A historical study of industrial ethnicity in urban colonial Zimbabwe and its contemporary transitions: The case of African Harare, c. 1890-1980

by
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Declaration

I declare that *A Historical Study of Industrial Ethnicity in Urban Colonial Zimbabwe and its contemporary transitions: the Case of Africa Harare, c. 1890-1980* is my own work, that has not been submitted for any degree or examination in any other university, and that all the sources I have used or quoted have been duly indicated and acknowledged as complete references.

Kudakwashe Manganga

October 2013
Abstract


This thesis provides a critical and historical analysis of industrial ethnicity in African Harare between the 1890s and 1980. It examines the origins, dynamics and ambiguities of industrial ethnicity in urban colonial Harare (then Salisbury) and its attendant implications for socio-economic wellbeing and inter-group relations. It locates industrial ethnicity within broader questions of inequality and social difference, especially issues like affordability, materiality and power. The thesis pays particular attention to individuals and groups’ differential access to the ‘raw materials’ used in imagining and constructing forms of identification. The thesis is empirically grounded in a specific case study of industrial ethnicity among disparate African groups in urban colonial Zimbabwe, and in the context formed by factors that fomented ethnic enclaves in African Harare’s competitive labour markets during particular historical epochs. Such complex currents remain under-represented in current Zimbabwean historical literature. This is despite the salience and resonance of industrial ethnicity, as well as its multi-layered and ambiguous implications for inter-group relations, and its potential to create differential access to life chances for individuals and groups. The thesis contends that in crisis situations, people tend to identify with their ‘type’ and to use ethnic, kinship and other social ties in their scramble for socio-economic and political resources. This usually involves definitions and re-definitions of ‘selves’ and ‘others’; ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’; contestations and negotiations over identification; and how these varied identities are ‘materialised’. The ways in which migrant workers positioned themselves in the labour market depended on ensuing socio-economic inequalities and the use of social networks, which were indispensable conduits for the transmission of job information and local intelligence. The prevalence of ethnic enclaves and widespread ethnic clusters in colonial Harare’s labour market is explained in terms of a complex synergy of factors, including behavioural, historical, institutional and structural elements. Equally, industrial ethnicity, which had pre-colonial precedents, remained contested, fluid, and ambiguous, and was one among a range of forms of identification available to Salisbury’s African migrant workers. The thesis further situates African ethnicity in its political context by examining its ambivalent interaction with nationalist politics, gender and ‘othering’ work. It contends that African nationalism’s inherent underlying contradictions and tensions, and the subsequent dual categorisation of citizens into ‘patriots’ and ‘sell-outs’ set the stage for hegemonic (and counter-hegemonic) politics, ethnic competition and the politics of marginalisation in postcolonial Zimbabwe.

Kudakwashe Manganga
Dedication

I dedicate this work to my mother Takalani Marwala.
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List of Acronyms

AAC- African Advisory Committee
AAG- Affirmative Action Group
AC- Action Committee
AMAAs- African Mutual Aid Associations
ANC- African National Congress
AOH- African Oral History
ATUC- African Trades Union Congress
BAAB- Bulawayo African Advisory Board
BSAP- British South Africa Police
CBD- Central Business District
CIFOZ- Construction Industry Federation of Zimbabwe
CNC- Chief Native Commissioner
CYL- City Youth League
DRC- Democratic Republic of Congo
EMA- Environmental Management Agency
ESAP- Economic and Structural Adjustment Programme
EU- European Union
FROLIZI- Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe
FTLRP- Fast Track Land Reform Programme
GDP- Gross Domestic Product
GPA- Global Political Agreement
HCC- Harare City Council
ICA- Industrial Conciliation Act
ICG- International Crisis Group
ICU- Industrial and Commercial Workers’ Union
IEEA- Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act
MDC- Movement for Democratic Change
MKD- Mavambo/Kusile/Dawn
MLF- Mthwakazi Liberation Front
MNP- Mthwakazi National Party
MP- Member of Parliament
MPC- Mthwakazi People’s Congress
NAD- Native Affairs Department
NADA- Native Affairs Department Annual
NAZ- National Archives of Zimbabwe
NC- Native Commissioner
NDP- National Democratic Party
NGOs- Non-governmental organisations
NLHA- Native Land Husbandry Act
NMZWP- National Matabeleland Zambezi Water Project
NPAs- Native Purchase Areas
OAU- Organisation of African Unity
PCC- People’s Caretaker Council
PEA- Portuguese East Africa
PF- Patriotic Front
PLO- Private Locations Ordinance
RCM- Rhodesian Chamber of Mines
RF- Rhodesian Front
RICU- Reformed Industrial and Commercial Workers’ Union
RNLB- Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau
SAAB- Salisbury African Advisory Board
SCC- Salisbury City Council
SCYL- Salisbury City Youth League
SNA- Superintendent of Native Affairs
SPB- State Procurement Board
SARW- Southern Africa Resource Watch
TTLs- Tribal Trust Lands
UAA- Urban Areas Act
UANC- United African National Council
UDI- Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UK- United Kingdom
UMR- United Mthwakazi Republic
UNF- United Federal Party
UNVA- Union Native Vigilance Association
USA- United States of America
UTC- United Transport Company
WNLA- Witwatersrand Native Labour Association
ZANLA- Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ZANU PF- Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front
ZAPU- Zimbabwe African Peoples’ Union
ZBC- Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation
ZCATWU- Zimbabwe Construction and Allied Trade Workers’ Union
ZIPRA- Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army
ZLP- Zimbabwe Liberator’s Platform
ZNA- Zimbabwe National Army
ZNP- Zimbabwe National Party
Map of Zimbabwe Showing Harare and Other Urban Centres

Map of Harare Showing Various Residential Areas

Source: [http://www.seeff.co.zw](http://www.seeff.co.zw) (Accessed 21 February 2013)
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Overview

The xenophobic attacks upon African immigrants in South Africa in 2008, called for the need to re-examine the interaction of migrant labour and meanings of ethnic identification in Africa.¹ More often than not, in crisis situations, people tend to identify themselves with their “type” and to use ethnic, kinship, or other social networks in their scramble for scarce socio-economic and political resources. Ethnicity is often “militarised” and given precedence over other forms of identification as the basis for political and socio-economic action.² Usually involving definitions and re-definitions of ‘selves’ and ‘others’, it also encompasses contestations and negotiations over identification and over how varied identities are embodied in material terms and in power.³ Furthermore, the way in which migrant workers position themselves in the labour market⁴ rests on ensuing socio-economic inequalities, including age/generation, gender, ethnicity and race, as well as the use and extent of social networks.⁵ Consequently, not all migrant workers are able to ‘afford’ particular identities, aside from these being fluid and contested.

For its part, ethnicity is viewed in modern scholarship as an ambiguous and problematic concept, which supposedly displays a tension between ‘inescapability’ and constructedness. This explains its great socio-political and economic potential.⁶ Because of its powerful emotive appeal, ethnicity is often used for political mobilization, through the politicisation of ethnic difference and as a veneer to hide a plethora of other tensions and conflicts. Ethnicity

² Ibid.
is, therefore, an important political, socio-economic and ideological resource, both at the level of the individual and of the group. Thomas Hylland Eriksen observes that the major reason for the current scholarly interest in ethnicity and nationalism is that its prevalence in so many societies makes it difficult to ignore.¹

Ethnicity also remains a pertinent subject of academic inquiry, especially in the context of globalisation, which tends to make people ‘glocalise’ and be more self assertive. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the influx of labour immigrants and refugees to Europe and North America has led to the increasing importance of identities and forms of identification.² At the regional level, the Zimbabwe political and economic crises (c. late 1990s-2009) saw millions of Zimbabweans emigrating from the country to better regional economies, mostly South Africa and Botswana, as well as overseas to America, Europe, New Zealand, Canada and Australia. These countries have also been favourite destinations for other emigrants from southern Africa who have become part of the African Diaspora.³ In most instances, these communities of migrants use social networks, including ethnic ones, when looking for jobs or company. This often creates ethnic enclaves.

The above discussion presents the difficult question as to whether ethnicity is a new or an old phenomenon. According to Thomas Spear, ethnicity is both a historical process and a process of historical representation, as ethnic identity asserts ‘continuity, despite change, across contexts’ and collective identity enhances ‘common action by shared past experiences’.⁴ Mahmood Mamdani further observes that ethnicity is an ideology, which is produced under concrete historical circumstances and by particular social actors or groups. Mamdani thus argues that:

To understand any ideology—be it tribalism, nationalism, or socialism—we must understand its historical origin and development and identify its social base. In other words, whose interests does the ideology articulate? From whose point of view does it explain social reality? To ask these questions is to go beyond the form and grasp the historical content.⁵

2 ibid.
5 M. Mamdani, Politics and Class Formation in Uganda, Kampala, Fountain Publishers, 1976, p.3.
In the light of the above, this study sets out to show that African ethnicity in colonial Zimbabwe\(^1\) was neither the product of colonial invention nor solely the result of imagination by Africans, as the classic inventionist thesis and Andersonian imagination may imply\(^2\). As both a process of historical representation and a historical process, ethnicity is thus more than merely an individual or collective process of imagination.

African ethnicity resulted from internal and external definitions involving a variety of forces, including the Rhodesian state, white Rhodesians and African migrant communities themselves, which continuously re-defined the emerging identities.\(^3\) Moreover, fluid African ethnicity remained one among a broad range of pre-colonial and colonial identities that could be assumed and articulated. Equally, the roots of industrial ethnicity cannot be understood outside the broader context of colonialism, although colonialism in itself did not entirely create industrial ethnicity, which appears to have had some pre-colonial precedents. Contemporary Zimbabwe was a multi-ethnic society inhabited by, \textit{inter alia}, the Karanga, Manyika, Ndau, Korekore, Venda and Shangan/Tsonga. These came to be lumped together under ethnic umbrellas; Shona and Ndebele. The political, economic and social relationships among these disparate groups were complex and fluid, characterised by incorporation as well as fragmentation.\(^4\)

However, colonialism set in motion the politicisation of African ethnicity by attempting to construct and reconstruct people’s identities and compartmentalising them in cultural and geographical terms.\(^5\) The colonial state and the white public often imagined and constructed some kind of ethnic taxonomy in which they ranked various African ethnicities,

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\(^{1}\) Until 1963, colonial Zimbabwe was referred to as Southern Rhodesia. The name changed to Rhodesia between 1963 and 1979, then Zimbabwe Rhodesia in 1979, and Zimbabwe in 1980.


categorizing certain groups as either inferior or superior to others.\(^1\) Subsequently, groups became polarised and were differentiated hierarchically on the basis of assumed ethnic virtues. The Rhodesian state enacted laws and introduced institutions which defined people into racial and ethnic categories: European, Asian, ‘Coloured’ and ‘Native’ or African. Africans were further classified into various categories according to colonial constructions of origin and geographical location (ethno-cartography). In particular, gender, race and ethnicity came to define social, economic and political relations between members of these different groups, according them differential access to resources and providing differential life-chances.

The term industrial ethnicity is used in the thesis to refer to the existence and salience of ethnic enclaves in the labour market, at workplaces and in industries. As a result of a complex mix of institutional, structural, historical and behavioural factors, certain occupations in urban colonial Zimbabwe came to be perceived as if reserved for particular ethnic groups and remuneration was equally hierarchically based on assumptions about ethnic virtues of African groups. For instance, the Shangaan were considered the best source of mine labour, while the Manyika were thought to be the best cooks and waiters. On their part, the Tonga and the ‘Zambezi Boys’ were thought to have a ‘natural liking’ of ‘night soil work’.

In colonial Zimbabwe and elsewhere in Africa, workplaces were often potential arenas for the use of ethnic and other social networks to get and maintain jobs within a particular group of migrants.\(^2\) Industrial ethnicity developed in the context of migrant labour, urbanisation and the growth of the colonial capitalist economy, which had regional and international linkages. Urban populations, competing for scarce socio-economic opportunities, created supportive social structures to which they could belong, and which could ease new immigrants’ settlement process. In addition, there were deliberate efforts by both employers and employees to maintain such ethnic enclaves in the labour market for disparate socio-economic and political considerations. Industrial ethnicity could be used by the white employers to maintain ‘discipline’ at work places and to divide the working class on ethnic lines. For African groups, industrial ethnicity helped to create and maintain differential social, economic and political life chances ahead of ethnic others. The propensity


by the colonial state and the white public to imagine some kind of African ethnic taxonomy helped reproduce stereotypes about the work ethic of different groups.

It is pertinent to note that, as used in the thesis, the term industrial ethnicity differs from ethnicity which can be defined broadly as the mobilisation of ethnic identities and difference to gain advantages in situations of competition, co-operation and conflict.\(^1\) Of course, like ethnicity, industrial ethnicity is ambivalent, ambiguous, contingent and one among a range of possible forms of identification. Its resonance in urban colonial Zimbabwe as well as its relationship to socio-economic wellbeing needs to historicised and periodised. The same applies to the connection between ethnicity and work, whose relationship was never linear but ambivalent and shifting. Additionally, as argued in Chapter 6, industrial ethnicity often intersected with the use of urban residential space.

In urban colonial Zimbabwe, industrial ethnicity was not always the dominant form of identification as it was often submerged by political and other identities, especially from the 1950s to 1980. At work places, industrial ethnicity is usually lumped together with issues like favouratism, nepotism and ‘organisational politics’. Competition for jobs, recognition, promotion and favours at work places can result in the use of social networks as people try to position themselves ahead of ethnic others. In postcolonial Africa, industrial ethnicity tends to be submerged by ‘broader’ issues like regionalism, kleptocracy, marginalisation and ‘ethnocracy’. However, industrial ethnicity is closely linked to but not reduceable to nepotism, regionalism or ‘ethnocracy’. Also, although colonialism, urbanisation, migrant labour and the development of the colonial economy had profound implications for the development of industrial ethnicity, the notion had pre-colonial and pre-urban manifestations as illustrated in Chapter 4 of the thesis.

Admittedly, colonialism played a key role in fomenting industrial ethnicity. Relational and categorical modes of identification were critical in fomenting industrial ethnicity in urban colonial Zimbabwe as the colonial state often developed ‘objectified systems of categorization’.\(^2\) The state routinely categorized people on the basis of categories such as age, gender, criminality, religion, ‘nativism’, nationality, citizenship, race and ethnicity. The state “has the material and symbolic resources to impose the categories, classificatory schemes, and modes of social counting and accounting with which bureaucrats, judges, teachers, and

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doctors must work and to which non-state actors must refer”.1 According to Brubaker and Cooper;

In culturalist extensions of the Weberian sociology of the state, notably those influenced by Bourdieu and Foucault, the state monopolizes, or seeks to monopolize, not only legitimate physical force but also symbolic force, as Bourdieu puts it. This includes the power to categorize, to state what is what and who is who.2

The above notwithstanding, the role of the Rhodesian state as an ‘identifier’ or in creating the structural elements that engendered industrial ethnicity should not be exaggerated. Even white Rhodesian society was not a homogenous community as there were contradictions with regard to colonial urban policy.3 James Muzondidya, therefore, argues for the need “to disaggregate the various interest groups within the so-called ‘colonial state’ and analyze the particular forces or groups that were behind certain racially segregatory measures and the reasons for advocating them”.4 The colonial state’s power and ability to model African identities had its limitations. As Brubaker and Cooper thus note, “even the most powerful state does not monopolize the production and diffusion of identifications and categories; and those that it does produce may be contested”.5

This thesis is also about ‘the African city’. Like most cities in the region, Salisbury was a product of colonisation and its subsequent industrial development. It was established by the Pioneer Column as an urban frontier on 12 September 1890. The Pioneer Column was a military volunteer force of occupiers led by Major Frank Johnson and organized by Cecil John Rhodes for the occupation of Mashonaland. It initially founded Salisbury as a military fort, naming it Fort Salisbury after the 3rd Marquess of Salisbury, then British Prime Minister. Subsequently, the new urban frontier became known simply as Salisbury, which was proclaimed a municipality in 1897 and consolidated as a city in 1935. Salisbury was not only the Rhodesian capital, but increasingly, the main industrial and commercial centre in the country and in the 1950s and 1960s the capital of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

1 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
5 Brubaker and Cooper, ’Beyond “Identity”’, p.16.
At independence, in 1980, Salisbury became the Zimbabwean capital, and on 18 April 1982, the city was renamed Harare.

Initially, ‘Harare’ referred to Mbare, the first African ‘township’ in Zimbabwe.\(^1\) Of course, pre-colonial Harare, especially the Harare Kopje (hill) had historical significance for the local Shona people around the area, as it demarcated boundaries for the people of Chishawasha, Seke, Mashayamombe and Chiweshe. The name Harare was borrowed from the name of a local chief, which meant one who does not sleep (Haarare). Over the next ninety years, the local communities were gradually integrated into the Rhodesian capitalist economy and the broader regional economy, yet, as is argued in Chapter 5, the proletarianization of local farming communities did not follow a linear pattern. The proletarianization thesis is, therefore, problematic when applied to these Shona communities around Salisbury. Moreover, Salisbury’s development and the extension of capitalist relations over time and space were neither systematic nor complete. According to Richard Parry:

No controlling hand guided the inhabitants through the fundamental contradictions of Salisbury’s position, subordinate as it was to the Rhodesian, as well as the wider regional, political economy. No Rhodesian administrator devised, let alone sought to implement, a means of reconciling the basic urban dilemma of ensuring the physical and social reproduction of the workforce while at the same time avoiding the creation of ‘a guerrilla army’ of the underemployed.\(^2\)

In the same vein, Brian Raftopoulos observes that “the inability of the Southern Rhodesian economy to stabilize broadly the reproduction of labour in the cities provided a general environment of instability of the urban population”\(^3\).

Here it is also noteworthy that Zimbabwean cities developed as multi-ethnic microcosms where ‘endemic’ racial segregation, deep class differences, ethnic ranking and stereotyping were rampant.\(^4\) For, as Tsuneo Yoshikuni observes of southern African cities, they were thoroughly ‘European’ yet they had interactions with African societies since their inceptions.\(^5\)

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\(^4\) C. F. Hallencreutz, “Religion in the City”, in Raftopoulos and Yoshikuni, eds., Sites of Struggle.

The twentieth-century influx of African, European, Asian and ‘Coloured’ immigrants transformed Salisbury into an ethnic mosaic or a thoroughly cosmopolitan urban environment. As the administrative and later industrial hub, the city was the centre of political, economic, social and cultural activities that drew people of diverse racial, cultural, linguistic, ethnic and historical backgrounds. In addition to English white settlers, there were ‘Coloureds’, Jews, Poles, Germans, Asians, Greeks, English, Irish, Chinese, and Afrikaners from South Africa; and Africans from South Africa, Nyasaland (Malawi), Portuguese East Africa (PEA) (Mozambique) and Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), among other countries.¹ As Richard Parry observes:

As an administrative centre and staging post for those hopeful, greedy or desperate whites who came to look for mineral riches in the hinterland, Salisbury provided opportunities for blacks from a wide variety of socio-economic and cultural systems to bolster their rural socio-economic position in the face of the colonial wave as it swept north. Alternatively numbers of blacks, like many of their white counterparts, were uprooted and dragged along by the complex of forces that produced Rhodesia, while some were able to ride the wave and exploit the possibilities within it.²

Salisbury emerged as the major urban centre in the region and a stepping stone to South Africa where wages were relatively higher. Southern Rhodesia was a comparatively favourable labour market for northern migrants from PEA, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Salisbury and Bulawayo, the second largest city, acted as ports of call for migrant workers from Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland on their way to South Africa where the mineral revolution created a huge demand for labour.³ In the next century, the Federation of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland was also a key factor behind the migration of many Malawians and Zambians into colonial Zimbabwe as it allowed for the ‘free’ movement of labour across the frontiers of the three countries.⁴ Economic opportunities were better in Southern Rhodesia and the numerous gold mines, commercial farms, towns and cities lured migrant workers from northern territories. According to Chikowero:

The railway line connecting then Nyasaland and the economically powerful southern Rhodesia brought millions of Nyasas south to the cities, mines and farms of the southern federal territory. The story of the railway line is a collective story of millions

³ See the Map of Zimbabwe showing Harare and other urban centres.
of people from Zambia, Malawi and even Mozambique whose lives and by extension those of their descendants were permanently changed by migration.1

Jonathan Crush, Vincent Williams and Sally Peberdy, equally, observe that intra-regional migration was perhaps the “single most important factor tying together all the various colonies and countries of the sub-continent into a single regional labour market during the twentieth century.”2 Cities, towns, mines, plantations and white commercial farms became ‘magnets’ for labour migrants from different countries in the region.3 In Zimbabwe, such migrant workers were regarded as ‘the Other’ and viewed disparagingly by insiders who regarded them as mabvakure (immigrants from faraway places) or mateveranjanji (those who followed the railway line).4 Nonetheless, these immigrants carried with them their own cultural and political attributes that would later interact informally with the ideological and cultural dominance of both the white colonialis and the African ‘indigenes’.

Indeed, up until the 1950s African Salisbury’s labour market and its social, cultural and political life were dominated by northern migrants, especially those from Nyasaland. For some time, the local Shona, in view of the favourable agro-ecological conditions in Mashonaland, were able to use the ‘peasant option’5 to meet colonial socio-economic demands without fully committing themselves to migrant wage labour and urban life. For Yoshikuni, the early history of Salisbury rested on a paradox in that before 1950, although about 40 to 50 percent of its African population was drawn from the surrounding Shona countryside, “its urban life was marked by a scarcity of indigenous influence”.6 The clue lay in the agrarian dynamics of Mashonaland during this period, which delayed the proletarianization of local peasants.7 Some Shona migrant workers had their original communities nearby, which enabled them to shuttle between their workplace and place of origin. That strategy could, however, not work for long-distant migrant workers. Consequently, the cultural and ideological influences of the local Shona in early Salisbury

1 Ibid. Migrant workers from Nyasaland were often labeled ‘Nyasas’, ‘MaNyasaran’i’ or ‘Blantyres’ (MaBhurandaya). These terms were usually derogatory, depicting the overtly ethnocentric and xenophobic tendencies of local Africans in their social intercourse with ‘alien’ Africans. As such, the terms are only used in the thesis as historical references.
3 Ibid.
7 The term ‘peasant’ is analytically problematic. The more appropriate term is ‘smallholder’, which acknowledges that smallholder farmers live on the land but have diverse livelihood portfolios.
were submerged by those of the ‘aliens’, and ChiNyanja rather that ChiShona was the city’s \textit{lingua franca} up until the 1950s. It is, therefore, not surprising that “dance, music and other forms of recreational culture had a strong northern flavour; and the formalized mutual aid associations which mushroomed after World War 1 were almost exclusively the products of foreign workers”\textsuperscript{1}.

However, as is argued in Chapter 5, the destructive changes on the land, especially the Native Land Husbandry Act (NLHA) of 1951, led to more demographic changes in the 1950s. The agricultural dynamics pushed indigenous Africans into urban areas, resulting in a marked increase in the number of local Africans in Salisbury. After the 1950s, the locals established their overall preponderance, yet Salisbury still remained an ethnic mosaic. As such, African migrant workers were “neither bewildered aliens in a white world nor the functionaries of a capitalist structure reacting puppet-like to the pressures of the urban economy”\textsuperscript{2}, but socio-economic, political and cultural actors in a cosmopolitan city. They were important actors in the shaping of ‘selves’ and of ethnic ‘others’, in contestations over position, in the creation and maintenance of internal boundaries, and in other complex processes of identity construction in the context of the challenges and opportunities presented by the new urban milieu.

\textbf{1.2 Thesis Goals and Research Questions}

The present study seeks to provide a historical analysis of the causes, configurations and ambiguities of industrial ethnicity in urban colonial Zimbabwe between 1890 and 1980, when the county attained political independence from Britain. Using Salisbury as a case study, this exploration has the following goals;

a. to document Salisbury’s demographic and ethnic dynamics between 1890 and 1980;

b. to examine factors that engendered industrial ethnicity in Salisbury;

c. to explore personal and collective identities and locate ethnicity within broader questions of inequality and social difference;

d. to examine the nature of ethnic discourse;

e. to analyze the impact of industrial ethnicity on ethnic group relations and socio-economic well-being;

f. to examine the interaction between ethnicity and African nationalism, and:

\textsuperscript{1} Yoshikuni, “Town-Country Relations”, p.115.
\textsuperscript{2} Parry, “Culture, Organisation and Class”, p.55.
g. to consider the postcolonial context of ethnicity in Zimbabwe.

To achieve these objectives, the thesis is informed by a set of research questions which include the following:

1. What was the nature of Salisbury’s demographic and ethnic dynamics between 1890 and 1980?
2. How, and to what extent, did behavioural, historical, institutional and structural factors help give rise to ethnic industrial concentrations in Salisbury?
3. How important were social networks in securing jobs and circulating job intelligence within and across migrant communities?
4. What was the nature, dynamics and ambiguities of the interaction of agency and structure?
5. How widespread was industrial ethnicity in Salisbury during this period?
6. What was the impact of industrial ethnicity on inter and intra-group relations?
7. What was the relationship between urban ethnicity and African nationalism?
8. What was the relationship between urban ethnicity and African nationalism?

This work argues that a complex set of factors helped to engender African ethnic enclaves in Salisbury’s industrial sectors between 1890 and 1980. It also contends that there were noticeable efforts by some African migrant workers and Rhodesian employers to maintain such ethnic enclaves due to reasons which included maintaining discipline at the workplace. However, industrial ethnicity remained contested and contingent, for its embodiment was distributed unevenly within African migrants. As such, industrial ethnicity was not always an exclusively salient form of identification. It should also be noted that industrial ethnicity was never exclusively a Rhodesian affair, as ethnic niches or ethnic economies have been observed elsewhere in the world.¹

1.3 Organisation of the Thesis

The present chapter, one of nine, develops the idea of the thesis as well as its motivation. Chapter 2 reviews some of the relevant literature on ethnicity and urban (social) history in Zimbabwe, identifying knowledge gaps that the present study seeks to fill. In this area, the

¹ Examples include Indian immigrants in Uganda and Chinese or Puerto Rican communities in the United States of America (USA).
debate on ethnicity in Zimbabwe has largely been informed by Terence Ranger’s invention of tribalism thesis¹ and his subsequent internal criticism or auto-critique, which resonates in other secondary works on the subject.² This has led to a shift towards Andersonian imaginings and the moral ethnicity approach.

Chapter 3 situates the thesis within the broader theoretical underpinnings that inform the study, situating it within social constructionist thought. It discusses Paris Yeros’s normative approach and Aletta Norval’s post-positivist constructionism,³ and argues for the need to integrate materiality into the constructionist debate. The discussion also borrows from Homi Bhabha’s notions of mimicry, hybridity and ambivalence, arguing that in one way or another people are all ‘hybrids’ in ethnic, cultural and linguistic terms, as there are no essential or ‘pure’ identities.⁴ Furthermore, the thesis also borrows conceptually from Judith Butler’s work, especially her attempt to incorporate materiality into constructionism and to counter linguistic determinism.

At the same time, like Geoff Boucher, the study is alert to the underlying problematic of Butler’s theoretical trajectory.⁵ Although she presents a conception of the body as ‘active materiality’ that in “combination with discursive practices works to form and reform the body”⁶, she merely pays lip service to the notion of ‘self’, seeming to regard it as an effect of

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discourse. For, as Dunn observes, the question of agency, which is central to discussion on African ethnicity, hinges on how we theorize ‘the self’.

Chapter 3 also discusses the network theory of socio-economic wellbeing in its attempt to conceptualize industrial ethnicity. Network analysis assumes that actors participate in social and economic systems connecting them to other actors, whose relations comprise important influences on another’s behaviour. The social network theory of socio-economic wellbeing is used to show how personal contacts, ‘home-boys’, relatives, acquaintances, ethnic communities and other social networks were used by migrant workers in Salisbury to secure jobs, job information and subsequently maintain particular jobs within a specific (ethnic) community.

Rather than focusing solely on identities, the thesis presents a historical case in which migrant workers could belong to numerous networks with varying socio-economic and political outcomes. As Brubaker and Cooper suggest, the term ‘identity’ has lost much of its analytical purchase, and should be disaggregated to its constituent elements, such as self-understanding, social location and commonality. Arguably, the shift in emphasis can help to provide “a richer view of social behaviour in addition to more complex understanding of historical change”. The way one identifies self and is identified by others changes from one context to the other as identification is situational and contextual.

Building on Ranger and on Atkinson and Eriksen’s arguments concerning ethnicity in pre-colonial Africa, Chapter 4 advances two arguments, firstly, that ethnicity was a pre-

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3 Granovetter “The Strength of Weak Ties”; Granovetter, Getting a Job; Adida, “Beyond the Immigrant Ethnic Economy”.

4 A. Talamo and M. B. Ligorio, “Identity in the Cyberspace: The Social Construction of Identity Through Online Virtual Interactions”, Ist Dialogical Self Conference, 23-26 June 2000, Nijmegen, NL. The choice of what possible self to assume and articulate is often driven by strategic moves. The thesis argues that some migrant workers could use their affordances and materialities to assume and articulate different identities as resources to acquire jobs, job information and local intelligence.


6 Ibid.


colonial reality in Zimbabwe, and secondly, that the Shangwe tobacco industry and the Njanja iron manufacturers point to an interesting intersection of ethnic identification and industrial specialization before 1890. Consequently, the thesis argues that industrial ethnicity had pre-colonial and pre-urban precedents.

Chapter 5 is the mainstay of the thesis. It examines Salisbury’s demographic and ethnic dynamics between 1890 and the 1970s, exploring statistical data with regard to migration patterns, volumes and trends, places of origins, and ethnic composition. The chapter illustrates how urbanization, colonisation, industrial development and migrant labour helped transform Salisbury from being an urban frontier into an ethnic cluster that subsequently became a cockpit for processes of identification construction, including industrial ethnicity. It discusses some of the factors that engendered industrial ethnicity in colonial Harare by examining historical, behavioural, institutional and structural elements. The chapter further attempts to establish the importance of social networks in transmitting local intelligence, job information and in keeping particular jobs within a specific group of migrant workers.¹

Chapter 5 also explores the issue of migrant labour and different meanings of ethnic identities and other forms of identification. Positive and negative stereotyping of migrants, colonial ethnic ranking, and the colonial attitudes of white employers, white Rhodesians and African migrants themselves were central in fashioning industrial ethnicity.

The above processes led to the development of varied perceptions about certain groups and their socio-economic positions. For example, Asians came to be seen by some white Rhodesians as dangerous economic competitors, while on the mines, Shangaans were thought to be the best workers below and above the ground, with the Basotho being not far short of the Shangaan.² Chapter 5 illustrates how ‘othered’ groups utilized positive and negative stereotyping for their own socio-economic benefits, for example to perpetuate differential access to jobs on the basis of ethnic identity.

Chapter 6 builds on the fifth chapter to provide analyses of the impact of industrial ethnicity on inter-group relations and on the socio-economic well-being of concerned groups. It notes that the use by migrants of ethnic and other social networks to secure and maintain

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jobs had varied and ambivalent outcomes for different groups, and therefore cannot be
generalized. Thus, the perceived economic success of ethnic immigrants could compromise
their security, leading to inter-group tensions, animosity and even violent manifestations of
ethnic competition. Ethnic immigrants were accused of not only stealing local jobs but of
‘stealing’ local women as well, which in turn had broader implications for moral
contestations within ethnically-mixed urban areas. Furthermore, this Chapter discusses the
feminisation of African migration to urban areas and its profound impact on the construction
of femininities and masculinities, on notions of social decency and on inter/intra-group
relations.

Chapter 7 discusses the issue of the relationship between ethnicity, gender, ‘othering’
work and African nationalism in colonial Zimbabwe. Arguably, nationalism has become the
“preeminent discursive form for modern claims to political autonomy and self
determination.”¹ Yet, as Craig Calhoun asserts, “while it is impossible to dissociate
nationalism entirely from ethnicity, it is equally impossible to explain it simply as a
continuation of ethnicity or a simple reflection of common history or language”.² For such
factors as generational and gender tensions, violent contests for power, and the politicisation
of ethnicity were some of the fissures within nationalist movements and the struggles for
independence, which in turn helped to set - or rather unsettle - the stage for the postcolonial
context of ethnicity. Although nationalism was never a coherent and uniform ideology, the
political barons who established their command over liberation struggles and the postcolonial
state fostered a dominant nationalist narrative which attempted to stifle underlying cracks and
to submerge competing narratives of African nationalisms and of Zimbabwe’s multi-layered
past.

Chapter 8 provides a brief view of the postcolonial milieu of ethnicity in Zimbabwe in
the context of ambivalent attempts to de-ethnicise and de-racial the state after 1980 against
the rhetoric of national reconciliation. The chapter illustrates the ambiguities of these
processes and how they were subsequently replaced by ethnic competition, reverse racism,
nativism and narrow definitions of citizenship and belonging. It discusses redefinitions of
nationalism, patriotism, and the resultant splitting of Zimbabweans into ‘patriots’ and ‘sell-
outs’/’Western puppets’, and the politics of marginalisation. Employing concepts like
hegemony, counter-hegemony or/and alternative hegemony in an attempt to explain ethic,

¹ C. Calhoun, “Nationalism and Ethnicity”, Annual Review of Sociology, Volume 19, 1993, pp.211-239
² Ibid; Anderson, Imagined Communities; J. G. Kellas, The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity, London:
Macmillan, 1991; Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality, New York:
political, economic and social competition by leading ethnic groups (Karanga, Zezuru, Manyika and Ndebele) in the post-independence era, discussion is informed by theorists such as Antonio Gramsci and Stuart Hall.¹

This chapter examines how cultural productions of consent and coercion were used by varying socio-political groups and individual political entrepreneurs to develop their own counter hegemonies in a bid to control the colonial and post-colonial state, naturally involving a re-negotiation of hegemony.² In this respect, varying theorists have taken Gramsci’s idea of prominent discourse, re-interpreting and proposing it as a suitable explanation about, inter alia, culture, constructions of beliefs and of identities under the influence of a dominant ‘common consensus’.³ Gramsci’s theory is pertinent for this thesis in as far as it influenced writings by scholars like Stuart Hall, whose works have influenced the present author’s understanding of hegemony and the issue of identities.

Chapter 9 concludes the thesis by suggesting pathways for further study. It also highlights the broader relevance of the study and its possible implications for policy and practice. The chapter concludes that the postcolonial African state, which has been caricatured as ‘crony’, ‘kleptocratic’, ‘rentier’, ‘compradorial’ and ‘ethnocratic’, has largely failed to adequately deal with ethnicity in society, politics and the economy. Consequently, industrial ethnicity remains a salient issue in postcolonial Africa, though its resonance tends to be overshadowed by other broader issues around corruption, ‘the politics of the belly’, ‘ethnocracy’, marginalisation, and ‘crude materialism’ on the part of political entrepreneurs at the helm of the state.

¹ The central concept in Gramsci’s work is that of hegemony, which can be defined as the “state of total social authority which at certain specific conjunctures, a specific class alliance wins by a combination of ‘coercion’ and ‘consent’, over the whole social formation and its dominated classes, not only at the economic level, but also at the level of political and ideological leadership, in civil, intellectual and moral life as well as at the material level: and over the terrain of civil society as well as in and through the condensed relations of the state” (S. Hall, Race, “Articulation and Societies Structured in Dominance”, UNESCO, ed., Sociological Theories: Race and Colonialism, Paris: UNESCO, 1980, pp.331-332. Also see A. Gramsci, Selections From the Prison Notebooks, International Publishers, 1971; T. Gitlin, “Prime Time Ideology: The Hegemonic Process in Television Entertainment”, in H. Newcomb ed., Television: The Critical View, Fifth Edition, New York: Oxford University Press). Hall further notes that the ‘authority’ and leadership is not given but a particular historical moment.


³ The thesis, nonetheless, acknowledges some of the theoretical weaknesses of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony. For example, Gramsci proposed the concept as a uniform, static and abstract structure yet hegemony is always a process, which is continually renewed, defended, challenged and modified.
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

As there is a large corpus of scholarly work on the subject of ethnicity in Zimbabwe, this literature review cannot in any way claim to be exhaustive. That said, the choice of scholarly works that are reviewed in this chapter is not arbitrary. The purpose is to identify emergent themes/questions, problems and findings on the subject as well as critical knowledge gaps that bear upon the present thesis. The chapter opens with a review of works by Terence Ranger, who has dominated the debate on ethnicity in Zimbabwe, particularly, his inventionist approach and subsequent internal criticism. Discussion then shifts to responses to Ranger’s theory, and other ‘secondary’ works on the subject, before considering some critical works on ethnicity and nationalism, urban social history and the postcolonial context of ethnicity in Zimbabwe.

2.2 Ranger’s Inventionism, His Auto-Critique and Related Works

In Zimbabwean historiography, Terence Ranger has undoubtedly made an immense contribution to debates on ethnicity and tradition both locally and internationally, producing numerous influential works on ethnicity and identity. Originally, his Zimbabwean studies tended to advance a distinctive ‘inventionist’ interpretation of ethnicity. Paris Yeros identifies Ranger and Eric Hobsbawm as the chief proponents of ‘inventionism’ who “have sought to unmask ethnic ideology, establish its historical novelty and fictitiousness, and lay bare the social hierarchies which it conceals”. To illustrate, in his 1982 publication, Ranger argued that colonial administrators needed comprehensive and manageable units, and as a result, they had to ‘invent’ tribes in Southern Africa. In urban areas, European employers developed ethnic hierarchies of hypothesized labour skills. According to Ranger, these inventions were then given legitimacy by ethnic ranking and the often racist tendencies of colonial science. In 1983, his chapter on The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa argued that colonialism resulted in the transplantation of neo-traditionalism and the inventions of identity and African

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3 Ranger, “Race and Tribe in Southern Africa”.
traditional religion, customary law and ethnicity. He identified the main African collaborators in the ‘invention’ process as chiefs, fathers and patriarchs.¹

Ranger further developed the inventionist thesis in a 1985 publication which focused on the alleged ‘invention’ of ‘tribalism’ in Zimbabwe. He argued that colonial administrators from Natal, South Africa, imbued with their pre-conceived notions about Ndebele identity, connived with salaried Ndebele indunas or chiefs and became instrumental in ‘inventing’ a narrower version of Ndebele identity.² The ‘invented’ self-conscious Ndebele ‘tribalism’, supposedly took the place of, or/and submerged membership in, a multi-ethnic state. Colonial administrators had, ostensibly, expected the ‘Ndebele’ to mirror the ‘ethnic virtues’ of ‘the Zulu’.³ Consequently, ‘Ndebele’ identification that had hitherto been open was now confined to the ‘Ndebele’ aristocracy. Ranger, thus, set out to demonstrate the artificial and narrowly-based ‘invention’ of ‘Ndebele ethnicity’. He argued moreover that the ‘invention’ of the ‘Ndebele’ contributed to colonial hegemony as the salaried indunas’ loyalty now lay with the paymasters rather than the ‘Ndebele’ nation.⁴

It is noteworthy that the 1985 study was in part a response to the then popular misconception that Ndebele and Shona ‘ethnic conflicts’ were primordial and natural. The publication was also produced in the context of the Gukurahundi, the massacre of an estimated 20 000 mostly civilian population in Matabeleland and the Midlands provinces in the 1980s.⁵ The conflict ended with the signing of the Unity Accord between the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) in 1987, forming the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF). Ranger also argued that before 1890, no one identified themselves as Karanga, Zezuru or Kalanga in the sense in which these terms are used today. In fact, as he observed:

David Beach’s admirable history of the Shona-speaking peoples shows clearly that before 1890, there were two ‘historical realities’. One was that all speakers of Shona possessed not only a language but also many other cultural traits in common. Scattered over a large area, in contrasting environments and pulled in different directions by trading links and military alliances, however, these Shona-speakers were not conscious

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¹ Ranger, “The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa”.
² Ranger, The Invention of Tribalism in Zimbabwe.
³ Ibid.
⁴ Ibid.
of a cultural identity, still less a political one. The second reality, and the one of which Shona-speakers were conscious, was the local chieftaincy group.\(^1\)

Drawing on the earlier work of Ranger and Beach, Gerald Chikozho Mazarire argues that pre-colonial Zimbabwean societies should not be treated as homogenous entities as the combined use of local sources, including linguistics and ethnography, renders the term ‘Shona’ anachronistic. According to Mazarire;

The term ‘Shona’ is a collective noun which conflates the linguistic, cultural and political attributes of a people who did not even know themselves by that name until the late nineteenth century, and even then, could still be variously described as ‘vaNyai’, ‘abeTshabi’, ‘Karanga’ or ‘Hole’.\(^2\)

The ‘Shona’ were largely viewed by ‘outsiders’ as ‘Karanga’ and not ‘Shona’. However, ‘Karanga’ today refers to a ‘Shona’ dialect spoken in southern Zimbabwe. Mazarire also notes that in some instances, ethnic identification had environmental or political origins, without necessarily evoking any form of determinism.\(^3\) While such arguments may not necessarily prove the absence of ethnic consciousness in pre-colonial Zimbabwe, they point rather to the historicity of ethnicity.

Ranger’s chapter in Leroy Vail’s influential collection of essays on *The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa* further developed his thoughts on inventionism by focusing on the work of missionaries and migrants in inventing a ‘Manyika identity’. He discussed the ideological input of younger men, “the first teacher-catechists of the Christian Mission in eastern Zimbabwe, who were the real creators and users of written ‘ChiManyika’ and the ethnographers of an imagined Manyika identity”.\(^4\) The author examined how these ideas

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\(^3\) Mazarire quoted by Raftopoulos and Mlambo, “Introduction. The Hard Road to Becoming Zimbabwe”, in Raftopoulos and Mlambo, eds., *Becoming Zimbabwe*, p. xix

developed and were spread by young migrant workers from eastern Zimbabwe in Rhodesian and South African cities, leading to the ‘invention’ of a ‘radical’ Manyika-ness. Ranger, in the process, incorporated John Lonsdale’s moral ethnicity approach by acknowledging that Manyika identity remained a contested one.¹

The inventionist thesis has, however, long lost its lustre. Recent research has emphasised that modern African ethnicity is a social construction and that ethnicity is the product of continuing historical processes which involve interpretations of the past and the present.² For instance, Thomas Spear explores a wide range of studies on the invention of tradition, the making of customary law and the creation of tribalism since the 1980s, including Ranger’s works, and argues that the case for invention overstated colonial power and its ability to manipulate African institutions to establish hegemony.³ For colonialism was not a unilateral political process. Even more so, tradition represents a complex discourse in which people continuously reinterpret the past using present lenses.⁴ Consequently, according to Spear:

Ethnicity reflected long-standing local political, cultural and historical conditions in the changing contexts of colonial rule. None of these institutions were easily fabricated or manipulated, and colonial dependence on them often limited colonial power as much as facilitating it.⁵

Ranger, in turn, has been accused by critics of essentializing tradition and of disregarding historical processes of re-interpretation.⁶ For instance, concerning African tradition, Mahmood Mamdani argues that “the point is that not only was there no single African tradition but also that customary law did not represent any significant tradition in pre-colonial Africa”⁷. Colonial constructions of tradition allowed no room for contradictory traditions.

¹ Ibid.
⁵ Spear, “Neo-Traditionalism and the Limits of Invention”, p.3. Ranger’s inventionist thesis failed to fully engage the importance of local discourses in the interpretation and reconstruction of tradition in view of the broader social, economic and political changes.

⁶ Ibid.
According to Mamdani, “colonial tradition was antithetical to change; in fact, any change was considered prima facie evidence of the corruption of tradition”\(^1\).

In view of the critique of inventionism, Ranger substantially revised his original argument which had presented Africans as passive recipients of ethnic consciousness from European missionaries and administrators.\(^2\) For example, his 1993 publication revisited the invention of tradition thesis and provided an ‘internal critique’ or ‘auto-criticism’ of his earlier ideas. Now accepting the intensely contested nature of colonial classification,\(^3\) he also acknowledged the over-masculine emphasis in his work and acknowledged the efforts by scholars like Nancy Hunt to address this gender bias.\(^4\) Overall, Ranger accepted that his earlier works had exaggerated the role of the “neo-traditional gentlemen of empire” in the ‘invention’ of ‘tribalism’ in southern Africa.\(^5\)

Ranger further acknowledged that the weakness of his thesis was the word ‘invention’ itself, which implies a one-sided happening and a conscious creation of ethnicity focusing on colonial power and agency.\(^6\) As he conceded, “an invention presupposes an inventor-and in my chapter in *The Invention*- the inventors were mainly colonial administrators or missionaries, working admittedly with African collaborators but with these playing the role of laboratory assistants rather than of scientists”.\(^7\) Yet Africans were not gullible collaborating dupes who were at the mercy of the ethnic machinations of their alleged European superiors.

Such an argument implies that in the absence of external influence, Africans were not capable of developing ethnic consciousness.\(^8\) Moreover, inventionism dichotomized the pre-colonial and colonial world and implied a once and for all event.\(^9\) It does not allow for a constant reworking of identities, and the transformation of institutions.\(^10\) Even more, it fails to

\(^{1}\) Ibid., p.7.
\(^{5}\) Ranger, “The Invention of Tradition Revisited”, p.66.
\(^{6}\) Spear, “Neo-Traditionalism and the Limits of Invention”, p.5.
\(^{7}\) Ranger, “The Invention of Tradition Revisited”, p.79.
\(^{8}\) Spear, “Neo-Traditionalism and the Limits of Invention”.
\(^{9}\) Ibid.
\(^{10}\) Ranger, “The Invention of Tradition Revisited”, p.79.
locate the sources of social change internally and to explore internal contestations within the ethnic group.¹

In defence, Ranger has also gone on to argue that his inventionism did not seek to abandon the idea of African creative initiative under colonialism, as invented African groups constantly re-defined themselves. However, he acknowledged that the term ‘invention’ compromised his early work on ethnicity and colonial custom.²

In his more recent 1999 publication, Ranger sets out his ‘third thoughts’ on African ethnicity. Responding to Ronald Atkinson’s challenge to take fully into account pre-colonial collective identities, he notes that he has “always agreed with Atkinson’s contention that historians should not ignore…pre-colonial identities. The question is whether they were ethnic or not”.³ In response, he identifies some of the non-ethnic and collective identities in pre-colonial Africa, including those based on religion and ecology, while also agreeing that ethnic identification was a pre-colonial possibility. Ranger’s ‘third thoughts’ include responses to Thomas Hylland Eriksen’s assertion that ethnicity is as universal as age and gender, as well as to Adrian Hastings’s challenge that by denying ethnicity to Africans he denies them humanity.⁴ Eriksen’s reflection is that if human beings have an innate propensity propensity to distinguish outsiders from insiders, ethnicity may be as universal as age and gender. For Hastings, the issue is:

While purportedly anti-colonial in its critical edge [constructionism] is very much a South African academic view of the impact of the West upon Africa because-like so much of traditional white South African culture- its thrust is to deny any significant identity to pre-colonial Africa. Every identity must be found to have been somehow given by Europeans, even ethnic identity⁵.

He is, therefore, surprised to find “Terence Ranger, who has spent his academic life defending African initiative, appearing to succumb to a theory which wished to deny Africans even the ability to provide themselves with the sort of ethnic identity which every people possesses in Europe”.⁶ Dismissing Hastings’s observations, Ranger’s response was that “even “even under the momentary spell of Marxism and racism” he could never “have intended to

² Ranger, “The Invention of Tradition Revisited”, p.81.
suggest that pre-colonial Africans had no ‘collective identities…I have always agreed with Atkinson’s contention that historians should not ignore such pre-colonial identities. The question, however, is whether they were ethnic’.1

In later works stressing the imagination of ethnicity, Ranger seems to prefer Benedict Anderson’s idea of imagined communities, marking a shift from invention to the imagination of African ethnicity2. He argues that customary law, ethnicity, religion and language were imagined by many different actors and over a long period of time. These multiple imaginations were contested and re-imagined as ideas, symbols and images, with colonial invention being built on much of what was already in existence.3 It was, arguably, the imagination of ethnicity by African organic intellectuals that gave it moral weight.

Ranger’s work on the Ndebele shows the alleged imagination of a wider Ndebele identification with Kalanga politicians like the late nationalist leader, Joshua Nkomo, emerging as ideological entrepreneurs and Ndebele cultural brokers. Having previously emphasized the colonial ‘inventedness’ of Ndebele ethnicity, he has subsequently accepted the pre-colonial ‘inventedness’ of Ndebele identity.4

Of course, Ranger’s works have focused largely on rural ethnicity, leaving an important gap that the present study seeks to fill. Nonetheless, those studies have helped to illustrate that African ethnicity was not a given nor primordial but was ideologically asserted. Indeed, with increasing African urbanization, he has himself emphasised the need for researchers to move from studies of rural ethnicity to urban identities.5 His recent (2010) book examines the social history of Bulawayo from 1893 to 1960 as depicted by the activities and lives of ‘township heroes’, like Masotsha Ndlovu, Grey Bango and Benjamin Burombo. Bulawayo is depicted as socio-political conjuncture where royal, settler, proto-nationalist, capitalist and imperial and other interests superseded one other.6

There are also other secondary studies, which provide a broad local context for this study and which build on Ranger’s work on rural ethnicity. JoAnn McGregor and Jocelyn Alexander take up Ranger’s work on the Ndebele and explore the construction of identities

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1 Ranger, “Concluding Comments”.
2 See Anderson, Imagined Communities.
3 Ranger, “Concluding Comments”.
5 Ranger, “Concluding Comments”, p.143.
through the everyday politics of naming, using the Shangani Reserve as a case study.\(^1\) They argue that daily interaction between the Ndebele and the locals was crucial in shaping the content of Ndebele identity. Alexander and McGregor’s research on the development of Ndebele ethnicity in the Shangani Reserve in the 1950s illustrated that chiefs, colonial administrators and other colonial agents all played their part in the construction of ethnic identities, yet that the main actors were the ordinary people themselves rather than those in positions of political influence.\(^2\) Alexander, McGregor and Ranger have examined how violence and its memory, particularly *Gukurahundi*, have shaped the history and identity of the Ndebele.\(^3\) They explore the ways in which the intersections of ethnicity, nationalism, religion and resistance against colonialism and the violent politics of the post-colonial state shaped and gave Ndebele identity its currency and tenure. Ndebele identification has also attracted the attention of Paul Kaarsholm, who examines the interface of state authority and local intellectual effort in the construction of Ndebele cultural traditions.\(^4\) The above studies build on Ranger’s inventionist thesis and reflect the subsequent shift to Andersonian imaginings.

Bjorn Lindgren has carried out research on politics, ethnicity and gender in Matabeleland. He explores the internal dynamics of ethnicity by focusing on clan names, origins and castes in south-western Zimbabwe,\(^5\) and argues that while scholarly works have critiqued essentialist notions of ethnicity, historical analyses of specific ethnicities have remained somewhat neglected.\(^6\) So, instead of studying whole ethnic categories, focusing on smaller units may provide a more complex picture of ethnicity, in this case, in Matabeleland.\(^7\)

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\(^6\) Lindgren, “The Internal Dynamics of Ethnicity”.

\(^7\) Ibid.
In Lindgren’s view, most works on ethnicity in Zimbabwe tend to examine the phenomenon in relation to the colonial and postcolonial state, rather than the ‘internal dynamics of ethnicity’. Instead, he focuses on the internal dynamics of Ndebele ethnicity through an examination of clan names and castes, observing that “Ndebele speakers use various clan names, origins, and ‘castes’ in a practice of naming and that these internal processes and practices break the category Ndebele into parts”.

On the other hand, Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni has argued that Ndebele totems have too “complex a history of their own for one to simplistically deploy as a concept to understand identity”, suggesting that Lindgren relied too heavily on the works of early white writers who “simplistically failed to go beyond the totem to the clan name in their definition of who was Ndebele and who was not”. In similar vein, Ngwabi Bhebe has illustrated how a number of people of Shona origin who were assimilated into the Ndebele state tended to “Ndebele-lise” their Shona surnames, with the Zhou changing their totem to Ndlovu.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s work has been informed by constructionist thought, Gramsci’s concept of hegemony and John and Jean Comaroff’s concept of cultural and colonial encounters. He, like the present author, subscribes to some of John Comaroff’s theoretical propositions with regard to ethnicity, especially the notions that it is constructed by specific historical forces, which are simultaneously structural and cultural - and that ethnicity is never a unitary phenomenon since it describes both a set of relations and a mode of ever-changing consciousness. Thus, Ndebele identity is a product of “complex constructivist processes that span pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial epochs”. British colonialists and their African retainers did not invent Ndebele ethnic identity but reconstructed it for colonial expedience.

Eric Worby discusses the making of official ethno-histories as a collaborative project based on conceptions held by the coloniser and colonised of the relationship between power,
conquest and kinship. Worby’s work is a nuanced analysis of ethno-cartography and is rural based. He argues that “whatever else it may be, ethnicity, conceived as a practice, is fundamentally about the power to name others”. Worby, however, seems to have overplayed the Shangwe’s refusal to be named, as up to the present day we have a group of people in Gokwe, north-western Zimbabwe, where Worby did his fieldwork, who identify themselves and are identified by others as ‘Shangwe’. If ethnicity is about the power to name others, it is equally about people having the materialities and power to name themselves.

2.3 Towards Urban Ethnicity

In all of this, there are relatively few works that focus on urban ethnicity, although the last two decades have seen an increase in the number of urban history studies. Tsuneo Yoshikuni’s book on urban social history in Zimbabwe is one influential example. In it, early African Salisbury consisted of an inner city, consisting of the municipal location inhabited by urbanites, proletarians, marginal and ‘foreign men’, and outer suburbs that were populated by local mission-educated, better paid workers, rural accumulators and their families. Yoshikuni also examines the influence of town-country relations on African urban history before 1957, focusing on both Bulawayo and Harare, arguing that “the theme of town-country relations represents one of the most strategic points of analysis for researchers working on African urban history”. Along the same vein, Brian Raftopoulos analyses some of the ambiguities of nationalism and labour in Salisbury which emerge from the continuing rural-urban linkages in the formation of African organizations and politics between 1945 and 1965, arguing that:


2 The present author taught in schools in Gokwe between 1998 and 2001. His observations are that due to the negative connotations that are often attached to ‘Shangwe identification’ the youths tend to deny the ‘identity’ although their ChiShangwe accent often betrays them. There exists in Gokwe a language (ChiShangwe) and culture that is identified as Shangwe.

3 See Raftopoulos and Yoshikuni, “Introduction”, in Raftopoulos and Yoshikuni, eds., Sites of Struggle; T. Yoshikuni, Urban Experiences in Colonial Zimbabwe: A Social History of Harare, Harare; Weaver Press, 2007; E. Chipembere’s “Colonial Policy and Africans in Urban Areas- With Special Focus on Housing, Salisbury, 1939-1964”, M.Phil thesis, University of Zimbabwe, 2002; and B. Mpofu, “No Place for ‘Undesirables’: the Urban Poor’s Struggle for Survival in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe, 1960-2005”, PhD thesis, Edinburgh University, 2010). Like Chipembere, Mpofu focuses on housing and unemployment, arguing that authorities have been reluctant to provide adequate housing for poor urbanites and have not accepted the emergence of informal urban settlements and economic activities. This in turn makes the poor’s claim to urban areas more fragile.

4 Yoshikuni, Urban Experiences in Colonial Zimbabwe.

5 Yoshikuni, “Notes on the influence of town-country relations on Africa urban history, before 1957; experiences of Salisbury and Bulawayo”, in Raftopoulos and Yoshikuni, eds., Sites of Struggle.

6 Ibid., p.114.
So often organizational histories of trade unions, accounts of strikes and surveys of nationalism, empirically record the importance of this linkage, but fail to understand its resonance. Yet in attempting to understand issues ranging from the origins of nationalism to the limitations of trade union activities, the implications of the relationship between the country and the city need to be more clearly articulated.¹

Michael West is another writer who touches on African ethnicity in his discussion of the development of an African middle class in Zimbabwe between 1890 and 1965.² He provides a critical analysis of its social and political construction, and illustrates how Africans were able to avail themselves of scarce educational opportunities in a bid to achieve some degree of upward mobility. By 1965, there had come into being a self-conscious, corporate African middle class that conceived itself as different both from the white community and from African workers and peasants. Yet, although West’s work is invaluable, his discussion of race and ethnicity is rather general and he further excludes non-Rhodesian African groups who were an important element of Salisbury life.

Theresa Barnes is perhaps one the first Zimbabwe historians to examine urban processes from a gendered perspective.³ For her, the early colonial period provided a “complex mix of opportunities for women in the cities, generated by the contradictions between the state and African patriarchal imperatives over the control of women”.⁴ Equally, as Barnes concedes of her work, a ‘problematic aspect is the fact that little is said here on the issue of inter-African ethnicity’⁵.

Richard Parry is yet another notable scholar whose work has enriched our understanding of the social history of Salisbury.⁶ Taking the period up to the 1930s, he

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⁵ Barnes, “We Women Work So Hard”, p.xxxv.
analyses the relationship between black culture, ideology and organization in Salisbury, the interaction of black and colonial culture, as well as the invention of tradition. He further explores patterns of cultural organization in Salisbury, especially those outside the direct influence of the Rhodesian state, and considers aspects of industrial ethnicity that are relevant to this thesis, especially the manipulative issue of colonial migrant ethnic ranking and stereotyping.

Barry Alexander Kosmin’s work is equally of relevance to the present discussion, providing as it does a social history of ethnic and commercial relations in Southern Rhodesia focusing on the Asian, Greek and Jewish populations between 1898 and 1943.1 He examines their class position as middlemen within a stratified colonial society and their discrimination at the hands of politically dominant British settlers. In his perspective, “ethnic categorization, far from being the root cause of stratified society, was controlled by the ruling class which utilized it as a tool to ascribe roles to population groups in accordance with its own political and economic interests.”2 In this context, ethnicity was a prime concern of ordinary people and an important principle of social organization, in addition to being a major criterion for determining occupational and economic position.

Alois Mlambo examines racial chauvinism as a factor in Rhodesian immigration policy between 1890 and 1963. Building on Kosmin’s work, Mlambo argues that scholars have emphasized white settler racism and discrimination against the African black majority but have erroneously regarded white society as a homogenous and harmonious entity. However, a closer look at racial dynamics within white colonial society revealed that some were ‘whiter’ than others.3 There were strong currents of ethnic chauvinism and division within white settler society, although whites presented a united front when protecting their collective interests in the face of perceived African threats.4

Mlambo focuses in particular on the racial and ethnic chauvinism of British settlers, which, inter alia, dictated the pace, volume and nature of white immigration into Rhodesia. This, together, with other factors, led to fewer whites coming to Rhodesia than had been envisaged by Cecil John Rhodes. According to Mlambo, “while Rhodes had dreamt of

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2 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
creating Rhodesia as white man’s country, this dream remained unfulfilled because of the
dominant British settler community’s reluctance to admit whites of non-British stock”.¹
Mlambo’s work has a useful bearing on this study with regard to its documenting of the
immigration of various white ethnicities into Rhodesia and also its location of ethnic pride
and ethnocentrism within the Rhodesian ‘white’ community.

At another level, James Muzondidya has also done extensive research on Coloured
‘identity’ and politics in Zimbabwe.² His 2005 volume discusses the various ways in which
Coloured identity was debated, defined and negotiated by the state, missionaries, settler
discourses, labour demands and educational concerns.³ In addition, Muzondidya explores
race, ethnicity, and the politics of positioning in the making of Coloured identity in
Zimbabwe between 1890 and 1980.

2.4 Ethnicity and Nationalism

Masipula Sithole has undeniably made a notable contribution to discussion on ethnicity and
politics in Zimbabwe,⁴ exploring the salience of ethnicity in African politics and its
intersection with class and factionalism. In extensive writings on ethnicity, class, nationalist
politics and democratisation in Zimbabwe, both before and after independence,⁵ Sithole
focused on how nationalist leaders and their political parties resorted to ‘ethnic balancing’ in

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⁵ Sithole, “Managing Ethnic Conflicts in Zimbabwe”.

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their attempts to manage and avert ethnic schism and the balkanisation of the nationalist movement.\(^1\)

Overall, his conceptualization of the role of ethnicity in African politics was largely informed by instrumentalism. Indeed, from the 1960s onwards, ethnicity increasingly became a divisive force in Zimbabwean African nationalist politics. Ethnicity became a vital political resource used by some political actors and the “tribal bourgeoisie” for their political benefits and as a basis for mobilization.\(^2\) Ethnicity within the African nationalist movement is argued to have significantly contributed to the ZAPU-ZANU split in 1963.\(^3\) Sithole argued that both ZAPU and ZANU struggled to manage ethnicity within their ranks, with ZAPU trying to field into leadership candidates from across the Ndebele-Shona-Kalanga ethnic divides, while ZANU attempted to undertake some form of ethnic arithmetic by drawing its top leadership from the three dominant Shona ethnic groups: Karanga, Manyika and Zezuru.\(^4\) However, despite these efforts, ethnicity remained a divisive force in African nationalist politics, as it remained a resource for post-independence political entrepreneurs.

On his part, Msindo has revisited the 1929 Bulawayo faction fights between mostly Manyika and other Shona immigrants on the one hand and local Ndebele and their non-Shona supporters on the other.\(^5\) He provides a critique of Ian Phimister and Charles van Onselen’s thesis that the violence was a manifestation of intra-working class conflict and an expression of competition within the working class over limited job opportunities.\(^6\) Msindo dismisses that thesis as a reflection of the Marxist class reductionist analysis that informed scholarship in the 1970s. Contending that ethnicity was a salient force in Bulawayo, he appears to subscribe to the moral ethnicity approach, illuminated through discussion of contestations within the ‘Ndebele’ ethnic community over issues to do with decency, ethnic endogamy and sexual encounters with ethnic others, in particular, the Manyika and Karanga.

Furthermore, Msindo argues that Zimbabwean historians have not yet fully examined the interaction of ethnicity and nationalism to determine if the two can co-exist and

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\(^1\) Sithole, *Zimbabwe. Struggles within the Struggle*.


\(^3\) Sithole, “Class and Factionalism”

\(^4\) *Ibid*, Sithole, “Class and Factionalism”.


complement each other. He observes that most academic works have limited their analysis of African nationalism to the liberation war (1966-1979), in which the focus has largely been on tensions within the nationalist movements, leadership differences, the Church and the war of liberation, mobilization towards the war effort, the role of peasants and other factors, at the expense of an understanding of the social history of African nationalism itself.¹

In Msindo’s view, ignoring the social history of nationalism before the liberation war leads to the misconception that African nationalism in Zimbabwe is synonymous with the violent war of liberation,² in effect, reducing African nationalism to a purely anti-colonial phenomenon of nationalist struggle.

Another scholar, Timothy Scanercchia, has also made a significant contribution to understandings of Zimbabwean urban history and nationalism.³ He examines the politics of gender and class in the formation of African communities in Salisbury between the late 1930s and the late 1950s, exploring fissures and alliances in the formation of urban nationalist movements in a 1999 publication which shows the tensions between married and single workers and between “more stable aspiring middle-class elements and migrants that also characterized community politics in the 1940s and 1950s”⁴. In addition, Scanercchia’s 2008 publication builds on his earlier work and discusses the urban roots of democracy and political violence in Zimbabwe between 1940 and 1960, using Mbare and Highfield ‘African townships’ as case studies.⁵ It details the development of a democratic tradition in urban colonial Zimbabwe, arguing that this was submerged by an elitist and divisive political culture by the 1960s, leaving the abandonment of urban democratic traditions as a hallmark of an unsustainable variety of nationalism in Zimbabwe.⁶

Scanercchia’s work is helpful in deconstructing nationalism in Zimbabwe by moving away from “narrative treatment of either an essentialized African woman or an essentialized

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² Msindo, “Ethnicity and Nationalism in Urban Colonial Zimbabwe: Bulawayo, 1950 to 1963”.


⁴ Raftopoulos and Yoshikuni, “Introduction”, in Raftopoulos and Yoshikuni, eds., *Sites of Struggle*, p.11.


⁶ Ibid.
notion of national unity”. Consequently, we can talk of plural African nationalisms rather than of an essentialized ‘nationalist struggle’. In the same vein, Raftopoulos and Mlambo note that “even at moments when nationalism could lay claim to its strongest appeal, the fault lines of class, race, ethnicity and gender, amongst other cleavages, were both subsumed and exacerbated in the political formations that emerged”. Indeed, the road to ‘becoming Zimbabwe’ was a “history of division and dispute, expressed in fluid identities, contested political ideas, and a complicated interplay of domination and resistance”.

