association with other persons in intersubjective community.

Ramose (2002: 325) underlines the oneness and wholeness of this on-going establishment of community. One can surmise that the oneness of African philosophy is perceivable in the plurality of its voices, and that no voice should be disregarded in the whole community of engagement. In particular, the notion of Ubuntu underlies the communalism by which the African community is characterised. For Ramose, the meaning of Ubuntu indicates that there is an elevated judgment of the community in African thought and practice, which is greater than that of the individual, but that, does not take place at the expense of overlooking the individuality of the person. A person is a person in the community, and his or her individuality is exercised through others in that community. This attests to a culture of mutual relations, of caring for one another and sharing with one another. The notion is not only expressed in African languages; it is also practised by talking to one another in dialogue – in this case in AHE. One therefore could infer that Ubuntu clearly exhibits an opportunity for inclusion, that is, one in which everyone (women and men) is included in deliberation. If it is correct that AHE upholds Ubuntu, then no one is supposed to be excluded and their voices will be heard in policy and decision making. The point is that the underlying principle of Ubuntu emphasises a community in which every member is included and in which each of their voices is heard. Although there might be some disagreement between members, for instance in
the AHE community, each member could depend on other members of the community for sustenance and support.

Furthermore, Tutu (1999, pp. 34-35) underscores the significance of *Ubuntu* as inclusion as follows:

Ubuntu is very difficult to render into a Western language. It speaks to the very essence of being human. When you want to give high praise to someone we say, ‘Yu, u Nobuntu’; he or she has Ubuntu. This means that they are generous, hospitable, friendly, caring and compassionate. They share what they have. It also means that my humanity is caught up, is inextricably bound up, in theirs. We belong in a bundle of life. We say, ‘a person is a person through other people’ (in Xhosa Ubuntu ungamuntu ngabanye abantu and in Zulu Umuntu ngumuntu ngabanye). I am human because I belong, I participate, and I share. A person with Ubuntu is open and available to others, affirming of others, does not feel threatened that others are able and good, for he or she has a proper self-assurance that comes from knowing that he or she belongs in a greater whole and is diminished when others are humiliated or diminished, when others are tortured or oppressed, treated as if they were less than who they are.

The citation above implies that *Ubuntu* as a way of life is unique to African thought and practices, which implies that AHE cannot be dismissive of the concept, specifically as it regards the inclusion of women. The concept of “I belong, I participate and I share” could be said to underscore what it means to cultivate an inclusive environment. Again, the phrase “a person is a person through other people” assumes that, when some people are excluded and mistreated, others should act to address the problem. In other words, when women, for instance, are humiliated or oppressed, they are regarded inhumanely, and this points to the absence of *Ubuntu* in the practice. In addition, Wiredu (2004) points out that an African philosophy of *Ubuntu* as inclusion cannot be articulated without any reference to what it means for a person, specifically an African – whether a man or woman – to be educated. For Wiredu, African higher educational discourses need to shape human action in a way that is comparable with and analogous to its fundamental ideas, meanings and practice (in this case *Ubuntu*) within its context, that is, Africa. No doubt an educated person upholds reasonable knowledge of her culture and environment, and demonstrates the ability to construct and articulate justifiable arguments. In other words, if African people’s way of life is constituted by *Ubuntu*, their customs and practices should manifest such values. Thus, AHE ought to act out the democratic element of *Ubuntu*, that is, inclusion, in which all are acknowledged as equal members of the same community. By so doing, all students nurtured in such institutions
would be able to engage in deliberations and offer reasons why women and other marginalised groups are excluded and treated unequally.

In response to the aforesaid, Wiredu (1996) explains further that, since African philosophy is a form of analytical inquiry, *Ubuntu* should aim at reformulating and shaping the current African polity (including that of higher education) on the basis of consensus, negotiation and reconciliation. Taking into consideration the above view and the practice of *Ubuntu* in AHE, everyone (women and men) should engage in discussions and negotiations about issues of concern in order to reach consensus without disregarding those views that seem under-developed. As a consequence, in that environment, women could be included and their points of view recognised, since people engaging in dialogue presumably subscribe to *Ubuntu*. Nonetheless, Maathai (2009) asserts that women’s exclusion is due in particular to the elongated colonial ideology and patriarchal system that perceives a woman as inferior and as someone who may not be treated equally in relation to men. I contend strongly that, in the absence of a legitimate form of *Ubuntu* in HE in Africa, the exclusion of women will continue to permeate post-colonial education practices.

To accentuate the analytical aspect of African philosophy, Appiah (1996) asserts that *Ubuntu* should evaluate arguments relative to a particular culture, and that such arguments relate to Africa’s intellectual heritage. He notes further that *Ubuntu* may create possibilities for African people to “understand each other as reasonable” individuals who are determined to treat one another with respect within a community of practice (Appiah, 1996: 134). This implies that *Ubuntu* should not be regarded as a faultless worldview, but as a concept with merit that could be explored in order to assist in recognising others as reasonable. As such, no educational institution in Africa could claim to practise *Ubuntu* without affording equal space to all to contribute reasonably to all pressing issues. Thus, Appiah’s notion of recognising others as reasonable beings should be at the centre of *Ubuntu* as an inclusive philosophy in African societies, including in the HE community. However, since some people (mainly women) are often excluded, the practice of *Ubuntu* as inclusion requires further scrutiny and expansion. Appiah’s call for a critical reflection on our understanding and practice of fundamental concepts such as *Ubuntu* in order to bring about change in the educational community of engagement makes sense (Appiah, 1996: 135). One would support the call for a critical engagement with and reflection on the concept, as it could help to address the problem of the absence of *Ubuntu* in African educational institutions, which has led to the exclusion of women. Equally, Letseka (in Waghid, 2011a: 240) regards *boto* or *Ubuntu* “as normative in that it encapsulates moral norms and virtues such as kindness, generosity, compassion, benevolence, courtesy, and respect and concern for others”. The idea of respect and concern for others is more profound and implies the inclusion of all, because even those who seem to experience some exclusion are considered. More recently, Waghid and Smeyers (2012: 6-7) have affirmed that *Ubuntu* as an African philosophy represents a form of human activity that can
create space in higher education in which all (women, men and other groups) can freely engage with one another deliberatively through practices and shared values such as *Ubuntu*.

At the same time, everyone can engage in critical conversations by interrogating and contesting their views and experiences. Waghid and Smeyers (2012) seem to argue that, with the embodiment and practice of *Ubuntu* in HE, everyone’s voice and experience would be listened to and respected. This simply means that no one should be excluded, as women and men ought to co-exist as equal persons. Nevertheless, one’s concern about the practice of *Ubuntu* in relation to women’s exclusion seems to bring the potentiality of the concept into disrepute. In my view, if the notion of respect for all human beings is a main constituent of *Ubuntu*, one could argue that the exclusion of women from AHE is indicative of a lack of human interdependence. Acknowledging the inclusion of all participants (women and men) as equal members in HE is one way of showing respect. To include is to respect people’s dignity, not only because they are women or men, but because they are human beings. Thus, creating space in which everyone can engage with one another in a humane manner is equivalent to recognising their rights to share in a communal practice in higher educational institutions. Affording women the opportunity to be included would unlock their cognitive and intellectual ability to express themselves freely within an enabling environment, and justify democratic HE in Africa.

With reference to Waghid and Smeyers (2012: 6), educational institutions on the African continent ought to become concerned especially with cultivating *Ubuntu* as respect for persons in terms of which everyone – women, men and others – deliberate freely in a humane and communally engaging manner. This implies that these educational institutions need to be concerned with creating democratic and responsible citizens and future leaders who are attenuated to the humane practice of *Ubuntu*. More importantly, through its commitment to educating people for humanity, a postcolonial AHE would propel its task of nurturing citizens in an inclusive, respected and valued environment. In relation to the concern whether *Ubuntu* is indeed prevalent in AHE, Assié-Lumumba’s perception of *Ubuntu* will be examined as a way of ascertaining its existence and efforts to create spaces for women.

### 3.2.2 Ubuntu and space for women in African higher education

On the discussion of *Ubuntu*, Assié-Lumumba (2007) proffers that HE in Africa has ignored the controversial issues: such as women’s access, gender, and the production of knowledge. Rather, the emphasis should be on the problem of creating a space for women’s access and inclusion in HE by reclaiming human rights, and providing a source for informed participation in social processes. Central to this argument are issues concerning the basic fundamental rights of women
in HE. Assié-Lumumba (2007: 471) acknowledges the importance of women’s access to HE and knowledge production as a way of breaking the cycle of poverty and human misery in African societies. The inclusion and participation of women as students and professionals in HE processes will enable them to speak and act more confidently and assertively in order to contribute meaningfully to the production of knowledge.

The point is that, since modern African societies are confronted by various predicaments and new challenges, such as HIV and AIDS, inadequate healthcare and poverty, there is a deep need for access to education by all at all levels in order for human development to take place (Assié-Lumumba, 2007: 472-473). To address the crisis, Assié-Lumumba states that it is necessary to break the imbalance in formal education that limits women’s acquisition of knowledge, their ability for self-realisation and their contribution as agents in the process of socio-economic development in Africa. The understanding is that, without women’s inclusion and the appropriate acquisition of knowledge through education, it would be difficult to tackle the societal problems facing African societies today and to ensure that the continent’s economic development flourishes. In addition, the issue of unequal access by women to formal education, in particular HE, may lead to the limited representation of women in critical positions in the fields of education, politics and economy, and in knowledge production (Teferra & Altbach, 2004: 22). Consequently, the poor distribution of education constitutes an objective barrier to development.

Furthermore, poor access to education limits women’s participation in decision-making processes and the planning of issues affecting their day-to-day lives. This restriction does not only miss the benefit of women’s insights, but excludes and overlooks their concerns, viewpoints and input, which constitutes an infringement of their rights to exercise their abilities. Apart from the low number of women at all levels in the formal education sector, especially in HE, there is a concern for the nature and type of education obtained by those who go through it. Hence, unequal gender distribution in education, both in quantity and type, is a major characteristic of many educational institutions. Assié-Lumumba (2007: 473-474) also notes that, although several policies have been adopted that are aimed at increasing enrolment and redressing inequalities, African nation-states have failed to maintain the pace of closing the gap, particularly in HE, where the imbalance is dominant. She also shows that the foundation of social progress and development, which includes the political, social and economic levels, needs to be valued, developed and utilised to enhance the quality of life for the general population. It is irrelevant to continue to address the issues of imposed or imported formal education and African indigenous education in dichotomous and mutually exclusive terms. In other words, it is a requisite to integrate formal education into the African social reality.
Consequently, Assié-Lumumba (2007: 474-476) advocates for the consideration of an indigenous knowledge system, particularly the notion of human dignity, which is constituted in *Ubuntu*. She explains that, although the illiteracy rate among African women is high when compared to that among European women, African women have been involved in every aspect of society on a basis that allowed different but equally worthy participation by both women and men in education, and in the production and utilisation of knowledge. They have also acquired other forms of literacy, such as the ability to read the world around them, to identify means and strategies for survival, and to promote human dignity (*Ubuntu*). Since African women constitute the majority of marginalised people, the focus on their full inclusion and gender equality would be a demonstration of a genuine effort to improve people’s lives through an integrated development policy that allows human capabilities and their knowledge and skills to be harnessed for the benefit of all people in both local and global communities. The point is that an African indigenous approach to the acquisition of knowledge needs to be reinforced formally and further developed in response to new and modern challenges, including the lack of inclusion. Here, the inference is that African *Ubuntu* possesses the quality that could be used to include all people.

However, the interesting question is why AHE still excludes women and treats them differently from men. My contention is that *Ubuntu* needs to be examined further to create conditions for the inclusion of women in HE. In addition, for African people to realise their aspirations and achieve a good quality of life in which their human needs are satisfied in dignity, it is necessary to formulate long-term plans founded on sustainability. This simply means that there is a great need to break the barriers to allow access of women to schooling and HE. In this case, each learner or individual, whether male or female, must be given the opportunity to reach his or her full potential (Assié-Lumumba, 2007: 473). Sharing the same sentiment, Teferra and Altbach (2003: 4) posit that the influence of colonialism on AHE has contributed to restricting students’ access, undermining the teaching of students in indigenous languages, limiting academic freedom and, constraining the Africanisation of the curriculum.

Waghid asserts that university education on the African continent is limping, especially with its focus on "performativity" and "meritocracy", which lead to the production of “technicians” of learning rather than critical thinkers (2012: 5). Likewise, Assié-Lumumba concedes that, since schools and higher education institutions play a major role as central educational institutions, they must also organise activities that can contribute to the promotion of people’s well-being in all areas of expertise in which women are shown to be powerful and positive, and in which they are acknowledged for their potential contributions to teaching, research and policy formulation. This implies that AHE should educate and consider the expertise, knowledge and experiences of African women in all spheres of learning, and empower them by encouraging their participation in all deliberations concerning their welfare and that of the community at large.
In this regard, Assié-Lumumba (2007: 477-479) avers that efforts should be made to provide learning opportunities that would bridge the gap in gender inequality. For African states and their institutions to break away from inequality, HE ought to offer girls and women equitable access to education at all levels and of all types. Women will regain access to their social space, which will enable them to play their full roles as equal members of communities and nation-states, as indispensable agents and as driving forces for change, as well as becoming beneficiaries of social progress. Such participation and involvement of all members of society in economic and cultural production, as well as in political participation and decision-making processes at various levels of society, are necessary conditions for the well-being of all. In view of this, there is a great need for women, as constitutive of the marginalised, to gain access to quality education at all levels, not only at the elementary or literacy (informal education) level, but at the HE level as well. However, if women are still gravely excluded from AHE, the idea of human dignity as constitutive of Ubuntu seems to be undermined, despite advocacy for African girls to gain access to education, thus ensuring their inclusion. However, women still experience exclusion, which calls into question whether Ubuntu has in fact been realised in higher institutional practices. The point I am making is that Ubuntu as an African worldview of inclusion has not manifested itself in institutional practices in AHE, which is why women have been and still are excluded.

3.2.3 Outlining meanings and dilemmas of Ubuntu as inclusion in higher education

In this subsection I want to examine the potential of Ubuntu to enhance the inclusion of women in HE. Firstly, the core understanding that underlies African scholars' perception of Ubuntu as inclusion is that it is a communal practice, which by its nature is inclusive. Ubuntu as a contextualised approach centres on a community of engagement of all members, and this understanding of Ubuntu, if extended to HE, would make a case for the discourse to be inclusive. In this sense, the phrase of “I am because we are” is a manifestation of inclusion through Ubuntu, which AHE ought to encourage. The idea that an African philosophy of Ubuntu is underlined by “I as We” makes AHE problematic, as women seemingly remain excluded. That is, despite the existing inclusiveness in the communal practices embodied in the notion of Ubuntu, there remains a grave exclusion of women, who also are treated unequally. For this reason I contend that the notion of Ubuntu requires reconceptualisation in order to address women’s exclusion in HE in Africa. It strengthens the argument in this dissertation that the lack of inclusion of women in AHE can be addressed positively if the notion of Ubuntu is reconceptualised, which potentially would make possible the substantive inclusion of women and gender equality. Such a dilemma in AHE (that is, the exclusion of women and gender inequality) is not perpetuated by Ubuntu.
However, a reconceptualised notion of *Ubuntu* can create conditions for women’s inclusion and gender equality. Secondly, the agreed understanding of *Ubuntu* centres on the idea of seeing humanity in others and having concern for the other. However, if AHE could enact or practise the said view, then women’s exclusion would be in consonance with the idea of *Ubuntu*. That is, what I want to ensure is that the inclusion of women becomes something in agreement with *Ubuntu*, not something different from or in contrast with it. Excluding women from HE means that they are being disregarded and treated inhumanely. Such elements of exclusion in the practice of AHE seem to affirm to some extent Enslin and Horsthemke’s (2004: 57) distrust of a limited understanding of *Ubuntu*. It remains unclear how characteristically African ways of philosophising are meant to help resolve problems and clarify issues in education. Prominent issues of concern are how an African philosophy of education from an *Ubuntu* perspective can contribute to curriculum selection, problems in HIV/AIDS education, the debates about authority and the classroom or schooling, and identities, democracy and citizenship.

Although one would not completely reinforce the cynical view of *Ubuntu* above, the authors’ concern seems partially credible, especially considering that *Ubuntu* exists in the language of African societies, yet women remain excluded from HE. Their question heightens my interest in interrogating the notion of *Ubuntu*. My point is that, although *Ubuntu* is lived out differently among African peoples, there is a need to reinforce and extend its emphasis on inclusion, especially in societies in which higher education institutions continue to exclude women and treat them differently from their male counterparts. If *Ubuntu* symbolises a community of practice and human dignity, the placement of women on the periphery, as well as their perception as passive members, shows that African institutions cannot be trusted to promote vigorous inclusion. The assumption implicit in the dilemma of exclusion is that contemporary higher education institutions in Africa seem to restrict women’s voices. This suggests that an African conception of *Ubuntu* in its current form may not bring adequate transformation to the AHE system. Taking into account the dilemma of women’s exclusion in AHE, this study seeks ways to look differently at the conception of *Ubuntu* as inclusion. It will explore Western liberal notions of inclusion, even though it is presumed that African and Western notions are not always regarded as mutually inclusive. As stressed in Chapter 1 of this study, Wiredu (2004) clearly recognises the prominence of linking African to Western knowledge systems, especially when these arrangements are to the advantage of African people, particularly disadvantaged groups (i.e. women). Thus, a call for the reconceptualisation of *Ubuntu* as inclusion from liberal perspectives may offer a different view that may well guide the post-colonial AHE system, and hence make the impetus for women’s inclusion and gender equality more compelling.
3.3 Reconceptualising Ubuntu as inclusion in African higher education

On the surface, the notion of inclusion appears to be a dominant element to evoke and deepen democratic\textsuperscript{11} practices. But this dissertation is concerned about the prevalence of women’s exclusion in AHE. In order to understand how HE perceives Ubuntu as inclusion, it may be helpful to consider a different and reconstructed perception of inclusion from liberal perspectives. Before exploring the liberal conception of Ubuntu as inclusion, I wish to examine its (inclusion’s) brief evolution. According to Young (1989) there is a dichotomy between the notion of social inclusion and exclusion that has emerged in recent years as a strong policy-leading concept at both the national and international level. The notion of social inclusion was driven by the emancipatory momentum of modern political life (Young, 1989: 250). Young states that the bourgeoisies\textsuperscript{12} commenced the idea by challenging Aristocratic privileges and claiming equal rights for all groups of people, such as women, Jews, blacks, and others who pressed for inclusion. As a result, modern political theory stressed the equal moral worth of all persons, and social movements of the oppressed claimed inclusion of all people to full citizenship. Although the advocacy for women’s inclusion began as early as the seventeenth century (Walters, 2005: 8), different movements strongly claimed their rights in the eighteenth to twentieth century’s. Among these were the excluded, oppressed and marginalised groups who thought that winning full citizenship status that is equal political and civil rights, would lead to their freedom and equality. Nevertheless, when equal rights were advocated by the liberal capitalist societies in the late twentieth century, some groups realised that they were being treated as second-class citizens.

Subsequently, feminist and other social movements raised concerns about why equal citizenship had not achieved social justice and equality. Young (1989: 251) argues that ensuring the inclusion of everyone in social and political institutions would require the pronouncement of special rights that focus on group differences in order to destabilise oppression and disadvantage. The point is that, for democratic institutions such as higher education bodies to attain inclusion, particularly for those situated differently, such as women and other excluded groups, enacting special rights for them would be a necessity. To interpret Young’s viewpoint, it is clear that robust inclusion cannot be attained through a mere call for special rights in terms of which women are given access to HE and left to engage as equal beings. Rather, there should be strategies to equip and guide women’s integration in higher education institutions towards legitimate inclusion. In the context of Africa, the

\textsuperscript{11} Democracy is best understood as a model for organising the collective and public exercise of power in major institutions of a society on the basis of the principle that decisions affecting people’s well-being can be viewed as the outcome of a procedure of free and reasoned deliberation among individuals considered as moral and political equals. Legitimacy in a complex democratic society must result from the free and unconstrained public deliberation by all citizens on constitutional issues and questions of basic justice (Benhabib, 1996: 68).

\textsuperscript{12} The bourgeoisies make up the class of capitalists, who own the means of social production and are the employers of wage labour. From a Marxist political view, the working class is supposed to drive out capitalism and effect the transition to socialism (Blackburn, 2008: 46).
impetus for an inclusive democratic society is driven by various international conventions and policies that coerce HE to create a space for the marginalised and excluded groups.

As articulated in Chapter 1 of this dissertation, the 2000 United Nations MDGs, to which many African nations are signatories, demands as goal three the empowerment of women and gender equality. Therefore, each designated country should achieve 50% gender equality by 2015. The core aim is to alleviate social exclusion and marginalisation to advance women’s legitimate inclusion at all levels. Inclusion and gender equality surfaced as a global and local agenda in HE in 1998, when UNESCO raised concern particularly about the African continent at the World Conference on Higher Education (UNESCO, 1998a). This concern was twofold, namely women’s lower enrolments in HE to date, and the absence of the gender dimension in the HE curriculum. That concern gave birth to the introduction of affirmative action (AA)\(^{13}\), which was promulgated to promote the expansion of and inclusion of women in HE.

For this reason, creating a policy merely for women’s access to university education in Africa, without hearing their voices, does not indicate genuine inclusion, considering that in the cultural background of many of the women, only men are permitted in the public space. Arising from the above, one could argue that, although much effort has been expended on the issue of inclusion, there remains a crisis of exclusion in HE on the continent. To proffer a richer and transformative understanding of *Ubuntu* as inclusion in AHE, the next section will draw from the conception of inclusion of Western liberal theorists in an attempt to think differently about inclusion in relation to *Ubuntu*.

### 3.3.1 Young’s conceptualisation of inclusion/exclusion

On a literal note, inclusion means involving others or inviting them to participate in doing something in public. Like a preliminary understanding of the concept of *Ubuntu*, inclusion is recognised as a norm for democratic society, including the higher education community (Young, 2000: 23-25). The idea of inclusion in decision making plays a central role in democratic discourses and society in which everyone ought to be included in public deliberative engagement. The inclusive processes of communication ought to be marked by people’s disposition to be accountable to others and to make deliberation open to the public, making it accessible for it to count as normatively legitimate (Young, 2000: 13). This approach envisages that decisions on how to address and promote

\(^{13}\)The policy of affirmative action (AA) has been adopted by many African countries to engender the inclusion of more women at all levels of society, especially in higher education. A study in four Commonwealth higher education institutions indicated that AA programmes could make women passive and dependent: “… it will not work out that way, because in spite of doing everything for the female and thinking things will work out that way, the female has to be independent to some certain level and if she gets to a place where everything is being done for her, the product at the end of the day will not be worth it. So, they have to really think about it, yes, help us, but don’t go too far” (Morley, 2004: 18).
inclusive democratic institutions such as higher education bodies are legitimate. The question is: Can a legitimate public HE system be sustained in Africa if women and other groups are excluded? Young argues that justified inclusion can only happen when all stakeholders are included in the process, which needs to occur irrespective of their colour, creed, gender, ethnic group, economic wealth or educational status.

Within this framework, inclusion embodies a norm of moral respect for individuals, irrespective of whether they belong to a group allegedly superior or inferior (in this case, women). This position makes sense because, in an inclusive AHE system, all people – whether women, who are regarded as inferior, or men, who are regarded as superior – should be included to show respect for their being. Specifically, inclusion increases the chances that those who make proposals will transform their positions from an initial self-seeking standpoint to a more objective appeal to justice, because they must listen to others with different views to whom they are also answerable (Young, 2000: 52). Young’s view of a normative element in democratic institutions appears significant here. Her normative view implies that AHE may include women in a normative manner, that is, for the sake of inclusion.

Even so, in such a form of inclusion, AHE may simply represent women and show their presence, without meaningful inclusion. For instance, an increase in the number of women as students and staff members may be used as empirical evidence of inclusion, but the courses they teach and levels of appointment they hold might not always be significantly better than those occupied by men. Moreover, Young states that everyone, including women, should articulate ideas and concerns as members of the deliberative community in public spheres. Therefore, public deliberation permits the articulation of all interests, opinions and criticisms in such a way that all participants are confident that the outcome has developed from good reason and consensus. Every person participating in and contributing to decision making and the conditions for political dialogue must do so by his or her choice of action (Young, 2000). This model promotes the idea that each person has to be included and treated as important in the dialogues and decision-making processes from which their voices and interests were previously excluded.

Ironically, Young states that, while mechanisms are hastened to include all stakeholders, new forms of exclusion come to play, that is, exclusion is concurrently intrinsic within inclusive democratic processes. This view shows that a more nuanced understanding of Ubuntu as inclusion should be one that contends with forms of exclusion in a subtle way. In other words, Ubuntu can be inclusive and simultaneously exclude. A notion of inclusion as argued for by Young will guide Ubuntu as inclusion differently, as women’s presence in AHE institutions will be far more inclusive than a reliance on mere statistics and percentages. That is, their inclusion would be substantive rather than just statistically viable. Moreover, those included also experience various forms of exclusion. This view reinforces my argument that post-colonial AHE has excluded women, in spite
of various mechanisms for promoting their inclusion. Although inclusion and equality are fundamental to facilitating public deliberation for a functional and inclusive democratic society, exclusion is inherent within inclusion, as access of women to HE becomes apparent while, at the same time, their voices are not considered in educational deliberations and knowledge production.

For this reason, one would agree with Young (2000: 52-53) that the deliberative democratic institutions such as institutions of HE in Africa fail to address the issue of women’s exclusion. The point is that certain democratic institutions in Africa frequently violate this norm of inclusion by excluding women and other marginalised groups internally. In other words, while HE institutions create spaces to include those who previously were excluded, other forms of exclusion surface. Young offers a compelling argument that excluding some citizens from political deliberation within democratic societies, such as in AHE, is a failure to live up to their emancipatory promise. Subsequently, the notion of exclusion can be conceptualised in two ways that is external and internal exclusion, as outlined below.

### 3.3.1.1 Understanding external exclusion within African higher education

External exclusion is commonly practised in democratic deliberations and occurs when some members are purposely kept out of public debates or decision-making processes (Young, 2000: 52). This means that, in HE institutions, some people are kept out of dialogues or knowledge production as well as processes of decision making. Firstly, external exclusion can happen in a "back-door brokering" approach in which powerful people acquire what they want out of the process through self-appointed committees (Young, 2000: 53). For example, in external exclusion, some members of the self-appointed committees could engage in private deliberation prior to the meeting and decide on the agenda and outcome of the policy, which is only presented in a public debate for endorsement. Such forms of deliberation, according to Young, violate the principles of inclusive democracy, as the people without dominant power are excluded, while the dominant groups control what happens in all processes. In the above account it could be presumed that external exclusion is inherent in *Ubuntu* within AHE, since only people who are regarded as powerful (in this case men) may be elected in private meetings, while women are regarded as inferior and excluded. The assumption could be that the powerful groups know better than the excluded people and therefore could make decisions for them.

Secondly, external exclusion occurs on the basis of the allocated venue and time for public deliberations, which create some impediment for many people who wish to attend. This implies that decisions on the venue of such higher educational deliberation are not communicated to everyone, which then leads to the inaccessibility of such engagement. Thus, decisions are made without the...
input of the entire public. Thirdly, the most prevalent form of external exclusion occurs when economically or socially powerful members exercise their political domination over the less affluent (Young, 2000: 54). For example, those who can afford to buy sufficient media time end up dominating the public discussion of issues of public interest, excluding others intentionally on the basis of economic inequality. This can be related to the current form of HE, which is economically driven and in which knowledge is viewed as a commodity. For instance, students from well-to-do families end up choosing courses and institutions that are assumed to offer the desired knowledge, leaving the poor groups (e.g. women) with no choice. Similarly, despite the fact that democratic governance proclaims equal rights for all citizens, due to differences in power and resources, women and other disadvantaged groups end up being excluded.

Therefore, it is evident that higher educational institutions in Africa address external exclusion to a certain extent through the introduction of strategies and policies, such as affirmative action and the structural adjustment programmes of the World Bank. However, other modes of exclusion occur, as attested to by statistics on the percentage of women who are students and staff members in institutions of HE in Africa (Assié-Lumumba, 2007). In other words, in spite of various mechanisms being used to address external inclusion, HE in Africa continues to exclude women in subtle ways, which make its practices and outcomes quite unacceptable.

3.3.1.2 Understanding internal exclusion in African higher education

Internal exclusion is the second approach, which is less noticeable and which often occurs even when individuals and groups are literally included in discussions and decision making. Young (2000) points out that internal exclusion is a less identifiable form of exclusion that is prevalent in many democratic engagements and other political public spaces. For instance, many women with access to HE serve in committees and various commissions, but do not have the skills to engage and make meaningful contributions in the same way as their male counterparts. This happens when powerful groups tend to ignore, dismiss or patronise the views of others, because they (the others) lack expertise or because their experiences are different. The outcome in HE is that such people are prevented from making meaningful contributions to decision making, knowledge production and policy making. If women’s voices do not have any impact, then their presence in HE does not guarantee their contribution to policy formulation and other deliberations. For this reason, the question is what can be done for women to make meaningful contributions to all democratic processes in AHE.
The point here is that, even though women are externally included, subtle ways of exclusion inherent in the idea of Ubuntu in such institutions affect these women. In other words, women are admitted into higher educational institutions and included in discourses, but the condition of deliberations creates an environment in which those unfamiliar with the specific style of expression or use of language find it difficult to understand and participate fully in the deliberations (Young, 1996: 130). This leads to the dismissal of the participation of some people as being out of order, thereby inducing internal exclusion of those who seem to be lacking knowledge. In my view, women are physically present in such discourses, but due to other systems of negotiating the outcomes or decisions of that engagement, their voices are repudiated. When public discussions of problems and issues are inclusive, they permit the articulation of all interests, opinions and criticism, and when they are free from domination, participants in such deliberations would be confident and convinced that the outcome is legitimate.

Against the aforementioned background, Young (2000: 55) calls for communicative democracy as an action to supplement non-inclusive forms of deliberative democracy in order to confront internal exclusion in a way that would result in the realisation of an inclusive democratic process. In contrast, since democratic HE ought to be inclusive, enabling every person to find a deliberative space; it becomes disheartening and questionable that HE excludes women in Africa. The impetus for internal exclusion comes into play especially in the case of women, which then confirms the lack of meaningful Ubuntu prevalent in AHE. In this respect, Young’s conception of exclusion suggests that, despite the numerous policies that encourage women's access to HE on the continent, such as affirmative action (AA), only a few of these women are able to make meaningful contributions to decision making, policy making and knowledge production, as shown in the previous chapter. Young has proposed a communicative approach that could assist in advancing the inclusive democratic public institutions which Africa requires. Regarding the process of mitigating internal exclusion in democratic deliberations, which also includes AHE, Young (2000: 53) offers three forms of communication, namely greeting, rhetoric and narrative or storytelling. The first action of manifesting internal inclusion is through greeting, which is a way to acknowledge others in public. This approach enables participants to recognise and respect each other’s presence as members of a community. For Young, this approach has a major role to play in the dialogue that aspires to reach an understanding between people who consider the other’s individuality. In the case of AHE, one first needs to recognise the presence of women (female students and academics) in lectures, research and decision making, while encouraging a continuous discussion and exchange among participants and promoting respect and tolerance.

Nevertheless, while appreciating greeting as a first step in public engagement, which shows that one is acknowledged, one’s voice could still be disregarded because of the dynamic and cultural practices that regard women as inferior and as being who are only expected to listen and adhere to
the structural norms of traditional African societies (Kwesiga, 2002). For Young, greeting could be accompanied by rhetoric. This approach entails naming the forms and styles of speaking that reflexively and argumentatively attend to the audience through speech. Young (2000) points out that, with rhetorical figures, a speech constructs the occasion, the speaker and the audience by invoking or creating specific meanings, connotations and symbols. At the same time, rhetoric serves this connecting function, whether the speaker and the audience share meanings or not. If this is the purpose of rhetoric in democratic deliberation, then more women without rhetorical skills will be excluded, and they may not be able to follow such a form of engagement. Young (2000: 63-65) rightly notes that rhetoric may not help in addressing exclusion, since it is contrary to the idea of inclusion. The approach has a high chance of provoking internal exclusion and suggests that all participants ought to possess rhetorical skills in communication.

However, I would argue that rhetoric may not necessarily lead to inclusion in AHE because of many women’s ability and nurturing, which limit them from unleashing their cognitive and intellectual skills. People without rhetorical skills may as well be excluded from debate. The point is that rhetoric coupled with greeting as a form of communication that focuses on the acknowledgement of people in public may not necessarily address the internal exclusion that pervades AHE today. Considering that women are still regarded as inferior and are expected to be silent, they may lack the ability to articulate and respond to rhetorical questions or talk. I hold that such forms of communication may propel the dominant members of a democratic HE system to take them at face value, without taking their voices seriously.

The third form of communication is narrative or storytelling, which aims to guide individuals towards understanding each other’s situations. By listening to other people’s narrative, one may develop compassion for others, particularly those who are not physically affected by the narrated situation (in this case, the excluded women). Moreover, one has to be acknowledged in public as a participant by way of greeting, before one begins to share and listen to each other’s narratives. By articulating their problems and experiences, the listeners are able to understand the serious and difficult situations others go through, and those unaffected will be able to contribute to the decision-making process. In this way, all listeners will understand how one’s positions, actions and values appear to others from their narratival perspective. Such narratives also serve to exhibit values and cultural meanings, while the experiences and values of the participants resonate with social knowledge based on the contextual situations of individuals (Young, 1996: 129-132). In the same way, Young (2000: 70-71) affirms that the combination of various narratives from different people’s viewpoints ought to produce collective understanding, unlike rhetoric.

Most notably, narrative plays a pivotal role in arguments in a free and equal political discussion in which decisions depend on a need or entitlement. In other words, every person has a story to tell and does it through different styles and meanings. Each person is allowed to tell a story with equal
legitimacy, and each story has equal value in the communicative situation. Moreover, that "narrative reveals the particular experiences of those in social locations, experiences that cannot be shared by those situated differently but that they must understand in order to do justice to the others" (Young, 1996: 131-132). In other words, narrative has to do primarily with how individuals make their case by telling stories about their physical, temporal, social and emotional obstacles. In other words, narrative exhibits subjective experiences to other subjects. The idea of narrative can evoke sympathy while maintaining distance, because the narrative also carries an inexhaustible latent shadow, the transcendence of the other, that there is always more to be told. Young further clarifies that narrative reveals a source of values, culture and meaning (1996: 132). When an argument proceeds from a premise to a conclusion, it is only as persuasive as the acceptance of its premises by the deliberators.

Narrative can also serve to explain to outsiders what practices, places or symbols mean to the people who hold them. Through narrative, the outsiders (in this case those already excluded) possibly may come to understand why the insiders (included women) value what they value and why they have the priorities they have. The process of narration not only exhibits experience and values from the point of view of the subjects that have and hold them. It also reveals that each social perspective has an account not only of its own life and history, but of every other position that affects its experience – the kind of exclusion that is difficult to test or observe, but rather is expressed through people's narratives (Young, 1996: 131-132). Nevertheless, in my view, this might be a minimal form of inclusion, which allocates special rights to some groups (in this case, women), and seems to place those who are unable to articulate their reasons and are non-eloquent as victims of more marginalisation. Following Young, if *Ubuntu* as inclusion is at the core of the democratic ideal, then the political and social exclusion prevalent in AHE is a sign that democratic societies do not live up to their promises. Consequently, to attain real inclusion there is a need to understand people's differences as a resource, rather than as an obstacle to be overcome.

Nonetheless, communicative forms that are relevant in the American context may not create a transformative educational environment in Africa, where the problems of internal exclusion of women and other marginalisation issues abound. One would need to take cognisance of African society where, unlike men, women continue to be placed in inferior positions (Kwesiga, 2002). Listening solely to their narratives may continue to place them in a victim mode, rather than creating conditions that would enable them to assert their voices. In my view, Young's forms of communicative democracy, specifically greetings and narrative, could be the beginning of internal inclusion. Even so, this approach is limited due to the cultural and religious beliefs that force women into subservient positions and place them in victim mode. Thus, communication exclusively may evoke further exclusion. In this sense, Young's conception of inclusion as a condition for
Ubuntu can inherently embrace two forms of exclusion that is external and internal exclusion. Therefore, on the basis of this understanding it is apparent that women are excluded in subtle ways. This study will show that, in a sense, AHE has mitigated external exclusion through policies, but internal exclusion remains a dilemma. Simply put, women are included procedurally and hence statistically. Yet they are not included substantively. The point is that, while communication should be part of higher education’s democratic processes, recognition needs to precede the communication, rather than be the sole foundation for inclusion. The focus should transcend communication towards a legitimate means of inclusion that potentially may engender an inclusive democratic HE community. Thus, Nussbaum’s conception of inclusion will be explored in what follows.

3.3.2 Nussbaum’s capabilities approach as a way to evoke inclusion for equality

Nussbaum (2000) proffers the capabilities approach, which is assumed to be sufficient for the development and attainment of justifiable equality. Her approach accounts for human, and invariably women’s, capabilities, and is based on what human beings are actually capable of doing or becoming in the real world, irrespective of their gender and other differences. She notes that gender equality lies at the heart of many feminist studies; women demand the rights to shape ethical and moral questions about the way they should be treated. At the same time, various traditions have perpetuated gender inequality and hindered the progress of women because of gender discrimination. Inequality continues to differ according to context. Nussbaum’s central question is how we can solve these ethical problems and apply universal concepts that will allow women to gain significant equality in the world? To answer the question, Nussbaum offers the capabilities approach to equality and argues that it would cause a rethinking that would trigger a different understanding of the way the universal capabilities approach elevates women to an equal place in the world to men. For her, this approach opens a pathway for women to live a fulfilled life that is not influenced by traditions that enable injustice to persist against women in different spheres of life. Consequently, Nussbaum (2000: 78-80) offers ten fundamental functional human capabilities to bridge the gap of inequality. She maintains that each person is worthy of being a human being on the basis of the fact that the person is able:

a) To imagine, think and reason – and to do these things in a truly human way;
b) To form a conception of good and to engage in critical reflection;
c) To live with and toward others, to recognise and show concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction – to be able to imagine the
situation of another, to have compassion for that situation, and to have the capability for both justice and friendship;

d) To be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others [which] entails, at a minimum, protection against discrimination on the basis of sex, race, sexual orientation, religion, caste, ethnicity, or national origin; and
e) To work as a human being, exercising practical reason and entering into meaningful relationships of mutual recognition with others.

From the above outline of the significance of Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, it can be inferred that, for equality to be secured and protected, it is necessary to recognise that every person, irrespective of their differences (women or men), has the capability to engage in discourses, offer reasons, show concern for those whose voices are excluded and unequally treated, and act to enable women to engage in meaningful relationships, like their male counterparts. One of the prominent capabilities suggests that all human beings ought to have equal opportunities in order to live a good human life (Nussbaum, 1999: 42). Essentially, Nussbaum posits that women have the same potential to hold these capabilities as men, and it is necessary to apply this approach to women as being equal to men. The fundamental nature of this conception of equality looks at women and their progress in relation to the capabilities of girls or women. Her capabilities approach to women’s development provokes does not provoke the question whether women should be able to build houses, but whether they have the capability to do so (Nussbaum 1999: 42). In this sense, the approach prompts me to think deeply about exclusion and to consider whether women’s exclusion is exercised on the basis of inability, incompetency or a tangible incompetency. To her, women have the right to assert themselves. They therefore need to exercise their freedom to act autonomously.

In other words, their freedom to act autonomously is their right to exercise democratic rights. Some good examples of these democratic rights include their right to life and their right to constructing their own voice. Recognising women’s rights may assist them and others experiencing exclusion and unequal treatment in HE in Africa to claim inclusion. Accordingly, Ubuntu as inclusion could be understood from the capabilities approach, in which all, particularly women, are perceived as equal human beings, who are able to act freely and articulate their points of view. Nussbaum draws on Sen’s explanation of equality, which is closely related to concerns of social justice and political value. Concurrently, she tries to demystify Sen’s idea of equality, since it is connected more to human rights but lacks the commitment to substance that the capabilities of a society ought to or most centrally have to pursue (Nussbaum, 2003: 35). Her aim is to enhance the idea because of its criticism by feminists, and to suggest that the level of health service or educational provision in a just society ought to be delivered as fundamental entitlements to all its citizens.
In her view, the equality of resources falls short because it fails to take into account individuals’ needs and different levels of resources, if they are to come up to the same level of capability to function (Nussbaum, 2003: 32). This means that the human capabilities approach is underlined by people’s accessibility to resources and intellectual exposure, which then causes women from deprived backgrounds to lack the ability to engage. It seems that the above point of inadequacy may jeopardise the capabilities approach as a means to mitigate internal exclusion in AHE. Like other marginalised groups, women from rural areas, where their rights to quality education and opportunities are limited, might experience further exclusion due to their inability to engage in deliberation to the same extent as men. To address this predicament, Nussbaum (2003: 36) points out that only if we formulate definite capabilities – even one that are tentative and revisable – would we be able to use capabilities as defined to elaborate a partial account of social justice, a set of basic entitlements without which no society can lay claim to justice.

