

Augustine's *Contra Fortunatum*. Perspectives from Critical Discourse Analysis and
Argumentation Theory

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English Abstract

Augustine of Hippo remains one of the most prominent and influential figures in the world of Catholicism, famous for his many writings and sermons on Catholic Christianity as well as his ardent defence of it. His debate with Fortunatus, a member of the Manichaeian faith presented Augustine with one of his defining moments as a member of the Catholic clergy. This is because Augustine had only been a *presbyter* in the Church at Hippo for a few months when this debate took place and therefore had much at stake against his wily opponent. To make matters even more complicated for Augustine, he himself had been a Manichee for at least nine years and knew Fortunatus as a skilled debater. But rhetoric, or the art of persuasion, was a field in which Augustine excelled, having both a natural proclivity for speaking as well as the formal education behind it.

Chapter one begins with an introduction to the debate, the primary characters, and the religions involved. Chapter two continues with an exposition of Augustine and his association with Manichaeism and then goes on to describe Augustine's anti-Manichaeian works. From this point, chapter two continues with a section on Manichaeism, its spread, its myth and its practice. From this contextual basis, chapter three deals with the methodology of Critical Discourse Analysis and the three most important characters in the form of Halliday, Fairclough and van Dijk. This chapter is followed by another chapter on theory: Argumentation Theory. Chapter four includes subsections on van Eemeren and his methodologies of Pragma-Dialectics and Strategic Maneuvering.

The analysis chapters of this dissertation begin with chapter five which deals with concepts from Critical Discourse Analysis and Argumentation Theory. This chapter

includes subsections on categories of enquiry, followed by a section on a number of recurring devices, namely: answering questions, changing the topic and quoting scripture. A Critical Discourse Analysis section follows with subsections that include difference, evaluation and knowledge as a common ground component of contexts. This in turn is followed by sections on Argumentation Theory and Strategic Maneuvering, which include subsections on economy, efficacy and coherence; realism and wellfoundedness; logical reasoning process and pragmatic inferences; reasonableness versus effectiveness; the rhetorical perspective; discussion strategies; dialectical aims versus rhetorical aims and deceptive manoeuvring.

The final analysis chapter, the *Contra Fortunatum* in context, includes subsections on the opening of the debate, the structure of the debate and the topics of discussion. Within this last section subsections on the Nebridian conundrum, the origin of evil, and free will occur. The next subsection discusses topics not mentioned in the debate: the Manichaean myth, Mani and the previous friendship between Fortunatus and Augustine. Following this there are sections on Manichaeism presenting itself as a form of Christianity, the debaters talking past each other and the issues of audience composition and power relations between the various role players. Chapter seven takes a concluding look at the issue of who should be designated the winner of the debate.

Opsomming

Augustinus van Hippo bly een van die mees prominente en invloedryke figure in die wêreld van die Katolisisme, bekend vir sy vele skrywes en preke oor die Katolieke Christendom sowel as sy ywerige verdediging daarvan. Sy debat met Fortunatus, 'n lid van die Manichese geloof, het aan Augustinus een van die bepalende oomblikke in sy rol as Katolieke geestelike besorg. Die rede hiervoor is dat Augustinus ten tyde van die debat nog net 'n paar maande 'n presbiter in die kerk in Hippo was; daarom was daar baie op die spel in die debat teen hierdie gedugte opponent. Om dinge selfs nog meer ingewikkeld vir Augustinus te maak, was hy self vir ten minste nege jaar 'n Manicheër en was hy bekend met Fortunatus se retoriese vermoëns. Retoriek, of die kuns van oorreding, was egter „n veld waarin Augustinus uitgeblink het. Hy het beide 'n natuurlike aanvoeling vir redevoering sowel as 'n formele opleiding gehad.

Hoofstuk een van die proefskrif begin met 'n inleiding tot die debat, die hoofkarakters en die gelowe wat betrokke is. Hoofstuk twee gaan voort met 'n uiteensetting van Augustinus en sy assosiasie met die Manichese geloof en beskryf ook Augustinus se anti-Manichese werke. Van hier af gaan hoofstuk twee dan verder met „n afdeling oor die Manichese geloof, die mitologie en lewenswyse, sowel as die verspreiding van die Manicheïsme. Met hierdie kontekstuele agtergrond as basis handel hoofstuk drie oor die metodologie van Kritiese Diskoersanalise en die drie belangrikste eksponente van hierdie teoretiese rigting, Halliday, Fairclough en Van Dijk. Hierdie hoofstuk word gevolg deur nog 'n teoretiese hoofstuk wat handel oor Argumentasieteorie. Hoofstuk vier sluit onderafdelings in oor Van Eemeren en sy metodologieë van Pragma-Dialektiek en Strategiese Maneuvers.

Die ontledingshoofstukke van hierdie proefskrif begin by hoofstuk vyf wat handel oor Kritiese Diskoersanalise en Argumentasieteorie. Hierdie hoofstuk sluit onderafdelings in oor kategorieë van ondersoek, opgevolg deur 'n gedeelte oor „n aantal herhalende tegnieke: die beantwoording van vrae, die verandering van die onderwerp en skrifaaanhalings. 'n Volgende afdeling oor Kritiese Diskoersanalise volg daarop met onderafdelings wat verskil, evaluasie en kennis as 'n gemeenskaplike komponent op die terrein van konteks insluit. Hierop volg „n afdeling oor Strategiese Maneuvers. Laasgenoemde sluit onderafdelings in oor ekonomie, doeltreffendheid en koherensie; realisme en gegrondheid; logiese denkprosesse en pragmatiese gevolgtrekkings; redelikheid versus effektiwiteit; die retoriese perspektief; besprekingstrategieë; dialektiese doelwitte versus retoriese doelwitte en maneuvres van misleiding.

Die finale ontledingshoofstuk, getiteld die *Contra Fortunatum* in konteks, sluit onderafdelings in oor die openingsreëls van die debat, die struktuur van die debat en tematiek daarvan. In die laaste afdelings word die kwessies van die Nebridiese vraagstuk, die oorsprong van boosheid en die vrye wil ingesluit. Die volgende onderafdeling bevat onderwerpe wat nie in die debat behandel word nie: die Manichese mite, Mani en die vroeëre vriendskap tussen Fortunatus en Augustinus. Daarop volg die afdelings oor die Manichese strategie om hierdie godsdiens as Christelike godsdiens voor te stel, die deelnemers se taktiek om verby mekaar te praat asook oor die samestelling van die gehoor en kwessie van die magsverhoudinge tussen die onderskeie rolspelers. Die laaste hoofstuk sluit samevattend af met „n kort bespreking van die kwessie van wie as die wenner van die debat beskou moet word.

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Dedication

To my whole family, without whom this would not have been possible.

Contents

Contents	viii
Chapter 1: Introduction.....	1
1.1 Introduction.....	1
1.2 Research on the <i>Contra Fortunatum</i>	10
1.3 Role players and the religious context.....	11
1.3.1 Fortunatus	11
1.3.2 Augustine	13
1.3.3 The audience.....	15
1.3.4 Catholicism	16
1.3.5 Manichaeism.....	18
1.4 Layout of the study	19
1.5 Conclusion	20
Chapter 2: Augustine and Manichaeism.....	22
2.1 Augustine and Manichaeism	22
2.2 Augustine’s works against the Manichees	31
2.3 Manichaeism.....	37
2.3.1 The spread of Manichaeism	38
2.3.2 The Manichaean mythology	39
2.3.3 The practice of Manichaeism	45
2.4 Conclusion	48
Chapter 3: A Critical Discourse Analysis model for the <i>Contra Fortunatum</i>.....	50
3.1 Introduction.....	50
3.2 M.A.K. Halliday	52
3.3 Norman Fairclough.....	54
3.4 Teun van Dijk.....	62
3.5 Conclusion	65
Chapter 4: An Argumentation Theory model for the <i>Contra Fortunatum</i>.....	66
4.1 Introduction.....	66
4.2 Frans van Eemeren.....	67
4.2.1 The Pragma-Dialectical approach.....	68
4.2.2 Strategic Maneuvering	78
4.3 Conclusion	87
Chapter 5: Argumentation strategies in the <i>Contra Fortunatum</i>	88
5.1 Introduction.....	88

5.2 Categories of enquiry.....	89
5.3 A number of recurring devices.....	89
5.3.1 Answering questions versus not answering questions.....	90
5.3.2 Changing the topic	93
5.3.3 Quoting scripture.....	96
5.4 Critical Discourse Analysis categories	99
5.4.1 Difference.....	100
5.4.2 Evaluation.....	104
5.4.3 Knowledge as a common ground component of contexts.....	108
5.5 Argumentation Theory: Argumentative indicators (standpoints and disputes)....	109
5.6 Strategic Maneuvering	118
5.6.1 Requirements: economy, efficacy and coherence	119
5.6.2 Requirements: realism, wellfoundedness	127
5.6.3 Inferences: logical reasoning process and pragmatic inference	131
5.6.4 Reasonableness versus effectiveness.....	134
5.6.5 Rhetorical perspective	137
5.6.6 Discussion strategy: vertical and horizontal, convergence and coordination.	139
5.6.7 Dialectical aims versus rhetorical aims	144
5.6.8 Deceptive manoeuvring.....	148
5.7 Conclusion	150
Chapter 6: The <i>Contra Fortunatum</i> in context.....	152
6.1 Introduction.....	152
6.2 The opening of the debate	152
6.3 Structure of the debate	156
6.4 The topics of discussion.....	160
6.4.1 The Nebridian conundrum	160
6.4.2 The origin of evil	177
6.4.3 Free will.....	181
6.4.4 The nature of Christ	184
6.5 Topics not mentioned in the debate	188
6.5.1 The Manichaeon myth of creation.....	188
6.5.2 Mani	191
6.5.3 Previous friendship.....	194
6.6 Manichaeism as Christianity.....	195
6.7 Talking past each other	197

6.8 The audience.....	200
6.9 Power	203
6.10 Conclusion.....	207
Chapter 7: Conclusion	210
Bibliography.....	214
Addendum: <i>Contra Fortunatum</i> disputatio.....	226

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Introduction

This study aims to investigate the rhetoric of an author who has been called one of the ancient world's most accomplished and skilled orators and writers by prominent scholars such as Brown and O'Donnell. Augustine of Hippo was a "professor of rhetoric" in Milan, who then converted to Christianity and later became Catholic bishop of Hippo Regius (Kennedy, 1980: 150-151). He has since been canonised and "is one of the four great church teachers of the West (and amongst these probably the most influential)" (Pollmann, 2011). O'Donnell (2005: 324-325) argues that this lofty accreditation came about due to his works regarding the philosophy and defence of Catholicism, whilst Rist (1997: 24) notes that apart from their immense volume, his writings and sermons have been noted for their eloquence and ability to sway their intended audiences.

In order to undertake an investigation of Augustine's powers of persuasion in a specific work, his *Contra Fortunatum*¹ (a debate between Augustine and Fortunatus, a Manichaeian *presbyter* also from Hippo), I will be guided by several separate goals and research questions. The first goal is to use the methodologies of Critical Discourse Analysis and Argumentation Theory to create a hybrid methodology uniquely suited to the *Contra Fortunatum*. The second goal of the study is to utilise the hybrid methodology to analyse the *Contra Fortunatum* in order to uncover the methods that each man uses in order to win over the audience to their point of view.

¹ The latin text that I shall be using is the CAG text in Mayer (2004) unless otherwise stated. For the translation of the text I refer to Teske (2006).

Before I begin to describe the research questions, I will endeavour to give an explanation of the point of departure for this analysis. The starting point for this investigation is the 2011 work of BeDuhn in which the prominent scholar posits the possibility that it was actually Fortunatus who won this debate and not Augustine. This conclusion, which goes against the mainstream view that Augustine won the debate (a view that Augustine held and that was the standard conclusion for the next one and a half millennia), was reached through the work of other scholars who also decided to investigate the debate more deeply, such as Decret, Teske, Alflatt, van Oort and Rutzenhöfer, but who did not quite reach the radical conclusion that BeDuhn did. I will therefore use the work of BeDuhn and the other scholars mentioned as the starting point for my study.

The research questions that I also use to guide this investigation are twofold, the first of which is: can the use of a hybrid methodology of Critical Discourse Analysis and Argumentation Theory lead to new perspectives on aspects of the *Contra Fortunatum*? The second question that I ask is if the hybrid methodology is able to lead the researcher to a definitive answer as to who won the debate and why? This section will now continue with an examination of the reasons why such an investigation into rhetoric and the primary characters of this debate is undertaken.

Murphy (2003: 201) affirms the scholarly consensus that classical (that is: Greek and Roman) rhetoric was not simply the production of a good speech, it was an art that was studied by all Greek and Roman men wishing to pursue a career in politics, or law, and taught by the finest tutors. The training was based on the works of the famous Greeks Demosthenes and Aristotle as well as the great Roman orator Cicero, and, by the time of Augustine, amalgamated into a unitary teaching system by Quintillian (Corbett and Connors, 1999: 495). Corbett and Connors (1999: 495)

also note that the teaching of rhetoric covered a vast array of separate considerations such as invention, style, tone, comedy, metaphor and hyperbole. Most important for my purposes is Habinek's (2005: vii) emphasis on the fact that, classical rhetoric is the result of extensive training and practice with a single purpose: persuasion of the intended audience.

As an exercise in the use of rhetoric in a real world situation, Augustine's *Acta seu disputatio contra Fortunatum Manichaeum* provides scholars with valuable insight into the techniques and strategies used by a trained rhetorician in a public debate. The *Contra Fortunatum* is one of only a few works by Augustine against individual Manichees, the religious sect against whom he devoted more time and effort than any other. Extensive searches have revealed a paucity of research on this particular work; such research also focuses primarily on what was said and not how or why it was said. Investigation of the *Contra Fortunatum* will therefore fill a gap in knowledge as well as contribute towards the renewed discourse, by scholars such as BeDuhn, Coyle and van Oort, on the Manichees and their influence on Augustine's works in general.

According to Walde (2011) and other scholars, the primary aim of classical rhetoric was the gaining and maintenance of power through persuasion. It is feasible that the debate against Fortunatus offers a unique window on the use of rhetoric to achieve power due to it having taken place early in Augustine's career (it took place just a year after he was ordained as a priest in Hippo Regius in 392 BCE), and thus at a time when he was not yet the powerful Catholic bishop that he would later become. O'Donnell (2005: 88-91) particularly emphasizes the view that Augustine used his rhetorical training to effect his considerable ambition for greater power and standing both within Hippo Regius and in the Catholic church as a whole. As Lieu (1985: 154)

points out Augustine was still a young man without fame and authority, eager to prove himself, whilst Fortunatus was an older man with a significant following amongst the population of Hippo. Apart from insights into the methods and strategies used by each man this debate also presents a crucial insight into the ideological battle between the Manichees and Catholicism.

The debate is made more pertinent by its placement within Augustine's lifetime of work. Augustine spent more time writing and preaching against the Manichees than he did against any other group, according to Pollmann (2011). Rist (1997: 321) argues that the primary reason for this stance against the Manichees was not simply due to their alternative view of religion, but because Augustine had been a Manichee for at least nine years and constantly needed to prove himself against perpetual rumours that he was still a Manichee. This debate is thus also an intensely personal matter for Augustine, one which he simply could not afford to be seen, in public, to lose. The record of this event comes from Augustine himself and has been presented, by both scholars and Augustine, as a resounding victory in Augustine's favour.

This finding has recently been countered by BeDuhn, who has conducted in depth analyses of the arguments and their logical implications and come to a radically different conclusion: namely that Fortunatus was the real victor in this debate. BeDuhn (2011), however, has come to this conclusion by using an exposition of what Fortunatus said and, even more importantly, implied in his questions and answers against Augustine. He thus, I believe, misses a crucial aspect of this debate: rhetoric, its effect on the audience and how each man grapples for power within the debate.

This study proposes to make use of two methodologies that do not seem to have been applied to Augustinian studies, namely Critical Discourse Analysis and Argumentation Theory². Critical Discourse Analysis takes analysis further than a simple review of what was said and looks instead at the multitude of factors surrounding the debate (such as the contexts of religion, education and history) and the various rhetorical techniques that lie within each turn³ of speech (politeness, aggression and turn-taking for instance) (Bloor and Bloor, 2003: 103-7). As classical rhetoric is a theory of the production and delivery of persuasive speech, for the purposes of gaining influence over the audience, and Critical Discourse Analysis is a theory that seeks to describe how persuasive speech is able to sway an audience and thus gain power for the speaker, it would seem that these theories form a neat fit with one another.

The methodology of Critical Discourse Analysis was developed in the 1980"s by Fairclough, van Dijk, Wodak and others in order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of discourse events, taking into consideration that such events contain far more information than a simple reading of a transcript thereof would allow. Some of this information, such as pauses, gestures and emphasis, are lost in the case of ancient discourse events like the *Contra Fortunatum*. However, other information such as the construction of the arguments and the overall strategy is still available within the text and it is this evidence that I wish to study. This data may take different forms but is primarily concerned with the gaining and maintenance of power.

² Numerous searches on a wide range of recognised databases support this view.

³ A turn being defined as "an unbroken stretch of speech of indeterminate length produced by a single participant in a verbal interaction" (Bloor and Bloor 2003: 177).

This methodology thus recognises that in a scenario such as this debate the two actors were, probably, not attempting to win over each other to their cause. A cursory reading of the debate creates the impression that both men were intelligent enough to understand that this was unlikely to happen.

Of far greater importance to this debate and the probable reason both men agreed to perform their parts in it may have been the fact that they were trying to influence the audience. Therefore it may be that the goal of the debate was not necessarily to win the argument, but to appear to win the argument. Thus, the relevance of the technical points of the various arguments are not near as important as the impression of having an unassailable position, with victory in the minds of the audience the ultimate goal.

Unfortunately, many aspects of the debate between Augustine and Fortunatus, such as pauses, emphasis, hand gestures and body language were not recorded (all important features of any conversational interactions, which would have added greatly to such an analysis). Instead I will have to rely purely on the text, which in itself is also problematic as it is an edited recording produced by a scribe (the text itself notes the use of scribes in order to record the debate) and at least the possibility of some editing by Augustine exists⁴. Nonetheless, the fact that scholars, such as BeDuhn, Rutzenhöfer, Alflatt and van Oort, generally accept this as a true reflection indicates that whilst we may not have a perfect recording of the event, the transcript is still an object that can be studied by Critical Discourse Analysis.

Of central importance to this study will be the way that each man constructed his arguments both within each turn and across the debate, and for this to be studied,

⁴ See *Retractationes* I, 16 (15), for the way in which this debate was made into a book.

the transcript provides ample information. Critical Discourse Analysis will allow me to concentrate on the following linguistic markers: coherence, topic choice and turn-taking in order to reveal a closer understanding of the effects of the arguments that the two men used. The analysis will consist of several steps: an analysis of semantic macrostructures (topics and macropropositions⁵), analysis of meaning that will focus on forms of implicit and indirect meanings such as allusions, vagueness and implications. Additional steps of analysis will seek to clarify subtle formal structures and context such as suggested by Meyer (2001: 26). These steps will be undertaken at all times with a view to how they might affect power relations and ideology within the discourse.

I shall also be making use of Argumentation Theory as described by van Eemeren (2010) and van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2009, 2007). By focussing on argumentative indicators and, specifically, on strategic manoeuvring in argumentative discourse their theory combines insights into rhetoric that focuses on explaining strategy in discourse. Argumentation Theory thus presents a good complement to Critical Discourse Analysis, which concentrates more on the actual words in the form of semantic markers and how they might be used to gain or maintain power.

An appealing feature of Critical Discourse Analysis is the possibility it offers for revealing power relations. In the *De Doctrina Christiana*, book IV, a manual written by Augustine on the creation of good rhetoric for the use of Catholic priests and bishops, Augustine makes two particular points regarding public debates that revolve around Catholicism, namely that the speaker should always show respect for his

⁵ Macrostructures and macropropositions are defined by van Dijk (2001: 102) as the topics within the text being studied and the summary of the text in the form of a series of propositions, respectively.

elders and that said speaker should also refute, in the most forceful manner any ideas that might be contrary to Catholicism. In the *Contra Fortunatum*, Augustine, to my mind, makes no effort to adhere to the first point, but uses the second to full effect. Critical Discourse Analysis, focussing on stance within the debate and the quest for power over the opponent, would suggest that there are definite reasons for Augustine to act in such a way. In terms of the power relation with Fortunatus, Augustine could not afford to grant the older man any respect because Augustine himself had not yet gained his standing and authority in public; therefore to do so would effectively have granted Fortunatus a more powerful position throughout the debate. As concerns the forceful rebuttals, Augustine never misses a chance to use this tactic to constantly undermine his opponent.

Argumentation Theory particularly facilitates analysis of how each turn of speech relates to the opponent's last turn of speech: does the new speaker acknowledge the opponent's point, dismiss it or even simply ignore it. Augustine's opening sentences in many of his turns of speech on the first day refuse to accept that Fortunatus has answered his question, but states that he, in turn, would gladly answer Fortunatus' questions. Critical Discourse Analysis would suggest that the reason for Augustine's blunt refusal to accept virtually anything his fellow debater says is done in a particularly insidious manner that both undermines his opponent and simultaneously makes Augustine seem magnanimous and rational, thus taking power from Fortunatus and conferring even more power on himself. Thus, while the two methodologies do overlap to an extent, within their focus on discourse, they are ultimately complementary and combine well to provide a fuller understanding of the debate being studied.

No analysis is possible without a thorough review of the context in which this debate took place. Of central importance to this context is the religion of Mani and the way in which its belief system is portrayed within the debate, both by Augustine and Fortunatus. Pearson (2007: 293) points out that as with Christianity, Manichaeism was a recent conception that had managed to gain traction throughout the Roman Empire by the time of Augustine. It is important to take into account Coyle's (2011: 365) emphasis on the fact that Manichaeism accepted large sections of the New Testament and claimed that Jesus "was at the centre of Manichaeism, the saviour par excellence". Mani's religion was also well orchestrated with missionaries, a clear hierarchy and a stirring message that it was the „true“ Christianity, claiming the Messiah and the Paraclete for themselves (BeDuhn, 2010: 26). It is for this same reason that it was viewed by Catholic authorities as being particularly insidious, since it subsumed so much of their own message (Pearson 2007: 312).

The majority of the debate between Fortunatus and Augustine concerns the differing interpretations of the writings of the New Testament, and in particular those of Paul. It is the interplay between their points of contention within the debate that hold so much more than a simple reading of the text extends. Critical Discourse Analysis, combined with Argumentation Theory, invites an examination of the way in which this debate took place, the constructions of the various arguments, the control of the subject and levels of aggression displayed as well as the importance of the verbal counter-attack after a good point is made by the man opposite.

Through this study I shall show how Critical Discourse Analysis and Argumentation Theory may be successfully applied to Augustinian studies as methodologies which are able to reveal crucial, new insights. I will also add to the work done by Manichaean scholars such as Coyle and BeDuhn. Additionally, this study hopes to

generate a greater understanding of the rhetoric of Augustine and his application of it in a real-life situation, in pursuit of gaining power in his early career.

1.2 Research on the *Contra Fortunatum*

A comprehensive overview of the available literature reveals that although there is much written on the subjects of Augustine, Manichaeism and Critical Discourse Analysis, there is a paucity of work on the *Contra Fortunatum* itself. The simplest explanation for the relative paucity of work on this debate is that it has not been deemed by academics as being either a seminal work of Augustine's, or one of relative importance with regard to his other major works. Another factor may be that the sheer volume of Augustine's work leads academics to focus on a select few works rather than the entirety of his writings. Those academics that do mention the debate with Fortunatus tend to do so only in passing, either to group it with the other debates Augustine had with Faustus and Felix or to point out Augustine's towering rhetorical ability and his ease in dispatching his opponents in debate.

The most important works that do in fact address the *Contra Fortunatum* directly amount to only a handful: the works of Coyle, BeDuhn, van Oort, Alflatt and Rutzenhöfer. All of these authors have in the last 40 years contributed to an attempt to rehabilitate Fortunatus, by taking an unbiased view of what Fortunatus actually said in the debate and by analysing it. In this way, several of these authors have come to the controversial conclusion that it may actually have been Fortunatus who won the debate. This is based mainly on the contents of Fortunatus' arguments and the fact that Augustine is noted to have changed his opinion on several highly important subjects after this debate.

1.3 Role players and the religious context

There are just three primary role players within the *Contra Fortunatum*, Augustine and his adversary Fortunatus, as well as the audience in attendance on both days of the debate. In terms of the reason they are there, Possidius in chapter six of his *Vita Sancti Augustini* relates that this debate was held at the behest of the Catholic and Donatist communities in Hippo, who wished for Augustine to have a debate revolving around the Law of the Manichaeism belief system against Fortunatus. The result of this request is the *Contra Fortunatum*, which deals with the differences between Manichaeism and Catholicism. The role of the audience within this debate is therefore an active one that must be taken into account just as Augustine, Fortunatus and the two different belief systems are. I shall begin with a brief overview of the salient points that are appropriate to this debate, first regarding the actors and then the faith systems. The reason for this section is simply to provide the necessary background knowledge in order for the reader to put the different aspects of the dissertation into perspective.

1.3.1 Fortunatus

It is conceivable that the man Fortunatus would be unknown to history if he had not had the debate that this study revolves around with Augustine, as the sheer lack of information that we have on the man suggests. The only other knowledge that modern scholars have about Fortunatus either comes from Augustine himself or from his protégé Possidius.

What we do know about Fortunatus is that he knew Augustine in Carthage when Augustine was still a Manichee (Possidius *Vita* 6). At the time of the debate, so we

are told by Augustine⁶ himself, Fortunatus the Manichee was a *presbyter* in that religion. Possidius (*Vita* 6) recounts that he was a successful and gifted debater that had been effective enough in Hippo Regius to cause both the Catholic and Donatist communities to jointly request that Augustine hold a public debate against him. Apart from this information we know very little other than that Fortunatus was apparently afraid to enter into this organised debate with Augustine because he had already known him, and evidently his rhetorical abilities, in Carthage and as a result feared Augustine (Possidius *Vita* 6). It was the insistence of both the Catholic and Donatist supporters who had called for the debate in the first instance as well as his own supporters that caused Fortunatus to finally agree to the public debate (Possidius *Vita* 6). Brown (2000: 35) makes the important observation that of equal relevance to this discussion is to realise that Manichaeism was technically against the law and labelled as a heresy at this time although the law itself was not wilfully enforced by the authorities. Nonetheless, as Humfrees (2012: 333) points out, this fact forms a very real threat to the Manichees and Fortunatus as the record of a public debate, such as this, was often used as a preliminary stage that lead towards the implicit or explicit threat of legal prosecution. Augustine himself actually states that the debate was recorded by an official *notarius* in the manner of an official judicial proceeding⁷ (Teske, 2006: 143). After the debate, which Possidius records as an emphatic success for Augustine, Fortunatus leaves the city of Hippo Regius and never returns (Possidius *Vita* 6).

The fact that Fortunatus leaves the city for good, should not come as a surprise when we take into account the aim of a public debate or contest (which this discussion most certainly was) was the complete annihilation of one's opponent

⁶ See *Retractationes* I, 16 (15)

⁷ *Retractationes* I, 16 (15)

since the defeat of an opponent could lead to a loss of reputation and the loser was often cast out of the community (Humfrees, 2012: 323, 331). Furthermore, as Humfrees (2012: 331) notes, it was thus not enough for an actor in a public debate to simply spar with his opponent and deftly parry his verbal blows; he had to completely assert his own dominance over his fellow debater.

1.3.2 Augustine

The sheer volume of information that has been written about Augustine, his life and work would suggest that there is little to be gained from a complete overview of Augustine's life⁸. This does not mean that certain important facts about Augustine's life and beliefs up to the time of the debate should not be briefly discussed in order to provide a more balanced view of Augustine in relation to Fortunatus.

This study will continue to highlight just a few of the most salient points and periods in Augustine's life as regards Manichaeism, Catholicism and rhetoric. Augustine was born and brought up in Roman North Africa in the province of Numidia. Born in Thagaste, Augustine was sent to Carthage to complete a good classical education. Despite growing up with a devout Catholic mother, Monnica, in his later adolescence Augustine became disillusioned with the Catholic faith and after reading Cicero he fell in with the supposedly empirical and rational Manichees.

After several years as a teacher of rhetoric in Carthage, Augustine began to have questions about certain aspects of his new faith. It was at this point that he met Faustus, the Manichaean bishop of North Africa, whom Augustine found singularly disappointing and who caused him to begin to question the Manichaean faith system

⁸In addition to the multitude of works on Augustine, I suggest the excellent biographies written by Brown (2000) and O'Donnell (2005), together with BeDuhn's 2010 book (and the forthcoming further two volumes of his planned trilogy) amply cover this subject.

as a whole. From Carthage Augustine then sailed to Rome to take up a teaching post that was organised for him by the Manichees in Carthage. At this stage Augustine did not consider himself a Manichee but he nonetheless still associates with the Manichaean community in Rome and they in turn find him a highly prestigious position as a professor of rhetoric in Milan. At this point in his life Augustine was well on his way to climbing up the social ladder in the Roman bureaucracy.

It was in Milan that Augustine had his crisis of faith and gradually slipped away from the Manichaean community and increasingly came under the influence of another very prominent character from the fourth and fifth century: Ambrose. Ambrose was the bishop in Milan and although Augustine never had the opportunity to have a deep and meaningful conversation with Ambrose in person, what Ambrose said during his sermons in his cathedral had a significant impact on the directionless Augustine. In due course Augustine suddenly gave up his post as professor of rhetoric and moved for a short but highly important period to Cassiciacum along with his mother, son, friends and students, and was baptised by Ambrose.

During this period Augustine decided to devote himself completely to spiritual contemplation and he returned to Africa, to Thagaste, where he stayed and read and wrote. Augustine had converted to Catholicism in Milan, but it was at Cassiciacum that his wholehearted belief in the Catholic system sprung forth. After two years in Thagaste he was gang pressed, by a congregation in church, into becoming a *presbyter* in Hippo Regius whilst visiting there.

It is shortly hereafter that the debate with Fortunatus takes place, but apart from this short history of Augustine it is equally important to point out the role of rhetoric and

debate in his life to this point. Other than the fact that Augustine was trained classically and taught and became a professor of rhetoric, and as such might be logically expected to be an expert in public speeches and debates, it should be noted that he also practiced the art of public debates when he was a Manichee. The Manichees were renowned for their oratorical abilities and their ability to debate very successfully in public against people of any faith, but particularly the Catholics. It is with this important information in mind that we should then view the rhetorical ability that Augustine expresses in this debate as being anything but ordinary. He was a sophisticated debater with a significant advantage over anyone he debated against on any topic, regardless of whether Augustine might have been right or wrong.

Yet another salient point in Augustine's personal history is the hostility and caution that Augustine would have felt from some of his Catholic brethren due to his Manichaean background for a significant period of time. The net result of this perceived caution would have been for Augustine to view any opportunity to prove himself directly against his former colleagues within the Manichaean fold as one to be grasped immediately and with relish. The debate with Fortunatus fitted neatly into this type of opportunity, taking place just a few months after he was made a presbyter.

1.3.3 The audience

It has already been noted above that there is little information on the man Fortunatus, however, there is even less information available on the composition of the crowd that made up the audience of the debate between Augustine and Fortunatus. Relying, once again, on Possidius (*Vita* 6) and Augustine himself in his *Retractationes* (I, 16 (15)), we know that the group that initially called for the debate to take place was both Catholic and Donatist in composition. We also know, through

the same sources, that the Manichees insisted that Fortunatus answer the call to debate against Augustine.

Apart from the mixed composition of the audience on the two days of the debate, we are also aware of the fact that the general public at the time of this debate, enjoyed public disputations as a form of intellectual entertainment (Alflatt, 1974: 123). In particular, they enjoyed debates that revolved around the meanings of the scriptures (Alflatt, 1974, 123). Considering that there were Manichees, Catholics and Donatists in the audience, it is important to note that all followers held the scriptures as sacrosanct, whether they just be parts of the New Testament in the case of the Manichees, or the whole Bible for the Catholics and Donatists (Alflatt, 1974: 123).

The importance of the audience in this debate has, in my opinion, been the most overlooked aspect of the scholarship regarding the *Contra Fortunatum*. As is made explicit in this dissertation, the strategies and tactics used by both men throughout the debate indicate that the sole focus of this dispute was the audience and everything that was said by both men was purely for their benefit. The chapter will now continue to give a brief overview of the two belief systems that form the central core of the debate and the differences between them.

1.3.4 Catholicism

The field of religion and how a researcher might be able to ascertain which version, Catholic or Manichaeism, might be the true Christianity is of fundamental importance to this study, both in terms of the topics under investigation and regarding the context necessary to understand why this debate occurred in the first place. As a result of this need to provide a brief basis of knowledge for the reader, I shall give brief introductions to both Catholicism and Manichaeism. At the point in time of the

debate Catholicism was far from being the primary driver of Christianity that it is in modern times. It was at this time a relatively new faith that faced rivals both from outside of Christianity and, more importantly, from within. Despite Catholicism being made the religion of state of the Roman Empire and being afforded legal protection from heresy, though not always enforced, it faced attack from numerous other belief systems that termed themselves Christian, such as the Manichees, the Donatists and just a few years later, the Pelagians and the Arians.

These heresies and/or schisms as Augustine termed them became the three most important battles that Augustine fought over his long career. They collectively represent the vast majority of his oeuvre of works. The term Catholic means universal and gives an indication as to why Augustine fought so hard and tirelessly against heresy and schism; Augustine believed that only through Catholicism could a Christian achieve salvation and by spreading their versions of Christianity these other faiths were denying themselves and their followers salvation (Evans, 1999: 150).

Whereas the Pelagians and Arians differed with Catholicism in terms of Biblical interpretation, the Manichees had a fundamentally different view of scripture. The Manichees totally disregarded the Old Testament as well as a number of the New Testament books, focussing primarily on the works of Paul. This difference is quite apart from their creation myth which is entirely different to anything Biblical as the second chapter of this study explains. The chapter will now continue with a brief explanation of the religion of Manichaeism.

1.3.5 Manichaeism

What follows will only be a very short introduction to the religion of Mani, since the majority of chapter two is involved with a wide description of the Manichaean faith and its creation story (a fundamental part of the belief that directly relates to other spheres of Manichaean life such as their diet and hierarchy). At the time of the debate between Augustine and Fortunatus, the Manichaean religion had only been in existence for a relatively short period (Mani only created the faith in the previous century), but had been remarkably successful in spreading from its original base in Persia.

Manichaeism was created by Mani as a Judeo-Christian belief system, with numerous sacred books that included Mani as a central „Jesus“ figure. Importantly for this investigation, the faith was also highly adaptable and appropriated the prophets and texts of local, established religions which helped it to spread rapidly. In the Roman Empire, Manichaeism found a solid footing in North Africa through the appropriation of those sections of the Bible that they agreed with (primarily the books of Paul, and a few other New Testament books). A result of this strategy was that the Manichees viewed and spread their religion in Roman North Africa as the true Christianity (Pearson, 2007: 309). This insistence, combined with their highly effective missionary work (often through public debates) brought them into conflict with the Catholics and other Christianities to the extent that two Roman Emperors issued edicts against the Manichees, trying to ban them through increasingly severe punishments. The final part of this introduction provides an explanation of the plan of the study and the placing of its various parts.

1.4 Layout of the study

The study consists of five primary chapters, the first three of which deal with background information that is necessary to both analyse and understand the gist of the various arguments that the two primary actors in this debate pose. The first of these primary chapters entails an exposition of Augustine and his Manichaean past as well as a brief introduction to Manichaeism and the topics of the debate. The second of these chapters gives an exposition of the field of Critical Discourse Analysis, its history, the primary figures that helped to develop the theory and their various methods, and finally those pertinent methods that I will be using to explore this debate. Following very similar lines to the Critical Discourse Analysis chapter that on Argumentation Theory chapter deals with Frans van Eemeren and his work on the analysis of arguments.

Chapters five and six together aim to provide an in depth analysis of the debate between Fortunatus and Augustine, illuminating those aspects that come to the fore when it is viewed through the lens of the hybrid terminology devised in chapters three and four. Whilst the fifth chapter is structured according to the categories of study that are laid out by Critical Discourse Analysis, Argumentation Theory and Strategic Maneuvering, the sixth chapter represents a thematic investigation of the *Contra Fortunatum* that focuses on the primary themes of discussion in the debate and other important features that become apparent through a thorough reading of the debate within its historical and religious context. Yet, also the insights represented in this thematic investigation are to an important extent moulded by the perspectives emerging from the chosen methodology.

The aim of the sixth chapter is to complement the more rigid analysis and categories of chapter five which are dictated by the various methodologies being used in conjunction with each other. One of the central concerns of each of these methodologies is to reveal the context within which the debate takes place and its various contextual dimensions. Methodologically I have found it easier to examine these contexts in chapter six. Here I focus on how the various contexts influence and coordinate with one another to determine the whole of the strategy that each man is trying to implement.

The chapter deals with the most important topics of discussion within the debate and investigates both how the topics fits into the debate, where it occurs in the debate, what the background to the topic is and which man takes the greatest advantage of the topic potential. I also discuss how Augustine's views on some subjects seem to have changed over time possibly also as a direct result of the confrontation with Manichaeism of which this debate represents one specific instance. In this manner it may be possible to illuminate the true impact that this argument had on one of the most influential minds in Catholicism through to the current age.

This chapter ends the discussion of the debate and leads to the final chapter in the form of the conclusion, which recapitulates the outcomes of this study according to the goals and research questions set out at the beginning of the dissertation. The final part of this introduction is now to conclude with a short restatement of the goals, point of departure and research questions.

1.5 Conclusion

As stated above, the first goal of the dissertation is to distil a hybrid methodology from the Critical Discourse Analysis and Argumentation Theory methodologies in

chapters three and four. This happens after the establishment of a background information basis for the analysis in chapter two. The second goal of the study is to utilise the hybrid methodology to analyse the *Contra Fortunatum* in order to reveal as much about the tactics and techniques used by each man to win the debate.

Using BeDuhn's 2011 work, *Did Augustine Win His Debate with Fortunatus?*, as my point of departure along with the works of Rutzenhöfer, Alflatt, Decret, Teske, van Oort and other Augustinian and Manichaean scholars, I shall endeavour to analyse the debate using the hybrid methodology. The rest of the information necessary for the departure point of this analysis is presented in chapter two in order to gain as full an understanding of the debate as possible.

The research questions that I have used to guide me through this study are the following: Which new perspectives on the *Contra Fortunatum* debate may emerge from using a hybrid methodology of Critical Discourse Analysis and Argumentation Theory? And: Does the use of the hybrid methodology lead to a conclusion as to who won this debate?

Chapter 2: Augustine and Manichaeism

This second chapter is designed to act as a background chapter that aims to provide perspective on and contextual information for the analysis section of this study in chapters five and six. It seeks to provide the Critical Discourse Analysis and Argumentation Theory hybrid methodology with the requisite context.

I begin with a section on Augustine and his relationship with Manichaeism, which is intended to provide the background information relevant to the analysis of the debate. The second section discusses the placement of the *Contra Fortunatum* in both Augustine's oeuvre of anti-Manichaean works and in terms of his career as a Catholic priest and, later, bishop in Hippo Regius. The third stage of this chapter entails a brief overview of Manichaeism, its spread through the Roman Empire and the salient elements of the Manichaean creation myth. I end this section with a quick look at several important topics that are discussed in the *Contra Fortunatum*.

2.1 Augustine and Manichaeism

Augustine himself claims that he was a Manichee for a total of nine years from the age of 19 to 27, during which he held the position of Hearer⁹ and ardently supported and promoted his new faith both to friends and the Carthaginian community at large¹⁰. The question that I wish to answer in this section of the chapter is why Augustine was attracted to the Manichees in the first instance and what caused him to leave his faith and return to Catholicism.

Brown (2000: 38) argues that Manichaeism initially appealed to Augustine on an intellectual level by not requiring blind faith in authority as other religions. Instead it

⁹ A position within the Manichaean community that will be discussed and explained later in this chapter.

¹⁰ See Ferrari (1975) for a concise description of Augustine's time as a Manichee and van Oort (1996) for an extensive study of Augustine's connection to Manichaeism.

proposed that a potential convert view the evidence for their faith first in order to see the proof of their religion. In this way I posit that they were able to persuade many intelligent sceptics to join their fold. The idea was that if the proof of one aspect of the faith was tangible then surely the rest of the system is likely to be true as well. This proof lay in the movements of the sun and the waxing and waning of the moon, which shall be discussed in 2.3.2.

The primary reason, though, that Augustine joined the Manichees was because they answered a key philosophical question that he had been wrestling with: *unde malum?* Whence does evil come from? Manichaeism's dualism neatly deals with this problem by apportioning the blame for the existence of evil squarely on the entity called Darkness, thus relieving God from any dealings with evil. The Manichaean system also deftly deals with the reason why people sin: it is the fact that all humans are made up of Light and Darkness and thus sometimes our Dark nature prevails and we sin (Brown, 2000: 36). In this way, humans are completely absolved of sin, since they cannot be expected to be in control of the Darkness at all times. It was this purely rational and logical explanation that would have had great appeal to both Augustine and other questioning converts; the whole system made sense and answered one of the most important questions asked of religion by philosophy.

Coyle (1978: 53-54) points out how at its base, there are just a few fundamentally important features of Manichaeism that account for its success and spread throughout the Roman Empire and beyond: it was a simple system that required only that which the follower was willing to offer, it offered a profoundly simple explanation for the existence of evil through radical dualism. It also offered the supreme prophet of God in the form of its founder, Mani, and was malleable enough to adapt itself in local situations and to incorporate aspects of other faiths. Brown (2000: 37) also

notes another very important aspect that would have appealed to those potential followers with an intellectual bent: Manichaean missionaries were noted as being very astute and successful public debaters against representatives of other religions.

Therefore, at its core, the Manichaean religion was a simple concept that was attainable and attractive to all whilst being malleable enough to tailor its message to adapt to local conditions. It is thus little wonder that once exposed to it Augustine became a convert in a very short space of time. Having detailed the reasons for Augustine's attraction to this religion, I shall now proceed with a short exposition of the reasons for Augustine falling out of Manichaeism, a process that he documented in his *Confessions*.

Augustine's doubts about Manichaeism began with his continued interest in philosophy, and in particular the works of astrologers and astronomers¹¹. He became aware of the fact that these men who studied the movements of the planets were able to accurately predict events such as lunar and solar eclipses years in advance (Brown, 2000: 47). Not only could they predict the event, but they could describe exactly the time and date of each event as well as whether the eclipse would be partial or full and the duration of the event. Ferrari (1977: 243) describes how Augustine lived through several solar eclipses and was informed about their occurrence before each event by the philosopher astronomers and thus knew of the accuracy of the predictions first-hand. He also knew that these predictions were based on simple mathematical models and not divine inspiration.

The problem posed by these accurate predictions for Augustine the Manichee was that he had been taught that the sun and the moon were holy Light vessels whose

¹¹ See Lee (1999: 5) for a concise account of Augustine's confrontation with astronomy, or Ferrari (1977) for a fuller account.

movements were certainly not ruled by mathematical formulae (Ferrari, 1977: 243). Lee (1999: 11) notes that Augustine obviously expressed some of his doubts regarding this problem to fellow members of the sect because we know that members told him to speak to the bishop of the area, Faustus, who would address all his doubts.

BeDuhn, Coyle, Brown, Lee and, indeed, every other scholar of Augustine and his Manichaean life whom I have read describe the meeting with Faustus as the point at which Augustine's faith in the Manichaean system first floundered. Lee (1999: 11) describes how this was brought about by Faustus refusing to even attempt to give Augustine an answer to his astronomical problem and instead telling Augustine that he viewed the Manichaean myth of creation as allegory; this despite the fact that Mani expressly stated that the myth was to be read and believed literally.

Lancel (2002: 55) points out how in Augustine's later writings he would have to admit that Faustus the man had impressed him. But, Lancel (2002: 55) argues, what Augustine needed in his time of crisis of faith was an intellectual who could unravel and unpack Augustine's astronomical problem and explain how the Manichaean principles were not undone or disproved by this problem, and Faustus was not an intellectual, at least not by Augustine's standards. BeDuhn (2010: 108) explains convincingly how through this and numerous subsequent meetings it would become apparent to Augustine that promotion within the Manichaean community was not necessarily a function of how well one knew and practiced the system, but often seemingly because of eloquence, looks and a variety of other similarly unrelated factors.

Faustus was a sceptic who believed in practice and action over dogmatic belief. As a result, as BeDuhn (2010: 117) points out, his view of religion was one in which an adherent should follow the rules and live as the religion demanded rather than simply believe and not follow the precepts of that religion. Coyle (1999c: 356) recounts how one consequence of this was Faustus' argument with Catholic Christians who technically followed the belief of both the New and Old Testaments yet did not follow the rules of the latter, thus, in Faustus' mind, obviating the requirements that belief in that Testament laid out¹². For him it was therefore a betrayal of your own religion to do so; as a result he had respect only for the Jews and Jewish Christians who at least followed the laws of the Old Testament (Coyle, 1999c: 356). This cynicism on the part of Faustus can be traced to his readings of Cicero and some of the Greek philosophers such as Plato and the New Academy (BeDuhn, 2010: 112).

It is this Academic scepticism that BeDuhn (2010: 129) argues helps to explain Faustus' response to Augustine regarding the movements of the sun and the moon, because he argued that the answer to such a problem was not only unimportant, but should also be irrelevant to one's faith since only actions were important. As a result Faustus did just this; he refused to answer the question and also refused to even discuss it (BeDuhn, 2010: 129). Augustine points to this very moment as the one that he stopped being a Manichee¹³. Interestingly though, as BeDuhn (2010: 130) points out, for as much as he may have stopped believing, he remained a member of the Manichaean community for the next three years in both Carthage and Rome.

In the year after he fled Carthage, Augustine lived within the Manichaean community at Rome and continued to teach. Yet, as BeDuhn (2010: 166) points out, the seeds

¹² This is a fundamental part of the debate between Augustine and Fortunatus, and manifests in the scriptural exegesis that each man espouses. It is discussed in 6.3.3.

¹³ *Confessions* V, vii, 12.

of his personal doubt must have continued to grow because when the same community procured him a job as professor of rhetoric in Milan, he left the Manichees in his new city within a matter of months of getting there. BeDuhn (2010: 143) notes that increasingly, from his later period in Carthage to his time in Rome and Milan, Augustine's Manichaeic interests were subordinated to more personal goals that took into account the ambitions of his rhetorical career and his intellectual pursuits. Interestingly, BeDuhn also alludes to the possibility that Augustine's time in Rome showed an even more committed period of Manichaeic involvement than in Carthage, but that this may have had more to do with the fact that the Manichaeans in Rome comprised his entire support group and, possibly, all his friends in that city (2010: 145).

Of even greater importance is the fact that, during his period in Rome, Augustine had not relinquished his dualist conception of the world¹⁴ and had actually begun to view his religion in much the same way as Faustus did in that he maintained a sceptical outlook on certain details of the scriptures, but kept faith in the correctness of the system as a whole¹⁵. Once again, it needs to be stated that Augustine's conversion from Manichaeism to Catholicism was not a simple path.

This Faustian Manichaeism experiment in Rome on the part of Augustine did not last the period of his stay in Rome. Ultimately, as BeDuhn (2010: 144) argues, Augustine could not merge Faustus' contention that action was the only true measure of worth with his own views that thought was the most important gauge of selfhood. Being Augustine, it would not surprise me at all if this was correct, especially considering

¹⁴ See *Confessions* book 5.

¹⁵ See BeDuhn (2010) page 145 for a more comprehensive breakdown of the specifics of what Augustine continued to believe and not believe in the Manichaeic system, distilled from the *Confessions* book 5. Also see BeDuhn's article (2013) on Augustine between Manichaeism and Catholicism.

Augustine's measure of personal self-worth based to a large extent on his own intellect¹⁶. The move to Milan, engineered by his fellow Manichees in Rome, thus must have seemed to Augustine to be an opportunity to leave behind the Manichees and to sort out his own beliefs in his own manner and time.

It is important to note, however, that a lack of conviction was certainly not the only reason for Augustine to cease being a practising Manichee. Having secured a very important and prominent position within Milan, Augustine realised that belonging to an illegal sect was, as BeDuhn (2010: 145) rightly points out, simply a dangerous position to put oneself and one's family and friends in¹⁷. This is probably the reason why he stopped being an active participant in the Manichee community in Milan within a few months of taking up the position, even though he held on to a number of Manichaeian ideals (BeDuhn, 2010: 145).