2.5 The Postcolonial Context of Ethnicity in Zimbabwe

There are relatively very few works that discuss ethnicity in postcolonial Zimbabwe. One major work is by Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni who argue that in spite of its rare entry into contemporary official and public discourse, “ethnicity alongside race has continued to shape and influence the economic, social and political life” since 1980. They argue that in spite of the de-ethnicisation processes:

Zimbabwe struggled to develop into a united nation-state because of its negative legacy of racial and ethnic polarization inherited from both colonialism and African nationalism. The suspicions and ethnic tensions developed, as well as alliances built during colonial rule and the nationalist struggle did not immediately disappear after independence. They continued to shape relations between political elites in post-independence.

Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni note that ethnic polarization has not only developed between the Ndebele and Shona but among various Shona groups also which have accused and counter-accused each other of ethnic favouratism. Minority groups like the Tonga, Kalanga, Venda, and Shangaan have also complained about marginalisation from the economy.

In *Do Zimbabweans Exist?* Ndlovu-Gatsheni examines the “triumphs and tribulations of the Zimbabwean national project, providing a radical and critical analysis of the fossilization of Zimbabwean nationalism against the wider context of African nationalism in

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general”¹. He critiques nationalism’s failure to create the nation-as-people and to engender democracy and a culture of human rights.² He also bemoans the issue that the country’s leaders in the postcolonial state have polarized the nation into ‘war veterans’, ‘patriots’, ‘puppets’, ‘traitors’ and ‘sell-outs’. This binary approach derailed efforts to forge a common citizenship in a ‘New Zimbabwe’ in which “tribalism, racism, regionalism and violence become things of the past”³. Ndlovu-Gatsheni asserts that nationalism has failed to engender a stable Zimbabwean national identity. He nonetheless acknowledges that;

In Zimbabwe, nationalism is not only studied as a historical phenomenon but also as an ever-living reality pulsating within the anatomy and physiology of the postcolonial state. Nationalism and the liberation struggle are conflated into one phenomenon and then celebrated as the foundation myth of the postcolonial nation.⁴

The discourse around the liberation struggle is at the centre of identity politics in postcolonial Zimbabwe and often results in the bifurcation of Zimbabweans into ‘patriots’ and ‘sell-outs’, which in turn can potentially have an impact on people’s access to state resources.⁵

Furthermore, Ndlovu-Gatsheni illuminates how the Matabeleland problem in the Diaspora has made Ndebele-speakers to link up via cyber space. In fact, there exists a cyber community and an “imagined autonomous United Mthwakazi Republic (UMR), complete with its own national flag and other ritualistic trappings of a state, if not a nation-state as a virtual community on the internet”⁶. He adds that Ndebele particularism is a complex phenomenon that cannot be ignored in the imaginations of a post-crisis Zimbabwe. He observes that the salient issue of Ndebele particularism has been overshadowed by the Zimbabwe crisis but has continued to haunt both the project of nationalism that “ended up unravelling along the fault-lines of Ndebele-Shona ethnicities and the post-colonial nation-building process that became marred by ethnic tensions and violence in the 1980s”¹. The

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² Ndlovu-Gatsheni provides a synopsis of his book in the Zimbabwe Independent of 14 January 2010, where he takes stock of “the state of the nation after three decades of uncertainty, violence and hostage to a selfish leadership that covered crony-party-capitalism under the respectable gloss of patriotic nationalism”.
³ Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Can 2010 be Zimbabwe’s Year of Redemption, Salvation?”
⁵ Raftopoulos and Mlambo, “Outside the Third Chimurenga”.
notion of the Ndebele as a distinctive nation inevitably threatens Shona hegemony that supposedly became triumphant when the Shona-dominated ZANU came to power in 1980.

2.6 Conclusion
The present chapter has reviewed some of the major works on ethnicity, urban history and nationalism in Zimbabwe. Although in no way exhaustive, it has nevertheless aimed at situating the thesis in its broader context. It has also illuminated a number of gaps in current literature which the present study sets out to fill. The following chapter further sets the stage for the main part of the thesis by discussing its theoretical and conceptual underpinnings.

1 Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Nation Building in Zimbabwe”, p.27.
CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

The present chapter charts the thesis’s theoretical trajectory, situating it within social constructionist thought which emphasizes the role of ordinary people in constructing their forms of identification; and postmodernism and poststructuralism with their emphasis on difference, language and discourse. Industrial ethnicity is presented as a social construct that is multilayered, malleable, contingent, shifting, context dependent and one among a broad range of identifications. Nevertheless, given the weakness of constructionism in seriously engaging issues of embodiment and materialities in forms of identification, this study borrows from the network theory of socio-economic wellbeing in an attempt to conceptualize industrial ethnicity in African Harare’s labour markets. The second part of the chapter discusses the research methods employed.

3.2 Theoretical Approaches to African Ethnicity

A ‘genealogy’ of the debates on African ethnicity can roughly be traced from primordialism to social constructionism. Primordialism explained ethnicity in terms of “the givens of social existence- blood, speech, custom- which have an ineffable coerciveness in and for themselves”. Its proponents sought to explain ethnicity’s emotional power by evoking “a common history, culture and destiny- potently symbolised by blood- in defence of group interests”. However, primordialism failed to provide the historicity of ethnicity, especially explaining when and why it was evoked and became charged.

On their part, instrumentalists argued that ethnicity was nothing but ‘false consciousnesses “deployed strategically to advance group interests which are often economic

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2 Norval, “Rethinking Ethnicity: Identification, Hybridity and Democracy”. The present discussion does not, however, provide an exhaustive examination of all the theoretical approaches to African ethnicity but discusses some of the approaches that have had significant impacts on interpretations and (mis)understandings of ethnicity in Africa.
3 Ibid., p.83.
4 Ibid., p.17.
They explored how ethnicity was mobilized by migrant workers to “counter urban anomie, poverty, insecurity and competition”; by political entrepreneurs for political mobilization and to gain access to national resources; by cultural elites to enhance their social status.\(^1\) The argument was that ethnicity is not primordial but politically, culturally and economically contingent, although authors have approached this from varying directions.

Although inventionism has had a significant impact on the analysis and understanding of African ethnicity, as argued in Chapter 2 the inventionist thesis has long lost its lustre. Simply put, the case for invention overstated colonial power and its ability to manipulate African institutions. Consequently, ethnicity is understood in this thesis as a product of human agency, construed as “a creative social act through which such commonalities as speech code, cultural practice, ecological adaptation, and political organization become woven into a consciousness of shared identity”.\(^3\)

While critics have highlighted shortcomings in a social constructivist perspective, this thesis borrows nevertheless from constructivist positions. These include the moral ethnicity approach, which illuminates political contestations made in the name of ethnicity and tradition. Ethnicity is conceived of as a moral debate over political community, rights, obligations and citizenship, in which ethnic groups are construed as internally dynamic moral arenas for political development. Thus, in the case of Kenya, Lonsdale deconstructs ethnicity into its opposed and contradictory aspects - these being a moral sensibility and its politically conscious dimension.\(^4\) Similarly, Yeros understands ethnicity “as an array of political idioms, mainly those that refer to ‘history’, ‘tradition’, ‘descent’ and ‘virtue’, through which moral debate is made relevant and meaningful - much like the moral ethnicity approach of John Lonsdale”.\(^5\)

### 3.3 Hybridity, Materiality and Materialisation

\(^1\) Norval, “Rethinking Ethnicity: Identification, Hybridity and Democracy”, p.83.
\(^2\) Spear, “Neo-Traditionalism and the limits of Invention”, p.17.
\(^3\) Yeros, “Introduction: On the Uses and Implications of Constructivism”, 4. However, ‘once a threshold is reached, the consciousness may become to a degree self-reproducing at a group level but continue to be contingent for the individual who remains in an ongoing process of transacting and redefining identity’.
\(^5\) Ibid.
Judith Butler and Homi Bhabha’s works, though considered theoretically ‘dense’ are also pertinent to the thesis.\textsuperscript{1} In Bhabha’s focus on literary and cultural thought as well as on postcolonial and post-modern scholarship,\textsuperscript{2} he explores issues such as hybridity. Hybridity is presented as a problematic of the colonial representation and individuation.\textsuperscript{3} It “commonly refers to the creation of new transcultural forms within the contact zone produced by colonialism”.\textsuperscript{4} Assuming many forms, including cultural, political and linguistic, it was part of the colonialist discourse of racism imbued in 19\textsuperscript{th} Century eugenicist and scientific racist thought.\textsuperscript{5}

In \textit{The Location of Culture} and other works, Bhabha contends that nations and cultures must be understood as ‘narrative’ constructions that arise from “the ‘hybrid’ interaction of contending national and cultural constituencies”.\textsuperscript{6} Moreover, Bhabha opines that as identities are performed and contested on border situations or fault lines, the focus should not be on the stark opposition between coloniser and colonised, men and women, black and white, straight and gay.\textsuperscript{7} Although this notion of hybridity is drawn from the concept of the postcolony, it can also be applied to pre-colonial societies, especially if it is understood as the encounter of multiple cultures.

Just as the colonised could resist and subvert the coloniser with varying degrees of success, so the power of the colonial state as an ‘identifier’ had its limitations. The existence of [ethnic] categories did not imply the automatic assumption of such classifications by those so named or categorized. As such, Bhabha’s works remain critical in as far as the present thesis’s conceptualization of industrial ethnicity and identification is concerned.


\textsuperscript{3} Bhabha, ed., \textit{Nation and Narration}; Bhabha, “Of Mimicry and Man”; Bhabha, \textit{The Location of Culture}. Michiel Verspaandonk notes that ‘hybridity is a prevalent concept in contemporary post-colonial discourse and is mostly concerned with the place of the post-colonial migrant in the West, but can also refer to the encounter between two or multiple cultures in (formerly) colonial areas’ (M. Verspaandonk, “A dialogue of cultures, the depiction of the Oriental in two works by Salman Rushdie”, BA, Westerse Literatuur, 2009-2010, 16.

\textsuperscript{4} “Hybridity”, \url{http://www.qub.ac.uk/Hybridity.htm} (Accessed 24 May 2010).

\textsuperscript{5} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{6} M. Perloff, “Cultural Luminality/Aesthetic Closure? The ‘Intersitial Perspective’ of Homi Bhabha”.

\textsuperscript{7} Perloff, “Cultural Luminality/Aesthetic Closure? The ‘Intersitial Perspective’ of Homi Bhabha”.

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The work of Judith Butler is equally important for the thesis’s understanding of industrial ethnicity and identification. Generally considered a major thinker on gender, power and the body, she attempts to incorporate materiality into social constructivist thought.\(^1\) *Matter*.\(^2\) The body is not simply a linguistic construct that can be changed and shaped at will, but rather an ‘active materiality’, which in combination with discursive practices, works to form and reform the body’.\(^3\) Consequently, people cannot ‘invent’ their genders and ethnicities willy-nilly, as these have to be materialised.\(^4\) Butler proposes replacing the idea of ‘construction’ with that of ‘materialisation’ as “a return to the notion of matter, not as a site or surface, but as a process of materialisation that stabilizes over time to produce the effect of boundary, fixity and surface we call matter”.\(^5\)

Accordingly, rather than solely focusing on identities, the thesis presents a case for identification and positioning as people can belong to numerous networks and categories with varying socio-economic and political outcomes.\(^6\) As such, some migrant workers in colonial Zimbabwe could use their materialities to assume and articulate different identities to position themselves in a competitive labour market.\(^7\) Of course, ethnicity poses analytical difficulties as it can be seen working in different social, political and economic contexts, often displaying contradictory dimensions.\(^8\) It can be viewed as a system of classification; a structure for the definition and interaction of groups; a system of social inequality or a strategic network of

\(^1\) Robinson, “The Body as Activity”, p.1.
\(^2\) Ibid; Butler, Bodies the Matter; Butler, “Gender Trouble: Feminist Theory and Psychoanalytic Discourse”, L. Nicholson, ed., *Feminism/Postmodernism*, New York: Routledge, 1990; Butler, *Gender Trouble*. For Butler, matter is not static and fixed, but an active process or force. She calls this conception of matter ‘materiality’. In addition, for Butler people are not born men or women, male or female, but they learn how to act these genders. Gender is presented as a ‘performed identity’ (Seidman, *Contested Knowledge*, p.211). Also see Neil Badminton and Julia Thomas, eds., *The Routledge Critical and Cultural Theory Reader*, London and New York: Routledge, 2008. Steph Lawyer further notes that for Judith Butler, bodies are saturated with sociality. People arguably give meaning to some characteristics and not others. Identities are performed or are constantly and repeatedly done, for example the practice of ‘girling’ or ‘boying’ (S. Lawyer, *Identity. Sociological Perspectives*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008, p.113).
\(^3\) Robinson, “The Body as Activity: Butler’s Active Materiality and Derrida’s Sexual Difference”, p.2. Robinson, however, contends that although Butler breaks with the essentialist/constructivist distinction, the concept of active materiality is underdeveloped in *Bodies that Matter*. Robinson thus turns to Jacques Derrida’s conception of sexual difference to develop the concept.
It can be seen, *inter alia*, as a socio-economic format in which individuals and groups navigate the imperatives of economic survival, material appropriation and interpersonal power. Seen this way, ‘industrial ethnicity’ emerges as a ‘structure of patronage’ and social capital, especially in the context of urbanisation, colonialism and migrant labour, though it evidently had pre-colonial and pre-urban precedence.

In urban colonial Zimbabwe, ethnic enclaves in industries and workplaces were engendered by a complex synergy of institutional, structural and behavioural factors, and there were often deliberate efforts by employers and workers to use and maintain industrial ethnicity for disparate socio-economic and political reasons, mostly to create and to maintain differential social, economic and political life chances ahead of ethnic others.

The above conceptualization of industrial ethnicity, in part, builds on earlier works by Cohen, Glazer and Moynihan, Epstein and Mitchell. Basing their conclusions on research on the Zambian copper belt in the 1950s, Epstein and Mitchell demonstrated that ‘tribalism’ in the urban context was not simply a primitive hangover from time immemorial as primordialists argued. Instead, ‘tribal’ affiliations “were activated to a significant extent as newly urbanised populations competed for resources and sought to create supportive social structures to which they could belong”.

This contradicted development theories of ethnic mobilization, which erroneously assumed that ethnicity would decline in resonance as modernization replaced sentiments based on ethnic and kinship identities. Yet, ethnicity does not necessarily lose its currency in the face of urbanization, industrial development and nation building.

Industrial ethnicity in urban colonial Zimbabwe developed in the context of migrant labour, urbanisation and the growth of the colonial capitalist economy. These processes brought together people of diverse historical, cultural, linguistic and ethnic backgrounds in competitive environments.

3.4 A Network Theory of Socio-economic Wellbeing

1 van Binsbergen, “Ethnicity and Identity in South Central Africa”.
2 Ibid.
Migrant labour was a critical factor in fomenting industrial ethnicity in urban colonial Zimbabwe. The migration processes, once started, “tend to become partly self-perpetuating, leading to the formation of migrant networks and migration systems”.¹ Migrant networks refer to sets of interpersonal ties which connect non-migrants, migrants and former migrants in origin and areas of destination through ethnic, kinship, and ‘community’ bonds, among other social networks.² Such complex social networks are a form of ‘social capital’ that can, depending on the context, be converted into cultural, human and economic capital, thereby easing the migrants’ settlement process by reducing the economic, social and political costs of migration.³

Social networks are critical for the transmission of local intelligence and job information within the group and to new arrivals. The term local intelligence is used in the thesis to refer to vital and usable information concerning host communities’ social norms and practices, their relations with ethnic and racial others, marriage practices, and other critical information (of social, political, economic and cultural nature) useful for immigrants’ settlement process. Job information or job intelligence refers to information on the structural and institutional milieu of the job market; job opportunities, including by industrial sector; wage levels (which often varied from sector/employer to the other); the prevalence, or lack of it, of industrial ethnicity; and overall trends in the job market among other issues.

The thesis makes some use of social network analysis in its examination of industrial ethnicity, arguing in Chapter 5 that social networks can be used as socio-economic resources, including securing and keeping jobs.⁴ Social networks constitute important ways through which ethnic immigrants can successfully settle and operate in certain economic activities.⁵ This is particularly so for ethnic immigrants who lack “resources, the formal/legal means, or the demographic weight to cast a significant vote”.⁶ Such groups often use their social

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² Ibid.
⁴ Williams and Durrance, “Social Networks and Social Capital”. Yu Zhou opines that ethnic enclaves can be both residential areas, which provide the ‘warmth of the welcome’ and prime locations for business. For Zhou, location strategies are important for ethnic entrepreneurs to exploit their market niches (Zhou, “Beyond Ethnic Enclaves”).
⁶ Ibid.
networks or structured sets of informal ties within communities for social capital to deal with socio-economic vulnerability.¹

Equally, the use of social networks and the resultant prevalence of ethnic enclaves in industries and at workplaces have engendered ambiguous outcomes for different groups across time and space. Ethnicity can lead to economic success at the expense of socio-political safety, as in the case of Indians in Uganda in 1972 or Zimbabweans in contemporary South Africa where they have been victims of xenophobic violence and stigmatisation. As Adida argues, “the economic success of ethnic minority groups, conceptualized so far mainly as niche success, is not enough; it is instead the extension and diversification of success beyond the niche economy that guarantees socio-economic wellbeing through both economic success and socio-political safety”.²

3.5 Research Methodology

The thesis is the product of historical research carried out in Harare between 2010 and 2013. It also builds on earlier research on ethnicity, gender and urban social history that has been carried out by the author in Harare since 2002.³ The research methods used in data gathering, data analysis and presentation were qualitative rather than quantitative. These included oral interviews and key informant interviews, archival research, personal field observations and textual analysis.

Archival research at the National Archives of Zimbabwe (NAZ) constituted one of the important stages of data gathering which form the mainstay of the study. Target files included government publications, ministerial and departmental reports, Native Commissioner’s Reports, historical manuscripts, census and statistical reports, Salisbury Town Clerk’s Reports, Council Meeting Reports, districts criminal cases files, and publications in the Native Affairs Department Annual (NADA).

Official documents helped to capture change and continuity in official attitudes towards industrial ethnicity and the African ethnic enigma. Of particular importance were reports by Native Commissioners (NCs), Location Superintendents and Chief Native Commissioners (CNCs), among other colonial officials. The official attitude projected both in these official documents as well as in European newspapers (Rhodesian Herald and

¹ Ibid, p.2.
² Ibid., p.7.
Bulawayo Chronicle) was not only varied but often conflicting. Equally, labour returns, reports by the department of labour and census reports proved critical in establishing Salisbury’s ethnic and demographic dynamics between the 1890s and the 1970s.

Seventy-two oral interviews were conducted in Harare, with the help of a research assistant, in order to capture the ethnic stories of both the literate and illiterate sections of the population. Seventy interviews were conducted in various suburbs of Harare, including Mbare, Highfields, Rugare, Mufakose, Marimba, Mabvuku, Tafara, Kambuzuma, Crowborough and Dzivarasekwa, and Warren Park high density residential areas. The above residential areas were some of the ‘townships’ that were established by colonial authorities to accommodate Africans in Harare, including migrant workers. A considerable number of labour migrants still live in some of these residential areas.

Participants were drawn from different gender, ethnic and social groups. Interviewees were chosen at random from each social stratum. Stratified random sampling helped to cater for social difference and to ensure the examination of the socio-economic dimensions of the research questions. This enabled the researcher to capture a multiplicity of often competing and conflicting narratives about industrial ethnicity in urban colonial Zimbabwe. Although a probability sampling method (stratified random) was used, the study also used snow-ball sampling, a non-probability sampling method. This was especially so in cases where the author was referred to potential informants by interviewees.

The thesis also made use of recollections, which include oral histories and personal reminiscences. The National Archives of Zimbabwe’s African Oral History files (AOH) proved to be another important historical source, which complemented oral interviews in a very significant way. The ‘African voice’, as captured in oral sources, also echoed sentiments raised in ‘African’ newspapers (African Daily News, Bantu Mirror, African Weekly and African Businessman) concerning industrial ethnicity.

Also, in view of the tense political atmosphere under which fieldwork was held, it was even more critical for the author to uphold research ethics. Most interviewees tended to be evasive when asked questions that they deemed to be ‘political’. Their overall sentiments were perhaps captured by Sekuru Dembeza who said that “mwanangu, zvematongerwo enyika zvakaoma. Ngatisiyane nazvo” (my son, the issue of politics is a tricky, sensitive and difficult one. Let us not discuss it). The anonymity and confidentiality of participants was ensured through the use of pseudonyms. Participation was voluntary and interviews were

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1 Interview with Sekuru Dzapasi, Mabvuku, 30 May 2011.
only recorded on tape with the consent of the participant. Different expectations were raised and the researcher situated the study as solely for the fulfilment of a research degree. The above issues helped ensure that the rights of participants were not compromised. Research ethics are a core requirement for consensual studies involving living human subjects.

3.6 Conclusion

The first part of the present chapter discussed the theoretical and conceptual trajectories that inform the thesis. It noted that although social constructionism rightly queries the basic assumptions of primordialism and instrumentalism with regard to African ethnicity, constructionism is itself no more than a general approach and does not necessarily engage fully with issues of materiality and power. Consequently, the thesis suggests that the writings of Judith Butler and Homi Bhabha can be helpful in conceptualising industrial ethnicity. Given the role of social networks as sources of social capital and conduits for the transmission of local intelligence and job information, the social network theory of socio-economic well-being is also useful for present purposes. The second part of the chapter discussed the research methods used in pursuit of the study’s historicising objectives. The next chapter further situates the thesis in its historical milieu through an examination of the intersection of ethnic identification and industrial specialisms in pre-colonial Zimbabwe.
CHAPTER 4: INDUSTRIAL ETHNICITY IN PRE-COLONIAL ZIMBABWE

4.1 Introduction

The present chapter argues that ethnicity was a pre-colonial reality in Zimbabwe, although like elsewhere in pre-colonial Africa, it remained fluid, contingent, ambivalent and one among numerous other forms of identification that could be assumed in given historical contexts. Using Shangwe tobacco producers and Njanja iron manufacturers as case studies, the chapter further argues for the existence of industrial ethnicity in pre-colonial Zimbabwe.

4.2 A Historical Background

Ethnic groups are prominently and consistently represented in African oral traditions to the effect that they cannot simply be explained away as mere projections of colonial and postcolonial realities into a pre-colonial past, although such projections do occur. Some ethnonyms appear in documents generated before European colonisation. In Zimbabwe, the ethnonym ‘Karanga’ appeared in Portuguese documents as early as the sixteenth century. However, as Binsbergen, observes:

The various generic and proper names for groups thus distinguished by pre-colonial central Africans must have lacked the standardization and territoriality imposed by colonialism. Their dimensions diverged; named political units constituting pre-colonial state systems did not coincide with linguistic clusters, but probably did reflect ecological specializations of agriculturalists, pastoralists, hunters, fishermen, petty commodity producers. Pre-colonial states, as systems integrating ecological diversities, were usually multi-ethnic; one dominant ethnic group, several languages and an underlying regional culture.

It is thus apparent that ethnonymic practices could, in some instances, articulate ecological specialisms. Together with language, they were important ethnic boundary markers in pre-colonial Africa, including Zimbabwe. In Southern Africa, language is an important ethnic

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1 van Binsbergen, ‘Ethnicity and Identity in south central Africa.”
2 Ibid.
boundary marker, although most Bantu languages and dialects tend to have a number of similarities. The importance of language as an ethnic boundary marker, in part stems from:

The codification of languages since the nineteenth century but also more in general from language’s capacity of encoding and displaying identity or alienness in social interaction. More than any other part of institutionalized culture, language is encoded in formal rules whose infringement (for example, by non-native speakers) immediately causes puzzlement, ridicule, rejection, or a breakdown of communication among listeners and readers. Language for the native speaker tends to be the last refuge of owning and belonging, of competence and identity.¹

Mashiri, quoting Obeng and Adegbija, also notes that “language is often a passport to ethnic origin, just as ethnic background is [was] indexical of language”.² In the same vein, Obeng posits that in Ghana, “language preferences and ethnic identity pull together”.³

In pre-colonial Africa, ethnonyms could also reflect a rejection of the political centre or a given state system. Examples of such ethnonyms included ‘Tonga’, literally ‘rule’, which denotes a group ‘tired’ of subservience and capitulating to the hegemonic political force.⁴ Ethnonyms could designate the prevailing nature of structural relations between the political centre and its margins. However, ethnonyms are dynamic and can change over time, depending on the historical context. Moreover, the process of ethnogenesis⁵ is complex, and can occur both passively or as a conscious effort on the part of the group concerned. Yet, since ethnic groups are not homogenous and harmonious entities, the transformation from ethnic awareness to ethnic consciousness within the group is uneven.

Ethnic groups that existed in pre-colonial Africa did not fit into the ‘tribal model’ in the sense of being primordial, static and belonging to fixed and unchanging boundaries. For political and socio-cultural boundaries in pre-colonial Africa were marked by “fuzziness and flexibility; multiple, overlapping and alternative collective identities”.⁶ Thus Kopytoff also

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¹ Ibid.
acknowledges the existence of ethnicity in pre-colonial African societies as ethnically ambiguous and marginal “a mish-mash” of different cultural traits, histories and identities.\(^1\)

Although territoriality is one of the ethnic boundary markers, pre-colonial boundaries were characterized by fluidity and lack of permanency or fixity, which was the product of colonial ethnocatagory.\(^2\) Ethnographic cartography “occupies a strange and uncomfortable position in the history of cartography, sandwiched between linguistics and political cartography”\(^3\). The colonial linguistic map was mainly concerned with the rough geographical delimitation of particular linguistic groups. As Noyes observes;

> It was common practice to designate linguistic groups simply by writing the name of the group or the language across the relevant territory, either with or without boundaries. This representational device was probably the earliest and certainly one of the most important moves in the designation of ethnicity.\(^4\)

The roots of ethnic identities extended well beyond the nineteenth century and “colonial ethnic permutations were simply the latest of a series of ‘re-inventions’ as people continually re-negotiated their place of origin, times of migration and marriage preferences to establish ethnicity, insider status and rights to land”.\(^5\) Concerning Ndebele ethnicity, Ndlovu-Ndlovu-Gatsheni observes that what began as the movement of a small Khumalo clan from Zululand in the wake of the Mfecane in the nineteenth century, and their subsequent settlement in western Zimbabwe in 1840, developed into a “more heterogeneous nation composed of Rozwi, Kalanga, Birwa, Tonga, Nyubi, Venda and Sotho, brought together through a combination of conquest, assimilation and incorporation”.\(^6\) Ndebele ethnicity was built on multiple origins and a Ndebele “may be of Nguni, Sotho, Tswana, Kalanga, Venda, Tonga and/ or Shona origin”.\(^7\) As such, Ndebele ethnicity was a product of complex constructivist processes spanning the pre-colonial, colonial and postcolonial period.\(^8\) The construction of Ndebele ethnicity started when they left Zululand in the 1800s up to the postcolonial period. In this regard, it is Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s contention that;


\(^2\) See Worby, “Maps, Names and Ethnic Games”.

\(^3\) Noyes, “The Natives in their Places”, p.250.

\(^4\) Ibid.

\(^5\) Spear, “Neo-traditionalism and the Limits of Invention”, p.22.

\(^6\) Ndlovu-Gatsheni quoted by Raftopoulos and Mlambo, “Introduction”, in Becoming Zimbabwe; Ndlovu-Gatsheni

\(^7\) Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Nation Building in Zimbabwe”, p.39.

\(^8\) Ibid., p.37. Ranger notes that even in comparison with the Kikuyu, the Shambaa or the Zulu, the Ndebele ethnicity is a very complex business as the people who call themselves ‘Ndebele’ cover a wider area, come from disparate origins and environments, and often have other numerous alternative identities (Ranger, “The Invention of Tradition Revisited”, p.97).
The colonialist did not ‘invent’ Ndebele ethnic identity; they ‘reconstructed’ it for colonial purposes. By the time of colonial rule, the Ndebele state had existed as a centralized political reality in the south-western part of the Zimbabwean plateau with people who were conscious of being Ndebele and who spoke IsiNdebele as their national language.¹

With regard to ‘Shona ethnicity’, Ranger rightly argues that before 1890, no one identified themselves as Karanga, Zezuru or Kalanga in the sense in which these terms are used today.²

In 1979, Hromnik noted that “the people who inhabit this land are known as Shona and consist of many linguistically more or less closely related tribes none of whom, curiously enough, claim this name as theirs. Nor do they know why they are so called”.³ Indeed, “to many historians and other writers the name Shona is practical and convenient for present use but otherwise devoid of historical significance”.⁴

As noted in Chapter 2, the term ‘Shona’ is a “collective noun which conflates the linguistic, cultural and political attributes of a people who did not even know themselves by that name until the late nineteenth century”.⁵ The term does not describe how these people viewed themselves but how they were viewed by others. Berman concludes that “important twentieth century ethnic communities and identities, such as the Shona and Yoruba, had no conscious or institutional pre-colonial existence, although there were large numbers of linguistically and culturally related people who would later become Shona and Yoruba”.⁶ Beach also notes that;

One of the salient features of Shona history is the fact that the Shona people have never been united under one rule at any point in their history, a fact emphasized by the absence of any single name accepted by all the people before the twentieth century; although the Zimbabwe, Torwa, Mutapa and Changamire states undoubtedly brought large numbers of Shona-speakers under their rule, they did not succeed in imposing a sense of common history upon the traditions of the people. Although the Shona people were undoubtedly conscious of their common culture, their historical traditions rarely deals with more than one group at a time.⁷

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¹ Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Nation Building in Zimbabwe”, p.40. Ndlovu-Gatsheni actually argues that the Ndebele had a pre-colonial existence both as an ethnic group and as a nation.
² Ranger, “Missionaries, Migrants and the Manyika”.
⁴ Hromnik, “Are there any Shona?” p.12. Concerning the Shona, D. N Beach concluded that they have a historiography but no history. See Beach, “The Historiography of the People of Zimbabwe in the 1960s”, Rhodesian History, Vol 4, 1973, p.23. C. M. Doke, in his report on the unification of Shona dialects in 1931 demonstrated that the dialects of Zezuru, Karanga, Korekore, Manyika and Ndau belong to one language. In the absence of better name, he proposed to call the language ‘Shona’.
⁵ Mazarire, “Reflections on Pre-colonial Zimbabwe”.
⁷ Beach, The Shona and Zimbabwe, 900-1850, p.xii.
The term Shona is said to have been first used by the Ndebele and other groups in the nineteenth century to describe the people of the south-west of the Zimbabwe plateau, especially the Rozwi. The term was extended to the central Shona and the rest of ‘Shona’ speakers. However, ‘whatever its derivation, the word ‘Shona’ is now used to name the south-central Bantu language of most of the modern Later Iron Age people on the Zimbabwean plateau, and by extension, the people themselves, even though in many cases the grandparents of the people today would not have used that name to describe themselves’.¹

Before 1890, the Shona-speaking people had a common regional culture and common language although there were regional and local variations.² These people did not have a ‘Shona ethnic consciousness’ or a consciousness of a ‘Shona cultural identity’. They could, nonetheless, be conscious of the local political leaders or chiefs.³ Consequently, what appears to be true is that a Shona ethnic identification only emerged in the late nineteenth century. Equally, the ethnic consciousness of ‘Shona’ constituent groups undoubtedly preceded the nineteenth century. Terms like Zezuru, Karanga, Ndau, Manyika, Korekore, Kalanga, Tonga and others had a pre-colonial currency although their usage was vague. As Theodore Bent observed in the 1960s:

All the people and tribes around [Great] Zimbabwe, down to the Sabi River and north to Fort Charter- and this is the most populous part of the whole country- call themselves by one name… and that name is Makalanga. In answer to questions as to nationality they invariably call themselves Makalangas, in contradistinction to the Shangaans who inhabit the eastside of the Sabi River. The race is exceedingly numerous and certain British and Dutch pioneers have given them various names such as Banyai, and Bakalaka, which latter they imagine to be a Zulu term of reproach for a limited number

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¹ Ibid., p.18; See L. Vambe, An Ill-fated People. Zimbabwe before and after Rhodes, London: Heinemann, 1972, p.xxiii. According to Vambe, the people we call Shona today did not know themselves with that name. It was a nickname given by the Ndebele to mean ‘tripe-cleaners’, in allusion to their eating the insides of animals. For the derivation of the term ‘Shona’ and the contestations over its meanings see, H. Von Sicard, “The Derivation of the Name Mashona”, in C. M Doke, J. Lewin and M. D. W. Jefreys, eds., African Studies, Vol 9, 1950, pp.138-143; Rev B. H. Barnes, “A Campaign Against Babel: The Unification of the Dialects of Mashonaland”, Native Affairs Department Annual (NADA), No 6, 1928, p.49; E. Reclus, “The Earth and its Inhabitants, Africa, Vol 4, South and East Africa, New York, 1889, p.267; For F. Marconnes (“The Karangas”, NADA, Vol 10, 1932, p.14), “the names Shona, Shuna, Svina [Swina] were given by the Tebeles [Ndebele] to all the tribes in present Mashonaland which they could not incorporate into their own regiment”. Ndebele etymology, arguably, later influenced the British who also picked up the term Shona. For Marconnes (1932, p.32) it is not clear whether it were the Ndebele or whites who coined the name. He suggests that the name might have been linked to the word Sona, meaning gold. He concludes that ‘Shona’ designates a metal for which there was no place either in the material culture or in the languages of the Bantu people. This argument, however, sounds pretty much speculative.

² The ‘Shona’ moved into present day Zimbabwe during the early years of the Early Iron Age. See B. Tavuyanago and K. Mbenewe, “Zimbabwe Hill Settlements in Proceeding Colonization: A Study in Local Factor”, The Journal of Pan-African Studies, Vol 2, No 3, 2008, p.25; I. Pikirayi, “David Beach, Shona History and the Archaeology of Zimbabwe”, Zambezia, Vol xxvi, No ii, 1999, pp.135-144; Knight-Bruce acknowledges that ‘Mashona culture’ had local variations and that there were no close connections between groups.

³ Ranger, “Missionaries, Migrants and the Manyika”, p.120.
of people who act as slaves and herdsmen for the Matabele down by the Shashe and Lundi Rivers.\(^1\)

While Bent’s observations reflected the colonialists’ pre-occupation with the ‘cataloguing’ of local African groups, they equally showed how locals groups thought about or identified themselves.

The term “Karanga/Kalanga” had a long history and significance as it has the longest recorded history of all the Shona groups. In the sixteenth century, Father Joao dos Santos, the Portuguese Dominican Friar, referred to the Karanga as “Mocarangas, a name which they have because they live in the land of Mocaranga, and talk the language called Mocaranga, which is the best and most polished of all Kaffir languages which I have seen”.\(^2\) The Portuguese recorded that chiefly lineages, which ruled over the commoners were known as “Karanga”.\(^3\) Consequently, according to dos Santos, “Monomotapa and all his vassals are Karangas, a name given to the inhabitants of the land of Mocaranga”.\(^4\)

Like all ethnonyms, the term ‘Karanga’ underwent a shift in location and meaning. The incoming British picked up this ‘historic’ term to describe the first Shona speakers they encountered. Populations to the south-west were named ‘Kalanga’ and those of the southern plateau ‘Karanga’.\(^5\) Contrary to Ranger’s inventionist argument, local populations also regarded themselves as ‘Kalanga’ or ‘Karanga’. Such ethnonyms could not have been created by the white settlers from nothing. In fact, “the Karanga language is one of great antiquity and of marked individual peculiarities. It is probably the earliest recorded of all Bantu languages, words of it appearing in Portuguese records of East African exploration as early as 1505, and thence onward to about 1760”.\(^6\) Today, Karanga or ChiKaranga, a dialect of the Shona language, is spoken by almost a third of all ‘Shona people’ in Zimbabwe.

\(^3\) Ranger, “Missionaries, Migrants and the Manyika”, p.120.
\(^4\) Marconnes, “The Karangas”, p.16.
\(^5\) Ranger, “Missionaries, Migrants and the Manyika”, p.120.
\(^6\) Marconnes, “The Karangas”, p.17. The Karanga occupied the same territory of ‘Mocaranga’ since about 1505 or even earlier. They settled south of the Zambezi River before later Bantu intrusions from the north. Place names mentioned in Portuguese documents in the 16th century remained in the ChiKaranga that was spoken when the British arrived in the late 19th century. These include names of rivers and other topographical features and local dynasties. For R. N. Hall, “such topographical nomenclature covering a vast area for at least five hundred years bespeaks a very long occupation of Makalanga extending back to some indefinitely remote time previous to 1505”. See Hall, “Notes on the Traditions of Some African Races. Especially of the Makalanga of Mashonaland”, *The African Monthly*, Vol 2, No 8, July 1907, pp.290-91. However, the late 18th and 19th centuries witnessed significant demographic transitions on the Zimbabwean plateau, including the settlement of the Karanga on the southern part of the country.
The ethnonym ‘Kalanga’ is often used interchangeably with Karanga and is sometimes also referred to as ‘western Shona’. Kalanga is argued to be the “most isolated and the most different form of ChiShona”.¹ Some writers consider Kalanga as non-Shona. Beach contends that the term was identical in meaning to Karanga and was used to describe the south-western Shona by at least 1727.² Today, Kalanga speakers inhabit the western and south-western parts of the country and some are found in eastern Botswana.

Like “Karanga”, the term “Manyika” also experienced a shift in usage and space, which illustrates the dynamism and problematic nature of ethnicity as a form of identification. While the Portuguese called a large region around the Manyika Chieftaincy by the name ‘Manicaland’, the British picked the name in the nineteenth century to refer to the whole of eastern Zimbabwe. Yet, according to Ranger, “most of the peoples themselves of this region did not think of themselves as related in any way to the Manyika Chieftaincy”.³ Like the term “Karanga”, “Manyika” has several usages. In the Zimbabwean and Mozambican Provinces of Manicaland and Manica respectively, the term refers to a dialect cluster of the Shona language known as ChiManyika.⁴ In the pre-colonial period, ‘Manyika’ or ‘territories’ meant both a particular political unit and its people, which first appeared in Portuguese documents in 1512. There was a Portuguese trading presence in Manyika (the territory or polity) from at least the 1560s to 1695 and from about 1719 to 1835. In the 1880s, Portuguese and British interests converged on Manyika, leading to its subsequent partition. A treaty between Britain and Portugal that was signed in 1891 divided what had for a thousand years been an ‘integrated socio-economic unit’.⁵

The Karanga, Kalanga, Korekore, Zezuru, Manyika, Tonga and Ndau, among other groups, used these ethnonyms as forms of self identification and definition by others long before the so-called invention of tribalism. These forms of self-definition and definition by others were context-based and socially constructed. Today, the Zezuru or central Shona constitute a quarter of all Shona speakers and are mainly found in the region between Chinhoyi in the north-west, Mvurwi in the north, Mtoko in the north-east, Bikita in the south-east, and Kwekwe in the south-west.⁶ ChiZezuru contains the largest number of typically

² Beach, *A Zimbabwean Past*, p.139.
Shona language features and formed the basis of standardized ChiShona. Zezuru sub-clusters include Hera, Gova, Njanja and Mbire.

On its part, ‘Ndau’ can be used as an ethnic and linguistic term for one of the main clusters of the Shona-speaking peoples living in south-eastern Zimbabwe and in Mozambique. The term was a derogatory nickname given to the peoples of the eastern frontier by the raiding Gaza Nguni of the mid-nineteenth century. The Nguni speaking Gaza occupied Ndau territory and left a strong Nguni cultural imprint on the locals. The Ndau often refer to themselves as ‘Shangaans’, a variant name for the Gaza, which has also been used for the Hlengwe of south-eastern Zimbabwe.

The existence of particular resources and ecological variations and subsequent specializations appear to have fomented the emergence of an interesting intersection between pre-colonial ‘industries’ and ethnic identification. Consequently, although both the Shona and Ndebele were agriculturalist who grew crops and kept livestock, especially cattle, there were local and regional variations. For instance, the Native Commissioner (NC) for Umtali (Mutare), in 1897, wrote that “in my opinion, the MaShona works his lands better than any other native tribe I know”. Also, while Shona farmers grew a variety of staple grains including mhunga (bulrush millet), rukweza (rapoko) and mapfunde (sorghum), others grew more ‘specialized’ crops depending on local agro-ecological conditions. Rice was grown in wetter regions like the eastern highlands, while the Shangwe of the drier north-western region specialized in tobacco growing.

Overall, the economies of pre-colonial societies in Zimbabwe were characterised by both specialization and socio-economic differentiation. In the thirteenth century, “the rulers of the Old Kingdom (Great Zimbabwe) harnessed the specialized skills of the copper workers of Hurungwe, the ironsmiths of Hwedza and the goldsmiths of Kwekwe for the art guilds that

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2 Ranger, “Missionaries, Migrants and the Manyika”, p.121; Beach, *The Shona and Zimbabwe*.

3 J. H. Bannerman, “Towards a History of the Hlengwe People of the South of Rhodesia”, *NADA*, Vol XI, N0 5, 1978, pp.483-5; Rubert and Rasmussen, *Historical Dictionary of Zimbabwe*, p.225. The south-eastern parts of Zimbabwe is almost a meeting point of a number of ethnic groups; to the south are the Venda and related Plumbi, to the south-west are the Tswana and Northern Sotho, to the north-west are the Ndebele and Kalanga, while to the north are the Karanga. See Bannerman, “Towards a History of the Hlengwe People of the South of Rhodesia”, p.483.


serviced the kingdom”.¹ White hunters and settlers also acknowledged that the Shona were excellent market gardeners from whom they would barter cloth and empty cartridges for food. With evident exaggerations, Theodore Bent observed that “in Chibi country, iron-smelting is a great industry. Here, whole villages devote all their time and energies to it, tilling no land and keeping no cattle, but exchanging their iron-headed assegais, barbed arrow-heads and field tools for grain and such commodities as they may require”.² Bent also made reference to the existence of ‘Native iron furnaces’. More so, Bent referred to the existence of a ‘bark industry’ in the Mshangashe area in Masvingo. He noted that:

By driving into the forests and climbing hills we came across groups of natives who interested us. It was the season just then in which they frequent the forests- the barking season- when they go forth to collect large quantities of the bark of certain trees, out of which they produce so much that is useful for their primitive lives. They weave textiles…they make quivers for their arrows, bee hives… and granaries. The bark industry is second only to the iron-smelting amongst the Makarangas³.

From the discussion above, it is apparent that there was a noticeable intersection of ethnic identification and industrial specialization in pre-colonial Zimbabwe. In this regard, using the Shangwe tobacco industry and the Njanja iron industry as case studies, the following two sections argue for the existence of industrial ethnicity in pre-colonial Zimbabwe.

### 4.3 Shangwe Tobacco Producers

The Shangwe tobacco industry presents an interesting example of the intersection of ethnic identification and industrial specialization in pre-colonial Zimbabwe. The Shangwe dominated the tobacco industry, which dates to the pre-colonial period. The Shangwe people of Gokwe in the Midlands Province, north-western Zimbabwe, “had a thriving tobacco industry and exported large quantities of the crop to their neighbours in the south, the Ndebele”.⁴ Kosmin also provides a detailed discussion on the growth and subsequent decline of the Shangwe’s Inyoka Tobacco Industry between the 1890s and 1938.⁵

The Shangwe are an explicitly identifiable Shona sub-group, which over time developed exceptional skills in growing and processing tobacco. The Shangwe are linked to

² T. Bent, *The Ruined Cities of Mashonaland*, 45. Contrary to Bent’s assertion, crop cultivation and livestock rearing were important sources of livelihoods for the Karanga people of Chivi.
the Rozvi who were powerful Shona rulers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.¹ They speak ChiShangwe, a language similar to ChiKorekore, a Shona sub-dialect, spoken in northern Zimbabwe. In addition to having an ethnonym and a language, the Shangwe share a common history, culture and myth of origin, which set them apart as a unique group. They trace their origins to a hill called Kunauhwa, which they state variously as on the other side of Harare, in Nyashanu, Buhera or Masvingo area.² Their founding ancestors, led by one Chimera—also known as Chirongamabwe—who was famed for his magical drum, Chivundika, left Kunauhwa sometime in the eighteenth century and reached the Bumi (Ume) River near chief Chireya’s country in present day Gokwe. They settled in an area called Shangwe that was under chief Nemangwe. According to Shangwe oral traditions, Chimera and his followers had ‘always known’ Shangwe country, also referred to as Nyoka, since they often came here from Kunauhwa to obtain the high quality Nyoka tobacco grown in Shangwe country.³

As a form of ethnic identification, Shangwe was neither primordial nor static. It was subject to a shift in meaning and usage and Shangwe could refer to a country that was famed for Nyoka tobacco or to the people who inhabited the area, including those under chiefs Chireya and Nemangwe. However, new immigrants led by Chimera soon identified themselves and were identified by others as VaShangwe. The immigrants, who were ‘originally’ VaRozvi of the Moyo totem, soon changed their mutupo (totem) to Shava or Mhofu that was shared by the autochthons.⁴ The Shangwe, under chiefs Nemangwe, Negande, Nebire and Chireya, occupy present-day Gokwe District. However, like the Tonga, and unlike the major Shona groups, “Shangwe identity never gained currency at the level of national politics”.⁵ In the same vein, Alexander and Ranger note that Gokwe had been peripheral to the African state systems, particularly the Rozvi and Ndebele, although they traded and paid tribute to them.⁶

The northwest remained peripheral to the Rhodesian state due to its unfavourable agro-ecological conditions, and the prevalence of tsetse flies and malaria. Apart from coal in

³ Ibid; Manganga, “Rainmaking in Gokwe, North-western Zimbabwe”, MA African Oral History Project, University of Zimbabwe, 2002. Interview with Chief Nemangwe, Nyoka (Gokwe), August 2002. Also see F. Marr, “Some Notes on Chief Sileya (Chireya)”.
⁴ Manganga, “Rainmaking in Gokwe”; Parkinson, “The VaShangwe of Chief Chireya”.
Hwange, there was also no mineral wealth. As a result, it failed to attract white settlers or missionaries. The sandy soils, low rainfall and recurrent droughts and famine (shangwa) did not attract white farmers. Instead, to the Rhodesian state, Gokwe was literally a ‘reserve’ into which African populations could be moved when necessity arose.\(^1\)

The prevalence of tsetse flies inhibited cattle production in pre-colonial Gokwe. Consequently, colonial agricultural experts suggested that Gokwe could best be used for the production of Turkish tobacco, which suited the local agro-ecological conditions. Interestingly, Shangwe ‘experts’ had made the same conclusion years before the establishment of colonial rule. The Shangwe’s dark tobacco leaf was similar to Turkish tobacco varieties.\(^2\) As a result, despite the adverse agro-ecological conditions, the Shangwe managed to establish a renowned tobacco industry that drew the attention of both pre-colonial Africa groups and the white settlers. The origin of the dark tobacco leaf grown by the Shangwe remains unclear. The crop, which originated in South America, might have been introduced to Gokwe as a result of contact and trade between the Shangwe and the Portuguese or the Arabs on the Zambezi. What is beyond doubt is the fact that Turkish tobacco was introduced to Gokwe after 1906 when the Inyoka Rhodesian Tobacco Company established a tobacco plantation on the confluence of the Svisvi (Swiswi) and Sasame (Sessami) rivers.\(^3\)

The Shangwe discovered that their area was conducive for tobacco growing long before their first contacts with the colonialists.\(^4\) The name ‘Shangwe’ was probably derived from the word shangwa, which denotes famine, drought or misery. In a way, the Shangwe turned their ‘misery’ into prosperity through establishing a prosperous tobacco industry, which best suited Gokwe’s agro-ecological conditions. In addition, “statistics indicate that tobacco failed only half as often as grain crops in the harvests between 1898 and 1938. In fact, in the years 1908, 1920 and 1936, when there was complete failure of grain crops, ‘good’ tobacco were harvested”.\(^5\) Accordingly, the Shangwe carved an economic niche for themselves in the tobacco sector of Zimbabwe’s pre-colonial economy.

Moreover, instead of just being content with crop specialization alone, the Shangwe processed their tobacco crop before exporting it to their trading partners, including the Ndebele. According to Kosmin:

\(^1\) Ibid.
\(^3\) Ibid., p.277-8.
\(^4\) Ibid., Madadlela, “A Smoky Affair”.
The Shangwe went further and specialized in the processing and manufacture of a special type of tobacco product. After the leaf was picked, from February to April, depending on the season, it was hung and air-cured. When the leaf was ready, it was placed in wooden mortars, then mixed with ashes of wild aloe, damped with water, and thoroughly pounded. The resultant mixture was kneaded while damp into loaves or cones, and then placed on platforms to dry. The cones were then tied on to reed trays ready for transportation. When wanted, the cones were broken into pieces and allowed to dry out, before the very strong and pungent product was smoked in pipes or ground into snuff.¹

In the 1870s, the Ndebele grew large quantities of tobacco and smoked it in pipes.² However, Shangwe tobacco was superior and more highly prized by the Ndebele. In fact, the Shangwe exported their tobacco as far as Matabeleland. They also used Nyoka tobacco to pay tribute to King Lobengula in order to avoid Ndebele raids.³ The Shangwe’s exceptional expertise was also acknowledged by some white farmers. In 1923, a European farmer at Figtree even sought to employ the Shangwe so that they could train his farm workers in the production of tobacco. According to Magadlela:

The Shangwe were experts in their trade, and some European farmers requested some of these experts to come to their farms and assist in training farm workers in handling or curing tobacco. It seems the Shangwe had no external influence on the growth of their tobacco industry other than the demand for the crop. They had their own internal, on-the job training, which was passed on like any other skills as part of their culture.⁴

The NC for Bulawayo District, in 1898, reported the presence of “Nyokas” selling tobacco in the area.⁵

The ‘exceptional technology’ of growing and processing tobacco became synonymous with the Shangwe people and part of the Shangwe’s cultural being. Chimera, Shangwe founding ancestor, used tobacco as part of the magical powers he used for game hunting. The magic was linked to the magical drum, Chivanduka. According to Shangwe traditions:

If there was a lion in the area, Chimera would order it to kill and leave the meat for his people and the lion obeyed. If there were no lions in the area, Chimera would take his people and his medicine and leaving Chivanduka, go hunting. On coming across a spoor, all would squat. Dust would be taken from the spoor, mixed with Nyoka tobacco and some medicine then all would smoke this mixture using a long reed tube. They

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² Ibid., p.272
³ Parkinson, “The VaShangwe of Chief Chireya”, p.21.
⁵ NAZ NB6/1/2 Reports of the Native Commissioners Bubi and Bulawayo for the years 1898; Kosmin, “The Inyoka Tobacco Industry of the Shangwe People”, p.272.
would then follow the spoor and eventually find the animal lying down asleep…. In addition to buck, rhinoceros and elephants were killed in this way.¹

Evidently, tobacco growing and use was an integral part of Shangwe-ness, Shangwe culture, religion and mythology. However, European colonisation and the immigration of Ndebele and Shona speakers, mostly Karanga, into northwestern Zimbabwe from the 1940s resulted in the redefinition of Shangwe identification. The Shangwe, who previously had been renowned tobacco growers and manufacturers, came to be regarded by the newcomers as the epitome of backwardness and anti-modernity.

The negative stereotyping of the once successful tobacco growers was largely linked to the ‘marginal nature’ of northwestern Zimbabwe. The newcomers had been exposed to the ‘modernizing’ influence of Christianity and Christian mission education. Others had been town workers while some had been exposed to ‘modern’ agricultural practices. When cotton was introduced in the area in the 1950s, it were the newcomers and not the Shangwe, who were more enthusiastic in cultivating the crop, which also tended to be associated with ‘modernity’. Consequently, the new comers perceived themselves as more ‘civilized’ and ‘modernized’ than the Shangwe. On the contrary, the Shangwe were largely illiterate, as the first Christian mission in the area, Kana Mission, was only established on the border between Gokwe and Nkayi in 1954.² The Shangwe had also never seen an agricultural demonstrator before 1963. Consequently, for the immigrants:

To refer to VaShangwe was to draw a portrait of the Other, of people who were living as some immigrants recalled, ‘naked like animals’, but it was also implicitly to characterize a MuShangwe as someone who is everything that the speaker is not; ignorant, and even defiant of the culture of modernity.³

The negative stereotyping explains why today the Shangwe often disown the label preferring to be referred as VaKorekore. Similarly, the Shangwe also ‘name’ Shona immigrants from Rhodesdale, Kwekwe District, calling them ‘Madheruka’, an “onomatopoetic word of the sound of lorry engines that brought them” to Gokwe.⁴ Equally, the ‘Madheruka’ often disown

¹ Parkinson, “The VaShangwe of Chief Chireya”, p.21; Interview with Chief Nemangwe, Nemangwe, August 2002.
³ Ibid., p.9; P. S. Nyambara, “Madheruka and the Shangwe: Ethnic Identities and the Culture of Modernity in Gokwe, North-Western Zimbabwe”, Journal of African History, Vol 43, 2002, pp.287-306’. An interviewee told Alexander and Ranger in 1994 that “the locals did not wear clothes, women wore nothing on top. They were living a primitive life. They were a mixture of Shangwe and Tonga”, See Ibid., p.11; Also see Nyambara, “Madheruka and Shangwe”.
the label, preferring to be identified as Karanga. They usually accept the label (Madheruka) to socially distance themselves from the supposedly ‘backward’ Shangwe.

4.4 The ‘Wolverhampton of Mashonaland’

Another notable intersection between ethnic identification and pre-colonial ‘industry’ was that of the Njanja iron manufacturers. The appearance of the Njanja people on pre-colonial Zimbabwe’s historical radar is almost synonymous with the rise and expansion of their successful and export-oriented iron industry. Although iron-working technology was known and used by most Bantu- speakers during this period\(^1\), the Njanja, who were famous for their iron hoes and mbira (African piano), “were extraordinarily highly specialized and produced a technology and a scale of operation that far out-ranked that of any other people”.\(^2\) The Njanja of central Zimbabwe were well organized, accomplished and specialized iron workers whose prominent iron industry produced an assortment of iron implements including hoes, knives, axes, spearheads, razors, hooks, needles, arm and leg bands and even bullets.\(^3\) The Njanja

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Wolverhampton is a city in north-western England, which after the industrial revolution became a major industrial centre specializing in mining, particularly coal, limestone and iron ore. The phrase ‘the Wolverhampton of Mashonaland’ was first used by a European missionary to refer to the Njanja iron industry. See I. Shimmin, “Journey to Gambisa’s”, in F. MacDonald, ed., The Story of Mashonaland and the Missionary Pioneers, London: Macmillan, 1896.


\(^3\) The bullets were made from locally forged iron rods and were fired from rifles bought in South Africa by African migrant workers. Gunpowder was ‘manufactured from the faecal droppings of the Rock Dassie or its dried urine found in caves, both of which contain saltpetre. These were mixed with charcoal or slag’ (McCosh, “Traditional Iron-making in Central Africa, pp.157-58; Mackenzie, “A Pre-colonial Industry: the Njanja Iron Trade”, p.218).
The iron industry was export-oriented with a marketing radius of over 100 kilometres. They exploited the rich hematite reefs of Wedza (Hwedza) Mountain with great success even though the mountain fell under enemy territory and belonged to the Mbire. Iron ore was exported “not only from Hwedza but from Shamva and Mangula (Mhangura) but it was among the Njanja tribe, near Hwedza Mountain that there evolved in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries an industry described as the ‘Wolverhampton of Mashonaland’.”

European missionaries who encountered Njanja iron workers were astounded by the sophistication of their industry. This was despite the prevailing colonial attitudes and negative stereotypes about Africans who were often depicted as “primitive”, “lazy”, “clumsy”, “barbaric”, “uncivilized” and technologically “backward”. According to Chirikure:

Against this background, some missionaries, who visited what is now Nharira, (Chikomba District) in east-central Zimbabwe, were impressed by the Njanja’s well organized and specialist iron production which they described as an industry. For example, the missionary Shimmin commented that ‘the Njanja country is the Wolverhampton of Mashonaland where the working of iron takes place from dawn till dusk’. The Anglican Bishop Knight-Bruce corroborated Shimmin’s views by arguing that Njanja iron working was a ‘modern industry’, with master smelters operating up to twenty furnaces using a shift system of labour. This economic specialization does not seem to have been practiced by most Shona groups on the plateau who only smelted infrequently for localized demand.

The term “Njanja” referred both to an ethnically identifiable group of people and to skilled iron workers. One, Gutsa, who came to the Harare area in the 19th century and from Nyashanu and settled around the present-day Hillside low density residential area, was regarded as a ‘Njanja’. He was introduced to Mbari (Mbare), the local chief, by Seke who lived in the Chitungwiza area. Gutsa was an iron worker and was looking for land where he and his followers could settle, make iron implements and engage in trade. Seke referred him to Mbari because there were no iron ore deposits in the former’s area. Consequently, Mbari gave Gutsa the land around Barapati Hill (Hillside) where there were iron ore deposits. Gutsa, however, later clashed with Mbare who was defeated and subsequently killed. Gutsa then

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3 See Bent, The Ruined Cities of Mashonaland; Chirikure, “New Light on Njanja Iron Working”.
established the Chiweshe Dynasty. When the settlers arrived in Harare in 1890, Chiweshe moved to the Mazowe area.\(^1\)

By the nineteenth century, pre-colonial iron working had become synonymous with the Njanja people.\(^2\) Arguably, “iron factories had emerged [among the Njanja] in which there might be from 10 to 20 men plus women employed, all under the supervision of one expert headman smelter”.\(^3\) Indeed, the Mbire and other groups from as far as southern Zimbabwe used iron ore from Wedza Mountain just like the Njanja. However, Njanja technology differed from the technology of other groups. Njanja iron furnaces were higher, more carefully constructed and more tapering than those, for example, of people around the Masvingo area.\(^4\) The ‘forced-draught beehive furnaces’ were introduced to the country by “a fairly recent immigration of Njanja from Mozambique in the eighteenth century”.\(^5\)

Consequently, Njanja technology set them apart as a unique group. In fact, it has been noted that:

Typical Njanja furnaces differed from those of Shona sub-groups such as the Karanga of Shurugwi and the Kalanga of the Matopos and this is to be expected given the differing scale of production. While the bowl furnaces of the Karanga of Shurugwi were operated by a single tuyere with a pair of bellows, Kalanga furnaces typically had two tuyeres with their air being supplied by a pair of bellows. Njanja furnaces possessed two or three tuyere ports, which accommodated between two and six tuyeres per furnace.\(^6\)

Chirikure further notes that the Njanja’s form of specialization differed from localized and non-specialized iron working among contemporary groups such as the Karanga. Iron ore was mined from Gandamasvinga and Chipangure mines in Wedza. It was then transported to Njanja, where it was smelted in furnaces or \textit{vira}, which required at least four men to operate.\(^7\)

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1. J. E. S. Turton, “Native History of Salisbury as Related by Chari Gwata to J. E. S. Turton”, \textit{NADA}, 1939, pp.17-19; NAZ S2929/2/3 Delineation Report, Mazowe District; Beach, \textit{A Zimbabwean Past}, pp.96-97, 121-23; NAZ AOH/73 Chief Chinamora Muchenje 17 November 1981.
4. \textit{Ibid.}
operate. The *vira* required a constant supply of charcoal. Smelt iron was in turn manufactured into implements in a forge or *chido*, which required several men to work it adequately. The iron implements, including hoes, were traded by trading parties of between 15 and 20 men over hundreds of kilometers.

Wedza Mountain was largely of no significance before the arrival of the Njanja. Although the mountain was captured by the Mbire from the Hera in the second half of the eighteenth century, it was the Njanja who exploited the ore to a greater extent. Wedza Mountain originally belonged to the Hera people who lost it to Mbire immigrants at the end of the eighteenth century. The Njanja, another immigrant group from the Zambezi Valley, settled at Bvumbura, south of Wedza, in the early eighteenth century and took over Wedza Mountain from the Mbire. By 1857, the Njanja iron trade was well established. Njanja master smelters controlled a large pool of labourers, including both men and women, “who mined the ore, processed the charcoal and pumped the bellows. Njanja smelting peaked during the dry season, when there was no farming activities, but a few groups smelted ores and smithed blooms from previous seasons all year round”.

The scale of their operations made the Njanja to go against some Shona traditions. Like the Shona, Njanja iron smelting furnaces were decorated with anthropomorphic features like female sexual organs, demonstrating that to some extent they shared the Shona religious and cultural beliefs. However, as a distinct group, the Njanja did not observe taboos associated with iron making and as a result women played a key role in the Njanja iron industry. They adhered neither to secrecy nor taboos attributed to iron work. The presence of menstruating women or of men who had recently indulged in sexual intercourse was thought to negatively affect iron smelting. Among the Karanga of Chivi, rituals and myths prevented female labour from participating in iron production. The Njanja, on the contrary, did not believe in such myths and rituals. Belief in such rituals would have negatively affected production given the scale and labour intensive nature of the Njanja iron industry.

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2 Ibid.
3 Beach, *The Shona and Zimbabwe*, p.312.
4 Ibid.
5 Beach, “The Shona Economy”, p.48.
8 Ibid.
10 See Bent, *The Ruined Cities of Mashonaland*. 

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Like other ethnic groups, the Njanja were an explicitly identifiable group of people that had a common history but nonetheless interacted with other groups. They are remembered in oral traditions as great iron workers, traders and mbira makers as far as Mberengwa in southern Zimbabwe. Mbira has come to be associated with the spiritual realm within the Shona belief systems.\(^1\) In the pre-colonial period, the mbira was almost synonymous with the Njanja who produced it and traded it as a luxury item. Mbira also became an important trade item and a source of fame among the southern Shona.\(^2\)

Equally, the ethnogenesis of the Njanja is ambiguous. They are a Shona sub-group who have historically occupied a considerable area in central Zimbabwe. According to Chirikure:

The ethnogenesis of the Njanja is still enveloped in controversy as several traditions have bestowed different and often conflicting versions. All the divergent myths, however, seem to converge around the fact that the Njanja were late comers who migrated from the Zambezi basin in Senna, Mozambique, and occupied a frontier created by the withering Chirwa-Shiri dynasty. Because of their mastery of iron working, Njanja success was initially more economical than political as they were organized in loose kin based groups. Great smelters such as Neshangwe attracted a lot of people as labourers and as their wealth grew, so did their political fortunes. Furthermore, as newcomers, the Njanja managed to establish their legitimacy through a combination of economic success, which revolved around specialist iron working and marriage alliances with others. It is not surprising that when colonialism dawned in the late 19\(^{th}\) century, the Neshangwe Chieftaincy encompassed a huge area with Neshangwe’s sons such as Ranga, Tambaoga and Kwenda, great smelters in their own right as sub-chiefs.\(^3\)

Beach also traces the origins of the Njanja to the Lower Zambezi Valley. He notes that the Njanja’s origins in Portuguese-held territory and “their use of the Portuguese term ‘senhor’ (sinyoro) as a praise name, has led to suggestions that the Njanja founding ancestor Muroro was a Portuguese”\(^4\). However, Beach opines that “a careful examination of the earlier Njanja traditions shows that the original Njanja were simply Africans from beyond the Shona-speaking area. In any event, before long they became completely acculturated and absorbed by the Shona around them”.\(^5\)

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\(^1\) Mackenzie, “A Pre-colonial Industry; the Njanja Iron Trade”, p.214.
\(^2\) Ibid.
\(^4\) Beach, The Shona and Zimbabwe, pp.291-929.
\(^5\) Ibid.
Like most groups, the Njanja were ‘hybrids’, an observation that supports Bhabha’s notions of ambivalence and hybridity. The Njanja, whose ancestors might have had links with the Portuguese, or might even have been Portuguese, over time absorbed the dominant and broader Shona culture, yet they managed to remain a distinctive group, similar but different from other Shona speakers. Equally, “although the Venda, who settled in northern South Africa in the seventeenth century, were once part of the Karanga people, they soon interacted with neighbouring Sotho-Tswana communities, creating a Venda identity which is in many ways different from the Karanga”. Consequently, there was never a ‘pure’ or essential ‘Njanja’ identity.

In addition to having a real or imagined common ancestor and history of origins, the Njanja occupied a particularly defined territory in central Zimbabwe. They occupied a large track of Hera territory, especially in the north and east. Over time, the Njanja developed into a confederacy. It is not clear how this expansion took place, but by 1857 the Njanja had acquired a reputation as iron-workers. Wealth from the iron trade probably enabled Neshangwe to increase his following. Beach, however, argues that the iron industry is associated with the northern Njanja dynasties nearest to Wedza Mountain and not with the original settlement in Bvumbura, where Neshangwe lived. Nonetheless, it is apparent that the leading Njanja iron smelters were minor chiefs who had a considerable following. These later expanded in the early nineteenth century under Chief Nzuwa who was also a smelter himself. Although ‘in Njanja men were smelters first and chiefs second’, the majority were members of the Njanja royal house.