This approach is useful to supplement the idea that, if the social goal of the capabilities of the members of society is to perform significant functions, then women should have the rights and obligation to contribute to the progress of the entire society at a greater level. This simply means that the capabilities approach is important because it forms a channel and environment for women (female students and staff members) to take part in areas where males dominate, which is the norm in most African societies. The significance of women’s labour or mental capability, whether they are inside or outside of the home (private or public), has been undermined in various regions of the world, and particularly in Africa. However, recognising their capabilities and acknowledging that women serve and contribute to fundamental issues in different ways, could pave the way for their inclusion. However, these capabilities may have to be approached in a special order in which each is to be applied in various cultures. This approach claims that a life that is incomplete with respect to one of the capabilities will fall short of being considered a good human life (Nussbaum, 2003: 42). In other words, if human life lacks one of these aspects, it creates a barrier that prevents the individual from achieving what she or he personally desires and envisages. People should attain the ability to control their own lives and make their own decisions – not only to contribute to individual desires, but also to provide reasons for the choices for which they have to give account. This could mean that women, like all human beings, ought to celebrate and exercise their freedom to express their views and contribute to deliberations in higher education. However, if women’s concerns are not considered, their lives are not well lived.

In addition, Nussbaum (2003) calls for a process in which women (female students and staff members) should be afforded an opportunity to advance in society based on having equal status as men. This approach calls for a universal set of predictions that permit an individual to become equal with others. On women’s inclusion, she argues that people’s capabilities should be allowed to reach their full potential in a way that would enable women to claim their space in democratic
discourses. One can say that the relevance of the capabilities’ approach lies in the fact that it does
not simply have the potential to induce positive prospects for women, but it could also unlock
opportunities for anyone (not only women) who is undermined or oppressed in any sphere of life,
including higher education. For instance, it is possible for women to be visible physically in higher
education, yet their presence is not felt and their voices are not heard on issues that concern them
due to their lack of capabilities. This may cause universities to shun opportunities for women to
prosper as equal and capable human beings.

Also, Nussbaum (1999: 43) notes that “human capabilities exert a moral claim that they should be
developed since human beings are creatures such that they need to be provided with the right
educational and material support, in order to become fully capable of the major human functions”.
The argument is that capabilities will only be unlocked through nurturing and that HE should offer
accurate and ample support for what needs to ensue. Nussbaum’s capabilities approach has the
advantage of taking distinct positions on these disputed issues, while pointing out what the
motivating concerns and their goals are (Nussbaum, 2003: 37-40). In the case of AHE, female
students, staff members and others are deliberately excluded in order to limit their achievement
through restrictions or structures that describe the acceptable roles of women at all levels of
society, or what they could become. This concurs with how women (female students and staff
members) are being marginalised not only in the private space, that is at home, but also in the
public space, such as in institutions of HE in Africa, where they are excluded and treated
unequally.

Conversely, the fact that each individual has the capability to show respect to the other and
recognise the capability in others indicates that it is inevitable for AHE to create a favourable
environment in which women can influence decisions, policies and knowledge production. For this
to happen, Nussbaum calls for educational discourses in which each participant is required to
listen to others’ points of view, based on the understanding that each contribution (either from
women or from men) is of value and ought to be respected as such (Nussbaum, 2003: 41). In this
way, equality among participants ultimately will be enacted, as well as respect for others (not only
as African women, but as human beings who can offer reasonable arguments in a cosmopolitan
world of engagement) as capable and competent individuals by sharing their perspectives, thus
promoting inclusion and equality. While the human capabilities approach is plausible in the context
of affluence, it may not guide African universities towards a justifiable form of inclusion. This is
because, following this particular understanding of Ubuntu as inclusion through the capabilities
approach entails exercising your freedom as a member of an AHE institution. And women are not
always positioned to do so.
Hence, considering the dynamics of women’s maltreatment and exclusion on the continent, the capabilities approach alone will not create an enabling environment for women to reach their individual potential. The point here is that, because women are already excluded and their voices are not heard, a call to exercise their freedom is insufficient to address internal exclusion. How can they be included if their voices are persistently marginalised in HE? The point is not that the capabilities approach to women exercising their freedom in the quest of being justly included in HE discourses is inappropriate. In fact, they should continue to make such claims. However, when conditions in AHE are not conducive to them exercising their capabilities, we require something else. For this reason, I draw on Butler’s conception of a troubling gender as a way to extend inclusion – that is, attempting to make it more substantive.

3.3.3 Butler’s gender-troubled view as a means for substantive inclusion

In this section, the notion of gender equality and inequality held by different theorists will be examined in order to understand its place in HE in Africa. Before exploring the notion of gender equality, which is an important concept in this study, it will be helpful to discuss the basic views on the concept of gender. The interest in gender equality, particularly within the political movements, began in the developed world in the 1960s. The systematic organisation for the struggle toward gender equality in Africa started in the 1970s with a creation of an Association of African Women for Research and Development (AAWORD) (see Assié-Lumumba, 2006a). In addition, Breitenbach, Brown, Mackay and Webb (2002: 1, 15) point out that the evolution of the gender equality project in Africa commenced in the 1980s and 1990s by different groups of women and men, and other marginalised groups, which demanded that political processes attain greater equality as well as equal opportunities for all citizens. Other activists, practitioners and academic commentators on equality shared, at the very least, a position that denied a weak and reductionist form of equality, and called for a vigorous version of equality based on gender in postcolonial AHE.

In her book, *Gender Trouble*, Butler (1990: 2-5) shows the limits of reflexivity in thinking about the self beyond the dichotomy of sex and gender. Butler enjoins feminist critics to analyse how the category of women is produced and restrained by power structures, rather than looking at the power structures for emancipation. While engaging in a critique of patriarchy, she embarks on what she calls a “feminist genealogy of the category of woman” and considers the concept of gender as

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14In Africa, the term ‘gender’ tends to evoke certain emotions in both the user and hearer of the term. For men, it conjures up images of militant women who forcefully and emotionally want to become like men. These women want to wrest ‘power’ in its various dimensions from the rightful owners, who in this case are the male of the human species. For some women, the term gender calls up images of fellow women who have lost direction and who want to destroy their God-given mandate to be submissive and follow their husband’s direction (Ayanga, 2012: 85).
genealogy\textsuperscript{15}, which might seem to promise a future direction for philosophical analyses. In this sense, the distinction between sex and gender seems to be increasingly unstable, since gender is radically independent of sex and is a “free-floating artifice” (Butler, 1990: 7, 22). Butler’s view implies that gender identifies those things that do not conform to the system of “compulsory and naturalized heterosexuality”, and divulges how gender norms are socially instituted and maintained.

Profoundly, Butler’s argument prompts me to further explore an appropriate means of understanding equality, besides seeing it from the position of gender, which is constructed with women and men in mind and does not account for those who fall outside the dichotomy. Butler (1990: 35) also describes how gender congeals or solidifies into a form that makes it appear to have been there all along. She claims that the idea is drawn from the French feminist Simone de Beauvoir, who stated that “one is not born, but rather becomes, a woman”, that is referring to gender identity. Subsequently, “gender is a process which has neither origin nor end, it is something that we do rather than we are” (Butler, 1990: 128-129). I found this understanding of gender compellingly, particularly the idea that being a woman or a man is something that is constructed. In other words, gender is viewed as a social relation that is categorised based on individual uniqueness and limitations (Butler, 1990: 324). Conversely, the challenge resulting from the identification of gender based on biological differences between women and men is that the categorisation leads to constructed discourse with the intention of recreating hegemonic paradigms and perpetuating today’s power relations – including in social institutions such as AHE (Butler, 1990: 182-185). In this respect, defining women and men as universal categories disguises the interests such definition serves. As a result, anything that is defined as natural or universal should be studied critically. I would agree, therefore, that gender should not only be approached based on the categories of man and woman, but also on the different social relations that prevail among them.

This theory of gender related to performance and performativity reveals the power relations that underlie pre-determined gender and sex. In this way, “the action of gender requires a performance that is repeated. This repetition is at once a re-enactment and re-experiencing of a set of meanings already socially established” (Butler, 1990: 178). Furthermore, Butler (1990) states that performativity creates a fictitious reality, in which gender and its roles are determined based on the binary distinction between men and women. This implies that the category of women from which the feminist struggle arises is different from the political, hierarchical fiction based on biology (which is also applicable in AHE). Butler’s view shows that, in everyday life, we take gender for granted; we only recognise a person as a man or woman, girl or boy. Being a man or a woman,

\textsuperscript{15} Genealogy investigates the political stakes in designing as an origin and causes those identity categories that are the effects of institutions, practices, and discourses with multiple and diffused points of origin (Butler, 1990: viii-ix, 10).
then, is not a pre-determined state, but rather a “becoming”, a condition actively under construction. If I understand Butler correctly, her concern is about the perception of the category “woman” as a single type, at the expense of other groups, such as homosexuals, lesbians, transgendered beings, and so forth. For her, to view a woman as a single category may lead to more exclusion. The Butlerian notion of gender-troubled situates the construction and existence of this category. She describes the subject-in-process that is constructed in discourse by the acts it performs. To her, the gender issue becomes troubled firstly by “calling the category of ‘the subject’ into question” – by arguing that it is a performative construct (Butler, 1990: 341). Secondly, it becomes trouble by “asserting that there are ways of doing” one’s identity that will cause even further trouble for those who have a vested interest in preserving existing oppositions such as male/female, masculine/feminine, gay/straight and so on.

The inference is that identity as a performative construct is a complex theory, in which the subject is an actor who simply gets up and “performs” its identity on a metaphorical stage of its own choosing (Butler, 1990: 341). Further, gender identity is a sequence of acts, but there is no pre-existing performer who does those acts, no doer behind the deed. For Butler (1990: 128-129), therefore, gender is a matter of choice and it is performed; and to choose for gender is to interpret the received gender norms in a way that organises them anew. This implies that gender is an act or a sequence of acts that is always inevitably happening. It is impossible for such a happening to exist as a social agent outside the terms of gender. This view is appealing, especially for understanding gender equality in AHE in order to expose the existing narrow view before making claims for any justified democratic processes. Thus, to foreground Ubuntu as inclusion in AHE based on the gender category of woman/man will exacerbate internal exclusion. In addition, Butler (2004: 1) postulates that:

If gender is a kind of doing, an incessant activity performed, in part, without one’s knowing and without one’s willing; it is not for that reason automatic or mechanical. On the contrary, it is a practice of improvisation within a scene of constraint; moreover, one does not ‘do’ one’s gender alone. One is always ‘doing’ with or another, even if the other is only imaginary. What I call my ‘own’ gender appears perhaps at times as something that I author or, indeed, own. But the terms that make up one’s own gender are, from the start, outside oneself, beyond oneself in a sociality that has a single author (and that radically contents the notion of authorship itself).

From the above assumption, one can argue that the aim is not to prescribe a new gendered way of life, but to open the field of possibility for gender talks in the current society and field of knowledge. Thus, the keenness to connect equality based on gender with African higher education will meet
with challenges due to the categories of woman and man. Those who fall outside the gender category will automatically experience internal exclusion. I concede that approaching equality based on gender will not help us to achieve our inevitable goals in the African post-colonial education system. I therefore would respond to Butler’s call to trouble the binary gender dichotomy by looking at sex, as including all people who should be treated as equal members of democratic (higher educational) institutions (Butler, 1990: 129). In other words, as soon as we think AHE promotes gender equality that focuses on the binary distinction between woman and man, then the institution would provoke internal exclusion. Excluding some groups (as being transgendered, transsexual, bisexual, gay, lesbian, etc.) may lead to inequality of those who are neither woman nor man. It would be interesting to ask whether excluding women and other groups and treating them unequally is not a way of dehumanising such people. I therefore affirm on the basis of the above that gender should not to be approached from a binary viewpoint, but rather should seek to include groups that fall outside these oppositional categories of man and woman.

In line with my view of gender being troubled in the context of Africa, Sylvia Tamale, editor of the book African Sexualities (2011), affirms that gender binary positions are highly contentious in the light of the fact that the social construction of gender is not fixed, but rather is fluid. Like Butler, Tamale perceives gender categorisation in the context of AHE as problematic and exclusive to people who disregard the binary category. I agree that gender categorisation needs to be deconstructed in AHE institutions to address the constant exclusion and maltreatment of marginalised groups. The concern of Ubuntu as inclusion here focuses on gender, but we need to look beyond current discourses of gender equality by examining the etymology of the word Ubuntu - humaneness. Since Ubuntu valorises humaneness, not in its gendered form, what matters as far as Ubuntu is concerned, or the meaning of the notion at least, is humaneness, not categories of humaneness such as able-bodied versus disabled man or woman, heterosexual or homosexual. Does this mean that this is what happens in practice in Africa, where a philosophy of Ubuntu is propounded and celebrated? Not really. The key point that should be developed here is that the notion of Ubuntu provides a framework that moves beyond categorisations, although our own practices have negated it by categorising people.

Since democratic HE is basically a Western depiction, I would show that Africa has its own distinctive and dynamic background and culture that seem to induce women’s internal exclusion and inequality in various and subtle ways. By the same token, an African contention of inclusion based on gender is evident in Tamale’s (2011) monograph, which points out the dilemma of exclusion and inequality. She locates AHE in the democratic project of a post-colonial epoch. Tamale sees sexuality as a biological process of reproduction while, at the same time, it is socially constructed as a homogeneous and unchanging notion for all Africans. This homogeneous
sexuality is identified as being out of touch not only with the realities of lives, experiences, identities and relationships, but also with current activism and scholarship (2011: 2).

Tamale further states that the discourse about and experiences of African sexualities have been and remain shaped by issues of colonialism, globalisation, patriarchy, gender, class, religion, age, law and culture (Tamale, 2011: 4; 23-26). Notably, while the post-colonial African institutions (specifically HE) strive to achieve inclusion and equality within a global democracy, the continent is confronted with the big challenge of debating the complexities of intersecting oppression and marginalisation. One of the issues is how to regard as equal human beings identified groups that do not conform to gender categorisations and that include sexual minorities such as lesbians, gays, transgendered, intersexed, rape survivors, sex workers and people living with HIV and AIDS. Expressing a similar concern, Ayanga (2012: 85) states clearly that the gender discourse is often a case of people talking at one another, rather than talking to one another while appreciating one another’s points of view and contributions. The process leads to one side seeking to hold on to what is perceived as rightfully theirs, whereas the other struggles to acquire the same. Thus, if AHE has embodied this perspective of gender categorisation, as seems to be the case, the possibility of achieving equality is limited. I am challenged to envisage equality differently, not presuming that the conception of inclusion of women and gender equality in postcolonial AHE leads to democracy.

With Butler’s gender perspective, one is impelled to investigate what democratic HE ought to be, since equality based on gender poses more danger for internal inclusion in AHE. The fact that the justification of equality continues to be approached on the basis of the number of female (or male) students and staff members of higher institutions, those who are outside the gender categorisation (women or men) will obviously be excluded. In that case, the democratic deliberations will end up ignoring their presence and continue to exclude them. Butler (1990) sees gender categorisation within a dominant ideology of heterosexuality as a social construct in which every person can decide what he or she wants to become. I identify with Butler’s standpoint, in that gender categorisation could further exacerbate internal exclusion when used as yardstick for inclusion. The problem is that to begin identifying the other in the public could prove problematic in many African societies, where the issue of homosexuality is regarded as taboo and unrealistic. Ironically, a single category – women – could prove problematic, since within that category groups such as lesbians may not receive fair treatment. Those who would be categorised as lesbian or gay might experience more exclusion, marginalisation and harassment than inclusion. Therefore, such a dilemma requires critical engagement when trying to identify and explore other specific voices not included specifically in the context of AHE.
Butler’s problematisation of gender categories could be used to probe what we never thought of or what we overlooked in the quest for the democratisation of African institutions and society. In this regard, approaching *Ubuntu*/inclusion based on gender as a yardstick may thwart the advancement of equality. For Butler, gender categorisation is problematic because it relies on dualism, that is, woman and man. Those groups who defy gender categories, such as homosexuals, bisexuals, transgendered, intersexed, lesbians and gays, will not be included. This implies that people who are neither women nor men are not human enough to be included in AHE. The point here is that inclusion based on the category of gender can in fact be very exclusive and hinder the urgent need for women’s inclusion. The concern about emphasising a gender category in HE in Africa is also shared by Mama (2006). She argues that “Africa urgently needs strong, creative and intellectually productive institutions of higher learning to address continental knowledge needs in a manner that is closely grounded in the political and cultural aspirations of Africa’s diverse peoples; women as well as men” (Mama, 2006: 53). For gender to be less destructive a category to consider, she suggests that university scholars and academic administrators in Africa should become intensely sensitive to the challenges of gender equality, social justice and democratisation. This calls for equity of access at all levels and in all areas of the higher education sector as a minimal condition for the pursuit of gender equality.

Mama (2006) further proposes the integration of institutional and intellectual strategies that promote the practice of gender equality, and concomitantly equip students for the production of both a democratic citizenry and the ideas that existing political and policy commitments stand for in order to meet the demands of gender equality. With this in mind, one is compelled to question the authenticity of *Ubuntu* as inclusion in the efforts towards equality that are championed in AHE. It seems that it is unfeasible to enable *Ubuntu* to advocate for equality based on gender categorisation and for the equal treatment of all, especially those who fall outside the constructed category of gender. In my opinion, before we claim equality, there is a need to interrogate the notion of gender particularly within African society, where the gender category is viewed as static and unchangeable. Our efforts should be to find a way to deconstruct the gender category first, before calling for equality. An AHE that regards woman or man on a binary basis will bring about more exclusion and consequently fail to advance equality in HE institutions. So far, Butler’s idea of gender, particularly regarding the category of man or woman, has helped me to unpack the problem of inclusion that is based purely on gender.

It is clear that the notion of gender is fluid because some categories can have effects on hetero- or homosexual (gay-man and lesbian-man) characters. We need to account for more groups, such as transsexual and transgender, since the problem of exclusion does not merely affect women, but also marginalised men. Even under the category of men, gays and other groups may experience
exclusion, just like women. Therefore Butler's perspective helps one to understand inclusion through the categories of woman and man. It can be said that there is a need to understand different constituents better in order to deal with internal exclusion in particular. As soon as HE emphasises inclusion based on gender, then students nurtured in such institutions will maintain the same categories, which ultimately may prolong exclusion and inequality. I now highlight the possibilities and limitations of the above-explored liberal theories of inclusion.

3.3.4 Possibilities and limitations of liberal perspectives in promoting Ubuntu

Although the liberal theorists discussed above proffer compelling arguments that may advance Ubuntu as inclusion, there seems to be some erroneous beliefs that hinder its fulfilment. For instance, Young’s conception of internal exclusion tallies with the dilemma that is prevalent in AHE. It seems that the communicative approach that is based on greeting, rhetoric and narrative is insufficient; hence a need for paradigm shifts. Thus, Nussbaum’s capabilities approach advances the use of Ubuntu to address internal exclusion in AHE. However, although her call for capabilities through which individuals can exercise their freedom to claim equality is credible, it promotes the exclusion of those who lack the capacity to exercise their freedom and rights. I have argued elsewhere that liberal perspectives are undeniable in trying to enhance women’s inclusion (Shanyanana, 2011: 114). However, the African cultural background or upbringing, which places girls/women in an inferior position to boys/men, may make it impossible for them to simply locate a space in which to engage their male counterparts in dialogue. Consequently, the notion of Ubuntu as inclusion has reached an impasse, and it requires further re-conceptualisation. For this reason, Butler’s idea of using gender as a characteristic of or yardstick for Ubuntu/inclusion highlights the gender-troubled view, particularly the category-base of a woman or man, which in itself is exclusive to those who defy the category boundary. Again, a single category of women can be problematic, since within that category other groups such as lesbians or transgender and so forth may not receive their fair treatment.

Therefore, aiming for inclusion through gender equality could provoke even more exclusion of those groups that fall outside the gender category, such as homosexuals, bisexuals, intersexed, and transgendered. The key point in this study is that we need to look beyond current discourses of gender equality in the etymology of the word Ubuntu (humaneness) if AHE is to be recognised as a post-colonial and transformed democratic institution. One can argue that Ubuntu valorises humaneness, although not in its gendered form, but in the idea that a person is a human being in totality and is part of humanity. Put clearly, it is apparent that, what matters most as far as Ubuntu
is concerned, or at least the meaning of the notion, is humaneness — not categories of humaneness such as able-bodied versus disabled, man versus woman, heterosexual versus homosexual. The question is: Does this mean that this is what happens in practice in Africa where the philosophy of Ubuntu is proclaimed and celebrated? Not really. The key point here is that the notion of Ubuntu (drawing on Butler’s gender-troubled idea) provides a framework that moves beyond categorisations, albeit that AHE practices negate it by actually categorising people. It should be noted that Africa has its own distinctive and dynamic background and culture that seems to induce the exclusion and inequality of African women in many ways.

However, the aforementioned liberal perspective of Ubuntu as inclusion is insufficient to engender the internal inclusion of women in AHE. It is argued here that HE needs to transcend an inclusion that is based solely on gender categorisation and capability approaches. Rather, AHE ought to move towards the recognition of all human beings. More importantly, our attempt to transform post-colonial AHE requires a paradigm shift beyond the liberal position. Therefore, the exploration of a post-liberal perspective in understanding Ubuntu may help to address the idea of internal exclusion in AHE. At this point, I turn to the Rancièrean notion of equality as disruption in order to provide a transformative understanding of Ubuntu that would promote the inclusion of women on the continent, especially in AHE. Put differently, if Ubuntu was extended to merely recognising internal inclusion, acknowledging people’s capabilities to exercise their freedoms, and looking beyond gender categorisations, women’s voices might still be excluded. Hence I present a different understanding of Ubuntu – one that can connect to Rancière’s idea of equality as voice with the constraints of internal exclusion in AHE.

3.4 A Rancièrean conception of Ubuntu as equality of voice in higher education

When constructing the concept of Ubuntu as inclusion following Rancière (1999), one infers a framework of thinking about equality that describes a way to act out, rather than distribute, equality. For Rancière, equality is the presupposition of those who act on their own behalf, rather than being represented by others. The idea of acting on their own behalf ties in very well with an inclusive HE, in which women, like other members, engage in educational deliberations and demand their deliberative spaces. Nonetheless, when people are being represented, the representatives act in support of others for the purpose of achieving equality on the assumption that they are acting on behalf of others, that is the marginalised groups (women, the disabled and the poor) who are incapable of asserting their own equality. For me, this idea of being represented is rather incapacitating and non-emancipatory, since the voices of the excluded will remain on the margin. To put it succinctly, Rancière points out that “equality is not a given that politics presses into service, an essence embodied in the law or a goal politics sets itself the task of attaining; it is a
mere assumption that needs to be discerned within the practices implementing it" (1999: 33). This simply means that equality cannot be achieved only when those who are deprived of it receive it through others, but also when they engage in educational deliberations on their own capacity. In other words, when women are receiving equality it would still mean that others must give it to them, which eschew their agency as equal citizens. In concurrence with Rancière (1999: 30), equality is a way of disrupting and attaining justice, and that is what people (women) are entitled to expect from the state or social institutions (higher education) in which they happen to find themselves.

Attaining equality is based on how people ought to act and what they do while claiming their equality – even in African higher educational arrangements. Rancière argues that equality is not a principle of receptivity or passivity – attained by being visible in AHE without making any meaningful contribution. Rather, it is a principle of activity. I find Rancière’s view of people (women) engaging in a particular activity to demand equality, rather than waiting as passive recipients of what is being distributed to them, quite compelling. Women, and in fact all categories of people, ought to be included as a way of claiming their equality with their voice. This approach has the potential to engender equality in HE, as it could empower and change the position of women, enabling them to air their voices like their male counterparts. Thus, only when AHE creates an enabling atmosphere in which all voices are heard will equality be achieved. Women should not expect to receive equality as passive objects and to be recipients of services; they need to demand what is rightfully theirs through vigorous inclusion. In this way, an appropriate and active form of equality in AHE would be engendered.

The potential question is how women and other excluded groups may demand their inclusion in post-colonial democratic institutions such as AHE? Following Rancière’s (1992: 4-8) analogy of Joseph Jacotot’s depiction of an intellectual framework among teachers and students, it follows that Rancière purports that all humans are equally intelligent, and that the difference between them lies not in their intelligence, but in their attention. Rancière writes that “what stultifies the common people is not the lack of instruction, but the belief in the inferiority of their intelligence” (1992: 39). The task of a teacher, then, is not to teach students what they do not know, because they are capable of finding out what it is that they do not know. This view that everyone, including women, is capable of learning in a way that can unleash their intelligence has implications for AHE. Consequently, the task of a teacher in a Rancièrean view is to motivate students to attend to their work so that their equal intelligence could find expression (May, 2008: 57-58). If inclusion as Ubuntu can be advanced by captivating the intelligence of students, that is, women and men, then there is no reason to exclude women when it comes to AHE.

Responding to the query whether those who lack capacity and confidence, particularly African women, possibly might be able to act and claim their equality, Rancière (1992: 46) posits that equality can be acted out based on the equality of intelligence. To him, equality of intelligence does
not imply that students have the capability to score the same marks or grades; rather, it implies equality of intelligence on a standard base. In other words, intellectual skills may vary from one person to another, but we are equally capable of using those skills to communicate, to discuss, to make decisions, and to take account of the world around us. The presupposition behind equality of intelligence is the starting point for all politics. As regards the idea of understanding and practising equality, Rancière argues that “[o]ur problem isn’t proving that all intelligence is equal. It’s seeing what can be done under that supposition. And for this, it’s enough for us that the opinion be possible – that is, that no opposing truth can be proved” (1992: 46). Stated differently, it is clear that human beings possess equal intellectual abilities which can be nurtured. Equality should be approached on that basis. However, there are always people who contribute to public discussions and those who are assigned to contribute to private work (May, 2008: 124). Of those in the two groups, only a few members will determine the course of society, as is evident in the case of HE in Africa. One can clearly establish whose voice counts the most, and whose voice is not considered, because inequality is being perpetuated.

Within this framework, the possibility of women articulating their viewpoints and making meaningful contributions to educational debates could produce equality. The emphasis should be on cultivating women who possess the attributes of intelligence, such as attentiveness and assertiveness. Equality ought to rest on a person’s ability to be attentive to what is seen and what is spoken in the world around. Intelligence is, first, “attention and research before being a combination of ideas” (Rancière, 1992: 54-56). Interestingly, in order to establish one another’s intelligence, people have to listen attentively to the point of view of others, and this can be done by higher education practitioners in Africa by including women and treating them as equal partners. The notion of being attentive in Rancière’s view is said to be “the moral foundation of the power to know”. However, this moral act, in turn, is not to be used to condemn others, but is a moral act of being truthful to oneself, and to start from the fact that “not knowing yourself would be a contradiction in terms” (1992: 57). Regarding the equality of intelligence, what I consider interesting is the exploration of the power that is set free by any man or woman when he or she judges himself/herself equal to everyone else, and judges everyone else equal to him/her.

Moreover, are the “ambitious” ones mostly men who claim they are not inferior to anyone else, namely women and the other marginalised groups, while judging themselves superior to everyone else? Such an individual identifies himself or herself in the inequality of the social structure, rather than with the equality of intelligence. It is only people who can lay claim to equality, says Rancière, who are really equal. As such, some form of individualism or the existence of a sense of unity holding society together is an extra quality already in place. Everyone would have an equal share in something that would unite them even before relating to one another. Rancière (1992: 58) further states that “people are united because they are people, that is to say distant beings".
Therefore, knowing this fact one is forced to communicate with others in order to live and survive in the world. This could be tied to the call for women’s inclusion in AHE. Women should be included not only because they are women, but because they are part of the community and of the world. There is no extra quality uniting people, no “reality of real”, no mystical segment (Rancière, 1992: 64). For everyone to engage in the community of intelligence there is a need for the distant being to communicate, to translate and counter-translate in order to move ahead with others. This implies that, if women and other oppressed groups cannot articulate their views, it will be difficult for them to express their points of view in the community of engagement.

Nevertheless, talking alone does not place a person in a community of intelligence, but only telling the truth; that is, by starting from a discrete place in oneself, one uses the power of reason to participate in the community of intelligence as a distinct but rational being (Rancière, 1992: 64). In other words, reason is not the privilege of the wise, but it is for everyone who uses power. In this respect, the community of intelligence ought to embody the ability to be attentive, which is a fundamental attribute of education. The point is that common ideas about intelligence tend to make learning dependent on inner faculties of the mind, rather than on outer events; things are illuminated rather than done. One can say that Rancière’s argument of being attentive takes on a larger meaning; it is not a call to a “common” teacher to pay attention. That is why he rightly points to three ways in which attentiveness could be inculcated – the first is the shift from intelligence to attention; the second explains what it means to be attentive, and the third considers the consequences of such a view for education, and for forms of teaching in AHE in particular (Rancière, 1992: 64-65). Finding one’s voice and the equality of intelligence could have a substantial influence and possibly may address inequality in AHE. He argues that equality should not be approached based on gender, but rather on the “equalisation of voice”. However, to advance “equalisation of voice”, AHE should reconstruct ways of including women and other marginalised groups based on voice. Basing inclusion on student or staff members’ percentages (women versus men) will not advance vigorous inclusion in Africa. Rather, the focus should be on voice. My conviction is that if Ubuntu is extended only in terms of communication, capabilities and gender, substantive inclusion might still not happen in AHE. For that reason, equalisation of voice as disruptive will enhance Ubuntu as inclusion.

To promote “equalisation of voice”, AHE ought to nurture in all people, irrespective of their gender, some sense of assertiveness, which may enable women to engage in debates and offer their reasons with confidence. At the same time, there is a need to cultivate the ability to listen, with attentive listening to all members of an educational community as a way of promoting internal inclusion. The above view suggests that human beings (men and women) possess equal rights to higher educational discourses, in which inclusion and equality should move beyond gender. Rather, educational discourses should consider human capabilities in relation to the “equalisation
of voice”. In terms of voice, people will listen to the standpoints of others, without considering which gender or group is making the claim. The standard will be to judge whether an act makes sense or not. Subsequently, to attain the level where people listen attentively, Africa needs to educate citizens with such attributes.

Bearing in mind that full inclusion may not be achieved within the human capabilities framework; the work of Rancière becomes important. If all human beings indeed have similar intellectual skills, then institutions and educators need to create an environment in which all students could unleash their potential and exercise attentive listening in their effort to attain equality. In my view, “equalisation of voice” is an ideal approach to the inclusion not only of women, but of other excluded groups such as homosexuals. Furthermore, a Rancièrean framework of equality as disruption through a voice is remarkable and could be used as a benchmark for internal inclusion. This means that being attentive is to be assertive and to disrupt the conversation. In other words, this rich conception offers a sufficient, reconstructed framework that moves beyond an inclusion based on capabilities and gender, to one that recognises human voice in an inclusive democratic HE in Africa, where many women and other marginalised groups aspire to experience humanity.

3.5 Summary: Rethinking Ubuntu as Inclusion and making a Case for the “Equalisation of Voice”

This chapter has explored the conceptions of inclusion and equality put forward by different theorists and tried to understand how AHE includes women. From an African perspective, the notion of Ubuntu could be interpreted as inclusion, because Ubuntu involves communal practices and seeing humanity in others as opportunities for inclusion. Nonetheless, women are still being excluded and, because their voices are not heard, equality is undermined. With respect to a reconstructed notion of Ubuntu as inclusion, one finds that the concept can promote internal inclusion. The chapter has also noted that internal exclusion is prevalent in AHE. Young (2000) proposes a communicative approach that is based on greeting, rhetoric and narrative to address internal exclusion. I have argued that the framework does not seem to enable AHE to mitigate women’s exclusion, especially in view of African cultural practices that disregard women and relegate them to inferior positions. I have examined Nussbaum’s capabilities approach as a possible means of mitigating internal exclusion. Conversely, using capabilities as a standard for inclusion can lead to exclusion in AHE, because women, particularly those from disadvantaged backgrounds, often lack the ability to claim and exercise their freedom. I have used Butler’s (1990) concept of gender-troubled to probe the idea of Ubuntu as inclusion, since it predominantly perceives human beings as gendered beings, that is, as woman and man.
However, I contend that a gendered approach may exclude more people who defy the socially constructed categories, such as homosexuals, bisexuals, transgendered or intersexed. Since the tendency in educational institutions is to use a single category of woman or man, this study calls for inclusion to transcend a dualist gender category and include all disadvantaged and excluded groups, irrespective of their differences (Tamale, 2011). Hence, I have argued that the views of Young, Nussbaum and Butler in relation to *Ubuntu* seem to be more liberal, and will cause an African liberal perspective to focus more on individual liberty, which will be insufficient to address the exclusion experienced by women in HE in Africa. The impasse calls for a shift beyond liberal to post-liberal theory, and a Rancièrean perspective of “equalisation of voice” could offer a deconstructed view for advancing women’s inclusion in AHE. Therefore, this chapter argues for an “equalisation of voice” as a plausible approach for enhancing *Ubuntu* as inclusion, since it possesses the ability to disrupt inequality and move beyond communication, capabilities and gender. I contend that *Ubuntu* as inclusion ought to transcend communication, capabilities and gender and move towards voice if substantive inclusion is to happen in AHE. The ensuing chapter will offer evidence of exclusion by doing two things: Firstly, I investigate women’s experiences of inclusion. Secondly, I ascertain whether the proposition of AHE is commensurable with the “equalisation of voice” framework propounded in this chapter. The chapter will show that all human beings have the ability to practise *Ubuntu*; therefore, AHE should include all people’s voices in order to attain substantive inclusion.
CHAPTER FOUR

EXAMINING AFRICAN HIGHER EDUCATION DISCOURSES AND THEIR (IN)COMMENSURABILITY WITH THE NOTION OF INCLUSION AS EQUALISATION OF VOICE

4.1 Introduction

The previous chapter argued that the African worldview of *Ubuntu*, which denotes inclusion within a communal practice in higher educational institutions, is limited, thus requires a reconstructed liberal framework as an impetus for transformation. Through the liberal lenses of Young (2000) and Nussbaum (2000), AHE should consider a communicative and capabilities approach as a standard for the inclusion of women and other excluded groups. Unlike other liberal scholars, Butler (1990) challenged inclusion based on the traditional gender category of woman and man, since these exclude those who fall outside the category of woman, such as lesbians, transgendered, intersexed and so forth. I echo her view that a gendered form of equality slightly undermines the internal inclusion of those without the capabilities and those who could not be identified within gender categories. An effort to address internal exclusion more substantively requires a move beyond a gendered approach towards a Rancièr®an (1999), post-liberal conception of equalisation of voice as a laudable framework to promote inclusion. This framework possesses the ability to disrupt current practices of exclusion that possibly may ignite a move towards substantive inclusion. The edified related meanings of inclusion I argue for in this chapter can be couched in terms of the equalisation of voice: communicative, capabilities-oriented, and non-gendered action towards a maximisation of voice.

Thus, Chapter 4 focuses on two main areas: firstly, examining discourses of AHE in relation to women’s experiences in order to provide evidence for concealed or inherent exclusion within inclusion. Secondly, to ascertain whether or not, women’s experiences of inclusion in such discourses are commensurable with the notion of inclusion as a manifestation of the equalisation of voice. I then shall employ the elements of an equalisation of voice framework as flashlights to explore exclusion in the discourse of AHE. This will happen by looking at three influential monographs by African scholars, particularly their views on women's experiences in relation to exclusion and equality in HE in a post-colonial Africa. This consideration is premised on the availability of data, leading texts and analyses of women’s experiences of exclusion and inequality in HE on the continent. In conclusion, I shall put forward whether or not the proposition of inclusion in AHE requires a reconstructed approach to propel substantive inclusion via the equalisation of voice. This is what this chapter endeavours to undertake in advancing a reasonable means to
recognise the voices of women as equal human beings, not only as Africans but cosmopolitans too – an approach that hopefully will facilitate transformation and justice on the continent.

4.2 Elucidating the equalisation-of-voice framework: communicative, capable and beyond a gendered view of inclusion

This section reiterates the argument of the previous chapter that HE in Africa excludes women in subtle ways, despite various efforts to include all people and treat them equally. Although efforts are under way to mitigate exclusion through HE expansion policies, that is the external and internal inclusion of Young’s (2000) interpretation, it also is worth mentioning that their advocacy for inclusion based on gender advances further exclusion, hence my call for more substantive inclusion. A depiction of exclusion is inherent within forms of inclusion, of which statistics attest that women are physically visible in AHE, but their voices are not heard making a meaningful contribution to knowledge production, and also not in decision-making processes. This section offers a brief recap of the equalisation-of-voice framework reconstructed in the previous chapter. This framework appears to have the ability to transcend the taken-for-granted narrative and conception of Ubuntu as the inclusion of women within higher education in Africa. From my interrogation of the renowned theorists’ work, namely Young (2000), Nussbaum (2000), Butler (1990) and Rancière (1999), I arrive at an inclusive paradigm for a post-colonial democratic HE system that ought to constitute the necessary features, such as communicative, capabilities-oriented, and non-gendered action towards voice. Although these features are interrelated, a post-liberal conception of equalisation of voice holds a great deal of weight in engendering the substantive inclusion of all human beings, irrespective of gender.

My contention is that, when space and deliberation underlie voice as a yardstick for inclusion towards equality in HE, the desired form of inclusion should be attained, particularly for women and other excluded groups. Simply put, gauging inclusion on the ground of gender is an inadequate approach and may not help Africa to address exclusion, particularly internal exclusion, which is rampant in higher education institutions. The interrelatedness of the constitutive elements should consider the dilemma of representation in universities and the dynamic of gender categorisation, which perceives women and those outside the gender category as not human enough to be considered.

Therefore, the dismaying status of the excluded groups (women) in relation to their rights as equal human beings requires a post-liberal lens, which can bridge the gap of marginalisation and further oppression on the continent through the equalisation of voice. Based on the above, I offered a Youngian (2000) view of Ubuntu as inclusion, which inherently is exclusion (external and internal),
as discussed in the previous chapter. In terms of external exclusion, a woman will not be invited due to social status or race – women who are black, from a poor family or background, with limited education, single, divorced, widowed, homosexual and so forth – to democratic deliberations, although she is part of the HE system. Internal exclusion is when a person is physically represented in the HE democratic processes, but excluded by the use of unfamiliar language and so forth. Considering such encounters within AHE, specifically women’s experiences of internal exclusion require reconstruction if women are to be fully liberated. This reconstruction is necessarily due to African women’s dynamic experiences of domination and relegation to subservient positions in their society, including the pessimistic response to the contemporary women’s category of homosexuality, that is lesbians, intersexed, and transgendered (see Tamale, 2011). Even though *Ubuntu* as inclusion embraces the celebrated idea of communal practices encompassing human dignity, interconnectedness and seeing humanity in others, such an understanding is restricted, since it internally excludes women from AHE. In my view, the way HE excludes women internally is an acknowledgement that women are not human enough.

As a result, such a deficit view of women spawned a need for Nussbaum’s (2000) capabilities approach to be applied as a yardstick for inclusion and equality. Using the capabilities approach as a base for inclusion, women, like other human beings, ought to exercise their capabilities to achieve equality. However, while Nussbaum’s championing of the ten capabilities as rights are elucidated in universal declaration of human rights, African women’s capabilities remain subjected to oppression and exclusion, and might not necessarily permit them to engage in HE as equal members. Even though Nussbaum (2000: 78-80) underlines the idea of women and the human capabilities approach, I contend that this approach is limited and, in isolation, may not achieve internal inclusion. Hence, I call for AHE to cultivate students (women) with the abilities to engage since this is an indispensable task in mitigating injustice and oppression, which are ubiquitous and pervasive.

I argued elsewhere that, in Namibian democratic education, “teachers and students learn to speak their minds and are prepared to confront or fight various injustices in their society, such as rape, murder, women and child abuse, domestic violence, armed robbery, theft, alcohol and drug abuse, teenage pregnancies, poverty, unemployment, tribalism, racism, exclusion of minority groups in decision making” (Shanyanana, 2011: 52-55). This simply means that democratic higher education institutions in Africa, especially universities, ought to cultivate citizens, particularly women, with valuable capabilities as a means for their inclusion. This is also the view Waghid (2008b: 23) called for, namely that democratic (African higher educational) institutions should nurture students and teachers with capabilities to take responsibility for their own ideas, to take intellectual risks, to develop a deep sense of respect for others, and to learn how to think critically with others in a democratic society. For this reason, considering African women’s status and inability to exercise
their rights and responsibilities, a paradigm shift transcending the boundaries of capabilities ought to be considered. At the same time, there is a need to debunk gender as a benchmark to advance equality. Therefore, a non-gendered, which I refer to as a-gendered, approach to engendering substantive internal inclusion and equality, is necessary.