For Augustine his period in Milan revolved around two important figures in his theological development: Plotinus and Ambrose. Plotinus was a third century philosopher who had continued to develop the work and ideas of Plato; as a result his philosophy was called Neo-platonism and at the time that Augustine was in Milan it was the latest fashion amongst the city's intelligentsia (BeDuhn, 2010: 165). Brown (2000: 71-76) reminds us that Ambrose, the current bishop of the Catholic Church in Milan at the time that Augustine was there, probably included many features in his services that Augustine was unfamiliar with from his time amongst the Catholics in North Africa.

¹⁶ While this may be a personal judgement on my part, I believe that Augustine's subsequent actions in terms of his book writing, speeches and debates are areas in which Augustine delights in showing off his intellectual prowess. It is something that he recognised in himself and took pride in exhibiting to all.

¹⁷ Along with his new position, Augustine found himself to be the primary breadwinner for his family, who joined him in Milan along with some friends and pupils.

There was one fact, though, that rendered Augustine more likely to readily absorb the lessons of Plotinus and Ambrose and that was because many of their ideas and concepts would have resonated strongly with all Manichaeans¹⁸. They constantly referred to the dualism of the body and soul, and that the soul could not serve evil unless it was under the influence of matter in the form of a body; matter thus was responsible for the darkening effect on the soul, all of which would have been very familiar to Augustine and any other Manichee¹⁹ (Brown, 2000: 79-92). Thus, as BeDuhn (2010: 172) notes, the speeches of Ambrose and the books of the Neoplatonists would have made sense to Augustine and eased the transition to Nicene Christianity. Of these two sources of inspiration, though, it was the written works of Plotinus and the Platonists that had the lasting influence over Augustine²⁰.

It was at this point that Augustine decided to rejoin the Catholic Church as a catechumen, the same position he held before becoming a Manichee. But it is important to note that the transition from Manichaeism to Catholicism is not a sudden change, but a very gradual movement that takes years to finally reach its climax in Cassiciacum (Brown, 2000: 108-120). Yet, it was not simply the fact that the message was vaguely familiar that drew Augustine to Catholicism. It was the unique intellectual atmosphere in Milan during that period that inspired Augustine, as BeDuhn (2010: 187) describes:

It was primarily to the degree that Milanese Christianity involved a credible engagement with the philosophical world that Augustine prized, I suggest,

¹⁸ See Brown's chapter on the work of the Platonists and their impact on Ambrose (2010: 69-92).

¹⁹ It is also pointed out by BeDuhn (2010: 173) and others that there are a number of common reference points with which each group agrees such as the source of the soul and that the reason for life was to subjugate the emotions and passions of the body so that the soul could be untangled from matter.

²⁰ BeDuhn (2010: 172) suggests the reason for this is that reading physical works made them far easier to analyse than listening to speeches delivered by Ambrose.

that it held appeal for him and gained his attention. Through the sermons of Ambrose, personal contact with men such as Simplicianus and Manlius Theodorus, and any number of books circulating in Milan, such as those of Marius Victorinus and Celsinus, Augustine encountered a tradition of philosophical theology and philosophically oriented allegorical biblical interpretation that derived from Basil of Caesarea, Origen, and ultimately Philo of Alexandria.

The single most important feature of the passage just quoted, in my opinion, is the concept of philosophical theology and the philosophically oriented interpretation of the bible. Brown (2000: 104) argues forcefully that these were the sparks that were able to both ignite Augustine's intellect and offer the opportunity for nigh unlimited intellectual growth. It would be Augustine's continued intellectual grappling that would lead to him becoming a leading member of the Catholic Church, as he was increasingly able to make sense of the bible and the concepts of the Catholic religion.

It was in Milan that Augustine was to be baptised by Ambrose himself, but it remains important to remember that even at this point Manichaeism still exerted an influence over him. This impact was not necessarily religious, but more to do with the respect and genuine friendships he had encountered and fostered within the Manichaean community. Augustine himself describes the final break with regards to his Manichaean sympathies at some time after his baptism when he heard about the

failed experiment in communal living amongst the Elect²¹, that had started whilst Augustine was still a, somewhat sceptical, Manichee (BeDuhn, 2010: 188-190).

It is from this moment on that I contend (based on the grounds of disappointment with his former fellow Manichees and his new enthusiasm for Catholicism) that Augustine be considered an unquestioningly faithful adherent of the Catholic Church. It is also from this point that the anti-Manichaean writings of Augustine begin to be produced within a couple of years of Augustine arriving in Hippo Regius and being appointed a priest. I will now move on to a section dealing with the anti-Manichaean works of Augustine and the place of the *Contra Fortunatum* amongst them.

2.2 Augustine's works against the Manichees

The *Contra Fortunatum* has a place amongst the earliest of Augustine's anti-Manichaean works, preceded only by the *De moribus ecclesiae Catholicae*, the *De moribus Manichaeorum* and *De Genesi adversus Manicheos*, which were written before Augustine was ordained as a priest in Hippo Regius. It is important to note that according to a number of scholars such as Coyle (1999a: 40) that it is entirely possible to view all of Augustine's works as being to some extent anti-Manichaean. However in this short section I shall refer only to those works that are of direct relevance to this analysis either in terms of their contextual relation to the *Contra Fortunatum* or through their contents, which may have a direct bearing on the topics under discussion in the debate between Fortunatus and Augustine.

²¹ BeDuhn (2010: 188-190) writes about how this experiment in communal living was instigated by a very influential and wealthy Auditor in Rome, named Constantius, who had decided to fund this experiment himself whereby the Elect who chose to could all live under his roof with everything they needed provided by him. It would seem that he intended to make the system of itinerancy that was a feature of the Manichaean system more noble. Constantius laid down a number of strict rules that were all in keeping with being an Elect, but the communal members found themselves unable to live by these rules and when they confronted Constantius about changing them, he refused. The experiment then fell apart as all the Elect left amidst a cloud of vile rumours about their conduct (BeDuhn, 2010: 188-190).

The first set of Augustine's works that I will discuss in this section is those that fit into the broad category of debates against Manichees. There are three works of significance in this grouping: the *Contra Fortunatum*, the *Contra Faustum* and the *Contra Felicem*. All three are presented as debates that physically took place against Manichees. The reason that I mention the fact that they are presented as such is because the longest work, the *Contra Faustum*, is not actually a public debate.

The first of these works is the public dispute that is the focus of this study, the *Contra Fortunatum*. The *Acta Contra Fortunatum Manicheum*, to give its full title, is a transcript of a public debate that took place on 28 and 29 August 392, between Augustine, at this time a *presbyter*, and Fortunatus, a Manichaeon. Throughout the course of the debate Augustine uses all his rhetorical ability, much practised whilst he was a Manichee, to put Fortunatus on the back foot and keep him there. He does so immediately making the Manichaeon religion the main subject of the debate. This is a crucial reversal of the tactic that the Manichees had much success in using in other public debates, in particular with Christians as Pearson (2007: 307-308) points out: the Manichaeans had more experience in criticizing others than in defending their own system.

On the first day of the debate Augustine focusses primarily on the issue of the corruptibility of God and the Manichaeon myth of the origin of the world and its implications in their theology. The second day's discussion revolves around the question of the source of evil and ends, I contend, without a clear winner or resolution. Coyle, though, reflects the traditional view that Augustine clearly won this debate (1999e: 371).

The *Contra Faustum Manicheum* takes the form of a substantial book that was written by Augustine between 398 and 400 as a response to a book written by his former leader that Decret (1970: 62-64) posits was quite possibly directed in turn at Augustine himself²². In Faustus' book, as Coyle (1999c: 355-356) notes, "the procedure followed in each *capitulum* is to first present Catholic objections regarding some point of Manichaean doctrine, then to offer a defence". In this way Faustus is able to avoid referring to any Manichaean documents and is able to attack the Old Testament using scripture that the Christians would recognise; the aim being to show how Manichaeism was the true Christianity²³.

The reply that Augustine wrote was to be his longest anti-Manichaean work and was written in much the same way as Faustus' book: he quotes excerpts from Faustus' book and then writes a response. Augustine purposely wrote it out in the form of a debate, which I believe is disingenuous on his part since Faustus does not have the ability to reply directly to that response²⁴. In this way Augustine also implies that he was able to win every point of the debate. The primary points of his response were the unity of the Old and New Testaments and that Jesus was human and divine, mixed with these points were attacks on the Manichaean system and their supposedly, absurd beliefs (Coyle, 1999c: 356). Apart from the point of absurd beliefs, these topics (unity of the Bible, the nature of Jesus and his references to the soul and the omnipotence of God) form much of the basis of topics that are discussed in the *Contra Fortunatum*.

²² It is in fact cryptically addressed to a former Manichee turned Catholic, without giving a name.

²³ This use of scripture forms a central part of the debate between Fortunatus and Augustine and will be dealt with in its own section of chapter six: 6.3.3.

²⁴ This is a clear illustration of the difference in presentational device described in chapters three and four: a book entry cannot be equated with a response in a debate.

Like the *Contra Fortunatum*, the *Contra Felicem Manicheum* is the record of a debate that took place between Felix, a Manichaean Elect, and Augustine in 414 over two days: 7 and 12 December. As Coyle (1999d: 358) points out, the debate had been sought by Felix as he was being persecuted as a Manichee²⁵. The debate itself did not proceed smoothly on the first day and ended with Felix claiming that he needed time to consider the accusations that Augustine had made against the Manichaean system. On the second day of the debate (a few days later) Augustine confronts Felix with the problems of sin and free will, the nature of God and the incarnation of Christ, just as in the debate with Fortunatus. However, Felix evidently refuses to cooperate and debate the matters at hand; this continues to such an extent that the exasperated Augustine ultimately gets to the point where he threatens to condemn Felix, an action which Coyle (1999d: 358) points out has very significant legal consequences. Finally, in order to avoid any further persecution, Felix signs a document renouncing Manichaeism (Coyle, 1999d: 358). The *Contra Felicem* therefore does not have a large amount of relevant information in terms of the argument for Manichaeism, but it does still display the manner in which Augustine debates and the points that he feels are the most relevant to such a discussion.

I will now briefly give an overview of those anti-Manichaean works of Augustine that also deal with topics discussed explicitly in the *Contra Fortunatum*. *De moribus Manicheorum* deals mainly, as Coyle (1999e: 571) points out, with the nature of evil and the supreme goodness of an uncontaminable God. Augustine continues with an attack on the „three seals“ of the Manichees moral behaviour. He concludes this book with an assault on the ascetic principles of the Manichees and how they lead to

²⁵ Felix's books had been confiscated and were to be burnt. If he proved problematic the law provided for Felix to be burnt with his books, so he approached the mayor and asked to discuss the contents of the books with Augustine in order to prove that they contained nothing worthy of damnation (Coyle, 1999d: 358).

moral corruption and decadence; he also describes immoral behaviour that he has become aware of amongst the ascetic Elect (Coyle, 1999e: 571).

It is important to note this final point because it is disputed by Fortunatus in the *Contra Fortunatum* and Augustine has to concede that this is untrue as far as he knows. In later writings Augustine will, though, continue to perpetuate these rumours as fact and evidence of the corruption of the Elect²⁶ as Coyle (1999e: 571) points out.

From around the same timeframe as the debate with Fortunatus, *De duabus animabus* has been dated to between 392 and 393²⁷ by Coyle (1999b: 287). The theme of this work is exactly as the title describes, the two souls, and Augustine wrote this as a work specifically against the Manichaean concept of the soul, which is Light, and the body, which is Darkness²⁸. Coyle (1999b: 287-288) criticises the incorrect manner in which Augustine refers to the two souls, which he contends is not technically accurate. I would contend that Augustine is simply using allegory in order to describe the situation. Regardless, the issues at hand in this text revolve around the nature of evil and its twin: the good soul, with decisions that are based simply on which „soul“ is in the ascendance at that particular point in time. As has been pointed out before, this belief of the Manichees conveniently deals with the issue of “moral responsibility” for evil actions of any type: there is thus no such thing as blame or merit since the matter is conveniently out of one’s control (Coyle, 1999b: 288). The prime issue that Augustine criticises is the idea of “evil as a positive reality” (Coyle, 1999b: 288). Augustine’s argument continues that if God is the good

²⁶ Augustine perpetuates these accusations in *De natura boni* 45 and 47, as well as *De haeresibus* 46 (Coyle, 1999f:571).

²⁷ Coyle describes an even wider timespan, between 391 and 395.

²⁸ The issue of the soul and its nature and origin form a lesser part of the debate between Fortunatus and Augustine and is therefore dealt with in two sections on the Nebridian conundrum and free will.

soul, but does not always win over each decision made by man then God by definition must be vulnerable and changeable²⁹.

De Natura Boni is the title of the final work I shall discuss in this section of Augustine's anti-Manichaean works. The *Nature of the Good* concerns good not as a philosophical construct but good as God: the Supreme Good. As Coyle (1999h: 581) points out virtually every point of issue therein has been written before in other books, primarily those already mentioned in this section. I believe it makes sense to regard this book as a distillation of Augustine's musings regarding the subject and offering the reader a single source for all of Augustine's thoughts on the topic.

God is thus the source of all good and all good beings and creatures³⁰. Augustine, in direct opposition to Manichaean belief, insists that there is a fundamental difference between that which is created and its creator (Coyle, 1999h: 581). Therefore rational creatures may be corrupted by sin but maintain their innate goodness (Coyle, 1999h: 581). Finally, according to Coyle (1999h: 581), Augustine ends the work with two more topics: a rebuttal of the Manichaean system of dualism and a continued attack on moral degeneracy within the Manichaean community.

Augustine's time within the Manichaean community would go on to shape much of his life and thought. It is also important to note that Augustine's nine (or twelve) years as a Manichee were happy ones where he felt a part of a community of fellow believers and excelled at the rhetoric that some practitioners had become famous for. The system itself was one that made sense, at least initially, and followed the

²⁹ This is much the same conclusion as that which flows from the Nebridian conundrum discussed in section 6.4 of chapter five.

³⁰ This is a point on which the Manichee Fortunatus will agree, yet he will question where all the evil comes from if God as conceived by the Catholics is the creator of all.

principles of Cicero towards *ratio* and that scepticism should precede belief, both ideas that Augustine valued highly.

The anti-Manichaean works of Augustine also provide crucial context since many of the problems and arguments addressed in them are also fundamentally important in the debate with Fortunatus. They may thus prove to be a yardstick for the style and manner in which Augustine goes about arguing particular points of difference even though it should be noted that argumentation in writing has a different form to that in verbal argumentation.

In the following section of this chapter (2.3) I discuss the Manichaean creation myth, which, although fairly convoluted, was able at once to deal with several major philosophical problems as well as provide a blueprint for how to go about living as a believer in the system. It was also flexible enough to incorporate aspects of various local religions thus making it potentially appealing to new converts since it was familiar (Pearson, 2007: 309). This mythology also provides foundation for the contested arena within which the debate between Fortunatus and Augustine takes place and is thus of crucial importance to the rest of this study.

2.3 Manichaeism

The tenets of the religion of Mani form the arena in which the debate between Augustine and Fortunatus took place; it was the religion which Fortunatus defended against the long-time, former adherent Augustine³¹. It is important to note that Manichaeism was viewed by its followers not as an alternative to Christianity, but, as Pearson (2007: 309) writes, the true way to follow Christ³².

³¹ See Mikkelsen (1997) for a thorough bibliography of Manichaean works up to 1996.

³² This aspect is discussed more comprehensively in chapter six (6.9).

2.3.1 The spread of Manichaeism

Specifically Manichaean missionary activities, including their debating practices, form an important part of the framework within which the *Contra Fortunatum* may be read. Although Manichaeism spread rapidly across Asia, Africa and Europe, in this section I focus primarily on the spread of Manichaeism in the Roman Empire. Within a very short span of time Manichaeism was able to establish itself as a viable religion within the Empire³³. Indeed, by using the trade routes, missionaries had entered Egypt in the 260's (within Mani's own lifetime) and had expanded their follower base to such an extent that, as Pearson (2007: 311-312) notes, by 302 the Emperor Diocletian had issued an edict against them and declared them the Persian threat³⁴.

The missionaries were well organised, being followed by scribes and Hearers that would tend to their needs, and their strategy of missionary work was conscious and active (Gibb and Montgomery, 1927: xxii)³⁵. Often skilled debaters, the missionaries would confront members of other Christian denominations and point out inconsistencies between the Old Testament and the New Testament (Pearson, 2007: 308-309). With the large majority of Christians within the Empire at that time being Gentiles, many were amenable to this line of argument as the Manichaean missionaries constantly repeated the message that they were in fact the true Christianity and that Catholics were merely semi-Christians. In this way they were able to convert many new members to their faith without much difficulty as the Gentile Christians may have viewed this as a transition to a purer form of Christianity and not as conversion (Pearson, 2007: 309).

³³ For a full exposition of how Manichaeism was spread through the Roman Empire see Brown (1969) and Tardieu (1981).

³⁴ For an interesting reading of how Augustine felt about the state's role in heresies see Smither (2006).

³⁵ See Mikkelsen (2011) for Augustine's reaction to the ability of the Manichees to gain new members.

In reading the *Contra Fortunatum* it is also important to note the point emphasised by BeDuhn and Pearson namely that the missionaries did not readily reveal much about their own mythology in the course of their work. Pearson (2007: 309) points out how in the Eastern Mediterranean missionaries tried to demonstrate that their faith could be equated with the work of Plato and other philosophers. Thus Pearson (2007: 309) argues convincingly that Manichaeism could be said to be all things to all people.

Yet the followers of this new religion were often treated with suspicion and aggression wherever they moved. The advent of Christianity as the state religion under Constantine did not slow the persecution either. The first of the edicts to be conveyed against the Manichaeans under Christian rule was decreed in 372 by Valentinian and the next by Theodosius in 381 (Pearson, 2007: 313). These edicts are pertinent to the analysis of the debate between Augustine and Fortunatus since the Manichees were to be officially persecuted. Although this had not happened to Fortunatus, the threat of an official proclamation being made against the Manichee using the transcription of the debate, which Augustine expressly orchestrated for just such a possibility, as evidence could damn him. Pearson (2007: 313) describes how in such decrees Manichees were relieved of their houses, the right to live under the protection of Roman law and the right to bequeath property. Later edicts were to simply allow the death penalty for being a Manichee. As a result, by the sixth century Manichaeism as a viable religion in the Roman Empire had been wiped out (Coyle, 1999f: 520).

2.3.2 The Manichaean mythology

Also an understanding of certain central aspects of the Manichaean creation myth is a *sine qua non* for a full appreciation of the strongest argument Augustine advances in the *Contra Fortunatum* (see the remarks below and the discussion in 6.4). Baker-

Brian (2011: 110) argues that at its very core, Manichaeism is a system of two sets of entities: Light versus Darkness, and three Times: the beginning, middle and end. Light and Darkness begin as separate and opposed to one another: Light occupies the upwards dimension and Darkness the downwards dimension; they do not share borders except at the point where they meet in the middle (Coyle, 1978: 32-33). Lieu (1985: 11) also emphasises how all is well during the beginning period while both sides keep to themselves practically unaware of the other's existence.

The second (middle) period starts with a random chance encounter between some demons that caught sight of the Kingdom of Light, which, according to Lieu (1985: 11), sets in motion an invasion by the mass of Darkness of the realm of the Light. The Kingdom of Light was without any defences since it was never intended for war, so the Father of Greatness, God, evoked new heavenly beings into existence to fight off the invasion (Coyle, 1978: 34-35). This part of the Manichaean myth is of primary importance to the reading of the *Contra Fortunatum* offered here since it forms the backdrop to the question of the Nebridian conundrum, the single most important topic of the debate and the one that Augustine claims cannot be answered by Fortunatus.

One of the beings evoked by God, the Mother of Life, in turn evoked the Primal Man who was commissioned by God to repel the invasion. The Primal Man wore the five elements (air, wind, fire, light and water) as his armour and was led into battle by an angel (Baker-Brian, 2011: 110). The Prince of Darkness put on his own armour of infernal elements and joined battle with the Primal Man and only after a long struggle succeeding in overcoming Primal Man, drugging him into a deep sleep (Lieu, 1985: 12). Through its desire for the light, the Darkness proceeded to devour the five elements, thus mixing them with evil (Coyle, 1978: 35). This defeat at the hands of

Darkness also forms an important point in the debate, since it suggests that evil can defeat God. This defeat may also form part of the reasoning why Manichaeism missionaries usually tried to steer away from a discussion of the creation myth when debating with members of other faiths (as discussed in 6.5.2).

Within Manichaeism, this event was seen as part of a well laid trap that was proceeding exactly as planned, for God had used the Primal Man to slow the invasion and ensnare the Darkness with the elements of Light (Lieu, 1985: 12). This willingness of God to sacrifice one of his own also forms a crucial aspect of the debate that Fortunatus uses to explain how the Nebridian conundrum could be turned on Catholicism as well: God's decision to send Christ to earth in order to suffer may be interpreted from a similar perspective.

In the myth the Father of Greatness then started the complex rescue plan by invoking a number of new deities, among them the Friend of Light, the Great Builder and the Living Spirit who then liberated the Primal Man and defeated the Darkness (Coyle, 1978: 36). At the point at which he was freed, the Primal Man proceeded to slash the roots of the Darkness that had been devouring his armour and elements, in order to ensure that the Darkness could not multiply any more (Coyle, 1978: 37). The only problem left to be sorted out was the Light particles that had become entangled with matter (Darkness) (Lieu, 1985: 14).

Within the myth, the problem of the entangled Light particles still exists, and describes how, in order to address this, the Living Spirit, along with his sons, creates ten heavens and eight earths (Pearson, 2007: 303). The stars were created from almost pure Light, whilst the sun and the moon were made up of entirely uncontaminated Light and formed Light-ships that were designed to be receiving

stations for Light that was released from earth (Coyle, 2009: 309). The moon would function as the first receiver of released Light during its waxing stage and then release the Light it had gathered to the sun in the waning stage (Coyle, 1978: 39). The relevance of the Manichaeon myth about the sun and moon to this study is that the movements of the sun and moon were the instigation for Augustine's first worries about the Manichaeon faith and lay at the basis of the problems with which he first approached Faustus, as discussed in 2.1 above.

It is also important to note that the only reason for creation in the Manichaeon system was to free the trapped Light elements from matter. With the cosmos in place, the Father of Greatness evoked the Third Messenger who in turn evokes the Maiden of Light (Pearson, 2007: 303). Their task was to extract the remaining Light from the powers of Darkness, which they did by appearing in their naked forms to the demons that had been trapped in the battle with the Primal Man (Pearson, 2007: 303). Thus the complicated process of the creation of the physical world in Manichaeon myth is started. On viewing the naked forms before them the demons released the Light within them in the form of ejaculation and aborted fetuses³⁶; however the Light was still mixed with some of the Darkness that the demons contained. The emanations then fell to earth where they spontaneously turned into plant and animal life.

Upon realising that the creation of this cosmos would be successful in liberating the Light that was mixed with the Darkness, the powers of Darkness send forth the demons Saklas and Nabroel; who in turn copulate and produce Adam and then Eve (Pearson, 2007: 304). This forms the basis for another significant difference between

³⁶ This may form part of the reason why there might have been the reported rumours about the Manichees consuming human semen, which Fortunatus alludes to in the opening stage of the debate on the first day.

Augustine and Fortunatus in the debate: Fortunatus believes that humans are innately evil and has scriptural passages that support his argument. Adam is created in order to mirror the image of the Third Messenger; as a result he is evil, but in the image of the divine (Pearson, 2007: 304). Pearson concisely explains the manner in which Adam is saved as well as the multiple roles of Jesus in the Manichaean belief system.

Jesus the Splendor descends to Adam to arouse him from sleep and provide him with saving gnosis. Adam's salvation is paradigmatic of all human redemption in the Manichaean system. In the subsequent course of history Jesus evokes the Light Mind (Nous), who calls forth the Apostle of Light. The Apostle of Light is incarnated in the various prophets, beginning with Sethel, and including Buddha, Zoroaster, and Jesus the Messiah. The culmination of this process is the commissioning of Mani himself (Pearson, 2007: 304).

Lieu (1985: 18) points to the important fact that the divine origin of the soul in Manichaean myth means that the only way that man can possibly sin is if he forgets his innate divinity, hence the importance of constantly following Manichaean practices designed to remind the soul of its origin. The origin of the soul forms another one of the highly important points of contention in the debate between Augustine and Fortunatus and many scholars have written on the subject since it is an important philosophical question as well³⁷.

As for the eternal philosophical and theological question: *unde malum?*, the Manichees have a simple answer: evil comes from the Darkness and good comes

³⁷ See Teske (2008) for the most comprehensive reading of the thoughts of Augustine regarding the soul, as well as Scibona (2011).

from the Light, thus absolving God of being responsible in any way for evil. The subjects of the origin of the soul, sin and the origin of evil will form three of the crucial topics in the debate between Fortunatus, the Manichee, and Augustine, the former Manichee turned Catholic. As stated previously these topics are discussed more comprehensively in 6.4.1 to 6.4.4.

The conclusion to this cosmic struggle is a great battle between the forces of Light and Darkness, during which the last of the Light particles will be released and Jesus will come again and judge the souls of man (Coyle, 1978: 39-40). Light and Darkness thus separated once again, the eight earths and ten heavens will collapse into total destruction and Light and Darkness will once again be all that exists, thus ushering in the end or final period.

An important part of this myth that is not mentioned by Augustine or Fortunatus during the course of the debate is the part played by Jesus in various roles: Jesus the Splendor, the suffering Jesus (portrayed as the personification of the Light elements trapped with the Darkness in the cosmos), Jesus Christ (though the Manichaeon view of Christ is that he was merely the image of a man and thus did not in fact suffer and die, nor was he really born of Mary³⁸) and finally Jesus the judge at the final judgement (Pearson, 2007: 305). The manifold variety of different Jesus" forms yet another topic that is not brought up in the debate, which, as with the mention of Mani, I would have assumed that Augustine could have used to great benefit. The chapter continues with a discussion of the Manichaeon way of life and practice by its believers, many aspects of which are directly connected to the complex creation myth.

³⁸ The relevance of this aspect of the Manichaeon view of Christ comes to a head at the end of the first day of the debate, where Augustine uses this knowledge to try and place Fortunatus in a difficult position.

2.3.3 The practice of Manichaeism

The followers of Mani's religion were divided into two distinct yet interdependent groups: the Hearers and the Elect (Pearson, 2007: 305). The religious leaders were drawn from the Elect and were ranked by strict hierarchy with the successors of Mani basing themselves in the founder's birthplace: the twin cities of Seleucia-Ctesiphon in Babylonia.

Lieu (1985: 19) and Pearson (2007: 305-306) describe the most important part of the creation myth that impacted on the Manichaeans on a daily basis was the idea that everything on earth has Light and Darkness mixed in them. The prime purpose of Manichaean liturgical practice was to release the Light elements. Their five commandments are summarised as the „three seals“: the seal of the mouth, the seal of the hands and the seal of the breast. The following quote from Pearson provides a concise description of what the following of the three seals entails for the Elect.

Obeying these precepts involved abstinence from marriage and procreation, abstinence from manual labor, especially that involved in the gathering and preparation of food, and dependence on the Hearers for daily sustenance. By refraining from harvesting or preparing food, they would not do injury to the Cross of Light bound up in fruit and vegetable life. Bathing in water was also forbidden. By their pious lives and prayers, the Elect would liberate the light particles that they had eaten in the fruits and vegetables given to them by the Hearers. This, too, would lead to their salvation after death. (Pearson, 2007: 306).

The reason for the vegan lifestyle was that animal flesh contains less Light than plants since they feed off the plants and the Light these animals take in is released

through their bodies (Lieu, 1985: 19). Importantly, some elements of Darkness are believed to be left behind and are able to become flesh through the act of procreation both in animals and in humans, hence the need for abstinence on the part of humans. BeDuhn (2010: 62) emphasises the important fact that it was this ascetic lifestyle which Augustine insists was one of the most powerful attractive forces for outsiders as it was highly admired.

The Hearers, of which Augustine had been a member, had a far less rigorous set of rules to follow. They were allowed to marry and procreate, which, though frowned upon, were accepted. Their prime function was, according to Pearson (2007: 306), seeing to the needs of the Elect, in particular their daily food needs. In fact, providing for the Elect was the requirement for their personal salvation. In a similar vein Pearson (2007: 306) points out that Hearers were encouraged to follow their own set of six rules: they should not lie, steal, give false testimony, kill, be unchaste or perform black magic. They were also encouraged to accumulate wealth and to hand their children over to be trained from a young age to become the new Elect. Hearers could not hope to attain salvation for themselves except under conditions of extreme piety, but they could attain it through being reincarnated as an Elect.

In the penultimate section of this chapter I provide some background information. Regarding the most important topics of the debate, namely the Nebridian conundrum, the origin of evil, free will and the nature of Christ, which will be discussed in full in chapter five. The Nebridian conundrum concerns the omnipotence of God and questions why an all-powerful God would need to defend Himself as the Manichaean myth suggests he does. As described in chapters five and six, Fortunatus gives numerous reasons why it is possible that an omnipotent God would defend himself and his realm, which I shall not delve into here.

The questions of the origin of evil and free will are directly interconnected with each other as well as with the issue of the nature and origin of the soul. These issues are touched on by both Augustine and Fortunatus, but it is Fortunatus who first brings up the subject of the origin of evil presumably because this is an area where the Manichees had had great success. In the debate it is also clear how this is a difficult aspect for Augustine to explain since according to Catholic dogma God is the origin of everything. Augustine defends himself by alluding to free will as the reason why evil exists, but as BeDuhn (2011: 473) points out, this is an issue about which his thought is still relatively undeveloped at the stage of the debate with Fortunatus. This problem does not feature at all for the Manichees since they have a dualistic system where the Darkness is the source of evil: God is therefore only responsible for the creation of good.

The origin of the soul and the reason for its existence on the other hand is put on the table by Augustine. In his view the Manichaean myth insists that God sent forth the soul into suffering in order to defend Himself. He argues forcefully that an omnipotent God would not need to send the soul forth in the first place and secondly would be cruel to do so due to His prescience about what will happen to the soul. Fortunatus deftly turns the tables on Augustine on this issue by pointing out that according to Catholic belief God sent forth his own son, Jesus Christ, into suffering, making the Catholic God just as guilty of cruelty.

The final major question that plays a role in the debate involves Manichaean ideas about the corporeality of Jesus, which has already been discussed in this section. Augustine brings up the topic of Christ's corporeality in order to embarrass Fortunatus in front of the crowd. He cleverly uses it to demonstrate to them that

Fortunatus does not follow all the books of the Bible, but in a selective fashion only those that agree with Manichaeism.

2.4 Conclusion

Augustine's time with the Manichees proves to be a crucial aspect of the debate between himself and Fortunatus and provides all of his ammunition against his former friend. Nine years as an ardent supporter of the Manichaeism and his access to the highest echelon of Roman North African Manichaeism in the form of Faustus causes Augustine to question the fundamentals of his faith and in so doing discover the weaknesses in it.

As has been described in section 2.2, Augustine's anti-Manichaean works were produced throughout his career, some of them even before he became an ordained priest. Amongst these works it seems that the *Contra Fortunatum* is one of the lesser studied works. Why this is so is perhaps a good topic for further studies, but is not an issue that I will deal with here. The *Contra Fortunatum* forms the first work in the trilogy of anti-Manichaean works of Augustine's that have the format of debates against prominent Manichaean practitioners. This debate is the first, and, due to the possible ramifications of losing it, I would argue a record of one of the most important events of his career. After this came numerous other works that dealt with similar themes such as the origin of evil, the nature of the soul and free will, some of which it is argued by scholars such as O'Connell (1987) and BeDuhn (2011: 473) was modified in important ways as a direct result of the debate with Fortunatus. Thus this debate played a central role in fundamentally changing Augustine's views regarding a select few, highly important topics.

The manner in which Manichaeism was able to spread as rapidly as it did in the ancient world as well the basic tenets of the Manichaean creation myth and the daily practices of a Manichaean believer, whether Hearer or Elect was discussed in section 2.3.3. It is the creation myth at the core of Manichaeism that explains so much of its followers' behaviour and actions. Although fairly convoluted it also offers a simple explanation for nature and movements of the sun and moon and for the existence of evil. These features, along with the religion's ability to adapt to local conditions by incorporating much from other religions help to explain its spread throughout the Roman Empire and beyond.

This overview of Manichaeism and its effects on Augustine helps to explain much of his actions, both in becoming a member and later falling out with them. More importantly, I would posit the possibility that Augustine would not have become the man he was without this experience. Augustine's time as a Manichee therefore represents one of the most important phases in his life and career, and the *Contra Fortunatum* provides unique insight into the thought of the young Augustine and his success in establishing his career.

Chapter 3: A Critical Discourse Analysis model for the *Contra*

Fortunatum

3.1 Introduction

Critical Discourse Analysis forms one of the two primary methods of analysis that will be applied to the debate which took place between Augustine of Hippo and the Manichee, Fortunatus in chapter five and six³⁹. As such it is imperative to reflect on the rationale and various methods applied through CDA, and how they might be more or less suited to the analysis that this study proposes to undertake.

The concept of Critical Discourse Analysis (numerous writers would argue against it being referred to as a theory) was developed by a small group of linguists interested in developing new methods for the analysis of texts (Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 3). They were to base their new methods on the pioneering work of the linguist M.A.K. Halliday⁴⁰, who had developed original means of studying texts through linguistic markers (Fairclough, 1989: 13).

Machin and Mayr (2012: 4) argue that a crucial feature of the pioneers of CDA was that they did not standardise their methods of analysis in order to form a single method of discourse analysis. What is most important for this study is that, instead, they recognised that a purely linguistic interpretation of discourse would miss many extraneous features thereof and thus decided on appropriating analytical methods

³⁹ Chapter five will deal with an investigation into the themes that are apparent in the debate, making use of context as a primary tool (as will become clear through the current chapter, context forms a fundamental part of CDA). Chapter six will be a more methodical analysis that takes into account a number of the various categories that CDA identifies in this chapter as well as taking into account the methodology of Argumentation Theory covered in chapter three.

⁴⁰ Machin and Mayr argue that CDA had its origins in the work of Fowler, Hodge, Kress and Trew (2012: 2).

from other disciplines such as sociology⁴¹. CDA is therefore, deliberately, an interdisciplinary theory which seeks to use any analytical methods that may be appropriate to the study of any particular discourse event, regardless of whether they are linguistic in origin or not (Machin and Mayr, 2012: 5). The analyses of the *Contra Fortunatum* offered here are, for example, not focused on the linguistic features of the text; nevertheless the study aims to demonstrate how many of the concepts developed by CDA may be used to illuminate important aspects of the debate.

Equally important to an understanding of CDA is that different researchers have each developed their own methods of analysis, none of which are discounted by fellow researchers since CDA has been designed from its inception to be eclectic in nature, as Wodak and Meyer (2009: 1) emphasise. As such, as Weiss and Wodak (2003: 22) suggest, practitioners of CDA are encouraged to use a mix of interdisciplinary methodologies that best suit the particular subject under investigation, which is exactly the *modus operandi* that characterises the way in which the concepts of CDA and Argumentation Theory are used in this dissertation.

The defining feature of Critical Discourse Analysis, however, is not its interdisciplinary nature so much as its overtly subjective, political stance. Operating under the assumption that there is no such thing as a truly objective stance in the social sciences, the originators made a bold decision to embrace their subjective positions and make active use of them in order to serve their own ends, as described by Fairclough (1995: 24). The common thread that linked all the originators of CDA, other than their basis in linguistics, was that they all studied discourse as a means of gaining and maintaining power over a subjugated group (Fairclough, 2012: 10). Their

⁴¹ "The manifold roots of CDA lie in Rhetoric, Text linguistics, Anthropology, Philosophy, Socio-Psychology, Cognitive Science, Literary Studies and Sociolinguistics, as well as in Applied Linguistics and Pragmatics" (Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 1).

research covers politics, racism, group dominance and other areas of asymmetrical power distribution (Weiss and Wodak, 2003: 12). The decision was thus made, as Weiss and Wodak (2003: 14) point out, to form CDA as a means of exposing these methods of domination and thereby act as a lightning rod for the powerless and oppressed to break free from domination. In more simple terms, CDA is overtly designed to fight on the side of the underdog by actively exposing and undermining the edifice of power. While there is no such interest present in this study, the concepts related to the issue of power achieved through discourse do allow fascinating insights into the rivalry for victory in the minds of the audience present at the debate between Augustine and Fortunatus.

O'Halloran (2003: 1) discusses how the modern media forms the foundation of the vast majority of CDA studies, whether in the form of television, radio, newspapers, interviews in each of the former, or advertisements. It is clear that the modern CDA practitioner has access to far more information surrounding the discourse in question than I will have regarding the discourse between Augustine and Fortunatus. Features such as body language, gestures, tone and emphasis are unfortunately lost to this study, as has been discussed in the first chapter. The rest of this chapter will be structured so as to cover the relevant techniques and contributions made by each of the primary contributors to CDA, which I argue may also be used fruitfully to analyse the debate between Augustine and Fortunatus.

3.2 M.A.K. Halliday

Although Halliday has published articles and books through to the present day, the works of relevance to this study are those from the 1960's through to the early 1980's. The reason for this is that it was these writings that influenced the creators of

Critical Discourse Analysis as they formed their theory over the 1980"s and early 1990"s.

Halliday formed a sociolinguistic theory that sought to understand language not simply as a means of communication, but as a fundamental part of human cognition. Language thus forms thought itself and, in turn, culture (Halliday, 1978: 9-15). Halliday (1978: 21) describes every act of communication as beginning with a thought or „meaning potential“, which is then filtered and realised as discourse, whether verbal, textual, gestural or in any number of other forms. The key concept in this process is that of the filter.

In his sociosemiotic interpretation of language, Halliday summarises the primary components as being a network of relations that form the foundation of his general sociolinguistic theory (Halliday 1978: 122). There are a total of nine components that form this network, of which only seven are relevant to this study. The remaining two components deal with language acquisition in children.

The overriding thrust of Halliday"s theory is the idea that language and communication in general hold far more information than a simple account of the words used will reveal (Halliday, 1978). The seminal aspect of this theory is the recognition of context, whether it be personal, class, geographical, temporal or any number of external contexts, as the principal determinant in an individual"s choice of words and their resultant meaning (Halliday, 1978: 28-31). And it is only through an understanding of all relevant contexts that a researcher might fully comprehend a text. In the case of an ancient text like the *Contra Fortunatum* it is extremely difficult to reconstruct many of the important elements of the context within which the debate took place and was then "made into a book"(Retractationes I, 16 (15)) by Augustine.

Yet the attempt to look at the context in terms of the categories discussed by Halliday and others does allow a number of interesting insights as I aim to illustrate in chapter six of the dissertation.

Halliday (2009: 41) uses linguistics, or more specifically sociolinguistics, in order to provide a social interpretation of language and meaning. Whilst the above explanation of his sociolinguistic theory pays scant regard to the phenomenal volume of writings over a career spanning six decades, it does emphasise the part of his work that had the greatest influence on those few individuals who were to use his work as the basis for their development of the concepts of Critical Discourse Analysis. The primary difference between the goals of sociolinguistics and CDA is thus that the former has no aim further than an understanding of how language shapes meaning in a social environment, whilst CDA expressly seeks to uncover the way that language is used to exert power over oppressed people. Ultimately, though, both theories emphasise the critical role that context plays in gaining an understanding of any text. As will become evident through the rest of this chapter, there is no single system for applying CDA, with each contributor using slightly different aspects of Halliday's sociolinguistics in order to achieve their aims.

3.3 Norman Fairclough

As with Halliday, Fairclough (1989: 1) started off as a linguist, but felt that linguistics simply described different parts of texts without analysing them. In order to address this void he turned to the work initiated by Halliday that combined linguistics with sociology (Fairclough, 1989: 13). By the early 1980's Fairclough (1989: 1) had become frustrated with Halliday's sociolinguistics due to its failure to describe the

reasons why a particular set of words were used and their effect on the audience to whom the text was directed.

Thus, in his landmark book *Language and Power* (1989), Fairclough set out his new theory which he called Critical Linguistic Studies (CLS). As the title of his book suggests, Fairclough (1989: 1) had come to the realisation that a large proportion of texts involved aspects of power. His aim in using CLS was to expose this power in order to better understand how it is produced and used in order to maintain, increase or overturn a power base.

Although the rhetoric of politics and politicians formed the core interest of Fairclough's work⁴², he realised that power relations pervasively influence almost all texts and dialogues, even though this is often not consciously recognised as such. Obvious examples would be the situation of a policeman interviewing a witness to a crime⁴³, or an employer instructing an employee. But, rarely is power manifested in a simple, singular dimension; an example of a relatively complicated instance might be an employer asking an employee about some technical aspect that the employee has training and experience in, but which the employer does not.

As Halliday recognised and Fairclough illustrates, context plays a vital role in understanding text. Equally, as Fairclough (1995: 112-129) realised, that same context will also elucidate the reasons why certain words within the text were chosen and their intended effect on a specific audience. Context, naturally covers considerations such as position within an organisation or party, age, education and income level, but also includes factors such as geography and mother tongue

⁴² Fairclough was particularly interested in British politics, especially Margaret Thatcher it seems, at the time of writing *Language and Power* (Fairclough, 1989: 1).

⁴³ See Fairclough (1989: 18) for this example.

(Fairclough, 1995: 112-129). Of equal importance is the form of the text: it might be a debate, speech, written work or newspaper article. Whilst this last point might seem superfluous, Fairclough (1989: 43) recognised that language used in these disparate events changes to suit the conditions under which they are produced. In a similar way Augustine treats in the *Contra Fortunatum* many issues also examined in other works and other anti-Manichaean writings. Yet, the specific format in which these points are handled in the *Contra Fortunatum* is determined by the fact that they form part of a public debate, with a very specific opponent, and are devised to target a very specific audience at a particular point in time.

Furthermore, Fairclough (1989: 26) viewed language as both discourse and as a social practice. Thus he argued that researchers should not limit themselves to the processes of production and interpretation, but, just as importantly, should make an analysis of the associations between texts, processes and their social conditions. Such analyses would also delve further into the “immediate conditions of the social context and the more remote conditions of institutional and social structures” (Fairclough 1989: 26). In simpler terms the analysis would research the associations between text, interactions and contexts, an issue that remains important in the analysis of the *Contra Fortunatum* offered in chapters five and six.

Relating directly to the three elements (texts, interactions and contexts) just mentioned, Fairclough was also able to describe three aspects (stages) of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA has become increasingly tangled with his own CLS and Fairclough seems, at this point (1989), to view CDA as a constituent part of CLS). These three stages were: description, interpretation and explanation (Fairclough 1989: 26). Fairclough describes the stages as follows: description concerns itself with the formal, linguistic features of the text; interpretation describes the connections

between the text and interactions (“seeing the text as the product of a process of production, and as a resource in the process of interpretation” (Fairclough 1989: 26)). The final step is explanation, which relates the interaction and social context aspects of the text, thus “the social determination of the processes of production and interpretation, and their social effects” (Fairclough 1989: 26).

In keeping with Fairclough’s (1989: 46) determination regarding language and power, he establishes that “power in discourse is to do with powerful participants *controlling and constraining the contributions of non-powerful participants*” (Fairclough’s emphasis). These constraints were classified into three broad categories: contents, relations and subjects. Contents refers to that which might be said or done, relations refers to the social relations which people in discourse enter into, and subjects refers to the subject positions which people may occupy (Fairclough 1989: 46).

To come back to the three stages of analysis in Critical Discourse Analysis identified by Fairclough, namely description, interpretation and explanation: Fairclough, developed a set of questions that could be applied universally to any text in order to fulfil the description requirement. The answers to these questions would in turn form the basis for the interpretation and explanation stages of an analysis (Fairclough, 1989: 110).

By the time Fairclough wrote *Analysing Discourse* in 2003, Critical Discourse Analysis had established itself in the linguistic community around the world, with Fairclough’s book *Language and Power* considered to be one of the seminal works in establishing CDA (Candlin, 1995: vii). As a result *Analysing Discourse* was able to take advantage of other author’s writings and influences and to incorporate these into a new system of questions that may be applied to any discourse and in so doing elicit

a comprehensive, critical analysis thereof using the cumulative experience and knowledge that Fairclough is able to elucidate on this topic.

As will become apparent, Fairclough has now decided to drop the top level of description, interpretation and explanation, and instead focusses on ten topics of enquiry that each covers several, more in-depth questions. The result is a less stratified, but wider and thus more comprehensive set of questions, which begin to form the core of the hybrid methodology that is used in this study. It is important to note that although Fairclough's method makes use of semantics and linguistic features, I will not be including these in my hybrid methodology and instead will focus on the contextual aspects of the debate. As a result a number of Fairclough's sections (such as modality, styles and semantic/grammatical relations between sentences and clauses) will be left out of this section.

Fairclough's first topic, „Social events“, is devised to describe how every text is part of a specific social event as well as of a chain of social events (Fairclough 2003: 191). “What social practice or network of social practices can the events be referred to, be seen as framed within?” (Fairclough 2003: 191). And lastly, does the text form part of a chain or network of events (Fairclough 2003: 191)? This topic forms a crucial aspect of the debate between Fortunatus and Augustine and will be dealt with throughout chapters five and six. But, just as importantly, much of the social aspect of the debate also refers directly to the Manichaeic myth and faith in general which is discussed in chapter four.

The *Contra Fortunatum* is a record of a specific social event, the public debate between Augustine and Fortunatus. But it is also important to see it as within the context of the series of confrontations between Catholics and Manichaeans in Hippo

and elsewhere in the Roman Empire, as well as part of a series of anti-Manichaean works by Augustine.

The following topic comprising three questions is „Genre“: “Is the text situated within a genre chain?” (Fairclough 2003: 192). Can the text be categorised by a variety of genres (Fairclough 2003: 192)? “What genres does the text draw upon, and what are their characteristics?” (Fairclough 2003: 192). As with many of these topics, that of genre refers to more context, which will be discussed in the following section of this chapter on van Dijk. The *Contra Fortunatum* forms part of the genre of public disputations and falls into several sections as with the previous topic. The debate might be seen as a public dispute between Manichees and Catholics in Roman North Africa, or a part of the chain of Augustine’s public disputes with Faustus and Felix.

Fairclough’s third topic is Difference and there is only one question to be asked in this section: by what combination of scenarios does the text characterise the inclination towards difference (Fairclough 2003: 192)?

- a) An openness to, acceptance of, recognition of difference; an exploration of difference, as in a „dialogue“ in the richest sense of the term
- b) An accentuation of difference, conflict, polemic, a struggle over meaning, norms, power
- c) An attempt to resolve or overcome difference
- d) A bracketing of difference, a focus on commonality, solidarity
- e) Consensus, a normalisation and acceptance of differences of power which brackets or suppresses differences of meaning and over norms (Fairclough 2003: 192)

As will be seen in the analysis of the debate between Augustine and Fortunatus, there may well be openness and a recognition of difference, but it is certainly not an open debate. If any particular category may be applied to this debate, it would be b, with a clear accent on difference, conflict and the most important part: the struggle over the meaning of scripture which is dealt with in 6.3.3.

Fairclough's fourth topic is Intertextuality. The first question in this section asks which relevant texts or voices are conspicuously included or excluded from the text under consideration (Fairclough 2003: 192). The section continues: "where other voices are included, are they attributed, and if so, specifically or non-specifically?" (Fairclough 2003: 192). Are attributed voices recorded as direct quotes or indirectly reported (Fairclough 2003: 192)? And finally, "how are other voices textured in relation to the authorial voice, and in relation to each other?" (Fairclough 2003: 192). This section leads the researcher to understand that there is a distinct role that the audience in the debate have as the ultimate arbiters of this dispute, which is to be studied in 6.8. Intertextuality forms a crucial part of the debate under analysis as there is also a critical amount of scriptural quoting by both opponents both explicit and indirect, but particularly on the part of Fortunatus (a feature described further in 6.3.3). This is important due to the great authority the Bible held in the minds of the audience, both Manichaean and Catholic, which will be discussed further in 6.9.