The rise of the Njanja Confederacy completed the break-up of Old Buhera, which after that consisted of Nyashanu’s Buhera, the Njanja and Mutekedzi’s West Buhera. Moreover, the Njanja did not establish their hegemony through warfare, force and the subjugation of conquered groups but through a remarkable entrepreneurship. Their success was also based on the nature of Wedza ore and economies of scale, which they achieved because the Njanja were able to overcome “the labour problem in a highly labour intensive industry and because they alone succeeded in establishing the industry on a supra-village

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1 Bhabha, The Location of Culture.
2 Chirikure and Pikirayi, “Inside and Outside the Dry Stone Walls”, 991; Beach, The Shona and Zimbabwe.
4 Beach, The Shona and Zimbabwe, p.292.
6 Ibid.
The Njanja iron industry created and supported an administrative elite among a rapidly expanding immigrant entrepreneurial group. These political ‘captains of industry’ ran an economy in which resources were allocated to meet demand and production was often geared towards meeting particular export orders. Although the Njanja iron industry lacked vertical specialization, there was a horizontal one, with workers fitting into a hierarchy of “apprentice/journeyman smelter/headman smelter, plus ‘auxiliaries’ who were mainly women. Moreover, in view of their special skills, the Njanja set up a form of labour migration through which they established symbiotic economic relationships with neighbouring peoples, like the Hera and the Mbire, with whom their political and military relations were normally hostile.”

Consequently, the Njanja carved a niche for themselves and used their economic success to strengthen their political hegemony. Njanja traders travelled to the south and south-east of the country and it was from these areas that customers came to buy Njanja iron products. Over time, the Njanja confederacy expanded to reach the Duma Confederacy to the south, where some Njanja settlers started their own local industries. By 1892, the Njanja confederacy had significantly fragmented. This culminated in the abandonment of the title “Gambiza” following the death of Gambiza Ngwena in 1908. Before then, political power lay with various Njanja chiefs, some of whom had settled outside Njanja territory among different Shona groups during their trade sojourns. Demand for iron hoes was high among the southern Karanga. Most Njanja trading parties travelled to Chirumanzu, Ndanga, Gutu, Chivi, Nyashanu and the Lower Sabi, marketing their iron implements. They exchanged hoes for cattle and as a result, accumulated large herds of cattle. During droughts and famine, cattle were exchanged for grain. However, by the late nineteenth century, the Mbire were beginning to make significant inroads in attempting to challenge the Njanja’s domination of the hoe trade on the southern part of the Zimbabwean plateau, especially around the Gutu area.

2 Mackenzie, “A Pre-colonial Industry”.
3 Ibid., p.219.
In view of the above discussion, the rise of the Njanja iron industry can be attributed to a number factors, including the availability of mineral resources, in particular the Wedza high quality iron ore; the skills, expertise and experience possessed by the Njanja; as well as demographic dynamics of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. According to Beach:

The Njanja iron trade arose at a time when the last of the great Shona pre-colonial demographic movements was in progress. The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw a complete settlement of the modern Karanga-speaking area by peoples from the north and east of the Shona country; no more than a few very small group identities survived from the earlier population…Within a century, the migrating settlers in their new lands came to equal or surpass the population of their original homelands. This involved the breaking of vast areas of new fields, and a consequent demand for many new hoes. It is thus hardly surprising that the Njanja iron industry developed when it did.¹

However, the above observation does not explain why it was the Njanja not the Hera or Mbire who benefited from the increased demand for iron hoes. For Beach, the answer lay in the excellent quality of the Njanja hoes, which were preferred due to the fact that they lasted longer (about three to five years). Those from the Dorowa area by contrast, were full of phosphatic impurities and lasted less than two years. This, again, does not sufficiently explain why the Hera or the Mbire, unlike the Njanja, failed to exploit the market opportunities since all were exposed to almost similar ‘business’ environment. The answer lay in the Njanja’s unparalleled iron-smelting expertise and their remarkable work ethics. This enabled them to successfully exploit both the market opportunities and the emerging demand for iron hoes created by the settlement of southern Zimbabwe.

Yet, the iron industry was never entirely a Njanja preserve. Young men from neighbouring groups like the Hera, the Mbire, Rozvi and Shiri, were encouraged by the Njanja to apprentice themselves and to learn the Njanja iron-making skills. They would work for several years in exchange for food, training in iron smelting and the opportunity to marry one of the daughters of the Njanja iron smelters upon the completion of training.² Such men became ‘Njanja’ by virtue of their acquisition of special iron-making technology. The Njanja also traded with the Sena who wanted high quality Njanja hoes in exchange for ivory. The Sena might even have bought Njanja iron products for re-sale further north. Portuguese traders also went to Njanja to sell cloth, beads, guns and shells.³ Some Njanja iron specialists settled in the south and south-east, establishing subsidiary iron industries among the southern

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¹ Beach, “The Shona Economy”, p.49.
² Ibid.
Shona, especially the Duma. The Njanja also inter-married with other Shona and non-Shona groups, thereby furthering the processes of ‘fragmentation’, assimilation and hybridisation.

The establishment of colonial rule, especially the use of imported iron hoes, subsequently led to the demise of the Njanja iron industry. McCosh observes that the decline of the once famed and export-oriented Njanja iron industry was in part due to political considerations, which arose from the manufacture of bullets by the Njanja from locally forged iron rods. These were fired from rifles that were brought from South Africa by African migrant workers. According to McCosh, “gunpowder was locally manufactured from the faecal droppings of the Rock Dassie or its dried urine found in caves, both of which contain saltpeter. These were mixed with charcoal or slag, the latter probably containing residual charcoal”.¹ The Njanja acquired fame for their ability to repair guns, in forging bullets, and in the production and sale of gunpowder.² However, gun confiscations and restrictions on African mobility after the 1896/97 uprisings led to the demise of the trade. Thereafter, iron production continued at a more local scale for domestic consumption.

4.5 Conclusion

From the discussion above, it can be concluded that ethnic identification, ethnicity and industrial ethnicity were pre-colonial possibilities in Zimbabwe. Indeed, as argued, the ethnic consciousness of ‘Shona’ constituent groups preceded the nineteenth century. However, the Korekore, Karanga, Zezuru, Ndau, Tonga, Manyika, Kalanga, among other groups, did not identify themselves and were not identified by others as ‘Shona’ until the nineteenth century. ‘Shona’ is largely a relatively ‘recent’ collective noun for disparate Shona-speaking groups. Pre-colonial ethnicity among ‘Shona’ constituent groups was characterised by contingency, fluidity and ambivalence. The same applied to Ndebele ethnicity, which was also complex and whose construction spanned the pre-colonial, colonial and postcolonial periods. More so, the case of the Shangwe tobacco producers and the Njanja iron manufacturers illustrates an interesting intersection between ethnic identification and industrial specialization in pre-colonial Zimbabwe. This sets the stage for the following chapter, which discusses industrial ethnicity in urban colonial Zimbabwe using African Salisbury as a case study.

CHAPTER 5: ORIGINS AND AMBIGUITIES OF INDUSTRIAL ETHNICITY IN AFRICAN HARARE, c1890s-1970s

5.1 Introduction

Chapter 4 discussed the pre-colonial context of industrial ethnicity in Zimbabwe. The present chapter examines the origins and ambiguities of industrial ethnicity in colonial Harare between the 1890s and the 1970s. It examines some of the factors that were instrumental in engendering a labour market in Salisbury, that was characterized by the existence of niches that appear to have been ‘reserved’ for particular ethnic groups. The chapter argues that the salience of ethnic enclaves at workplaces in urban colonial Zimbabwe was fomented by a plethora of factors, including structural, institutional and behavioural elements. The ethnic and racial stratifications of Rhodesian society were reproduced in the labour market, which was characterized by widespread ethnic clusters at workplaces. As such, industrial ethnicity was evident among the white community. For example, the British South Africa Police (BSAP), whose white troopers were highly regarded in Rhodesian society, were, in the early 1900s, mainly composed of whites born in the United Kingdom (UK), and were Anglicans. The trend continued until the 1920s. The Native Department (ND) was almost exclusively

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1 The idea of ‘origins’ can be problematic and the thesis takes due cognizance of this. The idea tends to imply a ‘total’ or ‘complete’ explanation of a particular phenomenon, something that is not academically feasible. See H. Giliomee, “The Beginnings of Afrikaner Ethnic Consciousness, 1850-1915”, in Vail, ed., The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa, p.21.
the preserve of British settlers, until the 1920s. The British also dominated the civil service, while Asians, Jews and Hellenics were excluded from the public service’s established posts.¹

5.2 African Demographic Dynamics, Migrant Labour and the Colonial Economy

Migration was instrumental in shaping the ethnic and demographic dynamics of urban colonial Zimbabwe, which in turn had important implications for industrial ethnicity. However, there is little information on Zimbabwe’s demographic profile during the pre-colonial and early colonial periods. Most of the available works deal with aspects of Rhodesian white immigration.² Iliffe and Beach note that there was a generally low African population in the country before the 1920s, although the population expanded significantly after colonization. The reason for the development remains unclear, with Iliffe rejecting the argument that the decrease in high famine mortality after the establishment of colonial rule led to rapid population growth after 1900, as the hypothesis is not supported by historical evidence.³

When European occupiers arrived in the Harare area, in the early 1890s, a number of groups had left the area as evidenced by the existence of remains of burnt kraals that were noticed by the occupying forces.⁴ By 1890, Chiweshe and Hwata, who had earlier inhabited the area, had moved into the Mazowe Valley. Mbare had been defeated by Chiweshe and his kraal had been burnt. The small Rwizi Dynasty ruled by Madzora in the 1880s was located near Seke’s people along the Manyame River. Chivero had moved off the Ngezi area having been usurped by Nyamweda. Chinamora’s people were located on the foothills of Shawasha through to Domboshava. A sub-chief of Seke, Marefi, was living in the area near the Mukuvisi River.⁵


³ Iliffe, Famine in Zimbabwe. Admittedly, famine, droughts, wars and migrations had important ramifications for the country’s demographic dynamics before 1890.

⁴ White hunters had also earlier reported similar situations between the 1860s and 1880s.

⁵ Beach, A Zimbabwean Past; J. E. S. Turton, “Native History of Salisbury as Related by Chari Gwata to J. E. S. Turton, NADA, 1939, 17-19; NAZ S2929/3/12 Delineation Report Seke; NAZ S2929/2/3 Delineation Report Mazoe District; Beach, 1994; 57-58; 121-123; NAZ African Oral History) NAZ AOH/73 Chief Chimanhora Muchenje 17 November 1981; AOH/5, 8, 32, 34, 35; AOH/44 Seke Chieftainship; NAZ AOH/3, 26, 27, 39, 40.
Beach observes that the African population was stable up until about 1911. He adds that the increase might have been due to more efficiency in colonial tax assessments, which were part of the sources of demographic data in the absence of population census.\(^1\) Beach further suggests that the notable increase in African cattle herds between 1904 and 1921 might have led to increased wealth, translating into more bride price for marriages, hence the increase in the African population. In 1898, the rural African population was estimated at 700 000. It rose to around 881 000, in 1920 and by 1992, the population had risen to about 10 400 000.\(^2\) Although before 1962, national population censuses were carried out every five to ten years, Africans in urban areas were considered to be important only as workers. Consequently, until 1962, only those Africans in employment were included in the censuses, which excluded single women, old people, housewives, children and visitors.\(^3\) As a result, the exact number of Africans living in Rhodesian urban areas remained unknown.

The birth of the Rhodesian state, in 1890 set in motion a number of structural and institutional factors that significantly impacted on African ethnicity and demographic dynamics. According to Berman, “the social construction of modern forms of ethnicity in Africa is coterminous with the development of the structure and culture of colonialism”.\(^4\) Colonial institutions constituted structural contexts that shaped the form and content of industrial ethnicity. The migrant labour system and capitalist commodity production significantly transformed the structural and spatial organization of African societies. Berman thus argues that the colonial state:

> Within the broader context of the intrusion of capitalist modernity, was the central force in the organization, production and distribution of social resources. It also shaped the accompanying changes in the social criteria of access to those resources; and the resulting social structural differentiation between individuals and communities. By authoritatively defining rules of behaviour that specified for Africans what was required, prohibited and permitted, the colonial state structured the choices of individuals by constructing social, economic and political situations: assigning individual roles and identities; and defining the choice of goals, strategies and behaviours.\(^5\)

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\(^1\) Beach, “Zimbabwe: Pre-colonial History, Demographic Disaster and the University”, p.11.


\(^5\) Ibid., p.313. It has already been alluded to in the previous chapter that the state is an important ‘identifier’ although there are limitations to its hegemony and ‘identifying’ potential.
Of course, the impact of colonialism on African society tended to be uneven and contested. Equally, the role of structural and institutional factors in the development of industrial ethnicity had their limitations. Nonetheless, the extension of a colonial capitalist mode of production and the capitalist economy facilitated redefinitions of ‘the self’ and ‘the Other’, as Africans scrambled for limited socio-economic opportunities. Migrant labour played a key role in Rhodesia’s economic development as it drew Africans into the capitalist economy through their labour. Labour shortage, especially in the early years of colonial rule, became a major concern in all sectors of the colonial economy, particularly agriculture and mining. The state resorted to both coercion and economic pressure to force local Africans to join the wage-labour system, until the decline of the ‘peasant’ sector starting from the 1920s. The state used its economic muscle to undermine the ‘peasant option’ and in the process created labour for its economic sectors.

However, the proletarianization of African ‘peasants’ did not follow a linear pattern. The linear proletarianization thesis does not apply for most communities in Mashonaland. This was due to the fact that proletarianization did not occur at the speed at which the white settlers had anticipated. Africans used the ‘peasant option’ during the era of peasant prosperity to subvert the colonial demand for labour. They supplied food for the emerging towns and mines. Their cattle soon recovered from the rinderpest outbreak of the 1890s. As a result, very few local Africans fully committed themselves to wage labour as they maintained one foot in the ‘traditional’ economy. Labour was, therefore, only sold to meet very particular needs. Africans could also provide seasonal labour, which did not affect their agricultural practices. Consequently, although the colonial state introduced taxation, in part, to force Africans to sell their labour, it was not until after the 1920s that most local Africans resorted to wage labour. Migrant labour duly became the mainstay of the colonial economy.

1 See Brubaker and Cooper, “Beyond ‘Identity,’” p.16.
2 Buoyed by the ‘second rand myth’, focus was initially on mining before it later shifted to agriculture and manufacturing after the occupiers’ hope to discover an Eldorado across the Limpopo River proved elusive.
6 Ibid., 25. The Hut Tax Ordinance of 1894 compelled every adult male to pay a hut tax of 10 shillings per year. The Hut Tax Ordinance was replaced by the Native Tax Ordinance in 1904, and a head tax of 20 shillings had to be paid annually. However, “once Africans were drawn into the Western economy, the social system in which they were absorbed offered them an opportunity for higher standards of living as an incentive in the competition for prestige and rank. Naturally, most of them who were drawn into commercial and industrial enterprises at the early stages of contract became unskilled labourers. Later, some of the Africans who had received education
Yet, as noted in preceding discussions, the state was neither monolithic nor ‘all-powerful’. Colonial ideological hegemony was by no means complete. According to Parry:

The structural tendency to emphasize both the power of the colonial formation in subordinating the black population to its will, and the strength of black worker responses at pressure points in the unified system, oversimplifies the dynamics within colonial society and inadequately describes the dialectics of human action in such a context.¹

In terms of their origins, functions, forms and power structures, southern African cities were thoroughly ‘European’ yet they had interactions with African societies since their inceptions.² The twentieth-century influx of African, European, Asian and Coloured immigrants further transformed Salisbury into an ethnic mosaic and a theatre for complex processes of ethnogenesis and the construction of forms of identification that were emblematic of cosmopolitan urban environments. As the administrative and later industrial hub, Salisbury was the centre of political, economic, social and cultural activities that drew people of diverse racial, cultural, linguistic, ethnic and historical backgrounds.³

In 1897, the African population in Salisbury was vaguely classified as follows; MaShona 481; Umtasa 89; Matabele 75; Victoria 7; Cape Boys 41; Shangaan 121; Portuguese Africans 331; Zambezi 121; and Blantyre 16.⁴ In the 1890s, a greater percentage of Salisbury’s African population was local. However, between 1897 and 1921, there was a marked increase in the number of non-Rhodesian African migrant workers in Salisbury. The percentage of the total African population in the city rose from 49 percent in 1897 to 59 percent in 1921. On the contrary, the percentage of local Africans dropped by 10 percent

from the mission schools were able to fill posts as teachers, messengers, interpreters, evangelists and foremen in industry. The rise in status was accompanied by better accommodation, higher wages, better food, better treatment too, was accorded to them by their European masters” (M.B. Lukhero, “The Social Characteristics of an Emergent Elite in Harare”, in P. C. Lloyd, ed., The New Elites of Tropical Africa, London: Oxford University Press, 1966, p.126).

¹ Parry, “Culture, Organisation and Class”, p.89.
² Yoshikuni, “Notes on the Influence of Town-Country Relations on Africa Urban History Before 1957”. Africans seeking work in urban areas had to obtain passes from their respective Native Commissioners (NCs) in the African Native Reserves or Native Purchase Areas (NPAs) first. Unemployed Africans were overall prohibited from staying in towns and cities. While in town, Africans were compelled to stay in the Native Locations and it was a criminal offence for them to be found outside the Location or African Township at night, except when he or she was on registered employer’s property, or had been issued with a special pass by a white employer.
⁴ Manganga, “Problematising Ethnicity in an Urban Context”, p.29; Kosmin, “Ethnic and Commercial Relations” pp.9-10; Yoshikuni, “Black Migrants in a White City”, p.274. The classification was evidently confused and confusing if not absurd. The difference, for example, between ‘MaShona’ and ‘Umtasa’ remained opaque.
from 59 percent to 41 percent during the same period. The percentage of non-Rhodesian Africans in Salisbury continued to increase until the 1950s.

Of the local Africans in Salisbury, there were more Shona-oriented groups in the city than Ndebele-oriented ones. The Korekore, Zezuru and Manyika tended to be numerically more dominant than the Ndau or Karanga. The Karanga, who constitute almost a third of Zimbabwe’s African population, were numerically submerged in Salisbury although they had a significant presence in Fort Victoria (Masvingo), Gwelo (Gweru), Bulawayo and Umtali (Mutare). In 1921, there were only 25 people who were classified as Karanga in Salisbury, yet in Bulawayo they numbered 1 072 against the Ndebele who numbered over 2 000. In general terms, Fort Victoria served as the commercial centre for the southern Shona; Umtali for the eastern and south-eastern Shona, Gwelo for both central and southern Shona and some Ndebele speakers, and Salisbury for the central and northern Shona. Yet the picture was not as clear-cut as none of the regional urban centres was ethnically exclusive. Labour mobility also cut across district, provincial and national frontiers.

Southern Rhodesia was part of a broader regional political economy that had transnational linkages. The Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau (RNLB) was formed in 1903 as a recruiting agency mostly for the mines. Its mandate included the recruitment of ‘alien’ African labour for the mines and this was later widened to cover the farms. The RNLB had agents at entry points into the colony and in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

In 1936, Southern Rhodesia entered into a Tripartite Agreement with Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland in an attempt to limit competition for labour from the South African mines. The expansion of mining in the Union of South Africa led to increasing competition for labour from Mozambique, Zambia and Malawi.

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1 Yoshikuni, “Black Migrants in a White City”, p.276; Manganga, “Problematising Ethnicity in an Urban Context”, p.29.
2 NAZ C5/2/1-16 Salisbury Census; 1921 Census Report; Manganga, “Problematising Ethnicity in an Urban Context”, p.29. Most of the Karanga in Victoria (Masvingo) and surrounding districts often went to surrounding mines (Shabani, Mashaba), Triangle Sugar Estates, other white farms in search of work. Others moved to towns in other provinces, while others even travelled to the South African mines.
4 Parry, “Culture, Organisation and Class”, p.26. For details on labour shortages in early colonial Zimbabwe see NAZ A3/18/30/23, Secretary, Willoughby Consolidated Company, London, to Secretary, BSAC, London, 8 January 1901. Attempts were made to recruit labour from Ethiopia and the Transkei but both schemes failed. Consequently, labour was largely recruited locally and from Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia. Other migrants came from as far away as the Belgian Congo (DRC) and Tanganyika (Tanzania). The Globe and Phoenix Mine attempted to recruit Somalis but failed. The Mine noted in January 1901 that its operations had been hampered by “the want of adequate supply of Native labour”.
5 Ibid.
The RNLB was one of the supranational labour recruitment agencies in southern Africa. The Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA) and the Native Recruitment Corporation were the recruiting agency of the South African Chamber of Mines. Other ‘Native’ labour recruiting bodies in the region, including the RNLB and the South West Africa Native Labour Association (SWANLA), were fashioned after the WNLA that was active throughout the region. The WNLA contract system was more attractive to Africans together with the better wages. However, efforts to regulate African labour had their limitations. Bonner, Hyslop and van der Walt note that “precisely because there was no general regional mechanism to direct flows of African labour, African workers were able to navigate competing claims on their labour power in search of the best jobs across the region”. As such, labour mobility and recruitment could take place outside the official channels.

Nevertheless, Southern Rhodesia was a comparatively favourable labour market for northern migrants and Salisbury emerged as the major urban centre in the region. Together with Bulawayo the second largest city, Salisbury acted as a ‘port of call’ for African migrant workers from northern territories on their way to South Africa. The Federation of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, between 1953 and 1963, was arguably ‘the single largest factor behind the migration of many Malawians and Zambians from their homelands’ to Zimbabwe.

Economic opportunities were far better in Southern Rhodesia than in northern territories. The numerous mines, commercial farms, towns and cities lured African migrant workers from both in and outside the country. The railway line that connected Nyasaland and the economically powerful Southern Rhodesia brought thousands of Nyasaland migrant workers to the latter’s cities, mines and farms. As Chikowero opines, “the story of the railway line is a collective story of millions of people from Zambia, Malawi and even Mozambique whose lives and by extension those of their descendants were permanently changed by migration”. Such migrant workers were often regarded as the ‘Other’ and viewed with disparaging attitudes by the autochthons who labelled them mabhvakure (immigrants from far-away places) or mateveranjanji (those who followed the railway line). However, these

1 Bonner, Hyslop and Van der Walt, “Rethinking Worlds of Labour”, p.151.
2 Ibid.
3 Chikowero, “I Too Sing Zimbabwe”, p.120.
4 Ibid.
5 Interview with Sekuru Phiri, Mbare, 23 and 26 May 2011. In an interview with author, Sekuru Phiri noted that like most migrants from Malawi, during this period, he came to Zimbabwe in the 1940s following the railway line together with a group of other Malawians. He also made use of contacts from home that provided shelter,
immigrants carried with them their own cultural and ideological deposits that would later ‘engage’, albeit informally, the ideological and cultural hegemony of both the white colonialists and the autochthonous Africans.

In 1939, Nyasaland suspended labour migration to focus on the war effort, with recruitment of volunteers for the King’s African Rifles. This confirmed a picture in which the number of northern immigrants entering Rhodesia was already falling. The figure fell from 97,421 in 1937 to 71,021 in 1938. Most employers turned their attention to Mozambique for their labour supplies. However, up until the 1950s, African Salisbury’s labour market and its social, cultural and political life were dominated by northern migrants, especially those from Nyasaland. Although not all employers faced labour shortages, it is evident that migrant labour significantly shaped Salisbury’s socio-economic development. This in turn impacted on the ambiguities of industrial ethnicity.

Migration could be short-term, seasonal, permanent, internal or across national boundaries. There were, however, no adequate instruments to provide accurate statistics on African migration. This largely depended on the development of adequate machinery of administrative control. Special returns by employers, population census and sample surveys provided valuable data on migration, but could not provide a direct measure of migration when it occurred. Overall, local Africans preferred working in towns rather than on mines and farms. In 1909, NC Selukwe (Shurugwi) District, reported that “local Natives exhibit a predilection for employment in town”. This created labour shortages, prompting the recruitment of ‘alien’ African labour.

In 1907, the Assistant Native Commissioner for Wankie (Hwange) District noted that only a small percentage of fixed residents could be found working on the mines as they appeared to have a dislike for mine work. They preferred shorter contracts, which enabled them to return to their rural homes to pursue farming activities at the start of the rainy season. Some other local Africans sought employment chiefly as domestic servants and on food and introduced them to prospective employers. The use of social networks to secure jobs is discussed later in this chapter. The same sentiments were raised in separate interviews with Tapiwa Mangwiro, Magaba, Mbare, 2 March 2003; Sixpence, Dzivarasekwa, Harare, 4 March 2011.

1 Maravanyika and Huijzenveld, “A Failed Neo-Britain”, p.27.
2 See NAZ S3431/7 Minutes of Meeting on Migration Statistics of Non-Native Population, 31 July 1951.
3 NAZ S3431/7 Minutes of Meeting on Migration Statistics of Non-Native Population, 31 July 1951.
4 NAZ N3/22/5, NC Mazoe to Supt of Natives, Salisbury, Influx of Portuguese Natives, 1 December 1922.
5 The use of the term ‘local’ in this thesis is discursive. It can refer to ‘indigenous blacks’ or Shona communities around Salisbury.
the upkeep of the railroad. Consequently, northern African migrants were introduced as farm and mine workers with ‘satisfying results’. Additional measures that were adopted by the state in order to address the problem of labour supply included the introduction of chibaro (forced labour). This followed the amendment of the Master and Servant Ordinance Act and the Compulsory Labour Act of 1942.

For some time, the local Shona, in view of the favourable agro-ecological conditions in Mashonaland, were able to use the ‘peasant option’ to meet colonial socio-economic demands without fully committing themselves to wage labour and urban life. To illustrate, on 15 January 1925, the CNC, Salisbury, noted that:

It has been stated that in certain districts, especially in Mashonaland, Natives do not go out to work in such numbers as may be expected of them. There are other legitimate means of earning money. Last year, it was estimated that some 500,000 bags of grain were disposed of by Natives mainly for cash. Can he be blamed if he finds it more remunerate to increase his acreage under cultivation than by working for a low wage? This factor must be taken into account when considering the labour position.

The migrant labour system further impacted on Africans’ constructions of home. Some Shona migrants detested the idea of having ‘two homes’, one in town and the other one

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1 NAZ NB6/1/8-10, Report of the Assistant NC, Wankie District, 31 December 1907. Runganga and Aggleton also note that Shona labourers “frequently returned their rural homes to farm on their own land in summer, thus rendering the supply of native labour, in settlers’ eyes at least, ‘unreliable’” (A. O. Runganga and P. Aggleton, “Migration, the Family and the Transformation of a Sexual Culture”, *Sexualities*, Vol 1, No 1, 1998, pp.63-81). The supposedly inconsistent work habits of local Africans prompted Rhodesian employers to turn to Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland and PEA for their labour supplies, especially at the mines and farms where the demand for labour was high.

2 NAZ NB6/1/9, Report of the NC, Insiza 31 December 1908. Similar reports were made by other NCs in various districts, including Belingwe (Mberengwa), Gwelo (Gweru), Matobo.


4 Ranger, “Growing From the Roots: Reflections on Peasant Research in Central and Southern Africa”, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol 5, No 1, 1978, pp.99-133. There is no agreement on exactly when the peasantry began to decline. For Palmer (1977) the decline began around 1908 when white agriculture was launched. According to Mosley (1983) and Phimister (1986), the African peasant sector prospered in some parts of the country until the 1920s. For Johnson (1992), coercion remained an important factor in labour recruitment until the 1940s. For Ranger (1978), some African peasant communities survived the depression in the 1930s and continued with their mode of production with relative success until the 1970s. The peasant option thus varied over time and space in terms of its effectiveness in delaying the proletarianization of local Africans, a process which was never complete or total.


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in the Native Reserve. Some Shona migrant workers had their original communities in proximity, which enabled them to shuttle between their workplaces and places of origin. The strategy could not work for ‘mabvakure’ from ‘far away’ places. Consequently, the cultural and ideological influence of the local Shona in early Salisbury was submerged by that of the ‘aliens’ and ChiNyanja rather than ChiShona was the city’s *lingua franca* up until the 1950s.\(^1\)

In 1951, following the recommendations of the 1944 Godlonton Commission on Native Production and Trade, the Rhodesian government introduced the Native Land Husbandry Act (NLHA). Many of the provisions of the NLHA extended earlier policies concerning destocking, grazing, conservation and centralizing settlement patterns. According to Raftopoulos, the NLHA’s “major innovation was its attempt to halt labour migration from rural areas and to place strict controls on reserves”.\(^2\) It led to an increase in the flow of indigenous Africans to towns and cities, although the extent varied from one urban centre to another. On the economic front, by the late 1950s, the ‘impressive growth’ of the federal economy began to slow down, with the fall in the price of copper at the world market. Moreover, due to the post-war economic slump, Southern Rhodesia’s economic growth began to fall and unemployment among African workers increased despite efforts to prevent African labour from entering into the colony through the introduction of the Foreign Migration Labour Act of 1958.\(^3\)

Consequent on the above developments, the period after the 1950s witnessed profound demographic changes in Salisbury. The percentage of the ‘indigenous’ African population in the country increased from 41 per cent of the total African population in 1951 to 72 per cent in 1962 and 83 per cent in 1969.\(^4\) This accelerated the ‘indigenization’ of Salisbury, which in turn impacted on industrial ethnicity. In Salisbury, including the commonage and suburbs outside the commonage, results of the 1941 census indicated that a total of 32 008 Africans were in employment. The figure had increased to 45 950 by 1946. Nationally, about 376 133 Africans were in employment in 1946, an increase from the 303

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\(^2\) Raftopoulos, “Nationalism and Labour in Salisbury, 1953-65”, p.132

\(^3\) Ibid., p.137.

279 in 1941.¹ The figure increased to about 628 000 in 1961, while average annual wages increased from £26 to £102.²

According to the results of the 1969 national census, the country had a total population of about 5 099 344.³ Of this, 4 869 300 (95 per cent) was classified as Africans; 228 269 (4.5 per cent) Europeans; 15 153 (0.3 per cent) Coloureds and 8 965 (0.2 per cent) Asians.⁴ By the early 1970s, about 850 000 Africans were living in towns and cities compared to an estimated 220 000 Europeans. Gargett observes that in the 1970s, nearly 500 000 Africans worked in ‘urban-type’ jobs, excluding mining, forestry and agriculture, with 127 500 working in private domestic service and about 124 300 in manufacturing industries.⁵ Manufacturing and private domestic service employed almost half of the African workforce in urban areas. Other major employers were hotels, restaurants, commerce, transport and communication, construction and the public service. Overall, Africans were concentrated in unskilled and semi-skilled work in view of the Rhodesian state’s racist and discriminatory labour laws and policies. Less than 10 per cent of African workers did clerical work or occupied professional posts.⁶

In the public service, Africans were mostly employed as messengers, ‘Native’ artisans and demonstrators, drivers, warders and guards, hospital staff, police, teachers, among others.⁷ Africans, together with Coloureds and Asians were only allowed to serve in fixed establishments in the public service in 1961. Before this, they could be appointed to non-established posts doing menial jobs and the lowest of these were reserved for Africans.⁸ Entry

¹ NAZ MS1090/2 Preliminary Results of 1946 Census on the Population; S898/1/1 Southern Rhodesia Census 1936; S2170/1-5 African and European Labour Health and Mortality Register for Mines in Salisbury, Bulawayo, Umtali, Hartley and Mazoe for other statistics.
⁴ Ibid.
⁶ Ibid.
⁷ See NAZ S246/646 Civil Service- African Conditions of Service 1919-1928; NAZ S235/443 Native Employees, 1929; Interviews with Mr Chitoro (retired civil servant), Warren Park, Harare, 5 December 2011; Denford Komboniyatsva (former katsekera (council police), Mbare National, 2 March 2003.
⁸ R. Murapa, “Race and the Public Service in Zimbabwe: 1890-1983”, in M. G. Schalfzberg, ed., The Political Economy of Zimbabwe, New York: Praeger, 1984, p.67; The opening of the civil service to Africans were part of the reforms that were introduced by the state in an attempt to ‘impress’ and ‘contain’ the emerging African middle class. See M. Meredith, The Past is Another Country. Rhodesia 1890-1979, London: Andre Deutsh, 1979, p.27.
Entry into the public service remained restricted by a number of technicalities, including one’s character and devotion to duty and country. The limited educational opportunities for Africans further reduced their chances of joining the public service.¹

Nevertheless, the sector experienced significant growth in the 1960s. In June 1962, there were 93 Africans in established posts out of a 2,747 workers, by July 1965, the public service had grown to 9,905 and of these 1,652 were Africans.² This was still a very low figure compared to the number of whites in the public service. It was, however, a significant improvement relative to the total number of Africans in the public service in previous years. After 1965, the recruitment of Africans became restricted consistent with the Rhodesian Front (RF) government’s racist attitudes and the outbreak of the liberation struggle. Government policies and structure became “consciously designed to hamper black progress within the public service”.³

The expansion of the public service in the 1950s and 1960s coincided with the influx of local Shona populations from surrounding Mashonaland and the subsequent ‘indigenization’ of African Salisbury. A significant number of these Shona migrants, some of whom had attained mission education, ended up getting jobs in the public service.⁴ However, it is interesting to note that most African instructors at the African Police Training School in Salisbury in the 1950s were from Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Most instructors also came from families that had served in the public service. This suggests the possible use of dense ties or strong social ties to secure jobs.⁵ However, the police maintained that ethnicity did not count for one to join the force. Station Sergeant Chikadza actually claimed that “we have no tribe in the police. We all live and work together like rock rabbits of one hill”.⁶

The increase in the percentage of local Africans in Salisbury coincided with the expansion of the manufacturing industry in Southern Rhodesia.⁷ Most African employees were in the domestic service sector, commerce, construction and the manufacturing sector, especially food, drink and tobacco, metal manufacture and repair, clothing and textile, and

¹ White racism and discrimination against blacks significantly militated against the latter’s efforts to acquire requisite educational and technical skills to advance themselves socially and economically. At independence, in 1980, only 35 per cent of blacks were in primary school, while only 4 per cent was in secondary school. See Chung, “Opportunities for Political Renewal in Zimbabwe”, p.239.
³ Ibid, p.69.
⁴ Interview with Mr Mandebvu (retired civil servant), Highfield, Harare, 11 August 2011.
⁷ See NAZ F292/16/10 Industrial Development, 1956-1959; NAZ F114/E6/6 Industrial Development Correspondence, 1953-1956; NAZ S932/33/16 Salisbury Chamber of Industries, 1939-1941.
bricks, tiles and lime.\textsuperscript{1} Manufacturing establishments in the country increased from 299 in 1939 to 1 300 in 1957.\textsuperscript{2} The expansion was due to a number of factors, including state intervention through financial assistance; fiscal incentives, which facilitated industrialisation; increasing internal demand resulting from the growing urban population; increasing white immigrants; and a relative increase in black industrial workers’ income after 1946.\textsuperscript{3}

In the 1950s, Salisbury had over 400 secondary industries but the ‘outstanding industrial activity’ was tobacco.\textsuperscript{4} Salisbury was at the centre of Rhodesia’s agricultural industry, which included maize, tobacco and cattle production. The Salisbury District area also had a number of gold, silver, iron, tin and copper mines. Most of these industries were experiencing significant growth in the 1950s. In 1954, for example, Salisbury’s mining district produced 13 percent (£2 445 276) of the total value of Rhodesia’s mineral output that was valued at £18 776 464.\textsuperscript{5} By 1956, there were about 13 000 employers in Salisbury in commerce, industry and domestic work employing about 69 000 African workers annually.\textsuperscript{6} A mobile employment bureau was established in an attempt to link job seekers with prospective employers.

Labour market opportunities that prevailed when a particular group entered the job market were critical in fomenting industrial ethnicity in urban colonial Zimbabwe. Often, there are differentially limited windows in society’s occupational structure, and this condition tends to produce ethnic occupational concentrations. These conditions include the characteristics of the labour market, the macro-economy, and the time at which specific groups enter the job market.\textsuperscript{7} The 1950s witnessed an expansion of the civil service, which coincided with a marked increase in the number of local (indigenous) Africans in Salisbury. Consequently, most African government workers were locals, leading to some intersection of industrial ethnicity and urban residential space.\textsuperscript{8} The expanding manufacturing industry also absorbed new Shona migrants during the same period.

\begin{itemize}
  \item Raftopoulos, Nationalism and Labour in Salisbury, 1953-65”, p.131.
  \item Ibid.
  \item A number of informants noted that at some point they worked for tobacco companies in Harare (Interviews with Muchineripi Tagwireyi, Mbare National, 11 August 2011; Mai Mavis, Mabvuku, 4 March 2011; Sekuru Deza, Mbare, 25 and 30 August 2011).
  \item The City of Salisbury Official Guide, p. 145.
  \item S. Cornell and D. Hartman, quoted by Manganga, “Problematising Ethnicity in an Urban Context”, p.53.
  \item Manganga, “Problematising Ethnicity in an Urban Context”.
\end{itemize}
However, the presence of non-Rhodesian Africans in the country remained significantly pronounced and increasingly became a concern for colonial authorities. In 1956, 2 465 male adults in Salisbury were from Angola, 1 512 from Bechuanaland (Botswana), 122 were from Belgian Congo, 102 941 were from PEA, 2 920 from Tanganyika (Tanzania), while about 4 242 were from other unspecified territories. Overall, there was a total of 114 202 non-Rhodesian migrants in the city in 1956.\(^1\) Nationally, figures from the Rhodesian Central Statistical Office indicated that, in June 1962, migrants from Mozambique numbered 107 330; while 2 820 were from Angola, 2 410 from Tanzania, 119 from Congo and 2 310 from other territories outside the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.\(^2\)

Amid the ensuing socio-economic and political pressures, deliberate efforts were made by the state to exclude foreign Africans from urban employment, channelling their labour to farms and mines, areas that were shunned by indigenous Africans and were witnessing labour shortages.\(^3\) In 1947, the Migrant Workers’ Bill was put in place and became the basis of the 1948 Migrant Workers’ Act.\(^4\) The recruitment of ‘alien’ African labour as farm labourers was authorised by Notice 1183 of 7 August 1936, which noted that aliens could be engaged by farmers on contracts approved by the Native Affairs Department (NAD) for a period not exceeding nine months.\(^5\) The acceleration in the ‘indigenisation’ of Southern Rhodesian cities and the state’s deliberate efforts to channel ‘alien’ African labour to particular industrial sectors had lasting implications on industrial ethnicity. In post-independence Zimbabwe, the farm worker became synonymous with Malawian and Mozambican migrant workers and/or their descendents. The new wave of immigrants to Salisbury after 1950 largely composed of Shona youths and an aspiring new elite of clerical

\(^{1}\) The figures are based on the 1956 Census. See NAZ F119/IMM/5/1/7, Intergovernmental Working Party on Immigration Control of Alien Africans into the Federation, 19 April 1961.

\(^{2}\) Bulawayo Chronicle, 27 July 1962, “Migrant labour will be progressively cut-Abrahamson”; also see NAZ F119/IMM5/12 Portuguese Labour in Southern Rhodesia- Agreement, 1961.

\(^{3}\) In fact, it was becoming clear that migrant labour would be a permanent feature of Rhodesia settler farming and the mining sector (Maravanyika and Huijzenveld, “A Failed Neo-Britain”, p.29).

\(^{4}\) Ibid.

\(^{5}\) NAZ S1561/3 Migrant Labour, Nyasaland Matters 1935-1940. Also see NAZ S1561/2 Migrant Labour, Northern Rhodesia Correspondence 1938-1940; NAZ S235/398-400 Native Labour; NAZ N3/22/5 Alien Natives Imported as Farm Workers; NAZ A3/18/30/14 Labour, Nyasaland, General Manager, Rhodesian Native Labour Bureau, Bulawayo to Secretary, Department of Administrator, Salisbury, 8 December 1910. The targeting of aliens for the farms and mines had started in the early 1900s. In 1904, The Compound Inspector for Mazoe noted a critical labour shortage during the month, especially on mines (NAZ H6/1/1 Compound Inspectors Monthly Reports December 1904). Earlier, in June 1902, the general Manager of Globe and Phoenix Mine had written to the Acting Administrator, Salisbury asking for permission to import 500 aliens for the mine (NAZ A3/18/30/23- General Manager, Globe and Phoenix Mine, to Acting Administrator, Salisbury, 2 June 1902).
workers and traders. These mostly lived in Mabvuku and New Highfield African Townships, which were also opened up during this period. Others moved to Harare Township.¹

The 1950s up to the 1970s witnessed growing unemployment levels among the indigenous African population in Salisbury. In April 1954, the African Trades Union Congress (ATUC) told the Department of Labour in Salisbury that 30 000 Southern Rhodesian Africans were unemployed during that time.² The ATUC expressed concern over the high unemployment rate, saying this could lead to social unrest in the country. As a possible solution to the problem, the ATUC, *inter alia*, proposed a review of the recruitment of foreign labour to facilitate the maximum utilization of local African labour.³ The ATUC claimed that about 120 000 Africans from Mozambique alone were in the country. It further petitioned government to reduce the quota of its recruited labour brought in by the Rhodesian Native Labour Supply Commission (RNLSC), as about 15 000 aliens were being recruited annually.⁴ However, the Department of Labour refuted the 30 000 unemployment figure saying it could not be substantiated.⁵ In its April 1960 Monthly Report, the Southern Rhodesia Department of Labour noted that in and around Salisbury, the general picture was of an “excess of supply over demand with more indigenous Africans than usual seeking jobs. The tobacco grading, picking and export firms, who sign on seasonal labour at this time of year, report many more applicants for work than can be absorbed”.⁶

The above notwithstanding, evidence indicates that unemployment was generally on the increase in colonial Harare during this period. In April 1961, between 20 000 and 25 000 ‘local’ Africans were unemployed in Southern Rhodesia. The same estimate was made for Northern Rhodesia, while in Nyasaland only 5000 were thought to be unemployed.⁷ About 15 per cent of the total African labour force in the Federation consisted of non-Federal African migrant workers. The control of these migrants was already underway by the early 1960s in both Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia, but did not extend to Nyasaland. However, it was practically impossible to stop Africans from crossing territorial frontiers in search of work. Consequently, unemployment in Southern Rhodesia continued to escalate

¹ Yoshikuni, “Notes on the influence of town-country relations”, p.121; Interviews with Timothy Takaendesa, Mbare National, 3 March 2011.
³ The movement of labour between Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi was of concern to the three countries. See NAZ F143/4 Report of the Central African Council Presented to the Legislative Assembly, 1947.
⁷ NAZ F119/IMM/5/1/7- Intergovernmental Economic Advisory Committee, Minutes of the first meeting held in Salisbury, 10 April 1961.
and “thousands of men, boys freshly graduated from school and even women” were “making daily rounds of factories and business firms in vain search for jobs”. A survey that was carried out by the African Daily News, in 1962, indicated that school leavers were the hardest hit with 50 percent of graduates out of work. The paper further noted that:

In Bulawayo, Gwelo, Umtali and Salisbury, thousands are making daily rounds of the factories and other business establishments in search of jobs. In Salisbury, industrialists believe that there are today more unemployed people than at any time in recent months. The number of people unemployed in Salisbury alone is estimated to be in the region of between 10 000 and 12 000.

At the Rhodesia and Nyasaland Tobacco Company, in Salisbury, a Daily News reporter found more than 600 people waiting outside the fence in search of work. The company’s human resources manager, a Mr. Wilton, said that similar crowds gathered daily outside the company premises in search of employment. These added to the more than 70 job applications the company received monthly, against a labour requirement of about 40 new workers monthly. At another ‘leading’ factory in Salisbury, a manager told the African Daily Daily News that as many as 200 people came to the premises daily in search of work, yet “I have a labour force of 250 and can scarcely afford taking more. But I have had to take up 16 Africans on temporary employment everyday at the rate of 8/bd per day”. Similar reports were also made for more than 30 other ‘established’ factories and firms in Salisbury.

Salisbury’s labour market had become very competitive. Local industries were failing to absorb all the prospective workers from within and outside Southern Rhodesia, as well as a swelling number of jobless school leavers. This structural context was important in fomenting industrial ethnicity. In response to the unemployment ‘crisis’ the Minister of Labour, A. E. Abraham, in January 1959, announced that with effect from March that year, Salisbury and Bulawayo would be ‘closed’ to African workers from PEA, Tanganyika, and the Belgian Congo. African workers from Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia were, however, not to be affected. The development would not affect Africans from outside the Federation who had been working in Southern Rhodesia for a long time and had become skilled in their jobs. Charles Mzingeli, a leading African trade unionist, commended the development, saying it

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2 Ibid.
3 In most instances, job seekers stayed with friends, relatives or acquaintances for a couple of months while looking for jobs. Each morning, they would go to various workplaces and wait outside (kuforera) hoping to get employment (Interviews with Sekuru Dube, Crowborough, Harare, 13 September 2011, and Mr Madzudzo, Mabvuku, 22 October 2011.
5 Ibid.
would help stabilize the labour force in Bulawayo and Salisbury and help reduce pressure on housing, which had been a perennial problem in Rhodesian cities.\(^1\) African migrant workers from northern territories were in some instances reluctant to go back home upon completion of their labour contracts in Southern Rhodesia.\(^2\)

In 1959, Prime Minister, Edgar Whitehead, announced that the recruitment of labour from PEA and Nyasaland had been stopped and more restrictive measures had been adopted. In fact, in 1958, the number of non-Rhodesian African migrant workers in Salisbury had dropped by 7,000 and priority was being given to locals.\(^3\) Whitehead noted that the Employment Exchange was finding work for 200 local Africans in Salisbury monthly. By the 1960s, efforts were made to restrict the recruitment of foreign African labour with some sections even proposing repatriation of the immigrants. A more gradual and cautious approach was, however, adopted as mass repatriations would negatively impact on the farming and mining industries. Sir Edgar Whitehead also noted that some ‘aliens’ had been in the country for over 30 years while others had already married and established families.\(^4\)

In addition, the discourse around ‘African advancement’, situated within the 1950s context of the thorny notion of multi-racialism, impacted on African mobility in the labour market, albeit insignificantly. What is probably noteworthy is that the deliberate policy of African socio-economic advancement appears to have targeted locals rather than ‘aliens’.\(^5\) Selection for ‘advancement’ or training – locally and abroad, seems to have been based on experience and merit rather than ethnic background.\(^6\) African migration was also becoming feminized as more African women were also using the Employment Exchange to secure jobs. The Rhodesian Premier noted that in future domestic work would be reserved for local African women. Whitehead told Parliament, in 1962, that “our people have a right to priority in employment in this country”.\(^7\) These pronouncements by Whitehead illustrate how structural and institutional factors were instrumental in engendering industrial ethnicity.

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4. *Bulawayo Chronicle*, 27 July 1962. The Minister of Labour, Abrahamson, proposed a gradual cut to labour migration from PEA and suggested a monthly quota of 1000 labourers who were to be channelled to farms and mines. Also see NAZ F128/L7, African Advancement-Climate of Opinion, August 1960-June 1962. In 1962, Whitehead estimated that about 274 000 Mozambican Africans were working in the country.
6. For example, in 1962, William Chigutsa Rugoyi was selected by the Department of Native Agriculture to undergo a one-year training course in Britain on the basis that he was a Senior Agricultural Supervisor at Makoholi Experimental Husbandry Station, Fort Victoria (Masvingo). He had been with the department for 27 years. See NAZ F128/753/L2.
7. *Bulawayo Chronicle*, 27 July 1962, Migrant labour will be progressively cut-Abrahamson”.

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5.3 The Feminisation of Africa Migration

Harare was until the 1940s officially regarded a city for white residents and black, mostly male, migrant workers, yet an African community existed in the city beyond official sanction. Although African women had a significant presence in urban areas with or without official sanction, “in relative numbers, the male migrant population-both long-distance and internal to Rhodesia- continued to dominate the Harare Township”. Indigenous Africans usually discouraged women to go to urban areas, which were associated with social evils that patriarchs wanted to ‘protect’ their daughters and female relatives from.

However, over time, the country’s urban population changed in structure and composition. In the early years, migration to urban areas was largely by relatively young male breadwinners, while women went to town to accompany their spouses or families. A small number of women went to town as bread-winners and independent migrants in search of economic advancement and to broaden their livelihoods, even without the consent of their fathers, husbands or other male relatives. Urbanization provided opportunities to subvert socio-cultural constraints on African women’s mobility and personal freedoms as well. Given the prevailing structural and institutional contexts of the African labour market, African women largely entered the so-called ‘feminine’ occupations like domestic work, nursing, teaching and the practice of commercial sex.

The critical shortage of accommodation in urban colonial Zimbabwe often ‘pushed’ some Africa women into commercial sex work and mapoto arrangements (cohabitation) with males who had access to accommodation in town. Accommodation was a serious problem for those women who were not staying in ‘married’ accommodation with their families or

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2 Scancerchia, “The Mapping of Respectability.”
3 Wives and children often visited their working husbands and fathers during the summer season after harvests and before the start of a new farming season (Interviews with Mrs Emily Mpofu, Watrefalls, Harare, 3 October 2011; Mai Musonza, Mbare, 12 and 13 August 2011; Gogo Musokeri, Highfield, Harare, 24 March 2011. However, other working men stayed with their wives and families in Salisbury (Interview with Mbuya Shoriwa, Highfield, Harare, 28 May 2011).
5 Interview with Mai Mavis, Mabvuku, Harare, 4 March 2012. Mai Mavis came to Harare from Malawi in the early 1970s to join her family already living in the city. She worked as a maid in Mount Pleasant until the late 1990s when she started an informal business in Mabvuku low-income residential area. While she denied ever engaging in the ‘profession’, Mai Mavis noted that “some girls came to Harare and became majoki (sex workers)”.
6 Interview with Jefrey Banda, Mbare, 21 May and 10 August 2011.
those whose accommodation was not provided by their employers.\textsuperscript{1} For others, mapoto was a socio-economic choice. In the 1920s, there was an inflow of ‘foreign’ women into Southern Rhodesia. In March 1921, the CNC, Salisbury noted that, “a large number of the women came down with one object, namely prostitution”.\textsuperscript{2} A similar observation was made by the NC Shamva, who in 1921 reported that most of the ‘alien’ African women were resident in the country’s mines, co-habiting (kuchaya mapoto) with mine workers. He added that the women came with groups of men from the north but avoided Native Commissioners’ stations to escape detection. Women were, during this time, exempted from the provisions of the Pass Laws, hence the extent of the ‘influx’ was not known. Nonetheless, the presence of such women in town often led to conflicts among African males as the ‘pot wives’ often hopped from one man to the other, depending on the men’s financial position.\textsuperscript{3} For the Assistant Native Commissioner for Shamva:

There is no doubt that a large number of the women come down with only one object, namely, prostitution, and there is reason to believe that a number are exploited by men in this respect, for purposes of gain, which is an easy matter in view of the extremely low moral tone of the women. Owing to the extent to which prostitution is practised, there is a danger of a serious spread of venereal disease or syphilis.\textsuperscript{4}

Commercial sex work in Zimbabwe is probably as old as the Rhodesian state itself whose policies contributed to its growth. According to Runganga and Aggleton:

By splitting families and confining the majority of women and children to rural areas, the Statutory Instruments indirectly but progressively contributed to the growth in sex work in urban areas, since men were separated from their spouses for prolonged periods of time. Another contributory factor was an improved transport infrastructure that facilitated movement between urban and rural areas. Concomitant with these changes was the rise in reported cases of sexually transmitted diseases (STDs).\textsuperscript{5}

However, colonial authorities, African men and the African public, including women themselves, in some instances, referred to independent single African women in town as ‘prostitutes’, simply because they earned incomes and kept their money without the supervision of men.\textsuperscript{6} This construction of social decency was influenced by the conservative

\textsuperscript{1} Scanercchia, “The Mapping of Respectability”, p.152.
\textsuperscript{2} NAZ N3/22/6- Influx of Native Women, CNC, Salisbury, to Superintendent of Natives, Salisbury, 17 March 1921.
\textsuperscript{3} Interview with John Phiri, Dzivarasekwa, Harare, 3 March 2012.
\textsuperscript{4} NAZ N3/22/6 (Influx of Foreign Native women) Assistant Native Commissioner Shamva to NC Mazoe, 3 March 1921. Alien African women were blamed by colonial authorities and mine managers for spreading venereal diseases in Southern Rhodesia. See also NAZ N3/22/7.
\textsuperscript{5} Runganga and Aggleton, “Migration, the Family and the Transformation of a Sexual Culture”, p.67.
nature of African society at the time. Also, colonial authorities regarded African women as undesirable vectors whose presence in urban areas and at mines risked the health of African labour by releasing sexually transmitted infections.¹

Yet, to some extent, commercial sex work, illicit ‘African’ beer (skokian/chikokiyana), the attendant skokian culture and the mahobo parties of the 1950s, were part of some African women’s response to the opportunities and challenges of the settler state, the colonial economy and the system of migrant labour. Some women redefined the use of space, constructing new forms of identification, challenging the state, African nationalism and patriarchy, which sought to construct narrower versions of femininities and emphasized the contentious issue of social decency.² This way, they could subvert the authority of both the colonial state and the patriarchal African males. According to Sekai Nzenza:

> There was a time before independence when prostitutes made money in the city. In our village, Matirasa was the most successful because she was quick to invest her money in cattle and also educating her nephews. She bought a house in Highfield at a time when most Shona men thought urban houses were for migrant Malawian workers without a village base. Matirasa had a home in both places- the city and the village. In those days, some clever prostitutes, or commercial sex workers as we call them now, struggled against racism and exploitation from black and white men....They did not become prostitutes out of choice. Often, they were running away from infertile marriages, domestic violence, accusations of witchcraft or unresolved conflicts in the village. The city gave them new freedom of speech, and the liberty to dance and still maintain the village base.³

As such, commercial sex work constituted some form of engagement with patriarchy, constructions of ‘social decency’, family disputes, violent masculinities, femininities, the colonial state, urbanisation, the colonial economy and the attendant implications for African women.

In Harare, prostitution was associated with ‘foreign’ women, including non- Rhodesian women as well as the Ndebele and the Karanga.⁴ This reflected the ethnocentric attitudes of the local Zezuru and Korekore. Ndebele women like Sarah and Magumede, who brewed skokian in Harare, rose to become powerful ‘skokian queens’ in the location. These Ndebele women were reportedly, “leading women in the township and they were allocated homes by the Sergeant so that they could carry on illicit trade, you know the corruption of the Sergeants and other senior people. They had beds which they used for prostitution, some were let for a

¹ According to Runganga and Aggleton (“Migration, the Family and the Transformation of a Sexual Culture”, p.67), the Government Report on Public Health for 1927 characterized sex workers as key players in spreading STDs.
² Raftopoulos, “Gender, Nationalist Politics and the Fight for the City”.
⁴ See NAZ AOH/56 Notes on Interview with Patrick Gwara Pazarangu.
pound, others ten shillings.”

Equally, women from Masvingo were also supposedly associated with commercial sex work. According to oral sources, in the 1930s commercial sex workers from Masvingo tended to live in the Old Bricks Section of Mbare. According to Pazarangu, “they came here for prostitution. In one house you could have as many as six people. In some cases, one house could have many men and just one woman who was shared by all the men”. Overall, commercial sex work in African Salisbury was viewed as a social vice of the ‘ethnic Other’, ‘the alien’ and ‘foreign’.

However, commercial sex was not the preserve of particular ethnic groups. Pazarangu’s comments echoed the ethnic stereotyping of the time, which praised the alleged ethnic virtues of a group while disparaging ethnic others. Indeed, the stereotyping of women of Karanga and Ndebele origins as ‘promiscuous’ was disputed by these groups. For example, Jabu Khumalo, a Ndebele man who came from Bulawayo to Harare in 1962, argued that “Ndebele women are naturally loving, good and faithful to their husbands. However, some of them were corrupted by the Shona who introduced them to prostitution”. Evidently, Khumalo’s assertions were equally ethnocentric and presented a eulogised picture of ‘Ndebeleness’. Groups tend to emphasize their real, imagined or assumed ethnic virtues vis à vis those of ethnic others.

A significant number of women were also getting employed in Salisbury, despite cultural and social inhibitions upon the mobility of women. However, Municipal regulations prevented the issuing of Certificates of Service to African women living in quarters in the Municipal area where they were not legally entitled to live. This restriction created problems for employers wishing to engage female workers. Nonetheless, the number of African women in Salisbury increased from 679 in 1930 to 8,790 in 1962. In 1936, 617 women were doing domestic work in Salisbury; 149 were in agriculture; 4 were in mining; 10 were in manufacturing, 29 in shops and offices; 112 had professional occupations; while 44 had

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1 Ibid. According to oral sources, women of Karanga and Ndebele were largely labelled ‘loose’ or ‘promiscuous’ by other African groups in Harare. In an interview with the author, in 2003, Nyashanu, who came from Mtoko to Harare in the 1940s and is a Korekore, claimed that the popular belief in Harare during that time was that “vakadzi veChivhitori neChindevere ipfambi” (women from Victoria (Masvingo) and Ndebele women are prostitutes” (Interview with Nyashanu, Magaba, Mbare, Harare, 2 March 2003. Also see, Manganga, “Problematising Ethnicity in an Urban Context”, p.91. The same sentiments were echoed in interviews with Chrispen Masango, Highfield, Harare, 26 March 2011; Bonface Gumbura, Dzivarasekwa, Harare, 13 March 2012.

2 NAZ AOH/56 Notes on Interview with Patrick Gwara Pazarangu.


4 Barnes and Win, To Live a Better Life, p.25.
undefined occupations. In 1957, 1,382 women were in domestic employment in Salisbury, 356 worked as shop assistants and in factories, 231 were self-employed, 166 were nurses, 56 were teachers, while 40 were municipal workers. Other women were entering into employment other than domestic work and were in some instances proving to be “more satisfactory and conscientious workers than the men”. At Downend Tobacco Grading Company in Salisbury, 25 African women were engaged in grading work in March 1960, earning 3 shillings per day. The opinion of white employers toward African female workers was varied and often conflicted. Some employers found women less reliable than men and not as good, yet others found women easier to work with than men and “quite as good as men, but slower”.

African migration to urban areas was becoming significantly feminised. The migration of women to urban areas had important implications for the ‘gendered geographies of power’ and constructions of femininities, masculinities and respectability. The varied and ambivalent impacts of the feminisation of African migration on ‘gendered geographies of power’ and moral contestations within ethnic groups are discussed in the next two chapters. In many ways, gender affects migrants at the spatial context of the body/individual, household, national and international arenas.

1 NAZ MS1090/2- Preliminary Results of the 1946 Census of Population.
2 Barnes and Win, To Live A Better Life, p.79. However, women’s wages, whether they were white of black were lower than those of men. For example, in 1941, the highest paid African female attendants at government hospital earned £3 while African men in the same position earned £4.6 shillings per month. In 1950, female teachers with the lowest qualifications earned £24 a months as compared to £30 per month for men.
The concept of ‘gendered geographies of power’ was proposed by Mahler and Pessar in response to transnational migration and transnationalism. It is a theoretical trajectory for considering migration as a gendered phenomenon “while recognizing complexities and multiplicity of axes of difference”. Mahler and Pessar use the term ‘geographies of power’ to show that gender operates on multiple spatial scales (of the body, family and the state) across transnational terrains, where gender discourses, ideologies and relations are negotiated, affirmed, reaffirmed, configured and reconfigured. The concept also encompasses elements like social location or embeddedness, agency, and imagination or ‘mind work’, which can either constrain or enhance mobility. Social embeddedness constitutes the multiple dimensions of identities. Migrants have varying degrees of agency in view of their varying embeddedness.

Consequently, female migrants to Salisbury were not a homogenous and harmonious entity. They were significantly differentiated on the basis of age, social location, political orientation, religion, ethnicity and class, among other factors. These factors influenced the socio-economic location of particular female migrants in Salisbury’s competitive labour market. The presence of such independent women in the city created tensions between them and the Harare African public. The following section explores how colonial ethnic ranking and stereotyping contributed to the emergence, prevalence and configurations of industrial ethnicity within African communities in colonial Harare.

5.4 The Role of Positive and Negative Stereotyping

Both positive and negative stereotyping were some of the factors that contributed towards the development and resonance of industrial ethnicity in urban colonial Zimbabwe. A stereotype is an exaggerated belief associated with a particular category. Stereotypes rationalise how people relate to particular categories, and this “results in bias in favour of one’s own group and against the other groups, and the propensity for blaming others for our condition or
mistakes and problems”.\footnote{1} The stereotyping of the racial, cultural or ethnic ‘Other’ is a universal phenomenon. For example, “African Americans are seen by whites as superstitious, lazy and happy-go-lucky; Chinese are seen as superstitious, sly and conservative; Turks are seen as cruel, very religious and treacherous; and the English are seen as sportsmanlike, intelligent and conventional”.\footnote{2} In Zimbabwe, “the Ndebele are generally seen as proud and aggressive; the Manyika are seen as too polite but hypocritical; the Karanga are judged as arrogant and pompous”.\footnote{3}

Yet, as John Hooker rightly observes, although stereotypes and “the bifurcation of peoples into the polite and the rude is not random”,\footnote{4} there are too many exceptions, variations and inconsistencies that often make stereotyping very misleading. For instance, the Shona people “charm everyone with their friendly nature and gentle good humour. But superiors bark orders at subordinates, and affability can vanish in an instant where ethnic rivalries are concerned”\footnote{5}. Although stereotypes should not be generalised, stereotyping plays a key role in in how people construct and imagine ‘the Other’ and ‘otherness’\footnote{6}. The same applies to how different African groups were constructed and imagined by the Rhodesian state, employers and the white public, and to how Africans perceived themselves.

Although it did not literally “invent” African ethnicity, the Rhodesian state was instrumental in the construction of the identities of African migrant workers in Salisbury. Rhodesian society was stratified along class, racial, and ethnic lines. Whites were deemed racially superior to blacks, yet white society was also stratified.\footnote{7} The British were at the apex while the “alien” and “naturalized” Europeans occupied the middle part of the ethnic pyramid. This group included “northern” Europeans, Afrikaners, and those from the Mediterranean region. Below them were Asians and Coloureds. These were further sub-classified by rank, with the Cape Coloureds at the top, the Chinese and Indians at the middle, and the “half-castes” at the bottom.\footnote{8}

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\begin{itemize}
  \item \footnote{1} Ibid. Also see, G. W. Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice*, Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1954, p.191.
  \item Mashiri, “The Language of Ethnic Contempt”, p.3; Obeng, “Speaking the Unspeakable”, p294.
  \item Mashiri, “The Language of Ethnic Contempt”, p.3.
  \item Ibid.
  \item For instance, while some Shona speakers negatively stereotyped migrants from Malawi as *Mabwidi asina misha*, (aliens who do not have rural homes) some ‘aliens’ actually married local women and established ‘homes’ both in the city and the rural areas (Interview with Mr Phiri (Sekuru Shumba). Mr Phiri, who originally came from Malawi, married a Zezuru woman from Seke and has homes in Harare (Warren Park 1) and Seke communal lands.
  \item Mlambo, “Some are More White than others”.
  \item Kosmin, “Ethnic and Commercial Relations”; Mlambo, “Some are More White than others”.
\end{itemize}
The term ‘Rhodesian’ was almost interchangeable with ‘Britisher’ or ‘real white men’, meaning those of British stock. Afrikaners, Jews and Greeks could merit the term on some instances but only in its widest and general sense, particularly when the term was used to refer to all the whites in the country as opposed to blacks. The title was never used to refer to Asians, who were classified as ‘Coolies’ or ‘Asiatics’. Neither was it used to refer to black African groups who were categorized as ‘Natives’. The British settlers’ ethnic pride and ethnic chauvinism “affected the ethnic consciousness and categorization of other groups”. Consequently, ethnic ranking emerged as a major criterion for determining people’s life chances and their attendant occupational and socio-economic positions in society.

Ethnic categorization evolved over time and remained highly contingent. Africans were ranked on the basis of their assumed ethnic superiority and the ‘tribal model’. Africans from South Africa were, together with those from Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, ranked higher than the local Ndebele, who, in turn, were regarded as ethnically superior to the Shona. This ranking and stereotyping by the colonial state and the Africans themselves helped to fuel ethnocentric attitudes among African populations. It also influenced colonial attitudes towards particular African groups as different ethnic groups were accorded differential rights and privileges. Muzondidya notes that “through its array of laws and institutions that categorized people in biological, cultural and geographical terms, the colonial state played a crucial role in the creation of black identities”. However, categorization and the existence of such legislation and categories did not necessarily entail an automatic assumption of particular racial, ethnic or cultural identities on the part of the categorized.