Some scholars have troubled the traditional gender category and its constant use as a surrogate for inclusion and equality in African higher education discourse (Butler, 1990; Tamale, 2011: 4). I agree that using gender to include may provoke more internal exclusion, since it may as well be used to exclude others. This is why Harding (1998) disrupted the traditional category of woman and suggested a difference-sensitive reworking of feminism to be linked to wider coalitions of oppressed and exploited groups amongst black, lesbian, working-class and colonised women. I restate that the aforementioned framework, which emphasises communication, capabilities and gendered action, is insufficient to advance the internal inclusion necessary for transforming current impoverished practices. As a result, efforts to mitigate the dilemma of internal exclusion will be addressed by arguing further for Rancière’s equalisation of voice view, which moves beyond capabilities and gender categories and appears plausible for a desirable post-colonial AHE. For me, a voice could be a defensible impetus and appropriate means if substantive inclusion is to be engendered in HE. I agree with Wiredu (2004) and Appiah (2006) that we need to move beyond our local understanding and explore different perspectives in attempts to reconcile the local and global insights to bring meaningful transformation to the unjust African higher education practices. What follows is my cursory glance at the discourse of AHE in relation to women’s experiences of exclusion.

4.3 Scanning African higher education discourses in relation to the experiences and roles of women

In this section I examine the discourse on AHE by renowned African scholars and their notions of women’s inclusion and gender equality. The aim is to confirm my claim that exclusion is prevalent in HE, not only of the traditional category of woman, but also of the experiences of other excluded groups, as retrieved from the discourses. The goal is not to probe the situation in all universities in all fifty-four African countries, but to offer a sample of purposefully selected discourses on HE in some countries where evidence is readily available. The investigation provided a general representation of women, as well as their encounters with and experiences of exclusion, to demonstrate how such experiences hamper their flourishing as students, staff members and, invariably, leaders at all levels of society. At the onset, it is imperative to acknowledge that the selected studies have contributed immensely to pioneering projects on women on the continent. Undoubtedly, without their initiatives and advocacy, the current state of women’s access to and
inclusion in HE would have remained a dream. At the same time, the analyses touch on women’s experiences and interrogate their encounters to determine possible gaps that hinder total inclusion. Firstly, I begin with Kwesiga’s (2002) ground-breaking analysis in her book, *Women’s Access to Higher Education in Africa*, a study in which she shares women’s experiences in Uganda. Secondly, I engage with the HE discourses in the volume edited by Zeleza and Olukoshi (2004), titled *African Universities for the Twenty-first Century*, which focuses on whether women should be cheerleaders or partners with men. I draw on women’s experiences related by selected African scholars who share the same concern about HE, especially in some African universities. Thirdly, I consider Assié-Lumumba’s (2007) exposition on *Women in Higher Education in Africa*. The primary task is to identify the views of various scholars on women’s experiences in HE in Africa, and how their involvement could transform HE on the continent.

Before outlining the discourse on AHE, it is important to offer some remarks on the origin of the term discourse and clarify its use in this chapter. This is because discourse on HE serves as the primary data in this chapter. According to Wittgenstein (1958: 50e), the term “discourse” can be defined and interpreted in different ways based on the reader’s perspective or background and culture. The term discourse comes from the Latin word “discursus”, which denotes “conversation” or “speech”. The term can be traced to the period of post-structuralism, the era when theorists such as Foucault (1980), Derrida (1976) and others worked diligently to engage with and transcend the boundaries of structures. This means that the word discourse is directly related to different theories of power and the state, at least as long as discourse is seen in relation to reality itself. This conception of discourse is largely derived from the work of the French philosopher Michel Foucault. *Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English* (2005: 416) denotes discourse as written and spoken communication. It can also reflect a formal way of thinking that is expressed through language, a social boundary that defines what can be said about a specific topic.

According to Foucault (1980), the concept discourse can be related to power, as it operates by rules of exclusion. Therefore, discourse is controlled by objects, what can be spoken of; ritual, where and how one may speak; and the privileged, who may speak. Crystal (1992: 25) states that “discourse is a continuous stretch of (especially written and spoken) language larger than a sentence often constituting a coherent unit such as a sermon, argument, joke, or narrative”. Discourse can also symbolise novels, short conversations or groans (Cook, 1990: 7). Furthermore, drawing from the post-structuralist maxim, Derrida argues that “[t]here is nothing outside the text” (Derrida, 1976: 158). In his view, the duality of discourse is also glimpsed in the conceptualisation of the absent trace. This means that discourse may exclude what is simultaneously exterior and interior to it. For instance, African universities aim to include all people (women and men), but end up internally excluding women unintentionally due to the emphasis on gender categories and the
like. Derrida’s (1978: 3-4) approach to language is one of deconstruction and the critique of Western metaphysics, which has always been structured in terms of dichotomies or polarities: truth versus error; being versus nothingness; science versus myth. Meaning is a function of presence (the written or spoken) and absence, that is, the chain of suppressed signifiers upon which the meaning of the present is based.

In agreement with Derrida (1978: 4), I posit that African higher education discourse on women’s exclusion is elsewhere, never in the words we use; it is always absent. For this reason, we require a “constant questioning and dismantling of implicit or explicit notions of presence and a concentration on the play of metaphors and the play of language” (Derrida, 1978: 4). It is necessary to look for meanings, which are inherent in views such as access, equality and inclusion within African higher education discourse, and to go beyond the text or margins in an attempt to identify what is not thought about women’s inclusion. For me, critical questions about who is included, how one is included, and why, are necessary conditions to determine the form of inclusion in the discourse of AHE aimed to achieve what is not thought about women’s exclusion. From the above perspectives, it is evident that discourse represents what cannot be identified in the use of language, particularly what is silenced and not said (Derrida, 1976, 1978) on a particular issue, in this case, HE and the inclusion of women in Africa. Thus, the thought of discourse as a language can also be viewed as a social practice whereby social structures determine the way higher education practices evolve and are shaped.

Bearing in mind the above understanding, this chapter will employ the Derridian deconstructive analytical lens to engage with the post-colonial higher education discourse and arguments that focus on the underlying assumptions about the role of women. The aim is to reveal the hidden and absent meaning in relation to the reconstructed equalisation-of-voice framework. Those who engage in the analysis of HE and women’s inclusion in such social practices might view, dissect and perceive such concepts differently. Thus, unpacking and questioning scholars’ analyses and arguments, narratives and proposed ideas, while focusing on their commonalities and respective divergent views, could guide us into a deeper understanding of what is necessary for post-colonial HE in Africa. For this reason, I intend to investigate the dominant discourse of African scholars on the call for women’s inclusion and equality in HE to establish whether it could lead to emancipation or would exacerbate further exclusion. In the search for authentic African texts on African voices, I find the views of Kwesiga (2002), Zeleza and Olukoshi (2004) and Assié-Lumumba (2007) on the dilemma facing women quite pertinent. Although these works foreground my analysis, other African voices that share the same concern will be acknowledged. However, I now turn to the experiences of women within the discourse on AHE, beginning with Kwesiga’s study, which I regard as ground-breaking on the continent.
4.3.1 Women’s (lack of) access to higher education in Africa: Kwesiga (2002) analysis

Kwesiga’s (2002) interrogation of women’s access to HE in Africa rests on a call for consideration and appreciation of all (women and men) in terms of resources and accessibility within their given democratic society. She postulates that, although divergent theories, concepts and approaches have been outlined regarding the causes of exclusion and inequality, as well as their remedies, women and men are still being treated differently in African society, particularly at higher education institutions (Kwesiga, 2002: 8). She further argues that such “theories were formulated or generated outward the sub-Saharan Africa”, which is the context of her book. The premise of her argument is that the proposed theoretical frameworks were designed for Western economic contexts and were inconsistent with the needs and aspirations of Africans. In her view, this established inconsistence is expressed in both theory and practice, and has effects on all those involved in HE, namely pupils, educators, parents, entire communities, as well as states, international agencies and donors. Most importantly, these effects are more detrimental to women than men in AHE, due to a lack of access, exclusion and inequality.

Furthermore, despite numerous policies and initiatives those were developed to address past inequalities in many Africa countries (in sub-Saharan Africa), women’s access to HE remains a delusion (Kwesiga, 2002: 24). Most importantly, her critical interrogation of the theories and concepts is coupled with the strengths and weaknesses of the central social themes, such as human capital and investment, gender inequality, and women and development. In her analysis of women’s access, she shows that, in terms of human capital for economic returns and investment in industrialised countries, women are more capable of finding mechanisms for succeeding in wage employment, trading and coping with housework (Kwesiga, 2002: 11-13). Nevertheless, she notes that minimal information is available on the challenges women face in accessing HE, earning and their rates of return. Specifically, the average return for women with secondary and HE is lower than for men. This attests to the dilemma of exclusion in HE, where women’s lower return is blamed on their reproductive role, as it is viewed as an alternative occupation to paid employment. Kwesiga notes, for example, that besides women’s status in the home, reproduction is seen as an alternative occupation. At the same time, employers may decide to pay women less than men, since they are most likely to go on leave to bear and raise children. She further points to the dilemma facing girls and women regarding the state of gendered schooling – from primary to tertiary education – in sub-Saharan Africa. Her argument that women lack access to education (at all levels), especially in Uganda, is clear and convincing. She shows that different factors, complexities and dynamics contribute to unequal access to education in Africa, using Uganda as a case study. Her study highlights the problem of achieving equal access and adequate inclusion, as well as developing a just society on the continent.
4.3.1.1 The connection between girls' schooling and women's access to higher education

The fact that Uganda, like a few other African countries, acquired independence in the 1960s shows that the impasse that inhibits women’s access to HE is undeniably a problem to the developmental agenda of the continent. The presupposition is that the women’s access to HE in countries that experienced early independence should have been fully attained. Nonetheless, Kwesiga argues that the lack of access is provoked by the absence of girls from schooling, which ultimately undermines women’s inclusion in HE and in other aspects of society (2002: 8). Kwesiga reflects on her first-hand experience of the journey in her quest for access to education as an African (Ugandan girl and woman). Her interest in examining the lack of women’s access to education could be tied to her encounters as a girl growing up in the rural areas of the South-west of Uganda. She acknowledges her good fortune of being one of the first girls in her district to complete elementary schooling and continue to the secondary level (Kwesiga, 2002: 8-12). I could identify with her narrative as evidence of the challenges experienced by girls and women on the continent, just as in my story and those of many others from other parts of the continent. Writing on women’s access to HE in other African countries, specifically in Ethiopia, which is a multi-ethnic and traditional society and one of the least developed countries in the world, Wondimu (2004: 1) also notes that the participation of girls and women in education is a critical issue.

Although the country’s participation rate of girls is lower than that of boys at all education levels, in HE it stands at approximately 1%. Considering the overall participation rate in the country and the position of girls, the development and percentage of women accessing HE become questionable. Tefera and Altbach (2003: 9) argue that, as in other African countries, the stagnation of change and the effort to remedy the gender and regional imbalances in Ethiopia are due to subtle resistance, implicit and explicit oversight, a lack of serious recognition, and ignorance. This point proves that the crisis of a lack of female access to HE is not peculiar to Uganda per se, but is a continental problem. Therefore, I would argue that a call for women’s access to HE needs to specify the type of access — either formal or epistemological — in order to formalise the type that contemporary AHE urgently requires. Morrow’s (2007: 39-40) illustration of these two forms of access that HE may offer, that is formal access and epistemological access, is apposite here. As underlined in Chapter 1 of this study, formal access emphasises expanding the university to the externally excluded by using various means, such as affirmative action and quota systems, in order to enable women’s statistical representation.

Through formal access, HE has made major strides in addressing external exclusion. However, those included are concomitantly experiencing subtle forms of exclusion by being denied...
epistemological access – in particular their lack of opportunity to contribute to knowledge production, engage in deliberation and contribute to decision making and policy formulation, what I refer to as exercising voice. In my view, only epistemological access can lead to the substantive inclusion that the current AHE requires. Only when women, like men, possess the skills and cognitive ability that will make their voices heard will a robust inclusion be engendered. The problem lies on having women in HE (formal access), but actually lack opportunities to make meaningful contributions (epistemological access) to decision makings and policy formation, and articulate their views on issues that might concern them. The point I am making is that creating enabling opportunities for women to grow intellectually and make a contribution to knowledge, which is affording them epistemological access, is indispensable.

Regarding women’s inclusion in AHE, staff members and researchers connect to the limitation in girls’ access to schooling, which shows the challenges confronting women in accessing HE, not only in Uganda, but in the entire sub-Saharan Africa. Again, Kwesiga’s personal access to schooling and eventually to HE placed her in the position of being a highly knowledgeable, experienced female scholar, faculty member and female activist who is able to engage in issues related to women’s marginalisation and oppression in her university and state. She acquired an education which shaped her position as Dean at a University in Uganda, and her current status at a different institution as one of the few African women to hold the office of Chancellor.

Again, Kwesiga’s experience and contributions to regional and national initiatives justify her role as a champion of ways to mitigate the plight of women in HE and other levels of society. In other words, her narrative and extensive experience of the crisis give evidence of the crises experienced by women in accessing HE. She suggests that access is an approach that could transform the unfavourable and exclusive nature of African (higher) education systems. In other words, access ought to be a first step by which women could experience inclusion. Thus, without access, plans to transform university education become worthless. Her argument triggers a question, “why educate women?” In response, Kwesiga (2002: 8-12) offers two reasons to justify the need for educating women. Firstly, permitting women to access HE will help them to make an intensive and meaningful contribution to their own well-being, as well as to the economic development of their communities and country. Secondly, women’s access to HE could enable them to contribute to the health of their families. It is important to note that Kwesiga’s call for female access to education is connected to the idea of capability as a mechanism to attain inclusion and equality. In terms of access as inclusion based on gender, her advocacy for girls’ access to schooling as a means of enabling women’s access to HE in Africa is worth noting.

However, I find her view inadequate, since her advocacy tends to be biased towards external inclusion. In my view, her call for equality in accessing education seems secured within a traditional gender categorisation of woman and man. This makes sense because the call for
schooling on the continent, which also favours boys more than girls, is gendered. She argues that access to education based on gender has been established as, and remains, a national concern. Her analysis focuses on the traditional categorisation of gender, that is, woman and man, but it says less about other groups within the category of woman, namely those with disabilities, single mothers, widows, divorced women, and so forth. Likewise, she is silent on the groups within the woman category that transcend the traditional category and who ought to be able to access HE, such as homosexuals, bisexuals and so forth. These include lesbians, transgendered, bisexuals and intersexed. In my opinion, the approach of grouping all women into one category may place the call for equal access in jeopardy. I contend that Kwesiga's advocacy for women's access aims to achieve inclusion. However, her approach is limited in engendering equality. If gender is employed as a yardstick for achieving equality, then all groups within the category of woman should be considered. If not, then the call for women’s access might not help contemporary AHE to attain substantive transformation.

Thus, girls’ and women’s access to education points to the “value of education as a tool to reduce these barriers” (Kwesiga, 2002: 152). It is on the basis of this background that she advocates for girls’ access to schooling, claiming that, as a strategy for “enabling Ugandan women to move through the system to HE [it] is without doubt the most sure way to consolidate the gains made so far and to open up new horizons” (2002: 152). The underlying assumption in her argument is that, as soon as girls access schooling, women would invariably achieve access to higher education as a way of inclusion. Although one would agree with Kwesiga’s view here, in current HE a mere call for access to HE does not guarantee internal inclusion to achieve gender equality. The fact that gender is used as a benchmark for inclusion towards equality shows that African universities could be promoting further exclusion of other groups that fall out of the traditional gender category of man and woman. Thus, African institutions provoke exclusion when using gender to determine access to (higher) education, which induces inequality in women's access to education through course offerings, types of secondary school (for instance gendered schools, i.e. girls’ or boys’ schools), and the restrictive nature of the system (Kwesiga, 2002: 248). These factors lead to the absence of educated women who could be role models, mentors and guides to girls and young women in Africa.

She has rightly noted that education should be a human right and resource for every citizen (both women and men) to enjoy. This makes sense because access to education confers benefits on individuals, families, communities, and society at large. The essence of the argument is that “educating women provides a crucial escape the route from poverty traps that places the continent at the tail end of those with access to the essential resources of modern development” (Kwesiga, 2002: 249). Further, the restrictive nature of the education system in which schools and courses
are gendered can be substantiated with the observation by Ajayi et al. (1996), which affirms that, even three decades after women were granted equal access at independence in most African countries, women made up only 6% of the professoriate. One can regard Kwesiga’s championing of women’s access to HE and the call for gender mainstreaming and holistic approaches as a framework for bridging the gap of inequality between genders on the continent. Even though there are clear links between access and inclusion, her focus is rather on women in HE who are not afforded the opportunity to make meaningful contributions to democratic processes. This is what Morrow (2007: 40) refers to as access in two forms — formal and epistemological — which was already mentioned in Chapter 1 of this study. Formal access entails granting students (i.e. women) access to HE, whilst epistemological access occurs when those represented are no longer denied the opportunity to make meaningful contributions to decision making, policy formation and knowledge production.

From the above understanding of access, Kwesiga’s perception of women’s access to education appears to promote formal access without considering the possibility of epistemological access. Indeed, formal access is the first step in women’s inclusion in HE, but there is a need for women to contribute to the democratic educational processes for equality to occur. Similarly, from Young’s (2000) idea of exclusion inherent in inclusion (internal and external), as alluded to Chapter 3 (section 3.3.1) of this study, one could say that women require both forms of inclusion to achieve equality. The focus on formal access can be seen as a step forward in mitigating external exclusion, where groups that were not represented are brought in through various strategies. However, if the focus of HE is to achieve formal access, which seems to be case, epistemological access may not be achieved. Thus, addressing exclusion would become mere lip-service. Young’s analysis shows a high interest in gender mainstreaming, which is linked to the gender dichotomy of woman and man in the educational setting, particularly in HE. The concept of access is a related meaning and can be seen as a first strategy in promoting inclusion, such that women in Africa presumably may experience inclusion in accessing HE.

However, accessing HE formally does not guarantee inclusion, as a result of subtle ways in which exclusion is further perpetuated. The mission to address women’s exclusion can be traced from different contexts that are local, regional and international. UNESCO made an urgent call for greater access at the World Conference on Higher Education in 1998. The conference centred on “equality of access” (UNESCO, 1998a). It is clear that HE discourse on the notion of inclusion as transformation has tended to revolve around the idea of access. It also has been noted that African studies advocate the idea of access as an approach to inclusion. Hitherto, I have argued that mere access (formal), which I refer to as external inclusion, is limited and the use of gender as a means to achieve equality may not help to engender substantive inclusion.
4.3.2 Making women partners with but not cheerleaders for men in African higher education

At this point, I examine the notion of inclusion in African universities and the move towards greater participation, which has become an urgent imperative since the onset of post-colonial HE in Africa. Zeleza and Olukoshi (2004) focus on women’s experiences and roles in African universities and how such institutions could direct HE in Africa in the twenty-first century. The study offers a fundamental discourse on the notion of access to knowledge for post-colonial African society, as well as issues that revolve around equal opportunities and gender equality.

In the discourse, access implies all efforts and measures taken by African higher education institutions to widen educational opportunities for all citizens as AHE moved into the twenty-first century (Zeleza & Olukoshi, 2004). Different contributors to this volume deal with different issues that are regarded as crucial for Africa to move into the new century. For instance, Okeke inquires whether women are partners with or cheerleaders for men in AHE. Her response is that, despite political independence and modernisation in Africa, the role of women in the modern economy has been and still is limited to that of wives and mothers. For this reason, women remain excluded from decisions and actions that define nation building (Okeke, 2004: 480). Okeke’s argument is significant, as it builds on Kwesiga’s analysis of women’s access to AHE. In her view, the fast-growing privatisation of HE in Africa challenges and poses a threat to women’s progress in achieving internal inclusion at all levels of society.

Furthermore, she poses a critical question — “what is the purpose of HE for African women?” In response, she calls for a move beyond an inadequate form of women’s access within a general expansion that would establish a genuine form of inclusion. It should be noted that Okeke’s framework debunks taking women’s formal access for granted, and demands epistemological access. She points out that any measures aimed at raising African women’s profile in HE should re-examine the content and utility of this training, with particular reference to the barriers preventing women from participating in nation building as full citizens and partners with men (Okeke, 2004: 480-486). Her disquiet about the position of women in HE provoked the question whether they are partners with or just mere cheerleaders for men. This shows how external exclusion is addressed, as women are statistically and physically visible in HE but, unlike men, their voices are not considered, and this indicates a form of internal exclusion. For Okeke, attention should be paid to the type of training women receive, which may instil in them the ability to participate as full citizens in all developmental deliberations. The presupposition is that only when women are well trained will they acquire full citizenship through participation at the same rate as men.
Therefore, she argues that, if women are to participate fully and effectively in their countries’ development, sufficient provision has to be made for them in terms of both access and distribution in the various fields of specialisation (Okeke, 2004: 486). In other words, the defender of access as inclusion ought to consider women’s backgrounds, struggles and their gender or status in society. This implies that women’s exclusion could be linked to their individual position in the society. For instance, if a woman is from a poor family, with limited knowledge, widowed, divorced or a single mother, her contribution to HE might be disregarded, since she is already marginalised. The point is that HE should also require women, as they progress through the system, to question the various facets of the present social arrangement that impede women’s inclusion (Okeke, 2004: 491).

For instance, an educated African woman should not simply accept the social dictates that define women’s access to land, the treatment of widows, and the cultural myths surrounding, among other things, female circumcision. Interestingly, Okeke regards the distribution of access as a process of ascertaining that women acquire inclusion in HE is limited. This means that affording women mere access in a distributive manner, that is external inclusion, can be not only an empowering activity, but also a disempowering one. This is because women may just accept their presence, without being able to claim equal space and rights to contribute to democratic processes through a voice, a way of attaining internal inclusion. It is puzzling that women appear complacent about being mere recipients – what Rancière’s idea of voice referred to in the previous chapter – “passive receivers” instead of “active claimers” of equality in AHE.

In my view, although African women possibly expect distributed access, the challenge could be the type of formal access that will enable them to participate in democratic processes in HE as equal and full citizens with their male counterparts. Furthermore, HE in Africa should also question the conditions of those women’s lives and the cultural elements that justify their subordinate status in their society (Okeke, 2004: 490). The same sentiment is expressed by Kwesiga (2002), who argues that the content of women’s education from the primary level on should be questioned, since it heralds women’s representation and inclusion in HE. This view confirms the painful encounters women have in HE on the continent. It is against this background that any attempt to enhance the quality of African women’s education at the tertiary level must take into account the widespread forces that shape and influence the social conception of who they are and what they can do in relation to their male counterparts (Okeke, 2004: 488). This point is apparent in Nussbaum’s (2000) capabilities approach, which expects that, like men, women should be able to express themselves and show their abilities in HE deliberations as a way of inclusion. However, the dynamic and complex nature of the African woman does not prepare her to have the capability to express herself like her male counterpart. In my view, the call for a distributed form of access appears insufficient, as noted in the previous chapter. Thus, Africa should formulate programmes
that transcend women’s formal access towards achieving epistemological access, which will enable them to interrogate the cultural beliefs and practices confronting their inclusion in HE.

4.3.2.1 Portrayal of women’s representation in higher education policy initiatives

In relation to policy development, Okeke (2004: 491) cautions that African governments should reassess the hindrances to women’s access to HE and their participation in nation building as full citizens who enjoy every right to tap into existing social opportunities. She notes that the crises surrounding the participation of girls and women in schooling and paid work in Africa make a powerful statement about the roles that society has carved for them in the task of nation building when compared to their male counterparts. According to Okeke, the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), like other policies, appears silent on the issue of women’s access to HE and their internal inclusion in democratic educational deliberations. She argues that it would not make sense for African leaders and policy makers to promote levels and kinds of training for women that would encourage them to aspire to positions that they are not expected to assume. It is not surprising that, in the areas of public governance and decision making, the NEPAD document points to the potential input women could make, but leaves untouched the social structures already in place that deny them the platform to be seen as an important political force to be reckoned with.

As cheerleaders for men in African political forums, women “observe”, for the most part, the machinery for public decision making (Okeke, 2004: 483; Okeke & Onu, 2006: 84-86). There are other, more significant concerns around women’s representation than the engagement in higher education deliberations. It is argued that, without women’s strong presence in such forums, the huge economic burden of social survival placed on their backs would receive the usual lip service. Inasmuch as it does not earmark any crucial steps for integrating gender into the structures of public governance, especially in sectors where women’s contributions have been duly recognised, NEPAD’s stance does not necessarily question the status quo. The above statements say much about the authors’ take on access and inclusion in Africa, particularly in HE through the African initiative NEPAD.

Suggesting ways to address the crises of exclusion and inequality, Okeke and Onu (2006: 87-88) identify gender sensitivity in the policy-making process because it could facilitate the global struggle for poverty reduction to a level that meets, at least, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) set by the United Nations Development Programme. They argue that African women’s lack of power is at the very centre of their inability to assert their claims of equal partnership with men in the development process, including in higher education. By ignoring this state of affairs,
African countries continue to endorse not only women’s disempowerment, but also the massive waste of human resources on the altar of traditions and cultures that block women’s progress. Thus, for Okeke (2004: 490), the continent cannot move forward without confronting the roots of cultures and traditions that justify the negative treatment that African women receive at the hands of men and the state. She laments women’s experiences in AHE, asking: “How then could women participate as equal partners with men in nation building when they remain outside the forums of decision-making, struggling to put together the pieces of community life as the paths to social progress unwrap their challenges?”

In response, she calls for different mechanisms that could enable women to thrive just like men in HE in Africa. More importantly, she argues that expanding HE should not be divorced from the nature and scope of training that African women receive at the tertiary level, but ought to be at the centre (2004: 490-491). Her suggestion is that an African woman’s training should also provide a platform on which she could pose critical questions about those practices that oppress women, such as issues of cultural stagnation, and policies and traditions that burden the transformative agenda of women’s empowerment, including exclusion. This is a form of epistemological access that is absent in HE and that tends to perpetuate internal exclusion. It is evident that women, when encountering internal exclusion, lack the abilities and skills to interrogate the mounting ills confronting their life on a daily basis, hence my call to critically analyse HE discourses as a way to emancipate them from the various oppressions they experience. In addition, HE should equip African women with the ability to face the challenges of highly competitive and shrinking national labour markets.

However, my concern is how women acquire capabilities if they are internally excluded from policy making on and development of the curricula that should emancipate and unleash their potential? In this regard, Okeke (2004: 490) postulates that, for African women, HE should also question the conditions of their lives and the cultural elements that legitimate their subordinate status in society, including the practice of African Ubuntu, which disregard women and consign them to menial work. In relation to her view, it is painful to note that, even though women are physically visible in HE, they are internally excluded, which makes it difficult for them to influence knowledge production, policy making and decision making on crucial democratic processes in HE. It goes without saying that African institutions with projects on women’s access, even in HE, cannot be trusted to engender substantive inclusion. Nawe (2004: 493) states that, in the post-independence period, HE played a dominant role in the public sector. Considering the thrust of HE, where everyone sought to acquire knowledge and skills to develop their nation, women’s participation, like that of men, became indispensable. The winds of change triggered different policy strategies for enhancing women's participation in HE. For this reason, different scholars have employed various strategies to advance women’s participation as a means to demand equity.
Nevertheless, despite efforts to address the predicament, women’s access to and participation in HE (as consumers and providers) have remained gravely low, not only in Tanzania, but in Africa at large (Nawe, 2004: 493). Thus, the primary reasons that propel the enhancement of women’s participation can be associated with historical developments, socialisation processes, and the demands of the working environment; but, most importantly, the combination of female productive and reproductive roles that could lead to fair performances at all levels. Nawe identifies two major groups set up to address the anomaly, namely: (a) affirmative measures aimed at redressing the past imbalances related to history; and (b) advocacy to address problems in all the areas mentioned above. Her study examined published and unpublished material, as well as interviews and beneficial experience (irrespective of gender) regarding the set of strategies (e.g. affirmative action (AA)) put in place to enhance women’s participation (Nawe, 2004: 494). Interestingly, a dominant concern is that women in Africa can be noticed in public engagements (seminars, workshops and others) where issues pertaining to HE are deliberated. However, only rarely are women able to make contributions at the same pace as other representatives. I agree with the preceding view that, though NEPAD has attempted to introduce profound initiatives, its foundations remain unstable as long as it refuses to consider equal spaces for both African women and men in its transformation project.

Okeke (2004: 491) mainly urges AHE to prepare women for full participation in the process of defining the content and nuances of Africa’s development and policy path in the twenty-first century. Although I echo Okeke’s analysis, the pertinent question is whether women’s lack of access and exclusion can be blamed solely on men and policies. Are there subtle ways in which women have contributed to their own exclusion? In my view, women should also be held accountable for their exclusion, especially those who made it to management and leadership positions, since nothing is said about their efforts to empower their fellow women. There are cases in which women who hold leadership positions deny other women the opportunity to climb the ladder. In some cases, women leaders allege that they usually feel unsafe having their fellow women as subordinates because of the latter’s negative attitudes towards their leadership. It appears then that, despite their call for inclusion, women are equally responsible for their own internal exclusion from HE in Africa. Unlike Kwesiga’s remarkable contribution to women’s projects in Uganda, other studies say little about how women in senior positions have advocated for projects that could advance substantive inclusion.

4.3.2.2 Women’s experiences of marginalisation in higher education

Unravelling women’s experiences of internal inclusion in AHE, Kwesiga (2002) and Okeke (2004) assert that female students and academics in African universities are often afraid to speak out to
demand transformation. This inability is further compounded by the fact that many women academics at managerial levels lack strong networks to encourage mentorship and to create a unified voice. Where changes are happening which could galvanise the chances of women to take their position as partners with, rather than cheerleaders of, men in HE on the continent, they are slow to yield the desired outcomes for women in academia. Despite the crisis of women’s lack of access to HE, other social factors block their interest in HE and hinder their human rights within the public space of higher learning. In a case study done in Namibia, a country that had only one university at the time of the study, Katjavivi & Otaala (2004) observed that the HE institution appeared to be an unfriendly environment for women. Their study explored women’s experiences in HE, particularly at the university level and in relation to the scourge of HIV and AIDS in the country. Katjavivi & Otaala (2004) make reference to Kelly’s study, which challenges the ignorance of the impact of HIV and AIDS on HE in Africa (in this case Zambia). The authors argue that the epidemic posed a crisis, particularly because of women’s extreme vulnerability and marginalisation in universities in Africa (Katjavivi & Otaala, 2004: 580). In the case of Namibia, like many African countries, there is evidence of the increasing prevalence of HIV and AIDS, especially because girls and women fall victim to the virus through what they call “sugar-daddy” practices on the campus. More so, Katjavivi & Otaala refer to Kelly’s report that “the entire university community – but in particular the university management – needs to face this threat squarely” (2004: 579). In the context of university life today, the institutional culture is in danger of affirming risk more than safety that is of HIV and AIDS.

Ironically, Katjavivi & Otaala caution that the “university in this case Namibia is in danger of affirming death more than life” (2004: 579-580). Given the above dilemma of sexual harassment and HIV and AIDS in HE, one can attest to the fact that HE can be perceived to be a dangerous environment for women, which invariably will hamper their participation and thriving, unlike their male counterparts. The point I am making is that, if women (as students and staff members of HE institutions) experience such hostility in public institutions, which are supposed to empower them, the possibility of affording them epistemological access is limited. Thus, the AHE environment, which is swamped by vicious discrimination, may not adequately cultivate women to develop intellectually and empower them to challenge the status quo. Katjavivi & Otaala (2004) assert that the university is often an inhospitable public space for women. Nonetheless, nothing is said about the possibility that women’s access to and participation in decision making could be enhanced, considering the predicament of HIV and AIDS, sexual harassment and so forth – which seem to hinder their progress in subtle ways.

Although the researchers were more interested in the effects of HIV and AIDS in HE, I cannot see how women’s experiences in such an institution can be divorced from their participation and inclusion. My contention is that issues of vulnerability and exclusion are interrelated, and that only
when the attitude to women’s contribution to deliberations in HE is transformed will such a predicament be mitigated. In my view, the above data paints a dismal picture of how women are explicitly and implicitly excluded from the university through under-representation, since the few women representatives only have had access to lower-level positions, where they cannot really influence decision-making processes and knowledge production.

This picture of selected experiences of women buttresses my claim for internal exclusion in AHE. I have noted that it is not surprising that women’s experiences indicate a lack of access and inclusion, considering the numerous social hostilities that they face in HE institutions, such as sexual harassment and other vulnerabilities that eventually could lead to their exclusion, even at other levels of society. Thus far, I have shown how Okeke (2004), Nawe (2004) and other contributors have expanded the call for women’s inclusion beyond their physical representation in AHE. These authors have defended an education that prepares women to engage as partners with men, rather than as their cheerleaders, a way of celebrating inclusion and equality through a voice. From the above analyses, women’s encounters point to serious problems of exclusion, as the students and staff members with access to HE are excluded in subtle ways. In so doing, women are unable to influence policies or even contribute to knowledge production as equal citizens. To shed more light on the limited nature of women’s inclusion in AHE, it is imperative to look at Assié-Lumumba’s (2007) book.

4.3.3 Gender-based human capabilities and human rights to knowledge

The discourse on HE in Africa took centre stage during the second part of the third biennial joint conference of the Pan-African Studies and Research Centre in International Relations and Education for Development (CEPARRED), which was held at Cornell University in Ithaca, New York in 2002. At this conference, which gave birth to the book edited by Assié-Lumumba, various scholars shared their perspectives on issues regarding women and HE on the continent. The editor also highlighted that the purpose of the conference was to engage in critical examination of and debates on issues relating to theory, epistemology and knowledge production with regard to women and gender from an African perspective. The aim was “to establish a succinct understanding of the historical and contemporary factors with pragmatic implications as well as pragmatic policy formulation, design and implementation for social progress in Africa” (Assié-Lumumba, 2007: xviii). The argument is that, since social progress is a desired goal, social inclusion should be the means by which all members of the society, and particularly the female population, which constitutes more than half of the entire population, encounter progress. It is against this background that the book becomes a critical base for this analysis.
In the attempt to unpack the discourse on AHE in relation to women’s inclusion, Assié-Lumumba succinctly points out that structural inequality in terms of region, rural or urban residence, religion, ethnicity and social class has pervaded the educational system. This dilemma of inequality has been, and remains, a serious factor in AHE and in the continent’s development. Kwesiga (2002), Okeke (2004) and Assié-Lumumba (2007: 1-2) articulate that the fundamental thrust of access to AHE is that, if women have access to HE institutions, they will acquire higher knowledge, which should enable them to contribute to the development of the continent. This simply means that women with limited exposure to HE lack the power and legitimacy that knowledge offers. Therefore, the lack of access to formal (higher) education jeopardises individuals’ (women’s) self-realisation and participation in social processes. In other words, access or lack of it can either be an enhancing process or an encumbering one. In Assié-Lumumba’s view, access to education (both lower and higher) is an economic and political issue, since it is a major source of the development of human capabilities and driver of socio-economic development (2007: 6). She suggests that female access to education needs to encompass a holistic education system in which all levels are interconnected and considered, as well as treated as being equally important. In simple terms, her text agrees with Kwesiga (2002) and Okeke (2004) that a lack of women’s access to education is responsible for their limitation in participating in decision making and knowledge production on the continent.

One can argue that, even by 2007, HE reflected consistent female under-representation, despite the various policy reforms and political efforts of the last four decades. Assié-Lumumba, as well as other participants in the joint conference, shares the dilemma of women’s lack of access to higher educational discourse in Africa. Her fundamental concern about gender inequality is evident even in her earlier publication, Empowerment of Women in Higher Education in Africa: The Role and Mission of Research (2006b). Assié-Lumumba claims that the persistent structural gender inequality is one of the most counterproductive and self-destructive traditions in AHE. She points to the societal norms and constraints, policy priorities, and contradictions between the officially stated pursuit of development agendas and the actual denial of women the possibility to participate fully in these agendas.

Furthermore, she notes that the gender policies and programmes in Africa, which sometimes report impressive quantitative achievements, endorse high structural inequalities with regard to gender. In her view, the achievement of gender equality:

Should not be measured by simple statistics, particularly in terms of the number of policies and programs designed. Rather, the real indicators of substantive equality are in terms of the actual improvements in chances for women to increase their
consciousness and have more of their informed participation in all decisions and knowledge production (Assié-Lumumba, 2006b: 26).

As long as the removal of gender gaps in African countries, particularly in the area of HE, remains only cosmetic, ending mostly as political rhetoric, and despite the many gender policies and programmes instituted to empower women, politics and decision making will remain a male domain. Moja (2007: 53-55) furthers the debate by exploring the experiences of women in HE, and the limitedness of gender issues in the context of globalisation, which to her encumbers the progress in the area of gender equality on the continent. She calls for the creation of women’s space in the deliberations on globalisation and policies critical to the project. She states that HE has ignored gender issues in globalisation, as discussed in Chapter two of this study, and it’s restructuring, which manifest constant exclusion of women in subtle ways. One predominant way is how women are side-lined and discriminated against in higher educational practices, such as governing appointments, promotional exercises, peer reviews and publications.

The presupposition here is that the historical exclusion and/or under-representation of women, especially in fields such as science and technology in the corporate world, prove that new forms of exclusion are more subtle than the discriminatory practices that were more overt in their exclusion of women from participating in HE. For Moja, the challenge is to ascertain that opportunities are created for participation in the new, emerging fields of the knowledge economy. It is clearly noted that HE institutions, particularly those in developing countries (including Africa), have to a large extent remained élite institutions and have failed to focus sufficiently on the science and technology requirements of the information revolution, which need increased female participation rates and better gender representation. Hence, HE continues with sexist practices that promote gender inequality and remains the stronghold of privileged groups and classes (Moja, 2007: 56-57). In other words, the politics of exclusion is both complex and subtle, and it would be hard to identify overt proponents of the exclusionist politics of women in HE. Overall, women remain under-represented.

The above-explored view affirms what Young (2000) calls forms of exclusion, especially internal exclusion, in which those who seem to be included are kept out of democratic processes, policy formation, decision making and deliberations. Thus, without full inclusion, women will find it difficult to take their place in society and make meaningful contributions to national development. Although several national policies and international agencies offer ways to address women’s exclusion by adopting world declarations on gender equality at all educational levels, and promoting inclusion in all fields of study, inequality remains a normal practice in higher education and on the entire
continent (Mama, 2006: 53-54). I agree strongly that the exclusion of women from the globalisation debate is rooted in the entire education system in Africa.

As long as girls are left behind in schooling, women will remain under-represented, hence the call for vigorous inclusion on the continent. Moja (2007: 65) raises the question whether higher education institutions afford a safe and friendly environment for women to participate in learning and to advance their future careers. In response to her question, she identifies organisational culture as the culprit and impediment to women in their efforts to excel as students and in their upward mobility as faculty members. For her, the culture in HE mirrors the culture of the society within which it is situated. Hence, genuine inclusion of women in HE needs concerted and urgent attention.

4.3.3.1 The position of women in science and mathematics in higher education

On the dilemma of the limited participation of girls and women in the fields of science and mathematics on the continent, Asimeng-Boahene (2007: 717-719) claims that, in Botswana, women have remained invisible, despite their long recognition and position as a cornerstone of development all over the world, and especially in Africa. She proposes that something positive be done to change the situation and make these subjects more appealing to women. Duncan (cited in Asimeng-Boahene, 2007: 716) posits that boys continue to be channelled into the so-called masculine fields such as mathematics, science and technology, whereas girls are directed to the so-called feminine disciplines such as home economics, languages and teaching. In the same vein, the absence of senior female scientists and mathematicians in most public educational institutions in Africa implies that girls would have few or no role models with whom to identify and few female mentors to encourage them pursue their dream in such disciplines (Asimeng-Boahene, 2007: 719). In my opinion, one may not expect women to be fully represented if girls’ access to schooling, particularly to dominant courses, are controlled and allocated based on gender.

It is highly recommended that African governments should encourage science and mathematics education for girls via schools and universities, which ultimately will enable women to contribute to knowledge and economic prosperity. Prosperity will be achieved only if women share in fields of study that were traditionally meant for men, and if they are empowered to participate in the same manner as their male counterparts. Only then will genuine equality and inclusion be advanced. I support the call by Asimeng-Boahene (2007: 724) that women’s lack of participation in and contribution to science and mathematics education as a form of external exclusion needs to be addressed urgently. Meena (2007) affirms that the dilemma of access based on gender triggers the
unequal representation of women in HE, especially in science, mathematics and technology, as highlighted above.

Some other contributors to the Assié-Lumumba (2007) edited volume state that, while many governments have done much to support regional and international conventions and declarations that would address gender disparities in HE rhetorically and legislatively, most countries have failed to implement these intentions strategically and programmatically, especially at the tertiary level (Meena, 2007; Mlama, 2007). In this sense, one can surmise that the above discussion challenges women’s access to HE and gender equality as dominant strategies for achieving social inclusion in the bid for social progress. Thus, one can say that a possible standard for assessing women’s experiences in HE is their statistical representation in HE, which does not seem to be reflected in the labour market and in knowledge production. Correspondingly, providing evidence of women’s participation in South Africa, the Council on Higher Education (CHE, 2013: 1) reported that more women were enrolling in postgraduate programmes, but that women were more successful than men in completing their programmes. However, despite their successful completion, only 42% of doctoral graduates in all fields other than education in 2007 were women. In other words, there are more men than women enrolled in doctoral studies in different fields: approximately 35% of women enrolled for doctoral studies in business, commerce and management, while 53% were in education, 43% in human and social sciences and 40% in science, engineering and technology.