There are only two questions in Fairclough's fifth section, which is headed Assumptions. Here he asks, firstly, what value, propositional or even existential assumptions are made within the text (Fairclough 2003: 192). Secondly: "is there a case for seeing any assumptions as ideological?" (Fairclough 2003: 192). An interesting assumption in scholarship on the debate between Augustine and Fortunatus concerns the now disputed claim that Augustine scored an important

victory in this debate, something that this study will constantly be dealing with throughout the entirety of chapters five and six. This assumption may also be seen as ideological as it is may be argued that such interpretive assumptions are linked to the ideologies of the Catholic and Manichaeian audience at the debate.

The sixth and seventh sections of Fairclough's methodology are involved with linguistic features that are not appropriate to this study and as such are not dealt with here. Fairclough calls the eighth section „Discourses“ and the most relevant question from this for my purposes here is “what discourses are drawn upon in the text, and how are they textured together? Is there significant mixing of discourses?” (Fairclough 2003: 193). In the case of the *Contra Fortunatum* there are certainly a number of contemporary discourses (especially those concerning the rivalry between the various religious groups playing a role in the lives of the citizens of Hippo) that all form part of the web of discourses within which the debate functions. But by far the most important feature of the debate is the text of scripture, together with contemporary Manichaeian and Catholic discourses around this authoritative book. Especially important are the Pauline letters, the authority of which both the Catholics and the Manichees agree on (this point will be further extrapolated in chapter five, especially in section 5.3.3). Quotes from a number of New Testament texts therefore become the primary battleground on which Fortunatus and Augustine fight a hard battle, concerning the most valid interpretations of these texts.

Fairclough's twelfth and final section is Evaluation and asks only two questions: In terms of what are pleasing or displeasing, to what values do authors commit themselves (Fairclough 2003: 194)? and lastly: “How are values realised – as evaluative statements, statements with deontic modalities, statements with affective mental processes, or assumed values?” (Fairclough 2003: 194). Although there is a

section in chapter five (5.4.2) that deals with the topic of evaluation, it is somewhat different to that envisaged by Fairclough. Instead I shall use this section of the chapter to deal with the manner in which the opponents make value judgements on each other's turns at speech.

This brings to a close my discussion of the theory and methods advocated by Norman Fairclough. As may be evinced by the evolution of his methodology, Fairclough was able to fundamentally change his method for analysing discourse and finally arrived at point where the thoroughness of his method is unquestioned even if this is because it has become large and copious. The next figure that I wish to examine as a progenitor of Critical Discourse Analysis is Teun van Dijk, another linguist who specialises in the importance of context as a factor determining the nature of discourses.

3.4 Teun van Dijk

In 1983, van Dijk, along with Walter Kintsch, wrote a book dubbed *Strategies of Discourse Comprehension*, which, as its name well implies, focusses on the role played by strategy in better understanding discourse. In the book van Dijk describes his model as an overview of strategies and includes specific focus on propositional strategies, local coherence strategies, macrostrategies, schematic strategies, production strategies and other strategies which, important to this study, includes rhetorical and conversational strategies (van Dijk 1983: 19).

After the formal instigation of Critical Discourse Analysis, of which he formed an integral part, van Dijk moved away from his earlier focus on strategy and turned more towards knowledge as a means of maintaining, generating or overthrowing power. In such terms it may be said that van Dijk's choice of terminology is a case of semantics

rather than an abandonment of his focus on strategy, since knowledge is a direct imperative to the implementation of strategy (van Dijk 2003b: 87). He then split knowledge into four sub groupings: declarative versus procedural knowledge, personal versus social knowledge, types of social knowledge, general versus specific knowledge (van Dijk 2003b: 90). Van Dijk then makes a critical connection between knowledge, context and cognition (van Dijk 2003b: 94): the most critical devices of discourse in my opinion. In a later article (2005), van Dijk further examines the importance of knowledge in slightly different, but equally important terms. By focussing on contextual knowledge management van Dijk explores the importance of the shared knowledge between participants in a discourse as well as the relevance of the skilled manipulation of the differences in knowledge between said participants for gaining advantage in the discourse (van Dijk 2005: 71-77). The issue of the knowledge shared between Fortunatus and Augustine, and, very importantly, the knowledge that may have been available to the audience forms a focal point of this study and will be dealt with in a variety of sections in chapters five and six.

Instead of a group of questions that may be used as an overarching formula for the practice of CDA, van Dijk (2009b) gives only a set of headlines which are meant to guide a comprehensive study of any particular discourse. Rather than giving a comprehensive overview of each of these headings, I shall instead focus on those aspects of context which are of direct relevance to this dissertation.

Van Dijk (2009b: 248) begins his methodology with the subject of context as the definition of the situation. This section of the methodology therefore involves itself with making sure that as complete a background as possible is first laid out before the analysis of the text can begin. In this study these contexts therefore cover the three prime actors in the *Contra Fortunatum*: Augustine, Fortunatus and the

audience, as well as the two religions involved: Catholicism and Manichaeism. A final piece of contextual background information extends to a brief discussion of Roman North Africa at the time of the debate. It is equally important to acknowledge that these contexts, although often common to many individuals of concern, are lived and experienced subjectively and are thus unique to each person (van Dijk, 2009b: 248). I deal with these contexts throughout the study. The contexts of Catholicism, Augustine and Fortunatus have been discussed in the first chapter, while chapter two offers a further examination of Augustine and Manichaeism.

The next category of interest to this study is that of contexts as mental models (van Dijk, 2009b: 249). As discussed in the preceding paragraph, the importance of the manner in which both opponents experience this debate is also an important part of this analysis and as a result both men are discussed at length and the way in which they both experience and participate in the debate forms a central feature of the study throughout chapter five and parts of chapter six.

Knowledge as a common ground component of contexts is the next category of van Dijk's methodology (2009b: 250) that will be used specifically in 5.4.3 in chapter five. This category has to do with the fact that unless both participants in a debate understand what the other man is talking about, the debate cannot proceed. Thus, the participants need to understand what the other man is presupposing, affirming or even leaving implicit (van Dijk, 2009b: 250). Knowledge also alludes to the way in which these participants are able to form their arguments through their experience as debaters and to know which is the most effective tactic to deploy (van Dijk, 2009b: 250).

Here ends my discussion of van Dijk's theory of context as a fundamental aspect of Critical Discourse Analysis. This chapter now ends with a short conclusion that gives an overview of the salient points discussed in this chapter and how they will be used in the hybrid model that I have constructed.

3.5 Conclusion

Halliday, Fairclough and van Dijk produced Critical Discourse Analysis as a means of establishing power relations in texts and in spite of the fact that their various methodologies are based in socio-linguistics, I believe that the sections that are described in this chapter hold great value for this dissertation. The result is that I have chosen various aspects of their methodologies in order to come up with an eclectic methodology of my own, which is designed to complement that of the fourth chapter. This hybrid method will be used to complete the analysis of the debate between Fortunatus and Augustine.

Whilst the hybrid methodology that I use in the analyses presented in the fifth and sixth chapters has its base in Critical Discourse Analysis and Argumentation Theory, and I will have illustrated the various parts of each linguist's methods that I will be using, the perspective that will have the greatest bearing on this analysis will be that of context as discussed by van Dijk. Although the basic features of this methodology are only briefly related in this chapter, their fundamental nature is profound and will therefore steer this study. I believe that the concept of contextual analysis will afford me the highest capability to study this debate. This does not discount the importance of the Argumentation Theory section of this hybrid methodology, but I feel that a study of context will provide me with a solid base on which to present the more theoretical findings of the fifth chapter as opposed to the sixth chapter.

Chapter 4: An Argumentation Theory model for the *Contra*

Fortunatum

4.1 Introduction

While the previous chapter showed how the primary focus of Critical Discourse Analysis is on power and the maintenance thereof, this chapter will introduce the second methodology that I will be using in the analysis of the debate between Fortunatus and Augustine: Argumentation Theory. This theory forms a perfect fit with CDA because it focusses on the rhetorical aspect of arguments as opposed to the purely dialectical aims of a more philosophical debate⁴⁴. The result is a methodology that specifically aims to reveal the methods and tactics used by each opponent to gain power over the other.

Van Eemeren created Argumentation Theory in order to study contemporary texts that ranged from political speeches to advertisements and other publicly available media that are designed to influence people. Argumentation Theory therefore takes a more pragmatic view of the whole concept of a debate than CDA, and may be used to expose the manner in which Augustine and Fortunatus seek to win the debate, which is the ultimate aim of the argument for both men. This last statement cannot be made strongly enough, the implications for losing the debate were to be severe for Fortunatus (who left the city as a direct result according to Possidius in *Vita Augustini* 6), but the implications for losing would have been dire for Augustine as well, as his reputation and standing within the Catholic community in Hippo Regius would have been severely damaged.

⁴⁴ There is a major difference between rhetoric and dialectic: rhetoric is designed to win an argument whereas dialectic is a philosophical method designed to reveal the truth. The focus of rhetoric in this instance is to gain power through winning an argument or debate over the opponent (van Eemeren, 2010: 45).

Argumentation Theory is focussed on the practical realities of arguments and how they are conducted in the real world. For an enhanced understanding of the debate between Fortunatus and Augustine, which is the focal point of this discussion, the concepts from Argumentation Theory therefore form an essential complement to the analyses based on Critical Discourse Analysis concepts. As with CDA I shall make use only of those concepts that are directly applicable to this debate in an eclectic manner, which Argumentation Theory also recommends⁴⁵. As a result I discuss here only those concepts and categories that are to be used in my analysis. Where I modify the categories slightly from the original I will explain both approaches and show why I have chosen to make the change.

Unlike Critical Discourse Analysis, which has several prominent figures involved in its genesis and development, Argumentation Theory revolves around one man: Frans van Eemeren. There are other collaborators such as Grootendorst, Houtlosser and Snoeck Henkemans, but each of these academics performs a merely supporting role.

4.2 Frans van Eemeren

There are two primary areas of van Eemeren's work that I will be focussing on: his pragma-dialectical approach and strategic maneuvering⁴⁶. As with the originators of CDA, van Eemeren became disenchanted with the inability of his field to accurately explain how arguments were structured and why certain features thereof were common to nearly all arguments. Not only structures were of interest, but also the

⁴⁵ "All these sources can, in my view, be used as resources for giving a justified account of a reconstruction of argumentative discourse with the help of pragma-dialectical analytical instruments. In most cases, the analyst may exploit these resources in the way he thinks most pertinent, without one source being superior to the other" van Eemeren (2010: 19).

⁴⁶ This is the way in which van Eemeren continuously spells manoeuvring and therefore I will continue to spell it in this manner as long as it is in reference to strategic maneuvering.

manner in which different tactics and strategies were expressed by opponents (van Eemeren and Houtlosser, 2005: 2). Van Eemeren had thus begun moving away from an emphasis on theoretical concepts and philosophical perspectives and towards actual argumentative *praxis* (van Eemeren and Houtlosser, 2005: 2). He also realised at an early stage that, as with CDA, context plays a hugely important role in the manner in which an argument plays out and forms a critical feature of a complete understanding of the discussion at hand (van Eemeren and Houtlosser, 2005: 2).

In order to address these concerns and add new perspectives, van Eemeren (and a few collaborators) developed a pragma-dialectical approach that was designed to take all of these new ideas into account. This approach sought to use indicators of argumentative discourse by methodically relating the pragmatic perceptions of linguistic characteristics of argumentative discourse with the dialectical insights associated with argumentative moves that are crucial in overcoming differences of opinion (van Eemeren et al 2007: ix).

4.2.1 The Pragma-Dialectical approach

The first attempt that van Eemeren made in creating an all-encompassing theory that aimed at dissecting arguments in order to understand them fully was termed Pragma-Dialectics (van Eemeren, 2010: 9). In order to comprehend the extent of pragma-dialectics and the manner in which it was designed, I refer to van Eemeren's own words:

Analyzing argumentative discourse pragma-dialectically amounts to interpreting the various moves that are made in the discourse systematically from the theoretical perspective of a critical discussion, exploiting in the process the conceptual instruments needed to implement

this perspective and making use of the terminological conventions that go with them. Such an analysis is pragmatic in the sense that the discourse is viewed as essentially a contextualized exchange of speech acts and dialectical in the sense that this exchange is viewed as a methodical attempt to resolve a difference of opinion on the merits by having a regulated critical exchange (van Eemeren, 2010: 9).

There are several crucial points that van Eemeren makes in this quote, beginning with the emphasis on the importance of the formulation of a theoretical framework to systematically interpret the various moves in an argument. This characterises the way in which I have constructed a hybrid methodology for the purposes of analysing the *Contra Fortunatum*, and its application to the discourse in order to reveal the moves that are made in it. The next point of importance is van Eemeren's concept concerning the dialectical nature of the discourse, which van Eemeren will later realize is a fundamental failing in his conception of his theory. This is because many arguments are not aimed at reaching a logical conclusion so much as they are designed to influence the audience listening in to the discussion. This, I argue, is precisely where the difference between the techniques and relative success of the participants in the debate between Fortunatus and Augustine lies.

This leads me to a crucial aspect of van Eemeren's work that needs an explanation in order to clearly understand the terminology, employed in this dissertation, specifically the term strategic maneuvering. When van Eemeren realised the shortcomings of his dialectical approach and understood the importance of taking into account the rhetorical dimension (both of which are best explained by figure 4.1 in section 4.2.2 below), in that people often seek to manipulate an argument for their own ends and not necessarily to resolve a difference of opinion that is rationally

correct, he created the concept of strategic maneuvering. Initially strategic maneuvering was simply a small additional section within pragma-dialectics; it was only later that van Eemeren realised that Strategic Maneuvering could be used as a methodology in its own right. Hence the appearance of the term in both of the sections on pragma-dialectics and the next section named Strategic Maneuvering. I have sought to differentiate the two by referring to „strategic maneuvering“ in the pragma-dialectics section and „Strategic Maneuvering“ in the section with the same name. This section on pragma-dialectics will now continue with an explanation of how this concept fits into the hybrid methodology that I use in this dissertation in order to analyse the *Contra Fortunatum*.

In their book *Argumentative Indicators in Discourse* (2007), van Eemeren, Houtlosser and Snoeck Henkemans set out six separate types of indicators of which only a couple are directly applicable to this study and the *Contra Fortunatum*. The single most important indicator that I will deal with in chapter five concerns that of confrontation and in particular indicators of standpoints and disputes. A standpoint is defined as a proposition to which the speaker commits himself and towards which he takes either a positive or negative stance (van Eemeren et al, 2007: 28). For a definition of a dispute I find Dascal's formulation (2008: 43) the most illuminating:

A dispute is the idealized form of a battle of wits. Its aim is victory over the adversary; no procedure capable of deciding the issue so as to fully and decisively convince the dispute is available; and no constraints limit the kind of argumentative stratagems designed to lead to desired victory, however momentary it may be.

In section 5.5.1 of the fifth chapter which is titled Indicators of confrontation: standpoints or disputes, I use these indicators in order to build on the analysis based on the concepts of CDA earlier in chapter five as well as to form the context and a basis for the strategic maneuvering section that will come later. As the title of section 5.5.1 implies there is a fundamental difference between standpoints and disputes. I have slightly modified the manner in which these terms are applied by slightly adapting the definition, based on the needs of this analysis. Standpoints remain relatively intact in that I have chosen to define them as propositions of which there is the possibility for the opponent (or the speaker) either responding in a positive or negative way. An example of this occurs in *C. Fort* 1A, where Augustine makes a grand opening statement that puts forward his (Catholic) view of the Nebridian conundrum in relation to the Manichaean faith and then asks Fortunatus to respond. Fortunatus, in turn, responds by asking Augustine for a concession regarding the Manichaean way of life.

Disputes are relatively straightforward in nature. As expressed by Dascal (2008: 43), disputes are a “battle of wits” where no clear stratagems can be predicted where the aim is victory. In order to isolate these disputes in the debate between Augustine and Fortunatus I identify disputes as turns at speech which actively make a judgement of a previous turn at speech and differ from it in terms of the content. Augustine is the prime exponent of the dispute and the disputes of his which I have identified are spread throughout the whole of the debate, evidence of a conscious tactic to undermine Fortunatus. Whilst Fortunatus also makes use of disputes, his are not as clear as Augustine’s and thus lose much of their efficacy as happens in *C. Fort* 28F, which will be further examined in 5.5.1.

While the rest of the indicators identified by van Eemeren and the others in pragma-dialectics are useful, they overlap to an extent with some of the categories to come in the section dedicated to Strategic Maneuvering or are less important for my purposes. There are, however, a number of other indicators which although not of great importance to this investigation are useful, such as the burden of proof indicators which may be equated with the use of scriptural quotes⁴⁷ by both men, but Fortunatus in particular, in order to qualify their arguments and will be dealt with in the section on quoting scripture in 6.3.3.

The final group of indicators that van Eemeren identifies are those for the end of a debate: indicators of the conclusion of a discussion, which begin with establishing the result of the discussion. After this a dialectical profile is described of how the result of the discussion is established; an argument may end with one of two alternatives: the protagonist maintains or withdraws his standpoint and the antagonist maintains or withdraws his doubt (van Eemeren et al 2007: 223-229). The ending of the debate between Fortunatus and Augustine is one of the most contested areas of the debate and as such is discussed at several points in chapters five and six. It is also the focal point of the concluding chapter where I will make a claim concerning whether Augustine won this debate or not. This brings to a conclusion my discussion of the work of van Eemeren on the use of indicators in argumentative discourse; I now move on to van Eemeren's next focal point in pragma-dialectics which has been dubbed strategic maneuvering.

As stated previously, van Eemeren realised that, although a very thorough method, pragma-dialectics simply did not take into account that most human of traits: the

⁴⁷ As the field of debate between Fortunatus and Augustine revolves around religion, specifically Christianity, the use of scripture to substantiate particular points of dispute may be seen as a way in which each man seeks to 'prove' his point.

ability to manipulate with the specific intention of winning a dispute, regardless of whether the rational and logical argument agrees with the winning argument or not. This is a point of huge importance in the debate between the Manichee Fortunatus and the Catholic Augustine.

The concept of strategic maneuvering seeks to combine a description of the critical reasonableness of pragma-dialectics with the artful effectiveness of rhetoric, thus taking into account the use of persuasion and manipulation that are features of virtually any argument, but ignored by the logical rationality of pragma-dialectics (van Eemeren, Houtlosser 2009: 4-5). In the conduct of this study strategic maneuvering is critically important to understanding the essence of the rhetoric used by Fortunatus and, in particular, Augustine, within their debate as this is the defining feature of this debate as opposed to the (sometimes superficial) logically argued points that each make.

Concepts from strategic maneuvering will in fact direct the majority of this analysis as I find that it is the unique perspective thereof that, in combination with CDA and Argumentation Theory indicators, allows it to be used in a hybrid methodology that is best suited to this debate. This methodology must therefore be carefully explained in the following pages.

Van Eemeren and Houtlosser developed the concept of strategic maneuvering as a means to expand the pragma-dialectical model that they had already created (van Eemeren, 2009: ix). In their view:

the reconstruction that takes place in pragma-dialectical analysis of argumentative discourse can be further refined and better accounted for if the standard version of the pragma-dialectical theory is extended by

including a rhetorical dimension that makes it possible to take the strategic design of the discourse into consideration in the analysis (van Eemeren, Houtlosser 2009: 2).

A pragma-dialectical theory thus extended, also allows for a more realistic treatment of the “fallacies in the evaluation of argumentative discourse” because the strategic function of argumentative moves is taken into account (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2009: 2).

Van Eemeren (2010: 16) insists that in order to start the actual operation of analysing a text, the accurate reconstruction of the original text proposed in pragma-dialectical analysis takes place. The reason for this is simple: “only when this is the case, can the reconstruction result in an analytic overview that constitutes a sound basis for carrying out an evaluation” (van Eemeren 2010: 16). The theoretical mechanism by which pragma-dialectics conducts such a reconstruction consists primarily of the model of the actual discourse (which can be found in section 5.3 of chapter five) and includes:

the four stages of the resolution process, the accompanying specification of the various argumentative moves instrumental in each of the stages, the specification of the types of (elementary and complex) speech acts by which these moves are made, and the commitments ensuing – according to the identity and correctness conditions – from performing these speech acts (van Eemeren 2010: 16).

As with the previous section on argumentative indicators I have taken an eclectic approach to the reconstruction of the text in this analysis. In section 6.3 of the fifth chapter I have written a systematic, chronological account of the proceedings of the

debate on the first and second day. In this section I have fulfilled the requirement for an explanation of the four stages of the debate, namely the confrontation, opening, argumentation and concluding stages. The latter three stages form a direct part of the debate itself whilst the first stage is involved with the background to the debate and is discussed briefly in 6.3, but far more thoroughly in chapter one and two.

The various argumentative moves that are made within the debate are discussed in a basic form in section 6.3, but far more thoroughly in sections 5.5.4 to 5.6.8, where I discuss the reasons that certain moves are made and their overall effect on the audience more thoroughly. These sections in chapter five also investigate the types of elementary and complex speech acts that take place in the various turns at speech.

Van Eemeren (2010: 17) insists that there are two primary requirements of the reconstructed textual analysis which need to be fulfilled by the analyst: the first is economy, efficacy and coherence, and the second is realism and wellfoundedness. Instead of using these terms in the reconstruction itself, I have decided that this terminology can be applied fruitfully to the analysis of the debate itself and have assigned them to be sections of enquiry in chapter five. As I will explain in fuller detail below (and in 5.5.1), the concepts of economy, efficacy and coherence may be regarded as three critical terms with regards to strategic maneuvering and its rhetorical aspect.

Economy refers to the length of a turn at speech and how it “should represent in a succinct way only those elements in the discourse vital to resolving a difference of opinion on the merits” (van Eemeren, 2010: 17). Efficacy, though perhaps often related to economy and coherence, is actually a completely separate concept and

focusses purely on the possible success of the turn at speech in the minds of the audience. This is an aspect that Augustine is particularly successful with in the debate, especially towards the end of the second day. Coherence is often linked to efficacy and economy, but as with efficacy, is able to stand alone without being linked to the other two concepts. An example of coherence is Fortunatus in *C. Fort* 21F where he delivers a long turn at speech filled with quotes from the New Testament. Though this is in dialectical terms a coherent turn, Fortunatus also tends to drift off topic and doesn't keep to a simple structure as Augustine does, therefore creating a logically coherent but not necessarily efficacious turn at speech. Therefore each section of the turn may be understood separately and the whole is logical, but the meaning of the turn in its entirety may be lost on the audience.

As with economy, efficacy and coherence, the concepts of realism and wellfoundedness are used in the analysis offered in 5.5.2 and not as part of the reconstruction offered in 6.3. The subject of realism is subjective in terms of this debate since the arena of argument entails two men debating their respective religions. Therefore realism may be seen as residing more in the ability of each man to base his arguments on the Bible and to be able to substantiate their disagreements with scriptural quotes that both religions agree on. In turn, wellfoundedness is intricately involved with logic, substantiation and reality. I argue in chapters five and six that the basis of this logic and reality also comes in the form of substantiation of points of dispute through the use of Biblical quotes. Van Eemeren views realism as the need to offer a representation "that is as plausible and credible as possible", whilst wellfoundedness means that views "should be backed up by pragmatically informed empirical observations concerning the discourse which offer a justificatory account of the analysis that is provided" (van Eemeren, 2010: 17).

The direct result of these definitions is that the beliefs of Catholicism and Manichaeism are the basis of realism and the Bible is the source of the “pragmatically informed empirical observations” that substantiate arguments in the debate.

The next set of concepts concerning strategic maneuvering that I use in chapter five (section 5.5.3) revolve around pragmatic and logical inferences. Van Eemeren (2010: 18) suggests that an important part is played in any analysis by the use of common sense and logical inferences, on the part of the analyst, in order to better understand both what the speaker is saying or trying to say (logical inference) and what the speaker actually means (pragmatic inference). In the case of Fortunatus these are often not the same thing as he often leaves too much unsaid an issue not always sufficiently taken into account by modern analysts. See for example sections 6.4.1 to 6.4.3 where Fortunatus, on numerous occasions, is able to deliver damaging arguments against Augustine⁴⁸, but to Fortunatus’ detriment the force of these arguments primarily rely on logical inferences by the audience. In fact, these arguments seem to be understood by Augustine, but the possibility has to be entertained that his own disregard of such logical implications may have manipulated the audience into a position where they did not make the logical inferences, as in *C. Fort* 18A where Augustine wilfully misinterprets Ephesians 2: 1-18 in order to waylay Fortunatus’ argument about grace.

Background information (surrounding the debaters and the audience) in all its various guises forms the focus of the next part of the process of analysis described by van Eemeren (2010: 18-19). It is important to note that background information refers to sets of knowledge about everything that surrounds and might affect the

⁴⁸ See BeDuhn (2011) where much of his discussion concerns these arguments on the part of Fortunatus.

debate. Considering inside information, expert information on the subjects or themes at hand and expert information about argumentative strategies on the part of the participants in the discourse form a critical part of the analysts toolkit for explaining not only the context of the debate, but also the reasons why the opponents deliver their turns at speech in the manner in which they do.

In terms of inside information, Augustine and Fortunatus know each other, they also know the location where the debate is to take place (the Sossian baths, a neutral public space). In terms of expert information, Fortunatus has greater expert knowledge of the Manichaeic system, whereas his knowledge of the Catholic system is not so easy to judge; it probably was extensive, but in some respects superficial. Augustine is assumed by scholars to have a high level of knowledge of both the Manichaeic and Catholic systems. Whether his deep knowledge of Manichaeism can compete with that of Fortunatus is an issue debated in scholarship⁴⁹. As for expert information about argumentative discourse, both men display a high degree of capability, but whereas Fortunatus is a gifted debater with, perhaps⁵⁰, little formal education, it is Augustine that holds the upper hand with his rhetorical training and ability as I argue in the course of the analyses offered below.

4.2.2 Strategic Maneuvering

At this point in the chapter it is important to provide more context as to how Strategic Maneuvering is related to pragma-dialectics and how it functions as a standalone concept. As has been stated before in the previous section on pragma-dialectics, van Eemeren first conceived of strategic maneuvering as a subsection of pragma-

⁴⁹ Van Oort (2008a and 2008b) argues that Augustine already had a deep knowledge of Manichaeic scriptures, whilst Coyle (2009: 251-264) does not agree.

⁵⁰ Due to the lack of information about Fortunatus other than what Augustine himself writes in his *Retractationes* and Possidius in his *Vita Sancti Augustini* about him, we cannot be sure of his level of education regarding rhetoric.

dialectics, which helped the overall methodology to explain the rhetorical manoeuvres of participants in disputes in particular. As van Eemeren worked on strategic maneuvering he realised that it could work as a methodology in its own right under the umbrella term of Argumentation Theory, which also includes pragma-dialectics. This section of chapter four is therefore meant to be an exposition of Strategic Maneuvering as a separate methodology in its own right. I start with van Eemeren's definition of Strategic Maneuvering (2010: 40).

Strategic maneuvering refers to the continual efforts made in all moves that are carried out in argumentative discourse to keep the balance between reasonableness and effectiveness. In principle, people engaged in argumentative discourse always have to reconcile their pursuit to maintain reasonableness and their pursuit to achieve effectiveness; because of this argumentative predicament they always have to manoeuvre strategically (van Eemeren, 2010: 40).

The quote above leads the researcher to understand the manner in which people are constantly striving to be both reasonable and effective. However, there are many occasions where these two concepts are mutually exclusive and this is the point at which a decision has to be made by the speaker and this is where Strategic Maneuvering comes into effect. Although a number of the points of Strategic Maneuvering have briefly been discussed before it is important to group them together here in this section in order to form a coherent whole.

Although established before under the pragma-dialectical section, I shall now continue to describe reasonableness and wellfoundedness from a rhetorical perspective. The balance between reasonableness and effectiveness is a delicate

one, where most reasonable arguments are also effective; it is when the balance swings towards effectiveness without reasonability that the argument might be said to be derailed (van Eemeren 2010: 41). So, the effect of reasonableness can be studied by pragma-dialectics whilst the pursuit of effectiveness can be best studied from a rhetorical perspective which van Eemeren includes under the concept of Strategic Maneuvering (van Eemeren 2010: 42). Hence van Eemeren's choice to supplement the concepts of regular pragma-dialectics with those of strategic maneuvering in order to considerably strengthen "not only the analysis and evaluation of the discourse but also the way in which the analysis and evaluation are justified" (van Eemeren 2010: 42).

A more complete understanding of the function of Strategic Maneuvering within argumentative discourse may be gained by scrutinising how the opportunities available to achieve the "objective of resolving a difference of opinion" in a reasonable way, dialectically, could be harnessed by an individual in the most rhetorically successful way (van Eemeren 2010: 43):

Each of the four stages [confrontation, opening, argumentation and concluding stages] in the resolution process is characterized by a specific dialectical aim and because the parties involved want to achieve this aim rhetorically in the best possible way, they can be expected to make at every stage the dialectically allowed moves that serve their rhetorical interests with the greatest effectiveness (van Eemeren 2010: 43).

In this manner the dialectical goals of the different discussion stages will always have a rhetorical equivalent, just as the apparent rhetorical objectives of the contestants are quantified according to the dialectical stage (van Eemeren 2010: 43):

“In all stages, both parties have to reconcile their own preferences for rhetorical effectiveness with the dialectical requirements of reasonableness inherent in the stage concerned”. This section might best be illustrated by van Eemeren’s table that is able to graphically parallel the dialectical aims versus the rhetorical aims in each of the four stages of an argument, or in the case of the *Contra Fortunatum* the entire debate.

Stage	Dialectical aims	Rhetorical aims
<i>Confrontation stage</i>	To achieve clarity concerning the specific issues at stake and the positions held by the parties in the difference of opinion.	To establish the definition of the difference of opinion that is optimal for the party concerned.
<i>Opening stage</i>	To achieve clarity concerning the point of departure for the discussion with regard to both the procedural and the material starting points.	To establish the procedural and material starting points that are optimal for the party concerned.
<i>Argumentation stage</i>	To achieve clarity concerning the protagonist's argumentation in defense of the standpoints at issue and the antagonist's doubts concerning these standpoints and the argumentation in their defense.	To establish argumentation that constitute an optimal defense of the standpoints at issue (by the protagonist) or to establish critical doubts that constitute an optimal attack on the standpoints and the argumentation (by the antagonist).
<i>Concluding stage</i>	To achieve clarity concerning the results of the critical procedure as to whether the protagonist may maintain his standpoints or the antagonist his doubts.	To establish results of the critical procedure in the way that is optimal for the party concerned as to maintaining standpoints or doubts.

Fig. 4.1 in van Eemeren (2010: 45): “Overview of the dialectical and rhetorical aims of the various stages of resolving a difference of opinion on the merits”.

The value of this table is that it is able to discern the differences between dialectical aims and rhetorical aims. As the table suggests, dialectical aims assumes that the participants in a debate are seeking to reach a mutually acceptable solution to a problem through a rational debate. On the other hand, the rhetorical aims of the table

suggest that the argument is actually a dispute, as defined by Dascal (2008: 43), a “battle of wits” where a rational conclusion is not necessarily the aim of the debate; rather the aim is to be seen to win the debate in the minds of the audience. Therefore, the rhetorical side of the table suggests that the aims of the opponents in the *Contra Fortunatum* more closely resemble the aims of the rhetorical side than those of the dialectical side. Although it should be stated that Fortunatus’ successes can be described as belonging more frequently to the dialectical sphere whereas Augustine dominates as far as the achievement of rhetorical goals are concerned.

Another important point is to note how the terms protagonist and antagonist are used in the table, where the protagonist defends a standpoint and the antagonist actively raises doubts concerning the standpoints. In the context of the debate between Augustine and Fortunatus it is important to note the manner in which the roles of protagonist and antagonist are frequently swapped between the two men. As a result I have decided that, in order to maintain clarity, I shall not use these terms as they will lead to confusion.

Also van Eemeren’s (2010: 45) concepts of coordinated Strategic Maneuvering and discussion strategies, based on the categories mentioned on the previous pages (in section 4.2.1), namely economy, efficacy, coherence, reasonableness and wellfoundedness are useful for unlocking the strategies used in the debate between Fortunatus and Augustine. Each of the four stages, namely confrontation, opening, argumentation and concluding, is characterised by its own type of manoeuvring, which in turn each has an array of specialist modes of strategic maneuvering whose characteristics are specifically attuned to promoting both the rhetorical and dialectical aims pertinent to the discussion stage that the participants happen to be in (van Eemeren 2010: 46). Furthermore, “if (and only if) the strategic maneuvers made in a

particular discussion stage hang together in such a way that they can be regarded as being systematically coordinated, ...[then we can] say that a specific *discussion strategy* (van Eemeren's emphasis) has been employed" (van Eemeren 2010:46 his emphasis).

With regard to reasonableness and effectiveness, I have decided to deal with them in separation from the four stages of argumentation in 5.5.4. The table on the previous page is important to this study for two critical reasons: the first is to establish the four stages of argumentation that take place in the debate between Augustine and Fortunatus (which I do in section 6.3). The second important reason for including the table here is the exceedingly clear way in which it describes the difference between dialectical and rhetorical aims discussed previously in this chapter. The confrontational stage of the *Contra Fortunatum* is described in section 5.5.4, the other three stages of the debate are discussed in the brief reconstruction of the debate in 5.3.

The discussion of the debate in terms of the concepts of reasonableness versus effectiveness in 5.5.4 is one of the most useful ways in which van Eemeren's explication of Strategic Maneuvering can be employed in the analyses offered here. It is the clear separation of the needs of dialectic and rhetoric which allows important perspectives on the issue of who wins the debate. The issues of reasonableness and effectiveness form a fundamental aspect of the debate between Fortunatus and Augustine, since both men are trying to win the debate in the perceptions of the audience and not necessarily aiming to find an actual solution to the problems dealt with. This is the reason why Augustine keeps on emphasising the Nebridian conundrum and Fortunatus the issue of the origin of evil. These are the issues through which each can achieve the highest rhetorical gains (thus effectiveness) and

that can do the most damage to the argument of the opponent. Both are probably aware that they will not change the viewpoints of the opponent.

A further section in chapter five that I believe is an important aspect of this study is the rhetorical perspective I discuss in 5.6.5. I feel that this section will give a clear indication as to just how intricate this debate truly is and reveal the lengths each man is willing to go to in order to influence the audience, which is the ultimate goal of the debate. As an example of the way in which rhetorical aims often overshadow dialectical aims I refer to the manner in which Augustine wilfully misinterprets the passage from Ephesians in *C. Fort* 17A purely in order to counteract the impressive ability of Fortunatus to recall such long passages from the New Testament word for word, and the impact that this may have on the audience⁵¹.

As for the discussion strategies that occur in the debate and which are examined in 6.6.7 of the analysis, I shall now describe how they are important to this study. Discussion strategies can, according to van Eemeren (2010: 47) be separated into two distinct categories: horizontal and vertical. A vertical discussion strategy involves an individual employing a clear, and usually predetermined, tactic of using a specific topic in just one stage of the debate (van Eemeren, 2010: 47). This is exemplified in Fortunatus' tactic of gaining a concession from Augustine regarding the Manichaean's way of life in the opening stage of the debate. In contrast to the vertical discussion strategy just mentioned, Augustine is the man who best evinces the manner in which a horizontal discussion strategy is employed. Instead of simply employing a few unconnected vertical discussion strategies, Augustine uses the Nebridian conundrum throughout all stages of the debate in a connected fashion,

⁵¹ See the discussion by Alflatt (1974: 125).

thus showing the value of the more complex horizontal discussion strategy and how it may be successfully employed.

The next aspect of van Eemeren's work on strategic maneuvering that allows important perspectives in the analyses in chapter five is that of topical potential and audience demand. By using a different perspective from which to view the debate, such as that of the audience, far more sophisticated analysis and evaluation are possible as opposed to simply viewing the discourse as a "monolithic whole" (van Eemeren 2010: 93).

Audience demand according to van Eemeren (2010: 94), refers to the way in which an arguer is able to manoeuvre the argument to suit the audience, so as to gain their favour. In the case of the debate between Augustine and Fortunatus, we can only speculate as to what suited the audience. However I believe that this complexity can be reasonably dealt with through the diligent use of logical reasoning and pragmatic inferences⁵² as well as making use of scholarship that pertains to the audience and their nature and requirements. A prime example of the manner in which an opponent consciously panders to the needs of the audience in the debate between Fortunatus and Augustine is *C. Fort 17A* where it seems that Augustine is forced by audience need to counter Fortunatus' use of the long Ephesians quote. Augustine feels compelled to reply with scriptural quotes of his own (which he had not done up to this point) in order to satisfy the audience to whom it can be assumed the authority of Biblical texts was paramount and because it was Fortunatus who was so effectively using quotes from it. Augustine, therefore, had to reply because he was possibly losing the sympathy of the audience through not substantiating his points by recourse to this authoritative text.

⁵² Van Eemeren suggests that pragmatic inferences can be made by making use of "common sense" (2010: 18).

It is important to bear in mind the fact that the aspects of topical potential and audience demand do not present themselves in isolation from one another; at all times they are in a constant state of flux, dependant on what the arguer feels is the most effective argumentation strategy at that particular point (van Eemeren 2010: 94). Indeed, “no strategic maneuvering can occur without making simultaneous choices regarding how to use the topical potential, how to meet audience demand and how to employ presentational devices” (van Eemeren 2010: 94).

The last paragraph of this chapter concerns the category of deceptive manoeuvring or “humptydumptying” as van Eemeren (2010: 46) calls it. I prefer to use the term deceptive manoeuvring as it more clearly defines the type of manoeuvring involved. “In employing this particular strategy a systemic effort is made to deviate from any preconceived idea of what the difference of opinion is about by determining the issues completely in one’s own way” (van Eemeren, 2010: 46). Therefore the concept of deceptive manoeuvring allows a description of the constant flux within the debate and the intention of each man to use this type of manoeuvring in order to gain an advantage over his opponent. Analysis through the employment of the concept of deceptive manoeuvring takes up the final section of chapter five in 5.6.9 and is intended as a means of evincing the manner in which Argumentation Theory and Critical Discourse Analysis can be linked successfully, as both ultimately involve power and the means to gain it over an opponent. This brings to an end the chapter on Argumentation Theory, pragma-dialectics, Strategic Maneuvering and the work of Frans van Eemeren and his associates.

4.3 Conclusion

The concepts included in this chapter form the Argumentation Theory section of my hybrid methodology and will be added to the selected concepts from Critical Discourse Analysis in order to form the analytical framework from which chapters five and six will emerge. In the conclusion of the previous chapter I mentioned how the Critical Discourse Analysis component of this hybrid methodology would use context in order to reveal crucial aspects of the debate. In the same manner I believe that the Argumentation Theory section of the hybrid methodology coupled with the pragma-dialectics and Strategic Maneuvering subsections will be able to reveal the rhetorical moves that each man makes in order to influence the audience and therefore gain power, which I argue is the ultimate goal of both Augustine and Fortunatus.

Chapter 5: Argumentation strategies in the *Contra Fortunatum*

5.1 Introduction

This chapter represents an investigation of the debate between Fortunatus and Augustine, and will be grouped into the categories involved and the strategies that are described by Critical Discourse Analysis and Argumentation Theory. The objective of this chapter is to reveal additional perspectives that Critical Discourse Analysis and Argumentation Theory are able to contribute to our understanding of numerous facets of the debate that have not been underscored before.

The use of a large number of different categories will necessitate multiple appearances of various turns at speech. This is because referring to a single turn at speech as belonging only to one category would be to oversimplify the complexity of this debate. Thus each turn at speech may appear in a wide variety of categories and subsections. The reason for the large number of subsections is in order to unravel as many different strands of complexity as possible, as dictated by Critical Discourse Analysis and Argumentation Theory⁵³. Of equal importance is the objective to expose the connections between the different turns at speech which will enable a more thorough explanation of the strategies used by each man.

The units of investigation deal with how the relevant turns at speech are characteristic of the investigation categories and how this affects the debate. Amongst the units of investigation I have also added a number of categories not formulated by Critical Discourse Analysis or Argumentation Theory, but that are

⁵³ As discussed in chapters three and four, not all of the different categories that are available for investigation will be used in this study. The reason for this consolidation of the categories of investigation is that some of the categories are irrelevant, and some others are only apparent in a few of the turns at speech. Thus, I have decided to focus on those categories that best describe the various facets of the debate, whilst avoiding those that are not apparent, repetitious or only apparent in a few turns at speech.

particularly relevant to this chapter and this particular debate (recurring devices in 5.3).

5.2 Categories of enquiry

A large number of the various categories of enquiry that are suggested by Critical Discourse Analysis and Argumentation Theory pertain to the debate as a whole. In those instances where these categories require answers to questions that concern the overall context of the debate, they are covered in chapter six. As has been stated before, in this chapter the goal is to unravel the complexity of this debate and display the intricate, and often hidden, dimensions of the rhetoric that each man uses. Also the variously persuasive, intimidating or subtle techniques that are used by both men in order to sway the audience into agreeing with their point of view are analysed further in chapter six.

Beginning (in 5.3 below) with a number of recurring devices that I have added to this analysis, due to their specific relevance to this debate, I shall then continue with the Critical Discourse Analysis categories (5.4), followed by a section structured according to the most relevant categories of Argumentation Theory (5.5) and Strategic Maneuvering (5.6). Under recurring devices I deal with techniques that are an integral part of this debate and as such are important in their own right (5.3).

5.3 A number of recurring devices

As has just been mentioned this section of the analysis of the debate between Augustine and Fortunatus complements the analysis of the debate according to either CDA or AT presented from section 5.4 onwards. In section 5.3 I investigate the following strategies that are used repeatedly by Augustine and Fortunatus and are very characteristic of the debate: answering questions, changing the topic and

quoting scripture. It is also important to note that aspects of these strategies could conceivably be placed under sections 5.4 to 5.6 dealing with some specific categories from Critical Discourse Analysis and Argumentation Theory, but their importance to this debate in particular warrants their being discussed separately and in depth.

5.3.1 Answering questions versus not answering questions

Answering and not answering questions is an issue that features prominently in the *Contra Fortunatum*. Regarding the number of times that questions are answered by each man, the total tally stands at 20 with Augustine having answered 8 questions and Fortunatus 12. There are not only direct questions (found in *C. Fort* 1F β ; 11F (2 questions); 13F; 16A; 17A; 22A; 23A; 24A; 25A; 26A; 27A; 30A; 32A; 34A; 35A; 36F), but also two other variations that I regard as questions: indirect questions (5A; 5F; 6A; 10F; 12F; 20A; 23A (contains direct and indirect questions); 24F (even though text erroneously has a question mark); 25F) and demands to answer a question posed or implied earlier (3A; 21A; 31A; 33A). These numbers also suggest that Fortunatus is not as recalcitrant as Augustine makes him out to be; indeed Fortunatus answers more questions than Augustine does.

But a truer reflection of the overall debate is revealed by the numbers of questions not answered in contrast to those that were answered. Fortunatus leaves 8 unanswered questions in total (*C. Fort* 4F, 5F, 6F, 16F, 24F, 30F, 31A, 36F). Augustine is not innocent either with three unanswered questions (*C. Fort* 5A, 25A, 31A) where he in each case answers with a counter question. Interestingly there is a pattern formed by the unanswered questions in that they seem to appear at the beginning of the first day and towards the middle to end of the second day. The fact that the clear majority of unanswered questions are Fortunatus" and follow this

pattern would suggest that Augustine used the tactic of asking questions as a deliberate strategy to find out which topics he could focus on the following day in order to win the debate through honing in on those topics that Fortunatus was clearly uncomfortable in answering, such as the question of the origin of the soul in 4A: *Augustinus dixit: has animas, quas morte ad uitam per Christum uenire fatemini, quae causa praecipitauit in mortem?*⁵⁴ It should also be mentioned here that I perceive not answering questions to be deceptive manoeuvring (which will be discussed in 5.6.9), something which is often used as a very effective tactic. Augustine is able to counteract Fortunatus' deceptive manoeuvring with his own deceptive manoeuvring; whether it be through ignoring the question or by answering a slightly different question, a circumstance that might not have been picked up by the audience and which Fortunatus does not make apparent, as Augustine certainly does such as in *C. Fort 7A* where he answers a different question to that asked by Fortunatus.

BeDuhn and Alflatt identify four primary questions that Augustine uses to target Fortunatus' weaknesses: Do humans have free will? Is evil rooted entirely in human action? Does God's omnipotence preclude an independent origin of evil? Lastly there is the question of the Nebridian conundrum (BeDuhn, 2011: 466). One by one Augustine drops these questions in the face of insightful answers on the part of Fortunatus, until all that is left is the question of the Nebridian conundrum (why God sent forth the soul to do battle with the forces of Darkness if he was invulnerable) for which Augustine will not accept any answer on the part of Fortunatus, in particular on the final day (BeDuhn, 2011: 466). BeDuhn (2011: 466) views Fortunatus as having answered the question of the Nebridian conundrum on at least six occasions

⁵⁴ Augustine said: You admit that these souls come from death to life through Christ. What cause cast them down to death?

(specifically *C. Fort* 7F, 8F, 16F, 20F, 22F and 28F). However, I view these answers as having been overly implicit in their meanings and their implications in terms of their reception by the audience. As such I argue that with the crowd being primarily Catholic, they would have taken their cue from Augustine and as a result would have not accepted the turns at speech by Fortunatus as having been proper answers to these fundamental questions. In turn it is also important to note how Alflatt (1974: 128-129) views Augustine as having evaded a number of questions himself, either by avoiding the question completely or by answering a different, but semantically similar question such as in *C. Fort* 20A and 22A, where he reacts to Pauline texts which directly contradict his position⁵⁵.

Fortunatus asks 13 questions in total and these are grouped into distinct units as well: Manichaeian morals (*C. Fort* 1F, 2F), whether there is anything besides God (*C. Fort* 4F, 5F, 6F), the origin of the soul (*C. Fort* 9F, 10F, 11F, 12F, 13F) and a few loose questions towards the end of the second day: the soul and evil (*C. Fort* 25F), the origin of Christ (*C. Fort* 30F) and the final question (*C. Fort* 36F): what then am I to say?. These groups show that, like Augustine, Fortunatus also had an idea of weak points in the Catholic system that could be exploited and used pointed questions in order to establish this. In response Augustine allows Fortunatus to dictate the direction of the debate for the first half of day one, but then takes over and effectively shuts Fortunatus down with a barrage of questions on the second day revolving around the Nebridian conundrum.

In short, Augustine's tactic in this debate was to use the asking of just a few key questions to completely undermine Fortunatus and the Manichaeian religion (in the

⁵⁵ It is important to note that after this debate Augustine changes his view on free will and actually uses the exact same combination of scriptural quotes that Fortunatus uses against him here in order to qualify this new position (BeDuhn, 2011: 475).

minds of the audience) based on his prior insider knowledge of the flaws in the Manichaean system (such as in *C. Fort* 4A and 5A); flaws that Augustine had agonised over for years and thus knew that Fortunatus would not be able to fully explain, as in the case of the Nebridian conundrum. By using just a few key questions Augustine also ensures that the audience is not confused by an oversupply of information.

Moreover, the fact that Fortunatus was, supposedly, often evasive in answering questions was made even more apparent by asking the same questions repeatedly. Most importantly, Augustine brings this „lack of satisfactory answers“ to the attention of the audience very pointedly, thus making sure that he derives maximum advantage from the situation.

5.3.2 Changing the topic

As with the different responses to questions asked, the tactic of changing the topic of discussion is a crucial feature of this debate and as with the category dealing with the answering of questions above, this category is also directly related to the Argumentation Theory categories on deceptive manoeuvring, rhetorical perspectives, dialectical aims versus rhetorical aims and discussion strategies. The reason for treating it separately here is in order to focus specifically on this very important feature of the debate.

Of interest is the fact that Augustine has asked nearly double the amount of questions that Fortunatus has asked in return. Fully 26 of Augustine’s 37 turns at speech include or imply questions, but these questions invariably revolve around only a few topics: free will, evil, the soul and the nature of God. These topics are spread out as follows: concerning free will and that evil is the result of human action

(*C. Fort* 15A, 17A, 20A, 21A, 22A), God's omnipotence precluding an independent origin of evil (*C. Fort* 13A, 15A, 21A), and the Nebridian conundrum (*C. Fort* 1A, 4A, 5A, 6A, 7A, 9A, 22A, 23A, 24A, 25A, 26A, 30A, 32A, 33A, 34A, 36A). This spread of topics shows clearly how Augustine begins the debate with the Nebridian conundrum and maintains his focus on this topic through the first nine turns of the first day, after which he opens the topics to those including the origin of evil, man's free will and man being responsible for evil. These three latter topics are apparent only in the latter half of the first day and the beginning of the second day. Thereafter Augustine focusses exclusively on the Nebridian conundrum once again. This distribution of the topics throughout the debate seems to vindicate the view that BeDuhn in particular has of the way in which Augustine stumbles over the topics other than the Nebridian conundrum, thus falling back on this single topic that shows rhetorical promise in terms of the audience.