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1 Kosmin, “Ethnic and Commercial Relations”, p.11.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., p.11.
4 Ibid., p.12.
5 The approach saw African ethnic identities as primordial, given, and unchanging.
8 Muzondidya, “The Evolution of Coloured Identity in Southern Rhodesia”, p.4. Location Inspectors, Police Officers and Magistrates still had to make distinctions among people defined as Native, Asian, white or Coloured, a process that could be subjective. See also Brubaker and Cooper, “Beyond ‘Identity’”.

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Nonetheless, some Africans internalized ethnic naming and stereotyping and thought of themselves as belonging to particular ‘tribes’. In addition, “as members of various cultural groups left their isolated rural areas and interacted with each other in industrial and urban locales, they formed stereotypes of themselves and others and these stereotypes effectively highlighted and strengthened culturally defined distinctions amongst peoples”. Significantly, Africans in Salisbury manipulated colonial ethnic naming for their own socioeconomic and political gains.

The above discussion illustrates the discursive interaction between structure and agency in the construction of forms of identification. For example, the Fingo were thought to be “very intelligent and among the most industrious of our natives.” The Sotho were regarded as the best when it came to crop and livestock production, while the Ngoni and Bemba enjoyed high esteem because of their alleged military prowess, unlike the Chewa and Shona who were thought to be pacific. Inevitably, stereotypes led to the development of a close link between assumed ethnic qualities and job hierarchy. On the basis of research on Africans in Northern Rhodesia, Mitchell concluded, “some tribes have widely established reputations, some favourable and some unfavourable, which affect their position on the social distance scale apart from cultural similarity and familiarity due to proximity of their rural homes.” The Tonga and migrant workers from Nyasaland were thought to have a natural affinity for sanitary work. Most sanitary workers, *vanamatanyera* in Shona (toilet cleaners) were northern migrants who were looked down upon widely.

Consequently, Salisbury’s labour market was characterized by widespread ethnic clusters at work-places. An analysis of the 1911 census manuscripts reveals that there were concentrations of Shona and Portuguese (Mozambican) workers in domestic employment, while municipal work was largely the preserve of men from Nyasaland and the Portuguese territories. Although immigrant blacks were largely regarded as inferior by the Rhodesian state, white public and white employers, they were thought to have benefited from their

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5 Interview with January Banda, 20 January 2012, Rugare, Harare.
6 Yoshikuni, “Black Migrants in a White City”; NAZ C5/2/12, Salisbury Census. Of course, the personal preferences of individual white employers differed. For example, the 1911 census of European households indicate that one employer could have as many as six servants classified as ‘MaShona’, while others employed a mixture of ‘MaKorekore’, Shangaan, Blantyre and Angoni.
physical contact with whites. These perceptions impacted on the development of industrial ethnicity. Immigrant blacks, especially “the Cape Boys”, were depicted in settler discourse as constituting a distinct social group “possessing better forms of civilization and intellect than local blacks”. They also saw their distinction from local Africans largely in terms of these notions of perceived cultural and intellectual differences between ‘raw Natives’ and ‘colonial boys’.

The stereotyping of African groups revealed significant contradictions or ambiguities. ‘Colonial boys’ were both potential allies in economic terms but a political liability, as they were thought to have the ideological potential to contaminate local Africans. According to Muzondidya, ‘Cape Boys’ were depicted as cunning and sophisticated and were often accused of committing ‘sophisticated crimes’ in the colony. Consequently, they were simultaneously praised and denigrated by the white community depending on the context. Such constructions affected the attitudes of white employers toward certain groups, thereby creating conditions that encouraged the development of ethnic clusters in Salisbury’s African labour market.

Naturally, as argued in preceding chapters, differential power relations and materialities afforded possibilities for different individuals and groups. Nonetheless, the above processes led to the development of varied perceptions about certain groups. At the mines, white employers stereotyped Shangaans as ‘the best workers above and below the ground’, and Basothos as ‘not far short of the Shangaan’. Bannerman, equally, observes that:

For many various reasons, the Hlengwe and Tsonga people, and others, have come to be known as ‘Shangaans’... The name was a praise name and an association with the heroic past of the Gaza. People called themselves ‘Shangaans’ in order to obtain employment on the Rand, where many ‘Shangaans’ had a good reputation as miners. Many Shona Ndau call themselves Shangaans as they were also associated with the Gaza Empire.

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2 Ibid., p.6; Rhodesia Herald, 24 September 1900.
4 Ibid., pp.6, 8; S. P. Hyatt, The Old Transport Road, London: Andrew Melrose, 1914.
5 Muzondidya, “The Evolution of Coloured Identity in Southern Rhodesia”. Equally, Chakamwe Chimanikire also notes that “the Shangaan slaves later became famous ‘drill boys’ in the mines. And then came those from Malawi and Zambia who up to today, are still there in mining towns across Zimbabwe” (The Patriot (Harare), 5-11 October 2012, “Labour Mobilization, Slavery in Rhodesia”, p16.
On several occasions, the Duma, a Karanga sub-group, of southern Zimbabwe called themselves ‘Shangaans’ in order to obtain employment on South African mines.\(^1\) The use and abuse of the term ‘Shangaan’ created animosity between the Ndu to the north of the Mkwasine River and Tsovani’s Hlengwe to the south over who were the ‘true’ ‘Shangaans’.

White employers regarded the Shangaan as the ‘best source of good labour’\(^2\). The Shangaan were valued by mine managers as “semi-skilled and experienced workers who together with “their more numerous brethren from southern Mozambique tended to monopolise the best-paying jobs”.\(^3\) Shangaan migrant workers soon realized their market value and were aware of the fact that they were a much sought after labour force at the mines both in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. According to Van Onselen, Shangaan workers insisted on being employed only at the best labour markets.\(^4\) In Southern Rhodesia, they favoured Selukwe (Shurugwi) and southern Matabeleland districts. Generally, Shangaan workers “moved to the area of the colony which had the largest mines, and the province which offered the highest wages. Within these regions, they again sought the best-paying mines”.\(^5\) These included Tebekwe Mine in Shurugwi at which, in 1900, Shangaans were earning £4-£5 monthly, well above the average wage of £2-£3 per month for ‘skilled drill boys’ at the time.\(^6\)

The Shangaans often had previous experience working at the mines either in South Africa or elsewhere in Southern Rhodesia. This previous experience and ‘exceptional’ work ethics gave the Shangaans a competitive edge in the labour market.\(^7\) The Shangaan also stayed at the workplace longer than the Shona or Ndebele and were therefore an attractive labour force for mine managers keen to stabilize labour.\(^8\) Van Onselen notes that, “in Selukwe District, even the unpopular Bonsor Mine had Shangaan workers who had been there for two years by late 1900”.\(^9\) Having secured such a niche for themselves in the labour market, some Shangaans used industrial ethnicity as an instrument for accumulation,

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1. See Mtetwa, “The Political and Economic History of the Duma People”.
4. van Onselen, Chibaro, p89.
5. Ibid., p.88.
6. Ibid.
7. In contrast, in 1895, the NC for Charter District claimed that “the Mashonas are in their infancy as working natives so that they are stupid at work and don’t like rising early [and] these points often aggravate employers, who, being unable to explain to the natives or too hot tempered to do so, resort to the sjambok” (Beach, “Afrikaner and Shona Settlement in the Enkeldoorn Area, 1890-1900”, p.28. Apparently, the Shona’s lack of previous contact with whites and their lack of work experience partly contributed to their construction and stereotyping as ‘stupid at work’.
8. van Onselen, Chibaro, p89.
9. Ibid.
investing their wealth to boost ‘peasant’ production by acquiring ploughs and cattle. At another level, on the basis of research on migrant workers in Mozambique and South Africa between the 1860s and 1910, Patrick Harries observes that the sudden arrival on the South African mines of men from the east coast “threatened the status quo and caused vertical, ethnic divisions to crystallise in the working class”.2

Africans utilized the negative and positive stereotypes for their own socio-economic advantages, combining these with their own distinctive cultural and phenotypical features to construct new forms of identification. They “manipulated such ethnic stereotyping, taking on ‘Zulu’ or ‘Portuguese’ identification in order to land jobs such as drivers or domestic workers, for specific economic reasons, but the relationship between colonial ‘invented tradition’ and the urban order was not entirely straightforward”.3 Magret Read found men on the Rhodesian copper belt and in Johannesburg who categorically asserted that they were Ngoni by virtue of being under Mpezeni or Gomani, “at the same time giving their clan names with a grin because they knew it will reveal their Chewa or Nsenga origins”.4 Read further observed that:

It is ‘the thing’ to pass as Ngoni if you can carry it off in strange places where the acid test of the clan name is not known- it is easy to do this. A group of Nyasaland men newly arrived on the Crown Mines in Johannesburg told me confidently, “Here we say only, ‘we are all Ngoni’. You know that our clan names are Chewa or Tumbuka, but we are the people of Gomani or of Mwambera, and so we say we are Ngoni, and then people are respecting us”. The prestige in the name Ngoni is a matter of pride, not only in their own country, but far and wide in Africa.5

However, the attitudes of white employers towards the assumed work ethics of particular African ethnicities varied from one employer to the other. While some white employers negatively stereotyped the Shona as ‘lazy’ and ‘stupid at work’, Theodore Bent’s first impressions of the Karanga were, in fact, positive:

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1 In early 20th century south-eastern Zimbabwe, the plough was mostly owned by a few Shangaan and even very few Karanga in the Ndanga and Bikita districts. In most instances, the Karanga had to hire Shangaan plough owners to till their land. In 1910, there were reportedly only 26 ploughs in Ndanga District, which were all owned by the Shangaan who had acquired knowledge of the use of the plough whilst working in South Africa (Manganga, “A Socio-economic history of the Jena (Nyajena) people with particular reference to the role and status of women, c.1890 to the early 1950s”, unpublished BA dissertation, University of Zimbabwe, 1997, p.27; NAZ N9/1/16 NC Annual Report, Ndanga District, 1913; NAZ N9/1/13 NC Annual Report Ndanga-Bikita Districts, 1910).


3 Parry, “Culture, Organization and Class”, p.63.


5 Ibid.
In their primitive state the Makalangas are naturally honest, exceedingly courteous in manner, and cowardice appears to be their only vice, arising doubtless from the fact that for generations they have had to flee to their fortresses before the raids of more powerful races. The Makalangas is above the ordinary Kaffir in intelligence. Contrary to the prognostications of our advisers, we found that some of them rapidly learnt their work, and were very careful excavators, never passing a thing of value, which is more than can be said of all the white men in our employ.¹

Bent was ‘overwhelmed’ by what he thought to be the Karanga’s exceptional ‘intelligence’ and work ethic. The Karanga did not have previous experience in archaeological excavations, but proved to be ‘very careful excavators’. He even made the wild speculation that the Karanga had Semitic origins.

For Stanley Portal Hyatt, a transport rider, Basotho drivers were ‘infinitely superior to all others’ but ‘nothing good came from the Cape Colony, at least in the way of Coloured men’”⁵. Hyatt initially engaged the services of a Zulu driver, Joseph, at the Geelong Mine near Bulawayo. He, however, noted that:

Once we had started, we managed to keep going fairly well, though it soon became only obvious that my driver knew absolutely nothing about his work. He was a useless creature, like most of his tribe. The virtues of the Zulu exist mainly in certain works of fiction; his vices are only too real. Generally speaking, he is a boastful, dissolute fraud.³

After the Zulu driver ran away, Hyatt employed, Amous, a Sotho, who later proved to be a ‘real driver’. According to Hyatt;

I had hardly sat down and told Darkie to get me some coffee when a little Basutu strolled up, and asked if I were the white men who wanted someone to train his very little cattle, who were cheeky, and would not pull, because a skelm called Joseph, a useless Zulu, had been spoiling them.... He was small and slightly built, though tough as watch spring, absolutely tireless, and perfectly indifferent to danger or hardship... he was extremely reliable.⁴

Amous was subsequently engaged for £3 a month. Concerning Amous’ ‘exceptional’ talent Hyatt further opined, “the moment he began to tie up the cattle, I saw that he knew his work, and, in some subtle way, the cattle saw it too. There were no wild chases over the veld, as there had been in Joseph’s time. Cattle were an obsession with him; really, he cared for nothing else, save perhaps tobacco”⁵. Amous was determined to train the span better than anyone else. Consequently, due to his enthusiasm and hard work, Hyatt, erroneously assumed

³ Hyatt, *The Old Transport Road*, p.29. Emphasis mine.
⁴ Ibid.
⁵ Ibid., pp.38- 39
that no African could equal the Basotho in that field. However, it was not his being a Sotho that made Amous an ‘exceptional driver’, but his exceptional personal work ethic. What Amous did was to ‘live out’ Hyatt’s otherwise baseless assumption that Sothos were better drivers than the Zulu.¹

Equally, it was believed that the Manyika were ‘naturally destined’ to be domestic servants, waiters and cooks.² Some enterprising migrants soon assumed this identification. In his 1929 annual report, NC Inyanga reported that “the WaManyika are in great demand as domestic servants…and they obtain good wages for this class of labour…The wage for this class of unproductive labour is generally higher than for other productive work.”³ The Chief Native Commissioner (CNC), Charles Bullock, added that “these WaManyika … now supply the best houseboys to South Africa”.⁴ Ranger also notes that during his field work in Makoni District, he “found that many informants had worked as waiters in South Africa and retained photograph albums to prove it. They also retained memories of the ‘Manyika’ networks along which they were able to move from job to job and town to town”.⁵ The belief of the Manyika being ‘natural waiters’, cooks and ‘houseboys’, probably explains why, up to the late 1950s, African domestic workers were receiving training at the Umtali Training Centre in Manicaland Province.⁶

The stereotype of the Manyika being ‘natural houseboys’ was ‘reified’ or ‘actualized’ by some African migrants. The label ‘Manyika’ was economically convenient and a potential source of socio-economic mobility in towns and cities. The tendency, then, was often to lump everyone from Makoni, Mutare and Nyanga districts under the rubric ‘Manyika’. Some Karanga and Ndau from Masvingo and Chipinge could also masquerade as “the Manyika” so that they could get preferential jobs as ‘houseboys’, cooks or waiters. The special place given

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¹ Zimbabweans often pride themselves as reliable hard workers especially those in the Diaspora. While this might be generalized view on the work ethics of Zimbabweans, some foreign employers may in fact regard this as fact. Once positively stereotyped, Zimbabweans, facing socio-economic difficulties back home tend to ‘live out’ the stereotype further entrenching the perception. This analysis resonates in the statement by Zimbabwean Kaizer Chiefs Football Club player, Lincoln Zvastiya, who noted that “I am not the one to shy away from hard work. I know that it was through hard work that I am here at Chiefs and it is going to take hard work for us to meet our objectives this season” The Herald 24 January 2012, Robson Sharuko, “Half a dozen warriors”, p.8. In January 2012, six Zimbabweans were playing for Kaizer Chiefs.

² This stereotype of the Manyika was repeated in a number of oral interviews, for example, in interviews with Sekuru Dembeza; Mr Sakala, Mbare, 12 and 13 December 2011.


⁴ Ibid., p.140. The use of social networks by communities of migrant workers is discussed at length in the chapter’s next section on behavioural factors that engendered industrial ethnicity in colonial Zimbabwe.

⁵ Research carried out by the author in 2008 established that a considerable number of workers, including managers, at the Meikles Hotel in Harare are of Manyika background or come from the Manicaland Province.
to the Manyika also made some Shonas who were not Manyika assume and articulate the ‘extended’ Manyika identification. Yet, stereotypes do not develop randomly. They need some form of subjective basis and some semblance of materiality for them to crystallize. Not all Shona migrant workers had the requisite cultural and linguistical ‘raw materials’ that could afford them a working identity. This could, perhaps, have been a bit easier for the Ndau who come from eastern and south eastern Zimbabwe and whose dialect is closer to ChiManyika than is ChiZezuru.

In Bulawayo, by the late 1920s, Manyika migrants had entered domestic service and other employment from the turn of the century. Their access to good jobs had caused them to be disliked by Ndebele workers. Thus, the Superintendent of Natives for Bulawayo explained the ‘faction fights’ in Bulawayo in 1929 as “an attempt to oust the Manyikas and the Natives of Victoria District, large numbers of whom are employed in the town, and because they are good servants, were preferred by employers at good wages... these men attracted Matabele girls because they were in a position to do so financially”.

Employers’ attitudes toward different migrant groups helped engender ethnic industrial concentrations in Salisbury. They appealed to ethnicity when it suited them, for example, as a mechanism to maintain discipline at the workplace. Some employers preferred Shona or ‘alien’ workers rather than the Ndebele, whom they regarded as lazy and financially demanding. On the contrary, others thought the Ndebele were better workers than the Shona. In 1966, the president of the Mashonaland Furniture and Bedding Manufacturers Association, Hubert Ponter, claimed that Africans from Matabeleland were better and brighter than any other group, and attributed this to their Zulu blood. It was in the interest of capitalist owners to maintain an ethnically fragmented labour force, which would ostensibly stifle the emergence of a common class consciousness.

Furthermore, both oral and archival sources underline that a farmer or mine owner who lost, say, his/her Mozambican labourer would ‘most certainly’ replace him/her with

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2 Ranger, “Missionaries, Migrants and the Manyika”, p.141; NAZ S1542; S12 Superintendent of Natives, Bulawayo, to CNC, 12 August 1935. The Bulawayo faction fight of 1929 is discussed in the next chapter under the impact of industrial ethnicity on inter-group relations.
3 Manganga, “Problematising Ethnicity in an Urban Context,” p.50; NAZ A/2/4/2 Administrator’s Office: Out Letters, High Commissioner 1902-3- Some employers gave the Ndebele higher wages than the Shona claiming that the former ‘make more efficient labourers’.
another Mozambican, Malawian or other foreign worker, and not a local.\textsuperscript{1} This was probably because ‘aliens’ “stayed longer in employment as opposed to the local men who often went back to their rural homes during the rainy season”.\textsuperscript{2} Malawian workers themselves often claimed that they worked harder and were more reliable than the local Shona or Ndebele and took pride in the saying ‘takavinga basa’ (‘we came here for work’).\textsuperscript{3}

In response to a letter by one Makowa, who denounced ‘tribalism’ among African migrants, the editor of the Bantu Mirror noted that while Makowa’s comments were sensible, workplace ethnicity was a reality that could not be wished away as “many employers black or white take a special thing to certain tribes because they have found them better than others, or because they have learnt to work with them.”\textsuperscript{4} Similarly, it was noted that “a Nyasa waiter stands a better chance of being employed in that capacity than a Hottentot”, while in South Africa, “a mine captain would consider a Basuto for employment on the mine better than a man from Nyasaland”.\textsuperscript{5} However, migrant workers were not docile and gullible and at the mercy of ethnic manipulation by the state or their employers. Instead, both employers and African migrants were equally complicit in the making of ethnicity as a salient force in working Salisbury.

The colonial policy of divide and rule admittedly contributed to the rise, resonance and the ambiguities of industrial ethnicity across the African continent. The colonial state often privileged some ethnic groups, especially ethnic minorities, at the expense of the numerically ‘dominant’ groups. On the basis of research on ethnic minorities, the Portuguese colonial state and a diamond mining company, Diamang, Todd Cleveland observes that;

In practice, mining companies across colonial-era Africa had varied and complex relationships with ethnic minorities. Most often, companies imagined a type of ethnic taxonomy, in which they ranked various ethnic groups and accordingly categorized particular communities as ‘superior’ or ‘inferior’. When mine managers considered particular minority populations preferable and rewarded them with overseer positions-while simultaneously assigning majority populations positions as unskilled labourers-tension naturally ensued.\textsuperscript{6}

In colonial Zimbabwe, both the state and private employers, including mining companies, demonstrated a propensity to catalogue African migrant workers on the basis of warped

\begin{footnotesize}
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  \item NAZ F119/IMM5/12, Portuguese Labour in Southern Rhodesia, 1961; Interview with Arimando.
  \item Moto Magazine, May 1988, Zarangwa Masina, “Now we are all Zimbabweans”, p.11; Interviews with Mr Mandaza, Highfield, 11 and 12 August 2011; Benjamin Phiri, Rugare, Harare, 6 and 19 September 2011.
  \item Ibid. The same sentiments were echoed by January Banda, on 20 January 2012 in an interview with the author.
  \item Bantu Mirror, 14 January, 1970, p.7.
  \item T. Cleveland, “A Minority in the Middle. Ethnic Baluba, the Portuguese Colonial State and the Campania de Diamantes de Angola (Diamang)”, in Mbanaso and Korieh, eds., Minorities and the State in Africa, pp.196-197.
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notions of ethnic superiority. This fomented industrial ethnicity and its attendant implications for inter-group relations on and off the workplace. Van Onselen, for example, notes that on colonial Zimbabwe’s mines, “the numerically preponderant Shona were particularly disliked by mine managers who found them to be ‘awkward’ and ‘useless’”.¹

The stereotyping of Africans by white employers and the state was not entirely without some first-hand basis.² Thus, positive and negative stereotyping as well as the resultant differential attitudes of different white employers towards various communities of African workers were to some extent influenced by the characteristics of the groups so named, particularly the issue of work experience and expertise. Once positively stereotyped, African migrants instinctively ‘lived-out’ the positive image in order to entrench their preferential treatment in the labour market. The characteristics of the ethnic group itself, including job skills and work experience, were pertinent in the development of aspects of industrial ethnicity. In the early colonial period, the majority of colonially-assimilated blacks possessed better job skills and had better income than the outside locals. The ‘colonial boys’ had been exposed to the so-called ‘white civilization’ and the capitalist economy and had acquired basic Western education and culture.³ Such immigrants regarded themselves as culturally unique and emphasized their closeness to whites. Africans and people of ‘mixed race’ from Mozambique, for example, called themselves ‘Portuguese’. They spoke Portuguese, had assimilated into Portuguese colonial culture and were mostly Catholics.⁴ Griquas, Malay and Cape Coloureds spoke Afrikaans and had assumed an ‘Afrikaans sub-culture’. Zulus, Basothos, Fingos from South Africa were Nguni but they had adopted aspects of British, Portuguese and Dutch colonial cultures. They spoke English, Portuguese or Afrikaans.⁵

It is evident that immigrant blacks had a competitive edge over locals in the job market. They had the skills and job experience that the white employers wanted and their knowledge and exposure to the colonial culture and language were added advantages. ‘Cape Boys’ came to Salisbury with a variety of special and essential skills, especially leather working, transport riding, smithing, building and market gardening. They were also

¹ van Onselen, Chibaro, p.93.
² See Hooker, “The Polite and the Rude”.
employed as personal servants, shop assistants, interpreters and messengers. Consequently, they dominated these professions and they were “indispensable to the economy of the town in its early years and formed the basis of the skilled working class”\(^1\). ‘Cape Boys’ almost became indispensable with regard to certain kinds of jobs in Salisbury\(^2\), and they were paid better than other African migrant workers, some of whom even tried to assume this form of identification and strategically position themselves in the labour market.

The ‘Cape Boys’ position in urban colonial Zimbabwe’s labour market compares with that of the Indians in Uganda, where “clerks, carpenters, bricklayers, blacksmiths, and gardeners…all came from India”.\(^3\) The Indians came in as semi-skilled and skilled workers. Equally, Cleveland notes that the preference for the ethnic Baluba for Diamang, a diamond mining company in colonial Angola, was partly based on the fact that unlike the local Chokwe, the Baluba had valuable and usable previous experience working in alluvial diamond mining at Forminiere in Belgian Congo. According to Cleveland;

Ethnic Baluba, who crossed the proximate (Belgian) Congolese border seeking work with Diamang, represented the most immediate, important and consistent source of ‘external’ labourers. Especially in the first two decades of Diamang’s operations, the company relied upon these experienced Luba workers to occupy mine oversees and other mid-level posts….\(^4\)

Like the “Cape Boys”, the Baluba were considered precious auxiliaries and were accorded preferential treatment than other ethnic groups. This, as is demonstrated in the next chapter, had profound implications for inter-group relations.

### 5.5 Social Networks as Conduits for the Transmission of Job Information

In addition to structural and institutional elements, behavioural factors were equally important in engendering industrial ethnicity in urban colonial Zimbabwe. The use of social networks was crucial in securing jobs and keeping them within particular communities of African workers. Ethnicity provided “a comforting sense of brotherhood in a world tending

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\(^2\) *Rhodesia Herald* 1 December 1900; Parry, “Culture, Organisation and Class”, p.57. Immigrant blacks were conscious of their ‘special skills’ and their value to the colonial economy. They were equally concerned about entrenching themselves as a unique class, a ‘colonial labour aristocracy’.

\(^3\) Mamdani, Politics and Class Formation in Uganda, p.69.

towards social atomization and rootlessness”.¹ Social capital and the strength of both weak and dense social ties became crucial in securing jobs.² Behavioural factors that helped give rise to industrial ethnicity included the behaviour of groups in positions of power in their dealings with less powerful populations. For example, they could systematically discriminate against, or deliberately withhold job intelligence from ethnic others.

African workers often relied on personal contacts to obtain job intelligence. Job information could be secured and transmitted through a network of friends, friends of friends, relatives, home-boys/girls and other acquaintances.³ For instance, John Phiri, who came to Harare from Zambia in the 1950s, said it was his brother Zakeo who encouraged him to come to the city in search of economic opportunities. Zakeo was staying in Old Highfield and worked as a ‘delivery boy’ for a dairy company. According to John Phiri;

Zakeo was a delivery boy for a dairy company in the industrial area. He is the one who organized my first job for me when I came to Salisbury. I also became a ‘milk boy’ like him delivering milk door-to-door in the location. I cannot remember my weekly wages but they were not much. However, life was not that expensive those days, and again I was staying with my brother sharing expenses. Getting a job was not easy especially if you knew no one in Salisbury.⁴

Another former migrant worker, January Banda, came to Harare in the 1940s and was received by an uncle who was already working in the city. The uncle provided food, accommodation and information about jobs. The uncle was working at a restaurant in the city and introduced January to the Indian restaurant owner. January got the job, starting as a cleaner and becoming a waiter later.⁵ Sekuru Sixpence, another former migrant worker, who now resides in Dzivarasekwa, said that he made use of social networks to get and maintain jobs in Harare. Sekuru Sixpence recalls that;

I came to Harare from Malawi in the early 1950s together with about 10 other men from my village. Some of my colleagues went to the farms and mines around the city but my uncle who was working at Meikles Stores as a cleaner advised me to come and stay with him in Gillingham while I look for a job. He later introduced me to his friend who was working at the Meikles Hotel. His name was Two Boy. He was the one who

¹ Vail, “Introduction: Ethnicity in Southern African History”, p.5. This was resonant in interviews with Mr Jairos (gardener of Mozambican origins), Mount Pleasant, Harare, 14 August 2011; Achimwene, Kuwadzana Extension, Harare, 15 and 16 December 2011.
³ Interview with Raimos Sajeni, Rugare, Harare, 5 March and 8 December 2011.
⁴ Interview with John Phiri, Dzivarasekwa 3, Harare, 3 March 2012. John Phiri later moved from Old Highfield to the Mbare Hostels, where he shared a room with other friends from ‘home’ (Zambia).
⁵ Interview with January Banda, Rugare, Harare, 20 January 2012.
introduced me to the manager at the hotel. Two Boy told the manager that he had known me since we were still in Malawi and assured him that I was an honest and hardworking young man. This is how I got my job. I never left the hotel. I resigned in the 1990s. There were other Malawians at the Meikles Hotel then. There were a number of Manyikas too. ... Some employers always preferred us ‘Nyasas’ and the Manyika to work as cooks and waiters in hotels and private homes. I do not know why...I maintained my job at Meikles and never left my employer until I retired. I think this is why some employers liked us. We loved our jobs and were very reliable unlike the Shona who would leave for their rural homes when the rain season started.¹

The use of social networks was, however, affected by structural and institutional factors as well as other sociological variables. This in turn problematised the agency-structure dichotomy. Not everyone in a given social network got reliable job intelligence because not everyone had the ‘right’ contacts. The structure of social networks determined possibilities available to those who were part of the network.² Personal characteristics of the individual migrant worker or group of migrant workers were equally critical for the effective use of social networks in securing jobs. The structure and dynamics of particular social networks determined the nature of the job intelligence circulated within that particular network.

Equally, income and status variations also determined a migrant’s social networks. Salisbury’s emerging African middle class had different social networks than those of the uneducated, poorly paid, unskilled, ‘less respectable’, poor, hostel dwellers. The African middle class created new networks discarding old friends in favour of those of their new class. They also avoided drinking in the crowded and ‘filthy’ Municipal Beer Halls, preferring ‘European’ hotels in town or in their houses in the ‘respectable’ sections of African Salisbury.³ They, however, still maintained contact with their relatives or those belonging to their dense social networks. Others could even be members of ‘ethnic associations’ in town. In the same vein, John Phiri noted that “after work, I usually went to the Council Beerhall to enjoy Chibuku (opaque beer) with my friends. This is where we shared and exchanged

¹ Interview with Sixpence, Dzivarasekwa 3, Harare, 4 March 2012. Sekuru Sixpence married a local Zezuru woman, Gogo Mutero and now lives with his grandchildren in Dzivarasekwa. He sometimes visits his relatives in Malawi.
² According Granovetter, “some individuals have the right contacts, while others do not. If one lacks the appropriate contact, there is little he can do about it” (Granovetter, Getting a Job, p.16; Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties”).
³ Lukhero, “The Social Characteristics of an Emergent Elite in Harare”, p.133. The same sentiments were echoed by Mr. Chitoro a retired school teacher in an interview with author. Chitoro noted that like other professionals during ‘his time’ he avoided drinking in shebeens and council beer halls, which were frequented by the illiterate, unemployed, poor and uneducated Africans (Interview with Chitoro, Warren Park, Harare, 5 December 2011.)
information about jobs as well as news from home. Most people enjoyed life in Salisbury and did not want to go back home”.

Wazha Morapedi observed a similar pattern and evidence of ‘ethnic loyalty’ and ‘cultural awareness’ among Botswana migrant miners in South Africa:

After work and during weekends, Batswana living in compounds met regularly in groups to discuss issues back home (‘go rera tsa ko gae’). They met regularly with those who stayed in the townships to discuss these issues and get appraisal on the prevailing situation at home from those who had been home recently.

African migrants in colonial Harare formed groups comprised of relatives and friends and went to employment centres, using acquaintances working at the centres as stepping-stones.

After 1918 there was a noticeable move towards Africans grouping together and becoming more self-assertive. They started forming ethnic and African Mutual Aid Associations (AMAAs) in response to a number of socio-economic pressures.

The 1918 Spanish influenza epidemic, which ravaged the African population in Salisbury, was a central factor in giving impetus to the formation of AMAAs, including dance and burial societies.

The main concern of burial societies was to help members meet funeral expenses in addition to aiding destitute members to return to their ‘original’ homes and paying fines for trivial offenses. The post-World War One global economic crisis further negatively impacted on migrants as there was a marked increase in the cost of living and a decline in real wages and income. The escalating cost of living made the need for brotherly support an imperative.

1 Interview with John Phiri, Dzivarasekwa, Harare, 3 March 2012.
3 Yoshikuni, “Black Migrants in a White City,” pp.243–244. This was further noted in interviews with several former African migrant workers, including immigrants and ‘autochthons’.
5 NAZ LG47/29 Town Clerk, Salisbury to Assistant native Commissioner Salisbury, December 1918- Influenza Epidemic, Town Clerk to Superintendent of natives, Salisbury, 15 October 1918. Subscriptions were devoted to helping members in times of sickness, death and the payment of fines for the less serious offences committed by members. Each burial society raised its own funds through joining fees, monthly subscriptions, concerts and dances. The money was used primarily to buy a coffin, pay for transport costs and to buy food for mourners (Anon, “A Study of the Life of the African at Harare Township, Salisbury”, The Central African Journal of Medicine, Vol 7, No 6, 1961, p. 220.
AMAAs tended to operate along ethnic lines and on the basis of origin (regionalism) with the ‘home-boy’ influence playing a critical role in providing a ‘home’, shelter, food, a sense of belonging, local intelligence and job information to African migrants in the city.\(^1\) They were also instrumental in defining and monitoring the behaviour of group members, thereby in a way trying to preserve ethnic virtues in the face of ‘culture contact’ and urbanization. The Tonga Society, for example, emphasised the ‘proper’ behaviour of its members.\(^2\) In 1920, a member of the Chikunda Club who had been convicted of public violence and sentenced to six months in prison with hard labour was dismissed from the club as soon as he completed his jail term. The club ordered the man out of the Native Location subsequently forcing him to leave Salisbury.\(^3\) By committing the offence the man had tarnished the image of the group, which did not want to be viewed in disrepute by the state and other African groups. Apart from being conduits for the transmission of job information, ethnic associations were critical in moral contestations within particular ethnic groups.

Burial societies and closed associations like Butwa and Zvinyawo were instrumental in transmitting job information and local intelligence among and within communities of African migrants in Salisbury. They provided the ‘warmth of the welcome’ to new immigrants. African migrant workers could be members of a plethora of intersecting ethnic and cultural systems “co-existent with kin and workplace ties, ranging from the oppositional Zvinyawo rooted in pre-colonial and colonial political resistance through regional identification, to gangs such as V8 and the Mangoromera cult which developed as distinct products of the urban and specifically the location environment”.\(^4\) However, the initial social network that received new immigrants came from their rural homes. Relatives or home-boys/girls introduced new immigrants to the wider urban society and provided essential socio-economic support including food, shelter, companionship and job information.\(^5\) Close-knit kinship ties were ‘at the core of the migrants’ associational life, including ethnic and mutual aid associations. It was “within such a world, grounded on the linguistic and cultural affinity that migrants would let their hair down, exchange job information and discuss home affairs”:\(^6\)

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1 Manganga, “Problematising Ethnicity”, p.56; Yoshikuni, “Black Migrants in a White City”, p.238
2 NAZ LG52/6/2 Location Superintendent to Town Clerk, Salisbury 31 December 1920
3 Ibid; Manganga, “Problematising Ethnicity”, p.62.
5 Bourdillon, “Korekore labour Migrants”, Southern African Congress, Lesotho, 1973, pp.6-7. Bourdillon’s assertions were corroborated by evidence from interviews that were conducted by the current author with Peter Newet (Rugare, Harare, 8 December 2011); Oscar Mwale (Mabvuku, 6 March and 23 October 2011); and with Raimos Sajeni (Rugare, Harare, 5 March and 8 December 2011).
Faced with new challenges in town, historic and rural-derived forms of social organization became relevant. In crisis situations, people tend to seek and identify themselves with those of their type. In some instances, jobs are handed over from one “home-boy” to the other. Kinship and ethnic connection play fundamental roles in the circulation of job information among migrants. When Patrick Gwara Pazarangu, a Manyika from Inyanga, first came to Salisbury, his nephew George received him. George was the only person Patrick knew. According to Pazarangu, George was “the son of my aunt who was working for H. G. Moilly, a German gunsmith in First Street. He is the only person I knew. I went to him and he sought employment for me”. His nephew helped in fixing guns while he worked as a cleaner and was paid £1.10 shillings per month. When George left his job, he “handed” it over to Pazarangu, who intimated that “this nephew of mine wanted to leave the job and this is why he had told me to come and work with him. He then left the job to me. He went and worked at the Post Office, leaving me working there”. The Post Office was in Manica Road, opposite Fereday and Sons Pvt Ltd.

Patrick worked for the gunsmith until his nephew called him to the Post Office as he was now about to leave the job. George’s job at the Post Office was to deliver telegrams to the Telegraph Office, while Patrick was a ‘tea boy’. Later, with the help of other ‘home boys’, Patrick soon learnt how to deliver telegrams and was employed as a messenger earning £2.10 shillings monthly. He rose through the ranks to become the first African Post Master stationed at Highfields Post Office. Yet, Patrick, in the 1930s and 1940s, was also a member of a number of non-ethnic associations, including the African Welfare Society, the Salisbury Cycling Club and the African Posts and Telecommunication Association.

Similarly, when Arimando first came to Harare from Mozambique in the late 1940s he first worked at a farm outside Salisbury before one of his ‘home boys’ organized a job for him as a gardener in Borrowdale. The ‘home boy’ had secured a better paying job and decided to ‘hand over’ the job to his friend from home. Arimando worked as a gardener for about 10 years before moving to Highfield after getting a job as a ‘delivery boy’ at Lion...
Another former African migrant worker, January Banda, intimated that when he got a job first as a cleaner before becoming a waiter at the Meikles Hotel in the 1960s, he moved from Mbare to Rugare where he stayed with other Malawians. Some of his friends worked for the Rhodesia Railways and were provided with company accommodation in Rugare. Through personal contacts and social networks, January Banda soon got a job at the Rhodesia Railways, where he worked in the canteen as a ‘tea boy’, becoming a cook later.  

Manyika migrants also used social networks as they moved from home to the towns and cities in search of work. Social networks proved indispensible during the Manyika’s long journeys to South Africa, where they earned more than “they had dreamed of in Mashonaland”. Manyika migrants were able to secure jobs as domestic workers or waiters and cooks as far away as Cape Town “by means of his contacts among the Manyika there”. Maurice Nyagumbo, the African nationalist, in his autobiography, presents a vivid account of how as a young lonely migrant from Makoni he activated these networks when he travelled to South Africa in search of work. Nyagumbo recalls how he bumped into a man in the streets of Kimberley, and that;

When I told him that I came from Umtali (Mutare), Southern Rhodesia, the man spoke in Shona and asked me where abouts in Umtali. I was really shocked to hear someone who could speak Shona so fluently and I told him that I came from Makoni. He demanded to know who my father was and after I had told him, the man embraced me and said, “Oh, I am Chitima, from Ruredzo Village. My brother is married to your aunt Christina”.  

The man took Nyagumbo in and helped him to secure a job with a Mrs. Mackenzie as butler. Nyagumbo’s new found friend apparently knew Mrs. Mackenzie’s chef, a Rhodesian from Mrewa. Similarly, Ranger, quoting Katie Hendrick, illustrates how Manyika migrants used social networks in their journeys from Manicaland to South Africa via Salisbury. Mandisodza, a Manyika migrant from Mutare, ‘worked his way slowly’ to Cape Town, where “the many Manyika natives....were earning more pounds than they had dreamed of in Mashonaland”. Mandisodza first went to Salisbury where he got employed as a waiter in a hotel. He later travelled to South Africa where he worked as a domestic servant after securing...

1 Interview with Arimando, Highfield, Harare, 2 March 2012.
2 Interview with January Banda.
3 Ranger, “Missionaries, Migrants and the Manyika”, p.139.
4 Ibid.
5 Nyagumbo, With the People, p.38.
6 Ranger, Missionaries, Migrants and the Manyika”, p.139, Ranger quotes Katie Hendick’s The Bend in the Road. Katie was a Coloured woman, daughter of a Manyika labour migrant to Cape Town, Mandisodza.
the job by means of his contacts among the Manyika who were already working in Cape Town.

In Bulawayo, Shona migrants in the 1920s, tended to “congregate by homeboy and ethnic loyalties”.

This resulted in the creation of ethnic enclaves at both workplaces and residential areas. Apart from attempting to live as ‘home-boys’, most immigrants preferred to work with friends and acquaintances from home. This tendency was interpreted by colonial authorities, white employers and the white public to mean a ‘natural’ ethnic preference for certain types of work. Thus, in 1910, the NC for Bulawayo noted that;

The aliens, to a greater extent monopolize the house work, while the Mandebele continue to prefer employment as drivers, store and office boys, policemen and similar outdoor service. The aliens being more careful in their habits make better indoor servants than the Mandebele.

For Msindo, it was not ethnicity per se that made some people prefer certain types of work to others but rather a matter of necessity. Working with home-boys meant no hurdles of learning IsiNdebele or other languages. It also made a foreigner feel socially and economically secure. It was a way of making one another feel at home in a foreign country. Colonial agents, however, “must have reinforced these homeboy loyalties by reserving certain jobs for specific ethnic groups”.

The end result was the creation of ethnic enclaves at workplaces.

Studies on Korekore labour migrants in Salisbury by Michael Bourdillon, in the 1970s, indicated a similar pattern and that kinship and ethnic relations played pivotal roles in fomenting industrial ethnicity. Responses to the question “why did you choose to work in this place?” showed that most migrants had followed a relative, replaced a relative, or followed or replaced a friend from home or another town.

In response to the question “how did you get this job?,” 31 per cent of the respondents had acquired it on their own, 41 per cent through a relative, 10 per cent through a friend from home, and 18 per cent through other means. This indicates that kinship ties, ethnic connections and the “home-boy” influence were central in

1 Msindo, “Ethnicity, Not Class?”
3 Msindo, “Ethnicity, Not Class?”
4 M. F. C. Bourdillon, “Korekore Labour Migrants,” Southern African Congress, Lesotho, South Africa, 1973, p.8. In the same vein, the present study noted that most migrant workers usually acquired job intelligence from relatives, friends, friends of friends, home boys/girls, contacts and acquaintances. For example, Mai Mavis came to Harare from Malawi in 1973 to join her family that was already staying in the city. Her father stayed in Mabvuku and worked as a gardener for a Mr. Jones in Grendale. Mai Mavis later got as a maid in Mount Pleasant, where she worked for the Fritz family. Her father’s friend (Mwale) worked for the family as a gardener and was the one who introduced her to the white employers. (Interview with Mai Mavis, Mabvuku, Harare, 4 March 2012).
5 Bourdillon, “Korekore Labour Migrants”, p.8.
circulating job information. Korekore migrants extended rural social networks to their places of employment in urban areas. According to Bourdillon, the society into which the immigrant entered at the workplace was derived from the rural home. He contends that:

Although the new environment incorporates wider society, including Europeans and Africans from other areas and backgrounds, the initial social network which receives the migrant comes from his rural home and most migrants continue to find their principal social contacts within this network as long as they are away from home.\(^1\)

Consequently, new immigrants tended to congregate in ethnic, regional or other such clusters not only at workplaces and the African residential areas but also at shebeens and the Municipal Beer Halls.\(^2\) In such places, the social network of relatives, friends and home boys circulated latest news from home and job information. So useful were social networks that it has been observed that;

Even when a person does not choose a place in order to be sure of the company of relatives from home, they often obtain their positions of employment through relatives or friends. A common practice is to replace a relative in domestic service when the relative wishes to terminate his employment and return to his rural home.\(^3\)

From the 1950s onwards, local Africans often complained that the “aliens” were taking away their jobs. Local school-leavers or local recent graduates had to compete with immigrants on the job market. One, J. C. Mukwandi, wrote in the *African Weekly* of September 16, 1953, complaining that the “Nyasa” did not want the locals to be employed in the same capacity as themselves and whenever Africans from Nyasaland left their jobs, they would “hand it” to their countrymen. Mukwandi called on the Southern Rhodesia government to come to the rescue of the locals by making sure that non–Southern Rhodesian Africans were employed as labourers and not as office workers.\(^4\) He urged government to exclude ‘alien’ Africans from urban areas. In response, the editor of the *African Weekly* noted that “to charge Nyasas with favouritism is to be unfair to them for this is a human trait. There are many Rhodesian Africans as there are Nyasas who are guilty of this practice”.\(^5\)

In some instances, some employees deliberately withheld information from job seekers on the basis of ethnic and regional origins. Often, Africans who were appointed to interview applicants and recommend them to the employer would tell the applicants (ethnic others) that there were no jobs. They would then call a relative, friend or ‘home-boy’ who would

\(^2\) Interview with Chitoro, Warren Park, Harare, 5 December 2011. There were exceptions, though as some Africans maintained ‘older’ networks.
\(^3\) Bourdillon, “Korekore Labour Migrants,” p.9.
\(^5\) *African Weekly*, 16 September 1953.
eventually get the job.\(^1\) Employers also seem to have preferred workers recommended by Africans already at work with whom they had established good rapport and a degree of trust. In other instances, a migrant could go to a particular workplace after picking job intelligence from his/her social network that could be a burial society, religious organization or ethnic association.

However, often, those already in employment would ask the applicant’s ‘tribe’ and if he/she is not ‘one of their own’, he/she would be told that there was no work available. If a migrant belonging to the dominant ethnic group at that particular workplace later came in search of employment, he would be immediately recommended to the employer and subsequently get the job.\(^2\) Tagarika, who is ethnic Karanga, opined that one had to verify the place of origin of the job seeker first before releasing job intelligence as “it was important to help *mwana wekumusha* (a home-boy) than *mutogwa* (a stranger). If *mwana wekumusha* came looking for work one would quickly recommend him to the employer”.\(^3\) Additionally, many employers took “special thing to certain tribes because they have found them better than others, or because they have learnt to work with them”.\(^4\) Some employers preferred immigrant blacks whom they thought to be more reliable, honest, hardworking and could do any kind of work. Due to their often precarious vulnerability contexts, immigrant blacks were often desperate and accepted whatever job they could get, while locals preferred office work and relatively better paying jobs.\(^5\)

Employers’ preference for certain groups could potentially problematise intergroup relations at the workplace. In her discussion on economic models of ethnic mobilization, notably the split labour market theory, Suzan Olzak observes that conflict ensues where two or more ethnic groups compete within the same labour market commanding different wages. Yet, it is in the interest of capitalists to maintain an ethnically and racially fractured labour force, which might negatively impact on the evolution of worker consciousness. The split labour market theory, thus, sees class divisions creating and sustaining ethnic mobilization.\(^6\)

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\(^1\) S. R. Chaitaukere, “Deplores Tribalism among Africans”, *African Weekly*, 26 August 1953, p.7. The same issue was raised in an interview with Tagarika at Matapi Hostels, Mbare, on 11 August 2011.


\(^3\) Interview with Tagarika, Matapi, Mbare, 10 August 2011. Muchineripi Tagwireyi, who came to Harare from Bikita, Masvingo in the late 1940s, noted that some of the questions the job-seeker was asked by Africans already in employment were ‘*unobvepi*? (Where do you come from?), *unoyerei*? (What is your totem?)’ The questions were meant to establish the job seeker’s ethnicity before supplying him with any job information.


\(^5\) Interview with Arimando.

Consequently, an interaction of structure and agency helped create ethnic enclaves in Salisbury’s labour market. Africans were not passive victims of European institutions and structures, and the colonial pre-occupation with ethnic hierarchy. African migrant workers were not pawns in complex ethnic games by European grandmasters. They manipulated colonial structures and institutions and appealed to the ethnic resource for their own benefits as they scrambled for the urban social, economic and political space. Identification is therefore not solely a replication of individual membership of particular collectivities or a product of cultural messages and discursive practices that name, classify, discipline and encourage individuals to assume particular identifications. African migrant workers had differential access to ‘raw materials’ used in constructing forms of identification as they positioned themselves in the labour market. Behavioural factors also intersected with institutional and structural ones. Although social networks were indispensable social capital for most migrants, it was the structure of a particular network that often determined the ‘quality’ of job intelligence that was transmitted within the social network.

In addition, some Africans in the city were becoming sophisticated cosmopolitan urbanites. Africans in urban areas were not bewildered ethnic minorities but important socio-economic and political actors in a cosmopolitan city. They were neither ‘detribalised’ nor ‘westernised’. Yet, as Gargett argues, debt to tribal origins’ was ‘as clear as their departure from them’, and their debt to European influence was also as clear as their divergence from it. The supposed ‘detribalizing’ influence of urban life often existed in juxtaposition with ‘retribalisation’ with ethnic forms of identification being re-defined in view of the changing socio-economic context. Africans could be ethnically conscious, belonging to ethnic associations like burial societies, yet they could equally owe allegiance and membership to non-ethnic or multi-ethnic organizations. These organizations campaigned for better wages,

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1 See Manganga, “Migrant Labour, Industrial Ethnicity, Urban Violence and the State in Colonial Zimbabwe”.
5 For example, they could be members of trade unions like the Reformed Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (RICU); civic organizations like the Harare Civic Association and the Harare Employed Women’s League. See *African Weekly*, 10 February 1954, p.1; 1 September 1954. However, most of the women clubs tended to exclude the ‘other’. They were largely concerned with ‘home craft’ and advancing ‘Victorian’ virtues concerning married ‘respectable’ women. Such organisations included the Harare Women’s Club, Helping Hand, Radio Home Craft, and the Harare Home Craft Club. See African Weekly, 8 April 1959, “More than 10 African women’s clubs met in Harare”, p.1.
housing and working conditions for Africans in the city. However, some of the organizations excluded others on the basis of class or social respectability.¹

Industrial ethnicity was never an ‘essential’ form of identification as it remained one among a wide range of ethnic and non-ethnic urban identities that Africans could assume and articulate in given contexts. There were a plethora of alternative identities like membership to dance and burial associations, civic, political and religious organizations.² From the 1950s onwards, Africans could, inter alia, be ethnic entrepreneurs, migrant workers, urbanites and members of political parties. The cosmopolitan African in Salisbury could belong to multi-racial societies, sporting clubs, religious and political organizations.³

5.6 Conclusion

In conclusion, it can be argued that complex synergy of factors, including behavioural, historical, institutional and structural elements, as well as the use of social networks helped engender industrial ethnicity in African Salisbury. There were noticeable efforts by some African migrant workers, Rhodesian state and mostly white employers to maintain such ethnic enclaves. However, industrial ethnicity remained contested, fluid, contingent, ambivalent and one among a range identifications available for Salisbury’s African migrant workers. Its articulation depended on the affordances presented by notions like materialities and power, which were unevenly distributed within communities of African migrants. As such, industrial ethnicity was not always the exclusively salient identification. The following chapter further problematises industrial ethnicity by interrogating its impact on social-economic wellbeing and on inter and intra-group relations.

¹ African Weekly, 10 January 1954
³ Salisbury grew as multi-religious microcosm as evidenced by the presence of multiplicity of religious groups, including Christians, Hindus and Muslims. However, some of the Christian churches were run along ethnic or regional lines. For a discussion on Salisbury’s religious history see Carl F. Hallencreutz, “Religion in the City”, in Raftopoulos and Yoshikuni, eds., Sites of Struggle.
CHAPTER 6: THE IMPACT OF INDUSTRIAL ETHNICITY ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC WELL-BEING AND INTER-GROUP RELATIONS

6.1 Introduction

Industrial ethnicity, as has been argued in the preceding chapter, was a salient feature of urban colonial Zimbabwe’s labour market. Industrial ethnicity afforded different life-chances to various social groups with the potential to foment ethnic tensions at and outside workplaces. Differential access to socio-economic resources fuelled competition, suspicion, hatred, tension and animosity between groups. The present chapter thus explores industrial ethnicity’s interface with the economic well-being of particular groups of African workers in colonial Harare and the attendant implications for inter and intra-group relations. The chapter argues that industrial ethnicity tended to problematise inter-group relations at and beyond the workplace.

6.2 Industrial Ethnicity and Socio-economic Wellbeing
The intersection of industrial ethnicity and socio-economic wellbeing is difficult to establish given the fluidity and ambivalence of the former. The relationship also varied across space and time and should not be generalized. Additionally, it is noteworthy that while ethnic groups may be hierarchically ranked within a given society, industrial ethnicity is not synonymous with social class. However, as we have seen in Chapter 5, there may be notable correlations between social class and industrial ethnicity. For instance, labour migrants belonging to a particular ethnic group could sometimes belong to a specific social class.\(^1\) In early colonial Bulawayo, Shona migrant workers tended to be economically better-off than the local Ndebele and Kalanga.\(^2\) They used their kinship, ethnic and other social networks to form co-operatives where they contributed money to purchase household goods, houses and cars. On the contrary, the Ndebele did not do so and there was a saying that “when the Ndebele were holding on to bicycle pumps, the Shona would be holding to their car key”.\(^3\) In addition, “very few Ndebele owned houses in town”.\(^4\)

The allegations of ‘tribalism’ in the Bulawayo African Advisory Board (BAAB) during the 1950s, particularly concerning the issue of the sale of houses to Africans in the ‘town ships’, were perhaps linked to the realization that an increasing number of Shona immigrants were becoming house owners ahead of the local Ndebele and Kalanga. In 1957, C. M. Pasipanodya, a ‘well-known’ trade unionist in Bulawayo, accused A. Mazibisa, a senior member of the BAAB, of being a tribalist.\(^5\) Pasipanodya made the accusations at a meeting held in Mpopoma, Bulawayo on 8 December 1957 that sought to clarify steps that were being taken by the Superintendent of Natives with regard to applications for houses by unmarried Africans. At that meeting, Mazibisa is reported to have demanded the tribe, surname and district of origin of every applicant. For Pasipanodya, this amounted to tribalism in the allocation of houses. According to Pasipanodya;

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\text{I was not surprised in the end to find that all the people I knew to have failed to obtain a house were of Shona origin. What worried me more than anything else was to find a respectable man like Mr. Mazibisa showing such bad example of tribalism to the young generation.} \]

In response, Mazibisa dismissed the accusation on the basis that the African Advisory Committee (AAC) had little power over the sale of houses since the Superintendent retained

\(^1\) Eriksen, *Nationalism and Ethnicity*. Also see S. Hall, “The Evolution of the Class Structure in Africa”; Hall, “Race, Articulation and Societies Structured in Dominance”.
\(^2\) Msindo, “Ethnicity, Not Class?”
\(^3\) Ibid.
\(^4\) Ibid.
\(^6\) Ibid.
the final say over the issue. Mazibisa argued that “it is not true that any preferential treatment was given to IsiNdebele speaking applicants. This fact is qualified by the fact that today one finds people of all tribes in Mpopoma”. However, Mazibisa did not refute that he had asked the tribes and district of origins of the applicants, which he claimed formed the basis of identifying ‘deserving cases’ that he would recommend to the Superintendent.

Oral sources further indicate that during the colonial period, most indigenous Africans in Zimbabwe who held jobs in towns and cities considered it contemptible to buy houses and live permanently in urban areas. According to Sekuru Matsveru, “most people used to say; ‘how can I have two homes?’ Most locals preferred to work in town while shuttling between Salisbury and their rural homes, which they regarded as ‘musha chaiwo’ or ‘the real home’”. January Banda, from Malawi, noted that most of his friends had houses in Rugare and other parts of Harare like Highfield, Dzivarasekwa, Mufakose, Kambuzuma and Mbare. He further intimated that;

You know, during the colonial period local Africans would say ‘handiite misha miviri kunge bwid’ (I cannot have two homes like a Malawian migrant). Now we are landlords and some of them are still lodgers. We were wiser than them. Now I have my family here and rarely go to Malawi. This is now my home. According to another Zimbabwean man of Malawian origins;

Each time I got into the bar they (Shona men) would start insulting me. One could start, ‘brother, come here dull-face so that you buy us beer because you have no rural home to spend money on. Do you want a rural home? We could allocate you a home in our village then you stop flying to Malawi at night in your magic winnowing basket.

In a significant way, ‘local’ Africans’ construction of ‘home’ constituted part of the ‘language of ethnic contempt’ that was used to denigrate and disparage ethnic others, particularly Malawian men who were regarded mabvakure (aliens from far-away places). The city was regarded as a place where one went to acquire wealth to be used to develop a ‘real home’ in the rural areas. As a result, many opted to shuttle between lodgings in the city and ‘the real home’ in the rural area where their families often stayed.

Due to the prevailing constructions of the notion of ‘home’, African immigrants, especially those from Malawi, were viewed with disparaging attitudes and labelled ‘mabwidi

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1 Ibid.
2 Interview with Sekuru Matsveru, Engineering Section, Highfield, Harare, 6 October 2011.
3 Interview with January Banda.
4 Mashiri, “The Language of Ethnic Contempt”, pp.6-7. Oral sources suggest that the popular belief among the Shona was that Malawian men possessed magical winnowing baskets which they used to fly to Malawi to see their families over night, returning to Salisbury the following morning (Interview with Gogo Rita, Mbare National, 27 May 2011; Interview with Sekuru Dzapasi, Mabvuku, 30 May 2011; Interview with Phiri (Sekuru Shumba).
emutaundi’, that is ‘homeless foreigners who live in towns’ or ‘the stupid, homeless ones’.¹

This was partly linked to colonial migrant labour and residency policies that discouraged Africans from permanently settling in urban areas. Consequently, according to Chikowero;

Many of those classified as indigenous maintained two homes; the main one in the Tribal Trust Lands where the family lived and the urban lodgings in the working class black residential areas. Precisely because the Shona valued family ties with families in the rural areas, they denigrated the Chewa, Chikunda and Komani [Gomani] migrant workers from Mozambique, Zambia and Malawi for whom it was impracticable to visit their countries of origin every month-end. Permanent urban residence thus became a mark of inferiority and synonymous with these ‘foreigners’.²

However, the attitude of indigenous Africans towards permanent settlement in urban areas cannot be generalized. Some actually bought houses in urban areas where they stayed with their families.³ The attitudes of local Africans with regard to ‘permanent’ settlement in urban areas varied over time, and depended on other variables like class, occupation and personal preference. Consequently, the problematic but interesting interface of ethnic identification and socio-economic wellbeing needs to be periodized in view of Salisbury’s demographic dynamics between the 1890s and the 1970s. By the 1960s, local Africans had begun to establish their cultural and ideological hegemony in Salisbury significantly challenging that of northern migrants, particularly those from Malawi. In 1969, autochthons constituted over 80 per cent of Salisbury’s African population. It is in this context that the intersection of industrial ethnicity and economic wellbeing should be examined.

The socio-economic differentiation of the African population was in most instances expressed in spatial terms, particularly the use of African residential space in the city. This usually intersected with other social categories like gender, marital status and even ethnic identification. More so, the increase in the African population in Salisbury led to increasing pressure on social services, especially housing, leading to social tensions.⁴

Salisbury was racially segregated in spatial terms. Overall, whites or Europeans lived in eastern and northern suburbs, while African ‘townships’ and ‘Native Locations’ were generally to the south and west of the city.⁵ In the middle were the residential areas of

¹ Mashiri, “The Language of Ethnic Contempt”. Equally, children born and bred in towns and cities were viewed disparaging attitudes and derogatively referred to as ‘Mabhonirokezheni’, that is ‘those born in the location’.
³ See Scanercchia, “The Mapping of Respectability”; Interviews with Mr and Mrs Rambanepasi, Marimba, Harare, 16 December 2011. The Rambanepasi family has been living in Marimba since the 1960s.
⁵ Some African residential areas like Mabvuku and Tafara were located on the eastern part of the city. They were specifically created to accommodate African domestic workers who worked for Europeans in eastern suburbs.
Coloureds and Asians acting as ‘buffer zones’ between white and black Salisbury.\(^1\) With the exception of those Africans who were employed as personal and domestic workers, those living on the employer’s premises, and those living outside the city, the majority lived in the Municipal Location or in ‘private’ accommodation. These had been established under the Private Locations Ordinance (PLO) of 1906. In the early years, more local Africans (Shona oriented groups) lived in such Private Locations, while the ‘aliens’ dominated the Municipal Location in the inner city.\(^2\)

One of the oldest African residential areas in colonial Zimbabwe was the Harare African Township, the present day Mbare high density suburb. Mbare’s origins can be traced to 1907, when 50 galvanized iron huts under thatch were erected, marking the beginnings of perhaps the most iconic residential area in Zimbabwe.\(^3\) The Magaba (Tins) Section was established in 1924, where Africans lived in corrugated iron huts. In 1932, Old Bricks Section was established mainly by single men, probably from northern territories.\(^4\) The section was, however, later occupied by married men and their families plus single men and women, most of whom were poorly educated.

Before the establishment of Old Highfields Township, in 1934, Harare witnessed a notable influx of Shona populations from surrounding areas, increasing pressure on the housing problem. Consequently, in 1935, a section designed for married Africans was added, while two years later, the MaJoburg Section was built to cater for small families. The New Location was added to the Harare Township in 1939, while the National Section (Mbare National), a much bigger section with four-roomed houses, was built in 1949. Mbare’s National Section was specifically built for the supposedly socially responsible, respectable, educated and married Africans. Some houses were also set aside for single African nurses who had been recruited by the city council from South Africa. Long-serving private, municipal and government employees were also allocated houses in the section together with the prominent African trade unionist Charles Mzingeli.\(^5\) The Runyararo Section with four-


\(^2\) Yoshikuni, *Urban Experiences in Colonial Zimbabwe*.


roomed ‘married houses’ was completed in 1954.\(^1\) By the 1970s, the Harare African Township consisted of 5,497 housing units and 51 hostels accommodating about 24,000 men in single accommodation.\(^2\)

In addition to the provision of ‘married’ accommodation in Harare, single men hostels were also established in the township. The Council Hostels were located on the southern portion of the commonage and were meant to provide accommodation for single migrant male workers, most of whom were non-Rhodesian. The development separated African Municipal Council workers from other Harare residents. The hostels were built after the South African hostel system which appeared economical. The largest of the hostels could accommodate 960 men. Capacity of the others varied between 305 and 960. In 1961, the hostels accommodated about 23,289 men.\(^3\) The hostels were situated close to heavy and light industrial areas to avoid transport costs. The male hostels were associated with the ‘ethnic Other’, the uneducated and less ‘respectable’ Africans. They were also linked to social vices, including *hungochani* (homosexuality), especially in the 1940s and 1950s. One notorious group of homosexuals that operated in the hostels during this time was known as Magube. Marc Epprecht also notes that ‘MaBlantyre’ and ‘MaZambezi’ accounted for the majority of homosexual law offenders during this period.\(^4\)

A hostel for single African women, Carter House, was opened in Harare African Township as a “relatively high class of accommodation for working girls”.\(^5\) Carter House could accommodate 165 single African ladies, with two sharing a bedroom and all the ladies sharing a communal bathroom and kitchen. Rent was £2.2 shillings per month. The employer of each occupant paid £1.9 shillings with the resident paying the remainder. Carter House residents were mainly domestic workers, hospital maids and shop assistants.\(^6\) Unlike the male male hostels, Carter House constituted a more ‘respectable’ residential space for African women.

Between 1952 and 1956, an average of 81 per cent of Salisbury’s African migrant workers came from Nyasaland and PEA. The figure, however, fell to 72 per cent between

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\(^1\) *The City of Salisbury Official Guide*, p.130.


1958 and 1965.¹ Council Hostels were also dominated by ‘non-indigenous’ Africans, who accounted for 67 per cent of occupants of Council Hostels in 1955 and 63 per cent in 1958.² Raftopoulos observes that an examination of Salisbury’s working population in 1956 revealed that approximately 40 per cent only were from Southern Rhodesia, 20 per cent came from Nyasaland and 40 per cent came here from PEA.³ Non-Rhodesian male African migrants who had moved into Salisbury earlier tended to concentrate in the inner city, particularly Harare Africa Township and the Hostels. According to Yoshikuni, the location represented the alien, uneducated, marginalised and urban-based African migrants, while the outer city, especially suburban settlements, represented indigenous, Christian, ‘respectable’ and rural-oriented Africans.⁴ During the first decade of the twentieth century, the Salisbury Municipal Location was almost exclusively occupied by foreign workers with the exception of the female population, which had a large local element from the earliest days. In the 1920s and beyond, some Shona did make their way there, but the entry was far from substantial. To illustrate, in June 1930, the Location’s adult population totalled 3,031, consisting of 1,450 Southern Rhodesians, 822 ‘Nyasalanders’, 551 Portuguese Africans, 204 Northern Rhodesians and 4 South Africans.⁵

Employers and the state played a significant role in the resultant intersection of identification and the use of African urban residential space. Apart from the Salisbury City Council (SCC) and government, other employers like Shell Oil, Tabex and Tobacco Auction Floors, Lever Brothers and the Rhodesian Railways also built or rented compounds and houses for their African workers most of whom tended to be non-Rhodesian.⁶ More Africans of Malawian origins lived in Rugare Township which was opened by the Rhodesian Railways to provide accommodation for its African workers, most of whom happened to be from Malawi.⁷ However, subsequent internal migrations within the city, and rural-urban influx, over the years distorted the dominance of Malawian migrants in the township.⁸ Dzivarasekwa, Mabvuku and Tafara high density residential areas were specifically established to accommodate African domestic workers. Mabvuku and Tafara catered for

² Ibid. p.132.
³ Ibid. p.131.
⁶ Manganga, “Problematising Ethnicity in an Urban Context”, p.79.
⁷ Interview with January Banda. Banda noted that when he left the Meikles Hotel to work for Rhodesia Railways, there were a number of fellow Malawians working there. They are the ones who initially provided him with accommodation and job intelligence.
⁸ Manganga, “Problematising Ethnicity in an Urban Context”, p.79; Interview with John Banda.
Africans working in eastern suburbs, while Dzivarasekwa accommodated those working on the other side of the city. The townships also provided accommodation for low incomes groups and unskilled workers. Research by Chavunduka in 1972 showed that about 83.3 percent of the household heads in Dzivarasekwa were domestic workers. The majority had a relatively low standard of education and of these a greater percentage consisted of Malawians and Mozambicans. However, 60 percent of the township’s population was Rhodesian.\(^1\)

However, while some Africans might have made deliberate efforts to settle in some parts of Salisbury because they were ‘respectable’, quiet, or so that they could enjoy the ‘warmth of the welcome’ from relatives or home-boys/home-girls, others just settled without any due considerations. In the early years, a handful of Shona built homes in Salisbury. These were mostly mission educated, working as messengers, policemen, ‘boss-boys’ or other better paying jobs. They lived as rent-paying tenants on private farms outside the Municipal boundary in areas like Epworth, St. Mary’s, Hunyani, Venterburg and Chishawasha. They often had long tenures of employment. According to Yoshikuni, this group of Africans embodied a rural migrant aspiration and invested their urban incomes in peasant production. Some of them became successful entrepreneurial farmers, rural accumulators and traders.\(^2\)

Until the 1920s, when colonial authorities started to strictly control the life of Africans on suburban land, shebeen queens and commercial sex workers resided on farms like Greendale, Hatfield and Lorelei.\(^3\)

A considerable number of Shona speakers settled in Salisbury from the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s. The new wave of immigration coincided with the opening of New Highfield, Mabvuku African townships, which were opened up during this period. Mabvuku was established to the east of the city to accommodate married Africans in Salisbury. Upon its establishment, 1 140 African families were settled in 3, 4 and 5-roomed houses.\(^4\) More Shona Shona migrants began to settle in Salisbury, mostly in new African residential areas like Highfield, Mufakose, Crowbrough and Marimba Park. This was closely linked to structural factors that gave rise to industrial ethnicity.