Looking at the portrayal above, the statistics on doctoral student cohorts per gender in South Africa are presented to substantiate my claim of the under-representation of women in HE in Africa. On can say that women’s representation is of critical concern even in countries such as South Africa in which the number of female students seems to fare well, especially at undergraduate levels. However, the figures above should not be taken as representative of the whole continent, but could provide a general nuanced perspective of how women are still externally included in minimal ways. Besides, there could be regional differences in some countries, depending on the state of development and the historical background of the regions. Even though the report by the CHE remarks on the progress made by South Africa’s HE, it confirms that the picture in other African countries may be more dismal, depending on the level of development (CHE, 2013: 1). Apart from ensuring female students’ participation, South Africa seems to be committed to promoting and monitoring the equal participation of women in HE. However, the above portrayal exposes that women are excluded, either deliberately or inadvertently, which undermines the institutions’ ability to achieve substantive inclusion and transformation.
4.3.3.2 Women’s external exclusion as staff members and researchers

Despite some achievements in female students’ (external inclusion) formal access to HE, women’s formal access to leadership positions in Africa shows a different picture. Teferra and Altbach (2003: 9) state that some African countries, such as Tunisia, Lesotho and Mauritius, have achieved 50% of female access to higher education, but in terms of women’s role as staff members, only Morocco (24%), Tunisia (33%) and South Africa (36%) could be commended for their efforts. Unsurprisingly, only 7% of the faculty members in HE institutions in Ethiopia are women. It is clear that, although some countries have addressed women’s external exclusion by expanding access to universities, women need much better access to HE than men to achieve equality (Wondimu, 2004: 4). Similarly, the CHE analysis found that, in 2005, public HE employed more men than women. However, women outnumbered men for the first time in 2006; and the CHE (2013: 1) reports that, in 2007, women constituted 51% of the total staff in public higher education institutions. A look at the array of academics in universities shows that 52% were women, while 46% of the staffs in the universities of technology were women, especially at the lower cadres such as support professionals and non-professional administrative posts. Again, the disturbing experiences of women in HE are not only shared by students, but by female staff members as well. The available data indicates their under-representation and forms of exclusion.

The dilemma of misrepresentation was deliberated on by HERS-SA (2008) at a conference held in Cape Town with the theme, “Institutional cultures and HE leadership: Where are the women?” The conference called for gender equity in academic, administrative and executive leadership in HE at all levels. The targeted groups are NGOs, government, higher education institutions, and educational and research agencies. It is noted that there has been an increase in women’s access to HE as students, especially to universities. Women’s participation in South Africa seems better than in all other African countries, but there is stagnation when it comes to women climbing the leadership ladder. Similarly, Mlama (2007) emphasises the absence of women’s contribution to research and the challenges they face in accessing leadership positions due to the increasing dependency of African governments on external donors, which leads to a loss of autonomy over the process of educational reforms.

An analysis of patterns of gender inequity in education in South Africa and the implications of their positioning in the educational and labour market structure shows that the women represent diverse races and class categories. While significant strides have been made through affirmative action policies to address both racial and gender inequalities in HE, women continue to dominate low-level administrative and non-professional positions in the labour market, even years after the dismantling of apartheid (Higgs, 2007; Moja, 2007). In addition, regarding promotion to certain positions such as junior lecturer and professor, there is huge inequality between women and men. Regarding women’s participation in research, the CHE analysis also shows that, as in many...
developing countries, most of the research in South Africa is carried out by men. The number of papers written and published by women in traditional universities ranges between 14% and 37%. In 2006, National Research Foundation (NRF)-rated female researchers comprised 24% of the total, although their number has increased remarkably to 48% since then. Although South Africa is a top African country as far as women being afforded ample space in HE is concerned, the statistics on female researchers remains marginal. Although HE achieved some success in the area of women’s access to higher education institutions, the statistics reveal that external exclusion remains prevalent. This means that women are physically visible, but are not afforded access to all aspects of HE, especially to knowledge production.

In terms of women as leaders, Guramatunhu-Mudiwa’s (2010: 1) study of 117 universities revealed that 105 universities (87.7%) were led by men, while only 12 universities (10.3%) were led by women. For instance, there is a wide gender disparity marked by male domination and women’s under-representation in vice-chancellorships, and ten (66.7%) countries (namely Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, Swaziland and Zambia) have never had a female university chancellor. Interestingly, out of 15 countries, South Africa had the highest number of women leaders of universities, at six out of 23 (26.1%); Madagascar had 25%, Zimbabwe 18.2% and Tanzania 8.7% (Guramatunhu-Mudiwa, 2010: 10). This implies that only four of the 15 countries had either public higher education institutions or universities led by female presidents (that is vice-chancellors, rectors or chief executive officers).

Clearly, HE is still predominantly a male domain, and men control knowledge and economic production, while women are relegated to reproductive tasks and have no or limited influence on production. This manifests their external exclusion even from leadership positions in AHE. Likewise, CODESRIA (2009: 2) observed that some strides have been made in terms of women’s external inclusion in AHE, as attested to by the increasing number of female students and staff members. Thus, the structures of many African universities remain deliberately masculine, in expressions of the representation, decision-making procedures and culture of their members. This confirms that HE remains a gendered and highly exclusive terrain serving the needs of the few.

CODESRIA (2009: 3) further clarifies that the persistent shortage of senior female academicians is a typical testimony of gender disparities at all levels of education on the continent, which requires a deeper understanding if transformation is to occur in Africa. A more nuanced perspective can be gained by focusing on regional data, e.g. the Commonwealth of Independent States has a relatively high share of women researchers, at 43%, followed by Europe and Africa (33%)

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16 According to NRF Online (2013), the NRF rating is a key driver in the National Research Foundation’s aim to build a globally competitive science system in South Africa. It is a valuable tool for benchmarking the quality of HE researchers against the best in the world. These ratings are allocated on the basis of a researcher’s recent outputs and impact as perceived by international peer reviewers.
(UNESCO-UIS, 2010: 80). However if the goal is to transform AHE, why are so few women enrolled in PhD studies and working as researchers, or even holding leadership positions? Apart from this, women who are statistically represented in AHE appear to encounter other forms of exclusion.

4.3.3.3 Portrayal of women’s internal exclusion as staff members and researchers

Despite the fact that women as students and staff members are externally included, there is evidence of internal exclusion in AHE. The problem of justifying internal exclusion is that, scientifically, one may not identify this form of exclusion. But a look at people’s narratives and shared stories reveals it nonetheless. As Young (2000) postulates, exclusion is inherent within inclusion. As soon as one claims to be included – in this case based on statistics – one continues to experience other forms of exclusion, such as vicious discrimination and prejudicial remarks that provoke exclusion. Adding to the evidence of women’s experiences of internal exclusion, Maürtin-Cairncross (2013: 1) posits that women have entered the academic arena only relatively recently, and that academia’s patriarchal history remains evident. Men continue to predominate in senior positions, as women struggle to establish themselves within the “centre” of the academic enterprise. Based on Maürtin-Cairncross’s study conducted in South Africa, women experience some sense of invisibility and exclusion within their workplaces. Different academic respondents in her study stated that (Maürtin-Cairncross, 2013: 1):

Women are made to feel invisible[,] one is often called to meetings and informed of decisions that were made. When challenging these decisions, you are “allowed” to speak but at the end of your discussion, the initial decision is reiterated as if you had not spoken at all. That is the reason that some women become aggressive….they want to be heard; they want their opinions to be taken seriously. When they react in this way, they are labelled emotional…. So what does one do [?] I have taken to remain[ing] silent…. (Respondent 1, higher education executive).

The work climate females experience in a very covert way excludes women from the real decision making….They [the men] have a camaraderie which excludes women, in the real sense. Women are listened to, without taking their points seriously. [Men’s] importance and being busy becomes an excuse for hoarding information and creating a sense of power that hides their inefficiencies. (Respondent 2, higher education executive).
…. being overlooked because of perceptions about you (age, EI [Emotional Intelligence], intelligence not being taken seriously by the senior managers and being overlooked for the work you deliver on in favour of someone else…..) (Respondent 5, director).

From the above, I deduce that women, especially those in senior positions, often feel excluded from decision making because their presence and ideas are often ignored. Furthermore, some respondents identified their exclusion as being inculcated by the limited number of women in senior positions in HE, which means that the few women’s voices in such decision making does not have an impact in male-dominated institutions (Maürtin-Cairncross, 2013: 1):

There are not many women role models or people who have occupied similar positions from whom I can learn. It is my perception that those who are out there are extremely busy or I do not know about them. There is definitely no “old/experienced girls club” and again it is my opinion that the women do not form groups who call on each other for support. (Respondent 7, director).

[There is a] lack of a critical mass of women in leadership positions, leading to isolation, which in turn often means that women do not have the confidence or support to take on styles and approaches different [than those of] male colleagues. (Respondent 8, executive member, women’s network).

I also found that all departments/areas of the institution were not going to assist me at the initial phases. They did not see it as “their business”—probably because people did not understand. Perhaps fear of change also has a great impact. (Respondent 9, director).

Noticeably, women’s experiences demonstrate that, when they feel invisible and excluded, especially when they are only a few in senior positions in which they are expected to influence decisions and policy making, they consequently become afraid to act with confidence. The following quotations reflect some of these sentiments (Maürtin-Cairncross, 2013: 1):

Lack of confidence on the part of many women [keeps them from being] bold and stand[ing] up for themselves. (Respondent 5, director).
Male counterparts...are driven by a fear that they may lose power and therefore they do not share it. They do self-esteem-lowering things – ignore people... [implying] I am busier than you and therefore I can give you only limited time and space! Women’s need to be made to feel valued is never addressed. Building self-esteem...you have to find these things for yourself and spend energy on "bouncing back" and keeping your own power as they will take it away from you and make you feel inferior; if you are not working from an inner center of strength you are doomed. (Respondent 2, higher education executive).

The foregoing experiences in HE illustrate how people without self-confidence could find it difficult to assert their voices as equal agents and stand up for their arguments, largely because of the fact that there are few women representatives in senior positions. On the other hand, the challenge faced is due to women’s resistance to supporting one another’s standpoints, as well as their promotion. I agree with Maürtin-Cairncross that, even though the “dominant social groups often control the channels of communication, reinforcing women’s subordinate status, when academic women do not challenge dominant institutional cultures, they may tacitly accept subordinate status” (2013: 2). This suggests that only when women have the confidence to challenge these exclusionary attitudes and practices by demanding their equal space might their ideas possibly be taken into consideration as a way of attaining internal inclusion. The point is that internal exclusion is implicit, evident only as expressed in women’s experiences, which makes it difficult for it to be revealed by looking at statistics on the numbers of women and men. My argument is extended by UNESCO-UIS (2010: 68-71), which maintains that:

We should start by considering what the data do not reveal. The fact that a rising number of women are pursuing higher education does not mean that there are fewer opportunities for men. The growth in female enrolment partly reflects the changing values and attitudes related to the roles and aspirations of women in society that are the legacy of social change and feminist movements which emerged globally in the 1960s and 1970s.

Thus, what I find troubling is that the current discourse, which champions access as inclusion, appears to be surface rather than substantive inclusion. Although most of these women’s experiences are extracted from South Africa, I argue that such forms of exclusion are evident in different countries on the continent. A study of two universities, one in Cape Coast, Ghana and the other in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, on the crisis of widening participation in public HE, revealed that, although policies are prevalent, “poorer and mature students were still absent from higher education” (Morley, 2012: 21). Although such universities have stipulated quotas for female students, especially those from disadvantaged groups, there are no monitoring systems to show
that such students actually participate in programmes and complete their studies. Morley observes that two hundred students from disadvantaged backgrounds, (particularly women), shared their unsatisfactory experiences in primary, secondary and HE. The study notes that students from diverse backgrounds, including under-represented groups (women, mature students, low socio-economic status, and people with disabilities) often experience hardship in their HE encounters (Morley, 2012: 22).

Furthermore, the access by and participation of female students from poor socio-economic backgrounds depends on loans and bursaries, while mature women share the stress of earning, as well as of extended family responsibilities. Those with disabilities have no provision for accessing higher educational institutions, which indicates that exclusion from HE can be experienced differently by women depending on their background and condition. Sharing their experiences of HE, some students acknowledged support from a number of caring individuals working in HE, such as lecturers, counsellors and advisors (Morley, 2012: 22). Clearly, some students appreciate the support and care provided by staff members to enable them to excel. This is fascinating to note, as it suggests that HE might as well turn into a caring public institution if staff members practise some form of care. Poignantly, the study shows that many lecturers seem unwilling to be accountable for widening participation and quality assurance; hence their inconsistent and delayed decisions regarding grades and curriculum. The evidence suggests that forms of exclusion are perpetuated in HE, specifically in relation to disadvantaged groups, including women.

To augment the prejudicial attitudes encountered by women in AHE, as expressed in different studies, I take a cue from various engagements with female students during postgraduate pedagogical deliberations and seminars at Stellenbosch University. Amongst them are students from a number of African countries, namely South Africa, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Kenya, Uganda and Nigeria, who shared their experiences of internal exclusion in HE. For instance, one of these students said that internal exclusion emanates from a number of issues: in her case, a lack of confidence to engage in deliberation due to her lack of proficiency in English. She prefers to speak to the lecturer or presenter after the seminar, rather than to engage with them in public. She acknowledges that she often has ideas, but to air them in public becomes a fearful exercise. This student, like others, feels that few female students who engage in deliberations are comfortable and certain of what they are saying. Similarly, another student agrees that fear of airing an idea that might be dismissed, and one’s inability to offer an argument and defend it, comprise another issue. In similar engagements, another student indicated that, because of her fluency in English, she could engage freely, despite her uncertainty of her ideas. The same student felt that, as a student, it is her right to make a contribution to pedagogical deliberations, just like other students.
Apart from the above, some students identify insensitive comments from their fellow women especially to when will one give birth. In her words, "I get irritated by such comments and I can’t understand why my study is seen as not important till I produce a baby". Such comments left her with doubt about whether she should have babies or focus on her studies first, which provoked a sense of insecurity in the presence of colleagues with babies. Another issue shared by some married women is questions about whether their husbands helped them or wrote the work for them? Some single women’s educational relations with male lecturers are often questioned. This is related to what Wagner-Martin (1994: 21) refers to as “the trap of the stereotype”, where she argues that the first question that society (HE) “still asks of any women is whose daughter [wife or student] she is. …The traditions of both patriarchy and heterosexuality are confirmed”.

From the above experiences it is clear that internal exclusion is provoked by numerous issues, such as poor language proficiency, fear of intimidation, discomfort about speaking in public, lack of confidence and inability to defend one’s argument, as well as sexist or prejudicial remarks about giving birth, and connecting a women’s work either to a husband or female supervisor. I contend that, if universities in Africa will not take the issue of internal exclusion seriously, then legitimate transformation will remain a dream. Women’s access to HE in Africa as a strategy for mitigating external exclusion is an achievement. However, I am concerned about the absence of women’s voices in democratic processes and knowledge production. It is apparent that mechanisms and strategies are in place to include women in HE, but it is disconcerting to encounter persistent internal exclusion in HE in Africa. Given the above predicament facing women in HE in Africa, I wish to explore in what follows whether the given proposition is commensurable with the reconstructed framework deemed suitable to engender substantive inclusion.

4.4 (In)commensurability of the African higher education discourses with the equalisation-of-voice paradigm

In this section I attempt to ascertain whether the discourse of AHE is commensurable with the equalisation-of-voice framework, namely its related concepts of communicative inclusion, non-gendered or gendered form and voice. What come to the fore are notions of women’s access, representation, participation, capability and gender equality as means to achieve substantive internal inclusion. In terms of statistics, women are represented in HE, as various policy initiatives such as affirmative action aim at promoting women's inclusion. Despite efforts to address the lack of access of women to the discourses on HE (Assié-Lumumba, 2007; Kwesiga, 2002; Zeleza & Olukoshi, 2004), gaps remain in the effort to engender substantive internal inclusion in which the voices of female students and staff members are recognised. The point is that some strides have been made in tackling external exclusion in AHE, but internal inclusion is yet to be attained. It is
argued here that the available data create the impression that, because women are statistically and physically visible in AHE, inclusion is automatically achieved and, ultimately, that gender equality is attained. Although the presence of women can be observed in HE, their inclusion is limited to statistics, as their voices are absent in terms of making meaningful contributions to all democratic processes and knowledge production.

The exploration of women’s experiences and shared stories in this chapter demonstrates that AHE is not necessarily commensurable with the equalisation-of-voice framework. Firstly, the proposition of access in HE as a way to inclusion is silent about how much inclusion HE aims to attain, whether external or internal. Secondly, the proposition of access is based on the traditional gender categories of woman and man as a yardstick for inclusion. However, such traditional categories of gender say nothing about other groups within the category of woman, such as those with disabilities, single mothers, widows, etc. Again, the gender categories ignore the inclusion of other groups and the current development of the homosexual category, e.g. lesbians, bisexual, transgendered and intersexed. Thirdly, the HE framework may claim women’s access to HE based on statistics; however, this is mere access, which addresses external exclusion; it does not warrant substantive inclusion. Distressingly, internal exclusion continues because those who seem to be included are still excluded in subtle ways, as I will show further on in this study. In essence, the overall arguments in existing studies on the roles and experiences of women in HE in Africa are commendable, yet limited in terms of achieving substantive internal inclusion. Various efforts to consider women’s inclusion and strategies, focusing on gender as a yardstick for equality, pose a threat to the transformation project. Thus, the analyses confirm the perpetuation of exclusion by omitting the subcategories of women, namely those with disabilities, homosexuals, intersexed, transgendered, and the poor. In my view, the lack of women’s access to HE requires urgent attention, as it undermines women’s capability, which is shunned through the rampant denial of girls’ access to schooling. I conclude that the claims by the authors mentioned earlier share some features in respect of the equalisation-of-voice framework, that is access and capability, but they differ in their call for a traditional categorisation of gender (woman and man). In other words, inclusion based on gender, communication and capabilities may not help the excluded groups to access intellectual encounters that would enable them to assert their voices. The constant focus on gender, especially in the area of women’s access to education, will not enable contemporary African universities to be on par with other nations in achieving substantive inclusion towards social justice.

Chauraya (2012: 257) argues that HE policies and programmes in Africa have remained gender neutral, gender blind or gender insensitive, thus failing to change the gendered structural status quo in the African context. Eventually, as long as the status quo remains gendered, HE programmes and policies will also remain ineffective and unbeneﬁcial to both women and men as
equal members of such democratic engagements. In affirming the call for gender as a yardstick for equality, UNESCO’s Director-General, Irina Bokova, strongly encouraged all governments, the international community, civil society and other partners to take stock of the rich body of evidence presented in the organisation’s publication to make gender equality the hallmark of all education policies (UNESCO-UIS, 2010: 6). She stressed that gender equality is the most fundamental condition for making our world more just and peaceful. Her view confirms that gender is strongly identified as a benchmark for achieving equality. However, the call for gender as a benchmark for inclusion is incongruent with the equalisation-of-voice framework. In my view, the idea of gender equality in HE in Africa is limited, since it does not mitigate exclusion. In addition, women’s access to HE requires skills and abilities that would enable them to attain economic prosperity and other heights, including internal inclusion. The studies reveal the predicament of African women who also are undermined at all other levels of society (culturally, religiously, etc.) and who have the same capacities to compete with their male counterparts. Ironically, considering my reconstructed framework, which seems to propel equality, this causes tension for the ideal form of transformation that Africa requires.

In terms of the capabilities that women are presumed to possess, those who lack ability will constantly experience internal exclusion, especially those from poor socio-economic or academic backgrounds, as well as those with disabilities. Again, even though some women may be eloquent in claiming their positions and exercising their rights, those with limited abilities are likely to be excluded internally. Hence, Nussbaum’s (2000) advocacy for capabilities calls HE stakeholders in Africa to prepare women to acquire the relevant skills that would enable them to express their equality and achieve internal inclusion. I concur with Rancière’s (1999) view of equality, which considers voice rather than gender. The AHE proposition of inclusion and equality based on gender remains a challenge and is incongruent with the equalisation-of-voice framework. Thus, inclusion based on voice would advance substantive inclusion, as human beings, irrespective of their differences, could air their voices and contribute to policy and knowledge, rather than simply being reduced to statistics and numbers. In other words, one’s voice is a remarkable yardstick for advancing the equality of all human beings, especially the excluded. The current arguments in HE are limited and inadequate when trying to address the weighty issues of internal exclusion in Africa.

From the above analyses, I concede that, in the past decades, AHE has achieved immense results in the area of women’s access, yet there is more to do in mitigating internal exclusion. The point I want to restate is that my intention is not to discard the gender categories, but to acknowledge that there is a need to be sensitive to their nuances in the call for inclusion in AHE. So, within the category of woman, just like man, there are other groups that are ignored and, if they are not recognised, internal exclusion will remain. Therefore, there is a need for a paradigm shift that
transcends gender and vicious discriminatory and repressive tendencies towards voice as a means to engender substantive inclusion in order to lead towards authentic transformation in Africa.

4.5 Summary

In this chapter I have argued that the AHE discourse of inclusion and equality based on gender is incommensurable with the democratic conception of equalisation of voice. Such an approach lessens external inclusion and considers only women’s statistical representation – that is, gender as a basis for inclusion lessens external inclusion, but ignores internal exclusion. In other words, women are there, but not there. Therefore, I have called for a move beyond statistical representation and for a striving toward addressing the intrinsic form of internal exclusion. Women’s internal exclusion is evident when those included are encountering prejudice and discrimination that provoke their exclusion in subtle ways, leading to their voicelessness. To nurture a voice, AHE ought to create opportunities for women to grow intellectually and make a contribution to knowledge, just like their male counterparts. This is in line with Morrow’s (2007) illustration of two forms of access — formal access and epistemological access — which can help us to understand HE in Africa, as referred to in Chapter one of this dissertation. Women have attained formal access to HE based on the statistical records of and their percentages in the institutions, and this has somewhat addressed external exclusion.

However, such women are yet to celebrate epistemological access, which will afford them a voice and allow them to make a meaningful contribution to knowledge production, decision making and policy formation. My argument is that women are still subjected to internal exclusion, although external exclusion is also not an overwhelming situation. That is, women remain excluded substantively, despite being included in minimal ways. I presuppose that internal inclusion is necessary in order for women to contribute towards human development and flourishing on the African continent, whether in their homes, workplaces and other professional spheres of societal life. I have argued throughout that, in different epochs, AHE has favoured men, which promotes a culture of patriarchy. The ensuing chapter will explore how the culture of patriarchy underscores women’s internal exclusion and show why such beliefs and practices do not have a place in a democratic society.
CHAPTER FIVE

PATRIARCHAL IDEOLOGY AND PRACTICES AS CONDITIONS PERPETUATING INTERNAL EXCLUSION IN AFRICAN HIGHER EDUCATION

5.1 Introduction

The previous chapter argued that women are internally excluded in AHE, despite their numerical representation. This means that, although women’s enrolment in HE has increased, their impact, paradoxically, is not felt much. In this chapter I explore what underscores internal exclusion – as I have identified in the previous chapter – which shows evidence that patriarchal conditions that is male chauvinism and domination, are persistent. Such conditions perpetuate the cultural beliefs that perceive women as mothers who have to merely raise children and, vices such as discrimination, subjugation and sexism – all instances of internal exclusion. My aim is to offer a philosophical argument for why the aforementioned conditions are undesirable that undermine women’s humanity and simultaneously ensure their internal exclusion in current HE. Firstly, I explore the conception of patriarchy and its ideology as reflected in conditions of male domination and chauvinism. Secondly, I illustrate how patriarchal conditions are fashioned within cultural norms and practices. Thirdly, I attempt to reveal how the patriarchal culture undermines and aggravates internal exclusion in AHE. Lastly, I challenge a gendered response to women’s internal exclusion, especially gender roles and the perspective that women, by nature, are child-bearers and child-rearers, care-givers and moral keepers. I argue for a non-gendered, reconstructed approach that construes that all human beings are moral keepers, against the socially constructed perception that sees women as sole moral keepers.

5.2 Conception of patriarchy and related conditions that perpetuate internal exclusion

In this section I intend to establish and interrogate the patriarchal beliefs that contribute to women’s subjugation and internal exclusion in AHE. Such beliefs are expressed through various conditions that implicitly or explicitly shape people’s minds and practices. Despite the presence of the patriarchal beliefs highlighted above, Castells (2001) illuminates the tension imposed on HE by stating that, historically, universities have played a major role as ideological apparatuses, expressing the ideological struggles present in society. Correspondingly, universities have always been mechanisms of selection and socialisation of the dominant elites and particular groups, who
support the fact that the university is viewed as a hub of knowledge production in which the hard skilled labour force is trained – what Castells calls the “professional university” (2001: 5). If this is what higher education, specifically universities, ought to do, internal exclusion of women to knowledge production is to deny them vital opportunities to realise their full potentials. Nevertheless, Castells (2001) cautions that universities are also subject to more implicit pressures from the host society, and the combination of the implicit pressures and explicit pressures of the local and universal functions generates great contradictions in university roles. Explicitly, one recognises the debate that HE, particularly universities in developing countries, are confronted by various ideologies, such as neoliberalism through its globalisation project articulated in Chapter 2 of this study, that lead to tensions and contradictions. This simply means that HE, especially universities, are situated at the centre of struggles in responding to local needs for transformation and international forces of recognition, be they ideological or functional. Nevertheless, I am still inclined to the argument that patriarchal beliefs are the prime condition perpetuating internal exclusion on the African continent. Thus, before discussing the defining patriarchal conditioned beliefs, namely male domination, chauvinism and authoritarianism, I wish to trace the inception and conception of patriarchy.

5.2.1 Patriarchy: a conception or misconception?

The concept “patriarchy” comes from the Greek word “patriakhes”, which means “father of a race” or “chief of a race”. Patriarchy is not a new concept, but has been deliberated upon in gender relations by different generations. It has largely dominated most of the world's social systems until the contemporary period. Different scholars have conceptualised it differently, but mainly as a social system in terms of which the rule is by fathers and sons, and all arrangements are to their advantage (Green, 2010: 969). In this system, the male is the dominant figure and possesses the primary authority in social organisation, and plays the central roles of political leadership, moral authority, and control of property. In the same manner, fathers hold authority over women and children. It is interesting to note that Aristotle, “the father of virtue”, was himself a patriarch. He declared without question that men were superior in all respects to women, which forms the basis for his theory of reproduction. For him, “the female is female by virtue of a certain lack of qualities”, and his framework regards a “virtuous woman as a person who ought to be active in her house and who ought to submit to her husband” (Woodfin & Groves, 2001: 97; 136). This observation corroborates that patriarchy is not a new belief.

Ironically, Aristotle admitted that a woman has rationality, but that she lacks the authority that permits her to play a role in and contribute to political community. I am in agreement with Woodfin and Groves (2001) when they state that Aristotle was politically incorrect to argue for the
subjugation of women, while confessing their rational mind just like that of men. Even though patriarchy historically has meant autocratic rule by the male head of a family, in recent times it has come to denote a "social system in which power is primarily held by adult men" (Gordon, 1996: 18). This means that patriarchy lives through the social, legal, political and economic organisation of a range of different cultures. In terms of social system, since HE is a social institution in which people interact with one another through education, the patriarchal beliefs has a negative influence in such educational practices. Within HE institutions, the patriarchal ideology is exercised by those who possess the authority to control others, mostly men, but also some women. This means that patriarchy manifests itself in different forms, not only ideologically, but also structurally. That is why Bhasin (1993: 9-12) states that patriarchy should be traced through the many layers in which it operates and reinforces the patriarchal order at multiple levels. One clearly can declare that there are divergent interpretations of what can be taken as a conception or misconception of patriarchy. I therefore offer a feminist exploration of the concept of patriarchy.

5.2.1.1 Feminist conceptualisation of patriarchy

Tracing the trajectory of the concept patriarchy, feminists have confronted this belief at different times, commencing from the ground-breaking frameworks of Simone de Beauvoir, Kate Millett, Susan Brownmiller and Adrienne Rich, to mention a few. Although these scholars vary greatly in their methods, theoretical approaches and conclusions, they all foregrounded De Beauvoir's question of what is a woman. In attempts to respond to this question, each scholar identifies a problem that relates to women in different epochs and proposes a framework to address it. Cudd and Andreasen (2005:1-2) point out that early feminist studies exposed patriarchal biases as being evident in three mistakes; sexism mistakes, which perceive men to be of greater value than women; androcentricism, which takes maleness or masculinity to be the norm for humaneness or humanity; and illegitimate cognitive authority, through which males and androcentric theories have been accorded the kinds of mistakes that are possibly the most difficult to establish. These mistakes bring me to the conceptualisation of patriarchy focusing on Millett’s and Rich's enhanced comprehension.

In her book, Sexual Politics (1969), Millett, a French feminist, theorises patriarchy as the dominance of men in all areas of social, cultural and political life. For her, patriarchy characterises a society dominated not just by masculinity, but also by men, whose primary purpose is to construct and maintain a certain power relationship between males and females (Millett, 1969: 72-73). This does not imply that all men get together to keep women out of power. But feminists believe that, in celebration of their privilege and advantage, most men agree to the system that is
in place and have no particular interest in changing it. She believes that the patriarchal ideology has a significant effect on the psychology of both sexes, whereby women, like men, believe that male domination and women’s subordination is the way it should be. To offer a deeper understanding, Millett (1969: 76-77) exemplifies sex differences based on gender using three interconnected dimensions, namely temperament, roles and status. Using a Manichaeism\textsuperscript{17} stance: from a temperamental dimension, women are regarded as more passive, while men are more active; women are dependent while men are independent; and women are emotional, whereas men are rational. Resulting from these temperamental differences, women are less comfortable with and less likely to seek a life of their own and more likely to rely on their feelings for truth; whereas men will concentrate on what is demonstrably true.

I echo that sex differences (either real or constructed) may have pessimistic implications for African women’s attempts to thrive in public institutions, and in a world whose values favour men. The point is that women who aspire to pursue knowledge that may sustain them in public space might not prosper as liberally as their male counterparts. In terms of roles, patriarchy expects people to believe that adult role differentiation is natural and in fact grows out of temperamental differences. Millett (1969: 76) offers the analogy that women’s desire to marry, to mother and to make a home is natural, just like men’s desire to make their mark in the outside world. This simply means that women and men may end up internalising the above ideology through systems or institutions according to which a woman is regarded as a private entity, unlike a man, who is a public figure. In this manner, a gender role difference is focused on how men celebrate their superior status to women. The status dimension between women’s and men’s separate positions or ranks reveals how the gendered roles, which categorise women as role players in private (home) and men as dominant figures in public, have an immense influence on individuals’ status in society. Such beliefs and influences are then reproduced in people’s daily practices at all levels of society, including in HE.

In providing further evidence of how patriarchy perpetuates internal exclusion in AHE, I draw from various women’s experiences in the study by Bhana and Pillay (2012), who exemplified through interviews the challenges women face as they navigate their academic environment. This study draws from the experiences of women academics who also mothers are regarding how they navigate research-led AHE, particularly in South Africa. These authors argue that there are inequitable gender relations in such institutions that fuel women’s marginalisation in AHE. One respondent states, (Bhana & Pillay, 2012: 82):

\textsuperscript{17} The doctrine that the world is not governed by one perfect being, but by a balance of the forces of good and evil (Blackburn, 2008: 222)
...this system has really used and abused academics, you come in with a lot of hope that this is going to be very empowering and facilitative environment, and it really just does the opposite. It tramps you down and makes you feel as if you are not good enough, all the time whatever you do is not good enough....

This exhibits how women struggle as they enter HE in Africa and how they try their best to prove themselves in a system that does not appreciate their efforts, no matter how much they work. Novice academics enter AHE with the hope of being empowered, but what they encounter rather are disempowering practices that hinder their progress. To show how women in AHE negotiate the inequitable gendered relations due to patriarchal influences within the academic environment, and how this contributes to their subordination, another academic participant narrates that:

...our department is very poorly managed and there is not enough support given to female staff...there are only three academic female members...the rest of them are all male...all of their wives have been at home... I just absolutely firmly believe that no extra support is given to us and they just load us with the damn work... I actually get very cross and yesterday I even phoned one of them and I actually said..." I'm not doing this anymore", then he phoned me back at 11 o'clock at night and said “Ok...forget about the marking, I'll do it tomorrow”...six males and all fuddy buddies... (Bhana & Pillay, 2012: 89).

This practice of male staff overloading their female colleagues with marking responsibilities is a case of injustice that robs women of productive time in which to do research and write academic papers. Expressing a similar sentiment, another woman academic shared her dismays about how her university department did not accord her enabling conditions to work while at the same time completing her degree. She argues that

In our department we've talked about how we can assist younger academics in terms of accomplishing their PhDs but...it will mean the senior academics need to absorb your work in order to assist you...may be they could be supportive but there is no support, and you can tell especially in our school people are busy planning their retirement...my PhD supervisor who's a known feminist and I said “I cannot cope” and the response that I got was, “Well..., we've all had it hard" and I think possibly it was...an abortive attempt at kind of being empathetic...think almost there is such a level of disillusionment that people just don’t care...the truth is women who move up the ladder very often do move because they also have decided to comply with the patriarchal structures and we see it in the university...at the end of the day, the kids are your problem (Bhana & Pillay, 2012: 89).
Taking into account these views of women academics who are mothers and their experiences of AHE manifests how patriarchal attitudes and gender relations pervade social institutions, which then ruin the well-being and progress of the subjugated staff members. The above encounters tie in with the struggle shared by colleagues at the university where I study. These students narrate how they navigate academic tasks while being expected to complete their PhD degree without being afforded leave of absence. These women, without the desired qualifications and knowledge, might struggle to assert their voices and make meaningful contributions to knowledge. In this respect, I further agree with Millett's position that patriarchy's fundamental goal is to maintain the superiority of males over females, and leads men to crave dominance and authority to control all people and things. Although there are patriarchal ideologies and practices prevalent in African society and its social institutions such as HE, I am not fully convinced about whether one can generalise that all men hold power and practise domination over women.

Millett clarifies that patriarchy assigns roles to women that isolate them from other adults and deprive them of opportunities to acquire the ability to compete (1969: 78-79). By so doing, whether intentionally or not, a patriarchal system keeps women busy with mothering, care-taking and housekeeping, and denies them the opportunity to acquire relevant abilities for public engagement. Even contemporary studies (Kwesiga, 2002; Paterson, 2001; Pillay, 2007; Ramphele, 1995) echo similar concerns about how such patriarchal beliefs continue to shape current practices in HE. In a similar vein, Millett (1969: 79) underlines that gender roles are taken as norms. People preserve them through their daily doings as professionals, social and behavioural scientists, therapists and educators, and by their direct contribution to patriarchy in defining what is normal and what is not.

In the same discourse, but a decade later, Rich confronts the notion of patriarchy by bringing in the controversial and complex dimension of homosexuality. In her text, Compulsory Heterosexuality (1980), she argues that a patriarchal system portrays woman as a rigid category with no differences. This category of woman expects all groups to adhere to gender roles, which can be discriminatory to others such as lesbians, transgendered, bisexual and intersexed. In this sense, all groups within the category of woman are expected to conform to heterosexual roles, which are oppressive and do not consider their differences. Thus, conceptions of patriarchy, from the rule of the heterosexual father figure to social structures and organisations that reinforce the beliefs of male domination and chauvinism, are the dominant conditions that perpetuate women's subjugation.
5.2.1.2 Patriarchal male domination in relation to women

In Africa, a host of studies demonstrate how patriarchy operates in many societies. Nwoko (2012: 70) indicates that the practice of gender roles (patriarchy and matriarchy) is controversial. In some societies, for instance the Igbo and Yoruba in Nigeria, the Zulu in Southern Africa and the Nuer in East Africa, matriarchal practices are evident, which makes an understanding of the flexibility and dynamics in practice insightful. Such social gender roles are viewed as flexible and dynamic, because some societies practise matriarchy but sustain patriarchy. Despite such dynamics, it was normal for authority to go with function. This means that patriarchy as practised in Africa has assigned authority and all powers to men in the system. A dominant function bestowed on men by the patriarchal system was the headship of the family, which permitted them by extension to become leaders of society (Nwoko, 2012: 70). The point is that, since men are recognised or tasked to be the head of the family, they are also suitable to rule and speak for those under them including his properties, women and children alike. Chinweizu observes this when he argues that “the patriarch zone of function and authority includes the physical protection of the homestead and its territory, the male economic sphere ... the spiritual sphere ... the social sphere” (cited in Nwoko, 2012: 71).

Poignantly, the matriarchal zone of function restricts women to the kitchen, and embraces and supports the female economic sphere, which is mostly perceived as demeaning for men to interfere in or engage with. Such kinds of socially ascribed roles and functions inhibit women's participation in public life, as they are to be seen and not heard. I surmise that it is not important for women to participate in public issues, given that men will speak for all those under their headship, including women. This further shows how the matriarchal practices in African society never change the condition of women, but patriarchy continues to dominate all public spheres. Kwesiga (2002: 56-58) affirms that patriarchal ideologies permeate every society through different categories, such as kinships and lineages, religious practices and marriage institutions. In this way, all cultures and religions uphold patriarchy, whether in Greek and Roman antiquity, Judaism, Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism, or African tradition (Mikell, 1997: 18). I agree that, although religion and culture have positive effects on the well-being of the people, their sustenance and preservation of patriarchy is undeniable. Alongside this, there also are external patriarchal forces that pervade African societies and HE through policies and media that influence prejudicial attitudes, namely male chauvinism. To this end, my argument is that African societies represent patriarchal-dominated cultures that permeate public institutions including AHE, and stir women's internal exclusion, which I argue against throughout this study.
5.2.1.3 Male chauvinism in relation to women’s internal exclusion

The concept of male chauvinism involves a man with an aggressive and unreasonable belief that his own sex is better than all others. Millett (1969: 44) epitomises male chauvinism as a condition of patriarchy and as a province of the lower class or immigrant male, which absorbs and takes on certain glamour through a number of contemporary figures. For example, a patriarchal approach sustains male domination over female subordination through acquired power, according to Rich's (1980) framework, which delineates eight characteristics employed to sustain men's power. These characteristics can clearly be connected to the dilemma of equality confronting women in AHE. Incontestably, male domination and chauvinism are determinant conditions that symbolise power over the other in terms of gender. Such repressive practices influence men to discriminate against women, as corroborated by their experiences of AHE. For instance, Familusi (2012: 301) acknowledges that the Yoruba nation, like many other African societies, is essentially patriarchal. Male chauvinism is stimulated by women’s victimisation as distinct from their male counterparts, who receive special treatment from birth. Olabode posits that:

Immediately a child is born, the question that will be posed will centre on sex, not minding of health of the mother. If the baby is a female, the mother will be scolded and treated as a lazy, good for nothing woman. On the other hand if the child is a male, praise will be showed on the mother, not considering the fact that Biology has shown it is the father who determines the sex of an offspring (cited in Familusi, 2012: 300).

The citation above exhibits how a person (female child) is treated with inferiority right from birth, and how she is perpetually caught up in a web of ill-treatment until adulthood. It should now be clear how a person who receives special treatment might enjoy the same throughout life, in this case a man. With a close look at these differences in treatment of the sexes, one wonders how this belief could not affect HE. In this light, Badinter (2006: 27) suggests the justification used for how such treatment of the sexes, especially the issue of male domination, receives thorny criticism in all spheres of human life. For her, in such spheres, being that of their sexual relations and in the unconscious (ideology or beliefs) including institutions – private and professional as well as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) – women are at the receiving end. She argues that this belief is everywhere and can mutate like some viruses and replicate in different forms when it is mature.

18 Ramphele (1995: 154) illustrates how the African patriarchal cultural beliefs influenced both women and men in her community in their approaches to gender roles in domestic spheres, in this case her husband. She refers to an incident when Desmond Tutu paid them a visit and 'tried unsuccessfully to get the chauvinists amongst her male colleagues to regard domestic chores as part of the responsibilities of being adult.

19 Rich’s eight characteristics: men's ability to deny women sex or to force it upon them; to command or exploit their labour to control their produce; to control or rob them of their children; to confine them physically and prevent their movement; to use them as objects in male transactions; to cramp their creativeness; or to withhold from them large areas of society's knowledge and cultural attainments' (1980: 638).
And as soon as you think you are done with it, new developments transpire. It is clearly stated that “men will never willingly abandon the material and sexual privileges their domination of women affords them” (Badinter, 2006: 27). If I follow Badinter’s argument well, the point is that men cannot act if not assisted in changing a patriarchal mind-set or the belief that shapes human practices particularly that favours them – which necessitates education. Yet I am sceptical about this view, since it implies that all men are patriarchs and not one might support women’s liberation. This perspective is nearly uncritical in generalising that all men support male domination.