Interestingly it is Augustine himself who attempts to change the topic most frequently on at least 11 occasions (*C. Fort* 3A (from Manichaeian morals to the Manichaeian faith), 4A (from Fortunatus' opening statement to the Nebridian conundrum), 5A and 6A (from whether there is anything besides God to the Nebridian Conundrum), 8A (from how to be liberated from death to how souls came into death), 19A (from Manichaeian mythology to the nature of Christ), 23A (from the nature of evil to whether God could suffer injury), 25A (from why the soul is involved in miseries to the Nebridian conundrum), 29A (from adoption of the soul to the Nebridian conundrum), 31A and 32A (from whether Christ came from God to the Nebridian conundrum)). Fortunatus attempts the same eight times: *C. Fort* 1F (from the Nebridian conundrum to Manichaeian morals), 4F and 5F (from the Nebridian conundrum to whether there is nothing besides God), 7F (from the inviolability of

God to how souls may be liberated from death), 9F and 10F (from the Nebridian conundrum to whether the soul comes from God), 16F (from whether God can suffer from evil to the source of evil) and 30F (from the Nebridian conundrum to whether Christ came from God). It would seem, however, that this picture is somewhat distorted; whereas in most of these instances Fortunatus is attempting to avoid a topic, the main goal pursued by Augustine in the quoted instances is to keep Fortunatus focussed on the previous argument and thus to block Fortunatus' escape from the topic at hand, mostly the Nebridian conundrum.

A pertinent example of the way in which this to and fro plays out is the series of turns at speech which comes towards the end of the second day, *C. Fort* 30A-30F-31A. Importantly this passage also shows the manner in which each man tries to avoid answering the question concerning the reason for either souls or Christ being sent to earth. Augustine asks: *quid opus erat isto progressu, ubi nihil habebat deus, quod caueret, cui noceri nihil poterat?*⁵⁶ (*C. Fort* 30A). To this Fortunatus responds: *constat apud conscientiam vestram a deo uenisse Christum?*⁵⁷ (*C. Fort* 30F). Augustine then indignantly replies with *iterum me interrogas. ad interrogata responde.*⁵⁸ (*C. Fort* 31A).

As we are able to read, Fortunatus is trying to change the direction of the debate towards a topic that is more favourable to his cause, whereas Augustine is actively blocking him from doing so. This implies, in fact, that the only way in which Fortunatus might have been able to change the topic successfully was if he had

⁵⁶ What need was there for this going forth when God had nothing to watch out for, since nothing could harm him?

⁵⁷ Is it certain in your mind that Christ came from God?

⁵⁸ Again you question me; reply to my questions.

answered Augustine's questions directly and to Augustine's satisfaction, which the latter can, of course, withhold indefinitely.

5.3.3 Quoting scripture

Before I begin to discuss the use of this device in the debate I shall give a brief overview of the use of scripture in public debate, both by Catholics and the Manichees during this time⁵⁹. First, Alflatt notes that the public in Roman North Africa were particular fans of public disputation and were highly susceptible to suggestion; they were very fond of practitioners of rhetoric (Alflatt, 1974: 119). But, more importantly, the general public held the scriptures in very high esteem and as a result anyone able to wield quotes that supported their position was far more likely to sway an audience (Alflatt, 1974: 119)⁶⁰. This is probably a large part of the reason why Fortunatus had done so well in Hippo with his public disputations against Catholics and Donatists alike. Quoting the New Testament seems to have been an integral part of the missionary practice of the Manichees at this time in Roman North Africa (Alflatt, 1974: 119-120)⁶¹. As for Augustine, "only on rare occasions did [he] quote from a section of the Scriptures in a continuous fashion, whether in exegesis or in defence of the faith" (Wiles, 1995: xix)⁶². This puts into stark contrast the manner in which the quoting of scripture is used in this debate and Augustine's first use of scripture in the debate may well have been forced due to his rival's continuous, successful use of New Testament writings to back his arguments (Alflatt, 1974: 126).

⁵⁹ For more information on this aspect of Augustine's strategy see Teske (2009) and Decret (1970).

⁶⁰ This was a double edged sword though, as Osterhaven points out, "[the] danger of perverting the gospel makes reflection and definition, comparison and comprehension imperative. Simply quoting scripture is not enough..." (Osterhaven, 1982: 2).

⁶¹ See van den Berg (2010) for a comprehensive discussion of Manichaean missionary practice in Roman North Africa.

⁶² For an exposition of the way in which Augustine uses scripture in general see Deems (1945).

Basing arguments on scriptural quotations is an important device in the debate and is one that is of particular relevance to the discussion at hand. Because the debate centres on religion and Christianity in general, it is natural that both Augustine and Fortunatus make numerous references to scripture in order to qualify their arguments. What an analysis of these instances shows us is that Fortunatus prefers to use the New Testament Gospel texts of Matthew and John, while the rest of the writings he quotes are all Pauline letters. Augustine uses a far wider spread of scriptures, although he too tends towards using the writings of Paul. This is because Paul was „the apostle of the Manichees“ (Kotzé, 2004: 121) and as such was accepted as an absolute authority by the Manichaeans. These quotes on the part of Augustine were aimed at Fortunatus as much as the audience. Augustine clearly sought to use the scriptures that Fortunatus himself recognises in order to show how Manichaeism was fundamentally not compatible with these scriptures, and in so doing prove that Fortunatus was being very selective in his use of Paul’s writings and the gospels of Matthew and John.

The following list reflects the New Testament quotes that Fortunatus uses in the debate, as identified by Decret and van Oort (2004: 77) (22 passages in total)⁶³.

- Mt: 3,10; 7, 17-20; 7,19; 10,16; 15,13
- Io: 5,24; 10,9; 10,18; 14,6; 14,9; 15,22
- Rm: 7,23-25; 8,7; 9,20; 11,1
- 1Cor: 15,50
- Gal: 5,17; 6,14
- Eph: 2,1-7a; 2,3; 6,12; 2,16b-18

⁶³ There exists some disagreement as to which sections of the debate are in fact quotes or paraphrasing from scripture. As a result the lists that mention biblical quotes tend to differ from one scholar to another.

Augustine's list of quotations is both more spread out as well as being fewer in number (11 in total):

- Gn: 3,19
- Ps: 148,5
- Mt: 12,33
- Io: 1,3; 10,18
- Rm: 1,1-4; 5,19; 8,2
- 1Cor: 1,24; 15,21; 15,49
- Gal: 5,13
- Eph: 1,5; 5,6
- 1Tm: 4,4; 6,10

There are no real patterns to the occurrence of these quotes, though they are often clustered together in single turns at speech (such as *C. Fort* 3F, then 7F and 9A). As is discussed in chapter six, Possidius (*Vita* 6) wrote that an agreement had been made previously that the debate was to be held on strictly rational grounds and not based on scripture. However, once one of the debaters starts a cycle of quoting it becomes necessary for the opponent to use scriptural quotes in order to counter argue against the scriptural quotes used by the other man. However, on both days the opening sequences are almost completely devoid of scriptural quotes, which suggests that both men initially observed the agreed rules of the debate. Yet it seems that Fortunatus' return to his habit of using quotation from scripture forces Augustine to then follow suit.

Before closing this section and moving on to section 5.4 about the categories of Critical Discourse Analysis, I refer the reader to one scriptural quote in particular.

Both Alflatt and BeDuhn suggest that at the end of the first day Augustine was in a rather precarious position and that he intentionally introduced the quote from Romans 1:1-4 which he knew would be harshly dealt with by Fortunatus as he fundamentally disagreed with its contents because it brought to the surface the issue of whether Christ inhabited a body of flesh or not. As Alflatt suggests, this may well have been introduced in order to force Fortunatus to disagree with the contents and expose the fact that he only followed certain New Testament passages and not others, thus drawing the ire of the crowd who held all the scriptures as sacred (Alflatt, 1974: 126). Alflatt also agrees with Decret (1970, 47-49) in that the debate at the end of day one may have been purposely broken up by a group of parishioners who sought to help Augustine (Alflatt, 1974: 127).

The arguments put forward by Decret and Alflatt surrounding the use of Romans 1:1-4 support my findings that by the end of day one Augustine had been placed in an uncomfortable corner by Fortunatus. This section on recurring devices within the debate will now be followed by an analysis of the debate more formally structured around the selected categories from Critical Discourse Analysis (5.4), Argumentation Theory (5.5) and Strategic Maneuvering (5.6).

5.4 Critical Discourse Analysis categories

The section based on Critical Discourse Analysis categories is divided into two separate units that are directly linked with the work of the authors who first suggested them as categories of enquiry. The first unit consists of the first two sections (5.4.1 and 5.4.2) and employs the categories devised by Halliday and Fairclough, that of evaluation and difference. These are the only two categories that meaningfully support the kind of analysis I am interested in in this section of the

dissertation (the other categories formulated by Halliday and Fairclough pertain to the debate as a whole and are used in chapter six). The second unit, consisting of 5.4.3, revolves around the category of knowledge as a common ground component of contexts explicated by van Dijk.

5.4.1 Difference

The category of difference is primarily concerned with the way in which difference between divergent viewpoints is expressly mentioned (or unmistakably alluded to) in a single turn at speech⁶⁴. This is something that frequently occurs in the *Contra Fortunatum* and should not come as a surprise since the very essence of this debate revolves around the differences between Manichaean Christianity and Catholic Christianity. These differences are explicitly mentioned by both Augustine and Fortunatus in roughly equal quantities throughout the debate and are also associated directly with the dominant topics of the discussion: free will, the nature of evil, the source of evil and the origin of the soul.

Explicit mention of difference occurs in only approximately half of all the turns at speech and they tend to form a pattern in that each time either Fortunatus or Augustine mentions difference the opponent will mirror this action and do the same in the very next turn at speech. For the most part it is Augustine who instigates this feature of the debate, but Fortunatus also articulates difference at times and in these cases it is Augustine who mirrors Fortunatus. This seems to be a conscious tactic that is employed by both men.

⁶⁴ Fairclough's category of difference (2.2) also includes issues such as power, age, education etc.. In this instance I shall be focussing on the most important difference in this debate, namely the difference between the Manichaean and Catholic faiths. The issues of age, power and educational differences have already been dealt with in the previous chapters and in particular chapters 1 and 6.

The first of two examples that I shall discuss forms the breaking point at the end of the first day and is the same passage just discussed in the previous category, namely that which concerns Augustine's quote of Romans 1:1-4. Difference is indicated by Augustine and then mirrored immediately by Fortunatus. This example occurs right at the end of the first day and concerns the nature of Jesus Christ (C. Fort 19A-19Fa). Augustine purposely chooses to stem the flow of Fortunatus' appeal to the audience through the use of scripture by formulating what stands in direct contrast to Manichaean belief: *uidimus apostolum de domino nostro nos docere, ut et uirtute dei ante carnem praedestinatus fuerit et secundum carnem factus sit ei de semine Daud.*⁶⁵(C. Fort 19A). Augustine then makes clear why he feels that Fortunatus has no right to quote scripture since the Manichaean does not actually grant authority to all of the scriptures, in the process articulating another crucial point of difference: *hoc uos cum semper negaueritis et negetis, quomodo scripturas flagitatis, ut secundum eas potius disseramus?*⁶⁶(C. Fort 19A). To this challenge, Fortunatus reacts precisely in the manner in which Augustine hopes he will, by disagreeing with the New Testament passage that Augustine has just used, and thus also expressing difference: *secundum carnem adseritis ex semine Daud, cum praedicetur ex uirgine esse natus, et filius dei magnificetur. fieri enim non potest, nisi ut quod de spiritu est, spiritus habeatur, et quod de carne est, caro intellegatur.*⁶⁷(C. Fort 19Fa).

⁶⁵ We see that the apostle teaches us that our Lord was both predestined by the power of God before he assumed flesh and was born for him according to the flesh as a descendant of David.

⁶⁶ Since you always denied this latter point and still deny it, how do you demand that we debate instead according to the scriptures?

⁶⁷ You claim that he was born according to the flesh as a descendant of David, though it is proclaimed that he was born of a virgin [Isaiah 7, 14] and was glorified as the Son of God. It is necessary, after all, that what comes from spirit be regarded as spirit and that what comes flesh be understood to be flesh [John 3,6].

The parallelism in Fortunatus' turn at speech underlines his difference with Augustine, in directly addressing a major point of contention between Manichaeism and Catholicism; the former views Jesus Christ as being a spirit who merely appeared to be human, whilst the Catholics saw Christ as actually having taken on human form (Alflatt, 1974: 127). The reason that Augustine chooses at this stage to accentuate this specific difference between the faiths is, Alflatt (1974: 127) argues, because of the success that Fortunatus was having in using scriptural passages in order to bolster his arguments. Augustine knew that one of the fundamental differences between the faiths was that the Catholics regarded all of scripture as sacred text whilst the Manichees viewed only sections of the New Testament as being so and expressly excluded any texts that contradicted their beliefs.

As a result, the audience would be made fully aware of the manner in which Fortunatus was selectively following the scriptures, which, as has been stated in the 5.3.3, the predominantly Catholic crowd held as sacrosanct. This expression of difference would thus immediately undermine Fortunatus in the eyes of the audience, which we may safely assume was exactly what Augustine meant to achieve.

The next example that I will examine is the occurrence of a disputed difference. By this I refer to one of the central points of contention between the two actors in this debate namely the inviolability of God. Both Augustine and Fortunatus insist that their faiths hold God to be invulnerable and incontaminable, yet Augustine insists that the very basis of the Manichaean faith system implies that God must be violable in order to explain the need for the Light to send defenders to repel the invasion of the Darkness. As examined in the second chapter of this study, the question that Augustine poses is why God would need to repel an attack at all if he was

invulnerable since an attack on an invulnerable God could never be successful: *ergo et tu dignare mihi breuiter ad unum, quod interrogo, respondere. noceri deo non poterat, an poterat? sed quaeso mihi ut non poterat respondeas (C. Fort 23A)*⁶⁸.

Fortunatus agrees to this, and in doing so quashes Augustine's statement of difference: *non poterat noceri (C. Fort 23F)*⁶⁹. In this case, Fortunatus is actually agreeing with Augustine and is thus insisting that the two faiths are not different on this point, but Augustine is using this conclusion to tear into Manichaeism using the Nebridian conundrum and in so doing is trying to show that there is a difference between the faiths, even on points where Fortunatus does not wish to acknowledge difference.

A further example of difference is perhaps best described in a turn at speech that Fortunatus directs towards Augustine. In this turn at speech (*C. Fort 28F*), which occurs towards the end of the second day's debate, we witness Fortunatus reacting angrily to a statement just made by Augustine regarding the reason why God sent forth the soul; he counters with a jibe of his own, which refuses to acknowledge the difference articulated by Augustine (namely that the Manichaean God is cruel by implication in contrast to the Catholic God). Again Fortunatus mirrors Augustine by formulating the difference in inverse form: *nos dicere adseueras crudelem esse deum mittendo animam; fecisse deum uero hominem et insufflasse in eum animam; quam utique pro sua scientia animam futuram inuolui et beneficio malorum non*

⁶⁸ And so, please briefly answer for me the one question I ask: Was God able to be harmed or was he not? But, please, I beg you, answer me that he was not able to be.

⁶⁹ He was not able to be harmed.

*posse hereditati suae repraesentari. hoc aut ignorantis est aut dantis animam ad haec mala, quae supra memorata sunt*⁷⁰ (C. Fort 28F).

The nature of this debate is one of fundamental difference between the debaters but I think that the point has been adequately demonstrated by the examples above. I now continue to analyse one more device highlighted by Critical Discourse Analysis before I proceed to an application of selected categories from Argumentation Theory in order to further the aim of understanding this debate fully. In order to do this I will now proceed to the category of evaluation.

5.4.2 Evaluation

As has been discussed in chapter three, I will use the category of evaluation to highlight places in the debate where the speaker makes an explicit evaluation of what the opponent has just said in his previous turn at speech. Evaluation in this sense is a direct and explicit judgement on what the opponent has just said and is meant to undermine the argument of the opponent, robbing the opponent of power, thus making evaluation an effective tool for the rhetorician to use against his fellow debater. The fact that Augustine uses evaluation twice as much as Fortunatus in this debate suggests Augustine's superior rhetorical ability and his cognisance of the effect that using this tactic will have on the audience. Similarly, the fact that Fortunatus later takes up the same strategy suggests that he may also have become aware of the corrosive effect that evaluation was having on his arguments and that he needed to emulate Augustine in using this tactic.

⁷⁰ You assert that we say that God is cruel in sending the soul, but you claim that God made man and breathed a soul into him, which he certainly foreknew would be involved in future misery and could not be restored to its inheritance by reason of its evils. This is an act either of someone ignorant or of someone who hands the soul over to these evils that were mentioned previously.

The full group of instances where this happens proceeds as follows: *C. Fort* 3A and 7A (evaluation of Fortunatus' debating strategy), 9A (evaluation of Fortunatus' theory of the origin of all things), 11A (again, evaluation of Fortunatus' debating strategy), 12A (evaluation of Fortunatus' view of the origin of the soul), 14F (evaluation of Augustine's view of God as the origin of all things), 15A (evaluation of Fortunatus' views on the origin of evil and free will), 15F (evaluation of Augustine's view on the inviolability of God), 17A (evaluation of Fortunatus' use of scripture), 17F (evaluation of Augustine's view of the origin of the soul), 19A and 19F (evaluation of each other's views on the nature of Christ), 20A, 20F, 21A, 21F, 22A and 23A (evaluation of each other's views on the source of evil), 25A, (evaluation of Fortunatus' debating tactics) 26F (evaluation of Augustine's view of the origin of evil), 27A (evaluation of Fortunatus' implied view that God might be pressed by necessity), 27F (evaluation of Augustine's debating strategy), 28F (Fortunatus' evaluation of the cruelty of the Catholic God), 29A (evaluation of Fortunatus' view of adoption of the soul), 30F (evaluation of Augustine's view of the origin of Christ), 33F (evaluation of Augustine's view on the origin of the soul), 34A, 35A, 36A and 37A (evaluation of Fortunatus' debating strategy).

Equally interesting is that whereas Augustine is from the beginning continuously making value judgements about what Fortunatus says. Fortunatus' evaluations of Augustine's turns at speech only really become evident towards the very end of the first day and then continuously throughout the second day's debate. The manner in which Fortunatus first does not use evaluation and then applies this strategy consistently would suggest that he is made aware of this tactic through the course of the first day and consequently decides that he needs to counter this with his own evaluations of what Augustine has said.

The first passage chosen as an example of evaluation on the part of Augustine (*C. Fort* 9A) occurs towards the middle of the first day and is an important expression of the way in which Augustine makes judgements on the Manichaean belief system using the Nebridian conundrum. It is also an example of several other strategies such as controlling the topic and influencing dominant context categories: in this case the topics which Augustine and Fortunatus respectively prefer to emphasize, namely the inviolability of God and the origin of the soul. In *C. Fort* 9A Augustine recapitulates the essence of the Nebridian conundrum and the rationale for the creation of man in Manichaean cosmology: *si non potest ei aliquid nocere, quid ei factura erat gens tenebrarum, contra quam dicitis bellum gestum esse a deo ante constitutionem mundi, in quo bello nos, id est animas, quas modo indigere liberatoris manifestum est, commixtas esse omni malo et morti implicatas adseritis?*⁷¹ More importantly, Augustine then provides an explicit evaluation by spelling out the implications of what he has just said. His short clipped phrases and the parallelism of the sentence make this an effective way of forcing the point in the minds of the audience: *redeo enim ad illud breuissimum: si poterat ei noceri, non est inuiolabilis; si non poterat, crudeliter huc nos misit, ut ista patiamur* (*C. Fort* 9A)⁷².

Another highly pertinent example of an evaluation on the part of an actor in this debate comes from the second day. It is spoken by Fortunatus and evinces a frustration that is rarely seen on his part: *iam hoc est: noli ad inuidiam excitare id, quod dictum est* (*C. Fort* 27F)⁷³. In this turn at speech, Fortunatus judges Augustine as having crossed a line in having asked a spurious question. This may be deduced

⁷¹ If nothing can harm it, what was the nation of darkness going to do to it? For you say that God waged war against the nation of darkness before the creation of the world, and you claim that in that war we, that is, our souls, which it is clear now need a deliverer, were mingled with every evil and entangled in death.

⁷² Now I am returning to that very brief argument: if something can harm him, he is not inviolable; if it cannot, he sent us here out of cruelty in order that we might suffer these evils.

⁷³ That is indeed the case. But do not stir up animosity over what was said.

from the initial interjection (which could be rendered: “now this is it”) and Fortunatus” admonishment of Augustine not to bring odium upon what has been said, combined with the use of the imperative *noli*. This particular evaluation is not of the question just posed by Augustine, but on Augustine himself and as such may be seen as a personal attack.

Shortly after the turn at speech just described Augustine again counters with an oblique evaluation of the core of the Manichaeian belief concerning the reason for man’s existence and the invulnerability of God: *quid opus erat isto progressu, ubi nihil habebat deus, quod caueret, cui noceri nihil poterat (C. Fort 30A)*⁷⁴? The importance of this judgement is that it forms part of a pattern by Augustine by which he systematically makes evaluations of Fortunatus” Manichaeian belief and the manner in which the Manichee answers his questions. A possible reason for this is that Augustine wants to make certain that every time Fortunatus describes his faith’s core beliefs, he counters with an evaluation meant to keep the questionable nature of the Manichaeian faith in the front of the audience’s mind and in so doing to undermine Fortunatus at every available opportunity.

The category of evaluation leads directly to the next category examined here, that of common knowledge between the debaters, since the evaluations of both men are primarily based on the knowledge that each man has of the other man’s faith. Such evaluations are all the more effective since they both strike at the core of the different faith systems.

⁷⁴ What need was there for this going forth when God had nothing to watch out for, since nothing could harm him?

5.4.3 Knowledge as a common ground component of contexts

From the beginning of this debate it is highly important to understand that it is not just the actors' knowledge that forms a common ground component of contexts, but the knowledge of the audience too. As the intended arbiters of this debate they are in fact the most important role players and the presence of a majority Catholic audience means that they may have had a better understanding of the Catholic side of the argument. More importantly, as argued before, it might be expected that they would have been susceptible to the supremacy of the scriptures as a way to underscore any particular point. There are thus three sets of knowledge at work in this debate: that of Fortunatus, of Augustine and of the audience.

As might be expected, the matter of shared knowledge plays a central role on both Augustine's and Fortunatus' sides. This is displayed by Augustine in the manner in which he answers several of his own questions that he poses to Fortunatus, when Fortunatus is unwilling or unable to answer, regarding the Manichaean system and its beliefs. In turn Fortunatus shows his knowledge of scripture (which also belongs to the domains of Augustine's and the crowd's knowledge) through his many quotes from the New Testament. It needs to be pointed out, though, that the scriptural passages which Fortunatus is able to quote often and at length are those which are from the selection of New Testament books which the Manichees claimed as their own. These Biblical quotes of Fortunatus then do not originate from the entirety of the Catholic New Testament and as such signify the fact that as much as Fortunatus knows these passages well, that knowledge does not extend to the rest of the New Testament writings (Alflatt, 1974: 120-121).

Augustine's vast knowledge of Manichaeism is visible already within his first turn at speech in which he discusses the foundations of the Manichaean faith and the

opinion that he holds regarding the fatal flaw in the system. Van Oort (2012: 192) makes the important observation that Augustine displays a thorough knowledge of the Manichaeic *Epistula fundamenti* and *Thesaurus*, not just in this turn at speech, but throughout the entire debate. This view of Augustine as having a thorough knowledge of Manichaeism early in his Catholic life is a question that is currently highly controversial though. Coyle (2003: 10) argues that Augustine learnt and read much about Manichaeism and its books only later during his time as a bishop of Hippo and that all he knew about Manichaeism at the time of the debate was that which he had heard as a Hearer. Van Oort's 2008b article titled „The young Augustine's knowledge of Manichaeism: An analysis of the Confessiones and other relevant texts“, deals directly with this question. I find van Oort's (2008b) arguments that Augustine had a far deeper knowledge of Manichaeism than that of a regular Hearer wholly convincing.

This section on shared knowledge between participants and audience now leads to the following section that deals with the category of Argumentation Theory. Within this section I shall delve into the category of argumentative indicators, and standpoints and disputes in particular.

5.5 Argumentation Theory: Argumentative indicators (standpoints and disputes)

The section on argumentative indicators is tasked with dealing with the categories of analysis devised by Frans van Eemeren (4.2). This unit will build on the analyses that have already been executed in the Critical Discourse Analysis section above. As has been indicated on several occasions, one of the important aims of this dissertation is to illustrate the manner in which the hybrid methodology advanced

here might lead to a greater understanding of the debate between Augustine and Fortunatus. The use of the categories of Argumentation Theory is complementary to the use of the terminology of Critical Discourse Analysis and yields new perspectives on some of the characteristics of the debate already discussed above.

Before I begin with the category of indicators of confrontation: standpoints or disputes, it is important to revise the terms standpoints and disputes. As has been expressed in 4.2.1, there is a fundamental difference between standpoints and disputes. I have slightly modified the manner in which these terms are applied by adapting the definition used based on the needs of this analysis. Standpoints remain relatively intact in that I have chosen to define them as propositions of which there is the possibility of the opponent (or the speaker) either responding in a positive or negative way. An example of this occurs in *C. Fort* 1A, where Augustine makes a grand opening statement that puts forward his (Catholic) view of the Nebridian conundrum in relation to the Manichaean faith and then asks Fortunatus to respond. Fortunatus, in turn, responds by asking Augustine for a concession regarding the Manichaean way of life; he thus postpones his opening standpoint (in this case it is also his opening statement).

Disputes, according to Dascal (2008: 43), are a “battle of wits” with no predictable stratagems. In order to identify these disputes in the debate between Augustine and Fortunatus I identify disputes by means of turns at speech which actively make a judgement of a previous turn at speech and differ from the content thereof. Augustine is the prime exponent of the dispute and the disputes of his which I have identified are spread throughout the whole of the debate.

Standpoints or disputes as indicators of confrontation are the first of those categories that deal with the classifications and terminology dictated by Argumentation Theory (4.2). There is a fundamental difference between standpoints on the one hand and disputes on the other, as well as in the way these are used by Fortunatus and Augustine: the standpoints that are posited by both men tend to be very clear and well-argued whilst the disputes are less so on the part of Fortunatus as exemplified by *C. Fort* 28F where he begins by disputing the fact that God is cruel in the Manichaean system because he sends forth the soul to do battle and suffer on his behalf, but then undermines the clarity of the statement by changing the topic to the question of the adoption of souls. On Augustine's part the disputes are logically presented and thus clear and easy to understand by the audience whereas Fortunatus sometimes falls into the habit of presenting his thoughts and disputes in an illogical manner that might well be rationally correct, but are not easily comprehensible to the audience, such as in the example just mentioned.

Augustine makes use of standpoints and disputes about 50% more often in total (21 times for Augustine versus 14 times for Fortunatus, see the discussion below) than Fortunatus does, but this statistic belies the nature and spread of these points of confrontation. Fortunatus manages to produce the vast majority of his confrontational points (i.e. both standpoints and disputes) through the first day, closely matching Augustine's own use of standpoints and disputes in terms of number of occurrences, but these occur at different points in the first day's debate. In *C. Fort* 3F Fortunatus argues that God is invulnerable and cannot be the source of evil (a standpoint), in *C. Fort* 4F and 5F he challenges Augustine to concur that God is the source of all things (therefore disputes). In *C. Fort* 9F, 10F and 11F Fortunatus disputes Augustine's view of the origin of the soul:

ergo negasti animam ex deo esse, quamdiu peccatis ac uitiis et mundanis rebus deseruit et errore ducitur, quod fieri non potest, aut ut deus hoc patiatur aut substantia eius. est enim deus incorruptibilis et substantia eius immaculata est et sancta. hic uero quaeritur a uobis, utrum anima ex deo sit necne. quod nos fatemur et ostendimus ex saluatoris aduentu, ex ipsius sancta praedicatione, ex ipsius lectione, dum animis miseretur et secundum eius arbitrium anima uenisse dicitur, ut eandem de morte liberaret et perduceret eam ad aeternam gloriam et restitueret patri. quid uero de anima tu ipse dicis aut speras, utrum sit a deo, necne? et substantiam dei, ex qua neges esse animam, nullis passionibus posse subiacere?⁷⁵ (C. Fort 11F).

In C. Fort 13F and 17F he disputes the topics of free will and, once again, God as creator of all things. In formulating these disputes and standpoints Fortunatus thus successfully counters three of Augustine's main lines of attack against the Manichaean system, forcing Augustine to focus almost exclusively on the Nebridian conundrum on the second day.

In the second day's debate, Fortunatus seems to have either changed his strategy or become entangled in Augustine's rhetorical traps. Here he finds himself in a defensive position, where all he is attempting to do is effectively control the damage that Augustine was inflicting on his argument. Fortunatus does so ineffectually in my opinion by attempting to change the topic as in 33F where he tries to steer the subject over to the origin of the soul. This is not to say that Fortunatus is completely overwhelmed by Augustine. On the contrary: Fortunatus succeeds in extracting

⁷⁵ And so you have denied that the soul is from God as long as it is enslaved to sins, vices, and worldly things, because it is impossible that either God or his substance should suffer this. For God is incorruptible, and his substance is immaculate and holy. But here you are being asked whether the soul is from God or not. We profess that it is and show this from the coming of the savior, from his holy preaching, and from his election, when he takes pity on souls; and the soul is said to have come in accord with his decision in order that he might set it free from death, lead it to eternal glory, and restore it to the Father. But what do you yourself say or hope for concerning the soul? Is it from God or not? And can the substance of God, from which you deny that the soul comes, be subject to no sufferings?

himself after he was backed into a corner by Augustine with the Nebridian conundrum of the reason why God sent forth the soul in *C. Fort* 30A, 31A, 32A, 33A, 34A through a combination of elusive answers that might cause members of the audience to question the argument of Augustine. In response to *C. Fort* 30A, where Augustine again asks why God sent forth the soul against a contrary nature if that nature could not harm God, Fortunatus answers: *constat apud conscientiam nostram a deo uenisse Christum?*⁷⁶(*C. Fort* 30F), therefore alluding to the fact that whatever reason God sent the soul to earth for, he did the same to Jesus Christ. In response to this evasion, Augustine insists that Fortunatus answer his questions about why the souls were sent to earth, to which Fortunatus answers with a valid statement showing that the same question applies, in fact, to the sending of Christ: *sic accepi in fide, quod uoluntate dei ipse huc uenerit.*⁷⁷(*C. Fort* 31F). As stated before, I believe that this series of exchanges by Fortunatus are designed to put doubt into the minds of the audience regarding the Nebridian conundrum. I argue that if Fortunatus had not stated this explicitly and clearly, he may have been able to quash the Nebridian conundrum. But for some reason he is unable to do so.

From the awkward position in which Fortunatus finds himself towards the end of the second day he debates vigorously to sidestep the dangerous question of the Nebridian conundrum, and does so very effectively in my opinion by answering with statements that themselves might undermine the Catholic position such as in *C. Fort* 33F:

nihil noceri deo iam diximus, et in contraria natura esse animam diximus, ideo ut contrariae naturae modum inponeret; modo inposito contrariae naturae sumit eandem deus. ipse enim dixit: potestatem habeo ponendi

⁷⁶ Is it certain in your mind that Christ came from God?

⁷⁷ I have accepted in faith that Christ came here by the will of God.

*animam meam et potestatem sumendi eam [John 10, 18]. hanc mihi pater dedit potestatem ponendi animam meam et sumendi eam. deus ergo, qui loquebatur in filio, de qua anima diceret? constat esse animam nostram, quae in his corporibus habetur, quod dei uoluntate uenerit et de uoluntate ipsius iterum adsumatur.*⁷⁸(*C. Fort* 33F).

But the reality of Fortunatus not providing more than four standpoints or disputes on the second day and just one in the end stages of the debate is very telling (*C. Fort* 19Fβ (God is not the origin of evil), 21F, 27F and 28F (origin of the soul)). The topics of these standpoints include the origin of evil, the nature of the soul and sin.

In contrast to the lopsided spread of confrontational indicators on the part of Fortunatus, Augustine is even and constant in his use of 14 disputes and 7 standpoints throughout the debate. This must form part of Augustine's overall strategy in order to keep the debate firmly revolving around the topic of Manichaeism and not Catholicism. He keeps control of the direction of the debate through disputes in particular as is evident in turns *C. Fort* 3A and 5A (disputes Fortunatus' topic of discussion), 7A (disputes Fortunatus' implied view of the violability of God), 12A (disputes Fortunatus' view of the nature of the soul), 15A (disputes Fortunatus' view of the origin of evil), 17A (disputes Fortunatus' view of free will and sin), 21A (disputes Fortunatus' view of the origin of evil), 25A (disputes Fortunatus' view of the the soul and free will), 28A (disputes Fortunatus' view of the origin of the soul), 29A (disputes Fortunatus' view of the adoption of the soul), 32A (poses the dispute of the Nebridian conundrum), 34A (disputes Fortunatus' view of God's power over the soul), 36A (poses the dispute of the Nebridian conundrum) and 37A (disputes

⁷⁸ We have already said that nothing harms God, and we have said that the soul was present in the opposing nature in order to place a limit upon the opposing nature. Once it has imposed a limit upon the opposing nature, God takes up the same soul. For he himself said, "I have the power to lay down my soul and the power to take it up again" [John 10, 18]. The Father gave me the power to lay down my soul and take it up again. About which soul, therefore, would God, who was speaking in the Son, say this? It is clear that it is our soul that is found in these bodies because it came by the will of God and will be taken up again by his will.

Fortunatus" answer to Augustine"s questions). In this way Augustine steers the debate in a different direction from what Fortunatus is comfortable with and is able to keep Fortunatus on the defensive and unable to effectively turn the tables on him.

Fortunatus did try to do this on several occasions, but was blocked by Augustine"s use of context control, as in *C. Fort* 9A followed by *C. Fort* 10A, as well as in *C. Fort* 30A through to 34A where Augustine insisted that Fortunatus answer his question (the Nebridian conundrum). Augustine simultaneously refused to accept any answer that Fortunatus gave, while ensuring he came across as magnanimous as in *C. Fort* 9A and 10A, by agreeing to answer Fortunatus" questions, but always ensuring that he points this fact out to the audience. This tactic compels Fortunatus to answer Augustine"s questions but not the reverse. The only questions that Augustine did answer were those that might be viewed as inconsequential to the overall debate apart from some questions that pertained to Christianity in general such as *C. Fort* 6A, 11A, 12A, 25A, discussed below.

It is important to note that although Augustine claimed to have answered the disputes put to him, in many instances he did not, in fact, address the substance of the questions put to him by Fortunatus in the turns at speech that precede *C. Fort* 6A, 11A, 12A, and 25A. Fortunatus first asks whether there is anything besides God, to which Augustine answers that God is invulnerable, a fact that they both agree on. The dispute in 10F is simply: does the soul act independently? This is a question that goes to the heart of the difference between Manichaeism and Catholicism, to which Augustine replies with a not entirely direct answer that God and the soul are different entities. In *C. Fort* 11F Fortunatus disputes that the substance of God, from which Augustine denies the soul has its source, can be subject to suffering. To this Augustine answers evasively, once again, that God and the thing he makes are

separate entities and are not equal to each other. The final dispute that Augustine answers is how he accounts for the soul being here on earth? The answer that Augustine gives in *C. Fort* 25A is that the soul sinned, was cast out from blessedness and that is why it is now in the world involved in miseries.

The opening statements of both Augustine and Fortunatus on each day all deal with the speaker's belief system and how they viewed this as being correct. These opening statements are prototypical standpoints in line with the definitions formulated by Fairclough in chapter three of this study as they represent the very essence of what the debate is going to revolve around. In contrast, regarding disputes, one of the best instances of dispute is delivered by Augustine and goes to the very core of the Manichaean problem, as he sees it: in *C. Fort* 7A Augustine first makes the statement that both men agree that God is invulnerable, but that this means that Manichaeism is in fact a heresy since it also states that God sent forth a power to do battle with the forces of Darkness, when they threatened His kingdom and that as a result of this battle human souls, comingled with Darkness, and are labouring. In order to press the point, Augustine again explains to the audience how this is a heresy since God cannot be threatened and that therefore the Manichaean belief system posits a God who is vulnerable and not inviolable:

*si deus nihil pati potuit a gente tenebrarum, quia inuiolabilis est, sine causa huc nos misit, ut nos hic aerumnas patiamur. si autem aliquid pati potuit, non est inuiolabilis deceptis eos, quibus dicitis esse inuiolabilem deum. hoc enim uestra haeresis negat, cum cetera exponitis.*⁷⁹(*C. Fort* 7A)

⁷⁹ If God could not suffer anything from the nation of darkness because he was inviolable; he sent us here for no purpose so that we might suffer these woes here. But if he could suffer something, he is not inviolable. For your heresy denies this point when it explains the others.

By way of illustration of the way in which Fortunatus is sometimes guilty of presenting his disputes in an illogical and not easily comprehensible manner I refer to turn *C. Fort* 26F, which follows the question posed by Augustine as to why God sent man to earth if He could not suffer injury. To this Fortunatus responds by first rephrasing the question, and in doing so adds the dimension of evil and the mingling of the soul with the world. Of itself there are no problems in this first sentence of the response, in that it is clear. The problems in logic and comprehensibility begin in the second sentence which includes a quote from Romans 9:20 that seems to admonish anyone for asking their maker why they were made in a specific way: “*numquid dicit figmentum ei qui se finxit: cur me ita formaueris?*”⁸⁰ This sentence suggests that the question initially asked by Augustine should not be asked at all and as such is not an answer to the initial question, even though it is posited as one. The text becomes more convoluted by the third sentence that suggests that an answer should be sought to the question regardless of the previous quote, thus nullifying the use of the quote and going back on its essential message: *si ergo causanda est haec res, interrogandus est, qui animam direxit nulla cogente se necessitate; si autem necessitas fuerat mittendi animam, merito est et uoluntas liberandi eam*⁸¹. The third sentence then continues to rephrase the initial question as to why God sent forth the soul if there was no necessity compelling him, thus turning around on what Fortunatus has just quoted. Fortunatus continues with the fourth and final sentence in this turn at speech by making a statement about the fact that if God was indeed pressed by necessity to send forth the soul, then there is rightly also the will to liberate it.

⁸⁰“Does the vessel say to the potter who made it: Why have you formed me in this way?”

⁸¹ If, then, this topic must be discussed, we must question him who sent the soul here under no compulsion from necessity. But if he was under some necessity to send the soul, it is right that he also has the will to set it free.

As with the Critical Discourse Analysis section, the preceding Argumentation Theory section is designed as both a foundation for the Strategic Maneuvering section and to yield findings in its own right. The analyses offered in 5.5 discussed above have provided the means by which distinct patterns in each man's rhetoric may be revealed, showing their importance to the study. The danger in relying solely on these categories of investigation is that the overall message and tone of the text may be lost, but nonetheless, the primary points of argumentation are revealed and the tactics used to apply those disputes and confrontations are made apparent through the implementation of this theory. Moreover, the holistic approach followed in chapter six, contributes to creating a better impression of the message and tone of the transcribed debate.

5.6 Strategic Maneuvering

The methodology of Strategic Maneuvering was designed by van Eemeren to be able to illuminate those tactics and strategies that are used by opponents in a debate in order to manoeuvre themselves into a position where they are able to win an argument. Strategic Maneuvering focuses to an important extent on the manner in which opponents are constantly striving to create a balance between wellfoundedness and effectiveness. Here the difference between dialectical aims and rhetorical aims illustrated in figure 4.1 in chapter four comes into play. It is important to note that the terms used in the section on requirements of Strategic Maneuvering are often very close to each other in meaning (economy, efficacy and coherence, as well as realism and wellfoundedness) with a number of these terms dependant on one another in order to be used for analysis in a meaningful manner. The result of these terms being so close to one another, with small but crucial differences between them, is that repetition is necessary in order to explain how

these terms are both different as well as necessary to this study in order to reveal the intricacies of the debate.

5.6.1 Requirements: economy, efficacy and coherence

Although the factors of economy, efficacy and coherence are grouped together in the category of requirements by van Eemeren, through this study I have come to the conclusion that they should be separate categories as they are often mutually exclusive. By this I mean that coherence does not necessarily imply economy or efficacy, just as economy does not automatically lead to coherence or efficacy. Though efficacy is dependent on coherence it is not necessarily dependent on economy.

The manner in which each man strives for efficacy, which is the ultimate goal of the entire debate, is striking in its disparity. Augustine never sways from his focus on efficacy, primarily through coherence, but certainly not always through economy. At all times Augustine ensures that his argument follows logically and simply, whereas Fortunatus regularly leaves the logical implications of his statements to be interpreted by the audience, thus potentially losing efficacy in the process. Also important to note is the way in which Fortunatus and Augustine mirror the lengths of each other's statements quite closely with both men varying the lengths of their turns at speech quite substantially; frequently they take little note of the aim of economy expressed by van Eemeren in 4.2.1, namely that a turn at speech should be as succinct as possible and contain only those points necessary to overcome the difference of opinion.

A prime example of the use of economy, efficacy and coherence occur in two consecutive turns at speech namely *C. Fort* 21F and 22A, which in the interests of

space I shall not quote since they are both substantial in length, where first Fortunatus and then Augustine give substantive arguments that evince the different styles that each man typically uses. In *C. Fort* 21F Fortunatus gives an exposition on his view of the origin of evil: *haec nos dicimus, quod a contraria natura anima cogatur delinquere: cui non uis esse radicem nisi hoc tantum, quod in nobis malum uersatur*⁸²(*C. Fort* 21F). Fortunatus then explains the Manichaean view of the existence of evil also outside of human beings: *cum constet exceptis nostris corporibus mala in omni mundo uersari*⁸³(*C. Fort* 21F) and how it contradicts the Catholic view according to scripture. He substantiates these beliefs with five direct quotes from scripture (one quote from the book of John and two each from the books of Galatians and Romans). Through the turn at speech Fortunatus continuously takes off on tangential issues which, although they may definitely add to his argument, are haphazardly set out and thus disrupt the overall flow of the argument and thus its coherence and efficacy. Each of these tangential issues, such as the tree of evil that Fortunatus brought up before and the root of evil being covetousness brought up by Augustine, is coherent in its own right (because they are clear and rational units of thought), but they interfere with the logical progression of Fortunatus' argument through the manner in which they cause the audience to consider too many separate issues simultaneously, which subtract from the primary argument: that sin exists separately from God. The final result of the entirety of this turn at speech is that whilst it may sound very impressive as an example of a learned man expressing his deep knowledge of the New Testament, Fortunatus may well make it

⁸² We say that the soul is forced to sin by the opposing nature. We do not want there to be a root for sin except for the evil that is found in us...

⁸³ ... though it is clear that, even apart from our bodies, there are evils in the whole world.

impossible for the audience to follow the main line of his argument. In terms of Argumentation Theory he loses efficacy.

The turn at speech which follows *C. Fort* 21F is a typical example of the manner in which Augustine presents his arguments. At all times Augustine ensures that his audience understands his line of argumentation by keeping it fundamentally logical and clear. He manages to do this by ensuring that each sentence follows directly on from the previous sentence: *liberum uoluntatis arbitrium in illo homine fuisse dico, qui primus formatus est. ille sic factus est, ut nihil omnino uoluntati eius resisteret, si uellet dei praecepta seruare. postquam autem libera ipse uoluntate peccauit, nos in necessitatem praecipitati sumus, qui ab eius stirpe descendimus*⁸⁴ (*C. Fort* 22A).

Where he does invariably digress (such as where he talks about the habit of swearing later in this turn at speech), Augustine makes sure to keep his audience fully aware of this change of direction, through the use of logical progression from the previous sentence, thus ensuring that the audience fully understand what he was doing at all times. An example of this is where Augustine says:

sic enim dictum est prudentiam carnis non posse legi dei esse subiectam, quemadmodum si diceretur glaciale niuem calidam esse non posse. nullo pacto enim quamdiu nix est, calida esse potest. sed quemadmodum illa nix calore resoluitur et desinit nix esse, ut possit calescere, sic illa carnis prudentia, id est consuetudo facta cum carne, cum fuerit mens nostra inluminata et ad arbitrium diuinae legis totum hominem sibi deus

⁸⁴ I say that free choice of the will existed in the man who was created first. He was created in such a way that nothing at all would have resisted his will if he had chosen to keep the commandments of God. But, after he sinned by free will, we who are descended from his stock were cast down into necessity.

*subiecerit, pro illa consuetudine animae mala facit consuetudinem bonam*⁸⁵. (C. Fort 22A).

Therefore, Augustine uses the metaphor of snow and ice to get across his point regarding how an enlightened mind is able to cast off bad habits. This particular quote from C. Fort 22A engages with what Augustine has just stated before regarding the habit of swearing, which according to Alflatt (1974: 131) was a major problem in the city of Hippo at the time. Thus it was a particularly pertinent example of bad habits and how some things are done without intention, thus through habit.

The clear result is rhetoric on the part of Augustine which does precisely what it sets out to do: appeal to the audience, whether by directly addressing them or taking them into account indirectly, such as in turns C. Fort 2A (questioning whether the audience wishes to hear about morals: *ego de fide proposui. sed si illi, qui adsunt malunt audire de moribus, nec ipsam quaestionem defugio*⁸⁶), 3A (reminding the audience of what the proposed topic of discussion was: *ad aliud uocas, cum ego de fide proposuerim*⁸⁷), 8A (reminding the audience that Fortunatus has not answered the question: *ego quaero, quemadmodum in mortem uenerimus et tu dicis, quemadmodum de morte liberemur*⁸⁸), 9A (reminding the audience of the Nebridian conundrum: *redeo enim ad illud breuissimum: si poterat ei noceri, non est inuiolabilis; si non poterat, crudeliter hunc nos misit, ut ista patiamur*⁸⁹), 10A

⁸⁵ For scripture said that the wisdom of the flesh could not be subject to the law of God in the same way as if someone said that icy snow could not be hot. For, as long as it is snow, it can by no means be hot. But snow is melted by heat and ceases to be snow so that it can become hot. In the same way, when our mind has been enlightened and God has subjected the whole person to the rule of the divine law, the wisdom of the flesh, that is, the habit produced in the flesh, becomes a good habit in place of the bad habit of the soul.

⁸⁶ I have proposed to debate your faith. But if those who are present prefer to hear about your way of life, I am not going to dodge that question either.

⁸⁷ You are steering me toward something else, though I had proposed to discuss your faith.

⁸⁸ I ask how we came into death, and you say how we are set free from death.

⁸⁹ Now I am returning to that very brief argument: if something can harm him, he is not inviolable; if it cannot, he sent us here out of cruelty in order that we might suffer these evils.

(reminding the audience that Fortunatus has not answered the question: *si iustum est, ut non interrogatis meis respondeatur et ego interroger, respondeo.*⁹⁰), 21A (reminding the audience both that Augustine has answered the question put to him and that Fortunatus is evading the question put to him: *ad hoc sine ambagibus responde, si placet, sicut tibi ego sine ambagibus respondi*⁹¹), 22A (reminding the audience that Augustine has answered the question and that Fortunatus has not satisfactorily answered the Nebridian conundrum:

*unde quoniam ego respondi tuis, dignare tu respondere illud, quod desidero, quemadmodum fieri possit, ut, si est deo natura contraria, nobis inputetur peccatum, qui in illam naturam non uoluntate, sed ab ipso deo, cui noceri nihil poterat, missi sumus*⁹²).

The trend continues in 29A and 31A (reminding the audience that Augustine has answered the question put to him, but Fortunatus has not responded to the question put to him: *et de illa insibilatione respondebo, cum tu meis obiectionibus responderis*⁹³ and *iterum me interrogas. ad interrogata responde*⁹⁴), 37A (explicitly stating that Fortunatus has no answer to the Nebridian conundrum: *et ego noui non te habere, quid dicas, et me cum uos audirem in hac quaestione numquam inuenisse, quod dicerem*⁹⁵). Taking into account the entirety of the debate and all of the instances where I have been able to ascertain efficacy through logical and rational argument, it would further reinforce the impression that Augustine was

⁹⁰ If it is fair that my questions are not answered and I am asked a question, I shall reply.