In a significant way, African residential areas in Salisbury manifested the differentiated nature of the African population. Old Highfield continued to expand in the 1950s and 1960s with new sections being added to it. These included the Lusaka, Egypt and Engineering

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\(^{3}\) Ibid, p.116.

sections. By 1980, Highfield was the largest ‘township’ in Zimbabwe.¹ Before the establishment of the Beatrice Cottages and Marimba Park, New Highfield was the epitome of African respectability, at least in spatial terms. It was associated with the African elite and educated homeowners. Prominent African political figures like Jasper Savanhu and leading business owners like Mwamuka, Machipisa and Murape had houses in Highfield. It was home for educated Africans, teachers, nurses and politicians. Initially, Highfield was established for African government workers. The Highfield Home Ownership Scheme that was launched in 1956 opened the township to other sections of the African population. Most of the residents were from Shona oriented groups, a development that was linked to Salisbury’s demographic dynamics and industrial ethnicity.

Highfield was established at a time when the local Shona were beginning to establish their numerical dominance, and were somehow re-claiming the city. More indigenous Africans were also getting jobs in the public service. A greater percentage of local Africans had comparatively higher educational levels than non-Rhodesian migrants and had a competitive edge over the latter in the job market, particularly in the public service sector. Indeed, upon its establishment, Highfield was regarded as a little paradise by both residents and government. Yet it did not remain exclusive and ‘respectable’. In fact, by the late 1950s, the “African Paradise’ was increasingly becoming the den of criminals and untold vices, including prostitution, and illicit beer brewing and selling.²

The Beatrice Cottages were built near the Runyararo Section of the Harare African Township. They were originally built for Polish war refugees. In 1958, they were taken over by the SCC and let to African elite group. They were classified as “special accommodation” intended for well-to-do Africans who desired to enjoy higher standards of living. The ‘attractive cottages’ were occupied by a “better class of Africans” whose earning power averaged £30 per month. Tenants paid £5 monthly as rent. The 74 cottages consisted of a sitting room, two bedrooms, a ‘fairly large’ kitchen, dining room, bathroom and water-borne toilet. Hot water and electricity were also available unlike other parts of African Salisbury.³ The cottages were indeed ‘attractive’ accommodation even when compared to the ‘married

houses’ in the African Townships, which were smaller and cheaper with rent averaging £1.9 shillings per month.¹

However, not all Africans who moved into this area had ‘enough money’ to match the life-style and facilities offered. Some avoided using the electricity offered in order to cut cost, prompting the Director of African Administration, C. R. Briggs to threaten them with eviction from the Beatrice Cottages. Some Africans had not applied to electricity connection, while others had disconnected it due to non-payment of accounts, resorting to using paraffin and candles for energy.² Briggs urged those who could not afford living in the Beatrice Cottages to apply to be transferred to their original accommodation.

In the same vein, J. G. S. Chingattie, the Member of Parliament (MP) who represented Northern Nyasaland in the Federal Assembly, suggested that only those earning more than £50 per month were to qualify for residence at the Beatrice Cottages. Those earning less than this were to be accommodated in the Municipal Townships.³ Yet, a female resident at the cottages noted that “my coming to the Beatrice Cottages was not because I had a lot of money but because it would be quiet here. Here one does not get the type of noisy and careless people who live in the Location”.⁴ ‘Respectable’ housewives resented the ‘cheaper houses’ due to the system of communal lavatories.

A new African Township, Crowborough, was established 8 miles west of the city in 1960. The houses varied from 1 to 3 bed-roomed houses, each with a dining room and a kitchen. The houses compared favourably with those in the National Section of the Harare Township and had inside latrines not communal ones. In April 1960, it was reported that “the ‘model’ African Township has spacious roads although the houses are semi-detached; they are not as closely packed as they are in Harare”.⁵ Part of Crowborough was set aside for the introduction of the first home-ownership scheme for Africans by the Salisbury City Council. Meanwhile, Marimba Park was established by government in 1961 to provide low-density housing for wealthy Africans who were proscribed from buying houses in ‘European’ areas in accordance with the Native (Urban Areas) Accommodation and Registration Act of 1946.⁶ The new ‘low density’ residential area was located about 16 kilometres south-west of the city.

⁴ Ibid.
⁶ See Historical Dictionary of Zimbabwe, p.171.
In addition, some Africans increasingly saw the value of education, especially its potential to increase their competitiveness in the labour market and enhancing their economic fortunes. Racial discrimination, of course, militated against Africans’ abilities to realize their full socio-economic and political advancement. The Industrial Conciliation Act (ICA) of 1934, for example, restricted Africans from qualifying for apprenticeships, being qualified as skilled workers or joining trade unions.\(^1\) Varying African levels of poverty and accumulation as well as uneven socio-economic development of provinces and districts led to differential regional- and in some instances groups’-access to education, which in turn had implications for one’s personal socio-economic advancement. In 1951, there were only 10 senior secondary schools in the country, including St. Augustine’s, Kutama, Dadaya, Hartzell, Solusi, Tegwani and Gokomere.\(^2\) By the 1970s, the number had increased to about 100 but very few Africans could afford secondary education.\(^3\)

An analysis of the interim report of the 1969 national census suggests that inequalities existed in access to secondary education by different regions and groups. This was “related to differentiation in educational development and provision in the various provinces of origin and not to ethnicity *per se*”.\(^4\) The rate of educational development was related to factors like a district’s physical environment, remoteness from urban centres, demographic distribution, and the historical development of Christian Missions in various provinces. At independence, most of the secondary schools in the country were run by Christian Missions. Dorsey concluded that the “Korekore who reside in Mashonaland North, which is least developed educationally, have far fewer pupils represented in senior secondary schools proportionate to their numbers, while Matabeleland South is one of the more advanced provinces”.\(^5\) Moreover, secondary schools tended to draw the bulk of their students from local school districts, although they were multi-ethnic, overall.

However, white racism and discrimination against blacks significantly militated against the latter’s efforts to acquire requisite educational and technical skills to advance themselves socially and economically. In 1980, only 35 per cent of blacks were in primary school, while only 4 per cent were in secondary school.\(^6\) For the ‘fortunate’ ones who managed to acquire some education and professional qualifications-hence relatively better paying jobs- with increased income came preference for better social amenities, including housing.

\(^2\) Ibid. p.72.
\(^3\) Ibid.
\(^6\) Chung, “Opportunities for Political Renewal in Zimbabwe”, p.239.
Consequently, class was crucial in determining housing preferences. Other factors that determined where a particular African settled in Salisbury included the need to stay near one’s friends and relatives; the period when one entered Salisbury, which often coincided with the opening or expansion of particular residential areas; and the provision of housing by employers.\(^1\) Admittedly:

As the number of Africans with higher education increased, more and more of the better type houses were built by the City Council to accommodate them. Men such as teachers no longer wanted to live in the Old Bricks, MaJoburg and New Location Sections for with the latrines and bathrooms in these sections being communal they thought they were not good for men such as themselves.\(^2\)

Other single professionals like teachers were also accommodated in those sections that were normally reserved for married couples. Attempts by the Housing and Education Departments to move these professionals from ‘married accommodation’ were successfully resisted in 1963.\(^3\) Government later built ‘hostels’ for single professionals in Highfield. Teachers insisted that these be referred to as teachers’ flats not hostels. They disliked the term ‘hostels’, which was associated with the hostels in Harare Township that were occupied by poor, uneducated, largely ‘alien’ migrants.\(^4\) The Teachers’ Flats were each named after prominent educated Africans with esteemed social standing, hence the names Jabavu Flats and Chitepo Flats. Other educated Africans who were teaching at the University of Rhodesia moved to ‘European’ areas by virtue of their profession which made them eligible for University accommodation.\(^5\) Overall, the emergent African elite disliked sharing rooms, especially with lower classes and the sub-alterns.

The problem of accommodation often prompted the use of social networks with earlier migrants providing the ‘warmth of the welcome’ to their relatives, friends from home or other acquaintances. This in turn resulted in ethnic clusters in residential areas. For example, Timothy Takaendesa, who came to Salisbury in the 1960s said when he came to the city, he was accommodated by his brother who lived in Harare using a single room. The brother was married and staying with his wife and they had to share the room with Timothy

\(^1\) For instance, some gardeners, cooks and maids stayed at the employer’s premises occupying the so called ‘boy’s khaya’ or ‘boyskay’, meaning ‘the boy’s house’. African man were derogatively considered ‘boys’, while female African domestic workers were derogatively referred to as ‘girls’. Interview with Mai Mavis, Mabvuku, Harare, 4 March 2012. Mai Mavis, who worked as a maid between the 1970s and the 1990s, stayed in Grendale from the early 1970s before moving to Mount Pleasant in 1980, where she stayed until 1995. She only left these formerly ‘white’ residential areas upon retirement.


\(^3\) Ibid.

\(^4\) Ibid.

\(^5\) Ibid.
sleeping on the floor, while the brother and his wife slept on the bed. After securing a job at a tobacco processing company, Timothy later left his brother to stay with a ‘homeboy’ sharing a room in Mbare National.1

The African population in colonial Harare was further differentiated in terms of wealth.2 The elite owned houses, businesses, cars, expensive furniture, television sets and other items that were associated with European style of living. By the 1960s, a number of prominent local African (mostly Shona-speaking) business owners had emerged in Salisbury. These included Aidan Mwamuka, Wilson Murambiwa, Gotham Zanyanya, Josiah Chinamano, James Chiweshe and Bernard Vito.3 Mwamuka was the chairperson of the African Chamber of Commerce that was formed in Harare Township in 1954. He was a former school teacher who by 1961 owned two service stations in Highfield. He also owned Mwamuka Motors in Highfield and could even import goods from outside Southern Rhodesia for his retail shops.4 The Machipisa Business Centre, the largest in Zimbabwe, is named after Wilson B Murambiwa, who was popularly known as Machipisa, that is, ‘one who charges lower prices’.5

Chinamano was the chairperson of the Highfield Traders Association and former teacher, headmaster and supervisor of African schools. He was from Mutare and ran a ‘successful’ trading shop at Highfield.6 On his part, James Chiweshe had shops in both Harare and Highfield. He was ‘a successful businessman and entrepreneur’, who even as far back as the 1950s was insightful enough to acquire businesses and properties in and around the African townships.7 Unlike most Africans of his time, James Chiweshe saw the value of educating the African girl child. In the 1960s, his daughter, Marcellina, was the first African to enrol at the Dominican Convent School, an ‘elitist’ and expensive school that has over the years maintained this reputation. Chiweshe’s son, Solomon, was the first black pupil at another elitist, very expensive and non-racial school, Hartman House.8

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1 Interview with Timothy Takaendesa, Mbare National, Harare, 3 March 2011. There was overcrowding in Harare to the extent that it was not uncommon to find two or more families, their children and single males (not relatives) living in one small room in the location. Most of these people lived in the location illegally in contravention of the 1892 Urban Locations Ordinance.

2 See West, The Rise of an African Middle Class.

3 African Businessman, No 1, April 1961, p.3.


5 Manganga, “An Analysis of the Dynamics of Street Vending in Post-Operation Murambatsvina Harare”.

6 Interview with Mbuya Musarurwa, Machipisa, Highfield, 12 August 2011. Also see African Businessman 14 April 1961.


8 Ibid.
Bernard Vito was the first African to run a bus service in Salisbury’s urban areas. He was a ‘well-known’ transport and bus operator who lived in the ‘affluent’ Beatrice Cottages. In 1961, he had 12 buses and ‘several transport lorries’. His children also attended prominent African schools like Goromonzi. It is, therefore, clear that a number of Africans had by the 1960s and 1970s managed to establish themselves as leading business people and employers in mostly Harare and Highfield. The above examples illustrate that the African population in urban colonial Zimbabwe was significantly differentiated in socio-economic terms. While people like James Chiweshe could afford to enrol their sons at Hartman House, other Africans in the townships and hostels were indeed the ‘poorest of the poor’.

Immigrant blacks, particularly those from Malawi and Mozambique were usually stereotyped as the ‘poorest of the poor’. Often, when most of them left Rhodesia at the end of their contracts or on retirement, their possessions were supposedly limited to the few rags in which they arrived and a pot in which to prepare food during the long journey home. Although the above construction of immigrant blacks was part of ethnic pride and prejudice in colonial Zimbabwe, stereotypes do not develop randomly. Indeed, due to the long term impact of industrial ethnicity and colonial labour policies, in post-independence Zimbabwe, the mine and farm worker became synonymous with black immigrants from Malawi and Mozambique. The two occupations are among the least paying, making the ‘aliens’ poorer than the average indigenous Zimbabwean. However, not all ‘alien’ migrants were poorer than locals. Zarangwa Masina, a descendent of a Malawian, held the view that “in spite of being called names, on the mines-at least in Mashava- Malawians were ‘masters’. Up to the 1970s, they formed senior staff almost in every department of mine work”.

Like the immigrant blacks who were derogatively labelled mabvakure/amading’ndawo (outsiders), some Shona, Ndebele or other groups could in some instances travel to urban areas in Rhodesia or South Africa in search of work and never return home. There were a number of Zezuru, Karanga, Korekore, Ndu or Manyika men.

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1 Interviews with Gogo Rita, Mbare National, Harare, 27 May 2011; Sekuru Mavesuru, Highfield, 6 and 7 October 2011.
4 Moto Magazine, May 1988, “Now we are all Zimbabweans”, p.11. Indeed, given the locals’ detest of mine and farm work, before independence, these sectors were dominated by immigrant blacks.
6 K. Manganga, “A Socio-Economic History of the Jena (Nyajena) People with Particular reference to the Role and Status of Women, c. 1890 to the early 1950s”, BA Honours Dissertation, History Department, University of Zimbabwe, 1997, pp.33-34; Also see NAZ S1044/2 Superintendent of Natives, Victoria, 10 October 1916.
who came to work in Salisbury where they spent their entire working or adult lives without remitting or returning to their rural homes. Such men were said to have been ‘swallowed’ by the pleasures of Salisbury, hence the sayings akadyiwa nepurezha kuSozibheri (he squandered all his fortunes in Salisbury) or akachonera Sozibheri (he went to Salisbury and never returned to the rural home).¹

It is noteworthy that the process of migration whether internal or across national borders has varied outcomes and can either improve or worsen the vulnerability context of particular groups or individuals. In socio-economic and socio-political terms, black immigrants tended to be more vulnerable than the ‘autochthons’. The denigration of migrants from northern territories and their depiction as the ‘poorest of the poor’ was also linked to the endemic xenophobic feelings of locals who felt ‘the foreigners’ were taking away their jobs. The picture was, in fact, more varied and multi-layered since some Nyasaland migrants even owned houses in Salisbury, while others remitted significant sums of money to their relatives back home.² Others married local women and settled in town, peri-urban areas and even in ‘Tribal Trust Lands’ (TTLs). The ‘wealthier’ ones could buy land in the Native Purchase Areas (NPAs)³, while others changed their names to sound more local in order to gain social acceptance.⁴

Some immigrant blacks actually remitted money to their families back home.⁵ John Phiri, a former migrant worker from Zambia who now resides in Dzivarasekwa and worked in Harare as a ‘milk boy’, noted that, “I did not earn much but I could save a little and send it to my parents back home at least once a year. I put the money in an envelope and gave it to Superintendent of Natives, Victoria, wrote to the manager of Messina Mine, South Africa, in 1916, requesting him to assist in the collection of taxes from defaulting Africans from Ndanga (Zaka) and Victoria districts working at the mine. The men were not remitting to their families who in turn failed to meet the colonial financial demands.

¹ Interview with Mbuya Musarurwa, Machipisa, Highfield, 12 August 2011.
² Interviews with Banda (Sekuru Shumba), Warren Park 1, Harare, 16 February 2012; Sixpence, Dzivarasekwa, Harare, 4 and 7 August 2011; Raimos Sajeni, Rugare, 5 March and 8 December 2011.
³ However, immigrant blacks could not be citizens or permanent residents in line with the provisions of the Foreign Migratory Labour Amendment Act which sought to phase out foreign labour. Also, even if they settled in the ‘Reserves’, they did not have legal access to land as they were considered non-indigenous. See B. Rutherford, “Belonging to the Farm(er): Farm Workers and the Shifting Politics of Citizenship”, Hammar, Raftopoulos and Jensen, eds., Zimbabwe’s Unfinished Business, p.202; Muzondidya, “Jambanja: Ideological Ambiguities in the Politics of Land and Resource Ownership in Zimbabwe”, p.328.
⁴ NAZ A3/18/30/14 General Manager, RNLB, Bulawayo, to the Secretary, Department of the Administrator, Salisbury, 22 July 1910.
⁵ Some of the Malawians have settled in Zimbabwe where they have established urban homes and raised families but still periodically visits their families ‘back home’. Achimwene of Kuwadzana Extension, a low income residential area in Harare, owns a house and has families in both Zimbabwe and Malawi. He also maintains contact with other people of Malawian origins around Harare. Achimwene normally goes to Malawi once a year (Interview with Sekuru Achimwene, Kuwadzana Extension, Harare, 15 December 2011).
friends who would pass the money to my relatives in Zambia”.\(^1\) Others remitted ‘large sums’ that even raised the concern of colonial authorities. Addula Mkwanda, from Malawi, who was working at and around Shamva under the name Abakatasepu Mkwanda, attracted the attention of the Superintendent of Native Affairs (SNA), Zomba, Nyasaland, who in turn alerted his colleagues in Southern Rhodesia to investigate the man. The SNA, Zomba, reported that Mkwanda was remitting ‘unusually large’ sums of money from Rhodesia and that:

Two months ago he remitted a sum of £12 and has now sent a sum of £53. It may be that he has acquired these sums quite honestly but on the other hand it appears that the second sum remitted, being so much larger than the first remittance of only two months earlier, cannot have been earned by him in the shape of wages. I therefore call your attention to the matter and suggest that inquiry be made as to what occupation he is following. For your information, I may state that the man has not borne a good character here with his employers when working as a sub-storekeeper.\(^2\)

The SNA, Zomba, under-estimated African labour migrants’ ability to save their wage incomes over time and to remit when the need arose. Although African wages were low, some migrant workers managed to save substantial portions of their meagre earnings.\(^3\) For example, when Manwere was arrested in Salisbury over the murder of Sergeant Chatima, he was in possession of £25 that he had been given by Patrick Gwara Pazarangu for safe-keeping. As Katsekera\(^4\) and a Tonga, Manwere was ‘feared’ by other Africans in the location and therefore could safely keep the money. Upon arrest, Manwere told the police that he had Pazarangu’s money and the money was given to its owner.\(^5\) Manwere knew that Pazarangu was a Manyika who could supposedly use magic to recover his money. The two were also related as Manwere was married to Pazarangu’s niece, Ida Mamboininga. Ida was related to Pazarangu in that she was also a Budya (Manyika).\(^6\) This illustrates how social networks were created and used as socio-economic resources. Pazarangu, a Manyika, regarded himself a relative of a Tonga (Manwere) by virtue of Manwere’s marriage to a fellow Manyika. When Pazarangu later decided to marry, he used the savings to pay for the bride price or roora/lobola.

In addition, given the generally low wages, remittances were made after several months of saving. Moreover, financial demands at home dictated how frequently one remitted and in

\(^1\) Interview with John Phiri.
\(^2\) NAZ N3/22/5-7, Superintendent of Native Affairs, Zomba, Nyasaland, to CNC, Salisbury, 10 February 1964.
\(^3\) Interview with Arimando.
\(^4\) The katsekera were Location Police who ‘closed’ houses when rent was not paid. See NAZ AOH/56 Notes on Interview with Patrick Gwara Pazarangu, p.34.
\(^5\) Ibid.
\(^6\) Ibid., p.34.
what amounts. In the event of emergencies requiring larger sums of money, migrant workers
could easily turn to their social networks to get ‘soft loans’ payable over a period of time.¹
Other African migrants earned relatively ‘better’ wages that could dwarf the £53 that raised
the Superintendent’s suspicions if saved over a couple of months. In 1960, it was reported
that in Salisbury there was:

A gradual and steady tendency for wages to rise slightly if only for the reason that
many Africans are now becoming urbanized and more fixed in both their place of
abode and outlook towards permanent employment, and therefore becoming entitled to
increments on service. Increments are paid by most employers at rates far beyond the
minimum laid down by regulation.²

An Inspector in the Salisbury Commercial Area reported wages as high as £18.10 shillings
per month at Oxley and Company.³ A workshop assistant at Panelcraft Limited, car panel
beaters, was earning £7 weekly. A Laboratory Assistant in Lithium Works at Gwelo (Gweru)
earned £28 per month.⁴ As such, Africans had varied incomes, which impacted on levels of
accumulation. Such variations were, inter alia, on the basis of ethnic ranking, work
experience and educational levels. However, the vulnerability contexts of immigrant blacks
tended to be more precarious than locals who could ‘retire’ to the rural homes when the
socio-economic situation in town became unbearable. Indeed, “because of massive
unemployment in their countries of origin, these immigrants also had little prospect of
guaranteed jobs or places to live, having lost land rights after years of absence”.⁵ The link
between industrial ethnicity and socio-economic wellbeing was, therefore, not clear-cut.

6.2 Industrial Ethnicity and Inter-Group Relations

As has been argued in preceding discussions, industrial ethnicity can be used as an avenue for
economic attainment by immigrants through their use of ethnic resources and ethnic ties.⁶
Industrial ethnicity can engender both positive and negative outcomes for groups and
individuals. Consequently, ethnic minorities not only seek wealth but social and political

¹ Interview with Mr Mandebvu, Highfield, Harare, 11 and 12 August 2011.
² NAZ S2239 (Labour Reports 1960), Southern Rhodesia Department of Labour Monthly Report, April 1960.
³ Ibid.
⁴ Ibid.
⁵ Muzondidya, “Jambanja: Ideological Ambiguities in the Politics of Land and Resource Ownership in
Zimbabwe”, p.328.
⁶ Fong and Ooka, “The Social Consequences of Participating in the Ethnic Economy,” p.1; see Granovetter,
pp.3-29.
A group’s socio-economic wellbeing is predicated on its ability to access a diversity of new economic opportunities and privileged access to these opportunities to its members. Various ethnic migrants have experienced a wide range of socio-economic outcomes over time and space as a result of their participation in labour markets that are characterized by widespread ethnic clusters. Strong ties within the group and weak ties bridging the group to mainstream society appear to optimize socio-economic opportunities and socio-political security for migrants. Strong ties are critical for promoting the flow of job information within a particular group, while weak ties are important for promoting information flows about activities outside the group. They help groups and individuals to secure new economic opportunities and improve relations with other groups, thereby ensuring the socio-political security of ethnic others and the social acceptance of ‘outsiders’.

The success of ethnic immigrants often results in backlashes as it creates ethnic hatred against the economically dominant groups. Their ambivalent position makes them insecure and vulnerable, especially if they remain ‘cultural islands’. One of the most notable examples was the expulsion of Asians from Uganda by Idi Amin in the 1972.

In colonial Zimbabwe, tensions between immigrant blacks and locals were evident from as early as the 1890s. Industrial workplace ethnicity afforded better life chances for immigrant blacks than locals who were paid lower wages than the ‘colonial boys’. Consequently, the workplace became both a conduit for ethnic solidarity and an arena for ethnic conflict. It has, therefore, been noted that:

The work situation therefore became a conduit where ethnic solidarities could be promoted while such things as differential remuneration obviously increased jealousies and suspicion. In the domestic employment sector, for example, by 1897 wages for ‘colonial boys’ were £5 per month while Shonas were paid £1, 15 shillings, and when wages were reduced in 1900, ‘colonial boys’ were paid £3 and Shonas 15 shillings.

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1. Adida, “Beyond the Immigrant Ethnic Economy.”
The colonial system of divide and rule as well as white employers and the state’s obsession with cataloguing Africans through imagined ethnic taxonomies led to an intersection of ethnic definition or hierarchy and life chances. This tended to create tensions within the African labour force. The situation obtaining in colonial Zimbabwe’s urban areas mirrored the experiences of migrant workers elsewhere across the African continent. In early colonial Angola, the Diamang diamond mining company gave higher wages to the ‘experienced’ ethnic Baluba, while underpaying the ‘inexperienced’ ethnic Chokwe labourers. This created animosity and heightened ethnic tensions at the workplace. According to Cleveland:

Diamang engendered this animosity by inserting the experienced Luba employees into overseer, or capataz, positions on the mines. In addition to thwarting diamond theft, capatazes were charged with ensuring that manual labourers worked at an acceptable pace and often meted out physical punishment, either on their own volition, or following orders issued by white managers.¹

Industrial ethnicity fuelled antagonism between ethnic groups. Groups that benefited from differential remuneration were constructed as ‘the Other’ and were perceived by other African groups as appendages or adjuncts of the exploitative colonial system. During the 1896/7 Ndebele and Shona uprisings against white settlers (First Chimurenga), immigrant catechists, messengers, drivers and store assistants were attacked and/or killed as they were not only seen as economic competitors but part of the colonial system as well.²

The hostile local attitude towards immigrant blacks was embedded in the Shona and Ndebele’s collective memory.³ As the ‘first group of black proletarians and lumpen proletarians’, immigrant blacks were absorbed in the success of settler capitalism in Rhodesia.⁴ This conflicted with the interests of local blacks who were keen to maintain their socio-economic and political autonomy. Consequently, black immigrants often clashed with locals during the execution of their duties as shop assistants, messengers, catechists or interpreters.⁵ In the early years of colonial rule, immigrant blacks identified themselves more with white Rhodesians than with blacks. The attitude changed much later as white oppression and colonial injustices against Africans become more entrenched.⁶ Immigrant blacks who fought along white settlers during the uprisings later sought compensation for their ‘special relationship’ with whites. In 1914, some of them founded the Union Native Vigilance

¹ Cleveland, “A Minority in the Middle”, p.204.
⁴ Ibid.
⁵ Ibid.
⁶ Ibid.
Association (UNVA) in the Salisbury location. They unsuccessfully petitioned for certificates of exemption to be granted them because of their ‘previous loyal service’. In addition to exemption from carrying passes, liquor laws and other restrictive legislations, immigrant blacks called for better social amenities.

The prevalence, salience and resonance of industrial ethnicity in urban colonial Zimbabwe often created tensions between ethnic groups. The Ndebele, for example, regarded the Fingo as their ‘natural inferiors’, and such ethnocentric attitudes were extended to workplaces as well as residential places. The disparaging attitude by the Ndebele was extended to other ‘colonial boys’. At the mines, van Onselen notes that there were conflicts between immigrant blacks and local Africans. In Salisbury, industrial ethnicity led to ethnic tensions at workplaces, especially where there were ethnic majorities and minorities. A ‘boss-boy’ or African supervisor from one ethnic group had to contend with rivalry and criticism from influential men belonging to other ethnic groups aspiring for the ‘boss-boyship’. For the employer, the use of a ‘boss-boy’ from a ‘minority’ ethnic group was thought to help in maintaining discipline at the workplace. As a result, “the tendency of employers to prefer certain groups for certain types of work and their conscious manipulation of ethnic differences to keep the workforce disunited resulted in competition between ethnic groups being built into the hierarchically structured workforce”.

On their part, the Butwa used industrial ethnicity to settle old scores with their ‘enemies’. The Butwa were a closed or secret society that operated in Salisbury in the early colonial period and were exclusively composed of workers at Salisbury’s Sanitary Farm. The Butwa had been carried south by workers prevented from returning to Katanga by the sleeping sickness regulations and the increased activities of the RNLB. Soon, the Butwa assumed ethnic and class dimensions. Like other ethnic associations in Salisbury, the Butwa “provided a support network offering job contacts, local intelligence and shelter to their enemies”. The Butwa were a closed or secret society that operated in Salisbury in the early colonial period and were exclusively composed of workers at Salisbury’s Sanitary Farm. The Butwa had been carried south by workers prevented from returning to Katanga by the sleeping sickness regulations and the increased activities of the RNLB.

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1 Ibid.
4 van Onselen, Chibaro.
5 African Weekly, 28 September 1955, “Tribalism a Sign of Ignorance”, p.11. The term ‘boss-boy’ was derogatory depicting white racist notions of the time. Grown African men with wives and children were called ‘boys’, hence derogatory colonial terms like ‘garden boy’ and ‘house girl’ for African domestic workers or house ‘servants’. The term ‘boss boy’ is used as a historical reference and not in its derogatory and racist senses.
8 Parry, “Culture, Organisation and Class,” p.67; Manganga, “Problematising Ethnicity in an Urban Context”.

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members”.\(^1\) Like Zvinyawo, the Butwa were a closed society that used secrecy and violence in their daily struggles with ethnic others. They accused Shona groups of having killed their people during the 1896/7 uprisings.\(^2\)

The Butwa used secrecy and violence to ensure their cultural and ideological autonomy and to secure the socio-political security of their members. According to Parry:

Sanitary workers, marginalised in the rural economy, exploited and harassed by the machinery of the colonial state, living and working in appalling conditions, and despised by other workers as matanyera, [the Butwa] may have soaked up the aggression and violence directed towards them, and by redirecting it outwards, used it to provide a positive self-image as well as a measure of security.\(^3\)

Between 1908 and 1912, 10 murders were committed by the Butwa who worked on Salisbury’s Sanitary Farm.\(^4\) The murders were committed in a context of heightening tension and animosity between ‘autochthons’ and ‘aliens’ over work related issues. The autochthons often looked down upon the northern migrants, especially the ‘Zambezi Boys’ or Tonga and migrants from Nyasaland some of whom did ‘night soil work’ or sanitary work.\(^5\) Scanercchia Scanercchia notes that “if a local was found using a toilet when the MaZambezi came to collect the tins, the unfortunate person stood the chance of being beaten….well dressed people often ran the risk of being splashed by passing night-soil workers” as a tactic in the ongoing ‘war’ between locals and ‘aliens’.\(^6\)

Some Africans also resorted to using lucky charms and jujú (magic) against their competitors in the job market.\(^7\) They would consult n’angas or sangomas who would give them lucky charms so that they could be liked by employers. Some of the magical concoctions were allegedly mixed with fat from a lion and were thought to make the user both respected and feared by ‘ethnic others’ and employers alike.\(^8\) The magical concoction could be in the form of a lotion that the user would smear around his/her body before leaving home for work or a dumwa, a band containing the concoction that was worn as an arm band concealed under a shirt. Sekuru Dembeza, an informant originally from Dande, northern Zimbabwe, who came to Salisbury in the 1940s, stressed that one needed to be

\(^1\) Ibid., p.65. The same was echoed in interviews the author conducted with former migrant workers from Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia.


\(^3\) Ibid. p.68; NAZ S713/3 Murder of Africans, 1908-1912.

\(^4\) NAZ S628/678 Evidence of Balamozi alias Joni, p.66.


\(^7\) Interview with Nyashanu, Magaba, Mbare, March 2003.

\(^8\) Interview with Sekuru Dembeza, Highfields, Harare, 23 March 2011.
‘strengthened’, *kusimbiswa*, first before coming to the city. This would ostensibly help the migrant meet the socio-economic challenges in the city.¹ Dembeza, in an interview with the author, intimated that:

There were dangerous people in town those days and the competition for jobs was fierce. One had to prepare himself before coming to Salisbury where you would meet people from different parts of the country and others who came from far away countries. The MaBlantyre [Malawians] possessed very powerful magic that made them to be liked by whites. I knew all these things before I left home for Salisbury. My uncle, Dickson, who came here earlier, told me all these things. So, before I left home for Salisbury in the 1940s, I consulted a local *n’anga* who gave me a *dumwa* to wear under my shirt as an armband. Employers liked me very much and after working for a few months at a tobacco company I was made a ‘bass boy’ (foreman). Other Africans also respected me in the location. I, however, feared guys from Mutare and Chipinge. Those ones had powerful magic I tell you... My *dumwa* later ‘expired’ after someone saw it while I was bathing. You see, no one, even my wife was supposed to see the *dumwa*. Now this guy we stayed with, he was from my village, saw it and all my powers were gone.²

Another interesting case is that of Patrick Gwara Pazarangu who was appointed Postmaster at Highfield Post Office in 1955. According to Pazarangu, “the man who was supposed to be appointed... was Paneal Phiri, a Tonga man”. However, the then Superintendent in the Telegraph Office in Salisbury, Papenfus, told Pazarangu to go to Highfield together with Paneal Phiri for training, towards the end of 1954. Pazarangu, who claims that he was very intelligent, accused Phiri of casting a spell on him so that he could not be appointed ahead of him. Pazarangu accused Paneal of using *juju* to make him lose his sight for a week. Concerning the incident, Pazarangu recalled that:

My eyes were examined and I was told that I need two pairs of spectacles. The one pair was for reading purposes and the other for general use. Someone came to my house and told me, ‘did I not tell you that there are some mischievous people? There are some people with black magic powers’.³

When Pazarangu returned to work, he warned his workmates that whoever was responsible for his misfortune ‘would suffer the consequences’. Immediately after the warning, Paneal, Pazarangu’s key competitor for the post of Postmaster for Highfield Post Office, is said to have developed measles all over his body. Pazarangu confronted Paneal and said: “it is now your turn to suffer. You were the first to use black magic”. Paneal later recovered and

² *Ibid.* In fact, the Korekore like Dembeza were associated with *Mangoromera*, a magical charm that was used by a boxer that was believed to give them great strength during fights. See D.C.H.P, “Mangoromera,” *NADA*, Vol 11, 1933, pp59-60; *Bulawayo Chronicle* 4 January 1930, “Boxing cause of Native trouble,” p.13. Sixpence further noted that the secrecy that was associated with *Zvinyาวo* might have made some local Africans to associate all Malawian migrant workers with ‘powerful magic’ (Interview with Sixpence).
³ NAZ AOH/56 Notes on Interview with Patrick Gwara Pazarangu, p.51.
together with Pazarangu and, one Wataya from Northern Rhodesia, completed their training in 1955. Pazarangu was, subsequently, appointed Postmaster for Highfield Post Office.

In other instances, competition for jobs or ‘key posts’ led to some migrant workers resorting to murdering their perceived ‘enemies’ and competitors. One such incident was the murder of Sergeant Chatima, a kateskera. Sergeant Chatima was killed at Old Bricks, Harare African Township, by a katsekera called Matanyera. Matanyera “hired Zvinyawo (Malawian masked dancers) to kill Chatima so that Manwere could take over as the Sergeant.”

Manwere was the Township Corporal. However, colonial authorities appointed one Vito as Sergeant instead of Manwere who was arrested and imprisoned. Chatima was a Chikunda while Manwere was a Tonga from the Zambezi Valley. Concerning the Tonga, Pazarangu had this to say: “I tell you those people are bad. One should not play around with them”. Interestingly, the Manyika like Pazarangu were also thought to be very ‘dangerous’ people in the location and at workplaces because they were thought to possess magical powers to recover lost property or execute revenge on enemies. They were thought to possess zvikwambo or goblins and could supposedly ‘create’ bolts of lightning and cause it to strike and kill their enemies.

The katsekera often abused their powers to subvert colonial hegemony and in their struggles with other groups at work and in the location. Industrial ethnicity appears to have been one of the factors that led to urban violence by African migrants in colonial Zimbabwe. This is clearly illustrated in the Ngoni faction fights in Salisbury in 1922, and the Bulawayo faction fights of 1929. The Ngoni faction fights illuminate the ambiguities of African ethnicity and the nature of relations between migrant workers and the state. The Gomani, or ‘real Ngoni’, were an off-shoot of the South African Zulu, who migrated to central and east Africa during the Mfecane period in the nineteenth century. When they arrived in present day Malawi, they subdued the autochthons, and the Ngoni aristocratic minority established a Ngoni state of mixed ethnic units. In a wider sense, the term ‘Ngoni’ referred to all those people who lived under the rule of the Ngoni paramount chief. Ngoni identity was fluid, inclusive, and context dependent, rather than rigid and static. The Chewa or Chipeta, Senga,

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1 Ibid.
2 Ibid. pp.34-35.
3 Ibid. p.10; Interview with Dembeza, Highfields, Harare, 23 March 2011. The Karanga from Zaka, Masvingo, were also thought to be ‘experts’ in the use of witchcraft, especially using ‘tokoloshe’ or zvidhoma against their ‘enemies’. Some Shona migrants could claim to be from Zaka, Mutare or Chipinge so that they could be feared by others who would think they possessed magic which they could use against them.
4 Parts of this section are based on the author’s chapter, “Migrant Labour, Industrial Ethnicity, Urban Violence and the State in Colonial Zimbabwe. The Case of Migrant Workers in Harare,” in Mbanaso and Chima, eds., Minorities and the State in Africa, especially pages 229-235.
Manganga/Manganja, and other groups could at times identify themselves as Ngoni in a bid to position themselves in competitive labour markets.

As argued in Chapter 5, colonial pre-occupation with hierarchy culminated in the crystallization and entrenchment of ethnic stereotypes subsequently helping in fomenting industrial ethnicity. Ngoni national feeling was invigorated, and prestige in the Ngoni label became a matter of pride in urban centres, including Salisbury. The Ngoni also enjoyed the reputation of being effective soldiers and administrators. They resisted British colonisation longer than any other groups in Malawi and when they were finally subdued in 1904, the British Governor allowed them to retain their paramount chief and to enjoy other freedoms not applicable to other African groups. The Ngoni subsequently manipulated this differential treatment to extend their control over other groups.

The ‘Ngoni’ emerged as an ethnically ‘superior’ group whose identification became the envy of the Gomani’s ‘traditional’ enemies, including the Chipeta or Chewa. In Salisbury, the Gomani Ngoni dominated the Location Police force since 1899 when they arrived in the city. As katsekera, they often used their influence to subvert colonial authority becoming a law unto themselves. During the pre-colonial period, the Chipeta or Chewa, whose name was translated to ‘slave’ or ‘tax payer’, occupied a subordinate position and paid tax to the Gomani. In Salisbury, the two met in similar work and under similar conditions as migrant workers and ethnic others, who were collectively denigrated by other migrants as ‘Nyasas’, ‘Manyasarandi’, ‘MaChawa’, ‘Mabwidi’, ‘Matevera njanji’ or ‘MaBlantyre’. The Chipeta presumably saw this as raising them to the level of the Gomani, “yet the latter did not attempt to conceal their contempt of this” . The Gomani probably felt that their assumed ethnic superiority was at stake.

Since 1917, there were reports of ensuing tensions between the Gomani and the Chipeta. The tension reached an apogee in 1922. In May that year, the Location Superintendent reported that the Gomani and the Chipeta tried to fight in the location and were disarmed. However, the Chipeta later went out of the location and challenged the Gomani, who chased them into town. Fighting broke out near the Bakon Factory, and during

2 Although other Zimbabweans normally referred to Zimbabweans of Malawian origins loosely as MaChawa (Chewa speakers) ethnographic interviews revealed that six ethnic groups exist in Zimbabwe: Chewa/Nyanja, Yawo, Tumbuka, Ngoni, Lomwe and Tonga” (Mashiri, “The Language of Ethnic Contempt”, p.5).
4 Manganga, “Migrant Labour, Industrial Ethnicity, Urban Violence and the State in Colonial Zimbabwe”; See NAZ LG/52/6/3 Native Location Superintendent, Salisbury, to Town Clerk, 30 May 1922.
the ensuing commotion, a Chipeta man called Kachekwa was struck on the head with an axe, while a man named Malombe sustained serious head injuries. The two later died from the injuries.¹

The immediate cause of the May 1922 Ngoni faction fight was a conflict between a Gomani and a Chipeta over a girlfriend. Bonongwe, a Chipeta working at the Mikles Hotel, had hitherto lived with a woman named Mary for three and a half years until May 1922 when she left him for another man, who happened to be a Gomani. While testifying in court, Bonongwe said that the woman left him because she had been persuaded to do so by a Ngoni man, Josiah, who was a katsekera. This angered Bonongwe, who consulted Kanyanga, the leader of the Chipeta in Salisbury. Bonongwe complained to Kanyanga that his ‘wife’ had been taken by one of their enemies. When the two consulted the Native Affairs Department (NAD), they were told that their case was hopeless since Bonongwe’s ‘marriage’ to Mary was not registered. In fact, it turned out that Mary was one of the numerous commercial sex workers in the Salisbury Location.²

It is noteworthy that colonial attitude, at least as depicted in reports by the Location Superintendent and colonial court records, tended to be favourable towards the Gomani, while the Chipeta were presented as becoming increasingly unscrupulous in their interaction with the ‘real Ngoni’. The colonial authorities incriminated the Chipeta while exonerating the Gomani. This colonial attitude centred on ethnic ranking, which tended to project a ‘favourable’ image of the Gomani. To illustrate, in his May 1922 monthly report, the Location Superintendent wrote that the Ngoni ‘behaved well’ within the location and only fought when the Chipeta had gone out of the location and challenged them. In addition, the Location Superintendent noted that “the Chipeta are the people who indulge in the Chinyau moonlight dances with effigies and are a bad lot. I have tried to forbid their dances in the location as they work themselves into such a pitch of excitement that they attack other Natives”.³

While the Gomani used their position as katsekera to subvert colonial power and to ‘dominate’ ethnic others, the Chipeta used the violence and secrecy associated with their Nyau dances to ‘discipline’ their enemies and challenge the ideological and cultural hegemony of other groups. The Nyau were a closed society like the Butwa and were

¹ NAZ LG/52/6/3 Native Location Superintendent, Salisbury, to Town Clerk, 30 May 1922; Manganga, “Migrant Labour, Industrial Ethnicity, Urban Violence and the State in Colonial Zimbabwe,” p.230.
² NAZ D3/5/57/1398 R. V. Josiah alias Peter, 12 June 1922, Bonongwe and Kanyanga’s testimonies.
³ NAZ LG52/6/4 Native location Superintendent to Town Clerk, Salisbury, 30 May 1922.
introduced to Salisbury by migrants from Malawi, particularly the Chipeta/Chewa, Manganga/Manganja and Yao.¹

The Ngoni faction fights can be interpreted in a number of ways. For Parry, the conflict had more complex roots and was engendered by the *katsekera*, in this case the Gomani’s abuse of power that negatively impacted on other African urban residents. Location policeman like Josiah were notorious for soliciting sexual favours from female residents and persecuting males whose partners refused to offer such favours.² Consequently, the interpretation of the fights as ethnic was a reflection of the ethnic stratification of Salisbury’s labour market. However, this analysis does not explain why the Gomani particularly targeted their ‘traditional’ enemies, the Chipeta, in their abuse of power as Location police. Yet, the analysis helps us to locate the conflict in its historical context. In fact, Parry attributes the faction fights to a ‘re-invention’ of tradition by Nyasaland migrants in Salisbury.

The conflict marked the transition from ethnocentrism to ethnicisation as identification assumed a more militant political idiom. The clash over a girlfriend was, in fact, used to re-kindle a conflict whose roots lay in the pre-colonial and pre-urban past.³ The conflict oscillated around naming and the refusal to be named, with the Gomani using their power as *katsekera* as an indispensable resource in the process. Kanyanga, the leader of the Chipeta, thus, noted that “we did not go around the location to fight the Angoni over the woman. The Angoni called us ‘Chipeta’ in the location, which means slaves... that was the real cause of the trouble”.⁴ Konde, a Senna migrant who witnessed the fight, also claimed that the Chipeta had left the location singing ‘rude’ songs about the Gomani.

Yet, the conflict seems also to have centred on class and by extension industrial ethnicity. The woman, Mary, might have left Bonongwe not because she was a Chipeta who was despised by the Gomani, but because her new found lover, Josiah, was a Location Policeman and therefore ‘richer’ and more ‘respectable’ than Bonongwe. In any case, the woman’s presence in town was primarily motivated by the desire to make money by selling her sexual services to the ‘highest bidder’. Josiah proved to be the highest bidder than the

² Parry, “Culture, Organisation and Class,” p.64.
⁴ NAZ D3/5/57/1398 Kanyanga.
Chipeta man, Bonongwe, as he even owned a sewing machine, something only ‘richer’ Africans could afford during this period.

Unlike Shona men, immigrant Malawian men tended to be popular with local women and commercial sex workers. They were considered to be gentle and generous.\(^1\) Of course, local African men often negatively stereotyped and looked down upon Malawian immigrants saying “\textit{handina mwana anoroorwa nebwidi, bhurandaya risina musha} (I will never allow my daughter to marry a man of Malawian origin who does not have a rural home)”.\(^2\) However, for local women, immigrant men offered an opportunity to escape from “the general adversities of rural life to which Shona patriarchy and colonialism had jointly condemned them”.\(^3\) A childless Shona woman living with a Malawian man, who was interviewed by Mashiri, intimated that:

\begin{quote}
I was married to a Shona man and I stayed in the rural areas most of the time. I would come to town only during the dry season. I would wait for my husband to invite me to town. If I came unannounced he would beat me up. At home, I toiled alone and my husband’s relatives, including his mother, harassed me for being childless. Eventually, I ran away and came to Harare where I moved in with this despised fiancée of mine. Yes, I love him because he does not abuse me, he has no rural home to send me to, he does not blame me for being childless, and so what is my worry? Should I worry about the stigmatisation of marrying a \textit{bwidi}? That does not worry me at all.\(^4\)
\end{quote}

The above woman’s testimony suggests that unlike local African men, the immigrant men, especially Malawians, were often ‘reasonable’, loving and caring. Marriages with such men would help some African women to subvert patriarchy and to escape from domestic violence, ‘dysfunctional’ marriages and various forms of oppression.

One of the names used mainly by migrants of Malawian origins or descent to deride the Shona, \textit{magarandichauya} (wait I will come), was derived from ‘temporary marriages’ between local women and Malawian men.\(^5\) The name “was used because Malawian men found that they could not always trust their \textit{mapoto} women to come back when they said they went to their rural homes for a while. Sometimes it was discovered that these women did not go to their rural homes but instead went to other \textit{mapoto} arrangements, very probably with

\begin{itemize}
\item \(^1\) Interview with Gogo Musokeri, Highfield, 24 March 2011. This was also noted in an interview with Sekuru Achimwene, a Zimbabwean of Malawian origins.
\item \(^2\) Interview with Banda (vaShumba); Interview with Mbuya Shoriwa, Engineering Section, Highfield, 28 May 2011. See also, Mashiri, “The Language of Ethnic Contempt”.
\item \(^3\) Mashiri, “The Language of Ethnic Contempt”, pp.19-21.
\item \(^4\) \textit{Ibid.}, p.22.
\item \(^5\) In retaliation for being ‘othered’ and labelled \textit{Mabwidi, Manyasarandi, Mabhurandaya, Mabvakure or Mateveera Njanjini}, Malawian immigrants hit back calling the Shona \textit{Masvina} or \textit{Magarandichauya}. In fact, immigrant blacks were not merely victims of Shona or Ndebele ethnic pride and prejudice but important socio-economic and political actors who challenged and contested the cultural and ideological hegemony of the so called autochthons.
\end{itemize}
other Malawian men”.\(^1\) Malawians normally suspected this and sometimes had the evidence but they ‘almost always’ welcomed their mapoto wives after their escapades. However, Shona men found it difficult to understand Malawian men’s ‘strange’ behaviour and apparent acceptance of overt cheating by their ‘wives’. They saw the ‘alien men’ as ‘hopelessly stupid’.\(^2\) This probably explains why, in post-independence Zimbabwe, some television dramas and films depicted men of Malawian descent as the ‘village idiot’.\(^3\)

Yet, rather than being ‘hopelessly stupid’, immigrant blacks sometimes used such relationship to navigate complex issues of belonging and to gain ‘social acceptance’. They used the feminisation of African migration to create bridging ties with xenophobic local communities. Of course, this did not necessarily guarantee the socio-political security of immigrant males.\(^4\) Some ‘alien’ men faced the problem of destitution at old age as they were no longer economically active and therefore could not finance such marriages. Also, most Shona-speakers feared ngozi or an avenging spirit that could possibly torment their families if a Malawian son-in-law were to die at their homes.\(^5\)

Inter-ethnic marriages, though common, were discouraged by most groups. Among Shona oriented groups, the advice was rooranai vematongo (marry a person whose family and background you know well).\(^6\) Often, “the ethnic chauvinism of the local Africans negatively impacted on their attitude towards ethnic exogamy”.\(^7\) In the novel Rakatsva Dumbu Nomusana, by E. Mazhero, when a Malawian man impregnates his daughter, Gobo, an ethnocentric Samkange and Zezuru who is regarded as the epitome of success in his village, finds it difficult to accept a ‘totemless bwidi’ as son-in-law. He ‘reasons’ that this would ‘pollute’ the Samkange and Zezuru blood, bringing ‘shame’ to him and his whole clan. Consequently, the ethnic chauvinistic Gobo decides to banish the Malawian man from his village.\(^8\)

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1. Moto Magazine, May 1988, “Now we are all Zimbabweans”, p.11.
2. Ibid. Rather than being ‘hopelessly stupid’ immigrant blacks sometimes used such relationship to navigate complex issues of belonging and to gain ‘social acceptance’.
4. For some migrants such marriages enabled them to secure ‘married accommodation’.
5. Interview with Sixpence. According to Sixpence, when he married a Zezuru woman from Mrewa, his in-laws did not readily accept him ‘as the majority of the Shona people feared us thinking that we used a lot of muti, which was not true for some of us. Locals did not understand us, especially our Nyaroro dances. They also looked down upon us calling us MaBwiti, MaBhurandayi and MaNyasarandi, which was bad. We also called them Masambadovi.” The term Masambadovi was used to deride the Shona for their love for peanut butter (dovi).
However, ethnic exogamy remained an important aspect of inter-group relations in urban colonial Zimbabwe despite the social and cultural inhibitions to the practice. On the basis of research in Dzivarasekwa high density suburb in the 1970s, Chavunduka observed that inter-ethnic marriages were a common feature in colonial Harare. He concluded that “with this influx of a variety of peoples some mixing of the tribal groups is inevitable and this is reflected in the inter-tribal marriages in the township”. Out of a sample of 60 women and men in his sample, Chavunduka observed that 48 per cent consisted of Rhodesian men married to Rhodesian women; 11.7 per cent were Rhodesian men married to ‘alien’ women; 21.6 per cent were Rhodesian women married to ‘alien’ men; while 18.3 per cent consisted of ‘alien’ men married to ‘alien’ women. What is perhaps striking from these figures was that more African women (21.6 per cent) tended to marry ‘foreign’ men than their local male counterparts (11.7 per cent).

Sexual relationships between local women and immigrant males created tensions between local men and immigrants, with the latter accusing the former of not only ‘stealing’ their jobs but their wives and daughters as well. An analysis of African civil court cases in Salisbury bears testimony to this. In one case, a Zezuru, Philemon Goro, sued Pasiko, a Ngoni from Nyasaland, claiming £10 for damages for adultery following sexual relations between Pasiko and Goro’s wife, Chuma. In defence, Pasiko said Chuma came to his workplace ‘posing as a prostitute’ and was given 5/- for her service. Chuma stayed with the Ngoni man for two months but would leave on short intervals claiming to be visiting her relatives in Salisbury (most probably other Malawian men). Pasiko was not concerned about these suspicious visits because for him the woman was ‘just a prostitute’. On her part, Chuma accused her husband of abusing her, a development which ‘forced’ her to flee to Salisbury, where she later became a commercial sex worker using Pasiko’s residence as a base for her wider operations in and around the city. It is apparent here that some women resorted to commercial sex work or mapoto marriages as a way of subverting male authority and to ‘handle’ abusive husbands.

3 Ibid; Manganga, “Problematising Ethnicity in an Urban Context”, p.92.
4 See NAZ S3/45/1, NC, Salisbury, Civil Cases, 1949.
5 Ibid. Sub-file S2866/11/482/49, Case number 482 (Philemon Goro, Goromonzi Vs Pasiko, Daugla’s Farm).
6 The ‘standard’ fee charged by commercial sex workers during this period was 2/6 for a ‘short time’ and 5/ for ‘all night’ (Scarnecchia, “The mapping of respectability”, p.154).
7 NAZ S3/45/1, NC, Salisbury, Civil Cases, 1949, Sub-file S2866/11/482/49, Case number 482 (Philemon Goro, Goromonzi Vs Pasiko, Daugla’s Farm). Refer to the Ngoni faction fights.
The feminization of African migration and its implications for ‘gendered geographies of power’ can equally help us understand the Bulawayo faction fights of 1929 that pitted the Ndebele and their ‘non Shona’ allies against the Shona, mainly Manyika and Karanga.¹ The Manyika and other Shona constituent groups had the jobs and the money because industrial ethnicity worked in their favour. They had relatively better paying jobs as waiters, ‘houseboys’ and cooks. This led to tension between the Manyika and other ethnic groups, particularly the Ndebele, who were ethnically ranked higher by colonial authorities and the white public but often, had comparatively less income than the Manyika in Bulawayo.²

In his re-examination of the 1929 Bulawayo faction fights, Msindo notes that unlike Phimister/van Onselen’s interpretation of the conflict as one about class tensions over limited jobs³, the conflict centred on the issue of belonging.⁴ Phimister and van Onselen’s analysis was developed in the context of the radical South African labour historiography of the 1970s. This explains why they located the question of ethnicity in the abode of production.⁵ The major pre-occupation of ‘radical’ labour historians of the time was to ‘prove’ the existence of worker consciousness ‘against the more undifferentiated focus of the Africanist and liberal schools’.⁶ However, Msindo notes that the conflict did not necessarily pit ‘older richer’ workers against ‘new poor’ ones. Shona victims of the attack were not new poor migrants. One victim of the attack on the Railway Compound, Mtero, a storekeeper who lost £21 in cash and goods worth over £80 when his shop was burnt down.⁷ Most Shona victims were ‘decent’ workers and not loafers. They lived in company accommodation and had valuable possessions. About 9 huge piles of clothes, the then prestigious bicycles and other items

¹ Bulawayo Chronicle, 4 January 1930, “Knobkerrie War Fare”.
² Manganga, “Problematising Ethnicity in an Urban Context”, p.47.
³ Phimister and van Onselen applied class analysis in their interpretation of the fights, arguing that the conflict was caused by competition for limited job opportunities among African workers in Bulawayo. The attributed the limited jobs to the economic crisis of the 1920s. As a result, rather than mindless irrational ‘tribal’ conflicts, the fights were manifestations of intra-class tensions. See Phimister and Van Onselen, “The Political Economy of Tribal Animosity: The Case of the 1929 Bulawayo Location Faction Fight”, Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol 6, No 1, 1979, p.2.
⁴ This was revealed by Msindo during an informal discussion with the author, on 12 July 2012, at the National Archives of Zimbabwe. Msindo indicated that he advances the same argument in his forthcoming book on ethnicity in Matabeleland, Ethnicity in Zimbabwe: Transformations in Kalanga and Ndebele Societies, 1860-1990).
belonging to the Shona were burnt by the Ndebele and their ‘allies’. This was a clear sign of relative affluence on the part of Shona immigrants in Bulawayo.

Like Salisbury, early Bulawayo was dominated by ‘alien’ Africans, including the Shona, rather than the local Ndebele and Kalanga. In 1910, the city’s ‘alien’ African population numbered about 25,086, having risen from 11,359 in 1906. On the contrary, the Ndebele and Kalanga population in the city increased from 6,345 in 1906 to 12,739 in 1910. In a way, it was the Shona and non-Rhodesian African migrants who ‘owned’ Bulawayo. Consequently, for Msindo, the 1929 faction fights were part of efforts to regain lost Ndebele moral authority over Bulawayo, and a “spirited response to a moral and ethnic panic by the ‘real’ claimants of the city”. The fights were a manifestation of ethnic ‘struggles’ within the Ndebele ethnic community in the city. The Manyika and other Shona constituent groups had the jobs and the money because industrial ethnicity worked in their favour. As a result, they were popular with Ndebele ladies and commercial sex workers due to their esteemed financial status.

However, the idea of the despised Shona having sexual relations with the supposedly esteemed Ndebele women was scandalous for groups like the Loyal Amandebele Patriotic Society and Ilihlo Lomuzi (The eye of the family). The latter became the Matabele Home Society. The Ndebele expressed their anger and jealous through burning Shona goods. They accused the Shona of taking both their jobs and their women as the Shona had apparently displaced the local Ndebele in the labour market and enjoyed greater standards of living. According to Msindo, while the Ndebele provocatively expressed their alleged superiority by their use of the sensitive notion and terminology of caste to denigrate all people of non-Ndebele descent as permanently inferior amahole, some Shona redefined their better social standing by parading their good jobs, money and their better command of the English language.

In addition to parading their socio-economic status in order to counter Ndebele imaginings and constructions of ‘Shona’ inferiority, some Shona groups in Bulawayo appealed to mangoromera in order to challenge and subvert Ndebele ideological hegemony in the city. Mangoromera was a magical charm associated with the northern Shona, especially

1 Ibid; Bulawayo Chronicle, 4 January 1930.
2 Msindo, “Ethnicity, Not Class?”
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
the Korekore, which was believed to give boxers unusual strength, courage and success.\textsuperscript{1} *Mangoromera,* like the power of the *katsekera* and the violence of the Butwa and Zvinyau, proved useful in the struggles for socio-economic urban space in Rhodesian cities, including Salisbury. *Mangoromera* was popular with Shona migrant workers, particular male youths as they made them to be feared and respected by ethnic ‘others’ at work and in the township. Carbutt, the Superintendent of Natives for Matabeleland, blamed the use of *mangoromera* for the Bulawayo faction fights arguing that the possession of the charm made some Shona migrants unscrupulous in their dealings with the Ndebele.\textsuperscript{2} He further noted that excessive beer drinking and lack of ‘tribal control’ worsened the situation fomenting inter-group violence.

The Shona had monopoly over *mangoromera* and used the magic to challenge Ndebele dominance. It helped them to ward off their assumed inferiority complex as in possession of the magic the Shona became fearless fighters. *Mangoromera* allegedly made the Shona ‘needlessly provocative and insolent’.\textsuperscript{3} In most boxing matches, the *mangoromera* using-Shona often defeated the Ndebele and denigrated them for the loss.\textsuperscript{4} This contributed to ethnic tensions that exploded in 1929 in Bulawayo. Since boxing matches were run along ethnic lines, the defeat of a Ndebele ‘fighter’ by a Shona meant ‘defeat’ for the Ndebele as a group. Defeat in the ring led to reprisals against members of the victorious group elsewhere in the location. *Mangoromera* was used by the Shona against other groups other than the Ndebele. As a result, the Ndebele, in 1929, mobilized other ethnic migrants against the Shona who had become the ‘common enemy’ in Bulawayo.

Overall, the 1929 Bulawayo faction fights were far more complex, involving industrial ethnicity and its implications for inter-group relations, moral ethnic contestations, moral arguments and re-definitions within Ndebele ethnicity. Some Shona groups in Bulawayo had benefited from industrial ethnicity and the preferential treatment given the Manyika by some employers. As a result, competition for jobs assumed an ethnic rather than class dimension. The flooding of Bulawayo’s labour market by the Shona reduced the local Ndebele and Kalanga’s chances of getting employment in ‘their city’.\textsuperscript{5} In response, the

\textsuperscript{1} D.C.H.P. “Mangoromera”, *NADA,* Vol 11, 1933, pp.59-60; *Bulawayo Chronicle,* 4 January 1930.
\textsuperscript{2} *Bulawayo Chronicle,* 4 January 1930, p.13. In Salisbury, boxing matches were often organized around ‘tribal clubs’ including the ‘WaManyika’, ‘WaKorekore’, ‘WaZezuru’, ‘WaBuda’ and the Blantyre. Bouts were characterized by ‘tribal’ self-praise or ethnocentrism and the denigration of ethnic others.
\textsuperscript{3} Msindo, “Ethnicity, Not Class?”
\textsuperscript{4} Ibid, Interview with Komboniyatsva.
\textsuperscript{5} Some Ndebele still feel that the Shona are coming to Bulawayo to take their jobs. This, of course, can be explained by the fact that over 80 percent of the black population in Zimbabwe is Shona-speaking.
Ndebele mobilized other Rhodesian and non-Rhodesian African migrants against what appeared to be the common enemy, the Shona.

Consequently, although workers could develop collective consciousness, African labour was fragmented along ethnic and intra-class basis as well as social location or embeddedness. The impact of industrial ethnicity on the development of worker consciousness is problematic, complex and ambivalent. Nonetheless, the prevalence of ethnic based associations tended to negatively impact on the transition from African class awareness to class consciousness. The preference for certain ethnic groups by employers, the use of social networks by Africans, structural and institutional elements led to ethnic clusters at work places. In Bulawayo:

Municipal workers tended to be Tonga, a group traditionally associated with the menial and lowly paid jobs. The impact of such ethnic differentiation could be paradoxical, in Thornton’s view. While it may have provided a basis for increased sectional militancy, for example amongst Tonga workers... within the urban working class as a whole it was a force of fragmentation.¹

According to Thornton, African workers’ unions held the Tonga in disdain, which partly explains why Bulawayo municipal workers did not take part in the 1948 general strike.² Of course, as argued in Chapter 3, ethnicity is not necessarily negative although it can be used for personal and narrow objectives. Parry actually views ethnicity and class as two aspects of ‘a single consciousness’. He contends that although ethnic vendettas could “on occasion dissipate energies better spent in collective struggle, ‘ethnicity’ as it operated in practice served to unite as well as fragment workers and did much to prevent the atomisation of the workforce”.³ He further asserts that ethnicity was rarely exclusive whether at the workplace or within mutual aid associations. Ethnicity did not preclude or replace the personal and collective African consciousness of colonial injustice—and hence collective action—at the workplace, location or township.⁴ Parry concludes that:

Ethnicity served as a conduit, a ‘language’ through which life was lived and the struggle over material and cultural conditions conducted. At the same time migrants shared a common recognition of a single oppression inside the workplace, the town and the regional economy.⁵

However, while it is true that Africans’ class situation could make them develop an ideology and consciousness that cut across ethnic, religious and cultural barriers; industrial ethnicity was an alternative form of identification that could in some instances preclude the successful development of worker consciousness. Parry rightly acknowledges the reality that the fragmented nature and complexity of Salisbury’s economy and the ever presence of ‘reserve labour force’ from 1919 onwards rendered worker organization difficult.\(^1\) Ossie Stuart concurs that some employers relied upon particular ethnic groups but argues against overstating the extent to which ethnicity fragmented the African workforce.\(^2\) Yet, Stuart, who appears to have equally undermined the salience of industrial ethnicity, asserts that ‘ethnicity was not necessarily inimical to a wider sense of community’ in Bulawayo in the 1940s. For Lunn, “the impact of ethnicity clearly varied depending on the specific context. To describe ethnicity simply as force for fragmentation or cohesion would be misleading”.\(^3\)

Most African mutual aid associations, which in**ter alia** acted as ‘homes away from home’ providing immigrants with the ‘warmth of the welcome’, local intelligence and critical job information, were run along ‘tribal’ lines under different ‘tribal’ or regional names.\(^4\) However, the state and European employers viewed African ethnic associations with suspicion. Consequently, African associations were closely monitored. Apart from closed societies, most associations functioned with the state’s sanction.\(^5\) The Native Department was involved in the operations of some of the societies, which in some instances would keep their funds with the Native Commissioner for safe keeping.\(^6\) In the 1950s, when Africans in Salisbury sought to federate all ‘tribal’, sports and entertainment associations they had to seek the approval of the Native Department, which they presented with their tentative plans.