A different observation is that of, bell hooks, representing an example of how a middle-class white woman’s experience of patriarchal domination differs significantly to that of a middle-class black woman’s experience. The former may claim social equality with men of their class: some women ask for an alternative equal pay for equal work, while others want an alternative lifestyle, the latter lies on the recognition equality (hooks, 2005: 63). Therefore, she is pessimistic about the assumption that women everywhere suffer the same form of oppression. I agree that diverse groups’ experience and different forms of oppression are due to the ways in which such oppression interacts, for example in the form of racial, economic, sexual and even ethnic oppression. Equally, oppression experienced by a heterosexual woman differs from that experienced by a homosexual woman. In this it is clear how patriarchy poses a danger to the category of woman, as the same attitudes could pervade the practice of HE.

The above contextual reflection of male domination of women and chauvinism are not only “transcultural”, but eternal. Badinter (2006: 29) argues that the above beliefs are transmitted not only through the practise of customs and norms, but reinforced to become an embodiment of both. In her view, “locking men and women into opposing camps closes the door to any hope of understanding their mutual influence and of measuring their common humanity” (Badinter, 2006: 30). Concerted efforts are necessary to confront patriarchal beliefs of male domination and chauvinism by re-educating men as a way of transforming their authoritarian practices, rather than to “fight against the abuses of some men” (Badinter, 2006: 30). I am attracted to Badinter’s advocacy of re-education, but this should enable both women and men to advance an inclusive educational community. The foregoing perspective highlights that patriarchy is socially constructed, reinforced and transmitted through cultural practices across generations. With this understanding, I proceed to probe internal exclusion.
5.2.2. Cultural practices in relation to internal exclusion

Cultural practices are believed to give impetus to patriarchal beliefs of male domination and chauvinism in society, which in my view provokes women's internal exclusion in AHE. The concept culture simply could be understood as a way of life of a people and everything about them. It constitutes people’s customs, traditions, beliefs, behaviours, dress, language, works of art and craft, attitudes, values, science, modes of perception, and habits of thought and activity among others (Familusi, 2012: 299). This suggests that each context has cultural values that are largely relative and peculiar to specific contexts. Noticing these contextual differences, my argument is that patriarchal beliefs are enclosed within cultural practices and taken as norms that incite women’s oppression in AHE. In addition, culture, explains Benhabib, is derived from the Latin origin *colare* and is associated with activities of preservation, of tending to and caring for (2002: 2). For her, culture is a contestable concept and has also become a ubiquitous synonym for identity – an identity marker and differentiator. Ever since the ancient period, culture has been the mark of social distinctions, although it has changed its meaning. This change was sparked by the emergence of western modernity, a capitalist commodity economy, rationalised scientific worldviews, and bureaucratic administrative control (Benhabib, 2002: 2). In Benhabib’s interpretation, there are different lines of thought regarding culture, both conservative and progressive.

Conservatives offer different reasons for why cultures should be preserved. Huntington, for instance, calls for preservation with the intention to keep groups separate, because cultural hybridity generates conflict and instability. This is proposed with the hope to avoid the “clash of civilizations” by reinforcing political alliances that closely follow cultural identity rifts (cited in Benhabib, 2002: 4). The progressives, on the other hand, claim that cultures should be preserved in order to rectify patterns of (male) domination and symbolic injury involving the misrecognition and (women’s) oppression of some cultures by others. On the above view, I agree that cultural preservation is harmful and may be a nuisance to democratic (higher education) institutions and civil society. For this reason, Benhabib (2002: 7-8) argues that cultures are clearly delineable wholes, that is cultures are congruent with population groups, a noncontroversial description of the culture of a human group is possible and, even if cultures and groups do not stand in one-to-one correspondence (even if there is more than one culture within a human group and more than one group that may possess the same cultural traits), this poses no important problems for politics or policy. Considering how patriarchal cultures perpetuate women’s internal exclusion in AHE, such preservation might be catastrophic to a democratic society.

In what follows is practical evidence based on women’s experiences of how patriarchal cultural norms influence relations that undermine women’s internal inclusion in AHE. There are a multitude of documents in the literature exposing how AHE excludes women internally (see Assié-Lumumba,
2006; Mabokela & Magubane, 2004; Maürtin-Cairncross, 2013: 1; Ramphele, 1995). For instance, Mabokela (2003) states that the marginalisation of women as administrators and scholars, and the institutional privileging of their male counterparts and of masculinists’ expectations and practices, all continue to be the norm. Similarly, Assié-Lumumba (2006b: 19) refers to studies by Gaidzanwa and Mlama, who assert that the university is an unfriendly and overtly gender-based hostile environment for both female students and staff members, while there are many indicators of the unwelcoming sphere of HE characterised by its “maleness” and sexual harassment. Further, there are the shortcomings of the lecturers, whose poor preparation and lack of awareness makes it practically impossible for female students to benefit fully from their learning experiences, especially in hitherto male-dominated subjects, in which the few enrolled female students have to endure loneliness and a lack of support from fellow female students. In order to engender the internal exclusion perpetuated by patriarchal attitudes and practices in AHE, I cement Benhabib’s (2002) argument that we need to recognise diversity and plurality when we contemplate issues of culture.

I am attracted to this argument, which I consider convincing and relevant to AHE, where women are relegated to subordination and inferior positions. Benhabib (2002: 8) suggests that we should view human cultures as constant creations, re-creations and negotiations of imaginary boundaries between “we” and “other(s)”. In her view, the “other”, that is the excluded woman, is always within us and is one of us. The self is a self only because it distinguishes itself from a real, or more often than not imagined, “other”. In this way, the struggles for recognition (of women) among individuals and groups are really efforts to negate the status of “otherness”, as otherness is taken to lead to disrespect, domination and inequality; hence her call for cultural dialogue. In this process, individuals and groups struggle to attain respect, self-worth, freedom and equality, and simultaneously retain some sense of selfhood. Her call is for the self to recognise the “other” and accept their differences, in recognition of human equality and dignity. The point is that the task for democratic equality is to create an impartial institution, that is HE in the public sphere and civil society where this struggle for the recognition of cultural differences and the contestation for cultural narratives can take place without male domination. It therefore is necessary to reconsider the way we treat people, who throughout creation have been subjugated to inferior positions, and to begin to respect their human dignity in a democratic society, especially at the HE level. More importantly, people who are reared in patriarchal cultures sustain male domination over female subordination as a norm, and could embody their dominant cultural codes in AHE. This implies that there are power relations among people, that is women and men, which trigger internal exclusion.
5.2.2.1 Power relations between women and men with patriarchal cultures

The concept of power is attributed to the French scholar Michel Foucault, who underscores that power is “disciplinary”, that it is “everywhere local, in the minute details of everyday life” (1977: 27). For him, power produces knowledge, whereby power and knowledge directly imply one another. This simply means that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge. In other words, power infiltrated by patriarchal culture in AHE works like a surveillance camera to monitor people’s conformity and functions by observing and regulating behaviour in various institutions. Disciplinary power is not only “repressive”, but also “creative”, and determines what is “normal” and acceptable. In other words, almost all aspects of human behaviour are governed by norms (male domination over female subordination), which stand as powerful tools to control peoples’ responses. Resistance to “normalisation” is resistance to the networks of power in which prison has existed (Foucault, 1977: 126-142). For example, normalisation enforces a belief that a woman is a man's property or object within the private sphere, and has no agency to contest or decline. From Foucault’s perception, patriarchal conditions that perpetuate women's internal exclusion are unchallengeable and threatening to those who may decide to contravene the norm. This shows the imbalances of power relations that exist among people caused by a taken-for-granted patriarchal norm, which poses a threat to democratic society, particularly in AHE.

In his book, Critical Social Science (1987), Brian Fay, a social theorist, expands on the idea of power relations based on the patriarchal norm that exist among people in African society, including in HE. He argues that critical social theory should work with a dyadic conception of power. The term “dyadic”, according to Blackburn (2008), entails a two-place relation. In these power relations, unlike those of Foucault, Fay expresses that both the dominant and the subordinate agents possess a degree of responsibility for the existence of the power relations between them. Put lucidly, Fay argues that:

Something as crucial in social life as power involves the activity of those being led or commanded as much as those leading or commanding. Power must arise out of the interaction of the powerful and powerless with both sides contributing something necessary for its existence (1987: 120).

By implication, the dyadic conception of power ensures justice, because it arises out of the interaction of the powerful and the powerless, in this case powerful men and powerless women in AHE. To put clearly, without a dyadic conception of power, the role of the disempowered would not be recognised. As a result, this makes it difficult, if not impossible, to articulate strategies by which the disempowered could try to find ways to change the power relationships in society, particularly in higher education (Fay, 1987: 121). The premise is that, in contrast to a model that conceives
power as something that can be possessed by a dominant agent, the dyadic conception of power affirms the fact that power is always the outcome of social relationships. I find Fay’s argument astounding in terms of the role of the disempowered groups, in this case women, in constituting the very relations in which they lack power and in stressing the contested nature of power relationships. Principally, his standpoint epitomises my position that women, who are already discriminated against, disempowered, marginalised and excluded within their cultural contexts, tend to submit to their usual or normal position in AHE. Powerful voices will be privileged to the detriment of powerless women, who may succumb to the power of men. In the main, women are manipulated and conceived by the other, and men become more powerful not because they are powerful, but more so because women give up their power by being powerless. The point is that women can also be responsible for their own powerlessness, which is internal exclusion in the case of AHE. It is clear that power relations play a critical role in determining who tends to dominate, and whom.

Cementing Fay’s standpoint, Bhana and Pillay’s (2012: 92-93) study exposes that, although HE in Africa has created new pathways for women academics, this formal recognition of equality has not provided women with an indisputable agency. In their view, gender functions in ways that reproduce and contest how women position themselves within these patterns. This means that women’s agency is at the core of equality and, without it, women’s presence in AHE is rather disempowering, since they cannot exercise their freedom as equal agents. The point that these authors are making is that women’s ability to negotiate and work with the demands of academia and the demands of child care and home arrangements depend on their ability to exercise power in both contexts (Bhana & Pillay, 2012: 93). I agree with these authors’ position that AHE needs to be aware of the perpetuation of patriarchal, masculine academic identities, which position women in a marginal way. For them, women are not merely acted upon by patriarchal systems, but they reproduce (as they challenge) unequal gender relations, which are indicative of how both women and men are culprits of internal exclusion. Therefore, I argue that women themselves, as a disempowered group, have a role to play in such relations when they succumb to dominant and authoritarian norms that propel their internal exclusion in HE.

Abu-Lughod (2006: 162) points out that “we may want justice for women, but can we accept that there might be different ideas about justice and that different women might want or choose different futures from what we envision as best?” We must consider that they might be called to personhood, so to speak, in different ways. That is to say, what counts as inclusion or equality somewhere (say, in the USA) might be exclusion (say, in Africa). Paradoxically, what looks like patriarchal injustice (for example female circumcision) in one culture, might be perceived as a noble act of justice to another culture. The point Abu-Lughod is making is that there are different issues arising from patriarchy, such as the conflicting relations among women’s groups
themselves, either in separate or similar contexts. Traditional women tend to defend patriarchal male domination over women’s subordination, while the other group advocates for women’s liberation from all unjust practices, including female genital mutilation/circumcision. Another group defends this cultural practice and regards female circumcision as a way of life and beneficial to women. I find this standpoint appealing, since there are different cultures evident in African societies, and the dilemma lies in the fact that there is no homogenous African type of culture, and as such it constitutes several others. Within cultural diversity, my contention is that, with a fast growing society, change is vital, especially in relation to the universal call for women and other groups to exercise their democratic human rights as equal beings despite their differences. For the internally excluded women to halt the dichotomy of patriarchal oppressive beliefs and practices embedded within AHE, I turn to Okin’s perception of whether “multiculturalism is bad for women”.

5.2.2.2 Beyond women’s right to exit towards intercultural dialogue

Considering the fact that women’s experiences of internal exclusion are widespread in AHE, as alluded to throughout this study, the question is: “what should they do?” Okin (2009) problematises patriarchal cultural beliefs and their conditions of male domination, chauvinism and authoritarianism. To her, since women are more than half of the world’s population, any theory based on the liberty or well-being of individuals cannot afford to ignore them or to pay relatively little attention to discrimination against them – in this case internal exclusion (Okin, 2009: 134). Her argument is that, in many cultural or religious groups on whom liberal theorists have drawn for special rights or exemptions, women are far less likely than men to be able to exercise “the right to exit”. Okin (2009: 135) compellingly argues that, when some individuals (girls and women) are unable to oppose oppressive practices or choose an alternative mode of life, for instance refuse to marry or to live as a lesbian in many African societies, while others are far more likely to be able to do so, this is a serious violation of the equality of persons that is basic to liberalism. I echo her viewpoint that, when women are treated unequally in various important ways within their cultural groups, it can affect their capacities to exercise the right of exit. In this way, the excluded women will end up having fewer chances to change the group’s norms and practices, including being able to remedy their status and to achieve gender equality in AHE.

As a result, Okin calls for “the right to exit” for the excluded groups namely women as a solution to the problem. However, I am sceptical about whether African women who are raised in traditional patriarchal cultures can easily decide to exit their oppressive society, such as in AHE. Some may lack the capability to articulate and be normalised by the set norms, which entail an impediment to exiting their cultures, however oppressive these cultures might be. Secondly, if a woman decides to exit, where will she exit to? I agree that to exit one’s culture, in this case AHE, is a very risky
option, since such disobedience may be punished by rape, honour killing, passion killing, or even being excommunicated from society (Benhabib, 2002; Familusi, 2012). Women who decide to exit may need to migrate to other areas, other than their places of birth, in order to avoid alienation and punishment, which in itself is a non-liberating practice. In my view, only when all women are empowered and capacitated to transcend the set of norms that thwart their quest for equality and internal inclusion, the right of exit might not be realised.

Efforts to debunk the oppressive patriarchal culture that perpetuates women’s internal exclusion, I examine Benhabib’s notion of intercultural dialogue in order to find appropriate ways through which the internally excluded groups could be retained, rather than exiting their society, including AHE. Benhabib proposes intercultural dialogue that will enable women not to dismiss and be disobedient to their patriarchal cultures, the act that may exposes them to ramification. Thus, for Benhabib (2002: ix-x), culture is a complex human practice of signification and representation, of organisation and attribution, which is internally driven by conflicting narratives. She is of the opinion that cultures are formed through complex dialogues with other cultures. As such, the dialogue between and with others is internal rather than external to the culture itself. Only when we accept the internal complexity and essentialness of cultures will the struggles for recognition that expand democratic dialogue by denouncing the exclusivity and hierarchy of existing cultural arrangements deserve our support. For her, what matters is the preservation and safeguarding of the minority cultures within liberal-democratic institutions which in a way may expand the circle of democratic inclusion.

Democratic theorists like her defend the political incorporation of new groups (minorities, including women) into established societies, which results in hybridisation of the cultural legacy on both sides. I am inclined to Benhabib’s (2002: xi) argument of calling for the recognition of minority cultures as a way of democratic inclusion. From the viewpoint of respect for others’ identity, Waghid (2011b: 31) elaborates that “the point about respecting the life world of others is that it involves experiencing them as they present themselves and not fitting into some kind of preconceived picture of one’s own imaginings – that is, what others should be like”. To put it differently, it could be said that, to include others internally, one has to demonstrate respect for others, not just for being women but as equal human beings, while considering their divergent identities in AHE. I am endeared to the above view of democratic inclusion and respect that potentially may happen when AHE endorses democratic deliberative practices via cultural dialogue as a plausible option in addressing the patriarchal culture of domination.
5.3 How do patriarchal beliefs undermine internal inclusion in African higher education?

This analysis shows how a patriarchal cultural belief reflects through male domination, chauvinism and authoritarian practices – all conditions that perpetuate internal exclusion in AHE, of which further evidence will be provided in the next section. Each condition might have a distinctive character, but all are interconnected in fulfilling a particular goal to dominate women and other groups, not only in their homes, but also in HE. Paterson (2001) observes that the idea of male fundamentalists and female inexpressiveness, based on gender roles, perpetuates inequality. I agree with her critique of the understanding that “women function better as nurturers and caretakers because they were naturally well suited for it, given their biologically determined reproductive capacity; thus, women’s roles were termed expressive”. Men, in turn, are regarded as better suited to the workplace because “they were thought to be physically and emotionally better suited to the harshness of the working world; thus, men’s roles were labelled instrumental” (Paterson, 2001: 42-44). Paterson also highlights how this belief can be traced to the 1950s, when women who acquired employment outside their husbands’ homes were blamed for male unemployment and were called “castrators”. With this in mind, one can say that, when women access senior leadership positions in HE they are perceivably considered as a threat to men. The fact that patriarchal cultural norms of male domination over female subordination are socially learned through reinforcement influences people’s (women and men) ways of doing things, even in HE. These gender roles, taken as norms, normalise people’s way of life and their daily practices, eventually influencing women’s internal exclusion in AHE.

5.3.1 Women as students

Since patriarchy denotes rule by the father or sons, people from such traditional cultures see a female person as submissive and subordinate to men. The same mechanism is applied to exclude female students internally in HE. Such attitudes are mostly associated with Millett’s (1969) three dimensions of understanding women: temperament, gender roles and status. Within this framework, women are characterised as the weaker sex and more emotional than rational. It is assumed that such ideas prejudice women in deliberations. Again, regarding gender roles, women’s power is limited to the private realm (home and reproduction) and is used as a standard for their level of engagement, and their voices are marginalised in democratic processes in higher education. Rich (1980: 40) avers that male-constructed sex roles are stereotypical and discourage women’s access to courses like engineering, science and technology, and other masculine-oriented pursuits. Offering an example of some female students, Akin (2011:1) asserts that women's participation is limited due to their social navigation of the structures of power through relationships with men; even their representation can only reinforce the very basis of women's
subordinate status. On conflicting power relations in higher education, women in academia at a rural South African institution report:

Sometimes you find that I am here working with people who are friends with my father. Instead of talking to me as a professional, they will go home to my father and say, 'talk to your daughter. She is not behaving well. She is rude to me'. So you find that people who have no business interfering with your work come to you and say, 'Professor so-and-so says you are rude to him. You must be careful how you talk to him'. Now I have to explain myself. With us women, we have to explain ourselves all the time. Otherwise our professional actions are misinterpreted (Mabokela, 2003: 141).

This shows how women in academia are not regarded as individuals with agency, but those from whom male intervention is sought, in this case her father, to discipline her, which means that family ties can determine one’s functioning in academia. In my opinion, the status of women affects their participation even in political and social deliberation on policy making and decision making. More so, my contention is that patriarchal cultural beliefs influence students’ attitudes towards one another in HE. I connect these views to chauvinistic questions posed to me on why I had decided to study philosophy and whether I would make it or would ask my supervisor to conduct the research for me. This led some colleagues (women and men alike) to begin to doubt my completion of a Master’s degree in Education Policy Studies cum laude and the credibility of my work, and some even asked whether my supervisor did the research for me. This is due to the patriarchal belief that women cannot undertake philosophical studies because they are emotional, unless favours are paid towards the completion of their studies. Another example is that of an older woman, beyond the age of 60, who in her quest for knowledge is presumed to have exceeded the limit of acquisition of knowledge in Africa. Moreover, when she was widowed, her culture expects of her to wear a black mourning outfit for a year. Her presence therefore in the university would trigger several comments and questions about “why not stay home and come back after a year?” Quite clearly then, one can connect such questions to socially constructed gender roles, that is, mothering-by-women and leading-by-men, which cause this imbalance of power between males and females. As a result, such patriarchal biases inhibit women from seeking to study and work in the intellectual professions, as they are usually regarded as incapable and unfit to do so.

Some questions about why one cannot fulfil one’s role as an African woman and mother and being accused of running away from the gender role of bearing and rearing babies and looking after the house, readily come to mind. These prejudicial remarks stir internal exclusion, making women feel intimidated and discriminated against or causing them to decide not to participate in educational deliberations. Here I restate the argument I made elsewhere, namely that female students from
traditional cultural practices are exposed to great limitations imposed by patriarchy, including limitations on accessing HE in Africa (Shanyanana, 2011). This is tied to how a colleague, referred to above, suffers multiple exclusion and stigmatisation because she decided to break the cultural norm of how women of her age in particular are expected to stay home, work in the field and look after the grandchildren. Different voices enquired why she was “wasting her time in higher education rather than looking after her grandchildren, etc.” At the same time, although she met a professor who was willing to supervise her research, she could not access funding for the study because she was considered too old and there seems to be no funding catering for mature students of her age in Africa. Intricately, women’s internal exclusion is experienced differently by different groups and from diverse backgrounds. This leads to some female students in institutions of higher learning being confronted with prejudicial attitudes due to their sexual orientation, as a result of living in a heterosexist and homophobic society. One student states:

One of my lecturers, Ms Adam, will always refer to me as “he”. Whenever she makes examples she would use my name and say “he this” and “he that” and the whole class would laugh. There was also Mr Hugo who did not seem to be sensitive about how he would refer to me in class. He would call me a “tomboy” and I dislike being referred to as such. One day I became courageous and I asked Mr Hugo to spare me a few minutes. I explained to him that there is something that I would like to convey to the class. I told my classmates that I do not appreciate it when they laugh whenever Ms Adam refers to me as “he”. And to Mr Hugo I am not a “tomboy” but a lesbian. I politely asked him to refer to me with my first name (Tati, 2009: 65).

Tati further asserts that this is a projection of gender stratification and an intolerance of a gender identity that is perceived to be “abnormal” and deviant from the dominant heterosexual norms. It is not surprising that any dominant group (men) will try hard to keep subordinate groups (women) away from knowledge (see Mabokela & Magubane, 2004; Paterson, 2001; Pillay, 2007). It is clear by now, as I have tried to show, that an increase in knowledge brings with it not only increased status, but also increased power, exactly what the entire patriarchal structure is designed to prevent. The above encounters are not only peculiar to students, but also to staff members.

5.3.2 Women as staff members and academics

Although women are statistically represented in HE, the patriarchal gender roles determine the kind of positions they occupy and what contribution they make in educational engagements. Meanwhile, women who participate encounter discriminatory attitudes and treatment from both

129
women and men (Akin, 2011; Barnes, 2007: 11; Kwesiga, 2002: 140; Pillay, 2007). It is, however, worthy to note that even women themselves might discourage others to pursue a higher position on the basis of the patriarchal belief that men are leaders and women should be servers. Women who dare to get beyond the norms will be categorised as radicals and militants. Moreover, Mabokela (2003) exposes how patriarchy undermines women administrators, who experience resistance not only from their male colleagues, but from their female counterparts. She states that some women are more tolerant of male power and readily accept male authority. Yet they constantly question and undermine rather than support women in positions of seniority. This is a phenomenon one female administrator described as the “PhD syndrome”, that is, the “pull her down” attitude. Mabokela (2003: 138) illustrates the analogy of the “pull her down” attitude:

> You know, we as women don’t always support each other. That’s a problem. If you are a successful woman, it’s not like everybody will be supportive. There is a lot of that here. A male boss can tell you where to get off, but a female can’t. My supervisor is having a tough time up there. She is a woman and our society is very patriarchal. You often hear people say “what’s wrong with this auntie?” That’s how they respond to her. They don’t give her the respect and deference that a person in a very senior position at this institution deserves … As a woman, you get these snide remarks but you just have to rise above that. When you do something good, don’t expect good feedback and acknowledgement. That’s the attitude.

The “PhD syndrome” attitude expressed above shows how women are cynical about their fellows’ viewpoints and contribute to their own internal exclusion, which connects to the patriarchal belief of domination and subordination. The point is, women in general, especially those from traditional African cultures, have been perceived as less privileged, subjugated and largely subordinated, and as being placed to carry out inferior jobs aligned with their traditional gender roles, even in AHE. On the dual roles of being academics and mothers in Africa, Barnes (2007: 8) poses rhetorical questions: “Who has hewn the wood, drawn the water, and who is now being paid to think? Where are the lines of power and exclusion?” These questions are very relevant in understanding patriarchal effects on women’s research and publications in AHE. She posits that colonialism transmitted the traditional European distinctions between men and masculinity as being directly linked to the labour of the mind, while women and femininity are associated with labour of the body. The idea is that learning in HE is a combative and aggressive process – that is, the worthy candidate is the one who survives attacks and beats her foe(s) and whose experience of intellectual combat is intrinsic to intellectual life and production. This categorisation of women as being labourers of the body and men as labourers of the mind manifests how patriarchal beliefs and conditions of male domination permeate HE.
On the question of patriarchal interpretation, Davids (2012: 160-162) confirms that, inasmuch as Muslim women – like other women in AHE – have the right to seek the knowledge they pursue, they have the responsibility to make informed choices about the type of knowledge they pursue, with what they agree, and with what they disagree even through research. The challenge for Muslim women, like other women of other belief systems, rests in their willingness to take control of their own identity construction and enactment, hence a need for respect for the diversity and multiple identities that women uphold (Davids, 2012: 160). This augments my viewpoint that change will come only when women in AHE begin to redefine their identity construction through a voice and propose new norms through research and publication. More so, the main concern is not solely patriarchy, but the way such beliefs are seen as rigid norms that cannot be challenged. Also, the fact that women have shown dual images and roles, of domestic responsibility and public obligation, means that their research and publication might be negatively affected. Barnes, taking a cue from other African scholars, asserts that scholarship can be a threatening and hazardous place to call home (2007: 12-13). In other words, African universities should not be seen as static, gender-neutral spaces, but are marked with codes for man-as-thinker, man-as-aggressive-debater, man-as-athlete, boys-becoming-men, etc. The point is that women are challenged by perceivably men dominating work environments, not only statistically, but also through social and symbolic processes. Ogundipe, in recounting her experience of academia in Nigeria, states the following:

Most men do not like women concerned with social transformations that shake the roots of their male dominance. As a colleague of mine said to me at Ibadan University, “No man wants a revolution in his kitchen”. This was in the eighties, and a female college professor’s space was still considered to be the kitchen … When I began talking and writing feminism in the late sixties and seventies, I was seen as a good and admirable girl who had gone astray, a woman whose head has been spoilt by too much learning (cited in Barnes, 2007: 15).

In light of the foregoing, universities remain men-dominated spaces, which mean that women have to struggle to acquire internal inclusion. Looking at women’s experiences of internal exclusion, one may ask: how much childcare do African males do and how many African female academics are responsible for childcare? (Barnes, 2007: 21). Undoubtedly, these gender roles contribute to women’s internal inclusion, since their dual roles – caring for the family and academic work – are not considered in HE, which hinders their contribution to knowledge production. As an academic, mother and executive, Ramphele (1995), in her memoir, *Mamphela Ramphele: A Life*, shares her experience of being one of the first black women executives at a university in South Africa:
Black women executives have to fight cultural stereotypes held by many people in society, including their own colleagues, about the place and role of black women. Black women executives fit the role of the witch perfectly: they are the ultimate transgressors. One way in which people attempt to deal with the transgression is to find a male connection with whom to identify the woman executive. The male connection resolves the enigma of a successful woman – she is seen as acting because of, or on behalf of, him. Her own discomforting agency is thus denied (Ramphele, 1995: 178-179).

The above quotation shows how substantially patriarchal cultural beliefs undermine the agenda of women’s internal inclusion in AHE as researchers. Ramphele further describes her encounter during her first presentation to the Anthropology Department seminar in 1987, when she engaged on the concept of patriarchy. Her conceptualisation was informed by feminist literature from the United States and research on the dynamics of gender in the migrant labour hostels of Cape Town. For her, “patriarchy is the system of male-dominated power relations I saw in operation” (1995: 167). She narrates what seems to be an appalling experience, when one of her colleagues objected to the use of the term “patriarchy”, because the concept was not commonly used in South Africa at that time. “He told me that anthropologists did not like using such terms, whereupon I reminded him that I was not there to become an anthropologist, and that I would continue to use the term anyway”. In her words, she reflected that “the exchange between my colleague and me was indicative of the tensions which existed between traditional and non-traditional approaches to social science in our discipline.

As a newcomer to academic life, I could go where angels feared to tread” (Ramphele, 1995: 167). My interpretation of her memoir in relation to the concept of patriarchy manifests an experience of patriarchal culture: first, as a black African woman brought up in a patriarchal society. Secondly, it tells of her encounters in a patriarchal marriage, where her husband had chauvinistic attitudes and refused to share house chores, and expected her (a medical doctor) to fulfil both her duty as a medical doctor and her role as a wife (Ramphele, 1995: 154-157). Thirdly, it reveals her being the first black South African woman to occupy a leadership position (Vice-Chancellor) in a typical white male-dominated university, where she learned to fit in regardless of being a woman. The aforementioned instance exemplifies the reality of patriarchal influences in HE in Africa.

Given the above, I contend that patriarchal beliefs negatively influence relations between people, including women academics and especially in their contribution to research and the theories they adopt. In the same vein, Lewin (2006: 48) criticises the assumption that “women are too busy with the realities of childbirth and child-rearing” and thus “have less time for or less propensity towards the making of models of society, for each other, for men, or for ethnographers”. This ties in well with how women are silenced by cultural norms that undermine their ability to articulate public
issues. Lewin (2006: 42; 47) argues vividly that male domination characterises most cultures, and also applies to research in HE. Women's voices are thus discounted because they do not seem to respond to research or they are simply presumed to have nothing to offer because they are at the marginal both politically and economically. Thus, the influence of male power interests, gender-differentiated roles and state control assists in perpetuating gender inequality in education. This picture shows how the gendered power relations prevent women's access to knowledge production because of the temperament, role and status of women in HE.

However, Pillay (2007: 158) suggests that “women should critique patriarchal thought, ways of being, construct new ways of thinking and being, but to also reconstruct internal and external oppressive ways of being and thinking”. This argument supports my central concern, because women in HE in Africa could express their distress and dissatisfaction through research and deliberation with their fellow human beings. I echo her argument that women, particularly academic mothers, require a lot of learning in order to exercise their freedoms in HE. In the light of this, I contend that patriarchy and its norms of male domination and female subordination impede inclusivity in AHE. Even though AHE has made strides in attaining external exclusion, the dilemma of internal inclusion remains. Thus, I proceed to debunk gender advocacy for inclusion.

5.4 The effects of a gendered response to internal exclusion

Before examining the effects of patriarchal beliefs, let me draw from a few concepts of gender in order to establish a premise for this debate. Gender is essentially a social construct and largely denotes the social and historical constructions of masculine and feminine roles. In addition, the entire range of institutions, values and practices are inherently built to sustain, deepen and, certainly, undermine it (Imam, 1997: 2). On the impact of gender as socially constructed, Obi (2003: 6) highlights that there is nothing natural about gender roles and that they could be static or dynamic, based on the equilibrium of social forces and the influence of factors of history, culture, power and production. In this section, I work in consonance with Obi’s assertion that the reality of the patriarchal condition of male domination is reproduced, thereby intensifying its salience to social mobilisation. This implies that the analysis of gender, in Obi’s words, “invariably focuses on women, and the ways the architecture of social power tend to subordinate the female to male power” (2003: 6). With this in mind, gender relations are therefore engaged as social constructs that reflect the dominant power relations among people. The systematic patterns of internal exclusion, the impact of other forms of relations with other groups, cannot be ignored. This is because different people experience internal exclusion differently, based on their level of confidence and ability to disrupt the power relations confronting them. The point is that no one
should rely on gender as a standard or an approach to engender internal inclusion, considering the fact that it is socially constructed.

As I argued earlier, gendered roles lead women to be relegated to specific fields, courses, jobs and positions that correlate with their assigned or socially constructed roles. In this way, women may continue to encounter internal exclusion instigated by patriarchal beliefs and structures. And this will jeopardise the AHE agenda to attain substantive inclusion. With the same concern, Akin (2011: 3) reemphasises that advocating for feminisation or the gendering of equality and development (in this case internal inclusion) is a roundabout way of campaigning for a reverse domination of men in the development agenda. At the same time, “the role construction sets men as a perpetual aggressors, the ‘doers’, and women as the perpetual victims, always innocent may influence hatred between the two categories” (Akin, 2011: 3). In affirmation of the above point, there is evidence that the patriarchal condition of male domination is not only reinforced by men, but women are also culprits, since these norms are learned through cultural practices and inherently transmitted from generation to generation. As a consequence, the gendered call for equality, inclusion and development will impede the transformation of the current higher educational system.

Although some feminists have made giant strides in addressing forms of external exclusion in HE, the gender equality approach overlooks the diversity and dynamism of the category of woman. The socially constructed category woman constitutes issues such as status, race, class and even sexual orientation. It is clear that the advocacy of equality and inclusion based on gender leads to further internal exclusion, rather than inclusion. This is so because the same category is used to exclude, especially those who fall out of the category of woman. Attempts to denounce the ideologies that perpetuate such a disaster, Badinter (2006: 93) asserts that, no religion or culture can ever have the last word against the equality of the sexes. Simply put, equality is best guaranteed by a universal law that everyone has to observe, rather than by relativism, which opens the door to all kinds of exceptions. It is within this understanding that I concur that we need to deconstruct the African cultural norms that perpetuate the marginalisation and oppression of other people, in this case women, in HE, hence my call for a “move beyond the norms” that stir internal exclusion.

In transcending the gender category – woman and man – I agree with Harding (2008: 110) that gender is not just about women, but also about men and, most importantly, the social relations between them. In other words, gender characteristics, including patriarchal beliefs, mark a woman and man differently based on their gender relations in each culture. One can identify attributes, behaviours and attitudes of both women and men in different cultures, depending on their nurturing and experience. For example, if a woman was raised in a traditional rural community where a man is the only provider, such a practice would shape understanding accordingly – that is, males would be privileged. Likewise, a man who experiences a less patriarchal environment, in which a woman
is the primary sources of income, might shape understanding in a way that alleviates the situation. Having said this, it is clear that there are many ways in patriarchal structures that influence an understanding of both women and men, in particular where gender is used to favour particular interests that promote gender segregation. In my view, AHE requires a non-gendered approach to inclusion that is equalisation of voice. Here it is necessary to take a cursory look at different studies in Africa on the dilemma of male domination and chauvinism prevailing in the society to advance the point I am making.

Contrary to the popular idea of gender, Oyewumi (1997) challenges the usefulness of gender as an analytic concept for Africa. She argues that, amongst the Yoruba of Nigeria, language is gender neutral and social roles and relations between men and women are based primarily on the notion of seniority. In this way, men and women can assume powerful positions by virtue of their age and seniority within a family. It is then questionable whether the notion of gender relations and roles is indeed biologically based or not. One can argue that the concept of gender in the African context is controversial and that different groups view it differently. The given example attests to my argument for a non-gendered approach that potentially can respond to the needs of all people. Notably, Ampofo, Boeku-Betts and Osirim (2008: 6) stress the tensions and contradictions that question whether there is a broad or otherwise “African” woman or man, and that African women’s and men’s lives, like those of all people, are fluid and change over time. Secondly, the generalised assumption that perceives all women, like men, as heterosexuals is exclusive, and ignores differences within the category of women, just like that of men. I argue that a gendered response to internal exclusion and inequality will create what I call “women’s self-exclusion” rather than inclusion (Butler, 1990; Paterson, 2001; Tamale, 2011). More importantly, since many higher education institutions in Africa are heterosexually orientated, reinforcing male domination through a gendered response will stir conflict between heterosexual and homosexual women. On these grounds, a non-gendered approach is imperative for Africa, in terms of which all human beings celebrate equality irrespective of gender within an enabling environment in which they can air their voices with the hope to engender substantial inclusion in AHE.

5.5 Beyond a gender divide: towards a non-gendered approach to internal inclusion

The non-gendered framework rests not only on what women should not do, but on what women and men alike ought to do as human beings. In order to reconstruct the norms that oppress women in higher education settings, there is a need to interrogate such norms in order to enable women’s emancipation. In my view, a gendered approach strives to include all people in higher education, irrespective of their gender differences, and treats them as respectable human beings. With this approach, women who experience internal exclusion and injustice will be treated like other human beings.
beings, rather than as subordinated women, as a way to become agents of change. In all efforts made to transform HE, women, like men, need to contribute to what counts as norms, instead of the socially constructed gender roles, which lead to internal exclusion. Ignoring these oppressive cultural norms that reinforce patriarchy, we shall keep working within the definitions that someone else provides. On the need to reconstruct norms, I draw on Butler’s words:

To say gender is performative is to say that it is a certain kind of enactment; the ‘appearance’ of gender is often mistaken as a sign of its internal or inherent truth; gender is prompted by obligatory norms to be one gender or the other (usually within a strictly binary frame), and the reproduction of gender is thus always a negotiation with power; and finally, there is no gender without this reproduction of norms that risks undoing or redoing the norm in unexpected ways, thus opening up the possibility of a remaking of gendered reality along new lines (2009: i).

This seems relevant in understanding the influence of patriarchal conditions, such as male domination and chauvinism, within the gender norms that perpetuate women’s internal exclusion in AHE. With this in mind, I revisit the argument that a gendered approach to inclusion means working within what norms have been prescribed for men and women. It is evident enough to argue that working within this norm is counterproductive, since we are dancing to the tune of someone else’s music. Hence the need to create another tune by going for non-gendered approaches, which, in Butlerian terms, would be an attempt at setting a new norm (Butler, 2009). I find Butler’s argument compelling as it reemphasises the need to dismantle the current norms and suggest possible new norms relevant for the African context. Familusi’s (2012: 310) suggests on the need to challenge the oppressive African cultural beliefs and practices that are detrimental to women and encumber the transformation of educational institution in Africa. Only when the current structure and norms are disrupted, debunked and challenged might we expect legitimate transformation towards democratising higher education in terms of a non-gendered approach, which I endeavour to discuss in the following chapter.

5.5.1 Why patriarchal conditions are undesirable acts that undermine our humanity

Patriarchal conditions have been shown to be discriminatory and to subjugate the category of woman. This leads to the question of how AHE can engender transformation in the midst of diverse influences, especially male domination over women’s subordination. If women were treated differently in post-independent HE, can the production of knowledge in such democratic public institutions be credible? Okin’s (1992: 65) sceptical observation regarding this is that educational
institutions as associational networks of civil society can also teach deference to authority and intolerance towards others’ faiths, prejudice against other races, and male dominance over women. Nonetheless, despite the latter observation, the question whether there are possibilities for transformation in HE from Waghid’s (2004: 34) position shifts my focus to the point that, even though HE institutions have often been used to promote difference, male domination, chauvinism, xenophobia, and illiberal and undemocratic practices, there still is hope that they could promote transformation. This calls us not to be distracted from the fact that schools and HE can be reorganised, particularly in Africa, to be effective in what Glendon (1991: 109) refers to as “seedbeds of civic virtues”.

The above ideas support and redirect us to the thinking that HE holds the authority to re-educate and nurture students, female and male, to respect one another’s differences and treat one another as equal human beings. For this reason, there is a need to reconsider an appropriate approach to achieving equality in AHE. On the question whether people’s cultures must be discarded or preserved in order to achieve equality, Appiah (2006) clarifies that cultures are internally diverse and constantly changing; they express scepticism about whether cultures have anything like an “essence” that could be or needs to be preserved. Although I seem to agree with Appiah’s position above, my query of his view is that it limits women’s liberation and equality as such that there is need for serious scrutiny of this kind of assertion. This line of argument is relevant in defending the premise that a patriarchal belief such as male domination, which threatens an AHE transformation agenda, requires alteration, but not the right to exit culture as Okin advocates.

Gyekye (1997: 135) cautions that, in order to address local problems, we need a Western view (democratic inclusion) to be rooted in an African cultural way of life. Gyekye argues against both “the wholesale, uncritical, nostalgic acceptance of the past tradition and the wholesale rejection of it on the grounds that cultural tradition, however ‘primitive’, would have positive as well as negative features” (1997: 135). It must be clear by now that one cannot totally exit his/her culture, since it is a way of life with exceptional values. Rather, oppressive beliefs such as male domination should be challenged. In the same manner, Davids (2011: 16) posits that individuals, for instance Muslim women, who are also victims of men’s subjugation in the guise of religion, have the right to be valued, since their value is determined by what they do. And what they do can neither be separated from who they are, nor from the community that has shaped them.

Given the complexity of HE, in which women live multiple identities – private and public – patriarchal beliefs cannot be taken as rigid norms that are unchangeable. The problem lies when the taken-for-granted norms, which are oppressive, make us believe that all we are doing is normal, without realising how hostile and perpetual we are to internal exclusion. Simply put, my concern is not necessarily with the concept of patriarchy, which has been conceptualised through generations, but with the identification of the subtle forms of patriarchy that we regard as normal, in
spite of the fact that they are oppressive. If HE, especially universities in Africa, do not take issues of internal exclusion seriously, then legitimate transformation will remain a dream. The issues of patriarchy explored here are not only peculiar to the African context, but to all cultures that identified to be patriarchal.

While African cultural practices reinforce patriarchy through male domination and chauvinism, Western cultures sustain it through colonialism, education, religion and media in African societies, particularly in HE. In sum, HE scorecard in Africa has always been and still is a gendered element. I agree with Assié-Lumumba’s argument that African realities require those engaged in basic and applied research to take into account the social dynamics of the interaction between men and women in order to refine the concept of gender. Given the specific social context of Africa, “the gender approach in research must demonstrate vigilance against all forms of sexism and at the same time against epistemological imperialism” (Assié-Lumumba, 2006b: 41) Considering the fact that such institutions constitute people from different cultures, backgrounds and levels of understanding, the effects of patriarchy vary greatly. In sum, transformation can potentially take place when higher education institutions transcend the boundaries of the patriarchal cultural conditions of male domination.