⁹¹ Reply to this without ambiguity, please, as I replied to you without ambiguity.

⁹² Hence, since I have replied to your questions, be so good as to reply to what I desire: How is it possible that, if there is a nature opposed to God, sin is imputed to us who were sent into that nature not by our will but by God, whom nothing can harm?

⁹³ And I shall reply concerning that inbreathing of the soul when you reply to my objections.

⁹⁴ Again you question me; reply to my questions.

⁹⁵ I too know that you do not have anything to say and that I have never found anything to say on this question when I was one of your Hearers...

absolutely aware of the importance of efficacy and its core aim: audience understanding.

The overwhelming impression that an analysis through the lens of this category leaves is that Augustine is focussed on convincing the audience through clear logic whilst Fortunatus, who does not appeal directly to the audience once, but rather seeks to influence the audience by impressing them with his intellectual knowledge of the New Testament, through his 22 pertinent quotes from scripture. It may seem contradictory, but as a result Fortunatus runs the risk of losing the complete understanding of the audience. A telling example of this manner of argumentation is turn *C. Fort* 21F, in which Fortunatus seems more concerned with showing his knowledge of the Books of John, Romans and Galatians than he is interested in making sure the argument he is making is effective.

In terms of economy, both men tend to vary the length of their utterances quite significantly as stated before. Economy becomes a factor when each man is pointedly asking a straightforward question, thus attempting to close all possible opportunities for the opponent to, purposely, misconstrue the dispute. This does not stop this misinterpretation, though, from either side.

Throughout the debate, Augustine constantly begins his turns of speech with an introductory sentence, followed by a simple (if sometimes lengthy) argument and finally a conclusion that sums up what he has just said and a suggested direction that the rest of the debate should follow. This manner of debating is found in nearly all of Augustine's turns at speech and in particular those that happen to be disputes (or then challenges to defend a standpoint). In this way Augustine always ensures that the audience is made completely aware of his argument and how it fits together.

In terms of this section, Augustine thus ensures coherence and efficacy, even if he is not always economical. A typical example of this manner of turn at speech construction, which is in fact economical, is *C. Fort 3A*: The first sentence leads with *ad aliud uocas, cum ego de fide proposuerim*⁹⁶. The turn at speech then goes on to describe how Augustine was not a full member of the Manichees, being only a Hearer and thus not privy to the full extent of the faith. The conclusion reads: *...itaque serua, si placet, quaestionem de moribus, ut inter electos uestros discutiatis, si discuti potest. mihi fides data est a uobis, quam hodie improbo. de ipsa proposui. ad propositum meum mihi respondeatur*⁹⁷. As stated earlier, this conclusion neatly wraps up what Augustine does not know (the Elect way of life), the fact that this is not the agreed topic of debate and a firm request to answer his initial question. Those occasions in which Augustine does not use this well-constructed form of argumentation might be exceptions (such as 5A, 8A, and 33A), but if anything they are even more effective in summarising what Augustine construes as the weak point of the argument just made by Fortunatus, or how Fortunatus is avoiding the question posed to him. An example of this comes in *C. Fort 8A*: *Augustinus dixit: ego quaero, quemadmodum in mortem uenerimus, et tu dicis, quemadmodum de morte liberemur*⁹⁸. All of the above quotes and observations are used to illustrate the manner in which Augustine seeks to maintain coherence and succeeds.

In contrast to the manner in which Augustine constructs each turn at speech, Fortunatus tends not to lead with an introduction, then body and finally an

⁹⁶ You are steering me toward something else, though I had proposed to discuss your faith.

⁹⁷ And so, please keep the question about your way of life for discussion among your Elect, if it can be discussed. You gave me a faith that I reject today. That is precisely what I proposed; answer me about what I proposed.

⁹⁸ Augustine said: I ask how we came into death, and you say how we are set free from death.

encompassing conclusion, features which significantly helps with attaining all three requirements of Strategic Maneuvering: economy, efficacy and coherence. Examples of this type of arguing include turns *C. Fort* 7F, 16F, 22F, 33F; all these examples are technically coherent, but are not as effective due to their lack of structure, that Augustine is so careful to use in order to maintain his coherence. Fortunatus is not averse to using short turns at speech, though where he is in fact very economical, are instances of reactive answers to questions posed to him such as *C. Fort* 34F: *naturae contrariae modum inponere*⁹⁹. Once again, in the turn at speech just quoted, Fortunatus does not take the opportunity to steer the debate, but at this stage of the debate this is perhaps an unfair observation since he has tried on several occasions, namely *C. Fort* 1F, 4F, 5F, 6F, 9F, 10F, 11F, 12F, 13F¹⁰⁰ (as discussed in 5.3.2), but has been unsuccessful in steering the debate other than for a few turns at a time. These attempts at topic control are made apparent through the use of questions that are aimed at Augustine personally, such as in 1F and 2F, or at the Catholic faith as concerns the topics of the origin of the soul, the nature of evil and free will.

As may be seen by the overview of turns above, Augustine does give some leeway to Fortunatus in the beginning of the first day, but then completely takes over and dominates the direction of the debate. In terms of efficacy then, Fortunatus falls short of the standard, admittedly high, set by Augustine in leading the debate in the minds of the audience. Both men are coherent, but Augustine is once again more so due to the construction of his turns at speech. As a result, it may be stated that whilst both men are acutely aware of the importance of coherence, efficacy and economy, it is Augustine that makes the greatest use of the strategies encompassed in these

⁹⁹ To place a limit on the opposing nature.

¹⁰⁰ These attempts at topic control are made apparent through the use of questions that are aimed at Augustine personally, such as in 1F and 2F, or the Catholic faith as concerns the topics of the origin of the soul, the nature of evil and free will.

concepts in order to maintain efficacy with regards to the audience. The dissertation will now continue with an application of the terms wellfoundedness and realism that were first discussed in 4.2.2.

5.6.2 Requirements: realism, wellfoundedness

Realism and wellfoundedness, as set out in 4.2.2, usually refer to points based on concepts that are irrefutable and provable. In this instance, however, the primary subject under discussion is religion and therefore the concepts of realism and wellfoundedness are subjective entities which differ between both the opponents in this debate and the audience (depending on whether they are Manichees or Catholics), at least in their relative opinions. I have chosen to view these requirements in terms of accurately describing Manichaeism and Catholicism. Each man is very careful in their accurate portrayal of their different faiths although the differences often come down to varying interpretations of scripture. One of the most potent ways in which they seek to appear as presenting well-founded arguments is to quote scripture in support. Thus, in terms of this debate it is important to note that the very concepts of realism and wellfoundedness are adapted to suit the argument at hand: realism is now the field of religion as opposed to worldly fact (therefore realism is different for Fortunatus and Augustine), with wellfoundedness based on the opponent's ability to substantiate their arguments with scriptural quotes. In this way the field of wellfoundedness is largely the same, due to the Manichees using large sections of the New Testament, but the field of realism is completely different based on the beliefs of Manichaeism and Catholicism.

Under this understanding of realism and wellfoundedness there is a close correlation with the categories mentioned above, in particular coherence. I would argue that coherence is also highly dependant on realism and wellfoundedness, just as with

economy and efficacy. Towards the end of the first day's debate this particularly pertinent example of coherence judged by the subjective categories of realism and wellfoundedness occurs: *C. Fort* 17F begins with Fortunatus countering the statement just made by Augustine in the previous turn at speech by using the Pauline phrase „we are by nature children of wrath“ to show that the soul does not belong to God. Fortunatus then goes on to explain how the soul is related to God and how the will of God sent the soul forth and that only through Christ could the soul be saved.

This turn at speech on the part of Fortunatus evinces a clear logic that is based on the well versed rhetoric of the Manichee. Each step in this argument is precise and clearly stated, and follows logically from the previous step, thus using a well-reasoned and wellfounded practice that is based on Manichaeian reality:

Fortunatus dixit: si secundum animam dixisset apostolus, quod simus naturaliter filii irae, alienata esset anima ore apostoli a deo. et hac modo tu ratione ostendis, quod anima non sit dei, quia naturaliter, inquit apostolus, sumus irae filii [Ephesians 2, 3]. si uero secundum quod lege tenebatur idem apostolus ex semine Abraham [Romans 11, 1], ut ipse contestatur, descendens, constat eum corporaliter dixisse nos fuisse filios irae, sicut et cetera. animae uero substantiam ostendit, quod sit ex deo, et animam aliter non posse reconciliari deo nisi per magistrum, qui est Christus Iesus. interfecta tamen inimicitia uidebatur anima indigna extitisse deo; sed quia missa est, hoc confitemur, a deo tamen omnipotente et originem trahens et missa ad ipsius uoluntatem consignandam, quemadmodum et saluatorem Christum credimus de caelo uenisse uoluntatem patris complere. quae uoluntas patris haec erat animas nostras de eadem inimicitia liberare interfecta eadem inimicitia.

*quae si aduersa deo non fuisset, nec inimicitia uocaretur, ubi erat unitas, nec interfectio diceretur aut fieret, ubi erat uita.*¹⁰¹

In this turn at speech, Fortunatus moves smoothly from the explanation of how Paul explained that we are by nature „children of wrath“ to how this applies to all humanity and the origin of the soul and the fact that deliverance for the soul can only come through Jesus Christ. The soul is also sent to earth just as Jesus was sent by God, thus he is implicitly turning the Nebridian conundrum back on Augustine, and also explaining how the will of God seeks to save the soul from the Darkness. This illustrates not only the fact that Fortunatus is capable of wellfounded and realistic rhetoric according to the set of parameters set forth earlier in this section. He is also evidently aware of the need for realism and wellfoundedness, in the judgement of the audience. This leads to the necessary question: why does he not use this type of argumentation strategy more often? It would almost make more sense if Fortunatus had not displayed this ability at all, since that would at least explain the reason why he doesn’t use such wellfounded and reasoned logic throughout the debate.

On the part of Augustine, a fine example, typical of Augustine’s style of argumentation where he actively seeks to have his argument understood and uses realism and wellfoundedness as far as possible, is expressed towards the beginning

¹⁰¹ Fortunatus said: If the apostle had said that we were naturally children of wrath in terms of the soul, the apostle’s lips would have alienated the soul from God. And by this reasoning you now show that the soul does not belong to God because the apostle says that we are naturally children of wrath. But if he had said this insofar as the same apostle was bound by the law since, as he himself testifies, he came from the family of Abraham [Romans 11, 1], it is clear that he said we were children of wrath in terms of the body, just as others are as well. But he showed that the substance of the soul comes from God and that the soul could only be reconciled to God through our teacher, who is Christ Jesus. For, once the hostility was slain, the soul seemed to have emerged as unworthy of God. But we admit that the soul was sent, both taking its origin from almighty God and sent to do his will, just as we believe that Christ the savior also came from heaven to carry out the will of the Father. The will of the Father was to set free our souls from the same hostility, once the same hostility had been slain. If this hostility had not been opposed to God, the apostle would not even have mentioned it where there was unity, and he would not have mentioned slaying, nor would it have taken place where there was life.

of the second day's discussion (C. Fort 23A). Augustine begins his turn at speech by locating the rest of his argument to come in the well-known quote from the Bible *agnos suos dominus noster in medium luporum misit*¹⁰². He then goes on to explain what being sent forth into the world as sheep into the midst of wolves means and thus places the argument within a reality that both Catholic and Manichee would agree with. The wellfoundedness of this turn at speech comes in the transitions from one train of thought to the next: Augustine always makes sure to connect the different stages of his argument through a common thread, such as:

*agnos suos dominus noster in medium luporum misit, id est homines iustos in medium hominum peccatorum ad praedicationem euangelii tempore hominis suscepti ab inaestimabili diuina sapientia, ut a peccato ad iustitiam nos uocaret. quod autem ait apostolus nobis colluctationem non esse aduersus carnem et sanguinem, sed aduersus principes et potestates et cetera, quae sunt commemorata. hoc significat: diabolum et angelos eius sicut etiam nos peccato cecidisse et lapsos esse dicimus et obtinuisse terrena, id est homines peccatores, qui quamdiu peccatores sumus, sub iugo eorum sumus; quemadmodum, cum iusti erimus, erimus sub iugo iustitiae; et contra illos luctam habemus, ut migrantes ad iustitiam ab eorum dominatione liberemur.*¹⁰³(C. Fort 23A).

Although the wellfoundedness aspect of these turns at speech is based on scriptural substantiation, in this turn Augustine uses the quote from Matthew concerning the sheep and wolves to lead to his next point: sin and righteousness. From this point Augustine moves to the next point: that all people, including the devil and his angels,

¹⁰² The Lord sent His lambs into the midst of wolves [Matthew 10: 16.].

¹⁰³The Lord sent His lambs into the midst of wolves, that is, righteous human beings into the midst of sinners, to preach the gospel at the time of the man who was assumed by the inestimable wisdom of God, in order to call us from sin to righteousness. But the apostle's assertion that we have a struggle not against the flesh and blood but against the principalities and powers and the other things he mentioned signifies that, just as we did, the devil and his angels fell by sin, are fallen, and have gained earthly possessions, that is, sinful human beings. We are under the yoke as long as we are sinners, just as, when we are righteous, we shall be under the yoke of righteousness. And we have a struggle against them in order that we may pass over to righteousness and be set free from their dominion.

are under the yoke of sin. The manner in which Augustine compares the sheep in the quote to those under the yoke of righteousness and the wolves to those under the yoke of sin thus becomes evident, as does the notion of the ultimate struggle which is to come under the yoke of righteousness and cast off the yoke of sin. In this way the train of logic based on the wellfoundedness of the quote leads to a situation where the audience may perceive this turn at speech as being reality.

By formulating this argument in simple terms that the audience will perceive as being grounded in realism and wellfoundedness, they will more readily accept it and agree with it. This is not to say that simplicity leads to wellfoundedness and realism, but it certainly helps the message come across. This last point leads directly to the next category of discussion: that of inferences and the logical reasoning process.

5.6.3 Inferences: logical reasoning process and pragmatic inference

Once again, the category of inferences could easily be split into two separate sections since the logical reasoning process and pragmatic inferences aren't necessarily linked (4.2). Indeed in this debate it would seem that whilst Augustine relies on logical reasoning, the efficacy of Fortunatus' arguments requires extensive use of pragmatic inferences by the audience. By itself this section could lead to a study in how Fortunatus and Augustine view their audience based on the way in which they address their turns at speech towards them. A strong possibility exists that the audience will simply not bother to infer what it is that Fortunatus is implying and will instead prefer to listen to what Augustine has to say since it is always easier to comprehend.

This is not to say that Fortunatus does not make use of logical reasoning at all. In fact many of his turns at speech reveal just this characteristic, but in general his style

of argumentation requires the audience to make pragmatic inferences because he does not present them with clear and straightforward logical reasoning. The first of the examples that I will use to illustrate the way in which Fortunatus makes use of logical reasoning, but also requires the audience to make pragmatic inferences occurs at the beginning of the second day in turn *C. Fort* 21F where he hops from one topic to another, as discussed in 5.5.1. In this turn at speech, Fortunatus begins by talking about the soul and the evil that is within us. He then moves on to an argument against Augustine's quote of 1 Timothy 6:10 about the root of evil being covetousness. Taking the tree metaphor further through reference to Matthew 15:13 he extends the argument to include the evil tree that bears no good fruit. This is one of the few points in the turn at speech that clearly links to the previous point and it may be argued that the audience would have had little trouble following this particular point and the previous one.

Continuing with his turn at speech, Fortunatus proceeds to quote from the book of John. The point of this quote is one of those that I suggest are not obviously linked to the previous point. This therefore represents an instance where a logical reasoning process is not clearly in evidence. From this point in the turn at speech, Fortunatus continues to use two scriptural quotes each from the books of Paul's letters to the Romans and Galatians. In this case the quotes do indeed hang together logically, but, as with the previous quote from John, they have a tenuous hold on the rest of the turn at speech.

There is thus a fundamental problem in the turn at speech as a unit: separate sections of it are intelligible, but the logical steps between them are sometimes not there, or as with the case of the quote from John, are difficult to establish. Pragmatic inferences are needed to help join these points, but would, likely, require more time

than a listener in the audience would have in such a debate, before the next point is made. The importance of logical reasoning is therefore to minimise the amount of confusion, created by a turn at speech, that the member of the audience may experience in a debate such as this.

Another example of the way in which Fortunatus sometimes obfuscates the argument, and thus does not necessarily use logical reasoning, occurs in *C. Fort* 25F: *causa haec quaerenda est, cur huc uenerit anima aut quare eandem deus hinc cupit liberare, quae in medio malorum uiuit?*¹⁰⁴ In this example of a turn at speech by Fortunatus, he is actually attempting to answer the question just put to him by Augustine: why did God, who could not suffer injury, send humans forth. As it stands, the response that Fortunatus gives is almost nonsensical and certainly does not address the question at all, it does seem to reiterate the question though, but to what point? This example of Fortunatus may be contrasted, once again, with the logical and clear reasoning that Augustine uses throughout the debate: in *C. Fort* 11A, Augustine is set on describing the relationship between the soul and God. First he makes the emphatic statement that the soul is not God; that they are two separate entities. Next he proceeds to describe the inviolability of God and then the nature of the soul as sinful, involved in misery, searching for the truth and in need of a liberator. As a result of the changing nature of the soul it cannot be God: *nam si anima substantia dei est, substantia dei errat, substantia dei corrumpitur, substantia dei uiolatur, substantia dei decipitur: quod nefas est dicere*¹⁰⁵. The importance of this turn at speech on the part of Augustine is that he clearly moves from one point to the

¹⁰⁴ We must seek the reason why the soul came here or why God desires to set free from here the same soul, which lives in the midst of evils.

¹⁰⁵ For if the soul is the substance of God, the substance of God is mistaken, the substance of God is corrupted, the substance of God is violated, the substance of God is deceived, and it is wicked to say this.

next, using short sentences, repetition and tricolon, which makes it easy for the audience to understand fully, since it evinces a logical reasoning process.

These examples, though, are not intended to create the impression that Fortunatus is incapable of using clear, logical reasoning. This study reveals that Fortunatus is more than able to present a clear argument, but that he does not do so consistently, as Augustine does. In terms of logical reasoning processes and pragmatic inferences, it is important to recognise that whilst both men make use of logical reasoning to varying degrees as discussed above, the logic of Fortunatus' arguments very frequently requires pragmatic inferences. Various levels of inferences may be required at various points; there are varying levels of intelligibility and as a result some turns at speech may have been understood and others not. I now move on to the categories of reasonableness and effectiveness as defined by van Eemeren and discussed in chapter 4.2.2.

5.6.4 Reasonableness versus effectiveness

As has become apparent through this analysis there is a fundamental difference between reasonableness and effectiveness as regards the ultimate arbiter of the debate: the audience. The goal of Strategic Maneuvering is effectiveness, but this does not necessarily come about due to reasonableness, nor does reasonableness automatically lead to effectiveness. A turn at speech may be reasonable or effective or reasonable and effective. Fortunatus' many turns at speech where his convoluted logic is sound, but possibly ineffectual is a case in point. In contrast, Augustine's continual appeals for Fortunatus to answer the Nebridian conundrum may be viewed as being effective even if they are not reasonable, in light of Fortunatus' many answers.

The categories of reasonableness and effectiveness lend themselves particularly towards illuminating the disparate approaches that each man takes in this debate. Where Fortunatus' focus appears to be primarily on reasonableness Augustine is focussed to a much greater extent on effectiveness. The analysis of this debate in terms of these categories reveals that whereas Augustine is intent on delivering effective turns at speech on every occasion, there are a number of places where Fortunatus sacrifices effectiveness as in *C. Fort* 6F, by giving an answer to a question that is more a repetition of the question just asked than a clear pointed question, therefore possibly confusing the audience. Once again this shows Augustine's knowledge of rhetoric and his cognisance of the absolute importance of the audience and influencing them at every possible opportunity. This is not to say that Fortunatus is not aware of this importance; he most certainly is and this is displayed in the beginning of both days. Yet, as the debate progresses each day Fortunatus seems to become tangled in Augustine's rhetoric and is thus hamstrung by his necessary responses and the fact that he seems to take for granted that pragmatic inferences will be made by the audience on the basis of his convoluted arguments. In contrast Augustine focusses on clear, simple and intelligible arguments.

In terms of illustrations for this category of the study I will first focus on the way in which each man questions the other. Towards the end of the second day's debate the two men exchange a series of questions, a typical example of this is *C. Fort* 30A, 30F and 31A, where Augustine asks: *quid opus erat isto progressu, ubi nihil habebat deus, quod caueret, cui noceri nihil poterat?*¹⁰⁶ To which Fortunatus replies: *constat*

¹⁰⁶ What need was there for this going forth when God had nothing to watch out for, since nothing could harm him?

*apud conscientiam uestram a deo uenisse Christum*¹⁰⁷?¹⁰⁸ And Augustine immediately responds with: *iterum me interrogas. ad interrogata responde*¹⁰⁹. In this exchange we are able to witness the way in which Fortunatus simply throws a question out in order to avoid answering a difficult question by Augustine, and Augustine puts a halt to this new line of questioning and insists that Fortunatus answer the previous question and quit asking questions himself unless he answers the questions put to him first. In this way Fortunatus is technically being reasonable in his choice of words, but is not effective, especially with the manner in which Augustine puts him down and exposes Fortunatus' attempt to evade the question. Thus Augustine is both reasonable and, more importantly, probably, effective with regard to the audience. Perhaps a more pertinent example of the manner in which Fortunatus is not always effective is turn *Fort* 26F, which is convoluted in its logic. It first deals with the inviolability of God, why the soul was sent forth and then suddenly states that we should not actually seek to know why God formed us, but then proceeds to do exactly that. He then goes on to conflate the sending forth of the soul with God's will to liberate it: *numquid dicit figmentum ei. numquid dicit figmentum ei qui se finxit: cur me ita formaueris? [Romans 9, 20] si ergo causanda est haec res, interrogandus est, qui animam direxit nulla cogente se necessitate; si autem necessitas fuerat mittendi animam, merito est et uoluntas liberandi eam*¹¹⁰.

It becomes clear that also a distinction in terms of the opposition between reasonableness and effectiveness has the potential of highlighting specific aspects of the dissimilar argumentative strategies of the two participants in the debate. This

¹⁰⁷ Is it certain in your mind that Christ came from God?

¹⁰⁸ This comes from the Jolivet and Jourjon (1961) latin text.

¹⁰⁹ Again you question me; reply to my questions.

¹¹⁰ "Does the vessel say to the potter who made it: Why have you formed me in this way?" [Romans 9, 20] If, then, this topic must be discussed, we must question him who sent the soul here under no compulsion from necessity. But if he was under some necessity to send the soul, it is right that he also has the will to set it free.

leads directly to the next category of enquiry: the rhetorical perspective. Effectiveness and reasonableness are directly linked to the manner in which the audience experiences the debate and are thus fundamentally important in their role as primary objectives of the rhetorical perspective.

5.6.5 Rhetorical perspective

The goal of all rhetoric is to convince the listener of the veracity of the speaker's point of view and thus to sway an audience. As a result this debate might be considered a typical example of rhetoric in practice as two men argue with each other for the purpose of swaying the audience listening to their arguments. The concepts of Strategic Maneuvering are designed to describe how rhetoric functions and are useful for describing how the two participants in the debate endeavour to win over the audience (4.2.2) with various degrees of success. It is possible to find the motive of attempting to sway the audience in virtually every single turn at speech that is uttered by Augustine, if not every one, whereas Fortunatus frequently seems to lose sight of this objective, or is simply not sensitive enough to the needs of the audience. It is in this category that Augustine's dominance over Fortunatus in terms of rhetoric becomes apparent.

Whilst both men are struggling to exert power over the other, as well as the audience, Augustine is the more successful of the two opponents in this debate. He achieves this by deploying a style of rhetoric that requires an answer from the opponent, which in turn has two goals. The first of these goals is to get the opponent to answer the question and thus lose momentum in terms of their own strategy, or keep the momentum by ignoring the question, but then be exposed for doing just so. This is a very effective rhetorical strategy that will likely lead to a highly successful situation for the questioner, namely Augustine; this happens on numerous occasions

such as *C. Fort* 2A and 3A where Augustine points out how Fortunatus is avoiding the topic agreed upon before the debate started. Of equal interest is the manner in which Augustine is able to deal with Fortunatus' questions and not fall into a similar trap. Augustine ignores a number of the questions posed to him and instead frames his responses to these questions with statements that it should be Fortunatus who should answer the question posed to him instead, such as in *C. Fort* 31A. Fortunatus is unable to turn the tables on Augustine: he simply does not point out clearly that the questions he asks are also being avoided.

Looking at these turns from the rhetorical perspective as described by van Eemeren shows how Augustine manipulates Fortunatus into doing what he wants him to do, without having to do that which Fortunatus wants Augustine to do. In this way Augustine leads the debate and steers it into the directions that are the most advantageous to his argument. In addition, the audience will be influenced by Augustine's rhetoric, by, potentially, becoming irritated by Fortunatus' perceived inability or lack of cooperation with regards to the questions posed to him.

The impression that I have formed of this debate is that Fortunatus is used to being in a position of dominance in his debates with regular members of the Catholic community where he is the one that controls the debate through strategically placed questions on perceived weaknesses of Catholicism. Evidence for this lies in the manner in which Fortunatus uses the New Testament to argue for all his beliefs (even dualism) and does not speak of Mani at all (Decret, 1995: 446). In this particular debate Fortunatus, however, finds himself in a non-dominant position and this places him at a distinct disadvantage and unsettles his rhetoric. To Augustine's credit, he, doubtless, realised that putting Fortunatus into this position would result in Fortunatus being unable to assert his usual debating strategy and that this would

place Augustine at a distinct advantage. In short, in the *Contra Fortunatum* it seems as if Fortunatus receives a dose of his own medicine.

Augustine does not only manage his dominance in the debate through questions, but primarily through aggression and the aggressive way in which he both poses and answers questions such as in *C. Fort* 5A (where he presses Fortunatus to answer the question: *immo tu dignare respondere id, quod interrogaris*¹¹¹), 7A (calling Manichaeism a heresy: *hoc enim uestra haeresis negat, cum cetera exponitis*.¹¹²), 8A (chastising Fortunatus for answering a different question: *ego quaero, quemadmodum in mortem uenerimus et tu dicis, quemadmodum de morte liberemur*.¹¹³), 10A (implying that Fortunatus is not fair in his debating: *si iustum est, ut non interrogatis meis respondeatur et ego interroger, respondeo*.¹¹⁴). Later on the second day Augustine is equally aggressive with turns *C. Fort* 31A (pointing out that Fortunatus is not answering and insisting on answers: *iterum me interrogas. ad interrogata responde*.¹¹⁵), 32A, 33A, 34A and 36A (hammering on the Nebridian conundrum: 34A: *ego autem abs te iterum atque iterum quaero: si deo noceri nihil poterat, cur huc animas misit?*¹¹⁶). The answering of questions, though, has already been dealt with in 5.3.1. Chapter 5.6.6 deals with the way in which discussion strategies are constructed and their impact on the debate.

5.6.6 Discussion strategy: vertical and horizontal, convergence and coordination

The categories of vertical and horizontal discussion strategies perhaps more than any other enables the interpreter to make explicit the coordinated strategy that

¹¹¹ Rather, you be so good as to reply to what you were asked.

¹¹² For your heresy denies this point when it explains the others.

¹¹³ I ask how we came into death, and you say how we are set free from death.

¹¹⁴ If it is fair that my questions are not answered and I am asked a question, I shall reply.

¹¹⁵ Again you question me; reply to my questions.

¹¹⁶ But I ask you again and again: If nothing could harm God, why did he send the soul here?

Augustine employs in this debate. Vertical strategies refer to those strategies that are deployed to gain a certain objective or make a specific point. Horizontal strategies refer to the manner in which these vertical strategies are linked together in order to form an overall strategy that encompasses the entire debate. It also refers to those discussion strategies that link thought to form a sustained argument through the whole debate. The convergence and coordination factors refer directly to the way that the vertical and horizontal discussion strategies are characterised: vertical strategies use convergence to get to a specific point across at a specific moment whilst horizontal strategy uses coordination to link the various vertical strategies and the overall strategies.

The set of turns at speech which belongs to the very beginning of the first day's debate form a vertical, convergent strategy unit: *C. Fort 1F* sees Fortunatus taking a completely different approach to that of Augustine in not making an opening standpoint, but instead asking Augustine to publicly endorse Manichaeism's lifestyle as being above suspicion. He doesn't specify what particular crimes the Manichees are rumoured to be guilty of, but clearly sees this debate as an opportunity to have these false charges refuted by a member of the Catholic faith whom the crowd respects and who has first-hand experience of Manichaeism. In *C. Fort 2F*, after Augustine has established that he will not decline to discuss the topic although it is not that which the debate was supposed to discuss, namely the Law of the Manichees¹¹⁷, Fortunatus repeats his request and compliments the honest reputation of Augustine. This opening confrontation of the debate on the part of Fortunatus is successful as Augustine then gives a qualified acknowledgement that as far as he was able to experience, which he insists was highly limited, he saw nothing untoward

¹¹⁷ See Possidius *Vita* 6.

in the practice of their religion. Only after this does Fortunatus give his opening statement in *C. Fort* 3F. The turns at speech revolving around the Manichaean way of life are unconnected to anything else in the debate and can thus be called a vertical strategy. The initial series of turns at speech on the part of Fortunatus form a unit that are intended to create a favourable platform for Fortunatus to launch his opening statement from.

Of importance is the way in which Fortunatus and Augustine differ in terms of their discussion strategies: whereas Fortunatus makes use of vertical strategies on several occasions, they are not linked to form a coherent horizontal strategy. After this first instance of Fortunatus using vertical strategy in turns *C. Fort* 1F-3F, the next section is turn *C. Fort* 4F-6F (is there anything besides God), this is followed by *C. Fort* 7F-8F (what happens to the soul also happened to Jesus Christ), 9F-14F (the origin of the soul), 16F-18F (the origin of evil), 19F β -21F (the origin of evil). Fortunatus does not explicitly link these units of vertical strategy so that it would not have been entirely clear to the audience that they form a connected line of thought or horizontal strategy. Importantly, the vertical strategies of Fortunatus taper off in the second day of the debate, as he becomes more reactive to Augustine's questions and fails to regain the initiative.

In contrast Augustine makes far more use of horizontal discussion strategy. This becomes apparent primarily through his use of the question of the Nebridian conundrum (*C. Fort* 4A, 5A, 6A, 8A, 10A, 13A, 24A, 25A, 26A, 30A, 31A, 32A, 33A, 34A, 36A: therefore showing a strategy that extends across the entire debate). These questions and disputes revolve around the question of the sending forth of the soul and the vulnerability of God to evil. The other important horizontal strategy on the part of Augustine is the use of his admonishment of Fortunatus for failing to

answer his questions (C. Fort 5A (*immo tu dignare respondere id, quod interrogaris*)¹¹⁸, 8A (*ego quaero, quemadmodum in mortem uenerimus et tu dicis, quemadmodum de morte liberemur.*)¹¹⁹, 10A (*si iustum est, ut non interrogatis meis respondeatur et ego interroger, respondeo.*)¹²⁰, 11A (*ego dicam quod interrogasti; tantum illud memineris te noluisse respondere interrogatis meis, me autem tuis respondere.*)¹²¹, 13A (*tantum memento me respondere ad ea, quae interrogas, te autem ad ea, quae interrogo, non respondere.*)¹²², 22A (*agnosco et amplector testimonia diuinarum scripturarum, et fidei meae quemadmodum congruant, sicut deus donare dignabitur. paucis exponam.*)¹²³, 23A (*ergo et tu dignare mihi breuiter ad unum, quod interrogo, respondere. noceri deo non poterat, an poterat? sed quaeso mihi ut non poterat respondeas.*)¹²⁴, 25A (*quoniam uideo te interrogatis meis respondere non potuisse et me aliquid interrogare uoluisse, ecce satisfacio tibi, dummodo memineris te ad id, quod interrogauis, non respondisse.*)¹²⁵, 29A (*et de illa insibilatione respondebo, cum tu meis objectionibus responderis.*)¹²⁶, 31A (*iterum me interrogas. ad interrogata responde.*)¹²⁷, 34A (*ego autem abs te iterum atque iterum quaero: si deo noceri nihil poterat, cur huc animas misit?*)¹²⁸, 37A (*ego noui non te habere, quid dicas, et me cum uos audirem in hac quaestione numquam inuenisse,*

¹¹⁸ Rather, you be so good as to reply to what you were asked.

¹¹⁹ I ask how we came into death, and you say how we are set free from death.

¹²⁰ If it is fair that my questions are not answered and I am asked a question, I shall reply.

¹²¹ I shall answer what you asked. Only remember that you refused to reply to my questions but that I replied to yours.

¹²² Just remember that I am replying to your questions but that you are not replying to mine.

¹²³ I recognize and embrace the testimonies of the divine scriptures, and I shall explain in a few words, as God will graciously allow me, how they fit with my faith.

¹²⁴ And so, please briefly answer for me the one question I ask: Was God able to be harmed or not? But, please, I beg you, answer me that he was not able to be.

¹²⁵ Since I see that you have been unable to reply to my questions and have wanted to ask me something, look, I shall satisfy you, provided you remember that you did not reply to what I asked.

¹²⁶ and I shall reply concerning that inbreathing of the soul when you reply to my objections.

¹²⁷ Again you question me; reply to my questions.

¹²⁸ But I ask you again and again: If nothing could harm God, why did he send the soul here?

quod dicerem)¹²⁹. This, once again, shows how Augustine uses strategies that extend across the breadth of the debate. Crucially to this study, the area of greatest concern regarding the eventual outcome of this debate, the end of the second day, is where Fortunatus fails to implement a coherent horizontal strategy.

The primary difference between Augustine and Fortunatus, in terms of horizontal and vertical discussion strategies, is that where Fortunatus haphazardly uses vertical strategy, Augustine consistently makes use of horizontal strategy which seems only interspersed by those times in which he willingly answers Fortunatus' questions posed to him. This seems to indicate the comfort with which Augustine approaches the use of his own discussion strategy in that he is quite prepared to deviate from this strategy, whilst not losing sight of the horizontal plan.

This analysis of the overall strategies employed by each man is disputed by BeDuhn in his article "Did Augustine win his debate with Fortunatus?" (2011). BeDuhn makes an interesting case for Fortunatus overcoming Augustine based on an analysis of the theological arguments made by each man. Thus Fortunatus is described as a man who is able to successfully answer the questions put to him and in such a manner as to corner Augustine. This study does not seek to refute BeDuhn's findings, but to point to an alternative way of describing the debate between Fortunatus and Augustine. This alternative view of the debate at hand is fundamentally a function of the twin concepts of dialectic and rhetorical aims, about which I say more in 5.6.7 below. I contend, in this dissertation, that the vast majority of scholarship on the *Contra Fortunatum* is based on a dialectical study of the debate, whereas this study

¹²⁹ I too know that you do not have anything to say and that I have never found anything to say on this question when I was one of your Hearers.

is designed to take into account the rhetorical aspect of the debate as well. This analysis proceeds with the category of dialectical aims versus rhetorical aims.

5.6.7 Dialectical aims versus rhetorical aims

This category fits closely together with several other categories in Argumentation Theory such as economy, efficacy and coherence and that of logic and reasonableness in that it points to the fact that utterances which are rational and logical and coherent are not necessarily effective in terms of swaying an audience. As stated in chapter four, the goal of dialectical aims is to be coherent, whilst the rhetorical aim of a turn at speech is to be efficacious. I refer back to figure 4.1 (in 4.2.2) where van Eemeren points out the difference between the two concepts of dialectical versus rhetorical aims at the confrontation stage as follows: the dialectical aim is “to achieve clarity concerning the protagonist’s argumentation in defence of the standpoints at issue and the antagonist’s doubts concerning these standpoints and the argumentation in their defence” (van Eemeren, 2010: 45). In opposition to the dialectical aim, the rhetorical aim is “to establish argumentation that constitutes an optimal defence of the standpoints at issue (by the protagonist) or to establish critical doubts that constitute an optimal attack on the standpoints and the argumentation (by the antagonist)” (van Eemeren, 2010: 45).

By way of example of how Fortunatus tends to focus on dialectical aims and Augustine focusses exclusively on rhetorical aims I shall now juxtapose consecutive turns of speech that occur at the end of the second day and which are typical of the manner in which each man approaches their specific aims, whether they be dialectical or rhetorical. In 33F Fortunatus addresses the question (the Nebridian Conundrum) posed to him in the previous turn at speech: *nihil noceri deo iam diximus, et in contraria natura esse animam diximus, ideo ut contrariae naturae*

*modum inponeret; modo inposito contrariae naturae sumit eandem deus*¹³⁰. In his second sentence Fortunatus repeats the sentence from John 10: 18 which he quoted in 32F as directly ascribed to Christ: *ipse enim dixit: potestatem habeo ponendi animam meam et potestatem sumendi eam.*¹³¹ Following the quote that he has just delivered, Fortunatus goes on to explain its implications for Manichaean thinking: *deus ergo, qui loquebatur in filio, de qua anima diceret? constat esse animam nostram, quae in his corporibus habetur, quod dei uoluntate uenerit et de uoluntate ipsius iterum adsumatur*¹³².

In reply (34A), Augustine first addresses the use of the quote, which, having been ascribed directly to Christ holds a large amount of weight with the audience: *unde dixerit dominus noster potestatem habeo ponendi animam meam et potestatem habeo sumendi eam omnibus notum est, quia passurus erat et resurrecturus*¹³³. After this concise, pointed rebuttal, Augustine refocuses on his strongest tactic by ignoring Fortunatus' answer and insisting on a satisfactory answer to the Nebridian Conundrum: *ego autem abs te iterum atque iterum quaero: si deo noceri nihil poterat, cur huc animas misit*¹³⁴?

Fortunatus' turn at speech in 33F (discussed above) was in direct response to Augustine asking him why God sent forth the soul and evinces the manner in which Fortunatus seeks to evade the question by referring to something else entirely, namely the origin of the soul. Here Fortunatus clearly shows his method of

¹³⁰ We have already said that nothing harms God, and we have said that the soul was present in the opposing nature in order to place a limit upon the opposing nature. Once it has imposed a limit upon the opposing nature, God takes up the same soul.

¹³¹ For he himself said, "I have the power to lay down my soul and the power to take it up again".

¹³² About which soul, therefore, would God, who was speaking in the Son, say this? It is clear that it is our soul that is found in these bodies because it came by the will of God and will be taken up again by his will.

¹³³ Everyone knows why our Lord said, "I have the power to lay down my soul and the power to take it up again" [John 10, 18]. For he was going to suffer and rise.

¹³⁴ But I ask you again and again: If nothing could harm God, why did he send the soul here?

answering uncomfortable questions on the part of Augustine with a convoluted, but nonetheless logically sound answer even if I view this response as being a misleading answer. In this instance Fortunatus uses both dialectical aims and rhetorical aims, as he does throughout much of the debate, in that his logic and rational argument fulfils the requirements of dialectical aims, whilst his avoidance of the question shows his rhetorical intent.

In response Augustine directly addresses both what Fortunatus has said and what he has not said: that Fortunatus has not answered the question. Augustine also points out the fact that he has asked this question repeatedly without a satisfactory answer coming from Fortunatus. It becomes evident that nearly all of what Augustine has said is for the benefit of the audience and as usual his manner of addressing Fortunatus evinces a tactic that constantly undermines his opponent.

An earlier example of a similar situation to that of 33F and 34A, mentioned above, occurs in 26A and 26F, where Fortunatus again fails to answer the question, posed by Augustine (*hanc causam abs te quaero, id est: si deo noceri non poterat, quare huc nos misit?*¹³⁵) but does give a logically constructed turn at speech, therefore expressing both his rhetorical aim (to avoid the question), and the dialectical aim of answering the question with a quote from Romans 9:20. But, Fortunatus, after expressing this view of the Apostle Paul, undermines it by insistently asking exactly the question that he has just stated should not be asked:

quaeritur a nobis, si deo malum nocere non possit, cur huc anima missa fuerit, aut qua ratione mundo permixta sit. quod in eo manifestum est, quod ait apostolus: numquid dicit figmentum ei. numquid dicit figmentum ei qui se finxit: cur me ita formaueris? [Romans 9, 20] si ergo causanda

¹³⁵ I request this reason from you. In other words, if God could not be harmed, why did he send us here?

*est haec res, interrogandus est, qui animam direxit nulla cogente se necessitate; si autem necessitas fuerat mittendi animam, merito est et uoluntas liberandi eam.*¹³⁶(C. Fort 26F).

In this way Fortunatus once again shows that he is aware of rhetorical aims in having to answer the question with the quote from Romans, but then crucially loses sight of the importance of leaving the argument there and not continuing with the rest of his explanation, which has more dialectical aims due to its wish to directly address the question at hand. This lapse in focus on the rhetorical aims of the debate, which Fortunatus is often guilty of, leads to Augustine pouncing on a problematic part of C. Fort 26F dealing with the necessity of sending forth the soul, which cogently shows the way in which Augustine always puts the rhetorical aim of his turns at speech before the dialectical aims.

It is very interesting to note the manner in which Rutzenhöfer, Alflatt and BeDuhn are able to reconstruct the message that Fortunatus tries to bring across in this debate and its logical implications. It would seem that Augustine simply chose to ignore the implications of what Fortunatus had said to a great extent, possibly hoping that the audience would not pick up on these logical inconsistencies. As the above mentioned scholars argue, it is possible to say that Fortunatus clearly won this debate based on the implications of what he had said and the manner in which Augustine was cleverly backed into a corner. The real question of this study, though, is not necessarily whether Fortunatus' reconstructed arguments were logically

¹³⁶ We are being asked, if evil could not harm God, why the soul was sent here or for what reason it was mingled with the world. This is evident from the words of the apostle: "Does the vessel say to the potter who made it: Why have you formed me in this way?" [Romans 9, 20] If, then, this topic must be discussed, we must question him who sent the soul here under no compulsion from necessity. But if he was under some necessity to send the soul, it is right that he also has the will to set it free.

superior, but what the audience, for whom this entire event was staged, thought about who the winner of the debate was; and as with many of the people who have subsequently written about this debate, the majority of the audience was probably biased in favour of Augustine from the beginning. This analysis now moves to the important aspect of deceptive manoeuvring and how Augustine and Fortunatus use this tactic which has already been referred to in separate stages through this chapter.

5.6.8 Deceptive manoeuvring

Deceptive manoeuvring was described in chapter four as wilfully deviating from the issue under discussion and instead addressing the issue that best suits one's own argument; the use of this concept allows interesting perspectives on this debate. Both men make use of it, but it is Fortunatus in particular that makes use of this strategy. The majority of deceptive manoeuvring in the debate happens in the middle and beginning of the first day and primarily consists in Fortunatus achieving some measure of success in using his wiles to waylay Augustine and the flow of his arguments. This deceptive manoeuvring also coincides with the categories at the beginning of this chapter (5.3.1 to 5.3.3) revolving around refusals to answer questions and changing the topic.

An especially pertinent example of this type of strategic maneuvering follows in a short passage of the debate that takes place early on the first day with both men refusing to comply with the other and trying to gain control of the subject (*C. Fort* 4A (attempt to change the subject to the Nebridian conundrum), 4F (attempt to change the subject to the origin of everything), 5A (attempt to change the subject to the reason for soul dying), 5F (attempt to change the subject to whether all things are from God)). In the exchange, both men are seeking to ignore what the other has just

said and are attempting to force the direction of the debate towards that which best suits them. Turn *C. Fort 4A* is the first of many turns at speech in which Augustine uses his horizontal strategy to back Fortunatus into a corner by forcing him to admit that God is violable, through the question concerning the cause of souls being precipitated into death. In response, Fortunatus tries to steer the discussion towards a dilemma for Augustine: if God is the source of everything, then he must also be responsible for evil. In insisting on this question Fortunatus is himself attempting to force Augustine into a very uncomfortable corner.

C. Fort 5A represents one of Augustine's deceptive manoeuvres: here he refuses to acknowledge Fortunatus' question about there being nothing besides God. In doing so, he simply ignores Fortunatus' question completely and keeps to his strategy of reiterating his own question about the soul. With a highly rhetorical aim Fortunatus turns Augustine's strategy against the Catholic presbyter by mirroring him: he ignores Augustine and asks his own question again. In this manner Fortunatus uses deceptive manoeuvring himself. The follow up to the question in *C. Fort 5F* is also interesting in that Augustine then changes his tactic to use a different type of deceptive manoeuvring. In *C. Fort 6A* where Augustine, perhaps realising that he cannot keep asking the same question and ignoring Fortunatus without, potentially, losing some influence over the audience, pretends to answer Fortunatus' question. If one studies this turn at speech it becomes apparent that Augustine is in fact answering a part of the question that he puts to Fortunatus in *C. Fort 4A* and *5A* and not Fortunatus' question: *Augustinus dixit: illud ego respondere possum, quod me dominus nosse uoluit deum necessitate pati nullam posse neque ex aliqua parte*

uiolari atque corrumpi...(C. Fort 6A)¹³⁷. It is perhaps this technique of seeming to answer questions, whilst not actually doing so that is the most important method of deceptive manoeuvring since it masks itself very well as opposed to the flat ignoring of the previous turn at speech, and as a result is that much more effective. This brings the first section of the analysis of the *Contra Fortunatum* to a close.

5.7 Conclusion

As can be seen from the contents of this chapter, there is far more than initially meets the eye in this debate (as may be said of almost any debate) and to draw a simplistic conclusion that either Augustine or Fortunatus won the debate is to misunderstand this study entirely. This chapter has made explicit the tactics, strategies and manoeuvrings that both men used throughout the debate and in so doing has revealed a complexity, which I believe for the first time does justice to the rhetorical skills of Fortunatus, and especially those of Augustine.

In modern rhetorical terms, it would seem that Augustine was the man that was more able to successfully deploy his strategy while Fortunatus appears to be the less skilled orator that was being led by Augustine for the majority of the debate. However, this statement also neglects the fact that Fortunatus was himself successful in many of his own turns at speech and he too made significant inroads into Augustine's argument. Such was his success that Augustine would later in his career revise a number of his reasonings and beliefs based on the quality of Fortunatus' arguments against him (BeDuhn, 2011). It should be noted though that this chapter, like the previous one, does not undertake a theological analysis of what was said by either man. The few analyses of this debate that do exist are all

¹³⁷ Augustine said: I can answer what God wanted me to know, namely, that God can suffer no necessity and cannot be violated or corrupted in any respect.

focussed on the theological perspective and it was for this reason that I sought to undertake this particular (non-theological) study.

Overall it is Augustine that was the one more focussed on influencing the audience, though much of this was achieved through an aggressive style of debating, which Fortunatus never emulates. In my mind it is this aggressive, badgering style of Augustine's that detracts from the rhetorical success that he displays throughout the debate, as has been shown here in this chapter.

In chapter 6 I now discuss various aspects pertaining to the context of the debate. This constitutes, as I have said before, a more holistic approach to the debate, which, amongst other things, provides a counterbalance to the fragmentation of the debate that necessarily results from the kind of analyses offered in chapter 5.

Chapter 6: The *Contra Fortunatum* in context

6.1 Introduction

As stated in the first chapter, the concepts developed by theoretical scholars in the fields of Critical Discourse Analysis and Argumentation Theory, along with Strategic Maneuvering have been chosen for this study as tools for the analysis of the debate in order to achieve several crucial goals. Firstly, the combination of these methodologies is designed to illustrate the potential of their complementary nature for analysing a work like the *Contra Fortunatum* and the advantages of using such a hybrid methodology. Secondly, the study attempts to show how these methods of analysis are able to uncover underlying information contained within the debate and its context to a greater extent than the traditional methods used by classicists.

6.2 The opening of the debate

In combination with the process already started in the previous chapter it is important to provide the contextual information that is needed to produce a comprehensive overview of the debate. Some of this information comes directly from the opening paragraph of the debate which describes the date and place of the debate which is presented as recorded by scribes present at the occasion.