In addition, colonial authorities and the Rhodesian Chamber of Mines (RCM) saw African mutual aid associations as potential sources of worker consciousness.\(^7\) Phimister and

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1 Parry, “Culture, Organisation and Class”, p.79.
4 *African Weekly*, 28 July 1946, p.15. At a Nyasaland Congress meeting of the Salisbury Branch held on 14 September 1946 in the Salisbury African Township’s Recreation Hall, ‘tribal’ leaders noted that ‘tribalism’ was balkanizing migrant workers. Consequently, they called for unity among the Malawian immigrants. However, the Angoni Highlands Association maintained that its main concern were issues affecting the ‘Angoni tribe’ not national politics. The society made it clear that no one “other than the Angoni” were allowed to join or attend in its meetings. See *African Weekly*, 5 October 1949, Nyasaland Congress and Tribal Associations, p.11; Manganga, “Problematising Ethnicity”, p.64. The leaders included Chimkwapulo of the Achewa Tribal Society, J. Moyo of the Angoni Tribal Society and Allen Kapwiti Sangola of the Manganga Tribal Society.
5 Parry, “Culture, Organisation and Class”, p.69.
6 NAZ N3/21/2 ANC to Supt of Natives, 18 May 1923.
van Onselen also argue that “the compound associations were… the logical precursors of a trade union movement and … offered a base for the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU) of the late 1920s”.\(^1\) The above assertions contradicted reports by some Superintendents of Natives who maintained that welfare associations were not labour movements and never used their subscriptions in connection with industrial action.\(^2\) African welfare associations, including closed societies like Butwa and Zvinyawo and burial societies, essentially acted as forms of social capital for job seekers providing job information, local intelligence and a moral community for ethnic groups in the city. They could equally act as sources of worker consciousness since industrial ethnicity was one among a plethora of other intersecting forms of identification, including trade unionism and a ‘city consciousness’.\(^3\)

### 6.4 Conclusion

The prevalence of ethnic enclaves in Salisbury’s labour market had varied impacts for individuals or groups. Industrial ethnicity also engendered both positive and negative outcomes for African workers in Salisbury. While ethnicity and kinship ties were important sources of social capital, industrial ethnicity often led to inter/intra ethnic tensions, heightened animosity, jealousies and in some instances violent manifestations of ethnic competition. More so, African communities remained heterogeneous, complex and socio-economically differentiated. Industrial ethnicity and sociological variables of groups, including education and work experience also had varied impacts on the socio-economic wellbeing of different African workers across space and time.\(^4\) The following chapter further interrogates African ethnicity by exploring its intersection with nationalism, which unsuccessfully attempted to submerge the varied, conflicting and competing African urban forms of identification. After the 1950s, political forms of identification tended to submerge other identities, including industrial ethnicity.

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\(^1\) *Ibid.*  
\(^2\) NAZ N3/21/4 Organized drills in Compounds, 1922.  
\(^3\) Ranger, “Zhii in Bulawayo: The meaning of urban violence”, p.16; Ranger, *Bulawayo Burning*.  
\(^4\) See Lunn, “The Meaning of the 1948 General Strike”.

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7.1 Introduction

In the preceding chapter, the thesis explored the complex, multi-layered and varied impacts of industrial ethnicity on the socio-economic wellbeing of those participating in labour markets characterised by wide-spread ethnic enclaves and the attendant implications for inter-group relations. The present chapter situates the thesis in its political context by discussing the interplay between ethnicity, gender, ‘othering work’ and nationalism in Harare between the 1950s and 1980.

Indeed, since the scholarship of the 1960s that was inspired by the nationalist movements and the struggle for Zimbabwe, there has been an increasing attempt to interrogate both the ideology and practice of nationalism and nationalist politics through analyses of class, gender, ethnicity, generation, dynamic rural-urban relations, and in periodizing the presence of nationalism in the country’s history. However, as Msindo argues, much of the scholarship has largely focused on the war of liberation. The focus on wartime politics did not illuminate a fuller understanding of nationalism itself. It is equally pertinent

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1 Raftopoulos, “Problematising Nationalism in Zimbabwe”, p.115.
to note that from the 1950s onwards, industrial ethnicity tended to be submerged by political forms of identification, with ‘political tribalism’, local particularism and othering work gaining noticeable currency. Although workplace ethnicity continued to play out and manifest itself in various forms, it were political identities that became dominant with the rise of African mass nationalism that had urban origins.

### 7.2 Urban Origins of African Nationalism in Zimbabwe

Both nationalism and ethnicity are part of ‘modern’ identities invoked by political entrepreneurs, the populace and other actors in political, economic and social struggles. Nationalism is a social construction that is contingent and like ethnicity can be used to exclude ‘the Other’. It is not “a distinct singular ideology but a variety of ideologies that manifest themselves in different forms, depending on the context. Its goals and objectives also change over time”.

According to Eriksen, “most theorists and commentators on nationalism described it as an ideology which promotes cultural homogeneity and a subjective feeling of ‘we-hood’.” However, it is not clear exactly how much the citizens of a nation ought to have in common for them to be deemed culturally homogenous. The extent and composition of the ‘we-group’ also shift according to context.

Eriksen sees the state in Africa as “a supra-ethnic or poly-ethnic phenomenon, which may nevertheless be appropriated by ethnic groups in a number of ways, including the monopolisation of power.”

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1. C. Calhoun, “Nationalism and Ethnicity”, *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol 19, 1993, p.211. The ‘tribal innocence’ of the masses cannot be celebrated as like the political elite they also appeal to the ethnic resource when it suits them.


5. Eriksen, *A Non-ethnic State for Africa?* p.49. For Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “in a country like ours, a progressive nationalist must realize that Zimbabwe is a plural and diverse social formation” consisting of numerous ethnic and racial groups, who are part of the socio-political construction called Zimbabwe (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “True Nationalists yet to be born”).
Nationalism is often contradictory and multilayered. Neither is it simply an anti-colonial ideology as it is a ‘discursive formation’. It is a historical and political process that “works as a trope for such things as ‘belonging’, ‘patriotism’, ‘sacrifice’ and ‘commitment’”. Consequently, the nationalist discourse is prone to ‘abuse’ through arbitrary, narrow and subjective definitions that exclude political competitors on the pretext that they are not ‘patriotic’ enough. This bifurcates citizens into ‘patriots’ and ‘sell-outs’, which in turn leads to differential access to the resources of the state.

In colonial Zimbabwe, mass nationalism can generally be traced to the period from the 1950s onwards. The ideology manifested itself through the formation of ‘national’ political parties that sought to dislodge white minority rule and replace it with African majority rule. Urban areas were important political theatres during the ‘formative’ years of African nationalism with Salisbury’s Mai Musodzi Hall in Harare Township, Cyril Jennings Hall in Highfields, and Stanley Square in Makokoba, Bulawayo, becoming popular spaces for African political rendezvous.

The emergence of a political elite, which spearheaded the call for the establishment of a Zimbabwean state, was preceded by the age of trade unionism. Bulawayo and Salisbury were theatres of African urban politics. Trade unionist Charles Mzingeli moved from Bulawayo to Salisbury in 1929 and established the Harare branch of the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU). Mzingeli and the Reformed ICU (RICU) then dominated African politics until the early 1950s. Before the 1950s, African urban politics was mainly concerned with African living conditions, working conditions, wages, and other issues that

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mostly affected the working class. By the 1950s, the popularity of the RICU and Mzingeli, who was popularly known as ‘the Mayor of Harare’, had, however, significantly waned. The ICU failed to link the grievances of urban workers with those of the rural populations. There were also clashes of interest between the RICU and the Salisbury branch of the African National Congress (ANC). In addition, “increasingly harassed by the settler state and opposed by the young Turks in the Youth League, Mzingeli became embroiled in quarrels on all sides displaying intolerance and fear of the growing opposition to his leadership”. The demise of Mzingeli saw the emergence of more ‘national’ forms of African political organization that attempted to bridge the rural-urban political divide. Unlike the trade unions of earlier years, political organizations that emerged in the 1950s were also concerned about a political project of constructing and imagining a Zimbabwean nation.

African nationalism was racially construed and, therefore to an extent, racially exclusive. Africans were the oppressed ‘Other’ and whites were the common enemy. The extent of the extension and penetration of colonial rule and its attendant negative effects on Africans significantly influenced the evolution and nature of African nationalism, which grew as an antithesis to white domination, racial discrimination, injustices against blacks and exploitation of black people. For Ndabaningi Sithole, one of the ‘founding fathers’ of African nationalism, African nationalism was “a political feeling seeking relentlessly to eliminate Eurocracy by supplanting it with Afrocracy... an effective instrument of establishing African rule”.

The City Youth League (CYL) was formed, in August 1955, as a “more articulate expression of the nationalist objectives of Africans in the city, and it paved way for the resuscitation of the African National Congress (ANC) in September 1957”. The Salisbury branch of the old ANC had been dissolved in 1953. The CYL was formed at a time when African nationalism was going through a recession in activism. Of the older breed of nationalist and trade unionist leaders, only Charles Mzingeli, Jason Moyo and Joseph Msika

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1 Msindo contends that although African nationalism was not strictly the brainchild of trade unionism, it benefited from the movement, particularly from former trade union leaders like Joshua Nkomo (Railways African Workers Union), Jason Moyo (Artisans Union), and Francis Nehwati (Municipal Workers Union) (Msindo, “Ethnicity and Nationalism in Urban Colonial Zimbabwe”, p.5).
4 Msindo, “Ethnicity and Nationalism in Urban Colonial Zimbabwe”.
5 Ibid.
7 Hallencreutz, “Religion in the City”, p.214.
were still active but in a more subdued way. The Bulawayo branch of the ANC had become more of a social organisation than a political one. Many nationalists during this period were rushing to join multi-racial associations, imbued with the spirit of partnership, believing it would engender racial equality.

The CYL was formed as a challenge to the dominance of an increasingly conservative Mzingeli on the Salisbury African Advisory Board (SAAB) and the leadership of the intellectuals who were participating in multiracial organizations dominated by white liberals. The formation of the CYL marked a shift of political leadership from people like Mzingeli, Samkange and Jasper Savanhu who were becoming more embroiled in federal politics, to a new young and more vibrant breed of leadership in the person of George Nyandoro, James Chikerema and Paul Mushonga. The CYL wanted to set itself apart from the main currents of elite African political thought of the time, and West regards the formation of the CYL as a major rupture in African politics in colonial Zimbabwe.

The newly formed CYL took over control of the SAAB and set out on a spate of militant direct-action protests, organizing boycotts and demonstrations against racial discrimination. Thus, according to Raftopoulos, the rise of the CYL saw African politics moving from the “squabbles amongst Africans over Federal nominations to the radical populism of the Youth League” At the same time, Africans in urban areas like Salisbury were becoming more militant, violent and confrontational unlike the preceding years.

7.3 The Salisbury Bus Boycott, 1956

Masculinity *dodaism* in contemporary Zimbabwe is the legacy of a violent and patriarchal colonial past and contested notions of manhood/womanhood that were characteristic of

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6. The term ‘dodaism’ is derived from the Ndebele terms ‘amadoda’ [men] and ‘amadoda sibili’ [real or courageous men]. The term ‘amadoda sibili’ gained political currency in contemporary Zimbabwe when it was used by President Mugabe to deride Minister Nkosana Moyo who quit government because of concerns about state repression in 2001. Castigating Moyo, Mugabe pointed out that he would keep only ‘amadoda sibili’, and not cowards, in his cabinet. See *New York Times*, 25 July 2001.
African life in Salisbury.¹ The term ‘masculinity dodaism’ is used to refer to sexist, violent, hegemonic and hyper masculinities that become characteristic of African nationalism. Amadoda sibili or ‘real men,’ supposedly do not ‘sell-out’, neither do they compromise the ‘nationalist cause’. Amadoda sibili are supposed to defend the ‘nationalist cause’ unwaveringly and are prepared to exert extreme punishment on all ‘sell-outs’. Such sexist, violent and hegemonic forms of masculinities were at play during the Salisbury bus boycott, which is regarded as one of the greatest achievements of the African nationalist struggle in the 1950s.

Masterminded by the most prominent African nationalist organisation of the 1950s, the James Chikerema-led CYL, the Salisbury bus boycott was undoubtedly an important event in the rise of African protest action against colonial rule in Zimbabwe. However, the violence and assault and rape of some of the Salisbury urbanites, especially the female residents of Carter House hostel, tend to diminish the heroism of the boycott’s political achievements. The bus boycott also showed the tensions between the nationalism of the elite and that of the subalterns that existed within the CYL.

The decision to boycott all bus services provided by the United Transport Company (UTC) by Africans in Salisbury was made on 19 August 1956. The boycott was intended to be a peaceful mass protest action against a bus fare increase by the UTC. Africans were calling for a bus fare subsidy that would cushion them against the escalating cost of transport. They regarded the bus fare as excessive and beyond the average African’s capacity to pay.² Maximum transport costs for people living in Highfield, Harare and Mabvuku African residential areas ranged between £3 and £4 per month and the announcement of a fare increase in August 1956 made the situation worse. Justifying the boycott, the Action Committee (AC), which coordinated the boycott, noted that “in our opinion this unavoidable expenditure is too high when compared with the average wage of £7 to £19 for it is impossible to maintain a family on the residue”³. The decision to boycott the UTC’s services was “because of its decision to raise fares at a time when workers were already spending 18-30% of their wages on transport”⁴. The transport crisis had also been compounded by the

¹ This section of the thesis is based on author’s chapter, “Masculinity Dodaism, Gender and Nationalism: The Case of the Salisbury Bus Boycott, September 1956”, in Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Muzondidya, eds., *Redemptive or Grotesque Nationalism*? pp.133-151.
1954 city council’s decision to give the UTC outright, total and virtual monopoly of public transport in Salisbury.\footnote{Scanerechia, ‘The Politics of Gender and Class,’ p.310; Rhodesia Herald, September 1956, p.17.}

On Sunday 16 September 1956, about 3000 Africans from Harare, Mabvuku and Highfield attended a meeting that had been called by the AC in Harare, where they unanimously agreed to indefinitely boycott all bus services provided by the UTC starting from Monday 17 September 1956.\footnote{Rhodesian Herald, 19 September 1956. I. M. Green, “The Salisbury Bus Boycott, 1956”, History in Zambia: Journal of the Historical Association of Zambia, Vol 13, 1983.} Despite the heavy police presence, many commuters took heed to the boycott. Hundreds of people went to work on foot, while others walked, used private cars, taxis, push carts or used bicycles to get to their work places.\footnote{African Weekly, 19 September 1956, p.2.} However, at around 5pm, a crowd of about 200-300 men gathered at the bus terminus and were becoming restive.\footnote{Scanerechia, “The Politics of Gender and Class”, p.312.}

The riot started at about 5:30 in the evening at the market square with the stoning of a UTC bus. The police used teargas to disperse the crowd who then moved further into the location and the trouble spread.\footnote{Rhodesia Herald, 18 September 1956, p.1.} Here, there was a bus that had been spotted earlier carrying female passengers going to work, who were allegedly identified as the female residents of Carter House Hostel. On being asked by the boycotters why they were defying the boycott, the passengers are alleged to have said they could afford to pay the bus fare.\footnote{Barnes, We Women Work So Hard; Barnes, “We Women Worked So Hard”, p.421.} It was at this point that the riot started and “a large crowd of hooligans, mainly loafers, spivs, apaches and people of the like organized themselves into a formidable force and sallied forth on a campaign of pillage and destruction”.\footnote{African Parade, November 1956, pp.1-2.}

During the rioting, a UTC waiting room at the Harare Bus Terminus was torn apart. The waiting room was mainly for passengers going to Nyasaland, Kwenda and Mtora, and on this evening it housed about 40 migrants from Nyasaland who were waiting to leave the following morning. The rioters not only tore down the waiting room but also stoned the inhabitants and destroyed their property- an indication of the ethnic hostility of the rioters (mainly locals) towards these migrants.\footnote{African Weekly, 19 September 1956, pp.1-2.} Migrants from Nyasaland were, in fact, among the worst victims of the riot, despite the local press initially blaming the migrant workers for the riot and violence.\footnote{Manganga, “Problematising Ethnicity in an Urban Context”.} Evidence from the police indicated that both local and immigrants took
part in the riots, including those from PEA. The blaming of the rioting and violence on the migrants was partially influenced by the xenophobia of the time. As already noted in preceding chapters, Salisbury’s African population was stratified along ethnic lines and prevailing ethnic tensions manifested themselves at the event of the riot.

The violence and assaults which took place during the boycott expressed themselves in racial, ethnic, class and gender terms as specific social groups were targeted. Among the African population, the other victims were the relatively rich, who owned houses, cars and businesses. City Council properties were also targeted. Many shops were looted, especially those run by African businessmen associated with white business owners. The estimate of the damage caused to council and private property was between £1000 and £2000. The violence and attack on white interests showed the confrontational and violent nature of CYL politics and its attack on the Rhodesian racial structure. This overt attack on the Rhodesian state and white interests arguably set the CYL apart from the ‘tea-drinking’ multiracial associations and the rhetoric on racial equality that characterized African politics during the federal era.

The worst form of gendered violence occurred against women when some of the rioters landed on Carter House, the 156-bed hostel housing single working African women in Harare, which was located opposite the main bus terminus where the violence started. The *African Parade* gave the following description of the incident:

They swooped on Carter House, the residence of Harare African working girls and did their worst, stabbing and raping the poor, defenceless girls as well as smash windows and steal their belongings, including money…Never will any of them forgive the desecration and profanity committed against their womanhood, nor regard members of the male species as anything but savage beasts in sheep’s clothes.

The rioters raped over ten women and one of the victims was raped 5 times. Another victim was also stabbed while others also lost cash among other personal belongings.

The incidents of rape show that there was more to the assaults than the mere desire to punish some Carter House residents for disobeying the boycott order. The chaos and violence during the boycott presented opportunities for both rapists and common criminals who looted and robbed women of their personal belongings and cash. The gendered and racial forms of the violence also manifested themselves when some of the attackers went after the white matron of Carter House, a Miss E. M. Waggott. They were heard shouting, “we want the

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3 Sibanda, *The Zimbabwe African People’s Union*.
European matron. We will kill her first.”¹ Waggott was, however, not at Carter House during the attack and her African assistant only escaped the attack by hiding under a bed.

Whilst condoning the stoning of shops, the CYL condemned the looting and raping of women. It claimed that its ‘real’ members had not taken part in the looting and raping.² Chikerema noted that; “it is a great pity that hooligan elements took the bus boycott for riots and started engaging in acts that are a disgrace to our race.”³ Many Africans also condemned the attack on Carter and the violence in general as ‘a blight on the good name of the African race’ and ‘Harare was sad, very sad and broken in spirit.’⁴ They blamed the ‘hooligan element’ for the attack and felt that the hooligans had spoilt the Action Committee’s case. Other Africans blamed the Action Committee for failing to control the crowd, “why did the Action Committee call this boycott and then leave those loafers and hooligans…these people are teenagers who have nothing to do and now have found a job to do on this boycott.”⁵

‘Respectable’ Africans specifically distanced themselves from the riot as “every decent person will revolt against such scandalous conduct”⁶. Most of those who distanced themselves from the rioting and violence included professionals like teachers, doctors, politicians, journalists and businessmen and women– a class which considered itself more respectable and of an esteemed social standing unlike the uneducated, illiterate and ‘uncivilised’ African majority.⁷ One African man was reported to have noted that, “I agree with the boycott of the buses but not with this (rape). This shows how far we are from civilization. Many Europeans have gone on strike in this country, in Britain and all other parts of the world but we never hear them doing this.”⁸ To a certain extent, the violence showed a conflict of interest between rich and privileged Africans and the lowly paid and unemployed populace. For example, the house and car of prominent African businessman, James Chiweshe, was attacked, yet a food stall belonging to a crippled man was left untouched when others were being destroyed at the market.⁹

The press blamed loafers, unemployed and the youth for the violence. To the press, it was the scum of the city or the less respectable section of the African population that had

¹ Rhodesia Herald, 19 September 1956.
⁴ African Parade, November 1956, p.25.
⁵ Ibid
⁹ Read On, 34; African Parade, October 1956, p.25.
rioted. The majority of hostel dwellers, who allegedly constituted the bulk of the rioters, were uneducated, unskilled, poorly paid and living in squalor. One Harare resident noted that, “the open-air meetings where many of the audience are spivs and loafers mean that people who hardly understand what the speakers are driving at become restless and the result is always the same: lawlessness and hooliganism”.¹

However, it was later established that even some of supposedly ‘respectable’ men, both married or not, had taken part in the riots.² While it is true that a considerable number of unemployed youths and male hostel dwellers took part in riots, it would be misleading to assume that they were the only section of the Africa population that rioted. Although unemployed youths generally tend to be associated with violence,³ there is no sufficient evidence to support the assertion that ‘overzealous’ Youth League enforcers or supporters and the tsotsi or criminal element were entirely behind the violence.

While a number of African leaders condemned the violence and raping of female members of Carter House residence, some condoned these gruesome acts of violence against women. In his 1965 publication, Crisis in Rhodesia, veteran nationalist, Nathan Shamuyarira regarded the boycott as the greatest achievement of the CYL. He wrote that, “for the first time people saw that effective retaliatory action could be taken by Africans against an unpopular measure. It was in a true sense a land mark in the history of African organization in Southern Rhodesia.”⁴ He also condoned the raping of women saying “it was in fact calculated revenge by strikers for the way in which the girls had defied the strike orders and boarded buses.”⁵

Another veteran nationalist Maurice Nyagumbo shared the same sentiments and claimed that the women had failed to take heed to a nationalist cause and as a result they deserved to be raped as punishment. He argued that “the Carter House was raided by a group of angry boys who intended to punish the girls who had defied the call for boycott.”⁶ He went on to say that the Youth League leadership had been “terribly embarrassed by the unruly youths who had attacked the girls…Personally, I had no reason to feel regret for the incident, I actually believed that the girls deserved their punishment.”⁷

¹ African Weekly, 19 September 1956.
² Scanercchia, “The Politics of Gender and Class”.
⁴ N. Shamuyarira, Crisis in Rhodesia, London: Andre Deutsch, 1965, Sp.43.
⁵ Ibid.
⁶ M. Nyagumbo, With the People, p.103.
⁷ Ibid., p.105.
Rape and domestic abuse are illustrations of some ways in which men exert control over women and through which the former often direct their anger at the latter.\(^1\) Beliefs associated with urban culture in colonial Zimbabwe from the 1930s also linked prostitution with a woman’s physical mobility and independence.\(^2\) The patriarchal colonial state and African society generally regarded the African woman’s place to be the home, especially the rural home under the authority and control of men.\(^3\)

Indeed, Nyagumbo and Shamuyarira were expressing personal opinions rather that the collective view of the African nationalist leadership. However, it is instructive to note that very few leaders of the AC or the CYL condemned the rapes publicly. Nyagumbo only notes that “of course, the leaders of the Youth League were terribly embarrassed by the unruly youths who attacked the girls at the Carter Hostel for ignoring the call for boycott.”\(^4\) The African nationalist discourse about the boycott sought to obliterate the ugly incidents from the collective memory. Predictably, those African leaders who publicly condemned the boycott were dismissed as stooges or quislings.\(^5\)

Scanercchia is critical of the sexist and nationalist interpretation of the event. He observes that the nationalists glossed over nationalism’s contradictions in their bid to locate the Salisbury bus boycott in a ‘progressive line of achievements and victories’ towards independence.\(^6\) In so doing, the nationalist narrative submerged and even belittled the class and gender tensions in Salisbury. The interpretation also amounted to a sexist treatment of rape, all in the name of ‘African nationalism’. Throughout history, a host of overt and covert racial, ethnic, class and gender crimes have been committed by the political elite and their supporters behind the façade of advancing a nationalist agenda or defending a nation’s sovereignty. The attack on Carter House was a manifestation of gender based tensions within the broader struggles against colonialism.\(^7\) There was more to the raping of the women than mere spontaneous mob violence- it was organized and systematic violence reflecting underlying fractures and tensions in society.\(^8\)

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\(^2\) Ibid.
\(^3\) Along the same vein, Parpart observes that control over women as well as junior males and children was a necessary condition for male success and a crucial element of ‘true maleness’ during the period. J. L. Parpart, “Masculinities, Race, Violence in the Making of Zimbabwe”, [http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/.../Gender520report2007.pdf](http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/.../Gender520report2007.pdf) (Accessed 12 July 2009).
\(^4\) Nyagumbo, *With the People*, p.104.
\(^5\) Ibid., p.105.
\(^7\) Ibid.
\(^8\) Ibid.
For among the root causes of the underlying tensions between African men and women in urban areas like Salisbury was the ‘feminisation’ of African migration to urban areas. As we have seen, the feminization of African migration engendered economic independence of working women, which undermined pervasive patriarchal forms of control and domination prevailing during this period. Behind the attacks on these female residents of the hostel was the African male resentment of African women’s ‘independence’ in Salisbury.

Some men and married women openly resented the presence of ‘single’ women in town. Scanercchia notes that in the 1940s and early 1950s there was “a growing tension between married and single workers and further among married people, between migrant workers, those who aspired middle-class status, and those who remained tied to rural ways of living”.\(^1\) Married women particularly resented the night parties, singing and beer drinking ‘orgies’ by some single women and men living as lodgers in ‘married accommodation’, which were associated with *vuramatambo* or *mahobo*, a dance involving the ‘sexually suggestive’ shaking of hips and “other immoral movements which descent people condemn”.\(^2\) Yet, as has been argued, the dances, together with the *skokian* culture and commercial sex work, were part of some African women’s responses to urbanisation and represented ways of subverting male authority.

In many ways, Carter hostel was a symbol of this African female independence. Barnes views the sexual violence against women during the boycott as a sad anticlimax of the hostility between married ‘responsible’ women and men on the one hand and the ‘less respectable’ but socio-economically independent Carter House residents on the other. Although there were about 4000 African women in Salisbury during this time, Carter House residents were specifically targeted in order to ‘punish’ the women “for their perceived social and economic transgressions”.\(^3\) Barnes adds that the 1956 attacks on Salisbury women were not the first ones in the history of nationalist struggle in Zimbabwe, as they had experienced a long history of sexual violence at the hands of men and during the nationalist struggles of the 1940s and 1950s, including the 1948 general strike.\(^4\)

The attacks against Carter occurred against a background of increasing hostility between Carter House residents on the one hand and the larger African community in Salisbury on the other. Carter House residents were labelled social misfits and prostitutes by

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\(^3\) Barnes, “We Women Worked So Hard”, p.424.
\(^4\) Barnes, *We Women Work So Hard*, pp.144-145. As she correctly explains, ‘the focus of male anger on these particular women illuminates some of the explosive undercurrents of urban gender relations in the period and the abandonment of the spirit of tolerance that prevailed briefly in the early 1950s'.

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the largely male community as they did not have ‘proper husbands’ and were not under the control of a male relative as was expected in the patriarchal society. The women’s social independence was a direct challenge to male authority and dominance.¹ This scenario undermined traditional power relations and challenged male hegemony. Some of the women used their financial leverage on the first day of the boycott as they boisterously asserted that they, unlike the majority men who were financially strapped, could afford to pay the fare despite the proposed increase. Barnes thus notes that “their very visibility as residents of a hostel for working women flaunted their independence.”²

Urban male workers’ hostility to Carter House residents and other women in the city was also fuelled by their inaccessibility to this large group of working class men who neither had the social status or material means to acquire the services of commercial sex workers. Due to the acute shortage of married accommodation, some married local African men were also failing to get accommodation in African townships and could not bring their wives into town. For some of the men, the riotous situation offered a rare opportunity for them to access these women they had always admired from a distance. One of the men arrested in connection with the rape at Carter House, for instance, is reported to have been married but living with his married brother in one section of the Harare African Township. His wife was staying in the Native Reserve and “when the riot broke out…he must have taken advantage of the evil situation to join the criminal assault on the girls.”³

According to West, the violence can also not be divorced from the CYL’s “undisguised demeanour, which created a socio-political context that had no tolerance for defiance by women”.⁴ He accuses the CYL leadership of being morally culpable in the rapes on the basis that they espoused the kind of politics that reasserted masculinity thereby creating an environment where rape could be acceptable punishment for disobedying a ‘nationalist’ cause.⁵ The CYL arguably encouraged politics that gave tenure and currency to hyper masculinities and dodiasm.

However, claims that the attack on Carter House residents were acts committed by boycott enforcers in the name of the CYL cannot be supported by existing evidence as the rioters were a mixed lot including both CYL supporters, opportunists and the tsotsi element.

¹ See Osirim, “Crisis in the State and the Family.”
² Barnes, “We Women Worked So Hard,” p.421. In this sense, “the men who had nothing…hated independent, rich professional women and the wives of successful black men. This resentment fuelled the attack on Carter House” (Read On, p.34).
⁴ West, The Rise of an African Middle Class, p.205.
⁵ Ibid.
Not all the rape victims had disobeyed the boycott call. Neither were all the rape victims Carter House residents. In addition, the rapes were selective in age as the attackers mainly targeted the young leaving out elderly Carter House residents. In view of this, the rapes cannot be entirely interpreted as punishment for disobeying the boycott order. None of the men convicted of the rapes told the court that they wanted to punish Carter House residents. Some of the assailants probably capitalized on the rioter’s situation and the Carter House residents presented an easiest target as the elderly white matron in charge of the hostel could do nothing to stop the assault. Also, there is no evidence to suggest that the attackers were boycott enforcers or even supporters of the CYL for that matter.

But, as already noted, violence against women has historically been a feature of Zimbabwean politics and African nationalism tended to mask and gloss the ensuing gender tensions. Rape and violence against women ironically continued to be rooted structurally in the country’s political struggles for independence through to the postcolonial state. Although ‘the image of the subservient mother or daughter’ under the control of a husband or a male relative came under challenge as women participated in the liberation struggle in the late 1960s and 1970s, as combatants, collaborators or ‘peasants’ 2, the war “introduced a new sexual permissiveness that was condoned but not officially sanctioned by the leadership or by the communities in which the ‘freedom fighters’ operated”.

7.4 African Nationalism and ‘Othering Work’ in Colonial Harare

‘Othering work’, like masculinity dodaism, was another salient feature of African nationalist politics in Salisbury. Kudzai Pfuwai Matereke, quoting Francisco Panizza, notes that populism can be considered a mirror in which democracy may contemplate itself, rather than as something antithetical to democracy. According to Matereke, populism consists of the

1 Osirim, “Crisis in the State and the Family.”
creation of an ‘us’ and a ‘them’, and the “populist strategy is essentially the creation of an antagonism between a group labelled as ‘the people’ and its ‘Other’”⁵. Populism, arguably, appeals to new forms of identification and the bifurcation of citizens into ‘the people’ and ‘the Other’. Such labels can gain a great deal of currency and become entrenched creating new senses of belonging, “which in turn triggers a new set of relations usually characterized by rivalry, competition and violence with ‘the Other’”⁶.

The ethnic, racial, gendered or political ‘Other’ is usually perceived as ‘different’ from ‘the self’. Chauvinistic tendencies also celebrate an individual, group, gender, nation or other category’s virtues while denigrating and excluding ‘foreigners’ and ‘outsiders’.⁷ Arguably, “all identities are based on some kind of exclusion, as the identity of the self can be defined only by reference to a non-self”.⁸ Zygmunt Bauman notes the almost innate human propensity to divide ‘strangers’ or ‘non-selves’ into friends and enemies.⁹ According to Bauman:

At the more general level, nationalism can be thought of as a specimen of the big family of the *we-talks*- that is, of discourses in which identities and counter-identities are conceived and through which they are sustained. From other discourses purporting to report experience or unpack its meaning the *we-talks* are set apart by their *exclusivity*; they tend to promote ego-centred binary divisions, divide the world into *friends* and *enemies* - sharply-separated from each other by mutually exclusive sets of assigned rights and duties, moral significance and behavioural principles. Identity offered by the postulated membership of the inner circle of friends is circumscribed-made real- by the non-identity relationship to the outer circle of enemies. The ‘we-ness’ of friends owes its materiality to the ‘they-ness’ of the enemies.⁹

The ‘Other’ is neither totally alien nor necessarily hostile to ‘the self’. Like stereotyping, othering can also be positive or and negative. Negative othering tends to be hostile to ‘the Other’. The process of othering can both be inclusive and exclusive. According to Canales, exclusionary othering utilizes the power within relationships for domination and subordination, while inclusionary othering attempts to utilize power within relationships for transformation and coalition building.⁸ Consequently, it can be argued that negative othering

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¹ Matereweke, “One Zimbabwe Many Faces”, p.244.
² Ibid.
³ Jamieson, “Theorizing Identity”.
⁴ Ibid., p.9.
⁶ Ibid., p.678.
⁷ Jamieson, “Theorizing Identity”.
and violence against ‘the Other’ - the ‘enemy’ or *muvengi*- is often part of the complex process of authoring ‘the Other’.¹

However, while Matereke sees ‘othering work’ being championed by the Ministry of Information and Publicity in postcolonial Zimbabwe, it is apparent that the othering of socio-economic and political competitors was an important facet of both industrial ethnicity and nationalist politics. Othering work not only shaped the evolution of political identities during the colonial period but significantly shaped the postcolonial context and content of ethnicity by determining citizens’ differential access to social, economic and political resources.

The revived ANC was formed in September 1957, when the CYL in Salisbury merged with the Bulawayo-based and largely inactive ANC under the leadership of Joshua Nkomo. By 1959, the ANC was attracting ‘large crowds’ in rural areas around Salisbury.² The ANC dominated the African Advisory Board elections in Harare, Highfield and Mabvuku. The advisory boards had close links with the ANC and in Highfield; three quarters of the 18-member Ratepayers Association were active ANC members. Like other African nationalist parties, the ANC ‘othered’ non-members, labelling them ‘sell-outs’. Local African business owners who refused to assist the ANC were struck from membership of the Highfield Trading Association and replaced by those who were ‘politically correct’.³ Urban residents were urged not to buy goods from shops whose owners were not members of the ANC.

The ANC, like the National Democratic Party (NDP) that was formed in 1960 following the banning of the ANC and the ZAPU, which was formed in 1961, manifested internal contradictions and an inherent hatred of alternative political voices. Moreover, the rise of a new intellectual elite in the nationalist movement submerged other protest voices.⁴ It was the nationalism of the elite that became hegemonic.⁵ After 1962, African nationalism became almost synonymous with ZAPU and ZANU, which split from the former in 1963. Other political voices were also under-represented. On the contrary, there were other political parties that emerged in Salisbury although they were not as popular as ZAPU and ZANU.

² NAZ S2827/2/2/6 Vol 1 Annual District Reports, 1958, Report of the NC Goromonzi District, p.31 December 1958; NAZ F120/725/L3443/1 Security Situation Reports, 30 December 1959; Raftopoulos, “Nationalism and Labour”, 140. Rural and urban areas tended to ideologically feed into each other reciprocally. In the 1950s, some urban workers in Salisbury increasingly called for greater symbolic unity with surrounding rural Mashonaland. Others even suggested the changing of street and school names so that they could make use of ‘Zezuru’ cultural heritage.
⁴ Ibid, p.142.
⁵ Joshua Nkomo was presented by a correspondent in the *African Daily News* (5 April 1958, p.2) as a ‘well educated man’ who lead the ANC. The writer claimed that Nkomo had a strong appeal to the intellectuals as well as ‘the masses of his people’.
Such political organizations included the “Non-Violent African Voice” that emerged in the late 1950s, and the Zimbabwe National Party (ZNP), whose leadership included Paul Mushonga, Thompson Gonese, Michael Mawema, Matimba and Mhizha.¹

The ZNP broke away from the NDP, with some ZNP leaders like Mawema claiming that they decided to resign from the NDP “because of the treachery, dishonesty, inconsistency and betrayal of the mandate and demands of our people” at the 1961 Constitutional Conference.² Mawema, who became the NDP Secretary General, noted that:

We demanded one man one vote but Nkomo agreed with the United Federal Party (UFP) and signed for a qualitative franchise of £720; we demanded a majority representation in Parliament but Nkomo signed for 15 seats in a house of 65; we demanded our land but Nkomo signed a document which excluded our Zimbabwe... Being a true son of Zimbabwe I made a public condemnation of the Nkomo-Whitehead-Sandys constitution as utterly unacceptable and I was suspended for having rejected that constitution.³

Although the name ‘Zimbabwe’ was first used by the ZNP,⁴ the party largely remained an ‘insignificant political ‘Other’. Nonetheless, some Salisbury residents regarded the ZNP as ‘the party’ in view of the failures of ZAPU to engender meaningful political change, particularly Nkomo’s hope to influence the United Nations, the United Kingdom and the international community to put pressure on the Rhodesian government to accept majority rule.⁵ Other Harare residents actually regarded the ZNP as the “only true African political party”. A resident, using the pseudonym “Frank Talk”, on 23 April 1962, wrote that:

... I am convinced that the ZNP is the only party which interprets the true feelings of the African people, but I must admit that its leaders, though sincere and honest, receive no support from the masses because they have no body among their members with high professionals such as doctors, lawyers and businessmen.⁶

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³ Ibid.
⁴ Ibid. Mawema is credited for giving the country the name ‘Zimbabwe’ during his brief tenure as NDP president in the early 1960s. The name was derived from Great Zimbabwe Monuments, which were an important symbol of African civilization, creativeness and innovation. See Ndlovu-Gatsheki, “Beyond the Drama of War”, p.59; J. Fontein, The Silences of Great Zimbabwe: Contested Landscapes and the Power of Heritage, London: University College of London Press, 2006, pp.119-120.
⁵ African Daily News, 6 April 1962, “No Europeans in ZNP, Gonese”, p.3. Gonese further said that no Europeans would be accepted to join the ranks of the ZNP as his organization was a ‘purified’ pan-African party which did not trust Europeans. The party also rejected multi-racialism although it accepted and acknowledged the friendship and sympathizers outside the country. The ZNP regarded itself a ‘purified pan-African’ party.
The ZNP was not as popular as ZAPU and the party’s activities are almost invisible in most ‘nationalist-inspired’ texts. Very few Africans openly declared their support for the ZNP. They probably chose to remain ‘invisible’ due to fear of being ‘othered’. An analysis of reports in the African newspapers also reveals that the African media tended to project an unfavourable image of the ZNP.

The ZNP supporters were the ‘political Other’, with whom other Africans did not want to be associated. For example, Lovemore Mutambanengwe, the Southern Rhodesian in the Secretariat of the International Students Association, Holland, in 1962, denied any links with the ZNP saying the African struggle did not need divisions.1 Mutambanengwe urged ‘progressive’ Africans to support ZAPU, the ‘real’ party. Equally, Tapfuma Mangozho of Kadoma denied any links with the ZNP saying it was in fact his ‘home-boy’, K. Mhiza, who was a ZNP supporter and not him. Mangozho emphatically noted that “I am a supporter of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union and I am not interested in the ZNP. Away with the ZNP!”2 Others described the ZNP as a ‘club’ and not a political party. One K. M Chawafambira of Salisbury, claimed that “the only political party here in Southern Rhodesia with a bright future is the ZAPU led by Mr. J. Nkomo”.3

The ZNP was regarded by the mainstream political organization, in this case ZAPU, as divisive and a political poison that ‘right-thinking’ Africans were to avoid by all means. Even Nelson Samkange, the former ZNP publicity secretary who resigned from the party in January 1962, claimed that the ZNP stood in the way of political progress. Samkange said there was need for unity among Africans as the existence of minority groups could derail African political advancement. On its part, the ZNP accused Samkange of cowardice describing him as a ‘cowardly individual’. Nathaniel Chingombe, who succeeded Samkange, accused ZAPU leaders of being treacherous by accepting the constitutional proposals. Arguably, Samkange decided to leave the ZNP, which appeared to have no political future in the envisaged independent Zimbabwe. His argument for resigning from the party was mere escapist reasoning as it had become clear that any serious politician had brighter future in ZAPU, whose members were estimated to be more that 300 000 in January 1962.4

Mainstream African nationalist parties were significantly exclusive and gendered, manifesting some form of ‘masculinity dodaism’. During the celebrations to mark the

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formation of ZAPU that were held at Gwanzura Stadium in Highfields and attended by over 15,000 people, former Chief Munhuwepasi Mangwende, who officially opened the function, likened ZAPU to a baby boy. Mangwende, in the presence of ZAPU leaders, including deputy president Dr S. T. Parirenyatwa, noted that “ZAPU is a newly born baby son and we have all gathered here to celebrate its birth, God and all our ancestral spirits will bless his great son who has come to life and also bless his future in all affairs of the country”.

However, despite the above constructions of African nationalism, it is evident that some African women significantly contributed to nationalist politics. African women in Salisbury challenged settler rule in various ways. They rallied behind trade union movements like RICU and were active members of the CYL, ANC, NDP, ZAPU, ZNP and ZANU among other political organizations. Yet, like male politicians, some African women ‘othered’ the ZNP and encouraged their folks to join ZAPU, emphasizing the importance of unity. In fact, some women joined ZAPU out of fear of being labelled ‘sell-outs’. Others joined because “they claim to be victimized”, while others joined the party in search of socio-economic and political opportunities.

As such, African nationalism meant different things for different sections of the African population. It could also be used as a facade to advance personal or sectarian interests. Its rise and pervasiveness was differential and never spontaneous. The conceptualization, essence and articulation of ‘nationalism’ manifested the differentiated nature of African societies in the country. It might even be more appropriate to talk in terms of ‘African nationalisms’ rather than ‘African nationalism’, a term which denotes assumed unity of purpose. The nationalism of the political leaders often conflicted with that of the freedom fighters, most of whom were young women and men. The nationalist parties supposedly “simply wanted to take power, change the name, flag and anthem and put black people into positions where whites had been before. These old parties did not want radical change in a way that would open up opportunities for the masses of the people”.

Nonetheless, Salisbury remained a cockpit for African nationalist politics until the early 1970s when the struggle for independence shifted to the rural areas. Undeniably, rural-urban linkages remained pertinent for the execution of the armed struggle. Salisbury

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2 African Businessman, 3 March 1962, “Why some people join ZAPU”, p.5. While addressing a ZAPU meeting on 2 March 1962, Sally Mugabe, wife of the then ZAPU Publicity Secretary Robert Mugabe, identified various reasons why some people, including women, joined the party. She noted that some business owners feared that “if they do not join, those who are members of ZAPU may influence people to boycott their businesses.”
remained a cosmopolitan city in which African workers and other urban residents were important socio-economic and political actors. They could be members of ethnic associations, which provided important social capital in a competitive job market; members of civic organizations; members of different political organizations, and supporters of the liberation war effort just like their rural counterparts.

7.5 Ethnicity and African Nationalism, 1963-1980

The relationship between ethnicity and nationalism is ambivalent and ambiguous. In Africa, nationalism tends to be identified with the state while ethnicity is perceived as divisive; hence, the two ideologies can supposedly not co-exist. African politicians often denounce ‘tribalism’, yet “in the open secret of African politics, sedulously attend to the maintenance of the ethnic networks of patronage that are the basis of their power”. They appeal to both ethnicity and nationalism when they suit them. Msindo attempts to draw a distinction between ethnicity and tribalism in an effort to illuminate the two concepts’ interaction with African nationalism. He argues that tribalism is the mobilization of ethnically conscious people to ferment political enmity and disunity between ethnic others to the detriment of nationalism. Msindo defines ethnicity as the ability in people to classify themselves as social others. Msindo argues that in Bulawayo, between 1950 and 1963, ethnicity co-existed with and complemented nationalism rather than the two working as polar opposite identities. He adds that African nationalists condemned ‘tribalism’, which they understood to be ‘an unreasonable hatred of other ethnic groups’, but they did not denounce ‘ethnicity’, which they christened a ‘healthy patriotism’. Consequently, one could double as an ethnic activist and nationalist.

Furthermore, Msindo argues that in the 1950s and early 1960s, ethnicity was positively developed to mobilize the masses. The SRANC, NDP and ZAPU appealed to the ‘imagined’ Shona and Ndebele ethnic past from which they drew cultural symbols that became part of the imagination and construction of the envisaged nation. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, however, cautions that the relationship between ethnicity and nationalism before 1963 was

2 Ibid.
3 Vail and White, “Tribalism in the Political History of Malawi”, p.151.
4 Msindo, “Ethnicity and Nationalism in Urban Colonial Zimbabwe”, 2. He sees ethnic communities as more inward looking in defining themselves than political tribes.
5 Ibid, p.11. Msindo cites Joseph Msika who was an executive member of the NDP but remained an active patron of the Mashonaland Cultural Society.
not always cordial as there is ‘convincing’ evidence that “ethnicity lurked beneath the rise of national consciousness always ready to fragment it”.¹ Msindo’s argument creates a “false impression of some consensus, which did not exist at any moment of nationalism”.²

The Ndebele-Shona axis was evident as early as the formation of the SRANC, in 1957, and this was manifested in the words exchanged at the founding congress of the party as well as in the subsequent party structure. Conscious efforts were made to achieve some degree of ethnic balance within the top leadership of the SRANC.³ During the federal era, some political actors resorted to ethnic politics as they canvassed for the seats reserved for Southern Rhodesian Africans in the Federal Parliament. In Bulawayo, the Matabeleland Home Society made it clear that it would not support candidates outside the ‘Ndebele tribe’, while in Mutare, it was reported in 1958 that “certain people said that they would like a local man as a candidate and that man should be of Manyika origin”.⁴ Local politicians played the ‘tribal’ card in a bid to exclude their competitors who became the ‘outsider’ and political Other. The Ndebele and Manyika were accused of reducing politics to the level of the ‘tribe’.⁵

Some Africans exhibited some form of ‘local particularism’. They preferred local candidates who knew their challenges, aspirations and expectations and were part of local socio-economic and political struggles. To illustrate, one R. D Dodzo wrote in ‘defence’ of the alleged Ndebele and Manyika ‘tribalists’ noting that Matabeleland was represented by M. M. Hove in the Federal Parliament, a man who was not Ndebele. Manicaland was represented by Savanhu, a Zezuru from Salisbury. These communities felt short-changed as these politicians spent most of their time in Salisbury and not their constituencies. The writer added that since joining the Federal Parliament, “five years ago, he [Savanhu] has only visited Chipinge and probably Maranke Reserve for a very special meeting”.⁶

Although Savanhu was a ‘capable MP’ he was not ‘local’. Manicaland did not need a Manyika but “a local man and not one living and farming or running a business at Karoi or Mazowe. Manicaland will accept a Nyanja, a Sena or a Ndebele- for that matter- provided the man lives in this part of the country, has a stake in Manicaland, above all, is a man of the

¹ Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Beyond the Drama of War”, p.57.
² Ibid.
³ Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Nation Building in Zimbabwe”, p.44.
⁵ African Daily News, 11 March 1958, “Steer Clear of Tribal Issues”, p.1. While addressing the Mutare branch of the ANC in March 1958, Jasper Z Savanhu, a Federal MP, insisted that Africans must put tribal influences behind if they were to succeed in their efforts of getting fair representation.
highest calibre”\(^1\). Consequently, preference for local candidates for political office was not necessarily entirely a manifestation of political tribalism. Undeniably, though, political tribalism afforded varying opportunities to different political actors and those, like Savanhu, who could not use ethnicity to canvas local support, had no option but to condemn both political tribalism and local particularism.

‘Tribalism’ was a pervasive feature that permeated into African sport, social relations, labour market and nationalist politics. Also, it is evident from the above discussion that political tribalism during this period could not be explained in purely primordial or instrumentalist terms.\(^2\) The African populace were not mere victims of ‘tribal games’ by the political elite and their ‘tribal innocence’ can in no way be celebrated. The danger, however, is to read local particularism as some form of ‘tribalism’. Nevertheless, ethnicity became a vital political resource used by some political entrepreneurs and the ‘tribal bourgeoisie’ as a basis for mobilization.\(^3\)

By 1963, “a major ethnic rift” hit African nationalist politics with the split of ZAPU along ethnic lines and the formation of ZANU that was Shona dominated, while ZAPU was Kalanga and Ndebele dominated.\(^4\) The politicisation of ethnicity within the African nationalist movement significantly contributed to the ZAPU-ZANU split in 1963.\(^5\) According to Raftopoulos, “ethnicity, which had played a contradictory role in the life of the city’s workers, was henceforth increasingly harnessed by the intellectual elite and deployed in the destructive form of ‘political tribalism’, which was to plague the nationalist movement throughout the anti-colonial struggle”.\(^6\) Joshua Nkomo also alluded to the role of ‘tribalism’ in the 1963 ZAPU-ZANU split. He noted that the Shona element in ZAPU wanted to get rid of zimundevere, a derogatory term for “the old Ndebele man”.\(^7\)

Concerning the split, Nkomo wrote that:

At that time, in the villages of Zimbabwe, rivalry between the two main language groups barely existed. In the towns the two groups are so mixed that it did not occur to people to divide in this way. But the students at universities abroad had lost contact with the realities of life at home. They felt the need to create some artificial loyalty to a

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\(^1\) Ibid.


\(^4\) Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Nation Building in Zimbabwe”, p.43;


\(^6\) Raftopoulos, “Nationalism and Labour”, p.143.

\(^7\) Nkomo, *The Story of My Life*, pp.112-113.
group, and they chose to exploit ‘tribal’ differences as a means of rallying that loyalty. White ‘experts’ on Rhodesia-missionaries, government employees, academics loyal to successive regimes- had for long emphasized and exaggerated such differences as a way of dividing the people. Now their work was bearing fruit to damage our cause. The leadership of ZAPU had always been drawn without distinction from all the areas of the country... Now I was accused of giving preference to Ndebele-speakers. Part of the false accusation stuck and was exploited by people who wished to attack me for their own personal advantage. That is our country’s tragedy.¹

Nkomo blamed the African educated elite, his political rivals and the Rhodesian state for fanning ‘tribal’ sentiments for their varying agendas. He also noted that before the split, the atmosphere within ZAPU was characterized by conspiracy, leadership wrangles and an undercurrent of tribalism among some ZAPU leaders and supporters. This was in turn exploited by the Rhodesian intelligence service, which further fanned ‘tribal’ sentiments to balkanise the African nationalist movement.

The ZAPU-ZANU split has also been explained in terms of personal differences, ideological contradictions and the lack of confidence by the ‘rebels’ in the leadership of Joshua Nkomo. The Zimbabwe Liberator’s Platform (ZLP) argues that Nkomo was not acceptable to ZANU and its fighters because of his role in the 1961 constitutional proposal. For the ZLP, ethnicity was not an issue at the time of the split.² Fay Chung notes that the differences between ZAPU and ZANU were not ‘fundamentally ideological’ but were based on different strategies. She further claims that ZAPU had popular support in the 1960s but “it was ZANU which managed to spear-head the armed struggle in the 1970s. Because of its military prowess, ZANU was able to gain control of a large area of influence by the time of independence in 1980”.³

Chung, however, acknowledges that the differences in strategy were further compounded by the issue of ethnicity as ZANU had predominantly Shona support while ZAPU had predominant Ndebele support. In the same vein, Martin Meredith notes that ZANU’s success in launching the war in 1972 also affected the political loyalties of Africans

¹ Ibid., p.114.
² ZLP, “What Happened to our Dream?” p.34.
³ F. Chung, “Opportunities for Political Renewal in Zimbabwe”, in Harold-Barry, ed., Zimbabwe. The Past is the Future, p.240. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, however, notes that the argument that ZANU PF initiated the armed struggle has been part of the party’s propaganda and ZANU PF triumphalism, which sought to undermine PF-ZAPU’s contribution towards the liberation war effort. Ndlovu-Gatsheni notes that contrary to ‘popular’ thinking that ZANLA started the armed struggle with the Chinhoyi battle in 1966, ZIPRA units from Zambia were involved in confrontations with the Rhodesian forces as early as 1965. See Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Beyond the Drama of War”, pp.65-66; Nkomo, The Story of My Life. Mainstream literature on the liberation war represents the year 1972 as marking the ‘Moment of Manoeuvre’. This was when the ZANLA forces opened the Nehanda Sector under the command of Rex Nhongo (the late Solomon Mujuru).
as since 1963 the ZANU leadership had come mostly from Shona- oriented groups.\textsuperscript{1} After 1972, ZANU support that had remained limited until ZANLA challenged white power began to swell.

In the 1960s, both groups drew supports from Shona-speaking areas and interestingly, Nkomo’s strongest support came from Salisbury and Bulawayo.\textsuperscript{2} This, in part, reflected the ‘urban origins’ of mass nationalism in Zimbabwe. However, Lee Cokorinos observes that at the time of their formation, both ZAPU and ZANU comprised of multi-ethnic and multi-class alliances of urban and rural Africans, including professionals, ‘peasants’, wealthier rural accumulators, traders, clergymen and the urban lumpenproletariat.\textsuperscript{3} It was after the split that the ethnic resource increasingly became an indispensable tool for political mobilization and the establishment of alternative and counter-hegemonic ideologies to the Rhodesian state.

The histories of ZAPU and ZANU became ones of ethnic strife, suspicions, tensions and ‘tribal politics’ that created divisions between the Ndebele and the Shona. In their efforts to gain support from different sections of the population, political barons often masqueraded as ‘nationalists’, when in fact their conceptualisation of nationalism and the nation was parochial with significant ethnic, racial, class and gendered exclusions. Political entrepreneurs resorted to political tribalism in desperate attempts to position themselves to submerge not only the hegemony of the racist and oppressive Rhodesian state, but that of the African political ‘Other’.

Ethnicity, then, remained a salient divisive force in African nationalist politics. Of course, ethnicity is often used as a veneer to hide other underlying political, ideological and socio-economic tensions. Both ZAPU and ZANU were, in the 1970s, concerned with their political hegemony and political survival as the leadership in both parties anticipated to eventually take control of the state from Ian Smith’s Rhodesian Front (RF) government. This probably explains why appeals for unity between the two movements from African states and the OAU largely failed.\textsuperscript{4}

While at the time of the ZAPU/ZANU split in 1963, Nkomo enjoyed the support of most nationalists and ethnic groups, by the mid 1970s, his support had waned. No figures are, however, available to determine African political loyalties at this stage. Nonetheless, by 1975, Nkomo, the once popular politician in Salisbury, had almost become a minority leader.

\textsuperscript{1} M. Meredith, The Past is another Country. Rhodesia 1890-1979, London; Andre Deutsch, 1979, p.198.
\textsuperscript{2} Meredith, The Past is Another Country, p.40.
\textsuperscript{3} Cokorinos, “The Political Economy of State and Party Formation in Zimbabwe”, p.32.
\textsuperscript{4} In 1971, James Chikerema from ZAPU and Nathan Shamuyarira from ZANU moved to combine the two guerrilla movements into the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI). FROLIZI was recognized by the OAU but rejected by ZANU and ZAPU leadership as an attempt to destroy the two parent political parties.
As already noted, ZANLA’s launch of the armed struggle in north-eastern Zimbabwe enabled it to gain substantial support from Africans across the country. Consequently, “as more and more Africans began to see armed struggle as the only force capable of overthrowing the Smith regime, ZANU was seen as the party leading the military campaign.”¹ By the time ZIPRA launched its military offensive of the 1970s, it was largely confined to the western parts of the country with Matabeleland as its stronghold. ZANLA, operating from the east and north-east, also largely recruited from Shona-speaking communities.² However, at the leadership levels, both ZANLA and ZIPRA continued to maintain some form of ethnic balance within their ranks.

By 1975, Nkomo had lost a number of former allies who had supported him in 1963. Chikerema and Nyandoro, senior Shona politicians, left ZAPU to form FROLIZI, while in the early 1970s Rex Nhongo (Solomon Mujuru) and other Shona militants left ZAPU to form the military core of ZANLA.³ Moreover, in the 1970s, the African National Council led by Bishop Abel Tendekayi Muzorewa was active in Salisbury and it vigorously campaigned against the Pearce Commission constitutional proposals in 1971. Muzorewa actually became the popular African politician in Salisbury in the 1970s.⁴ With most African nationalist leaders either imprisoned or in exile, a generation of black Rhodesians knew no other leader.⁵ This, in turn, submerged Nkomo’s popularity in Salisbury.

While at the national level the struggle for the leadership of the nationalist movement, until the mid-1970s, was between Nkomo and Sithole, within ZANU leadership had been hotly contested between Sithole and Mugabe. A leadership crisis soon arose as ZANU and

² Ibid.
³ Ibid.
⁴ Interviews with Tagarika, Mbare, Harare, 10 and 25 August 2011; Sekuru Chitedza, Mabvuku, 20 October 2011.
⁵ Meredith, The Past is another Country, p.196. Not every black Rhodesian supported the war. The idea of ‘popular’ peasant support for the war has been challenged by scholars like Norma Krigger. It is also noteworthy that Muzorewa, Sithole and Chirau, unlike other ‘militant nationalists, sought peaceful solutions for the ‘Rhodesian crisis’. They hoped to attain political independence through negotiations with the Rhodesian government. The negotiations later gave birth to Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, in 1979, with Muzorewa as President. Mainstream nationalists dismissed both Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and the ‘Internal Settlement’ that gave birth to it. Muzorewa later formed the United African National Council (UANC), which pursued ‘peaceful’ ways of establishing a democratic multiracial society. In mainstream nationalist discourse, Muzorewa was regarded as a ‘sell-out’, ‘stooge’, and political ‘Other’. His contribution to the development of nationalism in Zimbabwe has largely been trivialized and ignored (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Beyond the Drama of War”, pp.70-71; A. Chambati, ‘National Unity-ANC”, Banana, ed., Turmoil and Tenacity; G.L. Chavunduka, “Rhodesia/Zimbabwe: The Position of the African National Council”, International Affairs, Vol 53, No 1, 1977, pp.14-21).
ZANLA cadres soon lost confidence in Sithole’s leadership. ¹ According to Mugabe, when Sithole was made president in 1963, not everyone had approved his candidature. ² Like Nkomo, Sithole had been implicated in the 1961 ‘constitutional scandal’. Sithole could have been replaced at the inaugural ZANU congress in 1964 but its leaders feared creating divisions within the new party. When he was charged with plotting to murder Ian Smith and other white politicians, in 1969, Sithole, in mitigation against the six-year sentence, is said to have declared in court that “I wish publicly to dissociate my name in word, thought or deed from any subversive activities, from any terrorist activities, from any form of violence”. ³ Consequently, Sithole became ‘the betrayer’, the ‘sell-out’ and a political ‘outsider’. Mugabe described Sithole, Muzorewa and other ‘moderates’ like Chikerema and Chief Chirau as “four cowardly unprincipled creatures who have made their objective the destruction of our revolution... They are indeed political ciphers which are in vain struggling to become digits. Yet the more they try the deeper grows their hollowness”. ⁴ The four were political “puppets indulging in internal discussions with the enemy”. ⁵

The Rhodesian government equally fanned ‘tribal’ sentiments in order to ‘balkanize’ the nationalist movement using the ‘divide and rule’ tactic. As already alluded to earlier, the colonial authorities were pre-occupied with ethnocatography. During the war, the Rhodesian state increasingly used the notions of ‘traditional tribal maps’ to estimate the support of different African politicians. The *Zimbabwe Star*, in 1976, published a report alleging that the RF had a covert plan ‘Operation Shaka’ that sought to divide the Ndebele and the Shona, by emphasizing their alleged ethnic differences. The plan supposedly further sought to divide the Shona, emphasizing the differences between the various Shona constituent groups. ⁶ Meanwhile, ethnic rivalry and factionalism within the nationalist movement remained salient despite attempts by some African countries to unite ZIPRA and ZANLA. The two movements remained ethnic oriented and polarized.⁷

¹ The Mgagao Declaration of 1975, Tanzania, saw Sithole being deposed and being replaced by Mugabe. The declaration also called for the resumption of the liberation war (ZLP, “What happened to our dream?” p.35; *Focus* December 2000 -Helen Suzman Foundation-, “A freedom fighter’s story”, pp.25-28.
⁴ Ibid.
⁵ Ibid, p.11. Nkomo’s supporters were characterized as “mercenary stone-throwers”.
⁷ Masunungure, “Travails of Opposition Politics in Zimbabwe since Independence”, p.151. Under pressure from from their backers, ZIPRA and ZANLA formed the Zimbabwe People's Army. However, conflicts broke out in training camps in Tanzania between fighters from the two factions. The ZIPRA component of ZIPA later
Under pressure from their backers, Mugabe and Nkomo formed the Patriotic Front (PF) in October 1976, which took part in the Geneva talks with the British and the Americans. ZAPU and ZANU were also under the PF when they took part in the Lancaster House Agreement that resulted in the 1979 Lancaster House Constitution paving the way for the independence elections in 1980. However, ZANU PF pulled out of the PF preferring to contest the poll as an independent political party.\footnote{ZAPU leader, Dumiso Dabengwa, in an interview with The Sunday Mail, in July 2012, claimed that “we should have fought the elections in 1980 under one party, the Patriotic Front. Everything had been done, we in the military had agreed to merge our armies together…but at the last minute, ZANU reneged on that and went on to register their participation…as ZANU-PF, which forced ZAPU to then also say we are going to participate in that election as PF-ZAPU. That was very unfortunate” (The Sunday Mail, July 22-28, 2012, p.10.}

\footnote{Astrow, Zimbabwe: A Revolution that Lost its Way? p.82.} ZANU PF won 57 of the 80 seats up for grabs, while PF ZAPU got 20 seats and the United African National Council (UANC) got the remaining 3 seats in Parliament.\footnote{ZANU PF won 57 of the 80 seats up for grabs, while PF ZAPU got 20 seats and the United African National Council (UANC) got the remaining 3 seats in Parliament.} The RF won all the 20 parliamentary seats reserved for whites in accordance to the Lancaster Agreement. The ZANU PF-government subsequently faced the daunting task of constructing the new Zimbabwean nation from disparate and conflicting racial and ethnic groups amid intense hatred and suspicions.

### 7.6 Conclusion

African nationalist politics and struggles for political independence were characterized by underlying fissures, contradictions and tensions. African nationalism was not a unified and coherent ideology. The nationalism of the elite often differed from that of the sub-alterns. However, the ‘dominant’ nationalist narrative attempted to belittle and submerge various competing narratives about the ‘liberation struggles’ and African ‘nationalisms’. More so, masculinity \textit{dodaism}, gender and ethnic tensions and the ‘othering’ of alternative political voices and actors as \textit{vatengesi} or sell-outs were important facets of nationalist politics and the war of liberation. Various political entrepreneurs and their supporters fought to establish and maintain their political hegemony of over both the struggles for independence and the envisaged new Zimbabwe. Ethnicity and identification were politicised making them indispensable resources in violent contests for power. The violence politics, the politicisation of ethnicity and othering work became the new nation’s ugly birthmarks. The following chapter thus further explores the postcolonial context of ethnicity in Zimbabwe.

withdraw and returned to its base in Zambia. According to Masunungure, “mass force was unleashed upon real or imagined ZIPA leaders and their ‘Vashandi’ adherents and sympathizers. Many lives were lost in the purges”
CHAPTER 8: ETHNICITY IN POSTCOLONIAL ZIMBABWE

8.1 Introduction

Chapter 7 discussed ethnicity, gender and ‘othering work’ in colonial Harare between the 1950s and 1980. It argued that during the struggles for Zimbabwe’s political independence, ethnicity and identification were often politicised making them important sources of political capital in contestations for power and hegemonic control over the nationalist movement and the envisaged new Zimbabwean state. This set the stage for the postcolonial context of ethnicity. The present chapter explores the salience and configurations of ethnicity in post-independence Zimbabwe in view of the attempts to de-ethnicise and de-racial the state after 1980.

8.2 The Birth of the Nation State

The story about the birth of Zimbabwe is complex and multi-layered rather than a ‘grand’ meta-narrative.¹ However, multiple competing voices are normally discarded and silenced by

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hegemonic forces in the construction of a ‘unitary history’ of the nation. The imagining and writing of a nation’s pasts tend to be influenced by issues like ‘presentism’, ‘performativity’, crude revisionism, refashioning of ‘tradition’ and deliberate historical omissions.\textsuperscript{1} Raftopoulos and Mlambo note that the ‘dramatic’ narrowing of the country’s nationalist history has led to the occlusion of the political Other.\textsuperscript{2} Yet, “nationalism as a movement, or set of movements, and as an ideology, remains central to contemporary Zimbabwe and still requires a great deal of rigorous historical questioning”.\textsuperscript{3} The construction of nationalism and the discourse around the liberation struggle in turn impact on how the political elite engages with ethnicity. Attempts to construct and articulate a dominant meta-narrative of the country’s otherwise multi-layered and disparate pasts is not unique to Zimbabwe. In post-apartheid South Africa, the state has attempted to create an official, national and nationalist history limiting the space for other competing narratives. According to Bonner, Hyslop and van der Walt, “the record of ‘history from below’ has often been forced into a monolithic narrative of a single struggle (‘the struggle’), supposedly led throughout by the African National Congress (ANC)”\textsuperscript{4}.