5.6 Summary

In this chapter, I argued that patriarchal beliefs as reflected in male domination and chauvinism are fundamental conditions that perpetuate the subjugation of women. Such conditions give impetus to internal exclusion, which hinders the whole project of transformation and social justice in AHE. I claim that patriarchal beliefs are embedded within cultures and taken as norms that normalise people. I contend that patriarchal cultural practices are strategies that preserve male domination, chauvinism and authoritarianism and stir internal exclusion. I also argued that the gendered response to internal exclusion, which employs the traditional gender category of woman and man, is worrying. This is because defenders of gender equality ignore women’s multiple identities and diversity within that category – for instance women from poor backgrounds and traditional patriarchal cultures, lesbians, gays, intersexed and transgendered. My conception of patriarchy is foregrounded in Millett's and Rich's analysis of the role of women in society, while culture is connected to Okin's right to exit, Benhabib's idea of intercultural dialogue and Butler's calls for new norms towards an inclusive democratic HE. This analysis exhibits that women live in an array of images that is their gender roles within the cultural understanding of living in the private and the democratic rights of the public. I argue that such women envelope themselves with multiple images as they navigate through their patriarchal society and HE. I call for a non-gendered framework that bridges the gender divide without leading to internal exclusion. I call for a non-gendered approach
that possibly may disrupt antagonistic and unsympathetic cultural patriarchal beliefs that thwart 
women’s internal inclusion. I am under no illusion that disrupting such conditions inevitably may 
avert internal exclusion. Yet, its disruption may prompt HE to begin rethinking the fixed patriarchal 
cultural norms, which are anomalous to transformation in Africa. The ensuing chapter will answer 
how HE can engender internal inclusion while respecting diversity and recognising people as equal 
human beings, rather than gendered beings. The focus is on a reconstruction of a non-gendered 
approach as a new norm that potentially may engender substantial inclusion in AHE.
CHAPTER SIX

ETHICS OF CARE RECONSTITUTED: AN APPROACH TO INTERNAL INCLUSION

6.1 Introduction

The preceding chapter has shown that patriarchy (i.e. male domination over female subordination), chauvinism and authoritarianism are conditions that perpetuate women’s internal exclusion in AHE. The problem, it is shown, lies in the dominant and gendered character of power relations between women and men. Within such relations, women encounter internal exclusion and unjust practices, as they are denied full participation in democratic deliberative processes in HE. In this case, excluding others, primarily women, is an unfavourable and pernicious practice, which is appalling in efforts for the transformation and development of Africa. This chapter explores the conception of an ethics of care that could meaningfully advance pertinent democratic ideals, namely inclusion and equality towards justifiable HE in Africa. The key issue is to establish what constitutes an ethics of care, and how such a concept can be reconstructed and brought to the fore to address women’s internal exclusion in AHE. To accomplish this goal, the chapter begins with some preliminary remarks on an ethics of care, from antiquity to the contemporary epoch, in order to trace its history.

The first section centres on the conception of an ethics of care based on the influential ideas of Nel Noddings, Michael Slote and Alasdair MacIntyre. The second section is a reconstitution of an ethics of care prompted by the polemical notions of some of the renowned scholars, namely Jacques Rancière (intellectual equality), Seyla Benhabib (iterations), Martha Nussbaum (compassionate respect) and Stanley Cavell (acknowledging humanity). The third section defends a reconstituted non-gendered ethics of care that appears to possess enabling conditions for transforming the power relations among human beings, such that they treat one another in a just and humane manner. The aim is to adopt the culture of an ethics of care that may disrupt internal exclusion and make it impossible or unlikely to happen. This framework could invoke caring relations among those who recognise the other not according to gender, but as respectable human beings with dignity.
6.2 Ethics of care: from an ancient to a contemporary account

Before examining the conception of an ethics of care, I like to delve into the discourse on ethical virtue traced from the works of ancient Greek philosophers such as Aristotle. As a philosopher of virtue, Aristotle regarded caring as legitimate for rational beings, in this case men, unlike women, who were disregarded in the public realm. In a collection of his writings, *The Nicomachean Ethics*20, Aristotle focused on an ethical virtue that concerns the lives of men who were born well, were politically free, and were very much concerned with a well-lived life. His emphasis on ethical virtue was on the public nature of the agora, which characterises Aristotle’s portrait of the ideal moral man, the man with a great soul, a deep voice and long strides (Ross, 2009; Thomas, 2011: 135). Ross remarks that “Aristotle accepts slavery and a lowly status for women, without question, though his remark on women’s love for their children is telling and sympathetic” (2009: xxviii). Even though Aristotle failed to acknowledge women’s public roles, one can concede that caring for their children and husbands and for the elderly is inevitable. In an Aristotelian view, caring for and about others is a central issue. It is further argued that care is both an attitude towards others as well as a skill to be acquired. In other words, care entails not only treating people with respect, but it is an attempt to empathise with them and act to help them by all means (Ross, 2009). Therefore, one can conclude that Aristotle’s virtue of ethics focuses on the caring relationships between younger and older men and the responsibilities involved, but seemingly discriminates against women.

However, the early feminist scholars started to debunk the masculine dominant approach and called for the recognition of women’s caring domestic roles, which has become one of the topical ideas of the 20th century. This response began as a critique of the prevailing ethical traditions, which privileged only men, and also constructed a distinctly feminine ethics of care. As a result, the idea of an ethics of care as a feminine feature can be traced to the women’s movement, which called for the recognition of women and the attainment of equality. One of the first theorists to challenge the masculine approach is Carol Gilligan, who questioned the view of her supervisor Lawrence Kohlberg that boys are caring beings. She critiqued the Kantian ethics expanded by Kohlberg, with his use of an all-male sample that might not apply to women. Gilligan (1982: 74) argues that the appeal to universal principles of rights, contractual reciprocity, or justice is more typical of males than of females.

Drawing from a feminine experience21, Gilligan posits that girls and women are more likely to conceive moral issues in terms of a concern for people's well-being in the act of caring. The point

20 The book is a practical manual for preparing the free-born young men of Athens for practical life lived in the public realm, which was considered the social and political space of the agora. The public forum was for men of high social standing, and the only vulnerability within that space was that between older men, who were assumed to be wiser on the grounds of experience, and younger men, who lacked that experience. This was a vulnerability of an entirely different order from that which existed between all of the men, and the women and slaves who lived in the same society (Ross, 2009; Thomas, 2011:135).

21 Gilligan further regards the ethics of care as “a progressively more adequate understanding of the psychology of human relationships… [which] informs the development of an ethic of care”. To her, ethics which reflect a cumulative knowledge of human relationships are more adequate than universal principles of rights and duties.
is that women have a duty to care for those who are in need, which then connects with their unrecognised domestic roles of caring for children, husbands and the elderly. Maathai (2009: 2) clarifies Gilligan’s view and adds that society suggests women ought to perform caring duties because that is their role. For example, if a woman has children, then her duty is to care for them. However, while Gilligan calls for the recognition of such kinds of caring roles, her view echoes Aristotle and Kant’s idea that human beings are rational beings, and attentiveness to the relational aspect of human nature makes care ethics unique among all previous ethical theories and traditions. The claim that humans are relational is a claim about the nature of human beings, which is a personal relationship with others. The suppositions of these studies stimulate and set up an oppositional view between women and men, which can be connected to a gendered kind of caring, which this study opposes.

Nonetheless, the ancient perception of an ethical caring is unavoidable in gaining a deeper understanding of the contemporary view of an ethics of care. Thus, tracing the discourse of an ethics of care could facilitate a construction of a more plausible approach to AHE. The questions behind this analysis are: What does an ethics of care entail? Who should care or who do we expect to care? Why should women’s acts of care be carried out outwardly rather than inwardly? Could an ethics of care address internal exclusion perpetuated by patriarchal dominant power relations in AHE? To answer these questions, different perspectives on an ethics of care will be examined that consider the historical understanding of care in relation to women. In this regard, it is helpful to consider Virginia Held’s (2006: 3) exposition:

In the past few decades, the ethics of care has developed as a promising alternative to the dominant moral approaches that have been invoked during the previous two centuries. It has given rise to an extensive body of literature and has affected many moral inquiries in many areas. It is changing the ways moral problems are often interpreted and changing what many think the recommended approaches to moral issues ought to be. With interest in normative perspectives expanding everywhere – from the outlines of egalitarian families and workplaces, to the moral responsibilities of parents and citizens, to the ethical evaluations of governmental and foreign policies – the ethics of care offers hope for rethinking in more fruitful ways how we ought to guide our lives. It has the potential of being based on the truly universal experience of care … Understanding the values involved in care, and how its standards reject violence and domination, are possible with the ethics of care.

relationships is about the idea that the self and the other are interdependent (1982: 74). In her view, it is impossible to be in a concrete, loving, personal, and caring relationship with all human beings.
Held (2006: 5) further notes that an ethics of care is only a few decades old, a very short time in the history of human attempts to evaluate how we should live our lives and to recommend what we ought to do. An ethics of care therefore, at this stage, still has many limitations and lacunae, but its development is an on-going, cooperative project. This approach predominantly privileges well-born men, with no consideration for women, and this forms Aristotle’s ethical ideal. Bearing in mind the above, one can concede that an ethics of care is a contested and complex concept which requires deeper reflection for a better understanding. At this point, I turn to the conception of an ethics of care that is central to this discussion.

6.2.1 A sympathetic relational approach to caring

This section will focus on one of the pioneering conceptions of an ethics of care espoused by the prominent American feminist scholar Nel Noddings. She is closely identified with the promotion of an ethics of care in American schools. Caring, as well as its place in ethical relations, is central in her ground-breaking text *Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education* (1984). Noddings categorises caring into two forms: natural and ethical. Natural caring is referred to as sympathetic caring and develops out of maternal relationships. Although her early position considered caring as distinctively feminine, she acknowledges, however, that this does not mean that men are incapable of thinking in such terms or should be discouraged from doing so. This implies that both women and men have the inherent capacity to care. It is interesting to justify Noddings’ advocacy for caring as a human capacity, taking into account her experience as a mother who cared for ten children – five biological and five adopted – which speaks volumes about her prominence in a home as a starting sphere for nurturing caring attributes. As a care ethicist, Noddings, like Gilligan, advocates for equal rights for women as caregivers, not only caring for families but also other human beings. Noddings (1984: 5) formulated the term “the one-caring” and “the cared-for” as role players in the caring relationship. This simply means a caring relationship constitutes two parties and each has a role to play. Portraying the caring relationship, she identifies mother and child as a perfect example. The mother is perceived as the one-caring for and a care giver to a child, whereas the cared-for or the person being cared for is the child.

Noddings categorises natural caring as a simple example of a caring relationship, but cautions that it not be applied as a model for general moral relations or an institutional political theory (1984: 46-48). In her view, natural caring occurs in circles of intimates and friends who are engrossed and immersed in one another. These circles may be linked through chains of affection when members of one circle form relations with members of another circle. Considering the identified fundamental roles of the carer and cared-for, the carer ought to listen and attend to the expressed and inferred needs, opinions and expectations of others, whereas the cared-for is expected to respond in the
light of Buber's account of ethical relationships of *I-Thou* (Noddings 1984: 32; 2006a; 2006b). Thus, the I and Thou relationship is depicted as one of direct connection between two persons. If I understand this account well, the presumption is that the carer ought to establish the needs of the cared for and act to address them, whereas the cared-for is required to respond to the care, which is so ethical.

Unlike natural caring, ethical caring requires people to act permissibly if our actions express or exhibit an attitude or motive of caring for others (Noddings, 1984: 128; 2006a). Noddings admits that, because ethical caring is regarded as a particular and situational morality, we may care about strangers in the sense of maintaining “an internal state of readiness to try to care for whoever crosses our path” (1984: 18). In this way, caring should be carried out by and to all human beings, based on their initial experience of caring received from home, school or elsewhere. From this compelling position, it therefore is helpful to explore her argument further in order to determine the possibility of applying this perspective of ethical caring to social institutions such as AHE. Furthermore, Noddings (2006a: 239-241) classifies this relationship as a form of engrossment, which entails an action in which people draw themselves into the particular world of the other, rather than meeting others on their own terms. To be precise, caring demands that one moves out of individuality into others and requires one to imagine the others (in this case the excluded groups) and act to improve their situation. In my view, when we care, we consider the others’ point of view, their objective needs (tangible materials, for instance a computer or funding), and what they expect of us when they are physically represented in democratic deliberation without articulating their views and making a meaningful contribution.

A care ethics therefore does not stipulate any substantive norms, but rather consists merely of an attitude of attending to their wants and needs. Therefore, it is vitally important to say that the goal “lies in trying to discern the kinds of things I must think about” in caring for others (Noddings, 1984: 13-14). This kind of caring is an “ethical relationship of care” and is distinct from the more direct natural caring, in terms of which an individual may only care for so many particular others, and each of these individuals must be treated particularly, without general rules or principles. In the main, an authentic act of caring involves other people in particular, as one is concerned about the situation a given person is in, and one’s focus is on the individual herself, rather than on any general moral principles. In my view, this form of ethical caring seems restrictive and ignores the autonomy of the cared-for.

In her book *The Challenge to Care in Schools: An Alternative Approach to Education* (1992), Noddings revised her earlier position of caring from a feminine approach and encourages educators to practise caring as a perfect form for education and schooling. Her viewpoint is that, when students are cared for, they can learn to care for themselves, for others (those known to them and those unknown), and for plants, animals and ideas (Noddings, 1992: 174-175). To put it
succinctly, our strangeness or differences within AHE should not prevent us from caring for each other, especially those in the excluded groups. I echo Noddings’s viewpoint that if we cannot have caring relations with those we do not know personally, then our moral relations with them demand that it would be wrong not to help people in a distant country who are victims of famine, HIV and AIDS, rape, sexual harassment and other forms of marginalisation, including internal exclusion encountered by women in AHE.

A decade later, in her publication *Starting at Home: Caring and Social Policy* (2002), Noddings extends her idea of caring to schools and social policy. She argues that an ethics of care, rather than being viewed as natural caring, can in fact guide schools and social policymaking. Taking into account this radical move, one may concede that Noddings realises that ethical caring, unlike natural caring, is paramount in cultivating caring in learners (human beings), hence the need for every human being to care. Despite this shift, Noddings (2002: 13) argues for caring social policies to be developed by “starting at home” and examining the types of practices that characterise the best or most caring home environments. It is observed that the most caring homes attend to the needs of dependants, respond to their wants (even though not always positively), promote independence and growth, avoid causing pain or using coercion whenever possible, and cultivate the ability to care. Caring in this context is associated with “sympathy rather than empathy since the former signifies feeling with nearly capturing the effective state of attention in caring, while the latter is a peculiarly western masculine feature” (Noddings, 2002: 14). The point here appears to be that there are particular ways of caring that are different from the caring offered by women in the home.

Nevertheless, she insists on the supreme moral value of directly caring-for others, but now adds that indirect and general forms of caring, or caring-about, deserve much more attention (Noddings, 2002: 22-23). Most profoundly, she argues that caring-about ought to be the predominant means of creating the necessary conditions in which the cared-for thrive, which seems not to be stipulated here. In view of this, this study establishes that, although we may not directly care for everyone, we can care “indirectly for others by working to establish social conditions in which care can flourish”, and anyone who fails to do so is truly not caring (Noddings, 2002: 48). On this score, I contend that social conditions should be established to address the necessities of the internally excluded groups so as to articulate their standpoints, like those of other members. Thus, social structures like AHE, if not well thought of, might be disempowering rather than empowering.

Noddings undertakes constant reflection of her initial position and expands the idea of the caring relationship. In her articles published subsequently, namely *Educating Whole People: A Response to Jonathan Cohen* (2006a) and *Educational Leaders as Caring Teachers*, (2006b), Noddings calls for ethical caring that educates the whole person, since such caring has a significant effect on the individual and is a “must-do” in a democratic society. For her, by cultivating ethical caring in
students, teachers need to demonstrate through their “own actions and attitudes, that we care about what our students are going through and that we are partners in search for meaning” (Noddings, 2006a: 238). One can infer that this viewpoint that it demands the carer not only to address the needs of the cared-for, but also to have a sense of imagination in these encounters. She restates that students' responses to care should not be in the form of gratitude, or a laid-down expectation to respond, as this limits the possibility to think anew and identify better ways of acquiring knowledge (Noddings, 2006b: 341). To achieve this, there are strategies that both the teacher and students ought to follow. Firstly, people involved require exposure to a variety of competing views and a willingness to discuss, analyse and evaluate them. Secondly, they require the exploration of emotions that accompany various views, namely facts and interpretations that contribute to the constitution of meaning (Noddings, 2006a: 238). It is argued, however, that for schools to achieve the above, reflection and critical thinking is fundamental features in social, emotional and ethical learning.

More importantly, our focus should be on nurturing relationships between educators and students, and also among students themselves, rather than focusing on tests, narrowly defined competency, curricula, assessments, surveys, questionnaires and so forth. To put it clearly, when creating relationships between students, we should focus on enacting in them possibilities to care for the other, which is the predominant aspect in Noddings’s idea of an ethics of care. In the absence of such caring relations, education will produce test-takers rather than complete caring persons. The point is that, without caring teachers, there is the danger of producing predominantly uncritical human beings whose practices require them to respond to the given and adhere blindly to assessment tools. Equally, treating students like mere technicians will hinder their probability to reach their fullest potential that is attaining inclusion. I concur with Noddings (2006a: 242) that education should integrate participation and responsive virtues into caring if we are to produce lifelong learners who desire to learn more, and to become competent, caring, loving and lovable people. This position connects to my acknowledgment that Noddings, like Gilligan, has made substantial contributions to care practices in education and debunked the taken-for-granted narratives of ethical theory. Significant to this argument is that the cared-for cannot just be expected to respond to the carer in some uncritical way for the sake of showing gratitude. Rather, the cared-for should be allowed to enact their gratitude in a critical way, whereby she or he might even begin to disagree and take issue with the carer as a consequence of having had his or her critical attitudes evoked, although not necessarily by the carer. On this score, it should be stressed that Noddings’s approach of ethical caring demonstrates the importance of caring as both an educational goal and a key aspect of education; however, it restricts the autonomy of the cared-for agent, since the cared-for is expected to be responsive to the carer in a particular way, and may not assist in addressing internal exclusion. Since this caring requires autonomy between the carer and the cared-for, there is a need for supplementing views to halt the gap in caring relations.
6.2.2 Ethics of care as an empathetic action: a paradoxical response

Offering a contradictory approach to the argument advanced so far in this study, Michael Slote, in his text *The Ethics of Care and Empathy* (2007), perceives moral issues in terms of emotionally involved caring for others and connection to others, instead of autonomy from others – that is, the cared-for should merely be responsive to the carer as Noddings holds – and the just and rational application of rules or principles as problematic. His study seeks to show that a care-ethical approach makes sense across the whole range of normative moral and political issues that philosophers have sought to address. For him, the motivation for caring is based on and sustained by our human capacity for empathy with others (the primary mechanism of caring, benevolence, compassion, etc.). This approach attends to issues such as obligations to distant people, deontology, the relational character of autonomy and paternalism, as well as social justice and practical rationality. One may concede at this stage that there are various ways of caring, and a person’s intention to care determines the approach to be employed, either for justice or paternalism, etc. Also, we could conclude that a person’s act of caring is not only by virtue of experience, but also by virtue of a human being’s capacity to care.

Most noticeably, Slote’s empathetic caring can provide its own plausible take on justice. He maintains that “caring has to do with our obligations to distant people in other nations” (2007: 8). Moreover, the relation between caring and empathy can also be used to explain why our obligations to those who are currently suffering or are in danger are stronger than to those whom we know will suffer or be endangered in the future. In this respect, it is only when we acknowledge that our attitudes toward strangers or distant others can amount to caring that the way is open for such people within an ethics of care, or even to understanding justice as a whole in terms of caring (Slote, 2007: 11). It can be said that caring must be readily applicable to personal and public relationships, and justice must be relevant to political issues, including the internal inclusion of all people in social institutions, including women in AHE, as is the case in focus in this study. Slote also criticises the notion of paternalism, a process when someone – the caring person – acts for or against another person’s wishes “for his or her own good” (2007: 95). I share the sentiment that a paternalistic form of caring is unacceptable, especially when women are brought into HE as subjects by means of tokenism or affirmative action, without being prepared to assert their voices and make a meaningful contribution to democratic processes, such as in decision making.

Slote is cynical about Noddings’s sympathetic caring approach, which he regards as being of an emotional type; therefore, he proposes an empathetic caring that respects the autonomy of the cared-for. In his view, a morality of empathetic caring calls for “respect [for] other people's autonomy and not just or simply [being] concerned with their welfare” (Slote, 2007: 57). To put it
plainly, the cared-for is autonomous in one’s own right and does not have to merely respond to the
carer, but engages with him as an equal human being. Therefore, autonomy as a pertinent element
of empathetic caring should not only be understood as casually relational, but it is also
constitutively relational in an ethics of care (Slote, 2007: 74). The dual roles of empathetic caring,
which is casually and constitutively relational, is foregrounded on the kind of morality that
conceives caring for others and letting their needs supersede one’s own. I find this argument
appealing, since the cared-for – the internally excluded groups – ought to take responsibility
equally for her caring process as an agent. Central to this caring relation is that all people are
rational beings; hence the need for their critical thinking in establishing and proposing what is
good. Emphasising a Kantian view, Slote argues that “we owe people respect on the basis of their
autonomy – (or their moral worth or dignity) as rational beings, and so their respect for individuals
as respect for their autonomy” (2007: 55). In this regard, respecting other people and their
autonomy is an innermost feature of Slote’s conception of caring.

Epitomising the ideals of empathetic caring, Slote (2007: 95) categorises respect for the need of
others, whereby the autonomous individual – that is the cared-for agent – is considered as not
being frightened of his or her own desires or aspirations; where empathic caring realises the initial
human capacity for thinking and deciding things. Importantly, what matters in his framework is the
individual’s ability to express his or her liberal ideas (particularly women) in AHE. In this empathetic
caring relationship, the cared-for can actually challenge the autonomy of the carer – which means
that the cared-for is autonomous. This is what I understand Slote says to complement Noddings’s
perspective. The question to ponder here is how this can happen in AHE institutions, where there
is a discrepancy in power relations among role players? In this respect it can be surmised that
Slote’s study challenges the sympathetic and non-autonomous form of caring and offers an
extension to a mutually respectful form of caring that considers the agency of the cared-for. Thus
far in this study, I have concurred that autonomy is essential in a caring relation, but given that the
previous chapter has shown how power relations infiltrate HE in Africa, the excluded groups might
still encounter similar exclusionary practices. With this in mind, I now illustrate the limitation of the
sympathetic-empathetic caring relationship.

6.2.2.1 Restriction of Noddings’s and Slote’s ethics of care in addressing internal
exclusion

I argue here that Noddings’s and Slote’s notion of caring are worthwhile in themselves, but
restricted in addressing the internal exclusion permeating AHE. Similarly, the same approach
seems to be detrimental to women from traditional African societies who are raised and expected
to care for others to the extent that they do not care always for themselves. Offering a depiction of
this form of caring relation, I draw from my experience\(^{22}\) of the caring practice that lays emphasis on subordination and inferiority. This kind of caring is driven by patriarchy’s gendered roles, which see women as care-givers who are considered emotional, while men are viewed as having empathetic caring. In their joint publication, Noddings and Slote (2003) acknowledge that caring is both inherent and experienced; however, they argue that direct caring for other people is morally less advanced than a conscientious concern for principles of justice and human rights.

The analysis coming out of this joint paper is that only when the two forms of caring, that is sympathetic and empathetic caring, are incorporated, may create the possibility to cultivate autonomous and mutual respect between the carer and cared-for. The argument is that “drawing upon the naturally developing sympathy and empathy of children makes children aware of the bad (and good) effects of their actions on others and thereby leads [sic] them to be more considerate or caring in their actions” (Noddings & Slote, 2003: 355). Interestingly, the combination of Noddings’s and Slote’s positions of caring reflects my call for filling the divide with a sympathetic caring relation. This amalgamated approach is a novel shift in which the carer identifies the needs of the cared-for, but also creates enabling conditions for him/her to engage autonomously, to the extent of questioning the form of caring as well as ideas. The idea of enacting a complete human being is central with the understanding that “the better world ... depends on better people rather than on better principles” (Noddings & Slote, 2003: 356). What seems to come out clearly is that a relational and experiential form of caring is fundamental to shaping caring attributes in all people, especially in AHE, as opposed to the gendered form of caring expounded by the two dominant theorists.

In efforts to conceptualise the notion of an ethics of care, I have taken issue with Noddings’ view of sympathetic caring, which is too ethical and prescriptive, since it merely expects the cared-for to respond in a particular manner. I endorsed Slote’s idea of empathetic caring, which considers the relationship between carer and cared-for as mutually respectful, because both carer and cared-for have the autonomy to treat one another justly. Thus far I have used Slote to address and fill the gap left by some of Noddings’s limitations. However, taking into account the foregoing depiction of caring as articulated by Noddings and Slote (2003), it can be said that there are varieties of caring relationships in social institutions such as AHE. Therefore, I proceed to explore Alasdair MacIntyre’s notion of caring in order to expand the horizon of caring relations and take a position on the form of caring appropriate for eliminating internal exclusion.

\(^{22}\) My experience of an African traditional society in which a girl-child is instilled with the idea that only the vicinity of the home is suitable for her and is discouraged from performing tasks regarded as challenging, while a boy-child is encouraged to spread his wings and take risks in order to grasp all available opportunities in life. I would argue that the form of caring received by the girl-child in such a setting is debilitating rather than capacitating. Kwesiga (2002) and Ramphele (1995) confirm that, in many African societies, girls are seen to be safe in the private space which is the home and discouraged from participating actively in public roles. However, the kind of caring practised in some homes is deficient and may fail to cultivate in women the kind of caring that nurtures assertiveness, awakes their cognitive ability and independent thinking, and enables them to flourish in high education.
6.2.3 Caring as evoking people's rational potentialities

Defending human dependency in a caring relation, Alasdair MacIntyre (1999: 1-5), in his book *Dependent rational animals: Why human beings need the virtues*, identified two factors in relation to which human beings need the virtues. Firstly, it is our dependency on each other due to our vulnerability; and secondly, it is based on our potential for reasoning, as it is our independent capacity. In other words, it is our human dependency on each other as vulnerable species, i.e. prone to sickness, disability and ageing on the one hand, and our independent practical rationality on the other. His viewpoint is that people are also dependent on each other not only when they experience physical vulnerabilities, but in evoking people's potentialities for reasoning. The assumption is that there are two forms of human dependence – material needs on the one hand and rational needs on the other. In answering why human beings need these virtues, MacIntyre (1999) clarifies that the fact that we are dependent animals, our "human vulnerability and disability", is the "central feature of human life", hence the need for the "virtues of dependency", which is deeply required for individual human beings to flourish in their stages of development from infancy to adulthood, including old age. MacIntyre (1999: 5) posits that:

If we are to develop from our initial animal condition into that of independent rational agents, and the virtues that we need, if we are to confront and respond to vulnerability and disability both in ourselves and in others, belong to one and the same set of virtues, the distinctive virtues of dependent rational animals, whose dependence, rationality and animality have to be understood in relationship to each other.

This citation depicts that caring for one another ought to be a core virtue that we uphold if we are to excel, not individually, but as human beings. Principally, MacIntyre’s intention is to challenge what he perceives as the narrative of the disembodied, independent reasoner who determines ethical and moral questions autonomously, and in what he calls the "illusion of self-sufficiency" (1999: 127). I concur with his view that, the focus on self-sufficiency as the core idea of the liberal project encouraged by the contemporary world, including African higher education institutions, is pernicious to the virtue of dependency that human beings profoundly requires.

What is more, he postulates that the prime roles of the caring relation ought to stimulate people’s rational capacity to become independent practical reasoners. Problematising the emphasis on the autonomy of individuals and their capacity for making independent choices, MacIntyre (1999: 8) states that the virtues of independent rational agency need recognition of the virtues towards
human acknowledged dependence. In other words, the dual sets of virtues – rational independence and acknowledged dependence – are required in order to advance the distinctive potentialities that are specific to the human rational animal. Independent rationality is a fundamental virtue that will enable individuals to comprehend how and why the internally excluded groups are to prosper in human life. For me, acknowledging our human dependence links well to how the carer educator strives to evoke the cared-for’s rational potentialities. MacIntyre (1999) identified reasons why the carer ought to instil such virtues through caring relations that is caring pedagogical encounters. Furthermore, he clarifies the reasons why a carer educator needs to act out caring for the sake of that individual or these individuals at whose good it was directed. He gives an example that an act of caring requires to be done not for the self, but for the sake of others and being worth doing in and for themselves. So the carer educator may confidently answer questions like: "why did you do that?" by saying, "because it was just, because it was courageous, because it was what a decent human being would do" (MacIntyre, 1999: 112). This exposition clarifies why the carer educator may decide to act with belligerence and provocation, not necessarily to offend the cared-for, but as a way of respecting the dignity of the cared-for. Therefore, such a caring may not be understood or even liked at the beginning; but if this process is well thought for, may enable the cared-for student to appreciate this valuable form of caring in the long run. To this, it can be said that, if the cared-for fails to reach her or his rational level, then a proxy is suggested to act on his/her behalf. MacIntyre (1999: 141) identifies the role of the proxy as a representative of those without the capacity to speak for themselves as a second self. Insofar as those without the ability to engage, in this case the excluded groups, are to expect a proxy, the caring relations might not address the dilemma of exclusion. What is necessary is ensuring that for the excluded, whose confidence to articulate is limited, other means of caring would be required.

For rationality to be invoked, citizens (both carer and cared-for) need to engage in the social community of practices such as in higher educational institutions. This clearly shows how each party should feel some sense of belonging to that community as equal members. The process of listening to each other may lead the carer and cared-for towards dialogical action (MacIntyre, 1999: 14). If I follow the aforementioned argument well, it could mean that both the carer and cared-for are obligated to understand why a particular caring act is occurring, and to act out their roles in fulfilling the goal. MacIntyre (1999: 81-83) identifies dialogical action as a means to assist both the carer and cared-for to become good listeners, but also to make us more deliberative in the sense that we become open to revising or abandoning our own reasons in the light of what others (to whom we listen and with whom we engage) have to offer. Here, engaging and listening are central if acts of caring are to be comprehended. MacIntyre’s argument is that “coming to know” involves not just evaluating our own reasons as better or worse, but also detaching ourselves from the immediacy of our desires in order to “imagine alternative realistic futures” through engaging collegially that is dialogically (MacIntyre, 1999: 83). For that reason, only when the cared-for
student listens and understands the carer-supervisor’s critical and meticulous comment, such as: “this work is muddled and I cannot be read further” to a submitted essay or chapter, fruitful dialogical action may take place. I agree that, the cared-for may find this feedback very discouraging; however, critical thinking and listening are means to sustaining the dialogical action.

In my view, it is necessary for the cared-for firstly to identify and acknowledge a rational awakening that is a lack of scientific writing, logical presentation and argumentation, before being judgemental of the carer. In this way, the cared-for student may realise that the carer educator is not making a personal attack on them, but rather being critical of the work and caring through meticulous comments with the intention of improving it. So doing, the cared-for can begin to rethink, reconceptualise and rework the argument. What strikes me is MacIntyre’s call for a caring relationship that takes cognisance of another’s rationality in social institutions like AHE which surpasses other needs. This perception of caring substantiates my call for an ethics of care beyond Noddings’s and Slote’s position.

6.2.3.1 How do we invoke a caring relationship?

According to MacIntyre, the acts of caring by both the carer educators and cared-for play a crucial role in invoking the other’s capacity as independent practical reasoners. What I found appealing is the fact that human beings need each other in invoking humanity which differentiates us (people) from animals that is our level and practices of rationality. Therefore, if caring is an ultimate virtue that needs to be enacted in higher education, then such caring should also consider what makes human beings human, which is rationality. In MacIntyre’s (1999: 80-84) view, rationality can be invoked by fostering in students the capacities for independent rational reasoning through social relationships within a caring pedagogical community, such as in HE. In pedagogical encounters, students’ needs acquire, first of all, the ability to evaluate, modify or reject their own practical judgments, to ask, for instance, whether what we take to be good reasons for real action are sufficiently good reasons. Secondly, there is a call to foster in students the ability to imagine credibly alternative and presumable prospects that may enable them to make rational choices from various others. Lastly, a look at the ability to stand back from our desires is needed in order to enquire rationally what the pursuit of our good here and now requires, and how our desires must be directed and, if necessary, be re-educated, if we are to attain independent rational reasoning.

Considering the foregoing perspective, I draw from my own experience, as an internally excluded person, of caring that evoked my rational potentiality through an encounter with my carer.
supervisor in an AHE setting. This is the kind of caring relationship in which the conditions are created in a university environment for invoking the possibility of a reasoning voice. In my view, when we understand that we, as human beings, are dependent on each other as a community and that none of us is entirely independent, we begin to recognise that our fellow human beings, whose voices are internally excluded and not heard, need to be given a voice. In my view, only when caring relations pay more attention to people’s dependency (evoking their rational potentialities) and transcend the mere response to their material needs, we may possibly engender genuine transformation in AHE. With reference to MacIntyre, Waghid (2006: 434-345) advocates the kind of caring that evokes students' rational potentialities. He classifies the roles24 the caring supervisor can play in creating conditions for the cared-for student to reach his/her potential.

For Waghid, authentic learning can be reached when the carer educator acts caringly, so that the caring "supervisor creates conditions whereby students learn authentically, which requires the following: encouraging students to imagine situations in and beyond the parameters of their research interests, where things would be better—that is, to be caring towards students; democratising our interactions whereby students can take initiative to imagine possibilities not otherwise thought of, that is, to be responsible towards students; and connecting with students’ storytelling with the aim to discovering untapped possibilities – that is, to be respectful towards students" (2006: 434). In other words, the caring for people’s potentialities should not expect specific outcomes, but rather expect what potentially is going to happen and what might not happen.

By so doing, when the carer educator does not expects outlined outcomes, students possibly may experience authentic learning through these caring acts from a "friend-who-loves". Similarly, students may become as "friends-who-love" that is, acting caringly in a quest for achieving authentic learning. This form of friendship requires that the cared-for provide drafts on a regular and agreed upon basis that would make it possible for the carer-supervisors to engage critically (and not dismissively) with their work though of a tentative nature. Secondly, the cared-for “rework their earlier drafts in the light of their supervisors' critical comments; and resubmit their revised..."
drafts" (Waghid, 2006: 434). Waghid (2006: 345) clearly notes that "although being "friends-who-love" might seem to be quite a compelling and time-consuming process that students and I have to embark on, I cannot begin to see how authentic learning would ever be achieved without invoking such an idea of friendship". From this conception, it is clear that caring relationships can be framed and experienced differently, depending on how caring is conceptualised and on the intention of the carer. Here, I adopt Waghid's approach to caring, which clearly illustrates the conditions that the carer ought to create. What comes out explicitly, that is; firstly, the carer should have identified the rational need of the cared-for. Secondly, the carer has thought deeply on how to assist the cared-for to unleash his/her potential as a form of empowerment.

Thirdly, because the carer is also a human being with emotions and feelings, provoking them ought to be accompanied by compassion imagining on how painful it is to be agitated and confronted. Nonetheless, because the aspiration is to create conditions that evoke the cared-for student's potentialities, the carer takes a risk with the hope to awaken critically thinking and expect the unknown. Likewise, the cared-for may express autonomy in releasing rationality and possibly act in accordance with achieving authentic learning. The novelty here rests on the autonomy of both parties, especially where the cared-for may choose to either endure in this caring relation or quit. The point is that the carer should not expect the cared-for student to take caring as it is, but rather reflect on it with a desire to learn. The result of this caring relation is determined and driven by the carer's intrinsic interest, rather than extrinsic, with intention to strives for the cared-for authentic learning. In contemplating the foregoing view and my own experience, I recognise different types of caring relations. However, I defend caring relations that evoke people's rational potentialities, which is inescapably required in AHE.

6.2.3.2 Debunking a gendered form of caring and situating the ideal caring relation

Here I interrogate the thoughts that equate caring expressed by women and men as well as between women, which trigger the following questions. How do people genuinely demonstrate caring that empowers the internally excluded groups? Are some people really uncaring, or are we yet to understand their ways of caring? To respond to these queries in justifying my claim, I acknowledge the primary kind of care I received from home, as I argue that what we may call the best form of caring could be disadvantageous and debilitating in enacting a citizen who needs internal inclusion. Similarly, caring that merely responds to tangible needs is limited, hence the need for caring that recognises rational potentialities that empower the excluded person to air her
voice. In explaining the caring experience in African higher education, Ramphele (1995: 182-183) states that not all caring practices by women are useful for nurturing individuals who are articulate and assertive in a democratic higher education setting, and that not all men are uncaring. It can be said that higher education in Africa excludes women due to patriarchy, male chauvinism and male-dominated institutions, but there also are caring males who support the internally excluded groups in celebrating the citizenry’s rights to a voice.

Clearly, internal exclusion cannot be blamed entirely on one group, in this case men, but also lies in the complexity of the power relations among people. It is evident that some women in the higher education system in Africa, especially those in leadership positions, demonstrate a disempowering and debilitating form of caring towards their fellow women, just as do some men. I strongly believe that caring is relative and can be constituted differently, depending on what the carer regards as relevant in mitigating internal exclusion. The above caring encounter substantiates my stance that not all women are caring, and that not all men are uncaring. Concluding this section, I want to highlight that, in the light of the previous chapter; gendered caring is inadvertently practised and reinforced by all human beings. In other words, the perception of women as caring persons and men as uncaring is worrying, since it relegates women to specific roles that hinder their potential to exercise their rights as equal members of a democratic African higher education institution. To this end, I have argued that Noddings’s sympathetic caring is too ethical, and limits the agency of the cared-for, since one is expected to respond in a particular way. This establishes an unequal relationship between the two. In supplementing Noddings, I endorsed Slote’s empathetic caring, which underscores the autonomous relations between carer and cared-for as mutually respectful to treat one another justly. Nonetheless, both Noddings’s and Slote’s perceptions of caring restrict the addressing of internal exclusion, considering that the marginalised groups may autonomously decide to remain silent. Also, I utilised MacIntyre’s caring, which evokes people’s rational potentialities to expand the conception of caring. This caring for rational potentialities explored above is a definite refinement of sympathetic-empathetic caring. I concur that rationality is central if people are to be included and heard in democratic engagement. Nonetheless, MacIntyre’s liberal view of caring by proxy limits the rights of the cared-for agents, since they will not exercise their equality as citizens; henceforth this does not give sufficient meaning to this kind of caring that may disrupt internal inclusion. It is on these grounds that I call for a reconstitution of an ethics of care, which I now proceed to evaluate.

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25 Ramphele notes that “caring on the part of women can be discouraging in comparison to that of men. She argues that to navigate the realm of sexist and vicious African discriminatory practices, one need to apply different strategies. It is dangerous and limiting to exclude the possibility of real supportive relations with caring male colleagues wherever one goes, for they do arise” (1995: 182)
6.3 Towards a reconstituted ethics of care

This section aims to extend Noddings’ and Slote’s conception of caring by reconstituting an ethics of care that transcends the gender divide and may disrupt the internal exclusion that pervades AHE. The thrust of the reconstruction centres on how we can give meaning to caring that evokes people’s rational potentialities towards inclusion. I shall foreground this framework with Rancière’s idea of equal intelligence, which recognises people’s intellectual ability and need to exercise their rights through their assertion of voice as a way of disrupting the conversation. The intention is to shift from equality based on gender to an equalisation of voice. Central questions that impel this exploration are: what would human relations actually look like when they are not distinguished on a gender basis? What constitutes a reconstituted ethics of care that could engender equal and just caring relations? As a rejoinder to this interrogation, I proceed to explore Rancière’s notion of equal intelligence that defends equalisation of voice as a disruption of the power relations that proliferate internal exclusion in AHE.