The opening sequence gives the reader the context in which the debate took place, in that it gives the date as 27 and 28 August in the year 392 (dated from the year in which Arcadius Augustus, for the second time, and Quintus Rufinus were the consuls in Rome)¹³⁸. It also describes the fact that this is a dispute with a Manichaean presbyter named Fortunatus, who – according to Possidius - was at this

¹³⁸The Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers translation of the debate gives the dates as 5 and 6 September 392, but this seems to be a fairly simple translation error that has forgotten to take into account the Latin manner of counting backwards from the three key dates in every month.

stage at the same level of seniority within the Manichaean community as Augustine was in the Catholic community¹³⁹. The fact that this debate took place in the Sossian baths in Hippo Regius in front of a crowd is also mentioned.

What is equally important to this opening statement is what has not been stated. Through Possidius we also know that this was not a coincidental meeting between two men of different faiths who had mutually decided to hold an open debate in a public place. In fact the Catholics and Donatists¹⁴⁰ had been pestering Fortunatus for some time before he reluctantly agreed to the debate with Augustine¹⁴¹. The choice of Augustine as the debater on behalf of the Catholic church was also not a coincidence as he held several advantages over other Catholics who might have been put forward to defend their faith. Of prime importance was that Augustine had a thorough classical training in rhetoric and had even taught rhetoric in Carthage and Milan. By itself this fact would have made Augustine a highly formidable opponent regardless of the topic under debate. But perhaps even more important was the fact that Augustine had a history within the Manichaean community and understood the strengths and weaknesses of their theology better than most¹⁴².

¹³⁹ *Interea Hipponenses cives vel peregrini Christiani tam Catholici quam etiam Donatistae adeunt presbyterum, ac deposcunt, ut illum hominem Manichaeorum presbyterum, quem doctum credebant, videret, et cum eodem de Lege tractaret* (Possidius, *Sancti Augustini Vita* 6). Although we know very little about Fortunatus, the fact that he was older than Augustine as well as the fact that he was a member of the Elect may lead us to speculate that, while both men bore the title of presbyter, Fortunatus may, in fact, have been further advanced in his career than Augustine at this stage. See discussion in 6.9 below.

¹⁴⁰ The fact that the Donatists were also asking Augustine to hold this debate is due to the fact that they had nothing to lose in this debate: either Augustine won the debate and the Donatists were rid of the Manichee Fortunatus (who was converting Donatists as well as Catholics to Manichaeism equally successfully), or Augustine lost and the Donatists would know that there was one less Catholic threat that they would have to worry about (Alflatt, 1974: 123).

¹⁴¹ See *Vita* 6.

¹⁴² Of interest is the fact that Fortunatus had known Augustine in Carthage whilst Augustine was still a Manichee, this may be the reason that Possidius (*Vita* 6) states that not only was Fortunatus reluctant to enter into a debate with Augustine, but he was in fact afraid of his former friend.

Fortunatus was a Manichaean presbyter who had lived in the city of Hippo Regius for some time and had a strong following within the community¹⁴³. Though he was acknowledged as a skilled debater within the Manichaean population, he probably had little if any formal training in the art of debating. Moreover as has been pointed out in chapter two, the Manichaean debaters were primarily used to debating the weaknesses of other faiths and not necessarily in presenting the tenets of their own faith (Pearson, 2007: 307-308). As such, Fortunatus and other Manichaean debaters had become accustomed to being the protagonists in the discussions they sought with those of different faiths and probably had little practice in the art of performing the role of defensive antagonist successfully¹⁴⁴.

Another point to be made is that as much as this was a public debate before the local populace, the crowd itself seems to have been overwhelmingly Catholic as the reactions later in the debate point out¹⁴⁵, quite apart from the fact that this discussion was organised by the Catholics to begin with in order to counter the successful, spontaneous public debates that the Manichaeans were holding against Catholic individuals in particular (Possidius, *Vita* 6)¹⁴⁶. It is also important to consider the possibility that this Catholic crowd was not simply made up of congregants, but also perhaps other clergy and probably the bishop himself. I say this because of the official nature of the debate with a recording being made which could be used to prosecute Fortunatus, as it was technically illegal to be a Manichee in Roman North

¹⁴³ See Augustine's *Retractationes* I. 15 (1).

¹⁴⁴ See Lim 1995 for an overview of the manner in which Augustine approached Fortunatus, Faustus and Felix, all Manichees.

¹⁴⁵ Possidius in fact states that the entire audience was made up of fellow believers (Possidius, *Vita* 6).

¹⁴⁶ Of equal interest is that Possidius insists that not only were Catholics pleading with Augustine to engage with Fortunatus, but the Donatists as well (Possidius, *Vita* 6). This seems to indicate the seriousness that both the Catholics and Donatists took this issue since the Donatists were mortal enemies of the Catholics as evinced by the frequent attacks on Catholics and the eventual conference called by the emperor in order to establish whether Donatism was in fact a schism (Brown, 2000: 330-331). In the debate that took place in this conference over several days the Catholics were primarily lead by Augustine again, and he did so successfully as it turns out (Brown, 2000: 334).

Africa and the rest of the Roman Empire¹⁴⁷. Decret (2001: 57-58) notes that “*il ne s’agissait pas en effet d’une invitation pour un discussion doctrinale, mais bien d’une convocation, sous peine de denunciation aux autorités et donc d’arrestation comme <<hérétiques>> condamnés par la législation en vigueur.*”

In terms of context then, the opening lines point toward a wealth of information, both explicit and implicit. Whilst the aforementioned introduction has defined the situation that the debate takes place in, it is important to locate a number of other contextual features of this passage. Just as the definition of the situational context is subjective according to the context model¹⁴⁸ through which I view this debate, so too are the contexts that apply to each of the debaters in this text. These contexts are also dynamic in nature and likely to change through the course of the debate.

Further, the selected methodologies emphasize the importance of taking into account the common ground of possible background knowledge in terms of both the knowledge of debaters and that of the public listening in. Unless the points made are understood by all, they will lose their effect and potential potency. Regarding theological knowledge, Augustine holds the upper hand because he has a deep knowledge of the Manichaeism as well as the Catholic systems¹⁴⁹, whilst Fortunatus holds a deeper knowledge of Manichaeism¹⁵⁰. It may be assumed that the crowd listening in to the debate would have had a far smaller knowledge of either system,

¹⁴⁷ Transcripts of public debates were used as evidence in cases against heresies. As a result the fact that Augustine calls for a scribe to make a transcript of the debate may be seen as a direct threat against Fortunatus.

¹⁴⁸ “Subjective definitions of situations are cognitive objects that need to be made explicit in cognitive terms, namely as mental models, called context models, located in episodic memory. These context models control the variable properties of discourse production and comprehension” (van Dijk, 2009: 249).

¹⁴⁹ Alflatt (1974: ref) points out the fact that Augustine is not as well versed in scripture at this stage as he wishes. This is crucial to this debate since the audience views scripture as the ultimate arbiter of any theological debate and as a result, being able to wield a significant array of scriptural passages, as Fortunatus does, is very important to winning this debate (Alflatt 1974:Ref)

¹⁵⁰ It is possible that the gap between the knowledge of Augustine and that of Fortunatus about several aspects of Catholic dogma was not too significant at this early stage of Augustine’s career.

although as will be made clear at the end of the first day, the crowd had a relatively deep knowledge of scriptural passages and viewed these as being sacrosanct. A result of this is that both men might keep their arguments to those topics that are likely to be understood best by all in the audience.

It is also imperative that this debate is understood to have been planned in advance, thus giving the participants the opportunity to know the setting, opponent, topic and aim of the discussion beforehand (Possidius, *Vita* 6)¹⁵¹. In the following section (6.3) I start by providing an overview of the structure of the debate. This is followed by a thematic discussion of the main topics treated in the *Contra Fortunatum* in section 6.4.

6.3 Structure of the debate

Section 6.3 of this chapter gives a brief synopsis of the structure of the debate in terms of the topics discussed. Without going into an in depth discussion of every turn of speech, which has been done before by Rutzenhöfer in 1990, this section is a more generalised reconstruction that seeks to group turns at speech according to the topics involved and examine the importance of certain turns at speech within the context of the debate. With regards to the numbering of the debate, I find the system used by the *notarii* to be insufficient; as a result I will refer to the turns at speech by using both the original numbering system combined with either an A for Augustine, or a F for Fortunatus, thus for example: *C. Fort* 12F, signifying the twelfth turn of speech by Fortunatus. In addition it is important to reflect on the odd numbering that

¹⁵¹ The reason that I am able to state categorically that both men had forehand knowledge of various contexts of the debate is that Possidius has pointed out the circumstances surrounding this event and in terms of those conditions that have been made clear. Fortunatus knew that they would be debating one another and they knew the topic to be debated as this was set out beforehand. Both men also knew the place that the debate would take place and that the aim of the debate was in order to defend their respective faiths in public and not in order to attempt to change the mind of their opponent (Possidius, *Vita* 6).

occurs between the end of the first day and the beginning of the second. The *notarius* ascribes the same number to the turns at speech of Fortunatus which form the end of the first day and the beginning of the second, in order to keep the numbering system intact, I shall refer to either *C. Fort* 19F α or *C. Fort* 19F β .

As I said above, the *Contra Fortunatum* begins with a short contextual paragraph, which gives the date and place of the debate as well as the name of Fortunatus, a Manichaean *presbyter*, as a participant. Augustine's name is not mentioned here, because presumably his is the author's name attached to the *Contra Fortunatum* as a literary work. The debate itself begins with Augustine taking the offensive from the start by laying out the basis of the Nebridian conundrum, and concluding that the logical implication of the conundrum, that God is violable and not all mighty, means that Manichaeism is a heresy. In response Fortunatus asks Augustine for a concession from himself that the Manichees are not involved in alleged crimes of morality, which Augustine begrudgingly gives, but with the caveat that he was not an Elect and therefore not involved fully in the Manichaean faith, clearly implying that the accusations made against the Manichees might still be true, since he is in no position to provide information on the practices of the Manichaean Elect.

Having garnered his concession, Fortunatus continues with a short monologue (*C. Fort.* 3F) that may be considered his true opening statement. He uses two scriptural quotes from John in order to justify his own faith, importantly, in Christian terms. This ends the opening stage of the debate and begins the argumentation stage. The following six turns at speech involve Augustine and Fortunatus trading questions and attempting to gain control of the debate: Augustine with the Nebridian conundrum and Fortunatus by asking whether there is anything besides God, thus alluding to the origin of evil. Augustine eventually succeeds in forcing his topic on Fortunatus with

an explanation of the Nebridian conundrum and renewed reference to Manichaeism as a heresy (*C. Fort.* 7A).

Fortunatus gives an answer to the Nebridian question that is simply ignored by Augustine, who continues to pose the conundrum until *C. Fort.* 10F when he allows Fortunatus to pose his own question against Augustine regarding the soul. This starts a section of the debate in which the central question is the origin of evil, which lasts until *C. Fort.* 16A where Augustine brings up the topic of the Nebridian conundrum again. In answer to the conundrum Fortunatus now quotes Ephesians 2:1-18 *in toto* as a defence of Manichaeism. This draws Augustine into a reinterpretation of the same passage for his own ends, but which I argue in 6.4.1 is a misrepresentation of the scriptural passage. The debate then turns back quickly to the origin of evil, dualism, the role and nature of the soul and free will, which are discussed in 6.4.2 and 6.4.3.

At this stage of the debate Augustine is on the offensive, but unable to penetrate Fortunatus' defences; in reality Fortunatus is winning the debate and Augustine, realising his precarious position, decides to bring in another subject entirely on which he knows the Manichee will disagree and which he hopes will cause the audience to view Fortunatus in a negative light. The topic that Augustine brings up is the lineage of Christ from the seed of David as mentioned in Romans 1:1-4 which alludes to Jesus being born in the flesh. This point is disputed by Fortunatus, just as Augustine knows he will. As a result the audience create a clamour, which the *notarius* writes is due to their sense that Fortunatus does not accept the whole of scripture. To this Fortunatus - according to the notary and seemingly off the record - exclaims that the Bible was fettered by the race of Darkness. This turn of events causes the meeting to erupt and the end of the first day's debate. The dubious nature of the

circumstances surrounding the debate ending at this point is investigated below in 6.7.

From the beginning of the second day, when Fortunatus opens the proceedings, through to *C. Fort* 23A the closely interrelated topics of lengthy discussion by both opponents are the nature of evil, free will, the soul and sin. In *C. Fort* 23A Augustine returns to the Nebridian conundrum, once again ignoring all the answers Fortunatus had given before and insisting that he has not answered the question. In response Fortunatus asks what the Catholic view is of the origin of the soul to which Augustine replies with an answer that is not directly related to the question asked. Again, the audience finds itself in the throes of a dispute in which each man is trying to gain the upper hand by talking past the opponent and towards the audience; this topic will be discussed several times in chapter six.

In *C. Fort* 29A begins the concluding stage of the debate. Here Augustine again insists on bringing up the Nebridian conundrum and demanding that Fortunatus answer it. In yet another response to the barrage of questions concerning the conundrum Fortunatus gives another explanation (in *C. Fort*. 29F) that attempts to reconcile the dualist Manichaean notion of two primary realms (that of Light and that of Darkness) with the omnipotence of God: souls are sent to war against the Darkness, even though – he now takes care to emphasise – God could not be harmed by this contrary nature (Darkness), which Augustine again doggedly repeats the by now stale question: why are souls sent to earth? Fortunatus then answers with a question of his own concerning whether Augustine conscientiously holds that Christ came from God (*C. Fort*. 30F), but Augustine chooses not to respond to the implicit meaning of Fortunatus' question, which BeDuhn (2011: 469) argues (and I agree with him) would actually turn the Nebridian conundrum directly against

Catholicism as well. Continuing with the Nebridian conundrum, Augustine is finally able to make Fortunatus ask what he wants him to ask (what then am I to say?), which Augustine then promptly interprets as a capitulation. In truth, as I argue throughout this study, the conclusion that Augustine is the winner of this debate is contentious. Viewed through different lenses radically different conclusions about this issue may be arrived at.

In the following section I continue my investigation by looking in more detail at the various arguments that were put forth by each man. Beginning with the Nebridian conundrum (6.4.1), the study then proceeds with analyses of the points made concerning the origin of evil (6.4.2) and free will (6.4.3), as well as the topic of the end of the first day: the nature of Christ (6.4.4).

6.4 The topics of discussion

Within the topics of discussion section of the study I will endeavour to cover those few topics that the entire debate revolves around. The section will begin with the most pervasive argument of both days: the Nebridian conundrum and then proceed with the origin of evil, free will and the nature of Christ.

6.4.1 The Nebridian conundrum

Before I begin to describe how the Nebridian conundrum was used by Augustine throughout the speech and its importance and relevance to this analysis it is necessary to first explain what the conundrum is. It was Augustine's friend Nebridius¹⁵² who first posed this conundrum to Augustine (van Oort, 2010: 528). The

¹⁵² Nebridius was a close friend of Augustine's from the time the latter was in Carthage (Fitzgerald, 2009: 587). As a valued friend of Augustine's, Nebridius also followed the future bishop of Hippo to Milan, but was not at Cassiciacum; instead he is known from the *Confessiones* (6.10.17) and his letters to Augustine, of which three survive (*epp.* 5, 6, 8) where he displays himself as an astute seeker of religion (Fitzgerald, 2009: 588). According to Fitzgerald (2009: 588) it was also Nebridius who convinced the young Augustine to eventually abandon the Manichaean faith; he converted to Catholicism soon after Augustine and returned to Africa.

conundrum is closely tied to the Manichaean creation myth and specifically the beginning of the middle age as discussed in chapter two (2.3.2). The crucial moment of this myth is the invasion of the Darkness into the Realm of Light and the response of God to this invasion in the form of the creation of a force to stop the invasion. Regardless of the impact that the First Man had on the battle (he was defeated, which was evidently a part of God's plan), the primary question that Nebridius posed was simply: if God is impervious and invulnerable then why was it necessary for God to send a repulsive force if the enemy could do him no harm, an act that results in suffering through the entangling of human souls with evil¹⁵³ (van Gaans, 2012: 320-321)?

The reason that this category is placed first is that it is by some distance the most important argument used by Augustine throughout the debate and the one that is most often mentioned. As is made apparent throughout this chapter, Augustine falls back on this argument in virtually all instances where his other lines of enquiry prove to be unsuccessful. By the end of the debate on the second day it is this conundrum which will seal the victory for Augustine in the minds of the audience; and it is important to bear in mind that one of the goals of this study is to show how victory in the minds of the audience is not necessarily the same as winning the debate on technical or logical grounds.

Augustine both begins and ends the debate with the question of the Nebridian conundrum and much of the latter half of the second day revolves around constant attempts to stump Fortunatus with this question. The fact that Augustine keeps asking this question points to the fact that he never acknowledges receiving a

¹⁵³ For an explanation of Augustine's view of the fall of the soul see O'Connell (1969: 23-36). For an explanation of Augustine's early views on the origin of the soul see O'Connell (1993).

response that may be regarded as sufficient. The importance of this lies in the manner in which Augustine steadfastly refuses to recognise any response as being adequate and does so in an aggressive manner intended to influence the audience by undermining Fortunatus¹⁵⁴.

Considering the importance of the Nebridian conundrum to Augustine's arsenal of attacks against the Manichees in the *Contra Fortunatum*, it is surprising to find so little written about it other than the extensive analysis given by BeDuhn in his article: „*Did Augustus win his debate with Fortunatus?*’ (2011)¹⁵⁵. In this article he argues that through his responses to the Nebridian conundrum in particular, Fortunatus may be said to have actually won this debate. My contention is that BeDuhn has lost sight of the ultimate aim of debates of this nature which is to win over the audience to his specific position and not necessarily to win it on highly technical or logical grounds that might not have been fully comprehended by the same audience.

It is significant that Augustine refers to the Nebridian conundrum in his very opening statement (*C. Fort.* 1Aβ): ... *in primus summum errorem puto omnipotentem deum, in quo una nobis spes est, ex aliqua parte uiolabilem aut coinquinabilem aut corruptibilem credere*¹⁵⁶... This statement lays the foundation for the next part of the opening statement which goes to the heart of the Manichaean creation myth:

...*cum coeperitis cetera exponere, cogimini eum corruptibilem, penetrabilem et coinquinabilem confiteri. dicitis enim aliam nescio quam gentem tenebrarum aduersus dei regnum rebellare; deum autem omnipotentem cum uideret, quanta labes et uastitas inmineret regnis suis,*

¹⁵⁴ BeDuhn (2011: 463) refers to the manner in which the impression is made of the Nebridian conundrum winning the debate for Augustine due to the way in which he asks the question which refuses to acknowledge any answer that Fortunatus might give.

¹⁵⁵ See Eddy (2009) for the same line of thinking as BeDuhn's reading of this debate.

¹⁵⁶ First of all, I think it the worst error to believe that almighty God, in whom our one hope lies, can be violated, defiled, or corrupted in some respect.

*nisi aliquid aduersae genti obponeret et ei resisteret, misisse hanc uirtutem, de cuius commixtione cum malo et tenebrarum gente mundus sit fabricatus...*¹⁵⁷ .

In response to this direct attack on his faith by Augustine, Fortunatus replies with his own strategy, which is to gain a more favourable standing with the audience by asking Augustine to deviate from the initial direction of his opening by first openly admitting that the Manichees do not partake in any untoward behaviour in their daily living and religious practices. In this instance it is obvious that Fortunatus is simply ignoring what Augustine has just stated and wishes to wrest control of the topic from his opponent. Augustine does not seem to mind this change in direction, but is firm in his admonition (directed at both Fortunatus and the audience) that the agreed topic of discussion was to be faith and that his consent to answer Fortunatus is a gracious concession (*C. Fort 2A*).

Ultimately, Augustine recognises that the concession that Fortunatus is looking to obtain has little, if any, impact on the overall argument of this debate, but will have an effect on the audience's impression of both men. Augustine thus realises that by allowing the discourse to continue in this direction Fortunatus will be able to gain credibility and Augustine will be able to come across as a reasonable and magnanimous debater. By recognising that Fortunatus wishes to dispel the rumours about the Manichees, Augustine is therefore able to pre-empt a switch in power by losing little, but gaining much in the minds of the audience.

¹⁵⁷ ...when you explain other points, you are forced to admit that he can be corrupted, penetrated and defiled. For you say that some sort of nation of darkness rebelled against the kingdom of God. But when almighty God saw the great ruin and devastation that threatened his kingdoms unless he set something in the way of the enemy nation and resisted it, he sent forth this power, and this world was fashioned from this power's mingling with evil and the nation of darkness.

Augustine only refers back to the Nebridian conundrum a few more times on the first day of the debate (*C. Fort* 7, 8, 16), instead consenting to participate in other arguments brought into play by Fortunatus such as the origin of evil, which will be dealt with later in this chapter. The reason for this may be that in *C. Fort* 16 Fortunatus has considerable success in dealing with the issue of the Nebridian conundrum through the use of Ephesians 2: 1-18. This is not necessarily to say that Fortunatus was able to deal finally and comprehensively with the problem of the conundrum. Yet, it is clear that his answer causes Augustine to change the direction of his own argument. Throughout his article on this topic, BeDuhn (2011: 467) counts six occasions on which Fortunatus answers the conundrum, each time with a different answer and often backed up with quotes from the New Testament (*C. Fort.* 7, 8, 16, 20, 22, 28). However, using the methodologies of Critical Discourse Analysis and Argumentation Theory, I contend that these answers on the part of Fortunatus, as much as they may be valid (in particular in their implications), are not as effective as BeDuhn makes them out to be. This is primarily because of the manner in which Augustine deals with them (especially at the end of the second day). His clever techniques succeed in guiding the audience, who are mostly Catholic anyway and thus more likely to take Augustine's lead, into questioning every answer that Fortunatus gives.

This brings to the fore the distinct difference, postulated by Argumentation Theory, between dialectical aims and rhetorical aims. Fortunatus is focussed on the dialectical aims, on providing logical answers to the questions posed to him, but leaving important aspects of his argument and its logical conclusions implicit. In contrast Augustine is far more aware of the rhetorical aims and seeks solely to take advantage of every opportunity to steer the audience's sympathies toward his

argument. He is, of course, able to do through his thorough rhetorical training and prowess.

Perhaps a key issue at play in this instance is the fact that the audience experienced this debate as a live event; as much as this is an obvious statement to make it is crucially important to an understanding of the situation itself. Analyses that have come after the event, focus on at the contents in a far more critical way: where every word and sentence is plucked apart in order to study the arguments in minute detail. It is crucial to remember that these are not the conditions under which the audience experienced the debate. They had little time to digest fully each turn at speech before listening to the next turn. Under these circumstances it is the debater that most clearly is able to articulate his argument and express it in such a way as to make sure that as many of the audience understand him as clearly as possible, who is able to sway the audience, which was the ultimate reason why this debate took place in public. As a result, factors such as wit and ability to shift one's arguments as required becomes a far more important aspect of the debate than clever but cryptic answers which few members of the audience will be able to successfully interpret in their entirety.

When Augustine next uses the Nebridian conundrum it is on the second day and he uses it in place of the other arguments he had made on the first day, which had been successfully answered by Fortunatus to the extent that Augustine was at a major disadvantage by the end of the first day's debate. The result is that the Nebridian conundrum is virtually the sole major point of contention for Augustine on the second day and the consecutive turns at speech focussing on this issue may be viewed as a single entity with a single purpose: the destruction of Fortunatus. This is not just a metaphorical statement, Augustine needed to win this debate and in so doing would

effectively run Fortunatus out of the city of Hippo Regius. This was, in fact, the direct result of this debate. Yet, at the beginning of the second day it was Augustine who was in the perilous position and not his opponent.

The Nebridian conundrum had become Augustine's last line of attack and he is forced to take recourse to all of his rhetorical training to get himself through the rest of the debate. From *C. Fort.* 22A to 37A the focus of Augustine's argument revolves around the Nebridian conundrum and he constantly endeavours to pin Fortunatus down into an admission that the Manichaean creation myth involves a contradiction at its core: that God is invulnerable, but that he needs to defend Himself against an attack from the Realm of Darkness. In doing so, Augustine also ensures that he leads his argument, and the audience, into portraying Fortunatus as being disingenuous in his replies to this conundrum. Augustine is able to do so by constantly referring back to the question and refusing to acknowledge or accept any answer that Fortunatus might give in return. Not only does Augustine refuse to accept any answer to the conundrum that Fortunatus might give, but he also refuses Fortunatus the opportunity to lead the debate, as for example in *C. Fort.* 31A: *iterum me interrogas. ad interrogata responde*¹⁵⁸.

Of interest in terms of leading the debate, is the fact that within the first day's discussion Augustine seemed willing to allow Fortunatus to lead the conversation. However, perhaps due to the perilous position that Augustine found himself in at the end of the first day, he seems to have decided that a far more aggressive approach to the debate was necessary in order to salvage his position. Hence the overly badgering nature of Augustine's debating tactics in the second day that is fully in

¹⁵⁸ Again you question me; reply to my questions.

keeping with the aim of rhetoric and can be described particularly well by recourse to the concepts of Strategic Maneuvering (discussed in 4.2.2).

The next stage of this analysis of Augustine's use of the Nebridian conundrum is to take stock of what Fortunatus' arguments against the conundrum are and how it is that they might be purposely misinterpreted by Augustine. Of equal interest is the manner in which Fortunatus is able to construct his diverse arguments against the conundrum and to use scriptural quotes in order to substantiate his position. As this study will show through its various stages, particularly in chapter 6.3.3, Fortunatus' skill in employing New Testament quotes to back his arguments is formidable and it is primarily this skill which I believe results in Augustine's precarious position at the end of the first day's debate. It emerges from the debate that the audience view the scriptures as being the ultimate authority in any argument, as discussed in the introduction of this chapter and also argued convincingly by Alflatt before (1974: 126).

As has already been mentioned previously in this section, Fortunatus' first response to the Nebridian conundrum posed in Augustine's opening statement is to simply ignore it and to change the subject. This, however, is not the manner in which he treats the question of the Nebridian conundrum later throughout the debate. The first occasion on which Fortunatus directly addresses the conundrum is in *C. Fort* 7F, where he opens with a Pauline quote from Philippians 2:5-8 and then proceeds to give an explanation of what he believes this section of scripture means. As much as this may seem to be a straightforward operation, this is a prime example of the way in which Fortunatus argues throughout the debate: in a verbose manner that requires a lot of thought by the listener in order to understand completely the implications.

I will leave out the Pauline quote and simply proceed through the rest of the response to the Nebridian conundrum by Fortunatus: *hoc ergo sentimus de nobis, quod et de Christo: qui cum in forma dei esset constitutus, factus est subditus usque ad mortem, ut similitudinem animarum nostrarum ostenderet*¹⁵⁹. The following sentence seems designed to either qualify what has just been said or lead to further explanation: *et quemadmodum in se mortis similitudinem ostendit et patrem in se et in patre se esse de medio mortuorum resuscitatum, eo modo sentiamus et de animabus nostris futurum*¹⁶⁰. Note that Fortunatus has still not directly answered the question, nonetheless he continues to deliver the final sentence of this turn at speech: *quod per ipsum poterimus de hac morte liberari: quae aut aliena est a deo aut, si propria est dei, et misericordia eius cessat et liberatoris nomen et opera liberantis*¹⁶¹.

Rutzenöfer and BeDuhn differ radically in their views on this particular turn at speech: Rutzenhöfer argues that the opponents are talking past each other and that Fortunatus' inability to make the leap in understanding to differentiate between the Creator and the created is evidence of his deep lack of learning (Rutzenhöfer, 1992: 23). In contrast, BeDuhn pulls together the threads of what Fortunatus has said and comes to a completely different conclusion, namely that an explanation that the soul was sent forth to battle and misery just as Christ was sent forth by God to suffer for mankind means that God will send forth individuals and souls into misery for the

¹⁵⁹ We have this same mind about ourselves, then, as about Christ who, though he was established in the form of God, became subject to death in order to show his likeness to our souls.

¹⁶⁰ And just as he showed the likeness of death to himself and that, having been raised up from among, he is in the Father and the Father is in him, so we think that it will be the same way with our souls.

¹⁶¹ For we shall be able to be set free from this death through him. Death is either foreign to God, or, if it belongs to God, his mercy ceases, as well as his title of deliverer and the works of the deliverer.

greater good and ultimately exaltation, thus giving a satisfactory answer to the Nebridian conundrum¹⁶² (BeDuhn, 2011: 467).

Using Critical Discourse Analysis and Argumentation Theory, I would argue that neither author is completely correct: Rutzenhöfer is too severe on Fortunatus and BeDuhn too kind. Fortunatus undoubtedly has a great capacity to cite New Testament scripture in the appropriate occasions; he also has an ability to analyse these scriptures in terms of their relevance to the question at hand. What he is not able to do is to make these conclusions easily intelligible to an audience of laymen. This instance of Fortunatus answering the Nebridian conundrum will become synonymous with the manner in which he conducts much of the rest of this debate. It is for this reason that I believe it is reasonably safe to state that Fortunatus did not have a formal rhetorical training to a high level. He was not aware enough of the demands of the audience.

Fortunatus will continue to answer the Nebridian conundrum on at least five more occasions, each time with a different argument, which would suggest that there are several ways in which a Manichee might be able to answer this question, if only Fortunatus' answers were more easily intelligible. Perhaps Fortunatus' best reply to the Nebridian conundrum (other than *C. Fort* 22F) comes in *C. Fort* 8F, where he says: *ita apostolus dixit, quomodo sentire debeamus de nostris animis, quod Christus nobis ostendit. si fuit Christus in passione et morte, et nos; si uoluntate patris descendit in passionem et mortem, et nos*¹⁶³.

¹⁶² Read O'Connell (1987) for an interesting exposition of how Augustine's view of the origin of the soul evolves through his later works. Also see Teske's (2004) shorter article on Augustine's theory of the soul.

¹⁶³ The apostle said that we should think about our souls as Christ showed us. If Christ underwent suffering and death, we should as well. If he came down into suffering and death by the will of the Father, we should as well.

Once again, Fortunatus makes a very important observation which implies that the Nebridian conundrum could actually be applied to the Catholics in much the same way as it is to the Manichees (BeDuhn, 2011: 467). In a similar manner to sending Christ into suffering and misery, so could God be said to have sent the soul forth into misery and suffering in order to battle the forces of Darkness. However, as may be read from Fortunatus' response above, he does not say this explicitly and as a result runs the risk of the audience not picking up on this critically important point. Augustine, in contrast, does understand the implications of this response because he immediately drops all references to the Nebridian conundrum for the next eight turns at speech. In fact Augustine will only make one more reference to the conundrum on the first day, in *C. Fort* 16A.

There is an interesting split in opinions between the two authors that have written about this particular point in the debate (*C. Fort* 16F). Rutzenhöfer is of the opinion that Fortunatus does not achieve much in this turn at speech other than illustrating the fact that he is able to quote Ephesians 2:1-18 *in toto*¹⁶⁴. Impressive as this may have been to the audience, Rutzenhöfer argues that the quote from Paul's letter to the people of Ephesus falls short on several counts and could actually be claimed to count against the position of the Manichee, something that she argues Augustine takes advantage of in the following turn at speech (Rutzenhöfer, 1992: 35-38). In Rutzenhöfer's interpretation this passage of speech on the part of Fortunatus revolves first around the argument that God preceded evil and is thus superior to evil in a system of duality and secondly, that the long quote from Ephesians primarily discusses grace and mercy (Rutzenhöfer, 1992: 37-38).

¹⁶⁴ Teske's translation, in fact assumes that Fortunatus has *read* the passage (not recited it by heart): *C. Fort* 17A "this passage from the apostle that you chose to *read* aloud". The Latin does not necessitate such a translation (*ista apostoli lectio, quam recitare uoluisti*).

In stark contrast, BeDuhn claims this passage as yet another crucial argument against the Nebridian conundrum on the part of Fortunatus in the form of a formulation that claims God acted with “prescience” in the course of sending forth souls to suffering and misery in fighting against the forces of Darkness. According to BeDuhn (2011:467) this means that God acted for the long term goodwill of souls at the cost of short term suffering. These long term goals would also not have been possible if the attack of the Darkness had not been countered by a force for good in the form of human souls (BeDuhn, 2011: 467). BeDuhn (2011: 467-468) goes on to argue that Fortunatus’ logic here is superior: his explanation reveals how God in fact “redeems and empowers” the soul through such a counterattack that ultimately will lead to victory over evil.

In further contrast to Rutzenhöfer’s position, BeDuhn argues that the effective use of the quote of Ephesians in Fortunatus’ turn at speech leaves Augustine in a precarious position as he cannot counter the use of this passage of New Testament scripture (BeDuhn, 2011: 468). These disparate positions do make sense if the reader understands that practically the entire debate can be read on different levels of interpretation, dependent on how deep the reader is willing to go in searching for the full meaning of both this cryptic turn at speech and the rest of the debate to varying degrees. If modern academics with time to study this debate carefully cannot agree on the virtue and meaning of this turn at speech, how are we and Fortunatus to expect an audience to fully grasp the true argument that Fortunatus wishes to pose before them and Augustine.

In my opinion this turn at speech might endeavour to bring across the meaning BeDuhn says it has, in terms of being a brilliant and incisive riposte to Augustine’s

constant use of the Nebridian conundrum. Yet, I view Rutzenhöfer's interpretation of this turn at speech as much closer to the truth, but not for the same reasons. I first take into consideration what the audience is capable of understanding in the heat of an argument between two intelligent debaters, which Fortunatus and Augustine certainly were, and whether they, the audience, would have been able to dissect the contents of a turn at speech before the opponent began speaking again. In this case, I believe that Fortunatus is again guilty of leaving too much implicit and thus is not immediately understandable to the audience, thus losing efficacy. However, those in the audience who knew their scripture well would nonetheless have been impressed with the ability of Fortunatus to quote such a long passage in its entirety from memory and it seems that Augustine, in his next turn at speech, is far more interested in countering the use of the scriptural passage than of the argument behind it. This Augustine does in the first sentence of the next turn at speech: *ista apostoli lectio, quam recitare uoluisti, si non fallor, pro mea plurimum et contra tuam fidem facit*¹⁶⁵.

It is apparent from the debate itself that Augustine finds himself in trouble at the end of the first day, but I do not believe it is primarily through the arguments laid forth by Fortunatus. However, as will be discussed through the rest of this chapter there are numerous valid arguments. I argue that it is not so much Fortunatus' rhetorical prowess as the ease with which Fortunatus uses quotes from the New Testament that forces Augustine into a desperate situation. This leads directly to the distinctly underhand tactic of attempting to actively undermine Fortunatus through the use of Romans, as I argue below in section 6.4.4 of this chapter.

¹⁶⁵ Unless I am mistaken, this passage from the apostle that you chose to read aloud works very much in favour of my faith and against yours.

All the attempts by Augustine to trap Fortunatus with the Nebridian conundrum have come to nought on the first day, but Augustine's tactics will evolve in the second day's debate and will become the focal point of the argument between the two men. It is during this period on the second day that, I argue, Augustine makes full use of his rhetorical abilities and knowledge in relying on the fact that Fortunatus may continue to be obscure in his responses to the Nebridian conundrum and that the audience might not understand the full implications of Fortunatus' responses, which the latter does not spell out explicitly enough. As discussed previously, Augustine seems far more concerned with Fortunatus' ability to quote New Testament scripture at length and at will and the positive effect this may have on the audience even if they don't necessarily understand the details of his arguments. It is this ability to rely on scriptural passages in his responses to the Nebridian conundrum that Augustine will more readily address on the second day and which I discuss in 6.3.3 as an important feature of this debate.

As has been stated before in this chapter, the issue of the Nebridian conundrum is far more prominent on the second day of the debate and actually forms the central issue of Augustine's attack on the Manichaean system and Fortunatus as its representative. The first opportunity in which Augustine expresses the conundrum on the second day takes place in turn *C. Fort* 20A, where Fortunatus responds not with a defence of the Manichaean system, but an attack on the Catholic view of the origin of evil, which will be discussed later in this chapter (in section 6.4.2) as a separate topic.

A couple of lengthy turns at speech later, Augustine returns to the Nebridian conundrum (right at the end of *C. Fort* 22A) and, as BeDuhn describes it, Fortunatus

is once again prepared with another scriptural passage that reinforces his Manichaean view: Matthew 10:16 (BeDuhn, 2011: 468). If Augustine had been hoping for another one of Fortunatus' long and ambiguous answers, then he has misjudged the Manichee: this answer is one of the most damning and easily accessible replies to the conundrum that Fortunatus has managed to respond with. Matthew 10:16 states „Behold I send you as sheep into the midst of wolves“ and seems to clearly display the way in which God is prepared to send souls into misery and suffering in order to achieve a more important long term goal.

Of interest to this study is the fact that Rutzenhöfer does not pick up on the theoretically simple conclusion that both BeDuhn and I have come to: that this is an excellent comeback on the part of Fortunatus and will have been effective with the audience. Instead she views the turn at speech and scriptural quote from Matthew as being ineffectual (Rutzenhöfer, 1992: 58-59). This is due to the fact that Fortunatus does not deal with the bulk of the questions and observations put to him by Augustine in the previous turn at speech. Whilst this is correct, the final question that Augustine poses is directly linked to the Nebridian conundrum, which is precisely what Fortunatus addresses.

The next occurrence of the Nebridian conundrum occurs in *C. Fort* 28A, where Augustine again poses the question of why an omnipotent and invulnerable God would knowingly send souls forth into misery, by sending them into battle against the Darkness. This time Fortunatus responds by turning the argument against the Catholic view through showing how, according to Catholic dogma, God is just as guilty of being cruel by sending forth souls that he knew would become involved in sin and misery and as a result might not be able to join God in heaven. As

Fortunatus puts it: *nos dicere adseueras crudelem esse deum mittendo animam; fecisse deum uero hominem et insufflasse in eum animam; quam utique pro sua scientia animam futuram inuolui et beneficio malorum non posse hereditati suae repraesentari. hoc aut ignorantis est aut dantis animam ad haec mala, quae supra memorata sunt* (C.Fort 28F)¹⁶⁶. In this way the conundrum might just as easily be said to apply to the Catholic view as it does the Manichaeian (BeDuhn, 2011: 469). Importantly, though, as Augustine insists (for the benefit of the audience), Fortunatus has not answered the question; he has addressed the question, but not answered it.

The debate is now entering its final stages, where a series of short, pointed questions and sharp statements are made by both men, but the majority of the questions are asked by Augustine as he refuses to acknowledge any possible answer to the Nebridian conundrum that Fortunatus produces. Considering the valid responses made by Fortunatus on the first and second day of the debate it is bemusing to many that Fortunatus eventually gives in, but it seems that the only choice he has is between giving in or being bemused and irritated by the constant, badgering questions that he has already answered repeatedly. In this light it is perhaps a little less perplexing that Fortunatus eventually chooses to bring an end to the proceedings.

The final passage of scripture that Fortunatus quotes is John 10:18: "*potestatem habeo ponendi eam [sc. animam] et potestatem habeo iterum sumendi eam*"¹⁶⁷. This quote from the words of Christ is argued by Fortunatus to be just as applicable to human souls. BeDuhn makes the important observation that the Catholic view of

¹⁶⁶ You assert that we say that God is cruel in sending the soul, but you claim that God made man and breathed a soul into him, which he certainly foreknew would be involved in future misery and could not be restored to its inheritance by reason of its evils. This is an act either of someone ignorant or of someone who hands over to these evils that were mentioned previously.

¹⁶⁷ "I have the power to lay down my soul and the power to take it up again."

damnation of the soul is not analogous to the Manichaean soul and its battle against evil; and that where Catholics see misery and suffering leading to damnation, the Manichees see the suffering and misery of the soul in its battle with evil as heroic, and leading to a triumphant return to God (BeDuhn, 2011: 469). Thus, all Manichaean souls will eventually be returned to God, having completed their mission. This understanding seems to be the intention behind Fortunatus' final New Testament quotation in front of the predominantly Catholic crowd. Yet, once again, much of his meaning remains implicit: namely that there is no easy answer, neither in Manichaean, nor in Catholic terms, as to why souls are delivered into suffering on earth. One of the best ways to deal with this problem is simply to accept that the fate of Jesus is the will of God and that man should see his own fate as parallel to that of Christ and not question why God determined the state of the universe in this way. Unfortunately, he does not make this explicit.

In the end it is Fortunatus who admits in *C. Fort* 36F that he no longer knows what to say in order to satisfy Augustine, since all his previous answers have been ignored by Augustine, who at this point has full control of the debate. As a direct result of this reaction by Fortunatus, I believe that many of the listeners of this debate as well as readers thereof will come to the conclusion that Fortunatus was unable to answer the Nebridian conundrum and that as a direct result Augustine won the debate.

The Nebridian conundrum therefore represents the most important element in Augustine's arsenal of points on which to scrutinise his Manichaean opponents; but I would argue that there are several reasons to view the „victory“ in this issue on the part of Augustine as being suspect. Most important are the responses that Fortunatus gave in direct answer to the Nebridian conundrum: whether they were

well and clearly stated or not, they held very serious and dangerous implications for Augustine's view of Catholicism. Yet, if the focus is kept strictly on victory in the minds of the audience, it is possible to imagine how this turn in the debate may in fact be perceived as a victory for Augustine.

This study now moves on to the topic of the origin of evil, which I view as the secondary topic of discussion during the debate between Fortunatus and Augustine. It also includes the subject of Manichaean Dualism as an important feature in the argument of the Manichees for the complete goodness of God and the soul.

6.4.2 The origin of evil

The question of the origin of evil and how it fits into the debate between Fortunatus and Augustine is intricately linked with a number of other related topics such as the question of involuntary sin, free will and dualism. In this instance it is the Manichaean view that could be said to make the clearest argument for God not being the source of evil. The problem is a complex one for the Catholic Augustine to be able to explain: if God is the creator of all things, then surely he must be liable for the creation of evil and sin as well, how else may someone be able to explain it¹⁶⁸? The Manichees are able to deal with this problem easily through their dualistic system: they believe that God is the author only of good and that the Darkness is responsible for evil. In this way the Manichaean God is completely absolved of any responsibility for the creation of evil. This was probably one of the strongest factors that initially drew Augustine to Manichaeism (Brown, 2000: 37).

The crucial difference between the Nebridian conundrum and the question of the origin of evil is that whereas the Nebridian conundrum was the primary question

¹⁶⁸ For a thorough illustration of Augustine's conception of evil see Evans (1982), Burns (1988) and Mathewes (2001). For a more philosophical take on Augustine's understanding of evil see Maker (1984).

posed by Augustine to Fortunatus, in the case of the origin of evil the question is asked by Fortunatus and addressed to Augustine. It actually represents his best weapon against the problematic issues raised by the Nebridian conundrum. It is likely due to the prominence of this argument throughout the debate that this was Fortunatus' primary rhetorical tactic that he had used against other Catholics in his other successful debates with Catholics and Donatists in Hippo. The appeal of such a notion lies in its simplicity and ease of understanding, even more so than the Nebridian conundrum.

The first occasion on which Fortunatus alludes to the issue of the origin of evil is in the course of his attempt to demonstrate that God has not created all things good (he does not actually mention the origin of evil in this turn at speech) in *C. Fort* 14F: *hinc uero constat et ratione rerum, quod duae sunt substantiae in hoc mundo, quae speciebus et nominibus distant: quarum est una corporis, alia uero aeterna, patris omnipotentis quam esse credimus*¹⁶⁹. Augustine immediately recognises the potency of the question and responds by saying: *contraria ista, quae te mouent, ut aduersa sentiamus, propter peccatum nostrum, id est propter peccatum hominis contigerunt. nam omnia deus et bona fecit, et bene ordinauit; peccatum autem non fecit et hoc est solum, quod dicitur malum, uoluntarium nostrum peccatum. est et aliud genus mali, quod est poena peccati, cum ergo duo sint genera malorum, peccatum et poena peccati, peccatum ad deum non pertinet* (*C. Fort* 15A)¹⁷⁰. Augustine places evil firmly in the bounds of human free will and thus voluntary sin.

¹⁶⁹ Hence, it is very clear from the nature of things that there are two substances in this world, which differ in their appearance and names; one of these is that of the body, but the other is eternal, which we believe is the substance of the almighty Father.

¹⁷⁰ These contraries that bother you to the point that we should find them opposed to one another have come about as a result of our sin, that is, on account of the sin of man. For God made all things good and arranged them well, but he did not make sin. And this is the only thing that we are at present calling evil: our voluntary

A couple of turns later (*C. Fort* 17A) Augustine makes a telling point: if the Darkness within us compels us to sin, then surely it is not our fault that we sin; even more damning is the question that follows immediately after this: if we are not responsible for our sins, but we insist on asking God for forgiveness of our sins (as both the Manichees and Catholics do), then who is it that God forgives, the sinner or the Darkness? Surely, if we are not responsible for sinning then we would not need forgiveness of sins. It is therefore manifest to Augustine that it is the soul which sins voluntarily and not the Darkness.

BeDuhn has an interesting take on the argument of Fortunatus¹ regarding free will. He believes that the argument leaves Augustine in a quandary because there are only two ways of viewing a possible solution to the question of the origin of evil. Either Augustine has to accept a system of dualism or he has to recognise a system in which evil does not exist (BeDuhn, 2011: 473): “Lacking these options, Augustine will be left with a Christian God who either creates evil or abets its advance by withdrawing protection from his creation solely for the sake of free will – in other words, for the sole purpose of justifying his punishment of those who fall victim to the lure of sin”. As can be evinced from the conclusion laid out by BeDuhn, Augustine now finds himself in a very difficult situation, especially when Fortunatus quotes Paul’s letter to the Ephesians 2:3, „*et eramus natura filii irae*” (*C. Fort* 16F). Augustine has a biting answer to this quote though: if we are indeed by nature children of wrath, then how can the Manichees claim that the soul is of God. In this instance I am far more inclined to agree with the conclusion that BeDuhn comes to that Fortunatus has made a telling blow against Augustine, not just with this turn at speech, but with the argument in general. Of further interest is that later in his career

sin. But there is another kind of evil, which is the punishment of sin. Since, then, there are two kinds of evil, sin and the punishment of sin, sin does not pertain to God...

Augustine will actually take up Fortunatus' reading of the writings of Paul as regards free will (BeDuhn, 2011: 475).

Alflatt has a slightly different take on the manner in which Augustine replies to Fortunatus' use of Ephesians 2:1-18 and in particular 2:3. Arguing that Augustine purposely misinterprets the quote from Ephesians for his own ends, Alflatt makes the observation, as I have before, that it is not so much the contents of the scriptural quote that are problematic for Augustine as much as is the fact that Fortunatus has yet another passage from the Bible on his side, while Augustine has none in reply. This might be a significant reason why, at this stage, the audience might be more persuaded by Fortunatus than Augustine (Alflatt, 1974: 127). However, this aspect will be dealt with more fully in section 6.3.3.

The argument over the origin of evil, free will and sin continues into the second day's debate with Fortunatus making a telling indictment of the Augustinian position regarding free will: *de substantiis proposui, quod bonorum tantummodo deus creator, ultor uero malorum habeatur, eo quod mala ex ipso non sint. merito ergo hoc sentio et ulcisci deum mala, quia ex ipso non sunt. ceterum si ex ipso essent aut daret licentiam peccandi, quod dicis liberum arbitrium dedisse deum, consensor iam inueniebatur delicti mei, eo quod delicti mei auctor esset (C. Fort 20F)*¹⁷¹. In summary: If free will was given to man by God, and man then used free will to sin, is God not then responsible for sin (Alflatt, 1974: 127)? Alflatt's summary of what Augustine says in *C. Fort 21A* makes the crux of the matter clear:

¹⁷¹ I proposed that we discuss substances because God is considered to be the creator of only good things but the avenger of evils, for the reason that evils do not come from him. I am right, therefore, to hold that God avenges evils because they do not come from him. But if they came from him or he gave us the freedom to sin, since you say that God gave free choice, he would already be found to consent to my sin, because he would be the author of my sin.

Augustine says that sin must be of free will or else it would not deserve punishment. God created all, but the creature is inferior to the creator. The origin of evil is sin, and, following 1 Timothy 6:10, the root of all evils is covetousness. There can be no root of a root, so it is unnecessary to look any further for the cause of sin (Alflatt, 1974: 128).

This is a rather facetious move on the part of Augustine who claims to have answered Fortunatus' point. In this example of Strategic Maneuvering, which was dealt with in 5.5, Augustine not only does not answer the question, but by refusing to further investigate the origin of covetousness, he then insists that Fortunatus answers his question in turn, a clear example of topic control.