The postcolonial history of Zimbabwe has not been spared from such comparative reflection. Historical erasure, presentism and historical re-evaluation impact on future generations’ understanding of the country’s contested pasts. Hegemonic forces deliberately erase ‘contentious’ and ‘sensitive’ episodes of a nation’s pasts, resulting in the emergence of counter-memory narratives.\textsuperscript{5}

Zimbabwe is \textit{inter alia} the product of the country’s pre-colonial past; European imperialism; urbanisation; industrialisation; African nationalism; struggles for independence; and postcolonial imaginings and constructions of the nation state.\textsuperscript{6} The people who inhabited independent Zimbabwe came from disparate political, social, ethnic, racial and historical backgrounds with varying and often conflicting notions, imaginings and constructions of ‘the

\textsuperscript{2} Raftopoulos and Mlambo, “Outside the Third Chimurenga”.
\textsuperscript{4} Bonner, Hyslop and van der Walt, “Rethinking Worlds of Labour”, p.151.
\textsuperscript{5} Ohnuki-Tierney, “Historicization of the Culture Concept”, p.217.
\textsuperscript{6} The liberation war of the 1960s and 1970s was admittedly one of the multiple and complex developments that contributed to the birth of the Zimbabwean state. However, since political independence was immediately preceded by the Second Chimurenga, the birth of Zimbabwe is often associated with the liberation war and \textit{vice versa}. This, of course, is a simple and reductionist reading of Zimbabwean history.
nation’. They included, ‘autochthonous’ blacks\(^1\), whites, Asians, Coloureds, and immigrant
blacks. Their interests were divided and colonial racial injustice created a ‘natural’ hatred of
whites. They were further differentiated, \textit{inter alia}, on the basis of class, age, religion,
regionalism, ethnicity and political affiliation.\(^2\) The social, political and economic identities,
‘Ndebele’, ‘Shona’, and ‘white settlers’, among others, were constructed and evolved in the
context of the dynamic political economies of the pre-colonial polities, imperialism, settler
colonialism, decolonisation and postcolonial challenges.\(^3\)

As such, it is difficult to conceptualise Zimbabwe as a ‘closed community’ of people
with the same historical experiences, common origins, and cultural values\(^4\). According to
Ndlouv-Gatsheni:

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[\text{Zimbabwe}]\text{ is a complex mosaic of contending histories and memories, making it as much a reality as it is an idea- a construction not only moulded out of pre-colonial, colonial and nationalist pasts, but also out of global values of sovereignty, self-determination and territorial integrity. It is an idea born out of continuing synthesis of multilayered, overlapping and cross-pollinating historical genealogies, and contending nationalisms, as well as suppressed local and regional sovereignties.}^5
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Ndlouv-Gatsheni further contends that nationalism, which played and continue to play a key
role in the construction and imagining of the Zimbabwean state, is “always imagined, constructed, suffered and celebrated”.\(^6\) He also argues that nations, national symbols and states are social and political artifacts that are prone to “contestations, fragilities, acceptance, rejections and reconstructions”.\(^7\) Consequently, as a historical and social construction, Zimbabwe does not have primordial origins.

The above analysis contradicts claims that Zimbabwe is not merely a ‘geographical
expression’ that was created in the nineteenth century by European imperialism, but ‘a reality
that has existed for centuries, with a language, a culture and a ‘world view’ of its own, representing the inner core of the Shona historical experience.”\(^8\) Such an imagining and

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\(^1\) The thesis recognizes the problematic nature of the ‘autochthonous-allochthon’ nexus, which is contested, negotiated, and often appealed to in order to exclude ‘the Other’.


\(^3\) Raftopoulos and Mlambo, “Outside the Third Chimurenga”.

\(^4\) Kaulamu, “The Culture of Party Politics and the Concept of the State”. Even during the pre-colonial era, the inhabitants of present-day Zimbabwe did not all identify themselves as one nation.

\(^5\) Ndlouv-Gatsheni quoted by Mupotsa, ‘Book Review: Do ‘Zimbabweans’ Exist?’

\(^6\) Ibid.

\(^7\) Ibid.

construction of the Zimbabwean state is parochial, ‘Shona-centric’ and assumes a ‘holistic’, simple, too neat and harmonious ‘Shona’ past. The approach reflects ‘Shona/Karanga reductionist readings’ of the Zimbabwean state, which is grossly misleading. The reasoning downplays the role of “European imperialism and the political, economic and social contributions of non-Shona in the creation of the nation”.

At independence, Zimbabwe made efforts to end racial inequalities and racial privileges. The state had to grapple with the legacy of structural inequalities, violent colonial repression, and the war of liberation, with its ambiguities of emancipatory politics and ‘commandist violence’. However, while most African states managed to address the colonial legacy of racial inequalities with varying degrees of success, “the real question which distinguished governments in postcolonial Africa was not their attitude to race but their attitude to ethnicity and custom”. The nation building project tended to minoritize and submerge other ethnic identities, according them narrow negative tribal undertones. Racial and ethnic diversity were seen as ‘dangerous’, divisive and a hindrance to the ‘national project’.

Yet, in some instances, the notion of a ‘common national culture’ made no sense for the populace as it lacked any content with which they could identify. Feelings of belonging remained rooted in their local communities rooted in kinship, ethnic and other local allegiances. Peter Geschiere observes that the many postcolonial African countries actually witnessed a crisis of citizenship that significantly challenged the notion of ‘national citizenship’ that gained currency in the early years of independence. Ethnic forms of identification in postcolonial Africa tended to be against the political establishment. For Basil

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1 Kaulemu, “The Culture of Party Politics and the Concept of the State”, p.82.
2 Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Do ‘Zimbabweans’ Exist? pp.97-107. Some nationalist inspired narratives have sought to eulogize the past with distorted representations of the country’s history. They argue for a ‘Shona-centric’ state whose existence can be traced to time immemorial and whose boundaries have remained ‘fixed’ for thousands of years (Beach, “A. B. S. Chigwedere’s Histories of Zimbabwe and Africa”, Zambezia, Vol xv, No i, 1988, pp.87-9). Such claims are misleading constructions of the nation state as at no point did disparate peoples who inhabited pre-colonial Zimbabwe develop a ‘universal’ consciousness of belonging to one hegemonic state.
3 Kaulemu, “The Culture of Party Politics and the Concept of the State”, p.82.
5 Raftopoulos and Mlambo, “Outside the Third Chimurenga”.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
Davidson, this was because the jubilant crowds that celebrated independence “were not inspired by a national consciousness” but by the hope of improved personal socio-economic conditions, which unfortunately remained elusive.\(^1\) The postcolonial period provided new socio-economic and political milieu for the definitions and re-definitions of selves and others. Ethnicity remained one of the challenges to the survival of the state.

In Zimbabwe, the postcolonial state has failed to engage ethnicity in politics and the economy.\(^2\) Little attention has been paid to socio-economic and political ethnic configurations of the inherited state, and structures and institutions, which fomented, sustained and reproduced ethnicity, including the uneven development of provinces.\(^3\) Equally, the system of divide and rule, which had earlier been widely practiced by the colonialists, permeated the fabric of the African postcolonial state. The system has been associated with corruption, including ‘tribalism’, ‘ethnocracy’ and nepotism. According to Munyae Mulinge and Gwen Leseted:

> Aware of the political and economic value of the policy of divide and rule, postcolonial African political leaders have developed a tendency to treat members of their tribal group with favour thus setting the stage for the rapid growth of ethno-centric favouratism and nepotism. … In some countries, ethnicity/tribalism and nepotism have encouraged the spread of corrupt practices such as embezzlement and economic mismanagement through the appointment of under-qualified, and in some instances unqualified, but politically well-connected tribesmen to fill important positions.\(^4\)

Industrial ethnicity is a reality that the African postcolonial state has to seriously contend with. Jude Cocodia observes that:

> There is no denying that since the colonial era, African states have frequently been hampered by instability, corruption and ethnic violence. Great instability has mainly been the result of marginalisation of other ethnic groups. Many politicians have used their positions of power to ignite negative sentiments arising from such marginalisation….ethnic conflicts arise from the discontent of groups toward the perceived domination by other groups who are unduly favoured by the government.\(^5\)

Ethnicity continues to play an important role in not only determining a person’s potential access to socio-economic and political resources but also in imagining and constructing the

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\(^3\) Ibid.


nation state. It equally plays a key role in contestations and negotiations over the issue of belonging. In Zimbabwe, the Lancaster House Agreement of 1979 led to the end of the Rhodesian war with both parties making significant compromises, which in turn impacted on the imagination and construction of Zimbabwe.\(^1\) Focus was on reconstruction, reconciliation and redistribution under a socialist banner that was in most instances tempered with pragmatism.\(^2\) Theoretically, Zimbabwe, in the early 1980s, was an inclusive state in which all citizens could be ‘Zimbabwean’ regardless of colour, creed, gender, language, ethnicity and culture. However, the legacy of the violent nationalist struggle, the colonial legacy of racial and ethnic polarization complicated the project of building a united nation state. There were underlying tensions, suspicions and hostilities, which reached an ugly zenith through the Gukurahundi ‘massacres’ in Midlands and Matabeleland provinces between 1983 and 1987.\(^3\)

### 8.3 Gukurahundi and Hegemonic Politics in Zimbabwe

In postcolonial Zimbabwe, some ethnic groups have with varying degrees of success attempted to establish counter and/or alternative hegemonies in a bid to counter, subvert, undermine or parallel that of the state, which is perceived to be Shona-centric. Gukurahundi has thus been explained in terms of power contestations in postcolonial Zimbabwe. Gukurahundi was a code name of a “state military crackdown on perceived anti-government insurgents, many of Ndebele origin, carried out in Matabeleland and parts of Midlands”\(^4\). It was carried out by the North Korean-trained Fifth Brigade whose members are said to have been mostly Shona-speaking against ex-ZIPRA dissidents, their ‘supporters’ and ‘sympathizers’ leading to the killing of an estimated 20 000 civilians, most of whom were

\(^1\) Raftopoulos, “Unresolved Differences: The Limits of Reconciliation Politics in Zimbabwe”, p.2; I. Mandaza, “The Political Economy of Transition”, in I. Mandaza, ed., Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition, 1980-1986, Dakar: Codesria, 1986. Concerning national reconciliation, Mugabe, in 1982, noted that “hostilities or enmities of the past must cease to exist. Now, whether we fought against each other yesterday or were allies, we are bound to be allies. We have a common destiny” (Moto, August 1982, ‘Headaches, hopes and plans. The Prime Minister speaks to Moto’, p.5).
\(^3\) Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) and Legal Resources Foundation (LRF), Breaking the Silence, Building True Peace: A Report on the Disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands, 1980-1988, Harare: CCJP and LRF, 1997. David Harold-Barry argues that at independence, “there was reconciliation between Zezuru and Karanga, Ndebele and Shona, black and white. But it did not go deep”. According to him, independence was not a new beginning as 'in an uncanny way, the new rulers proceeded just as their predecessors had done’ despite making grand statements and sentiments about reconciliation (D. Harold-Barry, “One Country, Two Nations, No Dialogue”, in Harold-Barry, ed., Zimbabwe. The Past is the Future, pp.256-7).
Ndebele or belonged to ‘Ndebele affiliated groups’.¹ The operation ended in 1987 with the signing of the Unity Accord between ZANU and PF ZAPU.

Gukurahundi illustrated the postcolonial state’s failure to effectively manage the issue of ethnicity. Richard Webner notes that the military operation was a manifestation of ‘quasi-nationalism’ and part of struggles for power and moral authority in postcolonial Zimbabwe.² Gukurahundi targeted a specific ethnic group [Ndebele], “which was perceived to be linked to a political party [PF ZAPU] belonging to Matabeleland. The ethnic group was also understood to represent a threat to the unitary vision of the nation and the formation of a one-party state”.³

The military operation assumed an ethnic dimension although it might have been carried out to achieve political and economic objectives. Inter- and intra-party ethnic tensions that were characteristic of the African nationalist movements engendered a postcolonial political milieu in which groups and former liberation movements viewed each other with heightened suspicion and even intense hatred. However, this did not necessarily make Gukurahundi inevitable.⁴ Gukurahundi showed the state’s failure to smoothly ‘blend’ the major ethnicities into a new broader Zimbabwean identity.⁵ The new state failed to effectively manage the tensions, polarization, bitterness and feelings of hatred against the black political and ethnic ‘Other’.⁶

Gukurahundi can also be interpreted in terms of economistic readings of ethnicity. Zimbabwe inherited a diversified economy that was second most industrialized in sub-Saharan Africa after South Africa but the economy remained ‘fundamentally in a

¹ CCJP and LRF, Breaking the Silence. The figure (20 000) has not been substantiated by empirical evidence and as such remains a ‘wild’ estimate.
² R. Webner, Tears of the Dead: The Social Biography of an African Family, Harare: Baobab Books, 1991, p.159; Gukurahundi and ‘quasi-nationalism’ supposedly justified violence against the peoples of western Zimbabwe who appeared to threaten the ‘unity’ of the state by ‘supporting’ dissidents (Raftopoulos, “Problematising Nationalism in Zimbabwe”, p.29). Hammar and Raftopoulos also observe that the Gukurahundi campaign was built upon a growing ‘Shona nationalism’ that was generated through the state’s rhetorical association between Ndebele/PF-ZAPU and dissident, which was used to legitimize state violence ‘in defence of the nation’ (Hammar and Raftopoulos, “Zimbabwe’s Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation”, in Hammar, Raftopoulos and Jensen, eds., Zimbabwe’s Unfinished Business, p.2).
³ Chuma et al, “The Future of democratic Politics in Zimbabwe”. According to ZAPU leader Dumiso Dabengwa, “they said every Ndebele is a dissident and therefore must be destroyed. That’s the Fifth Brigade, which was trained by the Koreans. They went around killing innocent people…” (The Sunday Mail, July 22 -28, 2012, “Gukurahundi: Both sides should apologise”, p10).
⁴ Bhebe argues that given the histories of ZAPU and ZANU, the civil war was almost inevitable but probably not its excesses. He doubts if a ZIPRA dominated ZNA would not have carried such a campaign against the Shona had ZAPU triumphed in the 1980 elections. See Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Nation Building in Zimbabwe”.
⁵ Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Nation Building in Zimbabwe”, p.47.
disarticulated pattern’ of accumulation. The project of nation-building was cast as a matter of endogenizing the economy by deepening sectoral and social articulation. This was carried out in the context of increasing intra-black conflicts. The black petty-bourgeoisie that had been shut out of the white-dominated private sector directed its accumulation strategies through the instrumentality of both the state and ethnicity. Ethnicity was used to advance and entrench the class interests of the emerging petty-bourgeoisie who had dominated the nationalist struggles. The Unity Accord enabled the nationalist elite to set aside ethnic divisions paving the way for a joint strategy of accumulation. Energies were turned toward ‘black economic empowerment’ and ‘affirmative action’ in the context of economic liberalization, rather than the ethnic Other. In a way, Gukurahundi facilitated processes of ‘embourgeoisement’, ‘compradorisation’ and ‘national unification’ under a de facto one-party state.

However, Gukurahundi and its memory have provoked ‘radical’ Ndebele politics and ‘radical’ Ndebele cultural nationalism. New notions of ‘Ndebele-ness’ contrasted the state’s idea of a unitary Zimbabwe. Gukurahundi solidified feelings of Ndebele marginalisation by what has been perceived as a ‘Shona-dominated’ state. One of the legacies of Gukurahundi has been “the imagining of Matabeleland as a space of hurt and uncured wounds”. Some Ndebele in the diaspora continue to use Gukurahundi in their construction and imagining of the United Mthwakazi Republic (UMR), which exist only in cyber space with its own national boundaries, national flag and other ritualistic trappings of a nation state. The militant Mthwakazi Liberation Front (MLF) has been calling for the establishment of an

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2 Moyo and Yeros, “Land Occupations and Land Reform in Zimbabwe”.


5 Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Nation Building in Zimbabwe”, p.48. Radical pressure groups and political organizations that have emerged in Matabeleland include Vukani Mahlabazulu, Imbovane YeMahlabazulu, ZAPU 2000, Mthwakazi People’s Congress and Mthwakazi Action Group on Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing in Matabeleland and Midlands.


7 Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Nation Building in Zimbabwe”; Manganga, “Internet as Public Sphere”.

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independent state covering Matabeleland and Midlands provinces as well as some parts of the Masvingo Province. Such groups have been accused of attempting to ‘provincialize’ Ndebele political identity, making it an anti-thesis of assumed Shona hegemony in the nation state. Gukurahundi further strengthened feelings of ‘Ndebele particularism’, which has been defined as the “rendition of a separate Ndebele history which is different from the Shona historical experiences, the attempts to revive Ndebele kingship, and the continual formation of Ndebele particularistic organizations up to the mass nationalism phase of Zimbabwean history.”

Admittedly, Gukurahundi is an emotive and potentially divisive issue, which explains why there have been attempts to dismiss it as a ‘closed chapter’. Although ‘presentism’ and ‘historical closures’ in the construction of Zimbabwe’s postcolonial history tend to gloss over some ‘undesirable’ episodes of the country’s pasts. However, Gukurahundi cannot be dismissed as a ‘moment of madness’ without efforts towards national healing, reconciliation and possibly restitution. For ZAPU leader, Dumiso Dabengwa, both government and the ‘dissidents’ should make formal apologies to the victims of the Gukurahundi atrocities.

It often takes time for the aggrieved to ‘heal’, if they do at all. Gukurahundi was a historical reality and no amount of crude revisionism can blot it out of the nation’s collective memory. Although some revisionists, ‘patriotic’ historians and/or organic intellectuals- and hegemonic forces may attempt to erase some episodes of a country’s pasts, people “are not that easily fooled-at least not all of them all of the time”. Such attempts, which can potentially lead to the obfuscation of Zimbabwean history, in part, centre on the argument that the event is a ‘closed chapter’ that ended with the signing of the Unity Accord in 1987. The argument’s proponents argue against trying to open old wounds.

However, in 2011, ZANU PF Politburo member Jonathan Moyo observed that the party had not been able to ‘adequately and resolutely’ deal with the ‘Gukurahundi scourge’.

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2 Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Echoing Silences”.
4 See Ranger, “Historiography, Patriotic History and the History of the Nation”.
8 *The Sunday Mail*, 7-13 August 2011, “ZANU PF: An introspection”, p.9. Samuel Sipepa Nkomo, the MDC MP for Lobengula (Bulawayo), also intimated that ‘I saw the Gukurahundi horrors with my own eyes. I saw them tear apart pregnant women’s stomachs and the little thing (foetus) falling down just like that. I saw my relatives being marched into a hut and that hut set on fire. That is where they ended. I saw with my own eyes.
Moyo noted that some politicians had avoided the contentious issue or simply explained it away (as a moment of madness), while others had even tried to justify it. On the contrary, Moyo said Gukurahundi “was a monumental mistake that should not have been made, and which, having been made, should have been corrected as it still must be in an open, honest and responsible manner in the national interest that unites rather than divides us as a nation”. Gukurahundi requires a clear and comprehensive resolution involving all stakeholders. Clinically, ‘nasty’ wounds are opened, thoroughly cleaned—a procedure that is evidently painful—and dressed if they are to completely heal. The Herald columnist, using the pseudonym Nathaniel Manheru, correctly captured the wound allegory when he noted that:

We must learn from doctors. They do not cut around a suppurating wound for fear of pus, smell and all. No. They cut through the pus; scrub the dirt, clean the wound and they administer the healing concoction. You wail, you crease, you toss, you turn, you belch from all openings but the doctor’s healing hand will move in determinedly, ignoring all your discomforts and protests, however fervent. To reach the wound, you must scrap pus. This is what we fail to do in Zimbabwe, which is why we have never cured the disease that afflicts our body politic.

Failure to open and clean deep old wounds delays healing making them smellier and nastier. The ‘nasty’ national wound of Gukurahundi and its attendant implications for ethnicity cannot heal if residents in the affected regions “continue to narrate their horrific experiences with muffled voices”. Farmer concludes that “we know, too, that forgetting is also a natural—indeed biological—process. Time heals all wounds, including those, which never drained properly, [and] are waiting to burst open again, to the ‘surprise’ of those who have forgotten”.

8.4 The ‘Marginalisation Thesis’

The politicisation of ethnicity, regionalism and Gukurahundi feed into, and sustain the ‘marginalisation thesis.’ The ‘thesis’ claims that the ZANU PF government, since 1980, deliberately ‘underdeveloped’ the Matabeleland region through social, economic and political
marginalisation. The ‘rebellious’, mostly Ndebele-speaking provinces, were supposedly ‘punished’ by a ‘Shona-dominated state’, which allegedly concentrated state-driven development projects in Mashonaland. Although the ‘thesis’ is often trumpeted by ‘Ndebele-affiliated’ groups, it is not entirely synonymous with the Matabeleland region. Other regions and ethnic groups have complained of being marginalised by a state that is perceived to be controlled by Zezuru political elites in collaboration with pro-ZANU PF politicians from other regions. Claims of political and socio-economic marginalisation are therefore complex and multi-layered. Disparate groups have accused and counter-accused each other of attempting to ‘regionalize’, ‘provincialise’, ‘racialise’ or ‘tribalise’ the state in their struggles for power, resources and hegemony.

Arguably, the period after 1980 witnessed the minoritisation and marginalisation of the Ndebele and Matabeleland. The Ndebele became the ethnic and political ‘Other’, while the Shona supposedly enjoyed preferential treatment with regard to socio-economic development. Gukurahundi is argued to have facilitated the marginalisation of Matabeleland and the Midlands provinces as the ‘disturbances’ militated against socio-economic development. Gukurahundi and the ‘marginalisation’ thesis are at the centre of ‘radical’ politics in Matabeleland. The MLF contends that the major objective of their ‘struggle’ is to liberate the people of Umthwakazi who have been marginalised by the state since independence. The feeling among some Ndebele and Ndebele affiliated groups is that they have been sidelined both in the economy and in politics, while the Shona have enjoyed a greater part of the national cake. In Bulawayo and Gwanda, the Shona are often accused of coming to Matabeleland to ‘take’ Ndebele jobs and opportunities in educational facilities like colleges and universities, despite the fact that there are more training institutions in Mashonaland than there are in Matabeleland.

3 There are some parts of Mashonaland provinces that are also ‘underdeveloped’. What seems to entrench perceptions of a pro-Zezuru state is the fact that Zimbabwe has had a Zezuru President since independence (Interview with Samson Bhasikiti, Mufakose, 3 December 2011.
6 Nyathi, “Zimbabwe: New Radical Movements Expose Tribal Fault Lines”. The same sentiments were echoed in an interview with Mr Mkhize.
With regard to national politics, feelings are that a Ndebele cannot be considered for president of Zimbabwe.  

As S’tshela Sa observes, feelings are that “there is a tribe in this country which specializes in deputizing. Interestingly, these deputies from all the different parties behave the same. They defend their leaders as if their lives depend on them.” The same sentiments were echoed by Welshman Mabhena, one of the proponents of the ‘marginalisation thesis’, who in 2006 claimed that ZANU PF was a party that was founded on splitting Zimbabweans into ‘tribal groups’, that is ‘Shona’ and ‘Ndebele’, “whereby Shonas must provide nationalist leadership”. Mabhena opined that Shona political entrepreneurs have always taken leading positions with some ‘Ndebele apologists’, roped in after the Unity Accord, making up the numbers and painting a picture of ‘national’ unity.

The issue of marginalisation is contentious and is increasingly being appealed to by political entrepreneurs in their struggles for power in Matabeleland. While some politicians continue to fan feelings of marginalisation blaming it on the ZANU PF government, others have dismissed it as a ‘myth’ created by the West, some ‘misguided elements’ in the Matabeleland, political parties like the MDC formations and Western-funded non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The then governor of Bulawayo Metropolitan Province, Cain Mathema, in May 2011, opined that such organizations were funded by ‘white supremacists’ but “led by black pikininis who are given large fat salaries” in order for them to trumpet a ‘Western-generated myth’. For Mathema, the alleged ‘myth’ about the marginalisation of Matabeleland started in the late 1990s and never existed before then. He blamed the West, the MDC and sanctions for the emergence of the ‘myth’. Mathema further opined that ‘tribalism’ was created by the British to divide and rule.

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1 Nyathi, “Zimbabwe: New Radical Movements Expose Tribal Fault Lines”.
4 Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Nation Building in Zimbabwe”, pp.49-50. While addressing Bulawayo residents about the need to take advantage of the ‘fast-tracking’ of the Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Programme, on 16 April 2011, former Midlands Governor and Resident Minister, Cephas Msipa said “we have banks owned by indigenous people here in Bulawayo, but one notes that those owners are from Harare. Where are the people from Bulawayo? Does it mean we cannot start our own businesses here?” (The Sunday Mail, April 17-23 2011, Indigenization now of fast track”, p.4).
5 The Sunday Mail, 15-21 May 2011. Mathema said that when the British invaded the country in 1890 ‘they said they had done so in order to “liberate” the Shona from the Matabele, and today they are saying they are on a crusade to “liberate” the Ndebele from the Shona’. pikininis refers to white puppets. Mathema opined that ‘marginalisation’ was ‘a tool’ used by ‘the enemy’ to fan ‘tribalism and mayhem in Matabeleland’. He further claimed that: “these days, comrades, the enemy has been singing and dancing about the marginalisation of Matabeleland, even to the extent of saying Shona people are taking companies away from Bulawayo to Harare” (NewsDay, 9 December 2011, Dumisani Sibanda, “Matabeleland marginalisation a myth- Mathema”, p.3).
6 The Sunday Mail, 15-21 May 2011. Mathema said that when the British invaded the country in 1890 ‘they said they had done so in order to “liberate” the Shona from the Matabele, and today they are saying they are on a crusade to “liberate” the Ndebele from the Shona”.

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While, it is true that the British had a hand in the politicisation of ethnicity, Mathema’s argument denies the people of Matabeleland any form of agency, reducing them to local collaborating dupes propagating an unfounded West-generated myth. Certainly, the residents of Matabeleland have the capacity to recognize the under-development of their region even in the absence of external influence. Mathema’s attempt to attribute lack of socio-economic development in Matabeleland to sanctions imposed by the USA and the European Union (EU), after 2000 ignores the dynamics of Zimbabwe’s political economy between 1980 and 2000. In addition, the reasoning runs the risk of being trapped in some form of ‘sanctions reductionist analysis’.

Hegemonic politics resonates in Mathema’s dismissal of the marginalisation of Matabeleland as a myth. The feeling among some pressure groups and residents in Matabeleland is that ‘political appointees’ like Mathema have no significant political constituencies in the region and have lost touch with developments in Matabeleland. However, due to the politics of patronage, such politicians masquerade as the ‘real’ representatives and spokespersons of the people of Matabeleland. They are accused of behaving like the Biblical Judas Iscariot and being “blinded by the love of 30 pieces of silver” by the mostly ‘Shona’ political elite controlling the state. Seen this way, politicians like Mathema are equally guilty of complicity in the marginalisation of Matabeleland.

The marginalisation of Bulawayo (and Matabeleland) has also been explained in terms of ‘the tale of two cities’, with Harare getting preferential treatment and getting the ‘lion’s share’ of the national socio-economic and political cake. During the colonial era, Harare was referred to as bambazonke (‘take/grab all’) and once doubled as both the capital of Southern Rhodesia and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Bambazonke type of politics appears to have continued after independence. Cont Mhlanga, a Bulawayo-based playwright, in 2011, said the state of affairs in the country’s arts sector demonstrated the marginalisation of Matabeleland. He submitted that most of the programmes aired on national television and radio were produced in Harare not Bulawayo yet there were equally competent

3 *The Standard*, June 26 to July 2 2011, p.5.
5 Of course, the ‘preferential treatment’ given to Harare during the colonial period had nothing to do with ethnicity.
playwrights and producers in Matabeleland. The same sentiments were shared by Afro-Jazz musician Jeys Marabini (Majahawodwa Ndlovu) from Filabusi, Matabeleland South Province, who accused the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) of giving artists from Matabeleland a ‘raw deal’ as they ‘hardly play music from Matabeleland on radio’.2

The postcolonial state has also been accused by its critics of using ‘hydro politics’ to marginalise Matabeleland. The state is accused of deliberately failing to complete the National Matabeleland-Zambezi Water Project (NMZWP) as part of attempts to marginalise and de-industrialise Bulawayo and the region. Muchaparara Musemwa argues that the delays in the completion of the project, which might be the panacea for Bulawayo and Matabeleland water woes, was part of the ZANU PF and Shona dominated state’s attempt to ‘discipline’ an errant and ‘dissident’ city.3 The NMZWP was first mooted in 1912, with the intention to draw water from the Zambezi River, 452 kilometres from the city of Bulawayo. The project was abandoned by successive governments due to the high costs involved.4 In this regard, the delays in the completion of the project cannot be entirely explained in terms of the use of ‘hydro politics’ to rein in an ‘errant’ city. In fact, the marginalisation of Matabeleland and other regions need to be understood within the broader context of Zimbabwe’s political economy before and after 1980.

The discourse around marginalisation presents important political capital for politicians wishing to establish and maintain support in Matabeleland. To illustrate, Welshman Ncube, the president of the ‘smaller’ faction of the MDC, in July 2011, noted that the marginalisation of Matabeleland remained a ‘hard fact’ to dispute no matter how much some people would want to dismiss it.5 The Secretary General of the Tsvangirai-led MDC, Tendai Biti, on 7 July 2011, also argued that Matabeleland lagged behind other regions in terms of development due to the legacy of the uneven development of regions.6 He said “all

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2 NewsDay, 16 June 2011, “Marabini the Afro-Jazz Maestro”, p.20. Other Shona constituent groups often complain of marginalisation. One N. M. Hamainbiri, in September 1982 wrote a letter to Moto magazine complaining that ZBC programmes were biased towards the Zezuru. The author was referring to a programme ‘Manzinza neMitupo’ (Clans and Totems), which s/he said deliberately centred on ‘vaShawasha, Soko Murehwa, Gushungo, Mbanho Matemai, Une Ndoro, Shava, Mhara Mashayamombe and the Mwendamberis, Chivero’ and limited to Zezuru clans at the expense of other ‘Shona’ groups (Moto, September 1982, Hamainbiri, “Avoid this Zezuru bias”, p.3).
4 NewsDay, 16 May 2011, “We are not ready to apply for Zambezi water- Minister”, p.11.
5 NewsDay, 11 July 2011, “Gukurahundi Open Chapter”, p.2. Ncube asserted that “it is a fact that you can not dispute that over 30 years there has been neglect of the development of this region... People cannot be apologetic about it (underdevelopment)... Denying it (marginalisation) can only make the problem worse”.

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regions have to develop equally and evenly... the whole country is the same whether in Bambazonke (as Harare is referred to in the perception that it gets the lion’s share of everything) or you are here in the City of Kings (Bulawayo)”.¹ Biti, the then Finance Minister, pledged to push for the completion of all development projects in Matabeleland.

Equally, the de-industrialisation of Bulawayo, the country’s former industrial hub that was nick-named ‘the Manchester of Rhodesia’, has been manipulated by the political elite and political entrepreneurs alike in their competition for power in Matabeleland.² Undeniably, there have been ‘genuine concerns’ over the closure and relocation of companies from Bulawayo to Mashonaland regions, especially Harare. In 2010, for example, about 87 business establishments closed shop in Bulawayo and over 20 000 workers lost their jobs.³ However, Welshman Ncube alleged that the ‘de-industrialisation’ of Bulawayo was part of a broader ‘scheme’ to marginalise the region. He also attributed the de-industrialisation of the city to the policy structure and framework that centralises service provision in Harare a situation that makes doing business in the regions more expensive.⁴ The same sentiments seem to be shared by some politicians in the Tsvangirai-led MDC (MDC-T). In July 2011, Lovemore Moyo of the MDC-T said it is ‘highly possible’ that the closure of industries is a ‘calculated act of sabotage’ by some decision makers in business and government.⁵ Moyo further intimated that the problem could be solved if financial decisions were moved from bambazonke (Harare) to the regions.⁶

Indeed, the discourse around marginalisation increasingly became important political capital for political barons and their supporters, who positioned themselves to reap perceived

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¹ Ibid.
² Zimbabwe Independent, October 28-November 3 2011, Nqobile Bhebhe, “Government focuses on reviving industry in Bulawayo”, (Business Digest), p.37. The editor of The Sunday Mail noted that; “among all towns and cities in this country that are crying out for help, none are screaming louder than Bulawayo...Factories have collapsed in record numbers in that part of the country. Belmont industrial area-once the envy of Africa-has been reduced to a sorry wasteland. Vital infrastructure is rusting away and the billowing chimneys which gave Bulawayo the nickname ‘KoNtuthu Ziyathunqa’ (where smoke billows) are now clogged with cobwebs” (The Sunday Mail, December 4-10 2011, p.4).
⁴ Bulawayo-based economist, Eric Bloch blames the de-industrialisation of Bulawayo on the centralisation of services in Harare, which often prompt struggling business concerns to relocate to or set up in the capital (Zimbabwe Independent, October 28-November 3 2011). A newspaper correspondent from Bulawayo, in June 2011, claimed that most of the companies that were closing or relocating were either owned by people from Mashonaland or had their head offices in Harare. The correspondent further claimed that ‘outsiders’ rather than the local Ndebele had preferential access to financial resources facilitated for them because ‘all decision making is centralised in Harare’ (NewsDay, 15 June 2011, Hore, “I Smell a Rat”, p.9).
⁶ Feelings of marginalisation were expressed in Matabeleland during the 2010 constitutional outreach programmes, during which residents called for the devolution of power as a solution to the problem. There are strong feelings among some Zimbabweans that everything of economic and political significance revolves around Bambazonke (Harare). See The Sunday Mail, December 4-10 2011, p.4.

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political dividends from the re-industrialisation of Bulawayo and Matabeleland.\(^1\) However, the ‘marginalisation thesis’ needs to be situated in the context of Zimbabwe’s political economy in order to avoid reductionist readings of this emotive issue.\(^2\) ZANU PF alone cannot be accused of failing to complete the NMZWP that was mooted in 1912. There are other projects like the construction of the Tokwe-Mukosi Dam, in Masvingo and Harare’s Kunzvi Dam that were also mooted during the colonial era are yet to be completed. In Masvingo, marginalisation and underdevelopment has continued in the impoverished and ‘perennially’ drought-stricken province despite the fact that Masvingo has vast mineral resources and the country’s largest inland water bodies, including Lake Mtrikwi and Manyuchi Dam.\(^3\)

The closure and relocation of industries from Bulawayo and Matabeleland is not necessarily an attempt to ‘punish’ the ‘politically incorrect’ city, region and ethnic group but a manifestation of the difficulties bedevilling local industries in view of the effects of Zimbabwe’s unprecedented economic crisis that reached an ugly apogee since 2000.\(^4\) The genesis of Zimbabwe’s economic and political crisis pre-dates 1980. However, due to the disdain and revulsion towards President Mugabe and his ZANU PF government, especially in the late 1990s and the 2000s, some commentators have reduced their analyses to some form of ‘Mugabe reductionism’. Yet, “it is analytically impossible to discuss the problem of internal politics, economics and land reforms, without an understanding of the colonial inheritance”.\(^5\)

The de-industrialisation of the Zimbabwean economy can actually be traced to the early 1990s. The adoption of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) between 1991 and 1995 rapidly accelerated the process. By 1997, all economic indicators

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\(^2\) According to Eric Bloch, ‘with never-ending persistence and emphasis, the hierarchy of ZANU PF and innumerable vociferous supporters of that political party raucously insist that almost the entirety of Zimbabwe’s immense economic ills are wholly occasioned by “illegal international sanctions” imposed by diverse first world countries in general, and by the United Kingdom, USA and their allies in particular’ (*Zimbabwe Independent*, 30 to 6 September 2011, Eric Bloch, “Sanctions: real or a mirage?”, p.12). Sanctions reductionists ignore Zimbabwe’s economic decline since the early 1990s, long before the imposition of Western sanctions in the 2000s.

\(^3\) Farai Chinobva of Masvingo intimated that “we feel our province is underfunded and is deliberately discriminated against when it comes to the allocation of developmental project funds compared to other provinces” (*Daily News*, 22 October 2011, Godfrey Mtimba, “Government neglects Masvingo”, p.7).


pointed to a downward trend. In the 2000s, Zimbabwe’s economy was under threat as the country’s industrial hub faced ‘massive de-industrialisation’. In addition to unavailability of long term loans, power cuts and unviable tariffs has been the perennial water shortage in Bulawayo, which is linked to the non-completion of the NMZWP.

However, the above observations do not necessarily exonerate the post-independence state, which according to Ndlovu-Gatsheni, centred its nation-building project on ‘majoritarianism’, or the ‘ruzhinji mentality’ that “totally subordinates minorities to the whims of the majority”. The state did not adequately address the legacy of uneven economic development of regions inherited from the Rhodesian state. It failed to address not only the issue of ethnicity but the uneven development between the centre and its margins. To a large extent, the postcolonial state failed to address “the situations of marginalised, neglected, and isolated in the country’s periphery”. Equally, Patrick Bond and Masimba Manyanya note that the years of colonial development and under-development cannot be separated from the independence era.

The state remains an important player in determining particular groups’ access to socio-economic resources. The Global Political Agreement (GPA) that was signed, on 15 September 2008, between ZANU PF and the two MDC formations leading to the formation of Zimbabwe’s inclusive government in 2009, acknowledges the historical uneven socio-economic development of the regions and the need to address the anomaly. Under Article VII of the GPA, which deals with the “Promotion of Equality, National Healing, Cohesion

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3 Nhlanhla Masuku, the spokesperson of the National Economic Consultative Forum, observes that “the industrialisation challenges facing Bulawayo began a decade following erratic supplies of water”; The Standard, 14 to 20 August 2011, “Demise of Bulawayo not deliberate, says Tsvangirai”, p.4.
5 According to Beach, “when it comes to long-term planning Homo sapiens zimbabweensis is not significantly different from Homo sapiens rhodesiensis. Indeed, the two are far more alike than many would care to concede...Perhaps it is unfair to blame ZANU PF for its lack of thought; it is in many ways a prisoner of its own past, having evolved as an organization devoted to the acquisition of power from the Rhodesian Front and its predecessors” (Beach, “Zimbabwe: Pre-colonial History, Demographic Disaster and the University”, p.14).
6 I. Marowa, “The Tonga People of Zimbabwe. Historical Memories and Contemporary Challenges of a Minority Society”, in Mbanaso and Korieh, eds., Minorities and the State in Africa, pp.173, 179. In the 1950s, the Tonga were displaced to give way to the construction of the Kariba Dam, yet they have largely not benefited from the project, which significantly disrupted their livelihoods that had historically been tied to the Zambezi River (see The Standard, July 24 to 30 2011, “Hero’s son who stood up to Mugabe”, p.6).
Unity”, the parties to the agreement agreed that the inclusive government “will ensure equal and fair development of all regions of the country and in particular to correct historical imbalances in the development of regions”.¹

Other ethnic groups like the Shangaan, Kalanga, Tonga, Nambiya and Venda, also complain of being marginalised and ‘minoritised’ by the state.² Some of these communities are located in marginal borderlands and live in the economic and political margins. Their communities lack economic development and adequate physical infrastructure when compared with other regions. Consequently, the perceived political and economic hegemony of the ‘Shona’ is not only shared by the Ndebele but by other minority groups as well. To such communities, the Ndebele are part of the hegemonic groups in Zimbabwe. The southern and western regions have been ‘Ndebele-ised’ and lumped together under the rubric ‘Ndebele’ despite the fact that they are home to disparate ethnic groups including the Tonga, Venda, Nambiya, Sotho, and Kalanga. As such, to outsiders, and even to some Zimbabweans, the country is supposedly fairly homogenous with two ethnic groups—the ‘Ndebele’ and ‘Shona’.

Language specialist, Finex Ndhlovu, argues that Shona and Ndebele hegemony in the postcolonial state has partly been expressed through language use.³ Ndhlovu contends that contestations over power, citizenship and identity formation in postcolonial Zimbabwe have intersected with language policy, processes of nation-building and social integration, and political power contestations. Ndhlovu asserts that “all the languages and peoples of western Zimbabwe have lost ground to the dominant Ndebele while those in the eastern provinces have yielded to Shona hegemony”.⁴ For Ndhlovu, the linguistical hegemony of Shona and Ndebele is promoted by structural conditions and the “overt and tacit co-operation of marginalised sections of the Zimbabwean society. Thus, inasmuch as those in power want to control and dominate, there is also a strong willingness on the part of the subjects to be dominated and controlled so as to perpetuate their existing social structure”.⁵ The result has been that Zimbabwe has literally been divided into ‘Mashonaland’ and ‘Matabeleland’

² Moto October 1983, Bernard Moyo, “Forgotten Venda speak out”. Moyo complained that the dominance of English, Ndebele and Shona as national languages was short-changing ‘minority’ languages like Venda. He opined that “we fought together, so we should enjoy together, rather than have a policy of one tribe for itself but Zimbabwe for us all”.
⁴ Ndhlovu, “Language Policy, Citizenship and Discourses of Exclusion”, pp.156, 158.
⁵ Ibid., p.163.
submerging, minoritising, marginalising and ignoring other identifications other than ‘Shona’ and ‘Ndebele’.

In south-eastern Zimbabwe, the local Venda and Shangaan complain about the employment of Karangas ahead of their own sons and daughters. The Shangaan derogatively refer to the Karanga as *Vanyai*, meaning foreigners.\(^1\) However, it should be noted that the Karanga are the largest single ethnic group in Zimbabwe and it is expected that their numerically preponderance can be reflected in the job market. In some instances, for example in Mwenezi, the local Pfumbi tend to show a negative attitude towards formal education. The same applies to the Venda and Shangaan in the south-eastern lowveld of Zimbabwe.\(^2\) Overall, the literacy rate is low among communities in these marginal areas. The Tonga, for example, are one of the most illiterate communities in Zimbabwe although overall the country has a literate rate of over 90 per cent, the highest in Africa.\(^3\) This partly explains why Shona-speakers usually work as civil servants in Venda, Kalanga, Tonga or Shangaan-speaking areas.

However, what appears to be an indifferent attitude towards education in ‘marginal’ areas like Binga or Mwenezi is, in fact, a reflection of endemic poverty in these areas, which makes educating a child an unnecessary and unaffordable luxury in the face of chronic vulnerability. Consequently, even if the government builds more schools in these areas, attitudes towards education will largely remain unchanged. In rural Beitbridge, for example, a child who drops out of school and ‘border-jumps’ into neighbouring South Africa for farm or domestic work might in the short term appear to be of great value to a poor family than an educated child whose employment prospects remain bleak. In Mwenezi, the Pfumbi are stereotyped by the Karanga and Ndebele as ‘anti-modern’, anti-development and anti-education.\(^4\) In fact, due to chronic poverty, the Pfumbi value their cattle herds more than education. This explains why the majority of the civil servants in Mwenezi are from outside the district, which in turn leads to ethnic tensions between autochthons and ‘outsiders’.

The problematic ‘autochthon-allochthon’ dichotomy also manifested itself in struggles over land and land related resources. Zimbabwe’s Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) that began in 2000 to address racially skewed colonial land ownership and land use patterns, has seen land rights being contested and negotiated along regional, 

\(^1\) Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Echoing Silences”.
\(^3\) Marowa, “The Tonga People of Zimbabwe”, p.188.
\(^4\) Manganga, “An Agrarian History of the Mwenezi District”.

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The FTLRP was characterised by ethnic discrimination, ethno-regionalism, discourses around the exclusion of ‘strangers’ and nativist constructions of belonging. This was compounded by the fact that often people wanted to be resettled in ancestral lands or in farms near their communal areas. Consequently, those not ‘belonging’ to particular provinces were deemed ‘outsiders’ and excluded from accessing (prime) land. In 2002, a ZANU PF MP for Muzarabani, Nobby Dzinzi, instigated local villagers to evict Karangas in an area ‘indigenous’ to the Korekore. Mashonaland-born Coloured businessman and publisher, Ibbo Mandaza, in 2003, tried to occupy a farm he had acquired in Bubi District, Matabeleland North Province, but the occupation was successfully resisted by locals on the basis of regionalism and ethnicity.

8.5 Ethnic Competition among ‘Shona’ Constituent Groups

In view of the preceding discussion, the perceived ‘Shona’ hegemony in postcolonial Zimbabwe needs to be unpacked. The ‘Shona’ are not a homogenous and harmonious group that has enjoyed an equal share of the political and economic resources. The Karanga, Manyika and Ndau have complained about the perceived ‘Zezuru-isation’ of the state which

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1 Ibid.

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manifests itself through Zezuru dominance in politics and the economy. While commenting on the COPAC draft constitution, MDC-T Secretary General, Tendai Biti, in August 2012, claimed that the draft constitution was meant to curtail the dominance of the Zezuru in Zimbabwe’s body politic. Biti said the draft constitution would curb the influence of people from Mashonaland West in general and Zvimba in particular. President Mugabe is ethnic Zezuru from Zvimba. Biti reportedly claimed that “we are de-Zezurunising the state. Let me put it clear, there is too much Zvimbanisation of this state... under this constitution, all citizens will be equal.”

However, instead of critically analysing the Zezuru’s purported hegemonic control of the postcolonial state, *The Herald* newspaper skirted the issue and accused Biti of inciting tribalism and of launching an unwarranted ‘tribal assault’ on the Zezuru. The newspaper echoed the ‘official’ attitude toward ethnicity in Zimbabwe- pretending that there is ethnic harmony in the country and that anyone who raises the issue of the uneven allocation of the social, economic and political goods of the state is either a regionalist or ‘tribalist’ keen to divide the nation. Such an approach to ethnicity in postcolonial Africa is not only naive but a preposterous fallacy. What fuels ‘tribalism’ and violent ethnic conflicts are not calls for devolution or the equitable distribution of the national cakes between various nations within the nation state, but ‘ethnocracy’ and preferential treatment of some ethnic groups by political barons controlling the state.

Like Gukurahundi and the ‘marginalisation thesis’, discourses around the actual or/and imagined domination of the state by particular ethnic groups cannot be wished away. Although, the state might have attempted some form of ‘ethnic engineering’ to manage ethnicity in politics, ethnic competition is a reality that the state should seriously contend with. The same applies to the issue of marginalisation of regions and uneven development between *bambazonke* and its margins.

The real and perceived economic marginalisation of the Chipinge district, arguably, led to the politicisation of Nдаu ethnicity since the early 1980s and 1990s. The lack of ‘meaningful’ socio-economic and infrastructural development in the region resulted in local residents accusing government of deliberate marginalisation for their support of the Ndabaningi Sithole-led ZANU- Ndonga. In 1997, Themba Mhlanga, a ZANU Ndonga

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3 *The Standard*, October 30-November 5 2011, Obey Mawoneke, “Manicaland Marginalised in empowerment”, p.2. Mawoneke thinks the region has been deliberately marginalised by the state since 1980.
politician intimated that “the ZANU PF government is seeking to frog march us into the party through under-developing this area”.¹ Chipinge residents claimed that during the 1995 parliamentary election campaign ZANU PF politicians warned them that they would regret it if they did not vote for the ruling party’s candidates.² The development of a ‘politicised’ Ndau ethnicity arguably revolved around the ousting of Ndabaningi Sithole, a Ndau from Chipinge, from ZANU in 1975 and his subsequent replacement by Robert Mugabe, a Zezuru from Zvimba, Mashonaland West, as party leader.³ After 1980, Sithole’s party, ZANU Ndonga, mobilized Ndau ethnicity against the perceived hegemony of the ZANU PF government, with the Ndau voting for ZANU Ndonga in parliamentary elections.⁴

Some politicians from Masvingo supposedly appealed to ethnicity in their complex power games as they mobilized support around Karanga identification.⁵ Arguably, Karanga political elites like the late Edison Zvobgo tried to mobilize Karanga ethnicity to dilute Zezuru monopoly of political power and other resources. Karanga political barons and their supporters constitute a significant centre of political power in power calculations by political entrepreneurs.⁶ Politicians in Masvingo and the Midlands provinces, which are largely Karanga-speaking; Matabeleland North and South, which are Ndebele dominated; and Manicaland Province, which is Ndau and Manyika speaking, are said to be wary of fears of Zezuru domination.⁷ Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni see heavy Zezuru ethnic undertones in the so-called ‘Mujuru and Mugabe factions’ within ZANU PF. They argue that Mugabe faction proponents, like Nathan Shamuyarira, Webster Shamu, Ignatius Chombo and Nicholas Goche are all Zezurus from Mashonaland West Province, while leaders from the ‘Mujuru faction’ come from the Chikomba and Chivhu districts of Mashonaland East.⁸

Matereke also contends that the ZANU PF government consciously “perpetuated ethnicity in its quest for political dominance”.⁹ He further accuses the ZANU PF government of perpetuating colonial policies that promoted ethnic polarisation. According to Matereke:

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¹ Moto, August 1997, Rodrick Chinodakufa, “Development eludes Chipinge-out in political cold”.
² Ibid.
⁴ Ibid. It was only in 2005 that the party lost the two Chipinge parliamentary seats.
⁵ Ibid.
⁷ Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Echoing Silences”, p.293.
⁸ Ibid., p.292.
[ZANU PF] has shown a strong unwillingness to engage ethnicity as such an engagement is likely to upset its stronghold on the mechanism of power. The Zezuru have a major stake in the party and government. The intra-ZANU PF conflicts are a response to the challenge posed by the opposition. After the collapse of the Tsholotsho Declaration in November 2004, the question of succession within ZANU PF became a strong contest mobilised around ethnic identities epitomized by the Karanga and the Zezuru factions, with Mnangagwa and Solomon Mujuru as their respective representatives. The Unity Accord settled for an ethnic balance of having two vice-presidents. In September 2003, the death of Vice-President Simon Muzenda, a Karanga, created a vacancy which many thought should have been filled by another Karanga. Fielding Joyce Mujuru as vice-president and maintaining Joseph Msika as the second vice-president foiled the exit plans for the presidency and also strengthened the Zezuru faction in the party.¹

In addition, the International Crisis Group (ICG) notes that although ZANU PF has made efforts to ensure some form of power-sharing between the Shona and the Ndebele, most members of [President] Mugabe’s inner circle are Zezuru from Mashonaland provinces. Consequently, the two main factions in ZANU PF’s succession ‘battles’-the Mujuru and Mnagagwa factions-“mirror the political divide between Mugabe’s Zezuru sub-group and the Shona’s most populous group, the Karanga, which mainly occupies Masvingo and Midlands provinces”.”²

To maintain its hegemony within ZANU PF and over other ethnic groups, the Zezuru faction has supposedly made alliances with influential individuals who “claim the political leadership of ethnic groups in ways that have maintained and legitimized the status quo”.³ The strategy has supposedly weakened the mobilisation of similar alliances between factions against Zezuru hegemony. According to Matererke, “the ethnic groups are more suspicious of each other and now see the advantage of retaining the trust of the Zezuru. As such, the Zezuru have managed to maintain a tight grip on the party and government with a lot of willing allies drawn from the ethnic groups”.⁴ Matererke argues that the Zezuru faction has also managed to monopolise the revolutionary narratives with figures from Mashonaland like

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¹ Materereke, “One Zimbabwe Many Faces”, p.249. The term “Tsholotsho Declaration” refers to resolutions of a meeting that was held at Dinyane Secondary School on 18 November 2004. The meeting was reportedly organised by Professor Jonathan Moyo, and sought to discuss succession dynamics within ZANU (PF) with a view to promote internal democracy and the representation of major ethnic groups (Karanga, Manyika, Zezuru and Ndebele) in the top four leadership of the party (The Standard, 15 September 2006, Pearson Mbaekwa, “Truth behind Tsholotsho Declaration”; Jonathan Moyo, “Tsholotsho Saga: the untold story”, www.newzimbabwe.com (accessed 11/12/09).
² ICG, “Zimbabwe’s Continuing Self-destruction”, Africa Briefing, No 38, 6 June 2006, p.10. The supposedly silent but salient long-standing political feud between the Karanga and Zezuru can be traced to ZANU power contestations of the 1960s and 1970s.
⁴ Ibid., p.250.
Mbuya Nehanda, Sekuru Kaguvi and Chaminuka epitomizing the struggle for independence. These figures “are projected as ‘national’ spirit mediums despite the fact that during their times there was no sense of ‘nation’ as we have it today”.¹ In the same vein, Chikowero notes that the Zezuru have sometimes been imagined as the ‘owners’ of the country due to the Zezuru language’s ‘official support’ since the codification of the Shona language, and the issue that many top government officials belong to this ethnic group.²

Morgan Tsvingirai’s ascendency to the helm of the MDC in 1999 ahead of his late trade union movement president, Gibson Sibanda, is also thought to have been on ethnic grounds. Sibanda was supposedly sidelined because he was a Ndebele and therefore not saleable to the majority of the electorate.³ President Mugabe has been accused of attempting to use ethnicity as a wedge to divide the MDC pitting the Shona and Ndebele against each other.⁴ The MDC split in 2005 ostensibly over participation in Senate elections has also been explained along ethnic lines. The majority of the ‘rebel branches’ were from Matabeleland, notably Bulawayo, Matabeleland north and south, and Midlands Province, though they included Harare and Manicaland. The ‘hiring’ of Professor Arthur Mtambara to be president of the other faction of the MDC appeared to offer the prospects of gaining support beyond Matabeleland.⁵ The Mtambara-led MDC later split into two with another faction being led by Professor Welshman Ncube, who is ethnic Ndebele and appear to have his greatest support in Matabeleland.

8.7 Nativism and New Constructions of Belonging

The period after the year 2000 witnessed a marked departure from the national reconciliation rhetoric of the early 1980s. The civic kind of nationalism dissipated amid new definitions of belonging and citizenship.⁶ This was in the context of an increasing challenge to the ZANU PF government. Dissenting voices manifested themselves in student protests, strikes, and the emergence of opposition political parties, especially the MDC. In response to these challenges to its political hegemony, ZANU PF supposedly restructured the terrain of

² Chikowero, “1 Too Sing Zimbabwe”, p.118.
³ The Sunday Mail 23 to 29 October 2011, Kuda Bwiti, “Tsvangirai benefited from tribalism”, p.6.
⁴ See Zimbabwe Independent, 5 March 2004, Dumisani Muleya, “Mugabe trying to divide MDC”.
Zimbabwean politics by adopting the politics of ‘frontal assault’ targeting Britain (the former colonial power), white Zimbabweans, the MDC, civic groups, farm workers and urban populations, most of whom supported the political opposition.\(^1\) For ZANU PF, the emergence of the ‘Western-funded’ MDC was a threat not only to its survival but also to the ‘national project’ and the country’s sovereignty. The MDC was projected as a ‘Western puppet’ and an adjunct of the ‘imperialist and racist ‘regime change’ agenda.’\(^2\)

The 2000s further witnessed the constructions of “other more complex if narrower categories of identity defined in terms of political loyalty and war of liberation credentials, rather than referring to the more familiar ethnic distinctions of say ‘Shona’ and ‘Ndebele’’.\(^3\) Zimbabweans were categorized on the basis of political identifications such as ‘patriots’, ‘puppets’, ‘sell-outs’, ‘war veterans’ and ‘born-frees’.\(^4\) The country’s deepening political crisis further led to the entrenchment of political dichotomies, whose construction was linked to competing narratives of both Zimbabwe’s past and the ensuing economic and political imbroglio. The period further witnessed the abandonment of the policy of reconciliation as the state “contended with revived black nationalism where race became its major trope”.\(^5\)

Consequent to the above developments, both the state and Zimbabwean-ness were constructed along nativist lines making ‘national identity’ exclusive.\(^6\) Zimbabwean-ness was construed along racial and political party lines. Zimbabweans were largely defined as the black people only and ‘real Zimbabweans’ were expected to be patriotic by supporting the ZANU PF government and the land reform, and denouncing the West and its local adjuncts. According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Muzondidya, after 2000, Zimbabwe became the centre of a “complex crisis manifesting itself through radicalized, violent and autochthonous nationalism.”\(^7\) Some authors viewed the nationalism as emancipator with redemptive

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\(^1\) Raftopoulos, “Unreconciled Differences: The Limits of Reconciliation Politics in Zimbabwe”, p.2.

\(^2\) MDC supporters were labelled ‘sell-outs’ bent to sabotage the ‘Third Chimurenga’. Hammar and Raftopoulos, “Zimbabwe’s Unfinished Business”, p.10.

\(^3\) Ibid., p.26.

\(^4\) Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “True Nationalists Yet to be Born”; see M. B Munochiveyi, “War Vet Nation? Beyond ‘Guerrilla Nationalism’ and the Search for Other Nationalisms in Zimbabwe”, in Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Muzondidya, eds., *Grotesque Or Redemptive Nationalism?* ‘War Vet nationalism’ is exclusionary and ahistorical as it is based on selective readings of the nationalist struggles and fails to engage the multiple narratives about Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle. Materake also notes that ZANU PF deliberately venerated the victimhood of the war veterans for political expediency and to play down the significance of the MDC, with opposition politics being dismissed as the return of Empire and the re-colonization of Zimbabwe by the West (Materake, “One Zimbabwe Many Faces”, p.235). Also see Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Is Nationalisation the Solution to the Expropriation of African Resources? Public Lecture Organized by the African Democratic Institute, Devonshire Hotel, Braamfontein, Johannesburg, 4 May 2010.

\(^5\) Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Muzondidya, “Introduction: Redemptive or Grotesque Nationalism in the Postcolony?”

\(^6\) Ibid.

\(^7\) Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Muzondidya, “Introduction: Redemptive or Grotesque Nationalism in the Postcolony?”

p.1.
objectives while others dismissed it as an exhausted patriarchal model of nationalism devoid of popular support and legitimacy. Nationalism in Zimbabwe after 2000 has also been labelled ‘grotesque’ due to its supposed incongruous, bizarre and ‘ugly’ tendencies as well as its “terrible ambiguities and contradictions”.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni sees ‘cultural nationalism’ emerging from a terrain of economic crisis, state failure and the polarization of the nation. He argues that cultural nationalism developed in response to the challenges of “the embers of post-nationalist politics and its reaction often took the form of Afro-radicalism, nativism, xenophobia and violence”. The country’s cultural nationalism developed in the context of the FTLRP (the Third Chimurenga) and assumed the form of a Maoist cultural revolution. In other instances, “it took the form of intensification of the revival of nationalism and the tradition of liberation via state-sponsored memorialisation and commemorations”.

Meanwhile, black immigrants from countries like Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia and their descendants, who have become synonymous with the mine and farm worker, became ‘victims’ of nativist politics and new constructions of belonging and citizenship. They were perceived by the state as supporters of the political opposition just like their ‘masters’, the white commercial farmers. Often, these ‘aliens’ do not have land rights, unlike locals. Blair Rutherford suggests that the apparent marginalisation and exclusion of ‘orphans’ ‘orphans of the Federation’ from national projects can be linked to their construction as

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2 Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Muzondidya, “Introduction: Redemptive or Grotesque Nationalism in the Postcolony”,
3 Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Beyond the Drama of War”, pp.76-77.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid. Hammar and Raftopoulos note that Zimbabwe’s land question was reconstituted by the prevailing economic and political crisis with profound implications for re-constructions of state and citizenship. Moyo and Yeros contend that the ‘revolutionary situation’ that gripped Zimbabwe from the late 1990s, centred on the agrarian question and the national question. They argue that the ‘revolutionary situation” resulted in an interrupted revolution, which was marked by a ‘radical’ agrarian reform and a ‘radicalized’ state (S. Moyo and P. Yeros, “The Radicalized State: Zimbabwe’s Interrupted Revolution”, Review of African Political Economy (Special Issue: Debates on the Left in Southern Africa, Vol 34, Issue 3, 2007: pp.103-121.
6 Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Beyond the Drama of War”, p.78. However, Ndlovu-Gatsheni opines that such essentially cultural strategies of mobilization that lacked the backing of material rewards had limited prospects of becoming hegemonic.
7 L. M. Sachikonye, “Land Reform and Farm Workers”, in Harold-Barry, ed., Zimbabwe: the Past is the Future, p.73. Like South Africa, Zimbabwe has a significant proportion of migrant farm workers, a development linked to the country’s colonial labour history. According to Sachikonye, about 26 per cent of farm workers in the country “trace their descent to migrant workers who originally came from Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia.”
8 Ibid.
belonging to both the white farmer, who happened to be pro-MDC. In Harare, black immigrants and their descendants are largely concentrated in high density residential areas like Dzivarasekwa, Mbare, Rugare, Highfield, Kambuzuma, Mufakose and Mabvuku, which like the white farms were thought to be sympathetic to the MDC. In 2000, President Mugabe reportedly denounced some of these urban residents for voting for the MDC, calling them ‘totemless aliens’. This was supposedly said in a way that implied that people without totems are devoid of humanity, were ‘illegitimate’ and do not really belong. During Zimbabwe’s FTLRP, an elderly man of Malawian origin told Mashiri that:

The situation is volatile these days. In the past, ethnic insults were exchanged in the beer halls, sometimes light-heartedly. These days, the mood is very unpredictable because of the land conflicts. We are often blamed for supporting the white farmers in fear of losing our jobs on the farms if the government designates them. Most of us will be destitute, perhaps we may be told to go back to Malawi.

It is interesting to note that the relationship between industrial ethnicity and ‘current’ nativist trends are not linear or direct. There are a plethora of postcolonial identities, of which industrial ethnicity is simply one among a range. Most of the identities are also non-ethnic. Equally, the discrimination against Malawians and ‘subject minorities’ in postcolonial Zimbabwe was not necessarily on the basis of that they used to dominate farm work in colonial days but because they were identified with the white commercial farmer, and by extension, the political opposition.

Meanwhile, other Zimbabweans continue to disparage Africans of foreign origin using derogatory terms like mabwidi, manyasarandi, mabhurandayi, (Malawians) and mamoskeni or makarusha (Mozambicans). The overtly ethnocentric and xenophobic attitudes of locals toward these ‘foreigners’ is also expressed in social interaction, music and jokes. Indeed, “they [black immigrants] have continued to be the subject of crude jokes, often caricatured as idiots in popular songs, on national television dramas and in other public forums”. Mashiri

1 B. Rutherford, “Belonging to the Farm(er)”, Hammar, Raftopoulos and Jensen, eds., Zimbabwe’s Unfinished Business.
5 See Rutherford, “Beonging to the Farm(er).
6 Interview with John Phiri, Dzivarasekwa, Harare, 3 March 2012.
7 Muzondidya, “Jambanja: Ideological Ambiguities in the Politics of Land and Resource Ownership in Zimbabwe”, p.335; Chikowero, “I too Sing Zimbabwe”, p.126. According to Muzondidya, the character of the village idiot in almost every popular Zimbabwean drama is a person of Malawian, Zambian or Mozambican origins. Yet, such denigration and uncritical constructions of ethnic others tend to feed into and cement warped notions of ethnic superiority on the part of the so-called autochthons.
also observes that ethnic relations between the Shona and Malawian immigrants have been represented in fiction, drama and popular music as antagonistic. The antagonism between the Shona and Malawian immigrants has been reflected in language use, particularly insulting names like *mabhurandayi* and *masabhadovi*. However, despite the ethnocentric attitudes, relations between locals and African immigrants were not necessarily antagonistic.

Like other ‘subject minorities’, black Zimbabweans of foreign origins continue to be socially, economically and politically marginalised. They have not benefited from the Africanisation of the state, black economic empowerment and the indigenization drive. Most immigrant blacks and their descendents do not have rural homes (*kumusha/emakhaya*) and as such continue to be constructed as ‘rootless’ aliens living in ghettos, mines and farms. Most indigenous Zimbabweans consider their *kumusha/emakhaya* the ‘real home’. This acts as some form of social security as one can relocate to *kumusha* if her/his vulnerability context in town or at the farm becomes dire. Essentialized and nativist constructions of citizenship, the nation state and belonging has further alienated and marginalized immigrant blacks. The Citizenship of Zimbabwe Amendment Act of 2001 tend to disenfranchise not only immigrant white Zimbabweans but black Zimbabweans of ‘foreign’ origins as well.