6.3.1 Intellectual equality through an assertion of voice

The preceding section emphasises MacIntyre’s view of caring that evokes people’s rational potentialities; however, his call for proxies requires an extension. At this juncture, I draw on Jacques Rancière’s (1992) idea of equal intelligence. Although his conception of equality has already been explored in Chapter 3 of the dissertation, I find it apposite to situate a reconstituted ethics of care to build on caring for rationality. Rancière’s idea of equality is derived from Joseph Jacotot’s idea of an emancipatory method for education founded on the principle that “everyone is of equal intelligence”, and “everyone’s similarity, and everyone’s ability to voluntary thinking” (Rancière, 1992: 41; 101). For him, human beings are equal in terms of their intelligence, which I find vibrant in influencing caring relations between the carer educator and cared-for student as they engage in pedagogical encounters. The emancipatory method of teaching “looks for the totality of human intelligence in each intellectual manifestation” (Rancière, 1992: 39). The points emanating from the emancipatory method of teaching are: a) everyone has similar intelligence, b) everyone is able to teach themselves, and c) everything is everything, which means “all power of the language is in the totality of a book” (Rancière, 1992: 26). In this respect, taking caring in the same manner, the internally excluded groups are to be recognised based on their intellectual equality, which will not only instil in them critical thinking skills, but announce their presence via a voice. I am attracted to the argument in Rancière (1992) that, since all people can think, we evaluate people’s attainment of equality on the basis of people’s voice rather than gender, as has always been the case. In my view, equalisation of voice should be employed as a means to ensure that all people deliberate in higher educational conversation as the best tool to disrupt exclusion.
Pessimistic of democratic processes, which he calls policing, Rancière argues that “there is no police without the participation of the people, those people who are politically invisible, each in their proper place” (May, 2008: 48). He further states that, for the possibility of ensuring that the invisible becomes visible, “there is something in the sensible, then, that can, by expressing itself, disrupt the sensible that it partially constitutes” (May, 2008: 49). For such people to express themselves require a democratic environment in which they can exercise their equality, expressing their voices can be the suitable way of disrupting the status quo. Radically, the question is, “when does it, in fact, manifest the internal disruption of the sensible, the distance of the sensible from itself”? (May, 2008: 49). It could be deduced that democratic politics, unlike policing, takes place when such manifestation occurs. This does not imply that the disruption and the manifestation are constantly happening, since for Rancière, “politics doesn’t always happen ... it happens very little or rarely. But happen it does” (May, 2008: 29). The idea of a disruptive voice through confrontation between various interests and views is essential in ascertaining that all people’s voices are acknowledged.

Evidently, one may question the credibility of equalisation of voice either as a negative disruption or as an intervention of the internally excluded. In this regard, Rancière argues that democratic politics happens when all people engage each other such as the demos that intervene upon internal exclusion of the demos 26. This is not a mere disruption to bring chaos to conversation, but an intervention in which the discussion takes account of those who are excluded in the democratic politics (May, 2008: 49, 57). The profound questions that demand answers here are why should disruption be seen as a form of caring, considering its negative connotation? To what extent can disruption be considered as a form of caring? In response, we could say, of course, that caring can be regarded as disruption because of the problem at hand, which is internal exclusion. Although the idea of disruption has a negative connotation, I argue that we can only justify caring as disruption for the sake of transforming a hitherto exclusionary HE for the benefit of the internally excluded groups.

For this reason, I call for caring as disruption based on Rancière’s notion of equal intelligence, which connects to MacIntyre’s position that caring relations should emphasise the evoking of people’s rational potentialities. Going by this position, it must be clear by now that there is a link between disruption and rationality. As a way of disrupting the exclusionary police order, that is structures that control others, this study expounds that people’s expression of equality is demonstrated to those denying them genuine equality. Simply put, disruption of the police order and a call for the equality of politics is the marginalised groups’ refutation of the position and status to which they are assigned, “not for the sake of another or different position, but for the sake of

26As a Greek concept, signifies the populace as a political unit especially in a democracy. It is a political subject with the appearance of which the existing political order (Rancière, 2006).
nothing at all other than one’s own equality” (May, 2008: 49). There supposedly is not a particular group that qualifies to be called demos, but for Rancière, the people, the demos, comprise of those groups that fall in a given classification, those who are unequal to others in a specific category, such as women and so forth (May, 2008: 50). In Rancière’s view, the demos are people without any claim to making a meaningful contribution to public deliberation and conversation, who are invisible – in this case the internally excluded groups in AHE. It is in this light that I utilise his idea of equal intelligence, which epitomises how all people need to be viewed as equal human beings by the assertion of their voice, which may disrupt the exclusionary practices in AHE.

Similarly, I am of the view that for the internally excluded groups to exercise their right to equality would require the capacity to assert their voices, like other human beings, as a way of making a meaningful contribution to educational deliberations. Exploring the care relations incorporated in Rancière’s notion of equal intelligence, which suggests that people have equal ability to exercise their voice, we could justify why caring for other’s rationally is vital. Rancière (2006: 97) continues, “But among those who know how to share with anybody and everybody the equal power of intelligence, it can conversely inspire courage, and hence joy”. This idea becomes important for a reconstructed ethics of care, which one has to act on one’s own terms with one’s own equality, which is “evoking your sense of intelligibility” (Rancière, 2006: 97). The point is that democracy needs to be contested by expanding citizens’ deliberative horizon in order to include all people in their own right. Clearly, equality cannot be achieved only when those who are deprived of it receive it through others. Therefore, one cannot merely claim to include others without creating a caring space for all to engage in educational deliberations in their own capacity as exercisers and receivers of equality. On this score, I agree that equality of voice has a potential to disrupt African higher educational discussion and lead to the attainment of justice, whereby the carer educator conducts him/herself as an “amateur” or “ignorant master” rather as a highly knowledgeable citizen than the student (Rancière, 1992). This would instil in the excluded cared-for some sense of confidence and ability to utter her voice, grounded in her claim for equality in democratic educational deliberation.

The idea of having everyone engaged as equal citizens in higher educational activity, rather than waiting as passive recipients for a distributed pack of equality, is significant. I argue that, when caring relations incorporate the assertion of voice as a way of exercising peoples’ rights, this stands as a potential element for disrupting power relations. Inasmuch as people have equal intelligence that needs to be exercised through a voice, caring relations should aim at kindling citizens’ rationalities to enable them to think and offer reasons for their arguments. So, if a voice can assist in disrupting the exclusionary engagements, then caring relations should incorporate Benhabib’s idea of democratic iterations, whereby people engage each other with scepticism to augment and incite their intellectual capabilities.
6.3.2 Caring as iterations

I have argued above that a reconstituted ethics of care recognises people’s intellectual equality and requires others to invoke intellectual awakening in order for the excluded groups to assert their voice evocatively. Such caring relations need Benhabib’s cosmopolitan norms of iterations that aim to invoke confrontation in deliberation. In her most recent book, *Dignity in Adversity: Human Rights in Troubled Times*, Benhabib (2011) challenges cosmopolitan norms, which have often been misunderstood. The concept of cosmopolitanism and its norms has negative historical connotations, yet Benhabib regards it as “a place-holder for thinking beyond the confusing present towards a possible and viable future” (2011: 2). For her, cosmopolitanism celebrates our common humanity, whereas it concomitantly helps us to deal with diversity and differences, that is, those people who are experiencing some form of exclusion need to be considered. The term cosmopolitanism stems from the concept cosmopolites, which constitutes *kosmos* (the universe) and *polites* (citizens). To exemplify her identity as a cosmopolite, Benhabib (2011: 3-4) uses Montaigne’s recounting of Socrates’ response when he was asked where he came from:

... not ‘Athens’, but ‘the world’. He, whose imagination was fuller and more extensive, embraced the universe as his city, and distributed his knowledge, his company, and his affections to all mankind, unlike us who look only at what is underfoot.

This citation affirms how Socrates rejected his citizenship because of its association with and restriction to a small part of the world, by saying that “he was no Athenian or Greek, but a Cosmian” (Benhabib, 2011: 3-4). However, there are also negative inferences associated with cosmopolitanism when viewed “as a form of nomadism without attachment to a particular human city”, as espoused by Diogenes the Cynic. This argument is relevant when we ask how a human being can live in a borderless world without attachment to a particular nation, and what kind of laws will guide and protect such? The dual dimension of cosmopolitanism in Greek and Roman thought perceives "a kosmopolites [as] a person who distances herself either in thought or in practice from the habits and laws of her city” (Benhabib, 2011: 5). Thus, due to its transcendence of city borders, these human beings are required to be treated with scepticism and suspicion by those who claim their identity to a particular city.

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27 Diogenes, one of the Greek philosophers, when asked where he came from, identified himself by declaring, “I am a citizen of the world” (cosmopolites). By this, Diogenes meant he refused to be defined simply by his local origins and insisted on identifying himself in terms of more global aspirations and concerns (Nussbaum, 1997: 50-53).
More importantly, because of this claimed borderless world, Benhabib calls for a move from human rights to cosmopolitan rights. She intensifies Kant's view of cosmopolitan rights to hospitality, which aims to invite and welcome all people (strangers) in the cities of the cosmos. She claims that hospitality is not to be understood as a virtue of sociability, as the kindness and generosity one may show to strangers who come to one's land or who become dependent upon one's act of kindness through circumstances of nature or history; rather, hospitality is a right that belongs to all human beings insofar as we view them as potential participants in a world republic (Benhabib, 2011: 6). In my view, the notion of belonging is crucial in engendering internal inclusion for all people as citizens in a pedagogical community, not only as Africans, but also as citizens of the world. Only when all people, specifically the currently internally excluded groups, are recognised and their voices make a meaningful contribution to democratic processes, will caring relations in AHE achieve their goal of an ideal democratic society.

However, the fact is that we are not certain of strangers in our cities (i.e. women whose voices are not asserted); consequently, Benhabib (2011: 6) employs a Derridian idea to call for treating strangers with "hostipitality". The notion of hostipitality facilitates a process described as a "dangerous moment when the cosmopolitan project can get marred in hostility rather than hospitality" (2011: 7). I find Benhabib's rephrased cosmopolitan norm of hostipitality to connote a necessary condition that needs to entrench democratic iterations in which the internally excluded and the dominant others engage belligerently. Furthermore, Benhabib (2011: 15) calls for cosmopolitanism without illusions, especially what she calls a "jurigenerative effect" that may create democratic iterations whereby all people can claim rights across borders and be able to reinvent and re-appropriate valuable norms that were misinterpreted and abused. In her view, democratic iterations guided by the jurigenerative effect permit the "new actors (resultant of the Human Rights Declarations and Treaties – such as women and ethnic, linguistic, and religious minorities – to enter the public sphere, to develop new vocabularies of public claim-making, and to anticipate new forms of justice" (Benhabib, 2011: 15).

The idea of democratic iterations, in Benhabib's words, depicts "how the unity and diversity of human rights is enacted and re-enacted in strong and weak public spheres". This is practised "not only in legislatures and courts", but also by "social movements, civil society actors, and transnational organisations working across borders" (2011: 15). To cement the above, I argue that if African states are signatories to World Human Rights Declarations, including the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Convention to Eliminate all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW, 1979), as world citizens, public institutions, including in African higher education, require the idea of cosmopolitanism in their attitudes and practices. This simply means that iterations entail bringing to the fore aspects of engaging in a provocative and belligerent manner in order to learn how to offer reasons for an argument.
Since democratic iterations are essential for institutions, this approach requires “communicative freedom”, in terms of which all people are informed of their freedom of expression and association, not only as citizens with voting rights, for instance, but as recognised individuals and citizens with legitimacy to be convinced with good reasons (Benhabib, 2011: 15-16). The point is that people should not be seen merely as subject to the law, in this case educational policies, but also as authors of the law in all realms of society, including higher education institutions. Thus, democratic iterations are in a better position to ensure that all people as citizens engage in complex processes of public argument, deliberation and exchange, through which universalist rights claims are contested and contextualised, invoked and revoked, posited and positioned throughout all realms of society, including legal, political and civil.

Nevertheless, this study acknowledges how democratic iterations can also infiltrate the exclusion and marginalisation of the new actors, rather than expanding the public sphere, due to the appearance of new vocabularies of claim-making (Benhabib, 2011: 17). In iterations, people need to treat each other with scepticism as they engage in and propose new ways of claim-making. It is insightful to call for hospitality as a way to invoke change and disrupt the status quo, which has favoured the dominant groups. Such a caring relationship may open up the possibility for the internally excluded groups to find their spaces in AHE, irrespective of their background, gender, status and so forth. I am of the opinion that iterations should embrace African higher educational processes, thereby engaging them in provocative and disruptive manners. This disruption of caring deliberation revolves around creating conditions and a probable atmosphere for the excluded to reach a level of learning and thinking that enables them to speak their minds. Only when all people can act and engage in democratic iterations, could painful matters such as marginalisation and other vicious discrimination be uttered in what Waghid (2010) calls a process of “talking back”. In such a distressful manner, the excluded may speak their mind and ask the reasons why they should be excluded in pedagogical encounters. On this point, I am attracted to Benhabib’s compelling idea of hospitality to accompany the reconstructed ethics of care, since it seems to create enabling conditions for the internally excluded to engage provocatively. Such distressful encounters may incite those who usually are without a voice to speak their mind as a way of attaining internal inclusion.

Importantly, caring relations in such distressful encounters are aimed at empowering the internally excluded groups to air their voice. In this way, people engage in provocative and belligerent deliberation with the intention of soliciting each other’s frank views about issues of concern. This approach is worth looking into, because realising the unthinkable (rationality or knowledge) requires some disruption, whereby the carer moves the silenced cared-for out of the comfort zone, not necessarily to offend, but to maximise their potential. The above optimisation of the
unimaginative connects very well with the theory of the zone of proximal development (ZPD) of Levy Vygotsky, a renowned psychologist. According to this theory, the human mind has a tendency to do and repeat things that the person knows and avoid those things that are unfamiliar to the person due to fear of the unknown. Here, one can sense that the idea of caring for people's rational potentialities connects very well with the third assumption in Vygostky's ZPD theory considering intellectual equality. Therefore, the excluded rational potentialities can be unleashed through distressful encounters with the intention to get the best out of a cared-for student (attaining the unthinkable). From this psychological perspective, one can argue that it seems to be the nature of human beings to learn when agitated and begin to unlock in an unusual zone or environment.

Given the above situation, one can imagine a situation in which a cared-for student cannot construct an argument resulting from the form of education received. Such a student might regard the carer as being insensitive to his/her circumstance and history, unless the carer exhibits some sense of compassion. One should understand that the ideal caring relation that I support here emphasises rationality as a human trait. In other words, engaging the cared-for student in a distressful iteration without listening to their lived experiences and ill-prepared education, such an encounter might fail to evoke their desired rational potentialities. Although a distressful encounter can be a discouraging exercise, it is still relevant both for the dominant and the excluded to hear each other’s views in an attempt to address injustice. At this point, we could ask the following question: how does a caring relation take into account the different backgrounds and experiences that limit the rational ability of excluded groups? To answer this question, Nussbaum’s idea of compassionate respect to encompass a reconstituted ethics of care becomes relevant.

6.3.3 Caring as compassionate respect

For a reconstituted ethics of care to encourage the cared-for to become an independent rational citizen, compassionate respect is necessary. In her work, *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions*, Nussbaum (2001) calls for emotions, namely compassion, to embrace democratic deliberation. The notion of compassion entails that people − in this case the carer and cared-for − recognise one another’s vulnerabilities and misfortunes. For her, compassion is a significant emotion to cultivate in preparing people to engage in deliberation and just action, in public as well

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28 This theory can be conceptualised to mean “the distance between the actual development level as determined by independent problem solving and the level of potential development as determined through problem solving under adult guidance or in collaboration with more capable peers” (Vygotsky, 1978: 86, cited in Chaiklin, 2003: 1). Giving a simpler interpretation, Chaiklin clarifies that the ZPD “presupposes an interaction between a more competent person and a less competent person on a task, such that the less competent person becomes independently proficient at what initially a jointly-accomplished task” (2003: 2). The identified three assumptions of learning, namely (a) the generality assumption (i.e., applicable to learning all kinds of subject matter - person is able to perform a certain number of tasks alone, while in collaboration, it is possible to perform a greater number of tasks), (b) assistance assumption (learning is dependent on interventions by a more competent other - an adult/teacher/more competent person interact with a child), and (c) potential assumption (property of learner, which enables best easiest learning - it is possible to greatly accelerate or facilitate a child's/less competent's learning, if the zone can be identified properly). The latter assumption in Vygotsky's phrase is "for the individual's current potential for further intellectual development, a capacity not ordinarily measured by conventional intelligence tests" (Chaiklin, 2003: 3).
as in private affairs (Nussbaum, 2001: 299). Likewise, I concur with Nussbaum that enacting caring in students requires compassionate respect as a guiding act in AHE deliberations. To her, emotional impetus should underlie democratic iteration in order to treat students justly and humanely, which is treating them with compassion. The case in point is that a caring relation should consider the students’ limitations, especially those from disadvantaged backgrounds – be these educational, social or financial.

Needless to say, some students might find it challenging to engage in a provocative and belligerent manner due to patriarchal cultural norms that reinforce subordination. As argued elsewhere, most women from African societies are reared not to speak in the same manner as their male counterparts (Shanyanana, 2011). Therefore, in considering the foregoing view of their limitations, engaging distressfully might help the excluded groups to articulate their views and develop reasoning abilities. Thus, caring relations need to consider such misfortunes as the carer strives to inculcate people’s rational potentialities. It is for this reasons that the emotion of compassion becomes an imperative constituent for acting upon with care and deliberating about such matters, since compassion not only prompts in people an awareness of the misfortune or suffering of others, but also “pushes the boundaries of the self” outward by focusing one’s attention on the suffering of others (Nussbaum, 2001: 299). I am of the conviction that, in order to act in a caring manner, the carer needs to have regard for the other person that is being compassionate towards the cared-for.

In answering the question on how and why human beings ought to become compassionate, Nussbaum (2001) conceptualises compassion as an agonising emotional judgment that comprises two cognitive requirements. The first requirement demands that there is a belief or appraisal that the suffering of others is serious and not trivial, and that the cared-for student, like other citizens, does not deserve to suffer. The second requirement is that there is a belief that the possibilities of the person (carer) who experiences emotion are similar to those of the sufferer (cared-for). Looking at the two requirements of compassionate emotion, I proceed to show how the cared-for students and carer educator ought to apply compassion to rational deliberative engagement, which concomitantly enacts caring, that is being compassionate, with a concern to be just and humane towards others in AHE. I reckon that one needs to be compassionate in the caring relation by recognising that the misfortune, that is internal exclusion and limited rationality, is not of their fault, hence the need to act to address it. The point I am making is that compassion can be expressed to all people suffering either through their own fault or otherwise. However, this study centres on the internally excluded due to myriad forms of injustice experienced.

The point Nussbaum (2001: 317) makes is that human beings need to be compassionate by recognising that those who experience misfortune, in this case the excluded groups, do not do so due to their own fault, but that their plight needs to be addressed. On the other hand, compassion
can be enacted if one acknowledges a caring relation as a form of community between the carer and cared-for, particularly understanding what it means for one to experience vulnerabilities similar to those of the victim. In her words, “(One) will learn compassion best if he (she) begins by focusing on their sufferings ... (I)n order for compassion to be present, the person must consider the suffering of another as a significant part of his or her own scheme of goals and ends. She must take that person's ill as affecting her own flourishing. In effect, she must make herself vulnerable in the person of another” (Nussbaum, 2001: 317). This recognition of one's vulnerability require the carer educator to have a deeper understanding of what it feels to be excluded internally to the democratic processes where one is said to be part of.

The excluded people may become uncomfortable with the dominant groups, who tend to ignore the presence of those whose voices may not have made any meaningful contribution. The carer, embracing compassion, can begin to imagine what it would be like if it was they who was experiencing internal exclusion, especially knowing that their difficulties to express themselves eloquently and rationally are due to their long history of a segregated education system, the current unequal access to quality education, as well as patriarchy. A compassionate carer educator will do everything possible to enable cared-for students to grasp the relevant concepts and theories that may enable them to acquire deeper understandings of how structures and ideologies, namely patriarchy, male chauvinism, authoritarianism and a gendered response to equality, can be viewed as liberating on the one hand, and debilitating on the other. Nussbaum's notion of compassionate respect in this case relates to Maxine Greene's (1995) call for carer educators to begin releasing their imagination. In Greene's (1995) view, pedagogical encounters require educators to begin releasing their imagination if genuine education is to take place. The idea of releasing imagination expects people to begin to think differently about themselves as individuals, and about their roles in a democratic (educational) community and society (as in Africa).

To think differently in this case, caring demands that educators should not be technocrats and students should not be empty vessels that need to be filled with deposits, i.e. knowledge. Rather, it is to rethink ways of teaching: "we who are teachers would have to accommodate ourselves to live as functionaries if we did. Not have in mind a quest for a better state of things for those we teach and for the world we all share" (Greene, 1995: 1-3). She cautions that we should avoid reproducing the way things are, that is enacting compassionate imagination as a way to care. In Greene's view, imagination is a means through which we can assemble a coherent world, because imagination is what makes empathic caring possible. Imagination enables us (carers) to cross the empty spaces between ourselves and those we call the other to experience their difficulties. One could say that Waghid's (2006) view of caring is a form of imaginative approach to teaching and learning. Greene (1995: 3) further posits that, of our cognitive capacities, imagination is the one that permits us (educators) to give credence to alternative realities.
Here, the carer may not necessarily spoon feed the student, considering such person’s difficulty to comprehend the readings and know-how, but rather engage critically by asking deeper questions that may challenge the student’s thinking possibly to learn more to shape their reasoning. Nussbaum posits that “the recognition of one’s own related vulnerability is then an important and frequently an indispensable epistemological requirement for compassion in human beings” (2001: 317). What is evident from Nussbaum’s perspective is that compassion invokes the intellectual emotions of people that is the carer and cared-for engage in ethical and compassionate deliberation. Hence, it is insufficient to cultivate caring by focusing merely on educational deliberation without embracing compassion. This means that caring goes hand in hand with being compassionate.

We cannot claim to care for a student who is struggling to offer reasons for her argument without being compassionate of her inability and doing something to change the situation by thinking of better ways to empower the student. Moreover, like Nussbaum (2001) and Greene (1995), Waghid regards a compassionate act of caring as an ideal tool to enhance deliberative argumentation. For him, a compassionate act creates conditions that enable students and educators to question their ways of thinking, and their meaning of the taken-for-granted narratives, and to imagine alternative possibilities, to modify practical judgements, to foster respect, and to develop critical engagement (Waghid, 2005: 336). As we engage critically we listen to the lived experiences and stories of the excluded and may establish ways of assisting such students to unravel hidden but useful lessons of life (Waghid, 2005). Taking into account the above perception, I argue that the carer should not only provoke but also be compassionate towards the emotions and feelings of the cared-for in the process of evoking her rational potentialities. Similarly, the cared-for, in thinking and reflecting, may imagine how discomforting it is for the carer to witness tears and confusion in the confrontational process as a way to release one’s imagination. In a caring process, the carer begins firstly to put the self in the shoes of the cared-for, the case in point for those encountering internal exclusion. Secondly, the carer creates conditions to enable the cared-for to achieve what is never thought, a way of disrupting the status quo.

This form of caring may be difficult to grasp at the beginning, but may reveal the favourable outcomes. It could also be said that, for a sustainable caring relation to be attained, both parties should strive to comprehend the intended goal. Even so, for this critical engagement to surface, I contend that caring relations require not only blind, compassionate actions, but a cosmopolitan norm of hospitality as a way of invoking provoking engagement. Welcoming people and treating them with scepticism may help us become attentive to each other’s point of view and be ready to shift from parochial ideas. However, being the carer educator we must identify what the cared-for needs to be addressed, in this case internal exclusion encountered in HE. This form of provocation can be the best tool for evoking potentialities. It is clear that caring cannot always be as favourable
as the cared-for desires, but it has the potential of un-imagined performance and leads to a sustained caring relationship. Nonetheless, taking into account the lived experiences of some students, especially those from disadvantaged backgrounds, and their grave experiences of internal exclusion, caring requires some form of compassion. Consequently, caring relations that constitute compassion as an emotional intelligence feature in which people put themselves in the shoes of the excluded and become imaginative may lead to recognising humanity in people. This leads us to Cavell's idea of acknowledging humanity as an accompanying feature in caring relations.

6.3.4 Caring as acknowledging humanity

The idea of humanity is central to the reconstituted ethics of care if those internally excluded are to assert their voice and offer justifiable reasons as equal citizens. In his book, *The Claim of Reason*, Cavell (1979) calls for acknowledging humanity, which entails showing respect of people's dignity as human beings, a Kantian view made eminent by Cavell. According to Cavell (1979: 438, 440), acknowledging humanity “in Other and oneself” means that I see myself through the Other – that makes the Other a mirror that casts my image towards me, and suggests that there is some interconnectedness between the Other and me. Being a mirror image of the other in Cavellian terms requires me to be “answerable for what happens to them”, that is, to enact my responsibility towards them. In this sense, the Other – the actual Other as well as the Other in myself – confronts the self and therefore s/he is turned back upon her or his own self; therefore the Other is not simply the friend, but becomes the teacher, the possibility of self-transcendence. The ability of the self to move beyond those known to us is central to Cavell's argument that “the Other is like oneself, that whatever one can know about the other one first has to find in oneself and then read into the other ... (that is to) conceive the other from the other's point of view” (Cavell, 1979: 440). The notion of acknowledging humanity in others and in oneself is therefore a salient feature for enriching the proposed framework. Even though equal intelligence is at the core of equality, I contend that only when we begin to respect individuals as persons with dignity and as worthy citizens through their voices can justice be enacted.

This notion of acknowledging humanity links to Waghid and Smeyers’s (2011: 8) idea of considering our human interdependence and interconnectedness, for the well-being of all human beings. The same idea connects intensely with Ramose’s (1999) idea of African *Ubuntu* discussed in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, which presumably intends to include but rather internally excludes women in AHE. In Cavell's terms, caring for the other requires self-reflection of what you as the self might expect from the other, in this case the students. This implies that both the carer and cared-for need to reflect on their roles in such a relationship, and not necessarily to understand the
reason for committing to the task. Underlining the role of committing to the pedagogical encounter shows an understanding of why caring ought to be expressed in this way; that is, engaging in a distressful manner is not necessary, since both carer and cared-for may fail to understand each other at that point. Nevertheless, Cavell underscores acknowledging humanity in the self and the other as an approach that could drive, especially the carer-educator’s commitment towards a caring relation, which can be delineated below.

Firstly, if those (men) in AHE can see in women mirror images of themselves as human (and not treat them as subordinate or inferior citizens), the possibility of patriarchal belief, male chauvinistic tendencies and power relations could be eliminated – a process that would engender internal inclusion. Seeing the other as a human being demands that the dominant others who possess all the power to control and dominate the Other (women) depart from their authoritarian and inhuman practices of exclusion, and begin to treat the Other as an equal human being. To put it clearly, the assumption is that those with power (i.e. men in this context) may begin to demand internal inclusion for women by creating conditions to empower them, rather than women having to appeal continuously for inclusion. The argument I am defending here is that, treating certain human beings at face value and having them in institutions of HE without a voice is an injustice against humanity. The point is that, by allowing some people to achieve formal access (physical representation) without giving them epistemological access – in Morrowian terms referred to in Chapter 1 of the study – while subjecting them to internal exclusion and discrimination in AHE is an unjust act and cruelty to “human possibility” (Cavell, 1979: 378). This caring relation requires that men begin to establish ways to express their responsibility by including women and treating them as human beings, rather than as subordinate beings. In other words, men are expected to begin advocating for women’s internal inclusion due to the fact that the exclusion of the other becomes a challenge to their own humanity.

Secondly, caring with respect underlies how the carer educator begins connecting to the Other (cared-for student), which demands that one acknowledges humanity in the Other; and the basis for such action lies in oneself: “I have to acknowledge humanity in the other, and the basis of it seems to lie in me” (Cavell, 1979: 433). In the same spirit, given that women’s voices are internally excluded in higher education, it demonstrates that there are uncaring relations among people, especially when those in authority (mostly men) fail to acknowledge the humanity in them. To care in the Cavellian sense ought to begin from the point of acknowledging others’ inclusion and acting by challenging internal exclusion – an act that undermines humanity. In other words, the act of bringing women into higher educational deliberations and expecting them to assert their own voices is in itself a form of denying your own and other’s humanity. To exclude the other is to confirm that one (the dominant group) does not owe the other (internally excluded) respect as human beings. In such a situation, Cavell says, the failure of humanity with others reveals the
failure of one's own humanity (Cavell, 1979: 434). In the same way, failing to include women's voices, especially those who are articulate and able to make positive contributions, due to illiberal patriarchal and cultural influences, is to despise their dignity as human beings. People with authority to control internal engagement need to acknowledge themselves as humans and to consider others as humans who are equally worthy, as a matter of caring. In other words, respect for persons as a way of caring requires one with a voice to acknowledge the other as a person alongside her/himself.

What strikes me about Cavell's exposition is the point that, if one remains silent about the marginalisation and internal exclusion of the other, one affirms their being unworthy, a way of renouncing one’s humanity. Augmenting my call for a need for confrontational iterations in a moral caring relationship, I refer to Cavell (1979: 326), where he posits that “we may mistake someone’s cares and commitments” in evoking their rationality. In his words, “what is required in confronting another person [between the carer and cared-for] is not your liking him or her but your being willing to take his or her position into account, and bear the consequences, that is confronting others in position of which one will not imagine the acknowledgement” (Cavell, 1979: 326). This is a captivating standpoint, because acknowledging humanity requires taking risk, and not being liked or favoured by the cared-for, but striving towards enabling him/her to attain unimaginable results. In the main, the argument for acknowledging humanity in the self and the other and to respect them as persons with dignity is a probable act of caring. Without this very act, any caring act exercised in AHE will remain a harmful practice and continue to thwart citizens from exercising their equality.

Thirdly, to identify exclusion as a harmful practice provides a door through which someone alienated [by dominant men] can return by the offering and the acceptance of explanation, excuses and justification, or by the respect one human being will show another who sees and accepts the responsibility for a position which he himself would not adopt [women who remain silent despite their physical representation] (Cavell, 1979: 269). In this way, those with authority to dominate others will acknowledge internal exclusion as an unhealthy act and take responsibility to ensure that no deliberation may take place in higher education without consideration of women's voices. The carers are expected to initiate suitable ways of alleviating any act of internal exclusion, not only to speak for them but to create conditions for empowering them through a voice. At this point, one may ask if caring in a Cavellian sense is asking for “too much”, knowing that women's physical presence is evident in AHE. We may also need to consider the question of how much is “too much” when it comes to acknowledging the humanity of another (Cavell, 1979: 438). Respecting one’s fellow human beings (inclusion of others’ voices) is never “too much”, or else how much is enough when we talk of our answerability to the other or what happens to them? Thus, the reconstituted ethics of care in a Cavellian view should be framed as an acknowledgement that, in respect of our
fellow human beings, tells us not only why we are answerable for what happens to them, but also why our answerability is not unlimited (Cavell, 1979: 438). In other words, without seeing humanity in the other, the act of caring will not work. More importantly, what I think Cavell’s call for acknowledging humanity contests is the predisposition that rationality is an abstract thing living somewhere in the air rather than in the human body. This is a common perspective – that when we talk of rationality, we are talking of an abstract element of the human being. This approach to rationality has a tendency to take it as rigid framework that can be applied homogenously, without considering a human being’s physical needs and circumstances.

Taking into account this assumption, I echo Cavell’s standpoint that, when engaging in caring relations, the carer should consider and acknowledge humanity in the self and in the other. The point is that if a carer believes that she/he is a human being with feelings, desires and fears, the same needs be acknowledged in the Other cared-for, hence responsibility, accountability and answerability are required if rationality is to be attained. One therefore concedes that this is an apposite thought by Cavell against the perception of rationality as an abstract. He seems to remind us that rationality is a crucial part of our humanity, and is within us rather than outside us. Therefore, caring for people’s rationality is an undeniable and inevitable act, if the voice of the internally excluded groups is to be heard in democratic deliberation in AHE. With reference to Cavell’s notion of acknowledging humanity, Waghid and Smeyers (2011: 6) advocate for a positive ethics of care that demands the perpetrators to be answerable to the affliction of others – in their case, the Hutu militants killing the Tutsi in the Congo. In their radical approach, Waghid and Smeyers call for the Hutu to give reasons why they should treat the Tutsi inhumanely and expose them to murder and the daily rape of women and girls (2011: 6). I find their argument compelling, since questioning the perpetrators may cause them to begin some reconsideration of and reflection on why others are being treated maliciously. In their view, answerability and reasoning direct the perpetrators to think deeply about their inhumane acts and to justify their actions to the public.

Echoing this position, I call for the dominant others, predominantly men, to engage in self-reflection and give their reasons why women should continue to be internally excluded and treated as if they were not equal citizens. The assumption is that those instigating internal exclusion would have a chance to recognise the injustice done to others and give reasonable justification for their actions, which possibly could lead to caring relations. In a nutshell, Cavell’s idea of acknowledging humanity profoundly heightens the reconstituted ethics of care in the efforts to disrupt the cycle of power relations among people that stir internal exclusion. On the basis of the preceding exposition, I pose the question whether human beings can do without caring. In answering this question, MacIntyre (1999: 83-84) highlights the two vigorous reasons why human beings need to care.

Firstly, because we are dependent animals in the sense of caring for our physical needs (vulnerabilities; disabled, and ageing etc.). Secondly, we are also dependent on each other to
conjure up each other’s rationality. However, addressing people’s vulnerabilities, including our physical needs, is not a guarantee that our rationality will be invoked to the extent that will enable us to be independent reasoners. It is only when we pay close attention to care for each other’s rationality that we can attend to our humanity that is both our physical and our rational needs. This approach takes account our humanity, which is that our being human connects very well with Cavell’s (1979) call for acknowledging each other’s humanity. The core of this viewpoint is that our sense of being human is what we have in common and share—which is rationality. In other words, our physical differences alone do not characterise our humanity, but rather it is our commonalities that characterise our humanity. This simply means that human beings are complete when they encounter each other. My conviction is that an individual cannot survive without each other, evoking each other’s rationality as a way to recognising our humanity. From the above, it is clear that, when we care, we begin to encounter the otherness of others through iterations that is both our physical and our rationality—a way of advancing humanity—which is unavoidably salient of our being human.

Thus far, I have extended MacIntyre’s notion of caring that creates space for evoking potentialities, noting that this kind of an ethics of care needs to be reconstituted with Rancière’s idea of equal intelligence, which offers a potential base for the internally excluded groups to assert their voices. This can only happen when the excluded announce their presence in democratic deliberations via a voice as a way of disrupting the taken-for-granted conversation of the dominant group. In other words, equality is based on the voice of worthy human beings, rather than on gender, when looking at this from Benhabib’s hostitable iterations. Through belligerent engagement, the patriarchal norms, chauvinistic tendencies and authoritarian encounters might be put to scrutiny. In the same way, interrogation and agitation may stir distress, while iteration should give room to compassionate respect (Nussbaum, 2001) by listening to other’s stories and recognising their fates. Doing something for the excluded and acting for the common good affirms humanity in each other. This suggests that caring relations that acknowledge humanity in the self and in others (in Cavell’s idea) may advance an authentic form of democratic higher education deliberation. Therefore, I contend that the reconstituted ethics of care as sketched above possesses sufficient conditions to disrupt the power relations among people by means of an equalisation of voice, rather than of gender, as contended by this dissertation. Given the above, I proceed to defend an appropriate form of caring.

6.4 Caring as a human capacity – in defence of a reconstituted ethics of care

At this point I acknowledge various forms of caring offered in AHE aimed at creating spaces for the disadvantaged and marginalised groups in fulfilling universal human rights declarations such as the
CEDAW and MDGs. I also acknowledge the commitment of educators in ensuring that the deprived groups gain formal access to HE as citizens. Nonetheless, I defend caring relations that recognise people as human beings with equal intelligence and rationality, namely compassionate imagining, responsibility, and reasoning. These three features hold salient conditions for inculcating a culture of caring that transcends the material needs of rational, independent beings. My argument is that the pedagogical community, which is AHE, is incomplete without caring citizens invoking each other’s humanity in deliberative encounters. Hence, there is a need to engage in democratic deliberation if the otherness of the others is to be invoked, that is human rationality (MacIntyre, 1999). I incontestably acknowledge that evoking potentialities is a complicated task and requires risk taking in empowering the other. Yet this proves to be a viable mechanism to enable the potentialities in other to be unleashed – not in a prescribed way, but by expecting the unimaginable expression of equality.

Caring relations that are concerned about humanity are without doubt sufficient to disrupt and overturn the internally exclusive patriarchy, male chauvinistic practices and authoritarian attitudes among people in HE in Africa. This robust caring approach challenges the universal views that claim gender equality and defend intellectual equality through a voice for all human beings. The reconstituted, non-gendered caring transcends the patriarchal norms that dictate what males can do and what females cannot, which undermines democratic ideas of citizenship. However, an authentic caring relation perceives people – both women and men – as human beings who are worthy of respect, who can express their minds, and who should be treated in a non-gendered but dignified way. I contest the assumptions that men are more patriarchal than women or that women are more caring than men, in the light of the discriminatory experiences recounted by others (i.e. Ramphele, 1995), and the kind of caring I encountered in a male promoter. On the basis of these accounts, I contend that caring is a human capacity and can be expressed by all human beings, irrespective of their gender or class. What I found salient is the kind of caring relation that enacts rationality and is reciprocally caring, not for its own sake but for the sake of humanity.

The point is that, only when we begin to recognize all people as citizens of Africa and world, AHE caring relations may instil in citizens a sense of compassionate imagining, responsibility and reasoning. In this way, individuals could exercise their citizenship through a voice as equally as possible in educational iterations which can potentially engender substantive inclusion. In sum, caring relations should constitute three salient features: firstly, the caring relation needs compassionate imagining, where people listen to each other’s lived experiences and put themselves in the shoes of other’s misfortunes and act to alleviate internal exclusion. Secondly, the caring relation requires responsibility that enables the creation of conditions for people to exercise their equality via a voice. This can happen when the dominant others take responsibility to
recognise humanity in themselves and the other by invoking their potentialities and being remorseful when others are internally excluded.

Thirdly, the caring relation calls for reasoning abilities that enable people to become assertive and announce their presence as equal citizens. By engaging in provocative deliberation, people might interrogate issues of concern with the intention to challenge the exclusionary structures and ideologies in themselves and others that thwart transformation. I acknowledge that, if this reconstituted ethics of care is cultivated in HE, Africa could have caring democratic citizens who will not only be deliberative, but also stand against anomalies on the entire continent. In view of this, an apt caring offers a philosophically rich account that can both disrupt and possibly eliminate the power relations between people in HE. Unless higher education institutions, especially universities in Africa, promote this form of caring in their pedagogical encounters, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to cultivate caring citizens. Notably, this caring will not only help in attaining substantial inclusion, but may engender social justice, which Africa and the entire world require.

6.5 Summary

I have shown that the conception of an ethics of care as a sympathetic caring relation espoused by Noddings is worthwhile, but that it limits the autonomy of a cared-for agent. In supplementing sympathetic caring, I adopted Slote’s empathetic caring, which invokes autonomy and mutual respect. Even so, considering the deprived groups that might not be able to assert their voices autonomously, Slote’s, like Noddings’s caring approach, is restricted in addressing internal exclusion. I then endorsed McIntyre’s startling caring approach that evokes citizens’ rational potentialities. Although caring that evokes rationality is apposite, the fact that his liberal caring depends on a proxy for the non-eloquent requires further reconstitution. In the quest for an appropriate type of caring, I adopted equal intelligence (Rancière) to set the grounds for a caring relationship that may disrupt internal exclusion, whereby the excluded begin to announce their presence via a voice. This disruptive approach creates a space for people to engage in provocative iterations (Benhabib), with compassionate respect (Nussbaum) and humanity (Cavell). I then called for a framework of a reconstituted ethics of care for AHE that possibly may enact in people compassionate imagining, responsibility and reasoning.

I have also posited that caring relations that goes beyond gender equality to the equalisation of voice of all human beings stand a chance to engender social justice and, inevitably, humanity. When all students exercise their equality as citizens, they may become compassionate, imaginative and responsible reasoners, not only asserting individual voices, but taking account of others. Without each of these facets, a viable manifestation of caring would be unlikely, and even
impossible to advance. Therefore, unless AHE employs this reconceptualisation of an ethics of care, which constitutes compassionate imagining, responsibility and reasoning, internal exclusion will continue to undermine the project of democratisation in Africa. The subsequent and concluding chapter will provide the implications of a reconstituted ethics of care for a re-imagined university education, that is, teaching and learning, governance and management. At the same time, I will show the contribution of the study to research, reflect on the research journey, respond to potential criticism and offer possibilities for future studies.
CHAPTER SEVEN

IMPLICATIONS FOR A RECONSTITUTED ETHICS OF CARE FOR UNIVERSITY EDUCATION AND IT’S RELEVANCE TO RESEARCH

7.1 Introduction

In the preceding chapter I have been preoccupied with a reconstruction of an ethics of care that might potentially disrupt the exclusionary practices in AHE. In the final subsection, I defended an all-encompassing reconstituted ethics of care with its related concepts – compassionate imagining, responsibility and reasoning – as an appropriate framework to disrupt internal exclusion in AHE. This concluding chapter aims to demonstrate the implications of the defended approach for a re-imagined university education. It will also offer the contribution of the study to research; respond to potential criticism; and offer possibilities for future studies. I also reflect on my journey of educational research. Meanwhile, before engaging a re-imagined university education, let me offer a synopsis of the project by consolidating the core findings and arguments.