This is the last example of the issue of the origin of evil in the debate, though the questions of free will and sin are still to be dealt with, but not for much longer. As described in 6.3, the Nebridian conundrum becomes the dominant issue of the rest of the second day's debate. However, the debate on the topics of free will and involuntary sin in the *Contra Fortunatum* still need to be further analysed.

6.4.3 Free will

The topic of free will follows directly from the question of the origin of evil. In Manichaeism it is the *anima mala* that is responsible for sin whereas in Augustine's reading of Catholicism it is free will that leads to sin and thus evil¹⁷². As discussed in 6.4.1, Augustine explains that evil is the result of sin and therefore God is not liable for evil, even though he is the creator of all things according to the Catholic system.

It is in *C.Fort* 15A that Augustine first broaches the subject of free will during a passage that explain how evil has its origin in voluntary sin: *cum ergo omnia optime*

¹⁷² For further readings on the topic of free will see Rowe (1964), Scott (1995) and Stump (2004). On the subject of the link between sin and free will see Babcock (1988) and Wetzel (2010).

*sint ordinata, quae uidentur nobis nunc aduersa esse, merito contigit hominis lapsi, qui legem dei seruare noluit. animae enim rationali, quae est in homine, dedit deus liberum arbitrium; sic enim posset habere merita, si uoluntate, non necessitate boni essemus. cum ergo oporteat non necessitate, sed uoluntate bonum esse, oportebat, ut deus animae daret liberum arbitrium*¹⁷³. Therefore man was given free will in order to gain merit by serving God voluntarily and doing good, but at all times man, and so the soul, are to be bound by God's laws and those who transgress will be punished (C. Fort 15A).

Fortunatus counters this turn at speech from Augustine with his *in toto* quotation of Ephesians 2:1-18 in which the apostle Paul mentions how in a former time we were all „by nature children of wrath“, but that God had mercy on us and by the grace of Christ we are now saved (C. Fort 16F). It is highly interesting to note the manner in which Augustine responds to this feat of scriptural exegesis by first ignoring the issue of mercy and grace. Alflatt suggests that there are several key aspects of the Ephesians passage which are deliberately misrepresented by Augustine and I agree with Alflatt's argument as does Rutzenhöfer. In his analysis, Alflatt indicates that the fact that Augustine uses the example of Adam means that Augustine is cognisant of the fact that he cannot answer the passage from Ephesians purely with individual free will: “Next, despite that reference, his statement that only that which is not compelled by nature can be sinful, strongly suggests that he is still thinking of sin as a failure on the part of the individual man” (Alflatt, 1974: 125).

¹⁷³ Since, then, all things are arranged in the best way, those that now seem to us opposed to one another come about because of the sin of the man who fell, who did not want to observe the law of God. For God gave free choice to the rational soul, which is present in a man. After all, in that way the soul could earn merit if we were good by will, not by necessity. Since, then, we were to be good not by necessity but by will, God had to give free choice to the soul.

BeDuhn observes, as I have indicated before, that in Augustine's version of free will, God is guilty of giving man free will purely for the purposes of justifying his punishment of their sin and that in and of itself free will cannot explain evil (BeDuhn, 2011: 473). Whilst I believe that the former statement holds true for this passage of speech and is thus damning of Augustine's position, I do not hold the absolute position that BeDuhn does related to free will and evil, based purely on what Augustine has said here. The crucial point about this passage of speech, though, is that these arguments on the part of modern analysts mean little in terms of Critical Discourse Analysis and Argumentation Theory in that they do not focus on what the audience may have understood and how the original verbal argument would have been realised in the minds of the audience. In these terms I agree with Alflatt that Augustine had to respond in such a manner in order to try and counter the effect that all the scriptural quotes by Fortunatus were having on the audience (Alflatt, 1974: 126).

The second time that Augustine refers to free will is on the second day in *C. Fort* 20A. It is in this exchange that the full might of BeDuhn's reasoning that I disagreed with earlier comes to fruition and the implications therein come to pass: *quod liberum arbitrium si non dedisset deus, iudicium puniendi nullum iustum esse posset nec meritum recte faciendi nec praeceptum diuinum, ut ageretur paenitentia de peccatis, nec ipsa indulgentia peccatorum, quam nobis deus per dominum nostrum Iesum Christum donauit, quia qui non uoluntate peccat, non peccat*¹⁷⁴. Mentioning the use of free will in such an instance supports BeDuhn's assertion that Augustine makes God guilty of giving the soul free will purely in order to justify the punishment of the

¹⁷⁴ [And if God had not given this free choice, there could be no just judgement in punishing, nor any merit in acting rightly, nor a divine commandment to do penance for sins, nor the forgiveness of sins, which God gave to us through our Lord Jesus Christ. For someone who does not sin by his will does not sin.]

soul when it does sin (BeDuhn, 2011: 473). This is indeed an acutely embarrassing acknowledgement on the part of Augustine, but it is not one that Fortunatus makes clear enough to the audience in *C. Fort* 20F. This is a huge omission on the part of Fortunatus, since this could well be a point that the audience will have to question in their own minds. Once again, this lapse in Fortunatus' ability to quickly manoeuvre in order to take advantage of a potentially telling mistake on the part of Augustine seems to suggest that Fortunatus does not have the extensive rhetorical training that his opponent has. Fortunatus does mention the conclusions of Augustine's argument in the previous turn at speech, but he couches it within a related though different dispute (concerning the soul) and thus loses the efficacy of his argument.

This occasion is the last in which the subject of free will occurs, though, as with the rest of the themes that are dealt with in this debate, all are related and as a result it is more a case of semantics than actually changing the topic of conversation. The final topic of speech that I will deal with in this chapter is one that only appears in two turns at speech, one each for Fortunatus and Augustine, but which forms a fundamentally important point in the debate and causes the end of the first day's discussion.

6.4.4 The nature of Christ

The topic of the nature of Christ comes up at the end of the first day as Augustine finds himself in a precarious position due to the arguments of Fortunatus regarding the Nebridian conundrum, the origin of evil and various other related topics. As a result it may be argued by the analyst that the tactic that Augustine pursues in the deliberate change in topic is a desperate ploy designed to discredit Fortunatus in the minds of the audience. The fact that Augustine pursues this line of argumentation proves to the reader just how effective the debating prowess of Fortunatus really is

(and possibly even more importantly, Fortunatus' ability to substantiate his arguments with scriptural backing) as well as the fact that Augustine recognises this, and realises that he has to do something drastic in order to regain the upper hand.

The discussion in sections 6.3, 6.4.1 and 6.4.2 has made apparent why Augustine felt that at the end of the first day he needed a tangible victory in the minds of the audience. Whilst it may not have been obvious to the general, lay audience, the likelihood is that the more, well versed Catholic believers would have realised that Augustine, whilst perhaps not in dire straits, was in an awkward position at the end of *C. Fort* 18F. It is within this context that Augustine decides to make apparent to the audience two very important differences between the Catholic and the Manichaean faiths.

These two fundamental differences are: that the Manichees do not follow all of the scriptures of the Bible, not even all of the New Testament passages and, secondly, that the Manichees do not believe that Jesus Christ actually took on the form of a man of flesh and blood. Before Augustine makes these accusations, he first says something which may be considered potentially dangerous: *rationibus ut discuteremus duarum naturarum fidem, interpositum est ab his, qui nos audiunt. sed quoniam ad scripturas iterum confugisti, ad eas ego descendo ac nihil praetermittendum esse postulo, ne quibusdam capitibus utentes adferamus eis, quibus notae scripturae non sunt (C. Fort 19A)*¹⁷⁵. The key danger that lies in this turn at speech is the portion where he says that he descends to the scriptures. As Alflatt points out, saying something like this in front of a crowd that hold the

¹⁷⁵ Our listeners have imposed upon us the task of discussing in rational arguments the belief in two natures. But since you have had recourse to the scriptures again, I descend to them, and I ask that nothing be passed over for fear that by using certain chapters we might cause obscurity for those who do not know the scriptures.

scriptures as the ultimate arbiter is potentially devastating to the opinion of Augustine held by the audience (Alflatt, 1974: 126). However, Alflatt also suggests that what Augustine may have meant by his reference to descending to scripture was that he felt that Fortunatus was misleading the audience with his quotes from the New Testament and therefore misusing them (Alflatt, 1974: 126)¹⁷⁶.

The scriptural passage that Augustine employs in fighting Fortunatus is Paul's letter to the Romans 1:1-4. Of particular note in this instance is that Paul was viewed as "the Apostle" by the Manichees and the sections of the New Testament that they viewed as being holy were based on the writings of Paul (Kotzé, 2004: 121). The choice of scriptural quote is therefore meant to deleteriously affect Fortunatus since these are the words of his own apostle, and as a result are that much harder to be ignored by the Manichee. The contents of the quote are fundamentally in contrast with what Manichees believe and as a result are deployed in order to garner a negative reaction from Fortunatus.

The passage from the Book of Romans relates to Jesus Christ being born of the seed of David and in the flesh, therefore as any ordinary human is. The Manichaeans had a fundamental problem with this passage: they found the idea that Christ could be contaminated in any way by flesh abhorrent and believed that Christ was never actually flesh, but a spirit (this is backed up by a scriptural passage from John 3:6). It is at this point that the first day's debate comes to an end, but the *notarius* records that there was a clamour made by the crowd, precisely for the reason that Augustine had in mind: due to Fortunatus being unwilling to accept all of

¹⁷⁶ It might do well to remember at this juncture also Augustine's view pronounced in Confessions 3.5 that man needed to be humble in order to access scripture: *itaque institui animam intendere in scripturas sanctas, et videre, quales essent. et ecce video rem non compertam superbis neque nudatam pueris, sed incessu humilem, succesu excelsam, et velatam mysteriis, et non eram ego talis ut intrare in eam possem, aut inclinare cervicem ad eius gressus.*

the words of the apostle Paul. After this clamour the *notarius* writes that Fortunatus says that the Word of God was fettered by the race of Darkness at which point the crowd erupted in indignation and the debate was closed for the day.

As Rutzenhöfer notes, the circumstances surrounding the ending of the day's debate at this point is so advantageous to Augustine that both Decret (1970: 47-49) and Alflatt (1974: 126) consider it a distinct possibility that the meeting was broken up on purpose in order to stop the debate at this very point (Rutzehöfer, 1992: 44). Ultimately, it needs stating that the tactic of Augustine's of using this carefully selected piece of scripture in order to discredit Fortunatus was successful, even though it had no connection to any of the major or minor arguments of the first day and therefore strikes me as a desperate, though highly successful, ploy to gain the upper hand by any means necessary on the part of Augustine.

Another possibility exists behind this carefully selected piece of scripture: to dissuade Fortunatus from using scripture so readily and in so doing dilute the impact of Fortunatus' arguments. This possibility becomes all the more likely as Alflatt notes that Augustine's knowledge of scripture at this early stage of his career was not as well founded as might be expected (Alflatt, 1974: 121-122). The fact is that Augustine has not yet had the time to study the Bible thoroughly and so gain knowledge of scripture as deep as that of Fortunatus; Augustine outlines this very problem in his *Epistola* 21.3 to his bishop, Valerius, where he asks for time off in order to study the Bible properly (Alflatt, 1974: 121-122). Thus, by attempting to dissuade Fortunatus from using scripture, Augustine might find himself better able to argue against his opponent in the minds of the audience. I thoroughly agree with Alflatt that this turn of speech, regardless of which way one might view it, shows that Augustine might not be the better man in his use of scripture, but his use of this

passage certainly shows his rhetorical ability and his mastery over swaying crowds (Alflatt, 1974: 126).

This brings to an end the section of this chapter that deals with the topics that are debated in this discussion between Fortunatus and Augustine. From here the chapter will advance to other subjects that I have realised surround this debate, some of them unspoken. Often it is their silence on a certain topic that reveals much of what the two opponents in this debate are trying to achieve and their realisation that some topics are disadvantageous to both men, but for completely different reasons.

6.5 Topics not mentioned in the debate

In this section I discuss a number of topics that are not dealt with in the debate between Fortunatus and Augustine. The specific topics that are analysed briefly are Manichaean mythology and Mani in particular. Whilst these subjects have been given an overview in 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 they are now analysed in terms of their relevance to this debate and why they might have been intentionally left out of the discussion by both Fortunatus and Augustine. As with numerous other subjects of analysis, there is not enough evidence to give a full and accurate description as to the intentions of each man, but the advantages and disadvantages of their mention mean that I may at least attempt this short section with a modest level of certainty as others such as Alflatt and Rutzenhöfer have done.

6.5.1 The Manichaean myth of creation

As discussed in 2.3.2, the Manichaean creation myth is an intricate and far reaching version of how and why creation came about. It also formed the foundation stone of certain rigorous Manichaean practices and ways of life. Of interest to this section is

why this topic was not brought up in any level of detail in the debate between Augustine and Fortunatus. Surely if the topic was disadvantageous to one of them, then it would be advantageous to the other. The result is that we must conclude that the entry of this topic into the discussion was disadvantageous to both, but for different reasons.

The first consideration we should bear in mind is the composition of the audience: Possidius, Augustine's biographer and follower, himself describes the crowd as predominantly Catholic (but he was not actually there as he only joined Augustine later). Yet, Augustine himself in his final turn at speech throws some light on the question of the composition of the audience: *sed si confiteris te non habere, quod respondeas, omnibus audientibus et recognoscentibus, quoniam fideles sunt, catholicam fidem, si permittunt et uolunt. exponam* (C.Fort 37A)¹⁷⁷. From this final sentence we may gather that the majority of the audience are in fact Catholic. Another consideration that comes into play is that this debate was transcribed officially at a time when Manichaeism was officially against the law of Rome as discussed by BeDuhn (2010: 136). The result of the official transcript being taken is that it could form the basis of legal proceedings against Fortunatus and although Roman officials were lax in their persecution of Manichees¹⁷⁸, this was still a direct and hefty threat against Fortunatus in that it could be used at any time in the future.

The net result of these considerations is that the playing field of this debate was not even and was distinctly in opposition to Fortunatus. All these factors would have helped to form the tactic that Fortunatus took into the debate with Augustine, just as the identical factors would influence Augustine himself. As a consequence of these

¹⁷⁷ But if you admit that you do not have anything to reply, I shall explain the Catholic faith to all who are listening and who recognize this fact, if they allow me and want me to do this, for they are believers.

¹⁷⁸ See BeDuhn 2010 (141-142).

factors, Fortunatus would have realised that he needed to avoid any mention of topics that would alienate the audience: this is partly the reason why I argue that Fortunatus kept referring to Manichaeism in Catholic terms, thus making it seem to be a lot closer to Catholicism than it truly was. This was a particular characteristic of Manichaeism: wherever it spread great pains were taken to present itself in the manner that seemed to be in harmony with the dominant religious form(s) of the area (Pearson, 2007: 297-298). An example of this is the manner in which Fortunatus skilfully deploys scriptural quotes from the New Testament, which are discussed in 5.3.3.

On the subject of the Manichaean myth, Fortunatus understands that mention of the myth itself would have a deleterious effect on his standing with the Catholic members of the audience and thus alienate him further than he already is by virtue of his faith. This realisation will mean that Fortunatus will never refer explicitly to the myth other than defending himself against the Nebridian conundrum (why did God send forth souls in order to do battle with evil if God could not be harmed?) and the origin of evil, but even in such circumstances he will not refer to the myth other than to allude to the dualistic system that it implies.

The truly interesting question that this topic might cause in the minds of the audience is why Augustine never refers to the myth? The primary reason not to mention the myth and thus embarrass Fortunatus, due to the audience's possible perception of the myth as being preposterous, might have been in order to protect himself from the same sharp perceptions of the audience. If Augustine had shown too much familiarity with the Manichaeans and their various beliefs, he might have felt that the audience would become suspicious. It is possible that some doubt still existed about

whether Augustine had genuinely converted to Catholicism¹⁷⁹. An indication that this may be the case comes in Augustine's third turn at speech where he actively tries to distance himself from truly committed activity amongst the Manichees: *de moribus autem uestris plene scire possunt, qui electi uestri sunt. nostis autem me non electum uestrum, sed auditorem fuisse (C. Fort 3A)*¹⁸⁰. The conclusion that I have reached is that Augustine felt that the damage he could do to Fortunatus by using the Manichaean myth against him was not worth the potential damage that could be done to Augustine himself¹⁸¹. Of importance is to consider the potential scepticism felt by many Catholics towards Augustine and his relatively recent conversion¹⁸². This analysis will now move to another questionable aspect of the debate, which is the lack of mention, by either Augustine or Fortunatus, of the character Mani.

6.5.2 Mani

As discussed in 2.3.1, Mani was the founder of the Manichaean religion and he placed himself in a central position in his religion, claiming to be the Paraclete, promised by Jesus Christ. He was thus meant to be the final prophet in a line of prophets that included Jesus, Zoroaster, Buddha and others. The key point here is that Mani placed himself in a higher position than Jesus Christ, as well as reducing the role of Christ to that of an eminent prophet, but no more. As with the Manichaean

¹⁷⁹ See Ferrari's 1995 article: Young Augustine: Both Catholic and Manichee.

¹⁸⁰ But only those who are your Elect can be fully informed about your way of life. You know, however, that I was not one of your Elect but a Hearer.

¹⁸¹ Despite this fear, van Oort (2008a) has found that the terminology used by Augustine throughout the speech bears a remarkable resemblance to the style of argument made by the Manichaeans themselves in their other holy books. This resemblance is so consistent that van Oort argues that Augustine must have done so on purpose (van Oort, 2008a: 113-121). The ability to debate in this manner reveals a couple of interesting points about Augustine: firstly that he is unafraid to appeal to the Manichaean audience by using these methods, knowing that the Catholic audience will not be able to pick up on this point. Secondly, Augustine is far more familiar with the Manichaean religion than he makes himself out to be.

¹⁸² At this point it had been about five years since Augustine's baptism and around eighteen months since his ordination as priest (Alflatt, 1974: 122).

creation myth, the question that analysts wish to know the answer to is: why do neither Fortunatus nor Augustine even mention Mani once between them?

Whilst any answer that I give is mere speculation, I do feel that just as in the case of the Manichaean myth treated previously, the exercise is nonetheless a valid one and answers to the question are therefore a worthwhile pursuit. Answering this question may once again be as straightforward as taking the composition of the audience into account. Bearing in mind the predominantly Catholic audience, the aim of Fortunatus was to project an image of Manichaeism that was as close to that of Catholicism as possible, and to argue that, in fact, Manichaeans in Roman North Africa represented the true Christianity (Alflatt, 1974: 119). Fortunatus does this primarily through his learned use of New Testament scriptural quotes, which, being familiar to the Catholics, would have appealed to them. This also illuminates the reason why Fortunatus does not mention the founder of his faith or any of his writings. Such information would stand in stark contrast to his presentation of Manichaeism as Christianity, since Manichaeism places Mani above Jesus Christ in the great pantheon of Christian holiness and actively disputes his importance as the Messiah (Pearson, 2007: 298).

If the mention of Mani represented a huge disadvantage to Fortunatus, the next question to be answered is why Augustine did not mention Mani at all. Surely the mention of the founder of the Manichaean faith would represent a startlingly effective attack on the Manichaean *presbyter's* effort to emphasise the similarities between Manichaeism and Catholicism, which would be very difficult to defend against. Unlike the Manichaean creation myth, Augustine does not even allude to the figure of Mani and the reason for this lies perhaps in a similar vein to that of the previous section: the Catholic audience. While there is no way to verify this possibility, it may be

argued that a rhetorician as well trained and capable as Augustine would have taken the measure of the crowd. This may have made him sensitive to the fact that certain topics should not be mentioned even if they might be in his favour for fear of losing some of the sympathy of that audience.

One of Augustine's strong but implicit lines of defence in front of a fickle crowd might have been his insistence that he was not a knowledgeable Manichee, let alone one who had a deep understanding of Manichaean scripture and had been a personal tutor to Faustus, the highest ranking Manichee in Africa at the time, for several years¹⁸³. The result may have been that Augustine decided that it was in his best interest to stay away from the intricacies of the Manichaean faith and its founder in order to maintain his fragile reputation at this point. I agree with Alflatt's assertion that at this stage in his life, Augustine had a reputation as a rhetorician, but not necessarily as a defender of the Catholic faith (this would only come later). As a result his reputation was at great risk should he lose this debate to Fortunatus (Alflatt, 1974: 123). Augustine was therefore desperate to win this engagement, but realised at the same time that he had to be very careful in revealing just how much of the Manichaean faith he truly knew.

This is a prime example of the difference between dialectical aims and rhetorical aims in the debate: in this case the use of the topic of Mani on the part of Augustine would serve a narrow dialectical aim, but would potentially be deleterious to the rhetorical aim for the reasons already mentioned. As mentioned in 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 the needs of dialectical aims may differ from those of rhetorical aims in that rhetorical aims focus entirely on the effect that an issue would have on a potential audience and not just on the simpler aim of winning an argument with a strong counterpoint in

¹⁸³ See the discussion above in 2.1

dialectical terms. The net result is that whilst dialectical and rhetorical aims often overlap, in some circumstances it is prudent to be more cognisant of the effect an argument might have on an audience for reasons other than just the argument itself.

The final topic I shall be discussing in this section of the analysis is the fact that Fortunatus and Augustine knew each other in Carthage¹⁸⁴ (Alflatt, 1974: 122). Once again, this is an aspect that is not even mentioned by either man and as such remains another anomaly.

6.5.3 Previous friendship

Decret provides the most thorough overview of the relationship between Fortunatus and Augustine in his book *Aspects du manichéisme dans l'Afrique romaine: les controverses de Fortunatus, Faustus, et Felix avec saint Augustin* (1970). Decret describes how both men (Augustine and Fortunatus) were known for their debating abilities for the Manichaean community (Decret, 1970:41). The fact that the men knew each other leads me to the consideration of an intriguing possibility: that the future opponents might have discussed debating tactics, that Augustine may have given Fortunatus some rhetorical training and even that they may have discussed before the very topics now examined by them in public. In any case, the relationship between the two men is not alluded to at all throughout the debate.

As with the rest of the subjects in this section on unmentioned topics, a consideration of the question of why this relationship is not mentioned may also enhance understanding, even though the conclusions may only ever remain assumptions since there is no evidence to support or deny such claims. It is also likely that this question represents another opportunity to reveal the difference between dialectical

¹⁸⁴ See also Decret, 1970: 41.

and rhetorical aims in that both men realise the potential damage that acknowledging the past relationship in public might do to the feeling of the audience towards them. It may therefore be reasonably concluded that both men were more interested in maintaining their current standing than potentially sabotaging their opponent through such a revelation.

Unlike the previous two topics, I believe that in this case both men came to the same conclusion through a realisation that the revelation of this relationship would be a weak move, for the same reason as that just mentioned in the previous paragraph (neither man wants to potentially sabotage their standing amongst the audience by revealing this relationship). The fact that the men knew each other would also have had a deciding impact on the manner in which each man approached this debate. Undoubtedly Augustine and Fortunatus were not eager to face each other as may be evinced by the time (18 months) in which both had been in Hippo Regius and no debates had taken place between the two¹⁸⁵; they did not seek each other out, but came to this debate at the insistence of their respective delegations (Alflatt, 1974: 123). The debate was thus not of either Fortunatus' or Augustine's making, though it might reasonably be pointed out that just such a debate was inevitable at some point in time considering the reputations both men held for debating and oratory.

6.6 Manichaeism as Christianity

The subject of Fortunatus' presentation of Manichaeism as a form of Christianity becomes of particular interest in light of the arguments presented in 6.5.1 and 6.5.2 which illustrate how both Fortunatus and Augustine actively steered clear of an outright exposition of the Manichaean myth and the central figure of Mani. As discussed in 2.3.1, Manichaeism in Roman North Africa was considered by the

¹⁸⁵ See the discussion by Alflatt (1974: 123)

Manichees themselves as the true form of Christianity and Catholicism merely a semi-Christianity, as is clear from the *Contra Faustum*¹⁸⁶. The Manichees also took as their own scripture certain sections of the New Testament, particularly the letters of the Apostle Paul, which did not conflict with their beliefs. This is part of the reason why Fortunatus has such a depth of knowledge of many books of the New Testament and is able to easily quote entire lengths at a time.

Without a repetition of what has already been stated about the Christian nature of Manichaeism in 4.1.3, it is important to restate certain important points. Apart from the Manichees in Roman North Africa believing themselves to be true Christians, they were also adept at converting Donatists and Catholics to their ranks through public disputations where the contradictions between the Old and New Testament were pointed out, thus raising the ire of the Donatist and Catholic communities (Pearson, 2007: 308-309). This represents the primary reason that these communities decided to approach Augustine in order to check the success of the Manichees and Fortunatus in particular (Alflatt, 1974: 123).

It is therefore my understanding that Fortunatus realised that in appealing to an overtly hostile crowd he needed to be very cautious in his exposition of the Manichaean faith and that he needed to do so very rigidly within the framework of scripture. This is the reason, as stated before, that the Manichaean creation myth is only alluded to by Fortunatus and no mention of the founder of the religion, Mani, is made at all. In this way, Fortunatus is able to portray Manichaeism as being far closer to Catholicism than it actually is in order to appease the audience.

¹⁸⁶ See on this Pearson, 2007: 309.

This feature of the debate is more fully described in section 5.3.3 where I deal with the topic of quoting scripture in terms of the concepts devised by Critical Discourse Analysis and Argumentation Theory. It is, in fact, Fortunatus' excellent use of New Testament scriptural passages that causes him to be in such a strong position on the first day and it is exactly by using these familiar passages that he is able to directly appeal to the Catholic and Donatist members of the audience.

6.7 Talking past each other

A central feature of this debate which becomes apparent through a thorough reading thereof is that both men might be accused of talking past each other and towards the audience. This feature becomes apparent in the manner in which each man struggles for control of the debate at several key points, such as *C. Fort* 4A-6F, *C. Fort* 9F-11A and *C. Fort* 30A-31A. This is, however, not the only means by which we may conclude that the two opponents are talking past each other. Another way is to note the tactic of Augustine to never accept an answer to the Nebridian conundrum (as discussed in 6.4.1 above) and his attempts to convince the audience that Fortunatus does not present valid answers to the basic problem inherent in the conundrum.

As may be seen from the paragraph above, Augustine is not alone in his attempts to influence the audience through talking past his opponent. Fortunatus is the man who makes the first move away from the topic of debate and steers it to another through his attempt to gain the concession from Augustine concerning the way of life of the Manichees in *C. Fort* 1Fβ. This concession may be directly related to rumours of the consumption of human semen during the practising of the Manichaeon Eucharist (Newman, 2012: 191). Continuing under the assumption that Newman is correct, I

would argue that Fortunatus would have carefully prepared for this debate and decided that the potential damage that would be done to the audience's opinion of him when he deviates from the topic of the debate was not as damaging as that that would be done to the audience's conception of the Manichees should this rumour not first be addressed through the concession from none other than Augustine himself that the rumours were false. The fact that Fortunatus is prepared to begin his role in the debate in this way does not necessarily support the idea that the rumour concerned the consumption of human semen, but it does indicate that whatever the rumour was, it was a damning one that Fortunatus felt needed to be addressed right at the beginning of the debate. This observation thus evinces the point that Fortunatus was acutely aware of the importance of the attitude of the audience towards him and thus their conception of him throughout the debate.

Another way in which Fortunatus shows his understanding of the importance of the audience and the resultant talking past Augustine, is the extremely effective way in which he uses scriptural quotes from the New Testament, particularly the letters of the Apostle Paul. This is a topic in its own right, dealt with in 5.3.3 as I have indicated, but the importance of these scriptural references has to do with the relationship that the audience has towards the scriptures. At the time of the debate Christians of all types, whether Donatist, Catholic or Manichee, held the scriptures in the highest esteem and the only questions that they would consider were those surrounding the actual meaning of the texts (Alflatt, 1974: 119). It seems clear that Fortunatus was very much pandering to his audience through his scriptural exegesis.

It is, as I said above, as a direct result of Fortunatus' success in using scripture that Augustine uses the Romans 1:1-4 quote in order to attempt to stop Fortunatus from using his quotes so freely and so effectively on the audience. The way in which

Augustine uses this scriptural passage seems to me indicative of the fact that he realises that he is in trouble and that Fortunatus has the upper hand. Quoting from Paul's letter to the Romans here is a glaring example of ignoring the subject at hand and talking past his opponent. This is a rather underhand, though effective, measure and meant to denigrate Fortunatus in the minds of the audience.

Augustine's final tactic of incessantly asking the Nebridian conundrum at the end of the second day is, to my mind, the single most successful appeal to the audience through the means of talking past the opponent in the whole debate. By using such a badgering tactic, Augustine is able to exasperate Fortunatus and by refusing to accept any answer that Fortunatus might give to the conundrum Augustine is pushing his opponent into a corner. Fortunatus is finally forced to state the obvious fact that there is nothing that he could possibly say to satisfy the Catholic priest. But the fact that he formulates this realisation as a question is what allows Augustine to deliver the decisive blow and – in a final instance of talking past his opponent – designate this question an abdication. My reading of the debate using the concepts of Critical Discourse Analysis and Argumentation Theory is that this is not an abdication on the part of Fortunatus so much as exasperation. Yet, the way in which Augustine twists this may well have convinced the audience to think that Fortunatus has just admitted defeat. Finally, Fortunatus seems to prefer that the debate end rather than carry on *ad infinitum* a pointless discussion with his belligerent opponent.

The topic of speaking past each other brings into stark focus the importance of the role of the audience in this debate. The next topic will now cover a short section on the importance of the audience and the fact that it is they who are the intended arbiters of the discussion.

6.8 The audience

Although there is very little evidence for the composition of the audience of the debate between Fortunatus and Augustine, they play a critical role in this argument as the intended recipients of much of the turns of speech by both actors. It is to the audience that the two opponents appeal and it is their action at the end of the first day that proves decisive.

As mentioned in 6.3, the crowd would likely have been made up of Catholics, Donatists and Manichees. This may be claimed with a fair level of certainty since, according to Possidius, it was a group of Donatists and Catholics who first approached Augustine in order to take on Fortunatus in a public debate, and a group of Manichees who insisted that Fortunatus take part in the debate (Possidius, *Vita* 6). Alflatt makes a series of highly important observations about this audience: the highly intricate nature of the arguments might mean that the audience would not all understand the more delicate points of contention; rather, they would be aware of telling points that are well made and would be roused by them (Alflatt, 1974: 124). As has been noted previously, the crowd is also vocal at the end of the first day and are able to break up the debate. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the three groups that made up the crowd all held the New Testament scriptures in the highest esteem and as a direct result – in spite of Augustine’s efforts to steer away from scripture – each man would be on strong ground if he could substantiate his arguments with scriptural passages¹⁸⁷.

As to the reasons why the Donatists took an interest in this debate, Alflatt gives a different version to that provided by Possidius: in the *Vita Augustini*, Possidius (*Vita* 6) insists that it is because the Donatists recognise Augustine as a potential

¹⁸⁷ See the discussion by Alflatt, 1974: 124.

champion against the Manichees, who are a threat to both the Catholics and the Donatists. Alflatt gives a far more pragmatic, and thus believable, version of the reason why the Donatists joined with the Catholics in asking Augustine to take on the task of the debate: the Donatists had nothing to lose and a lot to gain from such a debate, regardless of the outcome (Alflatt, 1974: 124). If Augustine won, then the Donatists were rid of Fortunatus and if Augustine lost, he represented a diminished threat to them (Alflatt, 1974: 124). Even in the event of a draw, both Fortunatus and Augustine would have lost a significant amount of their reputations, which would serve the Donatists just as well (Alflatt, 1974: 124).

Possidius (*Vita* 6) actually states that the audience was entirely made up of fellow believers, thus Catholics, and whilst I respect Possidius' almost contemporary authority, I am far more inclined to acknowledge the possibility of a mixed crowd that Alflatt suggests. There are, however, two particular points in the debate in which the possibility of a majority Catholic crowd is alluded to. The eruption of the crowd at the end of the first day, when Fortunatus shows that he is not willing to accept all of scripture, but only certain parts and specifically when Fortunatus exclaims that the Bible was fettered by the race of Darkness, at which point the uproar of the crowd causes the end of the first day's debate. Both of these instances would suggest that the majority of the audience were Catholic, thus against the Manichaean view of the Bible. Decret (1970: 48) and others, including Alflatt and Rutzenhöfer, have indicated a possibility that the ending of the first day was so favourable to Augustine that the debate may have been purposely disrupted at this point by a group of Catholics who realised the peril that Augustine had found himself in at this point.

The most explicit instance where Augustine alludes to the composition of the audience comes in his final turn at speech on the second day: *sed si confiteris te non*

habere, quod respondeas, omnibus audientibus et recognoscentibus, quoniam fideles sunt, catholicam fidem, si permittunt et uolunt. exponam (C. Fort 37A)¹⁸⁸. It is not, however, just the composition of the crowd which has a bearing to this study, but primarily the manner in which the two opponents in the debate relate to the audience which holds importance as discussed in 6.7.

While Augustine in his first turn at speech, does not directly address the audience (he focusses on his opponent: *utrum recte aestimem, a te praesente audire cupio* (C. Fort 1A)¹⁸⁹), rather ironically (in light of Augustine's greater success in swaying the audience, as I argue) it is Fortunatus who first makes explicit that the audience will be the ultimate arbiters of the outcome of the debate: *ex te ergo praesentes audient boni uiri, utrum sint uera, super quibus criminamur et adpetimur, an sint falsa* (C. Fort 1F)¹⁹⁰. Of course I have argued that Augustine is the speaker most able to manipulate the perceptions of the audience (as evinced in chapter five). Yet, the supreme importance of the opinion of the audience is clearly understood by both men. Through the rest of the first day and the second, both Fortunatus and Augustine show their awareness of the audience directly and indirectly through their talking past each other. Direct references to the audience occur in C. Fort 1F, 2A, 7A, 19A, 37A. Note how Augustine is the man who refers directly to the audience four times in comparison to the single reference by Fortunatus, showing his concentrated attention on the audience. Fortunatus is also aware of the audience (as his opening statement makes clear), but, using the direct references as a yardstick, it

¹⁸⁸ But if you admit that you do not have anything to reply, I shall explain the Catholic faith to all who are listening and who recognize this fact, if they allow me and want me to do this, for they are believers.

¹⁸⁹ I desire to hear from you, while you are present, whether I am right to think ...

¹⁹⁰ Let the good people present, then, hear from you whether that with which we are being charged and pursued is true or false.

would seem that Fortunatus is not as concerted in his focus on the audience, perhaps showing his lack of intensive rhetorical training.

As will become clear through a reading of both this chapter and the next, the role of the audience is paramount in gaining an understanding both of this debate and of virtually all other debates both ancient and modern, as is argued by both Critical Discourse Analysis (chapter 2) and Argumentation Theory (chapter 3). It is with regards to these relatively new methodologies that a new light might be thrown on this debate and the participants' deciding power (or lack of power) over the audience. In the last section of this chapter I provide a brief overview of the issue of power as it is formulated within Critical Discourse Analysis and how it may influence our perceptions of the *Contra Fortunatum*.

6.9 Power

The subject of power forms the central theme of Critical Discourse Analysis since virtually all texts will show an asymmetry of power in terms of the writer and the audience (3.2, 3.3, 3.4). According to the exponents of Critical Discourse Analysis it is one of the most important aims of the researcher to expose this power dimension. Whilst this methodology is primarily aimed at modern discourse, this study may be considered an exercise in investigating the viability of the methodology with regards to ancient texts and their concomitant lack of substantial contextual information. Regarding the aspect of power within this debate, there are a number of different points to be considered.

Beginning with the characters themselves, Fortunatus is described as an older man than Augustine. How old is a matter of pure conjecture; however, the fact that Fortunatus is the older man should mean that he is to be considered as the senior

partner in the debate and thus more worthy of respect, especially from Augustine who stands at the very beginning of his career. In terms of rank within their respective faiths, both men hold the title of *presbyter* and may thus in this sense be regarded as being on the same level regarding power over one another. Yet, the fact that Fortunatus is a member of the Manichaean Elect probably indicates that he has advanced further within his own group than Augustine within his and he probably commanded more respect amongst his co-religionists than Augustine amongst his at this stage. An interesting point about which we may never have certainty is the relationship Fortunatus and Augustine had in Carthage and what their respective ranks within Manichaeism was at this stage. We know that Augustine was a Hearer, but if Fortunatus was already an Elect or a *presbyter*, then the more senior man in the debate would have been Fortunatus. This does not, however, take into account the relationship that Augustine had with the bishop Faustus and the fact that Faustus effectively appointed Augustine as his unofficial tutor (Brown, 2000: 48), thus giving Augustine a great unofficial standing within the Manichaean community and continued access to the very top of the Manichaean hierarchy in Roman North Africa.

The composition of the audience would also have a direct impact on the power relationship between Fortunatus and Augustine, for although they were on neutral ground in the Sossian Baths, a crowd could easily cause the power dynamic to shift in favour of the speaker with the greatest portion of the audience on his side, who in this case was probably Augustine. Another more obvious source of power lies in education. My analysis of the *Contra Fortunatum* points towards the conclusion that although a fine debater, Fortunatus was either not as well trained a rhetorician as Augustine or at least not an equally brilliant public speaker. This statement needs to

be given a large caveat though, in that Fortunatus may have had some training, but it was clearly not at the advanced level that Augustine had achieved. In contrast, a classically trained rhetorician who had reached the level of Professor of rhetoric in Milan such as Augustine should have a clear advantage in terms of power over virtually any opposition. There is a clear distinction, though, between having the knowledge of rhetoric and being able to practice it in public, and it becomes obvious that Augustine has a talent for public disputation that was already established before he become a *presbyter* himself and hence the reason that the Hippo Regius Catholic crowd forced him into the position¹⁹¹.

The power dynamic also plays out to an even greater extent within the debate itself as each man attempts to dominate the other. Augustine's opening statement in *C. Fort* 1A is an aggressive attack on the Manichaean system, filled with words such as *errorem*, *summum errorem*, *uiolabilem*, *coinquinabilem*, *corruptibilem* and the strongest word of all: *haeresim*. This is a strategy on the part of Augustine that continues throughout the debate, but is not simply confined to negative words. Another, perhaps even more obvious, strategy is that in which Augustine refuses to accept any answer to his questions and then insists that Fortunatus has not answered them. In order to make sure that he does not come across as an overly aggressive debater, Augustine tempers his tactics with a professed willingness to answer Fortunatus' questions. These tactics are usually combined such as in *C. Fort* 10A: *si iustum est, ut non interrogatis meis respondeatur et ego interroger, respondeo*¹⁹². In this manner Augustine is able to still be negative towards his

¹⁹¹ On this, see also Alflatt (2010: 121).

¹⁹² If it is fair that my questions are not answered and I am asked a question, I shall reply.

opponent whilst simultaneously coming across as magnanimous and fair to the audience.

The use of the refusal to accept an answer given by Fortunatus is also a tactic meant to influence the audience into thinking that Fortunatus has not answered the question, when he actually has. A prime reason why this is so effective, though, is because Fortunatus' answers are not always clear and easily intelligible. Thus Fortunatus plays directly into Augustine's hand and allows the Catholic *presbyter* to guide the audience in their thinking.

Another instance where Augustine is careful not to seem too aggressive in his debating occurs, as discussed above, on the first day by allowing Fortunatus the opportunity to guide the direction of the debate for at least ten consecutive turns at speech. Ultimately, though, Augustine makes sure that on the second day he ends the debate with the full might of his aggression by not allowing Fortunatus to change the subject and refusing to acknowledge any answer that Fortunatus may give, thus presumably backing the Manichee into a corner in the audience's minds, until Fortunatus, exasperated, seemingly capitulates. The reason that I write that Fortunatus „seemingly“ capitulates has been discussed in various sections of this chapter and will be discussed further in the following chapter.

At this point it is important to discuss the manner in which Fortunatus too attempts to gain dominion over Augustine and therefore the audience. The most obvious example of this occurs, as with Augustine, in the opening turn of speech and continues in the following two turns of speech of Fortunatus where he attempts to gain a concession from Augustine that the malicious rumours that have circulated about the Manichees are untrue and that their manner of life is above suspicion.

Guardedly Augustine complies with a qualified acknowledgement of the Manichee's assertion, but the primary point of this exercise on the part of Fortunatus was in order to make sure from the very beginning of the debate that the audience would have a more favourable outlook on the Manichees as a group, and as a direct result on his arguments in the debate. Fortunatus also attempts to steer the topic of debate on a number of occasions such as in *C. Fort* 4F, 5F, 6F, 9F, 10F, 12F, 13F, 19F β , 24F, 25F, 30F. This may seem a significant amount and it would be, had each of these turns at speech been effective. However, Augustine often parries these attempts at control with his own attempts, which tend to be more effective as the topics of conversation would suggest. Augustine often counters a direct question from Fortunatus by first completely ignoring the question posed and then issuing his own question, such as in *C. Fort* 5A, 26A, 31A. Augustine either follows the latter strategy or he superficially answers Fortunatus' question and then poses his own question, for example, in: *illud ego respondere possum, quod me dominus nosse uoluit deum necessitate pati nullam posse neque ex aliqua parte uiolari atque corrumpi. quod cum tu quoque fatearis, quaero, qua necessitate huc miserit animas, quas dicis per Christum redire* (*C. Fort* 6A)¹⁹³. The issue of power plays a central role in this debate as has been addressed in the fifth chapter through the use of selected categories of Critical Discourse Analysis and Argumentation Theory.

6.10 Conclusion

Through this chapter I have endeavoured to highlight the sheer complexity of this debate. Using the reconstruction of the actual debate as the basis of my analysis, the study then moved to the most important topic of the debate: the Nebridian

¹⁹³ I can answer what God wanted me to know, namely, that God can suffer no necessity and cannot be violated or corrupted in any respect. Since you also admit this, I ask under what necessity he sent here the souls that you say return through Christ.

conundrum. The manner in which both men are able to manoeuvre themselves around this topic was discussed at length, and as with much of the rest of the debate, the question as to whether this topic won the day for Augustine or not is inconclusive at best. The next important point concerned the issue of the origin of evil, a key point of interest that was carefully dealt with by Fortunatus. Ultimately, the answer to the question of who won this mini-battle concerning the origin of evil is, as with the Nebridian conundrum, not clear-cut, but I would give the advantage in this case to Fortunatus.

Free will and the soul formed the focal point of the next section of this chapter and, once again, both men made scoring arguments on this topic, without a clear outcome. The next issue was the topic of the nature of Christ, a very short section that only spanned two consecutive turns at speech, but which made apparent to the audience how the Manichaean conception of Jesus was fundamentally different to that of the Catholic conception. After this section on the topics discussed in the debate, the chapter moved on to those topics not discussed and why. The topics of Mani, the Manichaean creation myth and the opponent's previous friendship were, seemingly, topics that neither man wished to use in order not to embarrass the other.

The final issues under discussion in this chapter were those concerning Manichaeism as Christianity, talking past each other, the audience and the role of power relations in the debate. It was the use of the hybrid methodology introduced in chapters three and four which suggested an overview of the possible topics that are explicitly not discussed in the debate and the reasons why this may have been. Also, the final sections of this chapter (the sections on Manichaeism as Christianity, talking past each other, the audience and power) dealt with a number of fundamentally important aspects of the debate which the hybrid methodology suggested needed to

be discussed in order to fully appreciate the significance of certain movements and strategies used by Fortunatus and Augustine throughout the debate.

Through this analysis, it has begun to become apparent that looking at the rhetorical aspect of this debate is of great importance to an understanding of this debate. Issues such as the audience and power serve to help steer the discussion about this debate and lead a reader to realise the rhetorical abilities of each man and the extent to which these men were able to keep themselves focussed on the ultimate goal of the debate which was the swaying of public opinion to their side of the debate.

In the sixth chapter I have sought to create a broader picture of the ways in which my hybrid methodology is able to collate and analyse in detail various important aspects of the debate which have not been considered through the small number of academic works concerning the *Contra Fortunatum*. Chapter six therefore forms the second, and final, part of this analysis into the debate between Augustine and Fortunatus.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

The most important overarching goal of this study was to examine whether a hybrid methodology of Critical Discourse Analysis and Argumentation Theory could be produced in an eclectic manner for the conduct of a successful analysis of the *Contra Fortunatum*. I believe that the construction of this hybrid methodology has been done successfully and that it is well suited to the execution of intricate analyses of complex texts such as the debate between Fortunatus and Augustine. After explaining the rationale for this study and some background issues pertaining to Augustine's adherence to Manichaeism in chapters one and two I evaluated the various applicable categories of Critical Discourse Analysis and Argumentation Theory and then applied them in an experimental manner until I could distil which of these categories would be the most meaningful to use for this analysis. A crucial characteristic of both Critical Discourse Analysis and Argumentation Theory is their emphasis on the subjectivity of the analyst and their eclectic approach to the analysis of texts, important factors which governed the analysis of the *Contra Fortunatum* offered here.

The second goal of this dissertation was to demonstrate how this hybrid methodology could be used to gain more information about the methods and strategies of rhetoric that both men used in the debate and if the methodology could reveal new insights into the *Contra Fortunatum*. I am particularly pleased with the manner in which this hybrid methodology lent itself to various and shifting perspectives on the text of the debate. I hope that I have been able to illuminate a number of new insights on various levels: insight into the specific strategies used by the two participants in the debate „made into a book“ by Augustine; an enhanced understanding of some of the reasons behind Augustine's rise in prominence in his

secular as well as clerical career (based to an important extent on the brilliance of his rhetorical techniques) and additional perspectives on the interaction between the Manichees and Catholics in North Africa.

A question that fascinated me from the outset was why the general consensus was that Augustine won the debate whilst the impression of BeDuhn was that Fortunatus won the debate based on his stronger arguments. Throughout my analysis I kept this in mind and I arrived at the conclusion that the answer is not a simple one. In terms of who won the debate, the more relevant question might be to ask who won which aspect of the debate. This is because there are so many various dimensions to this debate as the hybrid methodology has been able to reveal: it made clear how there are different aspects in which each man had an advantage. In Fortunatus' case it was the use of scripture, whereas Augustine was strong on topic control. From my perspective there are two primary questions regarding the outcome of the debate that should be explored. The first question is who won the debate on technical grounds. The second question functions on another level: who won the debate in the minds of the audience?

In terms of the first question, I believe that it was Fortunatus who won this aspect of the debate. This is based on his remarkable ability to quote scripture that was able to substantiate his Manichaean views and, to a large extent, on the pragmatic inferences that the listener (and modern reader) may be able to glean from what he implies in many of his turns at speech. However, the use of implications and inferences is a double-edged sword, and they are only as effective as the audience is able to gather, which brings me to the second question. Through his ability to keep a distinct strategy going throughout the debate and his use of clear and easy to

understand logic, I believe that Augustine was the man who had the greatest impact on the audience.

The remarks above seem to suggest that I should call the result of the contest between Fortunatus and Augustine a draw, but this would be an incorrect assumption. As Critical Discourse Analysis and Argumentation Theory, and particularly Strategic Maneuvering, clearly and explicitly state, the purpose of discourse and argumentation is to sway the audience and therefore gain power over the opponent. If a final verdict had to be announced Augustine certainly emerges as the winner. This is the conclusion in all scholarly works that discuss the issue of who won this debate before the year 2011. Just as the hybrid methodology illuminates how Augustine almost certainly won over the audience at the time of the debate, so did he also sway those who read the transcript of the debate for over 1500 years. In fact the only people that I feel have not been completely won over or taken in by Augustine's rhetoric are BeDuhn, Rutzenhöfer, Alflatt, van Oort and perhaps Teske and Decret, all of whom have at least considered the possibility of victory inherent in Fortunatus' turns at speech even if they have not all considered the possibility of Fortunatus actually having won the debate. In fact it is only one scholar, BeDuhn, who has come to the contrary conclusion that Fortunatus beat his Catholic opponent, but this is only due to the use of pragmatic inferences that he makes about Fortunatus' turns at speech throughout his analysis.

The final question to be considered here concerns the possibility of using a hybrid methodology of Critical Discourse Analysis and Argumentation Theory as devised here for the analysis of other ancient debates, the polemical writings of the Church Fathers, or other argumentative ancient texts. I have come to the conclusion that it is primarily the eclectic nature of these two methodologies that has the potential to offer

new insights into a wide array of other ancient texts. It would be the task of the analyst of any specific text to follow a similar procedure as the one followed in this discussion, that is, to construct in an eclectic manner a methodology that meets the needs of the specific text under consideration. The specific hybrid methodology that I have utilised in this dissertation may also be applicable to ancient debates such as the *Contra Felicem*, but, with the necessary modifications, might be used to study also the *Contra Faustum* and perhaps all of Augustine's anti-Manichaean works.