In addition, race has remained a salient issue in postcolonial Zimbabwe, particularly in the context of farm occupations and nativist nationalism. Colour has become a symbol of belonging or ‘alien-ness’, with whites being lumped together as ‘unrepentant’ racist Rhodesians. The issue of race remained ambiguous with evidence of reverse racism. White Zimbabweans have remained *vauiyi* (settlers or strangers) and not *vana vevhu* (natives). The same applies for other racial minorities like Coloureds and Indians who continue to be minoritised and marginalised and do not ‘easily fit into the postcolonial nation’.

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4. Some of the ‘bizarre’ contributions about the issue of race that were made during the 2010 Constitutional Outreach Programme were that; ‘if one kills a white farmer s/he must not be arrested; sell-outs should be hanged; and if a white person marries a black Zimbabwean, s/he must be given citizenship after having 10 children’ (*NewsDay*, 25 July 2011, J. K. Ncube, “Negotiated constitution way to go”, p.9).
5. Muzondidya, “Jambanja: Ideological Ambiguities in the Politics of Land and Resource Ownership in Zimbabwe”, p.331. Muzondidiya notes that ‘excluded from the regime of ethnic rights through the government practice of enforcing colonial identities, subject minorities cannot legally access any communal land in the rural sphere where access to such land is defined primarily through ethnicity.’ Yet, agriculture is the mainstay of Zimbabwe’s economy and a critical source of livelihood. More so, land ownership enhances one’s sense of belonging. Consequently, the continuing exclusion of subject minorities has resulted in their marginalization in the economy and constructions of the nation.
8.7 Whither Industrial Ethnicity?

The above discussion has explored the postcolonial context of ethnicity in Zimbabwe without specific reference to industrial ethnicity, which appears to have been submerged by broader and ‘regional’ feelings of marginalisation and ethnic competition between ‘major’ ethnic groups. Ethnic contestations are more over ‘ethnocracy’\(^1\) and the perceived attempts by ethnic groups to establish hegemonic control of the state. However, industrial ethnicity remains an important category of analysis. The workplace and various industrial sectors, tertiary institutions, government ministries and departments are potential arenas for the use of ethnic and other social networks to get and maintain jobs.

At the workplace, industrial ethnicity is usually lumped together with nepotism, favouritism and other aspects of organizational politics. Competition for jobs, recognition, promotion and ‘favours’ at the workplace can result in the use of ethnic and other social networks and political connections as people seek to strategically position themselves ahead of ‘the Other’.\(^2\) Patronage or clientelism is a form of corruption that rewards relatives, friends and connections.\(^3\) Information can be withheld from competitors, ethnic and racial other, and availed to ‘home-boys’, friends, relatives and other contacts.\(^4\) Social networks remain important in securing jobs and transmitting job information. One’s social background can be an important determinant of success or failure in the job market or at the workplace.

People often get their jobs or information about employment vacancies through relatives, friends, home-boys/girls, former classmates or other such contacts. This complements job information sourced from ‘formal’ sources like advertisements in the electronic and print media.\(^5\) However, due to various reasons, including a sense of individualism and not wanting to rely on other people’s favours, not everyone make use of their social networks to obtain jobs, even if they have such an affordance.\(^6\) Nevertheless, the use of social networks in securing and maintaining jobs has continued to be resonant

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2. Interview with Sixpence, Dzivarasekwa, Harare, 4 March 2012.
4. One Likhwa Mpfu of Bulawayo, in 1982, said a Mr Jones refused to offer him a job on the basis of the colour of his skin. Mpfu, who had a BA degree in Administration and Economics, responded to a newspaper advertisement and applied for the job and was however, told him that although he had the right qualifications Mpfu was unemployable because he was black. Jones claimed that he was following company policies and did not want to antagonize his white employees and customers. As a result, Jones advised Mpfu to go to the government employment exchange where he stood a better chance of getting a job in government ministries and departments (*Moto*, November 1982, “Why I did not get a job”, p.3.

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despite efforts to de-racialise and de-ethnicise the labour market, after 1980, by introducing a non-racial meritocratic society, where theoretically ‘carrier was open to talent’.

The almost endemic problem of unemployment played an important role in fuelling corruption, nepotism and ‘home-boyism/home-girlism at workplaces and in government departments and ministries. The 1980s witnessed the expansion of public services and basic infrastructure, especially sectors like health, education, water supply, sanitation and road construction, which in turn led to the creation of jobs. The postcolonial state inherited a diversified economy that was fairly robust and second to that of South Africa in the region. However, by the late 1980s and early 1990s the economic growth had slackened and competition for limited socio-economic opportunities increased. This fuelled corruption and necessitated the use of social networks in securing jobs. Admittedly, in the 1980s and 1990s, the Ministry of Labour and the Employment Bureau acted as a link between job seekers and employers but this did not guarantee getting a job. Also, job seekers with good educational qualifications often preferred white collar jobs and a majority were absorbed by the public service. The economy also reflected colonial gender imbalances with men dominating the formal economy while women dominated the informal and communal ones.

One’s ‘technical know-how’ is usually complemented by her/his ‘technical know-who’, which gives the job seeker competitive edge in the labour market. Technical skills are a necessary but insufficient condition for getting jobs. Indeed, “one requires well-honed political skills as well. In organizational politics, it is about who you know rather that what you know. Talented people often exit the organization prematurely due to lack of political savvy, as they fail to protect themselves from others’ devious political antics”. Consequently, these well placed contacts are not necessarily those from the same ethnic group but also include former classmates, friends, and friends of friends or other acquaintances.

Much depends on one’s affordances, materialities and power. Not all job seekers have the social and political connections to secure jobs. For example, managers, politicians,
business owners, well-connected junior employees, and some job seekers with ‘the right connections’ have differential access to job information. Also, there are unsubstantiated claims that the late vice President, Simon Muzenda, who was a Karanga from Gutu, Masvingo Province, used to ‘remind’ other Karangas in senior and influential positions in government and private sector to ‘always remember wezhira’ or the folks from Masvingo. Oral sources suggest that a ‘typical’ Karanga would prefer chana chavatete (a relative or wezhira) for an employee than say a Zezuru or Ndebele. Managers, especially those in the human resources (personnel) departments are often victims of allegations of nepotism. In the 1980s, it was observed that “a foreman sent to the gate to select employees often chooses his friends or relatives... If the foreman doesn’t know you, your chances of getting a job are slim”. Those lacking the ‘right’ connections could pay their way to getting employment, a corrupt practice known as chioko muhomwe.

The continued resonance of industrial ethnicity in the postcolonial Zimbabwe was epitomized through songs by the Khiama Boys, a musical group led by Nicholas Zacharia who traces his origins to Malawi. The group challenge the uncritical denigration of ethnic others and industrial ethnicity in their songs Ndine Mubvunzo (I have a question) and Kubva Kure (To come from afar). Ndine Mubvunzo ‘dismisses a Zimbabwean national identity based on ethnic belonging’ and emphasizes ‘humanness and acceptance of multiple ethnicities given the artificial nature of the essentially colonial national boundaries and the complex history of migrations.’ In Kubvakure, the musicians dismiss the myth that

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1 *Ibid.* The Karanga dialect, unlike Zezuru that basically forms the so-called standard Shona, uses ‘zha’ for ‘nza. For example, the Karanga say ‘zhira’ not ‘nzira’ (way or road), ‘zhara’ not ‘nzara’ (hunger or finger/toe nails). *Wezhira* is derogatorily used to refer to the Karanga ‘teasing’ them for their use of zha not nza. It is, however, misleading to assume that only the Karanga prefer to avail job information and jobs to ‘their type’. Other racial and ethnic groups often manifest similar tendencies. Most Indian shop owners, for example, tend to have their type (family members) handling finances while blacks work as shop assistants.

2 *Interview with Ruth Mambo, Highfield, Harare, October 2011.* According to oral sources, ‘vezhira havarasane’ (the Karanga always take care of their own). Of course, there is nothing like a ‘typical Karanga’. The present author was born in Masvingo to a Venda mother and a Karanga-speaking father whose origins are suspected to have been Malawian. The author’s friends and acquaintances in Harare call him wezhira (Karanga) by virtue of his preference for ChiKaranga and having a rural home in Masvingo. However, on several occasions the author has ‘passed’ for a Venda and Ndebele on the basis of knowledge of these languages, which he learnt while staying with his maternal grandparents in Gwanda and at school in Beitbridge (Matabeleland South); and as ‘Coloured’ on the basis of his physical appearance.

3 *Moto*, September 1982, ‘The problem of unemployment’, p.11. This was confirmed in interviews with a number of informants.

4 *Interview with Sekuru Dube, Crowbrough, Harare, September 2011.*

5 Chikowero, “I Too Sing Zimbabwe”, p.129. The group challenged narrow and nativist constructions of Zimbabwean-ness and the practice of reserving jobs for people belonging to one’s ethnic group, unlike most other musicians.

‘foreigners’ have no totems but simultaneously refuse to be ‘imprisoned’ by their ancestral connections. They also condemn industrial ethnicity in the following verse:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Ndikati nditsvake basa} & \quad \text{If I try to look for a job} \\
\text{‘Pano tinoda Soko’} & \quad \text{‘Here we want a Soko’} \\
\text{Phiri haina nzvimbo} & \quad \text{Phiri has no place here} \\
\text{Ndikati nditsvake basa} & \quad \text{When I try to look for a job} \\
\text{‘Pano tinoda Ncube’} & \quad \text{Here we want a Ncube’} \\
\text{Phiri haina nzvimbo} & \quad \text{Phiri has no place here}\end{align*}
\]

The above verse suggests that the use of kinship, ethnic and other such ties to secure jobs has been rampant in postcolonial Zimbabwe.\(^2\)

Equally, there are feelings that economic and political privileges are promoted on regional and ethnic lines as political barons and influential people seek to establish and entrench grassroots support through kleptocracy, favouring ‘their own’ ahead of ethnic others. In the 1980s, media reports echoed similar sentiments over perceived or actual ethnic politics, nepotism and regionalism in both private and public sectors with some ministers being accused of creating ‘tribal and ethnic enclaves’ in their ministries and departments. Willie Musarurwa, then Sunday Mail editor, in 1983 observed that “there are situations when this nepotistic form of corruption is prevalent. There are ministries or departments where most jobs or important jobs are occupied by personnel from one region or ethnic group. Definitely this cannot be a coincidence”.\(^3\)

An anonymous member of the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA), in 1989, claimed that the army was ridden by ethnic politics with mostly Ndebele-speaking ex-ZIPRA cadres being discriminated against while the mostly Shona-speaking former ZANLA members of the ZNA enjoying unparalleled preferential treatment.\(^4\) The anonymous ZNA officer claimed that officers were promoted or demoted along ethnic lines as ‘tribalism’ and nepotism were thriving in the army. S/he further opined that since 1981, more than ten ex-ZIPRA cadres of the rank of Lieutenant Colonel had been demoted or dismissed for political reasons such as identifying with ZAPU, while ‘hundreds’ others had been dismissed without satisfactory

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\(^1\) Ibid., p.131; Khiama Boys, Best of Khiama Boys, 2001, Gramma Records, Harare.
\(^2\) A correspondent to Moto, in 1984, opined that there was talk of the existence of ethnic clubs and groups whose sole aim was to promote the interests of particular ethnic groups. The writer saw a class element in the ‘ethnic crusades’ of the time, which were supposedly led by politicians and their supporters (Moto April 1984, “Tribal politics: the cancer in our society”, p.12). Equally, investigations on corruption allegations at the National Social Security Authority (NSSA) by the National Economic Conduct Inspectorate (NECI), in 2012, revealed a plethora of white collar crimes and the recruitment of workers on ‘tribal’ and regional basis (Zimbabwe Independent, March 2 to 8, 2012, H. Moyo, “Corruption Rocks NSSA”, pp.1, 2.
\(^3\) Moto, April 1984, “Tribal politics: the cancer in our society”, p.12.
reasons being given. According to the anonymous ZNA officer, it appeared as if all ex-ZANLA combatants in the army already had 'passports' for promotion regardless of qualification.¹

The army officer further alleged that in early 1989, 90 officers of the rank of Captain were promoted to the rank of Major, and of these only nine were ex-ZIPRA, while 81 were ex-ZANLA. As a result, the army officer warned against creating a “Ugandan type of army in which a ruling tribe holds all key positions in the army”.² It is pertinent to indicate that though such claims of ethnic favouritism or ethnic victimization at workplaces might not be supported by empirical evidence, the very existence of such perceptions points to the resonance of industrial ethnicity. Perceptions, like stereotypes, also do not randomly develop but often echo or generalize some lived realities.³

The state’s general attitude to the apparently salient problems of ethnic politics, regionalism, nepotism and corruption in the distribution of socio-economic and political resources remained ambiguous. This can be explained in terms of the ambivalence of ethnicity and its great potential as both dividing and unifying force. Politicians fear ethnicity as much as they manipulate difference for political gain. Perhaps the state’s attitude towards job preference ethnicity was captured by Robert Mugabe, who in response to allegations of corruption, nepotism and regionalism by his ministers, in 1982 intimated that:

There have been allegations that some ministers are corrupt, that some officers are corrupt. But really if you compare our government with other governments the world over, I don’t think there is any corruption worth talking about. There might have been some nepotism, consideration of relatives, old friends or people from the same region for particular posts. This is a matter we are handling and where it has occurred we will correct it. But to tell you the truth, it hasn’t happened to such an alarming extent that it deserves any attention.⁴

After 1980, industrial ethnicity tended to be submerged by other forms of identification though it remains an important analytical category. Consequently, industrial

¹Ibid.
²Ibid. The anonymous member of the ZNA drew parallels with the Ugandan experience, where after the coup, Idi Amin not only sought to deal with (or eliminate) Obote loyalists, but ordered a major recruitment drive for the armed forces. In addition to the mercenary component, the bulk of the recruits were from Amin’s West Nile District. This was meant to ensure Amin’s political survival (see Mamdani, Politics and Class Formation in Uganda, pp.302-3).
³It is noteworthy that the ZNA recruits from all the country’s 10 provinces, although perceptions are that “the ZNA is … a Shona-centric or [Shona] dominated army, which … is simply there to oppress the Ndebele people….The ZNA’s recruitment covers all the provinces in the country….A state cannot sacrifice its core security values in order to please a group of very bitter tribalists whose only hatred of the security sector is based on disturbances which happened in Matabeleland in the early and late eighties” (The Herald, 8 June 2012, p.11, “Security sector reform, what reform?”).
⁴Moto, August 1982, “Headaches, hopes and plans. The Prime Minister speaks to Moto”, p.5
ethnicity in postcolonial Zimbabwe needs to be situated within the broader context of other forms of identification, most of which are non-ethnic. More so, ethnicity is never an ‘essential’ form of identification but one among a broad range of overlapping social, economic and political identifications. One can belong to a given profession, worker organization, political party, neighbourhood or locality, region, a kinship group, gendered organization, religious organization, social class, and so on. It is equally evident that in view of the bifurcation of Zimbabweans into ‘patriots’ and ‘sell-outs’, ‘war veterans’ and ‘Western puppets’, political forms of identification often permeate and submerge other identifications. Binary constructions of the nation state impact on notions of citizenship and belonging, as nativist constructions of Zimbabwean-ness can be used to exclude the ethnic and political ‘Other’. Such exclusive, narrow and even ‘dangerous’ imaginings and constructions of citizenship and belonging feed into and gives sustenance to the marginalisation thesis.¹

Nativist trends are equally discernible in the discourse on indigenisation and black economic empowerment. Indeed, the country’s indigenisation and economic empowerment drive is another important issue that can potentially engender profound implications for industrial ethnicity in postcolonial Zimbabwe. The Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act (IEEA) was signed into law in March 2008. The Act’s regulations first published in February 2010 require foreign-owned businesses with net assets of more than US$500 000 to divest 51 per cent of their shares to indigenous Zimbabweans within a five-year period.² The Act seeks to address colonial economic imbalances, which resulted in the marginalisation of indigenous populations, through ‘indigenisation’ and economic empowerment.

Despite its noble intentions, the IEEA can potentially problematise ethnic and racial immigrants’ socio-political security and their socio-economic survival.³ The nativist

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¹ Mutumwa Mawere opines that racial minorities have a sense that their rights and interests have not and did not count ‘in informing the choices about what kind of Zimbabwe should secure the future’. He argues that no serious consideration has been made since 1980 to address issues of identification, cohesion, inclusion nation building (NewsDay, 21 June 2011, Mutumwa Mawere, “Powerful Vocal Minority Empowered by Powerless Majority”, 15).


³ In January 2012, the Affirmative Action Group (AAG) chief executive, Davison Gomo, said his group opposed the appointment of another foreign managing director at Telecel Zimbabwe at the expense of local Zimbabweans. The AAG, a black empowerment advocacy group, urged government to deny the expatriate, US-born Swiss citizen John Swain, a work permit. Swain was to replace Rwandese and Canadian citizen Aimable Mpore, whose two year contract expired in 2011. Gomo argued that granting Swain a work permit would be contrary to the spirit of indigenisation and [black] empowerment (The Herald, 13 January 2012, Business Reporter, “AAG opposes Telecel appointment”.

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constructions of black economic empowerment can potentially divide citizens into ‘sell-outs’ and supporters of the ‘last Chimurenga’.¹ According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni:

The nationalist state of Zimbabwe under the Third Chimurenga seeks to achieve what is termed ‘conquest of conquest’, that is, the prevailing of Zimbabwean sovereignty over white settler colonialism. The core marker of the victory of nationalist forces is the repossession of land and the indigenization of the economy.²

The IEEA defines indigenous Zimbabweans as persons who suffered under colonial-era racial discrimination and their children born after independence. In essence, beneficiaries are black Zimbabweans. The IEEA’s has a number of significant exclusions.³ However, nativist constructions and imaginings of the Zimbabwean nation is problematic and can potentially engender the bifurcation of our interpretation and understanding of Zimbabwe’s otherwise complex and multi-layered histories. The ‘problem’ is worsened by the fact that like that of most African countries, Zimbabwean history is to some extent a history of migration, which in turn significantly problematises the ‘autochthon-allochthon dichotomy’. Crush, Williams and Peberdy rightly observe Southern Africa, including Zimbabwe, has long histories of intra-regional migration.⁴ The autochthon-allochthon dichotomy is often used by ‘dominant’ groups to exclude the ‘Other’ who are constructed as ‘outsiders’, ‘aliens’, ‘late comers’ and ‘strangers’ or vaunyi who ‘do not really belong. The notion of allochthony implies the ‘superiority’ of the ‘autochthons’ over late comers or ‘outsiders’.⁵ It is highly contested and can be used to exclude ‘the Other’ in competition for socio-economic and political resources.

This, in turn, has broader implications for industrial ethnicity as autochthony can be an instrument for differential access to resources by different groups and individuals. For

¹ According to ZANU PF Politburo member Jonathan Moyo, “ZANU PF’s irreversible indigenisation and economic empowerment thrust” as the “last phase of the people’s all time resistance against all vestiges of colonialism-the Last Chimurenga” (The Sunday Mail, October 30- November 5 2011, “Indigenisation: Putting colonialism to bed”, p.7). Critics, however, dismissed the acceleration of the indigenisation drive as an attempt to ‘dangle shares grabbed from foreign-owned companies for votes in the next election’; an argument rubbished by Moyo (The Standard, October 30- November 5 2011, Caiphas Chimhete, “Share scheme a vote-buying gimmick”, p.8; Government of Zimbabwe, The Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act, 2010.


³ Itai Zimunya cautions that government “must be aware of the unhealthy ethnic bitterness in Zimbabwe, especially the real or perceived Zezuru hegemony. The assumption that a certain people are supreme is a recipe for ethnic rupture. And inclusive developmental policies can surely avoid such” (Zimbabwe Independent, October 28 to November 3 2011, Itai Zimunya, “Indigenization: From one crisis to the next”, p.15. Also see The Standard, September 25 to October 1, 2011, Patience Nyangove, “ZANU PF chefs, chief fight over Zimplats shares”, p.4; The Saturday Herald, 12 November 2011, Nathaniel Manheru (pseudonym), “MDC-T: dreams, of death, division and invasion”, p.8; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “The Meaning of Nativism within the Debate on Public Sphere in Contemporary Africa.”


Zimbabwe, perhaps the question is who warrants the label *mwana wevhu* (son/daughter of the soil or the autochthone)? As Petina Gappah observes:

> It is difficult to define indigenous although many people think it means black while non-indigenous means white. Why are Ndebele people indigenous when they came into the country only 10 years before whites? And why are Shona people indigenous when the first people to live in the country were Khoisan?¹

Often, *vana vevhu* regard themselves as the ‘real citizens’.² Simba Makoni, the leader of Mavambo/Kusile/Dawn (MKD), an opposition political party, in 2011, noted that the indigenisation drive is racially driven and vindictive:

> There has been much concentration on saying prior to political independence in April 1980 there were people who were economically disadvantaged, but this has been narrowed to mean black people, What if Simba Makoni came from an affluent background at independence, but a John Smith who happens to be white did not? Who then should qualify to be economically advantaged and benefit under the indigenisation programme? Genuine indigenisation is not a matter of one’s racial background.³

Makoni warned that the youth empowerment drive could equally be politicised, regionalised or ethnicised with funds being given to relatives, friends and home boys/home girls of political barons spearheading the programme. A broad-based approach could probably result in a more equitable distribution of the national economic cake rather than ‘empowering’ the already empowered rich black petit bourgeois.⁴ The economic (and political) empowerment of formerly marginalised groups is a legitimate exercise that should ideally help redress colonial imbalances. As such, it should benefit all deserving Zimbabweans regardless of gender, ethnicity, political orientation, age, or region. This way, the discourse around indigenisation will not be used to sustain feelings of marginalisation. Ndlovu-Gatsheni thus argues that while it is beyond argument that the need for a fair and equitable redistribution of strategic resources in order to attain economic and social justice ‘has been a driving force’ of Zimbabwe’s liberation movement, “what is worrying is the partisan manner in which economic empowerment is unfolding”.⁵ Indeed, indigenisation and economic empowerment

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² Adejumobi, “Citizenship, Rights and the Problem of Internal Conflicts”, p.87.
³ *NewsDay*, 1 December 2011, Stephen Chadenga, “Makoni dismisses Biti’s budget”, p.9. The issue of ‘poor whites’- in postcolonial Zimbabwe- is an under-researched area. Admittedly, the racist Rhodesian colonial state’s policies led to the entrenchment or racial inequalities and the marginalisation of blacks as a racial group. However, it is equally misleading to assume that at independence all blacks were poor while all whites were rich as all these racial and ethnic groups were socio-economically differentiated. Exclusive focus on ‘indigenous’ blacks ‘overlooks the fact [that] some blacks are not economically marginalised’ (*NewsDay*, 13 December 2011, Nyasha Chizu, “Indigenisation from procurement viewpoint”, p.12).
⁵ [http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com](http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com).
are not inherently negative but can be abused as an instrument for compradorialism, kleptocracy and ‘crude materialism’.

The economic success of ethnic immigrants has ambivalent outcomes and can result in backlashes from locals who feel ‘foreigners’ are stealing their jobs, economic opportunities and even wives. Groups can organize around ethnicity in pursuit of collective socio-economic and political ends.\(^1\) The economic success of migrants can foment ethnic solidarity, which can be a “function of establishing control over jobs”.\(^2\) In this regard, the implications of the IEEA can be problematic for ‘foreigners’. Their economic success in economic sectors perceived to ‘belong’ to locals makes them more vulnerable. In September 2011, Alson Darikayi, the president of a youth empowerment group in Harare, *Upfumi Kuvadiki*, expressed concern over the heavy presence of ‘foreigners’ in the retail sector. He said that the development compromised black economic empowerment. Darikayi intimated that:

> While we support the government’s Look East Policy and respect the diplomatic relations we share with other African countries, our position remains the same; the retail sector must be reserved and preserved for locals as opening up the sector to foreigners is treacherous and ill-advised. If we are serious about indigenisation and empowerment, the government has to demonstrate its sincerity on this programme by supporting our stance to remove all foreigners from the retail sector and create opportunities for our young people. All foreigners in the retail sector should take heed and invest meaningfully in other capital intensive sectors such as mining and manufacturing.\(^3\)

For some Zimbabweans, Nigerians and Chinese traders have largely become synonymous with the ‘small’ retailer selling ‘fake’, poor-quality and pirated products. For Spiwe Moyo, a street vendor, “it just boggles the mind why someone travels all the way from Lagos to sell fake Nokia phones and accessories in Harare. What do they want us to do? Remain in the street?”\(^4\) The real and perceived dominance of foreigners, particularly Chinese and Nigerians in Zimbabwe’s retail sector can foment xenophobia, especially in view of the nativist nature

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\(^3\) *NewsDay*, 17 September 2011, “We can’t be used- Upfumi Kuvadiki”, p.13. Emphasis mine. In March 2012, Upfumi Kuvadiki said that it was losing patience with the continued presence of Chinese and Nigerian nationals in the country’s retail sector. The youth lobby group said it was making plans to eject the foreign nationals from the retail sector. Upfumi Kuvadiki president, Alison Darikayi, accused the indigenisation board of being toothless in dealing with Chinese and Nigerians some of whom are engaged in small-time businesses, selling fake products (*Daily News*, 10 March 2012, “ZANU PF youth group plans to eject Chinese”).

\(^4\) Interview with Spiwe Moyo (street vendor), Harare, August 2011.
of debate around indigenisation and black economic empowerment. The then Minister for Youth Development, Indigenisation and Empowerment, Saviour Kasukuwere, in February 2012, argued for the exclusion of foreigners from the retail sector, noting that licensing foreign-run retail businesses was in contravention of the and IEEA. Consequently, Kasukuwere ordered the Harare City Council (HCC) to stop renewing or issuing licences to foreigners. However, the then Harare Mayor, Muchadeyi Masunda, noted that “if for instance G. Jonathan Enterprises (Pvt) Ltd is a duly registered company in accordance with the laws of Zimbabwe, then it will be duly licensed in spite of the fact that some of its shareholders may be of Nigerian descent or origin”. The HCC spokesperson, Leslie Gwindi, further indicated that banning the issuance of trading licences to foreigners would precipitate xenophobia in Zimbabwe.

As part of attempts to create bridging ties, gain social acceptance, ensure socio-political security and subvert indigenisation regulations, some ‘foreigners’ have been entering into marriages of convenience with local women, registering the businesses in the women’s names while using them as fronts. This has, with varying degrees of success, helped some ‘foreign’ immigrants navigate issues around belonging, citizenship and social acceptance. Local women are often ditched as soon as the foreign businessmen acquire the requisite papers and bring in their ‘real’ wives from home. Other foreigners, especially those from Asia, seem to be reaping the rewards of the ‘Look East Policy’ and also bank on connections with influential political figures.

However, the construction of a successful ‘foreign’ business person by some Zimbabweans has largely been negative. This was perhaps captured by one correspondent to the Daily News (online), who wrote that:

1 Nevanji Madanhire regards xenophobia and racism as the ‘two evils’ that have emerged in Zimbabwe. He observes that “xenophobia has manifested itself in the way Zimbabweans hate fellow Africans such as West Africans who have established successful businesses in Zimbabwe” (The Standard, 5 to 11 August, 2012, p.11.
2 The Herald, 17 February 2012, Peter Matambanadzo and Michael Chideme, “Over 100 illegal shop operators deported”, p.1
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Daily News, 10 March 2012. Mangundhla, a Daily News correspondent, on 15 March 2012, observed that “Nigerians have attracted the wrong attention in Zimbabwe for fraudulent activities, ritual sex related offences, acts of bribery and marriages of convenience” (Daily News, 15 March 2012, Taurai Mangundhla, “Nigerians stage demo”). On 26 September 2012, the NewsDay reported the arrest of the arrest and deportation of an illegal Nigerian man, Henry Iledoro, alias, Anayo George, after he was convicted of wedding two Zimbabwean women within a space of five days. The Nigerian immigrant had earlier been deported from the country in 1998 but later sneaked into the country and tried to secure a resident permit by entering into ‘marriages of convenience’ with Zimbabwean women.
6 Interview with Mai Talent, CBD, Harare 13 August 2011.
MaNainjimbi ngaabude muno. Vaakutogarika kunge nyika ndeyavo (Nigerians should leave this country. They are now so comfortable here as if this is their country). They are mere immigrants who came here to make money but they are doing all sorts of dirty stuff and some of them are very rough with their employees…. They seem to think that because we are nice to everybody then we are fools. Send them packing!!

Equally, local players in the construction industry have raised concern over the continued domination of the sector by foreigners, especially the Chinese. In October 2011, they called for the State Procurement Board (SPB) to impose a 25 per cent added value to all foreign construction companies’ bids to improve the competitiveness of locals. The Construction Industry Federation of Zimbabwe (CIFOZ) noted that while government efforts towards empowerment were visible in other sectors like agriculture and mining, none was evident in the construction sector. The CIFOZ also accused Chinese companies of being “particularly notorious for flouting local and international labour practices, by among other things, ill-treating, underpaying and overworking employees”. In 2011, the Zimbabwe Construction and Allied Trade Workers’ Union (ZCATWU) expressed concern over the alleged malpractice by Chinese construction companies. Apart from being accused of flagrantly flouting the country’s Labour Relations Act with reckless abandon, the Chinese are also accused of ‘snatching’ business opportunities from ‘indigenous’ Zimbabweans. This antagonizes local employees, local employers and worker organizations who appear to feel that Chinese firms are being given preferential treatment though they disregard the country’s laws. This partly explains why some Zimbabweans seem to be xenophobic, particularly

1. [http://www.dailynews.co.zw/index.php/news/34-news/8033-nigerians-stage-demo.html](http://www.dailynews.co.zw/index.php/news/34-news/8033-nigerians-stage-demo.html) (Accessed 16 March 2012). Also see *Sunday Times (Southern Africa Edition)*, 8 April 2012, Simplicious Chirinda, “Please stop this xenophobia”, p.2. Nigerian businessman, Emeka Clement Emewusien, was deported from Zimbabwe in March 2012, after being accused of facilitating the illegal entry of hundreds of Nigerians into the country. When he was arrested, he was found to be in possession of two Nigerian passports with different names and had forged marriage certificates. Such ‘evidence’ seemed to sustain the construction of the Nigerian immigrant as essentially a ‘witty crook’.

2. *The Standard*, October 23 to 29, 2011, “Foreign firms dominate in construction” (*Standard Business*); *NewsDay*, 15 September 2011, Jeffrey Moyo, “Chinese brutality in the workplace”, p.6. An employee at a Chinese brick making firm claimed that “our Chinese bosses watch us for 24 hours. They even take shifts to make us work like donkeys and they don’t want to see us taking a rest, but at the end of the day they give as little as US$95 for wages, which they claim is just something to help us out and they promise to give us more later”.


against Nigerian and Chinese, whom they derogatively call *maNaijimbi* and *mazhing-zhong* respectively. One, Gone Mzana of Chitungwiza, in November 2011, noted that:

> Our country has been colonized my dear Zimbabweans! All the industrial space has been taken over by the East. Graniteside now belongs to the Chinese, New Arbennie and Willowvale now belong to the Mohammedies, Workington and Southerton to the Japanese while the city centre and Msasa have gone to the Nigerians and the Asians as well. Ours are the pavements and street corners.

The same sentiments were echoed by Simplicius Chirinda, of the *Sunday Times*, who observed that Chinese dealings with the locals “are uneasy because they are accused of taking jobs that should ordinarily be a preserve of locals”. In some instances, Chinese business people often bring some of their workers from China to do work that could ordinarily be done by locals. An informant who works for a Chinese brick-making firm in Harare claimed that Chinese brick-layers are usually given ‘dubious’ titles like ‘construction technicians’ and paid higher than locals yet their work would basically the same (brick-laying).

Such practices can lead to ethnic mobilization and xenophobia as groups compete in the same labour market but commanding different wages or salaries for similar work.

However, although foreign business persons are usually viewed as undesirable competitors who are unfairly taking away business opportunities from indigenous Zimbabweans, their positive contribution to the country’s economy, albeit on a limited scale, should not be ignored. In addition to cheaper priced goods, *zhing zhongz* or the ‘dollar for twos’, the increasing presence of Chinese business in the mining, construction, retail and other sectors of the economy has also helped in employment creation. For instance, the construction of a five-star hotel on a wetland near the National Sports Stadium in Harare by a

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1. While Nigerians are constructed as unscrupulous business persons some of whose activities borders on criminality, the Chinese are largely associated with the sale of cheap, fake and substandard goods (*zhing zhongz*).
2. *NewsDay*, 17 November 2011, (Readers’ feedback), p.11. Although the writer’s opinion sounds an overstatement, it nevertheless indicates some Zimbabweans’ anger, frustration, disdain, concern and revulsion over the real and perceived ‘dominance’ of ‘foreigners’ in the country’s economy, which might lead to the marginalisation of locals.
4. A similar pattern was observed in Mozambique, where a development consultant, Tapiwa Gomo, noted that “I remember a conversation with a Mozambican colleague who complained [that] most of these big companies were not bringing any development to Mozambique. He said in addition to tax incentives, foreign companies bring their own staff leaving cleaning jobs to locals” (*NewsDay*, 13 February 2012, Tapiwa Gomo, “Is Mozambique trending or trading?”; p.19.
5. Interview with Peter Mandaza (brick-layer for a Chinese construction company), Dzivarasekwa, Harare, October 2011. Equally, a report by the South African-based Southern Africa Resource Watch (SARW), released in 2012, noted that “a Minister from one SADC country who visited the Chinese company, Anjin, which is mining diamonds in Marange, was disturbed to find that it was a Chinese person who was opening the gate” ([http://www.financialgazette.co.zw](http://www.financialgazette.co.zw)), “Chinese Exploiting Zimbabwean Labour: Report”, 8 November 2012.
7. Interview with Mai Talent.
Chinese company, Anjin, created employment opportunities for locals although the project
drew the ire of the Environmental Management Agency (EMA). In February 2012, the
US$300 million project employed over 500 locals at the construction site. Upon the
completion of the 300-bed hotel and an envisaged US$580 shopping mall, it was expected to
create over 3000 jobs.¹

The ambivalent attitude of locals towards the Chinese needs to be located in within the
broader context of the growing Chinese economic might and the country’s increasing
presence on the African continent. China, which has experienced remarkable economic
buoyancy over the past decades, is increasingly prioritizing the continent as a key strategic
political and economic partner. In 2010, China overtook Japan as the world’s largest economy
after the USA and overtook Germany as the world’s largest exporter. In 2012, The Economist
predicted that by 2014, China would be the world’s largest exporter.² China has therefore
been turning to Africa for raw materials (especially crude oil, iron ore, copper and other
minerals) and export market triggering what might be called ‘the new scramble’ for Africa
pitting China against Western economies.

The increasing Chinese presence has varied impacts for different African countries. In
Southern Africa, Chinese companies are ‘notorious’ for pollution, non-payment of
‘overtime’, long working hours, disregarding public holidays, human rights violations, weak
safety and health conditions and poor labour practices.³ China’s competitors in Africa often
stress that country’s apparent indifference to issues to do with human rights and governance.
Like other foreign companies operating on African soil, Chinese companies often commit the
above ‘crimes’ almost with reckless abandon. In most instances, Chinese companies exploit
weaknesses of governance structures in some countries in the region.⁴ Like any other country
country in the world, China is primarily concerned with advancing and securing its social,
political, economic and other interests in Africa and should not be seen as an ‘all-weather

¹ The Standard, February 19 to 25 2012, Patrice Makova, “Frogs won’t stop US$300 million investment-
Kaseke”, p. 4.
“China to become the world’s largest importer by 2014” (Accessed 24 September 2012);
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/china-overtakes-germany-to-become-largest-exporter-1864052.html,
“China overtakes Germany to become largest exporter”; http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/jan/10/china-
³ Southern Africa Resource Watch (SARW), Win Win Partnership? China, Southern Africa and Extractive
Industries, 2012. According to SARW, in Zimbabwe, “the culprits are the small Chinese mining companies.
Most Chinese mining firms exceed the legally stipulated working hours of eight hours per day. They generally
work 12 to 18 hours” http://www.finacialgazette.co.zw, “Chinese exploiting Zimbabwean labour”, 8 November
2012.
friend’. Such a view constitutes a simplistic reading of China’s engagement with Africa, which is largely informed by economic and geostrategic considerations.

Yet, as already noted, the economic success of ethnic and racial immigrants has ambiguous implications for their socio-political security. This is especially so for foreign business owners, particularly those whose presence is conspicuous like Chinese and Indian communities.\(^1\) Mbanaso and Korieh rightly note that:

The economic, cultural and political position of trading and business minorities such as South Asians in East Africa, who control most of the trade and businesses, and the Lebanese in West Africa creates a unique kind of minority in Africa as elsewhere and has fuelled antagonistic tendencies as well as ethnic hatred for these economically dominant groups.\(^1\) The presence of a small number of Indians and Chinese in Africa obviously introduces a different dimension to African minority issues. Though often numerically small, the Asian minority has been economically successful despite being marginal in wielding political power. This ambivalent position has left them insecure and vulnerable, especially as they have successfully resisted assimilation in either multicultural or mono-cultural societies.\(^2\)

Consequently, Zimbabwe’s indigenisation drive can potentially engender profound ramifications for industrial ethnicity, ethnic competition, identification and inter-group relations. As noted above, the economic presence and perceived success of ethnic immigrants has often led to sour inter-group relations, particularly with host communities. The perceived economic success of ethnic immigrants has led to backlashes from local communities across space and time. Examples include the xenophobic attacks on (black) foreign immigrants in South Africa, the expulsion of Asians from Uganda by Idi Amin, and the backlash against Chinese migrants in the USA.\(^3\)

Often, ethnic migrants are victims of racial and ethnic discrimination and exclusion. The Chinese in the USA, for example, were accused of fomenting ‘rottenness’ and ‘driving away white labour’ through their ‘stealthy competition’.\(^4\) Despite their evident contribution to the USA’s economic development, Chinese immigrants, like Zimbabweans and

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\(^1\) Worth noting is the fact that these communities are not homogenous and harmonious entities but are significantly differentiated on the basis of class and ethnicity, among other factors, though they tend to appear like ‘unified’ communities. As individuals, they possess differential access to power, materialities and affordances that can help them navigate the complex issues around belonging and the insider-outsider nexus in view of the articulation of the indigenisation drive.


\(^3\) It is interesting to note that all the victims of the xenophobic attacks that took place in South Africa in 2008 were entirely blacks and included some black South Africans who were perhaps thought to be ‘too dark’ to be South African. The attacks appear to have bordered on ‘Negro phobia’ rather than xenophobia since immigrant whites and ‘Coloureds’, who could have been equally accused of stealing local jobs and wives were not attacked.

Mozambicans in South Africa, became an indispensable enemy. In response to their exclusion and minoritisation, Chinese immigrants built ‘China towns’, which acted as ‘homelands’ for Chinese migrants in the Diaspora. These communities acted as sources of social and economic support, just like ethnic and mutual aid associations like burial societies and closed societies, including Zvinyawo and Butwa, in colonial Harare.

8.8 Conclusion

In view of the above discussion, it can be concluded that feelings of marginalisation by the Ndebele, some Shona constituent groups, and other ethnic and racial ‘minorities’ cannot be ignored. The same applies to Gukurahundi and its memory. The uneven development of regions and perceived preferential treatment of ethnic (and racial) groups in the allocation of national resources can be a future source of conflict if the issues remain unsolved. Marginalised communities feel excluded, ‘alienated’ and being treated like second tier citizens who do not ‘really belong’. Such feelings can be manipulated by political entrepreneurs and their supporters in complex struggles for power, hegemony and counter-hegemonies in postcolonial Zimbabwe. The following chapter concludes the thesis by summarizing and discussing some of the salient issues raised by the preceding discussion.

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1 Ibid., p.233. The Workmen’s Party in California, under the slogan “The Chinese must go,” launched an anti-Chinese campaign for laws to exclude Chinese migrants. This led to the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. The Act was expanded to include all Asians after the Second World War.

2 Ibid.

CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION

The previous chapters provided a historical study of industrial ethnicity in colonial Harare, illuminating its ambiguities, ambivalence and continued resonance in postcolonial Zimbabwe. The present chapter concludes the thesis by summarizing and discussing some of the salient issues that were raised in preceding chapters. The chapter draws together the study’s findings with the literature reviewed in Chapter 2, which noted the shift in the conceptualisation of African ethnicity from inventionist interpretations towards the moral ethnicity approach, and the present thesis’s attempt to integrate materiality into the ethnicity debate. The chapter also discusses some of the aspects that require further exploration, the broader relevance of thesis, and the study’s possible implications of the study for policy and/or practice.

Anchored within a rubric of theoretical and conceptual trajectories located within social constructionist thought, which borrows from Homi Bhabha’s notions of ambivalence and hybridity; Judith Butler’s performativity and materialisation; and the network theory of socio-economic well-being, the thesis argued for the existence of industrial ‘workplace’ ethnicity in pre-colonial Zimbabwe. The export oriented Shangwe tobacco producers and Njanja iron manufacturers illuminated an interesting intersection of ethnic identification and industry in pre-colonial Zimbabwe. Like other pre-colonial societies, both the Njanja and Shangwe were explicitly named groups of people who had specific ethnonyms, shared cultures, shared histories and common myths of origins. Each of the two ethnic groups occupied defined geographical spaces whose boundaries, however, remained fluid. Their respective ethnic identifications were ambivalent, ‘hybrid’, socially constructed and open to challenge and negotiation. However, the assumption, articulation, performance of particular identifications and resultant contestations depended on the individuals’ differential access to raw materials used in the construction of identifications.

The thesis argued that during the pre-colonial era, industrial ethnicity was largely fomented by local factors, especially the availability of particular natural resources, ecological variations and local knowledge systems. Njanja iron manufactures, whose exceptional iron working technology, and whose extensive scale of iron production and marketing prompted European missionary to refer Njanja country as “the Wolverhampton of Mashonaland”¹, exploited the rich iron haematic ore deposits at Wedza Mountain. This enabled them to establish and sustain an iron industry whose technology and scale of

¹ Shimmin, “Journey to Gambisa’s.”
operations was unparalleled in the region. Equally, Shangwe tobacco producers of Gokwe utilized the ecological peculiarities of north-western Zimbabwe to carve an ‘industrial niche’ for themselves. Local agro-ecological conditions in Gokwe; especially low erratic rainfall, sandy soils and the prevalence of tsetse flies, inhibited crop and cattle production. Colonial agricultural experts concluded that Gokwe could best be used for the production of Turkish tobacco, a decision that had been made years back by Shangwe tobacco experts, whose high quality dark leaf variety was similar to Turkish tobacco. Consequently, despite the adverse agro-ecological conditions, the Shangwe established a renowned tobacco industry that drew the attention of both pre-colonial Africa groups and the European settlers. By the 1890s, the Shangwe had established a flourishing tobacco industry that became the envy of their neighbours. Just as the term ‘Njanja’ had by the nineteenth century became synonymous with skilled and exceptional iron workers, the term ‘Shangwe’, became synonymous with high quality dark leaf tobacco.

The characteristics of the ethnic group were equally critical in fomenting industrial ethnicity and giving it its currency and resonance in pre-colonial Zimbabwe. Iron and tobacco producing skills had to be developed, perfected, honed over time and the expertise transmitted from one generation to the other within the group. However, since pre-colonial ethnic boundaries were neither static nor impermeable, local knowledge and the Njanja’s ‘special’ iron technology, for instance, could be passed to non-Njanja apprentices. Ethnic exogamous unions were another avenue through which the ‘special iron working technology’ could be transmitted to non-Njanja groups. Such ‘specialists’ or iron workers in possession of Njanja iron working technology soon became ‘Njanja’ themselves. This in part illustrated the hybrid and ambivalent natures of Njanja identification. Although other Shona speaking groups like the Mbire and Karanga were iron workers in their own right, by the nineteenth century, iron working had become synonymous with the Njanja. Consequently, Njanja referred to iron workers, ethnic identification, a geographical space and its inhabitants. Equally, ‘Nyoka’ could refer to the type of tobacco grown in Nyoka country by the Shangwe; a geographical space, and people living therein. This illustrates the dynamism and ambiguity of ethnonyms in pre-colonial Africa. Just as iron making almost became synonymous with the Njanja, the growing and processing of high quality tobacco in pre-colonial Zimbabwe became synonymous with Nyoka country and an integral part of the Shangwe’s cultural package.

The Njanja and Shangwe exploited external factors, notably demographic dynamics of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and the increasing demand for their products, in order
to develop and extend their respective industries. Migration played a key role in the evolution of the two forms of identification. For example, the Njanja exploited the increased demand for iron hoes following the settlement of southern parts of Zimbabwe by Karanga speakers, in the 1840s, to expand their iron industry. In the same vein, the arrival of the Ndebele, around the mid-nineteenth century, presented a market for Shangwe tobacco growers. Although the incoming Ndebele grew tobacco and smoked it in pipes, they soon began to import the Shangwe’s high quality dark leaf tobacco. Some enterprising Shangwe tobacco producers travelled to Matabeleland selling their wares. It was the imposition of colonial subjugation that eventually heralded the demise of pre-colonial industries.

The role of migration in fomenting industrial ethnicity became more pronounced during the colonial era. While the role of ecological variations became insignificant during this period, industrial ethnicity appeared to have centred on labour mobility and meanings of ethnic identification. As such, Chapter 5 explained the salience of industrial ethnicity in urban colonial Zimbabwe in terms of a complex interaction of structure and agency. Structural, institutional, behavioural, local and historical factors that were critical in fomenting the emergence of ethnic niches in colonial Harare’s labour market included the role of colonial ethnic ranking; positive and negative stereotyping; self definition and definition by others, including the state, white public, white employers and Africans themselves; as well as the use of social networks. Yet, as argued, classifications, stereotypes and categories are negotiated and contested. They are not automatically assumed, embraced and articulated by those so named or categorized. More so, social differentiation within African communities meant that the way a migrant could use industrial ethnicity as a socio-economic resource and position him or herself in the competitive labour market largely depended of issues like embodiment, materialities and power.

An interaction of structure and agency fomented industrial ethnicity and gave it its resonance, leading to the prevalence of ethnic enclaves in Salisbury’s labour market. Africans were not passive victims of European institutions and structures, and the colonial preoccupation with hierarchy and ethnic ranking. African migrant workers in urban areas manipulated colonial structures and institutions for their own good. The ethnic resource constituted important social capital and was appealed to as people scrambled for urban social,

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1 Kosmin, “The Inyoka Tobacco Industry of the Shangwe People”.
2 Manganga, “Migrant labour and meanings of ethnic identities in urban colonial Zimbabwe”.
3 Brubaker and Cooper, “Beyond “Identity””. 
economic and political spaces. Consequently, identification cannot simply be argued to be a mere replication of individual membership of particular collectivities. Neither is it a culmination of cultural messages and discursive practices that name, categorize, identify, classify, discipline and encourage individuals to assume particular identifications.

Chapter 5 further argued that behavioural factors often intersected with institutional and structural ones. As such, the agency/structure duality cannot be dichotomized. Although social networks, including kinship and ethnic links, were indispensable social capital for most migrants, and constituted important conduits for the transmission of job information and local intelligence, it was the structure of a particular network that often determined the ‘quality’ of job intelligence that was transmitted within particular networks. Moreover, Africans in the city were cosmopolitan and not bewildered ethnic minorities in urban areas. African workers in colonial Harare were important socio-economic and political actors in a cosmopolitan city.

The thesis also noted that the colonial state was not all power-full and its ideological hegemony had limitations. However, colonialism admittedly created the structural and institutional context for industrial ethnicity, which remained one among an assortment/rubric of forms of identification/colonial identities. The colonial state and the socially differentiated white public constructed and imagined some forms of ethnic taxonomies that ranked Africans on the basis of warped notions of ethnic superiority. The resultant ethnic-based job hierarchies presented differential socio-economic life chances to different groups of African job seekers. This, in part, fomented industrial ethnicity in urban colonial Zimbabwe, giving it its currency and resonance.

Chapter 5 argued that a complex synergy of factors, including behavioural, historical, institutional and structural elements, as well as the use of social networks helped engender industrial ethnicity in African Salisbury. There were noticeable efforts by some African migrant workers, Rhodesian state and employers to maintain such ethnic enclaves due to various reasons, including as a way of maintaining discipline at the workplace and to divide

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1 Manganga, “Migrant Labour, Industrial Ethnicity, Urban Violence and the State in Colonial Zimbabwe”.

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African workers. Certain occupations came to be associated with particular groups of Africans, who equally took deliberate steps to exclude ‘the Other’ from such occupations through a complex system of social networks. Such behavioural efforts were complemented by other structural and institutional elements, including migration dynamics, the existence of ‘differential windows’ in the labour market, industrial expansion and the ever changing colonial attitude towards foreign African labour. However, industrial ethnicity was not always an exclusively salient form of identification.

The prevalence of ethnic enclaves in Salisbury’s labour market and efforts by employees and employers to maintain such enclaves had varied impacts for individuals or groups. It engendered both positive and negative outcomes for African workers. As a result of its broader ramifications on socio-economic wellbeing, the varied and multi-layered implications of industrial ethnicity transcended the workplace and problematised inter/intra-ethnic relations and the socio-economic and political wellbeing of groups. Consequently, Chapter 6 argued that while ethnicity and kinship ties were important sources of social capital, industrial ethnicity led to inter/intra ethnic tensions, heightened animosity, jealousies and in some instances violent manifestations of ethnic competition. It is partly in this sense that the Ngoni faction fights of the early 1920s and the Bulawayo faction fights of 1929, which pitted the local Ndebele, the Kalanga and other non-Rhodesian Africans on the one hand and the Shona, mostly the Manyika and Karanga on the other, has been interpreted.

Equally, the thesis explained the faction fights in terms of a complex interaction of industrial ethnicity and the feminisation of African migration. For example, in Bulawayo, the Manyika and other Shona constituent groups had the jobs and the money because industrial ethnicity worked in their favour. They had relatively better paying jobs as waiters, ‘houseboys’ and cooks and were popular with some Ndebele women. This led to tension between them and the Ndebele, who were ethnically ranked higher by colonial authorities and the white public but often, had comparatively less income than the Manyika in Bulawayo. As such, the 1929 faction fights were part of moral contestations within the Ndebele community and attempts to regain lost moral authority over Bulawayo¹, whose loss was supposedly demonstrated by the prevalence of sexual unions between some Ndebele women and Shona immigrants.

Admittedly, colonisation, urbanisation and industrial development had profound implications on migration dynamics. African migrant labour became an integral part of the

¹ Msindo, “Ethnicity, Not Class?”
colonial economy. Colonial practice, legislations and institutions as well as African social and cultural inhibitions militated against the presence of African women in urban areas. Yet, it is evident that from the 1950s onwards, there was a noticeable presence of ‘independent’ African women in Harare. Urbanisation created opportunities for some African women to broaden their livelihood portfolios and to subvert socio-cultural constrains to their mobility and personal freedoms. However, in view of the prevailing structural and institutional contexts of the African labour market, women largely entered into so-called ‘feminine’ occupations like domestic work, nursing, teaching and commercial sex work. A few ventured into the so called ‘male’ occupations working in factories and industries.

The resultant feminisation of both African migration and African labour had ambivalent, complex, dynamic and varied implications for ‘gendered geographies of power’ at the individual, household, ‘hostel’, township, and national levels. The presence of single, working/or self-employed and independent women who were not under the control of a husband or male relative significantly impacted on constructions of social decency, respectability, femininities and masculinities. Hegemonic masculinities and femininities exhibited by some African males, the African public and some African females tended to violently challenge women’s presence in town and their socio-economic autonomy as was demonstrated during the Salisbury bus boycott of 1956. Of course, African women in urban areas were differentiated on the basis of class, ethnicity, age, social location or embeddedness and religion among other factors. However, the material differences between various groups of African workers, both female and male, cannot be generalised as it varied across space and time.¹

Chapter 7 situated the study in its political context through an exploration of the interface of ethnicity, gender, ‘othering work’ and nationalism in Harare between the 1950s and the 1970s. African nationalist politics and the struggle for political independence were characterised by underlying fissures, contradictions and tensions. African nationalism was not a unified and coherent ideology. More often than not, the nationalism of the elite differed from that of the sub-alterns. The ‘dominant’ nationalist narrative, however, attempted to belittle and submerge various competing narratives about the liberation struggles and African ‘nationalisms’. Hegemonic masculinities and femininities, ethnic tensions and the ‘othering’ of alternative political voices and political competitors were important facets of nationalist politics and the war of liberation. In addition, some political barons and their supporters

¹ Lunn, “The Meaning of the 1948 General Strike”.

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fought to establish and maintain their political hegemony over the liberation movement and the envisaged new Zimbabwe. Ethnicity and identification were politicised making them indispensable resources in contests for power, which in part set the stage for the postcolonial context of ethnicity. This, arguably, made ethnic politics an ‘ugly birthmark’ that has continued to haunt postcolonial Zimbabwe.

On its part, Chapter 8 provided an overview of the postcolonial context of ethnicity in Zimbabwe. It noted that the state’s attitude to the apparently salient problems of ethnic competition, the uneven development of regions, regionalism, nepotism and corruption in the distribution of national socio-economic and political goods/services has largely been ambiguous. The ambiguity can partly be explained in terms of the ambivalence of ethnicity and its great potential as both a dividing and unifying force. As Alubo observes, although ethnicity is not necessarily negative or antithetical to nation building, the concept “harbours the potential of being hijacked by ‘visionaries’ and ‘leaders’ and turned into a weapon for the furtherance of particularistic aims, and thereby threatening nation building”.  

Chapter 8 also argued that industrial ethnicity in postcolonial Zimbabwe is usually lumped together with regionalism, cronyism, nepotism and other aspects of ‘organization politics’. The politics around the real and perceived socio-economic and political marginalisation of some ethnicities by a supposedly Shona-centric state, and ethnic competition over resources and hegemony tend to submerge industrial ethnicity. The above notwithstanding, kinship, ethnic ties and other social networks remain pertinent in securing and maintaining jobs. Much, of course, depends on the issue of materiality, the structure of one’s social networks and the broader structural and institutional context.

Feelings of marginalisation by the Ndebele, some Shona constituent groups, and other ethnic and racial ‘minorities’ have gained currency since 1980. However, the state’s apparent ‘denial attitude’ to both the existence and prevalence of ethnicity in the domains of politics,

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1 Alubo, “Citizenship and Nation Making in Nigeria,” p.137. However, the ‘tribal innocence’ of the masses should not be celebrated here as they can also hijack ethnicity for their own interests. In the same vein, D. Turton (“Introduction: War and Ethnicity”, Turton, ed., War and Ethnicity: Global Connections and Local Violence, Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 1997, p.3) notes that “ethnic sentiments can undoubtedly motivate people to acts of extreme violence against those whom they classify as ‘Other’… in many cases rivals for power make use of ethnic differences as a political resource, but the differences themselves are not responsible for war”. See J. S. Omofola, “The Nigerian State and Multiple Minorities”, Mbanaso and Korieh, eds., Minorities and the State in Africa, pp.267-68.

2 George, an university graduate with a degree in social sciences and is working as a civil servant said that “it is difficult to get better paying jobs in the private sector unless one has contacts in particular business entities, companies or NGOs. It is only in the public service that a graduate can easily get a job without using connections.” George further claimed that most NGOs and private companies do not advertise some of their vacancies, and that if they do it would simply be a public relations exercise as they tend to prefer individuals who are recommended by people already working for them (Interview with George, Kuwadzana Extension, 16 April 2012.)
economy and society has sustained the ‘marginalisation thesis’. The same can be said for Gukurahundi, which if not adequately addressed, will remain an ‘old and ugly national wound’ waiting to burst with nasty ramifications for ethnicity and the imagining and construction of the nation. The uneven development of regions- a legacy of the country’s colonial past- and perceived preferential treatment of ethnic (and racial) groups in the allocation of national resources can be a future source of conflict if the issues remain unsolved.

Marginalised communities feel excluded, ‘othered’, ‘alienated’ and being treated like second tier citizens who do not ‘really belong’. Such feelings can be manipulated by political entrepreneurs and their supporters in complex struggles for power, hegemony and counter-hegemonies. The failure by the postcolonial state to seriously engage the issue of ethnicity, Gukurahundi, and the uneven development between the centre and its underdeveloped margins are likely to continue fomenting ethnic competition and ‘radical politics’ by groups in marginalised regions. These regions include Matabeleland, where the MLF and the Mthwakazi National Party (MNP), the political wing of the MLF, are calling for the creation of an independent Mthwakazi state. Such local sentiments should not be dismissed as mere political dreams by separatist groups and power hungry political malcontents keen to reap perceived socio-economic and political dividends of secession or separatism. Instead, the increasing salience of ‘radical’ politics, calls for devolution and complains of marginalisation by some regions point to the urgency with which the postcolonial state should address the issue of ethnicity in politics, the economy and society.

The continued resonance of ethnicity in socio-economic and political spheres is however not unique to Zimbabwe but is rather characteristic of the postcolonial state in Africa. Generally, forms of identification are usually contingent. In fact, the ‘rationale behind subjective identification with a collective entity’ is to an extent informed by the resultant socio-economic and political ‘fruits’ or ‘rewards’ of belonging to a particular collectivity, which fruits can be products of cronyism, patronage and ‘ethnocracy’. Esman thus contends that critical political, social and economic goods are often transferred to members of a particular community once an ethnic group gains control of the state. For Mamdani, economic identities are a consequence of the history of development of markets, while

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1 *NewsDay*, 14 January 2012, Silas Nkala, “A little more love for the San community”, p.5. The San community in Matabeleland North complain that government has neglected them since 1980.
cultural and political identities should be “understood as specifically a consequence of the history of state formation.”

It can, therefore, be concluded that ethnicity and its politicisation remain salient issues that continue to daunt the African postcolonial state. According to Mamdani, “the clashes about rights are less and less racial, more and more ethnic. Put differently, ethnic clashes are more and more about rights…” Equally, Adejumobi observes that:

While in the present conjuncture most of the conflicts threatening to tear many states apart are identity-based; underlying them is the issue of citizenship and rights. Group identities have assumed not only a primary means of social expression, but also of rights and privileges in the polity. The concept of national citizenship of equal rights, benefits and duties for all citizens has been attenuated or bifurcated, with the state sunk in a cesspool of inter-group struggles and conflicts over the distribution of public goods. The claims of marginalization, domination, and social injustice by groups and individuals often derive from this reality.

Industrial ethnicity remains a pertinent category of analysis. At both global and national levels, the use of social networks is one of the most important parts of the migration process. The complex networks of relatives, home-boys/girls and friends provide accommodation, logistical support, local intelligence and job information to new immigrants. Ethnic ties and other social networks constitute important social capital that is key to the settlement process of immigrants, providing the essential ‘technical know-who’ to job seekers, which significantly complements, or even surpass, their professional competences and technical know-how. The practice, which evidently borders on blatant nepotism and corruption, engenders ethnic enclaves in workplaces, thereby fomenting and sustaining industrial ethnicity. Yet, industrial ethnicity can be partly sustained by, but is not reducible to, nepotism.

In terms of its impact and contribution to knowledge, the thesis builds on the works reviewed in Chapter 2 and fills in the identified knowledge gaps. It is empirically grounded in a specific case study of industrial ethnicity among various African groups in Salisbury. As we have seen the thesis’s context is formed by the factors that engendered such ethnic niches, enclaves or clusters in a specific historical period. Arguably, an analysis of behavioural, historical, institutional and structural elements of industrial ethnicity helps in understanding the varied meanings of migrant labour and ethnic identification as well as inter- and intra-

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2 Ibid, p.10.
group relations, the importance of social networks and the nature and peculiarities of relations between African migrant labour, the Rhodesian state and white Rhodesian employers in colonial Zimbabwe.

In historiographical terms, the thesis makes a significant contribution towards correcting a heavy bias in Zimbabwean scholarly literature towards the issue of rural ethnicity. Industrial ethnicity, as noted in Chapter 2, is under-represented in current literature on African ethnicity. Unlike some studies on ethnicity in Zimbabwe, the thesis attempted to come to grips with the complexity of discursive configurations of the construction and imagination of identities, locating ethnicity within broader questions of inequality and social difference, particularly the issues of embodiment, materiality, power and affordances.

Although the thesis is case-study based, its findings can be generalised given that industrial ethnicity is a lived global reality, whose salience, resonances and implications for inter/intra-group relations vary across space and time. More often than not, in Africa and other parts of the world, groups complain of perceived and real marginalisation by the political barons controlling the state and its resources. Regionalism, ‘homeboyism/homegirlism’, kleptocracy and the politics of patronage feature in contestations for power and hegemony in the African postcolonial state. Local communities tend to manifest a ‘glocal’ approach to national issues, including politics and the economy. The preference for local candidates for political office, for example might be informed by the realisation that a local (‘one of our own’) understands local aspirations, challenges and peculiarities better than a ‘foreigner’, ‘outsider’ or ethnic and racial ‘Other’. Yet, ‘glocalization’ and ‘local particularism’ can in some instances be misread for ‘tribal politics’.

Arguably, diasporic communities tend to ‘glocalise’ and maintain cultural and ethnic attachments to countries of origins. In addition to being a present reality that often has a destabilising effect on national societies globalisation tends to reconfigure the local instead of homogenising the world. As Cooper rightly observes:

People’s exposures to media- to dress, to music, to fantasies of good life- are highly fragmented; bits of imagery are detached from their context, all the more attractive because of the distant associations they evoke... This detachment of cultural symbolism from spatial locatedness paradoxically makes people realise the value of their cultural

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particularity. Hence, a sentimental attachment to ‘home’ by migrants who do not live there but who contribute money and energy to identity politics.¹ Migrants usually cling to identities from their places of origin infusing them in host communities.² Ethnic identification remains an interesting subject of academic inquiry, particularly in view of the nature of international migration. The movement of labour immigrants and refugees to Europe, North America, and some Asian economies has led to the increasing importance of identification.³ In Africa, drought, famine and political unrest and economic difficulties have fuelled both regional and international migration.⁴ These communities of migrants use social networks, including kinship and ethnic ones, when looking for jobs or company, creating ethnic enclaves or ethnic niches. As seen in Chapters 5 and 6, the use of social networks in the settlement process and as conduits for the transmission of local intelligence and job information results in the interface of identification and urban residential space. Hein de Haas rightly notes that “once started, migration processes tend to become partly self-perpetuating, leading to the formation of migrant networks and migration systems.”⁵

Migration networks are sets of interpersonal ties that connect migrants in countries of origin and destination. The thesis has illustrated that migrants are connected through bonds of kinship, shared community of origin and friendship. It further noted that these bonds act as forms of social capital, the potential or actual resources linked to possession of a durable social network. The social capital provided by migration networks can in turn be translated to human, cultural or economic capital that is critical for the migrants’ settlement process and the subsequent acquisition of jobs.⁶ This subsequently reduces the economic, social and cultural costs of migration.⁷

It is interesting to note that 84 percent of the 41 000 Chinese immigrants to the USA between 1851 and 1860 were concentrated in California’s mining counties. The Chinese

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² See Bonner, Hyslop and van der Walt, “Rethinking Worlds of Labour”, p.144.
³ Eriksen notes that many Americans continue to use ethnic networks when looking for employment or spouses. Many also prefer to live in neighbourhoods that are dominated by people with similar origins. See N. Glazer and D. P. Moynam, Beyond the Melting Pot, (Second Edition), Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1970; Granovetter, Getting a Job.
established an ethnic niche in the mines and railroad construction, work that was regarded extremely difficult by locals.\(^1\) In the same vein, Zimbabwean migrants to South Africa after the late 1990s were largely absorbed by the ‘labour thirsty’ construction industry and the commercial farms, areas that were shunned by local South Africans. Ironically, during the colonial era, most local Zimbabweans shunned working in mines and farms, occupations that were dominated by the ‘aliens’, mostly Malawians and Mozambicans. Other Zimbabwean ‘economic refugees’ in South Africa have been absorbed by the service industry, especially hotels, lodges and restaurants; and domestic service as house servants.

In its wider context, the thesis adds to the growing body of knowledge on the ‘the African city’\(^2\), especially its place in the global economy and culture, its contested histories and role as a theatre for the formation of complex socio-economic, political and cultural forms of identification. By situating industrial ethnicity in urban colonial Zimbabwe within the context of the regional political economy, the thesis contributes towards global labour history and global migration studies. These *inter alia* call for methodological transnationalities or globalisation and research on other issues like race, gender and ethnicity other than class.\(^3\) The study’s findings on the interaction of labour migration, work and urban urban ethnicity also present fascinating comparisons to those of urban sociologists of the 1950s (the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute).\(^4\) In particular, the thesis makes some interesting yet yet ambivalent and problematic connections between ethnicity and work, an area that admittedly still requires further study.

\(^1\) Ibid.
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