7.2 A synopsis and foundation of the dissertation

In the foregoing chapters of this dissertation, I explored why AHE excludes women, as evidently revealed throughout the study, and the underlying causes of such exclusion, thereby proposing how an ethics of care could disrupt this dilemma. The investigation was propelled by the hypothesis that AHE excludes women, premised on my lived experience and observations of statistical representation from various higher education institutions on the African continent. To substantiate the above assumption, I attempted to respond to the primary and secondary questions of the study: “Do exclusion and gender inequality undermine the pursuit of higher education in Africa? Can the production of knowledge be credible if higher education in Africa is permeated by patriarchal ideology, practices and gender inequality which perpetuate the exclusion women? Would an ethics of care be a feasible notion for remedying exclusion, gender inequality and social injustice, which perpetuate women’s lack of access to higher education institutions in Africa?”

To answer these research questions, the analysis started by setting the agenda for the research in Chapter 2, which offers a historical account of AHE, depicting women’s involvement in three
epochs. The analysis revealed that HE was in Africa before Western colonialism, yet during these periods women were assigned to non-recognised and trivial gendered roles within the private space, which were their husbands' homes. I have shown that women in Africa remained without rights to engage in the public space and contribute to development. Nonetheless, from the postcolonial period, African states and international agencies (i.e. the IMF and the World Bank) made drastic shifts in advocating for women's inclusion and gender equality. Although I acknowledged the major strides AHE made in widening access in redressing the past colonial/apartheid systems, the contemporary portrait, which is the focus of this study, exposed how such social institutions, especially universities, are confronted with competing demands of responding to local needs for transformation and international ideologies of liberalism and globalisation. This project emphasised the production of knowledge for the global market economy and educating people who can compete favourably. This is what Castells (2001: 16) asserted by showing that international demands overpowered the autonomy of AHE to educate for social justice, leading to four inhumane conditions in human existence: inequality, poverty, polarisation and social exclusion. Similarly, Divala (2008: 200) affirmed that AHE had to negotiate a position between international recognition and local needs. The assumption is that these structures left HE without freedom and space to care for its deprived citizens, especially women. Nonetheless, I argued that if Africa was serious about reaching genuine transformation, it was essential to explore other aspects that hold and impinge the continent's liberation agenda.

Within the above understanding, Chapter 3 conceptualised the notion of inclusion as the African philosophy of *Ubuntu* and equality in relation to AHE. I identified that HE adopted gender as a standard to attain inclusion and equality. My conceptualisation of inclusion and equality as democratic values revealed that an equalisation of voice, rather than a gendered approach, is the ideal one. Thus, the chapter showed the incongruence between AHE's proposition for inclusion and equality based on gender and the democratic theorist's notion of equalisation of voice. Similarly, this analysis exposed that there are subtle forms of exclusion that stir women's internal exclusion in spite of their statistical representation. I contend that, although *Ubuntu* is equal to inclusion, the portrayal of women's internal exclusion is unjust and shows a limited understanding of *Ubuntu*. I agree with Waghid and Smeyers's (2012) argument that “Knowing *Ubuntu* is not acting with care”, hence a need for reconceptualisation.

By probing women's inclusion, Chapter 4 offered evidence of women's experiences of higher educational discourses to substantiate the internal exclusion identified in the previous chapter. Data was constructed from purposely sampled HE discourses in countries where evidence of women’s exclusion is readily available (both statistically and experience). I argued that such exclusion and inequality are pernicious, as they undermine transformation, development and the democratic agenda Africa requires. This analysis exposed that, apart from international demands,
there is a culture of patriarchal beliefs, male chauvinism and authoritarianism that form the conditions that perpetuate internal exclusion. In Chapter 5, I investigated how patriarchal ideology is a taken-for-granted and static norm that normalise both male and female categories and influence internal exclusion. I discovered that there are power relations among people, and that both the excluded and the dominant ought to be held accountable for their sustenance. I also argued that a gendered approach to inclusion and equality provoked more exclusion, especially for people who fall out of the heterosexual category. In my view, African people and their social institutions ought to reflect on and take responsibility for injustices happening on the continent, rather than blaming external structures such as the globalisation project exclusively.

In Chapter 6 I explored the conception of an ethics of care to offer an appropriate means of addressing internal exclusion. Taking a cue from Noddings’s conception of caring, the study discovered that caring is relational between the carer and the cared-for. I extended her conception of caring beyond sympathy towards empathy, which recognises mutual respect for and the autonomy of the cared-for. In an effort to identify an appropriate approach, I endorsed MacIntyrean caring, which evokes people’s rational potentialities, because of the fact that human beings are dependent beings for both vulnerabilities and rationality to become independent rational beings. In view of the above, I drew the conclusion that caring can be constituted differently based on the carer’s agenda, specifically whether it is aimed to debilitate the cared-for or emancipate them. I then advocated a non-gendered, all-encompassing approach that harmonises the conception of an ethics of care based on a Rancièrean emancipatory approach that views all people (the carers and cared-for) as equal intellectuals who need to announce their presence via a voice. To give meaning to this approach, I employed the cosmopolitan norms of iteration, compassionate respect and humanity to reconstitute an ethics of care. This approach espoused three re-imagined features – compassionate imagining, responsibility and reasoning – as sufficient conditions to address internal exclusion. I argued that this approach is pertinent to disrupt the exclusionary power relations among people in AHE, whereby people, irrespective of their differences, possibly could celebrate equality and inclusion through a voice.

Considering the findings of this study, the next section of the chapter will exhibit the implications of a reconstituted ethics of care for a re-imagined university education, that is teaching and learning, as well as governance and management. The thrust of the chapter is to show the potentiality for a re-imagined university education to engender substantive inclusion.
7.3 Compassionate imagining, responsibility and reasoning: implications for substantive inclusion

Here, prior to the manifestation of what a re-imagined university looks like, I want to highlight why university education cannot be divorced from local needs. The crucial question that gives impetus to this exposition is: why are people excluded internally in HE in Africa? The response could be, because people are not really taught and do not grasp what it means to be a citizen of a democratic society, especially through acts of deliberation. Thus, it is a university’s responsibility to educate its citizens to be democrats. The same idea is advocated by different scholars, namely Benhabib (1996), Dunne & Pendlebury (2003), Enslin, Pendlebury and Tjiattas (2001), Gutmann & Thompson (2004), Waghid (2005), Assié-Lumumba (2007), Frank & Meyer (2007), and Smeyers (2011), who argue that HE, mainly the university, is an integral site where democratic values such as inclusion, equality, respect and caring are cultivated and experienced. In other words, Africa ought to educate people how to deliberate as a way of exercising their rights and responsibilities, with the purpose of finding amicable solutions and answers to others’ deprivation and marginalisation. I argue that it is through deliberation that students could potentially disrupt the taken-for-granted patriarchal narrative and challenge the practices that impede a transformational agenda.

My conviction is that we cannot expect people to care if they are not educated to do so. It is important to recount Abdalla’s view in Assié-Lumumba (2006a: 19), alluded to in Chapter 1, that a university is but one of the institutions of HE in which men and women are educated with high levels of intellectual development in different fields. This pedagogical community is seen as vital where people are engaged in study and research. I argue that only when a university takes its democratic responsibility of cultivating caring characters seriously, internal exclusion and other forms of injustice may be alleviated. Similarly, a university, as an integral social institution of democratic society, should not only produce competitors in the world market, but citizens who can strive for just society. Augmenting this view, Nussbaum (2010) is concerned about treating education as if its main goal is to teach students to be economically productive, rather than to think critically and become knowledgeable and empathetic citizens. Her argument is that nations, including those in Africa and their social institutions must resist efforts to reduce education to a tool of gross national product, but rather work towards education for a more inclusive type of citizenship that offers all students the capacity to be true democratic citizens of their countries and the world (Nussbaum, 2010: 6-7).
I echo the above view that university education should move beyond educating for profit making, but rather should inculcate democratic values like inclusion, equality, respect and caring, to mention a few. In what follows I present the manifestation of a re-imagined university education within the reconstructed ethics of care for substantive inclusion.

7.3.1 Implications for university teaching and learning

In this subsection, before exploring what teaching and learning encounters could look like within a reconstituted ethics of care, I want to make some preliminary remarks on what constitutes teaching and learning. One of the renowned philosophers of education, the late Terence McLaughlin, responded to the critical question of “How should practices and communities of practice be properly conceived in the context of teaching and learning?” by saying that the concept of teaching and education ought to be used interchangeably with an understanding that teaching ought to be an “educative teaching” (McLaughlin, 2003: 345). From the above it is clear that there are various interpretations and conceptions of what the notion of education entails; however, for him, teaching as a practice or community of practice should consider MacIntyre’s exposition. McLaughlin (2003: 346) cautions that teaching that restricts itself or ignores the MacIntyrean and Aristotelian elements or questions of coherent, overall, holistic vision, virtues, is insufficient. The point is that there is a danger of over- emphasising “skills” and being disconnected from dispositions, virtues, values, motives and other personal qualities of the teacher widely seen as central to teaching. With reference to Richard Smith (cited in McLaughlin, 2003: 346), “to put ‘skills’ at the heart of our conception of a teacher is to come close to conceding that teachers have nothing to say about the ends of education, no vision of human potential or of the way life might be lived to communicate to their pupils, but are experts in means only”. McLaughlin therefore asserts that there is a need for trainee teachers to be invited to consider and develop a broad, overall vision of education.

Like McLaughlin, Waghid (2008a) advocates the Aristotelian concepts of phronises (practical wisdom) and techne (technical know-how) as encompassing university teaching and learning (pedagogy). Waghid (2008a) reconstructed what he calls a critical pedagogy for university education with Dunne and Pendlebury’s (2003) view of practical reasoning. From within this viewpoint, Dunne and Pendlebury (2003) posit that education could achieve its goal by inculcating in students both practical wisdom and technical know-how. The idea of practical wisdom entails procedures (means) aimed at cultivating in citizens the ability and disposition or willingness to think critically, to assess, to evaluate, to question and to offer reasons for one’s position, and to be able to identify and address social problems in society, whereas technical know-how involves facts (ends) of education.
Waghid’s interpretation promotes McLaughlin’s argument, which urges educators not to ignore or favour one of these, but to advance both strands if education is to achieve its mission. With this in mind, I argue that university teaching and learning ought to prepare students with facts on the subject matter, but also with practical wisdom, that is, the ability and disposition and willingness to engage actively in deliberation on pressing issues like internal exclusion, and to take responsibility for offering reasons why others should not be treated unjustly. For a university to produce students with technical skills and practical reasoning abilities, i.e. caring traits, it should consider Benhabib’s (2002: 162-164) suggestion to educate for democratic citizenship. In her view, for democracy to flourish, university education requires three interrelated public attributes when educating citizens: collective identity, privileges of membership and social rights and benefits. These attributes are interconnected and require one another to achieve the desired democratic citizens. In other words, for citizens to be democrats, these attributes need to be in co-existence, which I find relevant for pedagogical encounters in African universities.

To Benhabib (2002: 169), “democracy is a form of life which rests upon active consent and participation”, whereas “citizenship is distributed according to passive criteria of belonging, like birth upon a piece of land and socialisation in that country or membership in an ethnic group”. Firstly, a university should educate students about their collective identity. This idea expects members of a political community who want to educate people to be democratic citizens to pursue an approach that takes into account people’s linguistic, cultural, ethnic and religious commonalities. Collective identity can only happen within the formation of civil spaces in which people learn to live with other people from different backgrounds and contexts, while respecting diversity or differences. Waghid (2010: 198) points out that collective identity can be achieved by establishing civil spaces where democratic citizens are taught how to share commonalities, and how to respect differences. He states further that people should not only be taught about their right to enter into deliberation, but that this right should be recognised by all others if they are to become active participants in an educative process that is informed by democratic citizenship. On this score, Waghid (2010: 198) holds that the process of educating people about their civil, political and social rights would teach them about the rights to the protection of life, liberty, freedom of conscience, and the right of self-determination. In his words, "a democratic citizenship education would also educate people to deliberate in such a way as to offer an account of one’s reasons and in turn listen to the reasons of others, and recognise and respect people’s, political and social rights" (Waghid, 2010: 198-199). This argument appeals to me because, when students are taught what it means to live and act democratically, they may realise the usefulness of engaging one another as equal citizens. In this way, the excluded groups, just like the dominant groups, may begin to air their views and claim what is right and just, including a demand for internal inclusion.
Secondly, the university should educate students about what it means to have privileges of membership, whereby people become aware of their democratic citizenry rights to political participation, right to hold office, and right to deliberate and be part of decision making (Benhabib, 2002: 162). All people, especially the internally excluded groups, may realise that to remain silent in AHE is to give up one’s citizenship right to be heard and to influence policies. In her view, Benhabib (2002: 130) notes that another important argument is educating people to be able to deliberate to make their voices heard and to give reasons in civil public spaces without fear of intimidation or domination. I say that when people are aware of what is expected of them, not just for mere representation, but that their voices can make a meaningful contribution and disrupt the taken-granted narrative or status quo, they would be heard.

Thirdly, a university should educate students about their social rights and benefits. Benhabib (2002: 163-164), with reference to T. H. Marshall’s viewpoint, notes that this requires three aspects: civil right, political right and social right. Civil right involves students’ right to protection of life, liberty and prosperity, the right to freedom of right or wrong, and the right to contract and marriage. Political right has to do with educating people about their right to self-determination, to hold office, and to have freedom of speech, hold opinions and join political associations. And social right entails people’s/students’ right to join trade unions or student bodies, enjoy professional health care, and have access to unemployment compensation, old-age unions, child care, housing and educational subsidies.

Profoundly, active consent and participation can only occur when people have a sense of belonging and attachment to such a deliberative group. In other words, democratic citizenship seeks to promote active participation, whereas citizenship works toward people with a sense of belonging when participants engage in deliberations. Thus, Benhabib’s (2002: 133-134) active participation is advanced through citizens’ engagement in deliberation as free and equal moral beings, in which process they attempt to persuade others about their point of view by explaining individual reasons in a reasonable manner. In a nutshell, university education as ingrained in Benhabib’s three delineated ideas of democratic citizenship education symbolises a social institution in which people are educated about one another’s shared values, meanings, justice, signs and symbols. Echoing the above, Waghid (2008a: 4) asserts that people need to be educated to be able to deliberate, offer their own reasons, listen to others’ reasons and recognise and respect other people’s civil, political and social rights, as well as question injustice without being ridiculed and rebuked by anyone. In my view, when students are informed about what it means to be democratic citizens, the features of a reconstituted ethics of care, compassionate imagining, responsibility and reasoning may possibly be upheld.

For students to begin releasing their compassionate imagining, as Nussbaum (2001) and Greene (1995) urge us to do, teaching and learning encounters must facilitate students to narrate their
stories of subjugation and mistreatment by others. By means of engagement, students who are educated to be democratic citizens have a better chance of listening to others’ misfortunes and maltreatment so that they may become compassionate imaginers and act responsibly to either give up or moderate their oppressive tendencies. Through these distressful encounters, the excluded assert their voice against the culture of patriarchy, male chauvinism and authoritarian practices that undermine others’ opportunity to exercise their citizenship rights.

Equally, such students (both the dominant and the excluded) might begin to engage provocatively in order to hear others’ points of view in order to address the injustice happening in Africa. I echo Waghid’s (2005: 340) compelling viewpoint that university classrooms require not only socialising students with an inherent/implicit body of facts and knowledge-constructs about society, human values and different cultural traditions, but should also initiate them into a discourse of critical questioning so that they challenge what they have been taught. Hence, cultivating a culture of caring demands that university educators afford all students equal opportunities to engage critically and reflexively with each other and with texts, irrespective of gender or how ill-informed their views are. In this way, university education produces critical citizens who will keep abreast of what is happening in society and vice versa, as a way of educating students to become responsible citizens for the well-being of humanity.

7.3.2 How do we inculcate caring traits in students?

To this end, democratic caring citizens can only be realised when all students are treated with equal intellect and are expected to justify their reasons for why a particular view, in this case patriarchy, is to be sustained. This means that democratic values should not only be taught, but should be experienced through caring encounters that potentially may stimulate critical thinking and shape reasoning skills. These kinds of pedagogical encounters that have sufficient conditions to disrupt the patriarchal cultural norms of male domination over female subordination are important for an amended ethics of care. Unless universities begin to cultivate this imaginative kind of caring among educators and students, internal exclusion will not be mitigated and people’s minds will not be transformed as we desire. And when people care about the other as themselves, they place their taken-for-granted beliefs, such as patriarchal cultural norms that perpetuate chauvinism and authoritarian power relations, into contestation. I hold that university encounters in which educators and students engage provocatively would question discriminatory beliefs and actions towards thinking anew. However, in order for a culture of caring to be promoted, university governance and management ought to embrace a reconstituted ethics of care.
7.3.3 Implications for governance and management

As argued above, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to engender a just society if university teaching and learning tried to cultivate caring in students without a clear conceptualisation and practices. The point is that, unless university governance and management frame their policy and practices in a similar manner, inclusion and equality may not be achieved. Firstly, university governance and management should pronounce what it means to care as a yardstick for the entire institution. This requires policies and an environment that respect all people’s voices and affords students, staff members and leaders equal opportunities, irrespective of their differences. Secondly, caring relations among management members should also break away from the patriarchal traditional cultural norm of male domination over female subordination. The point is that university governance ought to transcend the gender divide in its attempts to advance inclusion and equality.

As a result, governance and management should be an example for the rest of the institutions as a way of demonstrating pragmatically how caring is enacted. This will be evident when a diversified management in higher leadership positions engage staff members and students provocatively with the intention to evoke the views of the internally excluded group. By so doing, their voices may make a meaningful contribution to democratic processes. Also, seeing some people as the other should be discouraged, since such concepts trigger all forms of discrimination and exclusion. Thirdly, university governance and management should begin to take seriously issues of marginalisation and raise a radical voice against all forms of injustice happening to others, as a form of being compassionate and taking responsibility in addressing such encounters. Fourthly, university governance and management should sensitise their staff to their democratic responsibility as a way of holding people accountable for the excluded group’s voices. In other words, it is not sufficient to only formulate democratic policies, but they should be an example of what it means to care.

In the same way, a re-imagined university governance and management should treat all people as equal human beings rather than as gendered beings, particularly in its allocation of courses, jobs and even leadership positions. In sum, university governance and management ought to fulfil three tasks – outline a clear and richer conception of an ethics of care that evokes people’s rational potentialities, educate and sensitise staff members on what is expected of them, and ultimately speak publicly against unjust practices. By so doing, we may provoke other institutions, like schools and the religious, cultural and traditional aspects of civil society to debunk unjust acts that undermine democracy and humanity. Augmenting the call for university governance and management to begin rethinking and reviewing strategies as they emerge in the 21st century, the Rector and Vice-Chancellor of Stellenbosch University, Prof H Russel Botman (2013: 4), asserts that:
As we go deeper into the 21st century, it has become crucial to position Stellenbosch University for this era to benefit from new opportunities. This process offers many challenges, but also brings excitement about the future of our institution. With rapidly shifting societal needs worldwide, most universities have gone into “transformation mode” in order to deal with the pressures of serving more people with less space and money and to remain relevant in the knowledge economy. This requires a fundamental review of strategies, structures, missions, processes and programmes – never neglecting to involve all stakeholders. At SU we elected to take proactive steps to ensure that continuous transformation is integrated as part of the core “being” of the University – thus not necessity driven but rather because we view it as a key prerequisite for success in the 21st century. The management of the University therefore foresees this process to be reconciling and not divisive.

It therefore is evident that only when universities take a vigorous standpoint in framing their policies and practices within a reconstituted ethics of care, may internal exclusion and other injustices encountered in HE institutions and society be alleviated. It therefore is urgent for universities in Africa to retain their position as an integral place to produce not only technicians, but citizens with compassionate imagining, responsibility and reasoning who can respond to both new technologies and pressing injustices. This requires a university not only to teach the conception of caring, but to take it as a way of life. It has been proven that if universities cannot inculcate democratic citizenry, other institutions are unlikely to do so. From here, the following section will discuss the significance of the study and its contribution to research, reflect on the trajectory of finding a voice, respond to potential criticism, and then identify possibilities for future studies.

### 7.4 Significance of the study and its contribution to research

This study is significant in the field of Philosophy of Education and Educational Theory for three reasons. One main novelty of this study rests in the reconceptualisation of an ethics of care, with its related meanings – compassionate imagining, responsibility and reasoning – which have the potential to disrupt exclusionary practices and the status quo. Thus, the study offers a possibility for transforming HE in Africa by creating enabling conditions that evoke the internally excluded rational potentialities and making it possible to assert a disrupting voice as a way of emancipation. It also creates a deliberative and engaging environment in which the dominant groups take their taken-for-granted narrative and ideas into scrutiny and begins to think anew, which is a process of contributing towards attaining substantive inclusion.
7.4.1 How does a study of this nature fit into higher education?

Taking into account how AHE, especially the university, has become a playing field for competing ideologies and leaves learners without the autonomy to care for citizens, this study advocates a shift from economically driven education towards an inclusive democratic education for social justice. Africa needs to transcend what Nussbaum (2010) and Noddings (2006b: 339-340) assert about contemporary education, which serves two complementary aims: to produce competent workers on the one hand, and citizens on the other. In Noddings’s (2006b: 339) view, “an education worthy of its name will prepare students to develop as persons, thoughtful citizens, competent parents, faithful friends, capable workers, generous neighbours and lifelong learners”. This startling argument justifies the need for a re-imagined university that cultivates caring traits in students, who are lifelong learners and who will recognise that there is more to learn in our engagement and encounters with others.

Locating the place of this study within the emerging 21st century, Ronald Barnett (2012) and others, in *The Future University: Ideas and Possibilities*, offer some claims for the future university. This volume’s argument is premised on the idea that HE, specifically the university in the world, is “experiencing common pressures for fundamental change, reinforced by differing national and regional circumstances that also established institutional structures and procedures” (Barnett, 2012: ix). This leads to HE systems in different regions and nations experiencing pressures differently, depending on their socio-economic and political milieu. One infers here that regions and nations have specific urgent issues that need urgent responses. However, due to the pressures facing it, higher education has made a dramatic shift in its roles and character, its roles to state and society. Barnett (2012) posits that the international demands, specifically for the “performativity” and “commodification” of knowledge, permeate all practices of universities, including AHE, which has changed the understanding of “the idea of the university”, as Barnett puts it. Hence, considering the worrying state of Africa, a continent with a long history of colonialism that is facing current challenges ranging from ethnic conflict, poverty, sexual harassment and the HIV and AIDS pandemic, to vicious discrimination and the exclusion of women, a study of this nature is essential. This approach could propel towards a re-imagined university that may cultivate a democratic citizenry who are compassionate imaginers, responsible and ready to reason through deliberation with others, not only for individual needs but for the sake of humanity. Therefore, I think a study of this nature may save the university from degeneration and locate a place for it somewhere in the future.
The future university, which I refer to as a “re-imagined university”, requires what Barnett (2012) calls a re-examination of its “missions” and a re-imagination of its purposes. With this in mind, the contribution of my study to the discourse on a re-imagined university on the African continent attempts to address internal exclusion and engender equality. Although there are claims of the “end of the university”, Barnett’s (2012) volume offers possibilities for the idea that the university can live on vibrantly through the twenty-first century, which attests to the relevance of a re-imagined citizenship education in Africa. Thus, unless HE in Africa embraces and cultivates compassionate imagining, responsibility and reasoning abilities in citizens, its knowledge production will be for mere technicians, which pose a threat to democracy and humanity. Having said this, I now turn to a reflective dimension.

7.4.2 Finding a voice: how, who and what have I become?

PhD students and other researchers need to engage in personal reflection to understand themselves in relation to the World and to deliberate about or reconstruct their values in relation to everyday situations which constantly demand their judgments and their action. In conceptually reshaping the situation, they are therefore involved in a reflexive dimension (O’Hanlon, 1994: 282).

As highlighted above, in thinking through this doctoral degree, I want to reflect on how this study has changed me as a person and who or what I have become. In my journey of finding a voice, I reflect on the caring relation in which my carer educator recognised potential in me at the end of my B.Ed. Honours study. With his assistance, and that of other academics and other students, my carer educator moved me out of my comfort zone and challenged me to write a paper and submit an abstract for the Education Students’ Research Regional Conference (ESRRC) in 2008, which established a caring relation for my M.Ed. supervision. This caring was intensified during the two years of study in 2009 and 2010 that enabled me to complete my study within the prescribed time frame. This exceptional performance led to financial assistance to pursue PhD, which triggered my decision to resign from my job. It was during work on this doctoral degree that I realised what it means to care through the conception of an ethics of care. The reconstructed ethics of care that I am advocating for in AHE is exactly the caring encounter that changed my thinking about exclusion and enabled me to emancipate myself through exercising my voice.
7.4.2.1 How and who have I become?

The events or moments that shaped who I am today are uncountable; however, there are major
counters that have changed my thinking and world views towards a richer and deeper
understanding of who I am and what I can do as an independent thinker. First and foremost, I
acknowledge the caring relationship, one that I had never tasted before, in which potentialities in
me as a person were recognised. Through this relation, I realised that every human being has
rational potentialities in spite of where they come from or the level of knowledge they might have.
What is required is to recognise humanity in the otherness of other, that is in the self (carer
educator) and in the other (cared-for student), to evoke their rational potentialities. I learned that
human differences should not determine or undermine how people should care. Based on a
socially constructed gender, sexual orientation, religions, nationality, social status and even level of
education contribute to our inherent human capacity to care. Secondly, in his efforts to care,
especially to evoke my rational potentialities, my carer educator created conditions for growth,
namely regular meetings that expected well thought through positions and justified arguments
through compassionate provocative engagements accompanied by meticulous and guiding
feedback. Through belligerent but compassionate encounters, I learned to think critically and offer
reasons for my arguments, which my carer at times highly commended. My carer educator’s
inspirational words about scientific writing and argumentation may be summed up in this way:
“Nobody can teach you how to write, but you can learn it by yourself through continuous reading,
thinking and writing between 500 and 1 000 words daily, because practis

Interestingly, through this caring relationship I was introduced to various theorists who challenged
my preconceived assumptions and narrow interpretation of fundamental concepts for this study:
 inclusion, equality and caring. I also encountered and engaged with the theorists such as
Noddings, Benhabib, Nussbaum, Assié-Lumumba, Cavell, Young, Rancière, Butler, MacIntyre,
Fay, Harding, Kwesiga, Tamale and others. These engagements and encounters pushed me
beyond my comfort zone, which maximised my understanding. Equally, encountering the
otherness of others, specifically the ideas of those exposed to various forms of marginalisation and
vicious discrimination, in this case homosexuals, invoked in me a deep sense of compassion.
Through this experience, I realised that my call for women’s inclusion was in itself exclusionary. It
therefore was my responsibility as a citizen to advocate for a non-gendered ethics of care that
could lead to substantive inclusion. From the aforementioned scholars, I also learned that
patriarchal beliefs and gendered roles are socially constructed ideologies that are reinforced via
different structures, namely cultural, religious or social institutions. I also realised that what matters
in caring relations is not people’s differences, but rather our shared and common values that shape our humanity. In other words, my identity as a person and what I do should not be defined by others, but what I need from others is to enact my humanity. The point is that, because we human beings are dependent beings in terms of our vulnerabilities, evoking one another’s rationality to become independent thinkers is an indispensable act of caring.

Other conditions created to hone my knowledge in the field of philosophy of education, as well as to boost my confidence, were serving as a tutor, a marker and an assisting lecturer of the B.Ed. Honours students (both residential and distance education). In these processes I learned to engage critically with my colleagues, while being a compassionate imaginer, and to act responsibly to enable them to develop an argument and pursue critical thinking. I learned that caring action especially that which evokes students’ potentialities, is sometimes a painful exercise yet very rewarding in the long run. Here I can recall how some students were annoyed with me because they scored low marks. I encouraged them to rewrite their essays and, after clarifying their errors, some of them came to admit how naïve they were about writing an argument and how grateful they were to have reworked their essays, thereby enhancing their writing. One of the students demanded her “agency” through using whatever form of referencing she found fit. She called me a “gate keeper” when I explained to her what was expected of her and about the university’s referencing style. Surprisingly, this student was later to acknowledge my efforts, which she says paved the way for her to excel.

From such encounters, my compassionate imagining was invoked and I learned how to engage with fellow students’ questioning and often dismissive attitudes. Since the carer educator encourages new students to seek guidance from others, especially former or senior students, I learned a remarkable amount by listening to other’s stories and managed to guide some students to think critically about the issue at hand. Again, the introduction to the discourse on patriarchal beliefs and power relations, especially my reading of Foucault (1980) on how such a dominant idea “normalises” all people, enabled me to identify how accountable I am towards the internal inclusion I am advocating in AHE. Such power in patriarchal norms works as a “panoptical camera”, whilst the critical social scientist Fay (1987) perceived power as a “dyadic” relationship between people and determined by both women and men, because the so-called powerless surrender their power to the so-called dominant, which makes them more powerful. From this viewpoint, I learned not to surrender my power, either through intimidation or demeaning interpretations, chauvinistic tendencies or gendered structures, but became aware of my citizenship rights and responsibility to propose suitable approaches to learning. This patriarchal debate helped me in understanding why women, especially single women and those viewed as different, are treated in a particular way that leads to internal exclusion, marginalisation and vicious discrimination. Such perspectives showed
me that oppressive structures and ideologies require our critical engagement, and if not deconstructive lenses as a way of transforming and emancipating the self as an individual and others through a voice.

Through this caring relation, I managed to present my ideas at several conferences, like ESRRC and the KENTON Education Association of South Africa, and attended the international conference of the International Network of Philosophers of Education (INPE) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in 2012. At such conferences I was privileged to meet a variety of scholars, both local and international. At INPE I met some of the renowned philosophers of education, including Paul Smeyers and Penny Enslin. I also listened to a special lecture in memory of Terence McLaughlin, the philosopher of education who informed my M.Ed. thesis on minimalist-maximalist citizenship education. Another significant experience was serving as a member of the ESRRC Organising Committee from 2008 to 2012. Through this encounter I gained a voice by engaging others on the running of the conference, and also presented ideas at different departmental functions, such as Brown Bags and Postgraduate Days, during which students and lecturers engage in deliberation and present our work. I benefited through an Exchange Programme with the University of Hamburg, Germany, during which time I worked with a prominent feminist scholar and historian of education, Professor Dr Christine Mayer, on the recommendation of my carer. During this exchange and under her supervision, she encouraged me to do some of my research at the UNESCO Institute of Education Library, the Asia-Africa Institute Library, and to work with her colleagues and students, all of whom were hospitable and compassionate. Encountering them and their otherness, I did not only taste what it means to be a cosmopolitan citizen, but also what it means to be human.

7.4.2.2 What have I become?

In doing research, in deliberating about information and data that are being gathered one is in fact changing one’s self … Perhaps the research process has changed the person that they are conscious of this change and therefore become aware of the changes in their choice of action and how it has affected their personal judgments. Is or should there be a connection between reflection and becoming consciously aware of the educational potential of the research? (O’Hanlon, 1994: 282).

Through this study I have become consciously aware of the potentiality of caring relations, specifically those that evoke one’s rational potentialities. Although it was a laborious and challenging journey, I learned that our act of caring should not be provoked by favours, or gendered or natural connectedness, but because of our human capacity to care, that is to
recognise humanity in the self and in the other, as Cavell (1979) puts it. I can now think independently, although connected to others, to invoke my humanity through a voice, rather than being a "cheerleader" for men, according to Okeke’s (2004) view. I am aware that my identity as a black African woman does not have to be associated with trivial gendered roles, but rather should be recognised as being a human being with equal intelligence. My encounters with various human beings, either in person or through ideas, has helped me to carry out what my carer educator urges students to do – “fight against un-philosophical argumentation, hopelessness, complacency, and ignorance” (Shanyanana, 2011: xviii). The concept “ignorance”, according to the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English (2005: 741), is a lack of knowledge or information about something, whilst “complacency” entails a feeling of contented self-satisfaction, especially when unaware of the impending trouble that might ensue.

Notably, I can confidently say that this study facilitated the process of moving beyond the boundaries of un-philosophical argumentation, hopelessness, ignorance and complacency. In other words, different views and encounters interrogated my ignorance and complacency in believing the following narratives: firstly, that women’s statistical representation in AHE does not necessarily promote gender equality and internal inclusion; secondly, that men are the only people responsible for women’s exclusion; thirdly, that women are better carers that men; fourthly, that to care can only be manifested through kindness to the internally excluded and to express sympathy with them by merely speaking for them, rather than creating conditions for them to attain a voice. I learned not to further conform or succumb for the sake of others’ approval, and to marginalising attitudes and gendered remarks, but rather to disrupt such parochial views through an emancipated voice. I am now mindful of who I am as a human being with rational potentialities, rather than being a gendered being. Therefore, I acknowledge that an authentic caring relationship should be between a carer educator and a cared-for student as “friends-who-love but do not expect to be loved-back”, as posited by Waghid (2010) from a Derridian position. From this inclination, I conclude this reflection with Nelson Mandela’s (1995) concluding words to his book Long Walk to Freedom:

I have walked that long road to freedom. I have tried not to falter; I have made missteps along the way. But I have discovered the secret that after climbing a great hill, one only finds that there are many more hills to climb. I have taken a moment here to rest, to steal a view of the glorious vista that surrounds me, to look back on the distance I have come. But I can only rest for a moment, for with freedom comes with responsibilities, and I dare not linger, for my long walk is not ended.

The above words resonate with my walk on this journey in pursuit of knowledge, and the celebrated knowledge is my acquired emancipated voice. In conclusion, I embarked on this
dissertation with a huge backlog, but it has helped me to navigate through a major life transformation that can be attested to by the arguments that unfold in this study. Midway through writing this dissertation, I was finally rewarded with the strength to confront a personal demon of many years that I had been working hard to get the emotional strength to face. These concluding remarks connect to a recent interview with an eloquent young black female South African professor whom I have never encountered, Prof Pumla Dineo Gqola (2013), who averred that “writing is both transformative and emancipating” during her Book Lounge at the Open Book Festival in Cape Town in September 2013. Significantly, I can say that I came as a victim, but through writing this dissertation I have evolved an equal and active voice. I take Greene’s (1995) position that “I am not yet”, but in the “process of becoming” through my encounters and reasoning with others, as well as for others. Taking cognisance of the findings of this dissertation; let me offer a response to potential criticism of this work and suggest possibilities for future studies.

7.4.3 Potential criticisms and possibilities for future studies

Here I intend to respond to potential criticism that might arise from the findings of this study. In this process, I attend to ideas I might never have thought of or those I could not address here as a way of agitating and inviting further thinking and deliberation. Some critics might argue that my reconstituted ethics of care is rather idealistic. To this sceptic view I say that, through this approach, students need to exercise their critical thinking in understanding what caring means and why we need caring, especially in an institution and society engulfed by injustices. I believe that students need to develop some sense of compassionate imagining through provocative engagement with the dominant other to realise how pernicious their actions towards others are. My findings suggest that a caring relationship that creates enabling conditions for the excluded group to exercise their democratic rights through an equal voice is an inevitable type of caring in Africa. Another critic might ask why it is necessary to care for others and to keep insisting that people should care. My response is that, when you care you actually enact humanity, and then will not exclude others in the space of democracy. I argue that the mere fact that one is at university, which is a social institution, indicates that one needs to care, not just for students’ material needs, but about creating conditions that evoke their rational potentiality to assert a voice as independent citizens with equal intelligence in a democratic society.

Another potential critic might legitimately inquire whether Noddings’ frame of caring is insufficient to address inclusion, considering its relational frame? My answer is that Noddings’ frame of caring is in itself worthwhile, but because the problem is internal exclusion, which requires people to exercise their rights as agents, it is restricted to giving the excluded a voice. The concern is whether I am not proposing a radical form of caring that may silence the internally excluded, since
there could be confrontation and distressful encounters; I argue that not all acts of caring need to be in the form of kindness, taking into account that power relations and authoritarian practices require disruption. In response to the question whether this reconstituted ethics of care is a form of essentialism; my answer is simply, not necessarily. However, what I call caring is what enables the internally excluded to assert disrupting voices in an exclusionary HE, and to challenge the status quo to realise substantive inclusion and equality. Profoundly, my voice is also a disrupting voice in an effort to propose an appropriate approach, as Butler (2004) urges us to do in educating democratic citizens to become compassionate beings and responsible and reasoning carers for the internally excluded groups, which may engender substantive inclusion.

To rest my case, let me draw from Minow’s (1990: 20) problematisation of whether it is necessary to understand our differences of care:

> When does treating people differently empathize their differences and stigmatize or hinder them on that basis? And when does treating people the same become insensitive to their differences and likely stigmatize or hinder them on that basis?

The above paradoxical quotation stimulates uninterrupted deliberation in an effort to move beyond the impasse. As a way of opening the democratic iterations to continue, other studies are encouraged to explore whether a reconstituted ethics of care could potentially emancipate the privileged groups in efforts to engender a complete and authentic transformation. Hence, I invite others to engage in democratic iterations towards engendering substantial inclusion in a cosmopolitan society.

### 7.5 Concluding summary of the dissertation

The study started by contesting the space of women in AHE and raising questions that gave impetus to educational research in this area. The aim and objective were to explore the inclusion of women in HE in Africa, as well as how an ethics of care could assist in addressing their exclusion. Chapter 2 traced the historical account of HE in order to acquire an understanding of what shaped current education in Africa. I examined three epochs in relation to the involvement of women in AHE, specifically to understand current educational discourses. The chapter asserted that there had been higher learning in Africa before Western colonial education. These two education systems each had its distinctiveness: the former relied on non-formal oral education and storytelling, while the latter used the formal, written form. In both the pre-colonial and colonial
epochs, women were assigned trivialised gendered roles namely: rearing babies and caring for their husbands, children and the elderly. Women therefore were not offered equal rights as citizens to participate in public spaces. Upon independence, African states adopted Paul Freire’s (2004) emancipatory approach, which transcends the pedagogy of the oppressed towards pedagogy of hope. The intention was to educate citizens towards self-reliance and respond to local needs, especially widening education for the oppressed and ill-treated groups, including women.

Although social institutions in African states have initiated strategies such as the NEPAD policy and affirmative action to ensure the fulfilment of the MDGs, especially goal three, which requires women’s empowerment and equality, HE remains male dominated and excludes women. Chapter 2 also showed that HE is confronted by complex and competing demands; that is the local needs and the global movement of neoliberalism, which emphasises the commodification of knowledge for the market economy. Yet, AHE focus on responding to global recognition has left such institutions without agency to address local needs mainly inclusion of women. Chapter 3 explored the conception of inclusion and equality, exhibiting that AHE’s use of gender as a yardstick is (in)commensurable with the idea of equalisation of voice. It also showed that the African philosophy of Ubuntu tallies with a conception of inclusion and equality. Therefore, I have argued that the way women are treated and internally excluded manifest a limited understanding of Ubuntu. I have argued that AHE should move beyond Ubuntu as inclusion based on communication, capabilities and gender, to inclusion that recognises human voice in an inclusive democratic AHE, where the currently excluded groups exercise their equality and experience humanity. Chapter 4 offered evidence of women’s experiences of inclusion, which revealed that, although the number of women in African HE has increased, their level of representation is still relatively low, while those who have managed to attain representation encounter subtle forms of internal exclusion. This demonstrates that, despite competing international demands, there are other ideologies that influence the way people treat one another that silence women’s contribution to democratic engagement.

Chapter 5 explored how patriarchal beliefs, male chauvinism and authoritarianism emerge as conditions that perpetuate women’s internal exclusion. I argued that, if AHE is to transform its practices and nurture democratic citizens, all people need to be emancipated. Chapter 6 explored a conception of an ethics of care and advocated a non-gendered ethics of care that may advance substantive inclusion. Noddings’s sympathetic notion revealed that caring is relational between two people, the carer and the cared-for. Yet her approach is restricted and limits the autonomy of the cared-for agent. I used Slote's notion of empathy, which recognises people’s autonomy, in order to fill Noddings’s gap. Nonetheless, both perceptions are limited in addressing internal exclusion. In exploring other views of caring, I adopted MacIntyre’s account of caring, which evokes
potentialities in which human beings need to recognise their dependence on one another due to their vulnerabilities and rationalities. I have proposed a reconstruction of an ethics of care by using a Rancièrean emancipatory approach that perceives people as equal intellectuals. I have argued that this approach has the potential to disrupt the exclusionary practices in and status quo of AHE.

In my attempts to give meaning to this form of caring, I have utilised the cosmopolitan norms of iterations and hospitality, compassionate respect and humanity. I argue that, when people engage in provocative and distressful iterative encounters with compassionate respect, they invoke one another’s humanity. My conviction is that compassion should not be limited to mere sympathy, but rather should create enabling conditions to assist the cared-for to become independent reasoners, thus acknowledging humanity in the self and the other by creating conditions to evoke the rationality of the cared-for to attain a voice. I defended a non-gendered reconstituted ethics of care that encompasses compassionate imagining, responsibility and reasoning. I called for HE, especially teaching and learning and governance and management in university education, to foster a reconstituted ethics of care in order to become compassionate, responsible and humane. The point is that one cannot change the situation in one day, but I have demonstrated how a reconstituted ethics of care through educational encounters at university could gradually encourage people to learn and experience caring, both conceptually and pragmatically.
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