I am convinced that the eclectic design and use of the kind of hybrid methodologies used in this dissertation may be of huge benefit to classical and patristic scholars in general, because it does not seek to reanalyse texts using the same frames of reference, but does so from a completely new perspective, one which I believe may only be healthy for ancient studies. The potential of these eclectic, hybrid methodologies is therefore immense.

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Addendum: *Contra Fortunatum disputatio.*

praef. sexto et quinto Kalendas Septembris Arcadio Augusto bis et Q. Rufino uiris clarissimis consulibus actis habita disputatio aduersum Fortunatum Manichaeorum presbyterum in urbe Hipponensium regionum in balneis Sossii sub praesentia populi.

1 Augustinus dixit: ego iam errorem puto, quam antea ueritatem putabam; utrum recte aestimem, a te praesente audire cupio.

Fortunatus dixit: coepta errorem exponere [Fort. A. c. Fort.].

Augustinus dixit: in primis summum errorem puto omnipotentem deum, in quo una nobis spes est, ex aliqua parte uiolabilem aut coinquinabilem aut corruptibilem credere. hoc uestram haeresim adfirmare scio, non quidem his uerbis, quibus nunc usus, sum; nam et uos interrogati confitemini deum esse incorruptibilem et omni modo inuiolabilem et incoinquinabilem; sed cum coeperitis cetera exponere, cogimini eum corruptibilem, penetrabilem et coinquinabilem confiteri. dicitis enim aliam nescio quam gentem tenebrarum aduersus dei regnum rebellasse; deum autem omnipotentem cum uideret, quanta labes et uastitas inmineret regnis suis, nisi aliquid aduersae genti obponeret et ei resisteret, misisse hanc uirtutem, de cuius commixtione cum malo et tenebrarum gente mundus sit fabricatus; hinc esse, quod hic animae bonae laborant, seruiunt, errant, corrumpuntur, ut necessarium haberent liberatorem, qui eas ab errore purgaret et a commixtione solueret et a seruitute liberaret. hoc ego nefas puto credere deum omnipotentem aliquam aduersam gentem timuisse aut necessitate esse passum, ut nos in aerumnas praecipitaret.

Fortunatus dixit: quia te medium fuisse nostrum scio, id est inter Manichaeos administrasse, ista principalia sunt fidei nostrae. de conuersatione hic agitur, de quibus falsis criminibus pulsamur. ex te ergo praesentes audiant boni uiri, utrum sint

uera, super quibus criminamur et adpetimur, an sint falsa. etenim ex tua doctrina et ex tua expositione et ostensione poterunt uero uerius scire nostram conuersationem, si a te fuerit prodita. interfuisti orationi? [Fort. A. c. Fort.]

2 Augustinus dixit: interfui. sed alia quaestio est de fide, alia de moribus; ego de fide proposui. sed si illi, qui adsunt malunt audire de moribus, nec ipsam quaestionem defugio.

Fortunatus dixit: purgare me prius uolo penes conscientiam uestram, penes quos polluimur, ex idonei uiri testimonio, qui mihi et nunc idoneus est et in futura iusti iudicii examination Christi, si ea, quae iactantur, uidit in nobis uel consecutus est [Fort. A. c. Fort.].

3 Augustinus dixit: ad aliud uocas, cum ego de fide proposuerim. de moribus autem uestris plene scire possunt, qui electi uestri sunt. nostis autem me non electum uestrum, sed auditorem fuisse. itaque quamuis et orationi uestrae interfuerim, ut interrogasti, utrum separatim uobiscum habeatis aliquam orationem, deus solus potest nosse et uos. ego tamen in oratione, in qua interfui, nihil turpe fieri uidi, sed solum contra fidem animaduerti, quam postea didici et probaui, quod contra solem facitis orationem. praeter hoc in illa oratione uestra nihil noui comperi. quisquis autem uobis obponet quaestionem aliquam de moribus, electis uestris obponit. quid autem inter uos agatis, qui electi estis, ego scire non possum. nam et eucharistiam audiui a uobis saepe quod accipiatis; tempus autem accipiendi cum me lateret, quid accipiatis unde nosse potui? itaque serua, si placet, quaestionem de moribus, ut inter electos uestros discutiatis, si discuti potest. mihi fides data est a uobis, quam hodie inprobo. de ipsa proposui. ad propositum meum mihi respondeatur.

Fortunatus dixit: et nostra professio ipsa est, quod incorruptibilis sit deus, quod lucidus, quod inadibilis, intenibilis, impassibilis aeternam lucem et propriam habet, quod nihil ex sese corruptibile proferat, nec tenebras nec daemones nec satanam, nec aliud aduersum in regno eius reperiri possit; sui similem saluatorem direxisse; uerbum natum a constitutione mundi cum mundum fabricaret, post mundi fabricam inter homines uenisse, dignas sibi animas elegisse sanctae suae uoluntati mandatis suis caelestibus sanctificatas, fide et ratione inbutas caelestium rerum ipso ductore hinc iterum easdem animas ad regnum dei reuersuras esse secundum sanctam ipsius pollicitationem, qui dixit: ego sum uia, ueritas et ianua et: nemo potest ad patrem peruenire, nisi per me [Io 14,6]. his rebus nos credimus, quia alias animae, id est alio mediante non poterunt ad regnum dei reuerti, nisi ipsum reppererint, ueritatem, uiam et ianuam. ipse enim dixit: qui me uidit, uidit et patrem et: qui in me crediderit, mortem non gustabit in aeternum, sed transitum faciet de morte ad uitam et in iudicium non ueniet [Io 14,9]. his rebus nos credimus et haec est ratio fidei nostrae et pro uiribus animi nostri mandatis eius obtemperare unam fidem sectantes huius trinitatis, patris et filii et spiritus sancti [Fort. A. c. Fort.]

4 Augustinus dixit: has animas, quas de morte ad uitam per Christum uenire fatemini, quae causa praecipitauit in mortem?

Fortunatus dixit: hinc iam dignare prosequi et contraire, si nihil praeter deum [Fort. A. c. Fort.].

5 Augustinus dixit: immo tu dignare respondere id, quod interrogaris, has animas quae causa morti dederit.

Fortunatus dixit: immo tu dignare dicere, utrum aliquid sit praeter deum, an omnia in deo sunt [Fort. A. c. Fort.].

6 Augustinus dixit: illud ego respondere possum, quod me dominus nosse uoluit deum necessitatem pati nullam posse neque ex aliqua parte uiolari atque corrumpi. quod cum tu quoque fatearis, quaero, qua necessitate huc miserit animas, quas dicis per Christum redire.

Fortunatus dixit: quod tu dixisti, quia huc usque tibi deus reuelauit, quod incorruptibilis sit, quemadmodum et mihi, ratio quaerenda est, quemadmodum animae aut ob quam causam istum in mundum uenerunt, ut merito nunc eas per unigenitum filium suum ac sui similem de hoc mundo liberaret, si nil praeter ipsum [Fort. A. c. Fort.].

7 Augustinus dixit: non debemus frustrare tantos, qui praesentes sunt, et de quaestione proposita ire ad aliud. si confitemur ambo, si nobis concedimus esse incorruptibilem et inuiolabilem deum et nihil pati potuisse - ex quo est consequens, ut falsa sit haeresis uestra, quae dicit deum cum uideret imminere uastitatem ac labem regnis suis, misisse uirtutem, quae cum tenebrarum gente bellaret, et ex ea commixtione hic nostras animas laborare - breuis ergo est ratio mea et, quantum aestimo, cuius planissima. si deus nihil pati potuit a gente tenebrarum, quia inuiolabilis est, sine causa huc nos misit, ut nos hic aerumnas patiamur. si autem aliquid pati potuit, non est inuiolabilis et decipitis eos, quibus dicitis esse inuiolabilem deum. hoc enim uestra haeresis negat, cum cetera exponitis.

Fortunatus dixit: hoc sentimus, quod nos instruit beatus apostolus Paulus, qui dixit: hoc sentite in uobis, quod et in Christo Iesu; qui cum in forma dei esset constitutus, non rapinam arbitratus est aequalem se esse deo, sed semet ipsum exinaniuit formam serui accipiens in similitudinem hominum factus et habitu inuentus ut homo; humiliavit semet ipsum, factus est subditus usque ad mortem [Phil 2,5-8]. hoc ergo

sentimus de nobis, quod et de Christo: qui cum in forma dei esset constitutus, factus est subditus usque ad mortem, ut similitudinem animarum nostrarum ostenderet. et quemadmodum in se mortis similitudinem ostendit et patrem in se et in patre se esse de medio mortuorum resuscitatum, eo modo sentiamus et de animabus nostris futurum. quod per ipsum poterimus de hac morte liberari: quae aut aliena est a deo aut, si propria est dei, et misericordia eius cessat et liberatoris nomen et opera liberantis [Fort. A. c. Fort.].

8 Augustinus dixit: ego quaero, quemadmodum in mortem uenerimus, et tu dicis, quemadmodum de morte liberemur.

Fortunatus dixit: ita apostolus dixit, quomodo sentire debeamus de nostris animis, quod Christus nobis ostendit. si fuit Christus in passione et morte, et nos; si uoluntate patris descendit in passionem et mortem, et nos [Fort. A. c. Fort.].

9 Augustinus dixit: notum est omnibus catholicam fidem ita se habere, quod dominus noster, id est uirtus et sapientia dei et uerbum, per quod facta sunt omnia et sine quo factum est nihil, ad liberationem nostram hominem suscepit. in ipso homine, quem suscepit, demonstraui illa, quae dicis. nos autem nunc de ipsius dei et ineffabilis maiestatis substantia quaerimus, utrum ei aliquid nocere possit, an non possit. si enim potest aliquid nocere ei, non est inuiolabilis. si non potest ei aliquid nocere, quid ei factura erat gens tenebrarum, contra quam dicitis bellum gestum esse a deo ante constitutionem mundi, in quo bello nos, id est animas, quas modo indigere liberatoris manifestum est, commixtas esse omni malo et morti implicatas adseritis? redeo enim ad illud breuissimum: si poterat ei noceri, non est inuiolabilis; si non poterat, crudeliter huc nos misit, ut ista patiamur.

Fortunatus dixit: anima dei est, an non? [Fort. A. c. Fort.]

10 Augustinus dixit: si iustum est, ut non interrogatis meis respondeatur et ego interroger, respondeo.

Fortunatus dixit: si in proprio agit anima, hoc a te quaero [Fort. A. c. Fort.].

11 Augustinus dixit: ego dicam quod interrogasti; tantum illud memineris te noluisse respondere interrogatis meis, me autem tuis respondere. si quaeris, utrum a deo descenderit anima, magna quidem quaestio est; sed siue a deo descendit siue non, illud de anima respondeo non esse deum; aliud esse deum, aliud animam. deum esse inuiolabilem, incorruptibilem et inpenetrabilem et incoinquinabilem, et qui nulla ex parte corrumpi potest, et cui nulla ex parte noceri possit. animam uero uidemus et peccatricem esse et in aerumna uersari et ueritatem quaerere et liberatore indigere. haec mutatio animae ostendit mihi, quod anima non sit deus. nam si anima substantia dei est, substantia dei errat, substantia dei corrumpitur, substantia dei uiolatur, substantia dei decipitur: quod nefas est dicere.

Fortunatus dixit: ergo negasti animam ex deo esse, quamdiu peccatis ac uitis et mundanis rebus deseruit et errore ducitur, quod fieri non potest, aut ut deus hoc patiat aut substantia eius. est enim deus incorruptibilis et substantia eius immaculata est et sancta. hic uero quaeritur a uobis, utrum anima ex deo sit necne. quod nos fatemur et ostendimus ex saluatoris aduentu, ex ipsius sancta praedicatione, ex ipsius lectione, dum animis miseretur et secundum eius arbitrium anima uenisse dicitur, ut eandem de morte liberaret et perduceret eam ad aeternam gloriam et restitueret patri. quid uero de anima tu ipse dicis aut speras, utrum sit a deo, necne? et substantiam dei, ex qua neges esse animam, nullis passionibus posse subiacere? [Fort. A. c. Fort.]

12 Augustinus dixit: animam sic negavi esse substantiam dei, ut negem esse illam deum, sed tamen ex deo auctore esse, quia facta est a deo. aliud est qui fecit, aliud quod fecit; qui fecit, corruptibilis esse omnino non potest; quod autem fecit, omnimodo non potest aequale illi esse. qui fecit.

Fortunatus dixit: nec ego dixi animam similem esse deo. sed quia dixisti facticiam esse animam et nihil praeter deum, quaero, undenam deus animae substantiam adinuenit [Fort. A. c. Fort.].

13 Augustinus dixit: tantum memento me respondere ad ea, quae interrogas, te autem ad ea, quae interrogo, non respondere. animam dico factam a deo, ut cetera omnia, quae a deo facta sunt, et inter illa, quae deus omnipotens fecit, principalem locum datum esse animae. si autem quaeris, unde deus fecit animam, memento confiteri me tecum esse deum omnipotentem. omnipotens autem non est, qui quaerit adiuuari aliqua materia, unde faciat quod uelit. ex quo est consequens, ut secundum fidem nostram omnia, quae deus fecit per uerbum et sapientiam suam, de nihilo fecerit. sic enim legimus: ipse iussit et facta sunt; ipse mandauit et constituta sunt [Ps 148,5].

Fortunatus dixit: ex iussione constant uniuersa? [Fort. A. c. Fort.]

14 Augustinus dixit: ita credo, sed uniuersa, quae facta sunt.

Fortunatus dixit: facta consonant, sed quia inconuenientia sibi sunt haec, per hoc ergo constat non esse unam substantiam, licet ex unius iussione eadem ad compositionem mundi huius et faciem uenerint. ceterum rebus ipsis paret, quia nihil simile tenebrae et lux, nihil simile ueritas et mendacium, nihil simile mors et uita, nihil simile anima et corpus et cetera istis similia, quae et nominibus et speciebus distant

ab inuicem, et merito dixisse dominum nostrum: arbor, quam non plantauit pater meus caelestis, eradicabitur [Mt 15,13] et in ignem mittetur, quae non adferet fructus bonos [Mt 3,10], et esse arborem radicatam. hinc uero constat et ratione rerum, quod duae sunt substantiae in hoc mundo, quae speciebus et nominibus distant: quarum est una corporis, alia uero aeterna, patris omnipotentis quam esse credimus [Fort. A. c. Fort.].

15 Augustinus dixit: contraria ista, quae te mouent, ut aduersa sentiamus, propter peccatum nostrum, id est propter peccatum hominis contigerunt. nam omnia deus et bona fecit, et bene ordinauit; peccatum autem non fecit et hoc est solum, quod dicitur malum, uoluntarium nostrum peccatum. est et aliud genus mali, quod est poena peccati. cum ergo duo sint genera malorum, peccatum et poena peccati, peccatum ad deum non pertinet, poena peccati ad uindicem pertinet, etenim ut bonus est deus, quia omnia constituit, sic iustus est, ut uindictet in peccatum. cum ergo omnia optime sint ordinata, quae uidentur nobis nunc aduersa esse, merito contigit hominis lapsi, qui legem dei seruare noluit. animae enim rationali, quae est in homine, dedit deus liberum arbitrium; sic enim posset habere merita, si uoluntate, non necessitate boni essemus. cum ergo oporteat non necessitate, sed uoluntate bonum esse, oportebat, ut deus animae daret liberum arbitrium. huic autem animae obtemperanti legibus suis omnia subiecit sine aduersitate, ut ei cetera, quae deus condidit, seruirent, si et ipsa deo seruire uoluisset; si autem ipsa noluisset deo seruire, ut ea, quae illi seruiebant, in poenam eius conuerterentur. quare si recte Omnia a deo ordinata sunt, et bona sunt et deus non patitur malum.

Fortunatus dixit: non patitur, sed malum praeuenit deus [Fort. A. c. Fort.].

16 Augustinus dixit: a quo enim passurus erat?

Fortunatus dixit: hoc meum est, quia praeuenire uoluit, non temere, sed uirtute et praescientia. ceterum nega malum praetor deum esse, cum per praecepta ostendit, quia sunt alia, quae praeter uoluntatem ipsius fiunt. praeceptum non intercedit, nisi ubi est et contrarietas; libera facultas uiuendi non datur, nisi ubi est lapsus secundum apostoli rationem, qui dicit: et uos cum essetis mortui delictis et peccatis uestris, in quibus aliquando ambulastis secundum magisterium huius mundi, secundum principem potestatis aeris huius, spiritus, qui nunc operatur in filiis diffidentiae, in quibus et nos et omnes aliquando conuersati sumus in desideriis carnis nostrae facientes uoluntates consiliorum carnis, et eramus naturaliter filii irae, sicut et ceteri. deus autem, qui diues est in omni misericordia, misertus est nobis. et cum mortui essemus peccatis, conuiuificauit nos in Christo, cuius gratia estis salui facti; et simul suscitauit et cum eo collocauit in caelestibus cum Christo Iesu, ut ostenderet in saeculis superuenientibus [Eph 2,1-7] et cetera usque ad id, quod scriptum est interficiens inimicitiam in semet ipso. et ueniens euangelizauit pacem uobis, qui longe, pacem iis, qui prope. quoniam per ipsum habemus uterque in uno spiritu accessum ad patrem [Eph 2,16-18] [Fort. A. c. Fort.].

17 Augustinus dixit: ista apostoli lectio, quam recitare uoluisti, si non fallor, pro mea plurimum et contra tuam fidem facit. primo quia ipsum liberum arbitrium, quo ego dixi fieri, ut anima peccet, satis hic expressum est, cum peccata nominauit et cum reconciliationem nostram dixit fieri cum deo per Iesum Christum. peccando enim auersi eramus a deo, tenendo autem praecepta Christi reconciliamur deo, ut qui in peccatis mortui eramus, seruantes praecepta eius uiuificemur et pacem habeamus cum illo in uno spiritu. a quo alienati eramus non seruantes mandata eius, sicuti de homine, qui primus est conditus. in fide nostra praedicatur. ergo nunc quaero abs te, secundum eam lectionem, quae lecta est, quomodo habeamus peccata, si natura

contraria nos cogit facere, quod facimus. qui enim cogitur necessitate aliquid facere, non peccat; qui autem peccat, libero arbitrio peccat. quare sit nobis paenitentia imperata, si nos nihil mali fecimus. sed gens tenebrarum? quaero item, indulgentia peccatorum cui detur: nobis, an genti tenebrarum. si genti tenebrarum datur indulgentia peccatorum, regnabit et ipsa cum deo accipiens indulgentiam peccatorum; si autem nobis datur indulgentia peccatorum, manifestum est, quia uoluntate peccauimus. satis enim stultum est ignosci ei, qui nihil mali fecit; nihil autem mali fecit, qui nihil sua uoluntate fecit. hodie ergo anima pollicente sibi deo indulgentiam peccatorum et reconciliationem si peccare destiterit et de peccatis paenitentiam gesserit, si respondeat secundum uestram fidem et dicat: quid enim peccaui? quid commerui? quid me expulisti de regnis tuis, ut contra nescio quam gentem pugnarem? depressa sum, permixta sum, corrupta sum, defecta sum, non est mihi seruatum liberum arbitrium. tu nosti necessitatem, qua pressa sum; cur mihi inputas uulnera, quae suscepi? quare me cogis ad paenitentiam, cum tu causa sis uulnerum meorum; cum tu scias, quae passa sum, gentem tenebrarum in me fecisse te auctore, qui uiolari non poterat et tamen uolens cauere regnis tuis, quibus nihil noceri possit, me in miserias praecipitasti? si certe ego pars tua sum, quae de uisceribus tuis processit, si de regno tuo et de ore tuo, in hac gente tenebrarum aliquid pati non debui, ut me incorrupta illa subiceretur, si pars eram domini. nunc autem cum illa temperari non posset nisi mea corruptione, quomodo aut pars tua dicor aut tu inuiolabilis manes aut non es crudelis, qui me pati uoluisti pro his regnis, quibus nihil noceri poterat ab illa gente tenebrarum? ad hoc responde, si placet, et dignare etiam illud mihi exponere, quomodo dictum est a Paulo apostolo: eramus naturaliter filii irae [Eph 2,3], quos reconciliatos dicit deo. si ergo naturaliter filii irae erant, quomodo dicis naturaliter esse animam filiam dei et portionem dei?

Fortunatus dixit: si secundum animam dixisset apostolus, quod simus naturaliter filii irae, alienata esset anima ore apostolic a deo. et hac modo tu ratione ostendis, quod anima non sit dei, quia naturaliter, inquit apostolus, sumus irae filii [Eph 2,3]. si uero secundum quod lege tenebatur idem apostolus ex semine Abraham, ut ipse contestatur, descendens, constat eum corporaliter dixisse nos fuisse filios irae, sicut et cetera. animae uero substantiam ostendit, quod sit ex deo, et animam aliter non posse reconciliari deo nisi per magistrum, qui est Christus Iesus. interfecta tamen inimicitia uidebatur anima indigna extitisse deo; sed quia missa est, hoc confitemur, a deo tamen omnipotente et originem trahens et missa ad ipsius uoluntatem consignandam, quemadmodum et saluatorem Christum credimus de caelo uenisse uoluntatem patris complere. quae uoluntas patris haec erat animas nostras de eadem inimicitia liberare interfecta eadem inimicitia. quae si aduersa deo non fuisset, nec inimicitia uocaretur, ubi erat unitas, nec interfectio diceretur aut fieret, ubi erat uita [Fort. A. c. Fort.].

18 Augustinus dixit: memento, quod apostolus dixerit conuersatione nos alienatos a deo esse.

Fortunatus dixit: trado ego duas substantias fuisse: in lucis substantia haberi deum, ut superius diximus, incorruptibilem; fuisse uero contrariam naturam tenebrarum. eam uirtute dei uinci hodieque confiteor, et ad meum regressum saluatorem esse Christum emissum, ut ante idem apostolus ait [Fort. A. c. Fort.].

19 Augustinus dixit: rationibus ut discuteremus duarum naturarum fidem, interpositum est ab his, qui nos audiunt. sed quoniam ad scripturas iterum confugisti, ad eas ego descend ac nihil praetermittendum esse postulo, ne quibusdam capitibus utentes nebulas adferamus eis, quibus notae scripturae non sunt. a capite igitur

quod habet apostolus Paulus in epistula sua ad Romanos consideremus. in prima enim pagina est, quod uehementer contra uos est. dicit enim: Paulus seruus Iesu Christi, uocatus apostolus, praedestinatus in euangelium dei. quod ante promiserat per prophetas suos in scripturis sanctis, de filio, qui factus est ei ex semine Dauid secundum carnem, qui praedestinatus est filius dei in uirtute secundum spiritum sanctificationis ex resurrectione mortuorum Iesu Christi domini nostri [Rm 1,1-4]. uidemus apostolum de domino nostro nos docere, ut et uirtute dei ante carnem praedestinatus fuerit et secundum carnem factus sit ei de semine Dauid. hoc uos cum semper negaueritis et negetis, quomodo scripturas flagitatis, ut secundum eas potius disseramus?

Fortunatus dixit: secundum carnem adseritis ex semine Dauid, cum praedicetur ex uirgine esse natus, et filius dei magnificetur. fieri enim non potest, nisi ut quod de spiritu est, spiritus habeatur, et quod de carne est, caro intellegatur. contra quod est ipsa auctoritas euangelii, qua dicitur, quod caro et sanguis regnum dei possidere non possunt. nec corruptio incorruptelam possidebit [1 Cor 15,50].

hic strepitus factus est a consedentibus, qui rationibus potius agi uolebant, quia uidebant eum non omnia, quae in apostoli codice scripta sunt, uelle accipere. deinde passim sermocinatio ab omnibus haberi coepit, quousque diceret sermonem dei ligatum esse in gente tenebrarum. quod cum exhorruissent qui aderant. discessum est [Fort. A. c. Fort.].

postera die adhibito iterum notario res acta sic est.

Fortunatus dixit: dico, quod nihil mali ex se proferat omnipotens deus et quod quae sua sunt incorrupta maneant uno ex fonte inuiolabili orta et genita; cetera uero, quae in hoc mundo uersantur contraria, non ex deo manare nec principe deo paruisse in

hoc saeculo, id est quod non ex ipso originem trahant. haec ergo in fide suscepimus, quod aliena sint mala a deo [Fort. A. c. Fort.].

20 Augustinus dixit: et nostra fides haec est, quod malorum genitor non sit deus neque ullam naturam fecerit malam. sed cum uterque nostrum consentiat incorruptibilem deum et incoinquinabilem, prudentium est aestimare et fidelium, quae sit fides purior et maiestate dei dignior: illa, ubi adseritur uel uirtus dei uel pars aliqua dei uel sermo dei posse commutari, uiolari, corrumpi, ligari, an ea, ubi dicitur et omnipotentem deum et omnem ipsius naturam et substantiam nulla parte umquam posse corrumpi, sed mala esse uoluntario peccato animae, cui dedit deus liberum arbitrium. quod liberum arbitrium si non dedisset deus, iudicium puniendi nullum iustum esse posset nec meritum recte faciendi nec praeceptum diuinum, ut ageretur paenitentia de peccatis, nec ipsa indulgentia peccatorum, quam nobis deus per dominum nostrum Iesum Christum donauit, quia qui non uoluntate peccat, non peccat. hoc arbitror omnibus apertum esse atque perspicuum. quapropter non nos mouere debent, si aliqua in his, quae deus fecit, molesta patimur pro meritis nostris. sicut enim ille bonus est, ut constitueret omnia, sic iustus est, ut peccatis non parcat. quae peccata, ut dixi, nisi libera uoluntas esset in nobis, peccata non essent. si quis enim uerbi causa ligaretur ab aliquot ceteris membris et de manu eius falsum scriberetur sine eius propria uoluntate, quaero, si hoc iudici patefieret, possit hunc hominem falsitatis crimine condemnare? quare si manifestum est peccatum non esse, ubi non est liberum uoluntatis arbitrium, uolo audire animam, quam dicitis aut partem aut uirtutem aut sermonem aut quodlibet aliud dei, quid mali fecerit, ut a deo puniatur aut paenitentiam agat peccati, ut ueniam mereatur, cum nihil ipsa peccauerit.

Fortunatus dixit: de substantiis proposui, quod bonorum tantummodo deus creator, ultor uero malorum habeatur, eo quod mala ex ipso non sint. merito ergo hoc sentio et ulcisci deum mala, quia ex ipso non sunt. ceterum si ex ipso essent aut daret licentiam peccandi, quod dicis liberum arbitrium dedisse deum, consensor iam inueniebatur delicti mei, eo quod delicti mei auctor esset, aut ignorans quod futurus essem delinquere, quem ipse non se dignum institueret. hoc ergo propositum est a me, et quod interrogo nunc, utrum deus mala instituerit necne, et utrum ipse finem malorum instituerit. etenim quae ab ipso diximus facta esse ut opifice deo, uti ab ipso creata et genita incorruptibilia haberi, his rebus et paret et fides euangelica docet. haec ego et proposui, quae sunt credulitatis nostrae et quae a te possunt in ista professione nostra firmari, ita tamen, ut non desit auctoritas fidei christianae. et quia nullo genere recte me credere ostendere possum, nisi eandem fidem scripturarum auctoritate firmauerim, id ergo est, quod insinuaui, quod dixi. aut si mala auctore deo in mundum peruenerunt, hoc ipse dicere dignare; aut si recte creditur mala ex deo non esse, hoc etiam praesentium contemplatio prosequi debet et suscipere. de substantiis dixi, non de peccato, quod in nobis uersatur. si enim originem non haberet, quod cogitamus delicta facere, non cogeremur ad peccatum uenire uel ad delictum. nam quia inuiti peccamus et cogimur a contraria et inimical nobis substantia, idcirco sequimur scientiam rerum. qua scientia admonita anima et memoriae pristinae reddita recognoscet, ex quo originem trahat, in quo malo uersetur, quibus bonis iterum emendans, quod nolens peccauit, possit per emendationem delictorum suorum bonorum operum gratia meritum sibi reconciliationis apud deum collocare auctore deo saluatore nostro, qui nos docet et bona exercere et mala fugere. propositum est enim nobis, quod non aliqua contraria natura, sed sua sponte homo aut iustitiae seruiat aut peccatis se obnoxium faciat,

cum nulla contraria gente, si sola uersatur anima in corpore constituta, cui deus, ut dicis, liberum arbitrium dedit, sine peccato esset nec peccatis se obnoxium faceret [Fort. A. c. Fort.].

21 Augustinus dixit: ego dico peccatum non esse, si non propria uoluntate peccatur; hinc esse et praemium, quia propria uoluntate recta facimus. aut si poenam meretur, qui peccat inuitus, debet et praemium mereri, qui bene facit inuitus. quis autem, qui dubitet non deferri praemium nisi ei, qui aliquid bona uoluntate fecerit? ex quo intellegimus et poenam inferri ei, qui uoluntate mala aliquid fecerit. sed quoniam me ad priores naturas et substantias reuocas, fides mea est omnipotentem deum, quod maxime animaduertendum est et animo figendum, omnipotentem deum iustum et bonum fecisse bona. sed ea, quae ab illo facta sunt, non possunt esse talia, qualis est ipse, qui fecit. iniustum est enim et stultum credere, ut opera paria sint artifici et condita conditori. quapropter si pia fides est, ut omnia bona deus fecerit, quibus tamen ipse est multo excellentior longeque praestantior, origo et caput mali est in peccato, sicut apostolus dixit: radix omnium malorum est cupiditas; quam quidam sequentes naufragauerunt a fide et inseruerunt se doloribus multis [1 Tm 6,10]. si enim radicem omnium malorum quaeris, habes apostolum dicentem radicem omnium malorum esse cupiditatem. radicem radices quaerere non possum; aut si est aliud malum, cuius radix non est cupiditas, non erit omnium malorum radix cupiditas. si autem uerum est omnium malorum radicem esse cupiditatem, frustra aliud aliquod mali genus quaerimus. tua uero natura contraria, quam inducis - quoniam iam respondi obiectis tuis, quaeso, ut et tu mihi dicere digneris - si illa natura contraria est totum malum neque peccatum potest esse nisi ex illa, poenam ipsa sola debet mereri, non anima, a qua non est peccatum. at si dicis ipsam solam mereri poenam et animam non mereri, quaero, cui data sit paenitentia, quae sit iussa

paenitere. si anima iussa est paenitere, ab illa peccatum et ipsa uoluntate peccauit. nam si cogitur anima facere malum neque illa est, quod malum fecit, nonne stultum est et plenum dementiae, ut gens tenebrarum peccauerit et me paeniteat de peccatis? nonne plenum dementiae est, ut gens tenebrarum peccauerit et mihi detur indulgentia peccatorum? qui possum dicere secundum fidem uestram: quid feci? quid commisi? apud te fui, integer fui, nulla labe contaminatus fui; tu me huc misisti, tu necessitatem passus es, tu cauisti regnis tuis, cum magna eis labes et uastitas inmineret. cum ergo noueris necessitatem, qua hic obpressus sum, qua respirare non potui, cui resistere non potui: quid me accusas quasi peccantem? aut quid promittis indulgentiam peccatorum? ad hoc sine ambagibus responde, si placet, sicut tibi ego sine ambagibus respondi.

Fortunatus dixit: haec nos dicimus, quod a contraria natura anima cogatur delinquere: cui non uis esse radicem nisi hoc tantum, quod in nobis malum uersatur, cum constet exceptis nostris corporibus mala in omni mundo uersari. non ista, quae in corporibus solum habemus sed quae in toto mundo uersantur et nominibus ualent bona, mala radix habet. nam dixit dignatio tua, quod haec sit radix malorum, cupiditas, quae in nostris corporibus uersatur, cum quando non est cupiditas mali ex nostris corporibus, ex principali illa contraria natura uersatur in toto mundo. apostolus etenim id nominauit radicem esse malorum cupiditatem, non unum malum, quam dixisti radicem omnium malorum. cupiditas uero non uno modo intellegitur, quam dixisti radicem omnium malorum, quasi quae in cordibus nostris solum uersetur, cum constet hoc quod in nobis uersatur malum, ex auctore malo descendere et portiunculam esse mali hanc radicem, quam tu esse dicis, ut non sit ipsa radix, sed sit portiuncula mali, eius mali, quod ubique uersatur. quam radicem et arborem malam dominus noster appellauit numquam fructus bonos adferentem,

quam non plantauit pater suus, ac merito eradicari et in ignem mitti. nam quod dicis contrariae naturae peccatum debere inputari, illa natura mali est; et id esse peccatum animae, si post commonitionem saluatoris nostri et sanam doctrinam eius a contraria et inimica sui stirpe se segregauerit anima, et purioribus se adornans anima; aliter non posse substantiae suae reddi. dictum est enim: si non uenissem et locutus eis fuisset, peccatum non haberent. nunc uero quia ueni et locutus sum et noluerunt mihi credere, ueniam de peccato non habebunt [Io 15,22]. unde paret recte esse paenitentiam datam post aduentum saluatoris et post hanc scientiam rerum, qua possit anima acsi diuino fonte lota de sordibus et uitiiis tam mundi totius quam corporum, in quibus eadem anima uersatur, regno dei, unde progressa est, repraesentari. nam dictum est ab apostolo, quod prudentia carnis inimical sit deo; legi enim dei non est subiecta, nec enim potest [Rm 8,7]. paret ergo his rebus, quod anima bona factione illius, quae legi dei non est subiecta, peccare uidetur, non sua sponte. namque idem sequitur, quod caro concupiscit aduersus spiritum et spiritus aduersus carnem. ut non quaecumque uultis, illa faciatis [Gal 5,17] dicit iterum: uideo aliam legem in membris meis repugnantem legi mentis meae et captiuum me ducentem in legem peccati et mortis. ergo miser ego homo, quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius nisi gratia dei per dominum nostrum Iesum Christum [Rm 7,23-25], per quem mihi mundus crucifixus est et ego mundo [Gal 6,14]? [Fort. A. c. Fort.]

22 Augustinus dixit: agnosco et amplector testimonia diuinarum scripturarum, et fidei meae quemadmodum congruant, sicut deus donare dignabitur. paucis exponam. liberum uoluntatis arbitrium in illo homine fuisse dico, qui primus formatus est. sic factus est, ut nihil omnino uoluntati eius resisteret, si uellet dei praecepta seruare. postquam autem libera ipse uoluntate peccauit, nos in necessitatem praecipitati sumus, qui ab eius stirpe descendimus. potest autem unusquisque nostrum mediocri

consideratione inuenire uerum esse, quod dico. hodie namque in actionibus nostris antequam consuetudine aliqua implicemur, liberum habemus arbitrium faciendi aliquid uel non faciendi. cum autem ista libertate fecerimus aliquid et facti ipsius tenuerit animam perniciosam dulcedo et uoluptas, eadem ipsa consuetudine sua sic implicatur, ut postea uincere non possit, quod sibi ipsa peccando fabricata est. uidemus multos iurare nolle, sed quia iam consuetudinem lingua tenuit, non posse refrenare, cum ea exeant de ore ipsorum, quae non possumus dicere ad mali stirpem non pertinere. ut enim uobiscum his uerbis agam, quae utinam sicuti de ore uestro non recedunt, ita et corde intellegantur: per paracletum iuratis. si ergo uultis experiri uerum esse, quod dico, institute non iurare, uidebitis illam consuetudinem ferri quo solet. et hoc est, quod aduersus animam pugnat. consuetudo facta cum carne. ipsa est nimirum carnis prudentia, quae quamdiu ita est, legi dei subici non potest, quamdiu prudentia carnis est; sed inluminata anima desinit illa esse carnis prudentia. sic enim dictum est prudentiam carnis non posse legi dei esse subiectam, quemadmodum si diceretur glaciale niuem calidam esse non posse. nullo pacto enim quamdiu nix est, calida esse potest. sed quemadmodum illa nix calore resoluitur et desinit nix esse, ut possit calescere, sic illa carnis prudentia, id est consuetudo facta cum carne, cum fuerit mens nostra inluminata et ad arbitrium diuinae legis totum hominem sibi deus subiecerit, pro illa consuetudine animae mala facit consuetudinem bonam. ex quo illae duae arbores, bona arbor et mala arbor, quas commemorasti, uerissime dictum est a domino quod suos fructus habeant, id est neque bonam posse dare malos fructus neque malam bonos, sed malos quamdiu mala est. accipiamus duos homines: bonum hominem et malum hominem. quamdiu bonus est, malos fructus dare non potest; quamdiu malus est, fructus bonos dare non potest. sed ut intellegas istas duas arbores sic esse a domino

positas, ut ibi significaretur liberum arbitrium, non naturas esse istas duas arbores, sed uoluntates nostras, ipse ait in euangelio: aut facite arborem bonam aut facite arborem malam [Mt 12,33]. quis est, qui possit facere naturam? si ergo imperatum est nobis, ut faciamus arborem aut bonam aut malam, nostrum est eligere, quid uelimus. de isto ergo peccato hominis et de ista consuetudine animae facta cum carne apostolus dicit: nemo uos seducat [Eph 5,6]; omnis creatura, quae a deo facta est, bona est [1 Tm 4,4]. dicit idem apostolus, quem tu ipse commemorasti: sicuti per unius inobaudientiam peccatores constituti sunt multi, sic et per unius dicto audientiam iusti constituentur multi [Rm 5,19], quoniam per hominem mors et per hominem resurrectio mortuorum [1 Cor 15,21]. quamdiu ergo portamus imaginem terreni hominis, id est quamdiu secundum carnem uiuimus, qui uetus etiam homo nominatur, habemus necessitatem consuetudinis nostrae, ut non quod uolumus faciamus. cum autem gratia dei amorem nobis diuinum inspirauerit et nos suae uoluntati subditos fecerit, quibus dictum est: uos in libertatem uocati estis [Gal 5,13], et: gratia dei liberauit me a lege peccati et mortis [Rm 8,2] - lex autem peccati est, ut quicumque peccat, moriatur - ab ista lege liberamur, cum iusti esse coeperimus. lex mortis est, qua dictum est homini: terra es et in terram ibis [Gn 3,19]. Ex ipso enim omnes sic nascimur, quia terra sumus, et in terram ibimus propter meritum peccati primi hominis. propter autem gratiam dei, quae nos liberat a lege peccati et mortis, ad iustitiam conuersi liberamur: ut postea eadem ipsa caro, quae nos poenis torsit in peccatis manentes, subiciatur nobis in resurrectione et nulla aduersitate nos quatiat, quominus legem et diuina praecepta seruemus. unde quoniam ego respondi tuis, dignare tu respondere illud, quod desidero, quemadmodum fieri possit, ut, si est deo natura contraria, nobis inputetur peccatum, qui in illam naturam non uoluntate, sed ab ipso deo, cui noceri nihil poterat, missi sumus.

Fortunatus dixit: hoc genere, quemadmodum et dominus dixit discipulis suis: ecce mitto uos sicut oues in medio luporum [Mt 10,16]. hinc sciendum est, quod non inimica mente saluator noster agnos suos, id est discipulos suos in medio luporum dirigere uoluit, nisi esset aliqua contrarietas, quae in similitudine luporum eam deponeret, ubi et discipulos suos miserat, ut quae forte in medio luporum animae possent decipi, ad propriam substantiam reuocarentur. hinc ergo paret antiquitas temporum nostrorum, quam repetimus, et annorum nostrorum ante mundi constitutionem hoc more missas esse animas contra contrariam naturam, ut eandem sua passione subicientes uictoria deo redderetur. nam dixit idem apostolus, quod non solum esset luctatio contra carnem et sanguinem, sed et contra principes et potestates et spiritalia nequitiarum et dominationem tenebrarum. si ergo utrobique mala conuersantur et nequitiarum habentur, iam non solum est malum in nostris corporibus, sed in toto mundo, ubi uidentur uersari animae, quae sub caelo isto uersantur et implicatae sunt [Fort. A. c. Fort.].

23 Augustinus dixit: agnos suos dominus noster in medium luporum misit, id est homines iustos in medium hominum peccatorum ad praedicationem euangelii tempore hominis suscepti ab inaestimabili diuina sapientia, ut a peccato ad iustitiam nos uocaret. quod autem ait apostolus nobis colluctationem non esse aduersus carnem et sanguinem, sed aduersus principes et potestates et cetera, quae sunt commemorata. Hoc significat: diabolum et angelos eius sicut etiam nos peccato cecidisse et lapsos esse dicimus et obtinuisse terrena, id est homines peccatores, qui quamdiu peccatores sumus, sub iugo eorum sumus; quemadmodum, cum iusti erimus, erimus sub iugo iustitiae; et contra illos luctam habemus, ut migrantes ad iustitiam ab eorum dominatione liberemur. ergo et tu dignare mihi breuiter ad unum,

quod interrogo, respondere. noceri deo non poterat, an poterat? sed quaeso mihi ut non poterat respondeas.

Fortunatus dixit: non poterat noceri [Fort. A. c. Fort.].

24 Augustinus dixit: quare ergo huc nos misit secundum uestram fidem?

Fortunatus dixit: professio mea haec est, quia noceri non poterat deo et quod deus huc nos direxit. sed quia id tibi contrarium est, tu dic, qua ratione hic adparuit anima, quam nunc cupit deus noster et mandatis et proprio filio directo liberare? [Fort. A. c. Fort.]

25 Augustinus dixit: quoniam uideo te interrogatis meis respondere non potuisse et me aliquid interrogare uoluisse, ecce satisfacio tibi, dummodo memineris te ad id, quod interrogauit, non respondisse. anima quare hic sit in mundo inuoluta miseris, non modo, sed paulo ante nescio quotiens a me dictum est. peccauit anima et ideo misera est. liberum arbitrium accepit. usa est libero arbitrio, quemadmodum uoluit: lapsa est, eiecta de beatitudine, implicata miseris. ad hoc tibi testimonium recitauit apostoli dicentis: sicut per unum hominem mors, sic et per unum resurrectio mortuorum [1 Cor 15,21]. quid quaeris amplius? unde tu responde: cui noceri non poterat, quare huc nos misit?

Fortunatus dixit: causa haec quaerenda est, cur huc uenerit anima aut quare eandem deus hinc cupit liberare, quae in medio malorum uiuit [Fort. A. c. Fort.].

26 Augustinus dixit: hanc causam abs te quaero, id est: si deo noceri non poterat, quare huc nos misit?

Fortunatus dixit: quaeritur a nobis, si deo malum nocere non possit, cur huc anima missa fuerit, aut qua ratione mundo permixta sit. quod in eo manifestum est, quod ait

apostolus: numquid dicit figmentum ei. numquid dicit figmentum ei qui se finxit: cur me ita formaueris? [Rm 9,20] si ergo causanda est haec res, interrogandus est, qui animam direxit nulla cogente se necessitate; si autem necessitas fuerat mittendi animam, merito est et uoluntas liberandi eam [Fort. A. c. Fort.].

27 Augustinus dixit: premitur ergo deus necessitate?

Fortunatus dixit: iam hoc est: noli ad inuidiam excitare id, quod dictum est, quod non necessitati facimus subditum esse deum, sed uoluntarie misisse animam [Fort. A. c. Fort.].

28 Augustinus dixit: recita, quod supra dictum est. (et recitatum est: si autem necessitas fuit mittendi animam, merito est et uoluntas liberandi eam) [Fort. A. c. Fort.].

Augustinus dixit: audiuius (si autem necessitas fuit mittendi animam, merito est et uoluntas liberandi eam) [Fort. A. c. Fort.]. tu ergo dixisti fuisse necessitatem mittendi animam. sed si modo uoluntatem uis dicere, et hoc addo: cui noceri nihil poterat, crudelis uoluntas fuerat mittendi animam ad tantas miseras. quod refellendi causa quia loquor, ueniam peto ab illius unius misericordia, in quo spem liberationis habemus ab omnibus erroribus haereticorum.

Fortunatus dixit: nos dicere adseueras crudelem esse deum mittendo animam; fecisse deum uero hominem et insufflasse in eum animam; quam utique pro sua scientia animam futuram inuolui et beneficio malorum non posse hereditati suae repraesentari. hoc aut ignorantis est aut dantis animam ad haec mala, quae supra memorata sunt. id commemorauit, quia dixisti - ante tempus non multum - quod

adoptauerit sibi deus animam, non quod ab ipso sit; aliud est enim adoptare [Fort. A. c. Fort.].

29 Augustinus dixit: de adoptione nostra memini me ante dies dixisse secundum testimonium apostoli, qui dicit nos uocatos in adoptionem filiorum. non ergo meum fuit illud, sed apostolicum responsum. de qua re, id est de ista adoptione suo tempore, si placet, inquiramus; et de illa insibilatione respondebo, cum tu meis obiectionibus responderis.

Fortunatus dixit: progressum dico fuisse animae contra contrariam naturam, quae natura deo nihil nocere poterat [Fort. A. c. Fort.].

30 Augustinus dixit: quid opus erat isto progressu, ubi nihil habebat deus, quod caueret, cui noceri nihil poterat?

Fortunatus dixit: constat apud conscientiam nostram a deo uenisse Christum? [Fort. A. c. Fort.]

31 Augustinus dixit: iterum me interrogas. ad interrogata responde.

Fortunatus dixit: sic accepi in fide, quod uoluntate dei ipse huc uenerit [Fort. A. c. Fort.].

32 Augustinus dixit: et ego dico: deus omnipotens, inuiolabilis, incommutabilis, cui noceri nihil possit, quare huc animam ad miserias, ad errorem, ad ista, quae patimur, misit?

Fortunatus dixit: dictum est enim: potestatem habeo ponendi animam meam et potestatem accipiendi eam [Io 10,18], non dixit, quod uoluntate dei progressa est anima [Fort. A. c. Fort.].

33 Augustinus dixit: ego autem causam quaero, cum deo noceri nihil possit.

Fortunatus dixit: nihil noceri deo iam diximus, et in contraria natura esse animam diximus, ideo ut contrariae naturae modum inponeret; modo inposito contrariae naturae sumit eandem deus. ipse enim dixit: potestatem habeo ponendi animam meam et potestatem sumendi eam [Io 10,18]. hanc mihi pater dedit potestatem ponendi animam meam et sumendi eam. deus ergo, qui loquebatur in filio, de qua anima diceret? constat esse animam nostram, quae in his corporibus habetur, quod dei uoluntate uenerit et de uoluntate ipsius iterum adsumatur [Fort. A. c. Fort.]

34 Augustinus dixit: unde dixerit dominus noster potestatem habeo ponendi animam meam et potestatem habeo sumendi eam [Io 10,18] omnibus notum est, quia passurus erat et resurrecturus. ego autem abs te iterum atque iterum quaero: si deo noceri nihil poterat, cur huc animas misit?

Fortunatus dixit: naturae contrariae modum inponere [Fort. A. c. Fort.].

35 Augustinus dixit: et omnipotens deus et omnium misericordissimus, ut modum inponeret naturae contrariae, ideo illam moderatam esse uoluit, ut nos inmoderatos efficeret?

Fortunatus dixit: sed ideo ad se reuocat [Fort. A. c. Fort.].

36 Augustinus dixit: si ad se reuocat ab inmoderatione, si a peccato, ab errore, a miseria, quid opus erat tanta mala animam pati per tantum tempus, donec mundus finiatur, cum deo, a quo eam dicitis missam, noceri nihil possit?

Fortunatus dixit: quid ergo dicturus sum? [Fort. A. c. Fort.]

37 Augustinus dixit: et ego noui non te habere, quid dicas, et me cum uos audirem in hac quaestione numquam inuenisse, quod dicerem, et inde fuisse admonitum diuinitus, ut illum errorem relinquerem et ad fidem catholicam me conuerterem uel potius reuocarem ipsius indulgentia, qui me huic fallaciae semper inhaerere non siuit. sed si confiteris te non habere, quod respondeas, omnibus audientibus et recognoscentibus, quoniam fideles sunt, catholicam fidem, si permittunt et uolunt.

exponam.

Fortunatus dixit: sine praeiudicio professionis meae dixerim: illa quae a te obponuntur cum retractauero cum meis maioribus, si minus responderint interrogationi huic meae, quae similiter a te nunc mihi offertur, erit in mea contemplatio - quia et ego animam meam cupio certa fide liberari - uenire ad huius rei inquisitionem, quae a te mihi offertur et ostensurum te polliceris [Fort. A. c. Fort.].

Augustinus dixit: deo gratias.